Skip to main content

Full text of "Alexandrian, African and Spanish wars. With an English translation by A.G. Way"

See other formats


THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY 

FOUNDED BY JAMES LOEB, LL.D. 

EDITED BY 
fT. E. PAGE, C.H., LITT.D. 

tE. CAPPS, PH.D., LL.D. fW. H. D. ROUSE, litt.d. 

L. A. POST, M.A. E. H. WARMINGTON, m.a., f.r.hist.soc. 



CAESAR 

ALEXANDRIAN, AFRICAN AND 
SPANISH WARS 



CAESAR, die? 

ALEXANDRIAN, AFRICAN 
AND SPANISH WARS 

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY 

A. G. WAY, MA. 

LECTURER IN CLASSICS AT BIRKBECK COLLEGE, 
UNIVERSITY OF LON*DON 




LONDON 

WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD 

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 

MCMLV 



l^^ 



Printed in Great Britain 






2.g, /%■ ss 



CONTENTS 



GENERAL INTRODUCTION . 

CHRONOLOGY OF THE ALEXANDRIAN, 
SPANISH WARS .... 



AFRICAN AND 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR : 

INTRODUCTION ..... 

SUMMARY OF NARRATIVE IN CIVIL WARS, BOOK lU 
ANALYSIS OF THE BOOK .... 

TEXT AND TRANSLATION .... 

THE AFRICAN WAR : 

INTRODUCTION . ..... 

ANALYSIS OF THE BOOK .... 

TEXT AND TRANSLATION .... 

THE SPANISH WAR : 

INTRODUCTION ...... 

ANALYSIS OF THE BOOK .... 

TEXT AND TRANSLATION .... 

APPENDIX A : THE OPERATIONS NEAR UZITTA 

APPENDIX B : CAESAR'S WITHDRAWAL FROM COBDUBA 

APPENDIX C : THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE ATEGUAN ENVOY 
ON THEIR RETURN TO THE TOWN . 

APPENDIX D : THE EVENTS AT ^RSAO 

INDEX OF PERSONS AND PLACES : 

ALEXANDRIAN WAR ..... 

AFRICAN WAR ...... 

SPANISH WAR ...... 



PAGE 

vii 



3 

6 

8 

10 

139 
144 
146 

303 
308 
310 

391 

397 

401 
403 

407 

412 

417 

V 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 
GENERAL SUBJECT INDEX ...... 420 

MAPS — Al end 

1. PLAN OF ALEXANDRIA 

2. ASIA AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN 

3. AFRICA 

4. UZITTA 

5. THAPSUS 

6. FURTHER SPAIN (BAETICA) 



VI 



GENERAL INTRODUCTION 

The three works contained in this volume, though 
commonly ascribed by the MSS. to Caesar, are 
nowadays generally regarded as of uncertain author- 
ship ; and though any detailed presentation of the 
evidence would occupy too much space, some brief 
discussion of the pi'oblem seems called for. 

Even as early as the beginning of the second cen- 
tury of our era there were doubts about their 
authorship ^ ; and certainly the unity of their theme 
and the fact that they all three virtually formed a 
continuation of the Civil Wars may easily account 
for the early tradition that Caesar wTote them. 

Now the stvle o£ de Bello Alexandrino is, as Klotz ^ 
demonstrated in great detail, very similar to the style 
of the eighth, and last, book of the Gallic Wars, 
which is very commonly attributed to Hirtius. The 
opening chapter of this eighth book contains the 
following sentence ^ : 

' I have tacked a supplement to the Com- 
mentaries of our great Caesar on the operations 
in Gaul . . . and his last work {i.e. the Civil 
Wars), which was left unfinished from the 

1 Suetonius : Life of Caesar (Holland's Translation) : ' For 
of the Alexandrine, African and Spanish Wars, who was the 
writer it is uncertain ; while some think it was Oppius, others 
Hirtius, who also made up and finished the last of the Gallic 
War.' 

2 Cdsarstudien (1910), pp. 180-204, 

3 As translated by H. J. Edwards : Loeb Classical Library. 



GENERAL INTRODUCTION 

operations at Alexandria onwards, I have com- 
pleted as far as the conclusion, not indeed of 
civil discord, of which we see no end, but of 
Caesar's life.' 

This certainly appears to confirm what seems likely 
on stylistic grounds, namely that, if it was Hirtius 
who completed the Gallic Wars, it was Hirtius also 
who wrote de Bella Alexandrino, If he did so, his 
knowledge of the campaign was second-hand ; for 
later in the same chapter he says : 

For myself, I had not the fortune ever to 
take part in the Alexandrian and the African 
campaign.' ^ 

Was he then also the author of de Bella Africa and 
de Bella lUspaniensi ? His words — ' as far as the 
conclusion of Caesar's life ' may indeed be so inter- 
preted. The internal evidence, however, seems 
strongly against this theory, and suggests, on the 
contrary, that the three works are the independent 
productions of three separate hands, none of which 
was Caesar's own. 

For anyone who reads the Latin text carefully 
must surely be forcibly struck by certain idio- 
syncrasies of style peculiar to one of the books, but 
not apparent in either of the other two. Thus, to 
cite but one example, the author of de Bella His- 
pa7iie?isi — quite apart from his quotations from 
Ennius — constantly emplovs the adverb bene as a 

^ He goes on to remark that these two campaigns are 
partially known to him from conversations with Caesar; 
and as he may well have had access to Caesar's note- books, it 
does not seem impossible that he was the author of de Bella 
Alexandrino. 



GENERAL INTRODUCTION 

mere intensive particle, as in the recurrent phrase 
bene magna pars ; while the author of de Bello Africa 
has a passion for the word interim, and can seldom 
think of any alternative with which to introduce a new 
chapter. Neither of these foibles is common in the 
other work, nor do they occur to any extent in de 
Bello Alexandrino. 

Accordingly, though many scholars nowadays are 
disposed to accept Hirtius as the author of de Bello 
Alexandrino, few still contend that he wrote the other 
two works, at any rate in the form in which they have 
come down to us. The claims of Asinius Pollio and of 
Sallust to the authorship of de Bello Africo have 
each had a brief vogue. Possibly, however, as Bouvet 
has recently suggested,^ both the de Bello Africo 
and de Bello Hispaniensi which we possess are in 
reality no more than rough drafts prepared at the 
request of Hii'tius by two separate soldiers who 
fought in the respective campaigns ; and had he 
survived, Hirtius would have worked up this ' copy ' 
into more effective literary form. 

The manuscripts on which the text of these three 
works is based are in the main the same as those 
which contain the Civil Wars ; and most of them are 
far inferior to those which contain only the Gallic 
Wars. The most important are : 

Laurentianus Ashburnhamiensis x-xi century \ 
Lovaniensis - . . . . xi century 

Mediceus Laurentianus . . xi-xii century 

* Cesar : La Guerre d'Afrique (1949) : Introduction, 
p. xix. The suggestion, as Bouvet points out, was originally 
made by Nipperdey. 

- This MS. breaks off abruptly in chapter 33 of de Bello 
Africa. 

ix 



GENERAL INTRODUCTION 



Ursinianus 
Riccardianus . 
Thuaneus 
\'indobonensis . 
Neapolitanus . 



xi-xii century 
xi-xii century 
xi century 
xii century 
xii-xiii century 



Their relations to one another have already been 
discussed by Peskett in his Introduction to the 
Civil Wars in this series. 

For de Bello Alexandrino and de Bella Africa the 
text which these MSS. afford is reasonably sound ; 
but for de Bella Hispuniensi it is far otherwise. Rice 
Holmes was perhaps not overstating the case when 
he wrote : ^ 

' Bellum Hispaniense is the worst book in 
Latin literature ; and its text is the most 
deplorable. The language is generally un- 
grammatical and often unintelligible. The 
copyists performed their tasks so ill that in the 
forty-two paragraphs there are twenty-one 
gaps and six hundred corrupt passages, which 
Mommsen and lesser men have striven with an 
industry worthy of a better cause to restore.' 

In these circumstances the task of producing a 
readable translation has proved no easy one ; the 
less so since this series allows little scope for explana- 
tory notes. Hence, though I have generally adhered 
to the MS. reading wherever it seemed reasonably 
satisfactory, I have not hesitated in many places to 
adopt conjectural emendations, so as to produce as 
continuous and intelligible a rendering as possible. 
The more important departures from the text I have 

1 The Roman Republic : vol iii, p. 298. 



GENERAL INTRODUCTION 

indicated, with due acknowledgements, in brief foot- 
notes below the Latin. 

In view of the independent character of these 
three military monographs, linked together though 
they are by a common theme, it has seemed best to 
give to each a separate introduction of its own ; 
and, in the case of de Bella Alexandrino, to include a 
brief summary of the concluding chapters of Civil 
Wars, Book III, of which it is a continuation. A 
separate index of personal and place names con- 
tained in each work has been placed at the end of 
the book, followed by a combined subject index and 
six maps. Certain problems which are too unwieldy 
for footnotes — mainly topographical, sometimes 
controversial — are discussed in four appendixes. 

Among various other works and editions which 
have proved helpful acknowledgement is due in 
particular to Rice Holmes' The Roman Republic, 
Bouvet's La Guerre d'Afrique and Klotz's Kommentar 
zum Bellum Hispaniense. Unfortunately the recent 
edition in the Bude series — Guerre d'Alexandrie by 
J. Andrieu (1954) — reached me only when my own 
final proofs were being revised : hence only the 
briefest references to it have been possible. 



CHRONOLOGY OF THE ALEX- 
ANDRIAN, AFRICAN AND 
SPANISH WARS 

(The dates are given according to the official calendar, 
which, before Caesar reformed it in 46 B.C. by inserting 
two intercalary months between November and December, 
was approximately- two months ahead of the solar reckoning.) 

48 B.C. 

9 August. Battle of Pharsalus : Cn. Pompeius Magnus flees 

to Egj-pt. 
September. Pompeius murdered in Egjrpt. 
October. Caesar reaches Alexandria. 
October 48 — March 47. Caesar engaged in operations in 

and around Alexandria. 
December. Pharnaces routs Domitius Calvinus at Nico- 

polis. 

47 B.C. 

March. Battle of the Nile : Caesar defeats the Egyptians. 

27 March. Enters Alexandria in triumph. 

June.i Leaves Alexandria for Syria. 

29 July. Enters Pontus. 

2 August. Defeats Pharnaces at Zela. 

September. Embarks for Italy and Rome. 

17 December. Reaches Lilybaeum in Sicily. 

1 The date is entirely conjectural. The average estimate 
seems to be some time in June (Holmes, The Roman Republic, 
vol. Ill, p. 204 'about the 7th of June'. Andrieu, Guerre 
d'Alexnndrie, p. 83, 'at the end of June'). But L. E. Lord, 
in an article entitled The date of J. Caesar's departure from 
Alexandria (Journal of Roman Studies, vol. 28, pp. 19—40), 
argues in favour of an earlier date and repudiates the later 
traditions of Caesar's dalliance with Cleopatra. 



CHRONOLOGY OF THE WARS 

47 B.C. 

25 December. Embarks for Africa. 

28 December. Disembarks at Hadrumetum. 

29 December. Encamps at Ruspina. 

46 B.C. 

26 January. Leaves Ruspina and moves to the heights to 
the East of Uzitta. 

26 January — 3 April. Operations at Uzitta and Aggar. 

4 April. Caesar marches to Thapsus and begins to invest it, 
6 April. Battle of Thapsus. 

12 April. Cato commits suicide. 

13 June. Caesar embarks at Utica for Sardinia. 
25 July. Arrives at Rome. 

December. Reaches Spain. 

December-Januar3\ Operations at Corduba. Caesar lays 
siege to Ategua. 

45 B.C. 

19 February. Ategua surrenders to Caesar. 

5 March. Engagement near Snricaria. 
17 March. Battle of Munda. 

12 April. The head of Cn. Pompeius brought to Hispalis. 
September. Caesar returns to Rome. 

{Certain minor operations — chiefly those ichich are mentionec 
in the Latin text out of chronological sequence — are dated indt 
vidually in the margin of the translation.) 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 



INTRODUCTION 

The battle of Pharsalus, fought in August 48, was 
a crushing defeat for the Pompeians, but not finally 
decisive. Fifteen thousand men were said to have 
perished : more than twenty-four thousand to have 
been captured. Their field army was indeed 
shattered ; but both leader and cause yet survived. 

There were several quarters of the Roman world 
where resistance might be renewed successfully in 
the name of senatorial government : the province 
of Africa, where King Juba of Numidia was a 
formidable, if exacting, supporter of the Pompeians, 
and where, since Curio's defeat in the previous 
year, Caesar's prestige had ebbed ; Spain, where 
Pompey's name still stood high, while Caesar's 
cause had suffered from the prolonged misgovern- 
ment of his deputy, Q. Cassius ; and. closer at hand, 
Egypt, an independent kingdom whose rulers were 
indebted to Pompey for past services and so might be 
expected to succour him now. 

But Egypt — important to Rome as a prolific 
source of corn — was now faced with a constitutional 
crisis. The late king, Ptolemy Auletes, had been 
expelled in 58 but reinstated three yeai's later by 
Gabinius, acting in the interests of the triumvirs — 
Caesar, Pompey and Crassus — who were still awaiting 
payment for this service. An unofficial Roman 
army of occupation, comprising many soldiers who 
had once served under Pompey, still remained in 
the country. In 51 Ptolemy had died, bequeathing 



INTRODUCTION 

his throne jointly to his elder son— a mere boy — 
and his eldest daughter, Cleopatra, and urging the 
Senate in his will to ensure that its terms were 
faithfully observed. Nevertheless, Cleopatra had 
been driven out by the young king's regents, only 
to raise an army in Syria, return at its head, and 
confront her brother at Pelusium. 

In such a situation Pompey's arrival was hardly 
opportune. To the young king's unscrupulous 
regents, menaced as they were by Cleopatra and 
her adherents, his motives were obscure. Had he 
in mind to win over the Roman occupation troops 
and conquer the country ? And anyway, was not 
Caesar's cause now for them the better risk ? Thus 
possibly they argued : and, untroubled by scruples, 
accordingly contrived his murder, the treacherous 
character of which shocked the whole world and 
gave to Pompey the status of a martvr. 

Three days later Caesar arrived to find his fore- 
most rival thus destroyed. But others remained : 
prompt action was advisable both in Asia, whither 
Domitius had already been despatched, and in 
Africa, to crush the remnants of his opponents. 
However, the seasonal winds off Alexandria pre- 
vented any immediate departure ; and he might 
utilise the interval by settling the dispute over the 
royal succession and collecting the monevs long 
owing to the triumvirs. But if he argued thus he 
failed to take into account two factors : first, the 
natural feelings of the Egyptians and the resent- 
ment they might show at his official interference in 
their domestic affairs ; and secondly, the charms of 
Cleopatra. Of these two important factors the former 
is duly mentioned by Caesar himself, whereas the 



INTRODUCTION 

latter is studiously glossed over in de Bella Alexandrino. 
Yet what other reason can account for Caesar's 
strange inaction between March, when he made him- 
self master of Alexandria and Egypt, and June, when 
at last he left for Syria to conduct a whirlwind cam- 
paign against Pharnaces ? Where later writers ^ shed 
a lurid light, Hirtius observes a discreet silence. 

In literary merit de Bella Alexandrina, though in 
general a plain and somewhat pedestrian tale, is 
the best of the three works. If it never soars to 
the heights, it never sinks to the depths of de Bella 
Hispaniensi. The subject matter is well arranged, 
and Caesar's victory at Zela provides an eifective 
climax. The facts presented seem reasonably 
accurate and undistorted by party bias.^ The style 
is neither so terse nor so lively as Caesar's ; but it is 
neat, free from affectations, and above all clear. 
Though the narrative tends sometimes to monotony, 
yet the author is not without a sense of the dramatic 
and is at pains on occasion to work up the reader's 
interest before a climax.^ Nor is he a mere pur- 
veyor of facts : though there are very few speeches 
he not infrequently speculates on motives. His 
tendency in this respect is to suggest alternatives 
from which the reader may make his own choice ; * 
and where he does commit himself, his judgment 
does not always ring true.^ 

^ e.g. Suetonius : Life of Julius Caesar, ch. 52. 

* At any rate he does not appear in chapters 21 and 40 to 
underestimate Caesarian losses. 

^ e.g. cha])ter 1(5. * e.g. chapters 43 and 63. 

^ e.g. cliapter 24, where he suggests that Caesar's motive 
in releasing the young king was merely to enhance his own 
prestige, and makes no attempt to reconcile this attitude 
with the earlier policy described in Civil Wars III, ch. 109. 



SUMMARY OF THE NARRATIVE 
IN CIVIL WARS 

BOOK III 

CHAPTER 

103 Pompeius arrives at Pelusium with 2,000 armed men. 

Here the young king Ptolemaeus is waging war with 
his sister, Cleopatra, whom he has expelled a few 
months before. Pompeius sends messengers to the king 
begging him to shelter him in return for the services 
which Pompeius had once rendered the late king. 

104 The young king's regents give the messengers a fair 

reply but secretly plot to murder Pompeius. Achillas, 
the king's prefect, and Septimius, a military tribune, 
assassinate him as he comes ashore in a small boat. 

106 Caesar arrives at Alexandria with two legions (3,200 

men) and SOU cavalry, and with ten warships from 
Rhodes and a few from Asia. He hears of the death 
of Pompeius and lands with the fasces borne in front 
of him. The Alexandrians take affront at this, 
asserting that the royal authority is being infringed. 
Frequent riots take place on the following days and 
several of Caesar's soldiers are killed. 

107 Caesar sends to Asia for further legions levied from 

Pompeian troops ; for the Etesian winds prevent his 
sailing away from Alexandria. He decides that the 
quarrel between Ptolemaeus and Cleopatra must be 
composed and requests them both to disband their 
armies and settle their differences by legal means. 

108 Pothinus, the chief regent, is indignant at his inter- 

ference, secretly summons the king's armj' to 
Alexandria, and puts Achillas in command of it. 
The late king in his will has named as his heirs the 
elder of his two sons and the elder of his two daughters, 
with an appeal to the Roman people to carry out its 
provisions. 



SUMMARY OF THE CIVIL WARS 

CHAPTER 

109 Caesar learns of the approach of the king's army under 

Achillas and decides to remain on the defensive in 
the town, as his forces are insufiicient for a pitched 
battle. Two envoys sent by the king to Achillas are 
arrested, and one is killed. Caesar now brings the 
king under his own control. 

110 Achillas has an army of 20,000 men — mainly Roman 

ex-soldiers from the army of Gabinius who had made 
their homes in Egypt — as well as exiles and fugitive 
slaves. This motley army is a power in the land and 
exercises great political sway. 

111 Achillas now tries to occupy all Alexandria which is not 

already in Caesar's possession. In a fierce battle 
fought at the harbour Caesar is forced to burn the 
Alexandrian fleet, so as to deny the enemy its use. 

112 Caesar lands troops on the island of Pharos, which 

controls the passage into the main harbour, and seizes 
and garrisons it, thereby securing the transport by 
sea of provisions and reinforcements. Fighting 
elsewhere in the town is indecisive. He cordons off 
strategic points and strengthens his defences by night, 
occupying parts of the palace with the theatre 
adjoining it, and thus gaining access to the port and 
docks. Arsinoe, the younger princess, joins Achillas 
and bids against him for the favour of the troops. 
Pothinus is executed by Caesar when some of his 
messengers, sent to encourage Achillas in his resistance, 
are captured. 

This is the beginning of the Alexandrian war. 

{The reason for including the above summary has been stated in 
the General Introduction, p. zi.) 



ANALYSIS OF THE BOOK 



1-33 Operations at Alexandria and elsewhere in Egypt 

Description of Alexandria — Caesar's policy to 
isolate his sector of the town and secure plentiful 
supplies — ingenious dispositions of the enemy — 
their fear of Egypt's becoming a Roman province. 
Arsinoe kills Achillas and entrusts her army to 
Ganymedes. The latter contaminates Caesar's 
water supply — panic in Caesar's army — Caesar's 
counter measures. Arrival of the Thirty-Seventh 
legion. Naval action near Chersonensus— the 
enemy equip a new fleet — naval action in the 
harbour — -gallantry of the Rhodian squadron. 
Further attack on Pharos, and on the mole and its 
second bridge — Caesar narrowly escapes drowning. 
He sends the king back to his people Naval action 
off Canopus — death of Euphranor. Arrival at 
Pelusium of Mithridates with reinforcements from 
Syria and Cilicia — battle in the Delta — Caesar 
relieves Mithridates. Situation of the king's 
camp — Caesar foils his attempt at an ambush and 
proceeds to storm his camp. Defeat of the king 
and his forces — the king is drowned — Caesar re- 
enters Alexandria in triumph — submission of the 
inhabitants. Caesar settles the royal succession. 
34-41 Operations in the East 

Domitius Calvinus, the governor of Asia, learns 
that Pharnaces has over-run Lesser Armenia and 
Cappadocia — he assembles a force at Comana and 
sets out for Armenia. He approaches NicopoUs 
and receives an urgent request from Caesar for 
fresh reinforcements. Battle of Nicopolis — gallant 
conduct of the Thirty-Sixth legion — defeat and 
withdrawal of Domitius. Tyrannous behaviour 
of Pharnaces in Pontus. 



ANALYSIS OF THE BOOK 

CHAPTERS 

42-47 Operations in Illyricum 

yuccess of the cautious policy of Q. Cornificius — 
he captures Octavius' fleet. Gabinius arrives in 
the province during the winter and sustains many 
reverses — is defeated while withdrawing on Salona 
and dies soon afterwards. Vatinius raises a 
scratch fleet at Brundisium and pursues Octavius — 
naval action off the island of Tauris — defeat of 
Octavius. 

48-64 Operations in Further Spain 

Unpopularity of the governor, Q. Cassius 
Longinus — -his efforts to win the affection of his 
troops — his extortions to finance his briberies. 
Caesar orders him to bring an armj^ across to 
Africa. Attempt on his life at Corduba — his 
treatment of the ringleaders of this abortive plot. 
Mutiny of some of his legions while marching to 
the Straits — Marcellus is adopted as their leader. 
Cassius withdraws to Ulia where Marcellus follows 
him. King Bogud arrives in support of Cassius. 
Lepidus arrives from Hither Spain to compose the 
quarrel — Cassius is allowed to withdraw unmolested 
■ — he embarks at Malaca but is drowned at the 
mouth of the Ebro. 

65-78 Caesar personally conducts operations in the East 

He arrives in Syria and learns of the unrest at 
Rome — ^decides he must first settle affairs in the 
East before returning to the city. He arrives in 
Cilicia — passes through Cappadocia — reaches 
Comana. He pardons king Deiotarus and then 
arrives in Pontus. Pharnaces makes evasive 
overtures — they are refused. Description of Zela — 
the tactics of the battle — total defeat of Pharnaces. 
Caesar returns through Gallograecia and Bithynia 
to Asia — details of his settlement, of disputed 
territories — his arrival in Italy. 



DE BELLO ALEXANDRINO 

1 Bello Alexandrino conflato Caesar Rhodo atque 
ex Syria Ciliciaque omneni classem arcessit ; Creta 
sagittarios, equites ab rege Nabataeorum Malcho 
evocat ; tormenta undique conquiri et frumentum 
mitti, auxilia adduci iubet. Interim munitiones 
eotidie operibus augentur atque omnes oppidi 
partes, quae minus esse firmae videntur, testudinibus 
ae musculis aptantur ; ^ ex aedificiis autem per 
foramina in proxima aedificia arietes immittuntur, 
quantumque aut ruinis deicitur aut per vim recipitur 
loci, in tantum munitiones proferuntur. Nam 
incendio fere tuta est Alexandrea, quod sine contig- 
natione ae materia sunt aedificia et structuris ac 
fornicibus continentur tectaque sunt rudere aut 
pavimentis. Caesar maxime studebat ut, quam 
angustissimam partem oppidi palus a meridie 
interiecta efficiebat, banc operibus vineisque agendis 
ab reliqua parte urbis excluderet, illud spectans 
primum ut, cum in duas partis esset urbis divisa aeies, 
uno consilio atque imperio administraretur, deinde ut 
laborantibus succurri atque ex altera oppidi parte 

^ So 3ISS. : temptantur Nipperdey, perhaps rightly. 



^ A people of Arabia Petraea. 

* This seems to be the meaning oi pavimentum here : else- 
where it is used only of floors. 

lO 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

1 When the Alexandrian war flared up, Caesar sum- 
moned every fleet from Rhodes and Syria and Cilicia ; 
from Crete he raised archers, and cavahy from 
Malchus, king of the Nabataeans,^ and ordered 
artillery to be procured, corn despatched, and 
auxiliary troops mustered from every quarter. 
Meanwhile the entrenchments were daily extended 
by additional works, and all those sectors of the 
town which appeared to be not strong enough were 
provided with shelters and mantlets : battering- 
rams, moreover, were introduced from one building 
into the next through holes, and the entrench- 
ments were extended to cover all the ground laid 
bai*e by demolitions or gained by force of arms. 
For Alexandria is well-nigh fire-proof, because 
its buildings contain no wooden joineiy and are 
held together by an arched construction and are 
roofed with rough-cast or tiling. ^ Caesar was 
particularly anxious that, by bringing to bear his 
siege-works and pent-houses, he should isolate 
from the rest of the city that narrowest part of the 
town which was most constricted by the barrier 
of marshland Iving to the south : his object being 
first that, since his army Mas divided between two 
sectors of the city, it should be controlled by a single 
strategy and command ; secondly, that if they got 
into difficulties in one sector of the town, assistance 

II 



CAESAR 

auxilium ferri posset, in primis vero ut aqua pabuloque 
abundaret, quarum alterius rei copiam exiguam, 
alterius nullam omnino facultatem habebat ; quod 
utrumque large palus praebcre poterat. 
2 Neque vero Alexandrinis in gerendis negotiis 
cunctatio ulla aut mora inferebatur. Nam in omnis 
partis, per quas fines Aegypti regnumque pertinet, 
legatos conquisitoresque dilectus habendi causa 
miserant magnumque numerum in oppidum telorum 
atque tormentorum convexerant et innumerabilem 
multitudinem adduxerant. Nee minus in urbe 
maximae armorum erant institutae officinae. Servos 
praeterea puberes armaverant ; quibus domini 
locupletiores victum cotidianum stipendiumque 
praebebant. Hac multitudine disposita munitiones 
semotarum partium tuebantur ; veteranas cohortis 
vacuas in celeberrimis urbis locis habebant, ut 
quacumque regione pugnaretur integris viribus ad 
auxiliuni ferendum opponi possent. Omnibus viis 
atque angiportis triplicem vallum obduxerant — erat 
autem quadrato exstructus saxo neque minus XL 
pedes altitudinis habebat — quaeque partes urbis 
inferiores erant, has altissimis turribus denorum 
tabulatorum munierant. Praeterea alias ambula- 
torias totidem tabulatorum confixerant subieetisque 
eas rotis funibus iumentisque obiectis dereetis 
plateis in quamcumque erat visum partem move- 
bant. 

^ A much disputed passage. I assume that Caesar already 
occupied two separate sectors of the city south of Cape 
Lochias, and these he now intended to join up into one by 
securing the ground immediately to the south, adjoining the 
marshy depression. 

- Or possibly ' along the straight streets.' 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

and support could be brought from the other sector. ^ 
But above all his object was to secure himself 
abundance of water and fodder; of which, as regards 
the former, he had but a scanty supply, and, as 
regards the latter, no stocks whatever ; and the marsh- 
land could afford him bountiful supplies of both. 

Not indeed that this occasioned any hesitation or 
delay on the part of the Alexandrians in concerting 
their measures. They had in fact despatched 
emissaries and recruiting officers throughout the 
entire length and breadth of the territory and 
kingdom of Egypt for the purpose of holding a levy, 
and had conveyed into the town a large quantity of 
weapons and artillery and mustered a countless 
host. In the city too, no less, vast arms factories 
had been established. They had, moreover, armed 
the adult slaves, and these the Avealthier owners 
furnished with their daily food and pay. This 
numerous force they deployed to guard the fortifica- 
tions of outlying areas ; while they kept their 
veteran cohorts unemployed in the most frequented 
(juarters of the city so that, no matter in what 
district fighting occurred, they could be thrown in 
as fresh and lusty reinforcements. All the streets 
and alleys were walled off bv a triple barricade, 
built of rectangular stone blocks and not less than 
forty feet high ; while as for the lower quarters of 
the city, these were fortified with very lofty towers, 
each ten stories high. Besides these there were other 
towers which they had contrived — mobile ones of 
the like number of stories ; and these, being mounted 
on wheels with ropes and draught animals attached, 
they moved along the level ^ streets to any area they 
saw fit. 

13 



CAESAR 

3 Urbs fertilissima et copiosissima omnium rerum 
apparatus suggerebat. Ipsi homines ingeniosi atque 
acutissimi quae a nobis fieri viderant ea sollertia 
efficiebant ut nostri illorum opera imitati viderentur, 
et sua sponte multa reperiebant unoque tempore et 
nostras munitiones infestabant et suas defendebant. 
Atque haec principes in consiliis contionibusque 
agitabant : populum Romanum paulatim in consuetu- 
dinem eius regni occupandi venire. Faucis annis 
ante A. Gabinium cum exercitu fuisse in Aegypto ; 
Pompeium se ex fuga eodem recepisse ; Caesarem 
venisse cum copiis, neque morte Pompei quicquam 
profectum quo minus apud se Caesar commoraretur. 
Quem si non expulissent, futuram ex regno pro- 
vinciam ; idque agendum mature : namque eum 
Interclusum tempestatibus propter anni tenipus 
recipere transmarina auxilia non posse. 

4 Interim dissensione orta inter Achillan, qui 
veterano exercitui praeerat, et Arsinoen, regis 
Ptolomaei minorem filiam, ut supra demonstratum 
est, cum uterque utrique insidiaretur et summam 
imperi ipse obtinere vellet, praeoccupat Arsinoe per 
Ganvmeden eunuchum, nutricium suum, atque 
Achillan interficit. Hoc occiso sine ullo socio et 
custode ipsa omne imperium obtinebat ; exercitus 
Ganymedi traditur. Is suscepto officio largitionem 



^ A supporter of Pompeius who in 55 B.C., as governor of 
Syria, restored Ptolemy Auletes to the throne of Egypt. 
See ch. 43 below for his death in Illyricum. 

- Presumably a reference to Civil Wars III, ch. 112. 

^ Though in the Latin text I have retained the unfamiliar 
spelling given by all the MSS., in translation I have adopted 
the more common form. 

14 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

Highly productive and abundantly supplied as it 
was, the city furnished equipment of all kinds. The 
people themselves were clever and very shrewd, and 
no sooner had they seen what was being done by us 
than they would reproduce it with such cunning 
that it seemed it was our men who had copied their 
works. Much also they invented on their own 
account, and kept assailing our entrenchments while 
simultaneously defending their own. In their 
councils and public meetings the arguments which 
their leaders kept driving home were as follows : ' the 
Roman people were gradually acquiring a habit of 
seizing that kingdom ; a few years earlier Aulus 
Gabinius ^ had been in Egypt with an army ; 
Pompeius too had resorted thither in his flight ; 
Caesar had now come with his forces, and the death 
of Pompeius had had no effect in dissuading Caesar 
from staying on among them. If they failed to drive 
him out, their kingdom would become a Roman 
province : and this driving out they must do betimes ; 
for cut off as he now was by storms owing to the 
season of the year, he could not receive reinforce- 
ments from overseas.' 

Meanwhile a quarrel had arisen — as related above ^ 
— between Achillas, who commanded the veteran 
army, and Arsinoe, the younger daughter of king 
Ptolemaeus ; ' and with each party plotting against 
the other and anxious to obtain the supreme power 
for himself, Arsinoe, acting through the eunuch 
Ganymedes, her tutor, struck the first blow and 
killed Achillas. After his murder she herself exer- 
cised complete control without any consort or 
guardian, while the army was entrusted to Gany- 
medes. On undertaking this duty the latter in- 

15 



CAESAR 

in militem auget; reliqua pari diligentia adminis- 
trat. 

5 Alexandrea est fere tota suffossa specusque habet a 
Nilo pertinentis, quibus aqua in privatas domos 
inducitur, quae paulatim spatio temporis liquescit ac 
subsidit. Hac uti domini aedificiorum atque eorum 
familiae consuerunt : nam quae flumine Nilo fertur 
adeo est limosa ac turbida ut multos variosque 
morbos efficiat ; sed ea plebes ac multitudo contenta 
est necessario, quod fons urbe tota nullus est. Hoc 
tamen flumen in ea parte erat urbis quae ab Alexan- 
drinis tenebatur. Quo facto est admonitus Gany- 
medes posse nostros aqua intercludi ; qui distributi 
munitionum tuendarum causa vicatim ex privatis 
aedificiis specubus ac puteis extracta aqua utebantur. 

6 Hoc probato consilio magnum ac difficile opus 
aggreditur. Intersaeptis enim specubus atque omni- 
bus urbis partibus exclusis quae ab ipso tenebantur, 
aquae magnam vim ex mari rotis ac machinationibus 
exprimere contendit : banc locis superioribus fundere 
in partem Caesaris non intermittebat. Quam ob 
causam salsior paulo praeter consuetudinem aqua 
trahebatur ex proximis aedificiis magnamque homini- 
bus admirationem praebebat, quam ob rem id 
accidisset ; nee satis sibi ipsi credebant, cum se 
inferiores eiusdem generis ac saporis aqua dicerent 

1 This is generally taken to be the Canal (see map). 

i6 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

creased the soldiers' bounty and performed the rest 
of his functions with consistent thoroughness. 

Practically the whole of Alexandria is undermined 
with subterranean conduits running from the Nile, by 
which water is conducted into private houses ; which 
water in course of time gradually settles down and 
becomes clear. This is what is normally used by the 
owners of mansions and their households ; for what 
the Nile brings down is so muddy and turbid that it 
gives rise to many different diseases : yet the rank 
and file of the common sort are perforce content \nth 
the latter, inasmuch as there is not one natural 
spring in the whole city. The main stream in 
question,^ however, was in that quarter of the city 
which was held by the Alexandrians. This circum- 
stance suggested to Ganymedes the possibility that 
the water supply could be cut off from our troops ; 
who, posted as they were in various quarters of the 
town to guard our entrenchments, were using water 
drawn from conduits and cisterns in private buildings. 

This plan being once approved, Ganymedes em- 
barked upon a serious and difficult task. Having 
first blocked up the conduits and sealed off all 
quarters of the city occupied by himself, he then 
made haste to draw off a vast quantity of water out 
of the sea by means of mechanical water-wheels ; 
and this he steadily poured from higher ground 
into Caesar's area. For which reason the water 
drawn from the nearest buildings was a little more 
brackish than usual, and occasioned no little wonder 
among men as to why this had come about. Nor 
could they quite believe the evidence of their own 
ears when their neighbours lower down said that the 
water they were using was of the same kind and 

17 



CAESAR 

iiti atque ante consuessent, vulgoque inter se con- 
ferebant et degustando quantum inter se differrent 
aquae cognoscebant. Parvo vero temporis spatio 
haec propior bibi omnino non poterat, ilia inferior 
corruptior iam salsiorqiie reperiebatur. 

Quo facto dubitatione sublata tantus incessit timor 
ut ad extremum periculi omnes deducti viderentur 
atque alii morari Caesarem dicerent quin navis 
conscendere iuberet,^ alii multo gravius ' ex- 
timescerent, quod neque celari Alexandrini possent 
in apparanda fuga, cum tam parvo spatio distarent ab 
ipsis, neque illis imminentibus atque insequentibus 
ullus in navis receptus daretur. Erat autem magna 
multitudo oppidanorum in parte Caesaris, quam 
domiciliis ipsorum non moverat, quod ea se fidelem 
palam nostris esse simulabat et descivisse a suis 
videbatur : at mihi si ^ defendendi essent Alexandrini 
neque fallaces esse ^ neque temerarii, multa oratio 
frustra absumeretur ; cum vero uno tempore et 
natio eorum et natura cognoscatur, aptissimum esse 
hoc genus ad proditionem dubitare nemo potest. 

Caesar suorum timorem consolatione et ratione 
minuebat. Nam puteis fossis aquam dulcem reperiri 
posse adfirmabat : omnia enim litora naturaliter 
aquae dulcis venas habere. Quod si alia esset 

^ The MSS. are divided between iuberent and iuberet. 
2 ut mihi MSS. : at mihi si Madvig. 
^ essent MSS. : esse Nipperdey. 

i8 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

taste as they had previously been accustomed to ; 
and they were openly discussing the matter amongst 
themselves and, by tasting samples, learning how 
markedly the waters differed. However, in a short 
space of time the water nearer the contamination 
was entirely undrinkable, while that lower down was 
found to be relatively impure and brackish. 

7 This circumstance dispelled their doubts, and so 
great was the panic that took hold upon them that it 
seemed that they were all reduced to a most 
hazardous plight, and some asserted that Caesar 
was being slow in giving orders to embark. Others 
were much more seriously alarmed, on the ground 
that, in making their preparations for a withdrawal, 
it was impossible to keep the Alexandrians in the 
dai-k, being as they were so short a distance away 
from them ; and with their foes on top of them 
and pursuing them, no chance was afforded them 
of retreating to their ships. There was, however, 
a large number of townsfolk in Caesar's sector, 
whom Caesar had not evacuated from their homes, 
because they openly affected loyalty to our side and 
appeared to have deserted their own folk. Yet, 
as far as I am concerned, had I now the task of 
championing the Alexandrians and proving them to 
be neither deceitful nor foolhardy, it would be a 
case of many words spent to no purpose : indeed 
M-hen one gets to know both the breed and its 
breeding there can be no doubt whatever that as a 
race they are extremely prone to treachery. 

8 By encouragement and reasoning Caesar allayed 
his men's alai-m, declaring that sweet water could be 
found in wells and trenches, inasmuch as all sea- 
shores naturally possessed veins of sweet water. 

19 



CAESAR 

litoris Acgypti natiira atque omnium reliquorum, 
tamen, quoniam mare libere tenerent, neque hostes 
classem haberent, prohiberi sese non posse quo 
minus cotidie navibus aquam peterent vel a sinistra 
parte a Paratonio vel a dextra ab insula, quae 
diversae navigationes numquam uno tempore adver- 
sis ventis praecluderentur. Fugae vero nullum esse 
consilium non solum eis qui primam dignitatem 
haberent, sed ne eis quidem qui nihil praeterquam 
de vita cogitarent. Magno negotio impetus hostium 
adversos ex munitionibus sustinere ; quibus relictis 
nee loco nee numero pares esse posse. Magnam 
autem moram et difficultatem ascensum in navis 
habere, praesertim ex scaphis ; summam esse contra 
in Alexandrinis velocitatem locorumque et aedificio- 
rum notitiam. Hos praecipue in victoria insolentis 
praecursuros et loca excelsiora atque aedificia occupa- 
turos : ita fuga navibusque nostros prohibituros. 
Proinde eius consili obliviscerentur atque omni 
ratione esse vincendum cogitarent. 
• Hac oratione apud suos habita atque omnium 
mentibus excitatis dat centurionibus negotium ut 
reliquis operibus intermissis ad fodiendos puteos 
animum conferant neve quam partem nocturni 
temporis intermittant. Quo suscepto negotio atque 
omnium animis ad laborem incitatis magna una 

^ The places referred to are much disputed and have not 
been marked on Map 2. Strabo mentions a Uapairoviov, 
but it lay some 130 miles W. of Alexandria — too far, it seems, 
to be intended here. As for the island. Pharos itself hardly 
lay on their right : perhaps either the Delta is intended or 
some otherwise unknown island near Canopus. 
20 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

But if the nature of the sea-shore of Egypt was 
different from all others, none the less, since they 
held unfettered command of the sea, while their 
enemies had no fleet, they could not be prevented 
from seeking water daily in their ships, either from 
Paratonium on their left, or the island on their 
right ^ — voyages which, being in opposite directions, 
would never be prevented by contrary winds at one 
and the same time. As for retreating, there was 
no sound policy in that, not merely for those who 
held the chief responsibility, but not even for those 
whose sole concern was for their own lives. They 
were hard put to it to contain the enemies' frontal 
attacks from their entrenchments : once abandon 
those and they could be no match for them either 
in vantage ground or numbers. Moreover, boarding 
ships, especially from pinnaces, involved considerable 
delay and difficulty ; while set against this the 
Alexandrians had the greatest mobility and know- 
ledge of the ground and buildings. These people 
above all, overweening as they became in victory, 
would dash ahead and seize the higher ground and 
the buildings and thus prevent our men from 
retreating and gaining their ships. Accordingly, 
they should put that policy out of their minds and 
reflect that, at all costs, they must win the 
day. 
9 Having harangued his men to this effect and put 
fresh heart into them all, he briefed his centurions as 
follows : they were to interrupt their other tasks 
and turn their attention to digging wells, continuing 
without any cessation all through the night. Where- 
upon, the business being once undertaken with 
unanimous enthusiasm for the task, in the coui'se of 



CAESAR 

nocte vis aquae dulcis inventa est. Ita operosis 
Alexandrinorum machinationibus maximisque cona- 
tihus non longi temporis labore occursum est. Eo 
biduo legio XXX\'II. ex dediticiis Pompeianis 
militibus cum frumento, armis, telis, torrnentis 
imposita in navis a Domitio Calvino ad litora Africae 
paulo supra Alexandream delata est. Hae naves 
Euro, qui multos dies continenter flabat, portum 
capere prohibebantur ; sed loca sunt egregia ornni 
ilia regione ad tenendas ancoras. Hi cum diu 
retinerentur atque aquae inopia premerentur, navigio 
actuario Caesarem faciunt certiorem. 
10 Caesar, ut per se consilium caperet quid faciendum 
videretur, navem conscendit atque omnem classem 
se sequi iussit nuUis nostris militibus impositis, quod, 
cum longius paulo discederet, munitiones nudare 
nolebat. Cumque ad eum locum accessissent, qui 
appellatur Chersonensus, aquandique causa remiges 
in terram exposuissent, non nulli ex eo numero, 
cum longius a navibus praedatum processissent, ab 
equitibus hostium sunt excepti. Ex his cognoverunt 
Caesarem ipsum in classe venisse nee ullos milites in 
navibus habere. Qua re comperta magnam sibi 
facultatem fortunam obtulisse bene gerendae rei 
crediderunt. Itaque navis omnis quas paratas 
habuerant ad navigandum propugnatoribus in- 
struxerunt Caesarique redeunti cum classe occur- 
rerunt. Qui duabus de causis eo die dimicare 



1 Identified by some with a promontory about 8 miles W. 
of Alexandria. 



THEyALEXANDRIAN WAR 

that one night a great quantity of sweet water was 
discovered. Thus the laborious machinations and 
supreme efforts of the Alexandrians were countered 
by a few hours' work. In the course of the following 
day the Thirty-Seventh legion, part of the surren- 
dered remnants of Pompeius' troops, after being em- 
barked by Domitius Calvinus with corn, arms, 
weapons and artillery, made the coast of Africa a 
little beyond Alexandria. An East wind, which 
blew continuously for many days, prevented this 
fleet from gaining harbour ; but the ground through- 
out all that area gives excellent hold for anchoi'S. 
And as they were weather-bound for a long time, 
and hard put to it for lack of water, they infoi-med 
Caesar by means of a fast boat. 

In order to take some personal decision as to what 
he thought ought to be done, Caesar boai-ded a ship 
and ordered his whole fleet to follow him. He did 
not embark any of our troops, since, as he was going 
somewhat too far afield, he was loth to leave our 
entrenchments unmanned. On their arriving at that 
place which is called Chersonensus,^ and putting the 
rowers ashore to fetch water, some of their number, 
bent on plunder, advanced rather too far from the 
ships and were picked up bv enemy cavalry. Prom 
them the enemy learned that Caesar himself had 
arrived with his fleet, without any troops on board. 
This intelligence prompted the belief among them 
that fortune had put in their way a great opportunity 
for scoring a success. Accordingly, they manned 
with combat troops all the ships they had got in 
readiness for sailing, and encountered Caesar as he 
was returning with his fleet. Now there were two 
reasons why Caesar Was loth to fight an action that 



CAESAR 

nolebat, quod et nullos milites in navibus habebat et 
post horam X. diei res agebatur, nox autem allatura 
videbatur maiorem fiduciam illis, qui locorum notitia 
confidebant ; sibi etiam hortandi sues auxilium 
defuturum, quod nulla satis idonea esset hortatio 
quae neque virtutem posset notare neque inertiam. 
Quibus de causis navis quas potuit Caesar ad terram 
detrahit, quern in locum illos successuros non 
existimabat. 
11 Erat una navis Rhodia in dextro Caesaris cornu 
longe ab reliquis colloeata. Hanc eonspicati hostes 
non tenuerunt sese, magnoque impetu I II I ad eana 
constratae naves et complures apertae contenderunt. 
Cui coactus est Caesar ferre subsidium, ne turpem in 
conspectu hostium contumeliam acciperet, quam- 
quam, si quid gravius illis accidisset, merito casurum 
iudicabat. Proelium commissuni est magna con- 
tentione Rhodiorum ; qui cum in omnibus dimica- 
tionibus et scientia et virtute praestitissent, turn 
maxime illo tempore totum onus sustinere non 
recusabant, ne quod suorum culpa detrimentum 
acceptum videretur. Ita proelium secundissimum 
est factum. Capta est una hostium quadriremis, 
depressa est altera, duae omnibus epibatis nudatae ; 
magna praeterea multitudo in reliquis navibus pro- 
pugnatorum est interfecta. Quod nisi nox proelium 
diremisset, tota classe hostium Caesar potitus esset. 
Hac calamitate perterritis hostibus advei-so vento 

24 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

day : he had no troops on board ; and it was now 
after the tenth hour as the matter now stood, and on 
the other hand nightfall would, he thought, inspire 
greater confidence in the enemy, who were relying 
on their local knowledge. In his own case, also, he 
would be denied the advantage of encouraging his 
men, since no encouragement was quite to the 
point where it was impossible to single out for com- 
ment either bravery or slackness. For these reasons 
Caesar withdrew to land what ships he could, at a 
point where he supposed that the enemy would not 
follow them. 

There was one Rhodian ship on Caesar's right wing 
stationed far apart from the rest. As soon as the 
enemy caught sight of it they could not restrain 
themselves, and four decked ships and several open 
ones dashed madly towards it. This vessel Caesar 
was obliged to succour, to prevent the disgrace of 
sustaining rough treatment in full view of the 
enemy ; though, if any serious mischance should 
overtake its crew, he reckoned they would deserve it. 
Battle was joined, with hard fighting on the part of 
the Rhodians ; and though in every fray they had 
excelled both in seamanship and valour, on this 
present occasion above all they bore the whole brunt 
unflinchingly, lest it should seem their fault if any 
defeat were sustained. And so a highly successful 
action was fought. One enemy quadrireme was 
captured, a second was sunk, and two stripped of all 
their marines ; in addition, a large number of combat 
troops was killed aboard the other vessels. If night 
had not put an end to the action, Caesar would have 
become master of the entire enemy fleet. This 
catastrophe utterly demoralised the enemy, and 

25 



CAESAR 

leniter flante navis onerarias Caesar remulco victri- 
cibus suis navibus Alexandream deducit. 
12 Ko detriniento adeo sunt fracti Alexandrini, cum 
iam non vii-tute propugnatorum, sed scientia 
classiariorum se victos viderent, ut vix ex aedificiis 
defendi posse se confiderent, quibus et superioribus 
locis sublevabantur,^ et materiam cunctam obicerent, 
quod nostrae classis oppugnationem etiam ad terram 
verebantur. Idem, postea quam Ganymedes in 
concilio confirmavit sese et eas quae essent amissae 
restituturum et numerum adaucturum, magna spe et 
fiducia veteres reficere navis accuratiusque huic rei 
studere atque inservire instituerunt. Ac tametsi 
amplius CX navibus longis in portu navalibusque 
amiserant, non tamen reparandae classis cogita- 
tionem deposuerunt. Videbant enim non auxilia 
Caesari, non commeatus supportari posse, si classe 
ipsi valerent ; praeterea nautici homines urbis et 
regionis maritimae cotidianoque usu a pueris exerci- 
tati ad naturale ac domesticum bonum refugere 
cupiebant et quantum parvulis navigiis profecissent 
sentiebant ; itaque omni studio ad parandam classem 
incubuerunt. 

^ This clause is faulty as it stands in the MSS., which read — ■ 
quibus et superioribus locis sublevabantur, ut ex aedificiis 
defendi possent. / have adopted Dinter's conjecture, 

^ The contrast here appears to lie between combat crews 
(propugnatores, practically synonymous perhaps with the 
Greek term epibatae), whose function was that of marines, 
and navigating crews (classiarii = fleet personnel, sailors, 
as distinct from marines). Caesar had no marines on board, 
whereas the Alexandrians had ; so that, though Caesar doubt- 
less improvised boarding parties from such sailors as could 
be spared, he had to rely mainly upon superior seamanship 
to ram or cripple his opponents' ships. 

26 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

Caesar returned to Alexandria with his victorious 
fleet, towing the merchant-ships against a gentle 
head wind. 

So shattered were the Alexandrians by this 
reverse — for they saw that now it was not the bravery 
of combat troops but the seamanship of sailors that 
had caused their defeat ^ — that they scarcely trusted 
their ability to defend themselves from the buildings, 
fi-om which, as well as from their higher positions, 
they derived support,^ and used all their timber in 
building barricades, fearing as they did that our fleet 
would attack them even ashore. Nevertheless, after 
Ganymedes had declared in the council that he would 
not only make good the losses they had sustained but 
also increase the number of their ships, their hopes 
and confidence ran high and they began to repair 
their old ships and to devote greater care and more 
earnest attention to this matter. And though they 
had lost more than a hundred and ten warships in the 
harbour and docks,^ yet they did not abandon the 
idea of re-equipping their fleet. They saw in fact 
that neither troop reinforcements nor supplies could 
be conveyed to Caesar if they themselves had a strong 
fleet ; apart from which, the men of the city and the 
coastal district, seamen as they were and trained as 
such from boyhood by daily practice, were anxious to 
resort to this their natural and native gift, and were 
aware how successful they had been with their humble 
little vessels. Consequently they threw themselves 
whole-heartedly into the task of equipping a fleet. 

2 Or perhaps ut superioribus locis should be read, the sense 
being ' which, as being more elevated sites, had proved their 
mainstay.' 

^ Tliese losses are briefly alluded to in Civil Wars III, 
ch. 111. 

27 



CAESAR 

13 Erant omnibus ostiis Nili custodiae exigendi por- 
torii causa dispositae ; naves veteres erant in occultis 
regiae navalibus, quibus multis annis ad navigandum 
non erant usi : has refieiebant, illas Alexandream 
revocabant. Deerant remi : porticus, gymnasia, 
publica aedificia detegebant, asseres remorum usum 
obtinebant ; aliud naturalis sollertia, aliud urbis 
copia sumministrabat. Postremo non longam 
navigationem parabant, sed praesentis temporis 
necessitati serviebant et in ipso portu confligendum 
videbant. Itaque paucis diebus contra omnium 
opinionem quadriremis XXII, quinqueremis V con- 
fecerunt ; ad has minores apertasque compluris 
adiecerunt et in portu periclitati remigio quid quae- 
que earum efficere posset idoneos milites imposuerunt 
seque ad confligendum omnibus rebus paraverunt. 
Caesar Rliodias navis Villi habebat — nam decem 
missis una in cursu litore Aegyptio defecerat — , 
Ponticas Vlll, Lycias ^ V, ex Asia XII. Ex his erant 
quinqueren^es et quadriremes decem, reliquae infra 
banc magnitudinem et pleraeque apertae. Tamen 
virtute militum confisus cognitis hostium copiis se ad 
dimicandum parabat. 
14 Postquam eo ventum est ut sibi uterque eorum 
confideret, Caesar Pharon classe circumvehitur 

1 Lycias or licias MSS. : <Syrias . . . Ci> licias Schneider. 

1 This is somewhat difficult to reconcile with chapter 1, 
where Syria and Cilicia, as well as Rhodes, are specifically 
mentioned, and with the statement in Civil Wars III, ch. 106, 
where it is said that Caesar arrived at Alexandria with ten 
warships from Rhodes and a few from Asia. Could the 
missing Rhodian galley be after all the one described in 
chapter 11? Even so, unless the requisition for additional 
Rhodian ships had not so far been complied with, the figure 

28 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

There were guardships posted at all the mouths of 
the Nile to levy customs dues, and in secret royal 
dockyards there were old ships which had not seen 
service afloat for many years. These last they 
proceeded to repair, while the guardships they re- 
called to Alexandria. There w'as a shortage of 
oars : the roofs of colonnades, gymnasia and public 
buildings were dismantled, and their beams made to 
serve as oars. In one ease it was natural ingenuity 
that helped to bridge the gap, in another the city's 
resources. In fine it was no lengthy voyaging for 
which they were preparing ; but perceiving that the 
conflict must take place in the harbour itself they 
obeyed the dictates of the moment. In a few days, 
therefore, they sui-prised everyone by completing 
22 quadriremes and 5 quinqueremes, to which they 
added a considerable number of smaller, open craft ; 
and then, after trying out in the harbour by rowing 
what each of them could do, they manned them with 
suitable troops and prepared themselves at all points 
for the conflict. Caesar had 9 Rhodian ships (10 had 
been sent, but one had been lost during a voyage, 
on the coast of Egypt), 8 Pontic, 5 Lvcian and 
12 from Asia.^ These included 10 quinqueremes and 
quadriremes, while the rest were smaller craft and 
most of them un-decked. None the less, though 
informed of the enemies' forces, Caesar proceeded 
with his preparations for an action, confident in the 
valour of his troops. 

Now that the stage was reached when each side 
was self-confident, Caesar sailed round Pharos ^ 

of 9 remains a difficulty. The total of 34 tallies with the 
dispositions in ch. 14, below. 

^ i.e. from the Great Harbour to the Eunostos Harbour. 

29 



CAESAR 

advcrsasque navis hostibus constituit : in dextro 
cornu Ilhodias coUocat, in sinistro Ponticas. Inter 
has spatium CCCC passuum relinquit, quod satis 
esse ad explicandas navis videbatur. Post hunc 
ordinem reliquas navis subsidio distribuit ; quae 
quamque earum sequatur et cui subveniat constituit 
atque imperat. Non dubitanter Alexandrini classem 
producunt atque instruunt : in fronte collocant 
XXII, reliquas subsidiarias in secundo ordine consti- 
tuunt. Magnum praeterea numerum minorum 
navigioruni et scapharum producunt cum malleolis 
ignibusque, si quid ipsa multitudo et clamor et 
flamma nostris terroris adferre possent. Erant inter 
duas classis vada transitu angusto, quae pertinent 
ad regionem Africae — sic enim praedicant, partem 
esse Alexandreae dimidiam Africae — satisque diu 
inter ipsos est exspectatum ab utris transeundi 
fieret initium, propterea quod ei qui intrassent et 
ad explicandam classem et ad receptum, si durior 
accidisset casus, impeditiores fore videbantur. 
15 Rhodiis navibus praeerat Euphranor, animi magni- 
tudine ac virtute magis cum nostris hominibus quam 
cum Graecis comparandus. Hie ob notissimam 
scientiam atque animi magnitudinem delectus est 
ab Rhodiis qui imperium classis obtineret. Qui ubi 
cessare ^ Caesarem animum advertit, ' Mderis mihi,' 
inquit, ' Caesar, vereri, si haec vada primis navibus 

1 Caesaris MSS. : cessare Caesarem Hoffmann. 
30 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

with his fleet and drew up his ships facing the enemy. 
On his right wing he posted the Rhodian ships, on 
his left the Pontic ones, leaving a gap of 400 paces 
between them — a distance which he regarded as 
adequate for deploying his vessels. Behind this 
line he arranged his remaining ships in reserve, 
deciding which should follow each of the former 
vessels and which ship each should support, and 
giving orders accordingly. Nor were the Alexan- 
drians hesitant to bring up and array their fleet ; 
posting 22 ships in front, and the remainder in a 
second line in reserve. Besides these they brought 
up a large number of smaller craft and pinnaces, 
equipped with incendiary missiles and combustibles, 
in the hope that sheer numbers and the shouts and 
flames might have some effect in intimidating our 
men. Between the two fleets lay shoals with a 
narrow intersecting channel (these shoals belong 
to the region of Africa — in fact they say that half 
Alexandria is part of Africa) ; and for quite a long 
time there was a pause among the actual combatants 
as they waited to see which side was to begin the 
passage, inasmuch as it seemed that those who 
once entered the channel would be more restricted 
both in deploying their fleet and, if things fared 
badly, in withdrawing. 

The commander of the Rhodian squadron was 
Euphranor, a man M'ho in point of personality and 
bravery deserved comparison with our people rather 
than with the Greeks. Thanks to the great fame 
which his professional skill and forceful personality 
enjoyed, the Rhodians chose him to command their 
fleet. When he perceived Caesar's hesitation, he 
said : ' It seems to me, Caesar, that you are afraid 

31 



CAESAR 

intiaris, ne prius dirnicare cogaris quam reliquam 
classem potueris explicare. Nobis rem committe : 
nos proelium sustinebimus — neque tuum iudicium 
fallemus — dum reliqui subsequantur. Hos quidem 
diutius in nostro conspectu gloriari magno nobis et 
dedecori et dolori est.' Caesar ilium adhortatus 
atque omnibus laudibus prosecutus dat signum 
pugnae. Progressas ultra vadum III I Rhodias navis 
circumsistunt Alexandrini atque in eas impetum 
faciunt. Sustinent illi atque arte sollertiaque se 
explicant ; ac tantum doctrina potuit ut in dispari 
numero nulla transversa hosti obiceretur, nullius 
remi detergerentur, sed semper venientibus adversae 
occurrerent. Interim sunt reliquae subsecutae. 
Turn necessario discessum ab arte est propter 
angustias loci, atque omne certamen in virtute 
constitit. Neque vero Alexandreae fuit quisquam 
aut nostrorum aut oppidanorum, qui aut in opere aut 
in pugna occupatum animum haberent, quin altissima 
tecta peteret atque ex omni prospectu locum specta- 
culo caperet precibusque et votis victoriam suis ab 
dis immortalibus exposceret. 
Ifi Minime autem par erat proeli certamen. Nostris 
enim pulsis neque terra neque mari effugium dabatur 
victis, omniaque victoribus erant futura in incerto ; 
cum illi. si superassent navibus, omnia tenerent, si 
inferiores fuissent, reliquam tamen fortunam peri- 

32 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

that, if you once sail into these shoals with your 
leading flotilla, you may be forced to fight before 
you can deploy the rest of your fleet. Leave it to us : 
we shall bear the brunt of the fighting — we won't let 
vou down — until the others can come up with us. 
Certainly for these fellows to go on boasting yonder 
in our sight is a sore disgrace and mortification to us.' 
Caesar offered him encouragement and paid him 
every tribute of praise, and then gave the signal for 
battle. Four Rhodian ships advanced beyond the 
shoals to be at once surrounded and attacked by the 
Alexandrians. The Rhodians bore up and by skill 
and dexterity deployed their line ; and of such 
powerful effect was their training that despite the 
odds not one of them exposed its broadside to the 
enemy, not one had its oars swept away, but they 
always met the oncoming foe head-on. Mean- 
while the remaining ships came up with them. Then 
through lack of sea room skill had perforce to be 
sacrificed and the whole struggle devolved on courage. 
And indeed there was not one man in Alexandria, 
either of our troops or of the to\\'nsfolk, whose 
attention was bespoken with either work or fighting, 
but he made for the loftiest roof-tops and from out 
of all the vantage points chose one from which to view 
that spectacle, and besought the immortal gods with 
prayers and vows to grant victory to his side. 

The issues involved in the struggle were by no 
means equal. On our side no chance of escape either 
by land or sea was presented in the event of repulse 
and defeat, while victory would in no way settle the 
question ; whereas in their case, if their fleet should 
gain the upper hand, they would hold all the cards, 
while if they were beaten, it would still be left to 

33 



CAESAR 

clitarentur. Sirnul illud grave ac miserum videbatur, 
perpaucos de sumnia rerum ac de salute omnium 
decertare ; quorum si qui aut animo aut virtute 
cessisset, reliquis etiam esset cavendum, quibus pro 
se pugnandi facultas non fuisset. Haec superioribus 
diebus saepenumero Caesar suis exposuerat, ut hoc 
maiore animo contenderent, quod omnium salutem 
sibi commendatam viderent. Eadem suum quisque 
contubernalem, amicum, notum prosequens erat 
obtestatus, ne suam atque omnium falleret 
opinionem, quorum iudicio delectus ad pugnam pro- 
ficisceretur, Itaque hoc animo est decertatum, ut 
neque maritimis nauticisque sollertia atque ars 
praesidium ferret, neque numero navium praestanti- 
bus multitudo prodesset, neque electi ad virtutem e 
tanta multitudine viri virtuti nostrorum possent 
adaequare. Capitur hoc proelio quinqueremis una 
et biremis cum defensoribus remigibusque, et 
deprimuntur tres, nostris incolumibus omnibus. 
Reliquae propinquam fugam ad oppidum capiunt ; 
quas protexerunt ex molibus atque aedificiis im- 
minentibus et nostros adire propius prohibuerunt. 
17 Hoc ne sibi saepius accidere posset, omni ratione 
Caesar contendendum existimavit ut insulam molem- 

34 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

them to try their luck again. At the same time it 
seemed a grievous shame that the supreme issue and 
the salvation of all should be decided by the rival 
exertions of so few ; and if any one of these wavered 
in purpose or courage, the others too, who had had 
no chance of fighting to defend themselves, would 
have to look out for themselves. These considera- 
tions Caesar had repeatedly explained to his men in 
recent days, that they might fight with the greater 
resolution because they saw that the safety of all was 
entrusted to themselves. It was by these same argu- 
ments too that every man, as he escorted his mess- 
mate, friend or acquaintance, implored him not to 
prove false to the estimate which not only he himself 
had formed of him, but all those others likewise, to 
whose decision he owed it that he was now going forth 
as one of the chosen combatants. Consequently 
such was the resolute spirit with which the battle 
was contested that the Alexandrians, albeit a mari- 
time and seafaring folk, derived no assistance from 
their dexterity and skill, nor did they benefit from 
their superiority in number of ships, nor could their 
men, though chosen for their bravery from so vast a 
multitude, match the bravery of our men. In this 
battle one quinquereme and a bireme were captured 
with their combat crews and rowers, and three were 
sunk, all our ships being unharmed. The rest of 
their ships fled to the nearby town, where the towns- 
men, from stations on the moles and adjacent 
buildings, protected them and prevented our men 
from approaching at all close. 

To prevent the possibility of this kind of thing 
occurring to him too frequently, Caesar thought that 
he ought at all costs to make an effort to gain control 

35 



CAESAR 

que ad insulam pertinentem in suam redigeret 
potestatem. Perfectis enim magna ex parte muni- 
tionibus in oppido et insulam et urbem uno tempore 
temptari posse confidebat. Quo capto consilio 
cohortis X et levis armaturae electos, quosque 
idoneos ex equitibus Gallis arbitrabatur, in navigia 
minora scaphasque imponit ; alteram insulae partem 
distinendae manus causa constratis navibus aggre- 
ditur, praemiis magnis propositis qui primus insulam 
cepisset. Ac primo impetum nostrorum pariter 
sustinuerunt : uno enim tempore et ex tectis aedi- 
ficiorum propugnabant et litora armati defendebant, 
quo propter asperitatem loci non facilis nostris 
adit us dabatur, et scaphis navibusque longis quinque 
mobiliter et scienter angustias loci tuebantur. Sed 
ubi primum locis cognitis vadisque pertemptatis 
pauci nostri in litore constiterunt atque hos sunt alii 
subsecuti constanterque in eos qui in litore aequo 
institerant impetum fecerunt, omnes Pharitae terga 
verterunt. His pulsis custodia portus relicta navis 
ad litora et vicum applicarunt seque ex navibus ad 
tuenda aedificia eiecerunt. 
18 Neque vero diutius ea munitione se continere 
potuerunt, etsi erat non dissimile atque Alexandreae 
genus aedificiorum, ut minora maioribus conferantur, 
turresque editae et coniunctae muri locum obtine- 
bant, neque nostri aut scalis aut cratibus aut reliquis 

1 According to Ciiil Wars III, ch. 112, Caesar had already 
seized Pharos and placed a garrison in it ; but this may have 
been only the eastern tip, where the lighthouse stood, com- 
manding the entrance to the Great Harbour. 

36 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

of the island ^ and the mole extending to it. 
For as his entrenchments in the town were in the 
main completed, he was confident that a simul- 
taneous attempt could be made against both island 
and city. Having formed this plan, he embarked 
in smaller craft and pinnaces ten cohorts, some 
picked light-armed troops and such of his Gallic 
cavalry as he deemed suitable ; and, to distract the 
enemy gan*ison, he launched an attack with decked 
ships upon the other side of the island, offering large 
rewards to the first to capture it. At first the 
islanders held off our troops' attack, simultaneously 
fighting back from the roofs of buildings, and vith 
equal success defending the beaches with armed 
parties — and there the roughness of the ground did 
not afford our troops an easy approach — -and guarding 
the narrow waters with pinnaces and five warships 
displaying both speed and skill. But as soon as our 
men had become acquainted with the ground and 
tried out the shallows, a few got a footing on the 
beach, others followed in their wake, and a deter- 
mined attack was launched upon those of the enemy 
who were drawn up against us on the level fore- 
shore ; whereupon the men of Pharos all turned tail. 
FoUoAdng their rout the enemy abandoned their 
defence of the harbour, brought their ships to the 
built-up area by the water-front, and hastily dis- 
embarked to defend the buildings. 

They could not, however, hold on so very long with 
the defences these afforded, though the buildings 
Avere of a type not unlike those of Alexandria — to 
employ a flattering comparison — %\-ith a continuous 
line of lofty towers taking the place of a wall ; and 
our troops had not come equipped with ladders or 

37 



CAESAR 

rebus parati vcnerant ad oppugnandum. Sed terror 
hominibus mentem consiliumque eripit et membra 
debilitat ; ut turn accidit. Qui se in aequo loco ac 
piano pares esse confidebant, idem perterriti fuga 
suorum et caede paucorum XXX pedum altitudine in 
aedificiis consistere ausi non sunt seque per molem in 
mare praecipitaverunt et DCCC passuum intervallum 
ad oppidum enataverunt. Multi tamen ex his capti 
interfectique sunt ; sed numerus captivorum omnino 
fuit sex milium. 
19 Caesar praeda militibus concessa aedificia diripi 
iussit castellumque ad pontem, qui propior erat 
Pharo, communivit atque ibi praesidium posuit. 
Hunc fuga Pharitae reliquerant ; artiorem ^ ilium 
propioremque oppido Alexandrini tuebantur. Sed 
eum postero die simili ratione aggreditur, quod his 
obtentis duobus omnem navigiorum excursum et 
repentina latrocinia sublatum iri videbatur. lamque 
eos qui praesidio eum locum tenebant tormentis ex 
navibus sagittisque depulerat atque in oppidum 
redegerat et cohortium trium instar in terram ex- 
posuerat — non enim pluris consistere angustiae loci 
patiebantur — ; reliquae copiae in navibus stationem 
obtinebant. Quo facto imperat pontem adversus 
hostem praevallari et, qua exitus navibus erat fornice 
exstructo, quo pons sustinebatur, lapidibus oppleri 

' fortiorem or certiorem MSS, : artiorem Vielhaber. 
38 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

wicker screens or any other equipment for assault. 
But panic robs men of their sense and reason and 
palsies their limbs ; and so it happened then. The 
very men who on level and unbroken ground were 
confident they were a match for us, none the less, 
utterly demoralised now by the flight of their fellows 
and the slaughter of a few, did not venture to take 
up a position on buildings thirty feet high, but at 
various points along the mole dived into the sea and 
swam the intervening 800 paces to the safety of the 
town. Many of these, notwithstanding, were cap- 
tured or killed ; indeed, the number of captives 
amounted all told to six thousand. 

After granting his soldiers leave to plunder, 
Caesar ordered the buildings to be demolished. Near 
the bridge — the one closer to Pharos — he fortified 
a redoubt, and posted a garrison there. This bridge 
the inhabitants of Pharos had abandoned in their 
flight ; while the other one, which was narrower 
and closer to the town, was guarded by the Alexan- 
drians. However, on the next day he attacked it 
from a similar motive, because the possession of 
these two bridges seemed likely to do away with all 
the sallies and sudden forays of the enemies' ships. 
And by now he had dislodged the members of its 
garrison with artillery and arrows shot from his ships, 
had driven them back into the town, and put ashore 
approximately three cohorts — the confined space 
would not afford a footing for more — -while the rest 
of his forces remained at their posts aboard the ships. 
At this stage he ordered the bridge to be screened by 
a rampart on the side facing the enemy, and the 
opening for the passage of ships — formed by an arch 
which supported the bridge — to be filled up and 

39 



CAESAR 

atque obstrui. Quorum altero opere effecto, ut 
nulla omnino scapha egredi posset, altero institute 
omnes Alexandrinorum copiae ex oppido se eiecerunt 
et contra munitiones pontis latiore loco constiterunt, 
eodemque tempore quae consueverant navigia per 
pontis ad incendia onerariarum emittere ad molem 
constituerunt. Pugnabatur a nobis ex ponte, ex 
mole ; ab illis ex area, quae erat adversus pontem, et 
ex navibus contra molem. 
20 In his rebus occupato Caesare militesque hortante 
remigum magnus numerus et classiariorum ex longis 
navibus nostris in molem se eiecit. Pars eorum 
studio spectandi ferebatur, pars etiam cupiditate 
pugnandi. Hi primum navigia hostium lapidibus 
ac fundis a mole repellebant ac multum proficere 
multitudine telorum videbantur. Sed postquam 
ultra eum locum ab latere eorum aperto ausi sunt 
egredi ex navibus Alexandrini pauci, ut sine signis 
certisque ordinibus, sine ratione prodierant, sic 
temere in navis refugere coeperunt. Quorum fuga 
incitati Alexandrini plures ex navibus egrediebantur 
nostrosque acrius perturbatos insequebantur. Simul 
qui in navibus longis remanserant scalas rapere 
navisque a terra repellere properabant, ne hostes 
navibus potirentur. Quibus omnibus rebus per- 
turbati milites nostri cohortium trium quae in ponte 
40 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

blocked with stones. The latter task being com- 
pleted, so that not a single pinnace could come out, 
and the former one being under way, all the Alexan- 
drians' forces burst out of the town and took post in a 
fairly open position over against our fortifications of 
the bridge ; while at the same time they drew up 
near the mole the vessels which they had been in the 
habit of sending out under the bridges to set fire 
to our transports. And so the battle proceeded, 
with us fighting from the bridge and the mole, and 
with them from the area facing the bridge and from 
their ships opposite the mole. 

While Caesar was occupied with this situation, and 
as he was encouraging the troops, a large number of 
rowers and seamen left our warships and suddenly 
landed on the mole. Some were inspired by their 
anxiety to watch the fray, others also by the desire to 
take part in it. They began by driving back the 
enemy vessels from the mole with stones and slings, 
and it seemed that their heavy volleys of missiles 
were having great effect. But when a few Alexan- 
drians ventured to disembark beyond that point, 
on the side of their unprotected flank, then, just as 
they had advanced in no set order or formation and 
without any particular tactics, so now they began to 
retire haphazardly to the ships. Encouraged by 
their retreat, more of the Alexandrians disembarked 
and pursued our flustered men more hotly. At the 
same time those who had stayed aboard the warships 
made haste to seize the gang-planks and ease the 
ships away from land, to prevent the enemy from 
gaining possession of them. All this thoroughly 
alarmed our troops of the three cohorts which had 
taken post on the bridge and the tip of the mole ; 

41 



CAESAR 

ac prima mole constiterant, cum post se clamorem 
exaudirent, fugam suorum viderent, magnam vim 
telorum adversi sustinerent, veriti ne ab tergo 
circumvenirentur et discessu navium omnino reditu 
intercluderentur munitionem in ponte institutam 
reliquerunt et magno cursu incitati ad navis con- 
tenderunt. Quorum pars proximas nacta navis 
multitudine hominum atque onere depressa est, pars 
resistens et dubitans quid esset capiendum consili 
ab Alexandrinis interfecta est ; non nuUi feliciore 
exitu expeditas ad ancoram navis consecuti in- 
columes discesserunt, pauci allevatis scutis et animo 
ad conandum nisi ad proxima navigia adnatarunt. 
21 Caesar quoad potuit cohortando suos ad pontem 
ac munitiones continere, eodem in periculo versatus 
est ; postquam universos cedere animadvertit, in 
suum navigium se recepit. Quo multitudo hominum 
insecuta cum irrumperet neque administrandi neque 
repellendi a terra facultas daretur, fore quod accidit 
suspicatus sese ex navigio eiecit atque ad eas quae 
longius constiterant navis adnatavit. Hinc suis 
laborantibus subsidio scaphas mittens non nullos 
conservavit. Navigium quidem eius multitudine 
depressum militum una cum hominibus interiit. Hoc 
proelio desiderati sunt ex numero legionariorum 
militum circiter CCCC et paulo ultra eum numerum 
classiarii et remiges. Alexandrini eo loco castellum 
magnis munitionibus multisque tormentis confirma- 

42 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

and as they heard the clamour behind them, and 
saw the retreat of their comrades, and sustained a 
heavy frontal barrage of missiles, they feared they 
might be surrounded in rear and have their retreat 
entirely cut off by the departure of their ships ; and 
so they abandoned the entrenchment they had begun 
at the bridge, and doubled frantically to the ships. 
Some of them gained the nearest ships, only to be 
capsized by the weight of so many men ; some were 
killed by the Alexandrians as they put up a forlorn 
and bewildered resistance ; some proved luckier in 
reaching ships at anchor cleared for action, and so got 
away safely ; and a few, holding their shields above 
them and steeling their resolution to the task, swam 
off to ships near by. 

So long as by words of encouragement Caesar was 
able to keep his men at the bridge and its emplace- 
ments, he too was involved in the same danger ; 
but when he perceived that they were all retreating, 
he withdrew to his own vessel. As a large number of 
men followed him and kept forcing their way aboard 
it, and as no opportunity was afforded either of 
navigating it or easing it off shore, anticipating what 
actually happened he dived from the vessel and swam 
to those ships which were hove to farther off. From 
them he sent pinnaces to the help of his men who 
were in difficulties, and saved not a few. His vessel 
was in fact capsized by the large number of troops, 
and foundered with the men on board. In this 
battle the losses among the legionary troops 
amounted to approximately 400, with a slightly 
larger number of seamen and rowers. The Alexan- 
drians reinforced the redoubt there with strong 
entrenchments and many pieces of artillery and 

43 



CAESAR 

runt atque egcstis ex mari lapidibus libere sunt usi 
postea ad mittenda navigia. 

22 Hoc detrimento milites nostri tantum afuerunt ut 
perturbarentur, ut incensi atque ineitati magnas 
accessiones fecerint in operibus hostium expug- 
nandis. In proeliis cotidianis, quandocumque fors 
obtulerat, procurrentibus et erumpentibus Alexan- 
drinis, manum conserendi potestate facta multum 
proficiebat Caesar voluntate optima ^ et ardentibus 
studiis militum ; nee divulgata Caesaris hortatio 
subsequi legionum aut laborem aut pugnandi poterat 
cupiditatem, ut magis deterrendi et continendi a 
periculosissimis essent dimicationibus quam incitandi 
ad pugnandum. 

23 Alexandrini cum Romanos et secundis rebus 
confirmari et adversis incitari viderent neque ullum 
belli tertium casum nossent quo possent esse 
firmiores, ut coniectura consequi possumus, aut 
admoniti a regis amicis qui in Caesaris erant praesi- 
diis, aut suo priore consilio per occultos nuntios 
regi probato legatos ad Caesarem miserunt, ut 
dimitteret regem transireque ad suos pateretur : 
paratam enim omnem multitudinem esse, confectam 
taedio puellae, fiduciario regno, dominatione crude- 
lissima Ganymedis, facere id quod rex imperasset; 
quo si auctore in Caesaris fidem amicitiamque 
venturi essent, nullius periculi timorem multitudini 
fore impedimento quo minus se dederent. 

^ Alexandrinis manum comprehendi multum operibus et 
MSS. I have adopted Dinter's conjecture. 

^ viz. by Arsinoe to Ganymedes (cf. ch. 33) : others, how- 
ever, interpret the phrase as meaning ' the kingdom, by rights 
Ptolemy's, held in trust by others '. Andrieu, omitting the 
comma after puellae, renders ' degoute de I'autorite fictive 
d'unc jeune fille.' 

44 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

removed tlie stones from the sea, subsequently making 
free use of the opening to despatch their vessels. 

This reverse, so far from dismaying our troops, 
fired and stiinulated thein to carry out large-scale 
sallies in the course of storming the enemy's defence- 
works. Every day encounters took place, and when- 
ever a chance offered itself and the Alexandrians 
burst out in a frontal sally and gave Caesar an 
opportunity of engaging battle, he achieved con- 
siderable success, thanks to the excellent morale 
and ardent enthusiasm of his troops ; nor could his 
\videspread words of encouragement keep pace with 
the legions' exertions or their eagerness for fighting, 
so that they had to be deterred and held back from 
the most hazardous encounters rather than be 
spurred on to fight. 

The Alexandrians saw that the Romans were 
heartened by successes and stimulated by reverses, 
nor were they aware of any third vicissitude of war 
which could make them yet more steadfast. And so, 
whether it was they were warned by the king's friends 
who were in Caesar's camp, or whether they were 
acting on some previous plan of their own made known 
to the king by secret despatches and approved by him, 
— we can only guess at their motive — they sent envoys 
to Caesar requesting him to release the king and allow 
him to go over to his own side. ' The whole popula- 
tion ', they said, ' being tired and wearied of the 
girl, of the delegation of the kingship,^ and of the 
utterly remorseless tyranny of Ganymedes, were 
ready to do the king's bidding ; and if, at his instance, 
they were to enter into a loyal friendship with 
Caesar, then no danger would intimidate or prevent 
the population from submitting.' 

45 



CAESAR 

24 Caesar etsi fallacem gentem semperque alia 
cogitantem, alia simulantem bene cognitam habebat, 
tamen petentibus dare veniam utile esse statuit, 
quod, si quo pacto sentirent ea quae postularent, 
mansurum in fide diinissum regem credebat, sin, id 
quod magis illorum naturae conveniebat, ducem ad 
bellum gerendum regem habere vellent, splendidius 
atque honestius se contra regem quam contra con- 
venarum ac fugitivorum manum bellum esse gestu- 
rum. Itaque regem cohortatus ut consuleret regno 
paterno, parceret praeclarissimae patriae, quae 
turpibus incendiis et ruinis esset deformata, civis 
suos primum ad sanitatem revocaret, deinde con- 
servaret, fidem populo Romano sibique praestaret, 
cum ipse tantum ei crederet ut ad hostis armatos 
eum mitteret, dextra dextram tenens dimittere 
coepit adulta iam aetate puerum. At regius animus 
disciplinis fallacissimis eruditus, ne a gentis suae 
moribus degeneraret, flens orare contra Caesarem 
coepit ne se dimitteret : non enim sibi regnum ipsum 
conspectu Caesaris esse iucundius. Compressis pueri 
lacrimis Caesar ipse commotus celeriter, si ilia sen- 
tiret, fore eum secum adfirmans ad suos dimisit. 
Ille, ut ex carceribus in liberum cursum emissus, adeo 
contra Caesarem acriter bellum gerere coepit ut 
46 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

Though Caesar was well aware that they were a 
deceitful race, always pretending something different 
from their real intentions, yet he decided that it was 
expedient to satisfy their plea for clemency, since, if 
their demands in any way reflected their feelings, then 
he believed the king would remain loyal when released ; 
but if, on the other hand, they wanted to have the king 
to lead them with a view to waging the war — and that 
was more in keeping with their character — then he 
thought there would be greater honour and distinc- 
tion for him in waging war against a king than 
against a motley collection of refugees. Accord- 
ingly, he urged the king to take thought for the 
kingdom of his fathers, to have pity on his most 
illustrious country, shamefully scarred as it was by 
fire and desolation, to recall his citizens to sanity 
first and then to preserve them therein, and to 
prove his loyalty to the Roman people and to Caesar, 
inasmuch as Caesar himself had such faith in him 
that he was sending him to join an enemy under 
arms. Then, grasping his right hand in his own, 
Caesar made to take leave of the boy — already 
grown to manhood. But the royal mind, schooled in 
all the lessons of utter deceit, was loth to fall short 
of the customary standards of his race ; and so with 
tears he proceeded to beseech Caesar to the opposite 
effect not to send him away : his very kingdom, he 
declared, was not more pleasing to him than the 
sight of Caesar. Checking the lad's tears, albeit 
not unmoved himself, Caesar declared that, if that 
was the way he felt, they would speedily be re- 
united, and so sent him back to his people. Like a 
horse released from the starting-gate and given his 
head, the king proceeded to wage war against Caesar 

47 



CAESAR 

lacrimas quas in colloquio proiecerat gaudio vide- 
retur profudisse. Accidisse hoc complures Caesaris 
legati, amici, centuriones militesque laetabantur, 
quod nimia bonitas eius fallaciis pueri elusa esset. 
Quasi vero id Caesar bonitate tantum adductus ac 
non prudentissimo consilio fecisset. 
25 Cum duce assumpto Alexandrini nihilo se firmiores 
factos aut languidiores Romanes animadverterent 
eludentibusque militibus regis aetatem atque in- 
firmitatem magnum dolorem acciperent neque se 
quicquam proficere viderent, rumoresque exsisterent 
magna Caesari praesidia terrestri itinere ex Syria 
Ciliciaque adduci, quod nondum auditum Caesari 
erat, commeatum, qui mari nostris supportabatur, 
intercipere statuerunt. Itaque expeditis navigiis 
locis idoneis ad Canopum in statione dispositis navi- 
bus insidiabantur nostris commeatuque. Quod ubi 
Caesari nuntiatum est, universam classem iubet 
expediri atque instrui. Praeficit huic Tiberium 
Neronem. Proficiseuntur in ea elasse Rhodiae 
naves atque in his Euphranor, sine quo nulla um- 
quam dimicatio maritima, nulla etiam parum feliciter 
confecta erat. At fortuna, quae plerumque eos 
quos plurimis beneficiis ornavit ad duriorem casum 
reservat, superiorum temporum dissimilis Euphra- 
norem prosequebatur. Nam cum ad Canopum 

^ The father of the Emperor Tiberius. 
48 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

so energetically that the tears he had shed at their 
conference seemed to have been tears of joy. Not a 
few of Caesar's officers and friends and many of the 
centurions and soldiers were delighted at this turn 
of events, inasmuch as Caesar's over-generosity had, 
they felt, been made fun of by the deceitful tricks of a 
boy. As if indeed it was merely generosity and not 
the most far-sighted strategy which had led him 
to do it ! 

Having got themselves a leader, the Alexandrians 
observed no greater degree of resolution in them- 
selves or of listlessness in the Romans ; in addition, 
the fun which the soldiers made of the king's youth- 
fulness and irresolution caused great resentment, 
and they saw they were making no headway. As, 
moreover, rumours were current that large reinforce- 
ments for Caesar were on their way overland from 
Syria and Cilicia— intelligence which had not yet 
come to Caesar's ears — they decided to intercept a 
convoy of supplies which was being conveyed to our 
troops by sea. Accordingly they stationed some 
lightly armed vessels on guard at suitable points near 
Canopus, and lay in wait for our ships and supplies. 
When Caesar was informed of this he ordered his 
entire fleet to be got ready and equipped, putting 
Tiberius Nero ^ in command. Included in this fleet 
when it set out were the Rhodian ships, and aboard 
them Euphranor, without whom no naval action had 
ever been fought, and none even that was not a 
resounding victory. Fortune, however, very often 
reserves for a harsher fate those upon whom she has 
showered her most pi'olific blessings ; and so too the 
foi'tune that now attended Euphranor was different 
from that of former times. For when they reached 

49 



CAESAR 

ventum esset instructaque utrimque classis con- 
flixisset et sua consuetudine I'.uphranor primus 
proelium conimisisset et quadriremem hostium per- 
forasset ac demersisset, proximam longius insecutus 
parum celeriter insequentibus reliquis circumventus 
est ab Alexandrinis. Cui subsidium nemo tulit, sive 
quod in ipso satis praesidi pro virtute ac felicitate eius 
putarent esse, sive quod ipsi sibi timebant. Ita, 
qui unus ex omnibus eo proelio bene rem gessit, solus 
cum sua quadriremi victrice perit. 
26 Sub idem tempus Mithridates Pergamenus, 
magnae nobilitatis domi scientiaeque in bello et 
virtutis, fidei dignitatisque in amicitia Caesaris, 
missus in Syriam Ciliciamque initio belli Alexandrini 
ad auxilia arcessenda, cum magnis copiis, quas 
celeriter et propensissima civitatium voluntate et sua 
diligentia confecerat, itinere pedestri, quo coniungi- 
tur Aegyptus Syriae, Pelusium adducit : ^ idque 
oppidum firmo praesidio occupatum Achillae propter 
opportunitatem loci — namque tota Aegyptus mari- 
time accessu Pharo, pedestri Pelusio velut claustris 
munita existimatur — , repente magnis circumdatum 
copiis multiplici praesidio pertinaciter propugnan- 
tibus et copiarum magnitudine, quas integras 

1 adducit, the MSS. reading, is difficult. Duties proposed 
advenit : Hoffmann adductis, id oppidum . . . 



^ Son of a wealthy citizen of Pergamum who had been 
adopted by Mithridates the Great, from whom he took his 
name : another account made him out to be a natural son of 
the latter. 

^ I assume here that something like oppidanis is to be 
supplied as the noun defined by propugnantibus. 

50 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

Canopus and each side had drawn up its fleet and 
entered the conflict, Euphranor. following his normal 
custom, was the first to join battle ; but when he had 
holed and sunk one enemy quadrireme, he pursued 
the next one too far ; and as the other ships were not 
ipiick enough in following his lead, he was surrounded 
by the Alexandrians. No one brought him assist- 
ance, either because they thought that, considering 
his courage and his good luck, he was quite able to 
take care of himself, or because they were afraid 
for their own sakes. And so the one and only man 
who was successful in that battle perished alone 
along with his victorious quadrireme. 

Round about the same time Mithridates of 
Pergamum ^ approached Pelusium. A man of high 
standing in his own country and of great experience 
and valour in w'ar, as well as a very loyal and valued 
friend of Caesar, he had been sent into Syria and 
Cilicia at the outbreak of the Alexandrian war to 
fetch reinforcements ; and now, accompanied by 
large forces which he had speedily raised, thanks 
both to the very helpful attitude adopted by the 
states and to his own conscientious eiforts, he arrived 
at Pelusium by the overland route which links Egypt 
with Syria. This town had been occupied by a 
strong garrison of Achillas on account of the tactical 
importance of the place ; for Pharos and Pelusium 
are regarded as the keys, as it were, to the defence 
of the whole of Egypt, Pelusium guarding the over- 
land approach, as Pharos defends the seaward one. 
Mithridates now suddenly surrounded it with large 
forces; and, despite the obstinate defence put up 
by its numerous garrison,- thanks both to the large 
number of fresh troops which he kept throwing in to 

51 



CAESAR 

vulneratis defessisque subiciebat, et perseverantia 
constantiaque oppugnandi quo die est aggressus in 
suam redegit potestatem praesidiumque ibi suum 
collocavit. Inde re bene gesta Alexandream ad 
Caesarem eontendit omnisque eas regioncs per 
quas iter faciebat auctoritate ea quae plerumque 
adest victori pacarat atque in amicitiam Caesaris 
redegerat. 
27 Locus est fere regionum illarum nobilissimus non 
ita longe ab Alexandrea, qui nominatur Delta ; 
quod nomen a similitudine litterae cepit : nam pars 
quaedam fluminis Nili derivata ^ duobus itineribus 
paulatim medium inter se spatium relinquens diver- 
sissimo ad litus intervallo mari coniungitur. Cui loco 
cum appropinquare Mithridaten rex cognovisset et 
transeundum ei flumen sciret, magnas adversus 
eum copias misit, quibus vel superari delerique 
Mithridaten vel sine dubio retineri posse credebat. 
Quern ad modum autem optabat eum vinci, sic satis 
habebat interclusum a Caesare a se retineri. Quae 
primae copiae flumen a Delta transire et Mithridati 
occurrere potuerunt, proelium commiserunt festi- 
nantes praeripere subsequentibus victoriae socie- 
tatem. Quorum impetum Mithridates magna cum 
prudentia ^ consuetudine nostra castris vallatis 
sustinuit ; cum vero incaute atque insolenter suc- 

* derivata inter se MSS. Duebner deleted inter se. 

* Some MSS. add the words constantiaque virtutum et 
Alexandrinorum imprudentia. 



* Apparently he marched south so as to cross the Nile 
south of the Delta. 

* In antiquity the term ' Delta ' was also applied, in a 
restricted sense, to the southern apex of the triangle. The 

52 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

replace the wounded and exhausted and to the 
stubborn and unremitting nature of his assault, he 
reduced it to submission on the same day he started 
to attack it, and then posted a garrison of his own 
in it. Whereupon, having achieved this success, he 
marched to join Caesar in Alexandria, peacefully 
subduing, meanwhile, and winning over to friendship 
with Caesar, by that authority which normally 
belongs to the victor, all those districts along his line 
of march. ^ 

Not so very far from Alexandria lies what is per- 
haps the best known spot in those parts. It is called 
Delta, and took its name from its resemblance to the 
letter ; for a certain section of the river Nile splits up into 
two channels which diverge gradually but are separated 
by a very wide interval at the coast, where the river 
joinsthesea. Whentheking learned that Mithridates 
was approaching this spot,^ and knew that he must 
cross the river, he despatched large forces against 
him, by which he believed Mithridates could either 
be beaten and destroyed, or else undoubtedly held in 
check. However, desirous as he was for his defeat, 
he was quite as content to cut him off from Caesar 
and hold him in check. The first of his forces to 
succeed in crossing the river from Delta and meeting 
Mithridates joined battle in eager haste to forestall 
those following up behind, and so rob them of the 
chance to participate in victory. Mithridates con- 
tained their attack with great discretion, fortifying his 
camp after our regular fashion ; but when he saw 
them coming up to the entrenchinents with a con- 
battle must have taken place to the east of the Nile — according 
to Josephus at the Encampment of the Jews, identified by 
some with Tal-el-Jahoudieh about 17 miles north of Cairo. 

