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THE   LOEB   CLASSICAL  LIBRARY 

FOUNDED     BY    JAMES    LOEB,    LL.D. 

EDITED    BY 
fT.    E.    PAGE,    C.H.,    LITT.D. 

tE.  CAPPS,  PH.D.,  LL.D.  fW.  H.  D.  ROUSE,  litt.d. 

L.  A.  POST,  M.A.     E.  H.  WARMINGTON,  m.a.,  f.r.hist.soc. 


CAESAR 

ALEXANDRIAN,   AFRICAN   AND 
SPANISH   WARS 


CAESAR, die? 

ALEXANDRIAN,  AFRICAN 
AND  SPANISH  WARS 

WITH  AN  ENGLISH  TRANSLATION  BY 

A.   G.  WAY,   MA. 

LECTURER  IN  CLASSICS  AT  BIRKBECK  COLLEGE, 
UNIVERSITY  OF  LON*DON 


LONDON 

WILLIAM    HEINEMANN    LTD 

CAMBRIDGE,    MASSACHUSETTS 

HARVARD     UNIVERSITY     PRESS 

MCMLV 


l^^ 


Printed  in  Great  Britain 


2.g,  /%■  ss 


CONTENTS 


GENERAL   INTRODUCTION       . 

CHRONOLOGY      OF      THE      ALEXANDRIAN, 
SPANISH   WARS  .... 


AFRICAN      AND 


THE    ALEXANDRIAN    WAR  : 

INTRODUCTION  ..... 

SUMMARY   OF   NARRATIVE   IN   CIVIL   WARS,    BOOK   lU 
ANALYSIS    OF    THE    BOOK  .... 

TEXT    AND   TRANSLATION         .... 

THE    AFRICAN   WAR  : 

INTRODUCTION     .  ..... 

ANALYSIS    OF   THE    BOOK  .... 

TEXT   AND    TRANSLATION         .... 

THE    SPANISH    WAR  : 

INTRODUCTION      ...... 

ANALYSIS    OF   THE    BOOK  .... 

TEXT   AND    TRANSLATION         .... 

APPENDIX    A  :    THE    OPERATIONS    NEAR    UZITTA 

APPENDIX    B  :     CAESAR'S   WITHDRAWAL   FROM   COBDUBA 

APPENDIX   C  :    THE   BEHAVIOUR   OF  THE  ATEGUAN  ENVOY 
ON   THEIR   RETURN   TO   THE   TOWN      . 

APPENDIX    D  :     THE    EVENTS    AT  ^RSAO 

INDEX    OF   PERSONS    AND    PLACES  : 

ALEXANDRIAN   WAR       ..... 

AFRICAN  WAR   ...... 

SPANISH  WAR   ...... 


PAGE 

vii 


3 

6 

8 

10 

139 
144 
146 

303 
308 
310 

391 

397 

401 
403 

407 

412 

417 

V 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 
GENERAL    SUBJECT    INDEX    ......       420 

MAPS —  Al  end 

1.  PLAN    OF    ALEXANDRIA 

2.  ASIA    AND    THE    EASTERN    MEDITERRANEAN 

3.  AFRICA 

4.  UZITTA 

5.  THAPSUS 

6.  FURTHER    SPAIN    (BAETICA) 


VI 


GENERAL   INTRODUCTION 

The  three  works  contained  in  this  volume,  though 
commonly  ascribed  by  the  MSS.  to  Caesar,  are 
nowadays  generally  regarded  as  of  uncertain  author- 
ship ;  and  though  any  detailed  presentation  of  the 
evidence  would  occupy  too  much  space,  some  brief 
discussion  of  the  pi'oblem  seems  called  for. 

Even  as  early  as  the  beginning  of  the  second  cen- 
tury of  our  era  there  were  doubts  about  their 
authorship  ^  ;  and  certainly  the  unity  of  their  theme 
and  the  fact  that  they  all  three  virtually  formed  a 
continuation  of  the  Civil  Wars  may  easily  account 
for  the  early  tradition  that  Caesar  wTote  them. 

Now  the  stvle  o£  de  Bello  Alexandrino  is,  as  Klotz  ^ 
demonstrated  in  great  detail,  very  similar  to  the  style 
of  the  eighth,  and  last,  book  of  the  Gallic  Wars, 
which  is  very  commonly  attributed  to  Hirtius.  The 
opening  chapter  of  this  eighth  book  contains  the 
following  sentence  ^ : 

'  I  have  tacked  a  supplement  to  the  Com- 
mentaries of  our  great  Caesar  on  the  operations 
in  Gaul  .  .  .  and  his  last  work  {i.e.  the  Civil 
Wars),    which    was    left    unfinished    from    the 

1  Suetonius  :  Life  of  Caesar  (Holland's  Translation)  :  '  For 
of  the  Alexandrine,  African  and  Spanish  Wars,  who  was  the 
writer  it  is  uncertain ;  while  some  think  it  was  Oppius,  others 
Hirtius,  who  also  made  up  and  finished  the  last  of  the  Gallic 
War.' 

2  Cdsarstudien  (1910),  pp.  180-204, 

3  As  translated  by  H.  J.  Edwards  :   Loeb  Classical  Library. 


GENERAL  INTRODUCTION 

operations  at  Alexandria  onwards,  I  have  com- 
pleted as  far  as  the  conclusion,  not  indeed  of 
civil  discord,  of  which  we  see  no  end,  but  of 
Caesar's  life.' 

This  certainly  appears  to  confirm  what  seems  likely 
on  stylistic  grounds,  namely  that,  if  it  was  Hirtius 
who  completed  the  Gallic  Wars,  it  was  Hirtius  also 
who  wrote  de  Bella  Alexandrino,  If  he  did  so,  his 
knowledge  of  the  campaign  was  second-hand ;  for 
later  in  the  same  chapter  he  says : 

For  myself,  I  had  not  the  fortune  ever  to 
take  part  in  the  Alexandrian  and  the  African 
campaign.'  ^ 

Was  he  then  also  the  author  of  de  Bella  Africa  and 
de  Bella  lUspaniensi  ?  His  words — '  as  far  as  the 
conclusion  of  Caesar's  life  '  may  indeed  be  so  inter- 
preted. The  internal  evidence,  however,  seems 
strongly  against  this  theory,  and  suggests,  on  the 
contrary,  that  the  three  works  are  the  independent 
productions  of  three  separate  hands,  none  of  which 
was  Caesar's  own. 

For  anyone  who  reads  the  Latin  text  carefully 
must  surely  be  forcibly  struck  by  certain  idio- 
syncrasies of  style  peculiar  to  one  of  the  books,  but 
not  apparent  in  either  of  the  other  two.  Thus,  to 
cite  but  one  example,  the  author  of  de  Bella  His- 
pa7iie?isi — quite  apart  from  his  quotations  from 
Ennius — constantly   emplovs   the   adverb   bene  as   a 

^  He  goes  on  to  remark  that  these  two  campaigns  are 
partially  known  to  him  from  conversations  with  Caesar; 
and  as  he  may  well  have  had  access  to  Caesar's  note- books,  it 
does  not  seem  impossible  that  he  was  the  author  of  de  Bella 
Alexandrino. 


GENERAL  INTRODUCTION 

mere  intensive  particle,  as  in  the  recurrent  phrase 
bene  magna  pars  ;  while  the  author  of  de  Bello  Africa 
has  a  passion  for  the  word  interim,  and  can  seldom 
think  of  any  alternative  with  which  to  introduce  a  new 
chapter.  Neither  of  these  foibles  is  common  in  the 
other  work,  nor  do  they  occur  to  any  extent  in  de 
Bello  Alexandrino. 

Accordingly,  though  many  scholars  nowadays  are 
disposed  to  accept  Hirtius  as  the  author  of  de  Bello 
Alexandrino,  few  still  contend  that  he  wrote  the  other 
two  works,  at  any  rate  in  the  form  in  which  they  have 
come  down  to  us.  The  claims  of  Asinius  Pollio  and  of 
Sallust  to  the  authorship  of  de  Bello  Africo  have 
each  had  a  brief  vogue.  Possibly,  however,  as  Bouvet 
has  recently  suggested,^  both  the  de  Bello  Africo 
and  de  Bello  Hispaniensi  which  we  possess  are  in 
reality  no  more  than  rough  drafts  prepared  at  the 
request  of  Hii'tius  by  two  separate  soldiers  who 
fought  in  the  respective  campaigns ;  and  had  he 
survived,  Hirtius  would  have  worked  up  this  '  copy  ' 
into  more  effective  literary  form. 

The  manuscripts  on  which  the  text  of  these  three 
works  is  based  are  in  the  main  the  same  as  those 
which  contain  the  Civil  Wars  ;  and  most  of  them  are 
far  inferior  to  those  which  contain  only  the  Gallic 
Wars.     The  most  important  are  : 

Laurentianus  Ashburnhamiensis      x-xi  century    \ 
Lovaniensis  -    .  .  .  .     xi  century 

Mediceus  Laurentianus     .  .      xi-xii  century 

*  Cesar :  La  Guerre  d'Afrique  (1949)  :  Introduction, 
p.  xix.  The  suggestion,  as  Bouvet  points  out,  was  originally 
made  by  Nipperdey. 

-  This  MS.  breaks  off  abruptly  in  chapter  33  of  de  Bello 
Africa. 

ix 


GENERAL  INTRODUCTION 


Ursinianus 
Riccardianus    . 
Thuaneus 
\'indobonensis . 
Neapolitanus    . 


xi-xii  century 
xi-xii  century 
xi  century 
xii  century 
xii-xiii  century 


Their  relations  to  one  another  have  already  been 
discussed  by  Peskett  in  his  Introduction  to  the 
Civil  Wars  in  this  series. 

For  de  Bello  Alexandrino  and  de  Bella  Africa  the 
text  which  these  MSS.  afford  is  reasonably  sound ; 
but  for  de  Bella  Hispuniensi  it  is  far  otherwise.  Rice 
Holmes  was  perhaps  not  overstating  the  case  when 
he  wrote :  ^ 

'  Bellum  Hispaniense  is  the  worst  book  in 
Latin  literature ;  and  its  text  is  the  most 
deplorable.  The  language  is  generally  un- 
grammatical  and  often  unintelligible.  The 
copyists  performed  their  tasks  so  ill  that  in  the 
forty-two  paragraphs  there  are  twenty-one 
gaps  and  six  hundred  corrupt  passages,  which 
Mommsen  and  lesser  men  have  striven  with  an 
industry  worthy  of  a  better  cause  to  restore.' 

In  these  circumstances  the  task  of  producing  a 
readable  translation  has  proved  no  easy  one ;  the 
less  so  since  this  series  allows  little  scope  for  explana- 
tory notes.  Hence,  though  I  have  generally  adhered 
to  the  MS.  reading  wherever  it  seemed  reasonably 
satisfactory,  I  have  not  hesitated  in  many  places  to 
adopt  conjectural  emendations,  so  as  to  produce  as 
continuous  and  intelligible  a  rendering  as  possible. 
The  more  important  departures  from  the  text  I  have 

1  The  Roman  Republic  :  vol  iii,  p.  298. 


GENERAL  INTRODUCTION 

indicated,  with  due  acknowledgements,  in  brief  foot- 
notes below  the  Latin. 

In  view  of  the  independent  character  of  these 
three  military  monographs,  linked  together  though 
they  are  by  a  common  theme,  it  has  seemed  best  to 
give  to  each  a  separate  introduction  of  its  own ; 
and,  in  the  case  of  de  Bella  Alexandrino,  to  include  a 
brief  summary  of  the  concluding  chapters  of  Civil 
Wars,  Book  III,  of  which  it  is  a  continuation.  A 
separate  index  of  personal  and  place  names  con- 
tained in  each  work  has  been  placed  at  the  end  of 
the  book,  followed  by  a  combined  subject  index  and 
six  maps.  Certain  problems  which  are  too  unwieldy 
for  footnotes — mainly  topographical,  sometimes 
controversial — are  discussed  in  four  appendixes. 

Among  various  other  works  and  editions  which 
have  proved  helpful  acknowledgement  is  due  in 
particular  to  Rice  Holmes'  The  Roman  Republic, 
Bouvet's  La  Guerre  d'Afrique  and  Klotz's  Kommentar 
zum  Bellum  Hispaniense.  Unfortunately  the  recent 
edition  in  the  Bude  series — Guerre  d'Alexandrie  by 
J.  Andrieu  (1954) — reached  me  only  when  my  own 
final  proofs  were  being  revised :  hence  only  the 
briefest  references  to  it  have  been  possible. 


CHRONOLOGY  OF  THE  ALEX- 
ANDRIAN, AFRICAN  AND 
SPANISH   WARS 

(The  dates  are  given  according  to  the  official  calendar, 
which,  before  Caesar  reformed  it  in  46  B.C.  by  inserting 
two  intercalary  months  between  November  and  December, 
was  approximately-  two  months  ahead  of  the  solar  reckoning.) 

48  B.C. 

9  August.     Battle  of  Pharsalus  :  Cn.  Pompeius  Magnus  flees 

to  Egj-pt. 
September.     Pompeius  murdered  in  Egjrpt. 
October.     Caesar  reaches  Alexandria. 
October  48 — March  47.     Caesar  engaged  in  operations  in 

and  around  Alexandria. 
December.     Pharnaces  routs  Domitius  Calvinus  at  Nico- 

polis. 

47  B.C. 

March.     Battle  of  the  Nile  :    Caesar  defeats  the  Egyptians. 

27  March.     Enters  Alexandria  in  triumph. 

June.i     Leaves  Alexandria  for  Syria. 

29  July.     Enters  Pontus. 

2  August.     Defeats  Pharnaces  at  Zela. 

September.     Embarks  for  Italy  and  Rome. 

17  December.     Reaches  Lilybaeum  in  Sicily. 

1  The  date  is  entirely  conjectural.  The  average  estimate 
seems  to  be  some  time  in  June  (Holmes,  The  Roman  Republic, 
vol.  Ill,  p.  204  'about  the  7th  of  June'.  Andrieu,  Guerre 
d'Alexnndrie,  p.  83,  'at  the  end  of  June').  But  L.  E.  Lord, 
in  an  article  entitled  The  date  of  J.  Caesar's  departure  from 
Alexandria  (Journal  of  Roman  Studies,  vol.  28,  pp.  19—40), 
argues  in  favour  of  an  earlier  date  and  repudiates  the  later 
traditions  of  Caesar's  dalliance  with  Cleopatra. 


CHRONOLOGY  OF  THE  WARS 

47  B.C. 

25  December.     Embarks  for  Africa. 

28  December.     Disembarks  at  Hadrumetum. 

29  December.     Encamps  at  Ruspina. 

46  B.C. 

26  January.     Leaves  Ruspina  and  moves  to  the  heights  to 
the  East  of  Uzitta. 

26  January — 3  April.     Operations  at  Uzitta  and  Aggar. 

4  April.     Caesar  marches  to  Thapsus  and  begins  to  invest  it, 
6  April.     Battle  of  Thapsus. 

12  April.     Cato  commits  suicide. 

13  June.     Caesar  embarks  at  Utica  for  Sardinia. 
25  July.     Arrives  at  Rome. 

December.     Reaches  Spain. 

December-Januar3\     Operations  at  Corduba.      Caesar  lays 
siege  to  Ategua. 

45  B.C. 

19  February.     Ategua  surrenders  to  Caesar. 

5  March.     Engagement  near  Snricaria. 
17  March.     Battle  of  Munda. 

12  April.     The  head  of  Cn.  Pompeius  brought  to  Hispalis. 
September.     Caesar  returns  to  Rome. 

{Certain  minor  operations — chiefly  those  ichich  are  mentionec 
in  the  Latin  text  out  of  chronological  sequence — are  dated  indt 
vidually  in  the  margin  of  the  translation.) 


THE    ALEXANDRIAN    WAR 


INTRODUCTION 

The  battle  of  Pharsalus,  fought  in  August  48,  was 
a  crushing  defeat  for  the  Pompeians,  but  not  finally 
decisive.  Fifteen  thousand  men  were  said  to  have 
perished :  more  than  twenty-four  thousand  to  have 
been  captured.  Their  field  army  was  indeed 
shattered ;    but  both  leader  and  cause  yet  survived. 

There  were  several  quarters  of  the  Roman  world 
where  resistance  might  be  renewed  successfully  in 
the  name  of  senatorial  government :  the  province 
of  Africa,  where  King  Juba  of  Numidia  was  a 
formidable,  if  exacting,  supporter  of  the  Pompeians, 
and  where,  since  Curio's  defeat  in  the  previous 
year,  Caesar's  prestige  had  ebbed ;  Spain,  where 
Pompey's  name  still  stood  high,  while  Caesar's 
cause  had  suffered  from  the  prolonged  misgovern- 
ment  of  his  deputy,  Q.  Cassius  ;  and.  closer  at  hand, 
Egypt,  an  independent  kingdom  whose  rulers  were 
indebted  to  Pompey  for  past  services  and  so  might  be 
expected  to  succour  him  now. 

But  Egypt — important  to  Rome  as  a  prolific 
source  of  corn — was  now  faced  with  a  constitutional 
crisis.  The  late  king,  Ptolemy  Auletes,  had  been 
expelled  in  58  but  reinstated  three  yeai's  later  by 
Gabinius,  acting  in  the  interests  of  the  triumvirs — 
Caesar,  Pompey  and  Crassus — who  were  still  awaiting 
payment  for  this  service.  An  unofficial  Roman 
army  of  occupation,  comprising  many  soldiers  who 
had  once  served  under  Pompey,  still  remained  in 
the  country.     In  51  Ptolemy  had  died,  bequeathing 


INTRODUCTION 

his  throne  jointly  to  his  elder  son— a  mere  boy — 
and  his  eldest  daughter,  Cleopatra,  and  urging  the 
Senate  in  his  will  to  ensure  that  its  terms  were 
faithfully  observed.  Nevertheless,  Cleopatra  had 
been  driven  out  by  the  young  king's  regents,  only 
to  raise  an  army  in  Syria,  return  at  its  head,  and 
confront  her  brother  at  Pelusium. 

In  such  a  situation  Pompey's  arrival  was  hardly 
opportune.  To  the  young  king's  unscrupulous 
regents,  menaced  as  they  were  by  Cleopatra  and 
her  adherents,  his  motives  were  obscure.  Had  he 
in  mind  to  win  over  the  Roman  occupation  troops 
and  conquer  the  country  ?  And  anyway,  was  not 
Caesar's  cause  now  for  them  the  better  risk  ?  Thus 
possibly  they  argued :  and,  untroubled  by  scruples, 
accordingly  contrived  his  murder,  the  treacherous 
character  of  which  shocked  the  whole  world  and 
gave  to  Pompey  the  status  of  a  martvr. 

Three  days  later  Caesar  arrived  to  find  his  fore- 
most rival  thus  destroyed.  But  others  remained : 
prompt  action  was  advisable  both  in  Asia,  whither 
Domitius  had  already  been  despatched,  and  in 
Africa,  to  crush  the  remnants  of  his  opponents. 
However,  the  seasonal  winds  off  Alexandria  pre- 
vented any  immediate  departure ;  and  he  might 
utilise  the  interval  by  settling  the  dispute  over  the 
royal  succession  and  collecting  the  monevs  long 
owing  to  the  triumvirs.  But  if  he  argued  thus  he 
failed  to  take  into  account  two  factors  :  first,  the 
natural  feelings  of  the  Egyptians  and  the  resent- 
ment they  might  show  at  his  official  interference  in 
their  domestic  affairs ;  and  secondly,  the  charms  of 
Cleopatra.  Of  these  two  important  factors  the  former 
is  duly  mentioned  by  Caesar  himself,  whereas  the 


INTRODUCTION 

latter  is  studiously  glossed  over  in  de  Bella  Alexandrino. 
Yet  what  other  reason  can  account  for  Caesar's 
strange  inaction  between  March,  when  he  made  him- 
self master  of  Alexandria  and  Egypt,  and  June,  when 
at  last  he  left  for  Syria  to  conduct  a  whirlwind  cam- 
paign against  Pharnaces  ?  Where  later  writers  ^  shed 
a  lurid  light,  Hirtius  observes  a  discreet  silence. 

In  literary  merit  de  Bella  Alexandrina,  though  in 
general  a  plain  and  somewhat  pedestrian  tale,  is 
the  best  of  the  three  works.  If  it  never  soars  to 
the  heights,  it  never  sinks  to  the  depths  of  de  Bella 
Hispaniensi.  The  subject  matter  is  well  arranged, 
and  Caesar's  victory  at  Zela  provides  an  eifective 
climax.  The  facts  presented  seem  reasonably 
accurate  and  undistorted  by  party  bias.^  The  style 
is  neither  so  terse  nor  so  lively  as  Caesar's ;  but  it  is 
neat,  free  from  affectations,  and  above  all  clear. 
Though  the  narrative  tends  sometimes  to  monotony, 
yet  the  author  is  not  without  a  sense  of  the  dramatic 
and  is  at  pains  on  occasion  to  work  up  the  reader's 
interest  before  a  climax.^  Nor  is  he  a  mere  pur- 
veyor of  facts  :  though  there  are  very  few  speeches 
he  not  infrequently  speculates  on  motives.  His 
tendency  in  this  respect  is  to  suggest  alternatives 
from  which  the  reader  may  make  his  own  choice  ;  * 
and  where  he  does  commit  himself,  his  judgment 
does  not  always  ring  true.^ 

^  e.g.  Suetonius  :  Life  of  Julius  Caesar,  ch.  52. 

*  At  any  rate  he  does  not  appear  in  chapters  21  and  40  to 
underestimate  Caesarian  losses. 

^  e.g.  cha])ter  1(5.  *  e.g.  chapters  43  and  63. 

^  e.g.  cliapter  24,  where  he  suggests  that  Caesar's  motive 
in  releasing  the  young  king  was  merely  to  enhance  his  own 
prestige,  and  makes  no  attempt  to  reconcile  this  attitude 
with  the  earlier  policy  described  in  Civil  Wars  III,  ch.  109. 


SUMMARY   OF   THE   NARRATIVE 
IN   CIVIL   WARS 

BOOK  III 

CHAPTER 

103  Pompeius  arrives  at  Pelusium  with  2,000  armed  men. 

Here  the  young  king  Ptolemaeus  is  waging  war  with 
his  sister,  Cleopatra,  whom  he  has  expelled  a  few 
months  before.  Pompeius  sends  messengers  to  the  king 
begging  him  to  shelter  him  in  return  for  the  services 
which  Pompeius  had  once  rendered  the  late  king. 

104  The  young  king's  regents  give  the  messengers  a  fair 

reply  but  secretly  plot  to  murder  Pompeius.  Achillas, 
the  king's  prefect,  and  Septimius,  a  military  tribune, 
assassinate  him  as  he  comes  ashore  in  a  small  boat. 

106  Caesar  arrives  at  Alexandria  with  two  legions  (3,200 

men)  and  SOU  cavalry,  and  with  ten  warships  from 
Rhodes  and  a  few  from  Asia.  He  hears  of  the  death 
of  Pompeius  and  lands  with  the  fasces  borne  in  front 
of  him.  The  Alexandrians  take  affront  at  this, 
asserting  that  the  royal  authority  is  being  infringed. 
Frequent  riots  take  place  on  the  following  days  and 
several  of  Caesar's  soldiers  are  killed. 

107  Caesar  sends  to  Asia  for  further  legions  levied  from 

Pompeian  troops ;  for  the  Etesian  winds  prevent  his 
sailing  away  from  Alexandria.  He  decides  that  the 
quarrel  between  Ptolemaeus  and  Cleopatra  must  be 
composed  and  requests  them  both  to  disband  their 
armies  and  settle  their  differences  by  legal  means. 

108  Pothinus,  the  chief  regent,  is  indignant  at  his  inter- 

ference, secretly  summons  the  king's  armj'  to 
Alexandria,  and  puts  Achillas  in  command  of  it. 
The  late  king  in  his  will  has  named  as  his  heirs  the 
elder  of  his  two  sons  and  the  elder  of  his  two  daughters, 
with  an  appeal  to  the  Roman  people  to  carry  out  its 
provisions. 


SUMMARY   OF   THE   CIVIL  WARS 

CHAPTER 

109  Caesar  learns  of  the  approach  of  the  king's  army  under 

Achillas  and  decides  to  remain  on  the  defensive  in 
the  town,  as  his  forces  are  insufiicient  for  a  pitched 
battle.  Two  envoys  sent  by  the  king  to  Achillas  are 
arrested,  and  one  is  killed.  Caesar  now  brings  the 
king  under  his  own  control. 

110  Achillas  has  an  army  of  20,000  men — mainly  Roman 

ex-soldiers  from  the  army  of  Gabinius  who  had  made 
their  homes  in  Egypt — as  well  as  exiles  and  fugitive 
slaves.  This  motley  army  is  a  power  in  the  land  and 
exercises  great  political  sway. 

111  Achillas  now  tries  to  occupy  all  Alexandria  which  is  not 

already  in  Caesar's  possession.  In  a  fierce  battle 
fought  at  the  harbour  Caesar  is  forced  to  burn  the 
Alexandrian  fleet,  so  as  to  deny  the  enemy  its  use. 

112  Caesar  lands   troops   on   the   island   of  Pharos,   which 

controls  the  passage  into  the  main  harbour,  and  seizes 
and  garrisons  it,  thereby  securing  the  transport  by 
sea  of  provisions  and  reinforcements.  Fighting 
elsewhere  in  the  town  is  indecisive.  He  cordons  off 
strategic  points  and  strengthens  his  defences  by  night, 
occupying  parts  of  the  palace  with  the  theatre 
adjoining  it,  and  thus  gaining  access  to  the  port  and 
docks.  Arsinoe,  the  younger  princess,  joins  Achillas 
and  bids  against  him  for  the  favour  of  the  troops. 
Pothinus  is  executed  by  Caesar  when  some  of  his 
messengers,  sent  to  encourage  Achillas  in  his  resistance, 
are  captured. 

This  is  the  beginning  of  the  Alexandrian  war. 

{The  reason  for  including  the  above  summary  has  been  stated  in 
the  General  Introduction,  p.  zi.) 


ANALYSIS   OF   THE   BOOK 


1-33     Operations  at  Alexandria  and  elsewhere  in  Egypt 

Description  of  Alexandria — Caesar's  policy  to 
isolate  his  sector  of  the  town  and  secure  plentiful 
supplies — ingenious  dispositions  of  the  enemy — 
their  fear  of  Egypt's  becoming  a  Roman  province. 
Arsinoe  kills  Achillas  and  entrusts  her  army  to 
Ganymedes.  The  latter  contaminates  Caesar's 
water  supply — panic  in  Caesar's  army — Caesar's 
counter  measures.  Arrival  of  the  Thirty-Seventh 
legion.  Naval  action  near  Chersonensus— the 
enemy  equip  a  new  fleet — naval  action  in  the 
harbour — -gallantry  of  the  Rhodian  squadron. 
Further  attack  on  Pharos,  and  on  the  mole  and  its 
second  bridge — Caesar  narrowly  escapes  drowning. 
He  sends  the  king  back  to  his  people  Naval  action 
off  Canopus — death  of  Euphranor.  Arrival  at 
Pelusium  of  Mithridates  with  reinforcements  from 
Syria  and  Cilicia — battle  in  the  Delta — Caesar 
relieves  Mithridates.  Situation  of  the  king's 
camp — Caesar  foils  his  attempt  at  an  ambush  and 
proceeds  to  storm  his  camp.  Defeat  of  the  king 
and  his  forces — the  king  is  drowned — Caesar  re- 
enters Alexandria  in  triumph — submission  of  the 
inhabitants.  Caesar  settles  the  royal  succession. 
34-41     Operations  in  the  East 

Domitius  Calvinus,  the  governor  of  Asia,  learns 
that  Pharnaces  has  over-run  Lesser  Armenia  and 
Cappadocia — he  assembles  a  force  at  Comana  and 
sets  out  for  Armenia.  He  approaches  NicopoUs 
and  receives  an  urgent  request  from  Caesar  for 
fresh  reinforcements.  Battle  of  Nicopolis — gallant 
conduct  of  the  Thirty-Sixth  legion — defeat  and 
withdrawal  of  Domitius.  Tyrannous  behaviour 
of  Pharnaces  in  Pontus. 


ANALYSIS   OF  THE   BOOK 

CHAPTERS 

42-47     Operations  in  Illyricum 

yuccess  of  the  cautious  policy  of  Q.  Cornificius — 
he  captures  Octavius'  fleet.  Gabinius  arrives  in 
the  province  during  the  winter  and  sustains  many 
reverses — is  defeated  while  withdrawing  on  Salona 
and  dies  soon  afterwards.  Vatinius  raises  a 
scratch  fleet  at  Brundisium  and  pursues  Octavius — 
naval  action  off  the  island  of  Tauris — defeat  of 
Octavius. 

48-64     Operations  in  Further  Spain 

Unpopularity  of  the  governor,  Q.  Cassius 
Longinus — -his  efforts  to  win  the  affection  of  his 
troops — his  extortions  to  finance  his  briberies. 
Caesar  orders  him  to  bring  an  armj^  across  to 
Africa.  Attempt  on  his  life  at  Corduba — his 
treatment  of  the  ringleaders  of  this  abortive  plot. 
Mutiny  of  some  of  his  legions  while  marching  to 
the  Straits — Marcellus  is  adopted  as  their  leader. 
Cassius  withdraws  to  Ulia  where  Marcellus  follows 
him.  King  Bogud  arrives  in  support  of  Cassius. 
Lepidus  arrives  from  Hither  Spain  to  compose  the 
quarrel — Cassius  is  allowed  to  withdraw  unmolested 
■ — he  embarks  at  Malaca  but  is  drowned  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Ebro. 

65-78     Caesar  personally  conducts  operations  in  the  East 

He  arrives  in  Syria  and  learns  of  the  unrest  at 
Rome — ^decides  he  must  first  settle  affairs  in  the 
East  before  returning  to  the  city.  He  arrives  in 
Cilicia — passes  through  Cappadocia — reaches 
Comana.  He  pardons  king  Deiotarus  and  then 
arrives  in  Pontus.  Pharnaces  makes  evasive 
overtures — they  are  refused.  Description  of  Zela — 
the  tactics  of  the  battle — total  defeat  of  Pharnaces. 
Caesar  returns  through  Gallograecia  and  Bithynia 
to  Asia — details  of  his  settlement,  of  disputed 
territories — his  arrival  in  Italy. 


DE    BELLO    ALEXANDRINO 

1  Bello  Alexandrino  conflato  Caesar  Rhodo  atque 
ex  Syria  Ciliciaque  omneni  classem  arcessit ;  Creta 
sagittarios,  equites  ab  rege  Nabataeorum  Malcho 
evocat ;  tormenta  undique  conquiri  et  frumentum 
mitti,  auxilia  adduci  iubet.  Interim  munitiones 
eotidie  operibus  augentur  atque  omnes  oppidi 
partes,  quae  minus  esse  firmae  videntur,  testudinibus 
ae  musculis  aptantur ;  ^  ex  aedificiis  autem  per 
foramina  in  proxima  aedificia  arietes  immittuntur, 
quantumque  aut  ruinis  deicitur  aut  per  vim  recipitur 
loci,  in  tantum  munitiones  proferuntur.  Nam 
incendio  fere  tuta  est  Alexandrea,  quod  sine  contig- 
natione  ae  materia  sunt  aedificia  et  structuris  ac 
fornicibus  continentur  tectaque  sunt  rudere  aut 
pavimentis.  Caesar  maxime  studebat  ut,  quam 
angustissimam  partem  oppidi  palus  a  meridie 
interiecta  efficiebat,  banc  operibus  vineisque  agendis 
ab  reliqua  parte  urbis  excluderet,  illud  spectans 
primum  ut,  cum  in  duas  partis  esset  urbis  divisa  aeies, 
uno  consilio  atque  imperio  administraretur,  deinde  ut 
laborantibus  succurri  atque  ex  altera  oppidi  parte 

^  So  3ISS.  :    temptantur  Nipperdey,  perhaps  rightly. 


^  A  people  of  Arabia  Petraea. 

*  This  seems  to  be  the  meaning  oi  pavimentum  here  :   else- 
where it  is  used  only  of  floors. 

lO 


THE    ALEXANDRIAN    WAR 

1  When  the  Alexandrian  war  flared  up,  Caesar  sum- 
moned every  fleet  from  Rhodes  and  Syria  and  Cilicia  ; 
from  Crete  he  raised  archers,  and  cavahy  from 
Malchus,  king  of  the  Nabataeans,^  and  ordered 
artillery  to  be  procured,  corn  despatched,  and 
auxiliary  troops  mustered  from  every  quarter. 
Meanwhile  the  entrenchments  were  daily  extended 
by  additional  works,  and  all  those  sectors  of  the 
town  which  appeared  to  be  not  strong  enough  were 
provided  with  shelters  and  mantlets :  battering- 
rams,  moreover,  were  introduced  from  one  building 
into  the  next  through  holes,  and  the  entrench- 
ments were  extended  to  cover  all  the  ground  laid 
bai*e  by  demolitions  or  gained  by  force  of  arms. 
For  Alexandria  is  well-nigh  fire-proof,  because 
its  buildings  contain  no  wooden  joineiy  and  are 
held  together  by  an  arched  construction  and  are 
roofed  with  rough-cast  or  tiling. ^  Caesar  was 
particularly  anxious  that,  by  bringing  to  bear  his 
siege-works  and  pent-houses,  he  should  isolate 
from  the  rest  of  the  city  that  narrowest  part  of  the 
town  which  was  most  constricted  by  the  barrier 
of  marshland  Iving  to  the  south  :  his  object  being 
first  that,  since  his  army  Mas  divided  between  two 
sectors  of  the  city,  it  should  be  controlled  by  a  single 
strategy  and  command ;  secondly,  that  if  they  got 
into  difficulties  in  one  sector  of  the  town,  assistance 

II 


CAESAR 

auxilium  ferri  posset,  in  primis  vero  ut  aqua  pabuloque 
abundaret,  quarum  alterius  rei  copiam  exiguam, 
alterius  nullam  omnino  facultatem  habebat ;  quod 
utrumque  large  palus  praebcre  poterat. 
2  Neque  vero  Alexandrinis  in  gerendis  negotiis 
cunctatio  ulla  aut  mora  inferebatur.  Nam  in  omnis 
partis,  per  quas  fines  Aegypti  regnumque  pertinet, 
legatos  conquisitoresque  dilectus  habendi  causa 
miserant  magnumque  numerum  in  oppidum  telorum 
atque  tormentorum  convexerant  et  innumerabilem 
multitudinem  adduxerant.  Nee  minus  in  urbe 
maximae  armorum  erant  institutae  officinae.  Servos 
praeterea  puberes  armaverant ;  quibus  domini 
locupletiores  victum  cotidianum  stipendiumque 
praebebant.  Hac  multitudine  disposita  munitiones 
semotarum  partium  tuebantur ;  veteranas  cohortis 
vacuas  in  celeberrimis  urbis  locis  habebant,  ut 
quacumque  regione  pugnaretur  integris  viribus  ad 
auxiliuni  ferendum  opponi  possent.  Omnibus  viis 
atque  angiportis  triplicem  vallum  obduxerant — erat 
autem  quadrato  exstructus  saxo  neque  minus  XL 
pedes  altitudinis  habebat — quaeque  partes  urbis 
inferiores  erant,  has  altissimis  turribus  denorum 
tabulatorum  munierant.  Praeterea  alias  ambula- 
torias  totidem  tabulatorum  confixerant  subieetisque 
eas  rotis  funibus  iumentisque  obiectis  dereetis 
plateis  in  quamcumque  erat  visum  partem  move- 
bant. 

^  A  much  disputed  passage.  I  assume  that  Caesar  already 
occupied  two  separate  sectors  of  the  city  south  of  Cape 
Lochias,  and  these  he  now  intended  to  join  up  into  one  by 
securing  the  ground  immediately  to  the  south,  adjoining  the 
marshy  depression. 

-  Or  possibly  '  along  the  straight  streets.' 


THE   ALEXANDRIAN   WAR 

and  support  could  be  brought  from  the  other  sector. ^ 
But  above  all  his  object  was  to  secure  himself 
abundance  of  water  and  fodder;  of  which,  as  regards 
the  former,  he  had  but  a  scanty  supply,  and,  as 
regards  the  latter,  no  stocks  whatever ;  and  the  marsh- 
land could  afford  him  bountiful  supplies  of  both. 

Not  indeed  that  this  occasioned  any  hesitation  or 
delay  on  the  part  of  the  Alexandrians  in  concerting 
their  measures.  They  had  in  fact  despatched 
emissaries  and  recruiting  officers  throughout  the 
entire  length  and  breadth  of  the  territory  and 
kingdom  of  Egypt  for  the  purpose  of  holding  a  levy, 
and  had  conveyed  into  the  town  a  large  quantity  of 
weapons  and  artillery  and  mustered  a  countless 
host.  In  the  city  too,  no  less,  vast  arms  factories 
had  been  established.  They  had,  moreover,  armed 
the  adult  slaves,  and  these  the  Avealthier  owners 
furnished  with  their  daily  food  and  pay.  This 
numerous  force  they  deployed  to  guard  the  fortifica- 
tions of  outlying  areas ;  while  they  kept  their 
veteran  cohorts  unemployed  in  the  most  frequented 
(juarters  of  the  city  so  that,  no  matter  in  what 
district  fighting  occurred,  they  could  be  thrown  in 
as  fresh  and  lusty  reinforcements.  All  the  streets 
and  alleys  were  walled  off  bv  a  triple  barricade, 
built  of  rectangular  stone  blocks  and  not  less  than 
forty  feet  high  ;  while  as  for  the  lower  quarters  of 
the  city,  these  were  fortified  with  very  lofty  towers, 
each  ten  stories  high.  Besides  these  there  were  other 
towers  which  they  had  contrived — mobile  ones  of 
the  like  number  of  stories  ;  and  these,  being  mounted 
on  wheels  with  ropes  and  draught  animals  attached, 
they  moved  along  the  level  ^  streets  to  any  area  they 
saw  fit. 

13 


CAESAR 

3  Urbs  fertilissima  et  copiosissima  omnium  rerum 
apparatus  suggerebat.  Ipsi  homines  ingeniosi  atque 
acutissimi  quae  a  nobis  fieri  viderant  ea  sollertia 
efficiebant  ut  nostri  illorum  opera  imitati  viderentur, 
et  sua  sponte  multa  reperiebant  unoque  tempore  et 
nostras  munitiones  infestabant  et  suas  defendebant. 
Atque  haec  principes  in  consiliis  contionibusque 
agitabant :  populum  Romanum  paulatim  in  consuetu- 
dinem  eius  regni  occupandi  venire.  Faucis  annis 
ante  A.  Gabinium  cum  exercitu  fuisse  in  Aegypto ; 
Pompeium  se  ex  fuga  eodem  recepisse ;  Caesarem 
venisse  cum  copiis,  neque  morte  Pompei  quicquam 
profectum  quo  minus  apud  se  Caesar  commoraretur. 
Quem  si  non  expulissent,  futuram  ex  regno  pro- 
vinciam ;  idque  agendum  mature :  namque  eum 
Interclusum  tempestatibus  propter  anni  tenipus 
recipere  transmarina  auxilia  non  posse. 

4  Interim  dissensione  orta  inter  Achillan,  qui 
veterano  exercitui  praeerat,  et  Arsinoen,  regis 
Ptolomaei  minorem  filiam,  ut  supra  demonstratum 
est,  cum  uterque  utrique  insidiaretur  et  summam 
imperi  ipse  obtinere  vellet,  praeoccupat  Arsinoe  per 
Ganvmeden  eunuchum,  nutricium  suum,  atque 
Achillan  interficit.  Hoc  occiso  sine  ullo  socio  et 
custode  ipsa  omne  imperium  obtinebat ;  exercitus 
Ganymedi  traditur.     Is  suscepto  officio  largitionem 


^  A  supporter  of  Pompeius  who  in  55  B.C.,  as  governor  of 
Syria,  restored  Ptolemy  Auletes  to  the  throne  of  Egypt. 
See  ch.  43  below  for  his  death  in  Illyricum. 

-  Presumably  a  reference  to  Civil  Wars  III,  ch.  112. 

^  Though  in  the  Latin  text  I  have  retained  the  unfamiliar 
spelling  given  by  all  the  MSS.,  in  translation  I  have  adopted 
the  more  common  form. 

14 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

Highly  productive  and  abundantly  supplied  as  it 
was,  the  city  furnished  equipment  of  all  kinds.  The 
people  themselves  were  clever  and  very  shrewd,  and 
no  sooner  had  they  seen  what  was  being  done  by  us 
than  they  would  reproduce  it  with  such  cunning 
that  it  seemed  it  was  our  men  who  had  copied  their 
works.  Much  also  they  invented  on  their  own 
account,  and  kept  assailing  our  entrenchments  while 
simultaneously  defending  their  own.  In  their 
councils  and  public  meetings  the  arguments  which 
their  leaders  kept  driving  home  were  as  follows  :  '  the 
Roman  people  were  gradually  acquiring  a  habit  of 
seizing  that  kingdom ;  a  few  years  earlier  Aulus 
Gabinius  ^  had  been  in  Egypt  with  an  army ; 
Pompeius  too  had  resorted  thither  in  his  flight ; 
Caesar  had  now  come  with  his  forces,  and  the  death 
of  Pompeius  had  had  no  effect  in  dissuading  Caesar 
from  staying  on  among  them.  If  they  failed  to  drive 
him  out,  their  kingdom  would  become  a  Roman 
province  :  and  this  driving  out  they  must  do  betimes  ; 
for  cut  off  as  he  now  was  by  storms  owing  to  the 
season  of  the  year,  he  could  not  receive  reinforce- 
ments from  overseas.' 

Meanwhile  a  quarrel  had  arisen — as  related  above  ^ 
— between  Achillas,  who  commanded  the  veteran 
army,  and  Arsinoe,  the  younger  daughter  of  king 
Ptolemaeus  ; '  and  with  each  party  plotting  against 
the  other  and  anxious  to  obtain  the  supreme  power 
for  himself,  Arsinoe,  acting  through  the  eunuch 
Ganymedes,  her  tutor,  struck  the  first  blow  and 
killed  Achillas.  After  his  murder  she  herself  exer- 
cised complete  control  without  any  consort  or 
guardian,  while  the  army  was  entrusted  to  Gany- 
medes.    On   undertaking   this   duty   the   latter  in- 

15 


CAESAR 

in  militem  auget;    reliqua   pari  diligentia  adminis- 
trat. 

5  Alexandrea  est  fere  tota  suffossa  specusque  habet  a 
Nilo  pertinentis,  quibus  aqua  in  privatas  domos 
inducitur,  quae  paulatim  spatio  temporis  liquescit  ac 
subsidit.  Hac  uti  domini  aedificiorum  atque  eorum 
familiae  consuerunt :  nam  quae  flumine  Nilo  fertur 
adeo  est  limosa  ac  turbida  ut  multos  variosque 
morbos  efficiat ;  sed  ea  plebes  ac  multitudo  contenta 
est  necessario,  quod  fons  urbe  tota  nullus  est.  Hoc 
tamen  flumen  in  ea  parte  erat  urbis  quae  ab  Alexan- 
drinis  tenebatur.  Quo  facto  est  admonitus  Gany- 
medes  posse  nostros  aqua  intercludi ;  qui  distributi 
munitionum  tuendarum  causa  vicatim  ex  privatis 
aedificiis  specubus  ac  puteis  extracta  aqua  utebantur. 

6  Hoc  probato  consilio  magnum  ac  difficile  opus 
aggreditur.  Intersaeptis  enim  specubus  atque  omni- 
bus urbis  partibus  exclusis  quae  ab  ipso  tenebantur, 
aquae  magnam  vim  ex  mari  rotis  ac  machinationibus 
exprimere  contendit :  banc  locis  superioribus  fundere 
in  partem  Caesaris  non  intermittebat.  Quam  ob 
causam  salsior  paulo  praeter  consuetudinem  aqua 
trahebatur  ex  proximis  aedificiis  magnamque  homini- 
bus  admirationem  praebebat,  quam  ob  rem  id 
accidisset ;  nee  satis  sibi  ipsi  credebant,  cum  se 
inferiores  eiusdem  generis  ac  saporis  aqua  dicerent 

1  This  is  generally  taken  to  be  the  Canal  (see  map). 

i6 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

creased  the  soldiers'  bounty  and  performed  the  rest 
of  his  functions  with  consistent  thoroughness. 

Practically  the  whole  of  Alexandria  is  undermined 
with  subterranean  conduits  running  from  the  Nile,  by 
which  water  is  conducted  into  private  houses  ;  which 
water  in  course  of  time  gradually  settles  down  and 
becomes  clear.  This  is  what  is  normally  used  by  the 
owners  of  mansions  and  their  households ;  for  what 
the  Nile  brings  down  is  so  muddy  and  turbid  that  it 
gives  rise  to  many  different  diseases :  yet  the  rank 
and  file  of  the  common  sort  are  perforce  content  \nth 
the  latter,  inasmuch  as  there  is  not  one  natural 
spring  in  the  whole  city.  The  main  stream  in 
question,^  however,  was  in  that  quarter  of  the  city 
which  was  held  by  the  Alexandrians.  This  circum- 
stance suggested  to  Ganymedes  the  possibility  that 
the  water  supply  could  be  cut  off  from  our  troops ; 
who,  posted  as  they  were  in  various  quarters  of  the 
town  to  guard  our  entrenchments,  were  using  water 
drawn  from  conduits  and  cisterns  in  private  buildings. 

This  plan  being  once  approved,  Ganymedes  em- 
barked upon  a  serious  and  difficult  task.  Having 
first  blocked  up  the  conduits  and  sealed  off  all 
quarters  of  the  city  occupied  by  himself,  he  then 
made  haste  to  draw  off  a  vast  quantity  of  water  out 
of  the  sea  by  means  of  mechanical  water-wheels ; 
and  this  he  steadily  poured  from  higher  ground 
into  Caesar's  area.  For  which  reason  the  water 
drawn  from  the  nearest  buildings  was  a  little  more 
brackish  than  usual,  and  occasioned  no  little  wonder 
among  men  as  to  why  this  had  come  about.  Nor 
could  they  quite  believe  the  evidence  of  their  own 
ears  when  their  neighbours  lower  down  said  that  the 
water  they  were  using  was  of  the  same  kind  and 

17 


CAESAR 

iiti  atque  ante  consuessent,  vulgoque  inter  se  con- 
ferebant  et  degustando  quantum  inter  se  differrent 
aquae  cognoscebant.  Parvo  vero  temporis  spatio 
haec  propior  bibi  omnino  non  poterat,  ilia  inferior 
corruptior  iam  salsiorqiie  reperiebatur. 

Quo  facto  dubitatione  sublata  tantus  incessit  timor 
ut  ad  extremum  periculi  omnes  deducti  viderentur 
atque  alii  morari  Caesarem  dicerent  quin  navis 
conscendere  iuberet,^  alii  multo  gravius  '  ex- 
timescerent,  quod  neque  celari  Alexandrini  possent 
in  apparanda  fuga,  cum  tam  parvo  spatio  distarent  ab 
ipsis,  neque  illis  imminentibus  atque  insequentibus 
ullus  in  navis  receptus  daretur.  Erat  autem  magna 
multitudo  oppidanorum  in  parte  Caesaris,  quam 
domiciliis  ipsorum  non  moverat,  quod  ea  se  fidelem 
palam  nostris  esse  simulabat  et  descivisse  a  suis 
videbatur  :  at  mihi  si  ^  defendendi  essent  Alexandrini 
neque  fallaces  esse  ^  neque  temerarii,  multa  oratio 
frustra  absumeretur ;  cum  vero  uno  tempore  et 
natio  eorum  et  natura  cognoscatur,  aptissimum  esse 
hoc  genus  ad  proditionem  dubitare  nemo  potest. 

Caesar  suorum  timorem  consolatione  et  ratione 
minuebat.  Nam  puteis  fossis  aquam  dulcem  reperiri 
posse  adfirmabat :  omnia  enim  litora  naturaliter 
aquae    dulcis    venas    habere.     Quod    si    alia    esset 

^  The  MSS.  are  divided  between  iuberent  and  iuberet. 
2  ut  mihi  MSS. :    at  mihi  si  Madvig. 
^  essent  MSS. :   esse  Nipperdey. 

i8 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

taste  as  they  had  previously  been  accustomed  to ; 
and  they  were  openly  discussing  the  matter  amongst 
themselves  and,  by  tasting  samples,  learning  how 
markedly  the  waters  differed.  However,  in  a  short 
space  of  time  the  water  nearer  the  contamination 
was  entirely  undrinkable,  while  that  lower  down  was 
found  to  be  relatively  impure  and  brackish. 

7  This  circumstance  dispelled  their  doubts,  and  so 
great  was  the  panic  that  took  hold  upon  them  that  it 
seemed  that  they  were  all  reduced  to  a  most 
hazardous  plight,  and  some  asserted  that  Caesar 
was  being  slow  in  giving  orders  to  embark.  Others 
were  much  more  seriously  alarmed,  on  the  ground 
that,  in  making  their  preparations  for  a  withdrawal, 
it  was  impossible  to  keep  the  Alexandrians  in  the 
dai-k,  being  as  they  were  so  short  a  distance  away 
from  them ;  and  with  their  foes  on  top  of  them 
and  pursuing  them,  no  chance  was  afforded  them 
of  retreating  to  their  ships.  There  was,  however, 
a  large  number  of  townsfolk  in  Caesar's  sector, 
whom  Caesar  had  not  evacuated  from  their  homes, 
because  they  openly  affected  loyalty  to  our  side  and 
appeared  to  have  deserted  their  own  folk.  Yet, 
as  far  as  I  am  concerned,  had  I  now  the  task  of 
championing  the  Alexandrians  and  proving  them  to 
be  neither  deceitful  nor  foolhardy,  it  would  be  a 
case  of  many  words  spent  to  no  purpose  :  indeed 
M-hen  one  gets  to  know  both  the  breed  and  its 
breeding  there  can  be  no  doubt  whatever  that  as  a 
race  they  are  extremely  prone  to  treachery. 

8  By  encouragement  and  reasoning  Caesar  allayed 
his  men's  alai-m,  declaring  that  sweet  water  could  be 
found  in  wells  and  trenches,  inasmuch  as  all  sea- 
shores   naturally   possessed    veins    of  sweet    water. 

19 


CAESAR 

litoris  Acgypti  natiira  atque  omnium  reliquorum, 
tamen,  quoniam  mare  libere  tenerent,  neque  hostes 
classem  haberent,  prohiberi  sese  non  posse  quo 
minus  cotidie  navibus  aquam  peterent  vel  a  sinistra 
parte  a  Paratonio  vel  a  dextra  ab  insula,  quae 
diversae  navigationes  numquam  uno  tempore  adver- 
sis  ventis  praecluderentur.  Fugae  vero  nullum  esse 
consilium  non  solum  eis  qui  primam  dignitatem 
haberent,  sed  ne  eis  quidem  qui  nihil  praeterquam 
de  vita  cogitarent.  Magno  negotio  impetus  hostium 
adversos  ex  munitionibus  sustinere ;  quibus  relictis 
nee  loco  nee  numero  pares  esse  posse.  Magnam 
autem  moram  et  difficultatem  ascensum  in  navis 
habere,  praesertim  ex  scaphis  ;  summam  esse  contra 
in  Alexandrinis  velocitatem  locorumque  et  aedificio- 
rum  notitiam.  Hos  praecipue  in  victoria  insolentis 
praecursuros  et  loca  excelsiora  atque  aedificia  occupa- 
turos :  ita  fuga  navibusque  nostros  prohibituros. 
Proinde  eius  consili  obliviscerentur  atque  omni 
ratione  esse  vincendum  cogitarent. 
•  Hac  oratione  apud  suos  habita  atque  omnium 
mentibus  excitatis  dat  centurionibus  negotium  ut 
reliquis  operibus  intermissis  ad  fodiendos  puteos 
animum  conferant  neve  quam  partem  nocturni 
temporis  intermittant.  Quo  suscepto  negotio  atque 
omnium    animis    ad    laborem    incitatis    magna    una 

^  The  places  referred  to  are  much  disputed  and  have  not 
been  marked  on  Map  2.  Strabo  mentions  a  Uapairoviov, 
but  it  lay  some  130  miles  W.  of  Alexandria — too  far,  it  seems, 
to  be  intended  here.  As  for  the  island.  Pharos  itself  hardly 
lay  on  their  right :  perhaps  either  the  Delta  is  intended  or 
some  otherwise  unknown  island  near  Canopus. 
20 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

But  if  the  nature  of  the  sea-shore  of  Egypt  was 
different  from  all  others,  none  the  less,  since  they 
held  unfettered  command  of  the  sea,  while  their 
enemies  had  no  fleet,  they  could  not  be  prevented 
from  seeking  water  daily  in  their  ships,  either  from 
Paratonium  on  their  left,  or  the  island  on  their 
right  ^ — voyages  which,  being  in  opposite  directions, 
would  never  be  prevented  by  contrary  winds  at  one 
and  the  same  time.  As  for  retreating,  there  was 
no  sound  policy  in  that,  not  merely  for  those  who 
held  the  chief  responsibility,  but  not  even  for  those 
whose  sole  concern  was  for  their  own  lives.  They 
were  hard  put  to  it  to  contain  the  enemies'  frontal 
attacks  from  their  entrenchments :  once  abandon 
those  and  they  could  be  no  match  for  them  either 
in  vantage  ground  or  numbers.  Moreover,  boarding 
ships,  especially  from  pinnaces,  involved  considerable 
delay  and  difficulty ;  while  set  against  this  the 
Alexandrians  had  the  greatest  mobility  and  know- 
ledge of  the  ground  and  buildings.  These  people 
above  all,  overweening  as  they  became  in  victory, 
would  dash  ahead  and  seize  the  higher  ground  and 
the  buildings  and  thus  prevent  our  men  from 
retreating  and  gaining  their  ships.  Accordingly, 
they  should  put  that  policy  out  of  their  minds  and 
reflect  that,  at  all  costs,  they  must  win  the 
day. 
9  Having  harangued  his  men  to  this  effect  and  put 
fresh  heart  into  them  all,  he  briefed  his  centurions  as 
follows :  they  were  to  interrupt  their  other  tasks 
and  turn  their  attention  to  digging  wells,  continuing 
without  any  cessation  all  through  the  night.  Where- 
upon, the  business  being  once  undertaken  with 
unanimous  enthusiasm  for  the  task,  in  the  coui'se  of 


CAESAR 

nocte  vis  aquae  dulcis  inventa  est.  Ita  operosis 
Alexandrinorum  machinationibus  maximisque  cona- 
tihus  non  longi  temporis  labore  occursum  est.  Eo 
biduo  legio  XXX\'II.  ex  dediticiis  Pompeianis 
militibus  cum  frumento,  armis,  telis,  torrnentis 
imposita  in  navis  a  Domitio  Calvino  ad  litora  Africae 
paulo  supra  Alexandream  delata  est.  Hae  naves 
Euro,  qui  multos  dies  continenter  flabat,  portum 
capere  prohibebantur ;  sed  loca  sunt  egregia  ornni 
ilia  regione  ad  tenendas  ancoras.  Hi  cum  diu 
retinerentur  atque  aquae  inopia  premerentur,  navigio 
actuario  Caesarem  faciunt  certiorem. 
10  Caesar,  ut  per  se  consilium  caperet  quid  faciendum 
videretur,  navem  conscendit  atque  omnem  classem 
se  sequi  iussit  nuUis  nostris  militibus  impositis,  quod, 
cum  longius  paulo  discederet,  munitiones  nudare 
nolebat.  Cumque  ad  eum  locum  accessissent,  qui 
appellatur  Chersonensus,  aquandique  causa  remiges 
in  terram  exposuissent,  non  nulli  ex  eo  numero, 
cum  longius  a  navibus  praedatum  processissent,  ab 
equitibus  hostium  sunt  excepti.  Ex  his  cognoverunt 
Caesarem  ipsum  in  classe  venisse  nee  ullos  milites  in 
navibus  habere.  Qua  re  comperta  magnam  sibi 
facultatem  fortunam  obtulisse  bene  gerendae  rei 
crediderunt.  Itaque  navis  omnis  quas  paratas 
habuerant  ad  navigandum  propugnatoribus  in- 
struxerunt  Caesarique  redeunti  cum  classe  occur- 
rerunt.     Qui    duabus    de    causis    eo    die    dimicare 


1  Identified  by  some  with  a  promontory  about  8  miles  W. 
of  Alexandria. 


THEyALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

that  one  night  a  great  quantity  of  sweet  water  was 
discovered.  Thus  the  laborious  machinations  and 
supreme  efforts  of  the  Alexandrians  were  countered 
by  a  few  hours'  work.  In  the  course  of  the  following 
day  the  Thirty-Seventh  legion,  part  of  the  surren- 
dered remnants  of  Pompeius'  troops,  after  being  em- 
barked by  Domitius  Calvinus  with  corn,  arms, 
weapons  and  artillery,  made  the  coast  of  Africa  a 
little  beyond  Alexandria.  An  East  wind,  which 
blew  continuously  for  many  days,  prevented  this 
fleet  from  gaining  harbour ;  but  the  ground  through- 
out all  that  area  gives  excellent  hold  for  anchoi'S. 
And  as  they  were  weather-bound  for  a  long  time, 
and  hard  put  to  it  for  lack  of  water,  they  infoi-med 
Caesar  by  means  of  a  fast  boat. 

In  order  to  take  some  personal  decision  as  to  what 
he  thought  ought  to  be  done,  Caesar  boai-ded  a  ship 
and  ordered  his  whole  fleet  to  follow  him.  He  did 
not  embark  any  of  our  troops,  since,  as  he  was  going 
somewhat  too  far  afield,  he  was  loth  to  leave  our 
entrenchments  unmanned.  On  their  arriving  at  that 
place  which  is  called  Chersonensus,^  and  putting  the 
rowers  ashore  to  fetch  water,  some  of  their  number, 
bent  on  plunder,  advanced  rather  too  far  from  the 
ships  and  were  picked  up  bv  enemy  cavalry.  Prom 
them  the  enemy  learned  that  Caesar  himself  had 
arrived  with  his  fleet,  without  any  troops  on  board. 
This  intelligence  prompted  the  belief  among  them 
that  fortune  had  put  in  their  way  a  great  opportunity 
for  scoring  a  success.  Accordingly,  they  manned 
with  combat  troops  all  the  ships  they  had  got  in 
readiness  for  sailing,  and  encountered  Caesar  as  he 
was  returning  with  his  fleet.  Now  there  were  two 
reasons  why  Caesar  Was  loth  to  fight  an  action  that 


CAESAR 

nolebat,  quod  et  nullos  milites  in  navibus  habebat  et 
post  horam  X.  diei  res  agebatur,  nox  autem  allatura 
videbatur  maiorem  fiduciam  illis,  qui  locorum  notitia 
confidebant ;  sibi  etiam  hortandi  sues  auxilium 
defuturum,  quod  nulla  satis  idonea  esset  hortatio 
quae  neque  virtutem  posset  notare  neque  inertiam. 
Quibus  de  causis  navis  quas  potuit  Caesar  ad  terram 
detrahit,  quern  in  locum  illos  successuros  non 
existimabat. 
11  Erat  una  navis  Rhodia  in  dextro  Caesaris  cornu 
longe  ab  reliquis  colloeata.  Hanc  eonspicati  hostes 
non  tenuerunt  sese,  magnoque  impetu  I II I  ad  eana 
constratae  naves  et  complures  apertae  contenderunt. 
Cui  coactus  est  Caesar  ferre  subsidium,  ne  turpem  in 
conspectu  hostium  contumeliam  acciperet,  quam- 
quam,  si  quid  gravius  illis  accidisset,  merito  casurum 
iudicabat.  Proelium  commissuni  est  magna  con- 
tentione  Rhodiorum ;  qui  cum  in  omnibus  dimica- 
tionibus  et  scientia  et  virtute  praestitissent,  turn 
maxime  illo  tempore  totum  onus  sustinere  non 
recusabant,  ne  quod  suorum  culpa  detrimentum 
acceptum  videretur.  Ita  proelium  secundissimum 
est  factum.  Capta  est  una  hostium  quadriremis, 
depressa  est  altera,  duae  omnibus  epibatis  nudatae ; 
magna  praeterea  multitudo  in  reliquis  navibus  pro- 
pugnatorum  est  interfecta.  Quod  nisi  nox  proelium 
diremisset,  tota  classe  hostium  Caesar  potitus  esset. 
Hac   calamitate   perterritis   hostibus   advei-so   vento 

24 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

day :  he  had  no  troops  on  board ;  and  it  was  now 
after  the  tenth  hour  as  the  matter  now  stood,  and  on 
the  other  hand  nightfall  would,  he  thought,  inspire 
greater  confidence  in  the  enemy,  who  were  relying 
on  their  local  knowledge.  In  his  own  case,  also,  he 
would  be  denied  the  advantage  of  encouraging  his 
men,  since  no  encouragement  was  quite  to  the 
point  where  it  was  impossible  to  single  out  for  com- 
ment either  bravery  or  slackness.  For  these  reasons 
Caesar  withdrew  to  land  what  ships  he  could,  at  a 
point  where  he  supposed  that  the  enemy  would  not 
follow  them. 

There  was  one  Rhodian  ship  on  Caesar's  right  wing 
stationed  far  apart  from  the  rest.  As  soon  as  the 
enemy  caught  sight  of  it  they  could  not  restrain 
themselves,  and  four  decked  ships  and  several  open 
ones  dashed  madly  towards  it.  This  vessel  Caesar 
was  obliged  to  succour,  to  prevent  the  disgrace  of 
sustaining  rough  treatment  in  full  view  of  the 
enemy ;  though,  if  any  serious  mischance  should 
overtake  its  crew,  he  reckoned  they  would  deserve  it. 
Battle  was  joined,  with  hard  fighting  on  the  part  of 
the  Rhodians ;  and  though  in  every  fray  they  had 
excelled  both  in  seamanship  and  valour,  on  this 
present  occasion  above  all  they  bore  the  whole  brunt 
unflinchingly,  lest  it  should  seem  their  fault  if  any 
defeat  were  sustained.  And  so  a  highly  successful 
action  was  fought.  One  enemy  quadrireme  was 
captured,  a  second  was  sunk,  and  two  stripped  of  all 
their  marines  ;  in  addition,  a  large  number  of  combat 
troops  was  killed  aboard  the  other  vessels.  If  night 
had  not  put  an  end  to  the  action,  Caesar  would  have 
become  master  of  the  entire  enemy  fleet.  This 
catastrophe    utterly    demoralised    the    enemy,    and 

25 


CAESAR 

leniter  flante  navis  onerarias  Caesar  remulco  victri- 
cibus  suis  navibus  Alexandream  deducit. 
12  Ko  detriniento  adeo  sunt  fracti  Alexandrini,  cum 
iam  non  vii-tute  propugnatorum,  sed  scientia 
classiariorum  se  victos  viderent,  ut  vix  ex  aedificiis 
defendi  posse  se  confiderent,  quibus  et  superioribus 
locis  sublevabantur,^  et  materiam  cunctam  obicerent, 
quod  nostrae  classis  oppugnationem  etiam  ad  terram 
verebantur.  Idem,  postea  quam  Ganymedes  in 
concilio  confirmavit  sese  et  eas  quae  essent  amissae 
restituturum  et  numerum  adaucturum,  magna  spe  et 
fiducia  veteres  reficere  navis  accuratiusque  huic  rei 
studere  atque  inservire  instituerunt.  Ac  tametsi 
amplius  CX  navibus  longis  in  portu  navalibusque 
amiserant,  non  tamen  reparandae  classis  cogita- 
tionem  deposuerunt.  Videbant  enim  non  auxilia 
Caesari,  non  commeatus  supportari  posse,  si  classe 
ipsi  valerent ;  praeterea  nautici  homines  urbis  et 
regionis  maritimae  cotidianoque  usu  a  pueris  exerci- 
tati  ad  naturale  ac  domesticum  bonum  refugere 
cupiebant  et  quantum  parvulis  navigiis  profecissent 
sentiebant ;  itaque  omni  studio  ad  parandam  classem 
incubuerunt. 

^  This  clause  is  faulty  as  it  stands  in  the  MSS.,  which  read — ■ 
quibus  et  superioribus  locis  sublevabantur,  ut  ex  aedificiis 
defendi  possent.     /  have  adopted  Dinter's  conjecture, 

^  The  contrast  here  appears  to  lie  between  combat  crews 
(propugnatores,  practically  synonymous  perhaps  with  the 
Greek  term  epibatae),  whose  function  was  that  of  marines, 
and  navigating  crews  (classiarii  =  fleet  personnel,  sailors, 
as  distinct  from  marines).  Caesar  had  no  marines  on  board, 
whereas  the  Alexandrians  had ;  so  that,  though  Caesar  doubt- 
less improvised  boarding  parties  from  such  sailors  as  could 
be  spared,  he  had  to  rely  mainly  upon  superior  seamanship 
to  ram  or  cripple  his  opponents'  ships. 

26 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

Caesar  returned  to  Alexandria  with  his  victorious 
fleet,  towing  the  merchant-ships  against  a  gentle 
head  wind. 

So  shattered  were  the  Alexandrians  by  this 
reverse — for  they  saw  that  now  it  was  not  the  bravery 
of  combat  troops  but  the  seamanship  of  sailors  that 
had  caused  their  defeat  ^ — that  they  scarcely  trusted 
their  ability  to  defend  themselves  from  the  buildings, 
fi-om  which,  as  well  as  from  their  higher  positions, 
they  derived  support,^  and  used  all  their  timber  in 
building  barricades,  fearing  as  they  did  that  our  fleet 
would  attack  them  even  ashore.  Nevertheless,  after 
Ganymedes  had  declared  in  the  council  that  he  would 
not  only  make  good  the  losses  they  had  sustained  but 
also  increase  the  number  of  their  ships,  their  hopes 
and  confidence  ran  high  and  they  began  to  repair 
their  old  ships  and  to  devote  greater  care  and  more 
earnest  attention  to  this  matter.  And  though  they 
had  lost  more  than  a  hundred  and  ten  warships  in  the 
harbour  and  docks,^  yet  they  did  not  abandon  the 
idea  of  re-equipping  their  fleet.  They  saw  in  fact 
that  neither  troop  reinforcements  nor  supplies  could 
be  conveyed  to  Caesar  if  they  themselves  had  a  strong 
fleet ;  apart  from  which,  the  men  of  the  city  and  the 
coastal  district,  seamen  as  they  were  and  trained  as 
such  from  boyhood  by  daily  practice,  were  anxious  to 
resort  to  this  their  natural  and  native  gift,  and  were 
aware  how  successful  they  had  been  with  their  humble 
little  vessels.  Consequently  they  threw  themselves 
whole-heartedly  into  the  task  of  equipping  a  fleet. 

2  Or  perhaps  ut  superioribus  locis  should  be  read,  the  sense 
being  '  which,  as  being  more  elevated  sites,  had  proved  their 
mainstay.' 

^  Tliese  losses  are  briefly  alluded  to  in  Civil  Wars  III, 
ch.  111. 

27 


CAESAR 

13  Erant  omnibus  ostiis  Nili  custodiae  exigendi  por- 
torii  causa  dispositae  ;  naves  veteres  erant  in  occultis 
regiae  navalibus,  quibus  multis  annis  ad  navigandum 
non  erant  usi :  has  refieiebant,  illas  Alexandream 
revocabant.  Deerant  remi :  porticus,  gymnasia, 
publica  aedificia  detegebant,  asseres  remorum  usum 
obtinebant ;  aliud  naturalis  sollertia,  aliud  urbis 
copia  sumministrabat.  Postremo  non  longam 
navigationem  parabant,  sed  praesentis  temporis 
necessitati  serviebant  et  in  ipso  portu  confligendum 
videbant.  Itaque  paucis  diebus  contra  omnium 
opinionem  quadriremis  XXII,  quinqueremis  V  con- 
fecerunt ;  ad  has  minores  apertasque  compluris 
adiecerunt  et  in  portu  periclitati  remigio  quid  quae- 
que  earum  efficere  posset  idoneos  milites  imposuerunt 
seque  ad  confligendum  omnibus  rebus  paraverunt. 
Caesar  Rliodias  navis  Villi  habebat — nam  decem 
missis  una  in  cursu  litore  Aegyptio  defecerat — , 
Ponticas  Vlll,  Lycias  ^  V,  ex  Asia  XII.  Ex  his  erant 
quinqueren^es  et  quadriremes  decem,  reliquae  infra 
banc  magnitudinem  et  pleraeque  apertae.  Tamen 
virtute  militum  confisus  cognitis  hostium  copiis  se  ad 
dimicandum  parabat. 
14  Postquam  eo  ventum  est  ut  sibi  uterque  eorum 
confideret,     Caesar     Pharon     classe     circumvehitur 

1  Lycias  or  licias  MSS. :  <Syrias  .  .  .  Ci>  licias  Schneider. 

1  This  is  somewhat  difficult  to  reconcile  with  chapter  1, 
where  Syria  and  Cilicia,  as  well  as  Rhodes,  are  specifically 
mentioned,  and  with  the  statement  in  Civil  Wars  III,  ch.  106, 
where  it  is  said  that  Caesar  arrived  at  Alexandria  with  ten 
warships  from  Rhodes  and  a  few  from  Asia.  Could  the 
missing  Rhodian  galley  be  after  all  the  one  described  in 
chapter  11?  Even  so,  unless  the  requisition  for  additional 
Rhodian  ships  had  not  so  far  been  complied  with,  the  figure 

28 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

There  were  guardships  posted  at  all  the  mouths  of 
the  Nile  to  levy  customs  dues,  and  in  secret  royal 
dockyards  there  were  old  ships  which  had  not  seen 
service  afloat  for  many  years.  These  last  they 
proceeded  to  repair,  while  the  guardships  they  re- 
called to  Alexandria.  There  w'as  a  shortage  of 
oars :  the  roofs  of  colonnades,  gymnasia  and  public 
buildings  were  dismantled,  and  their  beams  made  to 
serve  as  oars.  In  one  ease  it  was  natural  ingenuity 
that  helped  to  bridge  the  gap,  in  another  the  city's 
resources.  In  fine  it  was  no  lengthy  voyaging  for 
which  they  were  preparing ;  but  perceiving  that  the 
conflict  must  take  place  in  the  harbour  itself  they 
obeyed  the  dictates  of  the  moment.  In  a  few  days, 
therefore,  they  sui-prised  everyone  by  completing 
22  quadriremes  and  5  quinqueremes,  to  which  they 
added  a  considerable  number  of  smaller,  open  craft ; 
and  then,  after  trying  out  in  the  harbour  by  rowing 
what  each  of  them  could  do,  they  manned  them  with 
suitable  troops  and  prepared  themselves  at  all  points 
for  the  conflict.  Caesar  had  9  Rhodian  ships  (10  had 
been  sent,  but  one  had  been  lost  during  a  voyage, 
on  the  coast  of  Egypt),  8  Pontic,  5  Lvcian  and 
12  from  Asia.^  These  included  10  quinqueremes  and 
quadriremes,  while  the  rest  were  smaller  craft  and 
most  of  them  un-decked.  None  the  less,  though 
informed  of  the  enemies'  forces,  Caesar  proceeded 
with  his  preparations  for  an  action,  confident  in  the 
valour  of  his  troops. 

Now  that  the  stage  was  reached  when  each  side 
was    self-confident,    Caesar    sailed    round    Pharos  ^ 

of  9  remains  a  difficulty.      The  total  of  34  tallies  with  the 
dispositions  in  ch.  14,  below. 

^  i.e.  from  the  Great  Harbour  to  the  Eunostos  Harbour. 

29 


CAESAR 

advcrsasque  navis  hostibus  constituit :  in  dextro 
cornu  Ilhodias  coUocat,  in  sinistro  Ponticas.  Inter 
has  spatium  CCCC  passuum  relinquit,  quod  satis 
esse  ad  explicandas  navis  videbatur.  Post  hunc 
ordinem  reliquas  navis  subsidio  distribuit ;  quae 
quamque  earum  sequatur  et  cui  subveniat  constituit 
atque  imperat.  Non  dubitanter  Alexandrini  classem 
producunt  atque  instruunt :  in  fronte  collocant 
XXII,  reliquas  subsidiarias  in  secundo  ordine  consti- 
tuunt.  Magnum  praeterea  numerum  minorum 
navigioruni  et  scapharum  producunt  cum  malleolis 
ignibusque,  si  quid  ipsa  multitudo  et  clamor  et 
flamma  nostris  terroris  adferre  possent.  Erant  inter 
duas  classis  vada  transitu  angusto,  quae  pertinent 
ad  regionem  Africae — sic  enim  praedicant,  partem 
esse  Alexandreae  dimidiam  Africae — satisque  diu 
inter  ipsos  est  exspectatum  ab  utris  transeundi 
fieret  initium,  propterea  quod  ei  qui  intrassent  et 
ad  explicandam  classem  et  ad  receptum,  si  durior 
accidisset  casus,  impeditiores  fore  videbantur. 
15  Rhodiis  navibus  praeerat  Euphranor,  animi  magni- 
tudine  ac  virtute  magis  cum  nostris  hominibus  quam 
cum  Graecis  comparandus.  Hie  ob  notissimam 
scientiam  atque  animi  magnitudinem  delectus  est 
ab  Rhodiis  qui  imperium  classis  obtineret.  Qui  ubi 
cessare  ^  Caesarem  animum  advertit,  '  Mderis  mihi,' 
inquit,  '  Caesar,  vereri,  si  haec  vada  primis  navibus 

1  Caesaris  MSS.  :   cessare  Caesarem  Hoffmann. 
30 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

with  his  fleet  and  drew  up  his  ships  facing  the  enemy. 
On  his  right  wing  he  posted  the  Rhodian  ships,  on 
his  left  the  Pontic  ones,  leaving  a  gap  of  400  paces 
between  them — a  distance  which  he  regarded  as 
adequate  for  deploying  his  vessels.  Behind  this 
line  he  arranged  his  remaining  ships  in  reserve, 
deciding  which  should  follow  each  of  the  former 
vessels  and  which  ship  each  should  support,  and 
giving  orders  accordingly.  Nor  were  the  Alexan- 
drians hesitant  to  bring  up  and  array  their  fleet ; 
posting  22  ships  in  front,  and  the  remainder  in  a 
second  line  in  reserve.  Besides  these  they  brought 
up  a  large  number  of  smaller  craft  and  pinnaces, 
equipped  with  incendiary  missiles  and  combustibles, 
in  the  hope  that  sheer  numbers  and  the  shouts  and 
flames  might  have  some  effect  in  intimidating  our 
men.  Between  the  two  fleets  lay  shoals  with  a 
narrow  intersecting  channel  (these  shoals  belong 
to  the  region  of  Africa — in  fact  they  say  that  half 
Alexandria  is  part  of  Africa) ;  and  for  quite  a  long 
time  there  was  a  pause  among  the  actual  combatants 
as  they  waited  to  see  which  side  was  to  begin  the 
passage,  inasmuch  as  it  seemed  that  those  who 
once  entered  the  channel  would  be  more  restricted 
both  in  deploying  their  fleet  and,  if  things  fared 
badly,  in  withdrawing. 

The  commander  of  the  Rhodian  squadron  was 
Euphranor,  a  man  M'ho  in  point  of  personality  and 
bravery  deserved  comparison  with  our  people  rather 
than  with  the  Greeks.  Thanks  to  the  great  fame 
which  his  professional  skill  and  forceful  personality 
enjoyed,  the  Rhodians  chose  him  to  command  their 
fleet.  When  he  perceived  Caesar's  hesitation,  he 
said :    '  It  seems  to  me,  Caesar,  that  you  are  afraid 

31 


CAESAR 

intiaris,  ne  prius  dirnicare  cogaris  quam  reliquam 
classem  potueris  explicare.  Nobis  rem  committe : 
nos  proelium  sustinebimus — neque  tuum  iudicium 
fallemus — dum  reliqui  subsequantur.  Hos  quidem 
diutius  in  nostro  conspectu  gloriari  magno  nobis  et 
dedecori  et  dolori  est.'  Caesar  ilium  adhortatus 
atque  omnibus  laudibus  prosecutus  dat  signum 
pugnae.  Progressas  ultra  vadum  III  I  Rhodias  navis 
circumsistunt  Alexandrini  atque  in  eas  impetum 
faciunt.  Sustinent  illi  atque  arte  sollertiaque  se 
explicant ;  ac  tantum  doctrina  potuit  ut  in  dispari 
numero  nulla  transversa  hosti  obiceretur,  nullius 
remi  detergerentur,  sed  semper  venientibus  adversae 
occurrerent.  Interim  sunt  reliquae  subsecutae. 
Turn  necessario  discessum  ab  arte  est  propter 
angustias  loci,  atque  omne  certamen  in  virtute 
constitit.  Neque  vero  Alexandreae  fuit  quisquam 
aut  nostrorum  aut  oppidanorum,  qui  aut  in  opere  aut 
in  pugna  occupatum  animum  haberent,  quin  altissima 
tecta  peteret  atque  ex  omni  prospectu  locum  specta- 
culo  caperet  precibusque  et  votis  victoriam  suis  ab 
dis  immortalibus  exposceret. 
Ifi  Minime  autem  par  erat  proeli  certamen.  Nostris 
enim  pulsis  neque  terra  neque  mari  effugium  dabatur 
victis,  omniaque  victoribus  erant  futura  in  incerto ; 
cum  illi.  si  superassent  navibus,  omnia  tenerent,  si 
inferiores  fuissent,  reliquam  tamen  fortunam  peri- 

32 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

that,  if  you  once  sail  into  these  shoals  with  your 
leading  flotilla,  you  may  be  forced  to  fight  before 
you  can  deploy  the  rest  of  your  fleet.  Leave  it  to  us  : 
we  shall  bear  the  brunt  of  the  fighting — we  won't  let 
vou  down — until  the  others  can  come  up  with  us. 
Certainly  for  these  fellows  to  go  on  boasting  yonder 
in  our  sight  is  a  sore  disgrace  and  mortification  to  us.' 
Caesar  offered  him  encouragement  and  paid  him 
every  tribute  of  praise,  and  then  gave  the  signal  for 
battle.  Four  Rhodian  ships  advanced  beyond  the 
shoals  to  be  at  once  surrounded  and  attacked  by  the 
Alexandrians.  The  Rhodians  bore  up  and  by  skill 
and  dexterity  deployed  their  line ;  and  of  such 
powerful  effect  was  their  training  that  despite  the 
odds  not  one  of  them  exposed  its  broadside  to  the 
enemy,  not  one  had  its  oars  swept  away,  but  they 
always  met  the  oncoming  foe  head-on.  Mean- 
while the  remaining  ships  came  up  with  them.  Then 
through  lack  of  sea  room  skill  had  perforce  to  be 
sacrificed  and  the  whole  struggle  devolved  on  courage. 
And  indeed  there  was  not  one  man  in  Alexandria, 
either  of  our  troops  or  of  the  to\\'nsfolk,  whose 
attention  was  bespoken  with  either  work  or  fighting, 
but  he  made  for  the  loftiest  roof-tops  and  from  out 
of  all  the  vantage  points  chose  one  from  which  to  view 
that  spectacle,  and  besought  the  immortal  gods  with 
prayers  and  vows  to  grant  victory  to  his  side. 

The  issues  involved  in  the  struggle  were  by  no 
means  equal.  On  our  side  no  chance  of  escape  either 
by  land  or  sea  was  presented  in  the  event  of  repulse 
and  defeat,  while  victory  would  in  no  way  settle  the 
question ;  whereas  in  their  case,  if  their  fleet  should 
gain  the  upper  hand,  they  would  hold  all  the  cards, 
while  if  they  were  beaten,  it  would  still  be  left  to 

33 


CAESAR 

clitarentur.  Sirnul  illud  grave  ac  miserum  videbatur, 
perpaucos  de  sumnia  rerum  ac  de  salute  omnium 
decertare ;  quorum  si  qui  aut  animo  aut  virtute 
cessisset,  reliquis  etiam  esset  cavendum,  quibus  pro 
se  pugnandi  facultas  non  fuisset.  Haec  superioribus 
diebus  saepenumero  Caesar  suis  exposuerat,  ut  hoc 
maiore  animo  contenderent,  quod  omnium  salutem 
sibi  commendatam  viderent.  Eadem  suum  quisque 
contubernalem,  amicum,  notum  prosequens  erat 
obtestatus,  ne  suam  atque  omnium  falleret 
opinionem,  quorum  iudicio  delectus  ad  pugnam  pro- 
ficisceretur,  Itaque  hoc  animo  est  decertatum,  ut 
neque  maritimis  nauticisque  sollertia  atque  ars 
praesidium  ferret,  neque  numero  navium  praestanti- 
bus  multitudo  prodesset,  neque  electi  ad  virtutem  e 
tanta  multitudine  viri  virtuti  nostrorum  possent 
adaequare.  Capitur  hoc  proelio  quinqueremis  una 
et  biremis  cum  defensoribus  remigibusque,  et 
deprimuntur  tres,  nostris  incolumibus  omnibus. 
Reliquae  propinquam  fugam  ad  oppidum  capiunt ; 
quas  protexerunt  ex  molibus  atque  aedificiis  im- 
minentibus  et  nostros  adire  propius  prohibuerunt. 
17  Hoc  ne  sibi  saepius  accidere  posset,  omni  ratione 
Caesar  contendendum  existimavit  ut  insulam  molem- 

34 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

them  to  try  their  luck  again.  At  the  same  time  it 
seemed  a  grievous  shame  that  the  supreme  issue  and 
the  salvation  of  all  should  be  decided  by  the  rival 
exertions  of  so  few  ;  and  if  any  one  of  these  wavered 
in  purpose  or  courage,  the  others  too,  who  had  had 
no  chance  of  fighting  to  defend  themselves,  would 
have  to  look  out  for  themselves.  These  considera- 
tions Caesar  had  repeatedly  explained  to  his  men  in 
recent  days,  that  they  might  fight  with  the  greater 
resolution  because  they  saw  that  the  safety  of  all  was 
entrusted  to  themselves.  It  was  by  these  same  argu- 
ments too  that  every  man,  as  he  escorted  his  mess- 
mate, friend  or  acquaintance,  implored  him  not  to 
prove  false  to  the  estimate  which  not  only  he  himself 
had  formed  of  him,  but  all  those  others  likewise,  to 
whose  decision  he  owed  it  that  he  was  now  going  forth 
as  one  of  the  chosen  combatants.  Consequently 
such  was  the  resolute  spirit  with  which  the  battle 
was  contested  that  the  Alexandrians,  albeit  a  mari- 
time and  seafaring  folk,  derived  no  assistance  from 
their  dexterity  and  skill,  nor  did  they  benefit  from 
their  superiority  in  number  of  ships,  nor  could  their 
men,  though  chosen  for  their  bravery  from  so  vast  a 
multitude,  match  the  bravery  of  our  men.  In  this 
battle  one  quinquereme  and  a  bireme  were  captured 
with  their  combat  crews  and  rowers,  and  three  were 
sunk,  all  our  ships  being  unharmed.  The  rest  of 
their  ships  fled  to  the  nearby  town,  where  the  towns- 
men, from  stations  on  the  moles  and  adjacent 
buildings,  protected  them  and  prevented  our  men 
from  approaching  at  all  close. 

To  prevent  the  possibility  of  this  kind  of  thing 
occurring  to  him  too  frequently,  Caesar  thought  that 
he  ought  at  all  costs  to  make  an  effort  to  gain  control 

35 


CAESAR 

que  ad  insulam  pertinentem  in  suam  redigeret 
potestatem.  Perfectis  enim  magna  ex  parte  muni- 
tionibus  in  oppido  et  insulam  et  urbem  uno  tempore 
temptari  posse  confidebat.  Quo  capto  consilio 
cohortis  X  et  levis  armaturae  electos,  quosque 
idoneos  ex  equitibus  Gallis  arbitrabatur,  in  navigia 
minora  scaphasque  imponit ;  alteram  insulae  partem 
distinendae  manus  causa  constratis  navibus  aggre- 
ditur,  praemiis  magnis  propositis  qui  primus  insulam 
cepisset.  Ac  primo  impetum  nostrorum  pariter 
sustinuerunt :  uno  enim  tempore  et  ex  tectis  aedi- 
ficiorum  propugnabant  et  litora  armati  defendebant, 
quo  propter  asperitatem  loci  non  facilis  nostris 
adit  us  dabatur,  et  scaphis  navibusque  longis  quinque 
mobiliter  et  scienter  angustias  loci  tuebantur.  Sed 
ubi  primum  locis  cognitis  vadisque  pertemptatis 
pauci  nostri  in  litore  constiterunt  atque  hos  sunt  alii 
subsecuti  constanterque  in  eos  qui  in  litore  aequo 
institerant  impetum  fecerunt,  omnes  Pharitae  terga 
verterunt.  His  pulsis  custodia  portus  relicta  navis 
ad  litora  et  vicum  applicarunt  seque  ex  navibus  ad 
tuenda  aedificia  eiecerunt. 
18  Neque  vero  diutius  ea  munitione  se  continere 
potuerunt,  etsi  erat  non  dissimile  atque  Alexandreae 
genus  aedificiorum,  ut  minora  maioribus  conferantur, 
turresque  editae  et  coniunctae  muri  locum  obtine- 
bant,  neque  nostri  aut  scalis  aut  cratibus  aut  reliquis 

1  According  to  Ciiil  Wars  III,  ch.  112,  Caesar  had  already 
seized  Pharos  and  placed  a  garrison  in  it ;  but  this  may  have 
been  only  the  eastern  tip,  where  the  lighthouse  stood,  com- 
manding the  entrance  to  the  Great  Harbour. 

36 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

of  the  island  ^  and  the  mole  extending  to  it. 
For  as  his  entrenchments  in  the  town  were  in  the 
main  completed,  he  was  confident  that  a  simul- 
taneous attempt  could  be  made  against  both  island 
and  city.  Having  formed  this  plan,  he  embarked 
in  smaller  craft  and  pinnaces  ten  cohorts,  some 
picked  light-armed  troops  and  such  of  his  Gallic 
cavalry  as  he  deemed  suitable ;  and,  to  distract  the 
enemy  gan*ison,  he  launched  an  attack  with  decked 
ships  upon  the  other  side  of  the  island,  offering  large 
rewards  to  the  first  to  capture  it.  At  first  the 
islanders  held  off  our  troops'  attack,  simultaneously 
fighting  back  from  the  roofs  of  buildings,  and  vith 
equal  success  defending  the  beaches  with  armed 
parties — and  there  the  roughness  of  the  ground  did 
not  afford  our  troops  an  easy  approach — -and  guarding 
the  narrow  waters  with  pinnaces  and  five  warships 
displaying  both  speed  and  skill.  But  as  soon  as  our 
men  had  become  acquainted  with  the  ground  and 
tried  out  the  shallows,  a  few  got  a  footing  on  the 
beach,  others  followed  in  their  wake,  and  a  deter- 
mined attack  was  launched  upon  those  of  the  enemy 
who  were  drawn  up  against  us  on  the  level  fore- 
shore ;  whereupon  the  men  of  Pharos  all  turned  tail. 
FoUoAdng  their  rout  the  enemy  abandoned  their 
defence  of  the  harbour,  brought  their  ships  to  the 
built-up  area  by  the  water-front,  and  hastily  dis- 
embarked to  defend  the  buildings. 

They  could  not,  however,  hold  on  so  very  long  with 
the  defences  these  afforded,  though  the  buildings 
Avere  of  a  type  not  unlike  those  of  Alexandria — to 
employ  a  flattering  comparison — %\-ith  a  continuous 
line  of  lofty  towers  taking  the  place  of  a  wall ;  and 
our  troops  had  not  come  equipped  with  ladders  or 

37 


CAESAR 

rebus  parati  vcnerant  ad  oppugnandum.  Sed  terror 
hominibus  mentem  consiliumque  eripit  et  membra 
debilitat ;  ut  turn  accidit.  Qui  se  in  aequo  loco  ac 
piano  pares  esse  confidebant,  idem  perterriti  fuga 
suorum  et  caede  paucorum  XXX  pedum  altitudine  in 
aedificiis  consistere  ausi  non  sunt  seque  per  molem  in 
mare  praecipitaverunt  et  DCCC  passuum  intervallum 
ad  oppidum  enataverunt.  Multi  tamen  ex  his  capti 
interfectique  sunt ;  sed  numerus  captivorum  omnino 
fuit  sex  milium. 
19  Caesar  praeda  militibus  concessa  aedificia  diripi 
iussit  castellumque  ad  pontem,  qui  propior  erat 
Pharo,  communivit  atque  ibi  praesidium  posuit. 
Hunc  fuga  Pharitae  reliquerant ;  artiorem  ^  ilium 
propioremque  oppido  Alexandrini  tuebantur.  Sed 
eum  postero  die  simili  ratione  aggreditur,  quod  his 
obtentis  duobus  omnem  navigiorum  excursum  et 
repentina  latrocinia  sublatum  iri  videbatur.  lamque 
eos  qui  praesidio  eum  locum  tenebant  tormentis  ex 
navibus  sagittisque  depulerat  atque  in  oppidum 
redegerat  et  cohortium  trium  instar  in  terram  ex- 
posuerat — non  enim  pluris  consistere  angustiae  loci 
patiebantur — ;  reliquae  copiae  in  navibus  stationem 
obtinebant.  Quo  facto  imperat  pontem  adversus 
hostem  praevallari  et,  qua  exitus  navibus  erat  fornice 
exstructo,  quo  pons  sustinebatur,  lapidibus  oppleri 

'  fortiorem  or  certiorem  MSS, :  artiorem  Vielhaber. 
38 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

wicker  screens  or  any  other  equipment  for  assault. 
But  panic  robs  men  of  their  sense  and  reason  and 
palsies  their  limbs  ;  and  so  it  happened  then.  The 
very  men  who  on  level  and  unbroken  ground  were 
confident  they  were  a  match  for  us,  none  the  less, 
utterly  demoralised  now  by  the  flight  of  their  fellows 
and  the  slaughter  of  a  few,  did  not  venture  to  take 
up  a  position  on  buildings  thirty  feet  high,  but  at 
various  points  along  the  mole  dived  into  the  sea  and 
swam  the  intervening  800  paces  to  the  safety  of  the 
town.  Many  of  these,  notwithstanding,  were  cap- 
tured or  killed ;  indeed,  the  number  of  captives 
amounted  all  told  to  six  thousand. 

After  granting  his  soldiers  leave  to  plunder, 
Caesar  ordered  the  buildings  to  be  demolished.  Near 
the  bridge — the  one  closer  to  Pharos — he  fortified 
a  redoubt,  and  posted  a  garrison  there.  This  bridge 
the  inhabitants  of  Pharos  had  abandoned  in  their 
flight ;  while  the  other  one,  which  was  narrower 
and  closer  to  the  town,  was  guarded  by  the  Alexan- 
drians. However,  on  the  next  day  he  attacked  it 
from  a  similar  motive,  because  the  possession  of 
these  two  bridges  seemed  likely  to  do  away  with  all 
the  sallies  and  sudden  forays  of  the  enemies'  ships. 
And  by  now  he  had  dislodged  the  members  of  its 
garrison  with  artillery  and  arrows  shot  from  his  ships, 
had  driven  them  back  into  the  town,  and  put  ashore 
approximately  three  cohorts — the  confined  space 
would  not  afford  a  footing  for  more — -while  the  rest 
of  his  forces  remained  at  their  posts  aboard  the  ships. 
At  this  stage  he  ordered  the  bridge  to  be  screened  by 
a  rampart  on  the  side  facing  the  enemy,  and  the 
opening  for  the  passage  of  ships — formed  by  an  arch 
which   supported  the   bridge — to   be   filled   up   and 

39 


CAESAR 

atque  obstrui.  Quorum  altero  opere  effecto,  ut 
nulla  omnino  scapha  egredi  posset,  altero  institute 
omnes  Alexandrinorum  copiae  ex  oppido  se  eiecerunt 
et  contra  munitiones  pontis  latiore  loco  constiterunt, 
eodemque  tempore  quae  consueverant  navigia  per 
pontis  ad  incendia  onerariarum  emittere  ad  molem 
constituerunt.  Pugnabatur  a  nobis  ex  ponte,  ex 
mole  ;  ab  illis  ex  area,  quae  erat  adversus  pontem,  et 
ex  navibus  contra  molem. 
20  In  his  rebus  occupato  Caesare  militesque  hortante 
remigum  magnus  numerus  et  classiariorum  ex  longis 
navibus  nostris  in  molem  se  eiecit.  Pars  eorum 
studio  spectandi  ferebatur,  pars  etiam  cupiditate 
pugnandi.  Hi  primum  navigia  hostium  lapidibus 
ac  fundis  a  mole  repellebant  ac  multum  proficere 
multitudine  telorum  videbantur.  Sed  postquam 
ultra  eum  locum  ab  latere  eorum  aperto  ausi  sunt 
egredi  ex  navibus  Alexandrini  pauci,  ut  sine  signis 
certisque  ordinibus,  sine  ratione  prodierant,  sic 
temere  in  navis  refugere  coeperunt.  Quorum  fuga 
incitati  Alexandrini  plures  ex  navibus  egrediebantur 
nostrosque  acrius  perturbatos  insequebantur.  Simul 
qui  in  navibus  longis  remanserant  scalas  rapere 
navisque  a  terra  repellere  properabant,  ne  hostes 
navibus  potirentur.  Quibus  omnibus  rebus  per- 
turbati  milites  nostri  cohortium  trium  quae  in  ponte 
40 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

blocked  with  stones.  The  latter  task  being  com- 
pleted, so  that  not  a  single  pinnace  could  come  out, 
and  the  former  one  being  under  way,  all  the  Alexan- 
drians' forces  burst  out  of  the  town  and  took  post  in  a 
fairly  open  position  over  against  our  fortifications  of 
the  bridge ;  while  at  the  same  time  they  drew  up 
near  the  mole  the  vessels  which  they  had  been  in  the 
habit  of  sending  out  under  the  bridges  to  set  fire 
to  our  transports.  And  so  the  battle  proceeded, 
with  us  fighting  from  the  bridge  and  the  mole,  and 
with  them  from  the  area  facing  the  bridge  and  from 
their  ships  opposite  the  mole. 

While  Caesar  was  occupied  with  this  situation,  and 
as  he  was  encouraging  the  troops,  a  large  number  of 
rowers  and  seamen  left  our  warships  and  suddenly 
landed  on  the  mole.  Some  were  inspired  by  their 
anxiety  to  watch  the  fray,  others  also  by  the  desire  to 
take  part  in  it.  They  began  by  driving  back  the 
enemy  vessels  from  the  mole  with  stones  and  slings, 
and  it  seemed  that  their  heavy  volleys  of  missiles 
were  having  great  effect.  But  when  a  few  Alexan- 
drians ventured  to  disembark  beyond  that  point, 
on  the  side  of  their  unprotected  flank,  then,  just  as 
they  had  advanced  in  no  set  order  or  formation  and 
without  any  particular  tactics,  so  now  they  began  to 
retire  haphazardly  to  the  ships.  Encouraged  by 
their  retreat,  more  of  the  Alexandrians  disembarked 
and  pursued  our  flustered  men  more  hotly.  At  the 
same  time  those  who  had  stayed  aboard  the  warships 
made  haste  to  seize  the  gang-planks  and  ease  the 
ships  away  from  land,  to  prevent  the  enemy  from 
gaining  possession  of  them.  All  this  thoroughly 
alarmed  our  troops  of  the  three  cohorts  which  had 
taken  post  on  the  bridge  and  the  tip  of  the  mole ; 

41 


CAESAR 

ac  prima  mole  constiterant,  cum  post  se  clamorem 
exaudirent,  fugam  suorum  viderent,  magnam  vim 
telorum  adversi  sustinerent,  veriti  ne  ab  tergo 
circumvenirentur  et  discessu  navium  omnino  reditu 
intercluderentur  munitionem  in  ponte  institutam 
reliquerunt  et  magno  cursu  incitati  ad  navis  con- 
tenderunt.  Quorum  pars  proximas  nacta  navis 
multitudine  hominum  atque  onere  depressa  est,  pars 
resistens  et  dubitans  quid  esset  capiendum  consili 
ab  Alexandrinis  interfecta  est ;  non  nuUi  feliciore 
exitu  expeditas  ad  ancoram  navis  consecuti  in- 
columes  discesserunt,  pauci  allevatis  scutis  et  animo 
ad  conandum  nisi  ad  proxima  navigia  adnatarunt. 
21  Caesar  quoad  potuit  cohortando  suos  ad  pontem 
ac  munitiones  continere,  eodem  in  periculo  versatus 
est ;  postquam  universos  cedere  animadvertit,  in 
suum  navigium  se  recepit.  Quo  multitudo  hominum 
insecuta  cum  irrumperet  neque  administrandi  neque 
repellendi  a  terra  facultas  daretur,  fore  quod  accidit 
suspicatus  sese  ex  navigio  eiecit  atque  ad  eas  quae 
longius  constiterant  navis  adnatavit.  Hinc  suis 
laborantibus  subsidio  scaphas  mittens  non  nullos 
conservavit.  Navigium  quidem  eius  multitudine 
depressum  militum  una  cum  hominibus  interiit.  Hoc 
proelio  desiderati  sunt  ex  numero  legionariorum 
militum  circiter  CCCC  et  paulo  ultra  eum  numerum 
classiarii  et  remiges.  Alexandrini  eo  loco  castellum 
magnis  munitionibus  multisque  tormentis  confirma- 

42 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

and  as  they  heard  the  clamour  behind  them,  and 
saw  the  retreat  of  their  comrades,  and  sustained  a 
heavy  frontal  barrage  of  missiles,  they  feared  they 
might  be  surrounded  in  rear  and  have  their  retreat 
entirely  cut  off  by  the  departure  of  their  ships  ;  and 
so  they  abandoned  the  entrenchment  they  had  begun 
at  the  bridge,  and  doubled  frantically  to  the  ships. 
Some  of  them  gained  the  nearest  ships,  only  to  be 
capsized  by  the  weight  of  so  many  men  ;  some  were 
killed  by  the  Alexandrians  as  they  put  up  a  forlorn 
and  bewildered  resistance ;  some  proved  luckier  in 
reaching  ships  at  anchor  cleared  for  action,  and  so  got 
away  safely ;  and  a  few,  holding  their  shields  above 
them  and  steeling  their  resolution  to  the  task,  swam 
off  to  ships  near  by. 

So  long  as  by  words  of  encouragement  Caesar  was 
able  to  keep  his  men  at  the  bridge  and  its  emplace- 
ments, he  too  was  involved  in  the  same  danger ; 
but  when  he  perceived  that  they  were  all  retreating, 
he  withdrew  to  his  own  vessel.  As  a  large  number  of 
men  followed  him  and  kept  forcing  their  way  aboard 
it,  and  as  no  opportunity  was  afforded  either  of 
navigating  it  or  easing  it  off  shore,  anticipating  what 
actually  happened  he  dived  from  the  vessel  and  swam 
to  those  ships  which  were  hove  to  farther  off.  From 
them  he  sent  pinnaces  to  the  help  of  his  men  who 
were  in  difficulties,  and  saved  not  a  few.  His  vessel 
was  in  fact  capsized  by  the  large  number  of  troops, 
and  foundered  with  the  men  on  board.  In  this 
battle  the  losses  among  the  legionary  troops 
amounted  to  approximately  400,  with  a  slightly 
larger  number  of  seamen  and  rowers.  The  Alexan- 
drians reinforced  the  redoubt  there  with  strong 
entrenchments   and   many   pieces   of  artillery   and 

43 


CAESAR 

runt  atque  egcstis  ex  mari  lapidibus  libere  sunt  usi 
postea  ad  mittenda  navigia. 

22  Hoc  detrimento  milites  nostri  tantum  afuerunt  ut 
perturbarentur,  ut  incensi  atque  ineitati  magnas 
accessiones  fecerint  in  operibus  hostium  expug- 
nandis.  In  proeliis  cotidianis,  quandocumque  fors 
obtulerat,  procurrentibus  et  erumpentibus  Alexan- 
drinis,  manum  conserendi  potestate  facta  multum 
proficiebat  Caesar  voluntate  optima  ^  et  ardentibus 
studiis  militum ;  nee  divulgata  Caesaris  hortatio 
subsequi  legionum  aut  laborem  aut  pugnandi  poterat 
cupiditatem,  ut  magis  deterrendi  et  continendi  a 
periculosissimis  essent  dimicationibus  quam  incitandi 
ad  pugnandum. 

23  Alexandrini  cum  Romanos  et  secundis  rebus 
confirmari  et  adversis  incitari  viderent  neque  ullum 
belli  tertium  casum  nossent  quo  possent  esse 
firmiores,  ut  coniectura  consequi  possumus,  aut 
admoniti  a  regis  amicis  qui  in  Caesaris  erant  praesi- 
diis,  aut  suo  priore  consilio  per  occultos  nuntios 
regi  probato  legatos  ad  Caesarem  miserunt,  ut 
dimitteret  regem  transireque  ad  suos  pateretur : 
paratam  enim  omnem  multitudinem  esse,  confectam 
taedio  puellae,  fiduciario  regno,  dominatione  crude- 
lissima  Ganymedis,  facere  id  quod  rex  imperasset; 
quo  si  auctore  in  Caesaris  fidem  amicitiamque 
venturi  essent,  nullius  periculi  timorem  multitudini 
fore  impedimento  quo  minus  se  dederent. 

^  Alexandrinis  manum  comprehendi  multum  operibus  et 
MSS.     I  have  adopted  Dinter's  conjecture. 

^  viz.  by  Arsinoe  to  Ganymedes  (cf.  ch.  33)  :  others,  how- 
ever, interpret  the  phrase  as  meaning  '  the  kingdom,  by  rights 
Ptolemy's,  held  in  trust  by  others  '.  Andrieu,  omitting  the 
comma  after  puellae,  renders  '  degoute  de  I'autorite  fictive 
d'unc  jeune  fille.' 

44 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

removed  tlie  stones  from  the  sea,  subsequently  making 
free  use  of  the  opening  to  despatch  their  vessels. 

This  reverse,  so  far  from  dismaying  our  troops, 
fired  and  stiinulated  thein  to  carry  out  large-scale 
sallies  in  the  course  of  storming  the  enemy's  defence- 
works.  Every  day  encounters  took  place,  and  when- 
ever a  chance  offered  itself  and  the  Alexandrians 
burst  out  in  a  frontal  sally  and  gave  Caesar  an 
opportunity  of  engaging  battle,  he  achieved  con- 
siderable success,  thanks  to  the  excellent  morale 
and  ardent  enthusiasm  of  his  troops ;  nor  could  his 
\videspread  words  of  encouragement  keep  pace  with 
the  legions'  exertions  or  their  eagerness  for  fighting, 
so  that  they  had  to  be  deterred  and  held  back  from 
the  most  hazardous  encounters  rather  than  be 
spurred  on  to  fight. 

The  Alexandrians  saw  that  the  Romans  were 
heartened  by  successes  and  stimulated  by  reverses, 
nor  were  they  aware  of  any  third  vicissitude  of  war 
which  could  make  them  yet  more  steadfast.  And  so, 
whether  it  was  they  were  warned  by  the  king's  friends 
who  were  in  Caesar's  camp,  or  whether  they  were 
acting  on  some  previous  plan  of  their  own  made  known 
to  the  king  by  secret  despatches  and  approved  by  him, 
— we  can  only  guess  at  their  motive — they  sent  envoys 
to  Caesar  requesting  him  to  release  the  king  and  allow 
him  to  go  over  to  his  own  side.  '  The  whole  popula- 
tion ',  they  said,  '  being  tired  and  wearied  of  the 
girl,  of  the  delegation  of  the  kingship,^  and  of  the 
utterly  remorseless  tyranny  of  Ganymedes,  were 
ready  to  do  the  king's  bidding  ;  and  if,  at  his  instance, 
they  were  to  enter  into  a  loyal  friendship  with 
Caesar,  then  no  danger  would  intimidate  or  prevent 
the  population  from  submitting.' 

45 


CAESAR 

24  Caesar  etsi  fallacem  gentem  semperque  alia 
cogitantem,  alia  simulantem  bene  cognitam  habebat, 
tamen  petentibus  dare  veniam  utile  esse  statuit, 
quod,  si  quo  pacto  sentirent  ea  quae  postularent, 
mansurum  in  fide  diinissum  regem  credebat,  sin,  id 
quod  magis  illorum  naturae  conveniebat,  ducem  ad 
bellum  gerendum  regem  habere  vellent,  splendidius 
atque  honestius  se  contra  regem  quam  contra  con- 
venarum  ac  fugitivorum  manum  bellum  esse  gestu- 
rum.  Itaque  regem  cohortatus  ut  consuleret  regno 
paterno,  parceret  praeclarissimae  patriae,  quae 
turpibus  incendiis  et  ruinis  esset  deformata,  civis 
suos  primum  ad  sanitatem  revocaret,  deinde  con- 
servaret,  fidem  populo  Romano  sibique  praestaret, 
cum  ipse  tantum  ei  crederet  ut  ad  hostis  armatos 
eum  mitteret,  dextra  dextram  tenens  dimittere 
coepit  adulta  iam  aetate  puerum.  At  regius  animus 
disciplinis  fallacissimis  eruditus,  ne  a  gentis  suae 
moribus  degeneraret,  flens  orare  contra  Caesarem 
coepit  ne  se  dimitteret :  non  enim  sibi  regnum  ipsum 
conspectu  Caesaris  esse  iucundius.  Compressis  pueri 
lacrimis  Caesar  ipse  commotus  celeriter,  si  ilia  sen- 
tiret,  fore  eum  secum  adfirmans  ad  suos  dimisit. 
Ille,  ut  ex  carceribus  in  liberum  cursum  emissus,  adeo 
contra  Caesarem  acriter  bellum  gerere  coepit  ut 
46 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

Though  Caesar  was  well  aware  that  they  were  a 
deceitful  race,  always  pretending  something  different 
from  their  real  intentions,  yet  he  decided  that  it  was 
expedient  to  satisfy  their  plea  for  clemency,  since,  if 
their  demands  in  any  way  reflected  their  feelings,  then 
he  believed  the  king  would  remain  loyal  when  released  ; 
but  if,  on  the  other  hand,  they  wanted  to  have  the  king 
to  lead  them  with  a  view  to  waging  the  war — and  that 
was  more  in  keeping  with  their  character — then  he 
thought  there  would  be  greater  honour  and  distinc- 
tion for  him  in  waging  war  against  a  king  than 
against  a  motley  collection  of  refugees.  Accord- 
ingly, he  urged  the  king  to  take  thought  for  the 
kingdom  of  his  fathers,  to  have  pity  on  his  most 
illustrious  country,  shamefully  scarred  as  it  was  by 
fire  and  desolation,  to  recall  his  citizens  to  sanity 
first  and  then  to  preserve  them  therein,  and  to 
prove  his  loyalty  to  the  Roman  people  and  to  Caesar, 
inasmuch  as  Caesar  himself  had  such  faith  in  him 
that  he  was  sending  him  to  join  an  enemy  under 
arms.  Then,  grasping  his  right  hand  in  his  own, 
Caesar  made  to  take  leave  of  the  boy — already 
grown  to  manhood.  But  the  royal  mind,  schooled  in 
all  the  lessons  of  utter  deceit,  was  loth  to  fall  short 
of  the  customary  standards  of  his  race  ;  and  so  with 
tears  he  proceeded  to  beseech  Caesar  to  the  opposite 
effect  not  to  send  him  away :  his  very  kingdom,  he 
declared,  was  not  more  pleasing  to  him  than  the 
sight  of  Caesar.  Checking  the  lad's  tears,  albeit 
not  unmoved  himself,  Caesar  declared  that,  if  that 
was  the  way  he  felt,  they  would  speedily  be  re- 
united, and  so  sent  him  back  to  his  people.  Like  a 
horse  released  from  the  starting-gate  and  given  his 
head,  the  king  proceeded  to  wage  war  against  Caesar 

47 


CAESAR 

lacrimas  quas  in  colloquio  proiecerat  gaudio  vide- 
retur  profudisse.  Accidisse  hoc  complures  Caesaris 
legati,  amici,  centuriones  militesque  laetabantur, 
quod  nimia  bonitas  eius  fallaciis  pueri  elusa  esset. 
Quasi  vero  id  Caesar  bonitate  tantum  adductus  ac 
non  prudentissimo  consilio  fecisset. 
25  Cum  duce  assumpto  Alexandrini  nihilo  se  firmiores 
factos  aut  languidiores  Romanes  animadverterent 
eludentibusque  militibus  regis  aetatem  atque  in- 
firmitatem  magnum  dolorem  acciperent  neque  se 
quicquam  proficere  viderent,  rumoresque  exsisterent 
magna  Caesari  praesidia  terrestri  itinere  ex  Syria 
Ciliciaque  adduci,  quod  nondum  auditum  Caesari 
erat,  commeatum,  qui  mari  nostris  supportabatur, 
intercipere  statuerunt.  Itaque  expeditis  navigiis 
locis  idoneis  ad  Canopum  in  statione  dispositis  navi- 
bus  insidiabantur  nostris  commeatuque.  Quod  ubi 
Caesari  nuntiatum  est,  universam  classem  iubet 
expediri  atque  instrui.  Praeficit  huic  Tiberium 
Neronem.  Proficiseuntur  in  ea  elasse  Rhodiae 
naves  atque  in  his  Euphranor,  sine  quo  nulla  um- 
quam  dimicatio  maritima,  nulla  etiam  parum  feliciter 
confecta  erat.  At  fortuna,  quae  plerumque  eos 
quos  plurimis  beneficiis  ornavit  ad  duriorem  casum 
reservat,  superiorum  temporum  dissimilis  Euphra- 
norem    prosequebatur.     Nam    cum    ad    Canopum 

^  The  father  of  the  Emperor  Tiberius. 
48 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

so  energetically  that  the  tears  he  had  shed  at  their 
conference  seemed  to  have  been  tears  of  joy.  Not  a 
few  of  Caesar's  officers  and  friends  and  many  of  the 
centurions  and  soldiers  were  delighted  at  this  turn 
of  events,  inasmuch  as  Caesar's  over-generosity  had, 
they  felt,  been  made  fun  of  by  the  deceitful  tricks  of  a 
boy.  As  if  indeed  it  was  merely  generosity  and  not 
the  most  far-sighted  strategy  which  had  led  him 
to  do  it ! 

Having  got  themselves  a  leader,  the  Alexandrians 
observed  no  greater  degree  of  resolution  in  them- 
selves or  of  listlessness  in  the  Romans ;  in  addition, 
the  fun  which  the  soldiers  made  of  the  king's  youth- 
fulness  and  irresolution  caused  great  resentment, 
and  they  saw  they  were  making  no  headway.  As, 
moreover,  rumours  were  current  that  large  reinforce- 
ments for  Caesar  were  on  their  way  overland  from 
Syria  and  Cilicia— intelligence  which  had  not  yet 
come  to  Caesar's  ears — they  decided  to  intercept  a 
convoy  of  supplies  which  was  being  conveyed  to  our 
troops  by  sea.  Accordingly  they  stationed  some 
lightly  armed  vessels  on  guard  at  suitable  points  near 
Canopus,  and  lay  in  wait  for  our  ships  and  supplies. 
When  Caesar  was  informed  of  this  he  ordered  his 
entire  fleet  to  be  got  ready  and  equipped,  putting 
Tiberius  Nero  ^  in  command.  Included  in  this  fleet 
when  it  set  out  were  the  Rhodian  ships,  and  aboard 
them  Euphranor,  without  whom  no  naval  action  had 
ever  been  fought,  and  none  even  that  was  not  a 
resounding  victory.  Fortune,  however,  very  often 
reserves  for  a  harsher  fate  those  upon  whom  she  has 
showered  her  most  pi'olific  blessings ;  and  so  too  the 
foi'tune  that  now  attended  Euphranor  was  different 
from  that  of  former  times.     For  when  they  reached 

49 


CAESAR 

ventum  esset  instructaque  utrimque  classis  con- 
flixisset  et  sua  consuetudine  I'.uphranor  primus 
proelium  conimisisset  et  quadriremem  hostium  per- 
forasset  ac  demersisset,  proximam  longius  insecutus 
parum  celeriter  insequentibus  reliquis  circumventus 
est  ab  Alexandrinis.  Cui  subsidium  nemo  tulit,  sive 
quod  in  ipso  satis  praesidi  pro  virtute  ac  felicitate  eius 
putarent  esse,  sive  quod  ipsi  sibi  timebant.  Ita, 
qui  unus  ex  omnibus  eo  proelio  bene  rem  gessit,  solus 
cum  sua  quadriremi  victrice  perit. 
26  Sub  idem  tempus  Mithridates  Pergamenus, 
magnae  nobilitatis  domi  scientiaeque  in  bello  et 
virtutis,  fidei  dignitatisque  in  amicitia  Caesaris, 
missus  in  Syriam  Ciliciamque  initio  belli  Alexandrini 
ad  auxilia  arcessenda,  cum  magnis  copiis,  quas 
celeriter  et  propensissima  civitatium  voluntate  et  sua 
diligentia  confecerat,  itinere  pedestri,  quo  coniungi- 
tur  Aegyptus  Syriae,  Pelusium  adducit :  ^  idque 
oppidum  firmo  praesidio  occupatum  Achillae  propter 
opportunitatem  loci — namque  tota  Aegyptus  mari- 
time accessu  Pharo,  pedestri  Pelusio  velut  claustris 
munita  existimatur — ,  repente  magnis  circumdatum 
copiis  multiplici  praesidio  pertinaciter  propugnan- 
tibus     et     copiarum     magnitudine,     quas     integras 

1  adducit,  the  MSS.  reading,  is  difficult.     Duties  proposed 
advenit :    Hoffmann  adductis,  id  oppidum  .  .  . 


^  Son  of  a  wealthy  citizen  of  Pergamum  who  had  been 
adopted  by  Mithridates  the  Great,  from  whom  he  took  his 
name  :  another  account  made  him  out  to  be  a  natural  son  of 
the  latter. 

^  I  assume  here  that  something  like  oppidanis  is  to  be 
supplied  as  the  noun  defined  by  propugnantibus. 

50 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

Canopus  and  each  side  had  drawn  up  its  fleet  and 
entered  the  conflict,  Euphranor.  following  his  normal 
custom,  was  the  first  to  join  battle  ;  but  when  he  had 
holed  and  sunk  one  enemy  quadrireme,  he  pursued 
the  next  one  too  far ;  and  as  the  other  ships  were  not 
ipiick  enough  in  following  his  lead,  he  was  surrounded 
by  the  Alexandrians.  No  one  brought  him  assist- 
ance, either  because  they  thought  that,  considering 
his  courage  and  his  good  luck,  he  was  quite  able  to 
take  care  of  himself,  or  because  they  were  afraid 
for  their  own  sakes.  And  so  the  one  and  only  man 
who  was  successful  in  that  battle  perished  alone 
along  with  his  victorious  quadrireme. 

Round  about  the  same  time  Mithridates  of 
Pergamum  ^  approached  Pelusium.  A  man  of  high 
standing  in  his  own  country  and  of  great  experience 
and  valour  in  w'ar,  as  well  as  a  very  loyal  and  valued 
friend  of  Caesar,  he  had  been  sent  into  Syria  and 
Cilicia  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Alexandrian  war  to 
fetch  reinforcements ;  and  now,  accompanied  by 
large  forces  which  he  had  speedily  raised,  thanks 
both  to  the  very  helpful  attitude  adopted  by  the 
states  and  to  his  own  conscientious  eiforts,  he  arrived 
at  Pelusium  by  the  overland  route  which  links  Egypt 
with  Syria.  This  town  had  been  occupied  by  a 
strong  garrison  of  Achillas  on  account  of  the  tactical 
importance  of  the  place ;  for  Pharos  and  Pelusium 
are  regarded  as  the  keys,  as  it  were,  to  the  defence 
of  the  whole  of  Egypt,  Pelusium  guarding  the  over- 
land approach,  as  Pharos  defends  the  seaward  one. 
Mithridates  now  suddenly  surrounded  it  with  large 
forces;  and,  despite  the  obstinate  defence  put  up 
by  its  numerous  garrison,-  thanks  both  to  the  large 
number  of  fresh  troops  which  he  kept  throwing  in  to 

51 


CAESAR 

vulneratis  defessisque  subiciebat,  et  perseverantia 
constantiaque  oppugnandi  quo  die  est  aggressus  in 
suam  redegit  potestatem  praesidiumque  ibi  suum 
collocavit.  Inde  re  bene  gesta  Alexandream  ad 
Caesarem  eontendit  omnisque  eas  regioncs  per 
quas  iter  faciebat  auctoritate  ea  quae  plerumque 
adest  victori  pacarat  atque  in  amicitiam  Caesaris 
redegerat. 
27  Locus  est  fere  regionum  illarum  nobilissimus  non 
ita  longe  ab  Alexandrea,  qui  nominatur  Delta ; 
quod  nomen  a  similitudine  litterae  cepit :  nam  pars 
quaedam  fluminis  Nili  derivata  ^  duobus  itineribus 
paulatim  medium  inter  se  spatium  relinquens  diver- 
sissimo  ad  litus  intervallo  mari  coniungitur.  Cui  loco 
cum  appropinquare  Mithridaten  rex  cognovisset  et 
transeundum  ei  flumen  sciret,  magnas  adversus 
eum  copias  misit,  quibus  vel  superari  delerique 
Mithridaten  vel  sine  dubio  retineri  posse  credebat. 
Quern  ad  modum  autem  optabat  eum  vinci,  sic  satis 
habebat  interclusum  a  Caesare  a  se  retineri.  Quae 
primae  copiae  flumen  a  Delta  transire  et  Mithridati 
occurrere  potuerunt,  proelium  commiserunt  festi- 
nantes  praeripere  subsequentibus  victoriae  socie- 
tatem.  Quorum  impetum  Mithridates  magna  cum 
prudentia  ^  consuetudine  nostra  castris  vallatis 
sustinuit ;    cum  vero  incaute  atque  insolenter  suc- 

*  derivata  inter  se  MSS.     Duebner  deleted  inter  se. 

