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Tni:,J^iSvER Library 
War, Revolution, and Peace 



^ 



i 




J/v. ^^ yj^X^ 



A.HISTOEY OF RHODESIA 






A HISTORY OF lillODESLV 



i^ 



COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL SOURCES 



BT 



HOWARD HENSMAN 



I ii 



WITH A MAP 



, WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS 

BDINBURGH AND LONDON 
MDCCCC 



AttSiffhts r«$trvtd 






219957 






TO THE FOUNDER OF THE NOW FLOURISHING 
COLONY OF RHODESIA, W^t JBttjjflt I^OTl* CeCtl 
3* Hi)OtieS, $*C, THIS BOOK IS, WITH VERY 
GREAT RESPECT, DEDICATED BY THE AUTHOR. 



w 



PREFACE. 



In the following pages will be found the first 
systematic attempt to record the history of a 
country that seems destined within the next few 
years to take a prominent position in that great 
confederation of States known as the British Empire. 
It is obvious to all that a book dealing with such 
contentious topics as the Jameson Baid and the 
works and methods of Mr Bhodes must provoke a 
deal of hostile criticism, whatever be the writer's 
attitude; but let me^in self-defence remark, that in 
all questions treated in the pages of this book it 
has been my endeavour to present a perfectly im- 
partial statement of the facts of the case. I hold 
no brief on behalf of, or against, any group or 
clique either in London or South Africa. Where 
personal opinions are given, they are such as are 
held by one who for many years has closely 
followed events in South Africa, especially in 



Viil PREFACS. 

Ithodesia, and who would wish to see that country 
become a flourishing British colony, but who has 
no direct interest in its doing so. With regard 
to the Jameson Said, none condemn it more than 
I do; but I strongly hold that one fault on the 
part of Mr Shodes, however great that fault, should 
not be allowed to outweigh all the benefits he has 
conferred on the Empira Mr Shodes, however, 
is fully able to defend himself, and needs no out- 
side apologist to intervene between himself and his 
critics, even if I were disposed to take such an 
onerous position* 

To turn to more peaceful matters. With r^ard 
to the identity of Shodesia with the Ophir of old 
which is discussed in the first chapter, since those 
lines were written Dr Carl Peters has returned from 
his expedition through the country, and, speaking 
with an antiquarian knowledge of South Africa 
which is probably unequalled, he gives it as his 
opinion that Mashonaland is undoubtedly the Ophir 
of the ancients, and produces very cogent reasons in 
support of this view. 

The book was mainly conceived and written 
before the outbreak of the war, but with the object 
of making the volume as complete as possible, 
chapters dealing with the sieges of Kimberley and 
Mafeking and the movements of Colonel Plumer's 
Bhodesian force have been added. The war has 
not, of course, failed to considerably militate against 



k 



PREFACS. ix 

the prosperity of Bhodesia. For several moDths 
that country was cut off from all telegraphic and 
railway communication with the south, and con- 
nection with the outside world was only possible 
by means of the Salisbury - Beira railway and 
telegrapL When the war is over and terms of 
settlement come to be discussed, signs are already 
forthcoming that any scheme which neglects the 
interests of Bhodesia will meet with strenuous 
opposition in that country. 

In conclusion, I would tender my thanks to the 
British South Africa Company for permission to 
insert in my book the latest official map of 
Bhodesia; and I would desire to place on record 
my great appreciation of the courtesy and kindness 
I have imiformly received from those in official 
quarters in London and South Africa, who have 
by their assistance and advice considerably lightened 
what would otherwise have been a very difficult 
task. 

HOWABD HENSMAN. 



LoHDON, AuguH 1000. 



i 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 

EARLT HISTORY OF RHODESIA. 

Introductoiy — Tracer of an ancient civiliaation — ^The 2^babwe 
ruina — ^Their probable object and extent — Peculiaritiea of 
construction — Who were the builders? — Identity with the 
Phoenicians urged — Was Hashonaland the Ophir of old! — 
Ruins in BCatabeleland — Rhodena in the seventeenth century 
— Portuguese invasion — Invasion of the Zulus — The BCatabele 
tribe — Early European explorers 



PAOB 



CHAPTER II. 



MATABELSLAND UNDER LOBENOULA. 

Death of Umsiligaas — Election of Lobengula as king — His cor- 
onation — His appearance and characteristics — A disgusting 
orgie — Lobengula's task — His attitude towards Europeans — 
The Tati concessions — The kraal of Ou-Buluwayo — Loben- 
gula's love of moving about — ^The king as rain-maker — The 
ceremiony of the war-dance — ^Attendant rites • 



18 



CHAPTER III. 



THE CONCESSION GAINED. 

mie emissaries of the British South Africa Company — Opposition 
to tham in Qu-Buluwayo— Unfortunate interference of the 



Xii CONTBNTa 

Aborigines' Proteotioii Society — Its result — ^^mely arriTal of 
Dr Jameson — ^Mr Rhodes's far-sighted poli($y — The concession 
granted — The charter signed — Its principal features — The 
raising of a Pioneer corps to proceed to Mashonaland — Re- 
action against the white men in Matabeleland — Arrival of 
the Queen's envoys at Qu-Buluwayo — The first races in 
Matabeleland — South African interest in the new country — 
The Pioneer column moves forward — Its organisation and 
equipment — Arrival at the Limpopo— Reviewed by Qeneral 
Methuen — Precautions against attack — The Tuli river 
reached — Gutting the road — Message from Lobengula — The 
column ordered to return— Colonel Pennefather's reply 88 



CHAPTER IV. 

FOUNDING A OOLONT. 

The advance of the Pioneers — Threatening attitude of the 
Matabele — Fort Victoria built — The British flag hoisted in 
Mashonaland — Disbandment of the Pioneer column — Issue 
of mining licences — The reaction against the country — The 
hardships of the settlers — ^Development of Salisbury — ^The 
grant of farms — Acquisition of Manicaland— Dispute with 
the Portuguese — Arrest of the Portuguese officers by Major 
Forbes— Exploits of Major Forbes's "army" — The dispute 
patched up— More trouble with the Portuguese — Despatch 
of a force under Captain Heyman — ^Def eat of the Portuguese 
troops — Attack on Sir John Willoughby's boats — Interven- 
tion of Lord Salisbury — ^The trouble over — Difficulty with 
the Boers — President Ejruger surprised • • • • 52 



CHAPTER V. 

WAR WITH THB MATABELB. 

The turn of the tide — Qrievances against the Chartered Com- 
pany — Development of Mashonaland — Disbandment of the 
police — Formation of a volunteer force — BCisbehaviour of the 
Matabele " boys "—Defiance of the Matabele by the Mashonas 
— Lobengula*s yengeance — Intervention of Dr Jameson — 



CONTKNTa XUl 

The Mttlera ctefied by the Matabele— The Matabele attacked 
bj the police — Miirepreeentation of the facts in England — 
" Bead Luke ziy. 81 " — Dr Jameson prepareB to advance into 
Matabeleland — Vacillating conduct of Lord Ripon— The 
financial aide of the question—" Mr Rhodee's war " — Forma- 
tion of an invading force — March towards the Matabeleland 
frontier — The first casualty to the whites — Bad generalship 
of tbe Matabele 70 



CHAPTER VL 

WAB WITH THB MATABBLB — Continued, 

Crossing the Shangani — Attack on the laager — Severe fighting 
— Repulse of the cavalry of the whites — Defeat of the 
Matabele — ^The column moves forward towards Bulawayo — 
The death of Captain Williams — Attack on the column near 
the Bembesi river— Attempt to "rush" the laager — The 
horses stampeded — Gallantry of Sir John Willoughby and 
Captain Boirow — ^Desperate fighting — Retreat of the natives 
vrith severe loss — Bulawayo blown up by the Matabele — 
Bulawayo occupied by the whites — News of the Tuli column 
— An unfortunate incident — Attack on the Tuli column — 
Arrival of the Tuli column at Bulawayo — Lobengula's flight 
towards the Bubi river — Jameson's message to the king — 
Treachery of the two troopers — Major Forbes sent in pursuit 
of the king — Hot chase after Lobengula — Despatch of a 
patrol under Major Wilson — The oolunm attacked — Des- 
perate position of Major ¥^lson's band — Gkdlantry of the 
American scouti 88 

CHAPTER VIL 

OONOLUSION OF THB WAR. 

Tlie massacre of Major Wilson and his men — A band of heroes 
— ^The oooclQsion of the campaign — Retreat of Major Wilson's 
column along the Shangani river — Hardships on the way — 
The colaom attacked— Narrow escape of the horses — Con- 
tinued fighting — The troubles of the column at an end — 
Jimction with the relief force — Death of Lobengula — Terms 



XIV CONTSNT& 

of peace arranged — Disbandment of the British force— The 
cost of the war — Matabeleland thrown open to settlers — 
Hostility of the Radical members of the House of Commons 
to the Chartered Company — The settlement of the country 
— Building a railway towards Salisbury — Moving a town — 
Mr Rhodes and the Colonial Office — Visit of Mr Rhodes and 
Dr Jameson to England — ^Transference of territory to the 
Chartered Company — The trans-continental telegraph — A 
sudden check to the colony's progress . • . .107 

CHAPTER VIII. 

THE JAMESON RAID. 

The discontent in the Transvaal — Mr Rhodes and the Uitlanders 
— Mr J. H. Hammond's views — Mr Rhodes's plans — Forma- 
tion of the Rhodesia Horse Volunteers — The Rhodesian police 
moved to the Transvaal border — The real intention of this 
movement — Mr Rhodes and the " Reform Committee " — The 
" women and children " letter — The position in Johannesburg 
— The dispute about the flag — Dr Jameson impatient — His 
start for the Transvaal — Mr Rhodes's attempt to prevent the 
Raid — The High Commissioner's proclamation — Why the 
telegraph line to Pretoria was not cut — How the news of Dr 
Jameson's incursion affected Mr Rhodes — The events of the 
Raid — The defeat and surrender of Dr Jameson — The re- 
ception of the news of the Raid in London — The German 
Emperor's telegram — Johannesburg disarmed — The Raiders 
handed over to the British Government — President Kruger 
and Johannesburg — Em threat to shell the town — Arrival of 
the Raiders in London — Their trial and sentences — The 
leaders of the " Reform Committee " sentenced to death— 
The sentence commuted 124 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE JAMISON RAID OOMMITTBB. 

The Raid in Parliament — ^Alleged complicity of the Colonial 
Office — ^Mr Labouchere's attacks — Mr Rhodes prepared to 
'face the music" — His triumplud progress through Cape 



CONTENTS. XV 

Colony — His arriTal in London and his interview with Mr 
Chamberlain — The inquiry into the Raid by the Cape Parlia- 
ment — A Select Committee of the House of Commons ap- 
pointed to go into the affair — Mr Rhodes before the com- 
mittee — His cross-examination by Sir William Harcourt — 
Eridence as to the future government of Rhodesia — Sir 
Graham Bowyer's evidence — Evidence of Mr W. Schreiner, 
Dr Jameson, the Directors of the Chartered Company, and 
Sir John Willoughby — Dr Harris and Mr Labouchere — 
A stormy scene — Mr Labouchere compelled to apologise 
— Mr Hawksley's defiance of the Committee — ^The Com- 
mittee's report— Condemnation of the Raid — Mr Labouchere 
unrepentant — Debate in the House of Commons — Mr 
Chamberlain's eulpgy on Mr Rhodes — Rout of the "Little 
Englanders" 143 

CHAPTER X. 

OUTBRKAK OF THB MATABSLB REBELLION. 

The rinderpest in Rhodesia — ^Rumours of discontent among the 
natives — The causes of the rebellion — The first act of the 
rising — Murder of settlers — ^Alarm in Bulawayo — Patrols 
despatched to the outlying districts — A general insurrection 
in progress — ^Atrocities by the natives — Panic in Bulawayo 
— ^A terrible night — Construction of a laager at Bulawayo— 
A night alarm — ^A gang of cowards — The sufferings of the 
women — Formation of the Bulawayo Field Force — Other 
laagers formed in the country 162 

CHAPTER XL 

THE MATABBLB REBELLION — COnHwUid. 

Patrol under the Hon. Maurice Qifford leaves Bulawayo — " Fire- 
side phUanthropists " — The defence of Cumming's store — 
Repulse of the rebels — Relief of Stewart's store — Departure 
of a fMKfcrol for the Insiza district — Fight in the Elibani hills 
— WJkt of the party at Inyati — Fortification of Campbell's 
store — Arrival of the rcdief force — Adventures of two 
troopers — The devotion of Trooper Henderson — The Qwanda 



XVI CONTENTS. 

patrol - Another force sets out for the Gwands — Native fear 
of the telegraph wire — Betom march of the Qwanda column 
— Serere fighting — The column in a tight place — A running 
fight — Heavy losaes of the whites— The rebels at last beaten 
ofi^— The Shiloh patrol — A skirmish — Arrival of the patrol 
at Fonseca's farm — Lieutenant Rorke's escape — Heavy fight- 
ing — Colonel Oifford wounded — More fighting — Relief of the 
patrol — Death of Captain Lumsden 180 

CHAPTER XII. 

THB MATABBLB REBELLION — COnHnwd, 

Rebels massing around Bulawayo — Action nesr the Umgusa 
river — ^Three members of the Afrikander corps murdered — 
Rebel attack on Napier's farm — Another skirmish at the 
Umgusa river — Determined efforts to break up the rebel 
impis — Third fight at the Umgusa— Mr Selous's narrow 
escape — ^Bravery of Trooper Baxter — GWantry of Grey's 
scouts — Fourth action at the Umgusa — A hot fight — Dash- 
ing chai^ by the Afrikander corps — The impis forced to 
retreat — Advance of a relief force from Salisbury — Departure 
of a large force for the Shangani — Qrey*s scouts attacked — 
A splendid charge — The whites' revenge— The Salisbury 
reliedf column — Meeting of the two forces- Colonel Spreckley 
leaves for the Insiza district — Several skirmishes — Bodies 
of murdered settlers found — Patrol through the Filabusi 
district — Arrival of Colonel Plumer's relief force at Bulawayo 
— A night march — Colonel Plumer's first patrol — The Im- 
perial Government takes command — Arrival of Sir Frederick 
Carrington and other Imperial officers at Bulawayo • . 198 

CHAPTER XIIL 

END OF THB MATABBLB REBELLION. 

Preparations for crushing the rebels — Three patrols sent out 
— An impi approaching the town — Another fight at the 
Umgusa — Reptdse of the Matabele — ^The promise of the 
witch-doctors — Patrol sent to the ShUoh district — Outbreak 
of the rebellion in Mashonaland — Its causes — The disband- 



CONTENTS. XVU 

ment of the Bulawayo ^eld Force — Departure of Colonel 
Plomer to attack the rebels — ^More severe fighting — General 
Carrington's proclamation of clemency — Campaign in the 
Matoppo Hills decided upon — Another white victory — 
Captain Laing attacked — Heavy fighting again in the 
MatoppoB — Captain Beresford in a tight comer — fighting 
near the Shangani — An induna captured — His court-martial 
and execution — Action of the High Commissioner — Colonel 
Baden-Powell's advance through the Somabula forest — 
Attack on Wedza's stronghold — Timely arrival of Prince 
Alexander of Teck — ^Three days' fighting — The downfall of 
Wedaa — ^A black outlook for the Chartered Company — Mr 
Rhodes's pluck 216 

CHAPTER XIV. 

AFTER THE WAR. 

Mr Rhodes in the Matoppoa — A dangerous errand — His inter- 
view with the indunas — Peace decided — " One of the scenes 
in life that make it worth living " — Progress of the rebellion 
in Mashonaland — Arrival of Sir Frederick Carrington at 
Salisbury — Several indunas attacked and defeated — The 
" butcher's bill " — Rhodesia after the war — ^The progress of 
the mining industry — The agricultural possibilities of the 
country — Famine prices— Stagnation of trade • • . 214 

CHAPTER XV. 

BIB BICHABD MARTIN'S INQUIRY. 

Inquiry into the administration of Rhodesia ordered — The 
points to be reported upon — Anonymous witnesses — The 
labour question — Did compulsory labour exist in Rhodesia ? 
— A serious charge — The real facts of the case — Sir R. Martin 
and the resident magistrate at Bulawayo — The conclusions 
of Sir Richard Martin — The cattle question — "A fatal 
mistake " — Mr Homan's monopoly — The causes of the 
rebellion — Sir R. Martin's conclusions — The local inquiry 
oonmiittee at Bulawayo — The Chartered Company ** as- 
tounded" — Denial of Sir Richard Martin's charges . . 252 



XVUl CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER XVL 

THI PROQRESS OF THE OOUNTRT. 

Opening of the railway at Bulawayo — ^The du^utee over the 
Salisbury line — Friction in Manhonaland — Steady progress 
at Bulawayo— The administration of the country — Offer of 
the Chartered Company — Mr Chamberlain's proposals — The 
scarcity of native labour — Its causes — A suggestion — ^The 
" land title " question — Another land question — ^The wrong 
way to develop a country — The first gold return — A triumph 
for the supporters of the country — Mines compelled to shut 
down — AxTtval of the railway at Salisbury • • • • 269 

CHAPTER XVII. 

MB BHODBS AND THX IMPEBIAL OOVBRNMBNT. 

The traofl-ciontinental telegraph and railway lines — Mr Rhodes 
arrives in England — Asks for a (Government (guarantee for 
the extension of the railway — Reply' of the Colonial Office — 
Further proposals to the Qovemment — The guarantee re- 
fused — Strange offer by the Cabinet — Mr Rhodes declines 
the Government offer ....... 287 

CHAPTER XVIII 

BEPRBSENTATIVS GOVERNMENT IN RHODESIA. 

Meeting of the British South Africa Company — ^Two branch 
railways to be built — ^The extension of the trans-continental 
railway — How the money will be raised — A significant com- 
parison — A representative form of government inaugurated 
in Rhodesia — Differences between the two sections of the 
Council — The Land Bill — Introduction of customs duties 
into the country — Indignation of the settlers — An appeal to 
the High Commissioner — Sir Alfred Milner's chilling reply — 
Rhodesia to-day — Eff(Bct of the Transvaal war on the country 
— The future of Rhodesia — Will the British South Africa 
Company lose its charter in 1914? S05 



CONTENXa 



XIX 



CHAPTER XIX. 



THE SIBQB OF KIHBSRLET. 

Tlie outbreak of hostilities — Colonel Plumer's force — Rhodes- 
ians in Kimberley and Mafeking — The Kimberley garrison 
— Major Scott-Turner — Christmas in Kimberley — "Long 
Cecil " — An intermittent bombardment — Arrival of Qeneral 
French 



821 



CHAPTER XX. 

EVXNT8 AT MAFEKING. 

General Baden-Powell — An armoured train — Cronje's failure— 
A hot bombardment — Christmas — Months of monotony — 
Colonel Plumer's force — ^A night attack — Boers* final effort 
— ^Eloff*s failure — The siege raised — The Empire's rejoicings 341 



Apfindiz L 370 

w II 371 

INDKX . • • • 872 



A HISTORY OF RHODESIA. 



CHAPTER L 



^ARLY HISTORY OF RHODESIA, 



Strbtohing away northwards from the north-western 
boundary of the South African Sepublic up to the 
confines of the Congo Free State is a vast country 
that, thanks to the energy and far-sightedness of one 
patriotic Englishman, now forms a part of the British 
Empire under the name Shodesia. The area of this 
great portion of the Central African plateau is about 
175,000 square miles, with a population of natives 
and Europeans that does not fall far short of a 
million. Its boundaries on the south are the Bechu- 
analand Protectorate and the Transvaal ; on the east 
is the strip of Portuguese East Africa; on the north 
is the Congo Free State and German East Africa; 
while on the west is the Portuguese territory of 
Angola and German South- West Africa, Ehodesia 
is divided into two portions by the Zambesi river, 

A 



s 



2 EARLY HISTORY OF RHODESIA. 

but it is with the southern of these two divisions 
that this history will chiefly deal At present 
Northern Rhodesia is more or less a terra incognita^ 
and is in about the same state of development as the 
southern portion of this country was when the British 
South Africa Company took possession of it eleven 
years ago. 

As has been already stated, Rhodesia forms part 
of the great Central African plateau, and it may 
therefore be said to consist, geographically speaking, 
of one broad swelling plain, which is cut up and 
intersected by numerous rivers and streams. This 
plain, however, gives way in places to rocky moun- 
tains and valleys, some of the latter being of great 
beauty; while at the famous Victoria Falls, in the 
west of the country, it would seem as though the 
plateau itself had been rent in twain by some gigantic 
Convulsion of nature. 

Southern Rhodesia is divided into two great pro- 
vinces — Mashonaland and Matabeleland — both of 
which are in the main well suited for European 
colonisation, and wliich are without doubt destined 
to play an important part in the future history of 
the empire to which they belong. It was the former 
province that was the first to attract the attention 
of prospectors and settlers, but it has been Matabele- 
land that has, thanks chiefly to the greater facilities 
in the way of transport and suchlike that it has pos- 
sessed, assumed the greater importance to-day; though, 
so soon as Mashonaland receives the same aids to its 
development, there is no reason to suppose that it will 
be one whit behind Matabeleland either in mineral 



MYSTIC RUINS. S 

wealth or agricultural value, the two great factors in 
the rapid opening up of a colony. 

The history of Bhodesia may be said to begin 
really with the granting of the charter to the British 
South Africa CJompany in October 1889, and it is 
doubtful whether any country ever had so eventful 
a history during the first ten years of its national 
life as Ehodesia has had. Prior to 1889 but 
little was known of the country beyond the 
Limpopo or Crocodile river, though explorers like 
Carl Mauch and Thomas Baines, and hunters of 
the stamp of F. C. Selous, had brought back reports 
of the healthy uplands and the abundance of gold 
and other metals in the great territory to the north ; 
but, save for a very few adventurous spirits, the 
white population preferred to remain in Cape 
Colony, Natal, and the two Dutch Republics. 

Bhodesia, though, has a history dating far back into 
the mists of antiquity, and was doubtless a flourishing 
semi- civilised colony long before the dawn of the 
Christian era. It is a history, moreover, that forms 
a perfect enigma to those who would fathom it. 
Scattered over the whole of the country are mystic 
ruins of vast extent that, like the pyramids of north- 
em Africa, have defied the ravages of time, and there 
they remain to-day, ruins, it is true, but ruins of such 
magnitude and solidity that one feels a strong admir- 
ation for the people, whosoever they might have been, 
that could leave behind them such mighty monuments 
of their skill and industry. While we can guess with 
some degree of accuracy at the period when these 
buildings were erected, and form good ideas of the 



4 RARLT HISTORY OF RHODESIA. 

objects for which they were intended, it can only be 
little more than conjecture when we come to consider 
what people it was that erected them or whence 
they came. 

It has been said that these traces of an ancient civil- 
isation — for it is impossible to believe that savage races 
erected them — extend extensively over Bhodesia ; 
but the chief of them, and those to which most atten- 
tion has been paid, are situated round Zimbabwe in 
Mashonaland, about fourteen miles from Victoria, and 
along the Lundi and Sabi rivers, and farther north, in 
the Mazoe valley. Matabeleland is freer from them, 
but the builders evidently traversed the country, for 
in the south-west, near the Tati and Shashi rivers, we 
again find these buildings, while there is a very fine 
specimen of their workmanship at Mombo, between 
Bulawayo and Gwelo. Having pointed out the way 
in which these ruins are scattered about, we now 
come to the consideration of the buildings themselves. 
To gain a clear idea of their nature and extent, those 
around Zimbabwe ofTer the best facilities, and it may 
be observed that the ruins are all of so similar a 
nature that while discussing one we are in the main 
discussing them all. 

The primary object of the erection of the whole of 
these structures throughout the entire country seems 
undoubtedly to be that of fortresses to protect the in- 
habitants from the inroads of other dwellers in the 
land who were presumably physically stronger and 
more numerous than the builders. Probably those 
against whom these walls were raised were the 
original owners of the soil, and those who entered the 




THE ZIMBABWE HUINa 6 

coniitry and sheltered themselves behind these mas- 
sive bulwarks did so to exploit the gold-reefs which 
they knew were to be found in the country. 

While it may be safely assumed, therefore, that 
one of the objects of these buildings was that of pro- 
tection, it seems none the less certain that they were 
also constructed for religious purposes, and therefore 
they may be said to have acted at once as citadels 
and temples. What the religion was none can say, 
but there would seem to be signs that it was a 
form of sun-worship, and on this all who have ex- 
auiined the ruins appear to be agreed, and this fact 
gives us a clue to the race that built them. Sun- 
worsliip was one of the earliest forms of religion 
adopted by the Semitic races, and therefore it seeuia 
but a Ic^cal deduction to infer that these people 
were at least of Semitic descent. 

At Zimbabwe the ruins may be conveniently 
divided into three sections. First, there is a large 
circular ruin which stands in a valley at the foot 
of a hill ; next, on the top of this hill is a huge 
building that evidently acted as an acropolis for the 
surrounding city, which now forms a huge mass of 
ruins between the top of the hill and the circular 
bnilding already referred to. This mass forms the 
third section of the ruins. The people who built 
these poesessed in a marked degree a knowledge of 
architecture and geometry, but it is as builders, pure 
and simple, that they appear to the best advantage. 
The walls consist of blocks of the hard granite that 
exists in abundance in Bhodesia, and these blocks, 
with what labour one can well imagine, were all hewn. 



6 8ARLY HISTORY OF RHODESIA. 



r . 



beibane being used, into a uniform size, about twice that 
of ordinary bricks, — a size most convenient to handle, 
and one that seems to point to the fact that the know- 
ledge of cranes and other devices for the raising of 
weights among these builders was elementary when 
compared with that displayed by the builders of the 
Pyramids. These blocks were placed upon each other 
in much the same manner that the modern bricklayer 
employs, but without the use of mortar or cement of 
any kind. The walls in places are no less than 
sixteen feet thick and thirty feet high, while the 
courses of the blocks are so regular as to excite 
wonder in the breasts of all who behold them. 
Here and there in the walls a long slab of granite 
runs right through from exterior to interior to give 
added solidity, and to these, together with the care 
employed in the placing of the blocks and the 
absence of mortar that has prevented the accumula- 
tion of moss or lichen, is to be attributed the good 
state of preservation in which the buildings remain 
to-day. The absence of cement from the walls, how- 
ever, must not be taken to indicate that the builders 
were ignorant of its use, for several of the floors that 
were laid down in the different buildings were of a 
firm hard cement. The walls generally taper to- 
wards the top, and this again has served to preserve 
them from collapse. 

There are many instances in the form of construc- 
tion adopted to show that they were built in accord- 
ance with some form of religion, and that that 
religion included sun - worship. For example, the 
parts of the walls that face the rising sun were 



F0BM8 OF ORNABfENTATION. 7 

always those that had the greatest care bestowed 
upon their construction, while one and all bear 
a peculiar form of ornamentation that is wanting on 
those portions that are away from the course of the 
sun. This ornamentation is usually in the form 
known as the "herring-bone'' pattern, thin slabs of 
granite having been inserted on their edges at an 
angle of 45'' to the ordinary courses. A course 
of this is followed by a similar one, in which the 
slabs run in the contrary direction, thus giving the 
appearance of a chevron placed on its side. The 
chevron proper is also used as a decoration in 
places, but the favourite form of ornamentation is 
that just described, and almost every ruin yet exam- 
ined bears traces of this ornamentation. The walls 
facing the rising sun, too, are nearly always thicker 
and higher than the rest, Mobile greater care has been 
taken to ensure the regularity of the courses. An- 
other curious point to be noted is that, almost without 
exception, the entrance, or at least the chief one, is 
facing the north, or away from the sun. 

Once the walls are passed, the interiors form a 
perfect labyrinth of narrow passages, along which in 
places two persons cannot walk abreast, and which 
are commanded by positions for archers, using the 
term advisedly, that would have made it next to 
impossible for a hostile force to have passed through 
without being annihilated. The passages all seem to 
tend towards the centre of the building, which was 
usually circular or elliptical, where in all probability 
stood the sacred place, and possibly the altar on 
which sacrifices were offered. Of the rites that 



. < 



8 BARLT mSTORT OF RHODESIA. 

were performed here, there is now nothing to show, 
but it seems certain that sacrifices of one kind or 
another formed part of them. On the walls surround- 
ing this sacred enclosure huge monoliths of granite 
were erected at equal distances, and these monoliths 
are, so far as can be judged, of a similar character to 
those to be seen at Stonehenge in Wiltshire, as well 
as in other parts of Northern Europe. These lead to 
the thought that the secret of Stonehenge is possibly 
also that of Mashonaland's ancient civilisation. 

In addition to their use as temples and fortresses, 
these buildings were also used to contain furnaces for 
the retorting and smelting of the gold that was won 
from the neighbouring mines, — for wherever these 
ruins are, old gold-workings are to be found in the 
immediate vicinity. In fact, these circular buildings, 
with their attendant walls and citadels, seem to have 
enclosed the whole of the dwelling-places of this 
strange race in much the same fashion as the town 
walls did the cities of medieval Europe. 

To return to the sacred enclosures, that at Zim- 
babwe, which is the largest in the country, contained, 
according to Mr J. D. Bent, who made long and care- 
ful excavations here in 1891, two round towers in 
the shape of gigantic sugar -loaves, the highest of 
which stood about thirty -five feet, and the use of 
these is unknown. They were solid, and that they 
were used for religious purposes seems to be the 
only possible inference. That they were monu- 
ments raised over the tombs of departed chiefs or 
priests, as had previously been urged, was disproved 
by Mr Bent, who carefully searched the ground at 



A MYSTERIOUS RACE. 9 

their base for evidence of this character, but could 
not find any. 

As before mentioned, all these ruins seem to 
hare been very strongly fortified, the protections 
reaching the point of redundancy; and this points 
unmistakably to the fact that the occupants lived in 
constant fear of attack, and that, to quote Mr Bent's 
words, they " lived like a garrison in the heart of an 
enemy's country." Here, then, we have a people 
well skilled in constructive art, deeply religious, and 
of probably a quiet and inoffensive description, hav- 
ing wandered on to the plains of Ehodesia to dwell 
among the fierce tribes that evidently overran the 
country then as later, to search for the precious 
metals that they knew to lie beneath the ground. 
That they were much inferior to the aborigines in 
fighting power we know from the fact that they took 
such pains to make their dwelling-places impregnable 
to attack. What race can they have been ? There 
is one answer to this question, which has been urged 
before, and which certainly seems to fit in with the 
facts that we know about them better than any other 
theory that has yet been advanced, and that is, that 
these people were the FhoBnicians. An examination 
of the evidence at our diisposal seems to be strongly 
in favour of this assumption. That the Phoenicians 
were a great colonising nation we know from the Old 
Testament, and the racei that strayed so far from its 
native land as Cornwall and the Baltic might surely 
have crossed the equator and settled in Mashonaland. 
Again, most historians and authorities on Phoenicia 
are agreed upon the fact that it was probable in 



10 EARLY HISTORY OF RHODESIA. 

the extreme that this race had a settlement in the 
mysterious land of Ophir, a land " teeming with gold 
and precious stones." Could that Ophir have been 
the country that we to-day call Mashonaland ? This 
is one of the moat interesting questions that occurs 
to students of African history, and the reply to it 
seems to be that, while not definitely asserting that 
Ophir and Mashonaland are synonymous, yet the 
inferences are strongly in that direction, and several 
recent writers and speakers on tliis subject have urged 
the indentity of Rhodesia with the Ophir of old. 

Another fact tliat seems to connect Mashonaland 
with the Phoenicians is the amount of mining skill 
that was displayed by these builders. The Phoenicians 
are universally known to have been expert miners, as 
the tin mines of Cornwall bear witness, and those who 
dug out the gold-ore in Mashonaland were assuredly 
possessed of this skill in mining in a large degree. 
They were not content to work merely on the 
outcrops of the reefs, but followed them down 
with considerable skill: some of the old workings 
existing in Rhodesia to-day are monuments to their 
industry and pertinacity. In the Hartley district, 
for instance, there is one shaft that was sunk by 
these ancient workers to a depth of eighty feet. 

It has long been thought that India represented the 
ancient Ophir, but it seems as though in the light of 
recent discoveries it must give place to Rhodesia. 
Whether this be so or not, — and, after all, the matter 
is of but secondary importance, — the whole of the 
evidence goes to show that it was either the Phoeni- 
cians or a nation closely allied to them that built 




THE RUINS AT MOMBO. 11 

these great structures. The presumed period during 
which they were erected, 1100 B.C., the skill shown 
in their construction, the manner in which the neigh- 
bouring mines were worked^ and the form of religion 
that the workers followed, all point strongly in that 
direction. As another link in the chain that seems 
to connect Phoenicia with the ruins of Rhodesia, it 
may be mentioned that some time ago an ingot of 
tin of undoubted Phoenician origin was found in 
Cornwall of a peculiar shape, — something like the 
ground -plan of the modern catamaran or double 
canoe ; and a mould of precisely the same shape 
has been brought to light in the Zimbabwe ruins. 
Turning from Mashonaland to Matabeleland, we 
find, as has already been said, that the ruins are 
not nearly so numerous, and a few that do exist 
obviously belong to some subsequent, though still 
remote, period. At Mombo, however, ruins have 
been discovered which, while inferior in size to those 
at Zimbabwe and Martendela, are much superior to 
them in construction and ornamentation. This ruin 
consists of a number of buildings, the central one of 
which corresponds closely with the circular ruin at 
Zimbabwe, while, as in almost every other case, this 
building is protected by walls and fortifications of 
the most solid description. Dr Schlichter, the well- 
known Bhodesian antiquary, at a recent meeting of 
the Royal Geographical Society, declared that the 
central building was, looked at from either an archi- 
tectural or an astronomical point of view, the most 
interesting ruin yet discovered south of the equator. 
Unfortunately, the natives have next to no traditions 



12 EARLY HISTOHY OF BHODESIA. 

about these ruins, and this is somewhat strange, for 
savage races are, as a rule, prolific in legends. The 
natives south of the Zambesi, however, are an excep- 
tion to this rule, for they have scarcely any legends 
at all. Yet they have one in connection with the 
Zimbabwe ruins that is worthy of note. They state 
that the buildings were erected by white men, but 
that black men poisoned the water, and the white 
men all died. This tradition is common for some 
distance round about Zimbabwe. 

A curious fact in connection with these most 
mysterious buildings is that where the walls have 
fallen, — and especially is this fact to be noted at 
Zimbabwe, — the stones of which they were composed 
have entirely vanished, and are not to be found in 
the neighbourhood; and this leads up to another 
question. Why did the inhabitants of these mighty 
buildings quit them, and where did they go ? We 
do not know whether the tradition of the natives 
related above is to be accepted , or whether the savage 
inhabitants ultimately triumphed over the builders 
and put them to the sword ; or whether they returned 
to their own country, wherever that land may have 
been. Another supposition that might be urged is, 
that in course of time they lost their fear of the natives 
and intermarried with them, and so disappeared as 
a separate race, in the same manner as the Normetns 
intermarried with the Saxons after the Conquest In 
support of this latter theory, we have the testimony 
of several explorers to the effect that there are to-day 
tribes inhabiting northern Mashonaland of a much 
lighter complexion than the remainder, and who seem 



MORE RECENT RUINa 13 

to belong to an altogether higher type. Mr F. C. 
Selous, at the meeting of the Eoyal Geographical 
Society previously referred to, gave it as his opinion 
that the extraction of gold in Mashonaland was not 
stopped by a cataclysm in which the original workers 
were overwhelmed by the aborigines, but that it 
ceased only with the Zulu invasion of the present 
centoij. This, however, does not seem so probable as 
the other suppositions noted abov& Mr Selous does 
not, of course, wish to convey the idea that the direct 
descendants of the Phoenicians, if it were they, were 
present in Mashonaland at the opening of this century 
and were working the gold, but rather that some 
tribes, whose ancestors maybe had learned the secret 
of mining from these ancient immigrants, were work- 
ing the mines — and in this possibly he is right. But 
it would seem more probable that the ancient miners 
either returned to their own country, were massacred 
by the aborigines, or have intermarried with them until 
all trace of them as an independent race has been lost. 

That there has been a race inhabiting Khodesia 
for its gold since the building of the Zimbabwe 
and other ruins is abundantly clear, for they have 
left many traces behind them in the shape of 
ruins, which are of a much poorer and less solid 
description than those contemporary with the ruins 
of Zimbabwe and Martendela, with which they must 
not be confounded. These later ruins are to be 
found in Mangwendi's and Makoni's countries, and 
were evidently used in connection with mining. So 
much for the ancient civilisation of Ehodesia. 

There is now a break of many centuries in the his- 



i 



14 EARLY HISTORY OF RHODESIA. 

tory of the country, of which we hear very little until 
about the middle of the seventeenth century, when 
the Portuguese settlers around the mouth of the 
Zambesi forced their way into the interior to what 
was known as the great empire of Monomatapa, in 
which a tribe called the Karanga had ruled paramount 
for centuries. The Portuguese made some efforts to 
settle in this country, but did not succeed. Attempts 
were made to conquer the natives, but it was beyond 
the invaders* powers, so they perforce had to be con- 
tent with establishing some trading stations in a half- 
hearted sort of way on the banks of the ZambesL 
These, however, soon dwindled away, some of the 
store - keepers died, some were murdered by the 
natives, while a good many lost heart and returned 
to their fellow-countrymen on the coast, none going 
to take their places. Contact with these Portuguese 
traders had in some measure tended to civilise the 
natives, but with the withdrawal of the traders they 
once more lapsed into barbarism pure and simple. 

At this time the inhabitants of the vast country 
known now as Bhodesia were the Mashonas and 
Makalakas, who, as African aboriginal tribes go, were 
quiet and inoflensive. They were extremely unwar- 
like, but were very clever workers in iron, which they 
obtained in quantities from the bases of some of their 
mountains, and deft in weaving the coarse grass that 
grew around them into mats for coverings ; but it 
was as cattle-raisers that they excelled. After the 
departure of the Portuguese they lived on, quietly 
and in peace, until about 1840, when a terrible black 
horde swept across the country, carrying death and 



THE MATABELE TRIBE. 15 

desolation for all who opposed it, and causing the 
timorous owners of the soil to flee to the hills and 
other inaccessible spots, in much the same fashion as 
the Saxon and Danish freebooters drove the ancient 
Britons into the rocky fastnesses of Wales. This 
invading force was a branch of the terrible and war- 
like Zulu tribe under the leadership of Umsiligaas, a 
cruel and despotic chief, and the tribe under him soon 
became famous as the Matabele. The Zulus had for 
ages occupied the whole of the country where the 
Transvaal and the Orange Free State are now situated. 
This tribe was constantly fij^hting, or " washing their 
spears," as they euphemistically termed it, but when 
the Boers took the field against them they found that 
they had met more than their match. Their heroic 
spear-charges were of but little avail with opponents 
that contented themselves with lying behind rocks 
and pouring volleys of rifle-fire into them, while their 
shields of skins, too, were of but small avail in stop- 
ping the bullets. They therefore retreated into the 
north of the Eepublic and settled on the shores of the 
Limpopo river, but they were soon at war again. 

Tliis time it was among themselves, the tribe being 
split into rival factions under the leadership of the 
despotic Chaka, who had long been the supreme chief, 
and Umsiligaas. The feud lasted for some time, 
many bloody fights taking place ; but it was at last 
terminated by the malcontents under Umsiligaas 
setting off across the Limpopo and pouring over the 
plains of the country that was afterwards named after 
them. The Mashona and Makalala tribes could offer 
but little resistance to these redoubtable warriors, and 



16 EARLY HISTORY OF RHODESIA. 

were driven before them like chaff before the wind. 
Tbe Matabele at length settled down beyond the 
Matoppo bills, and such of the or^nal inhabitants 
OS escaped the general massacres that took place were 
driven to seek refuge in the mountains near the 
Zambesi, where they built their villages on the top 
of inaccessible crags, and dwelt in constant tear of 
their bloodthirsty neighbours until the arrival of the 
British ten years ago, and the subsequent crushing of 
the Matabele power, when they were once more able 
to come down to the plains and work in peace and 
without going in daily dread of extermination at the 
hands of their conquerors. 

The Matabele, when they were not fighting, were 
great cattle-raisers, and in this the principal wealth 
of their nation consisted. A man was respected 
for the number of Mashonas he had killed and the 
number of bullocks he possessed, and they found 
that the plains of Matabeleland were well suited for 
grazing their cattle. The nation numbered about 
200,000 souls, and was divided into impis or regi- 
ments. These military divisions numbered four, and 
to each regiment on its formation was assigned a 
separate kraal or enclosure, which formed their only 
semblance to a town or villf^e. The kraals weM 
always situated where there was an abundance ol 
wood for fuel and other purposes, and pasture-land 
for their cattle, together with a plentiful supply of 
water. As the pasturage became worn out, or was 
found too small owing to the increase of cattle either 
by breeding or by plunder, the tribe moved their 
kraal to another part of the country, where they 



EARLY EXPLORERS. 17 

would perhaps dwell for ten years or so, until that in 
its turn became unsuitable, and then another " trek " 
would be made. The impi, however, still kept its 
distinctive name, which was bestowed on the kraal ; 
and so it often happens that we find the early ex- 
plorers in conflict as to the exact situation of the vari- 
ous kraals, for they do not seem to have been aware of 
this constant moving about on the part of the impis. 
The three chief kraals of the Matabele nation were 
the Inyati, the Emhlangen, and the Gu-Buluwayo. 

Here the impis dwelt, slaying and massacring as 
was their wont for some twenty-four or twenty- 
five years without the interference of white men, 
until the rumoured existence of gold in large 
quantities attracted the attention of several Euro- 
pean explorers, such as Nelson, a Swede, who first 
visited the country in 1869, and shortly afterwards 
became the manager of the Tati Gold Mines ; Hartley, 
who discovered the hills in Mashonaland which now 
bear his name ; and Mauch, the celebrated German 
mineralogist, who explored Matabeleland in 1864, 
and discovered the Tati goldfields. These are but a 
few of the men who were attracted by the great pos- 
abilities of the plateaus between the Limpopo and 
Aonbesi rivers. Hunters, too, like Mr F. C. Selous, 
begBLn to frequent these well-watered plains in search 
of the herds of elephants and other big game which 
abounded, and soon reports of the great mineral 
wealth and the healthy climate of the land to the 
north began to filter down to Cape Colony, Natal, the 
Free State, and other civilised parts, and so through 
to Europe. 

B 



18 



CHAPTER 11. 

MATABBLELAND UNDER LOBENGULA. 

About the year 1869 Umsiligaas, the first king of 
the Matabele nation, died, and a difficulty at once 
arose about his successor. The heir to the throne 
was Kuruman, son of Umsiligaas by the royal wife ; 
but this young cliief was mysteriously missing, and 
all efforts to find him proved unavailing. The lead- 
ing indunas, or chiefs, therefore assembled together 
to discuss the question of the succession, and when 
it was evident that Kuruman could not be traced, 
it was decided to offer the crown to Lobengula, a 
son of Umsiligaas by an inferior wife, and who had 
proved himself to be brave in battle and cunning 
in the council. This was accordingly done. A 
section of the nation, however, was opposed to Loben- 
gula, and several impis, stirred up in some instances 
by other members of the royal family who wished 
to have the crown for themselves, refused to accept 
any king but Kuruman. It was easy to see, there- 
fore, that there was but one way to decide the 
question, — the arbitrament of the assegai ; and con- 
sequently a fearful battle was fought between the 




THX ICATABILE WAR COSTUMK 19 

two opposing parties, with the result that Lobengula 
and the impis supporting him gained the victory, 
and the rebels were crushed, — so much so, that 
they consented to Lobengula becoming king without 
further demur. Possibly his bravery in the field 
on this occasion as much as anything led to his 
unanimous election ; for the Matabele, like most 
other primitive nations, gauged a man's capabilities 
by the courage he displayed in battle. 

The crowning of Lobengula was signalised by 
great feastings and rejoicings, about 10,000 warriors 
being present, each wearing his full war costume. 
This costume was rather an elaborate one for an 
African tribe, and consisted, first of all, of a helmet 
something of the same shape as the head-dress worn 
by the Highland regiments in the British army, only 
composed in this case of black ostrich-feather plumes. 
Over their shoulders they wore a short cape composed 
of the same plumes, and this had the effect of making 
them seem much broader-shouldered than they really 
were. Around their loins they wore a kilt made 
of tiger-cat and other skins, ornamented with the 
tails of white cattle. They also wore similar tails 
on their arms, while round their ankles they had 
rings of brass and other metal. This completed 
the war-dress of a Matabele warrior. His weapons 
consisted of one or more long spears for throwing, 
like the javelin of old, and the terrible short stabbing- 
spear or assegai, which was the principal weapon 
of the Zulu nation, and which had caused them 
to be dreaded from the Cape of Good Hope to 
the ZambesL For defence they carried a large oval 



20 BiATABELELAND UNDER LOBENGULA. 

shield of ox-hide, either black, white, red, or speckled, 
according to the impi they belonged to, each impi 
having its distinctive shield. 

Physically, Lobengula was tall, standing six feet 
high, though as he grew older he got so immensely 
fat that he did not seem so tall as he really was. 
His bearing was proud and haughty, making him 
a typical king of a savage race. His features were 
large and coarse to a degree, while he habitually 
wore a look of cunning intermingled with cruelty, 
— though when he allowed himself to smile his ex- 
pression was at once changed, and his face appeared 
to be pleasant and good-tempered. He had an ex- 
cellent memory, being able to recollect conversations 
and incidents years after they occurred; while he 
seemed to know intuitively how to govern his 
country and its turbulent population. 

The coronation ceremonies took place at a kraal 
called Inthlathangela, one of the principal military 
towns in the country. There the nation assembled 
in the form of a large semicircle, and having gone 
through the national war-dance, declared their will- 
ingness to fight for Lobengula, whom they hailed 
as king, and to die in his service. A great number 
of cattle were then slaughtered to provide a feast 
for the hungry population, and sacrifices of the 
choicest meat were offered to the Mlimo, or great 
Spirit, and to the dead Umsiligaas. Great quan- 
tities of native beer were also consumed, until, what 
with the excitement of the dance, the gorge on 
the beef, and the effects of the beer, the soldiers 
became extremely ferocious and more like demons 



A REPULSIVE INCroENT. 21 

than mere creatures of flesh and blood. Numerous 
awful scenes followed. One incident is currently 
quoted by the Matabele as having taken place, and 
those who are best acquainted with the character 
of the race are perfectly able to credit it. It is 
said that, in order to test their courage, Lobengula 
caused a number of the young soldiers to lay down 
their arms and shields, and this having been done, 
he had a bull turned loose amongst them, and 
ordered them, unarmed as they were, to seize it 
and eat it where it stood. So soon as they re- 
ceived this order the young men sprang on the 
animal like so many beasts of prey, and worried 
and tore it with their hands and teeth in a manner 
horrible to think of, so that in a short time nothing 
was left but the horns and the bones. It was such 
monsters as these who received the sympathy of 
a certain badly informed, though doubtless well- 
meaning, section of the English community who 
took up the cudgels on behalf of the poor, inno- 
cent, downtrodden natives during the Matabele war, 
and denounced the English settlers as bloodthirsty 
monsters for using Maxim guns against them. 

Lobengula on succeeding to the throne was con- 
fronted with a very difficult task. Having been 
elected by the people, and not having come to the 
throne by right of descent, he had not, and could 
never hope to have, the same despotic power with 
which his father had ruled, and yet he realised as 
well as anybody could have done that the slightest 
show of weakness on his part would mean his speedy 
deposition, if not, indeed, his death, — for the Mata- 



22 MATABELELAND UNDER LOBENGDLA. 

bele despised timidity, and mercy was thrown away 
on them. They held human life in supreme con- 
tempt However, he soon showed that he was well 
fitted for his task. He saw that when he came 
to the throne his power was likely to be seriously 
threatened through the way in which he had gained 
it, and therefore he resolved on getting rid of such 
of the older indunas as proved to be in any 
way antagonistic to him. This he quickly did by 
having them one by one executed for witchcraft 
and on other similar pretences, until at length he 
was free from opposition in the council, and his 
indunas were one and all warriors who were de- 
voted to him. There is a simple directness about 
this mode of procedure that seems to render the 
diplomatic methods of Western nations painfully 
tedious. 

Lobengula all through his reign showed that, 
while perhaps not an admirer of Europeans, yet he 
was at least tolerant of them. Such as appeared 
before him were always assured of fair treatment, 
and this continued down to the time of the arrival 
of the first emissaries of the Chartered Company 
at his kraal. In the early years of his reign he did 
not have much contact with white men, but later 
there came a few missionaries, and these were fol- 
lowed by hunters and explorers, and then came pros- 
pectors and concession-seekers. These last entered 
Matabeleland and Mashonaland in great numbers 
in the years 1887 and 1888, after the great dis- 
covery of gold on the Eand, within the boundaries 
of the South African Bepublic Traders also came 



THE TATI CONCESSION. 23 

and settled in Matabeleland about this time, and all 
foand a tolerant friend in Lobengula, who showed 
himself willing, so far as the means at his command 
would permit, to protect them from the inroads 
of his subjects, and to punish those whom he 
found guilty. 

Prior to 1889 the chief concession that had 
been granted to gold-seekers by Lobengula was one 
about 1870 to Sir John Swinburne, to whom was 
granted what afterwards came to be known as the 
Tati Ck)ncession. This concession consisted of the 
right to search for gold and other minerals on a 
tract of land situated in the extreme south-west 
of the country between the Shashi and Bamaquiban 
rivers, and here was started the first systematic 
mining operations that had taken place in Mata- 
beleland since the days of the ancients. The Tati 
Concessions, however, it should be remembered, do 
not form part of the territory controlled by the 
British South Africa Company, being under the direct 
administration of the Government of Cape Colony. 

It has been said that the concession to Sir John 
Swinburne was granted about the year 1870, and 
that mining operations then commenced, but it 
should also be stated that, owing chiefly to the 
unhealthy climate that prevails at times in this 
low-lying district, and inroads from impis of Mata- 
bele, it is only during the last ten years or so that 
any real development work has been able to be done 
on the property. 

The principal kraal of Lobengula was called 6u- 
Buluwayo, a name which translated means ''the 



24 MATABELELAND UNDER LOBENGUUL 

place of slaughter," — a sinister appellation, but one 
which well represents its character, for under the 
rule of the Matabele king it was undeniably a place 
of slaughter, and never a week passed without some 
members of the tribe being executed, either for witch- 
craft, which was the favourite charge, or for small 
sins of omission or commission. This kraal was the 
largest and the most important in the country, and a 
description of it may well be given here. It was 
situated on the high and healthy plateau between 
the upper courses of the Kahmi and the Umgusa 
rivers to the north of the Matoppo Hills, on the site 
where the prosperous town of Bulawayo, a corruption 
of Gu-Buluwayo, now stands. The town or kraal 
was about a mile in circumference, and was sur- 
rounded with a high and well-built palisade of wood. 
Inside this palisade were situated the huts of the 
inhabitants, and near these was another strongly- 
built barricade similar to the outer one, but not so 
high, and here the cattle were kept at night A 
large inside space was reserved for a parade-ground, 
where the annual war-dance and other great public 
ceremonies took place, when the tribe was present 
in large numbers. Here was the royal hut, and 
another small kraal where the sacred goats were 
kept, and into which it was death for any one to 
enter but the king without special permission, which 
was rarely given. There were also here separate 
huts for such of Lobengula's wives as might be 
on a visit to him, for they did not all dwell with 
him constantly. At the entrance to the kraal were 
two large heaps of horns and other refuse, the re- 



THE GU-BULUWAYO KRAAL. 25 

mains of bullocks which had been killed at different 
times, and these in the hot weather sent up an odour 
that can be far better imagined than described. 
Here also were always to be found a large number 
of soldiers, messengers, and others awaitiug the king, 
or to do his service. 

So far all the kraals in the country varied only 
in point of size, and one description fits the 
whole ; but Gu-Buluwayo could boast of an erection 
that was the first of its kind in Rhodesia. This 
was a house of brick, which had been built for 
Lobengula by a white sailor named Halyott, but 
which the king, for some reason or another, was very 
shy of, and did not live in, preferring to sleep in his 
waggon, which stood close at hand. A waggon-shed 
had also been provided to keep the king's carts from 
the inclemency of the weather, and this, too, was a 
novelty for a Zulu kraal. In the house referred 
to were many prints and paintings of more or less 
value which the king had accumulated ; and here 
was placed the large, almost life-size, picture of 
the Queen which her Majesty sent to him by his 
envoys when they visited London in 1889. Loben- 
gula, it may be mentioned, entertained a warm 
feeling of respect for the " Great White Queen," as 
he was wont to term her ; but it is probable that 
deep down in his heart he had a feeling of contempt 
for a nation that suffered itself to be ruled by a 
woman, for he had strong opinions on the proper 
sphere of the fair sex. 

The king, however, did not dwell exclusively in this 
one kraal, but, especially in his young days, was 




26 MATABRLELAND UNDER LOBENGULA. 

fond of roaming about the country in an aimless 
manner that must have been at times extremely 
annoying to his followers, supposing them to have 
been allowed to have any independent feelings, which 
is more than doubtful Lobengula would suddenly 
take it into his head to visit a certain portion of 
his dominions, and straightway orders would be given 
for the kraal to put itself in motion for the journey, 
and off they would set at the earliest possible moment 
after the command had been given. 

None knew where they were bound for, even 
Lobengula being ignorant of the spot that he would 
pitch upon for a camp ; but once he had selected the 
site, his followers would commence to build a new 
kraal — no light task, even with the amount of labour 
at command, seeing the number that the kraal would 
have to contain. Here the king would dwell for some 
time, months maybe, until another fit of restlessness 
would seize him, and he would once more set off 
across the veldt As he got older and began to be 
troubled with gout, the king lost a good deal of this 
fondness for roaming about, and was content to stay 
at Gu-Buluwayo. 

While nominally Lobengula ruled over the whole 
of the country of Matabeleland, yet the part con- 
taining the large kraals, and which formed the real 
Matabele country, may be said to have been com- 
prised, roughly speaking, in a circle with a radius of 
about sixty miles from Gu-Buluwayo. Outside this 
limit the inile of Lobengula was of little more than a 
passive description. Situated on the boundaries of 
this circle were outlying kraals, at which all white 



TflE iUNG AS RAIN-MAKBB. 27 

men were stopped on entering the country, and 
detained antU permission was received from the 
king for them to go forward. The principal of 
these outposts was the kraal known as " Minjama's/' 
which was situated on the road from Tati to 6u- 
Buluwayo, the route usually taken by those entering 
Matabeleland from the south. £unners were sent 
forward from this kraal to Lobengula whenever any 
whites arrived there, to obtain his sanction to their 
going forward, and this was but rarely refused. 

The Matabele thus lived on, fighting and slaying 
as was their wont, until the year 1889, when the 
real history of Bhodesia may be said to commence. 
This year had been a very bad one for fever, 
especially at Tati, where at one time every white 
man employed had been down with fever at once, 
thus causing a total stoppage of all mining work, 
and the mortality throughout the country had been 
high. To add to this discomfort, it was also a very 
dry year : little rain had fallen, the pasturage 
was completely parched up, and cattle were dying in 
all directions. Lobengula, as king of the Matabele, 
was supposed to have the power of making rain, and 
this was one of his greatest and most useful prerog- 
atives, although, probably, none knew better than 
the wily old savage himself the hollowness of such 
pretence. However, his people believed in his rain- 
making power, and he was far too astute to un- 
deceive them. When this drought continued, there- 
fore, urgent messages reached the king from different 
parts of the country asking him to hasten the 
rain, otherwise all the cattle would die. When he 



28 BIATABELELAND UNDER LOBENGUUL 

received these messages the king, who was really a 
very good weather-prophet, went to the door of his 
quarters and scanned the skies to see what the 
chance of rain was. There were no indications of the 
break-up of the fine weather, however, and therefore 
Lobengula turned a deaf ear to the entreaties of his 
subjects, with whom he affected to be very dis- 
pleased. The prayers for rain increased in force each 
day as the drought became more and more severe, 
and several impis arrived at Gu-Buluwayo to beg 
for rain in person. 

At last Lobengula saw that rain was really 
coming, so he gave it out that he would keep his 
people without the desired rain no longer, and 
calling his witch - doctors together, he prepared 
to bring about the downpour. For this he over- 
hauled his medicine - waggons, which followed him 
wherever he went, until he obtained the desired 
ingredients for weaving the spell. What all these 
consisted of are not known, but certain dried roots, 
and parts of the crocodile and other animals, entered 
into the concoction, together with several other 
unsavoury productions. When these had been 
collected the king retired to the sacred goat-kraal 
accompanied by the witch-doctors, and there per- 
formed several incantations over a huge pot which 
had been placed on a fire, and into which had been 
poured the mixture before alluded to. Then at last 
the rain came down, when the acute old king 
appeared in public once more, to receive the grate- 
ful thanks of an admiring nation. During the time 
that the charm was being worked the natives around 



\ 



A WAR DANCE. 29 

the kraal maintained an absolute silence, for fear of 
frightening away the approaching rain. 

The great event of the Matabele year was the 
war-dance that has been already mentioned, and a 
description of this will not be out of place. The 
dance lasted a week, and contained a good deal that 
closely resembled the rites practised by the ancient 
Jews. The festival was generally held in February, 
and preparations for it were made weeks beforehand. 
These preparations, by the way, chiefly consisted of 
the manufacture of an enormous supply of native 
beer. This beer was manufactured at the dififerent 
kraals throughout the country, and was then sent 
forward to 6u-Buluwayo or wherever else the dance 
was to be held, by native girls, who walked for long 
distances in Indian file, each with a calabash of beer 
on her head. Some curious facts in connection with 
the war-dance are to be noted. For example, during 
the week it waa in progress Lobengula was no longer 
king, he having temporarily to relinquish his ofiSce 
to Umshlaba, the regent; white men were neither 
permitted to enter nor leave the country during the 
time that the dance was being performed ; and another 
custom that was rigorously enforced was that nothing 
of a red colour, which in the Matabele mind symbol- 
ised blood, was to be worn or displayed, and no blood- 
shed or violence of any kind was permitted. The impis 
selected by the king to take part in the ceremony 
would arrive outside the kraal a day or two before 
the time for the opening of the dance, and would take 
up the positions assigned to them in the temporary 
camps that had been prepared. On the morning of 



30 HATABELSLATfD UNDER LOBRNOULA. 

the dance the impis inarched one by one on to the 
parade-ground, each surrounded by their women and 
girls, who shouted the praises of their individual 
warriors until the noise was wellnigh deafening. 
The king took up hia position in the centre of the 
line, and the impis were drawn up in crescent-shaped 
formation in front of him, the warriors being three 
or four deep. The numbers taking part in the dance 
differed considerably from year to year. On occa- 
sions it ia said that as many as 20,000 men were 
assembled before tlie king, hut the usual number was 
from 8000 to 10,000. Each soldier before being 
allowed to take part in the dance had to be " purified " 
by the witoh-doctors, who performed various mystic 
rites, and sprinkled them with " medicine." 

The dance opened with the royal salute, each impi 
stamping the ground furiously with their feet and 
crying out the royal welcome, " Kumalo ! " The 
soldiers wore their war r^alia as before described, 
and in addition to their spears also bore a short 
stave, called a " dancing-stick," with which they beat 
time on their shields. After the salute the leading 
witch-doctor inspected the impis, and then made a 
stirring speech to them about their victories in the 
past, while exhorting them to hght hravuly in the 
futura This harangue had the effect of working 
up the soldiers into something little short of a frenzy 
of excitement The dance proper then took place, 
the whole line swaying to and fro, singing a weird 
hut not unmelodious chant, and beating time with 
their sticks. Now and again an old warrior would 
spring forward from the ranks, and while performing 



lobekoula's dance. 31 

a series of high leaps in the air, would recount, with 
many a flowery figure of speech, his achievements in 
battle, while the line thundered its applause. This 
done, and a few more incantations performed by the 
small army of witch-doctors present, Lobengula would 
himself dance before the gratified onlookers. This 
effort of the king cannot be called a graceful one by 
any means, for it merely consisted of his slowly 
lifting first one leg from the ground and then the 
other, with the occasional introduction of a few 
awkward movements that are difiScult to explain on 
paper. His costume while performing this " dance " 
was similar to that worn by his soldiers, only of 
better quality, while around him he wore a kilt of 
monkey -skins, the distinguishing badge of royalty. 
A furious charge forward by the whole line with 
lowered assegais followed the pas de setU of the 
king, the men pulling themselves up sharply when 
within a few feet of Lobengula and his guests. 

The next event was the releasing of the sacred 
black cattle from their kraal, which were then turned 
loose on the open veldt They were not allowed their 
freedom for long, however, for the young soldiers 
dropped their assegais and shields and ran after the 
cattle at full speed, when, having headed them 
off, they would drive them back in triumph to 
their kraal. 

The most interesting part of the affair was still to 
come, and that was the "casting of the spear" by 
Lobengula. For this ceremony the king was escorted 
by the youngest impi present to the gates of the 
kraal overlooking the open veldt, and there taking an 



32 MATABELELAND UNDER L0BEN6ULA. 

assegai in his hand, he cast it in the direction that 
he thought it likely he should send his soldiers 
to fight during the ensuing year. This done, the 
young soldiers rushed forward, screaming and shout- 
ing with delight, and, reaching the place where the 
assegai had fallen, they stabbed the ground furiously 
with their spears in token of their willingness to fight 
and die for their king. After some more ceremonies 
of a similar type the impis were dismissed about 
evening and sent to their camps, whither they went 
dancing and singing in demoniacal exultation. 

On the following day large numbers of cattle were 
slaughtered by the king's orders, and the meat was 
distributed among the eager soldiers. In a short 
time the veldt for some distance round was dotted 
with small fires where parties were cooking their 
meat Their mode of doing so was somewhat 
curious. A large pot was put on the fire, and in 
this was placed some water, and a green branch or 
two from a neighbouring tree. Into this the meat 
was dropped, the bones having first been carefully 
removed, and the mess was allowed to stew or sim- 
mer for a whole day. The water and the branches 
prevented the meat from burning, and on the follow- 
ing day it was ready for eating, when the people 
devoured it with an avidity that was sickening to 
watch, washing it down with huge potations of native 
beer, until they could eat and drink no more, but fell 
down and slept where they were on the open veldt. 
Such was the life that was pursued in Rhodesia before 
the coming of the white men. 



S3 



CHAPTER III. 



THE CONCESSION GAINED. 



In the year 1888 three Englishmen arrived at Lo- 
bengula's kraal at 6u - Buluwayo, Messrs £udd, 
Thompeon, and Maguire, and this visit was destined 
to have great and far-reaching results. Several pro- 
spectors were already in the country trying to obtain 
concessions of gold-bearing land, but these three did 
not follow in the wake of those who had come before 
them and rest contented with a few hundred acres 
of land — they employed other methods. They boldly 
proposed to Lobengula that he should grant them a 
monopoly of all the gold -reefs in his country, and 
they offered him liberal terms as an inducement. 
This mode of procedure, of course, cut the ground 
from under the feet of the others who had been 
fishing for concessions, and consequently some very 
bitter feeling was shown against the three gentlemen 
mentioned above, as well as against Mr Cecil Bhodes, 
who was then chiefly known as a rising statesman 
in Cape Colony, and recognised as being the moving 
spirit in the Company that was behind the three 
prospectors — a Company that has since gained a 

G 



34 THE CONCESSION GAINED. 

world-wide reputation as the British South Africa 
Company. 

Those who had been swamped by the action of 
the Company through its representatives did all that 
they could to prevent the granting of the concession 
and to excite the suspicions of Lobengula and his 
leading indunas, so that the situation of Messrs 
Rudd, Thompson, and Maguire, who were veritably 
"outcasts in a strange land," became a somewhat 
serious one. Stormy meetings took place day after 
day before the king and his indunas, and no means 
were deemed too dishonourable to be used against 
the Company by the interested opposition. Mr 
Rhodes and his friends were assailed and vilified 
in every possible way, and the opposition told 
Lobengula plainly that he was giving away his 
country and not even getting the proverbial " mess 
of pottage" in return. They hinted that Rhodes 
and his white men would come into the country 
and seize his towns to dig under them, and that 
he would be king no longer, while his indunas 
and his women would be forced to serve as the 
white men's slaves. 

Lobengula, however, was far from being a fool, and 
could see through the manoeuvres of the opponents of 
the Chartered Company. Loch^, too, an induna of 
remarkable far-sightedness and breadth of view for a 
Kafir, and who had long been Lobengula's principal 
adviser, was strongly on the side of the Chartered 
Company, and urged the king to grant the concession. 
This Lobengula seemed to be in a fair way of 
doing, when an unfortunate incident arose which not 



AN ILL-ADVISED LETTER. 35 

only terminated the negotiations for a period, but 
almost led up to the general massacre of all the white 
people in the country. This incident was the recep- 
tion by Lobengula of a letter from the Aborigines 
Protection Society in London, — a Society whose 
aims are excellent, but whose methods leave a good 
deal to be desired, to say the least. This letter 
advised the king most strongly not to grant a 
monopoly to any one company, as he would be 
endangering his independence by so doing. Un- 
fortunately Lobengida and his counsellors had no 
means of arriving at the degree of authority with 
which this Society spoke, and therefore they attached 
an exaggerated importa&oe to it, and the suspicions 
that had been formed in the king's breast by the 
arguments of the interested opposition were fanned and 
grew until the outlook became very threatening for the 
representatives of the British South Africa Company. 
As soon as this letter was read to the indunas, and 
they b^an to show fear of granting the concession, 
Lobengula saw that for his own safety it was neces- 
sary for him to disavow the steps that he had been 
on the verge of taking; so he turned on Loch^, 
whom he made the scapegoat, and ordered his instant 
execution. Before the unfortunate chief could make 
any defence, or even speak, he was seized and taken 
from the king's presence and his brains dashed out 
in front of the waggons of the white men, who were 
powerless to interfere. Not content with this, an 
impi was despatched to bum the home of 'Loch& and 
to confiscate his cattle. The natives were very ex- 
cited, and openly threatened the white men who were 



36 THE CONCESSION GAINED. 

known to be favourable to Rhodes, and their camp 
was surrounded and the inhabitants detained as pris- 
oners. The situation was growing graver every day, 
and it seemed as though, thanks to the interference 
before referred to, every white man in the country 
would be butchered, when, fortunately, there arrived 
at Bulawayo the one white man who had any 
real influence over Lobengula, Dr Leander Starr 
Jameson. 

Dr Jameson had in the past successfully treated 
Lobengula both for gout, from which he was a great 
sufferer, and for sore eyes, and the king maintained 
a warm feeling of regard for him. On his arrival, 
when he saw how things were going, he immediately 
threw the whole weight of his influence into the 
balance on behalf of Mr Bhodes and his Company, 
and this action served in a great measure to relieve 
the tension of the situation : the white men in Mata- 
beleland were once more safe, and all difiSculties 
seemed to be smoothed over. 

As has been said, the arrival of the envoys of 
the Chartered Company at Bulawayo was brought 
about chiefly by the action of Mr Cecil Rhodes, 
who was then Prime Minister of Cape Colony, 
having succeeded Sir Gordon Sprigg. He was 
filled with an intense desire to unite and consoli- 
date the railways and telegraph systems of South 
Africa, and to extend both northwards towards the 
Zambesi, — for even at that early date he saw the 
great gain that would accrue to the British Empire to 
have the control of the interior of South Africa. He 
saw, likewise, that Germany from the west and Portu- 



MB RHODES' FORESIGHT. 37 

gal from the east were each casting covetous eyes on 
the rich territoiy of Matabeleland and Mashona- 
land, while the Boers in the South African Eepublic 
showed a disposition to trek over the Limpopo, and 
he understood what a severe blow it would be to 
Great Britain's supremacy in Africa if any of these 
Powers, but more especially Germany, should obtain 
possession of the new territory. He realised that it 
was not only necessary to act, but to act quickly, and 
he conceived the scheme of the Chartered Company, 
and was fortunate enough to find in England suffi- 
cient influential support to enable him to push for- 
ward his plans; and while negotiations were pro- 
ceeding with the Government for the granting of a 
royal charter, Messrs Rudd, Thompson, and Maguire 
were sent up to Lobengula, as we have seen, to en- 
deavour to get the concession from him. 

The king several times wavered in his attitude 
towards the Company, and for a long time did not 
seem to be able to make up his mind whether 
he would grant the concession or not. The terms 
that were offered to him were tempting, being 
£100 in British cun^ency every month, 1000 
Martini - Henry rifles with 100,000 rounds of 
ammunition, and a steamboat on the Zambesi, or 
the snm of £500 in lien as compensation ; and 
these terms he was strongly urged by Dr Jameson 
and others to accede to. On the other hand, 
he had a haunting fear, engendered by the op- 
ponents of the Chartered Company, that this was 
an insidious attempt to take his country from him 
and to make slaves of his people ; but at length he 



38 THE CONCifiSSION GAINED. 

was convinced of the needlessness of those fears, and 
on October 3, 1888, he signed the concession. By 
the terms of this concession the Company was to 
have the exclusive right to search for and work 
minerals in the country, and it was also authorised 
to take " all necessary and lawful steps to exclude 
from the Matabele kingdom, principalities, and do- 
minions all persons seeking land, metals, minerals, 
and mining rights therein," while Lobengula under- 
took to render all assistance to expel such people. 