53 



CAESAR 

cedere eos niunitionibus videret, eruptione undique 
facta magnum numerum eorum interfecit. Quod 
nisi locorum notitia reliqui se texissent partinique in 
navis quibus flumen transierant recepissent, funditus 
deleti essent. Qui ut paulum ab illo timore se 
recrearunt, adiuncti eis qui subsequebantur rursus 
oppugnare Mithridaten coeperunt. 
28 Mittitur a Mithridate nuntius Caesari qui rem 
gestam perferret. Cognoscit ex suis eadem haec 
accidisse rex. Ita paene sub idem tempus et rex 
ad opprimendum Mithridaten proficiscitur et Caesar 
ad recipiendum. Celeriore fluminis Nili navigatione 
rex est usus, in quo magnam et paratam classem 
habebat. Caesar eodem itinere uti noluit, ne navibus 
in flumine dimicaret, sed circumvectus est eo mari, 
quod Africae partis esse dicitur, sicuti supra demon- 
stravimus ; prius tamen regis copiis occurrit, quam is 
Mithridaten aggredi posset, eumque ad se victorem 
incolumi exercitu recepit. Consederat cum copiis 
rex loco natura munito, quod erat ipse excelsior 
planitie ex omnibus partibus subiecta : tribus autem 
ex lateribus variis genere munitionibus tegebatur : 
unum latus erat adiectum flumini Nilo, alterum 
editissimo loco ductum, ut partem castrorum ob- 
tineret, tertium palude cingebatur. 

^ See chapter 14. Apparently Caesar sailed W. to Cher- 
sonensus, to avoid fighting his way through the enemy- 
occupied part of Alexandria, and then marched S.E., keeping 
Lake Mareotis on his left. 

^ There is wide disagreement about identifj-ing this 
position ; but assuming that Mithridat«s marched X.W. to 
join Caesar it seems reasonable to place it close to the western 

54 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

temptiious recklessness, he made a general sally 
and killed a large number of them. And had not the 
remainder employed their knowledge of the district 
to find cover for themselves, and some retired to 
the ships in which they had crossed the river, they 
would have been completely wiped out. When 
they had recovered a little from the resulting panic, 
they joined forces with their comrades following up 
behind, and proceeded to a new attack on Mithridates. 
A messenger was despatched by Mithridates to 
Caesar to bring him tidings of the action. The king 
learned of these same events from his own people. 
Accordingly at practically the same time the king 
set forth to crush Mithridates, and Caesar to relieve 
him. The king had recourse to the quicker method of 
transport, namely sailing up the river Nile, in which 
he had a large fleet in readiness. Caesar was un- 
willing to use the same route, so as not to fight a 
naval action in the river. Instead, he sailed round 
by that sea which is said to belong to part of Africa, 
as I have explained earlier.^ Yet in spite of this he 
came up with the king's forces before the latter 
could attack Mithridates, and so rescued the vic- 
torious Mithridates with his army intact. The king 
had encamped with his forces in a naturally strong 
position,^ since in itself the position was higher than 
the plateau which lay beneath it on all sides ; more- 
over, on three sides it was covered by defences of 
diverse types : one side abutted the river Nile ; 
a second ran along very high ground and formed one 
face of his camp ; while the third was encircled by a 
marsh. 

branch of the Nile about half-way between Cairo and Alex- 
andria, but perhaps closer to the latter. 

55 



CAESAR 

29 Inter castra et Caesaris iter flumen intercedebat 
angustum altissimis ripis, quod in Nilum influebat, 
aberat autem ab regis castris milia passuum circiter 
^'II. Rex cum hoc itinere venire Caesarem com- 
perisset, equitatum omnem expeditosque delectos 
pedites ad id flumen misit qui transitu Caesarem 
prohiberent et eminus ex ripis proelium impar 
inirent : nullum enim processum virtus habebat aut 
periculum ignavia subibat. Quae res incendit dolore 
milites equitesque nostros, quod tarn diu pari proelio 
cum Alexandrinis certaretur. Itaque eodem tem- 
pore equites Germani dispersi vada fluminis quae- 
rentes partim demissioribus ripis flumen tranarunt, 
et legionarii magnis arboribus excisis, quae longi- 
tudine utramque ripam contingerent, proiectis eis ^ 
repentinoque aggere iniecto flumen transierunt. 
Quorum impetum adeo pertimuerunt hostes ut in 
fuga spem salutis collocarent ; sed id frustra : namque 
ex ea fuga pauci ad regem refugerunt paene omni 
reliqua multitudine interfecta. 

30 Caesar re praeclarissime gesta, cum subitum 
adventum suum iudicaret magnum terrorem Alexan- 
drinis iniecturum, protinus victor ad castra regis 
pertendit. Haec cum et opere magno vallata et loci 
natura munita animadverteret confertamque arma- 
torum multitudinem collocatam in vallo videret, 
lassos itinere ac proeliando milites ad oppugnanda 

^ eis added by Nipperdey. 
56 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

Between the camp and Caesar's line of march ran a 
narrow river with very high banks, which flowed 
into the Nile and was some seven miles distant from 
the king's camp. When the king learned that 
Caesar was coming by this route, he despatched all 
his cavalry and a picked force of light-armed infantry 
to this river to prevent Caesar from crossing it and 
to engage at long range from its banks — an unfair 
engagement, for the spot could neither afford scope 
for valour nor involve cowardice in any risk. These 
tactics filled our infantry and cavalrv with burning 
resentment at the thought that for so long their 
struggle with the Alexandrians should prove a drawn 
battle. And so, at the same time as scattered 
groups of German cavalry, looking for places to ford 
the river, swam across it at some points where the 
banks were lower, simultaneously the legionary 
troops, having felled lofty trees tall enough to reach 
from bank to bank, hurled them forward and crossed 
the river on a causeway hastily thrown on top. So 
terrified were the enemy by their attack, that they 
pinned their hopes of deliverance to flight : in vain, 
however ; for few survived that rout to take refuge 
with the king, and practically all the remainder were 
killed. 

After this most notable success Caesar forthwith 
pushed forward triumphantly to the king's camp, 
holding the view that his sudden approach would 
strike great terror into the hearts of the Alexandrians. 
But when he observed that this camp was strongly 
entrenched as well as protected by its natural 
position, and saw the serried mass of armed men 
posted at the rampart, he was unwilling to let his 
soldiers, weary as they were with marching and 

57 



CAESAR 

castra succedere noluit. Ita(jue non magno inter- 
vallo relicto ab hoste castra posuit. Postero die 
castellum, quod rex in proximo vico non longe a suis 
castris munierat bracchiisque cum opere castrorum 
coniunxerat vici obtinendi causa, Caesar aggressus 
omnibus copiis expugnat, non quo id minore numero 
militum consequi difficile factu putaret, sed ut ab ea 
victoria perterritis Alexandrinis protinus castra regis 
oppugnaret. Itaque eo cursu, quo refugientis 
Alexandrinos ex castello in castra sunt milites in- 
secuti, munitionibus successerunt acerrimeque eminus 
proeliari coeperunt. Duabus ex partibus aditus 
oppugnationis nostris dabatur : una, quam liberum 
accessum habere demonstravi, altera, quae mediocre 
intervallum inter castra ct flumen Nilum habebat. 
Maxima et electissima multitudo Alexandrinorum 
defendebat earn partem, quae facillimum aditum 
habebat ; plurimum proficiebant in repellendis 
vulnerandisque nostris, qui regione fluminis Nili 
propugnabant : diversis enim telis nostri figebantur, 
adversi ex vallo castrorum, aversi ex flumine, in quo 
multae naves instructae funditoribus et sagittairis 
nostros impugnabant. 
31 Caesar cum videret milites acrius proeliari non 
posse nee tamen multum profici propter locorum 
difficultatem, cumque animum adverteret exeelsissi- 



* This interpretation assumes qui . . . propugnabant as the 
subject of proficiebant ; and the normal usage of propugnare 
of defensive fighting seems to confirm it. The alternative — 
omitting the comma after nostris — ' they (the largest con- 
tingent of the Alexandrians) were the most successful in . . . 
wounding our men who were fighting in the area of the Xile.' 
seems hardly to agree with the tactical situation. 



58 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

fighting, advance to attack the camp. Accordingly 
he pitched camp at no great distance from the 
enemy. In a nearby hamlet, not far distant from the 
king's camp, there was a fort which the king had 
built and linked with bastions to the main defences 
of his camp so as to hold the hamlet. This fort 
Caesar attacked and took by storm on the following 
day with all his forces ; not that he thought it would 
be difficult to gain that objective by using a smaller 
number of soldiers, but in order that, with the 
Alexandrians thoroughly unnerved as a result, he 
might go straight on from that victory to attack the 
king's camp. And so, having chased the retreating 
Alexandrians from the fort into their camp, our 
troops carried on their charge right up to the forti- 
fications, where they proceeded to fight at long range 
very briskly. On two sides our men were afforded an 
opening for assault : the first was the one which, as I 
have explained, allowed unimpeded approach ; the 
second comprised the moderate-sized space between 
the camp and the river Nile. The largest and most 
carefully picked contingent of the Alexandrians was 
defending that side which afforded the easiest 
approach ; but the defenders in the area of the river 
Nile were the most successful in repelling and 
wounding our men : ^ for the latter were being hit by 
missiles coming from opposite directions — from the 
rampart of the camp ahead of them, and from the 
river behind them, where many ships manned with 
slingers and archers were engaging our men. 

Now Caesar saw that, while it was impossible for 
his soldiers to fight with any greater gallantry, yet 
little headway was being made on account of the 
difficulty of the ground ; he also noted that the 

59 



CAESAR 

mum locum castrorum rclictum esse ab Alexandrinis, 
quod et per se munitus esset et studio partim 
pugnandi partim spectandi decucurrissent in eum 
locum in quo pugnabatur, cohortis illo circumire 
castra et summum locum aggredi iussit eisque Car- 
fulenum praefecit, et animi magnitudine et rei 
militaris scientia virum praestantem. Quo ut ven- 
tum est, paucis defendentibus munitionem, nostris 
contra militibus acerrime pugnantibus, diverse 
clamore et proelio perterriti Alexandrini trepidantes 
in omnis partis castrorum discurrere coeperunt. 
Quorum perturbatione nostrorum animi adeo sunt 
incitati ut paene eodem tempore ex omnibus partibus, 
primi tamen editissimum castrorum locum caperent ; 
ex quo decurrentes magnam multitudinem hostium in 
castris interfecerunt. Quod periculum plerique 
Alexandrini fugientes acervatim se de vallo praecipi- 
tarunt in earn partem quae flunaini erat adiuncta. 
Horum primis in ipsa fossa munitionis magna ruina 
oppressis ceteri faciliorem fugam habuerunt. Con- 
stat fugisse ex castris regem ipsum receptumque in 
navem multitudine eorum qui ad proximas navis 
adnatabant demerso navigio perisse. 
32 Re felicissime celerrimeque gesta Caesar magnae 
victoriae fiducia proximo terrestri itinere Alexan- 
60 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

liighest sector of their camp had been abandoned by 
the Alexandrians, not only because of its natural 
strength, but also because, in their eagerness in 
some cases to fight, in others to look on, its defenders 
had rushed down to the sector where the fighting was 
going on ; consequently he ordered some cohorts to 
proceed thither, skirting the camp, and storm the 
height, putting in command of them Carfulenus, a 
man of exceptional personality and experience in the 
field. When they arrived there our men fought with 
the greatest gallantry against those few of the enemy 
who were defending the entrenchment ; whereupon 
the Alexandrians, panic-stricken by the shouting and 
fighting on both sides of them, began to rush about in 
confusion hither and thither throughout the camp. 
This utter bewilderment of theirs fired the spirits of 
our troops to such a pitch that they captured the 
camp almost simultaneously in all sectors, though its 
highest point was the first to capitulate ; and from 
that point our men rushed down and killed a vast 
multitude of the enemy in the camp. In their efforts 
to escape this danger most of the Alexandrians 
hurled themselves en masse from the rampart into the 
area adjoining the river ; the first of these were 
crushed by their heavy fall in the actual trench of the 
fortification, but the rest found it easier to escape. 
It is established that the king himself fled from the 
camp and then, after being taken aboard a ship along 
with a large number of his men who were swimming 
to the nearest ships, perished when as a result of the 
numbers the vessel capsized. 

This signal victory, the outcome of a most speedy 
and successful action, filled Caesar with such con- 
fidence that he hastened with his cavalry to Alexan- 

6i 



CAESAR 

dream cum cquitibus contendit atque ea parte 
oppidi victor introiit quae praesidio hostium tene- 
batur. Neque eum consilium suum fefellit quin 
hostes eo proelio audito nihil iam de hello essent 
cogitaturi. Dignum adveniens fructum virtutis et 
animi magnitudinis tulit : omnis enim multitudo 
oppidanorum armis proiectis munitionihusque suis re- 
lictis, veste ea sumpta qua supplices dominantis 
deprecari consuerunt, sacrisque omnibus prolatis 
quoi'um religione precari ofFensos iratosque animos 
regum erant soliti, advenienti Caesari occurrerunt 
seque ei dediderunt. Caesar in fidem receptos 
consolatus per hostium munitiones in suam partem 
oppidi magna gratulatione venit suorum, qui non 
tantum helium ipsum ac dimicationem sed etiam 
talem adventum eius felicem fuisse laetahantur. 
33 Caesar Aegypto atque Alexandrea potitus reges 
constituit quos Ptolomaeus testamento scripserat 
atque obtestatus erat populum Romanum ne muta- 
rentur. Nam maiore ex duobus pueris, rege, amisso 
minori tradidit regnum maiorique ex duabus filiis, 
Cleopatrae, quae manserat in fide praesidiisque eius ; 
minorem, Arsinoen, cuius nomine diu regnasse 
impotenter Ganymeden docuimus, deducere ex regno 

* See chapter 4. 
62 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

dria bv the nearest overland route, and entered it 
triumphantly by that quarter of the town which was 
held by the enemy garrison. Nor was he mistaken 
in his own conclusion that, as soon as they heard of 
that battle, the enemy would cease to think any 
longer in terms of w-ar. On his arrival he reaped the 
well-earned fruits of valour and magnanimity ; for 
the entire population of townsfolk threw down their 
arms, abandoned their fortifications, assumed that 
garb in which suppliants are used to placate tyrants 
with earnest prayers, and brought forth all the sacred 
emblems by the sanctity of which they had been wont 
to conjure the embittered and wrathful hearts of their 
kings : even so did they hasten to meet Caesar on his 
arrival and surrendered themselves to him. Caesar 
took them formally under his protection and consoled 
them ; then, passing through the enemy fortifica- 
tions, he came to his own quarter of the town amid 
loud cheers of congratulation from his own troops, 
who rejoiced at the happy issue, not only of the war 
itself and the fighting, but also of his arrival under 
such circumstances. 

Having made himself master of Egypt and 
Alexandria, Caesar appointed as kings those whose 
names Ptolemaeus had \\Titten down in his will with 
an earnest appeal to the Roman people that they 
should not be altered. The elder of the two boys — 
the late king — being now no more, Caesar assigned 
the kingdom to the younger one and to Cleopatra, 
the elder of the two daughters, who had remained 
his loyal adherent ; whereas Arsinoe, the younger 
daughter, in whose name, as we have shewn,'^ 
Ganymedes had long been exercising an unbridled 
sway, he determined to remove from the realm, to 

63 



CAESAR 

statuit, ne qua rursus nova dissensio, prius quam 
diuturnitate confirmarentur regibus imperia, per 
homines seditiosos nasceretur. Legiones ibi vete- 
rana sexta secum reducta ceteras reliquit, quo 
firmius esset eorum regum imperium, qui neque 
amorem suorum habere poterant, quod fideliter 
permanserant in Caesaris amicitia, neque vetustatis 
auetoritatem, paucis diebus reges constituti. Simul 
ad imperi nostri dignitatem utiUtatemque publicam 
pertinere existimabat, si permanerent in fide reges, 
praesidiis eos nostris esse tutos ; si essent ingrati, 
posse isdem praesidiis coerceri. Sic rebus omnibus 
confectis et collocatis ipse ^ profectus est in Syriam. 
34 Dum haec in Aegypto geruntur, rex Deiotarus ad 
Domitium Calvinum, cui Caesar Asiam finitimasque 
provincias administrandas tradiderat, venit oratum 
ne Armeniam minorem, regnum suum, neve Cappa- 
dociam, regnum Ariobarzanis, possideri vastarique 
pateretur a Pharnace ; quo malo nisi liberarentur, 
imperata se facere pecuniamque promissam Caesari 
non posse persolvere. Domitius, non tantum ad 
exphcandos sumptus rei miUtaris cum pecuniam 
necessariam esse iudicaret, sed etiam turpe populo 
Romano et C. Caesari victori sibique infame esse 
statueret i*egna sociorum atque amicorum ab externo 
rege occupari, nuntios confestim ad Pharnacem misit, 

^ The MSS. add itinere terrestri, which Nipperdey deleted. 

^ The Twenty-Seventh, the Thirty-Seventh and a third 
whose identity is not certain — possibly the one despatched 
overland by Calvinus (see ch. 34). 

2 King of Pontus, son of Mithridates the Great. 

64 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

prevent any renewed dissensions coming into being 
among factious folk before the dominion of the royal 
pair could be consolidated by the passage of time. 
The veteran Sixth legion he took away with him : 
all the others ^ he left there, the more to bolster 
up the dominion of the said rulers, who could enjoy 
neither the affection of their people, inasmuch as 
they had remained throughout staunch friends of 
Caesar, nor the authority of a long-established reign, 
it being but a few days since they came to the 
throne. At the same time he deemed it conducive 
to the dignity of our empire and to public expediency 
that, if the rulers remained loyal, they should be pro- 
tected by our troops : whereas if they proved 
ungrateful, those same troops could hold them in 
check. Having thus completed all his dispositions, 
he set out in person for Syria. 

While these events were taking place in Egypt, 
king Deiotarus came to Domitius Calvinus, to whom 
Caesar had assigned the government of Asia and the 
neighbouring provinces, to beg him not to allow 
Lesser Armenia, his own kingdom, or Cappadocia, 
the kingdom of Ariobarzanes, to be occupied and 
over-run by Pharnaces ^ : for unless they were 
liberated from this scourge, he could not carry out 
his instructions and pay out the money he had 
promised to Caesar. As Domitius not only con- 
sidered the money to be indispensable for defraying 
military expenses, but also decided it was a shameful 
affront to the Roman people and to the triumphant 
C. Caesar as well as a slight to himself that the 
kingdoms of their allies and friends should be seized 
by a foreign king, he forthwith sent a deputation to 
Pharnaces, bidding him withdraw from Armenia and 

6;; 



CAESAR 

Armenia C'appadociacjue decederet neve occupatione 
belli civilis populi Romani ius maiestatemque 
temptaret. Hanc denuntiationem cum maiorem 
vim habituram existimaret, si propius eas regiones 
cum exercitu accessisset, ad legiones profectus unam 
ex tribus, XXXVI., secum ducit, duas in Aegvptum 
ad Caesarem mittit litteris eius evocatas ; quarum 
altera bello Alexandrino non occurrit, quod itinere 
terrestri per Syriam erat missa. Adiungit Cn. 
Domitius legioni XXX\'I. duas ab Deiotaro, quas 
ille disciplina atque armatura nostra compluris annos 
constitutas habebat, equitesque C, totidemque 
ab Ariobarzane sumit. Mittit P. Sestium ad C. 
Plaetorium quaestorem, ut legionem adduceret quae 
ex tumultuariis militibus in Ponto confecta erat, 
Quintumque Patisium in Ciliciam ad auxilia arces- 
senda. Quae copiae celeriter omnes iussu Domiti 
Comana convenerunt. 
35 Interim legati a Pharnace responsa referunt : 
Cappadocia se decessisse, Armeniam minorem re- 
cepisse, quam paterno nomine iure obtinere deberet. 
Denique eius regni causa integra Caesari servaretur : 
paratum enim se facere quod is statuisset. Cn. 
Domitius cum animadverteret eum Cappadocia 
decessisse non voluntate adductum sed necessitate, 
quod facilius Armeniam defendere posset subiectam 
suo regno quam Cappadociam longius remotam, 
quodque omnis tris legiones adducturum Domitium 

^ See chapter 9 (arrival of the Thirty-Seventh) and chapter 
33, note 1 on p. 64. 
^ A town in Pontus. 

66 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

Cappadocia and not assail the rights and majesty 
of the Roman people by resorting to civil war. In the 
belief that this warning would have greater force if 
he approached closer to that area with an army, 
he set out for his legions ; then, taking with him one 
of the three, the Thirty-Sixth, he sent to Caesar in 
Egypt the two ^ which the latter had called for in his 
despatch. One of these two did not arrive in time 
for the Alexandrian war, as it was sent by the over- 
land route through Syria. Cn. Domitius reinforced 
the Thirty-Sixth legion with two from Deiotarus, 
which the latter had had for several years, having 
built them up on our system of discipline and 
amiament ; he also added to it 100 horsemen, and 
took a like number from Ai'iobarzanes. He sent 
P. Sestius to C. Plaetorius, the quaestor, with 
instructions to bring the legion which had been 
formed from the hastily improvised forces in Pontus ; 
and Quintus Patisius to Cilicia to muster auxiliary 
troops. All these forces speedily assembled at 
Comana ^ according to the orders of Domitius. 

Meantime the envoys brought back this reply from 
Pharnaces : ' he had withdrawn from Cappadocia, 
but had recovered Lesser Armenia, which he ought 
to possess by due right of inheritance from his father. 
In short, the issue touching that kingdom should be 
kept open for Caesar's decision ; for he was ready to 
do what Caesar should decide.' Now Cn. Domitius 
observed that he had withdrawn from Cappadocia 
not from free choice but of necessity, since he could 
defend Armenia next door to his own kingdom more 
easily than the more distant Cappadocia, and also 
because he had supposed that Domitius would bring 
up all three legions ; and that when he heard that 

67 



CAESAR 

putasset, ex (iiiibus rum duas ad Caesarem missas 
audisset, audacius in Armenia substitisse, per- 
severarc coepit, ut eo quoque regno decederet ; neque 
enim aliud ius esse Cappadociae atque Armeniae, 
nee iuste eum postulare ut in Caesaris adventum res 
integra differetur ; id enim esse integrum quod ita 
esset ut fuisset. His responsis datis cum eis copiis 
quas supra scripsi profectus est in Armeniam locisque 
superioribus iter faccre instituit : nam ex Ponto a 
Comanis iugum editum silvestre est, pertinens in 
Armeniam minorem, quo Cappadocia finitur ab 
Armenia ; cuius itineris has esse certas opportuni- 
tates vidit,^ quod in locis superioribus nullus impetus 
repentinus accidere hostium poterat, et quod Cappa- 
docia his iugis subiecta magnam commeatus copiam 
erat sumministratura. 
36 Compluris interim legationes Pharnaces ad Domi- 
tium mittit quae de pace agerent regiaque munera 
Domitio ferrent. Ea constanter omnia aspernabatur 
nee sibi quicquam fore antiquius quam dignitatem 
populi Romani et regna sociorum reciperare legatis 
respondebat. Magnis et continuis itineribus con- 
fectis cum adventaret ad NicopoUm, quod oppidum 
positum in Armenia minore est piano ipso loco, 
montibus tamen altis ab duobus lateribus obiectis 
satis magno intervallo ab oppido remotis, castra 

^ vidit added by Forchhammer. 



^ The conventional boundaries as marked in Map 2 are only 
approximate : Armenia may well have extended further W. 
and Cappadocia further N. r3omitius may, as K. Holmes 
suggested, have followed the ridge between the rivers Lycus 
and Iris; and this would have been his most direct route. 

68 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

two of those legions had been sent to Caesar, this 
had heightened his rash resolve to stay on in Armenia. 
Consequently Domitius proceeded to insist that Phar- 
naces should withdraw from that kingdom also : 
as far as legal right went, there was no difference 
between Cappadocia and Armenia, nor had he any 
right to demand that the question should be left open 
pending Caesar's arrival ; a matter was ' open ' 
when it remained just as it had been.' Having given 
him this reply Domitius set out for Armenia with the 
forces I have recorded above, and began by marching 
along the higher ground. From Comana in Pontus 
there is, in fact, a lofty, wooded ridge which extends 
into Lesser Armenia and forms the boundary ^ be- 
tween Cappadocia and Armenia. This route, as he 
saw, offered definite advantages, namely that on the 
higher ground no sudden enemy attack could develop, 
and that, as Cappadocia adjoined this ridge, it was 
likely to assist him by affording an abundance of 
supplies. 

Meanwhile Pharnaces sent several embassies to 
Domitius to discuss peace and to take princely gifts 
for Domitius. All these he firmly rejected and 
replied to the envoys that as far as he was concerned 
nothing should take precedence over the prestige 
of the Roman people and the recovery of the king- 
doms of its allies. Then, after completing an un- 
interrupted succession of long marches, he began to 
approach Nicopolis, a town in Lesser Armenia which 
is actually situated in the plain, though it is hemmed 
in on two sides by high mountains at a fairish 
distance. Here he pitched camp roughly seven 

But he ma}' have taken a more devious route further S. for 
the motives suggested in the text. 

69 



CAESAR 

posuit longe a Nieopoli circiter niilia passuum \ll. 
Quibus ex castris cum locus angustus atque im- 
peditus esset transeundus, Pharnaces in insidiis 
delectos pedites omnisque paene disposuit equites, 
magnam autem multitudinem pecoris intra eas 
fauces dissipari iussit paganosque ' et oppidanos 
in his locis obversari, ut sive amicus Domitius eas 
angustias transiret, nihil de insidiis suspicaretur, cum 
in agris et pecora et homines animum adverteret 
versari tamquam amicorum adventu, sive inimicus ut 
in hostium finis veniret, praeda diripienda milites 
dissiparentur dispersique caederentur. 
37 Haec cum administraret, numquam tamen inter- 
mittebat legates de pace atque amicitia mittere ad 
Domitium, cum hoc ipso crederet facilius eum 
decipi posse. At contra spes pacis Domitio in isdem 
castris moi'andi attulit causam. Ita Pharnaces, 
amissa proximi temporis occasione cum vereretur ne 
cognoscerentur insidiae, suos in castra revocavit. 
Donnitius postero die propius Nicopolim accessit 
castraque oppido contulit. Quae dum muniunt 
nostri, Pharnaces aciem instruxit more suo atque 
instituto. In fronte enim simplici derecta acie 
coi-nua trinis firmabantur subsidiis ; eadem ratione 
haec media collocabantur acie duobus dextra 
70 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

miles from Nicopolis. From this camp he had to 
traverse a narrow and confined defile ; and for this 
reason Pharnaces aiTayed the pick of his infantry 
and practically all his cavalry in an ambush, giving 
orders, moreover, that a large number of cattle 
should be pastured at various points within this 
gorge, and that the peasants and burghers should 
go about openly in that area. His object in so doing 
was that, if Domitius should pass through that defile 
as a fi'iend, he might have no suspicions of an ambush, 
as he would observe both men and beasts moving 
about the countryside, as if friends were in the offing ; 
while if he should come in no friendly spirit, treating 
it as enemy territory, his troops might become 
scattered in the process of plundering and so be cut 
down piecemeal. 

While making these dispositions he still constantly 
continued sending delegations to Domitius to talk of 
peace and friendship, as he believed that by these 
self-same tactics Domitius could the more readily be 
duped. But on the other hand Domitius' hopes 
of peace afforded him a motive for tarrying in the 
camp, where he was. Consequently, as Pharnaces 
had now lost his immediate opportunity and was 
afraid that his ambush might be discovered, he re- 
called his troops to camp. On the morrow Domitius 
advanced nearer Nicopolis and pitched his camp over 
against the town. While our troops were fortifying 
it, Pharnaces drew up his line of battle according 
to his own established custom. This, in fact, was 
formed with its front as a single straight line, with 
each of the wings reinforced by three supporting 
lines ; and on the same principle support lines were 
also posted in the centre, while ia the two spaces, 

71 



CAESAR 

sinistraque intervallis simplicibus ordinibus instructis. 
Perfecit inceptum castrorum opus Domitius parte 
copiarum pro vallo constituta. 

38 Proxima nocte Pharnaces interceptis tabellariis, 
qui de Alexandrinis rebus litteras ad Domitium 
ferebant, cognoscit Caesarem magno in periculo 
versari flagitarique ab Domitio ut quam primum 
Caesari subsidia mitteret propiusque ipse Alexan- 
dream per Syriam accederet. Qua cognita re 
Pharnaces victoriae loco ducebat, si trahere tempus 
posset, cum discedendum Domitio celeriter putaret. 
Itaque ab oppido, qua facillimum accessum et 
aequissimum ad dimicandum nostris videbat, fossas 
duas derectas non ita magno medio intervallo relicto 
nil pedum altitudinis in eum locum deduxit quo 
longius constituerat suam non producere aciem. 
Inter has fossas aciem semper instruebat, equitatum 
autem omnem ab lateribus extra fossam collocabat ; 
qui neque aliter utilis esse poterat et multum numero 
anteibat nostrum equitatum. 

39 Domitius autem, cum Caesaris magis periculo 
quam suo commoveretur neque se tuto discessurum 
arbitraretur, si condiciones quas reiecerat rursus 
appeteret aut sine causa ^ discederet, ex propinquis 
castris in aciem exercitum eduxit ; XXXVI. legionem 
in dextro cornu collocavit, Ponticam in sinistro, 
Deiotari legiones in mediam aciem contulit, quibus 

1 sine causa MSS. Hoffmann conjectured si negatis. 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

on the right hand and the left, single ranks were 
drawn up. Having once begun the task of fortifying 
his camp, Domitius completed it, with part of his 
forces posted in front of the rampart. 

The following night Pharnaces intercepted some 
couriers who were carrying despatches to Domitius 
concerning the situation at Alexandria. From them 
he learned that Caesar was in a very dangerous 
position, and that an urgent request was being made 
to Domitius that he should send Caesar reinforce- 
ments as soon as possible and himself advance 
through Syria closer to Alexandria. On learning 
this, Pharnaces saw himself virtually victorious if he 
could spin out the time, as he thought that Domitius 
must speedily ^\•ithdraw. Accordingly, from that 
side of the town which he saw offered our men the 
easiest and most favourable line of approach to do 
battle, he carried two straight trenches, four feet 
deep and spaced not so very far apart, as far as the 
point beyond which he had decided not to advance 
his own battle line. Between these trenches he 
consistently drew up his line, while posting all his 
cavalry on the flanks outside the trench ; for other- 
wise they could not be of any use, and they far out- 
numbered our cavalry. 

Domitius, however, was more disturbed by Caesar's 
peril than by his own; and as he thought that he 
would not be safe in withdrawing, if he made a fresh 
attempt to secure the terms he had rejected or if he 
withdrew for no good reason, he deployed his army 
from its nearby camp into battle formation. He 
posted the Thirty-Sixth legion on the right wing and 
the Pontic one on the left, while the legions of 
Deiotainis he concentrated in the centre, leaving 

73 



CAESAR 

tamen aIlgusti'^sinmm intervallum frontis reliquit 
reliquis cohortibus in subsidiis colloeatis. Sic utrim- 
que acie instructa processum est ad dimicandum. 
40 Signo sub idem tempus ab utroque dato concurri- 
tur : acriter varieque pugnatur. Nam XXX\'I. 
legio, cum extra fossam in equites regis impetum 
fecisset, adeo secundum proelium fecit ut moenibus 
oppidi succederet fossamque transiret aversosque 
hostis aggrederetur. At Pontica ex altera parte 
legio, cum paulum aversa hostibus cessisset, fossam 
autem circumire ac transcendere ^ conata esset, ut 
aperto latere aggrederetur hostem, in ipso transitu 
fossae confixa et oppressa est. Deiotari vero legiones 
vix impetum sustinuerunt. Ita victrices regiae 
copiae cornu suo dextro mediaque acie converterunt 
se ad XXX\'I. legionem. Quae tamen fortiter 
vincentium impetum sustinuit, magnis copiis hostium 
circumdata praesentissimo animo pugnans in orbem 
se recepit ad radices montium : quo Phariiaces 
insequi propter iniquitatem loci noluit. Ita Pontica 
legione paene tota amissa, magna parte Deiotari 
militum interfecta XXX\'I. legio in loca se superiora 
contulit non amplius CCL desideratis. Cecide- 
runt eo proelio splendidi atque inlustres viri non 
nulli, equites Romani. Quo tamen incommodo 
Domitius accepto reliquias exercitus dissipati collegit 

^ acies secundo MSS. : ac transcendere Nipperdey. 



^ The text is corrupt and the manoeuvre is by no means 
dear; but it would seem that part, if not all, the Pontic 
legion — like the Thirty-Sixth — was posted outside the trench, 
and so, to attack the enemy flank, they had either to cross the 
trench (its width is not stated) or else retire far enough U> work 
round its end. 

74 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

them, however, a very narrow frontage and posting 
his remaining cohorts behind them in support. 
The Hnes being thus arrayed on either side, they 
proceeded to battle. 

The signal to attack was given almost simul- 
taneously on both sides : then came the charge, 
with hotly contested and fluctuating fighting. Thus 
the Thirty-iSixth legion launched an attack on the 
king's cavalry outside the trench and fought so 
successful an action that it advanced up to the walls 
of the town, crossed the trench, and attacked the 
enemy in rear. The Pontic legion, however, on the 
other flank, drew back a little from the enemy, 
and attempted, moreover, to go round or cross the 
trench, so as to attack the enemy's exposed flank ; 
but in the actual crossing of the trench it was pinned 
down and overwhelmed.'^ The legions of Deiotarus, 
indeed, offered scarcely any resistance to the attack. 
Consequently the king's forces, victorious on their 
own right wing and in the centre of the line, now 
turned upon the Thirty-Sixth legion. The latter, 
nevertheless, bore up bravely under the victors' 
attack and, though surrounded by large enemy forces, 
yet with consummate presence of mind formed a 
circle and so made a fighting withdrawal to the foot- 
hills, where Pharnaces was loth to pursue it owing to 
the hilly nature of the ground. And so, %\-ith the 
Pontic legion an almost total loss and a large propor- 
tion of the troops of Deiotarus killed, the Thirty- 
Sixth legion retired to higher ground with losses not 
exceeding 250 men. There fell in that battle not a 
few Roman knights — ^brilliant and distinguished men. 
After sustaining this defeat Domitius none the less 
collected the remnants of his scattered army and 

75 



CAESAR 

itineribusque tutis per Cappadociarn se in Asiam 
recepit. 

41 Pharnaces rebus secundis elatus, cum de Caesare 
ea quae optabat speraret, Pontum omnibus copiis 
occupavit ibique et victor et crudelissimus rex, cum 
sibi fortunam paternam feliciore eventu destinaret, 
niulta oppida expugnavit, bona civium Romanorum 
Ponticorumque diripuit, supplicia constituit in eos 
qui aliquam formae atque aetatis commendationem 
habebant ea quae morte essent miseriora, Pontum- 
que nullo defendente paternum regnum glorians se 
recepisse obtinebat. 

42 Sub idem tempus in Illyrico est incommodum 
acceptum, quae provincia superioribus mensibus 
retenta non tantum sine ignominia sed etiam cum 
laude erat. Namque eo missus aestate cum duabus 
legionibus Q. Cornificius, Caesaris quaestor, pro 
praetore, quamquam erat provincia minime copiosa 
ad exercitus alendos et finitimo bello ac dissen- 
sionibus confecta et vastata, tamen prudentia ac 
diligentia sua, quod magnam curam suscipiebat ne 
quo temere progrederetur, et recepit et defendit. 
Namque et castella complura locis editis posita, 
quorum opportunitas castellanos impellebat ad 
decursiones faciendas et bellum inferendum, ex- 



^ His hereditary kingdom, from which his father Mithri- 
dates had been driven by LucuUus. 

- Mithridates tlie Great, a fugitive from Pompey the Great, 
took his own life in 63 B.C. as a result of the rebellion of his 
son Pharnaces. 

* I'iz. castration, cf. ch. 70. 

76 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

withdi'ew by safe routes through Cappadocia into 
Asia. 

Elated by this success and confident that his wishes 
for Caesar's defeat would be granted, Pharnaces 
seized Pontus ^ with all his forces. There he played 
the role of victor and utterly ruthless tyrant and, 
promising himself his father's fortune though with a 
happier ending,^ he took many towns by storm, 
plundered the property of Roman and Pontic 
citizens, and decreed for those who in respect of 
youth and beauty had anything to commend them 
such punishments ^ as proved more pitiful than death. 
Thus he held unchallenged sway over Pontus, boast- 
ing that he had recovered the kingdom of his 
father. 

Round about the same time a set-back was sustained 
in Illyricum, a province which during the previous 
months had been firmly held not merely without 
incurring disgrace but even with distinction. To this 
province there had been sent out in the summer a 
quaestor of Caesar's, Q. Cornificius, as pro-praetor ; 48 b.c. 
and although the province was not at all abundantly 
stocked for supporting armies and was exhausted 
and wasted bv war upon its borders and by rebellions,* 
yet by his far-sighted and careful policy, taking 
great pains not to make an ill-considered advance in 
any quarter, he recovered and defended it. For 
example, he successfully stormed several mountain 
strongholds, the commanding position of which 
prompted their occupants to carry on a predatory 
warfare, and presented his troops with the resulting 

* The Roman residents consistently supported Caesar, but 
the natives sided with Pompey. The heavy fighting at 
Dyrrhachium was just south of the border of the province. 

77 



CAESAR 

pugnavit eaque praeda milites donavit, quae etsi 
erat tenuis, tamen in tanta provinciae desperatione 
erat grata, praesertim virtute parta, et cum Octavius 
ex fuga Pharsalici proeli magna classe in ilium se 
sinum contulisset, paucis navibus ladertinorum, 
quorum semper in rem publioam singulare constiterat 
officium, dispersis Octavianis navibus erat potitus, ut 
vel classe dimicare posset adiunctis captivis navibus 
sociorum. Cum diversissima parte orbis terrarum 
Cn. Pompeium Caesar victor sequeretur complurisque 
advei'sarios in Illyricum propter Macedoniae pro- 
pinquitatem se reliquiis ex fuga collectis contulisse 
audiret, litteras ad Gabinium mittit, uti cum legio- 
nibus tironum, quae nuper erant conscriptae, pro- 
ficisceretur in Illyricum coniunctisque copiis cum 
Q. Cornificio, si quod periculum provinciae in- 
ferretur, depelleret ; sin ea non magnis copiis tuta 
esse posset, in Macedoniam legiones adduceret. 
Omnem enim illam partem regionemque vivo Cn. 
Pompeio bellum instauraturam esse credebat. 
43 Gabinius ut in Illyricum venit hiberno tempore 
aiini ac difficili sive copiosiorem pi'ovinciam existimans 
sive multum fortunae victoris Caesaris tribuens sive 
virtute et scientia sua confisus, qua saepe in bellis 

^ See ch. 3. Ca«sar had recalled him from exile. 
78 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

booty ; which, paltry though it was, was none the less 
welcome — ^considering the very meagre prospects of 
the province — especially since it was the prize of 
valour. Again, when in the course of his flight from 
the battle of Pharsalia Octavius took refuge with a 
large fleet upon that coast, Cornificius, with the aid 
of a few ships of the men of ladera — those devoted 
supporters of the commonwealth, who were unsur- 
passed in their constant loyalty — made himself 
master of Octavius' scattered ships, and was accord- 
ingly enabled by the addition of these vessels to 
those of his allies to go into action with something 
like a fleet. And when in quite a different quarter of 
the globe Caesar Avas victoriouslv pui'suing Cn. 
Pompeius, and heard that several of his opponents 
had collected the remnants of the fugitives and taken 
refuge in lUyricum on account of its proximity to 
Macedonia, he sent despatches to Gabinius,i bidding 
him set out for Ilh'ricum with the legions of recruits 
which had recently been raised : there he was to 
join forces with Q. Cornificius and repulse any 
dangerous move that might be made against the 
province : if on the other hand no large forces were 
needed to ensure the safety of the province, he was to 
lead his legions into Macedonia. It was in fact his 
belief that the whole of that neighbourhood and area 
would revive the war, so long as Cn. Pompeius was 
alive. 

When Gabinius came to Illvricum in the difficult 
winter season, — whether it was he thought the 
province was more abundantly supplied, or whether 
he set great store by Caesar's winning luck, or 
whether he trusted in his own courage and skill, 
which had many a time enabled him, when sur- 

79 



CAESAR 

})ericlitatus magnas res et secundas ductu ausuque 
suo gesserat, neque provinciae facultatibus sub- 
levabatur, quae partim erat exinanita partim 
infidelis, neque navibus intercluso mari tempestatibus 
commeatus supportari poterat ; magnisque difficulta- 
tibus coactus non ut volebat sed ut necesse erat 
bellum gerebat. Ita cum durissimis tempestatibus 
propter inopiam castella aut oppida expugnare 
cogeretur, crebro incommoda accipiebat adeoque est 
a barbaris contemptus ut Salonam se recipiens in 
oppidum maritimum, quod elves Romani fortissimi 
fidelissimi incolebant, in agmine dimicare sit coactus. 
Quo proelio duobus milibus militum amplius amissis, 
centurionibus XXXVIII, tribunis HIT, cum reliquis 
copiis Salonam se recepit summaque ibi difficultate 
rerum omnium pressus paucis mensibus morbo periit. 
Cuius et infelicitas vivi et subita mors in magnam 
spem Octavium adduxit provinciae potiendae ; quem 
tamen diutius in rebus secundis et fortuna, quae 
plurimum in bellis potest, diligentiaque Cornifici et 
virtus Vatini versari passa non est. 
44 Vatinius Brundisi cum esset, cognitis rebus quae 
gesta erant in lUyrico, cum crebris litteris Cornifici 
ad auxilium provinciae ferendum evocaretur et M. 
Octavium audiret cum barbaris foedera percussisse 
compluribusque locis nostrorum militum oppugnare 
praesidia partim classe per se partim pedestribus 
80 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

rounded by the hazards of war, to score great 
successes by his personal leadership and initiative — 
anyway he dei'ived no support from the resources of 
the province, bled white as it partly was, and partly 
disloyal, nor could supplies be conveyed to him by 
ship, since stormy weather had interrupted naviga- 
tion. As a result of these considerable difficulties he 
was forced to conduct the campaign, not as he wished, 
but as necessity dictated. And so, as lack of supplies 
forced him to storm towns or strongholds in very 
adverse weather, he frequently sustained reverses, 
and was held by the natives in such contempt that, 
while retreating on Salona, a coastal town occupied 
by very gallant and loyal Roman citizens, he was 
forced to fight an action on the march. In this battle jau. 47 
he lost more than two thousand soldiers, thirty-eight 
centurions and four tribunes : with what was left of his 
forces he retired to Salona, where, under the stress of 
overwhelming difficulties of every kind, he fell sick 
and died within a few months. His chequered 
fortune while alive and his sudden death inspired 
Octavius ^^'ith high hopes of securing possession of 
the province ; luck, however, which is a very potent 
factor in war, as well as the carefulness of Cornificius 
and the courage of Vatinius, did not allow Octavius 
to pursue his successful career much longer. 

When ^^atinius was at Brundisium he learned of 
what had been going on in Illyricum ; moreover, 
frequent despatches from Cornificius kept sum- 
moning him to bring aid to the province, and he 
heard that M. Octavius had concluded treaties with 
the natives and in several places was attacking the 
garrisons of our troops, in some cases in person with 
his fleet, in others with land forces, employing 

81 



CAESAR 

copiis per barbaros, ctsi gravi valetudine adfectus vix 
corporis viribus animum sequebatur, tamen virtute 
vicit incommodum naturae difficultatesque et hiemis 
et subitae praeparationis. Nam cum ipse paucas in 
portu navis longas haberet, litteras in Achaiam ad 
Q. Calenum misit, uti sibi classem mitteret. Quod 
cum tardius fieret quam periculum nostrorum flagita- 
bat, qui sustinere impetum Octavi non poterant, 
navibus actuariis, quarum numerus erat satis magnus, 
magnitude nequaquam satis iusta ad proeliandum, 
rostra imposuit. His adiunctis navibus longis et 
numero classis aucto militibus veteranis impositis, 
quorum magnam copiam habebat ex omnibus legio- 
nibus, qui numero aegrorum relicti erant Brundisi, 
cum exercitus in Graeciam transportaretur, pro- 
fectus est in Illyricum maritimasque non nullas 
civitates, quae defecerant Octavioque se tradiderant, 
partim recipiebat, partim remanentis in suo consilio 
praetervehebatur nee sibi ullius rei moram necessi- 
tatemque iniungebat quin quam celerrime posset 
ipsum Octavium persequeretur. Hunc oppugnantem 
Epidaurum terra marique, ubi nostrum erat prae- 
sidium, adventu suo discedere ab oppugnatione coegit 
praesidiunique nostrum recepit. 
45 Octavius cum Witinium classem magna ex parte 
confcctam ex naviculis actuariis habere cognosset, 
confisus sua classe substitit ad insulam Tauridem; 
82 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

native troops. So, although he was afflicted by a 
serious iUness and his bodily strength barely enabled 
him to obey hi^ will, yet by courage he overcame his 
physical handicap, as well as the difficulties both of 
winter and the sudden mobilisation. Thus, as he him- 
self had few warships in harbour, he sent despatches to 
Q. Calenus in Achaia, requesting him to send him 
a fleet ; but as this proved too slow a business — our 
troops were in no position to withstand Octavius' 
attack, and their critical situation urgently demanded 
something speedier — he fitted beaks to some fast 
boats, of which he had a sufficient number, though 
their size was by no means adequate for fighting 
purposes. With these added to his warships, and his 
fleet thereby numerically increased, he put on board 
some veteran troops, of which he had an abundant 
supply from all the legions — they had been on the 
sick list and had been left behind at Brundisium 
when the ai*my was being shipped to Greece — -and so 
set out for Illyricum. Now there were not a few 
coastal communities there which had revolted and 
surrendered to Octavius : some of these he re- 
covered, others he by-passed when they remained 
steadfast to their policy ; nor would he allow any- 
thing, however pressing, to embai-rass or delay him 
from pursuing Octavius himself with all the speed of 
which he was capable. While the latter was assault- 
ing Epidaurus by land and sea, where there was a 
garrison of oui*s, \'atinius forced him by his approach 
to abandon his assault, and so relieved our garrison. 
45 When Octavius learned that Vatinius had a fleet 
which was in the main made up of small, fast boats, 
having full confidence in his own fleet he hove to off 
the island of Tauris. In this area Vatinius wasMaroh47 

83 



CAESAR 

qua regione Vatinius insequens navigabat, non quo 
Octavium ibi restitisse sciret, sed quod eum longius 
progressum insequi decreverat. Cum propius Tauri- 
dem accessisset distensis suis navibus, quod et 
tempestas erat turbulenta et nulla suspicio hostis, 
repente adversam ad se venientem na\ cm antemnis 
ad medium malum demissis instructam propugna- 
toribus animum advertit. Quod ubi conspexit, 
celeriter vela subduci demittique antemnas iubet et 
milites armari et vexillo sublato, quo pugnandi dabat 
signum, quae primae naves subsequebantur idem ut 
facerent significabat. Parabant se ^'atiniani repente 
oppressi ; parati deinceps Octaviani ex portu pro- 
cedebant. Instruitur utrimque acies, ordine dis- 
posita magis Octaviana, paratior militum animis 
Vatiniana. 
46 \'atinius cum animum advei'teret neque navium se 
magnitudine neque numero parem esse fortuitae 
dimicationi, fortunae rem committere maluit. Itaque 
primus sua quinqueremi in quadriremem ipsius 
Octavi impetum fecit. Celerrime fortissimeque 
contra illo remigante naves adversae rostris con- 
currerunt adeo vehementer ut navis Octaviana rostro 
discusso ligno contineretur. Committitur acriter 
reliquis locis proelium concurriturque ad duces 
maxime : nam cum suo quisque auxilium ferret, 
magnum comminus in angusto mari pi-oelium factum 

84 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

cruising in pursuit, not from any knowledge that 
Octavius had hove to there, but because the latter 
had gained a fairly good start, and he had resolved to 
pursue him. On approaching closer to Tauris with 
his ships strung out, since the weather was rough 
and he had no suspicion of the enemy, he suddenly 
observed a ship bearing down upon him, its yard- 
arms lowered to mid-mast, and manned with combat 
troops. When he saw this, he promptly ordered the 
sails to be reefed, the yard-arms lowered, and the 
troops to stand to ; and then, by hoisting the pen- 
nant, which was his method of giving the signal for 
action, he signalled the leading ships astern of him 
to do the same. The Vatinians being thus suddenly 
taken unawares proceeded to man ship : the 
Octavians, their ships already manned, came sailing 
out of the harbour one after another. Line of 
battle was formed on either side, that of Octavius 
being superior in formation, that of \'atinius in the 
morale of the troops. 

When ^'atinius observed that neither in the size 
nor the number of his ships was he a match for a 
chance engagement, he chose rather to trust to 
luck. And so he attacked first, charging with his 
own quinquereme the quadrireme which was the 
flagship of Octavius. The latter rowed forward 
against him \\ith the utmost speed and bravery, 
and the two ships ran together with their beaks 
head-on so violently that Octavius' ship had its beak 
smashed away and was locked to the other by its 
timbers. Elsewhere a fierce engagement took place, 
with particularly sharp fighting near the leaders ; 
for with each individual captain trying to support 
his own leader, a great battle developed at close 

85 



CAESAR 

est. Quantoque coniunctis magis navibus con- 
fligendi potestas dabatur, tanto superiores erant 
V^itiniani ; qui admiranda virtute ex suis navibus in 
hostium navis transilire non dubitabant et dimica- 
tione aequata longe superiores virtute rem feliciter 
gerebant. Deprimitur ipsius Octavi quadriremis, 
niultae praeterea capiuntur aut rostris perforatae 
merguntur ; propugnatores Octaviani partim in 
navibus iugulantur, partim in mare praecipitantur. 
Ipse Octavius se in scapham confert ; in quam plures 
cum confugerent, depressa scapha vulneratus tamen 
adnatat ad suum myoparonem. Eo receptus, cum 
proelium nox dirimeret, tempestate magna velis 
profugit. Sequuntur hunc suae naves non nuUae, 
quas casus ab illo periculo vindicarat. 
47 At Vatinius re bene gesta receptui cecinit suisque 
omnibus incolumibus in eum se portum victor 
recepit, quo ex portu classis Octavi ad dimicandum 
processerat. Capit ex eo proelio penterem unam, 
triremis duas, dicrotas VIII complurisque remiges 
Octavianos posteroque ibi die, dum suas captivasque 
navis reficeret, consumpto post diem tertium con- 
tendit in insulam Issam, quod eo se recepisse ex 
fuga credebat Octavium. Erat in ea ^ nobilissimum 
regionum earum oppidum coniunctissimumque 
Octavio. Quo ut venit, oppidani supplices se \'atinio 

^ The MSS. vary between eum and ea. Possibly some 
unfamiliar place name produced the present readings. Thus 
Larsen conjectured Ratineum. 

86 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

range in the narrow sea. The more closely inter- 
locked the ships — whenever the opportunity was 
alforded for such fighting — the more marked was the 
superiority of the \^atinians ; for they displayed 
admirable courage in leaping without hesitation 
from their own ships on to those of the enemy, and 
where the fighting was on equal terms their markedly 
superior courage brought them success. Octavius' 
own quadrireme was sunk, and many besides were 
either captured or else rammed, holed and sunk : 
some of his combat troops were cut down on the 
ships, others dived overboard. Octavius himself took 
refuge in a pinnace ; and when too many others 
sought safety in it and it capsized, wounded as he 
was he swam to his own light galley. There he was 
taken safely aboard and, when night put an end to 
the action, took to flight, sailing in a stiff squall. 
He was followed by not a few of his own ships, which 
chance had delivered from that hazard. 

^'atinius, on the other hand, rounded off this 
success by sounding the retreat and withdrew 
triumphantly with his entire force intact to the 
harbour from which Octavius' fleet had advanced to 
do battle. As a result of that action he captured one 
quinquereme, two triremes, eight two-banked galleys 
and a large number of Octavius' rowers. The next 
day he spent there in refitting his own and the 
captured vessels ; and on the day following he 
hastened to the island of Issa, in the belief that 
Octavius had taken refuge there in the course of his 
flight. In it there was a town — the best known one 
in those parts, and one which was on the most 
friendly terms with Octavius. On the arrival of 
\'atinius there the townsfolk threw themselves upon 

87 



CAESAR 

dedlderunt, comperitque ipsum Octavium parvis 
paucisque navigiis vento secundo regionem Graeciae 
petisse, inde ut Siciliam, deinde Africam caperet. 
Ita brevi spatio re praeclarissime gesta, provincia 
recepta et Cornificio reddita, classe adversariorum ex 
illo toto sinu expulsa victor se Brundisium ineolumi 
exercitu et classe recepit. 
48 Eis autem temporibus quibus Caesar ad Dyr- 
rachium Pompeium obsidebat et Palaepharsali rem 
feliciter gerebat Alexandreaeque cum periculo 
magno turn etiam maiore periculi fama dimicabat, 
Q. Cassius Longinus, in Hispania pro praetore 
provinciae ulterioris obtinendae causa relictus, sive 
consuetudine naturae suae sive odio quod in illam 
provinciam susceperat quaestor ex insidiis ibi 
vulneratus, magnas odi sui fecerat accessiones, 
quod vel ex conscientia sua, cum de se mutuo sentire 
pi'ovinciam crederet, vel multis signis et testimoniis 
eorum qui difficulter odia dissimulabant animum 
advertere poterat, et compensare offensionem pro- 
vinciae exei'citus amore cupiebat. Itaque, cum 
primum in unum locum exercitum conduxit, sester- 
tios centenos militibus est pollicitus, nee multo post, 
cum in Lusitania Medobregam oppidum montemque 
Herminium expugnasset, quo Medobregenses con- 



^ In September 49 B.C. Caesar himself may have doubted 
the wisdom of this appointment, but Longinus had served him 
well in the past. 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

his mercy, and he learned that Octavius himself with 
a few small vessels had set course with a following 
wind in the direction of Greece, intending to make 
for Sicily next and then Africa. Thus in a short 
space of time Vatinius had achieved a most notable 
success, recovering the province and restoring it to 
Cornificius, and driving his opponents' fleet away 
from the whole of that coast. Whereupon he with- 
drew in triumph to Brundisium with his army and 
fleet unharmed. 

Now during the period when Caesar was besieging 
Pompeius at Dyrrachium, and achieving success at 
Old Pharsalus, and was engaged at Alexandria in 
operations which involved great risk, though rumour 
made it out to be still greater, Q. Cassius Longinus 
had been left behind in Spain as propraetor to 
govern the further province.^ Whether it was due 
to his own natural disposition, or because he had 
formed a hatred for that province from having as 
quaestor been treacherously wounded there, he had 
greatly added to his unpopularity ; which fact he 
was in a position to observe equally from his own 
intuition — believing as he did that the province 
reciprocated his own sentiments — and from the 
manifold signs and indications afforded by those who 
found difiiculty in concealing their feelings of hate ; 
and now he was anxious to offset the dislike felt by 
the province with the affection of his army. Conse- 
quently, as soon as he had mustered the army all 
together, he promised the soldiers one hundred 
sesterces apiece ; and not long afterwards in Lusi- 
tania, after successfully storming the town of Medo- 
brega and then Mount Herminius, on which the 
townsfolk had taken refuge, and being hailed there 



CAESAR 

fugerant, ibique imperator esset appellatus, sestertiis 
centenis milites donavit. Multa praeterea et magna 
praemia singulis concedebat ; quae speciosuni redde- 
bant praesentem exercitus amorem, paulatim tamen 
et occulte niilitareni disciplinam severitatemque 
minuebant. 

49 Cassius legionibus in hiberna dispositis ad ius 
dicendum Cordubam se recepit contractumque in ea 
aes alienum gravissimis oneribus provineiae constituit 
exsolvere ; et ut largitionis postulat consuetude, per 
causam liberalitatis speciosam plura largitori quaere- 
bantur. Pecuniae locupletibus imperabantur, quas 
Longinus sibi expensas ferri non tantum patiebatur 
sed etiani cogebat, in gregem locupletium simul- 
tatiuni causa tenues coiciebantur, neque ullum genus 
quaestus aut niagni et evidentis aut minimi et sordidi 
praetermittebatur quo domus et tribunal imperatoris 
vacaret. Nemo erat, qui modo aliquam iacturam 
facere posset, quin aut vadimonio teneretur aut in 
reos referretur, Ita magna etiam sollicitudo peri- 
culorum ad iacturas et detrimenta rei familiaris 
adiungebatur. 

50 Quibus de causis accidit ut, cum Longinus impera- 
tor eadem faceret quae fecerat quaestor, similia 
rursus de morte eius provinciales consilia inirent. 
Horum odium confirmabant non nulli familiares eius 
qui, cum in ilia societate versarentur rapinarum, 



^ From the sequel described in cli. 56 such appears to be the 
most likely interpretation of this phrase. The sums were to be 
entered uj) in the ledgers as paid out to Longinus as loans. 

^ Or, adopting Schneider's conjecture simidationis causa, 
' were included in the lists of the wealthy for the sake of 
appearances ', 

90 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

as Imperator, he presented the soldiers each with 
100 sesterces. In addition he granted many large 
rewards to individuals ; and though these gifts 
inspired in the army a semblance of affection for the 
moment, yet they gradually and insidiously under- 
mined strict military discipline. 

Having settled his legions in winter quarters, 
Cassius proceeded to Corduba to administer justice, 
and resolved to lay a very heavy impost on the 
province and so defray the debts he had incurred in it. 
And so, as the habit of bribery necessitates, open- 
handedness was the plausible excuse for seeking vet 
further contributions to the source of bribery. Wealthy 
men were ordered to furnish sums of money, and 
these Longinus not merely allowed but even com- 
pelled to be debited to his own account : ^ poor men 
were precipitated into conflict with the wealthy class 
to promote dissensions;^ and no kind of profit, 
either large and obvious, or quite insignificant and 
mean, was overlooked, none with which the com- 
mander-in-chief was not involved privately and 
officially. There was not one man — provided only 
he had something to lose — but he was either held on 
bail or duly entered in the lists of the accused. Thus 
there was also a very uneasy presentiment of danger 
in addition to the sacrifices and losses of personal 
possessions. 

For these reasons it so fell out that, since Longinus 
as commander-in-chief was employing the same 
tactics he had used as quaestor, the provincials once 
again embarked upon similar plans for his assassina- 
tion. Their hatred was intensified by some of his 
friends who, although they were employed in that 
plundering partnership, none the less hated the man 

91 



CAESAR 

nihilo minus oderant eum cuius nomine peccabant, 
sibique (juod rapuerant acceptum referebant, quod 
interciderat aut erat interpellatum Cassio assigna- 
bant. Quintam legionem novam conscribit. Auge- 
tur odium et ex ipso dilectu et sumptu additae 
legionis. Complentur equitum III milia maximisque 
ornantur impensis ; nee provinciae datur ulla requies. 

51 Interim litteras accepit a Caesare, ut in Africam 
exercitum traiceret perque Mauretaniam ad finis 
Numidiae perveniret, quod magna Cn. Pompeio 
luba miserat auxilia maioraque missurus existima- 
batur. Quibus litteris acceptis insolenti voluptate 
efFerebatur, quod sibi novarum provinciarum et 
fertilissimi regni tanta oblata esset facultas. Itaque 
ipse in Lusitaniam proficiscitur ad legiones arces- 
sendas auxiliaque adducenda ; certis hominibus dat 
negotium ut frumentum navesque C praepararentur 
pecuniaeque deseriberentur atque imperarentur, ne 
qua res cum redisset moraretur. Reditus eius fuit 
celerior omnium opinione : non enim labor aut 
vigilantia cupienti praesertim aliquid Cassio deerat. 

52 Exercitu coacto in unum locum castris ad Cor- 
dubam positis pro contione militibus exponit quas res 
Caesaris iussu gerere deberet, polliceturque eis, cum 
in Mauretaniam traiecisset, sestertios centenos ^ se 
daturum ; quintam fore in Hispania legionem. Ex 

^ centenos is omitted in all the MSS., which vary between 
sestertios, sestertia a?id sestertiorum. 

^ Caesar had allotted him four — the native legion and the 
Second ; and the Twenty-First and Thirtieth (sent from Italy). 
Whether this Fifth is the same legion as that mentioned in the 
African and Spanish Wars is a verj- vexed question. 

* No mention is made of these in the list of Pompey's 
forces given in Cicil Warn III, chs. 3-5. 

92 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

in whose name they did WTong, and so, while putting 
down to their own credit whatever they had gained 
by their plundering, attributed to Cassius whatever 
came to nothing or was foiled. He enrolled a new 
legion — -the Fifth. ^ Hatred increased as a result of 
the actual levy and the expense of the extra legion. 
The cavalry were brought up to a strength of three 
thousand and equipped at the greatest expense. No 
respite was given to the province. 

Meanwhile he received despatches from Caesar 
bidding him bring an army across to Africa and, 
passing through Mauretania, come to the territory 
of Numidia ; for Juba had sent large reinforcements ^ 
for Cn. Pompeius and would, it was thought, send 
larger ones, \^^len Cassius received these des- 
patches he was in transports of immoderate delight 
at the thought of his being offered so magnificent a 
chance of new provinces and a highly fertile king- 
dom. And so he set out in person for Lusitania to 
summon the legions and fetch auxiliaries, allotting 
certain men the task of organising in advance 
supplies of corn and 100 ships, as well as assessing 
and levying contributions of money, so as to avoid 
any delay on his return. His return proved more 
expeditious than anyone expected ; for there was no 
lack of energy or vigilance in Cassius, especially 
when he coveted something. 

He then assembled his army at a single rendezvous 
and pitched camp near Corduba. There at a parade 
he explained to his troops the scheme it was his duty 
to carry out on Caesar's instructions, and promised 
to give them 100 sesterces apiece when he had 
crossed over into Mauretania. The Fifth legion, he 
explained, would be in Spain. Then, after the 

93 



CAESAR 

contione se Cordubam recepit enque ip';o die tempore 
postmeridiano, cum in basilic-am iret, (luidam 
Minucius Silo cliens L. Racili libellum, quasi ali(juid 
ab eo postularet, ut miles ei tradit, deinde post 
Racilium — nam is latus Cassi tegebat — , quasi 
responsum peteret, celeriter dato loco cum se 
insinuasset, sinistra corripit aversum dextraque bis 
ferit pugione. Clamore sublato fit a coniuratis 
impetus universis. Munatius Flaccus proximum 
gladio traicit lictorem ; hoc interfecto Q. Cassium 
legatum vulnerat. Ibi T. \'asius et L. Mercello 
simili confidentia Flaccum, municipem suum, adiu- 
vant : erant enim omnes Italicenses. Ad ipsum 
Longinum L. Licinius Squillus involat iacentemque 
levibus sauciat plagis. 
53 Concurritur ad Cassium defendendum : semper 
enim Berones complurisque evocatos cum telis 
secum habere consuerat. A quibus ceteri inter- 
cluduntur qui ad caedem faciendam subsequebantur ; 
quo in numero fuit Calpurnius Salvianus et Manilius 
Tusculus. Minucius inter saxa quae iacebant in 
itinere fugiens opprimitur et relato domum Cassio ad 
eum deducitur. Racilius in proximam se domum 
familiaris sui confert, dum certum cognosceret con- 
fectusne Cassius esset. L. Laterensis, cum id non 

1 cf. ch. 57 below, where the same man is mentioned again 
as deputy to Longinus : the coincidence of names is confusing. 
- A town in Baetica, X.W. of Hispalis, founded by Scipio 
Africanus and the birthplace of Hadrian and Trajan. 

^ The Berones are mentioned in Livy, fragment 91 as a 
powerful tribe in Hispania Tarraconensis. 

* Presumably he tripped and his pursuers were luckier ! 
The alternative rendering ' in the course of flight was over- 
whelmed amid (a volley of) stones which littered the street ' 
seems barely justified by the Latin expression, though it 

94 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

parade, he returned to Corduba. That same after- 
noon, when he was entering the judgment hall, a 
certain Minucius Silo, who was a client of L. Racilius 
and was dressed as a soldier, handed him a note, as 
if he had some petition to make of him ; then, 
following behind Racilius — who was walking beside 
Cassius — as though he were waiting for an answer, he 
quickly wormed his way in between them when the 
chance offered, seized Longinus from behind with his 
left hand and with his right stabbed him twice with a 
daffger. No sooner was the alarm raised than all the 
conspirators joined in the attack. Munatius Flaccus 
ran the nearest lictor through with his sword, killed 
him and then wounded Q. Cassius, Longinus' 
deputy.^ Thereupon T. Vasius and M. Mercello 
displayed a like audacity in going to the help of 
Flaccus, their fellow-townsman; for they all hailed 
from Italica.^ Iv. Licinius Squillus rushed up to 
Longinus himself and inflicted minor wounds upon 
him as he lay prostrate. 

On all sides there was a rush to defend Cassius ; 
for it was his constant habit to have with him a 
numerous armed bodyguard of Beronians ^ and ex- 
soldiers. These intercepted all the other would-be 
assassins who were following up behind, and among 
them Calpurnius Salvianus and Manilius Tusculus. 
Minucius was caught as he sought to escape through 
the stones which were lying in the street,* and was 
escorted to Cassius, who had now been carried home. 
Racilius took refuge in a friend's house near by, 
until he should learn for certain whether Cassius was 
done for. L. Laterensis had no doubt about it, and 

would perhaps account more satisfactorily for the mention of 
the stones. 

95 



CAESAR 

dubitaret, accurrit laetus in castra militibusque 
vernaculis et secundae legionis, quilnis odio sciebat 
praecipue Cassium esse, gratulatur; tollitur a multi- 
tudine in tribunal, praetor appellatur. Nemo enim 
aut in provincia natus, ut vernaculae legionis milites, 
aut diuturnitate iam factus provincialis, quo in 
numero erat secunda legio, non cum omni provincia 
consenserat in odio Cassi : nam legionem XXX. et 
XXI. paucis mensibus in Italia scriptas Caesar 
attribuerat Longino, quinta legio nuper ibi erat 
confecta. 

54 Interim nuntiatur Laterensi vivere Cassium. 
Quo nuntio dolore magis permotus quam animo 
perturbatus reficit se celeriter et ad Cassium visen- 
dum proficiscitur. Re cognita XXX. legio signa 
Cordubam infert ad auxilium ferendum imperatori 
suo. Facit hoc idem XXI. Subsequitur has V. 
Cum duae legiones reliquae essent in castris, secun- 
dani, veriti ne soli relinquerentur atque ex eo quid 
sensissent iudicaretur, secuti sunt factum superiorum. 
Permansit in sententia legio vernacula nee ullo 
timore dc gradu deiecta est. 

55 Cassius eos qui nominati erant conscii caedis 
iubet comprehendi ; legiones in castra remittit 
quinque cohortibus tricesimae retentis.^ Indicio 

^ legiones V in castra remittit cohortibus XXX retentis 
MSS. : I have adopted Kuebler's conjecture, 

96 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

so hastened joyfully into the camp and congratulated 
the native troops and those of the Second legion, who, 
as he knew, cherished a particular hatred for Cassius ; 
and there the mob hoisted him on to the platform 
and hailed him as praetor. There was in fact no 
man, either born in the province, like the troops of 
the native legion, or else by this time qualified as a 
provincial by virtue of long residence — and the 
Second legion came into this category — who had not 
shared in the hatred which the entire province felt 
towards Cassius ; for the Thirtieth and Twenty-First 
legions, which Caesar had allotted to Longinus, had 
been enrolled in Italy within the last few months, 
while the Fifth legion had been raised in the province 
but recently. 

Meanwhile the tidings reached Laterensis that 
Cassius was alive. Not so much disconcerted as 
grievously disappointed by these tidings, he quickly 
recovered himself and set out to visit Cassius. On 
learning of the facts the Thirtieth legion advanced to 
Corduba to bring aid to their commander-in-chief: 
the Twenty-First did likewise ; and the Fifth 
followed their lead. Now that there were but two 
remaining legions in camp, the men of the Second 
were afraid that they might be the only ones left 
behind, and that the nature of their sentiments might 
be inferred from this circumstance : consequently 
they followed the example of the previous legions. 
The native legion remained steadfast in its attitude, 
and nothing could intimidate it or make it budge. 

Cassius ordered the arrest of those who had been 
named as privy to the murderous plot and, retaining 
five cohorts of the Thirtieth legion, sent the rest 
back to camp. From the evidence of Minucius he 

97 



CAESAR 

Minuci cognoscit L. Racilium et L. Laterensem et 
Annium Scapulam, maximae dignitatis et gratiae 
provincialem honiinem sibique tarn familiarem quam 
Laterensem et Racilium, in eadem fuisse coniura- 
tione, nee diu moratur dolorem suum quin eos inter- 
fici iubeat. Minucium libertis tradit excruciandum, 
item Calpurnium Salvianum, qui profitetur indicium 
coniuratorumcjue numerum auget, vere, ut quidam 
existimant, ut non nulli queruntur, coactus. Isdem 
cruciatibus adfectus L. Mercello.^ . . . Squillus 
nominat pluris ; quos Cassias interfici iubet exceptis 
eis qui se pecunia redemerunt. Nam palam HS 
LX 2 cum Calpurnio paciscitur et cum Q. Sestio L. 
Qui si maxime nocentes sunt multati, tamen peri- 
culum vitae dolorque vulnerum pecuniae remissus 
crudelitatem cum avaritia certasse significabat. 
56 Aliquot post diebus litteras a Caesare missas 
accipit, quibus cognoscit Pompeium in acie victum 
amissis copiis fugisse. Qua re cognita mixtam 
dolore voluptatem capiebat : victoriae nuntius 
laetitiam exprimebat, confectum bellum licentiam 
temporum intercludebat. Sic erat dubius animus 
utrum nihil timere an omnia licere mallet. Sanatis 
vulneribus arcessit omnis qui sibi pecunias expensas 
tulerant, acceptasque eas iubet referri ; quibus 

^ Nipperdey assumed a lacuna here. 
2 ^i X MSS. : HS LX Glandorp. 



^ Approximately equivalent to £530 in pre-war sterling. 
The interpretation 60,000 'great sesterces' (=£53,000), 
though permissible, seems less likely. 

98 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

learned that L. Racilius and L. Laterensis and 
Annius Scapula — the last a provincial of the highest 
standing and influence, with whom he was on as 
intimate a footing as with Racilius and Laterensis — 
had all been involved in that same conspiracy ; and it 
was not long before he gave expression to his 
indignation by ordering their execution. Minucius 
he handed over to his freedmen for torture : likewise 
Calpurnius Salvianus, who made a formal deposition 
in which he named a larger number of conspirators — 
truthfully, according to the belief of certain people ; 
under duress, as some complain. Similar torture 
was applied to L. Mercello : . . . Squillus mentioned 
more names. Cassius ordered their execution, except 
for those who bought themselves off. For example, he 
openly made a bargain in fact with Calpurnius for 
sixty thousand sesterces,^ and with Q. Sestius for 
fifty thousand. And if their extreme guilt earned 
them a corresponding fine, yet the fact that the peril 
of death and the pain of torture was remitted for 
cash showed how in Cassius cruelty had vied with 
greed. 

Several days later he received despatches sent by 
Caesar, from which he learned that Pompeius had 
been beaten in the field, lost his forces, and fled. 
This intelligence inspired in him mixed feelings— of 
disappointment and pleasure : the news of victory 
could not but make him happy : the completion 
of the war put an end to the present licence. Con- 
sequently he could not make up his mind whether he 
would rather have nothing to fear or nothing barred. 
When his wounds were healed he summoned all 
those who had booked sums of money as debited to 
his account and ordered the said sums to be entered 

99 



CAESAR 

parum videbatur imposuisse oneris, ampliorem 
pecuniam imperat. Equitum autem Romanorum 
dilectum instituit; quos ex omnibus conventibus 
coloniisque conscriptos transmarina militia per- 
territos ad sacramenti redemptionem vocabat. 
Magnum hoc fuit vectigal, maius tamen creabat 
odium. His rebus confectis totum exercitum lustrat ; 
legiones quas in Africam ducturus erat et auxilia 
mittit ad traiectum. Ipse classem quam parabat ut 
inspiceret, Hispalim accedit ibique moratur, prop- 
terea quod edictum tota provincia proposuerat, 
quibus pecunias imperasset neque contulissent, se 
adirent. Quae evocatio vehementer omnis turbavit. 
Interim L. Titius, qui eo tempore tribunus militum 
in legione vernacula fuerat, nuntiat eam a legione 
XXX., quam Q. Cassius legatus simul ducebat, cum 
ad oppidum Ilipam castra haberet, seditione facta 
centurionibus aliquot occisis qui signa tolli non 
patiebantur, discessisse et ad secundam legionem 
contendisse, quae ad fretum alio itinere ducebatur. 
Cognita re noctu cum V cohortibus unetvice- 
simanorum egreditur, mane pervenit Naevam.^ Ibi 

^ noctu MSS. Naevam Schneider. 



^ The sums here referred to appear to be those mentioned 
in ch. 49, and the meaning seems to be that the outstanding 
debts were written off in the ledgers as repaid, though in fact 
Longinus kept the money. But as the two terms expensas 
and acceptas denote the opposite sides of the ledger, the mean- 
ing might conceivably be that the outstanding debts were not 
merely cancelled, but reversed; and that the sums were to 
be entered up afresh as borrowed from {acceptas), not lent to 
(expensa^), Longinus. He would thus receive them twice 
over. The following clause perhaps favours this latter 
interpretation. 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

up as repaid ; ^ and where he seemed to have imposed 
too light a burden, he ordered the man to pay a 
greater sum. Moreover, he held a levy of Roman 
knights. Tliese were conscripted from all the cor- 
porations 2 and colonies and, as they were thoroughly 
scared of military service overseas, he invited them 
to purchase their discharge. This proved a great 
source of profit, but the hatred it produced was still 
greater. This done, he reviewed his entire army 
and then despatched to the point of embarkation 
the legions he intended to take into Africa, with their 
auxiliary troops. He himself pi'oceeded to Hispalis 
to inspect the fleet he was building up ; and there he 
tarried awhile, since he had published a decree 
throughout the province that those who had been 
ordei-ed to contribute, but had not yet contributed 
sums of money, must come before him. This 
summons disturbed them all profoundly. 

Meanwhile L. Titius brought tidings of the native 
legion, in which he had been at the time a military 
tribune : his report ran that while it was encamped 
near the town of Ilipa a mutiny had broken out, and 
several centurions who had refused to let them 
strike camp had been killed ; the legion had then 
parted company with the Thirtieth legion — this 
was also under command of Q. Cassius, the governor's 
deputy — and made haste to join the Second legion, 
which was being taken to the straits by another 
route. On learning of the matter Longinus left by 
night with five cohoi'ts of the Twenty-First legion, 
and early in the morning arrived at Naeva.^ There 

^ These were guilds of Roman citizens associated for pur- 
poses of trade in the various provincial towns. 

^ Its exact location is unknown : see Index. Andrieu, how- 
ever identifies it with Villaverde, 27 km. from Seville. 



CAESAR 

eum diem, ut quid ageretur perspiceret, moratus 
Carmonem contendit. Hie, cum legio XXX. et 
XXI. et cohortes IIII ex V. legione totusque con- 
venisset equitatus, audit IIII cohortis a vernaculis 
oppressas ad Obuculam cum his ad secundam per- 
venisse legionem omnisque ibi se coniunxisse et T. 
Thorium Italicensem ducem delegisse. Celeriter 
habito consilio M. Marcellum quaestorem Cordubam, 
lit earn in potestate retineret, Q. Cassium legatum 
Hispahm mittit. Faucis ei diebus afFertur conventum 
Cordubensem ab eo defecisse Marcellumque aut 
voluntate aut necessitate adductum — namque id 
varie nuntiabatur — consentire cum Cordubensibus ; 
duas cohortis legionis V., quae fuerant Cordubae 
in praesidio, idem facere. Cassius his rebus incensus 
movet castra et postero die Segoviam ad flumen 
SingiUense venit. Ibi habita contione miUtum 
temptat animos ; quos cognoscit non sua sed 
Caesaris absentis causa sibi fidissimos esse nullumque 
periculum deprecaturos, dum per eos Caesari pro- 
vincia restitueretur. 
58 Interim Thorius ad Cordubam veteres legiones 
adducit ac, ne dissensionis initium natum seditiosa 
mihtum suaque natura videretur, simul ut contra Q. 

1 Its exact location is unknown : see Index. 
102 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

he waited that day, in order to get a clear view of 
what was taking place: then he marched to Carmo. 
Here he was joined by the Thirtieth legion 
and the Twenty-First, with four cohorts of tlie Fifth 
and his entire cavalry force, and then heard that four 
cohorts had been overpowered by the native troops, 
and in company with the latter had made contact 
with the second legion near Obucula,^ where they 
had all joined forces and chosen T. Thorius, a native 
of Italica, as their leader. He promptly held a 
consultation and despatched the quaestor, M. 
Marcellus, to Corduba, to retain control of it, and 
Q. Cassius, his deputy, to Hispalis. Within a few 
days news was brought to him that the corporation of 
Corduba had revolted from him, and that Marcellus, 
either of his own free will, or under compulsion — 
reports varied on this point — was hand in glove with 
the men of Corduba ; and that the two cohorts of the 
Fifth legion which had formed the garrison force of 
Corduba were taking a similar line. Incensed by 
these reports Cassius struck camp, and on the morrow 
came to Segovia ^ on the river Singilis. There he 
held a parade and sounded the temper of his troops, 
learning thereby that it was not for his own sake, 
l)ut for the sake of the absent Caesar that they were 
entirely loyal to himself, and that there was no 
hazard they would not face without a murmur, so be 
they were the means of restoring the province to 
Caesar. 

Meanwhile Thorius led his veteran legions towards 
Corduba. To avoid the impression that the quarrel 
had originally arisen from any natural tendency to 
mutiny on his own part or on that of his troops, 
and at the same time to counter Q. Cassius — who, as 

103 



CAESAR 

Cassium, qui Caesaris nomine maioribus viribus uti 
videbatur, aeque potentem opponeret dignitatem, 
Cn. Pompeio se provinciam reciperare velle palam 
dictitabat. Et forsitan etiam hoc fecerit odio 
Caesaris et amore Pompei, cuius nomen multum 
poterat apud eas legiones quas M. Varro obtinuerat. 
Sed id qua mente, communis erat coniectura : 
certe hoc prae se Thorius ferebat ; miUtes adeo 
fatebantur, ut Cn. Pompei nomen in scutis inscriptum 
liaberent. Frequens legionibus conventus obviam 
prodit, neque tantum virorum sed etiam matrum 
familias ac praetextatorum, deprecaturque ne hostili 
adventu Cordubam diriperent : nam se contra Cas- 
sium consentire cum omnibus ; contra Caesarem ne 
facere cogerentur orare. 
59 Tantae multitudinis precibus et lacrimis exercitus 
commotus cum videret ad Cassium persequendum 
nihil opus esse Cn. Pompei nomine et memoria 
tamque omnibus Caesarianis quam Pompeianis 
Longinum esse in odio neque se conventum neque M. 
Marcelhim contra Caesaris causam posse perducere, 
nomen Pompei ex scutis detraxerunt, Marcellum, 
qui se Caesaris causam defensurum profitebatur, 
ducem asciverunt praetoremque appellarunt et 
conventum sibi adiunxerunt castraque ad Cordubam 
posuerunt. Cassius eo biduo circiter IIII milia 
passuum a Corduba citra flumen Baetim in oppidi 

^ Both the native and the second legion had served under 
Varro. 

104 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

it appeared, was operating in the name of Caesar 
with forces more powerful than liis own — with no 
less weighty an authority, he kept openly asserting 
that it was for Cn. Pompeius that he wished to 
recover the province. And it may even be that he did 
so wish, owing to his hatred for Caesar and affection 
for Pompey, the latter 's name carrying great weight 
with those legions which M. \^arro had held.^ But 
what his motive was in this was a matter for general 
conjecture. At any rate that was what Thorius 
gave out ; and his troops acknowledged it to the extent 
that they had the name of Cn. Pompeius carved on 
their shields. A vast concourse of citizens came 
forth to meet the legions, not only of men but also of 
matrons and youths, beseeching them not to ap- 
proach Corduba as enemies and plunder it : they 
themselves in fact shared in the universal antagonism 
against Cassius ; and they prayed they might not be 
compelled to act against Caesar. 

The tears and entreaties of this vast multitude had 
no little effect upon the army ; it saw too that to 
punish Cassius it had no need of the name and 
memorj' of Cn. Pompeius ; that Longinus was equally 
hateful to all the adherents of Caesar as he was to 
those of Pompey ; and that it could induce neither 
the citizen corporation of Corduba nor Marcellus to 
act contrary to Caesar's interest. Accordingly they 
removed Pompey 's name from their shields, adopted 
Marcellus, who professed his intention to champion 
Caesar's cause, as their leader and hailed him as 
praetor, made common cause with the citizen 
corporation, and pitched their camp near Corduba. 
Within two days Cassius pitched camp on his side of 
the river Baetis some four miles distant from Corduba, 



CAESAR 

conspectu loco excelso facit castra ; litteras ad regem 
Bogudem in Mauretaniam et ad M. Lepidum pro- 
consulem in Hispaniam citeriorem mittit, subsidio 
sibi provinciaeque Caesaris causa quam primum 
veniret. Ipse hostili mode Cordubensium agros 
vastat, aedificia incendit. 
60 Cuius rei deformitate atque indignitate legiones 
quae Marcellum sibi ducem ceperant ad eum con- 
currerunt, ut in aciem educerentur orant, priusque 
confligendi sibi potestas fieret quam cum tanta 
contumelia nobilissimae carissimaeque possessiones 
Cordubensium in conspectu suo rapinis, ferro flam- 
maque consumerentur. Marcellus cum confligere 
miserrimum putaret, quod et victoris et victi detri- 
mentum ad eundem Caesarem esset redundaturum 
neque suae potestatis esset, legiones Baetim traducit 
aciemque instruit. Cum Cassium contra pro suis 
castris aciem instruxisse loco superiore videret, 
causa interposita, quod is in aequum non descenderet, 
Marcellus militibus persuadet ut se recipiant in 
castra. Itaque copias reducere coepit. Cassius, 
quo bono valebat Marcellumque infirmum esse 
sciebat, aggressus equitatu legionaries se recipientis 
compluris novissimos in fluminis ripis interfecit. 
Cum hoc detrimento quid transitus fluminis viti 
difficultatisque haberet cognitum esset, Marcellus 
castra Baetim transfert, crebroque uterque legiones 
1 06 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

in a lofty position in sight of the town. He sent 
despatches to king Bogiid in Mauretania and to M. 
Lepidus, the pro-consul, in Hither Spain, urging 
each to come as soon as possible to the aid of himself 
and the province, in the interest of Caesar. He 
himself laid waste in hostile fashion the territory of 
Corduba and set buildings ablaze. 

The hideous and outrageous character of this action 
led the legions which had taken Marcellus for their 
leader to rush to him in a body and beg him that 
they might be led out to battle and granted an 
opportunity of engaging the enemy before those 
most illustrious and beloved possessions of the 
people of Corduba should suffer the grievous ignominy 
of being consumed before their very eyes by plunder, 
fire and sword. Though Marcellus thought it a 
thousand pities to engage, since the loss sustained by 
victor and vanquished alike would in either case have 
repercussions on Caesar, and it lay outside his power 
to control it, yet he took his legions across the 
Baetis and drew up his line. On seeing that Cassius 
had drawn up his line facing him on higher ground 
in front of his own camp, Marcellus prevailed upon 
his troops to ^\•ithdraw to their camp, putting them 
off with the excuse that the enemy refused to come 
down into the plain. And so he proceeded to withdraw 
his forces. Cassius employed his excellent cavalry — - 
in which arm he was strong, and knew Marcellus to 
be weak — to attack the retreating legionaries, and 
killed quite a number of their rearguard on the banks 
of the river. Made aware by this loss of the draw- 
back and difficulty involved in crossing the river, 
Marcellus transferred his camp to the other side of 
the Baetis. Now both commanders frequently led 

107 



CAESAR 

in acicm educit ; ncque tamen confligitur propter 
locorum difficultates. 
61 Erat copiis pedestribus multo firmior Marcellus ; 
habebat enim veteranas multisque proeliis expertas 
Icgiones. Cassias fidei magis quam virtuti legionum 
confidebat. Itaque, cum castra castris collata essent 
et Marcellus locum idoneum castello cepisset quo 
prohibere aqua Cassianos posset, Longinus, veritus 
ne genere quodam obsidionis clauderetur in regioni- 
bus alienis sibique infestis, noctu silentio ex castris 
proficiscitur celerique itinere Uliam contendit, quod 
sibi fidele esse oppidum credebat. Ibi adeo coniuncta 
ponit moenibus castra ut et loci natura — namque 
Ulia in edito monte posita est — et ipsa munitione 
urbis undique ab oppugnatione tutus esset. Hunc 
Marcellus insequitur et quam proxime potest Uliam 
castra castris confert locorumque cognita natura, quo 
maxime rem deducere volebat, necessitate est 
deductus ut neque confligeret — cuius si rei facultas 
esset, resistere incitatis militibus non poterat — 
neque vagari Cassium latius pateretur, ne plures 
civitates ea paterentur quae passi erant Cordu- 
benses. Castellis idoneis locis collocatis operibusque 
in circuitu oppidi continuatis Uliam Cassiumque 
munitionibus clausit. Quae prius quam perficerentur, 
1 08 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

out their legions to battle ; there was, however, no 
engagement owing to the difficult nature of the 
ground. 

Marcellus was much stronger in infantry forces ; 
for the legions he had were veteran ones, tested in 
many campaigns. Cassius relied on the loyalty 
rather than the valour of his legions. Consequently 
when the two camps had been pitched over against 
one another and Marcellus had selected a position 
suitable for a stronghold which might enable him to 
prevent the enemy troops from getting water, 
Longinus was afraid of being shut up by a virtual 
blockade in territory controlled by others and hostile 
to himself; and so he silently set out from his camp 
by night and marched swiftly to Ulia, a town which 
he believed to be loyal to himself. There he pitched 
his camp so close to the walls of the town that not 
only its natural position — for Ulia is situated on a 
lofty mountain — but also the actual fortification of 
the city made him safe on all sides from assault. 
Marcellus pursued him and pitched his camp over 
against the enemy camp as close to Ulia as he 
could. When he had appreciated the nature of the 
ground, he had inevitably to resort to the very 
tactics to which above all he wanted to resort, namely 
refraining from an engagement— and had there been 
an opportunity for engaging he could not have held 
in check his excited troops- — and at the same time 
not allowing Cassius to roam too far afield, to prevent 
more communities from suffering the fate of the 
inhabitants of Corduba. By siting strongholds at 
suitable points and carrying his field-works in a 
continuous ring round the town, he hemmed in Ulia 
and Cassius with entrenchments. But before these 

109 



CAESAR 

Longinus omnem suurn equitatiim eniisit ; queni 
magno sibi usu fore credebat, si pabulari frumen- 
tarique Marcellum non pateretur, magno autem fore 
impedimento, si clausus obsidione et inutilis neees- 
sariuni consumeret frumentuni. 

62 Paucis diebus Q. Cassi litteris acceptis rex Bogus 
cum copiis venit adiungitque ei legioni quam secum 
adduxerat compluris cohortis auxiliarias Hispanorum. 
Namque ut in civilibus dissensionibus aceidere con- 
suevit, ita temporibus illis in Hispania non nullae 
civitates rebus Cassi studebant, plures Marcellum 
fovebant. Accedit cum copiis Bogus ad exteriores 
Marcelli munitiones. Pugnatur utrimque acriter, 
crebroque id accidit fortuna saepe ad utrumque 
victoriam transferente ; nee tamen umquam ab 
opei-ibus depellitur Marcellus. 

63 Interim Lepidus ex citeriore provincia cum 
cohoi-tibus legionariis XXXV magnoque numero 
equitum et reliquorum auxiliorum venit ea mente 
Uliam, ut sine ullo studio contentiones Cassi Mar- 
cellique componeret. Huic venienti sine dubitatione 
Marcellus se credit atque ofFert ; Cassius contra 
suis se tenet praesidiis, sive eo quod plus sibi iuris 
deberi quam Marcello existimabat, sive eo quod ne 
praeoccupatus animus Lepidi esset obsequio adver- 
sarii verebatur, Ponit ad Uliam castra Lepidus 
neque habet a Marcello quicquam divisi. Ne 
pugnetur interdicit; ad exeundum Cassium invitat 

no 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

could be completed, Longinus sent out his entire 
cavali-y force, in the belief that it would stand him 
in very good stead if it stopped Marcellus from 
collecting fodder and corn, whereas it would prove a 
great handicap if, shut up by blockade and rendered 
useless, it used up precious corn. 

Within a few days king Bogud, having received Q. 
Cassius' despatches, arrived with his forces; he had 
brought one legion with him, and to this he now 
added several auxiliary cohorts of Spanish troops. 
For, as usually happens in civil wars, some states 
in Spain at that time were supporters of Cassius, 
though a larger number wai'mly espoused the cause 
of Marcellus. Bogud and his forces came up to the 
outer entrenchments of Marcellus : sharp fighting 
broke out between the two sides, and this recurred at 
frequent intervals, with the tide of fortune often 
turning from one side to the other. Marcellus, 
however, was never dislodged from his field-works. 