*  Some   MSS.   add  the  words   constantiaque   virtutum   et 
Alexandrinorum  imprudentia. 


*  Apparently  he  marched  south  so  as  to  cross  the  Nile 
south  of  the  Delta. 

*  In  antiquity  the  term  '  Delta  '  was  also  applied,  in  a 
restricted  sense,  to  the  southern  apex  of  the  triangle.  The 

52 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

replace  the  wounded  and  exhausted  and  to  the 
stubborn  and  unremitting  nature  of  his  assault,  he 
reduced  it  to  submission  on  the  same  day  he  started 
to  attack  it,  and  then  posted  a  garrison  of  his  own 
in  it.  Whereupon,  having  achieved  this  success,  he 
marched  to  join  Caesar  in  Alexandria,  peacefully 
subduing,  meanwhile,  and  winning  over  to  friendship 
with  Caesar,  by  that  authority  which  normally 
belongs  to  the  victor,  all  those  districts  along  his  line 
of  march. ^ 

Not  so  very  far  from  Alexandria  lies  what  is  per- 
haps the  best  known  spot  in  those  parts.  It  is  called 
Delta,  and  took  its  name  from  its  resemblance  to  the 
letter ;  for  a  certain  section  of  the  river  Nile  splits  up  into 
two  channels  which  diverge  gradually  but  are  separated 
by  a  very  wide  interval  at  the  coast,  where  the  river 
joinsthesea.  Whentheking  learned  that  Mithridates 
was  approaching  this  spot,^  and  knew  that  he  must 
cross  the  river,  he  despatched  large  forces  against 
him,  by  which  he  believed  Mithridates  could  either 
be  beaten  and  destroyed,  or  else  undoubtedly  held  in 
check.  However,  desirous  as  he  was  for  his  defeat, 
he  was  quite  as  content  to  cut  him  off  from  Caesar 
and  hold  him  in  check.  The  first  of  his  forces  to 
succeed  in  crossing  the  river  from  Delta  and  meeting 
Mithridates  joined  battle  in  eager  haste  to  forestall 
those  following  up  behind,  and  so  rob  them  of  the 
chance  to  participate  in  victory.  Mithridates  con- 
tained their  attack  with  great  discretion,  fortifying  his 
camp  after  our  regular  fashion ;  but  when  he  saw 
them  coming  up  to  the  entrenchinents  with  a  con- 
battle  must  have  taken  place  to  the  east  of  the  Nile — according 
to  Josephus  at  the  Encampment  of  the  Jews,  identified  by 
some  with  Tal-el-Jahoudieh   about  17  miles  north  of  Cairo. 

53 


CAESAR 

cedere  eos  niunitionibus  videret,  eruptione  undique 
facta  magnum  numerum  eorum  interfecit.  Quod 
nisi  locorum  notitia  reliqui  se  texissent  partinique  in 
navis  quibus  flumen  transierant  recepissent,  funditus 
deleti  essent.  Qui  ut  paulum  ab  illo  timore  se 
recrearunt,  adiuncti  eis  qui  subsequebantur  rursus 
oppugnare  Mithridaten  coeperunt. 
28  Mittitur  a  Mithridate  nuntius  Caesari  qui  rem 
gestam  perferret.  Cognoscit  ex  suis  eadem  haec 
accidisse  rex.  Ita  paene  sub  idem  tempus  et  rex 
ad  opprimendum  Mithridaten  proficiscitur  et  Caesar 
ad  recipiendum.  Celeriore  fluminis  Nili  navigatione 
rex  est  usus,  in  quo  magnam  et  paratam  classem 
habebat.  Caesar  eodem  itinere  uti  noluit,  ne  navibus 
in  flumine  dimicaret,  sed  circumvectus  est  eo  mari, 
quod  Africae  partis  esse  dicitur,  sicuti  supra  demon- 
stravimus ;  prius  tamen  regis  copiis  occurrit,  quam  is 
Mithridaten  aggredi  posset,  eumque  ad  se  victorem 
incolumi  exercitu  recepit.  Consederat  cum  copiis 
rex  loco  natura  munito,  quod  erat  ipse  excelsior 
planitie  ex  omnibus  partibus  subiecta :  tribus  autem 
ex  lateribus  variis  genere  munitionibus  tegebatur : 
unum  latus  erat  adiectum  flumini  Nilo,  alterum 
editissimo  loco  ductum,  ut  partem  castrorum  ob- 
tineret,  tertium  palude  cingebatur. 

^  See  chapter  14.  Apparently  Caesar  sailed  W.  to  Cher- 
sonensus,  to  avoid  fighting  his  way  through  the  enemy- 
occupied  part  of  Alexandria,  and  then  marched  S.E.,  keeping 
Lake  Mareotis  on  his  left. 

^  There  is  wide  disagreement  about  identifj-ing  this 
position ;  but  assuming  that  Mithridat«s  marched  X.W.  to 
join  Caesar  it  seems  reasonable  to  place  it  close  to  the  western 

54 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

temptiious  recklessness,  he  made  a  general  sally 
and  killed  a  large  number  of  them.  And  had  not  the 
remainder  employed  their  knowledge  of  the  district 
to  find  cover  for  themselves,  and  some  retired  to 
the  ships  in  which  they  had  crossed  the  river,  they 
would  have  been  completely  wiped  out.  When 
they  had  recovered  a  little  from  the  resulting  panic, 
they  joined  forces  with  their  comrades  following  up 
behind,  and  proceeded  to  a  new  attack  on  Mithridates. 
A  messenger  was  despatched  by  Mithridates  to 
Caesar  to  bring  him  tidings  of  the  action.  The  king 
learned  of  these  same  events  from  his  own  people. 
Accordingly  at  practically  the  same  time  the  king 
set  forth  to  crush  Mithridates,  and  Caesar  to  relieve 
him.  The  king  had  recourse  to  the  quicker  method  of 
transport,  namely  sailing  up  the  river  Nile,  in  which 
he  had  a  large  fleet  in  readiness.  Caesar  was  un- 
willing to  use  the  same  route,  so  as  not  to  fight  a 
naval  action  in  the  river.  Instead,  he  sailed  round 
by  that  sea  which  is  said  to  belong  to  part  of  Africa, 
as  I  have  explained  earlier.^  Yet  in  spite  of  this  he 
came  up  with  the  king's  forces  before  the  latter 
could  attack  Mithridates,  and  so  rescued  the  vic- 
torious Mithridates  with  his  army  intact.  The  king 
had  encamped  with  his  forces  in  a  naturally  strong 
position,^  since  in  itself  the  position  was  higher  than 
the  plateau  which  lay  beneath  it  on  all  sides ;  more- 
over, on  three  sides  it  was  covered  by  defences  of 
diverse  types :  one  side  abutted  the  river  Nile ; 
a  second  ran  along  very  high  ground  and  formed  one 
face  of  his  camp ;  while  the  third  was  encircled  by  a 
marsh. 

branch  of  the  Nile  about  half-way  between  Cairo  and  Alex- 
andria, but  perhaps  closer  to  the  latter. 

55 


CAESAR 

29  Inter  castra  et  Caesaris  iter  flumen  intercedebat 
angustum  altissimis  ripis,  quod  in  Nilum  influebat, 
aberat  autem  ab  regis  castris  milia  passuum  circiter 
^'II.  Rex  cum  hoc  itinere  venire  Caesarem  com- 
perisset,  equitatum  omnem  expeditosque  delectos 
pedites  ad  id  flumen  misit  qui  transitu  Caesarem 
prohiberent  et  eminus  ex  ripis  proelium  impar 
inirent :  nullum  enim  processum  virtus  habebat  aut 
periculum  ignavia  subibat.  Quae  res  incendit  dolore 
milites  equitesque  nostros,  quod  tarn  diu  pari  proelio 
cum  Alexandrinis  certaretur.  Itaque  eodem  tem- 
pore equites  Germani  dispersi  vada  fluminis  quae- 
rentes  partim  demissioribus  ripis  flumen  tranarunt, 
et  legionarii  magnis  arboribus  excisis,  quae  longi- 
tudine  utramque  ripam  contingerent,  proiectis  eis  ^ 
repentinoque  aggere  iniecto  flumen  transierunt. 
Quorum  impetum  adeo  pertimuerunt  hostes  ut  in 
fuga  spem  salutis  collocarent ;  sed  id  frustra  :  namque 
ex  ea  fuga  pauci  ad  regem  refugerunt  paene  omni 
reliqua  multitudine  interfecta. 

30  Caesar  re  praeclarissime  gesta,  cum  subitum 
adventum  suum  iudicaret  magnum  terrorem  Alexan- 
drinis iniecturum,  protinus  victor  ad  castra  regis 
pertendit.  Haec  cum  et  opere  magno  vallata  et  loci 
natura  munita  animadverteret  confertamque  arma- 
torum  multitudinem  collocatam  in  vallo  videret, 
lassos  itinere  ac  proeliando  milites  ad  oppugnanda 

^  eis  added  by  Nipperdey. 
56 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

Between  the  camp  and  Caesar's  line  of  march  ran  a 
narrow  river  with  very  high  banks,  which  flowed 
into  the  Nile  and  was  some  seven  miles  distant  from 
the  king's  camp.  When  the  king  learned  that 
Caesar  was  coming  by  this  route,  he  despatched  all 
his  cavalry  and  a  picked  force  of  light-armed  infantry 
to  this  river  to  prevent  Caesar  from  crossing  it  and 
to  engage  at  long  range  from  its  banks — an  unfair 
engagement,  for  the  spot  could  neither  afford  scope 
for  valour  nor  involve  cowardice  in  any  risk.  These 
tactics  filled  our  infantry  and  cavalrv  with  burning 
resentment  at  the  thought  that  for  so  long  their 
struggle  with  the  Alexandrians  should  prove  a  drawn 
battle.  And  so,  at  the  same  time  as  scattered 
groups  of  German  cavalry,  looking  for  places  to  ford 
the  river,  swam  across  it  at  some  points  where  the 
banks  were  lower,  simultaneously  the  legionary 
troops,  having  felled  lofty  trees  tall  enough  to  reach 
from  bank  to  bank,  hurled  them  forward  and  crossed 
the  river  on  a  causeway  hastily  thrown  on  top.  So 
terrified  were  the  enemy  by  their  attack,  that  they 
pinned  their  hopes  of  deliverance  to  flight :  in  vain, 
however ;  for  few  survived  that  rout  to  take  refuge 
with  the  king,  and  practically  all  the  remainder  were 
killed. 

After  this  most  notable  success  Caesar  forthwith 
pushed  forward  triumphantly  to  the  king's  camp, 
holding  the  view  that  his  sudden  approach  would 
strike  great  terror  into  the  hearts  of  the  Alexandrians. 
But  when  he  observed  that  this  camp  was  strongly 
entrenched  as  well  as  protected  by  its  natural 
position,  and  saw  the  serried  mass  of  armed  men 
posted  at  the  rampart,  he  was  unwilling  to  let  his 
soldiers,   weary   as   they   were   with   marching   and 

57 


CAESAR 

castra  succedere  noluit.  Ita(jue  non  magno  inter- 
vallo  relicto  ab  hoste  castra  posuit.  Postero  die 
castellum,  quod  rex  in  proximo  vico  non  longe  a  suis 
castris  munierat  bracchiisque  cum  opere  castrorum 
coniunxerat  vici  obtinendi  causa,  Caesar  aggressus 
omnibus  copiis  expugnat,  non  quo  id  minore  numero 
militum  consequi  difficile  factu  putaret,  sed  ut  ab  ea 
victoria  perterritis  Alexandrinis  protinus  castra  regis 
oppugnaret.  Itaque  eo  cursu,  quo  refugientis 
Alexandrinos  ex  castello  in  castra  sunt  milites  in- 
secuti,  munitionibus  successerunt  acerrimeque  eminus 
proeliari  coeperunt.  Duabus  ex  partibus  aditus 
oppugnationis  nostris  dabatur :  una,  quam  liberum 
accessum  habere  demonstravi,  altera,  quae  mediocre 
intervallum  inter  castra  ct  flumen  Nilum  habebat. 
Maxima  et  electissima  multitudo  Alexandrinorum 
defendebat  earn  partem,  quae  facillimum  aditum 
habebat ;  plurimum  proficiebant  in  repellendis 
vulnerandisque  nostris,  qui  regione  fluminis  Nili 
propugnabant :  diversis  enim  telis  nostri  figebantur, 
adversi  ex  vallo  castrorum,  aversi  ex  flumine,  in  quo 
multae  naves  instructae  funditoribus  et  sagittairis 
nostros  impugnabant. 
31  Caesar  cum  videret  milites  acrius  proeliari  non 
posse  nee  tamen  multum  profici  propter  locorum 
difficultatem,  cumque  animum  adverteret  exeelsissi- 


*  This  interpretation  assumes  qui  .  .  .  propugnabant  as  the 
subject  of  proficiebant ;  and  the  normal  usage  of  propugnare 
of  defensive  fighting  seems  to  confirm  it.  The  alternative — 
omitting  the  comma  after  nostris — '  they  (the  largest  con- 
tingent of  the  Alexandrians)  were  the  most  successful  in  .  .  . 
wounding  our  men  who  were  fighting  in  the  area  of  the  Xile.' 
seems  hardly  to  agree  with  the  tactical  situation. 


58 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

fighting,  advance  to  attack  the  camp.  Accordingly 
he  pitched  camp  at  no  great  distance  from  the 
enemy.  In  a  nearby  hamlet,  not  far  distant  from  the 
king's  camp,  there  was  a  fort  which  the  king  had 
built  and  linked  with  bastions  to  the  main  defences 
of  his  camp  so  as  to  hold  the  hamlet.  This  fort 
Caesar  attacked  and  took  by  storm  on  the  following 
day  with  all  his  forces ;  not  that  he  thought  it  would 
be  difficult  to  gain  that  objective  by  using  a  smaller 
number  of  soldiers,  but  in  order  that,  with  the 
Alexandrians  thoroughly  unnerved  as  a  result,  he 
might  go  straight  on  from  that  victory  to  attack  the 
king's  camp.  And  so,  having  chased  the  retreating 
Alexandrians  from  the  fort  into  their  camp,  our 
troops  carried  on  their  charge  right  up  to  the  forti- 
fications, where  they  proceeded  to  fight  at  long  range 
very  briskly.  On  two  sides  our  men  were  afforded  an 
opening  for  assault :  the  first  was  the  one  which,  as  I 
have  explained,  allowed  unimpeded  approach ;  the 
second  comprised  the  moderate-sized  space  between 
the  camp  and  the  river  Nile.  The  largest  and  most 
carefully  picked  contingent  of  the  Alexandrians  was 
defending  that  side  which  afforded  the  easiest 
approach  ;  but  the  defenders  in  the  area  of  the  river 
Nile  were  the  most  successful  in  repelling  and 
wounding  our  men  :  ^  for  the  latter  were  being  hit  by 
missiles  coming  from  opposite  directions — from  the 
rampart  of  the  camp  ahead  of  them,  and  from  the 
river  behind  them,  where  many  ships  manned  with 
slingers  and  archers  were  engaging  our  men. 

Now  Caesar  saw  that,  while  it  was  impossible  for 
his  soldiers  to  fight  with  any  greater  gallantry,  yet 
little  headway  was  being  made  on  account  of  the 
difficulty   of  the   ground ;    he   also   noted   that   the 

59 


CAESAR 

mum  locum  castrorum  rclictum  esse  ab  Alexandrinis, 
quod  et  per  se  munitus  esset  et  studio  partim 
pugnandi  partim  spectandi  decucurrissent  in  eum 
locum  in  quo  pugnabatur,  cohortis  illo  circumire 
castra  et  summum  locum  aggredi  iussit  eisque  Car- 
fulenum  praefecit,  et  animi  magnitudine  et  rei 
militaris  scientia  virum  praestantem.  Quo  ut  ven- 
tum  est,  paucis  defendentibus  munitionem,  nostris 
contra  militibus  acerrime  pugnantibus,  diverse 
clamore  et  proelio  perterriti  Alexandrini  trepidantes 
in  omnis  partis  castrorum  discurrere  coeperunt. 
Quorum  perturbatione  nostrorum  animi  adeo  sunt 
incitati  ut  paene  eodem  tempore  ex  omnibus  partibus, 
primi  tamen  editissimum  castrorum  locum  caperent ; 
ex  quo  decurrentes  magnam  multitudinem  hostium  in 
castris  interfecerunt.  Quod  periculum  plerique 
Alexandrini  fugientes  acervatim  se  de  vallo  praecipi- 
tarunt  in  earn  partem  quae  flunaini  erat  adiuncta. 
Horum  primis  in  ipsa  fossa  munitionis  magna  ruina 
oppressis  ceteri  faciliorem  fugam  habuerunt.  Con- 
stat fugisse  ex  castris  regem  ipsum  receptumque  in 
navem  multitudine  eorum  qui  ad  proximas  navis 
adnatabant  demerso  navigio  perisse. 
32  Re  felicissime  celerrimeque  gesta  Caesar  magnae 
victoriae  fiducia  proximo  terrestri  itinere  Alexan- 
60 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

liighest  sector  of  their  camp  had  been  abandoned  by 
the  Alexandrians,  not  only  because  of  its  natural 
strength,  but  also  because,  in  their  eagerness  in 
some  cases  to  fight,  in  others  to  look  on,  its  defenders 
had  rushed  down  to  the  sector  where  the  fighting  was 
going  on  ;  consequently  he  ordered  some  cohorts  to 
proceed  thither,  skirting  the  camp,  and  storm  the 
height,  putting  in  command  of  them  Carfulenus,  a 
man  of  exceptional  personality  and  experience  in  the 
field.  When  they  arrived  there  our  men  fought  with 
the  greatest  gallantry  against  those  few  of  the  enemy 
who  were  defending  the  entrenchment ;  whereupon 
the  Alexandrians,  panic-stricken  by  the  shouting  and 
fighting  on  both  sides  of  them,  began  to  rush  about  in 
confusion  hither  and  thither  throughout  the  camp. 
This  utter  bewilderment  of  theirs  fired  the  spirits  of 
our  troops  to  such  a  pitch  that  they  captured  the 
camp  almost  simultaneously  in  all  sectors,  though  its 
highest  point  was  the  first  to  capitulate  ;  and  from 
that  point  our  men  rushed  down  and  killed  a  vast 
multitude  of  the  enemy  in  the  camp.  In  their  efforts 
to  escape  this  danger  most  of  the  Alexandrians 
hurled  themselves  en  masse  from  the  rampart  into  the 
area  adjoining  the  river ;  the  first  of  these  were 
crushed  by  their  heavy  fall  in  the  actual  trench  of  the 
fortification,  but  the  rest  found  it  easier  to  escape. 
It  is  established  that  the  king  himself  fled  from  the 
camp  and  then,  after  being  taken  aboard  a  ship  along 
with  a  large  number  of  his  men  who  were  swimming 
to  the  nearest  ships,  perished  when  as  a  result  of  the 
numbers  the  vessel  capsized. 

This  signal  victory,  the  outcome  of  a  most  speedy 
and  successful  action,  filled  Caesar  with  such  con- 
fidence that  he  hastened  with  his  cavalry  to  Alexan- 

6i 


CAESAR 

dream  cum  cquitibus  contendit  atque  ea  parte 
oppidi  victor  introiit  quae  praesidio  hostium  tene- 
batur.  Neque  eum  consilium  suum  fefellit  quin 
hostes  eo  proelio  audito  nihil  iam  de  hello  essent 
cogitaturi.  Dignum  adveniens  fructum  virtutis  et 
animi  magnitudinis  tulit :  omnis  enim  multitudo 
oppidanorum  armis  proiectis  munitionihusque  suis  re- 
lictis,  veste  ea  sumpta  qua  supplices  dominantis 
deprecari  consuerunt,  sacrisque  omnibus  prolatis 
quoi'um  religione  precari  ofFensos  iratosque  animos 
regum  erant  soliti,  advenienti  Caesari  occurrerunt 
seque  ei  dediderunt.  Caesar  in  fidem  receptos 
consolatus  per  hostium  munitiones  in  suam  partem 
oppidi  magna  gratulatione  venit  suorum,  qui  non 
tantum  helium  ipsum  ac  dimicationem  sed  etiam 
talem  adventum  eius  felicem  fuisse  laetahantur. 
33  Caesar  Aegypto  atque  Alexandrea  potitus  reges 
constituit  quos  Ptolomaeus  testamento  scripserat 
atque  obtestatus  erat  populum  Romanum  ne  muta- 
rentur.  Nam  maiore  ex  duobus  pueris,  rege,  amisso 
minori  tradidit  regnum  maiorique  ex  duabus  filiis, 
Cleopatrae,  quae  manserat  in  fide  praesidiisque  eius ; 
minorem,  Arsinoen,  cuius  nomine  diu  regnasse 
impotenter  Ganymeden  docuimus,  deducere  ex  regno 

*  See  chapter  4. 
62 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

dria  bv  the  nearest  overland  route,  and  entered  it 
triumphantly  by  that  quarter  of  the  town  which  was 
held  by  the  enemy  garrison.  Nor  was  he  mistaken 
in  his  own  conclusion  that,  as  soon  as  they  heard  of 
that  battle,  the  enemy  would  cease  to  think  any 
longer  in  terms  of  w-ar.  On  his  arrival  he  reaped  the 
well-earned  fruits  of  valour  and  magnanimity ;  for 
the  entire  population  of  townsfolk  threw  down  their 
arms,  abandoned  their  fortifications,  assumed  that 
garb  in  which  suppliants  are  used  to  placate  tyrants 
with  earnest  prayers,  and  brought  forth  all  the  sacred 
emblems  by  the  sanctity  of  which  they  had  been  wont 
to  conjure  the  embittered  and  wrathful  hearts  of  their 
kings  :  even  so  did  they  hasten  to  meet  Caesar  on  his 
arrival  and  surrendered  themselves  to  him.  Caesar 
took  them  formally  under  his  protection  and  consoled 
them ;  then,  passing  through  the  enemy  fortifica- 
tions, he  came  to  his  own  quarter  of  the  town  amid 
loud  cheers  of  congratulation  from  his  own  troops, 
who  rejoiced  at  the  happy  issue,  not  only  of  the  war 
itself  and  the  fighting,  but  also  of  his  arrival  under 
such  circumstances. 

Having  made  himself  master  of  Egypt  and 
Alexandria,  Caesar  appointed  as  kings  those  whose 
names  Ptolemaeus  had  \\Titten  down  in  his  will  with 
an  earnest  appeal  to  the  Roman  people  that  they 
should  not  be  altered.  The  elder  of  the  two  boys — 
the  late  king — being  now  no  more,  Caesar  assigned 
the  kingdom  to  the  younger  one  and  to  Cleopatra, 
the  elder  of  the  two  daughters,  who  had  remained 
his  loyal  adherent ;  whereas  Arsinoe,  the  younger 
daughter,  in  whose  name,  as  we  have  shewn,'^ 
Ganymedes  had  long  been  exercising  an  unbridled 
sway,  he  determined  to  remove  from  the  realm,  to 

63 


CAESAR 

statuit,  ne  qua  rursus  nova  dissensio,  prius  quam 
diuturnitate  confirmarentur  regibus  imperia,  per 
homines  seditiosos  nasceretur.  Legiones  ibi  vete- 
rana  sexta  secum  reducta  ceteras  reliquit,  quo 
firmius  esset  eorum  regum  imperium,  qui  neque 
amorem  suorum  habere  poterant,  quod  fideliter 
permanserant  in  Caesaris  amicitia,  neque  vetustatis 
auetoritatem,  paucis  diebus  reges  constituti.  Simul 
ad  imperi  nostri  dignitatem  utiUtatemque  publicam 
pertinere  existimabat,  si  permanerent  in  fide  reges, 
praesidiis  eos  nostris  esse  tutos ;  si  essent  ingrati, 
posse  isdem  praesidiis  coerceri.  Sic  rebus  omnibus 
confectis  et  collocatis  ipse  ^  profectus  est  in  Syriam. 
34  Dum  haec  in  Aegypto  geruntur,  rex  Deiotarus  ad 
Domitium  Calvinum,  cui  Caesar  Asiam  finitimasque 
provincias  administrandas  tradiderat,  venit  oratum 
ne  Armeniam  minorem,  regnum  suum,  neve  Cappa- 
dociam,  regnum  Ariobarzanis,  possideri  vastarique 
pateretur  a  Pharnace ;  quo  malo  nisi  liberarentur, 
imperata  se  facere  pecuniamque  promissam  Caesari 
non  posse  persolvere.  Domitius,  non  tantum  ad 
exphcandos  sumptus  rei  miUtaris  cum  pecuniam 
necessariam  esse  iudicaret,  sed  etiam  turpe  populo 
Romano  et  C.  Caesari  victori  sibique  infame  esse 
statueret  i*egna  sociorum  atque  amicorum  ab  externo 
rege  occupari,  nuntios  confestim  ad  Pharnacem  misit, 

^  The  MSS.  add  itinere  terrestri,  which  Nipperdey  deleted. 

^  The  Twenty-Seventh,  the  Thirty-Seventh  and  a  third 
whose  identity  is  not  certain — possibly  the  one  despatched 
overland  by  Calvinus  (see  ch.  34). 

2  King  of  Pontus,  son  of  Mithridates  the  Great. 

64 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

prevent  any  renewed  dissensions  coming  into  being 
among  factious  folk  before  the  dominion  of  the  royal 
pair  could  be  consolidated  by  the  passage  of  time. 
The  veteran  Sixth  legion  he  took  away  with  him : 
all  the  others  ^  he  left  there,  the  more  to  bolster 
up  the  dominion  of  the  said  rulers,  who  could  enjoy 
neither  the  affection  of  their  people,  inasmuch  as 
they  had  remained  throughout  staunch  friends  of 
Caesar,  nor  the  authority  of  a  long-established  reign, 
it  being  but  a  few  days  since  they  came  to  the 
throne.  At  the  same  time  he  deemed  it  conducive 
to  the  dignity  of  our  empire  and  to  public  expediency 
that,  if  the  rulers  remained  loyal,  they  should  be  pro- 
tected by  our  troops :  whereas  if  they  proved 
ungrateful,  those  same  troops  could  hold  them  in 
check.  Having  thus  completed  all  his  dispositions, 
he  set  out  in  person  for  Syria. 

While  these  events  were  taking  place  in  Egypt, 
king  Deiotarus  came  to  Domitius  Calvinus,  to  whom 
Caesar  had  assigned  the  government  of  Asia  and  the 
neighbouring  provinces,  to  beg  him  not  to  allow 
Lesser  Armenia,  his  own  kingdom,  or  Cappadocia, 
the  kingdom  of  Ariobarzanes,  to  be  occupied  and 
over-run  by  Pharnaces  ^ :  for  unless  they  were 
liberated  from  this  scourge,  he  could  not  carry  out 
his  instructions  and  pay  out  the  money  he  had 
promised  to  Caesar.  As  Domitius  not  only  con- 
sidered the  money  to  be  indispensable  for  defraying 
military  expenses,  but  also  decided  it  was  a  shameful 
affront  to  the  Roman  people  and  to  the  triumphant 
C.  Caesar  as  well  as  a  slight  to  himself  that  the 
kingdoms  of  their  allies  and  friends  should  be  seized 
by  a  foreign  king,  he  forthwith  sent  a  deputation  to 
Pharnaces,  bidding  him  withdraw  from  Armenia  and 

6;; 


CAESAR 

Armenia  C'appadociacjue  decederet  neve  occupatione 
belli  civilis  populi  Romani  ius  maiestatemque 
temptaret.  Hanc  denuntiationem  cum  maiorem 
vim  habituram  existimaret,  si  propius  eas  regiones 
cum  exercitu  accessisset,  ad  legiones  profectus  unam 
ex  tribus,  XXXVI.,  secum  ducit,  duas  in  Aegvptum 
ad  Caesarem  mittit  litteris  eius  evocatas ;  quarum 
altera  bello  Alexandrino  non  occurrit,  quod  itinere 
terrestri  per  Syriam  erat  missa.  Adiungit  Cn. 
Domitius  legioni  XXX\'I.  duas  ab  Deiotaro,  quas 
ille  disciplina  atque  armatura  nostra  compluris  annos 
constitutas  habebat,  equitesque  C,  totidemque 
ab  Ariobarzane  sumit.  Mittit  P.  Sestium  ad  C. 
Plaetorium  quaestorem,  ut  legionem  adduceret  quae 
ex  tumultuariis  militibus  in  Ponto  confecta  erat, 
Quintumque  Patisium  in  Ciliciam  ad  auxilia  arces- 
senda.  Quae  copiae  celeriter  omnes  iussu  Domiti 
Comana  convenerunt. 
35  Interim  legati  a  Pharnace  responsa  referunt : 
Cappadocia  se  decessisse,  Armeniam  minorem  re- 
cepisse,  quam  paterno  nomine  iure  obtinere  deberet. 
Denique  eius  regni  causa  integra  Caesari  servaretur : 
paratum  enim  se  facere  quod  is  statuisset.  Cn. 
Domitius  cum  animadverteret  eum  Cappadocia 
decessisse  non  voluntate  adductum  sed  necessitate, 
quod  facilius  Armeniam  defendere  posset  subiectam 
suo  regno  quam  Cappadociam  longius  remotam, 
quodque  omnis  tris  legiones  adducturum  Domitium 

^  See  chapter  9  (arrival  of  the  Thirty-Seventh)  and  chapter 
33,  note  1  on  p.  64. 
^  A  town  in  Pontus. 

66 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

Cappadocia  and  not  assail  the  rights  and  majesty 
of  the  Roman  people  by  resorting  to  civil  war.  In  the 
belief  that  this  warning  would  have  greater  force  if 
he  approached  closer  to  that  area  with  an  army, 
he  set  out  for  his  legions  ;  then,  taking  with  him  one 
of  the  three,  the  Thirty-Sixth,  he  sent  to  Caesar  in 
Egypt  the  two  ^  which  the  latter  had  called  for  in  his 
despatch.  One  of  these  two  did  not  arrive  in  time 
for  the  Alexandrian  war,  as  it  was  sent  by  the  over- 
land route  through  Syria.  Cn.  Domitius  reinforced 
the  Thirty-Sixth  legion  with  two  from  Deiotarus, 
which  the  latter  had  had  for  several  years,  having 
built  them  up  on  our  system  of  discipline  and 
amiament ;  he  also  added  to  it  100  horsemen,  and 
took  a  like  number  from  Ai'iobarzanes.  He  sent 
P.  Sestius  to  C.  Plaetorius,  the  quaestor,  with 
instructions  to  bring  the  legion  which  had  been 
formed  from  the  hastily  improvised  forces  in  Pontus  ; 
and  Quintus  Patisius  to  Cilicia  to  muster  auxiliary 
troops.  All  these  forces  speedily  assembled  at 
Comana  ^  according  to  the  orders  of  Domitius. 

Meantime  the  envoys  brought  back  this  reply  from 
Pharnaces :  '  he  had  withdrawn  from  Cappadocia, 
but  had  recovered  Lesser  Armenia,  which  he  ought 
to  possess  by  due  right  of  inheritance  from  his  father. 
In  short,  the  issue  touching  that  kingdom  should  be 
kept  open  for  Caesar's  decision ;  for  he  was  ready  to 
do  what  Caesar  should  decide.'  Now  Cn.  Domitius 
observed  that  he  had  withdrawn  from  Cappadocia 
not  from  free  choice  but  of  necessity,  since  he  could 
defend  Armenia  next  door  to  his  own  kingdom  more 
easily  than  the  more  distant  Cappadocia,  and  also 
because  he  had  supposed  that  Domitius  would  bring 
up  all  three  legions ;    and  that  when  he  heard  that 

67 


CAESAR 

putasset,  ex  (iiiibus  rum  duas  ad  Caesarem  missas 
audisset,  audacius  in  Armenia  substitisse,  per- 
severarc  coepit,  ut  eo  quoque  regno  decederet ;  neque 
enim  aliud  ius  esse  Cappadociae  atque  Armeniae, 
nee  iuste  eum  postulare  ut  in  Caesaris  adventum  res 
integra  differetur ;  id  enim  esse  integrum  quod  ita 
esset  ut  fuisset.  His  responsis  datis  cum  eis  copiis 
quas  supra  scripsi  profectus  est  in  Armeniam  locisque 
superioribus  iter  faccre  instituit :  nam  ex  Ponto  a 
Comanis  iugum  editum  silvestre  est,  pertinens  in 
Armeniam  minorem,  quo  Cappadocia  finitur  ab 
Armenia  ;  cuius  itineris  has  esse  certas  opportuni- 
tates  vidit,^  quod  in  locis  superioribus  nullus  impetus 
repentinus  accidere  hostium  poterat,  et  quod  Cappa- 
docia his  iugis  subiecta  magnam  commeatus  copiam 
erat  sumministratura. 
36  Compluris  interim  legationes  Pharnaces  ad  Domi- 
tium  mittit  quae  de  pace  agerent  regiaque  munera 
Domitio  ferrent.  Ea  constanter  omnia  aspernabatur 
nee  sibi  quicquam  fore  antiquius  quam  dignitatem 
populi  Romani  et  regna  sociorum  reciperare  legatis 
respondebat.  Magnis  et  continuis  itineribus  con- 
fectis  cum  adventaret  ad  NicopoUm,  quod  oppidum 
positum  in  Armenia  minore  est  piano  ipso  loco, 
montibus  tamen  altis  ab  duobus  lateribus  obiectis 
satis    magno   intervallo    ab    oppido   remotis,   castra 

^  vidit  added  by  Forchhammer. 


^  The  conventional  boundaries  as  marked  in  Map  2  are  only 
approximate :  Armenia  may  well  have  extended  further  W. 
and  Cappadocia  further  N.  r3omitius  may,  as  K.  Holmes 
suggested,  have  followed  the  ridge  between  the  rivers  Lycus 
and  Iris;    and  this  would  have  been  his  most  direct  route. 

68 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

two  of  those  legions  had  been  sent  to  Caesar,  this 
had  heightened  his  rash  resolve  to  stay  on  in  Armenia. 
Consequently  Domitius  proceeded  to  insist  that  Phar- 
naces  should  withdraw  from  that  kingdom  also : 
as  far  as  legal  right  went,  there  was  no  difference 
between  Cappadocia  and  Armenia,  nor  had  he  any 
right  to  demand  that  the  question  should  be  left  open 
pending  Caesar's  arrival ;  a  matter  was  '  open  ' 
when  it  remained  just  as  it  had  been.'  Having  given 
him  this  reply  Domitius  set  out  for  Armenia  with  the 
forces  I  have  recorded  above,  and  began  by  marching 
along  the  higher  ground.  From  Comana  in  Pontus 
there  is,  in  fact,  a  lofty,  wooded  ridge  which  extends 
into  Lesser  Armenia  and  forms  the  boundary  ^  be- 
tween Cappadocia  and  Armenia.  This  route,  as  he 
saw,  offered  definite  advantages,  namely  that  on  the 
higher  ground  no  sudden  enemy  attack  could  develop, 
and  that,  as  Cappadocia  adjoined  this  ridge,  it  was 
likely  to  assist  him  by  affording  an  abundance  of 
supplies. 

Meanwhile  Pharnaces  sent  several  embassies  to 
Domitius  to  discuss  peace  and  to  take  princely  gifts 
for  Domitius.  All  these  he  firmly  rejected  and 
replied  to  the  envoys  that  as  far  as  he  was  concerned 
nothing  should  take  precedence  over  the  prestige 
of  the  Roman  people  and  the  recovery  of  the  king- 
doms of  its  allies.  Then,  after  completing  an  un- 
interrupted succession  of  long  marches,  he  began  to 
approach  Nicopolis,  a  town  in  Lesser  Armenia  which 
is  actually  situated  in  the  plain,  though  it  is  hemmed 
in  on  two  sides  by  high  mountains  at  a  fairish 
distance.     Here    he    pitched    camp    roughly    seven 

But  he  ma}'  have  taken  a  more  devious  route  further  S.  for 
the  motives  suggested  in  the  text. 

69 


CAESAR 

posuit  longe  a  Nieopoli  circiter  niilia  passuum  \ll. 
Quibus  ex  castris  cum  locus  angustus  atque  im- 
peditus  esset  transeundus,  Pharnaces  in  insidiis 
delectos  pedites  omnisque  paene  disposuit  equites, 
magnam  autem  multitudinem  pecoris  intra  eas 
fauces  dissipari  iussit  paganosque  '  et  oppidanos 
in  his  locis  obversari,  ut  sive  amicus  Domitius  eas 
angustias  transiret,  nihil  de  insidiis  suspicaretur,  cum 
in  agris  et  pecora  et  homines  animum  adverteret 
versari  tamquam  amicorum  adventu,  sive  inimicus  ut 
in  hostium  finis  veniret,  praeda  diripienda  milites 
dissiparentur  dispersique  caederentur. 
37  Haec  cum  administraret,  numquam  tamen  inter- 
mittebat  legates  de  pace  atque  amicitia  mittere  ad 
Domitium,  cum  hoc  ipso  crederet  facilius  eum 
decipi  posse.  At  contra  spes  pacis  Domitio  in  isdem 
castris  moi'andi  attulit  causam.  Ita  Pharnaces, 
amissa  proximi  temporis  occasione  cum  vereretur  ne 
cognoscerentur  insidiae,  suos  in  castra  revocavit. 
Donnitius  postero  die  propius  Nicopolim  accessit 
castraque  oppido  contulit.  Quae  dum  muniunt 
nostri,  Pharnaces  aciem  instruxit  more  suo  atque 
instituto.  In  fronte  enim  simplici  derecta  acie 
coi-nua  trinis  firmabantur  subsidiis ;  eadem  ratione 
haec  media  collocabantur  acie  duobus  dextra 
70 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

miles  from  Nicopolis.  From  this  camp  he  had  to 
traverse  a  narrow  and  confined  defile ;  and  for  this 
reason  Pharnaces  aiTayed  the  pick  of  his  infantry 
and  practically  all  his  cavalry  in  an  ambush,  giving 
orders,  moreover,  that  a  large  number  of  cattle 
should  be  pastured  at  various  points  within  this 
gorge,  and  that  the  peasants  and  burghers  should 
go  about  openly  in  that  area.  His  object  in  so  doing 
was  that,  if  Domitius  should  pass  through  that  defile 
as  a  fi'iend,  he  might  have  no  suspicions  of  an  ambush, 
as  he  would  observe  both  men  and  beasts  moving 
about  the  countryside,  as  if  friends  were  in  the  offing  ; 
while  if  he  should  come  in  no  friendly  spirit,  treating 
it  as  enemy  territory,  his  troops  might  become 
scattered  in  the  process  of  plundering  and  so  be  cut 
down  piecemeal. 

While  making  these  dispositions  he  still  constantly 
continued  sending  delegations  to  Domitius  to  talk  of 
peace  and  friendship,  as  he  believed  that  by  these 
self-same  tactics  Domitius  could  the  more  readily  be 
duped.  But  on  the  other  hand  Domitius'  hopes 
of  peace  afforded  him  a  motive  for  tarrying  in  the 
camp,  where  he  was.  Consequently,  as  Pharnaces 
had  now  lost  his  immediate  opportunity  and  was 
afraid  that  his  ambush  might  be  discovered,  he  re- 
called his  troops  to  camp.  On  the  morrow  Domitius 
advanced  nearer  Nicopolis  and  pitched  his  camp  over 
against  the  town.  While  our  troops  were  fortifying 
it,  Pharnaces  drew  up  his  line  of  battle  according 
to  his  own  established  custom.  This,  in  fact,  was 
formed  with  its  front  as  a  single  straight  line,  with 
each  of  the  wings  reinforced  by  three  supporting 
lines  ;  and  on  the  same  principle  support  lines  were 
also  posted  in  the  centre,  while  ia  the  two  spaces, 

71 


CAESAR 

sinistraque  intervallis  simplicibus  ordinibus  instructis. 
Perfecit  inceptum  castrorum  opus  Domitius  parte 
copiarum  pro  vallo  constituta. 

38  Proxima  nocte  Pharnaces  interceptis  tabellariis, 
qui  de  Alexandrinis  rebus  litteras  ad  Domitium 
ferebant,  cognoscit  Caesarem  magno  in  periculo 
versari  flagitarique  ab  Domitio  ut  quam  primum 
Caesari  subsidia  mitteret  propiusque  ipse  Alexan- 
dream  per  Syriam  accederet.  Qua  cognita  re 
Pharnaces  victoriae  loco  ducebat,  si  trahere  tempus 
posset,  cum  discedendum  Domitio  celeriter  putaret. 
Itaque  ab  oppido,  qua  facillimum  accessum  et 
aequissimum  ad  dimicandum  nostris  videbat,  fossas 
duas  derectas  non  ita  magno  medio  intervallo  relicto 
nil  pedum  altitudinis  in  eum  locum  deduxit  quo 
longius  constituerat  suam  non  producere  aciem. 
Inter  has  fossas  aciem  semper  instruebat,  equitatum 
autem  omnem  ab  lateribus  extra  fossam  collocabat ; 
qui  neque  aliter  utilis  esse  poterat  et  multum  numero 
anteibat  nostrum  equitatum. 

39  Domitius  autem,  cum  Caesaris  magis  periculo 
quam  suo  commoveretur  neque  se  tuto  discessurum 
arbitraretur,  si  condiciones  quas  reiecerat  rursus 
appeteret  aut  sine  causa  ^  discederet,  ex  propinquis 
castris  in  aciem  exercitum  eduxit ;  XXXVI.  legionem 
in  dextro  cornu  collocavit,  Ponticam  in  sinistro, 
Deiotari  legiones  in  mediam  aciem  contulit,  quibus 

1  sine  causa  MSS.     Hoffmann  conjectured  si  negatis. 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

on  the  right  hand  and  the  left,  single  ranks  were 
drawn  up.  Having  once  begun  the  task  of  fortifying 
his  camp,  Domitius  completed  it,  with  part  of  his 
forces  posted  in  front  of  the  rampart. 

The  following  night  Pharnaces  intercepted  some 
couriers  who  were  carrying  despatches  to  Domitius 
concerning  the  situation  at  Alexandria.  From  them 
he  learned  that  Caesar  was  in  a  very  dangerous 
position,  and  that  an  urgent  request  was  being  made 
to  Domitius  that  he  should  send  Caesar  reinforce- 
ments as  soon  as  possible  and  himself  advance 
through  Syria  closer  to  Alexandria.  On  learning 
this,  Pharnaces  saw  himself  virtually  victorious  if  he 
could  spin  out  the  time,  as  he  thought  that  Domitius 
must  speedily  ^\•ithdraw.  Accordingly,  from  that 
side  of  the  town  which  he  saw  offered  our  men  the 
easiest  and  most  favourable  line  of  approach  to  do 
battle,  he  carried  two  straight  trenches,  four  feet 
deep  and  spaced  not  so  very  far  apart,  as  far  as  the 
point  beyond  which  he  had  decided  not  to  advance 
his  own  battle  line.  Between  these  trenches  he 
consistently  drew  up  his  line,  while  posting  all  his 
cavalry  on  the  flanks  outside  the  trench ;  for  other- 
wise they  could  not  be  of  any  use,  and  they  far  out- 
numbered our  cavalry. 

Domitius,  however,  was  more  disturbed  by  Caesar's 
peril  than  by  his  own;  and  as  he  thought  that  he 
would  not  be  safe  in  withdrawing,  if  he  made  a  fresh 
attempt  to  secure  the  terms  he  had  rejected  or  if  he 
withdrew  for  no  good  reason,  he  deployed  his  army 
from  its  nearby  camp  into  battle  formation.  He 
posted  the  Thirty-Sixth  legion  on  the  right  wing  and 
the  Pontic  one  on  the  left,  while  the  legions  of 
Deiotainis   he   concentrated   in   the   centre,   leaving 

73 


CAESAR 

tamen  aIlgusti'^sinmm  intervallum  frontis  reliquit 
reliquis  cohortibus  in  subsidiis  colloeatis.  Sic  utrim- 
que  acie  instructa  processum  est  ad  dimicandum. 
40  Signo  sub  idem  tempus  ab  utroque  dato  concurri- 
tur :  acriter  varieque  pugnatur.  Nam  XXX\'I. 
legio,  cum  extra  fossam  in  equites  regis  impetum 
fecisset,  adeo  secundum  proelium  fecit  ut  moenibus 
oppidi  succederet  fossamque  transiret  aversosque 
hostis  aggrederetur.  At  Pontica  ex  altera  parte 
legio,  cum  paulum  aversa  hostibus  cessisset,  fossam 
autem  circumire  ac  transcendere  ^  conata  esset,  ut 
aperto  latere  aggrederetur  hostem,  in  ipso  transitu 
fossae  confixa  et  oppressa  est.  Deiotari  vero  legiones 
vix  impetum  sustinuerunt.  Ita  victrices  regiae 
copiae  cornu  suo  dextro  mediaque  acie  converterunt 
se  ad  XXX\'I.  legionem.  Quae  tamen  fortiter 
vincentium  impetum  sustinuit,  magnis  copiis  hostium 
circumdata  praesentissimo  animo  pugnans  in  orbem 
se  recepit  ad  radices  montium :  quo  Phariiaces 
insequi  propter  iniquitatem  loci  noluit.  Ita  Pontica 
legione  paene  tota  amissa,  magna  parte  Deiotari 
militum  interfecta  XXX\'I.  legio  in  loca  se  superiora 
contulit  non  amplius  CCL  desideratis.  Cecide- 
runt  eo  proelio  splendidi  atque  inlustres  viri  non 
nulli,  equites  Romani.  Quo  tamen  incommodo 
Domitius  accepto  reliquias  exercitus  dissipati  collegit 

^  acies  secundo  MSS.  :  ac  transcendere  Nipperdey. 


^  The  text  is  corrupt  and  the  manoeuvre  is  by  no  means 
dear;  but  it  would  seem  that  part,  if  not  all,  the  Pontic 
legion — like  the  Thirty-Sixth — was  posted  outside  the  trench, 
and  so,  to  attack  the  enemy  flank,  they  had  either  to  cross  the 
trench  (its  width  is  not  stated)  or  else  retire  far  enough  U>  work 
round  its  end. 

74 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

them,  however,  a  very  narrow  frontage  and  posting 
his  remaining  cohorts  behind  them  in  support. 
The  Hnes  being  thus  arrayed  on  either  side,  they 
proceeded  to  battle. 

The  signal  to  attack  was  given  almost  simul- 
taneously on  both  sides :  then  came  the  charge, 
with  hotly  contested  and  fluctuating  fighting.  Thus 
the  Thirty-iSixth  legion  launched  an  attack  on  the 
king's  cavalry  outside  the  trench  and  fought  so 
successful  an  action  that  it  advanced  up  to  the  walls 
of  the  town,  crossed  the  trench,  and  attacked  the 
enemy  in  rear.  The  Pontic  legion,  however,  on  the 
other  flank,  drew  back  a  little  from  the  enemy, 
and  attempted,  moreover,  to  go  round  or  cross  the 
trench,  so  as  to  attack  the  enemy's  exposed  flank ; 
but  in  the  actual  crossing  of  the  trench  it  was  pinned 
down  and  overwhelmed.'^  The  legions  of  Deiotarus, 
indeed,  offered  scarcely  any  resistance  to  the  attack. 
Consequently  the  king's  forces,  victorious  on  their 
own  right  wing  and  in  the  centre  of  the  line,  now 
turned  upon  the  Thirty-Sixth  legion.  The  latter, 
nevertheless,  bore  up  bravely  under  the  victors' 
attack  and,  though  surrounded  by  large  enemy  forces, 
yet  with  consummate  presence  of  mind  formed  a 
circle  and  so  made  a  fighting  withdrawal  to  the  foot- 
hills, where  Pharnaces  was  loth  to  pursue  it  owing  to 
the  hilly  nature  of  the  ground.  And  so,  %\-ith  the 
Pontic  legion  an  almost  total  loss  and  a  large  propor- 
tion of  the  troops  of  Deiotarus  killed,  the  Thirty- 
Sixth  legion  retired  to  higher  ground  with  losses  not 
exceeding  250  men.  There  fell  in  that  battle  not  a 
few  Roman  knights — ^brilliant  and  distinguished  men. 
After  sustaining  this  defeat  Domitius  none  the  less 
collected   the   remnants  of  his  scattered  army  and 

75 


CAESAR 

itineribusque   tutis  per  Cappadociarn   se   in    Asiam 
recepit. 

41  Pharnaces  rebus  secundis  elatus,  cum  de  Caesare 
ea  quae  optabat  speraret,  Pontum  omnibus  copiis 
occupavit  ibique  et  victor  et  crudelissimus  rex,  cum 
sibi  fortunam  paternam  feliciore  eventu  destinaret, 
niulta  oppida  expugnavit,  bona  civium  Romanorum 
Ponticorumque  diripuit,  supplicia  constituit  in  eos 
qui  aliquam  formae  atque  aetatis  commendationem 
habebant  ea  quae  morte  essent  miseriora,  Pontum- 
que  nullo  defendente  paternum  regnum  glorians  se 
recepisse  obtinebat. 

42  Sub  idem  tempus  in  Illyrico  est  incommodum 
acceptum,  quae  provincia  superioribus  mensibus 
retenta  non  tantum  sine  ignominia  sed  etiam  cum 
laude  erat.  Namque  eo  missus  aestate  cum  duabus 
legionibus  Q.  Cornificius,  Caesaris  quaestor,  pro 
praetore,  quamquam  erat  provincia  minime  copiosa 
ad  exercitus  alendos  et  finitimo  bello  ac  dissen- 
sionibus  confecta  et  vastata,  tamen  prudentia  ac 
diligentia  sua,  quod  magnam  curam  suscipiebat  ne 
quo  temere  progrederetur,  et  recepit  et  defendit. 
Namque  et  castella  complura  locis  editis  posita, 
quorum  opportunitas  castellanos  impellebat  ad 
decursiones    faciendas    et    bellum   inferendum,    ex- 


^  His  hereditary  kingdom,  from  which  his  father  Mithri- 
dates  had  been  driven  by  LucuUus. 

-  Mithridates  tlie  Great,  a  fugitive  from  Pompey  the  Great, 
took  his  own  life  in  63  B.C.  as  a  result  of  the  rebellion  of  his 
son  Pharnaces. 

*  I'iz.  castration,  cf.  ch.  70. 

76 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

withdi'ew  by  safe  routes  through  Cappadocia  into 
Asia. 

Elated  by  this  success  and  confident  that  his  wishes 
for  Caesar's  defeat  would  be  granted,  Pharnaces 
seized  Pontus  ^  with  all  his  forces.  There  he  played 
the  role  of  victor  and  utterly  ruthless  tyrant  and, 
promising  himself  his  father's  fortune  though  with  a 
happier  ending,^  he  took  many  towns  by  storm, 
plundered  the  property  of  Roman  and  Pontic 
citizens,  and  decreed  for  those  who  in  respect  of 
youth  and  beauty  had  anything  to  commend  them 
such  punishments  ^  as  proved  more  pitiful  than  death. 
Thus  he  held  unchallenged  sway  over  Pontus,  boast- 
ing that  he  had  recovered  the  kingdom  of  his 
father. 

Round  about  the  same  time  a  set-back  was  sustained 
in  Illyricum,  a  province  which  during  the  previous 
months  had  been  firmly  held  not  merely  without 
incurring  disgrace  but  even  with  distinction.  To  this 
province  there  had  been  sent  out  in  the  summer  a 
quaestor  of  Caesar's,  Q.  Cornificius,  as  pro-praetor ;  48  b.c. 
and  although  the  province  was  not  at  all  abundantly 
stocked  for  supporting  armies  and  was  exhausted 
and  wasted  bv  war  upon  its  borders  and  by  rebellions,* 
yet  by  his  far-sighted  and  careful  policy,  taking 
great  pains  not  to  make  an  ill-considered  advance  in 
any  quarter,  he  recovered  and  defended  it.  For 
example,  he  successfully  stormed  several  mountain 
strongholds,  the  commanding  position  of  which 
prompted  their  occupants  to  carry  on  a  predatory 
warfare,  and  presented  his  troops  with  the  resulting 

*  The  Roman  residents  consistently  supported  Caesar,  but 
the  natives  sided  with  Pompey.  The  heavy  fighting  at 
Dyrrhachium  was  just  south  of  the  border  of  the  province. 

77 


CAESAR 

pugnavit  eaque  praeda  milites  donavit,  quae  etsi 
erat  tenuis,  tamen  in  tanta  provinciae  desperatione 
erat  grata,  praesertim  virtute  parta,  et  cum  Octavius 
ex  fuga  Pharsalici  proeli  magna  classe  in  ilium  se 
sinum  contulisset,  paucis  navibus  ladertinorum, 
quorum  semper  in  rem  publioam  singulare  constiterat 
officium,  dispersis  Octavianis  navibus  erat  potitus,  ut 
vel  classe  dimicare  posset  adiunctis  captivis  navibus 
sociorum.  Cum  diversissima  parte  orbis  terrarum 
Cn.  Pompeium  Caesar  victor  sequeretur  complurisque 
advei'sarios  in  Illyricum  propter  Macedoniae  pro- 
pinquitatem  se  reliquiis  ex  fuga  collectis  contulisse 
audiret,  litteras  ad  Gabinium  mittit,  uti  cum  legio- 
nibus  tironum,  quae  nuper  erant  conscriptae,  pro- 
ficisceretur  in  Illyricum  coniunctisque  copiis  cum 
Q.  Cornificio,  si  quod  periculum  provinciae  in- 
ferretur,  depelleret ;  sin  ea  non  magnis  copiis  tuta 
esse  posset,  in  Macedoniam  legiones  adduceret. 
Omnem  enim  illam  partem  regionemque  vivo  Cn. 
Pompeio  bellum  instauraturam  esse  credebat. 
43  Gabinius  ut  in  Illyricum  venit  hiberno  tempore 
aiini  ac  difficili  sive  copiosiorem  pi'ovinciam  existimans 
sive  multum  fortunae  victoris  Caesaris  tribuens  sive 
virtute  et  scientia  sua  confisus,  qua  saepe  in  bellis 

^  See  ch.  3.     Ca«sar  had  recalled  him  from  exile. 
78 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

booty  ;  which,  paltry  though  it  was,  was  none  the  less 
welcome — ^considering  the  very  meagre  prospects  of 
the  province — especially  since  it  was  the  prize  of 
valour.  Again,  when  in  the  course  of  his  flight  from 
the  battle  of  Pharsalia  Octavius  took  refuge  with  a 
large  fleet  upon  that  coast,  Cornificius,  with  the  aid 
of  a  few  ships  of  the  men  of  ladera — those  devoted 
supporters  of  the  commonwealth,  who  were  unsur- 
passed in  their  constant  loyalty — made  himself 
master  of  Octavius'  scattered  ships,  and  was  accord- 
ingly enabled  by  the  addition  of  these  vessels  to 
those  of  his  allies  to  go  into  action  with  something 
like  a  fleet.  And  when  in  quite  a  different  quarter  of 
the  globe  Caesar  Avas  victoriouslv  pui'suing  Cn. 
Pompeius,  and  heard  that  several  of  his  opponents 
had  collected  the  remnants  of  the  fugitives  and  taken 
refuge  in  lUyricum  on  account  of  its  proximity  to 
Macedonia,  he  sent  despatches  to  Gabinius,i  bidding 
him  set  out  for  Ilh'ricum  with  the  legions  of  recruits 
which  had  recently  been  raised :  there  he  was  to 
join  forces  with  Q.  Cornificius  and  repulse  any 
dangerous  move  that  might  be  made  against  the 
province :  if  on  the  other  hand  no  large  forces  were 
needed  to  ensure  the  safety  of  the  province,  he  was  to 
lead  his  legions  into  Macedonia.  It  was  in  fact  his 
belief  that  the  whole  of  that  neighbourhood  and  area 
would  revive  the  war,  so  long  as  Cn.  Pompeius  was 
alive. 

When  Gabinius  came  to  Illvricum  in  the  difficult 
winter  season, — whether  it  was  he  thought  the 
province  was  more  abundantly  supplied,  or  whether 
he  set  great  store  by  Caesar's  winning  luck,  or 
whether  he  trusted  in  his  own  courage  and  skill, 
which   had   many   a  time   enabled   him,   when   sur- 

79 


CAESAR 

})ericlitatus  magnas  res  et  secundas  ductu  ausuque 
suo  gesserat,  neque  provinciae  facultatibus  sub- 
levabatur,  quae  partim  erat  exinanita  partim 
infidelis,  neque  navibus  intercluso  mari  tempestatibus 
commeatus  supportari  poterat ;  magnisque  difficulta- 
tibus  coactus  non  ut  volebat  sed  ut  necesse  erat 
bellum  gerebat.  Ita  cum  durissimis  tempestatibus 
propter  inopiam  castella  aut  oppida  expugnare 
cogeretur,  crebro  incommoda  accipiebat  adeoque  est 
a  barbaris  contemptus  ut  Salonam  se  recipiens  in 
oppidum  maritimum,  quod  elves  Romani  fortissimi 
fidelissimi  incolebant,  in  agmine  dimicare  sit  coactus. 
Quo  proelio  duobus  milibus  militum  amplius  amissis, 
centurionibus  XXXVIII,  tribunis  HIT,  cum  reliquis 
copiis  Salonam  se  recepit  summaque  ibi  difficultate 
rerum  omnium  pressus  paucis  mensibus  morbo  periit. 
Cuius  et  infelicitas  vivi  et  subita  mors  in  magnam 
spem  Octavium  adduxit  provinciae  potiendae  ;  quem 
tamen  diutius  in  rebus  secundis  et  fortuna,  quae 
plurimum  in  bellis  potest,  diligentiaque  Cornifici  et 
virtus  Vatini  versari  passa  non  est. 
44  Vatinius  Brundisi  cum  esset,  cognitis  rebus  quae 
gesta  erant  in  lUyrico,  cum  crebris  litteris  Cornifici 
ad  auxilium  provinciae  ferendum  evocaretur  et  M. 
Octavium  audiret  cum  barbaris  foedera  percussisse 
compluribusque  locis  nostrorum  militum  oppugnare 
praesidia  partim  classe  per  se  partim  pedestribus 
80 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

rounded  by  the  hazards  of  war,  to  score  great 
successes  by  his  personal  leadership  and  initiative — 
anyway  he  dei'ived  no  support  from  the  resources  of 
the  province,  bled  white  as  it  partly  was,  and  partly 
disloyal,  nor  could  supplies  be  conveyed  to  him  by 
ship,  since  stormy  weather  had  interrupted  naviga- 
tion. As  a  result  of  these  considerable  difficulties  he 
was  forced  to  conduct  the  campaign,  not  as  he  wished, 
but  as  necessity  dictated.  And  so,  as  lack  of  supplies 
forced  him  to  storm  towns  or  strongholds  in  very 
adverse  weather,  he  frequently  sustained  reverses, 
and  was  held  by  the  natives  in  such  contempt  that, 
while  retreating  on  Salona,  a  coastal  town  occupied 
by  very  gallant  and  loyal  Roman  citizens,  he  was 
forced  to  fight  an  action  on  the  march.  In  this  battle  jau.  47 
he  lost  more  than  two  thousand  soldiers,  thirty-eight 
centurions  and  four  tribunes  :  with  what  was  left  of  his 
forces  he  retired  to  Salona,  where,  under  the  stress  of 
overwhelming  difficulties  of  every  kind,  he  fell  sick 
and  died  within  a  few  months.  His  chequered 
fortune  while  alive  and  his  sudden  death  inspired 
Octavius  ^^'ith  high  hopes  of  securing  possession  of 
the  province ;  luck,  however,  which  is  a  very  potent 
factor  in  war,  as  well  as  the  carefulness  of  Cornificius 
and  the  courage  of  Vatinius,  did  not  allow  Octavius 
to  pursue  his  successful  career  much  longer. 

When  ^^atinius  was  at  Brundisium  he  learned  of 
what  had  been  going  on  in  Illyricum ;  moreover, 
frequent  despatches  from  Cornificius  kept  sum- 
moning him  to  bring  aid  to  the  province,  and  he 
heard  that  M.  Octavius  had  concluded  treaties  with 
the  natives  and  in  several  places  was  attacking  the 
garrisons  of  our  troops,  in  some  cases  in  person  with 
his    fleet,    in    others    with    land    forces,    employing 

81 


CAESAR 

copiis  per  barbaros,  ctsi  gravi  valetudine  adfectus  vix 
corporis  viribus  animum  sequebatur,  tamen  virtute 
vicit  incommodum  naturae  difficultatesque  et  hiemis 
et  subitae  praeparationis.  Nam  cum  ipse  paucas  in 
portu  navis  longas  haberet,  litteras  in  Achaiam  ad 
Q.  Calenum  misit,  uti  sibi  classem  mitteret.  Quod 
cum  tardius  fieret  quam  periculum  nostrorum  flagita- 
bat,  qui  sustinere  impetum  Octavi  non  poterant, 
navibus  actuariis,  quarum  numerus  erat  satis  magnus, 
magnitude  nequaquam  satis  iusta  ad  proeliandum, 
rostra  imposuit.  His  adiunctis  navibus  longis  et 
numero  classis  aucto  militibus  veteranis  impositis, 
quorum  magnam  copiam  habebat  ex  omnibus  legio- 
nibus,  qui  numero  aegrorum  relicti  erant  Brundisi, 
cum  exercitus  in  Graeciam  transportaretur,  pro- 
fectus  est  in  Illyricum  maritimasque  non  nullas 
civitates,  quae  defecerant  Octavioque  se  tradiderant, 
partim  recipiebat,  partim  remanentis  in  suo  consilio 
praetervehebatur  nee  sibi  ullius  rei  moram  necessi- 
tatemque  iniungebat  quin  quam  celerrime  posset 
ipsum  Octavium  persequeretur.  Hunc  oppugnantem 
Epidaurum  terra  marique,  ubi  nostrum  erat  prae- 
sidium,  adventu  suo  discedere  ab  oppugnatione  coegit 
praesidiunique  nostrum  recepit. 
45  Octavius  cum  Witinium  classem  magna  ex  parte 
confcctam  ex  naviculis  actuariis  habere  cognosset, 
confisus  sua  classe  substitit  ad  insulam  Tauridem; 
82 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

native  troops.  So,  although  he  was  afflicted  by  a 
serious  iUness  and  his  bodily  strength  barely  enabled 
him  to  obey  hi^  will,  yet  by  courage  he  overcame  his 
physical  handicap,  as  well  as  the  difficulties  both  of 
winter  and  the  sudden  mobilisation.  Thus,  as  he  him- 
self had  few  warships  in  harbour,  he  sent  despatches  to 
Q.  Calenus  in  Achaia,  requesting  him  to  send  him 
a  fleet ;  but  as  this  proved  too  slow  a  business — our 
troops  were  in  no  position  to  withstand  Octavius' 
attack,  and  their  critical  situation  urgently  demanded 
something  speedier — he  fitted  beaks  to  some  fast 
boats,  of  which  he  had  a  sufficient  number,  though 
their  size  was  by  no  means  adequate  for  fighting 
purposes.  With  these  added  to  his  warships,  and  his 
fleet  thereby  numerically  increased,  he  put  on  board 
some  veteran  troops,  of  which  he  had  an  abundant 
supply  from  all  the  legions — they  had  been  on  the 
sick  list  and  had  been  left  behind  at  Brundisium 
when  the  ai*my  was  being  shipped  to  Greece — -and  so 
set  out  for  Illyricum.  Now  there  were  not  a  few 
coastal  communities  there  which  had  revolted  and 
surrendered  to  Octavius :  some  of  these  he  re- 
covered, others  he  by-passed  when  they  remained 
steadfast  to  their  policy ;  nor  would  he  allow  any- 
thing, however  pressing,  to  embai-rass  or  delay  him 
from  pursuing  Octavius  himself  with  all  the  speed  of 
which  he  was  capable.  While  the  latter  was  assault- 
ing Epidaurus  by  land  and  sea,  where  there  was  a 
garrison  of  oui*s,  \'atinius  forced  him  by  his  approach 
to  abandon  his  assault,  and  so  relieved  our  garrison. 
45  When  Octavius  learned  that  Vatinius  had  a  fleet 
which  was  in  the  main  made  up  of  small,  fast  boats, 
having  full  confidence  in  his  own  fleet  he  hove  to  off 
the   island   of  Tauris.     In   this    area   Vatinius   wasMaroh47 

83 


CAESAR 

qua  regione  Vatinius  insequens  navigabat,  non  quo 
Octavium  ibi  restitisse  sciret,  sed  quod  eum  longius 
progressum  insequi  decreverat.  Cum  propius  Tauri- 
dem  accessisset  distensis  suis  navibus,  quod  et 
tempestas  erat  turbulenta  et  nulla  suspicio  hostis, 
repente  adversam  ad  se  venientem  na\  cm  antemnis 
ad  medium  malum  demissis  instructam  propugna- 
toribus  animum  advertit.  Quod  ubi  conspexit, 
celeriter  vela  subduci  demittique  antemnas  iubet  et 
milites  armari  et  vexillo  sublato,  quo  pugnandi  dabat 
signum,  quae  primae  naves  subsequebantur  idem  ut 
facerent  significabat.  Parabant  se  ^'atiniani  repente 
oppressi ;  parati  deinceps  Octaviani  ex  portu  pro- 
cedebant.  Instruitur  utrimque  acies,  ordine  dis- 
posita  magis  Octaviana,  paratior  militum  animis 
Vatiniana. 
46  \'atinius  cum  animum  advei'teret  neque  navium  se 
magnitudine  neque  numero  parem  esse  fortuitae 
dimicationi,  fortunae  rem  committere  maluit.  Itaque 
primus  sua  quinqueremi  in  quadriremem  ipsius 
Octavi  impetum  fecit.  Celerrime  fortissimeque 
contra  illo  remigante  naves  adversae  rostris  con- 
currerunt  adeo  vehementer  ut  navis  Octaviana  rostro 
discusso  ligno  contineretur.  Committitur  acriter 
reliquis  locis  proelium  concurriturque  ad  duces 
maxime :  nam  cum  suo  quisque  auxilium  ferret, 
magnum  comminus  in  angusto  mari  pi-oelium  factum 

84 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

cruising  in  pursuit,  not  from  any  knowledge  that 
Octavius  had  hove  to  there,  but  because  the  latter 
had  gained  a  fairly  good  start,  and  he  had  resolved  to 
pursue  him.  On  approaching  closer  to  Tauris  with 
his  ships  strung  out,  since  the  weather  was  rough 
and  he  had  no  suspicion  of  the  enemy,  he  suddenly 
observed  a  ship  bearing  down  upon  him,  its  yard- 
arms  lowered  to  mid-mast,  and  manned  with  combat 
troops.  When  he  saw  this,  he  promptly  ordered  the 
sails  to  be  reefed,  the  yard-arms  lowered,  and  the 
troops  to  stand  to ;  and  then,  by  hoisting  the  pen- 
nant, which  was  his  method  of  giving  the  signal  for 
action,  he  signalled  the  leading  ships  astern  of  him 
to  do  the  same.  The  Vatinians  being  thus  suddenly 
taken  unawares  proceeded  to  man  ship :  the 
Octavians,  their  ships  already  manned,  came  sailing 
out  of  the  harbour  one  after  another.  Line  of 
battle  was  formed  on  either  side,  that  of  Octavius 
being  superior  in  formation,  that  of  \'atinius  in  the 
morale  of  the  troops. 

When  ^'atinius  observed  that  neither  in  the  size 
nor  the  number  of  his  ships  was  he  a  match  for  a 
chance  engagement,  he  chose  rather  to  trust  to 
luck.  And  so  he  attacked  first,  charging  with  his 
own  quinquereme  the  quadrireme  which  was  the 
flagship  of  Octavius.  The  latter  rowed  forward 
against  him  \\ith  the  utmost  speed  and  bravery, 
and  the  two  ships  ran  together  with  their  beaks 
head-on  so  violently  that  Octavius'  ship  had  its  beak 
smashed  away  and  was  locked  to  the  other  by  its 
timbers.  Elsewhere  a  fierce  engagement  took  place, 
with  particularly  sharp  fighting  near  the  leaders ; 
for  with  each  individual  captain  trying  to  support 
his  own  leader,  a  great  battle  developed  at  close 

85 


CAESAR 

est.  Quantoque  coniunctis  magis  navibus  con- 
fligendi  potestas  dabatur,  tanto  superiores  erant 
V^itiniani ;  qui  admiranda  virtute  ex  suis  navibus  in 
hostium  navis  transilire  non  dubitabant  et  dimica- 
tione  aequata  longe  superiores  virtute  rem  feliciter 
gerebant.  Deprimitur  ipsius  Octavi  quadriremis, 
niultae  praeterea  capiuntur  aut  rostris  perforatae 
merguntur ;  propugnatores  Octaviani  partim  in 
navibus  iugulantur,  partim  in  mare  praecipitantur. 
Ipse  Octavius  se  in  scapham  confert ;  in  quam  plures 
cum  confugerent,  depressa  scapha  vulneratus  tamen 
adnatat  ad  suum  myoparonem.  Eo  receptus,  cum 
proelium  nox  dirimeret,  tempestate  magna  velis 
profugit.  Sequuntur  hunc  suae  naves  non  nuUae, 
quas  casus  ab  illo  periculo  vindicarat. 
47  At  Vatinius  re  bene  gesta  receptui  cecinit  suisque 
omnibus  incolumibus  in  eum  se  portum  victor 
recepit,  quo  ex  portu  classis  Octavi  ad  dimicandum 
processerat.  Capit  ex  eo  proelio  penterem  unam, 
triremis  duas,  dicrotas  VIII  complurisque  remiges 
Octavianos  posteroque  ibi  die,  dum  suas  captivasque 
navis  reficeret,  consumpto  post  diem  tertium  con- 
tendit  in  insulam  Issam,  quod  eo  se  recepisse  ex 
fuga  credebat  Octavium.  Erat  in  ea  ^  nobilissimum 
regionum  earum  oppidum  coniunctissimumque 
Octavio.     Quo  ut  venit,  oppidani  supplices  se  \'atinio 

^  The  MSS.  vary  between  eum  and  ea.  Possibly  some 
unfamiliar  place  name  produced  the  present  readings.  Thus 
Larsen  conjectured  Ratineum. 

86 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

range  in  the  narrow  sea.  The  more  closely  inter- 
locked the  ships — whenever  the  opportunity  was 
alforded  for  such  fighting — the  more  marked  was  the 
superiority  of  the  \^atinians ;  for  they  displayed 
admirable  courage  in  leaping  without  hesitation 
from  their  own  ships  on  to  those  of  the  enemy,  and 
where  the  fighting  was  on  equal  terms  their  markedly 
superior  courage  brought  them  success.  Octavius' 
own  quadrireme  was  sunk,  and  many  besides  were 
either  captured  or  else  rammed,  holed  and  sunk : 
some  of  his  combat  troops  were  cut  down  on  the 
ships,  others  dived  overboard.  Octavius  himself  took 
refuge  in  a  pinnace ;  and  when  too  many  others 
sought  safety  in  it  and  it  capsized,  wounded  as  he 
was  he  swam  to  his  own  light  galley.  There  he  was 
taken  safely  aboard  and,  when  night  put  an  end  to 
the  action,  took  to  flight,  sailing  in  a  stiff  squall. 
He  was  followed  by  not  a  few  of  his  own  ships,  which 
chance  had  delivered  from  that  hazard. 

^'atinius,  on  the  other  hand,  rounded  off  this 
success  by  sounding  the  retreat  and  withdrew 
triumphantly  with  his  entire  force  intact  to  the 
harbour  from  which  Octavius'  fleet  had  advanced  to 
do  battle.  As  a  result  of  that  action  he  captured  one 
quinquereme,  two  triremes,  eight  two-banked  galleys 
and  a  large  number  of  Octavius'  rowers.  The  next 
day  he  spent  there  in  refitting  his  own  and  the 
captured  vessels ;  and  on  the  day  following  he 
hastened  to  the  island  of  Issa,  in  the  belief  that 
Octavius  had  taken  refuge  there  in  the  course  of  his 
flight.  In  it  there  was  a  town — the  best  known  one 
in  those  parts,  and  one  which  was  on  the  most 
friendly  terms  with  Octavius.  On  the  arrival  of 
\'atinius  there  the  townsfolk  threw  themselves  upon 

87 


CAESAR 

dedlderunt,  comperitque  ipsum  Octavium  parvis 
paucisque  navigiis  vento  secundo  regionem  Graeciae 
petisse,  inde  ut  Siciliam,  deinde  Africam  caperet. 
Ita  brevi  spatio  re  praeclarissime  gesta,  provincia 
recepta  et  Cornificio  reddita,  classe  adversariorum  ex 
illo  toto  sinu  expulsa  victor  se  Brundisium  ineolumi 
exercitu  et  classe  recepit. 
48  Eis  autem  temporibus  quibus  Caesar  ad  Dyr- 
rachium  Pompeium  obsidebat  et  Palaepharsali  rem 
feliciter  gerebat  Alexandreaeque  cum  periculo 
magno  turn  etiam  maiore  periculi  fama  dimicabat, 
Q.  Cassius  Longinus,  in  Hispania  pro  praetore 
provinciae  ulterioris  obtinendae  causa  relictus,  sive 
consuetudine  naturae  suae  sive  odio  quod  in  illam 
provinciam  susceperat  quaestor  ex  insidiis  ibi 
vulneratus,  magnas  odi  sui  fecerat  accessiones, 
quod  vel  ex  conscientia  sua,  cum  de  se  mutuo  sentire 
pi'ovinciam  crederet,  vel  multis  signis  et  testimoniis 
eorum  qui  difficulter  odia  dissimulabant  animum 
advertere  poterat,  et  compensare  offensionem  pro- 
vinciae exei'citus  amore  cupiebat.  Itaque,  cum 
primum  in  unum  locum  exercitum  conduxit,  sester- 
tios  centenos  militibus  est  pollicitus,  nee  multo  post, 
cum  in  Lusitania  Medobregam  oppidum  montemque 
Herminium  expugnasset,  quo   Medobregenses  con- 


^  In  September  49  B.C.  Caesar  himself  may  have  doubted 
the  wisdom  of  this  appointment,  but  Longinus  had  served  him 
well  in  the  past. 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

his  mercy,  and  he  learned  that  Octavius  himself  with 
a  few  small  vessels  had  set  course  with  a  following 
wind  in  the  direction  of  Greece,  intending  to  make 
for  Sicily  next  and  then  Africa.  Thus  in  a  short 
space  of  time  Vatinius  had  achieved  a  most  notable 
success,  recovering  the  province  and  restoring  it  to 
Cornificius,  and  driving  his  opponents'  fleet  away 
from  the  whole  of  that  coast.  Whereupon  he  with- 
drew in  triumph  to  Brundisium  with  his  army  and 
fleet  unharmed. 

Now  during  the  period  when  Caesar  was  besieging 
Pompeius  at  Dyrrachium,  and  achieving  success  at 
Old  Pharsalus,  and  was  engaged  at  Alexandria  in 
operations  which  involved  great  risk,  though  rumour 
made  it  out  to  be  still  greater,  Q.  Cassius  Longinus 
had  been  left  behind  in  Spain  as  propraetor  to 
govern  the  further  province.^  Whether  it  was  due 
to  his  own  natural  disposition,  or  because  he  had 
formed  a  hatred  for  that  province  from  having  as 
quaestor  been  treacherously  wounded  there,  he  had 
greatly  added  to  his  unpopularity ;  which  fact  he 
was  in  a  position  to  observe  equally  from  his  own 
intuition — believing  as  he  did  that  the  province 
reciprocated  his  own  sentiments — and  from  the 
manifold  signs  and  indications  afforded  by  those  who 
found  difiiculty  in  concealing  their  feelings  of  hate ; 
and  now  he  was  anxious  to  offset  the  dislike  felt  by 
the  province  with  the  affection  of  his  army.  Conse- 
quently, as  soon  as  he  had  mustered  the  army  all 
together,  he  promised  the  soldiers  one  hundred 
sesterces  apiece ;  and  not  long  afterwards  in  Lusi- 
tania,  after  successfully  storming  the  town  of  Medo- 
brega  and  then  Mount  Herminius,  on  which  the 
townsfolk  had  taken  refuge,  and  being  hailed  there 


CAESAR 

fugerant,  ibique  imperator  esset  appellatus,  sestertiis 
centenis  milites  donavit.  Multa  praeterea  et  magna 
praemia  singulis  concedebat ;  quae  speciosuni  redde- 
bant  praesentem  exercitus  amorem,  paulatim  tamen 
et  occulte  niilitareni  disciplinam  severitatemque 
minuebant. 

49  Cassius  legionibus  in  hiberna  dispositis  ad  ius 
dicendum  Cordubam  se  recepit  contractumque  in  ea 
aes  alienum  gravissimis  oneribus  provineiae  constituit 
exsolvere  ;  et  ut  largitionis  postulat  consuetude,  per 
causam  liberalitatis  speciosam  plura  largitori  quaere- 
bantur.  Pecuniae  locupletibus  imperabantur,  quas 
Longinus  sibi  expensas  ferri  non  tantum  patiebatur 
sed  etiani  cogebat,  in  gregem  locupletium  simul- 
tatiuni  causa  tenues  coiciebantur,  neque  ullum  genus 
quaestus  aut  niagni  et  evidentis  aut  minimi  et  sordidi 
praetermittebatur  quo  domus  et  tribunal  imperatoris 
vacaret.  Nemo  erat,  qui  modo  aliquam  iacturam 
facere  posset,  quin  aut  vadimonio  teneretur  aut  in 
reos  referretur,  Ita  magna  etiam  sollicitudo  peri- 
culorum  ad  iacturas  et  detrimenta  rei  familiaris 
adiungebatur. 

50  Quibus  de  causis  accidit  ut,  cum  Longinus  impera- 
tor eadem  faceret  quae  fecerat  quaestor,  similia 
rursus  de  morte  eius  provinciales  consilia  inirent. 
Horum  odium  confirmabant  non  nulli  familiares  eius 
qui,    cum    in    ilia    societate    versarentur    rapinarum, 


^  From  the  sequel  described  in  cli.  56  such  appears  to  be  the 
most  likely  interpretation  of  this  phrase.  The  sums  were  to  be 
entered  uj)  in  the  ledgers  as  paid  out  to  Longinus  as  loans. 

^  Or,  adopting  Schneider's  conjecture  simidationis  causa, 
'  were  included  in  the  lists  of  the  wealthy  for  the  sake  of 
appearances ', 

90 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

as  Imperator,  he  presented  the  soldiers  each  with 
100  sesterces.  In  addition  he  granted  many  large 
rewards  to  individuals ;  and  though  these  gifts 
inspired  in  the  army  a  semblance  of  affection  for  the 
moment,  yet  they  gradually  and  insidiously  under- 
mined strict  military  discipline. 

Having  settled  his  legions  in  winter  quarters, 
Cassius  proceeded  to  Corduba  to  administer  justice, 
and  resolved  to  lay  a  very  heavy  impost  on  the 
province  and  so  defray  the  debts  he  had  incurred  in  it. 
And  so,  as  the  habit  of  bribery  necessitates,  open- 
handedness  was  the  plausible  excuse  for  seeking  vet 
further  contributions  to  the  source  of  bribery.  Wealthy 
men  were  ordered  to  furnish  sums  of  money,  and 
these  Longinus  not  merely  allowed  but  even  com- 
pelled to  be  debited  to  his  own  account :  ^  poor  men 
were  precipitated  into  conflict  with  the  wealthy  class 
to  promote  dissensions;^  and  no  kind  of  profit, 
either  large  and  obvious,  or  quite  insignificant  and 
mean,  was  overlooked,  none  with  which  the  com- 
mander-in-chief was  not  involved  privately  and 
officially.  There  was  not  one  man — provided  only 
he  had  something  to  lose — but  he  was  either  held  on 
bail  or  duly  entered  in  the  lists  of  the  accused.  Thus 
there  was  also  a  very  uneasy  presentiment  of  danger 
in  addition  to  the  sacrifices  and  losses  of  personal 
possessions. 

For  these  reasons  it  so  fell  out  that,  since  Longinus 
as  commander-in-chief  was  employing  the  same 
tactics  he  had  used  as  quaestor,  the  provincials  once 
again  embarked  upon  similar  plans  for  his  assassina- 
tion. Their  hatred  was  intensified  by  some  of  his 
friends  who,  although  they  were  employed  in  that 
plundering  partnership,  none  the  less  hated  the  man 

91 


CAESAR 

nihilo  minus  oderant  eum  cuius  nomine  peccabant, 
sibique  (juod  rapuerant  acceptum  referebant,  quod 
interciderat  aut  erat  interpellatum  Cassio  assigna- 
bant.  Quintam  legionem  novam  conscribit.  Auge- 
tur  odium  et  ex  ipso  dilectu  et  sumptu  additae 
legionis.  Complentur  equitum  III  milia  maximisque 
ornantur  impensis  ;  nee  provinciae  datur  ulla  requies. 

51  Interim  litteras  accepit  a  Caesare,  ut  in  Africam 
exercitum  traiceret  perque  Mauretaniam  ad  finis 
Numidiae  perveniret,  quod  magna  Cn.  Pompeio 
luba  miserat  auxilia  maioraque  missurus  existima- 
batur.  Quibus  litteris  acceptis  insolenti  voluptate 
efFerebatur,  quod  sibi  novarum  provinciarum  et 
fertilissimi  regni  tanta  oblata  esset  facultas.  Itaque 
ipse  in  Lusitaniam  proficiscitur  ad  legiones  arces- 
sendas  auxiliaque  adducenda ;  certis  hominibus  dat 
negotium  ut  frumentum  navesque  C  praepararentur 
pecuniaeque  deseriberentur  atque  imperarentur,  ne 
qua  res  cum  redisset  moraretur.  Reditus  eius  fuit 
celerior  omnium  opinione :  non  enim  labor  aut 
vigilantia  cupienti  praesertim  aliquid  Cassio  deerat. 

52  Exercitu  coacto  in  unum  locum  castris  ad  Cor- 
dubam  positis  pro  contione  militibus  exponit  quas  res 
Caesaris  iussu  gerere  deberet,  polliceturque  eis,  cum 
in  Mauretaniam  traiecisset,  sestertios  centenos  ^  se 
daturum ;    quintam  fore  in  Hispania  legionem.     Ex 

^  centenos  is  omitted  in  all  the  MSS.,  which  vary  between 
sestertios,  sestertia  a?id  sestertiorum. 

^  Caesar  had  allotted  him  four — the  native  legion  and  the 
Second ;  and  the  Twenty-First  and  Thirtieth  (sent  from  Italy). 
Whether  this  Fifth  is  the  same  legion  as  that  mentioned  in  the 
African  and  Spanish  Wars  is  a  verj-  vexed  question. 

*  No  mention  is  made  of  these  in  the  list  of  Pompey's 
forces  given  in  Cicil  Warn  III,  chs.  3-5. 

92 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

in  whose  name  they  did  WTong,  and  so,  while  putting 
down  to  their  own  credit  whatever  they  had  gained 
by  their  plundering,  attributed  to  Cassius  whatever 
came  to  nothing  or  was  foiled.  He  enrolled  a  new 
legion — -the  Fifth. ^  Hatred  increased  as  a  result  of 
the  actual  levy  and  the  expense  of  the  extra  legion. 
The  cavalry  were  brought  up  to  a  strength  of  three 
thousand  and  equipped  at  the  greatest  expense.  No 
respite  was  given  to  the  province. 

Meanwhile  he  received  despatches  from  Caesar 
bidding  him  bring  an  army  across  to  Africa  and, 
passing  through  Mauretania,  come  to  the  territory 
of  Numidia  ;  for  Juba  had  sent  large  reinforcements  ^ 
for  Cn.  Pompeius  and  would,  it  was  thought,  send 
larger  ones,  \^^len  Cassius  received  these  des- 
patches he  was  in  transports  of  immoderate  delight 
at  the  thought  of  his  being  offered  so  magnificent  a 
chance  of  new  provinces  and  a  highly  fertile  king- 
dom. And  so  he  set  out  in  person  for  Lusitania  to 
summon  the  legions  and  fetch  auxiliaries,  allotting 
certain  men  the  task  of  organising  in  advance 
supplies  of  corn  and  100  ships,  as  well  as  assessing 
and  levying  contributions  of  money,  so  as  to  avoid 
any  delay  on  his  return.  His  return  proved  more 
expeditious  than  anyone  expected ;  for  there  was  no 
lack  of  energy  or  vigilance  in  Cassius,  especially 
when  he  coveted  something. 

He  then  assembled  his  army  at  a  single  rendezvous 
and  pitched  camp  near  Corduba.  There  at  a  parade 
he  explained  to  his  troops  the  scheme  it  was  his  duty 
to  carry  out  on  Caesar's  instructions,  and  promised 
to  give  them  100  sesterces  apiece  when  he  had 
crossed  over  into  Mauretania.  The  Fifth  legion,  he 
explained,    would    be    in    Spain.     Then,    after    the 

93 


CAESAR 

contione  se  Cordubam  recepit  enque  ip';o  die  tempore 
postmeridiano,  cum  in  basilic-am  iret,  (luidam 
Minucius  Silo  cliens  L.  Racili  libellum,  quasi  ali(juid 
ab  eo  postularet,  ut  miles  ei  tradit,  deinde  post 
Racilium — nam  is  latus  Cassi  tegebat — ,  quasi 
responsum  peteret,  celeriter  dato  loco  cum  se 
insinuasset,  sinistra  corripit  aversum  dextraque  bis 
ferit  pugione.  Clamore  sublato  fit  a  coniuratis 
impetus  universis.  Munatius  Flaccus  proximum 
gladio  traicit  lictorem ;  hoc  interfecto  Q.  Cassium 
legatum  vulnerat.  Ibi  T.  \'asius  et  L.  Mercello 
simili  confidentia  Flaccum,  municipem  suum,  adiu- 
vant :  erant  enim  omnes  Italicenses.  Ad  ipsum 
Longinum  L.  Licinius  Squillus  involat  iacentemque 
levibus  sauciat  plagis. 
53  Concurritur  ad  Cassium  defendendum :  semper 
enim  Berones  complurisque  evocatos  cum  telis 
secum  habere  consuerat.  A  quibus  ceteri  inter- 
cluduntur  qui  ad  caedem  faciendam  subsequebantur ; 
quo  in  numero  fuit  Calpurnius  Salvianus  et  Manilius 
Tusculus.  Minucius  inter  saxa  quae  iacebant  in 
itinere  fugiens  opprimitur  et  relato  domum  Cassio  ad 
eum  deducitur.  Racilius  in  proximam  se  domum 
familiaris  sui  confert,  dum  certum  cognosceret  con- 
fectusne  Cassius  esset.     L.  Laterensis,  cum  id  non 

1  cf.  ch.  57  below,  where  the  same  man  is  mentioned  again 
as  deputy  to  Longinus  :  the  coincidence  of  names  is  confusing. 
-  A  town  in  Baetica,  X.W.  of  Hispalis,  founded  by  Scipio 
Africanus  and  the  birthplace  of  Hadrian  and  Trajan. 

^  The  Berones  are  mentioned  in  Livy,  fragment  91  as  a 
powerful  tribe  in  Hispania  Tarraconensis. 

*  Presumably  he  tripped  and  his  pursuers  were  luckier  ! 
The  alternative  rendering  '  in  the  course  of  flight  was  over- 
whelmed amid  (a  volley  of)  stones  which  littered  the  street ' 
seems   barely   justified    by   the    Latin   expression,   though   it 

94 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

parade,  he  returned  to  Corduba.  That  same  after- 
noon, when  he  was  entering  the  judgment  hall,  a 
certain  Minucius  Silo,  who  was  a  client  of  L.  Racilius 
and  was  dressed  as  a  soldier,  handed  him  a  note,  as 
if  he  had  some  petition  to  make  of  him ;  then, 
following  behind  Racilius — who  was  walking  beside 
Cassius — as  though  he  were  waiting  for  an  answer,  he 
quickly  wormed  his  way  in  between  them  when  the 
chance  offered,  seized  Longinus  from  behind  with  his 
left  hand  and  with  his  right  stabbed  him  twice  with  a 
daffger.  No  sooner  was  the  alarm  raised  than  all  the 
conspirators  joined  in  the  attack.  Munatius  Flaccus 
ran  the  nearest  lictor  through  with  his  sword,  killed 
him  and  then  wounded  Q.  Cassius,  Longinus' 
deputy.^  Thereupon  T.  Vasius  and  M.  Mercello 
displayed  a  like  audacity  in  going  to  the  help  of 
Flaccus,  their  fellow-townsman;  for  they  all  hailed 
from  Italica.^  Iv.  Licinius  Squillus  rushed  up  to 
Longinus  himself  and  inflicted  minor  wounds  upon 
him  as  he  lay  prostrate. 

On  all  sides  there  was  a  rush  to  defend  Cassius ; 
for  it  was  his  constant  habit  to  have  with  him  a 
numerous  armed  bodyguard  of  Beronians  ^  and  ex- 
soldiers.  These  intercepted  all  the  other  would-be 
assassins  who  were  following  up  behind,  and  among 
them  Calpurnius  Salvianus  and  Manilius  Tusculus. 
Minucius  was  caught  as  he  sought  to  escape  through 
the  stones  which  were  lying  in  the  street,*  and  was 
escorted  to  Cassius,  who  had  now  been  carried  home. 
Racilius  took  refuge  in  a  friend's  house  near  by, 
until  he  should  learn  for  certain  whether  Cassius  was 
done  for.     L.  Laterensis  had  no  doubt  about  it,  and 

would  perhaps  account  more  satisfactorily  for  the  mention  of 
the  stones. 

95 


CAESAR 

dubitaret,  accurrit  laetus  in  castra  militibusque 
vernaculis  et  secundae  legionis,  quilnis  odio  sciebat 
praecipue  Cassium  esse,  gratulatur;  tollitur  a  multi- 
tudine  in  tribunal,  praetor  appellatur.  Nemo  enim 
aut  in  provincia  natus,  ut  vernaculae  legionis  milites, 
aut  diuturnitate  iam  factus  provincialis,  quo  in 
numero  erat  secunda  legio,  non  cum  omni  provincia 
consenserat  in  odio  Cassi :  nam  legionem  XXX.  et 
XXI.  paucis  mensibus  in  Italia  scriptas  Caesar 
attribuerat  Longino,  quinta  legio  nuper  ibi  erat 
confecta. 

54  Interim  nuntiatur  Laterensi  vivere  Cassium. 
Quo  nuntio  dolore  magis  permotus  quam  animo 
perturbatus  reficit  se  celeriter  et  ad  Cassium  visen- 
dum  proficiscitur.  Re  cognita  XXX.  legio  signa 
Cordubam  infert  ad  auxilium  ferendum  imperatori 
suo.  Facit  hoc  idem  XXI.  Subsequitur  has  V. 
Cum  duae  legiones  reliquae  essent  in  castris,  secun- 
dani,  veriti  ne  soli  relinquerentur  atque  ex  eo  quid 
sensissent  iudicaretur,  secuti  sunt  factum  superiorum. 
Permansit  in  sententia  legio  vernacula  nee  ullo 
timore  dc  gradu  deiecta  est. 

55  Cassius  eos  qui  nominati  erant  conscii  caedis 
iubet  comprehendi ;  legiones  in  castra  remittit 
quinque     cohortibus     tricesimae     retentis.^     Indicio 

^  legiones  V  in  castra  remittit  cohortibus  XXX  retentis 
MSS.  :   I  have  adopted  Kuebler's  conjecture, 

96 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

so  hastened  joyfully  into  the  camp  and  congratulated 
the  native  troops  and  those  of  the  Second  legion,  who, 
as  he  knew,  cherished  a  particular  hatred  for  Cassius  ; 
and  there  the  mob  hoisted  him  on  to  the  platform 
and  hailed  him  as  praetor.  There  was  in  fact  no 
man,  either  born  in  the  province,  like  the  troops  of 
the  native  legion,  or  else  by  this  time  qualified  as  a 
provincial  by  virtue  of  long  residence — and  the 
Second  legion  came  into  this  category — who  had  not 
shared  in  the  hatred  which  the  entire  province  felt 
towards  Cassius  ;  for  the  Thirtieth  and  Twenty-First 
legions,  which  Caesar  had  allotted  to  Longinus,  had 
been  enrolled  in  Italy  within  the  last  few  months, 
while  the  Fifth  legion  had  been  raised  in  the  province 
but  recently. 

Meanwhile  the  tidings  reached  Laterensis  that 
Cassius  was  alive.  Not  so  much  disconcerted  as 
grievously  disappointed  by  these  tidings,  he  quickly 
recovered  himself  and  set  out  to  visit  Cassius.  On 
learning  of  the  facts  the  Thirtieth  legion  advanced  to 
Corduba  to  bring  aid  to  their  commander-in-chief: 
the  Twenty-First  did  likewise ;  and  the  Fifth 
followed  their  lead.  Now  that  there  were  but  two 
remaining  legions  in  camp,  the  men  of  the  Second 
were  afraid  that  they  might  be  the  only  ones  left 
behind,  and  that  the  nature  of  their  sentiments  might 
be  inferred  from  this  circumstance :  consequently 
they  followed  the  example  of  the  previous  legions. 
The  native  legion  remained  steadfast  in  its  attitude, 
and  nothing  could  intimidate  it  or  make  it  budge. 

Cassius  ordered  the  arrest  of  those  who  had  been 
named  as  privy  to  the  murderous  plot  and,  retaining 
five  cohorts  of  the  Thirtieth  legion,  sent  the  rest 
back  to  camp.     From  the  evidence  of  Minucius  he 

97 


CAESAR 

Minuci  cognoscit  L.  Racilium  et  L.  Laterensem  et 
Annium  Scapulam,  maximae  dignitatis  et  gratiae 
provincialem  honiinem  sibique  tarn  familiarem  quam 
Laterensem  et  Racilium,  in  eadem  fuisse  coniura- 
tione,  nee  diu  moratur  dolorem  suum  quin  eos  inter- 
fici  iubeat.  Minucium  libertis  tradit  excruciandum, 
item  Calpurnium  Salvianum,  qui  profitetur  indicium 
coniuratorumcjue  numerum  auget,  vere,  ut  quidam 
existimant,  ut  non  nulli  queruntur,  coactus.  Isdem 
cruciatibus  adfectus  L.  Mercello.^  .  .  .  Squillus 
nominat  pluris ;  quos  Cassias  interfici  iubet  exceptis 
eis  qui  se  pecunia  redemerunt.  Nam  palam  HS 
LX  2  cum  Calpurnio  paciscitur  et  cum  Q.  Sestio  L. 
Qui  si  maxime  nocentes  sunt  multati,  tamen  peri- 
culum  vitae  dolorque  vulnerum  pecuniae  remissus 
crudelitatem  cum  avaritia  certasse  significabat. 
56  Aliquot  post  diebus  litteras  a  Caesare  missas 
accipit,  quibus  cognoscit  Pompeium  in  acie  victum 
amissis  copiis  fugisse.  Qua  re  cognita  mixtam 
dolore  voluptatem  capiebat :  victoriae  nuntius 
laetitiam  exprimebat,  confectum  bellum  licentiam 
temporum  intercludebat.  Sic  erat  dubius  animus 
utrum  nihil  timere  an  omnia  licere  mallet.  Sanatis 
vulneribus  arcessit  omnis  qui  sibi  pecunias  expensas 
tulerant,    acceptasque    eas    iubet    referri ;     quibus 

^  Nipperdey  assumed  a  lacuna  here. 
2  ^i  X  MSS.  :  HS  LX  Glandorp. 


^  Approximately  equivalent  to  £530  in  pre-war  sterling. 
The  interpretation  60,000  'great  sesterces'  (=£53,000), 
though  permissible,  seems  less  likely. 

98 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

learned  that  L.  Racilius  and  L.  Laterensis  and 
Annius  Scapula — the  last  a  provincial  of  the  highest 
standing  and  influence,  with  whom  he  was  on  as 
intimate  a  footing  as  with  Racilius  and  Laterensis — 
had  all  been  involved  in  that  same  conspiracy  ;  and  it 
was  not  long  before  he  gave  expression  to  his 
indignation  by  ordering  their  execution.  Minucius 
he  handed  over  to  his  freedmen  for  torture  :  likewise 
Calpurnius  Salvianus,  who  made  a  formal  deposition 
in  which  he  named  a  larger  number  of  conspirators — 
truthfully,  according  to  the  belief  of  certain  people  ; 
under  duress,  as  some  complain.  Similar  torture 
was  applied  to  L.  Mercello  :  .  .  .  Squillus  mentioned 
more  names.  Cassius  ordered  their  execution,  except 
for  those  who  bought  themselves  off.  For  example,  he 
openly  made  a  bargain  in  fact  with  Calpurnius  for 
sixty  thousand  sesterces,^  and  with  Q.  Sestius  for 
fifty  thousand.  And  if  their  extreme  guilt  earned 
them  a  corresponding  fine,  yet  the  fact  that  the  peril 
of  death  and  the  pain  of  torture  was  remitted  for 
cash  showed  how  in  Cassius  cruelty  had  vied  with 
greed. 

Several  days  later  he  received  despatches  sent  by 
Caesar,  from  which  he  learned  that  Pompeius  had 
been  beaten  in  the  field,  lost  his  forces,  and  fled. 
This  intelligence  inspired  in  him  mixed  feelings— of 
disappointment  and  pleasure :  the  news  of  victory 
could  not  but  make  him  happy :  the  completion 
of  the  war  put  an  end  to  the  present  licence.  Con- 
sequently he  could  not  make  up  his  mind  whether  he 
would  rather  have  nothing  to  fear  or  nothing  barred. 
When  his  wounds  were  healed  he  summoned  all 
those  who  had  booked  sums  of  money  as  debited  to 
his  account  and  ordered  the  said  sums  to  be  entered 

99 


CAESAR 

parum  videbatur  imposuisse  oneris,  ampliorem 
pecuniam  imperat.  Equitum  autem  Romanorum 
dilectum  instituit;  quos  ex  omnibus  conventibus 
coloniisque  conscriptos  transmarina  militia  per- 
territos  ad  sacramenti  redemptionem  vocabat. 
Magnum  hoc  fuit  vectigal,  maius  tamen  creabat 
odium.  His  rebus  confectis  totum  exercitum  lustrat ; 
legiones  quas  in  Africam  ducturus  erat  et  auxilia 
mittit  ad  traiectum.  Ipse  classem  quam  parabat  ut 
inspiceret,  Hispalim  accedit  ibique  moratur,  prop- 
terea  quod  edictum  tota  provincia  proposuerat, 
quibus  pecunias  imperasset  neque  contulissent,  se 
adirent.  Quae  evocatio  vehementer  omnis  turbavit. 
Interim  L.  Titius,  qui  eo  tempore  tribunus  militum 
in  legione  vernacula  fuerat,  nuntiat  eam  a  legione 
XXX.,  quam  Q.  Cassius  legatus  simul  ducebat,  cum 
ad  oppidum  Ilipam  castra  haberet,  seditione  facta 
centurionibus  aliquot  occisis  qui  signa  tolli  non 
patiebantur,  discessisse  et  ad  secundam  legionem 
contendisse,  quae  ad  fretum  alio  itinere  ducebatur. 
Cognita  re  noctu  cum  V  cohortibus  unetvice- 
simanorum  egreditur,  mane  pervenit  Naevam.^     Ibi 

^  noctu  MSS.     Naevam  Schneider. 


^  The  sums  here  referred  to  appear  to  be  those  mentioned 
in  ch.  49,  and  the  meaning  seems  to  be  that  the  outstanding 
debts  were  written  off  in  the  ledgers  as  repaid,  though  in  fact 
Longinus  kept  the  money.  But  as  the  two  terms  expensas 
and  acceptas  denote  the  opposite  sides  of  the  ledger,  the  mean- 
ing might  conceivably  be  that  the  outstanding  debts  were  not 
merely  cancelled,  but  reversed;  and  that  the  sums  were  to 
be  entered  up  afresh  as  borrowed  from  {acceptas),  not  lent  to 
(expensa^),  Longinus.  He  would  thus  receive  them  twice 
over.  The  following  clause  perhaps  favours  this  latter 
interpretation. 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

up  as  repaid  ;  ^  and  where  he  seemed  to  have  imposed 
too  light  a  burden,  he  ordered  the  man  to  pay  a 
greater  sum.  Moreover,  he  held  a  levy  of  Roman 
knights.  Tliese  were  conscripted  from  all  the  cor- 
porations 2  and  colonies  and,  as  they  were  thoroughly 
scared  of  military  service  overseas,  he  invited  them 
to  purchase  their  discharge.  This  proved  a  great 
source  of  profit,  but  the  hatred  it  produced  was  still 
greater.  This  done,  he  reviewed  his  entire  army 
and  then  despatched  to  the  point  of  embarkation 
the  legions  he  intended  to  take  into  Africa,  with  their 
auxiliary  troops.  He  himself  pi'oceeded  to  Hispalis 
to  inspect  the  fleet  he  was  building  up  ;  and  there  he 
tarried  awhile,  since  he  had  published  a  decree 
throughout  the  province  that  those  who  had  been 
ordei-ed  to  contribute,  but  had  not  yet  contributed 
sums  of  money,  must  come  before  him.  This 
summons  disturbed  them  all  profoundly. 

Meanwhile  L.  Titius  brought  tidings  of  the  native 
legion,  in  which  he  had  been  at  the  time  a  military 
tribune :  his  report  ran  that  while  it  was  encamped 
near  the  town  of  Ilipa  a  mutiny  had  broken  out,  and 
several  centurions  who  had  refused  to  let  them 
strike  camp  had  been  killed ;  the  legion  had  then 
parted  company  with  the  Thirtieth  legion — this 
was  also  under  command  of  Q.  Cassius,  the  governor's 
deputy — and  made  haste  to  join  the  Second  legion, 
which  was  being  taken  to  the  straits  by  another 
route.  On  learning  of  the  matter  Longinus  left  by 
night  with  five  cohoi'ts  of  the  Twenty-First  legion, 
and  early  in  the  morning  arrived  at  Naeva.^     There 

^  These  were  guilds  of  Roman  citizens  associated  for  pur- 
poses of  trade  in  the  various  provincial  towns. 

^  Its  exact  location  is  unknown :  see  Index.  Andrieu,  how- 
ever identifies  it  with  Villaverde,  27  km.  from  Seville. 


CAESAR 

eum  diem,  ut  quid  ageretur  perspiceret,  moratus 
Carmonem  contendit.  Hie,  cum  legio  XXX.  et 
XXI.  et  cohortes  IIII  ex  V.  legione  totusque  con- 
venisset  equitatus,  audit  IIII  cohortis  a  vernaculis 
oppressas  ad  Obuculam  cum  his  ad  secundam  per- 
venisse  legionem  omnisque  ibi  se  coniunxisse  et  T. 
Thorium  Italicensem  ducem  delegisse.  Celeriter 
habito  consilio  M.  Marcellum  quaestorem  Cordubam, 
lit  earn  in  potestate  retineret,  Q.  Cassium  legatum 
Hispahm  mittit.  Faucis  ei  diebus  afFertur  conventum 
Cordubensem  ab  eo  defecisse  Marcellumque  aut 
voluntate  aut  necessitate  adductum — namque  id 
varie  nuntiabatur — consentire  cum  Cordubensibus ; 
duas  cohortis  legionis  V.,  quae  fuerant  Cordubae 
in  praesidio,  idem  facere.  Cassius  his  rebus  incensus 
movet  castra  et  postero  die  Segoviam  ad  flumen 
SingiUense  venit.  Ibi  habita  contione  miUtum 
temptat  animos ;  quos  cognoscit  non  sua  sed 
Caesaris  absentis  causa  sibi  fidissimos  esse  nullumque 
periculum  deprecaturos,  dum  per  eos  Caesari  pro- 
vincia  restitueretur. 
58  Interim  Thorius  ad  Cordubam  veteres  legiones 
adducit  ac,  ne  dissensionis  initium  natum  seditiosa 
mihtum  suaque  natura  videretur,  simul  ut  contra  Q. 

1  Its  exact  location  is  unknown  :   see  Index. 
102 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

he  waited  that  day,  in  order  to  get  a  clear  view  of 
what  was  taking  place:  then  he  marched  to  Carmo. 
Here  he  was  joined  by  the  Thirtieth  legion 
and  the  Twenty-First,  with  four  cohorts  of  tlie  Fifth 
and  his  entire  cavalry  force,  and  then  heard  that  four 
cohorts  had  been  overpowered  by  the  native  troops, 
and  in  company  with  the  latter  had  made  contact 
with  the  second  legion  near  Obucula,^  where  they 
had  all  joined  forces  and  chosen  T.  Thorius,  a  native 
of  Italica,  as  their  leader.  He  promptly  held  a 
consultation  and  despatched  the  quaestor,  M. 
Marcellus,  to  Corduba,  to  retain  control  of  it,  and 
Q.  Cassius,  his  deputy,  to  Hispalis.  Within  a  few 
days  news  was  brought  to  him  that  the  corporation  of 
Corduba  had  revolted  from  him,  and  that  Marcellus, 
either  of  his  own  free  will,  or  under  compulsion — 
reports  varied  on  this  point — was  hand  in  glove  with 
the  men  of  Corduba  ;  and  that  the  two  cohorts  of  the 
Fifth  legion  which  had  formed  the  garrison  force  of 
Corduba  were  taking  a  similar  line.  Incensed  by 
these  reports  Cassius  struck  camp,  and  on  the  morrow 
came  to  Segovia  ^  on  the  river  Singilis.  There  he 
held  a  parade  and  sounded  the  temper  of  his  troops, 
learning  thereby  that  it  was  not  for  his  own  sake, 
l)ut  for  the  sake  of  the  absent  Caesar  that  they  were 
entirely  loyal  to  himself,  and  that  there  was  no 
hazard  they  would  not  face  without  a  murmur,  so  be 
they  were  the  means  of  restoring  the  province  to 
Caesar. 

Meanwhile  Thorius  led  his  veteran  legions  towards 
Corduba.  To  avoid  the  impression  that  the  quarrel 
had  originally  arisen  from  any  natural  tendency  to 
mutiny  on  his  own  part  or  on  that  of  his  troops, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  counter  Q.  Cassius — who,  as 

103 


CAESAR 

Cassium,  qui  Caesaris  nomine  maioribus  viribus  uti 
videbatur,  aeque  potentem  opponeret  dignitatem, 
Cn.  Pompeio  se  provinciam  reciperare  velle  palam 
dictitabat.  Et  forsitan  etiam  hoc  fecerit  odio 
Caesaris  et  amore  Pompei,  cuius  nomen  multum 
poterat  apud  eas  legiones  quas  M.  Varro  obtinuerat. 
Sed  id  qua  mente,  communis  erat  coniectura : 
certe  hoc  prae  se  Thorius  ferebat ;  miUtes  adeo 
fatebantur,  ut  Cn.  Pompei  nomen  in  scutis  inscriptum 
liaberent.  Frequens  legionibus  conventus  obviam 
prodit,  neque  tantum  virorum  sed  etiam  matrum 
familias  ac  praetextatorum,  deprecaturque  ne  hostili 
adventu  Cordubam  diriperent :  nam  se  contra  Cas- 
sium consentire  cum  omnibus ;  contra  Caesarem  ne 
facere  cogerentur  orare. 
59  Tantae  multitudinis  precibus  et  lacrimis  exercitus 
commotus  cum  videret  ad  Cassium  persequendum 
nihil  opus  esse  Cn.  Pompei  nomine  et  memoria 
tamque  omnibus  Caesarianis  quam  Pompeianis 
Longinum  esse  in  odio  neque  se  conventum  neque  M. 
Marcelhim  contra  Caesaris  causam  posse  perducere, 
nomen  Pompei  ex  scutis  detraxerunt,  Marcellum, 
qui  se  Caesaris  causam  defensurum  profitebatur, 
ducem  asciverunt  praetoremque  appellarunt  et 
conventum  sibi  adiunxerunt  castraque  ad  Cordubam 
posuerunt.  Cassius  eo  biduo  circiter  IIII  milia 
passuum  a  Corduba  citra  flumen  Baetim  in  oppidi 

^  Both  the  native  and  the  second  legion  had  served  under 
Varro. 

104 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

it  appeared,  was  operating  in  the  name  of  Caesar 
with  forces  more  powerful  than  liis  own — with  no 
less  weighty  an  authority,  he  kept  openly  asserting 
that  it  was  for  Cn.  Pompeius  that  he  wished  to 
recover  the  province.  And  it  may  even  be  that  he  did 
so  wish,  owing  to  his  hatred  for  Caesar  and  affection 
for  Pompey,  the  latter 's  name  carrying  great  weight 
with  those  legions  which  M.  \^arro  had  held.^  But 
what  his  motive  was  in  this  was  a  matter  for  general 
conjecture.  At  any  rate  that  was  what  Thorius 
gave  out ;  and  his  troops  acknowledged  it  to  the  extent 
that  they  had  the  name  of  Cn.  Pompeius  carved  on 
their  shields.  A  vast  concourse  of  citizens  came 
forth  to  meet  the  legions,  not  only  of  men  but  also  of 
matrons  and  youths,  beseeching  them  not  to  ap- 
proach Corduba  as  enemies  and  plunder  it :  they 
themselves  in  fact  shared  in  the  universal  antagonism 
against  Cassius ;  and  they  prayed  they  might  not  be 
compelled  to  act  against  Caesar. 

The  tears  and  entreaties  of  this  vast  multitude  had 
no  little  effect  upon  the  army ;  it  saw  too  that  to 
punish  Cassius  it  had  no  need  of  the  name  and 
memorj'  of  Cn.  Pompeius  ;  that  Longinus  was  equally 
hateful  to  all  the  adherents  of  Caesar  as  he  was  to 
those  of  Pompey ;  and  that  it  could  induce  neither 
the  citizen  corporation  of  Corduba  nor  Marcellus  to 
act  contrary  to  Caesar's  interest.  Accordingly  they 
removed  Pompey 's  name  from  their  shields,  adopted 
Marcellus,  who  professed  his  intention  to  champion 
Caesar's  cause,  as  their  leader  and  hailed  him  as 
praetor,  made  common  cause  with  the  citizen 
corporation,  and  pitched  their  camp  near  Corduba. 
Within  two  days  Cassius  pitched  camp  on  his  side  of 
the  river  Baetis  some  four  miles  distant  from  Corduba, 


CAESAR 

conspectu  loco  excelso  facit  castra  ;  litteras  ad  regem 
Bogudem  in  Mauretaniam  et  ad  M.  Lepidum  pro- 
consulem  in  Hispaniam  citeriorem  mittit,  subsidio 
sibi  provinciaeque  Caesaris  causa  quam  primum 
veniret.  Ipse  hostili  mode  Cordubensium  agros 
vastat,  aedificia  incendit. 
60  Cuius  rei  deformitate  atque  indignitate  legiones 
quae  Marcellum  sibi  ducem  ceperant  ad  eum  con- 
currerunt,  ut  in  aciem  educerentur  orant,  priusque 
confligendi  sibi  potestas  fieret  quam  cum  tanta 
contumelia  nobilissimae  carissimaeque  possessiones 
Cordubensium  in  conspectu  suo  rapinis,  ferro  flam- 
maque  consumerentur.  Marcellus  cum  confligere 
miserrimum  putaret,  quod  et  victoris  et  victi  detri- 
mentum  ad  eundem  Caesarem  esset  redundaturum 
neque  suae  potestatis  esset,  legiones  Baetim  traducit 
aciemque  instruit.  Cum  Cassium  contra  pro  suis 
castris  aciem  instruxisse  loco  superiore  videret, 
causa  interposita,  quod  is  in  aequum  non  descenderet, 
Marcellus  militibus  persuadet  ut  se  recipiant  in 
castra.  Itaque  copias  reducere  coepit.  Cassius, 
quo  bono  valebat  Marcellumque  infirmum  esse 
sciebat,  aggressus  equitatu  legionaries  se  recipientis 
compluris  novissimos  in  fluminis  ripis  interfecit. 
Cum  hoc  detrimento  quid  transitus  fluminis  viti 
difficultatisque  haberet  cognitum  esset,  Marcellus 
castra  Baetim  transfert,  crebroque  uterque  legiones 
1 06 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

in  a  lofty  position  in  sight  of  the  town.  He  sent 
despatches  to  king  Bogiid  in  Mauretania  and  to  M. 
Lepidus,  the  pro-consul,  in  Hither  Spain,  urging 
each  to  come  as  soon  as  possible  to  the  aid  of  himself 
and  the  province,  in  the  interest  of  Caesar.  He 
himself  laid  waste  in  hostile  fashion  the  territory  of 
Corduba  and  set  buildings  ablaze. 

The  hideous  and  outrageous  character  of  this  action 
led  the  legions  which  had  taken  Marcellus  for  their 
leader  to  rush  to  him  in  a  body  and  beg  him  that 
they  might  be  led  out  to  battle  and  granted  an 
opportunity  of  engaging  the  enemy  before  those 
most  illustrious  and  beloved  possessions  of  the 
people  of  Corduba  should  suffer  the  grievous  ignominy 
of  being  consumed  before  their  very  eyes  by  plunder, 
fire  and  sword.  Though  Marcellus  thought  it  a 
thousand  pities  to  engage,  since  the  loss  sustained  by 
victor  and  vanquished  alike  would  in  either  case  have 
repercussions  on  Caesar,  and  it  lay  outside  his  power 
to  control  it,  yet  he  took  his  legions  across  the 
Baetis  and  drew  up  his  line.  On  seeing  that  Cassius 
had  drawn  up  his  line  facing  him  on  higher  ground 
in  front  of  his  own  camp,  Marcellus  prevailed  upon 
his  troops  to  ^\•ithdraw  to  their  camp,  putting  them 
off  with  the  excuse  that  the  enemy  refused  to  come 
down  into  the  plain.  And  so  he  proceeded  to  withdraw 
his  forces.  Cassius  employed  his  excellent  cavalry — - 
in  which  arm  he  was  strong,  and  knew  Marcellus  to 
be  weak — to  attack  the  retreating  legionaries,  and 
killed  quite  a  number  of  their  rearguard  on  the  banks 
of  the  river.  Made  aware  by  this  loss  of  the  draw- 
back and  difficulty  involved  in  crossing  the  river, 
Marcellus  transferred  his  camp  to  the  other  side  of 
the  Baetis.     Now  both  commanders  frequently  led 

107 


CAESAR 

in  acicm  educit ;  ncque  tamen  confligitur  propter 
locorum  difficultates. 
61  Erat  copiis  pedestribus  multo  firmior  Marcellus ; 
habebat  enim  veteranas  multisque  proeliis  expertas 
Icgiones.  Cassias  fidei  magis  quam  virtuti  legionum 
confidebat.  Itaque,  cum  castra  castris  collata  essent 
et  Marcellus  locum  idoneum  castello  cepisset  quo 
prohibere  aqua  Cassianos  posset,  Longinus,  veritus 
ne  genere  quodam  obsidionis  clauderetur  in  regioni- 
bus  alienis  sibique  infestis,  noctu  silentio  ex  castris 
proficiscitur  celerique  itinere  Uliam  contendit,  quod 
sibi  fidele  esse  oppidum  credebat.  Ibi  adeo  coniuncta 
ponit  moenibus  castra  ut  et  loci  natura — namque 
Ulia  in  edito  monte  posita  est — et  ipsa  munitione 
urbis  undique  ab  oppugnatione  tutus  esset.  Hunc 
Marcellus  insequitur  et  quam  proxime  potest  Uliam 
castra  castris  confert  locorumque  cognita  natura,  quo 
maxime  rem  deducere  volebat,  necessitate  est 
deductus  ut  neque  confligeret — cuius  si  rei  facultas 
esset,  resistere  incitatis  militibus  non  poterat — 
neque  vagari  Cassium  latius  pateretur,  ne  plures 
civitates  ea  paterentur  quae  passi  erant  Cordu- 
benses.  Castellis  idoneis  locis  collocatis  operibusque 
in  circuitu  oppidi  continuatis  Uliam  Cassiumque 
munitionibus  clausit.  Quae  prius  quam  perficerentur, 
1 08 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

out  their  legions  to  battle ;  there  was,  however,  no 
engagement  owing  to  the  difficult  nature  of  the 
ground. 