So soon as this concession was signed the eiforts 
to obtain the charter were redoubled, and on October 
20, 1889, twelve months later, the Queen affixed 
her signature to it, and the British South Africa 
Company then entered upon the active sphere of its 
existence. The charter was an extremely long and 
comprehensive document, divided into thirty - five 
paragraphs, and showing the original grantees to be 
the Duke of Abercom, the Duke of Fife, Lord 
Gififord, V.C, C. J. Ehodes, Esq., A. Beit, Esq., A. H. 
Grey, Esq. (afterwards Earl Grey), and G. Cawston, 
Esq. By this charter the Company was empowered 
to hold the concession granted by Lobengula to 
Messrs Eudd, Thompson, and Maguire for twenty-five 
years, and after that period it might be renewable for 
terms of ten years. The Imperitd Government main- 
tained a supreme control over the territory thus 
acquired, and the Company had to undertake to act 
upon the advice of the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, and to adopt any course upon any question 
that might be deemed best by the Government. It 
was to preserve law and order within the country. 



THE CHARTER GRANTED. 39 

establishing an adequate police force for that pur- 
pose, and to treat the natives fairly, while suppressing 
the trading in slaves and the sale of liquoi to 
natives. By the terms of the charter, also, the 
Company is required to have its head-office in Great 
Britain, and its principal representative in South 
Africa as well as its directors must be British sub- 
jects. The religion followed in the country was not 
to be interfered with, except, the charter was careful 
to add, '* 80 far as may be necessary in the interests 
of humanity," — a saving clause that was very neces- 
sary; while in the administration of justice due 
regard was always to be paid to the customs, laws, 
&c., of the tribe, class, or nation to which the parties 
concerned belong. The Company's powers and privi- 
leges were also clearly set forth, and its scope and 
extent carefully specified. 

On receiving the charter the Company at once 
prepared to commence that task for which it had 
been called into existence. Camps were formed in 
different parts of the country, and stores were sent 
forward to them for the use of the pioneer column 
which was then being organised in Cape Town and 
other parts of the Cape Colony. 

Towards the end of the year 1889 the news 
reached Lobengula that an army of white men were 
preparing to march through his territory to Mashona- 
land, and a severe reaction against the Company at 
once took place. The old fears and suspicions were 
revived with added force, and the Matabele became 
very threatening in their manner towards those 
white men who were known to be either in the 



40 THE CONCESSION GAINED. 

employ of the Company or to be in any way in 
sympathy with them, and the position of these men 
became grave in the extreme. The camps that they 
had formed were surrounded day by day by crowds 
of angry natives who required but the slighest pro- 
vocation to massacre them all out of hand ; and it 
needed great powers of self-restraint and patience on 
the part of the beleaguered Englishmen to suffer in 
silence the indignities and insults that were daily 
heaped upon them. They were powerless to re- 
taliate in any way, for to retort would have been 
the sheerest folly, seeing how few they were in 
number, and how they were scattered about the 
country. Several of the more timorous, however, 
hastily quitted the country without waiting for the 
king's permission for them to go; but so long as 
they were those who were not actively connected 
with the Company, Lobengula did not trouble him- 
self about them. The rest, however, were kept 
under the strictest surveillance. 

A diversion occurred in favour of the whites 
in February 1890, when two envoys of the Queen 
arrived at Bulawayo to announce to Lobengula that 
the royal charter had been granted to the Company, 
and advising him to give them all the assistance 
that he could. These envoys were Captain Ferguson 
and Surgeon -Major Mellidew, both of the Boyal 
Horse Guards, and they were attended by a corporal 
and a private of the same regiment They were the 
guests of Major Maxwell, the representative of the 
British South African Company at Bulawayo, during 
their stay, and the king expressed himself as de- 



THE TWO ENVOYS. 41 

lighted to see them^ and gave them a hearty 
welcome to his country. 

When they appeared before the king and the 
indunas at the first indaba or council, they all wore 
the full-dress uniform of their regiment, and caused 
a tremendous amount of excitement in the kraal 
as they passed through it ; for the natives had never 
seen anything like it before, and they fought and 
struggled round the Guardsmen in eager endeavour 
to see themselves in the bright steel cuirasses 
which they wore, and which the natives took to be 
looking-glasses. Lobengula received them in state, 
and they handed him the letter they had been 
entrusted with, which was opened and interpreted. 
This done, the envoys presented the gifts that they 
had been charged to convey to the king, which 
included a handsome revolver and a pair of field- 
glasses from the Duke of Abercom, the chairman 
of the Chartered Company. 

Lobengula expressed himself as highly delighted 
with the gifts, and entertained the envoys to a meal 
of beef and beer, the staple diet of the country. 
After this had concluded, the Guardsmen gave an 
exhibition of the sword exercise for the entertain- 
ment of the assembled tribe, who watched the clock- 
work-like movements of the men with wonder. The 
king was very curious as to the reason for their 
wearing breastplates of steel, and asked them if the 
Englishmen were afraid to fight without being 
guarded with iron. In a year or two's time he 
was destined to learn in a forcible manner that this 
was not the case. 



42 THE CONCESSION GAINED. 

Their duties concluded, and the king's reply pre- 
pared and delivered to them, the envoys had com- 
pleted their task, but they were not allowed to leave 
the country without the white inhabitants doing their 
best to entertain them to the utmost of their limited 
capabilities. It has often been asserted that the 
first step an Englishman will take when arriving in 
a new country will be to lay out first a racecourse 
and then a cricket-ground, and this was certainly 
true with regard to Matabeleland ; for when the 
question was raised as to how best to entertain 
the bearers of the Queen's message, it was decided to 
hold a race-meeting, the first of its kind ever pro- 
moted in Bhodesia. A spot was selected near the 
kraal at Bulawayo, and a fairly good course was laid 
out with hurdles. A goodly number of horses were 
entered, some of which had not the slightest pre- 
tensions to speed ; and Lobengula and some of his 
chief indunas, who entered into the affair with zest, 
likewise entered horses. The programme as drawn 
up consisted of four events — the Zambesi Handicap, 
the 6u-Buluwayo Plate, and two minor events, all of 
which produced very fair sport, while the king's joy 
knew no bounds when he found that he had gained 
one of the prizes. A race for natives only was also 
held, and this created much amusement, for the 
Matabele never use horses for riding, and are totally 
ignorant of the merest elements of the art, and they 
therefore cut queer figures in the race. But they 
enjoyed it immensely. There was really a good 
attendance of whites, many of whom had come 
long distances to take part in the affair, while a 



ORGANISING THE PIONEERS. 43 

large crowd of natives collected to see the white 
men at their sports. 

On the following day some impromptu athletic 
sports were held, and before the departure of the 
party for England the annual war - dance of the 
Matabele also took place, at which they were 
present Some 10,000 men took part in it this 
year, and the ceremony of throwing the spear was 
omitted owing to Lobengula being unable to walk 
through another bad attack of gout. During these 
festivities, however, there was a growing feeling of 
alarm among the natives at the continued prepara- 
tions that were going forward for the despatch of 
the pioneer column, and when the dance took place 
the younger natives were rather threatening in their 
attitude towards the English officers, but the affair 
passed off quietly on the whole. 

In Cape Colony, and indeed throughout the whole 
of South Africa, a great deal of the interest that 
was being manifested in the new country at this 
time was being centred in the pioneer force for 
which Major Frank Johnston was recruiting, and the 
object of which was to cut a road from the Tuli 
river through the eastern portion of Matabeleland 
to Mount Hampden in Mashonaland. Arrived at 
the latter place, a town was to be established and 
liberal grants of land and gold-mining claims to be 
made to those forming the column, which was really 
the nucleus of the colony that has since sprung up 
in Mashonaland. There is something almost romantic 
in the thought that this little band that was to 
assemble on the banks of the Molopo river near 



• I 



44 THE CONCESSION GAINED. 

Mafeking, from Cape Town, the East Coast ports, 
Johannesburg, and other parts of South Africa, was 
to march into a practically unknown land to found 
a new colony and plant another jewel in the diadem 
of the grandest empire that the world has ever seen. 

The Cape Town contingent of this corps left for 
the north on the 15th of April 1890, amid the 
cheers and good wishes of the large crowds that 
had assembled to see them depart. They were 
bound for Mafeking, on the frontier, and en route 
were to pick up those of the corps from the East 
Coast who were likewise desirous of seeing for them- 
selves what the new land was like and who had 
been assembled at Kimberley. A halt for a short 
time was made at this town, and before the colunm 
proceeded to Mafeking they were reviewed by Sir 
Henry (now Lord) Loch, then High Commissioner for 
Cape Colony, who, after the review, expressed his 
hopes for the success of the expedition. When they 
arrived at Mafeking they found their Johannesburg 
comrades awaiting them under the conmiand of 
Captain Mandy. 

Here the final steps were taken towards the 
equipment and organisation of the corps. Each 
man on joining had signed an agreement with 
Messrs Johnson, Heany, and Borrow to place himself 
under military control and discipline in every way, 
— a very necessary step in view of the attitude that 
the Matabele were taking up. The corps was 180 
strong, and was composed chiefly of Britishers and 
Britisher Afrikanders (men born in Africa of British 
parents), and a fine well-set-up body of men they 



THE PIONEER CORPS. 45 

wera Plucky and fearless, they were just the sort 
to confront the dangers that lay ahead of them, 
and to conquer all difficulties that might beset 
them. 

Their uniform consisted of tunic and trousers of 
brown corduroy, yellow leather leggings, and regula- 
tion army boots, while their head - dress was the 
picturesque soft felt hat that is the distinguishing 
mark of our colonial soldiers, and which is usually 
known as the " Bufialo Bill " pattern, and this was 
also of brown. The arms of the troopers consisted 
of Martini-Henry rifles, with the cartridges carried 
en bandolier, and revolvers ; while waterproof coats, 
regulation army saddles and bridles, blankets, &c., 
were also provided by the Company. The pay of 
the troopers was at the rate of 78. 6d. per day, while 
the officers received more according to their ranks ; 
and each man in addition to his pay was promised 
a farm of 3000 acres and fifteen gold claims in 
Mashonaland. 

The corps was divided into three troops, A, B, 
and C, the first two of which were mounted in- 
fantry, while C formed the artillery troop, the heavy 
guns consisting of 7 - pounders and quick - firing 
Maxims, and to this troop was attached a detail of 
bluejackets to handle the quick-firing guns. The 
command was taken by Major Johnson, while the 
Company commanders were respectively Major M. 
Heany and Messrs H. F. Hoste and J. Koach. 

When all the details of equipment, &c., had been 
settled, the column at length left Mafeking and 
pushed on towards the Limpopo, the start being 



46 THE CONCESSION GAINED. 

made on May 17, and the Limpopo was reached and 
crossed thirteen days later. The objective of the 
column at that time was the Macloutsie river, where 
they were to be met by some troops of the newly 
formed British South Africa Police, and this river 
was reached on June 13. Here a halt was called. 
The discipline of the Pioneer Corps had been rather 
loose at first, but as they approached the Matabele- 
land frontier it became much more rigid, and during 
this halt on the Macloutsie river almost incessant 
drilling took place. This was done on two accounts. 
Firstly, the attitude of Lobengula and his impis was 
getting less friendly every day, and it seemed almost 
certain that an attack would be made upon the 
column before it had proceeded very far into 
Matabeleland ; and, secondly, before the corps was 
to be allowed to enter the country, Major-General 
Lord Methuen, the Adjutant-General of the British 
forces in South Africa at that time, was to inspect 
them and report on their fitness or otherwise for the 
task before them. When the review had passed 
off General Methuen expressed himself as entirely 
satisfied with the aptitude for their work which the 
column had shown, and bade them God-speed, and 
the column then crossed the Macloutsie river and 
commenodd the next stage of their journey, which 
was to the Tub* river, the southern boundary line of 
Matabeleland. The land between the Macloutsie 
and Tuli rivers was then known as the "disputed 
territory," it being 6laimed by both Lobengula and 
Kfaama, the king of the Bamangwatos, as forming 
part of their dominions. This dispute, it may be 



/ ■ 



PRECAUTIONS AGAINST ATTACK. 47 

mentioned^ was ultimately settled in favour of the 
latter king, the land being added to the Bechuana- 
land Protectorata 

As they marched through this country every 
precaution was taken against attack by the Mata- 
bela When the column halted for the night a 
laager or enclosed camp was formed, the waggons 
being arranged in a diamond -shaped wedge, with 
either a 7-pounder or a Maxim at each comer. Each 
waggon had its distinct place in the formation, and 
every man knew his post, so that a laager could 
be formed in a very short space of time on the 
scouts reporting the presence of a hostile body when 
the column was on the march. While marching 
the long train of waggons was preceded by an 
advance - guard of troopers, Who rode some two 
hundred yards ahead of the main body. The 
waggons numbered thirty - six, and as each was 
drawn by about sixteen pairs of oxen, they extended 
for a considerable distance over the country. On 
either side of the waggons rode troopers in pairs at 
a distance of about two hundred yards from each 
other, while the rear was brought up by a small 
guard similar to the one in fronts In addition to 
this, scouts were despatched to examine the country 
on either side of the column, and it vas rendered 
next to impossible for a large body of Matabele 
to approach without warning. It was undoubtedly 
the intention of the impis to take the .convoy by 
surprise if they had an opportunity. The chief 
aim in Zulu warfare is to surprise the enemy, as 
when the Prince Imperial of France lost his life; 






48 THE CONCESSION GAINED. 

and had they been able to come upon the column 
suddenly and without warning of their approach, 
there would have been but few left to carry the 
news back to Cape Town. But, thanks to the admir- 
able care and foresight of Major Johnson and those 
serving under him, this the Matabele were prevented 
from doing, though, as will be seen later, the column 
had some very narrow escapes from being attacked. 

Another factor which undoubtedly prevented any 
hostile impis from trying to "rush" the laager in 
the darkness was an electric searchlight that the 
column had with them, and which was supplied 
by a dynamo run by a steam-engine that was going 
forward to work a saw-mill. The eerie manner in 
which this flashed around the country — now across 
the dark sky, seeming to extinguish the stars by 
its brilliance, and now stealing over the veldt like 
some gigantic glowworm, now flashing this way, 
now that — served to imbue the natives with a 
wholesome terror, and to keep them at a safe dis- 
tance. It was also very useful to detect the presence 
of any lurking foe in the vicinity of the laager. 

Marching steadily forward towards their goal, the 
Pioneer Column arrived at the Tuli river on July 
1, 1890, and Matabeleland having been at last 
entered, a halt was called while a fort was con- 
structed and the final arrangements made. It was 
here that the real work of the Pioneers began. 
Three troops of the British South Africa Company's 
Police were now attached to the column, the troops 
bemg commanded by Major Sir John Willoughby 
and Captains Heyman and Forbes. These served 



CUTTINQ A ROAD. 19 

to bring np tbe strength of tbe column to between 
400 and 500 men. The supreme command of the 
force was now taken over by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Pennefather, a British army officer of ripe experi- 
ence ; wliile Mr F. C. Seloua was appointed chief of 
the Intelligence Department, — a position for which 
his long training as a hunter and his great know- 
ledge of the country to be passed through peculiarly 
fitted }iim. The fort that was being constructed, 
and which received the name of Fort Tuli, was to 
form the base of the column, and a road was to 
be cut from here right away to Mount Hampden, 
a distance of something like 400 miles. 

While the troopers had commenced to make this 
road under tbe direction of Mr Seloua, Lobengula, 
for one reason or another, chose to take it ill that 
the force should be cutting their way through his 
territory, though he had previously given his con- 
sent to this being done, and had received the pay- 
ment for the concession. He now sent a message 
to Colonel Pennefather stating that if the column 
still wished to go forward, it must do so by way 
of Gn-Buluwayo ; and this having no effect on the 
column, he sent a further message by two whites, 
one of wliom was the celebrated African hunter Mr 
J. Colenbrander. This latter message was couched 
in the following terms : " Who are you, and where 
are yon going ? What do you want, and by whose 
orders are you here ? Where are you leading your 
young men to like so many sheep, and do you think 
that they will all get back to their homes again ? 
Go back at once, or I will not be answerable for 



50 THE CONCESSION GAINED. 

the consequences. Do you not think that white 
blood can flow as well as black ? " To this defiant 
and threatening note Colonel Pennefather returned 
the following reply : " I am an officer of the Queen 
of England, and my orders are to go to Mashonaland, 
and there I am going. We do not want to fight, 
we only want to dig for gold, and are taking this 
road to avoid your young men ; but if they attack 
us, we know how to defend ourselves." 

When Lobengula assented to this road being cut, 
he had an idea, in all probability, that the task 
would prove too great for the Englishman's powers ; 
but the result showed him to be wrong, and therefore 
he attempted to frighten the column away by a 
threat to turn his impis loose upon them, — a threat 
that proved futile and recoiled upon himself. As 
a counterstroke, a force of the Bechuanaland Border 
Police was moved up to the western boundary of 
Matabeleland ; and so Lobengula saw that should 
he attempt to attack the column as it marched 
forward, his soldiers would be caught between the 
two white forces with disastrous results. To this 
bit of "bluff" is to be attributed in some degree 
the immunity of the Pioneer Column. 

Making the road proved to be a difficult task. 
First of all, the trees on the line of route had to 
be hewn down and the undergrowth cleared away. 
Some of the sandy approaches to the rivers had 
to have a road of " corduroy " laid down to make 
them firm enough for the heavily laden waggons 
to pass over; while in some of the dry spruits or 
river-beds huge boulders had to be moved bodily 



FIBST ENTBT INTO RHODESIA. 



51 



aside. The work was apportioned between the A 
and B troops of the Pioneer Column, and each troop 
was divided into two sections while employed on 
the work. One-half of the men worked, while the 
other half rode in their wake fully equipped and 
leading the horses of the working party, so that 
in the event of an attack the whole band would 
have been prepared to fight at a moment's notice. 
The road-making party throughout the march was 
always kept about ten miles or so in advance of 
the main body; and in this fashion the first body 
of British colonists entered the land that was later 
to be known as Bhodesia. 



CHAPTER IV. 



TOUHDIHG A COLONr. 



Oh July 6, 1890, the B troop of the Pioneer Column 
crossed the Tuli river, and commenced to cut the 
road through the 400 miles of trackless wilderness 
that lay between them and their destination at 
Mount Hampden. The men quickly became accus- 
tomed to the work, and considerable progress was 
made iu a short time. The natives on the route, 
who were mostly of the Makalaka tribe, were some- 
what anxious when they saw the white men cut- 
ting their way through their country ; but they were 
soon reassured, and told that the Pioneers came as 
friends and not as enemies, and that it was their 
intention to prevent the Matabele from slaying and 
raiding as they liad been bo long in the habit of 
doing. 

The main column commenced its trek or march 
across Matabeleland on July 11, 1890, and was 
composed at that time of 200 of the British South 
Africa Police in addition to the 180 members of the 
Pioneer Corps, while it was accompanied by no less 
than sixty-five waggons. Among those going for- 



LOBENGULA'S THREAXa 53 

ward with the column were Mr Colquhoun, who had 
been appointed Administrator of the country, and 
Dr Jameson. 

All had gone well with the column so far, with 
one exception, — the amount of " horse-sickness " that 
prevailed. Nearly a hundred of the Pioneer horses 
had died of this disease between Mafeking and 
Tuli, and the scourge showed no signs of abating. 
After a good deal of hard work on the road by the 
Pioneers, the Lundi river was reached and crossed 
on August 6, and a short halt was called. While 
the column rested here Mr Colenbrander arrived 
with a further message from Lobengula, to the effect 
that the impis had defied him, and had fully deter- 
mined to slay every man of the column, and that 
there were at that time no less than 9000 men on 
their way to carry out that laudable intention. The 
message terminated with the advice that the column 
should instantly turn back if they would avoid being 
cut to pieces. 

This was serious news, but nothing was further 
from the minds of the column than to turn back and 
admit themselves beaten. Scouts were sent out in 
all directions by Colonel Pennefatlier to seek for 
signs of the Matabele in the neighbourhood, and 
these soon returned with the information that there 
was a large impi encamped on the banks of the 
Tokwe river, directly in front of the column, and 
across its line of route. This seemed to give con- 
firmation to the warning of Lobengula, but the 
column pushed resolutely forward, keeping a very 
sharp look-out, and at length reached the Tokwe 



64 FOUNDING A COLONY. 

river without having come into touch with the impL 
That it was somewhere in close vicinity to them was 
reported by the scouts, and at length the place where 
it had recently been encamped was discovered, but 
nothing was seen of the force itself. The scouts 
followed up the trail of the Matabele force and found 
that it was marching parallel to the column, and 
evidently seeking a suitable place for an ambuscade. 
Presently it seemed to have changed its mind, for it 
gradually melted away, and was not seen again any- 
where near the column, though vague rumours of its 
presence were rife among the natives in the villages 
through which the column passed. 

On August 14 another halt was called while a 
fort was constructed, which was afterwards named 
Fort Victoria, and here a company of Police under 
Major Sir John Willoughby was posted to guard the 
line of communication. This done, the column once 
more pushed forward to its destination, which it was 
now rapidly approaching. Towards the end of this 
month Mr Selous resigned his position as chief of 
the Intelligence Department, as the most difficult 
portion of the route had now been traversed, and, 
accompanied by Dr Jameson and Mr Colquhoun, 
struck off to the east into Manicaland, a journey 
that was destined to have rather important results. 
Captain Burnett was appointed to the position 
vacated by Mr Selous, and the column went forward 
under his guidance. About midway between Fort 
Victoria and Mount Hampden another fort was built 
and christened Fort Charter, and shortly after the 
last important river on the line of march, the 



THE GOAL REACHED. 55 

Umfuli, was crossed, on September 6, and the force 
eventually arrived at the spot selected for the last 
fort on September 10, — almost exactly five months 
from the time of the column leaving Cape Town, 
and less than four months from the date of its 
quitting Mafeking. During this time a journey 
through a difficult and almost unknown country for 
800 miles or so had been performed ; a practi- 
cable road had been laid out for half this distance, 
and three forts erected for the protection of those 
who should follow ; while for nearly the whole way 
the column had been harassed by the fear of attack 
from a bloodthirsty and savage foe who was hovering 
around them in overwhelming numbers, and who, 
moreover, had the advantage of knowing the country 
thoroughly. This march of the Mashonaland Pioneers 
was a monument to British pluck and tenacity of 
purpose, and the annals of Britain's colonial history, 
replete as they are with brilliant feats, can show 
nothing finer than this. 

On September 11, 1890, a parade was called of 
all the members forming the column, and the country 
was formally taken possession of in the name of the 
Queen. A rough flagstaff had been hastily erected, 
round the base of which the corps was drawn up, 
and on a given signal from Colonel Pennefather there 
was a quick jerk at the halyards, when a small 
bundle of coloured bunting was quickly run up to the 
top, and as this slowly unfurled itself, it displayed the 
well-known quarterings of the grand old union-jack. 
Prayer was ofifered up by the Rev. Canon Balfour, 
who had gone up with the column, and, amid cheers 



56 FOUNDING A COLONY. 

for the Queen a salute of twenty-one guns was fired 
by the 7-pounder battery. 

The situation of this fort, which shortly afterwards 
was named Fort Salisbury, in honour of the Imperial 
Prime Ministei, was a healthy one, being high on a 
plateau some 300 feet or so above the sea-level, and 
near to a small stream, the Makabusi. The column 
was maintained as a separate force until the fort was 
built, and then, on October 1, it was disbanded, and 
its members immediately made a rush for the gold- 
fields, about which such a lot had been heard. 

The principal fields, as known at this time, num- 
bered three: the Umfuli or Hartley field; the Lo 
Magondi field, to the north-west of Salisbury ; and 
the Mazoe valley field, to the westward of the Lo 
Magondi field. It was the first of these that was 
the most generally known, and as it had the reputa- 
tion of being very rich, it was here that the greatest 
rush was made by eager prospectors to peg out the 
claims which they had earned by their work as 
pioneers. 

In accordance with their promises, the British 
South Africa Company now issued the necessary 
licences to those entitled to prospect, for which the 
nominal charge of Is. was made. Armed with this 
document, a pioneer was entitled to stake out a block 
of fifteen claims in any gold district of the country, — 
a claim, it may be explained, being a piece of ground 
150 feet long and 400 feet broad. There were 
various conditions attached to these licences, the 
chief being that the holder was liable to be called 
upon to take up arms in defence of the territory of 



BBARCHING FOR GOLD. 67 

the Itritish South Africa Company ; while, having 
regard to the fact that it was the Coni])any that was 
providing the money tor the opening up and develop- 
ment of the country, 50 per cent of the shares of 
any company floated to work gold-mining claims in 
Mashonaiand were to be allotted to the Company. 
This clause is still in operation, but it has never 
been enforced to the full amount, the Company 
generally being contented with a much smaller 
proportion of the shares. 

There were some members of the Pioneer Corps, 
however, who preferred to remain in the neighbour- 
hood of Fort Salisbury and the police camp that had 
been formed near it, and very soon a small village 
began to spring up here. By the following March 
most of those who had wandered alield in search of 
gold, so soon as the Pioneer force was disbanded, 
returned to Salisbury either to negotiate the sale 
of their claims to one of the many syndicates and 
companies that were springing up like so many 
mushrooms, or to prepare for still more extensive 
explorations in search of gold ; while not a few had 
returned disenchanted, for they had not found the 
fabulous fortunes awaiting them that they had come 
to expect, and so were prepared to shake the dust of 
the country from their feet 

There were many of tliese disappointed and dis- 
enchanted persons in Salisbury about this time, for 
so soon as the reports of the rich finds on the 
Mashonaiand goldfields by the Pioneers filtered 
through to the south, a tremendous rush of gold- 
seekers was made, and the roads leading to the 



68 FOUNDING A COLONY. 

north became crowded with people of all nation- 
alities in all manner of vehicles, eager to reach this 
latter-day El Dorado. Hastily conceived and 
badly equipped as most of these expeditions were, 
the natural corollary was seen when the rainy season 
came on and overtook these rash and unthinking 
emigrants. The rivers became swollen and pre- 
vented their crossing, horse-sickness killed oflf their 
horses, while the noxious tsetse-fly decimated their 
cattle, and hardships and sufferings of every kind 
surrounded them. Detained for weeks in the low- 
lying lands on the banks of the rivers, and without 
the necessary medicines to keep them in health, and 
with only the scantiest food, scores of these foolish 
travellers died and were buried on the wayside 
without ever having as much as seen the land that 
had lured them to their death. On the goldfields, 
too, malaria and other sickness were rife, food was 
very dear and of poor quality, and soon dozens of 
half-starved and fever-ravaged prospectors began to 
return to Salisbury, there to recount their sufferings 
and privations. It was indeed a gloomy sequel to 
the glowing pictures of " Golden Mashonaland " that 
had been drawn but a few months before. 

The rainy season had been a very severe one, 
and though numbers of waggons containing pro- 
visions and other necessities had been despatched 
from Cape Town, the state of the rivers and the 
roads prevented their getting through to Salisbury, 
and something like a famine now prevailed in that 
town to add to the discomforts already being ex- 
perienced. Enormous prices were paid for the 



INITIAL DIFHCULTIBS. 59 

commonest necessities of life, while the principal 
food of many of those on the goldfields was 
pumpkins, which grew around in great profusion, 
and boiled rice. No wonder that even the most 
optimistic began to grow discouraged. In addition 
to these troubles, it was found that it was impossible 
to cut a road through to Salisbury from the East 
Coast as had been attempted, for there was a belt of 
country that was infested by the dreaded tsetse- 
fly, so that the cattle were unable to cross it 
This to many was the last straw, and several 
b^an to return to the south to tell their experi- 
ences. These accounts sent the pendulum of public 
opinion with regard to the new country swinging 
back, and caused some of those who had hitherto 
been enthusiastic in their support of Mr Rhodes 
and his expansionist schemes to stop and ponder 
whether they had done well. In the main, however, 
it was recognised, both in South Africa and in Eng- 
land, that this reaction was caused almost entirely 
by the settlers themselves, and was only what had 
happened on the first discovery of almost every 
goldfield throughout the world. 

Those who remained in the country meanwhile 
set themselves resolutely to conquer the diflBculties 
that lay before them, and to "put their house in 
order " before the coming of another wet season. 
It has been said that soon a considerable village 
began to spring up at Fort Salisbury, but it would 
be more correct to say that two villages were being 
formed closely adjacent to each other. Messrs 
Heany, Borrow, and Johnson had located a large 



60 FOUNDING A COLONY. 

reserve near a kopje or hill about a mile from the 
police camp, and it was around this kopje that most 
of the settlers pitched their camps, while the re- 
mainder built their dwellings around the police camp. 
The town, as it began to grow, thus became very 
straggling and divided, and this proved a great set- 
back to its prosperity during the early days of 
its existence. Most of the huts were of the flimsiest 
description, and just joined together roughly, the 
only buildings of anything like a substantial nature 
being the police barracks and the Administrator's 
quarters. The reason for the roughness and flimsi- 
ness of the construction of the settlers' houses 
and stores is not far to seek. Strictly speaking, 
at this time Salisbury was not a town at all, but 
merely a mining camp built around a semi-military 
fort From some inexplicable reason, the Company 
did not take steps to form a town there in the 
orthodox manner until August 1891, eleven months 
after the arrival of the Pioneer Column, and then 
their hands were practically forced by the settlers, 
who were rapidly erecting a town of their own 
without the interference of the Company. It was 
long before it was known where the site of the 
town was to be, and with things in this state none 
would, of course, build houses or shops of a sub- 
stantial nature when they might find that after all 
the town was to be some miles away, and they would 
have to pull their dwelling down and rebuild it, or 
be content to remain out on the veldt. It was 
generally thought that the site to be ultimately 
chosen would be that around the kopje, and here 



THE RISE OF SAUSBURY. 61 

the land began to be staked out in all directions, 
until whole streets were formed. The first street 
thus located was given the name of Pioneer Street, 
wliich name it bears to-day. Those who had staked 
out land here found that their judgment had been 
correct, for the Company at length had the ground 
surveyed and the town laid out, and some of those 
who had marked off their land discovered that they 
were placed in most favourable positions, and were 
able to realise on them at a handsome profit. So 
soon as this survey was made a great impetus was 
given to building, and several substantial buildings, 
chiefly of dried mud, began to spring up in all 
directions. 

The Grovemment, however, had never been 
thoroughly satisfied with the site, and about twelve 
mouths later a new town was surveyed adjoining the 
old one near the kopje, to which was given the 
name of the Causeway. Here the Government and 
other public oflBces were situated, and every induce- 
ment almost was offered to merchants and others 
having buildings at the Kopje, as the old site was 
now called, to migrate to the new township. For the 
most part, however, they held aloof, as they claimed 
that, seeing they had gone to considerable expense 
in erecting their buildings, the Company should 
pay them compensation if they migrated to the new 
site. This the Company, not unnaturally perhaps, 
refused to do ; so that the result is seen to-day in 
the scattered nature of the town at Salisbury when 
compared with Bulawayo, or indeed with almost any 
town that has since been built in Khodesia. About 



C2 FOONDINO A COLOITT, 

this time, too, a township had alao been formed at 
Hartley, near the goldfielda ; but, unfortunately, the 
climate here was very unhealthy. Indeed so bad was 
it that the medical ofBcer sent by the Government to 
report on the healthiness of the town declared on his 
return that no European could live in it tor longer 
than two years. 

As has been stated in the previous chapter, in 
addition to the gold-mining claims each pioneer was 
entitled to a fann of 3000 acres; but not many of 
these had been located, chiefly on account of the 
greater attractions of searching for gold, and of 
the fact that the Government required that the 
owner should have a bond Jide occupation of the 
land. This condition was shortly afterwards re- 
pealed so far as the Pioneers were concerned, but 
it was announced that no farms could be located 
within six miles of Fort Salisbury. Towards the 
end of 1891 Dr Harris arrived at Salisbury, as the 
town was now officially designated, the " Fort " hav- 
ing been dropped, and this gentleman, who was then 
acting as secretary of the Chartered Company, took 
charge of the administration of the country during 
the continued absence of Mr Colquhoun in Manica- 
land. While acting in this capacity Dr Harris set 
about the introduction of various changes in the 
granting of farm rights, which tended to improve the 
relations between the Government and the settlers, 
these having become rather strained. Farms were 
now allowed to be pe^ed within three miles of the 
fort, but here the occupation clause was rigorously 
enforced. This proved a very popular concession, 



MANICALAND ACQUIRED. 63 

however, and the land around Salisbury was quickly 
located. 

During the early part of 1891 an event occurred 
that served, for the time being at anyrate, to divert 
the attention of those at Salisbury from the hard- 
ships they had endured and the grievances they 
already began to consider that they had against the 
Company, and this was a call on the part of the 
Government for volunteers to occupy the newly 
acquired territory of Manicaland, which was situated 
on the healthy uplands to the south-east of Salis- 
bury. This country was under the control of a 
chief named Umtassa, and a concession of the mineral 
rights of his country had been gained from him on 
behalf of the Chartered Company by Dr Jameson, 
Mr Colquhoun, and Mr Selous — the last named 
having gone straight to his kraal on quitting the 
Pioneer Column at the end of the previous August. 

The country of Manicaland was a fine one, and 
well suited for European colonisation, but there were 
destined to be difficulties in the way of its occupa- 
tion. The Portuguese colonists on the East Coast 
had viewed with considerable disfavour the incur- 
sion of the British into Mashonaland, and when 
they heard that a concession had been gained from 
Umtassa they decided on interfering ; so they claimed 
the whole of the territory of Manicaland as belonging 
to them, and announced their intention of expelling 
by force any of the British South Africa Company's 
forces that might enter it This news was quickly 
followed by the intimation that two Portuguese 
officers. Colonels Paiva d'Andrade and Gouveia, were 



^ 



64 FOUNDING A COLONY. 

marching into the country with the avowed object of 
compelling Umtassa to publicly recant his concession 
to the British. On their way this force halted at 
MajBsi-Kessi, a fort on the eastern frontier of the coun- 
try where the British had left a small garrison, and 
they compelled this handful of Britishers to retreat, 
while they hauled down the British flag and trampled 
it underfoot. Such conduct as this last excited a 
strong feeling of resentment not only in Mashona- 
land, but throughout the empire at large. 

The British South Africa Company at once decided 
on taking prompt measures to avenge this insult to 
the flag and to dispose of the Portuguese pretensions, 
so a force of about thirty police under the command 
of Major Forbes was despatched to Umtassa's kraal. 
Arriving there, this handful of Britishers found the 
two Portuguese officers supported by nearly 300 
native levies, chiefly from Angola, preparing to make 
Umtassa recant the concession. With a daring that 
was almost reckless Major Forbes took the bull by 
the horns, and at once placed the two officers under 
arrest. Before they fully realised what had hap- 
pened, he had sent them oflF to Salisbury under a strong 
escort, while he disarmed their soldiers and turned 
them out of Manicaland. Not satisfied with this, he 
puslied forward to Massi-Kessi and took possession 
of the fort once mora He then conceived the bold 
idea of making an attack on Beira, the Portuguese 
port at the mouth of the Pungwe river. 

What with providing an escort for the two Portu- 
guese officers and leaving a garrison at Massa-Kessi, 
Major Forbes's little foroe had become rather de- 



FRICTION WITH THE PORTUGUESE. 65 

pleted, and he found that the whole army at his dis- 
posal for the seige of Beira numbered but six 
troopers. The exploits of these seven men read 
more like a chapter from the lives of the immortal 
Three Musketeers than a sober record of events 
that happened within the last decade ; for they 
marched through an unknown country for 150 
miles to the Pungwe river, and there embarked in 
canoes for Beira, which was well garrisoned with 
white Portuguese troops, and there seems to be little 
doubt but that these men would have captured the 
town, had it not been for the interference of the 
Government. They saw complications ahead as a 
result of this action on the part of Major Forbes; 
so he was ordered to return to Salisbury immedi- 
ately, and had perforce no alternative but to obey. 

Negotiations followed between the British South 
Africa Company and the Portuguese authorities, and 
in the end the two Portuguese officers were allowed 
to return to their own country, while the Company 
was permitted to hold the country ceded to them by 
Umtassa, Massi-Kessi being made the frontier, while 
the fort itself reverted to Portugal. The Portuguese, 
however, were seriously aflfronted by the action of 
the tiny British force which had made laughing- 
stocks of its soldiers, and therefore, in spite of the 
settlement which had been arrived at, steps were 
taken to equip a force to finally drive the British 
from the territory and to avenge the manner in 
which Ifajor Forbes had treated them. It was to 
resist this force that the Pioneer Column was being 
raised in Salisbury. 

E - 




66 FOUNDING A CX)LONY. 

Several volunteered for the work, and at length 
fifty men, composed jointly of Pioneers and police, 
with a 7-pounder gun, were drawn up under the 
command of Captain Heyman; and these were de- 
spatched to Manicaland to watch the movements of 
a large Portuguese force that was collecting near 
Massi-Eessi, and to take possession of the country. 
This little force halted on Chua Hill, a short distance 
from Massi-Eessi, and found that the Portuguese had 
assembled an army of 100 whites and about 400 
natives. At length the Portuguese were ready for 
striking a blow at the audacious English, and a 
message was sent to Captain Heyman telling him 
that unless he immediately withdrew the whole of 
his forces from Manicaland he would be attacked. 
Captain Heyman bluntly replied that he would do 
nothing of the kind, so the Portuguese resolved on 
making an attack on the British position. Captain 
Heyman had, with considerable foresight, taken his 
position on the upper slopes of the hill, and this 
meant that the enemy would have to fight their 
way up the slope, a condition that served in some 
degree to neutralise the great odds, which were fully 
ten to one. 

The fatuity of the Portuguese leaders was truly 
wonderful. They had with them no less than 
eleven quick-firing guns of the most modern descrip- 
tion, and these, coupled with their great numerical 
superiority, might well have gained them the day ; 
but as the commander considered that the guns might 
hamper his movements, they were left behind 
when the force advanced! It swept rapidly over 



VICTORY OF THE BRITISH FORCE. 67 

the plain at the foot of the hill, and commenced a 
hot fire on the British position; but the aim was 
very bad, and only little execution was done. The 
Britishers, on the other hand, reserved their fire until 
the enemy got well within range, and then poured 
some deadly volleys into the thick of them. The 
accuracy of the British aim and the rapidity of their 
fire disconcerted the native levies, who made one 
or two spasmodic rushes and then wavered. The 
7-pounder then opened fire upon them with canister, 
and this caused them to break and flee in the utmost 
confusion. The whites, however, were made of 
sterner stuff, and they made one or two desperate 
efforts to rush the British position, but were 
always met with a withering fire, and were soon 
compelled to retreat. Some parting volleys were 
sent after them, and then Captain Heyman advanced 
in skirmishing order across the plain in the direction 
of the fort, which capitulated forthwith. 

This fort was at once occupied and the British 
flag hoisted, while precautions were taken against 
a counter-attack, and a quantity of loot, including 
the eleven quick-firing guns, was taken possession of. 
This decisive victory, which occurred on May 14, 
1891, was received with jubilation in Salisbury, and 
indeed throughout Africa. 

About this time, also, an attack was made on two 
boats, the Agnes and the Shark, which were pro- 
ceeding up the Pungwe river with stores for Sir 
John Willoughby, and these were conveyed back 
to Beira, where they were detained. Affairs were 
becoming serious, for in Lisbon the Government 



68 FOUNDING A COLONY. 

was getting together a force of some 600 or 700 
men for service in Africa; but fortunately Lord 
Salisbury at the Foreign Ofi&ce was keeping a sharp 
eye on the movements of Portugal, and he promptly 
put an end to the affair by sending an ultimatum to 
Lisbon that had the effect of putting matters on 
a proper footing. In the following month, June, a 
treaty was concluded between the two countries 
whereby the seaboard of South-East Africa as far as 
the Natal boundary was left in the hands of Portugal, 
while the highlands, with the exception of a reserva- 
tion at Massi-Kessi, were ceded to the British. A 
rectification of the frontier of the territories north 
of the Zambesi was also effected. 

This was not the only trouble with foreign States 
that the Company was destined to have about this 
time, for a slight difficulty occurred with the 
Transvaal Boers. Several of the inhabitants of the 
northern portion of the Transvaal had shown a 
disposition to trek across the Limpopo and establish 
themselves in a small colony in the southern part 
of Mashonaland. This raised a warm protest from 
the British South Africa Company, and Mr Rhodes 
made a significant speech at Cape Town on the 
subject, in the course of which he warned President 
Kruger that " no more republics would be permitted 
to be established in South Africa." A strong body 
of British South Africa Police were sent down to 
the Limpopo to guard the " drifts " or fords and to 
turn back any Boers who might attempt to cross, 
and in this work they were ably supported by a 
contingent of the Bechuanaland Border Police. Of 



DIFFICULTY WITH THE TRANSVAAL. 



69 



course the Boer President disclaimed any intention 
of sanctioning such a proceeding on the part of his 
burghers, and indeed expressed a mild surprise that 
such a thing should have occurred ; but it was only 
by the prompt action of the Chartered Company 
that serious difficulties with the Transvaal were 
prevented. 



70 



CHAPTER V. 



WAR WITH THE MATABELE. 



The diflRculty with the Portuguese once disposed of, 
the settlers in Mashonaland and the newly acquired 
territory of Manicaland commenced to develop the 
mines and to exploit the agricultural value of their 
adopted country. The last few months of 1891 
were days of great prosperity, and during this 
time Dr Jameson superseded Mr Colquhoun as 
Administrator. All went as merrily as the pro- 
verbial marriage - bell for a time : then the tide 
began to turn, and, as before mentioned, an exodus 
commenced to take placa Before the end of this 
year Mr Bliodes paid his first visit to the country 
that mainly through his efforts had been added 
to the empire. He only made a short stay at 
Salisbury, but during that time a meeting of the 
settlers in and around the town was held, and 
as a result a deputation was formed to lay their 
more or less substantial grievances before him. 

The chief of these grievances was the 50-per- 
cent clause of the Government. This was held 
to be a great burden on the mining section of 




THE 50-PEK-CENT CLAUSE. 71 

the community. The fact that the Chartered Com- 
pany was preparing to spend thousands of pounds 
on railways and suchlike for the express purpose 
of lessening the cost of the transport of mining 
machinery and other heavy goods, which, had they 
to be sent up from Cape Colony by waggon, would 
cost a prohibitive sum, did not weigh in the 
least with these short-sighted agitators. They pre- 
feiTed to take the line that it was they who pro- 
vided both the capital and the labour for working 
the reefs, and that so soon as the mine began to 
repay them, they were called upon to hand over 
one -half of whatever they earned to a company 
far away in London, and one which had not raised 
a finger to assist them in any way. 

This was altogether a wrong view to take of 
the case. The prospectors were incessantly expati- 
ating on the great benefit that would accrue from 
the construction of a railway from Salisbury to 
the East Coast, but they overlooked the great cost 
of such an enterprise, as also did they the fact 
that the 60,'*p6r-cent clause was almost the only 
form in which they contributed to the revenue of 
the country in which they were winning their liveli- 
hood. It should be said, however, that it was 
mainly the settlers themselves who were in an- 
tagonism to the Company over this question : the 
syndicates and companies that were formed in Lon- 
don or elsewhere to exploit the mines saw things 
in a far more reasonable light, and accepted the 
50 -per -cent clause cheerfully, as being requisite 
for the rapid opening up of the country. When 



72 WAR WITH THE MATABELK. 

the deputation waited upon Mr Bhodes to explain 
their discontent, he met them with perfect courtesy 
and explained to them frankly what the position of 
the Company was, and it is to their credit to 
say that many of the delegates accepted Mr Ehodes's 
statements. On the other hand, several settlers, 
seeing that the Company would not repeal the 
obnoxious clause or reduce the amount, shook the 
dust of the country from their feet and returned 
to the south. 

Prior to this set-back the country had been pro- 
gressing splendidly. The trans-continental tel^iaph 
line was rapidly approaching Salisbury; on the 
goldfields the chaff was being separated from the 
wheat; while in Manicaland the agricultural pros- 
pects were very bright. In the latter province a 
township had been surveyed at UmtaU, and buildings 
were rapidly springing up there, while the neigh- 
bourhood round about was being actively prospected 
for gold with a fair amount of success. A scheme 
was on foot to connect Umtali to Beira by railway, 
and to bring this line eventually forward to Salis- 
bury; and preparations were being made for the 
survey of the land for this purpose. In fact, every- 
thing seemed to be going on most auspiciously, when 
an incident unfortunately occurred in Salisbury which 
once more strained the relations between the settlers 
and the Grovemment : this was the disbandment of 
the police. 

By the terms of the Charter the British South 

Africa Company was compelled to keep up an ade- 

^ quate armed force for the protection of the colonists. 



FINANCIAL RETRENCHMENT. 73 



-a very necessary proviso, but one which pressed 



heavily on the finances of the Company. From one 
cause or another the original capital of the Com- 
pany, £1,000,000 sterling, had already had great 
inroads made upon it, while the income had been 
practically nil, and it was clearly seen that great 
retrenchments would have to be made. Mr Rhodes 
threw himself into this question of husbanding the 
finances with characteristic energy, and mainly 
through his efibrts the expenditure was reduced 
from about a quarter of a million per annum to 
oonAthing like £30,000. Of course this reduction 
meaiit wholesale pruning and trimming, and the 
police, which formed by far the heaviest drain on 
the Company's coffers, was one of the first items 
to which attention was given. 

A few months previous to this a proposition had 
been mooted in Salisbury to form a volunteer force 
among those resident in the immediate vicinity for 
the protection of the town from any possible incur- 
sion on the part of Lobengula and his impis ; and this 
idea was eagerly taken up, though it was openly 
asserted later on that those who suggested the 
scheme did so at the instigation of the Government. 
The corps was constituted, however, and christened 
the Mashonaland Horse, and Major Forbes was 
elected by the popular vote of the members of the 
force to be the commanding officer. The Company 
welcomed the idea of this corps, and aided the for- 
mation and equipment in every manner possible. So 
soon as the corps was formed the Government took . . 
the step that brought down a storm upon their \^ 






74 WAR WITH THE MATABBLK. 

heads, for they disbanded a large proportion of the 
police force, and contended that, with the Mashonaland 
Horse in existence, a large body of police to protect 
Salisbury from assault was no longer required. Both 
the men forming the corps and the outside settlers 
took this very ill, and declared openly that the mem- 
bers of the Mashonaland Horse had been duped by 
the Company, and that they were expected to do for 
nothing what the police had been paid to do. The 
breaking up of the police, too, affected the com- 
mercial portion of the community considerably, for 
nearly the whole of the discharged men immediately 
quitted the country, and as hitherto the police had 
formed a considerable section of the population, there 
was at once a falling-off in trade. It is difficult to 
tell how this dispute would have ended had it not 
been for the appearance of another and greater cloud 
on the Mashonaland horizon — the attitude of the 
Matabela 

Many of these Matabele had entered the service 
of the white men at the mines — for it soon became 
apparent that while the Mashonas made excellent 
husbandmen, they were of little use at the mines, 
so that it was necessary for other natives to be en- 
gaged. Those who seemed best suited for mining 
were the Shangaans from the northern banks of the 
Zambesi, but they were comparatively few in num- 
ber, so the Matabele were employed when Shan- 
gaans were unobtainable. These Matabele were, 
however, a source of great trouble, both to the Native 
Commissioners who had been appointed in each 
mining district to supervise and protect the natives, 



LAWLESSNESS OF THE MATABBLE. 75 

and to the miners employing them. They were 
incorrigible thieves, and would suddenly depart with 
all and everything on which they could lay their 
hands. In this manner solitary prospectors in the 
open country, without any other Europeans near 
them, were at the mercy of these "boys" (as the 
native labourers in Africa are termed), and it was 
nothing uncommon for information to reach Salisbury 
that a white man had been robbed and left destitute 
on the veldt by the Matabele boys he had employed. 
As time went on they became more daring, for the 
magistrates in one or two cases had shown unwar- 
rantable leniency with such of the natives as had 
been brouglit before them for stealing (and leniency 
in the Kafir mind is synonymous with weakness), 
so that the natives had come to think they could 
do pretty much as they liked without fear of re- 
tribution. Eeports of murders and attempted mur- 
ders of whites by Matabele consequently began to 
arrive at Salisbury, until strong demands were ad- 
dressed to the Government for steps to be taken to 
put this lawlessness down and to teach the Matabele 
a much-needed lesson. Unless the whites managed 
to catch the " boys " in the very act of robbing them, 
moreover — and this they were but rarely able to do 
— ^it was next to impossible to arrest them, for they 
made straight for the Matabeleland border, over 
which Lobengula had forbidden the whites to cross. 
Things went on in this manner throughout 1892 
and the beginning of 1893, when the attitude of the 
Matabele served to precipitate matters. In all the 
communications between the representatives of tha 



76 WAB WITH THE MATABELK 

Chartered Company and the natives of the Mashona, 
Makalaka, and Banyai tribes, a great point was made 
of the fact that the white men were going to pre- 
vent the Matabele from raiding them and stealing 
their women and cattle. In consequence, these tribes 
became exultant over the freedom from attack that 
they were promised, and put on very insolent airs 
towards Lobengula and his impis, for they thought 
that they were now safe from the Matabele venge- 
ance. This conduct from the tribes that Lobengula 
and his nation had learned to look upon as their 
slaves and dogs, to be beaten, robbed, and massacred 
whenever it pleased their masters to do so, came 
as a complete surprise to them, and greatly incensed 
the young soldiers. Lobengula, however, saw the 
reason for this, and guessed that the Mashonas were 
assured of the white man's protection, and therefore 
80 long as was possible he restrained his impis from 
attacking the tribes. At length, however, they got 
out of hand, and he was obliged to give his consent 
to their entering Mashonaland and inflicting condign 
punishment on the impudent Mashonas, who now 
refused to pay any tax to Lobengula or to obey 
his commands in any way. 

The impis selected for this work of vengeance 
were strictly enjoined by the king not to harm 
the whites or to interfere with them or their prop- 
erty ; and in July 1893 the Matabele army crossed 
the border and entered Mashonaland. They made 
straight for Victoria, around which was the chief 
dwelling-place of the Mashona tribe ; and the news 
of this advance of the Matabele sent a feeling 



k 



MASSACBE OF THE MASHONAa 77 

of something akin to consternation through the 
whites in the country, and the development of the 
country was stopped. Messages were sent off to 
Lobengula to recall his soldiers, but he replied that 
no harm would happen to the white people, and that 
he had a right to punish his " slaves " ; but in spite 
of that the settlers felt that this was but a pre- 
liminary movement to see what the attitude of the 
British would be before commencing a regular attack 
on them, with the object of driving them from the 
country and annexing their guns and blankets, which 
had excited the cupidity of the Matabele. 

When the impis arrived at Victoria they made at 
once for the settlement of the Mashonas, who saw 
the unexpected arrival of their bloodthirsty foes with 
wild cries and shrieks of dread and despair ; and the 
Matabele were soon at their favourite pastime of 
stabbing and mutilating in horrible fashion the 
defenceless men, women, and children of the tribe, 
while they seized the cattle of their victims, together 
with their young women and girls. 

The white men in Victoria were, as may be 
imagined, indignant and wrathful in the extreme at 
this massacre before their eyes, and the Government 
were called upon to put an end to it. Dr Jameson 
at once answered the demand by proceeding to the 
scene of the massacre attended by a handful of 
police. He sent out to summon the leading indunas 
of the Matabele army to an indaba, and when they 
were assembled he told them plainly that they must 
at once return to their own country and cease for all 
time from slaying and pillaging among the Mashonas. 



78 WAK WITH THE MATABELB. 

Otherwise, he warned them, he should take them and 
hang them. This bold speech of the Administrator 
had its desired effect in one or two cases, for some of 
the lesser indunas, with considerable difficulty, drew 
off their men, who were very loth to leave, for the 
lust of blood was upon them. These withdrawals, 
however, only numbered a few hundred men, for 
the great body of the indunas and the men under 
them were very defiant, and openly threatened 
that it would not be long before they served the 
white men as they were then serving the Mashonas. 
In the end Dr Jameson gave the impis until the 
evening of that day to prepare to leave the country, 
otherwise he told them that he should order tlic 
white police to drive them out, and the indaba 
then broke up, 

A small force of police under Captain Lendy was 
in Victoria at this time, and these were held in 
readiness to enforce the Administrator's words if the 
Matabele refused to leave. The indunas quitted the 
indaba with the idea that the few whites in Victoria 
would never dare to proceed to the lengths that Dr 
Jameson had hinted at, and they were so accustomed 
to victories over impotent foes that the idea of any 
one successfully resisting them, much more defeating 
them, seemed absurd. The calm tones of the Ad- 
ministrator, however, had occasioned them a certain 
amount of uneasiness, so they determined to test the 
whites and see what really would happen. The 
main body of the impi was withdrawn for a short 
distance, and a sort of a rear-guard of a few hundred 
warriors was left behind to test the courage of the 



THE POLICE IN ACTION. 79 

white men and to see whether Dr Jameson was as 
good as his word. At sunset this rear-guard was 
still pillaging and burning the Mashona kraals and 
slaying such of the inhabitants as they came across, 
so the little body of police rode out against them. 
The spot where this took place was an open plain 
well adapted for the movements of the horses of the 
troopers, and the police spread out into skirmishing 
order and advanced directly towards the Matabele, 
who collected to oppose them. As the Britishers 
rode towards the natives the latter opened fire 
upon them, and in retaliation the troopers fired 
some volleys into their midst and charged them. 
This firing on the Matabele by the police was 
strongly condemned at the time in certain quarters 
in England, and Dr Jameson and Captain Lendy 
were roundly accused of "ruthlessly shooting down 
the defenceless Matabele" — a sweeping charge, for 
which there does not seem to be any foundation. It 
was also declared that the native soldiers were 
" butchered " even when they threw down their arms 
and craved for mercy. This is not by any means the 
case. It is certain that the police only fired on the 
natives when they had been first fired upon by them, 
and their conduct during the whole affair was only that 
which Dr Jameson had given the indunas to under- 
stand it would be if they disregarded his orders 
for them to retire. In all cases where quarter was 
asked for, moreover, there is not one tittle of evidence 
to show that it was not readily given, but in the 
hands of some people at this time any stick seems to 
have been good enough to beat the Rhodesian dog with. 



80 WAR WITH THB MATABELB. 

After this outbreak the requests which had been 
made for some time previously for the Company to 
dispose once and for all of the Matabele incubus that 
was retarding the progress of the country was now 
renewed, and public meetings were called at both 
Victoria and Salisbury to enforce this demand. The 
settlers expressed their views very forcibly on the 
question, for they saw that their homesteads would 
never be safe nor the country tranquil while the 
Matabele impis were allowed to hover on the frontier 
ready to sweep across the country whenever they felt 
so inclined. They spoke out plainly and insisted 
on the Company crushing the Matabele power with- 
out further delay, otherwise they threatened either 
to appeal to the Imperial Government to send up 
forces to protect them and to take over the country 
as a Crown Colony, or to combine together and quit 
MashoDaland in a body. 

The (government at Salisbury was therefore con- 
fronted with a grave crisis, and Dr Jameson tele- 
graphed the position of affairs to Mr Ehodes at Cape 
Town and asked for advice. He told him of the 
attitude of the settlers and of the threats held out, 
and inquired whether he should enter ICatabeleland 
with the object of breaking up the nation. Mr 
Ehodes's reply was laconic in the extreme, being 
merely a telegram bearing the words, " Eead Luke 
xiv. 31." Dr Jameson was surprised by this 
enigmatic answer, but he knew Mr Rhodes's manner, 
so he looked up the indicated verse and found it 
to run as follows: "Or what king, going to make 
war against another king, sitteth not down first, and 



"LUKK XIV. 31. 81 

consulteth whether he be able with ten thousand 
to meet him that cometh against him with twenty 
thousand ? " Dr Jameson understood the question 
that was implied by this thoroughly. Could he with 
the forces at Ids command, considerably under 1000 
men, hope to cope with the whole fighting force of 
the Matabele nation ? 

After careful consideration Dr Jameson decided 
that he could do this, so in equally laconic terms 
he telegraphed back to Mr Ehodes, "All right. 
Have read L\ike xiv. 31 "; and thus in two abrupt 
telegraphic messages the breaking up of the Mata- 
bele nation was decided upon, and the preparation 
for the invasion of Matabeleland commenced. 

It seems only probable that this step would have 
been decided on sooner, before the outbreak at 
Victoria, had it not been that the hands of thp 
Company were to a certain extent tied by the 
Imperial Government. Lord Eipon was at this 
time at the Colonial Office, and he seems all 
through to have been hopelessly out of touch with 
the real trend of affairs in Mashonaland. Sir Henry 
Loch, the High Commissioner at the Cape, had had 
instance after instance of Matabele hostility reported 
to him, until he at length came to see with the rest that 
the Matabele power must be destroyed, and though 
none could accuse him of being in the slightest degree 
jingoistic, he decided that sooner or later this must 
be done, and that it would be for the good of the 
whole of South Africa to have the fighting over and 
done with as soon as possible. He reported these 
views to the Colonial Office, but they seemed 

F 



82 WAR WITH THX MATABKLS. 

to carry little weight; for, true to the policy 
that governed (or misgoverned, whichever be the 
correct term) South Africa for so long, the opinion 
of the British representative on the spot, who 
might have been supposed to know something alx)ut 
the matter, was ignored and brushed aside. Lord 
Kipon, in reply to the despatches of Sir Henry Loch, 
ordered him to inform the British South Africa 
Company "that unless they were attacked, no ag- 
gressive movement was to be made without your 
[Sir Henry Loch's] previous sanction and approval" 
This was very right and proper, for it would have 
served to remove any suspicion of fillibustering on 
the part of the Chartered Company ; but the most 
remarkable part of the message was still to come, 
for Lord Kipon continued, " If your sanction for an 
offensive movement is asked, communicate with me 
before replying," thus meaning that weeks, or maybe 
months, — for Downing Street is not notorious for 
its alacrity of movement, — would elapse before the 
Company would be in a position to follow up any 
advantage that it might have gained over the 
Matabele. But at length things l)ecame so bad 
that even Lord Bipon was brought to see what 
the upshot of it all would be, and reluctantly the 
imperial sanction to Dr Jameson's advance into 
Matabeleland was given. 

There were other and serious difficulties in the 
way of this advance, however, besides the want of 
men and the imperial sanction, and of these the 
outside public was not aware. The Company realised 
as well as» perhaps better than, the settlers that 



MR EHODKS AHD THE NKW CODNTKY. 83 

there would be no peace in Mashonaland until 
the daj'8 of the supremacy of the Matabele nation 
were over ; but — and it was a momentous " but " 
— their finances were at a very low ebb, and totally 
unfitted to stand the drain of a war. The settlers 
did not look at the financial side of the question, 
and would have made light of it if they had, for 
a Government is always supposed to be rolling in 
wealth, but the ofBcials of the Company knew 
better, and therefore their disinclination to precip- 
itate matters can be well understood. 

Mr Rhodes, however, once more proved to be the 
sheet-anchor of the country, and so soon as he 
realised that the Matabele must be conquered, he 
determined on putting his hand into his pocket and 
providing the funds for the campaign. This, too, 
without ostentation or parade. He merely indi- 
cated to the Board of the Chartered Company in 
London that the money for the march on Bulawayo 
would be forthcoming, and left them to draw their 
own inferences as to the source. 

At this time, too, Mr Rhodes was already spend- 
ing a vast amount of money out of his private purse 
on the new country. He was providing four-fifths 
of the capital for the railway from Belra to Umtali, 
as well as a like proportion of the capital for the 
trans- continental telegraph ; just previously he bad 
found the greater part of the money for the exten- 
sion of the railway from Cape Colony northwards 
to Mafeking; and now, on the top of all this, he 
was to find this money for the prosecution of the 
war against the Matabele. It is often remarked 



84 WAB WITH THE 3CATABKLB. 

that the ex-£iupres8 Eugenie of France was at one 
time, before its disastrous termination, in the habit 
of referring to the war of 1870 as " ma guerre," but 
Mr Rhodes had a far better right to refer to the first 
Matabele war in those words. All must admire the 
loyalty and self-sacrifioe which Mr Khodes exhibited 
at this time, as indeed he has done at all others, 
towards the new country, of which he was the lead* 
ing spirit 

So soon as the necessary funds for the campaign 
weie assured, the preliminaries were entered upon. 
It was decided to fonn three columns of about 250 
men each, of the mounted infantry type, — by far the 
most suitable for this class of warfan?, — while each 
would be accompanied by Maxim and other quick- 
firinir eunsL The first column was cadled the Salisburr 
Horse, and was lar^y composed of the meml>er§ 
of the Mashonaland Hoise^ which was disbdindt^ 
about this time: and Major Forbes tcok command 
of this. The second column was recnhoi fn-m 
Victoria and district, and was called the V:::cr:A 
Rangerss being undo* the command of ihe ctlljir: 
and unfortunate Major Alan Wilson: wlile lir.-e 
thinl was being formed in Johann^bor^ £i>i :be 
neighbourtKod of the Band by Commandani Ri^. 
a Dutchman. Tliese columns. acoi>idin£! to the r-^i:: 
of ctmpaign« were u> join foroes at Ircm-Mirye Hill 
on the M;&tAl?^lelaDd frontio', to ibe saaih-wv^ Ki 
Salisburr and almiis^ in a direct line lir:wrt-:: iLi: 
town and BclawiTa while Cdonel G\xJd- Adai:i> w^ 
Ijo adranoe C4i BulawiTo from the sic«ih-wes$ wiib a 

m 

eoluua of tsbe BedmaiuJaDd Botder Police. 



PANIC IN SALISBUBY. 85 

Before commencing this march the Salisbury 
column was moved down to Fort Charter for a 
short time, and the men left the capital on Sep- 
tember 5, 1893. Each man of the column carried 
ten days* provisions on his horse with him, together 
with a hundred rounds of cartridges, while the heavy 
guns of the column consisted of a 7-pounder, two 
Maxim guns mounted on galloping carriages, a 
Gardner gun, and a Nordenfeldt. 

So soon as the column had quitted Salisbury a 
sort of panic seems to have seized those who remained 
behind, and who were forbidden by the Chartered 
Company to attempt to leave the country in its 
then unsettled condition. It was realised that should 
the advancing force meet with a reverse at the hands 
of the Matabele, the latter would at once make a 
dash for Salisbury, and, flushed with their victory 
over the white force, would massacre all whom they 
found there. It was decided to fortify the jail, 
so that it might offer a retreat upon which the 
population might fall back and there make a last 
stand if the worst should come to the worst; and 
this was done in as effective a manner as the means 
at their disposal would allow of. 

The Salisbury column spent a month at Fort 
Charter drilling and getting the men and the horses 
accustomed to the work that lay before them, and 
then on October 2 the force moved forward towards 
the rendezvous. Elaborate precautions were taken 
on the march against surprise by the Matabele, and 
laagers were formed every night in a similar manner 
to that adopted by the Pioneer Column. 



86 WAB WITH THE MATABELE. 

As the Salisbury column marched forward, that 
from Victoria did likewise. This latter body con- 
sisted of 415 Europeans, and was armed with a 
7-pounder screw gun, a Hotchkiss, and three Maxim 
guns on galloping carriages, together with a force of 
about 400 Mashonas under Mr Quested 

These columns combined at Iron-Mine Hill, as 
had been arranged, on October 16, and the final 
preparations for the advance were made. The force 
was placed under the command of Major Forbes, 
while Dr Jameson assumed the direction of the cam- 
paign. On October 15 the first casualty occurred 
to the force, a scouting party being attacked by a 
band of Matabele, with the result that Captain 
Campbell was killed. The objective of the column 
at this time was the Shangani river, and as they 
advanced through the Matabele country all the 
kraals they met with were destroyed. Contrary 
to expectations, the Matabele did not attack the 
column, but contented themselves with firing on 
isolated scouting parties, and in this way the force 
sustained a severe loss in the death of Captain 
Burnett, who was shot while out scouting. From 
the accounts of those who were with him, it seems 
that he had ridden up to a hut which was to all 
appearance deserted, and was about to dismount 
in front of it, when he was fired on from the 
interior, the bullet striking him in the abdomen. 
This was the gentleman who took over the guid- 
ance of the Pioneer Column when Mr Selous retired, 
and he was a first-rate scout. 

The Matabele were very badly generalled at this 



THE SHANGANI CROSSED. 



87 



time, and, indeed, throughout the war; for they 
threw away several opportunities of attacking the 
invading force while it was passing through the 
thick bush country, when they might have inflicted 
considerable loss on it, with the result that later 
they had to fight against the British on the open 
plains, when the conditions were much less in their 
favour. The Shangani was reached and crossed on 
October 24, and there the column halted to await 
the reports of the scouts who had been sent out 
to ascertain the movements of the enemy. 



88 



•». 



CHAFTER VI 



WAR WITH THE MATABELE continued. 



^* 



The Shangani was crossed in safety, and a double 
laager was formed and protected by thorn-bushes. 
As the column had approached the river a number 
of Mashonas who had been captured and carried 
off by the Matabele were rescued and restored to 
such of their friends and relations as were with 
the native contingent under Mr Quested, while a 
herd of cattle was captured by the column. 

The native camp on the Shangani was situated 
some 600 or 700 yards from the laager, and when 
preparations came to be made for spending the night 
of October 24 here, it did not seem as though there 
was a hostile native anywhere near. As the troopers 
retired to rest they could hear the laughter and 
unceasing chatter of the natives, and the next thing 
that those on guard within the laager heard was 
screaming and cries of terror coming from the native 
kraal, where just previously joy and gladness had 
been reigning supreme. The alarm was given, and 
the laager was at once manned and scouts were 
sent forward to see what the occasion of the hub- 



NIGHT ATTACK ON THE LAAGES. 89 

bub was, when it was found that a strong body of 
Matabele had suddenly swoo^d down on the helpless 
Mashmias and were stabbing and killing right and 
left. 

From what was afterwards gathered it appeared 
that tbis force of Matabele had been lying concealed 
in an adjacent raviae waiting for the laager to be 
wrapped in slumber previous to making a sudden 
attack, and so they settled down to wait until the 
noise among the Mashonas should have subsided ; 
but the joy of the latter at meeting the long-lost 
fellow-members of their tribe had prevented them «* 

from going to sleep, and it seemed to the impatient 
watchers as though they were going to keep up the 
merriment all night. At length the Matabele saw 
the dawn approaching ; and rather than be baulked 
of their prey, they made a rush on the kraal, in- 
tending to sweep on to the laager later. Here, 
however, they showed exceedingly bad generalship, 
for almost as soon as they commenced their work 
of slaughter among the Mashonas, the British camp 
was wide awake, and not only prepared to receive 
the onslaught, but able, in fact, to send out a 
detachment to clear the Matabele from the kraaL 
Advancing steadily and pouring withering volleys 
into the serried ranks of the Matabele, this force 
soon beat them back and rescued the Mashonas from 
their clutche& 

While this was going forward a daring attempt 
was being made to attack the laager from another 
side. About 300 Matabele without their shields 
collected on a small hill some little distance from 



90 WAR WITH THE MATABELE. 

the camp, and as the daylight grew marched directly 
forward to the laager. So cleverly was this move- 
ment carried out that for the moment even Major 
Forbes was deceived into believing them to be 
friendly natives ; until they got close up to the 
waggons, when they calmly halted and commenced 
firing into the camp. This sudden attack took the 
garrison somewhat by surprise, and had the aim of 
the Matabele been better they might have done 
considerable execution; but, fortunately for their 
antagonists, the Matabele had a superstition to the 
effect that when using a rifle the higher the back- 
sight was raised the better would be the aim, and 
consequently the great majority of their bullets flew 
harmlessly over the laager and dropped on the other 
side. Major Forbes immediately detailed some 200 
rifles to drive back this party of natives, and this 
was quickly done ; for as the bullets began to fall 
among them, and their numbers were getting thinned 
out, the remainder retired over the hill from whence 
they had come with considerable precipitation. A 
small party of cavalry was sent out to follow this 
impi and break it up, but once beyond the range 
of the death -dealing rifles of the white men, the 
Matabele re-formed, and turned on the cavalry and 
caused them to retire on the laager, losing several 
of their horses as they did so. 

This retreat of the British horsemen served to 
revive the flagging courage of the Matabele, and 
they dashed up at the laager with increased vigour, 
but as they approached the Maxims were turned 
on them and literally mowed them down like grass 



THE FINAL ATTACK REPULSED. 91 

before a scythe. About this time, too, Captain 
Lendy had got the 1 -pounder Hotchkiss gun into 
working order, and having got the range of some 
of the more distant bands of Matabele, the shells 
from this gun were soon dropping among them, 
much to their consternation, for they were unused 
to artillery fire. After a temporary retirement, a 
third and final attack was made on the laager, and 
this time they got very close indeed ; but the com- 
bined fire of the rifles and the Maxims was once 
more too much for them, and they were compelled 
to retire once more, this time not to return. As 
they made for the bush the cavalry sallied forth 
and followed them up, and the natives were too 
dispirited to turn on the horsemen as they had 
previously done. 