Meanwhile Lepidus came to Ulia from the nearer 
province Avith thirty-five legionary cohorts and a 
large number of cavahy and other auxiliary troops, 
his object being to resolve, quite impartially, the 
dispute between Cassius and Marcellus. On his 
arrival Marcellus without hesitation put himself con- 
fidently into Lepidus' hands. Cassius, on the other 
hand, remained within his own defences, either 
because he thought that a greater measure of justice 
was due to himself than to Marcellus, or else because 
he was afraid that Lepidus' attitude might have been 
biased by the deference shewn him by his opponent. 
Lepidus pitched his camp near Ulia, in complete 
accord with Marcellus. He refused to allow any 
fighting, invited Cassius to come out, and pledged 



CAESAR 

fidemque suani in re omni interponit. Cum diu 
dubitasset Cassius quid sibi faciendum quidve Lepido 
esset credendum, neque ullum exitum consili sui 
reperiret si permaneret in sententia, postulat uti 
munitiones disicerentur sibique liber exitus daretur. 
Non tantum indutiis factis sed prope iam pace ^ 
constituta opera cum - complanarent custodiaeque 
munitionum essent deductae, auxilia regis in id 
castellum Marcelli quod proximum erat regis castris, 
neque opinantibus omnibus — si tamen in omnibus 
fuit Cassius : nam de huius conscientia dubitabatur — , 
impetum fecerunt complurisque ibi milites oppres- 
serunt. Quod nisi celeriter indignatione et auxilio 
Lepidi proelium esset diremptum, maior calamitas 
esset accepta. 
64 Cum iter Cassio patefactum esset, castra Marcellus 
cum Lepido coniungit. Lepidus eodem tempore 
Marcellusque Cordubam cum suis, Cassius proficisci- 
tur Carmonem. Sub idem tempus Trebonius pro- 
consul ad provinciam obtinendam venit. De cuius 
adventu ut cognovit Cassius, legiones quas secum 
habuei'at equitatumque in hiberna distribuit ; ipse 
omnibus suis rebus celeriter correptis Malacam 
contendit ibique adverso tempore navigandi navis 
conscendit, ut ipse praedicabat, ne se Lepido et 
Trebonio et Marcello committeret, ut amici eius 
dictitabant, ne per cam provinciam minore cum 

^ pace added by Nipperdey. ^ cum added by Aldus. 

112 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

his word to every offer he made. For a long time 
Cassius was in doubt as to what he should do or what 
confidence he should place in Lepidus ; but as he 
could find no solution to his policy if he remained 
steadfast in his decision, he demanded that the 
entrenchments should be demolished and that he 
himself should be granted leave to depart unmolested. 
Not only had a truce been made, but bv now a peace- 
ful settlement had been all but arranged, and they 
were dismantling the fieldworks and the sentries 
manning the entrenchments had been withdrawn, 
when, though nobody expected it — if indeed nobody 
included Cassius, for there was some doubt as to his 
complicity — the king's auxiliary forces launched an 
attack upon the stronghold of Marcellus nearest the 
king's camp, and overpowered a number of troops in 
it. And had not Lepidus in righteous anger promptly 
lent his assistance to break up that fray, a greater 
disaster would have been sustained. 

Now that the way lay open to Cassius, Marcellus 
joined his camp to that of Lepidus. Lepidus and 
Marcellus then set out with their forces simul- 
taneously for Corduba, Cassius for Carmo. Round 
about the same time Trebonius came to govern the Feb. 47. 
province as pro-consul. WTien Cassius learned of his 
coming he posted the legions under his command 
and the cavalry to their various winter-quarters ; as 
for himself, he hurriedly grabbed all his belongings 
and hastened to Malaca, where he embarked, 
although the season was unfavourable for navigation. 
His object, as he personally averred, was to avoid 
committing himself to Lepidus, Trebonius and 
Marcellus : as his friends asserted, to avoid the 
relative humiliation of travelling through a province 

113 



CAESAR 

dignitate iter faceret cuius magna pars ab eo 
defecerat, ut ceteri existimabant, ne pecunia ilia ex 
infinitis rapinis confecta in potestateni cuiusquam 
veniret. Progressus secunda ut hiberna tempestate 
cum in Hiberum flumen noctis vitandae causa se 
contulisset, inde paulo vehementiore tempestate, 
nihilo periculosius se navigaturum credens, profectus, 
adversis fluctibus occurrentibus ostio fluniinis, in 
ipsis faucibus, cum neque flectere navem propter vim 
fluminis neque directam tantis fluctibus tenere posset, 
demersa nave periit. 
65 Cum in Syriam Caesar ex Aegypto venisset atque 
ab eis qui Roma venerant ad eum cognosceret 
litterisque urbanis animadverteret multa Romae 
male et inutiliter administrari neque ullam partem 
rei publicae satis commode geri, quod et conten- 
tionibus tribuniciis perniciosae seditiones orirentur et 
ambitione atque indulgentia tribunorum militum et 
qui legionibus praeerant multa contra miorem con- 
suetudinemque militarem fierent, quae dissolvendae 
disciplinae severitatisque essent, eaque omnia flagi- 
tare adventum suum videret, tamen praeferendum 
existimabat, quas in provincias regionesque venisset, 
eas ita relinquere constitutas ut domesticis dissen- 
sionibus liberarentur, iura legesque acciperent, 
externorum hostium metum deponerent. Haec in 

1 He touched first at Ace Ptolemais on the Syrian coast 
about mid-June (Holmes), early July (Stoffel). 

^ The mam causes of unrest were economic ; in particular 
Caesar's measures for the relief of debt were too mild for 
extremists like Caelius and, later, Dolabella : see also Intro- 
duction to Bell. Afr., p. 139. 
114 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

a great part of which had revolted from him : as 
everyone else believed, to avoid letting that money 
of his — the proceeds of innumerable robberies — ^fall 
into the hands of anyone else. At first he made some 
headway in weather which, considering it was winter, 
was favourable ; but after he had taken shelter in the 
river Ebro to avoid sailing by night, the weather then 
became somewhat stormier ; believing, however, 
that he would run no greater risk if he sailed, he set 
forth : but what with the swell rolling in head on 
against the river mouth, and the strong current 
preventing him from putting about just as the huge 
waves made it impossible to hold on straight ahead, 
his ship sank in the very mouth of the river, and so he 
perished. 

On his arrival in Syria ^ from Egypt Caesar learned 
from those who had joined him there from Rome, as 
well as from information contained in despatches 
from the city, that there was much that was bad and 
unprofitable in the administration at Rome, and that 
no department of the government was being really 
efficiently conducted ^ ; for rivalries among the 
tribunes, it was said, were producing dangerous 
rifts, and the flattering indulgence shewn to their 
troops by the military tribunes and legionary com- 
manders was giving rise to many practices opposed to 
military custom and usage which tended to under- 
mine strict discipline. All this, as he saw, urgently 
demanded his presence : yet, for all that, he thought 
it more important to leave all the provinces and 
districts he visited organised in such a way that they 
would be immune from internal disagreements, 
would accept a legal constitution, and lay aside their 
fears of aggression from without. This he was 

115 



CAESAR 

Syria, Cilicia, Asia celeriter se confecturum sperabat, 
quod hae provinciae nuUo bello premebantur; in 
Bithynia ac Ponto plus oneris vidt^bat sibi impendere. 
Non excessisse enim Ponlo Pharnacen audiebat 
neque excessurum putabat, cum secundo proelio 
vehementer esset inflatus quod contra Domitium 
Calvinum fecerat. Commoratus fere in omnibus 
civitatibus quae maiore sunt dignitate, praemia bene 
meritis et viritim et publice tribuit, de controversiis 
veteribus cognoscit ac statuit ; reges, tyrannos, 
dynastas provinciae finitimos, qui omnes ad eum con- 
currerant, receptos in fidem condicionibus impositis 
provinciae tuendae ac defendendae dimittit et sibi et 
populo Romano anwissimos. 
66 Paucis diebus in ea provincia consumptis Sextum 
Caesarem, amicum et necessarium suum, legionibus 
Syriaeque praeficit ; ipse eadem classe qua venerat 
proficiscitur in Ciliciam. Cuius provinciae civitates 
omnis evocat Tarsum, quod oppidum fere totius 
Ciliciae nobilissimum fortissimumque est. Ibi rebus 
omnibus provinciae et finitimarum civitatium con- 
stitutis cupiditate proficiscendi ad bellum gerendum 
non diutius moratur, magnisque itineribus per 
Cappadociam confectis biduum Mazacae commoratus 
Comana venit,^ vetustissimum et sanctissimum in 
Cappadocia Bellonae templum, quod tanta religione 

^ venit is read by two 31 SS., but is omitted by the rest. 

^ He sailed from Seleucia, the port of Antioch, for Tarsus, 
probably early in July, 47. 

- This sentence, as the text stands, presents a difiBculty; 
for it implies that, despite his urgent haste, Caesar made a 
detour of 60 miles 8.E. from Mazaca to visit the Cappadocian 
Comana. Strabo and Appian say that it was the Pontic, 
not the Cappadocian, Comana that Caesar visited, and possibly 
our author was confused. 
ii6 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

confident he would speedily achieve in Syria, Cilicia 
and Asia, as these provinces had no war afflicting 
them : in Bithynia and Pontus he had, as he saw, a 
heavier task impending. For he heard that Phar- 
naces had not evacuated Pontus, and he did not 
expect him to do so, exceedingly puffed up as he was 
by the successful battle he had fought against 
Domitius Calvinus. He spent some time in prac- 
tically all the more important states of Syria, 
besto^Wng rewards both upon individuals and com- 
munities where they deserved them, and holding 
official inquiries and giving his ruling in questions 
of long-standing dispute ; while as for the kings, 
sovereigns and rulers who, as neighbours of the 
province, had one and all flocked to him, he formally 
took them under his protection and then, on con- 
dition that they undertook to watch over and guard 
the province, he dismissed them as very loyal 
friends both to himself and the Roman people. 

After spending a few days in that province he 
posted Sextus Caesar, his friend and kinsman, to 
command the legions and govern Syria : he himself 
set out ^ for Cilicia in the same fleet in which he had 
arrived. He then summoned all the states of this 
latter province to forgather at Tarsus — perhaps the 
most famous and strongest township in the whole 
of Cilicia. There he settled all the affairs of the 
province and its neighbouring states ; but when he 
had done so, his eagerness to set out and prosecute 
the war admitted no further delay ; and so, after 
travei'sing Cappadocia by forced marches and staying 
two days at Mazaca, he reached Comana, where is 
the shrine of Bellona — the most ancient and holiest 
in Cappadocia. 2 This shrine is Avorshipped with such 

117 



CAESAR 

colitur lit sacerdos eius deae maiestate, imperio, 
potcntia secundus a rege consensu gentis illius 
habeatur. Id homini nobilissimo Lycomedi liithyno 
adiudicavit, qui regio Cappadocum genere ortus iure 
minime dubio, vetustate tamen propter adversam 
fortunam maiorum suorum mutationemque generis 
intermisso sacerdotium id repetebat. Fratri autem 
Ariobarzanis Ariarathi, cum bene meritus uterque 
eorum de re publica esset, ne aut regni hereditas 
Ai'iarathen sollicitaret aut heres regni terreret 
Ariobarzanen, partem Armeniae minoris concessit, 
eumque Ariobarzani attribuit qui sub eius imperio ac 
dicione esset. ^ Ipse iter inceptum simili velocitate 
conficere coepit. 
67 Cum propius Pontum finisque Gallograeciae 
accessisset, Deiotarus, tetrarches Gallograeciae tum 
quidem paene totius, quod el neque legibus neque 
moribus concessum esse ceteri tetrarchae contende- 
bant, sine dubio autem rex Armeniae minoris ab 
senatu appellatus, depositis regiis insignibus neque 
tantum privato vestitu sed etiam reorum habitu 
supplex ad Caesarem venit oratum ut sibi ignosceret, 
quod in ea parte positus terrarum quae nulla praesidia 
Caesaris habuisset exercitibus imperiisque coactus ^ 

1 this sentence is in great disorder in the MSS. : I have 
adopted Nipperdey's reading. 

- coactus added by Glandorp. 

^ Better known as Galatia. 

2 For his assistance to the Romans against Mithridates 
Deiotarus had been rewarded by Pompej- with grants of 
land in eastern Pontus and the title of king : Lesser Armenia 
may have been given him at the same time. He was originally 
tetrarch of western Galatia only, and his claim to central 
Galatia as well is a matter of some obscurity. 

ii8 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

reverence that the priest of that goddess is held by 
common consent of the nation to rank next to the 
king in majesty, dominion and influence. This 
priesthood he awarded to Lycomedes, a Bithynian 
of very noble descent, who sought it by right of 
inhei'itance ; for he was sprung from the royal 
Cappadocian house, his claim in this respect being, 
in point of legal right, by no means in doubt, though, 
in long passing of time, because of the chequered 
fortunes of his ancestors and changes in the royal line 
of descent, continuity had been broken. As for 
Ariobarzanes and his brother Ariarathes, both of 
them had deserved well of the Republic ; and so, to 
prevent Ariarathes from being tempted to claim his 
inheritance to the kingdom, or, as heir to it, from 
intimidating Ariobarzanes, Caesar granted him part 
of Lesser Armenia and allowed Ariobarzanes to treat 
him as his vassal. Whereupon Caesar himself 
proceeded to complete the remainder of his journey 
with similar despatch. 

When Caesar approached closer to Pontus and the 
boundaries of Gallograecia,'^ he was met by Deio- 
tarus. Although the latter's position at that time as 
tetrarch of practically the whole of Gallograecia was 
disputed by all his fellow tetrarchs as inadmissible 
both by law and by tradition, he w'as, however, 
indisputably hailed as king of Lesser Armenia by the 
Senate - ; and now he laid aside his royal insignia 
and, dressed not merely as a private person but 
actually in the garb of defendants in the courts, he 
came to Caesar as a suppliant to beg his pardon for 
having been on the side of Cn. Pompeius. He 
explained that, situated as he was in a part of the 
world which had had no garrisons of Caesar's to protect 

119 



CAESAR 

in Cn. Pompei castris fuisset : neque enim se debuisse 
iudicem esse controversiarum populi Roniani, sed 
parere praesentibus imperiis. 

68 Contra quern Caesar, cum plurima sua com- 
memorasset officia quae consul ei decretis publicis 
tribuisset, cumque defcnsioneni eius nullam posse 
excusationem eius imprudentiae recipere coarguisset, 
quod homo tantae prudentiae ac diligentiae scire 
potuisset quis urbem Italiamque tenerct, ubi senatus 
populusque Romanus, ubi res publica esset, quis 
denique post L. Lentulum, C. Marcellum consul 
esset, tamen se concedere id factum superioribus suis 
beneficiis, veteri hospitio atque amicitiae, dignitati 
aetatique hominis, precibus eorum qui frequentes 
concurrissent hospites atque amici Deiotari ad 
deprecandum, de controversiis tetrarcharum postea 
se cogniturum esse dixit, regium vestitum ei restituit. 
Legionem autem eam quam ex genere civium 
suorum Deiotarus armatura disciplinaque nostra 
constitutam habebat equitatumque omnem ad 
bellum gerendum adducere iussit. 

69 Cum in Pontum venisset copiasque omnis in unum 
locum coegisset, quae numero atque exercitatione 
bellorum mediocres erant — excepta enim legione 
sexta, quam secum abduxerat Alexandrea veteranam 



1 As consul in 59 B.C. Caesar had got the Senat* to ratify 
the grants of land with which Pompey had rewarded him. 

2 Lentulus and Marcellus were consuls in 49 B.C. : Caesar 
and Servilius in 48. 

^ This appears to be the meaning of superioribus suis 
beneficiis, >:iz. ' past acts of kindness done by Deiotarus to 
Caesar '. Others interpret the words as meaning ' acts of 
kindness done by Caesar ' ; but though this would be the 



TPIE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

it, he had been compelled to do so by orders backed by 
armed force ; for it had been no business of his to act 
as judge in the disputes of the Roman people, but 
only to obey the commands of the moment. 

68 In his reply Caesar reminded him of all the many 
loyal services he himself as consul had rendered to 
him by official decrees,^ and went on to point out 
that his apology could not be accepted as any excuse 
for his unwisdom ; a man, in fact, as wise and careful 
as he was could have known who was master of Rome 
and Italy, what was the attitude of the Senate and 
the Roman people and the position taken up by the 
government, who in short was consul after L. Lentulus 
and C. Marcellus.2 ' Nevertheless,' he continued, ' I 
make allowance for that action of yours in view of 
your past generosity towards myself,^ our long-stand- 
ing ties of hospitality and friendship, your rank and 
age, and the entreaties of all those guests and 
friends of yours who have flocked in crowds to entreat 
for your pardon. As for the matters in dispute 
between the tetrarchs, I shall examine into them 
later.' He then bade Deiotarus resume his royal 
garb, but ordered him to bring that legion of his, 
which was raised from the ranks of his own country- 
men but in equipment and training organised on our 
pattern, together with all his cavalry, for the prosecu- 
tion of the war. 

69 On his arrival in Pontus Caesar mustered his whole 
force at a single rendezvous. It was but a modest 
force both numerically and in practical expex'ience in 
the field ; for apart from the Sixth legion, which he 
had brought with him from Alexandria — and this, 

more obvious and usual meaning of the phrase, it scarcely 
suits the present context. 



CAESAR 

multis laboribus periculisque functam multisque 
militibus partini difficultate itinerum ac naviga- 
tionum partim creV)ntate bellorum adeo deminutam, 
ut minus mille hominibus in ea esset, reliquae erant 
tres legiones, una Deiotari, duae quae in eo proelio 
quod Cn. Domitium fecisse cum Pharnace scripsimus 
fuerant — , legati a Pharnace missi Caesarem adeunt 
atque imprimis deprecantur ne eius adventus hostilis 
esset : facturum enim omnia Pharnacen quae 
imperata essent. Maximeque commemorabant nulla 
Pharnacen auxilia contra Caesarem Pompeio dare 
voluisse, cum Deiotarus, qui dedisset, tamen ei 
satisfecisset. 
70 Caesar respondit se fore aequissimum Pharnaci, si 
quae polliceretur repraesentaturus esset. Monuit 
autem, ut solebat, mitibus verbis legatos, ne aut 
Deiotarum sibi obicerent aut nimis eo gloriarentur 
beneficio, quod auxilia Pompeio non missisent. Nam 
se neque libentius facere quicquam quam supplicibus 
ignoscere neque provinciarum publlcas iniurias con- 
donare eis posse qui fuissent in se officiosi. Quin ^ id 
ipsum quod commemorarent officium fuisse utilius 
Pharnaci, qui providisset ne vinceretur, quam sibi 
cui di immortales victoriam tribuissent. Itaque se 

^ quam MSS. : quin Nipperdey. 
122 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

being a veteran one with a long record of hazardous 
and strenuous achievements, had lost so many men, 
due partly to the difficulties of transit both by land 
and sea, partly to the frequency of its campaigns, and 
was now so much below strength as to comprise less 
than one thousand troops — apart from the Sixth, 
the remainder of the foi'ce consisted of three legions — 
one belonging to Deiotarus, and the two which had 
taken part in that engagement which Cn. Domitius 
fought ^\ith Phamaces, as I have related. Where- 
upon envoys sent by Pharnaces approached Caesar 
and first and foremost entreated him not to approach 
their country in anv hostile spirit, since Pharnaces 
would carry out all his instructions. In particular 
they reminded Caesar that Pharnaces had refused to 
provide Pompeius with any auxiliary troops for use 
against Caesar ; whereas Deiotarus, who had pro- 
vided them, had none the less given him satisfaction. 
Caesar replied that he would be scrupulously fair to 
Pharnaces if the latter intended to cany out his 
promises. He warned the envoys, however, inhis usual 
tactful language, not to tax him with the case of 
Deiotarus or pride themselves unduly on their good 
services in having refused to send Pompeius auxiliary 
troops. Forwhereasnothinggavehimgreaterpleasure 
than granting pardon when it was humbly entreated, 
yet it was impossible for him to condone public outrages 
against the provinces in the case of those who had 
been loyal towards himself. ' In point of fact,' he 
went on, ' that very act of loyalty Avhich you call to 
mind proved more expedient to Pharnaces, who 
thereby had the foresight to avoid defeat, than to 
myself, for whose victory the immortal gods were 
responsible. As for the great and serious outrages 

123 



CAESAR 

niagnas et gravis iniurias civium Romanorum qui in 
Ponto negotiati essent, quoniam in integrum resti- 
tuere non posset, concedere Pharnaci. Nam neque 
interfectis amissam vitam neque exsectis virilitatem 
restituere posse; quod quidem supplicium gravius 
morte cives Romani subissent. Ponto vero decederet 
confestim familiasque publicanorum remitteret 
ceteraque restitueret sociis civibusque Romanis quae 
penes eum essent. Si fecisset, iam tunc sibi mitteret 
munera ac dona quae bene rebus gestis imperatores 
ab amicis accipere consuessent. Miserat enim 
Pharnaces coronam auream. His responsis datis 
legatos remisit. 

71 At Pharnaces liberaliter omnia poUicitus, cum 
festinantem ac praecurrentem Caesarem speraret 
libentius etiam crediturum suis promissis quam res 
pateretur, quo celerius honestiusque ad res magis 
necessarias proficisceretur — nemini enim erat igno- 
tum plurimis de causis ad urbem Caesarem revocari — , 
lentius agere, decedendi diem postulare longiorem, 
pactiones interponere, in summa frustrari coepit. 
Caesar cognita calliditate hominis, quod aliis tem- 
poribus natiira facere consueverat tunc necessitate 
fecit adductus, ut celei'ius omnium opinione manum 
consereret. 

72 Zela est oppidum in Ponto positum, ipsum ut in 
piano loco satis munitum : tumulus enim naturalis, 
124 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

perpetrated against Roman citizens engaged in trade 
in Pontus, since it is not in my power to set them to 
rights, I accordingly forgive Pharnaces. I cannot, 
in fact, restore to murdered men the Hfe they have 
lost, nor to the mutilated their manhood ; and such 
indeed is the punishment — worse than death — ^that 
Roman citizens have undergone. Pharnaces, how- 
ever, must Avithdraw forthwith from Pontus, release 
the household slaves of the tax-gatherers, and 
make all other such restitution as lies in his power 
to the allies and Roman citizens. If he does this, 
then — and not before — shall he send me the tributes 
and gifts which triumphant commanders are in the 
habit of receiving from their friends.' (Pharnaces 
had, in fact, sent him a golden crown.) Such was the 
reply with which the envoys were sent back. 

71 All this Pharnaces graciously promised to do. 
However, as he hoped that Caesar's impetuous haste 
would lead him to trust his own assurances still more 
readily than the circumstances justified, so that he 
might tackle more urgent matters with the greater ex- 
pedition and propriety — for everyone was aware that 
there were many reasons demanding Caesar's return 
to Rome — in this hope, then, he began to take a more 
leisurely line, to demand a later date for his with- 
drawal, to propose agreements by way of causing delay 
• — in fine, he proceeded to cheat. Realising the fellow's 
cunning, Caesar was now of necessity constrained to 
adopt the very tactics which on other occasions it 
had been his natural habit to employ — namely to 
come to grips more promptly than anyone expected. 

72 Zela is a town situated in Pontus, with adequate 
natural defences, considering its position in a plain : 
for its battlements are reared upon a hillock — a 



CAESAR 

velut nianu factus, excelsiore undique fastigio 
sustinet murum. Circumpositi sunt huic oppido 
magni multique intercisi vallibus colles ; quorum 
editissimus unus, qui propter victoriam Mithridatis et 
iiifelicitatem Triari detrimentumque exercitus nostri 
magnam in illis partibus habet nobilitatem, superio- 
ribus locis atque itineribus paene coniunctus est ^ 
ojjpido nee niulto longius rnilibus passuum III abest 
ab Zela. Hunc locum Pharnaces veteribus pater- 
norum felicium castrorum refectis operibus copiis 
suis omnibus occupavit. 
73 Caesar cum ab hoste milia passuum V castra 
posuisset videretque eas vallis quibus regia castra 
munirentur eodem intervallo sua castra munituras, 
si modo ea loca hostes priores non cepissent, quae 
multo erant propiora regis castris, aggerem com- 
poi-tari iubet intra munitiones. Quo celeriter collate 
proxima nocte vigilia quarta legionibus omnibus 
expeditis impedimentisque in castris relictis prima 
luce neque opinantibus hostibus eum ipsum locunn 
cepit. in quo Mithridates secundum proelium adver- 
sus Triarium fecerat. Hue omnem comportatum 

^ / have adopted Vielhaber's restoration. 

1 Lucullus' lieutenant, C. Triarius,was heavily defeated in 67. 
^ Its exact position is doubtful; the highest hill in the 
neighbourhood (now Altiagatch Dagh, about 2000 feet) being 
some eight Roman miles north of Zela. 

* The reference of the two temporal expressions — vigilia 
quarta and prima luce — is not easy to decide. The rendering 
given is perhaps the most likely. Caesar had some four miles 
to march; and if he left camp early in the fourth watch (this 
would be quite short in June), he could have taken the position 
at dawn. Two other interpretations seem possible : (1) ' at 
the fourth watch as the dawn was (just) breaking he cap- 
tured . . .' (2) ' When at the fourth watch on the following 
126 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

natural one for all its artificial appearance — whose 
summit is loftier than all the terrain surrounding it. 
Encircling this town are many considerable hills, 
intersected by valleys ; and one of these — a very 
lofty one — which enjoys no little fame in those parts 
thanks to the victory of Mithridates, and the mis- 
fortune of Triarius and defeat of our armv,^ is all but 
linked to the town by tracks along the higher ground, 
and is little more than three miles distant from Zela.- 
Here Pharnaces repaired the ancient works of his 
father's once prosperous camp, and occupied the 
position with his entire forces. 

Caesar pitched his camp five miles distant from the 
enemy ; and as he now saw that that valley by which 
the king's camp was protected would, if its width 
separated them, equally afford protection to a camp 
of his own, provided only that the enemy did not 
anticipate him in capturing the ground in question, 
which was much nearer the king's camp, he ordered 
materials for a rampart to be carted within the 
entrenchments. This was speedily collected. The 
following night he left camp at the fourth watch ^ 
with all his legions in light order and the heavy 
baggage left behind in camp, and surprised the 
enemy at dawn by capturing that very position 
where Mithridates once fought his successful action 
against Triarius. To this spot * he ordered the slaves 

night this material had been collected . . .'. But this would 
more likely have been a daylight operation, unless motives 
of security demanded otherwise. 

■• The site of Caesar's new camp appears to have been 
immediately south of the valley, on the northern edge of which 
Pharnaces was already encamped. The site seems to have 
been dominated by — though not identical with — the hill 
where Mithridates had once encamped. 

127 



CAESAR 

aggerem ex castris per servitia aggeri ^ iussit, ne 
quis ab opere miles discederet, cum spatio non 
amplius passuum mille intercisa vallis castra hostium 
divideret ab opere incepto Caesaris castrorum. 
74 Pharnaces, cum id repente prima luce animadver- 
tisset, copias suas omnis pro castris instruxit. Quas 
interposita tanta locorum iniquitate consuetudine 
magis pervulgata militari credebat instrui Caesar vel 
ad opus suum tardandum, quo plures in armis tene- 
rentur, vel ad ostentationem regiae fiduciae, ne 
munitione magis quam manu defendere locum 
Pharnaces videretur. Itaque deterritus non est quo 
minus prima acie pro vallo instructa reliqua pars 
exercitus opus faceret. At Pharnaces impulsus sive 
loci felicitate sive auspiciis et religionibus inductus, 
quibus obtemperasse eum postea audiebamus, sive 
paucitate nostrorum qui in armis erant comperta, 
cum more operis cotidiani magnam illam servorum 
multitudinem quae aggerem portabat militem esse 
credidisset, sive etiam fiducia veterani exercitus sui, 

^ agerentur 3ISS. : aggeri, with per added before servitia, is 
Kuebler's conjecture. 

128 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

to bring from the camp all the accumulated matei-ial 
for the rampart, so that none of his troops should quit 
their work of fortification, since the intervening 
valley which separated the ertemy's camp from the 
emplacements which Caesar had begun was not more 
than a mile wide. 

On suddenly observing this situation at dawn, 
Pharnaces drew up all his forces in front of his camp. 
In view of the highly uneven character of the 
intervening ground Caesar supposed that it was the 
king's normal military practice more than anything 
that occasioned this deployment; or else his object 
was to delay Caesar's own work of fortification, 
through the necessity of keeping more men standing 
to arms ; or again it might be intended as a display 
of confidence on the king's part, to shew that it was 
not on fortification so much as on arined force that 
Pharnaces relied to defend his position. Accordingly, 
Caesar was not deterred from keeping the remainder 
of his army engaged on the work of fortification, 
deploying only the fi-ont line in front of the palisade. 
Pharnaces, however, took it into his head to engage. 
Whether it was the lucky associations of the spot 
that drove him to take this course, or whether it was 
his scrupulous observance of omens, to which, as we 
afterwards heard, he gave careful heed, that so 
prompted him ; or maybe it was the small number 
of our troops which, according to his infoi'mation, 
were standing to arms (for he had supposed that 
that vast gang of slaves which transported the 
material for the rampart, as though it was their daily 
employment, was in fact composed of troops) ; or 
maybe even it was his confidence in that veteran army 
of his, which, as his envoys boasted, had fought and 

129 



CAESAR 

quern bis et vicies in acie conflixisse et vicisse legati 
eius gloriabantur, simul contemptu exercitus nostri, 
quern pulsum a se • Domitio duce sciebat, inito 
consilio dimicandi descendere praerupta valle coepit. 
Cuius aliquamdiu Caesar irridebat inanem ostenta- 
tionem et eo loco militum coartationem, quern in 
locum nemo sanus hostis subiturus esset : cum 
interim Pharnaces eodem gradu quo in praeruptam 
descenderat vallem ascendere adversus arduum 
collem instructis copiis coepit. 

75 Caesar incredibili eius vel temeritate vcl fiducia 
commotus neque opinans imparatusque oppressus 
eodem tempore milites ab opere revocat, arma 
capere iubet, legiones opponit aciemque instruit ; 
cuius rei subita trepidatio magnum terrorem attulit 
nostris. Nondum ordinibus instructis falcatae regiae 
quadrigae permixtos milites perturbant ; quae tamen 
celeriter multitudine telorum opprimuntur. Insequi- 
tur has acies hostium, et clamore sublato confligitur 
multum adiuvante natura loci, plurimum deorum 
immortalium benignitate ; qui cum omnibus casibus 
bellicis intersunt, tum praecipue eis quibus nihil 
ratione potuit administrari. 

76 Magno atque acri proelio comminus facto, dextro 
cornu, quo veterana legio sexta erat collocata, 

130 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

conquered upon two and twenty battle-fields, coupled 
with a contempt for our army, which he knew had 
been routed by himself when Domitius led it : 
anyway, having decided to engage, he began the 
descent down the steep ravine. For some little time 
Caesar laughed contemptuously at this empty 
bravado on the part of the king, and at his troops 
packed closely on ground which no enemy in his 
senses would be likely to set foot on ; while in the 
meantime Pharnaces with his forces in battle array 
proceeded to climb the steep hill-side confronting 
him at the same steady pace at which he had 
descended the sheer ravine. 

This incredible foolhardiness or confidence on the 
part of the king disconcerted Caesar, who was not 
expecting it and was caught imprepared. Simul- 
taneously he recalled the troops from their work of 
fortification, ordered them to stand to arms, deployed 
his legions to meet the attack, and formed line of 
battle ; and the sudden excitement to which all this 
gave rise occasioned considerable panic among our 
troops. Disorganised as our men were, and as yet 
in no regular formation, the king's chariots armed 
with scythes threw them into confusion ; but these 
chariots were speedily overwhelmed by a mass of 
missiles. In their wake came the enemy line : the 
battle cry was raised and the conflict joined, our men 
lieing greatly helped by the nature of the ground but 
above all by the blessing of the immortal gods. For 
just as the gods play a part in all the chance vicissi- 
tudes of war, so above all do they do so in those where 
human strategy has pi-oved quite powerless to avail. 

Heavy and bitter hand-to-hand fighting took place ; 
and it was on the right wing, where the veteran Sixth 

131 



CAESAR 

initium victoriae natum est. Ab ca parte cum in 
proclive detruderentur liostes, multo tardius, sed 
tamen isdeni dis adiuvantibus sinistro cornu raediaque 
acie totae profligantur copiae regis. Quae quam facile 
subierant iniquum locum, tam celeriter gradu pulsae 
pi'emebantur loci iniquitate. Itaque multis militibus 
partim interfectis partim suorum ruina oppressis, qui 
velocitate efFugere poterant, armis tamen proiectis 
vallem transgressi nihil ex loco superiore inermi pro- 
ficere poterant. At nostri victoria elati subire 
iniquum locum munitionesque aggredi non dubi- 
tarunt. Defendentibus autem eis cohortibus castra 
quas Pharnaces praesidio reliquerat, celeriter castris 
hostium sunt potiti. Interfecta multitudine omni 
suorum aut capta Pharnaces cum paucis equitibus 
profugit ; cui nisi castrorum oppugnatio facultatem 
attulisset liberius profugiendi, vivus in Caesaris 
potestatem adductus esset. 
77 Tali victoria totiens victor Caesar incredibili est 
laetitia adfectus, quod maximum bellum tanta 
celeritate confecerat, quodque subiti periculi re- 
cordatione laetior victoria facilis ex difficillimis rebus 



132 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

legion was posted that the first seeds of victory were 
sown. As the enemy were being thrust back down 
the slope on this wing, so too on the left wing and in 
the centre — much more slowly, but thanks never- 
theless to the same divine assistance — the entire 
forces of the king were being crushed. The ease 
with which they had climbed the uneven ground was 
now matched by the speed with which, once dis- 
lodged from their footing, the unevenness of the 
ground enabled them to be driven back. Conse- 
quently, after sustaining many casualties — some 
killed, some knocked out by their comrades' falling 
on top of them*— those whose nimbleness did enable 
them to escape none the less threw away their arms ; 
and so, after crossing the valley, they could not 
make any effective stand from the higher ground, 
unarmed as they now were. Our men, on the con- 
trary, elated by their victory, did not hesitate to 
climb the uneven ground and storm the entrenchments. 
Moreover, despite the resistance of those enemy 
cohorts which Pharnaces had left to guard his camp, 
they promptly won possession of it. With his entire 
forces either killed or captured Pharnaces took to 
flight with a few horsemen ; and had not our storming 
of his camp afforded him a freer opportunity for 
flight, he would have been brought alive into Caesar's 
hands. 

Such a victory transported Caesar — for all the 
many past victories to his credit — with incredible 
delight, inasmuch as he had brought a very serious 
war to so speedy a conclusion, and because an easy 
victory, which delighted him the more when he 
recalled the sudden risk it had involved, had trans- 
pii-ed out of a very difficult situation. Having thus 

133 



CAESAR 

acciderat. Ponto recepto praeda omni regia mili- 
tibus condonata postero die cum expeditis equitibus 
ipse proficiscitur, legionem sextam decedere ad 
praemia atque honores accipiendos in Italiam iubet, 
auxilia Deiotari domum remittit, duas legiones cum 
Caelio Viiiiciano in Ponto relincjuit. 
78 Ita per Gallograeciam Bithyniamque in Asiam iter 
facit omniunKjue earum provinciarum de contro- 
versiis cognoscit et statuit ; iura in tetrarchas, reges, 
civitates distribuit. Mithridaten Pergamenum, a 
quo rem feliciter celeriterque gestam in Aegypto 
supra scripsimus, regio genere ortum, disciplinis 
etiam regiis educatum — nam eum Mithridates, rex 
Asiae totius, propter nobilitatem Pergamo parvulum 
secum asportaverat in castra multosque retinuerat 
annos — regem Bosphori constituit, qui ^ sub imperio 
Pharnacis fuerat, provinciasque populi Romani a 
barbaris atque inimicis regibus interposito amicissimo 
rege munivit. Eidem tetrarehian Gallograecorum 
iure gentis et cognationis adiudicavit occupatam et 
possessam paucis ante annis a Deiotaro. Xeque 
tamen usquam diutius moratus est quam necessitas 
urbanarum seditionum pati videbatur. Rebus felicis- 
simie celerrimeque confectis in Italiam celerius 
omnium opinione venit. 

1 quod MSS. : qui Dinler. 



1 Probably the tetrarchy of the Trocmi in East Galatia 
c/. ch. 67. 



134 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 

recovered Pontus and made a present to his troops of 
all the royal plunder, he himself set out on the 
following day with his cavalry in light order; in- 
structing the Sixth legion to leave for Italy to receive 
its rewards and honours, sending home the auxiliary 
troops of Deiotarus, and leaving two legions in Pontus 
with Caelius Vinicianus. 

Thus he marched through Gallograecia and 
Bithynia into Asia, holding investigations and 
giving his formal ruling on matters of dispute in all 
those provinces, and assigning due prerogatives to 
tetrarchs, kings and states. Now Mithridates of 
Pergamum, whose speedy and successful action in 
Egypt I have described above, was not merely of 
royal birth but also of royal training and upbringing ; 
for Mithridates, king of all Asia, had carried him off to 
camp with him from Pergamum on the score of his 
noble birth Avhen he was quite young, and had kept 
him there for many years ; for which reasons Caesar 
now appointed him king of Bosphorus, which had 
formerly been under control of Pharnaces, and, by 
thus creating a buffer state ruled by a inost friendly 
king, he secured the provinces of the Roman people 
from barbarian and unfriendly kings. To the saine 
Mithridates he awarded, by right of racial affinity 
and kinship, the tetrarchy of Gallograecia Avhich had 
been seized and occupied a few years earlier by 
Deiotarus.^ Nowhere, however, did he delay any 
longer than the urgency of unsettled conditions at 
Rome appeared to warrant ; and when he had 
accomplished his tasks with the greatest success and 
expedition, he ai-rived in Italy more quickly than 
anyone expected. 



THE AFRICAN WAR 



IXTRODUCTIOX 

As soon as Caesar had crushed Pharnaces at Zela and 
temporai'ily i-eorganised the affairs of Asia, he might, 
if mihtary strategy alone had governed his pohcy, 
have sailed straight to Africa, where his enemies had 
had a vear already in which to consolidate their 
position. But Caesar was more than a mere general ; 
and, as he well knew, the political situation in Rome 
was serious and urgently demanding his presence.^ 

Troubles there were in plenty. Economic prob- 
lems such as the administration of the new law of 
debt gave scope to malcontents like Caelius and 
Dolabella, who had expected harsh reprisals against 
the defeated Pompeians and were disgusted with 
Caesar's leniency. Still more dangerous to public 
security were Caesar's veteran legions, who, having 
been sent home after Pharsalus, had now little to do 
save noisily demand their promised triumph and 
discharge. Antony, the absent dictator's deputy in 
the city, had found all this unrest beyond his powers 
effectively to check : no magistrates had as yet 
been elected for the current year, and those for 46 
were shortly due for election. 

Such was the situation which confronted Caesar in 
September. By November he had restored order : 

1 Bell. Alex. ch. 65. 

139 



INTRODUCTION 

the economic crisis had been temporarily mitigated : 
the elections had been held : the mutinous legions 
disciplined and some detailed for service in Africa. 
But the additional delay was to cost him dear ; 
for not only was he to start his new campaign in the 
winter, when every convoy from Sicily was at the 
mercy of the winter gales, but, as he was soon to find 
out, his opponents had made good use of the respite. 
Since Curio's defeat in 49 the Roman province of 
Africa had been in the hands of the Pompeians. 
Its most powerful neighbour, king Juba of Numidia, 
had no love for Caesar and could accordingly, if his 
imperious temper were tactfully handled, be relied on 
to support Caesar's enemies. His military resources 
were reputed to be enormous and to outweigh by 
far those of his two Mauretanian neighbours, 
Bocchus and Bogud, who favoured Caesar, even if 
the latter were backed up by Sittius, a Roman 
adventurer who had for several years been operating 
in those parts with his own private army. Attius 
Varus, who had governed the province since 50, was 
joined, after Pharsalus, by Scipio and Cato, each 
with his own contingent of survivors from that battle. 
Labienus, Petreius and Afranius had now also joined 
them ; and in Labienus the enemy had a tactician 
hardly inferior to Caesar himself. In addition to 
Juba's four legions and countless cavalrv^ and light 
armed troops the Pompeians could muster ten 
legions, though most of them were raised in Africa 
and were of dubious quality. They possessed a 
considerable fleet : they had fortified practically all 
140 



INTRODUCTION 

the coastal towns and concentrated in them abundant 
stocks of grain ; and by calling up many of the native 
farmers they had curtailed the harvest of 47 and thus 
made it more difficult for Caesar to live off the land. 

Caesar's tiny expeditionary force was thus beset 
with enormous difficulties, not only of supply and 
reinforcement, but of very existence ; and within a 
week of its landing Labienus came very near to 
destroying it. The narrative of de Bello Africa bears 
striking testimony to Caesar's manifold qualities : the 
(logged patience which strategy demanded in the 
earlier stages : the outward buoyancy and cheerful- 
ness with which, despite his inward anxiety, he 
maintained the morale of his troops : the unflagging 
determination with which he tempted Scipio to 
engage ; and the brilliant tactics and opportunism 
thanks to which at Thapsus he finally turned the 
tables on his would-be ambusher. 

Although the identity of the author of de Bello 
Africo is obscure, certain inferences may yet be 
drawn from his narrative. '^ The careful chronology 
and the faithful record of the feelings of the troops 
suggests a soldier — possibly a junior officer — who 
was on the spot. That he was young and in- 
experienced; an ardent, but not always a balanced, 
partisan ; a keen observer of all that went on around 
him, but \\'ithout access to the inner counsels of his 

^ For these remarks I have drawn freely on the wealth of 
material contained in Bouvet"s excellent Introduction 
(pp. xvii-xxxix), to which the reader is referred for fuller 
detail in the way of illustration. 

141 



INTRODUCTION 

C.-in-C. — all these, I think, are reasonable inferences. 
His historical perspective was weak ; for he some- 
times gives unimportant, yet at other times with- 
holds important, details. '^ However, apart from this 
and the errors into which his blind admiration for 
Caesar occasionally leads him,^ his account on the 
whole rings true and leaves a distinct impression of 
sincerity and enthusiasm. 

His literary style is distinctive. His vocabulary, 
though it includes a number of Greek words ^ and 
colloquial phrases ■* normally avoided by good prose 
writers, is nevertheless marked by a definite poverty 
of expression ; ^ and his sentence structure, though 
not infrequently embellished by stock rhetorical 
flourishes,^ is often ungainly and sometimes un- 
grammatical.' Yet, on the whole, his style is clear, 

1 e.g. the detailed order of battle given in eh. 59-60, though 
in fact no battle ensues; whereas at Thapsus much is left to 
the reader's imagination. 

- e.g. in ch. 31 the various excuses made for Caesar's cautious 
tactics, especially the last. 

^ e.g. catascopvs, ch. 26 : epibata, ch. 20. 

* e.g. convvlnerare, ch. 5, etc. : rapsare, ch. 73 : magis 
suspensiore, ch. 48. 

* e.g. constant repetition of words such as interim, praeterea, 
etc.; in ch. 29-31, monotonous recourse to the relative 
pronoun as a link word (quod . . . quod . . . quo facia . . . 
quod . . . quibus rebus) ; in ch. 32 non intermiUere in two 
consecutive sentences. 

^ e.g. aUiteration : ch. 3.5 : praemiis pollicitationibusque 
propositis pro perfugis. 

Chiasmus : ch. 37 : singulae turres .tpeculaeque singulae. 

' e.g. ch. 5, where postqiiam is followed by no less than seven 
imperfects; and ch. 19, last but one sentence, where Labienus, 
the subject, has no verb. 

142 



INTRODUCTION 

if frequently monotonous and, in places, mere- 
tricious ; and in the set speeches — in which respect 
he is much more ambitious than the writer of de 
Bello Alexandrino — he is quite effective in varying the 
style to reflect the personality of the speaker.^ 

1 e.g. the didactic tone of Cato's lecture in ch. 22 ; the forth- 
right retort of the centurion in ch. 45; and Caesar's dis- 
ciplinary harangue in ch. 54. 



143 



ANALYSIS OF THE BOOK 



CHAPTERS 

1-2 Preparations at Lilybaeum : Caesar embarks and sails 
for Africa. 

3-6 Arrival at Hadrumetum : its commandant refuses to 
negotiate : Caesar makes a fighting withdrawal to 
Ruspina. 

7-36 Operations near Ruspina 

Caesar advances to Leptis but retires the next day 
to Ruspina : arrival of some of his missing trans- 
ports : Labienus offers battle ; Caesar's force is 
surrounded but fights its way out. — Build-up of 
defences at Ruspina : shortage of corn : Cato"s 
advice to the young Pompeius and its sequel : 
iScipio joins Labienus. — King Juba preoccupied by 
invasion of his country : reports of atrocities 
stimulate Caesar to prompter action, but he refuses 
iScipio's challenge to a pitched battle : his reasons 
for remaining on the defensive. — Garrison sent by 
Caesar to Acjdla : simultaneous arrival of corn and 
troops. 
37-66 Operations near Uzitta 

Description of the terrain S.W. of Ruspina : Caesar 
begins fortifying the high ground : a cavalry action 
ensues : he offers battle in the plain, but Scipio 
declines. — A centurion from one of Caesar's convoys 
defies Scipio : conditions in Caesar's camp : an 
unseasonable storm. — Juba joins Scipio with large 
reinforcements : Caesar's troops not so overawed as 
was expected. — Both sides prepare to seize more 
high ground : Labienus lays an ambush : Caesar 
captures the hill and carries two fortified lines to 
Uzitta to protect his flanks : Scipio's cavalry 
heavily repulsed. — Caesar receives further reinforce- 
ments, takes disciplinary measures, fortifies a 

144 



ANALYSIS OF THE BOOK 



new camp opposite Uzitta. — Juba's arrogant 
behaviour. — Order of battle on either side : only a 
cavalry skirmish ensues. — Varus fires some of 
Caesar's transports at Leptis : Caesar quits his 
camp and personally leads a successful counter- 
attack. — Foraging operations : Labienus vainly 
lays another ambush. 

67-78 Operations near Aggar 

Lack of corn prompts Caesar to march to Aggar : 
Scipio follows. — Caesar captures Zeta but is forced 
to fight his way back under heavy attacks from 
Numidian cavalry and light-armed units : he 
adapts training methods to meet these new tactics : 
his anxiety about the enemies' cavalry strength 
and their elephants. — He twice offers battle : 
captures Sarsura, approaches Thysdra, retires to 
Aggar. — Cavalry engagement near Tegea. 

79-86 Operations at Thapsus 

Caesar advances to Thapsus and begins to invest 
the town : Scipio follows and finally encamps close 
to Thapsus. — Caesar's dispositions : his reluctance 
to engage : the signal is finally given without his 
orders. — Rout of Scipio's elephants : Caesar's 
troops meet little resistance : sortie of the garrison 
of Thapsus repulsed. — Savage vengeance by Caesar's 
veterans on the fugitives. — VergiUus refuses to 
surrender Thapsus ; arrangements for blockading it 
and Thysdra : Caesar proceeds to Utica. 

87-98 Final stages of the campaign 

Brutal sack of Parada by Scipio's cavalry : they 
plunder Utica till Cato buys them off: he tries in 
vain to organise resistance and then commits 
suicide. — Caesar's clemency : he enters Utica and 
punishes its Roman citizens by inflicting a heavy 
fine. — Juba outlawed by his subjects takes refuge 
with Petreius in a villa. — Caesar comes to Zama : 
surrender of Thysdra and Thapsus : deaths of 
Juba, Petreius, Afranius and Scipio. — Caesar returns 
to Utica and fines Thapsus, Hadruraetum, Leptis 
and Thysdra : embarks at Utica : calls at Caralis in 
Sardinia : eventually arrives at Rome. 

145 



DE BELLO AFRICO 

1 Caesar itineribus iustis confectis nullo die inter- 
misso a. d. XIIII Kal. Ian. Lilybaeum pervenit 
statiraque ostendit sese navis velle conscendere, 
cum non amplius legionem tironum haberet unam, 
equites vix DC. Tabernaculum secundum litus 
ipsum constituit, ut prope fluctu'; verberaret. Hoc eo 
consilio fecit ne quis sibi morae quicquam fore 
speraret et ut omnes in dies horasque parati essent. 
Incidit per id tempus ut tempestates ad navigandum 
idoneas non haberet ; nihilo tamen minus in navibus 
remiges militesque continere et nullam praeter- 
mittere occasionem profectionis, cum praesertim ab 
incolis eius provinciae nuntiarentur adversariorum 
copiae equitatus infinitus, legiones regiae IIII, levis 
armaturae magna vis, Scipionis legiones X, elephanti 
CXX classesque esse complures ; tamen non deterre- 
batur animoque et spe confidebat. Interim in dies et 
naves longae adaugeri et onerariae complures eodem 



^ It is not quite clear whether this means the complete 
journey from Rome (over 600 miles, via Rhegium and 
Messana), or merely the last stage from Messana (some 200 
miles). But as it seems likely that he was not accompanied by 
any large number of troops — the legion of recruits may have 
been one already stationed at Lilj'baeum — most commentators 
appear to assume that the reference is to the whole journey. 

2 = October 23rd, 47, if Le Verrier's rectified system be 
followed : October 1, according to Groebe's SN'stem. All the 

146 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

1 After completing a series of full day's marches ^ 
without pausing for a single day, Caesar arrived at 
Lilybaeum on December 17,^ and shewed himself 
desirous of embarking forthwith, although he had no 
more than a single legion of recruits and barely six 
hundred cavalry. He had his tent pitched alongside 
the actual beach so that the waves all but beat upon 
it : his purpose in so doing was to prevent anyone 
from hoping he would enjoy any respite, and to 
ensure that everj'one was in a state of daily and 
hourly i*eadiness. During this time he was unlucky 
with the weather, which was unsuitable for sailing ; 
but for all that he still kept his rowers and troops 
aboard the ships and let slip no opportunity for 
setting forth, despite, above all, the reports which 
were coming in from the local provincials about the 
forces of the enemy — innumerable cavalry, four royal 
legions, a great quantity of light-armed troops, ten 
legions under command of Scipio, a hundred-and- 
twenty elephants and several fleets : yet even so he 
was not deterred, but remained resolute and opti- 
mistic. Meanwhile every day saw an increase in the 
number of his warships, and numerous transports also 

dates given in the text are according to the unreformed calen- 
dar, which was now some two months ahead owing to the 
failure of the pontifices to insert the necessary intercalary- 
months. 

147 



CAESAR 

concurrere et legiones tironum convenirc IIII,^ 
veterana Icgio quinta, equitum ad II milia. 

2 Legionibus collectis VI et equitum II milibus, ut 
quaeque prima legio venerat in navis longas im- 
ponebatur, equites autem in onerarias. Ita maio- 
rem partem navium antecedere iussit et insulam 
petere Aponianam, quae abest a Lilybaeo milia 
passuum X : ipse paucos dies ibi ^ commoratus bona 
paucorum vendit publice, deinde Alieno praetori, 
qui Siciliam obtinebat, de omnibus rebus praecipit et 
de reliquo exercitu celeriter imponendo. Datis 
mandatis ipse navem conscendit a. d. VI. Kal. Ian. et 
reliquas navis statim est consecutus. Ita vento 
certo celerique navigio vectus post diem quartum cum 
longis paucis navibus in conspectum Africae venit ; 
namque onerariae reliquae praeter paucas vento 
dispersae atque errabundae divei'sa loca petierunt. 
Clupeam classe praetervehitur, dein Neapolim ; 
complura praeterea castella et oppida non longe a 
mari reliquit. 

3 Postquam Hadrumetum accessit, ubi praesidium 
erat adversariorum cui praeerat C. Considius, et a 

1 in his MSS. : IIII R. Schneider. 

- milia . . . ihi conjectured by R. Schneider to fill the lacuna 

of the MSS. 

^ Probably the Fifth called Alaudae, formed in Gaul in 
51 B.C. There is much difficulty in identifying this veteran 
Fifth legion with the Fifth raised by Cassius in Spain (Bell. 
Alex. ch. 50). 

2 This apparently means Hadrumetum, and not Cape 
Bon ; for he must have landed at Hadrumetum on the 28tb, 
and 3-4 days' sail in a fast ship seems unduly long for the 

148 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

assembled there : four legions of recruits, the veteran 
Fifth ^ legion, and some two thousand cavalry also 
joined the muster. 

Six legions and two thousand cavalry had now been 
mustered. Each legion, as soon as it arrived, was 
embarked on the warships, while the cavalry were 
shipped aboard the transports. Accordingly, he 
oi'dered the greater part of the fleet to sail on ahead 
and make for the island of Aponiana, which is ten 
miles distant from Lilybaeum : he himself stayed 
behind there for a few days and sold up the property 
of a few persons for the profit of the state, and then 
gave full instructions to the praetor Alienus, who was 
governor of Sicily, in particular about the prompt 
embarkation of the rest of the army. Having given 
these instructions, he himself embarked on December 
25 and immediately caught up with the remainder 
of his fleet. And so, sailing in a fast ship with a 
steady wind, three days later with a few warships he 
came into sight of Africa ; ^ for his transports, which 
comprised the rest of his fleet, had, with a few 
exceptions, been scattered by the wind and, losing 
their course, made for various points along the coast. 
He sailed on past Clupea with his fleet, and then past 
Neapolis ; and besides these places he passed by 
quite a number of strongholds and towns not far 
from the sea. 

When Caesar reached Hadrumetum, where his 
opponents had a garrison commanded by C. Con- 
passage of less than 100 miles (cf. ch. 34, where his second 
convoy makes Ruspina on the fourth clay). Other apparent 
inconsistencies are the embarkation of all the legions aboard 
the warships and the capriciousness of the wind, which 
favoured the warships but scattered the transports. 

149 



CAESAR 

Clupeis secundum oram maritimam cum equitatu 
Hadrumetum petens ^ Cn. Piso cum Maurorum 
circiter tribus milibus apparuit, ibi paulisper Caesar 
ante portum commoratus, dum reliquae naves con- 
venirent, exponit exercitum, cuius numerus in 
praesentia fuit peditum III milia, equites CL, 
castrisque ante oppidum positis sine iniuria cuius- 
quam consedit cohibetque omnis a praeda. Oppi- 
dani interim muros armatis complent, ante portam 
frequentes considunt ad sese defendendum ; quorum 
numerus duarum legionum instar erat. Caesar 
circum oppidum vectus natura loci perspecta rediit in 
castra. Non nemo culpae eius imprudentiaeque 
assignabat, quod neque circum loca gubernatoribus 
praefectisque quid peterent praeceperat neque, ut 
more ipsius consuetudo superioribus temporibus 
fuerat, tabellas signatas dediderat, ut in tempore his 
perlectis locum certum peterent universi. Quod 
minime Caesarem fefellerat ; nam neque ullum 
portum terrae Africae quo classes decurrerent pro 
certo tutum ab hostium praesidio fore suspicabatur, 
sed fortuito oblatam occasionem egressus aucupa- 
batur, 

L. Plancus interim legatus petit a Caesare uti sibi 
daret potestatem cum Considio agendi, si posset 
aliqua ratione perduci ad sanitatem. Itaque data 
facultate litteras conscribit et eas captivo dat per- 

1 petens added by Kiessling. 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

sidius, Cn. Piso made his appearance there with 
approximately three thousand Moorish ti'oops, 
approaching Hadrumetum with his cavalry along the 
sea coast from Clupea ; whereupon Caesar paused for 
a little while in front of the port, waiting for the rest 
of his ships to assemble, and then landed his ai*my, 
which numbered at present three thousand infantry 
and a hundred-and-fifty cavalry. He then pitched 
camp in front of the town and established himself 
Avithout molesting anyone, looting being universally 
forbidden. Meanwhile the occupants of the town 
manned their battlements with armed troops, and 
massed in front of the gate to defend themselves : 
their numbers amounted to the equivalent of two 
legions. Caesar rode round the town carefully 
observing the lie of the land, and then returned to 
camp. Some blamed him for lack of foresight 
because he had not originally briefed his pilots and 
captains about what points on the coast they were to 
make for, and had not, as had been his own habitual 
practice on previous occasions, issued sealed instruc- 
tions to be read at a specified time, so that they 
could all make for a given rendezvous together. But 
this was by no means an oversight on Caesar's part ; 
in fact, he surmised that there was no port on 
African soil where his fleet could run ashore and 
which he could count on as immune from the enemy's 
protection ; and failing that, he was on the watch 
for luck to present him with an opportunity to land. 
Meanwhile one of his lieutenants, L. Plancus, 
asked Caesar to give him authority to treat with 
Considius, if by any means he could be brought to see 
reason. Permission being granted, he accordingly 
wrote a letter, which he gave to a pi-isoner to take to 



CAESAR 

ferendas in oppidum ad Considium. Quo simul 
atque captivus cum pervenisset litterasque, ut erat 
inandatum, Considio porrigere coepisset, prius quam 
acciperet ille, ' Unde,' inquit, ' istas ? ' Turn cap- 
tivus: ' Imperatore a Caesare.' Turn Considius, 
' Unus est,' inquit, ' Scipio imperator hoc tempore 
populi Romani ' ; deinde in conspectu suo statim 
captivum interfici iubet litterasque nondum per- 
lectas, sicut erant signatae, dat homini certo ad 
Scipionem perferendas. 

Postquam una nocte et die ad oppidum consumpta 
neque responsum ullum a Considio dabatur, neque ei 
reliquae copiae succurrebant neque equitatu abunda- 
bat et ad oppidum oppugnandum non satis copiarum 
habebat et eas tironum neque primo adventu con- 
vubierari exercitum volebat, et oppidi egregia 
munitio et difficilis ad oppugnandum erat ascensus et 
nuntiabatur auxilia magna equitatus oppidanis 
suppetias venire, non est visa ratio ad oppugnandum 
oppidum commorandi, ne, dum in ea re est Caesar 
occupatus, circumventus a tergo ab equitatu hostium 
laboraret. 
» Itaque castra cum movei-e vellet, subito ex oppido 
erupit multitudo atque equitatus subsidio uno 
tempore eis casu succurrit, qui erat missus a luba ad 
stipendium accipiendum, castraque, unde Caesar 
egressus iter facere coeperat, occupant et eius agmen 

^ This appears to mean the night of December 28th /29th 
and (most of) the 29th ; for the fighting withdrawal to Ruspina 
apparently took place on the 29th (the last day of the official 
year, according to the unreformed calendar). Bouvet adopts 
"R. Schneider's insertion of parte before die ; but with a writer 
like the present, whose accuracy is not always pedantic, the 
MSS. reading may perhaps be retained, 

152 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

Considius in the town. As soon as the prisoner had 
arrived there, and when he was in the very act of 
handing Considius the letter in accordance with his 
instructions, the latter remarked before accepting 
it : ' Where did you get this ? ' Whereupon the 
prisoner replied : ' From the commander-in-chief, 
Caesar.' Then Considius retorted: 'There is but 
one commander-in-chief of the Roman people at the 
moment, namely Scipio.' He then ordered the 
prisoner to be executed forthwith in his presence, 
and gave the letter — still unread and with its seals 
intact— to a reliable messenger to take to Scipio. 

5 A night and a day ^ were spent under the walls of 
the town without any reply being given by Con- 
sidius : moreover, the rest of Caesar's forces failed 
to arrive to reinforce him ; he had no abundance of 
cavalry and insufficient forces to assault the town, 
and those he had were mere recruits ; he was loath 
to let his army suffer heavy casualties immediately 
on its arrival ; the defences of the town were re- 
markably strong, its lofty position rendering it 
difficult to attack ; and reports were coming in that 
large reinforcements of cavalry were on their way to 
aid the occupants of the town. For these reasons 
there seemed no point in staying on for the purpose 
of attacking the town, lest, while engaged in that 
task, Caesar might be surrounded in the rear by the 
enemy cavalry and so find himself in difficulties. 

6 Caesar therefore was minded to strike camp ; and 
while he was doing so a large body of men suddenly 
sallied forth from the town, and were reinforced 
simultaneously, as it chanced, by some cavalry sent 
by .Tuba to collect their pay : they seized Caesar's 
camp, which he had just quitted to begin his march, 

153 



CAESAR 

extremum insequi coeperunt. Quae res cum anim- 
advei'sa esset, subito legionarii consistunt et equites, 
quamquam erant pauci, tamen contra tantam 
rnultitudinem audacissime concurrunt. Accidit res 
incredibilis, ut equites minus XXX Galli Maurorum 
equitum II milia loco pellerent fugarentque in 
oppidum. Postquam repulsi et coniecti erant intra 
munitiones, Caesar iter constitutum ire contendit. 
Quod cum saepius facerent et modo insequerentur, 
modo rursus ab equitibus in oppidum repellerentur, 
cohortibus paucis ex veteranis quas secum habebat in 
extreme agmine collocatis et parte equitatus iter 
leniter cum reliquis facere coepit. Ita quanto 
longius ab oppido discedebatur, tanto tardiores ad 
insequendum erant Numidae. Interim in itinere ex 
oppidis et castellis legationes venire, polliceri fru- 
mentum paratosque esse quae imperasset facere. 
Itaque eo die castra posuit ad oppidum Ruspinam. 

Kal. lanuariis ^ inde movit et pervenit ad oppidum 
Leptim, liberam civitatem et immunem. Legati ex 
oppido obviam veniunt, libenter se omnia facturos 
quae vellet poUicentur. Itaque centurionibus ad 
portas oppidi et custodiis impositis, ne quis miles in 
oppidum introiret aut iniuriam faceret cuipiam 
incolae, non longe ab oppido secundum litus facit 
castra. Eodemque naves onerariae et longae non 

1 I have followed Schneider in transferring this date from the 
foot of cliapter 6. cf. Ch. 5, Note 1. 

^ Leptis was one of seven towns which in 146 B.C. had been 
granted autonomy for failing to support Carthage in the 
Second Punic War. cf. Acylla (ch. 33). 

154 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

and began to pursue his rearguard. On seeing this 
the legionary troops came to an abrupt halt, while the 
cavalry, few as they were, nevertheless displayed the 
utmost gallantry in charging against such vast 
numbers. An incredible thing took place : less than 
thirty Gallic cavalry dislodged two thousand Moorish 
cavalry and drove them to take refuge in the town. 
After they had been repulsed and hurled back within 
their fortifications, Caesar made haste to proceed with 
his projected inarch. But as the enemy repeated 
these tactics all too frequently — now following in 
pursuit, now once again driven back into the town by 
the cavalry — Caesar posted in the rear of his column 
a few cohorts of the veteran troops which he had 
with him, as well as part of his cavalry, and so pro- 
ceeded to march at a slow pace with the remainder 
of his force. In this way the further they withdrew 
from the town, the slower were the Numidians to 
pursue them. Meanwhile in the course of his march 
deputations arrived from towns and strongholds with 
promises of corn and assurances of their readiness to 
carry out any orders he might give them. And so on 
that day he pitched camp near the town of Ruspina. 
From there he moved camp on January 1st and 
arrived at the town of Leptis, a free community, 
immune from taxes. ^ Envoys came from the town to 
meet him and promised they would readily do what- 
ever he wished. Accordingly, he posted centurions 
and picquets at the town gates, to prevent any soldier 
from entering it or molesting any inhabitant, and 
then made his camp adjoining the shore, not far 
from the town. And it so chanced that some of his 
transports and warships arrived at this same place : 
as for the rest of them, it appeared fi'om the reports 



CAESAR 

nullae casu advenerunt ; reliquae, ut est ei nuntia- 
tum, incertae locorum Uticam versus petere visae 
sunt. Interim Caesar a mari non digredi neque 
mediterranea petere propter navium errorem equita- 
tumque in navibus omnem continere, ut arbitror, ne 
agri vastarentur ; aquam in navis iubet compurtari. 
Remiges interim, qui aquatum e navibus exierant, 
subito equites Mauri neque opinantibus Caesarianis 
adorti multos iaculis convulnerarunt, non nullos 
interfecerunt. Latent enim in insidiis cum equis 
inter convallis ut subito exsistant,^ non ut in campo 
comminus depugnent. 

Caesar interim in Sardinian! nuntios cum litteris et 
in reliquas provincias finitimas dimisit, ut sibi 
auxilia, commeatus, frumentum, simul atque litteras 
legissent, mittenda curarent, exoneratisque partim 
navibus longis Rabirium Postumum in Siciliam ad 
secundum commeatum arcessendum mittit. Vati- 
nium 2 cum X navibus longis ad reliquas navis 
onerarias conquirendas quae deerrassent et simul 
mare tuendum ab hostibus iubet proficisci. Item C. 
Sallustium Crispum praetorem ad Cercinam insulam 
versus, quam adversarii tenebant, cum parte navium 
ire iubet, quod ibi magnum numerum frumenti esse 
audiebat. Haec ita imperabat unicuique, ita prae- 
cipiebat uti fieri posset necne locum excusatio 
nullum haberet nee moram tergiversatio. Ipse 
interea ex perfugis et incolis cognitis condicionibus 

^ et . . . exsistunt MSS. : ut . . . exsistant Hoffmann; 
but the interpretation of the ichole sentence is doubtful. 
* interim MSS. : Vatinium Schneider. 

i=;6 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

which reached him that owing to their uncertain 
knowledge of the district they were making towards 
Utica. For the time being Caesar would not leave 
the sea or strike inland on account of these wayward 
vessels, and kept all his cavalr}^ aboard ship, his 
purpose being, I imagine, to prevent their pillaging 
the countryside : as for water, he ordered it to be 
carried aboard. Meanwhile Caesar's troops were 
taken by surprise when some rowers who had dis- 
embarked to fetch water were suddenly set upon 
by Moorish cavalry, who wounded many with their 
lances and Idlled some of them. These Moors in 
fact lurk in ambush with their horses in the wadis, 
so as to start up suddenly and not to fight it out 
hand to hand in the plain. 

Meanwhile Caesar sent messengers to Sardinia 
and the other neighbouring provinces with despatches 
instructing them to take steps, immediately on 
reading the despatch, to send him reinforcements, 
supplies and corn. He also unloaded some of his 
warships and sent Rabirius Postumus to Sicily to 
fetch a second convoy. He ordered A^atinius to set 
out with ten warships to search for the remaining 
transports which had gone astray, and at the same 
time to keep the sea safe from enemy raiders. He 
likewise ordered the praetor C. Sallustius Crispus to 
proceed with a detachment of ships to the island of 
Cercina, which was under enemy occupation, as he 
heard that there was a great quantity of corn there. 
These orders and instructions he issued to each 
individual in such terms as to rule out any excuses as 
to whether or not they could be carried out, and to 
prevent any shuffling involving delay. Meanwhile 
he himself learned from deserters and the local 

157 



CAESAR 

Scipionis ct qui cum co bellum contra se gcrebant, 
miserari — regium enim equitatuni Scijuo ex pro- 
vincia Africa alebat — tanta homines esse dementia \it 
malint regis esse vectigales quam cum eivibus in 
patria in suis fortunis esse incolumes. 
9 Caesar a. d. IIII ^ Non. Ian. castra movet ; Lepti 
sex cohortiuiTi praesidio cum Saserna relicto ipse 
rursus unde pridie venerat Ruspinam cum reliquis 
eopiis convertit ibique sarcinis exercitus relictis ipse 
cum expedita manu proficiscitur circum villas 
frumentatum oppidanisque imperat ut plaustra 
iumentaque omnia sequantur. Itaque magno numero 
frumenti invento Ruspinam redit. Hue ^ eum id- 
circo existimo recepisse, ut maritima oppida post se 
ne vacua relinquei'et praesidioque firmata ad classim 
receptacula muniret. 
10 Itaque ibi relicto P. Saserna, fratre eius quem 
Lepti in proximo oppido reliquerat, cum legione, 
iubet comportari ligna in oppidum quam plurima ; 
ipse cum cohortibus \'II, quae ex veteranis legionibus 
in classe cum Sulpicio et Vatinio rem gesserant, ex 
oppido Ruspina egressus proficiscitur ad portum, 
qui abest ab oppido milia passuum duo, ibique 
classem sub vesperum cum ea copia conscendit. 

1 III MSS. : IIII Schneider. 

2 hoc MSS. : hue Davies. 



1 Juba's cavalry', the payment of whom was alhided to in 
ch. 6, above. 

- This seems to be an attempt to account for Caesar's abrupt 
withdrawal from Leptis, to which he had advanced without, 
apparently, taking steps to secure Ruspina in his rear. 

» <•/. Bell. Alex. ch. 44. 



158 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

inhabitants of the terms entered into by Scipio and 
his supporters M'ho were engaged in hostiHties 
against him — Scipio was in point of fact maintaining 
a royal ^ cavalry force at the expense of the province 
of Africa ; and he felt sorry that men could be so 
mad as to prefer to be the hirelings of a king to 
being in their own countiy, in the company of their 
own citizens, secure in the possession of their own 
fortunes. 

On January 2nd Caesar moved his camp. Leaving 
behind at Leptis a garrison of six cohorts with Saserna, 
he himself returned vith his remaining forces back to 
Ruspina, whence he had come the previous day. 
There the army's baggage was left, and he himself 
set out with a force in light order to forage round 
the farms, issuing instructions to the townsfolk that 
all their carts and draught animals must go with 
him ; and so, after finding a large quantity of corn, 
he returned to Ruspina. His object in returning to 
this town 2 was, I imagine, to avoid leaving the coastal 
towns behind him unoccupied, but rather, by secur- 
ing them with garrisons, to fortify them as strong- 
holds for the reception of his fleet. 

And so, leaving behind a legion under command of 
P. Saserna — brother of the man he had left in the 
nearby town of Leptis — with instructions that as 
much wood as possible should be conveyed into the 
town, he left the town of Ruspina and made for its 
harbour, which is two miles distant. With him he 
took seven cohorts which were drawn from veteran 
legions and had seen service aboard the fleet with 
Sulpicius and ^"atinius ; ^ and having reached the 
harbour he went aboard his fleet with this force as 
evening was approaching. There was not a man in 

159 



CAESAR 

Omnibus in exercitu insciis et requirentibus impera- 
toris consilium, magno metu ac tristimonia soUicita- 
bantur. Parva enim cum copia et ea tironum, 
neque omni exposita, in Africa contra magnas copias 
et insidiosae nationis equitatum innumerabilem se 
expositos videbant neque quicquam solati in prac- 
sentia neque auxili in suorum consilio animum 
advertebant, nisi in ipsius imperatoris vultu, vigore 
mirabilique hilaritate ; animum enim altum et 
erectum prae se gerebat. Huic adquiescebant 
homines et in eius scientia et consilio omnia sibi 
proclivia omnes fore sperabant. 
11 Caesar una nocte in navibus consumpta iam caelo 
albente cum proficisci conaretur, subito navium pars 
de qua timebat ex errore eodem conferebatur. Hac 
re cognita Caesar celeriter de navibus imperat 
omnis egredi atque in litore armatos reliquos ad- 
venientis milites exspectare. Itaque sine mora 
navibus eis in portum receptis et advectis militum 
equitumque copiis rursus ad oppidum Ruspinam 
redit atque ibi castris constitutis ipse cum cohortibus 
expeditis XXX frumentatum est profectus. Ex 
eo est cognitum Caesaris consilium, ilium cum classe 
navibus onerariis quae deerrassent subsidio ire clam 
hostibus voluisse, ne casu imprudentes suae naves in 
classem adversariorum inciderent, neque eam rem 
i6o 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

the army who knew the plans of the commander-in- 
chief, not a man but sought eagerly to know them ; 
and in their ignorance they were all filled with 
anxiety, grave alarm and depression. For they saw 
themselves landed in Africa with a tiny force — -and 
that too of recruits, and not all of it disembarked — • 
pitted against large forces including the limitless 
cavahy of a treacherous race ; nor could they discern 
anything to console them in their present plight, 
no help in the counsels of their comrades — no help at 
all, save in the expi-ession of their commander him- 
self, and his energy and remarkable cheerfulness ; for 
he displayed a high and buoyant spirit. It was in 
him that his men found peace of mind : his skill and 
resolution would, they all hoped, make everything 
run smoothly for them. 

After spending one night aboard his fleet Caesar 
was proceeding to set out at the first pale light of 
dawn, when suddenly the squadron about which he 
was apprehensive sought haven there from its 
wanderings. On learning of this, Caesar promptly 
ordered everyone to disembark and, drawn up under 
arms on the beach, to await the arrival of the rest 
of his troops. And so when these ships had been 
brought without delay into port, with their cargo 
of infantry and cavalry, Caesar once again returned 
to the town of Ruspina, drew up his camp there, and 
then set out himself with thirty cohorts in light order 
to forage. As a result of this Caesar's plan now 
became known : it had been his intention to go 
with his fleet to the assistance of those transports 
which had gone astray, but to do so without the 
enemy's knowing of it, lest by chance his own ships 
might run unawares against his opponents' fleet; 

i6i 



CAESAR 

eos voluisse scire qui in praesidiis relicti sui milites 
fuissent, ne hi propter suorum paucitatem et hostium 
multitudinem metu deficerent. 

12 Interim cum iam Caesar progressus esset a castris 
circiter milia passuum III, per speculatores et 
antecessores equites nuntiatur ei copias hostium haud 
longe ab sese visas. Kt hercule cum eo nuntio 
pulvis ingens conspici coeptus est. Hac re cognita 
Caesar celeriter iubet equitatum universum, cuius 
copiam habuit in praesentia non magnam, et sagit- 
tarios, quorum parvus numerus, ex castris arcessi 
atque ordinatim signa se leniter consequi ; ipse 
antecedere cum paucis armatis. lamque cum procul 
hostis conspici posset, miUtes in campo iubet galeari 
et ad pugnam parari ; quorum omnino numerus fuit 
XXX cohortium cum equitibus CCCC, sagittariis CL. 

13 Hostes interim, quorum dux erat Labienus et duo 
Pacidei, aciem derigunt mirabili longitudine non 
peditum sed equitum confertam, et inter eos levis 
armaturae Numidas et sagittarios pedites inter- 
posuerant et ita condensaverant ut procul Caesariani 
pedestris copias arbitrarentur ; dextrum ac sinistrum 
cornu magnis equitum copiis firmaverant. Interim 
Caesar aciem derigit simplicem, ut poterat propter 
paucitatem ; sagittarios ante aciem constituit, 
equites dextro sinistroque cornu opponit et ita 



^ The number is strangely small in view of ch. 2 and the 
arrival of the missing troops recorded in eh. 11. Stoffel 
proposed to read co oo , i.e. 2000 ; the total force mentioned 
in ch. 2. 

2 The most brilliant and enterprising of Scipio's subordinate 
commanders ; originally a staunch supporter of Caesar, he had 
joined Pompey's side early in 49 and, after Pharsalus, had 
crossed to Africa with Cato. 

162 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

nor had he wanted his own troops left behind on 
guard to know of this plan, lest, on account of their 
own small numbers and the multitude of the enemy, 
fear should make them fail in their duty. 

Meanwhile, when Caesar had now advanced about 
three miles from his camp, information obtained by 
his scouts and mounted patrols reached him that the 
enemy's forces had been sighted by them at no great 
distance. And indeed simultaneously with that 
information they began to see a great cloud of dust. 
On learning this, Caesar promptly gave orders for his 
entire cavalry force — of which arm he had no great 
abundance available at the moment — -and his small 
contingent of archers to be summoned from the 
camp, and for the standards to follow him slowly in 
their regular order : he himself went on ahead with a 
small armed party. Now that the enemy could be 
seen in the distance, he ordered the troops to don 
their helmets and prepare for battle in the open plain : 
their total number comprised thirty cohorts, together 
with four hundred ^ cavalry and one hundred-and- 
fifty archers. 

\Ieanwhile the enemy, led by Labienus ^ and the 
two Pacidei, deployed a straight line of remarkable 
length and closely packed, not with infantry, but with 
cavalry, interspersed ^v^th light-armed Numidians 
and unmounted archers in such close formation that 
at a distance Caesar's men supposed them to be 
infantry : the two wings — to right and left — were 
reinforced with strong detachments of cavalry. 
Meanwhile Caesar deployed a single straight line — 
the most his small numbers allowed ; he drew up his 
archers in front of the line and posted cavalry to 
cover his right and left wings, with instructions to 

163 



CAESAR 

praecipit ut providerent ne multitudine equitatus 
hostium circumvenirentur : existimabat enim se acie 
instructa cum pedestribus copiis dimicaturum. 

14 Cum utrimque exspectatio fieret neque Caesar sese 
moveret et cum suorum paucitate contra magnam 
vim hostium artificio magis quam viribus decernen- 
dum videret, subito adversariorum equitatus sese 
extendere et in latitudinem promovere collisque com- 
plecti et Caesaris equitatum extenuare simulque ad 
circumeundum comparare se coeperant. Caesarian! 
equites eorum multitudinem aegre sustinebant. 
Acies interim mediae cum concurrere conarentur, 
subito ex condensis turmis pedites Numidae levis 
ai'maturae cum equitibus procurrunt et inter legio- 
narios pedites iacula coiciunt. Hie cum Caesariani 
in eos impetum fecissent, illorum equites refugiebant ; 
pedites interim resistebant, dum equites rursus cursu 
renovato peditibus suis succurrerent. 

15 Caesar novo genere pugnae oblato cum animum 
adverteret ordines suorum in procurrendo turbari — 
pedites enim, dum equites longius a signis per- 
sequuntur, latere nudato a proximis Numidis iaculis 
vubierabantur ; equites autem hostium pilum miHtis 
cursu facile vitabant — edicit per ordines ne quis 
164 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

take care they were not enveloped by the mass of 
the enemy's cavalry ; for he supposed that he would 
be engaging infantry troops in the set battle line. 

There was now on either side a growing feeling of 
expectancy ; but Caesar made no move and saw that 
the smallncss of his own forces called for the use of 
strategy rather than a trial of strength against the 
vast numbers of the enemy ; when suddenly his 
opponents' cavalry began to deploy, extending to- 
wards the flanks and enveloping the high ground, 
causing Caesar's cavalry to lengthen and weaken 
their foi*mation, and preparing simultaneously for an 
cncii-cling movement. Caesar's cavalry found it 
difficult to bear up against their vast numbers. 
Meanwhile as the two centres were proceeding to 
charge one another, suddenly from out of the closely 
packed squadrons the light-armed Numidian infantry 
doubled forward alongside the cavalry and hurled 
their javelins among the infantry of the legions. 
Hereupon Caesar's men launched an attack upon 
them and their cavalry took to flight ; but the 
infantry stood their ground meantime, until the 
cavalry should renew their charge and return to 
succour their own infantry. 

Caesar was now confronted with novel tactics and 
observed that his men's formation was becoming 
disorganised as they ran forward to attack — the 
infantry in fact, exposing their flank as they advanced 
in pursuit of the cavalry too far from the standards, 
were suffering casualties from the javelins of the 
nearest Numidians ; whereas the enemy cavalry 
easily eluded by their speed the heavy infantry 
javelin. Accordingly, he had the order passed 
down the ranks that no soldier should advance more 

165 



CAESAR 

miles ab signis IIII pedes longius procederet. Equi- 
tatus interim Labieni suorum multitudine confisus 
Caesaris paucitatem oircuire conatur : equites luliani 
pauci multitudine hostium defessi equis convulneratis 
paulatim cedere ; hostes magis magisque instate. 
Ita puncto temporis omnibus Icgionariis ab hostium 
equitatu circumventis Caesarisque copiis in orbem 
compulsis intra cancellos omnes coniecti pugnare 
cogebantur. 
16 Labienus in equo capite nudo versari in prima acie ; 
simul suos cohortari, non numquam legionarios 
Caesaris ita appellare : 'Quid tu,' inquit, 'miles 
tiro ? Tam feroculus es ? Vos quoque iste verbis 
infatuavit ? In magnum mehercule vos periculum 
impulit. Misereor vestri.' Tum miles, ' Non sum,' 
inquit, ' tiro, Labiene, sed de legione X. veteranus.' 
Tum Labienus, ' Non agnosco,' inquit, ' signa decu- 
manorum.' Tum ait miles: 'lam me qui sim 
intelleges ' ; simul cassidem de capite deiecit, ut 
cognosci ab eo posset, atque ita pilum viribus con- 
tortum, dum in Labienum mittere contendit, equi 
graviter adverse pectori adfixit et ait : ' Labiene, 
decumanum militem qui te petit scito esse.' 
Omnium tamen animi in terrorem coniecti, et 
maxime tironum : cii*cumspicere enim Caesarem 
neque amplius facere nisi hostium iacula vitare. 
i66 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

than four feet from the standards. Meanwhile the 
cavalry of Labienus, relying on the lai-ge numbers 
on their own side, endeavoured to surround Caesar's 
scanty force ; and the mere handful of Julian cavalry, 
worn out by the enemy hordes, their horses wounded, 
gave ground little by little, while the enemy pressed 
on them more and more. Thus in a moment all the 
legionaries were surrounded by the enemy cavalry, 
and Caesar's forces were compressed into a circle ; 
and so they were all compelled to fight penned behind 
bars as it were. 

Labienus rode bare-headed up and down the front 
line, encouraging his own men the while and occa- 
sionally accosting Caesar's legionaries in such terms 
as these : ' What are you up to, recruit ? Quite the 
dashing little fellow, aren't you ? Have all of you 
too been made fools of by that fellow's words ? 
So help me, it's a very dangerous situation he has 
driven you into. I feel sorry for you.' ' I'm not a 
recruit, Labienus,' replied one soldier, ' but a veteran 
of the Tenth legion.' To this Labienus retorted: 
' I don't recognise the standards of the Tenth.' 
Then said the soldier: 'You'll soon see what I'm 
made of.' As he spoke the words he flung the 
helmet from his head so that the other could recognise 
him and, thus uncovered, brandished his heavy javelin 
with all his force, as he aimed it at Labienus : then 
plunging it violently full in the horse's chest he said : 
' That \n\\ teach you. Labienus, that it's a soldier 
of the Tenth who is attacking you.' All the troops, 
however, were demoralised, particularly the re- 
cruits ; for they kept looking round for Caesar and 
contented themselves ^vith dodging the enemy 
javelins, 

167 



CAESAR 

17 Caesar interim consilio hostium cognito iubet aciem 
in longitudinem quam maximam porrigi et altemis 
conversis cohortibus, ut una post, altera ante signa 
tenderet, ita coronam hostium dextro sinistroque 
cornu mediam dividit et unam partem ab altera 
exclusam equitibus intrinsecus adortus cum peditatu 
telis coniectis in fugam vertit neque longius pro- 
gressus veritus insidias se ad sues recipit ; idem 
altera pars equitum peditumque Caesaris fecit. 
His rebus gestis ac procul hostibus repulsis con- 
vulneratisque ad sua praesidia sese, sicut erat 
instructus, recipere coepit. 

18 Interim M. Petreius et Cn. Piso cum equitibus 
Numidis MDC ^ electis peditatuque eiusdem generis 
satis grandi ex itinere recta subsidio suis occurrunt. 
Atque hostes suis ex terrore firmatis rursusque 
renovatis animis legionarios conversis equitibus 
recipientes novissimos adoriri et impedire coeperunt 
quo minus se in castra reciperent. Hac re anim- 
adversa Caesar iubet signa converti et medio campo 
redintegrari proelium. Cum ab hostibus eodem 
mode pugnaretur nee comminus ad manus rediretur 
Caesarisque equites iumenta ex nausea recenti, siti, 
languore, paucitate, vulneribus defatigata ad in- 
sequendum hostem perseverandumque cursum tar- 

1 The MSS. vary between MC and CCC; hut cf. ch. 19. 
1 68 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

Meanwhile Caesar, aware of the enemy's tactics, 
gave orders for the line to be extended to its maxi- 
mum length, and for every other cohort to turn 
about, so that one was fiicing to the rear of the 
standards, while the next one faced to their front. 
By this means with his right and left wing he split 
in half the encircling enemy force ; and having 
isolated one half from the other with his cavalry, 
proceeded to attack it from inside with his infantry, 
turning it to flight Axith volleys of missiles : then, 
after advancing no great distance for fear of ambush, 
he retired to his own lines. The other half of 
Caesar's cavalry and infantry carried out the same 
tactics. This task accomplished and the enemy 
being driven far back with heavy casualties, Caesar 
began to retire to his own defence positions, main- 
taining battle formation. 

Meanwhile M. Petreius and Cn. Piso arrived with 
Xumidian troops — sixteen hundred picked cavalry 
and a fairly considerable force of infantry — and 
immediately on arrival hastened straight to the aid 
of their comrades. And so the enemy, putting their 
fears aside and taking fresh heart and courage, 
wheeled their cavalry round and began to attack the 
rear of the retreating legionaries and to hinder their 
withdrawal to camp. Obsening this, Caesar ordered 
to turn about and renew the battle in the middle of 
the plain. As the enemy repeated the same 
manoeuvre, but without any return to hand-to-hand 
fighting, and as Caesar's cavalry found that their 
horses, worn out with the effects of recent sea- 
sickness, thirst and the fatigue and wounds sustained 
in their unequal contest, were now more reluctant to 
keep doggedly on the move in pursuit of the enemy, 

169 



CAESAR 

diora habcrent dieique pars exigua iam reliqua 
esset, cohortibus equitibusque circumdatis cohortatur 
ut uno ictu contenderent neque remitterent, donee 
ultra ultimos collis hostis reppulissent atque eorum 
essent potiti. Itaque signo dato cum iam hostes Ian- 
guide tela neglegenterque mitterent, subito immittit 
cohortis turmasque suorum ; atque puncto temporis 
hostibus nullo negotio campo pulsis post collemque 
deiectis nacti locum atque ibi paulisper commorati, 
ita uti erant instrueti leniter se ad suas recipiunt 
munitiones. Itemque adversarii male accepti tum 
demum se ad sua praesidia contulerunt. 
19 Interim ea re gesta et proelio dirempto ex ad- 
versariis perfugere plures ex omni genere hominum, 
et praeterea intercepti hostium complures equites 
peditesque. Ex quibus cognitum est consilium 
hostium, eos hac mente et conatu venisse ut novo 
atque inusitato genere proeli tirones legionarii 
paucique perturbati Curionis exemplo ab equitatu 
circumventi opprimerentur, et ita Labienum dixisse 
pro contione, tantam se multitudinem auxiliorum 
adversariis Caesaris sumministratu>-uni ut etiam 
caedendo in ipsa victoria defatigati vincerentur atque 
a suis superarentur, quippe qui sine illorum ope sibi 

170 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

and as there was now but a little daylight left, Caesar 
urged his encircled cohorts and cavalry to make one 
vigorous thrust and not give up until they had driven 
the enemy back beyond the furthest high ground 
and gained possession of the latter. And so, waiting 
to give the signal until the enemy's volleys of missiles 
were half-hearted and inaccurate, he suddenly let 
loose some cohorts and squadrons of his own troops 
upon them. In a moment the enemy were driven 
without trouble off the plain and thrown back behind 
the high ground, and Caesar's men had gained the 
position ; then, after a brief pause there, they retired 
slowly in battle formation to their own fortifications. 
Their opponents likewise, after this warm reception, 
then at length withdrew to their own positions. 

Meanwhile after this engagement had taken place 
and when the action had been broken off, quite a 
number of all ranks of the opposing side deserted to 
Caesar, and in addition not a few of the enemy 
cavalry and infantry were taken prisoner. From 
them the enemy's plan became known. He had 
come with the intention of trying out new and un- 
familiar battle tactics upon Caesar's legionaries, in 
order that — raw recruits and few in numbers as they 
were — they should be demoralised thereby, and be 
enveloped and crushed by the cavalry, as Curio had 
been ; and Labienus had spoken to this effect to his 
troops on parade, that he would furnish Caesar's 
opponents with so vast a number of auxiliaries that 
Caesar's men would be quite exhausted even with 
killing them, and so would be vanquished in the very 
hour of victory, and mastered by his forces. In fact, 
quite apart from the aid of those auxiliaries, he had 
reason for self-confidence : first because he had heard 



CAESAR 

confideret,^ primum quod audierat Romae legiones 
veteranas dissentire neque in Africam velle transire ; 
deinde quod triennio in Africa suos milites retentos 
consuetudine fidelis sibi iam effecisset, maxima autem 
auxilia haberet Numidarum equitum levisque arma- 
turae, praeterea ex fuga proelioque Pompeiano 
Labienus quos secum a Buthroto ^ transportaverat 
equites Germanos Gallosque ibique postea ex hibri- 
dis, libertinis servisque conscripserat, armaverat 
equoque uti frenato condocuerat, praeterea regia 
auxilia, elephantis CXX equitatuque innumerabili,^ 
deinde legiones conscriptas ex cuiusquemodi generis 
amplius XII milibus. Hac spe atque ea audacia 
inflammatus Labienus cum equitibus Gallis Ger- 
manisque MDC, Numidarum sine frenis ^'III milibus, 
praeterea Petreiano auxilio adhibito equitibus MDC, 
peditum ac levis armaturae quater tanto, sagittariis 
ac funditoribus hippotoxotisque compluribus : his 
copiis pridie Non. Ian., post diem VI. quam Africam 
Caesar ^ attigit, in campis planissimis purissimisque 
ab hora diei quinta usque ad solis occasum est decer- 
tatum. In eo proelio Petreius graviter ictus ex acie 
recessit. 
20 Caesar interim castra munire diligentius, praesidia 
firmare copiis maioribus vallumque ab oppido Ruspina 
usque ad mare ducere et a castris alterum eodem, 

1 quippe quis in illorum sibi confideret is the general reading 
of the MSS. : I have adopted Forchhammer's conjecture. 

- Brundisio MSS. : Buthroto Frolich. 

^ equitatusque innumerabilis MSS. : equitatuque in- 
numerabili Hoffmann. 

* Caesar added by Dinter. 