Marcellus  was  much  stronger  in  infantry  forces ; 
for  the  legions  he  had  were  veteran  ones,  tested  in 
many  campaigns.  Cassius  relied  on  the  loyalty 
rather  than  the  valour  of  his  legions.  Consequently 
when  the  two  camps  had  been  pitched  over  against 
one  another  and  Marcellus  had  selected  a  position 
suitable  for  a  stronghold  which  might  enable  him  to 
prevent  the  enemy  troops  from  getting  water, 
Longinus  was  afraid  of  being  shut  up  by  a  virtual 
blockade  in  territory  controlled  by  others  and  hostile 
to  himself;  and  so  he  silently  set  out  from  his  camp 
by  night  and  marched  swiftly  to  Ulia,  a  town  which 
he  believed  to  be  loyal  to  himself.  There  he  pitched 
his  camp  so  close  to  the  walls  of  the  town  that  not 
only  its  natural  position — for  Ulia  is  situated  on  a 
lofty  mountain — but  also  the  actual  fortification  of 
the  city  made  him  safe  on  all  sides  from  assault. 
Marcellus  pursued  him  and  pitched  his  camp  over 
against  the  enemy  camp  as  close  to  Ulia  as  he 
could.  When  he  had  appreciated  the  nature  of  the 
ground,  he  had  inevitably  to  resort  to  the  very 
tactics  to  which  above  all  he  wanted  to  resort,  namely 
refraining  from  an  engagement— and  had  there  been 
an  opportunity  for  engaging  he  could  not  have  held 
in  check  his  excited  troops- — and  at  the  same  time 
not  allowing  Cassius  to  roam  too  far  afield,  to  prevent 
more  communities  from  suffering  the  fate  of  the 
inhabitants  of  Corduba.  By  siting  strongholds  at 
suitable  points  and  carrying  his  field-works  in  a 
continuous  ring  round  the  town,  he  hemmed  in  Ulia 
and  Cassius  with  entrenchments.     But  before  these 

109 


CAESAR 

Longinus  omnem  suurn  equitatiim  eniisit ;  queni 
magno  sibi  usu  fore  credebat,  si  pabulari  frumen- 
tarique  Marcellum  non  pateretur,  magno  autem  fore 
impedimento,  si  clausus  obsidione  et  inutilis  neees- 
sariuni  consumeret  frumentuni. 

62  Paucis  diebus  Q.  Cassi  litteris  acceptis  rex  Bogus 
cum  copiis  venit  adiungitque  ei  legioni  quam  secum 
adduxerat  compluris  cohortis  auxiliarias  Hispanorum. 
Namque  ut  in  civilibus  dissensionibus  aceidere  con- 
suevit,  ita  temporibus  illis  in  Hispania  non  nullae 
civitates  rebus  Cassi  studebant,  plures  Marcellum 
fovebant.  Accedit  cum  copiis  Bogus  ad  exteriores 
Marcelli  munitiones.  Pugnatur  utrimque  acriter, 
crebroque  id  accidit  fortuna  saepe  ad  utrumque 
victoriam  transferente ;  nee  tamen  umquam  ab 
opei-ibus  depellitur  Marcellus. 

63  Interim  Lepidus  ex  citeriore  provincia  cum 
cohoi-tibus  legionariis  XXXV  magnoque  numero 
equitum  et  reliquorum  auxiliorum  venit  ea  mente 
Uliam,  ut  sine  ullo  studio  contentiones  Cassi  Mar- 
cellique  componeret.  Huic  venienti  sine  dubitatione 
Marcellus  se  credit  atque  ofFert ;  Cassius  contra 
suis  se  tenet  praesidiis,  sive  eo  quod  plus  sibi  iuris 
deberi  quam  Marcello  existimabat,  sive  eo  quod  ne 
praeoccupatus  animus  Lepidi  esset  obsequio  adver- 
sarii  verebatur,  Ponit  ad  Uliam  castra  Lepidus 
neque  habet  a  Marcello  quicquam  divisi.  Ne 
pugnetur  interdicit;    ad  exeundum  Cassium  invitat 

no 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

could  be  completed,  Longinus  sent  out  his  entire 
cavali-y  force,  in  the  belief  that  it  would  stand  him 
in  very  good  stead  if  it  stopped  Marcellus  from 
collecting  fodder  and  corn,  whereas  it  would  prove  a 
great  handicap  if,  shut  up  by  blockade  and  rendered 
useless,  it  used  up  precious  corn. 

Within  a  few  days  king  Bogud,  having  received  Q. 
Cassius'  despatches,  arrived  with  his  forces;  he  had 
brought  one  legion  with  him,  and  to  this  he  now 
added  several  auxiliary  cohorts  of  Spanish  troops. 
For,  as  usually  happens  in  civil  wars,  some  states 
in  Spain  at  that  time  were  supporters  of  Cassius, 
though  a  larger  number  wai'mly  espoused  the  cause 
of  Marcellus.  Bogud  and  his  forces  came  up  to  the 
outer  entrenchments  of  Marcellus :  sharp  fighting 
broke  out  between  the  two  sides,  and  this  recurred  at 
frequent  intervals,  with  the  tide  of  fortune  often 
turning  from  one  side  to  the  other.  Marcellus, 
however,  was  never  dislodged  from  his  field-works. 

Meanwhile  Lepidus  came  to  Ulia  from  the  nearer 
province  Avith  thirty-five  legionary  cohorts  and  a 
large  number  of  cavahy  and  other  auxiliary  troops, 
his  object  being  to  resolve,  quite  impartially,  the 
dispute  between  Cassius  and  Marcellus.  On  his 
arrival  Marcellus  without  hesitation  put  himself  con- 
fidently into  Lepidus'  hands.  Cassius,  on  the  other 
hand,  remained  within  his  own  defences,  either 
because  he  thought  that  a  greater  measure  of  justice 
was  due  to  himself  than  to  Marcellus,  or  else  because 
he  was  afraid  that  Lepidus'  attitude  might  have  been 
biased  by  the  deference  shewn  him  by  his  opponent. 
Lepidus  pitched  his  camp  near  Ulia,  in  complete 
accord  with  Marcellus.  He  refused  to  allow  any 
fighting,  invited  Cassius  to  come  out,  and  pledged 


CAESAR 

fidemque  suani  in  re  omni  interponit.  Cum  diu 
dubitasset  Cassius  quid  sibi  faciendum  quidve  Lepido 
esset  credendum,  neque  ullum  exitum  consili  sui 
reperiret  si  permaneret  in  sententia,  postulat  uti 
munitiones  disicerentur  sibique  liber  exitus  daretur. 
Non  tantum  indutiis  factis  sed  prope  iam  pace  ^ 
constituta  opera  cum  -  complanarent  custodiaeque 
munitionum  essent  deductae,  auxilia  regis  in  id 
castellum  Marcelli  quod  proximum  erat  regis  castris, 
neque  opinantibus  omnibus — si  tamen  in  omnibus 
fuit  Cassius  :  nam  de  huius  conscientia  dubitabatur — , 
impetum  fecerunt  complurisque  ibi  milites  oppres- 
serunt.  Quod  nisi  celeriter  indignatione  et  auxilio 
Lepidi  proelium  esset  diremptum,  maior  calamitas 
esset  accepta. 
64  Cum  iter  Cassio  patefactum  esset,  castra  Marcellus 
cum  Lepido  coniungit.  Lepidus  eodem  tempore 
Marcellusque  Cordubam  cum  suis,  Cassius  proficisci- 
tur  Carmonem.  Sub  idem  tempus  Trebonius  pro- 
consul ad  provinciam  obtinendam  venit.  De  cuius 
adventu  ut  cognovit  Cassius,  legiones  quas  secum 
habuei'at  equitatumque  in  hiberna  distribuit ;  ipse 
omnibus  suis  rebus  celeriter  correptis  Malacam 
contendit  ibique  adverso  tempore  navigandi  navis 
conscendit,  ut  ipse  praedicabat,  ne  se  Lepido  et 
Trebonio  et  Marcello  committeret,  ut  amici  eius 
dictitabant,    ne    per    cam    provinciam    minore    cum 

^  pace  added  by  Nipperdey.  ^  cum  added  by  Aldus. 

112 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

his  word  to  every  offer  he  made.  For  a  long  time 
Cassius  was  in  doubt  as  to  what  he  should  do  or  what 
confidence  he  should  place  in  Lepidus ;  but  as  he 
could  find  no  solution  to  his  policy  if  he  remained 
steadfast  in  his  decision,  he  demanded  that  the 
entrenchments  should  be  demolished  and  that  he 
himself  should  be  granted  leave  to  depart  unmolested. 
Not  only  had  a  truce  been  made,  but  bv  now  a  peace- 
ful settlement  had  been  all  but  arranged,  and  they 
were  dismantling  the  fieldworks  and  the  sentries 
manning  the  entrenchments  had  been  withdrawn, 
when,  though  nobody  expected  it — if  indeed  nobody 
included  Cassius,  for  there  was  some  doubt  as  to  his 
complicity — the  king's  auxiliary  forces  launched  an 
attack  upon  the  stronghold  of  Marcellus  nearest  the 
king's  camp,  and  overpowered  a  number  of  troops  in 
it.  And  had  not  Lepidus  in  righteous  anger  promptly 
lent  his  assistance  to  break  up  that  fray,  a  greater 
disaster  would  have  been  sustained. 

Now  that  the  way  lay  open  to  Cassius,  Marcellus 
joined  his  camp  to  that  of  Lepidus.  Lepidus  and 
Marcellus  then  set  out  with  their  forces  simul- 
taneously for  Corduba,  Cassius  for  Carmo.  Round 
about  the  same  time  Trebonius  came  to  govern  the  Feb.  47. 
province  as  pro-consul.  WTien  Cassius  learned  of  his 
coming  he  posted  the  legions  under  his  command 
and  the  cavalry  to  their  various  winter-quarters ;  as 
for  himself,  he  hurriedly  grabbed  all  his  belongings 
and  hastened  to  Malaca,  where  he  embarked, 
although  the  season  was  unfavourable  for  navigation. 
His  object,  as  he  personally  averred,  was  to  avoid 
committing  himself  to  Lepidus,  Trebonius  and 
Marcellus :  as  his  friends  asserted,  to  avoid  the 
relative  humiliation  of  travelling  through  a  province 

113 


CAESAR 

dignitate  iter  faceret  cuius  magna  pars  ab  eo 
defecerat,  ut  ceteri  existimabant,  ne  pecunia  ilia  ex 
infinitis  rapinis  confecta  in  potestateni  cuiusquam 
veniret.  Progressus  secunda  ut  hiberna  tempestate 
cum  in  Hiberum  flumen  noctis  vitandae  causa  se 
contulisset,  inde  paulo  vehementiore  tempestate, 
nihilo  periculosius  se  navigaturum  credens,  profectus, 
adversis  fluctibus  occurrentibus  ostio  fluniinis,  in 
ipsis  faucibus,  cum  neque  flectere  navem  propter  vim 
fluminis  neque  directam  tantis  fluctibus  tenere  posset, 
demersa  nave  periit. 
65  Cum  in  Syriam  Caesar  ex  Aegypto  venisset  atque 
ab  eis  qui  Roma  venerant  ad  eum  cognosceret 
litterisque  urbanis  animadverteret  multa  Romae 
male  et  inutiliter  administrari  neque  ullam  partem 
rei  publicae  satis  commode  geri,  quod  et  conten- 
tionibus  tribuniciis  perniciosae  seditiones  orirentur  et 
ambitione  atque  indulgentia  tribunorum  militum  et 
qui  legionibus  praeerant  multa  contra  miorem  con- 
suetudinemque  militarem  fierent,  quae  dissolvendae 
disciplinae  severitatisque  essent,  eaque  omnia  flagi- 
tare  adventum  suum  videret,  tamen  praeferendum 
existimabat,  quas  in  provincias  regionesque  venisset, 
eas  ita  relinquere  constitutas  ut  domesticis  dissen- 
sionibus  liberarentur,  iura  legesque  acciperent, 
externorum  hostium  metum  deponerent.     Haec  in 

1  He  touched  first  at  Ace  Ptolemais  on  the  Syrian  coast 
about  mid-June  (Holmes),  early  July  (Stoffel). 

^  The  mam  causes  of  unrest  were  economic ;    in  particular 
Caesar's  measures  for  the  relief  of  debt  were  too  mild  for 
extremists  like  Caelius  and,  later,  Dolabella  :    see  also  Intro- 
duction to  Bell.  Afr.,  p.  139. 
114 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

a  great  part  of  which  had  revolted  from  him :  as 
everyone  else  believed,  to  avoid  letting  that  money 
of  his — the  proceeds  of  innumerable  robberies — ^fall 
into  the  hands  of  anyone  else.  At  first  he  made  some 
headway  in  weather  which,  considering  it  was  winter, 
was  favourable  ;  but  after  he  had  taken  shelter  in  the 
river  Ebro  to  avoid  sailing  by  night,  the  weather  then 
became  somewhat  stormier ;  believing,  however, 
that  he  would  run  no  greater  risk  if  he  sailed,  he  set 
forth :  but  what  with  the  swell  rolling  in  head  on 
against  the  river  mouth,  and  the  strong  current 
preventing  him  from  putting  about  just  as  the  huge 
waves  made  it  impossible  to  hold  on  straight  ahead, 
his  ship  sank  in  the  very  mouth  of  the  river,  and  so  he 
perished. 

On  his  arrival  in  Syria  ^  from  Egypt  Caesar  learned 
from  those  who  had  joined  him  there  from  Rome,  as 
well  as  from  information  contained  in  despatches 
from  the  city,  that  there  was  much  that  was  bad  and 
unprofitable  in  the  administration  at  Rome,  and  that 
no  department  of  the  government  was  being  really 
efficiently  conducted  ^ ;  for  rivalries  among  the 
tribunes,  it  was  said,  were  producing  dangerous 
rifts,  and  the  flattering  indulgence  shewn  to  their 
troops  by  the  military  tribunes  and  legionary  com- 
manders was  giving  rise  to  many  practices  opposed  to 
military  custom  and  usage  which  tended  to  under- 
mine strict  discipline.  All  this,  as  he  saw,  urgently 
demanded  his  presence  :  yet,  for  all  that,  he  thought 
it  more  important  to  leave  all  the  provinces  and 
districts  he  visited  organised  in  such  a  way  that  they 
would  be  immune  from  internal  disagreements, 
would  accept  a  legal  constitution,  and  lay  aside  their 
fears    of   aggression    from    without.     This    he    was 

115 


CAESAR 

Syria,  Cilicia,  Asia  celeriter  se  confecturum  sperabat, 
quod  hae  provinciae  nuUo  bello  premebantur;  in 
Bithynia  ac  Ponto  plus  oneris  vidt^bat  sibi  impendere. 
Non  excessisse  enim  Ponlo  Pharnacen  audiebat 
neque  excessurum  putabat,  cum  secundo  proelio 
vehementer  esset  inflatus  quod  contra  Domitium 
Calvinum  fecerat.  Commoratus  fere  in  omnibus 
civitatibus  quae  maiore  sunt  dignitate,  praemia  bene 
meritis  et  viritim  et  publice  tribuit,  de  controversiis 
veteribus  cognoscit  ac  statuit ;  reges,  tyrannos, 
dynastas  provinciae  finitimos,  qui  omnes  ad  eum  con- 
currerant,  receptos  in  fidem  condicionibus  impositis 
provinciae  tuendae  ac  defendendae  dimittit  et  sibi  et 
populo  Romano  anwissimos. 
66  Paucis  diebus  in  ea  provincia  consumptis  Sextum 
Caesarem,  amicum  et  necessarium  suum,  legionibus 
Syriaeque  praeficit ;  ipse  eadem  classe  qua  venerat 
proficiscitur  in  Ciliciam.  Cuius  provinciae  civitates 
omnis  evocat  Tarsum,  quod  oppidum  fere  totius 
Ciliciae  nobilissimum  fortissimumque  est.  Ibi  rebus 
omnibus  provinciae  et  finitimarum  civitatium  con- 
stitutis  cupiditate  proficiscendi  ad  bellum  gerendum 
non  diutius  moratur,  magnisque  itineribus  per 
Cappadociam  confectis  biduum  Mazacae  commoratus 
Comana  venit,^  vetustissimum  et  sanctissimum  in 
Cappadocia  Bellonae  templum,  quod  tanta  religione 

^  venit  is  read  by  two  31 SS.,  but  is  omitted  by  the  rest. 

^  He  sailed  from  Seleucia,  the  port  of  Antioch,  for  Tarsus, 
probably  early  in  July,  47. 

-  This  sentence,  as  the  text  stands,  presents  a  difiBculty; 
for  it  implies  that,  despite  his  urgent  haste,  Caesar  made  a 
detour  of  60  miles  8.E.  from  Mazaca  to  visit  the  Cappadocian 
Comana.  Strabo  and  Appian  say  that  it  was  the  Pontic, 
not  the  Cappadocian,  Comana  that  Caesar  visited,  and  possibly 
our  author  was  confused. 
ii6 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

confident  he  would  speedily  achieve  in  Syria,  Cilicia 
and  Asia,  as  these  provinces  had  no  war  afflicting 
them :  in  Bithynia  and  Pontus  he  had,  as  he  saw,  a 
heavier  task  impending.  For  he  heard  that  Phar- 
naces  had  not  evacuated  Pontus,  and  he  did  not 
expect  him  to  do  so,  exceedingly  puffed  up  as  he  was 
by  the  successful  battle  he  had  fought  against 
Domitius  Calvinus.  He  spent  some  time  in  prac- 
tically all  the  more  important  states  of  Syria, 
besto^Wng  rewards  both  upon  individuals  and  com- 
munities where  they  deserved  them,  and  holding 
official  inquiries  and  giving  his  ruling  in  questions 
of  long-standing  dispute ;  while  as  for  the  kings, 
sovereigns  and  rulers  who,  as  neighbours  of  the 
province,  had  one  and  all  flocked  to  him,  he  formally 
took  them  under  his  protection  and  then,  on  con- 
dition that  they  undertook  to  watch  over  and  guard 
the  province,  he  dismissed  them  as  very  loyal 
friends  both  to  himself  and  the  Roman  people. 

After  spending  a  few  days  in  that  province  he 
posted  Sextus  Caesar,  his  friend  and  kinsman,  to 
command  the  legions  and  govern  Syria :  he  himself 
set  out  ^  for  Cilicia  in  the  same  fleet  in  which  he  had 
arrived.  He  then  summoned  all  the  states  of  this 
latter  province  to  forgather  at  Tarsus — perhaps  the 
most  famous  and  strongest  township  in  the  whole 
of  Cilicia.  There  he  settled  all  the  affairs  of  the 
province  and  its  neighbouring  states ;  but  when  he 
had  done  so,  his  eagerness  to  set  out  and  prosecute 
the  war  admitted  no  further  delay ;  and  so,  after 
travei'sing  Cappadocia  by  forced  marches  and  staying 
two  days  at  Mazaca,  he  reached  Comana,  where  is 
the  shrine  of  Bellona — the  most  ancient  and  holiest 
in  Cappadocia. 2     This  shrine  is  Avorshipped  with  such 

117 


CAESAR 

colitur  lit  sacerdos  eius  deae  maiestate,  imperio, 
potcntia  secundus  a  rege  consensu  gentis  illius 
habeatur.  Id  homini  nobilissimo  Lycomedi  liithyno 
adiudicavit,  qui  regio  Cappadocum  genere  ortus  iure 
minime  dubio,  vetustate  tamen  propter  adversam 
fortunam  maiorum  suorum  mutationemque  generis 
intermisso  sacerdotium  id  repetebat.  Fratri  autem 
Ariobarzanis  Ariarathi,  cum  bene  meritus  uterque 
eorum  de  re  publica  esset,  ne  aut  regni  hereditas 
Ai'iarathen  sollicitaret  aut  heres  regni  terreret 
Ariobarzanen,  partem  Armeniae  minoris  concessit, 
eumque  Ariobarzani  attribuit  qui  sub  eius  imperio  ac 
dicione  esset. ^  Ipse  iter  inceptum  simili  velocitate 
conficere  coepit. 
67  Cum  propius  Pontum  finisque  Gallograeciae 
accessisset,  Deiotarus,  tetrarches  Gallograeciae  tum 
quidem  paene  totius,  quod  el  neque  legibus  neque 
moribus  concessum  esse  ceteri  tetrarchae  contende- 
bant,  sine  dubio  autem  rex  Armeniae  minoris  ab 
senatu  appellatus,  depositis  regiis  insignibus  neque 
tantum  privato  vestitu  sed  etiam  reorum  habitu 
supplex  ad  Caesarem  venit  oratum  ut  sibi  ignosceret, 
quod  in  ea  parte  positus  terrarum  quae  nulla  praesidia 
Caesaris  habuisset  exercitibus  imperiisque  coactus  ^ 

1  this  sentence  is  in  great  disorder  in  the  MSS.  :  I  have 
adopted  Nipperdey's  reading. 

-  coactus  added  by  Glandorp. 

^  Better  known  as  Galatia. 

2  For  his  assistance  to  the  Romans  against  Mithridates 
Deiotarus  had  been  rewarded  by  Pompej-  with  grants  of 
land  in  eastern  Pontus  and  the  title  of  king  :  Lesser  Armenia 
may  have  been  given  him  at  the  same  time.  He  was  originally 
tetrarch  of  western  Galatia  only,  and  his  claim  to  central 
Galatia  as  well  is  a  matter  of  some  obscurity. 

ii8 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

reverence  that  the  priest  of  that  goddess  is  held  by 
common  consent  of  the  nation  to  rank  next  to  the 
king  in  majesty,  dominion  and  influence.  This 
priesthood  he  awarded  to  Lycomedes,  a  Bithynian 
of  very  noble  descent,  who  sought  it  by  right  of 
inhei'itance ;  for  he  was  sprung  from  the  royal 
Cappadocian  house,  his  claim  in  this  respect  being, 
in  point  of  legal  right,  by  no  means  in  doubt,  though, 
in  long  passing  of  time,  because  of  the  chequered 
fortunes  of  his  ancestors  and  changes  in  the  royal  line 
of  descent,  continuity  had  been  broken.  As  for 
Ariobarzanes  and  his  brother  Ariarathes,  both  of 
them  had  deserved  well  of  the  Republic ;  and  so,  to 
prevent  Ariarathes  from  being  tempted  to  claim  his 
inheritance  to  the  kingdom,  or,  as  heir  to  it,  from 
intimidating  Ariobarzanes,  Caesar  granted  him  part 
of  Lesser  Armenia  and  allowed  Ariobarzanes  to  treat 
him  as  his  vassal.  Whereupon  Caesar  himself 
proceeded  to  complete  the  remainder  of  his  journey 
with  similar  despatch. 

When  Caesar  approached  closer  to  Pontus  and  the 
boundaries  of  Gallograecia,'^  he  was  met  by  Deio- 
tarus.  Although  the  latter's  position  at  that  time  as 
tetrarch  of  practically  the  whole  of  Gallograecia  was 
disputed  by  all  his  fellow  tetrarchs  as  inadmissible 
both  by  law  and  by  tradition,  he  w'as,  however, 
indisputably  hailed  as  king  of  Lesser  Armenia  by  the 
Senate  - ;  and  now  he  laid  aside  his  royal  insignia 
and,  dressed  not  merely  as  a  private  person  but 
actually  in  the  garb  of  defendants  in  the  courts,  he 
came  to  Caesar  as  a  suppliant  to  beg  his  pardon  for 
having  been  on  the  side  of  Cn.  Pompeius.  He 
explained  that,  situated  as  he  was  in  a  part  of  the 
world  which  had  had  no  garrisons  of  Caesar's  to  protect 

119 


CAESAR 

in  Cn.  Pompei  castris  fuisset :  neque  enim  se  debuisse 
iudicem  esse  controversiarum  populi  Roniani,  sed 
parere  praesentibus  imperiis. 

68  Contra  quern  Caesar,  cum  plurima  sua  com- 
memorasset  officia  quae  consul  ei  decretis  publicis 
tribuisset,  cumque  defcnsioneni  eius  nullam  posse 
excusationem  eius  imprudentiae  recipere  coarguisset, 
quod  homo  tantae  prudentiae  ac  diligentiae  scire 
potuisset  quis  urbem  Italiamque  tenerct,  ubi  senatus 
populusque  Romanus,  ubi  res  publica  esset,  quis 
denique  post  L.  Lentulum,  C.  Marcellum  consul 
esset,  tamen  se  concedere  id  factum  superioribus  suis 
beneficiis,  veteri  hospitio  atque  amicitiae,  dignitati 
aetatique  hominis,  precibus  eorum  qui  frequentes 
concurrissent  hospites  atque  amici  Deiotari  ad 
deprecandum,  de  controversiis  tetrarcharum  postea 
se  cogniturum  esse  dixit,  regium  vestitum  ei  restituit. 
Legionem  autem  eam  quam  ex  genere  civium 
suorum  Deiotarus  armatura  disciplinaque  nostra 
constitutam  habebat  equitatumque  omnem  ad 
bellum  gerendum  adducere  iussit. 

69  Cum  in  Pontum  venisset  copiasque  omnis  in  unum 
locum  coegisset,  quae  numero  atque  exercitatione 
bellorum  mediocres  erant — excepta  enim  legione 
sexta,  quam  secum  abduxerat  Alexandrea  veteranam 


1  As  consul  in  59  B.C.  Caesar  had  got  the  Senat*  to  ratify 
the  grants  of  land  with  which  Pompey  had  rewarded  him. 

2  Lentulus  and  Marcellus  were  consuls  in  49  B.C.  :  Caesar 
and  Servilius  in  48. 

^  This  appears  to  be  the  meaning  of  superioribus  suis 
beneficiis,  >:iz.  '  past  acts  of  kindness  done  by  Deiotarus  to 
Caesar  '.  Others  interpret  the  words  as  meaning  '  acts  of 
kindness  done  by  Caesar  ' ;    but  though  this  would  be  the 


TPIE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

it,  he  had  been  compelled  to  do  so  by  orders  backed  by 
armed  force  ;  for  it  had  been  no  business  of  his  to  act 
as  judge  in  the  disputes  of  the  Roman  people,  but 
only  to  obey  the  commands  of  the  moment. 

68  In  his  reply  Caesar  reminded  him  of  all  the  many 
loyal  services  he  himself  as  consul  had  rendered  to 
him  by  official  decrees,^  and  went  on  to  point  out 
that  his  apology  could  not  be  accepted  as  any  excuse 
for  his  unwisdom  ;  a  man,  in  fact,  as  wise  and  careful 
as  he  was  could  have  known  who  was  master  of  Rome 
and  Italy,  what  was  the  attitude  of  the  Senate  and 
the  Roman  people  and  the  position  taken  up  by  the 
government,  who  in  short  was  consul  after  L.  Lentulus 
and  C.  Marcellus.2  '  Nevertheless,'  he  continued, '  I 
make  allowance  for  that  action  of  yours  in  view  of 
your  past  generosity  towards  myself,^  our  long-stand- 
ing ties  of  hospitality  and  friendship,  your  rank  and 
age,  and  the  entreaties  of  all  those  guests  and 
friends  of  yours  who  have  flocked  in  crowds  to  entreat 
for  your  pardon.  As  for  the  matters  in  dispute 
between  the  tetrarchs,  I  shall  examine  into  them 
later.'  He  then  bade  Deiotarus  resume  his  royal 
garb,  but  ordered  him  to  bring  that  legion  of  his, 
which  was  raised  from  the  ranks  of  his  own  country- 
men but  in  equipment  and  training  organised  on  our 
pattern,  together  with  all  his  cavalry,  for  the  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war. 

69  On  his  arrival  in  Pontus  Caesar  mustered  his  whole 
force  at  a  single  rendezvous.  It  was  but  a  modest 
force  both  numerically  and  in  practical  expex'ience  in 
the  field ;  for  apart  from  the  Sixth  legion,  which  he 
had  brought  with  him  from  Alexandria — and  this, 

more  obvious  and  usual  meaning  of  the  phrase,  it  scarcely 
suits  the  present  context. 


CAESAR 

multis  laboribus  periculisque  functam  multisque 
militibus  partini  difficultate  itinerum  ac  naviga- 
tionum  partim  creV)ntate  bellorum  adeo  deminutam, 
ut  minus  mille  hominibus  in  ea  esset,  reliquae  erant 
tres  legiones,  una  Deiotari,  duae  quae  in  eo  proelio 
quod  Cn.  Domitium  fecisse  cum  Pharnace  scripsimus 
fuerant — ,  legati  a  Pharnace  missi  Caesarem  adeunt 
atque  imprimis  deprecantur  ne  eius  adventus  hostilis 
esset :  facturum  enim  omnia  Pharnacen  quae 
imperata  essent.  Maximeque  commemorabant  nulla 
Pharnacen  auxilia  contra  Caesarem  Pompeio  dare 
voluisse,  cum  Deiotarus,  qui  dedisset,  tamen  ei 
satisfecisset. 
70  Caesar  respondit  se  fore  aequissimum  Pharnaci,  si 
quae  polliceretur  repraesentaturus  esset.  Monuit 
autem,  ut  solebat,  mitibus  verbis  legatos,  ne  aut 
Deiotarum  sibi  obicerent  aut  nimis  eo  gloriarentur 
beneficio,  quod  auxilia  Pompeio  non  missisent.  Nam 
se  neque  libentius  facere  quicquam  quam  supplicibus 
ignoscere  neque  provinciarum  publlcas  iniurias  con- 
donare  eis  posse  qui  fuissent  in  se  officiosi.  Quin  ^  id 
ipsum  quod  commemorarent  officium  fuisse  utilius 
Pharnaci,  qui  providisset  ne  vinceretur,  quam  sibi 
cui  di  immortales  victoriam  tribuissent.     Itaque  se 

^  quam  MSS.  :   quin  Nipperdey. 
122 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

being  a  veteran  one  with  a  long  record  of  hazardous 
and  strenuous  achievements,  had  lost  so  many  men, 
due  partly  to  the  difficulties  of  transit  both  by  land 
and  sea,  partly  to  the  frequency  of  its  campaigns,  and 
was  now  so  much  below  strength  as  to  comprise  less 
than  one  thousand  troops — apart  from  the  Sixth, 
the  remainder  of  the  foi'ce  consisted  of  three  legions — 
one  belonging  to  Deiotarus,  and  the  two  which  had 
taken  part  in  that  engagement  which  Cn.  Domitius 
fought  ^\ith  Phamaces,  as  I  have  related.  Where- 
upon envoys  sent  by  Pharnaces  approached  Caesar 
and  first  and  foremost  entreated  him  not  to  approach 
their  country  in  anv  hostile  spirit,  since  Pharnaces 
would  carry  out  all  his  instructions.  In  particular 
they  reminded  Caesar  that  Pharnaces  had  refused  to 
provide  Pompeius  with  any  auxiliary  troops  for  use 
against  Caesar ;  whereas  Deiotarus,  who  had  pro- 
vided them,  had  none  the  less  given  him  satisfaction. 
Caesar  replied  that  he  would  be  scrupulously  fair  to 
Pharnaces  if  the  latter  intended  to  cany  out  his 
promises.  He  warned  the  envoys, however, inhis  usual 
tactful  language,  not  to  tax  him  with  the  case  of 
Deiotarus  or  pride  themselves  unduly  on  their  good 
services  in  having  refused  to  send  Pompeius  auxiliary 
troops.  Forwhereasnothinggavehimgreaterpleasure 
than  granting  pardon  when  it  was  humbly  entreated, 
yet  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  condone  public  outrages 
against  the  provinces  in  the  case  of  those  who  had 
been  loyal  towards  himself.  '  In  point  of  fact,'  he 
went  on,  '  that  very  act  of  loyalty  Avhich  you  call  to 
mind  proved  more  expedient  to  Pharnaces,  who 
thereby  had  the  foresight  to  avoid  defeat,  than  to 
myself,  for  whose  victory  the  immortal  gods  were 
responsible.     As  for  the  great  and  serious  outrages 

123 


CAESAR 

niagnas  et  gravis  iniurias  civium  Romanorum  qui  in 
Ponto  negotiati  essent,  quoniam  in  integrum  resti- 
tuere  non  posset,  concedere  Pharnaci.  Nam  neque 
interfectis  amissam  vitam  neque  exsectis  virilitatem 
restituere  posse;  quod  quidem  supplicium  gravius 
morte  cives  Romani  subissent.  Ponto  vero  decederet 
confestim  familiasque  publicanorum  remitteret 
ceteraque  restitueret  sociis  civibusque  Romanis  quae 
penes  eum  essent.  Si  fecisset,  iam  tunc  sibi  mitteret 
munera  ac  dona  quae  bene  rebus  gestis  imperatores 
ab  amicis  accipere  consuessent.  Miserat  enim 
Pharnaces  coronam  auream.  His  responsis  datis 
legatos  remisit. 

71  At  Pharnaces  liberaliter  omnia  poUicitus,  cum 
festinantem  ac  praecurrentem  Caesarem  speraret 
libentius  etiam  crediturum  suis  promissis  quam  res 
pateretur,  quo  celerius  honestiusque  ad  res  magis 
necessarias  proficisceretur — nemini  enim  erat  igno- 
tum  plurimis  de  causis  ad  urbem  Caesarem  revocari — , 
lentius  agere,  decedendi  diem  postulare  longiorem, 
pactiones  interponere,  in  summa  frustrari  coepit. 
Caesar  cognita  calliditate  hominis,  quod  aliis  tem- 
poribus  natiira  facere  consueverat  tunc  necessitate 
fecit  adductus,  ut  celei'ius  omnium  opinione  manum 
consereret. 

72  Zela  est  oppidum  in  Ponto  positum,  ipsum  ut  in 
piano  loco  satis  munitum :  tumulus  enim  naturalis, 
124 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

perpetrated  against  Roman  citizens  engaged  in  trade 
in  Pontus,  since  it  is  not  in  my  power  to  set  them  to 
rights,  I  accordingly  forgive  Pharnaces.  I  cannot, 
in  fact,  restore  to  murdered  men  the  Hfe  they  have 
lost,  nor  to  the  mutilated  their  manhood ;  and  such 
indeed  is  the  punishment — worse  than  death — ^that 
Roman  citizens  have  undergone.  Pharnaces,  how- 
ever, must  Avithdraw  forthwith  from  Pontus,  release 
the  household  slaves  of  the  tax-gatherers,  and 
make  all  other  such  restitution  as  lies  in  his  power 
to  the  allies  and  Roman  citizens.  If  he  does  this, 
then — and  not  before — shall  he  send  me  the  tributes 
and  gifts  which  triumphant  commanders  are  in  the 
habit  of  receiving  from  their  friends.'  (Pharnaces 
had,  in  fact,  sent  him  a  golden  crown.)  Such  was  the 
reply  with  which  the  envoys  were  sent  back. 

71  All  this  Pharnaces  graciously  promised  to  do. 
However,  as  he  hoped  that  Caesar's  impetuous  haste 
would  lead  him  to  trust  his  own  assurances  still  more 
readily  than  the  circumstances  justified,  so  that  he 
might  tackle  more  urgent  matters  with  the  greater  ex- 
pedition and  propriety — for  everyone  was  aware  that 
there  were  many  reasons  demanding  Caesar's  return 
to  Rome — in  this  hope,  then,  he  began  to  take  a  more 
leisurely  line,  to  demand  a  later  date  for  his  with- 
drawal, to  propose  agreements  by  way  of  causing  delay 
• — in  fine, he  proceeded  to  cheat.  Realising  the  fellow's 
cunning,  Caesar  was  now  of  necessity  constrained  to 
adopt  the  very  tactics  which  on  other  occasions  it 
had  been  his  natural  habit  to  employ — namely  to 
come  to  grips  more  promptly  than  anyone  expected. 

72  Zela  is  a  town  situated  in  Pontus,  with  adequate 
natural  defences,  considering  its  position  in  a  plain : 
for  its   battlements   are   reared   upon   a  hillock — a 


CAESAR 

velut  nianu  factus,  excelsiore  undique  fastigio 
sustinet  murum.  Circumpositi  sunt  huic  oppido 
magni  multique  intercisi  vallibus  colles ;  quorum 
editissimus  unus,  qui  propter  victoriam  Mithridatis  et 
iiifelicitatem  Triari  detrimentumque  exercitus  nostri 
magnam  in  illis  partibus  habet  nobilitatem,  superio- 
ribus  locis  atque  itineribus  paene  coniunctus  est  ^ 
ojjpido  nee  niulto  longius  rnilibus  passuum  III  abest 
ab  Zela.  Hunc  locum  Pharnaces  veteribus  pater- 
norum  felicium  castrorum  refectis  operibus  copiis 
suis  omnibus  occupavit. 
73  Caesar  cum  ab  hoste  milia  passuum  V  castra 
posuisset  videretque  eas  vallis  quibus  regia  castra 
munirentur  eodem  intervallo  sua  castra  munituras, 
si  modo  ea  loca  hostes  priores  non  cepissent,  quae 
multo  erant  propiora  regis  castris,  aggerem  com- 
poi-tari  iubet  intra  munitiones.  Quo  celeriter  collate 
proxima  nocte  vigilia  quarta  legionibus  omnibus 
expeditis  impedimentisque  in  castris  relictis  prima 
luce  neque  opinantibus  hostibus  eum  ipsum  locunn 
cepit.  in  quo  Mithridates  secundum  proelium  adver- 
sus    Triarium    fecerat.     Hue    omnem    comportatum 

^  /  have  adopted  Vielhaber's  restoration. 

1  Lucullus'  lieutenant,  C.  Triarius,was  heavily  defeated  in  67. 
^  Its  exact  position  is  doubtful;    the  highest  hill  in  the 
neighbourhood  (now  Altiagatch  Dagh,  about  2000  feet)  being 
some  eight  Roman  miles  north  of  Zela. 

*  The  reference  of  the  two  temporal  expressions — vigilia 
quarta  and  prima  luce — is  not  easy  to  decide.  The  rendering 
given  is  perhaps  the  most  likely.  Caesar  had  some  four  miles 
to  march;  and  if  he  left  camp  early  in  the  fourth  watch  (this 
would  be  quite  short  in  June),  he  could  have  taken  the  position 
at  dawn.  Two  other  interpretations  seem  possible  :  (1)  '  at 
the  fourth  watch  as  the  dawn  was  (just)  breaking  he  cap- 
tured .  .  .'  (2)  '  When  at  the  fourth  watch  on  the  following 
126 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

natural  one  for  all  its  artificial  appearance — whose 
summit  is  loftier  than  all  the  terrain  surrounding  it. 
Encircling  this  town  are  many  considerable  hills, 
intersected  by  valleys ;  and  one  of  these — a  very 
lofty  one — which  enjoys  no  little  fame  in  those  parts 
thanks  to  the  victory  of  Mithridates,  and  the  mis- 
fortune of  Triarius  and  defeat  of  our  armv,^  is  all  but 
linked  to  the  town  by  tracks  along  the  higher  ground, 
and  is  little  more  than  three  miles  distant  from  Zela.- 
Here  Pharnaces  repaired  the  ancient  works  of  his 
father's  once  prosperous  camp,  and  occupied  the 
position  with  his  entire  forces. 

Caesar  pitched  his  camp  five  miles  distant  from  the 
enemy  ;  and  as  he  now  saw  that  that  valley  by  which 
the  king's  camp  was  protected  would,  if  its  width 
separated  them,  equally  afford  protection  to  a  camp 
of  his  own,  provided  only  that  the  enemy  did  not 
anticipate  him  in  capturing  the  ground  in  question, 
which  was  much  nearer  the  king's  camp,  he  ordered 
materials  for  a  rampart  to  be  carted  within  the 
entrenchments.  This  was  speedily  collected.  The 
following  night  he  left  camp  at  the  fourth  watch  ^ 
with  all  his  legions  in  light  order  and  the  heavy 
baggage  left  behind  in  camp,  and  surprised  the 
enemy  at  dawn  by  capturing  that  very  position 
where  Mithridates  once  fought  his  successful  action 
against  Triarius.     To  this  spot  *  he  ordered  the  slaves 

night  this  material  had  been  collected  .  .  .'.  But  this  would 
more  likely  have  been  a  daylight  operation,  unless  motives 
of  security  demanded  otherwise. 

■•  The  site  of  Caesar's  new  camp  appears  to  have  been 
immediately  south  of  the  valley,  on  the  northern  edge  of  which 
Pharnaces  was  already  encamped.  The  site  seems  to  have 
been  dominated  by — though  not  identical  with — the  hill 
where  Mithridates  had  once  encamped. 

127 


CAESAR 

aggerem  ex  castris  per  servitia  aggeri  ^  iussit,  ne 
quis  ab  opere  miles  discederet,  cum  spatio  non 
amplius  passuum  mille  intercisa  vallis  castra  hostium 
divideret  ab  opere  incepto  Caesaris  castrorum. 
74  Pharnaces,  cum  id  repente  prima  luce  animadver- 
tisset,  copias  suas  omnis  pro  castris  instruxit.  Quas 
interposita  tanta  locorum  iniquitate  consuetudine 
magis  pervulgata  militari  credebat  instrui  Caesar  vel 
ad  opus  suum  tardandum,  quo  plures  in  armis  tene- 
rentur,  vel  ad  ostentationem  regiae  fiduciae,  ne 
munitione  magis  quam  manu  defendere  locum 
Pharnaces  videretur.  Itaque  deterritus  non  est  quo 
minus  prima  acie  pro  vallo  instructa  reliqua  pars 
exercitus  opus  faceret.  At  Pharnaces  impulsus  sive 
loci  felicitate  sive  auspiciis  et  religionibus  inductus, 
quibus  obtemperasse  eum  postea  audiebamus,  sive 
paucitate  nostrorum  qui  in  armis  erant  comperta, 
cum  more  operis  cotidiani  magnam  illam  servorum 
multitudinem  quae  aggerem  portabat  militem  esse 
credidisset,  sive  etiam  fiducia  veterani  exercitus  sui, 

^  agerentur  3ISS.  :  aggeri,  with  per  added  before  servitia,  is 
Kuebler's  conjecture. 

128 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

to  bring  from  the  camp  all  the  accumulated  matei-ial 
for  the  rampart,  so  that  none  of  his  troops  should  quit 
their  work  of  fortification,  since  the  intervening 
valley  which  separated  the  ertemy's  camp  from  the 
emplacements  which  Caesar  had  begun  was  not  more 
than  a  mile  wide. 

On  suddenly  observing  this  situation  at  dawn, 
Pharnaces  drew  up  all  his  forces  in  front  of  his  camp. 
In  view  of  the  highly  uneven  character  of  the 
intervening  ground  Caesar  supposed  that  it  was  the 
king's  normal  military  practice  more  than  anything 
that  occasioned  this  deployment;  or  else  his  object 
was  to  delay  Caesar's  own  work  of  fortification, 
through  the  necessity  of  keeping  more  men  standing 
to  arms ;  or  again  it  might  be  intended  as  a  display 
of  confidence  on  the  king's  part,  to  shew  that  it  was 
not  on  fortification  so  much  as  on  arined  force  that 
Pharnaces  relied  to  defend  his  position.  Accordingly, 
Caesar  was  not  deterred  from  keeping  the  remainder 
of  his  army  engaged  on  the  work  of  fortification, 
deploying  only  the  fi-ont  line  in  front  of  the  palisade. 
Pharnaces,  however,  took  it  into  his  head  to  engage. 
Whether  it  was  the  lucky  associations  of  the  spot 
that  drove  him  to  take  this  course,  or  whether  it  was 
his  scrupulous  observance  of  omens,  to  which,  as  we 
afterwards  heard,  he  gave  careful  heed,  that  so 
prompted  him ;  or  maybe  it  was  the  small  number 
of  our  troops  which,  according  to  his  infoi'mation, 
were  standing  to  arms  (for  he  had  supposed  that 
that  vast  gang  of  slaves  which  transported  the 
material  for  the  rampart,  as  though  it  was  their  daily 
employment,  was  in  fact  composed  of  troops) ;  or 
maybe  even  it  was  his  confidence  in  that  veteran  army 
of  his,  which,  as  his  envoys  boasted,  had  fought  and 

129 


CAESAR 

quern  bis  et  vicies  in  acie  conflixisse  et  vicisse  legati 
eius  gloriabantur,  simul  contemptu  exercitus  nostri, 
quern  pulsum  a  se  •  Domitio  duce  sciebat,  inito 
consilio  dimicandi  descendere  praerupta  valle  coepit. 
Cuius  aliquamdiu  Caesar  irridebat  inanem  ostenta- 
tionem  et  eo  loco  militum  coartationem,  quern  in 
locum  nemo  sanus  hostis  subiturus  esset :  cum 
interim  Pharnaces  eodem  gradu  quo  in  praeruptam 
descenderat  vallem  ascendere  adversus  arduum 
collem  instructis  copiis  coepit. 

75  Caesar  incredibili  eius  vel  temeritate  vcl  fiducia 
commotus  neque  opinans  imparatusque  oppressus 
eodem  tempore  milites  ab  opere  revocat,  arma 
capere  iubet,  legiones  opponit  aciemque  instruit ; 
cuius  rei  subita  trepidatio  magnum  terrorem  attulit 
nostris.  Nondum  ordinibus  instructis  falcatae  regiae 
quadrigae  permixtos  milites  perturbant ;  quae  tamen 
celeriter  multitudine  telorum  opprimuntur.  Insequi- 
tur  has  acies  hostium,  et  clamore  sublato  confligitur 
multum  adiuvante  natura  loci,  plurimum  deorum 
immortalium  benignitate ;  qui  cum  omnibus  casibus 
bellicis  intersunt,  tum  praecipue  eis  quibus  nihil 
ratione  potuit  administrari. 

76  Magno  atque  acri  proelio  comminus  facto,  dextro 
cornu,    quo    veterana    legio    sexta    erat    collocata, 

130 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

conquered  upon  two  and  twenty  battle-fields,  coupled 
with  a  contempt  for  our  army,  which  he  knew  had 
been  routed  by  himself  when  Domitius  led  it : 
anyway,  having  decided  to  engage,  he  began  the 
descent  down  the  steep  ravine.  For  some  little  time 
Caesar  laughed  contemptuously  at  this  empty 
bravado  on  the  part  of  the  king,  and  at  his  troops 
packed  closely  on  ground  which  no  enemy  in  his 
senses  would  be  likely  to  set  foot  on ;  while  in  the 
meantime  Pharnaces  with  his  forces  in  battle  array 
proceeded  to  climb  the  steep  hill-side  confronting 
him  at  the  same  steady  pace  at  which  he  had 
descended  the  sheer  ravine. 

This  incredible  foolhardiness  or  confidence  on  the 
part  of  the  king  disconcerted  Caesar,  who  was  not 
expecting  it  and  was  caught  imprepared.  Simul- 
taneously he  recalled  the  troops  from  their  work  of 
fortification,  ordered  them  to  stand  to  arms,  deployed 
his  legions  to  meet  the  attack,  and  formed  line  of 
battle ;  and  the  sudden  excitement  to  which  all  this 
gave  rise  occasioned  considerable  panic  among  our 
troops.  Disorganised  as  our  men  were,  and  as  yet 
in  no  regular  formation,  the  king's  chariots  armed 
with  scythes  threw  them  into  confusion ;  but  these 
chariots  were  speedily  overwhelmed  by  a  mass  of 
missiles.  In  their  wake  came  the  enemy  line :  the 
battle  cry  was  raised  and  the  conflict  joined,  our  men 
lieing  greatly  helped  by  the  nature  of  the  ground  but 
above  all  by  the  blessing  of  the  immortal  gods.  For 
just  as  the  gods  play  a  part  in  all  the  chance  vicissi- 
tudes of  war,  so  above  all  do  they  do  so  in  those  where 
human  strategy  has  pi-oved  quite  powerless  to  avail. 

Heavy  and  bitter  hand-to-hand  fighting  took  place  ; 
and  it  was  on  the  right  wing,  where  the  veteran  Sixth 

131 


CAESAR 

initium  victoriae  natum  est.  Ab  ca  parte  cum  in 
proclive  detruderentur  liostes,  multo  tardius,  sed 
tamen  isdeni  dis  adiuvantibus  sinistro  cornu  raediaque 
acie  totae  profligantur  copiae  regis.  Quae  quam  facile 
subierant  iniquum  locum,  tam  celeriter  gradu  pulsae 
pi'emebantur  loci  iniquitate.  Itaque  multis  militibus 
partim  interfectis  partim  suorum  ruina  oppressis,  qui 
velocitate  efFugere  poterant,  armis  tamen  proiectis 
vallem  transgressi  nihil  ex  loco  superiore  inermi  pro- 
ficere  poterant.  At  nostri  victoria  elati  subire 
iniquum  locum  munitionesque  aggredi  non  dubi- 
tarunt.  Defendentibus  autem  eis  cohortibus  castra 
quas  Pharnaces  praesidio  reliquerat,  celeriter  castris 
hostium  sunt  potiti.  Interfecta  multitudine  omni 
suorum  aut  capta  Pharnaces  cum  paucis  equitibus 
profugit ;  cui  nisi  castrorum  oppugnatio  facultatem 
attulisset  liberius  profugiendi,  vivus  in  Caesaris 
potestatem  adductus  esset. 
77  Tali  victoria  totiens  victor  Caesar  incredibili  est 
laetitia  adfectus,  quod  maximum  bellum  tanta 
celeritate  confecerat,  quodque  subiti  periculi  re- 
cordatione  laetior  victoria  facilis  ex  difficillimis  rebus 


132 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

legion  was  posted  that  the  first  seeds  of  victory  were 
sown.  As  the  enemy  were  being  thrust  back  down 
the  slope  on  this  wing,  so  too  on  the  left  wing  and  in 
the  centre — much  more  slowly,  but  thanks  never- 
theless to  the  same  divine  assistance — the  entire 
forces  of  the  king  were  being  crushed.  The  ease 
with  which  they  had  climbed  the  uneven  ground  was 
now  matched  by  the  speed  with  which,  once  dis- 
lodged from  their  footing,  the  unevenness  of  the 
ground  enabled  them  to  be  driven  back.  Conse- 
quently, after  sustaining  many  casualties — some 
killed,  some  knocked  out  by  their  comrades'  falling 
on  top  of  them*— those  whose  nimbleness  did  enable 
them  to  escape  none  the  less  threw  away  their  arms  ; 
and  so,  after  crossing  the  valley,  they  could  not 
make  any  effective  stand  from  the  higher  ground, 
unarmed  as  they  now  were.  Our  men,  on  the  con- 
trary, elated  by  their  victory,  did  not  hesitate  to 
climb  the  uneven  ground  and  storm  the  entrenchments. 
Moreover,  despite  the  resistance  of  those  enemy 
cohorts  which  Pharnaces  had  left  to  guard  his  camp, 
they  promptly  won  possession  of  it.  With  his  entire 
forces  either  killed  or  captured  Pharnaces  took  to 
flight  with  a  few  horsemen  ;  and  had  not  our  storming 
of  his  camp  afforded  him  a  freer  opportunity  for 
flight,  he  would  have  been  brought  alive  into  Caesar's 
hands. 

Such  a  victory  transported  Caesar — for  all  the 
many  past  victories  to  his  credit — with  incredible 
delight,  inasmuch  as  he  had  brought  a  very  serious 
war  to  so  speedy  a  conclusion,  and  because  an  easy 
victory,  which  delighted  him  the  more  when  he 
recalled  the  sudden  risk  it  had  involved,  had  trans- 
pii-ed  out  of  a  very  difficult  situation.     Having  thus 

133 


CAESAR 

acciderat.  Ponto  recepto  praeda  omni  regia  mili- 
tibus  condonata  postero  die  cum  expeditis  equitibus 
ipse  proficiscitur,  legionem  sextam  decedere  ad 
praemia  atque  honores  accipiendos  in  Italiam  iubet, 
auxilia  Deiotari  domum  remittit,  duas  legiones  cum 
Caelio  Viiiiciano  in  Ponto  relincjuit. 
78  Ita  per  Gallograeciam  Bithyniamque  in  Asiam  iter 
facit  omniunKjue  earum  provinciarum  de  contro- 
versiis  cognoscit  et  statuit ;  iura  in  tetrarchas,  reges, 
civitates  distribuit.  Mithridaten  Pergamenum,  a 
quo  rem  feliciter  celeriterque  gestam  in  Aegypto 
supra  scripsimus,  regio  genere  ortum,  disciplinis 
etiam  regiis  educatum — nam  eum  Mithridates,  rex 
Asiae  totius,  propter  nobilitatem  Pergamo  parvulum 
secum  asportaverat  in  castra  multosque  retinuerat 
annos — regem  Bosphori  constituit,  qui  ^  sub  imperio 
Pharnacis  fuerat,  provinciasque  populi  Romani  a 
barbaris  atque  inimicis  regibus  interposito  amicissimo 
rege  munivit.  Eidem  tetrarehian  Gallograecorum 
iure  gentis  et  cognationis  adiudicavit  occupatam  et 
possessam  paucis  ante  annis  a  Deiotaro.  Xeque 
tamen  usquam  diutius  moratus  est  quam  necessitas 
urbanarum  seditionum  pati  videbatur.  Rebus  felicis- 
simie  celerrimeque  confectis  in  Italiam  celerius 
omnium  opinione  venit. 

1  quod  MSS.  :   qui  Dinler. 


1  Probably  the  tetrarchy  of  the  Trocmi  in  East  Galatia 
c/.  ch.  67. 


134 


THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 

recovered  Pontus  and  made  a  present  to  his  troops  of 
all  the  royal  plunder,  he  himself  set  out  on  the 
following  day  with  his  cavalry  in  light  order;  in- 
structing the  Sixth  legion  to  leave  for  Italy  to  receive 
its  rewards  and  honours,  sending  home  the  auxiliary 
troops  of  Deiotarus,  and  leaving  two  legions  in  Pontus 
with  Caelius  Vinicianus. 

Thus  he  marched  through  Gallograecia  and 
Bithynia  into  Asia,  holding  investigations  and 
giving  his  formal  ruling  on  matters  of  dispute  in  all 
those  provinces,  and  assigning  due  prerogatives  to 
tetrarchs,  kings  and  states.  Now  Mithridates  of 
Pergamum,  whose  speedy  and  successful  action  in 
Egypt  I  have  described  above,  was  not  merely  of 
royal  birth  but  also  of  royal  training  and  upbringing ; 
for  Mithridates,  king  of  all  Asia,  had  carried  him  off  to 
camp  with  him  from  Pergamum  on  the  score  of  his 
noble  birth  Avhen  he  was  quite  young,  and  had  kept 
him  there  for  many  years ;  for  which  reasons  Caesar 
now  appointed  him  king  of  Bosphorus,  which  had 
formerly  been  under  control  of  Pharnaces,  and,  by 
thus  creating  a  buffer  state  ruled  by  a  inost  friendly 
king,  he  secured  the  provinces  of  the  Roman  people 
from  barbarian  and  unfriendly  kings.  To  the  saine 
Mithridates  he  awarded,  by  right  of  racial  affinity 
and  kinship,  the  tetrarchy  of  Gallograecia  Avhich  had 
been  seized  and  occupied  a  few  years  earlier  by 
Deiotarus.^  Nowhere,  however,  did  he  delay  any 
longer  than  the  urgency  of  unsettled  conditions  at 
Rome  appeared  to  warrant ;  and  when  he  had 
accomplished  his  tasks  with  the  greatest  success  and 
expedition,  he  ai-rived  in  Italy  more  quickly  than 
anyone  expected. 


THE    AFRICAN    WAR 


IXTRODUCTIOX 

As  soon  as  Caesar  had  crushed  Pharnaces  at  Zela  and 
temporai'ily  i-eorganised  the  affairs  of  Asia,  he  might, 
if  mihtary  strategy  alone  had  governed  his  pohcy, 
have  sailed  straight  to  Africa,  where  his  enemies  had 
had  a  vear  already  in  which  to  consolidate  their 
position.  But  Caesar  was  more  than  a  mere  general ; 
and,  as  he  well  knew,  the  political  situation  in  Rome 
was  serious  and  urgently  demanding  his  presence.^ 

Troubles  there  were  in  plenty.  Economic  prob- 
lems such  as  the  administration  of  the  new  law  of 
debt  gave  scope  to  malcontents  like  Caelius  and 
Dolabella,  who  had  expected  harsh  reprisals  against 
the  defeated  Pompeians  and  were  disgusted  with 
Caesar's  leniency.  Still  more  dangerous  to  public 
security  were  Caesar's  veteran  legions,  who,  having 
been  sent  home  after  Pharsalus,  had  now  little  to  do 
save  noisily  demand  their  promised  triumph  and 
discharge.  Antony,  the  absent  dictator's  deputy  in 
the  city,  had  found  all  this  unrest  beyond  his  powers 
effectively  to  check :  no  magistrates  had  as  yet 
been  elected  for  the  current  year,  and  those  for  46 
were  shortly  due  for  election. 

Such  was  the  situation  which  confronted  Caesar  in 
September.     By  November  he  had  restored  order : 

1  Bell.  Alex.  ch.  65. 

139 


INTRODUCTION 

the  economic  crisis  had  been  temporarily  mitigated : 
the  elections  had  been  held :  the  mutinous  legions 
disciplined  and  some  detailed  for  service  in  Africa. 
But  the  additional  delay  was  to  cost  him  dear ; 
for  not  only  was  he  to  start  his  new  campaign  in  the 
winter,  when  every  convoy  from  Sicily  was  at  the 
mercy  of  the  winter  gales,  but,  as  he  was  soon  to  find 
out,  his  opponents  had  made  good  use  of  the  respite. 
Since  Curio's  defeat  in  49  the  Roman  province  of 
Africa  had  been  in  the  hands  of  the  Pompeians. 
Its  most  powerful  neighbour,  king  Juba  of  Numidia, 
had  no  love  for  Caesar  and  could  accordingly,  if  his 
imperious  temper  were  tactfully  handled,  be  relied  on 
to  support  Caesar's  enemies.  His  military  resources 
were  reputed  to  be  enormous  and  to  outweigh  by 
far  those  of  his  two  Mauretanian  neighbours, 
Bocchus  and  Bogud,  who  favoured  Caesar,  even  if 
the  latter  were  backed  up  by  Sittius,  a  Roman 
adventurer  who  had  for  several  years  been  operating 
in  those  parts  with  his  own  private  army.  Attius 
Varus,  who  had  governed  the  province  since  50,  was 
joined,  after  Pharsalus,  by  Scipio  and  Cato,  each 
with  his  own  contingent  of  survivors  from  that  battle. 
Labienus,  Petreius  and  Afranius  had  now  also  joined 
them ;  and  in  Labienus  the  enemy  had  a  tactician 
hardly  inferior  to  Caesar  himself.  In  addition  to 
Juba's  four  legions  and  countless  cavalrv^  and  light 
armed  troops  the  Pompeians  could  muster  ten 
legions,  though  most  of  them  were  raised  in  Africa 
and  were  of  dubious  quality.  They  possessed  a 
considerable  fleet :  they  had  fortified  practically  all 
140 


INTRODUCTION 

the  coastal  towns  and  concentrated  in  them  abundant 
stocks  of  grain  ;  and  by  calling  up  many  of  the  native 
farmers  they  had  curtailed  the  harvest  of  47  and  thus 
made  it  more  difficult  for  Caesar  to  live  off  the  land. 

Caesar's  tiny  expeditionary  force  was  thus  beset 
with  enormous  difficulties,  not  only  of  supply  and 
reinforcement,  but  of  very  existence ;  and  within  a 
week  of  its  landing  Labienus  came  very  near  to 
destroying  it.  The  narrative  of  de  Bello  Africa  bears 
striking  testimony  to  Caesar's  manifold  qualities  :  the 
(logged  patience  which  strategy  demanded  in  the 
earlier  stages :  the  outward  buoyancy  and  cheerful- 
ness with  which,  despite  his  inward  anxiety,  he 
maintained  the  morale  of  his  troops  :  the  unflagging 
determination  with  which  he  tempted  Scipio  to 
engage  ;  and  the  brilliant  tactics  and  opportunism 
thanks  to  which  at  Thapsus  he  finally  turned  the 
tables  on  his  would-be  ambusher. 

Although  the  identity  of  the  author  of  de  Bello 
Africo  is  obscure,  certain  inferences  may  yet  be 
drawn  from  his  narrative. '^  The  careful  chronology 
and  the  faithful  record  of  the  feelings  of  the  troops 
suggests  a  soldier — possibly  a  junior  officer — who 
was  on  the  spot.  That  he  was  young  and  in- 
experienced; an  ardent,  but  not  always  a  balanced, 
partisan  ;  a  keen  observer  of  all  that  went  on  around 
him,  but  \\'ithout  access  to  the  inner  counsels  of  his 

^  For  these  remarks  I  have  drawn  freely  on  the  wealth  of 
material  contained  in  Bouvet"s  excellent  Introduction 
(pp.  xvii-xxxix),  to  which  the  reader  is  referred  for  fuller 
detail  in  the  way  of  illustration. 

141 


INTRODUCTION 

C.-in-C. — all  these,  I  think,  are  reasonable  inferences. 
His  historical  perspective  was  weak ;  for  he  some- 
times gives  unimportant,  yet  at  other  times  with- 
holds important,  details. '^  However,  apart  from  this 
and  the  errors  into  which  his  blind  admiration  for 
Caesar  occasionally  leads  him,^  his  account  on  the 
whole  rings  true  and  leaves  a  distinct  impression  of 
sincerity  and  enthusiasm. 

His  literary  style  is  distinctive.  His  vocabulary, 
though  it  includes  a  number  of  Greek  words  ^  and 
colloquial  phrases  ■*  normally  avoided  by  good  prose 
writers,  is  nevertheless  marked  by  a  definite  poverty 
of  expression ;  ^  and  his  sentence  structure,  though 
not  infrequently  embellished  by  stock  rhetorical 
flourishes,^  is  often  ungainly  and  sometimes  un- 
grammatical.'     Yet,  on  the  whole,  his  style  is  clear, 

1  e.g.  the  detailed  order  of  battle  given  in  eh.  59-60,  though 
in  fact  no  battle  ensues;  whereas  at  Thapsus  much  is  left  to 
the  reader's  imagination. 

-  e.g.  in  ch.  31  the  various  excuses  made  for  Caesar's  cautious 
tactics,  especially  the  last. 

^  e.g.  catascopvs,  ch.  26  :   epibata,  ch.  20. 

*  e.g.  convvlnerare,  ch.  5,  etc.  :  rapsare,  ch.  73  :  magis 
suspensiore,  ch.  48. 

*  e.g.  constant  repetition  of  words  such  as  interim,  praeterea, 
etc.;  in  ch.  29-31,  monotonous  recourse  to  the  relative 
pronoun  as  a  link  word  (quod  .  .  .  quod  .  .  .  quo  facia  .  .  . 
quod  .  .  .  quibus  rebus) ;  in  ch.  32  non  intermiUere  in  two 
consecutive  sentences. 

^  e.g.  aUiteration  :  ch.  3.5  :  praemiis  pollicitationibusque 
propositis  pro  perfugis. 

Chiasmus  :    ch.  37  :   singulae  turres  .tpeculaeque  singulae. 

'  e.g.  ch.  5,  where  postqiiam  is  followed  by  no  less  than  seven 
imperfects;  and  ch.  19,  last  but  one  sentence,  where  Labienus, 
the  subject,  has  no  verb. 

142 


INTRODUCTION 

if  frequently  monotonous  and,  in  places,  mere- 
tricious ;  and  in  the  set  speeches — in  which  respect 
he  is  much  more  ambitious  than  the  writer  of  de 
Bello  Alexandrino — he  is  quite  effective  in  varying  the 
style  to  reflect  the  personality  of  the  speaker.^ 

1  e.g.  the  didactic  tone  of  Cato's  lecture  in  ch.  22 ;  the  forth- 
right retort  of  the  centurion  in  ch.  45;  and  Caesar's  dis- 
ciplinary harangue  in  ch.  54. 


143 


ANALYSIS   OF   THE   BOOK 


CHAPTERS 

1-2  Preparations  at  Lilybaeum  :  Caesar  embarks  and  sails 
for  Africa. 

3-6  Arrival  at  Hadrumetum  :  its  commandant  refuses  to 
negotiate  :  Caesar  makes  a  fighting  withdrawal  to 
Ruspina. 

7-36     Operations  near  Ruspina 

Caesar  advances  to  Leptis  but  retires  the  next  day 
to  Ruspina  :  arrival  of  some  of  his  missing  trans- 
ports :  Labienus  offers  battle ;  Caesar's  force  is 
surrounded  but  fights  its  way  out. — Build-up  of 
defences  at  Ruspina  :  shortage  of  corn  :  Cato"s 
advice  to  the  young  Pompeius  and  its  sequel  : 
iScipio  joins  Labienus. — King  Juba  preoccupied  by 
invasion  of  his  country :  reports  of  atrocities 
stimulate  Caesar  to  prompter  action,  but  he  refuses 
iScipio's  challenge  to  a  pitched  battle  :  his  reasons 
for  remaining  on  the  defensive. — Garrison  sent  by 
Caesar  to  Acjdla  :  simultaneous  arrival  of  corn  and 
troops. 
37-66     Operations  near  Uzitta 

Description  of  the  terrain  S.W.  of  Ruspina  :  Caesar 
begins  fortifying  the  high  ground  :  a  cavalry  action 
ensues  :  he  offers  battle  in  the  plain,  but  Scipio 
declines. — A  centurion  from  one  of  Caesar's  convoys 
defies  Scipio  :  conditions  in  Caesar's  camp  :  an 
unseasonable  storm. — Juba  joins  Scipio  with  large 
reinforcements  :  Caesar's  troops  not  so  overawed  as 
was  expected. — Both  sides  prepare  to  seize  more 
high  ground  :  Labienus  lays  an  ambush  :  Caesar 
captures  the  hill  and  carries  two  fortified  lines  to 
Uzitta  to  protect  his  flanks  :  Scipio's  cavalry 
heavily  repulsed. — Caesar  receives  further  reinforce- 
ments,   takes    disciplinary    measures,    fortifies    a 

144 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  BOOK 


new  camp  opposite  Uzitta. — Juba's  arrogant 
behaviour. — Order  of  battle  on  either  side  :  only  a 
cavalry  skirmish  ensues. — Varus  fires  some  of 
Caesar's  transports  at  Leptis :  Caesar  quits  his 
camp  and  personally  leads  a  successful  counter- 
attack.— Foraging  operations :  Labienus  vainly 
lays  another  ambush. 

67-78     Operations  near  Aggar 

Lack  of  corn  prompts  Caesar  to  march  to  Aggar : 
Scipio  follows. — Caesar  captures  Zeta  but  is  forced 
to  fight  his  way  back  under  heavy  attacks  from 
Numidian  cavalry  and  light-armed  units :  he 
adapts  training  methods  to  meet  these  new  tactics  : 
his  anxiety  about  the  enemies'  cavalry  strength 
and  their  elephants. — He  twice  offers  battle  : 
captures  Sarsura,  approaches  Thysdra,  retires  to 
Aggar. — Cavalry  engagement  near  Tegea. 

79-86     Operations  at  Thapsus 

Caesar  advances  to  Thapsus  and  begins  to  invest 
the  town  :  Scipio  follows  and  finally  encamps  close 
to  Thapsus. — Caesar's  dispositions  :  his  reluctance 
to  engage  :  the  signal  is  finally  given  without  his 
orders. — Rout  of  Scipio's  elephants :  Caesar's 
troops  meet  little  resistance  :  sortie  of  the  garrison 
of  Thapsus  repulsed. — Savage  vengeance  by  Caesar's 
veterans  on  the  fugitives. — VergiUus  refuses  to 
surrender  Thapsus  ;  arrangements  for  blockading  it 
and  Thysdra  :   Caesar  proceeds  to  Utica. 

87-98     Final  stages  of  the  campaign 

Brutal  sack  of  Parada  by  Scipio's  cavalry  :  they 
plunder  Utica  till  Cato  buys  them  off:  he  tries  in 
vain  to  organise  resistance  and  then  commits 
suicide. — Caesar's  clemency  :  he  enters  Utica  and 
punishes  its  Roman  citizens  by  inflicting  a  heavy 
fine. — Juba  outlawed  by  his  subjects  takes  refuge 
with  Petreius  in  a  villa. — Caesar  comes  to  Zama  : 
surrender  of  Thysdra  and  Thapsus  :  deaths  of 
Juba,  Petreius,  Afranius  and  Scipio. — Caesar  returns 
to  Utica  and  fines  Thapsus,  Hadruraetum,  Leptis 
and  Thysdra  :  embarks  at  Utica  :  calls  at  Caralis  in 
Sardinia  :   eventually  arrives  at  Rome. 

145 


DE   BELLO   AFRICO 

1  Caesar  itineribus  iustis  confectis  nullo  die  inter- 
misso  a.  d.  XIIII  Kal.  Ian.  Lilybaeum  pervenit 
statiraque  ostendit  sese  navis  velle  conscendere, 
cum  non  amplius  legionem  tironum  haberet  unam, 
equites  vix  DC.  Tabernaculum  secundum  litus 
ipsum  constituit,  ut  prope  fluctu';  verberaret.  Hoc  eo 
consilio  fecit  ne  quis  sibi  morae  quicquam  fore 
speraret  et  ut  omnes  in  dies  horasque  parati  essent. 
Incidit  per  id  tempus  ut  tempestates  ad  navigandum 
idoneas  non  haberet ;  nihilo  tamen  minus  in  navibus 
remiges  militesque  continere  et  nullam  praeter- 
mittere  occasionem  profectionis,  cum  praesertim  ab 
incolis  eius  provinciae  nuntiarentur  adversariorum 
copiae  equitatus  infinitus,  legiones  regiae  IIII,  levis 
armaturae  magna  vis,  Scipionis  legiones  X,  elephanti 
CXX  classesque  esse  complures  ;  tamen  non  deterre- 
batur  animoque  et  spe  confidebat.  Interim  in  dies  et 
naves  longae  adaugeri  et  onerariae  complures  eodem 


^  It  is  not  quite  clear  whether  this  means  the  complete 
journey  from  Rome  (over  600  miles,  via  Rhegium  and 
Messana),  or  merely  the  last  stage  from  Messana  (some  200 
miles).  But  as  it  seems  likely  that  he  was  not  accompanied  by 
any  large  number  of  troops — the  legion  of  recruits  may  have 
been  one  already  stationed  at  Lilj'baeum — most  commentators 
appear  to  assume  that  the  reference  is  to  the  whole  journey. 

2  =  October  23rd,  47,  if  Le  Verrier's  rectified  system  be 
followed  :    October  1,  according  to  Groebe's  SN'stem.     All  the 

146 


THE   AFRICAN   WAR 

1  After  completing  a  series  of  full  day's  marches  ^ 
without  pausing  for  a  single  day,  Caesar  arrived  at 
Lilybaeum  on  December  17,^  and  shewed  himself 
desirous  of  embarking  forthwith,  although  he  had  no 
more  than  a  single  legion  of  recruits  and  barely  six 
hundred  cavalry.  He  had  his  tent  pitched  alongside 
the  actual  beach  so  that  the  waves  all  but  beat  upon 
it :  his  purpose  in  so  doing  was  to  prevent  anyone 
from  hoping  he  would  enjoy  any  respite,  and  to 
ensure  that  everj'one  was  in  a  state  of  daily  and 
hourly  i*eadiness.  During  this  time  he  was  unlucky 
with  the  weather,  which  was  unsuitable  for  sailing ; 
but  for  all  that  he  still  kept  his  rowers  and  troops 
aboard  the  ships  and  let  slip  no  opportunity  for 
setting  forth,  despite,  above  all,  the  reports  which 
were  coming  in  from  the  local  provincials  about  the 
forces  of  the  enemy — innumerable  cavalry,  four  royal 
legions,  a  great  quantity  of  light-armed  troops,  ten 
legions  under  command  of  Scipio,  a  hundred-and- 
twenty  elephants  and  several  fleets :  yet  even  so  he 
was  not  deterred,  but  remained  resolute  and  opti- 
mistic. Meanwhile  every  day  saw  an  increase  in  the 
number  of  his  warships,  and  numerous  transports  also 

dates  given  in  the  text  are  according  to  the  unreformed  calen- 
dar, which  was  now  some  two  months  ahead  owing  to  the 
failure  of  the  pontifices  to  insert  the  necessary  intercalary- 
months. 

147 


CAESAR 

concurrere    et    legiones    tironum    convenirc    IIII,^ 
veterana  Icgio  quinta,  equitum  ad  II  milia. 

2  Legionibus  collectis  VI  et  equitum  II  milibus,  ut 
quaeque  prima  legio  venerat  in  navis  longas  im- 
ponebatur,  equites  autem  in  onerarias.  Ita  maio- 
rem  partem  navium  antecedere  iussit  et  insulam 
petere  Aponianam,  quae  abest  a  Lilybaeo  milia 
passuum  X :  ipse  paucos  dies  ibi  ^  commoratus  bona 
paucorum  vendit  publice,  deinde  Alieno  praetori, 
qui  Siciliam  obtinebat,  de  omnibus  rebus  praecipit  et 
de  reliquo  exercitu  celeriter  imponendo.  Datis 
mandatis  ipse  navem  conscendit  a.  d.  VI.  Kal.  Ian.  et 
reliquas  navis  statim  est  consecutus.  Ita  vento 
certo  celerique  navigio  vectus  post  diem  quartum  cum 
longis  paucis  navibus  in  conspectum  Africae  venit ; 
namque  onerariae  reliquae  praeter  paucas  vento 
dispersae  atque  errabundae  divei'sa  loca  petierunt. 
Clupeam  classe  praetervehitur,  dein  Neapolim ; 
complura  praeterea  castella  et  oppida  non  longe  a 
mari   reliquit. 

3  Postquam  Hadrumetum  accessit,  ubi  praesidium 
erat  adversariorum  cui  praeerat  C.  Considius,  et  a 

1  in  his  MSS.  :  IIII  R.  Schneider. 

-  milia  .  .  .  ihi  conjectured  by  R.  Schneider  to  fill  the  lacuna 

of  the  MSS. 

^  Probably  the  Fifth  called  Alaudae,  formed  in  Gaul  in 
51  B.C.  There  is  much  difficulty  in  identifying  this  veteran 
Fifth  legion  with  the  Fifth  raised  by  Cassius  in  Spain  (Bell. 
Alex.  ch.  50). 

2  This  apparently  means  Hadrumetum,  and  not  Cape 
Bon ;  for  he  must  have  landed  at  Hadrumetum  on  the  28tb, 
and  3-4  days'  sail  in  a  fast  ship  seems  unduly  long  for  the 

148 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

assembled  there  :  four  legions  of  recruits,  the  veteran 
Fifth  ^  legion,  and  some  two  thousand  cavalry  also 
joined  the  muster. 

Six  legions  and  two  thousand  cavalry  had  now  been 
mustered.  Each  legion,  as  soon  as  it  arrived,  was 
embarked  on  the  warships,  while  the  cavalry  were 
shipped  aboard  the  transports.  Accordingly,  he 
oi'dered  the  greater  part  of  the  fleet  to  sail  on  ahead 
and  make  for  the  island  of  Aponiana,  which  is  ten 
miles  distant  from  Lilybaeum :  he  himself  stayed 
behind  there  for  a  few  days  and  sold  up  the  property 
of  a  few  persons  for  the  profit  of  the  state,  and  then 
gave  full  instructions  to  the  praetor  Alienus,  who  was 
governor  of  Sicily,  in  particular  about  the  prompt 
embarkation  of  the  rest  of  the  army.  Having  given 
these  instructions,  he  himself  embarked  on  December 
25  and  immediately  caught  up  with  the  remainder 
of  his  fleet.  And  so,  sailing  in  a  fast  ship  with  a 
steady  wind,  three  days  later  with  a  few  warships  he 
came  into  sight  of  Africa ;  ^  for  his  transports,  which 
comprised  the  rest  of  his  fleet,  had,  with  a  few 
exceptions,  been  scattered  by  the  wind  and,  losing 
their  course,  made  for  various  points  along  the  coast. 
He  sailed  on  past  Clupea  with  his  fleet,  and  then  past 
Neapolis ;  and  besides  these  places  he  passed  by 
quite  a  number  of  strongholds  and  towns  not  far 
from  the  sea. 

When  Caesar  reached  Hadrumetum,  where  his 
opponents  had  a  garrison  commanded  by  C.  Con- 
passage  of  less  than  100  miles  (cf.  ch.  34,  where  his  second 
convoy  makes  Ruspina  on  the  fourth  clay).  Other  apparent 
inconsistencies  are  the  embarkation  of  all  the  legions  aboard 
the  warships  and  the  capriciousness  of  the  wind,  which 
favoured  the  warships  but  scattered  the  transports. 

149 


CAESAR 

Clupeis  secundum  oram  maritimam  cum  equitatu 
Hadrumetum  petens  ^  Cn.  Piso  cum  Maurorum 
circiter  tribus  milibus  apparuit,  ibi  paulisper  Caesar 
ante  portum  commoratus,  dum  reliquae  naves  con- 
venirent,  exponit  exercitum,  cuius  numerus  in 
praesentia  fuit  peditum  III  milia,  equites  CL, 
castrisque  ante  oppidum  positis  sine  iniuria  cuius- 
quam  consedit  cohibetque  omnis  a  praeda.  Oppi- 
dani  interim  muros  armatis  complent,  ante  portam 
frequentes  considunt  ad  sese  defendendum  ;  quorum 
numerus  duarum  legionum  instar  erat.  Caesar 
circum  oppidum  vectus  natura  loci  perspecta  rediit  in 
castra.  Non  nemo  culpae  eius  imprudentiaeque 
assignabat,  quod  neque  circum  loca  gubernatoribus 
praefectisque  quid  peterent  praeceperat  neque,  ut 
more  ipsius  consuetudo  superioribus  temporibus 
fuerat,  tabellas  signatas  dediderat,  ut  in  tempore  his 
perlectis  locum  certum  peterent  universi.  Quod 
minime  Caesarem  fefellerat ;  nam  neque  ullum 
portum  terrae  Africae  quo  classes  decurrerent  pro 
certo  tutum  ab  hostium  praesidio  fore  suspicabatur, 
sed  fortuito  oblatam  occasionem  egressus  aucupa- 
batur, 

L.  Plancus  interim  legatus  petit  a  Caesare  uti  sibi 
daret  potestatem  cum  Considio  agendi,  si  posset 
aliqua  ratione  perduci  ad  sanitatem.  Itaque  data 
facultate  litteras  conscribit  et  eas  captivo  dat  per- 

1  petens  added  by  Kiessling. 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

sidius,  Cn.  Piso  made  his  appearance  there  with 
approximately  three  thousand  Moorish  ti'oops, 
approaching  Hadrumetum  with  his  cavalry  along  the 
sea  coast  from  Clupea ;  whereupon  Caesar  paused  for 
a  little  while  in  front  of  the  port,  waiting  for  the  rest 
of  his  ships  to  assemble,  and  then  landed  his  ai*my, 
which  numbered  at  present  three  thousand  infantry 
and  a  hundred-and-fifty  cavalry.  He  then  pitched 
camp  in  front  of  the  town  and  established  himself 
Avithout  molesting  anyone,  looting  being  universally 
forbidden.  Meanwhile  the  occupants  of  the  town 
manned  their  battlements  with  armed  troops,  and 
massed  in  front  of  the  gate  to  defend  themselves : 
their  numbers  amounted  to  the  equivalent  of  two 
legions.  Caesar  rode  round  the  town  carefully 
observing  the  lie  of  the  land,  and  then  returned  to 
camp.  Some  blamed  him  for  lack  of  foresight 
because  he  had  not  originally  briefed  his  pilots  and 
captains  about  what  points  on  the  coast  they  were  to 
make  for,  and  had  not,  as  had  been  his  own  habitual 
practice  on  previous  occasions,  issued  sealed  instruc- 
tions to  be  read  at  a  specified  time,  so  that  they 
could  all  make  for  a  given  rendezvous  together.  But 
this  was  by  no  means  an  oversight  on  Caesar's  part ; 
in  fact,  he  surmised  that  there  was  no  port  on 
African  soil  where  his  fleet  could  run  ashore  and 
which  he  could  count  on  as  immune  from  the  enemy's 
protection ;  and  failing  that,  he  was  on  the  watch 
for  luck  to  present  him  with  an  opportunity  to  land. 
Meanwhile  one  of  his  lieutenants,  L.  Plancus, 
asked  Caesar  to  give  him  authority  to  treat  with 
Considius,  if  by  any  means  he  could  be  brought  to  see 
reason.  Permission  being  granted,  he  accordingly 
wrote  a  letter,  which  he  gave  to  a  pi-isoner  to  take  to 


CAESAR 

ferendas  in  oppidum  ad  Considium.  Quo  simul 
atque  captivus  cum  pervenisset  litterasque,  ut  erat 
inandatum,  Considio  porrigere  coepisset,  prius  quam 
acciperet  ille,  '  Unde,'  inquit,  '  istas  ?  '  Turn  cap- 
tivus: '  Imperatore  a  Caesare.'  Turn  Considius, 
'  Unus  est,'  inquit,  '  Scipio  imperator  hoc  tempore 
populi  Romani  ' ;  deinde  in  conspectu  suo  statim 
captivum  interfici  iubet  litterasque  nondum  per- 
lectas,  sicut  erant  signatae,  dat  homini  certo  ad 
Scipionem  perferendas. 

Postquam  una  nocte  et  die  ad  oppidum  consumpta 
neque  responsum  ullum  a  Considio  dabatur,  neque  ei 
reliquae  copiae  succurrebant  neque  equitatu  abunda- 
bat  et  ad  oppidum  oppugnandum  non  satis  copiarum 
habebat  et  eas  tironum  neque  primo  adventu  con- 
vubierari  exercitum  volebat,  et  oppidi  egregia 
munitio  et  difficilis  ad  oppugnandum  erat  ascensus  et 
nuntiabatur  auxilia  magna  equitatus  oppidanis 
suppetias  venire,  non  est  visa  ratio  ad  oppugnandum 
oppidum  commorandi,  ne,  dum  in  ea  re  est  Caesar 
occupatus,  circumventus  a  tergo  ab  equitatu  hostium 
laboraret. 
»  Itaque  castra  cum  movei-e  vellet,  subito  ex  oppido 
erupit  multitudo  atque  equitatus  subsidio  uno 
tempore  eis  casu  succurrit,  qui  erat  missus  a  luba  ad 
stipendium  accipiendum,  castraque,  unde  Caesar 
egressus  iter  facere  coeperat,  occupant  et  eius  agmen 

^  This  appears  to  mean  the  night  of  December  28th /29th 
and  (most  of)  the  29th  ;  for  the  fighting  withdrawal  to  Ruspina 
apparently  took  place  on  the  29th  (the  last  day  of  the  official 
year,  according  to  the  unreformed  calendar).  Bouvet  adopts 
"R.  Schneider's  insertion  of  parte  before  die  ;  but  with  a  writer 
like  the  present,  whose  accuracy  is  not  always  pedantic,  the 
MSS.  reading  may  perhaps  be  retained, 

152 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

Considius  in  the  town.  As  soon  as  the  prisoner  had 
arrived  there,  and  when  he  was  in  the  very  act  of 
handing  Considius  the  letter  in  accordance  with  his 
instructions,  the  latter  remarked  before  accepting 
it :  '  Where  did  you  get  this  ?  '  Whereupon  the 
prisoner  replied :  '  From  the  commander-in-chief, 
Caesar.'  Then  Considius  retorted:  'There  is  but 
one  commander-in-chief  of  the  Roman  people  at  the 
moment,  namely  Scipio.'  He  then  ordered  the 
prisoner  to  be  executed  forthwith  in  his  presence, 
and  gave  the  letter — still  unread  and  with  its  seals 
intact— to  a  reliable  messenger  to  take  to  Scipio. 

5  A  night  and  a  day  ^  were  spent  under  the  walls  of 
the  town  without  any  reply  being  given  by  Con- 
sidius :  moreover,  the  rest  of  Caesar's  forces  failed 
to  arrive  to  reinforce  him ;  he  had  no  abundance  of 
cavalry  and  insufficient  forces  to  assault  the  town, 
and  those  he  had  were  mere  recruits ;  he  was  loath 
to  let  his  army  suffer  heavy  casualties  immediately 
on  its  arrival ;  the  defences  of  the  town  were  re- 
markably strong,  its  lofty  position  rendering  it 
difficult  to  attack ;  and  reports  were  coming  in  that 
large  reinforcements  of  cavalry  were  on  their  way  to 
aid  the  occupants  of  the  town.  For  these  reasons 
there  seemed  no  point  in  staying  on  for  the  purpose 
of  attacking  the  town,  lest,  while  engaged  in  that 
task,  Caesar  might  be  surrounded  in  the  rear  by  the 
enemy  cavalry  and  so  find  himself  in  difficulties. 

6  Caesar  therefore  was  minded  to  strike  camp  ;  and 
while  he  was  doing  so  a  large  body  of  men  suddenly 
sallied  forth  from  the  town,  and  were  reinforced 
simultaneously,  as  it  chanced,  by  some  cavalry  sent 
by  .Tuba  to  collect  their  pay :  they  seized  Caesar's 
camp,  which  he  had  just  quitted  to  begin  his  march, 

153 


CAESAR 

extremum  insequi  coeperunt.  Quae  res  cum  anim- 
advei'sa  esset,  subito  legionarii  consistunt  et  equites, 
quamquam  erant  pauci,  tamen  contra  tantam 
rnultitudinem  audacissime  concurrunt.  Accidit  res 
incredibilis,  ut  equites  minus  XXX  Galli  Maurorum 
equitum  II  milia  loco  pellerent  fugarentque  in 
oppidum.  Postquam  repulsi  et  coniecti  erant  intra 
munitiones,  Caesar  iter  constitutum  ire  contendit. 
Quod  cum  saepius  facerent  et  modo  insequerentur, 
modo  rursus  ab  equitibus  in  oppidum  repellerentur, 
cohortibus  paucis  ex  veteranis  quas  secum  habebat  in 
extreme  agmine  collocatis  et  parte  equitatus  iter 
leniter  cum  reliquis  facere  coepit.  Ita  quanto 
longius  ab  oppido  discedebatur,  tanto  tardiores  ad 
insequendum  erant  Numidae.  Interim  in  itinere  ex 
oppidis  et  castellis  legationes  venire,  polliceri  fru- 
mentum  paratosque  esse  quae  imperasset  facere. 
Itaque  eo  die  castra  posuit  ad  oppidum  Ruspinam. 

Kal.  lanuariis  ^  inde  movit  et  pervenit  ad  oppidum 
Leptim,  liberam  civitatem  et  immunem.  Legati  ex 
oppido  obviam  veniunt,  libenter  se  omnia  facturos 
quae  vellet  poUicentur.  Itaque  centurionibus  ad 
portas  oppidi  et  custodiis  impositis,  ne  quis  miles  in 
oppidum  introiret  aut  iniuriam  faceret  cuipiam 
incolae,  non  longe  ab  oppido  secundum  litus  facit 
castra.     Eodemque  naves  onerariae  et  longae  non 

1  I  have  followed  Schneider  in  transferring  this  date  from  the 
foot  of  cliapter  6.     cf.  Ch.  5,  Note  1. 

^  Leptis  was  one  of  seven  towns  which  in  146  B.C.  had  been 
granted  autonomy  for  failing  to  support  Carthage  in  the 
Second  Punic  War.     cf.  Acylla  (ch.  33). 

154 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

and  began  to  pursue  his  rearguard.  On  seeing  this 
the  legionary  troops  came  to  an  abrupt  halt,  while  the 
cavalry,  few  as  they  were,  nevertheless  displayed  the 
utmost  gallantry  in  charging  against  such  vast 
numbers.  An  incredible  thing  took  place  :  less  than 
thirty  Gallic  cavalry  dislodged  two  thousand  Moorish 
cavalry  and  drove  them  to  take  refuge  in  the  town. 
After  they  had  been  repulsed  and  hurled  back  within 
their  fortifications,  Caesar  made  haste  to  proceed  with 
his  projected  inarch.  But  as  the  enemy  repeated 
these  tactics  all  too  frequently — now  following  in 
pursuit,  now  once  again  driven  back  into  the  town  by 
the  cavalry — Caesar  posted  in  the  rear  of  his  column 
a  few  cohorts  of  the  veteran  troops  which  he  had 
with  him,  as  well  as  part  of  his  cavalry,  and  so  pro- 
ceeded to  march  at  a  slow  pace  with  the  remainder 
of  his  force.  In  this  way  the  further  they  withdrew 
from  the  town,  the  slower  were  the  Numidians  to 
pursue  them.  Meanwhile  in  the  course  of  his  march 
deputations  arrived  from  towns  and  strongholds  with 
promises  of  corn  and  assurances  of  their  readiness  to 
carry  out  any  orders  he  might  give  them.  And  so  on 
that  day  he  pitched  camp  near  the  town  of  Ruspina. 
From  there  he  moved  camp  on  January  1st  and 
arrived  at  the  town  of  Leptis,  a  free  community, 
immune  from  taxes. ^  Envoys  came  from  the  town  to 
meet  him  and  promised  they  would  readily  do  what- 
ever he  wished.  Accordingly,  he  posted  centurions 
and  picquets  at  the  town  gates,  to  prevent  any  soldier 
from  entering  it  or  molesting  any  inhabitant,  and 
then  made  his  camp  adjoining  the  shore,  not  far 
from  the  town.  And  it  so  chanced  that  some  of  his 
transports  and  warships  arrived  at  this  same  place : 
as  for  the  rest  of  them,  it  appeared  fi'om  the  reports 


CAESAR 

nullae  casu  advenerunt ;  reliquae,  ut  est  ei  nuntia- 
tum,  incertae  locorum  Uticam  versus  petere  visae 
sunt.  Interim  Caesar  a  mari  non  digredi  neque 
mediterranea  petere  propter  navium  errorem  equita- 
tumque  in  navibus  omnem  continere,  ut  arbitror,  ne 
agri  vastarentur ;  aquam  in  navis  iubet  compurtari. 
Remiges  interim,  qui  aquatum  e  navibus  exierant, 
subito  equites  Mauri  neque  opinantibus  Caesarianis 
adorti  multos  iaculis  convulnerarunt,  non  nullos 
interfecerunt.  Latent  enim  in  insidiis  cum  equis 
inter  convallis  ut  subito  exsistant,^  non  ut  in  campo 
comminus  depugnent. 

Caesar  interim  in  Sardinian!  nuntios  cum  litteris  et 
in  reliquas  provincias  finitimas  dimisit,  ut  sibi 
auxilia,  commeatus,  frumentum,  simul  atque  litteras 
legissent,  mittenda  curarent,  exoneratisque  partim 
navibus  longis  Rabirium  Postumum  in  Siciliam  ad 
secundum  commeatum  arcessendum  mittit.  Vati- 
nium  2  cum  X  navibus  longis  ad  reliquas  navis 
onerarias  conquirendas  quae  deerrassent  et  simul 
mare  tuendum  ab  hostibus  iubet  proficisci.  Item  C. 
Sallustium  Crispum  praetorem  ad  Cercinam  insulam 
versus,  quam  adversarii  tenebant,  cum  parte  navium 
ire  iubet,  quod  ibi  magnum  numerum  frumenti  esse 
audiebat.  Haec  ita  imperabat  unicuique,  ita  prae- 
cipiebat  uti  fieri  posset  necne  locum  excusatio 
nullum  haberet  nee  moram  tergiversatio.  Ipse 
interea  ex  perfugis  et  incolis  cognitis  condicionibus 

^  et  .  .  .  exsistunt  MSS.  :    ut  .  .  .  exsistant  Hoffmann; 
but  the  interpretation  of  the  ichole  sentence  is  doubtful. 
*  interim  MSS.  :   Vatinium  Schneider. 

i=;6 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

which  reached  him  that  owing  to  their  uncertain 
knowledge  of  the  district  they  were  making  towards 
Utica.  For  the  time  being  Caesar  would  not  leave 
the  sea  or  strike  inland  on  account  of  these  wayward 
vessels,  and  kept  all  his  cavalr}^  aboard  ship,  his 
purpose  being,  I  imagine,  to  prevent  their  pillaging 
the  countryside :  as  for  water,  he  ordered  it  to  be 
carried  aboard.  Meanwhile  Caesar's  troops  were 
taken  by  surprise  when  some  rowers  who  had  dis- 
embarked to  fetch  water  were  suddenly  set  upon 
by  Moorish  cavalry,  who  wounded  many  with  their 
lances  and  Idlled  some  of  them.  These  Moors  in 
fact  lurk  in  ambush  with  their  horses  in  the  wadis, 
so  as  to  start  up  suddenly  and  not  to  fight  it  out 
hand  to  hand  in  the  plain. 

Meanwhile  Caesar  sent  messengers  to  Sardinia 
and  the  other  neighbouring  provinces  with  despatches 
instructing  them  to  take  steps,  immediately  on 
reading  the  despatch,  to  send  him  reinforcements, 
supplies  and  corn.  He  also  unloaded  some  of  his 
warships  and  sent  Rabirius  Postumus  to  Sicily  to 
fetch  a  second  convoy.  He  ordered  A^atinius  to  set 
out  with  ten  warships  to  search  for  the  remaining 
transports  which  had  gone  astray,  and  at  the  same 
time  to  keep  the  sea  safe  from  enemy  raiders.  He 
likewise  ordered  the  praetor  C.  Sallustius  Crispus  to 
proceed  with  a  detachment  of  ships  to  the  island  of 
Cercina,  which  was  under  enemy  occupation,  as  he 
heard  that  there  was  a  great  quantity  of  corn  there. 
These  orders  and  instructions  he  issued  to  each 
individual  in  such  terms  as  to  rule  out  any  excuses  as 
to  whether  or  not  they  could  be  carried  out,  and  to 
prevent  any  shuffling  involving  delay.  Meanwhile 
he    himself  learned   from   deserters    and   the   local 

157 


CAESAR 

Scipionis  ct  qui  cum  co  bellum  contra  se  gcrebant, 
miserari — regium  enim  equitatuni  Scijuo  ex  pro- 
vincia  Africa  alebat — tanta  homines  esse  dementia  \it 
malint  regis  esse  vectigales  quam  cum  eivibus  in 
patria  in  suis  fortunis  esse  incolumes. 
9  Caesar  a.  d.  IIII  ^  Non.  Ian.  castra  movet ;  Lepti 
sex  cohortiuiTi  praesidio  cum  Saserna  relicto  ipse 
rursus  unde  pridie  venerat  Ruspinam  cum  reliquis 
eopiis  convertit  ibique  sarcinis  exercitus  relictis  ipse 
cum  expedita  manu  proficiscitur  circum  villas 
frumentatum  oppidanisque  imperat  ut  plaustra 
iumentaque  omnia  sequantur.  Itaque  magno  numero 
frumenti  invento  Ruspinam  redit.  Hue  ^  eum  id- 
circo  existimo  recepisse,  ut  maritima  oppida  post  se 
ne  vacua  relinquei'et  praesidioque  firmata  ad  classim 
receptacula  muniret. 
10  Itaque  ibi  relicto  P.  Saserna,  fratre  eius  quem 
Lepti  in  proximo  oppido  reliquerat,  cum  legione, 
iubet  comportari  ligna  in  oppidum  quam  plurima ; 
ipse  cum  cohortibus  \'II,  quae  ex  veteranis  legionibus 
in  classe  cum  Sulpicio  et  Vatinio  rem  gesserant,  ex 
oppido  Ruspina  egressus  proficiscitur  ad  portum, 
qui  abest  ab  oppido  milia  passuum  duo,  ibique 
classem    sub    vesperum    cum    ea   copia    conscendit. 

1  III  MSS.  :  IIII  Schneider. 

2  hoc  MSS.  :  hue  Davies. 


1  Juba's  cavalry',  the  payment  of  whom  was  alhided  to  in 
ch.  6,  above. 

-  This  seems  to  be  an  attempt  to  account  for  Caesar's  abrupt 
withdrawal  from  Leptis,  to  which  he  had  advanced  without, 
apparently,  taking  steps  to  secure  Ruspina  in  his  rear. 

»  <•/.  Bell.  Alex.  ch.  44. 


158 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

inhabitants  of  the  terms  entered  into  by  Scipio  and 
his  supporters  M'ho  were  engaged  in  hostiHties 
against  him — Scipio  was  in  point  of  fact  maintaining 
a  royal  ^  cavalry  force  at  the  expense  of  the  province 
of  Africa ;  and  he  felt  sorry  that  men  could  be  so 
mad  as  to  prefer  to  be  the  hirelings  of  a  king  to 
being  in  their  own  countiy,  in  the  company  of  their 
own  citizens,  secure  in  the  possession  of  their  own 
fortunes. 

On  January  2nd  Caesar  moved  his  camp.  Leaving 
behind  at  Leptis  a  garrison  of  six  cohorts  with  Saserna, 
he  himself  returned  vith  his  remaining  forces  back  to 
Ruspina,  whence  he  had  come  the  previous  day. 
There  the  army's  baggage  was  left,  and  he  himself 
set  out  with  a  force  in  light  order  to  forage  round 
the  farms,  issuing  instructions  to  the  townsfolk  that 
all  their  carts  and  draught  animals  must  go  with 
him ;  and  so,  after  finding  a  large  quantity  of  corn, 
he  returned  to  Ruspina.  His  object  in  returning  to 
this  town  2  was,  I  imagine,  to  avoid  leaving  the  coastal 
towns  behind  him  unoccupied,  but  rather,  by  secur- 
ing them  with  garrisons,  to  fortify  them  as  strong- 
holds for  the  reception  of  his  fleet. 

And  so,  leaving  behind  a  legion  under  command  of 
P.  Saserna — brother  of  the  man  he  had  left  in  the 
nearby  town  of  Leptis — with  instructions  that  as 
much  wood  as  possible  should  be  conveyed  into  the 
town,  he  left  the  town  of  Ruspina  and  made  for  its 
harbour,  which  is  two  miles  distant.  With  him  he 
took  seven  cohorts  which  were  drawn  from  veteran 
legions  and  had  seen  service  aboard  the  fleet  with 
Sulpicius  and  ^"atinius ;  ^  and  having  reached  the 
harbour  he  went  aboard  his  fleet  with  this  force  as 
evening  was  approaching.     There  was  not  a  man  in 

159 


CAESAR 

Omnibus  in  exercitu  insciis  et  requirentibus  impera- 
toris  consilium,  magno  metu  ac  tristimonia  soUicita- 
bantur.  Parva  enim  cum  copia  et  ea  tironum, 
neque  omni  exposita,  in  Africa  contra  magnas  copias 
et  insidiosae  nationis  equitatum  innumerabilem  se 
expositos  videbant  neque  quicquam  solati  in  prac- 
sentia  neque  auxili  in  suorum  consilio  animum 
advertebant,  nisi  in  ipsius  imperatoris  vultu,  vigore 
mirabilique  hilaritate ;  animum  enim  altum  et 
erectum  prae  se  gerebat.  Huic  adquiescebant 
homines  et  in  eius  scientia  et  consilio  omnia  sibi 
proclivia  omnes  fore  sperabant. 
11  Caesar  una  nocte  in  navibus  consumpta  iam  caelo 
albente  cum  proficisci  conaretur,  subito  navium  pars 
de  qua  timebat  ex  errore  eodem  conferebatur.  Hac 
re  cognita  Caesar  celeriter  de  navibus  imperat 
omnis  egredi  atque  in  litore  armatos  reliquos  ad- 
venientis  milites  exspectare.  Itaque  sine  mora 
navibus  eis  in  portum  receptis  et  advectis  militum 
equitumque  copiis  rursus  ad  oppidum  Ruspinam 
redit  atque  ibi  castris  constitutis  ipse  cum  cohortibus 
expeditis  XXX  frumentatum  est  profectus.  Ex 
eo  est  cognitum  Caesaris  consilium,  ilium  cum  classe 
navibus  onerariis  quae  deerrassent  subsidio  ire  clam 
hostibus  voluisse,  ne  casu  imprudentes  suae  naves  in 
classem  adversariorum  inciderent,  neque  eam  rem 
i6o 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

the  army  who  knew  the  plans  of  the  commander-in- 
chief,  not  a  man  but  sought  eagerly  to  know  them ; 
and  in  their  ignorance  they  were  all  filled  with 
anxiety,  grave  alarm  and  depression.  For  they  saw 
themselves  landed  in  Africa  with  a  tiny  force — -and 
that  too  of  recruits,  and  not  all  of  it  disembarked — • 
pitted  against  large  forces  including  the  limitless 
cavahy  of  a  treacherous  race  ;  nor  could  they  discern 
anything  to  console  them  in  their  present  plight, 
no  help  in  the  counsels  of  their  comrades — no  help  at 
all,  save  in  the  expi-ession  of  their  commander  him- 
self, and  his  energy  and  remarkable  cheerfulness  ;  for 
he  displayed  a  high  and  buoyant  spirit.  It  was  in 
him  that  his  men  found  peace  of  mind  :  his  skill  and 
resolution  would,  they  all  hoped,  make  everything 
run  smoothly  for  them. 

After  spending  one  night  aboard  his  fleet  Caesar 
was  proceeding  to  set  out  at  the  first  pale  light  of 
dawn,  when  suddenly  the  squadron  about  which  he 
was  apprehensive  sought  haven  there  from  its 
wanderings.  On  learning  of  this,  Caesar  promptly 
ordered  everyone  to  disembark  and,  drawn  up  under 
arms  on  the  beach,  to  await  the  arrival  of  the  rest 
of  his  troops.  And  so  when  these  ships  had  been 
brought  without  delay  into  port,  with  their  cargo 
of  infantry  and  cavalry,  Caesar  once  again  returned 
to  the  town  of  Ruspina,  drew  up  his  camp  there,  and 
then  set  out  himself  with  thirty  cohorts  in  light  order 
to  forage.  As  a  result  of  this  Caesar's  plan  now 
became  known :  it  had  been  his  intention  to  go 
with  his  fleet  to  the  assistance  of  those  transports 
which  had  gone  astray,  but  to  do  so  without  the 
enemy's  knowing  of  it,  lest  by  chance  his  own  ships 
might  run   unawares   against  his   opponents'   fleet; 

i6i 


CAESAR 

eos  voluisse  scire  qui  in  praesidiis  relicti  sui  milites 
fuissent,  ne  hi  propter  suorum  paucitatem  et  hostium 
multitudinem  metu  deficerent. 

12  Interim  cum  iam  Caesar  progressus  esset  a  castris 
circiter  milia  passuum  III,  per  speculatores  et 
antecessores  equites  nuntiatur  ei  copias  hostium  haud 
longe  ab  sese  visas.  Kt  hercule  cum  eo  nuntio 
pulvis  ingens  conspici  coeptus  est.  Hac  re  cognita 
Caesar  celeriter  iubet  equitatum  universum,  cuius 
copiam  habuit  in  praesentia  non  magnam,  et  sagit- 
tarios,  quorum  parvus  numerus,  ex  castris  arcessi 
atque  ordinatim  signa  se  leniter  consequi ;  ipse 
antecedere  cum  paucis  armatis.  lamque  cum  procul 
hostis  conspici  posset,  miUtes  in  campo  iubet  galeari 
et  ad  pugnam  parari ;  quorum  omnino  numerus  fuit 
XXX  cohortium  cum  equitibus  CCCC,  sagittariis  CL. 

13  Hostes  interim,  quorum  dux  erat  Labienus  et  duo 
Pacidei,  aciem  derigunt  mirabili  longitudine  non 
peditum  sed  equitum  confertam,  et  inter  eos  levis 
armaturae  Numidas  et  sagittarios  pedites  inter- 
posuerant  et  ita  condensaverant  ut  procul  Caesariani 
pedestris  copias  arbitrarentur  ;  dextrum  ac  sinistrum 
cornu  magnis  equitum  copiis  firmaverant.  Interim 
Caesar  aciem  derigit  simplicem,  ut  poterat  propter 
paucitatem ;  sagittarios  ante  aciem  constituit, 
equites    dextro    sinistroque    cornu    opponit    et    ita 


^  The  number  is  strangely  small  in  view  of  ch.  2  and  the 
arrival  of  the  missing  troops  recorded  in  eh.  11.  Stoffel 
proposed  to  read  co  oo  ,  i.e.  2000 ;  the  total  force  mentioned 
in  ch.  2. 

2  The  most  brilliant  and  enterprising  of  Scipio's  subordinate 
commanders ;  originally  a  staunch  supporter  of  Caesar,  he  had 
joined  Pompey's  side  early  in  49  and,  after  Pharsalus,  had 
crossed  to  Africa  with  Cato. 

162 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

nor  had  he  wanted  his  own  troops  left  behind  on 
guard  to  know  of  this  plan,  lest,  on  account  of  their 
own  small  numbers  and  the  multitude  of  the  enemy, 
fear  should  make  them  fail  in  their  duty. 

Meanwhile,  when  Caesar  had  now  advanced  about 
three  miles  from  his  camp,  information  obtained  by 
his  scouts  and  mounted  patrols  reached  him  that  the 
enemy's  forces  had  been  sighted  by  them  at  no  great 
distance.  And  indeed  simultaneously  with  that 
information  they  began  to  see  a  great  cloud  of  dust. 
On  learning  this,  Caesar  promptly  gave  orders  for  his 
entire  cavalry  force — of  which  arm  he  had  no  great 
abundance  available  at  the  moment — -and  his  small 
contingent  of  archers  to  be  summoned  from  the 
camp,  and  for  the  standards  to  follow  him  slowly  in 
their  regular  order  :  he  himself  went  on  ahead  with  a 
small  armed  party.  Now  that  the  enemy  could  be 
seen  in  the  distance,  he  ordered  the  troops  to  don 
their  helmets  and  prepare  for  battle  in  the  open  plain  : 
their  total  number  comprised  thirty  cohorts,  together 
with  four  hundred  ^  cavalry  and  one  hundred-and- 
fifty  archers. 

\Ieanwhile  the  enemy,  led  by  Labienus  ^  and  the 
two  Pacidei,  deployed  a  straight  line  of  remarkable 
length  and  closely  packed,  not  with  infantry,  but  with 
cavalry,  interspersed  ^v^th  light-armed  Numidians 
and  unmounted  archers  in  such  close  formation  that 
at  a  distance  Caesar's  men  supposed  them  to  be 
infantry  :  the  two  wings — to  right  and  left — were 
reinforced  with  strong  detachments  of  cavalry. 
Meanwhile  Caesar  deployed  a  single  straight  line — 
the  most  his  small  numbers  allowed ;  he  drew  up  his 
archers  in  front  of  the  line  and  posted  cavalry  to 
cover  his  right  and  left  wings,  with  instructions  to 

163 


CAESAR 

praecipit  ut  providerent  ne  multitudine  equitatus 
hostium  circumvenirentur :  existimabat  enim  se  acie 
instructa  cum  pedestribus  copiis  dimicaturum. 

14  Cum  utrimque  exspectatio  fieret  neque  Caesar  sese 
moveret  et  cum  suorum  paucitate  contra  magnam 
vim  hostium  artificio  magis  quam  viribus  decernen- 
dum  videret,  subito  adversariorum  equitatus  sese 
extendere  et  in  latitudinem  promovere  collisque  com- 
plecti  et  Caesaris  equitatum  extenuare  simulque  ad 
circumeundum  comparare  se  coeperant.  Caesarian! 
equites  eorum  multitudinem  aegre  sustinebant. 
Acies  interim  mediae  cum  concurrere  conarentur, 
subito  ex  condensis  turmis  pedites  Numidae  levis 
ai'maturae  cum  equitibus  procurrunt  et  inter  legio- 
narios  pedites  iacula  coiciunt.  Hie  cum  Caesariani 
in  eos  impetum  fecissent,  illorum  equites  refugiebant ; 
pedites  interim  resistebant,  dum  equites  rursus  cursu 
renovato  peditibus  suis  succurrerent. 

15  Caesar  novo  genere  pugnae  oblato  cum  animum 
adverteret  ordines  suorum  in  procurrendo  turbari — 
pedites  enim,  dum  equites  longius  a  signis  per- 
sequuntur,  latere  nudato  a  proximis  Numidis  iaculis 
vubierabantur ;  equites  autem  hostium  pilum  miHtis 
cursu  facile  vitabant — edicit  per  ordines  ne  quis 
164 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

take  care  they  were  not  enveloped  by  the  mass  of 
the  enemy's  cavalry ;  for  he  supposed  that  he  would 
be  engaging  infantry  troops  in  the  set  battle  line. 

There  was  now  on  either  side  a  growing  feeling  of 
expectancy ;  but  Caesar  made  no  move  and  saw  that 
the  smallncss  of  his  own  forces  called  for  the  use  of 
strategy  rather  than  a  trial  of  strength  against  the 
vast  numbers  of  the  enemy ;  when  suddenly  his 
opponents'  cavalry  began  to  deploy,  extending  to- 
wards the  flanks  and  enveloping  the  high  ground, 
causing  Caesar's  cavalry  to  lengthen  and  weaken 
their  foi*mation,  and  preparing  simultaneously  for  an 
cncii-cling  movement.  Caesar's  cavalry  found  it 
difficult  to  bear  up  against  their  vast  numbers. 
Meanwhile  as  the  two  centres  were  proceeding  to 
charge  one  another,  suddenly  from  out  of  the  closely 
packed  squadrons  the  light-armed  Numidian  infantry 
doubled  forward  alongside  the  cavalry  and  hurled 
their  javelins  among  the  infantry  of  the  legions. 
Hereupon  Caesar's  men  launched  an  attack  upon 
them  and  their  cavalry  took  to  flight ;  but  the 
infantry  stood  their  ground  meantime,  until  the 
cavalry  should  renew  their  charge  and  return  to 
succour  their  own  infantry. 

Caesar  was  now  confronted  with  novel  tactics  and 
observed  that  his  men's  formation  was  becoming 
disorganised  as  they  ran  forward  to  attack — the 
infantry  in  fact,  exposing  their  flank  as  they  advanced 
in  pursuit  of  the  cavalry  too  far  from  the  standards, 
were  suffering  casualties  from  the  javelins  of  the 
nearest  Numidians ;  whereas  the  enemy  cavalry 
easily  eluded  by  their  speed  the  heavy  infantry 
javelin.  Accordingly,  he  had  the  order  passed 
down  the  ranks  that  no  soldier  should  advance  more 

165 


CAESAR 

miles  ab  signis  IIII  pedes  longius  procederet.  Equi- 
tatus  interim  Labieni  suorum  multitudine  confisus 
Caesaris  paucitatem  oircuire  conatur :  equites  luliani 
pauci  multitudine  hostium  defessi  equis  convulneratis 
paulatim  cedere ;  hostes  magis  magisque  instate. 
Ita  puncto  temporis  omnibus  Icgionariis  ab  hostium 
equitatu  circumventis  Caesarisque  copiis  in  orbem 
compulsis  intra  cancellos  omnes  coniecti  pugnare 
cogebantur. 
16  Labienus  in  equo  capite  nudo  versari  in  prima  acie  ; 
simul  suos  cohortari,  non  numquam  legionarios 
Caesaris  ita  appellare :  'Quid  tu,'  inquit,  'miles 
tiro  ?  Tam  feroculus  es  ?  Vos  quoque  iste  verbis 
infatuavit  ?  In  magnum  mehercule  vos  periculum 
impulit.  Misereor  vestri.'  Tum  miles,  '  Non  sum,' 
inquit,  '  tiro,  Labiene,  sed  de  legione  X.  veteranus.' 
Tum  Labienus,  '  Non  agnosco,'  inquit,  '  signa  decu- 
manorum.'  Tum  ait  miles:  'lam  me  qui  sim 
intelleges  ' ;  simul  cassidem  de  capite  deiecit,  ut 
cognosci  ab  eo  posset,  atque  ita  pilum  viribus  con- 
tortum,  dum  in  Labienum  mittere  contendit,  equi 
graviter  adverse  pectori  adfixit  et  ait :  '  Labiene, 
decumanum  militem  qui  te  petit  scito  esse.' 
Omnium  tamen  animi  in  terrorem  coniecti,  et 
maxime  tironum :  cii*cumspicere  enim  Caesarem 
neque  amplius  facere  nisi  hostium  iacula  vitare. 
i66 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

than  four  feet  from  the  standards.  Meanwhile  the 
cavalry  of  Labienus,  relying  on  the  lai-ge  numbers 
on  their  own  side,  endeavoured  to  surround  Caesar's 
scanty  force  ;  and  the  mere  handful  of  Julian  cavalry, 
worn  out  by  the  enemy  hordes,  their  horses  wounded, 
gave  ground  little  by  little,  while  the  enemy  pressed 
on  them  more  and  more.  Thus  in  a  moment  all  the 
legionaries  were  surrounded  by  the  enemy  cavalry, 
and  Caesar's  forces  were  compressed  into  a  circle ; 
and  so  they  were  all  compelled  to  fight  penned  behind 
bars  as  it  were. 

Labienus  rode  bare-headed  up  and  down  the  front 
line,  encouraging  his  own  men  the  while  and  occa- 
sionally accosting  Caesar's  legionaries  in  such  terms 
as  these  :  '  What  are  you  up  to,  recruit  ?  Quite  the 
dashing  little  fellow,  aren't  you  ?  Have  all  of  you 
too  been  made  fools  of  by  that  fellow's  words  ? 
So  help  me,  it's  a  very  dangerous  situation  he  has 
driven  you  into.  I  feel  sorry  for  you.'  '  I'm  not  a 
recruit,  Labienus,'  replied  one  soldier, '  but  a  veteran 
of  the  Tenth  legion.'  To  this  Labienus  retorted: 
'  I  don't  recognise  the  standards  of  the  Tenth.' 
Then  said  the  soldier:  'You'll  soon  see  what  I'm 
made  of.'  As  he  spoke  the  words  he  flung  the 
helmet  from  his  head  so  that  the  other  could  recognise 
him  and,  thus  uncovered,  brandished  his  heavy  javelin 
with  all  his  force,  as  he  aimed  it  at  Labienus :  then 
plunging  it  violently  full  in  the  horse's  chest  he  said  : 
'  That  \n\\  teach  you.  Labienus,  that  it's  a  soldier 
of  the  Tenth  who  is  attacking  you.'  All  the  troops, 
however,  were  demoralised,  particularly  the  re- 
cruits ;  for  they  kept  looking  round  for  Caesar  and 
contented  themselves  ^vith  dodging  the  enemy 
javelins, 

167 


CAESAR 

17  Caesar  interim  consilio  hostium  cognito  iubet  aciem 
in  longitudinem  quam  maximam  porrigi  et  altemis 
conversis  cohortibus,  ut  una  post,  altera  ante  signa 
tenderet,  ita  coronam  hostium  dextro  sinistroque 
cornu  mediam  dividit  et  unam  partem  ab  altera 
exclusam  equitibus  intrinsecus  adortus  cum  peditatu 
telis  coniectis  in  fugam  vertit  neque  longius  pro- 
gressus  veritus  insidias  se  ad  sues  recipit ;  idem 
altera  pars  equitum  peditumque  Caesaris  fecit. 
His  rebus  gestis  ac  procul  hostibus  repulsis  con- 
vulneratisque  ad  sua  praesidia  sese,  sicut  erat 
instructus,  recipere  coepit. 

18  Interim  M.  Petreius  et  Cn.  Piso  cum  equitibus 
Numidis  MDC  ^  electis  peditatuque  eiusdem  generis 
satis  grandi  ex  itinere  recta  subsidio  suis  occurrunt. 
Atque  hostes  suis  ex  terrore  firmatis  rursusque 
renovatis  animis  legionarios  conversis  equitibus 
recipientes  novissimos  adoriri  et  impedire  coeperunt 
quo  minus  se  in  castra  reciperent.  Hac  re  anim- 
adversa  Caesar  iubet  signa  converti  et  medio  campo 
redintegrari  proelium.  Cum  ab  hostibus  eodem 
mode  pugnaretur  nee  comminus  ad  manus  rediretur 
Caesarisque  equites  iumenta  ex  nausea  recenti,  siti, 
languore,  paucitate,  vulneribus  defatigata  ad  in- 
sequendum  hostem  perseverandumque  cursum  tar- 

1  The  MSS.  vary  between  MC  and  CCC;   hut  cf.  ch.  19. 
1 68 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

Meanwhile  Caesar,  aware  of  the  enemy's  tactics, 
gave  orders  for  the  line  to  be  extended  to  its  maxi- 
mum length,  and  for  every  other  cohort  to  turn 
about,  so  that  one  was  fiicing  to  the  rear  of  the 
standards,  while  the  next  one  faced  to  their  front. 
By  this  means  with  his  right  and  left  wing  he  split 
in  half  the  encircling  enemy  force ;  and  having 
isolated  one  half  from  the  other  with  his  cavalry, 
proceeded  to  attack  it  from  inside  with  his  infantry, 
turning  it  to  flight  Axith  volleys  of  missiles :  then, 
after  advancing  no  great  distance  for  fear  of  ambush, 
he  retired  to  his  own  lines.  The  other  half  of 
Caesar's  cavalry  and  infantry  carried  out  the  same 
tactics.  This  task  accomplished  and  the  enemy 
being  driven  far  back  with  heavy  casualties,  Caesar 
began  to  retire  to  his  own  defence  positions,  main- 
taining battle  formation. 