Parties of the column then swept, the ground 
round the laager to clear out any Matabele who 
might be lurking about, and the first battle with the 
Matabele was over, and had resulted in the defeat 
of some of Lobenguela's best impis. On the British 
side the casualties amounted to one trooper killed 
and six wounded, the firing of the Matabele, as before 
stated, being very wild, while the destructive fire of 
those within the laager had prevented the natives 
getting close enough in to hurl their spears. In 
addition, about forty or fifty of the Mashonas under 
Mr Quested had been killed in the first attack. The 
losses on the Matabele side were estimated at about 
500 killed and wounded out of the 5000 or so that 
were engaged. 

So soon as the road was reported clear by the 



92 WAR WITH THE MATABBLE. 

scouts the column moved forward on its way to 
Bulawayo. On the day following this engagement 
of the Shangani, a party under Captain Heany 
advanced towards a large military kraal, but on the 
enemy appearing from it in force the patrol was 
compelled to fall back on the main column, which 
instantly put itself into a position of defence ; but 
the Matabele avoided coming to close quarters, and 
eventually retired. The enemy, while declining to 
attack the column, were ever hovering around it 
watching for opportunities to cut up any detached 
parties that they might come across, and collisions 
between the scouts and the Matabele were of con- 
stant occurrence. It was in one of these skirmishes 
that Captain Gwynyth Williams was killed under 
peculiarly sad circumstances. He was out with 
a small scouting party which was attacked by a 
strong body of Matabele and compelled to retire to 
the protection of the column, having to run the 
gantlet of the Matabele fire for about 100 yards or 
so. As this was being done, Captain Williams's 
horse got out of hand, and taking the bit between its 
teeth, dashed straight away for the Matabele lines. 
The natives sent up shouts of joy as they saw the 
solitary white man being borne quickly towards 
them by his runaway steed, and numberless rifles 
were at once turned on the animal and its rider, 
with the result that the horse was shot in the flank. 
Captain Williams managed to disentangle himself as 
the horse rolled over, and making his way to a 
neighbouring rock, planted his back against it, and 
prepared to sell his life dearly. The Matabele were 



THE BATTLE OF BEHBE8I BIYER. 93 

getting very close to him now, but he maintained a 
steady fire with first his magazine rifle and then his 
revolver; but at length he dropped, shot through 
the temple, though not until he had sent several 
natives to their last account 

The Matabele maintained these tactics of keeping 
at a distance from the main body of the column 
until the force was about twenty miles from Bula- 
wayo, when on October 29 the scouts reported that 
the natives were massing in strong force in front of 
the column. The British force was then near the 
Bembesi river, and a laager was immediately formed, 
it then being about midday. It was soon made 
clear that Lobengula had resolved on making a final 
efifort here to maintain the integrity of his kingdom 
and to repel the whites, for no sooner had the con- 
struction of the laager been commenced than a 
strong party of Matabele was seen advancing towards 
them. The guns under Captain Lendy got the range 
of this body at 1800 yards and quickly threw 
some shells into it. As this was being done the 
whole of the bush around suddenly became alive 
with natives, and a rush was made at the laager. 
It was about this time that a serious incident 
happened, the horses of the column being stampeded 
through the stupidity of the friendly natives within 
the laager, who were in great affright at the attack ; 
but Sir John Willoughby and Captain Borrow in- 
stantly dashed off after the animals, accompanied by a 
few troopers. The frightened animals were making 
directly for the Matabele position, but the horsemen 
managed to head them off, and despite the hail of 



94 WAR WITH THK MATABELK, 

Matabele bullets that was falling around them, at 
length managed to turn them back towards the 
laager. As this little party galloped back to the 
shelter of the waggons a strong body of Matabele 
rushed after it and followed it up to within about 
200 yards of the laager, when the combined fire of 
the rifle and the machine-guns proved too much 
for them, and they were beaten back. The Matabele 
fire now became very hot, and the aim was much 
better than it had been on the Shangani. 

The main attack was directed towards the right of 
the British position, and here several desperate rushes 
were made with which it took the defenders all their 
time to cope. In addition to a hot rifle-fire, which 
was being maintained, on this side of the laager were 
posted the Nordenfeldt and Gardner guns, together 
with a Maxim ; but even in the face of this fire the 
Matabele charged forward time and again, getting on 
occasions within 300 yards of the waggons. At 
length the direct aim of the British and the rapidity 
of the discharges of the machine-guns proved too 
much for the Matabele, and they were forced to 
retire. They retreated very sullenly, however, dis- 
daining to take advantage of any cover that offered 
itself from the galling fire which the British kept up, 
and in this fashion they retired to the hills, leaving 
the road to Bulawayo open to the column. 

The attack had been a very severe one, and the 
Matabele had lost heavily, one regiment, the Imbezu, 
which had led the attack and displayed great bravery, 
losing 500 men out of the 700 which it had when 
it commenced the struggle On the British side the 



ADVANCE TO BULAWAYO CONTINTTKD. 95 

casualties amounted to four killed and six wounded. 
A curious fact that was noted in this engagement 
was the way in which the natives stopped firing at 
the laager at times to fire at the shells from the guns 
as they flew over them, under the impression that 
if they could but hit them before they burst they 
would prevent them doing any damage, — a fallacy 
that proved expensive to them before the light was 
over. 

So soon as the news of the result of this action 
reached Bulawayo, Lobengula displayed great chagrin 
at the defeat of his troops, and at once set about 
making preparations for quitting his capital and 
retreating into the bush. As the column marched 
forward across the veldt to the hill of Thabas Induna, 
which ia situated a few miles to the south-east of 
Bulawayo, they came into contact with several 
parties of the enemy; but a few shells from the 
guns were in every case suflBcient to send them 
oflF into the bush, for, to tell the truth, by this time 
the Matabele had almost had their fill of fighting. 

As the column advanced towards Bulawayo a loud 
explosion was heard coming from the direction of 
the capital, and dense volumes of smoke could be 
seen ascending into the air. Two American scouts 
who had accompanied the column, Messrs Bumham 
and Ingram, and who had proved of the greatest 
service, were sent forward by Major Forbes to 
ascertain the cause of the explosion, and they soon 
returned with the intelligence that the Matabele had 
set fire to Bulawayo in four places and then evacuated 
the town, retreating towards the north-east, while 



I, 



96 WAft WITH THE MATABBLK. 

the explosion was caused by the flames reaching a 
stock of 2000 lb. of gunpowder which had been 
stored in the kraaL On November 4, 1893, the 
advance-guard of the column under Captain Borrow 
marched into the deserted town of Bulawayo and 
formally took possession of it, while the main body 
arrived three days later. The former of these dates 
has since been constituted a public holiday in 
Shodesia under the title of " Matabeleland Occupa- 
tion Day." 

On November 8 news reached Dr Jameson of the 
Tuli column, which was then about sixty miles oflP, and 
was making but slow progress owing to the cattle 
having become almost worn out with the amount of 
hard work they had had to do. This force consisted 
of 225 men of the Bechuanaland Border Police, with 
five Maxims and two 7 -pounder guns under Captain 
Coventry, and had been joined at Tuli by Command- 
ant Raafs force of 225 men with one Maxim, while 
the Bechuana king Khama was also with the column 
with about 1800 natives, the whole force being under 
the command of Colonel Goold- Adams. This column 
had not had any serious fighting, but inasmuch as it 
had caused Lobengula to detach a force of about 
8000 men to watch its movements, it had been of 
great service to Dr Jameson's column. 

On leaving Tuli Colonel Goold- Adams had marched 
towards Tati, and at this place had happened one 
of the most regrettable of the many unfortunate in- 
cidents that characterised this campaign, and one, 
moreover, that was seized upon with avidity by that 
section of the British press — fortunately a small and 



'^ 



, .* 



AN UNFORTUNATE OCCUBBENOB.. ' ' 97 

• 

uninfluential one — that was eagerly watching for the 
slightest peg on which to hang a string of calumnies 
against Mr Khodes and the brave men who were then 
fighting against the Matabele. It is, unfortunately, 
so easy to sit at home in a comfortable arm-chair and 
pour forth vigorous denunciations on the heads of 
those of one's countrymen who are battling with 
hordes of savages in a distant land. The incident 
here referred to is the killing of two of "^Xobengula's 
ambassadors by the members of Colonel Goold- 
Adams's force. Lobengula had sent a mission con- 
sisting of a white trader at Bulawayo, Mr Dawson, 
and three indunas, one of whom was his half-brother, 
Ingubogubo, to hold a parley with the leaders of the 
column. Unfortunately when the camp of the column 
was reached Mr Dawson became separated from the 
indunas, who wandered round the camp in aimless 
fashion. Colonel Goold- Adams noticed them roaming 
about, and seeing that they were Matabele, and 
having no knowledge of the expected arrival of any 
mission, took them for spies, and at once ordered 
their arrest until they could give a satisfactory 
account of themselves, as he was perfectly justified 
in doing by all the rules of warfare either against a 
civilised or a savage foe. 

As the troopers advanced to carry out this order 
the indunas became alarmed and made an attempt to 
escape, turning on two of the guards and stabbing 
them to death in their efforts to get away. The 
murder of these two men and the menacing attitude 
of the indunas caused the troopers to go to the 
extreme length of firing upon them, with the result 

G • 



98 WAR WITH THE MATABELK. 

that two of them were killed, while the third, Ingu- 
bogubo, quietly yielded himself up as a prisoner. 
The news of this affair reached the High Commis- 
sioner at Cape Town, Sir Henry Loch, and he 
promptly ordered an inquiry to be held into the 
whole matter. Ingubogubo was sent south, and the 
inquiry was conducted by the Military Secretary to 
the High Commissioner, Major Sawyer, who in the 
end completely exonerated all concerned from blame, 
and expressed his opinion that the whole thing arose 
from a series of extraordinary mischances ; and this 
seems to be the only possible view to take of the 
affair — though ugly insinuations were thrown out in 
England that the column had deliberately murdered 
two defenceless natives. 

The object of Colonel Goold-Adams on leaving the 
Tati district was to push forward to the Singuesi 
river, which he reached on October 29. Having 
arrived there, he was told by his scouts that the 
Matabele were massing across his line of march, and 
on November 1 some of his waggons were attacked 
by a force of the enemy about 600 or 700 strong 
when about a mile and a half from the camp. The 
aim of the Matabele on this occasion was to get if 
possible between the patrol and the camp, so that 
they might cut up the former at their leisure, and a 
warm engagement took place, during which Mr Selous 
was wounded, and one white. Corporal Mundy, was 
killed with an assegai The mounted men in the 
laager at once turned out on the news of this attack 
on the waggons reaching them, and this party suc- 
cessfully covered the retreat of the convoy. The 



A HOT naHT. 99 

Matabele, however, followed up the retiring Britishers 
right to the laager, and charged straight up to within 
150 yards of it, but there they remained. They 
could get no nearer ; the storm of lead from the rifles 
and the Maxims was such as would have baffled ex- 
perienced and war-scarred European veterans, let alone 
an ill-disciplined mob of naked savages. They soon 
began to waver, and then finally broke and made for 
the adjacent hills. As the enemy retired the mounted 
men of the column followed them up, and together 
with Khama's natives commenced sweeping the 
enemy from the surrounding hills, until at length 
after an hour's hard fighting there was not a Mata- 
bele left in the neighbourhood, and the column was 
assured of a safe progress for the next few miles of 
its journey. The engagement, however, had served 
to slake Khama's thirst for fighting, for he forthwith 
announced his intention of withdrawing his troops 
and returning to his own country, alleging as a 
reason that there was an outbreak of smallpox among 
his soldiers. As it turned out, the column met with 
no further opposition, and it arrived at Bulawayo, 
forming a junction with Major Forbes's forces on 
November 12. 

Just before Captain Borrow and the advance- 
guard of the column under Dr Jameson and Major 
Forbes arrived at Bulawayo, Lobengula had fled in 
the direction of the Bubi river, and was reported to 
be hiding there, and thither Dr Jameson sent a mes- 
sage calling upon the king to surrender himself and 
thus avoid further bloodshed, giving him two days 
in which to do so. Lobengula returned no direct 



100 WAB WITH THK MATABELB. 

reply to this demand, but subsequently sent a mes- 
sage asking that two white traders who were well 
known to him, and who were at that time with the 
column, Messrs Fairbaim and Asher, might be sent 
to talk with him, while he also sent another letter to 
Dr Jameson with a present of gold-dust. This second 
letter fell into the hands of two unprincipled troopers 
named Daniels and Wilson, who traitorously sup- 
pressed it and converted the gold-dust to their own 
uses. This crime was afterwards traced to them, and 
they were sentenced to a well-merited fourteen years' 
imprisonment. The treachery of these two men is 
the one dark spot on the history of the campaign, 
and for their conduct there is not the slightest 
palliation : indirectly it led up to the massacre of the 
gallant little band under Major Alan Wilson. 

As the letter intercepted by these two men failed 
to reach Dr Jameson, he naturally decided that Lo- 
bengula was still defiant, and thereupon a patrol of 
300 men was formed under the command of Major 
Forbes to go in pursuit of the Matabele king. This 
patrol was made up as follows: 90 men of the 
Salisbury column under Captains Heany and Spreck- 
ley, 60 men of the Victoria Eangers under Major 
Wilson and Captain Lendy, and 150 men of the 
Tuli column under Commandant Haaf and Captain 
Coventry ; while it was accompaned by a 7-pounder 
and a detachment of Maxims. The route of the 
patrol lay through fairly thick bush, towards the 
Bembesi and Inkwekwesi rivers, and for some time 
nothing was seen of the enemy, though several 
deserted kraals were passed on the way. The column 



m PUBSUIT OP LOBENGptAi 101 

halted at Umlangeni as they were running . short of 
provisions, and some rather sharp passages at scyms 
took place between the leaders as to whether fliey 
should push on or return to Bulawayo. Major 
Forbes was all in favour of the former course, but 
others, headed by Commandant Eaaf, declared that 
such a course would be foolhardy. The matter was 
at length solved by the arrival of a messenger from 
Dr Jameson telling them not to return, as Captain 
Napier was being sent up to their relief with food 
and ammunition together with reinforcements. Major 
Forbes, on hearing this, fell back on to the deserted 
mission-station at Shiloh to await the arrival of 
Captain Napier. 

Some Matabele had been captured by the scouts 
of the patrol, and from these it was learnt that the 
king was in full retreat with four waggons, the oxen 
of which were almost exhausted through their hard 
work. On hearing this Major Forbes decided to 
reorganise his force so as to enable it to move 
quicker, and with this end in view he sent back some 
280 men, taken from his own force of 300 and the 
reinforcements brought up by Captain Napier, to Bula- 
wayo, with about 1000 of Lobengnla's cattle which 
had been captured, and with 300 men set o£f in hot 
pursuit of Lobengula. Much valuable time had been 
lost by this delay, but the patrol soon came upon the 
track of the king's waggons and followed them up as 
quickly as they were able. The progress was not 
fast enough, however, for the rainy season was now 
rapidly approaching, and it was desired to have the 
campaign ended before then if possible ; so at Um- 



102 W^'WITH THE MATABELE. 

• . • 

langeni tbe Ibrce was once more split up into two por- 
tiopsjotte of which was left behind under the command 
of Captains Dallamore and Fitzgerald, while Major 
:>, -.Fbrbes pushed on with the other. The latter force 
:'•/' was composed as follows : Salisbury column, 28 men ; 
Victoria column, 46 men ; Tuli column, 24 men ; 
Bechuanaland Border Police, 60 men. The only 
heavy guns that were now taken forward were two 
Maxims. The Bembesi, Bubi, and Gwampa rivers 
were crossed in turn, and despite the fact that the 
rainy season was opening, good progress was made, 
so much so that when at length the force came up 
to the Shangani it was reported that the king's 
waggons were only a few miles in front of them. 

The two Americans, Burnham and Ingram, were 
sent across the river to see if they could hear any- 
thing of the flying monarch, but they quickly 
returned with the intelligence that there was a 
large force of some 2000 or 3000 Matabele in the 
vicinity, and that these might attack the column at 
any moment Later in the day a native boy was cap- 
tured, who was examined as to the exact whereabouts 
of Lobengula, whom he declared to be only just in 
front of them. When Major Forbes heard this he 
decided on striking at once, so he sent for Major 
Alan Wilson and ordered him to take twelve of his 
freshest horses and cross the river and follow up the 
spoor or tracks of the waggon so far as he could, and 
then to return to the camp, arriving back before 
dark. Major Wilson at once selected his little force, 
and Captains Greenfield and Kirton received special 
permission to accompany him, while the two American 



DBPARTURB OF MAJOR WILSON. 103 

scouts, Burnham and Ingram, were also attached to 
the party, which then set off across the river. 
These remaining behind proceeded to make them- 
selves ready for a night attack from the natives, and 
nothing more was heard of Major Wilson's party 
until about nine o'clock, when two of the party, 
whose horses had become knocked up, returned to 
the laager and reported that Major Wilson was on 
the heels of the king, and would not return to the 
camp that night. Shortly before midnight Captain 
Napier, who had been one of those to go forward 
¥rith Major Wilson, returned and stated to Major 
Forbes that they had passed through four scTiemis 
or enclosed spaces fenced round with branches of 
trees, &c., searching for the king, but had not found 
him. They had pushed on to another of these 
scherms, and were about to enter it when a number 
of natives appeared in the rear, threatening the 
British party's line of retreat, so that Major Wilson 
was forced to retire, though it was reported that the 
king was in the very next scherm. Captain Napier 
further brought a verbal request to Major Forbes 
asking that the whole column might move forward 
to his assistance without delay, as the attitude of the 
natives was becoming very threatening. 

This request it was found impossible to comply 
with, for the column was liable to be attacked at 
any moment by the Matabele, who were collecting 
around the laager, and Major Forbes dare not take 
the risk of crossing the river by night, hampered as 
he was with his two guns, under these circumstances. 
He therefore decided to remain where he was until 



104 WAR WITH THE MATABELB. 

dawn, when the crossing could be commenced in 
safety, and then to push on with all speed to the 
relief of Major Wilson. He realised, however, the 
danger in which the little band of scouts was in, so 
he sent Captain Borrow forward with a force of 
twenty men as a reinforcement, and with the intima- 
tion that the column would advance towards him first 
thing in the morning. 

As it happened, no attack on the column took 
place that night, and at dawn it advanced along 
the bank of the Shangani, following the tracks of 
Lobengula's waggons, with its right flank close to the 
river, and while this movement was being carried 
out the enemy showed in force in the bush in front, 
and commenced firing on the column. The two 
Maxims were rapidly brought to the front of the 
line, and by pouring a steady fire into the ranks of 
the enemy were able to frustrate any attempt to charge 
on their part Showing better tactics than they had 
yet displayed, the Matabele attempted to turn the 
left flank of the column, and so drive them back 
into the Shangani, but, thanks to the way in which 
the guns were handled, this move was foiled, and the 
whites slowly retreated in search of a position at which 
to take up a stand and assume the offensive. Five 
troopers were wounded in this attack, but the retreat 
was carried out very steadily, and was masked with 
a hot fire from the machine - guns. After going 
about 600 or 700 yards the column halted in a 
strip of bush on the bank of the river, and there 
prepared to drive back the Matabele. As this was 
being done heavy firing could be heard from the 



burnham's story. 105 

opposite bank, which indicated that Major Wilson 
was also coming into contact with the enemy. 

The column had scarcely taken up its position 
when Burnham and Ingram, with a trooper named 
Gooding, rode rapidly up and dismounted. As they 
did so, Burnham quietly said, " I think I may say 
that we are the sole survivors of that party," and 
then proceeded to load his rifle and help to beat back 
the natives. 

These words of the American scout were unfor- 
tunately only too true. So soon as the column had 
beaten off the enemy, which was only done after 
some very heavy fighting, the scout Burnham was 
sent for by Major Forbes to give an account of what 
had happened, and from what he said it appeared that 
the little band had been permitted to camp in safety, 
and had been joined by Captain Borrow and his men 
before daylight. A discussion took place among the 
officers, and it was decided to make a dash for the 
king's scherm at dawn, and endeavour to arrest him. 
This was done, and entering the scherm they boldly 
called for the king to come forward and deliver him- 
self up. The only reply to this was a dropping fire 
from about a hundred rifles from natives who were 
concealed in the bush on three sides of the party of 
Britishers, and Major Wilson was compelled to fall 
back on a large anthill about 700 yards away. They 
made for this shelter at full gallop. The hill once 
reached, the party dismounted and made a stand 
until the natives began to encircle them, and two 
of their horses were killed. At this point another 
retreat was decided upon. As this was being carried 



106 



WAR WITH THE MATABELB. 



out Major Wilson called to Burnham and asked him 
if he would try and get through to tell Major Forbes 
what was happening, and this Burnham bravely 
agreed to do on the condition that he had a com- 
panion. Major Wilson saw the reasonableness of 
this request, and therefore detailed Ingram and 
Gooding to accompany Burnham, and these three 
gallant men dashed ofif under a shower of bullets 
and spears to ask Major Forbes to set off to the 
rescue of their comrades. One hardly knows which 
to admire most — the men who went on this danger- 
ous errand, for the bush between them and the 
Shangani was now teeming with natives, or those 
who remained behind battling against overwhelming 
odds. 



107 



CHAPTER VIL 



CONCLUSION OF THE WAR. 



What afterwards happened to that little band cut oflF 
from all assistance and hemmed in on every side by 
cruel foes, who saw before them an opportunity of 
wreaking a vengeance on this handful of white men 
for the defeats they had sustained, was only gleaned 
at a later date from Matabele who had taken part 
in the affair and who were subsequently captured. 
From their accounts it appears that for two long 
hours this band of thirty -three men with their 
intrepid leader kept the Matabele at bay. In 
addition to the two horses that had been killed in 
the first attack, several of the others were completely 
worn out and could not travel farther ; but, on the 
other hand, some of the animals were comparatively 
fresh, and their riders could have got away on them 
had they been so minded. But they had no thought 
of doing so. Their attitude is well summed up in 
the few eloquent words of the scout, Ingram, who 
said, " Some of the best mounts might have got away, 
but — well, they were not the sort of men to leave 
their chums. No, I guess they fought it right out 



108 CONCLUSION OF THE WAR. 

where they stood." These words pithily sum up the 
situation, and to add more would be superfluous. 

As the horses of the party fell, the troopers made 
ramparts of their carcasses, from behind which they 
poured destructive volleys into the thick of their 
savage antagonists, and so they fought doggedly 
on, though not a man there but knew that for him 
the sun had risen for the last time, and that before 
another dawn he would have solved the mystery of life. 
Again and again the Matabele charged desperately for- 
ward, only to be beaten back by the rapidly dwindling 
party of whites, who answered the yells of the Mata- 
bele with defiant British cheers. Several fell killed 
or wounded, but the latter conquered their wounds 
for a time by sheer force of will and gamely loaded 
the rifles for their companions until the weapons fell 
from their hands and their eyes closed in death. At 
the end of two hours but one man of the party was 
left able to fight, and seizing as many rifles and 
bandoliers as lay within his reach, he made his way 
to a small anthill some twenty yards or so from the 
spot where his comrades had fallen, and from there 
he checked several rushes in a manner that filled the 
hearts of the Kafir soldiers with wonder. Such 
courage as this was a revelation to them. At last a 
ball struck him in the hip and he was forced to his 
knees, but even in that crippled state he continued 
firing till at length the shots of the Matabele evoked 
no answer, and the last survivor of a brave band was 
no more. One would like to have the name of this 
hero to treasure up with those of the remainder of his 
gallant countrymtfi, but it has never been discovered. 




"HEROES EVERY ONE." 109 

Now that the white men were all either dead or 
dying, the Matabele dashed forward with cries of 
victory ; but their exultation was quickly turned to 
terror, for as they closed around the party, some of 
the wounded, by almost superhuman efforts, roused 
themselves sufficiently to pour a scattered volley into 
the natives from their revolvers. It was as though 
their shades had come back to protect their lifeless 
bodies, and it proved the last straw to the already 
disheartened Matabele, who fled into the bush and 
did not dare to return to the spot for some hours, 
when they found that all the Britishers were dead. 

Thus, unconquered, fell a band of men who make 
one proud to belong to the nation that owned them ; 
for they were heroes every one, and their names 
deserved to be honoured and handed down to pos- 
terity as showing how Englishmen can die. 

Sad as this disaster had been, it practically decided 
the campaign ; for the Matabele now began to realise 
the futility of the struggle in which they were en- 
gaged, and were prepared to sue for peace. Major 
Forbes realised that it was hopeless to expect that 
any of the party could have escaped with their lives, 
and his own force was in so precarious a position as 
to render it impossible tov him toxross the Shangani, 
and therefore he begau to slowTJf retreat along the 
course of the river towards Bujawayo. He was 
running short of food and ammunition, and in the 
event of another attack of a serious nature from 
the Matabele, he would have been hard put to 
it to defend himself. He therefore decided on 
communicating with Dr Jameson at Bulawayo and 



110 CONCLUSION OF THE WAR. 

asking him tx) send a relief force to meet him with 
supplies of food and ammunition ; and the scout, 
Ingram — who seemed to love to thrust himself into 
danger — and a trooper named Lynch, at once 
volunteered to go on this errand, which was fraught 
with perih 

Those two men set off at once and made straight 
for the capital, while the column retreated slowly 
and cautiously along the river-bank, watching for 
signs of an attack. The rainy season was now 
approaching its height, and to add to the many 
discomforts that were overtaking the force, the horses 
began to show signs of exhaustion, and many were 
left for dead on the track of the column each day, 
while the two Maxim guns were proving a terrible 
hindrance to the progress of the force, the average 
rate of which did not often exceed twelve or fourteen 
miles a-day. On the retreat, too, food became so 
scarce that on December 6 one of the two pack-oxen 
had to be shot to provide a meal, and tough, stringy, 
and badly cooked as this meat was, it was eaten with 
a relish by the half-starved troopers. On December 
7 the scouts fell back on the column with about a 
hundred cattle belonging to Lobengula; for by the 
laws of the tribe practically the whole of the cattle 
in the country was the property of the king, and 
twenty of these were promptly seized upon with 
jubilation, for the herd was in good condition, and 
the troopers saw before them visions of unlimited 
beef, and their spirits in consequence were consider- 
ably raised. 

The rest of the cattle were then turned loose on 




A VANISHING DINNER. Ill 

to the veldt once more, and the column continued its 
march forward. After going a mile or two a halt 
was called, and scarcely had this been done before 
the scouts came galloping back with numberless 
Matabele bullets whistling around them, and it was 
plainly evident that the enemy was in force in the 
bush in front of the column. The Maxims were 
quickly brought into action, and Commandant Eaaf 
was sent forward with twelve men to clear the 
Matabele back, and this he quickly did, for the 
natives turned tail before the troopers in a manner 
that seemed to indicate that their courage had rapidly 
diminished since the previous engagements. Un- 
fortunately during this action the Matabele not only 
recaptured the twenty head of cattle that the column 
had managed to catch, but the solitary pack-ox of 
the force was also carried off, and the troopers saw 
their prospective dinners rapidly vanishing over the 
veldt. 

To add to the troubles of the now dinnerless force, 
a terrific storm broke over them and speedily soaked 
them to the skin ; and some of the members of the 
patrol felt so thoroughly miserable and uncomfortable 
that they would gladly have sunk down where they 
stood and died on the wayside. The oflRcers, how- 
ever, showed an admirable example in this time of 
privation and trial, and by putting a good face on to 
things so contrived to cheer the spirits of the droop- 
ing that at length belts were taken in another hole, 
and the men strode out cheerily towards their goal 
as though hunger and wet were the two things they 
most revelled in. 



^ 



112 CONOLUSIoy OF THK WAR. 

- TiiTee days after this akinnish the column vas 
agaia attacked by the Matabele, and their horses 
were almost captured ; bnt, aided by a heavy fire 
from ths Maxims, this disaster was averted, though 
several of the animals were killed. In this action 
one Britisher was fatally wounded — Sergeant Cribson, 
who waa ia charge of one of the guns. So soon as 
the enemy had been beaten oS and the route was 
otioe man clear. Major Forbes decided on a step that 
he bad long been contemplating, and that was the 
abandonment of the gun-carriages. Experiments 
were made, and it was found that the guns could 
easily be carried in blankets by six troopers, and this 
would enable much better proglWB to be made, so 
the ptaa was adopted for a time, and then the 
method of transport was once more changed, this 
time the guns being placed, tripods and all, across 
the backs of two troop-horses, wiCh a man on either 
aide to support them. 

It was necessary to' proceed with great caution, 
however. None knew when another attack on the 
column might not take place, for there were indica- 
tions that they were being followed up by large bodies 
of Matabele ; and in this careful fashion the junction 
of the Shangani with its tributary the Umvungu was 
reached. Here the party had to leave the river and 
strike across the country for Bulawayo, and a short 
halt was made before the start for the capital was 
begun. Friendly natives were sent forward to the 
villt^e of Longwe, which was on the route from 
Bulawayo, to see whether the relief column was 
coming forward, while messages were also despatched 



HARCHINQ TOWARDS BULAWAYO. 113 

to CaptainB Dallamore and Fitzgerald at UmlangeDi 
to advance to Longwe to meet the column. The 
force had not been settled down at the juoctioD of 
the two rivers for long before the Uatabele com- 
menced firing on them from the bush, but a search- 
ing fire from the machine-guns soon sent the natives 
off about their business. Food was now almost 
ezhausted, and as a last resource one of the troop- 
horses was slaughtered to supply meat, which was 
eaten with gusto. 

As they marched towards Longwe, the column 
passed a kraal of friendly natives, the induna of which 
appeared before Major Forbes and gave him much 
information, assertug, among other things, tbtt the 
main body of the Matabele was now soiue distance 
off, and that they were only stray bands of marauderB 
who had lately been attacking the column. In 
addition to this the induna supplied the hungry 
whites with two head of cattle, and these were im- 
mediately killed, cut up, and cooked ; and the men 
sat down to the raeal with feelings that it is im- 
possible to describe, for this succulent beef was a 
welcome change from the horse-flosh and wild herbs 
on which they had lately been existing. 

After the meal was disposed of the march was 
once more continued, under much rosier conditions 
than for some time before. The force had not 
proceeded more than about five miles on its way 
before two white men, Messrs Selous and Acutt, 
galloped up with the welcome tidings that the relief 
column under Dr Jameson, and accompanied by Mr 
Rhodes, who had just previously arrived at Bula- 



114 CONCLUSION OF THE WAR. 

wayo, was not more than a mile and a half away, 
and was pushing forward rapidly. Shortly after this 
the two forces met, and that night the members of 
Major Forbes's patrol were able to get that which 
they had not experienced for some months previous, 
— a good sound night's rest without any worry as to 
a Matabele attack. On the following morning the 
united force started for Bulawayo. It was reached 
after three days, during the whole of which rain 
fell almost incessantly. 

The force had not been long at Bulawayo before 
information came in to the effect that Lobengula had 
died in his waggon on the banks of the Shangani. 
Bumour at first asserted that smallpox was the 
cause of the king's demise, but this was afterwards 
disproved, and the cause of death was found to 
be dysentery. With Lobengula died the Matabele 
nation as a ruling power. Hostilities almost im- 
mediately came to an end, for the impis at length 
came to recognise that they had met their masters, 
and they bowed to the inevitable, and soon some of 
the leading indunas arrived at Bulawayo to sue for 
peace. This was readily granted, and the country 
at once commenced to settle down. On December 
23, 1893, the entire British force that had been 
engaged in the war paraded at Bulawayo before Mr 
Rhodes, who referred in complimentary terms to the 
manner in which they had acquitted themselves and 
to the many difficulties that they had faced and 
overcome, and the forces were then disbanded, as the 
work for which they were enrolled was now accom- 
plished. So soon as this was done those of the 



THE WAR AT AN END. 115 

Salisbury and Victoria column who were intending 
to return to those towns set ofif by waggon. The 
Salisbury party was under the command of Captain 
Spreckley, while those returning to Victoria were 
under the command of Lieutenant Beale, and each 
carried a month's rations with them. The first- 
named party arrived at Salisbury on January 20, 
1894, while Victoria was reached by the second 
two days previously. 

On December 24 those members of the Tuli 
column who were returning to Johannesburg and 
other towns in the south left Bulawayo under the 
command of Captain Carr, while the Bechuanaland 
Border Police also set ofif on their return southwards, 
and the first Matabele war was a thing of the past. 
As a campaign it had been very successful : the 
Matabele nation, with all the horrors that it brought 
with it, had been broken up, and the white man 
ruled at Bulawayo. The troops engaged had done 
their work splendidly, especially when it is recol- 
lected that, with the exception of the detachment 
of the Bechuanaland Border Police, all the men en- 
rolled were little more than raw levies. The cost 
of the war was, roughly, about £100,000, — not a 
tithe of what it would have been had imperial troops 
been employed. In Major Forbes the force had a 
leader of sound military judgment, who knew well 
both how to handle the forces that he had at his 
disposal and to cope with the savage foe, while per- 
sonally he was brave almost to the point of reck- 
lessness. 

On Christmas Day 1893 Matabeleland was judged 



116 00NCa:.I7SIQH OV THS WAS. 

by the Goveniment to be so &r settled as to per- 
mit of prospecting commencing, and it was therefore 
thrown open for the pegging - out of gold - mining 
claims and farms. The coontrr thus prepared for 
white colonisation was an extremely healthy one, 
and one that gave the promise of having a bright 
and prosperous future before it^ and this promise has 
since been maintained and even strengthened. 

The men who had fou<rht in the war, and who 
elected to lemain in Matabeleland by an agreement 
signed befoie the war commenced, which after- 
wards came to be known as the Mctoria agreement, 
were to be allowed to peg out fifteen gold claims 
on reefs and five alluvial claims in addition to a farm 
of oOOO Wi>iyni ^aWut 6000 aciesV whUe it was 
also anan^^ that any loot taken should be appor- 
tioned one-half to the British South Africa Com- 
pany and the other half to the officers and men in 
equal shaies^ This document was a very hastily 
constructed one. and in places was very amlnguously 
wvuded, but it was accepted by the Company and 
men in gocJ faith, though it led to considerable un- 
pleosiantness later when the conditioas came to be 
analvsed and interwrvtei So soon as the settle- 
ment of the countrv t\>mmenced. a force of 150 
polkv wsis orv^aiiisevl to protect the inhabitants from 
rakls bv strav bsiuvls of hcecile M4:abele, of which 
there were a few still lurkiag in the Matoppo Hills 
anvl a!ou^ the lower cocrjee^ v^f the Shangani and 
lieutenant Ixxlle w^ aptviutevl to the command of 
this fv>fvv. 

Itt Kii^land. itteanwiule. the moi^ Kahikal membeis 




THE ATTITUDE OF THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT. 117 

of the House of Commons, under the leadership 
of Mr Labouchere, were doing all that they could 
to prevent the British South Africa Company gaining 
the rewards that they had earned by conquering the 
Matabele, and no efforts were spared to discredit Mr 
Ehodes and his adherents in the eyes of the country. 
The representative of the Colonial Office in the 
House of Commons at this time was the Under 
Secretary, Mr Sydney Buxton ; and while assuring 
the House, and through it the nation, that the 
Government was keeping a close watch on events 
in Matabeleland, he showed but small sympathy 
with the rabid opponents of the Chartered Com- 
pany. These statements were echoed in the House 
of Lords by Lord Eipon, and several communications 
relating to the conditions under which the newly 
gained territory was to be governed passed between 
the Colonial Office and Sir Henry Loch. 

On Mr Ehodes's return to Cape Town he made 
a speech regarding Matabeleland which seemed to 
indicate the existence of some points of difference 
between the Imperial Government and the British 
South Africa Company, and the settlement of the 
country was greatly delayed. Finally, on May 9, 
1894, an Order in Council was signed regulating 
the government of Matabeleland, and it was then 
seen that the Government had considerably modified 
the conditions under which the original charter was 
granted. The Administrator was still to be appointed 
by the Company, but his appointment was to be 
subject to the approval of the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies. To assist the Administrator in 



118 CONCLUSION OF THE WAB. 

governing the countary an executive council of five 
was to be appointed, one member of which was 
to be a judge of the High Court of the country. 
While the will of the Executive Council was not 
binding on the Administrator, if he had occasion 
to dissent from its views in any way, he was to 
report his reasons for so doing to the High Com- 
missioner at Cape Town. Any regulations promul- 
gated by the Administrator were to have the force 
of law throughout the territory of the Company, 
provided that they had received the sanction of the 
High Commissioner ; but the Secretary of State was 
to have the power to veto them at any time within 
twelve months of their coming into force. The power 
of imposing taxes was also conferred on the Com- 
pany. The rights of the natives were stringently 
protected ; and it was stated that in all legal cases 
where natives were concerned native law was to be 
used except so far as it proved contrary to the laws 
of morality. No exceptional legislation was to be 
enacted against the natives except with regard to 
the sale of liquor to them, which was forbidden, 
and to the bearing of arms by them. Land was to 
be set aside for their exclusive use, and a sufficiency 
of grazing provided, and they were not to be re- 
moved from this land except on other land of equal 
suitability for their purposes being provided. To 
all these and other conditions of lesser import the 
Company subscribed, and Dr Jameson was appointed 
the first Administrator of Matabeleland, while a 
scion of an old Dutch family, Mr Joseph Vintcent, 
was appointed the first Chief -Justice of the pro- 



DEVELOPMENT OF MATABELELAND. 119 

vince of Matabeleland, a position which he still 
holds. 

A considerable town soon commenced to spring 
up around Bulawayo on the site that had been 
surveyed and laid out about four miles from where 
Lobengula's old kraal had been, and a large popu- 
lation began to be attracted thither owing to the 
richness of the gold-belts that had been discovered, 
the wide extent of these gold-belts, and the facility 
with which they could be worked. The British 
South Africa Company, which in the previous year 
had increased its capital to £2,000,000 sterling, 
was doing everything that lay in its power to 
turn their steps towards the new country, and the 
land seemed to be entering on a long spell of pros- 
perity now that the Matabele had been disposed 
of, and if not actually crushed, at any rate overawed 
and cowed into submission. Personally Mr Ehodes 
was throwing himself heart and soul into the work 
of making a new colony, and one of the chief 
things to which he was turning his attention was 
the railway that was being pushed forward from 
Beira to Umtali, and of which about seventy miles 
had been constructed at this tima Compared to 
the railways in civilised countries this line was, 
of course, only a very second-rate one, but its value 
in the opening up of Mashonaland was increasing 
day by day. The gauge of the line was a very 
narrow one, two feet, and the passenger cars were 
open vehicles of the most primitive construction; 
but it was not so much for the conveyance of 
passengers as for the transport of mining machinery 



120 ooHCxnsioii OF TEU wah. 

and other heavy material that the line was being 
built, and for this it waa serving ita purpose admir- 
ably, for while the engines and trucks looked little 
more tlian toys they proved themselves capable of 
pulling very heavy loads at a fair speed. 

As this railway approached Umtali it was found 
that it could only reach the town by some heavy 
engineering work, the cost of which would be exceed- 
ingly heavy ; so, on the principle that if the mountain 
won't come to Mahomet, Mahomet must go to the 
mountain, it was decided to move the town of Umtali 
some eleven miles to the south-east, where the railway 
could easily reach it This was eventually done, and 
a new town laid out, which was called New Umbili, 
in contradistinction to the old town. This method 
of surmounting the obstacle is said to have been 
originally suggested by Mr Kbodes when the posi- 
tion was explained to him, and certainly it savours 
strongly of bis method of overcoming any difBculties 
that present themselves to him. 

Mr Ebodes also about this time made an offer 
to the Imperial Qovernmeot to insert a clause in 
the charter of the Britisb South Africa Company 
providing that British goods imported to Africa 
should never be subject in the new territory of 
Matabeleland to duties higher than those imposed 
by the States within the South Africa Customs 
Union. When he made this proposal Mr Rhodes 
was contemplating the possibility of a federated 
South Africa from Table Bay to the shores of the 
Zambesi, and this oETer to the Government would 
mean that as the South African States became 



MR RHODES AND LORD RIPOK. 121 

welded into one harmonious iwrtiole, large and in- 
creasing markets would be opened to British manu- 
facturers. Somewhat inexplicably, Lord Kipon saw 
fit to decline to avail himself of this offer, on the 
ground thtat there was no precedent for it, thus 
indicating that Downing Street was still hidebound 
by tradition. Mr Rhodes was not unnaturally 
annoyed at this rebuff, and plainly showed as much 
in a speech on the subject which he delivered 
in the Cape House of Assembly, in the course of 
which he commented in vigorous terms on the 
short - sightedness of British statesmanship with 
regard to the Colonies — a point so obvious to 
students of our colonial history as to need no 
emphasis here. 

To exploit the mineral wealth of Ehodesia numer- 
ous companies and syndicates were being formed in 
London about this Lime, many of which took over 
the concessions that had been granted to those who 
fought against the Matabele and others, and a great 
interest in the new country, its resources and its 
possibilities, was manifested in England. 

Towards the end of 1894 Mr Rhodes and Dr 
Jameson visited England, and almost immediately 
on their arrival Mr Ehodes was sworn as a member 
of the Privy Council, wliile for his services during the 
Matabele war Dr Jameson was created a Companion 
of the Bath. One of the leading tasks which Mr 
Ehodes set himself to accomplish while in this 
country was to carry through the negotiations that 
had been commenced with the Government some 
little time previously for the transference to the 



\ 



122 GONCLUSIOK OF THE WAK. 

control of the British South Africa Company of 
that part of Nyssaland which had up till that time 
formed a protectorate of the British Crown, with 
Mr H. H. Johnston as Administrator. This country 
lay to the north of the Zambesi, and was bounded on 
the east by Portuguese East Africa and German East 
Africa ; on the west by Angola ; and on the north 
by the Congo Free State. It was practically an 
unknown land, but Mr Ehodes recognised its po- 
tential value, and perceived that when the trans- 
continental railway came to be built it would 
prove valuable to have the control of that part of 
Central Africa in his own hands. He was strongly 
desirous, therefore, of adding it to the dominions of 
the Chartered Company ; while, on the other hand, 
the Imperial Government probably was only too glad 
to get the country o£f their hands, for ever since the 
protectorate had been established it had been a 
drain on the public purse, and in fact had it not 
been for the annual subsidy of £10,000, subse- 
quently increased to £17,000, which the British 
South Africa Company paid to Mr (afterwards Sir 
Harry) Johnston, the admirable work of civilisation 
which that gentleman was carrying out in Central 
Africa could not have gone forward. As a result 
of the negotiations, therefore, the Government con- 
sented to the transference of the country to the 
British South Africa Company, with the exception 
of the strip of territory lying along the western 
shore of Lake Nyassa which is now known as the 
British Central Africa Protectorate, and which was 
retained as a Crown Colony. 



RHODESIA MOVING AHEAD. 123 

In addition to the acquisition of this territory, Mr 
Bhodes was also pushing forward the construction 
of the trans-continental telegraph line, which was 
already demonstrating its value. This line had 
reached to Blantyre, the capital of the British 
Central Africa Protectorate, and was being carried 
forward towards the northern banks of Lake Tan- 
ganyika, so that Mr Bhodes was very busy. 

On the return of the Administrator and Mr 
Bhodes to South Africa they found that the 
development of Bhodesia was progressing apace, 
and that many of the gold-reefs had already been 
proved payable, thus giving a direct contradiction 
to those in this country who iterated and reiterated 
that there was no gold in the country, and that if 
there ever had been the ancients had taken it all, 
and so on, ad nauseam, Bhodesia was, in fact, just 
beginning to move ahead as a colony, and a period 
of steady development, which lasted for nearly two 
years, was entered upon. At length this was broken 
by an event that threw the country back quite five 
years in its development, and was one of the indirect 
causes of the Matabele rebellion with its attendant 
horrors. We refer to the incident that has gained a 
world-wide celebrity under the name of the Jameson 
Baid 



CHAPTER VIIL 



THE JAMESON BAll). 



Thb Jameson raid may be said to belong more 
properly to tbe history of the TraoBvaal than 
to that of Khodeaia ; but seeing that the iocursiou 
was organised and prepared fot in the territories 
under the administration of the British South Africa 
Company; that it was led by the Administrator of 
Matabeleland ; that the force was composed, for a 
large proportion, of the men of the Matabeleland 
Mounted Police; and that two of the directors of 
the Chartered Company, Mr Rhodes and Mr Alfred 
Beit, were proved to have been prime movers in the 
affair, — it may be considered to form an important 
landmark in the history of Rhodesia, and one whose 
conseq^uences had a far-reaching effect on both the 
administrative and political history of that colony. 

So far as is possible the raid will be treated in these 
pages only as it concerned Rhodesia and its govern- 
ment: nevertheless, it will be necessary at times to 
depart from this rule and to speak of things which, 
while lying beyond the immediate scope of this work, 
yet have an important bearing on things Rhodesian. 



THE TRANSVAAI, DITLANDEES. 126 

For some years previous to 1395 a feeling had been 
growing up among the disFranchised Uitlandere of 
Johanuesburg and other parts of the Transvaal that 
they were being very harshly treated by the Boet 
Government at Pretoria. As Mr Ehodes expressed 
it when giving evidence before tlie Select Committee 
of the House of Commons on the Jameson raid, it 
was felt that the people "possessing more than half 
the land, nine - tenths of the wealth, and paying 
nineteen-twentieths of the taxes," should be allowed 
some voice in the government of the country. This, 
however, was resolutely denied them by the Boers, 
and so the discontent went on growing and gaining 
fresh force each day. 

Shortly after the end of the Matabele war in 
1893 Mr Rhodes began to turn his thoughts to 
the scheme that had presented itself to his mind 
of a federated South Africa from the Cape of Good 
Hope to beyond the Zambesi, but he saw that 
the slow moving, conservative, and alt<^ether anti- 
quated rule of President Kruger and his subordinates 
in the South Africa Kepublic presented an insuper- 
able bar to this project. In 1894, while travelling 
through Mntabeleland with Dr Jameson, Mr Bhodea 
came into contact with Mr John Hays Hammond, 
a well - known mining expert from Johannesburg, 
who was at that time making an exhaustive survey 
of the mineral deposits of Ehodesia on belialf of 
the British South Africa Company, and this gentle- 
man in conversation expatiated on the injustice and 
the oppression under which the European population 
at Johannesburg and on the Rand were suffering. 



116 CONCLUSION OF THE WAR. 

by the Government to be so far settled as to per- 
mit of prospecting commencing, and it was therefore 
thrown open for the pegging - out of gold - mining 
claims and farms. The country thus prepared for 
white colonisation was an extremely healthy one, 
and one that gave the promise of having a bright 
and prosperous future before it, and this promise has 
since been maintained and even strengthened. 

The men who had fought in the war, and who 
elected to remain in Matabeleland by an agreement 
signed before the war commenced, which after- 
wards came to be known as the Victoria agreement, 
were to be allowed to peg out fifteen gold claims 
on reefs and five alluvial claims in addition to a farm 
of 3000 morgen (about 6000 acres), while it was 
also arranged that any loot taken should be appor- 
tioned one-half to the British South Africa Com- 
pany and the other half to the officers and men in 
equal shares. This document was a very hastily 
constructed one, and in places was very ambiguously 
worded, but it was accepted by the Company and 
men in good faith, though it led to considerable un- 
pleasantness later when the conditions came to be 
analysed and interpreted. So soon as the settle- 
ment of the country commenced, a force of 150 
police was organised to protect the inhabitants from 
raids by stray bands of hostile Matabele, of which 
there were a few still lurking in the Matoppo Hills 
and along the lower courses of the Shangani, and 
Lieutenant Bodle was appointed to the command of 
this force. 

In England, meanwhile, the more Radical members 



THE ATTITUDB OF THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT. 117 

of the House of Commons, under the leadership 
of Mr Labouchere, were doing all that they could 
to prevent the British South Africa Company gaining 
the rewards that they had earned by conquering the 
Matabele, and no efforts were spared to discredit Mr 
Ehodes and his adherents in the eyes of the country. 
The representative of the Colonial Office in the 
House of Commons at this time was the Under 
Secretary, Mr Sydney Buxton ; and while assuring 
the House, and through it the nation, that the 
Government was keeping a close watch on events 
in Matabeleland, he showed but small sympathy 
with the rabid opponents of the Chartered Com- 
pany. These statements were echoed in the House 
of Lords by Lord Eipon, and several communications 
relating to the conditions under which the newly 
gained territory was to be governed passed between 
the Colonial Office and Sir Henry Loch. 

On Mr Rhodes*s return to Cape Town he made 
a speech regarding Matabeleland which seemed to 
indicate the existence of some points of diflference 
between the Imperial Government and the British 
South Africa Company, and the settlement of the 
country was greatly delayed. Finally, on May 9, 
1894, an Order in Council was signed regulating 
the government of Matabeleland, and it was then 
seen that the Government had considerably modified 
the conditions under which the original charter was 
granted. The Administrator was still to be appointed 
by the Company, but his appointment was to be 
subject to the approval of the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies. To assist the Administrator in 



128 THE JAMESON RAID. 

from Bulawayo to the little village of Pitsani, which 
was situated on the borders of the Transvaal in the 
recently acquired strip of territory. At this time 
the idea of Mr Ehodes was — and this was his 
intention right up to the finish — to keep this force 
within about three days' march of Johannesburg, 
so that, when the inha^utants of that town made the 
eflfort that had been decided upon to overthrow the 
Boer Government and vindicate their rights, this 
force would swiftly cross the border-line and aid in 
restoring order. This was the genesis of the move- 
ment that culminated in the raid. In itself this 
projected invasion of the Transvaal by an armed 
force would have been, of course, far from right ; but 
had the Uitlanders been in any grave danger from 
their Boer oppressors and bloodshed likely to take 
place, it is not in the nature of things to suppose 
that Englishmen in South Africa would have calmly 
stood by and seen their brethren shot down by the 
Boers without raising a hand to assist them, and 
intervention under these circumstances would have 
been easily condoned. It was under very different 
conditions that the Jameson raid actually occurred. 
The detachment of police sent down to Pitsani was 
under the command of Major Sir John Willoughby, 
and from the date of their arrival to the time of the 
raid events moved very rapidly. The Chartered 
Company had taken over the Bechuanaland Border 
Police on its disbandment by the Crown, and this 
force was held at Mafeking in readiness to act in 
conjunction with Dr Jameson's force. 

Mr Ehodes had by this time entered fully into the 



MR RHODES AND THE REFORM COMHaTTES. 129 

efforts of what was styled the " Reform Committee " 
of Johannesburg, of which his brother, Colonel 
Francis Ehodes, was one of the moving spirits, and 
was aiding the movement with both his influence and 
his purse. He promised the reformers that so soon 
as they were prepared to act, a force under Dr 
Jameson should immediately cross the border to their 
assistance. At first this force was to consist of 
1200 strong, but this number was afterwards con- 
siderably reduced. On their part the Uitlanders 
in Johannesburg were to rise and make a dash for 
the Government arsenal at Pretoria, which was in 
a semi-unprotected condition, to take possession of 
the arms therein, and then to fall back on Johannes- 
burg to await the arrival of Dr Jameson and his 
troops, and the coming of Mr Ehodes, who promised 
to bring Sir Hercules Eobinson, the High Commis- 
sioner, up from Cape Town to mediate between the 
Uitlanders and the Boers. A quantity of arms was 
also smuggled into Johannesburg by means of the 
De Beers Company, of which Mr Ehodes was the 
controlling spirit, though the quantity was noth- 
ing like sufficient to arm the Uitlanders in an effi- 
cient manner. In October of this year Dr Jameson 
paid another visit to Johannesburg to see how events 
were progressing, and then went forward to Cape 
Town to meet Mr Ehodes and to report to him how 
matters were proceeding in what the Poet Laureate 
has styled " the golden city." It was then that the 
arrangements for the support of the now imminent 
rising in Johannesburg were completed. Dr Jameson 
was to be ready to start for Johannes})urg with a 

I 



130 TEE JAHBBON RAID. 

force of 800 men so soon as the news reached him 
of the Uitlanders having risen. Dr Jameson then 
returned to Pitsani, and about the middle of De- 
cember, when the transfer of the Bechuanaland 
Border Police to the British South Africa Com* 
pany was completed, eveiTtbing was readj for the 
movement 

While he was in Johannesburg Dr Jameson had 
procured a letter from the members of the fieform 
Committee which was destined to play an important 
part in subsequent events. This letter was signed 
by Colonel Rhodes and Messrs C. Leonard, L. Phil- 
lips, J. H. Hammond, and 3. Farrar, and was couched 
in the following terms : " Thousands of unarmed men, 
women, and children of our race will be at the mercy 
of well - armed Boers, while property of enormous 
value will be in the greatest periL We cannot con- 
template the future without Uie gravest apprehension, 
and feel that we are justified in taking any steps to 
prevent the shedding of blood and to ensure the pro- 
tection of our rights. It is under these circumstances 
that we feel constrained to call upon you to come to 
our aid should disturbances arise here. The circum- 
stances are so extreme that we cannot but believe 
that you, and the men under you, will not fail 
to come to the rescue of people who would be so 
situated. We guarantee any expense that may 
reasonably be incurred by you in helping us, and 
ask to believe that nothing but the etemest necessity 
has prompted this appeal." 

This letter, which Dr Jameson obtained in Nov- 
ember, and which was dated for the 20th of that 




I( 



ii; UTTLANDERS. 131 

' -nliug to the account 
111 (.'oimnittee, to excul- 
'■innpany should he go 
distinctly not intended 
.«■ was warned not to go 
• iving a definite summons 
i:iiiieson, however, decided 
basis of his action, and 
.«■ date was altered to De- 
■ it appear that it was written 
:. There is no excuse for an 
lilting of the date ; but if the 
i'Y were correct at the end of 
just as true at the end of 
the meantime the signatories 
I asked Dr Jameson not to act 



:l 




I 



fohannesburg was finally fixed to 

lie end of December, but differences 

themselves as the time for talking 

for action drew near. President 

it afterwards turned out, was not so 

lie turn things were taking as he was 

. seemed to show himself disposed to 

iUiplaints of the Uitlander population, 

il in some degree to cool the ardour for 

Johannesburg. In addition, a serious 

^♦i about the flag which was to be lioisted 

burg when the revolution was effected. 

was firm in his intention that it should 

>n-jack that was used, and in this he had 

b of practically the whole of the Britishers 




132 THE JAMESON RAID. 

in the republic; but there were those Uitlanders of 
other countries, principally Germans and Americans, 
who objected to this, and held that it should be the 
flag of the South Africa Eepublic that should be 
used, as they intended that the republic should still 
be maintained, though they wished to reorganise it 
on a representative basis, and they had strong objec- 
tions to seeing the Transvaal become a British colony. 
Mr Bhodes remained firm in his intention, however, 
and a cleavage soon began to appear, and the rising 
was several times postponed, until at length it seemed 
plain that it would never take place at 'alL So ob- 
vious was this last fact, that on December 28 Mr 
Ehodes, in conversation with Sir Graham Bowyer, 
the Imperial Secretary to the High Commissioner, 
stated that, so far as he could see, the rising in 
Johannesburg "had fizzled out like a damp squib." 
Dr Jameson at Pitsani was rapidly losing patience 
at the continual delay, for he knew that rumours as 
to the real reason for his presence on the Transvaal 
border were conmiencing to get about, and he feared 
that the Boers would begin to mass a force to inter- 
cept his march to Johannesburg unless he moved 
quickly. So he at length decided, to quote the ex- 
pressive phraseology of Mr Rhodes, "to take the 
bit between his teeth," and by crossing the border 
to precipitate matters, and, as he hoped, thus force 
Johannesburg to rise. On December 28 the Doctor 
telegraphed to Mr Ehodes at Cape Town as follows : 
" Unless I hear definitely to the contrary, shall leave 
to-morrow evening." On the following day, Decem- 
ber 29, he again wired to Mr Ehodes, "Shall leave 



THE RAIDEB8 ENTER THE TRANSVAAL. 133 

to-night for the Transvaal." By some delay on the 
telegraph lines these two telegrams did not reach 
Mr Ehodes until the morning of the 29 th December, 
when they were delivered together. Mr Ehodes at 
once attempted to wire to Dr Jameson to forbid his 
departure, but found that the wires had been cut, 
and that it was impossible for him to get his mes- 
sage through. Mr Ehodes then gave up the at- 
tempt and returned to his house, fully aware that 
Dr Jameson, by his impetuous action, had ruined 
everything. 

Previous to starting, Dr Jameson had called his 
men together and read the letter to them that he 
had received a month before from Johannesburg 
(the date of which had been altered as we have 
seen), and this done, he told them that it was his 
intention to march straight to Johannesburg in 
response to that petition. The force then crossed 
the border, and after going for about eleven miles 
was joined by the Bechuanaland Border Police from 
Mafeking. Even with this addition the force was 
very much less than it had been intended it 
should be, for, all told, it only numbered 515 men, 
with eight Maxims, one 12i-pounder gun, an^". two 
7-pounders. The force was under the command of 
Major Sir John Willoughby, while the other prin- 
cipal oflBcers were Major the Hon. Eobert White, 
Colonel R Grey, Colonel the Hon. Hy. White, and 
Captain the Hon. C. Coventry. No sooner had the 
Transvaal been entered by this force than the Boers 
began to collect to oppose them, and it was then 
seen that the Government at Pretoria had been 



134 THE JAMESON RAID. 

prepared for this step, and had long had its plans 
laid for defeating it 

So soon as Mr Bhodes realised that the fat was 
in the fire, to use a colloquial expression, he went 
to Sir Graham Bowyer and showed him the two 
telegrams that he had received from Dr Jameson, 
and also told him how his efforts to prevent the 
advance had been checkmated by the wire having 
been cut. Sir Graham Bowyer, in his turn, on the 
morning of Monday the 30th December reported 
the raid to Sir Hercules Eobinson, who at once 
telegraphed to the British representative in the 
republic to ascertain whether the force had really 
crossed the border, and if so, to despatch a mes- 
senger at once to order its return; while on the 
following day the High Commissioner issued a pro- 
clamation publicly repudiating Dr Jameson's action 
in the name of the British Gt)vernment, and calling 
upon all British subjects to refrain from aiding or 
abetting the force in any shape or form. 

Mr Ehodes attempted, unsuccessfully, to prevent, or 
at anyrate delay, the publication of this proclamation, 
on the grounds that it outlawed Dr Jameson and 
his followers, and left them at the mercy of the 
Boers should they be taken prisoners. The High 
Commissioner recognised the correctness of this, but 
he had first of all his duty to his country to per- 
form, and that duty demanded that the Government 
should instantly be vindicated of any suspicion of 
violating a friendly State, and the proclamation was 
therefore issued. 

On crossing the frontier Dr Jameson's first step 



MR RHODES BROKEN DOWN. 135 

had been to cut the telegraph wire between Mafe- 
king and Cape Town so as to prevent any recall 
reaching him, and also the one to Pretoria to pre- 
vent the news of his departure being sent to the 
Boer Government Misfortune, however, seemed to 
dog the raiders from their first step, for the troopers 
who were detailed for this latter duty, the cutting 
of the Pretoria wire, called at a wayside store, where 
they dallied until they forgot the errand for which 
they had been despatched. When they left this 
place they had a confused idea of having been sent 
out to cut some wire or another, so they set to work 
on the first piece of wire they came across, which 
happened to be a portion of a fence, and the tele- 
graph line to Pretoria was thus left open. 

The news of the raid seemed to completely crush 
Mr Bhodes, and, as was afterwards stated, for some 
days he appeared to be completely broken down. 
He was at this time Prime Minister of Cape Colony, 
but he realised that he would be forced from this 
office, and that in all probability his political life 
was at an end. He retired to Groot Schuur, his 
house on the outskirts of Cape Town, where he shut 
himself up for some days and declined to take any 
part in the repudiation of Dr Jameson. His attitude 
towards the Doctor was well summed up in the 
broken words to which he gave expression when he 
first heard of the raid, " Poor old Jameson ! We 
have been friends for twenty years, and now he has 
ruined me ! " for at that time it seemed as if nothing 
but utter ruin was before the greatest man that 
Africa has yet discovered. At length the reserve 



136 THE JAMESON RAID. 

strength of Mr Shodes's nature came to his assist- 
ance, and he so far emerged from his retreat as 
to telegraph to Colonel Spreckley, the commanding 
officer of the Bhodesia Horse, on no account to 
move his force to Dr Jameson's assistance, as there 
seemed a likelihood of his doing; but Mr Bhodes 
continued firm in his refusal of the demands of the 
Colonial Office that he should make a public dis- 
avowal of any complicity in the raid. It is clear 
that Dr Jameson took the step he did entirely 
without the sanction, or even the knowledge, of Mr 
Bhodes, but the latter was not the one to shield 
himself behind the mistakes of others. 

As for the march of Dr Jameson, his refusal to 
turn back, the battle of Krugersdorp, and the sub- 
sequent ambush and surrender at Doornkop, these 
are matters that are too well known to need lengthy 
repetition here. So soon as Dr Jameson saw that 
there was no aid to be expected from Johannesburg, 
and that the men and their horses were tired out 
and in no condition to maintain a fight with the 
Boers, whose forces were being augmented each 
moment, he surrendered to Commandant Cronje on 
the latter giving a declaration that he would " spare 
the life of you and yours." The Boers promptly 
went back on this condition so soon as the Eng- 
lishmen were disarmed and in their power, on the 
grounds that Commandant Cronje had no authority 
to make it, and the raiders were at once marched off 
to Pretoria jaiL In this action Dr Jameson had 
lost twenty-seven men killed and wounded, among 
the latter being Captain Coventry, while the loss of 



THE EMPEEOR*S TELEGRAM. 137 

the Boers amounted to two killed in action and two 
more accidentally shot by their fellows. 

The news of this raid was received in London 
with the greatest astonishment, and there was at 
first a strong feeling in favour of Dr Jameson, prin- 
cipally brought about by the publication in the 
•Times' of the "women and children" letter. It 
was in the height of this wave of sympathy that 
the Poet Laureate wrote his unfortunate verses that 
were made the object of so much unfriendly criti- 
cism. When the real action of Dr Jameson began to 
be realised, as it was then understood by those not 
intimate with South African aflfairs, the feeling of 
the public turned against him, and he was rather 
severely handled for having entered a friendly State. 
Soon after this there was another reaction in the 
public mind, principally brought about by the ex- 
tremely ill-advised telegram which the German Em- 
peror despatched congratulating President Kruger on 
having defeated the raiders. This telegram, which 
has since become famous, was couched as follows: 
" I express to you my sincere congratulations that, 
without appealing to the help of friendly Powers, 
you and your people have succeeded in repelling 
with your own forces the armed bands which had 
broken into your country, and in maintaining the 
independence of your country against foreign aggres- 
sion." So soon as this telegram was sent oflF Ger- 
many approached Portugal for permission to land a 
force of marines at Delagoa Bay, " to protect Ger- 
man interests " ; but leave to do this was refused. 

This telegram seemed to recognise the South 



126 THE JAMESON RAID. 

and his utterances aroused the sympathies of Mr 
Ehodes and Dr Jameson, both of whom listened to 
the recitals of the wrongs of the Uitlander population 
and the grievances under which they laboured with 
the very deepest interest. It may be said that it 
was owing in a great measure to these conversations 
with Mr Hammond that Mr Bhodes first conceived 
the idea of attempting to assist the Uitlanders to 
cast off the yoke which bowed them down, and to 
gain that freedom which is the undeniable birthright 
of every Englishman; and in these ideas he found a 
willing seconder in Dr Jameson. Even at this time 
Mr Hammond, who was a well-known and highly 
respected figure in Johannesburg, foresaw what the 
upshot would be, aud he distinctly asserted that 
unless the economic conditions of the Eand were 
altered, there would be a general rising of the 
Europeans, and an internecine struggle would ensue. 
In October 1894 Dr Jameson was returning to 
the Cape, and went, as was customary in those days 
before the opening of the through railway line to 
Shodesia, vid Pretoria and Johannesburg. In the 
latter town he stayed for some short time, and there 
verified the correctness of the views which Mr 
Hammond had enunciated, and found that the Uit- 
landers were in a state of simmering discontent. 
Here it may be remarked that Dr Jameson did 
not make his investigations among capitalists or 
others who might be presumed to have ulterior 
motives in fomenting an upheaval, but rather pre- 
ferred to mix with the white men working on the 
mines, and to find there what the real opinion was 



THE POSITION IN JOHANNESBUBO. 127 

among those who had nothing financially to gain 
by a revolution, but rather something to lose. Here 
he found that the prevailing opinion was that the 
conditions under which they lived were intolerable, 
and must sooner or later be put an end to — by 
constitutional means if possible, and if not, then 
by force. That was the prevailing view among all 
classes in the Transvaal in the autumn of 1894. 

On leaving the Transvaal Dr Jameson went to 
Cape Town, where he met Mr Rhodes and told him 
what the real position in Johannesburg was. The 
words of Dr Jameson, who had been in Africa for 
twenty years, carried great weight with Mr Rhodes, 
and he at once decided, in view of eventualities, to 
have the Rhodesian police and volunteers brought to 
as high a state of efficiency as was possible, and in 
this he was ably seconded by Dr Jameson. 

Things continued like this for about a year, during 
which time the negotiations went on with the Colonial 
Office for the transfer to the British South Africa 
Company of the Bechuanaland Protectorate ; and these 
resulted in a strip of land along the border of the 
South Africa Republic being handed over to the 
Company In the early months of 1895 a volunteer 
force, called the Rhodesia Horse, was formed among 
the settlers in Bulawayo and equipped by the Char- 
tered Company. The corps was 1000 strong and 
was commanded by Colonel Spreckley, the purpose 
for which it was raised being the defence of the 
country and the protection of the settlers. In the 
autumn of this year (1895) Mr Rhodes decided to 
move a force of the Matabeleland Mounted Police 



128 THE JAMESON RAID. 

from Bulawayo to the little village of Pitsani, which 
was situated on the borders of the Transvaal in the 
recently acquired strip of territory. At this time 
the idea of Mr Ehodes was — and this was his 
intention right up to the finish — to keep this force 
within about three days* march of Johannesburg, 
so that, when the inha^utants of that town made the 
eflfort that had been decided upon to overthrow the 
Boer Government and vindicate their rights, this 
force would swiftly cross the border-line and aid in 
restoring order. This was the genesis of the move- 
ment that culminated in the raid. In itself this 
projected invasion of the Transvaal by an armed 
force would have been, of course, far from right ; but 
had the Uitlanders been in any grave danger from 
their Boer oppressors and bloodshed likely to take 
place, it is not in the nature of things to suppose 
that Englishmen in South Africa would have calmly 
stood by and seen their brethren shot down by the 
Boers without raising a hand to assist them, and 
intervention under these circumstances would have 
been easily Condoned. It was under very different 
conditions that the Jameson raid actually occurred. 
The detachment of police sent down to Pitsani was 
under the command of Major Sir John Willoughby, 
and from the date of their arrival to the time of the 
raid events moved very rapidly. The Chartered 
Company had taken over the Bechuanaland Border 
Police on its disbandment by the Crown, and this 
force was held at Mafeking in readiness to act in 
conjunction with Dr Jameson's force. 

Mr Ehodes had by this time entered fully into the 



MR RHODES AND THE REFORM C0M|OTTSS. 129 

efforts of what was styled the " Eeform Committee " 
of Johannesburg, of which his brother, Colonel 
Francis Ehodes, was one of the moving spirits, and 
was aiding the movement with both his influence and 
his purse. He promised the reformers that so soon 
as they were prepared to act, a force under Dr 
Jameson should immediately etoss the border to their 
assistance. At first this force was to consist of 
1200 strong, but this number was afterwards con- 
siderably reduced. On their part the Uitlanders 
in Johannesburg were to rise and make a dash for 
the Government arsenal at Pretoria, which was in 
a semi-unprotected condition, to take possession of 
the arms therein, and then to fall back on Johannes- 
burg to await the arrival of Dr Jameson and his 
troops, and the coming of Mr Ehodes, who promised 
to bring Sir Hercules Eobinson, the High Commis- 
sioner, up from Cape Town to mediate between the 
Uitlanders and the Boers. A quantity of arms was 
also smuggled into Johannesburg by means of the 
De Beers Company, of which Mr Ehodes was the 
controlling spirit, though the quantity was noth- 
ing like sufficient to arm the Uitlanders in an effi- 
cient manner. In October of this year Dr Jameson 
paid another visit to Johannesburg to see how events 
were progressing, and then went forward to Cape 
Town to meet Mr Ehodes and to report to him how 
matters were proceeding in what the Poet Laureate 
has styled " the golden city." It was then that the 
arrangements for the support of the now imminent 
rising in Johannesburg were completed. Dr Jameson 
was to be ready to start for Johannes{)urg with a 

I 



130 THE JAMESON RAID. 

force of 800 men so soon as the news reached him 
of the Uitlanders having risen. Dr Jameson then 
returned to Pitsani, and about the middle of De- 
cember, when the transfer of the Bechuanaland 
Border Police to the British South Africa Com- 
pany was completed, everything was ready for the 
movement 

While he was in Johannesburg Dr Jameson had 
procured a letter from the members of the Eeform 
Committee which was destined to play an important 
part in subsequent events. This letter was signed 
by Colonel Bhodes and Messrs C. Leonard, L. Phil- 
lips, J. H. Hammond, and G. Farrar, and was couched 
in the following terms : " Thousands of unarmed men, 
women, and children of our race will be at the mercy 
of well-armed Boers, while property of enormous 
value will be in the greatest periL We cannot con- 
template the future without the gravest apprehension, 
and feel that we are justified in taking any steps to 
prevent the shedding of blood and to ensure the pro- 
tection of our rights. It is under these circumstances 
that we feel constrained to call upon you to come to 
our aid should disturbances arise here. The circum- 
stances are so extreme that we cannot but believe 
that you, and the men under you, will not fail 
to come to the rescue of people who would be so 
situated. We guarantee any expense that may 
reasonably be incurred by you in helping us, and 
ask to believe that nothing but the sternest necessity 
has prompted this appeal." 