172 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

that at Rome the veteran legions were mutinous and 
refusing to cross into Africa ; next because he had 
kept his own troops in Africa for three years : they 
were accUmatised and he had now secured their 
loyalty to himself; he had, moreover, very large 
auxiliary forces composed of Numidian cavalry and 
light-armed troops and, besides these, the German 
and Gallic cavalry which, after the defeat and rout of 
Pompeius, he, Labienus, had brought across with 
him from Buthrotum, as well as those which he had 
levied later on in Africa from half-castes, freedmen 
and slaves, and had armed and taught to handle a 
bridled horse : he had in addition royal auxiliary 
forces, as well as a hundred and twenty elephants 
and innumerable cavalry ; and finally, legions raised 
from more than twelve thousand men of every type. 
On such considerations was based the reckless con- 
fidence that fired Labienus, wth his sixteen hundred 
Gallic and German cavalry, his eight thousand 
Numidians who rode without bridles, reinforced in 
addition by the cavalry contingent of Petreius, 
sixteen hundred strong, and with his infantry and 
light-armed force, four times as big, and with his 
numerous archers, slingers and mounted archers. 
These were the forces which on January 4th, five days 
after Caesar reached Africa, on a perfectly flat and 
unimpeded plain were engaged in a contest from the 
fifth hour of the day continuously till sundown. In 
that battle Petreius was gravely wounded and 
retired from the field. 

Meanwhile Caesar fortified his camp with greater 
care, strengthened its defences by manning them 
with larger forces, and carried an entrenchment from 
the town of Ruspina right to the sea, and a second 

173 



CAESAR 

quo tutius ultro citroque commeare auxiliaque sine 
periculo sibi succurrere possent, tela tormentaque ex 
navibus in castra comportare, remigum partem ex 
classe, Gallorum, Rhodiorum epibatarumque armare 
et in castra evocare uti, si posset, eadem ratione qua 
adversarii levis armatura interiecta inter equites suos 
interponeretur, sagittariisque ex omnibus navibus 
Ityreis, Syris et cuiusque generis ductis in castra 
compluribus frequentabat suas copias — audiebat 
enim Scipionem post diem tertium eius diei quo 
proelium factum erat appropinquare, copias suas cum 
Labieno et Petreio coniungere ; cuius copiae legio- 
num VIII et equitum III milium esse nuntiabantur 
— officinas ferrarias instruere, sagittas telaque ut 
fierent complura curare, glandis fundere, sudis 
comparare, litteras in Siciliam nuntiosque mittere, 
ut sibi cratis materiemque congererent ad arietes, 
cuius inopia in Africa esset, praeterea ferrum, 
plumbum mitteretur. Etiam animum advertebat 
frumento se in Africa nisi importaticio uti non posse : 
priore anno enim propter adversariorum dilectus, 
quod stipendiarii aratores milites essent facti, 
messem non esse factam ; praeterea ex omni Africa 
frumentum adversarios in pauca oppida et bene 
munita comportasse omnemque regionem Africae 
exinanisse frumento, oppida praeter ea pauca quae 

174 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

from his camp likewise to the sea : his purpose was to 
ensure safer communication in both directions and to 
enable his reinforcements to come up to his support 
\\'ithout danger. He brought missiles and artillery 
from the ships into his camp, and armed some of the 
Gallic and Rhodian rowei's and marines from the fleet 
and summoned them to camp, in order that, if 
possible, on the same principle which his opponents 
had employed, light-armed troops should be inter- 
spersed at intervals among his cavalry. From all his 
ships he brought archers into camp — Ityreans, 
Syrians and men of divers races — and thronged his 
forces with numerous drafts of them ; for he heard 
that on the second day after the battle was fought 
Scipio was approaching and uniting his forces — 
reported to comprise eight legions and three 
thousand cavalry — with those of Labienus and 
Petreius. He also established smithies, took steps to 
ensure a plentiful supply of arrows and missile- 
weapons, cast leaden bullets, collected stakes, and 
sent couriers with despatches to Sicily bidding them 
build up for his use stocks of hurdles and timber for 
battering-rams — timber was scarce in Africa^and 
in addition send him iron and lead. He realised, 
moreover, that no corn could be available for his use 
in Africa unless it was imported ; for there had been 
no harvest the previous year on account of the levies 
held by his opponents and the fact that the farmers, 
being tributary subjects of Rome, had been called 
up for military service : moreover, his opponents 
had collected corn from the whole of Africa and 
conveyed it into a few well-fortified towns, and 
every corner of Africa was thus ransacked of corn ; 
and apart from those few towns which his opponents 

175 



CAESAR 

ipsi suis praesidiis tueri poterant reliqua dirui ac 
deseri, et eorum incolas intra sua praesidia coegisse 
commigrare, agros desertos ac vastatos esse. 

21 Hac necessitate Caesar coactus privates ambiendo 
et blande appellando aliquantum numerum frumcnti 
in sua praesidia congesserat et eo parce utebatur. 
Opera interimipse cotidie circuire et alteras cohortis 
in statione habere propter hostium multitudinem. 
Labienus saucios suos, quorum numerus maximus 
fuit, iubet in plaustris deligatos Hadrumetum depor- 
tari. Naves interim Caesaris onerariae errabundae 
male vagabantur incertae locorum atque castrorum 
suorum ; quas singulas scaphae adversariorum com- 
plures adortae incendebant atque expugnabant. 
Hac re nuntiata Caesar classis circum insulas portus- 
que disposuit, quo tutius commeatus supportari 
posset. 

22 M. Cato interim, qui Uticae praeerat, Cn. Pom- 
peium filium multis verbis assidueque obiurgare non 
desistebat, ' Tuus,' inquit, ' pater istuc aetatis cum 
esset et animadvertisset rem publicam ab nefariis 
sceleratisque civibus oppressam bonosque aut inter- 
fectos aut exsilio multatos patria eivitateque carere, 
gloria et animi magnitudine elatus privatus atque 
adulescentulus paterni exercitus reliquiis collectis 
176 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

were able to defend themselves with their own 
garrisons, the rest were being destroyed and aban- 
doned : their inhabitants had been compelled to 
migrate to the shelter of the enemy garrisons, and 
their lands were now abandoned and laid waste. 

Under stress of this emergency Caesar had, by 
soliciting private individuals with touching appeals, 
amassed a certain amount of corn in his garrisons, 
and this he was using sparingly. Meanwhile every 
day he went round the field-works in person, and 
doubled the number of cohorts on guard duty in 
view of the large numbers of the enemy. Labienus 
gave orders that his wounded, who were very 
numerous, should have their wounds dressed and 
then be carried in carts to Hadrumetum. Mean- 
while some of Caesar's transports were cruising 
aimlessly about, badly off their course in their 
uncertain knowledge of the area and the position of 
his camp ; and one by one they were set upon by a 
number of enemy pinnaces and set on fire or boarded. 
When this was reported to Caesar he posted squad- 
rons round the islands and harbours to enable his 
supplies to be convoyed with greater safety. 
I Meanwhile M. Cato, who was in command at 
Utica, never left off assailing Cn. Pompeius, the son, 
with long and constant speeches of reproof. ' When 
your father was your age,' he said, ' he perceived 
that the state was oppressed by wicked and vicious 
citizens, and that loyal men had either been put to 
death or else, punished by exile, were deprived of 
their country and civic rights. Whereupon, carried 
away by his ambition and the nobility of his nature, 
though a mere private citizen and a callow youth, he 
mustered the remnants of his father's army and 

177 



CAESAR 

paene oppressam funditus et deletam Italiam urbem- 
que Romanam in libertatem vindicavit, idemque 
Siciliam, Africam, Numidiam, Mauretaniam mirabili 
celeritate armis recepit. Quibus ex rebus sibi earn 
dignitatem quae est per gentis elarissima notissima- 
que conciliavit adulescentulusque atque eques 
Romanus triumphavit. Atque ille non ita amplis 
rebus patris gestis neque tarn excellenti dignitate 
maiorum parta neque tantis clientelis nominisque 
elaritate praeditus in rem publicam est ingressus, 
Tu contra et patris nobilitate et dignitate et per te 
ipse satis animi magnitudine diligentiaque praeditus 
nonne eniteris et proficiseeris ad paternas clientelas 
auxilium tibi reique publicae atque optimo cuique 
efflagitatum ? ' 
23 His verbis hominis gravissimi incitatus adulescen- 
tulus cum naviculis cuiusquemodi generis XXX, inibi 
paueis rostratis, profectus ab Utica in Mauretaniam 
regnumque Bogudis est ingressus expeditoque exer- 
citu servorum, liberorum II milium numero, cuius 
partem inermem, partem habuerat armatam, ad 
oppidum Ascurum accedere coepit ; in quo oppido 
praesidium fuit regium. Pompeio adveniente oppi- 
dani, usque eo passi propius accedere donee ad ipsas 
portas ac murum appropinquaret, subito eruptione 
facta prostrates perterritosque Pompeianos in mare 
178 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

emancipated Italy and the city of Rome when they 
were all but utterly overwhelmed and destroyed ; 
and likewise he recovered Sicily, Africa, Numidia 
and Mauretania by force of arms with astonishing 
speed. By these achievements he won himself that 
prestige of his which in lustre and in fame is un- 
equalled throughout the world, and, albeit a mere 
youth and a Roman knight, celebrated a triumph. 
And in his case his father had not the same imposing 
record as your father has, nor had he inherited from 
his ancestors the same position of eminent distinc- 
tion, nor was he endowed with such influential ties of 
clientship or with a famous name, when he entered 
public life. Whereas in your case not only are 
you endowed ^\■ith the fame and prestige of your 
father, but you yourself are also adequately endowed 
on your own account with nobility of nature and with 
earnestness. Will you not therefore make an effort 
and set out in quest of your father's clients to demand 
their assistance for yourself, for the state and for 
every loyal citizen ? ' 
23 These words, coming from a man of the greatest 
authority, spurred on the youth. Taking with him 
thirty small ships of every type, including a few 
equipped with beaks, he set out from Utica and 
invaded Mauretania and the kingdom of Bogud. Dec. (?)4 
With an army in light order comprising two thousand 
slaves and freedmen, some with arms, some without, 
he proceeded to approach the town of Ascurum, where 
there was a royal garrison. As Pompeius drew 
near, the townsfolk allowed him to come closer 
and closer imtil he was actually approaching the very 
gates and the town wall : then suddenly they made a 
sally and drove the crushed and panic-stricken 

179 



CAESAR 

navisque passim compulerunt. Ita re male gesta 
Cn. Pompeius filius navis inde avertit neque postea 
litus attigit classemque ad insulas Balearis versus 
convertit. 

24 Scipio interim cum eis copiis quas paulo ante 
demonstravimus Uticae grandi praesidio relieto pro- 
fectus primum Hadrumeti castra ponit, deinde ibi 
paucos dies commoratus noctu itinere facto cum 
Labieni et Petrei copiis coniungit, atque unis castris 
factis III milia passuum longe considunt. Equitatus 
interim eorum circum Caesaris munitiones vagari 
atque eos qui pabulandi aut aquandi gratia extra 
vallum pi-Qgressi essent excipere : ita omnis adver- 
saries intra munitiones continere. Qua re Caesariani 
gravi annona sunt conflictati, ideo quod nondum 
neque ab Sicilia neque ab Sardinia commeatus sup- 
portatus erat neque per anni tempus in mari classes 
sine periculo vagari poterant ; neque amplius milia 
passuum \'I terrae Africae quoquo versus tenebant 
pabulique inopia premebantur. Qua necessitate 
coacti veterani milites equitesque, qui multa terra 
marique bella confecissent et periculis inopiaque tali 
saepe essent conflictati, alga e litore collecta et aqua 
dulci eluta et ita iumentis esurientibus data vitam 
eorum producebant. 

25 Dum haec ita fierent, rex luba cognitis Caesaris 
difficultatibus copiarumque paucitate — non est visum 

1 See Appendix A, p. 393. 

- The figure VI, given by all MSS., is not easily reconciled 
with the dimensions of the plateau of Ruspina : some editors 
would amend it to III. 

l8o 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

Pompeians back wholesale to the sea and their ships. 
After this reverse Cn. Pompeius, the son, withdrew 
his fleet from there and without touching land again 
set course with his fleet towards the Balearic Islands. 

Meanwhile Scipio set out with the forces we 
enumerated a little earlier, leaving a considerable 
garrison behind at Utica, and pitched camp first at 
Hadrumetum. Then, after staving there a few 
days, he made a night march and joined up with the 
forces of Labienus and Petreius ; whereupon they 
established themselves in a single camp three miles 
distant from Caesar.^ Meanwhile their cavalry 
went roving round Caesar's entrenchments, inter- 
cepting all such troops as had advanced beyond the 
rampai't to forage or fetch water ; and this had the 
effect of keeping all their opponents confined within 
their defences. By these tactics Caesar's men were 
afflicted with a severe scarcity of corn, for this reason 
that supplies had not so far been conveyed to him 
either from Sicily or Sardinia, and, on account of the 
season of the year, fleets could not move freely about 
the seas without risk ; moreover, they occupied no 
more than six ^ miles of Afi-ican soil in any one 
direction, and were hard put to it for lack of fodder. 
The urgency of this situation drove tlie veteran 
troops — infantry and cavalry — men who had gone 
through many campaigns by land and sea and had 
often been afflicted by hazai'ds and similar privation, 
to collect seaweed from the beach, cleanse it in fresh 
water, and give it in this state to their famished 
beasts, thereby prolonging their lives. 

While these events were taking place, king Juba, 
who was aware of Caesar's difficulties and the small 
numbers of his forces, thought it advisable not to 

i8i 



CAESAR 

dari spatiiim convalcscendi augendarunique eiiis 
opum : itaquc comparatis equitum maguis peditum- 
que copiis subsidio suis egressus e regno ire contendit. 
P. Sittius interim et rex Bochus coniunctis suis copiis 
cognito regis lubae egressu propius eius regnum 
copias suas admovere, Cirtamque, oppidum opulen- 
tissimum eius regni, adortus paucis diebus pugnando 
capit et praeterea duo oppida Gaetulorum. Quibus 
cum condicionem ferret, ut oppido excederent idque 
sibi vacuum traderent, condicionemque repudiassent, 
postea ab eo capti interfectique sunt omnes. Inde 
progressus agros oppidaque vexare non destitit. 
Quibus rebus cognitis luba cum iam non longe ab 
Scipione atque eius ducibus abesset, capit consilium 
satius esse sibi suoque regno subsidio ire quam, dum 
alios adiuturus proficisceretur, ipse suo regno 
expulsus forsitan utraque re expelleretur. Itaque 
rursus recipere atque auxilia etiam ab Scipione 
abduxit sibi suisque rebus timens elephantisque 
XXX relictis suis finibus oppidisque suppetias pro- 
fectus est. 
26 Caesar interim, cum de suo adventu dubitatio in 
provincia esset neque quisquam crederet ipsum sed 
aliquem legatum in Africam cum copiis venisse, 
conscriptis litteris circum provinciam omnis civitates 
facit de suo adventu certiores. Interim nobiles 
homines ex suis oppidis profugere et in castra 

' A Roman adventurer and soldier of fortune who since the 
conspiracy of Catiline had been operating independently in 
Africa with a body of troops raised in Spain. Bochus, king 
' of eastern Mauretania, sided with Caesar against Juba. 

182 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

give him any respite for recruiting his strength or 
increasing his resources. And so, having got to- 
gether large forces of cavalry and infantry, he 
departed from his kingdom and made haste to go to 
the assistance of his friends. Meanwhile P. Sittius ^ 
and king Bochus had united their forces and, learning 
of king Juba's departure, moved them closer to his 
kingdom. Sittius then attacked Cirta, the richest 
town of that kingdom, and after a few days' fighting 
captured it, as well as two Gaetulian towns. When 
he offered them terms, proposing that they should 
evacuate the town and surrender it unoccupied to 
him, they refused the terms and were subsequently 
captured by Sittius and all put to death. Thereupon 
he advanced, ravaging both countryside and towns 
without ceasing. Juba got to know of this when he 
was now not far away from Scipio and his lieutenants, 
and came to the conclusion that it was better to go 
to the aid of himself and his own kingdom, rather 
than that, in the course of setting out to help others, 
he should himself be driven out of his own kingdom, 
and perhaps be thwarted in both fields. Accord- 
ingly, he marched back again, Mithdrawing his 
auxiliary forces too from Scipio, in his alarm on 
account of himself and his own interests ; and leaving 
thirty elephants behind with Scipio, he set forth to 
the relief of his own territory and towns. 

Meanwhile as there was some doubt in the pi*o- 
vince as to Caesar's arrival, and nobody believed it 
was Caesar in pei'son that had come to Africa with 
the forces, but rather some one of his lieutenants, he 
sent written despatches round the province informing 
all the communities of his personal arrival. Mean- 
while persons of note fled from their towns and sought 

183 



CAESAR 

Caesaris devenire et de adversariorum eius crudeli- 
tate acerbitateque commemorare coeperunt. Quorum 
lacrimis querelisque Caesar commotus, cum antea 
constituisset e stativis castris aestate inita cunctis 
copiis auxiliisque accitis bellum cum suis adversariis 
gerere, hieme gerere ^ instituit, litteris celeriter in 
Siciliam ad Alienum et Rabirium Postumum con- 
scriptis et per catascopum missis, ut sine mora ac 
nulla excusatione hiemis ventorumque quam celer- 
rime exercitus sibi transportaretur : Africam pro- 
vinciam perire funditusque everti ab suis inimicis ; 
quod nisi celeriter sociis foret subventum, praeter 
ipsam Africam terram nihil, ne tectum quidem quo se 
reciperent, ab eorum scelere insidiisque reliquum 
futurum. Atque ipse erat in tanta festinatione et 
exspectatione ut postero die quam misisset litteras 
nuntiumque in Siciliam classem exercitumque morari 
diceret, dies noctesque oculos mentemque ad mare 
dispositos directosque haberet. Nee mirum : anim- 
advertebat enim villas exuri, agros vastari, pecus 
diripi, trucidari, oppida castellaque dirui deserique, 
principes civitatum aut interfici aut in catenis teneri, 
liberos eorum obsidum nomine in servitutem abripi ; 
eis se miseris suamque fidem implorantibus auxilio 
propter copiarum paucitatem esse non posse. Milites 

^ The words hieme gerere were conjectured by Woelffltn. 
184 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

refuge in Caesar's camp and proceeded to quote in- 
stances of the cruelty and harshness of his opponents. 
Their tears and complainings had no little effect on 
Caesar ; and though he had previously decided to 
wait for the beginning of summer to muster all his 
forces and auxiliaries from their permanent quarters 
and wage war on his opponents, he now resolved on a 
winter campaign, promptly drafting a despatch to 
Alienus and Rabirius Postumus in Sicily, which he 
sent by a reconnaissance vessel, to the effect that an 
army must be shipped across to him as quickly as 
possible : there must be no delay and no excuses on 
the ground of wintry weather or adverse winds. The 
province of Africa, he \\Tote, was in its death throes, 
in the process of utter destruction at the hands of his 
foes ; and unless aid were promptly rendered to their 
allies, nothing save the very soil of Africa — not even 
a roof to give them shelter — would be left as the 
result of their enemies' treacherous crimes. Caesar 
himself was in such a ferment of impatient expec- 
tancy that on the day after he sent the messenger to 
Sicily with the despatch he kept saving that the fleet 
and armv were dallying ; and day and night he kept 
his eyes and attention bent and riveted upon the sea. 
And no wonder ; for he perceived that farms were 
being burned to the ground, fields stripped, herds 
plundered or butchered, towns and strongholds de- 
stroyed and abandoned, and the principal citizens 
either murdered or held in chains, and their children 
haled off to slavery on the pretext of being hostages ; 
yet to these folk, Avho in their misery implored his 
protection, he could give no assistance because his 
forces were so few. Meanwhile he kept his troops 
continuously at work on their training, proceeded 



CAESAR 

interim in opere exercere atque castra munirc, turris, 
castella facei*e molesque iacere in mare non inter- 
mittere. 

27 Scipio interim clephantos hoc modo condocefacere 
instituit. Duas instruxit acies, unam funditorum 
contra elephantos, quae quasi adversariorum locum 
obtineret et contra eorum frontem adversam lapillos 
minutos mitteret ; deinde in ordinem elephantos 
constituit, post illos autem suam aciem instruxit ut, 
cum ab adversariis lapides mitti coepissent et ele- 
phanti perterriti se ad suos convertissent, rursus ab 
sua acie lapidibus missis cos converterent adversus 
hostem. Quod aegre tardeque fiebat ; rudes enim 
elephanti multorum annorum doctrina usuque vetusto 
vix edocti tamen communi pei'iculo in aciem pro- 
ducuntur. 

28 Dum haec ad Ruspinam ab utrisque ducibus 
administrantur, C. Vergilius praetorius, qui Thapsi 
oppido maritimo praeerat, cum animum advertisset 
navis singulas cum exercitu Caesaris incertas locorum 
atque castrorum suorum vagari, occasionem nactus 
navem quam ibi habuit actuariam complet militibus 
et sagittariis et eidem scaphas de navibus adiungit ac 
singulas navis Caesarianas consectari coepit. Et cum 
pluris adortus esset pulsus fugatusque inde disces- 
i86 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

with the fortification of his camp, and went on with- 
out interruption constructing towers and redoubts 
and driving moles out into the sea. 

Scipio meanwhile undertook the training of the 
elephants in the following manner. He drew up 
two lines of battle : one line of slingers, facing the 
elephants, to take the place of the enemy and to dis- 
charge small stones against the opposing front formed 
by the elephants ; next he arranged the elephants in 
line, and behind them drew up his own line so that, 
when the enemy proceeded to sling their stones and 
the elephants in their consequent panic wheeled round 
upon their own side, his men should receive them 
with a volley of stones, and so make them wheel 
round again away from his own line in the direction 
of the enemy. This method worked, though it was a 
difficult and slow process ; for elephants are uncouth 
creatures, and it is difficult to get them fully trained 
even with many years' training and long practice ; 
and if they are led forth to battle, they are, for all 
their training, equally dangerous to both sides. 

While these dispositions were being made at 
Ruspina by the leaders on either side, the ex-praetor 
C. \'ergilius, who was in charge of the coastal town 
of Thapsus, observed that ships carrying Caesar's 
troops were sailing singly on no set course, due to 
their uncertain knowledge of the locality and of the 
position of his camp. He therefore seized the 
opportunity and manned with soldiers and archers a 
fast boat which he had there, to which he added 
some ship's pinnaces, and with these he set about the 
pursuit of Caesar's ships one by one. He had 
attacked several, only to be beaten off, put to flight 
and forced to quit the area, but even so was still 

187 



CAESAR 

sisset nee tamen desisteret periclitari, forte incidit in 
navem, in qua erant duo Titii, Hispani adulescentes, 
tribuni legionis V., quorum patrem Caesar in senatum 
legerat, et cum his T. Salienus, centurio legionis 
ciusdem, qui M. Messallam legatum obsederat 
Messanae seditiosissima oratione apud eum usus 
idemque pecuniam et ornamenta triumphi Caesaris 
retinenda et custodienda curarat et ob has causas 
sibi timebat. Hie propter conscientiam peccatorum 
suorum persuasit adulescentibus ne repugnarent 
seseque Vergilio traderent. Itaque deducti a V'er- 
giUo ad Scipionem custodibus traditi et post diem 
tertium sunt interfecti. Qui eum ducerentur ad 
neeem, petisse dicitur maior Titius a centurionibus 
uti se priorem quam fratrem interficerent, idque ab 
eis faeile impeti-asse atque ita esse interfeetos. 
29 Turmae interim equitum, quae pro vallo in sta- 
tionibus esse solebant/ cotidie minutis proeHis inter 
se depugnare non intermittunt ; non numquam etiam 
Germani Gallique Labieniani cum Caesaris equitibus 
fide data inter se colloquebantur. Labienus interim 
cum parte equitatus Leptim oppidum, cui praeerat 
Saserna cum cohortibus VI, oppugnare ae vi irrum- 
pere conabatur ; quod ab defensoribus propter 
egregiam munitionem oppidi et multitudinem tor- 
mentorum facile et sine periculo defendebatur. 

1 After solebant the MSS. read ab utrisque ducibus : / 
have followed Nipperdey in omitting them. 



1 WTien Messalla and Sallust were sent by Caesar in August, 
47, to order certain legions to concentrate in Sicily for the 
African campaign, the legions mutinied and the Twelfth went 
so far as to pelt them with stones. 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

persisting in his hazardous tactics, wlien chance led 
him to fall in witli a ship which had on board two 
A'oung Spaniards of the name of Titius — tribunes of 
the Fifth legion, whose father Caesar had caused to 
be elected to the Senate — as well as T. Salienus, a 
centurion of the same legion, who had laid siege to the 
house of M. Messalla,^ Caesar's lieutenant, at Mes- 
sana, employing in his presence the language of 
downright mutiny. This man had also been respon- 
sible for withholding under guard some money and 
trappings belonging to Caesar's triumph, and for 
these reasons viewed his own prospects with mis- 
giving. His own guilty conscience led him to persuade 
the young men to put up no resistance, but to sur- 
render to \'ergilius. Accordingly they were escorted 
by \'ergilius to Scipio, put under guard, and two 
days later put to death. As they were being led 
to execution, the elder Titius, it is said, besought the 
centurions to put him to death before his brother, 
and was readily granted that request, and they were 
put to death in that order. 

Meanwhile the squadrons of cavalry w'hose regular 
duty it was to be on guard in front of the rampart 
were engaging daily in incessant skirmishes with one 
another; and there wei'e also times when Labienus' 
Germans and Gauls and Caesar's cavalry exchanged 
pledges of good faith and conversed with one another. 
Meantime Labienus Mith part of his cavalry was 
endeavouring to assault and force his way into the 
town of Leptis, which was under command of Saserna 
with six cohorts ; but its defenders, thanks to the 
excellent fortifications of the town and the large 
number of their engines of war, defended it easily 
and without danger. But Labienus' cavalry re- 



CAESAR 

Quod ubi saepius eius equitatus facere non inter- 
mittebat, et cum forte ante portam turma densa 
adstitisset, scorpione accuratius misso atque eorum 
decurione percusso et ad equum defixo reliqui per- 
territi fuga se in castra recipiunt. Quo facto postea 
sunt deterriti oppidum temptare. 

30 Scipio interim fere cotidie non longe a suis castris 
passibus CCC instruere aciem ac maiore parte diei 
consumpta rursus in castra se recipere. Quod cum 
saepius fieret neque ex Caesaris castris quisquam 
prodiret neque propius eius copias accederet, 
despecta Caesaris patientia exercitusque eius,^ uni- 
versis copiis productis elephantisque turritis XXX 
ante aciem instructis, quam latissime potuit porrecta 
equitum peditumque multitudine uno tempore pro- 
gressus haud ita longe a Caesaris castris constitit in 
campo. 

31 Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar iubet milites qui 
extra munitiones processerant pabulandi lignandique 
aut etiam muniendi gratia quique vallum petierant 
quaeque ad eam rem opus erant,^ omnis intra 
munitiones minutatim modesteque sine tumultu aut 
terrore se recipere atque in opere consistere. 
Equitibus autem qui in statione fuerant praecipit ut 

^ After eius all MSS. read luba : most editors follow Aldus in 
deleting it. 

- quique pabulandi aut lignandi aut etiam muniendi 
gratia vallem petierant quique most MSS. : vallum quaeque 
Aldus; quique transposed by Forchhammer. 

1 A small catapult. 
190 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

peated these tactics fairly frequently and gave them 
no respite ; and when it so chanced that a squadron 
had halted in massed formation in front of the gate, 
its captain was struck and pinned to his horse by a 
bolt discharged from a scorpion ^ with unusually 
accurate aim. This so unnerved the rest that they 
withdrew in flight to their camp, too much daunted 
by it to resume their attempt upon the town 
thereafter. 

Meanwhile practically every day Scipio arrayed 
his line of battle at no great distance — -three hundred 
paces — from his own camp, and then, when the 
greater part of the day was now spent, returned 
back again to camp. As this manoeuvre was carried 
out quite frequently without anyone's issuing forth 
from Caesar's camp or approaching closer to Scipio 's 
forces, the latter, holding scorn of the forbearance 
shewn by Caesar and his army, led forth his entire 
force, with thirty elephants equipped with towers 
drawn up in front of his line : then, advancing and 
simultaneously deploying to the widest possible 
extent his vast numbers of cavalry and infantry, he 
halted in the plain not so very far from Caesar's 
camp. 

When he learned of this Caesar gave orders that 
those troops who had gone forward outside the 
fortifications, whether to forage or fetch wood or 
even to work on the fortifications, as well as those who 
had been collecting stakes and what was needed for 
that work, should all retire within the fortifications — - 
gradually and in a disciplined manner, without any 
fuss or alarm — -and take their stand in the field- 
works. His instructions to the cavalry on guard were 
to go on holding the positions in which they had been 

191 



CAESAR 

usque eo locum obtinerent in quo paulo ante consti- 
tissent donee ab hoste telum missum ad se per- 
veniret ; quod si propius accederetur, quam honestis- 
sime se intra munitiones reciperent. Alii quoque 
equitatui edicit uti suo quisque loco paratus armatus- 
que praesto esset. At haec non ipse per se coram, 
cum de vallo prospecularetur, sed mirabili peritus 
scientia bellandi in praetorio sedens per speculatores 
et nuntios imperabat quae fieri volebat. Anim- 
advertebat enini, quamquam magnis essent copiis 
adversarii freti, tamen saepe a se fugatis, pulsis 
perterritisque et concessam vitam et ignota peccata ; 
quibus rebus numquam tanta suppeteret ex ipsorum 
inertia conscientiaque animi victoriae fiducia ut castra 
sua adoriri auderent. Praeterea ipsius nomen 
auctoritasque magna ex parte eorum exercitus 
minuebat audaciam. Tum egregiae munitiones 
castrorum atque valli fossarumque altitudo et extra 
vallum stili caeci mirabilem in modum consiti vel 
sine defensoribus aditum adversariis prohibebant : 
scorpionum, catapultarum ceterorumque telorum 
quae ad defendendum solent parari magnam copiam 
habebat. Atque haec propter exercitus sui prae- 
sentis paucitatem et tirocinium praeparaverat, non 

192 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

posted a little earlier, until they should come within 
range of the enemy's missiles : if the enemy advanced 
yet closer, they must then make as honourable a 
withdrawal as possible within the fortifications. As 
for the rest of the cavalry, they too had their orders — 
to be ready at hand, equipped and armed, each man 
in his proper place. These orders, however, he did 
not issue personally on the spot, surveying the 
situation for himself from the rampart ; but so 
remarkable was his skill and knowledge of warfare 
that, making use of look-outs and orderlies, he 
issued the instructions necessary for his purpose as 
he sat in his head-quarters. For he observed that, 
although his opponents were relying on the great 
size of their forces, yet they were the very men 
whom he himself had often routed, beaten back and 
utterly demoralised, only to spare their lives and 
forgive their misdemeanours ; in which circum- 
stances, considering their own lack of initiative and 
their guilty conscience, they would never muster 
sufficient confidence in victory as to venture to attack 
his camp. Moreover, his own name and prestige had, 
to a great extent, a sobering effect upon the reckless 
spirit of their army. Then again the exceptional de- 
fences of the camp — the height of the rampart, 
the depth of the ditches, and the concealed stakes 
outside the rampart, marvellously well planted — all 
these, even without defenders, served to deter the 
enemy's approach ; while as for scorpions, catapults 
and all the other noi-mal weapons of defence, he had a 
plentiful supply of these. These he had prepared 
in advance in view of the small size and lack of 
experience of his army as it then was, and it was not 
because he was taken aback or dismayed at the 

193 



CAESAR 

hostium vi et mctu commotus patientem sc timidum- 
que hostium opinioni praebebat. Neqiie idcirco 
copias, quamquam erant paucae tironumque, non 
educebat in aciem qui victoriae suae diffideret, sed 
referre arbitrabatur, cuiusmodi victoria esset futura ; 
turpe enim sibi cxistimabat tot rebus gestis tantisque 
exercitibus devictis, tot tarn claris victoriis partis, ab 
reliquis copiis adversariorum suorum ex fuga collectis 
se cruentam adeptum existimari victoriam. Itaque 
constituerat gloriam exsultationemque eorum pati, 
donee sibi veteranarum legionum pars ali(jua in 
sccundo commeatu occurrisset. 
32 Scipio interim paulisper, ut antea dixi, in eo loco 
commoratus, ut quasi despexisse Caesarem videretur, 
paulatim reducit suas copias in castra et contione 
advocata de terrore suo desperationeque exercitus 
Caesaris facit verba et cohortatus suos victoriam 
propriam se eis brevi daturum pollicctur. Caesar 
iubet milites rursus ad opus redire et per causam 
munitionum tirones in labore defatigare non inter- 
mittit. Interim Numidae Gaetulique diffugere coti- 
die ex castris Scipionis et partim in regnum se con- 
ferre, partim, quod ipsi maioresque eorum beneficio 
C. Marl usi fuissent Caesaremque eius adfinem esse 

1 The famous soldier and democratic champion, who in 115 
had married Julia, the sister of Caesar's father. There is no 
mention in other writers of his beneficence towards the Gaetu- 
lians, who had presumably served him well as mercenaries in 
his campaigns against Jugurtha (109-106). As some 60 years 
had now elapsed, it would seem that very few, if any, of the 
present Gaetulians could fhousflre.s have been kindly treated 
by Marius. Chapters 3'y and 56 below suggest rather that it 
was their fathers or grandfathers who had been rewarded and 
194 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

enemy's might that he showed himself — to the 
enemy's thinking — long-suffering and timid. The 
reason why he would not lead his forces on to the 
field, few and inexperienced though they were, was 
not that he lacked confidence in his victory, but he 
considered the important question was — what manner 
of victory it would prove ; for he thought it a personal 
slur if after all his achievements, after all the many 
brilliant victories he had won over such massive 
armies, men should look upon this victory^ as one 
gained only with much bloodshed over such remnants 
as his opponents had mustered from their routed 
forces. And so he had resolved to endure their 
boastful triumph until his second convoy should join 
him. including some portion of his veteran legions. 

Meanwhile Scipio lingered for a little while, as I 
mentioned earlier, in that postion, to create the 
impression that he had held Caesar virtually in 
contempt, and then gradually Mithdrew his forces to 
camp. There he paraded his troops and spoke to 
them of the dread which their own side inspired and 
the desperate attitude of Caesar's army ; and with 
such words of encouragement to his men he promised 
them that he would shortly give them a lasting vic- 
toi-y. Caesar ordered his troops to return once more 
to their duties and, on the pretext of the fortifica- 
tions, kept his recruits constantly employed to the 
point of exhaustion. Meanwhile Numidians and Gae- 
tulians Avere daily deserting from Scipio's camp : the 
former betook themselves to Juba's kingdom, while 
the latter, because they themselves and their ances- 
tors had been kindly treated by C. Marius ^ and heard 

made clients, and that the present generation had inherited 
this formal tie of clientship. 



CAESAR 

audiebant, in eius castra perfugere catervatim non 
intermittunt. Quorum ex numero electis hominibus 
inlustrioribus et litteris ad suos civis datis cohortatus 
uti manu facta se suosque dcfendcrent, ne suis 
inimicis adversariisque dicto audicntes essent, mittit. 
33 Dum haec ad Ruspinam fiunt, legati ex Acylla, 
civitate libera et immuni,^ ad Caesarem veniunt 
seque paratos quaecumque imperasset et libenti 
animo facturos pollicentur ; tantum orare et petere 
ab eo ut sibi praesidium daret. quo tutius id et sine 
periculo facere possent ; se et frunientum et quae- 
cumque res eis suppeteret communis salutis gratia 
sumministraturos. Quibus rebus facile a Caesare 
impetratis praesidioque date, C. Messium, aedilicia 
functum potestate, Acyllam iubet proficisci. Quibus 
rebus cognitis Considius Longus. qui Hadrumeti cum 
duabus legionibus et equitibus DCC praeerat, celeri- 
ter ibi parte praesidi relicta cum \'III cohortibus ad 
Acyllam ire contendit. Messius celerius itinere 
confecto prior Acyllam cum cohortibus peryenit. 
Considius interini cum ad urbem cum copiis acces- 
sisset et animadyertisset praesidium Caesaris ibi 
esse, non ausus periculum suorum facere nulla re 
gesta pro multitudine hominum rursus se Hadru- 
metum recepit ; deinde, paucis post diebus eques- 

^ etiam undique MSS. : et immuni Rubens. 



1 See ch. 7, note 1. Its site is much disputed. I have 
marked it in I\Iap 3 — very tentatively — in accordance with 
its traditional identification Avith the Acholia mentioned 
by Strabo and Pliny. This satisfies the requirements of 
ch. 43. But it seems very doubtful whether C. w(^uld have 
detached precious troops to garrison a spot so far south ; 
and this objection, together with its mention in ch. 67 in 

196 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

that Caesar was a I'elation of his, swarmed constantly 
for refuge into Caesar's camp. From among their 
number Caesai* chose certain more distinguished 
members, gave them letters for their fellow citizens, 
and so dismissed them, exhorting them to raise a 
force for the defence of themselves and their people, 
and not to submit passively to the dictates of their 
foes and opponents. 
33 While these events w'ere taking place at Ruspina, 
there came to Caesar envoys from Acylla, an inde- 
pendent state immune from taxes. ^ They assured 
him that they would readilv and gladly do whatever 
he might bid : they merely prayed and besought him 
to give them a garrison to enable them to do his 
bidding with the greater safety and without peril : 
they would supply its members with corn and with 
all other adequate supplies for the sake of their 
common welfare. This request Caesar readily 
granted and gave them a garrison, ordering C. 
Messius, who had once held the office of aedile, to set 
out for Acylla. On learning this, Considius Longus, 
who was in command at Hadrumetum with two 
legions and seven hundred cavalry, left part of his 
gaiTison force behind and, taking eight cohorts \vith 
him, promptly hastened off to Acylla. Messius 
completed his march more rapidly and Avas the first 
to arrive at Acylla with his cohorts. Whereupon 
Considius approached the city with his forces and 
observed that Caesar's garrison was there : and not 
venturing to jeopardise his troops, retired back 
again to Hadrumetum without having achieved any- 
thing to warrant so large a force. Subsequently, 

close conjunction witli Leptis and Riispina, led Veitli to 
place it some 4 km. S.E. of Leptis. 

197 



CAESAR 

tribus copiis a Labieno adductis, rursus Acyllitanos 
castris posit is obsidere coepit. 

34 Per id tempus C. Sallustius Crispus, quern paucis 
ante diebus missum a Caesare cum classe demonstra- 
vimus, Cercinam pervenit. Cuius adventu C. 
Decimius quaestorius, qui ibi cum grandi familiae 
suae praesidio praeerat commeatui, parvulum navi- 
gium nactus conscendit ac se fugae commendat. 
Sallustius interim praetor a Cercinitanis receptus 
niagno numero frumenti invento navis onerarias, 
quarum ibi satis magna copia fuit, complet atque in 
castra ad Caesarem mittit. Alienus interim pro 
consule Lilybaeo in navis onerarias imponit legionem 
XIII. et XIIII. et equites Gallos DCCC, funditorum 
sagittariorumque mille ac secundum commeatum 
in Africam mittit ad Caesarem. Quae naves ventum 
secundum nactae quarto die in portum ad Ruspinam, 
ubi Caesar castra habuerat, incolumes pervenerunt. 
Ita Caesar duplici laetitia ac voluptate uno tempore 
auctus, frumento auxiliisque, tandem suis hilaritis 
annonaque levata sollicitudinem deponit, legiones 
equitesque ex navibus egressos iubet ex languore 
nauseaque reficere, dimissos in castella munitionesque 
disponit. 

35 Quibus rebus Scipio quique cum eo essent comites 
miravi et requireve : C. Caesarem, qui ultro con- 
198 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

when a few days later he had procured a contingent 
of cavah-y from Labienus, he returned, pitched his 
camp and proceeded to lay siege to Acylla. 

It was during this time that C. Sallustius Crispus, 
who, as we haye explained, had been despatched by 
Caesar with a fleet a few days earlier, arriyed at 
Cercina. On his arriyal the ex-quaestor C. Decimius, 
who ^vas controller of supplies there and was attended 
by a large escort composed of his own household 
slaves, went aboard a small boat he had got hold of 
and took to flight. Meanwhile Sallustius, the 
praetor, was welcomed by the inhabitants of Cercina ; 
and finding a large quantity of corn he loaded some 
merchant yessels — there was quite a large number of 
them there — and sent them to Caesar in his camp. 
Meanwhile at Lilybaeum the pro-consul Alienus 
embarked in transports the Thirteenth and Four- 
teenth legions, eight hundred Gallic cayalry and one 
thousand slingers and archers, and sent to Caesar in 
Africa his second conyoy. With the wind behind 
them these ships arriyed safely three days later at the 
harbour of Ruspina, the town where Caesar had his 
camp. This heartened Caesar, who experienced 
twofold pleasure and delight at thus simultaneously 
receiying both corn and reinforcements ; and now 
that at last his troops were made cheerful and the 
corn problem Avas eased, he laid aside his cares, 
ordered his legions and cavalry to disembark and get 
over the effects of their lassitude and seasickness, and 
drafted them to the various forts and defended 
positions. 

All this filled Scipio and his colleagues with wonder 
and curiosity ; and they had a suspicion that some 
deep purpose must underlie this sudden transforma- 

199 



CAESAR 

suesset bellum inferre ac lacessere proelio, subito 
commutaturn iion sine magno consilio suspicabantur. 
Itaque ex eius patientia in magnum timorem coniecti 
ex Gaetulis duos quos arbitrabantur suis rebus 
amicissimos magnis praemiis pollicitationibusque pro- 
positis pro perfugis speeulandi gratia in castra 
Caesaris mittunt. Qui simul ad eum sunt deducti, 
petierunt ut sibi liceret verba sine periculo proloqui. 
Potestate facta, ' Saepenumero,' inquiunt, ' impera- 
tor. complures Gaetuli, qui sumus clientes C. Mari, et 
propemodum omnes cives Romani qui sunt in legione 
nil. et VI., ad te voluimus in tuaque praesidia 
confugere ; sed custodiis equitum Numidarum quo id 
sine periculo minus faceremus impediebamur. Nunc 
data facultate ad te cupidissime venimus, pro 
speculatoribus missi ab Scipione ut perspiceremus 
num quae fossae aut insidiae elephantis ante castra 
portasque valli factae essent, simulque consilia 
vestra contra easdem bestias comparationemque 
pugnae cognosceremus atque eis renuntiaremus.' 
Qui coUaudati a Caesare stipendioque donati ad 
reliquos perfugas deducuntur. Quorum orationem 
celeriter Veritas comprobavit : namque postero die 
ex legionibus eis quas Gaetuli nominarunt milites 
legionarii complures ab Scipione in castra Caesaris 
perfugerunt. 
36 Dum haec ad Ruspinam geruntui, M. Cato, qui 
Uticae praeerat, dilectus cotidie libertinorum, 

1 i.e. bv inheritance. See ch. 32, note 1. 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

tion in the C. Caesar who had habitually taken the 
offensive hitherto and was always spoiling for a fight. 
And so, thrown into no little panic as a result of his 
forbearance, they chose from the Gaetulians two 
men whom they considered to be the staunchest 
supporters of their cause ; and after offering them 
large rewards and making them generous promises, 
sent them in the guise of deserters on a spying 
mission into Caesar's camp. No sooner had these 
men been escorted to Caesar than they sought 
leave to speak out frankly without danger. That 
leave being granted, they said : ' Many of us 
Gaetulians, Commander-in-Chief, who are clients ^ of 
C. Marius, and practically all the Roman citizens who 
are in the Fourth and Sixth legions have very often 
wanted to take refuge with you and resort to your 
protection ; but we were prevented from doing so 
without hazard by the patrols of Numidian cavalry. 
But now that the chance has been given us we have 
come to you most eagerly. We were in fact sent by 
Scipio as spies to observe closely whether any 
trenches or traps had been made for the elephants 
in fi-ont of the camp and the gates of the rampart ; 
and at the same time to ascertain your tactics 
against these same beasts and your dispositions for 
battle, and then report back to them.' Caesar 
highly commended them, furnished them with pay, 
and had them taken to join the other deserters. 
Their statement was speedily verified by actual 
events ; for on the next day quite a number of 
legionary troops from the legions mentioned by the 
Gaetulians deserted from Scipio to Caesar's camp. 

While this was going on at Ruspina, M. Cato, the 
commander of Utica, was holding a constant sue- 



CAESAR 

Afrorum, servorum denique et cuiusquemodi generis 
hominum, qui modo per aetatem arma ferre poterant, 
habere atque sub manum Scipioni in castra sum- 
mittere non intermittit. Legati interim ex oppido 
Thysdrae, in quod tritiei modiurn milia CCC coni- 
portata fuerant a negotiatoribus Italicis aratoribus- 
que, ad Caesarem venire, quantaque copia frumenti 
apud se sit decent simulque orant ut sibi praesidium 
mittat quo facilius et frumentum et copiae suae con- 
serventur. Quibus Caesar in praesentia gratias egit 
praesidiumque brevi tempore se missurum dixit 
cohortatusque ad suos civis iubet proficisci. P. 
Sittius interim cum copiis Numidiae finis ingressus 
castellum in mentis loco munito locatum, in quod 
luba belli gerendi gratia et frumentum et res ceteras 
quae ad bellum usui solent esse comportaverat, vi 
expugnando est potitus. 
37 Caesar postquam legionibus veteranis duabus, 
equitatu levique armatura copias suas ex secundo 
commeatu auxerat, navis exoneratas statim iubet 
Lilybaeum ad reliquum exercitum transportandum 
proficisci ; ipse VI. Kal. Febr. circiter vigilia prima 
imperat speculatores apparitoresque omnes ut sibi 
praesto essent. Itaque omnibus insciis neque 
suspicantibus vigilia tertia iubet omnis legiones 
extra castra educi atque se consequi ad oppidum 
Ruspinam versus, in quo ipse praesidium habuit et 

^ = approximately 71,000 bushels. 

- i.e. early in the night of January 25;26. 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

cession of daily levies of freedmen, Africans, slaves 
even — any man, in fact, no matter of what class, so 
long as he was of an age to carrv arms — and drafting 
them to Scipio's camp to be at his disposal. Mean- 
while there came to Caesar envoys from the town of 
Thysdra, in which town three hundred thousand 
measures ^ of wheat had been collected by Italian 
merchants and farmers. These envoys now informed 
Caesar of the large quantity of corn they had and 
prayed him to send them a garrison whereby both 
their corn and all their stocks might the more 
readily be kept safe. For the present Caesar ex- 
pressed his thanks to them, saying that, as for a 
gaiTison, he would send one shortly ; he then dis- 
missed them with words of encouragement, bidding 
them go back to their oa\ii countrymen. Meanwhile 
P. Sittius invaded the territory of Numidia with his 
forces and forcibly took by storm a stronghold, 
situated on a well-defended mountain height, in 
which Juba had collected both corn and all other 
regular munitions of war, for the sake of prosecuting 
his campaign. 

Now that Caesar had reinforced his troops with two 
veteran legions, cavalry and light-armed forces from 
his second convoy, he gave orders that the ships, now 
unloaded, should set sail forthwith for Lilybaeum to 
bring across the rest of his army. On January 25, 
at approximately the first watch,^ he personally issued 
orders that all his scouts and aides-de-camp should 
hold themselves at his disposal. Accordingly, with- 
out anyone's knowing or suspecting his plan, at the 
third watch he ordered all his legions to be led 
outside the camp and follow him in the direction of 
the town of Ruspina, where he had a garrison ; 

203 



CAESAR 

quod priimim ad amicitiam eius accessit. Inde 
parvulam proclivitatem degressus sinistra parte 
canipi propter mare legiones ducit. Hie campus 
mirabili planitie patet milia passuum XII ; quern 
iugum cingens a mari ortum neque ita praealtum 
velut theatri efficit speciem. In hoc iugo colles suiit 
excelsi pauci, in quibus singulae turres speculaeque 
singulae perveteres erant collocatae, quarum apud 
ultimam praesidium et static fuit Scipionis. 

Postquam Caesar ad iugum de quo docui ascendit 
atque in unumquemque collem turremque, castella 
facere coepit atque ea minus semihora efFecit ; ^ 
et postquam non ita longe ab ultimo colle turrique 
fuit, quae proxima fuit castris adversariorum, in qua 
docui esse praesidium stationemque Numidarum, 
Caesar paulisper commoratus perspectaque natura 
loci equitatu in statione disposito legionibus opus 
attribuit bracchiumque medio iugo ab eo loco ad 
quern pervenerat usque ad eum unde egressus erat 
iubet derigi ac muniri. Quod postquam Scipio 
Labienusque animadverterant, equitatu omni ex 
castris educto acieque equestri instructa a suis 
munitionibus circiter passus mille progrediuntur 
pedestremque copiam in secunda acie minus passus 
CCCC a castris suis constituunt. 

^ turrem castellaque MSS. : turremque castella Nipperdey. 

1 See Maps 3 and 4. Presumably he kept close to the sea 
till he reached Sidi Messaoud, the north-easternmost height 
of the chain of hills, which lies approximately mid-way 
between Ruspina and Leptis, some two-thirds of a mUe from 
the coast, and then struck inland. 

204 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

it was also the first place to have joined his side. 
He then descended a gentle slope and, keeping to the 
left side of the plain, led his legions along close to the 
sea.i This plain is remarkably level and extends for 
twelve miles ; and the chain of not so very lofty 
downs which encircles it right from the very sea 
gives it the appearance of a kind of amphitheatre. 
This chain includes a few high hills, on each of which 
were situated some very ancient turrets and watch- 
towers ; and in the last - of these Scipio had a defence- 
post and picket. 

After Caesar had climbed up to the ridge I have 
described and visited each individual hill and tower, 
he proceeded to construct redoubts and these he 
completed in less than half an hour ; and when he 
was now not so very far away from the last hill and 
turret, which was nearest the enemy camp and where, 
as I have explained, there w'as a defence post and 
picket of Numidians, he paused for a little while ; 
then, after studying the lie of the land, he posted his 
cavalrv on guard and assigned to his legions their 
tasks, ordering them to carry a line of fortifications 
straight along the middle of the chain, from the point 
he had now reached right up to the point from where 
he had started. When Scipio and Labienus observed 
this, they led their entire cavalry force out of camp 
and, deploying it in battle line, advanced about a 
mile from their fortified positions and drew up their 
infantry forces in a second battle line less than four 
hundred paces from their camp. 

- This would seem to mean the last, i.e. southernmost, hill 
which contained a turret : its possible identity, along with 
several other prf)blems arising from the narrative of chs. 37- 
66, is discussed in Appendix A, p. 391. 

205 



CAESAR 

39 Caesar in opere milites adhortari neque adver- 
sariorum copiis moveri. lam cum non amplius 
passus MD inter hostium agmen suasque munitiones 
esse animadvertisset intellexissetque ad impediendos 
milites suos et ab opere depellendos hostem propius 
accedere necesseque haberet legiones a munitionibus 
deducere, imperat turmae Hispanorum ut ad proxi- 
mum collem propere occurrerent praesidiumque inde 
deturbarent locumque caperent, eodemque iubet 
levis armaturae paucos consequi subsidio. Qui missi 
celeriter Numidas adorti partim vivos capiunt, non 
nullos equites fugientis convulneraverunt locumque 
sunt potiti. Postquam id Labienus animadvertit, 
quo celerius eis auxilium ferret, ex acie instructa 
equitatus sui prope totum dextrum cornu avertit 
atque suis fugientibus suppetias ire contendit. Quod 
ubi Caesar conspexit Labienum ab suis copiis longius 
iam abscessisse, equitatus sui alam sinistram ad 
intercludendos hostis immisit. 

40 Erat in eo campo ubi ea res gerebatur villa per- 
magna turribus IIII exstructa ; quae Labieni pro- 
spectum impediebat, ne posset animum advertere 
ab equitatu Caesaris se intercludi. Itaque non prius 
vidit turmas lulianas quam suos caedi a tergo sentit. 
206 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

Caesar kept encouraging the troops as they worked, 
quite unmoved by his opponents' forces. When he 
perceived that no more than a mile and a half now 
separated the enemy ranks from his own fortifica- 
tions, and realised that the enemy were approaching 
closer for the purpose of obstructing his troops and 
forcing them to abandon their task, and as he con- 
sidered that he must now perforce withdraw his 
legions from their work of building fortifications, he 
ordered a squadron of Spaniards to launch a speedy 
attack upon the adjacent hill, dislodge its enemy 
defenders, and capture the position ; and he also 
instructed a small detachment of light-armed troops 
to follow them in support to the same objective. 
Thus despatched they speedily attacked the Numi- 
dians, capturing some of them alive and seriously 
wounding others of their troopers as they sought to 
escape, and so won the position. As soon as Labienus 
observed this, he detached practically the entire 
right wing of the line of cavalry he had deployed, so 
as the more speedily to render them assistance ; and 
with this force he made haste to proceed to the relief 
of his retreating troops. But when Caesar saw that 
Labienus had now withdrawn some distance from his 
forces, he launched the left wing of his own cavalry, 
so as to cut the enemy off. 

Now in the area where this action was going on 
there was a very large farm building, constructed 
with four lofty towers; and this impeded Labienus' 
field of view and prevented his observing that he 
was being cut off by Caesar's cavalry. Consequently 
it was only when he realised that his men were being 
cut down from the rear that he actually saw the 
Julian squadrons. As a result, triumph suddenly 

207 



CAESAR 

Ex qua re subito in terrorem converse equitatu 
Numidarum recta in castra fugere contendit. Galli 
Germanique, qui restiterant, ex superiore loco et post 
tergum circumventi fortiterque restantes conciduntur 
universi. Quod ubi legiones Scipionis, quae pro 
castris erant instructae, animum adverterunt, metu 
ac terrore occaecatae omnibus portis in sua castra 
fugere coeperunt. Postquam Scipione eiusque 
copiis campo collibusque exturbatis atque in castra 
compulsis cum receptui Caesar cani iussisset equi- 
tatumque omnem intra suas munitiones recepisset, 
campo purgato animadvertit mirifica corpora Gal- 
lorum Germanorumque ; qui partim eius auctorita- 
tem erant ex Gallia secuti, partim pretio pollicita- 
tionibusque adducti ad eum se contulerant, non 
nuUi, qui ex Curionis proelio capti conservatique 
parem gratiam in fide pariter tuenda ^ praestare 
voluerant. Horum corpora mirifica specie ampli- 
tudineque caesa toto campo ac prostrata diverse 
iacebant. 
41 His rebus gestis Caesar postero die ex omnibus 
praesidiis cohortis deduxit atque omnis suas copias in 
campo instruxit. Scipio suis male acceptis, occisis 
convulneratisque intra suas continere se munitiones 
coepit. Caesar instructa acie secundum infimas iugi 
radices propius munitiones leniter accessit. lamque 

1 partienda MSS. : pariter tuenda Hoffmann. 
208 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

gave place to panic among the Numidian cavalry, 
and Labienus made haste to flee straight back to 
camp. As for the Gauls and Germans, they stood 
their ground ; but hemmed in between the enemy 
on the higher ground and those in their rear, despite 
a gallant resistance they were slaughtered to a man. 
On observing this, Scipio's legions, which were drawn 
up in front of his camp, were seized with blind panic 
and began to flee by every gate into their camp. 
Now that Scipio and his forces had been swept in 
disorder from plain and hills and driven wholesale 
into their camp, Caesar ordered the retreat to be 
sounded and withdrew all his cavalry inside his own 
fortifications ; and it was then, when the field had 
been cleared, that his attention Avas caught by the 
amazing bodies of the Gauls and Germans : some of 
whom had followed Labienus from Gaul in deference 
to his authority ; others had been induced to join 
him by rewards and promises ; and there were yet 
others who, having been made prisoners after Curio's 
defeat and their lives being spared, had been anxious 
to give proof of their unswerving gratitude by main- 
taining a con-espondingly unswerving loyalty. These 
were the men whose bodies, amazing in their beauty 
and stature, were lying mutilated and prostrate here 
and there all over the battle-field. 

On the day following this action Caesar withdrew 
his cohorts from all his defence posts and drew up 
all his forces in the plain : whereas Scipio, after the 
disastrous reception his troops had met with and 
their resulting heavy casualties in dead and wounded, 
proceeded to sit tight within his own fortifications. 
Caesar deployed his battle line along the lowest 
spurs of the chain of hills, and then slowly approached 

209 



CAESAR 

minus mille passus ab oppido Uzitta, quod Scipio 
tenebat, aberant legiones lulianae, cum Scipio 
veritus ne oppidum amitteret, undo aquari rcliquis- 
que rebus sublevari eius exercitus consuerat, eductis 
omnibus copiis quadruplici acie instructa ex instituto 
suo, prima equestri turmatim derecta elcphantisque 
turritis interpositis armatisque, suppetias ire con- 
tendit — quod ubi Caesar animadvertit, arbitratus 
Scipionem ad dimicandum paratum ad se certo 
animo venire, in eo loco, quo paulo ante com- 
memoravi, ante oppidum constitit — suamque aciem 
mediam eo oppido texit ; dextrum sinistrumque 
cornu, ubi elephanti erant, in conspectu patenti 
adversariorum constituit.^ 
42 Cum iam prope solis occasum Caesar exspecta- 
visset neque ex eo loco quo constiterat Scipionem 
progredi propius se animadvertisset locoque se magis 
defendere, si res coegisset, quam in campo comminus 
consistere audere, non est visa ratio propius aecedendi 
eo die ad oppidum, quoniam ibi praesidium grande 
Numidarum esse cognoverat, hostisque mediam aciem 
suam oppido texisse et sibi difficile factu esse in- 
tellexit simul et oppidum uno tempore oppugnare et 
in acie in cornu dextro ac sinistro ex iniquiore loco 
pugnare, praesertim cum militcs a mane diei ieiuni 

^ I have, folloxved Dinter's punctuation of this difficult 
sentence. Though either Caesar or Scipio could be the subject 
of texit, the clause ubi elephanti erant strongly suggests that 
Scipio is the subject o/ constituit. 

2IO 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

closer to Scipio's fortifications. And now the Julian 
legions were less than a mile away from the town of 
Uzitta, which Scipio held, when the latter, fearing 
that he would lose the town, on which his army 
had been accustomed to rely for its water supply 
and all other means of support, led out all his forces. 
These forces were drawn up, according to his custom, 
in four lines, the first consisting of cavalry deployed 
in line of squadrons, interspersed with elephants 
equipped with towers and armour. Thus deployed, 
Scipio marched to the relief of the town, while 
Caesar, observing this move and supposing that 
Scipio was advancing towards him prepared and fully 
resolved to fight, accordingly halted before the town 
in the position I described a little earlier. With his 
own centre covered by the town, Scipio drew up his 
right and left wings, where his elephants were, in 
full view of his opponents. 

Caesar had now waited till nearly sunset without 
observing any signs of Scipio's leaving the position 
in which he had halted and advancing towards 
him ; and his impression was that Scipio would rather 
remain on the defensive, utilising his position, if the 
circumstances demanded it, than venture to come 
to close grips on the plain. Accordingly, there 
seemed no sense in approaching closer to the town 
that day. For he was aware that it contained a large 
garrison force of Numidians, and he realised that the 
enemy had used the town to screen his centre, and 
that he himself was faced Avith a difficult task in 
simultaneously attacking the town and at the same 
time engaging in battle on his right and left wing 
fi-om a disadvantageous position, the more especially 
so since his troops had been standing to since early 

211 



CAESAR 

sub armis stetissent defatigati. Itaque reductis suis 
copiis in castra postero die propius eorum aciem 
instituit exporrif!:ere munitiones. 

43 Interim Considius, qui Acyllam VIII cohortibus et 
stipendiariis Numidis Gaetulisque obsidebat, ubi C. 
Messius cum III cohortibus praeerat,^ diu multumque 
expertus magnisque operibus saepe admotis et his ab 
oppidanis incensis cum proficeret nihil, subito nuntio 
de equestri proeHo allato commotus, frumento cuius 
in castris copiam habuerat incenso, vino, oleo 
ceterisque rebus quae ad victum parari solent 
corruptis, Acyllam, quam obsidebat, deseruit atque 
itinere per regnum lubae facto copias cum Scipione 
partitus Hadrumetum se recepit. 

44 Interea ex secundo commeatu, quern a Sicilia 
miserat Alienus, navis una, in qua fuerat Q. Cominius 
et L. Ticida, eques Romanus, ab residua classe cum 
erravisset delataque esset vento ad Thapson, a 
\'ergilio scaphis naviculisque actuariis excepta est et 
adducta. Item altera navis trieris ex eadem classe 
errabunda ac tempestate delata ad Aegimurum a 
classe Vari et M. Octavi est capta, in qua milites 
veterani cum uno centurione et non nulli tirones 
fuerunt ; quos Varus asservatos sine contumelia 

^ Acyllam et VIII cohortis stipendiarias Numidis Gaetulis- 
que obsidebat ubi C. Messius qui cohortibus praeerat MSS. : 
VIII cohortibus et stipendiariis Frolich : cum III cohortibus 
praeerat Kitebler. 



^ It would seem that he marched west of the Sebkra de Sidi 
el Hani — thus entering Numidian territory — to give a wide 
berth to the fighting zone round Uzitta. But the site of 
Acylla is open to doubt. 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

morning without a bite of food, and were quite 
exhausted. Accordingly, he led his forces back to 
camp, deciding to wait till the following day and then 
extend his fortifications nearer the enemy's line. 

In the meantime Considius with eight cohorts and 
some Numidian and Gaetulian mercenaries was 
besieging Acylla, where C. Messius was in command 
with three cohorts. He had made prolonged and 
manifold attempts, and had repeatedly approached 
the walls with siege-works on a large scale ; but these 
the townsfolk had set on fire, and he was making no 
progress. So when the unexpected report of the 
cavalry engagement arrived, he was much dis- 
concerted and set fire to the large stock of corn in his 
camp, rendered unusable his wine, oil and all the 
other victuals with which an amiy is normally 
provided, and raised the siege of Acylla. Then he 
marched through .Tuba's kingdom,^ gave part of his 
forces to Scipio, and retired to Hadrumetum. 

Meanwhile from the second convoy, which Alienus 
had despatched from Sicily,^ one ship having 
aboard Q. Cominius and a Roman knight named L. 
Ticida had got astray from the rest of the fleet and 
had been carried by the wind towards Thapsus ; and 
being intercepted by the pinnaces and light craft of 
^>rgilius was escorted to that port. A second 
trireme from the same fleet likewise went astray, was 
carried by a gale towards Aegimurus, and captured 
by the fleet of ^'arus and M. Octavius. On board 
this vessel were some veteran soldiers, with one 
centurion and a few recruits ; and these ^'arus kept 
imder guard, though without any maltreatment, 

- cf. ch. 34, where it is implied that all the ships arrived 
safelv. 



CAESAR 

deducendos curavit ad Scipionem. Qui postquam ad 
eum pervenerunt et ante suggestum eius consti- 
terunt, ' Non vestra,' inquit, ' sponte vos certo scio, 
sed illius scelerati vestri imperatoris impulsu et 
imperio coactos civis et optimum quemque nefarie 
consectari. Quos quoniam fortuna in nostram detulit 
potestatem, si, id quod facere debetis, rem publicam 
cum Optimo quoque defendetis, certum est vobis 
vitam et pecuniam donare. Quapropter quid senti- 
atis proloquimini.' 
45 Hac habita oratione Scipio cum existimasset pro 
suo beneficio sine dubio ab his gratias sibi actum iri, 
potestatem eis dicendi fecit. Ex eis centurio legionis 
XIIII. ' Pro tuo,' inquit, ' summo beneficio, Scipio, 
tibi gratias ago — non enim impcratorem te appello — 
quod mihi vitam incolumitatemque belli iure capto 
polliceris, et forsan isto uterer beneficio, si non ei 
summum scelus adiungeretur. Egone contra 
Caesarem imperatorem meum, apud quem ordinem 
duxi, eiusque exercitum, pro cuius dignitate victoria- 
que amplius XXXVI annos depugnavi, adversus 
armatusque consistam ? Neque ego istud facturus 
sum et te magnopere ut de negotio desistas adhortor. 
Contra cuius enim copias contendas, si minus antea 
expertus es, licet nunc cognoscas. Elige ex tuis 
cohortem unam quam putas esse firmissimam, et 

^ This, the MSS. reading, has often been queried. But 
thirty-six years' service was no impossibihty ; and the 
impUed claim that it was all devoted to Caesar can, I think, be 
taken as a rhetorical overstatement prompted by that extreme 
loyalty which Caesar so often inspired in his troops. 

214 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

and had them escorted to Scipio. When they came 
before him and stood in front of his tribunal, he 
said : ' It is not of your own free will — of that I am 
quite sure — ^but under the compulsion and at the 
behest of that villainous commander of yours, that 
you are iniquitously persecuting your own citizens 
and all true patriots. But now that fortune has 
delivered you into our hands, if you mean to do your 
duty and i-ange yourselves on the side of all true 
patriots in the defence of the state, then I am 
resolved to grant you your lives and reward you with 
money. Now therefore declare your mind.' 

After addressing them to this effect Scipio had 
little doubt that they would express their gratitude 
to him for his kindness, and accordingly gave them 
permission to speak. One of their number, a 
centurion of the Fourteenth legion, then spoke as 
follows : ' For your great kindness, Scipio — I refrain 
from calling you commander-in-chief — I thank you, 
inasmuch as you promise me, by rights a prisoner of 
war, my life and safety ; and maybe I should now 
avail myself of that kind offer, but for the utterly 
iniquitous condition attached to it. Am I to range 
myself in armed opposition against Caesar, my 
commander-in-chief, under whom I have held my 
command, and against his army, to sustain the 
victorious reputation whereof I have been fighting 
for upwards of thirty-six years ? ^ No, I am not 
likely to do that, and I strongly advise you to give up 
the attempt. For you now have the chance of 
appreciating — if you have not previously found it out 
sufficiently by experience — whose troops they ai-e you 
are fighting. Choose from your men one cohort, 
the one you regard as your most reliable, and array 



CAESAR 

constitue contra me ; ego autem ex meis com- 
militonibus quos nunc in tua tenes potestate non 
amplius X sumam. Tunc ex virtute nostra intel- 
leges quid ex tuis copiis sperare debeas.' 

46 Postquam haec centurio praesenti animo adversus 
opinionem eius est locutus, ira percitus Scipio atque 
animi dolore incensus innuit suis ^ centurionibus quid 
fieri vellet, atque ante pedes centurionem interfecit 
reliquosque veteranos a tironibus iubet secerni. 
' Abducite istos,' inquit, ' nefario scelere contamina- 
tos et caede civium saginatos.' Sic extra vallum 
deducti sunt et cruciabiliter interfecti. Tirones 
autem iubet inter legiones dispertiri et Cominium 
cum Ticida in conspectum suum prohibet adduci. 
Qua ex re Caesar commotus eos quos in stationibus 
cum longis navibus apud Thapsum custodiae causa in 
salo esse iussei'at ut suis onerariis longisque navibus 
praesidio essent, ob neglegentiam ignominiae causa 
dimittendos ab exercitu gravissimumque in eos 
edictum proponendum curavit. 

47 Per id tempus fere Caesaris exercitui res accidit 
incredibilis auditu. Namque vergiliarum signo con- 
fecto circiter vigilia secunda noctis nimbus cum 
saxea grandine subito est exortus ingens. Ad hoc 
autem incommodum accesserat quod Caesar non 
more superiorum temporum ^ in hibernis exercitum 

* suis added by Warmington. 

* imperatorum MSS. : temporum Glandorp, 



^ The setting of the Pleiades in early November was 
normally accompanied by stormy weather; but it was now 
probably December, 47 (= February, 46, according to the 
unreformed calendar). 

2l6 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

it here over against me : I for my part will take no 
more than ten men from my comrades whom you 
now hold in your power. Then from our prowess 
you shall realise what you ought to expect from your 
own forces.' 

This forthright and quite unlocked for retort on the 
part of the centurion infuriated Scipio. Smarting 
with resentment he signified his wishes to his own cen- 
turions by a nod, causing the centurion to be 
executed in his presence, and issuing instructions 
for the remaining veterans to be segregated from the 
recruits. ' Away with these fellows,' said he, 
' tainted as they are with unspeakable iniquities and 
gorged with the blood of their own citizens.' 
Accordingly, they were led outside the rampart and 
tortured to death. As for the recruits, he ordered 
them to be di-afted among the legions, and would not 
allow Cominius and Ticida to be brought into his 
presence. This incident disquieted Caesar, who took 
steps to punish those whom he had instructed to 
be stationed with warships anchored out at sea on 
guard off Thapsus, so as to give protection to his 
transports and men-of-war : in view of their negli- 
gence he had them dismissed the service with 
ignominy, and had a general order published re- 
primanding them most severely. 

It was round about this time that an incredible 
and unheard-of experience befell Caesar's army. 
Although the constellation of the Pleiades had set,^ 
at about the second watch of the night a heavy rain- 
storm suddenly broke, accompanied by a shower of 
hail stones. Moreover, to make matters worse, 
Caesar at the time was not, as was his custom on 
previous occasions, keeping his army billeted in 

217 



CAESAR 

continebat, sed in tertio quartocjue die procedendo 
propiusque hostem accedendo castra communibat 
opereque faciendo milites se circumspiciendi non 
habebaiit facultatein. Praeterea ita ex Sicilia 
exercituni transportabat ut praeter ipsum militem et 
arma nee vas nee mancipium neque ullam rem quae 
Usui militi esse consuevit in navis imponi pateretur. 
In Africa autem non modo sibi quicquam non ad- 
quisierant aut paraverant sed etiam propter annonae 
caritatem ante parta consumpserant. Quibus rebus 
attenuati oppido perquam pauci sub pellibus ad- 
quiescebant : reliqui ex vestimentis tentoriolis factis 
atque harundinibus scopisque contextis permane- 
bant. Itaque subito imbre grandineque consecuta 
gravatis pondere tentoriis aquarumque vi subrutis 
disiectisque, nocte intempesta ignibus exstinctis, 
rebus quae ad victum pertinent omnibus corruptis per 
castra passim vagabantur scutisque capita contege- 
bant. Eadem nocte V. legionis pilorum cacumina 
sua sponte arserunt. 
4S Rex interim luba de equestri proelio Scipionis 
certior factus evocatusque ab eodem litteris praefecto 
Saburra cum parte exercitus contra Sittium relicto, 
ut secum ipse aliquid auctoritatis adderet exercitui 
Scipionis ac terrorem Caesaris, cum tribus legionibus 
equitibusque frenatis DCCC, Numidis sine frenis 
peditibusque levis armaturae grandi numero, ele- 



^ cf. ch. 54 for the flagrant infringement by Avienus, and 
ch. 85 where, by the time of the battle of Thapsus, 
there would seem to have been man}' slaves in Caesar's 
camp. 

- Probably the electrostatic phenomenon called St. Elmo's 
fire. 

218 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

•winter quarters ; but every otlier, or every third day, 
he would be advancing, moving up closer to the 
enemy and fortifying a camp, and in the course of 
doing this work his troops had no chance to look after 
themselves. Apart from this, his arrangements for 
transporting his army from Sicily were such as to 
allow only the troops themselves and their arms to be 
embarked, but no baggage, no slaves,^ none of the 
soldier's normal comforts. In Africa, moreover, not 
only had they neither bought nor provided them- 
selves with anything, but in addition the high price 
of corn had run away with all their savings. In 
these straitened circumstances very few men indeed 
were sleeping under proper tents : the rest bivouacked 
under tents of a sort improvised from clothing or 
woven with reeds and twigs. And so when the 
rain came down suddenly and the hail followed it, 
their tents sagged under the weight, and were under- 
niined and swept away by the violence of the floods : 
in the dead of night the storm put out their fires : 
all their victuals were ruined ; and they \vandered 
aimlessly hither and thither about the camp, covering 
their heads with their shields. That same night the 
spear-points of the men of the Fifth legion spon- 
taneously caught fire.- 

Meanwhile king Juba had been informed of Scipio's 
cavalry battle ; and in response to a written sum- 
mons from the latter he left behind his general, 
Saburra, with part of his army, to keep Sittius in 
check, and quitting his kingdom set off to join 
Scipio. With him he took three legions, eight 
hundred bridled cavalry, a numerous contingent of 
Numidians who rode without bridles, and of light- 
armed infantry ti'oops, and thirty elephants. His 

219 



CAESAR 

phantis XXX egressus e regno ad Scipionem est pro- 
fectus. Postquam ad cum pervenit, castris regiis 
seorsum positis cum eis copiis quas commemoravi, 
haud ita longe ab Scipione consedit. — Erat in castris 
Caesaris superiore tempore magnus terror, et 
exspectatione copiarum regiarum exercitus eius 
magis suspensiore animo ante adventum lubae com- 
movebatur; postquam vero castra castris contulit, 
despectis eius copiis omnem timorem deponit. Ita 
quam antea absens habuerat auctoritatem, cam 
omnem praesens dimiserat. — Quo facto cuivis facile 
fuit intellectu Scipioni additum animum fiduciamque 
regis adventu. Nam postero die universas suas 
regisque copias cum elephantis LX productas in 
aciem quam speciosissime potuit instruxit ac paulo 
longius progressus ab suis munitionibus haud ita diu 
commoratus se recipit in castra. 
49 Caesar postquam animadvertit Scipioni auxilia fere 
quae exspectasset omnia convenisse neque moram 
pugnandi ullam fore, per iugum summum cum 
copiis progredi coepit et bracchia protinus ducere et 
castella munire propiusque Scipionem capiendo loca 
excelsa occupare contendit, ne adversarii magni- 
tudine copiarum confisi pi'oximum collem occuparent 

220 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

purpose in so doing was to add a certain prestige to 
Scipio's army by his personal appearance, and the 
more to intimidate Caesar's. On reaching Scipio 
he pitched a separate royal camp with the forces I 
have mentioned, and took up a position not so far 
distant from Scipio. Now hitherto there had been 
considerable apprehension in Caesar's camp : before 
Juba's arrival the feeling of suspense was greater, 
and it was this which unsettled Caesar's army as it 
was waiting for the royal forces ; but as soon as the 
king pitched his camp close to theirs, they held his 
forces in contempt and all their fears were laid aside. 
And so all the prestige with which his previous 
absence had endowed the king he forfeited now that 
he was on the spot. That the king's arrival in this 
manner gave Scipio additional courage and con- 
fidence was a fact that anyone could readily ap- 
preciate ; for on the following day he led out his own 
and the king's entire forces, including sixty elephants, 
and set them in battle array with as much pomp 
and circumstance as possible, and then, after ad- 
vancing somewhat farther than usual from his fortified 
positions and pausing there a little while, withdrew to 
camp. 

When Caesar observed that practically all the 
reinforcements that Scipio had been awaiting had 
now forgathered and that there was nothing to delay 
an engagement, he began to advance with his troops 
along the crest of the ridge, carrying forward his lines 
of fortification and building strong points. He also 
made strenuous efforts to seize the high ground 
closer to Scipio and, by capturing it, to forestall his 
opponents, lest, relying on their superiority in 
numbers, they should seize the nearby hill and so 



CAESAR 

atque ita longius sibi progrediendi eriperent facul- 
tatem.*^ Eiusdem collis occiipandi Labienus con- 
silium ceperat ot quo propiorc loco fuerat eo celerius 
occurrerat. 
50 Erat convallis satis magna latitudine, altitudinc 
praerupta, crebris locis speluncae in modum subrutis, 
quae erat transgredienda Caesari, ante quam ad 
eum coUem quem capere volebat perveniretur ; 
ultraque earn convallem olivetum vetus crebris 
arboribus condensum. Hie cum Labienus anim- 
advertisset Caesarem, si vellet eum locum occupare, 
prius necesse esse convallem olivetumque transgredi, 
eorum locorum peritus in insidiis cum parte equitatus 
levique armatura consedit et praeterea post montem 
collesque ^ equites in occulto collocaverat ut, cum 
ipse ex improviso legionarios adortus esset, ex colle 
se equitatus ostenderet, ut re duplici perturbatus 
Caesar eiusque exercitus neque retro regrediendi 
neque ultra procedendi oblata facultate circumventus 
concideretur. Caesar postquam equitatu ante prae- 
misso inscius insidiarum cum ad eum locum venisset, 
abusi sive obliti praeceptorum Labieni sive veriti ne 
in fossa ab equitibus opprimerentur rari ac singuli de 
rupe prodire et summa petere collis. Quos Caesaris 
equites consecuti partim interfecerunt, partim vivo- 
rum sunt potiti ; deinde protinus collem petere con- 
tenderunt atque eum decusso Labieni praesidio 

1 I have foUotced Nipperdcy's emendation, inserting ne and 
altering the MSS. readings occupaverunt and eripueriint. 

- After collesque the MSS. read Caesari siibito se ostenderet : 
Aldus deleted these ivords. 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

deprive him of the opportunity of advancinc; farther. 
But Labienus too had made up his mind to seize this 
hill ; and his closer proximity to it had enabled him 
to achieve the objective more rapidly. 

There was a ravine, of a fair width and with high, 
precipitous sides, and honeycombed at many points 
with cave-like hollows ; and Caesar had to cross it 
before he could reach the hill he wished to take. 
On the far side of this ravine there was an ancient 
olive grove, dense and thickly planted with trees. 
It M'as here that Labienus, perceiving that Caesar 
must first cross the ravine and olive grove if he 
wanted to seize that position, and availing himself 
of his local knowledge, took his stand in ambush 
with a detachment of cavalry and some light-armed 
troops. In addition he had posted some cavalry out 
of sight behind the range of hills, in order that, when 
he himself unexpectedly launched his attack upon the 
legionaries, this cavalry might make its appearance 
from behind the hill ; thereby Caesar and his army 
were to be thrown into utter confusion by this 
double attack and, denied the opportunity either of 
retiring or advancing, were to be surrounded and cut 
to pieces. When Caesar, in ignorance of the ambush, 
but with a screen of cavalry thrown out in front, 
came up to this position, the troops of Labienus 
either misinterpreted or forgot his instructions, 
or maybe they were afraid of being caught in the 
trap by Caesar's cavalry ; anyway, they came out 
from behind the rocks in small groups or singly, and 
made for the crest of the hill. Caesar's cavalry 
pursued them, killing some and capturing others 
alive, and then forthwith made all haste towards the 
hill, which they speedily seized after dislodging 

223 



CAESAR 

celeriter occupaverunt. Labienus cum parte equi- 
tum vix fuga sibi peperit salutem. 
51 Hac re per equites gesta Caesar legionibus opera 
distribuit atque in eo colle quo erat potitus castra 
munivit. Deinde ab suis maximis castris per medium 
campum e regione oppidi Uzittae, quod inter sua 
castra et Scipionis in planitie positum erat tenebatur- 
que a Scipione, duo bracchia instituit ducere et ita 
dirigere ut ad angulum dextrum sinistrumque eius 
oppidi convenirent. Id hac ratione opus instruebat 
ut, cum propius oppidum copias admovisset op- 
pugnareque coepisset, tecta latera suis munitionibus 
haberet, ne ab equitatus multitudine circumventus 
ab oppugnatione deterreretur, praeterea quo faciliuG 
colloquia fieri possent et, si qui perfugere vellent, id 
quod antea saepe accidebat magno cum eorum 
periculo, turn facile et sine periculo fieret. A'oluit 
etiam experiri, cum propius hostem accessisset, 
haberetne in animo dimicare. Accedebat etiam ad 
reliquas causas quod is locus depressus erat puteique 
ibi non nuUi fieri poterant : aquatione enim longa et 
angusta utebatur. Dum haec opera quae ante dixi 
fiebant a legione, interim pars acie ante opus in- 
structa sub hoste stabat ; equites barbari levisque 
armaturae proeliis minutis comminus dimicabant. 
224 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

Labienus' holding force. Labienus and part of his 
cavah-y barely managed to escape with their lives. 

After this action fought by the cavalry Caesar 
fortified a camp on the hill of which he had gained 
possession, assigning each legion its share of the 
work. He then began to carry two fortified lines 
from his own principal camp across the centre of 
the plain in the direction of the town of Uzitta — - 
which town was situated on flat ground between his 
camp and Scipio's and was occupied by the latter — - 
their direction being such as to make them converge 
upon the right and left corners of the town. His 
purpose in, constructing this field-work was as 
follows : when he advanced his forces closer to the 
town and proceeded to attack it, he should have his 
flanks covered by these fortifications of his and not 
be enveloped by the swarms of enemy cavalry and so 
be deterred from attacking ; moreover, it should 
make it easier to hold conversations with the enemy, 
and if any of the latter wanted to desert — this had 
often occurred in the past, but at great risk to the 
deserters — it should now prove easy and devoid of 
risk. He was also anxious to discover, when he 
approached closer to the enemy, whether they 
intended to fight. Over and above these reasons 
was the additional fact that this was a low-lying 
tract, and quite a few wells could be sunk in it : 
water in fact was in short supply and had to be carried 
a long distance. While the legionaries were engaged 
in this work of fortification which I have mentioned 
above, a detachment of them took post in front of the 
work in battle formation close to the enemy ; for the 
hitter's foreign cavalry and part of his light-armed 
force kept skirmishing at close quarters. 

225 



CAESAR 

52 Caesar ab eo opere cum iarn sub vesperum copias in 
castra reduceret, magno incursu cum omni equitatu 
levique armatura luba, Scipio, Labienus in legionarios 
impetum fecerunt. Equites Caesariani vi universae 
subitaeque hostium multitudinis pulsi parumper 
cesserunt. Quae res aliter adversariis cecidit : nam- 
que Caesar ex medio itinere copiis reductis equitibus 
suis auxilium tulit ; equites autem adventu legionum 
animo addito conversis equis in Numidas cupide 
insequentis dispersosque impetum fecerunt atque 
eos convulneratos usque in castra regia reppulerunt 
multosque ex eis interfecerunt. Quod nisi in noctem 
proelium asset coniectum pulvisque vento elatus 
omnium prospectui offecisset, luba cum I.abieno capti 
in potestatem Caesaris venissent, equitatusque cum 
levi armatura funditus ad internecionem deletus 
asset. Interim incredibiliter ex legione IIII. et VI. 
Scipionis milites diffugere partim in castra Caesaris, 
partim in quas quisque poterat regiones pervenire ; 
itemque equites Curioniani diffisi Scipioni eiusque 
copiis complures se eodem conferebant. 

53 Dum haec circum Uzittam ab utrisque ducibus 
administrantur, legiones duae, X. et \'IIII., ex 
Sicilia navibus onerariis profectae, cum iam non 
longe a portu Ruspinae abessent, conspicati navis 



^ After the battle of the Bagradas they had been pardoned 
by Juba and incorporated in his army : cf. ch. 40. 

226 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

It was now nearly dusk, and Caesar was with- 
drawing his troops from this work to camp, when 
Juba, Scipio and Labienus launched a violent attack 
upon his legionaries, employing all their cavalry 
and light-armed forces. Caesar's cavalry reeled and 
gave ground momentarily under the sudden and 
violent impact of the massed swarms of the enemy. 
But the latter found that this manoeuvre did not go 
according to plan ; for Caesar halted in his tracks 
and led his forces back to the assistance of his 
cavalry. The arrival of the legions put fresh heart 
into the cavalry, who wheeled round, charged the 
Numidians in the middle of their eager, but scattered 
pursuit, and drove them right back into the royal 
camp, with heavy casualties and many of their 
number killed. And had not nightfall speedily over- 
taken this action, and a cloud of dust raised up by the 
wind hampered everyone's vision, Juba and Labienus 
would have been captured and have fallen into 
Caesar's hands, and their cavalry and light-armed 
troops would have been utterly and entirely an- 
nihilated. Whereupon an incredible number of 
Scipio's troops deserted from the Fourth and Sixth 
legion — some to Caesar's camp, others to various 
places wherever each individual managed to find 
refuge. The cavalry who were once under Curio's 
command ^ likewise lost confidence in Scipio and his 
forces, and many of them took refuge with the 
others. 

While the leaders on either side were engaged in 
these operations in the neighbourhood of Uzitta, two 
legions, the Tenth and the Ninth, which had sailed 
from Sicilv in transports, were now not far from the 
port of Ruspina. Here they sighted those ships of 

227 



CAESAR 

Caesarlanas quae in statione apud Thapsum stabant, 
veriti ne in adversariorum ut insidiandi gratia ibi 
commorantium classem inciderent imprudentes, vela 
in altum dederunt ac diu multumque iactati tandem 
inultis post diebus siti inopiaque confecti ad Caesarem 
perveniunt. 
54 Quibus legionibus expositis memor in Italia 
pristinae licentiae militaris ac rapinarum certorum 
hominum parvulam modo causulam nactus Caesar, 
quod C. Avienus, tribunus militum X. legionis, 
navem ex commeatu familia sua atque iunientis 
occupavisset neque militem unum ab Sicilia sustu- 
lisset, postero die de suggestu convocatis omnium 
legionum tribunis centurionibusque, ' Maxime vel- 
lem,' inquit, ' homines suae petulantiae nimiaeque 
libertatis aliquando finem fecissent meaeque leni- 
tatis, modestiae patientiaeque rationem habuissent. 
Sed quoniam ipsi sibi neque modum neque terminum 
constituunt, quo ceteri dissimiliter se gerant egomet 
ipse documentum more militari constituam. C. 
Aviene, quod in Italia milites populi Romani contra 
rem publicam instigasti rapinasque per municipia 
fecisti quodque mihi reique publicae inutilis fuisti et 
pro militibus tuam fcimiliam iumentaque in navis 
imposuisti tuaque opera militibus tempore necessario 
228 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

Caesar's which were stationed on patrol oif Thapsus; 
and fearing they might be falhng unawares upon an 
enemy flotilhi loitering there presumably with 
treacherous designs, they made oiF out to sea. 
Many days later, exhausted by thirst and privation 
after a long and very storm-tossed voyage, they at 
length reached Caesar. 

These legions were then disembarked. Now 
Caesar had in mind the lack of discipline of old among 
the troops in Italy and the plundering exploits of 
certain individuals ; and he had now some ground for 
complaint, though only a trifling one, in the fact that 
C. Avienus, a military tribune of the Tenth legion, 
had commandeered a vessel from the convoy and 
filled it with his own household slaves and beasts 
of burden, without transporting a single soldier from 
Sicily. Accordingly, on the following day Caesar 
paraded the tribunes and centurions of all his legions 
and thus addressed them from the platfoi-m. ' I 
could have wished above all things that people 
would at some time or other have set bounds to their 
wanton and highly irresponsible behaviour, and had 
regard for my own leniency, moderation and for- 
bearance. However, since they set themselves no 
limit or boundary, I myself will set them a precedent 
in accordance with military custom, so that the 
remainder may behave somewhat differently. Inas- 
much as you, C. Avienus, in Italy have stirred up 
soldiers of the Roman people against the state and 
have committed acts of plunder in various municipal 
towns ; inasmuch as you have proved useless to me 
and to the state and have embarked, instead of 
troops, your own household slaves and beasts of 
burden, so that thanks to you the state is short of 

229 



CAESAR 

res publica caret, ob eas res ignominiae causa ab 
exercitu meo removeo hodieque ex Africa abesse et 
quantum pote proficisci iubeo. Itemque te, A. 
Fontei, quod tribunus militum seditiosus malusque 
civis fuisti, te ab exercitu dimitto. T. Saliene, M. 
Tiro, C. Clusinas, cum ordines in meo exercitu 
beneficio non virtute consecuti ita vos gesseritis ut 
neque bello fortes neque pace boni aut utiles fueritis 
et magis in seditione concitandisque militibus 
adversum vestrum imperatorem ^ quam pudoris 
modestiaeque fueritis studiosiores, indignos vos esse 
arbitror qui in meo exercitu ordines ducatis, missos- 
que facio et quantum pote abesse ex Africa iubeo.' 
Itaque tradit eos centurionibus et singulis non 
amplius singulos additos servos in navem imponendos 
separatim curavit. 
55 Gaetuli interim perfugae, quos cum litteris man- 
datisque a Caesare missos supra docuimus, ad suos 
civis perveniunt. Quorum auctoritate facile adducti 
Caesarisque nomine persuasi a rege luba desciscunt 
celeriterque cuncti arma capiunt contraque regem 
facere non dubitant. Quibus rebus cognitis luba, 
distentus triplici bello necessitateque coactus, de suis 
copiis quas contra Caesarem adduxerat sex cohortis 
in finis regni sui mittit quae essent praesidio contra 
Gaetulos. 

1 adversariorum vestrorum imperatoris MSS. : adversum 
vestrum imperatorem Ciacconius. 

230 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

troops at a critical time ; for these reasons I hereby 
discharge you with ignominy from my army and 
direct that you leave as soon as possible and be quit 
of Africa this day. You also, A. Fonteius, I dismiss 
from my army, for having proved a mutinous military 
tribune and a disloyal citizen. T. Salienus, M. Tiro 
and C. Clusinas, you have attained your ranks in my 
army, not by merit, but by favour ; your conduct has 
been such as to prove you neither brave in war, nor 
loyal nor competent in peace, and more eager to 
stir up mutiny among the troops against your 
commander-in-chief than to preserve respect and 
discipline : on these counts I deem you to be un- 
worthy to hold rank in my army, and I hereby 
discharge you and direct that you be quit of Africa 
as soon as possible.' Accordingly he handed them 
over to the centurions, assigned them each no more 
than a single slave, and had them embarked 
separately in a ship. 

Meanwhile the Gaetulian deserters who, as we 
have described above, ^ were sent by Caesar with 
despatches and instructions, arrived back among 
their own citizens. The authority they held readily 
induced their countrymen, who were also influenced 
by Caesar's reputation, to revolt from king Juba ; 
and so they one and all promptly took up arms and 
did not hesitate to oppose the king. On learning 
of this situation king Juba, compelled as he now 
was by necessity to divide his energies between 
three fronts, detached six cohorts from the force 
which he had led against Caesar and sent them 
to his own royal domain to defend it against the 
Gactulians. 