Meanwhile  M.  Petreius  and  Cn.  Piso  arrived  with 
Xumidian  troops — sixteen  hundred  picked  cavalry 
and  a  fairly  considerable  force  of  infantry — and 
immediately  on  arrival  hastened  straight  to  the  aid 
of  their  comrades.  And  so  the  enemy,  putting  their 
fears  aside  and  taking  fresh  heart  and  courage, 
wheeled  their  cavalry  round  and  began  to  attack  the 
rear  of  the  retreating  legionaries  and  to  hinder  their 
withdrawal  to  camp.  Obsening  this,  Caesar  ordered 
to  turn  about  and  renew  the  battle  in  the  middle  of 
the  plain.  As  the  enemy  repeated  the  same 
manoeuvre,  but  without  any  return  to  hand-to-hand 
fighting,  and  as  Caesar's  cavalry  found  that  their 
horses,  worn  out  with  the  effects  of  recent  sea- 
sickness, thirst  and  the  fatigue  and  wounds  sustained 
in  their  unequal  contest,  were  now  more  reluctant  to 
keep  doggedly  on  the  move  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy, 

169 


CAESAR 

diora  habcrent  dieique  pars  exigua  iam  reliqua 
esset,  cohortibus  equitibusque  circumdatis  cohortatur 
ut  uno  ictu  contenderent  neque  remitterent,  donee 
ultra  ultimos  collis  hostis  reppulissent  atque  eorum 
essent  potiti.  Itaque  signo  dato  cum  iam  hostes  Ian- 
guide  tela  neglegenterque  mitterent,  subito  immittit 
cohortis  turmasque  suorum ;  atque  puncto  temporis 
hostibus  nullo  negotio  campo  pulsis  post  collemque 
deiectis  nacti  locum  atque  ibi  paulisper  commorati, 
ita  uti  erant  instrueti  leniter  se  ad  suas  recipiunt 
munitiones.  Itemque  adversarii  male  accepti  tum 
demum  se  ad  sua  praesidia  contulerunt. 
19  Interim  ea  re  gesta  et  proelio  dirempto  ex  ad- 
versariis  perfugere  plures  ex  omni  genere  hominum, 
et  praeterea  intercepti  hostium  complures  equites 
peditesque.  Ex  quibus  cognitum  est  consilium 
hostium,  eos  hac  mente  et  conatu  venisse  ut  novo 
atque  inusitato  genere  proeli  tirones  legionarii 
paucique  perturbati  Curionis  exemplo  ab  equitatu 
circumventi  opprimerentur,  et  ita  Labienum  dixisse 
pro  contione,  tantam  se  multitudinem  auxiliorum 
adversariis  Caesaris  sumministratu>-uni  ut  etiam 
caedendo  in  ipsa  victoria  defatigati  vincerentur  atque 
a  suis  superarentur,  quippe  qui  sine  illorum  ope  sibi 

170 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

and  as  there  was  now  but  a  little  daylight  left,  Caesar 
urged  his  encircled  cohorts  and  cavalry  to  make  one 
vigorous  thrust  and  not  give  up  until  they  had  driven 
the  enemy  back  beyond  the  furthest  high  ground 
and  gained  possession  of  the  latter.  And  so,  waiting 
to  give  the  signal  until  the  enemy's  volleys  of  missiles 
were  half-hearted  and  inaccurate,  he  suddenly  let 
loose  some  cohorts  and  squadrons  of  his  own  troops 
upon  them.  In  a  moment  the  enemy  were  driven 
without  trouble  off  the  plain  and  thrown  back  behind 
the  high  ground,  and  Caesar's  men  had  gained  the 
position  ;  then,  after  a  brief  pause  there,  they  retired 
slowly  in  battle  formation  to  their  own  fortifications. 
Their  opponents  likewise,  after  this  warm  reception, 
then  at  length  withdrew  to  their  own  positions. 

Meanwhile  after  this  engagement  had  taken  place 
and  when  the  action  had  been  broken  off,  quite  a 
number  of  all  ranks  of  the  opposing  side  deserted  to 
Caesar,  and  in  addition  not  a  few  of  the  enemy 
cavalry  and  infantry  were  taken  prisoner.  From 
them  the  enemy's  plan  became  known.  He  had 
come  with  the  intention  of  trying  out  new  and  un- 
familiar battle  tactics  upon  Caesar's  legionaries,  in 
order  that — raw  recruits  and  few  in  numbers  as  they 
were — they  should  be  demoralised  thereby,  and  be 
enveloped  and  crushed  by  the  cavalry,  as  Curio  had 
been ;  and  Labienus  had  spoken  to  this  effect  to  his 
troops  on  parade,  that  he  would  furnish  Caesar's 
opponents  with  so  vast  a  number  of  auxiliaries  that 
Caesar's  men  would  be  quite  exhausted  even  with 
killing  them,  and  so  would  be  vanquished  in  the  very 
hour  of  victory,  and  mastered  by  his  forces.  In  fact, 
quite  apart  from  the  aid  of  those  auxiliaries,  he  had 
reason  for  self-confidence  :  first  because  he  had  heard 


CAESAR 

confideret,^  primum  quod  audierat  Romae  legiones 
veteranas  dissentire  neque  in  Africam  velle  transire ; 
deinde  quod  triennio  in  Africa  suos  milites  retentos 
consuetudine  fidelis  sibi  iam  effecisset,  maxima  autem 
auxilia  haberet  Numidarum  equitum  levisque  arma- 
turae,  praeterea  ex  fuga  proelioque  Pompeiano 
Labienus  quos  secum  a  Buthroto  ^  transportaverat 
equites  Germanos  Gallosque  ibique  postea  ex  hibri- 
dis,  libertinis  servisque  conscripserat,  armaverat 
equoque  uti  frenato  condocuerat,  praeterea  regia 
auxilia,  elephantis  CXX  equitatuque  innumerabili,^ 
deinde  legiones  conscriptas  ex  cuiusquemodi  generis 
amplius  XII  milibus.  Hac  spe  atque  ea  audacia 
inflammatus  Labienus  cum  equitibus  Gallis  Ger- 
manisque  MDC,  Numidarum  sine  frenis  ^'III  milibus, 
praeterea  Petreiano  auxilio  adhibito  equitibus  MDC, 
peditum  ac  levis  armaturae  quater  tanto,  sagittariis 
ac  funditoribus  hippotoxotisque  compluribus :  his 
copiis  pridie  Non.  Ian.,  post  diem  VI.  quam  Africam 
Caesar  ^  attigit,  in  campis  planissimis  purissimisque 
ab  hora  diei  quinta  usque  ad  solis  occasum  est  decer- 
tatum.  In  eo  proelio  Petreius  graviter  ictus  ex  acie 
recessit. 
20  Caesar  interim  castra  munire  diligentius,  praesidia 
firmare  copiis  maioribus  vallumque  ab  oppido  Ruspina 
usque  ad  mare  ducere  et  a  castris  alterum  eodem, 

1  quippe  quis  in  illorum  sibi  confideret  is  the  general  reading 
of  the  MSS.  :   I  have  adopted  Forchhammer's  conjecture. 

-  Brundisio  MSS.  :   Buthroto  Frolich. 

^  equitatusque  innumerabilis  MSS.  :  equitatuque  in- 
numerabili  Hoffmann. 

*  Caesar  added  by  Dinter. 

172 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

that  at  Rome  the  veteran  legions  were  mutinous  and 
refusing  to  cross  into  Africa ;  next  because  he  had 
kept  his  own  troops  in  Africa  for  three  years :  they 
were  accUmatised  and  he  had  now  secured  their 
loyalty  to  himself;  he  had,  moreover,  very  large 
auxiliary  forces  composed  of  Numidian  cavalry  and 
light-armed  troops  and,  besides  these,  the  German 
and  Gallic  cavalry  which,  after  the  defeat  and  rout  of 
Pompeius,  he,  Labienus,  had  brought  across  with 
him  from  Buthrotum,  as  well  as  those  which  he  had 
levied  later  on  in  Africa  from  half-castes,  freedmen 
and  slaves,  and  had  armed  and  taught  to  handle  a 
bridled  horse :  he  had  in  addition  royal  auxiliary 
forces,  as  well  as  a  hundred  and  twenty  elephants 
and  innumerable  cavalry ;  and  finally,  legions  raised 
from  more  than  twelve  thousand  men  of  every  type. 
On  such  considerations  was  based  the  reckless  con- 
fidence that  fired  Labienus,  wth  his  sixteen  hundred 
Gallic  and  German  cavalry,  his  eight  thousand 
Numidians  who  rode  without  bridles,  reinforced  in 
addition  by  the  cavalry  contingent  of  Petreius, 
sixteen  hundred  strong,  and  with  his  infantry  and 
light-armed  force,  four  times  as  big,  and  with  his 
numerous  archers,  slingers  and  mounted  archers. 
These  were  the  forces  which  on  January  4th,  five  days 
after  Caesar  reached  Africa,  on  a  perfectly  flat  and 
unimpeded  plain  were  engaged  in  a  contest  from  the 
fifth  hour  of  the  day  continuously  till  sundown.  In 
that  battle  Petreius  was  gravely  wounded  and 
retired  from  the  field. 

Meanwhile  Caesar  fortified  his  camp  with  greater 
care,  strengthened  its  defences  by  manning  them 
with  larger  forces,  and  carried  an  entrenchment  from 
the  town  of  Ruspina  right  to  the  sea,  and  a  second 

173 


CAESAR 

quo  tutius  ultro  citroque  commeare  auxiliaque  sine 
periculo  sibi  succurrere  possent,  tela  tormentaque  ex 
navibus  in  castra  comportare,  remigum  partem  ex 
classe,  Gallorum,  Rhodiorum  epibatarumque  armare 
et  in  castra  evocare  uti,  si  posset,  eadem  ratione  qua 
adversarii  levis  armatura  interiecta  inter  equites  suos 
interponeretur,  sagittariisque  ex  omnibus  navibus 
Ityreis,  Syris  et  cuiusque  generis  ductis  in  castra 
compluribus  frequentabat  suas  copias — audiebat 
enim  Scipionem  post  diem  tertium  eius  diei  quo 
proelium  factum  erat  appropinquare,  copias  suas  cum 
Labieno  et  Petreio  coniungere ;  cuius  copiae  legio- 
num  VIII  et  equitum  III  milium  esse  nuntiabantur 
— officinas  ferrarias  instruere,  sagittas  telaque  ut 
fierent  complura  curare,  glandis  fundere,  sudis 
comparare,  litteras  in  Siciliam  nuntiosque  mittere, 
ut  sibi  cratis  materiemque  congererent  ad  arietes, 
cuius  inopia  in  Africa  esset,  praeterea  ferrum, 
plumbum  mitteretur.  Etiam  animum  advertebat 
frumento  se  in  Africa  nisi  importaticio  uti  non  posse : 
priore  anno  enim  propter  adversariorum  dilectus, 
quod  stipendiarii  aratores  milites  essent  facti, 
messem  non  esse  factam ;  praeterea  ex  omni  Africa 
frumentum  adversarios  in  pauca  oppida  et  bene 
munita  comportasse  omnemque  regionem  Africae 
exinanisse  frumento,  oppida  praeter  ea  pauca  quae 

174 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

from  his  camp  likewise  to  the  sea  :  his  purpose  was  to 
ensure  safer  communication  in  both  directions  and  to 
enable  his  reinforcements  to  come  up  to  his  support 
\\'ithout  danger.  He  brought  missiles  and  artillery 
from  the  ships  into  his  camp,  and  armed  some  of  the 
Gallic  and  Rhodian  rowei's  and  marines  from  the  fleet 
and  summoned  them  to  camp,  in  order  that,  if 
possible,  on  the  same  principle  which  his  opponents 
had  employed,  light-armed  troops  should  be  inter- 
spersed at  intervals  among  his  cavalry.  From  all  his 
ships  he  brought  archers  into  camp — Ityreans, 
Syrians  and  men  of  divers  races — and  thronged  his 
forces  with  numerous  drafts  of  them ;  for  he  heard 
that  on  the  second  day  after  the  battle  was  fought 
Scipio  was  approaching  and  uniting  his  forces — 
reported  to  comprise  eight  legions  and  three 
thousand  cavalry — with  those  of  Labienus  and 
Petreius.  He  also  established  smithies,  took  steps  to 
ensure  a  plentiful  supply  of  arrows  and  missile- 
weapons,  cast  leaden  bullets,  collected  stakes,  and 
sent  couriers  with  despatches  to  Sicily  bidding  them 
build  up  for  his  use  stocks  of  hurdles  and  timber  for 
battering-rams — timber  was  scarce  in  Africa^and 
in  addition  send  him  iron  and  lead.  He  realised, 
moreover,  that  no  corn  could  be  available  for  his  use 
in  Africa  unless  it  was  imported ;  for  there  had  been 
no  harvest  the  previous  year  on  account  of  the  levies 
held  by  his  opponents  and  the  fact  that  the  farmers, 
being  tributary  subjects  of  Rome,  had  been  called 
up  for  military  service :  moreover,  his  opponents 
had  collected  corn  from  the  whole  of  Africa  and 
conveyed  it  into  a  few  well-fortified  towns,  and 
every  corner  of  Africa  was  thus  ransacked  of  corn ; 
and  apart  from  those  few  towns  which  his  opponents 

175 


CAESAR 

ipsi  suis  praesidiis  tueri  poterant  reliqua  dirui  ac 
deseri,  et  eorum  incolas  intra  sua  praesidia  coegisse 
commigrare,  agros  desertos  ac  vastatos  esse. 

21  Hac  necessitate  Caesar  coactus  privates  ambiendo 
et  blande  appellando  aliquantum  numerum  frumcnti 
in  sua  praesidia  congesserat  et  eo  parce  utebatur. 
Opera  interimipse  cotidie  circuire  et  alteras  cohortis 
in  statione  habere  propter  hostium  multitudinem. 
Labienus  saucios  suos,  quorum  numerus  maximus 
fuit,  iubet  in  plaustris  deligatos  Hadrumetum  depor- 
tari.  Naves  interim  Caesaris  onerariae  errabundae 
male  vagabantur  incertae  locorum  atque  castrorum 
suorum ;  quas  singulas  scaphae  adversariorum  com- 
plures  adortae  incendebant  atque  expugnabant. 
Hac  re  nuntiata  Caesar  classis  circum  insulas  portus- 
que  disposuit,  quo  tutius  commeatus  supportari 
posset. 

22  M.  Cato  interim,  qui  Uticae  praeerat,  Cn.  Pom- 
peium  filium  multis  verbis  assidueque  obiurgare  non 
desistebat,  '  Tuus,'  inquit,  '  pater  istuc  aetatis  cum 
esset  et  animadvertisset  rem  publicam  ab  nefariis 
sceleratisque  civibus  oppressam  bonosque  aut  inter- 
fectos  aut  exsilio  multatos  patria  eivitateque  carere, 
gloria  et  animi  magnitudine  elatus  privatus  atque 
adulescentulus  paterni  exercitus  reliquiis  collectis 
176 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

were  able  to  defend  themselves  with  their  own 
garrisons,  the  rest  were  being  destroyed  and  aban- 
doned :  their  inhabitants  had  been  compelled  to 
migrate  to  the  shelter  of  the  enemy  garrisons,  and 
their  lands  were  now  abandoned  and  laid  waste. 

Under  stress  of  this  emergency  Caesar  had,  by 
soliciting  private  individuals  with  touching  appeals, 
amassed  a  certain  amount  of  corn  in  his  garrisons, 
and  this  he  was  using  sparingly.  Meanwhile  every 
day  he  went  round  the  field-works  in  person,  and 
doubled  the  number  of  cohorts  on  guard  duty  in 
view  of  the  large  numbers  of  the  enemy.  Labienus 
gave  orders  that  his  wounded,  who  were  very 
numerous,  should  have  their  wounds  dressed  and 
then  be  carried  in  carts  to  Hadrumetum.  Mean- 
while some  of  Caesar's  transports  were  cruising 
aimlessly  about,  badly  off  their  course  in  their 
uncertain  knowledge  of  the  area  and  the  position  of 
his  camp ;  and  one  by  one  they  were  set  upon  by  a 
number  of  enemy  pinnaces  and  set  on  fire  or  boarded. 
When  this  was  reported  to  Caesar  he  posted  squad- 
rons round  the  islands  and  harbours  to  enable  his 
supplies  to  be  convoyed  with  greater  safety. 
I  Meanwhile  M.  Cato,  who  was  in  command  at 
Utica,  never  left  off  assailing  Cn.  Pompeius,  the  son, 
with  long  and  constant  speeches  of  reproof.  '  When 
your  father  was  your  age,'  he  said,  '  he  perceived 
that  the  state  was  oppressed  by  wicked  and  vicious 
citizens,  and  that  loyal  men  had  either  been  put  to 
death  or  else,  punished  by  exile,  were  deprived  of 
their  country  and  civic  rights.  Whereupon,  carried 
away  by  his  ambition  and  the  nobility  of  his  nature, 
though  a  mere  private  citizen  and  a  callow  youth,  he 
mustered   the   remnants   of  his   father's   army   and 

177 


CAESAR 

paene  oppressam  funditus  et  deletam  Italiam  urbem- 
que  Romanam  in  libertatem  vindicavit,  idemque 
Siciliam,  Africam,  Numidiam,  Mauretaniam  mirabili 
celeritate  armis  recepit.  Quibus  ex  rebus  sibi  earn 
dignitatem  quae  est  per  gentis  elarissima  notissima- 
que  conciliavit  adulescentulusque  atque  eques 
Romanus  triumphavit.  Atque  ille  non  ita  amplis 
rebus  patris  gestis  neque  tarn  excellenti  dignitate 
maiorum  parta  neque  tantis  clientelis  nominisque 
elaritate  praeditus  in  rem  publicam  est  ingressus, 
Tu  contra  et  patris  nobilitate  et  dignitate  et  per  te 
ipse  satis  animi  magnitudine  diligentiaque  praeditus 
nonne  eniteris  et  proficiseeris  ad  paternas  clientelas 
auxilium  tibi  reique  publicae  atque  optimo  cuique 
efflagitatum  ?  ' 
23  His  verbis  hominis  gravissimi  incitatus  adulescen- 
tulus  cum  naviculis  cuiusquemodi  generis  XXX,  inibi 
paueis  rostratis,  profectus  ab  Utica  in  Mauretaniam 
regnumque  Bogudis  est  ingressus  expeditoque  exer- 
citu  servorum,  liberorum  II  milium  numero,  cuius 
partem  inermem,  partem  habuerat  armatam,  ad 
oppidum  Ascurum  accedere  coepit ;  in  quo  oppido 
praesidium  fuit  regium.  Pompeio  adveniente  oppi- 
dani,  usque  eo  passi  propius  accedere  donee  ad  ipsas 
portas  ac  murum  appropinquaret,  subito  eruptione 
facta  prostrates  perterritosque  Pompeianos  in  mare 
178 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

emancipated  Italy  and  the  city  of  Rome  when  they 
were  all  but  utterly  overwhelmed  and  destroyed ; 
and  likewise  he  recovered  Sicily,  Africa,  Numidia 
and  Mauretania  by  force  of  arms  with  astonishing 
speed.  By  these  achievements  he  won  himself  that 
prestige  of  his  which  in  lustre  and  in  fame  is  un- 
equalled throughout  the  world,  and,  albeit  a  mere 
youth  and  a  Roman  knight,  celebrated  a  triumph. 
And  in  his  case  his  father  had  not  the  same  imposing 
record  as  your  father  has,  nor  had  he  inherited  from 
his  ancestors  the  same  position  of  eminent  distinc- 
tion, nor  was  he  endowed  with  such  influential  ties  of 
clientship  or  with  a  famous  name,  when  he  entered 
public  life.  Whereas  in  your  case  not  only  are 
you  endowed  ^\■ith  the  fame  and  prestige  of  your 
father,  but  you  yourself  are  also  adequately  endowed 
on  your  own  account  with  nobility  of  nature  and  with 
earnestness.  Will  you  not  therefore  make  an  effort 
and  set  out  in  quest  of  your  father's  clients  to  demand 
their  assistance  for  yourself,  for  the  state  and  for 
every  loyal  citizen  ?  ' 
23  These  words,  coming  from  a  man  of  the  greatest 
authority,  spurred  on  the  youth.  Taking  with  him 
thirty  small  ships  of  every  type,  including  a  few 
equipped  with  beaks,  he  set  out  from  Utica  and 
invaded  Mauretania  and  the  kingdom  of  Bogud.  Dec.  (?)4 
With  an  army  in  light  order  comprising  two  thousand 
slaves  and  freedmen,  some  with  arms,  some  without, 
he  proceeded  to  approach  the  town  of  Ascurum,  where 
there  was  a  royal  garrison.  As  Pompeius  drew 
near,  the  townsfolk  allowed  him  to  come  closer 
and  closer  imtil  he  was  actually  approaching  the  very 
gates  and  the  town  wall :  then  suddenly  they  made  a 
sally    and    drove    the    crushed    and    panic-stricken 

179 


CAESAR 

navisque  passim  compulerunt.  Ita  re  male  gesta 
Cn.  Pompeius  filius  navis  inde  avertit  neque  postea 
litus  attigit  classemque  ad  insulas  Balearis  versus 
convertit. 

24  Scipio  interim  cum  eis  copiis  quas  paulo  ante 
demonstravimus  Uticae  grandi  praesidio  relieto  pro- 
fectus  primum  Hadrumeti  castra  ponit,  deinde  ibi 
paucos  dies  commoratus  noctu  itinere  facto  cum 
Labieni  et  Petrei  copiis  coniungit,  atque  unis  castris 
factis  III  milia  passuum  longe  considunt.  Equitatus 
interim  eorum  circum  Caesaris  munitiones  vagari 
atque  eos  qui  pabulandi  aut  aquandi  gratia  extra 
vallum  pi-Qgressi  essent  excipere :  ita  omnis  adver- 
saries intra  munitiones  continere.  Qua  re  Caesariani 
gravi  annona  sunt  conflictati,  ideo  quod  nondum 
neque  ab  Sicilia  neque  ab  Sardinia  commeatus  sup- 
portatus  erat  neque  per  anni  tempus  in  mari  classes 
sine  periculo  vagari  poterant ;  neque  amplius  milia 
passuum  \'I  terrae  Africae  quoquo  versus  tenebant 
pabulique  inopia  premebantur.  Qua  necessitate 
coacti  veterani  milites  equitesque,  qui  multa  terra 
marique  bella  confecissent  et  periculis  inopiaque  tali 
saepe  essent  conflictati,  alga  e  litore  collecta  et  aqua 
dulci  eluta  et  ita  iumentis  esurientibus  data  vitam 
eorum  producebant. 

25  Dum  haec  ita  fierent,  rex  luba  cognitis  Caesaris 
difficultatibus  copiarumque  paucitate — non  est  visum 

1  See  Appendix  A,  p.  393. 

-  The  figure  VI,  given  by  all  MSS.,  is  not  easily  reconciled 
with  the  dimensions  of  the  plateau  of  Ruspina  :  some  editors 
would  amend  it  to  III. 

l8o 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

Pompeians  back  wholesale  to  the  sea  and  their  ships. 
After  this  reverse  Cn.  Pompeius,  the  son,  withdrew 
his  fleet  from  there  and  without  touching  land  again 
set  course  with  his  fleet  towards  the  Balearic  Islands. 

Meanwhile  Scipio  set  out  with  the  forces  we 
enumerated  a  little  earlier,  leaving  a  considerable 
garrison  behind  at  Utica,  and  pitched  camp  first  at 
Hadrumetum.  Then,  after  staving  there  a  few 
days,  he  made  a  night  march  and  joined  up  with  the 
forces  of  Labienus  and  Petreius ;  whereupon  they 
established  themselves  in  a  single  camp  three  miles 
distant  from  Caesar.^  Meanwhile  their  cavalry 
went  roving  round  Caesar's  entrenchments,  inter- 
cepting all  such  troops  as  had  advanced  beyond  the 
rampai't  to  forage  or  fetch  water ;  and  this  had  the 
effect  of  keeping  all  their  opponents  confined  within 
their  defences.  By  these  tactics  Caesar's  men  were 
afflicted  with  a  severe  scarcity  of  corn,  for  this  reason 
that  supplies  had  not  so  far  been  conveyed  to  him 
either  from  Sicily  or  Sardinia,  and,  on  account  of  the 
season  of  the  year,  fleets  could  not  move  freely  about 
the  seas  without  risk ;  moreover,  they  occupied  no 
more  than  six  ^  miles  of  Afi-ican  soil  in  any  one 
direction,  and  were  hard  put  to  it  for  lack  of  fodder. 
The  urgency  of  this  situation  drove  tlie  veteran 
troops — infantry  and  cavalry — men  who  had  gone 
through  many  campaigns  by  land  and  sea  and  had 
often  been  afflicted  by  hazai'ds  and  similar  privation, 
to  collect  seaweed  from  the  beach,  cleanse  it  in  fresh 
water,  and  give  it  in  this  state  to  their  famished 
beasts,  thereby  prolonging  their  lives. 

While  these  events  were  taking  place,  king  Juba, 
who  was  aware  of  Caesar's  difficulties  and  the  small 
numbers  of  his  forces,  thought  it  advisable  not  to 

i8i 


CAESAR 

dari  spatiiim  convalcscendi  augendarunique  eiiis 
opum  :  itaquc  comparatis  equitum  maguis  peditum- 
que  copiis  subsidio  suis  egressus  e  regno  ire  contendit. 
P.  Sittius  interim  et  rex  Bochus  coniunctis  suis  copiis 
cognito  regis  lubae  egressu  propius  eius  regnum 
copias  suas  admovere,  Cirtamque,  oppidum  opulen- 
tissimum  eius  regni,  adortus  paucis  diebus  pugnando 
capit  et  praeterea  duo  oppida  Gaetulorum.  Quibus 
cum  condicionem  ferret,  ut  oppido  excederent  idque 
sibi  vacuum  traderent,  condicionemque  repudiassent, 
postea  ab  eo  capti  interfectique  sunt  omnes.  Inde 
progressus  agros  oppidaque  vexare  non  destitit. 
Quibus  rebus  cognitis  luba  cum  iam  non  longe  ab 
Scipione  atque  eius  ducibus  abesset,  capit  consilium 
satius  esse  sibi  suoque  regno  subsidio  ire  quam,  dum 
alios  adiuturus  proficisceretur,  ipse  suo  regno 
expulsus  forsitan  utraque  re  expelleretur.  Itaque 
rursus  recipere  atque  auxilia  etiam  ab  Scipione 
abduxit  sibi  suisque  rebus  timens  elephantisque 
XXX  relictis  suis  finibus  oppidisque  suppetias  pro- 
fectus  est. 
26  Caesar  interim,  cum  de  suo  adventu  dubitatio  in 
provincia  esset  neque  quisquam  crederet  ipsum  sed 
aliquem  legatum  in  Africam  cum  copiis  venisse, 
conscriptis  litteris  circum  provinciam  omnis  civitates 
facit  de  suo  adventu  certiores.  Interim  nobiles 
homines    ex    suis    oppidis    profugere    et    in    castra 

'  A  Roman  adventurer  and  soldier  of  fortune  who  since  the 
conspiracy  of  Catiline  had  been  operating  independently  in 
Africa  with  a  body  of  troops  raised  in  Spain.     Bochus,  king 
'     of  eastern  Mauretania,  sided  with  Caesar  against  Juba. 

182 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

give  him  any  respite  for  recruiting  his  strength  or 
increasing  his  resources.  And  so,  having  got  to- 
gether large  forces  of  cavalry  and  infantry,  he 
departed  from  his  kingdom  and  made  haste  to  go  to 
the  assistance  of  his  friends.  Meanwhile  P.  Sittius  ^ 
and  king  Bochus  had  united  their  forces  and,  learning 
of  king  Juba's  departure,  moved  them  closer  to  his 
kingdom.  Sittius  then  attacked  Cirta,  the  richest 
town  of  that  kingdom,  and  after  a  few  days'  fighting 
captured  it,  as  well  as  two  Gaetulian  towns.  When 
he  offered  them  terms,  proposing  that  they  should 
evacuate  the  town  and  surrender  it  unoccupied  to 
him,  they  refused  the  terms  and  were  subsequently 
captured  by  Sittius  and  all  put  to  death.  Thereupon 
he  advanced,  ravaging  both  countryside  and  towns 
without  ceasing.  Juba  got  to  know  of  this  when  he 
was  now  not  far  away  from  Scipio  and  his  lieutenants, 
and  came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  better  to  go 
to  the  aid  of  himself  and  his  own  kingdom,  rather 
than  that,  in  the  course  of  setting  out  to  help  others, 
he  should  himself  be  driven  out  of  his  own  kingdom, 
and  perhaps  be  thwarted  in  both  fields.  Accord- 
ingly, he  marched  back  again,  Mithdrawing  his 
auxiliary  forces  too  from  Scipio,  in  his  alarm  on 
account  of  himself  and  his  own  interests  ;  and  leaving 
thirty  elephants  behind  with  Scipio,  he  set  forth  to 
the  relief  of  his  own  territory  and  towns. 

Meanwhile  as  there  was  some  doubt  in  the  pi*o- 
vince  as  to  Caesar's  arrival,  and  nobody  believed  it 
was  Caesar  in  pei'son  that  had  come  to  Africa  with 
the  forces,  but  rather  some  one  of  his  lieutenants,  he 
sent  written  despatches  round  the  province  informing 
all  the  communities  of  his  personal  arrival.  Mean- 
while persons  of  note  fled  from  their  towns  and  sought 

183 


CAESAR 

Caesaris  devenire  et  de  adversariorum  eius  crudeli- 
tate  acerbitateque  commemorare  coeperunt.  Quorum 
lacrimis  querelisque  Caesar  commotus,  cum  antea 
constituisset  e  stativis  castris  aestate  inita  cunctis 
copiis  auxiliisque  accitis  bellum  cum  suis  adversariis 
gerere,  hieme  gerere  ^  instituit,  litteris  celeriter  in 
Siciliam  ad  Alienum  et  Rabirium  Postumum  con- 
scriptis  et  per  catascopum  missis,  ut  sine  mora  ac 
nulla  excusatione  hiemis  ventorumque  quam  celer- 
rime  exercitus  sibi  transportaretur :  Africam  pro- 
vinciam  perire  funditusque  everti  ab  suis  inimicis ; 
quod  nisi  celeriter  sociis  foret  subventum,  praeter 
ipsam  Africam  terram  nihil,  ne  tectum  quidem  quo  se 
reciperent,  ab  eorum  scelere  insidiisque  reliquum 
futurum.  Atque  ipse  erat  in  tanta  festinatione  et 
exspectatione  ut  postero  die  quam  misisset  litteras 
nuntiumque  in  Siciliam  classem  exercitumque  morari 
diceret,  dies  noctesque  oculos  mentemque  ad  mare 
dispositos  directosque  haberet.  Nee  mirum  :  anim- 
advertebat  enim  villas  exuri,  agros  vastari,  pecus 
diripi,  trucidari,  oppida  castellaque  dirui  deserique, 
principes  civitatum  aut  interfici  aut  in  catenis  teneri, 
liberos  eorum  obsidum  nomine  in  servitutem  abripi ; 
eis  se  miseris  suamque  fidem  implorantibus  auxilio 
propter  copiarum  paucitatem  esse  non  posse.    Milites 

^  The  words  hieme  gerere  were  conjectured  by  Woelffltn. 
184 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

refuge  in  Caesar's  camp  and  proceeded  to  quote  in- 
stances of  the  cruelty  and  harshness  of  his  opponents. 
Their  tears  and  complainings  had  no  little  effect  on 
Caesar ;  and  though  he  had  previously  decided  to 
wait  for  the  beginning  of  summer  to  muster  all  his 
forces  and  auxiliaries  from  their  permanent  quarters 
and  wage  war  on  his  opponents,  he  now  resolved  on  a 
winter  campaign,  promptly  drafting  a  despatch  to 
Alienus  and  Rabirius  Postumus  in  Sicily,  which  he 
sent  by  a  reconnaissance  vessel,  to  the  effect  that  an 
army  must  be  shipped  across  to  him  as  quickly  as 
possible :  there  must  be  no  delay  and  no  excuses  on 
the  ground  of  wintry  weather  or  adverse  winds.  The 
province  of  Africa,  he  \\Tote,  was  in  its  death  throes, 
in  the  process  of  utter  destruction  at  the  hands  of  his 
foes  ;  and  unless  aid  were  promptly  rendered  to  their 
allies,  nothing  save  the  very  soil  of  Africa — not  even 
a  roof  to  give  them  shelter — would  be  left  as  the 
result  of  their  enemies'  treacherous  crimes.  Caesar 
himself  was  in  such  a  ferment  of  impatient  expec- 
tancy that  on  the  day  after  he  sent  the  messenger  to 
Sicily  with  the  despatch  he  kept  saving  that  the  fleet 
and  armv  were  dallying ;  and  day  and  night  he  kept 
his  eyes  and  attention  bent  and  riveted  upon  the  sea. 
And  no  wonder ;  for  he  perceived  that  farms  were 
being  burned  to  the  ground,  fields  stripped,  herds 
plundered  or  butchered,  towns  and  strongholds  de- 
stroyed and  abandoned,  and  the  principal  citizens 
either  murdered  or  held  in  chains,  and  their  children 
haled  off  to  slavery  on  the  pretext  of  being  hostages  ; 
yet  to  these  folk,  Avho  in  their  misery  implored  his 
protection,  he  could  give  no  assistance  because  his 
forces  were  so  few.  Meanwhile  he  kept  his  troops 
continuously  at  work  on  their  training,  proceeded 


CAESAR 

interim  in  opere  exercere  atque  castra  munirc,  turris, 
castella  facei*e  molesque  iacere  in  mare  non  inter- 
mittere. 

27  Scipio  interim  clephantos  hoc  modo  condocefacere 
instituit.  Duas  instruxit  acies,  unam  funditorum 
contra  elephantos,  quae  quasi  adversariorum  locum 
obtineret  et  contra  eorum  frontem  adversam  lapillos 
minutos  mitteret ;  deinde  in  ordinem  elephantos 
constituit,  post  illos  autem  suam  aciem  instruxit  ut, 
cum  ab  adversariis  lapides  mitti  coepissent  et  ele- 
phanti  perterriti  se  ad  suos  convertissent,  rursus  ab 
sua  acie  lapidibus  missis  cos  converterent  adversus 
hostem.  Quod  aegre  tardeque  fiebat ;  rudes  enim 
elephanti  multorum  annorum  doctrina  usuque  vetusto 
vix  edocti  tamen  communi  pei'iculo  in  aciem  pro- 
ducuntur. 

28  Dum  haec  ad  Ruspinam  ab  utrisque  ducibus 
administrantur,  C.  Vergilius  praetorius,  qui  Thapsi 
oppido  maritimo  praeerat,  cum  animum  advertisset 
navis  singulas  cum  exercitu  Caesaris  incertas  locorum 
atque  castrorum  suorum  vagari,  occasionem  nactus 
navem  quam  ibi  habuit  actuariam  complet  militibus 
et  sagittariis  et  eidem  scaphas  de  navibus  adiungit  ac 
singulas  navis  Caesarianas  consectari  coepit.  Et  cum 
pluris  adortus  esset  pulsus  fugatusque  inde  disces- 
i86 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

with  the  fortification  of  his  camp,  and  went  on  with- 
out interruption  constructing  towers  and  redoubts 
and  driving  moles  out  into  the  sea. 

Scipio  meanwhile  undertook  the  training  of  the 
elephants  in  the  following  manner.  He  drew  up 
two  lines  of  battle :  one  line  of  slingers,  facing  the 
elephants,  to  take  the  place  of  the  enemy  and  to  dis- 
charge small  stones  against  the  opposing  front  formed 
by  the  elephants  ;  next  he  arranged  the  elephants  in 
line,  and  behind  them  drew  up  his  own  line  so  that, 
when  the  enemy  proceeded  to  sling  their  stones  and 
the  elephants  in  their  consequent  panic  wheeled  round 
upon  their  own  side,  his  men  should  receive  them 
with  a  volley  of  stones,  and  so  make  them  wheel 
round  again  away  from  his  own  line  in  the  direction 
of  the  enemy.  This  method  worked,  though  it  was  a 
difficult  and  slow  process  ;  for  elephants  are  uncouth 
creatures,  and  it  is  difficult  to  get  them  fully  trained 
even  with  many  years'  training  and  long  practice ; 
and  if  they  are  led  forth  to  battle,  they  are,  for  all 
their  training,  equally  dangerous  to  both  sides. 

While  these  dispositions  were  being  made  at 
Ruspina  by  the  leaders  on  either  side,  the  ex-praetor 
C.  \'ergilius,  who  was  in  charge  of  the  coastal  town 
of  Thapsus,  observed  that  ships  carrying  Caesar's 
troops  were  sailing  singly  on  no  set  course,  due  to 
their  uncertain  knowledge  of  the  locality  and  of  the 
position  of  his  camp.  He  therefore  seized  the 
opportunity  and  manned  with  soldiers  and  archers  a 
fast  boat  which  he  had  there,  to  which  he  added 
some  ship's  pinnaces,  and  with  these  he  set  about  the 
pursuit  of  Caesar's  ships  one  by  one.  He  had 
attacked  several,  only  to  be  beaten  off,  put  to  flight 
and  forced  to  quit  the  area,  but  even  so  was  still 

187 


CAESAR 

sisset  nee  tamen  desisteret  periclitari,  forte  incidit  in 
navem,  in  qua  erant  duo  Titii,  Hispani  adulescentes, 
tribuni  legionis  V.,  quorum  patrem  Caesar  in  senatum 
legerat,  et  cum  his  T.  Salienus,  centurio  legionis 
ciusdem,  qui  M.  Messallam  legatum  obsederat 
Messanae  seditiosissima  oratione  apud  eum  usus 
idemque  pecuniam  et  ornamenta  triumphi  Caesaris 
retinenda  et  custodienda  curarat  et  ob  has  causas 
sibi  timebat.  Hie  propter  conscientiam  peccatorum 
suorum  persuasit  adulescentibus  ne  repugnarent 
seseque  Vergilio  traderent.  Itaque  deducti  a  V'er- 
giUo  ad  Scipionem  custodibus  traditi  et  post  diem 
tertium  sunt  interfecti.  Qui  eum  ducerentur  ad 
neeem,  petisse  dicitur  maior  Titius  a  centurionibus 
uti  se  priorem  quam  fratrem  interficerent,  idque  ab 
eis  faeile  impeti-asse  atque  ita  esse  interfeetos. 
29  Turmae  interim  equitum,  quae  pro  vallo  in  sta- 
tionibus  esse  solebant/  cotidie  minutis  proeHis  inter 
se  depugnare  non  intermittunt ;  non  numquam  etiam 
Germani  Gallique  Labieniani  cum  Caesaris  equitibus 
fide  data  inter  se  colloquebantur.  Labienus  interim 
cum  parte  equitatus  Leptim  oppidum,  cui  praeerat 
Saserna  cum  cohortibus  VI,  oppugnare  ae  vi  irrum- 
pere  conabatur ;  quod  ab  defensoribus  propter 
egregiam  munitionem  oppidi  et  multitudinem  tor- 
mentorum    facile    et    sine    periculo    defendebatur. 

1  After  solebant  the  MSS.  read  ab  utrisque  ducibus  :    / 
have  followed  Nipperdey  in  omitting  them. 


1  WTien  Messalla  and  Sallust  were  sent  by  Caesar  in  August, 
47,  to  order  certain  legions  to  concentrate  in  Sicily  for  the 
African  campaign,  the  legions  mutinied  and  the  Twelfth  went 
so  far  as  to  pelt  them  with  stones. 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

persisting  in  his  hazardous  tactics,  wlien  chance  led 
him  to  fall  in  witli  a  ship  which  had  on  board  two 
A'oung  Spaniards  of  the  name  of  Titius — tribunes  of 
the  Fifth  legion,  whose  father  Caesar  had  caused  to 
be  elected  to  the  Senate — as  well  as  T.  Salienus,  a 
centurion  of  the  same  legion,  who  had  laid  siege  to  the 
house  of  M.  Messalla,^  Caesar's  lieutenant,  at  Mes- 
sana,  employing  in  his  presence  the  language  of 
downright  mutiny.  This  man  had  also  been  respon- 
sible for  withholding  under  guard  some  money  and 
trappings  belonging  to  Caesar's  triumph,  and  for 
these  reasons  viewed  his  own  prospects  with  mis- 
giving. His  own  guilty  conscience  led  him  to  persuade 
the  young  men  to  put  up  no  resistance,  but  to  sur- 
render to  \'ergilius.  Accordingly  they  were  escorted 
by  \'ergilius  to  Scipio,  put  under  guard,  and  two 
days  later  put  to  death.  As  they  were  being  led 
to  execution,  the  elder  Titius,  it  is  said,  besought  the 
centurions  to  put  him  to  death  before  his  brother, 
and  was  readily  granted  that  request,  and  they  were 
put  to  death  in  that  order. 

Meanwhile  the  squadrons  of  cavalry  w'hose  regular 
duty  it  was  to  be  on  guard  in  front  of  the  rampart 
were  engaging  daily  in  incessant  skirmishes  with  one 
another;  and  there  wei'e  also  times  when  Labienus' 
Germans  and  Gauls  and  Caesar's  cavalry  exchanged 
pledges  of  good  faith  and  conversed  with  one  another. 
Meantime  Labienus  Mith  part  of  his  cavalry  was 
endeavouring  to  assault  and  force  his  way  into  the 
town  of  Leptis,  which  was  under  command  of  Saserna 
with  six  cohorts  ;  but  its  defenders,  thanks  to  the 
excellent  fortifications  of  the  town  and  the  large 
number  of  their  engines  of  war,  defended  it  easily 
and    without    danger.     But    Labienus'    cavalry    re- 


CAESAR 

Quod  ubi  saepius  eius  equitatus  facere  non  inter- 
mittebat,  et  cum  forte  ante  portam  turma  densa 
adstitisset,  scorpione  accuratius  misso  atque  eorum 
decurione  percusso  et  ad  equum  defixo  reliqui  per- 
territi  fuga  se  in  castra  recipiunt.  Quo  facto  postea 
sunt  deterriti  oppidum  temptare. 

30  Scipio  interim  fere  cotidie  non  longe  a  suis  castris 
passibus  CCC  instruere  aciem  ac  maiore  parte  diei 
consumpta  rursus  in  castra  se  recipere.  Quod  cum 
saepius  fieret  neque  ex  Caesaris  castris  quisquam 
prodiret  neque  propius  eius  copias  accederet, 
despecta  Caesaris  patientia  exercitusque  eius,^  uni- 
versis  copiis  productis  elephantisque  turritis  XXX 
ante  aciem  instructis,  quam  latissime  potuit  porrecta 
equitum  peditumque  multitudine  uno  tempore  pro- 
gressus  haud  ita  longe  a  Caesaris  castris  constitit  in 
campo. 

31  Quibus  rebus  cognitis  Caesar  iubet  milites  qui 
extra  munitiones  processerant  pabulandi  lignandique 
aut  etiam  muniendi  gratia  quique  vallum  petierant 
quaeque  ad  eam  rem  opus  erant,^  omnis  intra 
munitiones  minutatim  modesteque  sine  tumultu  aut 
terrore  se  recipere  atque  in  opere  consistere. 
Equitibus  autem  qui  in  statione  fuerant  praecipit  ut 

^  After  eius  all  MSS.  read  luba  :  most  editors  follow  Aldus  in 
deleting  it. 

-  quique  pabulandi  aut  lignandi  aut  etiam  muniendi 
gratia  vallem  petierant  quique  most  MSS.  :  vallum  quaeque 
Aldus;   quique  transposed  by  Forchhammer. 

1  A  small  catapult. 
190 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

peated  these  tactics  fairly  frequently  and  gave  them 
no  respite  ;  and  when  it  so  chanced  that  a  squadron 
had  halted  in  massed  formation  in  front  of  the  gate, 
its  captain  was  struck  and  pinned  to  his  horse  by  a 
bolt  discharged  from  a  scorpion  ^  with  unusually 
accurate  aim.  This  so  unnerved  the  rest  that  they 
withdrew  in  flight  to  their  camp,  too  much  daunted 
by  it  to  resume  their  attempt  upon  the  town 
thereafter. 

Meanwhile  practically  every  day  Scipio  arrayed 
his  line  of  battle  at  no  great  distance — -three  hundred 
paces — from  his  own  camp,  and  then,  when  the 
greater  part  of  the  day  was  now  spent,  returned 
back  again  to  camp.  As  this  manoeuvre  was  carried 
out  quite  frequently  without  anyone's  issuing  forth 
from  Caesar's  camp  or  approaching  closer  to  Scipio 's 
forces,  the  latter,  holding  scorn  of  the  forbearance 
shewn  by  Caesar  and  his  army,  led  forth  his  entire 
force,  with  thirty  elephants  equipped  with  towers 
drawn  up  in  front  of  his  line :  then,  advancing  and 
simultaneously  deploying  to  the  widest  possible 
extent  his  vast  numbers  of  cavalry  and  infantry,  he 
halted  in  the  plain  not  so  very  far  from  Caesar's 
camp. 

When  he  learned  of  this  Caesar  gave  orders  that 
those  troops  who  had  gone  forward  outside  the 
fortifications,  whether  to  forage  or  fetch  wood  or 
even  to  work  on  the  fortifications,  as  well  as  those  who 
had  been  collecting  stakes  and  what  was  needed  for 
that  work,  should  all  retire  within  the  fortifications — - 
gradually  and  in  a  disciplined  manner,  without  any 
fuss  or  alarm — -and  take  their  stand  in  the  field- 
works.  His  instructions  to  the  cavalry  on  guard  were 
to  go  on  holding  the  positions  in  which  they  had  been 

191 


CAESAR 

usque  eo  locum  obtinerent  in  quo  paulo  ante  consti- 
tissent  donee  ab  hoste  telum  missum  ad  se  per- 
veniret ;  quod  si  propius  accederetur,  quam  honestis- 
sime  se  intra  munitiones  reciperent.  Alii  quoque 
equitatui  edicit  uti  suo  quisque  loco  paratus  armatus- 
que  praesto  esset.  At  haec  non  ipse  per  se  coram, 
cum  de  vallo  prospecularetur,  sed  mirabili  peritus 
scientia  bellandi  in  praetorio  sedens  per  speculatores 
et  nuntios  imperabat  quae  fieri  volebat.  Anim- 
advertebat  enini,  quamquam  magnis  essent  copiis 
adversarii  freti,  tamen  saepe  a  se  fugatis,  pulsis 
perterritisque  et  concessam  vitam  et  ignota  peccata ; 
quibus  rebus  numquam  tanta  suppeteret  ex  ipsorum 
inertia  conscientiaque  animi  victoriae  fiducia  ut  castra 
sua  adoriri  auderent.  Praeterea  ipsius  nomen 
auctoritasque  magna  ex  parte  eorum  exercitus 
minuebat  audaciam.  Tum  egregiae  munitiones 
castrorum  atque  valli  fossarumque  altitudo  et  extra 
vallum  stili  caeci  mirabilem  in  modum  consiti  vel 
sine  defensoribus  aditum  adversariis  prohibebant : 
scorpionum,  catapultarum  ceterorumque  telorum 
quae  ad  defendendum  solent  parari  magnam  copiam 
habebat.  Atque  haec  propter  exercitus  sui  prae- 
sentis  paucitatem  et  tirocinium  praeparaverat,  non 

192 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

posted  a  little  earlier,  until  they  should  come  within 
range  of  the  enemy's  missiles  :  if  the  enemy  advanced 
yet  closer,  they  must  then  make  as  honourable  a 
withdrawal  as  possible  within  the  fortifications.  As 
for  the  rest  of  the  cavalry,  they  too  had  their  orders — 
to  be  ready  at  hand,  equipped  and  armed,  each  man 
in  his  proper  place.  These  orders,  however,  he  did 
not  issue  personally  on  the  spot,  surveying  the 
situation  for  himself  from  the  rampart ;  but  so 
remarkable  was  his  skill  and  knowledge  of  warfare 
that,  making  use  of  look-outs  and  orderlies,  he 
issued  the  instructions  necessary  for  his  purpose  as 
he  sat  in  his  head-quarters.  For  he  observed  that, 
although  his  opponents  were  relying  on  the  great 
size  of  their  forces,  yet  they  were  the  very  men 
whom  he  himself  had  often  routed,  beaten  back  and 
utterly  demoralised,  only  to  spare  their  lives  and 
forgive  their  misdemeanours ;  in  which  circum- 
stances, considering  their  own  lack  of  initiative  and 
their  guilty  conscience,  they  would  never  muster 
sufficient  confidence  in  victory  as  to  venture  to  attack 
his  camp.  Moreover,  his  own  name  and  prestige  had, 
to  a  great  extent,  a  sobering  effect  upon  the  reckless 
spirit  of  their  army.  Then  again  the  exceptional  de- 
fences of  the  camp — the  height  of  the  rampart, 
the  depth  of  the  ditches,  and  the  concealed  stakes 
outside  the  rampart,  marvellously  well  planted — all 
these,  even  without  defenders,  served  to  deter  the 
enemy's  approach ;  while  as  for  scorpions,  catapults 
and  all  the  other  noi-mal  weapons  of  defence,  he  had  a 
plentiful  supply  of  these.  These  he  had  prepared 
in  advance  in  view  of  the  small  size  and  lack  of 
experience  of  his  army  as  it  then  was,  and  it  was  not 
because  he   was   taken   aback   or  dismayed   at   the 

193 


CAESAR 

hostium  vi  et  mctu  commotus  patientem  sc  timidum- 
que  hostium  opinioni  praebebat.  Neqiie  idcirco 
copias,  quamquam  erant  paucae  tironumque,  non 
educebat  in  aciem  qui  victoriae  suae  diffideret,  sed 
referre  arbitrabatur,  cuiusmodi  victoria  esset  futura ; 
turpe  enim  sibi  cxistimabat  tot  rebus  gestis  tantisque 
exercitibus  devictis,  tot  tarn  claris  victoriis  partis,  ab 
reliquis  copiis  adversariorum  suorum  ex  fuga  collectis 
se  cruentam  adeptum  existimari  victoriam.  Itaque 
constituerat  gloriam  exsultationemque  eorum  pati, 
donee  sibi  veteranarum  legionum  pars  ali(jua  in 
sccundo  commeatu  occurrisset. 
32  Scipio  interim  paulisper,  ut  antea  dixi,  in  eo  loco 
commoratus,  ut  quasi  despexisse  Caesarem  videretur, 
paulatim  reducit  suas  copias  in  castra  et  contione 
advocata  de  terrore  suo  desperationeque  exercitus 
Caesaris  facit  verba  et  cohortatus  suos  victoriam 
propriam  se  eis  brevi  daturum  pollicctur.  Caesar 
iubet  milites  rursus  ad  opus  redire  et  per  causam 
munitionum  tirones  in  labore  defatigare  non  inter- 
mittit.  Interim  Numidae  Gaetulique  diffugere  coti- 
die  ex  castris  Scipionis  et  partim  in  regnum  se  con- 
ferre,  partim,  quod  ipsi  maioresque  eorum  beneficio 
C.  Marl  usi  fuissent  Caesaremque  eius  adfinem  esse 

1  The  famous  soldier  and  democratic  champion,  who  in  115 
had  married  Julia,  the  sister  of  Caesar's  father.  There  is  no 
mention  in  other  writers  of  his  beneficence  towards  the  Gaetu- 
lians,  who  had  presumably  served  him  well  as  mercenaries  in 
his  campaigns  against  Jugurtha  (109-106).  As  some  60  years 
had  now  elapsed,  it  would  seem  that  very  few,  if  any,  of  the 
present  Gaetulians  could  fhousflre.s  have  been  kindly  treated 
by  Marius.  Chapters  3'y  and  56  below  suggest  rather  that  it 
was  their  fathers  or  grandfathers  who  had  been  rewarded  and 
194 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

enemy's  might  that  he  showed  himself — to  the 
enemy's  thinking — long-suffering  and  timid.  The 
reason  why  he  would  not  lead  his  forces  on  to  the 
field,  few  and  inexperienced  though  they  were,  was 
not  that  he  lacked  confidence  in  his  victory,  but  he 
considered  the  important  question  was — what  manner 
of  victory  it  would  prove  ;  for  he  thought  it  a  personal 
slur  if  after  all  his  achievements,  after  all  the  many 
brilliant  victories  he  had  won  over  such  massive 
armies,  men  should  look  upon  this  victory^  as  one 
gained  only  with  much  bloodshed  over  such  remnants 
as  his  opponents  had  mustered  from  their  routed 
forces.  And  so  he  had  resolved  to  endure  their 
boastful  triumph  until  his  second  convoy  should  join 
him.  including  some  portion  of  his  veteran  legions. 

Meanwhile  Scipio  lingered  for  a  little  while,  as  I 
mentioned  earlier,  in  that  postion,  to  create  the 
impression  that  he  had  held  Caesar  virtually  in 
contempt,  and  then  gradually  Mithdrew  his  forces  to 
camp.  There  he  paraded  his  troops  and  spoke  to 
them  of  the  dread  which  their  own  side  inspired  and 
the  desperate  attitude  of  Caesar's  army ;  and  with 
such  words  of  encouragement  to  his  men  he  promised 
them  that  he  would  shortly  give  them  a  lasting  vic- 
toi-y.  Caesar  ordered  his  troops  to  return  once  more 
to  their  duties  and,  on  the  pretext  of  the  fortifica- 
tions, kept  his  recruits  constantly  employed  to  the 
point  of  exhaustion.  Meanwhile  Numidians  and  Gae- 
tulians  Avere  daily  deserting  from  Scipio's  camp  :  the 
former  betook  themselves  to  Juba's  kingdom,  while 
the  latter,  because  they  themselves  and  their  ances- 
tors had  been  kindly  treated  by  C.  Marius  ^  and  heard 

made  clients,  and  that  the  present  generation  had  inherited 
this  formal  tie  of  clientship. 


CAESAR 

audiebant,  in  eius  castra  perfugere  catervatim  non 
intermittunt.  Quorum  ex  numero  electis  hominibus 
inlustrioribus  et  litteris  ad  suos  civis  datis  cohortatus 
uti  manu  facta  se  suosque  dcfendcrent,  ne  suis 
inimicis  adversariisque  dicto  audicntes  essent,  mittit. 
33  Dum  haec  ad  Ruspinam  fiunt,  legati  ex  Acylla, 
civitate  libera  et  immuni,^  ad  Caesarem  veniunt 
seque  paratos  quaecumque  imperasset  et  libenti 
animo  facturos  pollicentur ;  tantum  orare  et  petere 
ab  eo  ut  sibi  praesidium  daret.  quo  tutius  id  et  sine 
periculo  facere  possent ;  se  et  frunientum  et  quae- 
cumque res  eis  suppeteret  communis  salutis  gratia 
sumministraturos.  Quibus  rebus  facile  a  Caesare 
impetratis  praesidioque  date,  C.  Messium,  aedilicia 
functum  potestate,  Acyllam  iubet  proficisci.  Quibus 
rebus  cognitis  Considius  Longus.  qui  Hadrumeti  cum 
duabus  legionibus  et  equitibus  DCC  praeerat,  celeri- 
ter  ibi  parte  praesidi  relicta  cum  \'III  cohortibus  ad 
Acyllam  ire  contendit.  Messius  celerius  itinere 
confecto  prior  Acyllam  cum  cohortibus  peryenit. 
Considius  interini  cum  ad  urbem  cum  copiis  acces- 
sisset  et  animadyertisset  praesidium  Caesaris  ibi 
esse,  non  ausus  periculum  suorum  facere  nulla  re 
gesta  pro  multitudine  hominum  rursus  se  Hadru- 
metum  recepit ;    deinde,  paucis  post  diebus  eques- 

^  etiam  undique  MSS.  :   et  immuni  Rubens. 


1  See  ch.  7,  note  1.  Its  site  is  much  disputed.  I  have 
marked  it  in  I\Iap  3 — very  tentatively — in  accordance  with 
its  traditional  identification  Avith  the  Acholia  mentioned 
by  Strabo  and  Pliny.  This  satisfies  the  requirements  of 
ch.  43.  But  it  seems  very  doubtful  whether  C.  w(^uld  have 
detached  precious  troops  to  garrison  a  spot  so  far  south ; 
and  this  objection,  together  with  its  mention  in  ch.  67  in 

196 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

that  Caesar  was  a  I'elation  of  his,  swarmed  constantly 
for  refuge  into  Caesar's  camp.  From  among  their 
number  Caesai*  chose  certain  more  distinguished 
members,  gave  them  letters  for  their  fellow  citizens, 
and  so  dismissed  them,  exhorting  them  to  raise  a 
force  for  the  defence  of  themselves  and  their  people, 
and  not  to  submit  passively  to  the  dictates  of  their 
foes  and  opponents. 
33  While  these  events  w'ere  taking  place  at  Ruspina, 
there  came  to  Caesar  envoys  from  Acylla,  an  inde- 
pendent state  immune  from  taxes. ^  They  assured 
him  that  they  would  readilv  and  gladly  do  whatever 
he  might  bid  :  they  merely  prayed  and  besought  him 
to  give  them  a  garrison  to  enable  them  to  do  his 
bidding  with  the  greater  safety  and  without  peril : 
they  would  supply  its  members  with  corn  and  with 
all  other  adequate  supplies  for  the  sake  of  their 
common  welfare.  This  request  Caesar  readily 
granted  and  gave  them  a  garrison,  ordering  C. 
Messius,  who  had  once  held  the  office  of  aedile,  to  set 
out  for  Acylla.  On  learning  this,  Considius  Longus, 
who  was  in  command  at  Hadrumetum  with  two 
legions  and  seven  hundred  cavalry,  left  part  of  his 
gaiTison  force  behind  and,  taking  eight  cohorts  \vith 
him,  promptly  hastened  off  to  Acylla.  Messius 
completed  his  march  more  rapidly  and  Avas  the  first 
to  arrive  at  Acylla  with  his  cohorts.  Whereupon 
Considius  approached  the  city  with  his  forces  and 
observed  that  Caesar's  garrison  was  there :  and  not 
venturing  to  jeopardise  his  troops,  retired  back 
again  to  Hadrumetum  without  having  achieved  any- 
thing to  warrant  so  large  a  force.     Subsequently, 

close   conjunction   witli    Leptis   and   Riispina,   led   Veitli   to 
place  it  some  4  km.  S.E.  of  Leptis. 

197 


CAESAR 

tribus  copiis  a  Labieno  adductis,  rursus  Acyllitanos 
castris  posit  is  obsidere  coepit. 

34  Per  id  tempus  C.  Sallustius  Crispus,  quern  paucis 
ante  diebus  missum  a  Caesare  cum  classe  demonstra- 
vimus,  Cercinam  pervenit.  Cuius  adventu  C. 
Decimius  quaestorius,  qui  ibi  cum  grandi  familiae 
suae  praesidio  praeerat  commeatui,  parvulum  navi- 
gium  nactus  conscendit  ac  se  fugae  commendat. 
Sallustius  interim  praetor  a  Cercinitanis  receptus 
niagno  numero  frumenti  invento  navis  onerarias, 
quarum  ibi  satis  magna  copia  fuit,  complet  atque  in 
castra  ad  Caesarem  mittit.  Alienus  interim  pro 
consule  Lilybaeo  in  navis  onerarias  imponit  legionem 
XIII.  et  XIIII.  et  equites  Gallos  DCCC,  funditorum 
sagittariorumque  mille  ac  secundum  commeatum 
in  Africam  mittit  ad  Caesarem.  Quae  naves  ventum 
secundum  nactae  quarto  die  in  portum  ad  Ruspinam, 
ubi  Caesar  castra  habuerat,  incolumes  pervenerunt. 
Ita  Caesar  duplici  laetitia  ac  voluptate  uno  tempore 
auctus,  frumento  auxiliisque,  tandem  suis  hilaritis 
annonaque  levata  sollicitudinem  deponit,  legiones 
equitesque  ex  navibus  egressos  iubet  ex  languore 
nauseaque  reficere,  dimissos  in  castella  munitionesque 
disponit. 

35  Quibus  rebus  Scipio  quique  cum  eo  essent  comites 
miravi  et  requireve :  C.  Caesarem,  qui  ultro  con- 
198 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

when  a  few  days  later  he  had  procured  a  contingent 
of  cavah-y  from  Labienus,  he  returned,  pitched  his 
camp  and  proceeded  to  lay  siege  to  Acylla. 

It  was  during  this  time  that  C.  Sallustius  Crispus, 
who,  as  we  haye  explained,  had  been  despatched  by 
Caesar  with  a  fleet  a  few  days  earlier,  arriyed  at 
Cercina.  On  his  arriyal  the  ex-quaestor  C.  Decimius, 
who  ^vas  controller  of  supplies  there  and  was  attended 
by  a  large  escort  composed  of  his  own  household 
slaves,  went  aboard  a  small  boat  he  had  got  hold  of 
and  took  to  flight.  Meanwhile  Sallustius,  the 
praetor,  was  welcomed  by  the  inhabitants  of  Cercina  ; 
and  finding  a  large  quantity  of  corn  he  loaded  some 
merchant  yessels — there  was  quite  a  large  number  of 
them  there — and  sent  them  to  Caesar  in  his  camp. 
Meanwhile  at  Lilybaeum  the  pro-consul  Alienus 
embarked  in  transports  the  Thirteenth  and  Four- 
teenth legions,  eight  hundred  Gallic  cayalry  and  one 
thousand  slingers  and  archers,  and  sent  to  Caesar  in 
Africa  his  second  conyoy.  With  the  wind  behind 
them  these  ships  arriyed  safely  three  days  later  at  the 
harbour  of  Ruspina,  the  town  where  Caesar  had  his 
camp.  This  heartened  Caesar,  who  experienced 
twofold  pleasure  and  delight  at  thus  simultaneously 
receiying  both  corn  and  reinforcements ;  and  now 
that  at  last  his  troops  were  made  cheerful  and  the 
corn  problem  Avas  eased,  he  laid  aside  his  cares, 
ordered  his  legions  and  cavalry  to  disembark  and  get 
over  the  effects  of  their  lassitude  and  seasickness,  and 
drafted  them  to  the  various  forts  and  defended 
positions. 

All  this  filled  Scipio  and  his  colleagues  with  wonder 
and  curiosity ;  and  they  had  a  suspicion  that  some 
deep  purpose  must  underlie  this  sudden  transforma- 

199 


CAESAR 

suesset  bellum  inferre  ac  lacessere  proelio,  subito 
commutaturn  iion  sine  magno  consilio  suspicabantur. 
Itaque  ex  eius  patientia  in  magnum  timorem  coniecti 
ex  Gaetulis  duos  quos  arbitrabantur  suis  rebus 
amicissimos  magnis  praemiis  pollicitationibusque  pro- 
positis  pro  perfugis  speeulandi  gratia  in  castra 
Caesaris  mittunt.  Qui  simul  ad  eum  sunt  deducti, 
petierunt  ut  sibi  liceret  verba  sine  periculo  proloqui. 
Potestate  facta,  '  Saepenumero,'  inquiunt,  '  impera- 
tor.  complures  Gaetuli,  qui  sumus  clientes  C.  Mari,  et 
propemodum  omnes  cives  Romani  qui  sunt  in  legione 
nil.  et  VI.,  ad  te  voluimus  in  tuaque  praesidia 
confugere  ;  sed  custodiis  equitum  Numidarum  quo  id 
sine  periculo  minus  faceremus  impediebamur.  Nunc 
data  facultate  ad  te  cupidissime  venimus,  pro 
speculatoribus  missi  ab  Scipione  ut  perspiceremus 
num  quae  fossae  aut  insidiae  elephantis  ante  castra 
portasque  valli  factae  essent,  simulque  consilia 
vestra  contra  easdem  bestias  comparationemque 
pugnae  cognosceremus  atque  eis  renuntiaremus.' 
Qui  coUaudati  a  Caesare  stipendioque  donati  ad 
reliquos  perfugas  deducuntur.  Quorum  orationem 
celeriter  Veritas  comprobavit :  namque  postero  die 
ex  legionibus  eis  quas  Gaetuli  nominarunt  milites 
legionarii  complures  ab  Scipione  in  castra  Caesaris 
perfugerunt. 
36  Dum  haec  ad  Ruspinam  geruntui,  M.  Cato,  qui 
Uticae     praeerat,     dilectus     cotidie     libertinorum, 

1  i.e.  bv  inheritance.     See  ch.  32,  note  1. 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

tion  in  the  C.  Caesar  who  had  habitually  taken  the 
offensive  hitherto  and  was  always  spoiling  for  a  fight. 
And  so,  thrown  into  no  little  panic  as  a  result  of  his 
forbearance,  they  chose  from  the  Gaetulians  two 
men  whom  they  considered  to  be  the  staunchest 
supporters  of  their  cause ;  and  after  offering  them 
large  rewards  and  making  them  generous  promises, 
sent  them  in  the  guise  of  deserters  on  a  spying 
mission  into  Caesar's  camp.  No  sooner  had  these 
men  been  escorted  to  Caesar  than  they  sought 
leave  to  speak  out  frankly  without  danger.  That 
leave  being  granted,  they  said :  '  Many  of  us 
Gaetulians,  Commander-in-Chief,  who  are  clients  ^  of 
C.  Marius,  and  practically  all  the  Roman  citizens  who 
are  in  the  Fourth  and  Sixth  legions  have  very  often 
wanted  to  take  refuge  with  you  and  resort  to  your 
protection ;  but  we  were  prevented  from  doing  so 
without  hazard  by  the  patrols  of  Numidian  cavalry. 
But  now  that  the  chance  has  been  given  us  we  have 
come  to  you  most  eagerly.  We  were  in  fact  sent  by 
Scipio  as  spies  to  observe  closely  whether  any 
trenches  or  traps  had  been  made  for  the  elephants 
in  fi-ont  of  the  camp  and  the  gates  of  the  rampart ; 
and  at  the  same  time  to  ascertain  your  tactics 
against  these  same  beasts  and  your  dispositions  for 
battle,  and  then  report  back  to  them.'  Caesar 
highly  commended  them,  furnished  them  with  pay, 
and  had  them  taken  to  join  the  other  deserters. 
Their  statement  was  speedily  verified  by  actual 
events ;  for  on  the  next  day  quite  a  number  of 
legionary  troops  from  the  legions  mentioned  by  the 
Gaetulians  deserted  from  Scipio  to  Caesar's  camp. 

While  this  was  going  on  at  Ruspina,  M.  Cato,  the 
commander  of  Utica,  was  holding  a  constant  sue- 


CAESAR 

Afrorum,  servorum  denique  et  cuiusquemodi  generis 
hominum,  qui  modo  per  aetatem  arma  ferre  poterant, 
habere  atque  sub  manum  Scipioni  in  castra  sum- 
mittere  non  intermittit.  Legati  interim  ex  oppido 
Thysdrae,  in  quod  tritiei  modiurn  milia  CCC  coni- 
portata  fuerant  a  negotiatoribus  Italicis  aratoribus- 
que,  ad  Caesarem  venire,  quantaque  copia  frumenti 
apud  se  sit  decent  simulque  orant  ut  sibi  praesidium 
mittat  quo  facilius  et  frumentum  et  copiae  suae  con- 
serventur.  Quibus  Caesar  in  praesentia  gratias  egit 
praesidiumque  brevi  tempore  se  missurum  dixit 
cohortatusque  ad  suos  civis  iubet  proficisci.  P. 
Sittius  interim  cum  copiis  Numidiae  finis  ingressus 
castellum  in  mentis  loco  munito  locatum,  in  quod 
luba  belli  gerendi  gratia  et  frumentum  et  res  ceteras 
quae  ad  bellum  usui  solent  esse  comportaverat,  vi 
expugnando  est  potitus. 
37  Caesar  postquam  legionibus  veteranis  duabus, 
equitatu  levique  armatura  copias  suas  ex  secundo 
commeatu  auxerat,  navis  exoneratas  statim  iubet 
Lilybaeum  ad  reliquum  exercitum  transportandum 
proficisci ;  ipse  VI.  Kal.  Febr.  circiter  vigilia  prima 
imperat  speculatores  apparitoresque  omnes  ut  sibi 
praesto  essent.  Itaque  omnibus  insciis  neque 
suspicantibus  vigilia  tertia  iubet  omnis  legiones 
extra  castra  educi  atque  se  consequi  ad  oppidum 
Ruspinam  versus,  in  quo  ipse  praesidium  habuit  et 

^  =  approximately  71,000  bushels. 

-  i.e.  early  in  the  night  of  January  25;26. 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

cession  of  daily  levies  of  freedmen,  Africans,  slaves 
even — any  man,  in  fact,  no  matter  of  what  class,  so 
long  as  he  was  of  an  age  to  carrv  arms — and  drafting 
them  to  Scipio's  camp  to  be  at  his  disposal.  Mean- 
while there  came  to  Caesar  envoys  from  the  town  of 
Thysdra,  in  which  town  three  hundred  thousand 
measures  ^  of  wheat  had  been  collected  by  Italian 
merchants  and  farmers.  These  envoys  now  informed 
Caesar  of  the  large  quantity  of  corn  they  had  and 
prayed  him  to  send  them  a  garrison  whereby  both 
their  corn  and  all  their  stocks  might  the  more 
readily  be  kept  safe.  For  the  present  Caesar  ex- 
pressed his  thanks  to  them,  saying  that,  as  for  a 
gaiTison,  he  would  send  one  shortly ;  he  then  dis- 
missed them  with  words  of  encouragement,  bidding 
them  go  back  to  their  oa\ii  countrymen.  Meanwhile 
P.  Sittius  invaded  the  territory  of  Numidia  with  his 
forces  and  forcibly  took  by  storm  a  stronghold, 
situated  on  a  well-defended  mountain  height,  in 
which  Juba  had  collected  both  corn  and  all  other 
regular  munitions  of  war,  for  the  sake  of  prosecuting 
his  campaign. 

Now  that  Caesar  had  reinforced  his  troops  with  two 
veteran  legions,  cavalry  and  light-armed  forces  from 
his  second  convoy,  he  gave  orders  that  the  ships,  now 
unloaded,  should  set  sail  forthwith  for  Lilybaeum  to 
bring  across  the  rest  of  his  army.  On  January  25, 
at  approximately  the  first  watch,^  he  personally  issued 
orders  that  all  his  scouts  and  aides-de-camp  should 
hold  themselves  at  his  disposal.  Accordingly,  with- 
out anyone's  knowing  or  suspecting  his  plan,  at  the 
third  watch  he  ordered  all  his  legions  to  be  led 
outside  the  camp  and  follow  him  in  the  direction  of 
the   town   of  Ruspina,   where   he   had   a   garrison ; 

203 


CAESAR 

quod  priimim  ad  amicitiam  eius  accessit.  Inde 
parvulam  proclivitatem  degressus  sinistra  parte 
canipi  propter  mare  legiones  ducit.  Hie  campus 
mirabili  planitie  patet  milia  passuum  XII ;  quern 
iugum  cingens  a  mari  ortum  neque  ita  praealtum 
velut  theatri  efficit  speciem.  In  hoc  iugo  colles  suiit 
excelsi  pauci,  in  quibus  singulae  turres  speculaeque 
singulae  perveteres  erant  collocatae,  quarum  apud 
ultimam  praesidium  et  static  fuit  Scipionis. 

Postquam  Caesar  ad  iugum  de  quo  docui  ascendit 
atque  in  unumquemque  collem  turremque,  castella 
facere  coepit  atque  ea  minus  semihora  efFecit ;  ^ 
et  postquam  non  ita  longe  ab  ultimo  colle  turrique 
fuit,  quae  proxima  fuit  castris  adversariorum,  in  qua 
docui  esse  praesidium  stationemque  Numidarum, 
Caesar  paulisper  commoratus  perspectaque  natura 
loci  equitatu  in  statione  disposito  legionibus  opus 
attribuit  bracchiumque  medio  iugo  ab  eo  loco  ad 
quern  pervenerat  usque  ad  eum  unde  egressus  erat 
iubet  derigi  ac  muniri.  Quod  postquam  Scipio 
Labienusque  animadverterant,  equitatu  omni  ex 
castris  educto  acieque  equestri  instructa  a  suis 
munitionibus  circiter  passus  mille  progrediuntur 
pedestremque  copiam  in  secunda  acie  minus  passus 
CCCC  a  castris  suis  constituunt. 

^  turrem  castellaque  MSS.  :  turremque  castella  Nipperdey. 

1  See  Maps  3  and  4.  Presumably  he  kept  close  to  the  sea 
till  he  reached  Sidi  Messaoud,  the  north-easternmost  height 
of  the  chain  of  hills,  which  lies  approximately  mid-way 
between  Ruspina  and  Leptis,  some  two-thirds  of  a  mUe  from 
the  coast,  and  then  struck  inland. 

204 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

it  was  also  the  first  place  to  have  joined  his  side. 
He  then  descended  a  gentle  slope  and,  keeping  to  the 
left  side  of  the  plain,  led  his  legions  along  close  to  the 
sea.i  This  plain  is  remarkably  level  and  extends  for 
twelve  miles ;  and  the  chain  of  not  so  very  lofty 
downs  which  encircles  it  right  from  the  very  sea 
gives  it  the  appearance  of  a  kind  of  amphitheatre. 
This  chain  includes  a  few  high  hills,  on  each  of  which 
were  situated  some  very  ancient  turrets  and  watch- 
towers  ;  and  in  the  last  -  of  these  Scipio  had  a  defence- 
post  and  picket. 

After  Caesar  had  climbed  up  to  the  ridge  I  have 
described  and  visited  each  individual  hill  and  tower, 
he  proceeded  to  construct  redoubts  and  these  he 
completed  in  less  than  half  an  hour ;  and  when  he 
was  now  not  so  very  far  away  from  the  last  hill  and 
turret,  which  was  nearest  the  enemy  camp  and  where, 
as  I  have  explained,  there  w'as  a  defence  post  and 
picket  of  Numidians,  he  paused  for  a  little  while ; 
then,  after  studying  the  lie  of  the  land,  he  posted  his 
cavalrv  on  guard  and  assigned  to  his  legions  their 
tasks,  ordering  them  to  carry  a  line  of  fortifications 
straight  along  the  middle  of  the  chain,  from  the  point 
he  had  now  reached  right  up  to  the  point  from  where 
he  had  started.  When  Scipio  and  Labienus  observed 
this,  they  led  their  entire  cavalry  force  out  of  camp 
and,  deploying  it  in  battle  line,  advanced  about  a 
mile  from  their  fortified  positions  and  drew  up  their 
infantry  forces  in  a  second  battle  line  less  than  four 
hundred  paces  from  their  camp. 

-  This  would  seem  to  mean  the  last,  i.e.  southernmost,  hill 
which  contained  a  turret  :  its  possible  identity,  along  with 
several  other  prf)blems  arising  from  the  narrative  of  chs.  37- 
66,  is  discussed  in  Appendix  A,  p.  391. 

205 


CAESAR 

39  Caesar  in  opere  milites  adhortari  neque  adver- 
sariorum  copiis  moveri.  lam  cum  non  amplius 
passus  MD  inter  hostium  agmen  suasque  munitiones 
esse  animadvertisset  intellexissetque  ad  impediendos 
milites  suos  et  ab  opere  depellendos  hostem  propius 
accedere  necesseque  haberet  legiones  a  munitionibus 
deducere,  imperat  turmae  Hispanorum  ut  ad  proxi- 
mum  collem  propere  occurrerent  praesidiumque  inde 
deturbarent  locumque  caperent,  eodemque  iubet 
levis  armaturae  paucos  consequi  subsidio.  Qui  missi 
celeriter  Numidas  adorti  partim  vivos  capiunt,  non 
nullos  equites  fugientis  convulneraverunt  locumque 
sunt  potiti.  Postquam  id  Labienus  animadvertit, 
quo  celerius  eis  auxilium  ferret,  ex  acie  instructa 
equitatus  sui  prope  totum  dextrum  cornu  avertit 
atque  suis  fugientibus  suppetias  ire  contendit.  Quod 
ubi  Caesar  conspexit  Labienum  ab  suis  copiis  longius 
iam  abscessisse,  equitatus  sui  alam  sinistram  ad 
intercludendos  hostis  immisit. 

40  Erat  in  eo  campo  ubi  ea  res  gerebatur  villa  per- 
magna  turribus  IIII  exstructa  ;  quae  Labieni  pro- 
spectum  impediebat,  ne  posset  animum  advertere 
ab  equitatu  Caesaris  se  intercludi.  Itaque  non  prius 
vidit  turmas  lulianas  quam  suos  caedi  a  tergo  sentit. 
206 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

Caesar  kept  encouraging  the  troops  as  they  worked, 
quite  unmoved  by  his  opponents'  forces.  When  he 
perceived  that  no  more  than  a  mile  and  a  half  now 
separated  the  enemy  ranks  from  his  own  fortifica- 
tions, and  realised  that  the  enemy  were  approaching 
closer  for  the  purpose  of  obstructing  his  troops  and 
forcing  them  to  abandon  their  task,  and  as  he  con- 
sidered that  he  must  now  perforce  withdraw  his 
legions  from  their  work  of  building  fortifications,  he 
ordered  a  squadron  of  Spaniards  to  launch  a  speedy 
attack  upon  the  adjacent  hill,  dislodge  its  enemy 
defenders,  and  capture  the  position ;  and  he  also 
instructed  a  small  detachment  of  light-armed  troops 
to  follow  them  in  support  to  the  same  objective. 
Thus  despatched  they  speedily  attacked  the  Numi- 
dians,  capturing  some  of  them  alive  and  seriously 
wounding  others  of  their  troopers  as  they  sought  to 
escape,  and  so  won  the  position.  As  soon  as  Labienus 
observed  this,  he  detached  practically  the  entire 
right  wing  of  the  line  of  cavalry  he  had  deployed,  so 
as  the  more  speedily  to  render  them  assistance  ;  and 
with  this  force  he  made  haste  to  proceed  to  the  relief 
of  his  retreating  troops.  But  when  Caesar  saw  that 
Labienus  had  now  withdrawn  some  distance  from  his 
forces,  he  launched  the  left  wing  of  his  own  cavalry, 
so  as  to  cut  the  enemy  off. 

Now  in  the  area  where  this  action  was  going  on 
there  was  a  very  large  farm  building,  constructed 
with  four  lofty  towers;  and  this  impeded  Labienus' 
field  of  view  and  prevented  his  observing  that  he 
was  being  cut  off  by  Caesar's  cavalry.  Consequently 
it  was  only  when  he  realised  that  his  men  were  being 
cut  down  from  the  rear  that  he  actually  saw  the 
Julian   squadrons.     As   a  result,  triumph   suddenly 

207 


CAESAR 

Ex  qua  re  subito  in  terrorem  converse  equitatu 
Numidarum  recta  in  castra  fugere  contendit.  Galli 
Germanique,  qui  restiterant,  ex  superiore  loco  et  post 
tergum  circumventi  fortiterque  restantes  conciduntur 
universi.  Quod  ubi  legiones  Scipionis,  quae  pro 
castris  erant  instructae,  animum  adverterunt,  metu 
ac  terrore  occaecatae  omnibus  portis  in  sua  castra 
fugere  coeperunt.  Postquam  Scipione  eiusque 
copiis  campo  collibusque  exturbatis  atque  in  castra 
compulsis  cum  receptui  Caesar  cani  iussisset  equi- 
tatumque  omnem  intra  suas  munitiones  recepisset, 
campo  purgato  animadvertit  mirifica  corpora  Gal- 
lorum  Germanorumque ;  qui  partim  eius  auctorita- 
tem  erant  ex  Gallia  secuti,  partim  pretio  pollicita- 
tionibusque  adducti  ad  eum  se  contulerant,  non 
nuUi,  qui  ex  Curionis  proelio  capti  conservatique 
parem  gratiam  in  fide  pariter  tuenda  ^  praestare 
voluerant.  Horum  corpora  mirifica  specie  ampli- 
tudineque  caesa  toto  campo  ac  prostrata  diverse 
iacebant. 
41  His  rebus  gestis  Caesar  postero  die  ex  omnibus 
praesidiis  cohortis  deduxit  atque  omnis  suas  copias  in 
campo  instruxit.  Scipio  suis  male  acceptis,  occisis 
convulneratisque  intra  suas  continere  se  munitiones 
coepit.  Caesar  instructa  acie  secundum  infimas  iugi 
radices  propius  munitiones  leniter  accessit.     lamque 

1  partienda  MSS.  :   pariter  tuenda  Hoffmann. 
208 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

gave  place  to  panic  among  the  Numidian  cavalry, 
and  Labienus  made  haste  to  flee  straight  back  to 
camp.  As  for  the  Gauls  and  Germans,  they  stood 
their  ground ;  but  hemmed  in  between  the  enemy 
on  the  higher  ground  and  those  in  their  rear,  despite 
a  gallant  resistance  they  were  slaughtered  to  a  man. 
On  observing  this,  Scipio's  legions,  which  were  drawn 
up  in  front  of  his  camp,  were  seized  with  blind  panic 
and  began  to  flee  by  every  gate  into  their  camp. 
Now  that  Scipio  and  his  forces  had  been  swept  in 
disorder  from  plain  and  hills  and  driven  wholesale 
into  their  camp,  Caesar  ordered  the  retreat  to  be 
sounded  and  withdrew  all  his  cavalry  inside  his  own 
fortifications ;  and  it  was  then,  when  the  field  had 
been  cleared,  that  his  attention  Avas  caught  by  the 
amazing  bodies  of  the  Gauls  and  Germans  :  some  of 
whom  had  followed  Labienus  from  Gaul  in  deference 
to  his  authority ;  others  had  been  induced  to  join 
him  by  rewards  and  promises ;  and  there  were  yet 
others  who,  having  been  made  prisoners  after  Curio's 
defeat  and  their  lives  being  spared,  had  been  anxious 
to  give  proof  of  their  unswerving  gratitude  by  main- 
taining a  con-espondingly  unswerving  loyalty.  These 
were  the  men  whose  bodies,  amazing  in  their  beauty 
and  stature,  were  lying  mutilated  and  prostrate  here 
and  there  all  over  the  battle-field. 

On  the  day  following  this  action  Caesar  withdrew 
his  cohorts  from  all  his  defence  posts  and  drew  up 
all  his  forces  in  the  plain :  whereas  Scipio,  after  the 
disastrous  reception  his  troops  had  met  with  and 
their  resulting  heavy  casualties  in  dead  and  wounded, 
proceeded  to  sit  tight  within  his  own  fortifications. 
Caesar  deployed  his  battle  line  along  the  lowest 
spurs  of  the  chain  of  hills,  and  then  slowly  approached 

209 


CAESAR 

minus  mille  passus  ab  oppido  Uzitta,  quod  Scipio 
tenebat,  aberant  legiones  lulianae,  cum  Scipio 
veritus  ne  oppidum  amitteret,  undo  aquari  rcliquis- 
que  rebus  sublevari  eius  exercitus  consuerat,  eductis 
omnibus  copiis  quadruplici  acie  instructa  ex  instituto 
suo,  prima  equestri  turmatim  derecta  elcphantisque 
turritis  interpositis  armatisque,  suppetias  ire  con- 
tendit — quod  ubi  Caesar  animadvertit,  arbitratus 
Scipionem  ad  dimicandum  paratum  ad  se  certo 
animo  venire,  in  eo  loco,  quo  paulo  ante  com- 
memoravi,  ante  oppidum  constitit — suamque  aciem 
mediam  eo  oppido  texit ;  dextrum  sinistrumque 
cornu,  ubi  elephanti  erant,  in  conspectu  patenti 
adversariorum  constituit.^ 
42  Cum  iam  prope  solis  occasum  Caesar  exspecta- 
visset  neque  ex  eo  loco  quo  constiterat  Scipionem 
progredi  propius  se  animadvertisset  locoque  se  magis 
defendere,  si  res  coegisset,  quam  in  campo  comminus 
consistere  audere,  non  est  visa  ratio  propius  aecedendi 
eo  die  ad  oppidum,  quoniam  ibi  praesidium  grande 
Numidarum  esse  cognoverat,  hostisque  mediam  aciem 
suam  oppido  texisse  et  sibi  difficile  factu  esse  in- 
tellexit  simul  et  oppidum  uno  tempore  oppugnare  et 
in  acie  in  cornu  dextro  ac  sinistro  ex  iniquiore  loco 
pugnare,  praesertim  cum  militcs  a  mane  diei  ieiuni 

^  I  have,  folloxved  Dinter's  punctuation  of  this  difficult 
sentence.  Though  either  Caesar  or  Scipio  could  be  the  subject 
of  texit,  the  clause  ubi  elephanti  erant  strongly  suggests  that 
Scipio  is  the  subject  o/ constituit. 

2IO 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

closer  to  Scipio's  fortifications.  And  now  the  Julian 
legions  were  less  than  a  mile  away  from  the  town  of 
Uzitta,  which  Scipio  held,  when  the  latter,  fearing 
that  he  would  lose  the  town,  on  which  his  army 
had  been  accustomed  to  rely  for  its  water  supply 
and  all  other  means  of  support,  led  out  all  his  forces. 
These  forces  were  drawn  up,  according  to  his  custom, 
in  four  lines,  the  first  consisting  of  cavalry  deployed 
in  line  of  squadrons,  interspersed  with  elephants 
equipped  with  towers  and  armour.  Thus  deployed, 
Scipio  marched  to  the  relief  of  the  town,  while 
Caesar,  observing  this  move  and  supposing  that 
Scipio  was  advancing  towards  him  prepared  and  fully 
resolved  to  fight,  accordingly  halted  before  the  town 
in  the  position  I  described  a  little  earlier.  With  his 
own  centre  covered  by  the  town,  Scipio  drew  up  his 
right  and  left  wings,  where  his  elephants  were,  in 
full  view  of  his  opponents. 

Caesar  had  now  waited  till  nearly  sunset  without 
observing  any  signs  of  Scipio's  leaving  the  position 
in  which  he  had  halted  and  advancing  towards 
him  ;  and  his  impression  was  that  Scipio  would  rather 
remain  on  the  defensive,  utilising  his  position,  if  the 
circumstances  demanded  it,  than  venture  to  come 
to  close  grips  on  the  plain.  Accordingly,  there 
seemed  no  sense  in  approaching  closer  to  the  town 
that  day.  For  he  was  aware  that  it  contained  a  large 
garrison  force  of  Numidians,  and  he  realised  that  the 
enemy  had  used  the  town  to  screen  his  centre,  and 
that  he  himself  was  faced  Avith  a  difficult  task  in 
simultaneously  attacking  the  town  and  at  the  same 
time  engaging  in  battle  on  his  right  and  left  wing 
fi-om  a  disadvantageous  position,  the  more  especially 
so  since  his  troops  had  been  standing  to  since  early 

211 


CAESAR 

sub  armis  stetissent  defatigati.  Itaque  reductis  suis 
copiis  in  castra  postero  die  propius  eorum  aciem 
instituit  exporrif!:ere  munitiones. 

43  Interim  Considius,  qui  Acyllam  VIII  cohortibus  et 
stipendiariis  Numidis  Gaetulisque  obsidebat,  ubi  C. 
Messius  cum  III  cohortibus  praeerat,^  diu  multumque 
expertus  magnisque  operibus  saepe  admotis  et  his  ab 
oppidanis  incensis  cum  proficeret  nihil,  subito  nuntio 
de  equestri  proeHo  allato  commotus,  frumento  cuius 
in  castris  copiam  habuerat  incenso,  vino,  oleo 
ceterisque  rebus  quae  ad  victum  parari  solent 
corruptis,  Acyllam,  quam  obsidebat,  deseruit  atque 
itinere  per  regnum  lubae  facto  copias  cum  Scipione 
partitus  Hadrumetum  se  recepit. 

44  Interea  ex  secundo  commeatu,  quern  a  Sicilia 
miserat  Alienus,  navis  una,  in  qua  fuerat  Q.  Cominius 
et  L.  Ticida,  eques  Romanus,  ab  residua  classe  cum 
erravisset  delataque  esset  vento  ad  Thapson,  a 
\'ergilio  scaphis  naviculisque  actuariis  excepta  est  et 
adducta.  Item  altera  navis  trieris  ex  eadem  classe 
errabunda  ac  tempestate  delata  ad  Aegimurum  a 
classe  Vari  et  M.  Octavi  est  capta,  in  qua  milites 
veterani  cum  uno  centurione  et  non  nulli  tirones 
fuerunt ;     quos    Varus    asservatos    sine    contumelia 

^  Acyllam  et  VIII  cohortis  stipendiarias  Numidis  Gaetulis- 
que obsidebat  ubi  C.  Messius  qui  cohortibus  praeerat  MSS.  : 
VIII  cohortibus  et  stipendiariis  Frolich  :  cum  III  cohortibus 
praeerat  Kitebler. 


^  It  would  seem  that  he  marched  west  of  the  Sebkra  de  Sidi 
el  Hani — thus  entering  Numidian  territory — to  give  a  wide 
berth  to  the  fighting  zone  round  Uzitta.  But  the  site  of 
Acylla  is  open  to  doubt. 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

morning  without  a  bite  of  food,  and  were  quite 
exhausted.  Accordingly,  he  led  his  forces  back  to 
camp,  deciding  to  wait  till  the  following  day  and  then 
extend  his  fortifications  nearer  the  enemy's  line. 

In  the  meantime  Considius  with  eight  cohorts  and 
some  Numidian  and  Gaetulian  mercenaries  was 
besieging  Acylla,  where  C.  Messius  was  in  command 
with  three  cohorts.  He  had  made  prolonged  and 
manifold  attempts,  and  had  repeatedly  approached 
the  walls  with  siege-works  on  a  large  scale  ;  but  these 
the  townsfolk  had  set  on  fire,  and  he  was  making  no 
progress.  So  when  the  unexpected  report  of  the 
cavalry  engagement  arrived,  he  was  much  dis- 
concerted and  set  fire  to  the  large  stock  of  corn  in  his 
camp,  rendered  unusable  his  wine,  oil  and  all  the 
other  victuals  with  which  an  amiy  is  normally 
provided,  and  raised  the  siege  of  Acylla.  Then  he 
marched  through  .Tuba's  kingdom,^  gave  part  of  his 
forces  to  Scipio,  and  retired  to  Hadrumetum. 

Meanwhile  from  the  second  convoy,  which  Alienus 
had  despatched  from  Sicily,^  one  ship  having 
aboard  Q.  Cominius  and  a  Roman  knight  named  L. 
Ticida  had  got  astray  from  the  rest  of  the  fleet  and 
had  been  carried  by  the  wind  towards  Thapsus  ;  and 
being  intercepted  by  the  pinnaces  and  light  craft  of 
^>rgilius  was  escorted  to  that  port.  A  second 
trireme  from  the  same  fleet  likewise  went  astray,  was 
carried  by  a  gale  towards  Aegimurus,  and  captured 
by  the  fleet  of  ^'arus  and  M.  Octavius.  On  board 
this  vessel  were  some  veteran  soldiers,  with  one 
centurion  and  a  few  recruits ;  and  these  ^'arus  kept 
imder   guard,    though    without    any    maltreatment, 

-  cf.  ch.  34,  where  it  is  implied  that  all  the  ships  arrived 
safelv. 


CAESAR 

deducendos  curavit  ad  Scipionem.  Qui  postquam  ad 
eum  pervenerunt  et  ante  suggestum  eius  consti- 
terunt,  '  Non  vestra,'  inquit,  '  sponte  vos  certo  scio, 
sed  illius  scelerati  vestri  imperatoris  impulsu  et 
imperio  coactos  civis  et  optimum  quemque  nefarie 
consectari.  Quos  quoniam  fortuna  in  nostram  detulit 
potestatem,  si,  id  quod  facere  debetis,  rem  publicam 
cum  Optimo  quoque  defendetis,  certum  est  vobis 
vitam  et  pecuniam  donare.  Quapropter  quid  senti- 
atis  proloquimini.' 
45  Hac  habita  oratione  Scipio  cum  existimasset  pro 
suo  beneficio  sine  dubio  ab  his  gratias  sibi  actum  iri, 
potestatem  eis  dicendi  fecit.  Ex  eis  centurio  legionis 
XIIII.  '  Pro  tuo,'  inquit,  '  summo  beneficio,  Scipio, 
tibi  gratias  ago — non  enim  impcratorem  te  appello — 
quod  mihi  vitam  incolumitatemque  belli  iure  capto 
polliceris,  et  forsan  isto  uterer  beneficio,  si  non  ei 
summum  scelus  adiungeretur.  Egone  contra 
Caesarem  imperatorem  meum,  apud  quem  ordinem 
duxi,  eiusque  exercitum,  pro  cuius  dignitate  victoria- 
que  amplius  XXXVI  annos  depugnavi,  adversus 
armatusque  consistam  ?  Neque  ego  istud  facturus 
sum  et  te  magnopere  ut  de  negotio  desistas  adhortor. 
Contra  cuius  enim  copias  contendas,  si  minus  antea 
expertus  es,  licet  nunc  cognoscas.  Elige  ex  tuis 
cohortem  unam   quam   putas   esse   firmissimam,   et 

^  This,  the  MSS.  reading,  has  often  been  queried.  But 
thirty-six  years'  service  was  no  impossibihty ;  and  the 
impUed  claim  that  it  was  all  devoted  to  Caesar  can,  I  think,  be 
taken  as  a  rhetorical  overstatement  prompted  by  that  extreme 
loyalty  which  Caesar  so  often  inspired  in  his  troops. 

214 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

and  had  them  escorted  to  Scipio.  When  they  came 
before  him  and  stood  in  front  of  his  tribunal,  he 
said :  '  It  is  not  of  your  own  free  will — of  that  I  am 
quite  sure — ^but  under  the  compulsion  and  at  the 
behest  of  that  villainous  commander  of  yours,  that 
you  are  iniquitously  persecuting  your  own  citizens 
and  all  true  patriots.  But  now  that  fortune  has 
delivered  you  into  our  hands,  if  you  mean  to  do  your 
duty  and  i-ange  yourselves  on  the  side  of  all  true 
patriots  in  the  defence  of  the  state,  then  I  am 
resolved  to  grant  you  your  lives  and  reward  you  with 
money.     Now  therefore  declare  your  mind.' 

After  addressing  them  to  this  effect  Scipio  had 
little  doubt  that  they  would  express  their  gratitude 
to  him  for  his  kindness,  and  accordingly  gave  them 
permission  to  speak.  One  of  their  number,  a 
centurion  of  the  Fourteenth  legion,  then  spoke  as 
follows :  '  For  your  great  kindness,  Scipio — I  refrain 
from  calling  you  commander-in-chief — I  thank  you, 
inasmuch  as  you  promise  me,  by  rights  a  prisoner  of 
war,  my  life  and  safety ;  and  maybe  I  should  now 
avail  myself  of  that  kind  offer,  but  for  the  utterly 
iniquitous  condition  attached  to  it.  Am  I  to  range 
myself  in  armed  opposition  against  Caesar,  my 
commander-in-chief,  under  whom  I  have  held  my 
command,  and  against  his  army,  to  sustain  the 
victorious  reputation  whereof  I  have  been  fighting 
for  upwards  of  thirty-six  years  ?  ^  No,  I  am  not 
likely  to  do  that,  and  I  strongly  advise  you  to  give  up 
the  attempt.  For  you  now  have  the  chance  of 
appreciating — if  you  have  not  previously  found  it  out 
sufficiently  by  experience — whose  troops  they  ai-e  you 
are  fighting.  Choose  from  your  men  one  cohort, 
the  one  you  regard  as  your  most  reliable,  and  array 


CAESAR 

constitue  contra  me ;  ego  autem  ex  meis  com- 
militonibus  quos  nunc  in  tua  tenes  potestate  non 
amplius  X  sumam.  Tunc  ex  virtute  nostra  intel- 
leges  quid  ex  tuis  copiis  sperare  debeas.' 

46  Postquam  haec  centurio  praesenti  animo  adversus 
opinionem  eius  est  locutus,  ira  percitus  Scipio  atque 
animi  dolore  incensus  innuit  suis  ^  centurionibus  quid 
fieri  vellet,  atque  ante  pedes  centurionem  interfecit 
reliquosque  veteranos  a  tironibus  iubet  secerni. 
'  Abducite  istos,'  inquit,  '  nefario  scelere  contamina- 
tos  et  caede  civium  saginatos.'  Sic  extra  vallum 
deducti  sunt  et  cruciabiliter  interfecti.  Tirones 
autem  iubet  inter  legiones  dispertiri  et  Cominium 
cum  Ticida  in  conspectum  suum  prohibet  adduci. 
Qua  ex  re  Caesar  commotus  eos  quos  in  stationibus 
cum  longis  navibus  apud  Thapsum  custodiae  causa  in 
salo  esse  iussei'at  ut  suis  onerariis  longisque  navibus 
praesidio  essent,  ob  neglegentiam  ignominiae  causa 
dimittendos  ab  exercitu  gravissimumque  in  eos 
edictum  proponendum  curavit. 

47  Per  id  tempus  fere  Caesaris  exercitui  res  accidit 
incredibilis  auditu.  Namque  vergiliarum  signo  con- 
fecto  circiter  vigilia  secunda  noctis  nimbus  cum 
saxea  grandine  subito  est  exortus  ingens.  Ad  hoc 
autem  incommodum  accesserat  quod  Caesar  non 
more  superiorum  temporum  ^  in  hibernis  exercitum 

*  suis  added  by  Warmington. 

*  imperatorum  MSS.  :   temporum  Glandorp, 


^  The  setting  of  the  Pleiades  in  early  November  was 
normally  accompanied  by  stormy  weather;  but  it  was  now 
probably  December,  47  (=  February,  46,  according  to  the 
unreformed  calendar). 

2l6 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

it  here  over  against  me :  I  for  my  part  will  take  no 
more  than  ten  men  from  my  comrades  whom  you 
now  hold  in  your  power.  Then  from  our  prowess 
you  shall  realise  what  you  ought  to  expect  from  your 
own  forces.' 

This  forthright  and  quite  unlocked  for  retort  on  the 
part  of  the  centurion  infuriated  Scipio.  Smarting 
with  resentment  he  signified  his  wishes  to  his  own  cen- 
turions by  a  nod,  causing  the  centurion  to  be 
executed  in  his  presence,  and  issuing  instructions 
for  the  remaining  veterans  to  be  segregated  from  the 
recruits.  '  Away  with  these  fellows,'  said  he, 
'  tainted  as  they  are  with  unspeakable  iniquities  and 
gorged  with  the  blood  of  their  own  citizens.' 
Accordingly,  they  were  led  outside  the  rampart  and 
tortured  to  death.  As  for  the  recruits,  he  ordered 
them  to  be  di-afted  among  the  legions,  and  would  not 
allow  Cominius  and  Ticida  to  be  brought  into  his 
presence.  This  incident  disquieted  Caesar,  who  took 
steps  to  punish  those  whom  he  had  instructed  to 
be  stationed  with  warships  anchored  out  at  sea  on 
guard  off  Thapsus,  so  as  to  give  protection  to  his 
transports  and  men-of-war :  in  view  of  their  negli- 
gence he  had  them  dismissed  the  service  with 
ignominy,  and  had  a  general  order  published  re- 
primanding them  most  severely. 

It  was  round  about  this  time  that  an  incredible 
and  unheard-of  experience  befell  Caesar's  army. 
Although  the  constellation  of  the  Pleiades  had  set,^ 
at  about  the  second  watch  of  the  night  a  heavy  rain- 
storm suddenly  broke,  accompanied  by  a  shower  of 
hail  stones.  Moreover,  to  make  matters  worse, 
Caesar  at  the  time  was  not,  as  was  his  custom  on 
previous    occasions,    keeping    his    army    billeted    in 

217 


CAESAR 

continebat,  sed  in  tertio  quartocjue  die  procedendo 
propiusque  hostem  accedendo  castra  communibat 
opereque  faciendo  milites  se  circumspiciendi  non 
habebaiit  facultatein.  Praeterea  ita  ex  Sicilia 
exercituni  transportabat  ut  praeter  ipsum  militem  et 
arma  nee  vas  nee  mancipium  neque  ullam  rem  quae 
Usui  militi  esse  consuevit  in  navis  imponi  pateretur. 
In  Africa  autem  non  modo  sibi  quicquam  non  ad- 
quisierant  aut  paraverant  sed  etiam  propter  annonae 
caritatem  ante  parta  consumpserant.  Quibus  rebus 
attenuati  oppido  perquam  pauci  sub  pellibus  ad- 
quiescebant :  reliqui  ex  vestimentis  tentoriolis  factis 
atque  harundinibus  scopisque  contextis  permane- 
bant.  Itaque  subito  imbre  grandineque  consecuta 
gravatis  pondere  tentoriis  aquarumque  vi  subrutis 
disiectisque,  nocte  intempesta  ignibus  exstinctis, 
rebus  quae  ad  victum  pertinent  omnibus  corruptis  per 
castra  passim  vagabantur  scutisque  capita  contege- 
bant.  Eadem  nocte  V.  legionis  pilorum  cacumina 
sua  sponte  arserunt. 
4S  Rex  interim  luba  de  equestri  proelio  Scipionis 
certior  factus  evocatusque  ab  eodem  litteris  praefecto 
Saburra  cum  parte  exercitus  contra  Sittium  relicto, 
ut  secum  ipse  aliquid  auctoritatis  adderet  exercitui 
Scipionis  ac  terrorem  Caesaris,  cum  tribus  legionibus 
equitibusque  frenatis  DCCC,  Numidis  sine  frenis 
peditibusque    levis    armaturae   grandi   numero,    ele- 


^  cf.  ch.  54  for  the  flagrant  infringement  by  Avienus,  and 
ch.  85  where,  by  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Thapsus, 
there  would  seem  to  have  been  man}'  slaves  in  Caesar's 
camp. 

-  Probably  the  electrostatic  phenomenon  called  St.  Elmo's 
fire. 

218 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

•winter  quarters  ;  but  every  otlier,  or  every  third  day, 
he  would  be  advancing,  moving  up  closer  to  the 
enemy  and  fortifying  a  camp,  and  in  the  course  of 
doing  this  work  his  troops  had  no  chance  to  look  after 
themselves.  Apart  from  this,  his  arrangements  for 
transporting  his  army  from  Sicily  were  such  as  to 
allow  only  the  troops  themselves  and  their  arms  to  be 
embarked,  but  no  baggage,  no  slaves,^  none  of  the 
soldier's  normal  comforts.  In  Africa,  moreover,  not 
only  had  they  neither  bought  nor  provided  them- 
selves with  anything,  but  in  addition  the  high  price 
of  corn  had  run  away  with  all  their  savings.  In 
these  straitened  circumstances  very  few  men  indeed 
were  sleeping  under  proper  tents  :  the  rest  bivouacked 
under  tents  of  a  sort  improvised  from  clothing  or 
woven  with  reeds  and  twigs.  And  so  when  the 
rain  came  down  suddenly  and  the  hail  followed  it, 
their  tents  sagged  under  the  weight,  and  were  under- 
niined  and  swept  away  by  the  violence  of  the  floods : 
in  the  dead  of  night  the  storm  put  out  their  fires : 
all  their  victuals  were  ruined ;  and  they  \vandered 
aimlessly  hither  and  thither  about  the  camp,  covering 
their  heads  with  their  shields.  That  same  night  the 
spear-points  of  the  men  of  the  Fifth  legion  spon- 
taneously caught  fire.- 

Meanwhile  king  Juba  had  been  informed  of  Scipio's 
cavalry  battle ;  and  in  response  to  a  written  sum- 
mons from  the  latter  he  left  behind  his  general, 
Saburra,  with  part  of  his  army,  to  keep  Sittius  in 
check,  and  quitting  his  kingdom  set  off  to  join 
Scipio.  With  him  he  took  three  legions,  eight 
hundred  bridled  cavalry,  a  numerous  contingent  of 
Numidians  who  rode  without  bridles,  and  of  light- 
armed   infantry  ti'oops,   and  thirty   elephants.     His 

219 


CAESAR 

phantis  XXX  egressus  e  regno  ad  Scipionem  est  pro- 
fectus.  Postquam  ad  cum  pervenit,  castris  regiis 
seorsum  positis  cum  eis  copiis  quas  commemoravi, 
haud  ita  longe  ab  Scipione  consedit. — Erat  in  castris 
Caesaris  superiore  tempore  magnus  terror,  et 
exspectatione  copiarum  regiarum  exercitus  eius 
magis  suspensiore  animo  ante  adventum  lubae  com- 
movebatur;  postquam  vero  castra  castris  contulit, 
despectis  eius  copiis  omnem  timorem  deponit.  Ita 
quam  antea  absens  habuerat  auctoritatem,  cam 
omnem  praesens  dimiserat. — Quo  facto  cuivis  facile 
fuit  intellectu  Scipioni  additum  animum  fiduciamque 
regis  adventu.  Nam  postero  die  universas  suas 
regisque  copias  cum  elephantis  LX  productas  in 
aciem  quam  speciosissime  potuit  instruxit  ac  paulo 
longius  progressus  ab  suis  munitionibus  haud  ita  diu 
commoratus  se  recipit  in  castra. 
49  Caesar  postquam  animadvertit  Scipioni  auxilia  fere 
quae  exspectasset  omnia  convenisse  neque  moram 
pugnandi  ullam  fore,  per  iugum  summum  cum 
copiis  progredi  coepit  et  bracchia  protinus  ducere  et 
castella  munire  propiusque  Scipionem  capiendo  loca 
excelsa  occupare  contendit,  ne  adversarii  magni- 
tudine  copiarum  confisi  pi'oximum  collem  occuparent 

220 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

purpose  in  so  doing  was  to  add  a  certain  prestige  to 
Scipio's  army  by  his  personal  appearance,  and  the 
more  to  intimidate  Caesar's.  On  reaching  Scipio 
he  pitched  a  separate  royal  camp  with  the  forces  I 
have  mentioned,  and  took  up  a  position  not  so  far 
distant  from  Scipio.  Now  hitherto  there  had  been 
considerable  apprehension  in  Caesar's  camp  :  before 
Juba's  arrival  the  feeling  of  suspense  was  greater, 
and  it  was  this  which  unsettled  Caesar's  army  as  it 
was  waiting  for  the  royal  forces ;  but  as  soon  as  the 
king  pitched  his  camp  close  to  theirs,  they  held  his 
forces  in  contempt  and  all  their  fears  were  laid  aside. 
And  so  all  the  prestige  with  which  his  previous 
absence  had  endowed  the  king  he  forfeited  now  that 
he  was  on  the  spot.  That  the  king's  arrival  in  this 
manner  gave  Scipio  additional  courage  and  con- 
fidence was  a  fact  that  anyone  could  readily  ap- 
preciate ;  for  on  the  following  day  he  led  out  his  own 
and  the  king's  entire  forces,  including  sixty  elephants, 
and  set  them  in  battle  array  with  as  much  pomp 
and  circumstance  as  possible,  and  then,  after  ad- 
vancing somewhat  farther  than  usual  from  his  fortified 
positions  and  pausing  there  a  little  while,  withdrew  to 
camp. 

When  Caesar  observed  that  practically  all  the 
reinforcements  that  Scipio  had  been  awaiting  had 
now  forgathered  and  that  there  was  nothing  to  delay 
an  engagement,  he  began  to  advance  with  his  troops 
along  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  carrying  forward  his  lines 
of  fortification  and  building  strong  points.  He  also 
made  strenuous  efforts  to  seize  the  high  ground 
closer  to  Scipio  and,  by  capturing  it,  to  forestall  his 
opponents,  lest,  relying  on  their  superiority  in 
numbers,  they  should  seize  the  nearby  hill  and  so 


CAESAR 

atque  ita  longius  sibi  progrediendi  eriperent  facul- 
tatem.*^  Eiusdem  collis  occiipandi  Labienus  con- 
silium ceperat  ot  quo  propiorc  loco  fuerat  eo  celerius 
occurrerat. 
50  Erat  convallis  satis  magna  latitudine,  altitudinc 
praerupta,  crebris  locis  speluncae  in  modum  subrutis, 
quae  erat  transgredienda  Caesari,  ante  quam  ad 
eum  coUem  quem  capere  volebat  perveniretur ; 
ultraque  earn  convallem  olivetum  vetus  crebris 
arboribus  condensum.  Hie  cum  Labienus  anim- 
advertisset  Caesarem,  si  vellet  eum  locum  occupare, 
prius  necesse  esse  convallem  olivetumque  transgredi, 
eorum  locorum  peritus  in  insidiis  cum  parte  equitatus 
levique  armatura  consedit  et  praeterea  post  montem 
collesque  ^  equites  in  occulto  collocaverat  ut,  cum 
ipse  ex  improviso  legionarios  adortus  esset,  ex  colle 
se  equitatus  ostenderet,  ut  re  duplici  perturbatus 
Caesar  eiusque  exercitus  neque  retro  regrediendi 
neque  ultra  procedendi  oblata  facultate  circumventus 
concideretur.  Caesar  postquam  equitatu  ante  prae- 
misso  inscius  insidiarum  cum  ad  eum  locum  venisset, 
abusi  sive  obliti  praeceptorum  Labieni  sive  veriti  ne 
in  fossa  ab  equitibus  opprimerentur  rari  ac  singuli  de 
rupe  prodire  et  summa  petere  collis.  Quos  Caesaris 
equites  consecuti  partim  interfecerunt,  partim  vivo- 
rum  sunt  potiti ;  deinde  protinus  collem  petere  con- 
tenderunt    atque    eum    decusso    Labieni    praesidio 

1  I  have  foUotced  Nipperdcy's  emendation,  inserting  ne  and 
altering  the  MSS.  readings  occupaverunt  and  eripueriint. 

-  After  collesque  the  MSS.  read  Caesari  siibito  se  ostenderet : 
Aldus  deleted  these  ivords. 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

deprive  him  of  the  opportunity  of  advancinc;  farther. 
But  Labienus  too  had  made  up  his  mind  to  seize  this 
hill ;  and  his  closer  proximity  to  it  had  enabled  him 
to  achieve  the  objective  more  rapidly. 

There  was  a  ravine,  of  a  fair  width  and  with  high, 
precipitous  sides,  and  honeycombed  at  many  points 
with  cave-like  hollows ;  and  Caesar  had  to  cross  it 
before  he  could  reach  the  hill  he  wished  to  take. 
On  the  far  side  of  this  ravine  there  was  an  ancient 
olive  grove,  dense  and  thickly  planted  with  trees. 
It  M'as  here  that  Labienus,  perceiving  that  Caesar 
must  first  cross  the  ravine  and  olive  grove  if  he 
wanted  to  seize  that  position,  and  availing  himself 
of  his  local  knowledge,  took  his  stand  in  ambush 
with  a  detachment  of  cavalry  and  some  light-armed 
troops.  In  addition  he  had  posted  some  cavalry  out 
of  sight  behind  the  range  of  hills,  in  order  that,  when 
he  himself  unexpectedly  launched  his  attack  upon  the 
legionaries,  this  cavalry  might  make  its  appearance 
from  behind  the  hill ;  thereby  Caesar  and  his  army 
were  to  be  thrown  into  utter  confusion  by  this 
double  attack  and,  denied  the  opportunity  either  of 
retiring  or  advancing,  were  to  be  surrounded  and  cut 
to  pieces.  When  Caesar,  in  ignorance  of  the  ambush, 
but  with  a  screen  of  cavalry  thrown  out  in  front, 
came  up  to  this  position,  the  troops  of  Labienus 
either  misinterpreted  or  forgot  his  instructions, 
or  maybe  they  were  afraid  of  being  caught  in  the 
trap  by  Caesar's  cavalry ;  anyway,  they  came  out 
from  behind  the  rocks  in  small  groups  or  singly,  and 
made  for  the  crest  of  the  hill.  Caesar's  cavalry 
pursued  them,  killing  some  and  capturing  others 
alive,  and  then  forthwith  made  all  haste  towards  the 
hill,    which    they    speedily    seized    after   dislodging 

223 


CAESAR 

celeriter  occupaverunt.  Labienus  cum  parte  equi- 
tum  vix  fuga  sibi  peperit  salutem. 
51  Hac  re  per  equites  gesta  Caesar  legionibus  opera 
distribuit  atque  in  eo  colle  quo  erat  potitus  castra 
munivit.  Deinde  ab  suis  maximis  castris  per  medium 
campum  e  regione  oppidi  Uzittae,  quod  inter  sua 
castra  et  Scipionis  in  planitie  positum  erat  tenebatur- 
que  a  Scipione,  duo  bracchia  instituit  ducere  et  ita 
dirigere  ut  ad  angulum  dextrum  sinistrumque  eius 
oppidi  convenirent.  Id  hac  ratione  opus  instruebat 
ut,  cum  propius  oppidum  copias  admovisset  op- 
pugnareque  coepisset,  tecta  latera  suis  munitionibus 
haberet,  ne  ab  equitatus  multitudine  circumventus 
ab  oppugnatione  deterreretur,  praeterea  quo  faciliuG 
colloquia  fieri  possent  et,  si  qui  perfugere  vellent,  id 
quod  antea  saepe  accidebat  magno  cum  eorum 
periculo,  turn  facile  et  sine  periculo  fieret.  A'oluit 
etiam  experiri,  cum  propius  hostem  accessisset, 
haberetne  in  animo  dimicare.  Accedebat  etiam  ad 
reliquas  causas  quod  is  locus  depressus  erat  puteique 
ibi  non  nuUi  fieri  poterant :  aquatione  enim  longa  et 
angusta  utebatur.  Dum  haec  opera  quae  ante  dixi 
fiebant  a  legione,  interim  pars  acie  ante  opus  in- 
structa  sub  hoste  stabat ;  equites  barbari  levisque 
armaturae  proeliis  minutis  comminus  dimicabant. 
224 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

Labienus'  holding  force.     Labienus  and  part  of  his 
cavah-y  barely  managed  to  escape  with  their  lives. 

After  this  action  fought  by  the  cavalry  Caesar 
fortified  a  camp  on  the  hill  of  which  he  had  gained 
possession,  assigning  each  legion  its  share  of  the 
work.  He  then  began  to  carry  two  fortified  lines 
from  his  own  principal  camp  across  the  centre  of 
the  plain  in  the  direction  of  the  town  of  Uzitta — - 
which  town  was  situated  on  flat  ground  between  his 
camp  and  Scipio's  and  was  occupied  by  the  latter — - 
their  direction  being  such  as  to  make  them  converge 
upon  the  right  and  left  corners  of  the  town.  His 
purpose  in,  constructing  this  field-work  was  as 
follows :  when  he  advanced  his  forces  closer  to  the 
town  and  proceeded  to  attack  it,  he  should  have  his 
flanks  covered  by  these  fortifications  of  his  and  not 
be  enveloped  by  the  swarms  of  enemy  cavalry  and  so 
be  deterred  from  attacking ;  moreover,  it  should 
make  it  easier  to  hold  conversations  with  the  enemy, 
and  if  any  of  the  latter  wanted  to  desert — this  had 
often  occurred  in  the  past,  but  at  great  risk  to  the 
deserters — it  should  now  prove  easy  and  devoid  of 
risk.  He  was  also  anxious  to  discover,  when  he 
approached  closer  to  the  enemy,  whether  they 
intended  to  fight.  Over  and  above  these  reasons 
was  the  additional  fact  that  this  was  a  low-lying 
tract,  and  quite  a  few  wells  could  be  sunk  in  it : 
water  in  fact  was  in  short  supply  and  had  to  be  carried 
a  long  distance.  While  the  legionaries  were  engaged 
in  this  work  of  fortification  which  I  have  mentioned 
above,  a  detachment  of  them  took  post  in  front  of  the 
work  in  battle  formation  close  to  the  enemy ;  for  the 
hitter's  foreign  cavalry  and  part  of  his  light-armed 
force  kept  skirmishing  at  close  quarters. 

225 


CAESAR 

52  Caesar  ab  eo  opere  cum  iarn  sub  vesperum  copias  in 
castra  reduceret,  magno  incursu  cum  omni  equitatu 
levique  armatura  luba,  Scipio,  Labienus  in  legionarios 
impetum  fecerunt.  Equites  Caesariani  vi  universae 
subitaeque  hostium  multitudinis  pulsi  parumper 
cesserunt.  Quae  res  aliter  adversariis  cecidit :  nam- 
que  Caesar  ex  medio  itinere  copiis  reductis  equitibus 
suis  auxilium  tulit ;  equites  autem  adventu  legionum 
animo  addito  conversis  equis  in  Numidas  cupide 
insequentis  dispersosque  impetum  fecerunt  atque 
eos  convulneratos  usque  in  castra  regia  reppulerunt 
multosque  ex  eis  interfecerunt.  Quod  nisi  in  noctem 
proelium  asset  coniectum  pulvisque  vento  elatus 
omnium  prospectui  offecisset,  luba  cum  I.abieno  capti 
in  potestatem  Caesaris  venissent,  equitatusque  cum 
levi  armatura  funditus  ad  internecionem  deletus 
asset.  Interim  incredibiliter  ex  legione  IIII.  et  VI. 
Scipionis  milites  diffugere  partim  in  castra  Caesaris, 
partim  in  quas  quisque  poterat  regiones  pervenire ; 
itemque  equites  Curioniani  diffisi  Scipioni  eiusque 
copiis  complures  se  eodem  conferebant. 

53  Dum  haec  circum  Uzittam  ab  utrisque  ducibus 
administrantur,  legiones  duae,  X.  et  \'IIII.,  ex 
Sicilia  navibus  onerariis  profectae,  cum  iam  non 
longe  a  portu  Ruspinae   abessent,  conspicati  navis 


^  After  the  battle  of  the  Bagradas  they  had  been  pardoned 
by  Juba  and  incorporated  in  his  army  :  cf.  ch.  40. 

226 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

It  was  now  nearly  dusk,  and  Caesar  was  with- 
drawing his  troops  from  this  work  to  camp,  when 
Juba,  Scipio  and  Labienus  launched  a  violent  attack 
upon  his  legionaries,  employing  all  their  cavalry 
and  light-armed  forces.  Caesar's  cavalry  reeled  and 
gave  ground  momentarily  under  the  sudden  and 
violent  impact  of  the  massed  swarms  of  the  enemy. 
But  the  latter  found  that  this  manoeuvre  did  not  go 
according  to  plan ;  for  Caesar  halted  in  his  tracks 
and  led  his  forces  back  to  the  assistance  of  his 
cavalry.  The  arrival  of  the  legions  put  fresh  heart 
into  the  cavalry,  who  wheeled  round,  charged  the 
Numidians  in  the  middle  of  their  eager,  but  scattered 
pursuit,  and  drove  them  right  back  into  the  royal 
camp,  with  heavy  casualties  and  many  of  their 
number  killed.  And  had  not  nightfall  speedily  over- 
taken this  action,  and  a  cloud  of  dust  raised  up  by  the 
wind  hampered  everyone's  vision,  Juba  and  Labienus 
would  have  been  captured  and  have  fallen  into 
Caesar's  hands,  and  their  cavalry  and  light-armed 
troops  would  have  been  utterly  and  entirely  an- 
nihilated. Whereupon  an  incredible  number  of 
Scipio's  troops  deserted  from  the  Fourth  and  Sixth 
legion — some  to  Caesar's  camp,  others  to  various 
places  wherever  each  individual  managed  to  find 
refuge.  The  cavalry  who  were  once  under  Curio's 
command  ^  likewise  lost  confidence  in  Scipio  and  his 
forces,  and  many  of  them  took  refuge  with  the 
others. 

While  the  leaders  on  either  side  were  engaged  in 
these  operations  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Uzitta,  two 
legions,  the  Tenth  and  the  Ninth,  which  had  sailed 
from  Sicilv  in  transports,  were  now  not  far  from  the 
port  of  Ruspina.     Here  they  sighted  those  ships  of 

227 


CAESAR 

Caesarlanas  quae  in  statione  apud  Thapsum  stabant, 
veriti  ne  in  adversariorum  ut  insidiandi  gratia  ibi 
commorantium  classem  inciderent  imprudentes,  vela 
in  altum  dederunt  ac  diu  multumque  iactati  tandem 
inultis  post  diebus  siti  inopiaque  confecti  ad  Caesarem 
perveniunt. 
54  Quibus  legionibus  expositis  memor  in  Italia 
pristinae  licentiae  militaris  ac  rapinarum  certorum 
hominum  parvulam  modo  causulam  nactus  Caesar, 
quod  C.  Avienus,  tribunus  militum  X.  legionis, 
navem  ex  commeatu  familia  sua  atque  iunientis 
occupavisset  neque  militem  unum  ab  Sicilia  sustu- 
lisset,  postero  die  de  suggestu  convocatis  omnium 
legionum  tribunis  centurionibusque,  '  Maxime  vel- 
lem,'  inquit,  '  homines  suae  petulantiae  nimiaeque 
libertatis  aliquando  finem  fecissent  meaeque  leni- 
tatis,  modestiae  patientiaeque  rationem  habuissent. 
Sed  quoniam  ipsi  sibi  neque  modum  neque  terminum 
constituunt,  quo  ceteri  dissimiliter  se  gerant  egomet 
ipse  documentum  more  militari  constituam.  C. 
Aviene,  quod  in  Italia  milites  populi  Romani  contra 
rem  publicam  instigasti  rapinasque  per  municipia 
fecisti  quodque  mihi  reique  publicae  inutilis  fuisti  et 
pro  militibus  tuam  fcimiliam  iumentaque  in  navis 
imposuisti  tuaque  opera  militibus  tempore  necessario 
228 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

Caesar's  which  were  stationed  on  patrol  oif  Thapsus; 
and  fearing  they  might  be  falhng  unawares  upon  an 
enemy  flotilhi  loitering  there  presumably  with 
treacherous  designs,  they  made  oiF  out  to  sea. 
Many  days  later,  exhausted  by  thirst  and  privation 
after  a  long  and  very  storm-tossed  voyage,  they  at 
length  reached  Caesar. 

These  legions  were  then  disembarked.  Now 
Caesar  had  in  mind  the  lack  of  discipline  of  old  among 
the  troops  in  Italy  and  the  plundering  exploits  of 
certain  individuals  ;  and  he  had  now  some  ground  for 
complaint,  though  only  a  trifling  one,  in  the  fact  that 
C.  Avienus,  a  military  tribune  of  the  Tenth  legion, 
had  commandeered  a  vessel  from  the  convoy  and 
filled  it  with  his  own  household  slaves  and  beasts 
of  burden,  without  transporting  a  single  soldier  from 
Sicily.  Accordingly,  on  the  following  day  Caesar 
paraded  the  tribunes  and  centurions  of  all  his  legions 
and  thus  addressed  them  from  the  platfoi-m.  '  I 
could  have  wished  above  all  things  that  people 
would  at  some  time  or  other  have  set  bounds  to  their 
wanton  and  highly  irresponsible  behaviour,  and  had 
regard  for  my  own  leniency,  moderation  and  for- 
bearance. However,  since  they  set  themselves  no 
limit  or  boundary,  I  myself  will  set  them  a  precedent 
in  accordance  with  military  custom,  so  that  the 
remainder  may  behave  somewhat  differently.  Inas- 
much as  you,  C.  Avienus,  in  Italy  have  stirred  up 
soldiers  of  the  Roman  people  against  the  state  and 
have  committed  acts  of  plunder  in  various  municipal 
towns ;  inasmuch  as  you  have  proved  useless  to  me 
and  to  the  state  and  have  embarked,  instead  of 
troops,  your  own  household  slaves  and  beasts  of 
burden,  so  that  thanks  to  you  the  state  is  short  of 

229 


CAESAR 

res  publica  caret,  ob  eas  res  ignominiae  causa  ab 
exercitu  meo  removeo  hodieque  ex  Africa  abesse  et 
quantum  pote  proficisci  iubeo.  Itemque  te,  A. 
Fontei,  quod  tribunus  militum  seditiosus  malusque 
civis  fuisti,  te  ab  exercitu  dimitto.  T.  Saliene,  M. 
Tiro,  C.  Clusinas,  cum  ordines  in  meo  exercitu 
beneficio  non  virtute  consecuti  ita  vos  gesseritis  ut 
neque  bello  fortes  neque  pace  boni  aut  utiles  fueritis 
et  magis  in  seditione  concitandisque  militibus 
adversum  vestrum  imperatorem  ^  quam  pudoris 
modestiaeque  fueritis  studiosiores,  indignos  vos  esse 
arbitror  qui  in  meo  exercitu  ordines  ducatis,  missos- 
que  facio  et  quantum  pote  abesse  ex  Africa  iubeo.' 
Itaque  tradit  eos  centurionibus  et  singulis  non 
amplius  singulos  additos  servos  in  navem  imponendos 
separatim  curavit. 
55  Gaetuli  interim  perfugae,  quos  cum  litteris  man- 
datisque  a  Caesare  missos  supra  docuimus,  ad  suos 
civis  perveniunt.  Quorum  auctoritate  facile  adducti 
Caesarisque  nomine  persuasi  a  rege  luba  desciscunt 
celeriterque  cuncti  arma  capiunt  contraque  regem 
facere  non  dubitant.  Quibus  rebus  cognitis  luba, 
distentus  triplici  bello  necessitateque  coactus,  de  suis 
copiis  quas  contra  Caesarem  adduxerat  sex  cohortis 
in  finis  regni  sui  mittit  quae  essent  praesidio  contra 
Gaetulos. 

1  adversariorum  vestrorum  imperatoris  MSS.  :  adversum 
vestrum  imperatorem  Ciacconius. 

230 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

troops  at  a  critical  time ;  for  these  reasons  I  hereby 
discharge  you  with  ignominy  from  my  army  and 
direct  that  you  leave  as  soon  as  possible  and  be  quit 
of  Africa  this  day.  You  also,  A.  Fonteius,  I  dismiss 
from  my  army,  for  having  proved  a  mutinous  military 
tribune  and  a  disloyal  citizen.  T.  Salienus,  M.  Tiro 
and  C.  Clusinas,  you  have  attained  your  ranks  in  my 
army,  not  by  merit,  but  by  favour  ;  your  conduct  has 
been  such  as  to  prove  you  neither  brave  in  war,  nor 
loyal  nor  competent  in  peace,  and  more  eager  to 
stir  up  mutiny  among  the  troops  against  your 
commander-in-chief  than  to  preserve  respect  and 
discipline :  on  these  counts  I  deem  you  to  be  un- 
worthy to  hold  rank  in  my  army,  and  I  hereby 
discharge  you  and  direct  that  you  be  quit  of  Africa 
as  soon  as  possible.'  Accordingly  he  handed  them 
over  to  the  centurions,  assigned  them  each  no  more 
than  a  single  slave,  and  had  them  embarked 
separately  in  a  ship. 

Meanwhile  the  Gaetulian  deserters  who,  as  we 
have  described  above, ^  were  sent  by  Caesar  with 
despatches  and  instructions,  arrived  back  among 
their  own  citizens.  The  authority  they  held  readily 
induced  their  countrymen,  who  were  also  influenced 
by  Caesar's  reputation,  to  revolt  from  king  Juba ; 
and  so  they  one  and  all  promptly  took  up  arms  and 
did  not  hesitate  to  oppose  the  king.  On  learning 
of  this  situation  king  Juba,  compelled  as  he  now 
was  by  necessity  to  divide  his  energies  between 
three  fronts,  detached  six  cohorts  from  the  force 
which  he  had  led  against  Caesar  and  sent  them 
to  his  own  royal  domain  to  defend  it  against  the 
Gactulians. 

1  Ch.  32. 


CAKSAR 

66  Caesar  bracchiis  perfectis  promotisque  usque  eo 
quo  telum  ex  oppido  adigi  non  posset  castra  munit, 
ballistis  scorpionibusque  crebris  ante  frontem  castro- 
rum  contra  oppidum  collocatis  defensores  muri 
deterrere  non  intermittit  eoque  quinque  legiones  ex 
superioribus  castris  deducit.  Qua  facultate  oblata 
inlustriores  notissimique  conspectum  amicorum  pro- 
pinquorumque  efflagitabant  atque  inter  se  colloque- 
bantur.  Quae  res  quid  utilitatis  haberet  Caesarem 
non  fallebat :  namque  Gaetuli  ex  equitatu  regio 
nobiliorcs  equitumque  praefecti,  quorum  patres  cum 
Mario  ante  meruerant  eiusque  beneficio  agris  finibus- 
que  donati  post  Sullae  victoriam  sub  Hiempsalis 
regis  erant  dati  potestatem,  occasione  capta  nocte 
iam  luminibus  accensis  cum  equis  calonibusque  suis 
circiter  mille  perfugiunt  in  Caesaris  castra  quae 
erant  in  campo  proxime  Uzittae  locata. 

67  Quod  postquam  Scipio  quique  cum  eo  erant  cogno- 
verunt,  cum  commoti  ex  tali  incommodo  essent,  fere 
per  id  tempus  M.  Aquinum  cum  C.  Saserna  collo- 
quentem  viderunt-  Scipio  mittit  ad  Aquinum,  nihil 
attinere  eum  cum  adversariis  coUoqui.  Cum  nihilo 
minus  eius  sermonem  nuntius  ad  Scipionem  ^  referret 
sed  restate  ut  reliqua  quae  sibi  ^  vellet  perageret, 
viator   praeterea   ab   luba   ad   eum   est   missus   qui 


^  se  MSS.  :   Scipionem  Davies. 
^  si  MSS.  :  sibi  Oudendorp. 


232 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

Caesar  had  now  completed  his  lines  of  fortification 
and  extended  them  right  up  to  a  point  so  as  to  be 
just  out  of  range  of  spear-cast  from  the  town.  He 
then  fortified  a  camp,  ranging  catapults  and  scorpions 
at  close  intervals  in  front  of  it  and  training  them  upon 
the  town,  and  harrying  without  respite  the  defenders 
of  its  walls ;  he  also  detached  five  legions  from  his 
former  camp  and  brought  them  down  to  the  new  one. 
Making  use  of  the  opportunity  thus  offered,  certain 
more  distinguished  persons  and  those  of  the  widest 
acquaintance  kept  demanding  to  see  their  friends  and 
relations,  and  conversations  ensued  between  them. 
Caesar  was  not  blind  to  the  expediency  of  this 
turn  of  events ;  and  in  fact  some  of  the  nobler 
Gaetulians  among  the  royal  cavalry,  including  cap- 
tains of  horse,  whose  fathers  had  previously  served 
with  Marius  and  had,  by  his  good  offices,  been 
presented  with  farms  and  lands,  but  later  on  after 
Sulla's  victory  had  been  handed  over  as  subjects  to 
king  Hiempsal,  seized  their  chance  and  deserted, 
when  it  was  night  and  the  lamps  were  now  lit,  and 
came  with  their  horses  and  grooms — roughly  a 
thousand  of  them — to  Caesar's  camp  which  was 
situated  in  the  plain  close  to  Uzitta. 

It  was  just  about  this  time,  after  Scipio  and  his 
colleagues  had  come  to  leam  of  this  disconcerting 
setback,  that  they  saw  M.  Aquinus  holding  a  con- 
versation with  C.  Saserna.  Scipio  sent  word  to 
Aquinus  saying  that  he  had  no  business  to  be  holding 
a  conversation  with  the  enemy.  When  none  the  less 
the  messenger  brought  back  to  Scipio  the  other's 
answer,  namely  that  on  the  contrarv  it  remained  for 
him  to  complete  the  rest  of  his  business,  .Tuba  also 
sent  him  a  courier,  to  say,  in  the  hearing  of  Saserna : 

233 


CAESAR 

diceret  audiente  Saserna :  '  Vetat  te  rex  colloqui.' 
Quo  nuntio  perterritus  discessit  et  dicto  audiens 
fuit  regi.  Usu  venisse  hoc  civi  Romano  et  ei  qui  ab 
populo  Romano  honores  accepisset,  incolumi  patria 
fortunisque  omnibus  lubae  barbaro  potius  oboe- 
dientem  fuisse  quam  aut  Scipionis  obtemperasse 
nuntio  aut  caesis  eiusdem  partis  civibus  incolumem 
reverti  malle !  Atque  etiam  et  superbius  lubae 
factum  non  in  M.  Aquinum,  hominem  novum 
parvimique  senatorem,  sed  in  Scipionem,  hominem 
ilia  familia,  dignitate,  honoribus  praestantem.  Nam- 
que  cum  Scipio  sagulo  purpureo  ante  regis  adventum 
uti  solitus  esset,  dicitur  luba  cum  eo  egisse  non 
oportere  ilium  eodem  vestitu  atque  ipse  uteretur. 
Itaque  factum  est  ut  Scipio  ad  album  sese  vestitum 
transferret  et  lubae  homini  superbissimo  inertissimo  • 
que  obtemperaret. 
58  Postero  die  universas  omnium  copias  de  castris 
omnibus  educunt  et  supercilium  quoddam  excelsum 
nacti  non  longe  a  Caesaris  castris  aciem  constituunt 
atque  ibi  consistunt.  Caesar  item  producit  copias 
celeriterque  eis  instructis  ante  suas  munitiones  quae 
erant  in  campo  consistit,^  sine  dubio  existimans 
ultro  adversarios,  cum  tam  magnis  copiis  auxiliisque 
regis  essent  praediti  promptiusque  prosiluissent 
ante,  secum  concursuros  propiusque  se  accessuros. 

^  constituit  MSS.  :   consist  it  Davits, 

^  This  appears  to  imply  that  Labienus  had  a  separate  camp. 
234 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

'  The  king  forbids  you  to  hold  this  conversation.' 
Alarmed  by  this  message,  Aquinus  withdrew  in 
deference  to  the  king's  injunction.  To  think  that  it 
had  come  to  this,  that  a  Roman  citizen,  one,  more- 
over, who  had  received  office  at  the  hands  of  the 
Roman  people,  at  a  time  when  his  country  and  all  his 
fortunes  stood  secure,  should  rather  have  obeyed 
Juba,  a  foreigner,  than  deferred  to  Scipio's  instruc- 
tions or  else,  if  he  preferred,  let  his  own  partisans  be 
massacred,  while  he  himself  returned  home  safe  and 
sound !  Still  more  arrogant  even  was  Juba's  be- 
haviour, not  towards  M.  Aquinus,  a  mere  upstart 
and  junior  member  of  the  Senate,  but  towards  Scipio, 
whose  family,  rank  and  magistracies  were  such  as  to 
make  him  an  outstanding  man.  For  Scipio  had  been 
in  the  habit  of  wearing  a  purple  cloak  before  the  king 
arrived  ;  and  Juba — so  it  is  said — took  the  matter  up 
with  him,  saying  that  Scipio  ought  not  to  wear  the 
same  dress  as  he  himself  wore.  And  so  it  came  about 
that  Scipio  changed  to  white  dress  in  deference  to 
Juba — that  bv-word  of  arrogance  and  indolence. 

On  the  next  day  the  enemv  led  out  their  entire 
combined  forces  from  all  ^  their  camps  and,  gaining 
possession  of  a  certain  prominent  knoll,  arrayed 
their  battle  line  not  far  from  Caesar's  camp,  and 
took  up  their  position  there.  Caesar  likcAvise  led 
forth  his  forces,  speedily  arrayed  them  and  took  up  a 
position  in  front  of  his  fortifications  which  were  in 
the  plain ;  for  he  thought,  no  doubt,  that  his  oppo- 
nents, seeing  they  were  equipped  with  such  sub- 
stantial forces  and  the  reinforcements  supplied  by 
the  king,  and  had  previouslv  been  quite  prompt  to 
sally  forth,  would  now  take  the  initiative,  advance 
towards  him   and  join  battle.     After  riding  round 

235 


CAESAR 

Equo  circumvectus  legionesque  cohortatus  signo 
dato  accessum  hostium  aucupabatur.  Ipse  enim  a 
suis  munitionibus  longius  non  sine  ratione  non  ^ 
procedebat,  quod  in  oppido  Uzittae,  quod  Scipio 
tenebat,  hostium  erant  cohortes  arnmatae ;  cidem 
auteni  oppido  ad  dextrum  latus  eius  cornu  erat 
oppositum,  verebaturque  ne,  si  praetergressus  esset, 
ex  oppido  eruptione  facta  ab  latere  eum  adorti 
conciderent.  Praeterea  haec  quoque  eum  causa 
tardavit,  quod  erat  locus  quidam  perimpeditus  ante 
aciem  Scipionis,  quern  suis  impedimento  ad  ultro 
occurrendum  fore  existimabat. 
59  Non  arbitror  esse  praetermittendum,  quem  ad 
modum  exercitus  utriusque  fuerint  in  aciem  instructi. 
Scipio  hoc  modo  aciem  derexit.  Collocabat  in  fronte 
suas  et  lubae  legiones,  post  eas  autem  Numidas  in 
subsidiaria  acie  ita  extenuatos  et  in  longitudinem 
derectos  ut  procul  simplex  esse  acies  media  ab 
legionariis  militibus  videretur.^  Elephantos  dextro 
sinistroque  cornu  collocaverat  aequalibus  inter  eos 
intervallis  interiectis,  post  autem  elephantos  arma- 
turas  levis  Numidasque  auxiliaris  substituerat. 
Equitatum  frenatum  universum  in  suo  dextro  cornu 
disposuerat :  sinistrum  enim  cornu  oppido  Uzitta 
claudebatur  neque  erat  spatium  equitatus  explicandi. 
Praeterea  Numidas  levisque  armaturae  infinitam 
multitudinem  ad  dextram  partem  suae  aciei  oppo- 
suerat  fere  interiecto  non  minus  mille  passuum 
spatio  et  ad  collis  radices  magis  appulerat  longiusque 
ab  adversai'iorum  suisque  copiis  promovebat,  id  hoc 
consilio  ut,  cum  acies  duae  inter  se  concurrissent, 

^  non  added  by  Aldus. 

-  After  videretur  the  MSS.  add  in  cornibus  autem  duplex 
esse  existimabatur.     Xipperdey  deleted  them. 

236 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

encouraging  his  legions  he  gave  the  signal  and 
awaited  the  enemy's  advance.  For  he  himself  had 
good  reason  not  to  advance  too  far  from  his  fortifica- 
tions, since  the  town  of  Uzitta,  held  by  Scipio,  con- 
tained enemy  cohorts  under  arms ;  moreover,  his 
right-hand  wing  lay  opposite  the  said  town,  and  he 
was  afraid  that,  if  he  advanced  beyond  it,  the 
enemy  might  make  a  sally  from  the  town,  attack 
him  in  flank,  and  maul  him  severely.  Apart  from  this 
there  was  another  reason  too  to  make  him  pause, 
namely  that  in  front  of  Scipio's  line  there  was  a 
patch  of  very  broken  ground,  which  he  believed  would 
prevent  his  troops  from  going  over  to  the  offensive. 

I  do  not  think  I  ought  to  pass  over  without  mention 
the  manner  in  which  the  armies  of  either  side  were 
deployed  in  battle  formation.  Scipio's  order  of  battle 
was  as  follows.  In  front  he  placed  his  own  and  Juba's 
legions:  behind  these,  in  a  support  line,  the  Numi- 
dians,  drawn  out  in  so  thin  and  long  a  formation  as  to 
give  the  impression  at  a  distance  that  the  centre 
was  a  single  line  composed  of  legionary  troops.  His 
elephants  he  had  placed  at  regular  intervals  on  his 
right  and  left  wings,  and  behind  the  elephants  his 
light-armed  troops  and  Numidian  auxiliaries  were 
stationed  in  support.  On  his  right  wing  he  had 
posted  his  entire  force  of  bridled  cavalry  ;  for  his  left 
wing  was  covered  by  the  town  of  Uzitta,  and  there 
was  no  room  to  deploy  cavalry.  In  addition  he  had 
posted  some  Numidians  and  a  vast  multitude  of 
light-armed  troops  to  cover  the  right  flank  of  his  line 
at  a  distance  of  at  least  a  mile  or  so,  pushing  them 
more  towards  the  foothills  and  so  withdrawing  them 
farther  away  both  from  the  enemy  and  his  own 
forces.     His  purpose  in  doing  this  was  that  when 

237 


CAESAR 

initio  certaminis  paulo  longius  eius  equitatus  cir- 
cumvectus  ex  improviso  clauderet  multitudine  sua 
exercitum  Caesaris  atque  perturbatum  iaculis  con- 
figeret.     Haec  fuit  ratio  Scipionis  eo  die  proeliandi. 

60  Caesaris  autem  acies  hoc  modo  fuit  collocata,  ut  ab 
sinistro  eius  cornu  ordiar  et  ad  dextrum  perveniam. 
Habuit  legionem  X.  et  Villi,  in  sinistro  cornu, 
XXV.,  XXVIIII.,  XIII.,  XIV.,  XXVIII.,  XXVI.  in 
media  acie.^  Ipso  autem  dextro  cornu  veteranarum 
legionum  partem  ^  cohortium  collocaverat,  praeterea 
ex  tironum  adiecerat  paucas.  Tertiam  autem  aciem 
in  sinistruni  suum  cornu  contulerat  et  usque  ad  aciei 
suae  mediam  legionem  porrexerat  et  ita  collocaverat 
uti  sinistrum  suum  cornu  esset  triplex.  Id  eo  con- 
silio  fecerat  quod  suum  dextrum  latus  munitionibus 
adiuvabatur,  sinistrum  autem  equitatus  hostium 
multitudini  uti  resistere  posset  laborabat,  eodemque 
suum  omnem  equitatum  contulerat  et,  quod  ei 
parum  confidebat,  praesidio  his  equitibus  legionem 
V.  praemiserat  levemque  armaturam  inter  equites 
interposuerat.  Sagittarios  varie  passimque  locis 
certis  maximeque  in  cornibus  collocaverat. 

61  Sic  utrorumque  exercitus  instructi  non  plus 
passuum  CCC  interiecto  spatio,  quod  forsitan  ante  id 

^  I  have  followed  most  editors  in  adopting  Xipperdey's 
restoration  of  X  and  XXV  in  place  of  the  MSS.  readings  VIII 
and  XXX. 

2  Fere  ipsum  dextrum  cornu  secundam  autem  aciem  fere  in 
earum  legionum  parte  most  MSS.  :  I  have  followed  Bouvet, 
who  among  other  changes  deletes  secundam  autem  aciem  and 
adopts  Oudendorp's  veteranarum  in  place  of  fere  in  earum, 

238 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

the  two  battle  lines  charged  one  another,  his  cavalry- 
would  only  have  to  continue  their  outflanking  move- 
ment a  little  farther  in  the  early  stages  of  the  action, 
and  then  by  sheer  weight  of  numbers  they  could 
surprise  and  envelop  Caesar's  army,  throw  it  into 
disorder,  and  riddle  it  with  lances.  Such  was  Scipio's 
plan  of  battle  that  day. 

Caesar's  battle  line,  on  the  other  hand,  was  dis- 
posed as  follows,  my  description  beginning  with  his 
left  wing  and  working  round  to  his  right.  On  his 
left  wing  he  had  the  Tenth  and  Ninth  legions :  in 
the  centre  the  Twenty-Fifth,  Twenty-Ninth,  Thir- 
teenth, Fourteenth,  Twenty-Eighth  and  Twenty- 
Sixth.  As  for  the  actual  right  wing,  he  had  posted 
there  some  of  the  cohorts  of  his  veteran  legions  as 
well  as  a  few  cohorts  from  the  legions  of  recruits 
besides.  His  third  line  he  had  concentrated  on  his 
left  wing,  extending  it  right  up  to  the  central  legion 
of  his  line,  and  had  arranged  it  in  such  a  formation 
that  his  left  wing  was  composed  of  three  lines.  His 
motive  for  doing  this  was  the  fact  that,  whereas  his 
right  flank  was  supported  by  his  fortifications,  he 
was  hard  put  to  it  to  know  how  his  left  flank  could 
bear  up  under  the  hordes  of  enemy  cavalry ;  and  it 
was  on  this  same  left  flank  that  he  had  concentrated 
the  whole  of  his  own  cavalry  and,  not  feeling  too  con- 
fident in  it,  had  detached  the  Fifth  legion  to  support 
this  cavalry,  and  drafted  light-armed  troops  at 
intervals  among  the  horse.  As  for  his  archers,  he 
had  posted  them  in  various  formations  at  definite 
points  throughout  the  line,  but  chiefly  on  the  wings. 

Such  was  the  manner  in  which  the  armies  on  either 
side  were  drawn  up,  with  a  distance  of  no  more  than 
three  hundred  paces  separating  them— a  situation 

239 


CAESAR 

tempus  accident  numquam  quin  dimicaretur,  a  mane 
usque  ad  horam  X.  diei  perstiterunt.  lamque 
Caesar  dum  exercitum  intra  munitiones  suas  reducere 
coepisset,  subito  universus  equitatus  ulterior  Numida- 
rum  Gaetulorumque  sine  frenis  ad  dextram  partem  ^ 
se  movere  propiusque  Caesaris  castra  quae  erant 
in  colle  se  conferre  coepit,  frenatus  autem  Labieni 
eques  in  loco  permanere  legionesque  distinere : 
cum  subito  pars  equitatus  Caesaris  cum  levi  armatura 
contra  Gaetulos  iniussu  ac  temere  longius  progressi 
paludemque  transgressi  multitudinem  hostium  pauci 
sustinere  non  potuerunt  levique  armatura  deserta 
pulsi  ^  convulneratique  uno  equite  amisso,  multis 
equis  sauciis,  levis  armaturae  XX\'II  occisis  ad  suos 
refugerunt.  Quo  secundo  equestri  proelio  facto 
Scipio  laetus  in  castra  nocte  copias  reduxit.  Quod 
proprium  gaudium  bellantibus  fortuna  tribuere  non 
decrevit :  namque  postero  die  Caesar  cum  partem 
equitatus  sui  frumentandi  gratia  Leptim  misisset,  in 
itinere  praedatores  equites  Numidas  Gaetulosque 
ex  improviso  adorti  circiter  C  partim  occiderunt, 
partim  vivorum  potiti  sunt.  Caesar  interim  cotidie 
legiones  in  campum  deducere  atque  opus  facere 
vallumque  et  fossam  per  medium  campum  ducere 
adversariorumque     excursionibus     ita     officere     non 

^  ad  dextram  partem,  giveyi  by  all  MSS.,  is  difficult,  since  the 
encircling  manoeuvre  {ch.  59)  apparently  required  them  to  move  to 
their  left.  The  choice  seems  to  lie  between  interpreting  the  phrase 
as  denoting  position  rather  than  direction,  or  amending  ivith 
Nipperdey  to  ab  dextra  parte. 

-  ac  MSS.  :   pulsi  Nipperdey. 

240 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

which  had  never,  perhaps,  arisen  before  without 
leading  to  an  engagement ;  and  there  they  remained 
continuously  from  early  morning  right  until  the  tenth 
hour.  And  now,  while  Caesar  was  beginning  to 
lead  his  army  back  within  his  fortifications,  suddenly 
the  entire  force  of  cavalry — the  more  distant  one, 
comprising  Numidians  and  Gaetulians  riding  without 
bridles^began  a  movement  on  the  right  and  to 
advance  closer  to  Caesar's  camp  on  the  high  ground, 
while  Labienus'  bridled  cavalry  maintained  their 
positions  and  distracted  the  attention  of  the  legions. 
Whereupon  part  of  Caesar's  cavalry  together  with 
the  light-armed  troops,  acting  without  orders  and 
without  discretion,  suddenly  advanced  too  far, 
crossed  a  marshy  tract  and  found  themselves  too 
far  outnumbered  to  be  able  to  contain  the  enemy. 
Abandoning  the  light-armed  troops,  the  cavalry 
were  driven  back  and  fled  to  their  own  lines  not 
without  casualties — one  horseman  missing,  many 
horses  wounded  and  twenty-seven  light-armed 
soldiers  killed.  It  was  now  night  when  Scipio, 
delighted  with  this  successful  cavalry  engagement, 
withdrew  his  foi'ces  into  camp.  But  in  vouchsafing 
him  this  triumph  the  fortunes  of  war  saw  fit  to  make 
it  but  short-lived.  On  the  following  day,  in  fact,  a 
detachment  of  Caesar's  cavalry  which  he  had  sent  to 
Leptis  on  a  foraging  mission  surprised  in  the  course 
of  their  march  and  attacked  about  a  hundred 
marauding  Numidian  and  Gaetulian  horse,  killing 
some  of  them  and  taking  the  rest  alive.  Meanwhile 
Caesar  made  it  his  constant  and  daily  practice  to 
lead  his  legions  down  into  the  plain,  proceed  with 
his  field-works,  carry  his  rampart  and  trench  across 
the    middle    of   the  plain,   and   thereby   hinder   his 

241 


CAESAR 

intermittit.  Scipio  item  munitiones  contra  facere  et, 
ne  iugo  a  Caesare  excluderetur,  ujjproperare.  Ita 
duces  utrique  et  in  operibus  occupati  esse  et  nihilo 
minus  equestribus  proeliis  inter  se  cotidie  dimicabant. 
62  Interim  Varus  classem,  quam  antea  Uticae  hiemis 
gratia  subduxerat,  cognito  legionis  \'II  et  VIII  ^ 
ex  Sicilia  adventu  celeriter  deducit  ibique  Gaetulis 
remigibus  epibatisque  complet  insidiandique  gratia 
ab  Utica  progressus  Hadrumetum  cum  L\'  navibus 
pervenit.  Cuius  adventus  inscius  Caesar  L.  Cispium 
cum  classe  XXVII  navium  ad  Thapsum  versus  in 
stationem  praesidi  gratia  commeatus  sui  mittit  item- 
que  Q.  Aquilam  cum  XIII  navibus  longis  Hadru- 
metum eadem  de  causa  praemittit.  Cispius  quo 
erat  missus  celeriter  pervenit ;  Aquila  tempestate 
iactatus  promunturium  superare  non  potuit  atque 
angulum  quendam  tutum  a  tempestate  nactus  cum 
classe  se  longius  a  prospectu  removit.  Reliqua  classis 
in  salo  ad  Leptim  egressis  remigibus  passimque  in 
litore  vagantibus,  partim  in  oppidum  victus  sui 
mercandi  gratia  progressis,  vacua  a  defensoribus 
stabat.  Quibus  rebus  Varus  ex  perfuga  cognitis 
occasionem  nactus  vigilia  secunda  Hadrumeto  ex 
cothone  egressus  primo  mane  Leptim  cum  universa 
classe  vectus  navis  onerarias,  quae  longius  a  portu 

^  So  most  MSS.  But  it  is  strange  that  the  author,  who 
elsewhere  notes  in  detail  the  arrival  of  each  convoy,  should 
nowhere  else  (except  ch.  60  tfc  ch.  81,  where  all  MSS.  read 
VIII)  have  alluded  to  these  two  veteran  legions.      Accordingly 

242 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

opponents'  sallies.  Scipio  likewise  built  counter- 
defences,  pushing  them  forward  in  haste  to  pre- 
vent Caesar  from  barring  him  access  to  the  ridge. 
Thus  the  generals  on  both  sides  were  occupied  with 
field-works,  but  none  the  less  engaged  one  another 
daily  in  cavalry  actions. 
62  NIeanwhile  Varus,  who  had  previously  beached  his 
flotilla  at  Utica  for  the  winter,  learned  that  the 
Seventh  and  Eighth  legions  were  on  the  way  from 
Sicily.  Thereupon  he  promptly  launched  his  flotilla, 
manned  it  on  the  spot  with  Gaetulian  oarsmen  and 
marines  and,  setting  sail  from  Utica,  arrived  at 
Hadrumetum  with  fifty-five  ships  with  the  object  of 
setting  a  trap  for  them.  Caesar,  who  was  unaware 
of  his  arrival,  despatched  L.  Cispius  with  a  squadron 
of  twenty-seven  ships  to  the  area  of  Thapsus  to  patrol 
there  and  give  cover  to  his  convoy ;  and  he  also  sent 
Q.  Aquila  with  thirteen  warships  to  Hadrumetum  for 
the  same  purpose.  Cispius  speedily  reached  his  desti- 
nation, whereas  Aquila,  lashed  by  a  storm  and  unable 
to  double  the  headland,  gained  a  certain  cove  which 
was  sheltered  from  the  storm  and  afforded  him  and 
his  squadron  a  fairly  inconspicuous  retreat.  The  rest 
of  the  fleet  stood  at  anchor  out  at  sea  off  Leptis ; 
and  as  the  crews  had  disembarked  and  were  roaming 
here  and  there  about  the  beach,  some  of  them  having 
gone  off  to  the  town  to  buy  themselves  food,  the  fleet 
had  no  one  to  defend  it.  Learning  of  this  situation 
from  a  deserter,  Varus  seized  his  opportunity  :  at  the 
second  watch  he  came  out  of  the  inner  harbour  of 
Hadrumetum  and  arrived  off  Leptis  in  the  early 
morning  with  his  entire  squadron ;   and  there  he  set 

some  editors  conjecture  IX  and  X,  assuming  that  the  reference 
is  to  ch.  53  .-   others  XIII  and  XIV. 

243 


CAESAR 

in  salo  stabant,  vacuas  a  defensoribus  ^  incendit  et 
penteres  duas  nullo  repugnante  cepit. 
63  Caesar  interim  celeriter  per  nuntios  in  castris,  cum 
opera  eircumiret,  certior  factus,  quae  aberant  a  portu 
milia  passuum  Yl,  equo  admisso  ornissis  omnibus 
rebus  celeriter  pervenit  Leptim  ibique  hortatur 
omnes  ut  se  naves  consequerentur ;  ipse  parvulum 
navigiolum  conscendit,  in  cursu  Aquilam  multitudine 
navium  perterritum  atque  trepidantem  nactus 
hostium  classem  sequi  coepit.  Interim  Varus  eeleri- 
tate  Caesaris  audaciaque  commotus  cum  universa 
classe  conversis  navibus  Hadrunietum  versus  fugere 
contendit.  Quem  Caesar  in  milibus  passuum  IIII 
consecutus  reciperata  quinqueremi  cum  suis  omnibus 
epibatis  atque  etiam  hostium  custodibus  CXXX  in  ea 
nave  captis  triremem  hostium  proximam,  quae  in 
repugnando  erat  commorata,  onustam  remigum 
epibatarumque  cepit.  Reliquae  naves  hostium  pro- 
munturium  superarunt  atque  Hadrumetum  in  cotho- 
nem  se  universae  contulerunt.  Caesar  eodem  vento 
promunturium  superare  non  potuit  atque  in  salo  in 
ancoris  ea  nocte  commoratus  prima  luce  Hadru- 
metum aecedit  ibique  navibus  onerariis  quae  erant 
extra  cothonem  incensis  omnibusque  reliquis  ab  eis 
aut  subductis  aut  in  cothonem  compulsis  paulisper 

1  I  have  adopted  Klotz's  transposition  of  the  words  vacuas 
a  defensoribus,  which  in  the  MSS.  follow  duas;  for  in  the  next 
chapter  the  %vords  reciperata  quinqueremi  cum  suis  omnibus 
epibatis  suggest  that  the  penteremes  had  crews  aboard. 

244 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

fire  to  the  defenceless  transports  which  were  anchored 
out  at  sea  at  some  distance  from  the  port,  and 
captured  two  five-banked  warships,  which  offered  no 
resistance. 

Meanwhile  a  message  speedily  acquainted  Caesar 
with  the  news  as  he  was  touring  the  defence  works 
in  his  camp,  which  was  six  miles  distant  from  the 
harbour.  Putting  everything  else  on  one  side  and 
giving  his  horse  its  head  he  speedily  reached  Leptis, 
where  he  insisted  that  all  the  ships  should  follow  his 
lead :  he  himself  then  went  aboard  a  small  cutter. 
As  he  sailed  on  he  came  up  with  Aquila,  who  was 
filled  with  panic  and  confusion  at  the  large  number  of 
the  enemy  ships,  and  then  set  off  in  pursuit  of  the 
enemy  squadron.  Meanwhile  \'arus,  disconcerted 
by  Caesar's  promptitude  and  boldness,  had  turned 
about  with  his  entire  squadron  and  was  now  beating  a 
hasty  retreat  to  Hadrumetum.  In  four  miles'  sail 
Caesar  overhauled  him,  recovered  one  of  his  quinque- 
remes,  complete  with  all  its  crew,  and  capturing  in 
addition  the  enemy  prize-crew  aboard  her,  one 
hundred-and-thirty  strong,  and  then  captured  the 
nearest  enemy  trireme,  which  in  the  course  of  the 
action  had  lagged  behind  the  rest,  with  its  full 
complement  of  rowers  and  marines.  The  rest  of  the 
enemy  fleet  doubled  the  headland,  and  one  and  all 
sought  refuge  in  the  inner  harbour  of  Hadrumetum. 
But  the  wind  did  not  hold  for  Caesar  also  to  be  able 
to  double  the  headland ;  so  after  riding  out  that 
night  at  anchor  in  deep  water  he  approached  Hadru- 
metum at  dawn.  There  he  set  fire  to  the  transports 
which  were  outside  the  inner  harbour  and  then,  as 
all  the  others  had  either  been  beached  by  the 
enemy  or  massed  inside  the  inner  harbour,  he  waited 

245 


CAESAR 

commoratus,  si  forte  vellent  classe  dimicarc,  rursus  se 
recepit  in  castra. 

64  In  ea  nave  captus  est  P.  Vestrius,  eques  Romanus, 
et  P.  Ligarius,  Afranianus,  quern  Caesar  in  Hispania 
cum  reliquis  dimiserat,  et  postea  se  ad  Pompeium 
contulerat,  inde  ex  proelio  effugerat  in  Africamque 
ad  Varum  venerat ;  quem  ob  periuri  perfidiam 
Caesar  iussit  necari.  P.  \'estrio  autem,  quod  eius 
frater  Romae  pecuniam  imperatam  numeraverat  et 
quod  ipse  suam  causam  probaverat  Caesari,  se  a 
Nasidi  classe  captum,  cum  ad  necem  duceretur, 
beneficio  Vari  esse  servatum,  postea  sibi  facultatem 
nullam  datam  transeundi,  ignovit. 

65  Est  in  Africa  consuetude  incolarum  ut  in  agris  et  in 
omnibus  fere  villis  sub  terra  specus  frumenti  con- 
dendi  gratia  clam  habeant  atque  id  propter  bella 
maxime  hostiumque  subitum  adventum  praeparent. 
Qua  de  re  Caesar  per  indicem  certior  factus  tertia 
vigilia  legiones  duas  cum  equitatu  mittit  a  castris 
suis  milia  passuum  X  atque  inde  magno  numero 
frumenti  onustos  recipit  in  castra.  Quibus  rebus 
cognitis  Labienus  progressus  a  suis  castris  milia 
passuum  ^'II  per  iugum  et  collem,  per  quem  Caesar 
pridie  iter  fecerat,  ibi  castra  duarum  legionum  facit 
atque  ipse  cotidie  existimans  Caesarem  eadem  saepe 


^  Aft^r  the  battle  of  Ilerda,  in  August  49  B.C. 

2  Perhaps  y.E.  to  the  fertile  district  round  Moknine. 

246 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

a  little  while  to  see  if  by  chance  the  enemy  were 
disposed  to  fight  a  naval  action  and  then  withdrew 
back  to  his  camp. 

Among  those  made  prisoner  aboard  that  trireme 
was  P.  Vestrius,  a  Roman  knight,  and  P.  Ligarius, 
once  a  supporter  of  Afranius.  Caesar  had  set  the 
latter  free  in  Spain  along  with  the  other  Afranians,^ 
and  he  had  later  on  joined  Pompeius  and  then,  as  a 
fugitive  after  the  battle  (of  Pharsalus),  had  come  to 
Varus  in  Africa.  In  view  of  his  falseness  and 
treachery  Caesar  bade  him  be  executed.  P.  Vestrius, 
on  the  other  hand,  he  pardoned ;  for  his  brother  had 
paid  the  stipulated  ransom  at  Rome,  and  Vestrius 
himself  had  satisfied  Caesar  as  to  the  honesty  of  his 
motives,  explaining  that  he  had  been  taken  prisoner 
by  the  fleet  of  Nasidius,  his  life  had  been  saved 
through  the  kindness  of  \^arus  just  as  he  was  being 
led  oif  to  execution,  and  after  that  he  had  been 
given  no  opportunity  of  going  over  to  Caesar's  side. 

There  is  in  Africa  a  custom  among  the  natives 
whereby  both  in  the  open  fields  and  in  practically  all 
their  farm  buildings  they  have  a  secret  undergi-ound 
vault  for  the  storage  of  corn,  the  main  motive  for  this 
provision  being  wars  and  the  sudden  appearance  of 
an  enemy.  WTien  Caesar  got  to  know  of  this  custom 
through  an  informer,  at  the  third  watch  of  the  night 
he  sent  two  legions  and  some  cavalry  a  distance  of 
ten  miles  from  his  camp,^  and  later  saw  them  return 
to  camp  laden  with  a  large  quantity  of  corn.  When 
Labienus  learned  of  this,  he  advanced  seven  miles 
from  his  camp  across  the  hilly  plateau  across  which 
Caesar  had  marched  the  day  before,  encamped  two 
legions  there  and,  supposing  that  Caesar  would 
frequently  pass  along  that  same  route  for  foraging 

247 


CAESAR 

frumentandi  gratia  commeaturum  cum  rnagno  equi- 
tatu  levique  armatura  insidiaturus  locis  idoneis 
considit. 

66  Caesar  interim  de  insidiis  Labieni  ex  perfugis. 
certior  factus  paucos  dies  ibi  commoratus,  dum  hostes 
cotidiano  institute  saepe  idem  faciendo  in  negle- 
gentiam  adducerentur,  subito  mane  imperat  porta 
decumana  legiones  se  III  ^  veteranas  cum  parte 
equitatus  sequi  atque  equitibus  praemissis  neque 
opinantis  insidiatores  subito  in  convallibus  latentis 
ex  2  levi  armatura  concidit  circiter  D,  reliquos  in 
fugam  turpissimam  coniecit.  Interim  Labienus  cum 
universe  equitatu  fugientibus  suis  suppetias  occurrit. 
Cuius  vim  multitudinis  cum  equites  pauci  Caesariani 
iam  sustinere  non  possent,  Caesar  instructas  legiones 
hostium  copiis  ostendit.  Quo  facto  perterrito  La- 
bieno  ac  retardato  suos  equites  recepit  incolumis. 
Postero  die  luba  Numidas  eos  qui  loco  amisso  luga 
se  receperant  in  castra  in  cruce  omnis  suffixit. 

67  Caesar  interim,  quoniam  inopia  frumenti  pre- 
mebatur,  copias  omnis  in  castra  conducit  atque 
praesidio  Lepti,  Ruspinae,  Acyllae  relicto,  Cispio 
Aquilaeque  classe  tradita  ut  alter  Hadrumetum, 
alter  Thapsimi  mari  obsiderent,  ipse  castris  incensis 
quarta  noctis  vigilia  acie  instructa  impedimentis  in 
sinistra  parte  collocatis  ex  eo  loco  proficiscitur  at 
pervenit  ad  oppidum  Aggar,  quod  a  Gaetulis  saepe 

1  VIII  MSS.  :   III  Nipperdet/. 
^  ex  supplied  by  Nipperdey. 

248 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

purposes,  established  himself  daily  at  suitable  points 
to  lie  in  wait  for  him  with  a  large  force  of  cavalry 
and  light-armed  troops. 

In  the  meantime  information  reached  Caesar  from 
deserters  about  Labienus'  trap.  He  waited  in  camp 
there  a  few  days  for  the  constant  repetition  of  the 
same  daily  routine  to  lead  the  enemy  into  careless- 
ness and  then,  early  one  morning,  he  suddenly  gave 
the  oi-der  that  three  veteran  legions  and  a  detach- 
ment of  cavalry  should  follow  him  by  way  of  the  rear 
gate.  Then,  sending  on  the  cavalry  ahead,  he 
suddenly  surprised  the  enemy  ambush  lurking  in  the 
ravines,  killing  some  five  hundred  of  their  light-armed 
troops  and  throwing  the  rest  into  a  very  unseemly 
rout.  Whereupon  Labienus  dashed  up  -with  his 
entire  cavalry  force  to  the  relief  of  his  routed  troops  ; 
and  as  the  odds  were  now  too  great  for  the  Caesarian 
horse  to  contain  their  powerful  onslaught,  Caesar 
displayed  to  the  enemy  forces  his  legions  in  battle 
formation.  This  action  utterly  daunted  and  checked 
Labienus,  and  Caesar  thereupon  withdrew  his  own 
cavalry  without  loss.  On  the  following  day  Juba 
crucified  those  Numidians  who  had  quitted  their 
posts  and  fled  back  to  their  camp. 

Caesar  meanwhile  was  embarrassed  by  lack  of 
corn ;  for  which  reason  he  mustered  all  his  forces  in 
camp  and,  leaving  troops  to  garrison  Leptis,  Ruspina 
and  Acylla,  and  assigning  his  fleet  to  Cispius  and 
Aquila  to  maintain  the  naval  blockade,  the  one  of 
Hadrumetum  and  the  other  of  Thapsus,  he  himself 
set  fire  to  his  camp  and  at  the  fourth  watch  of  the 
night  in  battle  formation  with  his  baggage  concen- 
trated on  the  left  wing  evacuated  that  position  and 
came  to  the  town  of  Aggar.     This  town  had  pre- 

249 


CAESAR 

antea  oppugnatum  summaque  vi  per  ipsos  oppidanos 
erat  defensum.  Ibi  in  campo  castris  unis  positis 
ipse  frumentatum  circum  villas  cum  parte  exercitus 
profectus  magno  invento  hordei,  olei,  vini,  fici 
numero,  pauco  tritici,  atque  recreato  exercitu  redit 
in  castra.  Soipio  interim  cognito  Caesaris  discessu 
cum  universis  copiis  per  iugum  Caesarem  subsequi 
coepit  atque  ab  eius  castris  milia  passuum  Vl  longe 
trinis  castris  dispertitis  copiis  consedit. 
68  Oppidum  erat  Zeta,  quod  aberat  a  Scipione  milia 
passuum  X,  ad  eius  regionem  et  partem  castrf)rum 
collocatum,  a  Caesare  autem  diversum  ac  remotum, 
quod  erat  ab  eo  longe  milia  passuum  XIIII.^  Hue 
Scipio  legiones  duas  frumentandi  gratia  misit. 
Quod  postquam  Caesar  ex  perfuga  cognovit,  castris 
ex  campo  in  collem  ac  tutiora  loca  collatis  atque  ibi 
praesidio  relicto  ipse  quarta  vigilia  egressus  praeter 
hostium  castra  proficiscitur  cum  copiis  et  oppidum 
potitur.  Legiones  Scipionis  comperit  longius  in 
agris  frumentari  et,  cum  eo  contendere  conaretur, 
animadvertit  copias  hostium  his  legionibus  occurrere 
suppetias.  Quae  res  eius  impetum  retardavit. 
Itaque  capto  C.  Minucio  Regino,  equite  Romano, 
Scipionis  familiarissimo,  qui  ei  oppido  praeerat,  et 
P.  Atrio,  equite  Romano  de  conventu  Uticensi,  et 
camelis  XXII  regis  abductis,  praesidio  ibi  cum 
Oppio  legato  relicto  ipse  se  recipere  coepit  ad  castra. 


1  The  distances  given  in  the  MSS.— 10  and  14  (or  18,  or  19) 
have  been  much  disputed,  and  editors  have  amended  to  suit 
their  own  identification  of  the  towns.  But  the  general 
meaning  seems  clear — that  Zeta  lay  closer  to  Scipio.  I  have 
adopted  Veith's  identification  of  Aggar,  Zeta  and  Tegea. 

250 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

viously  been  repeatedly  attacked  by  the  Gaetulians 
only  to  be  very  stoutly  defended  by  the  inhabitants 
themselves.  Here  in  the  plain  he  pitched  a  single 
camp  and  then  set  off  in  person  with  part  of  his  army 
on  a  foraging  mission  round  the  farmsteads ;  and 
finding  a  large  quantity  of  barley,  oil,  wine  and  figs, 
and  a  little  wheat,  he  returned  to  camp  with  his 
army  duly  refreshed.  Meanwhile  Scipio,  who  had  got 
to  know  of  Caesar's  departure,  proceeded  to  follow 
him  across  the  plateau  with  his  entire  forces  and  es- 
tablished himself  six  miles  away  from  Caesar's  camp, 
with  his  forces  divided  among  three  separate  camps. 
There  was  a  town  called  Zeta,  which  was  ten  miles 
distant  from  Scipio  but  situated  in  the  general 
direction  of  his  camp ;  whereas  it  w^as  relatively 
distant  and  remote — fourteen  miles  in  fact — from 
Caesar.^  To  this  town  Scipio  sent  two  legions  to 
forage.  When  Caesar  learned  of  this  from  a  deserter 
he  moved  his  camp  from  the  plain  to  a  safer  position 
on  the  high  ground ;  and  leaving  a  covering  force 
there,  he  himself  set  out  at  the  fourth  watch,  marched 
on  past  the  enemy's  camp,  and  took  possession  of  the 
town.  He  then  ascertained  that  Scipio's  legions 
were  foraging  farther  afield;  and  he  was  just  pro- 
ceeding to  march  in  their  direction  when  he  observed 
enemy  forces  hastening  up  to  support  those  legions. 
This  circumstance  made  him  loath  to  attack.  And  so, 
taking  prisoner  C.  Minucius  Reginus,  the  com- 
mandant of  that  town,  who  was  a  Roman  knight  and  a 
very  intimate  friend  of  Scipio.  and  P.  Atrius,  a 
Roman  knight  and  a  member  of  the  corporation  of 
Utica,  and  leading  away  twenty-two  of  the  king's 
camels,  he  proceeded  to  retire  to  camp,  leaving  his 
lieutenant,  Oppius,  with  a  garrison  in  the  town. 

251 


CAESAR 

69  Cum  iani  non  longe  a  castris  Scipionis  abessct, 
quae  eum  necesse  erat  praetergredi,  Labienus 
Afraniusque  cum  omni  equitatu  levique  armatura  ex 
insidiis  adorti  agmini  eius  extreme  se  offcrunt  atque 
ex  collibus  proximis  ^  exsistunt.  Quod  postquam 
Caesar  animum  advertit,  equitibus  suis  hostium  vi 
oppositis  sarcinas  legionarios  in  acervum  iubet 
comportare  atque  celeriter  signa  hostibus  inferre. 
Quod  postquam  coeptum  est  fieri,  primo  impetu 
legionum  equitatus  et  levis  armatura  hostium 
nullo  negotio  loco  pulsa  et  deiecta  est  de  colle.  Cum 
iam  Caesar  existimasset  hostis  pulsos  deterritosque 
finem  lacessendi  facturos  et  iter  coeptum  pergere 
coepisset,  iterum  celeriter  ex  proximis  collibus 
erumpunt  atque  eadem  ratione  qua  ante  dixi  in 
Caesaris  legionarios  impetum  faciunt  Numidae 
levisque  armatura  mirabili  velocitate  praediti,  qui 
inter  equites  pugnabant  et  una  pariterque  cum 
equitibus  accurrere  et  refugere  consueverant.  Cum 
hoc  saepius  facerent  et  proficiscentis  lulianos  in- 
sequerentur,  refugerent  instantis,  propius  non  acce- 
derent  et  singulari  genere  pugnae  uterentur  equos- 
que  ^  iaculis  con\  ulnerare  satis  esse  existimarent, 
Caesar  intellexit  nihil  aliud  eos  conari  nisi  ut  se 
cogerent  castra  eo  loco  ponere  ubi  omnino  aquae 
nihil  esset,  ut  exeixitus  ieiunus,  qui  a  quarta  vigilia 

'  primis  MSS.  :   proximis  Schneider. 
-  eosqiie  MSS.  :    equosque  Hoffmann. 

2^2 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

When  he  was  now  not  far  away  from  Scipio's 
camp,  which  of  necessity  he  had  to  pass,  Labienus 
and  Afranius  with  all  their  cavalry  and  light-armed 
troops  sprang  up  and  revealed  themselves  from 
behind  the  nearby  hills  where  they  had  been  lurking 
in  ambush,  and  flung  themselves  upon  his  rear- 
guard. Seeing  himself  thus  attacked,  Caesar  de- 
ployed his  cavalry  to  bear  the  brunt  of  the  enemy 
onslaught  and  ordered  his  legionaries  to  pile  their 
packs  and  promptly  deliver  a  counter-attack.  As 
soon  as  this  was  under  way  the  enemy  cavalry  and 
light-armed  troops  were  without  difficulty  driven 
back  and  dislodged  from  the  hill  directly  the  legions 
charged.  No  sooner  had  Caesar  come  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  enemy,  beaten  back  and  demoralised 
as  they  were,  would  now  stop  their  harrying,  and  no 
sooner  had  he  begun  to  resume  his  march,  than  once 
again  they  promptly  flung  themselves  from  the 
cover  of  the  nearby  hills  and  attacked  Caesar's 
legionaries,  employing  the  same  tactics  as  I  described 
above — ^Numidians  and  light-armed  troops  they  were, 
possessed  of  a  marvellous  turn  of  speed,  fighting  in 
the  ranks  of  the  cavalry  and  used  to  keeping  pace 
with  the  horsemen  and  doubling  forward  or  retreating 
at  their  side.  As  they  repeated  this  manoeuvre 
quite  frequently,  chasing  the  Julians  as  they  marched 
and  taking  to  flight  when  their  opponents  turned  to 
attack  them,  and  as  they  would  not  approach  at  all 
close,  but  employed  peculiar  tactics  and  were  content 
with  wounding  the  horses  with  their  javelins, 
Caesar  realised  that  what  they  were  trying  to  do 
was  no  less  than  force  him  to  pitch  camp  at  a  spot 
where  there  was  not  a  drop  of  water,  so  that  his 
famished  army,  which  had  tasted  nothing  at  all  from 

253 


CAESAR 

usque  ad  horam  X.  diei  nihil  gustasset,  ac  iumenta 
siti  perirent. 
70  Cum  iam  ad  solis  occasum  esset,  et  non  totos  C 
passus  in  horis  IIII  esset  progressus,  equitatu  suo 
propter  equoruni  interitum  extreme  agmine  remoto 
legiones  in  vicem  ad  extremum  agmen  evocabat. 
Ita  vim  hostium  placide  leniterque  procedens  per 
legionarium  militem  commodius  sustinebat.  Interim 
equitum  Numidarum  copiae  dextra  sinistraque  per 
collis  praecurrere  coronaeque  in  modum  cingere 
multitudine  sua  Caesaris  copias,  pars  agmen  extre- 
mum insequi.  Caesaris  interim  non  amplius  III  aut 
IIII  milites  veterani  si  se  convertissent  et  pila  viribus 
contorta  in  Numidas  infestos  coniecissent,  amplius 
duum  milium  numero  ad  unum  terga  vertebant  ac 
rursus  ad  aciem  passim  conversis  equis  se  colligebant 
atque  in  spatio  consequebantur  et  iacula  in  legionarios 
coiciebant.  Ita  Caesar  modo  procedendo  modo 
resistendo  tardius  itinere  confecto  noctis  hora  prima 
omnis  suos  ad  unum  in  castra  incolumis  sauciis  X 
factis  reduxit.  Labienus  circiter  CCC  amissis, 
multis  vulneratis  ac  defessis  insfcando  omnibus 
ad  suos  se  recepit.  Scipio  interim  legiones  pro- 
ductas    cum    elephantis,    quos    ante    castra    in    acie 

254 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

the  fourth  watch  of  the  night  right  up  till  the  tenth 
hour  of  the  day,  should  die  of  thirst — both  men  and 
beasts. 

It  was  now  nearly  sundown  and  less  than  a 
hundred  paces  had  been  covered  all  told  in  four  hours, 
when  Caesar  withdrew  his  cavalry — in  view  of  the 
casualties  among  their  horses — from  the  rear- 
guard, and  called  on  the  legions  to  replace  them. 
By  employing  the  legionary  troops  in  this  manner 
and  advancing  calmly  and  at  a  gentle  pace  he  found 
it  less  awkward  to  contain  the  enemy's  violent 
onslaught.  Meanwhile  detachments  of  the  Numi- 
dian  cavalry  kept  charging  ahead  along  the  high 
ground  to  his  right  and  left  and  availing  themselves 
of  their  superior  numbers  to  surround  Caesar's 
forces  with  a  kind  of  continuous  circle  of  troops, 
while  others  of  them  pursued  his  rear-guard.  Mean- 
while on  Caesar's  part  it  needed  no  more  than  three 
or  four  of  his  veterans  to  wheel  round  and  brandish 
and  hurl  amain  their  heavy  javelins  at  the  Numidians 
who  menaced  them  for  more  than  two  thousand  of 
the  latter  to  turn  tail  to  a  man ;  and  then,  wheeling 
their  horses  round  on  all  sides,  they  would  regroup 
once  more  for  battle  and  resume  their  pursuit  at  a  set 
distance,  hurling  their  javelins  at  the  legionaries. 
In  this  manner,  now  advancing,  now  pausing  to  fight 
hack,  Caesar  completed  his  march,  albeit  somewhat 
slowly  ;  for  it  was  the  first  hour  of  the  night  when  he 
brought  all  his  men  back  to  camp,  with  not  a  single 
man  lost  and  ten  wounded.  Labienus  retired  to  his 
lines  with  roughly  three  hundred  men  missing,  many 
wounded,  and  all  his  troops  exhausted  by  their  con- 
tinuous offensive.  Meanwhile  Scipio,  who  had  de- 
ployed   his    legions,   with   the   elephants   posted  in 

255 


CAESAR 

terroris    gratia   in    conspectu   Caesaris   collocaverat, 
reducit  in  castra. 

71  Caesar  contra  eiusmodi  hostium  genera  copias 
suas  non  ut  imperator  exercitum  veteranum  victorem- 
que  maximis  rebus  gestis,  sed  ut  lanista  tirones 
gladiatores  condocefacere ;  quot  pedes  se  reciperent 
ab  hoste  et  quern  ad  modum  obversi  adversariis  et  in 
quantulo  spatio  resisterent,  modo  procurrerent  modo 
recederent  comminarenturque  impetum,  ac  prope 
quo  loco  et  quern  ad  modum  tela  mitterent,  prae- 
cipere.  Mirifice  enim  hostium  levis  armatura 
anxium  exercitum  nostrum  atque  sollicitum  habebat, 
quia  et  equites  deterrebat  proelium  inire  propter 
equorum  interitum,  quod  eos  iaculis  interficiebat, 
et  legionarium  militem  defatigabat  propter  veloci- 
tatem :  gravis  enim  armaturae  miles  simul  atque  ab 
eis  insectatus  constiterat  in  eosque  impetum  fecerat, 
illi  veloci  cursu  periculum  facile  vitabant. 

72  Quibus  ex  rebus  Caesar  vehementer  commove- 
batur  quod,  quotienscunque  proelium  ^  erat  com- 
missum,  equitatu  suo  sine  legionario  milite  hostium 
equitatui  levique  armaturae  eorum  nuUo  modo  par 
esse  poterat.  Sollicitabatur  autem  his  rebus,  quod 
nondum  legiones  hostium  cognoverat,  et  quonam 
modo  sustinere  se  posset  ab  eorum  equitatu  levique 

1  quodcumque  proelium  quotiens  most  MSS.  quod,  quotiens- 
cunque proelium  Woelfflin. 

256 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

battle  array  in  front  of  his  camp  in  full  view  of 
Caesar  to  inspire  terror,  now  led  them  back  to  camp. 

Faced  with  an  enemy  of  this  kind  Caesar  pro- 
ceeded to  train  his  forces,  not  as  a  commander  trains 
a  veteran  army  with  a  magnificent  record  of  vic- 
torious achievements,  but  as  a  gladiatorial  instructor 
trains  his  recruits.  How  many  feet  they  were  to 
retreat  from  the  enemy ;  the  manner  in  which  they 
must  wheel  round  upon  their  adversary ;  the 
restricted  space  in  which  they  must  offer  him  resist- 
ance— now  doubling  forward,  now  retiring  and 
making  feint  attacks ;  and  almost  the  spot  from 
which,  and  the  manner  in  which  they  must  discharge 
their  missiles — these  were  the  lessons  he  taught 
them.  For  it  was  surprising  the  amount  of  worry 
and  anxiety  the  enemy's  light-armed  troops  were 
causing  our  army,  what  with  their  making  the 
cavalry  chary  of  engaging  for  fear  of  losing  their 
mounts,  since  the  light-armed  troops  kept  killing 
them  with  their  javelins,  and  with  their  wearing 
the  legionaries  out  by  their  speediness ;  for  no 
sooner  had  a  heavy-armed  soldier,  when  pursued  by 
them,  halted  and  then  made  an  attack  on  them  than 
their  speed  of  movement  enabled  them  easily  to 
avoid  the  danger. 

As  a  result  of  this  Caesar  was  seriously  perturbed, 
since  as  often  as  an  engagement  had  occurred  he  had 
been  quite  unable  to  be  a  match  with  his  own 
cavalry,  unsupported  by  legionary  troops,  for  the 
enemy  cavalry  and  their  light-armed  units.  More- 
over, there  was  this  other  problem  which  worried 
him  :  as  yet  he  had  had  no  experience  of  the  enemy 
legions;  and  how,  he  wondered,  could  he  cope  with 
their  cavalry  and  amazing  light-armed  troops  if  they 

257 


CAESAR 

armatura,  quae  erat  mirifica,  si  legiones  quoque 
accessissent.  Accedebat  etiam  hacc  causa,  quod 
elephantorum  magnitudo  multitudoque  animos  mili- 
tum  detinebat  in  terrore.  Cui  uni  rci  tamen  in- 
venerat  remedium :  namque  elephantos  ex  Italia 
transportari  iusscrat,  quos  et  miles  nosset  spccicmque 
et  virtutcm  bestiae  cognosceret  et  cui  parti  corporis 
eius  telum  facile  adigi  posset,  ornatusque  ac  loricatus 
cum  esset  elephas,  quae  pars  corporis  eius  sine 
tegmine  nuda  relinqueretur,  ut  eo  tela  coicerentur ; 
praeterea  ut  iumenta  bestiarum  odorem,  stridorem, 
speciem  consuetudine  capta  non  reformidarent. 
Quibus  ex  rebus  largiter  erat  consecutus :  nam  et 
milites  bestias  manibus  pertrectabant  earumque 
tarditatem  cognoscebant,  equitesque  in  eos  pila 
praepilata  coiciebant,  atque  in  consuetudinem  equos 
patientia  bestiarum  adduxerat. 

Ob  has  causas  quas  supra  commemoravi  sollicita- 
batur  Caesar  tardiorque  et  consideratior  erat  factus 
et  ex  pristina  bellandi  consuetudine  celeritateque 
excesserat.  Neque  mirum  :  copias  enim  habebat  in 
Gallia  bellare  consuetas  locis  campcstribus  et  contra 
Gallos,  homines  apertos  minimeque  insidiosos,  qui 
per  virtutem,  non  per  dolum  dimicare  consuerunt ; 
tum  autem  erat  ei  laborandum  ut  consuefaceret 
milites  hostium  dolos.  insidias,  artificia  cognoscere  et 
quid  sequi,  quid  vitare  conveniret.     Itaque,  (juo  haec 

258 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

were  backed  up  by  their  legions  too.  He  had  yet 
another  cause  for  anxiety — the  panic  with  which  the 
size  and  number  of  the  elephants  gripped  the  minds 
of  his  soldiers.  Here,  however,  was  one  problem  to 
which  he  had  found  an  answer ;  for  he  had  ordered 
elephants  to  be  brought  across  from  Italy  to  enable 
our  troops  not  only  to  become  familiar  with  them, 
but  also  to  get  to  know  both  the  appearance  and 
capabilities  of  the  beast,  what  part  of  its  body  was 
readily  vulnerable  to  a  missile  and,  when  an  elephant 
was  accoutred  and  armoured,  what  part  of  its  body 
was  still  left  uncovered  and  unprotected,  so  that 
their  missiles  should  be  aimed  at  that  spot.  He  had 
also  this  further  object  in  mind,  that  his  horses 
should  learn  by  familiarity  with  these  beasts  not  to 
be  alarmed  bv  their  scent,  trumpeting  or  appearance. 
From  this  experiment  he  had  profited  handsomely : 
for  the  troops  handled  the  beasts  and  came  to  appre- 
ciate their  sluggishness  ;  the  cavalry  hurled  dummy 
javelins  at  them;  and  the  docility  of  the  beasts 
had  brought  the  horses  to  feel  at  home  with  them. 

For  the  reasons  above-mentioned  Caesar  was 
worried,  and  his  old  habitual  dashing  tactics  had  now 
given  place  to  a  more  sedate  and  deliberate  policy. 
And  no  wonder :  for  the  troops  he  now  commanded 
had  been  used  to  fighting  in  the  flat  terrain  of  Gaul 
against  Gauls — men  of  forthright  character  with 
barely  a  trace  of  deceit,  whose  habit  it  is  to  rely  on 
valour,  not  on  guile,  in  their  fighting ;  whereas  now 
he  had  to  perform  the  arduous  task  of  accustoming 
his  troops  to  recognise  the  tricks,  traps  and  strata- 
gems of  the  enemj',  and  what  tactics  could  fittingly 
be  adopted,  and  what  avoided.  Accordingly,  to 
speed  up  this  training  of  theirs,  he  took  pains  not  to 

259 


CAESAR 

celerius  conciperent,  dabat  operam  ut  Icgiones  non  in 
uno  loco  contineret  sed  per  caiisam  frumcntandi  hue 
atque  illiic  rapsaret,  ideo  quod  hostium  copias  ab  se 
suoque  vestigio  non  discessuras  existimabat.  Atque 
post  diem  tertium  productis  accuratius  suis  copiis  ^ 
sicut  instruxerat,  propter  hostium  castra  praeter- 
gressus  aequo  loco  invitat  ad  dimicandum.  Post- 
quam  eos  abhorrerc  vidct,  reducit  sub  vespcrum 
legiones  in  castra. 

74  Legati  interim  ex  oppido  ^'aga,  quod  finitimum 
fuit  Zetae,  cuius  Caesarem  potitum  esse  demonstra- 
vimus,  veniunt;  pctunt,  obsecrant,  ut  sibi  prae- 
sidium  mittat ;  se  res  compluris  quae  utiles  bcllo  sint 
sumministraturos.  Per  id  tempus  dcorum  voluntate 
studioque  erga  Caesarem  transfuga  suos  civis  facit 
certiores  ^  lubam  regem  celeriter  cum  copiis  suis, 
antequam  Caesaris  praesidium  eo  perveniret,  ad 
oppidum  accucurrisse  atque  advenientem  multitudine 
circumdata  eo  potitum  omnibusque  eius  oppidi 
incolis  ad  unum  interfectis  dedisse  oppidum  diri- 
piendum  delendumtjue  militibus. 

75  Caesar  interim  lustrato  exercitu  a.  d.  XII.  Kal. 
April,  postero  die  productis  universis  copiis  pro- 
gressus  ab  suis  castris  milia  passuum  X,  a  Scipionis 
circiter  duum  milium  interiecto  spatio,  in  acie  con- 
stitit.  Postquam  satis  diuque  adversaries  ab  se  ad 
dimicandum  invitatos  supersedere  pugnae  anim- 
advertit,  reducit  copias  posteroque  die  castra  movet 
atque  iter  ad  oppidum  Sarsuram,  ubi  Scipio  Numi- 

^  productas  suas  copias  MSS.  :  /  have  adopted  Clark's  con- 
jecture. 

^  The  MSS.  text  of  the  earlier  part  of  this  sentence  is  very 
probably  corrupt  :  some  MSS.  read  de  eorum  and  tran- 
fugas. 

260 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

keep  the  legions  confined  to  one  area,  but  to  keep 
them  constantly  on  the  move,  first  to  one  spot,  then 
to  another,  ostensibly  for  foraging  purposes,  for  the 
very  reason  that  he  reckoned  the  enemy  forces 
would  not  fail  to  follow  in  his  tracks.  And  two  days 
later,  when  he  had  led  forth  his  forces  duly  and  care- 
fullv  deployed,  he  marched  past  close  to  the  enemy's 
camp  and  challenged  them  to  battle  on  level  ground  ; 
but  when  he  saw  the  enemy  reluctant  to  accept,  he  led 
his  legions  back  to  camp  as  evening  was  approaching. 

Meanwhile  envovs  arrived  from  the  town  of  \'aga, 
wliich  was  near  Zeta,  the  occupation  of  which  by 
Caesar  we  have  already  described.  They  prayed 
and  besought  Caesar  to  send  them  a  garrison,  saying 
they  would  assist  him  by  furnishing  various  supplies 
useful  in  war.  At  this  point,  by  the  good  will  of  the 
gods  and  their  favour  towards  Caesar,  a  deserter 
informed  his  compatriots  that  king  Juba  had 
speedily  hastened  to  the  town  with  his  forces  to 
forestall  the  arrival  there  of  Caesar's  garrison  ;  that 
at  his  coming  he  had  surrounded  the  town  with  vast 
forces,  won  control  of  it,  slaughtered  all  the  inhabi- 
tants to  a  man,  and  then  given  it  over  to  his  troops  to 
plunder  and  destroy. 

Meanwhile  Caesar  ceremonially  purified  his  army 
on  March  21st.  On  the  following  day  he  led  forth 
his  entire  forces,  advanced  five  miles  from  his  own 
camp,  and  took  his  stand  in  battle  an*ay  at  a  distance 
of  some  two  miles  from  Scipio's  camp.  On  per- 
ceiving that  his  opponents,  despite  this  adequate  and 
sustained  challenge,  declined  his  offer  of  battle,  he 
led  his  forces  back ;  and  on  the  following  day  he 
struck  camp  and  took  the  road  to  the  town  of 
Sarsura,    where    Scipio    had    posted    a    garrison    of 

261 


CAESAR 

darum  habuerat  praesidium  frumentumque  com- 
portaverat,  ire  contendit.  Quod  ubi  Labienus 
animadvertit,  cum  equitatu  levique  armatura  agmen 
eius  extremuin  carpere  coepit  atque  ita  lixarum 
mercatorumque  qui  plaustris  merces  portabant 
interceptis  sarcinis  addito  aninio  propius  audaciusque 
accedit  ad  legiones,  quod  existimabat  milites  sub 
onere  ac  sub  sarcinis  defatigatos  pugnare  non  posse. 
Quae  res  Caesarem  non  fefellerat :  namque  expedites 
ex  singulis  legionibus  trecenos  milites  esse  iusserat. 
Itaque  eos  in  equitatum  Labieni  immissos  turmis 
suorum  suppetias  mittit.  Turn  Labienus  conversis 
equis  signorum  conspectu  perterritus  turpissime 
fugere  contendit.  Multis  eius  occisis,  compluribus 
vulneratis  milites  legionarii  ad  sua  se  recipiunt  signa 
atque  iter  inceptum  ire  coeperunt.  Labienus  per 
iugum  summum  collis  dextrorsus  procul  subsequi  non 
destitit. 
76  Postquam  Caesar  ad  oppidum  Sarsuram  venit, 
inspectantibus  adversariis  interfecto  praesidio  Scipio- 
nis,  cum  suis  auxilium  ferre  non  auderent,  fortiter 
repugnante  P.  Cornelio,  evocato  Scipionis,  qui  ibi 
praeerat,  atque  a  multitudine  circumvento  inter- 
fectoque  oppido  potitur  atque  ibi  frumento  exercitui 
dato  postero  die  ad  oppidum  Thysdram  pervenit ; 
in  quo  Considius  per  id  tempus  fuerat  cum  grandi 
praesidio  cohorteque  sua  gladiatorum.  Caesar  op- 
262 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

Numidians  and  laid  in  a  stock  of  corn.  When  Labi- 
enus  perceived  this  he  proceeded  to  harry  Caesar's 
rear-guard  with  his  cavahy  and  Hght-armed  troops ; 
and  having  by  this  means  cut  off  the  baggage  trains 
of  the  sutlers  and  merchants  who  were  carrying  their 
wares  in  carts,  he  was  thereby  the  more  encouraged 
to  grow  bolder  and  come  closer  to  the  legions,  since 
he  supposed  that  the  soldiers  were  worn  out  with 
carrying  their  heavy  packs  and  so  in  no  condition  to 
fight.  But  this  contingency  had  not  escaped 
Caesar's  attention :  he  had  in  fact  given  instructions 
that  three  hundred  men  out  of  each  legion  should 
be  in  light  order ;  and  these  he  accordingly  des- 
patched against  Labienus'  cavalry  to  give  support  to 
his  own  squadrons.  Whereupon  Labienus,  dismayed 
at  the  sight  of  the  standards,  wheeled  round  his 
horses  and  beat  a  hasty  and  highly  undignified 
retreat.  The  legionary  troops,  having  killed  many 
of  his  men  and  wounded  not  a  few,  retired  to  their 
standards  and  proceeded  to  resume  their  march. 
Labienus  still  kept  up  his  pursuit  at  a  distance, 
moving  along  the  crest  of  the  ridge  of  hills  upon  the 
right. 

When  Caesar  came  to  the  town  of  Sarsura  he 
massacred  Scipio's  garrison  while  his  opponents 
looked  on,  not  daring  to  assist  their  friends.  Its 
commander,  however,  P.  Cornelius,  a  reservist  re- 
called by  Scipio,  offered  a  gallant  resistance,  but  was 
surrounded  by  overwhelming  numbers  and  killed. 
Then  Caesar  gained  control  of  the  town,  distributed 
corn  to  his  army  on  the  spot,  and  arrived  next 
day  at  the  town  of  Thysdra.  Considius  was  in  the 
town  at  this  time  with  a  considerable  garrison 
force  and  his  own  bodyguard  of  gladiators.     Caesar 

263 


CAESAR 

pidi  natura  perspecta  aquae  inopia  ab  oppugnatione 
eius  deterritus  protinus  profectus  circiter  milia 
passuum  II 1 1  ad  aquam  facit  castra  atque  inde  quarta 
vigilia  egressus  redit  rursus  ad  ea  castra  quae  ad 
Aggar  habuerat.  Idem  facit  Scipio  atque  in  antiqua 
castra  copias  reducit. 

77  Thabenenses  interim,  qui  sub  dicione  et  potestate 
lubae  esse  consuessent  in  extrema  eius  regni  regione 
maritima  locati,  interfecto  regio  praesidio  legates  ad 
Caesarem  mittunt,  rem  a  se  gestam  decent,  petunt 
orantque  ut  suis  fortunis  populus  Romanus,  quod  bene 
meriti  essent,  auxilium  ferret.  Caesar  eorum  con- 
silio  probato  Marcium  Crispum  tribus  cum  cohortibus 
et  sagittariis  tormentisque  compluribus  praesidio 
Thabenam  mittit.  Eodem  tempore  ex  legionibus 
omnibus  milites  qui  aut  morbo  impediti  aut  com- 
meatu  dato  cum  signis  non  potuerant  ante  transire  in 
African!  ad  milia  I II I,  equites  CCCC,  funditores 
sagittariique  mille  uno  commeatu  Caesari  oc- 
currerunt.  Itaque  cum  his  copiis  et  omnibus 
legionibus  eductis,  sicut  erat  instructus,  V  milibus 
passuum  ab  suis  castris,  ab  Scipionis  vero  II  milibus 
passuum  longe  constitit  in  campo. 

78  Erat  oppidum  infra  castra  Scipionis  nomine  Tegea, 
ubi  praesidium  equestre  circiter  II  milium  numero 
habere  consuerat.  Eo  equitatu  dextra  sinistra 
derecto  ab  oppidi  lateribus  ipse  legiones  ex  castris 


^  Its  site  is  unknown,  and  the  suggested  identification  with 
Thena,  mentioned  by  Strabo  and  located  by  some  editors 
far  south,  opposite  the  islands  of  Cercina,  seems  dubious. 

264 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

studied  the  characteristics  of  the  town,  and  the  lack 
of  water  discouraged  him  from  attacking  it :  he  then 
set  out  forthwith  and  pitched  a  camp  some  four 
miles  away  near  water,  only  to  quit  it  at  the  fourth 
watch  and  return  once  again  to  the  camp  he  had 
occupied  near  Aggar.  Scipio  followed  suit  and  led 
his  forces  back  to  his  old  camp. 

Meanwhile  the  inhabitants  of  Thabena,^  who 
dwelt  on  the  coast  at  the  extreme  verge  of  Juba's 
kingdom  and  were  his  traditional  lieges  and  subjects, 
had  none  the  less  massacred  the  royal  garrison,  and 
now  sent  envoys  to  Caesar  informing  him  of  their 
action  and  earnestly  soliciting  that  the  Roman 
people  should  give  them  succour  in  their  present 
plight,  as  they  had  deserved  well  at  their  hands. 
Caesar  approved  their  policy  and  sent  Marcius 
Crispus  with  three  cohorts  and  numerous  archers 
and  pieces  of  artillery  to  Thabena  as  a  garrison 
force.  It  was  at  this  same  time  that  Caesar  was 
reinforced  by  the  troops  from  all  his  legions  who, 
whether  prevented  by  sickness  or  because  they  had 
been  granted  leave,  had  previously  been  unable  to 
cross  to  Africa  with  the  colours  :  these  comprised 
about  four  thousand  infantry,  four  hundred  cavalry 
and  a  thousand  slingers  and  archers,  and  all  came  in 
one  convoy.  And  so,  leading  out  all  his  legions, 
including  these  forces,  he  took  up  a  position  in  battle 
array  in  the  plain  five  miles  away  from  his  own  camp 
and  two  miles  distant  from  Scipio 's. 

Below  Scipio's  camp  there  was  a  town  called 
Tegea,  where  he  kept  a  standing  garrison  force  of 
cavalry  numbering  some  two  thousand  men.  This 
cavalry  he  now  deployed  in  line  on  the  right-  and  left- 
hand  flanks  of  the  town,  while  he  himself  led  his 

26^ 


CAESAR 

eductas  atque  in  iugo  inferiore  instructas  non 
longius  fere  niille  passus  ab  suis  munitionibus  pro- 
gressus  in  acie  constituit.  Postquam  diutius  in  uno 
loco  Scipio  commorabatur  et  tempus  diei  in  otio 
consumebatur,  Caesar  equitum  turmas  suorum  iubet 
in  hoslium  equitatum  qui  ad  oppiduni  in  statione 
erant  facere  impressionem  levemque  armaturam, 
sagittarios  funditoresque  eodem  summittit.  Quod 
ubi  coeptum  est  fieri  et  equis  concitatis  luliani  im- 
petum  fecissent,  Pacideius  suos  equites  exporrigere 
coepit  in  longitudinem,  ut  haberent  facultatem 
turmas  Julianas  circumfundi  et  nihilo  minus  for- 
tissime  acerrimeque  pugnare.  Quod  ubi  Caesar 
animadvertit,  CCC,  quos  ex  legionibus  habere 
expeditos  consuerat,  ex  legione  quae  proxima  ei 
proelio  in  acie  constiterat  iubet  equitatui  succurrere. 
Labienus  interim  suis  equitibus  auxilia  equestria 
summittere  sauciisque  ac  defatigatis  integros  recen- 
tioribusque  viribus  equites  suniministrare.  Post- 
quam equites  luliani  CCCC  vim  hostium  ad  IIII 
milia  numero  sustinere  non  poterant  et  ab  levi 
armatura  Numidarum  vulnerabantur  minutatimque 
cedebant,  Caesar  alteram  alam  mittit  qui  sat- 
agentibus  celeriter  occurrerent.  Quo  facto  sui  sublati 
266 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

legion*;  out  of  camp  and  after  advancing  not  much 
more  than  about  a  mile  from  his  defences  drew  them 
up  arrayed  in  battle  formation  on  the  lower  slopes  of 
a  ridge.  After  some  little  time  had  elapsed  with- 
out Scipio's  shifting  his  position,  and  as  the  daylight 
hours  were  being  frittered  away  in  inaction,  Caesar 
ordered  some  squadrons  of  his  own  horse  to  make  a 
charge  against  the  enemy  cavalry  which  were  posted 
on  guard  near  the  town,  and  despatched  some  light- 
armed  units,  archers  and  slingers  to  the  same  objec- 
tive in  support.  When  this  manoeuvre  was  under 
way  and  the  Julians  had  delivered  their  attack  at  full 
gallop,  Pacideius  began  to  deploy  his  horsemen  on  a 
broader  front,  to  enable  them  to  swarm  round  the 
flanks  of  the  Julian  cavalry  and  still  fight  ^\ith  the 
utmost  gallantry  and  spirit.  When  Caesar  observed 
these  tactics  he  instructed  the  three  hundred  men  in 
light  order — it  was  his  normal  practice  that  this 
number  of  men  in  each  of  his  legions  should  be  in 
light  order — from  the  legion  which  was  posted  in  the 
line  nearest  the  scene  of  this  action  to  hasten  to  the 
assistance  of  the  cavalry.  Meanwhile  Labienus  sent 
cavalry  reinforcements  to  support  his  own  horsemen, 
furnishing  unscathed  troopers  and  those  whose 
strength  was  relatively  unspent  to  take  the  place  of 
their  wounded  or  exhausted  comrades.  Now  that  the 
four  hundred  Julian  cavalry  were  finding  it  impossible 
to  contain  the  violent  onslaught  of  an  enemy  some 
four  thousand  strong,  and  were  suffering  casualties  at 
the  hands  of  the  light-amied  Numidians  and  giving 
ground  very  slightly,  Caesar  despatched  a  second 
wing  of  cavalry  to  dash  speedily  to  the  help  of  his 
hard-pressed  men.  This  action  i*aised  the  spirits  of 
his  troops,  who  delivered  a  massed  charge  against  the 

267 


CAESAR 

univei'si  in  hostis  impressione  facta  in  fugam  adver- 
saries dederunt ;  multis  occisis,  compluribus  vulnera- 
tis  insecuti  per  III  niilia  passuum  uscjue  ad  collem 
hostibus  adactis  se  ad  suos  recipiunt.  Caesar  in 
horam  X.  commoratus,  sicut  erat  instructus,  se  ad 
sua  castra  recepit  omnibus  incolumibus.  In  quo 
proelio  Pacideius  gravitt-r  pilo  per  cassidem  caput 
ictus  conipluresque  duces  ac  fortissimus  quisque  inter- 
fecti  vulneratique  sunt. 
79  Postquam  nulla  condicione  cogere  adversaries 
poterat  ut  in  aequuni  locum  descenderent  legionum- 
que  periculum  facerent,  neque  ipse  propius  hostern 
castra  ponere  propter  aquae  penuriam  se  posse 
animadvertebat,  adversarios  non  virtute  eorum  con- 
fidere  sed  aquarum  inopia  fretos  despicere  se  intel- 
lexit,  II.  Non.  Apr.  tertia  vigilia  egressus  ab  Aggar 
XVI  niilia  nocte  progressus  ad  Thapsum,  ubi  \ergilius 
cum  grandi  praesidio  praeerat,  castra  ponit  oppidum- 
que  eo  die  circumniunire  coepit  locaque  idonea 
opportunaque  complura  praesidiis  occupare,  liostes 
ne  intrare  ad  se  ac  loca  interiora  capere  possent. 
Scipio  interim  cognitis  Caesaris  consiliis  ad  necessi- 
tatem  adductus  dimicandi,  ne  per  summum  dedecus 
fidissimos  suis  rebus  Thapsitanos  et  \'ergilium  amit- 
teret,  confestim  Caesarem  per  superiora  loca  con- 
secutus  milia  passuum  VIII  a  Thapso  binis  castris 
consedit. 

^  i.e.  at  about  midnight  on  the  night  of  April  3rd-4th.   Thus 
eo  die  is  still  April  4th. 

-  See  Map  5.  I  have  assumed,  with  most  editors,  that 
Caesar  approached  Thapsus  from  the  south,  by  way  of  the 
narrow  coastal  corridor  east  of  the  Marsh  of  Moknine;  and 
that  Scipio  took  the  same  route  and  encamped  near  its 
south-eastern  fringe.  The  strategic  points  may  well — as 
Veith  suggested — have  included  El  Faca  and  El  Hafsa. 
268 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

enemy  and  turned  their  opponents  to  flight ;  and 
after  kilHng  many  and  wounding  not  a  few  and 
chasing  the  enemy  for  three  miles  and  driving  them 
right  up  to  the  high  ground  they  retired  to  their  lines. 
Caesar  waited  till  the  tenth  hour  and  then  withdrew 
to  his  camp  in  battle  order  without  any  losses.  In 
this  engagement  Pacideius  was  seriously  wounded 
in  the  head  by  a  heavy  javelin  Avhich  pierced  his 
helmet ;  and  several  of  the  enemy  leaders  and  all 
their  bravest  men  were  either  killed  or  wounded. 

Finding  it  impossible  on  any  terms  to  induce  his 
opponents  to  come  down  to  level  ground  and  risk 
their  legions,  and  realising  that  it  was  equally 
impossible  for  him  to  pitch  his  own  camp  closer 
to  the  enemy  owing  to  the  poor  supply  of  water,  and 
perceiving  that  his  opponents,  so  far  from  having 
any  confidence  in  their  own  valour,  were  led  to  hold 
him  in  contempt  by  their  reliance  on  the  dearth 
of  water,  Caesar  left  Aggar  on  April  4th  at  the  third 
watch. ^  Then,  after  advancing  sixteen  miles  by 
night,  he  pitched  camp  near  Thapsus,^  where  Ver- 
gilius  was  in  command  with  a  considerable  garrison. 
That  same  day  he  began  to  invest  the  town,  seizing 
and  manning  several  suitable  strategic  points  to 
prevent  the  enemy's  being  able  to  infiltrate  and 
approach  him,  or  capture  any  inner  positions. 
Scipio  had  in  the  meantime  got  to  know  of  Caesar's 
plans ;  and  being  now  reduced  to  the  necessity  of 
fighting,  if  he  was  to  avoid  the  utter  humiliation  of 
losing  Vergilius  and  those  most  staunch  supporters  of 
his  cause — the  men  of  Thapsus,  he  forthwith  followed 
Caesar  along  the  high  ground  and  established  himself 
in  two  camps  at  a  distance  of  eight  miles  from 
Thapsus. 

269 


CAESAR 

80  Erat  stagnum  salinarum,  inter  quod  et  mare 
angustiae  quaedam  non  amplius  mille  et  D  passus 
intererant ;  quas  Seipio  intrare  et  Thapsitanis 
auxilium  ferre  conabatur.  Quod  futurum  Caesarem 
non  fefellerat.  Namque  pridie  in  eo  loco  castello 
munito  ibique  III  cohortium  ^  praesidio  relicto  ipse 
cum  reliquis  copiis  lunatis  castris  Thapsum  operibus 
circummunivit.  Seipio  interim  exclusus  ab  incepto, 
itinere  supra  stagnum  postero  die  et  nocte  confecto, 
caelo  albente  non  longe  a  castris  praesidioque  quod 
supra  commemoravi  MD  passibus  ad  mare  versus 
consedit  et  castra  munire  coepit.  Quod  postquam 
Caesari  nuntiatum  est,  milite  ab  opere  deducto, 
castris  praesidio  Asprenate  pro  consule  cum  legionibus 
duabus  relicto  ipse  cum  expedita  copia  in  eum  locum 
citatim  contendit,  classisque  parte  ad  Thapsum 
relicta  reliquas  navis  iubet  post  hostium  tergum  quam 

^  The  MSS.  omit  cohortium,  which  Woelfflin  conjectured. 


*  Apparently  he  marched  round  its  western  side.  The 
words  postero  die  et  nocte  have  been  variously  explained  and 
amended.  Scipio's  abortive  attempt  to  penetrate  the  eastern 
corridor  was  made,  as  pridie  shews,  on  April  5th  :  postero  die 
is,  I  think,  relative  to  pridie  (April  4th)  and  denotes  the 
remainder  of  April  oth,  nocte  being  the  night  of  April  5th/'6th. 
The  time  involved — perhaps  some  eighteen  hours  is  ccrtainh' 
long  for  the  distance  of  about  20  miles ;  but,  as  R.  Holmes 
has  pointed  out,  Seipio  may  well  have  rested  en  ronfe  and 
timed  his  march  so  as  to  begin  his  entrenchments  under  cover 
of  darkness. 

-  See  Map  5.  The  defence  area  here  alluded  to  may  well 
be  that  close  to  Thapsus  mentioned  in  the  previous  chapter. 
If  the  allusion  is  to  the  fort  mentioned  earlier  in  this  chapter, 
then  the  fort  too  must  have  been  close  to  Thapsus.  But  the 
only  place  where  the  corridor  to-day  is  not  more  than  a  mile 
and  a  half  wide  is  at  the  S.E.  corner  of  the  lagoon. 

270 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

80  There  was  a  lagoon  of  salt  water,  separated  from 
the  sea  by  a  certain  narrow  strip  of  land  not  more 
than  a  mile  and  a  half  wide  ;  and  this  corridor  Scipio 
now  attempted  to  enter  to  bring  help  to  the  men  of 
Thapsus.  The  likelihood  of  such  a  move  had  not 
escaped  Caesar's  attention  :  in  fact,  the  dav  before 
he  had  built  a  fort  at  this  spot  and  left  behind  a 
force  of  three  cohorts  to  hold  it,  while  he  himself 
with  the  rest  of  his  forces  established  a  crescent- 
shaped  camp  and  invested  Thapsus  with  a  ring  of 
siege  works.  Meanwhile  Scipio,  foiled  in  his  under- 
taking, by-passed  the  lagoon  to  the  north  bv  a  march 
which  he  completed  in  the  ensuing  day  and  night,^ 
and  then,  at  the  first  pale  light  of  dawn,  took  up  a 
position  not  far  from  the  camp  and  the  defence  area 
I  mentioned  above,^  and  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the 
sea  coast ;  ^  and  there  he  began  to  fortify  a  camp. 
When  this  was  reported  to  Caesar,  the  latter  with- 
drew his  troops  from  their  work  of  fortification,  left 
behind  the  pro-consul  Asprenas  to  guard  the  camp 
with  two  legions,  and  hurriedly  marched  to  that 
location  with  a  force  in  light  order.  As  for  his  fleet, 
part  of  it  was  left  behind  off  Thapsus,  while  the 
remaining  ships  were  ordered  to  advance  as  close  as 

^  The  words  ML)  passihiis  present  a  difficulty.  Bouvet 
translates  "  a  quinze  cents  pas  du  cote  de  la  mer,'  though  in  a 
later  note  he  refers  to  Scipio's  position  as  near  Caesar  (at  1.500 
paces),  and  in  his  map  he  marks  Scipio's  camp  only  1  km. 
distant  from  the  sea.  It  seems  possible  to  render  the  words 
non  longe  .  .  .  consedit  by  '  took  up  a  position  towards  the  sea, 
not  far  distant — a  mile  and  a  half — from  the  camp  .  .  .'. 
According  to  this  interpretation  Scipio'.s  camp  would  appear 
on  Map  5  not — as  now  marked — close  to  Bekalta,  but  some 
1^  Roman  miles  nearer  the  sea,  behind  the  left  wing  of  Scipio's 
battle  line.  This  is  perhaps  confirmed  by  the  behaviour  of  the 
routed  elephants  described  below  in  ch.  83. 

271 


CAESAR 

maxime  ad  lit  us  appclli  signumquc  suum  observare. 
quo  signo  dato  subito  clamore  facto  ex  iniproviso 
hostibus  aversis  incuterent  terrorem,  ut  pcrturbati 
ac  perterriti  respicere  post  terga  cogerentur. 

81  Quo  postquam  Caesar  pervenit  et  animadvcrtit 
acicm  pro  vallo  Scipionis  constitutam  ^  elephantis 
dextro  sinistroque  cornu  collocatis,  et  nihilo  minus 
partem  militum  castra  non  ignavitcr  munire,  ipse  acie 
triplici  collocata,  legione  X.  VII. que  ^  dextro  cornu, 
^'III.  et  ^'IIII.  sinistro  oppositis,  quintae  legionis  ' 
in  quarta  acie  ad  ipsa  cornua  quinis  cohortibus 
contra  bestias  collocatis,  sagittariis,  funditoribus 
in  utrisque  cornibus  dispositis  levique  armatura  inter 
equites  interiecta,  ipse  pedibus  circum  milites  con- 
cursans  virtutesque  veteranorum  proeliaque  superiora 
commemorans  blandeque  appellans  animos  eorum 
excitabat.  Tirones  autem,  qui  numquam  in  acie 
dimicassent,  hortabatur  ut  veteranorum  virtutem 
aemularentur  eorumque  famam,  locum,  nomen 
victoria  parta  cuperent  possidere. 

82  Itaque  in  circumeundo  exercitu  animadvei-tit  hostis 
circa  vallum  trepidare  atque  ultro  citroque  pavidos 
concursare  et  modo  se  intra  portas  recipere,  modo 
inconstanter  immoderateque  prodire.  Cum  idem  a 
pluribus    animadverti   coeptum   esset,    subito   legati 

1  contra  MSS.  :   constitutam  i?.  Schneider. 

'  secundaque  3ISS.  :  VII. que  Groebe  :  but  it  j?  open  to 
doubt  ichether  the  1th  cfc  %th  legions  ivere  present :  cf.  note  I  on  ch. 
62.  Nipperde>/ proposed  X.  XIII. que  .  .  .  XIIII.  et  Villi.; 
Schneider  X.  Villi. que  .  .  .  XIII.  et  XIIII. 

^  quinque  legiones  MSS.  :   quintae  legionis  Vielhaber, 

272 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

possible  inshore  in  rear  of  the  enemy  and  to  watch 
for  a  signal  from  Caesar ;  on  the  giving  of  which  signal 
they  were  suddenly  to  raise  a  shout,  surprise  the 
enemy  from  the  rear,  and  thus  demoralise  them,  so 
that  in  their  utter  confusion  and  panic  they  would  be 
obliged  to  look  behind  them. 

81  When  Caesar  arrived  there  and  observed  Scipio's 
battle  line  arrayed  in  front  of  the  rampart,  with 
the  elephants  posted  on  the  right  and  left  wings, 
while  none  the  less  part  of  his  troops  were  busily 
engaged  in  fortifying  the  camp,  he  himself  dis- 
posed his  army  in  three  lines :  the  Tenth  and 
Seventh  legions  he  posted  on  the  right  wing,  the 
Eighth  and  Ninth  on  the  left,  while  five  cohorts  of  the 
Fifth  legion  were  stationed  on  each  of  the  actual 
wings,  forming  a  fourth  line  to  contain  the  elephants  ; 
and  his  archers  and  slingers  were  deployed  on  either 
wing,  and  the  light-armed  units  interspersed  among 
the  cavalry.  Caesar  himself  hurriedly  went  the 
rounds  of  his  troops  on  foot,  reminding  the  veterans  of 
their  gallant  bearing  in  previous  combats  and  raising 
their  morale  by  flattering  appeals.  As  for  the 
recruits,  seeing  they  had  never  so  far  fought  in 
pitched  battle,  he  urged  them  to  emulate  the  gal- 
lantry of  the  veterans  and  to  make  it  their  ambition 
by  gaining  a  victory  to  enjoy  a  fame,  status  and 
renown  equal  to  theirs. 

82  Now  in  the  course  of  making  these  rounds  of  his 
army  he  observed  that  the  enemy  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  their  rampart  were  excited,  rushing  hither 
and  thither  in  alarm,  now  retiring  inside  the  gates, 
now  trooping  out  in  a  spasmodic  and  undisciplined 
fashion.  Several  others  were  beginning  to  observe 
the   same   symptoms   when   without   more   ado   his 

273 


CAESAR 

evocatique  obsecrare  Caesarem  ne  dubitaret  signum 
dare :    victoriam  sibi  propriam   a  dis  immortalibus 

portendi.  Dubitante  Caesare  atque  eorum  studio 
cupiditatique  rcsistente  sibique  eruptione  pugnari 
non  placcre  clamitante,  etiam  atque  etiam  aciem 
sustentante,  subito  dextro  cornu  iniussu  Caesaris 
tubicen  a  militibus  coactus  canere  coepit.  Quo 
facto  ab  universis  cohortibus  signa  in  hostem  coepere 
inferri,  cum  centuriones  pectore  adverso  resisterent 
vique  continerent  milites,  ne  iniussu  imperatoris 
concurrerent,  nee  quicquam  proficerent. 
83  Quod  postquam  Caesar  intellexit  incitatis  militum 
animis  resisti  nullo  modo  posse,  signo  Felicitatis  dato 
equo  admisso  in  hostem  contra  principes  ire  con- 
tendit.  A  dextro  interim  cornu  funditores  sagit- 
tariique  concita  tela  in  elephantos  frequentes 
iniciunt.  Quo  facto  bestiae  stridore  fundarum, 
lapidum  plumbique  iactatu  ^  perterritae  sese  con- 
vertere  et  suos  post  se  frequentis  stipatosque  pro- 
terere  et  in  portas  valli  semifactas  ruere  contendunt. 
Item  Mauri  equites,  qui  in  eodem  cornu  elephantis 
erant,  praesidio  deserti  principes  fugiunt.  Ita 
celeriter    bestiis    circumitis    legiones    vallo    hostium 

*  itata  MSS.  :   iactatu  Kuebler. 
274 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

lieutenants  and  reservists  implored  Caesar  not  to 
hesitate  to  give  the  signal,  saying  that  it  was  decisive 
victorj'  that  the  immortal  gods  were  thus  foretelling 
them.  Caesar  still  hesitated,  opposing  their  im- 
petuous eagerness,  repeatedly  protesting  that  a 
precipitate  sally  was  not  his  approved  May  of  fighting, 
and  again  and  again  holding  his  battle  line  in  check ; 
when  suddenly  on  the  right  wing,  without  orders 
from  Caesar  but  under  coercion  of  the  troops,  a 
trumpeter  began  to  sound  the  charge.  Whereupon 
every  single  cohort  began  to  attack  the  enemy, 
despite  the  resistance  of  the  centurions,  who  planted 
themselves  in  the  path  of  the  troops  and  sought  to 
hold  them  back  by  force  to  prevent  their  attacking 
without  orders  from  the  commander-in-chief,  but  all 
in  vain. 
83  When  Caesar  realised  that  it  was  quite  out  of  the 
question  to  hold  back  his  troops  in  their  present  state 
of  excitement,  he  signalled  '  Good  Luck  '  and  giving 
his  horse  its  head  rode  in  hot  haste  against  the 
enemv  front  ranks.  Meanwhile  on  the  right  wing 
the  slingers  and  archers  in  crowds  launched  rapid 
vollevs  of  missiles  against  the  elephants.  Where- 
upon the  beasts,  terrified  by  the  whizzing  sound  of 
the  slings  and  by  the  stones  and  leaden  bullets 
launched  against  them,  speedily  wheeled  round, 
trampled  under  foot  the  massed  and  serried  ranks  of 
their  own  supporting  troops  behind  them,  and 
rushed  towards  the  half-completed  gates  of  the 
rampart.  The  Moorish  cavalry,  who  were  posted  on 
the  same  wing  as  the  elephants,  followed  suit  and, 
abandoned  by  their  protective  screen,  started  the 
rout.  Having  thus  speedily  got  round  the  elephants, 
the  legions  gained  possession  of  the  enemy's  rampart ; 

275 


CAESAR 

sunt  potitae,  et  paucis  acriter  repugnantibus  inter- 
fectisque  reliqui  concitati  in  castra  unde  pridie  erant 
cgressi  confugiunt. 

84  Non  videtur  esse  praetermittendum  de  virtute 
militis  veteran!  V.  legionis.  Nam  cum  in  sinistro 
cornu  elephas  vulnere  ictus  et  dolore  concitatus  in 
lixam  inermem  impetum  fecisset  eumque  sub  pede 
subditum  dein  genu  innixus  pondere  suo  proboscide 
erecta  vibrantique  stridore  maximo  premeret  atque 
enecaret,  miles  hie  non  potuit  pati  quin  se  armatus 
bestiae  offerret.  Quern  postquam  elephas  ad  se  telo 
infesto  venire  animadvertit,  relicto  cadavere  militem 
proboscide  circumdat  atque  in  sublime  extollit. 
Armatus,  qui  in  eiusmodi  periculo  constanter  agen- 
dum sibi  videret,  gladio  proboscidem  qua  erat 
circumdatus  caedere  quantum  viribus  poterat  non 
destitit.  Quo  dolore  adductus  elephas  milite  abiecto 
maximo  cum  stridore  cursuque  conversus  ad  reliquas 
bestias  se  recepit. 

85  Interim  Thapso  qui  erant  praesidio  ex  oppido 
eruptionem  porta  maritima  faciunt  et,  sive  ut  suis 
subsidio  occurrerent,  sive  ut  oppido  deserto  fuga 
salutem  sibi  parerent,  egrediuntur  atque  ita  per 
mare  umbilici  fine  ingressi  terram  petebant.  Qui  a 
servitiis  puerisque  qui  in  castris  erant  lapidibus 
pilisque  prohibit!  terram  attingere  rursus  se  in 
oppidum  receperunt.     Interim  Scipionis  copiis  pro- 

^  It  would  appear  that  Asprenas  and  his  two  legioas  (ch.  80) 
had  moved  out,  either  to  take  part  in  the  battle,  or  to  seal  off 
the  eastern  corridor  and  menace  Scipio's  camps  at  its  southern 
end. 

276 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

and  when  the  few  defenders  who  offered  a  spirited 
resistance  had  been  killed,  the  remainder  pre- 
cipitately sought  refuge  in  the  camp  from  which  they 
had  issued  the  day  before. 

I  ought  not,  I  think,  to  omit  to  mention  the 
gallantry  of  a  veteran  soldier  of  the  Fifth  legion. 
On  the  left  wing  an  elephant,  maddened  by  the  pain 
of  a  wound  it  had  received,  had  attacked  an  unarmed 
sutler,  pinned  him  underfoot,  and  then  knelt  upon 
him  ;  and  now,  with  its  trunk  erect  and  swaying,  and 
trumpeting  loudly,  it  was  crushing  him  to  death 
with  its  weight.  This  was  more  than  the  soldier  could 
bear  ;  he  could  not  but  confront  the  beast,  fully  armed 
as  he  was.  When  it  observed  him  coming  towards  it 
with  weapon  poised  to  strike,  the  elephant  abandoned 
the  corpse,  encircled  the  soldier  with  its  trunk,  and 
lifted  him  up  in  the  air.  The  soldier,  perceiving 
that  a  dangerous  crisis  of  this  sort  demanded  resolute 
action  on  his  part,  hewed  with  his  sword  again  and 
again  at  the  encircling  trunk  with  all  the  strength  he 
could  muster.  The  resulting  pain  caused  the 
elephant  to  drop  the  soldier,  wheel  round,  and  with 
shi'ill  trumpetings  make  all  speed  to  rejoin  its 
fellows. 

Meanwhile  the  members  of  the  garrison  of  Thapsus 
made  a  sortie  from  the  town  by  way  of  the  seaward 
gate  and,  whether  their  object  was  to  hasten  to  the 
aid  of  their  fellows,  or  to  abandon  the  town  and  secure 
their  own  safety  by  flight,  out  they  came  and  accord- 
inglv,  wading  waist-high  into  the  sea,  made  for  the 
land.  They  were,  however,  prevented  from  reaching 
land  by  stones  and  heavy  javelins  hurled  by  the  slaves 
and  lackeys  in  the  camp ;  ^  and  so  they  retux-ned 
back  into  the  town.     Meanwhile  Scipio's  forces,  now 

277 


CAESAR 

stratis  passimque  toto  campo  fugientibus  confestim 
Caesaris  legiones  consequi  spatiumque  se  non  dare 
colligendi.  Qui  postquam  ad  ea  castra  quae  pete- 
bant  perfugerunt,  ut  refecti  ^  castris  rursus  sese 
defenderent  ducemque  aliquem  requirerent,  quem 
respicerent,  cuius  auctoritate  imperioque  rem  ge- 
rerent : — qui  postquam  animadverterunt  neminem 
ibi  esse  praesidio,  protinus  armis  abiectis  in  regia 
castra  fugere  contendunt.  Quo  postquam  per- 
venerunt,  ea  quoque  ab  lulianis  teneri  vident. 
Desperata  salute  in  quodam  colle  consistunt  atque 
armis  demissis  salutationem  more  militari  faciunt. 
Quibus  miseris  ea  res  parvo  praesidio  fuit.  Namque 
milites  veterani  ira  et  dolore  incensi  non  mode  ut 
parcerent  hosti  non  poterant  adduci  sed  etiam  ex  sue 
exercitu  inlustris  urbanos,  quos  auctores  appellabant, 
compluris  aut  vulnerarunt  aut  interfecerunt ;  in  quo 
numero  fuit  Tullius  Rufus  quaestorius,  qui  pilo 
traiectus  consulto  a  milite  interiit ;  item  Pompeius 
Rufus  bracchium  gladio  percussus,  nisi  celeriter  ad 
Caesarem  accucurrisset,  interfectus  esset.  Quo  facto 
complux'es  equites  Romani  senatoresque  perterriti  ex 
proelio  se  receperunt,  ne  a  militibus,  qui  ex  tanta 
victoria    licentiam    sibi    assumpsissent    immoderate 

^  refectis  MSS.  :    refecti  Daehn. 
278 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

thrown  into  utter  confusion,  were  in  wholesale  retreat 
in  every  sector  of  the  field,  and  Caesar's  legions 
promptly  pursued  them  without  giving  them  any 
respite  in  which  to  pull  themselves  together.  When 
the  fugitives  reached  the  camp  they  were  making  for, 
with  the  object  of  making  a  recovery  there  and  de- 
fending themselves  once  more,  and  of  trying  to  find 
someone  to  lead  them — someone  to  look  up  to,  under 
whose  authority  and  command  they  could  carry  on  the 
fight ;  when  they  got  there  and  perceived  that  there 
was  nobody  guarding  it,  they  forthw'ith  discarded 
their  armour  and  beat  a  hasty  retreat  to  the  royal 
camp.  This  too  on  their  arrival  they  saw  to  be  in 
the  hands  of  the  Julians.  Abandoning  all  hope  of 
salvation,  they  now  halted  on  a  hill  and  gave  the 
military  salute  by  lowering  their  arms.  This 
gesture,  unhappily  for  them,  stood  them  in  but  little 
stead.  For  Caesar's  veterans  were  filled  with  such 
burning  indignation  and  resentment  that,  so  far 
fi'om  any  possibility  of  inducing  them  to  spare  the 
enemy,  they  actually  wounded  or  killed  several  men 
of  culture  and  distinction  among  the  ranks  of  their 
own  side,  calling  them  ringleaders.  Among  these 
was  Tullius  Rufus,  an  ex-quaestor,  who  was  mortally 
wounded  by  a  soldier  who  deliberately  ran  him 
through  with  a  heavy  javelin;  and  similarly  Pom- 
peius  Rufus  was  stabbed  in  the  arm  with  a  sword  and 
would  have  been  done  to  death,  had  he  not  promptly 
rushed  to  Caesar's  side.  This  behaviour  caused 
grave  alarm  among  quite  a  number  of  Roman  knights 
and  senators,  who  retired  from  the  battle  lest  they 
themselves  should  also  be  massacred  by  the  soldiers, 
who  after  so  resounding  a  victory  had  apparently 
taken  it  for  granted  that  they  were  free  to  perpetrate 

279 


CAESAR 

peccandi  impunitatis  spe  propter  maximas  res  gestas, 
ipsi  quoque  interficerentur.  Itaque  ei  omnes  Scipio- 
nis  milites  cum  fidem  Caesaris  implorarent,  inspec- 
tante  ipso  Caesare  et  a  militibus  deprecante  eis  uti 
parcerent,  ad  unum  sunt  interfecti. 
86  Caesar  trinis  castris  potitus  occisisque  hostium  X 
milibus  fugatisque  compluribus  se  recepit  L  militibus 
amissis,  paucis  sauciis  in  castra  ac  statim  ex  itinera 
ante  oppidum  Thapsum  constitit  elephantosque 
LXIIII  ornatos  armatosque  cum  turribus  orna- 
mentisque  capit,  captos  ante  oppidum  instructos 
constituit,  id  hoc  consilio,  si  posset  Vergilius  quique 
cum  eo  obsidebantur  rei  male  gestae  suorum  indicio  a 
pertinacia  deduci.  Deinde  ipse  Vergilium  appellavit 
invitavitque  ad  deditionem  suamque  lenitatem  et 
clementiam  commemoravit.  Quem  postquam  anim- 
advertit  responsum  sibi  non  dare,  ab  oppido  discessit. 
Postero  die  divina  re  facta  contione  advocata  in 
conspectu  oppidanorum  milites  collaudat  totumque 
exercitum  veteranorum  donavit,  praemia  fortissimo 
cuique  ac  bene  merenti  pro  suggestu  tribuit,  ac 
statim  inde  digressus  Rebilo  pro  consule  cum  III  ad 
Thapsum  legionibus  et  Cn.  Domitio  cum  duabus 
Thysdrae,  ubi  Considius  praeerat,  ad  obsidendum 
280 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

any  excesses,  on  the  assumption  that  they  would  go 
unpunished  in  view  of  their  magnificent  achieve- 
ments. Accordingly,  although  all  these  troops  of 
Scipio  implored  Caesar's  protection,  they  were 
massacred  to  a  man,  despite  the  fact  that  Caesar 
himself  was  looking  on  and  entreating  his  troops  to 
spare  them. 

Having  made  himself  master  of  three  camps  and 
killed  ten  thousand  of  the  enemy  and  routed  a  large 
number,  Caesar  retired  to  camp  with  fifty  soldiers 
missing  and  a  few  wounded.  Immediately  on  his 
arrival  he  established  himself  in  front  of  the  town 
of  Thapsus.  He  then  took  sixty-four  elephants, 
equipped,  armed  and  complete  with  towers  and 
harness,  and  these  he  now  drew  up  in  array  in  front  of 
the  town:  his  object  in  so  doing  was  to  see  if  \'er- 
gilius  and  the  others  who  were  being  besieged  with 
him  could  be  induced  to  abandon  their  obstinate 
resistance  by  the  evidence  of  their  comrades' 
failure.  He  then  addressed  a  personal  appeal  to 
\'ergilius  inviting  him  to  surrender  and  reminding 
him  of  his  own  leniency  and  clemency ;  but  on 
failing  to  observe  any  response  he  withdrew  from  the 
town.  On  the  following  dav,  after  offering  sacrifice, 
he  held  a  parade  and  in  full  view  of  the  occupants 
of  the  town  congratulated  his  troops,  rewarding  his 
entire  veteran  force  and  bestowing  decorations 
publicly  in  front  of  the  dais  for  conspicuous  gal- 
lantry and  meritorious  service.  Thereupon  he 
inmiediately  withdrew  from  the  town,  leaving 
behind  the  proconsul  Rebilus  in  front  of  Thapsus 
with  three  legions  and  Cn.  Domitius  with  two  at 
Thysdra,  where  Considius  was  in  command,  to  con- 
tinue   the    blockades    of    these   places ;    and    then, 


CAESAR 

relictis,  M.  Messalla  Uticam  ante  praemisso  cum 
equitatu  ipse  eodem  iter  facere  contendit. 
87  Kquites  intei'im  Scipionis  qui  ex  proelio  fugerant, 
cum  Uticam  versus  iter  facerent,  perveniunt  ad 
oppidum  Paradae.  Ubi  cum  ab  incolis  non  recipe- 
rentur,  ideo  quod  fama  de  victoria  Caesaris  praecu- 
currisset,  vi  oppido  potiti  in  medio  foro  lignis  coacer- 
vatis  omnibusque  rebus  eorum  congestis  ignem 
subiciunt  atque  eius  oppidi  incolas  cuiusque  generis 
aetatisque  vivos  constrictosque  in  flammam  coiciunt 
atque  ita  acerbissimo  adficiunt  supplicio ;  deinde 
protinus  Uticam  perveniunt.  Superiore  tempore  M. 
Cato,  quod  in  Uticensibus  propter  beneficium  Ipgis 
luliae  parum  suis  partibus  praesidi  esse  existima- 
verat,  plebem  inermem  oppido  eiecerat  et  ante 
portam  bellicam  castris  fossaque  parvula  dumtaxat 
muniverat  ibique  custodiis  circumdatis  habitare 
coegerat;  senatum  autem  oppidi  custodia  tenebat. 
Eorum  castra  ei  equites  adorti  expugnare  coeperunt, 
ideo  quod  eos  Caesaris  partibus  favisse  sciebant,  ut 
eis  intei'fectis  eorum  pernicie  dolorem  suum  ulcis- 
cerentur.  Uticenses  animo  addito  ex  Caesaris 
victoria  lapidibus  fustibusque  equites  reppulerunt. 
Itaque   postea   quam   castra   non   potuerant   potiri, 

^  Nothing  is  known  of  the  details  of  this  law,  passed  in  his 
consulship  in  59  B.C.,  as  affecting  the  citizens  of  Utica. 

282 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

sending  M.  Messalla  on  ahead  to  Utica  with  the 
eavah-y,  he  himself  also  proceeded  with  despatch  to 
the  same  destination. 

Meanwhile  those  horsemen  of  Scipio's  who  had 
escaped  from  the  battle  were  proceeding  in  the 
dii-ection  of  Utica  when  they  came  to  the  town  of 
Parada.  Being  refused  admittance  by  the  inhabi- 
tants— for  the  tidings  of  Caesar's  victory  had  pre- 
ceded them — they  gained  possession  of  the  town  by 
force ;  then,  making  a  pile  of  faggots  in  the  middle 
of  the  market-place  and  heaping  on  top  all  the 
inhabitants'  possessions,  they  set  fire  to  it  and  then 
Hung  into  the  flames,  alive  and  bound,  the  inhabitants 
of  the  town  themselves,  irrespective  of  rank  or  age, 
thereby  meting  out  to  them  the  most  cruel  of  all 
punishments.  Whereupon  they  came  straight  to 
Utica.  Now  earlier  on  M.  Cato  had  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  on  account  of  the  benefit  they  had 
received  from  the  Julian  law  ^  the  men  of  Utica 
were  but  luke-warm  supporters  of  his  cause  ;  and  so 
he  had  expelled  the  unarmed  mob  from  the  town, 
built  a  concentration  camp  in  front  of  the  military 
gate,  protected  by  quite  a  shallowish  trench,  and 
forced  them  to  live  there  cordoned  off  by  sentries. 
As  for  the  town's  senate,  he  kept  it  under  restraint. 
This  concentration  camp  of  theirs  Scipio's  horsemen 
now  attacked  and  began  to  storm,  for  the  very 
reason  that  they  knew  that  its  occupants  had  been 
adherents  of  Caesar's  side ;  and  if  they  massacred 
them  their  destruction  might  serve  to  avenge  their 
own  sense  of  disappointment.  But  the  people  of  Utica, 
emboldened  as  a  result  of  Caesar's  victory,  drove  back 
the  horsemen  with  stones  and  clubs.  And  so,  finding 
it  impossible  to  gain  possession  of  the  camp,  the 

28^ 


CAESAR 

Uticam  se  in  oppidum  coniecerunt  atque  ibi  multos 
Uticensis  interfecerunt  domosque  eorum  expugna- 
verunt  ac  diripuerunt.  Quibus  cum  Cato  persuadere 
nulla  ratione  quiret  ut  secum  oppidum  defenderent 
et  caede  rapinisque  desisterent  et  quid  sibi  vellent 
sciret,  sedandae  eorum  importunitatis  gratia  singulis 
C  divisit.  Idem  Sulla  Faustus  fecit  ac  de  sua  pecunia 
largitus  est  unaque  cum  his  ab  Utica  proficiscitur 
atque  in  regnum  ire  intendit. 

Complures  interim  ex  fuga  Uticam  perveniunt. 
Quos  omnis  Cato  convocatos  una  cum  CCC,  qui 
pecuniam  Scipioni  ad  bellum  faciendum  contulerant, 
hortatur  uti  servitia  manumitterent  oppidumque 
defenderent.  Quorum  cum  partem  assentire,  partem 
animum  mentemque  perterritam  atque  in  fugam 
destinatam  habere  intellexisset,  amplius  de  ea  re 
agere  destitit  navisque  his  attribuit,  ut  in  quas 
quisque  partis  vellet  proficisceretur.  Ipse  omnibus 
rebus  diligentissime  constitutis,  libei'is  suis  L.  Caesari, 
qui  tum  ei  pro  quaestore  fuerat,  commendatis,  et  sine 
suspicione,  vultu  atque  sermone  quo  superiore 
tempore  usus  fuerat,  cum  dormitum  isset,  ferrum 
intro  clam  in  cubiculum  tulit  atque  ita  se  traiecit. 
Qui  dum  anima  nondum  exspirata  concidisset,  et 
impetu  facto  in  cubiculum  ex  suspicione  medicus 
familiaresque   continere   atque   vulnus   obligare   co- 

1  Wealthy  Roman  citizens — bankers  and  traders — organised 
in  an  influential  guild  or  corporation.  Whether  they  formed 
the  whole  conventus  or  only  the  council  of  a  larger  corporation 
is  not  clear;  nor  is  it  certain,  in  view  of  the  words  eos  qui 
inter  CCC  in  ch.  90,  whether  they  had  all  contributed  funds  to 
Scipio. 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

horsemen  hurled  themselves  upon  the  town  of  Utica, 
where  they  massacred  many  of  the  inhabitants  and 
stormed  and  looted  their  houses.  As  Cato  could  not 
persuade  them  l)y  any  means  to  join  him  in  defending 
the  town  or  cease  from  their  butchery  and  pillagins;', 
and  as  he  was  aware  of  their  intentions,  he  distributed 
a  hundred  sesterces  to  each  of  them  by  way  of 
appeasing  their  wanton  attitude.  Faustus  Sulla 
followed  suit  and  bribed  them  out  of  his  own  pocket ; 
he  then  left  Utica  with  them  and  proceeded  on  his 
v,ax  to  .Tuba's  kingdom. 

^leanwhile  a  considerable  number  of  the  fugitives 
reached  Utica.  All  these,  together  with  the  Three 
Hundred,^  who  had  contributed  money  to  Scipio  for 
the  prosecution  of  the  war,  Scipio  now  called  together 
and  urged  them  to  set  their  slaves  at  liberty  and 
defend  the  town.  On  perceiving  that,  while  some 
of  them  agreed  with  him,  others  were  thoroughly 
scared  at  heart  and  had  set  their  minds  on  flight,  he 
refrained  from  further  mention  of  the  subject  and 
assigned  ships  to  the  latter  to  enable  them  to  leave 
for  the  destination  of  their  individual  choice.  As  for 
himself,  having  made  all  arrangements  with  the 
greatest  care  and  entrusted  his  children  to  L.  Caesar, 
who  at  the  time  was  acting  as  his  quaestor,  he 
retired  to  bed  without  arousing  any  suspicions, 
there  being  nothing  unusual  either  about  the  way 
he  looked  or  the  May  he  talked;  and  then,  having 
secretly  smuggled  a  dagger  into  his  bedroom,  he 
accordingly  stabbed  himself.  He  had  collapsed  but 
was  still  breathing  when  his  doctor  and  some  members 
of  his  household,  suspecting  something  amiss,  forced 
their  way  into  the  bedroom  and  proceeded  to  staunch 
and  bind  up  the  wound ;   but  with  his  own  hands  he 

285 


CAESAR 

epissent,  ipse  suis  manibus  vulnus  crudelissime 
divellit  atque  animo  praesenti  se  interemit.  Quern 
L  ticenses  quamquam  oderant  partium  gratia,  tamen 
propter  eius  singularem  intcgritatem,  et  quod  dis- 
simillimus  reliquorum  ducum  fucrat  quodque  Uticam 
mirificis  operibus  muniverat  turrisque  auxerat, 
sepultura  adficiunt.  Quo  interfecto  L.  Caesar  ut 
aliquid  sibi  ex  ea  re  auxili  pararet  convocato  populo 
contione  habita  cohortatur  omnis  ut  portae  aperi- 
rentur :  se  in  C.  Caesaris  dementia  magnam  spem 
habere.  Itaque  portis  patefactis  Utica  egressus 
Caesari  iniperatori  obviam  proficiscitur.  Messalla,  ut 
erat  imperatuni,  Uticam  pervenit  omnibusque  portis 
custodias  ponit. 

Caesar  interim  ab  Thapso  progressus  Ussetam  ^ 
pervenit,  ubi  Scipio  magnum  frumenti  numerum, 
armorum,  telorum  ceterarumque  rerum  cum  parvo 
praesidio  habuerat.  Id  adveniens  potitur,  deinde 
Hadrumetum  pervenit.  Quo  cum  sine  mora  intro- 
isset,  armis,  frumento  pecuniaque  considerata  Q. 
Ligario,  C.  Considio  filio,  qui  tum  ibi  fuerant,  vitam 
concessit.  Deinde  eodem  die  Hadrumeto  egressus 
Livineio  Regulo  cum  legione  ibi  relicto  Uticam  ire 
contendit.  Cui  in  itinere  fit  obvius  L.  Caesar  et 
subito  se  ad  genua  proiecit  vitamque  sibi  neque 
amplius  quicquam  deprecatur.  Cui  Caesar  facile  et 
pro    natura    sua    et    pro    institute    concessit,    item 

^  so  most  MSS. ;  but  perhaps  Uzittam  should  be  read  with 
Kuebler  and  Bouvet. 

286 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

tore  it  open  with  utter  ruthlessness  and  resolutely 
made  an  end  of  himself.  Despite  their  hatred  of 
him  on  party  grounds,  yet,  on  aecount  of  his  unique 
integrity,  and  because  he  had  proved  so  very  different 
from  the  other  leaders  and  had  fortified  Utica  with 
wonderful  defences  and  extended  its  battlements,  the 
men  of  Utica  accorded  him  burial.  After  Cato's 
suicide  L.  Caesar,  intending  to  turn  this  incident 
somehow  to  his  personal  advantage,  delivered  a 
speech  to  the  assembled  people  in  which  he  urged 
them  all  to  open  their  gates,  saying  that  he  set  great 
store  by  C.  Caesar's  clemency.  Accordingly,  the 
gates  were  thrown  open  and  he  came  out  from  Utica 
and  set  forth  to  meet  Caesar,  the  commander-in- 
chief.  Messalla  arrived  at  Utica  in  accordance  with 
his  instructions  and  posted  guards  at  all  the  gates. 

Caesar  meanwhile  advanced  from  Thapsus  and 
arrived  at  Usseta,  where  Scipio  had  kept  a  large 
quantity  of  stores  including,  amongst  other  things, 
corn,  arms  and  weapons :  there  was  also  a  small 
garrison  force.  Of  this  arsenal  he  gained  possession 
on  his  arrival,  and  then  came  to  Hadrumetum. 
Entering  this  town  without  opposition,  he  made  an 
inventory  of  the  arms,  corn  and  money  in  it,  and 
spared  the  lives  of  Q.  Ligarius  and  C.  Considius, 
the  son,  both  of  whom  were  present  at  that  time. 
Then,  quitting  Hadrumetum  the  same  day  and 
leaving  Livineius  Regulus  behind  there  >nth  a  legion 
he  hastened  on  to  Utica.  On  the  way  he  was  met 
by  L.  Caesar,  who  incontinently  threw  himself  at  his 
feet  and  prayed  him  for  one  boon,  for  one  alone — ^to 
spare  him  his  life.  Caesar  readily  granted  him  this 
boon — an  act  which  accorded  both  with  his  natural 
temperament  and  principles ;    and  in  the  same  way 

287 


CAESAR 

Caecinae,  C.  Ateio,  P.  Atrio,  L.  Celiac  patri  et 
filio,  M.  Eppio,  M.  Aquino,  Catonis  filio  Damasippi- 
que  liberis  ex  sua  consuetudine  tribuit  circiterque 
luminibus  accensis  Uticam  pervenit  atque  extra 
oppidum  ea  noctc  mansit. 
90  Postero  die  mane  in  oppidum  introiit  contioneque 
advocata  Uticensis  incolas  cohortatus  gratias  pro 
eorum  erga  se  studio  cgit,  civis  autem  Romanes 
negotiatores  et  eos  qui  inter  CCC  pecunias  con- 
tulerant  Varo  et  Scipioni  multis  verbis  accusat  ^  et 
de  eorum  sceleribus  longiore  habita  oratione  ad 
extremum  ut  sine  metu  prodirent  edicit :  se  eis 
dumtaxat  vitam  concessurum ;  bona  quidem  eorum 
se  venditurum,  ita  tamen,  qui  eorum  ipse  sua  bona 
redemisset,  se  bonorum  venditionem  inducturum  et 
pecuniam  multae  nomine  relaturum,  ut  incolumi- 
tatem  retinere  posset.  Quibus  metu  exsanguibus  de 
vitaque  ex  suo  promerito  desperantibus  subito  oblata 
salute  libentes  cupidique  condicionem  acceperunt 
petieruntque  a  Caesare  ut  universis  CCC  uno  nomine 
pecuniam  imperaret.  Itaque  bis  milies  sestertio  ^  his 
imposito,  ut  per  tricnnium  sex  pensionibus  populo 
Romano  solverent,  nullo  eorum  recusante  ac  se  eo 


1  accusatos  MSS.  :   accusat  E.  Schneider. 

'  sestertium  most  MSS.  :   sestertio  Oudendorp. 


288 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

he  followed  his  normal  procedure  in  sparing  the 
lives  of  Caeeina,  C.  Ateius,  P.  Atrius,  L.  Cella  (both 
father  and  son),  M.  Eppius,  M.  Aquinus,  as  well  as 
Cato's  son  and  the  children  of  Damasippus.  He  then 
arrived  at  Utica  when  it  was  just  about  dusk  and 
spent  that  night  outside  the  town. 

Early  the  following  morning  he  entered  the  town 
and  summoned  an  assembly,  at  which  he  addressed 
the  citizens  of  Utica  in  a  stirring  speech  and  thanked 
them  for  the  zealous  support  they  had  given  him. 
As,  however,  for  the  Roman  citizens  who  were 
engaged  in  trade  and  those  members  of  the  Three 
Hundred  who  had  contributed  sums  of  money  to 
\'arus  and  Scipio,  he  brought  a  very  detailed  accusa- 
tion against  them  and  dilated  at  some  length  upon 
their  crimes,  but  finally  announced  that  they  could 
come  out  into  the  open  without  fear :  their  lives  at 
any  rate  he  would  spare :  their  property  indeed  he 
would  sell,  yet  on  the  following  condition,  that  if  any 
man  among  them  personally  bought  in  his  own 
property,  he  himself  would  duly  register  the  sale  of 
the  property  and  enter  up  the  money  paid  under  the 
heading  of  a  fine,  so  as  to  enable  the  man  in  question 
to  enjoy  full  security  thereafter.  For  these  men, 
pale  with  fear  and,  considering  their  deserts,  with 
little  hope  of  saving  their  lives,  here  was  an  un- 
expected offer  of  salvation.  Gladly  and  eagerly  they 
accepted  the  terms  and  besought  Caesar  to  fix  a 
lump  sum  of  money  to  be  paid  by  the  entire  Three 
Hundred  as  a  whole.  Accoi'dingly,  he  required  them 
to  pay  to  the  Roman  people  the  sum  of  two  hundred 
million  sesterces  in  six  instalments  spread  over  three 
years ;  and  this  they  accepted  gladly  and  without 
a    single    murmur,    expressing    their    gratitude    to 


CAESAR 

denium  die  natos  praedicantes  laeti  gratias  agunt 
Caesari. 
91  Rex  interim  luba,  ut  ex  proelio  fugerat,  una  cum 
Petreio  interdiu  in  villis  latitando  tandem  nocturnis 
itineribus  confectis  in  regnum  pervenit  atque  ad 
oppidum  Zamam,  ubi  ipse  domieilium,  coniuges 
liberosque  habebat,  quo  ex  cuncto  regno  omnem 
pecuniam  carissimasque  res  comportaverat  quodque 
inito  bello  operibus  maximis  muniverat,  accedit. 
Quem  antea  oppidani  rumore  exoptato  de  Caesaris 
victoria  audito  ob  has  causas  oppido  prohibuerunt, 
quod  bello  contra  populum  Romanum  suscepto  in 
oppido  Zamae  lignis  congestis  maximam  in  medio  foro 
pyram  construxerat  ut,  si  forte  bello  foret  superatus, 
omnibus  rebus  eo  coacervatis,  dein  civibus  cunctis 
interfectis  eodemque  proiectis  igne  subiecto  tum 
demum  se  ipse  insuper  interficeret  atque  una  cum 
liberis,  coniugibus,  civibus  cunctaque  gaza  regia 
cremaretur.  Postquam  luba  ante  portas  diu  multum- 
que  primo  minis  pro  imperio  egisset  cum  Zamensibus, 
dein  cum  se  parum  proficere  intellexisset  precibus 
orasset  uti  se  ad  suos  deos  penates  admitterent,  ubi 
eos  perstai'e  in  sententia  animadvertit  nee  minis  nee 
precibus  suis  moveri  quo  magis  se  reciperent,  tertio 
petit  ab  eis  ut  sibi  coniuges  liberosque  redderent 
290 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

Caesar  and  declaring  that  this  day  finally  marked  for 
them  the  start  of  a  new  life. 
91  Meanwhile  king  Juha  had  fled  from  the  battle 
and,  accompanied  by  Petreius,  by  lying  up  in  farms 
by  day  and  travelling  by  night,  arrived  at  length  in 
his  kingdom  and  came  to  the  town  of  Zama.  In  this 
town  he  had  his  own  residence  and  his  wives  and 
children ;  and  it  was  here  he  had  collected  all  his 
money  and  most  precious  possessions  from  all  over 
his  kingdom,  having  fortified  the  town  at  the  outset 
of  hostilities  with  very  strong  defences.  But  the 
townsfolk,  who  had  already  heard  the  much-desired 
tidings  of  Caesar's  victory,  refused  him  admittance 
on  the  following  grounds  :  when  he  entered  upon 
hostilities  with  the  Roman  people  he  had  collected  a 
mass  of  wooden  billets  and  built  a  vast  pyre  in  the 
town  of  Zama  in  the  middle  of  the  market-place,  so 
that,  should  it  so  chance  he  was  beaten  in  the  war, 
he  might  pile  all  his  possessions  on  it,  then  massacre 
all  his  citizens  and  fling  them  also  on  to  it,  set  it 
alight,  and  then  finally  slay  himself  on  top  of  it,  and 
thus  be  consumed  by  fire  along  with  his  children, 
wives,  citizens  and  the  entire  royal  treasure.  For  a 
long  time  Juba  earnestly  treated  with  the  men  of 
Zama  before  the  gates  of  the  town,  employing 
threats  in  the  first  place,  as  his  authority  warranted ; 
secondly,  realising  that  he  was  making  but  little 
headway,  he  besought  them  with  entreaties  to  let 
him  have  access  to  his  own  hearth  and  home ;  and 
thirdly,  when  he  observed  that  they  persisted  in  their 
determination,  and  that  neither  threats  nor  en- 
treaties on  his  part  had  any  effect  upon  them  or 
disposed  them  the  more  to  admit  him,  he  begged 
them  to  hand  over  to  him  his  wives  and  children,  so 

2gi 


CAESAR 

ut  secum  eos  asportaret.  Postquam  sibi  niliil  omnino 
oppidanos  responsi  reddere  animadvertit,  nulla  re.ab 
his  impetrata  ab  Zama  discedit  atque  ad  villain  suam 
se  cum  M.  Petreio  paucisque  equitibus  coiifert. 

92  Zamenses  interim  legates  de  his  rebus  ad  Caesarem 
Uticam  mittunt  pctuntque  ab  eo  uti  antequam  rex 
manum  eolligeret  seseque  oppugnaret  sibi  auxilium 
mitteret :  se  tamen  paratos  esse,  sibi  quoad  vita 
suppeteret,  oppidum  seque  ei  reservare.  Legates 
collaudatos  Caesar  domum  iubet  antecedere  ac  suum 
adventum  praenuntiare.  Ipse  postero  die  Utica 
egi'essus  cum  equitatu  in  regnum  ire  contendit. 
Interim  in  itinere  ex  regiis  copiis  duces  complures 
ad  Caesarem  veniunt  orantque  ut  sibi  ignoscat. 
Quibus  supplicibus  venia  data  Zamam  pervcnit. 
Rumore  interim  perlato  de  eius  lenitate  clementiaque 
propemodum  omnes  regni  equites  Zamam  perveniunt 
ad  Caesarem  ab  eoque  sunt  metu  periculoque  liberati. 

93  Dum  haec  utrobique  geruntur,  Considius,  qui 
Thysdrae  cum  familia  sua,  gladiatoria  manu  Gaetulis- 
que  praeerat,  cognita  caede  suorum  Domitique  et 
legionum  adventu  pcrterritus  desperata  salute 
oppidum   deserit   seque   clam   cum   paucis   barbaris 

292 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

that  lie  could  carry  them  away  with  him.  On 
observing  that  the  townsfolk  vouchsafed  him  no 
answer  at  all  he  left  Zama  without  gaining  any 
satisfaction  from  them,  and  then  betook  himself  to  a 
country  residence  of  his,  attended  by  M.  Petreius 
and  a  few  horsemen. 

Whereupon  the  men  of  Zama  sent  envoys  to 
Caesar  at  Utica  to  discuss  this  situation,  asking  him 
to  send  them  help  before  the  king  should  collect  a 
foi'ce  and  attack  them  :  at  all  events,  they  said,  they 
were  prepared  to  preserve  the  town  and  themselves 
for  him  so  long  as  the  breath  of  life  remained  in  them. 
Caesar  congratulated  the  envoys  and  bade  them 
return  home  :  he  would  follow  them,  and  they  must 
make  known  his  coming  in  advance.  He  himself 
left  Utica  the  following  day  with  his  cavalry  and 
proceeded  with  despatch  into  the  royal  territory. 
Meanwhile  in  the  course  of  his  march  there  came  to 
Caesar  several  leaders  of  the  royal  forces,  who  begged 
him  to  forgive  them.  To  these  suppliants  he  granted 
pardon,  and  then  came  to  Zama.  Meanwhile  the 
tidings  of  his  leniency  and  clemency  had  spread 
abroad,  with  the  result  that  practically  all  the  horse- 
men in  the  kingdom  came  to  Caesar  at  Zama ;  and 
there  they  were  set  free  by  him  from  their  fears  and 
the  danger  which  involved  them. 

During  the  course  of  these  proceedings  on  cither 
side  Considius,  who  was  in  command  at  Thysdra  and 
was  accompanied  by  his  household  slaves,  a  body- 
guard of  gladiatoi's  and  some  Gaetulians,  learned  of 
the  massacre  of  his  comrades ;  and  being  seriously 
perturbed  by  the  arrival  of  Domitius  and  his  legions, 
and  despairing  of  saving  his  life,  he  abandoned  the 
town,  made  a  secret  withdraMal  with  a  handful  of  his 

293 


CAESAR 

pecunia  onustus  subducit  atque  in  regnum  fugere 
contendit.  Quem  Gaetuli,  sui  comites,  in  itinere 
pracdae  cupidi  concidunt  seque  in  quascumque 
potuere  partis  conferunt.  C.  interim  \'ergilius, 
postquam  terra  marique  clausus  se  nihil  proficere 
intellexit  suosque  interfectos  aut  fugatos,  M. 
Catonem  Uticae  sibi  ipsum  manus  attulisse,  regem 
vagum  ab  suisque  desertum  ab  omnibus  aspernari, 
Saburram  eiusque  copias  ab  Sittio  esse  deletas, 
Uticae  Caesarem  sine  mora  receptum,  de  tanto 
exercitu  reliquias  esse  nullas,  ipse  sibi  suisque  liberis 
a  Caninio  pro  consule,  qui  eum  obsidebat,  fide 
accepta  seque  et  sua  omnia  et  oppidum  proconsuli 
tradit. 

94  Rex  interim  ab  omnibus  civitatibus  exclusus, 
desperata  salute,  cum  iam  cenatus  ^  esset  cum 
Petreio,  ut  per  virtutem  interfecti  esse  viderentur, 
ferro  inter  se  depugnant  atque  firmior  imbecilliorem 
luba  Petreium  ^  facile  ferro  consumpsit.  Deinde 
ipse  sibi  cum  conaretur  gladio  traicere  pectus  nee 
posset,  precibus  a  servo  suo  impetravit  ut  se  inter- 
ficeret  idque  obtinuit. 

95  P.  Sittius  interim  pulso  exercitu  Saburrae,  prae- 
fecti  lubae,  ipsoque  interfecto  cum  iter  cum  paucis 
per  Mauretaniam  ^  ad  Caesarem  faceret,  forte  incidit 

1  conatus  MSS.  :   cenatus  Buhenius. 

2  luba  Petreium  MSS. ;  but  lubam  Petreius  is  a  common 
restoration  u-hich  not  only  serves  to  improve  the  word  order  by 
securing  chiasmus,  but  also  conforms  to  the  traditional  account 
of  the  duel  given  both  in  Livy,  Epitome  and  Florus. 

'  The  MSS.  reading  appears  corrupt  :  the  phrase  is  barely 
intelligible  in  this  position,  and  Modken  may  well  be  right  in 
placing  it  after  Hispaniam.  One  MS.  (M)  gives  per  marit- 
timam,  whence  per  maritima  or  per  oram  maritimam  have  been 
conjectured. 

294 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

foreign  troops  and  a  large  sum  of  money,  and  beat  a 
hasty  retreat  to  Juba's  kingdom.  But  while  he 
was  on  the  road  the  Gactulians  who  bore  him  com- 
pany cut  him  down  in  their  impatience  to  loot  his 
treasure,  and  then  made  off,  as  best  they  could,  in 
various  directions.  Meanwhile  C.  \'ergilius,  who 
was  cut  off  alike  by  land  and  sea,  perceived  that  he 
was  making  no  progress  :  that  his  comrades  were 
either  killed  or  put  to  flight :  that  M.  Cato  had 
taken  his  own  life  at  Utica :  that  the  king  was  a 
wanderer  at  large,  abandoned  by  his  subjects  and 
held  in  universal  contempt :  that  Saburra  and  his 
troops  had  been  destroyed  by  Sittius  :  that  Caesar 
had  been  received  without  opposition  at  Utica ; 
and  that  out  of  all  that  vast  army  there  was  nothing 
left  whatever.  For  his  own  part,  therefore,  he 
accepted  the  safeguard  for  himself  and  his  children 
offered  him  by  the  pro-consul  Caninius,  who  was 
blockading  him,  and  surrendered  himself  to  the  latter 
with  all  his  effects  and  the  town. 

Meanwhile  king  Juba,  outlawed  by  all  his  town- 
ships, despaired  of  saving  his  life.  And  so  finally, 
after  dining  with  Petreius,  he  fought  a  duel  with  him 
with  swords,  so  as  to  create  the  impression  that  both 
had  met  a  gallant  death ;  and  the  sword  of  the 
stronger  man,  Juba,  easily  put  an  end  to  Petreius, 
his  weaker  adversai-y.  Juba  then  endeavoured  to 
run  himself  through  the  chest  with  his  sword ;  but 
not  being  able  to  do  it,  he  successfully  entreated  a 
slave  of  his  to  kill  him,  and  so  achieved  his  purpose. 

Meanwhile  P.  Sittius  had  routed  the  army  of 
Saburra,  Juba's  lieutenant,  killing  Saburra  himself, 
and  was  marching  with  a  small  force  through 
Mauretania  to  join  Caesar  when  he  happened  to  fall 

295 


CAESAR 

in  Faustum  Afraniumque,  qui  earn  manum  habebant 
qua  Uticam  diripuerant  iterque  in  Hispaniam  in- 
tendcbant  et  crant  numcro  circitcr  mille.  Itaque 
celeritcr  nocturno  tempore  insidiis  dispositis  cum 
prima  luce  adortus  praetcr  paucos  equites,  qui  ex 
primo  agmine  fugerant,  reliquos  aut  interfecit  aut  in 
deditionem  acccpit,  Afranium  et  Faustum  cum 
coniuge  et  liberis  vivos  capit.  Faucis  post  diebus 
dissensione  in  exercitu  orta  Faustus  et  Afranius 
interficiuntur ;  Pompeiae  cum  Fausti  liberis  Caesar 
incolumitatem  suaque  omnia  concessit. 

96  Scipio  interim  cum  Damasippo  et  Torquato  et 
Plaetorio  Rustiano  navibus  longis  diu  multumque 
iactati,  cum  Hispaniam  peterent,  ad  Hipponem 
regium  deferuntur,  ubi  classis  P.  Sitti  id  temporis 
erat.  A  qua  pauciora  ab  amplioribus  circumventa 
navigia  deprimuntur,  ibique  Scipio  cum  illis  quos  ^ 
paulo  ante  nominavi  interiit. 

97  Caesar  interim  Zamae  auctione  regia  facta  bonis- 
que  eorum  venditis  qui  cives  Romani  contra  populum 
Romanum  arma  tulerant  praemiisque  Zamensibus, 
qui  de  rege  excludendo  consilium  ceperant,  tributis 
vectigalibusque  regiis  locatis  ^  ex  regnoque  provincia 
facta  atque  ibi  C.  Sallustio  pro  consule  cum  imperio 
relicto  ipse  Zama  egressus  Uticam  se  recepit.  Ibi 
bonis    venditis    eorum    qui    sub    luba    Petreioque 

^  cum  quos  or  cum  illis  quas  MSS.  :  cum  illis  quos  Kuehler. 
2  togatis   most   MSS.    (irrogatis   in   two   inferior   Dresden 
codices)  :   locatis  R.  Schneider. 

296 


.     THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

in  with  Faustus  and  Afranius,  who  were  in  command 
of  the  party — some  thousand  strong — with  which 
they  had  phmdcred  Utica,  and  were  now  making 
tracks  for  Spain.  And  so  he  promptly  laid  an  ambush 
by  night  and  attacked  them  at  dawn.  A  few  of  the 
cavalry  in  their  vanguard  escaped ;  but  all  the  rest 
were  either  killed  or  else  they  surrendered,  and 
Sittius  captured  alive  Afranius  as  well  as  Faustus 
with  his  wife  and  children.  A  few  days  later  some 
disagreement  arose  in  the  army  and  Faustus  and 
Afranius  were  killed.  As  for  Pompcia  and  the 
children  of  f^austus,  Caesar  spared  their  lives  and 
allowed  them  to  retain  all  their  property. 

Meanwhile  Scipio,  Damasippus,  Torquatus  and 
Plaetorius  Rustianus  were  making  for  Spain  aboard 
some  warships ;  and  after  a  long  and  very  stormy 
passage  they  were  carried  towards  Royal  Hippo, 
where  P.  Sittius  had  his  fleet  at  that  time.  Out- 
numbered as  they  were  by  the  latter,  Scipio 's  vessels 
were  surrounded  and  sunk ;  and  Scipio  and  those  I 
have  just  named  perished  aboard  them. 

Meanwhile  at  Zama  Caesar  held  an  auction  of  the 
royal  property  and  sold  the  goods  of  those  who, 
albeit  Roman  citizens,  had  borne  arms  against  the 
Roman  people.  He  bestowed  rewards  upon  the 
inhabitants  of  Zama,  who  had  adopted  the  policy 
of  barring  their  gates  to  the  king,  farmed  out  the 
collection  of  the  royal  taxes,  and  turned  the  kingdom 
into  a  province.  Then,  leaving  C.  Sallustius  behind 
there  in  military  command  with  the  powers  of  pro- 
consul, he  himself  left  Zama  and  returned  to  Utica. 
There  he  sold  the  property  of  those  who  had  held 
military  commands  under  Juba  and  Petreius,  and 
exacted  the  following  payments  under  the  title  of 

297 


CAESAR 

ordines  duxerant,  Thapsitanis  HS  |XX,  conventui 
eorum  HS  |XXX,  itemque  ^  Hadrumctinis  HS  jXXX, 
conventui  eorum  HS  |L  multac  nomine  imponit ; 
civitates  bonaque  eorum  ab  omni  iniuria  rapinisque 
defendit.  Leptitanos,  quorum  superioribus  annis 
bona  luba  diripuerat,  et  ad  senatum  questi  per 
legatos  at(jue  arbitris  a  senatu  datis  sua  reccperant, 
XXX  centenis  milibus  pondo  olei  in  annos  singulos 
multat,  ideo  quod  initio  per  dissensionem  principum 
societatem  cum  luba  inierant  eumque  armis,  mili- 
tibus,  pecunia  iuverant.  Thysdritanos  propter 
humilitatem  civitatis  certo  numero  frumenti  multat. 
His  rebus  gestis  Idibus  lun.  Uticae  classem  con- 
scendit  et  post  diem  tertium  Caralis  in  Sardiniam 
pervenit.  Ibi  Sulcitanos,  quod  Nasidium  eiusque 
classem  receperant  copiisque  iuverant,  HS  C  multat 
et  pro  decumis  octavas  pendere  iubet  bonaque 
paucorum  vendit  et  ante  diem  llll  Kal.  Quint, 
navis  conscendit  et  a  Caralibus  secundum  terram 
provectus  duodetricesimo  die,  ideo  quod  tempesta- 
tibus  in  portibus  cohibebatur,  ad  urbem  Romam 
venit. 

^  itemque  appears  in  the  MSS.  before  Thapsitanis  :  Nipper- 
dey  transposed  it. 


298 


THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

fines :  from  the  men  of  Thapsus — two  million 
sesterces ;  from  their  corporation — three  million  ; 
likewise  from  the  men  of  Hadrumetum — three 
million ;  and  from  their  corporation — five  million. 
But  he  protected  their  cities  and  property  from  all 
injury  and  looting.  As  for  the  inhabitants  of  Leptis, 
whose  property  had  been  plundered  in  former  years 
by  Juba  but  had  been  restored  to  them  after  the 
Senate  had  appointed  arbitrators  on  receiving  a 
deputation  of  theirs  lodging  a  formal  complaint, 
Caesar  now  required  them  to  pay  by  way  of  fine 
three  million  pounds  weight  of  oil  annually,  because 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war  in  the  course  of  disagree- 
ments among  their  leaders  they  had  entered  into  an 
alliance  with  Juba,  and  had  assisted  him  with  arms, 
troops  and  money.  The  men  of  Thysdra — not  a 
well-to-do  community — were  fined  a  certain  quantity 
of  corn. 

After  making  these  arrangements  he  went  aboard 
his  fleet  at  Utica  on  June  1,3th,  and  arrived  two  days 
later  at  Caralis  in  Sardinia.  There  he  fined  the  men 
of  Sulci  one  hundred  thousand  sesterces  for  having 
harboured  Nasidius  and  his  fleet  and  assisted  him  by 
supplying  troops,  and  directed  that  they  should  pay 
as  tax  one-eighth  of  their  produce  instead  of  one- 
tenth.  He  also  sold  up  the  property  of  a  few 
individuals.  Then  he  embarked  on  June  27th,  and 
leaving  Caralis,  sailed  along  the  coast.  Twenty- 
seven  days  later — for  bad  weather  kept  holding  him 
up  in  the  various  ports — he  arrived  at  the  city  of 
Rome. 


299 


THE    SPANISH    WAR 


INTRODUCTION 

The  battle  of  Thapsus  sealed  the  fate  of  the  Pom- 
peians'  venture  in  Africa.  Once  again  their  army 
had  been  shattered  :  their  main  ally,  Juba,  was  dead  : 
Cato  and  Scipio  had  both  perished  by  their  own 
hands :  Afranius,  Petreius,  Faustus  Sulla  and  Con- 
sidius  had  all  been  killed  :  of  the  leaders  only  \'arus, 
Labienus  and  the  two  sons  of  Pompey  survived.  In 
Spain  lay  their  last  chance  of  regrouping  and  making 
another  stand.  But  this  time  they  were  not  to  enjoy 
so  long  a  respite  in  which  to  consolidate  ;  for  less  than 
nine  months  after  his  victory  at  Thapsus  Caesar  was 
to  set  foot  in  Spain  for  the  final  reckoning. 

For  two  months  after  the  battle  Caesar  was 
occupied  in  reducing  the  remaining  African  strong- 
holds, replenishing  his  finances  by  inflicting  heavy 
fines  upon  the  prosperous  communities  which  had 
lately  defied  him,  and  reorganising  the  province  and 
its  neighbouring  territories.  On  his  return  to  Rome 
in  July  4G  conditions  were  outwardly  more  settled 
than  on  his  previous  visit.  Honours  and  offices, 
including  a  third  dictatorship  .and  a  fourth  consulship 
for  the  ensuing  year,  were  showered  upon  him,  while 
preparations  went  ahead  for  his  delayed  triumphs. 
These  he  celebrated  in  August  with  unprecedented 
magnificence — over  Gaul,  Egypt,  Pontus  and  Africa  ; 
and  there  appears  to  have  been  a  general  feeling 
that  the  last  battle  of  the  civil  wars  had  already  been 

303 


INTRODUCTION 

fought  and  that,  with  Cato's  suicide,  the  struggle  to 
maintain  the  old  order  was  too  futile  to  pursue. 

Meanwhile  the  news  from  Further  Spain  was 
ominous.  Since  Caesar's  brilliant  victory  at  Ilerda 
in  49  much  had  happened  to  lessen  his  prestige  and 
revive  memories  of  Poinpey's  earlier  feats  of  arms  in 
the  peninsula.  The  prolonged  misgovernment  of 
Q.  Cassius  had  exasperated  the  Spaniards  and  driven 
several  of  the  Roman  legions  to  open  mutiny  ^ ; 
and  though  this  had  been  quelled  with  but  little 
bloodshed  and  Cassius  had  fled,  the  mischief  was 
done.  The  mutinous  legions,  fearing  Caesar's 
retribution,  expelled  the  new  governor,  Trebonius, 
and  chose  Scapula  and  Aponius  as  their  leaders ; 
and  when,  in  the  autumn  of  40,  Pompey's  elder  son, 
Gnaeus,  landed  in  the  province,  he  was  at  once 
elected  as  their  commander.  After  Thapsus  came 
the  refugees — his  younger  brother.  Sextus,  and  the 
remnants  of  the  broken  armies  led  by  Labienus  and 
Varus  ;  while  in  Spain  itself  many  of  the  troops  who 
had  once  served  with  Afranius  and  had  been  dis- 
banded by  Caesar  to  their  homes  in  Spain  now 
joined  his  standards.  By  the  end  of  46  Gnaeus  had 
thirteen  legions,  though  only  four  were  of  proved 
worth ;  and  though  his  own  record  ill  fitted  him  for 
the  supreme  command,  yet  he  had  two  valuable 
assets — the  magic  influence  of  his  father's  name  and, 
in  Labienus,  at  least  one  brilliant  and  experienced 
subordinate. 

Caesar  had  not  been  blind  to  these  ever-increasing 

dangers.     Didius  had  been  despatched  with  a  fleet : 

Pedius  and  Fabius  had  been  furnished  initially  with 

troops    from   Sardinia   and,   when   these   proved   in- 

1  See  Bell.  Alex.  chs.  4S-G4. 


INTRODUCTION 

sufficient,  i-einforced.  But  the  situation  had  got  out 
of  their  control :  most  of  Baetica  had  gone  over  to 
the  rebels,  and  the  few  remaining  loyal  communities 
like  Ulia,  unable  to  hold  out  much  longer,  kept 
sending  him  urgent  appeals  for  help.  Early  in 
November  46  Caesar  left  Rome  for  Further  Spain, 
whei"e,with  a  force  of  eight  legions  and  eight  thousand 
cavalry,  he  now  entered  upon  what  was  to  prove  the 
final  campaign  alike  of  the  war  and  of  his  own 
career. 

Of  this  campaign,  the  bloodiest  of  the  war,  we 
have  one  contemporary  account,  de  Bella  Hispaniensi 
— perhaps  the  most  illiterate  and  exasperating  book 
in  classical  literature.  Who  wrote  it  is  unknown ; 
but  he  appears  to  have  been  one  of  the  combatants  ^ ; 
and  Macaulay's  guess  that  he  was  some  '  sturdy  old 
centurion  who  fought  better  than  he  wrote  '  is 
possibly  not  far  off  the  truth.  In  view  of  the  sorry 
state  of  the  MSS.  tradition  it  is  difficult  to  assess 
accurately  his  historical  and  literary  merits :  all 
that  can  be  attempted  here  is  a  brief  and  general 
survey  of  his  qualities. 

As  a  military  commentator  he  lacks  a  sense  of 
proportion ;  for  while  he  describes — often  at  some 
length — all  kinds  of  engagements,  including  quite 
minor  skirmishes,^  as  well  as  frequent  atrocities,^ 
desertions  and  even  apparent  trivialities.*  yet  he 
throws  little  light  on  problems  of  supply,^  finance, 

^  cf.  in  ch.   29  the  topographical  details  of  the  plain  of 
Munda  and  the  allusion  to  the  weather. 
-  e.g.  eh.  13,  21,  27. 
'  e.g.  ch.  12,  15,  20,  21,  27. 

*  e.g.  the  appearance  of  the  moon  in  ch.  27. 

*  The  references  in  ch.  5,  1 1  and  26  are  very  vague. 


INTRODUCTION 

the  number  of  troops  engaged  '  and,  above  all,  the 
tactical  reasons  for  the  various  manoeuvres. ^  His 
grasp  of  tactics  seems,  in  fact,  negligible.^ 

His  enumeration  of  casualties  *  sometimes  reflects 
the  partisan ;  but  in  other  respects,  wherever  his 
narrative  can  be  compared  with  the  brief  accounts 
of  later  writers,  it  appears  in  the  main  to  be  reason- 
ably trustworthy. 

His  presentation  of  his  material  is  not  always 
effective.  He  tries  hard  to  follow  a  chronological 
sequence  and,  when  it  occurs  to  him  to  do  so,  he 
quotes  a  date.^  But  this  day-by-day  system  often 
involves  a  mere  catalogue  of  disconnected  incidents.* 
Nor  is  his  chronology  always  accurate :  not  seldom 
he  forgets  to  mention  something  in  its  proper  place 
and  so  has  to  go  back.' 

His  literary  style  is  poor.  Colloquial  expressions  ^ 
jostle  with  quotations  from  Ennius  and  reminiscences 
of  Homer :   his  vocabulary  is  limited  and  dull  repeti- 

^  Meagre  details  are  given  in  ch.  7  and  30. 

-  Thus,  while  he  accounts  for  Gnaeus's  taking  the  field  at 
Munda  in  ch.  28,  he  gives  no  reasons  for  the  manoeuvres  of 
ch.  27. 

^  e.g.  in  ch.  29  his  strange  assumption  that  the  Caesarians 
expected  the  enemy  to  come  down  to  tight  in  the  plain. 

*  e.g.  ch.  15  :  123  enemy  dead,  but  only  3  Caesarians  killed ; 
and  ch.  23,  where  after  desperate  hand-to-hand  fighting 
Caesarian  casualties  are  two  dead  and  several  wounded. 

^  e.g.  ch.  19,  27,  31,  39. 

6  e.g.  ch.  10,  11,  13,  20. 

'  e.g.  ch.  10  :  'I  forgot  to  mention  in  its  proper  place  '  ; 
moreover,  he  appears  to  have  coined  a  special  phrase  for  such 
emergencies,  if  the  recurrent  words  hoc  praeterito  tempore 
mean,  as  they  seem  to,  '  just  before  this  time  '. 

*  e.g.  his  constant  use  of  bene  in  the  sense  of  '  very  ',  which 
occurs  in  Cicero  (but  mainly  in  the  letters)  and  the  comic 
poets;    words  like  loricalus. 

306 


INTRODUCTION 

tions  of  the  same  word  or  phrase  are  frequent. ^  His 
grammar  is  uncertain,  often  colloquial,  sometimes 
barely  intelligible.-  But  his  chief  failing  is  a  want 
of  clarity  resulting  from  a  habit  of  not  stating 
clearly  the  subject  of  the  sentence  and  frequently 
changing  it  without  warning;  and  this  often  leads  to 
serious  ambiguities. ^ 

Nevertheless,  despite  all  its  obvious  failings,  de 
Bello  Hispaniensi  has  character.  Its  author  appeal's 
as  an  honest  man  struggling  with  an  unfamiliar 
task ;  and  if  fortune  had  not  preserved  his  efforts, 
our  knowledge  of  the  campaign  would  be  the  poorer. 

^  e.g.  his  monotonous  repetition  of  tlie  relative  pronoun  as  a 
connective  in  the  middle  of  ch.  3,  and  the  doubled  prope  in 
the  last  sentence;  also,  in  ch.  9,  committere  twice  in  the  same 
sentence.  The  repetition  of  tripertito  in  ch.  5  and  of  itaque 
nostri  procedunt  in  ch.  29  is  rather  different  and  suggests  the 
informal  style  of  conversation. 

-  See  ch.  22  for  several  examples  of  the  subjunctive  used  in 
factual  relative  clauses  :  ch.  36  for  renuntiare  followed  by  a 
quod  clause ;  and  in  ch.  27  the  barely  grammatical  phrase 
'  a.  d.  Hi  .  .  .  factum  est,  ex  eo  tempore  .  .  .'. 

^  See  note  1  at  foot  of  ch.  27,  and  ch.  38. 


307 


ANALYSIS   OF   THE   BOOK 


1  Cn.  Pompeius  ransacks  Further  Spain  for  troops  and 

money. 

2  Caesar  enters  the  province  and  joins  his  lieutenants. 
3-5       Caesar    sends    help    to    Ulia — marches    to    Corduba, 

thereby   relieving   Ulia — crosses   the    Baetis    by   a 
pontoon  bridge  :   indecisive  fighting  S.  of  the  town. 
6-19     Siege  of  Ategua 

Pompeius  encamps  S.  of  the  Salsum — description 
of  his  forces  and  of  the  terrain — skirmish  at  Castra 
Postumiana — sally  of  Ateguans  repulsed— peace 
overtures  rejected  :  Pompeius  skirmishes  success- 
fully N.  of  Salsum — Caesar's  cavalry  retaliate  dis- 
mounted— barbarous  behaviour  of  Pompeian  garri- 
son :  another  sally  from  the  town  repulsed— 
Tullius  and  Cato  offer  terms  which  Caesar  rejects  : 
further  heavy  fighting  round  the  town — it  surren- 
ders on  February  lUth. 
20-26     Operations  near  Ucubi 

Pompeius  executes  Caesarian  partisans  at  Ucubi  : 
party  strife  at  Ursao  :  skirmish  near  river  Salsum — 
gallantry  of  two  centurions  :  battle  on  high  ground 
near  Soricaria — Pompeius  repulsed  with  heavy 
losses  :  single  combat  between  Turpio  and  Niger  : 
evidence  of  disaffection  in  Pompeian  army. 
27-31     Operations  near  Munda 

Both  armies  move  S. — Caesar  storms  Ventipo — 
Pompeius  burns  Carruca — takes  field  outside 
Munda  :  description  of  the  terrain  :  Pompeius 
remains  on  defensive  on  high  ground — Caesar 
attacks — bitter  fighting — the  Tenth  legion  starts  the 
enemy  rout — total  casualties  on  either  side. 


308 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  BOOK 

CHAPTERS 

32-42     '  Mopping- up  '  Operations 

Fugitives  in  Munda  closely  invested:  Cn.  Pompeius 
flees  to  Carteia  :  Caesar  arrives  outside  Corduba- — ■ 
sedition  in  the  town  expedites  its  capture  :  Caesar 
marches  to  Hispalis — Philo  renews  resistance  and 
makes  a  final  sail}' — Hispalis  falls  :  Pompeius 
wounded  in  fighting  at  Carteia — flees  by  sea  with 
Didius  in  pursuit — his  fleet  destroyed — he  is  finally 
caught,  killed,  and  his  head  brought  to  Hispalis  : 
Didius  ambushed  and  killed  :  Fabius  finally 
reduces  Munda  :  Ursao  is  invested  :  Caesar  returns 
to  Hispalis — convenes  the  assembly — accuses  the 
people  of  base  ingratitude  in  supporting  Pompeius. 


309 


DE    BELLO    HISPANIENSI 

1  Pharnace  superato,  Africa  rccepta,  qui  ex  his 
proeliis  cum  adulescente  Cn.  Pompeio  profugissent, 
cum  .  .  .  et  ulterioris  Hispaniae  potitus  esset,  dum 
Caesar  muneribus  dandis  in  Italia  detinetur,  .  .  . 
quo  facilius  praesidia  contra  compararet,  Pompeius 
in  fidem  uniuscuiusque  civitatis  confugere  cocpit.^ 
It  a  partim  prccihus  partini  vi  bene  magna  com- 
parata  manu  provinciam  vastare.  Quibus  in  rebus 
non  nullae  civitates  sua  sponte  auxilia  mittebant, 
item  non  nullae  portas  contra  cludebant.  Ex  quibus 
si  (}ua  oppida  vi  ceperat,  cum  aliquis  ex  ea  civitate 
optime  de  Cn.  Pompeio  meritus  civis  esset,  propter 
pecuniae  magnitudinem  alia  qua  ei  inferebatur 
causa,  ut  eo  de  medio  sublato  ex  eius  pecunia  latro- 
num  largitio  fieret.     Ita  paucis  commoda  ab  hoste 

^  A.  Klofz  (Teubner,  1927)  conjerturally  restores  the  text  as 
follows  : — Pharnace  .  .  .  proeliis  •  superfuissent)  cum  <ad)> 
adulescente<m>  Cn.  Pompeium  profugissent,  cum  <Baleares 
appulisset)  et  ulterioris  .  .  .  detinetur,  <^magnas  copias  coege- 
runt.  Caesaris  autem  copiae  nil  profecerunt).  quo  facilius  . . . 
'  .  .  .  and  when  those  u-ho  had  survived  from  these  battles  had 
taken  refuge  with  the  young  Cn.  Pompeius,  ichen  he  had  put  in 
at  the  Balearic  Islands  and  had  gained  possession  of  Further 
Spain,  .  .  .  they  collected  large  forces.  Caesar's  forces,  however, 
made  no  headway.' 

^  i.e.  the  elder  of  the  two  sons  of  Cn.  Pompeius  Magnus. 
His  departure  from  Africa  before  the  decisive  battle  of  Thapsus 
is  mentioned  in  Bell.  Afr.  eh.  23,  where  he  is  described  as 

310 


THE    SPANISH   WAR 

1  Now  that  Pharnaccs  had  been  overcome  and  Africa 
recovered,  and  those  who  had  made  good  their 
escape  from  these  battles  with  the  young  Cn.  Pom- 
peius  1  had  .  .  .  and  he  had  gained  possession  of 
Further  Spain,  while  Caesar  was  occupied  in  Italy 
exhibiting  games,  ...  to  make  it  easier  to  gather  (Xriump 
together  defensive  forces  for  the  purposes  of  resist-  ^^^*"  * 
ance,  Pompeius  proceeded  to  throw  himself  upon  the 
protection  of  each  individual  state.  Having  in  this 
way  mustered  a  good  large  force,  partly  by  entreaties, 
partly  by  violent  measures,  he  was  now  playing  havoc 
with  the  province.  In  these  circumstances  some  states 
sent  reinforcements  of  their  own  accord,  while  on  the 
other  hand  some  shut  their  gates  against  him.  And 
if,  whenever  he  took  any  of  their  towns  by  force, 
there  was  any  rich  citizen  of  that  township  who  had 
deserved  well  of  Cn.  Pompeius,  yet  in  view  of  his 
great  wealth  some  other  charge  would  always  be 
brought  against  him,  in  order  that  he  might  be  done 
away  with  and  his  money  used  to  provide  a  handsome 
share-out  for  the  plunderers.     This  policy  enabled  a 

setting  course  for  the  Balearic  Islands.  From  references  in 
Cicero  and  Dio  it  appears  that  he  was  ill  in  the  summer  of  46, 
but  crossed  to  the  mainland  of  Spain  in  the  autumn  and 
attacked  New  Carthage.  Klotz's  restoration  of  the  sentence 
could,  I  think,  imply  that  all  the  Pompeian  survivors — 
including  those  from  Thapsus — eventually  joined  the  young 
Pompeius  in  Spain. 

311 


CAESAR 

orta  :  eo  ^  maiorcs  augcbantur  cnpiac.  Hoc  crebrius  ^ 
nuntiis  in  Italiam  missis  civitatcs  contrariae  Pompeio 
auxilia  sibi  depostulabant. 

2  C.  Caesar  dictator  tcrtio,  dcsifjnatus  dictator 
quarto  multis  ante  iter  rebus  confcctis  ^  cum  celeri 
festinatione  ad  bellum  conficiendum  in  Hispaniam 
cum  venisset,  legatique  Cordubenses,  qui  a  Cn. 
Pompeio  discessissent,  Caesari  obviam  venisscnt,  a 
quibus  nuntiabatur  nocturno  tempore  oppidum 
Cordubam  capi  posse,  quod  nee  opinantibus  adver- 
sariis  eius  provinciae  potitus  esset,  simulque  quod 
tabellariis,  qui  a  Cn.  Pompeio  dispositi  omnibus  locis 
essent,  qui  certiorem  Cn.  Pompcium  de  Caesaris 
adventu  facerent,  ipse  suum  cius  adventus  metum 
significasset,*  multa  practerea  veri  similia  propone- 
bant.  Quibus  rebus  adductus  quos  legatos  ante 
exercitui  praefecerat  Q.  Pedium  et  Q.  Fabium 
Maximum  de  suo  adventu  facit  certiores,  utque  sibi 
equitatus  qui  ex  provincia  fuisset  praesidio  esset. 
Ad  quos  celerius  quam  ipsi  opinati  sunt  appropinqua- 
vit  neque,  ut  ipse  voluit,  equitatum  sibi  praesidio 
habuit. 

3  Erat  idem  temporis  Sex.  Pompeius  frater  qui  cum 
praesidio  Cordubam  tenebat,  quod  eius  provinciae 
caput  esse  existimabatur ;  ipse  autem  Cn.  Pompeius 
adulescens  Uliam  ^  oppidum  oppugnabat  et  fere  iam 
aliquot   mensibus  ibi  detinebatur.     Quo  ex  oppido 

^  /  have  adopted  Fleischer's  emendation  of  the  MSS.  reading — 
ita  pacis  commoda  hoste  hortato. 

'  crebris  MSS.  :   crebrius  Xipperdey. 

^  multis  iterante  diebus  coniectis  MSS.  :  /  have  adopted 
Hoffmann  s  reading. 

*  ipse  .  .  .  significasset  is  Mommsen's  conjectural  restora- 
tion. 

'"  ullam  MSS.  :   Uliam  most  editors. 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

few  men  to  reap  profits  on  the  enemy  side,  and  their 
resources  correspondingly  increased ;  whereas  its 
effect  upon  the  states  opposed  to  Pompeius  was  to 
make  them  send  more  frequent  messages  to  Italy 
urgently  requesting  assistance  to  be  sent  to  them. 

2  C.  Caesar,  who  was  now-  in  his  third  dictatorship 
and  had  been  appointed  to  a  fourth,  had  had  much 
business  to  complete  before  he  took  to  the  road ; 
but  this  was  now  disposed  of,  and  he  had  come 
post  haste  to  Spain  to  finish  off  the  war.  Envoys  from 
those  in  Corduba  who  had  deserted  the  cause  of  Cn. 
Pompeius  had  met  Caesar  and  now  reported  that 
the  town  of  Corduba  could  be  captured  by  night, 
because  it  was  by  surprise  that  Pompeius  had 
mastered  his  rivals  in  that  province,  and  moreover, 
Pompeius  himself  had  revealed  his  own  fears  of 
Caesar's  arrival  by  the  fact  that  he  had  posted 
couriers  at  all  points  to  notify  him  of  Caesar's 
coming.  They  also  advanced  many  other  plausible 
reasons  besides  this.  Caesar  Avas  thereby  en- 
couraged and  informed  Q.  Pedius  and  Q.  Fabius 
Maximus,  the  two  officers  he  had  previously  ap- 
pointed to  command  his  army,  that  he  had  arrived, 
adding  instructions  that  the  cavalry  which  had  been 
raised  in  the  province  should  support  him.  But  he 
came  up  with  them  more  expeditiously  than  they 
themselves  anticipated,  and  so  did  not  have  the 
cavalry  to  support  him  as  he  himself  had  wished. 

3  At  the  same  time  there  was  the  brother,  Sextus 
Pompeius,  who  was  holding  Corduba  with  a  garrison 
force,  that  town  being  regarded  as  the  capital  of  the 
province ;  whereas  the  young  Cn.  Pompeius  himself 
was  attacking  the  town  of  Ulia,  and  had  now  been 
engaged  there  for  some  months  or  so.     On  learning 

313 


CAESAR 

cognito  Caesaris  advcntu  logati  clam  praesidia  Cn. 
Pompei  Caesarem  cum  adissent,  petere  coeperunt 
uti  sibi  primo  quoque  tempore  subsidium  mitteret. 
Caesar — earn  civitatem  omiii  tempore  optime  de 
populo  Romano  meritam  esse — celeritcr  sex  cohortis 
secunda  vigilia  iiibet  proficisci,  pari  equitcs  nuniero. 
Quibus  praefecit  hominem  eius  provinciae  iiotum  et 
non  parum  scientem,  L.  \'ibium^  Paciaecum.  Qui 
cum  ad  Cn.  Pompei  praesidia  venisset,  incidit  idem 
temporis  ut  tempestate  adversa  vehementique  vento 
adflictaretur ;  aditusque  vis  tempestatis  ita  obscura- 
bat  ut  vix  proximum  agnoscere  posset.  Cuius 
incommodum  summam  utilitatem  ipsis  praebebat. 
Ita  cum  ad  eum  locum  venerunt,  iubct  binos  equites 
conscendere,  et  recta  per  adversariorum  praesidia  ad 
oppidum  coiitendunt.  Mediisque  eorum  praesidiis 
cum  essent,  cum  quaererctur  qui  essent,  unus  ex 
nostris  respondit,  ut  sileat  verbum  facere :  nam  id 
temporis  conari  ad  murum  aecedere,  ut  oppidum 
capiant ;  et  partim  tempestate  impediti  vigiles  non 
poterant  diligentiam  praestare,  partim  illo  response 
deterrebantur.  Cum  ad  portam  appropinquassent, 
signo   dato    ab   oppidanis   sunt   recepti,    et   pedites 

^  vivium  MSS.  :   Vibium  Forckhammer. 

^  Klotz,  however,  interprets  : — '  a  man  familiar  with  that 
province  and  not  without  mlHtary  knowledge.' 

^  Or  possibly — '  bade  the  infantry  mount  pillion  '.  The 
subsequent  rapid  advance,  as  well  as  the  mention  of  the 
cavalry's  being  numerically  equal  to  the  infantn-,  tends, 
I  rather  think,  to  support  this  interpretation.  It  would, 
however,  fit  much  better  in  the  next  chapter,  where  the 
infantry  undoubtedly  took  to  the  horses  for  a  time.     Perhaps 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

of  Caesar's  arrival,  envoys  left  this  town  unbeknown 
to  Cn.  Pompeius'  outposts,  came  to  Caesar,  and  pro- 
ceeded to  entreat  him  to  send  them  help  at  the 
earliest  opportunity.  Caesar,  who  was  aware  that 
the  township  in  question  had  always  deserved  well 
of  the  Roman  people,  promptly  gave  orders  that  six 
infantry  cohorts  and  a  corresponding  number  of 
cavalry  should  set  out  at  the  second  watch  ;  and  in 
command  of  them  he  put  L.  Vibius  Paciaecus,  a  well- 
known  member  of  that  province,  and  one  that  knew 
it  pretty  well.^  Now  it  so  chanced  that  at  the  very 
time  he  came  to  Cn.  Pompeius'  outposts  he  was  beset 
by  bad  weather  and  a  violent  gale.  So  severe  was 
the  storm  and  so  dark  did  it  make  the  approaches 
to  the  town  that  they  could  scarcely  recognise  their 
next-door  neighbours.  To  them  indeed  this  draw- 
back proved  of  the  utmost  advantage.  And  so, 
when  they  had  got  thus  far,  he  bade  the  horsemen 
go  up  in  file,-  and  they  pushed  rapidly  forward  to 
the  town  straight  through  their  opponent's  positions. 
When  they  were  in  the  middle  of  their  positions  some- 
one asked  who  they  were  ;  and  one  of  our  men  told 
the  questioner  to  hold  his  tongue:  'just  at  the 
moment  they  were  trying  to  come  up  to  the  wall  so  as 
to  capture  the  town.'  It  was  in  fact  partly  the  dis- 
concerting effect  of  this  reply,  partly  the  difficulties 
of  the  storm,  which  prevented  the  sentries  fi'om  dis- 
playing proper  attention  to  their  duties.  When 
they  came  up  to  the  gate  they  gave  the  pass-word 
and  were  admitted  by  the  townsfolk :  the  infantry 
were  deployed  in  various  sectors  of  the  town  and 

the  author  was  confused  about  the  details  of  the  two  sorties, 
and  attributed  somewhat  allusively  to  both  the  tactics  which 
properl}'  belonged  only  to  one. 


CAESAR 

dispo&iti  ^  partim  ibi  rcmanserunt,  equites  clamore 
facto  eruptioncm  in  adversariorum  castra  fecerunt. 
Sic  in  illo  facto,  cum  inscientibus  accidisset,  existima- 
bant  prope  magna  pars  hominuin  qui  in  his  castris 
fuissent  se  prope  captos  esse. 

4  Hoc  misso  ad  Uliam  praesidio  Caesar,  ut  Pompeium 
ab  ea  oppugnatione  deduceret,  ad  Cordubam  con- 
tendit,  ex  quo  itinere  loricatos  viros  fortis  cum 
equitatu  ante  praemisit.  Qui  simul  in  conspcctum 
oppidi  se  dederunt,  cum  equis  recipiuntur,  hoc  a  Cor- 
dubensibus  nequaquam  poterat  animadverti.  Appro- 
pinquantibus  ex  oppido  bene  magna  multitudo  ad 
equitatum  concidendum  cum  exissent,  loricati,  ut 
supra  scripsimus,  ex  equis  descenderunt  et  magnum 
proelium  fecerunt,  sic  uti  ex  infinita  hominum 
multitudine  pauci  in  oppidum  se  reciperent.  Hoc 
timore  adductus  Sex.  Pompcius  htteras  fratri  misit  ut 
celeriter  sibi  subsidio  veniret,  ne  prius  Caesar 
Cordubam  caperet  quam  ipse  illo  venisset.  Itaque 
Cn.  Pompeius  Ulia  prope  capta  litteris  fratris 
excitus  cum  copiis  ad  Cordubam  iter  facere 
coepit. 

5  Caesar,  cum  ad  flumen  Baetim  venisset  neque 
propter  altitudinem  flimiinis  transire  posset,  lapidibus 
corbis  plenos  demisit :  insuper  ponit  trabes ;  ita 
ponte  facto  copias  ad  castra  tripertito  traduxit. 
Tendebat   adversum   oppidum   e   regione  pontis,  ut 

1  pedites  equites  clamore  facto  dispositis  MSS.  :    pedites 
dispositi  Nipperdeij. 

316 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

stayed  inside,  while  the  cavah-y  raised  a  shout  and 
saUied  forth  against  the  enemy  camp.  Thus,  in  the 
course  of  this  operation,  which  had  taken  the  enemy 
unawares,  well  nigh  the  majority  of  the  troops  in  this 
camp  thought  they  were  as  good  as  captured. 

Having  despatched  this  relief  force  to  Ulia,  Caesar 
marched  to  Corduba  with  the  object  of  inducing 
Pompeius  to  abandon  his  assault  of  Ulia ;  and  while 
on  the  march  he  sent  on  ahead  some  heavy-armed 
infantry  troops — brave  soldiers — accompanied  by 
cavalry.  No  sooner  had  they  come  within  sight  of 
the  town  than  they  all  took  to  the  liorses ;  but  this 
manoeuvre  it  was  quite  impossible  for  the  men  of 
Corduba  to  observe.  Now  as  they  were  approaching 
Corduba,  a  good  large  force  came  out  of  the  town 
to  cut  the  cavalry  to  pieces,  and  the  heavy-armed 
infantry  we  have  just  mentioned  now  dismounted. 
They  then  fought  a  great  battle,  to  such  effect  that 
out  of  that  countless  host  but  few  men  retired  back 
into  the  town.  In  his  alarm  at  this  reverse  Sextus 
Pompeius  was  constrained  to  send  a  despatch  to  his 
brother  urging  him  to  come  promptly  to  his  aid,  to 
prevent  Caesar's  capturing  Corduba  before  Gnaeus 
himself  could  arrive  thei'e.  Accordingly,  though 
Cn.  Pompeius  had  almost  captured  Ulia,  he  was 
disturbed  by  his  brother's  despatch  and  proceeded 
to  march  to  Corduba  with  his  forces. 

When  Caesar  came  to  the  river  Baetis  he  could  not 
cross  it  owing  to  the  depth  of  the  stream ;  so  he 
lowered  into  it  wicker  baskets  filled  with  stones, 
laid  beams  on  top  of  them,  and  thus  made  a  bridge, 
by  which  he  brought  his  forces  across  to  a  camp 
divided  into  three  sections.  He  was  now  encamped 
over  against  the  town  in  the  area  of  the  bridge,  and 

317 


CAESAR 

supra  scripsimus,  tripertito.^  Hue  cum  Pompeius 
cum  suis  copiis  venisset,  ex  adverso  pari  ratione 
castra  ponit.  Caesar,  ut  eum  ab  oppido  coinmea- 
tuque  exoludcret,  bracchium  ad  pontem  ducere 
coepit :  pari  idem  eoiidicioiie  Pompeius  facit.  Hie 
inter  duces  duos  fit  contentio  uter  prius  pontem 
occuparet ;  ex  qua  contentione  cotidiana  minuta 
proelia  fiebant,  ut  modo  hi,  non  numquam  illi 
superiores  discederent.  Quae  res  cum  ad  maiorem 
contentionem  venisset,  ab  utrisque  comminus  pugna 
inita,  dum  cupidius  locum  student  tenere,  propter 
pontem  coagulabantur,^  fluminis  ripas  appropin- 
quantes  coangustati  praecipitabantur.  Hie  alternis  ^ 
non  solum  morti  mortem  exaggerabant,  sed  tumulos 
tumulis  exaequabant.  Ita  diebus  compluribus  con- 
sumptis  cupiebat  Caesar,  si  qua  condicione  posset, 
adversarios  in  aequum  locum  deducere  et  prime 
quoque  tempore  de  bello  decernere. 
6  Id  cum  animadverteret  adversarios  minime  velle, 
quo   eos   quomodo   ab   Ulia  *   retraxerat  in  aequum 

^  After  demisit  the  MSS.  give  : — ita  insuper  ponte  facto 
copias  ad  castra  tripertito  transduxit  tenebat  adversum 
oppidum  e  regione  ponit  trabes  pontis  ut  supra  scripsimus 
tripertito.  The  reading  here  followed  is  that  of  Fleischer,  but 
ivith  Kroner's  tendebat  in  place  of  tenebat. 

^  coagulabant  3ISS.  :   coagulabantur  Kuebler. 

'  alterius  MSS.  :   alternis  most  editors. 

*  quos  quoniam  a  a  via  retraxerat  ut  MSS.  I  have  adopted 
Nipperdey's  restoration. 

*  viz.  the  permanent  bridge  over  the  Baetis  (Guadalquivir), 
the  northern  end  of  which  must  have  been  in  the  hands  of 
Sextus  :  Caesar's  object  was  to  deny  its  use  to  Gnaeus. 
Caesar's  line  presumably  ran  from  his  own  bridgehead  at  the 
southern  end  of  his  pile  bridge  to  the  southern  end  of  the  per- 
manent bridge  :  Gnaeus'  line  must  have  been  a  contra vallation. 

*  The  exact  import  of  this  colourful  expression  is  not  easy  to 

318 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

his  camp  was,  as  we  have  just  mentioned,  divided  into 
three  sections.  When  Pompeius  arrived  there  with 
his  forces  he  pitched  a  camp  on  the  same  principle 
on  the  opposite  side.  In  order  to  cut  him  off  from 
the  town  and  the  suppUes  it  afforded,  Caesar  began 
to  carry  a  Une  of  fortifications  to  the  bridge,^  and 
Pompeius  adopted  tactics  on  similar  lines.  Where- 
upon a  race  took  place  between  the  two  commanders 
as  to  which  of  them  should  seize  the  bridge  first ;  and 
this  race  gave  rise  to  daily  skirmishes  on  a  small  scale 
in  which  now  our  troops,  now  theirs,  would  come  out 
on  top.  This  situation  had  now  developed  into  a 
more  intensive  struggle,  and  both  sides  being  more 
]iassionately  bent  on  holding  their  ground  had  em- 
l)arked  upon  hand-to-hand  fighting  and  formed  a 
solid  mass  near  the  bridge ;  and  as  they  approached 
the  river's  banks  they  were  flung  headlong  into  it, 
packed  tightly  as  they  were.  At  this  point  the  two 
sides  vied  with  each  other  not  merely  in  piling  one 
death  upon  another  but  in  matching  mound  of  dead 
with  mound. 2  Several  days  were  passed  in  this 
fashion,  and  Caesar  was  anxious  to  bring  his  oppo- 
nents down  to  favourable  ground,  if  by  any  means  he 
could  do  so,  and  fight  a  decisive  action  at  the  earliest 
opportunity. 

Observing  that  his  opponents  were  by  no  means 
willing  to  do  this,  Caesar  led  his  forces  across  the 
river  and  ordered  large  fires  to  be  lit  at  night,  so  as 

decide.  As  it  seems  likely  that  the  purpose  of  the  whole 
sentence  is  merely  to  emphasise  the  extent  of  the  carnage,  the 
tumuli  are  probably  the  burial  mounds,  or  possibly  the  piles  of 
corpses.  The  elaborate  balance  of  expression  suggests,  I 
think,  that  tu)nulos  lumulis  are  the  rival  barrows.  Klotz, 
liowever,  interprets  the  latter  phrase  as  meaning  '  they  made 
the  barrows  to  look  like  hills.' 

319 


CAESAR 

deduceret,  copiis  flumine  traductis  noctu  iubet  ignis 
fieri  magnos  :  ita  firmissirnum  eius  praesidium  Ate- 
guani  proficiscitur.  Id  cum  Ponipeius  ex  perfugis 
rescisset,  qua  die  facultatem  nactus  est,  relinquens 
niontis  ^  et  angustias,  carra  complura  niulosque 
onustos  2  retraxit  et  ad  Cordubam  se  recepit. 
Caesar  munitionibus  Ateguam"^  oppugnare  et  brac- 
chia  circumducere  coepit.  Cui  de  Pompeio  cum  nun- 
tius  esset  allatus  eo  die  proficisci,'*  cuius  in  adventum 
praesidi  causa  Caesar  complura  castella  occupasset, 
partim  ubi  equitatus,  partim  ubi  pedestres  copiae  in 
statione  et  in  excubitu  ^  castris  praesidio  esse  possent, 
hie  in  adventu  Pompei  incidit  ut  matutino  tempore 
nebula  esset  crassissima.  Ita  ilia  obscuratione  cum 
aliquot  cohortibus  et  equitum  turmis  circumcludunt 
Caesaris  equites  et  concidunt,  sic  ut  vix  in  ea  caede 
pauci  eftugerent. 

Insequenti  nocte  castra  sua  incendit  Pompeius  et 
trans  flumen  Salsum  per  convallis  castra  inter  duo 
oppida  Ateguam  et  Ucubim  in  monte  constituit. 
Caesar  interim  munitionibus  ceterisque  quae  ad 
oppugnanduin  opus  fuerunt  perfectis  aggerem 
vineasque  agere  instituit.®  Haec  loca  sunt  montuosa 
et  natura  impedita  '  ad  rem  militarem  ;  quae  planitie 

^  nactus  .  .  .  montis  ^vas  supplied  by  Mommsen. 
^  multosque    lanistas    MSS.  :    mulosque  onustos    Nipper- 
dey. 

^  antequam  or  antiquas  MSS.  :   Ateguam  Aldus. 

*  proficiscitur  MSS.  :   proficisci  Vahlen. 

*  in  stationes  in  excubitus  MSS.  :  in  statione  et  in  excubitu 
editors. 

*  Caesar  in  munitionibus  ceterisque  quae  ad  oppidum  opus 
fuerunt  aggerem  MSS.  :  interim  Fleischer;  uppugnandum 
Kraner;   perfectis  supplied  by  Nipperdey. 

'  edita  MSS.  :   impedita  Mommsen. 

320 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

to  entice  them  into  the  plain  just  as  he  had  drawn 
them  away  from  UUa ;  and  in  this  manner  he  set  out 
for  Ategua,  the  strongest  garrison  of  Pompeius.  When 
Pompeius  got  to  know  of  this  from  deserters,  on  the 
first  day  that  afforded  him  the  opportunity  he  quitted 
the  mountain  passes  and  retired  to  Corduba  with  a 
numerous  train  of  carts  and  laden  mules. ^  Caesar  be- 
gan to  assault  Ategua  bv  surrounding  it  with  siege 
works  and  fortified  lines.  Now  a  message  had  been 
brought  to  him  concerning  Pompeius  to  the  effect  that 
he  was  setting  out  that  day ;  and  by  way  of  safe- 
guarding himself  against  Pompeius'  coming  Caesar 
had  occupied  several  forts  where  in  some  cases 
cavalry,  in  others  infantry  forces  could  be  posted  as 
outlying  pickets  and  sentries  to  protect  his  camp  : 
yet,  in  these  circumstances,  it  so  chanced  that 
when  Pompeius  did  arrive  there  was  a  very  thick 
mist  in  the  early  morning.  And  so  in  the  re- 
sulting gloom  the  Pompeians  surrounded  Caesar's 
cavalry  with  a  number  of  infantry  cohorts  and 
squadrons  of  horse,  and  cut  them  up  so  severely 
that  but  few  men  barely  managed  to  escape  that 
massacre. 

The  following  night  Pompeius  burned  his  camp 
and,  passing  through  the  valleys  on  the  far  side  '^  of  the 
river  Salsum.  established  a  camp  on  a  hill  between  the 
two  towns  of  Ategua  and  Ucubi.  Meanwhile  Caesar 
had  completed  his  emplacements  and  all  his  other 
dispositions  which  were  required  for  assaulting  the 
town,  and  proceeded  to  carry  forward  a  ramp  fur- 
nished with  mantlets.  Now  this  area  is  mountainous 
and  offers  natural  obstructions  to  military  operations  : 
it   is   divided   by    a   plain — the   basin   of  the   river 

^  See  Appendix  B,  p.  397.  ^  i.e.  S.  of  the  river. 

321 


CAESAR 

dividimtur,  Salso  flumine,  proxime  tamen  Ateguam 
ut  flumen  sit  circiter  passus  duo  milia.  Kx  ea 
regione  oppidi  in  montibus  castra  hahuit  posita 
Pompcius  in  conspcctu  iitrnrumque  oppidonini,  neque 
suis  ausus  est  subsidio  venire.  Aquilas  et  signa 
habuit  XIII  legionuni ;  sed  ex  quibus  alicjuid 
firmanienti  se  existimabat  habere  duae  fuerunt 
vernaculae,  quae  a  Trebonio  transfugerant ;  una 
facta  ex  colonis  qui  fuerunt  in  his  regionibus ; 
quarta  fuit  Afraniana  ex  Africa  quam  secum  ad- 
duxerat ;  reliquae  ex  fugitivis  auxiliariisve  ^  con- 
sistebant :  nam  de  levi  armatura  et  equitatu  longe 
et  virtute  et  numero  nostri  erant  superiores. 
8  Accedebat  hue,  ut  longius  bellum  duceret  Pom- 
peius,  quod  loca  sunt  edita  et  ad  castrorum  muni- 
tiones  non  paruni  idonea.  Nam  fere  totius  ulterioris 
Hispaniae  regio  propter  terrae  fecunditatem  et  non 
minus   copiosam   aquationem  -  inopem   difficilcmque 

^  auxiliares  3ISS.  :   auxiliariisve  Mommscn. 

*  et  .  .  .  aquationem  follow  oppugnationem  in  the  MSS. : 
Nipperdey  transposed  them. 

1  Klntz,  who  puts  a  full  stop  after  sit,  takes  this  last  phrase 
as  meaning  '  Some  two  miles  distant  from  the  sector  concerned 
of  the  town  Pompeius  had  his  camp  .  .  .'  I  have  followed  the 
punctuation  of  Holmes  and  Du  Pontet. 

*  It  seems  very  difficult  to  identify  these  four  reliable 
legions  with  any  certainty.  The  only  Pompeian  legions 
definitelv  named  in  the  narrative  are: — the  First  (ch.  18); 
the  Second  (ch.  13) ;  and  the  Thirteenth  (ch.  34).  From  Bell. 
Alex.  chs.  50-54  it  is  clear  that  Cassius,  whom  Trebonius 
succeeded  as  governor  of  Further  Spain,  had  five  legions  : 
the  Twent3'-first  and  the  Thirtieth  (raised  in  Italy) ;  the 
Second  (long  quartered  in  Spain);  the  'native  legion' 
(always  thus  named) ;  and  the  Fifth  (newly  raised  in  Spain  by 
Cassius  himself).  Of  these  the  Second,  Fifth  and  the  native 
legion  joined  the  mutiny  against  Cassius,  and  shewed  Pom- 

322 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

Salsum — in  such  a  way,  however,  that  the  river  is 
nearest  Ategua,  the  distance  being  about  two  miles. ^ 
It  was  in  this  direction,  namely  that  of  Ategua,  that 
Pompeius  had  his  camp  pitched  in  the  mountains  in 
sight  of  both  towns,  without,  however,  venturing 
to  come  to  the  aid  of  his  comrades.  He  had  the 
eagles  and  standards  of  thirteen  legions  ;  but  among 
those  which  he  thought  afforded  him  any  solid 
support  two  were  native  legions,  having  deserted 
from  Trebonius ;  a  third  had  been  raised  from  the 
local  Roman  settlers ;  a  fourth  was  one  which  was 
once  commanded  by  Afranius  and  which  Pompeius 
had  brought  with  him  from  Africa  ^ :  while  the  rest 
were  made  up  of  runaways  or  auxiliaries.  As  for 
light-armed  units  and  cavaliy,  our  troops  were  in 
fact  far  superior  both  in  quality  and  quantity. 

Besides  this,  there  was  another  factor  which 
prompted  Pompeius  to  protract  hostilities  ^ — the  hilly 
type  of  country  by  no  means  unsuitable  for  the 
fortification  of  camps.  In  fact,  practically  the  whole 
region  of  Further  Spain,  fertile  as  it  is  and  corre- 
spondingly well  watered,  makes  a  siege  a  fruitless 

peian  sympathies;  for  which  reason  it  would  not  seem 
surprising  if  they  were  opposing  Caesar  now.  Holmes  was 
satisfied  that  the  other  of  the  two  native  legions  here  mentioned 
was  the  Fifth ;  but  he  assumed,  without  accounting  for  the 
reference  in  ch.  13,  that  the  Second  had  now  joined  Caesar. 
Klotz,  on  the  other  hand,  asserting  that  there  was  never  more 
than  one  native  legion  in  Spain,  adopts  Mommsen's  emendation 
and  reads  vernacula  eit  secnnda  >.  This  drastic  course  seems 
indeed  the  only  method  of  including  the  Second ;  and  the 
Fifth  might  well  be  the  one  described  as  '  raised  from  the 
local  Roman  settlers '.  But  the  whole  problem  is  obscure. 
See  also  ch.  13,  note  1  (trans.). 

^  i.e.  his  strategic  decision  not  to  relieve  Ategua  was 
influenced  not  only  bj^  his  inferiority  in  troops,  but  also  by 
the  terrain. 


CAESAR 

habet  oppu^nationem.  Hie  etiam  propter  bar- 
barorum  crebras  excursiones  omnia  loca  quae  sunt  ab 
oppidis  remota  turribus  et  munitionibus  retinentur, 
sicut  in  Africa,  rudere,  non  tcfrulis  teguntur;  simul- 
que  in  his  habent  speculas  et  propter  altitudinem  late 
longeque  prospieiunt.  Item  oppidorum  magna  pars 
eius  provineiae  montibus  fere  munita  et  natura 
excellentibus  loeis  est  eonstituta,  ut  sirtiul  aditus 
ascensusque  habeat  difficilis.  Ita  ab  oppugnationibus 
natura  loci  distinentur,  ut  civitates  Hispaniae  non 
facile  ab  hoste  capiantur ;  id  quod  in  hoc  contigit 
bello.  Nam  cum  inter  Ateguam  et  Ucubim,  quae 
oppida  supra  sunt  scripta,  Pompeius  habuit  castra 
eonstituta  in  conspectu  duorum  oppidorum,  ab  suis 
castris  circiter  milia  passuum  Illl  grumus  est  excel- 
lens  natura,  qui  appellatur  Castra  Postuniiana  :  ibi 
praesidi  causa  castellum  Caesar  habuit  constitutum. 
9  Quod  Pompeius,  quod  eodem  iugo  tegebatur  loci 
natura  et  remotuni  erat  a  castris  Caesaris,  animad- 
vertebat  ^  et,  quia  flumine  Salso  intercludebatur,  non 
esse  commissurum  Caesarcm  ut  in  tanta  loci  diffi- 
cultate  ad  subsidium  niittendum  se  committeret.^ 
Ita  fretus  opinione  tertia  vigilia  profectus  castellum 
oppugnare  coepit.  Cum  appropinquassent,  clamore 
repentino  telorumque  multitudine  iactus  facere 
coeperunt,  uti  magnam  partem  hominum  vulueribus 

^  animadvertebat  loci  difficultatem  et  MSS.  :  Du  Pontet 
deleted  loci  difficultatem. 

^  committendum  se  mitteret  MSS.  :  mittendum  se  com- 
mitteret  Nipperdey. 


^  This  is  usually  identified  with  the  modern  hill  of  Harinilla, 
some  3  miles  S.W.  of  Teba.  It  was  probably  named  after  L. 
Postumius  Albinus,  propraetor  of  Further  Spain  in  180-179. 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

and  difficult  task.  Here  too,  in  view  of  the  constant 
sallies  of  the  natives,  all  places  which  are  remote 
from  towns  are  firmly  held  by  towers  and  fortifica- 
tions, as  in  Africa,  roofed  over  with  rough-cast,  not 
tiles.  Moreover,  they  have  watch-towers  in  them, 
commanding  a  view  far  and  wide  by  reason  of  their 
altitude.  Again,  a  large  proportion  of  the  towns  of 
this  province  are  more  or  less  protected  by  the 
mountains  and  are  established  in  naturally  elevated 
positions,  with  the  result  that  the  approach  to  them, 
involving  as  it  does  a  simultaneous  climb,  proves  a 
difficult  task.  Thus  it  is  their  natural  position  that 
holds  them  aloof  from  sieges,  and  as  a  result  the 
townships  of  Spain  are  no  easy  prey  to  an  enemy, 
as  proved  to  be  the  case  in  this  war.  To  take  the 
present  instance  :  Pompeius  had  his  camp  established 
between  the  above-mentioned  towns  of  Ategua  and 
Ucubi,  in  sight  of  both  of  them  ;  and  some  four  miles 
distant  from  his  camp  there  lies  a  hillock — a  natural 
elevation  which  goes  by  the  name  of  the  Camp  of 
Postumius  1 ;  and  there  Caesar  had  established  a  fort 
for  purposes  of  defence. 

Now  Pompeius  observed  that  this  fort  was  screened 
by  its  natural  position  on  the  same  I'idge  of  hills 
and  was  some  distance  away  from  Caesar's  camp ; 
and  he  further  observed  that  Caesar,  cut  off  as  he 
was  from  it  by  the  river  Salsum,  was  not  likely  to  let 
himself  be  committed  to  sending  support,  considering 
the  very  difficult  character  of  the  ground.  Accord- 
ingly, with  the  courage  of  his  convictions,  he  set  out 
at  the  third  watch  and  proceeded  to  attack  the  fort. 
On  their  approach  they  suddenly  raised  a  shout  and 
began  to  launch  heavy  volleys  of  missile  weapons, 
with  the  result  that  they  wounded  a  large  proportion 

325 


CAESAR 

adficerent.  Quo  peracto,  cum  ex  castello  repugnare 
coepissent  maioribusque  castris  Caesari  nuntius 
esset  allatus,  cum  III  legionibus  est  profectus,  ut 
laborantibus  succurreret  nostris ;  ^  et  cum  ad  eos 
appropinquasset,  fuga  perterriti  multi  sunt  inter- 
fecti,  complures  capti,  in  quibus  duo  centuriones  ^ : 
multi  praeterea  armis  exuti  fugerunt,  quorum  scuta 
sunt  relata  LXXX. 

10  Insequenti  luce  Arguetius  ex  Italia  cum  equitatu 
venit.  Is  signa  Saguntinorum  rettulit  quinque, 
quae  ab  oppidanis  cepit.  Suo  loco  praeteritum  est  ^ 
quod  equites  ex  Italia  cum  Asprenate  ad  Caesarem 
venissent.  Ea  nocte  Pompeius  castra  sua  incendit 
et  ad  Cordubam  versus  iter  facere  coepit.  Rex 
nomine  Indo,  qui  cum  equitatu  suas  copias  adduxerat, 
dum  cupidius  agmen  adversariorum  insequitur,  a 
vernaculis  legionariis  exceptus  est  et  interfectus. 

11  Postero  die  equites  nostri  longius  ad  Cordubam 
versus  prosecuti  sunt  eos  qui  commeatus  ad  castra 
Pompei  ex  oppido  portabant.  Ex  his  capti  L  cum 
iumentis  ad  nostra  adducti  sunt  castra.  Eo  die  Q. 
Marcius,  tribunus  militum  qui  fuit  Pompei,  ad  nos 
transfugit ;   et  noctis  tertia  vigilia  in  oppido  acerrime 

^  ut  .  .  .  nostris  (nostri  MSS.)  transposed  by  Xipperdey.    In 
the  MSS.  they  fullow  coepit,  5  lines  above. 
2  centurionea  supplied  by  Oudendorp. 
'  praeterritus  est  most  AISS.  :  praeteritum  est  Davies. 


^  or — '  were  panic-stricken  by  the  ensuing  rout,  and  many 
were  killed  .  .  .' 

^  Possibly,  the  place  mentioned  by  Pliny  (III,  1,  15)  in  a 
list  of  tributary  Baeturian  towns  under  the  jurisdiction  of 
Cadiz.  If  so,  he  would  seem  to  have  come  by  sea.  Klotz, 
however,  assumes  the  reference  to  be  to  Saguntum.  See 
Index. 

326 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

of  the  defenders.  Whereupon  the  latter  began  to 
fight  back  froin  the  fort ;  and  when  the  tidings  were 
brought  to  Caesar  in  his  main  camp  he  set  out  with 
three  legions  to  succour  our  hard-pressed  troops. 
When  he  reached  them  the  enemy  retired  in  rout 
and  panic,^  with  many  killed  and  several  captured, 
including  two  centurions.  Many  in  addition  threw 
away  their  arms  and  fled,  and  eighty  of  their  shields 
were  brought  back  by  our  men. 

On  the  following  day  Arguetius  arrived  with 
cavalry  from  Italy.  He  brought  with  him  five 
standards  belonging  to  the  men  of  Saguntia,"'  which 
he  took  from  the  inhabitants  of  that  town.  I 
omitted  to  mention  in  its  proper  place  the  arrival  of 
the  cavalry  who  came  to  Caesar  from  Italy  with 
Asprenas.  That  night  Pompeius  burned  his  camp 
and  proceeded  to  march  towards  Corduba.^  A  king 
n:imed  Indo,  who  had  accompanied  the  cavalry,  bring- 
ing with  him  troops  of  his  own,  pursued  the  enemy's 
column  somewhat  too  eagerly,  and  in  the  process 
was  cut  off  and  killed  by  ti'oops  of  the  native 
legions. 

On  the  next  day  our  cavalry  fared  somewhat  far 
afield  in  the  direction  of  Corduba  in  pursuit  of  those 
who  were  carrying  supplies  from  the  town  to  Pom- 
peius' camp.  Fifty  of  the  latter  were  captured  and 
brought  with  their  pack  animals  to  our  camp.  That 
day  Q.  Marcius,  who  was  one  of  Pompeius'  military 
tribunes,  deserted  to  us.  At  the  third  watch  of  the 
night  there  was  very  sharp  fighting  in  the  area  of  the 

^  Klotz  plausibly  suggests  that  Castra  Postumiana  was  a 
serious  threat  to  his  lines  of  communication  with  Corduba ; 
and  that  having  failed  to  capture  it,  he  now  decided  to  with- 
draw farther  West. 

327 


CAESAR 

pugnatum  est,  ignemque  multum  miserunt.^  Hoc 
praeterito  tempore  C.  Fuiulanius,  eques  Romanus, 
ex  eastris  adversariorum  ad  nos  transfugit. 
12  Postero  die  ex  legione  vernacula  milites  sunt  capti 
ab  equitibus  nostris  duo,  qui  dixerunt  se  servos  esse. 
Cum  venirent,  cogniti  sunt  a  militibus  qui  antea  cum 
Fable  ^  et  Pedio  fuerant.et  a^Trebonio  transfugerant. 
Eis  ad  ignoscendum  nulla  facultas  est  data  et  a 
militibus  nostris  interfecti  sunt.  Idem  temporis 
capti  tabellarii,  qui  a  Corduba  ad  Pompeium  missi 
erant  perperamque  ad  nostra  castra  pervenerant, 
praecisis  manibus  missi  sunt  facti.  Pari  consuetudine 
vigilia  secunda  ex  oppido  ignem  multum  telorumque 
multitudinem  iactando  bene  magnum  tempus  con- 
sumpserunt  complurisque  vulneribus  adfecerunt. 
Praeterito  noctis  tempore  eruptionem  ad  legionem 
VI.  fecerunt,  cum  in  opere  nostri  distenti  essenf, 
acriterque  pugnare  coeperunt ;  quorum  vis  repressa  a 
nostris,  etsi  oppidani  superiore  loco  defendebantur. 
Hi  *  cum  eruptionem  facere  coepissent,  tamen  virtute 
militum  nostrorum,  etsi  inferiore  loco  premebantur, 

1  The  MSS.  add  :   sicut  omne  genus  quibus  ignis  per  iactus 
solitus  est  mitti.     /  have  followed  Hoffmann  in  deleting  them. 

2  babio  or  babibio  or  habio  MSS.  :   Fabio  Glandorp. 

^  (a)  supplied  by  Kuebler,  who  assumed  a  lacuna  after  fuerant. 
*  -V  MSS.  :   Hi  Davies. 


^  I  think  that  Holmes  was  right  in  assuming  that  this 
curious  temporal  phrase  refers  back  to  the  past  (literally — "  at 
this  past  time  ');  and  that  the  author  employs  it  whenever 
his  chronology  has  got  out  of  hand.  Thus,  just  as  in  ch.  10 
the  arrival  of  Arguetius  reminds  him  to  mention  belatedly  the 
earlier  arrival  of  Asprenas,  so  here  the  desertion  of  Q.  Marcius 
reminds  him  of  that  of  Fundanius.     Its  use  below  in  chs.  20 

328 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

town,  and  many  fire-brands  were  discharged.  Just 
before  this  time  ^  a  Roman  knight  named  C.  Funda- 
nius  deserted  to  us  from  the  enemy  Hnes. 

On  the  next  day  two  soldiers  from  one  of  the 
native  legions  were  captured  by  our  cavalry :  they 
asserted  they  were  slaves.  Immediately  on  their 
arrival  thev  were  recognised  by  troops  who  had 
fonnerly  been  with  Fabius  and  Pedius  and  had 
deserted  from  Trebonius.^  No  opportunity  was 
afforded  of  reprieving  them,  and  they  were  executed 
by  our  troops.  At  the  same  time  some  couriers  were 
captured  who  had  been  sent  from  Corduba  to 
Pompeius  and  had  come  to  our  camp  in  error :  their 
hands  were  cut  off  and  they  were  then  let  go.  At 
the  second  watch  the  enemy  observed  his  usual 
custom  of  hurling  from  the  town  a  large  quantity  of 
fire-brands  and  missiles,  spending  a  good  long  time  in 
the  process  and  wounding  a  large  number.  When 
the  night  had  now  passed  they  made  a  sally  against 
the  Sixth  legion  when  our  men  were  busily  occupied 
on  a  field-work,^  and  began  a  brisk  engagement ; 
but  their  sharp  attack  was  contained  by  our  troops 
despite  the  support  which  the  townsmen  derived 
from  the  higher  ground.  Having  once  embarked 
upon  their  sally,  our  opponents  were  none  the  less 
repulsed  by  the  gallantry  of  our  troops,  although  the 

and  22  seems  similar.  Klotz,  however,  apparently  takes  it 
to  mean  '  when  this  time  had  now  gone  past.' 

*  rf.  p.  322  note  2  (trans.).  It  is  clear  that  not  all  the  troops 
who  had  mutinied  against  Cassius  and  later  deserted  Trebonius 
were  now  on  Pompey's  side.  Some  editors,  however,  suspect 
the  text. 

^  In  this  phrase,  which  recurs  below  in  ch.  27  the  word  opns 
seems  to  have  its  technical  meaning — "  work  of  fortification.' 
Klotz  interprets  :    '  scattered  among  the  fortifications.' 


CAESAR 

repulsi  adversarii  bene  multis  vulneribus  adfecti  in 
oppidum  se  contulerunt.^ 
13  Postero  die  Pompeius  ex  castris  suis  bracchium 
coepit  ad  flumen  Salsum  ducere;^  et  cum  nostri 
equites  pauci  in  statione  fuissent  a  pluribus  reperti, 
de  statione  sunt  deiecti  et  occisi  tres.  Eo  die  A. 
Valgius,  senatoris  iilius,  cuius  frater  in  castris  Pompei 
fuisset,  omnibus  suis  rebus  relictis  equum  conscendit 
et  fugit.  Speculator  de  legione  II.  Pompeiana 
captus  a  militibus  et  interfeetus  est ;  idemque 
temporis  glans  missa  est  inscripta :  quo  die  ad 
oppidum  capiendum  accederent,  se  scutum  esse 
positurum.  Qua  spe  non  nulli,  dum  sine  periculo 
murum  ascendere  et  oppido  potiri  posse  se  sperant, 
postero  die  ad  murum  opus  facere  coeperunt,  et  bene 
magna  prioris  muri  parte  deiecta.^  .  .  .  Quo  facto  ab 
oppidanis,  ac  si  suarum  partium  essent,  conservati  .  .  . 

^  /  have  followed  Kroner  in  deleting  qui  before  etsi  and  tamen 
before  repulsi  from  the  reading  of  the  MSS. 

^  ducere  is  omitted  by  all  but  two  inferior  MSS. 

^  Klotz  supplies  in  oppidum  intraverunt,  but  considers  it 
probable  that  more  than  this  is  /nissing. 

^  cf.  p.  322,  note  2  (trans.).  Klotz  regards  the  addition  of 
Pompeiana  as  "  remarkable,  since  Caesar  did  not  have  a 
Second  legion.'  It  is  true  that  in  the  narrative  there  is  no 
mention  of  the  Second  as  fighting  on  Caesar's  side.  But 
neither  is  there  any  mention  of  the  Twenty-first,  Twenty- 
eighth,  or  Thirtieth,  all  of  which  may  well  have  participated. 
I  am  inclined  to  think  that  Pompeiana  is  no  accidental 
addition,  but  that  it  signified  clearly  one  of  two  things  : 
either  that  there  were  two  Second  legions  (just  as  there  were 
apparently  two  Fifth  legions),  and  that  this  was  not  Caesar's 
Second ;  or,  if  there  was  but  one  Second  legion,  that  now, 
after  months  of  wavering  loyalty,  it  was  on  Pompey  s  side. 
To  the  author's  contemporaries  it  was  doubtless  perfectly 
clear  which  was  the  meaning  intended. 

33° 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

latter  were  labouring  under  the  disadvantage  of  a 
lower  position ;  and  after  sustaining  very  heavy 
casualties  they  withdrew  back  into  the  town. 

On  the  next  day  Pompeius  began  to  carry  a  line  of 
fortifications  from  his  camp  to  the  river  Salsum ; 
and  when  a  few  of  our  horsemen  on  outpost  duty 
were  discovered  by  the  enemy,  who  were  in  greater 
strength,  they  were  driven  from  their  post,  and  three 
of  them  were  killed.  It  was  on  that  day  that  A. 
Valgius — his  fsither  was  a  senator  and  his  brother 
was  in  Pompeius'  camp — left  all  his  kit  behind, 
mounted  his  horse  and  deserted.  A  spy  from  the 
Second  legion,  on  Pompeius'  side,i  was  captured  by 
our  troops  and  put  to  death  ;  and  at  the  same  time 
a  sling-bullet  was  discharged  which  bore  the  following 
inscription  :  '  On  the  day  you  advance  to  capture  the 
town  I  shall  lay  down  my  shield.'  ^  This  raised 
hopes  in  some  of  our  men,  who,  feeling  confident 
that  thev  could  now  climb  the  wall  and  gain  posses- 
sion of  the  town  without  danger,  proceeded  on  the 
next  day  to  construct  a  field-work  adjoining  the 
wall ;  and  having  demolished  a  good  lai'ge  section 
of  the  first  wall,  .  .  .  Whereupon,  their  lives  being 
spared  by  the  townsfolk  as  if  they  belonged  to  their 
own    side,^  .   .   .  the    latter    begged    Caesar    to    get 

-  Some  editors  render  '  display  a  shield  as  a  signal " ; 
but  the  undertaking  to  offer  no  armed  resistance  seems  to  me 
to  suit  the  context  better.  Though  apparently  in  the  singular 
number  (Fleischer  conjectured  posituros),  the  message  was  no 
doubt  interpreted  as  reflecting  the  attitude  of  many  of  the 
townsfolk. 

*  The  mutilated  state  of  the  MSS.  will  permit  no  more 
than  a  disjointed  rendering.  It  would  seem  that  the  storming 
party  was  captured,  but  that  the  townsfolk  sent  its  members 
back  unharmed,  accompanied  by  a  deputation  to  Caesar 
ofiFering  terms  of  surrender. 


CAESAR 

missos  facere  loricatos,  qui  praesidi  causa  praepositi 
oppido  a  Pompeio  essent,  orabant.  Quibus  respondit 
Caesar  se  condiciones  dare,  non  accipere  consuevisse. 
Qui  cum  in  o])pidum  revertissent,  relato  response 
clamore  sublato  omni  genere  teloruni  emisso  pugnare 
pro  niuro  toto  coeperunt ;  propter  quod  fere  magna 
pars  hominum  qui  in  castris  nostris  essent  non 
dubitarunt  quin  eruptionem  eo  die  essent  facturi. 
Ita  corona  circumdata  pugnatum  est  aliquamdiu 
vehementissime,  simulque  ballista  missa  a  nostris 
turrem  deiecit,  qua  adversarioruuj  qui  in  ea  turre 
fuerant  quinque  deiecti  sunt  et  puer,  qui  ballistam 
solitus  erat  observare. 
14  Eius  diei  praeterito  tempore  ^  Pompeius  trans 
flumen  Salsum  castellum  constituit  neque  a  nostris 
prohibitus  falsaque  ilia  opinione  gloriatus  est  quod 
prope  in  nostris  partibus  locum  tenuisset.  Item 
insequenti  die  eadem  consuetudine  dum  longius 
prosequitur,  ijuo  loco  equites  nostri  stationem 
habuerant,  aliquot  turmae  cum  levi  armatura  impetu 
facto  loco  sunt  deiecti  et  propter  paucitatem  nostro- 
rum  equitum  simul  cum  levi  armatura  inter  turmas 
adversariorum  protriti.  Hoc  in  conspectu  utrorum- 
que  castrorum  gerebatur,  et  maiore  Pompeiani 
exsultabant  gloria  longius  quod  nostris  cedentibus 

*  eius    praeteriti    temporis    MSS.  :     eius    diei    praeterito 
tempore  Nipperdey. 


^  I  interpret  Nipperdey's  restoration,  on  the  analog}'  of  the 
phrase  hoc  praeterito  tempore  in  ch.  11  above,  as  meaning 
'  in  the  past  (earlier)  period  of  that  day.'  Klotz  retains  the 
MSS.  reading,  which  he  explains  as  a  Genitive  Absolute  mean- 
ing '  that  time  having  gone  past.' 

^  i.e.  N.  of  the  river. 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

rid  of  the  heavy-armed  troops  who  had  been  put  in 
charge  of  the  defence  of  the  town  by  Pompeius. 
Caesar's  reply  to  them  was  that  his  habit  was  to 
impose  conditions,  not  to  accept  them.  On  their 
return  to  the  town  with  this  reply,  the  inhabitants 
raised  a  shout,  discharged  volleys  of  missiles  of  all 
sorts,  and  went  into  action  along  the  entire  circuit  of 
the  battlements ;  and  this  led  to  a  strong  conviction 
among  quite  a  large  number  of  the  men  in  our  lines 
that  they  would  make  a  sally  that  day.  As  a  result 
a  cordon  of  troops  was  thrown  round  the  town  and 
very  violent  fighting  went  on  for  some  time  ;  in  the 
course  of  which  a  missile  was  discharged  by  our  men 
from  a  piece  of  heavy  artillery  and  demolished  a 
tower,  knocking  out  five  members  of  the  enemy  crew 
who  manned  it,  as  well  as  a  slave  whose  regular 
duty  it  was  to  keep  watch  on  that  piece  of  artillery. 
Earlier  on  that  day  ^  Pompeius  established  a  fort 
across  ^  the  river  Salsum  without  meeting  any  oppo- 
sition from  our  troops ;  and  this  put  him  under  a 
misapprehension  and  led  him  to  boast  inasmuch  as 
he  had  occupied  a  position  which  was  as  good  as  in 
our  territory.  Likewise  on  the  following  day  he 
again  pursued  his  usual  tactics  and  made  a  fairly 
extensive  sweep,  in  the  course  of  which  at  one 
point  where  our  cavalry  were  picketed  several 
squadrons  of  ours  with  some  light-armed  troops  were 
attacked  and  dislodged  from  their  position ;  and 
then,  because  of  their  small  numbers,  both  our  horse- 
men and  the  light-armed  troops  were  completely 
crushed  amidst  the  squadrons  of  their  opponents. 
This  action  took  place  in  view  of  both  camps,  and  now 
the  Pompeians  were  boasting  with  yet  greater 
triumph   on   the   ground   that   they   had   begun   to 

333 


CAESAR 

prosequi  coepisscnt.  Qui  cum  aequo  ^  loco  a  nostris 
recepti  essent,  ut  consuessent,  eximia  ^  virtute, 
clamore  facto  avcrsati  sunt  proclium  facere. 
15  Fere  apud  excrcitus  haec  est  equestris  proeli 
consuetudo :  cum  equcs  ad  dimicandum  dimisso 
equo  cum  pedite  congreditur,  nequaquam  par 
habetur ;  id  quod  contra  ^  in  hoc  accidit  proelio. 
Cum  pedites  levi  armatura  lecti  ad  pugnam  equitibus 
nostris  nee  opinantibus  venissent,  idque  in  proelio 
animadversum  esset,  complures  ex  equis  deseende- 
runt.  Ita  exiguo  tempore  equcs  pedestre  *  proelium 
facere  coepit,  usque  eo  ut  caedem  proxime  a  vallo 
fecerint.  In  quo  proelio  adversariorum  ceciderunt 
CXXIII,  compluresque  arniis  exuti.  multi  vulncribus 
adfecti  in  castra  sunt  redacti.  Nostri  ceciderunt  III ; 
saucii  XII  pedites  et  equites  V.     Eius  diei  insequcnti 

1  aliquo  3ISS.  :   aequo  Lipsius. 

*  ex  simili  MSS.  :   eximia  Mommscn. 

*  contra  added  by  Hoffmann. 

*  The  words  pedes  equestre,  which  JoUoic  here  in  all  MSS., 
were  deleted  by  Nipperdey. 


1  Klotz,  who  retains  the  MSS.  reading  ex  simili,  assumes 
qui  to  refer  to  the  Caesarian  cavalry  mentioned  above,  the 
subject  changing  abruptly  to  Pompciani  at  avfrmti  sunt. 
His  rendering  would  thus  apparently  be  :  '  When  these 
squadrons  of  ours  had  been  received  back  on  favourable 
ground  and,  as  usual,  had  raised  the  war  cry  with  the  same 
braA'ery,  the  Pompeians  refused  battle.'  But  the  sense  seems 
to  me  very  strained;  and  the  fact  that  Pompeiani  is  subject 
of  the  clause  which  immediately  precedes  makes  the  repeated 
change  of  subject  exceptionally  harsh.  It  is  perhaps  more 
reasonable  to  assume  that  Pompeiani  is  subject  throughout, 
and  that  recipio  is  here  used  in  the  sense  of  rtirsus  excipio. 

^  The  reader  may  well  be  puzzled  by  the  respective  casual- 
ties resulting,  apparently,  from  the  outpost  skirmish  described 
in  ch.  14  above.     It  would  seem  that  the  figures  are  grossly 

334 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

sweep  further  ahead  while  our  men  were  retreating 
further  baek.  But  when  on  favourable  ground  our 
men  took  them  on  again  with  their  eustomary  out- 
standing gallantry,  they  cried  out  and  refused  to 
engage  battle. ^ 

With  nearly  all  armies  what  normally  happens  in  a 
cavalry  battle  is  this  :  when  a  cavalrynian  is  once 
dismounted  and  closes  in  with  an  infantryman  to 
engage  him,  he  is  not  by  any  means  regarded  as  a 
match  for  the  latter.  However,  it  turned  out  quite 
otherwise  in  this  battle.  When  picked  light-armed 
infantry  took  our  cavalry  by  surprise  by  coming 
forward  to  engage  them,  and  when  this  manoeuvre 
was  observed  in  the  course  of  the  fighting,  quite  a 
number  of  our  horsemen  dismounted.  As  a  result, 
in  a  short  time  our  cavalry  began  to  fight  an  infantry 
action,  to  such  good  purpose  that  they  dealt  death 
right  up  close  to  the  rampart.  In  this  battle  ^  on  our 
opponents'  side  there  fell  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
three  men ;  and  of  those  who  were  driven  back 
to  their  camp  not  a  few  had  been  stripped  of  their 
arms  and  many  were  wounded.  On  our  side  there 
fell  three  men :  twelve  infantrymen  and  five  horse- 
men were  wounded.   Later  on  that  day  the  old  routine 


distorted  if  only  three  Caesarians  were  killed  out  of  several 
squadrons  and  some  light-armed  troops  overrun  by  the 
enemy  cavalry  I  {rf.  Introduction,  p.  306,  and,  for  official 
suppression  of  casualty  figures,  ch.  18.)  But  I  rather  suspect 
that  cavalry  reinforcements  were  despatched  by  Caesar  and 
fought  a  second,  and  more  evenly-matched  action  closer  to 
Pompey's  camp;  and  that  brief  details  of  this  were  originally 
given  towards  the  end  of  ch.  14.  If  it  is  to  this  second  action 
that  the  casualty  figures  relate,  then  it  is  not  surprising  that 
the  Pompeians  refused  a  third  challenge  on  ground  favourable 
to  Caesar. 

335 


CAESAR 

tempore  pristina  consuetudine  pro  muro  pujjnari 
coeptum  est.  Cum  bene  mapnam  multitudinem 
telorum  ignemque  nostris  defendentibus  iniecissent, 
nefandum  crudelissimumque  facinus  sunt  aggressi  in 
conspectuque  nostro  hospites  qui  in  oppido  erant 
iugulare  et  de  muro  praecipites  mittere  coeperunt, 
sicuti  apud  barbaros  ;  quod  post  hominum  memoriam 
numquam  est  factum. 
16  Huius  diei  extremo  tempore  a  Pompeianis  clam 
nostros  ^  tabellarius  est  missus,  ut  ea  nocte  turris 
aggerem(|ue  incenderent  et  tertia  vigilia  eruptionem 
facerent.  Ita  igne  telorumque  multitudine  iacta 
cum  bene  magnam  partem  noctis  ^  consumpsissent, 
portam  quae  e  regione  et  in  conspectu  Pompei 
castrorum  fuerat  aperuerunt  copiaeque  totae  erup- 
tionem fecerunt  secumque  extulerunt  virgulta,  cratis  ' 
ad  fossas  complendas  et  harpagones  ad  casas,  quae 
stramenticiae  ab  nostris  hibernoi'um  causa  aedi- 
ficatae  erant,  diruendas  et  incendendas,  praeterea 
argentum,  vestimenta,  ut,  dum  nostri  in  praeda 
detinentur,  illi  caede  facta  ad  praesidia  Pompei  se 
reciperent :  nam  quod  existimabat  eos  posse  cona- 
tum  *  efficere,  nocte  tota  ultra  ibat  flumen  Salsum  in 
acie.  Quod  factum  licet  nee  opinantibus  nostris  esset 
gestum,  tamen  virtute  freti  repulsos  multisque 
vulneribus    adfectos    oppido    rcpresserunt,    praedam 

^  clam  ad  nostros  3ISS.  :   clam  nostros  some  editors  :   clam 
nostros  ad  oppidum  Klotz. 

^  muri  MSS.  :   noctis  Fleischer. 

^  cultatas  or  culc- or  calc- 3/ <S<S.  :  virgulta,  cratis  Xipperdey. 

*  conatu  MSS.  :  conatum  or  -a  editors. 

*  i.e.  the  Pompeian  troops  massacred  those  of  the  local 
townsfolk  whom  they  suspected  of  siding  with  Caesar. 

*  Probably  S.  of  the  river. 

^  Or,  if  oppido  is  the  adverb,  '  completely  drove  them  back.' 

33^ 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

was  observed  and  fighting  broke  out  along  the  battle- 
ments. After  discharging  a  very  large  number  of 
missile  weapons  and  firebrands  at  our  troops,  who 
were  on  the  defensive,  the  enemy  embarked  upon  an 
abominable  and  completely  ruthless  outrage  ;  for  in 
our  sight  they  proceeded  to  massacre  some  of  their 
hosts  1  in  the  town,  and  to  fling  them  headlong  from 
the  battlements — a  barbarous  act,  and  one  for  which 
history  can  produce  no  precedent. 
16  In  the  closing  hours  of  this  day  the  Pompeians 
sent  a  courier,  without  the  knowledge  of  our  men, 
with  instructions  that  in  the  course  of  that  night 
those  in  the  town  should  set  our  towers  and  rampart 
on  fire  and  make  a  sally  at  the  third  watch.  Accord- 
ingly, after  they  had  hurled  fire-brands  and  a  quantity 
of  missile  weapons  and  spent  a  very  large  part  of  the 
night  in  so  doing,  they  opened  the  gate  which  lay 
directly  opposite  Pompeius'  camp  and  was  in  sight 
of  it,  and  made  a  sallv  with  their  entire  forces. 
With  them  thev  brought  out  brushwood  and  hurdles 
to  fill  up  the  trenches,  as  well  as  hooks  for  demolishing 
and  then  burning  the  straw-thatched  huts  which  had 
been  built  by  our  men  to  serve  as  winter  quarters ; 
they  also  brought  silver  and  clothing  besides,  so  that, 
while  our  men  were  busily  engaged  in  looting  it, 
they  could  wreak  havoc  upon  them  and  then  retire  to 
Pompeius'  lines.  For  in  the  belief  that  they  could 
carry  through  their  enterprise  he  spent  the  whole 
night  on  the  move  in  battle  formation  on  the  far 
side  2  of  the  river  Salsum.  But  although  this  opera- 
tion had  come  as  a  surprise  to  our  men,  yet,  reiving 
on  their  valour,  they  repulsed  the  enemy,  inflicted 
heavy  casualties  upon  them,  and  drove  them  back  to 
the    town,^    taking    possession   of  their    booty    and 

337 


CAESAR 

armaque  eorum  sunt  potiti  vivosque  aliquos  ceperunt, 
qui  postero  die  sunt  interfecti.  Eodemque  tempore 
transfuga  nuntiavit  ex  oppido  lunium,  qui  in 
cuniculo  fuisset,  iugulatione  oppidanorum  facta 
clamasse  facinus  se  nefandum  et  scclus  fecisse ; 
nam  eos  nihil  meruissc  quare  tali  poena  adficerentur 
qui  eos  ad  aras  et  foeos  suos  recepissent,  eosque 
hospitium  scelere  contaminasse ;  multa  praeterea 
dixisse  :  qua  oratione  deterritos  amplius  iugulationem 
non  fecisse. 
17  Ita  postero  die  Tullius  legatus  cum  Catone  et  An- 
tonio 1  venit  et  apud  Caesarem  verba  fecit :  '  Utinam 
quidem  di  immortales  fecissent  ut  tuus  potius  miles 
quam  Cn.  Pompei  factus  essem  et  banc  virtutis 
constantiam  in  tua  victoria,  non  in  illius  calamitate 
praestarem.  Cuius  funestae  laudes  quoniam  ad 
banc  fortunam  reciderunt  ut  cives  Romani  indigentes 
praesidi  simus  et  propter  patriae  luctuosam  perniciem 
demur  ^  bostium  numero,  qui  neque  in  illius  prospera 
acie  primam  fortunam  neque  in  adversa  secundam 
obtinuimus,^  qui  legionum  tot  impetus  sustentantes, 
nocturnis      diurnisque      operibus      gladiorum      ictus 

^  Lusitano  MSS.  The  arguments  in  support  of  this  con- 
jecture of  mine  and  o/introiit  and  Catonem  in  ch.  18  are  set  forth 
in  Appendix  C,  p.  401 . 

^  /  have  followed  Fleischer  in  supplying  simus  and  reading 
demur  in  place  of  dedimur. 

^  /  have  followed  Xipperdey  in  deleting  victoriam  which  the 
MSS.  give  after  obtinuimus. 


^  This  abrupt  reference  led  Mommsen  to  conjecture  unum 
in  place  of  lunium.     Klotz  considers  that,  though  no  mine 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

equipment  and  capturing  some  alive,  who  were  put 
to  death  the  next  day.  It  was  at  this  same  period 
that  a  deserter  an-ived  from  the  town  with  the 
news  that,  after  the  massacre  of  the  townsfolk, 
Junius,  who  had  been  in  a  mine,^  protested  that  it 
was  an  abominable  crime  and  outrage  that  his  people 
had  committed  ;  for  inasmuch  as  the  burghers  had 
given  them  the  protection  of  their  altars  and  hearths 
they  had  done  nothing  to  deserve  such  punishment : 
rather  had  they  themselves  polluted  hospitality  by  a 
crime.  Junius  had  said  a  lot  more  besides,  according 
to  the  deserter's  account,  and  his  words  had 
frightened  them  and  caused  them  to  refrain  from 
further  massacres. 
17  So  the  next  day  Tullius  came  as  an  envoy,  accom- 
panied by  Cato  and  Antonius,  and  held  talk  with 
Caesar  as  follows  :  '  Would  indeed  that  the  immortal 
gods  had  caused  ine  to  have  become  a  soldier  of  yours, 
rather  than  one  of  Pompeius',  and  vouchsafed  that  I 
should  now  display  this  unflinching  valour  of  mine  on 
your  victorious  side,  and  not  at  his  debacle.  Now 
that  his  prestige,  fraught  with  disaster,  has  slumped 
so  far  that  in  this  our  present  plight  we,  citizens  of 
Rome,  not  only  stand  in  need  of  protection,  but  on 
account  of  the  grievous  calamity  of  our  country  are 
accorded  the  status  of  public  enemies ;  we,  who 
alike  won  no  success  either  when  at  first  fortune 
smiled  upon  his  deeds  of  arms  or  later  when  she 
frowned  upon  them ;  we,  who  have  constantly  borne 
up  under  so  many  attacks  of  legions  and  have  as 
constantly,  in  operations  by  day  and  night,  formed 
targets  for  the  thrusts  of  swords  and  the  flight  of 

has  so  far  been  mentioned,  sapping  was  so  constant  in  sieges 
that  the  apparent  oversight  is  a  natural  one. 

339 


CAESAR 

telonimque  missus  exceptantes,  relicti  ^  et  deserti  a 
Pompeic),  tua  \  irtute  superati  salutem  a  tua  dementia 
deposcimus  petimusque  ut  .  .  .'  ^  '  qualem  gentibus 
me  praestiti,  similem  in  civium  deditione  praestabo.' 
18  Rcmissis  legatis,  cum  ad  portani  venisscnt,  introiit^ 
Tib.  Tullius  ;  et  cum  introcuntem  Catonem'*  Antonius 
insecutus  non  esset,  revcrtit  ad  portam  et  hominem 
apprehendit.  Quod  Tiberius  cum  fieri  animadvertit, 
simul  pugionem  eduxit  et  manum  eius  incidit.  Ita 
refugerunt  ad  Caesarem.  Eodemque  tempore  signi- 
fer  de  legione  prima  transfugit  et  innotuit,  quo  die 
equestre  proelium  factum  esset,  suo  signo  perisse 
homines  XXX\',  neque  licere  castris  C'n.  Pompei 
nuntiare  neque  dicere  perisse  quemquam.^  Servus, 
cuius  dominus  in  Caesaris  castris  fuisset — uxorem  et 
filios  in  oppido  reliquerat — dominum  iugulavit  et  ita 
clam  a  Caesaris  praesidiis  in  Pompei  castra  discessit 
.  .  .  et  indicium  glande  scriptum  misit,  per  quod  cer- 
tior  fieret  Caesar  quae  in  oppido  ad  defendendum 
compararentur.  Ita  litteris  acceptis,  cum  in  oppidum 
revertisset    qui    mittere    glandem    inscriptam    sole- 

^  expectantes  victi  MSS.  :  exceptantes  Koch  :  relicti 
A'ipperdey. 

^  Kloiz  conjectures  vitam  nobis  concedas.'  Quibus  Caesar 
respondit. 

^  /  have  supplied  introiit. 

*  C.  MSS.  :  /  have  conjectured  Catonem. 

*  quamquam  or  quamque  most  MSS. :  quemquam  editors. 


^  grant  us  our  lives.'     To  which  Caesar  replied  :   (according 
to  Klotz's  conjecture). 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

missiles ;  we,  who  are  now  abandoned  and  forsaken 
by  Pompeius  and  vanquished  by  your  valour,  do  now 
earnestly  entreat  you  in  your  mercy  to  save  us,  and 
beg  you  to  .  .  .'  ^  '  As  I  have  shewn  myself  to  foreign 
peoples,  even  so  will  I  show  myself  to  my  fellow 
citizens  when  they  surrender.' 
18  The  envoys  were  now  sent  back  and  on  their 
arrival  at  the  gate  Tiberius  Tullius  went  inside  ;  and 
when,  as  Cato  was  going  in,  Antonius  failed  to  follow 
him,  Cato  ^  turned  back  to  the  gate  and  grabbed 
the  fellow.  Observing  this  action,  Tiberius  immedi- 
ately drew  a  dagger  and  stabbed  Cato's  hand.  So 
they  ^  fled  back  to  Caesar.  It  was  at  this  same 
time  that  a  standard-bearer  from  the  First  legion 
deserted  to  us  and  it  became  known  that  on  the  day 
when  the  cavalry  action  was  fought  his  own  unit  *  lost 
thirty-five  men,  but  that  they  were  not  allowed  to 
report  this  in  Cn.  Pompeius'  camp  or  to  say  that  any 
man  had  been  lost.  A  slave,  whose  master  was  in 
Caesar's  camp — he  had  left  his  wife  and  sons  behind 
in  the  town — murdered  his  master  and  then  got  away 
unobserved  from  Caesar's  lines  to  Pompeius'  camp 
.  .  .  and  he  sent  a  message  written  on  a  bullet  to 
apprise  Caesar  of  the  defence  measures  which  were 
being  taken  in  the  town.  Accordingly,  when  this 
message  had  been  received,  and  the  man  who 
normally  discharged  the  bullet  bearing  an  insci-iption 

^  Klotz  too  assumes  that  Cato  is  the  subject.  He  remarks 
that  such  abrupt  changes  of  subject  are  not  uncommon  in  the 
lively,  colloquial  style,  and  quotes  parallel  examples  from 
Cicero,  Livy  and  Seneca. 

^  sc.  Tiberius  and  Antonius.     See  Appendix  C,  p.  401. 

*  here,  probably,  a  maniple,  nominally  comprising  200 
men. 

341 


CAESAR 

bat.^  .  .  .  In<;cquenti  tempore  duo  Lusitani  fratres 
transfugae  nuntiarunt  (juam  Pompeius  contionem 
habuisset :  quoniam  oppido  subsidio  non  posset 
venire,  noctu  ex  adversariorum  conspectu  se  dedu- 
eerent  ad  mare  versum ;  unum  respondisse  ut  potius 
ad  dimicandum  descenderent  quam  signum  fugae 
ostenderent ;  eum  qui  ita  locutus  esset  iugulatum. 
Eodem  tempore  tabellarii  eius  deprensi  qui  ad 
oppidum  veniebant :  quorum  litteras  Caesar  oppi- 
danis  obiecit  et,  qui  vitam  sibi  peteret,  iussit  turrem 
ligneam  oppidanorum  incendere  ;  id  si  fecisset,  ei  se 
promisit  omnia  eoncessurum.  Quod  difficile  erat 
factu,  ut  eam  turrem  sine  perieulo  quis  ineenderet. 
Ita  fune  crura  deligatus,^  cum  propius  accessisset,  ab 
oppidanis  est  occisus.  Eadem  nocte  transfuga  nuntia- 
vit  Pompeium  et  Labienum  de  iugulatione  oppida- 
norum indignatos  esse. 
19  \'igilia  secunda  propter  multitudinem  telorum 
turris  lignea,  quae  nostra  fuisset,  ab  imo  vitium  fecit 
usque  ad  tabulatum  secundum  et  tertium.  Eodem 
tempore  pro  muro  pugnarunt  acerrime  et  turrim 
nostram  ut  superiorem  incenderunt,  idcirco  quod 
ventum  oppidani  secundum  habuerunt.     Insequenti 

^  solebant  MSS. :  solebat  Xipperdey,  who  first  assumed  a 
lacuna  here. 

*  crure  de  ligno  MSS.  :  crura  deligatus  Warminglon. 


^  I  have  followed  Klotz  in  assuming  two  gaps  in  this 
extraordinary  narrative.  For  no  likely  explanation  occurs  to 
me  why  the  slave  should  have  sent  such  a  message  to  Caesar 
from  Pompey's  camp.  Whether  it  was  his  master  or  his 
mistress  he  killed  (in  ch.  20  most  MSS.  read  dominam),  and 
whether  he  was  loyal  to  Caesar  or  to  Pompey,  it  seems  im- 
possible to  account  consistently  for  his  actions  and  subsequent 
fate. 

342 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

had  returned  to  the  town,  ,  .  .^  At  a  later  period  two 
brothers,  Lusitanians,  deserted  and  reported  a 
speech  which  Pompeius  had  delivered,  to  the  effect 
that,  since  he  could  not  come  to  the  assistance  of 
the  town,  they  must  withdraw  by  night  out  of  sight 
of  their  opponents  in  the  direction  of  the  sea.  One 
man,  according  to  this  account,  retorted  that  they 
should  rather  go  into  battle  than  display  the  signal 
for  retreat ;  whereupon  the  author  of  this  remark 
had  his  throat  cut.  At  the  same  time  some  of  Pom- 
peius' couriers  were  arrested  on  their  way  to  the 
town.  Caesar  presented  their  despatches  ^  to  the 
townsfolk  and  directed  that  any  of  the  couriers  who 
wanted  his  life  to  be  spared  must  set  fire  to  a  wooden 
tower  belonging  to  the  townsfolk,  undertaking  to 
grant  him  complete  amnesty  if  he  did  so.  But  it  was 
a  difficult  task  for  anyone  to  set  fire  to  that  tower 
without  risking  disaster;  thus  when  any  of  them 
came  close  up  to  it,  his  legs  wei'e  tied  with  a  rope 
and  he  was  killed  by  the  townsfolk.  That  same 
night  a  deserter  reported  that  Pompeius  and  Labienus 
had  been  filled  with  indignation  at  the  massacre 
of  the  townsfolk. 

At  the  second  watch,  as  a  result  of  a  heavy  salvo 
of  missiles,  a  wooden  tower  of  ours  sustained  damage 
which  extended  from  its  base  up  to  the  second  and 
third  storeys.  Simultaneously  there  was  very  heavy 
fighting  along  the  battlements,  and  the  townsfolk, 
taking  advantage  of  a  favourable  wind,  set  on  fire 
our  tower  as  aforementioned.     The  following  day  a 

^  Klotz  believes  that  these  despatches  notified  the  com- 
mandant of  Ategua  that  Pompey  was  withdrawing.  This 
seems  probable,  and  would  explain  why  Caesar  passed  them 
on  so  promptly. 

343 


CAESAR 

luce  materfamilias  de  muro  se  deiecit  et  ad  nos 
transsiliit  dixitque  se  cum  familia  constitutum 
habuisse  ut  una  transfugerent  ad  Caesarem ;  illam 
oppressam  et  iugulatam.  Hoc  praeterea  tempore 
tabellae  de  muro  sunt  deiectae,  in  quibus  scriptum 
est  inventum :  '  L.  Munatius  Caesari.  Si  niihi 
vitam  tribues,  quoniam  ab  Cn.  Pompeio  sum  desertus, 
qualem  me  illi  praestiti  tali  virtute  et  constantia 
futurum  me  in  te  esse  praestabo.'  Eodem  tempore 
oppidani  legati  qui  antea  exierant  Caesarem  adierunt: 
si  sibi  vitam  concederet,  sese  insequenti  luce  oppidum 
esse  dedituros.  Quibus  respondit  se  Caesarem 
esse  fidemque  praestaturum.  Ita  ante  diem  XI. 
Kal.  Mart,  oppido  potitus  imperator  est  appellatus. 
20  Quod  Pompeius  ex  perfugis  cum  deditionem 
oppidi  factam  esse  scisset,  castra  movit  Ucubim 
versus  et  eircum  ea  loca  castella  disposuit  et  mu- 
nitionibus  se  continei*e  coepit :  Caesar  movit  et 
propius  castra  castris  contulit.  Eodem  tempore 
mane  loricatus  unus  ex  legione  vernacula  ad  nos 
transfugit  et  nuntiavit  Pompeium  oppidanos  Ucu- 
bensis  convocasse  eisque  ita  imperavisse,  ut  dili- 
gentia  adhibita  perquirerent  qui  essent  suarum 
partium  itemque  adversariorum  victoriae  fautores. 
Hoc  praeterito  tempore  in  oppido  quod  fuit  captum 
344 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

mother  of  a  family  leapt  down  from  the  battlements 
and  slipped  across  to  our  lines  and  told  us  that  she 
had  arranged  with  her  household  to  desert  to 
Caesar  all  together  ;  but  her  household,  she  said,  had 
been  taken  by  surprise  and  massacred.  It  was  at 
this  time  also  that  a  missive  was  thrown  down  from 
the  wall,  which  was  found  to  contain  the  following 
message :  '  L.  Munatius  greets  Caesar.  If  you 
grant  me  my  life,  now  that  I  am  abandoned  by  Cn. 
Pompeius,  I  will  guarantee  to  display  the  same 
unwavering  courage  in  support  of  you  as  I  have 
shewn  to  him.'  At  the  same  time  the  envoys  from 
the  townsfolk  who  had  come  out  to  Caesar  before 
now  came  to  him,  saying  that,  if  he  would  spare  their 
lives,  they  would  surrender  the  town  the  following 
day.  His  reply  to  them  ran  thus :  '  I  am  Caesar 
and  I  will  be  as  good  as  my  word.'  Accordingly,  on 
February  I9th  he  took  possession  of  the  town  and  was 
hailed  as  Imperator. 

When  Pompeius  got  to  know  from  deserters  that 
the  surrender  of  the  town  had  taken  place,  he 
moved  his  camp  towards  Ucubi,  built  forts  at  inter- 
vals in  that  locality,  and  proceeded  to  keep  within 
his  emplacements.  Caesar  struck  his  camp  and 
moved  it  closer  to  that  of  Pompeius.  It  was  at  this 
same  time  that  early  in  the  morning  one  of  the 
heavy-armed  troops  from  a  native  legion  deserted  to 
us  and  reported  that  Pompeius  had  assembled  the 
inhabitants  of  the  town  of  Ucubi  and  given  them 
orders  as  follows,  namely  that  they  were  to  make 
careful  and  searching  enquiry  who  were  in  favour 
of  a  victory  for  his  side,  and  who  on  the  con- 
trary favoured  victory  for  his  enemies.  Just  be- 
fore this    the    slave    who,    as    we    have    described 

345 


CAESAR 

servus  est  prensus  in  cuniculo  quern  supra  demonstra- 
vimus  dorninum  iugulasse  :  is  vi\  us  est  combustus. 
Idemque  temporis  centuriones  loricati  Vlll  ad 
Caesarem  transfugerunt  ex  legione  vernacula,  et 
equites  nostri  cum  adversariorum  equitibus  congressi 
sunt,  et  saucii  aliquot  occiderunt  levi  armatura.  Ea 
nocte  speculatores  prensi  servi  III  et  unus  ex  legione 
vernacula.  Servi  sunt  in  crucem  sublati,  militi 
cervices  abscisae. 

21  Postero  die  equites  cum  levi  armatura  ex  adversa- 
riorum castris  ad  nos  transfugerunt.  Et  eo  tem- 
pore circiter  XL  equites  ad  aquatores  nostros  excu- 
currerunt,  non  nullos  interfecerunt,  item  alios  vivos 
abduxerunt :  e  quibus  capti  sunt  equites  VIII. 
Insequenti  die  Pompeius  seeuri  percussit  homines 
LXXIIII,  qui  dicebantur  esse  fautores  Caesaris 
victoriae,  reliquos  rursus  in  ^  oppidum  iussit  deduci ; 
ex  quibus  effugerunt  CXX  et  ad  Caesarem  venerunt. 

22  Hoc  praeterito  tempore,  qui  in  oppido  Ategua 
Ursaonenses  ^  capti  sunt  legati  profecti  sunt  cum 
nostris  uti  rem  gestam  L  rsaonensibus  -  referrent,  quid 
sperarent  de  Cn.  Pompeio,  cum  viderent  hospites 
iugulari,  praeterea  multa  scelera  ab  eis  fieri  qui 
praesidi  causa  ab  eis  reciperentur.  Qui  cum  ^  ad 
oppidum  venissent,  nostri,  qui  fuissent  equites 
Romani  et  senatores,  non  sunt  ausi  introire  in  oppi- 
dum, praeter  quam  qui  eius  civitatis  fuissent. 
Quorum  responsis  ultro  citroque  acceptis  et  redditis 

^  versum  or  in  MSS.  :   rursus  in  Fleischer. 

^  bursa vonenses,  -ibus  MSS. :  Ursaonenses,  -ibus  Ciacconius. 

^  cum  added  by  earlier  editors. 

^  viz.  men  of  Ucubi :  the  author  here  resumes  his  narrative 
of  chapter  20,  which  he  interrupted  to  relate  earlier  incidents. 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

above,  had  murdered  his  master  was  arrested  in  a 
mine  in  the  captured  town  :  he  was  burned  alive. 
At  the  same  period  eight  heavy-armed  centurions 
deserted  to  Caesar  from  a  native  legion ;  our  cavalry 
came  into  conflict  with  the  enemy  cavalry  and  quite 
a  number  of  our  light-armed  troops  died  of  their 
wounds.  That  night  some  scouts  were  caught — 
three  slaves  and  one  soldier  from  a  native  legion. 
The  slaves  were  crucified,  the  soldier  beheaded. 

On  the  next  dav  some  cavalry  and  light-armed 
troops  came  over  to  us  from  the  enemy's  camp.  At 
that  time  too  about  forty  of  their  horse  dashed  out 
upon  a  watering  party  of  ours,  killing  some  of  its 
members  and  leading  others  off  alive  :  eight  of  their 
horsemen  were  taken  prisoner.  The  following  day 
Pompeius  beheaded  seventy-four  men  ^  who  were 
said  to  be  in  favour  of  a  victory  for  Caesar :  the 
remainder  he  ordered  to  be  escorted  back  into  the 
town ;  but  a  hundred  and  twenty  of  them  escaped 
and  came  to  Caesar. 

2  Just  prior  to  this  time  the  envoys  from  Ursao 
who  had  been  captured  in  the  town  of  Ategua  set 
forth,  accompanied  by  some  of  our  men,  to  report 
to  their  fellow  citizens  of  Ursao  what  had  taken 
place  and  ask  them  what  hopes  they  could  enter- 
tain of  Cn.  Pompeius  when  they  saw  hosts  being 
massacred  and  many  other  crimes  too  being  per- 
petrated bv  those  to  whom  the  latter  gave  admit- 
tance as  garrison  troops.  When  the  party  reached 
Ursao,  our  men,  who  comprised  Roman  knights  and 
senators,  did  not  venture  to  enter  the  town,  apart 
from  those  who  were  members  of  that  community. 
An  exchange  of  views  then  took  place  between  the 

2  See  Appendix  D,  p.  403,  for  a  discussion  of  this  chapter. 

347 


CAESAR 

cum  ad  nostros  se  reciperent  qui  extra  oppidum 
fuissent,  illi  praesidio  insecuti  ex  aversione  ^  legatos 
iugularunt.  Duo  reliqui  ex  eis  fugerunt  et  Caesari 
rem  gestam  detuleruiit  .  .  .  -  et  speeulatores  ad 
oppidum  Ateguam  miseruut.  Qui  cum  certum  com- 
perissent  legatorum  responsa  ita  esse  gesta  quern  ad 
modum  illi  retulissent,  ab  oppidanis  concursu  facto 
eum  qui  legatos  iugulasset  lapidare  et  ei  manus 
intentare  coeperunt :  illius  opera  se  perisse.  Ita  vix 
periculo  liberatus  petiit  ab  oppidanis  ut  ei  liceret 
legatum  ad  Caesarem  proficisci :  illi  se  satisfacturum. 
Potestate  data  cum  inde  esset  profectus,  praesidio 
comparato,  cum  bene  magnam  manum  fecisset  et 
nocturno  tempore  per  fallaciam  in  oppidum  esset 
receptus,  iugulationem  magnam  facit  principibusque 
qui  sibi  contrarii  fuissent  interfectis  oppidum  in 
suam  potestatem  recepit.  —  Hoc  praeterito  tempore 
servi  transfugae  nuntiaverunt  oppidanorum  bona 
venire  ^  neque  extra  vallum  licere  *  exire  nisi  dis- 
cinctum,  idcirco  quod  ex  quo  die  oppidum  Ategua 
esset  captum  metu  conterritos  compluris  profugere  in 
Baeturiam ;  neque  sibi  uUam  spem  victoriae  pro- 
positam  habere  et,  si  qui  ex  nostris  transfugeret,  in 

^  adversione  MSS.  :   aversione  Aldus. 

-  lacuna  assumed  by  Nipperdey. 

^  vendere  MSS.  :   venire  Lipsius. 

*  ne  cui  .  .  .  liceret  MSS.  :   neque  .  .  .  licere  Nipperdey. 

^  Of  Ucubi,  he  may  mean  :   see  Appendix  D,  p.  404. 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

two  sides;  whereupon,  as  the  envoys  were  rejoining 
our  men  who  were  outside  the  town,  the  townsmen 
followed  them  up  from  behind  with  an  armed  party 
and  then  massacred  them.  There  were  two  sur- 
vivors, who  fled  and  reported  the  incident  to  Caesar 
.  .  .  and  the  men  of  Ui'sao  sent  investigators  to  the 
town  of  Ategua.  And  when  they  had  definitely 
established  that  the  envoys'  account  was  correct, 
and  that  the  incidents  had  occurred  just  as  they  had 
related,  a  crowd  of  townsfolk  quickly  gathered,  and 
thev  began  to  stone  and  shake  their  fists  at  the  man 
who  had  massacred  the  envoys,  shouting  that  he  had 
been  responsible  for  their  own  undoing.  So  when 
he  had  barelv  been  rescued  from  his  perilous  plight, 
he  besought  the  townsfolk  for  leave  to  go  on  a  mission 
to  Caesar,  saying  that  he  would  satisfy  the  latter. 
Permission  being  granted,  he  set  out  from  the  town, 
collected  a  bodyguard  and.  when  he  had  made  it  a 
good  large  force,  contrived  by  treachery  to  be  taken 
back  into  the  town  by  night.  Whereupon  he  carried 
out  a  wholesale  massacre,  killed  the  leading  men 
who  had  been  opposed  to  him,  and  took  the  town 
under  his  own  control. — Just  before  this  deserting 
slaves  reported  that  the  goods  of  the  townsfolk  ^ 
were  being  sold,  and  that  it  was  forbidden  to  go 
out  beyond  the  rampart  except  ungirt,^  for  the 
reason  that,  ever  since  the  day  when  Ategua  was 
captured,  quite  a  number  of  people  in  their  panic 
had  been  seeking  asylum  in  Baeturia ;  that  they  had 
no  prospects  of  success  in  view  and  that,  if  any  man 
deserted  from  our  side,  he  was  shoved  ^  into  some 

*  i.e.  without  a  belt,  the  wearing  of  which  might  enable 
them  to  conceal  weapons. 

'  The  use  of  coicere  here  appears  to  be  disparaging. 

349 


CAESAR 

levem  armaturam  coici  eumquc  ^  non  amplius  XVII 
accipere. 
23  Insequcnti  tempore  Caesar  castris  castra  contulit 
et  bracchium  ad  flumen  Salsum  ducere  coepit.  Hie 
dum  in  opere  nostri  distenti  essent,  complures  ex 
superiore  loco  adversariorum  deeucurrerunt  nee 
desinentibus  nostris  ^  multis  telis  iniectis  compluris 
vulneribus  adfecere.  Hie  turn,  ut  ait  P',nnius,  '  nostri 
cessere  parumper.'  Itaque  praeter  consuetudineni 
cum  a  nostris  animadversum  esset  cedere,  centu- 
riones  ex  legione  \'.  flumen  transgressi  duo  resti- 
tuerunt  aciem,  acriterque  eximia  virtute  pluris  cum 
agerent,  ex  superiore  loco  multitudine  telorum 
alter  eorum  concidit.  Ita  cum  eius  comes  impar  ^ 
proelium  facere  coepisset,  cum  undique  se  circum- 
veniri  animum  advertisset,  regressus  *  pedem  offendit. 
In  huius  concidentis  centurionis  ac  viri  ^  fortis 
insignia  cum  complures  adversariorum  concursum 
facerent,    equites   nostri   transgressi   inferiore  *   loco 

^  The  MSS.  vary  between  transfugerent  and  transfugerunt, 
eumque  and  eum  qui.  /  have  adopted  Fleischers  reading 
transfugeret,  though  possibly,  in  vieiv  of  qui,  transfugerent  .  .  . 
eamque  should  be  read. 

-  detinentibus  nostros  MSS.  :  desinentibus  nostris  Vossius. 

'  compar  MSS.  :  comes  Warmington.  impar  added  by 
yipperdey,  who  also  read  eius  for  eis  or  is  of  MSS. 

*  ingressus  MSS.  :   regressus  Lipsius. 

*  huius  concidentis  temporis  aquari  MSS.  I  have  adopted 
Kipperdey's  conjecture. 

*  interiori  MSS.  :   inferiore  Ueinsius. 


^  This  is  the  traditional  interpretation,  but  the  sense  is  far 
from  satisfactorj\  Reckoning  10  asses  =  1  denarius  this 
would  amount  to  over  600  denarii  a  year;  whereas  the 
legionaries'  pay,  as  increased  by  Caesar,  was  only  225  denarii 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

light-.irmed  unit  and  drew  no  more  than  seventeen 
asses  a  day-^ 

In  the  period  which  followed  Caesar  moved  up  his 
camp  and  proceeded  to  carry  a  line  of  fortifications  to 
the  river  Salsum.  At  this  point,  while  our  men  were 
busily  engaged  in  the  operation,  a  fair  number  of  the 
enemy  swooped  down  upon  them  from  higher 
ground  and,  as  our  men  carried  on  with  their  work, 
there  were  not  a  few  casualties  among  them  from  the 
heavy  volleys  of  enemy  missiles.  Hereupon,  as  En- 
niusputsit,  "  our  men  gave  ground  for  a  brief  space." 
Conse(juently,  when  our  men  observed  that  they 
Avere  giving  ground  more  than  their  wont,  two 
centurions  from  the  Fifth  legion  crossed  the  river 
and  restored  the  battle  line  ^  ;  and  as  they  drove 
their  more  numerous  enemies  back,  displaying  dash 
and  gallantry  of  an  exceptional  order,  one  of  them 
succumbed  to  a  heavy  volley  of  missiles  discharged 
from  higher  ground.  And  so  his  colleague  now 
began  an  uphill  fight ;  and  when  he  observed  that 
he  was  being  completely  surrounded,  he  retreated 
and  lost  his  footing.  As  this  gallant  officer  fell 
not  a  few  of  the  enemy  made  a  rush  to  plunder  his 
decorations ;  but  our  cavalry  crossed  the  river  and 
from  lower  ground  proceeded  to  drive  the  enemy  to 

a  year.     Klotz's  reading  •X'VII  (sc.  per  mensem  =  84  denarii 
a  year)  is  attractive. 

-  It  would  seem  that  Caesar's  main  camp  was  still  X.  of  the 
river  Salsum,  whereas  Pompeius  was  S.  of  it.  But  Caesar 
may  well  have  had  detachments  holding  strong  points  across 
the  river  {e.g.  Castra  Postumiana,  ch.  8);  and  the  present 
context  suggests,  I  think,  that  his  sappers  were  working  S. 
of  the  river  and  that  their  desperate  plight  was  observed 
by  their  comrades,  and  relieved  b}-  the  cavalry,  from  X.  of 
the  river. 


CAESAR 

adversaries  ad  vallum  agcre  cocperunt.  Ita  cupidius 
dum  intra  praesidia  illorum  studfnt  caedem  facere,  a 
tiirmis  et  levi  armatura  sunt  interclusi.  Quorum 
nisi  summa  virtus  fuisset,  vivi  capti  essent :  nam  et 
munitione  praesidi  ita  coanjtjustabantur  ut  eques 
.spatio  intercluso  vix  se  defendere  posset.  Ex 
utroque  genere  pugnae  complures  sunt  vulneribus 
adfecti,  in  quis  ctiam  Clodius  Arquitius ;  inter  quos 
ita  comminus  est  pugnatum  ut  ex  nostris  praeter  duos 
centuriones  sit  nemo  desideratus  gloria  se  efferentis. 
24  Postero  die  ad  Soricariam  ^  utrorumque  convenere 
copiae.  Nostri  bracehia  ducere  eoeperunt.  Pom- 
peius  cum  animadverteret  castello  se  excludi  Aspavia, 
quod  est  ab  Ucubi  milia  passuum  ^^  haee  res  neces- 
sario  devocabat  ut  ad  dimicandum  descenderet ; 
neque  tamen  aequo  loco  sui  potestatem  faciebat, 
sed  ex  grumo  .  .  .^  excelsum  tumulum  capiebant, 
usque  eo  ut  necessario  cogeretur  iniquum  locum 
subire.  Quo  de  facto  cum  utrorumque  copiae 
tumulum  excellentem  petissent,  prohibit!  a  nostris 
sunt  deiecti  in  planitiem.^  Quae  res  secundum 
nostris     efficiebat    proelium.     Undique     cedentibus 

^  ab  Soricaria  MSS.  :   ad  Soricariam  Glandorp. 

*  lacuna  assumed  b;/  Nipperdey. 

^  deiecti  planitie  MSS.  But  the  sense  certainly  seems  to 
require  in  planitiem,  u'hick  I  have  accordingly  conjectured. 
{The  plain  dative  planitiei  or  planitiae  would  be  a  simpler 
correction  and,  syntactically,  perhaps  not  impossible  in  the  case 
of  this  author.) 

^  i.e.  either  infantry  and  cavalry,  or,  as  Klotz  suggests, 
with  the  enemy  cavalry  and  light-armed  units. 

-  March  5th,  as  ch.  27  shews. 

'  Both  Holmes  and  Klotz  accept  Stoffel's  identification  of 
Soricaria  with  Castro  del  Rio,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Salsum, 
6  miles  S.E.  of  Ategua. 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

their  rampart.  And  so,  in  their  too  eager  anxiety 
to  carry  destruction  within  the  area  of  the  latter's 
defence  positions,  they  were  cut  off  by  enemy  squad- 
rons and  Hght-armed  troops.  Had  not  their  gallan- 
try been  of  the  highest  order,  they  would  have  been 
captured  alive;  for  they  were,  moreover,  hemmed 
in  so  tightly  by  the  emplacements  of  the  camp  as  to 
make  it  well  nigh  impossible  for  a  hoi'seman  to  defend 
himself  in  the  restricted  space.  As  a  result  of  both 
types  of  engagement  ^ — quite  a  number  of  men 
were  wounded,  including  Clodius  Arquitius ;  but 
although  both  sides  were  engaged  at  such  close 
quarters,  no-one  was  lost  on  our  side  apart  from  the 
two  centurions,  who  bore  themselves  with  out- 
standing distinction. 

On  the  next  day  ^  the  forces  of  both  sides  con- 
verged upon  Soi'icaria.^  Our  men  proceeded  to  build 
fortified  lines.  When  Pompeius  observed  that  he 
was  in  process  of  being  cut  off  from  the  fortress  of 
Aspavia,*  which  is  five  miles  distant  from  Ucubi, 
this  circumstance  peremptorily  demanded  that  he 
should  enter  the  lists;  yet,  for  all  that,  he  gave  his 
opponents  no  opportunity  of  engaging  him  on  fav- 
ourable ground,  but  from  a  hillock  .  .  .  they  set 
about  capturing  a  lofty  knoll,  and  made  such  good 
progress  that  Caesar  had  no  option  but  to  approach 
unfavourable  ground.  When  accordingly  the  forces 
of  both  sides  had  launched  an  attack  upon  this  lofty 
knoll,  our  men  forestalled  the  enemy  and  hurled 
them  back  on  to  the  level  ground.  This  led  to  a 
successful  action  by  our  troops :    on  all  sides  their 

*  Stoffel  sited  it  some  2  miles  S.E.  of  Soricaria,  and  S.  of 
the  river.  Hence  it  would  appear  that  Caesar  had  now — if  not 
before — crossed  the  Salsum. 


CAESAR 

adversariis  non  parum  magna  in  caede  versabantur. 
Quibus  mons,  non  virtus,  saluti  fuit.  Quo  subsidio 
subnisi,^  nisi  advespcrasset,  a  paucioribus  nostris 
omni  auxilio  privati  cssent.  Nam  ceciderunt  ex  le\  i 
armatui-a  CCCXXIII,  ex  legionariis  CXXX\'III, 
praeterquam  quorum  arma  et  spolia  sunt  ablata. 
Ita  pridie  duorum  centurionum  interitio  hac  adver- 
sariorum  poena  est  litata. 
25  Insequenti  die  pari  consuetudine  cum  ad  eundem 
locum  eius  praesidium  venisset,  pristino  illo  suo 
utebantur  instituto :  nam  praeter  equites  nullo  loco 
aequo  se  committere  audebant.  Cum  nostri  in 
opere  essent,  equitum  copiae  concursus  facere 
coeperunt,  simulque  vociferantibus  legionai'iis,  cum 
locum  efflagitarent,  ut  consueti  insequi — existimare 
posses  paratissimos  esse  ad  dimicandum — nostri  ex 
humili  convalle  bene  longe  sunt  egressi  et  planitie  in 
aequiore  -  loco  constiterunt.  Illi  tamen  procul  dubio 
ad  congrediendum  in  aequum  locum  non  sunt  ausi 
descendere  praeter  unum  Antistium  Turpionem  ;  qui 
fidens  viribus  ex  adversariis  sibi  parem  esse  neminem 

^  quo   subsidio   ut   nisi   most   MSS.  :     subnisi   is   Dinter's 
conjecture. 

*  inaequore  or  iniquiori  most  MSS.  :  in  aequiore  Davies. 


^  This  appears,  as  Holmes  has  remarked,  to  be  distinct 
both  from  the  grunius  and  the  tumulus  mentioned  earlier. 
No  doubt  it  was  some  hill  nearby  to  which  the  Pompeians  had 
been  able  to  fight  their  way  out. 

-  So  Holmes  :  Caesar's,  according  to  Klotz.  But  the 
author  normally  uses  nosier  to  denote  the  Caesarians;  and 
the  phrase  pari  consuetudine  seems  to  me  to  refer  rather  to  the 

354 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

opponents  gave  ground,  and  our  men  were  engaged 
in  a  massacre  of  no  mean  proportions.  It  was  the 
high  ground,^  not  the  enemy's  valour,  which  proved 
the  latter 's  salvation ;  and  even  relying  upon  its  aid 
they  would,  but  for  the  approach  of  evening,  have 
been  deprived  of  all  support  by  our  less  numerous 
forces.  As  it  was,  their  casualties  comprised  three 
hundred  and  twenty-three  light-armed  and  a  hundred 
and  thirty-eight  legionaries,  apart  from  those  who 
were  stripped  of  their  arms  and  equipment.  Thus 
by  this  present  retribution  did  the  enemy  atone  for 
his  slaughter  of  our  two  centurions  the  day  before. 

On  the  following  day  Pompeius'  ^  force  followed  a 
similar  routine  and  returned  to  the  same  spot,  where 
they  employed  those  old  established  tactics  of  theirs  ; 
for  with  the  exception  of  his  cavalry  at  no  point  did 
his  troops  venture  to  commit  themselves  to  favourable 
ground.  While  our  men  were  engaged  on  their  task  of 
fortification,  the  enemy  cavalr>' forces  began  to  launch 
attacks  ;  and  simultaneously  his  legionary  troops  kept 
clamorously  demanding  to  have  their  turn,  seeing 
that  their  normal  role  was  to  support  the  cavalry — ■ 
you  might  have  supposed  them  to  be  straining  madly 
at  the  leash  :  when  our  men  advanced  a  good  long  way 
from  a  shallow  valley  and  halted  on  more  favourable 
ground  in  the  plain.  However,  there  was  no  doubt 
about  it,  the  enemy  all  lacked  the  courage  to  come 
down  into  the  plain  to  engage — all  except  one  man, 
Antistius  Turpio  ;  and  he,  confident  in  his  sti-ength, 
began  to  indulge  in  taunts,  claiming  that  there  was 
nobody  a  match  for  him  on  the  opposite  side.  Here- 
third  sentence  of  ch.  24.  The  '  same  spot '  would  seem  to  be 
the  neighbourhood  of  the  lofty  knoll,  and  not  the  high  ground 
mentioned  later. 

355 


CAESAR 

agitare  coepit.  Hie,  ut  fertur  Achillis  Memnonisque 
congressus,  Q.  Pompeius  Niger,  eques  Romanus 
Italicensis,  ex  acie  nostra  ad  congrediendum  pro- 
gressus  est.  Quoniam  ferocitas  Antisti  omnium 
mentis  converterat  ab  opere  ad  spectandum,  acies 
sunt  dispositae  :  nam  inter  bellatores  principes  dubia 
erat  posita  victoria,  ut  prope  videretur  finem  bellandi 
duorumdirimere  pugna.  *  Itaavidi  cupidicjuesuarum 
quisque  ex  partium  virorum  f'autorumque  voluntate 
habebatur.  Quorum  virtute  alacri,  cum  ad  dimi- 
candum  in  planitiem  se  contulissent,  scutorumque 
laudis  insignia  praefulgens  opus  caelatum  .  .  . 
quorum  cei'tamine  ^  pugna  esset  prope  profecto  di- 
rempta,  nisi  propter  equitum  eongressum,^  ut  supra 
demonstravimus  .  .  .  levem  armaturam  praesidi 
causa  non  longe  ab  opere  constituit.*  ^  Ut,  nostri 
equites  in  receptu  dum  ad  castra  redeunt,  adversarii 
cupidius  sunt  insecuti,  universi  clamore  facto  im- 
petum  dederunt.  Ita  metu  perterriti,  cum  in  fuga 
essent  multis  amissis  in  castra  se  recipiunt. 

Caesar  ob  virtutem  turmae  Cassianae  donavit 
milia  •XIII'*  et  praefecto  torques  aureos  V  et  levi 
armaturae  milia  X'll.''  Hoc  die  A.  Baebius  et  C. 
Flavius  et  A.  Trebellius,  equites  Romani  Astenses, 
argento  prope  teetis  equis  ®  ad  Caesarem  transfuge- 

*  The  MSS.  text  of  these  two  sentences  appears  to  be  highly 
corrupt  and  so  full  of  gaps  as  to  defy  any  plausible  reconstruction. 
The  English  rendering  is  accordingly  little  more  than  an 
approximation. 

1  certamine  added  by  Klotz. 

2  concessum  MSS.  :   congressum  Nipperdey. 

^  castra  constituit  MSS.  :   Klotz  deletes  castra. 

*  mil  XUIMSS.  :   milia  -XIII  Dinter. 
5  mil  OCCI  MSS.  :   milia  -X-II  Binter. 

8  tecti  equites  MSS.  :   teetis  equis  Glandorp. 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

upon,  like  the  traditional  encounter  between 
Achilles  and  Memnon,  Q.  Pompeius  Niger,  a  Roman 
knight  from  Italica,  advanced  from  our  ranks  to 
encounter  him.  All  men's  minds  were  now  dis- 
tracted from  their  work  and  bent  upon  this  spectacle 
— such  was  the  effect  of  the  dauntless  spirit  of 
Antistius — and  the  armies  were  arrayed  over  against 
one  another ;  for  the  chances  of  victory  were  nicelv 
balanced  between  the  two  warring  champions,  so  that 
it  almost  seemed  as  if  their  duel  meant  the  final 
decision  and  cessation  of  hostilities.  So  fanatically 
eager  were  they  all,  each  man  gripped  by  the 
enthusiasm  of  the  champions  and  supporters  of  his 
own  side.  As  for  the  two  champions,  what  with  their 
dashing  courage,  now  that  they  had  moved  into  the 
plain  for  the  encounter,  and  the  inwrought  work  of 
their  shields — emblems  of  their  fame  — flashing  in 
front  of  them  .  .  .  and  their  duel  would  almost 
certainly  have  put  an  end  to  the  action,  unless,  owing 
to  the  attack  of  the  enemy  cavalry  noted  above,  .  .  . 
Caesar  posted  some  light-armed  troops  not  far  from 
the  emplacement  to  give  cover.  While  our  cavalry 
were  withdrawing  to  camp,  the  enemy  pursued  them 
too  eagerly,  whereupon  the  light-armed  troops  one 
and  all  raised  a  shout  and  charged  them.  This  created 
a  panic  among  them  and  they  retii-ed  to  their  camp 
sustaining  heavy  losses  in  the  course  of  their  rout. 

In  recognition  of  the  gallantry  of  the  Cassian 
squadron  Caesar  awarded  it  three  thousand  de- 
narii and  its  commander  five  golden  collars ;  he 
also  awarded  the  light-armed  troops  two  thousand 
denarii.  On  this  day  A.  Baebius,  C.  Flavius 
and  A.  Trebellius,  who  were  Roman  knights  from 
the  town  of  Asta,  deserted   to   Caesar,   with   their 

357 


CAESAR 

runt ;  qui  nuntiaverunt  equites  Romanes  coniurasse 
omnis  qui  in  castris  Pompei  essent  ut  transitionem 
facerent ;  servi  indicio  omnis  in  custodiam  esse 
coniectos,  c  quibus  occasione  capta  se  transfugisse. 
Item  hoc  die  litterae  sunt  deprensae,  quas  mittebat 
Ursaonem  Cn.  Pompeius :  '  S.  V.  G.  E.  V.  Etsi, 
prout  nostra  felicitas,  ex  sententia  adversarios  adhuc 
propulsos  habemus,  si  aequo  loco  sui  potestatem 
facerent,  celerius  quam  vestra  opinio  fert  bellum 
confecissem ;  sed  exercitum  tironem  non  audent  in 
campum  deducere  nostrisque  adhuc  fixi  praesidiis 
beHum  ducunt.  Nam  singulas  civitates  circum- 
sederunt :  inde  sibi  commeatus  capiunt.  Quare  et 
civitates  nostrarum  partium  conservabo  et  bellum 
primo  quoque  tempore  conficiam.  Cohortes  .  .  . 
animo  habeo  ad  vos  mittere.  Profectu  ^  nostro 
commeatu  privati  necessario  ad  dimicandum 
descendent.' 
27  Insequenti  tempore  cum  nostri  in  opere  distenti 
essent,  equites  in  oliveto,  dum  lignantur,  interfecti 
sunt  aliquot.  Servi  transfugerunt,  qui  nuntiaverunt, 
a.  d.  III.  Non.  Mart,  proelium  ad  Soricariam  ^  quod 
factum  est,  ex  eo  tempore  metum  esse  magnum,  et 

^  profecto  MSS.  :   profectu  Mommsen. 

^  soriciatQ  or  siticia  MSS.  :   Soricariam  Clarke. 


^  Presumably,  as  Klotz  explains,  thcA^  brought  all  their 
valuables  with  them.  In  the  next  sentence  '  all  the  Roman 
knights  '  must  refer  only  to  those  from  Asta. 

*  Yet  from  ch.  28  it  appears  that  this  despatch — or  a  copy 
of  it — eventually  got  through,     cf.  ch.  18. 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

horses  practically  covered  in  silver.^  They  reported 
that  all  the  Roman  knights  in  the  camp  of  Pom- 
peius  had  taken  an  oath  to  desert ;  but  a  slave 
had  informed  against  them,  and  they  had  all  been 
thrown  into  prison;  they  themselves  were  among 
this  number,  but  had  seized  their  opportunity  and 
deserted.  It  was  on  this  day  too  that  a  despatch 
was  intercepted  -  which  Cn.  Pompeius  was  sending  to 
Ursao :  it  read :  '  If  you  are  well,  I  am  delighted : 
I  for  my  part  am  well.^  Although,  in  accordance  with 
our  usual  good  luck,  we  have  so  far  kept  the  enemy 
on  the  run  to  our  satisfaction,  yet,  if  they  gave  us 
the  chance  of  engaging  them  on  favoui'able  ground,  I 
should  have  finished  the  war  sooner  than  your  belief 
suggests.  But  as  it  is,  they  lack  the  courage  to 
bring  down  their  inexperienced  army  into  the  field, 
and,  pinned  down  so  far  by  our  forces,*  they  are  pro- 
longing hostilities.  They  have  in  fact  laid  siege  to 
individual  townships,  and  it  is  from  them  that  they 
derive  their  supplies.  I  shall  accordingly  not  only 
protect  the  townships  which  belong  to  our  side,  but 
shall  finish  the  war  at  the  first  opportunity.  I 
intend  to  send  you  .  .  .  cohorts.  When  we  take 
the  field  we  shall  deprive  them  of  their  vital  supplies, 
and  they  will  then  come  down  to  fight.'* 

Later  on,  when  our  men  were  busily  engaged  on 
a  field-work,  a  number  of  our  cavalry  were  killed 
while  collecting  wood  in  an  olive  grove.  Some 
slaves  deserted  to  us,  who  reported  that  since 
March  5th,  the  day  w'hen  the  battle  took  place  at 
Soricaria,  there  had  been  grave  alarm,  and  Attius 

3  Abbreviation  of — Si  valetis  gmideo,  ego  valeo.  This  is 
one  of  the  conventional  greetings  with  which  many  a  Roman 
letter  began.  *  See  p.  405. 

359 


CAESAR 

Attium  \"arum  circum  castella  praeesse.  Eo  die 
Pompeius  castra  niovit  ct  contra  Spalim  ^  in  oliveto 
constituit.  Caesar  prius  quam  eodem  est  profectus, 
luna  hora  circiter  sexta  visa  est.  Ita  castris  motis 
Ucubim  -  Pompeius  praesidium  quod  rcliquit  iussit 
incendere,  ut  deusto  oppido  in  castra  maiora  se 
reciperent.  Insequenti  tempore  \'entiponem  ^  op- 
pidum  cum  oppugnare  coepisset,  deditione  facta 
iter  fecit  in  Carrucam,  contra  Pompeium  castra 
posuit.  Pompeius  oppidum,  quod  contra  sua  prae- 
sidia  portas  claussiset,  incendit ;  milesque,  qui 
fratrem  suum  in  castris  iugulasset,  interceptus  est  a 
nostris  et  fustibus  percussus.  Hinc  itinere  facto  in 
campum  Mundensem  cum  esset  ventum,  castra 
contra  Pompeium  constituit. 
28  Sequenti  die  cum  iter  facere  Caesar  cum  copiis 
vellet,  renuntiatum  est  a  speculatoribus  Pompeium 
de  tertia  vigilia  in  acie  stetisse.  Hoc  nuntio  allato 
vexillum  proposuit.     Idcirco  enim  copias  eduxerat, 

1  The  MSS.  give  Spalim  or  Sparim  ;  neither  place  is  other- 
wise known.  But  the  tempting  conjecture  Hispalim  seems 
geographically  most  improbable,  as  it  lay  some  eighty  miles 
west  of  Soricaria  and  over  forty  miles  distant  from  Ursao. 

2  aucubim  or  accubim  MSS.  :   Ucubim  editors. 
*  ventiponte  MSS.  :   Ventiponem  Nipperdey. 

^  In  this  sentence  and  the  following  one  the  Latin  presents 
a  striking  example  of  the  ambiguity  mentioned  in  the  Intro- 
duction, p.  307.  Pompeius  is  almost  certainly  subject  of 
iussit,  and  the  camp  is  presumably  his;  and  so  one  expects — 
in  default  of  any  indication  to  the  contrary — Pompeius  to  be 
subject  in  the  following  sentence  too.  But  Caesar  must 
obviously  be  subject  of  posuit  and  is  apparentlj'  also  the 
subject  of  coepisset  and  fecit. 

^  Carruca  is  not  otherwise  known  :  its  general  position  can 
thus  be  inferred  only  from  this  context — somewhere  between 
Ventipo  (close  to  the  modern  Casariche)  and  Munda.     Klotz, 

360 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

Varus  had  been  in  command  of  the  fortified  zone. 
On  that  day  Pompeius  moved  his  camp  and  estab- 
lished it  in  an  oUve  grove  over  against  SpaHs.  Before 
Caesar  set  out  for  the  same  locality,  the  moon  was 
observed  at  approximately  the  sixth  hour.  As 
Pompeius  ^  had  thus  withdrawn  his  camp,  he  accord- 
ingly instructed  his  garrison  force  which  he  had 
left  behind  to  set  fire  to  Ucubi,  so  that,  when  the 
town  was  burned  out,  they  should  retire  to  his 
principal  camp.  Later  on  Caesar  proceeded  to  assault 
the  town  of  ^'entipo ;  and  when  it  capitulated  he 
marched  to  Carruca,-  and  pitched  camp  over  against 
Pompeius.  Pompeius  burned  the  town  ^  for  having 
barred  its  gates  to  his  foi-ces ;  and  a  soldier  who  had 
murdered  his  own  brother  in  camp  was  intercepted 
by  our  troops  and  clubbed  to  death.  From  this  area 
Caesar  marched  into  the  plain  of  Munda,*  and  on  his 
arrival  there  established  his  camp  over  against 
Pompeius. 

On  the  following  day  Caesar  was  minded  to  take 
the  road  with  his  forces  when  scouts  came  back  with 
the  news  that  Pompeius  had  been  in  battle  formation 
since  the  third  watch.  On  receipt  of  this  news 
Caesar  displayed  the  flag-signal  for  action.  Now  the 
reason  why  Pompeius  had  led  out  his  forces  was  this  : 

however,  who  assumes  throughout  that  operations  were 
confined  to  a  relatively  small  area,  tentatively  places  Ventipo, 
Carruca  and  Spalis  at  distances  respectively  of  only  7,  8  and  1 1 
kilometres  S.  of  Aspavia  on  the  Salsum. 

^  i.e.  Carruca. 

*  Its  position  is  disputed  :  I  have  followed  Holmes  and 
Veith  in  locating  it  some  six  miles  N.W.  of  Ursao  (Osuna). 
Stoffel  and  Klotz  place  it  at  Montilla,  some  35  miles  N.E.  of 
Ursao;  while  Hiibner  identifies  it  with  a  place  known  locally 
as  Campo  de  Munda,  about  30  miles  S.  of  Ursao. 

561 


CAESAR 

quod  Ursaonensium  ^  civitati,  qui  sui  ^  fuissent 
fautorcs,  antea  litteras  miserat  Caesarem  nolle  in 
convallem  descendere,  quod  maiorem  partem  exer- 
citus  tironeni  haberet.  Hae  litterae  vchementer 
conflrmabaiit  mentis  oppidanorum.  Ita  hac  opinione 
fretus  totum  se  ^  facere  posse  existimabat  :  etcnim  et 
natura  loci  defcndebatur  et  ipsius  oppidi  munitione, 
ubi  castra  habuit  constituta.  Namque  ut  superius 
demonstravimus,  loca  excellentia  tumulis  contineri 
intervallo  planitiei  dividi  * ;  id  (juod  co  incidit 
tempore. 
29  Planities  inter  utraque  castra  intercedebat  circiter 
milia  passuum  V,  ut  auxilia  Pompei  duabus  dcfen- 
derentur  rebus,  oppido  et  excelsi  ^  loci  natura.  Hinc 
dirigens  proxima  planities  aequabatur.  Cuius  de- 
cursum  antecedebat  rivus,  qui  ad  eorum  accessum 
summam  efficiebat  loci  iniquitatem :  nam  palustri  et 
voraginoso  solo  currens  crat  ad  dextram.  Itaque  ® 
Caesar  cum  aciem  derectam  vidisset,  non  habuit 
dubium   quin   media   planitie    in    aequum   ad   dimi- 

^  versaonensium  or  versoe-  or  verso-  MSS.  :  Ursaonensium 
Glandorp. 

-  qui  sui  supplied  by  Nipperdey. 

^  se  added  by  Oiidendorp. 

*  /  have  adopted  Nipperdey's  conjecture.  The  3ISS.  give 
variously  interim  nulla  planitia  edividit  :  nulla  planitiae 
dividit  :  nullam  planitie  dividi. 

^  oppidi  excelsi  et  MSS.  :   oppido  et  excelsi  Xipperdey. 

^  id  quod  MSS.  :  itaque  Nipperdey. 


1  Klotz  takes  this  to  mean  the  more  confident  attitude  of 
the  men  of  Ursao.  But  would  their  increased  confidence  by 
itself  lead  Pompey  to  think  he  could  carry  the  whole  thing 
off?  It  seems  to  me  more  likely  that  what  the  author 
reallj-  meant  was  this  :  "  The  reason  why  Pompey  had  led 
his  forces  out  was  that  Caesar — so  he  had  told  the  men  of 


362 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

he  had  previously  sent  a  despatch  to  the  citizens  of 
Ursao,  who  were  supporters  of  his,  saying  that 
Caesar  was  unwilling  to  come  doM'n  into  the  valley 
because  the  greater  part  of  his  army  was  inex- 
perienced. This  despatch  stiffened  the  morale  of 
the  townsfolk  considerably.  Pompeius  therefore, 
relying  on  this  conviction,^  supposed  that  he 
could  carry  the  whole  thing  off;  for  where  he  had 
established  his  camp  he  was  protected  not  only 
by  the  natural  conformation  of  the  gi-ound  but  also 
by  the  fortifications  of  the  town  itself.  For,  as 
we  have  pointed  out  earlier,^  it  is  lofty  country, 
l)astioned  by  hills  with  an  occasional  intervening 
plain ;  and  this,  it  so  happened,  was  the  case  on  the 
present  occasion. 

Between  the  two  camps  ran  a  plain,  extending  for 
some  five  miles,  so  that  there  were  two  factors  which 
made  for  the  protection  of  Pompeius'  troops — the 
town,  and  the  lofty  nature  of  the  ground.  Extending 
from  the  town  the  plain  ground  nearest  to  it  levelled 
out,  and  ran  down  to  where  a  stream  ran  in  front  of 
it,  which  made  the  ground  there  extremely  awkward 
for  Caesar's  troops  to  approach  the  Pompeians ;  for 
the  soil  to  the  right  of  the  river's  course  was  marshy 
and  full  of  bog-holes.  Consequently,  when  Caesar 
saw  their  battle  line  deployed,  he  had  no  doubt  that 

Ursao  in  a  despatch,  which  considerably  encouraged  them — 
was  unwilling  to  come  down  to  engage.  Pompey  accordingly, 
relying  on  this  conviction  (viz.  that  Caesar  would  decline 
battle),  supposed  he  could  carry  the  whole  thing  off." 

^  The  reference  seems  to  me  to  be  to  the  general  description 
of  Baetica  given  in  ch.  8  rather  than  to  that  of  the  Ategua- 
Ucubi  district  in  ch.  7.  .Stoifel  assumes  the  latter  on  the 
supposition  that  Munda  was  on  the  site  of  the  modern  Mon- 
tilla,  rather  less  than  ten  miles  S.W.  of  Ucubi, 

Z^3 


CAESAR 

candum  adversarii  procederent.  Hoc  erat  in  omnium 
conspectu.  Hue  ^  accedebat  ut  locus  ilia  planitie 
equitatum  evocaret  et  diei  solisque  serenitate,^ 
ut  niirificum  et  optandum  tempus  prope  ab  dis 
immortalibus  illud  tributum  esset  ad  proelium  com- 
mittendum.  Nostri  laetari,  non  nulli  etiani  timere, 
quod  in  cum  locum  res  fortunaeque  omnium  dedu- 
cerentur  ut,  quidquid  post  horam  casus  tribuisset,  in 
dubio  poneretur.  Itaque  nostri  ad  dimicandum 
procedunt,  id  quod  adversarios  existimabamus  esse 
facturos ;  qui  tamen  a  munitione  oppidi  longius  non 
audebant  procedere,  immo  se  ibi  prope  murum 
adversarii  ^  constituebant.  Itaque  nostri  procedunt. 
Interdum  aequitas  loci  adversarios  efflagitabat  ut 
tali  condicione  contenderent  ad  victoriam ;  neque 
tamen  illi  a  sua  consuetudine  discedebant,  ut  aut  ab 
excelso  loco  aut  ab  oppido  discederent.  Nostri  pede 
presso  propius  rivum  cum  appropinquassent,  adver- 
sarii patrocinari  loco  iniquo  non  desinunt. 
30  Erat  acies  XHI  aquilis  constituta,  quae  lateribus 
equitatu  tegebatur  cum  levi  armatura  milibus  sex, 
praeterea  auxiliares  accedebant  prope  alterum 
tantum ;  nostra  praesidia  LXXX  cohortibus,  octo 
milibus  equitum.  Ita  cum  in  extrema  planitie 
iniquum  in  locum  nostri  appropinquassent,  paratus 
hostis  erat  superior,  ut  transeundum  superius  iter 

^  hoc  MSS.  :  hue  editors. 

^  ornaret  .  .  .  serenitatem  MSS. :  evocaret  .  .  .  serenitate 
Kraner. 

^  in  quo  sibi  .  .  .  adversariis  MSS.  :  immo  se  ibi  .  .  . 
adversarii  Mommsen. 

^  i.e.  eight  legions — 4  veteran  (III,  V,  VI  and  X)  and  4 
of  recruits ;  the  cavalry  included  a  detachment  of  Numidians 
led  by  Bogud. 

364 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

his  opponents  would  advance  to  the  level  ground  to 
do  battle  in  the  middle  of  the  plain.  This  area  was 
in  full  view  of  all.  Moreover,  with  a  level  plain  like 
that  and  a  calm,  sunny  day,  it  was  a  tempting 
situation  for  cavalry — a  wonderful,  longed-for  and 
well-nigh  heaven-sent  opportunity  for  engaging 
battle.  Our  men  were  delighted — though  some  also 
had  misgivings — at  the  thought  that  the  welfare 
and  fortunes  of  everyone  were  being  brought  to  the 
point  that  no  one  could  tell  for  certain  what  would 
prove  to  be  the  luck  vouchsafed  them  an  hour  later. 
And  so  our  men  advanced  to  do  battle  ;  and  we  sup- 
posed that  the  enemy  would  do  likewise  :  but  our  op- 
ponents would  not  venture  to  advance  far  from  the 
defences  of  the  town :  on  the  contrary,  they  were 
establishing  themselves  in  the  town  close  to  the  wall. 
And  so  our  men  advanced.  From  time  to  time  the 
favourable  nature  of  the  ground  would  sorely  tempt 
the  enemy  to  press  on  to  victory  under  such  condi- 
tions ;  but,  none  the  less,  they  would  not  depart 
from  their  accustomed  tactics  so  as  to  forsake  either 
the  high  ground  or  the  town.  And  when  our  men, 
advancing  at  a  moderate  pace,  came  up  closer  to  the 
stream,  their  opponents  remained  consistently  on 
the  defensive  on  the  steep  ground. 

Their  battle  line  was  composed  of  thirteen  legions, 
and  was  screened  on  the  flanks  by  cavaliy  as  well  as 
six  thousand  light-armed  troops,  while  in  addition 
there  were  nearly  as  many  again  auxiliary  troops 
besides  :  our  forces  comprised  eighty  cohorts  ^  and 
eight  thousand  cavalry.  So  when  our  men,  as  they 
approached,  reached  the  unfavourable  ground  at  the 
farthest  limit  of  the  plain,  the  enemy  were  ready  on 
higher  ground,  making  it  extremely  dangerous  for  our 

365 


CAESAR 

vehementer  esset  periculosum.  Quod  cum  a  Caesare 
esset  animadversum,  ne  quid  temere  culpa  secus 
admitteretur,  eum  locum  definire  coepit.  Quod  cum 
hominum  auribus  esset  obiectum,  moleste  et  acerbe 
accipiebant  se  impediri  quo  minus  proelium  con- 
ficere  possent.  Haec  mora  adversarios  alacriores 
efficiebat :  Caesaris  copias  timore  impediri  ad  com- 
mittendum  proelium.  Ita  se  efferentes  iiiiquo  loco 
sui  potestatem  faciebant,  ut  magno  tamen  periculo 
accessus  eorum  haberetur.  Hie  decumani  suum 
locum,  cornum  dextrum,  tenebant,  sinistrum  III.  et 
v.,  itemque  cetera  auxilia  et  equitatus.^  Proelium 
clamore  facto  committitur. 
31  Hie  etsi  virtute  nostri  antecedebant,  adversarii 
loco  superiore  se  defendebant  acerrime,  et  vehemens 
fiebat  ab  utrisque  clamor  telorumque  missu  concur- 
sus,  sic  ut  prope  nostri  diffiderent  ^  victoriae.  Con- 
gressus  enim  et  clamor,  quibus  rebus  maxime  hostis 
conterretur,  in  collatu  pari  erat  condicione.  Ita  ex 
uti'oque  genere  pugnae  cum  parem  virtutem  ad 
bellandum  contulissent,  pilorum  missu  ^  fixa  curnula- 
tur  et  concidit  adversariorum  multitudo.  Dextrum  ut 
demonstravimus  decumanos  coi-num  tenuisse ;  qui 
etsi  erant  pauci,  tamen  propter  virtutem  magno 
adversarios  timore  eorum  opera  adficiebant,  quod  a 
suo  loco  hostis  vehementer  premere  coeperunt,  ut  ad 

^  itemque  et  cetera  auxilia  equitatua  3ISS.  :  most  editors 
either  transpose  or  add  et  after  auxilia. 

'^  different  or  -ferrent  or  deferunt  MSS.  :   diffiderent  editors. 
^  missus  MSS.  :  missu  editors. 

^  The  phrase  locum  definire  has  been  variously  explained 
by  editors.  But  if  it  be  assumed  that  Caesar's  troops  had 
already  crossed  the  stream,  it  may,  I  think,  imply  that 
Caesar    ordered    a    strictly    limited    advance    up    the    slope, 

366 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

men  to  pursue  their  passage  to  the  higher  level. 
When  Caesar  observed  this,  to  avoid  any  blunder 
being  perpetrated  owing  to  rashness  or  faulty  judg- 
ment, he  began  to  restrict  the  opei*ational  area.^ 
But  when  it  came  to  the  ears  of  the  men  that  he  was 
doing  so,  they  were  bitterly  disgusted,  as  they  took 
it  to  mean  that  their  chance  of  deciding  the  conflict 
was  being  hampered.  This  delay  made  the  enemy 
keener :  it  was  fear,  they  thought,  that  was  prevent- 
ing Caesar's  forces  from  joining  battle  :  and  although 
by  displaying  themselves  they  gave  our  men  the 
opportunity  of  engaging  them  on  steep  ground,  yet 
it  was  only  at  great  risk  that  one  could  approach 
them.  On  our  side  the  men  of  the  Tenth  legion  held 
their  proper  post — the  right  wing ;  while  the  men 
of  the  Third  and  Fifth  legions  together  with  all  the 
rest  of  our  foi'ces — the  auxiliary  troops  and  the 
cavalry — held  the  left  wing.  The  shout  was  raised 
and  the  battle  joined. 

Hereupon,  although  our  men  were  superior  in 
point  of  valour,  their  opponents  offered  a  very  spirit- 
ed resistance  from  their  higher  position  ;  and  so  furi- 
ous proved  the  shouting  on  both  sides,  so  furious  the 
charging  with  its  attendant  volley  of  missiles,  that  our 
men  well  nigh  lost  their  confidence  in  victory.  In 
fact,  as  regards  attacking  and  shouting — ^the  two 
chief  methods  of  demoralising  an  enemy — both  sides 
stood  on  equal  terms  of  comparison.  But,  though  they 
accordingly  brought  to  the  contest  an  equal  fighting 
capacity  in  both  these  departments  of  battle,  yet 
the  enemy  masses  were  pinned  down  by  our  volleys 
of  heavy  javelins,  and  fell  in  heaps.     Our  i-ight  wing, 

since  he  was  unaware  as  yet  of  the  strength  of  tlie  enemy's 
IJrepared  positions  on  the  heights. 

367 


CAESAR 

subsidium,  ne  ab  latere  nostri  occuparent,  legio 
adversariorum  traduci  coepta  sit  a  dextro.^  Quae 
simul  est  mota,  e(juitatus  Caesaris  siiiistrum  cornum 
premere  coepit  ita  uti  eximia  virtute  proelium 
facere  posseiit,^  locus  in  aciem  ad  subsidium  veniendi 
non  daretur.  Ita  cum  clamor  esset  intermixtus 
gemitu  gladiorumque  crepitus  auribus  oblatus, 
imperitorum  mentis  timore  praepediebat.  Hie,  ut 
ait  Ennius,  pes  pede  premitur,  armis  teruntur  arma, 
adversariosque  vehementissime  pugnantes  nostri 
agere  coeperunt ;  quibus  oppidum  fuit  subsidio.  Ita 
ipsis  Llberalibus  fusi  fugatique  non  superfuissent, 
nisi  in  eum  locum  confugissent  ex  quo  erant  egressi. 
In  quo  proelio  ceciderunt  milia  hominum  circiter 
XXX  et  si  quid  amplius,  praeterea  Labienus,  Attius 
Varus,  quibus  occisis  utrisque  funus  est  factum, 
itemque  equites  Romani  partim  ex  iirbe  partim  ex 
provincia  ad  milia  III,  Nostri  desiderati  ad 
hominum  mille  partim  equitum  partim  peditum ; 
saucii  ad  D.  Adversariorum  aquilae  sunt  ablatae 
XIII  et  signa  et  fasces  praeterea  hos  habuit  .  .  . 

1  ad  dextrum  MSS.  :    a  dextro  Glandorp.     Klotz  retains 
ad  dextrum  as  meaning  to  Caesar's  right. 

2  possent  ut  locus  MSS.  :   Du  Pontet  deleted  ut. 


^  I  have  retained  the  MSS.  reading,  although  some  emend 
to  give  the  sense  '  from  their  own  left  wing  ',  i.e.  on  the 
enemy's  right.  But  as  the  Pompeian  legion  was  already 
crossing  over,  it  seems  to  me  that  increased  pressure  by  the 
cavalry  on  the  enemy's  left  wing  might  well  have  made 
eflfective  reinforcement  impracticable. 

-  The  festival  in  honour  of  Liber  or  Bacchus,  celebrated  on 
March  17  th. 

368 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

as  we  have  explained,  was  held  by  the  men  of  the 
Tenth  legion;  and  despite  their  small  numbers, 
their  gallantry  none  the  less  enabled  them  by  their 
exertions  to  inspire  no  little  panic  among  their 
opponents.  They  proceeded,  in  fact,  to  exert  strong 
pressm-e  on  the  enemy,  driving  him  back  from  his 
positions,  with  the  result  that  he  began  to  transfer  a 
legion  from  his  right,  to  give  suppoi't  and  to  prevent 
our  men  from  outflanking  him.  As  soon  as  this 
legion  had  been  set  in  motion  Caesar's  cavalry 
began  to  exert  pressure  on  the  enemy  left  wing,^ 
so  that,  no  matter  how  gallantly  the  enemy  might 
fight,  he  was  afforded  no  opportunity  of  reinforcing 
his  line.  And  so,  as  the  motley  din — shouts,  groans, 
the  clash  of  swords — assailed  their  ears,  it  shackled 
the  minds  of  the  inexperienced  with  fear.  Here- 
upon, as  Ennius  puts  it,  "  foot  forces  against  foot  and 
weapons  grind  'gainst  weapons  "  ;  and  in  the  teeth  of 
very  strong  opposition  our  men  began  to  drive  the 
enemy  back.  The  town,  however,  stood  them  in 
good  stead.  And  so  they  were  routed  and  put  to 
flight  on  the  very  day  of  the  Liberalia  - ;  nor  would 
thev  have  survived,  had  thev  not  fled  back  to  their 
original  starting  point.  In  this  battle  there  fell  some 
thirtv  thousand  men — if  anything,  more — as  well  as 
Labienus  and  Attius  Varus,  both  of  whom  were 
buried  where  thev  fell,  and  about  three  thousand 
Roman  knights  besides,  some  from  Rome,  some  from 
the  province.  Our  losses  amounted  to  about  a 
thousand  men,  partly  cavalry,  partly  infantry  ;  while 
our  wounded  totalled  about  five  hundred.  Thirteen 
legionary  eagles  belonging  to  the  enemy  were 
captured ;  and  in  addition  he  had  the  following 
standai'ds  and  rods  of  office  .  .  . 

369 


CAESAR 

32  ...  ex  fuga  hac  qui  oppidum  Mundam  sibi  con- 
stituissent  praesidium,  nostrique  cogcbantur  necess- 
ario  eos  circumvallare.  Ex  hostium  armis  scuta  et 
pila  pro  vallo,  pro  caespite  cadavera  collocabantur, 
insuper  abscisa  in  gladiorum  mucrone  capita  homi- 
nuni  ordinata  ad  oppidum  conversa  universa,  ut  et 
ad  hostium  timorem  virtutisque  insignia  proposita 
viderent  et  vallo  circumcluderentur  adversarii.^ 
Ita  Galli  tragulis  iaculisque  oppidum  ex  hostium 
cadaveribus  circumplexi  ^  oppugnare  coeperunt.  Ex 
hoc  proelio  Valerius  adulescens  Cordubam  cum 
paucis  equitibus  fugit ;  Sex.  Pompeio,  qui  Cordubae 
fuisset,  rem  gestam  refert.  Cognito  hoc  negotio, 
quos  equites  secum  habuit,  quod  pecuniae  secum 
habuit  eis  distribuit  et  oppidanis  dixit  se  de  pace  ad 
Caesarem  proficisci  et  secunda  vigilia  ab  oppido 
discessit.  Cn.  Pompeius  cum  equitibus  paucis  non 
nullisque  peditibus  ad  navale  praesidium  parte  altera 
Carteiam  contendit,  quod  oppidum  abest  ab  Corduba 
milia  passuum  CLXX.  Quo  cum  ad  octavum 
miliarium  venisset,  P.  Caucilius,^  qui  castris  antea 
Pompei  praepositus  esset,  eius  verbis  nuntium  mittit 
eum  minus  bellum  habere :  ut  mitterent  lecticam 
qua  in  oppidum  deferri  posset.  Lecticariis  *  missis 
Pompeius  Carteiam  defertur.  Qui  illarum  partium 
fautores  essent  conveniunt  in  domum  quo  erat 
delatus — qui  arbitrati  sunt  clanculum  venisse — ,  ut 

*  Ex  hostium  armis  pro  caespite  cadavera  collocabantur 
scuta  et  pila  pro  vallo  insuper  occisi  et  gladio  ut  mucro  et 
capita.  .  .  .  MSS.  I  have  adopted : — Nipperdeys  trans- 
position of  scuta  .  .  .  vallo,  and  his  conjecture  in  gladiorum 
mucrone;  Oudendorp's  abscisa;  and  Hoffmann's  insertion  of 
ut  et  ad  between  universa  and  hostium. 

^  sunt  circumplexi  MSS.  :  Du  Pontet  deleted  sunt. 
^  caucili  MSS.  :   Caucilius  Scaliger. 

*  litteris  MSS.  :   lecticariis  Fleischer. 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

.  .  .  those  who,  after  surviving  thi>^  rout,  had  made 
the  town  of  Munda  their  refuge,  and  our  men  were  of 
necessity  compelled  to  blockade  them.  Shields  and 
javelins  taken  from  among  the  enemy's  weapons  were 
placed  to  serve  as  a  palisade,  dead  bodies  as  a  ram- 
pai't ;  on  top,  impaled  on  sword  points,  severed 
human  heads  were  ranged  in  a  row  all  facing  .the 
town,  the  object  being  not  merely  to  enclose  the 
enemy  bv  a  palisade,  but  to  afford  him  an  awe- 
inspiring  spectacle  by  displaying  before  him  this 
evidence  of  valour.  Having  thus  encircled  the  town 
with  the  javelins  and  spears  taken  from  the  corpses  of 
the  enemy,  the  Gallic  troops  now  proceeded  to  assault 
it.  From  this  battle  the  young  Valerius  escaped  to 
Corduba  with  a  few  horsemen,  and  delivered  his 
report  of  it  to  Sextus  Pompeius,  who  was  present 
there.  On  learning  of  these  events,  the  latter  divided 
what  money  he  had  with  him  among  his  present 
cavalry  force,  told  the  townsfolk  that  he  was  setting 
out  for  peace  talks  with  Caesar,  and  left  the  town  at 
the  second  watch.  Cn.  Pompeius,  attended  by 
a  few  horsemen  and  some  infantry,  pressed  forward 
on  the  other  hand  to  the  naval  fortified  base  of 
Carteia,  a  town  which  lies  one  hundred  and  seventy 
miles  away  from  Corduba.  When  he  had  reached 
the  eighth  milestone  from  Carteia,  P.  Caucilius, 
who  had  formerly  been  in  command  of  Pompeius' 
camp,  sent  a  message  dictated  by  Pompeius  saying 
that  he  was  in  a  bad  way,  and  they  must  send  a  litter 
in  which  he  could  be  carried  into  the  town.  A  litter 
and  bearers  were  despatched,  and  Pompeius  was 
carried  to  Carteia.  His  partisans  forgathered  at  the 
house  to  which  he  had  been  brought — each  supposing 
his  visit  to  have  been  a  private  one — to  make  enquiry 

371 


CAESAR 

ab  eo  quae  vellet  ^  de  bello  requirerent.  Cum 
frequentia  convenisset,  de  lectica  Pompeius  eorum  in 
fidem  confugit. 
33  Caesar  ex  proelio  Munda  munitione  eircunidata 
Cordubam  venit.  Qui  ex  caede  eo  refugerant, 
pontem  occuparunt.  Cum  eo  vcntum  esset,  con- 
yieiari  coeperunt :  nos  ex  proelio  paucos  superesse ; 
quo  fugeremus  ?  Ita  pugnare  coeperunt  de  ponte. 
Caesar  flumen  ti'aiecit  et  castra  posuit.  Scapula, 
totius  seditionis,  familiae  et  libertinorum  caput,  ex 
proelio  Cordubam  cum  venisset,  familiam  et  libertos 
convocavit,  pyram  sibi  exstruxit,  cenam  adferri 
quam  optimam  imperavit,  item  optimis  insternendum 
vestimentis :  pecuniam  et  argentum  in  praesentia 
familiae  donavit.  Ipse  de  tempore  cenare  ;  resinam  - 
et  nardum  identidem  sibi  infundit.  Ita  novissimo 
tempore  servum  iussit  et  libertum,  qui  fuisset  eius 
concubinus,  alterum  se  iugulare,  alterum  pyram 
incendere. 

^  vellent  MSS.  I  have  adopted  vellet — conjectured  by 
Kraffert — assuming  that  vellent  arose  from  the  plural  verb  which 
follows. 

-  sitam  most  MSS.  :  resinam  some  late  MSS.  :  stactam 
(=  myrrh-oil)  Oudendorp. 


^  This  seems  to  be  the  normal  interpretation,  though  the 
jeering  remark  seems  rather  pointless  as  addressed  to  Caesar. 
I  am  inclined  to  believe  that  the  words  Qui  ex  caede  .  .  .  de 
ponte  are  parenthetical  and  refer  to  the  time  when  the 
refugees  first  arrived.  If  so,  the  sense  will  be  :  On  their 
arrival  there  they  began  to  jeer,  viz.  at  the  members  of  the 
Caesarian  faction,  who  wished  them  further,  since  their 
presence  would  lessen  the  chances  of  reaching  a  composition 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

of  him  what  were  his  intentions  about  the  war ;  but 
when  a  crowd  of  them  had  forgathered,  Pompeius 
left  his  litter  and  threw  himself  upon  their  protection. 
After  the  battle  Caesar  invested  Munda  with  a 
ring  of  emplacements  and  came  to  Corduba.  The 
survivors  of  the  carnage  who  had  taken  refuge  there 
seized  the  bridge ;  and  when  Caesar  ^  arrived  there 
they  proceeded  to  jeer,  saying — -'  There  are  few  of  us 
survivors  from  the  battle  :  where  were  we  to  seek  re- 
fuge ?  '  And  so  they  fell  to  fighting  from  the  bridge. ^ 
Caesar  crossed  the  river  and  pitched  camp.  Now 
the  ringleader  of  all  this  unrest,  as  well  as  the  head 
of  a  gang  of  slaves  and  freedmen,  was  Scapula  ^ ; 
and  when  he  came  to  Corduba  as  a  survivor  from  the 
battle  he  summoned  his  slaves  and  freedmen,  had 
himself  built  a  lofty  pyre,  and  ordered  a  banquet  to 
be  served  on  the  most  lavish  possible  scale  and  the 
finest  tapestries  likewise  to  be  spread  out ;  and  then 
and  there  he  presented  his  slaves  with  money  and 
silver.  As  for  himself,  in  due  course  he  fell  to  upon 
the  banquet,  and  ever  and  anon  anointed  himself 
with  resin  and  nard.  Accordingly,  at  the  latest 
possible  moment,  he  bade  a  slave  and  a  freedman — - 
the  latter  was  his  concubine — the  one  to  cut  his 
throat,  the  other  to  light  the  pyre. 

with  Caesar.  The  following  chapter  tends,  I  think,  to  confirm 
this  interpretation. 

^  i.e.  down  from  their  position  on  it.  If,  however,  the 
alternative  interpretation  given  in  the  note  above  is  accepted, 
the  meaning  might  well  be  :  '  And  so  they  (sc.  the  refugees, 
who  had  seized  the  bridge,  and  the  Caesarian  partisans  in  the 
town)  fell  to  fighting  for  control  of  the  bridge.' 

^  Scapula  and  Aponius  had  been  elected  as  leaders  by  the 
legions  who  had  previously  mutinied  against  Q.  Cassius 
Longinus  and  later  expelled  his  successor,  Trebonius. 

373 


CAESAR 

34  Oppidani  autem,  sinml  Caesar  castra  contra  ad 
oppidum  posuit,  discordare  coeperunt  usque  eo  ut 
clamor  in  castra  nostra  perveniret  rixae  ^  inter 
Caesarianos  et  inter  Pompcianos.  Erant  hie  legiones 
duae  2  ex  perfugis  conscrij)tao,  partini  oppidanorum 
servi,  qui  erant  a  Sex.  Pompcio  nianu  niissi ;  qui  in 
Caesaris  adventum  disccdere  ^  coeperunt.  Legio 
XIII.  oppidum  defendere  cocpit,  nonani  *  cum  iam 
depugnarent,^  turris  ex  parte  et  murum  occuparunt. 
Denuo  legatos  ad  Caesarem  mittunt,  ut  sibi  legiones 
subsidio  intromitteret.  Hoc  cum  animadverterent 
homines  fugitivi,  oppidum  incendere  coeperunt. 
Qui  superati  a  nostris  sunt  interfecti  hominum  milia 
XXII,  praeter  quam  extra  murum  qui  perierunt.  Ita 
Caesar  oppido  potitur.  Dum  hie  detinetur,  ex 
proelio  quos  circummunitos  supcrius  demonstra- 
vimus,  eruptionem  fecerunt  et  bene  multis  interfectis 
in  oppidum  sunt  redacti. 

35  Caesar  Hispalim  cum  contendisset,  legati  depre- 
catum  venerunt.  Ita  cum  ad  oppidum  esset  ventum, 
Caninium  cum  praesidio  legatum  intromittit :  ipse 
castra  ad  oppidum  ponit.     Erat  bene  magna  manus  ^ 

^  fere  MSS.  :  rixae  Mommsen. 

2  quae  MSS.  :   duae  Madvig. 

'  descendere  MSS.  :   discedere  Duebner. 

*  non  3ISS.  :   nonani  Hoffmann. 

*  repugnarent  MSS.  :   depugnarent  Nippcrdcij. 
®  magnum  31 SS.  :  magna  manus  Ciacconius. 


1  f/.  ch.  2. 

^  The  state  of  the  text  makes  the  sketchy  narrative  still 
harder  to  follow.     It  looks  rather  as  if  the  Thirteenth  and  the 

374 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

Now  as  soon  as  Caesar  pitched  his  camp  over 
against  the  town  its  occupants  proceeded  to  quarrel ;  so 
much  so  that  the  sound  of  the  shouting  and  brawHng 
between  the  supporters  of"  Caesar  on  the  one  hand, 
and  Pompeius  on  the  other,  reached  our  camp. 
There  were  two  legions  in  this  town  which  had  been 
raised  partly  from  deserters,  while  others  were  slaves 
of  the  townsmen  who  had  been  set  free  by  Sextus 
Pompeius ;  and  now  in  view  of  Caesar's  approach 
they  began  to  desert.  The  Thirteenth  legion  pro- 
ceeded to  defend  the  town,  whereas  the  men  of  the 
Ninth,  as  soon  as  they  became  involved  in  the  fray, 
seized  some  of  the  towers  and  battlements.  Once 
again  ^  they  sent  envoys  to  Caesar,  requesting  that  he 
should  send  in  his  legions  to  support  them ;  and 
when  the  refugees  got  to  know  of  it  they  proceeded 
to  set  fire  to  the  town.^  But  they  were  overpowered 
by  our  men  and  put  to  death,  to  the  number  of 
twenty-two  thousand  men,  not  counting  those  who 
lost  their  lives  outside  the  battlements.  Thus  did 
Caesar  gain  possession  of  the  town.  While  he  was 
occupied  here,  the  survivors  of  the  battle  who  had 
been  shut  up  (in  Munda),  as  we  desci-ibed  above,^ 
made  a  sally,  only  to  be  driven  back  into  the  town 
with  very  heavy  losses. 

On  Caesar's  marching  to  Hispalis  envoys  came  to 
him  to  entreat  his  pardon.  So  when  he  reached  the 
town,  he  sent  in  Caninius  as  his  deputy,  accompanied 
l)y  a  garrison  force,  while  he  himself  pitched  camp 
near  the  town.     Now  inside  the  town  there  was  a 

'  refugees  '  (survivors  from  Munda  mentioned  above  in  ch.  33?) 
were  still  bent  fanatically  on  resistance,  while  the  Ninth  (?)  was 
ready  to  surrender. 
3  in  ch.  32. 

375 


CAESAR 

intra  Pompeianarum  partium,  quae  prarsidium 
reccptiim  indignaretur  clam  quendam  Philonem, 
ilium  qui  Pompeianarum  partium  fuisset  defensor 
acerrimus — is  tota  Lusitania  notissimus  erat — :  hie 
clam  praesidia  Lusitaniam  pro^lci'^oitur  et  Caecilium 
Nigrum,  hominem  ^  barbarum,  ad  Lennium  convenit, 
qui  bene  magnam  manum  Lusitanorum  haberet. 
Reversus  Hispalim  in  ^  oppidum  denuo  noctu  per 
murum  recipitur  :  praesidium,  vigiles  iugulant,  portas 
praecludunt,  de  integro  pugnare  coeperunt. 
36  Dum  haec  geruntur,  legati  Carteienses  renuntia- 
verunt  quod  Pompeium  in  potestatem  haberent. 
Quod  ante  Caesari  portas  praeclusissent,  illo  beneficio 
suum  maleficium  existimabant  se  lucri  facere. 
Lusitani  Hispali  pugnare  nuUo  tempore  desistebant. 
Quod  Caesar  cum  animadverteret,  si  oppidum 
capere  contenderet,  timuit  ne  homines  perditi 
incenderent  et  moenia  delerent ;  ita  consilio  habito 
noctu  patitur  Lusitanos  eruptionem  facere ;  id  quod 
consulto  non  existimabant  fieri.  Ita  erumpendo 
navis,  quae  ad  Baetim  flumen  fuissent,  incendunt. 
Nostri  dum  incendio  detinentur,  illi  profugiunt  et  ab 
equitibus  conciduntur.  Quo  facto  oppido  reciperato 
Astam  iter  facere  coepit ;  ex  qua  civitate  legati  ad 
deditionem  venerunt.     Mundenses,  qui  ^  ex  proelio 


^  nomine  MSS.  :   hominem  Glandorp. 

2  in  added  by  Oudendorp. 

*  mundensesque  MSS.  :   Mundenses  qui  Kraffert. 

376 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

^ood  large  ijroup  of  siipporters  of  Pompeius;,  who 
thought  it  scandalous  that  a  garrison  should  have 
been  admitted  unbeknown  to  a  certain  Philo — the 
man  w  ho  had  been  the  most  ardent  champion  of  the 
Pompeian  faction,  and  was  a  very  well-known  figure 
throughout  Lusitania.  This  man  now  set  out  for 
Lusitania  without  the  knowledge  of  our  garrison 
troops,  and  at  Lennium  met  Caecilius  Niger,  a 
foreigner,  who  had  a  good  large  force  of  Lusitanians. 
Returning  to  Hispalis,  he  penetrated  the  fortifications 
by  night  and  thus  gained  re-admission  to  the  town ; 
whereupon  they  massacred  the  garrison  and  sentries, 
barred  the  gates,  and  renewed  hostilities. 
36  In  the  course  of  these  proceedings  envoys  from 
Carteia  duly  reported  that  they  had  Pompeius  in 
their  hands.  They  thought  they  stood  to  gain  by 
this  good  deed,  which  might  offset  their  previous 
offence  in  having  barred  their  gates  to  Caesar.  At 
Hispalis  the  Lusitanians  kept  up  the  fight  without  a 
moment's  pause ;  and  when  Caesar  observed  their 
stubbornness  he  was  afraid  that,  if  he  made  strenuous 
efforts  to  capture  the  town,  these  desperadoes  might 
fire  the  town  and  destroy  the  walls.  So  after  holding 
consultations  he  allowed  the  Lusitanians  to  make  a 
sally  by  night — a  course  which  the  latter  never 
supposed  was  deliberate  policy.  Accordingly,  they 
made  a  sally,  and  in  the  process  fired  some  ships 
which  were  alongside  the  river  Baetis.  While  our  men 
were  occupied  >vith  the  fire,  the  Lusitanians  took  to 
flight  and  were  cut  down  by  our  cavalry.  This  led 
to  the  recovery  of  the  town ;  whereupon  Caesar 
proceeded  to  march  to  Asta,  from  which  township 
envoys  came  to  him  to  surrender  it.  As  for  the 
survivors  of  the  battle  who  had  taken  refuge  in  the 

377 


CAESAR 

in  oppidum  confugerant,  cum  diutius  circumside- 
rentur,  bene  multi  deditioncm  faciunt  et,  cum  essent 
in  legionem  distributi,  coniurant  inter  sesc,  ut  noctu 
signo  dato  (jui  in  oppido  fuissent  eruj)tionem  facerent, 
illi  eaedeni  in  castris  administrarcnt.  Hac  re  cognita 
insecpienti  nocte  vigilia  tertia  tessera  data  extra 
vallum  omnes  sunt  eoncisi. 
37  Carteienses,  dum  Caesar  in  itinere  relicjua  oppida 
oppugnat,  propter  Pompeium  dissentire  coeperunt. 
Pars  erat  quae  legates  ad  Caesarem  miserat,  pars  erat 
qui  Pompeianarum  partium  fautores  essent.  Sedi- 
tione  concitata  portas  ^  occupant ;  caedes  fit  magna  ; 
saucius  Pompeius  navis  XX  occupat  longas  ct  pro- 
fugit.  Didius,  qui  (ladibus  classi  praefuisset,  simul  ^ 
nuntius  allatus  est,  confestim  sequi  coepit ;  C'arteia 
pedites  ^  et  equitatus  ad  persequendum  celeriter  iter 
faciebant  item  confestim  consequentes.  Quarto  die 
navigationis,*  quod  imparati  a  Carteia  profecti  sine 
aqua  fuissent,  ad  terram  applicant.  Dum  aquantur, 
Didius  classe  accurrit,  navis  inccndit,  non  nullas 
capit. 

1  partes  MSS.  :  portas  Vnscosanus. 
^  ad  quem  simul  MSS:  :   ad  quem  deleted  by  Vielhaber. 
^  partim  pedibus  MSS.  :   Carteia  pedites  Kueblrr. 
*  item    quarto    die    navigatione    confestim    consequentes 
MSS.     J  have  adopted  Nipperdey's  conjecture. 


^  This  rendering  assumes  that  tessera  refers  to  signo;  that 
the  plot  was  allowed  to  take  place  by  night,  as  originally 
planned;  but  that  the  authorities,  warned  in  advance, 
intervened  and  cut  down  all  the  insurgents  [omnes  =  both 
groups  ?)  outside  the  rampart.  Klotz,  however,  holds  the 
view  that  the  conspirators  were  arrested  as  soon  as  the  plot 
was  discovered,  and  then,  very  early  next  morning,  led  outside 
the  rampart  and  there  executed.    The  fact  that,  as  he  observes, 

378 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

town  of  Munda,  a  somewhat  protracted  siege  led  a 
good  large  number  to  surrender ;  and  on  being 
drafted  to  foma  a  legion  they  swore  a  mutual  oath 
that  during  the  night  at  a  given  signal  their  com- 
rades in  the  town  should  make  a  sally,  while  they 
carried  out  a  massacre  in  the  camp.  But  this  plot  was 
discovered ;  and  when  at  the  third  watch  on  the 
following  night  the  pass-word  was  given,  they  were 
all  cut  down  outside  the  rampart. "^ 
37  While  Caesar  was  on  the  move  and  attacking  the 
remaining  towns,  the  men  of  Carteia  began  to  fall 
out  on  the  question  of  Pompeius.  There  was  the 
party  which  had  sent  envoys  to  Caesar :  there  was 
another  party  which  espoused  the  cause  of  Pompeius. 
Civil  discord  being  thus  stirred  up,  they  seized  the 
gates :  much  blood  was  shed :  Pompeius,  who  was 
wounded,"  seized  twenty  warships,  and  took  to  flight. 
As  soon  as  the  news  of  his  escape  reached  Didius, 
who  was  at  Gades  in  command  of  a  squadron,  he 
forthwith  began  to  give  chase  ;  and  from  Carteia  too 
the  hunt  was  likewise  taken  up  forthwith  by  infantry 
and  cavalry  marching  in  swift  pursuit.  On  the  fourth 
day  of  their  voyage  Pompeius'  party  put  in  to  land, 
since  they  had  been  ill  provided  and  without 
water  when  they  sailed  from  Carteia.  While  they 
were  getting  water  Didius  hastened  up  with  his  fleet, 
captured  some  of  their  ships,  and  burned  the  rest. 

Buch  executions  commonly  took  place  around  dawn  and  out- 
side the  rampart  (cf.  Bell.  Afr.  ch.  46)  favours  this  view  : 
against  it  it  may  perhaps  be  argued  that  the  verb  concidere  is 
more  appropriate  to  a  surprise  attack. 

-  That  Pompey  had  been  wounded  at  Munda  seems 
implied  in  ch.  32,  and  details  are  given  below  in  ch.  38.  But 
whether  he  sustained  further  injuries  on  this  occasion  is  by  no 
means  clear. 

379 


CAESAR 

38  Pompeius  cum  paucis  profugit  et  locum  quendam 
munitum  natura  occupat.  Equites  et  cohortes  qui 
ad  persequendum  missi  essent  speculatoribus  ante- 
missis  certiores  fiunt :  diem  et  noctem  iter  faciunt. 
Pompeius  umero  et  sinistro  crure  vehementer  erat 
saucius.  Hue  accedebat  ut  etiam  talum  intorsisset ; 
quae  res  maxime  impediebat.  Ita  lectica  ad 
turrem  cum  esset  ablatus  in  ea  ferebatur.  Lusi- 
tanus,  more  militari  ex  eius  praesidio  speculator 
missus,  cum  Caesaris  praesidio  ^  fuisset  conspectus, 
celeriter  equitatu  cohortibusque  circumcluditur. 
Erat  accessus  loci  difficilis.  Nam  idcirco  ^  munitum 
locum  natura  ceperat  sibi  Pompeius,  ut  quamvis 
magna  multitudine  adducta  ^  pauci  homines  ex 
superiore  loco  defendere  possent.  Subeunt  in 
adventu  nostri,  depelluntur  telis.  Quibus  cedentibus 
cupidius  insequebantur  adversarii  et  confestim 
tardabant  ab  accessu.  Hoc  saepius  facto  animum 
advertebatur  nostro  magno  id  fieri  periculo.  Opera 
circummunire  instituunt :  *  pares  ^  autem  ex  celeri 
festinatione     circummunitiones     iugo     derigunt,     ut 

*  I  have  adopted  Hoffmann's  conjecture  ;  the  3ISS.  reading — 
Lusitanus  more  militari  cum  Caesaris  praesidio  fuisset 
conspectus — seems  very  difficult. 

^  After  idcirco  the  MSS.  give — propt«r  suo  praesidio  fuisset 
conspectus  celeriter  ad.  /  have  omitted  these  toords,  following 
Dinter. 

^  deducti  MSS.  :  adducta  Madvig,  who  also  supplied  ut 
and  pauci. 

*  instituit  MSS.  :  in.stituunt  Nipperdey. 
^  pari  MSS.  :   pares  Mommsen. 

380 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

38  Pompeius  took  to  flight  with  a  few  companions  and 
occupied  a  certain  spot  which  possessed  natural 
defences.  When  the  cavalry  and  infantry  cohorts 
which  had  been  despatched  in  his  pursuit  learned  of 
this  fi-om  scouts  they  had  sent  on  ahead,  they  pushed 
on  day  and  night.  Now  Pompeius  was  seriously 
wounded  in  the  shoulder  and  left  leg  ;  added  to  which 
he  had  also  sprained  his  ankle,  which  hampered  him 
very  much.  So  a  litter  was  employed  to  carry  him 
off  to  this  redoubt  and.  once  arrived  there,  he  con- 
tinued to  be  can-ied  about  in  it.  One  of  the  Lusi- 
tanians  who  had  been  despatched  from  his  escort  on 
reconnaissance  in  accordance  with  normal  military 
routine  was  now  spotted  bv  the  Caesarian  force,  and 
Pompeius  was  promptly  surrounded  by  the  cavalry 
and  cohorts.  It  was  a  difficult  place  to  approach : 
that  in  fact  was  the  very  reason  why  Pompeius  had 
chosen  himself  a  naturally  fortified  position,  so  that, 
no  matter  how  great  a  force  was  brought  up  to  it,  a 
handful  of  men  might  be  able  to  defend  it  from 
higher  ground.  On  their  annval  our  men  came  up 
close  to  it  only  to  be  driven  back  with  javelins. 
As  they  gave  ground  the  enemy  pressed  upon  them 
the  more  eagerly  and  called  an  immediate  halt  to 
their  advance.  When  this  manoeuvre  had  been 
repeated  several  times  it  became  obvious  that  it 
was  a  very  risky  business  for  our  men.  The  enemy  ^ 
then  began  to  fortify  his  position  with  a  circum- 
vallation ;  our  men,  however,  acting  with  speed 
and  despatch,  carried  a  similar  circumvallation 
along     the     high     ffi-ound,     to     enable     them     to 

*  In  this  and  the  following  sentence  all  the  subjects  are 
left  unspecified  in  the  Latin  :  several  interpretations  are 
therefore  possible. 

381 


CAESAR 

aequo  pede  cum  adversariis  congredi  possent.  A 
quibus  cum  animum  adversum  esset,  fuga  sibi 
praesidium  capiunt. 

39  Pompeius,  ut  supra  demonstravimus,  saucius  et 
intorto  talo  idcirco  tardabatur  ad  fugienduni,  item- 
que  propter  loci  difficultatem  ueque  equo  neque 
vehiculo  saluti  suae  praesidium  parare  poterat. 
Caedes  a  nostris  undique  administrabatur.  Exclu- 
sus  ^  munitione  amissisque  auxiliis  ad  convallem 
exesumque  locum  in  speluncam  Pompeius  se  occul- 
tare  coepit,  ut  a  nostris  non  facile  inveniretur  nisi 
captivorum  indicio.  Ita  ibi  interficitur.  Cum  Caesar 
Gadibus  fuisset,  Hispalim  prid.  Id.  April,  caput 
allatum  et  populo  datum  est  in  conspectum. 

40  Interfecto  Cn.  Pompeio  adulescente  Didius,  quern 
supra  demonstravimus,  ilia  adfectus  laetitia  proximo 
se  recepit  castello  non  nullasque  navis  ad  reficiendum 
subduxit  et  quodvis  essent  bracchium  ex  utrisque 
partibus.^  Lusitani  qui  ex  pugna  superfuerunt  ad 
signum  se  receperunt  et  bene  magna  manu  comparata 
ad  Didium  se  reportant.  Huic  etsi  non  aberat 
diligentia  ad  navis  tuendas,  tamen  non  numquam  ex 
castello  propter  eorum  crebras  excursiones  elicie- 
batur,^  et  sic  prope  cotidianis  pugnis  insidias  ponunt 
et  tripertito  signa  distribuunt.  Erant  parati  qui 
navis  incenderent,  incensisque  qui  subsidium  repel- 

^  exclusa  MSS.  :   exclusus  Fleischer. 

^  The  last  six  words,  as  given  by  most  MSS.,  are  clearly 
corrupt  :  no  obvious  emendation  has  been  suggested,  arid 
Nipperdey's  assumption  of  a  lacuna  seems  probable.  Klotz 
proposes : — et  quodvis  essent  <periculum  minaturi  Lusitani 
ut  caveret>  bracchium  ex  utrisque  partibus  <'ad  mare  dueere 
coepit>  '  and,  to  guard  against  any  danger  likely  to  threaten  from 
the  Lusita7iians,  proceeded  to  carry  a  line  of  fortifications  to  the 
sea  on  either  side.' 

^  eiiciebatur  MSS.  :   eliciebatur  Olandorp. 
382 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

encounter  their  opponents  on  an  equal  footing'. 
When  the  latter  observed  this  move  they  took 
refuge  in  flight. 

Pompeius,  as  we  have  pointed  out  above,  was 
wounded  and  had  sprained  his  ankle,  and  this  handi- 
capped him  in  flight ;  moreover,  the  difficult  nature 
of  the  ground  made  it  impossible  for  him  to  have 
recourse  to  riding  horseback  or  driving  to  assist 
his  escape  to  safety.  On  all  sides  our  troops  were 
carrving  on  the  work  of  slaughter.  Cut  off  from  his 
entrenchment  and  having  lost  his  supporters, 
Pompeius  now  resorted  to  a  ravine,  to  a  spot  where 
the  ground  was  eaten  away ;  and  there  in  a  cave 
he  proceeded  to  hide  himself,  so  that,  short  of  his 
being  given  away  by  a  prisoner,  it  was  no  easy  matter 
for  our  men  to  find  him.  By  such  means  in  fact  he 
was  discovered  there  and  put  to  death.  When 
Caesar  was  at  Gades,  the  head  of  Pompeius  was 
brought  to  Hispalis  on  April  12th,  and  there  publicly 
exhibited. 

Filled  with  delight  at  the  death  of  the  young 
Pompeius,  Didius,  whom  we  mentioned  above,  with- 
drew to  a  nearby  stronghold,  beached  some  of  his 
ships  for  a  refit,  and  .  .  .  Those  Lusitanians  who 
survived  the  battle  rallied  to  their  standard  and, 
when  a  good  large  force  had  been  mustered,  duly 
pi-oceeded  against  Didius.  Although  he  displayed 
no  lack  of  care  in  guarding  his  ships,  yet  their  con- 
stant sallies  enticed  him  on  occasions  to  leave  his 
stronghold,  with  the  result  that  in  the  course  of 
almost  daily  battles  they  laid  a  trap  for  him,  dividing 
up  their  forces  into  three  groups.  There  were  some 
who  were  detailed  to  burn  the  ships ;  some  to  repel 
an  enemy  relief  force,  when  the  ships  had  once  been 

383 


CAESAR 

lerent  ^ :  hi  sic  dispositi  erant,  ut  a  nullo  conspici 
possent :  reliqui  in  ^  conspectu  omnium  ad  pugnam 
contendunt.  Ita  cum  ex  castello  Didius  ad  pro- 
pellendum  processisset  cum  copiis,  signum  a  Lusi- 
tanis  toUitur,  naves  incenduntur,  simulque  qui  ex 
castello  ad  pugnam  processerant,  eodem  signo 
fugientis  latrones  dum  persequuntur,  a  tergo  insidiae 
clamore  sublato  circumveniunt.  Didius  magna  cum 
virtute  cum  compluribus  interficitur ;  non  nulli  ea 
pugna  scaphas  quae  ad  litus  fuerant  occupant,  item 
complures  nando  ad  navis  quae  in  sale  fuerunt  se 
recipiunt,  ancoris  sublatis  pelagus  remis  petere 
coeperunt ;  quae  res  eorum  vitae  fuit  subsidio. 
Lusitani  praeda  potiuntur.  Caesar  Gadibus  rursus 
ad  Hispalim  recurrit. 
41  Fabius  Maximus,  quem  ad  Mundam  praesidium 
oppugnandum  reliquerat,  operibus  assiduis  diurnis 
nocturnisque  circumsedit :  interclusi  inter  se  decer- 
nere  armis  coeperunt,  facta  caede  bene  magna 
eruptionem  faciunt.^  Nostri  ad  oppidum  recipe- 
randum  occasionem  non  praetermittunt  et  reliquos 
vivos  capiunt,  XII II  milia.  Ursaonem  proficiscuntur ; 
quod  oppidum  magna  munitione  continebatur,  sic  ut 

^  repeterent  MSS.  :   repellerent  Glandorp. 

2  conspici  possent :   reliqui  in  added  by  Xipperdey. 

^  operibus  assiduis  iurnia  circum  sese  interclusi  inter  se 
decernere  facta  caede  bene  magna  faciunt  MSS.  :  diurnis 
nocturnisque  Dinter;  circumsedit  Fleischer;  armis  coeperunt 
added  by  Hoffmann  ;  eruptionem  appears  before  faciunt  in  some 
late  MSS. 

^  Klotz's  punctuation  (as  followed  here)  whereby  eodem 
signo  is  taken  with  fugientis — the  latter  word  apparently 

384 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

fired  :  these  parties  were  posted  in  such  a  way  as  to 
be  entirely  hidden  from  view,  whereas  the  remainder 
marched  into  battle  in  full  view  of  all.  Accordingly, 
when  Didius  advanced  with  his  forces  from  his 
stronghold  to  drive  them  back,  the  signal  was  dis- 
played by  the  Lusitanians,  the  ships  were  set  on 
fire,  and  simultaneously  those  who  had  advanced 
to  battle  from  the  stronghold — thev  were  now  pur- 
suing the  retreating  bandits,  who  had  turned  tail 
on  that  same  signal — Avere  surprised  by  the  am- 
bushing party,  which  raised  a  shout  and  surrounded 
them  from  the  rear.^  Didius  met  a  gallant  death  with 
many  of  his  men  ;  some  in  the  course  of  the  fighting 
seized  some  pinnaces  which  were  close  inshore, 
while  quite  a  number,  on  the  other  hand,  swam  off  to 
the  ships  moored  in  deep  water,  weighed  anchor, 
and  then  began  to  row  them  out  to  sea,  thereby 
saving  their  lives.  The  Lusitanians  gained  posses- 
sion of  the  booty.  Caesar  left  Gades  and  hastened 
back  to  Hispalis. 

Pabius  Maximus,  who  had  been  left  behind  by 
Caesar  to  attack  the  enemy  garrison  at  Munda, 
besieged  that  town  in  a  continuous  series  of  opera- 
tions by  day  and  night.  Now  that  they  were  cut  off 
the  enemy  fell  to  fighting  amongst  themselves ; 
and  after  a  welter  of  bloodshed  they  made  a  sally. 
Our  troops  did  not  fail  to  take  this  opportunity  of 
recovering  the  town  and  captured  the  remaining 
men  alive,  to  the  number  of  fourteen  thousand. 
Our  men  now  set  out  for  Ursao,  a  town  which  was 
buttressed  by  massive  fortifications,  to  such  an 
extent  that  in  itself  the  place  seemed  adapted  to 

implying  both  the  initial  act  of  turning  about  and  the  sub- 
sequent retreat — seems  to  yield  the  most  satisfactory  sense. 

385 


CAESAR 

ipse  locus  non  solum  opere  sed  etiam  natura  datus  ^ 
ad  oppugnandum  hostem  appareret.  Hue  accedebat 
ut  aqua  praeter  quam  in  ipso  oppido  unam  circum- 
circa  nusquam  reperiretur  propius  milia  passuum 
VIII;  quae  res  magno  erat  adiumento  oppidanis. 
Turn  praeterea  accedebat  ut  aggerem,  .  .  .  materies- 
que,  unde  soliti  sunt  turris  ac  vineas  facere  ^  propius 
milia  passuum  \l  non  reperiebatur :  ac  Pompeius 
ut  se  ad  oppidi  ^  oppugnationem  tutiorem  efficeret, 
omnem  materiem  circum  oppidum  succisam  intro 
congessit.  Ita  necessario  diducebantur  nostri,  ut  a 
Munda,  quod  proxime  ceperant,  materiem  illo 
deportarent. 
42  Dum  haec  ad  Mundam  geruntur  et  Ursaonem, 
Caesar,  ad  Hispalim  cum  Gadibus  se  recepisset, 
insequenti  die  contione  advocata  commemorat : 
initio  quaesturae  suae  earn  provinciam  ex  omnibus 
provinciis  peculiarem  sibi  constituisse  et  quae 
potuisset  eo  tempore  beneficia  largitum  esse ;  in- 
sequente  praetura  ampliato  honore  vectigalia  quae 
Metellus  inposuisset  a  senatu  petisse  et  ea  pecunia  * 
provinciam  liberasse  simulque  patrocinio  suscepto 
multis  legationibus  ab  se  in  senatum  inductis  simul 

1  aditus  MSS.  :   datus  Hoffmann. 
-  agi  MSS.  :   ac  vineas  facere  Kraner. 

^  hac  Pompeius  ad  oppidum  MSS.  :    I  have  adopted  Hoff- 
mannas  reading. 

*  eius  pecuniae  or  -a  MSS.  :   ea  pecunia  editors. 


^  ad  oppugnandum  hostem  appears  to  mean  '  to  assail  a 
(besieging)  enemy  ',  the  implication  possibly  being  '  go  over  to 
the  offensive  against ' ;   but  the  text  is  verj'  uncertain. 

^  69  B.C.  in  Further  Spain. 

3  62  B.C. 

386 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

assail  ^  an  enemy  by  virtue  of  its  natural  site  as  well 
as  its  artificial  fortification.  Added  to  this,  apart 
from  a  single  fountain  in  the  town  itself,  there  was 
no  water  to  be  found  anywhere  in  the  neighbourhood 
under  eight  miles  from  the  town ;  and  this  was  a 
great  advantage  to  the  townsfolk.  Then  again 
there  was  the  additional  circumstance  that  materials 
for  a  rampart,  .  .  .  and  timber,  which  they  habitually 
used  for  the  construction  of  towers  and  mantlets, 
was  not  to  be  found  under  six  miles'  distance  from 
the  town;  and  in  order  the  more  to  safeguard  him- 
self against  an  attack  upon  it,  Pompeius  had  had  all 
the  timber  in  the  neighbourhood  felled  and  dumped 
inside  it.  Thus  our  troops  were  under  the  necessity 
of  detaching  men  to  carry  timber  thither  from 
Munda,  the  town  they  had  just  recently  captured. 
42  While  these  operations  were  proceeding  at  Munda 
and  Ursao,  Caesar  left  Gades  and  returned  to 
Hispalis,  and  on  the  day  after  his  arrival  there 
summoned  an  assembly  of  the  people.  He  reminded 
them  that  at  the  outset  of  his  quaestorship  ^  he  had 
made  that  province  above  all  others  his  own  special 
concern,  and  had  liberally  bestowed  on  it  such  bene- 
fits as  lay  in  his  power  at  that  time  ;  that  when 
subsequently  he  had  been  promoted  to  the  praetor- 
ship  ^  he  had  asked  the  Senate  to  rescind  the  taxes 
which  Metellus  *  had  imposed,  and  had  secured  the 
province  immunity  from  paving  the  money  in 
question ;  that  having  once  taken  upon  himself  to 
champion  the  province  he  had  defended  it,  not  only 
introducing  numerous  deputations  into  the  Senate 

*  Q.  Caecilius  Metollus  Pius  had,  together  with  Cn.  Pom- 
peius Magnus,  crushed  the  rebellion  of  Sertorius  in  Spain 
80-72.     The  imposts  mentioned  here  were  probably  punitor}-. 

387 


CAESAR 

publicis  privatisque  causis  multoniiii  iiiitnicitiis 
susceptis  defcndisse  ;  suo  item  in  consulatu  absentem 
quae  potuisset  oommoda  provinciac  tribuissc  :  eorum 
omnium  Cf)nimod()rum  ct  immemorcs  ^  ct  ingratos  in 
se  ot  in  populuin  Ilomanum  hoc  bello  et  praoterito 
tempore  cognosse.  '  \'os  lure  gentium  eiviunKjue 
llomanorum  institutis  cognitis  more  barbarorum 
populi  llomani  magistratibus  sacrosanctis  manus 
semel  ^  et  saepius  attulistis  et  luce  clara  Cassium  ^  in 
medio  foro  nefarie  interficere  voluistis.  \'os  ita 
pacem  semper  odistis  ut  nullo  tempore  legiones 
desitae  sint  populi  Romani  in  hac  provincia  haberi. 
Apud  vos  beneficia  pro  maleficiis,  malcficia  pro 
beneficiis  habcntur.  Ita  neque  in  otio  concordiam 
neque  in  bello  virtutem  ullo  tempore  retinere  potuis- 
tis.  Privatus  ex  fuga  Cn.  Ponipeius  adulescens  a 
vobis  receptus  fascis  impcriumque  sibi  arripuit, 
multis  interfectis  civibus  auxilia  contra  populum 
Romanum  comparavit.  agros  provinciamque  vestro 
impulsu  depopulavit.  In  quo  vos  victores  exstabatis  ? 
An  me  deleto  non  animum  advertebatis  habere 
legiones  populum  Romanum,  quae  non  solum  vobis 
obsistere  sed  etiam  caelum  diruere  possent  ?  Quarum 
laudibus  et  virtute  .  .  . 

^  etiam  memores  MSS.  :  et  immemores  editors. 
2  magna  trans  aero  {or  ero  or  ore)  Sanctis  Romanus  MSS. : 
magistratibus  sacrosanctis  manus  semel  Bcroaldus. 
'  captum  3ISS.  :   Cassium  Manutius. 


1  59  B.C.  with  Bibulus. 

2  Bell.  Alex.  eh.  52. 


388 


THE  SPANISH  WAR 

but  also  undertaking  legal  actions  both  public  and 
private,  and  thereby  incurring  the  enmity  of  many 
men.  Similarly,  during  the  period  of  his  consulship  ^ 
he  had  bestowed  on  the  province  in  his  absence  such 
advantages  as  lay  in  his  power.  Yet  both  in  the 
present  war  and  in  the  period  before  it  he  was  well 
aware  that  they  had  been  unmindful  of  all  these 
advantages,  and  ungrateful  for  them,  both  towards 
himself  and  towards  the  Roman  people.  '  You,'  he 
went  on,  '  who  are  well  acquainted  with  the  law  of 
nations  and  the  established  usages  of  Roman  citizens, 
have  none  the  less  behaved  like  savages  and  have 
laid  violent  hands  more  often  than  once  upon  the 
inviolable  magistrates  of  the  Roman  people,  and 
designed  the  dastardly  murder  of  Cassius  ^  in  broad 
daylight  in  the  middle  of  the  forum.  You  have 
always  so  hated  f)eace  that  this  province  has  never 
ceased  to  be  occupied  by  the  legions  of  the  Roman 
people.  With  you  good  deeds  count  as  misdeeds, 
and  vice  versa.  Consequently  you  have  never  been 
able  to  maintain  hai'monv  in  peace  or  high  morale  in 
war.  It  was  you  who  harboured  the  young  Cn. 
Pompeius  after  his  flight ;  it  was  at  your  instigation 
that,  albeit  a  private  citizen,  he  seized  the  rods  of 
office  and  usurped  military  command,  put  many 
citizens  to  death,  raised  armed  forces  to  fight  the 
Roman  people,  and  laid  waste  the  territories  of  the 
province.  On  what  field  did  you  come  out  victorious  ? 
Or  didn't  you  take  into  consideration  the  fact  that, 
if  I  were  done  away  with,  the  Roman  people  possessed 
legions  which  could  not  only  offer  you  resistance  but 
could  also  cause  the  heavens  to  fall  ?  By  their  glori- 
ous deeds  of  valour  ..." 


389 


APPENDIX   A 

THE   OPERATIONS   NEAR   UZITTA 

(African  War  chapters  37-66) 

Although  in  general  the  narrative  contained  in  these 
thirty  chapters  is  clear,  yet  there  remain  not  a  few  prob- 
lems mainly  concerned  with  the  identification  of  positions 
mentioned  in  the  text.  Some  of  these  problems  are  vital 
to  the  interpretation  of  the  text;  and  as  any  adequate 
discussion  of  them  is  impossible  in  brief  footnotes  they  are 
dealt  with  here  in  this  appendix. 

(1)  The  Identity  of  the  ultimus  collis  of  chapters  37-39 

It  is  of  some  importance  to  identify  this  hill  because  it 
has  a  bearing  not  only  upon  the  position  of  both  Scipio's 
and  Caesar's  camps,  but  also  upon  the  operations  of 
chapters  49-51. 

The  first  sentence  of  chapter  38  provides  the  main  evidence 
for  its  identification.  It  was,  apparently,  not  the  southern- 
most hill  in  the  chain  (Sidi  Jeha),  but  the  southernmost  of 
those  hills  only  which  contained  ancient  watch-towers. 
R.  Holmes  argued — convincingly,  as  I  think — that  the 
word  unurtuiuenuiue  must  imply  that  Caesar  had  visited  at 
least  three  hills  before  he  was  not  so  far  from  the  last  one. 
This  argument  would  suggest  Haniadet  er  Ressa  or  one  of 
its  southern  neighbours.  To  this  it  has  been  objected 
that  Caesar  could  not  possibly  have  covered  the  distance 
by  night  over  rough  ground  ;  and  in  support  of  this  objec- 
tion great  stress  has  been  laid  by  some  upon  the  word 
seniihora.  But  to  me  it  seems  unnecessary  to  connect 
semihora    with   Caesar's   preUminary   reconnaissance  :     if 


APPENDIX  A 

ea  refers  to  castella,  as  it  would  seem  to,  may  not  the 
meaning  be  simply  that,  once  the  preliminary  survey  and 
brieting  was  completed,  the  terajjorary  re-instatement  of 
the  ()1<1  watch-towers — carried  out  simultaneously  on  all 
the  hills  by  parties  of  sappers  usin^  in  the  main  materials 
on  the  spot — was  completed  in  half  an  hour  ? 

As  flamadet  er  Ressa  satisfies  the  other  requirements — 
proximity  to  Scipio's  camp  and  the  operations  described 
in  chapter  49 — I  accordingly  accept  this  identification. 

(2)  Caesar's  Camps  and  Fortified  Lines 

Three  distinct  camps  are  referred  to  in  the  text — two 
main  and  one  subsidiary.  The  latter  is  mentioned  in  the 
first  sentence  of  chapter  51.  It  was  apparently  a  redoubt, 
built  on  Sidi  Jehu — possibly  on  the  forward  slopes — to 
command  its  southern  and  western  approaches.  It  is 
marked  on  Map  4  (Uzitta)  with  the  figure  2. 

In  the  following  sentence  of  chapter  .51  the  writer  goes  on  : 
'  from  his  main  [or  possibly  '  largest ']  camp  Caesar  pro- 
ceeded to  carry  two  fortified  lines  across  the  centre  of  the 
plain  towards  Uzitta.'  I  have  followed  StolTel  and  Holmes 
in  locating  this  main  camp  (numbered  1  in  map  4)  on  the 
western  slopes  of  the  ridge,  rather  than  on  the  plateau 
farther  east,  where  Veith  and  Bouvet  place  it.  The  former 
location  agrees  better  with  the  statement  in  chapter  63 
that  the  camp — apparently  the  main  camp — was  six  miles 
from  Leptis. 

As  to  his  third  camp,  there  is  little  dispute  about  its 
position  described  in  chapter  56.  It  was  in  the  plain 
opposite  Uzitta,  just  out  of  range  of  infantry  weapons,  but 
within  artillery  range  of  the  tow  n  ;  and  it  was  large  enough 
to  hold  five  legions. 

The  approximate  location  of  Caesar's  main  fortified 
lines  is  not  seriously  disputed.  In  ]Map  4  I  have  marked 
the  initial  field-works,  described  in  chapter  38,  as  running 
along  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  though  the  phrase  medio  iugo 
might  well  imply  '  half-way  up  (the  western  side  of)  the 
ridge  '.     Their  prolongation  S.W.  to  Rhar  ed  Deba  is,  I 

392 


APPENDIX  A 

think,  implied  in  chapter  49,  though  the  interpretatiorx 
of  this  difficult  chapter  is  much  disputed.  The  words  '  he 
began  to  advance  along  the  crest  of  the  ridge  '  I  interpret 
as  a  movement  S.W.  in  the  direction  of  Sicli  Jeha,  which  I 
identify  with  pru.rimam  collem;  and  I  interpret  the  phrase 
'  capturing  the  high  ground  closer  to  Scipio  '  as  implying 
the  western  slopes  oi  Bhar  ed  Deba,  which  might  otherwise 
provide  Scipio  with  a  springboard  for  an  enflanking 
movement. 

(3)  Scipio's  Camp 

The  position  of  this  camp  is  a  very  vexed  question. 
The  main  evidence  in  the  text  is  as  follows  : 

ch.  24  :  Scipio,  marching  by  night  from  Hadrumetum, 
joins  forces  with  Labienus  and  Petreius,  and  they  then 
establish  themselves  in  a  single  camp  three  miles 
distant  (presumably  from  Caesar's  camp  near 
Ruspina). 

cA.  38  :  '  from  the  last  hill  and  turret,  which  was  nearest 
the  enemy's  camp,  .  .  .' 

chs.  38,  39  :  '  Scipio  and  Labienus  advanced  about  a 
mile  from  their  fortified  positions.  .  .  .  When  Caesar 
perceived  that  no  more  than  a  mile  and  a  half  now 
separated  the  enemy  line  from  his  own  fortifica- 
tions .  .  .'  (see  footnote  on  p.  396). 

cA.  51  :  '  the  town  of  Uzitta,  which  was  situated  in  the 
plain  between  his  own  (Caesar's)  camp  and  Scipio's  .  . .' 

Commentators  have  accordingly  searched  for  a  suitable 
site  answering  the  following  three  requirements  : 

(0  three  Roman  miles  distant  from  Ruspina; 
(ii)  roughly   two   and   a   half  Roman   miles   from 
Caesar's  emplacements  on  or  near  the  ridge ; 
(Hi)  on  the  far  {i.e.  western)  side  of  Uzitta. 

Now  it  is  fairly  easy  to  select  two  sites  which  between 
them  shall  satisfy  all  these  three  conditions ;  but  it  is  well 
nigh  impossible  to  select  one.     Thus  R.  Holmes,  differing 

393 


APPENDIX  A 

but  slightly  from  Veith,  places  the  camp  about  one  and  a 
half  miles  N.E.  of  Uzitta,  not  far  from  the  modem  village 
of  Mnara.  But  this  is  nearly  five  Roman  miles  distant 
from  Caesar's  positions  at  Ruspina,  and,  moreover,  it 
fails  to  satisfy  the  third  condition.  Bouvet,  on  the  other 
hand,  locates  the  camp  about  one  mile  X.W.  of  Uzitta, 
a  location  which  satisfies  the  third  condition  but  is  four 
Roman  miles  from  the  ridge.  I  would  place  the  camp 
somewhat  closer  to  the  town,  though  in  Map  4  it  may 
perhaps  be  marked  too  close,  in  view  of  the  details — rather 
ambiguous  ones — given  in  chapter  41  :  some  sort  of  com- 
promise appears  inevitable  between  these  indications 
and  the  approximate  distance  of  two  and  a  half  Roman 
miles  mentioned  above.  But  this  location  does  not  satisfy 
the  first  condition  :  it  is  about  six  Roman  miles  from 
Ruspina.  Hence  Bouvet  somewhat  arbitrarily  amends  the 
MSS.  reading  of///  to  17. 

It  was  Stoffel  who,  appreciating  the  difficulties  of  satis- 
fying all  the  stated  conditions  in  a  single  site,  suggested 
that  the  camp  mentioned  in  chapter  24  was  not  the  same 
as  the  one  close  to  Uzitta.  Much  scorn  has  been  poured 
upon  this  theory,  but  even  so  I  am  inclined  to  accept  it. 
What  Scipio's  reasons  may  have  been  for  moving  camp,  if 
in  fact  he  did  so,  are  by  no  means  apparent  :  a  more 
serious  objection  to  the  theory  is  that  the  move  is  quite 
unmentioned.  In  this  respect  the  question  of  Labienus' 
camp,  discussed  below,  is  somewhat  parallel ;  and  it  is 
perhaps  worth  noting  that  more  than  one  editor,  while 
arguing  on  the  one  hand  that  Scipio  could  not  have 
moved  his  camp  because  no  mention  is  made  of  the  fact,  is 
quite  disposed  to  believe  on  the  other  hand  that  Labienus 
latterly  occupied  a  separate  camp,  even  though  this  move 
too  has  gone  unrecorded. 

There  is,  I  think,  another  point  in  favour  of  Stoffel's 
theory.  In  chapter  30  it  is  stated  that  Scipio  made  almost 
daily  demonstrations  in  battle  array  at  a  distance  of  some 
300  paces  from  his  camp,  Caesar  being  at  that  time  still  at 
Ruspina;  and  that  finally  Scipio  halted  his  battle  line 
not  so   far  from  Caesar's   camp.     That  he  made   these 

394 


APPENDIX  A 

demonstrations  in  no  serious  spirit  and  took  good  care  not 
to  run  any  serious  risk  is  no  doubt  true  :  he  ran  little 
enough  risk  in  all  conscience  if  his  camp  was  then,  as 
Stoffel  suggests,  near  Knais,  three  miles  away  from 
Caesar  at  Ruspina ;  but  if,  even  in  those  days,  he  was 
already  encamped  near  Uzitta  almost  six  miles  distant, 
there  would  seem  very  little  point  in  demonstrating  at  a 
range  of  some  five  and  a  half  miles. 

For  these  reasons  I  am  inclined  to  accept  Stoffel' s 
theory  in  order  to  justify  my  location  of  Scipio's  camp  near 
Uzitta. 

(4)  Juba's  Camp 

There  is  little  evidence  in  the  text  for  its  position,  nor  is 
the  matter  of  any  great  moment.  In  chapter  48  it  is 
stated  that  the  king  pitched  a  separate  camp  not  far  from 
Scipio.  The  statement  in  chapter  52  that  Caesar's  cavalrj'^ 
drove  the  Xumidians  right  back  to  the  royal  camp  seems 
to  me  inconclusive  :  Veith  inferred  from  this  that  it  was 
nearer  than  Scipio's  camp  to  Uzitta ;  but  the  opposite 
conclusion  might,  I  think,  be  drawn  from  the  word 
vsque. 