This letter, which Dr Jameson obtained in Nov- 
ember, and which was dated for the 20th of that 



i 



HALTING ATTITUDE OF THE XnTLANDKRS. 131 

month, was handed to him, according to the account 
afterwards given by the Reform Committee, to excul- 
pate him with the Chartered Company should he go 
into the Transvaal, but was distinctly not intended 
as an invitation, and later he was warned not to go 
in on that letter without receiving a definite summons 
from Johannesburg. Dr Jameson, however, decided 
to make that letter the basis of his action, and 
to serve this purpose the date was altered to De- 
cember 20 so as to make it appear that it was written 
just previous to the raid. There is no excuse for an 
action like this, the changing of the date ; but if the 
facts stated in the letter were correct at the end of 
November, they were just as true at the end of 
December, though in the meantime the signatories 
had repudiated it and asked Dr Jameson not to act 
upon it. 

The rising at Johannesburg was finally fixed to 
take place about the end of December, but differences 
began to present themselves as the time for talking 
passed and that for action drew near. President 
Kruger, who, as it afterwards turned out, was not so 
ignorant as to the turn things were taking as he was 
supposed to be, seemed to show himself disposed to 
listen to the complaints of the Uitlander population, 
and this served in some degree to cool the ardour for 
revolution in Johannesburg. In addition, a serious 
difficulty arose about the flag which was to be hoisted 
in Johannesburg when the revolution was effected. 
Mr Rhodes was firm in his intention that it should 
be the union-jack that was used, and in this he had 
the support of practically the whole of the Britishers 



132 THE JAMESON BAID. 

in the republic; but there were those Uitlanders of 
other countries, principally Germans and Americans, 
who objected to this, and held that it should be the 
flag of the South Africa Eepublic that should be 
used, as they intended that the republic should still 
be maintained, though they wished to reorganise it 
on a representative basis, and they had strong objec- 
tions to seeing the Transvaal become a British colony. 
Mr Bhodes remained firm in his intention, however, 
and a cleavage soon began to appear, and the rising 
was several times postponed, until at length it seemed 
plain that it would never take place at 'alL So ob- 
vious was this last fact, that on December 28 Mr 
Ehodes, in conversation with Sir Graham Bowyer, 
the Imperial Secretary to the High Commissioner, 
stated that, so far as he could see, the rising in 
Johannesburg "had fizzled out like a damp squib." 
Dr Jameson at Pitsani was rapidly losing patience 
at the continual delay, for he knew that rumours as 
to the real reason for his presence on the Transvaal 
border were commencing to get about, and he feared 
that the Boers would begin to mass a force to inter- 
cept his march to Johannesburg unless he moved 
quickly. So he at length decided, to quote the ex- 
pressive phraseology of Mr Ehodes, "to take the 
bit between his teeth," and by crossing the border 
to precipitate matters, and, as he hoped, thus force 
Johannesburg to rise. On December 28 the Doctor 
telegraphed to Mr Ehodes at Cape Town as follows : 
" Unless I hear definitely to the contrary, shall leave 
to-morrow evening." On the following day, Decem- 
ber 29, he again wired to Mr Ehodes, "Shall leave 



THE BAIDERS ENTER THE TRANSVAiOi. 133 

to-night for the Transvaal." By some delay on the 
telegraph lines these two telegrams did not reach 
Mr Ehodes until the morning of the 29th December, 
when they were delivered together. Mr Ehodes at 
once attempted to wire to Dr Jameson to forbid his 
departure, but found that the wires had been cut, 
and that it was impossible for him to get his mes- 
sage through. Mr Bhodes then gave up the at- 
tempt and returned to his house, fully aware that 
Dr Jameson, by his impetuous action, had ruined 
everything. 

Previous to starting, Dr Jameson had called his 
men together and read the letter to them that he 
had received a month before from Johannesburg 
(the date of which had been altered as we have 
seen), and this done, he told them that it was his 
intention to march straight to Johannesburg in 
response to that petition. The force then crossed 
the border, and after going for about eleven miles 
was joined by the Bechuanaland Border Police from 
Mafeking. Even with this addition the force was 
very much less than it had been intended it 
should be, for, all told, it only numbered 515 men, 
with eight Maxims, one 12i-pounder gun, anl two 
7-pounders. The force was under the command of 
Major Sir John Willoughby, while the other prin- 
cipal oflScers were Major the Hon. Bobert White, 
Colonel R Grey, Colonel the Hon. Hy. White, and 
Captain the Hon. C. Coventry. No sooner had the 
Transvaal been entered by this force than the Boers 
began to collect to oppose them, and it was then 
seen that the Government at Pretoria had been 



134 THE JAMESON RAID. 

prepared for this step, and had long had its plans 
laid for defeating it 

So soon as Mr Ehodes realised that the fat was 
in the fire, to use a colloquial expression, he went 
to Sir Graham Bowyer and showed him the two 
telegrams that he had received from Dr Jameson, 
and also told him how his efforts to prevent the 
advance had been checkmated by the wire having 
been cut. Sir Graham Bowyer, in his turn, on the 
morning of Monday the 30th December reported 
the raid to Sir Hercules Bobinson, who at once 
telegraphed to the British representative in the 
republic to ascertain whether the force had really 
crossed the border, and if so, to despatch a mes- 
senger at once to order its return; while on the 
following day the High Commissioner issued a pro- 
clamation publicly repudiating Dr Jameson's action 
in the name of the British Government, and calling 
upon all British subjects to refrain from aiding or 
abetting the force in any shape or form. 

Mr Rhodes attempted, unsuccessfully, to prevent, or 
at anyrate delay, the publication of this proclamation, 
on the grounds that it outlawed Dr Jameson and 
his followers, and left them at the mercy of the 
Boers should they be taken prisoners. The High 
Commissioner recognised the correctness of this, but 
he had first of all his duty to his country to per- 
form, and that duty demanded that the Government 
should instantly be vindicated of any suspicion of 
violating a friendly State, and the proclamation was 
therefore issued. 

On crossing the frontier Dr Jameson's first step 



MR RHODES BROKEN DOWN. 135 

had been to cut the telegraph wire between Mafe- 
king and Cape Town so as to prevent any recall 
reaching him, and also the one to Pretoria to pre- 
vent the news of his departure being sent to the 
Boer Government Misfortune, however, seemed to 
dog the raiders from their first step, for the troopers 
who were detailed for this latter duty, the cutting 
of the Pretoria wire, called at a wayside store, where 
they dallied until they forgot the errand for which 
they had been despatched When they left this 
place they had a confused idea of having been sent 
out to cut some wire or another, so they set to work 
on the first piece of wire they came across, which 
happened to be a portion of a fence, and the tele- 
graph line to Pretoria was thus left open. 

The news of the raid seemed to completely crush 
Mr Shodes, and, as was afterwards stated, for some 
days he appeared to be completely broken down. 
He was at this time Prime Minister of Cape Colony, 
but he realised that he would be forced from this 
office, and that in all probability his political life 
was at an end. He retired to Groot Schuur, his 
house on the outskirts of Cape Town, where he shut 
himself up for some days and declined to take any 
part in the repudiation of Dr Jameson. His attitude 
towards the Doctor was well summed up in the 
broken words to which he gave expression when he 
first heard of the raid, " Poor old Jameson ! We 
have been friends for twenty years, and now he has 
ruined me ! '* for at that time it seemed as if nothing 
but utter ruin was before the greatest man that 
Africa has yet discovered. At length the reserve 



148 THE JAMESON RAID COMMITTEE. 

Govemment of the South African Republic towards 
the Cape Colony was the great obstacle to common 
action for practical purposes among the various States 
of South Africa, he "assisted the movement in 
Johannesburg with his purse and influence." After 
this frank declaration Mr lihodes made what he 
must have realised later was a most unfortunate 
remark. " Acting within my rights," he |paid, " I 
placed on territory under the administration of the 
British South Africa Company, upon the borders of 
the Transvaal, a body of troops under Dr Jameson 
prepared to act in the Transvaal in certain eventu- 
alities." As regarded the rights of Mr Rhodes to 
place a body of troops on the borders of a friendly 
State with the ultimate object of an invasion, this 
remark was of course indefensible, and he was sub- 
jected to a severe cross-examination by Sir William 
Harcourt on this point In explaining the expression 
away, Mr Rhodes seemed to hint that it was rather 
his right as managing director of the British South 
Africa Company to move troops about in Rhodesia 
tliat he was referring to. 

The evidence of Mr Rhodes may be divided into 
three portions — the influence of the Uitlander 
grievances upon his conduct and policy; the direct 
assertion that Dr Jameson entered the Transvaal 
without his authority; and the concealment of his 
views and plans from the Board of Directors of the 
British South Africa Company. Mr Rhodes stated, 
after asserting that Dr Jameson entered upon the 
raid witliout his authority or knowledge, that he was 
willing generally to accept the finding of the Cape 




CROSS-EXAMINATION OF MR RHODES. 149 

Committee as being correct as to facts. In con- 
cluding his statement, Mr Rhodes said that in all his 
actions he was greatly influenced by the belief that 
the policy of the Government of the South Africa 
Kepublic was to introduce the influence of another ' 
foreign Power — obviously Germany — into the already 
complicated system of South African politics, and 
thereby render it more difficult in the future for the 
closer union of the different States. • 

In reference to the " women and children " letter 
which Mr Rhodes had cabled home for publication 
in the ' Times/ Sir William Harcourt attempted to 
draw an admission from him that the object of its 
publication was to make it the ground for Dr 
Jameson's action ; but this Mr Rhodes resolutely 
denied, though confronted with a telegram that he 
had sent to the Chartered Company immediately 
after the raid in which he seemed to hint that it 
was through this letter that Dr Jameson crossed the 
border. He now asserted, however, that the only 
object of its publication was to show that there had 
been communications between the Uitlanders and 
Dr Jameson. Questioned as to whether the High 
Commissioner had ever been informed by him as to 
what he was doing, Mr Rhodes answered in the 
negative, and admitted that when in the autumn of 
1895 Sir Hercules Robinson had asked him why 
the force was being collected on the Transvaal 
border, he replied that it was to protect the railway 
line then being constructed, and for economy, as the 
troops could be kept much more cheaply at Pitsani 
and Mafeking than they could at Bulawayo. 



150 THE JAMESON RAID COMMITTEE. 

When at length Sir William Harcourt came to the 
end of his examination, Mr Rhodes was successively 
questioned by most of the other members of the 
committee, but nothing that was altogether new was 
gathered. Mr Labouchere's cross-examination of Mr 
Bhodes had been looked forward to with interest by 
the general public, but when the turn of the member 
for Northampton came his questions fell very flat, 
and were mostly confined to trying to force Mr 
Bhodes to admit that the whole thing had been 
organised and carried through to enable him and his 
friends to make money on the Stock Exchange ; but 
in this Mr Labouchere proved a dismal failure, and 
of the two Mr Rhodes decidedly came out of the 
bout the better. After an examination lasting for six 
days Mr Rhodes was released from further attendance, 
and he was free to return to Rhodesia, which he 
immediately did. 

After Mr Rhodes came two Dutch members of the 
Cape House of Assembly, Messrs Louw and Ventner, 
who had volunteered their evidence, which dealt 
principally with the future government of Rhodesia. 
Both gentlemen were strongly of the opinion that 
it would be unwise to revoke the charter, as the 
settlers in the country were well satisfied with the 
rule of the Company, and the general opinion of the 
Cape Colony was that colonial control of Rhodesia 
was far preferable to government by imperial officers. 
This view, it may be mentioned, was also the one 
expressed by the Cape Assembly in the session of 
1896, when Mr Merriman introduced a motion to 
the effect that the exercise of sovereign rights by a 




MR SCHREINER'S VIEWS. 151 

trading and financial company such as the British 
South Africa Company was not consistent with the 
peace and prosperity of South Africa, and that an 
address should be presented to her Majesty praying 
for the revocation or alteration of the charter. A 
long debate took place on this motion, but when 
the division was taken it only found eleven sup- 
porters in a house of seventy-six members, and was 
therefore thrown out by a majority of sixty -five 
votes. 

The next witness was Sir Graham Bowyer, who 
under cross - examination admitted that he was 
cognisant of the plans of Mr Bhodes, but did not 
divulge them to the High Commissioner because he 
considered himself bound by a pledge of secrecy. 
After this confession his resignation of his position 
as imperial secretary to the High Commissioner 
followed in a short time as a matter of course. 

The evidence of Mr William Schreiner was next 
taken. This gentleman, who was of Dutch extrac- 
tion, had been Attorney-General under Mr Rhodes, 
and his evidence was valuable so far as it related to 
the future government of Bhodesia. Examined by 
Sir William Harcourt, he expressed the opinion that 
while he thought that the control of Rhodesia should 
still remain in the hands of the British South Africa 
Company, yet there should be an imperial officer in 
supreme control in the country, paid by the Imperial 
Government, and to whom the Imperial Government 
could look for an explanation should anything unto- 
ward occur. As a matter of fact, this had already 
been done in a limited sense, the control of the 



152 THE JAMESON RAID COMMriTEE. 

police and other armed forces in Khodesia having 
been taken out of the hands of the Chartered Com- 
pany and placed under the command of an imperial 
oflScer, Sir Richard Martin. Having spoken with a 
great many people who had lived in Ehodesia, Mr 
Schreiner gathered that they did not at all desire 
the charter to be abrogated. They were more or 
less contented with the Company's government, and 
he thought that their views deserved a very great 
deal of consideration. Cross - examined by Mr 
Chamberlain, Mr Schreiner agreed that on many 
occasions President Kruger had attempted to infringe 
or evade the conditions imposed upon him by the 
treaties of 1881 and 1884. 

Following Mr Schreiner came Dr Jameson, who 
added very little to what had been disclosed at his 
trial some months previously. The most important 
statement that he made, perhaps, was the remark 
that his hand was to a certain extent forced by 
rumours which reached him of the secret arming 
and the warlike preparations that were taking place 
in Johannesburg, thereby indicating that he feared 
the Uitlanders would rise and throw off the Boer 
control without him. Mr Blake in his cross- 
examination of Dr Jameson tried to elicit an admis- 
sion that the Ehodesia Horse, a volunteer force, was 
to have marched down to the Transvaal to support 
him, and that it had, in fact, been organised with 
that end in view. But this was denied, and Dr 
Jameson stated that the only use which would 
have been made of the force would have been to 
parade it at Bulawayo as a significant hint to Pre- 



THE RHODESIA HORSE. 153 

toria. " It was merely," said the witness, " for moral 
eftect." 

Dr 'Jameson having given his evidence, he was 
succeeded by a string of directors of the Chartered 
Company, the Board of which at the time of the 
raid was composed as follows : Duke of Abercorn 
(president), Duke of Fife, K.T., Earl Grey, Lord 
Giffbrd, V.C, Mr Khodes, Mr A. Beit, Mr George 
Cawston, and Mr Rochefort Maguire, who acted on 
the Board as Mr Ehodes's representative while that 
gentleman was in South Africa. Of these gentle- 
men all appeared in the witness-box save Earl Grey, 
who was at that time acting as Administrator at 
Bulawayo. Each one except Mr Beit gave most 
emphatic denials to having had any knowledge that 
the raid was being organised : the Duke of Fife was 
especially indignant, and roundly asserted that Mr 
Ehodes had deceived him. 

The Duke of Abercorn, as president of the Com- 
pany, was asked by the chairman of the committee if 
he could give any information as to the formation of 
the Khodesia Horse, and the reasons that led to the 
corps being raised, for there was still a lingering 
doubt in the minds of some of the members that it 
had been raised with the intention of using it in the 
Transvaal. But the Duke of Abercorn denied this, 
and stated that it was formed in the early part of the 
year 1895, on the recommendation of Mr Rhodes and 
Dr Jameson, in view of the extension of the Com- 
pany's responsibilities north of the Zambesi, and for 
the purpose of maintaining a properly armed force 
within its territories, — an obligation imposed upon it 



154 THE JAMESON RAID COMMITTEE. 

by the charter ; and that it was formed and equipped 
under the authority of the Board on a resolution 
passed as early as December 12, 1894. 

When Mr Labouchere came to cross-examine the 
Duke of Abercorn, he tried to show that by the 
twenty-ninth article of the charter, witness, the Duke 
of Fife, and Earl Grey were placed on the British 
South Africa Company with the object of protecting 
the Government interest; but he was speedily set 
right by Mr Chamberlain, who showed that what 
really occurred was that, when the Company applied 
for its charter, the Government of the day suggested 
that, as a public safeguard, the original Board should 
be strengthened by the addition of persons of inde- 
pendence and influence, and that the names of the 
three gentlemen mentioned above were suggested by 
the Company as fulfilling that condition, and with 
the approval of the Government their names were 
added to the Board, but that they differed in no 
respect from the remainder of the directors, save that 
they were not liable to retire in rotation ; and in this 
statement the Colonial Secretary was corroborated by 
the Duke of Abercorn. In reply to further questions, 
this witness admitted that shortly after the formation 
of the Company a very wide power of attorney was 
given to Mr Bhodes, and that he was authorised to 
do whatever he considered best for the Company, 
without previous reference to the Board in London, 
and out of this statement a minority of the commit- 
tee strived to make capital But it was obvious to 
all who took the trouble to consider the question 
that this was the only course for the directors to 



MR CHAMBERLAIN IN THE BOX. 155 

pursue if the CJompany was to be made a success, for 
Mr Bhodes being as it were on the spot, and know- 
ing the country and the natives as he did, was in a 
far better position to judge as to the measures neces- 
sary to be adopted than were the directors sitting in 
the board-room in far-away London, so that the at- 
tempt of Mr Labouchere and his colleagues in this 
respect fell very flat. 

After Sir John Willoughby had appeared in the 
witness - box, Mr Beit and Dr Eutherfoord Harris, 
who had acted in the affair as the confidential agent 
of Mr Ehodes, came to be examined ; and it was seen 
that they were both entangled in the plot, though, 
like Mr Bhodes, they had no idea that Dr Jameson 
was about to cross the frontier until he actually did 
so. After the examination of other minor witnesses, 
prominent among whom was Miss Flora Shaw, one 
of the colonial correspondents of the 'Times,' and 
who had had a limited knowledge of Mr Bhodes's 
plans, the evidence closed ; but not before Mr Cham- 
berlain had gone into the witness-box and given an 
emphatic denial to the insinuations of Dr Harris to 
the effect that he, Dr Harris, had in some of his 
conversations with the Colonial Secretary endeav- 
oured " by guarded allusions " to show him what the 
real reasons were for placing Dr Jameson's force on 
the Transvaal border. By his evidence Mr Cham- 
berlain completely exculpated himself and the whole 
of the permanent officials of the Colonial Office from 
any suspicion of complicity, though Mr Labouchere 
afterwards professed to have doubts on the point 

Towards the end of the sittings of the committee 



% 



156 THB JAMESON RAID COMMITTEE. 

there were several rather stormy scjenes, the first of 
which occurred when Sir John Willoughby abso- 
lutely declined to answer a question of Mr Labou- 
chere's as to the grounds he had for assuring liis 
officers that in the event of their success "they 
would not be bothered by anybody." This breeze 
over, another and more serious question arose a few 
days later when Dr Harris, in the course of his 
evidence, hotly complained to the committee that one 
of their number (Mr Labouchere) had libelled him, 
first in the House of Commons and afterwards in 
his journal * Truth,' and in the columns of a French 
journal ' La Gaulois,' by saying that he had been en- 
gaged in " bear '* transactions on the Stock Exchange, 
and had used the raid for his own enrichment. Dr 
Harris denied this charge in toto, and asked the 
committee to either compel Mr Labouchere — who 
seemed fated to act the part of the stormy petrel all 
through — to substantiate his words or else withdraw 
them ; meanwhile the witness declined to answer any 
questions addressed to him by his accuser. After 
considering the question the committee called upon 
Mr Labouchere to prove his words, and this he at 
first professed his entire willingness to do, but on 
the following day he wrote a letter to the chairman, 
saying that he was prepared to apologise and with- 
draw the charge since his informant, " a gentleman 
of high position and great business experience," de- 
clined to come forward. This at once caused Mr 
Labouchere to appear discredited, and to be regarded 
with a certain amount of suspicion, for one who had 
erred once might err again. The proceedings had 



THE REPORT OF THE COBIMITTEE. 157 

now lost all public interest, and witnesses seemed to 
be able to do much as they pleased about answering 
any awkward questions that were put to them. 

When Mr Hawksley, the solicitor to the British 
South Africa Company and to Mr Bhodes, appeared 
as a witness, he was called upon to produce certain 
telegrams which he had from the latter, and this he 
refused to do, on the ground that by complying with 
the demand he would be violating professional con- 
fidence. He offered, indeed, to cable out to Mr 
Bhodes and ask for his consent to the messages 
being produced; but Mr Ilhodes declined to allow 
him to do so, and therefore Mr Hawksley had no 
option but to defy the committee, which he did, 
despite threats of reporting him to the House of 
Commons. Seeing that he remained firm, the 
committee decided to proceed without the telegrams, 
in spite of the protests of Mr Blake, who indignantly 
retired from the committee in consequence. The 
latter part of the evidence having been hurried 
through, the committee were in a position to con- 
sider their report, which was finally presented to 
the House on July 27, 1897. There were two 
reports submitted — one signed by the majority of 
tlie committee, and a minority report drawn up by 
Mr Labouchere, who was unrepentant to the last 

The former document was a very mildly worded 
one, and commenced with a condensation of the 
evidence. Kegarding the responsibility for the raid, 
they found that whatever justification there might 
have been for the action on the part of the people 
of Johannesburg, there was none for the conduct 



158 THE JAMESON RAID COMMITTEE. 

of a person in Mr Bhodes's position in subsidising, 
organising, and stimulating an armed insurrection, 
and in employing the forces of the British South 
Africa Company for that purpose. Although Dr 
Jameson " went in," the report continued, " without 
Mr Bhodes's authority, it was always a part of the 
plan that these forces should be used in the Trans- 
vaal in support of an insurrection. Nothing could 
justify the use of such a force, and Mr Bhodes's 
heavy responsibility remained, they considered, al- 
though Dr Jameson had at the last moment invaded 
the Transvaal without his sanction." The committee 
were of the opinion that of the directors of the 
British South Africa Company who appeared before 
them, only Mr Beit and Mr Maguire had cognisance 
of Mr Bhodes's plans ; but in view of the statement 
of the Duke of Abercom, that "Mr Bhodes had 
received a large power of attorney, giving him the 
fullest power to do precisely what he liked without 
consultation with the Board, and the whole adminis- 
tration and everything connected practically with 
Bhodesia was carried on by Mr Bhodes, he simply 
notifying to the Board what had been done," the 
committee " considered that the Board as then con- 
stituted did not fulfil the objects for which it was 
created, or offer sufficient security against the misuse 
of powers delegated to the Chartered Company by 
the Crown," — a statement which meant but little 
when carefully analysed. As for Mr Beit, he had 
played a prominent part in the affair, and had to 
share full responsibility for the consequences, but 
the committee completely exonerated the Colonial 



^ 



MR LABOUCHERK'S REPORT. 159 

Office from any foreknowledge of the aflFair. In 
conclusion, the committee desired to put on record 
their absolute and unqualified condemnation of the 
raid, and the plans which made it possible. Regard- 
ing the second part of the inquiry, relating to the 
administration of the British South Africa Company, 
the committee did not go into that, as it would have 
necessitated a prolonged inquiry, which would have 
prevented their presenting a report that session. 

As for Mr Labouchere's report, the best thing 
about it was the recommendation that the officers 
concerned in the raid should have their commissions 
restored, as they had only acted under the orders 
of their superior officers. Mr Labouchere admitted 
that the Uitlanders had substantial grievances, but 
held that they had been much exaggerated, and that 
the real object of the raid was to enable wealthy 
men to become more wealthy. It is significant, 
when considering the value of this minority report, 
to recollect that not one tittle of evidence had been 
adduced at the sittings of the committee to sup- 
port this very grave charge. In conclusion, Mr 
Labouchere gave it as his opinion that the raid 
formed one of the most disgraceful episodes in the 
history of this country, and that Mr Rhodes and 
Mr Beit merited severe punishment, — two remarks 
which the House of Commons assessed at their 
proper value. 

In spite of an efibrt by the extreme Radicals to 
get Mr Hawksley brought to the bar of the House, 
which was vetoed by the Speaker, on the ground 
that the majority of the committee had made no 



«W*«i>«*M 



•^■a 



t: 



160 



THE JAKESOX RAID GOMfiflTTEE. 



h 



> 



recommeTidation to that ^effofet, it seemed as though 
the Government would take no action on the Eeport 
until, in response to agitation from the Opposition 
benches, Mr Balfour consented to set aside a night 
for the discussion of the whole question. So soon 
fts this concession was announced the " Liberal For- 
wards " drew up a resolution on the subject, regret- 
ting the inconclusive report of the committee, and 
recommending that Mr Hawksley be ordered to 
attend at the bar of the House. When the debate 
came on, the Opposition front bench sided with the 
Government "in the position they had taken up, and 
Mr Labouchere came in for a severe castigation at 
the hands of Sir William Harcourt, his nominal 
leader, for proposing what was virtually a vote of 
1;aensure on a committee of which he had been a 
member. 

In one of the most able speeches of the evening 
Mr Chamberlain vindicated his own position, and 
concluded with a eulogy on Mr Ehodes, in the 
course of which he declared that while his fault 
was almost as great as any that a politician could 
commit, yet he had done nothing which aflfected his 
character as a man of honour, — a self-evident fact 
which one or two of the lesser-known members 
received with manifestations of astonishment. When 
the division came to be taken it showed the utter 
rout of Messrs Labouchere, Blake, and those who had 
supported them ; for while the Government forces, 
augmented by tlie leaders of the Opposition, amounted 
to 304, the "Liberal Forwards" could only muster 
the insignificant number of 77. 



-■'?t'- 



■A ^- 






THE HISTORY OF THE RAID CLOSED. 

■1. 



161 



. * 

With thia debate the*hi«(ory of a most deplorable 

affair may be said to have come to an epd, though 
its effects still linger in South Africa, and are re- 
sponsible for a considerable amount of the trouble 
that has since arisen there. 



rt 



f •• 



L 



162 



CHAPTER X, 



OUTBREAK OF THE MATABELE REBELLION. 




In the early part of 1896 rumours of discontent and 
' incipient rebellion among the natives in Matabeleland 
became somewhat frequent, but the authorities at 
Salisbury and Bulawayo laughed these to scorn, and 
urged that such a thing as a general insurrection 
among the natives was impossible. The Govern- 
ment, too, already had its hands full in coping with 
the terrible scourge of rinderpest, which was playing 
havoc among the cattle of the country, and had but 
little attention to give to the alarmist statements 
of settlers as to natives having been seen sharpen- 
ing assegais and overhauling rifles, — a considerable 
quantity of which, it was known, had not been de- 
livered up in conformity with the order for the 
disarmament of the natives at the conclusion of the 
war of 1893. As for the rinderpest, Mr Coryndon, 
on his return from a shooting expedition in the 
northern portion of Central Africa, reported that the 
disease, which had been prevalent among the herds of 
game there for some years, was moving southwards, 
and had, in fact, already crossed the Zambesi river. 



THE OUTBREAK OF RINDERPEST. 163 

This was looked upon as serious, though the 
general opinion was that there was no call for 
alarm, as while it was possible that it might 
decimate the wild game and such herds of cattle 
as were to be found in the low-lying and marshy 
parts of the country, yet it would not, in all pro- 
bability, gain any footing among the cattle on the 
high plateaus. In this anticipation, however, which 
was shared in by both Government and settlers, they 
were wrong, unfortunately, for, to the general con- 
sternation, the disease soon made itself manifest 
among the cattle at Bulawayo, and in the middle 
of March 1896 it had reached to Salisbury, where 
it raged fiercely on the commonage around the town. 
The cattle seized with it died almost immediately, 
just as though they had been poisoned; and it has 
been estimated that fully 90 per cent of the cattle 
attacked succumbed to the disease. This was about 
the worst blow that the young colony had yet re- 
ceived, for not only did the cattle represent the 
principal source of food-supply, but it was practi- 
cally the only means of transport that the settlers 
possessed In addition to this, the epidemic was 
one of the indirect causes of the rising in Matabele- 
land which has now to be considered. 

It has become a proverb almost in certain circles 
in England that the Matabele rebellion of 1896, 
with all the horrors that attended it, was brought 
about through the withdrawal of the white police 
force to accompany Dr Jameson to the Transvaal, 
which thus left Shodesia at the mercy of the 
natives. This is by no means correct Instead of 




164 OUTBREAK OF THE MATABELE REBELLION. 

supplying the cause, the Jameson raid merely offered 
the opportunity. The causes of the rebellion were 
many, but the chief one, and the one to which all 
the others were subservient, was the dislike of the 
Matabele — who had been the lords of the land for 
so long — for their present position under the whites, 
and for the restraints which the spread of civilisation 
put upon them. When peace was arranged after the 
war of 1893, it should be remembered that while 
the Matabele had been defeated in two engagements, 
neither of which was decisive, the nation was by no 
means crushed, and there were thousands of natives 
who had never fought against the white men, and 
who were not at all content to credit the stories 
which those who had been pitted against the English 
told of their bravery and fighting powers. The death 
of Lobengula, coming as it did on the heels of the 
defeats at Bembesi and on the Shangani, made the 
Matabele glad to accept the British terms of peace. 
For a time they appeared contented — but only until 
the halter commenced to chafe their necks. 

First of all came the cattle question, and this 
proved a sore point with the natives. As has 
already been said in these pages, the chief wealth 
of a Kafir was his cattle ; and a blanket, a gun, or 
even a wife, was always estimated as being worth so 
many head of cattle. When the first war was at an 
end, following the procedure recognised in civilised 
warfare the Chartered Company demanded an in- 
demnity, a step for which they have been severely 
condemned in certain quarters by persons who con- 
tended that the possession of the country was a 



THE CATTLE QUESTION. 165 

sufficient indemnity : this indemnity was taken by 
the Company in the form of cattle. Seeing that 
Lobengula only allowed his followers to own cattle 
on sufferance as it were, all the herds in the country 
might be said to bo the property of the late king, 
and that was the view which the British South 
Africa Company took. The number of cattle in the 
country at this time was estimated at not less than 
a quarter of a million head, and the indunas were 
ordered at once to drive in the cattle from the 
districts over which they had control to Bulawayo. 
Some of the indunas duly complied with this de- 
mand, in wliich they saw nothing more than what 
was to be expected as the outcome of the war ; but 
others, and these were chiefly they who had not taken 
any part in the fighting, declined to do so, and hid 
the cattle away out of reach of the Native Commis- 
sioners. 

As the cattle did not come in in such numbers 
as they ought to have done, the Government ordered 
the Native Commissioners to collect and send in each 
month a certain number of cattle ranging from 100 
to 500 head, according to the size of the district 
and the estimated number of cattle in it. This step 
proved a highly unpopular one among the natives, 
who would have been much more content to have 
yielded up the whole of their cattle at once. They 
did not understand this piecemeal method of taking 
the cattle, and thought that it was done through fear 
of them and of what would happen if the Government 
took them all at once ; and they easily brought them- 
selves to believe that they were much wronged, — 



166 OUTBREAK OF THE MATABELE REBELLION. 

not a very difficult task, — and that the white men 
were taking their cattle from them so as to make 
them no better than slaves. The Native Com- 
missioners noted this attitude on the part of the 
natives and reported it to the Government, at the 
same time adding their own condemnation of the 
scheme. 

These unfavourable reports led the Government to 
reconsider its position, and an indaba of the leading 
indunas of the nation was summoned to discuss the 
question. At this indaba it was decided that the 
Government should take 45 per cent of the cattle in 
the country, while the remaining 55 per cent should 
be left for the use of the native population, and 
should be branded with the mark "KG." (native 
cattle), and the disagreement on this head there- 
upon appeared to have become a thing of the 
past 

The native excitement over the cattle question 
would have most likely subsided in a very short time 
after the above settlement had been arrived at had 
it not been for the fact that with the outbreak of 
the rinderpest, which occurred very shortly after the 
indaba, it was considered necessary to exterminate 
any herds in which the disease had made its appear- 
ance, so as to prevent the contagion spreading and 
reaching those cattle which up till then had escaped 
the pest. This shooting of seemingly healthy cattle, 
though an absolutely necessary step, was an act that 
was beyond the comprehension of the Matabele, who 
saw in it only a wanton intention to ruin them by 
taking away the only thing that made them wealthy ; 




THE NATIVE POLICE. 167 

and this was one of the chief contributory causes of 
the rebellion. 

As will be seen later, however, there were many 
other contributory causes. One of them was the 
formation of a native police corps in Matabeleland, 
which was organised about the end of May 1895, 
was composed of about 300 men drawn from the 
Matabele nation, and was formed partly with the 
idea of propitiating the natives and partly with an 
idea of economy. The duties of this corps, which 
was, of course, ofl&cered by Europeans, was principally 
to assist the Native Commissioners to trace hidden 
cattle, and to keep an eye on the natives generally, 
and it was thought that the idea of letting the 
natives be controlled by men of their own nation 
would be welcomed by the Matabele. As a matter 
of fact, this step only served to accentuate the 
dislike felt by the bulk of the nation for the rule 
of the Chartered Company. The police soon began 
to assume domineering airs over their countrymen, 
and to bully and harry them as a Kafir will, once he 
has the power to do so placed in his hands ; and this 
was the cause of grave discontent in the kraals, as 
was afterwards explained by the indunas to Mr 
Shodes when he visited them in the Matoppo Hills 
on his mission of peace. 

Then came the influence of the witch-doctors, 
always a potent factor when dealing with savage 
and superstitious nations. These witch-doctors 
found that since the advent of the white men 
their occupation was, like that of Othello, gone, 
for the practice of " smelling - out " and suchlike 






168 OUTBREAK OF THE MATABELB REBELLION. 

were ruthlessly forbidden, and this the doctors 
noted with dismay. So soon as they saw that 
they were to be no longer allowed to weave their 
spells, they commenced to practise all their arts 
to work on the feelings of the nation to induce 
them to expel the white men from the . country. 
The exceptional drought and the scourge of locusts 
which swept over the country about the time 
of the occupation they did not hesitate to ascribe 
to the white men, who had " bewitched " the coun- 
try; and by the same reasoning the doctors traced 
the rinderpest to the same source. They art- 
fully pointed out how few in number the settlers 
were, expatiated on the former prowess of the 
Matabele nation, and on the treasures of blankets, 
guns, and other articles that would be theirs once 
they had either exterminated the white men or 
driven them from the country, and were able to 
take possession of their belongings. In these efforts 
to stir up the nation to rebel, the witch-doctors were 
energetically seconded by the various members of 
Lobengula's family, who sighed for their former pride 
of place in the land ; and then the mysterious 
" M'Limo " or god who dwelt in a cave in the 
Matoppo Hills, commenced to speak and to incite 
the natives to rise. All this encouragement fell on 
willing ears as the natives thought of the wrongs 
that they had suffered by the shooting of their cattle, 
and of the way in which they had been plundered 
and beaten by the native police, and of the shame to 
which that force had put numbers of their women ; so 
that the seed once scattered fell on fruitful ground. 




THE JREAL REASON FOR THE REBELUON. 169 

There remains to mention the most important 
reason of all, which has already been hinted at, — 
the hatred of the rule of the white men. The 
Matabele,- used as they were to a life of plunder and 
fighting, found the restraint now placed upon them 
intolerable, and they disliked heartily being com- 
pelled to work for the settlers on the farms and in 
the mines ; and this, coupled with the proud and un- 
broken spirit of the nation, led to the resolve to rise 
and turn the white men from the country so soon 
as an opportunity occurred. While the rule of the 
Chartered Company, despite the assertions to the 
contrary by many people who were ignorant even 
of the rudiments of the questions they professed 
to discuss, erred if anything on the side of leniency, 
which to the Matabele meant weakness and fear, the 
conduct of certain individual settlers served to 
greatly accentuate the ill-feeling which the natives 
felt towards the whites. These settlers, who were, 
after all, one is glad to recollect, only a very small 
minority, seemed to look upon their Kafir labourers 
as so many dogs, to be beaten and cuffed at will, 
while they overlooked or disregarded the fact that 
the Matabele were as jealous for the chastity of their ^^m" 
women as any white nation could have been. * 

The opportunity for the rising, which had long 
before been determined upon, was found when the 
white police were withdrawn from the country, and 
the assertions that the natives were contemplating a 
rising increased in number each day ; but still the 
Government declined to believe the statements until 
when at length the Matabele did cast off the mask 



I 



170 OUTBREAK OF THE MATABELE KEBELLION. 

and rise in open insurrection, the authorities were 
almost totally unprepared to cope with them, though 
to the credit of the Government it should be said 
that they at once took all the steps possible to 
remedy this failure, and to stamp out the re- 
bellion. 

The first act of the rising was an attack on a 
police camp of eight natives on the banks of the 
Umsingwani river on the night of March 20, 1896, 
by a party of Matabele under the command of an 
induna named Umbozo. This attack took place 
about twenty-five miles from Bulawayo, and resulted 
in the murder of one of the police. The remainder 
of the party at once made their way to the Native 
Commissioner of the district and reported to him 
what had happened, and no sooner had this report 
been made than the announcement of the murder of 
another native policeman, on the same night, and by 
members of the same tribe, was received. This news 
was at at once sent forward to Bulawayo, but at that 
time is was thought that the rising was merely local. 

On the 23rd March news reached Bulawayo that 
a white prospector named Maddocks had been mur- 
dered in the Insiza district to the south-east of 
Bulawayo, together with the information that the 
natives in that quarter were in open rebellion, and 
that the white inhabitants had been compelled to 
form a laager for their protection. In addition to 
this, other statements as to the outbreak of the 
natives in various parts of the country reached 
Bulawayo, and it was realised that the rebellion 
was of a general and widespread character, and 



A GltAVK SITUATION. 171 

that the situation was rapidly becoming a very grave 
one. The Administrator at Bulawayo, Earl Grey, was 
away on leave at the time of the outbreak of the 
rebellion. In his absence, the Acting- Administrator, 
Mr A. H. F. Duncan, an ex-member of the British 
navy, at once formed a council of defence to cope 
with the emergency, which council was composed 
of himself. General Digby Willoughby, Captain 
Nicholson, and Captain Garden. So soon as this 
body was formed its first act was to despatch a 
patrol, made up of the remaining members of the 
Matabeleland Mounted Police, to the Insiza district, 
to rescue the settlers there and to bring them into 
Bulawayo ; and this party was under the command 
of Inspector Southey, while the Hon. Maurice 
Gifford accompanied it. 

On the evening of March 23 another patrol of 
sixty men, drawn from the Bhodesia Horse Volun- 
teers, under Colonel Napier, set off towards the 
Shangani to succour any settlers in that part who 
might be in danger. News of the outbreak of 
the rebellion now poured into Bulawayo from all 
quarters. From the Umsingwani district the in- 
surrection rapidly spread through the Filabusi and 
Insiza districts, while from beyond the Malung- 
wani Mountains news arrived of the murder of 
some white men, including the assistant native 
commissioner, Mr Bently ; and tales of massacres 
of the settlers in the outlying districts were so 
numerous and arrived so frequently that by March 
30 it was estimated that there was not a white 
settler left alive in any of the unfrequented dis- 



172 OUTBKEAK OF THE MATAfiSLE REBELUON. 

tricts of Matabeleland. Daring this time, from March 
23 to March 30, numerous patrols left Bulawayo 
for the outlying districts to rescue the settlers, and 
as these arrived in Bulawayo the town began to be 
extremely crowded. 

On March 24 patrols were despatched to the 
Filabusi district and to "Essexvale," Mr F. C. 
Selous' farm, which had already been attacked, 
while Captain Dawson took a party of scouts to 
reconnoitre the country in the direction of the 
Umsingwani At noon of the 25 th Mr Duncan 
summoned a public meeting in the court-house at 
Bulawayo, and in view of the gravity of the situa- 
tion called upon every able - bodied man in the 
town to prepare at once for active service, to which 
they were liable under the terms on which settlers 
were admitted to the country. It was now fully 
seen that a general rising of the natives had taken 
place, and that severe fighting would be necessary 
before they were subdued. The Hon. Maurice 
Gilford seems to have been one of the first to 
recognise the determination of the blacks to re- 
gain their independence, for in a letter written to 
Colonel Napier after the fight at Cumming's store 
— ^which will be described later — he said, "This, 
in my opinion, will prove a more serious business 
than the old war." As terrible tales of the 
murder of helpless women and children began to 
arrive at Bulawayo, it made the settlers there 
eager to set ofif for the native strongholds, and 
come face to face with the fiends that could per- 
petrate such atrocities, and to give them what 



% 



PANIC m BULAWAYO. 173 

Mr Ehodes described as an "everlasting lesson." 
The Dutch residents in the town at once offered 
to form a corps of their own for the defence of 
the country of their adoption. This force was 
afterwards known as the Afrikander Corps, and 
rendered the most valuable services throughout the 
campaign under the command of Captain A. H. 
van Eensburg. Almost as soon as the rebellion 
took place it was seen that the native police were 
not to be trusted in this crisis, for numbers of 
them deserted to the rebels, taking with them 
tlieir rifles and bandoliers ; so it was decided to 
disarm the force as a precautionary measure. When 
this step came to be taken it was found that more 
than 200 of them had gone over to the rebela 

On the night of March 25 the dwellers in Bula- 
wayo had a severe fright, and one that brought 
home to them in a forcible manner the peril in which 
they were situated. Owing to the carelessness of 
some one or other a rifle was allowed to go off on 
the outskirts of the town, and this at once led to a 
panic among the population, whose brains had already 
been excited with the tales that they had heard of 
the Matabele massacres. In the utmost alarm they 
rushed along the streets of the town crying that the 
Matabele were attacking the town, and hurrying the 
women and children into the buildings of the Bula- 
wayo Club for safety. To add to the confusion, the 
bugles of the police were sounding the " alarm," fol- 
lowed by the " double " ; and to those who were ac- 
quainted with the calls, this seemed to indicate clearly 
that they were in imminent danger of being attacked. 



174 OUTBREAK OF THE MATABKLE REBELLION. 

The women and children once placed in a post of 
safety, the men rushed madly towards the Govern- 
ment store to try to obtain rifles, while those who 
possessed weapons of their own hurried excitedly 
hither and thither without any idea as to what they 
were going to do, but filled with the intention to die 
fighting, and to put a bullet into the first black man 
that they caught sight of, independent of his being a 
friendly or a rebel ; and it would have gone hard with 
any natives, no matter what their tribe, who had 
come within the range of the rifles of these distracted 
individuals. 

Around the Government store the clamour and 
riot were indescribable, and rifles and ammunition 
could not be doled out fast enough by the officials. 
In fact, to slightly alter Macaulay's well - known 
line, — 

" Such night in Bulawayo ne'er had been, nor e'er again shall be.*' 

When at length all the rifles in the store had been 
given out, comparative order was restored, and the 
excitement began to cool down somewhat. There 
were at this time many incidents that would have 
been irresistibly comic had it not been for the tragedy 
that was underlying them all. Men who had never 
grasped a rifle in their lives before found themselves 
armed with the latest pattern Lee-Metford and a 
supply of cartridges, at which they gazed in helpless 
astonishment. Such trained officers as there were 
in the town at once took those with arms under 
their control, divided them into parties, and then 
marched them ofi^ to guard those parts of the town 



PRECAUTIONS AGAINST ATTACK. 175 

at which an attack from the Matabele might be 
expected. At length the dawn arrived without an 
assault on the town having been made, and one and 
all gave a sigh of thankfulness. Had a rush on the 
town been made by the rebels that night, when the 
confusion and the clamour were at their height, the 
consequences would have been too awful to contem- 
plate, and would have vied with anything that the 
blood-stained pages of the Indian Mutiny can show. 

On the following morning the authorities realised 
that precautions must be taken against any such 
alarm in the future, and that they must be prepared 
to resist an attack should one be made ; so they 
decided to construct a laager in the market square 
large enough to hold all the inhabitants, where a 
stand could be made against any number of rebels. 
So soon as this was determined upon all the empty 
waggons in the town were requisitioned and drawn 
up around the square, and at each comer was posted 
either a quick - firing gun or a 7 - pounder. The 
artillery in the town consisted of twelve guns, 
including a Gardner, a Gatling, a Nordenfeldt, the 
balance being made up of Maxims and 7-pounders ; 
but out of these dozen guns fully one-half were un- 
serviceable. The rifles in the town numbered under 
600, principally of. the Lee-Metford pattern, with a 
few Martini-Henrys, and about a million and a half 
rounds of ammunition— none too much for the work 
that lay in front of them. 

Outside the laager entanglements of barbed wire 
were laid down at a distance of about forty feet or 
so from the line of waggons, and as the days went 



176 OUTBREAK OF THE MATABELE REBELLION. 

on the laager was added to and strengthened until it 
was considered to be impregnable to any force that 
the rebels could briug against it. The women and 
children were now transferred to the Market Hall, 
the entrance to which was in the laager, within 
which every night all the men of the town who were 
not away on patrol or on picket duty slept. The 
first night that this laager was occupied saw another 
unfortunate accident such as had created the panic 
on the previous evening, — a dynamite charge being 
exploded in one of the wells on the market square 
by some of the officers going the rounds. It had 
been announced that the signal for the outposts to 
fall back on the laager in case of an attack would be 
three rifle-shots, and at the sound of the explosion 
it was at once thought that the enemy were on the 
town. As a whole, the men kept their heads much 
better than they had done the night before : for one 
thing, they were this time behind fortifications, 
always an important point with untrained levies, 
and armed with rifles and cartridges, so that they 
took up their positions to await the onslaught with 
a fair amount of confidence. 

There were some, however, who disgraced their 
manhood by making a mad rush for the Market 
Hall, which was already crowded to excess by the 
women and children, and the rapid entrance of these 
miserable cowards served to accentuate the terror 
which was reigning there. The ofiicer on guard at 
the door was brushed aside by this frightened band, 
but he quickly reasserted himself, and, drawing his 
revolver, sent the craven-hearts back to the laager. 



^ 



THE TERROR OF THE WOMEN. 177 

announcing meanwhile his determination to shoot 
the first man that should attempt anything like that 
again. 

The terror prevailing among the women at this 
time was pitiable in the extreme, for they had no 
means of ascertaining what had really happened, and 
they crouched together in fear and trembling, listen- 
ing for the sound of the first volley that should tell 
them that the attack had commenced. During this 
time several premature births took place under the 
most deplorable conditions ; and altogether it was a 
scene such as those who were not actually present 
can only form a dim conception of. Outside the 
hall the cause of the explosion was quickly explained, 
and things soon quieted down. 

A day or two after this the Ehodesia Horse was 
disbanded, and a new force, comprising every man in 
the town capable of handHng a rifle, was organised 
in its place under the title of the Bulawayo Field 
Force. This body was divided into fourteen troops, 
the whole being under the command of Colonel 
Spreckley, with the Hon. Maurice Gifford, who 
assumed the rank of lieutenant-colonel, as second in 
command. The force included an artillery troop; 
an engineering troop ; Grey's scouts, a fine body of 
men; the Afrikander corps, over 200 strong; Daw- 
son's scouts, another splendid body ; and a corps of 
natives, mostly of the Amaxosa tribe, under Mr 
Johann Colenbrander. These natives mustered 150 
strong, and were always to be found in the thick of 
the fight. The total strength of the force was about 
800, but from this had to be subtracted the various 

M 




178 OUTBREAK OF THE MATABELE REBELLION. 

patrols that were always out, so that the number 
available for the defence of Bulawayo was nowhere 
near this total. 

In addition to the main laager in the market 
square, an outpost was erected and fortified on the 
edge of the town on a large unfinished double-storey 
building known as William's Buildings, from the roof 
of which excellent views over the surrounding coun- 
try were to be obtained. A post of observation was 
established here and carefully protected from attack, 
and was in direct telephonic communication with 
the staff office in the laager: this proved of the 
utmost service as the operations against the rebels 
proceeded. Outside Bulawayo three laagers were 
erected and garrisoned by the settlers — namely, at 
Gwelo, about 120 miles to the north of the capital; 
at Mangwe, sixty miles or so off on the main road to 
the south ; and at Belingwe, about the same distance 
away on the east. The road between Bulawayo and 
Mangwe, leading as it did to the Cape Colony, was 
that along which reinforcements and supplies would 
have to come, and therefore an important line of 
communication. It was determined to keep it open 
at all costs ; so a series of small forts was built 
along it, and the whole distance was systematically 
patrolled. For some reason or another, while the 
natives eflfectually prevented communication along 
the other roads leading out of Bulawayo in the early 
days of the rebellion, they left this, the most import- 
ant of all, open. Their conduct in this respect was 
inexplicable, and showed exceedingly bad general- 
ship. The prevailing idea was that the Matabele 



A MATABELE TRAP. 



179 



had been ordered to leave this road open by the 
M'limo, so that the settlers might take the hint and 
depart south by it ; but it seems more probable that 
it was done as a sort of trap to get the whites to set 
off by it in a body, and then to ambush them at some 
selected point, thus exterminating them at one blow. 
The work done by the various patrols that were 
sent out in the early days of the struggle is of so 
important and interesting a character that it demands 
a chapter to itself 



180 



CHAPTER XT. 



THE MATABELE REBELLION — continued. 



The first patrol to come into contact witli the rebels 
was that under the Hon. Maurice Gifford and Captain 
Southey, which left Bulawayo on March 24 for the 
Insiza district, to relieve a party of about thirty 
settlers who had collected in a store kept by a man 
named Cumming, who had sent to Bulawayo for 
assistance. As the patrol rode forward towards this 
store, they came across the first tangible evidence of 
the rising that the inhabitants had yet seen. About 
twenty - five miles from Bulawayo they found a 
waggon standing abandoned by the wayside, with 
the sixteen donkeys that had harnessed it lying in 
front of it stabbed to death with assegais. The load 
of the waggon had not been disturbed, but the men 
to which it belonged were nowhere to be seen. The 
patrol had not the time to make a long search for 
them, but it was afterwards found that they were 
lying murdered in the bush some little distance 
from the waggon. As the patrol rode forward, they 
were informed by such settlers as they met of the 
terrible murders that had taken place in that district, 



*'FIRB8IDE PHILANTHROPlBTa" 181 

and these tales made the men's blood boil with rage, 
imparting a bitterness and hatred of the Matabele 
into their fighting such as had been absent from 
the war of 1893, and leading to stem resolves to 
show no mercy to such of the rebels as should fall 
into their power. 

Such a bloodthirsty and unforgiving spirit natur- 
ally raised a cry of horror among the fireside philan- 
thropists at home, who denounced the white men in 
Ehodesia as cruel and barbarous monsters, slaying 
the gentle, undefenceless Matabele without mercy. 
But these slanderers of brave men had not seen the 
curls of tiny children and the grey locks of the aged 
bathed alike in their life-blood, with their features 
battered out of recognition, and with every atrocity 
that the diabolical minds of the " sweet and g.entle " 
Matabele could devise; so that such outbursts and 
accusations of brutality against the settlers in Mata- 
beleland only met with the contempt they deserved 
among all with the ability to distinguish between 
right and wrong. 

To return to the patrol. Though the first part of 
the route traversed lay through a broken country 
with plenty of cover, the Matabele did not attack 
them as had been expected, but contented themselves 
with watching the force from a distance, and finally 
allowing it to get out into the open country without 
molestation. Cutting up solitary unarmed settlers 
was much more to the tastes of these rebels than 
attacking a party of well-armed men, even with the 
odds of twenty to one in their favour. The patrol 
reached Gumming's store on the night of March 27, 



% 



182 THE MATABELE REBELLION. 

and immediately preparations were made for resisting 
an attack. Of the thirty men in the store when the 
patrol arrived, a large proportion were unarmed, so 
that the Hon. Maurice 6i£ford found that he had 
only about fifty rifles all told under his command. 
The Matabele attack was delayed for a few hours, 
but about five o'clock on the morning of March 28 
a most determined rush was made on the store by 
a party of about 300 rebels, who in all probability 
looked for an easy victory. In this, however, they 
were much mistaken, thanks to the timely arrival of 
the patrol, by whom, keeping up a steady fire point- 
blank into their ranks, they were at length beaten 
ofif, but not before they had got very close to the 
store. So close did they get on one occasion, that 
one man was killed while endeavouring to climb up 
the window-silL 

When the Matabele retired it was seen that six 
dead were left behind, and it was ascertained later 
that their total loss was about twenty -five. On 
the side of the defenders six of the little force 
were wounded, one seriously; while Sergeant-Major 
O'Leary of the Matabeleland Mounted Police was 
killed, as was an American negro who was present. 
So soon as the natives were finally beaten off, the 
patrol prepared to return to Bulawayo with the 
settlers that they had relieved, while a message 
was sent forward to Mr Duncan asking for a 
small force to be sent out to meet them, together 
with waggons for the wounded, and if possible a 
doctor. 

The next patrol to leave Bulawayo was a small 



BRINQING IN THB SBTTLERa 183 

force of twenty-three men, which Mr Grey hastily 
collected to go to the rescue of six men and two 
women who were shut up in Stewart's store on the 
Tekwe river between Bulawayo and the Shangani. 
This force formed the nucleus of the body that was 
later to perform such gallant service under the name 
of " Grey's Scouts." The Tekwe store was reached 
on the afternoon of March 27, and it was found 
that the tiny garrison was on the point of being 
attacked. The rebels seemed to have got wind of 
the reinforcement having arrived, however, for no 
attack took place, and on the following day Colonel 
Napier's column, which had been patrolling the Insiza 
district, arrived at the store, and a return was made 
to Bulawayo. Between them the two patrols brought 
in no less than forty-three refugees to Bulawayo, all 
of whom, had it not been for the prompt action of 
the patrols, would have undoubtedly fallen victims 
to the Matabele. 

On the night of March 29 another patrol left 
Bulawayo, commanded by Captain Pittendrigh of 
the Afrikander Corps, and composed of eleven men 
of that force. The object of the party was to go 
forward to the Bembesi district to relieve Mr 
Graham, the native commissioner at Inyati, who 
with six others was besieged there, and it was in- 
tended to make a call at Jenkins's store on the way 
to rescue another party there. This latter house 
was reached on the afternoon of Sunday, March 30, 
and ten men were found to be imprisoned here, 
hourly expecting an attack, for which they had made 
every preparation, even removing the thatched roof 



184 THE MATABBLE BBBELLION. 

80 that the place might not be set on fire. As soon 
as the patrol arrived the settlers abandoned the store 
and went forward with the force towards Inyati, so 
that the party now numbered twenty-one strong, — 
not a very formidable force with which to confront a 
horde of Matabele. But the whole record of these 
patrols goes to show what can be done, even in the 
face of overpowering odds, by small bands of brave 
and determined men. 

On their way across the Elibani Hills the party 
was fired upon by some stray Matabele, and a rush 
forward was made by the force to retaliate. As they 
did so they saw a large force of rebels approaching them 
in the favourite crescent formation nearly invariably 
adopted by the Zulu tribe, and it seemed as though 
nothing could prevent the little force being encircled 
and massacred where they stood. The whites at 
once fell back on a strip of brushwood, and using 
this to cover them, they maintained a hot fire on 
the enemy, who returned it. In a short time two 
of the little band were badly wounded, and it was 
decided to make a dash for the road, and to try 
and get away towards the Bembesi river. This 
was at once done, and the party went ofiF as fast 
as their horses could carry them, closely followed 
by the natives. These were, however, soon left 
behind, and none appeared ahead of the party to 
dispute their passage, so that the Bembesi river 
was reached in safety. 

A call was made at Campbell's store on the banks 
of the river, and here the sad news was learnt that 
the party at Inyati, eight miles farther on, ^which the 




PBEPAKING FOB A FIGHT. 185 

force had been sent to relieve, had all been murdered, 
with the exception of one miner, an Irishman named 
Madden, who told the story. In addition to this, 
it was learned that an impi of some 1200 or 1500 
men was in the neighbourhood of Inyati, so that 
Captain Pittendrigh decided that with this body 
of rebels in front of him, and the 300 or so from 
which they had just escaped in their rear, who, he 
feared, were following them up, the position was 
getting somewhat serious. It was decided to fortify 
Campbeirs store as effectively as possible, so that 
the overwhelming advantage of numbers which the 
rebels possessed might be to some extent neutralised. 
This fortification was carried out in a very systematic 
manner : the thatch on the verandah was cut down so 
as to lessen the risk of fire, openings were cut in the 
interior walls to allow of a free passage from one 
part of the store to another, and the outer walls were 
loopholed on every side. A case of dynamite which 
was on the premises was utilised to lay some mines 
round the store, to which a few hastily contrived 
short-time fuses were attached, while the remainder 
of the explosive was converted into hand-grenades; 
and seeing that they possessed about 2000 rounds of 
ammunition, they looked forward to the contest with 
a fair amount of confidence. Two of the party were 
sent off to Bulawayo to inform Mr Duncan and 
Colonel Spreckley of the peril the party was in, and 
to ask for assistance to be sent — a most dangerous 
errand. 

On the early morning of March 31 the garrison 
at the stor^ heard heavy firing in the distance, and 



186 THE MATABELE REBELLION. 

as this gradually drew nearer it was conjectured that 
the reinforcements were arriving. This proved to 
be correct; for in a short time thirty men, drawn 
from the Bhodesia Horse Volunteers and the Afri- 
kander Corps, galloped up to the store, under the 
command of Captain Macfarlane and Commandant 
van Eensburg. This relief force had been fired 
upon at a spot close to where the Queen's Mine 
is now situated, and a running fire with the rebels 
had been kept up for about half an hour. None 
of the party had been wounded by the rebel's fire, 
but two members of the advance-guard, Troopers 
Henderson and Celliers, were reported missing. 
These two men, it may be mentioned, arrived at 
Bulawayo almost exhausted on the morning of April 
1, when it appeared that they had been fired upon 
by a party of rebels who had got between them and 
the main body, with the result that Celliers had his 
horse killed under him, and was himself severely 
wounded in the knee, so that he could scarcely stand. 
Henderson at once dismounted from his own horse 
and insisted on Celliers getting into the saddle while 
he walked beside it; and in this fashion the two 
men, one of whom was badly wounded, hid among 
the hills for three days with thousands of rebels 
almost within sight of them, until at length they 
managed to reach Bulawayo. Had they been at- 
tacked, there was nothing short of a miracle that 
could have saved their lives. If Henderson had 
been so minded, he could have in all probability 
escaped, for both he and his horse were unwounded ; 
but he preferred to remain and risk death rather 




FIGHT IN THE SHILOH HILLS. 187 

than abandon his helpless companion. Such an 
instance of devotion was only one of many which 
occurred during the rebellion in Bhodesia, and 
yet it was such men that Mr Labouchere in his 
paper, * Truth/ denounced as " buccaneers." Cel- 
liers was at once conveyed to the hospital at Bula- 
wayo, but he unfortunately died of his wounds on 
May 16. 

So soon as the newly arrived force had rested, the 
whole party prepared to return to Bulawayo, and 
the journey was performed without incident as far 
as the Shiloh Hills, where the natives began to 
appear in force. The rebels at once opened fire 
on the patrol, but, generally speaking, their aim 
was bad. On the other hand, the practice of the 
white men was excellent, and such of the natives 
as showed themselves paid the penalty of their 
temerity. The Matabele soon had their fill of 
fighting, and retired across the hills with con- 
siderable precipitation. During this skirmish the 
only casualty on the side of the patrol was one 
of the horses, which was shot in the abdomen. As 
the column approached the Kotki river a halt was 
called while a meal was prepared, the meat being 
provided by some native cattle that had been cap- 
tured ; and late that night Bulawayo was reached 
in safety, amid the cheers of the pickets who as- 
sembled to welcome the patrol. 

Another patrol that did good service was that 
organised by Mr James Dawson for service in the 
Gwanda district. This force consisted of about 
twelve men, and left on March 25 for Mr Dawson's 



188 THE MATABELE REBELLION. 

store, which was situated in the Gwanda district, 
about seventy-five miles from Bulawayo, on the 
main road to Tuli. On the journey it was found 
that, to all appearance, everything was quiet along 
the road, and this revived in the minds of the patrol 
the idea that, after all, the rising was only of a local 
character, and was not general. By the time the 
force reached the Umsingwani river, however, evi- 
dences of the recent murder of settlers were plentiful, 
and its false hope was quickly dispelled. Though 
the force seemed to be close on the heels of the 
Matabele, the store was reached without any fighting 
having taken place, or indeed any parties of hostile 
natives having been sighted. 

Almost all of the settlers in the outlying dis- 
tricts that had escaped massacre had been rescued 
by this time, and with the accession of strength 
which they made to Bulawayo, it was thought that 
offensive operations against the rebels might now 
commence. So with this end in view two forces of 
much superior strength to those that had been sent 
out before were organised and prepared to take the 
field. 

The first of these forces was composed of fifty 
men of the C troop of the Bulawayo Field Force 
under Captain Brand, and as many of the Afrikander 
Corps under Captain van Niekerk, together with a 
mule-waggon and a Maxim, and this left Bulawayo 
for the Gwanda district on April 1. The Umsingwani 
river was reached without the force having come 
into contact with the rebels, though while the men 
halted for the night some stray shots were fired at 




THE OWANDA PATROL. 189 

the pickets, but a volley or two quickly sent them 
off out of range. As the force moved forward on 
the following day the buildings of the roadside 
were found to have been pillaged, and apparently 
the Matabele were only just in front. Early on 
the following morning Dawson's store was reached, 
and this was found to have been recently evacuated 
by the whites, though it had since been entered and 
plundered by the rebels. Some little uncertainty 
prevailed in the minds of the patrol as to the route 
taken by the settlers after quitting the store, and 
eventually it was decided to ride forward some four 
miles to where Mr Nicholson's camp was situated to 
see whether the party was there or not. On the 
camp being reached no trace of the settlers was to be 
seen, but an abandoned fort was found perched on 
the top of a kopje, and it was resolved to strengthen 
this, and to station the patrol in it until the settlers 
were traced. 

Four of the troopers thereupon set off for Tuli to 
see if the party had gone on ahead, and to despatch 
a telegram to Bulawayo reporting the safe arrival of 
the column. On the following day two of these 
scouts returned with the intelligence that the white 
settlers were making for Tuli; and as information 
had been received by the patrol that they would in 
all probability be attacked on the return journey, 
two despatch-riders were again sent off to Tuli to 
forward a message to Bulawayo asking that reinforce- 
ments with a Hotchkiss gun might be sent forward 
to meet them. In reply Colonel Spreckley tele- 
graphed that it was impossible to render any help, 



I 



190 THE MATABELE REBELLION. 

and that the column was to return to the capital as 
quickly as possible. With regard to these telegrams 
being sent, it is worthy of note that the Matabele 
were terribly afraid of the telegraph wire, and 
hesitated to go near it, much more attempt to cut 
it; and to this fortunate fact is due the safety of 
many patrols who were able to telegraph to Bulawayo 
for assistance or further orders. 

The column set oflf on its return on April 9, and 
all went well until the afternoon of the following 
day, when a party of rebels were seen seeking cover 
about 1000 yards from the head of the column. 
The Maxim was at once got into action, and as soon 
as the range was found made splendid practice, so 
that the natives were forced to retire after firing a 
few shots. The position cleared, the patrol once 
more moved forward, and after travelling for some 
little time came to a spot that was eminently suited 
for an ambush by the rebels. It was a narrow pass 
between two hills, with ample cover, and here it was 
thought that the Matabele would make a stand, — a 
conjecture that was quickly verified, for as the 
column approached the pass a heavy fire broke out 
on the left flank. This was at once returned by the 
whites, but the enemy were so well hidden that but 
little loss could have been inflicted on them. The 
Maxim was immediately brought into action, and 
commenced sweeping the bush from where the fire 
was coming. At this moment an unfortunate 
incident took place which greatly delayed the 
column, and led to more of the force being wounded 
than would have otherwise been the case. This was 



A RUNNING FIGHT. 191 

the breaking of the disselboom or pole of the mule- 
waggon through a sudden outburst of firing just in 
front of the team's heads, causing them to swerve 
violently. While this accident was being repaired 
the natives kept up a warm fire on the force; 
and had it not been for the fact that there were 
many old and experienced campaigners among the 
detachment of the Afrikander Corps present, the 
patrol might easily have suffered the same fate as 
Major Wilson and his men in the 1893 war. 
The force at length managed to get through the 
pass, though in a terribly disorganised condition, 
and as soon as the open country was reached the 
men spread out into skirmishing order, advancing 
towards the enemy, who were now fully 1000 
strong. 

The country in front of the column was an 
undulating one, comprising ridges of dwarf hills 
with little valleys in between, and there was an 
abundance of cover, of which the rebels took every 
advantage. The formation of the Matabele was the 
inevitable crescent, which is, as has been said, char- 
acteristic of Zulu warfare, and the horns of this 
crescent were slowly closing in with the intention 
of outflanking the white men, whose ranks were 
rapidly thinning under a well-directed fire from the 
centre of the rebel position. They stubbornly main- 
tained their ground, however, and managed to keep 
moving forward, though very slowly, keeping up a 
hot rifle -fire meantime, while the Maxim did good 
service. The struggle raged on for about three 
hours, the whites going forward towards the centre 



192 THE MATABSLK REBELLION. 

of the Matabele line, and the blacks doggedly con- 
testing every inch of the way. 

At length a small kopje was sighted, and for this 
the advance-guard of the column made a dash, with 
the object of gaining a slight rest and arranging a 
plan of campaign. So soon as they made for this 
kopje the Matabele divined their intention and 
rushed off to try to defeat it, and it was a race 
as to which should get there first. Ultimately the 
advance-guard managed to win and hold the kopje 
—which was nothing more nor less than a huge 
flat -topped rock standing about fifteen feet higher 
than the surrounding country — until the main body 
arrived. 

The kopje was surrounded on all sides by dense 
bush, and in this the Matabele took shelter, getting 
up to within forty yards of the position, and it was 
only after four charges that they were beaten oft 
The fight had now lasted for six hours, and had been 
the hardest bit that had yet taken place. The loss on 
the white side was five men killed and about twenty- 
five wounded, two of whom were dying by the time 
the hill was reached, and thirty-three horses had 
been killed, while they had only been able to advance 
about five miles. It was estimated that some 250 
of the rebels had been killed and wounded. The 
patrol was by no means out of danger when they 
saw the enemy retire, for they had sixteen miles or 
so of very bad country to traverse, and hampered as 
they were with their wounded, they would have 
been in an awkward position to repel an attack. 
Luckily the Matabele seemed to be tired of fighting 



THE SHILOH PATROL. 193 

for a bit, and the patrol was permitted to go on its 
way without further opposition. On April 1 1 Bula- 
wayo was reached, when the wounded (one man had 
died on the way) were transferred to the hospital. 
How the little force of 100 men escaped complete 
annihilation was a mystery. A considerable share 
of the credit must be given to Captain van Niekerk, 
who took command at the request of Captain Brand, 
and whose knowledge of Kafir warfare stood him in 
excellent stead ; but all the men engaged fought with 
a bravery and a coolness which it would have been 
hard to surpass. 