1 Ch. 32. 



CAKSAR 

66 Caesar bracchiis perfectis promotisque usque eo 
quo telum ex oppido adigi non posset castra munit, 
ballistis scorpionibusque crebris ante frontem castro- 
rum contra oppidum collocatis defensores muri 
deterrere non intermittit eoque quinque legiones ex 
superioribus castris deducit. Qua facultate oblata 
inlustriores notissimique conspectum amicorum pro- 
pinquorumque efflagitabant atque inter se colloque- 
bantur. Quae res quid utilitatis haberet Caesarem 
non fallebat : namque Gaetuli ex equitatu regio 
nobiliorcs equitumque praefecti, quorum patres cum 
Mario ante meruerant eiusque beneficio agris finibus- 
que donati post Sullae victoriam sub Hiempsalis 
regis erant dati potestatem, occasione capta nocte 
iam luminibus accensis cum equis calonibusque suis 
circiter mille perfugiunt in Caesaris castra quae 
erant in campo proxime Uzittae locata. 

67 Quod postquam Scipio quique cum eo erant cogno- 
verunt, cum commoti ex tali incommodo essent, fere 
per id tempus M. Aquinum cum C. Saserna collo- 
quentem viderunt- Scipio mittit ad Aquinum, nihil 
attinere eum cum adversariis coUoqui. Cum nihilo 
minus eius sermonem nuntius ad Scipionem ^ referret 
sed restate ut reliqua quae sibi ^ vellet perageret, 
viator praeterea ab luba ad eum est missus qui 



^ se MSS. : Scipionem Davies. 
^ si MSS. : sibi Oudendorp. 



232 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

Caesar had now completed his lines of fortification 
and extended them right up to a point so as to be 
just out of range of spear-cast from the town. He 
then fortified a camp, ranging catapults and scorpions 
at close intervals in front of it and training them upon 
the town, and harrying without respite the defenders 
of its walls ; he also detached five legions from his 
former camp and brought them down to the new one. 
Making use of the opportunity thus offered, certain 
more distinguished persons and those of the widest 
acquaintance kept demanding to see their friends and 
relations, and conversations ensued between them. 
Caesar was not blind to the expediency of this 
turn of events ; and in fact some of the nobler 
Gaetulians among the royal cavalry, including cap- 
tains of horse, whose fathers had previously served 
with Marius and had, by his good offices, been 
presented with farms and lands, but later on after 
Sulla's victory had been handed over as subjects to 
king Hiempsal, seized their chance and deserted, 
when it was night and the lamps were now lit, and 
came with their horses and grooms — roughly a 
thousand of them — to Caesar's camp which was 
situated in the plain close to Uzitta. 

It was just about this time, after Scipio and his 
colleagues had come to leam of this disconcerting 
setback, that they saw M. Aquinus holding a con- 
versation with C. Saserna. Scipio sent word to 
Aquinus saying that he had no business to be holding 
a conversation with the enemy. When none the less 
the messenger brought back to Scipio the other's 
answer, namely that on the contrarv it remained for 
him to complete the rest of his business, .Tuba also 
sent him a courier, to say, in the hearing of Saserna : 

233 



CAESAR 

diceret audiente Saserna : ' Vetat te rex colloqui.' 
Quo nuntio perterritus discessit et dicto audiens 
fuit regi. Usu venisse hoc civi Romano et ei qui ab 
populo Romano honores accepisset, incolumi patria 
fortunisque omnibus lubae barbaro potius oboe- 
dientem fuisse quam aut Scipionis obtemperasse 
nuntio aut caesis eiusdem partis civibus incolumem 
reverti malle ! Atque etiam et superbius lubae 
factum non in M. Aquinum, hominem novum 
parvimique senatorem, sed in Scipionem, hominem 
ilia familia, dignitate, honoribus praestantem. Nam- 
que cum Scipio sagulo purpureo ante regis adventum 
uti solitus esset, dicitur luba cum eo egisse non 
oportere ilium eodem vestitu atque ipse uteretur. 
Itaque factum est ut Scipio ad album sese vestitum 
transferret et lubae homini superbissimo inertissimo • 
que obtemperaret. 
58 Postero die universas omnium copias de castris 
omnibus educunt et supercilium quoddam excelsum 
nacti non longe a Caesaris castris aciem constituunt 
atque ibi consistunt. Caesar item producit copias 
celeriterque eis instructis ante suas munitiones quae 
erant in campo consistit,^ sine dubio existimans 
ultro adversarios, cum tam magnis copiis auxiliisque 
regis essent praediti promptiusque prosiluissent 
ante, secum concursuros propiusque se accessuros. 

^ constituit MSS. : consist it Davits, 

^ This appears to imply that Labienus had a separate camp. 
234 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

' The king forbids you to hold this conversation.' 
Alarmed by this message, Aquinus withdrew in 
deference to the king's injunction. To think that it 
had come to this, that a Roman citizen, one, more- 
over, who had received office at the hands of the 
Roman people, at a time when his country and all his 
fortunes stood secure, should rather have obeyed 
Juba, a foreigner, than deferred to Scipio's instruc- 
tions or else, if he preferred, let his own partisans be 
massacred, while he himself returned home safe and 
sound ! Still more arrogant even was Juba's be- 
haviour, not towards M. Aquinus, a mere upstart 
and junior member of the Senate, but towards Scipio, 
whose family, rank and magistracies were such as to 
make him an outstanding man. For Scipio had been 
in the habit of wearing a purple cloak before the king 
arrived ; and Juba — so it is said — took the matter up 
with him, saying that Scipio ought not to wear the 
same dress as he himself wore. And so it came about 
that Scipio changed to white dress in deference to 
Juba — that bv-word of arrogance and indolence. 

On the next day the enemv led out their entire 
combined forces from all ^ their camps and, gaining 
possession of a certain prominent knoll, arrayed 
their battle line not far from Caesar's camp, and 
took up their position there. Caesar likcAvise led 
forth his forces, speedily arrayed them and took up a 
position in front of his fortifications which were in 
the plain ; for he thought, no doubt, that his oppo- 
nents, seeing they were equipped with such sub- 
stantial forces and the reinforcements supplied by 
the king, and had previouslv been quite prompt to 
sally forth, would now take the initiative, advance 
towards him and join battle. After riding round 

235 



CAESAR 

Equo circumvectus legionesque cohortatus signo 
dato accessum hostium aucupabatur. Ipse enim a 
suis munitionibus longius non sine ratione non ^ 
procedebat, quod in oppido Uzittae, quod Scipio 
tenebat, hostium erant cohortes arnmatae ; cidem 
auteni oppido ad dextrum latus eius cornu erat 
oppositum, verebaturque ne, si praetergressus esset, 
ex oppido eruptione facta ab latere eum adorti 
conciderent. Praeterea haec quoque eum causa 
tardavit, quod erat locus quidam perimpeditus ante 
aciem Scipionis, quern suis impedimento ad ultro 
occurrendum fore existimabat. 
59 Non arbitror esse praetermittendum, quem ad 
modum exercitus utriusque fuerint in aciem instructi. 
Scipio hoc modo aciem derexit. Collocabat in fronte 
suas et lubae legiones, post eas autem Numidas in 
subsidiaria acie ita extenuatos et in longitudinem 
derectos ut procul simplex esse acies media ab 
legionariis militibus videretur.^ Elephantos dextro 
sinistroque cornu collocaverat aequalibus inter eos 
intervallis interiectis, post autem elephantos arma- 
turas levis Numidasque auxiliaris substituerat. 
Equitatum frenatum universum in suo dextro cornu 
disposuerat : sinistrum enim cornu oppido Uzitta 
claudebatur neque erat spatium equitatus explicandi. 
Praeterea Numidas levisque armaturae infinitam 
multitudinem ad dextram partem suae aciei oppo- 
suerat fere interiecto non minus mille passuum 
spatio et ad collis radices magis appulerat longiusque 
ab adversai'iorum suisque copiis promovebat, id hoc 
consilio ut, cum acies duae inter se concurrissent, 

^ non added by Aldus. 

- After videretur the MSS. add in cornibus autem duplex 
esse existimabatur. Xipperdey deleted them. 

236 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

encouraging his legions he gave the signal and 
awaited the enemy's advance. For he himself had 
good reason not to advance too far from his fortifica- 
tions, since the town of Uzitta, held by Scipio, con- 
tained enemy cohorts under arms ; moreover, his 
right-hand wing lay opposite the said town, and he 
was afraid that, if he advanced beyond it, the 
enemy might make a sally from the town, attack 
him in flank, and maul him severely. Apart from this 
there was another reason too to make him pause, 
namely that in front of Scipio's line there was a 
patch of very broken ground, which he believed would 
prevent his troops from going over to the offensive. 

I do not think I ought to pass over without mention 
the manner in which the armies of either side were 
deployed in battle formation. Scipio's order of battle 
was as follows. In front he placed his own and Juba's 
legions: behind these, in a support line, the Numi- 
dians, drawn out in so thin and long a formation as to 
give the impression at a distance that the centre 
was a single line composed of legionary troops. His 
elephants he had placed at regular intervals on his 
right and left wings, and behind the elephants his 
light-armed troops and Numidian auxiliaries were 
stationed in support. On his right wing he had 
posted his entire force of bridled cavalry ; for his left 
wing was covered by the town of Uzitta, and there 
was no room to deploy cavalry. In addition he had 
posted some Numidians and a vast multitude of 
light-armed troops to cover the right flank of his line 
at a distance of at least a mile or so, pushing them 
more towards the foothills and so withdrawing them 
farther away both from the enemy and his own 
forces. His purpose in doing this was that when 

237 



CAESAR 

initio certaminis paulo longius eius equitatus cir- 
cumvectus ex improviso clauderet multitudine sua 
exercitum Caesaris atque perturbatum iaculis con- 
figeret. Haec fuit ratio Scipionis eo die proeliandi. 

60 Caesaris autem acies hoc modo fuit collocata, ut ab 
sinistro eius cornu ordiar et ad dextrum perveniam. 
Habuit legionem X. et Villi, in sinistro cornu, 
XXV., XXVIIII., XIII., XIV., XXVIII., XXVI. in 
media acie.^ Ipso autem dextro cornu veteranarum 
legionum partem ^ cohortium collocaverat, praeterea 
ex tironum adiecerat paucas. Tertiam autem aciem 
in sinistruni suum cornu contulerat et usque ad aciei 
suae mediam legionem porrexerat et ita collocaverat 
uti sinistrum suum cornu esset triplex. Id eo con- 
silio fecerat quod suum dextrum latus munitionibus 
adiuvabatur, sinistrum autem equitatus hostium 
multitudini uti resistere posset laborabat, eodemque 
suum omnem equitatum contulerat et, quod ei 
parum confidebat, praesidio his equitibus legionem 
V. praemiserat levemque armaturam inter equites 
interposuerat. Sagittarios varie passimque locis 
certis maximeque in cornibus collocaverat. 

61 Sic utrorumque exercitus instructi non plus 
passuum CCC interiecto spatio, quod forsitan ante id 

^ I have followed most editors in adopting Xipperdey's 
restoration of X and XXV in place of the MSS. readings VIII 
and XXX. 

2 Fere ipsum dextrum cornu secundam autem aciem fere in 
earum legionum parte most MSS. : I have followed Bouvet, 
who among other changes deletes secundam autem aciem and 
adopts Oudendorp's veteranarum in place of fere in earum, 

238 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

the two battle lines charged one another, his cavalry- 
would only have to continue their outflanking move- 
ment a little farther in the early stages of the action, 
and then by sheer weight of numbers they could 
surprise and envelop Caesar's army, throw it into 
disorder, and riddle it with lances. Such was Scipio's 
plan of battle that day. 

Caesar's battle line, on the other hand, was dis- 
posed as follows, my description beginning with his 
left wing and working round to his right. On his 
left wing he had the Tenth and Ninth legions : in 
the centre the Twenty-Fifth, Twenty-Ninth, Thir- 
teenth, Fourteenth, Twenty-Eighth and Twenty- 
Sixth. As for the actual right wing, he had posted 
there some of the cohorts of his veteran legions as 
well as a few cohorts from the legions of recruits 
besides. His third line he had concentrated on his 
left wing, extending it right up to the central legion 
of his line, and had arranged it in such a formation 
that his left wing was composed of three lines. His 
motive for doing this was the fact that, whereas his 
right flank was supported by his fortifications, he 
was hard put to it to know how his left flank could 
bear up under the hordes of enemy cavalry ; and it 
was on this same left flank that he had concentrated 
the whole of his own cavalry and, not feeling too con- 
fident in it, had detached the Fifth legion to support 
this cavalry, and drafted light-armed troops at 
intervals among the horse. As for his archers, he 
had posted them in various formations at definite 
points throughout the line, but chiefly on the wings. 

Such was the manner in which the armies on either 
side were drawn up, with a distance of no more than 
three hundred paces separating them— a situation 

239 



CAESAR 

tempus accident numquam quin dimicaretur, a mane 
usque ad horam X. diei perstiterunt. lamque 
Caesar dum exercitum intra munitiones suas reducere 
coepisset, subito universus equitatus ulterior Numida- 
rum Gaetulorumque sine frenis ad dextram partem ^ 
se movere propiusque Caesaris castra quae erant 
in colle se conferre coepit, frenatus autem Labieni 
eques in loco permanere legionesque distinere : 
cum subito pars equitatus Caesaris cum levi armatura 
contra Gaetulos iniussu ac temere longius progressi 
paludemque transgressi multitudinem hostium pauci 
sustinere non potuerunt levique armatura deserta 
pulsi ^ convulneratique uno equite amisso, multis 
equis sauciis, levis armaturae XX\'II occisis ad suos 
refugerunt. Quo secundo equestri proelio facto 
Scipio laetus in castra nocte copias reduxit. Quod 
proprium gaudium bellantibus fortuna tribuere non 
decrevit : namque postero die Caesar cum partem 
equitatus sui frumentandi gratia Leptim misisset, in 
itinere praedatores equites Numidas Gaetulosque 
ex improviso adorti circiter C partim occiderunt, 
partim vivorum potiti sunt. Caesar interim cotidie 
legiones in campum deducere atque opus facere 
vallumque et fossam per medium campum ducere 
adversariorumque excursionibus ita officere non 

^ ad dextram partem, giveyi by all MSS., is difficult, since the 
encircling manoeuvre {ch. 59) apparently required them to move to 
their left. The choice seems to lie between interpreting the phrase 
as denoting position rather than direction, or amending ivith 
Nipperdey to ab dextra parte. 

- ac MSS. : pulsi Nipperdey. 

240 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

which had never, perhaps, arisen before without 
leading to an engagement ; and there they remained 
continuously from early morning right until the tenth 
hour. And now, while Caesar was beginning to 
lead his army back within his fortifications, suddenly 
the entire force of cavalry — the more distant one, 
comprising Numidians and Gaetulians riding without 
bridles^began a movement on the right and to 
advance closer to Caesar's camp on the high ground, 
while Labienus' bridled cavalry maintained their 
positions and distracted the attention of the legions. 
Whereupon part of Caesar's cavalry together with 
the light-armed troops, acting without orders and 
without discretion, suddenly advanced too far, 
crossed a marshy tract and found themselves too 
far outnumbered to be able to contain the enemy. 
Abandoning the light-armed troops, the cavalry 
were driven back and fled to their own lines not 
without casualties — one horseman missing, many 
horses wounded and twenty-seven light-armed 
soldiers killed. It was now night when Scipio, 
delighted with this successful cavalry engagement, 
withdrew his foi'ces into camp. But in vouchsafing 
him this triumph the fortunes of war saw fit to make 
it but short-lived. On the following day, in fact, a 
detachment of Caesar's cavalry which he had sent to 
Leptis on a foraging mission surprised in the course 
of their march and attacked about a hundred 
marauding Numidian and Gaetulian horse, killing 
some of them and taking the rest alive. Meanwhile 
Caesar made it his constant and daily practice to 
lead his legions down into the plain, proceed with 
his field-works, carry his rampart and trench across 
the middle of the plain, and thereby hinder his 

241 



CAESAR 

intermittit. Scipio item munitiones contra facere et, 
ne iugo a Caesare excluderetur, ujjproperare. Ita 
duces utrique et in operibus occupati esse et nihilo 
minus equestribus proeliis inter se cotidie dimicabant. 
62 Interim Varus classem, quam antea Uticae hiemis 
gratia subduxerat, cognito legionis \'II et VIII ^ 
ex Sicilia adventu celeriter deducit ibique Gaetulis 
remigibus epibatisque complet insidiandique gratia 
ab Utica progressus Hadrumetum cum L\' navibus 
pervenit. Cuius adventus inscius Caesar L. Cispium 
cum classe XXVII navium ad Thapsum versus in 
stationem praesidi gratia commeatus sui mittit item- 
que Q. Aquilam cum XIII navibus longis Hadru- 
metum eadem de causa praemittit. Cispius quo 
erat missus celeriter pervenit ; Aquila tempestate 
iactatus promunturium superare non potuit atque 
angulum quendam tutum a tempestate nactus cum 
classe se longius a prospectu removit. Reliqua classis 
in salo ad Leptim egressis remigibus passimque in 
litore vagantibus, partim in oppidum victus sui 
mercandi gratia progressis, vacua a defensoribus 
stabat. Quibus rebus Varus ex perfuga cognitis 
occasionem nactus vigilia secunda Hadrumeto ex 
cothone egressus primo mane Leptim cum universa 
classe vectus navis onerarias, quae longius a portu 

^ So most MSS. But it is strange that the author, who 
elsewhere notes in detail the arrival of each convoy, should 
nowhere else (except ch. 60 tfc ch. 81, where all MSS. read 
VIII) have alluded to these two veteran legions. Accordingly 

242 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

opponents' sallies. Scipio likewise built counter- 
defences, pushing them forward in haste to pre- 
vent Caesar from barring him access to the ridge. 
Thus the generals on both sides were occupied with 
field-works, but none the less engaged one another 
daily in cavalry actions. 
62 NIeanwhile Varus, who had previously beached his 
flotilla at Utica for the winter, learned that the 
Seventh and Eighth legions were on the way from 
Sicily. Thereupon he promptly launched his flotilla, 
manned it on the spot with Gaetulian oarsmen and 
marines and, setting sail from Utica, arrived at 
Hadrumetum with fifty-five ships with the object of 
setting a trap for them. Caesar, who was unaware 
of his arrival, despatched L. Cispius with a squadron 
of twenty-seven ships to the area of Thapsus to patrol 
there and give cover to his convoy ; and he also sent 
Q. Aquila with thirteen warships to Hadrumetum for 
the same purpose. Cispius speedily reached his desti- 
nation, whereas Aquila, lashed by a storm and unable 
to double the headland, gained a certain cove which 
was sheltered from the storm and afforded him and 
his squadron a fairly inconspicuous retreat. The rest 
of the fleet stood at anchor out at sea off Leptis ; 
and as the crews had disembarked and were roaming 
here and there about the beach, some of them having 
gone off to the town to buy themselves food, the fleet 
had no one to defend it. Learning of this situation 
from a deserter, Varus seized his opportunity : at the 
second watch he came out of the inner harbour of 
Hadrumetum and arrived off Leptis in the early 
morning with his entire squadron ; and there he set 

some editors conjecture IX and X, assuming that the reference 
is to ch. 53 .- others XIII and XIV. 

243 



CAESAR 

in salo stabant, vacuas a defensoribus ^ incendit et 
penteres duas nullo repugnante cepit. 
63 Caesar interim celeriter per nuntios in castris, cum 
opera eircumiret, certior factus, quae aberant a portu 
milia passuum Yl, equo admisso ornissis omnibus 
rebus celeriter pervenit Leptim ibique hortatur 
omnes ut se naves consequerentur ; ipse parvulum 
navigiolum conscendit, in cursu Aquilam multitudine 
navium perterritum atque trepidantem nactus 
hostium classem sequi coepit. Interim Varus eeleri- 
tate Caesaris audaciaque commotus cum universa 
classe conversis navibus Hadrunietum versus fugere 
contendit. Quem Caesar in milibus passuum IIII 
consecutus reciperata quinqueremi cum suis omnibus 
epibatis atque etiam hostium custodibus CXXX in ea 
nave captis triremem hostium proximam, quae in 
repugnando erat commorata, onustam remigum 
epibatarumque cepit. Reliquae naves hostium pro- 
munturium superarunt atque Hadrumetum in cotho- 
nem se universae contulerunt. Caesar eodem vento 
promunturium superare non potuit atque in salo in 
ancoris ea nocte commoratus prima luce Hadru- 
metum aecedit ibique navibus onerariis quae erant 
extra cothonem incensis omnibusque reliquis ab eis 
aut subductis aut in cothonem compulsis paulisper 

1 I have adopted Klotz's transposition of the words vacuas 
a defensoribus, which in the MSS. follow duas; for in the next 
chapter the %vords reciperata quinqueremi cum suis omnibus 
epibatis suggest that the penteremes had crews aboard. 

244 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

fire to the defenceless transports which were anchored 
out at sea at some distance from the port, and 
captured two five-banked warships, which offered no 
resistance. 

Meanwhile a message speedily acquainted Caesar 
with the news as he was touring the defence works 
in his camp, which was six miles distant from the 
harbour. Putting everything else on one side and 
giving his horse its head he speedily reached Leptis, 
where he insisted that all the ships should follow his 
lead : he himself then went aboard a small cutter. 
As he sailed on he came up with Aquila, who was 
filled with panic and confusion at the large number of 
the enemy ships, and then set off in pursuit of the 
enemy squadron. Meanwhile \'arus, disconcerted 
by Caesar's promptitude and boldness, had turned 
about with his entire squadron and was now beating a 
hasty retreat to Hadrumetum. In four miles' sail 
Caesar overhauled him, recovered one of his quinque- 
remes, complete with all its crew, and capturing in 
addition the enemy prize-crew aboard her, one 
hundred-and-thirty strong, and then captured the 
nearest enemy trireme, which in the course of the 
action had lagged behind the rest, with its full 
complement of rowers and marines. The rest of the 
enemy fleet doubled the headland, and one and all 
sought refuge in the inner harbour of Hadrumetum. 
But the wind did not hold for Caesar also to be able 
to double the headland ; so after riding out that 
night at anchor in deep water he approached Hadru- 
metum at dawn. There he set fire to the transports 
which were outside the inner harbour and then, as 
all the others had either been beached by the 
enemy or massed inside the inner harbour, he waited 

245 



CAESAR 

commoratus, si forte vellent classe dimicarc, rursus se 
recepit in castra. 

64 In ea nave captus est P. Vestrius, eques Romanus, 
et P. Ligarius, Afranianus, quern Caesar in Hispania 
cum reliquis dimiserat, et postea se ad Pompeium 
contulerat, inde ex proelio effugerat in Africamque 
ad Varum venerat ; quem ob periuri perfidiam 
Caesar iussit necari. P. \'estrio autem, quod eius 
frater Romae pecuniam imperatam numeraverat et 
quod ipse suam causam probaverat Caesari, se a 
Nasidi classe captum, cum ad necem duceretur, 
beneficio Vari esse servatum, postea sibi facultatem 
nullam datam transeundi, ignovit. 

65 Est in Africa consuetude incolarum ut in agris et in 
omnibus fere villis sub terra specus frumenti con- 
dendi gratia clam habeant atque id propter bella 
maxime hostiumque subitum adventum praeparent. 
Qua de re Caesar per indicem certior factus tertia 
vigilia legiones duas cum equitatu mittit a castris 
suis milia passuum X atque inde magno numero 
frumenti onustos recipit in castra. Quibus rebus 
cognitis Labienus progressus a suis castris milia 
passuum ^'II per iugum et collem, per quem Caesar 
pridie iter fecerat, ibi castra duarum legionum facit 
atque ipse cotidie existimans Caesarem eadem saepe 



^ Aft^r the battle of Ilerda, in August 49 B.C. 

2 Perhaps y.E. to the fertile district round Moknine. 

246 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

a little while to see if by chance the enemy were 
disposed to fight a naval action and then withdrew 
back to his camp. 

Among those made prisoner aboard that trireme 
was P. Vestrius, a Roman knight, and P. Ligarius, 
once a supporter of Afranius. Caesar had set the 
latter free in Spain along with the other Afranians,^ 
and he had later on joined Pompeius and then, as a 
fugitive after the battle (of Pharsalus), had come to 
Varus in Africa. In view of his falseness and 
treachery Caesar bade him be executed. P. Vestrius, 
on the other hand, he pardoned ; for his brother had 
paid the stipulated ransom at Rome, and Vestrius 
himself had satisfied Caesar as to the honesty of his 
motives, explaining that he had been taken prisoner 
by the fleet of Nasidius, his life had been saved 
through the kindness of \^arus just as he was being 
led oif to execution, and after that he had been 
given no opportunity of going over to Caesar's side. 

There is in Africa a custom among the natives 
whereby both in the open fields and in practically all 
their farm buildings they have a secret undergi-ound 
vault for the storage of corn, the main motive for this 
provision being wars and the sudden appearance of 
an enemy. WTien Caesar got to know of this custom 
through an informer, at the third watch of the night 
he sent two legions and some cavalry a distance of 
ten miles from his camp,^ and later saw them return 
to camp laden with a large quantity of corn. When 
Labienus learned of this, he advanced seven miles 
from his camp across the hilly plateau across which 
Caesar had marched the day before, encamped two 
legions there and, supposing that Caesar would 
frequently pass along that same route for foraging 

247 



CAESAR 

frumentandi gratia commeaturum cum rnagno equi- 
tatu levique armatura insidiaturus locis idoneis 
considit. 

66 Caesar interim de insidiis Labieni ex perfugis. 
certior factus paucos dies ibi commoratus, dum hostes 
cotidiano institute saepe idem faciendo in negle- 
gentiam adducerentur, subito mane imperat porta 
decumana legiones se III ^ veteranas cum parte 
equitatus sequi atque equitibus praemissis neque 
opinantis insidiatores subito in convallibus latentis 
ex 2 levi armatura concidit circiter D, reliquos in 
fugam turpissimam coniecit. Interim Labienus cum 
universe equitatu fugientibus suis suppetias occurrit. 
Cuius vim multitudinis cum equites pauci Caesariani 
iam sustinere non possent, Caesar instructas legiones 
hostium copiis ostendit. Quo facto perterrito La- 
bieno ac retardato suos equites recepit incolumis. 
Postero die luba Numidas eos qui loco amisso luga 
se receperant in castra in cruce omnis suffixit. 

67 Caesar interim, quoniam inopia frumenti pre- 
mebatur, copias omnis in castra conducit atque 
praesidio Lepti, Ruspinae, Acyllae relicto, Cispio 
Aquilaeque classe tradita ut alter Hadrumetum, 
alter Thapsimi mari obsiderent, ipse castris incensis 
quarta noctis vigilia acie instructa impedimentis in 
sinistra parte collocatis ex eo loco proficiscitur at 
pervenit ad oppidum Aggar, quod a Gaetulis saepe 

1 VIII MSS. : III Nipperdet/. 
^ ex supplied by Nipperdey. 

248 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

purposes, established himself daily at suitable points 
to lie in wait for him with a large force of cavalry 
and light-armed troops. 

In the meantime information reached Caesar from 
deserters about Labienus' trap. He waited in camp 
there a few days for the constant repetition of the 
same daily routine to lead the enemy into careless- 
ness and then, early one morning, he suddenly gave 
the oi-der that three veteran legions and a detach- 
ment of cavalry should follow him by way of the rear 
gate. Then, sending on the cavalry ahead, he 
suddenly surprised the enemy ambush lurking in the 
ravines, killing some five hundred of their light-armed 
troops and throwing the rest into a very unseemly 
rout. Whereupon Labienus dashed up -with his 
entire cavalry force to the relief of his routed troops ; 
and as the odds were now too great for the Caesarian 
horse to contain their powerful onslaught, Caesar 
displayed to the enemy forces his legions in battle 
formation. This action utterly daunted and checked 
Labienus, and Caesar thereupon withdrew his own 
cavalry without loss. On the following day Juba 
crucified those Numidians who had quitted their 
posts and fled back to their camp. 

Caesar meanwhile was embarrassed by lack of 
corn ; for which reason he mustered all his forces in 
camp and, leaving troops to garrison Leptis, Ruspina 
and Acylla, and assigning his fleet to Cispius and 
Aquila to maintain the naval blockade, the one of 
Hadrumetum and the other of Thapsus, he himself 
set fire to his camp and at the fourth watch of the 
night in battle formation with his baggage concen- 
trated on the left wing evacuated that position and 
came to the town of Aggar. This town had pre- 

249 



CAESAR 

antea oppugnatum summaque vi per ipsos oppidanos 
erat defensum. Ibi in campo castris unis positis 
ipse frumentatum circum villas cum parte exercitus 
profectus magno invento hordei, olei, vini, fici 
numero, pauco tritici, atque recreato exercitu redit 
in castra. Soipio interim cognito Caesaris discessu 
cum universis copiis per iugum Caesarem subsequi 
coepit atque ab eius castris milia passuum Vl longe 
trinis castris dispertitis copiis consedit. 
68 Oppidum erat Zeta, quod aberat a Scipione milia 
passuum X, ad eius regionem et partem castrf)rum 
collocatum, a Caesare autem diversum ac remotum, 
quod erat ab eo longe milia passuum XIIII.^ Hue 
Scipio legiones duas frumentandi gratia misit. 
Quod postquam Caesar ex perfuga cognovit, castris 
ex campo in collem ac tutiora loca collatis atque ibi 
praesidio relicto ipse quarta vigilia egressus praeter 
hostium castra proficiscitur cum copiis et oppidum 
potitur. Legiones Scipionis comperit longius in 
agris frumentari et, cum eo contendere conaretur, 
animadvertit copias hostium his legionibus occurrere 
suppetias. Quae res eius impetum retardavit. 
Itaque capto C. Minucio Regino, equite Romano, 
Scipionis familiarissimo, qui ei oppido praeerat, et 
P. Atrio, equite Romano de conventu Uticensi, et 
camelis XXII regis abductis, praesidio ibi cum 
Oppio legato relicto ipse se recipere coepit ad castra. 



1 The distances given in the MSS.— 10 and 14 (or 18, or 19) 
have been much disputed, and editors have amended to suit 
their own identification of the towns. But the general 
meaning seems clear — that Zeta lay closer to Scipio. I have 
adopted Veith's identification of Aggar, Zeta and Tegea. 

250 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

viously been repeatedly attacked by the Gaetulians 
only to be very stoutly defended by the inhabitants 
themselves. Here in the plain he pitched a single 
camp and then set off in person with part of his army 
on a foraging mission round the farmsteads ; and 
finding a large quantity of barley, oil, wine and figs, 
and a little wheat, he returned to camp with his 
army duly refreshed. Meanwhile Scipio, who had got 
to know of Caesar's departure, proceeded to follow 
him across the plateau with his entire forces and es- 
tablished himself six miles away from Caesar's camp, 
with his forces divided among three separate camps. 
There was a town called Zeta, which was ten miles 
distant from Scipio but situated in the general 
direction of his camp ; whereas it w^as relatively 
distant and remote — fourteen miles in fact — from 
Caesar.^ To this town Scipio sent two legions to 
forage. When Caesar learned of this from a deserter 
he moved his camp from the plain to a safer position 
on the high ground ; and leaving a covering force 
there, he himself set out at the fourth watch, marched 
on past the enemy's camp, and took possession of the 
town. He then ascertained that Scipio's legions 
were foraging farther afield; and he was just pro- 
ceeding to march in their direction when he observed 
enemy forces hastening up to support those legions. 
This circumstance made him loath to attack. And so, 
taking prisoner C. Minucius Reginus, the com- 
mandant of that town, who was a Roman knight and a 
very intimate friend of Scipio. and P. Atrius, a 
Roman knight and a member of the corporation of 
Utica, and leading away twenty-two of the king's 
camels, he proceeded to retire to camp, leaving his 
lieutenant, Oppius, with a garrison in the town. 

251 



CAESAR 

69 Cum iani non longe a castris Scipionis abessct, 
quae eum necesse erat praetergredi, Labienus 
Afraniusque cum omni equitatu levique armatura ex 
insidiis adorti agmini eius extreme se offcrunt atque 
ex collibus proximis ^ exsistunt. Quod postquam 
Caesar animum advertit, equitibus suis hostium vi 
oppositis sarcinas legionarios in acervum iubet 
comportare atque celeriter signa hostibus inferre. 
Quod postquam coeptum est fieri, primo impetu 
legionum equitatus et levis armatura hostium 
nullo negotio loco pulsa et deiecta est de colle. Cum 
iam Caesar existimasset hostis pulsos deterritosque 
finem lacessendi facturos et iter coeptum pergere 
coepisset, iterum celeriter ex proximis collibus 
erumpunt atque eadem ratione qua ante dixi in 
Caesaris legionarios impetum faciunt Numidae 
levisque armatura mirabili velocitate praediti, qui 
inter equites pugnabant et una pariterque cum 
equitibus accurrere et refugere consueverant. Cum 
hoc saepius facerent et proficiscentis lulianos in- 
sequerentur, refugerent instantis, propius non acce- 
derent et singulari genere pugnae uterentur equos- 
que ^ iaculis con\ ulnerare satis esse existimarent, 
Caesar intellexit nihil aliud eos conari nisi ut se 
cogerent castra eo loco ponere ubi omnino aquae 
nihil esset, ut exeixitus ieiunus, qui a quarta vigilia 

' primis MSS. : proximis Schneider. 
- eosqiie MSS. : equosque Hoffmann. 

2^2 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

When he was now not far away from Scipio's 
camp, which of necessity he had to pass, Labienus 
and Afranius with all their cavalry and light-armed 
troops sprang up and revealed themselves from 
behind the nearby hills where they had been lurking 
in ambush, and flung themselves upon his rear- 
guard. Seeing himself thus attacked, Caesar de- 
ployed his cavalry to bear the brunt of the enemy 
onslaught and ordered his legionaries to pile their 
packs and promptly deliver a counter-attack. As 
soon as this was under way the enemy cavalry and 
light-armed troops were without difficulty driven 
back and dislodged from the hill directly the legions 
charged. No sooner had Caesar come to the con- 
clusion that the enemy, beaten back and demoralised 
as they were, would now stop their harrying, and no 
sooner had he begun to resume his march, than once 
again they promptly flung themselves from the 
cover of the nearby hills and attacked Caesar's 
legionaries, employing the same tactics as I described 
above — ^Numidians and light-armed troops they were, 
possessed of a marvellous turn of speed, fighting in 
the ranks of the cavalry and used to keeping pace 
with the horsemen and doubling forward or retreating 
at their side. As they repeated this manoeuvre 
quite frequently, chasing the Julians as they marched 
and taking to flight when their opponents turned to 
attack them, and as they would not approach at all 
close, but employed peculiar tactics and were content 
with wounding the horses with their javelins, 
Caesar realised that what they were trying to do 
was no less than force him to pitch camp at a spot 
where there was not a drop of water, so that his 
famished army, which had tasted nothing at all from 

253 



CAESAR 

usque ad horam X. diei nihil gustasset, ac iumenta 
siti perirent. 
70 Cum iam ad solis occasum esset, et non totos C 
passus in horis IIII esset progressus, equitatu suo 
propter equoruni interitum extreme agmine remoto 
legiones in vicem ad extremum agmen evocabat. 
Ita vim hostium placide leniterque procedens per 
legionarium militem commodius sustinebat. Interim 
equitum Numidarum copiae dextra sinistraque per 
collis praecurrere coronaeque in modum cingere 
multitudine sua Caesaris copias, pars agmen extre- 
mum insequi. Caesaris interim non amplius III aut 
IIII milites veterani si se convertissent et pila viribus 
contorta in Numidas infestos coniecissent, amplius 
duum milium numero ad unum terga vertebant ac 
rursus ad aciem passim conversis equis se colligebant 
atque in spatio consequebantur et iacula in legionarios 
coiciebant. Ita Caesar modo procedendo modo 
resistendo tardius itinere confecto noctis hora prima 
omnis suos ad unum in castra incolumis sauciis X 
factis reduxit. Labienus circiter CCC amissis, 
multis vulneratis ac defessis insfcando omnibus 
ad suos se recepit. Scipio interim legiones pro- 
ductas cum elephantis, quos ante castra in acie 

254 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

the fourth watch of the night right up till the tenth 
hour of the day, should die of thirst — both men and 
beasts. 

It was now nearly sundown and less than a 
hundred paces had been covered all told in four hours, 
when Caesar withdrew his cavalry — in view of the 
casualties among their horses — from the rear- 
guard, and called on the legions to replace them. 
By employing the legionary troops in this manner 
and advancing calmly and at a gentle pace he found 
it less awkward to contain the enemy's violent 
onslaught. Meanwhile detachments of the Numi- 
dian cavalry kept charging ahead along the high 
ground to his right and left and availing themselves 
of their superior numbers to surround Caesar's 
forces with a kind of continuous circle of troops, 
while others of them pursued his rear-guard. Mean- 
while on Caesar's part it needed no more than three 
or four of his veterans to wheel round and brandish 
and hurl amain their heavy javelins at the Numidians 
who menaced them for more than two thousand of 
the latter to turn tail to a man ; and then, wheeling 
their horses round on all sides, they would regroup 
once more for battle and resume their pursuit at a set 
distance, hurling their javelins at the legionaries. 
In this manner, now advancing, now pausing to fight 
hack, Caesar completed his march, albeit somewhat 
slowly ; for it was the first hour of the night when he 
brought all his men back to camp, with not a single 
man lost and ten wounded. Labienus retired to his 
lines with roughly three hundred men missing, many 
wounded, and all his troops exhausted by their con- 
tinuous offensive. Meanwhile Scipio, who had de- 
ployed his legions, with the elephants posted in 

255 



CAESAR 

terroris gratia in conspectu Caesaris collocaverat, 
reducit in castra. 

71 Caesar contra eiusmodi hostium genera copias 
suas non ut imperator exercitum veteranum victorem- 
que maximis rebus gestis, sed ut lanista tirones 
gladiatores condocefacere ; quot pedes se reciperent 
ab hoste et quern ad modum obversi adversariis et in 
quantulo spatio resisterent, modo procurrerent modo 
recederent comminarenturque impetum, ac prope 
quo loco et quern ad modum tela mitterent, prae- 
cipere. Mirifice enim hostium levis armatura 
anxium exercitum nostrum atque sollicitum habebat, 
quia et equites deterrebat proelium inire propter 
equorum interitum, quod eos iaculis interficiebat, 
et legionarium militem defatigabat propter veloci- 
tatem : gravis enim armaturae miles simul atque ab 
eis insectatus constiterat in eosque impetum fecerat, 
illi veloci cursu periculum facile vitabant. 

72 Quibus ex rebus Caesar vehementer commove- 
batur quod, quotienscunque proelium ^ erat com- 
missum, equitatu suo sine legionario milite hostium 
equitatui levique armaturae eorum nuUo modo par 
esse poterat. Sollicitabatur autem his rebus, quod 
nondum legiones hostium cognoverat, et quonam 
modo sustinere se posset ab eorum equitatu levique 

1 quodcumque proelium quotiens most MSS. quod, quotiens- 
cunque proelium Woelfflin. 

256 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

battle array in front of his camp in full view of 
Caesar to inspire terror, now led them back to camp. 

Faced with an enemy of this kind Caesar pro- 
ceeded to train his forces, not as a commander trains 
a veteran army with a magnificent record of vic- 
torious achievements, but as a gladiatorial instructor 
trains his recruits. How many feet they were to 
retreat from the enemy ; the manner in which they 
must wheel round upon their adversary ; the 
restricted space in which they must offer him resist- 
ance — now doubling forward, now retiring and 
making feint attacks ; and almost the spot from 
which, and the manner in which they must discharge 
their missiles — these were the lessons he taught 
them. For it was surprising the amount of worry 
and anxiety the enemy's light-armed troops were 
causing our army, what with their making the 
cavalry chary of engaging for fear of losing their 
mounts, since the light-armed troops kept killing 
them with their javelins, and with their wearing 
the legionaries out by their speediness ; for no 
sooner had a heavy-armed soldier, when pursued by 
them, halted and then made an attack on them than 
their speed of movement enabled them easily to 
avoid the danger. 

As a result of this Caesar was seriously perturbed, 
since as often as an engagement had occurred he had 
been quite unable to be a match with his own 
cavalry, unsupported by legionary troops, for the 
enemy cavalry and their light-armed units. More- 
over, there was this other problem which worried 
him : as yet he had had no experience of the enemy 
legions; and how, he wondered, could he cope with 
their cavalry and amazing light-armed troops if they 

257 



CAESAR 

armatura, quae erat mirifica, si legiones quoque 
accessissent. Accedebat etiam hacc causa, quod 
elephantorum magnitudo multitudoque animos mili- 
tum detinebat in terrore. Cui uni rci tamen in- 
venerat remedium : namque elephantos ex Italia 
transportari iusscrat, quos et miles nosset spccicmque 
et virtutcm bestiae cognosceret et cui parti corporis 
eius telum facile adigi posset, ornatusque ac loricatus 
cum esset elephas, quae pars corporis eius sine 
tegmine nuda relinqueretur, ut eo tela coicerentur ; 
praeterea ut iumenta bestiarum odorem, stridorem, 
speciem consuetudine capta non reformidarent. 
Quibus ex rebus largiter erat consecutus : nam et 
milites bestias manibus pertrectabant earumque 
tarditatem cognoscebant, equitesque in eos pila 
praepilata coiciebant, atque in consuetudinem equos 
patientia bestiarum adduxerat. 

Ob has causas quas supra commemoravi sollicita- 
batur Caesar tardiorque et consideratior erat factus 
et ex pristina bellandi consuetudine celeritateque 
excesserat. Neque mirum : copias enim habebat in 
Gallia bellare consuetas locis campcstribus et contra 
Gallos, homines apertos minimeque insidiosos, qui 
per virtutem, non per dolum dimicare consuerunt ; 
tum autem erat ei laborandum ut consuefaceret 
milites hostium dolos. insidias, artificia cognoscere et 
quid sequi, quid vitare conveniret. Itaque, (juo haec 

258 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

were backed up by their legions too. He had yet 
another cause for anxiety — the panic with which the 
size and number of the elephants gripped the minds 
of his soldiers. Here, however, was one problem to 
which he had found an answer ; for he had ordered 
elephants to be brought across from Italy to enable 
our troops not only to become familiar with them, 
but also to get to know both the appearance and 
capabilities of the beast, what part of its body was 
readily vulnerable to a missile and, when an elephant 
was accoutred and armoured, what part of its body 
was still left uncovered and unprotected, so that 
their missiles should be aimed at that spot. He had 
also this further object in mind, that his horses 
should learn by familiarity with these beasts not to 
be alarmed bv their scent, trumpeting or appearance. 
From this experiment he had profited handsomely : 
for the troops handled the beasts and came to appre- 
ciate their sluggishness ; the cavalry hurled dummy 
javelins at them; and the docility of the beasts 
had brought the horses to feel at home with them. 

For the reasons above-mentioned Caesar was 
worried, and his old habitual dashing tactics had now 
given place to a more sedate and deliberate policy. 
And no wonder : for the troops he now commanded 
had been used to fighting in the flat terrain of Gaul 
against Gauls — men of forthright character with 
barely a trace of deceit, whose habit it is to rely on 
valour, not on guile, in their fighting ; whereas now 
he had to perform the arduous task of accustoming 
his troops to recognise the tricks, traps and strata- 
gems of the enemj', and what tactics could fittingly 
be adopted, and what avoided. Accordingly, to 
speed up this training of theirs, he took pains not to 

259 



CAESAR 

celerius conciperent, dabat operam ut Icgiones non in 
uno loco contineret sed per caiisam frumcntandi hue 
atque illiic rapsaret, ideo quod hostium copias ab se 
suoque vestigio non discessuras existimabat. Atque 
post diem tertium productis accuratius suis copiis ^ 
sicut instruxerat, propter hostium castra praeter- 
gressus aequo loco invitat ad dimicandum. Post- 
quam eos abhorrerc vidct, reducit sub vespcrum 
legiones in castra. 

74 Legati interim ex oppido ^'aga, quod finitimum 
fuit Zetae, cuius Caesarem potitum esse demonstra- 
vimus, veniunt; pctunt, obsecrant, ut sibi prae- 
sidium mittat ; se res compluris quae utiles bcllo sint 
sumministraturos. Per id tempus dcorum voluntate 
studioque erga Caesarem transfuga suos civis facit 
certiores ^ lubam regem celeriter cum copiis suis, 
antequam Caesaris praesidium eo perveniret, ad 
oppidum accucurrisse atque advenientem multitudine 
circumdata eo potitum omnibusque eius oppidi 
incolis ad unum interfectis dedisse oppidum diri- 
piendum delendumtjue militibus. 

75 Caesar interim lustrato exercitu a. d. XII. Kal. 
April, postero die productis universis copiis pro- 
gressus ab suis castris milia passuum X, a Scipionis 
circiter duum milium interiecto spatio, in acie con- 
stitit. Postquam satis diuque adversaries ab se ad 
dimicandum invitatos supersedere pugnae anim- 
advertit, reducit copias posteroque die castra movet 
atque iter ad oppidum Sarsuram, ubi Scipio Numi- 

^ productas suas copias MSS. : / have adopted Clark's con- 
jecture. 

^ The MSS. text of the earlier part of this sentence is very 
probably corrupt : some MSS. read de eorum and tran- 
fugas. 

260 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

keep the legions confined to one area, but to keep 
them constantly on the move, first to one spot, then 
to another, ostensibly for foraging purposes, for the 
very reason that he reckoned the enemy forces 
would not fail to follow in his tracks. And two days 
later, when he had led forth his forces duly and care- 
fullv deployed, he marched past close to the enemy's 
camp and challenged them to battle on level ground ; 
but when he saw the enemy reluctant to accept, he led 
his legions back to camp as evening was approaching. 

Meanwhile envovs arrived from the town of \'aga, 
wliich was near Zeta, the occupation of which by 
Caesar we have already described. They prayed 
and besought Caesar to send them a garrison, saying 
they would assist him by furnishing various supplies 
useful in war. At this point, by the good will of the 
gods and their favour towards Caesar, a deserter 
informed his compatriots that king Juba had 
speedily hastened to the town with his forces to 
forestall the arrival there of Caesar's garrison ; that 
at his coming he had surrounded the town with vast 
forces, won control of it, slaughtered all the inhabi- 
tants to a man, and then given it over to his troops to 
plunder and destroy. 

Meanwhile Caesar ceremonially purified his army 
on March 21st. On the following day he led forth 
his entire forces, advanced five miles from his own 
camp, and took his stand in battle an*ay at a distance 
of some two miles from Scipio's camp. On per- 
ceiving that his opponents, despite this adequate and 
sustained challenge, declined his offer of battle, he 
led his forces back ; and on the following day he 
struck camp and took the road to the town of 
Sarsura, where Scipio had posted a garrison of 

261 



CAESAR 

darum habuerat praesidium frumentumque com- 
portaverat, ire contendit. Quod ubi Labienus 
animadvertit, cum equitatu levique armatura agmen 
eius extremuin carpere coepit atque ita lixarum 
mercatorumque qui plaustris merces portabant 
interceptis sarcinis addito aninio propius audaciusque 
accedit ad legiones, quod existimabat milites sub 
onere ac sub sarcinis defatigatos pugnare non posse. 
Quae res Caesarem non fefellerat : namque expedites 
ex singulis legionibus trecenos milites esse iusserat. 
Itaque eos in equitatum Labieni immissos turmis 
suorum suppetias mittit. Turn Labienus conversis 
equis signorum conspectu perterritus turpissime 
fugere contendit. Multis eius occisis, compluribus 
vulneratis milites legionarii ad sua se recipiunt signa 
atque iter inceptum ire coeperunt. Labienus per 
iugum summum collis dextrorsus procul subsequi non 
destitit. 
76 Postquam Caesar ad oppidum Sarsuram venit, 
inspectantibus adversariis interfecto praesidio Scipio- 
nis, cum suis auxilium ferre non auderent, fortiter 
repugnante P. Cornelio, evocato Scipionis, qui ibi 
praeerat, atque a multitudine circumvento inter- 
fectoque oppido potitur atque ibi frumento exercitui 
dato postero die ad oppidum Thysdram pervenit ; 
in quo Considius per id tempus fuerat cum grandi 
praesidio cohorteque sua gladiatorum. Caesar op- 
262 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

Numidians and laid in a stock of corn. When Labi- 
enus perceived this he proceeded to harry Caesar's 
rear-guard with his cavahy and Hght-armed troops ; 
and having by this means cut off the baggage trains 
of the sutlers and merchants who were carrying their 
wares in carts, he was thereby the more encouraged 
to grow bolder and come closer to the legions, since 
he supposed that the soldiers were worn out with 
carrying their heavy packs and so in no condition to 
fight. But this contingency had not escaped 
Caesar's attention : he had in fact given instructions 
that three hundred men out of each legion should 
be in light order ; and these he accordingly des- 
patched against Labienus' cavalry to give support to 
his own squadrons. Whereupon Labienus, dismayed 
at the sight of the standards, wheeled round his 
horses and beat a hasty and highly undignified 
retreat. The legionary troops, having killed many 
of his men and wounded not a few, retired to their 
standards and proceeded to resume their march. 
Labienus still kept up his pursuit at a distance, 
moving along the crest of the ridge of hills upon the 
right. 

When Caesar came to the town of Sarsura he 
massacred Scipio's garrison while his opponents 
looked on, not daring to assist their friends. Its 
commander, however, P. Cornelius, a reservist re- 
called by Scipio, offered a gallant resistance, but was 
surrounded by overwhelming numbers and killed. 
Then Caesar gained control of the town, distributed 
corn to his army on the spot, and arrived next 
day at the town of Thysdra. Considius was in the 
town at this time with a considerable garrison 
force and his own bodyguard of gladiators. Caesar 

263 



CAESAR 

pidi natura perspecta aquae inopia ab oppugnatione 
eius deterritus protinus profectus circiter milia 
passuum II 1 1 ad aquam facit castra atque inde quarta 
vigilia egressus redit rursus ad ea castra quae ad 
Aggar habuerat. Idem facit Scipio atque in antiqua 
castra copias reducit. 

77 Thabenenses interim, qui sub dicione et potestate 
lubae esse consuessent in extrema eius regni regione 
maritima locati, interfecto regio praesidio legates ad 
Caesarem mittunt, rem a se gestam decent, petunt 
orantque ut suis fortunis populus Romanus, quod bene 
meriti essent, auxilium ferret. Caesar eorum con- 
silio probato Marcium Crispum tribus cum cohortibus 
et sagittariis tormentisque compluribus praesidio 
Thabenam mittit. Eodem tempore ex legionibus 
omnibus milites qui aut morbo impediti aut com- 
meatu dato cum signis non potuerant ante transire in 
African! ad milia I II I, equites CCCC, funditores 
sagittariique mille uno commeatu Caesari oc- 
currerunt. Itaque cum his copiis et omnibus 
legionibus eductis, sicut erat instructus, V milibus 
passuum ab suis castris, ab Scipionis vero II milibus 
passuum longe constitit in campo. 

78 Erat oppidum infra castra Scipionis nomine Tegea, 
ubi praesidium equestre circiter II milium numero 
habere consuerat. Eo equitatu dextra sinistra 
derecto ab oppidi lateribus ipse legiones ex castris 



^ Its site is unknown, and the suggested identification with 
Thena, mentioned by Strabo and located by some editors 
far south, opposite the islands of Cercina, seems dubious. 

264 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

studied the characteristics of the town, and the lack 
of water discouraged him from attacking it : he then 
set out forthwith and pitched a camp some four 
miles away near water, only to quit it at the fourth 
watch and return once again to the camp he had 
occupied near Aggar. Scipio followed suit and led 
his forces back to his old camp. 

Meanwhile the inhabitants of Thabena,^ who 
dwelt on the coast at the extreme verge of Juba's 
kingdom and were his traditional lieges and subjects, 
had none the less massacred the royal garrison, and 
now sent envoys to Caesar informing him of their 
action and earnestly soliciting that the Roman 
people should give them succour in their present 
plight, as they had deserved well at their hands. 
Caesar approved their policy and sent Marcius 
Crispus with three cohorts and numerous archers 
and pieces of artillery to Thabena as a garrison 
force. It was at this same time that Caesar was 
reinforced by the troops from all his legions who, 
whether prevented by sickness or because they had 
been granted leave, had previously been unable to 
cross to Africa with the colours : these comprised 
about four thousand infantry, four hundred cavalry 
and a thousand slingers and archers, and all came in 
one convoy. And so, leading out all his legions, 
including these forces, he took up a position in battle 
array in the plain five miles away from his own camp 
and two miles distant from Scipio 's. 

Below Scipio's camp there was a town called 
Tegea, where he kept a standing garrison force of 
cavalry numbering some two thousand men. This 
cavalry he now deployed in line on the right- and left- 
hand flanks of the town, while he himself led his 

26^ 



CAESAR 

eductas atque in iugo inferiore instructas non 
longius fere niille passus ab suis munitionibus pro- 
gressus in acie constituit. Postquam diutius in uno 
loco Scipio commorabatur et tempus diei in otio 
consumebatur, Caesar equitum turmas suorum iubet 
in hoslium equitatum qui ad oppiduni in statione 
erant facere impressionem levemque armaturam, 
sagittarios funditoresque eodem summittit. Quod 
ubi coeptum est fieri et equis concitatis luliani im- 
petum fecissent, Pacideius suos equites exporrigere 
coepit in longitudinem, ut haberent facultatem 
turmas Julianas circumfundi et nihilo minus for- 
tissime acerrimeque pugnare. Quod ubi Caesar 
animadvertit, CCC, quos ex legionibus habere 
expeditos consuerat, ex legione quae proxima ei 
proelio in acie constiterat iubet equitatui succurrere. 
Labienus interim suis equitibus auxilia equestria 
summittere sauciisque ac defatigatis integros recen- 
tioribusque viribus equites suniministrare. Post- 
quam equites luliani CCCC vim hostium ad IIII 
milia numero sustinere non poterant et ab levi 
armatura Numidarum vulnerabantur minutatimque 
cedebant, Caesar alteram alam mittit qui sat- 
agentibus celeriter occurrerent. Quo facto sui sublati 
266 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

legion*; out of camp and after advancing not much 
more than about a mile from his defences drew them 
up arrayed in battle formation on the lower slopes of 
a ridge. After some little time had elapsed with- 
out Scipio's shifting his position, and as the daylight 
hours were being frittered away in inaction, Caesar 
ordered some squadrons of his own horse to make a 
charge against the enemy cavalry which were posted 
on guard near the town, and despatched some light- 
armed units, archers and slingers to the same objec- 
tive in support. When this manoeuvre was under 
way and the Julians had delivered their attack at full 
gallop, Pacideius began to deploy his horsemen on a 
broader front, to enable them to swarm round the 
flanks of the Julian cavalry and still fight ^\ith the 
utmost gallantry and spirit. When Caesar observed 
these tactics he instructed the three hundred men in 
light order — it was his normal practice that this 
number of men in each of his legions should be in 
light order — from the legion which was posted in the 
line nearest the scene of this action to hasten to the 
assistance of the cavalry. Meanwhile Labienus sent 
cavalry reinforcements to support his own horsemen, 
furnishing unscathed troopers and those whose 
strength was relatively unspent to take the place of 
their wounded or exhausted comrades. Now that the 
four hundred Julian cavalry were finding it impossible 
to contain the violent onslaught of an enemy some 
four thousand strong, and were suffering casualties at 
the hands of the light-amied Numidians and giving 
ground very slightly, Caesar despatched a second 
wing of cavalry to dash speedily to the help of his 
hard-pressed men. This action i*aised the spirits of 
his troops, who delivered a massed charge against the 

267 



CAESAR 

univei'si in hostis impressione facta in fugam adver- 
saries dederunt ; multis occisis, compluribus vulnera- 
tis insecuti per III niilia passuum uscjue ad collem 
hostibus adactis se ad suos recipiunt. Caesar in 
horam X. commoratus, sicut erat instructus, se ad 
sua castra recepit omnibus incolumibus. In quo 
proelio Pacideius gravitt-r pilo per cassidem caput 
ictus conipluresque duces ac fortissimus quisque inter- 
fecti vulneratique sunt. 
79 Postquam nulla condicione cogere adversaries 
poterat ut in aequuni locum descenderent legionum- 
que periculum facerent, neque ipse propius hostern 
castra ponere propter aquae penuriam se posse 
animadvertebat, adversarios non virtute eorum con- 
fidere sed aquarum inopia fretos despicere se intel- 
lexit, II. Non. Apr. tertia vigilia egressus ab Aggar 
XVI niilia nocte progressus ad Thapsum, ubi \ergilius 
cum grandi praesidio praeerat, castra ponit oppidum- 
que eo die circumniunire coepit locaque idonea 
opportunaque complura praesidiis occupare, liostes 
ne intrare ad se ac loca interiora capere possent. 
Scipio interim cognitis Caesaris consiliis ad necessi- 
tatem adductus dimicandi, ne per summum dedecus 
fidissimos suis rebus Thapsitanos et \'ergilium amit- 
teret, confestim Caesarem per superiora loca con- 
secutus milia passuum VIII a Thapso binis castris 
consedit. 

^ i.e. at about midnight on the night of April 3rd-4th. Thus 
eo die is still April 4th. 

- See Map 5. I have assumed, with most editors, that 
Caesar approached Thapsus from the south, by way of the 
narrow coastal corridor east of the Marsh of Moknine; and 
that Scipio took the same route and encamped near its 
south-eastern fringe. The strategic points may well — as 
Veith suggested — have included El Faca and El Hafsa. 
268 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

enemy and turned their opponents to flight ; and 
after kilHng many and wounding not a few and 
chasing the enemy for three miles and driving them 
right up to the high ground they retired to their lines. 
Caesar waited till the tenth hour and then withdrew 
to his camp in battle order without any losses. In 
this engagement Pacideius was seriously wounded 
in the head by a heavy javelin Avhich pierced his 
helmet ; and several of the enemy leaders and all 
their bravest men were either killed or wounded. 

Finding it impossible on any terms to induce his 
opponents to come down to level ground and risk 
their legions, and realising that it was equally 
impossible for him to pitch his own camp closer 
to the enemy owing to the poor supply of water, and 
perceiving that his opponents, so far from having 
any confidence in their own valour, were led to hold 
him in contempt by their reliance on the dearth 
of water, Caesar left Aggar on April 4th at the third 
watch. ^ Then, after advancing sixteen miles by 
night, he pitched camp near Thapsus,^ where Ver- 
gilius was in command with a considerable garrison. 
That same day he began to invest the town, seizing 
and manning several suitable strategic points to 
prevent the enemy's being able to infiltrate and 
approach him, or capture any inner positions. 
Scipio had in the meantime got to know of Caesar's 
plans ; and being now reduced to the necessity of 
fighting, if he was to avoid the utter humiliation of 
losing Vergilius and those most staunch supporters of 
his cause — the men of Thapsus, he forthwith followed 
Caesar along the high ground and established himself 
in two camps at a distance of eight miles from 
Thapsus. 

269 



CAESAR 

80 Erat stagnum salinarum, inter quod et mare 
angustiae quaedam non amplius mille et D passus 
intererant ; quas Seipio intrare et Thapsitanis 
auxilium ferre conabatur. Quod futurum Caesarem 
non fefellerat. Namque pridie in eo loco castello 
munito ibique III cohortium ^ praesidio relicto ipse 
cum reliquis copiis lunatis castris Thapsum operibus 
circummunivit. Seipio interim exclusus ab incepto, 
itinere supra stagnum postero die et nocte confecto, 
caelo albente non longe a castris praesidioque quod 
supra commemoravi MD passibus ad mare versus 
consedit et castra munire coepit. Quod postquam 
Caesari nuntiatum est, milite ab opere deducto, 
castris praesidio Asprenate pro consule cum legionibus 
duabus relicto ipse cum expedita copia in eum locum 
citatim contendit, classisque parte ad Thapsum 
relicta reliquas navis iubet post hostium tergum quam 

^ The MSS. omit cohortium, which Woelfflin conjectured. 



* Apparently he marched round its western side. The 
words postero die et nocte have been variously explained and 
amended. Scipio's abortive attempt to penetrate the eastern 
corridor was made, as pridie shews, on April 5th : postero die 
is, I think, relative to pridie (April 4th) and denotes the 
remainder of April oth, nocte being the night of April 5th/'6th. 
The time involved — perhaps some eighteen hours is ccrtainh' 
long for the distance of about 20 miles ; but, as R. Holmes 
has pointed out, Seipio may well have rested en ronfe and 
timed his march so as to begin his entrenchments under cover 
of darkness. 

- See Map 5. The defence area here alluded to may well 
be that close to Thapsus mentioned in the previous chapter. 
If the allusion is to the fort mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
then the fort too must have been close to Thapsus. But the 
only place where the corridor to-day is not more than a mile 
and a half wide is at the S.E. corner of the lagoon. 

270 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

80 There was a lagoon of salt water, separated from 
the sea by a certain narrow strip of land not more 
than a mile and a half wide ; and this corridor Scipio 
now attempted to enter to bring help to the men of 
Thapsus. The likelihood of such a move had not 
escaped Caesar's attention : in fact, the dav before 
he had built a fort at this spot and left behind a 
force of three cohorts to hold it, while he himself 
with the rest of his forces established a crescent- 
shaped camp and invested Thapsus with a ring of 
siege works. Meanwhile Scipio, foiled in his under- 
taking, by-passed the lagoon to the north bv a march 
which he completed in the ensuing day and night,^ 
and then, at the first pale light of dawn, took up a 
position not far from the camp and the defence area 
I mentioned above,^ and a mile and a half from the 
sea coast ; ^ and there he began to fortify a camp. 
When this was reported to Caesar, the latter with- 
drew his troops from their work of fortification, left 
behind the pro-consul Asprenas to guard the camp 
with two legions, and hurriedly marched to that 
location with a force in light order. As for his fleet, 
part of it was left behind off Thapsus, while the 
remaining ships were ordered to advance as close as 

^ The words ML) passihiis present a difficulty. Bouvet 
translates " a quinze cents pas du cote de la mer,' though in a 
later note he refers to Scipio's position as near Caesar (at 1.500 
paces), and in his map he marks Scipio's camp only 1 km. 
distant from the sea. It seems possible to render the words 
non longe . . . consedit by ' took up a position towards the sea, 
not far distant — a mile and a half — from the camp . . .'. 
According to this interpretation Scipio'.s camp would appear 
on Map 5 not — as now marked — close to Bekalta, but some 
1^ Roman miles nearer the sea, behind the left wing of Scipio's 
battle line. This is perhaps confirmed by the behaviour of the 
routed elephants described below in ch. 83. 

271 



CAESAR 

maxime ad lit us appclli signumquc suum observare. 
quo signo dato subito clamore facto ex iniproviso 
hostibus aversis incuterent terrorem, ut pcrturbati 
ac perterriti respicere post terga cogerentur. 

81 Quo postquam Caesar pervenit et animadvcrtit 
acicm pro vallo Scipionis constitutam ^ elephantis 
dextro sinistroque cornu collocatis, et nihilo minus 
partem militum castra non ignavitcr munire, ipse acie 
triplici collocata, legione X. VII. que ^ dextro cornu, 
^'III. et ^'IIII. sinistro oppositis, quintae legionis ' 
in quarta acie ad ipsa cornua quinis cohortibus 
contra bestias collocatis, sagittariis, funditoribus 
in utrisque cornibus dispositis levique armatura inter 
equites interiecta, ipse pedibus circum milites con- 
cursans virtutesque veteranorum proeliaque superiora 
commemorans blandeque appellans animos eorum 
excitabat. Tirones autem, qui numquam in acie 
dimicassent, hortabatur ut veteranorum virtutem 
aemularentur eorumque famam, locum, nomen 
victoria parta cuperent possidere. 

82 Itaque in circumeundo exercitu animadvei-tit hostis 
circa vallum trepidare atque ultro citroque pavidos 
concursare et modo se intra portas recipere, modo 
inconstanter immoderateque prodire. Cum idem a 
pluribus animadverti coeptum esset, subito legati 

1 contra MSS. : constitutam i?. Schneider. 

' secundaque 3ISS. : VII. que Groebe : but it j? open to 
doubt ichether the 1th cfc %th legions ivere present : cf. note I on ch. 
62. Nipperde>/ proposed X. XIII. que . . . XIIII. et Villi.; 
Schneider X. Villi. que . . . XIII. et XIIII. 

^ quinque legiones MSS. : quintae legionis Vielhaber, 

272 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

possible inshore in rear of the enemy and to watch 
for a signal from Caesar ; on the giving of which signal 
they were suddenly to raise a shout, surprise the 
enemy from the rear, and thus demoralise them, so 
that in their utter confusion and panic they would be 
obliged to look behind them. 

81 When Caesar arrived there and observed Scipio's 
battle line arrayed in front of the rampart, with 
the elephants posted on the right and left wings, 
while none the less part of his troops were busily 
engaged in fortifying the camp, he himself dis- 
posed his army in three lines : the Tenth and 
Seventh legions he posted on the right wing, the 
Eighth and Ninth on the left, while five cohorts of the 
Fifth legion were stationed on each of the actual 
wings, forming a fourth line to contain the elephants ; 
and his archers and slingers were deployed on either 
wing, and the light-armed units interspersed among 
the cavalry. Caesar himself hurriedly went the 
rounds of his troops on foot, reminding the veterans of 
their gallant bearing in previous combats and raising 
their morale by flattering appeals. As for the 
recruits, seeing they had never so far fought in 
pitched battle, he urged them to emulate the gal- 
lantry of the veterans and to make it their ambition 
by gaining a victory to enjoy a fame, status and 
renown equal to theirs. 

82 Now in the course of making these rounds of his 
army he observed that the enemy in the neighbour- 
hood of their rampart were excited, rushing hither 
and thither in alarm, now retiring inside the gates, 
now trooping out in a spasmodic and undisciplined 
fashion. Several others were beginning to observe 
the same symptoms when without more ado his 

273 



CAESAR 

evocatique obsecrare Caesarem ne dubitaret signum 
dare : victoriam sibi propriam a dis immortalibus 

portendi. Dubitante Caesare atque eorum studio 
cupiditatique rcsistente sibique eruptione pugnari 
non placcre clamitante, etiam atque etiam aciem 
sustentante, subito dextro cornu iniussu Caesaris 
tubicen a militibus coactus canere coepit. Quo 
facto ab universis cohortibus signa in hostem coepere 
inferri, cum centuriones pectore adverso resisterent 
vique continerent milites, ne iniussu imperatoris 
concurrerent, nee quicquam proficerent. 
83 Quod postquam Caesar intellexit incitatis militum 
animis resisti nullo modo posse, signo Felicitatis dato 
equo admisso in hostem contra principes ire con- 
tendit. A dextro interim cornu funditores sagit- 
tariique concita tela in elephantos frequentes 
iniciunt. Quo facto bestiae stridore fundarum, 
lapidum plumbique iactatu ^ perterritae sese con- 
vertere et suos post se frequentis stipatosque pro- 
terere et in portas valli semifactas ruere contendunt. 
Item Mauri equites, qui in eodem cornu elephantis 
erant, praesidio deserti principes fugiunt. Ita 
celeriter bestiis circumitis legiones vallo hostium 

* itata MSS. : iactatu Kuebler. 
274 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

lieutenants and reservists implored Caesar not to 
hesitate to give the signal, saying that it was decisive 
victorj' that the immortal gods were thus foretelling 
them. Caesar still hesitated, opposing their im- 
petuous eagerness, repeatedly protesting that a 
precipitate sally was not his approved May of fighting, 
and again and again holding his battle line in check ; 
when suddenly on the right wing, without orders 
from Caesar but under coercion of the troops, a 
trumpeter began to sound the charge. Whereupon 
every single cohort began to attack the enemy, 
despite the resistance of the centurions, who planted 
themselves in the path of the troops and sought to 
hold them back by force to prevent their attacking 
without orders from the commander-in-chief, but all 
in vain. 
83 When Caesar realised that it was quite out of the 
question to hold back his troops in their present state 
of excitement, he signalled ' Good Luck ' and giving 
his horse its head rode in hot haste against the 
enemv front ranks. Meanwhile on the right wing 
the slingers and archers in crowds launched rapid 
vollevs of missiles against the elephants. Where- 
upon the beasts, terrified by the whizzing sound of 
the slings and by the stones and leaden bullets 
launched against them, speedily wheeled round, 
trampled under foot the massed and serried ranks of 
their own supporting troops behind them, and 
rushed towards the half-completed gates of the 
rampart. The Moorish cavalry, who were posted on 
the same wing as the elephants, followed suit and, 
abandoned by their protective screen, started the 
rout. Having thus speedily got round the elephants, 
the legions gained possession of the enemy's rampart ; 

275 



CAESAR 

sunt potitae, et paucis acriter repugnantibus inter- 
fectisque reliqui concitati in castra unde pridie erant 
cgressi confugiunt. 

84 Non videtur esse praetermittendum de virtute 
militis veteran! V. legionis. Nam cum in sinistro 
cornu elephas vulnere ictus et dolore concitatus in 
lixam inermem impetum fecisset eumque sub pede 
subditum dein genu innixus pondere suo proboscide 
erecta vibrantique stridore maximo premeret atque 
enecaret, miles hie non potuit pati quin se armatus 
bestiae offerret. Quern postquam elephas ad se telo 
infesto venire animadvertit, relicto cadavere militem 
proboscide circumdat atque in sublime extollit. 
Armatus, qui in eiusmodi periculo constanter agen- 
dum sibi videret, gladio proboscidem qua erat 
circumdatus caedere quantum viribus poterat non 
destitit. Quo dolore adductus elephas milite abiecto 
maximo cum stridore cursuque conversus ad reliquas 
bestias se recepit. 

85 Interim Thapso qui erant praesidio ex oppido 
eruptionem porta maritima faciunt et, sive ut suis 
subsidio occurrerent, sive ut oppido deserto fuga 
salutem sibi parerent, egrediuntur atque ita per 
mare umbilici fine ingressi terram petebant. Qui a 
servitiis puerisque qui in castris erant lapidibus 
pilisque prohibit! terram attingere rursus se in 
oppidum receperunt. Interim Scipionis copiis pro- 

^ It would appear that Asprenas and his two legioas (ch. 80) 
had moved out, either to take part in the battle, or to seal off 
the eastern corridor and menace Scipio's camps at its southern 
end. 

276 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

and when the few defenders who offered a spirited 
resistance had been killed, the remainder pre- 
cipitately sought refuge in the camp from which they 
had issued the day before. 

I ought not, I think, to omit to mention the 
gallantry of a veteran soldier of the Fifth legion. 
On the left wing an elephant, maddened by the pain 
of a wound it had received, had attacked an unarmed 
sutler, pinned him underfoot, and then knelt upon 
him ; and now, with its trunk erect and swaying, and 
trumpeting loudly, it was crushing him to death 
with its weight. This was more than the soldier could 
bear ; he could not but confront the beast, fully armed 
as he was. When it observed him coming towards it 
with weapon poised to strike, the elephant abandoned 
the corpse, encircled the soldier with its trunk, and 
lifted him up in the air. The soldier, perceiving 
that a dangerous crisis of this sort demanded resolute 
action on his part, hewed with his sword again and 
again at the encircling trunk with all the strength he 
could muster. The resulting pain caused the 
elephant to drop the soldier, wheel round, and with 
shi'ill trumpetings make all speed to rejoin its 
fellows. 

Meanwhile the members of the garrison of Thapsus 
made a sortie from the town by way of the seaward 
gate and, whether their object was to hasten to the 
aid of their fellows, or to abandon the town and secure 
their own safety by flight, out they came and accord- 
inglv, wading waist-high into the sea, made for the 
land. They were, however, prevented from reaching 
land by stones and heavy javelins hurled by the slaves 
and lackeys in the camp ; ^ and so they retux-ned 
back into the town. Meanwhile Scipio's forces, now 

277 



CAESAR 

stratis passimque toto campo fugientibus confestim 
Caesaris legiones consequi spatiumque se non dare 
colligendi. Qui postquam ad ea castra quae pete- 
bant perfugerunt, ut refecti ^ castris rursus sese 
defenderent ducemque aliquem requirerent, quem 
respicerent, cuius auctoritate imperioque rem ge- 
rerent : — qui postquam animadverterunt neminem 
ibi esse praesidio, protinus armis abiectis in regia 
castra fugere contendunt. Quo postquam per- 
venerunt, ea quoque ab lulianis teneri vident. 
Desperata salute in quodam colle consistunt atque 
armis demissis salutationem more militari faciunt. 
Quibus miseris ea res parvo praesidio fuit. Namque 
milites veterani ira et dolore incensi non mode ut 
parcerent hosti non poterant adduci sed etiam ex sue 
exercitu inlustris urbanos, quos auctores appellabant, 
compluris aut vulnerarunt aut interfecerunt ; in quo 
numero fuit Tullius Rufus quaestorius, qui pilo 
traiectus consulto a milite interiit ; item Pompeius 
Rufus bracchium gladio percussus, nisi celeriter ad 
Caesarem accucurrisset, interfectus esset. Quo facto 
complux'es equites Romani senatoresque perterriti ex 
proelio se receperunt, ne a militibus, qui ex tanta 
victoria licentiam sibi assumpsissent immoderate 

^ refectis MSS. : refecti Daehn. 
278 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

thrown into utter confusion, were in wholesale retreat 
in every sector of the field, and Caesar's legions 
promptly pursued them without giving them any 
respite in which to pull themselves together. When 
the fugitives reached the camp they were making for, 
with the object of making a recovery there and de- 
fending themselves once more, and of trying to find 
someone to lead them — someone to look up to, under 
whose authority and command they could carry on the 
fight ; when they got there and perceived that there 
was nobody guarding it, they forthw'ith discarded 
their armour and beat a hasty retreat to the royal 
camp. This too on their arrival they saw to be in 
the hands of the Julians. Abandoning all hope of 
salvation, they now halted on a hill and gave the 
military salute by lowering their arms. This 
gesture, unhappily for them, stood them in but little 
stead. For Caesar's veterans were filled with such 
burning indignation and resentment that, so far 
fi'om any possibility of inducing them to spare the 
enemy, they actually wounded or killed several men 
of culture and distinction among the ranks of their 
own side, calling them ringleaders. Among these 
was Tullius Rufus, an ex-quaestor, who was mortally 
wounded by a soldier who deliberately ran him 
through with a heavy javelin; and similarly Pom- 
peius Rufus was stabbed in the arm with a sword and 
would have been done to death, had he not promptly 
rushed to Caesar's side. This behaviour caused 
grave alarm among quite a number of Roman knights 
and senators, who retired from the battle lest they 
themselves should also be massacred by the soldiers, 
who after so resounding a victory had apparently 
taken it for granted that they were free to perpetrate 

279 



CAESAR 

peccandi impunitatis spe propter maximas res gestas, 
ipsi quoque interficerentur. Itaque ei omnes Scipio- 
nis milites cum fidem Caesaris implorarent, inspec- 
tante ipso Caesare et a militibus deprecante eis uti 
parcerent, ad unum sunt interfecti. 
86 Caesar trinis castris potitus occisisque hostium X 
milibus fugatisque compluribus se recepit L militibus 
amissis, paucis sauciis in castra ac statim ex itinera 
ante oppidum Thapsum constitit elephantosque 
LXIIII ornatos armatosque cum turribus orna- 
mentisque capit, captos ante oppidum instructos 
constituit, id hoc consilio, si posset Vergilius quique 
cum eo obsidebantur rei male gestae suorum indicio a 
pertinacia deduci. Deinde ipse Vergilium appellavit 
invitavitque ad deditionem suamque lenitatem et 
clementiam commemoravit. Quem postquam anim- 
advertit responsum sibi non dare, ab oppido discessit. 
Postero die divina re facta contione advocata in 
conspectu oppidanorum milites collaudat totumque 
exercitum veteranorum donavit, praemia fortissimo 
cuique ac bene merenti pro suggestu tribuit, ac 
statim inde digressus Rebilo pro consule cum III ad 
Thapsum legionibus et Cn. Domitio cum duabus 
Thysdrae, ubi Considius praeerat, ad obsidendum 
280 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

any excesses, on the assumption that they would go 
unpunished in view of their magnificent achieve- 
ments. Accordingly, although all these troops of 
Scipio implored Caesar's protection, they were 
massacred to a man, despite the fact that Caesar 
himself was looking on and entreating his troops to 
spare them. 

Having made himself master of three camps and 
killed ten thousand of the enemy and routed a large 
number, Caesar retired to camp with fifty soldiers 
missing and a few wounded. Immediately on his 
arrival he established himself in front of the town 
of Thapsus. He then took sixty-four elephants, 
equipped, armed and complete with towers and 
harness, and these he now drew up in array in front of 
the town: his object in so doing was to see if \'er- 
gilius and the others who were being besieged with 
him could be induced to abandon their obstinate 
resistance by the evidence of their comrades' 
failure. He then addressed a personal appeal to 
\'ergilius inviting him to surrender and reminding 
him of his own leniency and clemency ; but on 
failing to observe any response he withdrew from the 
town. On the following dav, after offering sacrifice, 
he held a parade and in full view of the occupants 
of the town congratulated his troops, rewarding his 
entire veteran force and bestowing decorations 
publicly in front of the dais for conspicuous gal- 
lantry and meritorious service. Thereupon he 
inmiediately withdrew from the town, leaving 
behind the proconsul Rebilus in front of Thapsus 
with three legions and Cn. Domitius with two at 
Thysdra, where Considius was in command, to con- 
tinue the blockades of these places ; and then, 



CAESAR 

relictis, M. Messalla Uticam ante praemisso cum 
equitatu ipse eodem iter facere contendit. 
87 Kquites intei'im Scipionis qui ex proelio fugerant, 
cum Uticam versus iter facerent, perveniunt ad 
oppidum Paradae. Ubi cum ab incolis non recipe- 
rentur, ideo quod fama de victoria Caesaris praecu- 
currisset, vi oppido potiti in medio foro lignis coacer- 
vatis omnibusque rebus eorum congestis ignem 
subiciunt atque eius oppidi incolas cuiusque generis 
aetatisque vivos constrictosque in flammam coiciunt 
atque ita acerbissimo adficiunt supplicio ; deinde 
protinus Uticam perveniunt. Superiore tempore M. 
Cato, quod in Uticensibus propter beneficium Ipgis 
luliae parum suis partibus praesidi esse existima- 
verat, plebem inermem oppido eiecerat et ante 
portam bellicam castris fossaque parvula dumtaxat 
muniverat ibique custodiis circumdatis habitare 
coegerat; senatum autem oppidi custodia tenebat. 
Eorum castra ei equites adorti expugnare coeperunt, 
ideo quod eos Caesaris partibus favisse sciebant, ut 
eis intei'fectis eorum pernicie dolorem suum ulcis- 
cerentur. Uticenses animo addito ex Caesaris 
victoria lapidibus fustibusque equites reppulerunt. 
Itaque postea quam castra non potuerant potiri, 

^ Nothing is known of the details of this law, passed in his 
consulship in 59 B.C., as affecting the citizens of Utica. 

282 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

sending M. Messalla on ahead to Utica with the 
eavah-y, he himself also proceeded with despatch to 
the same destination. 

Meanwhile those horsemen of Scipio's who had 
escaped from the battle were proceeding in the 
dii-ection of Utica when they came to the town of 
Parada. Being refused admittance by the inhabi- 
tants — for the tidings of Caesar's victory had pre- 
ceded them — they gained possession of the town by 
force ; then, making a pile of faggots in the middle 
of the market-place and heaping on top all the 
inhabitants' possessions, they set fire to it and then 
Hung into the flames, alive and bound, the inhabitants 
of the town themselves, irrespective of rank or age, 
thereby meting out to them the most cruel of all 
punishments. Whereupon they came straight to 
Utica. Now earlier on M. Cato had come to the 
conclusion that on account of the benefit they had 
received from the Julian law ^ the men of Utica 
were but luke-warm supporters of his cause ; and so 
he had expelled the unarmed mob from the town, 
built a concentration camp in front of the military 
gate, protected by quite a shallowish trench, and 
forced them to live there cordoned off by sentries. 
As for the town's senate, he kept it under restraint. 
This concentration camp of theirs Scipio's horsemen 
now attacked and began to storm, for the very 
reason that they knew that its occupants had been 
adherents of Caesar's side ; and if they massacred 
them their destruction might serve to avenge their 
own sense of disappointment. But the people of Utica, 
emboldened as a result of Caesar's victory, drove back 
the horsemen with stones and clubs. And so, finding 
it impossible to gain possession of the camp, the 

28^ 



CAESAR 

Uticam se in oppidum coniecerunt atque ibi multos 
Uticensis interfecerunt domosque eorum expugna- 
verunt ac diripuerunt. Quibus cum Cato persuadere 
nulla ratione quiret ut secum oppidum defenderent 
et caede rapinisque desisterent et quid sibi vellent 
sciret, sedandae eorum importunitatis gratia singulis 
C divisit. Idem Sulla Faustus fecit ac de sua pecunia 
largitus est unaque cum his ab Utica proficiscitur 
atque in regnum ire intendit. 

Complures interim ex fuga Uticam perveniunt. 
Quos omnis Cato convocatos una cum CCC, qui 
pecuniam Scipioni ad bellum faciendum contulerant, 
hortatur uti servitia manumitterent oppidumque 
defenderent. Quorum cum partem assentire, partem 
animum mentemque perterritam atque in fugam 
destinatam habere intellexisset, amplius de ea re 
agere destitit navisque his attribuit, ut in quas 
quisque partis vellet proficisceretur. Ipse omnibus 
rebus diligentissime constitutis, libei'is suis L. Caesari, 
qui tum ei pro quaestore fuerat, commendatis, et sine 
suspicione, vultu atque sermone quo superiore 
tempore usus fuerat, cum dormitum isset, ferrum 
intro clam in cubiculum tulit atque ita se traiecit. 
Qui dum anima nondum exspirata concidisset, et 
impetu facto in cubiculum ex suspicione medicus 
familiaresque continere atque vulnus obligare co- 

1 Wealthy Roman citizens — bankers and traders — organised 
in an influential guild or corporation. Whether they formed 
the whole conventus or only the council of a larger corporation 
is not clear; nor is it certain, in view of the words eos qui 
inter CCC in ch. 90, whether they had all contributed funds to 
Scipio. 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

horsemen hurled themselves upon the town of Utica, 
where they massacred many of the inhabitants and 
stormed and looted their houses. As Cato could not 
persuade them l)y any means to join him in defending 
the town or cease from their butchery and pillagins;', 
and as he was aware of their intentions, he distributed 
a hundred sesterces to each of them by way of 
appeasing their wanton attitude. Faustus Sulla 
followed suit and bribed them out of his own pocket ; 
he then left Utica with them and proceeded on his 
v,ax to .Tuba's kingdom. 

^leanwhile a considerable number of the fugitives 
reached Utica. All these, together with the Three 
Hundred,^ who had contributed money to Scipio for 
the prosecution of the war, Scipio now called together 
and urged them to set their slaves at liberty and 
defend the town. On perceiving that, while some 
of them agreed with him, others were thoroughly 
scared at heart and had set their minds on flight, he 
refrained from further mention of the subject and 
assigned ships to the latter to enable them to leave 
for the destination of their individual choice. As for 
himself, having made all arrangements with the 
greatest care and entrusted his children to L. Caesar, 
who at the time was acting as his quaestor, he 
retired to bed without arousing any suspicions, 
there being nothing unusual either about the way 
he looked or the May he talked; and then, having 
secretly smuggled a dagger into his bedroom, he 
accordingly stabbed himself. He had collapsed but 
was still breathing when his doctor and some members 
of his household, suspecting something amiss, forced 
their way into the bedroom and proceeded to staunch 
and bind up the wound ; but with his own hands he 

285 



CAESAR 

epissent, ipse suis manibus vulnus crudelissime 
divellit atque animo praesenti se interemit. Quern 
L ticenses quamquam oderant partium gratia, tamen 
propter eius singularem intcgritatem, et quod dis- 
simillimus reliquorum ducum fucrat quodque Uticam 
mirificis operibus muniverat turrisque auxerat, 
sepultura adficiunt. Quo interfecto L. Caesar ut 
aliquid sibi ex ea re auxili pararet convocato populo 
contione habita cohortatur omnis ut portae aperi- 
rentur : se in C. Caesaris dementia magnam spem 
habere. Itaque portis patefactis Utica egressus 
Caesari iniperatori obviam proficiscitur. Messalla, ut 
erat imperatuni, Uticam pervenit omnibusque portis 
custodias ponit. 

Caesar interim ab Thapso progressus Ussetam ^ 
pervenit, ubi Scipio magnum frumenti numerum, 
armorum, telorum ceterarumque rerum cum parvo 
praesidio habuerat. Id adveniens potitur, deinde 
Hadrumetum pervenit. Quo cum sine mora intro- 
isset, armis, frumento pecuniaque considerata Q. 
Ligario, C. Considio filio, qui tum ibi fuerant, vitam 
concessit. Deinde eodem die Hadrumeto egressus 
Livineio Regulo cum legione ibi relicto Uticam ire 
contendit. Cui in itinere fit obvius L. Caesar et 
subito se ad genua proiecit vitamque sibi neque 
amplius quicquam deprecatur. Cui Caesar facile et 
pro natura sua et pro institute concessit, item 

^ so most MSS. ; but perhaps Uzittam should be read with 
Kuebler and Bouvet. 

286 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

tore it open with utter ruthlessness and resolutely 
made an end of himself. Despite their hatred of 
him on party grounds, yet, on aecount of his unique 
integrity, and because he had proved so very different 
from the other leaders and had fortified Utica with 
wonderful defences and extended its battlements, the 
men of Utica accorded him burial. After Cato's 
suicide L. Caesar, intending to turn this incident 
somehow to his personal advantage, delivered a 
speech to the assembled people in which he urged 
them all to open their gates, saying that he set great 
store by C. Caesar's clemency. Accordingly, the 
gates were thrown open and he came out from Utica 
and set forth to meet Caesar, the commander-in- 
chief. Messalla arrived at Utica in accordance with 
his instructions and posted guards at all the gates. 

Caesar meanwhile advanced from Thapsus and 
arrived at Usseta, where Scipio had kept a large 
quantity of stores including, amongst other things, 
corn, arms and weapons : there was also a small 
garrison force. Of this arsenal he gained possession 
on his arrival, and then came to Hadrumetum. 
Entering this town without opposition, he made an 
inventory of the arms, corn and money in it, and 
spared the lives of Q. Ligarius and C. Considius, 
the son, both of whom were present at that time. 
Then, quitting Hadrumetum the same day and 
leaving Livineius Regulus behind there >nth a legion 
he hastened on to Utica. On the way he was met 
by L. Caesar, who incontinently threw himself at his 
feet and prayed him for one boon, for one alone — ^to 
spare him his life. Caesar readily granted him this 
boon — an act which accorded both with his natural 
temperament and principles ; and in the same way 

287 



CAESAR 

Caecinae, C. Ateio, P. Atrio, L. Celiac patri et 
filio, M. Eppio, M. Aquino, Catonis filio Damasippi- 
que liberis ex sua consuetudine tribuit circiterque 
luminibus accensis Uticam pervenit atque extra 
oppidum ea noctc mansit. 
90 Postero die mane in oppidum introiit contioneque 
advocata Uticensis incolas cohortatus gratias pro 
eorum erga se studio cgit, civis autem Romanes 
negotiatores et eos qui inter CCC pecunias con- 
tulerant Varo et Scipioni multis verbis accusat ^ et 
de eorum sceleribus longiore habita oratione ad 
extremum ut sine metu prodirent edicit : se eis 
dumtaxat vitam concessurum ; bona quidem eorum 
se venditurum, ita tamen, qui eorum ipse sua bona 
redemisset, se bonorum venditionem inducturum et 
pecuniam multae nomine relaturum, ut incolumi- 
tatem retinere posset. Quibus metu exsanguibus de 
vitaque ex suo promerito desperantibus subito oblata 
salute libentes cupidique condicionem acceperunt 
petieruntque a Caesare ut universis CCC uno nomine 
pecuniam imperaret. Itaque bis milies sestertio ^ his 
imposito, ut per tricnnium sex pensionibus populo 
Romano solverent, nullo eorum recusante ac se eo 



1 accusatos MSS. : accusat E. Schneider. 

' sestertium most MSS. : sestertio Oudendorp. 



288 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

he followed his normal procedure in sparing the 
lives of Caeeina, C. Ateius, P. Atrius, L. Cella (both 
father and son), M. Eppius, M. Aquinus, as well as 
Cato's son and the children of Damasippus. He then 
arrived at Utica when it was just about dusk and 
spent that night outside the town. 