(5)  Lahienus'  Camp 

Whereas  it  is  clear  from  chapter  24  that  while  Caesar  was 
still  at  Ruspina  Labienus  shared  a  single  camp  with 
Scipio  and  Petreius,  there  are  certain  indications  that  at  a 
later  period  he  was  operating  from  a  camp  situated  to  the 
south  of  the  plain.  Thus  in  the  last  sentence  of  chapter  49 
we  read  that  '  Labienus  too  had  made  up  his  mind  to  seize 
this  hill  (probably  Sidi  Jeha),  and  his  closer  proximity  to  it 
had  enabled  him  to  achieve  the  goal  more  rapidly.' 
Chapter  50  implies  that  he  was  quite  familiar  with  this 
southern  area ;  while  in  chapter  58  it  is  stated  that  '  the 
enemy  led  forth  their  entire  combined  forces  from  all  their 
camps.' 

This  evidence  has  led  most  editors  to  assume  that 
Labienus  latterly  had  an  independent  camp  to  the  south- 

395 


APPENDIX   A 

ward.  I  have  followed  R.  Holmes  and  Bouvet  in  locating 
it  in  the  foothills  east  of  the  modem  village  of  Djemmal. 
The  battle  dispositions  described  in  chapters  59-60  make  it 
difficult  to  assume  that  this  camp  was  much  farther 
north  :  I  assume  that  the  phrase  '  closer  proximity  '  in 
chapter  49  refers,  not  to  this  main  camp,  but  to  some 
redoubt  or  advanced  post  which  he  occupied  at  the  time. 

(Note.  On  pp.  393-4  I  have  inferred  from  ch.s.  38  and  39 
that  Scipio's  camp  was  "  roughly  two  and  a  half  Roman  miles 
from  Caesar's  emplacements '.  But  in  fact  the  distance  may 
have  been  greater,  if  it  is  assumed  from  the  sec(jnd  sentence 
of  ch.  39  that  Scipio's  cavalry,  Aiter  first  advancing  about  a 
mile,  later  continued  to  advance  till  tliey  were  now  no  more 
than  a  mile  and  a  half  from  Caesar.  On  this  assumption 
Bouvet's  location  of  .Scipio's  camp  some  4  miles  distant  from 
the  ridge  seems  quite  defensible  so  far  as  this  evidence  is  con- 
cerned.) 


396 


APPENDIX   B 

CAESAR'S   WITHDRAWAL   FROM  CORDUBA 

{Spayiish  War  chapter  6) 

Many  corruptions  in  the  MSS.  text  of  the  earher  part  of 
this  chapter  make  its  interpretation  very  difficult.  As  the 
text  I  have  adopted  varies  considerably  both  from  the 
MS8.  tradition  and  from  the  reading  given  by  Klotz,  all 
three  readings  are  here  set  out  in  full. 

(i)  The  MSS.  Beading 

id  cum  animadverteret  adversarios  minime  velle, 
quos  quoniam  a  avia  retraxerat,  ut  in  aequum 
deduceret,  copiis  flumine  traductis  noctu  iubet  ignis 
fieri  magnos  :  ita  firmissimum  eius  praesidium 
Ateguam  proficiscitur.  id  cum  Pompeius  ex  perfugis 
rescisset,  qua  die  facultatem  et  angustias,  carra  com- 
plura  multosque  lanistas  retraxit  et  ad  Cordubam  se 
recepit.  Caesar  munitionibus  antequam  {or  antiquas) 
oppugnare  et  bracchia  circumducere  coepit.  cui  de 
Pompeio  cum  nuntius  esset  allatus  eo  die  proficiscitur. 

(ii)  Klotz' s  Reading 

(ch.  5)  id  cum  animadverteret  adversarios  minime 
velle.  .  .  . 

(ch.  6)  Quos  quoniam  ab  Ulia  retraxerat,  ut  in 
aequum  deduceret,  copiis  flumine  traductis  noctu 
iubet  ignes  fieri  magnos.  ita  firmissimum  eius 
praesidium  Ateguam  proficiscitur.  id  cum  Pom- 
peius ex  perfugis  rescisset,  cum  die  facultatem 
<liberam  sequendi  nactus  inter  montes)  et  angustias 

397 


APPENDIX  B 

oarra  complura  mulosque  onustos  retraxit  et  ad 
("ordubam  8e  recepit.  Caesar  niunitionibus  Ateguam 
oppugnare  et  brachia  circumducere  coepit.  cuius 
re  Pompeio  cum  nuntius  esset  adlatus,  eo  die  pro- 
ficiscitur. 

(iii)  My  Ovn  Reading 

Id  cum  animadverteret  adversarios  minime  velle, 
quo  eos  quomodo  ab  Ulia  retraxerat  [ut]  in  aequum 
deduceret,  copiis  flumine  traductis  noctu  iubet  ignis 
fieri  magnos  :  ita  firmissimum  eius  pracsidium 
Ateguam  proficiscitur.  Id  cum  Pompeius  ex  perfugis 
rescisset,  qua  die  facultatem  <nactus  est,  relinquens 
mentis)  et  angustias,  carra  complura  mulosque 
onustos  retraxit  et  ad  C'ordubam  se  recepit.  Caesar 
munitionibus  Ateguam  oppugnare  et  bracchia  cir- 
cumducere coepit.  Cui  de  Pompeio  cum  nuntius 
esset  allatus  eo  die  proficisci[tur], 

The  two  most  puzzling  problems  involved  in  this 
narrative  seem  to  me  to  be  these  : — 

(a)  The  Purpose  and  Position  of  the  Fires 

Holmes  thought  that  they  were  left  burning  in  Caesar's 
camps  at  Corduba.  But  though  that  would  doubtless 
have  been  the  orthodox  manoeuvre,  the  author  has 
expressed  himself  very  ambiguously,  if  that  was  his  mean- 
ing. What  he  appears  to  say  is  that  the  order  to  light  the 
fires  was  given  after  the  crossing  of  the  river.  To  a  rear 
party  perhaps  ?  Yet  one  would  have  expected  the  decoy 
fires  to  have  been  most  useful  in  misleading  the  enemy, 
had  they  been  alight  during,  not  after,  the  crossing  of  the 
river.  The  alternative  occurs  to  me  that  they  were  lit 
somewhere  south  of  the  river,  and  in  the  wrong  direction, 
so  as  to  bring  Pompey  down  from  the  high  ground,  but 
none  the  less  mislead  him  as  to  Caesar's  route.  Klotz 
merely  describes  the  fires  as  '  to  cover  the  departure.' 

398 


APPENDIX  B 

(b)  How  much  did  Pompey  know  of  Ca€sar\s  plans,  and 
why  did  he  at  first  follow  Caesar  and  then  retire  to 
Corduha  / 

Holmes  took  id  in  the  phrase  id  cum  Pompeius  ex 
pcrfufjis  rescisset  to  refer  to  Caesar's  destination,  viz. 
Ategua,  and  not  (as  StofFel,  whom  Klotz  appears  to  follow) 
to  the  fact  that  Caesar  had  now  left  Corduba.  In  this  I 
certainly  think  that  Holmes  is  right ;  for  even  if  the  decoy 
fires  were  lit — as  Holmes  thinks — in  Caesar's  camps  at 
Corduba,  it  seems  almost  incredible  that  Caesar's  army 
should  have  crossed  the  river  entirely  unobserved  by 
Pompey's  outposts.  Moreover,  if  the  fires  were  lit  sub- 
sequently, south  of  the  river,  it  can  fairly  be  assumed  that 
Caesar  never  hoped  to  keep  his  departure  secret,  but  only 
his  destination;  and  that  the  latter  was  only  now  dis- 
closed by  deserters. 

I  assume  that  Pompey  followed  Caesar  with  the  object 
of  harassing  his  convoy,  but  without  risking  a  general 
engagement.  That  he  met  with  some  success  seems  to  be 
implied  by  the  words  carra  complura  .  .  .  retrarit;  for  I 
accept  Klotz's  explanation  that  these  were  captured  from 
Caesar's  convoy.  But  the  reason  which  Klotz  suggests 
for  Pompey's  withdrawal  to  Corduba,  viz.  '  to  protect  his 
troops  from  the  inclemency  of  the  weather ',  hardly  seems 
adequate;  it  is  more  likely,  I  think,  that  Pompey  had  to 
return  to  Corduba  to  revictual  his  forces,  since  he  was  not 
sure  whether  his  communications  with  Ategua — well 
stocked  with  com,  according  to  the  account  given  by  Dio 
Cassius — were  still  open. 

The  following  points  where  my  readings  vary  from  those 
of  Klotz  are  perhaps  of  less  importance  for  the  general 
interpretation  of  the  narrative  : — 

(1)  In  support  of  his  reading  facultatem  liberam 
sequendi  nactus  inter  monies  et  angustias  Klotz  remarks 
that  the  heights  which  surround  the  narrow  places  of 
the  Guadajos  valley  are  about  100  metres  above  the 
valley.  On  the  other  hand,  my  reading  (based  on 
Mommsen's  co-aieciwre)  facultaiem  nactus  est,  relinquens 

399 


APPENDIX  B 

montis  et  anguslias  is,  geographically  speaking,  perhaps 
no  less  possible,  and  seems  more  appropriate  in  view 
of  Caesar's  object  of  bringing  Pomjx^y  down  to  the 
plain. 

(2)  As  between  Klotz's  cuitis  re  Pompeio  cum 
nvntiuii  essei  adlatns,  to  die  proficiscitur  and  my  cui  de 
Pompeio  cum  nuntius  esset  allafus  eo  die  proficisci,  the 
latter  admits  a  more  emphatic  interpretation  of  eo  die 
which,  to  ray  mind,  gives  greater  point  to  the  following 
words ;  namely,  that  though  Caesar  was  advised  of 
the  actual  day  when  Pomjiey  left  Corduba,  and 
though  he  had  already  made  adequate  dispositions 
against  any  surprise  attack,  yet  a  thick  morning  mist 
upset  his  calculations. 


400 


APPENDIX   C 

THE  BEHAVIOUR  OF  THE  ATEGUAN  ENVOYS 
ON  THEIR  RETURN  TO  THE  TOWN 

(Spanish  War  chapter  18) 

For  the  first  three  sentences  of  this  chapter  Klotz  adopts 
the  following  reading  : — 

Remissis  legatis,  cum  ad  portam  venissent,  <con- 
stitit)  Tib.  Tullius,  et  cum  introeuntem  Catonem  ^ 
insecutus  non  esset,  revertit  ad  portam  et  hominem 
adprehendit.  cjuod  Tiberius  cum  fieri  animadvertit, 
simul  pugionem  eduxit  et  manum  eius  incidit.  ita 
refugerunt  ad  Caesarem. 

From  the  explanation  which  Klotz  gives  in  his  commentary 
he  would  seem  to  interpret  as  follows  : — 

'  When  the  envoys  had  been  sent  back  and  had 
come  to  the  gate,  Tiberius  Tullius  stopped  ;  and  as, 
when  Cato  was  going  in,  Tiberius  did  not  follow  him, 
Cato  turned  back  to  the  gate  and  grabbed  the  fellow. 
Observing  this  action,  Tiberius  at  once  drew  a  dagger 
and  stabbed  the  other's  hand.  So  they  fled  back  to 
Caesar.' 

This  reading,  which  is  very  close  to  the  MSS.,  is  in  many 
ways  attractive ;  but  two  serious  objections  can,  I  think, 
reasonably  be  made  to  the  sense  it  gives. 

(i)  Why  should  both  men  flee  back  to  Caesar  ? 
Klotz  suggests  that  '  they  did  not  return  to  the  town, 
probably  because  they  were  not  sure  of  the  comman- 

^  C.  Antonius  3ISS. :  Catonem  Mommsen. 

401 


APPENDIX  C 

dant.'  But  when  they  had  just  fallen  out — pre- 
sumably over  the  question  of  the  terms  of  surrender — 
and  one  had  stabbed  the  other,  it  seems  unlikely  that 
both  would  flee  to  Caesar. 

(ii)  The  phrase  quod  Tiberius  cum  fieri  animaAvertit 
seems  to  me  inappropriate  as  applied  to  a  man  in  the 
very  act  of  being  grabbed  :  on  the  contrary,  it  suggests 
a  third  party  witnessing  an  action  in  which  he  is  not 
immediately  involved. 

My  own  belief  is  that  there  were  three  envoys,  not  two; 
that  the  MSS.  reading  C.  Antonius  has  partially  preserved 
an  original  Catonem  Antonius;  and  that  at  the  beginning 
of  ch.  17  Lusitano  is  a  corruption  of  et  Antonio. 

On  this  assumption  the  narrative  seems  much  easier  to 
follow.  Caesar  had  apparently  rejected  conditional  terms 
of  surrender.  Tiberius  and  Antonius  may  have  favoured 
unconditional  surrender  but  have  been  overruled  by  Cato. 
By  the  time  they  reached  the  town  they  maj-  have  realised 
that  Cato  might  denounce  them  to  the  commandant  as 
traitors;  and  when  he  resorted  to  force,  they  sought 
safety  with  Caesar.  That  they  later  returned  to  the  town 
and  Cato  was  won  over  to  their  view  is  implied  at  the  ena 
of  ch.  19. 


402 


APPENDIX   D 

THE   EVENTS   AT   URSAQi 

{Spanish  War  chapter  22) 

Party  strife  seems  to  me  to  be  the  key  to  this  diflScuIt 
chapter.  For  though  the  existence  of  a  Caesarian  party 
in  Ursao  is  nowhere  mentioned,  and  in  chapter  28  its 
inhabitants  are  described  as  supporters  of  Gnaeus,  yet  in 
view  of  the  conditions  at  Ucubi  (ch.  20-21),  Corduba 
(ch.  34)  and  Carteia  (ch.  37)  this  hypothesis  appears 
reasonable.  On  this  assumption  the  incidents  described 
may,  I  think,  be  explained  as  follows. 

The  fall  of  Ategua — Gnaeus's  strongest  garrison — must 
have  had  important  effects ;  for  it  strengthened  the  hand 
of  Caesar's  partisans  in  all  the  towns,  and  increased  the 
strategic  value  of  those  in  the  south,  particularly  Ursao. 
The  anxiety  of  Gnaeus  is  obviously  reflected  in  his  purge 
of  the  opposing  faction  at  Ucubi. 

Now  Ursao  was  at  this  time  divided  in  its  allegiance 
and,  as  it  lay  some  distance  to  the  south,  Gnaeus  had  not 
yet  detached  any  troops  to  hold  it,  though  he  had  in  mind 
to  do  so  (f/.  ch.  26).  Caesar  was  anxious  that  its  inhabi- 
tants should  learn  how  the  Pompeian  garrison  at  Ategua 
had  behaved  and  accordingly  had  the  envoys — clearly 
Caesarian  partisans — escorted  to  the  town;    and  the  high 

^  Throughout  the  following  argument  it  is  assumed  that 
the  town  referred  to  in  the  greater  part  of  this  chapter  is 
Ursao  (Osuna),  mentioned  later  in  the  book  in  close  connection 
with  Munda.  Madvig  and  Glandorp,  among  others,  held  this 
view.  Klotz,  however,  who  identifies  Munda  with  MontUla 
(35  miles  X.E.  of  Osuna),  assumes  (Kommentar  zum  Bellum 
Hispaniense,  p.  80)  that  the  reference  here  is  to  a  town  named 
Bursao,  of  unknown  situation  in  Baetica. 

403 


APPENDIX   D 

rank  of  the  nienibors  of  this  escorting  party  emphasises 
the  importance  of  their  mission.  They  may  have  been 
empowered  to  treat  directly  with  the  townsmen  if  the 
latter  decided  to  join  Caesar.  But  the  Pomj)eian  partisans 
seem  to  have  persuaded  their  fellow-citizens  as  a  whole 
that  the  envoys  were  liars  in  the  pay  of  Caesar,  and  so 
procured  the  massacre  of  all  but  two  of  them  before  they 
could  rejoin  Caesar's  dey)utation.  Later  on — no  doubt  at 
the  instance  of  the  Caesarian  faction — a  fact-finding 
commission  was  despatched  to  Ategua  and  on  its  return 
confirmed  the  envoys'  report.  A  revulsion  of  feeling  now 
set  in  and  the  Caesarians  demanded  vengeance  on  the 
Pompeian  partisan  who  had  misled  them  and,  by  butcher- 
ing the  envoys,  ruined  their  chances  of  a  composition  with 
Caesar. 

At  this  crisis  the  man  appears  to  have  duped  his  oppo- 
nents very  thoroughly.  Affecting  remorse,  he  sought  to 
leave  the  town,  pretending  that  he  would  explain  to  Caesar 
that  the  massacre  was  a  genuine  mistake  committed  in 
ignorance  of  the  true  facts  of  the  case.  But  once  clear  of 
the  town  he  collected  sufficient  reinforcements  to  enable 
him  to  massacre  all  his  leading  opponents  and  thus  secure 
Ursao's  allegiance  to  Gnaeus. 

The  last  sentence  of  the  chapter  is  particularly  difficult 
to  interpret.  I  myself  believe  that  it  refers,  not  to 
Ursao,  but  to  Ucubi.^  For  Ursao  lay  forty-five  miles 
south  of  the  Salsum,  where  the  fighting  was  then  going  on, 
and  its  distance  from  Baeturia  was  not  much  less.  Deserters 
from  Caesar's  army  would  surely  make  for  Ucubi ;  and 
Pompeian  refugees  from  Ucubi  would  not  have  far  to  go  to 
cross  the  Bactis. 

It  is  not,  I  think,  necessary  to  assume  a  gap  in  the  text  to 
account  for  the  change  in  scene  :  harsh  though  it  certainly 
is,  it  is  perhaps  not  bej^ond  the  powers  of  the  author. 
Elsewhere  he  uses  the  phrase  hoc  pra-ekrito  tempore  to 
alter  the  scene  as  well  as  the  time  {e.g.  the  opening  words 
of  this  same  chapter;    also  ch.  20)  :    his  recurrence,  in 

1  So  also  Klotz,  ibid.,  p.  81. 
404 


APPENDIX   D 

chapter  21,  to  events  at  Ucubi  is  quite  sudden  and  oppidum 
is  left  unspecified ;  while  in  chapter  34  he  switches  harshly 
(oppido  .  .  .  o;:ip/rfM/»)  from  Corduba  to  Munda. 

If  it  is  Ucubi  to  which  he  here  refers,  his  narrative  seems 
easier  to  follow.  The  goods  being  sold  are  those  of 
Caesar's  partisans  in  the  town  :  all  Pompey's  troops  are 
virtually  confined  to  camp  lest,  following  the  example  of 
the  civilian  refugees,  they  desert  fully  armed  :  morale  in 
the  town  and  camp  is  low  and — if  the  text  can  be  trusted — 
deserters  from  Caesar's  side  are  discouraged  to  the  extent 
of  being  embodied  only  in  the  low-paid  light-armed  units. 


ADDITIONAL  NOTE 

{Spanish  War,  ch.  26,  p.  359) 

In  two  passages  in  this  short  despatch  the  interpretation 
given  by  Klotz  in  his  commentary  is  as  follows  : — 

(i)  Reading  '  nostrisque  adhuc  freti  praesidiis ',  he 
renders  '  relying  on  the  strong  places  until  now  belonging 
to  us  ',  explaining  that  the  allusion  is  in  particular  to  the 
provisions  Casesar  had  captured  at  Ategua. 

(ii)  Reading  '  profeeto  nostro  commeatu  privati 
necessario  ad  dimicandum  deseendent  '  he  apparently 
renders  '  assuredly,  when  they  are  deprived  of  the  pro- 
visions we  have  collected  {sc.  and  have  fallen  into  their 
hands),  they  will  of  necessity  come  down  to  fight '. 

This  interpretation  does,  I  admit,  considerably  improve  the 
general  sense ;  but  whether  the  Latin  text  can  in  either  case 
be  fairly  thus  interpreted  seems  open  to  doubt. 


405 


INDEX  OF  PERSONS  AND  PLACES 
THE  ALEXANDRIAN  WAR 


C.  =  Caesar,  Caesarian;     P.  =  Pompeius,  Ponipeian  ; 
cos.=coiisul,  coasulship. 


R.=  Roman ; 


Figures  in  brackets  denote  dates  B.C.  :  olheru-ise  they  refer  to  the  chapters 
of  the  Latin  text. 


ACHAIA,  the  R.  protectorate  of  Greece, 
properly  the  N.  district  of  the 
Peloponnese,  44 

Achillas,  commander  of  the  Egyptian 
army  under  king  Ptolemaeus,  4, 
26 

Aegyptium  litus,  the  Egyptian  coast, 
roughly  from  Alexandria  to  Pelu- 
sium,  8,  13 

Aegyptus,  Egypt,  the  Nile  valley, 
ruled  by  the  Ptolemies  as  friends 
and  allies  of  the  R.  people,  2,  3,  26, 
33,  34,  65,  78 

Africa,  the  R.  province  comprising 
the  coastal  area  opposite  Sardinia 
and  Sicily  :  also  used  of  the  N. 
African  coast  eastwards  to  Alex- 
andria, 9,  14,  28,  47,  51,  56 

Alexandrea,  now  Alexandria,  then  the 
capital  of  Egypt,  founded  by 
Alexander  the  Great,  1,  5,  9,  11, 
13-15,  18,  26,  27,  32,  33,  38,  48,  69 

Alexandrini,  Egyptian  inhabitants  of 
Alexandrea,  2,  5-31 

Annius  Scapula,  an  influential 
Spaniard  who  took  part  in  the 
conspiracy  against  Cassias,  55 

Ariarathes,  brother  of  Ariobarzanes 
and  rival  claimant  to  his  kingdom, 
66 

Ariobarzanes,  king  of  Cappadocia, 
adherent  of  P.,  34,  66 

Armenia  Minor,  kingdom  of  Deiotarus 
in  far  E.  of  Asia  Minor,  later  made 
R.  province  by  Trajan,  34,  36,  66,  67 

Arsinoe,  younger  of  the  two  daughters 
of  Ptolemaeus  (Auletes),  who   dis- 


puted the  throne  with  her  brother, 
4,  33 
Asia,  the  R.  province  comprising  the 
western  parts  of  Asia  Minor,  13,  34 
40,  65,  78 


Baetis  flumen,  river  in  S.  Spain,  now 

Guadalquivir,  59,  60 
Bellona,  goddess  of  war,  with  famous 

shrine   at   Comana   in   Cappadocia, 

also  worshipped  at  Rome,  66 
Berones,  a  powerful  Spanish  tribe  in 

Hispania  Tarraconensis,  53 
Bithynia,  N.W.  district  of  Asia  Minor, 

bordering  the  Thracian  Bosphorus 

and  Euxine  Sea,  65,  78 
Bogus,  Bogud,  king  of  \V.  Mauretania, 

ally  of  C,  59,  62 
Bosphorus,    the   territory   dominated 

by  Panticapaeum  in  the  Crimea — 

hereditary  kingdom  of  Mithridates 

and  Pharnaces,  but  awarded  by  C. 

to  Mithridates  of  Pergamum,  78 
Brundisium,     now      Brindisi,     chief 

Italian  port  of  embarkation  for  E., 

44,47 


Caelius  Vinicianus,  C.  officer  left  in 

charge  of  Pontus,  77 
Caesar,  see  lulius. 
Caesariani,  troops  of  C,  59 
Calenus,    Q.,   C.   officer  operating   in 

Achaia,  44 
Calpurnius    Salvianus,    a   conspirator 

against  Cassius,  53,  55 


407 


PERSONS  AND  PLACES   (ALEX.  WAR) 


Calvinus,  see  Domitius. 

Canopus,  Egyptian  coastal  town  at 
Canopic  mouth  of  Nile,  25 

Cappadoces,  inhabitants  of  Cappa- 
docia,  66 

Cappadocia,  eastern  kingdom  of  Asia 
Minor  adjoining  Armenia,  ruled  by 
Ariobarzanes,  34,  35,  40,  66 

Carfulenus,  experienced  C.  officer 
prominent  in  Battle  of  Nile,  31 

Carmo,  Spanish  town,  now  Carmona  in 
Andalusia,  E.N.E.  of  Seville,  57,  04 

Cassius,  (i)  Q.  Longinus,  unpopular 
governor  of  Further  Spain,  ap- 
pointed by  C,  48-64.  (ii)  Q.,  de- 
puty and  military  aide  of  the  above, 
52,  57 

Chersonensus,  Egyptian  promontory, 
perhaps  some  8  miles  W.  of  Alex- 
andrea,  10 

Cilicla,  district  of  Asia  Minor  between 
Taurus  Mts.  and  sea,  the  coastal 
region  being  made  a  R.  province  by 
P.  (66),  1,  25,  26,  34,  65,  66 

Claudius,  (i)  C.  Marcellus,  cos.  (49) 
with  Lentulus,  68.  (ii)  M.  Mar- 
cellus, quaestor  of  Cassius,  sent  to 
hold  Corduba,  but  chosen  as  their 
leader  by  the  mutinous  legions,  57- 
64.  (iii)  Tiberius  Nero,  father  of 
the  emperor  Tiberius,  commanded  a 
C.  fleet,  25 

Cleopatra,  elder  daughter  of  Ptole- 
maeus  (Auletes),  entrusted  with  the 
kingdom  liy  C.  jointly  with  her 
brother,  33 

Comana,  (i)  town  in  Cappadocia, 
shrine  of  Bellona,  66.  (ii)  town  in 
Pontus,  used  as  a  rendezvous  bv 
Domitius,  34,  35 

Corduba,  now  Cordoba,  Spanish  town 
on  river  Baetis,  capital  of  Further 
Spain,  49,  52,  54,  57-59,  64 

Cordubenses,  citizens  of  Corduba,  57, 
69-61 

Cornelius,  L.  Lentulus,  cos.  (49)  with 
Marcellus,  68 

Cornificius,  Q.,  C.  quaestor,  governor 
of  Illyricum  as  pro-praetor,  42^4, 
47 

Creta,  Crete,  1 


P.,  pardoned  by  C,  34,  39,  40,  67- 
70,  77,  78 

Delta,  the  Delta  of  the  Nile;  some- 
times used  to  refer  to  its  S.  apex,  27 

Domitius,  Cn.  Calvinus,  governor  of 
Asia  appointed  bv  C,  9,  34-40,  65, 
69,  74 

Dyrrachium,  now  Durazzo  in  Albania, 
the  lUyrian  port  linking  with 
Brundisium,  attacked  by  C.  in 
July  (48),  48 


EPIDAIIRU.S,  town  on  Dalmatian  coast 

besieged  by  Octavius,  44 
Euphranor,  Rhodiau  admiral  killed  in 

action  oS  Canopus,  15,  25 


FlaCCUS,  see  Munatius. 


GabintL'S,  AuIus,  had  previoJisly 
restored  Ptoleraaeus  to  Egyptian 
throne :  defeated  and  died  in 
Illyricum,  3,  42,  43 

Galli  equites,  C.  contingent  of  Gallic 
cavalry,  17 

Gallograecia,  otherwise  Galatia,  the 
central  upland  district  of  Asia 
Minor,  divided  into  3  tetrarchies, 
67,  78 

Ganymedes,  an  Egyptian  eunuch, 
tutor  to  Arsinoe,  to  whom  she 
delegated  military  command,  4,  5, 
12,  23,  33 


Hf.rmixius  mons,  Spanish  mountain 
range  in  W.  Lusitania  near  Medo- 
brega,  48 

Hiberus  flumen,  river  in  E.  Spain, 
now  Ebro,  64 

Hispalis,  important  Spanish  town  on 
river  Baetis,  now  Seville,  56,  67 

Hispania,  Spain,  as  a  whole,  com- 
prising 2  provinces,  48,  52,  62. 
Citerior  (Hither  Spain),  roughly 
the  E.  half  of  the  peninsula,  59,  63. 
Ulterior  (Further  Spain),  the  AV.  half 
with  Portugal,  48-50,  53,  56-58,  64 


Deiotakus,  king  of  Armenia  Minor 
and  a  tetrarch  of  Galatia,  supported 

408 


lADERTINI,  inhabitants  of  ladera,  an 
lUyrian  town,  now  Zara,  42 


PERSONS  AND  PLACES  (ALEX.  WAR) 


Ilipa,  Spanish  town  in  Baetioa,  near 
modern  Alcala  del  Rio  on  right  bank 
of  Guadalquivir,  57 

lUyricum,  K.  province  K.  of  Adriatic 
extending  from  Istria  on  N.  to 
Epirus  on  S.  and  Macedonia  on 
S.E.,  42-44 

Issa  insula,  now  Lissa,  an  island  oS 
the  lUvrian  coast,  47 

Italia,  Italy,  53,  68,  77,  78 

Italicensis,  native  of  Italica,  Spanish 
town  in  Baetica,  now  Santiponce, 
on  right  bank  of  river  Baetis,  52, 
57 

luba,  king  of  Xumidia,  ally  of  P., 
51 

lulius,  (i)  C.  Caesar,  the  dictator, 
rival  of  P.  and  most  famous  member 
of  the  Julian  family,  passim. 
(ii)  Sextus  Caesar,  relation  of  the 
above,  left  by  him  as  governor  of 
Syria,  66 


Laterensis,  L.,  one  of  the  conspira- 
tors against  Cassius,  53-55 

Lentulus,  L.,  see  Cornelius. 

Lepidus,  M.,  proconsular  governor  of 
Hither  Spain,  59,  C3,  64 

Licinius,  L.  Squillus,  one  of  the  con- 
spirators against  Cassius,  52,  55 

Longinus,  see  Cassius. 

Lusitania,  part  of  Further  Spain, 
comprising  Portugal  S.  of  Oporto 
and  part  of  W.  Spain,  48,  51 

Lyciae  naves,  ships  from  Lycia  in  S. 
Asia  Minor,  13 

Lyoomedes,  a  noble  Bithynian  ap- 
pointed by  C.  as  priest  of  Bellona, 
66 


Macedonia,  R.  province  N.  of  Thes- 
saly  and  S.E.  of  Illyricum,  42 

Malaca,  Spanish  town,  now  Malaga, 
some  70  miles  N.E.  of  Gibraltar, 
64 

Malchus,  king  of  the  Nabataeans,  1 

Manilius  Tusculus,  one  of  the  con- 
spirators against  Cassius,  53 

Marcellus,  see  Claudius. 

Mauretania,  country  of  the  Mauri 
(Moorsj  on  N.  coast  of  Africa, 
opposite  Spain  and  \V.  of  JJumidia, 
51,  52,  59 


Mazaca,  chief  town  of  Cappadocia, 
now  Kaisariveh,  some  130  miles  N. 
of  Tarsus,  66 

Medobrega,  Spanish  town  in  Lusitania, 
now  Marvao,  48 

Mercello,  L.,  one  of  the  conspirators 
against  Cassius,  52,  55 

Minucius  Silo,  leading  conspirator 
against  Cassius,  52,  53,  55 

Mithridates,  (i)  the  Vlth,  the  '  Great  ', 
king  of  Pontus  and  Bosphorua 
(120-63)  who  waged  three  wara 
against  R.  and  was  finally  defeated 
by  P.,  72,  73,  78.  (ii)  Pergamenus, 
a  well-born  youth  from  Pergamum, 
adopted  by  the  above,  26-28,  78 

Munatius  Flaccus,  one  of  the  con- 
spirators against  Cassius,  52 


XabaTAEI,  Nabataeans,  a  people  of 

Arabia  Petraea,  N.E.   of  the  Red 

Sea,  I 
Xaeva  (?),  Spanish  town,  apparently 

between  Hispalis  and  Carmo,  exact 

position  unknown,  57 
Nero,  T.,  see  Claudius. 
Nicopolis,    town    in   Armenia   Minor, 

where  Pharnaces  defeated  Domitius, 

36,  37 
Nilus  flumen,  river  Nile,  5,  13,  27- 

30 
Numidia,    N.    African    kingdom    of 

Juba,  between  Mauretania  and  K. 

province  of  Airica,  61 


OBUCULA,  Spanish  town  probably 
lying  between  Carmo  and  Astigi, 
but  exact  position  obscure,  57 

Octavius,  M.,  P.  admiral  operating  off 
lUyrian  coast,  42—47 


PAL.AEPHARSALUS,  Old  Pharsalus  in 
Thessalv,  where  C.  defeated  P.  in 
August '(48),  48 

Paratonium,  a  place  on  the  Egyptian 
coast  W.  of  Alexandria ;  of  dis- 
puted position,  but  perhaps  at  the 
mouth  of  El  Baradan  some  20  miles 
W.,  8 


409 


PERSONS  AND  PLACES  (ALEX.  WAR) 


Patisius,  Q.,  sent  by  Domitius  into 
Cilicia  for  troops,  34 

Pelusium,  Egyptian  coastal  town  near 
the  E.  mouth  of  the  Nile,  2(i 

Perganienus,  see  Mithridatea. 

Pergamum,  now  Bergania,  Mysian 
town  on   W.  coast  of  Asia  Minor, 

■    78 

Pharitae,  inhabitants  of  island  of 
Pharos,  17,  19 

Pharnaces,  son  of  Mithridates  the 
Great,  king  of  Bosphorus ;  over- 
ran Cappadocia,  Armenia  Minor 
and  Pontus ;  finally  defeated  by  C. 
at  Zela,  34-41,  65,  69-78 

Pharos,  island  off  Alexandria,  con- 
nected to  it  by  mole,  with  famous 
lighthouse  at  E.  tip,  14,  19,  26 

Pharsalicum  proelium,  see  Palae- 
pharsalus. 

Plaetorius,  C,  quaestor,  to  whom  P. 
Sestius  was  sent  in  Pontus,  34 

Pompeiani,  troops  or  adherents  of  P., 
9,  59 

Pompeius,  Cn.  Magnus,  Senatorial 
champion,  defeated  by  C.  at 
Pharsalus  and  later  murdered  in 
Egypt,  3,  42,  48,  51,  56,  58,  59, 
67,  69,  70 

Pontica  legio,  a  legion  hastily  raised  in 
Pontus,  34,  39,  40 

Ponticae  naves,  C.  squadron  of  ships 
from  Pontus,  13,  14 

Pontici  cives,  native  population  of 
Pontus  plundered  by  Pharnaces,  41 

Pontus,  N.E.  district  of  Asia  Minor  on 
Euxine  (Black  Sea),  hereditary 
kingdom  of  Mithridates,  34,  35,  41, 
65,  67,  69,  70,  72,  77 

Ptolomaens,  more  commonly  Ptole- 
:maeus,  (i)  Auletes,  (father),  restored 
to  throne  of  Egypt  (55)  by  Gabinius 

-  at  instance  of  P.  :  appointed  R. 
people  to  execute  his  will,  4,  33. 
(ii)  rex,  elder  son  of  the  above,  23- 
33 


RACILIUS,  L.,  one  of  the  conspirators 
against  Cassius,  52,  53,  55 

Rhodiae  naves,  0.  squadron  of  ships 
from  Rhodes,  11,  13-15,  25 

Rhodus,  Rhodes,  island  in  E.  Mediter- 
ranean, 1 

Roma  (urbs),  Rome,  65,  68,  71 


Romani  cives,  R.  citizens,  23,  25,  41, 

43,  70 
Romani   equites,   R.   citizens   of  the 

equestrian    order,    the    influential 

middle  class,  40,  56 
Romanus  populus,  the  R.  people  in  a 

political  sense,  3,  24,  33,  34,  36,  65, 

67,  68,  78 


SaU)NA,  town  on  Dalmatian  coast 
near  modern  Spalato,  43 

Salvianus,  see  Culpurnius. 

Scapula,  see  Annius. 

Segovia,  Spanish  town  on  river 
Singilis  (Genii),  exact  position 
doubtful,  probably  between  Astigi 
and  Palma,  57 

Sestius,  (i)  P.,  sent  by  Domitius  to 
fetch  the  Pontic  legion,  34.  (ii)  Q., 
conspirator  against  Cassius  who 
bought  his  pardon,  55 

Sicilia,  Sicily,  R.  province,  stepping- 
stone  to  Africa,  47 

Silo,  see  Miuucius. 

Singiliense  flumen,  river  Singilis,  now 
Genii,  tributary  of  the  Baetis,  57 

Squillus,  see  Licinius. 

Syria,  R.  province  formed  by  P.  (64), 
"capital  Antioch,  1,  25,  26,  33,  34, 
38,  65,  66 


Tarsu.S,  chief  town  of  Cilicia,  on  S. 
coast  of  Asia  Minor,  66 

Tauris  insula,  island  off  lUyrian 
coast,  now  Torcola,  where  ^'atimu3 
defeated  Octavius,  45 

Thorius,  T.,  native  of  Italica,  chosen  as 
their  leader  by  the  troops  who 
mutinied  against  Cassius,  57-58 

Tiberius  Nero,  see  Claudius. 

Titius,  L.,  tribune  of  the  native  legion 
who  reported  its  mutiny,  57 

Trebonius,  C,  succeeded  Cassius  as 
governor  of  Further  Spain,  64 

Triarius,  C,  lieutenant  of  LucuUus,  de- 
feated at  Zela  by  Mithridates  (67), 
72,  73 

Tusculus,  see  Manilius. 


Ui.ia,  Spanish  town,  now  Monte 
Mayor,  some  17  miles  S.  of  Corduba 
61,"63 


410 


PERSONS  AND  PLACES  (ALEX.  WAR) 

Varro,  M.,  p.  supporter  who  operated  Octavius  by  sea  off  island  of  Taiiris, 

with  two  legions  in  Further  Spain  43-47 

and  surrendered  to  C.  after  Ilerda  Vinicianus,  see  Caelius. 
(49),  58 

Vasius,  T.,  native  of  Italica  who  con- 
spired against  Cassius,  52  Zela,  town  in  S.  Pontus  near  which  C. 

Vatinius,  P.,  C.  otEcer  who  defeated  defeated  Pharuaces,  72 


411 


INDEX  OF  PERSONS  AND  PLACES 
THE  AFRICAN  WAR 

C.=  Caesar,  Caesarian  ;      P.  =  Pompeius,  Pompeian  ;      R.  =  Roman ; 
COS.  =  consul,  consulship. 

Figures  in  brackets  denote  dates  B.C.  :  otherwise  they  refer  to  the  cftapters 
of  the  Latin  text. 


ACTLLA,  African  coastal  town,  gar- 
risoned bv  C.  (position  disputed  : 
see  eh.  33," Note  1),  33,  43,  67 

Acyllitani,  inhabitants  of  Acylla,  33 

Aegimurus,  now  Djamour,  island  in 
Gulf  of  Tunis,  44 

Afranius,  L.,  P.  ofiicer  captured  and 
killed  in  flight  to  Spain,  69,  95 

Afri,  native  Africans,  36 

Africa,  the  R.  province,  comprising 
the  coastal  district  facing  Sardinia 
and  Sicily,  passim 

Aggar,  African  town,  position  dis- 
puted, but  possibly  near  Ksour  es 
Saf,  16  R.  miles  S.  of  Thapsus,  67, 
76,  79 

Alienus,  A.,  praetor,  governor  of 
Sicily,  2,  26,  34,  44 

Aponiana  iasula,  now  Faviemana, 
island  close  to  Lilybaeum  in  Sicily,  2 

Aquila,  Q.,  0.  officer  sent  on  naval 
patrol  off  Hadrumetum,  62,  63,  67 

Aquinus,  M.,  senator,  adherent  oif  P., 
caught  parleying  with  enemy,  later 
pardoned  by"C.,  57,  89 

Ascurum,  town  in  ilauretania  vainlv 
attacked  by  P.  (son),  23 

Asprenas,  L.  Nonius,  proconsul,  left 
bv  C.  at  Thapsus  to  guard  the  camp, 
80 

Ateius,  C,  adherent  of  P.  pardoned  by 
C,  89 

Atrius,  P.,  R.  knight  of  Utica  cap- 
tured by  C.  at  Zeta,  later  pardoned, 
68,  89 

Avienus,  C,  tribune  of  Tenth  legion 
cashiered  for  inefiBciency,  54 

412 


Baleares  insulae,  the  Balearic 
Islands,  E.  of  Spain,  23 

Bochus,  king  of  E.  Mauretania,  sup- 
porter of  C,  aided  Sittius  to  attack 
Juba,  25 

Bogus,  Bogud,  king  of  W.  Mauretania, 
sufiporter  of  C,  23 

Buthrotum  Cf),  now  Butrinto,  port  in 
Epirus  opposite  Corcyra  (Corfu),  19 


Caectn'A,  a.,  (probably  the  friend  of 

Cicero)  supporter  of  P.  pardoned  by 

C,  89 
Caesar,  see  lulius. 
Caesarianae  naves,  C.  fleets,  28,  53 
Caesariani,  C.  troops,  7,  13,  14,  24,  52, 

66 
Calpumius,     Cn.     Piso,     P.     cavalry 

commander,  3,  18 
Calvinus,  see  Domitiua 
Caninius,  C.  Rebilus,   proconsul,   left 

by  C.  to  besiege  Thapsus,  86,  93 
Carales,     town     in     Sardinia,     now 

Cagliari,  98 
Cato,  see  Porcius. 
Catonis  fUius,  son  of  M.  Cato  pardoned 

by  C,  89 
Cella,  L.,  (father  and  son)  partisans  of 

P.  spared  by  C,  89 
Cercina  insula,  island,  now  Karkenah, 

off  African  coast  some  60  miles  S. 

of  ThapsM,  8,  34 
Cercinitani,  inhabitants  of  Cercina,  34 
Cirta,    important   town   in   Numidia, 

now     Constantlne,     attacked     by 

Sittius,  25 


PERSONS  AND  PLACES  (APR.  WAR) 


Cispius,  L.,  officer  sent  by  C.  on  naval 
patrol  off  Thapsus,  62,  67 

Clupea,  African  coastal  town  near 
Cape  Bon,  now  Kelibee,  2,  3 

Cliisinas,  C,  G.  centurion  cashiered  for 
indiscipline,  5-i 

Cominius,  Q.,  C.  officer  captured  at  sea 
by  Vergilius,  44,  46 

Considius,  (i)  C.  Longus  (father), 
conimanded  P.  garrison  at  Hadru- 
metum,  and  later  at  Thvsdra,  3-5, 
33,  43,  76,  86,  93.  (ii)  C.  (son), 
spared  by  C.,  89. 

Cornelius,  (i)  L.  Sulla,  the  dictator  and 
rival  of  Marius,  56.  (ii)  L.  Sulla 
Faustus,  P.  officer  who  fled  with 
Afranius  and  was  captured  by 
Sittius,  87,  95 ;  his  wife  and 
children  pardoned  by  C,  95. 
(iii)  P.,  reservist  on  P.  side  who 
commanded  garrison  at  Sarsura,  76 

Crispus,  see  Marcius  and  Sallustius. 

Curioniani  equites,  cavalry  once  com- 
manded by  Curio  who  had  joined 
Juba,  52 

Curio,  C.  Scribonius,  C.  officer  de- 
feated and  killed  by  Juba  in  Africa 
at  river  Bagrada  (49),  19,  40 


DAMASLPPl'S,  Licinius,  R.  senator,  P. 

supporter,  drowned  off  Hippo,  96  ; 

his  children  spared  by  C.,  89 
Decimius,  C,  controller  of  supplies  at 

Cercina,  34 
Domitius,  Cn.  Calvinus,  entrusted  by 

C.  with  siege  of  Thvsdra,  86,  93 


Eppii'S,  M.,  supporter  of  P.  pardoned 
by  C,  89 


Faustus,  see  Cornelius. 
Fonteius,  A,  military  tribune  cashiered 
for  mutinous  conduct,  54 


Gaetuli,  Gaetulians,  an  inland  Libyan 
people  dwelling  S.  of  Mauretania 
and  Numidia,  25,  32,  35,  43,  55,  56, 
61,62,  67,93 

Galli  equites,  Gallic  cavalry,  con- 
tingents of  which  fought  on  both 
sides,  6,  19,  29,  34,  40 


Galli  rcmiges,  Gallic  rowers,  2ii 
Gallia,  Gaul,  conquered  by  C.  after 

eight  vears  of  campaigning  (58-51), 

40,  73" 
Germani  equites,  German  cavalrv,  19, 

29,  40 


nADRUMETIXI,  inhabitants  of  Hadru- 

metum,  97 
Hadrumetum,  now  Soufse  on  E.  coast 

of  Tunis,  important  P.  stronghold, 

3,  21,  24,  33,  43,  62,  63,  67,  89 
Hiempsal,  king  of  Numidia,  father  of 

Juba,    expelled    by    Marians    but 

restored  by  P.,  56 
Ilippo  regius,  town  on  Xumidian  coast 

some  120  miles  W.  of  Utica,  96 
Hispani,  Spaniards,  28,  39 
Hispania,  Spain,  64,  95,  96 


Italia,  Italy,  22,  54,  72 

Ityrei,  Ityreans,  a  people  of  Coele- 
syria  (N.  Palestine,  El-Jeidoor) 
famed  as  archers,  20 

luba,  king  of  Numidia,  adherent  of  P., 
6,  25,  36,  43,  48,  52,  55,  57-59,  66, 
74,  77,  91-97 

luliani,  C.  troops,  15,  40,  41,  69,  78, 
85 

Julius,  (i)  C.  Caesar,  the  dictator  and 
most  famous  member  of  the  Julian 
family,  passim,  (ii)  L.  Caesar, 
acted  as  Cato's  quaestor,  surren- 
dered Utica,  pardoned  by  C,  88,  89 


Labiexlani,  troops  of  Labienus,  29 
Labienus,  T.,  P.  officer,   13,  15,   16, 

19-21,  24,  29,  33,  38-iO,  49-52,  61, 

65,  66,  69,  70,  75,  78 
Leptis,  African  coastal  town  between 

Kuspina  and  Thapsus,  garrisoned  by 

C,  7,  9,  10,  29,  61-63,  67 
Leptitani,  inhabitants  of  Leptis,  fined 

by  C,  97 
Ligarius,  (i)  P.,  member  of  Afranius's 

army   amnestied   by   C.   in   Spain, 

later   executed    for    treachery,    64. 

(ii)  Q.,    spared    by    C.    at    Hadru- 
metum, 89 
Lilybaeum,     embarkation     port     in 

extreme  W.  of  Sicilv,  now  Marsala, 

1,  2,  34,  37 


PERSONS  AND  PLACES  (AFR.   WAR) 


Livineius  Rcgulua,  left  by  C.  to  garri- 
son Hadrumetum,  89 
Longus,  see  Considius. 


Maklius,  L.  Torquatus,  drowned  with 
Scipio  and  others  o£E  Hippo,  96 

Marcius  Crispus,  sent  by  C.  to  garrison 
Thabena,  77 

Marius,  C,  the  celebrated  soldier,  cos. 
seven  times,  conqueror  of  Jugurtha 
(106)  and  the  Cimbri  (101),  32,  35, 
56 

Mauretania,  country  of"  the  Mauri 
(Moors)  on  N.  coast  of  Africa  oppo- 
site Spain,  W.  of  Numidia,  22,  23,  95 

Mauri,  Moors,  inhabitants  of  Maure- 
tania, 3,  6,  7,  83 

Messalla,  see  Valerius. 

Messana,  now  Messina  in  E.  Sicily,  28 

Messius,  C,  ex-aedile  sent  by  C.  to 
garrison  Acylla,  33,  43 

Minucius,  C.  Reginus,  R.  knight,  close 
friend  of  Scipio,  commandant  of 
Zeta,  68 


Xasidius,  L.,  commander  of  P.  fleet  at 
siege  of  Massilia,  64,  98 

Xeapolis,  African  coastal  town  some 
50  miles  N.  of  Ruspina,  2 

Numidae,  Numidians,  passim 

Numidia,  N.  African  kingdom  of  Juba, 
between  Mauretania  and  K.  pro- 
vince of  Africa,  22,  36 


OCTAVIUS,  M.,  commanded  with  Varus 
a  P.  fleet  cruising  ofE  Utica,  44 

Oppius,  staff  officer  of  C.  left  to 
garrison  Zeta,  68 


PACIDEI,  two  brothers,  officers  sub- 
ordinate to  Labienus,  13 

Pacideius,  one  of  the  above  who  com- 
manded the  cavalry  at  Tegea,  78 

Parada,  African  town,  position  doubt- 
ful, but  apparently  between  Thap- 
sus  and  Utica,  87 

Petreius,  M.,  P.  cavalry  commander 
with  Piso ;  fled  with  Juba  after 
Thapsus ;  killed  in  duel  with  Juba, 
18-20,  24,  91,  94,  97 

Piso,  Cn.,  see  Calpurnius. 


Plaetorius  Rustianus,  drowned  with 
Scipio  off  Hippo,  96 

Plancus,  L.,  staff  officer  of  C.  who 
negotiated  with  Ckjnsidius,  4 

Pompeia,  wife  of  Sulla  Faustus,  par- 
doned by  C,  95 

Pompeiani,  troops  and  supporters  of 
P.,  23 

Pompeianum  proelium,  battle  of 
Pharsalus  in  August  (48)  in  which 
P.  was  routed,  19 

Pompeius,  (i)  Cn.  Magnus,  (father), 
the  great  rival  of  C,  murdered  in 
Egypt,  64.  (ii)  Cn.,  his  elder  son, 
who  later  carried  on  the  struggle  in 
Spain,  22,  23.  (iii)  Rufus,  officer 
of  C.  wounded  by  C.'s  own  veterans 
on  suspicion  of  treachery,  85 

Porcius,  M.  Cato  (Uticensis),  aristo- 
cratic supporter  of  P.,  commandant 
at  Utica,  where  he  took  his  own  life, 
22,  36,  87,  88,  93 

Postumus,  see  Rabirius. 


Rabirius  Postumus,  C.  officer  sent  to 

Sicily  to  fetch  the  second  convoy, 

8,  26 
Rebilus,  see  Caninius. 
Reginus,  see  Minucius. 
Regulus,  see  Livineius. 
Rhodii,    rowers   from    the    islana    of 

Rhodes,  20 
Roma  (urbs),  Rome,  19,  22,  64,  98 
Romani  cives,  Roman  citizens,  35,  57, 

90,  97 
Romani   equites,    R.   citizens   of   the 

equestrian    order,    the    influential 

middle  class,  22,  44,  64,  68,  85 
Romanus  populus,  the  R.  people  in  a 

political  sense,  4,  54,  67,  77,  90,  91, 

97 
Rufus,   see  Pompeius,   Sulpicius  and 

Tullius. 
Ruspina,  African  coastal  town  near 

Monastir,     possiblv     at     Henchir 

Tenir,  6,  9-11,  20,  28,  33-37,  53,  67 
Rustianus,  see  Plaetorius. 


Saburra,  chief  general  of  Juba, 
defeated  and  killed  by  Sittius,  48, 
93,  95 

Salienus,  T.,  (i)  Centurion  of  6th 
legion  captured  at  sea  by  Vergilius, 


414 


PERSONS  AND  PLACES  (AFR.  WAR) 


2R.  (ii)  Centurion  cashiered  by  C. 
for  indiscipline,  54 

Sallustius,  C.  Crispus,  the  historian 
Sallust,  praetor,  sent  by  C.  to  Cer- 
cina,  later  appointed  as  proconsular 
governor  of  new  province  formed 
from  Juba'ri  kingdom,  8,  34,  97 

Sardinia,  8,  24,  98 

Sarsura,  inland  African  town  W.  of 
Aggar,  probably  on  site  of  Henchir 
el  Ksour,  captured  by  C,  75, 
76 

Saserna,  (i)  C,  officer  left  by  C.  to 
garrison  Leptis,  9,  29,  57.     (ii)  P., 

'  his  brother,  left  in  charge  ot  Kus- 
pina,  10 

Scipio,  Q.  Metellus  Pius,  leading  P. 
general  in  this  campaign ;  father- 
in-law  of  P.  and  cos.  with  him  (52); 
commanded  P.  centre  at  Pharsalus, 
1,  4,  8.  20,  24-32,  35-52,  57,  61, 
67-70,  75-81,  85-90,  96 

Sicilia,  Sicily,  the  K.  province,  2,  8, 
20,  22,  24,  26,  41,  47,  53,  54, 
62 

Sittius,  P.,  R.  soldier  of  fortune,  self- 
exiled  for  baniruptcy.  led  private 
army  of  Italian  and  Spanish  free- 
lances against  Juba,  in  alliance  with 
king  Bochus,  25,  36,  48,  93,  95, 
96 

Sulcitani,  Inhabitants  of  Sulci  (Sol)  in 
Sardinia,  fined  by  C.  for  having 
abetted  Nasidius,  98 

Sulla,  see  Cornelius. 

Sulpicius,  P.  Rufus,  praetorian  staff 
officer  of  C,  who  commanded  a 
flotilla  at  Yibo  (48),  10 

Syri,  archers  recruited  in  Syria,  20 


modern  B^kalta,  garrisoned  by  Ver- 
gilius,  out.'iide  whi<h  the  decisive 
battle  was  fought,  28,  41,  46,  53,  62, 
67,  79,  80,  85,  86,  89 

Thysdra,  African  inland  town  (EI 
Piem),  about  ten  miles  S.  of  Sar- 
sura and  18  miles  S.W.  of  Aggar, 
besieged  by  Domitius,  36,  76,  86, 
93 

Thvsdritani,  inhabitants  of  Thvsdra, 
97 

Ticida,  L.,  R.  knight  captured  at  sea 
by  Tergilius,  44,  46 

Tiro,  il.,  C.  centurion  cashiered  for 
indiscipline,  54 

Titii,  two  young  Spanish  brothers, 
centurions  of  5th  legion,  captured  at 
sea  and  executed  by  Scipio,  28 

Torquatus,  see  Manlius. 

Tullius  Rufus,  ex-quaestor  on  C.  side 
killed  by  C.'s  own  veterans  on 
suspicion  of  treachery,  85 


USSETA,  {so  MSS.)  African  town  be- 
tween Thapsus  and  Hadrumetum 
occupied  by  C.  :  otherwise  un- 
known, 89 

Utica,  chief  town  of  R.  province  of 
Africa,  on  N.  coast  near  present 
mouth  of  River  Bagrada  (Med- 
ierda)  :  P.  main  depot,  commanded 
by  Cato,  7,  22-24,  36,  62,  86-98 

Uticenses,  inhabitants  of  Utica,  68,  87, 
88,90 

T'zitta,  African  inland  town  in  valley 
of  Oued  el  Melah  S.W.  of  Ruspina, 
scene  of  protracted  fortifications 
and  skirmishing,  41,  51-59 


TEGEA,  African  inland  town,  possibly 
on  site  of  ruins  at  Henchir  Mer- 
hesse,  X.W.  of  Aggar,  78 

Thahena,  Numidian  coastal  town  at 
furthest  limit  of  Juba's  kingdom, 
site  very  uncertain ;  it  revolted 
from  Juba  and  was  garrisoned  bv 
C,  77 

Thabenenses,  inhabitants  of  Thabena, 
77 

Thapsitani,  inhabitants  of  Thapsus, 
79,  80,  97 

Thapsus,  African  coastal  town,  E.  of 


Vaga,  African  inland  town  near  Zeta, 
exact  position  uncertain,  74 

Valerius,  M.  Messalla,  sent  with  Sal- 
lust  by  C.  in  August  (47)  to  concen- 
trate legions  in  Sicily  for  African 
campaign  :  after  Thapsus  sent 
ahead  to  Utica,  28,  86,  88 

Varus,  Attius  P.,  P.  admiral  operating 
from  Utica  with  Octavius,  44,  62-64, 
90 

Vatinius  P.,  active  partisan  of  C. 
who  had  commanded  a  fleet  cover- 


PERSONS  AND  PLACES  (AFR.  WAR) 

ing  Brunfiisium,  8  (?),  lo;  sec  also  ZAMA,  one  of  the  royal  cities  of  Nu- 

Bell.  Alex.  Index)  mi'iia,  whose  position  is  disputed, 

Vergilius,  C,  praetor  (62),  P.  officer  91,  92,  97 

commandini?   Thapsus ;     raided    0.  Zamcnses,  inhabitants  of  Zama,   91, 

convoys;   finally  surrendered  Thap-  92,97 

BUS  to  Caninius,  28,  44,  79,  86,  93  Zeta,  African  inland  town  of  uncertain 

Vestrius,   P.,    R.    knif?ht   on    P.   side  position,  possibly  at  Beni  Hassan, 

captured  at  sea  off  Leptis,  pardoned  some  ten  K.  miles  N.W.  of  Tegea, 

by  C,  64  68,  74 


4i6 


INDEX  OF  PERSONS  AND  PLACES: 
THE  SPANISH  WAR 

C.  =  Caesar,  Caesarian ;    P.  =  Pompeius,  Pompeian ;     E.  =  Roman; 
COS.  =  consul,  consulship. 

Figures  in  brackets  denote  dates  B.C. :  othericise  they  refer  to  the  chapters  of  the 
Latin  text. 


ACHILLES,  the  famous  mythical  Greek 

hero,  wlio  slew  Menmon  in  single 

combat,  25 
Africa,   the   R.   province,  comprising 

the  coastal  area  opposite  Sardinia 

and  Sicily,  1,  7,  8 
Antistius  Turpio,  P.  soldier  who  chal- 
lenged and  fought  Pompeius  Niger, 

25 
Antonius,  C,  P.  euvoT  from  Ategua, 

17  (?),  18 
Arsuetius,  brought  cavalry  to  C.  from 

Italy,  10 
Arquitius,  see  Clodius. 
Aspavia,  Spanish  town,  5  R.  miles  E. 

of    Ucubi,   on   left   bank    of    river 

Salsum,  24 
Asprenas,  L.  Nonius,  brought  cavalry 

to  C.  from  Italy,  10 
Asta,  probably  the  modern  Mesa  de 

Asta,    some    20    miles    N.N.E.    of 

Cadiz,  36 
Astenses,  inhabitants  of  Asta,  26 
Ategua,  probably  the  modern  Teba  la 

vieja  on  right  bank  of  river  Salsum, 

some  14  miles  S.E.  of  Corduba,  6-8, 

22 


Baebius,  a.,  R.  knight  from  Asta  who 
deserted  to  C,  26 

Baetis  flumen,  now  the  river  Guadal- 
quivir in  Spain,  5,  .^6 

Baeturia,  the  N.W.  part  of  Baetica, 
the  district  between  the  Baetis  and 
Ana,s(Guadiana),  22 


Caecilius,  (i)  Q.  Metellus  Pius,  cos. 
(80),  fought  Sertorius  in  Spain  (79- 
71);  taxes  imposed  by  him 
rescinded  at  C.'s  instance,  42. 
(ii)  Niger,  a  Spaniard  who  supplied 
Philo  with  Lusitanian  troops,  35 

Caesar,  see  Julius. 

Caesariani,  C.'s  supporters  at  Corduba, 
34 

Caninius,  C.  Eebilus,  C.  officer  sent 
into  Hispalis  with  a  garrison  (see 
also  Bill.  Afr.),  'Ab 

Carruca,  Spanish  town,  otherwise  un- 
known, apparently  near  Ventipo,  27 

Carteia,  now  El  Rocadillo,  between 
Gibraltar  and  Algeciras,  32,  37 

Carteienses,  inhabitants  of  Carteia, 
36,  37 

Cassius,  Q.  Longinus,  unpopular 
governor  of  Further  Spain  who 
barely  escaped  assassination  at 
Corduba  {see  aUo  Bill.  Alex.),  42 

Castra  Postvimiana,  perhaps  the  hill 
of  HarLnilla,  some  3  miles  S.AV.  of 
Ategua ;  stronghold  occupied  by 
C,  8 

Cato  [Lusitanus  ?],  fellow  envoy  of 
Tullius,  who  offered  to  surrender 
Ategua  to  C,  17,  18(?) 

Caucilius,  P.,  camp  commandant  who 
accomuanied  P.  to  Carteia,  32 

Clodius  Arquitius,  officer  wounded  in 
skirmish  at  river  Salsum,  23 

Corduba,  now  Cordova,  on  river 
Baetis,  capital  citv  of  Further 
Spain,  2-4,  6,  10-1 2,"  32,  33 


PERSONS  AND  PLACES  (SPAN.  WAR) 


Cordubenses,  inhabitants  or  garrison 
of  Corduba,  2,  4 


DlDIUS,  C,  C.  officer,  commanding 
llect  at  Gades,  whose  troo[)s  caught 
and  killed  I'.;  later  himself  killed 
by  Lusitanians,  37,  40 


Ennius,  Q.,  Koman  epic  poet  of  Italian 
birth  (239-168),  of  whose  writings 
only  fragments  survive,  23,  31 


FABnjS,  Q.  Maximus,  joint  commander 
with  Pedius  of  C.  forces  in  Spain 
before  C.'s  arrival  :  later  left  to 
besiege  Munda,  2,  12,  41 

Flavins,  C,  R.  knight  from  Asta  who 
deserted  to  C,  26 

Fundanius,  C,  R.  knight  on  P.  side 
who  deserted  to  0.,  11 


Gades,  now  Cadiz,  37,  39,  40,  42 


HISPALIS,  now  Seville,  important  town 
on  river  Baetis,  35,  36,  39,  40,  42 

Hispania,  Spain,  comprising  two 
K.  provinces  — ■  Hispania  Citerior 
(Hither  Spain),  E.  of  a  line  roughly 
from  Oviedo  to  Almeria  Bay,  and 
Hispania  Ulterior  (Further  Spain), 
W.  Spain  and  Portugal,  1-3,  8,  31,  42 


INDO,   Spanish  chieftain,  ally  of  C, 

killed  in  a  sally,  10 
Italia,  Italy,  1,  10 
Italicensis,  native  of  Italica,  town  in 

Baetica    on    right    bank    of    river 

Baetis,  25 
lulius,    0.    Caesar,   the  dictator   and 

most  famous  member  of  the  Julian 

family,  passim 
lunius,  protested  at  the  massacre  of 

townsfolk  in  Ategua,  16 


LABIENUS,  T.,  p.  commander,  IS,  31 
Lennium,  Lusitanian  town,  otherwise 

unknown,  35 
Longinus,  see  Cassius. 


Lusitani,  natives  of  Lusitania,  18,  35, 

36,  38,  40 
Lusitania,  part  of  Hispania  Ulterior 

comprising  Portugal  S.   of  Oporto 

and  i)art  of  W.  Spain,  35 
[Lusitanus  '■'],  see  Cato. 


Marcius,  Q.,  p.  military  tribune  who 
deserted  to  C,  11 

Maximus,  see  Fabius. 

Memnon,  mythical  hero,  son  of  Titho- 
nus  and  Eos,  King  of  Ethiopians, 
slain  by  Achilles,  25 

Metellus,  see  Caecilius. 

ilunatius,  L.  Flaccus,  P.  officer,  com- 
mandant of  Ategua,  19 

Munda,  Spanish  town  outside  which 
the  decisive  battle  was  fought : 
site  disputed,  but  perhaps  about  6 
R.  miles  N.W.  of  Osuna,  32,  33,  41, 
42 

Mundenses,  P.  fugitives  who  had  fled 
into  Munda,  27 

Mundensis  campus,  the  plain  of 
Munda,  27,  30,  31 


Niger,  see  Caecilius  and  Pompcius. 


PACTAECUS,  see  A'ibius. 

Pedius,  Q.,  joint  commander  with 
Fabius  of  C.  forces  in  Spain  before 
C.'S  arrival,  2,  12 

Phamaces,  son  of  Mithridates  the 
Great,  king  of  Bosphorus,  defeated 
by  C.  at  Zela,  1 

Phiio,  well-known  Lusitanian  and 
ardent  P.  supporter  who  brought 
fresh  troops  into  Hispalis,  35 

Pompeiani,  troops  or  supporters  of  P., 
13,  14,  16,  34,  35,  37 

Pompeius,  (i)  Cn.,  elder  son  of  Pom- 
peius  Magnus,  chief  opponent  of  0. 
in  this  campaign,  passim,  (ii) 
Sextus.  younger  son  of  Pompeius 
Magnus,  who  held  Cofduba,  3,  4, 
32,  34.  (iii)  Q.  Niger,  E.  knight  of 
Italica  on  C.  side  who  fought  Anti- 
stius  in  single  combat,  25 

Postiimiana,  see  Castra. 


4iS 


PERSONS  AND  PLACES  (SPAN.  WAR) 


Rkbilus,  lee  Caninius. 
Roma  (urbs),  Rome,  31 
Romani  cives,  R.  citizens,  17,  42 
R(iBiani   equites,    R.   citizens   of   the 
equestrian     order,     the    influential 
middle  class,  11,  22,  25,  26,  31 
Romanus  populus,  the  R.  people  in  a 
political  sense,  3,  42 


Saguntini,  inhabitants  of  Saguntia, 
now  Xigonza,  a  town  in  Baeturia ; 
or  of  Saguntum,  now  Murviedro, 
S.W.  of  mouth  of  Ebro,  10 

Salsum  (lumen,  the  river  Guadaioz,  7, 
9,  13,  14,  16,  23 

Scapula,  Quiuctius,  joint  leader  with 
Aponius  of  legions  which  had  previ- 
ously mutinied  against  Cassius :  after 
Munda  fled  to  Corduba  and  com- 
mitted suicide,  33 

Soricaria,  Spanish  town,  perhaps  the 
modern  Castro  del  Rio,  6  miles  S.E. 
of  Ategua,  24,  27 

Spalis  or  Sparis,  ?(.?o  MSS.),  a  town 
which  has  not  beau  identified,  27 


Tiberius,  see  TuUius. 

Trebellius,  A.,  R.  knight  from  Asta 

who  deserted  to  C,  26 
Trebonius,   C,   succeeded   Cassius   as 

governor  of  Further  Spain,  7,  12 


TuUius,  Tiberius,  chief  envoy  from 
Ategua  offering  C.  the  surrender  of 
the  town,  17,  18 

Turpio,  see  Antistius. 


UCUBENSES,  inhabitants  of  Ucubi,  20 
Ucubi,  Spanish  town  at  or  close  to  the 

modern    Espejo,    5J    miles    S.    of 

Ategua,  7,  8,  20,  24,  27 
Ulia,      Spanish     town,     now    Monte 

Mayor,  about  17  miles  S.  of  Corduba, 

besieged  by  P.,  3,  4 
Ursao,  Spanish  town,  now  Osuna,  some 

35  miles  S.W.  of  Montilla,  26,  41, 

42 
Ursaonenses,    inhabitants    of    Ursao, 

22,  28 


Valerius,  fled  from  Munda  to  Cor- 
duba to  inform  Sex.  P.  of  the  defeat, 
32 

Valgius,  A.,  son  of  a  senator,  who 
deserted  to  P.  to  join  his  brother,  13 

Varus,  Attius,  P.,  P.  commander 
killed  at  Munda  {see  also  Bell,  Afr.), 
27,  31 

Ventipo,  Spanish  town,  now  Vado 
Garcia  close  to  Casariche,  about 
20  R.  miles  S.  of  Montilla,  27 

Vibius,  L.  Paciaecus,  C.  officer  com- 
manding relief  force  sent  to  Ulia,  3 


p2 


419 


GENERAL   SUBJECT   INDEX 


Figures  denote  chapters  :  Al 


Belluin  AlexanJrinura ; 
:  Bellum  Hispauieuse.) 


Af  =  Belluin  Africum  ; 


Acies  : 

prima,  Al  7-1 ;   AS  IG,  41 

secunda,  Af  38 

tertia,  Af  60 

quarta,  Af  81 

simplex,  Al  37  ;   Af  13,  59 

triplex,  Af  81 

guadriiplex,  Af  41 

subsidiaria,  Af  59 
Aedilicia  poteslas,  Af  33 
Africans,  treacherous  character,  Af  10 
Agger,  Al  29,  73,  74;   S  7,  16,  41 
Agmen  eitremum  or 

novissimiim,  Af  6,  69,  70,  75 

primum,  Af  95 
Alexandria  : 

fireproof  buildings,  Al  1 

topography,  Al  1,  5,  14 
Alexandrians  : 

ingenuity,  Al  3,  13 

maritime  traditions,  Al  12 

treacherous  nature,  Al  7,  24 
Ambushes,  Al  25,  36,  37,  48  ;  Af  17,  35, 

50,  53,  62,  65,  66,  69,  95;    S  40 
Antemna,  Al  45 
Apparitores,  Af  37 
Aquila,  S  7,  30,  31 
Archers  (see  sagittarii,  hippotoxotae). 
Aries,  Al  1 ;   Af  20 
Armatura  : 

graeis,  Af  71 

lei-is,  Al  17  ;  Af  1,  13,  14,  19,  20,  37, 
39,  48,  50-52,  59-61,  65,  66,  69, 
71,  72,  75,  78,  81;  S  7,  14,  15, 
20-26,  30 

(Numidian)  :     special    hit-and-run 
tactics,  Af  69-72 
Arms  factories,  Al  2 
Artillery.     See  tormenla. 
Assemblies,  civil,  Af  88,  90;   S  20,  42 
Auctions  of  private  property,  Af  2,  90, 
97,  98;   S  22 

420 


Aiispicia,  Al  74 

Aiixilia,  aiixiliares,  Al  1,  12,  26,  34,  51, 
56,  63,  69,  70,  77  ;  Af  5,  8,  19,  20, 
25,  26,  34,  49,  58,  59,  78  ;  SI,  30, 
42 


Baggage,  dumped,  Al  73 ;  Al  9,  69 

BaUistum  (see  turmenta). 

Basilica,  Al  52 

Battle,  order  of,  Al  14  (naval),  37,  39; 

Ai  13,  41,  59,  60,  81;   S  30 
Battles,  land  : 

Pharos  Island,  AI  17-18 

Heptastadion,  Al  19-21 

Delta,  Al  27 

Nile,  AJ  30-31 

Nicopolis,  Ai_40,  65 

Salona,  Al  43 

Zela,  Al  74-76 

cavalry,  rearguard,  Ai  6 

near  Ruspina,  Af  14-18 

cavalry,  near  Uzitta,  Ai  39-40,  42, 
48,  61 

cavalry,  near  Tegea,  Af  78 

Thapsiis,  Af  83-85 

for  bridge  at  Oorduba,  S  5 

Castra  Postumiana,  S  9 

cavalry  skirmish  near  Ategua,  S  14, 
15 

near  river  Salsum,  S  23 

near  Soricaria,  S  24-25 

Munda,  S  29-31 
Battles,  naval : 

Alexandria,   Eunostos  harbour,   Al 
14-16 

off  Canopos,  Al  25 

off  Tauris  Island,  Al  45-46 

Leptis-Hadrumetum,  Af  62-63 
Blockades  : 

Ategua,  S  6-19 

Louginus,  at  Ulia,  Al  61-63 


GENERAL  SUBJECT  INDEX 


Blockades : 

Munda,  S  32,  3."!,  36,  41 
Pompeius,  in  Lusitania,  S  38-39 
Thapsus,  Af  86,  93 
Thysdra,  Ai  86 
Ulia,  S  3 
Bounty  moneys,  Al  4,  48,  52 ;   Af  44  ; 

S  1,  26 
Bracchium,  Al  30;    Af  38,  49,  51,  56; 

S  5,  6,  13,  23,  24 
Bribery,  Al  49;   Af  87 
Bridges  : 

built  by  felling  trees,  Al  29 
at  Corduba,  on  temporary  piers,  S  5 
at  Corduba,  permanent,  S  33 
two  in  Heptastadion  :   one  fortified, 
Al   19;    the  other  attacked   and 
temporarily  blocked,  Al  19-21 
Buffer  state,  Al'  78 


Caesar  : 

alleged  carelessness,  Af  3 

cheerfulness,  Af  10 

clemency,  Af  64,  86,  88,  89,  92,  95; 
S17 

impatience,  Af  26 

impetuosity,  Al  71 

increased  caution,  Af  35,  73 

military  skill,  Af  31 

patience,  Af  30,  31,  35,  54 

prestige,  Af  31,  55 

training  methods,  Af  71,  73 
Calmes,  Af  56 
Camels,  Af  68 

Camps,  burning  of,  Af  67 ;   S  7,  10 
Cancelli,  Af  15 

Castellitm,  Al  19,  21,  30,  42,  43,  61,  63 ; 
Af  2,  6,  26,  34,  36,  38,  49,  80  ; 
S  6,  8,  9,  14,  20,  24,  27,  40 
Castra  : 

lunala,  Af  80 

slativa,  Af  26 
Casualties,  suppression  of,  S  18 
Catapitltum  {see  tor  men  ta) 
Cavalry : 

African,  Af  10 

of  Deiotarus,  Al  34 

Egyptian,  Al  29 

Gailic,  Al  17 ;   Af  6,  19,  29,  34,  40 

German,  Al  29 ;   Af  19,  29,  40 

Moorish,  Af  3,  6,  7,  83 

Nabataean,  Al  1 

Numidian,  Af  6,  14,  18,  19,  35,  38- 
40,  48,  52,  69,  61,  66,  69,  70,  7S 


Cavalry : 

roya'l  (Juba's),  Af  8,  48,  56 

Spanish,  Af  39 

advanced  patrols,  Af  12,  50,  66,  86; 

S  4 
confined  to  ships,  Af  7 
dismounted,  S  15 
harassing  supplies,  Al  61 ;  Af  24 ;  S 

11 
in  ambush,  Al  36 ;   Af  50,  65 
in  light  order,  Al  77 
in  pursuit,  Al  60 ;   Af  6 
normal  tactics,  S  15 
outflanking,  Af  5,  13,  14,  15,  19,  39, 

40,  50,  59,  70,  78 
unbridled,  Af  19,  48,  61 
unsupported  by  infantry,  Af  72 
with  light-armed  troops,  Af  13-15 
vedettes,  Af  31,  35,  38,  78;   S  14 
CeiUiirio,  Al  9,  24,  43,  67;    Af  7,  28, 

44-16,  54,  82;    S  20,  23,  24 
Chariots,  scythed,  Al  75 
Ciritas  libera  et  immunis,  Af  7,  33 
Classiarii,  Al  12,  20,  21 
Cliens,  dientela,  Al  52;   Af  22,  35 
Cohorts,  auiiliary  (Spanish),  Al  62 
Cohorts  : 

detachments  of,  Al  17,  19,  20,  31, 
39,  56,  67,  63,  76;    Af  6,  9-11, 
21,  29,  33,  41,  43,  45,  55,  58,  60, 
77,  80,  81;   S3,  6,  26,  30,  38 
veteran,  Al  2 ;   Af  6 
Colonia,  Al  56 
'  'olonus,  S  7 

Combat,  single,  Af  94 ;   S  26 
Commeatiis  (supplies,  convoys),  Al  12, 
26,  36,  43;    Af  8,  21,  24,  31,  34, 
37,  44,  54,  77;    S  5,  11,  26 
Conquisitores,  Al  2 
Cmisul,  Al  68 
Consulship,  S  42 
Conveiitus  (corporation,  citizen-body), 

Al  56-59;  Ai  68,  97 
Convoys : 

overland,  Al  25,  26,  34 

sea-borne,  protection  of,  Al  25 ;  Af  8, 

21,  62 
{See  also  commeatus.) 
Corn  : 

accumulated  in  towns,  Af  20,   36, 

75 
burning  of,  Af  43 
high  price,  Af  47 
imported,  Af  20 
improved  supplies,  Af  34 

421 


GENERAL  SUBJECT  INDEX 


Com: 

shortage,  Al  1';   Af  21,  24,  G7 
stored  underground,  Af  G6 

Corona  {see  formations). 

Cotho,  Af  C2,  63 

Council  of  war,  Al  3,  12,  57  ;  S  30 

Crates,  Al  18;   Af  20;  S  16 

Ciiniciiliis,  S  16,  20 

Cnstodiae,  Al  63 ;   Af  7,  87,  88 
eqtiitum,  Af  35 


Fortifications  {see  agger,  fossa,  miini- 
Ho,  opus,  praesiJium,stili,  rallitin). 
Fortune  : 

as  factor  in  war,  Al  43 
fickleness  of,  Al  25,  62;   Af  61 
Fossa,  MZ\,  38,40;  Af  31,  35,61,87; 

S  16 
Fraternisation,  Af  29,  51,  56,  57 
Fimda,  fumiilores,  Al  20,  30;    Al  19, 
27,  34,  77,  78,  81,  83 


Debts,  Al  49,  56 

Decorations  and  awards,  military,  Al 

77;   Af  86;   S  26 
Decurio,  Af  29 
Defences,  natural,  Al  28,  30,  31,  61, 

:     72;   S  8,  9,  28,  29,  38,  41 
Deserters,  desertions,  Af  8,  19,  26,  32, 

35,  51,  52,  55,  56,  62,  66,  68,  74; 

S  6,  11,  13,  16,  18-20,  21,  22,  26, 

27,  34 
Dictator,  S  2 
Dilectus  (military  coascription),  Al  2, 

50,  56 ;   Af  20,  36 
Discipline,  militarv,  undermining  of, 

Al  48,  65 
Dockyards,  Al  12,  13 


Garrison  {see  praesidium), 

Gauls,    forthright    character    of,    Af 

73 
Gaza  regia,  Af  91 
Gladiators,  Af  76,  93 

training  of,  Af  71 
aians,  Af  20 

inscripta,  S  13,  18 
Gods,  favour  of  in  battle,  Al  75,  76; 
Af  74,  82;   S  29 


Harpagones,  S  16 
Hiberna,  Al  49,  64  ;   Af  47  ;   S  16 
Hippotoxolae,  Af  19 
Hospitality,  violation  of,  S  16 


Edictum,  Al  56 ;   Af  46 
Elephants,  Af  1,  19,  25,  35,  48,  59,  70, 
81,  83,  84 

armed  and  equipped  with  towers, 
Af  30,  41,  86 

imjjorted  from  Italy,  Af  72 

training  of,  Af  27 

drawbacks  of,  Af  27,  72 
Epibatae,  Al  11 ;   Af  20,  62,  63 
Evocali,  Al  53 ;   Af  76,  82 
Exile,  Af  22 
Expenses,  military,  Al  34,  50,  51 


Fasces,  S  31,  42 

Fire,  St.  Elmo's,  Af  47 

Firebrands  {see  incendiary  missiles). 

Fleet,  co-operating  with  land  forces, 

Al  19,  30;  Af  80 
i'ormations  : 

military  :    alternate  cohorts  facing 

about,    Af    17;     circular  {orbis), 

Al  4U  ;  Af  15  ;  encircling  {corona), 

Af  17,  70;   S  13 
naval,  Al  14,  45 


Imperator  (C.-in-C),  Al  48-50,  54 ;  Af 

4,  10,  35,  44,  45,  54,  71,  82,  88; 

S  19 
Incendiary  missiles,  Al  14 ;    S  11,  12, 

15,  16 
Index,  indicium,  Al  55;    Af  65,  86; 

S  18,  26,  39 
Indatiae,  Al  63 

Infantry,  mounted  pillion,  S  4 
1  us  dicere,  Al  49 


Lanista,  Af  71 
l.atus  apertum,  Al  20,  40 
l.ectica,  lecticarii,  S  32,  38 
Legatus      (staff,      lieutenant-general, 
deputy   C.-in-C),  Al  24;   Af  26, 
82 

Caninius,  S  35 

Cassius,  Q.,  Al  52,  57 

Fabius,  Q.  Masimus,  S  2 

Messalla,  M.,  Af  28 

Oppius,  Af  68 

Pedius,  Q.,  S  2 

Plancus,  L,  AJ  4 


422 


GENERAL  SUBJECT  INDEX 


Legati  (envoys,    official    deputations) 
from  : 
Acylla,  Af  33 
Alexandria,  Al  23 
Asta,  S  36 
Ategua,  S  17,  19 
Carteia,  S  36,  37 
Corduba,  S  2,  34 
Further  Spain  (to  Senate),  S  12 
Hispalis,  S  35 
Leptis,  Af  7,  97  (to  Senate) 
Pharnaces,  Al  35-37,  69,  74 
Thabena,  Af  77 
Thvsdra,  Af  36 
Xnia,  S  3,  19 
Trsao,  S  22 
Vaga,  Af  74 
Zama,  Af  92 

various  African  towns,  Af  6 
Legions — (a)  Alexandrian  War 
Legio  II,  53,  54,  57 

V  (iiova),  50,  52,  54,  57 
VI  (retcrana),  33,  69,  76,  77 
XXI,  53,  54,  57 
XXX,  53,  54,  55,  57 
XXXVI,  34,  39,40,  69 
XXXVII  (ex  Pompei-anis).  9 

vernac'ila  (Spanish),  53,  54,  57 
Leginnes  expeditae,  73 
one  brought  by  Bogud,  62 
one   raised  in   Pontus,  34,   39,  40, 

69 
some  of  recruits,  sent  to  lUvricum, 

42 
two  by  Deiotarus,  34,  39,  40,  68,  69, 

77 
two  sent  to  Egypt  by  Domitius,  34, 

35 
two  serving  in  Illyricum,  42 
Legions — (6)  African  War  : 

Legio  V  {vcterana),  1,  28,  47,  60,  81, 
84 
VII,  62,  81 
VIII,  62,  81 
IX,  53,  60,  81 

X   (i-elerana),  16,  53,  51,   60 
81 

XIII,  34,  60 

XIV,  34,  46,  60 
XXV,  60 

XXVI,  60 

XXVIII,  60 

XXIX,  60 

IV  (Scipio's),  35,  52 

VI  (Scipio's),  35,  62 


Legions — (6)  African  War : 

Legiones  veteranae,  10,   19,   31,   37, 
60,  66 
regiae  (.Tuba's),  1,  59 
of  recruits,  five  mustered  in  Sicily,  1 
three  brought  by  Juba,  48 
Legions — (c)  Spanish  War  ; 
Legio  III,  30 

V,  23,  30 
VI,  12 
X,  30,  31 
I  (Pompeian),  18 
II  (Pompeian),  13 
IX  (Pompeian),  34 
XIII  (Pompeian),  34 
Afraniana,  7 
Legiones  rernaciilae,  7,  10,  12,  20 
one  recruited  from  local  colonies,  7 
several  of  deserters,  7,  34 
Lex  lulia,  Af  87 
LictOT,  Al  62 
Liia,  Af  75,  84 
Loricntus,  -i,  S  4,  13,  20 
Luminibus  accensis,  Af  56,  89 


Marches  : 
normal,  Af  1 
forced,  Al  36,  66 
Materia,  maleries,  Al   12;    Af  20;    S 

41 
Mercatores,  Af  '5 

Alilites  expediti  (300  per  legion),  Af  75, 
78 
vernaculi,  Al  53,  57 
Moles  : 
(sea-walls,  piers),  Al  16 ;   Af  26 
(Heptastadion,   at  Alexandria),   Al 
17-20 
Miiniceps,  Al  52 

Munilio,  miinitiones,  Al  1-3,  5,  8,  10, 
17-21,  27,  30-32,  61-63,  73,  74, 
76 ;  Af  5,  6,  18.  24,  29,  31.32,  34, 
38^2,  48,  51,  68,  60,  61.  78 ;  5  6, 
7,  8.  20,  23,  28,  29,  33,  38,  39,  41 
Musoili,  Al  1 
Mutinous  conduct,  Al  57,  58 ;    Af  19, 

"54,  95 
Mutinous  language,  Af  28 


Naval  tactics,  Al  14,  15,  46 
Aavis,    naviculum,    naviginm,    navi- 
qiolum  : 
achiaria,  Al  9,  44,  46;  Af  28,  44 


423 


GENERAL  SUBJECT  INDEX 


yams,    nnriculum,    naiigium,     navi- 

giolum  : 
aperla,  Al  11,  13 
biremii,  site  dicrota,  Al  16,  47 
eataseopum,  Af  26 
eeler,  Af  2 
eonslrata,  Al  11,  17 
expedita,  Al  20,  25 
Zow7a,  Al  12,  17,  20,  44;    Af  1,  2,  7 

8,  46,  96;   S  37 
myoparo,  Al  46 
onemria,  Al  11,  19;    Af  1,  2,  7,  8 

11,  21,  34,  46,  53,  62,  63 
parva,  parvula,  Al  12,  14,  17,  47 

Af  34,  63 
guadriremis.  Al  11,  13,  25,  46 
quinqueremis,  sive  penteris,  Al   13 

16,46,47;  Af  62,  63 
TOStrala,  Af  23 
tcapha,  Al   8,   14,   17,   19,   21,   46 

Af  21,  28,  44;   S  40 
triremU,  sire  trieris,  Al  47;    Af  44 

63 
naves — ■ 

Asiae,  Al  13 

Ciliciar,  Al  1 

Lyciae,  Al  13 

Ponlicae,  Al  13,  14 

Rhodiae.  Al  11,  13-15,  25 

Syriae,  Al  1 
{See  also  Ships.) 
yegotiari,  Al  70 
yegotiatores,  Af  36,  90 
yovits  homo,  Af  57 


Oars,  improvised,  Al  13 

OflBcers  (see  centurio,  decurio,  legalus, 

praefecfii.^,  tribunus). 
Officitiae  ferrariae,  Af  20 
Olivetum,  Af  50;   S  27 
Opus  (field-work),  Al  1,  22,  61-63,  72; 

Af  21,  43,  51,  61,  63,  80,  91 ;  S  13, 

23 
Orbis  (see  formations). 


Parades,  military,  Al  52,  57;    At  19, 

32,  54  (ofBcers).  86 
Piln  praepilata,  Af  72 
Potis  (see  bridges). 
Porta  : 

belliea,  Af  87 

decumana,  Af  66 

tnaritima,  Al  85 


Port'is  : 

Alexandria,  Al  13,  17 
Hadrumetum,  Af  3 
Leptis,  Af  63 

Ruspina,  Af  10,  11,  .34,  53 
Tauridis  insulae,  Al  45 
Praefectus,  Af  3,  48,  .56,  95;   S  26 
Praesidinm,  praesidia  (post,  garrison, 
prepared  positions) : 
Al    19,   26,  32,  33,  44,  57,  63,  67, 

76 
Af  3,  9,  11,  17,  18,  20,  21,  23,  24,  33, 
34,  36-39,  41,  42,  50,  67,  68,  74- 
80,  85,  89 
S  3,  4,  6,  13,  18,  23,  27,  35 
narale,  S  32 
PraelOT,  Al  53,  59 ;  Af  2,  8,  34 
Praetorium  (G.H.Q.),  Af  31 
Praetorius,  Af  28 
Praelura,  S  42 
Prize  crew,  Af  63 
Pro  eonsule,  Al  59,  64 ;   Af  34,  80,  86, 

93,97 
Pro  praetore,  Al  42,  48 
Propugnalores,  Al  10-12,  45,  46 
Provirwia,  Al  3,  70,  78 ;  Af  97 

individual  provinces  (governor,  or 
C.  legatus,  in  parentheses,  where 
mentioned  in  text)  : 
Africa,  Al  51 ;   Af  8,  26 
Asia  (Domitius   Calvinus),   Al 

34,  65,  78 
Bithynia,  Al  65,  78 
Cilicia,  Al  34,  65,  66 
Hispania  citerior  (Lepidus),  Al 
69,  63;    ulterior  (Q.  Cassius 
Longinus  :     Trebonius),    Al 
48-64;    S  1-3,  8,  42;    topo- 
graphy of,  S  7,  8 
Illrricum   (Q.    (Jomificius),   Al 

42-47 
Macedonia,  Al  42 
Sardinia,  Af  8 
Sicilia  (Alienus),  Af  1,  2 
Svria  (Sextus    Caesar),  Al  65, 
"66 
Proiincialis  homo,  Al  50,  53,  55 
P'Micani,  Al  70 

Punishments,     civilian     and     politi- 
cal : 
collective  fines  in  money,  Af  90,  97 ; 

oil,  Af  97;  corn,  Af  97 
by  increase  of  tithe,  Af  98 
general  massacre,  AJ  87 ;    S  15,  18, 
21,  22 


424 


GENERAL  SUBJECT  INDEX 


Punishments,  military  : 

beating  to  death  (murderer),  S 
27;  beheading,  S  20;  burning 
alive  (slave),  S  20 ;  cruciUxion, 
At  66,  S  20  (slaves) ;  dismissal 
with  ignominy,  ki  46,  54 ; 
execution  of  prisoners,  if  28, 
64;  S  12,  13,  16;  mutilation, 
S  12 

Pvre,  funeral,  Af  87,  91 ;  S  33 


Quaestor,  Al  34,  42,  48,  50,  57;   Ai 
Quaestorius,  Af  34,  85 
Qu(Lestura,  S  42 


Ransom  money,  Af  64 
Keconnaissance,  Al  61 ;   Af  3,  38,  76 
Remiges,  Al  10,  16,  20,  21,  47;   Af  1, 

7,  20,  62,  63 
Rewards  for  loyalty,  Al  65;  Af  97 
Rich  men,  victimised,  Al  49 
Rostra  (beaks,  rams),  Al  44,  46 


Sacrametittim  (militarv  oath),  Al  56 
SagitlariU  Al  1,  30;   Af  12,  13,  19,  20, 

28,  34,  60,  77,  78,  81,  83 
Salute,  militarv,  Af  86 
Scalae,  Al  18,  20 
Scorpio  (see  tormenta) 
Sea  power,  influence  of,  Al  8,  12 
Sea-sickness,  Af  18,  34 
Seaweed,  fed  to  animals,  Ai  24 
Senator,  Af  57,  85;   S  13,  22 
Senatus,  Al  67,  68 ;  Af  28,  87  (Utica), 

97;   S  42 
Service,  military  overseas,  Al  56;   Af 

19 
Ships  (for  types  see  navis)  : 

firing  of,  Af  62,  63 ;   S  36,  37,  40 
capsizing  when  overloaded,  Al  20, 

21,46 
customs,  at  Xile  mouths,  Al  13 
on  tow,  Al  11 

off  course,  Af  2,  7,  8,  11,  21,  28,  44 
refitting  of,  Al  12,  13,  47 ;   S  40 
rowing  tests  of,  Al  13 
Signa  (standards  of  maniples),  Al  20 ; 
Af  12,  15-17,  75,  77;   S  7,  10,  18, 
31,  40 
conrerlere,  Af  18 
inferre,  Al  54;  Af  69,  82 
tollere,  AI  57 


Hignifer,  S  18 

Signum  FelicUatis,  Af  83 

Slaves,  recruiting,  arming  of,  Al  2 ; 

Ai  19,  22,  36,  88 ;   S  34 
used  as  pioneers,  Al  73,  74 ;    bat- 

pien,  Af  54 
in  Scipio's  camp  at  Thapsus,  Af  85 
Slingers  (see  funda). 
Specula  (watch-tower),  Af  37 ;   S  8 
Speculatores,  Af  12,  31,  35,  37;    S  13, 

20    2*^    28    38 
Statio,  Al  19 ;   Af  38,  62 ;   S  14 

in  statione,  AJ  25 ;  Af  21,  29,  31,  38, 

46,  53,  78;   S  6,  13 
Stili  caeci,  Af  31 
Stipendium,  Af  35 
Stores,  destruction  of,  Af  43,  47 
Slides,  Af  20 


Tahdlae,  S  19 

siipmtae  (sealed  sailing  orders),  Af  3 
Tnh'eUnrii.  Al  38;   S  2,  12,  16,  18 
Tnbcniactil'im,  Ai  1 
Taxes,  imposts,  Al  49 ;   Af97;   S  42 
Tentori'im.  tentoriolum,  Af  47 
Testament'im,  Al  33 
Testudo,  Al  1 

Tetrarches,  letrarehia,  Al  67,  68,  78 
Three    Hundred,    the,    (bodv    of    R 

traders  at  Utica),  Af  88,"  90 
Tiro,  tirones,  Af  1,  5,  10,  16,  19,  31, 
32,   44,    46,    60,    71,   81;    S   26, 
28 
Tirocinium,  Af  31 

Tormenta  (artillerv),  Al   1,   2,   9,   21; 
Af  20,  29,  77  " 
on  ships,  Al  19 
ballisVim,  Af  56  ;   S  13 
catapulta,  Ai  31 
Scorpio,  Ai  29,  31,  56 
Torture,  Ai  46 

examination  under,  Al  55 
Tribuni   plebis,  rivalries    among,    AI 

65 
Tribunus  militum,  Al  43,  57,  65;    Af 

28,  54;   S  11 
Troops  : 

on  leave,  Af  77 
on  sick  list,  AI  44 ;  Af  77 
Titbicen,  Af  82 
Turma,  Af  14,  18,  29,  39,  40,  75,  78; 

S  6,  14,  23,  26 
Tiirmatim,  Af  41 


425 


GENERAL  SUBJECT  INDEX 


Turris,  turret  (tower,  battlement),  AS 
26,  88;   S  8,  13,  34,  38,  41 
at  Alexandria,  ten   storeys,   fixed, 

Al  2 ;   mobile,  Al  2 
ancient  watoh-towers,  Af  37,  38 
continuous   battlement   at   Pharos, 

Al  18 
on  farm  building,  Af  40 
siege-towers  at  Ategua,  S  16,  19 


Tadimonium,  Al  49 

Vallum,  Al  2  (triplex),  30,  31,  37,  74; 

Ai  20,  24,  29,  31,  35,  46,  61,  81- 

83;    S  16,  22,  23,  32,  36 
Tergiliarum  si^ium,  Ai  47 
Teterani,  Al  44 ;    Af  6,  16,  24,  44,  46, 

70,  81,  84-86 
Vexillum  (flag  signal),  Al  45  (naval); 

S28 


Vigiles,  S  3,  35 

Vigilia  (watch  of  night)  : 
prima,  Af  37 

secunda,  Af  47,  62;   S3,  12,  19,  32 
quartn,  AI  73  ;   Af  67-69,  76 

Vinea,  Al  1 ;   S  7 


Water : 

abundant  supply  in  Spain,  S  8 

contamination  of,  Al  5,  6 

lack  of,  Ai  1,  9;   Af  51,  53,  69,  76, 
79;   S  37,  41 

underground     conduits     at     Alex- 
andria, Al  5 

wells,    on    coast,    Al    8,    9 ;     near 
Uzitta,  Af  51 

-wheels,  mechanical,  AI  6 
Wounded,  evacuation  of,  Ai  21 


426 


Printed  in  Great  Britain  by 

EiCHARD  Clay  and  Company,  Ltd. 

BUNGAY,  Suffolk, 


Map 


PLAN     OF      ALEXANDRIA 

(to    illustrate      Bellum     Alexandrinum ) 


Stanford,   London 


Map    2 


Stanford.  London. 


Map    3 


AFRICA 

to  illustrate  Bellum  Atricum 


Map  4 


/  Scipio    /     ,e^^' 

/  \     Sx/  °> 

Mesdour        „\if^ 


B.Afr        U   Z    I   T  T  A      37-66 

Modern    V///oyey     e/)u5  CS  Menzel-Knr 

Caesar's     dispositions _   j  | 

Scipio's     dispositions  _        .. ^ ^Ij 

Contours    and     heights    are    m    metres 
The   Bottle    dispositions  os  described  m  chapters  59-60 


Stanford,  London 


Map    5 


Stanford.  London 


NOTES  -  1.  Some  would  place  it   further   North   on    Dahret  El  Hafsa 

2.  Caesar's   dispositions  shewr  in  RED.   Scipio's  in   BLACK    Unbroken   arrows 
indicate    movements  prior  to  the   Battle,  broken  ones   movements  after  the 


Map    6 


Nofva  '  \ 

Names  mentionea  in  the  text,    otjuculo   I 

but  position    undefined  Segovio   \ 

Corruca  I 

Spoil!  ?  j 


GADES 

FURTHER  SPAIN  (BAETICA) 

to  illustrate  the  Spanish   &   Alexandrian  Wars 
English   Miles 


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Plautus.      Paul  Nixon.      5  Vols.      (Vols.  I.  and  II.  5th  Imp.,  Vol. 

IJl.  3rd  Imp.,  Vols.  IV.  and  V.  2nd  Imp.) 
Puny  :    Letters.      Molmotli's  Translation  revised  by  W.  M.  L. 

Hutchinson.      2  Vols,      {(ith  Imp.) 
Pliny  :   Natural  History.     H.  Kaekhnm  and  W.  H.  S.  Jones. 

10    Vols.      Vols.    l.-V.    and    IX.     H.    Kackhain.      Vol.    VI. 

W.  H.  S.  Jones.      (Vols.  1.  and  il.  Srd  Imp..  Vols.  III.  and  IV. 

2nd  Imp.) 
Propertius.     H.  E.  Butler.     (6//j  Imp.) 
Prudentiu3.     H.  J.  Thomson.      2  Vols. 
Quintilian.     H.  E.  Butler.     4  Vols,      ('ird  Imp.) 
Remains  of  Old  Latin.     E.  H.  VVarmington.     4  Vols.     Vol.  I. 

(Ennius     and     Caecii.ius.  )     Vol.     II.     (Livius,     Naevius, 

Pacuvius,  Accius.)     Vol.  III.     (Lucilius  and  Laws  of  XII 

Tables.)     Vol.  IV.  {2nd  Imp.)     (Archaic  Inscriptions.) 
Sallust.     J.  C.  Rolfe.      {4tk  Imp.  revised.) 
Scriptores  Historiae  Augustae.     D.  Magie.     3  Vols.  (Vol.  I. 

'ird  Imp.  revised.  Vols.  II.  and  III.  2nd  Imp.) 
Seneca  :   Apocolocyntosis.     Cf.  Petronius. 
Seneca  :     Epistulae    Morales.     R.    M.    Gummere.     3    Vols. 

(Vol.  I.  4lh  Imp.,  Vols.  II.  and  III.  2nd  Imp.) 
Seneca  :    Moral  Essays.     J.   VV.    Basore.     3   Vols.    (Vol.    II. 

3rd  Imp.,  Vols.  I.  and  III.  2nd  Imp.  revised.) 
Seneca  :  Tragedies.     F.  J.  Miller.     2  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  'ilh  Imp., 

Vol.  II.  3rd  Imp.  revised.) 
SiDONius :    Poems  and  Letters.     VV.   B.  Anderson.     2  Vols. 

(Vol.  I.  2nd  Imp.) 
SiLius   Italicus.     J.    D.    DuS.      2  Vols.      (Vol.    I.    2nd   Imp., 

Vol.  II.  3rd  Imp.) 
Statius.     J.  H.  Mozley.     2  Vols.     (2nd  Imp.) 
Suetonius.     J.  C.  Rolfe.     2  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  1th  Imp.,  Vol.  II. 

6th  Imp.  revised.) 
Tacitus  :      Dialogus.     Sir    \Vm.     Peterson.     Aoricola     and 

Germania.     Maurice  Hutton.      (Gth  Imp.) 
Tacitus  :    Histories  and  Amnals.     C.  H.  Moore  and  J.  Jack- 
son.    4  Vols.     (Vols.  1.  and  II.  3rd  Imp.,  Vols.  III.  and  IV 

2nd  Imp.) 
Terence.     John  Sargeaunt.     2  Vols.     (1th  Imp.) 
Tertullian  :    Apologia  and  De  Spectaculis.     T.  R.  Glover. 

Menucius  Felix.     G.  H.  Rendall.     (2nd  Imp.) 
Valerius  Flaccus.     J.  H.  Mozley.     (2nd  Imp.  revised.) 
Varro  :  De  Lingua  Latina.     R.  G.  Kent.     2  Vols.     (2nd  Imp. 

revised.) 
Velleius  Paterculus  and  Res  Gestae  Divi  Auoustl     F.  VV. 

Shipley.      (2nd  Imp.) 
Virgil.     H.  R.  Fairclough.     2  Vols.     (Vol.  L  ISi/t /mp..  Vol.  XL 

\4th  Imp.  revised.) 
Vitruvius  :  De  Architectura.     F.  Granger.     2  Vols.     (Vol.  I. 

3rd  Imp.,  Vol.  II.  'Znd  Imp.) 

3 


Greek  Authors 

AcHfLLES  Tatius.     S.  Gaselee.      (2nd  Imp.) 

Aeneas    Tacticus,    Asclepiodotus    and    Onasander.     The 

Illinois  Greek  Club.      {2nd  Imp.) 
Aeschines.     C.  D.  Adams.     {2nd  Imp.) 
Aeschylus.     H.    Weir    Smyth.     2    Vols.      (Vol.    I.    6lh    Imp., 

Vol.  II.  5th  Imp.) 
Alciphron,  Aelian,   Philostratus  Letters.     A.   R.   Benner 

and  F.  H.  Fobes. 
Andocides,  Antiphon.     Cf.  Minor  Attic  Orators. 
Apollodorus.     Sir  James   G.    Frazer.     2   Vols.     (Vol.    I.    3rd 

Irnp.,  Vol.  II,  2nd  Imp.) 
Apollonius  Rhodius.     R.  C.  Beaton.     {5th  Imp.) 
The  Apostolic   Fathers.     Kirsopp   Lake.     2  Vols.      (Vol.    I. 

8th  Imp.,  Vol.  II.  6th  Imp.) 
Appian  :    Roman  History.     Horace  White.     4  Vols.     (Vol.  I. 

4th  Imp.,  Vols.  II.  and  IV.  3rd  Imp.,  Vol.  III.  2nd  Imp.) 
Aratus.     Cf.  Callimachus. 
Aristophanes.     Benjamin    Bickley    Rogers.     3    Vols.     Verse 

trans.      {5t}t  Imp.) 
Aristotle  :  Art  of  Rhetoric.     J.  H.  Freese.     (3rd  Imp.) 
Aristotle  :     Athenian    Constitution,    Eudemian    Ethics, 

Vices  and  Virtues.     H.  Rackham.     (3rd  Imp.) 
Aristotle:   Generation  of  Animals.    A.  L.  Peck.     (2nd/mp.) 
Aristotle:  Metaphysics.    H.  Tredennick.    2  Vols.    (3rd  imp.) 
Aristotle  :    Meteorologica.     H.  D.  P.  Lee. 
Aristotle  :     Minor   Works.     W.    S.    Hett.     On   Colours,    On 

Things  Heard,  On  Physiognomies,  On  Plants,  On  Marvellous 

Things  Heard,   Mechanical   Problems,   On   Indivisible   Lines, 

On  Situations  and  Names  of  Winds,  On  MeUssus,  Xenophanes, 

and  Gorgias.      (2nd  Imp.) 
Aristotle  :    Nicomachean  Ethics.     H.  Rackham.      {6th  Imp. 

revised. ) 
Aristotle  :    Oeconomica  and  Magna  Moralia.     G.  C.  Arm 

strong;    (with  Metaphysics,  Vol.  II.).      (3rd  Imp.) 
Aristotle  :   On  the  Heavens.     W.  K.  C.  Guthrie.     (3rd  Imp. 

revised. ) 
Aristotle  :  On  Sophistical  Refutations,  On  Coming  to  be  and 

Passing  Away,  On  the  Cosmos.     E.  S.  Forster  and  D.  J.  Furley. 
Aristotle  :    On  the  Soul,   Parva   Naturalia,   On   Breath. 

W.  S.  Hett.      (2nd  Imp.  revised.) 
Aristotle  :  Organon.    Categories  :  On  Interpretation  :  Prior 

Analytics.     H.  P.  Cooke  and  H.  Tredennick.      (3rd  Imp.) 
Aristotle  :    Parts  of  Animals.     A.   L.   Peck ;    Motion   and 

Progression  of  Animals.     E.  S.  Forster.     '3rd  Imp.  revised.) 
Aristotle  :   Physics.     Rev.  P.  Wicksteed  and  F.  M.  Cornford. 

2  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  2nd  Imp.,  Vol.  II.  3rd  Imp.) 
Aristotle  :     Poetics    and    Longinub.     W.    Hamilton    Fyfe; 

Demetrius  on  Style.     W.  Rhys  Roberts.      {5th  Imp.  revised.) 
Aristotle  :    Politics.     H.  Rackham.      {ith  Imp.  revised.) 
Arisiotui::  Fbobucms.    \V.  S.  Hett.    2  Vols.    {2nd  Imp  revised.) 


Abistotle  :  Rhetorica    Ad    Alexandrum     (with    Peoblkms. 

Vol.  II.).     H.  Rackhara. 
Abrian  :    History  of  Alexander  and  Indica.     Rev.  E.  IlifJe 

Robson.      2  Vols.      (Vol.  1.  3rd  imp.,  Vol.  11.  2m/ /wp.) 
Athenaeus  :      Deipnosophistae.      C.     B.     Gulick.     7     Vols. 

(Vols.  1..  IV.-VII.  2nd  Imp.) 
St.  Basil:    Letters.     R.  J.  Deferrari.     4  Vols.     (2nd  Imp.) 
Callimachus,  Hymns  and  Epigrams,  and  Lycophron.      A.  W. 

Mair;     Aratl's.     G.  R.  Mair.      (2nd  Imp.) 
Clement   of   Alexandria.     Rev.    G.    VV.    Butterwoith.      {3rd 

Imp. ) 
Colluthus.     Cf.  Oppian. 
Daphnis     and    Chloe.     Thornley's    Translation    revised     by 

J.  M.  Edmonds:    and  Parthenius.     S.  Gaselee.      {Uh  Imp.) 
Demosthenes   1  :    Olynthiacs,   Philippics   and   Minor  Ora- 
tions.     I. -XVII.  AND  XX.     J.  H.  Vince.      (2nd  Imp.) 
Demosthenes    II  :     De   Corona    and    De   Falsa    Leqatione. 

C.  A.  Vince  and  J.  H.  Vince.      (3rd  Imp.  revised.) 
Demosthenes     III  :      Meidias,     Androtion,     Aristocrates, 

TiMOCRATES   and   Abistoqeiton,    1.    and    II.     J.    H.    Vince. 

{2nd  Imp.) 
Demosthenes  IV-VI  :    Private  Orations  and  In   Neaeram. 

A.  T.  Murray.      (Vol.  IV.  2nd  Imp.) 
Demosthenes  VII  :  Funeral  Speech,  Erotic  Essay,  Exordia 

and  Letters.     N.  W.  and  N.  J.  DeWitt. 
Dio  Cassius  :    Roman  History.     E.  Cary.     9  Vols.      (Vols.  1. 

and  II.  3rd  Imp.,  Vols.  III. -IX.  2nd  Imp.) 
Dio  Chrysostom.     J.  W.  Cohoon  and  H.  Lamar  Crosby.     5  Vols. 

(Vols.  I.-IV.  2nd  Imp.) 
DioDORUs  SicuLus.      12  Vols.     Vols.  I.-VI.     C.  H.  Oldfather. 

Vol.  VII.     C.  L.  Sherman.     Vols.  IX.  and  X.     R.  M.  Geer. 

(Vols.  I.-IV.  2nd  Imp.) 
Diogenes  Laertius.     R.  D.  Hicks.      2  Vols.      (Vol.  I.  4/A  Imp., 

Vol.  II.  3rd  Imp.) 
DioNYSius   OF  Halicabnassus  :    Roman   Antiquities.     Spel- 

man's  translation  revised  by  E.  Cary.      7  Vols.      (Vols.  I.-V. 

2Md  Imp.) 
Epictetus.     W.  a.  Oldfather.     2  Vols.     (2nd  Imp.) 
Euripides.     A.  S.  Way.     4  Vols.     (Vols.  1.  and  II.  7/A  Imp., 

III.  and  IV.  6<A  Imp.)     Verse  trans. 
EusEBius :      Ecclesiastical    History.     Kirsopp    Lake    and 

J.  E.  L.  Oulton.  2  Vols.  (Vol.  1.  3rd /mp.,  Vol.  II.  4<A  /mp.) 
Galen  :  On  the  Natural  Faculties.  A.  J.  Brock,  {ith  Imp.) 
The  Greek  Anthology.     W.  R.  Paton.     5  Vols.     (Vols.  I.  and 

II.  5th  Imp.,  Vol.  III.  ilh  Imp.,  Vols.  IV.  and  V.  3rd  Imp.) 
Gbeer    Elegy   and    Iambus   with   the   Anacbeontea.     J.  iSL 

Edmonds.      2  Vols.      (Vol.  I.  3rd  Imp.,  Vol.  II.  2nd  Imp.) 
The   Greek    Bucolic   Poets    (Theocritus,    Bion,    Moschus). 

J.  M.  Edmonds.      {1th  Imp.  revised.) 
Greek  Mathematical  Works.     Ivor  Thomas.     2  Vols.     {2nd 

Imp.) 
Herodes.     Cf.  Thecphbastus  :    Chabactebs. 


Herodotus.     A.  D.  Godley.     4  Vols.      (Vols.  I.-III.  4<A  Imp., 

Vol.  IV.  3rd  Imp.) 
Hesiod    and   The    Homeric    Hymns.     H.    Q.    Evelyn    White. 

{1th  Imp.  reviled  and  enlarged.) 
Hippocrates  and  the  Fragments  of  Heeaclkitus.     W.  H.  S. 

Jones  and  E.  T.  Witliington.      4  Vols.      (3rd  Imp.) 
Homer  :    Iliad.     A.  T.    Murray.     2   Vols.     {Vol.   I.    1th  Imp., 

Vol.  11.  fiih  Imp.) 
Homer  :    Odvssev.     A.  T.  Murray.     2  Vols.      {8th  Imp.) 
Jsaeus.      E.  VV.  Forster.      (2nd  Imp.) 

IsocRATES.     George  Norlin  and  LaRue  Van  Hook.      3  Vols. 
St.  John  Damascene  :    Barlaam  and  Ioasaph.     Rev.  G.  R. 

Woodward  and  Harold  Mattingly.      (3rd  Imp.  revised.) 
Joseph  us.     H.  St.  J.  Thackeray  and  Ralph  Marcus.      9  Vola. 

Vols.  I.-VII.     (Vol.  V.  3rd  Imp.,  Vol-s.  I.-IV.,  VI.  and  VII.  2nd 

Imp  ) 
Julian.     Wilmer  Cave  Wright.     3  Vols.      (Vols.  I.  and  IL  3rd 

Imp.,  Vol.  III.  2nd  Imp.) 
LuciAN.     A.  M.  Harmon.     8  Vols.     Vols.  l.-V.   (Vols.   I.  and 

11.  4th  Imp.,  Vol.  111.  3rd  Imp.,  Vols.  IV.  and  V.  2nd  Imp.) 
Lycophron.     Cf.  Callimachus. 
Lyra  Graeca.     J.  M.  Edmonds.     3  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  ith  Imp., 

Vol.  II.  revised  and  enlarged,  and  III.  3rd  Imp.) 
Lysias.     W.  R.  M.  Lamb.      (2nd  Imp.) 
Manetho.     VV.  G.  Waddell :    Ptolemy  :    Tetrabiblo8.     F.  E. 

Robbins.      (2nd  Imp.) 
Marcus  Aurelius.     C.  R.  Haines.     (4(A  Imp.  revised.) 
Menander.      F.  G.  Allinson.      (3rd  Imp.  revised.) 
Minor    Attic    Orators    (Antiphon,    Andocides,    Lycurocs, 

Demades,  Dinarchus,  Hypereides).     K.  J.  Maidment  ana 

J.  O.  Burrt.      2  Vols.      (Vol.  I.  2nd  Imp.) 
NoNNOS:  DiONYSiACA.     W.  H.  D.  Rouse.     3  Vols.      (2nd  Imp.) 
Oppian,  Colluthus,  Tryphiodorus.     A.  W.  Mair.      (2nd  Imp.) 
Papyri.     Non-Literary  Selections.     A.  S.  Hunt  and  C.  C. 

Edgar.     2  Vols.      (Vol.  1.  2nd  Imp.)     Literary  Selections. 

Vol.  1.  (Poetry).     D.  L.  Page.     (3rd  Imp.) 
Parthenius.     Cf.  Daphnis  and  Chloe. 
Pausanias  :    Description   of   Greece.     W.    H.   S.   Jones.     6 

Vols,   and   Companion   Vol.   arranged   by   R.    E.   Wycherley. 

(Vols.  1.  and  HI.  3rd  Imp.,  Vols.  IL,  IV.  and  V.  2nd  Imp.) 
Philo.      10  Vols.     Vols.  I.-V. ;    F.  H.  Colson  and  Rev.  G.  H. 

Whitaker.     Vols.   VI.-IX. ;    F.    H.   Colson.     (Vols.   II.-III., 

V.-IX.  2nd  Imp.,  Vols.  I.  and  IV..  3rd  Imp.) 
Philo  :    two  supplementary  Vols.      {Translation  only.)     Ralph 

Marcus. 
Philostratus  :    The  Life  of  Apollonids  of  Tyana.     F.  C. 

Conybeare.     2  Vols.      (Vol.  I.  ith  Imp.,  Vol.  II.  3rd  Imp.) 
Philostratus:     Imagines;     Callistratus  :      Descriptions. 

A.  Fairbanks. 
Philostratus    and    Eunapius  :      Lives    of    thb    Sophists. 

Wilmer  Cave  Wright.     (2nd  Imp.) 
Pindar.     Sir  J.  E.  Sandys.      {1th  Imp.  revised.) 


Plato  :    Charmides,   Alcibiades,   Hipparchus,  The  Lovers, 

Theages,    Minos   and    Epinomis.     VV.    R.    M.    Lamb,      i'lnd 

Imp.) 
PL4.TO :    Cratylus,   Parmenides,  Greater  HrppiAS,    Lesser 

HiPPiAS.     H.  N.  Fowler.      (-Ith  Imp.) 
Plato  :     Edthyphro,    Apoloqy.    Crito.    Phaedo.    Phaedrus. 

H.  N.  Fowler.      (Wth  imp.) 
Plato  :   Laches,  Protagoras.  Meno,  Euthydemus.     \V.  R.  M. 

Lamb.      (3rd  Ivip.  revised.) 
Plato:    Laws.      Rev.  R.  G.  Bury.      2  Vols.      (3rd  Imp.) 
Plato  :    Lysis    Symposium,  Gorqias.     W.  R.  M.  Lamb.      {5th 

Imp.  revised.) 
Plato  :    Republic.      Paul  Shorey.      2  Vols.      (Vol.  I.  5^  Imp., 

Vol.  II.  :ird  Imp.) 
Plato:   Statesman,  Philebds.     H.  N.  Fowler;   Ion.    W.  R.  M. 

Lamb.      (4</i  hnp.) 
Plato:   Theaetetus  and  Sophist.      H.  N.  Fowler,      (ith  Imp.) 
Plato  :   Timaeus.  Critias,  Clitopho,  Menexenus,  Epistulae. 

Rev.  R.  G.  Burv.      iord  Imp.) 
Plutarch:    Mobalia.      14  Vols.      Vols.  l.-V.      F.  C    Babbitt: 

Vol.  VI.     VV.  C.  Helmbold  :  Vol.  X.     H.  N.  Fowler.     {2nd  Imp.) 
Plutarch  :      The    Parallel    Lives.       B.     Perrin.       1 1     Vols. 

(Vols.  I..  II.,  VI.,  VII.,  and  XI.   3rd  Imp.    Vols.  IIL-V.  and 

VIII.-X.  2nd  Imp.) 
PoLYBius.      W.  R.  Paton.      6  Vols.      {2nd  Imp.) 
Pkocopius  :    History  of  the  Wars.      H.  B.  Dewing.      7  Vols. 

(Vol.  I.  3rd  Imp.,  Vols.  II. -VII.  2nd  Imp.) 
Ptolemy  :   Tetrabiblos.     Cf.  M.axetho. 

Quintus  Smyrnaeus.     A.  S.  Way.      Verso  trans.      (3rd  Imp.) 
Sextus  Empiricus.     Rev.   R.  G.  Bury.      4  Vols.      (Vol.    I.    3rd 

Imp.,  Vols.  II.  and  III.  2nd  Imp.) 
Sophocles.     F.  Storr.     2  Vols.     (Vol.  L.      lOth  Imp.    Vol.  II.  Qth 

Imp.)     Verse  trans. 
Stbabo  :    Geography.     Horace  L.  Jones.     8  Vols.     (Vols.  1.,  V., 

and  VIII.  -Srdlmp.,  Vols.  II..  III.,  IV.,  VI.,  and  VII.  2nd  Imp.) 
Theophbastus  :     Characters.      J.    M.    Edmonds.      Herodes. 

etc.     A.  D.  Knox.      (3rd  Imp.) 
Theophrastus  :     Enquiry    into    Plants.      Sir    Arthur    Hort, 

Bart.      2  Vols.      {2nd  Imp.) 
Thucydides.     C.  F.  Smith.     4  Vols.     (Vol.  I.     ith  Imp.,  Vols. 

II.,  III.,  and  IV.  3rd  Imp.  revised.) 
Tryphiodorus.     Cf.  Oppi.^n. 
Xenophon  :   Cyropaedia.     Walter  Miller.     2  Vols.     (Vol.  1.  ith 

Imp.,  Vol.  II.  3rd  Imp.) 
Xenophon  :   Hellenica,  Anabasis,  Apology,  and  Symposium. 

C.  L.  Brownson  and  O.  J.  Todd.     3  Vols.     (Vols.  I.  and  III. 

3rd  Imp.,  Vol.  II.  ith  Imp.) 
Xenophon  :  Memorabilia  and  Oeconomicus.    E.  C.  Marchant. 

(3rd  Imp.) 
Xjemofhon  :   Scripta  Minora.     E.  C  Marchant.     {2nd  Imp.  i. 


IN    PREPARATION 


Greek  Authors 

Akistotle  :   History  of  Animals.     A.  L.  Peck. 
Callimachus  :    Fragments.     C.  A.  Trypanis. 
Plotinus  :   A.  H.  Armstrong. 


Latin  Authors 

St.  Augustine  .-   City  of  God. 

Cicero  :  Pro  Sestio,  In  Vatinium,  Pro  Caelio,  De  PROvtNcna 
CoNsuLABiBus,  Pro  Balbo.     J.  H.  Freese  and  R.  Gardner. 
Phaedrus      Ben  E.  Perry 


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