The second of these patrols was under the com- 
mand of Lieutenant-Colonel Gifford, and was known 
as the Shiloh patrol, leaving Bulawayo on April 4. 
This force likewise met with some severe fighting. 
The column was made up of the corps known as 
Gifford's Horse, with thirty men of the F troop of 
the Bulawayo Field Force under Captain Dawson, 
and eleven men of Grey's Scouts under Lieutenant 
Crewe — making a total in all of 118 men, with one 
Maxim ; while it was accompanied by forty - nine 
Colonial Boys under the command of Captain Bisset. 
This force had a kind of roving commission, and 
was first to go to the Khami river to disperse an 
impi or two, then cross over to Inyati and do 
likewise, and finally to join the Salisbury road at 
the Bembesi river, thence returning to Bulawayo ; 
but it was found impossible to carry this programme 
out. The force had not proceeded very far on its 
journey when news reached it of an impi being 
encamped about fourteen miles away on the Umguza 

N 



194 THE MATABKLK REBELLION. 

river, and thither Colonel Gifford determined to 
make his way. This was done, and soon an outburst 
of firing on the right of the column indicated that 
some of the scouts were being attacked, and the 
rear-guard quickly came into collision with a force 
of about 300 natives. Support was sent to the 
rear-guard, and after some heavy fighting for about 
an hour the rebels were beaten oflf. While this 
skirmish was going forward the main body had 
formed a laager on the open plain, and so soon as 
the fighting ceased the rear-guard fell back on this. 

The column set off on its journey again early 
on the following morning, and had gone but a short 
distance when a body of about 500 rebels attacked 
the advance-guard under Captain Meikle. This 
contest raged across the Umguza river, but when 
the Maxim was brought into action and a searching 
fire opened on the rebel position, the Matabele soon 
beat a retreat. As they were doing this the Col- 
onial Boys under Captain Bisset executed a smart 
flank movement and came upon the rebels un- 
expectedly, killing some thirty of them. After 
this no further attack was made on the column, 
which reached Fonseca's Farm in safety, though a 
strong force of Matabele was reported to be marching 
parallel with them. 

On the following day, Easter Monday, April 6, 
the scouts under Lieutenant Borke came across an 
indaba taking place, and as soon as the white men 
were seen a rush was made to cut them off. Lieu- 
tenant Borke in particular had a narrow escape, 
his horse breaking loose from him and causing him 



A HOT BATTLE. 195 

to have to make his way back to the camp on 
foot It is likely that he would have been quickly 
killed had it not been for the timely arrival of the 
Colonial Boys, who covered his retreat. So soon 
as this firing was heard at the main camp, Captain 
Dawson's troop was ordered forward in support, 
while the B troop under Captain Flynn was sent 
off to take possession of some kopjes on the right 
of Colonel Gifford's position. The action now became 
general, and the rebels showed in very strong force, 
the brunt of the fighting being borne by the Colonial 
Boys and Dawson's and Flynn's troops on the riglit 
of the lines. After a time the column fell back 
upon a donga for shelter, and seeing that this posi- 
tion formed a natural laager. Colonel Gifford sent 
out orders for the whole force to fall back on it 
This movement was carried out not a moment too 
soon, for some of the troops had great difficulty 
in fighting their way through the advancing horde 
of Matabele. The rebels followed this retreat up 
closely, and seemed to be about to attempt to rush 
the laager, but a steady fire checked them, and on 
the Maxim being turned upon them they fell back 
into the bush, about 600 yards away, from where 
they maintained a hot fire. Colonel Gififord took 
up his position near the Maxim, and here it was 
that he was wounded in the right shoulder. He 
made an effort to keep his place, but was at length 
overcome, and had to be taken to the rear, handing 
over the command to Captain Lumsden, who had 
accompanied the force as chief of the staff and 
second in command. 



196 THE MATABELE REBELLION. 

The fire of the rebels about this time was very 
accurate, and seemed to indicate that there were 
many ex-members of the native police force among 
them, and several of the troopers fell either killed or 
wounded. Shortly afterwards the rebels drew oflf, 
and the fighting for that day was at an end. 

On the following day, however, the rebels returned 
to the attack, driving the Colonial Boys, who had 
been sent out scouting, back into the laager, which 
they charged with a desperate rush of the old 
Zulu type. They were received with a very heavy 
fire, however, which bowled several of their number 
over, so they changed their tactics, and opening out 
their ranks, attacked the laager on every sida 
Fighting had not been in progress long when Captain 
Lumsden was hit in the leg and rendered hors de 
combat, the command now falling to Captain Bisset. 
The fight raged sternly until midday, when the 
Matabele were at last beaten and compelled to retire. 
About two o'clock a messenger rode up to the laager 
with the news that the relief force, which had been 
sent for to Bulawayo on the previous day, was about 
five miles away, and was moving forward as rapidly 
as possible ; and soon this force, which was under 
the command of Captain Macfarlane, arrived. The 
return journey was started on the following morning, 
and Bulawayo was reached by nightfall without 
incident. 

The losses of the patrol amounted to two troopers 
killed in action, while six others were wounded, in- 
cluding Colonel Gifford, whose right arm it was 



DEATH OF CAPTAIN LUMSDSN. 



197 



found necessary to amputate at the shoulder, and 
Captain Liunsden, who unfortunately died of his 
wound in Bulawayo hospital on April 10. The 
deceased officer was a retired captain in the 4th 
Scottish Bifies, and had arrived in Matabele- 
land on a shooting expedition only a few weeks 
previously. 



198 



CHAPTEE XII. 



THE MATABBLB REBELLION continued. 



About the middle of April the Matabele impis began 
to draw in around Bulawayo, which was quickly 
beconiiDg encircled by the rebels, who, as time went 
on and the defenders made no sign, grew very bold, 
and ventured under cover of night to steal several 
head of cattle from the outskirts of the town, and to 
murder the boys in charge of them. Several col- 
lisions between the white outposts and the Matabele 
occurred within sight of the town, but for some time 
nothing decisive took place. While this was going 
on at Bulawayo, Captain Laing managed to send 
news through from the Belingwe district to the 
effect that all the white inhabitants there had gone 
into laager and would be able to successfully resist 
any attack that might be made upon them. This 
was welcome news, for much anxiety had been felt 
in Bulawayo as to the fate of the settlers in the 
Belingwe district; but it appeared that Captain 
Laing had been warned of the rising, so soon as the 
first outbreak occurred, by the native commissioner 
in the Insiza district, and he had been thus enabled 



FIGHTING AT THE UMGUZA. 191) 

to take precautions, though not a moment too soon, 
as it happened. A laager was immediately formed 
into which all the white settlers in the vicinity were 
ordered, and as this was being done a strong body 
of rebels made a sudden swoop on the farms and 
carried off a number of cattle. So soon as the news 
of this raid reached Captain Laing he set off, followed 
by nine men, to attack the natives, and succeeded in 
recapturing the cattle. 

On April 16 the first real brush with the natives 
around Bulawayo, then estimated at about 10,000, 
occurred, a force of forty-five men under Captains 
Grey and Van Niekerk being attacked by an impi 
near the Umguza river, to the north-east of the 
town. The rebels opened fire at 800 yards, and 
the white force, all of whom were mounted, at once 
opened out into skirmishing order and made straight 
for the rebels' lines, which were across the river, at a 
canter. The stream was forded in two places, and 
on the farther bank being reached a party of rebels 
was seen about 200 yards off. The horsemen 
charged down on these, and after firing a wild volley 
at the whites, this party turned and fled into the 
bush. As the force rode forward it was seen that 
the natives who had been firing on them were but 
an advance-guard of a much stronger body, which 
now appeared in force, spreading out on either flank 
of the patrol with the intention of outflanking it and 
preventing it recrossing the river. Seeing that the 
odds were too great for them to cope with, the 
whites commenced to beat a retreat, and were closely 
followed up by the rebels, who became very courage- 



• • 



200 THE MATABELE REBELLION. 

ous as they saw the white men giving way before 
them. Slowly the white force fell back until the 
rebels gave up the attack and retired to their strong- 
hold, while the patrol returned to Bulawayo, their 
casualties amounting to one man wounded. 

The next event of importance around Bulawayo 
was the murder of an isolated scouting party of 
three members of the Afrikander Corps who were 
massacred by a force of natives on April 19 ; while 
about the same time the farm of Colonel Napier, 
which was situated about three miles to the south 
of Bulawayo, was raided by a strong body of Mata- 
bele, who carried off a quantity of cattle in addition 
to murdering several friendly natives and besieging 
a party of white men. A force consisting of a troop 
of the Afrikander Corps under Captain Pittendrigh, 
the K troop of the Bulawayo Field Force, and a 
detachment of Grey's Scouts, was immediately sent 
forward to the assistance of those on the farm, 
under the command of Captain Macfarlane, who also 
took a Maxim vdth him. As the homestead was ap- 
proached Captain Macfarlane received the informa- 
tion that the whites and the friendly natives on the 
farm had succeeded in beating off the rebels, so the 
column struck off for the Umguza river, in the 
neighbourhood of which it was thought that the 
rebels would collect after their repulse. As the 
stream was approached scouts reported that a 
strong force of the Matabele was on the farther 
bank, and soon the rebels were sighted. They 
had evidently been informed of the presence of 
the patrol in their vicinity, for they were making 



A STRONG FORCE ORGANISED. 201 

preparations for their favourite manoeuvre of out- 
flanking the whites. Captain Macfarlane also re- 
ceived the intelligence that another impi was 
advancing against him from the direction of Gov- 
ernment House, so he decided that his force was 
too weak to warrant his crossing the river. He 
therefore took up a position on a piece of open 
ground at the junction of a smaller stream with 
the Umguza, and there awaited the onslaught of 
the rebels. A skirmish took place in which the 
patrol lost one man killed and another wounded, 
while the rebels lost about twenty killed and 
wounded, — a loss that would have been much 
greater had it not been that the Maxim "jammed" 
just at the moment when its fire was becoming 
efiTective. As the natives showed signs of com- 
pletely surrounding the force, and news was re- 
ceived of another impi being on its way to join 
in the attack. Captain Macfarlane decided to 
return at once to Bulawayo, and this was forth- 
with done. 

So soon as the report of the skirmish was made 
to the authorities in Bulawayo, it was decided that 
an effort must be at once made to break up some 
of the impis, which were daily growing in bold- 
ness. On April 20, therefore. Colonel Napier 
collected a force of 230 whites with 100 of the 
Colonial Boys, together with a Hotchkiss, a 7- 
pounder, and a Maxim, this being the strongest 
force that could with safety be spared from the 
town, and an advance was made as far as the 
Umguza river. The Matabele, however, wanted to 



202 THE MATABELB REBELUON. 

draw the whites across the river; but Colonel 
Napier was not to be caught, so no fighting took 
place on that day, and the column returned to 
Bulawayo much disappointed. On April 22 another 
patrol left Bulawayo for the Umguza river, where 
the rebels seemed to have established their head- 
quarters. This force was about 120 strong, and 
was composed of detachments of various corps 
under the command of Captain Bisset. Accom- 
panying the force was the Hotchkiss and a Maxim 
and about 100 friendly natives. As this patrol 
advanced towards the Umguza it was quickly seen 
that on this occasion the natives intended to oppose 
the march, for firing on the patrol commenced as 
soon as the river was sighted. It was the left 
of the line under Captain van Niekerk that first 
came into action, but the fighting soon became 
general all along the line of the whites' advance, 
and a strong effort was made by the Colonial 
Boys, led by their officers and Mr F. C. Selous, to 
force the rebels back on to the river. While this 
was being done the Umguza was forded by the 
detachment of Grey's Scouts present, and these 
charged down on the Matabele stationed on the 
farther bank with telling effect, sending them off 
in full retreat completely demoralised. 

There were many exciting incidents in this fight, 
chiefly when the recall was sounded and the Scouts 
fell back on the main position. Seeing the white 
men retiring, the Matabele plucked up fresh courage 
and charged forward, and it was about this time 
that Mr F. C. Selous had a very narrow escape. 



BRAVERY OF TROOPER BAXTER. 203 

This gentleman's pony, though broken in to fire, 
suddenly made off while its rider had dismounted, and 
left Mr Selous stranded some distance away from 
the patrol, who did not observe his plight, and with 
the Matabele rapidly bearing down upon him when 
they saw a single white man left to their mercy. 
Fortunately Lieutenant Windley noticed the position 
of affairs, and after making an unsuccessful attempt 
to catch the runaway steed, he rode up to Mr 
Selous's side and the two of them managed to get 
clear away from the Matabele, who maintained a 
dropping fire after them, luckily without effect It 
was as narrow an escape as Mr Selous ever had, full 
of dangers as his life has been. 

The most gallant deed of the many that were 
performed that day has yet to be told, and that 
was the bravery of Trooper Baxter of Grey's Scouts. 
These scouts had gone for some distance ahead of 
the main line and got among the Matabele, when 
the signal was given them to return. As they 
turned to execute this movement one of their 
number. Trooper Wise, was wounded as he mounted 
his horse, and fell to the ground. So soon as 
he let go the bridle his horse galloped away, 
leaving the wounded man to face certain death. 
Trooper Baxter, however, who saw what had hap- 
pened, at once dismounted, placed Wise on his 
own horse, and proceeded to make his way back 
on foot. The Matabele thereupon turned their 
attention to Baxter, whose position seemed pre- 
carious in the extreme, until Captain Grey and 
Lieutenant Hook went to his rescue. As the two 



204 THE MATABELE REBELLION. 

officers galloped up to Baxter the rebels made a 
rush at them, wounding them both. The scouts, 
however, hung together in splendid fashion, and 
others turned back to help to beat o£f the rapidly 
increasing band of natives that was surrounding 
their companions. A trooper named Long rode 
up to Baxter, when the latter took hold of the 
mounted man's stirrup-leather, and the two then 
tried to dash oflf, but they had not gone far before 
Baxter was wounded and had to relinquish his 
hold. The Matabele were now nearly up to the 
horses, no further attempt to rescue Baxter was 
possible, and he had to be left where he had 
fallen, to die the death of a hero, giving up his 
life for the sake of another. This instance out of 
many similar can be commended to those people 
who seem to be of the opinion that an English- 
man in South Africa, and especially in Rhodesia, 
is an incarnation of all the vices without a single 
redeeming virtue. 

About a week after this fight — on April 24, 
to be precise — another determined move against 
the Matabele was decided upon, and the following 
force, being every man that could safely be spared 
from Bulawayo, was collected: 35 of Grey's Scouts 
under Captain Grey, 25 of B troop Bulawayo Field 
Force under Captain Fynn, 15 of Captain Dawson's 
troop, 35 of the Afrikander Corps under Com- 
mandant van Eensberg, 100 of Colenbrander's 
Native Boys under Captain Cardigan, and about 
65 friendly natives under chief native Commissioner 
Taylor, with the Hotchkiss and a Maxim. The 



ANOTHER FIGHT AT THE UMGUZA. 205 

guns were under the command of Captain Bixon, 
and the whole force, which numbered 120 whites 
and about 170 natives, was commanded by Cap- 
tain Macfarlane, while several unattached officers 
accompanied the force, which left Bulawayo early on 
the morning of April 25 and marched towards the 
Umguza river once more. 

The plan this time was for the scouts to lead the 
natives on to attack the main body where the guns 
were, so as to give the quick-firing weapons an 
opportunity of inflicting a much -needed lesson on 
the rebels. So soon as the men riding in advance 
of the patrol were attacked, therefore, they fell back 
very slowly towards the guns, leading the natives 
on in pursuit The Matabele were very wary, how- 
ever, and though on occasions they got as close to 
the column as 200 yards, they resolutely kept to 
the bush, so that less punishment was inflicted on 
them than would have been the case had they 
showed themselves in the open country. The native 
fire was very hot for some time, but the aim was 
poor in the extreme : in fact, only two men on the 
white side were hit by this fire, though one of these 
was shot dead. Two determined rushes close up to 
where the Maxim was posted were made, but the 
steady fire from the machine - gun and the rifles 
drove the rebels back each time. The Matabele 
then changed their tactics, the main body retiring 
out of range, while a few picked shots stole forward 
under cover in the attempt to " snipe " as many of 
the column as possible. This movement would have 
doubtless caused much loss to the patrol had it not 



206 THE BIATABELE REBELLION. 

been for the fact that, as it was being carried out, 
the Afrikander Corps made a dashing charge on the 
Matabele line, driving the rebels from position after 
position in iSne style. The natives in their flight 
made straight for the ford across the Umguza river, 
but the Afrikander Corps were before them, and 
managed to deliver a crushing blow at the rebels 
as they attempted to cross the river, killing about 
seventy of them. The Hotchkiss, too, got the range 
of the retreating natives, and planted some shells 
right in their midst, doing considerable execution. 
While this was going forward on the left of the 
fighting line, the troopers on the right wing under 
Captain Dawson were having a warm time of it 
with the rebels in the bush in front of them, who 
were maintaining a galling fira A party of 100 
natives was detailed to clear the bush : this was 
speedily done, and the Matabele were soon in full 
flight all along the line, being hotly pursued by 
the whites for a distance of about two miles. A 
new impi then appeared to the west of the patrol, 
and made an attempt to cut ofif the Afrikander 
Corps ; but the guns were quickly turned upon them, 
and they soon beat a retreat. Captain Macfarlane 
now decided that further pursuit was useless, and 
the return to Bulawayo commenced. The loss of 
the column on this occasion was four white men 
killed and as many wounded, while three natives 
also were wounded. The enemy's loss was con- 
siderable, probably about 150 out of the 2000 or 
so that were engaged. The result of this action 
was to cause the Matabele impis that had been 



RELIEF FORCE FROM SALISBURY. 207 

massing around Bulawayo to shift their quarters to 
a more remote spot. 

Several other skirmishes, sufficient in themselves 
to fill a goodly sized volume, took place in dififerent 
parts of Matabeleland about this time, in all of 
which the settlers — though numerically much in- 
inferior to the rebel forces opposed to them — 
managed to hold their own, and, in fact, to do a 
little more ; but the final suppression of the rebellion 
still seemed a long way off. 

About the beginning of May Colonel Napier re- 
ceived news that a small relief force from Salisbury 
was advancing towards Matabeleland, and it was at 
once decided to equip a large force to go towards 
the Shangani to meet this column, which was 
accompanied by Mr Rhodes. The force told off in 
Bulawayo for this duty was composed as follows : 
44 men of Grey's Scouts under Captain Grey, 62 
men of the Afrikander Corps under Commandant 
van Rensberg, 43 men of Gifford's Horse under 
Captain Fynn, 21 men of the F troop Bulawayo 
Field Force under Lieutenant H. Lamb, a dis- 
mounted force of about 100 men under Captain F. 
C. Selous, and 38 men of the Artillery Corps under 
Captain Biscoe, with a 7-pounder, a 2-5 gun, a 
Nordenfeldt, a Maxim, and a Hotchkiss, while 250 
natives also formed part of the force. Colonel 
Napier was in command of this formidable column, 
with Colonel Spreckley as second in command and 
Captain Molyneux as adjutant. The force numbered 
in all 655 officers and men. The column advanced 
some distance across the Umguza river before any- 



308 THE HATABELE BBBELUOK. 

thing of the rebels was seen beyond a few sconts, 
but as they approached the hill to the Dorth-east of 
Bulawayo, known as Thabaa Induna, a considerable 
body of Matabele was suddenly come upon by the 
dismounted scouts that had been sent forward under 
Mr Selooa. A few shots from the Maxim, which 
was pushed forward, sufficed, however, to send these 
to the right-about, and they made for the thick bush 
which covered the country to the north of Thabas 
Induna. 

On the following day the main body of the column 
remained in laager while a patrol of about 150 men 
under Colonel Napier went forward to reconnoitre 
the country. This patrol advanced in skirmishing 
order to Thabas Induna, which was reached without 
any of the natives having been seen, though their 
recently evacuated camps were discovered and burnt. 
The day was not destined to pass without a skirmish, 
however, for a party of about eighty sconts under 
Captain Grey suddenly came upon a body of some 
300 natives, who were intrenched on a ridge about 
400 yards away. The natives at once opened fire on 
ihe horsemen, who without hesitation charged directly 
at them. The sight of tbe horses bearing down upon 
them was too much for the nerves of the savages, 
who turned and fled. The scouts were quickly 
among them, however, and, their blood being fairly 
np, they were intent on slaying every Matabele they 
could find — for there were but few there who had 
not lost relatives or friends through the butcheries 
by the Matabele at the breaking out of the rebellion, 
and they would have been more than human had 



• • 



THE scout's vengeance. 209 

they neglected to take advantage of this opportunity 
for revenge which was offered to them. No quarter, 
therefore, was given to the blacks as they were 
caught, but they were killed where they stood, and 
the deaths of the defenceless settlers were amply 
avenged on that afternoon by the infuriated scouts, 
who had at length got to close quarters with the 
rebels. It seems diflScult in cold blood to justify 
this slaughter of the natives, but having regard to 
all the circumstances it can well be condoned. 

On the next day the column resumed its march, 
and on May 19 the relief force from Salisbury 
was met. This relief column was organised to 
set out for Matabeleland so soon as the news of 
the outbreak of the rebellion reached Mashonaland. 
It was composed of 150 mounted men under the 
command of Mr Robert Beal, an old pioneer. The 
start of the corps was much delayed by want of 
transport, the oxen dying of the terrible rinderpest 
almost as fast as they were sent into the country; 
but it was at last able to set off, and, as already 
mentioned, Mr Rhodes, with Sir Charles Metcalfe, 
the consulting engineer of the Chartered Company, 
and other gentlemen, accompanied the force. It 
entered Matabeleland and proceeded on its way 
without incident until April 30, when the advance- 
guard was attacked by a body of rebels, about 800 
strong, who were posted on the slopes of a hill. A 
gallant charge was made at this hill, which was 
eventually carried, and the rebels driven off. This 
skirmish over, the force managed to reach Gwelo 
without further fighting. At Gwelo they found 





210 THE MATABELE REBELLION. 

the inhabitants in laager, strengthened by the 
presence of a hunting party from the Sabakwe 
district, including Mr A. Weston Jarvis, a director 
of some of the leading Bhodesian mining and finance 
companies, Mr Egerton, M.P., and other gentlemen ; 
and after leaving Gwelo until the time the force met 
Colonel Napier's column, the journey was entirely 
without incident of more than passing moment. 
Almost immediately the two forces met a confer- 
ence was held, at which it was decided that a 
flying column under Colonel Spreckley should be 
sent into the Insiza district to break up any 
impis that might be there, while the main body 
under Colonel Napier should march through the 
valley of the Insiza river, the two forces ultimately 
joining hands again at the ford across the Insiza 
on the Bulawayo-Belingwe road. 

Accordingly, on the morning of May 21 Colonel 
Spreckley set off with about 400 men for the south, 
while the main body left shortly afterwards as 
arranged. The flying column met with no fighting 
to speak of, but Colonel Napier's column had rather 
a hot skirmish in the Insiza valley on May 22. 
Early on this morning a force of about 100 men, 
under the command of Captains Grey and Van 
Niekerk, set ofl^ to find if possible the headquarters 
of the numerous bands of rebels that were known 
to be in the neighbourhood. As this scouting force 
rode forward a large party of Matabele appeared 
suddenly from the dry bed of a river, where they 
had been lying concealed, and a running fight com- 
menced which ranged over four miles of ground. 



BODIES OP SETTLERS FOUND. 211 

The rebels made desperate efiforts to cut ofif the 
scouts from the main body, but the horsemen pre- 
vented this, though they had two men killed and 
two others slightly wounded in doing so. Further 
skirmishing took place on May 23, but the rebels 
were soon dispersed and their kraals burnt The 
column came upon several bodies of men, women, 
and children who had been brutally murdered by 
the blacks, and these were reverentially buried, 
while the men who witnessed these sad sights 
were more than ever incensed against the perpe- 
trators of them. As the force marched through 
the district it also came across a number of cattle 
and large quantities of grain, which Were taken 
possession of, so much of the latter as was not 
needed for the horses being destroyed. The two 
forces met at the appointed place on May 27, and 
three days later Bulawayo was reached. 

Instead of proceeding to Bulawayo, the Salisbury 
column, strengthened by sixty men of the Bulawayo 
force under the command of Colonel Beal, turned 
southwards through the Filabusi district to meet an 
impi which was thought to be lurking there and 
to disperse it. In this they were disappointed, 
however, for, beyond a few stray natives who fled 
at the approach of the white men, nothing was 
seen of the rebels, and the column finally returned 
to Bulawayo towards the end of May without having 
come into contact with the Matabele. 

Before Colonel Napier's force arrived in Bulawayo 
on May 27, reinforcements had arrived at that town 
under the command of Colonel Herbert Plumer of 



210 THE MATABELE REBELLION. 

the inhabitants in laager, strengthened by the 
presence of a hunting party from the Sabakwe 
district, including Mr A. Weston Jarvis, a director 
of some of the leading Bhodesian mining and finance 
companies, Mr Egerton, M.P., and other gentlemen ; 
and after leaving Gwelo until the time the force met 
Colonel Napier's column, the journey was entirely 
without incident of more than passing moment. 
Almost immediately the two forces met a confer- 
ence was held, at which it was decided that a 
flying column under Colonel Spreckley should be 
sent into the Insiza district to break up any 
impis that might be there, while the main body 
under Colonel Napier should march through the 
valley of the Insiza river, the two forces ultimately 
joining hands again at the ford across the Insiza 
on the Bulawayo-Belingwe road. 

Accordingly, on the morning of May 21 Colonel 
Spreckley set off with about 400 men for the south, 
while the main body left shortly afterwards as 
arranged. The flying column met with no fighting 
to speak of, but Colonel Napier's column had rather 
a hot skirmish in the Insiza valley on May 22. 
Early on this morning a force of about 100 men, 
under the command of Captains Grey and Van 
Niekerk, set ofif to find if possible the headquarters 
of the numerous bands of rebels that were known 
to be in the neighbourhood. As this scouting force 
rode forward a large party of Matabele appeared 
suddenly from the dry bed of a river, where they 
had been lying concealed, and a running fight com- 
menced which ranged over four miles of ground. 



BODIES OP SETTLERS FOUND. 211 

The rebels made desperate eflforts to cut oflf the 
scouts from the main body, but the horsemen pre- 
vented this, though they had two men killed and 
two others slightly wounded in doing so. Further 
skirmishing took place on May 23, but the rebels 
were soon dispersed and their kraals burnt The 
column came upon several bodies of men, women, 
and children who had been brutally murdered by 
the blacks, and these were reverentially buried, 
while the men who witnessed these sad sights 
were more than ever incensed against the perpe- 
trators of them. As the force marched through 
the district it also came across a number of cattle 
and large quantities of grain, which Were taken 
possession of, so much of the latter as was not 
needed for the horses being destroyed. The two 
forces met at the appointed place on May 27, and 
three days later Bulawayo was reached. 

Instead of proceeding to Bulawayo, the Salisbury 
column, strengthened by sixty men of the Bulawayo 
force under the command of Colonel Beal, turned 
southwards through the Filabusi district to meet an 
impi which was thought to be lurking there and 
to disperse it. In this they were disappointed, 
however, for, beyond a few stray natives who fled 
at the approach of the white men, nothing was 
seen of the rebels, and the column finally returned 
to Bulawayo towards the end of May without having 
come into contact with the Matabele. 

Before Colonel Napier's force arrived in Bulawayo 
on May 27, reinforcements had arrived at that town 
under the command of Colonel Herbert Plumer of 



212 THE MATABELE REBELLION. 

the York and Lancaster Begiment This officer was 
aide-de-carap to Greneral Groodenough, who was then 
in command of the forces at the Gape, and had been 
appointed by the High Commissioner to raise a force 
of Irregular Horse for service in Matabeleland, now 
that it was becoming manifestly clear that the settlers 
were unable to put down the rebellion unaided. The 
force was quickly raised to its authorised number, 
850, and this was divided into fourteen troops, form- 
ing five squadrons, each with quick-firing machine- 
guns; while a further force of 250 natives was 
organised to accompany Colonel Plumer's force by 
Captain Coope. On May 24 the first portion of 
this force reached Bulawayo, being about 370 strong, 
with two Maxims, and so soon as this arrived it was 
thought that with the force already raised a success- 
ful blow might now be struck at the rebels who had 
collected to the north-west of the town between the 
Khami and Umguza rivers. On the night of May 
24, therefore, the force moved out towards the native 
position shortly before midnight in two columns, one 
of which was led by Colonel Plumer and the other 
by Major Watts. About eight miles from the town 
the advance-guard of the latter column came upon 
a force of natives who immediately opened fire on 
the whites. The men were taken at a disadvantage 
by this counter-attack, but they quickly dismounted 
and poured some effective volleys into the bush 
where the Matabele were hiding, thus checking 
any intention of charging which the natives might 
have had. The main body of the column hurried 
forward on hearing the firing, and with the Maxim 



COLONEL PLUMEK IN ACTION. 213 

promptly got to work, the Matabele were fain to 
beat a retreat At the sound of this action Colonel 
Plumer*s column, which was marching parallel to 
Major Watts's force, turned aside to ascertain the 
cause and to render any assistance necessary; and 
when the rebels were driven ofif the forces combined 
and formed a square, in which formation they rested 
until daylight without further attack. 

So soon as it was dawn a scouting party was sent 
out to search for traces of the Matabele in the vicinity, 
and to find out exactly where the native position was. 
A small force of these scouts under Captain Knapp 
came on a body of Matabele outposts in a strong 
position among the wooded ridges of the adjacent hills, 
and these the scouts at once attacked, driving them 
back on the main body of rebels, which was in the 
distance. About eight o'clock that morning the whole 
force under Colonel Plumer's command moved for- 
ward towards where the natives were, to give battle 
to them. The outposts of the Matabele having been 
driven in, the column was at once launched against 
the rebels' main position, and the blacks were driven 
from three successive ridges in fine style. This was 
followed up by a stem chase across the country for a 
distance of upwards of three miles. 

This chase over, the column rested for some 
hours, and then in the afternoon it set ofif for a 
farm on the Khami river where the scouts reported 
that an impi had collected at a spot about six- 
teen miles from Bulawayo, occupying a very strong 
position. After a march across country for about 
two hours the scouts reported that the enemy were 



214 THE MATABELE REBELLION. 

assembling in force on their left, and the advance- 
guard at once attacked a strong body of Kafirs who 
were established on a thickly wooded hill, to reach 
which it was necessary for the attacking force to 
cross two gullies under a perfect hail of bullets. 
The whites went at it resolutely, however, and with 
the arrival of the main body the rebels were routed 
out of their position and pursued through the bush 
until nightfall put an end to the pursuit. The 
brunt of the fighting had fallen upon the advance- 
guard, who had done their work in excellent fashion, 
and who were complimented by Colonel Plumer. 
As the horses showed signs of fatigue, it was de- 
cided to return to Bulawayo without further delay ; 
and this was done. The first patrol under Colonel 
Plumer was in every way a success, for the natives 
had had the severest defeat inflicted upon them 
that they had up till then experienced, and they 
had been forced to retire from the neighbourhood 
of Bulawayo. 

When the column returned to Bulawayo it was 
found that the situation had altered somewhat, for 
the Imperial Goverment, now recognising that the 
rebellion was spreading, and that the settlers had 
no real prospects of being able to suppress the re- 
volt, decided to take over the crushing of the Mata- 
bele into its own hands, and to employ imperial 
troops for that purpose. With this end in view 
Major- General Sir Frederick Carrington was sent 
up to Bulawayo to see for himself how the land 
lay, and to decide as to the number and character 
of the troops that would be needed before the re- 



IMPERIAL OFPICBfiS AT BULAWAYO. 215 

bellion was at an end. Sir Frederick Carrington 
was an officer who had seen considerable service in 
South Africa, having taken part in the expedition 
to Griqualand in 1875, and in most of the other 
South African wars since that time, and at the date 
of his appointment to take charge of the imperial 
forces in Ehodesia he was commander of the infantry 
at Gibraltar. Among the numerous staff which 
accompanied General Carrington to Ehodesia was 
Lieutenant -Colonel K. S. S. Baden-Powell of the 
13th Hussars, an officer who had seen considerable 
service in Afghanistan, Bechuanaland, and at the 
Cape, and who had the reputation of being a very 
capable soldier, — a reputation which he considerably 
enhanced by his successful scouting in Matabeleland, 
for which work he has a marvellous gift, such as 
distinguished the early trappers and hunters in 
Canada. This gentleman was General Carrington's 
chief staff-officer, while Captain C. B. Vyvyan was 
appointed brigade -major, and Lieutenant V. Fer- 
guson aide-de-camp. 

With this arrival of imperial officers at Bulawayo 
the first period of the Matabele rebellion may be 
said to have come to an end. 



216 



CHAPTER XIIL 



END OF THE MATABELE REBELLION. 



General Carkington arrived at Bulawayo on June 
2, and on the same day the second portion of Col- 
onel Plumer's Irregulars also arrived, so preparations 
for delivering a decisive blow at the Matabele were 
immediately commenced. Greneral Carrington as a 
first step decided to send out three patrols to clear 
the country around Bulawayo of such rebels as still 
remained there. This done, the columns were to 
be combined and an advance made towards the 
Matoppo Hills, wliere three strong impis were es- 
tablished, and which it was seen would only be 
cleared after severe fighting. In accordance with 
this idea Colonel Plumer left on June 5 with a 
force 460 strong to go towards the north-west along 
the Khami river to its junction with the Gwaai 
river, to attack an impi stationed there, while about 
the same time a force of 400 men under Captain 
Macfarlane set off for the north to clear back the 
natives there. 

So soon as these two forces had left the town, 
news was received by Sir Frederick Carrington that 



AN IMPI NEAR BULAWAYO. 217 

a large impi had taken up a position on the Salis- 
bury road near the Umgusa river, about six miles 
from Bulawayo, and about two and a-half miles from 
the camp of the Salisbury column under Colonel 
Beal, which was stationed outside Bulawayo. The 
news of the arrival of this strong rebel force so close 
to the town, now depleted of nearly 1000 of its garri- 
son, was serious, and all the mounted men in Bula- 
wayo were instantly mustered under the command 
of Colonel Spreckley to set off to attack this impi. 
The white force numbered about 200 men, with 
three guns, and was composed of Grey's Scouts 
under their gallant leader, a strong detachment of 
the Afrikander Corps under Captain van Niekerk, 
and about forty -five men of the Bulawayo Field 
Force under Captains Brand and Selous. As they 
approached the Umgusa Colonel Spreckley's force was 
joined by the Salisbury column, which had been 
attentively watching the movements of the rebels 
for some time. They reported that the natives had 
broken up their camp and were awaiting the attack 
of the whites in the open country, so it was decided 
to strike at once. The Afrikander Corps was de- 
tached from the main body and set off to ford the 
river at some distance higher up the country, while 
the main force followed the road. Once across, the 
Afrikanders were to attack the rebels on the flank, 
while the main attack took place on their centre. 

The river forded, the main body turned towards 
the left and crossed some rising ground which con- 
cealed them from the Matabele. The heights once 
reached, the order was given to charge down on the 



218 END OF THE MATA6ELE REBELLION. 

rebels, then about 100 yards or so away, and this 
order was immediately carried out, the Afrikanders 
now rejoining the main body and forming up on the 
left of the line, the right wing being occupied by 
the Salisbury Corps with the scouts in the centre. 
As this body thundered forward, the Kafirs, who 
were fully 1000 or 1200 strong, were seized with 
panic, and after an ill-directed volley they turned 
tail and fled into the bush. A hot chase followed, 
during which considerable execution was done on 
the rebels, and this was only relinquished as the 
natives reached the thick bush country around 
Thabas Indunas. The native loss on this occasion 
was very heavy — in fact, some of those present 
declared that it was the heaviest of any action yet 
fought — while the casualties on the side of the whites 
were four men wounded, two seriously. 

The story, as told, of the daring of this impi in 
approaching so close to Bulawayo is an interesting 
one. It is said that the witch-doctors, whose 
powers had greatly increased, or rather revived, 
since the outbreak of the rebellion, had promised 
the soldiers that they would bewitch the white men 
and strike them blind, so that the Matabele might 
cut them up at their leisure and without fear of 
their being hurt themselves. Implicitly believing 
in this, the impi moved forward and awaited the 
onslaught of the whites with confidence. As the 
column charged forward, however, and numbers of 
the natives began to fall killed and wounded, and 
the white men showed no signs of becoming blind, 
the rebels lost their faith in the promises of the 



THE TABLES TURNED. 219 

doctors, and saw that they had been duped ; so they 
turned and fled, as has already been stated. One 
cannot help feeling that this turning of the tables 
on the Matabele, who had marched towards Bula- 
wayo in the firm belief that they would be able to 
murder the white men in safety, was nothing more 
than what they deserved. 

As regards Colonel Plumer's patrol on the Gwaai 
river, it was unable to come up with the enemy, who 
melted away before the whites, and all that was done 
was to bum some of the rebel kraals and to destroy 
a large quantity of grain ; after which a return was 
made to Bulawayo without any decisive eugagement 
having been fought. No better fortune had attended 
Captain Macfarlane in his endeavour to attack the 
rebels, and this force likewise returned to Bulawayo 
without any fighting to report The next patrol to 
set out was one uuder Colonel Spreckley for the 
Shiloh district and the country to the north-east of 
Bulawayo, and this left on June 7. This force was 
composed of over 500 whites and natives combined, 
but only about 120 of this number were mounted. 
The patrol at first marched along the banks of the 
Kokti river, and the old police-camp at Shiloh was 
reached on June 11 without any of the rebels hav- 
ing been seen. A fort was built on this site, and a 
garrison of about seventy whites with some twenty 
natives under the command of Native Commissioner 
Lanning was left in charge, while the patrol marched 
forward in the direction of the Queen's Mine. The 
Matabele, however, had retired towards the Bembesi 
river. A force of 100 men was detached from the 



220 END OF THE MATABELE REBELUON. 

maia column about this time, under the command 
of Lieutenant Banks- White, to set off to Inyati to 
assist in building a fort there; and this done, the 
force was to return to Shiloh. 

This was carried out, and the whole force on June 
17 moved forward up the banks of the Bembesi. 
Soon the scouts reported the presence of rebels in the 
vicinity of the column, and numbers of Matabele 
quickly collected on the hills which skirted the val- 
ley of the river and were watching the movements 
of the column. When the force halted for the night 
a conference of the leaders was held, at which it was 
decided to attack the hills on the following morning 
and to drive the rebels out of their positions — a diffi- 
cult task ; but, as it happened, there was no need to 
attempt it, for on the following morning the scouts 
reported that the rebels had decamped, and were fall- 
ing back on a much stronger position at Thabas 
Imamba — a rocky hill some twenty miles to the 
eastward. With the small force at his command, 
Colonel Spreckley did not feel justified in making for 
this position; so the column returned to Bulawayo 
without having come to blows with the enemy. 

Just as preparations for launching a strong force 
at Thabas Imamba were going forward, Bulawayo 
was startled to hear that a rebellion had broken out 
in Mashonaland, and that the natives there were 
murdering and plundering with all the ardour and 
the cruelty of the Matabele. This news to many 
was the last straw, and it was confidently stated that 
the prosperity of Ehodesia was a thing of the past 
Instant steps were taken by the authorities to assist 



RBBELLION OF THE KASHONAS. 221 

the settlers in the eastern province of the colony to 
put the rising down. The Salisbury column under 
Colonel Beal at once returned to Mashonaland, and 
a force of sixty men, drawn from Grey's Scouts and 
Gifford's Horse, was also despatched to Salisbury. 
The causes for the rising in Mashonaland have never 
been fathomed, but probably the influence of the 
Matabele M'Limo had something to do with it, and, 
without doubt, it was to a considerable extent fer- 
mented by the Matabele indunas, who announced 
that they were driving the white men from the 
country, and that if the Mashonas rose and aided 
them to do this, henceforward they would be safe 
from raids by the Matabele, and they would be 
allowed to live in peaca The Mashonas still had 
lively recollections of the cruelty and relentlessness 
of the Matabele, and they saw that if they did not 
rise and help their neighbours to cast off the control 
of the white men, and the latter were driven from the 
country, the Matabele would turn upon them and 
exterminate them ; and as the Mashonas feared the 
Matabele far more than they did the whites, they 
rose in sympathy. Then, again, the national char- 
acteristics of the Mashonas have to be taken into 
consideration. They were avaricious, cunning, great 
cowards, callous to a degree to the sufferings of 
others, and with respect for nothing but brute force. 
They had been treated for some years with great, 
almost excessive, leniency by the white men, so that 
their opinion of them was far lower than the one 
they held of the Matabele, who were always ready to 
enforce their commands with the point of the spear ; 



222 END OF THE MATABELE REBELLION. 

and when they saw the Salisbury Belief Force set 
off for Matabeleland, they considered that the re- 
mainder of the white settlers in the country were 
completely at their mercy, and therefore looked upon 
it as an unusually good opportunity for them to rise 
and massacre the white men and confiscate their 
property. 

To return to the rebellion in Matabeleland, which 
as yet demands the chief attention. The next event 
of importance was the disbandment of the Bulawayo 
Field Force on July 4, it being considered that the 
work for which it was originally formed was at an 
end with tlie arrival of imperial troops ; so the force 
was assembled at Bulawayo for a final inspection by 
Sir Frederick Carrington, after which the Adminis- 
trator, Earl Grey, addressed them. He referred in 
warm terms to the way in which they had fought, at 
times in the face of great hardships, and commented 
in especially complimentary language on the way in 
which the Dutch settlers had rallied to the defence 
of the country of their adoption. A new military 
police force was at once raised so soon as the Field 
Force was disbanded, and many of those who had 
fought in the former force joined the new one. 

Henceforward the whole of the operations against 
the rebels were under the direct control of Sir 
Frederick Carrington. Seeing that the patrols had 
managed to break up effectively the Matabele to the 
north of Bulawayo, and to disperse them until there 
was only one spot, at Inyati some fifty miles away, 
where they were in anything like force, General 
Carrington decided to send a body of 800 men to 



ST0RMIN6 THE HEIGHTS. 223 

attack this stronghold under the command of Colonel 
Plumer. The force was made up of 400 men of the 
Matabeleland Eelief Force with four Maxims, a detach- 
ment of the Eoyal Artillery with two guns, a portion 
of No. 10 Mountain Battery from Natal, a detach- 
ment of Irregulars under Captain H. Brown with 
Colenbrander*s natives, and the Cape Boys under 
Major Eobertson. This force left Bulawayo by night, 
and marching under cover of darkness towards the 
rebel position, reached it at dawn on July 5, when 
preparations were at once made to carry the hills by as- 
sault. The detachment under Captain Howard Brown 
went to the front first, and going straight at the first 
kopje on which the natives were massed, carried it 
in splendid style. Beyond this kopje was another 
larger hill on which the main body of the enemy 
were posted, and this was stormed by the Cape Boys, 
who, led by Major Eobertson, behaved gallantly, and 
were, man for man, much better soldiers than the 
Matabele rebels. The Matabele clung to their posi- 
tion with the utmost tenacity, but were at length 
forced to retire with considerable loss. As they 
retreated the guns were brought into action, and the 
shells from these weapons did excellent work in 
breaking the enemy up. When the fighting was 
over, the casualties among Colonel Plumer's men 
were found to amount to four whites killed and as 
many wounded, while of the Cape Boys and friendlies 
engaged six were killed and nine wounded. The 
rebels' loss was estimated at fully 200, while 600 
women and children fell into the hands of the 
column, among the number being one of the queens 



224 END OF THE HATABELE REBELUOM. 

of the late Lobengula. About 1000 cattle, with a 
large number oE sheep and goats, were also captured. 
By this action the power of the Matabele was com- 
pletely broken to the north of Buiawayo, and the 
rebellion stamped out there. 

After this defeat it was thought that the natives 
might be prepared to accept terms of peace, so the 
Imperial Government ordered General Carrington to 
issue a proclamation of clemency to the Matabele, 
offering pardon to all who surrendered and gave up 
their arms, unless they were proved to have been 
actively engaged in the murder of white settlers at 
the outbreak of the rebellion. The publishing of this 
proclamation was received very unfavourably in 
Buiawayo and throughout Ehodesia generally. The 
settlers held that it hinted that the white men were 
too weak to crush the rebellious Matabele, and that 
they were compelled to make the first overtures of 
peace. It was also held that it would be the means 
of encouraging the Mashonas to proceed with their 
rebellion, and to go on massacring and pillaging, as 
the whites were powerless to prevent them. While 
not justifying this extreme view, it certainly seemed 
to be an admission of impotence on the part of the 
Imperial Government ; but it should be remembered 
that the war, coming as it did on the heels of the 
rinderpest, the raid, and other troubles, was proving 
a terrible drain on the finances of the already de- 
pleted treasury of the Chartered Company, and they, 
at least, would have welcomed with gladness the 
conclusion of the rebellion. The end was not yet, 
however, for the rebels declined to avail themselves 



CAMPAIGN IN THE MATOPPOa 225 

of the offer of clemency, despite the lessons that had 
been taught them. 

While the north-western portion of Matabeleland 
had been cleared of the rebels, the difl&cult country 
round the Matoppo Hills was teeming with them, 
and it was recognised that whatever decisive engage- 
ments were fought would have to take place in that 
district ; so a vigorous campaign in the Matoppos was 
decided upon. On July 19 Sir Frederick Carrington 
assembled a force of about 1000 strong, which moved 
ofiF at once for the hills. Sir Frederick Carrington 
accompanied this force in person, while Mr Bhodes 
and Earl Grey also were present. The advance party 
was under the command of Colonel Baden-Powell, 
and was composed of a mixed force of whites, 
friendly Matabele, and Cape Boys, with a Hotchkiss 
and two Maxims, while the main body was led by 
Colonel Plumer. As the hills were reached several 
small parties were detached and sent forward to clear 
the numerous caves and kopjes of such rebels as 
might be concealed there ; and in this work they were 
well supported by the guns, who shelled any parties 
of rebels who showed themselves. The impi opposing 
the force was under the command of Babyan, one of 
the two indunas who visited England in 1889 with 
Mr Maund, and before the whites retired they had 
completely broken it up. 

While this action was going forward, Captain 
Tyrie Laing, who had been in command of the laager 
at BeUngwe, was engaged in a sharp struggle with 
another impi about eight miles away. This white 
force was in laager on the morning of July 20, when 

p 



226 END OF THE MATABELE REBELLION. 

a strong force of rebels attacked him, charging right 
up to the laager, and inflicting considerable loss on 
the defenders. The machine-guns which the force 
had with them were immediately got into action, and 
after hard fighting for upwards of three hours, the 
Matabele were beaten and driven off northwards. 
The casualties to the whites in this action were three 
white men killed and ten wounded, and twenty-five 
friendly natives killed and eighteen wounded, or a 
total loss of killed and wounded of nearly sixty. 

From this time up to the end of July several small 
patrols were sent out through the eastern portion of 
the Matoppos, and the rebels were hunted from 
position after position ; but as the impis were collect- 
ing again in force, it was decided to strike another 
heavy blow at them. It was reported by the recon- 
noitring parties that five impis had gathered in the 
hills under the command of a chief named Umlugulu ; 
so on August 5 a strong force under Colonel Plumer 
set off to attack them. The first step with which 
Colonel Plumer concerned himself was the capture 
of a ridge on which the rebels were posted, which 
would enable him to sweep the ground for some dis- 
tance round with his artillery. Captain Beresford 
was therefore detailed to carry this ridge, and at once 
went forward with a small force. Heavy fighting at 
once commenced. Captain Beresford being attacked 
on three sides at once by bodies of the enemy. They 
rushed close up to his party, who managed to beat 
them back several times. So soon as Colonel Plumer 
learnt the tight comer Captain Beresford was in, he 
hastened his main body forward with all speed to his 



THE REBELS AGAIN BEATEN. 227 

assistance. Before he could reach Beresford, however, 
the little force had succeeded in forcing the rebels 
from the ridge, and the guns were almost immediately 
brought forward, when they commenced to shell the 
enemy at a distance of 1000 yards. While this was 
going on, the column under Colonel Plumer had 
opened out into skirmishing order and gone forward 
to the next ridge on which the enemy had halted, and 
at this they charged, covered by a hot fire from the 
guns. Fighting was now proceeding all along the 
line, but the whites maintained the upper hand, and 
the rebels were driven from one position after another. 
They fought very stubbornly, however, in the real 
old Zulu fashion, and at one time caused the whites 
to temporarily give way until the arrival of the guns, 
which, by the accuracy of their aim and the quickness 
with which they were handled, completed the discom- 
fiture of the Matabele, who were at length sent off in 
full flight to hide in detached parties in the surround- 
ing hills, the smallness of the white force preventing 
any pursuit. This was by far the most important 
engagement yet fought, and it had been entirely suc- 
cessful. The column had lost five men killed and 
fifteen wounded, some of the latter ultimately suc- 
cumbing to their wounds, while of the 6000 natives 
engaged fully 600 must have been killed and wounded. 
For the next few days after this action only scout- 
ing work was entered upon, when it was ascertained 
that the impi under Umlugulu had not taken part 
in the fighting, and that if he was to be attacked 
another action would be necessary. Accordingly on 
August the 8th another advance against the rebels 



228 END OF THE MATABELE BEBELUON. 

was decided upon, and a force was despatched for 
that purpose ; but beyond a few desultory skirmishes 
no fighting took place, as the Matabele declined to 
show themselves in the open. 

While this fighting was taking place in and around 
the Matoppos, Major Kidley, with a force made up of 
a squadron of the 13th Hussars and detachments of 
other regular regiments, was patrolling the district 
around the Gwaai river and breaking up such bodies 
of rebels as he came across. At this time the situ- 
ation in Matabeleland was rather a curious ona 
While the northern portion of the country was clear 
of rebels, and those in the Matoppos were, as will be 
shown later, prepared to treat for peace, in the east 
the rebellion was still in full swing ; and while Major 
Bidley's force was round about Gwaai, a similar force, 
composed of a squadron of the 7th Hussars and a 
detachment of mounted infantry, was moving forward 
from Tati under the command of Colonel Paget. On 
August 26 Major Eidley prepared to strike a blow 
at the rebels, who had collected between the Shan- 
gani river and the Somabula forest. For this pur- 
pose he formed a force consisting of a squadron of 
the 13 th Hussars under Captain Agnew, a company 
of the mounted infantry of the York and Lancaster 
regiment under Captain Kekewich, and a strong body 
of the Afrikander Corps under Captain van Niekerk, 
— consisting in all of about 350 men, together with a 
7-pounder and three Maxims. At the beginning of 
September this force moved forward to attack several 
kopjes on which the rebels had massed in force, and 
the first of these was taken after hard fighting for 



AN INDUNA EXECUTED. 229 

over five hours, the white loss being five men killed 
and wounded. While no less than seven other 
kopjes remained to be taken, the troops under Major 
Bidley had gained a great moral victory, inasmuch 
as an induna named Uwini, who was supposed by 
the natives to have been endowed with invulner- 
ability by the M'limo, was wounded and taken 
prisoner. 

About the time that this happened Colonel Baden- 
Powell arrived to take over the command of the 
force, and the first question that presented itself to 
him was, What was to be done with Uwini ? The 
induna was known to have been one of the chief 
instigators of the rebellion, — indeed he admitted as 
much, — and to have been active in the murder of 
several whites in the opening days of the rebellion ; 
and as he declined stubbornly to forbid his people 
to proceed further with their resistance to the whites, 
it was decided to try him by court-martial. This 
court-martial was held on September 13, and as he 
practically confessed to all the charges brought 
against him, he was condemned to be shot. This 
sentence was carried out on the evening of the same 
day at a place where the whole of his people, who 
were still holding out on the neighbouring kopjes, 
could see all that transpired. The wisdom of this 
drastic step was quickly seen, for on the following 
day over 1000 of Uwini's people came in with their 
arms in their hands and surrendered, and yet it led to 
some friction between the £[igh Commissioner of the 
Cape and General Carrington. The High Commis- 
sioner, so soon as he was informed of the affair. 



230 END OF THE MATABELE REBELLION. 

ordered the arrest of Colonel Baden-Powell until 
an inquiry was held, and this order General Carring- 
ton flatly refused to carry out, thus giving Colonel 
Baden-Powell his full support in the action he had 
taken, which was, after all, a most necessary one. 
At the conclusion of the rebellion a court of inquiry 
was held to go into the matter, and in the end 
Colonel Baden - Powell was completely exonerated 
from all blame for the course that he took. 

Colonel Baden-Powell having defeated the natives 
around the Gwaai, now resolved on commencing 
operations in the Somabula forest, and for this pur- 
pose he formed a patrol of 160 men from Major 
Ridley's force. This patrol was divided into three 
parties under the command respectively of Colonel 
Baden-Powell, Major Ridley, and Captain Kekewich, 
and was to enter the forest at three different points 
so as to come up with an impi under the command 
of an induna named M*Tini, which it was supposed 
was being driven towards them by Colonel Paget's 
force. This patrol had a difficult task before it, for 
the route lay through very thick bush, and day after 
day passed in keen search for a foe who never came. 
At length the party under Captain Kekewich managed 
to join hands with Colonel Paget at the Gwelo river, 
and the latter stated that he had made a dash for a 
rebel position some forty miles down the river, and 
this he had surprised, cutting up the impi. So soon 
as Colonel Baden -Powell heard of this he at once 
returned to the main body of his command and sent 
out orders for the parties under Major Ridley and 
Captain Kekewich to meet him on the Hartley Hill 




BADEN-POWELL IN ACTION. 231 

road, his object then being to advance against an 
impi which was rumoured to be at Inyati. This 
destination was reached on October 1, when it was 
found that the impi, hearing of the advance of the 
white force against it, had broken up and dispersed 
over the country. Colonel Baden -Powell was not 
quite sure of his next step after this, but he received 
an order from Sir Frederick Carrington to join 
forces with Colonel Paget in advancing against a 
chief named Wedza. 

So soon as he had received this order Colonel 
Baden -Powell struck off from Inyati towards the 
Belingwe district, where Wedza's impi was stationed, 
with a force of 160 men, the Afrikander Corps 
having been withdrawn from his command to return 
to Bulawayo to be disbanded. On arriving within 
about fifteen miles of Wedza's mountain, where the 
stronghold of that induna was. Colonel Baden- Powell 
found no signs of Colonel Paget's force being any- 
where in the neighbourhood; and on October 14 
receiving information that the other force was unable 
to get through, he decided to attack the mountain, 
which was in reality nothing more than a huge kopje, 
with his own force. He so skilfully manoeuvred 
as to make it appear to the rebels that there was a 
very strong force of whites present. As he approached 
the hill the guns were at once taken forward and the 
leading position shelled, and the men charged right 
up to the natives, Colonel Baden-Powell leading them 
in many casea 

In one of these skirmishes the colonel with a 
small force was almost surrounded by the enemy, and 



232 END OF THE MATABELE REBELUON. 

things looked very serious for the little band for 
a short time until Prince Alexander of Teck, who 
was acting as staff oflBcer to Colonel Baden-Powell, 
opportunely arrived with a strong force of Hussars, 
and drove the rebels back. Skirmishes of this 
character went on for three days, the enemy being 
driven from one position after another, but still 
fighting with the utmost pertinacity, until at length 
they were forced to flee across the country, and 
the whole district was in the hands of the whites 
by the night of October 17. On the following day 
a party of volunteers under Major Ridley went 
forward, and with a quantity of dynamite which was 
found in Wedza's camp, and which had been stolen 
from the whites in the early days of the rising, blew 
up the granite kopje which had formed the key of 
Wedza's position. 

With the downfall of Wedza and the shooting of 
the M'Limo in a cave in the Matoppos by liie 
American scout, Burnham, the Matabeleland rebel- 
lion may be said to have come to an end. The rainy 
season was fast approaching, and it was seen that the 
force under General Carrington's command was much 
too small to ultimately crush the natives into sub- 
mission : it looked therefore as though the forces 
would have to go into winter quarters at Bulawayo 
until the rainy season was over, when more troops 
could be sent up and the campaign started afresh. 

This step, which was the only possible one from 
a military point of view, would practically have been 
the ruin of the British South Africa Company, which 
would have been called upon to pay the enormous 



MH RHODSS'S IDEA. 



233 



bill that would have resulted ; and it was when this 
idea was first mooted that Mr Rhodes conceived the 
bold idea of going unarmed and without escort into 
the rebel stronghold in the Matoppos and endeavour- 
ing to fix up terms of peace with them. This gallant 
feat, with its successful issue, will be described fully 
in the next chapter. 



f 



234 



CHAPTER XIV. 



AFTER THE WAR. 



To have crushed the Matabele rebellion by force of 
arms would have meant a cost of close on £5,000,000 
for the British South Africa Company, and this would 
have been nothing more nor less than ruin for them. 
Yet there did not seem to be any way out of the 
difficulty, until Mr Rhodes resolved on trying what 
his personal influence with the natives would do. 
He gained Sir Frederick Carrington's permission to 
set off on his dangerous errand to the Matoppos, — a 
scheme that seemed preposterous and foolhardy to a 
degree to most of those in Bulawayo. Plucky and 
fearless the action undoubtedly wa3 ; but Mr Rhodes 
IS far too brave a man to be foolhardy, and, as it 
turned out, he had gauged correctly the feelings of 
the natives, and what his influence with them was. 
He chose as his companions Dr Hans Sauer, Mr J. 
Colenbrander, who acted as interpreter, Captain Stent 
(the correspondent of the ' Cape Times,* to whom we 
are indebted for the knowledge of what really oc- 
curred), and two friendly natives, John Grootboom, 
and Makunga. The three white men accompanying 



MB KUODSS IN THE REBEL CAMP. 235 

Mr Shodes all carried revolvers but Mr Rhodes 
himself carried nothing more than a riding-switch,— a 
mannerism that is strongly reminiscent of his early 
friend, General Gordon, with whom Mr Ehodes has 
much in common. 

As they rode forward to the Matoppos they had to 
pass through a country that was covered with boulders 
and thick bush that would have given the rebels 
excellent cover, but none appeared to dispute the 
way, and the camp was pitched on the lower slopes 
of the hills. Mr Shodes had not remained there 
many days before he was informed by John Groot- 
boom, a Kafir of the Xosa tribe, that an indaba of the 
leading indunas had been summoned to take place in 
one of the fastnesses of the hills, where they would 
be safe from the white soldiers, and that they would 
like to see their old friend Johann (Mr Colenbrander), 
but they did not dare to hope that Mr Shodes would 
visit them. If he would do so, however, he would 
be welcome, and would not be molested in any way. 
This was the opportunity for which Mr Shodes had 
been seeking, and he seized on it at once and moved 
forward with his followers to the place indicated. 

The spot selected by the rebels was a small amphi- 
theatre at the foot of sheer granite walls, which 
towered up some 200 feet in height, and this amphi- 
theatre was further dominated by a large granite 
kopje. As the white men approached, both the hills 
around and the kopje were covered with natives, who 
watched the arrival of the little party with interest. 
It was a trying moment for the nerves of Mr Shodes 
and his companions, for even supposing the indunas 



336 



AFTER THE WAB. 



to keep their word, what guarantee had they that the 
chiefs would he able to restrain the majaha (young 
warriors), whose tempers had been excited by the 
rebellion, and prevent them from swarming down on 
the whites and massacring them without further 
delay ? The least sign of weakness or nervousness 
on the part of any one of the party would have 
probably signed the death - warrant of them alL 
Fortunately they did not flinch, but dismounted un- 
concernedly from their horses and awaited the issue. 
They were not kept long watting, for soon a white 
flag was hoisted on the kopje and a long string of 
indunas approached the place where the four white 
men were standing, forming a semicircle round them, 
and squatting on the ground. Among the indunas 
present were all the chief men of the tribe, including 
Sikomho, Babyan, Umlngulu, considered by many beat 
qualifled to know to have been the chief instigator of 
the rebellion, and Dhliso. 

Mr Rhodes greeted them according to the native 
formula, and then told Mr Colenbrander to ask them 
what they wished. Mr Colenbrander therefore called 
upon the ladi 
their father, who hi 
in bis heart," Eei 
poured out thai 
great volubility. 
5iough, there 
— as has aire! 
the native poli 
on this head 
police 





troubles Co " Rhod^ 
oiig them 
invitation, ' 
■u^iyiiied 1 
:y 1 lad 



?"r ' •-' 



THK RIBELS' COMTLATX:^. - 

induras thereupon turned to the ca::k :-er::- n 
said that Dr Jameson had promU«d iai :-> L-.";>t 
iiula's cattle should be taken, and '^'. i~-.^ — 
should be allowed to keep hia own, ani ji'. lii.: 1 
not been done. It was an eiceedinglj ii±:-L.-. 'a 
fov the Native Commissioners to det*n:::i« •*'ii:.'- 
the cattle had been the personal propen; ',f 'Jl-. !■■ 
king and which had not, though in a stijj 'Ij: -^'l 
of the cattle in the kingdom had b*>,Lri-i v. i. 
so that there was justification for iL^j irrJj.2 
tlioy had dona In reply to this, Mr 'Kz.-A':-. ••: • • 
out that since the advent of the rit-'^n«if: Czl- 
all the cattle in the country had been "c^hi :■-. 
that the natives and the Government w^t* * /> - 
being without cattle. 

The indunas then discussed other cJ=.'.7 v.-. 
but Mr Rhodes's natural impatience c-f •J::L-'^r' 
him to stop this and take the offenavfe ; *■..-.:. -, 
Mr Colenbrander to aay to them thai be ■n.i 
angry with them for fightii^ against the vzjrj: z 
" but why," he asked sternly, " did yon kill c: • ^ - ■ 
and children? For that you de«ne ly^ r.^^- 
Even Mr Colenbrander, brave and lenits tt ■ - 
proved himself, was astounded bythe wdj,--;- ■■' 
demand on the part of Mr Ehoda,tt~ -^ -. ■ 
a his leader the risk he was nasLs "- - 
inent question to the aaim *-•■ ^- - 
»inthefidic:T-.i> -, 
1 on thewii^ L\-:. 




r 



238 AFTER THE WAR. 

say, through Mr Oolenbrander, that what was past was 
past, but what of the future ? Were they prepared 
to go on and continue to fight against the white men, 
whose numbers could be increased ahnost to infinity, 
or would they have peace ? This was the critical 
moment, and the fate of the British South Africa 
Company hung in the balance. To the intense relief 
of Mr Rhodes and his companions, who fully under- 
stood the importance of the question to all interested 
commercially or financially in Bhodesia, one of the 
leading indunas seized a stick and held it above his 
head. This done, he threw it down at the feet of 
Mr Rhodes, crying, " See ! this is my gun ; I cast it 
at your feet." He then repeated the action and said, 
"And this is my assegai, and I do likewise." As 
he did this the remainder of the indunas sent up a 
cry of assent, and Mr Rhodes and his companions 
knew that the policy of bearding the natives in 
their stronghold had been crowned with success, that 
the people who had invested their money in the 
country were saved, and that the Chartered Company 
had turned a very ugly corner. 

So soon as this was done Mr Rhodes pointed out 
to the indunas what the situation in the country 
really was: how the cattle were nearly all dead; 
how their grain had been destroyed, and unless more 
was speedily sown there would be famine in the 
land. He urged them all, therefore, to return to 
their own country and prepare to avert this calamity, 
while he would remain at Bulawayo, where they 
could come to him and consult him and lay their 
grievances before him should any arise. The induna 



THE REBELLION AT AN END. 239 

Somnavulu then spoke and assured Mr Bhodes tbat 
he need not fear, the war was over, and they would 
keep their word not to fight again ; whereupon the 
white men mounted their horses and prepared to 
return to their camp, well satisfied that peace would 
henceforward reign in the land that had been for so 
long ravaged by war. Mr Rhodes's own comment on 
the proceeding as he rode away is worth recording. 
"It was,'* he remarked, "one of the scenes in life 
that make it worth living." He remained for 
some time longer in his camp in the Matoppos sur- 
rounded by thousands of armed natives, who never, 
however, showed the slightest disposition to harm 
him. Truly, if there is, as the poet asserts, 

" A sweet little cherub that sits up aloft, 
To keep watch for the life of poor Jack," 

there is another who watches over the fate of Mr 
Bhodes. 

The rebellion thus closed had been a very severe 
one, as the death-roll showed. The number of persons 
murdered during the insurrection was 148, while 
there were fifty-eight others who were known to have 
been in the country at the time of the outbreak, and 
of whom nothing further was heard, and therefore 
the whole of these must be presumed to have been 
killed by the natives. In addition, thirty-four offi- 
cers, non-commissioned officers, and men were killed 
in action and 100 wounded, so that the total 
" butcher's bill," to use a latter-day colloquialism, 
amounted to 240 white people killed and another 
100 maimed, some permanently ; and to this has yet 



240 AITER THB WAS. , T' 

to ' be added the returns from Mashonaland, where 
the revolt was at this time in luH swing. 

The rebellion in Mashonaland was only vervsUght 
when compared with the rising in MatabelQjil<idy1)nt 
itd oaibreak was. characterised with even mdto brutal 
atrocities than those perpetnited by the Matabele. 
As an instance of the methods adopted for killing 
unprotected white settlers by these " genfie, innocent, 
' and guileless '' natives, as soAe person^ at home are 
wont to regard them, the death of a settler named 
Behr may be cited. He was seized by anjOj^ii^power- 
mg numl>er of Mashonas, who, after a desperate re- 
sistance on his part, managed to -pin him to the 
ground, where he was firmly held while one of the 
fiends took an axe and actually hacked his chest 
open. ' After such horrors as this it can hardly be 
wondered that the whites lost command of them- 
selves at times, and went to jnore extreme lengths 
lirith the natives than they otherwise would have 
done. 

The first act o£ the Mashonaland rising took place 
about the middle of June 1896, and it quickly 
spread throughout the countiy, until something like 
20,000 natives were disafifected. Opposed to this 
horde were about 2000 settlers all told. With the 
experience they had gained in the Matabele rebel- 
lion, however, the authorities took a firm grasp of 
the situation, and instantly commenced preparations 
for putting it down. General Carrington could not 
then spare more men from Matabeleland than those 
of Gifford's Horse, which he had sent forward with 
the Salisbury Kelief Force under Colonel Beal, and 



THE MASHONALAND BBVOLT. 4Wl 

4 

the Imperial GovenHnent determined to send oid^ . 
regular troops to sttpp^ss the insurrection. A force 
of mounted infantry was therefore despatched by sea 
to ^criba, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel 
Alderson.' At Beira they were met by a paf^. of 
Eoyal Engineers and ^ome other detachments, and 
this force at once advanced to Salisbury. As things 
began to settle down in Matabel^and, General Car- ^ 
rington foun<l%iat he W8s able io send up more help 
to Mashonaland ; and therefore, on July 3, 100 men 
of the ly^Ubeleland Field Force, under the command 
of Major Watts, started for a post known ^ Mazeii- 
della's, on the road between Salisbury ancl Umtikli, 
while a short time later three other small* ^tach- 
ments also left Bulawayo for Mashonaland. ; - ; 

The inhabitants of Salisbury at once formed a 
laager rouird the jail on the outbreak of the rising, 
into which 700 people retired, while events suc- 
ceeded each othe^ in very similar fashion to those' 
which had marked the opening of the Matabele 
revolt. At Enkeldoorn another laager was formed 
by the Boers, who were the inhabitants of this agri- 
cultural portion of the country. Jhis laager had to 
stand several attacks from the rebels, who fought 
in very determined fashion ; but they were on each 
occasion met with that stubborn resistance for which 
the Boers are famous, and were beaten back every 
time. Things went on like this for some months, 
several desultory skirmishes taking place, at which 
the natives sometimes showed great counige, and at 
others beat hurried retreats almost as soon as the 
whites attacked them. 

Q 



242 AFTER THE WAR. 

As the rainy season approached and peace was 
arranged in Matabeleland, the forces, or a consider- 
able portion of them, were moved up into Mashona- 
land ; and on November 1 Sir Frederick Carrington 
was able to start for Salisbury with his staff and ac- 
companied by a column und^ Colonel Paget, while 
Mr Rhodes and Earl Grey had already gone forward. 
This column passed Enkeldoorn without meeting the 
rebels, but when that town had been left about 
twenty-five miles behind, a skirmish took place with 
the native forces near a hill known aa. Thabas 
Isamba, in which the rebels met with a severe re- 
pulse, losing some fifty of their number. Qeneral 
Carrington arrived at Salisbury by means of forced 
marches on November 19, and found that the hos- 
pital was filled with men who had been wounded in 
the skirmishes which had taken place. 

Enough space has already been taken up by the re- 
bellion in Ehodesia, but a brief risumA of the various 
patrols that swept Mashonaland may be given hera 
Major Watts had coined his attention at first to 
the south-eastern portion of the country, attacking 
the forces of an induna named Makoni, who was at 
length captured by the whites and his impi dispersed. 
Fearing that the rebels would make an effort to 
rescue him, — ^in fact, Major Watts had definite infor- 
mation that it was their intention to do so, — a court- 
martial was held on Makoni, and he was condemned 
to be shot, a sentence that was carried out without 
loss of time. Acting on the same lines as he had 
done with Colonel Baden -Powell, the High Com- 
missioner ordered the arrest of Major Watts so soon 



QUELLING THE INSURRECTION. 243 

as he heard of the execution of Makoni, but at the 
subsequent inquiry that officer was completely ex- 
onerated and acquitted. 

While Major Watts had been conducting these 
operations in the south-east, Major Jenner had been 
attacking a chief named Umtigeza, who had his 
stronghold to the south of Salisbury. Major Jenner's 
force was composed of 180 whites, and after some 
severe fighting, in which the force had three men 
killed and as many wounded, Umtigeza was captured 
and his refuge destroyed. In addition to these two 
columns, a detachment of the Mashonaland Field 
Force, 160 strong, under Major Tennant, attacked an 
induna named Limbansotas, who was routed and his 
kraals destroyed. Captain Sir Horace MacMahon, 
with a force of 200 men, had marched northwards 
from Salisbury through the Mazoe district, where 
they found large bodies of rebels taking refuge in 
caves. These caves were at once attacked and the 
rebels driven out of them, while three of the largest 
were destroyed. 

The strongest column sent out about this time 
was that under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel 
Alderson, which numbered about 500 men, and 
patrolled the country in the Lo Magondi district to 
the west of Salisbury. This column attacked three 
impis and dispersed them all, blowing up their 
strongholds with dynamite, and inflicting severe loss 
on them. The whole history of the Mashonaland re- 
bellion is, in fact, that of a series of detached patrols 
being sent out to break up various impis and to 
scour the different parts of the country. There were 



244 AFTER THE WAR. 

no set battles such as characterised the Matabeleland 
rising, but in their pleuse there were harassing skir- 
mishes by the score, in which the natives hid behind 
rocks and in caves, and had to be literally driven 
out into the open by main force. These patrols 
visited every part of Mashonaland, but almost as 
quickly as an impi was broken up in one direction 
the remnants collected in another part of the country 
and formed a fresh force, so that the whole pro- 
gramme had to be gone through again. 

(general Oarrington was recalled so soon as it 
was deemed that there was no further need for his 
presence. The final pacification of Mashonaland 
was left in the hands of Sir Bichard Martin, who, 
so soon as the dry season of 1897 set in, at once 
prepared to take the field with a force of 1400 
men, made up of a detachment of the 13th Hussars 
under the command of Major Ridley, the British 
South Africa Company's new force of mounted 
police, several corps of volunteers, and a number 
of friendly natives, when an energetic campaign was 
at once entered upon. The principal efforts of the 
whites were directed against the forces of the leading 
indunas of the country, Mashingombi and Kunzi. 
Some very determined fighting took place, which 
lasted intermittingly until October 1897, when the 
tenacity and perseverance of the whites, and their 
policy of forcing a fight whenever the rebels showed 
themselves in anything like strength, led to the 
natives relinquishing the contest This they did 
all the more readily, seeing that their warlike neigh- 
bours, the Matabele, had given up the struggle and 



REBELLION STAMPED OUT. 245 

left the white settlers in possession of the country. 
Very soon large numbers of rebels surrendered to 
Sir Bichard Martin, so that by the close of the year 
all organised opposition to the rule of the Chartered 
Company was at an end, and only isolated parties 
held out, with which the police were sufficient to 
cope. And so the rebellion in Bhodesia was finally 
stamped out^ after having lasted for about twenty 
months. 

During the rising in Mashonaland 98 persons 
are known to have been murdered by the natives, 
almost all of them in the most horrible fashion; 
while 35 men were killed in action and 39 
wounded. The total number of men killed and 
wounded fighting in Bhodesia during the outbreak 
was 69 and 139 respectively, — a large total in 
the face of the comparatively small number of 
whites engaged. 

With the rebellion over, there was a sorry sight 
to meet the eyes of the settlers in Bhodesia. The 
cattle were almost all dead, so that the principal 
means of transport was cut oflf; the crops were 
not yet sown, while the stock of grain in the country 
was almost nil; and such mines as had got well 
forward with their development were almost all 
wrecked. The head -gearing on these mines in 
many cases was broken down, either by the whites 
to barricade their dwellings against the assaults of 
the natives, or by the rebels from sheer malicious- 
ness ; and the shafts, for want of attention, had caved 
in, and in places had become flooded for want of 
pumping. The whole country was, in short, a 



246 AFTER THE WAB. 

wreck, and the authorities hardly knew where to 
commence to set matters straight. To crown all, 
Dr Jameson and his officers, who knew the country 
best, were all in England serving their sentences 
for the raid, and Mr Bhodes was summoned to 
London to attend the sitting of the parliamentary 
committee; while it seemed very possible at that 
time that the British South Africa Company would 
be deprived of its charter. On the whole, the out- 
look for Bhodesia was gloomy in the extreme, and 
it was no wonder that the voice of the pessimist 
was to be heard on every side. 

The bulk of the men, however, who had embarked 
their fortunes in Bhodesia were not of a type to 
allow themselves to be overcome by difficulties, 
however severe, and they set about putting their 
house in order in a very determined and systematic 
manner. While there were those in Bulawayo and 
Salisbury who loudly declared that Bhodesia was 
a ruined country, and that all efforts to make it 
otherwise were foredoomed to failure, there were 
others, and these were in the great majority, who 
yet believed that the country had a great future 
before it. That there were gold-reefs of a payable 
character in the country they had proved for them- 
selves; and the presence of other minerals, such as 
coal, silver, copper, lead, blende, tin, antimony, 
quicksilver, and arsenic, was known; but it was 
generally recognised that before the wealth of the 
country could be exploited the cost of transport 
must be greatly lessened. This fact had already 
impressed itself on the mind of Mr Bhodes, and 



BUILDING A RAILWAY TO BULAWAYO. 247 

he determined on at once 'extending the Cape Rail- 
way system northwards to Bulawayo, thus forming 
the first link of the now famous " Cape to Cairo " 
scheme, which probably even then was shaping itself 
in his brain. So soon as this step was decided 
upon, which was before the rebellion, but owing 
to that cause had been much interrupted, the money 
was immediately forthcoming, Mr Rhodes providing 
a large proportion of it from his private purse, and 
the construction was pushed forward with all speed. 

Pending the arrival of the railway at Bulawayo, 
which Mr Rhodes, in a speech made at a banquet to 
Colonel Napier in Bulawayo at the conclusion of the 
rebellion, said would be before the end of 1897, the 
land and mining companies in Rhodesia set about 
energetically to repair the ravages caused by the 
rising, as also did individual settlers. While the 
mining companies naturally delayed sending up 
heavy machinery for hauling or crushing the ore, 
they commenced to systematically open up and 
prove their properties, and this time was therefore 
well employed in sifting the good claims from 
the poor ones. 

When the rumours of gold in Rhodesia first com- 
menced to circulate three or four years before this 
time, the wealth of the goldfields, as has been the 
case on the Klondike, in West Australia, and in 
fact on every goldfield yet discovered, was much 
exaggerated, and there were many people who 
entered Rhodesia in the firm belief that once they 
had staked out ten claims anywhere, they might 
look upon their fortunes as made, and a mansion 



248 AFTER THE WAK. 

in Park Lane as only a matter of a short time. 
This was, of course, absurd, and there was bound 
to be a severe reaction as a result, which is pre- 
cisely what has happened. Men totally inexperi- 
enced in quartz-mining, in many cases, pegged out 
claims, and set to work to sink shafts and bring to 
the surface the fortunes that they firmly believed 
were lying there, ready to be hauled up as rapidly as 
they could be shovelled into the buckets. 

While rich claims undoubtedly do exist in the 
country — and even the most rabid opponents of 
Bhodesia will hardly now deny that some rich reefs 
are actually there, — wherever there are 60,000 
claims taken up, as there were in the country at 
the end of 1896, there are bound to be hundreds, 
perhaps thousands, of claims staked off that either 
contain no gold or else possess it in such small 
quantities as not to pay for the extraction. When 
the disappointed miners found that their claims 
were of but little value, they quitted the colony, 
declaring that its mineral wealth was much ex- 
aggerated, and that, save in very few instances, the 
gold would not pay for the digging. Then the 
pendulum commenced to swing against the country. 
There were many individuals and companies, how- 
ever, who saw that while some of the claims they 
held were valueless or nearly so, yet there were 
others that would pay, and pay well, and work on 
these selected properties was pushed forward with 
all speed. 

So soon as the rinderpest had been stamped out, too, 
the fanning population, who were mostly of Dutch 




AGRICULTURAL VALUE OF RHODESIA. 249 

descent, began seriously to turn their attention to 
the agricultural possibilities of the country. While 
it seems probable at the present time that Bhodesia 
wiU never become a great wheat-growing country, 
like Manitoba or Southern Bussia, yet there is 
without doubt a great future before it as a grazing 
and stock - raising colony, especially now that the 
rinderpest shows no signs of returning. The high 
lands around Umtali and to the east of Salisbury 
offer pasturage for countless herds of cattle, sheep, 
and horses, which last, away from the haunts of 
the tsetse - fly, should thrive exceedingly, and it 
seems but a question of time before Bhodesia 
rivals New Zealand and the other Australian 
colonies in stock-raising. 

It is to this farming and stock-raising that we 
must look for the real future prosperity of the 
country. The mining community form the bulk of 
the population at the present moment, but the miners 
as a class are what one may term a floating popu- 
lation merely : they enter the country with the idea 
of making, if not a fortune, at anyrate a competency, 
after which they will return to London, to New York, 
or to Berlin, according to their nationality, to spend 
the remainder of their days. They do not for a single 
instant contemplate the possibility of settling per- 
manently in Bhodesia, and it is therefore to the com- 
mercial and agricultural classes that the country must 
look for its future population, for it is these who will 
form the backbone of the country, and on whom the 
future place of Bhodesia in the history of the empire 
depends. For the next few years it will be for its 



250 AFTER THE WAR. 

mines that Bhodesia will be most talked of, but in the 
future it will be its commerce and its agriculture that 
will maintain the position which its mineral wealth 
has won for the country, and that mineral wealth will 
then be but an incident. 

As to the trade and commerce of the country, at 
the end of the rising it was, naturally, at a complete 
standstill The commonest necessities of life were 
scarce and commanded famine prices. As an illustra- 
tion of the prices which were gained in Bulawayo 
daring the time of the laager in the early days of tJiie 
rebellion, the following may be quoted as having been 
actually obtained : Eggs, 74s. a dozen ; potatoes, £30 
per bag; cauliflowers, 32s. 6d. each; bottle of milk, 
30s. ; fowls, £1 each ; and turnips and carrots at the 
rate of 6s. a pound. 

After the war the trade of the towns — such as 
Bulawayo, Salisbury, Gwelo, Umtali, and Victoria — 
immediately began to increase rapidly as the popula- 
tion settled down to their everyday employment, 
and the sudden improvement of trade led to a 
great mistake being made, the consequences of which 
were felt throughout the country, but principally at 
Bulawayo and Salisbury. As trade increased, traders 
also increased, but in greater proportion, and on the 
strength of a few months' good trade buildings of an 
ornate and expensive character began to spring up in 
Bulawayo, until, architecturally speaking, that town is 
to-day the equal of almost any town in South Africa, 
and is, indeed, much superior to many with double its 
trade and revenue : in fact, Bulawayo has been dubbed 
the "City of Palaces." While this desire of the 




A STAGNANT TIMS. 



251 



inhabitants to form a first-class town which should 
be in every way a credit to the new colony was 
highly commendable, yet one cannot help thinking 
that they allowed their zeal to outrun their discre- 
tion ; for when the reaction came, as it was bound 
to do, the great bulk of the traders had no reserve 
funds on which they could fall back and await the 
passing away of the quiet tima It was then found 
that the preparations for trading greatly exceeded all 
the demands which the colonists could possibly make 
for several years to come ; and for some eighteen 
months, therefore, trade and commerce in Khodesia 
in general, and in Matabeleland in particular, were 
almost completely stagnant, and several of the 
weaker traders went to the walL 



252 



CHAPTER XV. 

SIR RICHARD MARTIN'S INQUIRT. 

Havino r^ard to the fact that the Select Committee 
of the House of Commons was ordered to make an 
inquiry into the administration of Rhodesia, the 
Government towards the end of 1896 instructed Sir 
Richard Martin, the Deputy Commissioner for South 
Africa, to inquire into the native administration of 
the British South Africa Company, and the probable 
cause or causes of the recent rebellion. The points 
on which he was specially to report were : (1) The 
labour question; (2) the cattle question; (3) the 
alleged concession of a monopoly to Mr Homan, in 
direct conflict with article 20 of the charter ; and (4) 
the cause of the rebellion. So soon as he received 
these orders. Sir Richard Martin immediately set 
about his task, despite the fact that the rising in 
Matabeleland was only just over and that in Mash- 
onaland was in full swing; and on January 16, 
1897, he sent his report to the High Commissioner, 
Lord Rosmead (Sir Hercules Robinson). This report 
treated each of the four heads given above separately, 
and Sir Richard Martin opened his remarks by saying 



ANONYMOUS EVIDBNCE. 263 

that the evidence he had been able to obtain had by 
no means been sufficient to enable him to make as 
satisfactory and exhaustive a report as he would have 
wished. Private individuals, he continued, had been 
most reluctant to give information, and those who 
had done so, with but one or two exceptions, had 
made it conditional that their evidence should be 
accepted as confidential, — for obvious reasons not 
wishing their names to be made public. These facts^ 
Sir Bichard Martin added, prevented him from sup- 
porting his own views in several cases with the 
names of men whose opinions, owing to their un- 
questioned knowledge and experience of the natives 
of Matabeleland and Mashonaland, must needs carry 
much weight. 

Without for an instant wishing to impugn the 
bond fides of a most painstaking member of the public 
service such as Sir Bichard Martin has proved him- 
self to be, one must confess feeling dubious about the 
authority of these men " whose opinions, owing to 
their unquestioned knowledge and experience of the 
natives of Matabeleland and Mashonaland, must needs 
carry much weight." Who were they ? and why were 
they reluctant to come forward and publicly give 
their evidence? Men of weight and authority do 
not usually make accusations in private that they 
fear to support in public. The relations between the 
British South Africa Company and the settlers had 
up to the time of the outbreak of the rebellion been 
of a most cordial character, with one or two very 
slight exceptions, and there seem to be no grounds 
whatever for the insinuation made by Sir Bichard 



254 SIR RICHARD KARTIK'S IKQUIRT. 

Martiu that men in the country feared to come for- 
ward and state their grievances against the Company. 
The testimony of such men who fear to have their 
evidence investigated, and if possible refuted, is 
unworthy of consideration, and Sir Eichard Martin 
should have refused to accept it. The government 
of Ehodesia was not perfect — the perfect government 
has yet to be discovered — and no one would for an 
instant hesitate to say that the Chartered Company 
had made mistakes ; but the mistakes were such as 
come through inexperience and are inevitable in the 
opening up to civilisation of a new and extensive 
territory with a large native population. 

To come to details, the first part of Sir Bichard's 
report dealt with the labour question. In September 
of 1896, the Deputy Commissioner, as the first step in 
his inquiry, addressed a series of questions to each of 
the magistrates and Native Commissioners in Mata- 
beleland and Mashonaland, the leading one of which 
was as follows: "Did there exist in your district 
previous to the outbreak any practice exacting com- 
pulsory labour from natives either for public works, 
such as roads, &c., or for private persons or com- 
panies in mines or elsewhere ? " This was followed 
by others as to signs of disaffection prior to the ris- 
ing, and the claiming of the cattle by the Company. 

This circular was answered by five magistrates and 
fifteen Native Commissioners ; and the first paragraph 
in Sir Bichard Martin's report states that of the 
fifteen Native Commissioners who sent in replies, 
eight admit in unhesitating language that compulsory 
labour did exist, while two only, those at Matoko's 



"compulsory labour. 256 

and Lesapi, state directly that no practice exacting 
compulsory labour existed. Of the remainder, the 
Native Commissioner at Marandellas stated that he 
believed there did exist a practice exacting compul- 
sory labour, but he was unable to speak with cer- 
tainty ; and the Native Commissioners for Melsetter, 
Umtali, and Bulawayo did not deal with the question 
directly. This, it may be pointed out en passant, 
only accounts for fourteen out of the fifteen said to 
have sent in replies. " Of the five resident magis- 
trates who have sent in replies," the report continues, 
" three, those for Salisbury, Victoria, and Melsetter, 
state deliberately that no practice exacting compulsory 
labour existed. One, the magistrate at Gwelo, pleads 
inability to speak with certainty, owing to the matter 
having been left in the hands of the Native Commis- 
sioner ; and one, the resident magistrate at Bulawayo, 
avoids the question." " I would point out," says Sir 
Eichard Martin after these remarks, ** that out of the 
eight Native Commissioners of Matabeleland who have 
sent in reports, only one, the Native Commissioner for 
Bulawayo, refrains from admitting that the practice 
of compulsory labour did exist." 

These sentences in Sir Bichard Martin's report 
form at first sight a very serious indictment of the 
British South Africa Company, amounting to noth- 
ing less than a charge of permitting, and even en- 
couraging, slavery under the British flag, and these 
charges have now to be considered impartially in 
detail. To commence with, it must be premised 
that the term "compulsory labour" is a most 
elastic one, and one that it is hard to confine within 



256 sm RICHARD martin's inqtjirt. 

defined limits. It may mean slavery pure and 
simple, or it may mean the necessity which exists 
throughout the world of a man earning his daily 
bread. In the former case it would be a curse and 
a disgrace to any civilised nation, but in the latter 
it would be one of the greatest blessings of mankind. 
The men who are compelled by circumstance to 
work the hardest are those who make a nation what 
it is; and we have it on old authority that "the 
drones must die." The charge against the Char- 
tered Company of forcing the natives to work seems 
to be one that should be placed to their credit, for 
the person that is idle is the one that is vicioua 
But this charge in the report of Sir Bichard 
Martin goes further than this, — it plainly hints 
that natives were seized in their kraals, taken by 
force, and compelled to work at the bidding of the 
whites. This, it is claimed, is supported by eight 
Native Commissioners in Matabeleland. It would 
be out of place here to give the replies of the 
Native Commissioners to Sir Bichard Martin's ques- 
tions in full, but it will be sufficient to indicate 
where necessary their general tenor. The reply of 
the Native Commissioner for Gwelo, one of the eight 
cited by Sir Richard Martin, is a typical one. He 
says : " It [compulsory labour] did exist for all the 
purposes named to the extent that the supply was 
not equal to the demand. The contract wages were 
10 shillings [per month ?]. The period three months 
with food. In many cases, I believe, the wages were 
more than doubled by the employers when the boys 
proved themselves worthy of it." 




"forced" labour. 267 

This is one of the Commissioners on whom the 
Deputy Commissioner relies for support of his con- 
tention, and it shows — what ? That when the 
Matabele would not work they were compelled to 
do so. This is undoubtedly compulsory labour, but it 
is nothing more than what must happen in every 
State, whether the population be white, black, or 
yellow. Take our own country : a man who refuses 
to work is arrested and sent to prison as a rogue 
and a vagabond. In Bhodesia a native who declined 
to work was taken before the Native Commissioner 
and sent off to some mine or public work close at 
hand, paid at what, to him, were very high rates, 
fed and housed, and then at the end of three months 
he was allowed to return to his kraal, where he was 
permitted to remain for the rest of the year. So 
by working for a quarter of a year, a native in 
Ehodesia was allowed to follow his own bent for 
nine months. There are many persons nearer home 
who would be delighted to work under the same 
conditions. 

Before passing on, it should be mentioned that 
throughout the whole report of Sir Eichard Martin 
there is not one word about any act of cruelty, or 
even harshness, towards the native by the white 
employers, and yet we may be certain that all the 
white men throughout the country were not spot- 
less. There were, doubtless, black sheep among 
them who abused the natives under their control, 
but this was not sufficiently significant in the 
opinion of the Deputy Commissioner to justify 
special mention in his report. Men, however, who 

s 



258 Sm RICHABD MABTm'S IKQUIBT. 

abused the natives with whom they came in con- 
tact did exist in the country, and possibly it was 
some of them who gave "confidential evidence" to 
the Deputy Commissioner : that would be in accord 
with the rest of their conduct It was this com- 
pulsory labour, then, which existed in Bhodesia, — 
a form of compulsion not nearly so severe as that 
which is in vogue in England and other civilised 
countries, where if a man will not work he must 
either starve or go to prison; and yet it led to 
vigorous denunciations being hurled at the heads 
of the Chartered Company for encouraging slavery 
in their territories. 

The reply of the resident magistrate at Bulawayo, 
who, according to Sir Eichard Martin, avoids the 
question put to him, was couched in the following 
terms : " Inspectors of police were sent to the differ- 
ent kraals to obtain labour in proportion to the 
number of male adults at each kraaL The various 
inspectors assure me that no difficulty whatever was 
experienced in obtaining boys. The chief was 
simply informed that he was expected to supply a 
certain number of boys, at the same time being 
assured that they would each receive a weekly 
[monthly?] wage (never less than ten shillings with 
food and lodgings), and that they would be well 
treated. A large number of natives were thus in- 
duced to come in to work, many coming in quite 
voluntarily. In no case, however, to my know- 
ledge, and I have specially questioned the various 
inspectors on the point, has physical force been 
used to compel the natives to come in and work." 



SIB BICHARD KABTIN'S CONCLUSIONS. 259 

This statement of Mr P. G. Smith, the magistrate, 
is as clear and categorical a reply to Sir Bichard 
Martin's question as could be desired, and yet the 
Deputy Commissioner saw fit to say that Mr Smith 
" avoided the question." Such an unfortunate re- 
mark as this only gave some grounds for the charges 
of bias against Sir Bichard Martin which were, 
quite unjustifiably, being freely circulated in Bula- 
wayo at this time. Mr Smith states distinctly and 
clearly what happened, and goes into greater detail 
than any of his confreres, and yet he is the one 
mentioned as "avoiding the question"! 

The conclusions at which Sir Bichard Martin 
arrived at were — "(1) That compulsory labour 
undoubtedly did exist in Matabeleland, if not in 
Mashonaland; (2) that labour was procured by the 
various Native Commissioners for the various re- 
quirements of the Government, mining companies, 
and private persons ; and (3) that the Native Com- 
missioners in the first instance endeavoured to 
obtain labour through the indunas, but failing that 
they procured it by force." The first paragraph, 
showing that labour was compulsory in Bhodesia, 
can be passed over without comment, for it is so 
all over the world. The second paragraph must 
also be conceded, for it was one of the chief duties 
of their oflBce for the Native Commissioners to ensure 
a plentiful supply of native labour for the mines 
and public works; but with regard to the third 
conclusion at which Sir Bichard Martin arrives it 
must be challenged. Not that it is totally wrong 
— if it were, its refutation would be all the easier 



260 Snt RICHABD MABTn^S mQUIBT. 

— but it is set forward in such a manner as to lead 
those who do not happen to have the replies of the 
Native Commissioners before them, to form an erron- 
eous opinion as to what really occurred. 

The only grounds that the Deputy Commissioner 
had for making this statement, presuming that his 
anonymous witnesses did not give him " confidential 
evidence ** on the point, are in the letters of the 
native commissioners for the Insiza and Umsing- 
wane districts. The former stated that when the 
indunas told him that they had no control over 
their people, and that they declined to work, then, 
and only then, he sent the native police to coUect 
the labour. Mr H. M. Jackson, the Native Commis- 
sioner at Umsingwane, stated that "compulsion of 
a more direct nature was used upon the young and 
idle, who were made to work for two or three 
months in the year at a wage of ten shillings a- 
month with food, under registration." The truth of 
the matter is, that the Matabele as a nation had no 
stomach for work or for anything but fighting and 
debauchery, and the British South Africa Compcuiy 
took the same course with them as a father in this 
country would take with a son who refused to sup- 
port himself when means were offered him — they 
compelled them to do so. 

To pass on to the second section of Sir Bichard 
Martin's report, which dealt with the cattle question. 
It was prefaced by the remark that his report would 
be entirely confined to Matabeleland, as it appeared 
from the various reports that no difficulty had ever 
been experienced in Mashonaland with regard to it, 



THE CATTLE QUESTION. 261 

owing in a great measure to the comparatively small 
number of cattle owned by the people. In the open- 
ing sentences Sir Bichard refers to the taking over 
of the cattle by the Chartered Company at the con- 
clusion of the war in 1893, and challenges Lord 
Grey's statement that " nearly all the cattle in 
the country belonged to the king." The Deputy 
Commissioner considered that the way in which the 
Company went to work was a fatal one, and in this 
he would seem to be more or less correct. Looking 
at it without bias, it would seem that while the bulk 
of the cattle was owned by the king, there was a 
quantity which was the private property of the 
natives, and, unwittingly no doubt, the Native Com- 
missioners fell into the error of considering all the 
cattle in the country as the personal property of the 
king. Possibly they found it hard to get information 
of a trustworthy character as to which of the herds 
were owned by Lobengula and which were not, so 
they lumped them all together and claimed the whole 
on behalf of the Company, — a rough-and-ready 
method whose only defence is its expediency, which 
is no defence at all. This latter was the view that 
Sir Bichard Martin took, and it certainly seems 
to have a great deal in its favour. As has been 
said already, had the Company taken possession of 
all the cattle in the country immediately on the con- 
clusion of the war of 1893 as the "spoils of war," 
the natives would have recognised their right to do 
so, but it was the hesitating, half-hearted policy of 
the authorities that first led the natives to think 
themselves badly treated. 



262 Sm RICHARD martin's INQUIRY. 

As regards the third portion of Sir Richard Mar- 
tin's report, the granting of a monopoly to Mr 
Homan, it is necessary to go into some particulars 
to make it explicit. Mr K £. Homan was a trader 
in Mashonaland who, early in April of 1895, wrote 
to Mr George Pauling, who was at that time a mem- 
ber of the executive council at Salisbury, suggesting 
that the Chartered Company might effect a consider- 
able saving if the Native Commissioners in the Mazoe, 
Hartley, Lo Magondi, Charter, and Marandellas dis- 
tricts of Mashonaland were given instructions that 
the natives in their respective districts had to hand 
over the " hut - tax " in grain at a central spot in 
each district to Mr Homan, who would receive it and 
grant receipts for it, the price to be fixed between 
the Grovernment and himself. This would of course 
place in the hands of Mr Homan the principal grain 
supplies of the districts named, and so give him 
a great advantage over the other traders ; but this 
arrangement was sanctioned by the councU on April 
23, 1895, for a period of six months. On July 25 
things went a step further, for the Civil Commissioner 
at Salisbury was informed by the Administrator that 
he was not to issue any more trading licences for the 
Charter and Sabi districts except to Mr Homan, — a 
step which naturally excited a good deal of opposi- 
tion and not a little heartburning among the traders 
already settled in those two districts, who feared 
that when their licences expired they would not be 
renewed. Consequently an agitation against this 
monopoly was commenced, and as a result it was 
withdrawn by the Admmistrator on September 30, 




THE HOMAN MONOPOLY. 263 

1895. Things were not allowed to rest here, how- 
ever. It was thought by many people, though Earl 
Grey strongly denied the correctness of this, that 
the granting of this concession was against the 20 th 
article of the charter, which begins by premising 
that nothing in the charter should be deemed to 
authorise the Company to set up or grant any mono- 
poly of trade save in certain cases, such as the grant 
of concessions for banks, railways, tramways, &c. ; 
and on the matter being brought before Mr Justice 
Vintcent of the High Court of Matabeleland, he, 
after careful deliberation, decided that such a grant 
was tUtra vires, and that the Chartered Company 
had exceeded their powers in granting it It was at 
once relinquished. In this view of the matter Sir 
Bichard Martin concurred, and thereupon the matter 
was allowed to drop. The Company, or its repre- 
sentatives at Salisbury, had unwittingly erred, but so 
soon as the fault was discovered it was remedied. 

The last part of Sir Eichard Martin's report dealt 
with the causes of the rebellion, and as these have 
already been considered at length, suffice it to say 
that the Deputy Commissioner considered the causes 
to have been — (1) The fact that the Matabele 
had never been thoroughly subdued ; (2) the labour 
regulations ; (3) the cattle regulations ; and (4) the 
rinderpest and the slaughter of the cattle. The raid, 
he considered, merely afforded the opportunity, and 
was not a primary cause. This report as a whole 
was forwarded to England for the consideration of 
the Select Committee on February 27, 1897; and 
about the same time the report of a committee 



264 SIR RICHARD MARTIN'S INQUIRY. 

which had been appointed in Bulawayo, composed 
jointly of representatives of the Bulawayo Chamber 
of Commerce, the local Chamber of Mines, and the 
Sanitary Board (at that time the municipal authority 
of the town), to collect evidence to be submitted to 
the parliamentary committee regarding the adminis- 
tration of Ehodesia by the British South Africa Com- 
pany, was also forwarded to England. This com- 
mittee first met on November 20, 1896, and was 
composed of the following gentlemen : Mr J. Mudie 
Thompson (chairman), Colonel Spreckley, and Messrs 
J. Sampson, P. V. Weir, A. M'Kinnon, S. Eedrup, 
and 0. E. Armstrong. 

In view of the fact that Sir Richard Martin had 
inferred in his report that there were persons in the 
country who were afraid to come forward and give 
evidence antagonistic to the British South Africa 
Company, a paragraph in the report of this com- 
mittee is significant. It reads, " It will be seen that 
the British South Africa Company has given the 
utmost accessibility to every individual who desired 
to present either a suggestion or a grievance." This 
testimony considerably weakens the allegations of the 
Deputy Commissioner. 

The evidence submitted to this committee was of 
a voluminous character, and while several sugges- 
tions were made for minor alterations in the legal 
and representative conditions which prevailed, yet it 
was nearly always stated by the witnesses that they 
had never known the Government to fail to consider 
any suggestions that were made to them for improve- 
ments in their administration. In fact, the Chartered 




THE GHABTEBED COMPANY "ASTOUNDED." 265 

Company and Mr Bhodes realised that the conditions 
under which the country was governed * wwe not 
ideal ones. Mr Rhodes, in the speech he ihade at 
Colonel Napier's banquet at the conclusion of the 
Matabeleland rebellion, and to which reference has 
already been made, said, referring to the governm^it 
by charter, that such a form was only temporary, and 
that such government was only the first step towards 
government by ballot and popular control. Many 
of the witnesses who appeared before the Bulawayo 
committee had lived for some years in other British 
colonies, and these gave interesting comparisons be- 
tween the conditions under which settlers lived and 
worked in Ehodesia and those obtaining in other 
colonies. These comparisons were nearly always in 
favour of Rhodesia. The evidence bearing on this 
subject of Messrs Schreiner, Loew, and Yentner before 
the parliamentary committee has already been given. 
When this evidence and Sir Richard Martin's 
report reached England, their purport was for- 
warded to the head office of the British South 
Africa Company, the directors of which wrote a 
letter to the Colonial Office under date of March 
24, 1897, in which they stated that the suggestion 
made in Sir Richard Martin's report, that a system 
of compulsory labour had existed in any part of 
Rhodesia, had astounded them, and they could not 
credit the statements made. "Certainly," the letter 
went on, " no authority whatever, direct or indirect, 
has been given by the Company for such a practice, 
and if it has prevailed, it has been wholly without 
the consent or knowledge of the Board." This flat 



266 BIB BICHARD MARTIN'S INQUIRY. 

denial of the charges of Sir Eichard Martin pointed 
to the fact that there was some serious misapprehen- 
sion somewhere; but the Company upheld their 
contention very stoutly, and continuing in this letter 
of March 24 stated that the directors had had an 
interview with Dr Jameson on the point, and that 
he said he did not believe that any system of 
compulsory labour could have prevailed without his 
knowledge when he was acting as Administrator. 
In conclusion, the Company informed the Colonial 
Office that they had ordered the Native Commis- 
sioners and magistrates whose reports had formed 
the basis of Sir Eichard Martin's report to come to 
England to give evidence on the point before the 
Select Committee, then sitting, and they requested 
that the Colonial Secretary should order the atten- 
dance of Sir Richard Martin likewise. Unfortunately 
for all parties concerned, but especially for the British 
Soutli Africa Company, which was thereby debarred 
from clearing itself from the charge, the Committee 
decided to drop the second part of its inquiry. And 
so this vexed question remained, and remains, un- 
settled. 

That there was compulsory labour of the type 
hinted at by Sir Richard Martin is disproved by 
the weight of evidence, so far as an impartial 
observer is able to find ; but that the natives were 
compelled to work and to forsake for a few weeks 
every year their habits of sloth and idleness is 
certain, and it is to the credit of the British 
South Africa Company that it was so. Had it 
been otherwise, and had they allowed the natives 



MAKING TllK NATIVES WOIUL 267 

to live on in their kraals in their own way, there 
would not have been one rebellion but several 
Without the necessity for working the Matabele 
would not have continued long without fight- 
ing, either among themselves or against the whites 
or the neighbouring tribes. The greatest thinkers 
of all countries and all ages are agreed on the 
point that a life without work is not good for 
any man, and assuredly it would be the worst 
thing that could happen for the Matabelelaod 
native population and for all who laboured in the 
same country with them. A carefully regulated 
system of making the natives work, under safe- 
guards and efficient Government supervision, is 
the one great thing that is needed in Ehodesia, 
not only for the prosperity of the white settlers 
in the country, and the opening up of the country 
itself, but for the natives as well ; and the only 
manner in which the Matabele can be weaned from 
their ingrained habits of war, rapine, and plunder 
is to make it necessary for them to work. 

The Chartered Company have recognised the truth 
of this from the first. The step that they took in 
making the hut -tax — the only way in which the 
natives directly contribute to the revenue of the 
country — payable in money in pljice of cattle or 
grain was a wise one ; for it meant that those 
who refused to work and earn the money neces- 
sary to pay the tax, which could easily be done 
by a few weeks' work either at the mines or on 
the diflfeient public works, would be punished for 
not having the money when the time came round. 



268 SI& BICHABD martin's INQUIRY. 

unless they could produce a sufficient explanation 
of their condition. 

To environ the natives round with civUising 
conditions, to teach them that those who wUl not 
work will be treated as rogues and vagabonds, and 
at the same time to offer them the means of working 
peaceably and under good conditions, is one of the 
best works that the British South Africa Company 
can accomplish in the mighty territory over which 
they have control; and to their credit it must be 
said that they have recognised this obligation from 
the first, and attempted to carry it out in spite 
of both the natural disinclination of the natives 
themselves for manual labour and a great deal 
of ill - advised interference from outsiders in this 
country. 

It must not be for a moment supposed, however, 
that the present writer is encouraging anything in 
the nature of slavery, in however mild a form. 
Far from it, for the proudest boast of a British 
colony is that in its territory all men, irrespective 
of colour, of race, or of religion, are alike free; 
but they must work if they would live, and those 
who will not, be they English-born or Matabele, 
must either be made to do so, or in default most 
suffer. The curse of any country is its idlers. 



269 



CHAPTER XVL 



THE PROGRESS OF THE COUNTRY. 



Throughout the year of 1897, in spite of the many 
set-backs it received, the railway from the south 
was steadily advancing towards Bulawayo, which it 
eventually reached on October 19 ; and on November 
4, 1897, the line was formally declared open for 
traffic amid a scene of great popular enthusiasm. 
The track for some distance outside Bulawayo had 
been brightened by the erection of Venetian poles 
and lines of bunting, while the engine hauling the 
first train to arrive at the town was also gaily 
decorated. A large party of notabilities from Eng- 
land had gone out to take part in the festivities, 
which were kept up for some days. The construc- 
tion of this railway between Vryburg and Bulawayo 
was a record-breaking piece of work, especially when 
the enormous difficulties, engineering and otherwise, 
are taken into consideration. From the time of the 
commencement of the work to that of laying the 
last rail at Bulawayo only twelve months passed, 
during which time a distance of no less than 385 
miles was bridged by the railway. It was a great 



270 THE PROGRESS OF THE COUNTRY. 

achievement, and the resulting benefit to the town 
has been abundantly seen ; for though Mashonaland 
was colonised some four years before its sister pro- 
vince, and active mine-prospecting was commenced 
there some time previous to the Matabeleland war of 
occupation, yet it has been the latter part of Eho- 
desia which has been the quicker developed, and 
it was a Jtfatabele mine, the Geelong, in the Gwanda 
district, that was the first to commence making a 
systematic output of gold. 

The railway to Bulawayo, too, has been from 
the first worked with the utmost smoothness, and 
but little fault has been found with it ; while, on the 
other hand, the railway which was advancing very 
slowly from the Eewt Coast towards Salisbury has 
been a veritable bone of contention ever since it was 
first commenced. First the Chartered Company and 
the settlers in Mashonaland came into conflict over 
the dilatory manner, as it seemed to the inhabitants 
of the country, in which the work was being carried 
out ; and then, when the railway was at length opened 
as far as Umtali, endless disputes and controversies 
took place about the rates charged for the convey- 
ance of goods over it. It must be remembered that 
the gauge of the line was only a two feet one, which, 
in the opinion of many settlers in Mashonaland, 
formed the initial mistake. Consequently only 
a limited quantity of freight could be carried at 
once, so that the railway company had to charge 
high rates to make the line anything like payabla 
On the other hand, the railway to Bulawayo was 
of the standard Cape gauge, and therefore much 



i 



RAILWAYS IN THE COUNTRY. 271 

more powerful engines could be used and heavier 
trains drawn, which meant the lowering of the 
rates and the acceleration of transport over the 
line. 

With the rates from the Cape to Bulawayo lower 
than those from Beira to Umtali, about one-seventh 
of the distance, the residents in Mashonaland, not 
unnaturally perhaps, got it into their heads that they 
were being very badly treated when compared with 
the way in which the settlers in Matabeleland were 
being favoured. However, Messrs Pauling & Co., 
the constructors and lessees of the Beira Bailway, 
made several concessions in the matter of rates, 
and the authorities gave the assurance that so soon 
as ever it was possible the line should be widened 
to the standard gauge, and in the meantime it was 
steadily pushed forward towards Salisbury. 

So soon as the railway to Bulawayo reached that 
town most people living there looked forward to see- 
ing trade advance by leaps and bounds ; but this did 
not prove to be the case, and those who expected to 
see Bulawayo develop mushroom-like so soon as the 
railway was opened were doomed to disappointment 
A far healthier state of things prevailed, — a steady 
and systematic progress being made, instead of the 
place expanding in the rapid manner of some of 
the towns on the American and Australian gold- 
fields. Instead of the capital of Matabeleland be- 
coming little more than a city of huts and hovels, 
it developed quietly and substantially; for while 
there was no mad rush to build in the town, such 
buildings as were erected were of solid yet oma- 



272 THE PROORBSS OF THE COUNTRY. 






mental construction, and of such a character as 
might do credit to any town in any State. 

While signs of progress were abundantly to be 
observed in the country, there was still an outcry 
of bad times by the traders and commercial classes 
generally. This seemed strange at first sight, for 
the mining industry was going ahead rapidly, and 
half-a-dozen mines in the country were quickly ap- 
proaching the crushing stage, when the real pros- 
perity of Matabeleland might be looked upon as 
commencing, and people were flocking up to Rho- 
desia. There were many reasons for this outcry, 
however, which was in reality well founded, and 
one of the chief of these reasons has already been 
outlined in a previous chapter. Another cause was 
the shyness of the general public, both in England 
and on the Continent, to have anything to do with 
the new colony until its resources were proved. 
The investor, knowing but little about Ehodesia, 
feared to risk his money until he had tangible proof 
of the likelihood of his getting a return for it. 
Those who were in a position to know what the 
country was like were fully convinced of its great 
prospects and its great potential value in the future 
history of the world ; but this latter class was but 
comparatively a small one, and there were many 
interested persons at work belittling Rhodesia and 
its resources, so that the uninformed knew not 
which to believe — the parties who spoke of the 
hundreds of miles of gold-reefs in the country, or 
those who declared that there was no gold what- 
ever in the land, and that if there ever had been. 




> - 



THE CAUSES OF STAGNATION. 273 



the ancient miners had taken it all thousands of 
years ago. 

The faQt that the mines in Bhodesia had been 
so slowly opened up was also made a great deal 
of by the persons who were either ignorant of the 
many stupendous difSculties that had to be sur- 
mounted, or else were dishonest enough to pass them 
by deliberately to bolster up their case the better. 
About this time it was a common thing for those 
lately returned from the country to be besieged with 
inquiries as to "whether there really was gold in 
Ehodesia ? " and to one fresh from viewing gold- 
reef upon gold-reef in an unbroken succession the 
question seemed absurd to a degrea Another cause 
that may have had a great deal to do with the 
cry of stagnant trade raised by the smaller traders 
was the presence in all the towns and on the 
principal mining - fields of agents for commercial 
firms in Port Elizabeth and other parts of Cape 
Colony, who took wholesale orders for goods of every 
description and had them sent forward, which they 
were able to do at a cheaper rate than the traders in 
Bulawayo or Salisbury could supply them for. 

Turning to the administration of the country, it 
was realised by almost all that after the Jameson 
raid some change would have to be made in the 
form of government, so as to give the Imperial 
authorities greater control of the forces in Ehodesia 
and to prevent a recurrence of such an affair. Mr 
Rhodes and the British South Africa Company 
were among the first to see that alterations would 
have to be made in the charter, and it is a fact 

8 



274 THE PROGRESS OF THE COUNTRY. 

worth noticing that the proposal for the formation 
of a quasi-representative council in Bhodesia first 
emanated from the Chartered Company. The Im- 
perial Government was in rather a difficult situation 
with regard to Bhodesia and its administration. 
The Government saw that the Colonial Office must 
have a greater say in the administration of the 
British South Africa Company, and yet it must not, 
either actually or by implication, assume any finan- 
cial liability with regard to it. To ask whether or 
not a country can be controlled without some finan- 
cial liability being undertaken is to raise a question 
which is outside the present limits ; but it may be 
pointed out that the last thing in the world that the 
shareholders or directors of the Chartered Company 
desired was that the Imperial Government should 
assume any financial liability in Ehodesia, though, 
as has been said, it was seen that changes in the 
administration of the country were imperative. 

Having this end in view, the British South Africa 
Company forwarded certain proposals to the Colonial 
Office about the beginning of 1898 for the consider- 
ation of the Imperial Government. These proposals 
included the reconstitution of the Administrator's 
Council by the addition of four elected members — 
being two from Matabeleland and two from Mashona- 
land — and as many nominated by the Company as 
would preserve to them a majority so long as they 
were responsible for meeting the expenditure. The 
Colonial Office provisionally accepted this offer, and 
on February 24, 1898, Mr Chamberlain formulated 
a series of proposals for the modification of the 




CHANGES IN THB ADMINISTBATION. 275 

charter, which were forwarded to Sir Alfred Milner, 
who had been appointed High Commissioner at Cape 
Town in succession to Lord Bosmead, and received 
his approval 

In addition to accepting the offer of the Chartered 
Company mentioned above, the Colonial Secretary 
proposed w modify the arrangements then existing 
in Southern Bhodesia (meaning that portion of the 
country south of the Zambesi river), so that the 
control of the High Commissioner might be more 
direct, and might be based upon full information 
obtained locally through an imperial officer specially 
appointed and stationed at Salisbury for that pur- 
pose. It was suggested that the imperial officer 
named should be styled the Besident Commissioner, 
and appointed and paid by the Crown, while his 
powers and limitations were set forth at length. 
The chief of these limitations were, that he should 
not interfere with the administration of the territory 
except with regard to the employment of the armed 
forces therein, and that he should have no veto on 
the action of the Administrators or the Council. 
It was further proposed that another imperial officer 
should be appointed and paid by the Crown to 
command all the armed forces in the country. 

It was believed that by these measures the exten- 
sive powers which were possessed by the Crown 
under the charter would be rendered effective with- 
out the Government assuming any responsibilities 
to the shareholders or debenture -holders of the 
Company. " That responsibility," declared Mr 
Chamberlain in the communication under notice. 



276 THE PROGRESS OF THE GOXTNTRY. 

"must remain with the Board of Directors of the 
British South Africa Company/' The Colonial Sec- 
retary went on to say that it was desirable that 
the Imperial Government should have more ample 
information than they had hitherto been able to 
obtain as to the transactions and general financial 
situation of the Company. After remarking that 
the precedent created by the India Act of 1784 
for the control of the affairs of the East India Com- 
pany (by which a board of control, composed of 
members of the Grovernment of the day, was con- 
stituted) naturally suggested itself, Mr Chamberlain 
remarked that to apply such a system in its en- 
tirety to the British South Africa Company would 
amount to the creation of a separate public office 
with full responsibility for the government and 
revenues of tlie territories in question, and therefore, 
by implication, with a certain amount of respon- 
sibility for tlie finances of the Company ; so that it 
was not proposed at that time to do more than to 
define explicitly, and to strengthen where necessary, 
the existing powers of the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, and to indicate the way in which 
they would be exercised. These proposals of Mr 
Chamberlain eventually formed the basis of the 
Order in Council of 1898, which constituted the 
first step in the history of Rhodesia towards popular 
representation on the governing council of the 
colony. 

Another question that concerned Rhodesia in- 
timately about this time was the scarcity of native 
labour for the mines and other works. With a 



SCAKCITY OF NATIVE LABOUR. 277 

native population estimated approximately by the 
Native Commissioners at over 300,000 persons, it 
seems strange that there ever should be a scarcity 
of labour in the country, but yet it is so ; and, in 
fact, one of the most worrying questions with which 
the government at Salisbury have so far been con- 
fronted has been that of the native labour supply 
and the provision of enough black labour to keep 
the mines working. It should be remembered that 
a native at most only works for about three months 
in the year at the mines, and by that time, having 
earned enough to pay his hut-tax and to keep him 
in luxury for the remainder of the year, he returns 
to his kraaL This means that every mine in the 
country must have at least four completely new 
staffs in twelve months, so that to begin with, each 
mine uses four times as much labour as it otherwise 
would if the natives were content to work con- 
stantly. Then, again, but few of the boys tried, 
comparatively speaking, and referring especially to 
the Mashona tribe, make good miners, though they 
are excellent husbandmen, and in this respect they 
are supported by a large section of the Matabele 
tribe : in fact, the best native miners yet tried in the 
country are those of the Shangaan and other trans- 
Zambesian tribes. 

Then there is the serious competition of the 
Rand and other goldfields in South Africa to reckon 
with, which, by offering higher wages and more 
tempting conditions, manage to secure a large pro- 
portion of the native labour that would otherwise 
be available for Bhodesian use ; but it seems that. 



278 THE PROGRESS OF THE COUNTRT. 

properlj organised and administered, there should 
be native workmen enough in South and Central 
Africa to supply all possible requirements for some 
years to come. Probably when, within a few years 
now, the Trans-continental Eailway gets working, 
say, as far as the southern shores of Lake Tangan- 
yika, one of the first benefits Rhodesia, and indeed 
the whole of South Africa, will feel from it will be 
in the tapping of a plentiful supply of native labour. 
It may be said, therefore, — bearing in mind that as 
time goes on, and Shodesia gets brought more and 
more into line with civilisation, the Matabele and 
other tribes in the country will feel the necessity 
for constantly working more than they do at present, 
— that this labour difficulty is only a temporary one ; 
but at the time of writing it is a very pressing one, 
and has been for two years or so — in fact, ever 
since the development on a large scale of the Itho- 
desian mines commenced. So great a difficulty has 
the scarcity of native labourers on the mines been 
on occasions, that when the extension of the railway 
northwards from Bulawayo was commenced the con- 
structors had to give a guarantee that the necessary 
black labour should not be drawn from Bhodesia, 
but imported either from Bechuanaland or the 
nortli. 

Native labour on the mines in South Africa seems 
to be a necessity, and one that cannot be dispensed 
with, but why, save for the climate, it should be so 
seems puzzling when the conditions that prevail on 
the other goldfields of the world are examined. 
Indian gold-mines, it is true, are extensively manned 



THB LAND QUESTION. 279 

by natives, and a certain proportion of blacks are 
employed on the Western Australian fields, though 
they probably do not number so many as the white 
miners ; while on the principal of the remaining 
fields — such as California, the Klondike, and British 
Columbia — white labour is exclusively used. The 
moral of this seems to be, then, that if a goldfield is 
situated on tropical regions where natives abound, 
white labourers either could not work or it would 
not pay a company to import white labourers, as the 
work can be done both better and cheaper by the 
blacks. If the blacks cannot be obtained, however, 
it would seem the wiser course to make an effort 
to get together a staff of acclimatised white men who 
could be depended on to work permanently rather 
than to ** close down " the mines, as has been done 
in two prominent cases in Bhodesia lately. 

The " land-title question " was also one that was 
agitating Bhodesia in the early days of 1898, as 
much difference of opinion seemed to exist as to 
what was the exact interpretation of the rather 
ambiguously worded " Victoria agreement," which 
was hastily drawn up and given to those residents 
in Mashonaland who volunteered to form the pioneer 
column to Matabeleland in 1893. 

There is another aspect of the land question in 
Rhodesia, however, which has not received the con- 
sideration it deserves, and yet is far more important 
than any dispute about the land titles, and that is 
the way in which the land in the country is parcelled 
out. In the early days of the Chartered Company's 
taking over the country, companies were formed in 



280 THE PROGRESS OF THE COUNTRT. 

London with large capitals, and these were granted 
immense tracts of land which they were to exploit 
to their beat advantage, the British South African 
Company only reserving to themselves the right 
to one -half of the profits of any minerals found 
on the land. It has come about, therefore, that the 
companies have been very reluctant to part with 
their land, and though they have in some instances 
allowed farms to be leased from them, yet they 
retain the freehold, and thus a settler in the country 
has but little opportunity for acquiring a small plot 
for himself. This seems to be, surely, the wrong 
way to open up a country. Freehold plots of con- 
venient size at moderate rentals on easy terms of 
payment should be offered as inducements for emi- 
grants to go out to Ehodesia and help to populate 
and open up the country. The wisdom of this 
course has been recognised in the United States, 
where even the smallest farmer in the Western 
States owns his "quarter -lot," and in most of the 
British colonies — such as British Columbia, Canada, 
and the Australian States ; and it would seem that 
it would have been much better had the British 
South Africa Company reserved at least certain 
areas in each district for this purpose. They must 
be presumed to know their business best, however, 
and they have not seen fit to do this, but have 
preferred to allow companies and syndicates to be- 
come possessed of mighty tracts of country that are 
to-day virtually closed to settlement As an in- 
stance of this, a reference to the latest Bulawayo 
Directory shows that the British West Charterland 



LAND COMPANIES AND COLONISATION. 281 

Company holds concession rights over 75,000 square 
miles of country in K'Gamiland ; the North Charter- 
land Company has " mining and surface " rights 
over 10,000 square miles; the Ehodesia Concessions 
Company has similar rights over 600 square miles 
in Northern Ehodesia; the Bhodesian Exploration 
and Development Company has either a whole or 
a half interest in an area exceeding 500 square 
miles, — and this list might be greatly prolonged. 

Of course, the obvious retort to such figures is 
that the grants have been made to these corpora- 
tions in order that they might develop the territory 
under their control, and then, when it was ripe for 
settlement, throw it open in small lots. 

This is without doubt the view that the Chartered 
Company took when the grants were made ; but 
unfortunately this has not been done, and there is 
no actual evidence that it ever will be : and hence 
it is that, save in a very few instances, small farmers 
have been unable to get their land otherwise than 
on lease. There seems to be an opinion growing 
up in all civilised countries that the old territorial 
system of holding land, and the consequent forma- 
tion of a landowning community with large estates, 
is a mistaken one, and that all the inhabitants of a 
State should have an opportunity of owning small 
plots of land if they wish ; and yet in this virgin 
country of Ehodesia the old conditions are threaten- 
ing to spring up. This is not written in a spirit 
of socialism in any shape or form, but it does seem 
to an unbiassed mind that a country, the whole of 
which practically is owned by financial corporations. 



282 THB PROGRESS OF THE COUNTRY. 

is saddled with a great disadvantage as compared 
with one such as, say, Victoria, where, away from 
the towns, ahnost every man is his own freeholder. 

It is not too late even now for the British South 
Africa Company to intervene and make it com- 
pulsory for these landowning companies to throw 
open portions at least of their vast tracts in small 
allotments of about 500 acres, and until this is done 
Bhodesia will appeal in vain, it is to be feared, to 
the great body of men who form the emigrant por- 
tion of this country. Of course, with its stupendous 
mineral wealth Rhodesia is not so dependent on the 
agricultural classes as a purely farming country like 
Manitoba or as some of the Australian colonies; 
but as the mining population and the industrial 
classes increase in the country, the farmer will be 
needed to grow the food -stuffs necessary for the 
support of the colony, — for it is out of the question 
to suppose that, with the conditions of climate, soil, 
and irrigation which prevail in Shodesia, that colony 
will be content for all time to import its grain and 
other crops from over the seas. Bather will it be 
able to send its produce home to the mother-country. 

The above remarks are penned in no spirit of 
hostility to the British South Africa Comjiany, whose 
excellent work in obtaining and developing this fine 
country demands the praise of all true empire lovers, 
but it is an attempt to point out an evil which is 
taking root in the country. The landowning com- 
panies are naturally not blind to their own interests, 
and must in course of time throw their estates open 
to settlers; but what guarantee is there at the 



THE FIRST GOLD RETURN. 283 

present time that this step will be taken for years to 
come, or, in fact, that the land will ever be sold 
freehold ? It seems more rea,8onable to presume 
that, especially with regard to the land around the 
principal gold-belts, which may be looked upon as 
the first that will appreciate in value, the companies 
will prefer to let it on lease, and so ensure an 
annual income from the ground-rents, — for of course 
their first and principal consideration is, and must 
be, the benefit of their shareholders. One does not 
grudge these companies holding this land, for in 
a measure they have earned it by their support with 
both their money and their influence, when, had they 
not come to its rescue, the country would have been 
on the verge of bankruptcy ; but it would be well if 
the Chartered Company were to make a stipulation 
that land should be sold in the different districts to 
suitable purchasers who gave proofs of a bond fide 
intention to settle on it and cultivate it, at a price to 
be fixed by the Govemment officials on the spot, — 
these prices not to be so high on the one hand as to 
be prohibitive, nor so low on the other as to offer 
no return to the proprietary companies. 

As 1898 progressed, the thoughts of all in Bho- 
desia, and of great numbers in London and other 
European centres, began to be turned to four mines 
in Matabeleland — the Geelong, the Tebekwe, the 
Bonsor, and the Dunraven — which were erecting 
gold- crushing mills, while many other mines were 
hurrying forward towards the same end. The (Jee- 
long mine was the first to make a return, which 
was published in London on October 8, 1898. I 



284 THE PROGRESS OF THE COUNTRY. 

showed that in the month of September the mill 
had crushed 2260 tons of quartz, gaining 1417 
ounces of gold, an equivalent of 12 J pennyweights 
of gold for each ton of quartz crushed, to which has 
to be added a further 7 pennyweights of gold left 
behind in each ton of " tailings " to be treated by 
the cyanide or other process, — thus giving a total 
return of nearly an ounce of gold for every ton of 
quartz crushed. 

This result was looked upon in London as being 
very satisfactory, though the shares in the Geelong 
Gold-mining Company did not immediately show 
any appreciation — a fact which was accounted for 
in financial circles by the statement that the result 
was very similar to that which had been expected. 
The Tebekwe mine quickly followed in the wake 
of the Geelong, by making a return which was of 
an equally satisfactory character; and the Bonsor 
and Dunraven mines, which are controlled by the 
same group as that owning the Geelong mine, were 
soon making regular returns likewise, so that by the 
end of the year these four mines, aided by sundry 
small returns from various quarters, had gained a 
total output of 17,613 ounces, which, taking the 
standard price per ounce of gold at £4 sterling, 
meant that in four months Bhodesia had added over 
£70,000 to the wealth of the world, or at the rate 
of nearly a quarter of a million a-year, — a trium- 
phant retort to those whose cry had for long been 
that there was no gold in the country. 

As 1899 went on, however, labour troubles 
began to show themselves once more, until the 




THE FALL IN THE GOLD RETUBNa 285 

monthly output, which in March of that year had 
risen to 6614 ounces, fell in August to a little over 
3000 ounces, — this falling oflf being principally due 
to two of the mines, the Bonsor and the Dunraven, 
having been compelled to stop their mills, or, in the 
parlance of the miners, to "close down," owing to 
the scarcity of native labour. This scarcity is ac- 
counted for by different authorities in various ways, 
but the chief cause seems to have been the return 
of the natives to their homes in order to get in 
their harvest of grain, which was then ripe ; but so 
soon as this was done the natives seemed, or at least 
a large proportion of them seemed, perfectly willing 
to commence working again. With regard to the 
Bonsor mine, there was another cause which led 
to the lack of natives. This was an explosion 
which unfortunately occurred on it in the early 
part of 1899, and was attended with loss of life, 
which led to the mine being looked upon as " be- 
witched" by the superstitious natives. The Gov- 
ernment and the various Chambers of Mines in the 
country saw that some steps would have to be taken 
to prevent this falling off in the native labour-supply 
becoming an annual affair, and, after some consider- 
able correspondence and debate, a "native labour 
bureau," by which it was hoped that the labour 
difficulty would be surmounted, was formed. At 
the time of writing, this bureau has only just got 
into working order, so that it is impossible to say 
whether this will be the case or not, but it is de- 
voutly hoped by all who have the welfare of the 
country at heart that the means taken to ensure 



286 



THK PROGRESS OF THE COUNTET. 



a plentiful labour-supply for the future will be suc- 
cessful. 

While these events were taking place in Mata- 
beleland, the railway from the East Coast was 
rapidly approaching Salisbury, and on the Queen's 
birthday (May 24) the line was formally opened for 
traffic amid scenes of rejoicing similar to those which 
characterised the arrival of the line at Bulawaya 
Now that each portion of Bhodesia has got its 
railway to the coast, it seems as if the tide of mis- 
fortune and difficulty which has for so long dogged 
the country is about to turn, and a wave of pros- 
perity such as was looked for in the early days of 
the Pioneers is about to set in. There have been 
other causes, however, which have delayed this, as 
will be explained later, but those who know the 
country best are certain that the period of its 
prosperity cannot now be long delayed. 




S87 



CHAPTER XVIL 



MR RHODES AND THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT. 



Exactly when the first conception of a railway line 
to stretch across Africa from north to south first 
took shape in the brain of Mr Rhodes is hard to 
say, but undoubtedly the trans-continental telegraph, 
which he announced his intention of constructing 
some ten years ago, was in a measure intended to 
be the forerunner of this other larger enterprise. 
Mr Rhodes realised that one of the first things re- 
quired for the rapid civilisation of the countiy 
which bore his name was the means of quick com- 
munication with the south, and as the first step in 
this communication he pushed forward the erection 
of the telegraph wire and the railway. Probably 
when he commenced the former he had no idea of 
carrying it through to Egypt, but it is easy to 
imagine how such a suggestion would naturally 
evolve itself once the building of the line was 
started. At first it may be considered that Salis- 
bury was intended as the northernmost limit of the 
line, and then, as the British South Africa Company 
assumed the administration of the territories north 



288 MR RHODES AND THE UfPSRIAL OOVERNIONT. 

of the Zambesi, the wire was carried gradually for- 
ward towards the Central African Lakes, until at last 
it was decided to connect the Gape with Cairo and 
the northern ports of Egypt 

Mr Ehodes's appeal for funds for laying and 
maintaining this wire met with but slight response 
on the London Stock Exchange, for the idea of a 
telegraph wire right across Africa in those days 
seemed little more than an idle dream. The Soudan 
was then the headquarters of the Khalifa, and the 
dervish power in that region had yet to be broken ; 
and then there was the vast stretch of unknown 
country in Central Africa to be crossed, so that it 
is no wonder that matter-of-fact business men were 
shy of putting their money into such an undertak- 
ing, especially as the prospective profits did not seem 
to be great To-day, however, notes avons changi 
tout cda ; every one who knows anjrthing of Africa 
realises that the telegraph line will be working from 
Cairo to the Cape in a very few years now, and that 
all the remaining diflSculties will be successfully 
surmounted. In fact, what Mr Ehodes perceived 
six or seven years ago all the world admits to-day. 
That is the key-note of Mr Ehodes's life — he 
can always see a decade ahead of the rest of the 
world. As the London Stock Exchange would not 
provide the money, Mr Ehodes provided it him- 
self, and the line was quickly carried forward. The 
construction to Salisbury was commenced in 1890, 
at the beginning of 1892 the line reached that 
town, and at the end of 1898 its length was 3613 
miles. It had arrived at Lake Kyassa, and its 




THE TRANS-CONTINKNTAL RAILWAY. 289 

construction to Lake Tanganyika was being under- 
taken. So much for the progress of the telegraph 
line. 

As for the trans-continental railway, as has already 
been stated it reached Bulawayo in November 1897, 
at the time when in the north of the continent Lord 
Kitchener was pushing forward his railway from 
Wady Haifa to Berber with the primary object of 
striking a decisive blow at the power of the Khalifa ; 
so Mr Ehodes lost no time in preparing to move 
his end of the railway farther northwards towards 
the Zambesi Nominally the moving spirit in the 
railway extension to the north is the Bechuanaland 
Railway Company, but in reality it is Mr Ehodes, 
who by the very force of his personality has con- 
vinced nearly all who have come into contact with 
him, not only that the line can be constructed with- 
out much difficulty, but also that it will pay once it 
has been opened for traffic. 

When the rebellion in Mashonaland was at length 
thoroughly over, Mr Rhodes was at liberty to turn his 
undivided attention to the question of the railway, 
and so in the spring of 1898 he came to London 
for the purpose of opening negotiations with the 
Imperial Government. As soon as he arrived he 
wrote a letter to the Colonial Secretary, dated April 
28, 1898, placing before the Government certain 
proposals with regard to the extension of the railway 
from Bulawayo towards Lake Tanganyika, which he 
had determined on as the first portion of the line to 
be constructed, and inviting the co-operation of the 
Imperial Government in the scheme. In this letter 



290 MB RHODES AND THE DfPEBIAL GOYSBmCKMT. 

Mr Bhodes stated that the distance to be traversed 
by this part of the line would be between 700 and 
800 miles, and while no survey had been made of 
the country, yet trustworthy information had been 
obtained as to the character of the land and the difiB- 
culties to be overcome, and also that these difficulties 
would probably be no greater than those which had 
already been successfully surmounted in the section 
between Mafeking and Bulawayo. Mr Bhodes had 
received a letter from Sir Gordon Sprigg, then Pre- 
mier at the Cape, saying that should he be success- 
ful in obtaining the help and countenance he required 
from the Imperial (Jovemment, he — Sir Grordon — 
would be prepared to confer with his colleagues in 
the Cape Cabinet with a view to submitting pro- 
posals to the local parliament under which the 
Government of the colony might practically contrib- 
ute towards the cost of the work of the extension, 
thus recognising the advantages which would accrue 
to the colony from the construction of the line. A 
copy of this letter was enclosed in Mr Bhodes's letter 
to the Colonial Office. 

Mr Bhodes in this letter went on to say that he 
estimated the net cost of the construction of the line 
to Lake Tanganyika at about two millions sterling, 
basing his estimate on the fact that the average cost 
per mile of the existing portion of the railway had 
been, approximately, £3000. With regard to raising 
this money, Mr Bhodes stated that he should recom- 
mend the Bechuanaland Bailway Company to obtain 
the sum by a further issue of debentures, which would 
be secured upon the whole of its assets and under- 



MB RHODES'S FROPOSAL& 291 



taking, after provision had been made for safeguard- 
ing the rights of the holders of the existing debenture 
issue of two millions sterling. This meant that, sub- 
ject to the existing debentures, the subscribers to 
the new issue would have offered them as security 
for their money the whole line of 580 miles from 
Vryburg to Bulawayo then built and being worked 
at a profit, as well as any further extension that 
might be made; the subsidies paid to the railway 
company by the Imperial Government and the 
British South Africa Company, which then amounted 
to £30,000 per annum ; and blocks of valuable land 
in Bechuanaland and the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 
amounting in all to an aggregate area of 8000 square 
miles, thus making ample provision for the payment 
of the interest on the debenture issue. 

The British South Africa Company was prepared 
to guarantee the interest upon the whole of the 
further issue of debentures required; and with the 
view to the creation of these debentures upon more 
favourable terms than would otherwise be possible, 
Mr Ehodes asked that the Imperial Government 
should give a collateral guarantee. This is an im- 
portant point to be recollected in this correspondence 
between Mr Ehodes and the Imperial Government 
He did not want the Government to give him a 
single halfpenny in cash: all he wanted them to 
do was to guarantee that, in the unlikely event of 
the Bechuanaland Eailway Company failing to pay 
the interest on its debentures as it became due, 
and the British South Africa Company failing to 
meet its guarantee likewise, the British Government 



292 MR BHODBS AND THE IMPERIAL GOYERNMSNT. 

should promise to pay the interest How this 
request was received will be seen later. In the 
event of the Government acceding to the proposal, 
it was intended to issue the new debentures at the 
rate of either 3^ per cent for a limited number of 
years, or of 2 1 per cent in perpetuity. The con- 
struction of the line, Mr Bhodes went on to say, 
would be carried out in sections of 200 miles at a 
time; and he further suggested that the funds for 
each section should be raised separately, and that 
it should be open for the Imperial Government to 
refuse to guarantee the interest upon the deben- 
tures to be issued for the construction of any section 
unless it was satisfied as to the commercial prospects 
of the proposed extension, and as to the nature of 
the contracts intended to be entered into. The first 
of these 200-mile sections, Mr Bhodes pointed out, 
would tap the valuable coalfields which had been dis- 
covered in the Bubi, Mafungabusi, Sengwe, and San- 
yati districts, and would also traverse the promising 
gold districts of Bembesi, the Lower Sebakwe, and 
the Lower Umfuli ; while the second section would 
pass through the Lo Magondi district, which was 
rich in evidence of gold ; while, once the- Zambesi 
was crossed, the line would run througli an excellent 
cattle country densely populated by natives. 

Mr Bhodes then referred to the traffic which 
might be expected to accrue from this portion of 
the line, and the benefits which the railway would 
confer on South Africa generally with regard to the 
provision of native labour, after which he gave it as 
his opinion that each section of the line would 




THE BENEnTS OF THE LUiE. 293 

quickly pay its way, and cited in support of this 
the fact that for the first four months during which 
the line had been working to Bulawayo a net profit 
at the rate of £155,000 a-year had been earned, 
which, after the payment of the interest on the 
existing debentures, left a balance of £85,000, — 
a sum suflficient to pay the whole of the interest 
on the capital required to extend the line to Lake 
Tanganyika ; so that the responsibility of the Imperial 
Government, in the event of its giving the guarantee 
asked for, would have been little more than nominal. 
Mr Shodes emphasised the desirability of the 
Imperial Government supporting this enterprise, if 
only to enable them to more eflTectually put down 
the slave - trade which was carried on in Central 
Africa, — which could be better done by means 
of a railway through the interior than by an ex- 
pensive blockade by gunboats at the mouths of the 
rivers. He referred to the precedent of India, where 
it has long been the policy of the Government to 
encourage railway enterprise, and for which sub- 
sidies and guarantees had been freely given by the 
Imperial Government. Mr Rhodes also pointed out 
that it had long been the practice of the Bechuana- 
land Railway Company to purchase the whole of its 
material, plant, and rolling-stock in England, and 
said that there would be no change of policy in this 
respect. The construction of the line to Lake 
Tanganyika would, it was estimated, require 160,000 
tons of material — apart from all rolling-stock — and 
the realisation of the project would thus confer a 
substantial benefit upon British trade. 



294 MB RHODES AND THB IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT. 

In conclusion, Mr Rhodes summarised the prin- 
cipal heads of his letter, and pointed out that there 
was not the slightest probability of any payment 
ever being required to be made under the guarantee 
out of public funds, since this could only happen in 
the contingency of both the railway company and 
the British South Africa Company failing to meet 
their obligations, — "which," added Mr Rhodes, "is 
almost absurd to contemplata" He therefore sub- 
mitted, in his own words, " that the present occasion 
furnishes a unique opportunity for the mutual co- 
operation of her Majesty's Government, the Govern- 
ment of the Cape Colony, and the British South 
Africa Company, in an undertaking which will 
probably prove of far-reaching importance in its 
effect upon the development and consolidation of 
British interests in Africa." This was the opening 
letter of the correspondence between Mr Rhodes 
and the Imperial Government on the subject of the 
railway, and was of such a character as to demand 
the best attention and consideration that the Govern- 
ment could give it ; and this, no doubt, it received. 

The reply of the Colonial Secretary was forwarded 
to Mr Rhodes on July 28, 1898, three months after 
the receipt of Mr Rhodes's letter. This reply com- 
menced by stating that Mr Chamberlain had been 
in communication with the Lords Commissioners of 
the Treasury in connection with Mr Rhodes's pro- 
posals, and that her Majesty's Government recog- 
nised that the ultimate responsibility for the peace, 
order, and good administration of the territory 
controlled by the British South Africa Company 



THE government's REPLY. 295 

rested with the Imperial Government, and that the 
establishment of communications by means of a 
railway was one of the most advantageous and most 
economical means of securing these objects, and there- 
fore the scheme was one the conception of which 
commended itself to the Grovemment. "Before, 
however," the letter continued, "the Government 
could invite Parliament to give its financial support, 
it must be furnished with more definite information 
on certain points." 

The Government seemed favourably disposed to 
Mr Bhodes's suggestion that the railway should be 
built in sections of 200 miles each, and that any 
assistance given by the Government to one section 
should not commit them to giving assistance to any 
other section. The heads on which the Government 
desired further information were set out at length, 
and the leading condition that they made was, that 
an adequate survey of the country through which 
the railway was proposed to be taken for the first 
section of the line should be made, so that a trust- 
worthy and fairly accurate estimate of the cost of its 
construction could be formed. Particulars were asked 
for as to the financial standing of the Bechuanaland 
Bailway Company, its outstanding liabilities, and its 
ability to pay the interest on its proposed debentures, 
and also for similar evidence regarding the assets 
and liabilities of the British South Africa Company 
in the form of a certified balance-sheet Finally, it 
was stated that the Government attached great im- 
portance to substantial co-operation on the part of 
the Cape Government. This letter, while showing 



296 ICB BHODBS AND THB lUPKBIAL GOVKBMHKNT. 

that the Cabinet r^arded the construction of the 
line with a certain amount of favour, waa couched 
in a studiously non-committal form until the fuither 
information asked for vas supplied. 

So soon as Mr Rhodes received this letter he pre- 
pared to return to South Africa to have the survey 
for the first section of the railway made, and to 
collect the other information required hy the Govern- 
ment; and there the matter rested until January 
1899, when Mr Bhodes once more returned to 
England and resumed the correspondence. In the 
meantime he had had the route of the railway to the 
Zambeai surveyed by Sir Charles Metcalfe, the con- 
Bulting engineer to the British South Africa Company, 
and this geotleman in his report stated that he wag 
of the opinion that the first section of the line 
beyond BuUwayo should be extended to 250 milea, 
so as to tap the extensive coalfields of the Mafunga- 
busi district. He further stated that a detailed 
survey for tlie railway northwards from Bulawayo 
as far as Gwelo, a distance of 110 miles, had been 
completed under his supervision, and that his assist- 
ants were then at work on the detailed survey from 
Gwelo to the Zambesi ; he had satisfied himself that 
no special engineering difBcuIties would be met with, 
and he estimated that the average cost of construc- 
tion per mile would not exceed £3600. According 
to this estimate, the total coat of the construction 
of the 250'mile section would be, in round figures, 
£900,000. 

Mr Khodes, in a letter to the Colonial Office, 
dated January 16, 1899, submitted two proposals 



ALTXBHATIVB PROPOSALS. 297 

to the Government for the raising of the necessary 
capital. By the first he proposed that the amount 
required — £900,000 — should be raised by an issue 
at par of debentures to be redeemable at par, and 
bearing interest at the rate of 2^ per cent; that 
the interest of these debentures, together with a 
further 1 per cent for sinking fund, should be 
guaranteed by the British South Africa Company 
for a period of 50 J years; and that in addition 
a guarantee of the 3 J per cent required for interest 
and sinking fund should be given by the Imperial 
Oovemment The alternative proposition of Mr 
Bhodes was, that the Bechiianaland Eailway Com- 
pany should exercise their option to redeem the 
whole of their existing £2.000,000 of 5 per cent 
debentures at 5 per cent premium ; that a fresh 
issue of £3,000,000 debentures, bearing interest at 
the rate of 2i per cent, should be made to provide 
(1) the £900,000 required for the construction of 
the new section, and (2) the £2,100,000 required 
for the redemption of the existing £2,000,000 issue 
of debentures; that a guarantee of interest at the 
rate of 2 J per cent and of 1 per cent sinking 
fund should be given by the British South Africa 
Company for a period of 50| years upon the whole 
of the £3,000,000 issue of debentures; and that 
in addition a guarantee of interest and sinking fund 
to the same amount should be given by the Imperial 
Qovemment 

Of these two schemes, Mr Rhodes considered that 
the second was preferable to the first, as from a 
financial point of view it was undesirable that there 



298 MB BHODES AND THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT. 

should be different classes of debentures, as would 
be the case if the Government accepted the first 
scheme. As showing the advantage to the railway 
company of having the guarantee of the Imperial 
Government, Mr Bhodes pointed out that while 
the liability of the ndlway company for interest 
at the rate of 5 per cent on its £2,000,000 was 
£100,000 per annum, under the scheme outlined 
above the annual liability for interest at 2| per 
cent on the whole of the £3,000,000 of debentures 
would only be £75,000, or a clear saving to the 
raUway company, through the use of the imperial 
credit, of £25,000 per annum, with the addition 
of 250 miles to its system. With regard to the 
further information asked for by the Government 
in its letter of July 28, 1898, regarding the receipts 
of the line between Vryburg and Bulawayo, its cost 
of construction, and other particulars, Mr Bhodes 
enclosed these and also a certified copy of the British 
South Africa Company's balance-sheet, showing that 
with the issue of new shares then being made the 
available cash assets of that Company would be 
over two millions sterling. This letter of Mr Bhodes 
closed by saying that " this railway may fairly claim 
to be an imperial undertaking, and as such it is 
commended to the favourable consideration of her 
Majesty's Government." 

There was much interest being manifested in 
this correspondence with the Government about the 
trans-African railway, but Mr Bhodes preserved a 
sphinx-like silence, and with the (xovemment equally 
uncommunicative, the public was compelled to fall 



k 



MB RHODES'S VISIT TO BERLIN. 299 

back on conjecture. At the beginning of February 
Mr Rhodes caused a mild surprise in London by 
the announcement that he was going to 'Egypt, for 
it had been looked upon as a certainty that he 
would remain in England until the matter with the 
Government was settled one way or another, and 
it was thought in some quarters that his thus 
quitting the country was an indication that he had 
met with a rebuff at Downing Street His visit 
to Cairo, however, was principally to arrange for 
the transport of the iron poles for the trans-con- 
tinental telegraph line up the Nile, and to confer 
with Lord Cromer on the rates to be charged and 
other details in connection. In the House of Com- 
mons the "Liberal Forwards" gave evidence of 
bitter animosity to Mr Bhodes and his work, and 
a certain section of the London press also attacked 
him in vigorous terms ; but the numbers of the one 
were so small, and the influence of the other so 
exceedingly slight, that this opposition did not affect 
the issue at all. 

On his return to Europe Mr Bhodes halted at 
Berlin at the beginning of March 1899, where 
he had an audience with the German Emperor 
regarding the passage of the trans-continental tele- 
graph and railway lines through German territory. 
A glance at the map of Africa will show that 
Bhodesia is separated from the British colony of 
Uganda by Lake Tanganyika and the boundary 
line between German East Africa and the Congo 
Free State, so that the dream of an "all -red" 
line across Africa is impossible, and the railway 



300 MB BHODES AND THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT. 

and the telegraph will therefore have to pass through 
either German or Belgian territory : of these two, 
Mr Rhodes preferred the former. He therefore 
approached the German Emperor for permission 
to lay the lines through German possessions, and 
was well received by the Kaiser, who has a keen 
eye for business, and is well endowed with the 
"imperial instinct." The first interview between 
these two interesting personages, the German Em- 
peror and Mr Rhodes, took place on March 11, and 
while what passed thereat is of course a secret, yet 
the Kaiser is known to have shown himself as being 
very friendly disposed to the scheme, — an attitude 
that was reflected by the German Government and 
the Berlin press; and it was at length announced 
that the agreement for the carrying of the telegraph 
wire through German East Africa had been com- 
pleted, and that the question regarding the railway 
was still under negotiation. 

Mr Rhodes arrived once more in London on 
March 27, and immediately wrote to the Colonial 
OflBce saying that as the adoption of either of his 
previous proposals seemed to offer certain difficulties, 
he made the following further proposal: That the 
Bechuailaland Railway Company's existing debenture 
issue of £2,000,000 be paid off; that a new issue 
at par of debentures to the same amount redeemable 
at par, bearing interest at the rate of 2| per cent 
per annum, should be made upon the same security 
as previously offered; and that, in lieu of a guar- 
antee of interest upon the capital to be raised for 
the extension, the Imperial Government should guar« 




THE OOVEBNMEMT'S DSCISION. SOI 

antee the interest upon the above amount, and in 
addition a sinking fund charge at the rate of | 
per cent. The total liability would thus be 3 per 
cent on £2,000,000, or £60,000 per annum. Under 
these conditions the British South Africa Company 
W£is prepared to give a similar guarantee, and also 
to deposit for a term of years to be agreed upon 
the sum of £300,000 in Consols as an insurance 
against any shortfall in the receipts of the line. 
Mr Bhodes stated that if the Imperial (rovemment 
was prepared to accept this, the Bechuanaland Bail- 
way Company would construct immediately, at its 
own risk and without further guarantee, the first 
section of the line to the nortL 

On May 1, 1899, the Colonial Secretary wrote 
to Mr Bhodes with reference to the three proposals 
he had made to the Government, announcing that 
the Government was not prepared to accept any of 
them — a most surprising conclusion. The main 
objections, as stated by Mr Chamberlain, were as 
follows: (1) The Government considered that they 
would incur a certain risk, while no adequate finan- 
cial advantage would accrue to them under any 
of the proposals; and (2) there was no provision 
that the Cape Government would participate in the 
guarantee, though that Government was greatly in- 
terested in the matter, looking at the direct personal 
advantage which might be expected to accrue to the 
colony from the traffic that would flow between the 
north and the sea over its railway system. 

While not accepting any of Mr Bhodes's proposals, 
the Government made a provisional oifer in the 



302 MR RHODES AND THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT. 

following terms : That the Imperial Government 
should lend the Bechuanaland Railway Company 
£2,100,000 for the redemption of the existing 5 
per cent debentures of the railway at a premium 
of 5 per cent, the interest for this sum to be at 
the rate of 2f per cent with a sinking fund of 
f per cent, for which no guarantee would be 
required by the British South Africa Company. 
This arrangement was conditional on the guarantee 
by the Cape Government to pay for the period 
of the currency of the loan (sixty years) one- third 
of any deficiency which might at any time exist 
in the payment of interest and sinking-fund. The 
ordinary shareholders of the Bechuanaland Railway 
Company were to contract that at the expiry of the 
period of repayment the railway from Vryburg to 
Bulawayo should become the joint property of her 
Majesty's Government and the Cape Government 
on the payment to the shareholders of the sum of 
£100,000, while the railway company was to de- 
posit the sum of £300,000 in Consols until the 
extension of the line was completed. 

Such conditions as these were, of course, absurd, 
and could not for a moment be entertained. Mr 
Rhodes did not want any money from the Imperial 
Government, and had never asked for it: all he 
wanted was a collateral guarantee, so as to enable 
him to raise the money on better terms than he 
could have done without it. On May 9, therefore, 
Mr Rhodes replied to the communication from the 
Colonial OflSce regretting that the Government had 
not seen its way to accept any one of his proposals^ 



% 



UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONa 303 

as he had been led by the letter of the Colonial 
Office, dated July 28, 1898, to believe that they 
considered the matter favourably. With regard to 
the introduction of the Cape Government into the 
guarantee, Mr Shodes said that he did not think 
that Shodesia should put itself under an obligation 
to the Cape Colony by asking for a guarantee with 
the risk of a refusal, which would place it and the 
Imperial Government in an absolutely false position. 
" I am further,** Mr Ehodes went on, " in a position 
to state that the financial objections to the scheme 
from the point of view of the Bechuanaland Railway 
Company are vital The board of that company 
point out that, under one of the clauses of your 
proposal, all the profits of the line are to be devoted 
to its extension or improvement; that for sixty 
years the shareholders are to get no profits, and 
that after that time the whole of their rights are 
to be surrendered for £100,000. As shares repre- 
senting one-third of the share capital are in the 
hands of independent shareholders at a present 
market value of £120,000, they are unable to 
understand on what grounds her Majesty's Govern- 
ment expect the shareholders to consent to hand 
over their whole properly for £100,000 after sixty 
years, and to receive no profits in the mean time."* 
It is not often given to a private individual to be 
in a position to rebuke the Government of a great 
Power in this manner, nor is it often that a Govern- 
ment needs such a rebuke ; for the proposals of the 
Cabinet were ridiculous to a degree, and demand no 
further comment than that which Mr Bhodes be- 



I 



304 MB RHODES AND THB IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT. 

stowed upon them in the paragraph of his letter 
quoted above. 

With this breaking off of the negotiations Mr 
Bhodes was not beaten by any means, despite the 
exultation of his opponents; for, as will be more 
fully explained later, the financial houses in London 
interested in Bhodesia immediately came to Mr 
Bhodes's assistance and offered to provide the money 
for the extension of the railway northwards. And 
80 in a very short time after the rejection of the 
proposals of Mr Bhodes by the Imperial Grovern- 
ment, the construction of the railway northwards 
to Gwelo from Bulawayo was commenced. 



305 



CHAPTER XVIIL 



REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN RHODESIA. 



Shortly after the rejection of Mr Bhodes's proposals 
by the Imperial Government, an extraordinary meet- 
ing of the British South Africa Company was called 
to enable that gentleman to lay before the share- 
holders his views as to the future policy and pros- 
pects of the Company, and naturdly a great portion 
of his speech dealt with the telegraph and railway 
schemes. Eeferring to his recent visit to Egypt, 
Mr Ehodes said that he had come to an agreement 
with the Egyptian authorities whereby the charge 
for messages through their territory was fixed at 
2|d per word; and he further stated that he had 
signed an agreement with the German Government 
for the passage of the telegraph wire through their 
territory for a period of forty years, after which time 
so much of the line as passed through that territory 
would become the property of Germany, who would, 
however, undertake to transmit through messages. 

Mr Bhodes then turned to the railway enterprise, 
dealing first of all with two branch Unes which 
were to be built from Bulawayo. The first of these 

a 



306 REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN RHODESIA. 

was to go to the Gwanda district to the south- 
east of Bulawayo, and was intended to be extended 
eventually to the Tuli coalfield. The capital needed 
for this railway, which would be about 100 miles 
long, was set down at £300,000, and this had been 
provided by the mining and other companies hold- 
ing large interests in the Gwanda district, and for 
whose benefit chiefly the line was to be built. The 
other branch railway which it was proposed to con- 
struct was to go to the north-west from Bulawayo, 
to reach an extensive coalfield which had been 
discovered in the neighbourhood of the Victoria 
Falls. It was proposed that this line should be a 
narrow-gauge one, its length to be about 170 
miles, while the capital required would be nearly 
the same as that for the Gwanda line, £300,000. 
Mr Bhodes announced that there was a group 
of financiers in the city prepared to raise this 
capital, without any guarantee from the Chartered 
Company. 

These two branch lines disposed of, Mr Bhodes 
turned to the trans-continental trunk lina After 
commenting on the refusal of the Government to 
give him the guarantee that he sought, Mr Ehodes 
announced that the directors of the British South 
Africa Company had, after a great deal of consider- 
ation, determined to build the line northwards as 
far as the limits of their territory — roughly speak- 
ing, about 900 miles north of Bulawayo, — but the 
idea of pushing it forward beyond that towards 
I^ypt must be suspended for a whila It might 
come in the future, but the directors of the Char- 



^ 



RAISING MONEY FOB THE RAILWAT. 307 

tered Company had first to look to the development 
of the country under the administration of the Com- 
pany. To raise the money for this extension, the 
directors of the British South Africa Company had 
been to all the companies owning claims in the 
country and asked them for financial support for 
this undertaking, and in response these companies 
had immediately subscribed nearly half a million 
sterling at 3 per cent interest, which was sufficient 
to carry the railway forward for 150 miles or so, 
to the Globe and Phoenix mine in the Sabakwe 
district. This meant that about 750 miles of 
railway would remain to be built before the northern 
boundary of Ehodesia was reached; and Mr 
Rhodes explained at length to the meeting how 
he proposed to raise the capital for this great 
undertaking. 

Briefly his plan was this : The whole of the pro- 
posed route to Lake Tanganyika had been traversed, 
and some idea could be formed as to the probable 
cost of the line, which was set down as three 
millions sterling, and this the Bechuanaland BaU- 
way Company proposed to raise by means of de- 
bentures carrying interest at the rate of 4 per cent 
with the guarantee of the Chartered Company. The 
money would not be required all at once, as at the 
outside only about 200 miles of railway could be 
built in a year, and therefore the railway company 
would require the sum of £600,000 a-year for five 
years. As an additional inducement for persons to 
subscribe to this issue, it was further proposed to 
offer to those taking railway debentures an option 



I 



308 BEPRESENTATIYE GOYEBNMENT IN RHODESIA. 

for two years to take up a certain proportion of the 
unissued shares of the British South Africa Com- 
pany at £5 per shara As security the railway 
company and the Chartered Company gave guaran- 
tees on capital and interest in perpetuity. This 
meant that a person buying £100 of debenture 
stock would pay up £20 a-year for five years. For 
this he would be receiving interest at the rate of 
4 per cent, with ample security for his money. In 
addition he would for two years have the option of 
taking up so many shares in the British South 
Africa Company at £4 premium, and this he would 
naturally do if the state of the market warranted 
the step : if not, then he would still be receiving 4 
per cent for his money, which was double what he 
would have got had he deposited it with the Bank 
of England. 

Supposing that the shareholders did not respond 
to this offer, Mr Bhodes announced that Mr Alfred 
Beit was prepared to take up half a million sterling 
of debentures, while he himself would take another 
£200,000 worth — "I would have taken more," 
remarked Mr Ehodes parenthetically, "only for the 
last few years I have devoted myself to politics, 
and politics and the accumulation of wealth do not 
go well together," — and there was a syndicate of 
Mr Ehodes's City friends prepared to take up a 
further half million of debentures, so that if the 
shareholders did not subscribe a shilling, practically 
half the capital needed was assured. The latter 
part of Mr Bhodes's remarks was instructive, if 
only to show how men of business in London, who 



RHODESIA AND THE TSAKSYAAL COMFABSD. 309 

do not as a rule allow sentiment to intervene in 
their transactions, were convinced of the future of 
Bhodesia and the benefits that the railway would 
confer on it 

In concluding this speech, Mr Bhodes drew a 
significant comparison between the position of 
Bhodesia and that of the Transvaal as regarded 
raising money. In two months Bhodesia had suc- 
ceeded in obtaining the sum of ten millions sterling 
for various purposes, while the Transvaal, though 
producing gold at the rate of seventeen millions 
sterling per annum, had been trying in vain for two 
years to borrow two million pounda Seeing that 
it was those interested in Bhodesia who were pro- 
viding the money for the extension of the railway, 
Mr Bhodes decided to change the name of the 
Bechuanaland Bailway Company to the one which 
it now bears, the Bhodesia Bailways. 

While Mr Bhodes was in England negotiating 
with the Government about the railway, Bhodesia 
was in the throes of its first election for members 
of the newly constituted Legislative Council, which 
had been formed by the Order in Council promul- 
gated in October 1898, by which it was ordered 
that two members from Matabeleland and two from 
Mashonaland were to be elected to represent the 
settlers in the country on the new Council, with five 
members of the British South Africa Company. 
The result of this election showed that Dr Hans 
Sauer and Mr Hutchinson had been elected for' 
Matabeleland, and Colonel Grey and Mr Grimmer for 
Mashonaland, while the nominees of the Chartered 



310 RSPRBSENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN RHODESIA. 

Company were Sir Thomas Scanlan, K.C.M.G., Mr Jus- 
tice Vintcent, and Messrs Castens, Griffin, and Orpen ; 
while the Administrator of Mashonaland (Mr W. H. 
Milton), the Administrator of Matabeleland (Captain 
the Hon. A. Lawley), and the Resident Commissioner 
(Lieutenant- Colonel Sir M. J. Clarke, K.C.M.G.) 
were members ex officio. The first meeting of this 
Council took place on May 15, 1899, at Salisbury, 
Mr Milton, as senior Administrator, presiding. 

Almost as soon as this Council met, differences 
began to show themselves between the elected 
representatives and the nominated members. Ex- 
ception was at once taken to the presence on the 
Council of Mr Justice Vintcent, on the ground that 
one whose duty it was to administer the law should 
not take any part in the making of the law ; and 
there seemed to be something to say in favour of 
this contention. But the supporters of the action of 
the Government pointed to the fact that in this 
country the highest legal tribunal is the House of 
Lords ; and as it was stated that the judge's appoint- 
ment was only of a temporary nature, this difficulty 
was overcome, only, however, to make way for a much 
more serious one — that of the land tenure question. 
This dispute arose through the introduction of a 
" land bill " by Mr Orpen on behalf of the Govern- 
ment, defining the word " occupation " in the title 
granted to owners of land as meaning actual bond 
fide farming and cultivation, with stock, either by 
the original grantee himself or by an approved sub- 
stitute. This savoured rather of shutting the gate 
after the horse had gone, for, as has already been 



I 



THE LAND QUESTION AGAIN. 311 

seen in these pages, huge tracts of land now be- 
longed to companies who kept them practically 
closed to farmers and settlers. The opposition to 
this measure, however, arose from another cause 
than this, it being urged that the Land Bill was an 
attempt to import into the titles of land grants 
certain conditions which did not exist. The whole 
of the elected members were unanimous in their 
opposition to the bill ; but eventually the Govern- 
ment, by means of its majority, carried the measure, 
which, receiving the approval of the High Commis- 
sioner, then became law. When the bill was carried 
in the Legislative Council the popular representatives 
retired in a body to mark their disapproval. Ulti- 
mately the Chartered Company decided to shelve 
this measure for a time until the conditions for its 
enforcement were more opportune. 

This vexed question over, another immediately 
presented itself in its place, this time over the tax- 
ation question. Up to the time of the meeting of 
the Legislative Council direct taxation had been 
unknown in Bhodesia. The expenditure had been 
up till then met out of the funds of the British 
South Africa Company, with the assistance of such 
sources of revenue as the sale of stamps and other 
post-office business, mining licences, and suchlike. 
Now the conditions were changed, and the Chartered 
Company contended that, as the people had a voice 
in the government of the country, it was only fair 
that they should contribute towards the revenue 
of the country in the shape of direct taxation, and 
it was therefore proposed to introduce customs 



312 RSPRESSNTATIYE GOVERNMENT IN RHODESIA. 



■< 



duties on certain classes of goods entering the 
country. To this course the representatives of the 
electors on the Council announced themselves as 
bitterly opposed, and they not unnaturally had behind 
them almost the whole of the inhabitants of Rho- 
desia, who, while not unwilling that they should 
have some voice in the management of the country 
in which they were living, were averse, apparently, 
to contributing so largely to the revenue. A good 
deal of feeling on the matter was manifested on 
either side. The residents did not deny their 
liability to pay taxes — that would have been absurd 
— but they argued that the burdens proposed by the 
Chartered Company were more than they ought to 
be expected to bear. The elected representatives, 
with entire unanimity, held that the proportion of 
the expenditure to be met by the inhabitants of the 
country should not be more than one -third of the 
total, excluding the large sum required for the main- 
tenance of the police force, which, they contended, 
had been rendered necessary through the acts of 
certain members of the Chartered Company in the 
past, and with which the people of Rhodesia had 
had nothing whatever to do. The total of the 
estimated expenditure for the current year was 
£739,713, while the receipts from all sources, in- 
cluding customs, were set down at £381,000, thus 
leaving a deficit of £358,713 to be provided by the 
Chartered Company. The expenditure for the police 
appeared in the estimates at £285,706, and this 
deducted from the total of the estimated expenditure 
left £454,007, and it was a third of this sum — 






., FRICTION IN THB COUNCIL. 313 

viz., £151,335, 13s. 4d. — that the elected members 
contended should be the utmost that the inhabitants 
ought to be called upon to pay. 

The Government refused to accept this contention, 
when the inhabitants thereupon changed their tactics 
and argued that, adhering to the terms of the Order 
in Council whereby the Legislative Council was in- 
stituted, the Government had no power to impose 
taxes; and it was stated that the collection of the 
customs duties would be resisted on that ground. 

The real position of the settlers appeared to be 
this: While recognising the justness of the conten- 
tion of the Chartered Company that they ought to 
be taxed, they held that such taxation should be 
introduced gradually, and not sprung on them all at 
once, as was being done. They admitted that it was 
right that they should contribute towards the cost 
of law and order in the country, but they urged that 
the British South Africa Company had a far larger 
stake in the country than the settlers had, and that 
they, therefore, should bear the larger share of the 
expenditure. The Chartered Company were, in 
truth, in a rather awkward position, for they occu- 
pied to some extent a dual position: on the one 
hand, they were a trading company whose primary 
duty it was to earn dividends for its shareholders; 
and on the other hand, they were the Government 
of a large extent of country, and as such were re- 
sponsible for the revenue and the good administra- 
tion of the land, together with the welfare of the 
inhabitants. 

As the Company persisted in its intention to 






314 REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN RHODESIA. 

levy these customs — a step, by the way, which 
was clearly contemplated by the Order in Council, 
article 47 of which says that no customs duties 
shall be levied in Bhodesia of a heavier nature than 
than those charged by the countries within the 
South African Customs Union — a petition was drawn 
up and despatched to the High Commissioner at 
Cape Town, asking for his intervention in the matter, 
and a copy of this was sent to England to the 
Colonial Secretary. It was a tactical error on 
the part of the elected members of the Legislative 
Council thus to invite the interference of outside 
authorities. The Chartered Company had shown 
their willingness to consider the views of the settlers 
by suspending for a time the land bill after it had 
become law, and would, no doubt, have listened 
favourably to the arguments against the imposition 
of these customs duties ; but this appeal to Sir Alfred 
Milner stiffened their backs, and made them deter- 
mined to carry their point in spite of the opposition. 
The reply of Sir Alfred Milner, moreover, was dis- 
tinctly unfavourable to the views of the settlers, 
for he said that " it is unreasonable to suggest that a 
source of revenue universally employed should not 
be available in Bhodesia." This summed up the 
situation, and gave the people of Ehodesia to under- 
stand that they must not look to the imperial 
authorities for support in this agitation. Despite 
the threats of a wholesale quitting of the country by 
the settlers and what not, which were hurled at the 
head of the British South Africa Company, when it 
was seen that it was resolutely sticking to its guns 



CUSTOM DUTIES INTRODUCED. 316 

in the matter, the people seemed to have accepted 
the inevitable very well, and on August 1, 1899, 
the first customs on goods entering Bhodesia were 
levied. 

So soon as the contest over this question had lost 
some of its acuteness, things quieted down consider- 
ably, and the development of the country went 
steadily forward ; and had it not been for the uneasi- 
ness which prevailed throughout South Africa owing 
to the crisis in the Transvaal, the country would 
have undoubtedly forged ahead strongly. As it was, 
if it was not moving forward very rapidly, Bhodesia 
was certainly not losing ground, and once the Trans- 
vaal difficulty is settled the country will speedily 
make its way to the forefront of the many States 
forming the British Empira While this war be- 
tween the Boers and the Imperial Government has 
not directly concerned Bhodesia, indirectly it has 
had a great influence over that country. As these 
lines are being written, that struggle which it has 
long been clear to all students of South African 
affairs must one day occur — the struggle to de- 
termine for all time whether the British or the 
Dutch Boers are to be the predominant race in 
South Africa — is going forward. The Bhodesian 
frontiers are threatened by Boer forces, while their 
railway communication with the south is cut off. 
But these things are only temporary, and once the 
war is over Bhodesia will feel to the full the benefit 
of it. In the end the British forces must prevail, 
and the corrupt and retrograde rule of the Dutch 
will be replaced by the constitution of a British 



316 BEPRESENTATIVS GOVEENMENT IK RHODESIA. 

colony or colonies working harmoniously side by 
side with the other British States of South Africa. 
This war once over, it can only then be a ques- 
tion of a few years before there is a federation of 
South African States under the union-jack, spread- 
ing from Cape Town northwards to nearly 1000 
miles beyond the Zambesi, and another of Mr 
Shodes's "dreams" will have been converted into 
a reality. 

The eflfect of the long-drawn-out dispute between 
this country and the Transvaal, and the consequent 
war, has been to depress the Bhodesian shares on 
the London Stock Exchange very considerably — more 
so, perhaps, than there has been any justification for, 
having regard to the amount of work there is going 
forward in the country, and of course prospective 
settlers in Bhodesia have been to a certain extent 
discouraged from entering the country with fighting 
taking place so close to it Given an early termina- 
tion of the war, however, and Bhodesia will com- 
mence that bright future which has been so long 
in coming. 

The history of Bhodesia has now been brought 
down to the outbreak of the war with the Boer 
republics; but before turning to this, a few words 
on the future of the country may be included here. 
That future has over and over again in these pages 
been declared to be a very bright one, and having 
regard to all the facts, it seems impossible that 
it can be otherwise. In the face of great, almost 







THB FUTURE OF RHODESIA. 317 

superhuman, difficulties, the openiDg up of the min- 
ing industry has been steadily pushed forward, and 
towns and villages have sprung up throughout the 
land as though by magic. It is but eleven short 
years since the first pioneers of the British South 
Africa Company entered the country, and yet there 
are to-day towns in it — such as Bulawayo, Salisbury, 
Umtali, and Grwelo — that need not fear comparison 
with any others in South Africa. Bailways and 
roads have been constructed through trackless wilder- 
nesses, while the telegraph wire — that forerunner of 
civilisation — has been carried to almost the northern- 
most limits of the territory, and what was the kraal 
of a savage and bloodthirsty despot seven years ago 
is to-day a flourishing, modem, weU- built town, 
replete with all the most modern improvements (to 
use the phraseology of the house-agent). It possesses 
hotels which would do credit to any provincial city 
in England, electric light in its houses and on its 
well-kept streets, and a tramway system is projected. 
Away in the open country, in what was ten years 
ago a terra incognita to all save a handful of daring 
explorers, are mines in full working order, and each 
has collected around it a little hive of British in- 
dustry. With two fiercely contested wars, the rinder- 
pest, the locusts, difficulty of transport, scarcity of 
native labour, and the thousand and one other 
setbacks Bhodesia has had to contend with during 
its brief existence as a British colony, the country 
is to-day a monument to all the world, as showing 
what British pluck, skill, perseverance, and aptitude 



. 1 1 



318 REPRBSBNTATIYE GOYEBNMENT IN RHODSSIA. 

for colonising can accomplish when controlled by one 
master-mind. It is not too much to say that no 
other European Power could have done in double 
time what the British settlers in Ehodesia have done 
in ten years. In spite of tremendous opposition — 
often of the most unscrupulous nature — in the past 
to contend against, the country has progressed 
amazingly; and now that this opposition is daily 
being disproved and discredited, there seems to be 
nothing that can prevent those who in the times 
when the country was practically unknown, and 
when the outlook for the young colony was the 
blackest, came to its assistance with either their 
influence or their purse from quickly reaping the 
reward for their eflforts. 

There is one other point to touch upon regarding 
the future of the country, and that is the continued 
existence of the British South Africa Company. By 
the terms of the charter the Company exercises its 
administrative rights over Ehodesia for a term of 
twenty-five years from 1889, and the option of the 
renewal of these rights at the end of that time is left 
in the hands of the Imperial Government of the day. 
Will they be renewed? That is a question which 
both the supporters and the opponents of the British 
South Africa Company are already asking themselves. 
It is, of course, difficult to say so far ahead, but 
the reply at the present moment seems to be un- 
hesitatingly in the affirmative The work for which 
the charter was granted can hardly be completed 
in the fourteen years which remain, for it does not 




BHODESU AND THE WAR. 319 

in the least seem likely that the colony will be able 
to govern itself at the end of that tima Much may, 
of course, intervene in fourteen years to change the 
policy necessary for the Imperial Government to 
pursue with regard to Bhodesia, but unless the 
present war in South Africa brings about the federa- 
tion of the various States in the sub-continent, 
it would seem almost certain at the present time 
that the charter must be continued for a further 
period. 

The war in South Africa has naturally altered to 
some extent the outlook for Bhodesia, as indeed it 
has altered the outlook for the whole of South 
Africa. Instead of the sub-continent having in its 
centre a plague spot — "an arsenal to which every 
rebel against Great Britain could turn," as Pretoria 
has been aptly termed — a place where too long this 
country has permitted the wrong to be upheld, the 
weak to be oppressed, the British flag to be jeered 
at almost daily, and the might of the empire to be 
either ignored or scoffed at, we shall in a few months' 
time find the whole of South Africa welded into a 
harmonious whole, with equal rights for all, whether 
they be of British or of Dutch birth. The helots of 
Johannesburg will be enfranchised and their right 
to freedom of action recognised, while the effete 
oligarchy of President Kruger and his myrmidons 
will be but a dark recollection of the past, a thing 
vanished never to return. The new century will 
open all the brighter in South Africa for the 
supremacy of Great Britain having been finally 



320 REPRSSENTATiyB GOVERNMENT IN RHODESIA. 



asserted, and for the suppression of the utterly 
corrupt and vicious Boer Grovemment in the Trans- 
vaal; and with fair government under the union- 
jack from Cape Town to the northernmost limit of 
Bhodesia, an era of great prosperity must inevitably 
set in for South Africa, and in this Bhodesia will 
have its full share. 



CHAPTEH XIX. 

THE SIEGE or KIUBKRLEr. 

When the war in South Africa broke out it was 
recognised hy all who understood the conditions 
which prevailed that for a few weeks the Boers, 
thanks to their great mobility, and being as it were 
on the spot, must hold the upper hand. This being 
the case, it was accepted as unavoidable that British 
territory, in some quarter or another, would be in> 
vaded. But it was beUeved, though this belief was 
entirely erroneous, that the British garrisons in Cape 
Colony and Natal would be strong enough to repel 
the Boer advance into either of these colonies, and 
that therefore it would be to the north, towards 
Bulawayo, that the Boers would move, seeing that 
there were no British troops in Rhodesia. 

This, however, has not been the case, and prob- 
ably for two reasons. Firstly, the opportunity of 
plunder was far greater in the older colonies, where 
nearly the whole of the land is under cultivation 
and horses and cattle are numerous ; and secondly, 
the Boers would infinitely rather fight against the 
British soldier, who advances in close order and 



322 THS SIEGB or KIMBERLET. 

fights strictly by the book, than they would against 
men like the settlers in Bhodesia, who would play 
the Boers' own game, and probably beat them at 
it Therefore the Boers overran the northern part 
of Cape Colony and north-western KataL Another 
reason for this movement by the Boers to the south 
rather than to the north is probably to be found in 
the fact that among the Afrikander population the 
invaders were assured of aid, either covert or open, 
while in Bhodesia they would have been under very 
different conditions. Besides, it was realised by the 
generals of the allied forces that when the British 
advance commenced, it would be from either Cape 
Town or Durban, and therefore to have moved to 
the north would have been to have left the Bepublics 
open to the British army. 

The negotiations between the British Government 
and President SIruger, with all their many fluctu- 
ations and developments, were followed with the 
closest interest in Ehodesia; and when it became 
known that the Bloemfontein Conference was broken 
off, through the stubbornness of the Transvaal Presi- 
dent, there was not a single individual from Tuli 
to Tanganyika who was not thoroughly convinced 
that war was inevitable, unless the Home Govern- 
ment was content to abandon the Uitlanders, and to 
leave Africa to the mercy of Paul Kruger. Diplo- 
macy might have deferred the war — it could not 
have prevented it 

That being the general belief in Bhodesia, no one 
in the country was surprised when the Presidents 
launched their ultimatum, although the action of 



% 



THE DEFENSIVE FORGE IN RHODESIA. 323 

the President of the Free State in throwing in his 
lot with the Transvaal was somewhat unexpected, 
seeing that the Free Staters had everything to lose 
and nothing to gain by participation in the war. 
No one in South Africa attacked the Imperial Gov- 
ernment for not sending troops out to Africa sooner, 
for those on the spot knew perfectly well that if the 
British troops despatched from India to Natal in 
September had been sent in June, the war would 
have commenced three months earlier. 

So soon as war was declared, Rhodesia prepared 
to defend itself from attack. In some quarters, at 
Bulawayo and Salisbury, disappointment was mani- 
fested that the Imperial Government had not sent 
up troops to aid in guarding the country. Colonel 
Plumer, who had rendered himself highly popular in 
Bhodesia by the part he had played in the Mata- 
bele rebellion, had, before the outbreak of hostilities, 
arrived in Bulawayo, and he forthwith commenced 
to raise a corps of Irregulars to watch the drifts 
across the Limpopo, and to repel any raiding by the 
Boers in that direction. Volunteers quickly came 
forward for this purpose, and there was soon a 
useful body under Colonel Plumer's command. The 
armed force available for the defence of Bhodesia, 
according to the oflBcial returns, were — five police 
troops, comprising a total of all ranks of 714 men, 
in Mashonaland; and five troops, composed of 570 
men, in Matabeleland ; or a total police strength of 
1284 officers and men. From these, however, had 
to be deducted a troop wliich was shut up with 
Colonel Baden-Powell in Mafeking. In addition to 



324 THB SIEQB OF KIMBERLKT. 

the police there were three corps of volunteers, 
stationed respectively at Salisbury, Bulawayo, and 
Umtali; and by October 31, 1899, there were over 
300 volunteers in camp outside Bulawayo equipped 
for active service. Included in this number were 60 
mounted men, a force that would have been increased 
by 50 mounted police had the occasion required it 

It was soon seen that one of the objects of the 
Boers was to cut the railway communication between 
Shodesia and the south ; and to prevent this so far 
as possible. Colonel Plumer moved down to Tuli to 
watch the movements of the Boers in the northern 
portion of the Transvaal So soon as it was known 
that Colonel Plumer was about to move, the Rho- 
desians quickly offered their services, and soon 1500 
men — many of them with considerable experience 
of South African fighting, and all of them of a type 
which guaranteed them giving a good account of 
themselves — were in the field. As a further pre- 
caution, the Government of Rhodesia distributed 
about 600 rifles among the workers of the leading 
mines, so as to enable them to offer some resistance 
in case their property was attacked by the Boers. 
This was a good idea, and greatly added to the 
defensive resources of the country. Each of these 
mines became, as it were, a small armed camp ; and 
it was estimated that on one of these properties 
alone, the Geelong, 100 men could have taken the 
field against the Boers, many of them seasoned cam- 
paigners, and nearly all of them good shots and 
riders. 

Taking one force with another, there were between 



RHODESIA'S INTEliEST IN THE WAR. 325 

2000 and 3000 men under arms in Ehodesia of a 
most useful type. 

As the war went forward, however, it was quickly 
seen that Bhodesia was not destined to be attacked 
in force, though Colonel Plumer's column had some 
hot skirmishes with the Boers, which will be referred 
to more fully later. This being the case, the thoughts 
of those in the country were turned towards the 
beleaguered garrisons of £imberley and Mafeking. 
On the outbreak of the war Mr Bhodes had taken 
up his abode in the former town in preference to 
returning to Cape Town, as he would have been 
quite justified in doing. This fact alone led to 
every incident in the siege of Kimberley being fol- 
lowed with eager attention by the people of Bhodesia, 
who realised how necessary it was for the wellbeing 
of that country that Mr Bhodes should not fall into 
the hands of the Boers. With regard to Mafeking, 
the interest which Bhodesians took in the defence 
of that town was only very slightly less than that 
manifested with regard to Kimberley. In the first 
place, there was in the former town, as has already 
been mentioned, a troop of the British South Africa 
Police, most of the members of which had relatives 
and friends in Bhodesia. Again, it was realised that 
the defence of the town had been undertaken mainly 
with a view to protecting the railway line to tlie 
north ; and, moreover. Colonel Baden - Powell had 
made many friends in Bhodesia during the course of 
the rebellion, and his gallant defence of Mafeking 
was the subject of praise on every hand. 

To give detailed descriptions of the events of the 



326 THE SIEGE OF KIM6ERLET. 

war as it raged round these two frontier towns would 
be manifestly beyond the scope of this book ; but a 
brief sketch of the salient features of the sieges of 
Kimberley and Mafeking may well be included, 
seeing how intimately Ehodesia was concerned in 
the successful defence of these two towns. 

To turn first to Kimberley. At the outbreak of 
the war it was one of the first towns on which the 
Boer forces bestowed their attention. Prominent 
among the reasons for this were the rich diamond 
mines, which, had they fallen into the hands of the 
Boers, would have enormously increased the wealth 
of the Bepublics. The town, commanding as it does 
the main railway line between Cape Town and the 
north, has a strategic importance; and lastly — and 
this, perhaps, is the strongest reason of all — Cecil 
Bhodes, the man whom the Boers hate with a hatred 
that only their sluggish, vindictive, barbarous natures 
are capable of, was shut up there, and to all appear- 
ances they had him in the hollow of their hand. 
Therefore when news reached this country that on 
October 14, 1899, the railway line and telegraph 
wires had been cut to the south of Kimberley, none 
who had followed the events in South Africa closely 
were at all surprised. The inhabitants of Kimberley, 
however, had not been idle, and despite the strong 
disinclination which the Cape Government manifested 
to do anything for the frontier towns which might 
enable them to oppose the Boers, their importunity 
was at length rewarded by a half battalion of the 
Lancasliire Eegiment, under the command of Lieut- 
Colonel Kekewichy being sent to the town from the 



THE EIMBERLE7 6AERIS0K. 327 

Orange Eiver, together with a handful of the Eoyal 
Highlanders. 

This small infantry force numbered about 500 
men — better than nothing, but not nearly strong 
enough for the work before thenL However, volun- 
teers were plentiful enough in the town; and the 
De Beers Company, which has the controlling in- 
fluence in Kimberley, set a good example by arming 
the whole of their employees, and setting aside a 
certain portion of each day for purposes of drill and 
instruction. As soon as rumours reached the town 
of a strong Free State force being on its way to 
attack them', everything that was possible was done 
in the way of defence. Notable features of the 
topography of Kimberley are the huge " dumps " of 
earth which has been dug out of the mines and 
thrown up on the outskirts. Intrenchments and 
gun - emplacements were made on the summits of 
these artificial kopjes, while at their bases shelters 
were hollowed out into which the women and chil- 
dren in the town might be placed out of the way 
of the Boer shells. 

When paraded just before the first attack, the 
total force available for fighting was, in addition to 
the 500 men of the Lancashire Begiment mentioned 
above, a battery of Eoyal Field Artillery some 70 
strong, with six 7 -pounders, and about 50 of the 
Eoyal Engineers. These were the whole of the 
Imperial forces in Kimberley during the siege. 
The volunteer forces consisted of the Kimberley 
Eifles, 1000 strong; the Diamond Fields Artillery, 
70 strong, with six field-guns and a Maxim detach- 



328 THE SIEGE OF KIM6ERLE7. 

ment; and the Diamond Fields Light Horse, com- 
prising about 200 men, all of them skilled riders 
and good shots. In addition, forming as it were a 
second line of defence, was the Kimberley Town 
Guard, composed of practically every able - bodied 
man in the town who was not a member of one 
or other of the above-mentioned corps. Its mem- 
bers were only liable to be called upon in moments 
of stress, whereas all the other corps were under 
arms at all times. This town guard numbered 
slightly over 2000 men, thus bringing up the 
total of the garrison to close upon 4000, all 
under the command of Colonel Kekewich. 

On October 24 the first collision between the 
garrison and the Boers took place, a sortie being 
conducted by a force from Kimberley, in order to 
drive the Boers back from some of their advanced 
positions. In this movement they were successful, 
but, unfortunately, the British force available was 
not strong enough to press its advantage home. 
The Boers kept gradually increasing their force 
outside the town, and maintained a desultory 
bombardment while they gradually pushed their 
earthworks forward towards the outskirts. After 
this period of inaction, or comparative inaction, 
had lasted for some days, the besiegers plucked 
up courage, and on November 7 commenced a 
furious artillery - fire on the town, which, how- 
ever, did but little damage. The guns of the 
garrison replied to this attack with spirit, and 
soon the firing died away almost as suddenly as 
it had begun. 



THE BESIEGING FORGE REDUCED. 829 

So far as the besieged were able to make out, 
things about this time seemed to be getting into 
train for a general assault on the town, and prepara- 
tions were being made to resist this when the scouts 
brought in information to the effect that part of the 
encircling force was trekking to the south. This 
movement on the part of the fioers was inexplicable 
to those in £imberley for some little time, until at 
length it became known that a strong column under 
Lord Methuen was moving up along the railway line 
with the object of relieving the beleaguered town. 
So soon as the news of British victories at Belmont 
and Graspan reached it, through the agency of native 
spies, and it was ascertained that the Boer forces 
had been much reduced, the garrison proceeded to 
make things extremely uncomfortable for such of 
the Boers as remained behind. The slightest move- 
ment on the part of the besiegers was the signal 
for a furious and, generally speaking, an effective 
cannonade. On the evening of November 25 a 
strong force was paraded under the command of 
Major Scott-Turner of the Black Watch, a gallant 
officer, and one who had made himself extremely 
popular in the town. The object of this force was 
a sortie against the main Boer laager; and this 
being made, some fierce fighting ensued, in the 
course of which the Britishers lost 5 men killed 
and about 25 wounded. The Boer loss on this 
occasion is unknown ; but it was probably heavy, 
as the fighting was at very close quarters for some 
time. 

Encouraged by this success, the garrison deter- 



330 THE SIEGE OF KIMBEBLET. 

mined on another sortie ; and on November 28, 
when the sound of heavy firing in the direction 
of the Modder river told that Lord Methuen's force 
was engaged with the enemy, a strong force col- 
lected in the town and sallied forth straight at the 
chief Boer position. This time the enemy were on 
the alert, and almost as soon as the British force 
commenced to move across the open country they 
were detected by the search-light which the Boers 
had mounted on their works, a heavy rifle-fire was 
opened on the advancing force, and several men 
dropped. The blood of the garrison was aroused, 
however, and with a defiant cheer Imperials and 
Colonials vied with each other as to which should 
be the first to reach the Boer lines and give the 
enemy a taste of the bayonet In the words of an 
eyewitness, the Kimberley volunteers "fought like 
devils," and in this they were set a good example 
by the Imperial troops, for the men of the " Loyal 
North" drove the Boers before them like so many 
sheep, and the dim light of the stars and the moon 
overhead glinted on the death-dealing steel of the 
Lancashire men as they pressed forward and again 
and again went right through the Boer troops. 
When at length the work for which the force had 
been sent out from the town to perform was accom- 
plished and the " recall " was sounded, it was found 
that 22 of the force had been killed and over 30 
wounded. Numbered with the dead was Major 
Scott-Turner, who had died as all English oflBcers 
would wish to die, sword in hand and face to face 
with the foe. The Boers, following their usual 



A LULL IN THE SIEGE. 331 

tactics, endeavoured to minimise their loss; but it 
must, in the face of the desperate character of the 
fighting, have been very considerable. 

After this second sortie there was a lull in the 
siege, and both sides settled down to recoup them- 
selves after the severe fighting. The garrison took 
advantage of this lull to strengthen their defences, 
until the town was looked upon as wellnigh im- 
pregnable unless heavy siege -guns firing lyddite 
or some other high explosive were brought against 
it The employees of the De Beers Company, who, 
although serving as soldiers, were still receiving 
their pay as workers on the mines, about this time 
turned their attention to the manufacture of shells 
for the field-guns, and, after a few experiments, were 
successful in turning out some very useful missiles. 
Meanwhile Mr Ehodes spent such of his time as his 
share in the defence of the town left him in laying 
out a new street and planting it with trees; and 
soon he had formed a very handsome thoroughfare, 
on which he bestowed the appropriate name of 
" Siege Avenue." 

On December 4 the inhabitants of Kimberley 
were delighted to see a British flash-light working 
from the ridges near the Modder river, which were 
then held by General Methuen's force, and by 
means of a similar search-light rigged up in Kim- 
berley, the dwellers in the besieged town were able 
to maintain some slight communication with the 
outer world. Hope of a speedy relief now ran 
high in Kimberley, for General Methuen had gained 
three victories over the Boers, each, however, after 



332 THE SIEGE OF EIMBERLEr. 

very severe fighting; and while it was seen that 
the relief force would have to fight another hard 
battle, either at Magersfontein or at Spytfontein, 
there was but little doubt in the town that the 
British force would emerge victorious. These hopes 
were doomed to disappointment The result of the 
engagement at Magersfontein — a name which will for 
many years to come rankle in the breasts of the 
Highland regiments — was to check the advance of 
the British force and send Lord Methuen back to 
the Modder river, where he intrenched himself and 
settled down for a long period of inactivity. 

As the dream of speedy relief vanished from the 
minds of those in Eimberley, lips were clenched a 
trifle tighter, and the determination to hold out for 
as long as was humanly possible was intensified. 
The available stores in the town were overhauled. 
Every one was put on strict rations, with the object 
of husbanding the supplies as much as possible. 
The garrison then settled down to await the next 
move on the part of the Boers. The besiegers, 
however, were chary of attempting to "rush" the 
town. Such a mode of fighting is foreign to Boer 
tactics, and all that was done was to maintain an 
intermittent artillery - fire, as many as a hundred 
shells being thrown into the town on a single day — 
with but remarkably little eflfect, however, for a 
considerable proportion of them failed to burst 
Nor were the British guns silent at this time, for 
so soon as the positions of the Boer guns were 
located, a hot fire was concentrated upon them until 
they were either silenced or forced to retire. The 



CHRISTMAS IN KIMBERLSr. 333 

courage of those in the town was as indomitable as 
ever, and the idea of surrender never entered their 
minds ; while the offers of large sums by President 
Kruger for Mr Rhodes, dead or alive, served to pro- 
vide them with a constant fund of amusement 

When the news reached the town that the plan 
of campaign had been somewhat modified, and that 
D)rd Roberts and Lord Kitchener were on their way 
to Cape Town with strong reinforcements, things 
began to look rather brighter than they had been 
for a short time previously ; and not even the news 
of British checks in Cape Colony and Natal, or the 
fact that tjrphoid and scurvy were making their 
presence felt among the besieged, served to damp 
their spirits. 

As Christmas approached the inhabitants of 
£imberley prepared to celebrate the occasion in 
as festive a manner as the means at their dis- 
posal would permit, and Mr Rhodes came forward 
with a donation of nearly fifty plum - puddings, 
which had been cooked in the sanitarium while 
a brisk bombardment was proceeding. The relaxa- 
tions, however, were not permitted to interfere with 
the vigilance of the garrison, and every movement 
of the enemy was closely scanned. 

After a period of almost entire inaction a small 
sortie was made by the garrison on January 9, with 
the object of ascertaining the real disposition of the 
Boer forces, and in this the force was successful : 
there were no casualties on either side. On Janu- 
ary 17 the enemy opened a hot artillery-fire on the 
town, and the entire force within Kimberley at once 



334 THE SIEGE OF EIMBERLBT. 

stood to arms, expecting that this firing was but a 
prelude to the long-looked-for assault. The Boer 
fire, which lasted about the whole of the day, was 
chiefly directed towards the redoubts and earthworks 
of the defenders, and these were in places rather 
severely damaged. The casualties among the gar- 
rison, however, were only slight 

Stimulated by their success in the manufacture of 
shells, the workmen of the De Beers Company now 
turned their attention to a more ambitious design — - 
the construction of a heavy siege-gun ; and, despite 
the difficulties attending such a scheme, in the 
end they turned out a very creditable weapon, 
which they jocularly christened " Long CeciL" This 
weapon was not long before it proved its utility, 
Mr Bhodes himself firing some of the shells from it 
Had it not been for the De Beers Company, indeed, 
the defence of Kimberley would have provided very 
different and less cheerful reading. When it was 
seen that war was inevitable, and Mr Schreiner 
declined to arm the frontier towns or to sanction 
their putting themselves into any posture of defence, 
— the Premier of Cape Colony apparently thinking 
that he had done all that was necessary when he 
permitted arms and ammunition to be conveyed over 
the Cape Grovernment railways for the use of the 
burghers in the Free State and the Transvaal, — De 
Beers, on their own initiative, and in defiance of 
the Cape Ministry, proceeded to accumulate at the 
£imberley mines large stores of food-stufiEs, arms, 
and ammunition, so that when the siege began there 
were these reserves to fall back upon. There can 



A FIERCE BOMBABDMENT. 335 

never be any justification for the part played by 
certain members of this company in encouraging 
and stimulating the Jameson raid; but at least 
these efforts, which tended so largely to the suc- 
cessful defence of Kimberley, deserve to be set off 
against their former criminality. 

The Boers had by this time massed their forces 
in an irregular semicircle running from the south of 
Ejmberley to the east, and extending through the 
villages of Wimbledon, Alexandersfontein, and Oli- 
fantsfontein, while there was another strong com- 
mando on the north and north-west of Kimberley 
around Kampersfontein and Otto's kopje ; and on 
January 23 the fiercest and most prolonged bom- 
bardment the town was destined to be subjected to 
was commenced from each of these centres. There 
were, however, no casualties, the majority of the 
shells passing over the town and dropping harm- 
lessly on to the "floors" of the mines. 

Early on the morning of January 24 Colonel 
Peakman collected a mounted force with some 
guns, and made a demonstration through Beacons- 
field to the east of Kimberley, — threatening to 
pass between the Boer forces at Olifantsfontein and 
Alexandersfontein, and so to enter the Free State. 
As soon as the object of this force was understood 
by the enemy, they commenced a hot rifle-fire on 
the column, and Colonel Peakman was forced to 
abandon his design and seek shelter at Booifontein. 
Here the force intrenched itself, and replied to 
the Boer fire under almost complete shelter. The 
column returned to Kimberley in the evening with- 



336 THE SIEGE OF EIM6ERLEY. 

out having one of their number either killed or 
wounded In fact, the whole day's operations on 
the pirt of the enemy had been singularly ineffec- 
tive, the only case to trouble the doctors being that 
of a trooper who fell off one of the guns in a fit 
On the morning of January 25 the bombardment 
was again commenced, the Boers seeming bent on 
reducing the town before help from Lord Methuen 
could get through. The inhabitants, however, re- 
treated to their bomb - proof shelters, with the ex- 
ception of those actually needed for the defence of 
the town, and were there safe from the shells which 
were flying over their heads. 

On January 26 it was seen that the bombard- 
ment was now being chiefly directed towards the 
undefended portions of the town where the hospital 
and women's laagers were situated, and unfortunately, 
as a result of this, two women and two children were 
killed. It was computed that in the four days from 
January 23 over a thousand shells were thrown into 
the town, but the damage done either to property or 
life was very slight. In fact, it was a little later 
announced that up to January 31 only twelve of 
the garrison had been killed as a result of the Boer 
shells. 

Another lull now took place, and Mr Ehodes's 
avenue being completed, he found an outlet for his 
superabundant energy in arranging for the laying 
out of a new suburb, while he set a large staff of 
natives to clear a site for the erection of a column 
in commemoration of the siege. A large dam was 
also made at Dorsfontein^ to remedy, so far as was 



RENEWED ACTIVITY OF THE BOERS. 337 

possible, the lack of water for the cattle in the town, 
caused by the Boers having cut o£f the main water- 
supply from near Kampersfontein at the beginning 
of the siege. The garrison enjoyed a plentiful supply 
of water from the mines, which were independent of 
the town supply. 

As General Boberts matured his plans at Cape 
Town, the Boer generals seemed to realise that one 
of the earliest features of the new campaign would 
be the relief, or attempted relief, of Kimberley, and 
they redoubled their efforts to reduce the town 
before Lord Koberts could move. On February 7 
it was signalled by search-light from Kimberley to 
the Modder river that the Boer forces round the 
town were being greatly increased, and that the 
enemy were pushing their trenches towards the 
Premier mine on the outskirts of the town. This 
could not be regarded without misgiving even by 
the most courageous among the garrison. The siege 
had been in progress for nearly four months now, 
and the continued confinement, coupled with the 
fact that certain food-stuffs were beginning to get 
scarce, could not fail to have a bad effect on the 
health and spirits of those in Kimberley. Fever, 
dysentery, and scurvy were on the increase. How- 
ever, there was nothing for it but to hold on for as 
long as possible, and then to die fighting; so the 
redoubts and intrenchments were manned, guns 
shotted, bayonets fixed, and the Boer attacks 
awaited with composure. They were not kept 
waiting long, and for some days from February 10 
an intermittent fire was maintained, and this gradu- 

Y 



338 THE SIEGE OF KIMBERLET. 

ally increased in strength until February 12, when 
all the non-combatants were conveyed to places of 
safety while the British guns attempted to keep 
down the enemy's cannonade. This bombardment, 
like those which had preceded it, died away with- 
out doing much damage, and was only resumed 
spasmodically. 

Things were now rapidly shaping themselves for 
a climax, and on February 14 some hurried move- 
ments were noted by the garrison among the 
different Boer laagers. It was conjectured that 
news of some kind or another had been received, 
and those in Kimberley were on the tiptoe of 
expectation as to what the nature of this intelli- 
gence might be. Was it good or bad ? Had Lord 
Roberts commenced his march, or had Ladysmith 
fallen ? The beleaguered town then tried in vain to 
get a reply to their flash-light signals from the 
Modder river. General Methuen's camp was as 
silent as the grave, and gave Kimberley no sign of 
their presence. 

Thus the day of February 14 wore away and the 
morrow dawned. The first thing that those on the 
look-out in Kimberley noted was that the Boer 
forces seemed to have been greatly reduced; and 
shells were fired by the guns from the town without 
eliciting any response, the besiegers only breaking 
their silence by occasional outbursts of rifle-firing. 
Clearly this betokened something, and it puzzled the 
wits of the garrison to understand what it was that 
was portended. 




ARRIVAL OP OENEBAL FRENCH. 339 

Suddenly, bs the aftemooB was at its height, there 
came a souod of heavy firing, both of rifles and of 
big guns, from round about Alexandersfontein, and 
the anxiety in Kimberley was greatly intensified. 
A few hours of this heavy firing and then a clond 
of dust was seen sweeping over the plain from the 
east and rapidly approaching Kimberley, and out of 
this large bodies of horsemen could be seen emerging. 
As though by instinct the besieged town seemed to 
realise that this was the long-expected relief force, 
though it came upon them like a bolt from the blue. 
Colonel Eekewich and those with him, however, 
were not to be led away by appearances, for they 
knew the cunning nature of their foe, and this might 
be nothing but an elaborate ruse on the part of the 
Boers to gain access to the town. The advancing 
force was therefore signalled and asked who they 
were, and the reply came back, "General French 
with relief force." This seemed good news, but still 
the defenders of Kimberley were not satisfied. The 
appearance of the force was too sudden and un- 
looked-for, and it was not until further communica- 
tions had passed between the town and the force 
that doubts were removed. General French and his 
force of cavalry entered the town amid a scene 
which it is safe to believe has up to the present had 
no parallel in South Africa. To say that the town 
went mad with excitement would be a mild way of 
stating the case; but the relief force had such a 
welcome as none who were present will forget as 
long as they live. 



340 



THE 8ISGE OF EIHBEKLBT. 



The siege of Kimberley was at an end, and Mr 
Rhodes waa not in Paul Kruger'e clutches. The 
total losses during the siege were 2 officers and 29 
men killed, and 13 officers and 95 men wounded, 
while 4 men subsequently died of theii wounds, and 
1 officer was reported as " missiug." 



341 



CHAPTER XX. 



EVENTS AT MAFEKIN6. 



When the Imperial authorities in South Africa 
became conscious of the systematic preparations for 
war which were being made by the two Boer Ee- 
publics, they took such steps as seemed necessary to 
prevent the invasion of British territory. That these 
preparations were insufficient to keep the burghers 
on their own land was not their fault : they did the 
best they could with the material at their disposal. 
With the idea of defending the long stretch of 
Bechuanaland frontier to the west of the Transvaal, 
and, if possible, of preventing the Boers seizing the 
railway line, it was decided to garrison Mafeking 
with colonial troops under the command of Colonel 
R S. S. Baden-Powell — a happy choice. 

Colonel Baden- Powell has the reputation of being 
the finest scout in the British army, and the task 
which he had performed in quelling the Matabele 
rebellion added greatly to this reputation. Further, 
he had a long experience of South African warfare 
to recommend him, and his cheery good-humour and 
great personal courage served to make him an almost 



342 KVENTS AT HAFEKING. 

ideal commander for colonial irregnlars shut up in 
an unfortified frontier town. When leaving England 
for South Africa in the early summer of 1899, 
before the outbreak of the war, but at the time when 
its possibility was foreseen, Colonel Baden -Powell 
expressed a wish that if hostilities should commence 
the War Office would find him " a nice warm 
corner," and be has not been disappointed in this 
respect. The forces under his command in Mafeking 
included the Bechuanaland Protectorate Begiment, 
the Bechuanaland Bifles, a squadron of the British 
South Africa Police, and a half battery of the Kim- 
berley Artillery Volunteers ; while there were several 
unattached Imperial officers in the town who proved 
of inestimable value as the siege proceeded 

Two days after the despatch of the Boer ultimatum 
a Transvaal force entered Bechuanaland about forty 
miles to the south of Mafeking, and at once com- 
menced to wreck the railway and telegraph lines. 
So soon as news of this reached the town, Lieutenant 
Nesbit was despatched with an armoured train to 
try to beat back the Boers, and keep open the com- 
munication with the south. Unfortunately, the 
enemy had foreseen the probability of an attack by 
an armoured train, and had taken precautions against 
it. They loosened some of the rails without re- 
moving them, so that when the engine ran on to 
them it would be at once thrown over; and this 
done, they retired to a place of ambush. There they 
waited until the train had overturned and the in- 
mates were entangled in the wreckage, when they 
poured a withering fire into the now defenceless 




THB FIBST BOER SUCCES& 343 

party, who returned it as well as they were abla 
The struggle was too unequal to last long. The 
Boers were almost completely hidden from those in 
the train, many of whom had been injured by the 
engine running off the metals, while the remainder 
of the party offered a splendid target for the Boer 
bullets, so that before long the Britishers were com- 
pelled to surrender, and so enable the Boers to con- 
gratulate themselves on having gained the first 
success of the campaign, — a fact which, unfortunately, 
served to confirm the belief already held by many 
of the burghers, that they were bound to have an 
easy and complete triumph over the much-despised 
Tooindcs, 

Perceiving that an attack on Mafeking was prob- 
able, and to be ready for emergencies. Colonel 
Baden-Powell quickly set about protecting the town 
by every means in his power. Across the entrances 
to Mafeking empty waggons were drawn up in lines 
with the idea of minimising the power of the enemy's 
shells as much as possible, and at the same time of 
affording a post of vantage to the defenders should 
the Boers try to carry the town by assault In 
addition to these waggons, breastworks composed of 
sandbags, and carefully planned earthworks, were 
constructed, while all exterior walls fronting posi- 
tions where an attack was most likely to be ex- 
pected were carefully loopholed for rifle and machine- 
gun fire. The country round about Mafeking is for 
the greater part flat and devoid of cover, with the 
exception of one or two kopjes near the town, which 
were promptly fortified and manned by the garrison, 



344 KTENT8 AT MAFEl^G. 

while for some distance on each side of the town 
the veldt was carefully mined, — a fact which Colonel 
Baden-Powell took good care should reach the ears 
of the Boers, who have a great dread of these 8ub> 
terranean mines. Within the town itself the in- 
habitants, as was the case at Kimberley, took care 
to excavate bomb-proof shelters to which they could 
retire out of the reach of the Boer shells. 

It was not long before Mafeking was attacked. 
On the 14th October a Boer force appeared before 
the town and opened fire. The garrison at once 
responded with spirit, and a sharp engagement en- 
sued, which ultimately resulted in the attacking 
force being beaten off and forced to retire out of the 
range of the garrison's field-guns. Here the Boers 
rallied and set about forming a laager. For a day 
or two the besieging force was content to complete 
its preparations for a long siege without paying much 
attention to the town, and to wait for the arrival 
of General Piet Cronje, who was hastening up, eager 
to reduce the garrison, and so gain the first great 
success of the war, — for the news of the British 
victories at Glencoe and Dundee had not at that 
time penetrated to the western border. 

General Cronje for twenty years or so had hated 
the British with a fierce vindictive hatred which 
nothing could remove, and was eager to meet them 
once more in the field. Seeing that the garrison 
was determined, and realising that a proposal to 
attempt to " rush " the town across the open veldt 
would create something like a mutiny in his camp 
(for the average Boer fighting-man has an intense 



A ' MIDNIGHT SORTIE. 345 

dislike to showing himself in the open for his foes 
to fire at from behind shelter), General Cronje de- 
cided to fall back on the same tactics which he had 
adopted with so much success at the siege of Potchef- 
stroom in 1881, and to push trenches forward towards 
the town, where he might conceal his men and yet 
enable them to maintain a severe rifle-fire. 

The defenders of Mafeking watched the Boers 
commence to push forward trenches, and at once 
turned their attention to preventing this as much 
as possible by means of artillery - fire, for as yet 
the besiegers were outside the range of the rifles. 
The Boers persevered with their earthworks, how- 
ever; so on the night of October 25 it was decided 
to deliver an assault on the most advanced position. 
With that end in view a squadron of the Protectorate 
Regiment was sent forward under Captain Fitz- 
clarence to drive the Boers from the trench. The 
commander's orders were precise : the party was not 
to fire a shot, depending on their bayonets to do 
the work. Silently this little force stole out into 
the night, and were soon lost to the view of those 
remaining in the town, where the whole garrison 
was standing under arms prepared to go to their 
comrades' assistance if required. After what seemed 
an age to those in the town the stillness of the 
night was broken by a shrill whistle. Captain Fitz- 
clarence's signal for his men to charge. So soon as 
this was heard there was a cry from the Boers in the 
trench nearest the town ; but this was drowned by 
a defiant British cheer, which was answered by a yet 
louder one from Mafeking. Gallantly led by Captain 



316 EVENTS AT HAKBKIKG. 

Fitzclarence, the Colonials, about fifty strong, sprang 
into the trench and were driving their bayonets 
home before the Boers quite realised what was going 
forw6u:d. As the enemy were aroused from their 
sleep, the sight of the thirsty steel glinting in the 
moonlight drove terror to their hearts, and many 
dropped on to their knees and pleaded in piteous 
terms for mercy, — that mercy which they had 
denied to the women and children of the refugees 
fleeing from Johannesburg. The Boers in the other 
trenches, alarmed by the struggle which was going 
forward, and of which they could only gain a hazy 
account, commenced a hot rifle-fire, ignoring the fact 
that by so doing they were in danger of wounding or 
slaying their own comrades. 

After a time Captcdn Fitzclarence's whistle was 
again heard above the commotion, and, acting on 
their orders, the British force at once sprang from 
the trench and prepared to return to the town as 
silently as they had come, separating as much as 
possible so as to lessen the risk of their being hit 
by the bullets which were falling around theuL For 
some time after they had quitted the trench they 
could hear the Boers firing and shouting in their 
confusion, and unawcure of the fact that their as- 
sailants had retired. The British losses during 
this attack were six men killed, and eleven 
wounded, all of whom were conveyed back to the 
town by their comrades. In addition, one man 
was reported missing. The Boer loss was not 
known precisely, but was estimated at about fifty 
killed and wounded. 



MAFEEINO BOMBABDED. 347 

It took the enemy some little time to rally them- 
selves ; but after Gronje had summoned Baden-Powell 
to surrender, " and so avoid further bloodshed," — a 
demand which the garrison received with a smile, 
— a hot bombardment of the town was commenced 
by some heavy guns which by this time had been got 
into position. The commencement of this bombard- 
ment was on October 31, the Boers first of all 
concentrating their fire on a detached hill known 
as Cannon Kopje, which was garrisoned by a 
squadron of the Protectorate Regiment under 
Colonel Walford. After the artillery- fire had been 
maintained on this position for about two hours, 
the main body of the enemy skirmished forward 
across the open veldt and attacked the kopje on 
three sides. Colonel Baden -Powell took prompt 
steps to render those on the kopje every assistance 
possible, and with that idea turned all the artillery 
that he could spare from the other parts of the 
town on to the advancing Boers, and so drew some 
of the Boer fire from Colonel Walford's men, who 
were fighting with great coolness and repelling the 
enemy's attempts to get to close quarters. The 
fight raged fiercely round this kopje for some hours ; 
for, could the Boers have captured it, they would 
have been able to speedily reduce the town by 
mounting their big guns on the summit, and Cronje 
realised this just as much as Baden-Powell did. In 
the end the Boers were beaten off, and after five 
hours' fierce fighting they withdrew to their trenches, 
raked by a murderous fire from the British rifles 
and machine-guns as they did so. This was the 



348 EYKNTS AT MAFEKING. 

hottest day's work the garrison had so far been 
called upon to perform, and they had acquitted 
themselves with great credit, seeing that none save 
the officers were trained soldiers in the accepted 
sense of the word The losses of the garrison 
must be considered slight in the face of the des- 
perate nature of the fighting. They were two 
officers and four men killed and five men wounded. 
The Boer losses were very heavy — two of their 
waggons being occupied for nearly the whole of 
the day in searching the veldt for the killed and 
wounded. 

After this repulse the Boers settled down to 
push their trenches forward, and seemed to relin- 
quish their hopes of canning the town by assault 
About this time Cronje prepared to retire, from the 
command at Mafeking, as he saw no immediate 
chance of capturing the town, and his presence 
was needed elsewhera Before he left, however, 
Baden - Powell played a trick on him which ex- 
cited his strong resentment. There was a lai'ge 
quantity of dynamite in the town which the garri- 
son feared might be exploded by a chance shot, 
and so to avoid this it was decided to load the 
explosive into two railway trucks and send it 
some distance down the line, in the hope that 
the Boers might be tempted to open fire upon it 
The ruse acted perfectly. So soon as the enemy 
perceived two trucks apparently running away down 
the line, they attacked them with their rifles in 
the hope of hitting any persons there might be 
iuside. One of their bullets exploded the whole 



DRAWING THE COBDON TIGHTER. 349 

of the cargo with disastrous effects, many Boers 
being killed, while others were hurled through the 
air like so many stones from catapulta It served 
its purpose, however, by making the Boers very 
wary of approaching the town. 

After the withdrawal of Cronje and the consequent 
weakening of the Boer forces, those remaining behind 
proceeded to advance their earthworks nearer to the 
town and to draw the cordon tighter: to prevent 
this the defenders commenced counter-sapping about 
the middle of November. By means of these new 
earthworks Colonel Baden -Powell's force was able 
to command the Boer trenches, and to make things 
very unpleasant for those working in them. In re- 
taliation for this, and to demolish the works if pos- 
sible, a daily shelling of the town and earthworks was 
now commenced by the enemy ; but as the inhabi- 
tants retired to the bomb-proof shelters which had 
been formed, the casualties were not very severe. 
About this time Lady Sarah Wilson, the aunt of 
the Duke of Marlborough, and the only lady war- 
correspondent in the campaign, was taken prisoner 
by the Boers, and afterwards exchanged for a Dutch 
criminal, Yiljoen, who up to that time had been 
imprisoned in the town. 

On December 10 Colonel Baden -Powell issued 
a letter addressed to "The Burghers under arms 
around Mafeking." In the course of this document 
the Colonel pointed out to the Boers the causes of 
the war, and the great resources of the empire against 
which they had taken up arms. This done, he 
warned them to return to their homes at once after 



350 EVENTS AT MAFEEIN6. 

laying down their arms and to take no further part 
in the war, otherwise they could not hope to pre- 
serve their homesteads when the British advance 
through the Free State and the Transvaal commenced. 
General Snyman, then in command of the Boer forces 
outside the town, was greatly incensed with this 
letter from the British commandant, especially with 
the paragraph which stated that "Mafeking would 
never be taken by sitting down and looking at it" 
So annoyed was the Boer general, indeed, that he 
returned a very heated reply to Baden-Powell, whom 
he challenged to come out of the town and attempt 
to drive the burghers away, — a challenge which the 
British garrison were well content to pass by without 
retort 

An intermittent bombardment of the town then 
proceeded, mainly from the small forts which the 
Boers had thrown up, the chief of which was situ- 
ated at Game Tree, about two miles from the town. 
So annoying to the defenders was the fire from this 
position that it was decided to make a sortie against 
it On the early dawn of Boxing-day, therefore, the 
garrison stood to arms, and a strong force was detailed 
for the work. This force was made up of two squad- 
rons of the Protectorate Begiment under Captains 
Fitzclarence and Vernon, one squadron of the Bech- 
uanaland Bifles under Captain Cowen, and three 
guns. An armoured train also was manned by a 
detachment of the British South Africa Police under 
Captain Williams, with a Maxim and a Hotchkiss. 
Unfortunately the assault failed, and what added 
to the bitterness of the British repulse was the 



FIERCK FIGHTING AT GAME TBSE. 351 

obvious fact that there was a traitor in the town 
who had divulged the scheme of the attack to the 
Boers, and so enabled them to take precautions to 
repel it. The fighting was commenced at daybreak, 
when the British guns opened fire on the forts, while 
the train moved off down the line so as to bring 
its occupants within range of the enemy's position. 
The Boer guns quickly responded to ours, and as 
the British riflemen moved forward into action, it 
became evident that the Boers occupied the fort 
in much greater numbers than had hitherto been 
the case. Nothing daunted by this discovery, how- 
ever, the men rushed gallantly forward, led by Cap- 
tain Vernon, and though the Boer fire was terrible, 
got to within 300 yards of the fort Here they 
were forced to halt. The space between them and 
the fort was totally destitute of cover, and the 
bullets were falling on it like hcdL 

Brave and courageous to the point of recklessness. 
Captain Vernon and his brother officers made a dash 
across this space, followed closely by their men, 
many of whom fell victims to the Boer markmanship. 
Clearly the position was impregnable to assault with- 
out a sufficient force of artillery to prepare the way. 
Not even the desperate courage of Captain Vernon 
and Lieutenant Paton, who actually reached the walls 
of the fort and fired through the loopholes with their 
revolvers at the enemy within, could avail. Eeluct- 
antly the force fell back to the armoured train, while 
the failure of the attack was reported to Colonel 
Baden -Powell, who after consideration decided to 
recall his men and to sacrifice no more lives in 



352 EVENTS AT MAFEKINQ. 

attempting to carry the fort at the bayonet-point. 
The storming party thereupon returned to Mafeking, 
and a short armistice was agreed upon. The ambu- 
lances were then sent out to bring in the wounded 
and the killed, most of whom were found close up 
to the walls of the fort and on every side of it 
The British losses were heavy, being three officers 
and eighteen men killed, and one officer and twenty- 
seven men wounded, while three men were taken 
prisoners, and four more subsequently died of their 
wounds. The Boer losses were not known, but were 
probably not so heavy as those sustained by the 
British, seeing that they had the advantage of fighting 
under cover the whole time. 

After the engagement the enemy admitted having 
been warned that the attack was about to take place, 
and as a consequence had been strongly reinforced, 
while their big guns had been removed farther to 
the rear into positions of great security. Had Colonel 
Baden-Powell been able to surprise the position, as 
he had aimed at doing, there seems to be small doubt 
but that the assault would have succeeded. 

For some time after this attack the Boers refrained 
from doing anything more than throw a few casual 
shells into the town, and these did but little damage, 
thanks to the timely warnings which those on the 
look-out gave by means of alarm-bells whenever the 
smoke from the enemy's guns told that a shell had 
been fired. Sundays were by mutual agreement 
strictly observed as days of truce in the early days 
of the siege. 

Christmas in Maf eking was celebrated as joyfully 




THE EFFECTS OF THE SIEGE. 353 

as possible, a children's party being held in the 
women's laager on the afternoon of Christmas Day, 
where a huge Christmas tree was erected for the little 
ones. The result of the action on the following 
morning threw a gloom over the town and curtailed 
-the remaining festivities. 

The effects of the siege were now commencing to 
be felt by those shut up in Mafeking, and the constant 
strain on the nerves occasioned by the falling of the 
Boer shells, together with the close confinement, tended 
to affect the health of those in the town. Colonel 
Baden-Powell and his officers, however, maintained a 
cheerful front, and by the gaiety of their spirits 
managed to invigorate the others, and all were pre- 
pared to hold out "until the place became a cemetery," 
as the commander put it in one of his despatches. 
The provisions in the town were ample for many 
months to come, and there was a good supply of 
ammunition at hand for both the field-guns and the 
rifles, so that there was no thought of yielding, and 
considerable ground for the message which Colonel 
Baden - Powell forwarded to I^ord Eoberts, to the 
effect that there was no particular hurry for the 
relief force, as he was detaining outside the town a 
strong force of Boers who might do more damage 
elsewhere. This humorous message is strongly 
characteristic of Colonel Baden-Powell. 

Unfortunately about this time the Boers took to 
deliberately firing on the hospital and the women's 
laager, though these buildings were protected by 
the Eed Cross, and the Boers were expressly warned 
of where their shells were falling. Despite the 

z 



354 EVENTS AT MAFEKING. 

repeated protests of Colonel Baden-Powell, the enemy 
continued to bombard these buildings at intervals for 
some weeks, until the British commander at length 
found a sure way of protecting the wounded and the 
non-combatants by placing such of the Boer prisoners 
as he had captured in these buildings. He informed 
General Snyman of what he had done, and from that 
time the enemy was more careful in his observance 
of the usages of civilised warfare. 

On January 6 the garrison managed to mount an 
old muzzle-loading naval gun which was found l3dng 
by in the town, together with a quantity of spherical 
shot; and this weapon proved of service in helping to 
keep down the fire of the large gun which the Boers 
had got into position, and whose shells proved very 
troublesome. An artillery duel was started early on 
the morning of this day, and continued until night- 
fall — a Nordenfeldt and other small guns being 
brought to bear on the enemy's big gun, which in 
the end was temporarily disabled. The weapon was 
quickly repaired, however, and for some days this 
artillery fire went on, no particular damage being 
done by either side ; but inasmuch as the Boer fire 
was diverted from the town towards the redoubts 
where the British guns were posted, the defenders 
of the town were quite satisfied with the result 
Despite the constant coming and going which the 
garrison noted among the besieging force, a sufficient 
force always remained outside the town to prevent 
the British getting the upper hand, and on January 
10 it was estimated that there were 2000 Boers 
investing the town* 



A PERIOD OF MONOTONY. 355 

The enemy apparently had now given up any 
intentions which they might at one time have had of 
taking the town by assault, and seemed quite con- 
tent to try and starve the garrison into submission. 
The shells from their guns were a source of danger 
and annoyance to the garrison, and this was the 
worst thing from which those in the town suffered. 
It was against these guns, therefore, that the garrison 
was chiefly employed. Picked shots were sent for- 
ward into the trenches to fire at the Boer gunners 
through the embrasures of the guns, and by these 
means they were able in the end to cause the with- 
drawal of the guns farther from the town into a place 
of greater safety. 

From January 15 until the end of February the 
siege proceeded with great monotony, the only event 
of interest being the discovery made by the garrison 
that some of the besiegers were trekking to the north, 
apparently in the hope of intercepting Colonel Plumer, 
and so preventing him reaching Mafeking with his 
relief force. The numbers outside the town, however, 
were still too great to permit of the garrison adopting 
offensive tactics with any real prospect of success. 
The casualties in Mafeking from the beginning of the 
siege up to February 24, as they were then known 
in London, were 5 officers and 59 men killed, and 8 
officers and 126 men wounded; while 4 men had 
died of their wounds, and 34 men were reported as 
missing. 

To turn now to Colonel Plumer's force, which was 
operating along the southern border of Khodesia, 
with the object of repelling Boer invasion in that 




356 EVENTS AT If ArERIKO. 

direction. The base of this force was established at 
TulL Its first move was to watch the "drifts" 
across the Limi>opo, and the first collision between 
the Bhodesian force and the Boers occurred at 
Rhodes' Drift, about forty miles directly to the 
south of Tuli This skirmish resulted successfully 
for the British force, inasmuch as the burghers were 
compelled to keep on their own side of the river. 
The losses on either side were slight 

As at first organised, Colonel Plumer's force was 
intended solely to protect Rhodesia; but when it 
became evident that the Boer plan of campaign did 
not include any attack in force on Rhodesia, this 
intention was considerably modified, and Colonel 
Plumer equipped his force with the object of making 
an attempt to relieve Mafeking. The difficulties in 
the way of the successful accomplishment of this 
attempt were many. To reach Mafeking would en- 
tail the force cutting itself off from its base — always 
a dangerous expedient, and one discountenanced by 
military theorists. In addition to this, the railway 
line on which the force might otherwise have relied 
had been torn up for some miles, and the column 
would therefore be dependent on horse transport; 
and lastly, there was known to be a strong body of 
the enemy between the column and Mafeking. As a 
set-off against these drawbacks, there was the fact 
that the column was made up of sturdy colonial 
fighting men, used to guerilla warfare in South Africa, 
and inured to living on the open veldt and to pro- 
viding for themselves ; so that what to an elaborately 
equipped army, accustomed to rely on its officers to 



FIGHTING ROUND TULI. 367 

see them through, would have been a very risky 
proceeding, was to these hardy irregulars an ettbrt 
little out of their ordinary existence. 

Before, however, the relief column could set oflf 
some severe fighting took place around Tuli, in which 
Colonel Plumer's men, though numerically inferior, 
fully held their own, and demonstrated that they 
were quite competent to fight the Boers by their 
own methods. The chief of these skirmishes was 
that which occurred at Bryce's store in the early 
part of November. In this affair, thanks in some 
measure to the treacherous use made by the Boers 
of a flag of truce, the enemy were successful A 
detachment of Colonel Plumer's force had halted 
at the store on their return from a reconnaissance 
to rest their liorses, and had not been there long 
when they perceived what seemed to be a sham 
fight proceeding between two bodies of Boers on 
some hills a short distance away. The colonists, 
seeing that they were outnumbered, prepared to 
fall back on Tuli, when they were surprised to 
see one of the Boer forces advancing at a gallop 
towards them with a white flag conspicuously dis- 
played. This party was about fifty strong, and 
rode quickly forward to where the colonists had 
halted until they were within about 200 yards of 
the store, when they deliberately poured a volley 
into the astonished Britishers, who made a hurried 
rush towards the store so soon as their hostile in- 
tentions were seen. As they entered and prepared 
to defend the building, the Boers who had remained 
on the hills commenced to shell the store, carry- 



358 EYKNTS AT MAFKKIKG. 

ing away the roof. It quickly became evident that 
the place was uDtenable, and after a sharp fight the 
Bhodesians prepared to make a dash for Tali, leav- 
ing their waggons and some of their mules and 
horses in the hands of the Boers. Three of the 
patrol who were wounded, and four others who 
had not heard the order to withdraw, were left 
behind and taken prisoners by the Boers, who, 
despite the use they made of tlie wliite flag, treated 
the men with kindness. 

Fighting of a more or less desultory character 
continued around Tuli for some time until about 
the beginiiini^ of 1900, when Colonel Plumer's 
preparations for his advance to the relief of Mafek- 
ing were complete, and the force moved southwards 
down the railway line towards Mochudi and Gab- 
erones. The lina 8o far had been relaid, and there- 
fore the force was able to be escorted by an 
armoured train under Captain Llewellyn of the 
British South Africa Police. The column moved 
forward without resistance until the neighbourhood 
of Gaberones was reached, when the scouts reported 
that the Boers had taken up a strong position at 
CrocofUle Pools, and were directly in front of the 
column's line of march. A reconnaissance of the 
enemy's position was thereupon made, and their 
laager was found to be heavily entrenched ; so 
that for Colonel Plumer to attack it with the force 
at his command would have been to court disaster. 
He preferred, therefore, to defend the position which 
he had already gained, and to mature his plans 
before pushing forward. By January 20 he had 



ON THE ROAD TO MAFEKING. 359 

managed to get into communication with Mafeking 
by means of native runners, and was thus able to 
transmit to Colonel Baden -Powell information as 
to the enemy's disposition in this part of the 
country which could not fail to be useful Three 
days after this a reconnaissance in force of the 
Boer position was made by Major Bird, accompanied 
by four squadrons of the force. This patrol soon 
came into action, making a bayonet charge up the 
slope of one of the hills against a party of Boers, 
who hastily fell back without waiting to come to 
close quarters. The object of the reconnaissance 
gained, the party fell back on the main column 
with much useful intelligence, being shelled by a 
9-pounder as they retired. 

The next event of interest was an artillery duel, 
which commenced on the afternoon of January 31, 
between the British guns and a small fort, which 
was rather severely handled. This duel continued 
at intervals until February 2, when Major Bird, 
accompanied by 150 men, made a demonstration 
on the right flank of the enemy's position. A 
sharp infantry action then took place, the Boers 
being strongly posted on a ridge commanding 
the road to Mafeking, which passed through the 
hills by means of a nek or pass. The result 
of this skirmish was indecisive, both forces hold- 
ing their ground with great tenacity, and when 
the fighting ceased neither side could claim the 
advantage. 

Seeing that the enemy was in such strength, 
Colonel Plunier determined on a night attack, as 



"S 



360 EVENTS AT HAFEKING. 

being less costly than any other movement he could 
adopt; so on February 12 Major Bird moved for- 
ward with a strong force against the Boer position 
at Crocodile Pools. The laager at this spot was 
situated in a naturally strong position on the top 
of a rocky kopje, and was further defended by 
means of earthworks which had been thrown up 
wherever possible, while the rides of the hill were 
protected by the closely growing thorn-bushes which 
grew around in profusion. The attacking force 
reached the foot of this kopje without the alarm 
being given; but in climbing the slope some of 
the boulders which were strewn about were dis- 
placed, the noise waking the Boer watchdogs which 
were kept in the trenches, and these animals by 
their barking efifectually aroused the enemy, who 
immediately poured a heavy ritie-fire into the ad- 
vancing ranks of the British. Despite the lire 
and the steepness of the ascent. Major Bird and 
his men rushed forward ; but before they could get 
near enough to use their bayonets several dynamite 
mines were exploded under them, and this fact, 
coupled with the heavy fire they were under, caused 
Major Bird to withdraw his force and report the 
state of affairs to Colonel Plumer, as it was clear 
that the place was impregnable to assault save by 
vastly superior forces to those at his disposal. 
Having examined the position for himself, Colonel 
Plumer decided that to attempt to carry it with the 
bayonet would mean the sacrifice of more lives 
than he could afford to lose ; so the force re- 
turned to its old quarters at Gaberones, and there 



RUM0X7BS IK ENGLAND. 361 

awaited such developments as should enable them 
to strike at the enemy with a greater chance of 
success. 

It soon became obvious to all that Colonel Plumer's 
force was not nearly strong enough to relieve the 
beleaguered town without aid from the south. Many 
rumours were rife ia London as to Lord Roberts* 
intentions — for none believed for a moment that the 
town would be allowed to capitulate after the gallant 
manner in which it had held out. Many were the 
leaders that were selected in England as likely to go 
to the aid of Mafeking. At one time Lord Methuen's 
force was said to be moving up the railway line from 
Kimberley to Mafeking. When this was seen to be 
incorrect it was announced that the real objective 
of Sir Frederick Carrington, who was then landing 
his force at Beira, was to reinforce Colonel Plumer 
and so raise the siege of Mafeking ; and later, when 
it became known that Sir Archibald Hunter was 
concentrating a considerable force at Kimberley, 
which comprised a very large proportion of cavalry 
and mounted infantry, public opinion in England 
veered round once more, and it was this force that 
was generally looked upon as the one destined for 
the relief of Baden -Powell and his plucky band. 

It is not too much to say that the eyes of the 
whole world were turned towards the little Bechuana- 
land town at this time, and when it was announced 
that Lord Boberts had asked the garrison to hold 
out until May 18, by which time he hoped to relieve 
them, the tension became greater than ever. They 
were weary days in London, those days of watching 




362 EVENTS AT MAFKKINQ. 

and waiting for the news that was so terribly long 
in coming, and as each portion of the great army 
under Lord Boberts was accounted for hope sank to 
zero when no force that was obviously moving up to 
Mafeking could be traced. Methuen was at Buschof 
and Warrenton, Hunter was driving the Boers 
before him at Rooidam, Carrington was organising 
his base camp at Marandellas, and Plumer was 
marking time at Gaberones. Where, tlien, was the 
long-delayed relief to come from ? That was the 
question that each was asking himself, and the 
answer was known to none. Lord Roberts kept his 
secret well, — so well, in fact, that even after it was 
known tliat the siege was at an end none could say 
for some days wlio had led the force or how it was 
composed. 

In Mafeking itself the garrison managed to keep 
up its spirits, though food was becoming scarcer and 
scarcer. As had been the case at Kimberley and 
Ladysmith, the horses in the town were handed over 
to the commissariat department, while porridge made 
from sowans appeared on the daily menu. Enteric 
and dysentery were rife, and malaria had broken out 
in tlie women's laager ; but one and all were de- 
termined to hold out until the last gasp and to keep 
the liag flying, though — saddest of all — the children's 
graveyard near to the women's laager grew fuller and 
fuller each week as the delicate young lives suc- 
cumbed to the trials to which they were subjected. 
Tlie man who brought about this war will have a 
heavy account to answer when the Judgment Day 
arrives, 

■4 



TIIK BOERS' FINAL EFFORT, 363 

But little news filtered through from Mafeking to 
the outside world, though what there was told of 
the increased privations which tlie inhabitants of 
the town were enduring. Not that there was any 
wliining or cavilling at the delay in relief reaching 
the town : that is not the way of Baden-Powell and 
those who served under him. They knew that so 
soon as the Field-Marshal in command could do it, 
he would put an end to their sufferings, and they 
looked forward to the time arriving. The laconic 
" All well " which the commanding officer main- 
tained until the last, showed the cheeriness of their 
spirits, though to those who could read between the 
lines the story was obvious. 

The Boers had long given up any intentions they 
might at one time have had of carrying the town by 
storm, but their dogged determination to starve the 
garrison into surrender was increased by the news of 
the defeats and repulses they were suffering in the 
other theatres of war. 

As the middle of May approached, and the day 
Lord Eoberts had named for the relief of Mafeking 
drew nearer, the enemy prepared to make their final 
effort; so on May 12 Commandant Eloff, the grand- 
son of President Kruger, led a storming-party against 
the town, selecting the old British South Africa 
police fort as his objective. News had reached the 
Boers of a strong British column having arrived at Vry- 
burg on its way northwards, and with a new-found 
courage they determined to come to close quarters 
with the half-starved garrison of Mafeking, trusting 
to their superior numbers to gain them the day. 

I 



364 EVENTS AT MAFEKINO. 

Their plan was well conceived, and only very nar- 
rowly escaped success : had Cronje been in supreme 
command instead of Snyman a different ending to the 
siege might well have been recorded. Under cover 
of darkness General Snyman made a feint attack 
with his artillery on the eastern side of the town, 
while Eloff with some 700 men rushed the outer 
ring of forts to the west, driving the British 
pickets in before him, taking the garrison by sur- 
prise, and eventually compelling the officer in 
command of the forts. Colonel Hore, to surrender. 
The alarm, however, had been given to Colonel 
Baden-Powell by telephone, and he took prompt 
measures to stem the tide. He had no intention 
of being beaten in the last lap, as it were. 

As the day broke, things seemed almost hope- 
less for the garrison. The native quarter of the 
town was in flames, tired by the Boers ; one of the 
forts was in the enemy's hands, and its commandant 
taken prisoner, and an exulting telegram was 
received from the Boers stating this fact. Nothing 
daunted. Colonel Baden-Powell set about retrieving 
his fallen fortunes, and the reserves under Major 
Panzera were sent forward at the double to form 
a new line of defence along the railway, to keep the 
enemy in play, while the remainder of the force 
carried out one of the most daring movements that 
the annals of the British army can show. This 
was nothing less than an attempt to get between 
Eloff and his party and the main body of the Boers, 
and subsequent events showed how well Baden- 
Powell had laid his plans. 



AN EXTRAORDINARY POSITION. 365 

The position at this time was indeed an extra- 
ordinary one. Colonel Hore was a prisoner in his 
own fort, the supports of Commandant ElofiF — who 
had sent to Snyman to say that the town was 
practically in his hands — were efifectually beaten 
back, and he himself surrounded without his appar- 
ently being aware of the fact. So the fighting raged 
for some hours, Eloff maintaining the position he had 
gained, wliile the garrison drew the cordon tighter 
and tighter around him. Had it not been for the 
underlying grimness of the thing, the situation would 
have been comic in the extreme. 

At last the Boer storming-party realised what had 
happened when it was too late for them to remedy 
their blunder. They tried to force their way back, 
but in vain. Whichever way they turned there 
were countless British rifles spitting vicious tongues 
of death-dealing flame at them, while a 7 -pounder, 
under Lieutenant Daniels, was adding to their dis- 
comtitura Not even Cronje was trapped more 
neatly than were these Boers under Eloff. Early in 
the day the first party of about eighty Boers sur- 
rendered to the garrison that they had hoped to take 
by surprise, but the rest maintained their ground 
with the courage that is bom of despair. 

Had General Snyman only possessed sufficient 
military skill to have grasped the situation even at 
this time, he could have turned the tide and gained 
the day ; for the British force, weakened as it was 
by the seven months* siege it had undergone, and 
tired out by its long spell of fighting, would have 
been too weak to have ofl'ered more than a feeble 



366 EVENTS AT MAFEKING. 

resistance to the overwhelmiai^ odds that the Boers 
possessed. 

A dropping fire was kept up all day between the 
fort where Eloff had placed himself and the British 
force, but this gradually died away, and at length all 
was silence. This silence was broken by a tremen- 
dous outburst of firing from the fort, which caused 
the garrison to fly hastily to their posts; but to 
their surprise they found that the Boer fire was not 
directed towards the town, but in the direction of 
the main Boer laager. The affair was an enigma to 
those inside the town, but later they learnt that it 
was Eloff and his men firing on about eighty of their 
party who declined to stay longer in the fort and 
prepared to return to the main body. The Britishers 
now closed in towards the fort, and the end was not 
long delayed, for Eloff at length surrendered to 
Colonel Here, his own prisoner. The victory of the 
garrison was thus complete. They had taken in all 
about 120 prisoners, and could have greatly in- 
creased this number had it not been for the fact 
that so many extra mouths to feed meant a serious 
drain on their small stock of food. This was the 
last event of importance in the siege, and a brilliant 
achievement it was. Five days later, in the early 
morning of May 17, the combined forces of Brigadier- 
General Mahon and Colonel Plumer entered the town 
amid the frantic enthusiasm of the garrison. 

This relief fell upon the world like a bolt from 
the blue. Who the leader was or where the force 
had come from were mysteries that none could 
explain. Vague rumours from Boer sources of a 



THE RELIEF FORCE. 367 

force being on its way to Mafeking from the south 
reached Eugland from time to time, but no one 
knew whether to believe them or not. From what 
was afterwards learnt, a force composed almost 
entirely of mounted men, principally from the 
Imperial Yeomanry and the Colonial Volunteers, 
with horse artillery and quick-firing Vickers-Maxim 
or "pom-pom" guns, and in light marching order, 
had been detached from Sir A. Hunter's force on 
May 4 under the command of Colonel Mahon, with 
instructions to push straight on to Mafeking with- 
out delay. Silently this force, about 3000 strong, 
quitted Kimberley and worked its way northwards 
along the railway line, the rapidity with which it 
moved completely nonplussing the Boers, who 
offered but feeble opposition until Vryburg was 
reached, which occurred on May 9, the force having 
covered a distance of 120 miles in five days. A 
halt of two days took place at Vryburg while com- 
munications were opened up with Colonel Plumer 
and arrangements made for the effective co-operation 
of the two forces. 

When the force under Colonel Mahon again 
moved forward they came into contact with the 
enemy at Koodoosrand, the Boers occupying a 
strong position right across the line of march ; but 
the combined fire of the Royal Horse Artillery, 
"pom-pom," and Maxim guns which the British 
brought to bear on them proved so hot that they 
were forced back after a short but sharp engagement, 
and the road was left open to the advancing force. 

The two forces, Mahon's and Plumer's, met at 



368 EVENTS AT MAFBKIN6. 

the little village of Madibi, about twenty miles west 
of MafekiDg, and early on May 15 they came across 
the enemy, who had placed themselves between the 
relief force and the besieged town. A hot fight 
ensued for an hour or so, but at the end of that 
time the Boers had had enough, and were glad to 
fall back to the trenches on the eastern side of 
Mafeking, where they were assailed by Baden- 
Powell's force aided by the guns of the now rapidly 
approaching relief force. 

After a short halt the relief force moved forward 
once more, and finally entered Mafeking on May 17, 
and the siege of Mafeking was at an end, the town 
having been relieved on the day previous to the one 
that Lord Eoberts had named as marking the limit 
of their endurance. 

The casualties in the town during the investment 
amounted to 6 officers and 62 men killed, 8 officers 
and 143 men wounded, and 5 men had died of their 
wounds. In addition, many in the town had died 
from diseasa 

It was but an incident in the war this defence of 
the little out-of-the-way town of Mafeking, and the 
final issue of the war would not have been affected 
in the least, whatever the result of the siege had 
been ; and yet when at length the electric wires 
throbbed with the welcome news, and carried it to 
the outermost portions of the empire, scenes of joy — 
wild, delirious, heartfelt joy — took place such as had 
never before been known. It will be long before 
there is another day in London to approach that 
famous Saturday, the 19th of May, when the entire 



THE FINAL WORD. 369 

population rejoiced over the deliverance of Colonel 
Baden-Powell and his gallant band after a siege of 
218 days. 

The reason for the outburst is not far to seek. 
The plucky defence of the little town had gone 
straight to the hearts of all as nothing else would 
have done, and so the British race all the world over 
*' let itself go," to use an expressive colloquialism. 

A word of praise is due to Colonel Plumer and 
his men, whose good work in protecting the railway 
line from Bulawayo to the south, and so inmiensely 
furthering the rapid provisioning of Mafeking, is 
liable to be forgotten among the other events of 
the war, — the more so as there were no brilliant 
pen-artists with this force, as there were with almost 
every other. But in Rhodesia the events of Plumer's 
long contest with the Boers round Mafeking will 
long be remembered, as they deserve to be through- 
out the empire. 

As for the siege of Mafeking itself, that will go 
down to history side by side with the famous de- 
fence of Lucknow, and the empire's youngest limb — 
Khodesia — may well be proud of the part which her 
sons played in this bright episode in the history of 
the empire. 



2 A 



APPENDIX L 



Rktdbh op the Odtpdt op Gold froh Novehbeb 1891 
TO June 1900. 

oi. ilwta. 

During perioil from Nov. 1891 to July 31, 1898 6,470 13 

1898. August 27 2 

September 2,346 10 

Outober 3,913 

November 5,566 13 

December 6,258 19 

181W. January 6,370 IS 

February 6,243 IS 

Mareh 6,614 2 

April 5,756 1 

May 4,938 13 

June 6,103 18 

July 6,031 7 

August 3,177 2 

September 5,653 7 

October 4,276 8 

November 4,670 

December 5,289 

laOO. January 5,24* 

February 6,238 15 

March 6,285 16 

April 6,456 

May 6,553 12 

June 6,185 

Orantl total . . 125,662 



AVERAGB RATE OP WAGES AND HOURS. 



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INDEX. 



Abercorn, Duke of, 38, 41, 153, 
164, 168. 

Aborigiues Protection Society, 
letter to Lobengula, 36. 

Acutt, Mr, 113. 

Admiaistration of Rhodesia, Sir 
Richard Martin's report on, 262- 
263— Bulawavo Committee's re- 
port, 264— the Chartered Com- 
pany's defence, 266 et seq. — 
modifications of the charter, 273 
et sea. — the future administra- 
tion, ^18. 

African-Portuguese Syndicate, 147. 

Afrikander Corps, the, 173, 177, 
186, 188, 191, 200, 204, 206, 207, 
217, 228, 281. 

Agnew, Captain, 228. 

Agricultural value of Rhodesia, 
249, 280 H seq. 

Alderson, Lieut. -Colonel, 241, 243. 

Armstrong, Mr 0. R., 264. 

Asher, Mr, 100. 

Babyan, 226, 226. 

Baden - Powell, Major - General 

R. S. S., 216, 226, 229-232, 242 

— his defence of Mafeking, 

323, 326, 341 et seq. 
Baines, Thomas, 3. 
Balfour, Mr A. J., 146, 160. 
Balfour, Rev. Canon, 65. 
Banks-White, Lieutenant, 220. 
Baxter, Trooper, 203, 204. 
Beal, Mr Robert, 209, 211, 217, 

221, 240. 



Beale, Lieutenant, 116. 
Bechuanaland Border Police, 84, 

96, 116. 
Bechuanaland Protectorate, part 

of, transferred to the Chartered 

Company, 127. 
Bechuanaland Railway Company. 

See Rhodesia Railways. 
Behr, murder of, 240. 
Beira 64. 
Beira' RaUway, the, 72, 83, 119, 

270 271 286. 
Beit, Mr Alfired', 38, 124, 146, 147, 

163, 166, 168, 169, 308. 
Belingwe district, 178. 198. 
Bent, Mr J. D., on the Zimbabwe 

ruins, 8, 9. 
Bembosi river, 220. 
Bently, Mr, murder of, 171. 
Beresford, Captain, 226, 'J27. 
Bigham, Mr, 147. 
Biscoe, Captain, 207. 
Bisset, Captain, 193, 194, 196, 202. 
Blake, Mr, 147. 162, 167, 160. 
Bird, Mi^or, 369, 3ii0. 
Blantyre, the telegraph reaches, 

123. 
Boer war, the, 316, 316, 319— the 

siege of Kimberley, 821 et weq. — 

the defence of Mafeking, 341 

et seq, 
Bonsor mine, the, 283, 284. 
Borrow, Captain, 44, 69, 98, 96, 99, 

104, 105. 
Bowyer, Sir Graham, 132, 184, 153. 
Brand, Captain, 188, 198, 217. 



INDKX. 



873 



Bridge, Sir John, 139. 
British South Africa Company, 8 
—approach Lobengula for a con- 
cession, 33 et sea. — opposition of 
the indunas, 34 — action of the 
Aborigines Protection Society, 35 
— Dr Jameson uses his influence 
with Lobeugula, 36— the terms 
offered, 37 — the concession ob- 
tained, 38— charter granted, ib. 
— preparations begun. 89 — the 
pioneer force and its ooject, 43 — 
across the Macloutsie, 46— Fort 
Tuli constructed, 48 — threats 
from Lobengula, 49, 63 — Forts 
Victoria and Charter built, 54— 
Maahonahind formally occupied, 
55— Fort Salisbury built, 56— 
prospecting licence issued, ib. 
— granting of farm rights, 62 
— Manicaland concession, 63 — 
trouble with Portuguese, ib, et 
tea. — Boer attempt to establish a 
colony in Hashonaland, 68 — the 
fifty -per -cent clause ^evance, 
70 et aeq, — cutting down expenses, 
73 — formation of a volunteer 
force, lb. — portion of the police 
disbanded, 74 — attitude of the 
Matabele, ib, — Matabele mas- 
sacre Mashonas, 77— necessity of 
crushing the llatabele, 80— Mr 
Rhodes^ counsel, ib, — Imperial 
sanction of the war, 82 — Mr 
Rhodes finances the campaign, 
83— the Matabele war, 84 et aeq, 
— Matabeleland thrown open for 
prospecting, 116 — the Victoria 
Agreement, ib. — hostility in Eng- 
land to the Company, 117 — modi- 
fications of the charter^ ib, — Dr 
Jameson appointed administrator 
of Matabeleland, 118— develop- 
ment of the country, 119— part 
of Nyssaland transferred to the 
Company, 122 — the Jameson 
raid, 124 et seq, — Mr Labou- 
chere's attacks on the Company, 
143— the Company's suggestions 
as to future administration, 145 
— evidence before the Jameson 
Raid Committee, 147 et seq.— the 
Committee's report, 157 — Mr 
Labouchere's report, 159— causes 



leading to the Matabele rising, 
162 et 40$. —the Matabele rebel-, 
lion, 170 et wq. — rebellion of the 
Ma><hona8, 220, 240 et seq. — Sir 
Richani Martin's inquiry, 252 et 
seq. — Bulawayo Committee's re- 
port, 264 — the Company and Sir 
Richard Martin's report, 265— 
progress in Rhodesia, ^9 et »m. 
— idterations in the charter, 278 
et seq. — the Company and Mr 
Rhodes's railway extension. 291, 
305 et M^.— Rhodesian Legislative 
Council. 309 et seo.—ihe future 
of tlie Compimv, 818. 

British West Charterland Com- 
pany, 280. 

Brown, Captain H., 223. 

Bulawayo Field Force, 177, 188, 
198, 200, 204, ii07, 217, 222. 

Bulawayo, Matabele kraal at, 17 — 
the Queen's envoys arrive, 40 — 
first race meeting at, 42— evacu- 
ated by Lobengula, 95 — formal 
British occupation, 96— growth 
of the township, 119— panic in, 
173— laager formed, 175— another 
false alarm, 176 — railway exten- 
sion to, 247 — prices of commodi- 
ties during tne rising, 250 — a 
** City of Palaces," t6.— commit- 
tee's report on the administra- 
tion, 264— railway opened to, 
269, 270— two branch lines fh>m, 
805-817. 

Burnett, Captain, 54, 86. 

Bomham, the American scout, 95, 
102, 103, 105, 232. 

Buxton, Mr Sydney, 117, 147. 

Campbell. Captain, 86. 

Campbelrs store, 184, 185. 

Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, 
147. 

Cape Parliament, inquiry into the 
Jameson raid, 144. 

Cape to Cairo Railway scheme, ex- 
tension to Bulawayo, 247, 269, 
270— negotiations for farther ex- 
tension, 289 et seq. — two branch 
lines from Bulawavo, 305, 306— 
the trunk line, 806-309. 

Cardigan, CapUin, 204. 

Carr, Captain, 115. 



374 



INDKX. 



% 



Corrington, Sir Frederick, 214-216, 
222, 224, 225, 229-232, 234, 240> 
242, 244, 861, 802. 

Castens, Mr, 310. 

Cattle question, the, 164 et ieq. — 
effect of rinderpest, 166. 

Cawston, Mr O., 38, 153. 

Celliers, Trooper, 186, 187. 

Chamberlain, Mr Joseph, 141, 148, 
144, 147, 152, 154, 155, 160, 274, 
275. 

Charter, Fort, 54, 85. 

Charter granted to British South 
Afirica Company, 88 — modifica- 
tions of; 117, 278 et »eq. 

Clarke, Lieut -Colonel Sir M. J., 
K.C.M.G., 310. 

Coalfields, 292, 306. 

Colenbrander, Mr Johann, 49, 58, 
177, 234-237. 

Colquhoun, Mr, first administrator 
of Mashonaland, 58, 54, 62, 63, 
70. 

Coope, Captain, 212. 

Coryndon, Mr, 162. 

Coventry, Captain the Hon. C, 
96, 100, 188, 186. 140. 

Co wen, Captain, 850. 

Crewe, Lieutenant, 198. 

Cripps, Mr, 147. 

Crocodile Pools, 858, 860. 

Crocodile river, 8. 

Cromer, Lord, 299. 

Cronje, General, 186, 844, 847-849, 
864. 

Cumming's store, 180 et seq. 

Customs duties, Mr Rhodes's pro- 
posal, 120, 121— introduction of, 
in Rhodesia, 811-315. 

Dallamore, Captain, 118. 
Daniels, Lieutenant, 865. 
Daniels, Trooper, treachury of, 100. 
Dawson, Mr James, 97, l72, 187, 

193, 195, 204, 206. 
Dawson's Scouts, 177. 
De Beers Company smu^les arms 

into Johannesburg, 129 — assists 

in the defence of Kimberley, 827, 

331, 334. 
Doomkop, 136. 
Duncan, Mr A. H. F., 171, 172, 182, 

185. 
Dunraven mine, the, 288, 284. 



EgertoD, Mr, M.P., 210. 
^ibani HUls, fighting at, 184. 
Ellis, Mr John, 147. 
Eloff, Commandant, 863-366. 
Emhlangen, Matabele kraal at, 17. 
Enkeldoom, 241, 242. 

Fairbaim, Mr, 100. 

Farm rights, difilculty regarding, 

at Salisbury, 62. 
Farrar, Mr G., 180, 141. 
Ferguson, Captain, 40. 
Ferguson, Lieutenant V., 215. 
Fife, Duke of, 88, 158, 154. 
Filabusi district, 171, 211. 
Fitzclarence, Captain, 845, 846, 850. 
Fitsgerald, Captain, 118. 
Fonseca's farm, 194. 
Forbes, Captain, 48. 
Forbes, Major, 64, 65. 78, 84, 86, 

90, 95, 99-108, 105, 109, 112, 118, 

115. 
French, General, 839. 
Fynn, Captain, 195, 204, 207. 

Gaberones, 860, 862. 

Garden, Captain, 171. 

Geelong mine, the, 270, 288, 284. 

German Emperor, telegram to Pre- 
sident Kruger from, 187 — Mr 
Rhodes's interview with, 299, 
800. 

Gibson, Sergeant, 112. 

Gifford, Lopl, V.C, 88, 168. 

Gifford, Hon. Maurice, 171, 172, 
177, 180, 182, 193-196. 

Gifford's Horse, 193, 207, 221, 240. 

Goldfields, ancient workings, 8, 10, 
18— in Mashonaland, 56 — fifty- 
per-cent clause nievanoe, 70 — 
employment of Matabele in the 
mines, 74 — first gold returns, 
283— output of gold, November 
1891 to June 1900, 370. 

Goodenough, General, 212. 

Gooding, Trooper. 105. 

Goold-Adams, Colonel, 84, 96-98. 

Graham, Mr, native commissioner 
at Inyati, 188, 184. 

Greenfield, Captain, 102. 

Grey, Captain, 199, 203, 204, 207, 
208, 210, 217. 

Grey, Earl, 38, 158, 154, 171, 222, 
225, 242, 261. 



INDEX. 



375 



Grey, Colonel R., 133, 140, 309. 
Grey'8 Scouts, 177, 183, 193, 200, 

202, 204, 207, 217, 221. 
Griffen, Mr, 310. 
Grimmer, Mr, 309. 
Grootboom, John, 234, 235. 
Gu-Huluwayo. Bee Bulawayo. 
Gwaai river, 216, 219, 228, 230. 
Gwanda district, 188. 
Gwelo, 178, 209, 260, 296, 317. 

Hammond, Mr John Hays, 125, 

126, 130, 141. 
Harcourt, Sir William, 146-149, 

151, 160. 
Harris, Dr Rutherfoord, 62, 146, 

147, 155, 156. 
Hart-Dyke, Sir William, 147. 
Hartley, 62. 

Hartley or Umfnli goldfields, 66. 
Hawkins, Mr Justice, 140. 
Hawksley, Mr, 157, 159, 160. 
Heany, Captain, 92, 100. 
Heany, Major M., 44, 45, 69. 
Henderson, Trooper, 186. 
Heyman, Captain, 48. 66, 67. 
Hicks-Beach, Sir Michael, 147. 
Homau monopoly, the, 262, 268. 
Hook, Lieutenant, 203. 
Hore, Colonel, 864-366. 
Hoste, Mr H. F., 45. 
Hunter, Sir Archibald, 361, 862, 

367. 
Hutchinson, Mr, 809. 
Hut-taz, the, 267. 

Ingram, the American scout, 96, 

102, 103, 105, 107, 110. 
Ingram, Mr W. B., 147. 
Insiza district, 171, 180, 210. 
Inyati, 17, 18H, 185, 222, 223, 231. 
Iron-Mine Hill, 84, 86. 

Jiickson, Mr W. L., 147. 

Jameson, l)r, influences Lobengnla 
in favour of the C*hartered Com- 
pany, 36, 37 — accompanies the 
pioneer force, 53 - visits Manica- 
land, 54, 63 — administrator of 
Mashonaland, 70, 77, 79— decides 
upon crushing the Matabele, ^0 
—directs the earo[)aign, 86, 96, 
99-101, 109, 11:3— first adminis- 
trator of Matabeleland, 118 — 



created C.B., 121— the Jameson 
raid, 124 et acq. — brought up 
for trial, 139— his sentence, l40 
—examination by select com- 
mittee, 152—246, 266. 

Jameson raid, the, 124 et ieq. — 
discontent of the Uitlanders, 
125-Mr Rhodes's intention, 128 
—the '' Reform Committee," 129 
— the Committee's letter, 130— 
differences among the Uitlanders, 
131 — Dr Jameson takes action, 
132 — the raiders enter the Trans- 
vaal, 133 — surrender of the force, 
136 — German f^neror's tele- 
gram, 137— raiders nanded over 
to the British Government, 138 
— brought up for trial, 139 — 
the verdict, 140 — Cape Parlia- 
mentary inquiry, 146— House of 
Commons Committee, 146 et teq. 
— not responsible for the Mata- 
bele rebellion, 168. 

Jarvis, Mr A. Weston, 210. 

Jenkins's store, 188. 

Jenner, Miyor, 243. 

Johannesburg, column raised for 
service in Matabele war, 84 — 
force disbanded, 114— discontent 
of the Uitlanders, 126— Dr Jame- 
son investigates the position. 126 
—the '* Reform Committee,*' 129 
—the Committee's letter, ISO- 
Sir Jacobus de Wet's visit, 138— 
"Reform Committee" anested, 
139— trial of the Reformers, 141 
— the sentence, ib, 

Johnson, Ua^or Frank, 43-45, 48, 
49. 

Johnston, Sir H. H., 122. 

Kekewich, Captain, 228, 230. 
Kekewich, Lieut. -Colonel, 326, 828, 

329. 
Khama, 46, 96. 

Kimberley, si^ of, 821 et aeq, 
Kirton, Cfaptain, 1012. 
Kitchener, Lord, 333. 
Knapp, Captain, 213. 
Kraals, Matabele, 16, 23 et seq, 
Kruger. President, 125, 131, 137, 

m, 141, 152, 319, 322, 333. 
Krugersdorp, 136. 
Kunzi, 244. 



376 



INDSX. 



Labouchero^ Mr, 117, 148, 147, 150, 
164-167, 169, 160, 187, 

Lmhk, CapUin, 198, 199, 226. 

Lamb, Lieutenant H., 207. 

Land question, the 62— Victoria 
Agreement, 116, 279— large con- 
cessions to companies, 280 et Mf. 
—the Land Bill, SIO; 811. 

Lanning, native oommissioner, 219^ 

Lawley, Hon. A., 810. 

Legislative Council, the, consti- 
tuted, 309. 

Lendy. Captain, 78, 79, 91, 93, 
100. 

Leonard, Mr C, 130. 

Limbansotas, 243. 

Limpopo river, 3. 

Llewellyn, Captain, 868. 

Lobengula becomes king of the 
Matabele, 18^per8onaI appear- 
ance, 20--coronation ceremonies, 
i&.— rids himself of luitagonistic 
indunas, 22— toleration of Euro- 
peans, tb. — the Tati concession, 
23 — his principal kraal, 24 — re- 
spect for the "Great White 
Queen," 26— extent of his rule, . 
1^ — rain-making, 27— his war- 
dance, 81 — approached for a con- 
cession to the Chartered Com- 
pany, 33— opposition among the 
indtkaas, 84 et uq, — letter from 
the Aborigi^^es Protection Soci- 
ety, 36— the concession granted, 
.88-^^armed by rumours of the 
company's intentions, 89 — re- 
ceives two envoys from the 
Queen, 40^threatens the pioneer 
force, 49, 63 — his ^pis enter 
Mashonaland, 76— th(§ Matabele 
war, 86 et seq, — he retreats to 
the bush, 96— two of his am- 
bassadors shot by the British, 
97 — called on to surrender, 99 — 
iiis reply suppressed by troopers, 
100 — patrol sent in pursuit of 
him, tft.- dies of dysentery, 114. 

Loch, Lord, 44, 81, 98, 117. 

Looh6, 34, 35. 

Loew, Mr, 160, 266. 

Lo Magondi goldfield, 66— district, 
243. 

Long, Trooper, 204. 

Longwe, 113. 



" Luke xiv. 31," Mr Rhodes's enig- 
matic telegram, 80. 
Lumsden, Captain, 196-197. 
Lynch, Trooper, 110. 

Macfarlane, CapUin, 186, 196, 20O, 
^1, 206, 206. 216, 219. 

M^nnon, Mr A., 264. 

MacMahon, Captain ^ H., 248. 

Madden, escapes from Matabele at 
Inyati, 186. 

Maddocks, murder of. 170. 

Mafeking, 88, 128, 138— defence of, 
341 e^ Ma. 

Maguire, Mr llochefoH, 88, 34, 37, 

^, 168. 168. 

Mahon, General, 866, 867. 

MakaUkas, the, 14, 16. 

Makoni, 8h^.)ij Ma^ Watts, 242. 

Makunga, 234. 

lliandy. Captain, 44. 

M an^nve, 1/8. 

Manicaland, Dr Jameson and 
• Messrs Colquhoun and Selons 
visit, 64--ecqui8ition <of, 63— 
friction with Portuguese, ib, — 
prompt action of the Chartered 
Company, 64 — attempt to settle 
the difficulty, 65 — the Portu- 

Siese take the field, 66— decisive 
ritish victory, 67 — a treaty 
concluded, 68--the township of 
Umteli, 72. 

Martin, Sir Richard, 152, 244, 246 
— report on the administration 
and cause of the rising, 252 H seq, 
—anonymous evidence, 268 — the 
labour question, 254 et sea. — the 
cattle question, 260, 261 — the 
Homan monopoly, 262, 268 — 
causes of the rebellion, 268 — the 
Bulawayo Committee's report, 
264 — the Chartered Company 
and the reports, 264, 266. 

Mashingombi, 244. 

Mashonaland, 2— mystic ruins in, 
4^formally taken possession of 
by the pioneers, 56 — the gold- 
fields, 6d — prospecting licences 
issued to the pioneers, ib, — the 
rush to the goldfields, 67 — ^hard- 
ships during the rainy season, 
584-ttie granting of farm rights, 
62-HRtU for volunteers to occupy 



INDEX. 



377 



Manicaland, 63 — ^fonnatioD of the 
HaAhonaland Horse. 73 — portion 
of the police force disbanded, 74 
— the Matebele impis cross the 
border, ^6 — andT massacre the 
Maahonas at Victoria, 77 — the 
police rout the Matabele, 79. . 

Mashonaland Horse, 73, 84. 

Mashonas, the, inhabited Rhodesia 
in the seYente^th century, 14 — 
driven to the hills by Mata- 
bele j^vad«rs, 15 — under British 
protection, 76— insulting attitude 
towards the Matabele, tb. — mas- 
sacred at Niictoria \fy the Ma^- 
bele, 77— rebellion of, 221, 240 
et 8^, * 

Mashonas, rebellion ot«the : causes 
of the rising, 221— beginning of 
the rebellion,* 240 — the Govern- 
ment send up troops, 2^1— de- 
sultory skirmish ing, ib. — Sif 
Frederick Carrington arrives at 
Salisbury, 242— Major Watts'* 
patrol, «6. — patrols sent against 
Umtigeza, Lmibansotas, and the 
rebels in the Mazoe and Lo 
Ma^ondi districts, 243 — final 

Sacification by Sir Richard 
[artin, 244 — casualties during 
the revolt, 245 — Sir Richard 
Martin's inquiry into the causes 
of the rebellion, 252 et seq. 

Massi-Kessi, 64. 

Matabele, the, a branch of the Zulu 
tribe, 15 — usurp the country of 
the Mashonas and the Makalakas, 
ib. — great warriors and cattle - 
raisers, 16 — their kraals, 17 — 
Ix)bengula becomes king, 18 — 
the war costume, 19 — corona- 
tion ceremonies, 20 — Lobengula's 
toleration of Europeans, 22~the 
Tati concession, 23 — the Bula- 
wayo kraal described, 24 — the 
king as rain - maker, 27 — the 
annual war-dance, 29 et seq., 43 
— the granting of the concession 
to the Chartered Company, 33 el 
seq. — the Queen's envoys visit 
Lobengula, 40 — their attitude to 
the pioneer force, 49, 53— em- 
ployment of, in the mines, 74 — 
their lawlessness, 75 — Inrpis 



enter Mashonaland, 76 — they 
massacre the Mashonas, 77 — 
warned by Dr Jameson, ib. — 
routed by the police, 79 — the 
Matabele war, 81 et seq. -^ the 
Matabe\e rebellion, 162 et seq. 
■•^the cattle question, 164 et seq, 
—the native police, 167 — the 

•* witch-doctors, ib. — their hatred 
• of the whites, 169. •* 

Matabeieland, 2— mystic ruins in, 
11 — thrown open for prospecting, 
116 — the Victoria Aneement, t6. 
— Order in Counsel regulating 
the government of the country, 
117 — Dr Jameson appointed first 
administrator, 118— the develop- 
ment of the country, 119 — Mr 
Rhodes's proposal as to Customs 
rejected by Lord Ripon, 120— 
formation of mining companies, 
121— the Jameson raid, 124 et 
seq. 

Matabeieland Mounted Police, 171. 

Matabele rebellion, the: causes of 
the rising, 162 et ^.-r>the first 
act, 170— council of defence at 
Bulawayo, 171 — patrols sent to 
lusiza and Shangani, ib. — rapid 
spread of the rebellion, ib. — 

' <patrols sent to Filabnai and 
*' Essexvale," 172- settlers called 
on for active service, ib. — the 
Afrikander Corps, 173 — panic in ' 
Bulawayo, ib. — the Bula#ayo* 
,laager, 175 — another false alarm, 
176 — Bulawayo field force or- 
ganised, 177 — laagers formed at 
Gwelo, Maagwe, and Belingwe, 
178— guanlin^ the Mangwe road, 
ib. — the relief of Curaming's 
store, 180 f^ seq.— Orey'n scouts, 
183— patrol sent to Inyati, ib. — 
the patrol attacked on the Eli- 
bani Hills, 184— Campbell's store 
fortifie<l, 185— relief force from 
Bulawayo, 186 — fight in the 
ShUoh Hills, 187 — Dawson's 
patrol, ib. — the Gwanda patrol, 
lS8 et seq.— A six hours* fight, 
190 et seq.— t\te Shiloh patrol, 
193 et seq. — fighting at the Um- 

giza, 194 — a hot fight, 195— 
elingwe reported safe, 198— 



378 INI 

Grey uid Vsti Nitkerk attacked 
neir the Umgna, 1 99 — the enemy 
PBpuIsod at fiilooel N«pier'« 
farm, 200— fighting at the Urn- 
gnu, 201 -20e— a force despitched 
to meat the Salisbory column, 
207— the two forces meet, 209— 
■ akimiih in the luaiu Tnllev, 
210-Colonel Plunier Miirea with 
raiuforcementa, 212 — the enemy 
attacked eight milea ^m Bnla- 
w»yo, ib. — Colonel Plumar In 
action, aiS— the Imperial Gov- 
ernment andertakea the crnshiDs 
of the rebellion, 214— airiTal of 
Sir Frederick Carriogton and 
ataff, 216 — patrola aent to the 
nortli and north-weat of Itula- 
wayo, Slfl — Colonel Spreckley 
atUcka an impi near the Um- 
gnia, 217 — the witch - docton" 
Tun HomitFt, 218— a forre aent 
to the Shibh diatricL 219— 
Balawayo Field Foree disbanded, 
222— the Hatahele broken up at 
Tnfati, 223— a prodamatioa of 
clemency, 224— the campaign in 
the Hatoppo4, 226 ei m;. -fight- 
ing at the Gwaal, 228-the exe- 
cution of Uwini, 229 — open- 
tioni in the Somabnla forest, 
230 — defeat of Wedia'a impi, 
231-the M'Umo ahot, 232-Ur 
Rhodes triea hii iDHnenea with 
the natives, 2S4 tt leq. — Oie 
indunia state their grierances, 
2»6— peace arranged, S3S— the 
total casualties, 239— Sir Kichard 
Martin's inquiry Into the causes 
of the rebellioQ, 252 el tra. 
Hatabcle war, the, decided on by 
the Chartered Company, Si- 
Imperial aiinction given, 82 — 
beginning of the campaign, 88- 
a night attack on the British 
laager, SS rf ttq. — repulae of the 
Uatabele, 91— baHle at Bembesi 
river, 93— the Mntsbele evacuate 
and set fire to Bnlawayo, 95— 
movements of the Tuli Column, 
96— two of LobrnEUla's amluucia- 
dors shot. 97— Hght at the Sin- 
guesi, 98— Lobengula called on 
to surrender, 99— hia reply sup- 



bengula, »*. et leg.— the fate of 

H^or Wilson'H paily, 102 ei loi. 
—retreat of the patrol to Bnla- 
wayo, 109 — arrival at IjOUgwe, 



Uatoppollilla, the, 216, 225. 

Manch, Carl, 3. 

Maxwell, U^or, 40. 

Maioe district, 243. 

Uazoe valley goldfield, M. 

Uelkle, Captun, 194. 

Uellidtw, Bnigeon-M^or, 40. 

Herriman, Mr, 160. 

Metcalfe, Sir Chariec, 209, 296. 

Methuan, Lord, 48, 329-331, 338, 

3S1, 302. 
Uilaer, Sir Alfred, 275, 314. 
Milton, Mr W. H., 310. 
M'Limo, the, 30, 16S, 179, 221, 229, 

Molynenx, Captain, 207. 
Mombq, 4, 11. 
Monomatapa, 14. 
MTini, 280. 
Mnndy, Corporal, 98. 

Xapier, Captain, 101, 103. 
Napier, Colonel, 171, 172, 1S3, 200- 

202, 207, 208, 210, 211, 247. 
Native cattle queMloD, the, IM, 

auq., :^, 261. 

Native labour qaeation, 254-280, 
285 et aeg.-Bcarcity of Ubonr, 
276 et uq., 2S4— the "native 
labour bureau, " 285. 

Nicholaon, Captain, 171. 

Nicholson, Ur, 189. 

Niekerk, Captain, I8S, 193, 190, 
202, 210, 217, H28. 

North Cliarlerland Company, 281. 

Nysaalanrl. part of, traosfeiied to 
the Chartered Company, 122. 

O'Leary. Sergeant-Miijor, 182, 
Ophir, the land of, 10. 
Open, Ur, 310. 

Pa«e^ Colonel, 228, 2S<^ 231, 242. 



Puiien, H^or. 364. 
I'atoti, Uenteiunt, 3S1. 
PiuUne t Co., Meaiini. 271- 
PMkmui, Colaoel, 336. 
Pennefeather, Lieut. -Colonel, 49, 

50, 53, GG- 
Pllilli|)a, Mr L-, 130, 141, 147. 
PbceDicimB, luppoaedKHIemeDtin 

RliadeBi* of, 9. 
Pfoneer fores for MuhoDitlkiid or- 

Eaited, 43 — ita composition, 
— equipment, 4S — crosses 
the MRcloutsle, 4S— precantiODB 
■gainiit Attack, 47 — Fort Tuli 
constructed, 43 — threatened by 
Lol)engnl», 49 — the m&kiiiK o( 
the road, 50 — sickness among the 
horses, 63 — danger or » Hatsbele 
ittack, ».— Forts Vicloris nnd 
Chnrtsr built, 64— the deatina- 
tioa rucheil, 66— the force dig- 
banded, GS. 

Pitsaal, 128, 130, 132. 

Plttenibigh, Captain, 1S3, SOO. 

Plumer, ColoDel Herbert, 211-214, 
21S, 219, 223, 226-227, 323-S26, 
355-863, 366, 367, 369. 

Pollock, Baron, 140. 



Portugneae, atteoipt to settle in 
Honomatapa, it — difficulties 
with, in ManicaUnd, 63— the; 
•alie HaBsi-Kesal, 04— the tables 
tamed, ib. — attempt to dri™ the 
British bom Uaclcaland, 6fi tl 
ttq. — defeated by Captain Hey- 
mau, 67— a treaty concluded, 68. 

Proclamatlou of clemency to Mala- 
bele rebels, 224. 

Prospecting licencea tiaued to Ua- 
-'■ — '—id pioneera, 66. 



Quested, Hr, 86, 88, 01. 

Raaf, nommandant, B4, 96, 100, 



Railnayx. See Beira Railway, Cape 
to Cairo Railway, and Rhodeslan 
Railways. 

Redrup, Mr 3„ 264. 

Rensbanr, Captain A. H. van, 173, 
186, 2*4, 207- 

Rhodes, Hr Cecil, the monDg 



spirit Id tlie Cbartered Company, 
S3— bitter feeling against, 34— 
his aim in forming tbe Chartered 
Company, 36 — obtains the char- 
ter, 36— Orat visit to Haahona- 
Und, 70, 72— finances the Hala- 
bele war, 33 — his expenditure 
on Rhodes* " ' "^ ' 
113, 114-, 
iu Engknd, 117-the Beirs rail. 
way, 119 — proposal regarding 
ciutoms dntles in UaUbdeUnd, 
120— made a Privr Councillor, 
121 — puahes on the trani-con- 
tiiieuta] tele^aph, 123 — hia 
counectlon with the Jameson 
raid, 124-129, 131-136, 141, 142, 
146 — euminatioD by the selaet 
committee, 147 et »«.— 164, 167- 
160— aceompanlea the Salisbury 
Belief Colunm, 207, 208—225, 
233-uBea his influenoe with the 
Hatabele to conclude peace, 234 
tt *s--242, 248, 247, 266-hia 
telegraph and railway schemei, 
287 ei Beq.j 305 et aeq, — negotia- 
tions with the Qoverament for the 
extension of the railwar north of 
Bulawayo, 289-298, 800-304— 
Interview with the German Em- 
peror, 299, 300 — in Kimberley 
during the siege, 326, 326, 331, 
333, S3i, 336. 

Rhodes, Colonel Trank, 180, 141, 
142. 

Rhodesia, geographical position, I 
— Uashonalanil and Hatabele- 
Und, 2— early history, 8 el tig. 
—the Hatabele enter the country, 
16— Hatabeleland nnder Loben- 

gula, 13 et teq the coneeaaion 

granted to tbe Chartered Com- 
pany, 33 «( aeg.-the pioneer 
corps, 43 et sm.— the founding 
of the colony, 62 et *u.— InltU 
difflcnlties, 67 — acquisition of 
Hanicalind, 63- friction with 
the Portuguese, 64— tronble with 
the Transraal, 66— the Hfty-por- 
cent clause grievance, 70 — war 
with the Hatabele, 71 et teq.~ 
Mr Rhodea the aheet-anchor of 
the conntry, S3 — the end of tiia 
war, 114 — the Victoria AgrM- 



380 



'index. 






ment, 116 — deTelopment of the 
country, 119 — part of Njsaa- 
land transferred to the Chartered 
Company, % 122 — the Jameson 
raid, 124 ef'^e?.— administration 
of the country, 145 — outbreak 
of rinderpest, 162 — the Mata- 
bele rebellion, 163 et aeq. — the 
Mashonaland rising, 220, 240 et 
*eq. — state of the country after the 
rising, 245— extension of the rail- 
way to Bulawayo, 247 — tkt gold- 
mines, ib. — agricultural value 
of the country, 249— trade and 
commerce, 250 — Sir Richard 
Martin's inquiry, 252 et aeq. — 
the labour question, 254 et seq, 

■ *^the cattle question, 260 et aeq, 

* -^the BGaman monopoly, 262 — 
the causes of the rebellion, 268 — 
the Bulawayo Committee's re- 
port, 26A^the Company and Sir 
Richard Martin's report, 265 — 
compulsory labour, 266 et seq, — 
the railway opened to Bulawayo, 
269 — benefits of the railway, 
270— growth of Bulawayo, 271 — 
outcry of stagnant trade, 272 — 
the administration of the coun- 
try, 278 — scarcity of natiye 
labour, 276 et aeq. — the land 
question, 279 et aeq, — the first 
gold return, 283— fall in the gold 
returns, 2^5 — ^the natiye labour 
bureau, ib. — the East Coast 
Railway reaches Salisbury, 286— 
the trans-continental telegraph. 
287, 305— Mr Rhodes's proposed 
railway extension northward 
from Bulawayo, 289 et seq,, 305 
et aeq. — constitution of tljft.^ 
Legislative Council, 309 — the 
Land Bill^ 310— taxation, 311 et 
seq. — the Boer war, 315 — the 
future of the country, 316 et aeq, 
— the siege of Kimberley, 321 et 
aeq, — events at Mafeking, 341 et 
aeq. 

Rhodesia Concessions Company, 
281 

Rhodesia Horse, 127, 136, 152, 153, 
171. 177, 186. 

Rhodesia Railways, 290, 291, 300, 
303, 309. 



Rhodesian Exploration and De- 
velopment Company, 281. 

Ridley, Major, 228-230, 282 244. 

Rinderpest, outbreak in Rhodesia 
of, 162. 

Ripon, Lord, 81, 82, 117, 121. 

Rixon, Captain, 205. 

Roach, Mr J., 45. 

Roberts, Lord, 333, 337, 353, 9S|. 
363,368. 

Robertson, Msjor, 223. 

Rorke, Lieutenant, 194. 

Rosmead, Lord, 129, 134, 139, 149, 
252. 

Rudd, Mr, 83, 34, 37,38. 

Ruins, mysUo, in Rhodesia, 8 — 
object of the buildings, 4— struc- 
ture of the Zimbabwe ruins, 5^ 
their religious connactlon, 6— 
their ornamentation, ^7 — used 
as fortresses, ib. -—contained 
furnaces for gold smelting, 8 — 
Mr J. D. Bent's excavations, ib, 
—the inhabitants, 9— Dr Schlich- 
ter on the Mombo ruins, 11 — 
native traditions, 12. 

Russell, Lord, of Killowen, 140. 

Salisbury, the £ort built, 55 — ^rush 
of prosnectoift 57 — scarcity of 
food, 58— giowth of the town, 
60— the nflj^lKiwn surveyed, 61 
—the fanMights difficulty, 62— 
call for volunteers to occupy 
Manlcaland, 63 — Mashonaland 
Horse constituted, 73 — portion 
of police disbanded, 74 — Salis- 
bury Horse formed, 84— panic in 
the town, 85— laager formed, 241 
— increase of trade, 250 — Beira 
Railwayopened to, 286—317. 

Salisburylppe, 84, 85, 114. 

SalUbury,^Md, 68. 

Salisbury Relief Column, 207 el 
aeq,, 221, 240. 

Sampson, Mr J., 264. 

Bauer, Dr Hans, 234, 309. 

Sawyer, Miyor^8. 

Scanlan, Sir Thomas, KC.M.G., 
310. 

Schlichter, Dr, on the Mombo 
ruins, 11. 

Schreiner, Mr, 151, 265^Premier 

^ of Cape Colony, 334. 




jt^* 



INDEX. 



381 



Scott-Turuer, Ikr^or, 329, 330. 
Selous, Mr F. C, 3, 13, 49, 54, 63, 

98, 118, 172, 202, 203, 207, 208, 

217. 
Shangaans, the, 74. 
Shangani, the, 171. 
Shaw, Miss Flora, 155. 
Shiloh Hills, the, 187, 219. 
Shiloh patrol, the, 193. 
Sikoinbo, 236. 
Snyman, GeDsral, 350, 354, 864, 

^65. 
Soniabtda Forest, 230. 
Somnavnlu, 239. 
Southey, CantaiD, 171, 180. 
Spreckley, Captain, 100, 115. 
Spreckley, Colonel, 127, 136, 177, 

186. 189, 207, 210, 217, 219, 220, 

264. 
Sprigg, Sir Gordon, 290. 
Stent, Captain, 234. 
Stewart's store, 183. 
Swinburne, Sir John, 23. 

Tati, 27. 

Tati Concession, 23. 

Taylor, Mr, Commissioner, 204. 

Tebekwe mine, 283, 2S4. 

Teck, Prince Alexander of, 232. 

Telegraph, Mr Rhodes's trans -con - 
tinenUl, 36, 7S, 83, 123, 287, 
288, 305— natiye terror of the 
wire, 190. 

Tennant, Major, 243L 

Thabas Jmamba, 220. 

I'habas Indunas. 208, 218. 

Thabas Isamba, 242. 

Thompson, Mr, 88, 34, 37, 38. 

Thompson, Mr J. Mudie, 264. 

•Times,' the, newspaper, 137, 155. 

Transvaal Boers attempt to estab- 
lish a colony in Mashonaland, 68. 

Tuli. Fort, 48, 189, SffT, 858. 

Uitlanders, the Transvaal, 125 et 

seq. 
XJmbozo, 170. 

Umfuli, or Hartley goldfield, 56. 
Umguza river, 194, 199, 200, 202, 

205, 207. 
Umlugulu, 226, 227, 236. 
Umsilagaas, first king of the Mata- 

bele, 15— succeed^ by Loben- 

gula, 18. 



Umsingwani river, 170-172, 188. 

Umtali, 72 — New UmtoU, 120— 
250, 317. 

Umtassa, Chief of Manicaland, 63. 

Umtigeza, 243. 

Uwini, shot by Cblonel Baden- 
Powell, 229, 230. 

Ventner, Mr, 160, 265. 
Vernon, Captain, 350, 351. 
Victoria Agreement, the, 116, 279. 
Victoria, Fort, 64, 77, 260. 
Victoria Rangers, 84, 86 114. 
Vintoent, Mr Joseph, ' 118, 263, 

810. 
Vyvyan, Captain, C.B., 215. 

Wages, table of average rate in, 
Bolawayo, Salisbury^ Gwelo, and 
Umtali, 371. 

Walford, Colonel. 847. 

War-dance, Mataoele, 29 ei seq., 43 
— liObengnla's dance, 81. 

War dress of the Matabele, 19. 

Watts, Major, 212, 218, 241-248. 

Webster, Sir Richard, 147. . 

Wedza, 231. 

Weir, Mr P. V., 264. 

Wet, Sir Jacobus de, 138. 

Wharton, Mr, 147. 

White, Colonel the Hon. Henry, 
183, 140. 

White, Major the Hon. Robert, 
138, 140. 

Williams, Captain, 350. 

Williams, Captain Gwynyth, 92. 

Willonghby, General Digby, 171. 

Willoughby, Major Sir John, 48, 
54, 67, 98, 128, 133, 140, 166, 156. 

Wilson, Lady Sarah, 349. 

Wilson, Mfgor Alan, in command 

■ of Victoria Rangers, 84, 100 — 
sent with small party in pursuit 
of Lobengula, 102— requests as- 
sistance, 103 — reinforcement sent, 
104— attacked by the Matabele, 
105 — a hopeless struggle, 107 — 
the fate of the partv, 108. 

Wilson, Trooper, treachery of, 100. 

Windl^, Lieutenant, 203. 

Wise. Trooper, 208. 

Witch-doctors, influence over the 
natives of, 167. 

Wyndham, Mr George, 147. 



PRIKTKD BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND BOSS. 




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