Early the following morning he entered the town 
and summoned an assembly, at which he addressed 
the citizens of Utica in a stirring speech and thanked 
them for the zealous support they had given him. 
As, however, for the Roman citizens who were 
engaged in trade and those members of the Three 
Hundred who had contributed sums of money to 
\'arus and Scipio, he brought a very detailed accusa- 
tion against them and dilated at some length upon 
their crimes, but finally announced that they could 
come out into the open without fear : their lives at 
any rate he would spare : their property indeed he 
would sell, yet on the following condition, that if any 
man among them personally bought in his own 
property, he himself would duly register the sale of 
the property and enter up the money paid under the 
heading of a fine, so as to enable the man in question 
to enjoy full security thereafter. For these men, 
pale with fear and, considering their deserts, with 
little hope of saving their lives, here was an un- 
expected offer of salvation. Gladly and eagerly they 
accepted the terms and besought Caesar to fix a 
lump sum of money to be paid by the entire Three 
Hundred as a whole. Accoi'dingly, he required them 
to pay to the Roman people the sum of two hundred 
million sesterces in six instalments spread over three 
years ; and this they accepted gladly and without 
a single murmur, expressing their gratitude to 



CAESAR 

denium die natos praedicantes laeti gratias agunt 
Caesari. 
91 Rex interim luba, ut ex proelio fugerat, una cum 
Petreio interdiu in villis latitando tandem nocturnis 
itineribus confectis in regnum pervenit atque ad 
oppidum Zamam, ubi ipse domieilium, coniuges 
liberosque habebat, quo ex cuncto regno omnem 
pecuniam carissimasque res comportaverat quodque 
inito bello operibus maximis muniverat, accedit. 
Quem antea oppidani rumore exoptato de Caesaris 
victoria audito ob has causas oppido prohibuerunt, 
quod bello contra populum Romanum suscepto in 
oppido Zamae lignis congestis maximam in medio foro 
pyram construxerat ut, si forte bello foret superatus, 
omnibus rebus eo coacervatis, dein civibus cunctis 
interfectis eodemque proiectis igne subiecto tum 
demum se ipse insuper interficeret atque una cum 
liberis, coniugibus, civibus cunctaque gaza regia 
cremaretur. Postquam luba ante portas diu multum- 
que primo minis pro imperio egisset cum Zamensibus, 
dein cum se parum proficere intellexisset precibus 
orasset uti se ad suos deos penates admitterent, ubi 
eos perstai'e in sententia animadvertit nee minis nee 
precibus suis moveri quo magis se reciperent, tertio 
petit ab eis ut sibi coniuges liberosque redderent 
290 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

Caesar and declaring that this day finally marked for 
them the start of a new life. 
91 Meanwhile king Juha had fled from the battle 
and, accompanied by Petreius, by lying up in farms 
by day and travelling by night, arrived at length in 
his kingdom and came to the town of Zama. In this 
town he had his own residence and his wives and 
children ; and it was here he had collected all his 
money and most precious possessions from all over 
his kingdom, having fortified the town at the outset 
of hostilities with very strong defences. But the 
townsfolk, who had already heard the much-desired 
tidings of Caesar's victory, refused him admittance 
on the following grounds : when he entered upon 
hostilities with the Roman people he had collected a 
mass of wooden billets and built a vast pyre in the 
town of Zama in the middle of the market-place, so 
that, should it so chance he was beaten in the war, 
he might pile all his possessions on it, then massacre 
all his citizens and fling them also on to it, set it 
alight, and then finally slay himself on top of it, and 
thus be consumed by fire along with his children, 
wives, citizens and the entire royal treasure. For a 
long time Juba earnestly treated with the men of 
Zama before the gates of the town, employing 
threats in the first place, as his authority warranted ; 
secondly, realising that he was making but little 
headway, he besought them with entreaties to let 
him have access to his own hearth and home ; and 
thirdly, when he observed that they persisted in their 
determination, and that neither threats nor en- 
treaties on his part had any effect upon them or 
disposed them the more to admit him, he begged 
them to hand over to him his wives and children, so 

2gi 



CAESAR 

ut secum eos asportaret. Postquam sibi niliil omnino 
oppidanos responsi reddere animadvertit, nulla re.ab 
his impetrata ab Zama discedit atque ad villain suam 
se cum M. Petreio paucisque equitibus coiifert. 

92 Zamenses interim legates de his rebus ad Caesarem 
Uticam mittunt pctuntque ab eo uti antequam rex 
manum eolligeret seseque oppugnaret sibi auxilium 
mitteret : se tamen paratos esse, sibi quoad vita 
suppeteret, oppidum seque ei reservare. Legates 
collaudatos Caesar domum iubet antecedere ac suum 
adventum praenuntiare. Ipse postero die Utica 
egi'essus cum equitatu in regnum ire contendit. 
Interim in itinere ex regiis copiis duces complures 
ad Caesarem veniunt orantque ut sibi ignoscat. 
Quibus supplicibus venia data Zamam pervcnit. 
Rumore interim perlato de eius lenitate clementiaque 
propemodum omnes regni equites Zamam perveniunt 
ad Caesarem ab eoque sunt metu periculoque liberati. 

93 Dum haec utrobique geruntur, Considius, qui 
Thysdrae cum familia sua, gladiatoria manu Gaetulis- 
que praeerat, cognita caede suorum Domitique et 
legionum adventu pcrterritus desperata salute 
oppidum deserit seque clam cum paucis barbaris 

292 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

that lie could carry them away with him. On 
observing that the townsfolk vouchsafed him no 
answer at all he left Zama without gaining any 
satisfaction from them, and then betook himself to a 
country residence of his, attended by M. Petreius 
and a few horsemen. 

Whereupon the men of Zama sent envoys to 
Caesar at Utica to discuss this situation, asking him 
to send them help before the king should collect a 
foi'ce and attack them : at all events, they said, they 
were prepared to preserve the town and themselves 
for him so long as the breath of life remained in them. 
Caesar congratulated the envoys and bade them 
return home : he would follow them, and they must 
make known his coming in advance. He himself 
left Utica the following day with his cavalry and 
proceeded with despatch into the royal territory. 
Meanwhile in the course of his march there came to 
Caesar several leaders of the royal forces, who begged 
him to forgive them. To these suppliants he granted 
pardon, and then came to Zama. Meanwhile the 
tidings of his leniency and clemency had spread 
abroad, with the result that practically all the horse- 
men in the kingdom came to Caesar at Zama ; and 
there they were set free by him from their fears and 
the danger which involved them. 

During the course of these proceedings on cither 
side Considius, who was in command at Thysdra and 
was accompanied by his household slaves, a body- 
guard of gladiatoi's and some Gaetulians, learned of 
the massacre of his comrades ; and being seriously 
perturbed by the arrival of Domitius and his legions, 
and despairing of saving his life, he abandoned the 
town, made a secret withdraMal with a handful of his 

293 



CAESAR 

pecunia onustus subducit atque in regnum fugere 
contendit. Quem Gaetuli, sui comites, in itinere 
pracdae cupidi concidunt seque in quascumque 
potuere partis conferunt. C. interim \'ergilius, 
postquam terra marique clausus se nihil proficere 
intellexit suosque interfectos aut fugatos, M. 
Catonem Uticae sibi ipsum manus attulisse, regem 
vagum ab suisque desertum ab omnibus aspernari, 
Saburram eiusque copias ab Sittio esse deletas, 
Uticae Caesarem sine mora receptum, de tanto 
exercitu reliquias esse nullas, ipse sibi suisque liberis 
a Caninio pro consule, qui eum obsidebat, fide 
accepta seque et sua omnia et oppidum proconsuli 
tradit. 

94 Rex interim ab omnibus civitatibus exclusus, 
desperata salute, cum iam cenatus ^ esset cum 
Petreio, ut per virtutem interfecti esse viderentur, 
ferro inter se depugnant atque firmior imbecilliorem 
luba Petreium ^ facile ferro consumpsit. Deinde 
ipse sibi cum conaretur gladio traicere pectus nee 
posset, precibus a servo suo impetravit ut se inter- 
ficeret idque obtinuit. 

95 P. Sittius interim pulso exercitu Saburrae, prae- 
fecti lubae, ipsoque interfecto cum iter cum paucis 
per Mauretaniam ^ ad Caesarem faceret, forte incidit 

1 conatus MSS. : cenatus Buhenius. 

2 luba Petreium MSS. ; but lubam Petreius is a common 
restoration u-hich not only serves to improve the word order by 
securing chiasmus, but also conforms to the traditional account 
of the duel given both in Livy, Epitome and Florus. 

' The MSS. reading appears corrupt : the phrase is barely 
intelligible in this position, and Modken may well be right in 
placing it after Hispaniam. One MS. (M) gives per marit- 
timam, whence per maritima or per oram maritimam have been 
conjectured. 

294 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

foreign troops and a large sum of money, and beat a 
hasty retreat to Juba's kingdom. But while he 
was on the road the Gactulians who bore him com- 
pany cut him down in their impatience to loot his 
treasure, and then made off, as best they could, in 
various directions. Meanwhile C. \'ergilius, who 
was cut off alike by land and sea, perceived that he 
was making no progress : that his comrades were 
either killed or put to flight : that M. Cato had 
taken his own life at Utica : that the king was a 
wanderer at large, abandoned by his subjects and 
held in universal contempt : that Saburra and his 
troops had been destroyed by Sittius : that Caesar 
had been received without opposition at Utica ; 
and that out of all that vast army there was nothing 
left whatever. For his own part, therefore, he 
accepted the safeguard for himself and his children 
offered him by the pro-consul Caninius, who was 
blockading him, and surrendered himself to the latter 
with all his effects and the town. 

Meanwhile king Juba, outlawed by all his town- 
ships, despaired of saving his life. And so finally, 
after dining with Petreius, he fought a duel with him 
with swords, so as to create the impression that both 
had met a gallant death ; and the sword of the 
stronger man, Juba, easily put an end to Petreius, 
his weaker adversai-y. Juba then endeavoured to 
run himself through the chest with his sword ; but 
not being able to do it, he successfully entreated a 
slave of his to kill him, and so achieved his purpose. 

Meanwhile P. Sittius had routed the army of 
Saburra, Juba's lieutenant, killing Saburra himself, 
and was marching with a small force through 
Mauretania to join Caesar when he happened to fall 

295 



CAESAR 

in Faustum Afraniumque, qui earn manum habebant 
qua Uticam diripuerant iterque in Hispaniam in- 
tendcbant et crant numcro circitcr mille. Itaque 
celeritcr nocturno tempore insidiis dispositis cum 
prima luce adortus praetcr paucos equites, qui ex 
primo agmine fugerant, reliquos aut interfecit aut in 
deditionem acccpit, Afranium et Faustum cum 
coniuge et liberis vivos capit. Faucis post diebus 
dissensione in exercitu orta Faustus et Afranius 
interficiuntur ; Pompeiae cum Fausti liberis Caesar 
incolumitatem suaque omnia concessit. 

96 Scipio interim cum Damasippo et Torquato et 
Plaetorio Rustiano navibus longis diu multumque 
iactati, cum Hispaniam peterent, ad Hipponem 
regium deferuntur, ubi classis P. Sitti id temporis 
erat. A qua pauciora ab amplioribus circumventa 
navigia deprimuntur, ibique Scipio cum illis quos ^ 
paulo ante nominavi interiit. 

97 Caesar interim Zamae auctione regia facta bonis- 
que eorum venditis qui cives Romani contra populum 
Romanum arma tulerant praemiisque Zamensibus, 
qui de rege excludendo consilium ceperant, tributis 
vectigalibusque regiis locatis ^ ex regnoque provincia 
facta atque ibi C. Sallustio pro consule cum imperio 
relicto ipse Zama egressus Uticam se recepit. Ibi 
bonis venditis eorum qui sub luba Petreioque 

^ cum quos or cum illis quas MSS. : cum illis quos Kuehler. 
2 togatis most MSS. (irrogatis in two inferior Dresden 
codices) : locatis R. Schneider. 

296 



. THE AFRICAN WAR 

in with Faustus and Afranius, who were in command 
of the party — some thousand strong — with which 
they had phmdcred Utica, and were now making 
tracks for Spain. And so he promptly laid an ambush 
by night and attacked them at dawn. A few of the 
cavalry in their vanguard escaped ; but all the rest 
were either killed or else they surrendered, and 
Sittius captured alive Afranius as well as Faustus 
with his wife and children. A few days later some 
disagreement arose in the army and Faustus and 
Afranius were killed. As for Pompcia and the 
children of f^austus, Caesar spared their lives and 
allowed them to retain all their property. 

Meanwhile Scipio, Damasippus, Torquatus and 
Plaetorius Rustianus were making for Spain aboard 
some warships ; and after a long and very stormy 
passage they were carried towards Royal Hippo, 
where P. Sittius had his fleet at that time. Out- 
numbered as they were by the latter, Scipio 's vessels 
were surrounded and sunk ; and Scipio and those I 
have just named perished aboard them. 

Meanwhile at Zama Caesar held an auction of the 
royal property and sold the goods of those who, 
albeit Roman citizens, had borne arms against the 
Roman people. He bestowed rewards upon the 
inhabitants of Zama, who had adopted the policy 
of barring their gates to the king, farmed out the 
collection of the royal taxes, and turned the kingdom 
into a province. Then, leaving C. Sallustius behind 
there in military command with the powers of pro- 
consul, he himself left Zama and returned to Utica. 
There he sold the property of those who had held 
military commands under Juba and Petreius, and 
exacted the following payments under the title of 

297 



CAESAR 

ordines duxerant, Thapsitanis HS |XX, conventui 
eorum HS |XXX, itemque ^ Hadrumctinis HS jXXX, 
conventui eorum HS |L multac nomine imponit ; 
civitates bonaque eorum ab omni iniuria rapinisque 
defendit. Leptitanos, quorum superioribus annis 
bona luba diripuerat, et ad senatum questi per 
legatos at(jue arbitris a senatu datis sua reccperant, 
XXX centenis milibus pondo olei in annos singulos 
multat, ideo quod initio per dissensionem principum 
societatem cum luba inierant eumque armis, mili- 
tibus, pecunia iuverant. Thysdritanos propter 
humilitatem civitatis certo numero frumenti multat. 
His rebus gestis Idibus lun. Uticae classem con- 
scendit et post diem tertium Caralis in Sardiniam 
pervenit. Ibi Sulcitanos, quod Nasidium eiusque 
classem receperant copiisque iuverant, HS C multat 
et pro decumis octavas pendere iubet bonaque 
paucorum vendit et ante diem llll Kal. Quint, 
navis conscendit et a Caralibus secundum terram 
provectus duodetricesimo die, ideo quod tempesta- 
tibus in portibus cohibebatur, ad urbem Romam 
venit. 

^ itemque appears in the MSS. before Thapsitanis : Nipper- 
dey transposed it. 



298 



THE AFRICAN WAR 

fines : from the men of Thapsus — two million 
sesterces ; from their corporation — three million ; 
likewise from the men of Hadrumetum — three 
million ; and from their corporation — five million. 
But he protected their cities and property from all 
injury and looting. As for the inhabitants of Leptis, 
whose property had been plundered in former years 
by Juba but had been restored to them after the 
Senate had appointed arbitrators on receiving a 
deputation of theirs lodging a formal complaint, 
Caesar now required them to pay by way of fine 
three million pounds weight of oil annually, because 
at the beginning of the war in the course of disagree- 
ments among their leaders they had entered into an 
alliance with Juba, and had assisted him with arms, 
troops and money. The men of Thysdra — not a 
well-to-do community — were fined a certain quantity 
of corn. 

After making these arrangements he went aboard 
his fleet at Utica on June 1,3th, and arrived two days 
later at Caralis in Sardinia. There he fined the men 
of Sulci one hundred thousand sesterces for having 
harboured Nasidius and his fleet and assisted him by 
supplying troops, and directed that they should pay 
as tax one-eighth of their produce instead of one- 
tenth. He also sold up the property of a few 
individuals. Then he embarked on June 27th, and 
leaving Caralis, sailed along the coast. Twenty- 
seven days later — for bad weather kept holding him 
up in the various ports — he arrived at the city of 
Rome. 



299 



THE SPANISH WAR 



INTRODUCTION 

The battle of Thapsus sealed the fate of the Pom- 
peians' venture in Africa. Once again their army 
had been shattered : their main ally, Juba, was dead : 
Cato and Scipio had both perished by their own 
hands : Afranius, Petreius, Faustus Sulla and Con- 
sidius had all been killed : of the leaders only \'arus, 
Labienus and the two sons of Pompey survived. In 
Spain lay their last chance of regrouping and making 
another stand. But this time they were not to enjoy 
so long a respite in which to consolidate ; for less than 
nine months after his victory at Thapsus Caesar was 
to set foot in Spain for the final reckoning. 

For two months after the battle Caesar was 
occupied in reducing the remaining African strong- 
holds, replenishing his finances by inflicting heavy 
fines upon the prosperous communities which had 
lately defied him, and reorganising the province and 
its neighbouring territories. On his return to Rome 
in July 4G conditions were outwardly more settled 
than on his previous visit. Honours and offices, 
including a third dictatorship .and a fourth consulship 
for the ensuing year, were showered upon him, while 
preparations went ahead for his delayed triumphs. 
These he celebrated in August with unprecedented 
magnificence — over Gaul, Egypt, Pontus and Africa ; 
and there appears to have been a general feeling 
that the last battle of the civil wars had already been 

303 



INTRODUCTION 

fought and that, with Cato's suicide, the struggle to 
maintain the old order was too futile to pursue. 

Meanwhile the news from Further Spain was 
ominous. Since Caesar's brilliant victory at Ilerda 
in 49 much had happened to lessen his prestige and 
revive memories of Poinpey's earlier feats of arms in 
the peninsula. The prolonged misgovernment of 
Q. Cassius had exasperated the Spaniards and driven 
several of the Roman legions to open mutiny ^ ; 
and though this had been quelled with but little 
bloodshed and Cassius had fled, the mischief was 
done. The mutinous legions, fearing Caesar's 
retribution, expelled the new governor, Trebonius, 
and chose Scapula and Aponius as their leaders ; 
and when, in the autumn of 40, Pompey's elder son, 
Gnaeus, landed in the province, he was at once 
elected as their commander. After Thapsus came 
the refugees — his younger brother. Sextus, and the 
remnants of the broken armies led by Labienus and 
Varus ; while in Spain itself many of the troops who 
had once served with Afranius and had been dis- 
banded by Caesar to their homes in Spain now 
joined his standards. By the end of 46 Gnaeus had 
thirteen legions, though only four were of proved 
worth ; and though his own record ill fitted him for 
the supreme command, yet he had two valuable 
assets — the magic influence of his father's name and, 
in Labienus, at least one brilliant and experienced 
subordinate. 

Caesar had not been blind to these ever-increasing 

dangers. Didius had been despatched with a fleet : 

Pedius and Fabius had been furnished initially with 

troops from Sardinia and, when these proved in- 

1 See Bell. Alex. chs. 4S-G4. 



INTRODUCTION 

sufficient, i-einforced. But the situation had got out 
of their control : most of Baetica had gone over to 
the rebels, and the few remaining loyal communities 
like Ulia, unable to hold out much longer, kept 
sending him urgent appeals for help. Early in 
November 46 Caesar left Rome for Further Spain, 
whei"e,with a force of eight legions and eight thousand 
cavalry, he now entered upon what was to prove the 
final campaign alike of the war and of his own 
career. 

Of this campaign, the bloodiest of the war, we 
have one contemporary account, de Bella Hispaniensi 
— perhaps the most illiterate and exasperating book 
in classical literature. Who wrote it is unknown ; 
but he appears to have been one of the combatants ^ ; 
and Macaulay's guess that he was some ' sturdy old 
centurion who fought better than he wrote ' is 
possibly not far off the truth. In view of the sorry 
state of the MSS. tradition it is difficult to assess 
accurately his historical and literary merits : all 
that can be attempted here is a brief and general 
survey of his qualities. 

As a military commentator he lacks a sense of 
proportion ; for while he describes — often at some 
length — all kinds of engagements, including quite 
minor skirmishes,^ as well as frequent atrocities,^ 
desertions and even apparent trivialities.* yet he 
throws little light on problems of supply,^ finance, 

^ cf. in ch. 29 the topographical details of the plain of 
Munda and the allusion to the weather. 
- e.g. eh. 13, 21, 27. 
' e.g. ch. 12, 15, 20, 21, 27. 

* e.g. the appearance of the moon in ch. 27. 

* The references in ch. 5, 1 1 and 26 are very vague. 



INTRODUCTION 

the number of troops engaged ' and, above all, the 
tactical reasons for the various manoeuvres. ^ His 
grasp of tactics seems, in fact, negligible.^ 

His enumeration of casualties * sometimes reflects 
the partisan ; but in other respects, wherever his 
narrative can be compared with the brief accounts 
of later writers, it appears in the main to be reason- 
ably trustworthy. 

His presentation of his material is not always 
effective. He tries hard to follow a chronological 
sequence and, when it occurs to him to do so, he 
quotes a date.^ But this day-by-day system often 
involves a mere catalogue of disconnected incidents.* 
Nor is his chronology always accurate : not seldom 
he forgets to mention something in its proper place 
and so has to go back.' 

His literary style is poor. Colloquial expressions ^ 
jostle with quotations from Ennius and reminiscences 
of Homer : his vocabulary is limited and dull repeti- 

^ Meagre details are given in ch. 7 and 30. 

- Thus, while he accounts for Gnaeus's taking the field at 
Munda in ch. 28, he gives no reasons for the manoeuvres of 
ch. 27. 

^ e.g. in ch. 29 his strange assumption that the Caesarians 
expected the enemy to come down to tight in the plain. 

* e.g. ch. 15 : 123 enemy dead, but only 3 Caesarians killed ; 
and ch. 23, where after desperate hand-to-hand fighting 
Caesarian casualties are two dead and several wounded. 

^ e.g. ch. 19, 27, 31, 39. 

6 e.g. ch. 10, 11, 13, 20. 

' e.g. ch. 10 : 'I forgot to mention in its proper place ' ; 
moreover, he appears to have coined a special phrase for such 
emergencies, if the recurrent words hoc praeterito tempore 
mean, as they seem to, ' just before this time '. 

* e.g. his constant use of bene in the sense of ' very ', which 
occurs in Cicero (but mainly in the letters) and the comic 
poets; words like loricalus. 

306 



INTRODUCTION 

tions of the same word or phrase are frequent. ^ His 
grammar is uncertain, often colloquial, sometimes 
barely intelligible.- But his chief failing is a want 
of clarity resulting from a habit of not stating 
clearly the subject of the sentence and frequently 
changing it without warning; and this often leads to 
serious ambiguities. ^ 

Nevertheless, despite all its obvious failings, de 
Bello Hispaniensi has character. Its author appeal's 
as an honest man struggling with an unfamiliar 
task ; and if fortune had not preserved his efforts, 
our knowledge of the campaign would be the poorer. 

^ e.g. his monotonous repetition of tlie relative pronoun as a 
connective in the middle of ch. 3, and the doubled prope in 
the last sentence; also, in ch. 9, committere twice in the same 
sentence. The repetition of tripertito in ch. 5 and of itaque 
nostri procedunt in ch. 29 is rather different and suggests the 
informal style of conversation. 

- See ch. 22 for several examples of the subjunctive used in 
factual relative clauses : ch. 36 for renuntiare followed by a 
quod clause ; and in ch. 27 the barely grammatical phrase 
' a. d. Hi . . . factum est, ex eo tempore . . .'. 

^ See note 1 at foot of ch. 27, and ch. 38. 



307 



ANALYSIS OF THE BOOK 



1 Cn. Pompeius ransacks Further Spain for troops and 

money. 

2 Caesar enters the province and joins his lieutenants. 
3-5 Caesar sends help to Ulia — marches to Corduba, 

thereby relieving Ulia — crosses the Baetis by a 
pontoon bridge : indecisive fighting S. of the town. 
6-19 Siege of Ategua 

Pompeius encamps S. of the Salsum — description 
of his forces and of the terrain — skirmish at Castra 
Postumiana — sally of Ateguans repulsed— peace 
overtures rejected : Pompeius skirmishes success- 
fully N. of Salsum — Caesar's cavalry retaliate dis- 
mounted — barbarous behaviour of Pompeian garri- 
son : another sally from the town repulsed— 
Tullius and Cato offer terms which Caesar rejects : 
further heavy fighting round the town — it surren- 
ders on February lUth. 
20-26 Operations near Ucubi 

Pompeius executes Caesarian partisans at Ucubi : 
party strife at Ursao : skirmish near river Salsum — 
gallantry of two centurions : battle on high ground 
near Soricaria — Pompeius repulsed with heavy 
losses : single combat between Turpio and Niger : 
evidence of disaffection in Pompeian army. 
27-31 Operations near Munda 

Both armies move S. — Caesar storms Ventipo — 
Pompeius burns Carruca — takes field outside 
Munda : description of the terrain : Pompeius 
remains on defensive on high ground — Caesar 
attacks — bitter fighting — the Tenth legion starts the 
enemy rout — total casualties on either side. 



308 



ANALYSIS OF THE BOOK 

CHAPTERS 

32-42 ' Mopping- up ' Operations 

Fugitives in Munda closely invested: Cn. Pompeius 
flees to Carteia : Caesar arrives outside Corduba- — ■ 
sedition in the town expedites its capture : Caesar 
marches to Hispalis — Philo renews resistance and 
makes a final sail}' — Hispalis falls : Pompeius 
wounded in fighting at Carteia — flees by sea with 
Didius in pursuit — his fleet destroyed — he is finally 
caught, killed, and his head brought to Hispalis : 
Didius ambushed and killed : Fabius finally 
reduces Munda : Ursao is invested : Caesar returns 
to Hispalis — convenes the assembly — accuses the 
people of base ingratitude in supporting Pompeius. 



309 



DE BELLO HISPANIENSI 

1 Pharnace superato, Africa rccepta, qui ex his 
proeliis cum adulescente Cn. Pompeio profugissent, 
cum . . . et ulterioris Hispaniae potitus esset, dum 
Caesar muneribus dandis in Italia detinetur, . . . 
quo facilius praesidia contra compararet, Pompeius 
in fidem uniuscuiusque civitatis confugere cocpit.^ 
It a partim prccihus partini vi bene magna com- 
parata manu provinciam vastare. Quibus in rebus 
non nullae civitates sua sponte auxilia mittebant, 
item non nullae portas contra cludebant. Ex quibus 
si (}ua oppida vi ceperat, cum aliquis ex ea civitate 
optime de Cn. Pompeio meritus civis esset, propter 
pecuniae magnitudinem alia qua ei inferebatur 
causa, ut eo de medio sublato ex eius pecunia latro- 
num largitio fieret. Ita paucis commoda ab hoste 

^ A. Klofz (Teubner, 1927) conjerturally restores the text as 
follows : — Pharnace . . . proeliis • superfuissent) cum <ad)> 
adulescente<m> Cn. Pompeium profugissent, cum <Baleares 
appulisset) et ulterioris . . . detinetur, <^magnas copias coege- 
runt. Caesaris autem copiae nil profecerunt). quo facilius . . . 
' . . . and when those u-ho had survived from these battles had 
taken refuge with the young Cn. Pompeius, ichen he had put in 
at the Balearic Islands and had gained possession of Further 
Spain, . . . they collected large forces. Caesar's forces, however, 
made no headway.' 

^ i.e. the elder of the two sons of Cn. Pompeius Magnus. 
His departure from Africa before the decisive battle of Thapsus 
is mentioned in Bell. Afr. eh. 23, where he is described as 

310 



THE SPANISH WAR 

1 Now that Pharnaccs had been overcome and Africa 
recovered, and those who had made good their 
escape from these battles with the young Cn. Pom- 
peius 1 had . . . and he had gained possession of 
Further Spain, while Caesar was occupied in Italy 
exhibiting games, ... to make it easier to gather (Xriump 
together defensive forces for the purposes of resist- ^^^*" * 
ance, Pompeius proceeded to throw himself upon the 
protection of each individual state. Having in this 
way mustered a good large force, partly by entreaties, 
partly by violent measures, he was now playing havoc 
with the province. In these circumstances some states 
sent reinforcements of their own accord, while on the 
other hand some shut their gates against him. And 
if, whenever he took any of their towns by force, 
there was any rich citizen of that township who had 
deserved well of Cn. Pompeius, yet in view of his 
great wealth some other charge would always be 
brought against him, in order that he might be done 
away with and his money used to provide a handsome 
share-out for the plunderers. This policy enabled a 

setting course for the Balearic Islands. From references in 
Cicero and Dio it appears that he was ill in the summer of 46, 
but crossed to the mainland of Spain in the autumn and 
attacked New Carthage. Klotz's restoration of the sentence 
could, I think, imply that all the Pompeian survivors — 
including those from Thapsus — eventually joined the young 
Pompeius in Spain. 

311 



CAESAR 

orta : eo ^ maiorcs augcbantur cnpiac. Hoc crebrius ^ 
nuntiis in Italiam missis civitatcs contrariae Pompeio 
auxilia sibi depostulabant. 

2 C. Caesar dictator tcrtio, dcsifjnatus dictator 
quarto multis ante iter rebus confcctis ^ cum celeri 
festinatione ad bellum conficiendum in Hispaniam 
cum venisset, legatique Cordubenses, qui a Cn. 
Pompeio discessissent, Caesari obviam venisscnt, a 
quibus nuntiabatur nocturno tempore oppidum 
Cordubam capi posse, quod nee opinantibus adver- 
sariis eius provinciae potitus esset, simulque quod 
tabellariis, qui a Cn. Pompeio dispositi omnibus locis 
essent, qui certiorem Cn. Pompcium de Caesaris 
adventu facerent, ipse suum cius adventus metum 
significasset,* multa practerea veri similia propone- 
bant. Quibus rebus adductus quos legatos ante 
exercitui praefecerat Q. Pedium et Q. Fabium 
Maximum de suo adventu facit certiores, utque sibi 
equitatus qui ex provincia fuisset praesidio esset. 
Ad quos celerius quam ipsi opinati sunt appropinqua- 
vit neque, ut ipse voluit, equitatum sibi praesidio 
habuit. 

3 Erat idem temporis Sex. Pompeius frater qui cum 
praesidio Cordubam tenebat, quod eius provinciae 
caput esse existimabatur ; ipse autem Cn. Pompeius 
adulescens Uliam ^ oppidum oppugnabat et fere iam 
aliquot mensibus ibi detinebatur. Quo ex oppido 

^ / have adopted Fleischer's emendation of the MSS. reading — 
ita pacis commoda hoste hortato. 

' crebris MSS. : crebrius Xipperdey. 

^ multis iterante diebus coniectis MSS. : / have adopted 
Hoffmann s reading. 

* ipse . . . significasset is Mommsen's conjectural restora- 
tion. 

'" ullam MSS. : Uliam most editors. 



THE SPANISH WAR 

few men to reap profits on the enemy side, and their 
resources correspondingly increased ; whereas its 
effect upon the states opposed to Pompeius was to 
make them send more frequent messages to Italy 
urgently requesting assistance to be sent to them. 

2 C. Caesar, who was now- in his third dictatorship 
and had been appointed to a fourth, had had much 
business to complete before he took to the road ; 
but this was now disposed of, and he had come 
post haste to Spain to finish off the war. Envoys from 
those in Corduba who had deserted the cause of Cn. 
Pompeius had met Caesar and now reported that 
the town of Corduba could be captured by night, 
because it was by surprise that Pompeius had 
mastered his rivals in that province, and moreover, 
Pompeius himself had revealed his own fears of 
Caesar's arrival by the fact that he had posted 
couriers at all points to notify him of Caesar's 
coming. They also advanced many other plausible 
reasons besides this. Caesar Avas thereby en- 
couraged and informed Q. Pedius and Q. Fabius 
Maximus, the two officers he had previously ap- 
pointed to command his army, that he had arrived, 
adding instructions that the cavalry which had been 
raised in the province should support him. But he 
came up with them more expeditiously than they 
themselves anticipated, and so did not have the 
cavalry to support him as he himself had wished. 

3 At the same time there was the brother, Sextus 
Pompeius, who was holding Corduba with a garrison 
force, that town being regarded as the capital of the 
province ; whereas the young Cn. Pompeius himself 
was attacking the town of Ulia, and had now been 
engaged there for some months or so. On learning 

313 



CAESAR 

cognito Caesaris advcntu logati clam praesidia Cn. 
Pompei Caesarem cum adissent, petere coeperunt 
uti sibi primo quoque tempore subsidium mitteret. 
Caesar — earn civitatem omiii tempore optime de 
populo Romano meritam esse — celeritcr sex cohortis 
secunda vigilia iiibet proficisci, pari equitcs nuniero. 
Quibus praefecit hominem eius provinciae iiotum et 
non parum scientem, L. \'ibium^ Paciaecum. Qui 
cum ad Cn. Pompei praesidia venisset, incidit idem 
temporis ut tempestate adversa vehementique vento 
adflictaretur ; aditusque vis tempestatis ita obscura- 
bat ut vix proximum agnoscere posset. Cuius 
incommodum summam utilitatem ipsis praebebat. 
Ita cum ad eum locum venerunt, iubct binos equites 
conscendere, et recta per adversariorum praesidia ad 
oppidum coiitendunt. Mediisque eorum praesidiis 
cum essent, cum quaererctur qui essent, unus ex 
nostris respondit, ut sileat verbum facere : nam id 
temporis conari ad murum aecedere, ut oppidum 
capiant ; et partim tempestate impediti vigiles non 
poterant diligentiam praestare, partim illo response 
deterrebantur. Cum ad portam appropinquassent, 
signo dato ab oppidanis sunt recepti, et pedites 

^ vivium MSS. : Vibium Forckhammer. 

^ Klotz, however, interprets : — ' a man familiar with that 
province and not without mlHtary knowledge.' 

^ Or possibly — ' bade the infantry mount pillion '. The 
subsequent rapid advance, as well as the mention of the 
cavalry's being numerically equal to the infantn-, tends, 
I rather think, to support this interpretation. It would, 
however, fit much better in the next chapter, where the 
infantry undoubtedly took to the horses for a time. Perhaps 



THE SPANISH WAR 

of Caesar's arrival, envoys left this town unbeknown 
to Cn. Pompeius' outposts, came to Caesar, and pro- 
ceeded to entreat him to send them help at the 
earliest opportunity. Caesar, who was aware that 
the township in question had always deserved well 
of the Roman people, promptly gave orders that six 
infantry cohorts and a corresponding number of 
cavalry should set out at the second watch ; and in 
command of them he put L. Vibius Paciaecus, a well- 
known member of that province, and one that knew 
it pretty well.^ Now it so chanced that at the very 
time he came to Cn. Pompeius' outposts he was beset 
by bad weather and a violent gale. So severe was 
the storm and so dark did it make the approaches 
to the town that they could scarcely recognise their 
next-door neighbours. To them indeed this draw- 
back proved of the utmost advantage. And so, 
when they had got thus far, he bade the horsemen 
go up in file,- and they pushed rapidly forward to 
the town straight through their opponent's positions. 
When they were in the middle of their positions some- 
one asked who they were ; and one of our men told 
the questioner to hold his tongue: 'just at the 
moment they were trying to come up to the wall so as 
to capture the town.' It was in fact partly the dis- 
concerting effect of this reply, partly the difficulties 
of the storm, which prevented the sentries fi'om dis- 
playing proper attention to their duties. When 
they came up to the gate they gave the pass-word 
and were admitted by the townsfolk : the infantry 
were deployed in various sectors of the town and 

the author was confused about the details of the two sorties, 
and attributed somewhat allusively to both the tactics which 
properl}' belonged only to one. 



CAESAR 

dispo&iti ^ partim ibi rcmanserunt, equites clamore 
facto eruptioncm in adversariorum castra fecerunt. 
Sic in illo facto, cum inscientibus accidisset, existima- 
bant prope magna pars hominuin qui in his castris 
fuissent se prope captos esse. 

4 Hoc misso ad Uliam praesidio Caesar, ut Pompeium 
ab ea oppugnatione deduceret, ad Cordubam con- 
tendit, ex quo itinere loricatos viros fortis cum 
equitatu ante praemisit. Qui simul in conspcctum 
oppidi se dederunt, cum equis recipiuntur, hoc a Cor- 
dubensibus nequaquam poterat animadverti. Appro- 
pinquantibus ex oppido bene magna multitudo ad 
equitatum concidendum cum exissent, loricati, ut 
supra scripsimus, ex equis descenderunt et magnum 
proelium fecerunt, sic uti ex infinita hominum 
multitudine pauci in oppidum se reciperent. Hoc 
timore adductus Sex. Pompcius htteras fratri misit ut 
celeriter sibi subsidio veniret, ne prius Caesar 
Cordubam caperet quam ipse illo venisset. Itaque 
Cn. Pompeius Ulia prope capta litteris fratris 
excitus cum copiis ad Cordubam iter facere 
coepit. 

5 Caesar, cum ad flumen Baetim venisset neque 
propter altitudinem flimiinis transire posset, lapidibus 
corbis plenos demisit : insuper ponit trabes ; ita 
ponte facto copias ad castra tripertito traduxit. 
Tendebat adversum oppidum e regione pontis, ut 

1 pedites equites clamore facto dispositis MSS. : pedites 
dispositi Nipperdeij. 

316 



THE SPANISH WAR 

stayed inside, while the cavah-y raised a shout and 
saUied forth against the enemy camp. Thus, in the 
course of this operation, which had taken the enemy 
unawares, well nigh the majority of the troops in this 
camp thought they were as good as captured. 

Having despatched this relief force to Ulia, Caesar 
marched to Corduba with the object of inducing 
Pompeius to abandon his assault of Ulia ; and while 
on the march he sent on ahead some heavy-armed 
infantry troops — brave soldiers — accompanied by 
cavalry. No sooner had they come within sight of 
the town than they all took to the liorses ; but this 
manoeuvre it was quite impossible for the men of 
Corduba to observe. Now as they were approaching 
Corduba, a good large force came out of the town 
to cut the cavalry to pieces, and the heavy-armed 
infantry we have just mentioned now dismounted. 
They then fought a great battle, to such effect that 
out of that countless host but few men retired back 
into the town. In his alarm at this reverse Sextus 
Pompeius was constrained to send a despatch to his 
brother urging him to come promptly to his aid, to 
prevent Caesar's capturing Corduba before Gnaeus 
himself could arrive thei'e. Accordingly, though 
Cn. Pompeius had almost captured Ulia, he was 
disturbed by his brother's despatch and proceeded 
to march to Corduba with his forces. 

When Caesar came to the river Baetis he could not 
cross it owing to the depth of the stream ; so he 
lowered into it wicker baskets filled with stones, 
laid beams on top of them, and thus made a bridge, 
by which he brought his forces across to a camp 
divided into three sections. He was now encamped 
over against the town in the area of the bridge, and 

317 



CAESAR 

supra scripsimus, tripertito.^ Hue cum Pompeius 
cum suis copiis venisset, ex adverso pari ratione 
castra ponit. Caesar, ut eum ab oppido coinmea- 
tuque exoludcret, bracchium ad pontem ducere 
coepit : pari idem eoiidicioiie Pompeius facit. Hie 
inter duces duos fit contentio uter prius pontem 
occuparet ; ex qua contentione cotidiana minuta 
proelia fiebant, ut modo hi, non numquam illi 
superiores discederent. Quae res cum ad maiorem 
contentionem venisset, ab utrisque comminus pugna 
inita, dum cupidius locum student tenere, propter 
pontem coagulabantur,^ fluminis ripas appropin- 
quantes coangustati praecipitabantur. Hie alternis ^ 
non solum morti mortem exaggerabant, sed tumulos 
tumulis exaequabant. Ita diebus compluribus con- 
sumptis cupiebat Caesar, si qua condicione posset, 
adversarios in aequum locum deducere et prime 
quoque tempore de bello decernere. 
6 Id cum animadverteret adversarios minime velle, 
quo eos quomodo ab Ulia * retraxerat in aequum 

^ After demisit the MSS. give : — ita insuper ponte facto 
copias ad castra tripertito transduxit tenebat adversum 
oppidum e regione ponit trabes pontis ut supra scripsimus 
tripertito. The reading here followed is that of Fleischer, but 
ivith Kroner's tendebat in place of tenebat. 

^ coagulabant 3ISS. : coagulabantur Kuebler. 

' alterius MSS. : alternis most editors. 

* quos quoniam a a via retraxerat ut MSS. I have adopted 
Nipperdey's restoration. 

* viz. the permanent bridge over the Baetis (Guadalquivir), 
the northern end of which must have been in the hands of 
Sextus : Caesar's object was to deny its use to Gnaeus. 
Caesar's line presumably ran from his own bridgehead at the 
southern end of his pile bridge to the southern end of the per- 
manent bridge : Gnaeus' line must have been a contra vallation. 

* The exact import of this colourful expression is not easy to 

318 



THE SPANISH WAR 

his camp was, as we have just mentioned, divided into 
three sections. When Pompeius arrived there with 
his forces he pitched a camp on the same principle 
on the opposite side. In order to cut him off from 
the town and the suppUes it afforded, Caesar began 
to carry a Une of fortifications to the bridge,^ and 
Pompeius adopted tactics on similar lines. Where- 
upon a race took place between the two commanders 
as to which of them should seize the bridge first ; and 
this race gave rise to daily skirmishes on a small scale 
in which now our troops, now theirs, would come out 
on top. This situation had now developed into a 
more intensive struggle, and both sides being more 
]iassionately bent on holding their ground had em- 
l)arked upon hand-to-hand fighting and formed a 
solid mass near the bridge ; and as they approached 
the river's banks they were flung headlong into it, 
packed tightly as they were. At this point the two 
sides vied with each other not merely in piling one 
death upon another but in matching mound of dead 
with mound. 2 Several days were passed in this 
fashion, and Caesar was anxious to bring his oppo- 
nents down to favourable ground, if by any means he 
could do so, and fight a decisive action at the earliest 
opportunity. 

Observing that his opponents were by no means 
willing to do this, Caesar led his forces across the 
river and ordered large fires to be lit at night, so as 

decide. As it seems likely that the purpose of the whole 
sentence is merely to emphasise the extent of the carnage, the 
tumuli are probably the burial mounds, or possibly the piles of 
corpses. The elaborate balance of expression suggests, I 
think, that tu)nulos lumulis are the rival barrows. Klotz, 
liowever, interprets the latter phrase as meaning ' they made 
the barrows to look like hills.' 

319 



CAESAR 

deduceret, copiis flumine traductis noctu iubet ignis 
fieri magnos : ita firmissirnum eius praesidium Ate- 
guani proficiscitur. Id cum Ponipeius ex perfugis 
rescisset, qua die facultatem nactus est, relinquens 
niontis ^ et angustias, carra complura niulosque 
onustos 2 retraxit et ad Cordubam se recepit. 
Caesar munitionibus Ateguam"^ oppugnare et brac- 
chia circumducere coepit. Cui de Pompeio cum nun- 
tius esset allatus eo die proficisci,'* cuius in adventum 
praesidi causa Caesar complura castella occupasset, 
partim ubi equitatus, partim ubi pedestres copiae in 
statione et in excubitu ^ castris praesidio esse possent, 
hie in adventu Pompei incidit ut matutino tempore 
nebula esset crassissima. Ita ilia obscuratione cum 
aliquot cohortibus et equitum turmis circumcludunt 
Caesaris equites et concidunt, sic ut vix in ea caede 
pauci eftugerent. 

Insequenti nocte castra sua incendit Pompeius et 
trans flumen Salsum per convallis castra inter duo 
oppida Ateguam et Ucubim in monte constituit. 
Caesar interim munitionibus ceterisque quae ad 
oppugnanduin opus fuerunt perfectis aggerem 
vineasque agere instituit.® Haec loca sunt montuosa 
et natura impedita ' ad rem militarem ; quae planitie 

^ nactus . . . montis ^vas supplied by Mommsen. 
^ multosque lanistas MSS. : mulosque onustos Nipper- 
dey. 

^ antequam or antiquas MSS. : Ateguam Aldus. 

* proficiscitur MSS. : proficisci Vahlen. 

* in stationes in excubitus MSS. : in statione et in excubitu 
editors. 

* Caesar in munitionibus ceterisque quae ad oppidum opus 
fuerunt aggerem MSS. : interim Fleischer; uppugnandum 
Kraner; perfectis supplied by Nipperdey. 

' edita MSS. : impedita Mommsen. 

320 



THE SPANISH WAR 

to entice them into the plain just as he had drawn 
them away from UUa ; and in this manner he set out 
for Ategua, the strongest garrison of Pompeius. When 
Pompeius got to know of this from deserters, on the 
first day that afforded him the opportunity he quitted 
the mountain passes and retired to Corduba with a 
numerous train of carts and laden mules. ^ Caesar be- 
gan to assault Ategua bv surrounding it with siege 
works and fortified lines. Now a message had been 
brought to him concerning Pompeius to the effect that 
he was setting out that day ; and by way of safe- 
guarding himself against Pompeius' coming Caesar 
had occupied several forts where in some cases 
cavalry, in others infantry forces could be posted as 
outlying pickets and sentries to protect his camp : 
yet, in these circumstances, it so chanced that 
when Pompeius did arrive there was a very thick 
mist in the early morning. And so in the re- 
sulting gloom the Pompeians surrounded Caesar's 
cavalry with a number of infantry cohorts and 
squadrons of horse, and cut them up so severely 
that but few men barely managed to escape that 
massacre. 

The following night Pompeius burned his camp 
and, passing through the valleys on the far side '^ of the 
river Salsum. established a camp on a hill between the 
two towns of Ategua and Ucubi. Meanwhile Caesar 
had completed his emplacements and all his other 
dispositions which were required for assaulting the 
town, and proceeded to carry forward a ramp fur- 
nished with mantlets. Now this area is mountainous 
and offers natural obstructions to military operations : 
it is divided by a plain — the basin of the river 

^ See Appendix B, p. 397. ^ i.e. S. of the river. 

321 



CAESAR 

dividimtur, Salso flumine, proxime tamen Ateguam 
ut flumen sit circiter passus duo milia. Kx ea 
regione oppidi in montibus castra hahuit posita 
Pompcius in conspcctu iitrnrumque oppidonini, neque 
suis ausus est subsidio venire. Aquilas et signa 
habuit XIII legionuni ; sed ex quibus alicjuid 
firmanienti se existimabat habere duae fuerunt 
vernaculae, quae a Trebonio transfugerant ; una 
facta ex colonis qui fuerunt in his regionibus ; 
quarta fuit Afraniana ex Africa quam secum ad- 
duxerat ; reliquae ex fugitivis auxiliariisve ^ con- 
sistebant : nam de levi armatura et equitatu longe 
et virtute et numero nostri erant superiores. 
8 Accedebat hue, ut longius bellum duceret Pom- 
peius, quod loca sunt edita et ad castrorum muni- 
tiones non paruni idonea. Nam fere totius ulterioris 
Hispaniae regio propter terrae fecunditatem et non 
minus copiosam aquationem - inopem difficilcmque 

^ auxiliares 3ISS. : auxiliariisve Mommscn. 

* et . . . aquationem follow oppugnationem in the MSS. : 
Nipperdey transposed them. 

1 Klntz, who puts a full stop after sit, takes this last phrase 
as meaning ' Some two miles distant from the sector concerned 
of the town Pompeius had his camp . . .' I have followed the 
punctuation of Holmes and Du Pontet. 

* It seems very difficult to identify these four reliable 
legions with any certainty. The only Pompeian legions 
definitelv named in the narrative are: — the First (ch. 18); 
the Second (ch. 13) ; and the Thirteenth (ch. 34). From Bell. 
Alex. chs. 50-54 it is clear that Cassius, whom Trebonius 
succeeded as governor of Further Spain, had five legions : 
the Twent3'-first and the Thirtieth (raised in Italy) ; the 
Second (long quartered in Spain); the 'native legion' 
(always thus named) ; and the Fifth (newly raised in Spain by 
Cassius himself). Of these the Second, Fifth and the native 
legion joined the mutiny against Cassius, and shewed Pom- 

322 



THE SPANISH WAR 

Salsum — in such a way, however, that the river is 
nearest Ategua, the distance being about two miles. ^ 
It was in this direction, namely that of Ategua, that 
Pompeius had his camp pitched in the mountains in 
sight of both towns, without, however, venturing 
to come to the aid of his comrades. He had the 
eagles and standards of thirteen legions ; but among 
those which he thought afforded him any solid 
support two were native legions, having deserted 
from Trebonius ; a third had been raised from the 
local Roman settlers ; a fourth was one which was 
once commanded by Afranius and which Pompeius 
had brought with him from Africa ^ : while the rest 
were made up of runaways or auxiliaries. As for 
light-armed units and cavaliy, our troops were in 
fact far superior both in quality and quantity. 

Besides this, there was another factor which 
prompted Pompeius to protract hostilities ^ — the hilly 
type of country by no means unsuitable for the 
fortification of camps. In fact, practically the whole 
region of Further Spain, fertile as it is and corre- 
spondingly well watered, makes a siege a fruitless 

peian sympathies; for which reason it would not seem 
surprising if they were opposing Caesar now. Holmes was 
satisfied that the other of the two native legions here mentioned 
was the Fifth ; but he assumed, without accounting for the 
reference in ch. 13, that the Second had now joined Caesar. 
Klotz, on the other hand, asserting that there was never more 
than one native legion in Spain, adopts Mommsen's emendation 
and reads vernacula eit secnnda >. This drastic course seems 
indeed the only method of including the Second ; and the 
Fifth might well be the one described as ' raised from the 
local Roman settlers '. But the whole problem is obscure. 
See also ch. 13, note 1 (trans.). 

^ i.e. his strategic decision not to relieve Ategua was 
influenced not only bj^ his inferiority in troops, but also by 
the terrain. 



CAESAR 

habet oppu^nationem. Hie etiam propter bar- 
barorum crebras excursiones omnia loca quae sunt ab 
oppidis remota turribus et munitionibus retinentur, 
sicut in Africa, rudere, non tcfrulis teguntur; simul- 
que in his habent speculas et propter altitudinem late 
longeque prospieiunt. Item oppidorum magna pars 
eius provineiae montibus fere munita et natura 
excellentibus loeis est eonstituta, ut sirtiul aditus 
ascensusque habeat difficilis. Ita ab oppugnationibus 
natura loci distinentur, ut civitates Hispaniae non 
facile ab hoste capiantur ; id quod in hoc contigit 
bello. Nam cum inter Ateguam et Ucubim, quae 
oppida supra sunt scripta, Pompeius habuit castra 
eonstituta in conspectu duorum oppidorum, ab suis 
castris circiter milia passuum Illl grumus est excel- 
lens natura, qui appellatur Castra Postuniiana : ibi 
praesidi causa castellum Caesar habuit constitutum. 
9 Quod Pompeius, quod eodem iugo tegebatur loci 
natura et remotuni erat a castris Caesaris, animad- 
vertebat ^ et, quia flumine Salso intercludebatur, non 
esse commissurum Caesarcm ut in tanta loci diffi- 
cultate ad subsidium niittendum se committeret.^ 
Ita fretus opinione tertia vigilia profectus castellum 
oppugnare coepit. Cum appropinquassent, clamore 
repentino telorumque multitudine iactus facere 
coeperunt, uti magnam partem hominum vulueribus 

^ animadvertebat loci difficultatem et MSS. : Du Pontet 
deleted loci difficultatem. 

^ committendum se mitteret MSS. : mittendum se com- 
mitteret Nipperdey. 



^ This is usually identified with the modern hill of Harinilla, 
some 3 miles S.W. of Teba. It was probably named after L. 
Postumius Albinus, propraetor of Further Spain in 180-179. 



THE SPANISH WAR 

and difficult task. Here too, in view of the constant 
sallies of the natives, all places which are remote 
from towns are firmly held by towers and fortifica- 
tions, as in Africa, roofed over with rough-cast, not 
tiles. Moreover, they have watch-towers in them, 
commanding a view far and wide by reason of their 
altitude. Again, a large proportion of the towns of 
this province are more or less protected by the 
mountains and are established in naturally elevated 
positions, with the result that the approach to them, 
involving as it does a simultaneous climb, proves a 
difficult task. Thus it is their natural position that 
holds them aloof from sieges, and as a result the 
townships of Spain are no easy prey to an enemy, 
as proved to be the case in this war. To take the 
present instance : Pompeius had his camp established 
between the above-mentioned towns of Ategua and 
Ucubi, in sight of both of them ; and some four miles 
distant from his camp there lies a hillock — a natural 
elevation which goes by the name of the Camp of 
Postumius 1 ; and there Caesar had established a fort 
for purposes of defence. 

Now Pompeius observed that this fort was screened 
by its natural position on the same I'idge of hills 
and was some distance away from Caesar's camp ; 
and he further observed that Caesar, cut off as he 
was from it by the river Salsum, was not likely to let 
himself be committed to sending support, considering 
the very difficult character of the ground. Accord- 
ingly, with the courage of his convictions, he set out 
at the third watch and proceeded to attack the fort. 
On their approach they suddenly raised a shout and 
began to launch heavy volleys of missile weapons, 
with the result that they wounded a large proportion 

325 



CAESAR 

adficerent. Quo peracto, cum ex castello repugnare 
coepissent maioribusque castris Caesari nuntius 
esset allatus, cum III legionibus est profectus, ut 
laborantibus succurreret nostris ; ^ et cum ad eos 
appropinquasset, fuga perterriti multi sunt inter- 
fecti, complures capti, in quibus duo centuriones ^ : 
multi praeterea armis exuti fugerunt, quorum scuta 
sunt relata LXXX. 

10 Insequenti luce Arguetius ex Italia cum equitatu 
venit. Is signa Saguntinorum rettulit quinque, 
quae ab oppidanis cepit. Suo loco praeteritum est ^ 
quod equites ex Italia cum Asprenate ad Caesarem 
venissent. Ea nocte Pompeius castra sua incendit 
et ad Cordubam versus iter facere coepit. Rex 
nomine Indo, qui cum equitatu suas copias adduxerat, 
dum cupidius agmen adversariorum insequitur, a 
vernaculis legionariis exceptus est et interfectus. 

11 Postero die equites nostri longius ad Cordubam 
versus prosecuti sunt eos qui commeatus ad castra 
Pompei ex oppido portabant. Ex his capti L cum 
iumentis ad nostra adducti sunt castra. Eo die Q. 
Marcius, tribunus militum qui fuit Pompei, ad nos 
transfugit ; et noctis tertia vigilia in oppido acerrime 

^ ut . . . nostris (nostri MSS.) transposed by Xipperdey. In 
the MSS. they fullow coepit, 5 lines above. 
2 centurionea supplied by Oudendorp. 
' praeterritus est most AISS. : praeteritum est Davies. 



^ or — ' were panic-stricken by the ensuing rout, and many 
were killed . . .' 

^ Possibly, the place mentioned by Pliny (III, 1, 15) in a 
list of tributary Baeturian towns under the jurisdiction of 
Cadiz. If so, he would seem to have come by sea. Klotz, 
however, assumes the reference to be to Saguntum. See 
Index. 

326 



THE SPANISH WAR 

of the defenders. Whereupon the latter began to 
fight back froin the fort ; and when the tidings were 
brought to Caesar in his main camp he set out with 
three legions to succour our hard-pressed troops. 
When he reached them the enemy retired in rout 
and panic,^ with many killed and several captured, 
including two centurions. Many in addition threw 
away their arms and fled, and eighty of their shields 
were brought back by our men. 

On the following day Arguetius arrived with 
cavalry from Italy. He brought with him five 
standards belonging to the men of Saguntia,"' which 
he took from the inhabitants of that town. I 
omitted to mention in its proper place the arrival of 
the cavalry who came to Caesar from Italy with 
Asprenas. That night Pompeius burned his camp 
and proceeded to march towards Corduba.^ A king 
n:imed Indo, who had accompanied the cavalry, bring- 
ing with him troops of his own, pursued the enemy's 
column somewhat too eagerly, and in the process 
was cut off and killed by ti'oops of the native 
legions. 

On the next day our cavalry fared somewhat far 
afield in the direction of Corduba in pursuit of those 
who were carrying supplies from the town to Pom- 
peius' camp. Fifty of the latter were captured and 
brought with their pack animals to our camp. That 
day Q. Marcius, who was one of Pompeius' military 
tribunes, deserted to us. At the third watch of the 
night there was very sharp fighting in the area of the 

^ Klotz plausibly suggests that Castra Postumiana was a 
serious threat to his lines of communication with Corduba ; 
and that having failed to capture it, he now decided to with- 
draw farther West. 

327 



CAESAR 

pugnatum est, ignemque multum miserunt.^ Hoc 
praeterito tempore C. Fuiulanius, eques Romanus, 
ex eastris adversariorum ad nos transfugit. 
12 Postero die ex legione vernacula milites sunt capti 
ab equitibus nostris duo, qui dixerunt se servos esse. 
Cum venirent, cogniti sunt a militibus qui antea cum 
Fable ^ et Pedio fuerant.et a^Trebonio transfugerant. 
Eis ad ignoscendum nulla facultas est data et a 
militibus nostris interfecti sunt. Idem temporis 
capti tabellarii, qui a Corduba ad Pompeium missi 
erant perperamque ad nostra castra pervenerant, 
praecisis manibus missi sunt facti. Pari consuetudine 
vigilia secunda ex oppido ignem multum telorumque 
multitudinem iactando bene magnum tempus con- 
sumpserunt complurisque vulneribus adfecerunt. 
Praeterito noctis tempore eruptionem ad legionem 
VI. fecerunt, cum in opere nostri distenti essenf, 
acriterque pugnare coeperunt ; quorum vis repressa a 
nostris, etsi oppidani superiore loco defendebantur. 
Hi * cum eruptionem facere coepissent, tamen virtute 
militum nostrorum, etsi inferiore loco premebantur, 

1 The MSS. add : sicut omne genus quibus ignis per iactus 
solitus est mitti. / have followed Hoffmann in deleting them. 

2 babio or babibio or habio MSS. : Fabio Glandorp. 

^ (a) supplied by Kuebler, who assumed a lacuna after fuerant. 
* -V MSS. : Hi Davies. 



^ I think that Holmes was right in assuming that this 
curious temporal phrase refers back to the past (literally — " at 
this past time '); and that the author employs it whenever 
his chronology has got out of hand. Thus, just as in ch. 10 
the arrival of Arguetius reminds him to mention belatedly the 
earlier arrival of Asprenas, so here the desertion of Q. Marcius 
reminds him of that of Fundanius. Its use below in chs. 20 

328 



THE SPANISH WAR 

town, and many fire-brands were discharged. Just 
before this time ^ a Roman knight named C. Funda- 
nius deserted to us from the enemy Hnes. 

On the next day two soldiers from one of the 
native legions were captured by our cavalry : they 
asserted they were slaves. Immediately on their 
arrival thev were recognised by troops who had 
fonnerly been with Fabius and Pedius and had 
deserted from Trebonius.^ No opportunity was 
afforded of reprieving them, and they were executed 
by our troops. At the same time some couriers were 
captured who had been sent from Corduba to 
Pompeius and had come to our camp in error : their 
hands were cut off and they were then let go. At 
the second watch the enemy observed his usual 
custom of hurling from the town a large quantity of 
fire-brands and missiles, spending a good long time in 
the process and wounding a large number. When 
the night had now passed they made a sally against 
the Sixth legion when our men were busily occupied 
on a field-work,^ and began a brisk engagement ; 
but their sharp attack was contained by our troops 
despite the support which the townsmen derived 
from the higher ground. Having once embarked 
upon their sally, our opponents were none the less 
repulsed by the gallantry of our troops, although the 

and 22 seems similar. Klotz, however, apparently takes it 
to mean ' when this time had now gone past.' 

* rf. p. 322 note 2 (trans.). It is clear that not all the troops 
who had mutinied against Cassius and later deserted Trebonius 
were now on Pompey's side. Some editors, however, suspect 
the text. 

^ In this phrase, which recurs below in ch. 27 the word opns 
seems to have its technical meaning — " work of fortification.' 
Klotz interprets : ' scattered among the fortifications.' 



CAESAR 

repulsi adversarii bene multis vulneribus adfecti in 
oppidum se contulerunt.^ 
13 Postero die Pompeius ex castris suis bracchium 
coepit ad flumen Salsum ducere;^ et cum nostri 
equites pauci in statione fuissent a pluribus reperti, 
de statione sunt deiecti et occisi tres. Eo die A. 
Valgius, senatoris iilius, cuius frater in castris Pompei 
fuisset, omnibus suis rebus relictis equum conscendit 
et fugit. Speculator de legione II. Pompeiana 
captus a militibus et interfeetus est ; idemque 
temporis glans missa est inscripta : quo die ad 
oppidum capiendum accederent, se scutum esse 
positurum. Qua spe non nulli, dum sine periculo 
murum ascendere et oppido potiri posse se sperant, 
postero die ad murum opus facere coeperunt, et bene 
magna prioris muri parte deiecta.^ . . . Quo facto ab 
oppidanis, ac si suarum partium essent, conservati . . . 

^ / have followed Kroner in deleting qui before etsi and tamen 
before repulsi from the reading of the MSS. 

^ ducere is omitted by all but two inferior MSS. 

^ Klotz supplies in oppidum intraverunt, but considers it 
probable that more than this is /nissing. 

^ cf. p. 322, note 2 (trans.). Klotz regards the addition of 
Pompeiana as " remarkable, since Caesar did not have a 
Second legion.' It is true that in the narrative there is no 
mention of the Second as fighting on Caesar's side. But 
neither is there any mention of the Twenty-first, Twenty- 
eighth, or Thirtieth, all of which may well have participated. 
I am inclined to think that Pompeiana is no accidental 
addition, but that it signified clearly one of two things : 
either that there were two Second legions (just as there were 
apparently two Fifth legions), and that this was not Caesar's 
Second ; or, if there was but one Second legion, that now, 
after months of wavering loyalty, it was on Pompey s side. 
To the author's contemporaries it was doubtless perfectly 
clear which was the meaning intended. 

33° 



THE SPANISH WAR 

latter were labouring under the disadvantage of a 
lower position ; and after sustaining very heavy 
casualties they withdrew back into the town. 

On the next day Pompeius began to carry a line of 
fortifications from his camp to the river Salsum ; 
and when a few of our horsemen on outpost duty 
were discovered by the enemy, who were in greater 
strength, they were driven from their post, and three 
of them were killed. It was on that day that A. 
Valgius — his fsither was a senator and his brother 
was in Pompeius' camp — left all his kit behind, 
mounted his horse and deserted. A spy from the 
Second legion, on Pompeius' side,i was captured by 
our troops and put to death ; and at the same time 
a sling-bullet was discharged which bore the following 
inscription : ' On the day you advance to capture the 
town I shall lay down my shield.' ^ This raised 
hopes in some of our men, who, feeling confident 
that thev could now climb the wall and gain posses- 
sion of the town without danger, proceeded on the 
next day to construct a field-work adjoining the 
wall ; and having demolished a good lai'ge section 
of the first wall, . . . Whereupon, their lives being 
spared by the townsfolk as if they belonged to their 
own side,^ . . . the latter begged Caesar to get 

- Some editors render ' display a shield as a signal " ; 
but the undertaking to offer no armed resistance seems to me 
to suit the context better. Though apparently in the singular 
number (Fleischer conjectured posituros), the message was no 
doubt interpreted as reflecting the attitude of many of the 
townsfolk. 

* The mutilated state of the MSS. will permit no more 
than a disjointed rendering. It would seem that the storming 
party was captured, but that the townsfolk sent its members 
back unharmed, accompanied by a deputation to Caesar 
ofiFering terms of surrender. 



CAESAR 

missos facere loricatos, qui praesidi causa praepositi 
oppido a Pompeio essent, orabant. Quibus respondit 
Caesar se condiciones dare, non accipere consuevisse. 
Qui cum in o])pidum revertissent, relato response 
clamore sublato omni genere teloruni emisso pugnare 
pro niuro toto coeperunt ; propter quod fere magna 
pars hominum qui in castris nostris essent non 
dubitarunt quin eruptionem eo die essent facturi. 
Ita corona circumdata pugnatum est aliquamdiu 
vehementissime, simulque ballista missa a nostris 
turrem deiecit, qua adversarioruuj qui in ea turre 
fuerant quinque deiecti sunt et puer, qui ballistam 
solitus erat observare. 
14 Eius diei praeterito tempore ^ Pompeius trans 
flumen Salsum castellum constituit neque a nostris 
prohibitus falsaque ilia opinione gloriatus est quod 
prope in nostris partibus locum tenuisset. Item 
insequenti die eadem consuetudine dum longius 
prosequitur, ijuo loco equites nostri stationem 
habuerant, aliquot turmae cum levi armatura impetu 
facto loco sunt deiecti et propter paucitatem nostro- 
rum equitum simul cum levi armatura inter turmas 
adversariorum protriti. Hoc in conspectu utrorum- 
que castrorum gerebatur, et maiore Pompeiani 
exsultabant gloria longius quod nostris cedentibus 

* eius praeteriti temporis MSS. : eius diei praeterito 
tempore Nipperdey. 



^ I interpret Nipperdey's restoration, on the analog}' of the 
phrase hoc praeterito tempore in ch. 11 above, as meaning 
' in the past (earlier) period of that day.' Klotz retains the 
MSS. reading, which he explains as a Genitive Absolute mean- 
ing ' that time having gone past.' 

^ i.e. N. of the river. 



THE SPANISH WAR 

rid of the heavy-armed troops who had been put in 
charge of the defence of the town by Pompeius. 
Caesar's reply to them was that his habit was to 
impose conditions, not to accept them. On their 
return to the town with this reply, the inhabitants 
raised a shout, discharged volleys of missiles of all 
sorts, and went into action along the entire circuit of 
the battlements ; and this led to a strong conviction 
among quite a large number of the men in our lines 
that they would make a sally that day. As a result 
a cordon of troops was thrown round the town and 
very violent fighting went on for some time ; in the 
course of which a missile was discharged by our men 
from a piece of heavy artillery and demolished a 
tower, knocking out five members of the enemy crew 
who manned it, as well as a slave whose regular 
duty it was to keep watch on that piece of artillery. 
Earlier on that day ^ Pompeius established a fort 
across ^ the river Salsum without meeting any oppo- 
sition from our troops ; and this put him under a 
misapprehension and led him to boast inasmuch as 
he had occupied a position which was as good as in 
our territory. Likewise on the following day he 
again pursued his usual tactics and made a fairly 
extensive sweep, in the course of which at one 
point where our cavalry were picketed several 
squadrons of ours with some light-armed troops were 
attacked and dislodged from their position ; and 
then, because of their small numbers, both our horse- 
men and the light-armed troops were completely 
crushed amidst the squadrons of their opponents. 
This action took place in view of both camps, and now 
the Pompeians were boasting with yet greater 
triumph on the ground that they had begun to 

333 



CAESAR 

prosequi coepisscnt. Qui cum aequo ^ loco a nostris 
recepti essent, ut consuessent, eximia ^ virtute, 
clamore facto avcrsati sunt proclium facere. 
15 Fere apud excrcitus haec est equestris proeli 
consuetudo : cum equcs ad dimicandum dimisso 
equo cum pedite congreditur, nequaquam par 
habetur ; id quod contra ^ in hoc accidit proelio. 
Cum pedites levi armatura lecti ad pugnam equitibus 
nostris nee opinantibus venissent, idque in proelio 
animadversum esset, complures ex equis deseende- 
runt. Ita exiguo tempore equcs pedestre * proelium 
facere coepit, usque eo ut caedem proxime a vallo 
fecerint. In quo proelio adversariorum ceciderunt 
CXXIII, compluresque arniis exuti. multi vulncribus 
adfecti in castra sunt redacti. Nostri ceciderunt III ; 
saucii XII pedites et equites V. Eius diei insequcnti 

1 aliquo 3ISS. : aequo Lipsius. 

* ex simili MSS. : eximia Mommscn. 

* contra added by Hoffmann. 

* The words pedes equestre, which JoUoic here in all MSS., 
were deleted by Nipperdey. 



1 Klotz, who retains the MSS. reading ex simili, assumes 
qui to refer to the Caesarian cavalry mentioned above, the 
subject changing abruptly to Pompciani at avfrmti sunt. 
His rendering would thus apparently be : ' When these 
squadrons of ours had been received back on favourable 
ground and, as usual, had raised the war cry with the same 
braA'ery, the Pompeians refused battle.' But the sense seems 
to me very strained; and the fact that Pompeiani is subject 
of the clause which immediately precedes makes the repeated 
change of subject exceptionally harsh. It is perhaps more 
reasonable to assume that Pompeiani is subject throughout, 
and that recipio is here used in the sense of rtirsus excipio. 

^ The reader may well be puzzled by the respective casual- 
ties resulting, apparently, from the outpost skirmish described 
in ch. 14 above. It would seem that the figures are grossly 

334 



THE SPANISH WAR 

sweep further ahead while our men were retreating 
further baek. But when on favourable ground our 
men took them on again with their eustomary out- 
standing gallantry, they cried out and refused to 
engage battle. ^ 

With nearly all armies what normally happens in a 
cavalry battle is this : when a cavalrynian is once 
dismounted and closes in with an infantryman to 
engage him, he is not by any means regarded as a 
match for the latter. However, it turned out quite 
otherwise in this battle. When picked light-armed 
infantry took our cavalry by surprise by coming 
forward to engage them, and when this manoeuvre 
was observed in the course of the fighting, quite a 
number of our horsemen dismounted. As a result, 
in a short time our cavalry began to fight an infantry 
action, to such good purpose that they dealt death 
right up close to the rampart. In this battle ^ on our 
opponents' side there fell one hundred and twenty- 
three men ; and of those who were driven back 
to their camp not a few had been stripped of their 
arms and many were wounded. On our side there 
fell three men : twelve infantrymen and five horse- 
men were wounded. Later on that day the old routine 



distorted if only three Caesarians were killed out of several 
squadrons and some light-armed troops overrun by the 
enemy cavalry I {rf. Introduction, p. 306, and, for official 
suppression of casualty figures, ch. 18.) But I rather suspect 
that cavalry reinforcements were despatched by Caesar and 
fought a second, and more evenly-matched action closer to 
Pompey's camp; and that brief details of this were originally 
given towards the end of ch. 14. If it is to this second action 
that the casualty figures relate, then it is not surprising that 
the Pompeians refused a third challenge on ground favourable 
to Caesar. 

335 



CAESAR 

tempore pristina consuetudine pro muro pujjnari 
coeptum est. Cum bene mapnam multitudinem 
telorum ignemque nostris defendentibus iniecissent, 
nefandum crudelissimumque facinus sunt aggressi in 
conspectuque nostro hospites qui in oppido erant 
iugulare et de muro praecipites mittere coeperunt, 
sicuti apud barbaros ; quod post hominum memoriam 
numquam est factum. 
16 Huius diei extremo tempore a Pompeianis clam 
nostros ^ tabellarius est missus, ut ea nocte turris 
aggerem(|ue incenderent et tertia vigilia eruptionem 
facerent. Ita igne telorumque multitudine iacta 
cum bene magnam partem noctis ^ consumpsissent, 
portam quae e regione et in conspectu Pompei 
castrorum fuerat aperuerunt copiaeque totae erup- 
tionem fecerunt secumque extulerunt virgulta, cratis ' 
ad fossas complendas et harpagones ad casas, quae 
stramenticiae ab nostris hibernoi'um causa aedi- 
ficatae erant, diruendas et incendendas, praeterea 
argentum, vestimenta, ut, dum nostri in praeda 
detinentur, illi caede facta ad praesidia Pompei se 
reciperent : nam quod existimabat eos posse cona- 
tum * efficere, nocte tota ultra ibat flumen Salsum in 
acie. Quod factum licet nee opinantibus nostris esset 
gestum, tamen virtute freti repulsos multisque 
vulneribus adfectos oppido rcpresserunt, praedam 

^ clam ad nostros 3ISS. : clam nostros some editors : clam 
nostros ad oppidum Klotz. 

^ muri MSS. : noctis Fleischer. 

^ cultatas or culc- or calc- 3/ <S<S. : virgulta, cratis Xipperdey. 

* conatu MSS. : conatum or -a editors. 

* i.e. the Pompeian troops massacred those of the local 
townsfolk whom they suspected of siding with Caesar. 

* Probably S. of the river. 

^ Or, if oppido is the adverb, ' completely drove them back.' 

33^ 



THE SPANISH WAR 

was observed and fighting broke out along the battle- 
ments. After discharging a very large number of 
missile weapons and firebrands at our troops, who 
were on the defensive, the enemy embarked upon an 
abominable and completely ruthless outrage ; for in 
our sight they proceeded to massacre some of their 
hosts 1 in the town, and to fling them headlong from 
the battlements — a barbarous act, and one for which 
history can produce no precedent. 
16 In the closing hours of this day the Pompeians 
sent a courier, without the knowledge of our men, 
with instructions that in the course of that night 
those in the town should set our towers and rampart 
on fire and make a sally at the third watch. Accord- 
ingly, after they had hurled fire-brands and a quantity 
of missile weapons and spent a very large part of the 
night in so doing, they opened the gate which lay 
directly opposite Pompeius' camp and was in sight 
of it, and made a sallv with their entire forces. 
With them thev brought out brushwood and hurdles 
to fill up the trenches, as well as hooks for demolishing 
and then burning the straw-thatched huts which had 
been built by our men to serve as winter quarters ; 
they also brought silver and clothing besides, so that, 
while our men were busily engaged in looting it, 
they could wreak havoc upon them and then retire to 
Pompeius' lines. For in the belief that they could 
carry through their enterprise he spent the whole 
night on the move in battle formation on the far 
side 2 of the river Salsum. But although this opera- 
tion had come as a surprise to our men, yet, reiving 
on their valour, they repulsed the enemy, inflicted 
heavy casualties upon them, and drove them back to 
the town,^ taking possession of their booty and 

337 



CAESAR 

armaque eorum sunt potiti vivosque aliquos ceperunt, 
qui postero die sunt interfecti. Eodemque tempore 
transfuga nuntiavit ex oppido lunium, qui in 
cuniculo fuisset, iugulatione oppidanorum facta 
clamasse facinus se nefandum et scclus fecisse ; 
nam eos nihil meruissc quare tali poena adficerentur 
qui eos ad aras et foeos suos recepissent, eosque 
hospitium scelere contaminasse ; multa praeterea 
dixisse : qua oratione deterritos amplius iugulationem 
non fecisse. 
17 Ita postero die Tullius legatus cum Catone et An- 
tonio 1 venit et apud Caesarem verba fecit : ' Utinam 
quidem di immortales fecissent ut tuus potius miles 
quam Cn. Pompei factus essem et banc virtutis 
constantiam in tua victoria, non in illius calamitate 
praestarem. Cuius funestae laudes quoniam ad 
banc fortunam reciderunt ut cives Romani indigentes 
praesidi simus et propter patriae luctuosam perniciem 
demur ^ bostium numero, qui neque in illius prospera 
acie primam fortunam neque in adversa secundam 
obtinuimus,^ qui legionum tot impetus sustentantes, 
nocturnis diurnisque operibus gladiorum ictus 

^ Lusitano MSS. The arguments in support of this con- 
jecture of mine and o/introiit and Catonem in ch. 18 are set forth 
in Appendix C, p. 401 . 

^ / have followed Fleischer in supplying simus and reading 
demur in place of dedimur. 

^ / have followed Xipperdey in deleting victoriam which the 
MSS. give after obtinuimus. 



^ This abrupt reference led Mommsen to conjecture unum 
in place of lunium. Klotz considers that, though no mine 



THE SPANISH WAR 

equipment and capturing some alive, who were put 
to death the next day. It was at this same period 
that a deserter an-ived from the town with the 
news that, after the massacre of the townsfolk, 
Junius, who had been in a mine,^ protested that it 
was an abominable crime and outrage that his people 
had committed ; for inasmuch as the burghers had 
given them the protection of their altars and hearths 
they had done nothing to deserve such punishment : 
rather had they themselves polluted hospitality by a 
crime. Junius had said a lot more besides, according 
to the deserter's account, and his words had 
frightened them and caused them to refrain from 
further massacres. 
17 So the next day Tullius came as an envoy, accom- 
panied by Cato and Antonius, and held talk with 
Caesar as follows : ' Would indeed that the immortal 
gods had caused ine to have become a soldier of yours, 
rather than one of Pompeius', and vouchsafed that I 
should now display this unflinching valour of mine on 
your victorious side, and not at his debacle. Now 
that his prestige, fraught with disaster, has slumped 
so far that in this our present plight we, citizens of 
Rome, not only stand in need of protection, but on 
account of the grievous calamity of our country are 
accorded the status of public enemies ; we, who 
alike won no success either when at first fortune 
smiled upon his deeds of arms or later when she 
frowned upon them ; we, who have constantly borne 
up under so many attacks of legions and have as 
constantly, in operations by day and night, formed 
targets for the thrusts of swords and the flight of 

has so far been mentioned, sapping was so constant in sieges 
that the apparent oversight is a natural one. 

339 



CAESAR 

telonimque missus exceptantes, relicti ^ et deserti a 
Pompeic), tua \ irtute superati salutem a tua dementia 
deposcimus petimusque ut . . .' ^ ' qualem gentibus 
me praestiti, similem in civium deditione praestabo.' 
18 Rcmissis legatis, cum ad portani venisscnt, introiit^ 
Tib. Tullius ; et cum introcuntem Catonem'* Antonius 
insecutus non esset, revcrtit ad portam et hominem 
apprehendit. Quod Tiberius cum fieri animadvertit, 
simul pugionem eduxit et manum eius incidit. Ita 
refugerunt ad Caesarem. Eodemque tempore signi- 
fer de legione prima transfugit et innotuit, quo die 
equestre proelium factum esset, suo signo perisse 
homines XXX\', neque licere castris C'n. Pompei 
nuntiare neque dicere perisse quemquam.^ Servus, 
cuius dominus in Caesaris castris fuisset — uxorem et 
filios in oppido reliquerat — dominum iugulavit et ita 
clam a Caesaris praesidiis in Pompei castra discessit 
. . . et indicium glande scriptum misit, per quod cer- 
tior fieret Caesar quae in oppido ad defendendum 
compararentur. Ita litteris acceptis, cum in oppidum 
revertisset qui mittere glandem inscriptam sole- 

^ expectantes victi MSS. : exceptantes Koch : relicti 
A'ipperdey. 

^ Kloiz conjectures vitam nobis concedas.' Quibus Caesar 
respondit. 

^ / have supplied introiit. 

* C. MSS. : / have conjectured Catonem. 

* quamquam or quamque most MSS. : quemquam editors. 



^ grant us our lives.' To which Caesar replied : (according 
to Klotz's conjecture). 



THE SPANISH WAR 

missiles ; we, who are now abandoned and forsaken 
by Pompeius and vanquished by your valour, do now 
earnestly entreat you in your mercy to save us, and 
beg you to . . .' ^ ' As I have shewn myself to foreign 
peoples, even so will I show myself to my fellow 
citizens when they surrender.' 
18 The envoys were now sent back and on their 
arrival at the gate Tiberius Tullius went inside ; and 
when, as Cato was going in, Antonius failed to follow 
him, Cato ^ turned back to the gate and grabbed 
the fellow. Observing this action, Tiberius immedi- 
ately drew a dagger and stabbed Cato's hand. So 
they ^ fled back to Caesar. It was at this same 
time that a standard-bearer from the First legion 
deserted to us and it became known that on the day 
when the cavalry action was fought his own unit * lost 
thirty-five men, but that they were not allowed to 
report this in Cn. Pompeius' camp or to say that any 
man had been lost. A slave, whose master was in 
Caesar's camp — he had left his wife and sons behind 
in the town — murdered his master and then got away 
unobserved from Caesar's lines to Pompeius' camp 
. . . and he sent a message written on a bullet to 
apprise Caesar of the defence measures which were 
being taken in the town. Accordingly, when this 
message had been received, and the man who 
normally discharged the bullet bearing an insci-iption 

^ Klotz too assumes that Cato is the subject. He remarks 
that such abrupt changes of subject are not uncommon in the 
lively, colloquial style, and quotes parallel examples from 
Cicero, Livy and Seneca. 

^ sc. Tiberius and Antonius. See Appendix C, p. 401. 

* here, probably, a maniple, nominally comprising 200 
men. 

341 



CAESAR 

bat.^ . . . In<;cquenti tempore duo Lusitani fratres 
transfugae nuntiarunt (juam Pompeius contionem 
habuisset : quoniam oppido subsidio non posset 
venire, noctu ex adversariorum conspectu se dedu- 
eerent ad mare versum ; unum respondisse ut potius 
ad dimicandum descenderent quam signum fugae 
ostenderent ; eum qui ita locutus esset iugulatum. 
Eodem tempore tabellarii eius deprensi qui ad 
oppidum veniebant : quorum litteras Caesar oppi- 
danis obiecit et, qui vitam sibi peteret, iussit turrem 
ligneam oppidanorum incendere ; id si fecisset, ei se 
promisit omnia eoncessurum. Quod difficile erat 
factu, ut eam turrem sine perieulo quis ineenderet. 
Ita fune crura deligatus,^ cum propius accessisset, ab 
oppidanis est occisus. Eadem nocte transfuga nuntia- 
vit Pompeium et Labienum de iugulatione oppida- 
norum indignatos esse. 
19 \'igilia secunda propter multitudinem telorum 
turris lignea, quae nostra fuisset, ab imo vitium fecit 
usque ad tabulatum secundum et tertium. Eodem 
tempore pro muro pugnarunt acerrime et turrim 
nostram ut superiorem incenderunt, idcirco quod 
ventum oppidani secundum habuerunt. Insequenti 

^ solebant MSS. : solebat Xipperdey, who first assumed a 
lacuna here. 

* crure de ligno MSS. : crura deligatus Warminglon. 



^ I have followed Klotz in assuming two gaps in this 
extraordinary narrative. For no likely explanation occurs to 
me why the slave should have sent such a message to Caesar 
from Pompey's camp. Whether it was his master or his 
mistress he killed (in ch. 20 most MSS. read dominam), and 
whether he was loyal to Caesar or to Pompey, it seems im- 
possible to account consistently for his actions and subsequent 
fate. 

342 



THE SPANISH WAR 

had returned to the town, , . .^ At a later period two 
brothers, Lusitanians, deserted and reported a 
speech which Pompeius had delivered, to the effect 
that, since he could not come to the assistance of 
the town, they must withdraw by night out of sight 
of their opponents in the direction of the sea. One 
man, according to this account, retorted that they 
should rather go into battle than display the signal 
for retreat ; whereupon the author of this remark 
had his throat cut. At the same time some of Pom- 
peius' couriers were arrested on their way to the 
town. Caesar presented their despatches ^ to the 
townsfolk and directed that any of the couriers who 
wanted his life to be spared must set fire to a wooden 
tower belonging to the townsfolk, undertaking to 
grant him complete amnesty if he did so. But it was 
a difficult task for anyone to set fire to that tower 
without risking disaster; thus when any of them 
came close up to it, his legs wei'e tied with a rope 
and he was killed by the townsfolk. That same 
night a deserter reported that Pompeius and Labienus 
had been filled with indignation at the massacre 
of the townsfolk. 

At the second watch, as a result of a heavy salvo 
of missiles, a wooden tower of ours sustained damage 
which extended from its base up to the second and 
third storeys. Simultaneously there was very heavy 
fighting along the battlements, and the townsfolk, 
taking advantage of a favourable wind, set on fire 
our tower as aforementioned. The following day a 

^ Klotz believes that these despatches notified the com- 
mandant of Ategua that Pompey was withdrawing. This 
seems probable, and would explain why Caesar passed them 
on so promptly. 

343 



CAESAR 

luce materfamilias de muro se deiecit et ad nos 
transsiliit dixitque se cum familia constitutum 
habuisse ut una transfugerent ad Caesarem ; illam 
oppressam et iugulatam. Hoc praeterea tempore 
tabellae de muro sunt deiectae, in quibus scriptum 
est inventum : ' L. Munatius Caesari. Si niihi 
vitam tribues, quoniam ab Cn. Pompeio sum desertus, 
qualem me illi praestiti tali virtute et constantia 
futurum me in te esse praestabo.' Eodem tempore 
oppidani legati qui antea exierant Caesarem adierunt: 
si sibi vitam concederet, sese insequenti luce oppidum 
esse dedituros. Quibus respondit se Caesarem 
esse fidemque praestaturum. Ita ante diem XI. 
Kal. Mart, oppido potitus imperator est appellatus. 
20 Quod Pompeius ex perfugis cum deditionem 
oppidi factam esse scisset, castra movit Ucubim 
versus et eircum ea loca castella disposuit et mu- 
nitionibus se continei*e coepit : Caesar movit et 
propius castra castris contulit. Eodem tempore 
mane loricatus unus ex legione vernacula ad nos 
transfugit et nuntiavit Pompeium oppidanos Ucu- 
bensis convocasse eisque ita imperavisse, ut dili- 
gentia adhibita perquirerent qui essent suarum 
partium itemque adversariorum victoriae fautores. 
Hoc praeterito tempore in oppido quod fuit captum 
344 



THE SPANISH WAR 

mother of a family leapt down from the battlements 
and slipped across to our lines and told us that she 
had arranged with her household to desert to 
Caesar all together ; but her household, she said, had 
been taken by surprise and massacred. It was at 
this time also that a missive was thrown down from 
the wall, which was found to contain the following 
message : ' L. Munatius greets Caesar. If you 
grant me my life, now that I am abandoned by Cn. 
Pompeius, I will guarantee to display the same 
unwavering courage in support of you as I have 
shewn to him.' At the same time the envoys from 
the townsfolk who had come out to Caesar before 
now came to him, saying that, if he would spare their 
lives, they would surrender the town the following 
day. His reply to them ran thus : ' I am Caesar 
and I will be as good as my word.' Accordingly, on 
February I9th he took possession of the town and was 
hailed as Imperator. 

When Pompeius got to know from deserters that 
the surrender of the town had taken place, he 
moved his camp towards Ucubi, built forts at inter- 
vals in that locality, and proceeded to keep within 
his emplacements. Caesar struck his camp and 
moved it closer to that of Pompeius. It was at this 
same time that early in the morning one of the 
heavy-armed troops from a native legion deserted to 
us and reported that Pompeius had assembled the 
inhabitants of the town of Ucubi and given them 
orders as follows, namely that they were to make 
careful and searching enquiry who were in favour 
of a victory for his side, and who on the con- 
trary favoured victory for his enemies. Just be- 
fore this the slave who, as we have described 

345 



CAESAR 

servus est prensus in cuniculo quern supra demonstra- 
vimus dorninum iugulasse : is vi\ us est combustus. 
Idemque temporis centuriones loricati Vlll ad 
Caesarem transfugerunt ex legione vernacula, et 
equites nostri cum adversariorum equitibus congressi 
sunt, et saucii aliquot occiderunt levi armatura. Ea 
nocte speculatores prensi servi III et unus ex legione 
vernacula. Servi sunt in crucem sublati, militi 
cervices abscisae. 

21 Postero die equites cum levi armatura ex adversa- 
riorum castris ad nos transfugerunt. Et eo tem- 
pore circiter XL equites ad aquatores nostros excu- 
currerunt, non nullos interfecerunt, item alios vivos 
abduxerunt : e quibus capti sunt equites VIII. 
Insequenti die Pompeius seeuri percussit homines 
LXXIIII, qui dicebantur esse fautores Caesaris 
victoriae, reliquos rursus in ^ oppidum iussit deduci ; 
ex quibus effugerunt CXX et ad Caesarem venerunt. 

22 Hoc praeterito tempore, qui in oppido Ategua 
Ursaonenses ^ capti sunt legati profecti sunt cum 
nostris uti rem gestam L rsaonensibus - referrent, quid 
sperarent de Cn. Pompeio, cum viderent hospites 
iugulari, praeterea multa scelera ab eis fieri qui 
praesidi causa ab eis reciperentur. Qui cum ^ ad 
oppidum venissent, nostri, qui fuissent equites 
Romani et senatores, non sunt ausi introire in oppi- 
dum, praeter quam qui eius civitatis fuissent. 
Quorum responsis ultro citroque acceptis et redditis 

^ versum or in MSS. : rursus in Fleischer. 

^ bursa vonenses, -ibus MSS. : Ursaonenses, -ibus Ciacconius. 

^ cum added by earlier editors. 

^ viz. men of Ucubi : the author here resumes his narrative 
of chapter 20, which he interrupted to relate earlier incidents. 



THE SPANISH WAR 

above, had murdered his master was arrested in a 
mine in the captured town : he was burned alive. 
At the same period eight heavy-armed centurions 
deserted to Caesar from a native legion ; our cavalry 
came into conflict with the enemy cavalry and quite 
a number of our light-armed troops died of their 
wounds. That night some scouts were caught — 
three slaves and one soldier from a native legion. 
The slaves were crucified, the soldier beheaded. 

On the next dav some cavalry and light-armed 
troops came over to us from the enemy's camp. At 
that time too about forty of their horse dashed out 
upon a watering party of ours, killing some of its 
members and leading others off alive : eight of their 
horsemen were taken prisoner. The following day 
Pompeius beheaded seventy-four men ^ who were 
said to be in favour of a victory for Caesar : the 
remainder he ordered to be escorted back into the 
town ; but a hundred and twenty of them escaped 
and came to Caesar. 

2 Just prior to this time the envoys from Ursao 
who had been captured in the town of Ategua set 
forth, accompanied by some of our men, to report 
to their fellow citizens of Ursao what had taken 
place and ask them what hopes they could enter- 
tain of Cn. Pompeius when they saw hosts being 
massacred and many other crimes too being per- 
petrated bv those to whom the latter gave admit- 
tance as garrison troops. When the party reached 
Ursao, our men, who comprised Roman knights and 
senators, did not venture to enter the town, apart 
from those who were members of that community. 
An exchange of views then took place between the 

2 See Appendix D, p. 403, for a discussion of this chapter. 

347 



CAESAR 

cum ad nostros se reciperent qui extra oppidum 
fuissent, illi praesidio insecuti ex aversione ^ legatos 
iugularunt. Duo reliqui ex eis fugerunt et Caesari 
rem gestam detuleruiit . . . - et speeulatores ad 
oppidum Ateguam miseruut. Qui cum certum com- 
perissent legatorum responsa ita esse gesta quern ad 
modum illi retulissent, ab oppidanis concursu facto 
eum qui legatos iugulasset lapidare et ei manus 
intentare coeperunt : illius opera se perisse. Ita vix 
periculo liberatus petiit ab oppidanis ut ei liceret 
legatum ad Caesarem proficisci : illi se satisfacturum. 
Potestate data cum inde esset profectus, praesidio 
comparato, cum bene magnam manum fecisset et 
nocturno tempore per fallaciam in oppidum esset 
receptus, iugulationem magnam facit principibusque 
qui sibi contrarii fuissent interfectis oppidum in 
suam potestatem recepit. — Hoc praeterito tempore 
servi transfugae nuntiaverunt oppidanorum bona 
venire ^ neque extra vallum licere * exire nisi dis- 
cinctum, idcirco quod ex quo die oppidum Ategua 
esset captum metu conterritos compluris profugere in 
Baeturiam ; neque sibi uUam spem victoriae pro- 
positam habere et, si qui ex nostris transfugeret, in 

^ adversione MSS. : aversione Aldus. 

- lacuna assumed by Nipperdey. 

^ vendere MSS. : venire Lipsius. 

* ne cui . . . liceret MSS. : neque . . . licere Nipperdey. 

^ Of Ucubi, he may mean : see Appendix D, p. 404. 



THE SPANISH WAR 

two sides; whereupon, as the envoys were rejoining 
our men who were outside the town, the townsmen 
followed them up from behind with an armed party 
and then massacred them. There were two sur- 
vivors, who fled and reported the incident to Caesar 
. . . and the men of Ui'sao sent investigators to the 
town of Ategua. And when they had definitely 
established that the envoys' account was correct, 
and that the incidents had occurred just as they had 
related, a crowd of townsfolk quickly gathered, and 
thev began to stone and shake their fists at the man 
who had massacred the envoys, shouting that he had 
been responsible for their own undoing. So when 
he had barelv been rescued from his perilous plight, 
he besought the townsfolk for leave to go on a mission 
to Caesar, saying that he would satisfy the latter. 
Permission being granted, he set out from the town, 
collected a bodyguard and. when he had made it a 
good large force, contrived by treachery to be taken 
back into the town by night. Whereupon he carried 
out a wholesale massacre, killed the leading men 
who had been opposed to him, and took the town 
under his own control. — Just before this deserting 
slaves reported that the goods of the townsfolk ^ 
were being sold, and that it was forbidden to go 
out beyond the rampart except ungirt,^ for the 
reason that, ever since the day when Ategua was 
captured, quite a number of people in their panic 
had been seeking asylum in Baeturia ; that they had 
no prospects of success in view and that, if any man 
deserted from our side, he was shoved ^ into some 

* i.e. without a belt, the wearing of which might enable 
them to conceal weapons. 

' The use of coicere here appears to be disparaging. 

349 



CAESAR 

levem armaturam coici eumquc ^ non amplius XVII 
accipere. 
23 Insequcnti tempore Caesar castris castra contulit 
et bracchium ad flumen Salsum ducere coepit. Hie 
dum in opere nostri distenti essent, complures ex 
superiore loco adversariorum deeucurrerunt nee 
desinentibus nostris ^ multis telis iniectis compluris 
vulneribus adfecere. Hie turn, ut ait P',nnius, ' nostri 
cessere parumper.' Itaque praeter consuetudineni 
cum a nostris animadversum esset cedere, centu- 
riones ex legione \'. flumen transgressi duo resti- 
tuerunt aciem, acriterque eximia virtute pluris cum 
agerent, ex superiore loco multitudine telorum 
alter eorum concidit. Ita cum eius comes impar ^ 
proelium facere coepisset, cum undique se circum- 
veniri animum advertisset, regressus * pedem offendit. 
In huius concidentis centurionis ac viri ^ fortis 
insignia cum complures adversariorum concursum 
facerent, equites nostri transgressi inferiore * loco 

^ The MSS. vary between transfugerent and transfugerunt, 
eumque and eum qui. / have adopted Fleischers reading 
transfugeret, though possibly, in vieiv of qui, transfugerent . . . 
eamque should be read. 

- detinentibus nostros MSS. : desinentibus nostris Vossius. 

' compar MSS. : comes Warmington. impar added by 
yipperdey, who also read eius for eis or is of MSS. 

* ingressus MSS. : regressus Lipsius. 

* huius concidentis temporis aquari MSS. I have adopted 
Kipperdey's conjecture. 

* interiori MSS. : inferiore Ueinsius. 



^ This is the traditional interpretation, but the sense is far 
from satisfactorj\ Reckoning 10 asses = 1 denarius this 
would amount to over 600 denarii a year; whereas the 
legionaries' pay, as increased by Caesar, was only 225 denarii 



THE SPANISH WAR 

light-.irmed unit and drew no more than seventeen 
asses a day-^ 

In the period which followed Caesar moved up his 
camp and proceeded to carry a line of fortifications to 
the river Salsum. At this point, while our men were 
busily engaged in the operation, a fair number of the 
enemy swooped down upon them from higher 
ground and, as our men carried on with their work, 
there were not a few casualties among them from the 
heavy volleys of enemy missiles. Hereupon, as En- 
niusputsit, " our men gave ground for a brief space." 
Conse(juently, when our men observed that they 
Avere giving ground more than their wont, two 
centurions from the Fifth legion crossed the river 
and restored the battle line ^ ; and as they drove 
their more numerous enemies back, displaying dash 
and gallantry of an exceptional order, one of them 
succumbed to a heavy volley of missiles discharged 
from higher ground. And so his colleague now 
began an uphill fight ; and when he observed that 
he was being completely surrounded, he retreated 
and lost his footing. As this gallant officer fell 
not a few of the enemy made a rush to plunder his 
decorations ; but our cavalry crossed the river and 
from lower ground proceeded to drive the enemy to 

a year. Klotz's reading •X'VII (sc. per mensem = 84 denarii 
a year) is attractive. 

- It would seem that Caesar's main camp was still X. of the 
river Salsum, whereas Pompeius was S. of it. But Caesar 
may well have had detachments holding strong points across 
the river {e.g. Castra Postumiana, ch. 8); and the present 
context suggests, I think, that his sappers were working S. 
of the river and that their desperate plight was observed 
by their comrades, and relieved b}- the cavalry, from X. of 
the river. 



CAESAR 

adversaries ad vallum agcre cocperunt. Ita cupidius 
dum intra praesidia illorum studfnt caedem facere, a 
tiirmis et levi armatura sunt interclusi. Quorum 
nisi summa virtus fuisset, vivi capti essent : nam et 
munitione praesidi ita coanjtjustabantur ut eques 
.spatio intercluso vix se defendere posset. Ex 
utroque genere pugnae complures sunt vulneribus 
adfecti, in quis ctiam Clodius Arquitius ; inter quos 
ita comminus est pugnatum ut ex nostris praeter duos 
centuriones sit nemo desideratus gloria se efferentis. 
24 Postero die ad Soricariam ^ utrorumque convenere 
copiae. Nostri bracehia ducere eoeperunt. Pom- 
peius cum animadverteret castello se excludi Aspavia, 
quod est ab Ucubi milia passuum ^^ haee res neces- 
sario devocabat ut ad dimicandum descenderet ; 
neque tamen aequo loco sui potestatem faciebat, 
sed ex grumo . . .^ excelsum tumulum capiebant, 
usque eo ut necessario cogeretur iniquum locum 
subire. Quo de facto cum utrorumque copiae 
tumulum excellentem petissent, prohibit! a nostris 
sunt deiecti in planitiem.^ Quae res secundum 
nostris efficiebat proelium. Undique cedentibus 

^ ab Soricaria MSS. : ad Soricariam Glandorp. 

* lacuna assumed b;/ Nipperdey. 

^ deiecti planitie MSS. But the sense certainly seems to 
require in planitiem, u'hick I have accordingly conjectured. 
{The plain dative planitiei or planitiae would be a simpler 
correction and, syntactically, perhaps not impossible in the case 
of this author.) 

^ i.e. either infantry and cavalry, or, as Klotz suggests, 
with the enemy cavalry and light-armed units. 

- March 5th, as ch. 27 shews. 

' Both Holmes and Klotz accept Stoffel's identification of 
Soricaria with Castro del Rio, on the right bank of the Salsum, 
6 miles S.E. of Ategua. 



THE SPANISH WAR 

their rampart. And so, in their too eager anxiety 
to carry destruction within the area of the latter's 
defence positions, they were cut off by enemy squad- 
rons and Hght-armed troops. Had not their gallan- 
try been of the highest order, they would have been 
captured alive; for they were, moreover, hemmed 
in so tightly by the emplacements of the camp as to 
make it well nigh impossible for a hoi'seman to defend 
himself in the restricted space. As a result of both 
types of engagement ^ — quite a number of men 
were wounded, including Clodius Arquitius ; but 
although both sides were engaged at such close 
quarters, no-one was lost on our side apart from the 
two centurions, who bore themselves with out- 
standing distinction. 

On the next day ^ the forces of both sides con- 
verged upon Soi'icaria.^ Our men proceeded to build 
fortified lines. When Pompeius observed that he 
was in process of being cut off from the fortress of 
Aspavia,* which is five miles distant from Ucubi, 
this circumstance peremptorily demanded that he 
should enter the lists; yet, for all that, he gave his 
opponents no opportunity of engaging him on fav- 
ourable ground, but from a hillock . . . they set 
about capturing a lofty knoll, and made such good 
progress that Caesar had no option but to approach 
unfavourable ground. When accordingly the forces 
of both sides had launched an attack upon this lofty 
knoll, our men forestalled the enemy and hurled 
them back on to the level ground. This led to a 
successful action by our troops : on all sides their 

* Stoffel sited it some 2 miles S.E. of Soricaria, and S. of 
the river. Hence it would appear that Caesar had now — if not 
before — crossed the Salsum. 



CAESAR 

adversariis non parum magna in caede versabantur. 
Quibus mons, non virtus, saluti fuit. Quo subsidio 
subnisi,^ nisi advespcrasset, a paucioribus nostris 
omni auxilio privati cssent. Nam ceciderunt ex le\ i 
armatui-a CCCXXIII, ex legionariis CXXX\'III, 
praeterquam quorum arma et spolia sunt ablata. 
Ita pridie duorum centurionum interitio hac adver- 
sariorum poena est litata. 
25 Insequenti die pari consuetudine cum ad eundem 
locum eius praesidium venisset, pristino illo suo 
utebantur instituto : nam praeter equites nullo loco 
aequo se committere audebant. Cum nostri in 
opere essent, equitum copiae concursus facere 
coeperunt, simulque vociferantibus legionai'iis, cum 
locum efflagitarent, ut consueti insequi — existimare 
posses paratissimos esse ad dimicandum — nostri ex 
humili convalle bene longe sunt egressi et planitie in 
aequiore - loco constiterunt. Illi tamen procul dubio 
ad congrediendum in aequum locum non sunt ausi 
descendere praeter unum Antistium Turpionem ; qui 
fidens viribus ex adversariis sibi parem esse neminem 

^ quo subsidio ut nisi most MSS. : subnisi is Dinter's 
conjecture. 

* inaequore or iniquiori most MSS. : in aequiore Davies. 



^ This appears, as Holmes has remarked, to be distinct 
both from the grunius and the tumulus mentioned earlier. 
No doubt it was some hill nearby to which the Pompeians had 
been able to fight their way out. 

- So Holmes : Caesar's, according to Klotz. But the 
author normally uses nosier to denote the Caesarians; and 
the phrase pari consuetudine seems to me to refer rather to the 

354 



THE SPANISH WAR 

opponents gave ground, and our men were engaged 
in a massacre of no mean proportions. It was the 
high ground,^ not the enemy's valour, which proved 
the latter 's salvation ; and even relying upon its aid 
they would, but for the approach of evening, have 
been deprived of all support by our less numerous 
forces. As it was, their casualties comprised three 
hundred and twenty-three light-armed and a hundred 
and thirty-eight legionaries, apart from those who 
were stripped of their arms and equipment. Thus 
by this present retribution did the enemy atone for 
his slaughter of our two centurions the day before. 

On the following day Pompeius' ^ force followed a 
similar routine and returned to the same spot, where 
they employed those old established tactics of theirs ; 
for with the exception of his cavalry at no point did 
his troops venture to commit themselves to favourable 
ground. While our men were engaged on their task of 
fortification, the enemy cavalr>' forces began to launch 
attacks ; and simultaneously his legionary troops kept 
clamorously demanding to have their turn, seeing 
that their normal role was to support the cavalry — ■ 
you might have supposed them to be straining madly 
at the leash : when our men advanced a good long way 
from a shallow valley and halted on more favourable 
ground in the plain. However, there was no doubt 
about it, the enemy all lacked the courage to come 
down into the plain to engage — all except one man, 
Antistius Turpio ; and he, confident in his sti-ength, 
began to indulge in taunts, claiming that there was 
nobody a match for him on the opposite side. Here- 
third sentence of ch. 24. The ' same spot ' would seem to be 
the neighbourhood of the lofty knoll, and not the high ground 
mentioned later. 

355 



CAESAR 

agitare coepit. Hie, ut fertur Achillis Memnonisque 
congressus, Q. Pompeius Niger, eques Romanus 
Italicensis, ex acie nostra ad congrediendum pro- 
gressus est. Quoniam ferocitas Antisti omnium 
mentis converterat ab opere ad spectandum, acies 
sunt dispositae : nam inter bellatores principes dubia 
erat posita victoria, ut prope videretur finem bellandi 
duorumdirimere pugna. * Itaavidi cupidicjuesuarum 
quisque ex partium virorum f'autorumque voluntate 
habebatur. Quorum virtute alacri, cum ad dimi- 
candum in planitiem se contulissent, scutorumque 
laudis insignia praefulgens opus caelatum . . . 
quorum cei'tamine ^ pugna esset prope profecto di- 
rempta, nisi propter equitum eongressum,^ ut supra 
demonstravimus . . . levem armaturam praesidi 
causa non longe ab opere constituit.* ^ Ut, nostri 
equites in receptu dum ad castra redeunt, adversarii 
cupidius sunt insecuti, universi clamore facto im- 
petum dederunt. Ita metu perterriti, cum in fuga 
essent multis amissis in castra se recipiunt. 

Caesar ob virtutem turmae Cassianae donavit 
milia •XIII'* et praefecto torques aureos V et levi 
armaturae milia X'll.'' Hoc die A. Baebius et C. 
Flavius et A. Trebellius, equites Romani Astenses, 
argento prope teetis equis ® ad Caesarem transfuge- 

* The MSS. text of these two sentences appears to be highly 
corrupt and so full of gaps as to defy any plausible reconstruction. 
The English rendering is accordingly little more than an 
approximation. 

1 certamine added by Klotz. 

2 concessum MSS. : congressum Nipperdey. 

^ castra constituit MSS. : Klotz deletes castra. 

* mil XUIMSS. : milia -XIII Dinter. 
5 mil OCCI MSS. : milia -X-II Binter. 

8 tecti equites MSS. : teetis equis Glandorp. 



THE SPANISH WAR 

upon, like the traditional encounter between 
Achilles and Memnon, Q. Pompeius Niger, a Roman 
knight from Italica, advanced from our ranks to 
encounter him. All men's minds were now dis- 
tracted from their work and bent upon this spectacle 
— such was the effect of the dauntless spirit of 
Antistius — and the armies were arrayed over against 
one another ; for the chances of victory were nicelv 
balanced between the two warring champions, so that 
it almost seemed as if their duel meant the final 
decision and cessation of hostilities. So fanatically 
eager were they all, each man gripped by the 
enthusiasm of the champions and supporters of his 
own side. As for the two champions, what with their 
dashing courage, now that they had moved into the 
plain for the encounter, and the inwrought work of 
their shields — emblems of their fame — flashing in 
front of them . . . and their duel would almost 
certainly have put an end to the action, unless, owing 
to the attack of the enemy cavalry noted above, . . . 
Caesar posted some light-armed troops not far from 
the emplacement to give cover. While our cavalry 
were withdrawing to camp, the enemy pursued them 
too eagerly, whereupon the light-armed troops one 
and all raised a shout and charged them. This created 
a panic among them and they retii-ed to their camp 
sustaining heavy losses in the course of their rout. 

In recognition of the gallantry of the Cassian 
squadron Caesar awarded it three thousand de- 
narii and its commander five golden collars ; he 
also awarded the light-armed troops two thousand 
denarii. On this day A. Baebius, C. Flavius 
and A. Trebellius, who were Roman knights from 
the town of Asta, deserted to Caesar, with their 

357 



CAESAR 

runt ; qui nuntiaverunt equites Romanes coniurasse 
omnis qui in castris Pompei essent ut transitionem 
facerent ; servi indicio omnis in custodiam esse 
coniectos, c quibus occasione capta se transfugisse. 
Item hoc die litterae sunt deprensae, quas mittebat 
Ursaonem Cn. Pompeius : ' S. V. G. E. V. Etsi, 
prout nostra felicitas, ex sententia adversarios adhuc 
propulsos habemus, si aequo loco sui potestatem 
facerent, celerius quam vestra opinio fert bellum 
confecissem ; sed exercitum tironem non audent in 
campum deducere nostrisque adhuc fixi praesidiis 
beHum ducunt. Nam singulas civitates circum- 
sederunt : inde sibi commeatus capiunt. Quare et 
civitates nostrarum partium conservabo et bellum 
primo quoque tempore conficiam. Cohortes . . . 
animo habeo ad vos mittere. Profectu ^ nostro 
commeatu privati necessario ad dimicandum 
descendent.' 
27 Insequenti tempore cum nostri in opere distenti 
essent, equites in oliveto, dum lignantur, interfecti 
sunt aliquot. Servi transfugerunt, qui nuntiaverunt, 
a. d. III. Non. Mart, proelium ad Soricariam ^ quod 
factum est, ex eo tempore metum esse magnum, et 

^ profecto MSS. : profectu Mommsen. 

^ soriciatQ or siticia MSS. : Soricariam Clarke. 



^ Presumably, as Klotz explains, thcA^ brought all their 
valuables with them. In the next sentence ' all the Roman 
knights ' must refer only to those from Asta. 

* Yet from ch. 28 it appears that this despatch — or a copy 
of it — eventually got through, cf. ch. 18. 



THE SPANISH WAR 

horses practically covered in silver.^ They reported 
that all the Roman knights in the camp of Pom- 
peius had taken an oath to desert ; but a slave 
had informed against them, and they had all been 
thrown into prison; they themselves were among 
this number, but had seized their opportunity and 
deserted. It was on this day too that a despatch 
was intercepted - which Cn. Pompeius was sending to 
Ursao : it read : ' If you are well, I am delighted : 
I for my part am well.^ Although, in accordance with 
our usual good luck, we have so far kept the enemy 
on the run to our satisfaction, yet, if they gave us 
the chance of engaging them on favoui'able ground, I 
should have finished the war sooner than your belief 
suggests. But as it is, they lack the courage to 
bring down their inexperienced army into the field, 
and, pinned down so far by our forces,* they are pro- 
longing hostilities. They have in fact laid siege to 
individual townships, and it is from them that they 
derive their supplies. I shall accordingly not only 
protect the townships which belong to our side, but 
shall finish the war at the first opportunity. I 
intend to send you . . . cohorts. When we take 
the field we shall deprive them of their vital supplies, 
and they will then come down to fight.'* 

Later on, when our men were busily engaged on 
a field-work, a number of our cavalry were killed 
while collecting wood in an olive grove. Some 
slaves deserted to us, who reported that since 
March 5th, the day w'hen the battle took place at 
Soricaria, there had been grave alarm, and Attius 

3 Abbreviation of — Si valetis gmideo, ego valeo. This is 
one of the conventional greetings with which many a Roman 
letter began. * See p. 405. 

359 



CAESAR 

Attium \"arum circum castella praeesse. Eo die 
Pompeius castra niovit ct contra Spalim ^ in oliveto 
constituit. Caesar prius quam eodem est profectus, 
luna hora circiter sexta visa est. Ita castris motis 
Ucubim - Pompeius praesidium quod rcliquit iussit 
incendere, ut deusto oppido in castra maiora se 
reciperent. Insequenti tempore \'entiponem ^ op- 
pidum cum oppugnare coepisset, deditione facta 
iter fecit in Carrucam, contra Pompeium castra 
posuit. Pompeius oppidum, quod contra sua prae- 
sidia portas claussiset, incendit ; milesque, qui 
fratrem suum in castris iugulasset, interceptus est a 
nostris et fustibus percussus. Hinc itinere facto in 
campum Mundensem cum esset ventum, castra 
contra Pompeium constituit. 
28 Sequenti die cum iter facere Caesar cum copiis 
vellet, renuntiatum est a speculatoribus Pompeium 
de tertia vigilia in acie stetisse. Hoc nuntio allato 
vexillum proposuit. Idcirco enim copias eduxerat, 

1 The MSS. give Spalim or Sparim ; neither place is other- 
wise known. But the tempting conjecture Hispalim seems 
geographically most improbable, as it lay some eighty miles 
west of Soricaria and over forty miles distant from Ursao. 

2 aucubim or accubim MSS. : Ucubim editors. 
* ventiponte MSS. : Ventiponem Nipperdey. 

^ In this sentence and the following one the Latin presents 
a striking example of the ambiguity mentioned in the Intro- 
duction, p. 307. Pompeius is almost certainly subject of 
iussit, and the camp is presumably his; and so one expects — 
in default of any indication to the contrary — Pompeius to be 
subject in the following sentence too. But Caesar must 
obviously be subject of posuit and is apparentlj' also the 
subject of coepisset and fecit. 

^ Carruca is not otherwise known : its general position can 
thus be inferred only from this context — somewhere between 
Ventipo (close to the modern Casariche) and Munda. Klotz, 

360 



THE SPANISH WAR 

Varus had been in command of the fortified zone. 
On that day Pompeius moved his camp and estab- 
lished it in an oUve grove over against SpaHs. Before 
Caesar set out for the same locality, the moon was 
observed at approximately the sixth hour. As 
Pompeius ^ had thus withdrawn his camp, he accord- 
ingly instructed his garrison force which he had 
left behind to set fire to Ucubi, so that, when the 
town was burned out, they should retire to his 
principal camp. Later on Caesar proceeded to assault 
the town of ^'entipo ; and when it capitulated he 
marched to Carruca,- and pitched camp over against 
Pompeius. Pompeius burned the town ^ for having 
barred its gates to his foi-ces ; and a soldier who had 
murdered his own brother in camp was intercepted 
by our troops and clubbed to death. From this area 
Caesar marched into the plain of Munda,* and on his 
arrival there established his camp over against 
Pompeius. 

On the following day Caesar was minded to take 
the road with his forces when scouts came back with 
the news that Pompeius had been in battle formation 
since the third watch. On receipt of this news 
Caesar displayed the flag-signal for action. Now the 
reason why Pompeius had led out his forces was this : 

however, who assumes throughout that operations were 
confined to a relatively small area, tentatively places Ventipo, 
Carruca and Spalis at distances respectively of only 7, 8 and 1 1 
kilometres S. of Aspavia on the Salsum. 

^ i.e. Carruca. 

* Its position is disputed : I have followed Holmes and 
Veith in locating it some six miles N.W. of Ursao (Osuna). 
Stoffel and Klotz place it at Montilla, some 35 miles N.E. of 
Ursao; while Hiibner identifies it with a place known locally 
as Campo de Munda, about 30 miles S. of Ursao. 

561 



CAESAR 

quod Ursaonensium ^ civitati, qui sui ^ fuissent 
fautorcs, antea litteras miserat Caesarem nolle in 
convallem descendere, quod maiorem partem exer- 
citus tironeni haberet. Hae litterae vchementer 
conflrmabaiit mentis oppidanorum. Ita hac opinione 
fretus totum se ^ facere posse existimabat : etcnim et 
natura loci defcndebatur et ipsius oppidi munitione, 
ubi castra habuit constituta. Namque ut superius 
demonstravimus, loca excellentia tumulis contineri 
intervallo planitiei dividi * ; id (juod co incidit 
tempore. 
29 Planities inter utraque castra intercedebat circiter 
milia passuum V, ut auxilia Pompei duabus dcfen- 
derentur rebus, oppido et excelsi ^ loci natura. Hinc 
dirigens proxima planities aequabatur. Cuius de- 
cursum antecedebat rivus, qui ad eorum accessum 
summam efficiebat loci iniquitatem : nam palustri et 
voraginoso solo currens crat ad dextram. Itaque ® 
Caesar cum aciem derectam vidisset, non habuit 
dubium quin media planitie in aequum ad dimi- 

^ versaonensium or versoe- or verso- MSS. : Ursaonensium 
Glandorp. 

- qui sui supplied by Nipperdey. 

^ se added by Oiidendorp. 

* / have adopted Nipperdey's conjecture. The 3ISS. give 
variously interim nulla planitia edividit : nulla planitiae 
dividit : nullam planitie dividi. 

^ oppidi excelsi et MSS. : oppido et excelsi Xipperdey. 

^ id quod MSS. : itaque Nipperdey. 



1 Klotz takes this to mean the more confident attitude of 
the men of Ursao. But would their increased confidence by 
itself lead Pompey to think he could carry the whole thing 
off? It seems to me more likely that what the author 
reallj- meant was this : " The reason why Pompey had led 
his forces out was that Caesar — so he had told the men of 



362 



THE SPANISH WAR 

he had previously sent a despatch to the citizens of 
Ursao, who were supporters of his, saying that 
Caesar was unwilling to come doM'n into the valley 
because the greater part of his army was inex- 
perienced. This despatch stiffened the morale of 
the townsfolk considerably. Pompeius therefore, 
relying on this conviction,^ supposed that he 
could carry the whole thing off; for where he had 
established his camp he was protected not only 
by the natural conformation of the gi-ound but also 
by the fortifications of the town itself. For, as 
we have pointed out earlier,^ it is lofty country, 
l)astioned by hills with an occasional intervening 
plain ; and this, it so happened, was the case on the 
present occasion. 

Between the two camps ran a plain, extending for 
some five miles, so that there were two factors which 
made for the protection of Pompeius' troops — the 
town, and the lofty nature of the ground. Extending 
from the town the plain ground nearest to it levelled 
out, and ran down to where a stream ran in front of 
it, which made the ground there extremely awkward 
for Caesar's troops to approach the Pompeians ; for 
the soil to the right of the river's course was marshy 
and full of bog-holes. Consequently, when Caesar 
saw their battle line deployed, he had no doubt that 

Ursao in a despatch, which considerably encouraged them — 
was unwilling to come down to engage. Pompey accordingly, 
relying on this conviction (viz. that Caesar would decline 
battle), supposed he could carry the whole thing off." 

^ The reference seems to me to be to the general description 
of Baetica given in ch. 8 rather than to that of the Ategua- 
Ucubi district in ch. 7. .Stoifel assumes the latter on the 
supposition that Munda was on the site of the modern Mon- 
tilla, rather less than ten miles S.W. of Ucubi, 

Z^3 



CAESAR 

candum adversarii procederent. Hoc erat in omnium 
conspectu. Hue ^ accedebat ut locus ilia planitie 
equitatum evocaret et diei solisque serenitate,^ 
ut niirificum et optandum tempus prope ab dis 
immortalibus illud tributum esset ad proelium com- 
mittendum. Nostri laetari, non nulli etiani timere, 
quod in cum locum res fortunaeque omnium dedu- 
cerentur ut, quidquid post horam casus tribuisset, in 
dubio poneretur. Itaque nostri ad dimicandum 
procedunt, id quod adversarios existimabamus esse 
facturos ; qui tamen a munitione oppidi longius non 
audebant procedere, immo se ibi prope murum 
adversarii ^ constituebant. Itaque nostri procedunt. 
Interdum aequitas loci adversarios efflagitabat ut 
tali condicione contenderent ad victoriam ; neque 
tamen illi a sua consuetudine discedebant, ut aut ab 
excelso loco aut ab oppido discederent. Nostri pede 
presso propius rivum cum appropinquassent, adver- 
sarii patrocinari loco iniquo non desinunt. 
30 Erat acies XHI aquilis constituta, quae lateribus 
equitatu tegebatur cum levi armatura milibus sex, 
praeterea auxiliares accedebant prope alterum 
tantum ; nostra praesidia LXXX cohortibus, octo 
milibus equitum. Ita cum in extrema planitie 
iniquum in locum nostri appropinquassent, paratus 
hostis erat superior, ut transeundum superius iter 

^ hoc MSS. : hue editors. 

^ ornaret . . . serenitatem MSS. : evocaret . . . serenitate 
Kraner. 

^ in quo sibi . . . adversariis MSS. : immo se ibi . . . 
adversarii Mommsen. 

^ i.e. eight legions — 4 veteran (III, V, VI and X) and 4 
of recruits ; the cavalry included a detachment of Numidians 
led by Bogud. 

364 



THE SPANISH WAR 

his opponents would advance to the level ground to 
do battle in the middle of the plain. This area was 
in full view of all. Moreover, with a level plain like 
that and a calm, sunny day, it was a tempting 
situation for cavalry — a wonderful, longed-for and 
well-nigh heaven-sent opportunity for engaging 
battle. Our men were delighted — though some also 
had misgivings — at the thought that the welfare 
and fortunes of everyone were being brought to the 
point that no one could tell for certain what would 
prove to be the luck vouchsafed them an hour later. 
And so our men advanced to do battle ; and we sup- 
posed that the enemy would do likewise : but our op- 
ponents would not venture to advance far from the 
defences of the town : on the contrary, they were 
establishing themselves in the town close to the wall. 
And so our men advanced. From time to time the 
favourable nature of the ground would sorely tempt 
the enemy to press on to victory under such condi- 
tions ; but, none the less, they would not depart 
from their accustomed tactics so as to forsake either 
the high ground or the town. And when our men, 
advancing at a moderate pace, came up closer to the 
stream, their opponents remained consistently on 
the defensive on the steep ground. 

Their battle line was composed of thirteen legions, 
and was screened on the flanks by cavaliy as well as 
six thousand light-armed troops, while in addition 
there were nearly as many again auxiliary troops 
besides : our forces comprised eighty cohorts ^ and 
eight thousand cavalry. So when our men, as they 
approached, reached the unfavourable ground at the 
farthest limit of the plain, the enemy were ready on 
higher ground, making it extremely dangerous for our 

365 



CAESAR 

vehementer esset periculosum. Quod cum a Caesare 
esset animadversum, ne quid temere culpa secus 
admitteretur, eum locum definire coepit. Quod cum 
hominum auribus esset obiectum, moleste et acerbe 
accipiebant se impediri quo minus proelium con- 
ficere possent. Haec mora adversarios alacriores 
efficiebat : Caesaris copias timore impediri ad com- 
mittendum proelium. Ita se efferentes iiiiquo loco 
sui potestatem faciebant, ut magno tamen periculo 
accessus eorum haberetur. Hie decumani suum 
locum, cornum dextrum, tenebant, sinistrum III. et 
v., itemque cetera auxilia et equitatus.^ Proelium 
clamore facto committitur. 
31 Hie etsi virtute nostri antecedebant, adversarii 
loco superiore se defendebant acerrime, et vehemens 
fiebat ab utrisque clamor telorumque missu concur- 
sus, sic ut prope nostri diffiderent ^ victoriae. Con- 
gressus enim et clamor, quibus rebus maxime hostis 
conterretur, in collatu pari erat condicione. Ita ex 
uti'oque genere pugnae cum parem virtutem ad 
bellandum contulissent, pilorum missu ^ fixa curnula- 
tur et concidit adversariorum multitudo. Dextrum ut 
demonstravimus decumanos coi-num tenuisse ; qui 
etsi erant pauci, tamen propter virtutem magno 
adversarios timore eorum opera adficiebant, quod a 
suo loco hostis vehementer premere coeperunt, ut ad 

^ itemque et cetera auxilia equitatua 3ISS. : most editors 
either transpose or add et after auxilia. 

'^ different or -ferrent or deferunt MSS. : diffiderent editors. 
^ missus MSS. : missu editors. 

^ The phrase locum definire has been variously explained 
by editors. But if it be assumed that Caesar's troops had 
already crossed the stream, it may, I think, imply that 
Caesar ordered a strictly limited advance up the slope, 

366 



THE SPANISH WAR 

men to pursue their passage to the higher level. 
When Caesar observed this, to avoid any blunder 
being perpetrated owing to rashness or faulty judg- 
ment, he began to restrict the opei*ational area.^ 
But when it came to the ears of the men that he was 
doing so, they were bitterly disgusted, as they took 
it to mean that their chance of deciding the conflict 
was being hampered. This delay made the enemy 
keener : it was fear, they thought, that was prevent- 
ing Caesar's forces from joining battle : and although 
by displaying themselves they gave our men the 
opportunity of engaging them on steep ground, yet 
it was only at great risk that one could approach 
them. On our side the men of the Tenth legion held 
their proper post — the right wing ; while the men 
of the Third and Fifth legions together with all the 
rest of our foi'ces — the auxiliary troops and the 
cavalry — held the left wing. The shout was raised 
and the battle joined. 

Hereupon, although our men were superior in 
point of valour, their opponents offered a very spirit- 
ed resistance from their higher position ; and so furi- 
ous proved the shouting on both sides, so furious the 
charging with its attendant volley of missiles, that our 
men well nigh lost their confidence in victory. In 
fact, as regards attacking and shouting — ^the two 
chief methods of demoralising an enemy — both sides 
stood on equal terms of comparison. But, though they 
accordingly brought to the contest an equal fighting 
capacity in both these departments of battle, yet 
the enemy masses were pinned down by our volleys 
of heavy javelins, and fell in heaps. Our i-ight wing, 

since he was unaware as yet of the strength of tlie enemy's 
IJrepared positions on the heights. 

367 



CAESAR 

subsidium, ne ab latere nostri occuparent, legio 
adversariorum traduci coepta sit a dextro.^ Quae 
simul est mota, e(juitatus Caesaris siiiistrum cornum 
premere coepit ita uti eximia virtute proelium 
facere posseiit,^ locus in aciem ad subsidium veniendi 
non daretur. Ita cum clamor esset intermixtus 
gemitu gladiorumque crepitus auribus oblatus, 
imperitorum mentis timore praepediebat. Hie, ut 
ait Ennius, pes pede premitur, armis teruntur arma, 
adversariosque vehementissime pugnantes nostri 
agere coeperunt ; quibus oppidum fuit subsidio. Ita 
ipsis Llberalibus fusi fugatique non superfuissent, 
nisi in eum locum confugissent ex quo erant egressi. 
In quo proelio ceciderunt milia hominum circiter 
XXX et si quid amplius, praeterea Labienus, Attius 
Varus, quibus occisis utrisque funus est factum, 
itemque equites Romani partim ex iirbe partim ex 
provincia ad milia III, Nostri desiderati ad 
hominum mille partim equitum partim peditum ; 
saucii ad D. Adversariorum aquilae sunt ablatae 
XIII et signa et fasces praeterea hos habuit . . . 

1 ad dextrum MSS. : a dextro Glandorp. Klotz retains 
ad dextrum as meaning to Caesar's right. 

2 possent ut locus MSS. : Du Pontet deleted ut. 



^ I have retained the MSS. reading, although some emend 
to give the sense ' from their own left wing ', i.e. on the 
enemy's right. But as the Pompeian legion was already 
crossing over, it seems to me that increased pressure by the 
cavalry on the enemy's left wing might well have made 
eflfective reinforcement impracticable. 

- The festival in honour of Liber or Bacchus, celebrated on 
March 17 th. 

368 



THE SPANISH WAR 

as we have explained, was held by the men of the 
Tenth legion; and despite their small numbers, 
their gallantry none the less enabled them by their 
exertions to inspire no little panic among their 
opponents. They proceeded, in fact, to exert strong 
pressm-e on the enemy, driving him back from his 
positions, with the result that he began to transfer a 
legion from his right, to give suppoi't and to prevent 
our men from outflanking him. As soon as this 
legion had been set in motion Caesar's cavalry 
began to exert pressure on the enemy left wing,^ 
so that, no matter how gallantly the enemy might 
fight, he was afforded no opportunity of reinforcing 
his line. And so, as the motley din — shouts, groans, 
the clash of swords — assailed their ears, it shackled 
the minds of the inexperienced with fear. Here- 
upon, as Ennius puts it, " foot forces against foot and 
weapons grind 'gainst weapons " ; and in the teeth of 
very strong opposition our men began to drive the 
enemy back. The town, however, stood them in 
good stead. And so they were routed and put to 
flight on the very day of the Liberalia - ; nor would 
thev have survived, had thev not fled back to their 
original starting point. In this battle there fell some 
thirtv thousand men — if anything, more — as well as 
Labienus and Attius Varus, both of whom were 
buried where thev fell, and about three thousand 
Roman knights besides, some from Rome, some from 
the province. Our losses amounted to about a 
thousand men, partly cavalry, partly infantry ; while 
our wounded totalled about five hundred. Thirteen 
legionary eagles belonging to the enemy were 
captured ; and in addition he had the following 
standai'ds and rods of office . . . 

369 



CAESAR 

32 ... ex fuga hac qui oppidum Mundam sibi con- 
stituissent praesidium, nostrique cogcbantur necess- 
ario eos circumvallare. Ex hostium armis scuta et 
pila pro vallo, pro caespite cadavera collocabantur, 
insuper abscisa in gladiorum mucrone capita homi- 
nuni ordinata ad oppidum conversa universa, ut et 
ad hostium timorem virtutisque insignia proposita 
viderent et vallo circumcluderentur adversarii.^ 
Ita Galli tragulis iaculisque oppidum ex hostium 
cadaveribus circumplexi ^ oppugnare coeperunt. Ex 
hoc proelio Valerius adulescens Cordubam cum 
paucis equitibus fugit ; Sex. Pompeio, qui Cordubae 
fuisset, rem gestam refert. Cognito hoc negotio, 
quos equites secum habuit, quod pecuniae secum 
habuit eis distribuit et oppidanis dixit se de pace ad 
Caesarem proficisci et secunda vigilia ab oppido 
discessit. Cn. Pompeius cum equitibus paucis non 
nullisque peditibus ad navale praesidium parte altera 
Carteiam contendit, quod oppidum abest ab Corduba 
milia passuum CLXX. Quo cum ad octavum 
miliarium venisset, P. Caucilius,^ qui castris antea 
Pompei praepositus esset, eius verbis nuntium mittit 
eum minus bellum habere : ut mitterent lecticam 
qua in oppidum deferri posset. Lecticariis * missis 
Pompeius Carteiam defertur. Qui illarum partium 
fautores essent conveniunt in domum quo erat 
delatus — qui arbitrati sunt clanculum venisse — , ut 

* Ex hostium armis pro caespite cadavera collocabantur 
scuta et pila pro vallo insuper occisi et gladio ut mucro et 
capita. . . . MSS. I have adopted : — Nipperdeys trans- 
position of scuta . . . vallo, and his conjecture in gladiorum 
mucrone; Oudendorp's abscisa; and Hoffmann's insertion of 
ut et ad between universa and hostium. 

^ sunt circumplexi MSS. : Du Pontet deleted sunt. 
^ caucili MSS. : Caucilius Scaliger. 

* litteris MSS. : lecticariis Fleischer. 



THE SPANISH WAR 

. . . those who, after surviving thi>^ rout, had made 
the town of Munda their refuge, and our men were of 
necessity compelled to blockade them. Shields and 
javelins taken from among the enemy's weapons were 
placed to serve as a palisade, dead bodies as a ram- 
pai't ; on top, impaled on sword points, severed 
human heads were ranged in a row all facing .the 
town, the object being not merely to enclose the 
enemy bv a palisade, but to afford him an awe- 
inspiring spectacle by displaying before him this 
evidence of valour. Having thus encircled the town 
with the javelins and spears taken from the corpses of 
the enemy, the Gallic troops now proceeded to assault 
it. From this battle the young Valerius escaped to 
Corduba with a few horsemen, and delivered his 
report of it to Sextus Pompeius, who was present 
there. On learning of these events, the latter divided 
what money he had with him among his present 
cavalry force, told the townsfolk that he was setting 
out for peace talks with Caesar, and left the town at 
the second watch. Cn. Pompeius, attended by 
a few horsemen and some infantry, pressed forward 
on the other hand to the naval fortified base of 
Carteia, a town which lies one hundred and seventy 
miles away from Corduba. When he had reached 
the eighth milestone from Carteia, P. Caucilius, 
who had formerly been in command of Pompeius' 
camp, sent a message dictated by Pompeius saying 
that he was in a bad way, and they must send a litter 
in which he could be carried into the town. A litter 
and bearers were despatched, and Pompeius was 
carried to Carteia. His partisans forgathered at the 
house to which he had been brought — each supposing 
his visit to have been a private one — to make enquiry 

371 



CAESAR 

ab eo quae vellet ^ de bello requirerent. Cum 
frequentia convenisset, de lectica Pompeius eorum in 
fidem confugit. 
33 Caesar ex proelio Munda munitione eircunidata 
Cordubam venit. Qui ex caede eo refugerant, 
pontem occuparunt. Cum eo vcntum esset, con- 
yieiari coeperunt : nos ex proelio paucos superesse ; 
quo fugeremus ? Ita pugnare coeperunt de ponte. 
Caesar flumen ti'aiecit et castra posuit. Scapula, 
totius seditionis, familiae et libertinorum caput, ex 
proelio Cordubam cum venisset, familiam et libertos 
convocavit, pyram sibi exstruxit, cenam adferri 
quam optimam imperavit, item optimis insternendum 
vestimentis : pecuniam et argentum in praesentia 
familiae donavit. Ipse de tempore cenare ; resinam - 
et nardum identidem sibi infundit. Ita novissimo 
tempore servum iussit et libertum, qui fuisset eius 
concubinus, alterum se iugulare, alterum pyram 
incendere. 

^ vellent MSS. I have adopted vellet — conjectured by 
Kraffert — assuming that vellent arose from the plural verb which 
follows. 

- sitam most MSS. : resinam some late MSS. : stactam 
(= myrrh-oil) Oudendorp. 



^ This seems to be the normal interpretation, though the 
jeering remark seems rather pointless as addressed to Caesar. 
I am inclined to believe that the words Qui ex caede . . . de 
ponte are parenthetical and refer to the time when the 
refugees first arrived. If so, the sense will be : On their 
arrival there they began to jeer, viz. at the members of the 
Caesarian faction, who wished them further, since their 
presence would lessen the chances of reaching a composition 



THE SPANISH WAR 

of him what were his intentions about the war ; but 
when a crowd of them had forgathered, Pompeius 
left his litter and threw himself upon their protection. 
After the battle Caesar invested Munda with a 
ring of emplacements and came to Corduba. The 
survivors of the carnage who had taken refuge there 
seized the bridge ; and when Caesar ^ arrived there 
they proceeded to jeer, saying — -' There are few of us 
survivors from the battle : where were we to seek re- 
fuge ? ' And so they fell to fighting from the bridge. ^ 
Caesar crossed the river and pitched camp. Now 
the ringleader of all this unrest, as well as the head 
of a gang of slaves and freedmen, was Scapula ^ ; 
and when he came to Corduba as a survivor from the 
battle he summoned his slaves and freedmen, had 
himself built a lofty pyre, and ordered a banquet to 
be served on the most lavish possible scale and the 
finest tapestries likewise to be spread out ; and then 
and there he presented his slaves with money and 
silver. As for himself, in due course he fell to upon 
the banquet, and ever and anon anointed himself 
with resin and nard. Accordingly, at the latest 
possible moment, he bade a slave and a freedman — - 
the latter was his concubine — the one to cut his 
throat, the other to light the pyre. 

with Caesar. The following chapter tends, I think, to confirm 
this interpretation. 

^ i.e. down from their position on it. If, however, the 
alternative interpretation given in the note above is accepted, 
the meaning might well be : ' And so they (sc. the refugees, 
who had seized the bridge, and the Caesarian partisans in the 
town) fell to fighting for control of the bridge.' 

^ Scapula and Aponius had been elected as leaders by the 
legions who had previously mutinied against Q. Cassius 
Longinus and later expelled his successor, Trebonius. 

373 



CAESAR 

34 Oppidani autem, sinml Caesar castra contra ad 
oppidum posuit, discordare coeperunt usque eo ut 
clamor in castra nostra perveniret rixae ^ inter 
Caesarianos et inter Pompcianos. Erant hie legiones 
duae 2 ex perfugis conscrij)tao, partini oppidanorum 
servi, qui erant a Sex. Pompcio nianu niissi ; qui in 
Caesaris adventum disccdere ^ coeperunt. Legio 
XIII. oppidum defendere cocpit, nonani * cum iam 
depugnarent,^ turris ex parte et murum occuparunt. 
Denuo legatos ad Caesarem mittunt, ut sibi legiones 
subsidio intromitteret. Hoc cum animadverterent 
homines fugitivi, oppidum incendere coeperunt. 
Qui superati a nostris sunt interfecti hominum milia 
XXII, praeter quam extra murum qui perierunt. Ita 
Caesar oppido potitur. Dum hie detinetur, ex 
proelio quos circummunitos supcrius demonstra- 
vimus, eruptionem fecerunt et bene multis interfectis 
in oppidum sunt redacti. 

35 Caesar Hispalim cum contendisset, legati depre- 
catum venerunt. Ita cum ad oppidum esset ventum, 
Caninium cum praesidio legatum intromittit : ipse 
castra ad oppidum ponit. Erat bene magna manus ^ 

^ fere MSS. : rixae Mommsen. 

2 quae MSS. : duae Madvig. 

' descendere MSS. : discedere Duebner. 

* non 3ISS. : nonani Hoffmann. 

* repugnarent MSS. : depugnarent Nippcrdcij. 
® magnum 31 SS. : magna manus Ciacconius. 



1 f/. ch. 2. 

^ The state of the text makes the sketchy narrative still 
harder to follow. It looks rather as if the Thirteenth and the 

374 



THE SPANISH WAR 

Now as soon as Caesar pitched his camp over 
against the town its occupants proceeded to quarrel ; so 
much so that the sound of the shouting and brawHng 
between the supporters of" Caesar on the one hand, 
and Pompeius on the other, reached our camp. 
There were two legions in this town which had been 
raised partly from deserters, while others were slaves 
of the townsmen who had been set free by Sextus 
Pompeius ; and now in view of Caesar's approach 
they began to desert. The Thirteenth legion pro- 
ceeded to defend the town, whereas the men of the 
Ninth, as soon as they became involved in the fray, 
seized some of the towers and battlements. Once 
again ^ they sent envoys to Caesar, requesting that he 
should send in his legions to support them ; and 
when the refugees got to know of it they proceeded 
to set fire to the town.^ But they were overpowered 
by our men and put to death, to the number of 
twenty-two thousand men, not counting those who 
lost their lives outside the battlements. Thus did 
Caesar gain possession of the town. While he was 
occupied here, the survivors of the battle who had 
been shut up (in Munda), as we desci-ibed above,^ 
made a sally, only to be driven back into the town 
with very heavy losses. 

On Caesar's marching to Hispalis envoys came to 
him to entreat his pardon. So when he reached the 
town, he sent in Caninius as his deputy, accompanied 
l)y a garrison force, while he himself pitched camp 
near the town. Now inside the town there was a 

' refugees ' (survivors from Munda mentioned above in ch. 33?) 
were still bent fanatically on resistance, while the Ninth (?) was 
ready to surrender. 
3 in ch. 32. 

375 



CAESAR 

intra Pompeianarum partium, quae prarsidium 
reccptiim indignaretur clam quendam Philonem, 
ilium qui Pompeianarum partium fuisset defensor 
acerrimus — is tota Lusitania notissimus erat — : hie 
clam praesidia Lusitaniam pro^lci'^oitur et Caecilium 
Nigrum, hominem ^ barbarum, ad Lennium convenit, 
qui bene magnam manum Lusitanorum haberet. 
Reversus Hispalim in ^ oppidum denuo noctu per 
murum recipitur : praesidium, vigiles iugulant, portas 
praecludunt, de integro pugnare coeperunt. 
36 Dum haec geruntur, legati Carteienses renuntia- 
verunt quod Pompeium in potestatem haberent. 
Quod ante Caesari portas praeclusissent, illo beneficio 
suum maleficium existimabant se lucri facere. 
Lusitani Hispali pugnare nuUo tempore desistebant. 
Quod Caesar cum animadverteret, si oppidum 
capere contenderet, timuit ne homines perditi 
incenderent et moenia delerent ; ita consilio habito 
noctu patitur Lusitanos eruptionem facere ; id quod 
consulto non existimabant fieri. Ita erumpendo 
navis, quae ad Baetim flumen fuissent, incendunt. 
Nostri dum incendio detinentur, illi profugiunt et ab 
equitibus conciduntur. Quo facto oppido reciperato 
Astam iter facere coepit ; ex qua civitate legati ad 
deditionem venerunt. Mundenses, qui ^ ex proelio 



^ nomine MSS. : hominem Glandorp. 

2 in added by Oudendorp. 

* mundensesque MSS. : Mundenses qui Kraffert. 

376 



THE SPANISH WAR 

^ood large ijroup of siipporters of Pompeius;, who 
thought it scandalous that a garrison should have 
been admitted unbeknown to a certain Philo — the 
man w ho had been the most ardent champion of the 
Pompeian faction, and was a very well-known figure 
throughout Lusitania. This man now set out for 
Lusitania without the knowledge of our garrison 
troops, and at Lennium met Caecilius Niger, a 
foreigner, who had a good large force of Lusitanians. 
Returning to Hispalis, he penetrated the fortifications 
by night and thus gained re-admission to the town ; 
whereupon they massacred the garrison and sentries, 
barred the gates, and renewed hostilities. 
36 In the course of these proceedings envoys from 
Carteia duly reported that they had Pompeius in 
their hands. They thought they stood to gain by 
this good deed, which might offset their previous 
offence in having barred their gates to Caesar. At 
Hispalis the Lusitanians kept up the fight without a 
moment's pause ; and when Caesar observed their 
stubbornness he was afraid that, if he made strenuous 
efforts to capture the town, these desperadoes might 
fire the town and destroy the walls. So after holding 
consultations he allowed the Lusitanians to make a 
sally by night — a course which the latter never 
supposed was deliberate policy. Accordingly, they 
made a sally, and in the process fired some ships 
which were alongside the river Baetis. While our men 
were occupied >vith the fire, the Lusitanians took to 
flight and were cut down by our cavalry. This led 
to the recovery of the town ; whereupon Caesar 
proceeded to march to Asta, from which township 
envoys came to him to surrender it. As for the 
survivors of the battle who had taken refuge in the 

377 



CAESAR 

in oppidum confugerant, cum diutius circumside- 
rentur, bene multi deditioncm faciunt et, cum essent 
in legionem distributi, coniurant inter sesc, ut noctu 
signo dato (jui in oppido fuissent eruj)tionem facerent, 
illi eaedeni in castris administrarcnt. Hac re cognita 
insecpienti nocte vigilia tertia tessera data extra 
vallum omnes sunt eoncisi. 
37 Carteienses, dum Caesar in itinere relicjua oppida 
oppugnat, propter Pompeium dissentire coeperunt. 
Pars erat quae legates ad Caesarem miserat, pars erat 
qui Pompeianarum partium fautores essent. Sedi- 
tione concitata portas ^ occupant ; caedes fit magna ; 
saucius Pompeius navis XX occupat longas ct pro- 
fugit. Didius, qui (ladibus classi praefuisset, simul ^ 
nuntius allatus est, confestim sequi coepit ; C'arteia 
pedites ^ et equitatus ad persequendum celeriter iter 
faciebant item confestim consequentes. Quarto die 
navigationis,* quod imparati a Carteia profecti sine 
aqua fuissent, ad terram applicant. Dum aquantur, 
Didius classe accurrit, navis inccndit, non nullas 
capit. 

1 partes MSS. : portas Vnscosanus. 
^ ad quem simul MSS: : ad quem deleted by Vielhaber. 
^ partim pedibus MSS. : Carteia pedites Kueblrr. 
* item quarto die navigatione confestim consequentes 
MSS. J have adopted Nipperdey's conjecture. 



^ This rendering assumes that tessera refers to signo; that 
the plot was allowed to take place by night, as originally 
planned; but that the authorities, warned in advance, 
intervened and cut down all the insurgents [omnes = both 
groups ?) outside the rampart. Klotz, however, holds the 
view that the conspirators were arrested as soon as the plot 
was discovered, and then, very early next morning, led outside 
the rampart and there executed. The fact that, as he observes, 

378 



THE SPANISH WAR 

town of Munda, a somewhat protracted siege led a 
good large number to surrender ; and on being 
drafted to foma a legion they swore a mutual oath 
that during the night at a given signal their com- 
rades in the town should make a sally, while they 
carried out a massacre in the camp. But this plot was 
discovered ; and when at the third watch on the 
following night the pass-word was given, they were 
all cut down outside the rampart. "^ 
37 While Caesar was on the move and attacking the 
remaining towns, the men of Carteia began to fall 
out on the question of Pompeius. There was the 
party which had sent envoys to Caesar : there was 
another party which espoused the cause of Pompeius. 
Civil discord being thus stirred up, they seized the 
gates : much blood was shed : Pompeius, who was 
wounded," seized twenty warships, and took to flight. 
As soon as the news of his escape reached Didius, 
who was at Gades in command of a squadron, he 
forthwith began to give chase ; and from Carteia too 
the hunt was likewise taken up forthwith by infantry 
and cavalry marching in swift pursuit. On the fourth 
day of their voyage Pompeius' party put in to land, 
since they had been ill provided and without 
water when they sailed from Carteia. While they 
were getting water Didius hastened up with his fleet, 
captured some of their ships, and burned the rest. 

Buch executions commonly took place around dawn and out- 
side the rampart (cf. Bell. Afr. ch. 46) favours this view : 
against it it may perhaps be argued that the verb concidere is 
more appropriate to a surprise attack. 

- That Pompey had been wounded at Munda seems 
implied in ch. 32, and details are given below in ch. 38. But 
whether he sustained further injuries on this occasion is by no 
means clear. 

379 



CAESAR 

38 Pompeius cum paucis profugit et locum quendam 
munitum natura occupat. Equites et cohortes qui 
ad persequendum missi essent speculatoribus ante- 
missis certiores fiunt : diem et noctem iter faciunt. 
Pompeius umero et sinistro crure vehementer erat 
saucius. Hue accedebat ut etiam talum intorsisset ; 
quae res maxime impediebat. Ita lectica ad 
turrem cum esset ablatus in ea ferebatur. Lusi- 
tanus, more militari ex eius praesidio speculator 
missus, cum Caesaris praesidio ^ fuisset conspectus, 
celeriter equitatu cohortibusque circumcluditur. 
Erat accessus loci difficilis. Nam idcirco ^ munitum 
locum natura ceperat sibi Pompeius, ut quamvis 
magna multitudine adducta ^ pauci homines ex 
superiore loco defendere possent. Subeunt in 
adventu nostri, depelluntur telis. Quibus cedentibus 
cupidius insequebantur adversarii et confestim 
tardabant ab accessu. Hoc saepius facto animum 
advertebatur nostro magno id fieri periculo. Opera 
circummunire instituunt : * pares ^ autem ex celeri 
festinatione circummunitiones iugo derigunt, ut 

* I have adopted Hoffmann's conjecture ; the 3ISS. reading — 
Lusitanus more militari cum Caesaris praesidio fuisset 
conspectus — seems very difficult. 

^ After idcirco the MSS. give — propt«r suo praesidio fuisset 
conspectus celeriter ad. / have omitted these toords, following 
Dinter. 

^ deducti MSS. : adducta Madvig, who also supplied ut 
and pauci. 

* instituit MSS. : in.stituunt Nipperdey. 
^ pari MSS. : pares Mommsen. 

380 



THE SPANISH WAR 

38 Pompeius took to flight with a few companions and 
occupied a certain spot which possessed natural 
defences. When the cavalry and infantry cohorts 
which had been despatched in his pursuit learned of 
this fi-om scouts they had sent on ahead, they pushed 
on day and night. Now Pompeius was seriously 
wounded in the shoulder and left leg ; added to which 
he had also sprained his ankle, which hampered him 
very much. So a litter was employed to carry him 
off to this redoubt and. once arrived there, he con- 
tinued to be can-ied about in it. One of the Lusi- 
tanians who had been despatched from his escort on 
reconnaissance in accordance with normal military 
routine was now spotted bv the Caesarian force, and 
Pompeius was promptly surrounded by the cavalry 
and cohorts. It was a difficult place to approach : 
that in fact was the very reason why Pompeius had 
chosen himself a naturally fortified position, so that, 
no matter how great a force was brought up to it, a 
handful of men might be able to defend it from 
higher ground. On their annval our men came up 
close to it only to be driven back with javelins. 
As they gave ground the enemy pressed upon them 
the more eagerly and called an immediate halt to 
their advance. When this manoeuvre had been 
repeated several times it became obvious that it 
was a very risky business for our men. The enemy ^ 
then began to fortify his position with a circum- 
vallation ; our men, however, acting with speed 
and despatch, carried a similar circumvallation 
along the high ffi-ound, to enable them to 

* In this and the following sentence all the subjects are 
left unspecified in the Latin : several interpretations are 
therefore possible. 

381 



CAESAR 

aequo pede cum adversariis congredi possent. A 
quibus cum animum adversum esset, fuga sibi 
praesidium capiunt. 

39 Pompeius, ut supra demonstravimus, saucius et 
intorto talo idcirco tardabatur ad fugienduni, item- 
que propter loci difficultatem ueque equo neque 
vehiculo saluti suae praesidium parare poterat. 
Caedes a nostris undique administrabatur. Exclu- 
sus ^ munitione amissisque auxiliis ad convallem 
exesumque locum in speluncam Pompeius se occul- 
tare coepit, ut a nostris non facile inveniretur nisi 
captivorum indicio. Ita ibi interficitur. Cum Caesar 
Gadibus fuisset, Hispalim prid. Id. April, caput 
allatum et populo datum est in conspectum. 

40 Interfecto Cn. Pompeio adulescente Didius, quern 
supra demonstravimus, ilia adfectus laetitia proximo 
se recepit castello non nullasque navis ad reficiendum 
subduxit et quodvis essent bracchium ex utrisque 
partibus.^ Lusitani qui ex pugna superfuerunt ad 
signum se receperunt et bene magna manu comparata 
ad Didium se reportant. Huic etsi non aberat 
diligentia ad navis tuendas, tamen non numquam ex 
castello propter eorum crebras excursiones elicie- 
batur,^ et sic prope cotidianis pugnis insidias ponunt 
et tripertito signa distribuunt. Erant parati qui 
navis incenderent, incensisque qui subsidium repel- 

^ exclusa MSS. : exclusus Fleischer. 

^ The last six words, as given by most MSS., are clearly 
corrupt : no obvious emendation has been suggested, arid 
Nipperdey's assumption of a lacuna seems probable. Klotz 
proposes : — et quodvis essent <periculum minaturi Lusitani 
ut caveret> bracchium ex utrisque partibus <'ad mare dueere 
coepit> ' and, to guard against any danger likely to threaten from 
the Lusita7iians, proceeded to carry a line of fortifications to the 
sea on either side.' 

^ eiiciebatur MSS. : eliciebatur Olandorp. 
382 



THE SPANISH WAR 

encounter their opponents on an equal footing'. 
When the latter observed this move they took 
refuge in flight. 

Pompeius, as we have pointed out above, was 
wounded and had sprained his ankle, and this handi- 
capped him in flight ; moreover, the difficult nature 
of the ground made it impossible for him to have 
recourse to riding horseback or driving to assist 
his escape to safety. On all sides our troops were 
carrving on the work of slaughter. Cut off from his 
entrenchment and having lost his supporters, 
Pompeius now resorted to a ravine, to a spot where 
the ground was eaten away ; and there in a cave 
he proceeded to hide himself, so that, short of his 
being given away by a prisoner, it was no easy matter 
for our men to find him. By such means in fact he 
was discovered there and put to death. When 
Caesar was at Gades, the head of Pompeius was 
brought to Hispalis on April 12th, and there publicly 
exhibited. 

Filled with delight at the death of the young 
Pompeius, Didius, whom we mentioned above, with- 
drew to a nearby stronghold, beached some of his 
ships for a refit, and . . . Those Lusitanians who 
survived the battle rallied to their standard and, 
when a good large force had been mustered, duly 
pi-oceeded against Didius. Although he displayed 
no lack of care in guarding his ships, yet their con- 
stant sallies enticed him on occasions to leave his 
stronghold, with the result that in the course of 
almost daily battles they laid a trap for him, dividing 
up their forces into three groups. There were some 
who were detailed to burn the ships ; some to repel 
an enemy relief force, when the ships had once been 

383 



CAESAR 

lerent ^ : hi sic dispositi erant, ut a nullo conspici 
possent : reliqui in ^ conspectu omnium ad pugnam 
contendunt. Ita cum ex castello Didius ad pro- 
pellendum processisset cum copiis, signum a Lusi- 
tanis toUitur, naves incenduntur, simulque qui ex 
castello ad pugnam processerant, eodem signo 
fugientis latrones dum persequuntur, a tergo insidiae 
clamore sublato circumveniunt. Didius magna cum 
virtute cum compluribus interficitur ; non nulli ea 
pugna scaphas quae ad litus fuerant occupant, item 
complures nando ad navis quae in sale fuerunt se 
recipiunt, ancoris sublatis pelagus remis petere 
coeperunt ; quae res eorum vitae fuit subsidio. 
Lusitani praeda potiuntur. Caesar Gadibus rursus 
ad Hispalim recurrit. 
41 Fabius Maximus, quem ad Mundam praesidium 
oppugnandum reliquerat, operibus assiduis diurnis 
nocturnisque circumsedit : interclusi inter se decer- 
nere armis coeperunt, facta caede bene magna 
eruptionem faciunt.^ Nostri ad oppidum recipe- 
randum occasionem non praetermittunt et reliquos 
vivos capiunt, XII II milia. Ursaonem proficiscuntur ; 
quod oppidum magna munitione continebatur, sic ut 

^ repeterent MSS. : repellerent Glandorp. 

2 conspici possent : reliqui in added by Xipperdey. 

^ operibus assiduis iurnia circum sese interclusi inter se 
decernere facta caede bene magna faciunt MSS. : diurnis 
nocturnisque Dinter; circumsedit Fleischer; armis coeperunt 
added by Hoffmann ; eruptionem appears before faciunt in some 
late MSS. 

^ Klotz's punctuation (as followed here) whereby eodem 
signo is taken with fugientis — the latter word apparently 

384 



THE SPANISH WAR 

fired : these parties were posted in such a way as to 
be entirely hidden from view, whereas the remainder 
marched into battle in full view of all. Accordingly, 
when Didius advanced with his forces from his 
stronghold to drive them back, the signal was dis- 
played by the Lusitanians, the ships were set on 
fire, and simultaneously those who had advanced 
to battle from the stronghold — thev were now pur- 
suing the retreating bandits, who had turned tail 
on that same signal — Avere surprised by the am- 
bushing party, which raised a shout and surrounded 
them from the rear.^ Didius met a gallant death with 
many of his men ; some in the course of the fighting 
seized some pinnaces which were close inshore, 
while quite a number, on the other hand, swam off to 
the ships moored in deep water, weighed anchor, 
and then began to row them out to sea, thereby 
saving their lives. The Lusitanians gained posses- 
sion of the booty. Caesar left Gades and hastened 
back to Hispalis. 

Pabius Maximus, who had been left behind by 
Caesar to attack the enemy garrison at Munda, 
besieged that town in a continuous series of opera- 
tions by day and night. Now that they were cut off 
the enemy fell to fighting amongst themselves ; 
and after a welter of bloodshed they made a sally. 
Our troops did not fail to take this opportunity of 
recovering the town and captured the remaining 
men alive, to the number of fourteen thousand. 
Our men now set out for Ursao, a town which was 
buttressed by massive fortifications, to such an 
extent that in itself the place seemed adapted to 

implying both the initial act of turning about and the sub- 
sequent retreat — seems to yield the most satisfactory sense. 

385 



CAESAR 

ipse locus non solum opere sed etiam natura datus ^ 
ad oppugnandum hostem appareret. Hue accedebat 
ut aqua praeter quam in ipso oppido unam circum- 
circa nusquam reperiretur propius milia passuum 
VIII; quae res magno erat adiumento oppidanis. 
Turn praeterea accedebat ut aggerem, . . . materies- 
que, unde soliti sunt turris ac vineas facere ^ propius 
milia passuum \l non reperiebatur : ac Pompeius 
ut se ad oppidi ^ oppugnationem tutiorem efficeret, 
omnem materiem circum oppidum succisam intro 
congessit. Ita necessario diducebantur nostri, ut a 
Munda, quod proxime ceperant, materiem illo 
deportarent. 
42 Dum haec ad Mundam geruntur et Ursaonem, 
Caesar, ad Hispalim cum Gadibus se recepisset, 
insequenti die contione advocata commemorat : 
initio quaesturae suae earn provinciam ex omnibus 
provinciis peculiarem sibi constituisse et quae 
potuisset eo tempore beneficia largitum esse ; in- 
sequente praetura ampliato honore vectigalia quae 
Metellus inposuisset a senatu petisse et ea pecunia * 
provinciam liberasse simulque patrocinio suscepto 
multis legationibus ab se in senatum inductis simul 

1 aditus MSS. : datus Hoffmann. 
- agi MSS. : ac vineas facere Kraner. 

^ hac Pompeius ad oppidum MSS. : I have adopted Hoff- 
mannas reading. 

* eius pecuniae or -a MSS. : ea pecunia editors. 



^ ad oppugnandum hostem appears to mean ' to assail a 
(besieging) enemy ', the implication possibly being ' go over to 
the offensive against ' ; but the text is verj' uncertain. 

^ 69 B.C. in Further Spain. 

3 62 B.C. 

386 



THE SPANISH WAR 

assail ^ an enemy by virtue of its natural site as well 
as its artificial fortification. Added to this, apart 
from a single fountain in the town itself, there was 
no water to be found anywhere in the neighbourhood 
under eight miles from the town ; and this was a 
great advantage to the townsfolk. Then again 
there was the additional circumstance that materials 
for a rampart, . . . and timber, which they habitually 
used for the construction of towers and mantlets, 
was not to be found under six miles' distance from 
the town; and in order the more to safeguard him- 
self against an attack upon it, Pompeius had had all 
the timber in the neighbourhood felled and dumped 
inside it. Thus our troops were under the necessity 
of detaching men to carry timber thither from 
Munda, the town they had just recently captured. 
42 While these operations were proceeding at Munda 
and Ursao, Caesar left Gades and returned to 
Hispalis, and on the day after his arrival there 
summoned an assembly of the people. He reminded 
them that at the outset of his quaestorship ^ he had 
made that province above all others his own special 
concern, and had liberally bestowed on it such bene- 
fits as lay in his power at that time ; that when 
subsequently he had been promoted to the praetor- 
ship ^ he had asked the Senate to rescind the taxes 
which Metellus * had imposed, and had secured the 
province immunity from paving the money in 
question ; that having once taken upon himself to 
champion the province he had defended it, not only 
introducing numerous deputations into the Senate 

* Q. Caecilius Metollus Pius had, together with Cn. Pom- 
peius Magnus, crushed the rebellion of Sertorius in Spain 
80-72. The imposts mentioned here were probably punitor}-. 

387 



CAESAR 

publicis privatisque causis multoniiii iiiitnicitiis 
susceptis defcndisse ; suo item in consulatu absentem 
quae potuisset oommoda provinciac tribuissc : eorum 
omnium Cf)nimod()rum ct immemorcs ^ ct ingratos in 
se ot in populuin Ilomanum hoc bello et praoterito 
tempore cognosse. ' \'os lure gentium eiviunKjue 
llomanorum institutis cognitis more barbarorum 
populi llomani magistratibus sacrosanctis manus 
semel ^ et saepius attulistis et luce clara Cassium ^ in 
medio foro nefarie interficere voluistis. \'os ita 
pacem semper odistis ut nullo tempore legiones 
desitae sint populi Romani in hac provincia haberi. 
Apud vos beneficia pro maleficiis, malcficia pro 
beneficiis habcntur. Ita neque in otio concordiam 
neque in bello virtutem ullo tempore retinere potuis- 
tis. Privatus ex fuga Cn. Ponipeius adulescens a 
vobis receptus fascis impcriumque sibi arripuit, 
multis interfectis civibus auxilia contra populum 
Romanum comparavit. agros provinciamque vestro 
impulsu depopulavit. In quo vos victores exstabatis ? 
An me deleto non animum advertebatis habere 
legiones populum Romanum, quae non solum vobis 
obsistere sed etiam caelum diruere possent ? Quarum 
laudibus et virtute . . . 

^ etiam memores MSS. : et immemores editors. 
2 magna trans aero {or ero or ore) Sanctis Romanus MSS. : 
magistratibus sacrosanctis manus semel Bcroaldus. 
' captum 3ISS. : Cassium Manutius. 



1 59 B.C. with Bibulus. 

2 Bell. Alex. eh. 52. 



388 



THE SPANISH WAR 

but also undertaking legal actions both public and 
private, and thereby incurring the enmity of many 
men. Similarly, during the period of his consulship ^ 
he had bestowed on the province in his absence such 
advantages as lay in his power. Yet both in the 
present war and in the period before it he was well 
aware that they had been unmindful of all these 
advantages, and ungrateful for them, both towards 
himself and towards the Roman people. ' You,' he 
went on, ' who are well acquainted with the law of 
nations and the established usages of Roman citizens, 
have none the less behaved like savages and have 
laid violent hands more often than once upon the 
inviolable magistrates of the Roman people, and 
designed the dastardly murder of Cassius ^ in broad 
daylight in the middle of the forum. You have 
always so hated f)eace that this province has never 
ceased to be occupied by the legions of the Roman 
people. With you good deeds count as misdeeds, 
and vice versa. Consequently you have never been 
able to maintain hai'monv in peace or high morale in 
war. It was you who harboured the young Cn. 
Pompeius after his flight ; it was at your instigation 
that, albeit a private citizen, he seized the rods of 
office and usurped military command, put many 
citizens to death, raised armed forces to fight the 
Roman people, and laid waste the territories of the 
province. On what field did you come out victorious ? 
Or didn't you take into consideration the fact that, 
if I were done away with, the Roman people possessed 
legions which could not only offer you resistance but 
could also cause the heavens to fall ? By their glori- 
ous deeds of valour ..." 



389 



APPENDIX A 

THE OPERATIONS NEAR UZITTA 

(African War chapters 37-66) 

Although in general the narrative contained in these 
thirty chapters is clear, yet there remain not a few prob- 
lems mainly concerned with the identification of positions 
mentioned in the text. Some of these problems are vital 
to the interpretation of the text; and as any adequate 
discussion of them is impossible in brief footnotes they are 
dealt with here in this appendix. 

(1) The Identity of the ultimus collis of chapters 37-39 

It is of some importance to identify this hill because it 
has a bearing not only upon the position of both Scipio's 
and Caesar's camps, but also upon the operations of 
chapters 49-51. 

The first sentence of chapter 38 provides the main evidence 
for its identification. It was, apparently, not the southern- 
most hill in the chain (Sidi Jeha), but the southernmost of 
those hills only which contained ancient watch-towers. 
R. Holmes argued — convincingly, as I think — that the 
word unurtuiuenuiue must imply that Caesar had visited at 
least three hills before he was not so far from the last one. 
This argument would suggest Haniadet er Ressa or one of 
its southern neighbours. To this it has been objected 
that Caesar could not possibly have covered the distance 
by night over rough ground ; and in support of this objec- 
tion great stress has been laid by some upon the word 
seniihora. But to me it seems unnecessary to connect 
semihora with Caesar's preUminary reconnaissance : if 



APPENDIX A 

ea refers to castella, as it would seem to, may not the 
meaning be simply that, once the preliminary survey and 
brieting was completed, the terajjorary re-instatement of 
the ()1<1 watch-towers — carried out simultaneously on all 
the hills by parties of sappers usin^ in the main materials 
on the spot — was completed in half an hour ? 

As flamadet er Ressa satisfies the other requirements — 
proximity to Scipio's camp and the operations described 
in chapter 49 — I accordingly accept this identification. 

(2) Caesar's Camps and Fortified Lines 

Three distinct camps are referred to in the text — two 
main and one subsidiary. The latter is mentioned in the 
first sentence of chapter 51. It was apparently a redoubt, 
built on Sidi Jehu — possibly on the forward slopes — to 
command its southern and western approaches. It is 
marked on Map 4 (Uzitta) with the figure 2. 

In the following sentence of chapter .51 the writer goes on : 
' from his main [or possibly ' largest '] camp Caesar pro- 
ceeded to carry two fortified lines across the centre of the 
plain towards Uzitta.' I have followed StolTel and Holmes 
in locating this main camp (numbered 1 in map 4) on the 
western slopes of the ridge, rather than on the plateau 
farther east, where Veith and Bouvet place it. The former 
location agrees better with the statement in chapter 63 
that the camp — apparently the main camp — was six miles 
from Leptis. 

As to his third camp, there is little dispute about its 
position described in chapter 56. It was in the plain 
opposite Uzitta, just out of range of infantry weapons, but 
within artillery range of the tow n ; and it was large enough 
to hold five legions. 

The approximate location of Caesar's main fortified 
lines is not seriously disputed. In ]Map 4 I have marked 
the initial field-works, described in chapter 38, as running 
along the crest of the ridge, though the phrase medio iugo 
might well imply ' half-way up (the western side of) the 
ridge '. Their prolongation S.W. to Rhar ed Deba is, I 

392 



APPENDIX A 

think, implied in chapter 49, though the interpretatiorx 
of this difficult chapter is much disputed. The words ' he 
began to advance along the crest of the ridge ' I interpret 
as a movement S.W. in the direction of Sicli Jeha, which I 
identify with pru.rimam collem; and I interpret the phrase 
' capturing the high ground closer to Scipio ' as implying 
the western slopes oi Bhar ed Deba, which might otherwise 
provide Scipio with a springboard for an enflanking 
movement. 

(3) Scipio's Camp 

The position of this camp is a very vexed question. 
The main evidence in the text is as follows : 

ch. 24 : Scipio, marching by night from Hadrumetum, 
joins forces with Labienus and Petreius, and they then 
establish themselves in a single camp three miles 
distant (presumably from Caesar's camp near 
Ruspina). 

cA. 38 : ' from the last hill and turret, which was nearest 
the enemy's camp, . . .' 

chs. 38, 39 : ' Scipio and Labienus advanced about a 
mile from their fortified positions. . . . When Caesar 
perceived that no more than a mile and a half now 
separated the enemy line from his own fortifica- 
tions . . .' (see footnote on p. 396). 

cA. 51 : ' the town of Uzitta, which was situated in the 
plain between his own (Caesar's) camp and Scipio's . . .' 

Commentators have accordingly searched for a suitable 
site answering the following three requirements : 

(0 three Roman miles distant from Ruspina; 
(ii) roughly two and a half Roman miles from 
Caesar's emplacements on or near the ridge ; 
(Hi) on the far {i.e. western) side of Uzitta. 

Now it is fairly easy to select two sites which between 
them shall satisfy all these three conditions ; but it is well 
nigh impossible to select one. Thus R. Holmes, differing 

393 



APPENDIX A 

but slightly from Veith, places the camp about one and a 
half miles N.E. of Uzitta, not far from the modem village 
of Mnara. But this is nearly five Roman miles distant 
from Caesar's positions at Ruspina, and, moreover, it 
fails to satisfy the third condition. Bouvet, on the other 
hand, locates the camp about one mile X.W. of Uzitta, 
a location which satisfies the third condition but is four 
Roman miles from the ridge. I would place the camp 
somewhat closer to the town, though in Map 4 it may 
perhaps be marked too close, in view of the details — rather 
ambiguous ones — given in chapter 41 : some sort of com- 
promise appears inevitable between these indications 
and the approximate distance of two and a half Roman 
miles mentioned above. But this location does not satisfy 
the first condition : it is about six Roman miles from 
Ruspina. Hence Bouvet somewhat arbitrarily amends the 
MSS. reading of/// to 17. 

It was Stoffel who, appreciating the difficulties of satis- 
fying all the stated conditions in a single site, suggested 
that the camp mentioned in chapter 24 was not the same 
as the one close to Uzitta. Much scorn has been poured 
upon this theory, but even so I am inclined to accept it. 
What Scipio's reasons may have been for moving camp, if 
in fact he did so, are by no means apparent : a more 
serious objection to the theory is that the move is quite 
unmentioned. In this respect the question of Labienus' 
camp, discussed below, is somewhat parallel ; and it is 
perhaps worth noting that more than one editor, while 
arguing on the one hand that Scipio could not have 
moved his camp because no mention is made of the fact, is 
quite disposed to believe on the other hand that Labienus 
latterly occupied a separate camp, even though this move 
too has gone unrecorded. 

There is, I think, another point in favour of Stoffel's 
theory. In chapter 30 it is stated that Scipio made almost 
daily demonstrations in battle array at a distance of some 
300 paces from his camp, Caesar being at that time still at 
Ruspina; and that finally Scipio halted his battle line 
not so far from Caesar's camp. That he made these 

394 



APPENDIX A 

demonstrations in no serious spirit and took good care not 
to run any serious risk is no doubt true : he ran little 
enough risk in all conscience if his camp was then, as 
Stoffel suggests, near Knais, three miles away from 
Caesar at Ruspina ; but if, even in those days, he was 
already encamped near Uzitta almost six miles distant, 
there would seem very little point in demonstrating at a 
range of some five and a half miles. 

For these reasons I am inclined to accept Stoffel' s 
theory in order to justify my location of Scipio's camp near 
Uzitta. 

(4) Juba's Camp 

There is little evidence in the text for its position, nor is 
the matter of any great moment. In chapter 48 it is 
stated that the king pitched a separate camp not far from 
Scipio. The statement in chapter 52 that Caesar's cavalrj'^ 
drove the Xumidians right back to the royal camp seems 
to me inconclusive : Veith inferred from this that it was 
nearer than Scipio's camp to Uzitta ; but the opposite 
conclusion might, I think, be drawn from the word 
vsque. 

(5) Lahienus' Camp 

Whereas it is clear from chapter 24 that while Caesar was 
still at Ruspina Labienus shared a single camp with 
Scipio and Petreius, there are certain indications that at a 
later period he was operating from a camp situated to the 
south of the plain. Thus in the last sentence of chapter 49 
we read that ' Labienus too had made up his mind to seize 
this hill (probably Sidi Jeha), and his closer proximity to it 
had enabled him to achieve the goal more rapidly.' 
Chapter 50 implies that he was quite familiar with this 
southern area ; while in chapter 58 it is stated that ' the 
enemy led forth their entire combined forces from all their 
camps.' 

This evidence has led most editors to assume that 
Labienus latterly had an independent camp to the south- 

395 



APPENDIX A 

ward. I have followed R. Holmes and Bouvet in locating 
it in the foothills east of the modem village of Djemmal. 
The battle dispositions described in chapters 59-60 make it 
difficult to assume that this camp was much farther 
north : I assume that the phrase ' closer proximity ' in 
chapter 49 refers, not to this main camp, but to some 
redoubt or advanced post which he occupied at the time. 

(Note. On pp. 393-4 I have inferred from ch.s. 38 and 39 
that Scipio's camp was " roughly two and a half Roman miles 
from Caesar's emplacements '. But in fact the distance may 
have been greater, if it is assumed from the sec(jnd sentence 
of ch. 39 that Scipio's cavalry, Aiter first advancing about a 
mile, later continued to advance till tliey were now no more 
than a mile and a half from Caesar. On this assumption 
Bouvet's location of .Scipio's camp some 4 miles distant from 
the ridge seems quite defensible so far as this evidence is con- 
cerned.) 



396 



APPENDIX B 

CAESAR'S WITHDRAWAL FROM CORDUBA 

{Spayiish War chapter 6) 

Many corruptions in the MSS. text of the earher part of 
this chapter make its interpretation very difficult. As the 
text I have adopted varies considerably both from the 
MS8. tradition and from the reading given by Klotz, all 
three readings are here set out in full. 

(i) The MSS. Beading 

id cum animadverteret adversarios minime velle, 
quos quoniam a avia retraxerat, ut in aequum 
deduceret, copiis flumine traductis noctu iubet ignis 
fieri magnos : ita firmissimum eius praesidium 
Ateguam proficiscitur. id cum Pompeius ex perfugis 
rescisset, qua die facultatem et angustias, carra com- 
plura multosque lanistas retraxit et ad Cordubam se 
recepit. Caesar munitionibus antequam {or antiquas) 
oppugnare et bracchia circumducere coepit. cui de 
Pompeio cum nuntius esset allatus eo die proficiscitur. 

(ii) Klotz' s Reading 

(ch. 5) id cum animadverteret adversarios minime 
velle. . . . 

(ch. 6) Quos quoniam ab Ulia retraxerat, ut in 
aequum deduceret, copiis flumine traductis noctu 
iubet ignes fieri magnos. ita firmissimum eius 
praesidium Ateguam proficiscitur. id cum Pom- 
peius ex perfugis rescisset, cum die facultatem 
<liberam sequendi nactus inter montes) et angustias 

397 



APPENDIX B 

oarra complura mulosque onustos retraxit et ad 
("ordubam 8e recepit. Caesar niunitionibus Ateguam 
oppugnare et brachia circumducere coepit. cuius 
re Pompeio cum nuntius esset adlatus, eo die pro- 
ficiscitur. 

(iii) My Ovn Reading 

Id cum animadverteret adversarios minime velle, 
quo eos quomodo ab Ulia retraxerat [ut] in aequum 
deduceret, copiis flumine traductis noctu iubet ignis 
fieri magnos : ita firmissimum eius pracsidium 
Ateguam proficiscitur. Id cum Pompeius ex perfugis 
rescisset, qua die facultatem <nactus est, relinquens 
mentis) et angustias, carra complura mulosque 
onustos retraxit et ad C'ordubam se recepit. Caesar 
munitionibus Ateguam oppugnare et bracchia cir- 
cumducere coepit. Cui de Pompeio cum nuntius 
esset allatus eo die proficisci[tur], 

The two most puzzling problems involved in this 
narrative seem to me to be these : — 

(a) The Purpose and Position of the Fires 

Holmes thought that they were left burning in Caesar's 
camps at Corduba. But though that would doubtless 
have been the orthodox manoeuvre, the author has 
expressed himself very ambiguously, if that was his mean- 
ing. What he appears to say is that the order to light the 
fires was given after the crossing of the river. To a rear 
party perhaps ? Yet one would have expected the decoy 
fires to have been most useful in misleading the enemy, 
had they been alight during, not after, the crossing of the 
river. The alternative occurs to me that they were lit 
somewhere south of the river, and in the wrong direction, 
so as to bring Pompey down from the high ground, but 
none the less mislead him as to Caesar's route. Klotz 
merely describes the fires as ' to cover the departure.' 

398 



APPENDIX B 

(b) How much did Pompey know of Ca€sar\s plans, and 
why did he at first follow Caesar and then retire to 
Corduha / 

Holmes took id in the phrase id cum Pompeius ex 
pcrfufjis rescisset to refer to Caesar's destination, viz. 
Ategua, and not (as StofFel, whom Klotz appears to follow) 
to the fact that Caesar had now left Corduba. In this I 
certainly think that Holmes is right ; for even if the decoy 
fires were lit — as Holmes thinks — in Caesar's camps at 
Corduba, it seems almost incredible that Caesar's army 
should have crossed the river entirely unobserved by 
Pompey's outposts. Moreover, if the fires were lit sub- 
sequently, south of the river, it can fairly be assumed that 
Caesar never hoped to keep his departure secret, but only 
his destination; and that the latter was only now dis- 
closed by deserters. 

I assume that Pompey followed Caesar with the object 
of harassing his convoy, but without risking a general 
engagement. That he met with some success seems to be 
implied by the words carra complura . . . retrarit; for I 
accept Klotz's explanation that these were captured from 
Caesar's convoy. But the reason which Klotz suggests 
for Pompey's withdrawal to Corduba, viz. ' to protect his 
troops from the inclemency of the weather ', hardly seems 
adequate; it is more likely, I think, that Pompey had to 
return to Corduba to revictual his forces, since he was not 
sure whether his communications with Ategua — well 
stocked with com, according to the account given by Dio 
Cassius — were still open. 

The following points where my readings vary from those 
of Klotz are perhaps of less importance for the general 
interpretation of the narrative : — 

(1) In support of his reading facultatem liberam 
sequendi nactus inter monies et angustias Klotz remarks 
that the heights which surround the narrow places of 
the Guadajos valley are about 100 metres above the 
valley. On the other hand, my reading (based on 
Mommsen's co-aieciwre) facultaiem nactus est, relinquens 

399 



APPENDIX B 

montis et anguslias is, geographically speaking, perhaps 
no less possible, and seems more appropriate in view 
of Caesar's object of bringing Pomjx^y down to the 
plain. 

(2) As between Klotz's cuitis re Pompeio cum 
nvntiuii essei adlatns, to die proficiscitur and my cui de 
Pompeio cum nuntius esset allafus eo die proficisci, the 
latter admits a more emphatic interpretation of eo die 
which, to ray mind, gives greater point to the following 
words ; namely, that though Caesar was advised of 
the actual day when Pomjiey left Corduba, and 
though he had already made adequate dispositions 
against any surprise attack, yet a thick morning mist 
upset his calculations. 



400 



APPENDIX C 

THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE ATEGUAN ENVOYS 
ON THEIR RETURN TO THE TOWN 

(Spanish War chapter 18) 

For the first three sentences of this chapter Klotz adopts 
the following reading : — 

Remissis legatis, cum ad portam venissent, <con- 
stitit) Tib. Tullius, et cum introeuntem Catonem ^ 
insecutus non esset, revertit ad portam et hominem 
adprehendit. cjuod Tiberius cum fieri animadvertit, 
simul pugionem eduxit et manum eius incidit. ita 
refugerunt ad Caesarem. 

From the explanation which Klotz gives in his commentary 
he would seem to interpret as follows : — 

' When the envoys had been sent back and had 
come to the gate, Tiberius Tullius stopped ; and as, 
when Cato was going in, Tiberius did not follow him, 
Cato turned back to the gate and grabbed the fellow. 
Observing this action, Tiberius at once drew a dagger 
and stabbed the other's hand. So they fled back to 
Caesar.' 

This reading, which is very close to the MSS., is in many 
ways attractive ; but two serious objections can, I think, 
reasonably be made to the sense it gives. 

(i) Why should both men flee back to Caesar ? 
Klotz suggests that ' they did not return to the town, 
probably because they were not sure of the comman- 

^ C. Antonius 3ISS. : Catonem Mommsen. 

401 



APPENDIX C 

dant.' But when they had just fallen out — pre- 
sumably over the question of the terms of surrender — 
and one had stabbed the other, it seems unlikely that 
both would flee to Caesar. 

(ii) The phrase quod Tiberius cum fieri animaAvertit 
seems to me inappropriate as applied to a man in the 
very act of being grabbed : on the contrary, it suggests 
a third party witnessing an action in which he is not 
immediately involved. 

My own belief is that there were three envoys, not two; 
that the MSS. reading C. Antonius has partially preserved 
an original Catonem Antonius; and that at the beginning 
of ch. 17 Lusitano is a corruption of et Antonio. 

On this assumption the narrative seems much easier to 
follow. Caesar had apparently rejected conditional terms 
of surrender. Tiberius and Antonius may have favoured 
unconditional surrender but have been overruled by Cato. 
By the time they reached the town they maj- have realised 
that Cato might denounce them to the commandant as 
traitors; and when he resorted to force, they sought 
safety with Caesar. That they later returned to the town 
and Cato was won over to their view is implied at the ena 
of ch. 19. 



402 



APPENDIX D 

THE EVENTS AT URSAQi 

{Spanish War chapter 22) 

Party strife seems to me to be the key to this diflScuIt 
chapter. For though the existence of a Caesarian party 
in Ursao is nowhere mentioned, and in chapter 28 its 
inhabitants are described as supporters of Gnaeus, yet in 
view of the conditions at Ucubi (ch. 20-21), Corduba 
(ch. 34) and Carteia (ch. 37) this hypothesis appears 
reasonable. On this assumption the incidents described 
may, I think, be explained as follows. 

The fall of Ategua — Gnaeus's strongest garrison — must 
have had important effects ; for it strengthened the hand 
of Caesar's partisans in all the towns, and increased the 
strategic value of those in the south, particularly Ursao. 
The anxiety of Gnaeus is obviously reflected in his purge 
of the opposing faction at Ucubi. 

Now Ursao was at this time divided in its allegiance 
and, as it lay some distance to the south, Gnaeus had not 
yet detached any troops to hold it, though he had in mind 
to do so (f/. ch. 26). Caesar was anxious that its inhabi- 
tants should learn how the Pompeian garrison at Ategua 
had behaved and accordingly had the envoys — clearly 
Caesarian partisans — escorted to the town; and the high 

^ Throughout the following argument it is assumed that 
the town referred to in the greater part of this chapter is 
Ursao (Osuna), mentioned later in the book in close connection 
with Munda. Madvig and Glandorp, among others, held this 
view. Klotz, however, who identifies Munda with MontUla 
(35 miles X.E. of Osuna), assumes (Kommentar zum Bellum 
Hispaniense, p. 80) that the reference here is to a town named 
Bursao, of unknown situation in Baetica. 

403 



APPENDIX D 

rank of the nienibors of this escorting party emphasises 
the importance of their mission. They may have been 
empowered to treat directly with the townsmen if the 
latter decided to join Caesar. But the Pomj)eian partisans 
seem to have persuaded their fellow-citizens as a whole 
that the envoys were liars in the pay of Caesar, and so 
procured the massacre of all but two of them before they 
could rejoin Caesar's dey)utation. Later on — no doubt at 
the instance of the Caesarian faction — a fact-finding 
commission was despatched to Ategua and on its return 
confirmed the envoys' report. A revulsion of feeling now 
set in and the Caesarians demanded vengeance on the 
Pompeian partisan who had misled them and, by butcher- 
ing the envoys, ruined their chances of a composition with 
Caesar. 

At this crisis the man appears to have duped his oppo- 
nents very thoroughly. Affecting remorse, he sought to 
leave the town, pretending that he would explain to Caesar 
that the massacre was a genuine mistake committed in 
ignorance of the true facts of the case. But once clear of 
the town he collected sufficient reinforcements to enable 
him to massacre all his leading opponents and thus secure 
Ursao's allegiance to Gnaeus. 

The last sentence of the chapter is particularly difficult 
to interpret. I myself believe that it refers, not to 
Ursao, but to Ucubi.^ For Ursao lay forty-five miles 
south of the Salsum, where the fighting was then going on, 
and its distance from Baeturia was not much less. Deserters 
from Caesar's army would surely make for Ucubi ; and 
Pompeian refugees from Ucubi would not have far to go to 
cross the Bactis. 

It is not, I think, necessary to assume a gap in the text to 
account for the change in scene : harsh though it certainly 
is, it is perhaps not bej^ond the powers of the author. 
Elsewhere he uses the phrase hoc pra-ekrito tempore to 
alter the scene as well as the time {e.g. the opening words 
of this same chapter; also ch. 20) : his recurrence, in 

1 So also Klotz, ibid., p. 81. 
404 



APPENDIX D 

chapter 21, to events at Ucubi is quite sudden and oppidum 
is left unspecified ; while in chapter 34 he switches harshly 
(oppido . . . o;:ip/rfM/») from Corduba to Munda. 

If it is Ucubi to which he here refers, his narrative seems 
easier to follow. The goods being sold are those of 
Caesar's partisans in the town : all Pompey's troops are 
virtually confined to camp lest, following the example of 
the civilian refugees, they desert fully armed : morale in 
the town and camp is low and — if the text can be trusted — 
deserters from Caesar's side are discouraged to the extent 
of being embodied only in the low-paid light-armed units. 



ADDITIONAL NOTE 

{Spanish War, ch. 26, p. 359) 

In two passages in this short despatch the interpretation 
given by Klotz in his commentary is as follows : — 

(i) Reading ' nostrisque adhuc freti praesidiis ', he 
renders ' relying on the strong places until now belonging 
to us ', explaining that the allusion is in particular to the 
provisions Casesar had captured at Ategua. 

(ii) Reading ' profeeto nostro commeatu privati 
necessario ad dimicandum deseendent ' he apparently 
renders ' assuredly, when they are deprived of the pro- 
visions we have collected {sc. and have fallen into their 
hands), they will of necessity come down to fight '. 

This interpretation does, I admit, considerably improve the 
general sense ; but whether the Latin text can in either case 
be fairly thus interpreted seems open to doubt. 



405 



INDEX OF PERSONS AND PLACES 
THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR 



C. = Caesar, Caesarian; P. = Pompeius, Ponipeian ; 
cos.=coiisul, coasulship. 



R.= Roman ; 



Figures in brackets denote dates B.C. : olheru-ise they refer to the chapters 
of the Latin text. 



ACHAIA, the R. protectorate of Greece, 
properly the N. district of the 
Peloponnese, 44 

Achillas, commander of the Egyptian 
army under king Ptolemaeus, 4, 
26 

Aegyptium litus, the Egyptian coast, 
roughly from Alexandria to Pelu- 
sium, 8, 13 

Aegyptus, Egypt, the Nile valley, 
ruled by the Ptolemies as friends 
and allies of the R. people, 2, 3, 26, 
33, 34, 65, 78 

Africa, the R. province comprising 
the coastal area opposite Sardinia 
and Sicily : also used of the N. 
African coast eastwards to Alex- 
andria, 9, 14, 28, 47, 51, 56 

Alexandrea, now Alexandria, then the 
capital of Egypt, founded by 
Alexander the Great, 1, 5, 9, 11, 
13-15, 18, 26, 27, 32, 33, 38, 48, 69 

Alexandrini, Egyptian inhabitants of 
Alexandrea, 2, 5-31 

Annius Scapula, an influential 
Spaniard who took part in the 
conspiracy against Cassias, 55 

Ariarathes, brother of Ariobarzanes 
and rival claimant to his kingdom, 
66 

Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia, 
adherent of P., 34, 66 

Armenia Minor, kingdom of Deiotarus 
in far E. of Asia Minor, later made 
R. province by Trajan, 34, 36, 66, 67 

Arsinoe, younger of the two daughters 
of Ptolemaeus (Auletes), who dis- 



puted the throne with her brother, 
4, 33 
Asia, the R. province comprising the 
western parts of Asia Minor, 13, 34 
40, 65, 78 



Baetis flumen, river in S. Spain, now 

Guadalquivir, 59, 60 
Bellona, goddess of war, with famous 

shrine at Comana in Cappadocia, 

also worshipped at Rome, 66 
Berones, a powerful Spanish tribe in 

Hispania Tarraconensis, 53 
Bithynia, N.W. district of Asia Minor, 

bordering the Thracian Bosphorus 

and Euxine Sea, 65, 78 
Bogus, Bogud, king of \V. Mauretania, 

ally of C, 59, 62 
Bosphorus, the territory dominated 

by Panticapaeum in the Crimea — 

hereditary kingdom of Mithridates 

and Pharnaces, but awarded by C. 

to Mithridates of Pergamum, 78 
Brundisium, now Brindisi, chief 

Italian port of embarkation for E., 

44,47 



Caelius Vinicianus, C. officer left in 

charge of Pontus, 77 
Caesar, see lulius. 
Caesariani, troops of C, 59 
Calenus, Q., C. officer operating in 

Achaia, 44 
Calpurnius Salvianus, a conspirator 

against Cassius, 53, 55 



407 



PERSONS AND PLACES (ALEX. WAR) 



Calvinus, see Domitius. 

Canopus, Egyptian coastal town at 
Canopic mouth of Nile, 25 

Cappadoces, inhabitants of Cappa- 
docia, 66 

Cappadocia, eastern kingdom of Asia 
Minor adjoining Armenia, ruled by 
Ariobarzanes, 34, 35, 40, 66 

Carfulenus, experienced C. officer 
prominent in Battle of Nile, 31 

Carmo, Spanish town, now Carmona in 
Andalusia, E.N.E. of Seville, 57, 04 

Cassius, (i) Q. Longinus, unpopular 
governor of Further Spain, ap- 
pointed by C, 48-64. (ii) Q., de- 
puty and military aide of the above, 
52, 57 

Chersonensus, Egyptian promontory, 
perhaps some 8 miles W. of Alex- 
andrea, 10 

Cilicla, district of Asia Minor between 
Taurus Mts. and sea, the coastal 
region being made a R. province by 
P. (66), 1, 25, 26, 34, 65, 66 

Claudius, (i) C. Marcellus, cos. (49) 
with Lentulus, 68. (ii) M. Mar- 
cellus, quaestor of Cassius, sent to 
hold Corduba, but chosen as their 
leader by the mutinous legions, 57- 
64. (iii) Tiberius Nero, father of 
the emperor Tiberius, commanded a 
C. fleet, 25 

Cleopatra, elder daughter of Ptole- 
maeus (Auletes), entrusted with the 
kingdom liy C. jointly with her 
brother, 33 

Comana, (i) town in Cappadocia, 
shrine of Bellona, 66. (ii) town in 
Pontus, used as a rendezvous bv 
Domitius, 34, 35 

Corduba, now Cordoba, Spanish town 
on river Baetis, capital of Further 
Spain, 49, 52, 54, 57-59, 64 

Cordubenses, citizens of Corduba, 57, 
69-61 

Cornelius, L. Lentulus, cos. (49) with 
Marcellus, 68 

Cornificius, Q., C. quaestor, governor 
of Illyricum as pro-praetor, 42^4, 
47 

Creta, Crete, 1 



P., pardoned by C, 34, 39, 40, 67- 
70, 77, 78 

Delta, the Delta of the Nile; some- 
times used to refer to its S. apex, 27 

Domitius, Cn. Calvinus, governor of 
Asia appointed bv C, 9, 34-40, 65, 
69, 74 

Dyrrachium, now Durazzo in Albania, 
the lUyrian port linking with 
Brundisium, attacked by C. in 
July (48), 48 



EPIDAIIRU.S, town on Dalmatian coast 

besieged by Octavius, 44 
Euphranor, Rhodiau admiral killed in 

action oS Canopus, 15, 25 



FlaCCUS, see Munatius. 



GabintL'S, AuIus, had previoJisly 
restored Ptoleraaeus to Egyptian 
throne : defeated and died in 
Illyricum, 3, 42, 43 

Galli equites, C. contingent of Gallic 
cavalry, 17 

Gallograecia, otherwise Galatia, the 
central upland district of Asia 
Minor, divided into 3 tetrarchies, 
67, 78 

Ganymedes, an Egyptian eunuch, 
tutor to Arsinoe, to whom she 
delegated military command, 4, 5, 
12, 23, 33 



Hf.rmixius mons, Spanish mountain 
range in W. Lusitania near Medo- 
brega, 48 

Hiberus flumen, river in E. Spain, 
now Ebro, 64 

Hispalis, important Spanish town on 
river Baetis, now Seville, 56, 67 

Hispania, Spain, as a whole, com- 
prising 2 provinces, 48, 52, 62. 
Citerior (Hither Spain), roughly 
the E. half of the peninsula, 59, 63. 
Ulterior (Further Spain), the AV. half 
with Portugal, 48-50, 53, 56-58, 64 



Deiotakus, king of Armenia Minor 
and a tetrarch of Galatia, supported 

408 



lADERTINI, inhabitants of ladera, an 
lUyrian town, now Zara, 42 



PERSONS AND PLACES (ALEX. WAR) 



Ilipa, Spanish town in Baetioa, near 
modern Alcala del Rio on right bank 
of Guadalquivir, 57 

lUyricum, K. province K. of Adriatic 
extending from Istria on N. to 
Epirus on S. and Macedonia on 
S.E., 42-44 

Issa insula, now Lissa, an island oS 
the lUvrian coast, 47 

Italia, Italy, 53, 68, 77, 78 

Italicensis, native of Italica, Spanish 
town in Baetica, now Santiponce, 
on right bank of river Baetis, 52, 
57 

luba, king of Xumidia, ally of P., 
51 

lulius, (i) C. Caesar, the dictator, 
rival of P. and most famous member 
of the Julian family, passim. 
(ii) Sextus Caesar, relation of the 
above, left by him as governor of 
Syria, 66 



Laterensis, L., one of the conspira- 
tors against Cassius, 53-55 

Lentulus, L., see Cornelius. 

Lepidus, M., proconsular governor of 
Hither Spain, 59, C3, 64 

Licinius, L. Squillus, one of the con- 
spirators against Cassius, 52, 55 

Longinus, see Cassius. 

Lusitania, part of Further Spain, 
comprising Portugal S. of Oporto 
and part of W. Spain, 48, 51 

Lyciae naves, ships from Lycia in S. 
Asia Minor, 13 

Lyoomedes, a noble Bithynian ap- 
pointed by C. as priest of Bellona, 
66 



Macedonia, R. province N. of Thes- 
saly and S.E. of Illyricum, 42 

Malaca, Spanish town, now Malaga, 
some 70 miles N.E. of Gibraltar, 
64 

Malchus, king of the Nabataeans, 1 

Manilius Tusculus, one of the con- 
spirators against Cassius, 53 

Marcellus, see Claudius. 

Mauretania, country of the Mauri 
(Moorsj on N. coast of Africa, 
opposite Spain and \V. of JJumidia, 
51, 52, 59 



Mazaca, chief town of Cappadocia, 
now Kaisariveh, some 130 miles N. 
of Tarsus, 66 

Medobrega, Spanish town in Lusitania, 
now Marvao, 48 

Mercello, L., one of the conspirators 
against Cassius, 52, 55 

Minucius Silo, leading conspirator 
against Cassius, 52, 53, 55 

Mithridates, (i) the Vlth, the ' Great ', 
king of Pontus and Bosphorua 
(120-63) who waged three wara 
against R. and was finally defeated 
by P., 72, 73, 78. (ii) Pergamenus, 
a well-born youth from Pergamum, 
adopted by the above, 26-28, 78 

Munatius Flaccus, one of the con- 
spirators against Cassius, 52 



XabaTAEI, Nabataeans, a people of 

Arabia Petraea, N.E. of the Red 

Sea, I 
Xaeva (?), Spanish town, apparently 

between Hispalis and Carmo, exact 

position unknown, 57 
Nero, T., see Claudius. 
Nicopolis, town in Armenia Minor, 

where Pharnaces defeated Domitius, 

36, 37 
Nilus flumen, river Nile, 5, 13, 27- 

30 
Numidia, N. African kingdom of 

Juba, between Mauretania and K. 

province of Airica, 61 



OBUCULA, Spanish town probably 
lying between Carmo and Astigi, 
but exact position obscure, 57 

Octavius, M., P. admiral operating off 
lUyrian coast, 42—47 



PAL.AEPHARSALUS, Old Pharsalus in 
Thessalv, where C. defeated P. in 
August '(48), 48 

Paratonium, a place on the Egyptian 
coast W. of Alexandria ; of dis- 
puted position, but perhaps at the 
mouth of El Baradan some 20 miles 
W., 8 



409 



PERSONS AND PLACES (ALEX. WAR) 



Patisius, Q., sent by Domitius into 
Cilicia for troops, 34 

Pelusium, Egyptian coastal town near 
the E. mouth of the Nile, 2(i 

Perganienus, see Mithridatea. 

Pergamum, now Bergania, Mysian 
town on W. coast of Asia Minor, 

■ 78 

Pharitae, inhabitants of island of 
Pharos, 17, 19 

Pharnaces, son of Mithridates the 
Great, king of Bosphorus ; over- 
ran Cappadocia, Armenia Minor 
and Pontus ; finally defeated by C. 
at Zela, 34-41, 65, 69-78 

Pharos, island off Alexandria, con- 
nected to it by mole, with famous 
lighthouse at E. tip, 14, 19, 26 

Pharsalicum proelium, see Palae- 
pharsalus. 

Plaetorius, C, quaestor, to whom P. 
Sestius was sent in Pontus, 34 

Pompeiani, troops or adherents of P., 
9, 59 

Pompeius, Cn. Magnus, Senatorial 
champion, defeated by C. at 
Pharsalus and later murdered in 
Egypt, 3, 42, 48, 51, 56, 58, 59, 
67, 69, 70 

Pontica legio, a legion hastily raised in 
Pontus, 34, 39, 40 

Ponticae naves, C. squadron of ships 
from Pontus, 13, 14 

Pontici cives, native population of 
Pontus plundered by Pharnaces, 41 

Pontus, N.E. district of Asia Minor on 
Euxine (Black Sea), hereditary 
kingdom of Mithridates, 34, 35, 41, 
65, 67, 69, 70, 72, 77 

Ptolomaens, more commonly Ptole- 
:maeus, (i) Auletes, (father), restored 
to throne of Egypt (55) by Gabinius 

- at instance of P. : appointed R. 
people to execute his will, 4, 33. 
(ii) rex, elder son of the above, 23- 
33 



RACILIUS, L., one of the conspirators 
against Cassius, 52, 53, 55 

Rhodiae naves, 0. squadron of ships 
from Rhodes, 11, 13-15, 25 

Rhodus, Rhodes, island in E. Mediter- 
ranean, 1 

Roma (urbs), Rome, 65, 68, 71 



Romani cives, R. citizens, 23, 25, 41, 

43, 70 
Romani equites, R. citizens of the 

equestrian order, the influential 

middle class, 40, 56 
Romanus populus, the R. people in a 

political sense, 3, 24, 33, 34, 36, 65, 

67, 68, 78 



SaU)NA, town on Dalmatian coast 
near modern Spalato, 43 

Salvianus, see Culpurnius. 

Scapula, see Annius. 

Segovia, Spanish town on river 
Singilis (Genii), exact position 
doubtful, probably between Astigi 
and Palma, 57 

Sestius, (i) P., sent by Domitius to 
fetch the Pontic legion, 34. (ii) Q., 
conspirator against Cassius who 
bought his pardon, 55 

Sicilia, Sicily, R. province, stepping- 
stone to Africa, 47 

Silo, see Miuucius. 

Singiliense flumen, river Singilis, now 
Genii, tributary of the Baetis, 57 

Squillus, see Licinius. 

Syria, R. province formed by P. (64), 
"capital Antioch, 1, 25, 26, 33, 34, 
38, 65, 66 



Tarsu.S, chief town of Cilicia, on S. 
coast of Asia Minor, 66 

Tauris insula, island off lUyrian 
coast, now Torcola, where ^'atimu3 
defeated Octavius, 45 

Thorius, T., native of Italica, chosen as 
their leader by the troops who 
mutinied against Cassius, 57-58 

Tiberius Nero, see Claudius. 

Titius, L., tribune of the native legion 
who reported its mutiny, 57 

Trebonius, C, succeeded Cassius as 
governor of Further Spain, 64 

Triarius, C, lieutenant of LucuUus, de- 
feated at Zela by Mithridates (67), 
72, 73 

Tusculus, see Manilius. 



Ui.ia, Spanish town, now Monte 
Mayor, some 17 miles S. of Corduba 
61,"63 



410 



PERSONS AND PLACES (ALEX. WAR) 

Varro, M., p. supporter who operated Octavius by sea off island of Taiiris, 

with two legions in Further Spain 43-47 

and surrendered to C. after Ilerda Vinicianus, see Caelius. 
(49), 58 

Vasius, T., native of Italica who con- 
spired against Cassius, 52 Zela, town in S. Pontus near which C. 

Vatinius, P., C. otEcer who defeated defeated Pharuaces, 72 



411 



INDEX OF PERSONS AND PLACES 
THE AFRICAN WAR 

C.= Caesar, Caesarian ; P. = Pompeius, Pompeian ; R. = Roman ; 
COS. = consul, consulship. 

Figures in brackets denote dates B.C. : otherwise they refer to the cftapters 
of the Latin text. 



ACTLLA, African coastal town, gar- 
risoned bv C. (position disputed : 
see eh. 33," Note 1), 33, 43, 67 

Acyllitani, inhabitants of Acylla, 33 

Aegimurus, now Djamour, island in 
Gulf of Tunis, 44 

Afranius, L., P. ofiicer captured and 
killed in flight to Spain, 69, 95 

Afri, native Africans, 36 

Africa, the R. province, comprising 
the coastal district facing Sardinia 
and Sicily, passim 

Aggar, African town, position dis- 
puted, but possibly near Ksour es 
Saf, 16 R. miles S. of Thapsus, 67, 
76, 79 

Alienus, A., praetor, governor of 
Sicily, 2, 26, 34, 44 

Aponiana iasula, now Faviemana, 
island close to Lilybaeum in Sicily, 2 

Aquila, Q., 0. officer sent on naval 
patrol off Hadrumetum, 62, 63, 67 

Aquinus, M., senator, adherent oif P., 
caught parleying with enemy, later 
pardoned by"C., 57, 89 

Ascurum, town in ilauretania vainlv 
attacked by P. (son), 23 

Asprenas, L. Nonius, proconsul, left 
bv C. at Thapsus to guard the camp, 
80 

Ateius, C, adherent of P. pardoned by 
C, 89 

Atrius, P., R. knight of Utica cap- 
tured by C. at Zeta, later pardoned, 
68, 89 

Avienus, C, tribune of Tenth legion 
cashiered for inefiBciency, 54 

412 



Baleares insulae, the Balearic 
Islands, E. of Spain, 23 

Bochus, king of E. Mauretania, sup- 
porter of C, aided Sittius to attack 
Juba, 25 

Bogus, Bogud, king of W. Mauretania, 
sufiporter of C, 23 

Buthrotum Cf), now Butrinto, port in 
Epirus opposite Corcyra (Corfu), 19 



Caectn'A, a., (probably the friend of 

Cicero) supporter of P. pardoned by 

C, 89 
Caesar, see lulius. 
Caesarianae naves, C. fleets, 28, 53 
Caesariani, C. troops, 7, 13, 14, 24, 52, 

66 
Calpumius, Cn. Piso, P. cavalry 

commander, 3, 18 
Calvinus, see Domitiua 
Caninius, C. Rebilus, proconsul, left 

by C. to besiege Thapsus, 86, 93 
Carales, town in Sardinia, now 

Cagliari, 98 
Cato, see Porcius. 
Catonis fUius, son of M. Cato pardoned 

by C, 89 
Cella, L., (father and son) partisans of 

P. spared by C, 89 
Cercina insula, island, now Karkenah, 

off African coast some 60 miles S. 

of ThapsM, 8, 34 
Cercinitani, inhabitants of Cercina, 34 
Cirta, important town in Numidia, 

now Constantlne, attacked by 

Sittius, 25 



PERSONS AND PLACES (APR. WAR) 



Cispius, L., officer sent by C. on naval 
patrol off Thapsus, 62, 67 

Clupea, African coastal town near 
Cape Bon, now Kelibee, 2, 3 

Cliisinas, C, G. centurion cashiered for 
indiscipline, 5-i 

Cominius, Q., C. officer captured at sea 
by Vergilius, 44, 46 

Considius, (i) C. Longus (father), 
conimanded P. garrison at Hadru- 
metum, and later at Thvsdra, 3-5, 
33, 43, 76, 86, 93. (ii) C. (son), 
spared by C., 89. 

Cornelius, (i) L. Sulla, the dictator and 
rival of Marius, 56. (ii) L. Sulla 
Faustus, P. officer who fled with 
Afranius and was captured by 
Sittius, 87, 95 ; his wife and 
children pardoned by C, 95. 
(iii) P., reservist on P. side who 
commanded garrison at Sarsura, 76 

Crispus, see Marcius and Sallustius. 

Curioniani equites, cavalry once com- 
manded by Curio who had joined 
Juba, 52 

Curio, C. Scribonius, C. officer de- 
feated and killed by Juba in Africa 
at river Bagrada (49), 19, 40 



DAMASLPPl'S, Licinius, R. senator, P. 

supporter, drowned off Hippo, 96 ; 

his children spared by C., 89 
Decimius, C, controller of supplies at 

Cercina, 34 
Domitius, Cn. Calvinus, entrusted by 

C. with siege of Thvsdra, 86, 93 



Eppii'S, M., supporter of P. pardoned 
by C, 89 



Faustus, see Cornelius. 
Fonteius, A, military tribune cashiered 
for mutinous conduct, 54 



Gaetuli, Gaetulians, an inland Libyan 
people dwelling S. of Mauretania 
and Numidia, 25, 32, 35, 43, 55, 56, 
61,62, 67,93 

Galli equites, Gallic cavalry, con- 
tingents of which fought on both 
sides, 6, 19, 29, 34, 40 



Galli rcmiges, Gallic rowers, 2ii 
Gallia, Gaul, conquered by C. after 

eight vears of campaigning (58-51), 

40, 73" 
Germani equites, German cavalrv, 19, 

29, 40 



nADRUMETIXI, inhabitants of Hadru- 

metum, 97 
Hadrumetum, now Soufse on E. coast 

of Tunis, important P. stronghold, 

3, 21, 24, 33, 43, 62, 63, 67, 89 
Hiempsal, king of Numidia, father of 

Juba, expelled by Marians but 

restored by P., 56 
Ilippo regius, town on Xumidian coast 

some 120 miles W. of Utica, 96 
Hispani, Spaniards, 28, 39 
Hispania, Spain, 64, 95, 96 



Italia, Italy, 22, 54, 72 

Ityrei, Ityreans, a people of Coele- 
syria (N. Palestine, El-Jeidoor) 
famed as archers, 20 

luba, king of Numidia, adherent of P., 
6, 25, 36, 43, 48, 52, 55, 57-59, 66, 
74, 77, 91-97 

luliani, C. troops, 15, 40, 41, 69, 78, 
85 

Julius, (i) C. Caesar, the dictator and 
most famous member of the Julian 
family, passim, (ii) L. Caesar, 
acted as Cato's quaestor, surren- 
dered Utica, pardoned by C, 88, 89 



Labiexlani, troops of Labienus, 29 
Labienus, T., P. officer, 13, 15, 16, 

19-21, 24, 29, 33, 38-iO, 49-52, 61, 

65, 66, 69, 70, 75, 78 
Leptis, African coastal town between 

Kuspina and Thapsus, garrisoned by 

C, 7, 9, 10, 29, 61-63, 67 
Leptitani, inhabitants of Leptis, fined 

by C, 97 
Ligarius, (i) P., member of Afranius's 

army amnestied by C. in Spain, 

later executed for treachery, 64. 

(ii) Q., spared by C. at Hadru- 
metum, 89 
Lilybaeum, embarkation port in 

extreme W. of Sicilv, now Marsala, 

1, 2, 34, 37 



PERSONS AND PLACES (AFR. WAR) 



Livineius Rcgulua, left by C. to garri- 
son Hadrumetum, 89 
Longus, see Considius. 



Maklius, L. Torquatus, drowned with 
Scipio and others o£E Hippo, 96 

Marcius Crispus, sent by C. to garrison 
Thabena, 77 

Marius, C, the celebrated soldier, cos. 
seven times, conqueror of Jugurtha 
(106) and the Cimbri (101), 32, 35, 
56 

Mauretania, country of" the Mauri 
(Moors) on N. coast of Africa oppo- 
site Spain, W. of Numidia, 22, 23, 95 

Mauri, Moors, inhabitants of Maure- 
tania, 3, 6, 7, 83 

Messalla, see Valerius. 

Messana, now Messina in E. Sicily, 28 

Messius, C, ex-aedile sent by C. to 
garrison Acylla, 33, 43 

Minucius, C. Reginus, R. knight, close 
friend of Scipio, commandant of 
Zeta, 68 



Xasidius, L., commander of P. fleet at 
siege of Massilia, 64, 98 

Xeapolis, African coastal town some 
50 miles N. of Ruspina, 2 

Numidae, Numidians, passim 

Numidia, N. African kingdom of Juba, 
between Mauretania and K. pro- 
vince of Africa, 22, 36 



OCTAVIUS, M., commanded with Varus 
a P. fleet cruising ofE Utica, 44 

Oppius, staff officer of C. left to 
garrison Zeta, 68 



PACIDEI, two brothers, officers sub- 
ordinate to Labienus, 13 

Pacideius, one of the above who com- 
manded the cavalry at Tegea, 78 

Parada, African town, position doubt- 
ful, but apparently between Thap- 
sus and Utica, 87 

Petreius, M., P. cavalry commander 
with Piso ; fled with Juba after 
Thapsus ; killed in duel with Juba, 
18-20, 24, 91, 94, 97 

Piso, Cn., see Calpurnius. 



Plaetorius Rustianus, drowned with 
Scipio off Hippo, 96 

Plancus, L., staff officer of C. who 
negotiated with Ckjnsidius, 4 

Pompeia, wife of Sulla Faustus, par- 
doned by C, 95 

Pompeiani, troops and supporters of 
P., 23 

Pompeianum proelium, battle of 
Pharsalus in August (48) in which 
P. was routed, 19 

Pompeius, (i) Cn. Magnus, (father), 
the great rival of C, murdered in 
Egypt, 64. (ii) Cn., his elder son, 
who later carried on the struggle in 
Spain, 22, 23. (iii) Rufus, officer 
of C. wounded by C.'s own veterans 
on suspicion of treachery, 85 

Porcius, M. Cato (Uticensis), aristo- 
cratic supporter of P., commandant 
at Utica, where he took his own life, 
22, 36, 87, 88, 93 

Postumus, see Rabirius. 



Rabirius Postumus, C. officer sent to 

Sicily to fetch the second convoy, 

8, 26 
Rebilus, see Caninius. 
Reginus, see Minucius. 
Regulus, see Livineius. 
Rhodii, rowers from the islana of 

Rhodes, 20 
Roma (urbs), Rome, 19, 22, 64, 98 
Romani cives, Roman citizens, 35, 57, 

90, 97 
Romani equites, R. citizens of the 

equestrian order, the influential 

middle class, 22, 44, 64, 68, 85 
Romanus populus, the R. people in a 

political sense, 4, 54, 67, 77, 90, 91, 

97 
Rufus, see Pompeius, Sulpicius and 

Tullius. 
Ruspina, African coastal town near 

Monastir, possiblv at Henchir 

Tenir, 6, 9-11, 20, 28, 33-37, 53, 67 
Rustianus, see Plaetorius. 



Saburra, chief general of Juba, 
defeated and killed by Sittius, 48, 
93, 95 

Salienus, T., (i) Centurion of 6th 
legion captured at sea by Vergilius, 



414 



PERSONS AND PLACES (AFR. WAR) 



2R. (ii) Centurion cashiered by C. 
for indiscipline, 54 

Sallustius, C. Crispus, the historian 
Sallust, praetor, sent by C. to Cer- 
cina, later appointed as proconsular 
governor of new province formed 
from Juba'ri kingdom, 8, 34, 97 

Sardinia, 8, 24, 98 

Sarsura, inland African town W. of 
Aggar, probably on site of Henchir 
el Ksour, captured by C, 75, 
76 

Saserna, (i) C, officer left by C. to 
garrison Leptis, 9, 29, 57. (ii) P., 

' his brother, left in charge ot Kus- 
pina, 10 

Scipio, Q. Metellus Pius, leading P. 
general in this campaign ; father- 
in-law of P. and cos. with him (52); 
commanded P. centre at Pharsalus, 
1, 4, 8. 20, 24-32, 35-52, 57, 61, 
67-70, 75-81, 85-90, 96 

Sicilia, Sicily, the K. province, 2, 8, 
20, 22, 24, 26, 41, 47, 53, 54, 
62 

Sittius, P., R. soldier of fortune, self- 
exiled for baniruptcy. led private 
army of Italian and Spanish free- 
lances against Juba, in alliance with 
king Bochus, 25, 36, 48, 93, 95, 
96 

Sulcitani, Inhabitants of Sulci (Sol) in 
Sardinia, fined by C. for having 
abetted Nasidius, 98 

Sulla, see Cornelius. 

Sulpicius, P. Rufus, praetorian staff 
officer of C, who commanded a 
flotilla at Yibo (48), 10 

Syri, archers recruited in Syria, 20 



modern B^kalta, garrisoned by Ver- 
gilius, out.'iide whi<h the decisive 
battle was fought, 28, 41, 46, 53, 62, 
67, 79, 80, 85, 86, 89 

Thysdra, African inland town (EI 
Piem), about ten miles S. of Sar- 
sura and 18 miles S.W. of Aggar, 
besieged by Domitius, 36, 76, 86, 
93 

Thvsdritani, inhabitants of Thvsdra, 
97 

Ticida, L., R. knight captured at sea 
by Tergilius, 44, 46 

Tiro, il., C. centurion cashiered for 
indiscipline, 54 

Titii, two young Spanish brothers, 
centurions of 5th legion, captured at 
sea and executed by Scipio, 28 

Torquatus, see Manlius. 

Tullius Rufus, ex-quaestor on C. side 
killed by C.'s own veterans on 
suspicion of treachery, 85 



USSETA, {so MSS.) African town be- 
tween Thapsus and Hadrumetum 
occupied by C. : otherwise un- 
known, 89 

Utica, chief town of R. province of 
Africa, on N. coast near present 
mouth of River Bagrada (Med- 
ierda) : P. main depot, commanded 
by Cato, 7, 22-24, 36, 62, 86-98 

Uticenses, inhabitants of Utica, 68, 87, 
88,90 

T'zitta, African inland town in valley 
of Oued el Melah S.W. of Ruspina, 
scene of protracted fortifications 
and skirmishing, 41, 51-59 



TEGEA, African inland town, possibly 
on site of ruins at Henchir Mer- 
hesse, X.W. of Aggar, 78 

Thahena, Numidian coastal town at 
furthest limit of Juba's kingdom, 
site very uncertain ; it revolted 
from Juba and was garrisoned bv 
C, 77 

Thabenenses, inhabitants of Thabena, 
77 

Thapsitani, inhabitants of Thapsus, 
79, 80, 97 

Thapsus, African coastal town, E. of 



Vaga, African inland town near Zeta, 
exact position uncertain, 74 

Valerius, M. Messalla, sent with Sal- 
lust by C. in August (47) to concen- 
trate legions in Sicily for African 
campaign : after Thapsus sent 
ahead to Utica, 28, 86, 88 

Varus, Attius P., P. admiral operating 
from Utica with Octavius, 44, 62-64, 
90 

Vatinius P., active partisan of C. 
who had commanded a fleet cover- 



PERSONS AND PLACES (AFR. WAR) 

ing Brunfiisium, 8 (?), lo; sec also ZAMA, one of the royal cities of Nu- 

Bell. Alex. Index) mi'iia, whose position is disputed, 

Vergilius, C, praetor (62), P. officer 91, 92, 97 

commandini? Thapsus ; raided 0. Zamcnses, inhabitants of Zama, 91, 

convoys; finally surrendered Thap- 92,97 

BUS to Caninius, 28, 44, 79, 86, 93 Zeta, African inland town of uncertain 

Vestrius, P., R. knif?ht on P. side position, possibly at Beni Hassan, 

captured at sea off Leptis, pardoned some ten K. miles N.W. of Tegea, 

by C, 64 68, 74 



4i6 



INDEX OF PERSONS AND PLACES: 
THE SPANISH WAR 

C. = Caesar, Caesarian ; P. = Pompeius, Pompeian ; E. = Roman; 
COS. = consul, consulship. 

Figures in brackets denote dates B.C. : othericise they refer to the chapters of the 
Latin text. 



ACHILLES, the famous mythical Greek 

hero, wlio slew Menmon in single 

combat, 25 
Africa, the R. province, comprising 

the coastal area opposite Sardinia 

and Sicily, 1, 7, 8 
Antistius Turpio, P. soldier who chal- 
lenged and fought Pompeius Niger, 

25 
Antonius, C, P. euvoT from Ategua, 

17 (?), 18 
Arsuetius, brought cavalry to C. from 

Italy, 10 
Arquitius, see Clodius. 
Aspavia, Spanish town, 5 R. miles E. 

of Ucubi, on left bank of river 

Salsum, 24 
Asprenas, L. Nonius, brought cavalry 

to C. from Italy, 10 
Asta, probably the modern Mesa de 

Asta, some 20 miles N.N.E. of 

Cadiz, 36 
Astenses, inhabitants of Asta, 26 
Ategua, probably the modern Teba la 

vieja on right bank of river Salsum, 

some 14 miles S.E. of Corduba, 6-8, 

22 



Baebius, a., R. knight from Asta who 
deserted to C, 26 

Baetis flumen, now the river Guadal- 
quivir in Spain, 5, .^6 

Baeturia, the N.W. part of Baetica, 
the district between the Baetis and 
Ana,s(Guadiana), 22 



Caecilius, (i) Q. Metellus Pius, cos. 
(80), fought Sertorius in Spain (79- 
71); taxes imposed by him 
rescinded at C.'s instance, 42. 
(ii) Niger, a Spaniard who supplied 
Philo with Lusitanian troops, 35 

Caesar, see Julius. 

Caesariani, C.'s supporters at Corduba, 
34 

Caninius, C. Eebilus, C. officer sent 
into Hispalis with a garrison (see 
also Bill. Afr.), 'Ab 

Carruca, Spanish town, otherwise un- 
known, apparently near Ventipo, 27 

Carteia, now El Rocadillo, between 
Gibraltar and Algeciras, 32, 37 

Carteienses, inhabitants of Carteia, 
36, 37 

Cassius, Q. Longinus, unpopular 
governor of Further Spain who 
barely escaped assassination at 
Corduba {see aUo Bill. Alex.), 42 

Castra Postvimiana, perhaps the hill 
of HarLnilla, some 3 miles S.AV. of 
Ategua ; stronghold occupied by 
C, 8 

Cato [Lusitanus ?], fellow envoy of 
Tullius, who offered to surrender 
Ategua to C, 17, 18(?) 

Caucilius, P., camp commandant who 
accomuanied P. to Carteia, 32 

Clodius Arquitius, officer wounded in 
skirmish at river Salsum, 23 

Corduba, now Cordova, on river 
Baetis, capital citv of Further 
Spain, 2-4, 6, 10-1 2," 32, 33 



PERSONS AND PLACES (SPAN. WAR) 



Cordubenses, inhabitants or garrison 
of Corduba, 2, 4 



DlDIUS, C, C. officer, commanding 
llect at Gades, whose troo[)s caught 
and killed I'.; later himself killed 
by Lusitanians, 37, 40 



Ennius, Q., Koman epic poet of Italian 
birth (239-168), of whose writings 
only fragments survive, 23, 31 



FABnjS, Q. Maximus, joint commander 
with Pedius of C. forces in Spain 
before C.'s arrival : later left to 
besiege Munda, 2, 12, 41 

Flavins, C, R. knight from Asta who 
deserted to C, 26 

Fundanius, C, R. knight on P. side 
who deserted to 0., 11 



Gades, now Cadiz, 37, 39, 40, 42 



HISPALIS, now Seville, important town 
on river Baetis, 35, 36, 39, 40, 42 

Hispania, Spain, comprising two 
K. provinces — ■ Hispania Citerior 
(Hither Spain), E. of a line roughly 
from Oviedo to Almeria Bay, and 
Hispania Ulterior (Further Spain), 
W. Spain and Portugal, 1-3, 8, 31, 42 



INDO, Spanish chieftain, ally of C, 

killed in a sally, 10 
Italia, Italy, 1, 10 
Italicensis, native of Italica, town in 

Baetica on right bank of river 

Baetis, 25 
lulius, 0. Caesar, the dictator and 

most famous member of the Julian 

family, passim 
lunius, protested at the massacre of 

townsfolk in Ategua, 16 



LABIENUS, T., p. commander, IS, 31 
Lennium, Lusitanian town, otherwise 

unknown, 35 
Longinus, see Cassius. 



Lusitani, natives of Lusitania, 18, 35, 

36, 38, 40 
Lusitania, part of Hispania Ulterior 

comprising Portugal S. of Oporto 

and i)art of W. Spain, 35 
[Lusitanus '■'], see Cato. 



Marcius, Q., p. military tribune who 
deserted to C, 11 

Maximus, see Fabius. 

Memnon, mythical hero, son of Titho- 
nus and Eos, King of Ethiopians, 
slain by Achilles, 25 

Metellus, see Caecilius. 

ilunatius, L. Flaccus, P. officer, com- 
mandant of Ategua, 19 

Munda, Spanish town outside which 
the decisive battle was fought : 
site disputed, but perhaps about 6 
R. miles N.W. of Osuna, 32, 33, 41, 
42 

Mundenses, P. fugitives who had fled 
into Munda, 27 

Mundensis campus, the plain of 
Munda, 27, 30, 31 



Niger, see Caecilius and Pompcius. 



PACTAECUS, see A'ibius. 

Pedius, Q., joint commander with 
Fabius of C. forces in Spain before 
C.'S arrival, 2, 12 

Phamaces, son of Mithridates the 
Great, king of Bosphorus, defeated 
by C. at Zela, 1 

Phiio, well-known Lusitanian and 
ardent P. supporter who brought 
fresh troops into Hispalis, 35 

Pompeiani, troops or supporters of P., 
13, 14, 16, 34, 35, 37 

Pompeius, (i) Cn., elder son of Pom- 
peius Magnus, chief opponent of 0. 
in this campaign, passim, (ii) 
Sextus. younger son of Pompeius 
Magnus, who held Cofduba, 3, 4, 
32, 34. (iii) Q. Niger, E. knight of 
Italica on C. side who fought Anti- 
stius in single combat, 25 

Postiimiana, see Castra. 



4iS 



PERSONS AND PLACES (SPAN. WAR) 



Rkbilus, lee Caninius. 
Roma (urbs), Rome, 31 
Romani cives, R. citizens, 17, 42 
R(iBiani equites, R. citizens of the 
equestrian order, the influential 
middle class, 11, 22, 25, 26, 31 
Romanus populus, the R. people in a 
political sense, 3, 42 



Saguntini, inhabitants of Saguntia, 
now Xigonza, a town in Baeturia ; 
or of Saguntum, now Murviedro, 
S.W. of mouth of Ebro, 10 

Salsum (lumen, the river Guadaioz, 7, 
9, 13, 14, 16, 23 

Scapula, Quiuctius, joint leader with 
Aponius of legions which had previ- 
ously mutinied against Cassius : after 
Munda fled to Corduba and com- 
mitted suicide, 33 

Soricaria, Spanish town, perhaps the 
modern Castro del Rio, 6 miles S.E. 
of Ategua, 24, 27 

Spalis or Sparis, ?(.?o MSS.), a town 
which has not beau identified, 27 



Tiberius, see TuUius. 

Trebellius, A., R. knight from Asta 

who deserted to C, 26 
Trebonius, C, succeeded Cassius as 

governor of Further Spain, 7, 12 



TuUius, Tiberius, chief envoy from 
Ategua offering C. the surrender of 
the town, 17, 18 

Turpio, see Antistius. 



UCUBENSES, inhabitants of Ucubi, 20 
Ucubi, Spanish town at or close to the 

modern Espejo, 5J miles S. of 

Ategua, 7, 8, 20, 24, 27 
Ulia, Spanish town, now Monte 

Mayor, about 17 miles S. of Corduba, 

besieged by P., 3, 4 
Ursao, Spanish town, now Osuna, some 

35 miles S.W. of Montilla, 26, 41, 

42 
Ursaonenses, inhabitants of Ursao, 

22, 28 



Valerius, fled from Munda to Cor- 
duba to inform Sex. P. of the defeat, 
32 

Valgius, A., son of a senator, who 
deserted to P. to join his brother, 13 

Varus, Attius, P., P. commander 
killed at Munda {see also Bell, Afr.), 
27, 31 

Ventipo, Spanish town, now Vado 
Garcia close to Casariche, about 
20 R. miles S. of Montilla, 27 

Vibius, L. Paciaecus, C. officer com- 
manding relief force sent to Ulia, 3 



p2 



419 



GENERAL SUBJECT INDEX 



Figures denote chapters : Al 



Belluin AlexanJrinura ; 
: Bellum Hispauieuse.) 



Af = Belluin Africum ; 



Acies : 

prima, Al 7-1 ; AS IG, 41 

secunda, Af 38 

tertia, Af 60 

quarta, Af 81 

simplex, Al 37 ; Af 13, 59 

triplex, Af 81 

guadriiplex, Af 41 

subsidiaria, Af 59 
Aedilicia poteslas, Af 33 
Africans, treacherous character, Af 10 
Agger, Al 29, 73, 74; S 7, 16, 41 
Agmen eitremum or 

novissimiim, Af 6, 69, 70, 75 

primum, Af 95 
Alexandria : 

fireproof buildings, Al 1 

topography, Al 1, 5, 14 
Alexandrians : 

ingenuity, Al 3, 13 

maritime traditions, Al 12 

treacherous nature, Al 7, 24 
Ambushes, Al 25, 36, 37, 48 ; Af 17, 35, 

50, 53, 62, 65, 66, 69, 95; S 40 
Antemna, Al 45 
Apparitores, Af 37 
Aquila, S 7, 30, 31 
Archers (see sagittarii, hippotoxotae). 
Aries, Al 1 ; Af 20 
Armatura : 

graeis, Af 71 

lei-is, Al 17 ; Af 1, 13, 14, 19, 20, 37, 
39, 48, 50-52, 59-61, 65, 66, 69, 
71, 72, 75, 78, 81; S 7, 14, 15, 
20-26, 30 

(Numidian) : special hit-and-run 
tactics, Af 69-72 
Arms factories, Al 2 
Artillery. See tormenla. 
Assemblies, civil, Af 88, 90; S 20, 42 
Auctions of private property, Af 2, 90, 
97, 98; S 22 

420 



Aiispicia, Al 74 

Aiixilia, aiixiliares, Al 1, 12, 26, 34, 51, 
56, 63, 69, 70, 77 ; Af 5, 8, 19, 20, 
25, 26, 34, 49, 58, 59, 78 ; SI, 30, 
42 



Baggage, dumped, Al 73 ; Al 9, 69 

BaUistum (see turmenta). 

Basilica, Al 52 

Battle, order of, Al 14 (naval), 37, 39; 

Ai 13, 41, 59, 60, 81; S 30 
Battles, land : 

Pharos Island, AI 17-18 

Heptastadion, Al 19-21 

Delta, Al 27 

Nile, AJ 30-31 

Nicopolis, Ai_40, 65 

Salona, Al 43 

Zela, Al 74-76 

cavalry, rearguard, Ai 6 

near Ruspina, Af 14-18 

cavalry, near Uzitta, Ai 39-40, 42, 
48, 61 

cavalry, near Tegea, Af 78 

Thapsiis, Af 83-85 

for bridge at Oorduba, S 5 

Castra Postumiana, S 9 

cavalry skirmish near Ategua, S 14, 
15 

near river Salsum, S 23 

near Soricaria, S 24-25 

Munda, S 29-31 
Battles, naval : 

Alexandria, Eunostos harbour, Al 
14-16 

off Canopos, Al 25 

off Tauris Island, Al 45-46 

Leptis-Hadrumetum, Af 62-63 
Blockades : 

Ategua, S 6-19 

Louginus, at Ulia, Al 61-63 



GENERAL SUBJECT INDEX 



Blockades : 

Munda, S 32, 3."!, 36, 41 
Pompeius, in Lusitania, S 38-39 
Thapsus, Af 86, 93 
Thysdra, Ai 86 
Ulia, S 3 
Bounty moneys, Al 4, 48, 52 ; Af 44 ; 

S 1, 26 
Bracchium, Al 30; Af 38, 49, 51, 56; 

S 5, 6, 13, 23, 24 
Bribery, Al 49; Af 87 
Bridges : 

built by felling trees, Al 29 
at Corduba, on temporary piers, S 5 
at Corduba, permanent, S 33 
two in Heptastadion : one fortified, 
Al 19; the other attacked and 
temporarily blocked, Al 19-21 
Buffer state, Al' 78 



Caesar : 

alleged carelessness, Af 3 

cheerfulness, Af 10 

clemency, Af 64, 86, 88, 89, 92, 95; 
S17 

impatience, Af 26 

impetuosity, Al 71 

increased caution, Af 35, 73 

military skill, Af 31 

patience, Af 30, 31, 35, 54 

prestige, Af 31, 55 

training methods, Af 71, 73 
Calmes, Af 56 
Camels, Af 68 

Camps, burning of, Af 67 ; S 7, 10 
Cancelli, Af 15 

Castellitm, Al 19, 21, 30, 42, 43, 61, 63 ; 
Af 2, 6, 26, 34, 36, 38, 49, 80 ; 
S 6, 8, 9, 14, 20, 24, 27, 40 
Castra : 

lunala, Af 80 

slativa, Af 26 
Casualties, suppression of, S 18 
Catapitltum {see tor men ta) 
Cavalry : 

African, Af 10 

of Deiotarus, Al 34 

Egyptian, Al 29 

Gailic, Al 17 ; Af 6, 19, 29, 34, 40 

German, Al 29 ; Af 19, 29, 40 

Moorish, Af 3, 6, 7, 83 

Nabataean, Al 1 

Numidian, Af 6, 14, 18, 19, 35, 38- 
40, 48, 52, 69, 61, 66, 69, 70, 7S 



Cavalry : 

roya'l (Juba's), Af 8, 48, 56 

Spanish, Af 39 

advanced patrols, Af 12, 50, 66, 86; 

S 4 
confined to ships, Af 7 
dismounted, S 15 
harassing supplies, Al 61 ; Af 24 ; S 

11 
in ambush, Al 36 ; Af 50, 65 
in light order, Al 77 
in pursuit, Al 60 ; Af 6 
normal tactics, S 15 
outflanking, Af 5, 13, 14, 15, 19, 39, 

40, 50, 59, 70, 78 
unbridled, Af 19, 48, 61 
unsupported by infantry, Af 72 
with light-armed troops, Af 13-15 
vedettes, Af 31, 35, 38, 78; S 14 
CeiUiirio, Al 9, 24, 43, 67; Af 7, 28, 

44-16, 54, 82; S 20, 23, 24 
Chariots, scythed, Al 75 
Ciritas libera et immunis, Af 7, 33 
Classiarii, Al 12, 20, 21 
Cliens, dientela, Al 52; Af 22, 35 
Cohorts, auiiliary (Spanish), Al 62 
Cohorts : 

detachments of, Al 17, 19, 20, 31, 
39, 56, 67, 63, 76; Af 6, 9-11, 
21, 29, 33, 41, 43, 45, 55, 58, 60, 
77, 80, 81; S3, 6, 26, 30, 38 
veteran, Al 2 ; Af 6 
Colonia, Al 56 
' 'olonus, S 7 

Combat, single, Af 94 ; S 26 
Commeatiis (supplies, convoys), Al 12, 
26, 36, 43; Af 8, 21, 24, 31, 34, 
37, 44, 54, 77; S 5, 11, 26 
Conquisitores, Al 2 
Cmisul, Al 68 
Consulship, S 42 
Conveiitus (corporation, citizen-body), 

Al 56-59; Ai 68, 97 
Convoys : 

overland, Al 25, 26, 34 

sea-borne, protection of, Al 25 ; Af 8, 

21, 62 
{See also commeatus.) 
Corn : 

accumulated in towns, Af 20, 36, 

75 
burning of, Af 43 
high price, Af 47 
imported, Af 20 
improved supplies, Af 34 

421 



GENERAL SUBJECT INDEX 



Com: 

shortage, Al 1'; Af 21, 24, G7 
stored underground, Af G6 

Corona {see formations). 

Cotho, Af C2, 63 

Council of war, Al 3, 12, 57 ; S 30 

Crates, Al 18; Af 20; S 16 

Ciiniciiliis, S 16, 20 

Cnstodiae, Al 63 ; Af 7, 87, 88 
eqtiitum, Af 35 



Fortifications {see agger, fossa, miini- 
Ho, opus, praesiJium,stili, rallitin). 
Fortune : 

as factor in war, Al 43 
fickleness of, Al 25, 62; Af 61 
Fossa, MZ\, 38,40; Af 31, 35,61,87; 

S 16 
Fraternisation, Af 29, 51, 56, 57 
Fimda, fumiilores, Al 20, 30; Al 19, 
27, 34, 77, 78, 81, 83 



Debts, Al 49, 56 

Decorations and awards, military, Al 

77; Af 86; S 26 
Decurio, Af 29 
Defences, natural, Al 28, 30, 31, 61, 

: 72; S 8, 9, 28, 29, 38, 41 
Deserters, desertions, Af 8, 19, 26, 32, 

35, 51, 52, 55, 56, 62, 66, 68, 74; 

S 6, 11, 13, 16, 18-20, 21, 22, 26, 

27, 34 
Dictator, S 2 
Dilectus (military coascription), Al 2, 

50, 56 ; Af 20, 36 
Discipline, militarv, undermining of, 

Al 48, 65 
Dockyards, Al 12, 13 



Garrison {see praesidium), 

Gauls, forthright character of, Af 

73 
Gaza regia, Af 91 
Gladiators, Af 76, 93 

training of, Af 71 
aians, Af 20 

inscripta, S 13, 18 
Gods, favour of in battle, Al 75, 76; 
Af 74, 82; S 29 



Harpagones, S 16 
Hiberna, Al 49, 64 ; Af 47 ; S 16 
Hippotoxolae, Af 19 
Hospitality, violation of, S 16 



Edictum, Al 56 ; Af 46 
Elephants, Af 1, 19, 25, 35, 48, 59, 70, 
81, 83, 84 

armed and equipped with towers, 
Af 30, 41, 86 

imjjorted from Italy, Af 72 

training of, Af 27 

drawbacks of, Af 27, 72 
Epibatae, Al 11 ; Af 20, 62, 63 
Evocali, Al 53 ; Af 76, 82 
Exile, Af 22 
Expenses, military, Al 34, 50, 51 



Fasces, S 31, 42 

Fire, St. Elmo's, Af 47 

Firebrands {see incendiary missiles). 

Fleet, co-operating with land forces, 

Al 19, 30; Af 80 
i'ormations : 

military : alternate cohorts facing 

about, Af 17; circular {orbis), 

Al 4U ; Af 15 ; encircling {corona), 

Af 17, 70; S 13 
naval, Al 14, 45 



Imperator (C.-in-C), Al 48-50, 54 ; Af 

4, 10, 35, 44, 45, 54, 71, 82, 88; 

S 19 
Incendiary missiles, Al 14 ; S 11, 12, 

15, 16 
Index, indicium, Al 55; Af 65, 86; 

S 18, 26, 39 
Indatiae, Al 63 

Infantry, mounted pillion, S 4 
1 us dicere, Al 49 



Lanista, Af 71 
l.atus apertum, Al 20, 40 
l.ectica, lecticarii, S 32, 38 
Legatus (staff, lieutenant-general, 
deputy C.-in-C), Al 24; Af 26, 
82 

Caninius, S 35 

Cassius, Q., Al 52, 57 

Fabius, Q. Masimus, S 2 

Messalla, M., Af 28 

Oppius, Af 68 

Pedius, Q., S 2 

Plancus, L, AJ 4 



422 



GENERAL SUBJECT INDEX 



Legati (envoys, official deputations) 
from : 
Acylla, Af 33 
Alexandria, Al 23 
Asta, S 36 
Ategua, S 17, 19 
Carteia, S 36, 37 
Corduba, S 2, 34 
Further Spain (to Senate), S 12 
Hispalis, S 35 
Leptis, Af 7, 97 (to Senate) 
Pharnaces, Al 35-37, 69, 74 
Thabena, Af 77 
Thvsdra, Af 36 
Xnia, S 3, 19 
Trsao, S 22 
Vaga, Af 74 
Zama, Af 92 

various African towns, Af 6 
Legions — (a) Alexandrian War 
Legio II, 53, 54, 57 

V (iiova), 50, 52, 54, 57 
VI (retcrana), 33, 69, 76, 77 
XXI, 53, 54, 57 
XXX, 53, 54, 55, 57 
XXXVI, 34, 39,40, 69 
XXXVII (ex Pompei-anis). 9 

vernac'ila (Spanish), 53, 54, 57 
Leginnes expeditae, 73 
one brought by Bogud, 62 
one raised in Pontus, 34, 39, 40, 

69 
some of recruits, sent to lUvricum, 

42 
two by Deiotarus, 34, 39, 40, 68, 69, 

77 
two sent to Egypt by Domitius, 34, 

35 
two serving in Illyricum, 42 
Legions — (6) African War : 

Legio V {vcterana), 1, 28, 47, 60, 81, 
84 
VII, 62, 81 
VIII, 62, 81 
IX, 53, 60, 81 

X (i-elerana), 16, 53, 51, 60 
81 

XIII, 34, 60 

XIV, 34, 46, 60 
XXV, 60 

XXVI, 60 

XXVIII, 60 

XXIX, 60 

IV (Scipio's), 35, 52 

VI (Scipio's), 35, 62 



Legions — (6) African War : 

Legiones veteranae, 10, 19, 31, 37, 
60, 66 
regiae (.Tuba's), 1, 59 
of recruits, five mustered in Sicily, 1 
three brought by Juba, 48 
Legions — (c) Spanish War ; 
Legio III, 30 

V, 23, 30 
VI, 12 
X, 30, 31 
I (Pompeian), 18 
II (Pompeian), 13 
IX (Pompeian), 34 
XIII (Pompeian), 34 
Afraniana, 7 
Legiones rernaciilae, 7, 10, 12, 20 
one recruited from local colonies, 7 
several of deserters, 7, 34 
Lex lulia, Af 87 
LictOT, Al 62 
Liia, Af 75, 84 
Loricntus, -i, S 4, 13, 20 
Luminibus accensis, Af 56, 89 



Marches : 
normal, Af 1 
forced, Al 36, 66 
Materia, maleries, Al 12; Af 20; S 

41 
Mercatores, Af '5 

Alilites expediti (300 per legion), Af 75, 
78 
vernaculi, Al 53, 57 
Moles : 
(sea-walls, piers), Al 16 ; Af 26 
(Heptastadion, at Alexandria), Al 
17-20 
Miiniceps, Al 52 

Munilio, miinitiones, Al 1-3, 5, 8, 10, 
17-21, 27, 30-32, 61-63, 73, 74, 
76 ; Af 5, 6, 18. 24, 29, 31.32, 34, 
38^2, 48, 51, 68, 60, 61. 78 ; 5 6, 
7, 8. 20, 23, 28, 29, 33, 38, 39, 41 
Musoili, Al 1 
Mutinous conduct, Al 57, 58 ; Af 19, 

"54, 95 
Mutinous language, Af 28 



Naval tactics, Al 14, 15, 46 
Aavis, naviculum, naviginm, navi- 
qiolum : 
achiaria, Al 9, 44, 46; Af 28, 44 



423 



GENERAL SUBJECT INDEX 



yams, nnriculum, naiigium, navi- 

giolum : 
aperla, Al 11, 13 
biremii, site dicrota, Al 16, 47 
eataseopum, Af 26 
eeler, Af 2 
eonslrata, Al 11, 17 
expedita, Al 20, 25 
Zow7a, Al 12, 17, 20, 44; Af 1, 2, 7 

8, 46, 96; S 37 
myoparo, Al 46 
onemria, Al 11, 19; Af 1, 2, 7, 8 

11, 21, 34, 46, 53, 62, 63 
parva, parvula, Al 12, 14, 17, 47 

Af 34, 63 
guadriremis. Al 11, 13, 25, 46 
quinqueremis, sive penteris, Al 13 

16,46,47; Af 62, 63 
TOStrala, Af 23 
tcapha, Al 8, 14, 17, 19, 21, 46 

Af 21, 28, 44; S 40 
triremU, sire trieris, Al 47; Af 44 

63 
naves — ■ 

Asiae, Al 13 

Ciliciar, Al 1 

Lyciae, Al 13 

Ponlicae, Al 13, 14 

Rhodiae. Al 11, 13-15, 25 

Syriae, Al 1 
{See also Ships.) 
yegotiari, Al 70 
yegotiatores, Af 36, 90 
yovits homo, Af 57 



Oars, improvised, Al 13 

OflBcers (see centurio, decurio, legalus, 

praefecfii.^, tribunus). 
Officitiae ferrariae, Af 20 
Olivetum, Af 50; S 27 
Opus (field-work), Al 1, 22, 61-63, 72; 

Af 21, 43, 51, 61, 63, 80, 91 ; S 13, 

23 
Orbis (see formations). 



Parades, military, Al 52, 57; At 19, 

32, 54 (ofBcers). 86 
Piln praepilata, Af 72 
Potis (see bridges). 
Porta : 

belliea, Af 87 

decumana, Af 66 

tnaritima, Al 85 



Port'is : 

Alexandria, Al 13, 17 
Hadrumetum, Af 3 
Leptis, Af 63 

Ruspina, Af 10, 11, .34, 53 
Tauridis insulae, Al 45 
Praefectus, Af 3, 48, .56, 95; S 26 
Praesidinm, praesidia (post, garrison, 
prepared positions) : 
Al 19, 26, 32, 33, 44, 57, 63, 67, 

76 
Af 3, 9, 11, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 33, 
34, 36-39, 41, 42, 50, 67, 68, 74- 
80, 85, 89 
S 3, 4, 6, 13, 18, 23, 27, 35 
narale, S 32 
PraelOT, Al 53, 59 ; Af 2, 8, 34 
Praetorium (G.H.Q.), Af 31 
Praetorius, Af 28 
Praelura, S 42 
Prize crew, Af 63 
Pro eonsule, Al 59, 64 ; Af 34, 80, 86, 

93,97 
Pro praetore, Al 42, 48 
Propugnalores, Al 10-12, 45, 46 
Provirwia, Al 3, 70, 78 ; Af 97 

individual provinces (governor, or 
C. legatus, in parentheses, where 
mentioned in text) : 
Africa, Al 51 ; Af 8, 26 
Asia (Domitius Calvinus), Al 

34, 65, 78 
Bithynia, Al 65, 78 
Cilicia, Al 34, 65, 66 
Hispania citerior (Lepidus), Al 
69, 63; ulterior (Q. Cassius 
Longinus : Trebonius), Al 
48-64; S 1-3, 8, 42; topo- 
graphy of, S 7, 8 
Illrricum (Q. (Jomificius), Al 

42-47 
Macedonia, Al 42 
Sardinia, Af 8 
Sicilia (Alienus), Af 1, 2 
Svria (Sextus Caesar), Al 65, 
"66 
Proiincialis homo, Al 50, 53, 55 
P'Micani, Al 70 

Punishments, civilian and politi- 
cal : 
collective fines in money, Af 90, 97 ; 

oil, Af 97; corn, Af 97 
by increase of tithe, Af 98 
general massacre, AJ 87 ; S 15, 18, 
21, 22 



424 



GENERAL SUBJECT INDEX 



Punishments, military : 

beating to death (murderer), S 
27; beheading, S 20; burning 
alive (slave), S 20 ; cruciUxion, 
At 66, S 20 (slaves) ; dismissal 
with ignominy, ki 46, 54 ; 
execution of prisoners, if 28, 
64; S 12, 13, 16; mutilation, 
S 12 

Pvre, funeral, Af 87, 91 ; S 33 



Quaestor, Al 34, 42, 48, 50, 57; Ai 
Quaestorius, Af 34, 85 
Qu(Lestura, S 42 



Ransom money, Af 64 
Keconnaissance, Al 61 ; Af 3, 38, 76 
Remiges, Al 10, 16, 20, 21, 47; Af 1, 

7, 20, 62, 63 
Rewards for loyalty, Al 65; Af 97 
Rich men, victimised, Al 49 
Rostra (beaks, rams), Al 44, 46 



Sacrametittim (militarv oath), Al 56 
SagitlariU Al 1, 30; Af 12, 13, 19, 20, 

28, 34, 60, 77, 78, 81, 83 
Salute, militarv, Af 86 
Scalae, Al 18, 20 
Scorpio (see tormenta) 
Sea power, influence of, Al 8, 12 
Sea-sickness, Af 18, 34 
Seaweed, fed to animals, Ai 24 
Senator, Af 57, 85; S 13, 22 
Senatus, Al 67, 68 ; Af 28, 87 (Utica), 

97; S 42 
Service, military overseas, Al 56; Af 

19 
Ships (for types see navis) : 

firing of, Af 62, 63 ; S 36, 37, 40 
capsizing when overloaded, Al 20, 

21,46 
customs, at Xile mouths, Al 13 
on tow, Al 11 

off course, Af 2, 7, 8, 11, 21, 28, 44 
refitting of, Al 12, 13, 47 ; S 40 
rowing tests of, Al 13 
Signa (standards of maniples), Al 20 ; 
Af 12, 15-17, 75, 77; S 7, 10, 18, 
31, 40 
conrerlere, Af 18 
inferre, Al 54; Af 69, 82 
tollere, AI 57 



Hignifer, S 18 

Signum FelicUatis, Af 83 

Slaves, recruiting, arming of, Al 2 ; 

Ai 19, 22, 36, 88 ; S 34 
used as pioneers, Al 73, 74 ; bat- 

pien, Af 54 
in Scipio's camp at Thapsus, Af 85 
Slingers (see funda). 
Specula (watch-tower), Af 37 ; S 8 
Speculatores, Af 12, 31, 35, 37; S 13, 

20 2*^ 28 38 
Statio, Al 19 ; Af 38, 62 ; S 14 

in statione, AJ 25 ; Af 21, 29, 31, 38, 

46, 53, 78; S 6, 13 
Stili caeci, Af 31 
Stipendium, Af 35 
Stores, destruction of, Af 43, 47 
Slides, Af 20 



Tahdlae, S 19 

siipmtae (sealed sailing orders), Af 3 
Tnh'eUnrii. Al 38; S 2, 12, 16, 18 
Tnbcniactil'im, Ai 1 
Taxes, imposts, Al 49 ; Af97; S 42 
Tentori'im. tentoriolum, Af 47 
Testament'im, Al 33 
Testudo, Al 1 

Tetrarches, letrarehia, Al 67, 68, 78 
Three Hundred, the, (bodv of R 

traders at Utica), Af 88," 90 
Tiro, tirones, Af 1, 5, 10, 16, 19, 31, 
32, 44, 46, 60, 71, 81; S 26, 
28 
Tirocinium, Af 31 

Tormenta (artillerv), Al 1, 2, 9, 21; 
Af 20, 29, 77 " 
on ships, Al 19 
ballisVim, Af 56 ; S 13 
catapulta, Ai 31 
Scorpio, Ai 29, 31, 56 
Torture, Ai 46 

examination under, Al 55 
Tribuni plebis, rivalries among, AI 

65 
Tribunus militum, Al 43, 57, 65; Af 

28, 54; S 11 
Troops : 

on leave, Af 77 
on sick list, AI 44 ; Af 77 
Titbicen, Af 82 
Turma, Af 14, 18, 29, 39, 40, 75, 78; 

S 6, 14, 23, 26 
Tiirmatim, Af 41 



425 



GENERAL SUBJECT INDEX 



Turris, turret (tower, battlement), AS 
26, 88; S 8, 13, 34, 38, 41 
at Alexandria, ten storeys, fixed, 

Al 2 ; mobile, Al 2 
ancient watoh-towers, Af 37, 38 
continuous battlement at Pharos, 

Al 18 
on farm building, Af 40 
siege-towers at Ategua, S 16, 19 



Tadimonium, Al 49 

Vallum, Al 2 (triplex), 30, 31, 37, 74; 

Ai 20, 24, 29, 31, 35, 46, 61, 81- 

83; S 16, 22, 23, 32, 36 
Tergiliarum si^ium, Ai 47 
Teterani, Al 44 ; Af 6, 16, 24, 44, 46, 

70, 81, 84-86 
Vexillum (flag signal), Al 45 (naval); 

S28 



Vigiles, S 3, 35 

Vigilia (watch of night) : 
prima, Af 37 

secunda, Af 47, 62; S3, 12, 19, 32 
quartn, AI 73 ; Af 67-69, 76 

Vinea, Al 1 ; S 7 



Water : 

abundant supply in Spain, S 8 

contamination of, Al 5, 6 

lack of, Ai 1, 9; Af 51, 53, 69, 76, 
79; S 37, 41 

underground conduits at Alex- 
andria, Al 5 

wells, on coast, Al 8, 9 ; near 
Uzitta, Af 51 

-wheels, mechanical, AI 6 
Wounded, evacuation of, Ai 21 



426 



Printed in Great Britain by 

EiCHARD Clay and Company, Ltd. 

BUNGAY, Suffolk, 



Map 




PLAN OF ALEXANDRIA 

(to illustrate Bellum Alexandrinum ) 




Stanford, London 



Map 2 




Stanford. London. 



Map 3 



AFRICA 

to illustrate Bellum Atricum 




Map 4 




/ Scipio / ,e^^' 

/ \ Sx/ °> 

Mesdour „\if^ 



B.Afr U Z I T T A 37-66 

Modern V///oyey e/)u5 CS Menzel-Knr 

Caesar's dispositions _ j | 

Scipio's dispositions _ .. ^ ^Ij 

Contours and heights are m metres 
The Bottle dispositions os described m chapters 59-60 




Stanford, London 



Map 5 




Stanford. London 



NOTES - 1. Some would place it further North on Dahret El Hafsa 

2. Caesar's dispositions shewr in RED. Scipio's in BLACK Unbroken arrows 
indicate movements prior to the Battle, broken ones movements after the 



Map 6 




Nofva ' \ 

Names mentionea in the text, otjuculo I 

but position undefined Segovio \ 

Corruca I 

Spoil! ? j 



GADES 

FURTHER SPAIN (BAETICA) 

to illustrate the Spanish & Alexandrian Wars 
English Miles 



THE LOEB CLASSICAL 
LIBRARY 

VOLUMES ALREADY PUBLISHED 
Latin Authors 

Ammianhs Marcellinus. Translated by J. C. Rolfe. 3 Vols. 

(2nd Itnp. revised.) 
Apuleius : The Golden Ass (Metamorphoses). W. Adling- 

ton(1566). Revised by S. Gaselee. (Ith Imp.) 
St. Adoustine, Confessions of. W. Watts (1631). 2 Vols. 

(Vol. I. 1th Imp., Vol. II. &th Imp.) 
St. Augustine, Select Letters. J. H. Baxter. (2nd Imp.) 
AusONius. H. G. Evelyn White. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 
Bede. J. E. King. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 
Boethius : Tracts and De Consolatione Prilosofhiab, 

Rev. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand, (dth Imp.) 
Caesar : Alexandrian, African and Spanish Wars. A. G. 

Way. 
Caesar: Civil Wars. A. G. Peskett. (5th Imp.) 
Caesar: Gallic War. H.J.Edwards. (\Qth Imp.) 
Cato : De Re Rustica ; Varro : De Re Rustica. H. B. Ash 

and W. D. Hooper. (3rd Imp.) 
Catullus. F. W. Cornish ; Tibullus. J. B. Postgate ; Per- 
vigilium Veneris. J. W. Mackail. (\2th Imp.) 
Celsus : De Medicina. W. G. Spencer. 3 Vols. (Vol. I. 

3rd Imp. revised. Vols. II. and III. 2nd Imp.) 
Cicero : Brutus, and Orator. G. L. Hendrickson and H. M. 

Hubbell. (3rd/mp.) 
[Cicero]: Ad Herennium. H. Caplan. 
Cicero : De Fato ; Paradoxa Stoicorum ; De Partitions 

Oratoria. H. Rackham. (With De Oratore, Vol. II.) 

(2nd Imp.) 
Cicero : De Finibus. H. Rackham. (\th Imp. revised.) 
Cicero : De Invextione, etc. H. M. Hubbell. 
Cicero : De Natura Deorum and Academica. H. Rackham. 

(2nd Imp.) 
Cicero : De Officiis. Walter Miller. (Gth Imp.) 
Cicero : De Oratore. 2 Vols. E. W. Sutton and H. Rack- 
ham. (2nd Imp.) 
Cicero : De Republica and De Legibus. Clinton W. Keyes. 

(4th Imp.) 
Cicero : De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divdjationb. 

W. A. Falconer. (6th Imp.) 
Cicero : In Catilinam, Pro Flacco, Pro Murena, Pro Sulla. 

Louis E. Lord. (3rd Imp. revised.) 
Cicero : Letters to Atticus. E. O. Winstedt. 3 Vols. 

(Vol. I. 6th Imp., Vols. II. and III. ith Imp.) 
I 



Cicero : Letters to His Friends. W. Olynn WilliarriB. 3 

Vols. (Vols. 1. and II. 3rd Imp.. V'ol. III. '2nd Imp. revised.) 
Cicero: rHiLippics. W. C. A. Ker. {3rd Imp. revised.) 
Cicero : Pro Archia, Post Reditum, De Domo, De Harus- 

picuM Responsis, Pro Plancio. N. H. Watts. (4</» Imp.) 
Cicero : Pro Caecina, Pro Lege Manilia, Pro Cluentio, 

Pro Rabirio. H. Grose Hodge. {Srd Imp.) 
Cicero : Pro Milonk, In Pisonem, Pro Scauro, Pro Fonteio, 

Pro Rabirio Postumo, Pro Marcello, Pro Ligario, Pro 

Rege Deiotaro. N. H. Watts. {2nd Imp.) 
Cicero : Pro Quinctio, Pro Roscio Amerino, Pro Roscio 

CoMOEDO, Contra Rullum. J. H. Freese. {3rd Imp.) 
Cicero : Tusculan Disputations. J. E. King. {4th Imp.) 
Cicero : Verrine Orations. L. H. G. Greenwood. 2 Vole. 

(Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vol. II. 2nd Imp.) 
Claudian. M. Platnauer. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 
Columella : De Re Rustica, De Arboribus. H. B. Ash, 

E. S. Foreter and E. Heffner. 3 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.) 
Curtius, Q. : History of Alexander. J. C. Rolfe. 2 Vols. 

{2nd Imp.) 
Florus. E. S. Forster and Cornelius Nepos. J. C. Rolfe. 

{2nd Imp.) 
Frontinus : Stratagems and Aqueducts. C. E. Bennett and 

M. B. McElwain. (Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vol. II. 2nd Imp.) 
Feonto : Correspondence. C. R. Haines. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 

3rd Imp., Vol. II. 2nd Imp.) 
Gellius. J. C. Rolfe. 3 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vols. II. and 

III. 2nd Imp.) 
Horace : Odes and Erodes. C.E.Bennett. {lAth Imp. revised.) 
Horace : Satires, Epistles, Ars Poetica. H. R. Fairclough. 

{9th Imp. revised.) 
Jerome : Selected Letters. F. A. Wright. (2nd Imp.) 
Juvenal and Persius. G. G. Ramsay. {1th Imp.) 
LivY. B. O. Foster, F. G. Moore, Evan T. Sage, and A. C. 

Schlesinger. 14 Vols. Vols. I.-XIH. (Vol. I. Ath Imp., 

Vols. II., III., v., and IX. 3rd Ivip.; Vols. IV., VI.-VIIL, 

X.-XII. 2nd Imp. revised.) 
Lucan. J. D. Duff. (3rd Imp.) 
Lucretius. W. H. D. Rouse. {Ith Imp. revised.) 
Martial. W. C. A. Ker. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. bth Imp., Vol. II. 

Ath Imp. revised.) 
Minor Latin Poets : from Publilius Syrus to RuriLiua 

Namatianus, including Grattius, Calpurnius Siculus, 

Nemesianus, Avianus, and others with " Aetna " and the 

"Phoenix." J. Wight Duff and Arnold M. Duff. {3rd Imp.) 
Ovid : The Art of Love and Other Poems. J. H. Mozley. 

(3rd Imp.) 
Ovid : Fasti. Sir James G. Frazer. (2nd Imp.) 
Ovid: Heroides and Amores. Grant Showerman. (5th Imp.) 
Ovid : Metamorphoses. F. J. Miller. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. lOlh 

Imp., Vol. II. Sth Imp.) 
Ovid : Tristia and Ex Ponto. A. L. Wheeler. (3rd Imp.) 
2 



Persius. Cf. Juvenal. 

Petronics. M. Heseltine; Seneca Apocolocvnto3I3. 

W. H. D. Rouse. (Hth Imp. revised.) 
Plautus. Paul Nixon. 5 Vols. (Vols. I. and II. 5th Imp., Vol. 

IJl. 3rd Imp., Vols. IV. and V. 2nd Imp.) 
Puny : Letters. Molmotli's Translation revised by W. M. L. 

Hutchinson. 2 Vols, {(ith Imp.) 
Pliny : Natural History. H. Kaekhnm and W. H. S. Jones. 

10 Vols. Vols. l.-V. and IX. H. Kackhain. Vol. VI. 

W. H. S. Jones. (Vols. 1. and il. Srd Imp.. Vols. III. and IV. 

2nd Imp.) 
Propertius. H. E. Butler. (6//j Imp.) 
Prudentiu3. H. J. Thomson. 2 Vols. 
Quintilian. H. E. Butler. 4 Vols, ('ird Imp.) 
Remains of Old Latin. E. H. VVarmington. 4 Vols. Vol. I. 

(Ennius and Caecii.ius. ) Vol. II. (Livius, Naevius, 

Pacuvius, Accius.) Vol. III. (Lucilius and Laws of XII 

Tables.) Vol. IV. {2nd Imp.) (Archaic Inscriptions.) 
Sallust. J. C. Rolfe. {4tk Imp. revised.) 
Scriptores Historiae Augustae. D. Magie. 3 Vols. (Vol. I. 

'ird Imp. revised. Vols. II. and III. 2nd Imp.) 
Seneca : Apocolocyntosis. Cf. Petronius. 
Seneca : Epistulae Morales. R. M. Gummere. 3 Vols. 

(Vol. I. 4lh Imp., Vols. II. and III. 2nd Imp.) 
Seneca : Moral Essays. J. VV. Basore. 3 Vols. (Vol. II. 

3rd Imp., Vols. I. and III. 2nd Imp. revised.) 
Seneca : Tragedies. F. J. Miller. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 'ilh Imp., 

Vol. II. 3rd Imp. revised.) 
SiDONius : Poems and Letters. VV. B. Anderson. 2 Vols. 

(Vol. I. 2nd Imp.) 
SiLius Italicus. J. D. DuS. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp., 

Vol. II. 3rd Imp.) 
Statius. J. H. Mozley. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 
Suetonius. J. C. Rolfe. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 1th Imp., Vol. II. 

6th Imp. revised.) 
Tacitus : Dialogus. Sir \Vm. Peterson. Aoricola and 

Germania. Maurice Hutton. (Gth Imp.) 
Tacitus : Histories and Amnals. C. H. Moore and J. Jack- 
son. 4 Vols. (Vols. 1. and II. 3rd Imp., Vols. III. and IV 

2nd Imp.) 
Terence. John Sargeaunt. 2 Vols. (1th Imp.) 
Tertullian : Apologia and De Spectaculis. T. R. Glover. 

Menucius Felix. G. H. Rendall. (2nd Imp.) 
Valerius Flaccus. J. H. Mozley. (2nd Imp. revised.) 
Varro : De Lingua Latina. R. G. Kent. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp. 

revised.) 
Velleius Paterculus and Res Gestae Divi Auoustl F. VV. 

Shipley. (2nd Imp.) 
Virgil. H. R. Fairclough. 2 Vols. (Vol. L ISi/t /mp.. Vol. XL 

\4th Imp. revised.) 
Vitruvius : De Architectura. F. Granger. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 

3rd Imp., Vol. II. 'Znd Imp.) 

3 



Greek Authors 

AcHfLLES Tatius. S. Gaselee. (2nd Imp.) 

Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus and Onasander. The 

Illinois Greek Club. {2nd Imp.) 
Aeschines. C. D. Adams. {2nd Imp.) 
Aeschylus. H. Weir Smyth. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 6lh Imp., 

Vol. II. 5th Imp.) 
Alciphron, Aelian, Philostratus Letters. A. R. Benner 

and F. H. Fobes. 
Andocides, Antiphon. Cf. Minor Attic Orators. 
Apollodorus. Sir James G. Frazer. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd 

Irnp., Vol. II, 2nd Imp.) 
Apollonius Rhodius. R. C. Beaton. {5th Imp.) 
The Apostolic Fathers. Kirsopp Lake. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 

8th Imp., Vol. II. 6th Imp.) 
Appian : Roman History. Horace White. 4 Vols. (Vol. I. 

4th Imp., Vols. II. and IV. 3rd Imp., Vol. III. 2nd Imp.) 
Aratus. Cf. Callimachus. 
Aristophanes. Benjamin Bickley Rogers. 3 Vols. Verse 

trans. {5t}t Imp.) 
Aristotle : Art of Rhetoric. J. H. Freese. (3rd Imp.) 
Aristotle : Athenian Constitution, Eudemian Ethics, 

Vices and Virtues. H. Rackham. (3rd Imp.) 
Aristotle: Generation of Animals. A. L. Peck. (2nd/mp.) 
Aristotle: Metaphysics. H. Tredennick. 2 Vols. (3rd imp.) 
Aristotle : Meteorologica. H. D. P. Lee. 
Aristotle : Minor Works. W. S. Hett. On Colours, On 

Things Heard, On Physiognomies, On Plants, On Marvellous 

Things Heard, Mechanical Problems, On Indivisible Lines, 

On Situations and Names of Winds, On MeUssus, Xenophanes, 

and Gorgias. (2nd Imp.) 
Aristotle : Nicomachean Ethics. H. Rackham. {6th Imp. 

revised. ) 
Aristotle : Oeconomica and Magna Moralia. G. C. Arm 

strong; (with Metaphysics, Vol. II.). (3rd Imp.) 
Aristotle : On the Heavens. W. K. C. Guthrie. (3rd Imp. 

revised. ) 
Aristotle : On Sophistical Refutations, On Coming to be and 

Passing Away, On the Cosmos. E. S. Forster and D. J. Furley. 
Aristotle : On the Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath. 

W. S. Hett. (2nd Imp. revised.) 
Aristotle : Organon. Categories : On Interpretation : Prior 

Analytics. H. P. Cooke and H. Tredennick. (3rd Imp.) 
Aristotle : Parts of Animals. A. L. Peck ; Motion and 

Progression of Animals. E. S. Forster. '3rd Imp. revised.) 
Aristotle : Physics. Rev. P. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford. 

2 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp., Vol. II. 3rd Imp.) 
Aristotle : Poetics and Longinub. W. Hamilton Fyfe; 

Demetrius on Style. W. Rhys Roberts. {5th Imp. revised.) 
Aristotle : Politics. H. Rackham. {ith Imp. revised.) 
Arisiotui:: Fbobucms. \V. S. Hett. 2 Vols. {2nd Imp revised.) 



Abistotle : Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum (with Peoblkms. 

Vol. II.). H. Rackhara. 
Abrian : History of Alexander and Indica. Rev. E. IlifJe 

Robson. 2 Vols. (Vol. 1. 3rd imp., Vol. 11. 2m/ /wp.) 
Athenaeus : Deipnosophistae. C. B. Gulick. 7 Vols. 

(Vols. 1.. IV.-VII. 2nd Imp.) 
St. Basil: Letters. R. J. Deferrari. 4 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 
Callimachus, Hymns and Epigrams, and Lycophron. A. W. 

Mair; Aratl's. G. R. Mair. (2nd Imp.) 
Clement of Alexandria. Rev. G. VV. Butterwoith. {3rd 

Imp. ) 
Colluthus. Cf. Oppian. 
Daphnis and Chloe. Thornley's Translation revised by 

J. M. Edmonds: and Parthenius. S. Gaselee. {Uh Imp.) 
Demosthenes 1 : Olynthiacs, Philippics and Minor Ora- 
tions. I. -XVII. AND XX. J. H. Vince. (2nd Imp.) 
Demosthenes II : De Corona and De Falsa Leqatione. 

C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince. (3rd Imp. revised.) 
Demosthenes III : Meidias, Androtion, Aristocrates, 

TiMOCRATES and Abistoqeiton, 1. and II. J. H. Vince. 

{2nd Imp.) 
Demosthenes IV-VI : Private Orations and In Neaeram. 

A. T. Murray. (Vol. IV. 2nd Imp.) 
Demosthenes VII : Funeral Speech, Erotic Essay, Exordia 

and Letters. N. W. and N. J. DeWitt. 
Dio Cassius : Roman History. E. Cary. 9 Vols. (Vols. 1. 

and II. 3rd Imp., Vols. III. -IX. 2nd Imp.) 
Dio Chrysostom. J. W. Cohoon and H. Lamar Crosby. 5 Vols. 

(Vols. I.-IV. 2nd Imp.) 
DioDORUs SicuLus. 12 Vols. Vols. I.-VI. C. H. Oldfather. 

Vol. VII. C. L. Sherman. Vols. IX. and X. R. M. Geer. 

(Vols. I.-IV. 2nd Imp.) 
Diogenes Laertius. R. D. Hicks. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 4/A Imp., 

Vol. II. 3rd Imp.) 
DioNYSius OF Halicabnassus : Roman Antiquities. Spel- 

man's translation revised by E. Cary. 7 Vols. (Vols. I.-V. 

2Md Imp.) 
Epictetus. W. a. Oldfather. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 
Euripides. A. S. Way. 4 Vols. (Vols. 1. and II. 7/A Imp., 

III. and IV. 6<A Imp.) Verse trans. 
EusEBius : Ecclesiastical History. Kirsopp Lake and 

J. E. L. Oulton. 2 Vols. (Vol. 1. 3rd /mp., Vol. II. 4<A /mp.) 
Galen : On the Natural Faculties. A. J. Brock, {ith Imp.) 
The Greek Anthology. W. R. Paton. 5 Vols. (Vols. I. and 

II. 5th Imp., Vol. III. ilh Imp., Vols. IV. and V. 3rd Imp.) 
Gbeer Elegy and Iambus with the Anacbeontea. J. iSL 

Edmonds. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vol. II. 2nd Imp.) 
The Greek Bucolic Poets (Theocritus, Bion, Moschus). 

J. M. Edmonds. {1th Imp. revised.) 
Greek Mathematical Works. Ivor Thomas. 2 Vols. {2nd 

Imp.) 
Herodes. Cf. Thecphbastus : Chabactebs. 



Herodotus. A. D. Godley. 4 Vols. (Vols. I.-III. 4<A Imp., 

Vol. IV. 3rd Imp.) 
Hesiod and The Homeric Hymns. H. Q. Evelyn White. 

{1th Imp. reviled and enlarged.) 
Hippocrates and the Fragments of Heeaclkitus. W. H. S. 

Jones and E. T. Witliington. 4 Vols. (3rd Imp.) 
Homer : Iliad. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. {Vol. I. 1th Imp., 

Vol. 11. fiih Imp.) 
Homer : Odvssev. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. {8th Imp.) 
Jsaeus. E. VV. Forster. (2nd Imp.) 

IsocRATES. George Norlin and LaRue Van Hook. 3 Vols. 
St. John Damascene : Barlaam and Ioasaph. Rev. G. R. 

Woodward and Harold Mattingly. (3rd Imp. revised.) 
Joseph us. H. St. J. Thackeray and Ralph Marcus. 9 Vola. 

Vols. I.-VII. (Vol. V. 3rd Imp., Vol-s. I.-IV., VI. and VII. 2nd 

Imp ) 
Julian. Wilmer Cave Wright. 3 Vols. (Vols. I. and IL 3rd 

Imp., Vol. III. 2nd Imp.) 
LuciAN. A. M. Harmon. 8 Vols. Vols. l.-V. (Vols. I. and 

11. 4th Imp., Vol. 111. 3rd Imp., Vols. IV. and V. 2nd Imp.) 
Lycophron. Cf. Callimachus. 
Lyra Graeca. J. M. Edmonds. 3 Vols. (Vol. I. ith Imp., 

Vol. II. revised and enlarged, and III. 3rd Imp.) 
Lysias. W. R. M. Lamb. (2nd Imp.) 
Manetho. VV. G. Waddell : Ptolemy : Tetrabiblo8. F. E. 

Robbins. (2nd Imp.) 
Marcus Aurelius. C. R. Haines. (4(A Imp. revised.) 
Menander. F. G. Allinson. (3rd Imp. revised.) 
Minor Attic Orators (Antiphon, Andocides, Lycurocs, 

Demades, Dinarchus, Hypereides). K. J. Maidment ana 

J. O. Burrt. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.) 
NoNNOS: DiONYSiACA. W. H. D. Rouse. 3 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 
Oppian, Colluthus, Tryphiodorus. A. W. Mair. (2nd Imp.) 
Papyri. Non-Literary Selections. A. S. Hunt and C. C. 

Edgar. 2 Vols. (Vol. 1. 2nd Imp.) Literary Selections. 

Vol. 1. (Poetry). D. L. Page. (3rd Imp.) 
Parthenius. Cf. Daphnis and Chloe. 
Pausanias : Description of Greece. W. H. S. Jones. 6 

Vols, and Companion Vol. arranged by R. E. Wycherley. 

(Vols. 1. and HI. 3rd Imp., Vols. IL, IV. and V. 2nd Imp.) 
Philo. 10 Vols. Vols. I.-V. ; F. H. Colson and Rev. G. H. 

Whitaker. Vols. VI.-IX. ; F. H. Colson. (Vols. II.-III., 

V.-IX. 2nd Imp., Vols. I. and IV.. 3rd Imp.) 
Philo : two supplementary Vols. {Translation only.) Ralph 

Marcus. 
Philostratus : The Life of Apollonids of Tyana. F. C. 

Conybeare. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. ith Imp., Vol. II. 3rd Imp.) 
Philostratus: Imagines; Callistratus : Descriptions. 

A. Fairbanks. 
Philostratus and Eunapius : Lives of thb Sophists. 

Wilmer Cave Wright. (2nd Imp.) 
Pindar. Sir J. E. Sandys. {1th Imp. revised.) 



Plato : Charmides, Alcibiades, Hipparchus, The Lovers, 

Theages, Minos and Epinomis. VV. R. M. Lamb, i'lnd 

Imp.) 
PL4.TO : Cratylus, Parmenides, Greater HrppiAS, Lesser 

HiPPiAS. H. N. Fowler. (-Ith Imp.) 
Plato : Edthyphro, Apoloqy. Crito. Phaedo. Phaedrus. 

H. N. Fowler. (Wth imp.) 
Plato : Laches, Protagoras. Meno, Euthydemus. \V. R. M. 

Lamb. (3rd Ivip. revised.) 
Plato: Laws. Rev. R. G. Bury. 2 Vols. (3rd Imp.) 
Plato : Lysis Symposium, Gorqias. W. R. M. Lamb. {5th 

Imp. revised.) 
Plato : Republic. Paul Shorey. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 5^ Imp., 

Vol. II. :ird Imp.) 
Plato: Statesman, Philebds. H. N. Fowler; Ion. W. R. M. 

Lamb. (4</i hnp.) 
Plato: Theaetetus and Sophist. H. N. Fowler, (ith Imp.) 
Plato : Timaeus. Critias, Clitopho, Menexenus, Epistulae. 

Rev. R. G. Burv. iord Imp.) 
Plutarch: Mobalia. 14 Vols. Vols. l.-V. F. C Babbitt: 

Vol. VI. VV. C. Helmbold : Vol. X. H. N. Fowler. {2nd Imp.) 
Plutarch : The Parallel Lives. B. Perrin. 1 1 Vols. 

(Vols. I.. II., VI., VII., and XI. 3rd Imp. Vols. IIL-V. and 

VIII.-X. 2nd Imp.) 
PoLYBius. W. R. Paton. 6 Vols. {2nd Imp.) 
Pkocopius : History of the Wars. H. B. Dewing. 7 Vols. 

(Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vols. II. -VII. 2nd Imp.) 
Ptolemy : Tetrabiblos. Cf. M.axetho. 

Quintus Smyrnaeus. A. S. Way. Verso trans. (3rd Imp.) 
Sextus Empiricus. Rev. R. G. Bury. 4 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd 

Imp., Vols. II. and III. 2nd Imp.) 
Sophocles. F. Storr. 2 Vols. (Vol. L. lOth Imp. Vol. II. Qth 

Imp.) Verse trans. 
Stbabo : Geography. Horace L. Jones. 8 Vols. (Vols. 1., V., 

and VIII. -Srdlmp., Vols. II.. III., IV., VI., and VII. 2nd Imp.) 
Theophbastus : Characters. J. M. Edmonds. Herodes. 

etc. A. D. Knox. (3rd Imp.) 
Theophrastus : Enquiry into Plants. Sir Arthur Hort, 

Bart. 2 Vols. {2nd Imp.) 
Thucydides. C. F. Smith. 4 Vols. (Vol. I. ith Imp., Vols. 

II., III., and IV. 3rd Imp. revised.) 
Tryphiodorus. Cf. Oppi.^n. 
Xenophon : Cyropaedia. Walter Miller. 2 Vols. (Vol. 1. ith 

Imp., Vol. II. 3rd Imp.) 
Xenophon : Hellenica, Anabasis, Apology, and Symposium. 

C. L. Brownson and O. J. Todd. 3 Vols. (Vols. I. and III. 

3rd Imp., Vol. II. ith Imp.) 
Xenophon : Memorabilia and Oeconomicus. E. C. Marchant. 

(3rd Imp.) 
Xjemofhon : Scripta Minora. E. C Marchant. {2nd Imp. i. 



IN PREPARATION 



Greek Authors 

Akistotle : History of Animals. A. L. Peck. 
Callimachus : Fragments. C. A. Trypanis. 
Plotinus : A. H. Armstrong. 



Latin Authors 

St. Augustine .- City of God. 

Cicero : Pro Sestio, In Vatinium, Pro Caelio, De PROvtNcna 
CoNsuLABiBus, Pro Balbo. J. H. Freese and R. Gardner. 
Phaedrus Ben E. Perry 



DESCRIPTIVE PROSPECTUS OI\ APPLICATION 



London WILLIAM HEINEMA.NN LTD 

Cambridge, Mass. HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 



PA Caesar, C. Julius 
6238 Alexandrian, African and 

B35 Spanish wars 
"1955 



PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE 
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET 

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY