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BERKOWITZ ENVELOPE 00., K. 0., MO.

JUN1V41

MAY 12 41

MAP 23
JUN 11964

U/p

FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT ALLENBY OF MEGIDDO AND
FELIXSTOWE, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.

Photo Russell and Sons

A STUDY IN GREATl^MS

THE BIOGRAPHY OF FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT ALLENBY
OF MEGIDDO AND FELIXSTOWE G.C.B. G.C.M.G.

GENERAL
SIR ARCHIBALD WAVELL

K.C.B. C.M.G. M.C.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MIDDLE EAST

NEW YORK

Oxford University Press

1941

Made in Great J9rttain. Printed ly R. <V R, CLARK, LIMITED,

Edinburgh

TO
LADY ALLENBY

The general must know how to get his men their rations and every
other kind of stores needed in war, He must have imagination to originate
plans, practical sense and energy to carry them through. He must be
observant, untiring, shrewd, kindly and cruel, simple and crafty, a watch-
man and a robber, lavish and miserly, generous and stingy, rash and con-
servative. All these and many other qualities, natural and acquired, he
must have. He should also, as a matter of course, know his tactics ; for a
disorderly mob is no more an army than a heap of building materials
is a house.

SOCRATES

PREFACE

THE war came before this biography of Field-Marshal Lord
Allenby, which was originally to have appeared in one volume,
had been finished. As there is little prospect of my having
time to write the remaining chapters at present, I have arranged
to publish at once the completed portion, which deals with
Lord Allenby's military life and campaigns, leaving till later
the story of his post- War years, which include the important
period when he held the post of High Commissioner for Egypt
and did much to shape the political future of that country.

The military career of one of the greatest soldiers of the
last war, whose courage and will to victory never faltered,
may perhaps be of more interest and value during the present
conflict than at a later time ; whereas the record of his doings
and influence in Egypt during the troubled period from 1919
to 1925 forms a chapter of history of which the results are
still being unrolled: its relation can wait till peace comes
again.

Lord Allenby kept no diaries or papers and left little personal
record of his life ; this biography, accordingly, could not have
been written without the assistance of his relatives and friends,
of those who served with him or under him, or who knew
him in his unofficial times. Besides Lady Allenby, his sister,
Mrs Porter, and his nephew, Lieutenant-Colonel R, H. Andrew,
have given invaluable help. Of those who served with him
I would like especially to thank Field-Marshal Sir Philip
Chetwode, Bart., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., O.M., D.S.O.,
General Sir George Barrow, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., General Sir
John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., General Sir William
Bartholomew, K.CB., C.M.G., D.S.O., Lieutenant-Colonel
James Stevenson -Hamilton (a brother officer of his early
days), Lieutenant-Colonel the Earl of Rosebery, D.S.O., M.C
(who was on his personal staff from 1915 till the end of the

ALLENBY

Great War), and Major-General G. P. Dawnay, C.B., CM.G.
D.S.O. I am much indebted to Brigadier-General Sir Jame;
Edmonds, C.B., C.M.G., and Captain Cyril Falls, of the
Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, fo]
their help and advice. I also thank the many others who have
sent me material or have read and corrected my drafts.

A. P. W.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

MIDDLE EAST

June 1940

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

PROLOGUE : ALLENBY THE MAN 13

BOOK I
FORGE

I. EARLY LIFE (1861-82) 23

I. Origins and Childhood (1861-71)
II. Schooldays (1871-78)

III. Royal Military College, Sandhurst (1878-82)

IV. The Young Allenby

II. THE REGIMENT (1882-96) 40

I. Early Service in South Africa (1882-83)

II. Zululand and Bechuanaland (1883-85)

III. South Africa (1886-90)

IV. Garrison Life at Home (1890-96)

III. THE STAFF (1896-99) 61

I. The Staff College (1896-97)
II. The Curragh (1898-99)

IV. THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR (1899-1902) 67

I. The Coming of War
II. The Voyage to South Africa (NovemberDecember 1899)

III. The First Phases of the War (December iS^-February 1900)

IV. Kimberley and Bloemfontein (February- April 1900)

V. The Transvaal : Command of the Inniskillings (April 1900-

January 1901)
VI. The Column Commander (January igoi-May 1902)

V. PREPARATION FOR ARMAGEDDON (1902-14) no

I. Command of the 5th Lancers (August i^Qi-October 1905)
II. The 4th Cavalry Brigade (October 190 ^-October 1909)
III. Inspector-General of Cavalry (1910-14)

BOOK II

SWORD AND BATON
VI. THE CAVALRY IN FRANCE (A.ugu$i iyi4-May 1915) 127

I. Mobilization and Engagement (August 4-2.4, 1914)
II. The Retreat (August z4~September 5, 1914)

III. The Advance to the Aisne (September 6-30, 1914)

IV. The Cavalry Corps (October i$i4~~May 1915)

ALLENBY

CHAPTER PAGE

VII. CORPS AND ARMY COMMANDER (May lyij-Jme 1917) 152

I. The Fifth Corps (May-October 1915)
II. The Third Army (to the Battle of Arras) (October 1915-

November 1916)

III. The Battles of Arras : Preparation and Execution (Winter
1917)

VIII. THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM (June-December 1917) 186

I. The Preparation of a Campaign (June-October 1917)
II. Breaking the Line (October z~j-November 7, 1917)

III. Pursuit in Philistia (November 8-18, 1917)

IV. Jerusalem (November 18 December 31, 1917)

IX. THE FINAL CAMPAIGN (January-September 1918) 234

I. Interval (January-March 1918)
II. Trans- Jordan (March-May 1918)

III. Reorganization and Planning (May-~A.ugust 1918)

IV. The Eve of Megiddo (August-September 1918)

X. CAVALCADE (September i-j-October 31, 1918) . 272

I. Megiddo (September 17-22, 1918)
II. Damascus (September 2^-October 5, 1918)
III. Aleppo (flctober 5-31, 1918)

EPILOGUE: ALLENBY THE GENERAL 291

INDEX 303

BOOK III, PLOUGHSHARE, the record of AUenbfs life after 1918,
mil be published later.

ILLUSTRATIONS

PAGE

FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT ALLENBY OF MEGIDDO AND

FELIXSTOWE, G.C.B., G.C.M.G. Frontispiece

MR AND MRS HYNMAN ALLENBY AND THEIR FAMILY 34

EDMUND ALLENBY ABOUT 1870 34

LIEUTENANT ALLENBY IN 1882 35

CAPTAIN ALLENBY IN 1891, WHEN ADJUTANT OF THE INNIS-

KILLING DRAGOONS 68

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ALLENBY DURING THE SOUTH AFRICAN

WAR 106

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ALLENBY IN 1904, WHEN IN COMMAND

OF THE 5TH LANCERS 107

LIEUTENANT MICHAEL ALLENBY 196

VISCOUNTESS ALLENBY 197

GENERAL ALLENBY' s HEADQUARTERS DURING 1918 206

VON FALKENHAYN WITH TURKISH GENERALS AND OFFICIALS

AT THE RAILWAY-STATION AT JERUSALEM 206

SOME OF ALLENBY'S OPPONENTS IN THE PALESTINE CAMPAIGN 207
READING THE PROCLAMATION AT THE CITADEL ON GENERAL

ALLENBY'S ENTRY INTO JERUSALEM 230

AT TWENTIETH CORPS H.Q* : LOOKING TOWARDS THE MOUNT

OF OLIVES (MARCH 1918) 231

GENERAL SIR EDMUND ALLENBY AT G.H.Q. AT BIR SALEM

(MARCH 1918) 242

A PAGE OF A LETTER WRITTEN BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL

ALLENBY DURING THE SOUTH AFRICAK WAR 243

MAPS AND PLANS

EAST ANGLIA 29

SOUTH AFRICA (1885) 49

ALLENBY'S SKETCH-MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE BREAKDOWN TO

s.s. " PERSIA " 69

SOUTH AFRICA DURING THE BOER WAR 75

ALLENBY

PAGE

OPERATIONS MODDER RIVER TO BLOEMFONTEIN 81
INTENDED MOVEMENTS OF THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE,

AUGUST 21-23, 1914, AS ORDERED ON AUGUST 20 131

THE RETREAT FROM MONS, 1914 135

YPR.ES, 1914-15 155

THE BATTLES OF ARRAS, 1917 177

THE CAPTURE OF BEERSHEBA 209

THE THIRD BATTLE OF GAZA 215

THE CAPTURE OF JERUSALEM 227

THE JORDAN VALLEY 247

MEGIDDO 274

THEATRE OF THE PALESTINE CAMPAIGNS (1917-18) 302

Wain

PROLOGUE

ALLENBY THE MAN

Who would true valour see,

Let him come hither;
Here's one will constant be,

Come wind, come weather.

JOHN BUNYAN

Without courage there cannot be truth ; and without truth there
can be no other virtue. SlR WALTER ScOTT

PROLOGUE
ALLENBY THE MAN

ALLENBY was the last man who would have cared what his
biographer wrote of him, or, indeed, that his biography should
be written at all. He never troubled to explain his successes
or to justify any action he had taken; he bore no grudge
against his critics or detractors ; he left behind no account of
his life and no material to compile one; he had, in truth, a
certain impatience with those who recalled past events, saying
that it was only the future that mattered. Yet it is well that
an attempt should be made to tell his story and to paint his
portrait. Not only is there interest in the record of one who
was a successful soldier in the most testing of all wars and
a wise, sympathetic administrator in perplexed countries at
difficult times ; but also Allenby's character was of such rare
truth and strength that it can serve as a model, and yet of
such humanity rough, violent humanity at times that it
can escape the aversion that most people feel towards anyone
held up as a model.

His fame as a soldier rests secure on two brilliant campaigns
in Palestine and Syria. The Great War of 1914-18 was mostly
hard, pitiless, clumsy pounding, and the manoeuvres of those
five years that will be remembered and discussed as examples
of the strategist's art are few. Tannenberg, the Marne, the
campaigns on the Russian front in 1914 and 1915, the over-
running of Serbia and of Rumania, the operations that began
at Gaza-Beersheba and ended with the fall of Jerusalem, the
final annihilation of the Turkish armies in Palestine and Syria
these will form the main material for text-book analysis and dis-
cussion. In two of them the master-hand was Allenby's ; and
while it is true that the odds in numbers and equipment were
on his side in his victories, the manner of their accomplishment

ALLENBY

showed a bigness of conception and a firmness of execution
that must give him a high place among great captains of war.
The opening of the Arras battle in April 1917 showed that
even in the close-locked conditions of trench warfare he could
plan on original lines : had he remained in France and been
given the opportunity he might well have developed a tech-
nique in position warfare that would have brought an earlier
end to the long conflict; it is notable that two prominent
officers of the Tank Corps have recorded that he was the most
understanding of the high commanders on the Western Front.
Indeed, (Allenby had qualities of courage, loyalty, directness
of thought and purpose, knowledge of his profession and
common sense in the application of his knowledge, that would
have made him a great soldier in any age and under any
conditions.!

He brought these same qualities, together with a patience
and a tolerance that were innate in him, though his appear-
ance and manner did not always suggest them, to his task of
administrating first the occupied enemy territories that his
troops had overrun in Palestine, Syria, and beyond, and later
the ancient, baffling land of Egypt at a difficult and dangerous
period. His success as diplomat and administrator has been
more questioned than his ability as a soldier; and his handling
of the Egyptian problem has been bitterly criticized in some
quarters, Allenby never replied or defended himself: it was
not his way. It will be possible one day to provide a basis on
which his actions in Egypt can be better understood and
judged, but the later course of events has been the best justifica-
tion of his foresight and good sense.

The official records and documents of his victories as a
soldier and of his success or failure as an administrator will
remain available for future strategists and historians to dissect
and discuss ; but history, and more especially military history,
is dry, misleading stuff without a clear understanding of the
character and motives of the chief actors. It is like tinned

1 Had he lived in the Middle Ages he might have inspired a, statue in Whitehall
like Verrocchio's statue of CoUeoni in Venice,

PROLOGUE

food : it lacks the vitamins necessary for health. The aim of
this biography is to leave on record, while memory is fresh
and many of those who knew him well are still alive, a portrait
of Allenby as a man, rather than to describe in detail his
achievements in war and peace. He is perhaps too near yet
for a final estimate as general and administrator, but he will
soon be too far for a contemporary portrait as a man.

Allenby came from the English countryside, of old-
rooted English stock. He was the embodiment of those
virtues which the Englishman likes to think most typical
of his race tolerance and kindliness, love of peace and
order and fair dealing. Allenby had no family tradition of
military service, and glory was the last idea that would ever
have entered his head. His attitude to soldiering was not
that of the professional man-at-arms seeking a bubble reputa-
tion, but rather that of the good citizen who bears arms in the
defence of peace and trade, but longs always to return from
the distasteful necessity of fighting to his beloved countryside
or town, to his home and his business. While still a young
officer Allenby once confided to a friend that to have a garden
and to grow roses was the thing in life that made most appeal
to him. But, having once adopted a military career, the deep
sense of duty and loyalty which was the guiding motive of his
whole life caused him to give of his best unsparingly, and
made him sometimes a hard taskmaster to those under him.
He had little personal ambition, and never sought advance-
ment; but his character and abilities made it certain that
advancement would come to him. Nor did Allenby ever
pretend not to enjoy the exercise of power and the privileges
and position that it gave him.

His mind had breadth and poise rather than any great
depth. He had not a creative and imaginative brain, like
Marlborough : his military genius was colder and stiffer, like
that of Wellington, the very embodiment of character and
common sense. He had the gift of a wonderfully retentive
memory, and he stored it wisely, adding a sound knowledge
of his profession and much of the learning of a scholar to the

B 17

ALLENBY

lore of the countryside that he had acquired in youth. In all
three departments he kept his stock fresh and up to date.
Indeed, Allenby's range of information was remarkable, and
it was not wise in his presence to lay down the law on any
subject, unless very sure of the facts : he was disconcertingly
likely to have read more, thought more, and remembered
more on the same subject. He made no parade of his know-
ledge, and never talked for effect; but he would not pass
uncorrected any inaccurate or ignorant statement made in
his presence. He was studious, and read much; he enjoyed
foreign travel, and missed no opportunity to visit fresh coun-
tries and see new sights; but most he loved the quiet and
peaceful things of life gardens and birds and old buildings.
Fishing was his favourite recreation.

All this does not seem to accord well with his nickname
and traditional reputation in the Army as " the Bull" Yet
the name was appropriate enough at first sight and knowledge
of the man and to some of his moods. His size, bearing, and
obvious physical strength were of themselves impressive:
the frank, open countenance, with its firm jaw and steady
eyes, gave assurance of power and courage ; the voice was of
a part with the form and face strong, clear, and confident
almost to arrogance. The conscious strength of form, face,
and voice could affect very powerfully those who came in
contact with him. To those who knew him well, and to those
who faced him fairly and without fear, his dominant person-
ality was an inspiration and support ; to those who met him
for the first time or were at all nervous in his presence he was
without doubt alarming and disconcerting, especially in his
official capacity. His manner was often gruff and abrupt;
his questions were straight and sharp ; and he demanded an
immediate, direct reply. Any attempt at prevarication, any
indefiniteness, even hesitation, might provoke a sudden ex-
plosion of anger that could shake the hardiest.

But it needed no long acquaintance with Allenby to realke
that his nickname was appropriate to externals only, that
the man was big mentally and morally as well as physically,

PROLOGUE

and that, in spite of his volcanic outbursts of temper, his
attitude to men was at bottom kindly and tolerant. The
outstanding spiritual characteristic of Allenby was a greatness
of mind that matched his bigness of body ; he was incapable
of the least meanness or pettiness of spirit in his dealings with
persons or with questions of conduct. However violently his
anger might rage, he never cherished a grudge or bore any
ill-will. Though intensely self-reliant, he was not obstinate,
and would always listen to the views of those who had special
knowledge, accepting their advice if he judged it sound.
Once his mind was made up he asked no one to share his
responsibility. If things went well, he was generous in his
acknowledgment of the services of his subordinates; if
things went ill, he was sparing of blame and never stooped to
shirk his own responsibility or to defend himself.
ijtje was always grave and courteous to women, and all
women liked him; to children he was kind and humorous,
and children adored him. With men he was reserved, even
with those who knew him best, and remained, except on rare
occasions, somewhat aloof and Olympian as little likely to
ask for confidences as to give them, so sure of himself as hardly
to recognize the existence of doubts in lesser men. His path
through life was simple, straight, and direct; neither fear nor
favour could ever make him swerve from it| and the end he
sought was peace and quiet, the peace of the English country-
side from which he sprang.

Such is the outline that the following pages will attempt to
develop into a portrait, the portrait of a great soldier and a
very gallant and honourable gentleman, whose family motto,
Fide et labore (" By loyalty and service "), records the faith by
which he lived and died.

BOOK I
FORGE

This is the best blade that Weland ever made. Even the user will
never know how good it is. RuDYARD KlpLINGj

CHAPTER I

EARLY LIFE

(1861-82)

ORIGINS AND CHILDHOOD
(1861-71)

THE family of Allenby (or Allanby) originally came from
Cumberland. The name is apparently derived from Allonby,
a village on the coast of Cumberland, or from Ellonby, a
hamlet in Inglewood Forest, also in Cumberland. These two
place-names are really identical, as Allonby was Allayneby in
1262 and Ellonby was Alanebi in 1228. They are post-
Conquest names, meaning the * by/ or homestead, of Alain,
a Breton name, of Celtic origin and uncertain meaning, which
came over with the Conqueror. There is a third possibility
that the name comes from Aglionby (locally pronounced
Allenby), derived from a Norman surname, Aquillon. It is
not impossible that all three places may have contributed to
the Cumberland surname. It seems, then, that the founder of
the Allenby family was some stout warrior from Brittany, who
followed the Conqueror's fortunes to England and received
a grant of land on the northern marches, in the debatable
land between Norman and Scot, where good skirmishing
was always to be had, and only strong hand and good watch
could keep the roof on the farm and the cattle from the
raider. 1

The county of Lincoln, to which the most prosperous
branch of the family presently moved, and where it is known
to have owned land since the middle of the sixteenth century,

1 Professor Ernest Weekley, the well-known authority on surnames and place-
names, has provided most of the information in this paragraph.

ALLENBY

lies somewhat off the beaten track of English history and
beyond the edge of the average Englishman's knowledge of
his country. He probably connects it with fens and skating,
with a bishop and cathedral, with country life and with a
poacher who has inspired a cheerful marching tune. If asked
for the principal event in its history he would be most likely
to recall King John's lost baggage in the Wash. In this
retired, quiet county the Allenby family seem to have lived
quiet, retired, useful lives, concerning themselves mainly with
their houses and their land and their stock, taking their proper
part in local affairs, but making little show outside, typical of
that lesser landed gentry who have been the backbone of the
English race and the principal source of its greatest names.
The type is passing, or has changed. No longer does the
possession of land ensure a comfortable, untroubled living
and the power to support a large family.

Some two hundred and fifty years ago one Thomas Allenby,
by his marriage with Dorothy, daughter of Henry Hinman,
of Swinhope, in the county of Lincoln, brought into the
family two names which have been common in it ever since
Hinman (or Hynman) and Henry. About a hundred years
later another marriage secured to the family an inheritance of
more value than a name a strain of the blood of oine of
England's greatest soldiers and administrators, Oliver Crom-
well, 1 also a man of the Eastern Counties, and living, like the
Allenby family, " neither in any considerable height, nor yet
in obscurity." The marriage which imported this strain of
military and political genius was that of Hinman Allenby with
Anne Raddish, a great-great-granddaughter of General Ireton
and Bridget Cromwell, daughter of the Protector. Hinman

1 It is interesting that a large number of the principal families of England have
inherited the blood of Oliver Cromwell; his descendants, in the female line, have
included a Prime Minister, a Foreign Secretary, two Lords-Lieutenant of Ireland, and
a Viceroy of India. The following contemporary description of Cromwell indicates
that Allenby may well have inherited a part of his qualities : " His body was well com-
pact and strong ... his head so shaped as you might see it both a storehouse and a
shop of a vast treasury of natural parts. His temper exceedingly fiery, as I have known,
but the flame of it kept down for the most part, or soon allayed by those moral endow-
ments he had. ... A larger soul, I think, hath seldom dwelt in a house of day than
his was."

EARLY LIFE

and Anne Allenby established themselves at Kenwick Hall,
near Louth, which remained the principal seat of the elder
branch of the Allenby family up to a few years ago. Hinman
Raddish Allenby, their son, married in 1819 Elizabeth,
daughter of Mr H. Bourne, of Dalby. She and her sister were
well-known beauties, and Tennyson, who was in his youth a
near neighbour, addressed poems to them.

Of the marriage of Hinman Raddish Allenby and Elizabeth
Bourne came two sons, of whom the elder was named Henry
Hynman Allenby, and the younger, with the economy proper
to a younger son, just Hynman Allenby. This latter was the
father of the subject of this biography. He should, in the
strict tradition of younger sons, have gone out into the world
and adopted a profession, but he seems to have desired nothing
more than to lead the life of a country gentleman, as had his
ancestors for so many generations. He was educated at home
by a private tutor, and then went to Corpus Christi College,
Cambridge, which he left, however, without taking a degree.
He at one time thought to become a doctor, and even began
the study of medicine. But his heart was always in the
country and in country occupations and sports shooting and
horses, fishing and boat-sailing. He was of medium height,
handsome, kindly, straightforward, and generous, with some
artistic and musical talent, but little business acumen. He
married in 1859 a woman of remarkable force of character
and ability, Miss Catherine Anne Cane, a daughter of the Rev.
Thomas Coats Cane.

This grandfather of Allenby's was a well-known Notting-
hamshire clergyman of the c squarson * type, with comfortable
private means (his mother had been a Coats, of the cotton-
spinning family), living in his own house (Brackenhurst, near
Southwell), active as a magistrate and forward in all the affairs
of the county. He was a very keen fisherman, kept pedigree
cows and pigs, and insisted on everything being always of
the best and most expensive quality. He died, in 1887, at
the age of eighty-seven. His wife, Mary Brettle, daughter of
a banker, was a handsome and charming woman, of much

ALLENBY

good-humour and wit, in spite of a large family, nine sons
and three daughters, of whom Mrs AUenby was the third
child

Mrs Allenby's outstanding characteristic was thoroughness
in all she did; in the management of her easy-going husband,
her children, the house, the horses, a sailing-boat, a garden,
and the villagers of Felixstowe she never left any duty undone,
she never wasted time, she was never at a loss. Yet she was
not domineering, and her family were all devoted to her.
When they were first married she and her husband went to
live at Dartmouth, where he kept a small boat, being very
fond of sailing. Mrs AUenby suffered daily at first the agonies
of the bad sailor ; but her strength of will mastered her weak-
ness, and she became in time an excellent sea-woman, and
thoroughly competent at handling a boat. She retained her
spirit to old age : when she was eighty-one she sat up in her
bed, a few hours after an operation for appendicitis, and
gave very explicit and forcible instructions through an open
window to her gardener, who was doing something in the
garden below of which she disapproved.

There were six children of the marriage, three sons and
three daughters. The eldest, Catherine Mary (Kitty), 1 was
born in 1860 at Kenwick Hall. The first son, the future Field-
Marshal, was born the next year, on April 23, St George's Day,
at his mother's old home at Brackenhurst, Southwell, Notts.
He was given the name of Edmund, together with the two
traditional family names of Henry and Hynman. After barely
surviving in infancy a serious attack of whooping cough he
grew up straight, strong, and healthy.

When his father died, in 1861, and he found himself better
off Mr AUenby and his family left Dartmouth and returned to
the Eastern Counties, The first house rented was St Osyth
Priory, &ear Brightlingsea, on the Essex coast; and there a
second daughter was born, in June i862. 2 Next the family

1 She married in 1881 Canon Henry Andrew, vicar of Griston, Norfolk, and died
April 7, 1935.

a She married Major C L. Fanshawe, R.E., who died in 1904.

EARLY LIFE

moved to Felixstowe, where a house called The Lodge was
tented for a year. Felixstowe was at this time a primitive
village of a few hundred inhabitants, with no railway nearer
than Ipswich. There were a few gentlemen's houses, a farm
or two on the outskirts, one church, and the old Landguard
Fort, built to defend the mouth of the Orwell in the days of
Queen Anne. Harwich could be reached in an open ferry-
boat, Ipswich in a ramshackle one-horse omnibus. Liking
the neighbourhood, Mr Allenby decided to settle there, and
bought Felixstowe House, which remained the home of the
family till after the death of Mrs Allenby, in 1922, at the age
of ninety-one. Here the three younger children were born,
two more sons and a third daughter. 1

Besides the Felixstowe house, Mr Allenby bought an estate
of some two thousand acres in Norfolk, at West Bilney, with
some good rough shooting. It was not a successful purchase
from the business point of view, for the land in Lincolnshire
which he sold to pay for the Norfolk property steadily in-
creased in value, while the Bilney estates steadily declined in
the market, and when sold at Mr Allenby's death fetched only
half the price originally paid. But it suited his tastes admir-
ably during his lifetime. There was good shooting with which
to entertain his friends ; the surroundings of wood and field,
hedge and lane, stream and pond, were those he had known
and loved from childhood; and here he could pass on to his
children that deep feeling for the English countryside that he
inherited through so many generations. He was one of those
rarely fortunate people, rarer now than ever, who know
exactly what they like and are in such circumstances that they
can do exactly what they like to do.. From his forbears he had
inherited not only pleasant tastes, but a sufficient competence
to indulge these tastes and to live the life that suited him.

1 These three children were: (i) Frederick Claude Hynman, born September zi 9
1864. He joined the Navy, was present at the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882,
and served in the Royal Yacht. He retired as a Captain, and received the C.B.E. for
services during the War. He died on August i, 1934. His elder son, a captain in the
nth Hussars, is the present Viscount Allenby. (2) Helen Henriette (Nellie), born
December 15, 1866. She married Thomas Cunningham Porter, for many years senior
science master at Eton. He died in 1933. (3) Alfred Hynman, born March 9, 1870.

ALLENBY

He was a good whip, and drove a four-in-hand regularly;
but he could not afford to pay long prices fo his horses,
which were not always fully broken ; there were often exciting
and dangerous moments during his drives. He did not hunt,
in deference to the sensibilities of his mother, whose memory
he cherished deeply : she had had a passionate tenderness for
all animals and weak things, and denounced hunting as a
cruel sport. Shooting and fishing did not, however, come
under the same ban apparently, and the latter especially was
Mr Allenby's favourite pastime. He went often to Scotland
to fish, and sometimes to Norway, a far more enterprising
and adventurous journey then than now.

He had also a 2 8-ton schooner-rigged yacht, the Water
Witch, in which he and his family cruised regularly, and in
which he won prizes in the races of the Royal Harwich Yacht
Club. 1 Indoors he had some musical and artistic talents, and
was an earnest student of the Bible, especially the Old Testa-
ment, long passages of which he used to read and expound to
his children in the mornings.

The family usually spent the summer at Felixstowe, and
moved to the Norfolk property for the autumn and winter.
This was an ideal place for children. The house was a smallish
Georgian building, with a fine walled garden. It stood in a
park, with woods and a rookery close by, through which ran
a small trout stream (a tributary of the river Nar), dammed
in one place to provide a swimming-pool. The woods were
full of birds, and during the seasons of the spring and autumn
migrations many rare visitors to these islands could be found
in them or on the coast near by.

Life in the country really was country life in those days,
and the children grew up with little knowledge of towns or
factories or crowds or of the *stir of business, but with much
simple lore of the peaceful countryside and the countryfolk
and of the ways of birds and beasts. They rode and drove as

1 Edward FitzGerald, translator of the #&#><#, also had a yacht here, called The
Scandal. He was a friend of the Allenby family, and a striking but untidy figure at
Felixstowe.

ALLENBY

a matter of course as soon as they were old enough, or even
earlier. Perambulators were almost unknown at that time:
panniers on a donkey, or a red pad-saddle with an iron ring
round it to prevent falls, served in their place, so the children
were on donkey-back or pony-back before they were a year
old. Their games and pastimes were of their own devising.
At Brackenhurst, the home of their Cane grandparents, which
was near Sherwood Forest, they naturally played Robin Hood,
with home-made bows and arrows ; there were also two young
bulls (Hoogly and Boogies) which Edmund and his Cane
cousin tried to ride or drive with occasional success for a
short while. In the woods round Bilney they went bird-
nesting and fished the stream; as the boys grew up they
learned to handle a gun, and there was swimming and boat-
sailing in the summer at Felixstowe.

SCHOOLDAYS
(1871-78)

Presently the question of the sons' education arose. The
means and habits of education in the upper classes were
changing. A few generations earlier the squire's son had
usually begun (and sometimes finished) his education at- the
local grammar school, with the sons of the farmers and of the
local tradesmen. This wholesome practice ceased as educa-
tional opportunities developed and class-consciousness grew,
but there was an interval before it became the accepted custom
for the sons of the gentry and would-be gentry to go to a
public school, and before such schools were available in
sufficient numbers to meet the demand. During this inter-
val a private tutor, usually a clergyman, was used in many
families. About the middle of the nineteenth century the old
public schools (Winchester, Eton, Shrewsbury, Westminster,
Rugby, Harrow, and one or two others) were rapidly supple-
mented. Cheltenham was founded in 1841, Marlborough in

EARLY LIFE

1843, Radley in 1847, Lancing in 1848, Bradfield in 1850,
Wellington in 1859, Clifton, Malvern, and Haileybuty in
1862. The system of feeding the public schools from recog-
nized private schools took a little longer to develop. Mean-
time a parson with a bent for teaching and a rectory too large
for the needs of his family would often take some of the sons
of his neighbours and friends and prepare them for the public
schools or university. In this way Edmund Allenby, followed
shortly by his brother Claude, went at the age of ten to the
Rev. Maurice Cowell, vicar of Ashbocking, about seven miles
north of Ipswich and some fifteen miles from Felixstowe. He
had previously received his first grounding from a governess,
a Miss Simpson.

There were about a dozen boys at the Ashbocking Vicarage ;
they were taught by the vicar, and by his curate, the Rev.
T. Heavyside-Peat, the usual subjects demanded by the schools
at this time, in which, of course, the classics figured pro-
minently. It must have been for young Allenby a pleasant
beginning to the serious business of education : his school-
mates were sons of neighbours, many of whom were friends
of his family ; his teachers were both able and kindly ; the
atmosphere was that of a home rather than of a school; and
home itself was not many miles away. It is interesting to
note that the future Field-Marshal's first introduction to
military matters was the reading in French of Napoleon's
campaigns of Arcole and Marengo.

Edmund Allenby was at this period a quiet, reserved
boy, but noticeable even then for his strong, straight figure
and frank, fearless bearing. A nephew of Mr CowelPs who
afterwards became Bishop Welldon, 1 and was constantly at the
vicarage during the time Allenby was there, writes of him :

Edmund Allenby would not, I think, have been regarded as a
boy of outstanding distinction, either in work or in play. But
in his lessons, as in his games, he was always painstaking and

1 Headmaster of Harrow 1885-98; Bishop of Calcutta 1898-1902; Canon of West-
minster 1902-6; Dean of Manchester 1906-18; Dean of Durham 1918-33; died
June 1937.

ALLENBY

thoroughgoing. He was a quiet, strong, manly, conscientious
boy, of singular modesty, who never put himself forward.
Among his qualities I think I should place first his high ideal of
duty : he was one upon whom it was possible to rely in boyhood
as in manhood for entirely faithful service.

It was the Welldon family who decided, indirectly, what
Allenby's next school should be. His father, hearing that
William Welldon, a younger brother of the future bishop and
a pupil at Ashbocking, was going to Haileybury, decided to
send his son there also. Accordingly in May 1875, when he
was just fourteen, Allenby went to Haileybury, which had
been founded some thirteen years previously in Hertfordshire,
a mile or two south-east of the county town. He thus spent
all his schooldays within easy reach of his home. He was
placed in the Lower Middle part of the school and in Bartle
Frere House (named in honour of Sir Bartle Frere, who after
a distinguished career in India was shortly to embark on a
stormy term as High Commissioner in South Africa). 1

There is not much to record of the three years that Allenby
spent at Haileybury. He went steadily up the school, and was
in the Lower Sixth (the second class) for his last two terms ;
had he stayed his full time he might have been head of the
school, or near it. As prefect he had his first taste of authority
and his first proving as a master of men. His selection as
school prefect was a tribute to his character, for while members
of the Upper Sixth were entitled to that office by virtue of
their position, it was given only to those members of the Lower
Sixth who were selected as specially suitable by * The Master '
(as the headmaster of Haileybury has always been termed).
Authority came easily to Allenby, who feared no one and loved
order and justice. A fellow-prefect writes of him :

No one in my time justified his selection more completely than
Allenby. He was sane, simple, and direct in all he did ; he had
no difficulties with discipline, which he exercised without harsh-
ness and with absolute justice. He was invaluable in a house where

1 One of the houses at Haileybury is now named after Allenby, who left to the
school his banner of the Order of the Bath.

EARLY LIFE

the other prefects were not over-strong, and where the house-
master was too gentle in his methods and trusted where trust
was abused and believed the impossible best of the wholly
unworthy.

Allenby made no mark in the athletic side of school life.
He played Rugby football for bis house as a forward, but was
never in the school fifteen, and there is no record of his
appearance on the cricket-field. He cared nothing, now as
ever, for the applause or condemnation of his fellows ; and
the exaggerated renown that athletic prowess brought in the
school world made no appeal to him. He was more interested
in books and study than in games. The picture that he has
left on his contemporaries at school is that of a large, pleasant,
good-tempered boy, quiet and rather reserved, somewhat old
for his age in thought and manner, with a kindly but slightly
ironical sense of humour, who made no special mark in the
school, but was respected by all with whom he came in
contact. Years later some one remarked to Allenby, " School
life was very rough in those days. You had to fight your way
up, I suppose." " Nonsense ! " replied Allenby. " I never
had to fight at all." Even then there must have been some-
thing impressive about the large, strong, but peaceable boy
that kept him from any necessity to fight; and his good-
humour contained no desire to do so.

In the holidays there was the pleasant home life and
country pursuits of West Bilney and Felixstowe: in the
summer sailing, fishing, swimming, and riding; in the winter
shooting, riding, and skating. Country life was not the rest-
less week-end business it has now become in so many places.
Golf had not yet come to Felixstowe, nor was tennis much
played. But the Water Witch was always available for a cruise ;
there was sea-bathing, and there was fishing. At West Bilney
the two elder boys with their father tramped the fields with
guns, or sometimes went for long walks through the woods
with an axe to cut off dead branches or to blaze trees for cut-
ting. There were horses and ponies, and all the family rode,
though hunting lay under the ban of the tender-hearted
c 33

ALLENBY

grandmother. When it froze there were plenty of oppor-
tunities to skate. Both his father and mother were keen
observers of bird-life, and from them Allenby drew the great
interest in and love of birds that was to remain with him all
his life. From his mother, a keen botanist with a well-stocked
garden, Allenby learned the names and care of flowers and
plants. A brother of the vicar of Ashbocking, Professor
Edward Cowell (Lecturer in Sanskrit at Cambridge), who
frequently visited at Bilney and Felixstowe, added to his
knowledge of botany and taught him to recognize and classify
ferns and plants. Another visitor at Bilney was Maria Charles-
worth (sister-in-law of Professor Cowell), a Victorian authoress
of simple tales of a devotional nature.

In February 1878, while Edmund Allenby was still at
Haileybury, his father died. The West Bilney property was
sold soon afterwards, and the family henceforward lived
entirely at Felixstowe.

Ill

ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE, SANDHURST
(1878-82)

At the end of the summer term of 1878 Allenby left Hailey-
bury. It had been decided that he should go up for the
entrance examination to the Indian Civil Service, which was
then considered to offer the best career for young men of
ambition and brains. The examination was so stiff and the
competition for admission so keen that for all except the most
brilliant boys cramming was considered a necessity. Accord-
ingly Allenby went to Wren's cramming establishment in
Powis Square, Bayswater, which specialized in coaching for
the Indian Civil Service. He went up twice for the examina-
tion, in 1879 and 1880, but was unsuccessful on each occasion,
though failing only narrowly (according to family tradition,
for the marks are not now available) at the second attempt.
This was undoubtedly a great disappointment ; but the severity
of the competition may be judged by the fact that in the 1879

LIEUTENANT ALLENBY IN 1 882
This was the time of Allenby's first commission.

Photo Window and Grove 35

EARLY LIFE

examination 174 candidates sat for 24 vacancies, while in
1880 the figures were 182 and 26, and few but boys with
brains and ability much above the average faced the examina-
tion. The subjects offered by Allenby in 1879 were English
composition, Greek, 1 Latin, French, mathematics (pure and
mixed), chemistry, and mechanical philosophy (which in-
cluded mechanics, heat, and astronomy) a sufficiently formid-
able syllabus for a boy of eighteen, though of what value much
of it would have been for the better government of the in-
habitants of India is not easy to determine. If character could
have been assessed in marks Allenby would have been lost to
the Army.

At this time, when it was necessary to make new choice of
a profession, young Allenby, who had lost the guidance of
his father, must have looked to his mother for advice. It was
quite natural that some of those who failed for the Indian
Civil Service should turn to the Army for a career; 2 in fact,
other openings were limited, for commercial business was not
in those days considered a suitable occupation for a gentle-
man. Allenby, though he had no family tradition of Army
service and no influence to help him in a military career,
decided to go up for the Royal Military College at Sandhurst.
He was not satisfied that Wren's had done their best for him,
and left that establishment for another crammer Adams,
in Clydesdale Road, Bayswater. Adams had been a tutor at
Wren's, and in 1880 had set up for himself as an Army
crammer. Allenby was happier at Adams's than at Wren's.
Pupils were fewer and instruction more individual. Adams
was a fine scholar, and Allenby profited much from his teach-
ing. Games never interested Allenby greatly, but a combina-
tion of strength, activity, and determination made him a
formidable forward in Adams's football team, of which he
was captain. He was not at Adams's long, for in December

1 " A good Greek scholar was lost in Allenby," his tutor said.

* There are curious similarities between the careers of Allenby and Colonel Sir Henry
McMahon, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O,, K.C.LE. They were at Haileybury together ; both
went to Wren's to cram for the I.C.S.; both failed and went to the Army through
Sandhurst; both were High Commissioners for Egypt.

ALLENBY

1880 he passed fifth into the Royal Military College at Sand-
hurst.

Allenby began his military career as a cadet of the Royal
Military College on February 10, 1881, and was posted to a
company (or * division/ as it was then termed) commanded by
a Major Williams, of the Royal Engineers, who had a high
reputation for smartness and ability. Military life came easily
to the young Allenby. With his smart, well-set-up figure and
alertness, he can have been little trouble to the drill-sergeant ;
and his gospel of unfailing loyalty to those set over him made
him ready to accept without outward questioning the restric-
tions of the military code and the conservatism of regulations.
With the same gospel a weaker character or less acute mind
would soon have become rigid and routine-ridden; but
Allenby had too open and well stored an intelligence ever to
be a mere automaton. He was to become that rare thing in a
professional army, the perfect subordinate who yet retains the
capacity for independent action; he could always be trusted
to carry out the orders and intentions of his superiors with
complete loyalty, but he never lost the power to think and act
independently.

AJlenby had a number of friends at the College who had
been contemporaries at Haileybury or at his crammers'. One
of these, who had preceded him from Wren's six months
earlier, was now an under-officer and able to give him some
help. This was J. M. Stewart, who became afterwards a
Major-General of the Indian Army, 1 and served with con-
siderable distinction in India and in the Great War (in East
Africa and at Aden) ; as Political Resident at this last place
he came in 1919 under the orders of Allenby as High Com-
missioner for Egypt. Among other fellow-cadets were two,
L. E. Kiggell 2 and the Hon. H. A. Lawrence, 3 who during the
Great War occupied in succession the responsible post of
Chief of the General Staff to Sit Douglas Haig ; one who held

1 Major-General Sir James Stewart, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

2 Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
8 General the Hon. Sir Herbert Lawrence, K.C.B.

3 6

EARLY LIFE

many high administrative posts in the Army, G. F. Ellison ; 1
a celebrated writer and explorer, F. E. Younghusband ; 2 and
two well-known novelists, H. A. Vachell and Egerton Castle.

The year's course was divided into two terms ; at the end
of each term one batch of cadets at the College passed out and
received their commissions, while the next batch, who had
completed one term, became 'seniors' instead of * juniors/
and were eligible for promotion to the posts of under-
officers, of whom there was one for each of the ten divisions.
These appointments were much-coveted distinctions. Again
Allenby's character and qualities received recognition. He
was transferred from his own division (of which H. A.
Lawrence, a great friend of Allenby, became under-officer) to
be under-officer of another division, No. 4. The path of one
promoted from outside is not always smooth, but Allenby
knew how to inspire loyalty as well as to give it, and estab-
lished his authority naturally and without friction.

During the years he was at the crammers' and at Sandhurst
Allenby spent some time abroad. In the summer of 1879 the
whole family, together with Mr Andrew, 3 the curate of Walton,
near Felixstowe, spent some eight weeks in Belgium, Germany,
and Switzerland; and Allenby then acquired a taste for
foreign travel that never left him. In the winter of 1 880-81,
before going to Sandhurst, he spent two months at Saumur
(where the French Cavalry School is), in the family of a French
Protestant clergyman, M. Davaine, improving his French.
His friends Lawrence and McMahon, on Allenby's recom-
mendation, went to this same family the following year.
Allenby kept up a correspondence with M. Davaine for many
years, and retained a warm feeling for French people all his life.
In 1881, during one of the Sandhurst vacations, he went with
Lawrence and another fellow-cadet to Rome. Here he became
ill with diphtheria, spending some little time afterwards con-
valescing at Felixstowe. During this convalescence he occupied

1 Lieutenant-General Sir Gerald Ellison, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

2 Sir Francis Younghusband, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.

3 He married Allenby's eldest sister, and became Canon Andrew (see p. 26, . i).

ALLENBY

himself in making pen-and-ink drawings, for which he had
some talent. He had the eye and hand of an artist, could he
have found time to cultivate it ; but, like Wellington with his
fiddle, he put aside his artistic leanings on becoming a soldier.
In December 1881 Allenby passed out of Sandhurst " with
honours/' being bracketed twelfth on the list with Kiggell,
also destined for a distinguished career. On May 10, 1 882, just
after his twenty-first birthday, he was gazetted to a commission
in the 6th Inniskilling Dragoons, then stationed in South
Africa.

IV
THE YOUNG ALLENBY

It is time to sum up the influence of origin, upbringing,
and home life on Allenby's character and career. He was of
hard, sound North Country stock on both sides. His forbears
had lived on the land for some centuries, free, independent,
and fearless, usually in easy enough circumstances, but never
so rich as to lose energy and vitality. He inherited the best
traditions of the English spirit freedom, good-humour,
courage, love of fair play which had been bred and pre-
served in his ancestors for many generations.

From his father he had a perfect and straightforward
honesty, kindliness, and generosity, love of sport, some talent
for music and drawing gifts of good-fellowship that would
smooth his way through life, and would bring him the respect
and appreciation of those who travelled with him. From his
mother he had a gift more momentous than all these for his
future success, but more uncomfortable for himself and fot
others absolute and unsparing thoroughness in all he did.
He was to say with truth at the height of his success, " I owe
everything to my mother." The text she gave him, which
stayed always in his actions, was, " Whatsoever thy hand
findeth to do, do it with thy might." It would not always be
appreciated by those under him. We shall find, perhaps, that
the influence of the easy-going father was uppermost in the

EARLY LIFE

first part of his life, and that of the determined, active mother
in the latter part, after he had begun to rise to high rank. Not
that Allenby was not thorough from the start : while still await-
ing appointment to a regiment he went through a full and prac-
tical course of horse-shoeing with the Felixstowe blacksmith.
He thus started his life as a commissioned officer with
qualities and advantages that would mean success and high
position, if luck was with him and if high position was his aim.
He had absolute courage, moral and physical; he was loyal
and honest by tradition and upbringing ; he had brains above
the average ; he had strength and health and good looks ; and
he had money sufficient for his needs, yet not so much as to
induce idleness or extravagance. And there had been much
.in his upbringing that would help him as a soldier. His
wanderings with gun or rod or axe had given him field-craft
and woodcraft, and had trained his eye for observation; 1
the sailing of a boat had developed skill with bis hands and
resource in an emergency; he was a strong swimmer, and
could sit a horse ; as a prefect at Haileybury and under-officer
at Sandhurst he had learned something of the handling of men.
Many young men who joined the Army in those days of un-
hurried country life had similar qualities. But few had learned
to study books also, as Allenby had, and few had his experience
of foreign travel, and could actually speak to those queer
foreigners in their own language. 2 It was a well-equipped
young man, more mature than most subalterns, more reserved
and thoughtful, who received his first step towards a Field-
MarshaPs baton in the spring of 1882.

1 His mother had required him in early years to give her an account of all he had
seen in his morning rambles, and sometimes to draw a map of his route.

* The British officer is, though, a much better linguist than is supposed ; probably
no other army has a higher proportion of officers who have a good working knowledge
of some language, European or native. Allenby spoke French with determination
rather than great accuracy, but could always understand it and make himself understood.

CHAPTER II

THE REGIMENT
(1882-96)

EARLY SERVICE IN SOUTH AFRICA
(1882-83)

ALLENBY began his military service at a period when the old
red-coated, long-service, close-ranked, horse-power, shock-
action Army had just begun to develop into the modern
khaki-clad, short-service, open-order, mechanized, fire-plan
force. After the Napoleonic wars the British people unbelted
the sword that Wellington had wielded with such effect, hung
it on the wall with a sigh of relief, and went back to the busi-
ness of making money, with the fixed hope of not having to
use a military force again for many years, if ever, save only for
ceremony at home and police work abroad. But the Crimean
War betrayed what rust had gathered on the old-fashioned
weapon, which even Wellington himself had neglected to keep
serviceable during the years of peace ; and the Indian Mutiny
immediately after showed that a different system was required
if we were to continue to seize and hold an Empire abroad.

While our rulers were considering the problem of which
no one has yet produced an entirely satisfactory solution
of how to organize the army of a people with a taste for empire
in distant lands and a great distaste for military service, Prussia
startled the world with her victories over Austria and France,
and introduced into Europe the new system of * a nation in
arms/ with rapid mobilization and great masses of short-
service troops, trained and led by a body of long-service
professional (really professional) officers and N.C.O.s.

There followed from about 1873 onward a period of some

THE REGIMENT

twenty years during which all the European nations re-
fashioned their armies on the Prussian model. At this hour of
much-needed reform Great Britain was fortunate enough to
find the first of her two great War Ministers, Mr (afterwards
Lord) Cardwell. The reforms he introduced during his
period at the War Office, from 1868 to 1874, were far-reaching,
and they stood the test of time almost too well. They
included the abolition of the purchase system, by which
officers with means could buy promotion over the heads of
those without money; the substitution of short service and a
reserve for long service with no reserve ; and the equalization
of the number of units at home and abroad, still known as the
Cardwell system. The linking of battalions in pairs, which is
an essential feature of this system, was not actually put into
execution, though designed by Cardwell, until 1881, the year
before Allenby joined. These reforms laid the foundations of
the British Regular Army that was tested in the South African
War of 1899-1902, found wanting in many respects, and then
brought to a high level of efficiency by another great War
Minister, Mr Haldane, in time for the vortex of 1914. So that
Allenby came into the Army on a rising market, at a time
when its fortunes and efficiency were on the upgrade and
the neglect of half a century was being gradually repaired.
At the actual moment, however, the reputation of the Army
in the field lay under the shadow of a series of disasters
Isandhlwana in 1879, Maiwand in 1880, Majuba in 1881.

Chance rather than design had guided Allenby thus far.
He had been sent to Haileybury because the son of a friend of
his father's had gone there; Haileybury's associations with
India had probably been the cause of his attempting to enter
the Indian Civil Service; his friendship at the crammers* with
many boys who were working for the Army had led him to
turn to a military career after his failure in the Indian Civil
examination. Of the influences that guided his appointment
to the Inniskilling Dragoons we have now no record, 1 but

1 Curiously enough, when he had gone up for the Sandhurst examination a year or
two before he had been accosted near the door by an impoverished ex-soldier, who had

ALLENBY

the choice was a fortunate one. The regiment had fine tradi-
tions of service ; it had among its officers a number of men
who were to rise to high, distinction and responsibility; and
it was stationed in an eventful country at an eventful time.

The regiment had been raised in Northern Ireland just on
two hundred years earlier, to fight for the Protestant cause
against King James. It was raised in a district where a regi-
ment of Cromwell's Ironsides had been disbanded and settled
some thirty-six years before, so that its original troopers may
well have been the descendants of some of the best and stoutest
cavalry soldiers that ever drew sword or pulled trigger, and
have brought into the regiment something of their spirit and
traditions. After playing a distinguished part in the defeat of
King James at the Battle of the Boyne the Inniskillings served
in several campaigns on the Continent. In the War of the
Austrian Succession they fought in the glorious victory of
Dettingen and the hardly less glorious defeat of Fontenoy.
In the Seven Years War they were present at Minden, where
the indolence or cowardice of Lord George Sackville pre-
vented the cavalry from reaping the fruits of one of the finest
exploits ever performed by British infantry; at Warburg a
little later they took part in a charge that restored to the
cavalry some of the prestige lost at Minden. In the Wars of
the French Revolution they served in the Duke of York's ill-
starred expedition to the Low Countries, participating in the
success won by the cavalry at Willems and in the horrors of
the retreat that ended the campaign. The regiment was not in
the Peninsula with Wellington, but was in the famous Union
Brigade that charged at Waterloo; and forty years later it
rode with Scarlett's Heavy Brigade at Balaclava. It had thus
a fine fighting record and traditions, and had always borne a
high reputation for efficiency. It was one of the less expensive
cavalry regiments, which may have been a reason why Allenby
joined it, for his income was not a large one.

The Inniskillings had arrived in South Africa and landed at

wished him success, and on receiving a satisfactory coin had added, *' May you be a
captain in the Inniskillinger Dragooners 1 "

THE REGIMENT

Durban, in Natal, in February 1881, just before the disaster
of Majuba on February 27. Before they could reach the front
Gladstone's Government had ordered an armistice; peace
was concluded without further fighting, and later in the
year the independence of the Transvaal was recognized. By
April 1882 the regiment had settled down under canvas
at Pinetown, seventeen miles from Durban. Here Allenby
joined it, together with J. W. Yardley, 1 who had been at
Sandhurst with him, and who became his closest friend in the
regiment.

Few countries and few periods could have offered greater
interest for the active mind or scope for the active body than
the South Africa of the i88o's. It was from the European
point of view an almost empty land, the wealth and poten-
tialities of which were just being realized. There were, it is
true, large numbers of natives, of an inconveniently warlike
type, who claimed to possess the lands in the interior, but
they were just a part of the e white man's burden/ and which
particular breed of white man should bear the burden
and pocket the profits, if any was the real question to be
decided.

The long struggle between Boer and Briton for control of
that vast, obscure interior was nearing a crisis. In the first
part of the century British sea-power had wrested Cape Colony
and Natal from the original Dutch settlers, a part of whom
had withdrawn north to found new republics in the Transvaal
and Orange Free State. Round their ill-defined borders lay
lands as yet unappropriated by whites Zululand to the east,
Bechuanaland to the west, the country of the Matabele to the
north. The next ten years were to decide whether Boer or
Briton should c protect * or annex these territories. Ten years
or more previously Britain had absorbed Basutoland, between
Cape Colony and Natal, and, following the discovery of the
Kimberley diamond field, Griqualand West. In 1877 she
had boldly annexed the Transvaal itself, disordered within by
bankruptcy and threatened without by the warrior state of

1 He was afterwards a well-known amateur steeplechase rider. He died in 1920.

ALLENBY

Zuluiand, and had broken the power of the Zulus and their
chief Cetewayo in the war of 1879-80. But she had failed to
reconcile the Boers to British rule, and in 1881, after the
Majuba defeat, had again recognized the independence of the
Transvaal, retaining only some shadowy * suzerainty/

So that in 1882 the Boer was for the moment insolently in
the ascendant. He saw only the small Regular garrison (one
cavalry regiment, two and a half battalions), the inept leading
and low training of the despised * rooinek/ as shown at
Majuba, and the poor quality of many of the British immi-
grants. He knew nothing of the mighty power behind this
unimpressive outpost, or of the real temper and quality of the
British people when roused to fight; and he thought and
acted in accordance with his contempt.

The protagonists of their respective nations in this struggle
were two remarkable men, Cecil Rhodes and Paul Kruger.
Rhodes, the princely money-grubber, the unscrupulous
dreamer, the tolerant Imperialist, the backwoods apostle of
education, had just entered the Cape Assembly, of which he
remained a member for the rest of his life; Kruger, the
shrewd, narrow, fanatical pioneer, who had spent his whole
life as hunter, farmer, and warrior, struggling with wild
nature and savage man, was at the height of his power and
prestige as President of the Transvaal and as one of those who
had wrested its independence from a mighty Empire.

Such was the South Africa to which Allenby came : a land
with a wonderful climate, but with sudden death at close
hand in many forms ; a land of boundless opportunity and
constant strife ; a land where courage and enterprise were at
their highest, and rascality abounded; a land to which came
the hardy pioneers and needy adventurers of many races ; a
restless, untamed, immature land; a great Dominion in the
rough. Here Allenby was to serve his first apprenticeship in
the field, and twenty years later to make his name as a com-
mander. Curiously enough, also, at the very time of his first
landing in South Africa events were taking place in the extreme
north of the same continent that were to provide the scene

THE REGIMENT

and opportunity for his last service, forty years later. In July
1882 British naval forces, in which Allenby's brother Claude
was serving, bombarded Alexandria, and two months later a
British force was in occupation of Cairo, an event which
roused in the Imperialistic mind of Rhodes the dream of an
all-red route from Cape to Cairo under British control.
Allenby was to see this dream fulfilled, as well as Rhodes'
other dream of Dutch and British working together in a
united South Africa.

It might be thought that a cavalry subaltern would have
little opportunity or desire to meditate on such problems,
and would receive little encouragement to do so. But the
Inniskillings had among their officers at this time a remarkable
group of men, who were to play a considerable part in the
development and administration of Africa. R. E. R. Martin,
then a Major, was afterwards Commissioner in Swaziland
and in Rhodesia, and became Sir Richard Martin, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G. ; A. C. M'Kean and E. G. Pennefather, captains,
served with distinction in Colonial forces, as did also Raleigh
Grey and Patrick Forbes, subalterns, who joined a year earlier
than Allenby. Grey led the Bechuanaland Police Force in the
notorious Jameson Raid of 1895, and was one of those tried
and sentenced for participation in it ; he was later reinstated,
and did much valuable work in the development of Rhodesia,
receiving the K.C.M.G. for his services. There were also in
the regiment " Mike " Rimington, who became a celebrated
column commander in the Boer War, and commanded the
Indian Cavalry Corps in France in the Great War ; J. Steven-
son-Hamilton, for many years Warden of the Kruger Game
Reserve ; and Richard Crawshay, who was well known later
as administrator, hunter, and naturalist in Nyasaland. Rhodes
himself was a friend of the Inniskillings, and knew many of
the officers personally. There must have been much dis-
cussion in the mess of African politics and problems, be-
sides the usual talk of sport and amusement. Allenby had
also opportunities to meet and talk with such men as Sir
Theophilus Shepstone, who had annexed the Transvaal in 1877

ALLENBY

and had administered it during the greater part of the period
it remained under British rule, Colonel Dartnell, who com-
manded the Natal police, and other well-known adminis-
trators and pioneers. With his alert and well-stored mind he
was able to take full advantage of such opportunities.

ZULULAND AND BECHUANALAND
(1883-85)

Allenby soon found his feet in the regiment. He was quick
to learn the course of exercises prescribed for young officers,
and was soon passed as efficient by the adjutant; the regi-
mental sergeant-major of those days, Mr Bramley, who is still
alive, reports him as having been noticeably good with the
sword. He had ridden from boyhood, and was always a
strong, intrepid horseman, though never a very polished one.
His weight and physical make-up were against his mastering
the more delicate arts of horsemanship, but he rode boldly
and well to hounds or at polo, and on parade or in the field
fully satisfied the standard of military horsemanship of those
days, which was somewhat rougher and less exacting than
now. He was liked and respected both by his brother-officers
and by his men, and was at all points a proved and trusted
subaltern when he received, a little more than a year after
joining, his first experience of service in the field.

Of the three great territories (Zululand, Bechuanaland,
Matabeleland) still remaining at this time under native control
(though both Briton and Boer were pressing in on them),
Zululand was the first to require military intervention. In the
settlement after the Zulu War of 1879-80 the fierce Cetewayo
had been deposed and exiled, and his country had been divided
between thirteen tribal chiefs. Disputes and disturbances soon
became so frequent that, in spite of his previous record of
tyrannies and cruelties, it was decided to carry out a partial
restoration of Cetewayo, who had been to England, where he

THE REGIMENT

had posed as a leopard with an entirely new set of spots and
had professed himself a loyal friend of England. His pro-
testations deceived those at home who knew not Zululand
nor the Zulus.

The country was divided into three portions. Cetewayo
was to be king over the major part, comprising two-thirds of
his old dominions ; one part remained under a chief named
Usibebu; and the third part, called the Reserve, was placed
under British protection. Cetewayo landed at Port Durnford
in January 1883, and was escorted to his capital, Ulundi, by
two troops 1 of the Inniskillings. Allenby was not with this
force, but went up to Eshowe, in the Reserve, with a small
British column in September of the same year.

The restoration of Cetewayo had not been a success ; dis-
regarding all his undertakings, he had attempted again to
place the whole country under his subjection. But his star
had set, and after several defeats at the hands of Usibebu he
surrendered to the British at Eshowe on October 15, 1883.
He continued, however, from his sanctuary in the Reserve
to stir up trouble in the rest of Zululand, so that Usibebu
threatened a raid on the Reserve to seize Cetewayo's person*
On a wild night of thunderstorm part of the Inniskillings,
including Allenby's troop, rode to forestall the raiders and
remove Cetewayo to the safety of their camp. His sudden
death on February 8, 1884, solved the problem of how to
dispose of this unwanted chieftain, but did not resolve the
troubles of Zululand, where Boer encroachments in the north
had produced a fresh complication. On May 21, 1884, the
Boers proclaimed Dinizulu, son of Cetewayo, King of Zulu-
land, and then aided him to dispose of Usibebu, who was
overpowered and fled to Eshowe. In the middle of June an
attack on the Reserve was believed to be imminent, and the
whole of the Inniskillings were concentrated at Eshowe. No

1 British cavalry regiments were at this time organized in eight independent troops.
The squadron organization, which was general in Continental armies, had been tried
in 1869, but abandoned for some reason. It was not till 1892 that it was reintroduced.
Meantime in the field two troops were sometimes formed into a temporary squadron
organization,

ALLENBY

attack, however, took place, and presently the situation im-
proved. Allenby with his troop took part in an extensive
reconnaissance over the Reserve lasting some weeks, and
later acted as escort to a Boer delegate who had come to dis-
cuss the affairs of Zululand with the British authorities.

Having disposed of Usibebu, the intruding Boers now pro-
ceeded to annex a large slice of the territories of their protege r ,
Dinizulu, and proclaimed it the * New Republic.' After some
negotiation the British Government acquiesced in their rivals'
successful poaching, but blocked any possible Boer extension
to the sea by hoisting the British flag at St Lucia Bay, the only
remaining good harbour on the Zululand coast.

Matters on this eastern flank of the Transvaal had to be
left in this unsatisfactory condition for a time, since a more
serious Boer encroachment on the west threatened to place all
Bechuanaland in their power, and thus to shut off the British
from the third great territory open to exploitation Matabele-
land, in the north. Accordingly, the Inniskillings returned to
Pinetown at the end of November 1884, embarked at Durban
for the Cape, and encamped at Wynberg, to form part of a
column under Major-General Sir Charles Warren for service
in Bechuanaland. Here they were equipped with corduroy
jackets and Bedford cord breeches in place of the red uniform
which had been up to then the campaigning as well as the
parade dress of the British soldier.

The purpose of the expedition was to eject from Bechuana-
land certain Boer freebooters who had, in defiance of treaties,
set up two small independent republics that of Stellaland,
round Vryburg, and that of Goshenland, farther north. The
importance of ousting the Boer from these territories lay in
the fact that the one road to the north between the Transvaal
and the Kalahari Desert lay through them; Rhodes called it
the Suez Canal of Cape Colony, the key of its road to the
interior. In all probability no Imperial force would, however,
have been sent had not the Germans in 1884 proclaimed a
protectorate over Damaraland and Namaqualand (afterwards
German South-west Africa), and thus threatened to join

ALLENBY

hands with the Transvaal and hem in Cape Colony on the
north.

Sir Charles Warren's force of some 4000 men (including
the Inniskillings, three batteries, the Royal Scots, and three
specially formed regiments of mounted rifles *) was trained
to the Orange river, then the terminus of the railway, and
marched thence to Barkly, on the Vaal river, which was
reached in January 1885. President Kruger met General
Warren on January 22, and tried to induce him to proceed no
farther. 2 But he continued the march, reaching Vryburg in
February and Mafeking, nearly nine hundred miles from the
Cape, on March n. The republics of Stellaland and Goshen
broke up without a shot being fired, and the Boer adventurers
withdrew. The advanced part of the column remained for
some time at Mafeking, pushing reconnaissances to the north
through the Kalahari Desert, where Allenby found some good
sport and made some interesting visits to native chieftains.
The return march to the Orange river was made in July and
August, and by October the regiment was back in Natal, at
Pinetown. Bechuanaland was formally taken under British
protection on September 30, 1885.

It has been thought worth while to give some little space
to these two small expeditions because they form a very
definite stage in Allenby' s military education as well as in the
expansion of British rule in Africa. Though there was no
fighting in either Zululand or Bechuanaland, the experience of
these two years from the autumn of 1883 to the autumn of
1885, during which he had been almost continuously on
active service, must have been invaluable to Allenby. He
learned the conduct of the minor operations of war, such as

1 The ist Mounted Rifles was raised from men brought from England and enlisted
in Cape Colony. Its composition is recorded as: gentlemen, 188; volunteers, 68;
farmers, 29; old soldiers, 118; Yeomanry, etc., 196. It was commanded by Colonel
the Hon. Paul Methuen (afterwards Field-Marshal Lord Methuen). The 2nd Mounted
Rifles was raised in Cape Colony, and commanded by Colonel F, Carrington; the 3rd
was raised from the diamond fields at Kimberley by Colonel H. Gough.

* Rhodes was with Warren on this occasion, and he and Kruger crossed swords for
the first time. Kruger is said to have at once recognised him as his rival in the struggle
for power in South Africa, and to have remarked, " The racehorse is swifter than the
ox:, but the ox can draw the greater load.**

THE REGIMENT

patrols, outposts, reconnaissances, the protection of camps and
convoys, in circumstances when a mistake or carelessness
might have meant loss of life, and not merely a reprimand at a
powwow ; he learned the care of man and horse on the march
and in bivouac under rough conditions of climate and country ;
and he learned under skilled and practised guidance. Sir
Charles Warren had had previous experience of colonial
warfare, and was a prudent and capable soldier, so that his
expedition was thoroughly well organized and run. 1 And the
Inniskillings had deservedly acquired a great reputation for
their efficiency and discipline in the field.

Also Allenby made the acquaintance in these two years of
many interesting types, British, Boer, and native adminis-
trators, adventurers, hunters, chieftains. Rhodes himself
accompanied the Bechuanaland expedition for part of the
time, and Allenby used to relate in after-years how it had once
fallen to him on a very cold night in bivouac to share a
blanket with Rhodes, who was a guest of the regiment.
Allenby presently awoke, shivering, to find that Rhodes in
his sleep had pushed him from under the blanket and had
wrapped it round himself. Rhodes apologized profusely
when aroused, and the two again composed themselves to
slumber. But in a very short time the same thing happened
again; and eventually, after his third ejection from the
blanket, Allenby went off to find some one less restless
satisfied, however, that British interests in South Africa were
safe in the hands of one who was so acquisitive and tenacious
even in his sleep. Allenby met also such characters as John
Dunn, the white chief of a Zulu tribe, Montsioa, the Bechuana
chief, who had struggled for a lifetime against the Boers, and
Van Niekerk, ex-President of Stellaland and the c bad boy 9 of
the Bechuanaland imbroglio. With these and many others his
broad, receptive mind found points of contact and interest.
Altogether, few young subalterns have ever had a better two
years' training than had Allenby from 1883 to 1885.

1 His reputation as a commander was lost in the Spion Kop disaster, fifteen years
later, in the Boer War.

ALLENBY

SOUTH AFRICA
(1886-90)

In May 1886 the Inniskillings moved from their camp at
Pinetown to Pietermaritzburg, the capital of Natal, about
seventy-five miles by rail from Durban. Shortly afterwards
Allenby went home for a two years' tour of duty at the cavalry
depot at Canterbury. There is little record of these two years.
AUenby's commanding officer at the depot remembers him
as a loyal and conscientious officer who always did hi& work
well and as a keen and dashing fox-hunter. He was promoted
captain in January 1888, and in the summer of that year
returned to South Africa, bringing with him a draft of the
regiment and a few couples of fox-hounds. With these latter,
until they succumbed to the various hazards that beset dog-
life in South Africa, he hunted jackal and small buck in the
hills outside Pietermaritzburg,

The greater part of the regiment was at this time in Zulu-
land, which had again become the scene of serious trouble.
Dinizulu had proved almost as truculent and turbulent as his
father, and showed the same obstinate prejudice against seeing
his lands occupied by white settlers, whether British or Dutch,
It ended as such differences of opinion between white men
and black men always have ended in the long run or the short
run. Great Britain in May 1887 annexed Zululand, except the
New Republic, where the occupation by Dutch settlers had
already been recognized. Next year Dinizulu made a last
effort to throw off white dominion, and, there was some
fighting between May and August 1888. Allenby did not
arrive back from England in time to accompany the regiment
to Zululand, and was employed for some time after his arrival
in collecting remounts and performing other base duties in
Natal; by the time he reached Zululand most of the fighting
was over. 1 In September his leg was injured by his horse

1 Dinizulu at least ended his chieftainship with dignity. He slipped through the*
columns which were hunting him, got to Maritzburg, and walked into Government

THE REGIMENT

falling with him, and he was sent down-country to Natal in an
ox-wagon.

In October regimental headquarters and the greater part
of the regiment returned to Pietermaritzburg, though part of
the regiment remained in Zululand for another six months.
In Pietermaritzburg the younger officers of the InnisMllings
settled down to the relaxations and amusements proper to
light-hearted cavalry officers polo, racing, shooting, dances,
and other entertainments provided by the hospitable people
of Natal.

Allenby rode boldly, had strength and good looks (of which
last he was quite unconscious), danced well, and 'could talk on
many subjects, so was popular in all classes of society. He
never had the passion for sport which was characteristic of
most young cavalry officers of the time : it was with him a
relaxation, not the main object of life. He played polo, and
played well, but racing had no attraction for him. Anything
in which there was the slightest suspicion even of finesse was
anathema to him; and he was, of course, far too heavy to
ride races himself. He had, however, a grey mare which even
with his weight on her back was so remarkably fast at polo
that he was persuaded to enter her for the principal race at the
next gymkhana meeting. " What name is the pony to run
under ? " inquired the race secretary. " Oh, anything you
like," replied the rather bored and busy owner. So Captain
Allenby's Anything You Like duly appeared on the card and
won her race with ease, as she did several others. 1 Allenby
acted as Mess President during much of the time in South
Africa. With characteristic thoroughness he studied with a
butcher the choosing of meat, and visited the baker to see how
bread was made; he rode many miles to find plants for the
mess garden or flowers for the mess table. He was known to
his friends as " Apple-pie " (sometimes shortened to c * Pie "),

House, saying to the Governor, " I am a king, and surrender only to the representative
of the Great White Queen." He was exiled to St Helena, allowed to return to Zululand
in 1898, was tried for treason in 1908, and died on a farm in the Transvaal in 1913.

1 Allenby brought his pony back with him, and she became his wife's mount after
his marriage.

ALLENBY

a play on his name and probably also a tribute to his love of
order.
A brother-officer 1 writes of him at this time :

At this period of his career, whatever may have been his own
secret thoughts and ambitions, Allenby was not regarded by his
brother-officers in general as what used to be known in peace-
time as a c keen soldier.' He carried out all his military duties
with complete efficiency, played polo, liked a little rough shooting,
but all with rather an air of insouciance, so that many thought of
him as one constitutionally easy-going who took nothing seriously.
He was popular with all ranks ; he had a strong sense of humour,
with just a touch of irony in his good-natured comments. A
great reader on all manner of subjects unconnected with his
profession, he could hold his own in conversation with older men
who had made a special study of the subject under discussion.
He held original ideas on many matters, military and civil, and
did not hesitate to give expression to them, however contrary
they may have been to accepted standards. He was always a little
detached in manner, and did not court familiarity. But he would
go out of his way to be kind to newly joined officers and to put
them at their ease if necessary. He was an acute judge of character,
and when he conceived a dislike it was invariably found to be
justified, sooner or later. He hated and despised to an exceptional
degree anything in the least savouring of sharp practice, of im-
morality, or of cowardice, moral or physical. In nearly every-
thing else he was, even as a young man, exceedingly tolerant.
He had a strong scientific bent, which expressed itself in various
ways, but found its chief outlet in love of natural history*

Early in 1889 Allenby was appointed Adjutant of the regi-
ment. From this moment his general outlook seemed to
change and his air of good-natured insouciance was replaced
by a determined thoroughness which was sobering to the
more thoughtless of the young subalterns. It was as though
with the acceptance of responsibility he put aside the easy-
going outlook on life that he had inherited from his father,
and took on the gospel of thoroughness laid on him by his
mother. He soon made the most careless of subalterns under-

1 lieutenant-Colonel James Stevenson-Hamilton, who joined the InniskilHng
Dragoons a few years after Allenby, and was Warden of the Transvaal Government
Game Reserves from 1902 to 1926.

THE REGIMENT

stand that duty came before their pleasure and parade before
their leisure, and that there was a serious side to soldiering.
As an officer who knew him well in his official capacity puts it,
" There was no wheeling before the CO. ; a few words, short,
sharp, and decisive, from the Adjutant were sufficient/' The
same officer 1 gives a good picture of him in his unofficial
moments :

He had never the herd instinct, and was at his best with a few
friends. He had no desire to hold the floor on all possible
occasions. If there was a heated argument in the mess on such a
vital issue as, say, the date of the next gymkhana, he would listen
with an amused smile and make no attempt to rush into the fray.
Never a great talker, he got to the root of the matter straight away
in his short, crisp, rather staccato style. He was a first-rate judge
of men, and had a wonderful knack of hitting off anyone's char-
acter in a short sentence or with a caricature. He was toying with
a pencil and paper one day as we talked of a mutual friend.
Presently he tossed me the scrap of paper ; it was a caricature of
our friend with all his little foibles and characteristics staring me
in the face. He had a great sense of humour, and saw the comic
side of a situation in a moment.

Once we rode together on leave from Etchowe to Maritzburg,
a three-day trek. I picture him now in the glorious sunshine of
a spring morning on the veldt, his handsome face lit up with the
joy of Mving, taking the keenest interest in the animals and birds
he loved birds on our way, and as pleased as a schoolboy
that his little red-roan pony, named The Pink *Un, could live
up all day with my much bigger pony carrying three stone less.
It was difficult to imagine that this was the same man who with
a look and a few words could reduce the most insubordinate
subaltern almost to a state of tears.

AUenby's consideration for his men at a period when such
consideration was by no means a matter of course is illustrated
by an incident remembered by one who was a corporal in the
regiment at this time. On a day when drill was be ; ng done
over rough ground at a fast pace the corporal's horse put his
foot into a hole hidden by the long grass and crashed with him.

1 Major-General Sir Thomas O'Donnell, K.C.LK, CB., D.SXX He was Medical
Officer to the Inniskilling Dragoons in South Africa from 1887 till 1890.

ALLENBY

It was the traditional custom in those tougher days for the
farrier-sergeant-major to be sent to the scene of the casualty
to inquire anxiously about injury to the horse, careless of any
injury to the rider. t On this occasion the Adjutant rode up
and asked the corporal whether he was hurt, and, seeing that
he was shaken by the fall, ordered him to ride his horse quietly
back to barracks.

While Adjutant Allenby was called by his commanding
officer, Colonel Martin, and by others of his friends, " the
Mouthpiece." The nickname arose from a remark made by
Allenby himself, a propos of some orderly-room mandate :
" I am but a sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal, the mouth-
piece of a greater than I."

In November 1889 Allenby 's career was nearly ended by a
serious accident at polo. He was crossed by another player
who was unable to control his pony, and came down very
heavily on the hard ground on head and shoulder. He lay
unconscious for some time, and every one believed him to be
fatally injured. Presently he recovered a little, and was found
to be suffering from severe concussion of the brain and a dis-
located shoulder: he had had an extremely narrow escape
from breaking his neck. It was some months before he was
fit enough to resume duty.

In 1890 the Inniskillings were suddenly ordered home,
at a time when Allenby and a brother-officer were planning
an expedition to Nyasaland, then known as British Central
Africa, and still in the stage of primitive administration
and of an unofficial war with the Arab slave-traders whose
interests were threatened by British occupation. The regiment
embarked at Durban on October 10 on H.M.S. Himalaya one
of the last of the old troopships manned by the Royal Navy,
She proceeded alternately by steam and sail, taking nearly five
weeks over the voyage home. Allenby spent most of his spare
time in fighting mimic battles on a large Rriegspiel board, his
usual opponents being Rimington or the First Lieutenant of
the ship. The Inniskillings landed at Portsmouth on Novem-
ber 13, after nearly ten years' service in South Africa.

THE REGIMENT

In these years Allenby had passed from youth to manhood,
from apprentice to craftsman. He had learned the soldier's
motley trade, and had gained knowledge of himself and his
fellows in a good school. The cavalry arm gives the best
military training possible for the young officer who means to
learn and has the character and capacity to do so. He has
responsibility out of sight and call of his immediate superior
earlier and more entirely than his confreres of the artillery and
infantry. He ranges wider, has to look farther ahead, to decide
more quickly ; in his care for man and horse, often at a distance
from his unit, he has to solve small administrative problems
not taught in books or barrack-room routine; in his sports
of hunting and polo he has to think at speed, if he thinks
at all, and to make decisions at once, if he is capable of
deciding.

Allenby was fortunate, too, in spending his early service
abroad rather than at home, where in those far-off, unregener-
ate days precise and stereotyped parade movements under the
adjutant and drill-sergeant formed the chief military occupa-
tion, where the ambitious subaltern sought distinction in the
hunting-field, on the polo-ground, on the racecourse, and
even in the ballroom rather than in any manoeuvre area,
and where there was always the temptation to waste time
and money in London. Instead, Allenby had passed his early
service mainly in camp or bivouac, on the open veldt, in a
manoeuvre area nearly a thousand miles square from Cape
Town to Mafeking, from St Lucia Bay to the Kalahari Desert.
If he had seen little actual fighting in the Zululand and
Bechuanaland expeditions, he had learned to handle a patrol or
picket under the unseen but hostile and critical eyes of watch-
ing natives, who had read no text-books, but had studied war-
craft from boyhood, and who seldom left a mistake unpunished.
He had known the attraction and repulsion of South Africa,
a larid of sunshine and sudden storm, of bleak bareness and
hidden wealth, of simple homeliness and stark savagery. But
for the offer of the Adjutancy he might well have joined the
pioneers of Rhodesia, as did so many of his friends. His

ALLENBY

knowledge of South Africa and its peoples was to serve him
well when he returned less than ten years later with the
expedition that was to bring the Dutch republics under
British control. The discovery in 1885 of gold on the Wit-
watersrand, where the bare veldt then was and Johannesburg
is now, had really, though few yet knew it, destroyed the last
chance that those sturdy, uncompromising farmers in the
Orange Free State and Transvaal would be left to their
primitive hunting and farming and praying, and to their
treasured independence from outside interference. And no
further trek was possible, since the British under Rhodes and
his lieutenant, Jameson, had occupied the country of the
Matabele (now Rhodesia). The Boers were, as their leader,
Paul Kruger, expressed it, " shut up in a kraal," or, as the
modern German would claim, " subjected to a policy of
encirclement/'

GARRISON LIFE AT HOME
(1890-96)

The Inniskillings were quartered at Brighton for the first
three years after their return from South Africa. The condi-
tions of service, the requirements of training, and the standard
of polish were, of course, very different from those to which
they had become accustomed during their campaigning life
in South Africa. On Allenby as Adjutant fell much hard
work to maintain the efficiency and smartness of the regiment
in the new atmosphere. He found time, however, to play polo,
to hunt and to shoot in due season. He made the acquaint-
ance at this time of a Mr Kenneth Angelo, who owned a deer
forest in Inverness-shire, and he used to spend a week or two
with him* each autumn in the stalking season. This friendship
was to have momentous consequences for him.

An attempt that was made at this time to win a race with one
of Allenby's ponies was not so successful as in South Africa. 1

i Seep. 53.
58

THE REGIMENT

The incident is recorded by a brother-officer, Lieutenant-
Colonel J. Stevenson-Hamilton, as follows :

He owned a pony with a mouth beside which iron was mere
putty : when it started to gallop it would go straight on in the
direction in which its head was facing until it had to stop for
want of breath. This fearsome beast was too dangerous for polo,
but its pace, to its rider at least, appeared so terrific while it
was running away, as it always did the moment its head was let
go, that it was thought likely to win a pony race. Our method
of training the animal was to have it led up on to the Downs,
and then, having selected a stretch of grass ending after an ade-
quate interval in a piece of heavy ploughland, to mount and in-
struct the groom to let go. By this means the animal could be
^brought to a halt within a reasonable distance, with no fear of
being carried over a chalk cliff. Pony races took place every
Saturday during the summer at Ranelagh, and hither, when the
great day came, AUenby and I proceeded with high expectations
of success. Although it had not been possible to try the animal
with another, we felt sure that it had a high turn of speed. I, as
the lightweight, duly mounted at the post and we started.
The animal, of course, bolted as usual, luckily in the same direction
as the other competitors. Unfortunately it soon became dear
that it could not bolt nearly fast enough, and when the winner
was passing the judge we were scarcely yet at the distance. The
pony, however, having failed in speed, was determined to display
its stamina, and after passing the winning-post some fifty yards
behind the last of the others insisted on completing another
entire circuit of the course before coming to a halt from want of
breath. I cannot recall how Allenby got rid of this racehorse or
to what purpose it was subsequently put.

Allenby's period as Adjutant came to an end in 1893. The
Adjutant, the Colonel's staff officer and representative, had in
those days much greater power and responsibility than now,
and regiments run entirely by the Adjutant were not tin-
common. , During a considerable part of Allenby's tenure of
office the commanding officer was away, which fact increased
the influence of the Adjutant. Allenby, however, with his usual
complete loyalty, never made any attempt to usurp power or to
himself forward.

ALLENBY

The experience of responsible work as Adjutant inspired
him to make an attempt to enter the Staff College, a somewhat
unusual proceeding in those days almost eccentric, indeed,
in a cavalry officer. The Staff College had not then assumed
the exaggerated importance it now holds in the eyes of the
average officer, nor become the Mecca to which every devout
subaltern feels compelled to make pilgrimage. Only some
sixty to seventy officers competed annually for thirty-two
vacancies, of which eight were by nomination of the Com-
mander-in-Chief. Perhaps the syllabus deterred many; it
demanded a high standard of mathematics, a detailed know-
ledge of fortification and topography, and considerable pro-
ficiency in foreign languages. Allenby began to read hard
for the examination as soon as he had completed his Ad-
jutancy, and spent some weeks with a crammer in London.
He went up first for the examination in 1894 (the examination
then took place in August), and though his percentage of
marks was high (over 70 per cent.), he failed by a few marks
to reach the qualifying minimum in military topography.
Next year he passed in successfully, being the only cavalry
officer to do so, or even to qualify. 1

Meanwhile the Inniskillings had gone from Brighton to
Shorncliffe, and thence, after a winter at Manchester, with
good hunting in Cheshire, to Edinburgh. From here Allenby
left them to join the Staff College in January 1896, the first
officer of his regiment ever to enter that seat of military
learning.

1 The examination comprised three papers in mathematics, two in fortification, two
in tactics, two in military history, one each in topography, military law, administration,
and geography, and one obligatory and two optional in foreign languages (of which
four only were admissible French, German, Hindustani, Russian), Allenby was 2 1st
out of sixty-eight candidates, and obtained the highest marks (90 per cent.) in French.
First on the list was J. E. Edmonds (now Sir James Edmonds, C.B., C.M.G., the
official military historian), and the second was Captain G. M. W. Macdonogh (now
Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., G.B.E.), both officers
of the Royal Engineers.

CHAPTER III

THE STAFF
(1896-99)

THE STAFF COLLEGE
(1896-97)

THE names of those who have successfully passed the course
of the Staff College since its foundation in 1859 ate inscribed
on wooden panels in the central hall and principal passages of
the building. On the panel which records those students who
joined the college in January 1896 and passed out in December
1897 the names of Major E H. H. AUenby, of the 6th
Dragoons, and Captain D. Haig, of the 7th Hussars, stand
next to each other. 1

The careers and characters of these two men, who were the
most famous commanders of British forces in the Great War,
have many resemblances and some striking differences. They
were practically of an age, Haig less than two months younger
than Allenby ; they were of similar stock and fortune, since
each came of an old-established country family of good repute
and comfortable circumstances, but of no particular eminence.
Both lost their fathers early and owed much to their mothers
for their upbringing. Neither was intended originally for a
military career. Both had the essential qualities of greatness

1 Haig, who had sat for the examination in 1893, but had failed in mathematics,
received a nomination in 1895 and joined in 1896. Others in the same term who
greatly distinguished themselves later were Sir Richard HaHng (a corps commander in
France), Sir Thompson Capper (who died of wounds received at Loos in command of a
division), Sir George Macdonogh (head of the Intelligence branch in France and at the
War Office during the War, and afterwards Adjutant-General), Sir William Furse (a
divisional commander of the War and Master-General of Ordnance later), Sir George
Forestier-Walker (a divisional commander of the War), and Sir James Edmonds
(Deputy Engineer-in-Chief in France and now official military historian of the War).

ALLENBY

absolute courage, moral and physical, strength of purpose and
constancy, a high sense of duty, and a fine generosity of spirit.
Both were hardy and enduring of body and handsome of face
and form. Both, though self-reliant, were reserved and aloof,
both in their different ways somewhat alarming to approach.
Both were liked and admired by women for their strength, and
welcomed by children for their gentleness. Neither took any
notice of women's admiration, but both adored children.

Thus in spirit and in body they were fellows strong,
enduring, and upright; but jn mind there was a wide
difference between them. Allenby had the finer percep-
tion and the greater knowledge; his intelligence had, as
already shown, a wide range and many interests outside
soldiering; he took every opportunity to visit new places
and to acquire fresh learning. He was earnest and thorough
in his profession, but it was by no means his only, probably
not even his first, interest. Haig, on the other hand, had a
single-track mind, intensely and narrowly concentrated, like
a telescope, on the one object ; except his profession of soldier-
ing, and later his family, he had no real interests of any kind,
and little knowledge ; nor had he any desire for knowledge,
unless it bore on his own special subject. Very quick of
temper in his youth, he had so disciplined his mind and body
to serve his fixed purpose that he seldom showed anger or
impatience. Allenby, by nature of a more tolerant humour,
indulged as the years went on in frequent outbursts of violent
temper. Haig, secure in his own self-confidence, seldom
listened to the opinion of others; Allenby, equally strong-
willed, would always pay heed to those who had knowledge.
Haig recorded all events in a carefully kept diary; Allenby
made no note whatever of his acts or thoughts, and destroyed
practically every letter or paper he received. Haig had a
deeply religious strain, and was a regular churchgoer ; Allenby,
though a constant student of the Bible, made little observance
of the outward forms of religion.

To sum up, Allenby was the more broad-minded and the
more human; Haig, by virtue of concentration, the more

THE STAFF

technically efficient. Their differences in character can be
attributed partly to their respective nationalities. Haig was
Scottish to the bone, Allenby was English to the core. The
two men never understood each other well, nor were easy in
each other's company. Allenby himself once told one of his
staff of a meeting during the War between himself and Haig
alone. They had important matters to discuss, but from sheer
shyness of each other neither uttered a word. They parted
with a mutual, but still unspoken, resolve never to meet again
without others present.

At the Staff College, where their paths first met, Haig was
an outstanding personality in his batch, for whom the highest
honours were predicted both by his instructors and by his
fellow-students; Allenby made no special mark, and his
work, though of good quality, was undistinguished. He was
always inclined to listen and to absorb knowledge, rather
than to talk and exhibit it. He was remembered by his fellow-
students chiefly for his remarkable appetite, his good humour,
and his Mastership of the Staff College Draghounds, a post
carrying considerable distinction and responsibility. 1 The
Master of the Drag is elected each year by the students of the
term concerned. For the season 1896-97 Haig, who was a
better horseman than Allenby, was the obvious choice, and
his election was confidently expected. But Haig was not
popular with his fellow-students, and Allenby was. At the
meeting held to elect the Master Allenby was chosen. He duly
succeeded an old Sandhurst friend of his, Herbert Lawrence,
and made a most successful Master, though his falls were
frequent. He won the heavy-weight point-to-point race on
his chestnut gelding Chisel. A point-to-point did not consist
of prepared fences in those days. There were three flags only,
and riders could take any course outside them. Allenby rode
his own line a little wide of the majority, and came up at the
finish to beat by a head Captain Mackenzie, 2 of the Seaforths.

1 One fellow-student remembers Allenby as notorious for his unpunctuality. If so,
he cured himself of the fault, for he was an extremely punctual man in later life.

2 Major-General Sir Colin Mackenzie, K.CB.

6 3

ALLEN13Y

AUenby also made a remarkably good speech at the hunt
dinner to the farmers.

Allenby had married at the end of his first year at the Staff
College. At the house in Scotland of his friends, the Angelos,
he had met in 1895 Miss Mabel Chapman, the third daughter
of a Wiltshire landowner. 1 He had seen her for a few days
only, but had been strongly attracted by her ; and when he again
found her there in August next year he made up his mind
with his usual swiftness and directness, and by the end of a
week they were engaged. Miss Chapman's father at first
disapproved strongly of his daughter throwing herself away
on a young cavalry officer with poor prospects. But his
objections ^were soon overcome, and the marriage took place
at the bride's home, Donhead St Andrew, in the south-
west of Wiltshire, on December 30, 1896, during the winter
vacation of the Staff College, After a short honeymoon in
London the Allenbys began married life in a house on a hill
just abcrve Camberley, within a mile or so of the Staff College.

The union of these two was, from the beginning to the end,
a true and ideal one. Mrs Allenby looked on life with the
same clear courage and directness as her husband, and had
in he* gentle way as great a strength of will as he. Like him,
she had been brought up to a country life, and loved birds
and gardens ; like him, she rode well and boldly to hounds.
She could share his adventures in travel, his liking for fresh
sights, and his appreciation of the old and quiet and lovely
things of life.

Allenby was promoted Major in May 1897. He completed
the course at the Staff College at the end of that year. He
received a good report as a thoroughly practical soldier, and
was recommended for the appointment of Brigade-Major to a
cavalry brigade. He had found time while at the Staff College

1 There were three other daughters, of whom the eldest married Canon Tupper-Carey,
Chaplain at Monte Carlo; the second, Sir Arthur Downes, a distinguished public
servant; and the youngest, Admiral Sir Charles Napier.

6 4

THE STAFF

to qualify as Army interpreter in French. He also knew some
German, and visited Germany during one vacation.

THE CURRAGH
(1898-99)

Allenby received the appointment for which he had been
recommended almost immediately on leaving the Staff College.
In March 1898 he took up the post of Brigade-Major (or
Adjutant, as it was termed at that time) to the 3rd Cavalry
Brigade in Ireland, at the Curragh. Lord Downe, late of the
xoth Hussars, a charming personality and a good soldier, was
the brigade commander. The brigade included the 8th and
1 4th Hussars, Allenby's own regiment, the InniskUHngs, and
two batteries of Horse Artillery. This was the only staff
appointment ever held by Allenby: the remainder of his
career was spent as a commander. His natural genius was for
command, but he had also the qualities required for a staff
officer, for he was hard-working, accurate, and methodical,
he wrote good, clear English, and he could get orders
carried out without friction. Of his loyalty there could never
be any question. Though he was always a stickler for the
Regulations, he interpreted them with common sense and
forbearance, and he was liked as well as respected by the
officers of the brigade.

Ireland was in those days a highly popular station for the
sporting soldier. Hunting was good and cheap, and there
was plenty of fishing and rough shooting to be had. The
Allenbys hunted, fished, and cultivated their garden, which
they made one of the best at the Curragh. In his letters home
from South Africa Allenby remembers continually the garden
at Simla, their house, and laments its fate of neglect on their
departure. Their only child, Michael, was born in January
1898 at Donhead St Andrew, Mrs Allenby's Wiltshire home.
He was to grow to the promise of a brilliant and useful life,
and to lay down that life prematurely in the Great War.

E 65

ALLENBY

Allenby's appointment was ended by the outbreak of the
South African War. He rejoined his regiment, which was one
of the first ordered to the theatre of war, in October 1899
as a squadron commander, and embarked on s.s. Persia at
Queenstown at the end of that month.

CHAPTER IV

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR
(18991902)

I
THE COMING OF WAR

THE Boer War marks a turning-point in our history. It was
the climax of British Imperialism, of the time the last time
when we were aggressively sure of ourselves and of our
destiny. Though it is not, perhaps, an episode of our history
in which we have reason to feel great pride, politically or
militarily, yet it is certainly not one "of which we need be
ashamed. That two stiffnecked peoples, with a background
of past quarrels and injustices, might come to a proper respect
for each other, and thus to union, a war was practically in-
evitable; and it had in the end healthful consequences both
for South Africa and for the British Army. No more of its
origin and course will be related here than is necessary for the
understanding of AUenby's part in the operations.

Since Allenby had left South Africa, nine years earlier,
friction between Briton and Boer had developed a heat at
which fire was bound to occur before long. The discovery in
1885 of gold on the Witwatersrand the low range of hills
that forms the watershed of the great South African plateau
between the Orange and Limpopo rivers had brought an
influx into the Transvaal of so great a body of gold-seekers
and their satellites that they soon came to outnumber the
other whites in the Transvaal. These * Uitlanders/ as they
were termed, the great majority of whom were British sub-
jects, formed a serious problem for the narrow, suspicious
Dutch farmers and their stubborn, Biblical old President,
Paul Kruger. The Boers grumbled that their country was

, ALLENBY

being overrun by undesired and undesirable foreigners. The
Uitlanders, on the other hand, complained that, though the
taxes they contributed provided by far the greater part of the
republic's revenue, they were denied a fair franchise or equit-
able treatment. The criminal folly of the Jameson Raid fit the
end of 1895 confirmed the Dutch in their hatred of the British
and in their refusal of any rights or privileges to the Uitlanders.
The dispute dragged on for another three years. In June 1899
a conference at Bloemfontein between Kruger and Milner,
the British High Commissioner in South Africa, showed that
the gulf between their respective points of view was un-
bridgeable.

Thereafter both parties prepared for war, the British slowly
and reluctantly, the Boers convinced that their day had come.
The British garrison, which in January 1899 consisted of two
cavalry regiments and half a dozen battalions, was reinforced
in August and September by some 10,000 men from India
and the Mediterranean. The two Dutch republics for the
Orange Free State had resolved to support the Transvaal
determined to strike before more troops could be sent. They
mustered their commandos at the end of September; and, on
the British Government responding by ordering the mobilisa-
tion of an Army Corps, sent, on October 9, 1899, an ultimatum
that had been prepared some time earlier. It was unacceptable,
as it was meant to be, and was, in fact, a declaration of Var on
the British Empire.

It seemed on the face of it an impudent, if gallant, challenge.
A handful of farmers, with little military organization, faced
the might of a great empire. Yet it was not from the Boer *
calculations so desperate an enterprise as it seemed to the
outside world. They had a considerable initial superiority jfor
at least several weeks, since the total British garrison amounted,
at the beginning of October, only to some 27,000, of whom
one-third were Colonial troops, while the two republics
could muster 60,000 fighting burghers to whom any success
would add large numbers of the Dutch inhabitants of Cape
Colony, only too ready to throw off their British allegiance if

CAPTAIN ALLENBY IN 1 89 1, WHEN ADJUTANT OF THE

INNISKILLING DRAGOONS

Pkoto F. 0. Devereux

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

it could safely be done. And, in the experience of President
Kruger and his advisers, both British troops and British
Governments could be made to yield without great difficulty.
Finally, they had encouragement to hope for the intervention
in their favour of one or more of the Great Powers of Europe.
They entered the war, then, with a vision of quick and easy
successes in the field like Majuba and Doornkop, a great
rising of fellow-Dutchmen in Cape Colony, a driving of the
hated British into the sea from which they came, the inter-
vention of Europe to safeguard their victory, and a wholly
Dutch South Africa at last. They could not know the in-
domitable determination and staying-power of the British
nation when roused, nor that the British Navy had then such
unchallenged supremacy as to overawe, during three years, a
Europe united for once in shrill condemnation of the Islanders
and in sympathy for the Boers, That no intervention was
attempted was one of the greatest demonstrations in history
of the value of sea-power, though never a shot was fired by
those silent, unseen fleets. 1

THE VOYAGE TO SOUTH AFRICA
(November-December 1899)

The Inniskillings embarked at Queenstown by squadrons
in three separate ships during the last week of October 1899.
The first two ships, with headquarters and A and B Squadrons,
had uneventful passages ; but the third ship, on which was
Allenby with C Squadron, had a difficult and dangerous
voyage. The Persia, an Anchor Line boat of about 3 5 oo tons,
sailed four or five days later than the other two, and at once
tan into a heavy gale which caused much discomfort and the
loss of a number of horses. Later, when about twenty miles
from St Vincent, in the Cape Verde Islands, and about six

1 It is odd to remember in these days of long-range naval warfare that in 1 900 two
thousand to three thousand yards was regarded as the normal range of engagement
for battleships, and that in all ships cutlasses for boarders or to repel boarders were
still carried. The range of torpedoes at that time was some eight hundred yards only.

6 9

ALLENBY

miles from the rocky island of San Antonio, the screw shaft
broke, and the ship lay 'helpless in a heavy swell, with the wind
driving her on to the cliffs of San Antonio. A boat manned by
Inniskilling volunteers under the ship's second officer set out
to sail to St Vincent for aid; it was dismasted by a squall,
rescued by a shore boat, and taken into St Vincent, where by
great luck lay the cruiser Diadem and a tug which had arrived
the day previously from Liverpool. The story of events on
board the Persia meanwhile is told in a letter from Allenby to

his wife: *

ST VINCENT

November yth

At 6 A.M. yesterday our screw shaft broke. Heavy swell and
stiff breeze dead on shore, 20 miles from St Vincent and 6 miles
from the island of S. Antonio, straight on our lee. We made all
the distressful signals that are known, but though we saw some
villages and a lighthouse on shore, no notice was taken. So we
sent 6 volunteers from my men and an officer of the ship in a small
boat to sail to St Vincent for help. They got it in the end, or we
shouldn't be here, and we didn't know, till we were retrieved,
that their mast was carried away, that they were picked up by a
Portuguese shore boat, and towed here, to St Vincent, where they
found a tug. Well, we really had quite a dramatic and satisfactory
day. The ship was being steadily carried in towards the most
beautiful bit of mountain scenery I have ever seen. A steep
rocky island, with mountains up to 3000 or 4000 feet. Lovely
green valleys and little villages with cliffs that reminded one of
Dor6's illustrations of Dante's Inferno. But we couldn't see much
chance of landing, and the probability was that there would be
no anchorage, as the charts showed 70 fathoms right up to the
mountain-sides, where the rollers were spouting up 2 or 300 feet
high. A lot of sharks came round in the morning, and we had
great practice at them with revolvers, but did not do them much
harm. After a time we got all our boats out. The arrangement
was that if we took to the boats they should all try to get to the
lee of the island and land. The captain and I and 6 men would
remain, with one boat, on the off-chance of the anchor catching,
and would leave when there was no chance for the ship or the
horses. At last, at about 3 P.M., a tug hove in sight, and at that
moment, to our considerable relief, our anchor, which was hanging
with 60 fathoms of chain, caught and held, and we swung to it,

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

| a mile from shore. 1 Then the tug got us, and we were right,
but we couldn't get the men out of the boats, which, 1 1 in number,
were swinging astern in a very heavy swell, and with all the tow-
ropes twisted up, and the boats bumping and jumping all over
the place. Then up came the Diadem, a cruiser, and signalled that
she would pick up the boats. . . . She sent a boat and picked off
our men from our boats. We could not get them up again, and
in a very short time they were all swamped and broken away,
except one. We were then towed in here to St Vincent, the cruiser
following up as a convoy. It was lucky our anchor caught hold
when it did, as otherwise I think we should have lost a lot of men
and the whole ship and horses. Still it was a most cheerful ship-
wreck. The men behaved like bricks, and those in the boats
looked on it as a sort of picnic. They spent the night in the man-
of-war, and are very pleased with themselves. The trouble now
is that we have no boats and can't go on without them, and it
will probably take a week or more to repair our shaft. . . . We've
had a really unlucky voyage so far ; zi horses have died.

The coolness and common sense displayed by Allenby on
this occasion gave all on board great confidence in his leader-
ship. The squadron had to wait over a fortnight at St Vincent
while another ship, the Gotb 9 of the Union Castle Line, came
out from England to replace the disabled Persia. Allenby's
love of children is shown by an extract from a letter written
during this period of waiting. He went to dine on shore with
a missionary, not anticipating a very cheerful evening:

Luckily I found that there were four little girls in the house,
ranging from 5 to 9 years old; so I got our hostess to take me
to see them in bed, and I pulled them all out and carried them
up, two at a time, to the billiard room in their nightgowns.
They were the most delightful children, and we had a terrific romp
till quite late. ... I fancy I am engaged to be married to them
all^ and they have all promised to come with me to the Cape.

Allenby and his squadron finally landed at Cape Town
on December n, during that " Black Week " in which the
British nation was shaken out of its complacency and stirred

1 Actually it was Allenby "who persuaded the captain, to let the anchor fcang. The
captain said that the charts showed deep water, and there was no possibility of the
anchor finding hold, but Allenby insisted that the off-chance should be taken.

ALLENBY

to action by the successive disasters of Stormberg, Magers-
fontein, and Colenso. The remainder of the InnisBllings was
with French's force in front of Colesberg, near the Orange
Free State border, and Allenby received orders to join it at
once as second-in-command, to replace Rimington, who had
been detailed to raise a local irregular force. 1 Allenby went
by train to Naauwpoort Junction, leaving his squadron to
follow later.

Ill

THE FIRST PHASES OF THE WAR
(December ifyg-Febrttaty 1900)

The opening events of the war had brought shocks and
disappointments to both sides ; each had under-estimated the
other, and each had been disillusioned. The Boer plan was to
make their main initial effort against Natal, the northern part
of which lay in a salient between the Transvaal and Orange
Ftee State, and was thus open to invasion from two sides/
Other commandos were to deal with the small British force
on the Bechuanaland border, near Mafeking, and others to
occupy the diamond fields of Kimberley. They reckoned
easily to overrun Natal and teach its port of Durban, and that
this success, together with the occupation of Kimberley and
Mafeking, would rouse all the Dutch of Cape Colony, some
40,000 fighting men, to rise in rebellion and join them against
the British. Thus reinfotced, they could drive the British to
the coast, and make their task of reconquering the interior
impossible.

For the British the danger was a very real one, to which
they had tardily awakened after the failure of the Bloemfontein
conference. The troops hastily sent from India and the
Mediterranean in August and September were intended to
secure Natal from the threatened invasion. For the defence
of Bechuanaland and Kimberley only local, forces were avail-
able, but selected Regular officers were sent to take command

1 It became famous during the war as " Rimington's Tigers."

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

Baden-Powell/ then a young Brevet-Colonel of cavalry,
to Mafeking, and Kekewich > an infantryman, to Kimberley;
Plumer, 2 another infantry soldier, led a few hundred irregulars
in Rhodesia, The small forces in Cape Colony could do no
more than hold, with inadequate detachments, the principal
railway bridges and junctions at Orange River Station, De
Aar, Naauwpoort, and Stormberg, and hope to keep the enemy
in check by bluff. Thus only in Natal had the defence any
strength, and even there it was dangerously weak. But it was
not believed that irregulars like the Boers, with little military
training, would have much offensive power against Regular
troops ; and it was hoped that the defence in Natal and else-
where would hold until the Army Corps and Cavalry Division
from the United Kingdom could land. Once this imposing
force was concentrated there could be no question, it was felt,
of its ability to end by a direct advance on Bloemfontein and
Pretoria any pretence of the Dutch republics to oppose the
might of Great Britain. Sir Redvers Buller had been selected
for command a brave, stolid, burly man, who looked just as
the public expected a British general to look, and was popular
accordingly; he had made his name largely by his personal
courage in small wars, but had little real knowledge of the
arts of generalship. He always had the liking of his troops^
even after his repeated failures.

The Boer invasion of Natal ended in a stalemate the siege
of Ladysmith. There was a moment when the invaders, had
they been content merely to blockade the British forces in
Ladysmith, might have overrun the rest of Natal and have
reached its capital, Pietermaritzburg, and its port, Durban.
But their leader, Joubert, was old and cautious; 3 the British
attacks at Talana and Ekndslaagte had somewhat shaken
Boer confidence ; their organization was ill-fitted for a pro-
longed invasion, and the opportunity was allowed to pass.
But the British plan had been completely dislocated by the

1 Lieutenant-General Lord Baden-Powell, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.CJ3., K.C.V.O.,
founder of the Boy Scouts organization.

2 The kte Field-Marshal Lord Plumer, commander of the Second Army in France
during the Great War. 3 See Commando* by Deneys Reitfc, Chapter IL

ALLENBY

events in Natal. The Army Corps that was to advance tri-
umphantly on Bloemfontein was broken up before it was
landed. The greater part, under Buller himself, was hurried
east to save Natal and relieve Ladysmith, while a portion
only, under Lord Methuen, advanced to the relief of Kimber-
ley. The bulk of the Cavalry Division was placed in the centre
opposite Colesberg, with the mission of checking any further
enemy advance from the Free State into Cape Colony. It was
under General French, 1 with Haig as his principal staff officer ;
after taking part in the early fighting in Natal they had escaped
together by the last train to leave Ladysmith.

Allenby landed, as we have seen, at a gloomy moment:
within one week three severe reverses had befallen the
British forces, Gatacre, on French's right, attempted to
improve his position at Stormberg by a night operation,
mismanaged it, and met disaster; Methuen's advance on
Kimberley was checked by the repulse of his night attack at
Magersfontein ; and, worst shock of all, Buller failed with
heavy loss to cross the Tugela at Colenso and to relieve hard-
pressed Ladysmith. A pause of two months followed, while
the British gathered fresh strength. The opening moves of
the campaign had effectively shaken their complacency and re-
moved their hopes for a quick end, but the failure of the enemy
to overrun Natal or raise any substantial rebellion in Cape
Colony had made the ultimate end inevitable. During this
two months' pause while the Boers strove to capture Lady-
smith, Kimberley, and Mafeking by siege operations (for
which they were singularly ill-adapted by training and tem-
perament) and to improve their defences (at which they were
adepts) against Buller and Methuen, French's operations
round Colesberg were the main centre of movement and
interest. He carried out his task of safeguarding the northern
frontier of Cape Colony by means of constant harassing tactics
and threats against the flanks and rear of the Boers, without
ever committing himself to a large operation.

1 Afterwards Field-Marshal the Earl of Ypres, leader of the British Army in France
1914-15.

ALLENBY

In these condittoas Allenby quickly made for himself a
reputation as a bold and yet a safe commander, who had no
feat of responsibility or of danger, but who took no un-
necessary risks, He had joined as second-in-command, but a
few days later one of the squadron leaders was wounded, and
as there was no other senior officer available to command the
squadron Allenby took it over. It was a post more congenial
to him than second4n-command of the regiment. He was
constantly given the command of small independent enter-
prises, the most considerable of which was a demonstration on
January 14, 1900, against the Boer communications at Coles-
berg road bridge, in which he had under his command his
own squadron, a squadron of the loth Hussars, two companies
of Mounted Infantry under de Lisle, 1 a section of Horse
Artillery, and some Engineers. With this force he penetrated
behind the Boer lines, shelled the bridge, and, avoiding an
enemy attempt to cut him off, returned with several prisoners
and without losing a man. His experience of South African
campaigning in 1884-85 and his previous knowledge of the
Boers stood him in good stead, and he avoided more than one
enemy trap by Hs pmdent leadership.

On one occasion, for instance, when going out on an
enterprise, he left a guard on a farm he passed with orders to
allow no one to leave it on any pretext whatever. Since the
farm belonged to a Dutchman of reputed loyalty it seemed
an unnecessary precaution, but a month or two later the cor-
poral of this guard recognized in a batch of Boer prisoners a
youth from this very farm who had on this occasion attempted
to pass the guard on some pretext. He then realized the
prudent wisdom of his squadron commander. At another
time Allenby, believing his squadron had been seen by the
"enemy going into bivouac, moved after dark, leaving his fir^s
burning ; at dawn the old bivouac suddenly came under heavy
fire. Such precautions may seem elementary, but it was excep-
tional for them to be taken by the British Army of 1899-1900.

1 General Sit Beauvoir de Lisle, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., a famous polo-player,
who was an Army Corps commander in France during the Great War.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

Once his knowledge of, and interest in, the ways of bkds
and beasts saved Allenby from a dangerous ambush. With
another officer he had ridden ahead of his squadron to recon-
noitre a farmhouse., apparently deserted and surrounded by a
low wall. After scanning it for a while with his field-glasses
he remarked to his companion, " Did you ever see ducks
perching on a wall before ? " And, riding back to the
squadron, he gave the order to retire. As soon as the move-
ment began heavy rifle-fire broke out from behind the wall.
The Boers had placed the ducks, with a well-founded contempt
for the average English patrol's knowledge of natural history,
on the wall behind which they were hiding, to entice their
enemy into thinking the farm safe and get them to ride up to
it to buy poultry and eggs.

No officer, in fact, carried out General French's policy of
harrying and alarming the enemy without becoming heavily
engaged or unnecessarily losing lives more efficiently than
Allenby. His courage was so natural to him that he did not
have to take unwise risks to himself and to his men to prove
it. He had no use fot displays of bravety where bravety had
no utility.

The Earl of Dunmore (Lord Fincastle of those days) writes
of Allenby :

In the operations around Colesberg under French he seemed
to me one of the few men who had the courage to exercise his
own judgment. He wasn't out to earn a reputation by some un-
necessary and futile charge. But no man had greater courage or
was more ready to take great risks if the circumstances justified
his doing so.

So that when, at the beginning of February, a cavalry force
was collected under French on the Modder river, to attempt
the relief of Kimberley and to support Lo^d Roberts' flank
march on Bloemfontein, Allenby's squadron was taken to
form part of it, though the remainder of Ms regiment was left
opposite Colesberg.

One of his subalterns at this time was Prince Alexander of

ALLENBY

of the yth Hussars, who was attached to the Innis-
killings. He relates the following incident :

One day the senior subaltern and I walked out to shoot some-
thing for the pot and wandered further than we realized. The
trumpeter sounded " Stables/' and we started to run back to
camp, which appeared to be within half a mile, but South Africa's
rarefied air makes it very difficult to judge distance ! When we
reached camp one of the best tellings-off I have ever heard
awaited us from our squadron-leader. I trust I became more
zealous over my duties ; I certainly became more careful in the
judging of distances ! This was the only occasion I ever saw
Allenby really angry during the four months I was his very
close companion. I say " very close companion " because we
shared a tent when in front of Colesberg, and always lay alongside
each other when tents were discarded for the advance to Kim-
berley.

Allenby's letters to his wife during the Boer Wat give a
complete record of his movements and of the events in which
he took part. They ate typical of the man, straight, concise,
and clear. He was always a very conscientious letter-writer,
and to the end of his life answered practically every letter he
received in his rather unformed, sprawling, but perfectly
legible handwriting. His letters had no pretence to literary
grace, were always short and to the point, and never went
beyond it. Not even hi$ wife had a gossiping letter from
Allenby. His letters during this early period show well his
attitude towards war. He writes without any depression at
the uncomfortable conditions or the news of British reverses,
nor with any elation at the opportunity of distinguishing him-
self or desire to do so. He looks on fighting as part of the
day's work, to be done as efficiently and to be ended as expedi-
tiously as possible, but does not conceal his opinion of the
stupidity of war. He says much in praise of others and little
or nothing of his own successes ; for the enemy he has no
bitterness and much admiration and kindness. Flowers
interest him as much as, or mote than, fighting. He is full of

* Now the Bad of Athlone, K.G., G.CB., G.C.M.G., G.CV.O., P.C., D.S.O.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

longing for home and for his small son Michael Two typical

extracts follow :

November 6 3 1899

I have too happy a life at home to make a really good soldier.
I catch myself often half hoping that the war may be over by the
time we arrive.

January 5, 1900

They tell me these Boers are fighting splendidly and most
pluckily, although they occasionally fire on an ambulance. I
think myself that they mistrust us and that they fancy we are
bringing up ammunition by stealth if our ambulance goes out
during a fight, as they are very civil to our people when they are
collecting wounded after a fight. Fincastle went out to pick up
the wounded yesterday, and met several Boers who said what a
pity the war was, what a mistake it was for two Christian nations
to be shooting each other like wild beasts. We got about 20
prisoners yesterday, such rough, unkempt fellows, but quite
pleasant and polite. I must say I rather like Brother Boer. 1 It's
satisfactory in a way to be up here as 2nd in command, but I'm
not ferocious and I don't want any particular distinctions.

KlMBERLEY AND BLOEMFONTEIN
{February-April 1900)

When the shocks of the Black Week roused the British
nation and Government to a realization of the task before
them they sent to South Africa their two most proved
Generals the veteran Lord Roberts, who had served over
forty years in India, and, as his Chief of Staff, Lord Kitchener,
the recent conqueror of the Sudan. They reached Cape Town
on January 10, 1900. Reinforcements from England were
arriving daily, and many local corps were being formed.

Of the three possible lines of advance into the Dutch
republics through Natal, directly on Bloemfontein by Coles-
berg, or to Kimberley along the western railway line, where

1 Later in the war he wrote in a letter, " The Boer if treated the right way is a very
decent fellow. I know that very few of my countrymen agree with me, but I have
always liked and admired the Boer, and always shall."

ALLENBY

Methuen's force, after its defeat at Magersfontein, lay on the
Modder river opposite Cronje's commandos Roberts chose
the last. The topography of the northern frontier of Natal was
too favourable to the defence, while the direct advance on
Bloemfontein would be slow especially as the Boers still held
the bridge at Norval's Pont over the Orange river and liable
to attack from both flanks. Further, the relief of Kimberley
was becoming urgent; in fact, one influential and autocratic
person besieged in that town, Cecil Rhodes, made no secret
of his belief that it was the most pressing task of the military
forces. Accordingly Roberts made up his mind to concentrate
under cover of Methuen's force, to outflank Cronje on the
east, relieve Kimberley, and thence move on Bloemfontein.
In Natal the puzzled, groping Buller was left to work out his
own and Ladysmith's salvation by a somewhat costly process
of trial and error.

In its essentials Roberts' plan was, like most successful
plans in war, simple almost to the point of crudity a feint at
Cronje's right and then a quick side-step round his left. The
rest depended on the marching powers of man and horse.
But elaborate arrangements had to be made to deceive the
enemy and to make the outflanking force mobile ; in the care-
ful execution of these details lay the difficulties and success of
the plan. Many years later, in Palestine, AUenby was to make
and to execute successfully a very similar plan.

The activity of French and his cavalry in front of Colesberg
was continued, so as to direct the attention of the enemy to
that line of advance, till the moment came for the bulk of the
mounted men to slip away for the projected ride to Kimberley ;
and other steps were taken by the able head of the Intelligence
Service, Colonel Henderson, 1 to prevent the real plan being
guessed. Much transport had been procured, and the whole
transport system reorganized with the object of enabling a
large force to operate in the bare veldt between the widely
separated lines of railway that led to Kimberley and Bloem-

1 Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, the well-known writer, author of Stonewall Jackson
and other military works.

ALLENBY

fontein. Preparations were, however, still incomplete when
the growing danger to Kimberley and the restlessness of
Rhodes led Roberts to start his force to its rescue early in
February,

Allenby's squadron marched from Rensburg to Arundel on
February 2, and went on next day to Naauwpoort, where it
entrained for Modder River Camp, arriving there on Feb-
ruary 4 after a trying nineteen hours in the train. The cavalry
was being assembled in a hot, dusty camp south of the Modder
river, where Allenby had bathed just fifteen years before
on his way to Bechuanaland with Warren's expedition. A
cavalry division of three brigades under General French was
now organized, and AUenby's squadron was placed in the
ist Brigade with the Carabiniers, Scots Greys, one squadron
of the i4th Hussars, one squadron of the New South Wales
Lancers, 1 and three batteries of Horse Artillery. The brigade
was commanded by Colonel Porter, of the Carabiniers, and
the Brigade-Major was Captain J. Vaughan, of the yth Hussars
(afterwards Allenby's staff officer with the Cavalry Division
in 1914). The selection of Allenby's squadron to form part of
this force was a great personal compliment, and a tribute to
the work he had done in the Colesberg operations.

The movement began on February n, south-east from
Modder Camp to Ramdam Farm, where the striking force
assembled. Thence the Cavalry Division, followed by two
infantry divisions, was to cross the Riet river and strike north-
east to the Modder again, arriving, if all went well, outside
the flank of Cronje's position, and moving round it on Kimber-
ley. Speed was the essence of the plan, but speed was not easy
without great sacrifice and exertion. February is the hottest
month of the year on the South African plateau; water was
scarce, and there was little or no grazing for the cavalry horses
and transport animals on the bare, scorched, dusty plains.
A large proportion of the army's transport was by slow-

1 They had been training at Aldershot when the war opened, and had volunteered
for service in South Africa, being thus the first Australian troops to reach the theatre
of war.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

moving ox-wagon. The distances were considerable over
twenty miles to Ramdam, twelve miles to the Riet river, and
twenty-five miles thence to the Modder. On February 12 the
drifts over the Riet were secured in face of some opposition,
and on the i3th the cavalry crossed the long, waterless stretch
between the rivers. Allenby's squadron, which had had some
fighting as advanced guard to his brigade on the i2th, was
again heavily engaged as right-flank guard. By a masterly
manoeuvre with his tired horses at the end of the long day
French outwitted the Boers who disputed the drifts over the
Modder, and established his division on the northern bank.
The loss in horses on this day had been serious; many had
died outright, and many more were unfit to move farther.
There was a halt on the i4th while the infantry closed up.

On the 1 5th the division moved north for the last stage of
its dash to Kimberley, now only twenty miles distant. A few
miles from the river its path was barred by a force of some
900 Boers with two guns. They were cunningly posted,
holding two ridges which flanked on either side the cavalry's
direct line of advance ; these ridges were joined on the north
by a narrow ( nek/ or col, forming a natural amphitheatre,
which was ringed with rifle-fire. It seemed madness to enter
that open, bullet-swept zone, but the horses were too worn
for a swift, outflanking movement, and time was pressing.
Field-Marshal the Earl of Ypres, Commander of the British
Expeditionary Force in 1914-15, will not go down to history
as a great general; but Lieutenant-General French, leader of
the Cavalry Division in 1900, had a quick eye and a bold heart
on the field of battle, and the instinct for an opportunity that
comes of those qualities. Seeing that the nek was only lightly
held, he led the whole division at it in extended order, at
the best pace the tired horses could muster, disregarding,
except by fire from his guns, the Boers on the flanking
ridges. The very boldness of the manoeuvre saved it from
punishment. The astonished Boers shot wildly, and the dust
raised by the galloping horsemen prevented accurate aim;
the charge reached its objective with a loss of under twenty

ALLENBY

men, and the Boers fled in panic. The road to Kimberley lay
open. The memory of that brilliant feat, and its demonstra-
tion of the value of pace and mobility in battle, must have
stayed long in Allenby's mind. He probably remembered it
when, seventeen years later, Grant's squadrons of Light
Horse rode over the Turkish trenches in a cloud of dust and
captured Beersheba ; or when, a fortnight later, a brigade of
Yeomanry galloped the El Mughar ridge.

Next day, the i6th, the ist Cavalry Brigade had a very
hard, unsatisfactory day, trying on exhausted horses to inter-
cept the Boers who had besieged Kimberley, The following
is an account of this day by the Earl of Athlone, who was
Allenby's subaltern at the time :

French with his Staff rode up to our bivouacs among the mines
at about 5 A.M. the day after the relief of Kimberley, and told us
to turn out at once as the " Long Tom," which had been shelling
Kimberley, was still in position and there was a chance of its
capture. When Allenby asked about feeding the horses, he was
told that we should be back in time for * dinners/ As a matter of
fact we were all under our saddle blankets, which were all we had
to cover us, and had intended to have a c Europe morning/ We
turned out in double-quick time that is, the ist Cavalry Brigade
(Porter) and had to pass the Ridge of Dronveld, strongly held
by the Boers. The Boers, who were scattered, were cleverly
hidden behind rocks, and allowed the scouts and advanced guard
and left-flank guard to pass, with the result that Harry ScobelFs
squadron of the Greys on the left of Allenby's squadron of
Inniskilling Dragoons lost two officers dangerously wounded and
several men.

Allenby was told to work along the ridge, ancj, retiring a short
distance, the squadron dismounted. Leaving our horses under
cover, we opened out and crawled from rock to rock, knocking
over a number of Boers, finally reaching a small laager, where we
found a 9-pr. gun. It was by then afternoon, and as no one had
had anything to eat or drink since the previous evening, when we
finished the ration we had brought with us from Modder River,
the men were very tired and not too easy to handle. Allenby gave
me a beef-lozenge to suck (his wife had sent him some), and with
a small pebble I found I was able to overcome extreme dryness of

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

the throat. The heat was appalling, but fortunately we were all
In the same boat, and with a little chaff the grumblers became
reconciled. Not one man in Allenby's squadron was wounded, and
I attribute this to the way he selected the position where the man
lay when firing. It became second nature to us all to place our-
selves so that we could do the utmost damage with the minimum
of exposure. I recollect on that day that we were only 50 yards
from the laager, and a fairly heavy rifle-fire was being directed at
us, AUenby and I were lying just behind our men, and the bullets
were striking the ground about a foot behind our heels ! I had
always the greatest confidence in him in these little actions, and
the men had a great respect for him, although at times he could
turn and rend one.

Just before dusk we were ordered back to Kimberley. We
found that Harry Scobell had placed the two officers in stretchers
which were being carried by men of his squadron, all of whom
were nearly cooked by this time, like ours* Allenby therefore
told Scobell that he would march our squadron as escort and rear-
guard and relieve him of that work. It was lucky we did, as we
picked up a number of prisoners on the way back hiding in the
bush. I think the distance of our bivouac was eight miles, and
we were back by 9 P.M., after a rather trying march done mostly
on our feet ; and I remember the horses smelt the mine-water in
the troughs and just dragged us along to them. I shouted to my
men a warning not to drink this water, but it was twenty-four
hours since we had had any ourselves, and even I succumbed.

So ended " the longest week I ever spent/ 1 as Allenby wrote
to his wife ; " my property now consists of the dirty clothes I
live and sleep in day and night, a cloak, a saddle blanket, a
tooth-brush, a box of cigarettes, and a tube of lanoline," His
squadron was reduced to forty-two horses. The squadron of
New South Wales Lancers was now attached to it and put
under his command. They remained under him till their
return to Australia in the following October. The exhausted
brigade now had a few days' rest.

Allenby resumed his acquaintance with Rhodes, who enter-
tained him to dinner, and, remembering his old friendship
with the InnisMllings, sent firewood, soup, and othet comforts
to his squadron. The supply-wagons of the Cavalry had been

ALLENBY

left behind on the Riet, and did not rejoin for many days.
They were lucky to rejoin at all, for that great leader of
guerrillas, Christian De Wet, had pounced on the convoys at
Waterval Drift, on the Riet, and had captured a large portion
of the army's supplies.

Meanwhile important events were taking place on the
Modder. Cronje, who had obstinately refused to believe that
the clumsy, headlong English could ever march or man-
oeuvre, suddenly found himself with the cavalry between him
and Kimberley and the infantry almost between him and
Bloemfontein. He tried hurriedly to escape east along the
Modder, but French, taking the only brigade fit to move (it
had not been launched in pursuit of the besiegers of Kirnber-
ley), headed him off at Koodoosrand Drift after a march of
thirty-five miles, and with a much inferior force stood boldly
in his path another example of the power of well-handled
horsemen, which did not leave Allenby's memory. Cronje
went to ground in the bed of the river, and was soon
surrounded by the infantry. Lord Kitchener's impetuosity
caused unnecessarily heavy losses in an attack on the Boer
laager, and the sudden intervention of De Wet from the south
made a temporary gap in the lines of investment. But the
odds against stubborn old Cronje were too heavy, and on
February 27, the anniversary of Majuba, he surrendered with
his force of 4000. Meanwhile Allenby's squadron, with the
rest of the ist Cavalry Brigade, leaving Kimberley on the
zist, had rejoined French at Koodoosrand. It was engaged
in the line of investing troops up to the time of the sur-
render.

A few days after the capture of Cronje's force Buller had at
last relieved Ladysmith, and the whole basis on which the
Dutch republics had built their war plan had crumbled. They
were now invaded, instead of invaders, and a large proportion
of the burghers were demoralized and ready to submit. All
the efforts of the fiery De Wet, of the gallant De la Rey, of the
implacable Steyn, and even of old President Kruger himself
could not hearten the burghers into a resolute defence of the

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

toad to Bloemfontein. If Lord Roberts 3 army could have
acted energetically now the war might have been ended in a
few months. Unfortunately it was in no state to do so. Men,
horses, and transport animals were all on short rations (caused
largely by De Wet's raid on the communications during the
march to Kimberley), and were worn by their exertions.

The army halted for a week on the Modder and then moved
on Bloemfontein, There were two actions on the way, at
Poplar Grove (March 7) and Driefontein (March 10). At the
first of these the Boer resistance was half-hearted, but the
horses of the cavalry were too exhausted to make either the
turning movement round the flank or the pursuit effective,
At Driefontein some of the Boers fought desperately, and our
infantry had severe losses. Again the condition of the cavalry
horses hampered thek usefulness and prevented pursuit. On
March 12 Allenby's squadron led the final advance on Bloem-
fontein and seized some kopjes to the south; under cover of
this the remainder of the brigade turned the defences of the
town, which surrendered next day. A staff officer 1 from the
6th Division sent forward to keep touch with the cavalry at
this time has given an interesting picture of his first impres-
sions of Allenby :

I joined up with Allenby's squadron, and was with it when it
occupied Brand Kop, the big hill overlooking Bloemfontein. My
first impression of him was that he was the typical heavy dragoon,
obviously a good squadron leader. That night I changed my
mind. We bivouacked together on the top of Brand Kop, and
as we were smoking round a bivouac fire he started talking about
the future of the British Army. I remember him saying that our
existing organization was utterly out of date, and he put the
reforms that we must go for in the following order : (a) a properly
trained General Staff; () the peace organization of the Army to
be the same as the war organization, units and formations to be
commanded and trained in peace by the men who would lead them
in war ; (?) promotion above the rank of captain to be by selection ;
(d) the'organization of the military forces to be uniform through-
out the Empire. All this sounded revolutionary in March 1900,

i Captain F B Maurice, now Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, K.C.M.G., CB.

ALLENBY

and I was deeply impressed., and thereafter watched Allenby's
career with great interest.

At Bloemfontein the exhausted army sank down for a long
rest. A relaxation of effort was inevitable., for the force had
no stable line of communication till the railway from Coles-
berg to Bloemfontein was repaired and reopened. But the
prolongation of this rest, due in part to an easy optimism that
the -war was already won, gave the wavering burghers a
breathing-space and fresh heart, and probably lengthened the
war by nearly two years. Another lesson that Allenby re-
membered to good purpose in later years never to allow a
beaten enemy time to recover, whatever the hardships and
sacrifices required of the troops. At the time he welcomed the
halt as much as anyone, for his men had been worked up to
their limit and his horses beyond it. The Brigade-Major of
the ist Cavalry Brigade has recorded that he kept a special
list of officers who could be trusted with important tasks and
independent missions ; Allenby's name stood at the head of
the list, an honour which brought more than a normal share
of danger and exertion.

His squadron was bivouacked with the remainder of the
ist Cavalry Brigade at Springfield, a few miles east of Bloem-
fontein.- The baggage of the brigade had not been with it
since Modder Camp, and no tents were available. The men
slept on the bare ground, often in mud, for rainstorms were
frequent. The officers of the army round Bloemfontein at this
time made a ragged appearance. Few possessed a spare coat
or breeches, and many had grown beards during the last
month's continuous marching and fighting. Allenby had not,
but had " shaved about every third day," and had repaired
his own clothes with what he regarded as considerable suc-
cess. There was a good deal of sickness, caused by exertion,
exposure, and bad water; soon there was a disastrous epi-
demic of enteric, a disease which throughout the South African
campaign claimed more casualties than the bullet.

Allenby and his men and horses had only ten davs* rest

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

before they entered on a fresh spell of nearly a fortnight's
continuous hard duty. It began on March 22, when Allenby,
with a hundred men, was sent to escort a convoy to Tha-
banchu, some forty miles east of Bloemfontein, to which a
part of the cavalry had been sent. Almost complete peace was
believed to exist for many miles round Bloemfontein, and
careless optimism was the fashion with many. But Allenby
was not the man to neglect military precautions at any time;
he knew the Boers better than most, and that so long as De
Wet and his like were at large a small convoy moving without
support was in no little danger. He handled it, especially on
the return journey with surrendered arms and ammunition,
with all possible speed and concealment, and brought it
safely back past Sannah's Post, where only a few days later
the cavalry force to which he had taken his convoy was to
suffer ambush and disaster. To the men of his own squadron
Allenby's vigilance was normal, but one of another regiment
who rode with him on this march has recorded his deep and
lasting impression of the skill and care with which this minor
operation of war was conducted.

In all Allenby's letters to his wife during this period there
is hardly one word of criticism of commanders or of operations
except this, written after a disaster caused by careless protective
arrangements : " I can't excuse any man who is caught nap-
ping. One is always liable to be smashed by superior force,
but one should never be caught unprepared to do one's best."
He adds, characteristically, " However, I hate criticizing, and
I hate war."

The day after his return Allenby was on the move again.
All the cavalry round Bloemfontein for whom mounts could
be found, some 650 only, went north under French to join
the yth Division at the Glen, fourteen miles distant, A bridge
over the Modder had been destroyed by the Boers, and the
enemy entrenched a few miles north of the river had to be
driven off, so that the Engineers could repair it. This was
accomplished by the action of Karee Siding on March 29.
The cavalry were under shell-fire, but not heavily engaged.

ALLENBY

They returned to Springfield on the 3oth. Next day came the
news of Btoadwood's disaster at Sannah's Post ; the remainder
of the cavalry hurried to the rescue, but were too late. In the
evening Allenby was sent on a mission to Colville, the com-
mander of the 9th Division, tic rode through the night, and
returned at dawn next day, having covered forty-five miles
on his charger Pirate. The ist Cavalry Brigade rescued some
of Broadwood's wounded, but could do no more. A few days
later the brigade moved out again, to operate against some
Boers located to the south-east. But by this time it had only
120 horses fit to move, and it was obvious that the cavalry
could do no more till it was rested and remounted.

The Earl of Athlone, who had been attached to Allenby's
squadron since his arrival in South Africa, now left it to
join Mahon's column for the relief of Mafeking, He says of
Allenby :

We had had some good fighting together, and on looking
back to those days it surprises me how few casualties we had in
the squadron, considering how much fighting we had. Allenby
was very good at selecting ground and very particular that all
duties we had to perform were carried out with exactitude. He
instilled confidence and respect in all his subordinates, officers
and men*

THE TRANSVAAL: COMMAND OF THE INNISKILLINGS
(April ityQQ^Jamtarj 1901)

On April 7 the remainder of the Inniskillings, who had
been left opposite Colesberg, arrived at Bloemfontein, and the
regiment was reunited after two months* separation, Shortly
afterwards the commanding officer was placed in charge of a
cavalry depot,, from which he was presently invalided home.
Allenby took over temporary command of the Inniskillings,
which he held till January 1901, when he was given charge of
an independent column.

The squadron of New South Wales Lancers which had

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

been put undet Allenby's command at Kimberley temained
attached to the InnisMllings till October, when they left South
Africa. 1 In later days Allenby used to tell, with evident amuse-
ment, a tale of the N.S.W. Lancers when under his command.
One day he found a party of them dismounted, contrary to
orders, and raiding a patch of water-melons ; he called up
their commanding officer, and reprimanded him severely; the
latter's only comment was, " Rub it in, Colonel; it won't lose
nothing in passing of it on." That evening, after the column
had halted for the night, Allenby overheard Hs reprimand
being cc passed on." The CO., who had a lurid vocabulary,
prefaced each of his remarks with " The Colonel says," and,
while he recognized little of what he himself had said, Allenby
realized that his reprimand had lost nothing of picturesque-
ness or vigour in the passing-on process.

During April, while the advance into the Transvaal was
being prepared, the regiment rested near Bloemfontein, except
for occasional spells of outpost or escort duty. It did not,
however, receive remounts till a day or two before the advance
began, and the horses then issued were soft and quite unfit for
hard marching. The result naturally was that heavy wastage
began again at once.

The advance of Lord Roberts* main army from Bloem-
fontein to Pretoria, some three hundred miles, occupied just
over one month, from May 3 to June 5 . There were many
engagements, but no battle. Lord Roberts' tactics were to
advance, with his greatly superior numbers, on as broad a
front as possible, so as to overlap each successive Boer posi-
tion. The Boers used their superior mobility, their knowledge
of the ground, and their skifl. in defence to such effect that
they never were actually outflanked, though always compelled
by superior numbers to retire after engaging and delaying the
British advanced forces with more or less success.

The Cavalry Division operated beyond the western wing

1 A. B. Paterson, the Australian poet (" Snowy River Patetson "), who was with
the N.S.W. Lancets, gives in Ms book Happy Dispatches a graphic account of Allenby's
taking over command of the squadron at Bloemfontein. Actually the squadron had
been vorking under AJlenby since Kimberley.

9 1

ALLENBY

of the army, but their effectiveness as an outflanking force was,
as in the advance to Bloemfontein, crippled by the state of the
horses. The division had remained at Bloemfontein for several
days after the infantry march began, in order to complete the
issue of remounts. It then hurried after the main army by
forced marches. This was, naturally, disastrous to the newly
arrived remounts; and when Kroonstad, 140 miles distant,
was reached six days later nearly half of the horses of the
cavalry had succumbed or were unfit to move farther. The
horses were overloaded, even if they had been hard in con-
dition; three days' rations were invariably carried, though
the supply-wagons were reaching the divisions daily. This
wasteful method of over-marching and overloading remounts
before they were conditioned continued practically through-
out the war, and was largely responsible for its length. Rightly
did Kipling's Sikh trooper (in his tale A Sahibs' War} remark,
"The army . . . used horses as a courtesan uses oil: with

both hands/'

It did not take the Inniskillings long to realize that they
had in Allenby a commanding officer who was equal to every
occasion in the field, and in whom they could place complete
trust; not did it take the Higher Command any longer to
understand that in the Inniskillings under Allenby's command
they had a unit that was always handled with dash, discretion,
and common sense, and could be sent with confidence on any
mission. But the first engagement after leaving Bloemfontein
was a c regrettable incident/ almost a disaster. On May 10
a squadron of the Inniskillings, sent on under higher orders
without support a mistake Allenby never committed was
cut up by a superior force, and the whole brigade was for
a while in danger of heavy casualties. Allenby's imperturb-
ability soon restored order and confidence.

After a halt of a week at Kroonstad the advance was re-
sumed. The Vaal was crossed practically without opposition
on May 2.4? and British troops were once again in the Trans-

1 The motale of the Boers was felling very low at this time (see Chapter XII of
o^ by Deneys Reitz, a fascfna.ti.ng account of the war from the enemy's side).

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

vaal, neatly twenty years after the Majuba surrender. On
the march from the Vaal to Johannesburg, which was occu-
pied on May 31, the cavalry had constant skirmishing under
artillery- and rifle-fire; and the Inniskillings were able to
appreciate the skill with which their commander led them
and saved them from unnecessary casualties. Just before the
fall of Johannesburg the regiment bivouacked at Doornkop,
where Jameson's raiders had been brought to bay and cap-
tured, an incident which had contributed largely to causing the
war.

About this time the Inniskillings received an official noti-
fication that a Carmelite monk, Father Knapp, was to be
attached to the regiment as chaplain. There was some con-
sternation at the announcement, and anxious canvassing as to
which of the squadron messes was to receive this unknown
quantity, who sounded so little likely to adapt himself to the
life of a cavalry regiment in the field. He fell, by lot or other-
wise, to the headquarters mess of Allenby and the regimental
Staff, and proved to be not only " quite the best specimen of
Army Chaplain Fve ever met," as Allenby wrote home, but a
charming companion. He remained with the regiment during
almost the whole of AUenby's command, and in 1901 spent
six months with Allenby's column. 1

The advance from Johannesburg to Pretoria was made
with little fighting, for the Boers had become demoralized by
their inability to stem the flood of the British invasion. But
the Cavalry Division had one exciting evening and night
when General French, in pursuit of an enemy rearguard,,
pressed on late in the afternoon of June 3 into the narrow
Kalkheuvel Pass, flanked by rocky heights on either side. The
advanced guard was ambushed and checked, General French
and his staff coming under close and heavy fire; at the same
time a small party of Boers opened fire from the heights on
the flank. There was som^ confusion, and Allenby's coolness
and resource were again much in evidence; he promptly

1 Father Knapp was killed with the Irish Guards at the Battle of Cambrai in 1917,
after winning the Military Cross.

ALLENBY

engaged the enemy on the flanks., kept down their fire, and
soon had the situation in hand. But the cavalry spent most of
the night jammed in the narrow pass in an uncomfortable
and dangerous situation, till the front could be cleared and a
bivouac established in the plain beyond the defile.

Pretoria, in spite of its fortifications, fell without a struggle,
and the ist Cavalry Brigade was sent on to Waterval, north of
the town, to release the British prisoners there. No opposition
was expected, but a force of Boers under De la Rey suddenly
appeared, attacked the covering troops, and shelled impartially
the rescued prisoners, their late gaolers, the train waiting to
remove them, and the cavalry escort. There was considerable
confusion, and Allenby's competence in such circumstances
was . recognized by his being left to cover the withdrawal,
which he did, in face of superior numbers, with his usual calm-
ness and skill. When the released British prisoners had
steamed away to Pretoria and the Boer attackers had been
driven off, the Inniskillings found themselves in the dark,
with a crowd of Boer prisoners (the late gaolers of Waterval),
and with no very clear idea of the way to Wonder Boom Farm,
some eight miles distant, where they had been ordered to spend
the night. Inquiry among the prisoners for a guide revealed
that the owner of the farm was present, and, further, that he
was an old friend of Allenby and the Inniskillings, having
met the regiment at the time of Warren's Bechuanaland ex-
pedition. Allenby was delighted to renew his acquaintance,
and the regiment proceeded to his farm under his guidance*
It was a bitterly cold night, and the subaltern on duty found
in the early morning that Boer prisoners and the Inniskilling
troopers of their guard were sleeping together in comrade-
ship under the same blankets. Somewhat scandalized at this
fraternization with the enemy, he hurried to Allenby and woke
him, " Let them be," said Allenby ; " that will do more to
ending this stupid war than anything else/'

The surrender of Pretoria was held at the time to mean the
virtual end of the war, and Lord Roberts opened negotiations
for a general surrender with Botha, who had with difficulty

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

halted some seven thousand dispirited burghers fifteen miles
east of the capital. But at the critical moment came news of
De Wet's successes in the south against the long, vulnerable
line of British communications ( cc I am beginning to dislike
this De Wet/' wrote AUenby to his wife; " he is keeping the
war alive "), and Botha announced that the Transvaalers would
fight to the last. Accordingly Roberts advanced east against
the Boer position, an extremely strong one along a range of
hills. There followed the curious battle of Diamond Hill,
fought on June n and 12, in which the Boer force of 7000 to
8000 men with twenty guns became extended over twenty-
five miles of front in its determination not to be outflanked, in
which after two days' fighting at close range the casualties on
either side were under two hundred, and in which the defend-
ing force, with its enemy in a thoroughly uncomfortable and
even dangerous position, suddenly lost heart and gave up the
battle.

The ist and 4th Cavalry Brigades under General French,
who were given the mission of turning the enemy's northern
flank, had a particularly hard and anxious two days. Regi-
ments were, owing to the wastage of horses, barely the
strength of a squadron; and the force, instead of outflanking,
was itself outflanked and outnumbered, and had hard work to
hold its own. Much the same occurred on the southern flank,
where the turning force of mounted men could make no head-
way; while the infantry in the right centre after two days of
attack found itself faced by the main Boer position, still
frowning formidably in front of it. But the nerves of the
Boers, who had with difficulty been persuaded to stand at all,
were not equal to a third day's fighting ; and when the morning
of June 13 came they were gone. Roberts' force had not the
mobility for pursuit, and returned to Pretoria.

There followed a month's pause spent in rest and refitting
and in hopes of an early peace. That Allenby's knowledge
and ability were recognized as much as his fighting qualities
was shown by his appointment to a Committee of Cavalry
Reorganization. The records and results of 'that committee

ALLENBY

have passed into oblivion, but the advice given by Allenby
may perhaps be judged by a sentence in a letter he wrote home
about this time : " It is not so much reorganization that the
cavalry want as a little common sense."

The small organized remnant of the Transvaal Boers was
now on the railway-line from Pretoria to Delagoa Bay cover-
ing the seat of their Government a railway carriage near
Komatipoort. In mid- July (midwinter in South Africa) Lord
Roberts moved eastward again, but after advancing as far as
Mddelburg decided to break off operations because of the
weather, and to await junction with Sir Redvers Buller's Natal
army, which was now moving slowly northward through the
Eastern Transvaal. The cavalry were left on a thinly stretched
line in front of Middelburg. Allenby showed his skill in
defence by holding for three weeks with a small force an
outpost line of seven or eight miles in face of an active enemy,
without any untoward incident. In the middle of August
Sir Redvers Buller's force came up on the right of the line
held by Allenby; and the advance on Komatipoort was re-
sumed soon after, the cavalry being transferred to the left
flank, where it worked through difficult hill country. On
August 27 at Bergendal Farm, about a hundred miles west of
Komatipoort, was fought the last regular engagement of the
war. When the Boers were driven from this position and
Komatipoort lay open their last object of defence and their
last line of communication was gone. The aged President
Kruger left by Delagoa Bay for Europe in the fruitless hope of
persuading one or more of the great Continental Powers to
more active measures of sympathy with the Boer cause than
mere abuse of England ; most of the remaining artillery was
destroyed; and the stubborn burghers still remaining in the
field broke up into the small bands that were to keep the war
alive so gallantly for almost two years more.

While the main British force went slowly on to Komatipoort
the cavalry turned south to Carolina, and thence over almost
trackless hills to Barberton, an important gold-mining centre.
The capture of Barberton was one of the most brilliant feats

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

of the war, 1 and the advance to it from Carolina was led by
Allenby and the Inniskillings on every day, except the last.
It was typical of Allenby's practical view of things that when
offered, in recognition of his fine work during the advance,
the honour of leading the entry into Barberton with his
regiment on the final day he declined on finding that it would
mean extra work for his tired horses and men, and asked to
be allowed to move quietly by a better road with the guns.
Shortly after the occupation of Barberton Allenby was sent
to seize and guard the Sheba group of mines, some fourteen
miles away in the mountains above the town. Here the regi-
ment remained for over a fortnight, in high and difficult hills
where wheeled transport could not be taken, and the scattered
squadrons were fed by aerial tram or pack-donkeys.

Early in 'October the Cavalry Division was ordered back to
Machadodorp, on the railway east of Middelburg, whence it
was to proceed south to Carolina and then by Ermelo and
Bethel through the Eastern Transvaal (the area known as the
High Veldt), slowly and methodically clearing up these dis-
tricts in preparation for the expected peace. Little opposition
was anticipated ; and the division, trailed with it a large and
cumbrous convoy containing fourteen days' supplies. The
hopes of a peaceful march were soon rudely dispelled. The
leading brigade was heavily attacked the day after leaving
Machadodorp, and scarcely avoided disaster; and for nearly
a fortnight the division was continually engaged. Hampered
by its unwieldy convoy, it was unable to take the offensive
against the confident and elusive commandos who swarmed
round its flanks and rear. The loss of their capital and the
freedom from any obligation to defend a line of communica-
tion or fixed point had given the Boers full scope for the
guerrilla tactics in which their military genius lay, and had
produced a complete change in their morale. The dispirited

1 Kipling's returned South African warrior (in his poem Chant-pagan) remembers it
with pride :

" Me that saw Barberton took
When we dropped through the clouds on their 'ead,
And they 'ove the guns over and fled."

G 97

ALLENBY

men who had failed to hold strong natural positions a month
or two before now attacked in the open with boldness and
skill

On October 16, the day the force left Carolina, the Innis-
killings had a brief but dangerous fight. The regiment was
acting as advanced guard to the left column, and its foremost
troops surprised a Boer laager near Lake Chrissie. If the
remainder of the brigade had been available to support the
advanced guard a notable success was in its hands. Un-
fortunately the brigade had changed its plans and direction,
had halted some miles back, and was now going into bivouac.
The brigade staff had omitted to inform the advanced guard of
this change of plan, with the result that not only was a great
opportunity missed, but the advanced squadron was in danger
of being overwhelmed and the whole brigade of being caught
at a disadvantage. The Boer commando, realizing that the
British advanced guard was isolated, rallied and made a
determined attack. Allenby galloped up to the firing-line and
took in the situation. He found his best friend, Yardley, on a
low hill, endeavouring with a small body of men to check the
Boer rush, but very closely pressed. " Curate," said Allenby
to him, " you're in a tight place. I'll bring you support as soon
as I can, but you must hold this kopje till you're killed, to
cover the brigade behind." Yardley was badly wounded,
one of the officers with him was killed and two others were
wounded, and there were some twenty casualties among his
men. But their gallant resistance gave time for Allenby to
bring up the rest of the regiment and two guns ; and after a
sharp action at close range the Boer attack was driven off,
and the brigade behind saved from disaster. Characteristically
enough, Allenby in a letter to his wife gives no more space
to this stirring little fight than to a description of some wild-
flowers which had interested him.

For another ten days, till Heidelberg (just south-east of
Johannesburg) was reached, the force had to fight a continual
series of flank and rearguard actions. Then it returned to
Pretoria, and the Inniskillings went into camp for the first

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

time after eight months of bivouac in the open. The Cavalry
Division was now broken up. The ist Cavalry Brigade re-
mained in being, though seldom operating as a brigade, for
another two months, when it also was broken up, its units
being allotted to small independent columns, of which Allenby
received the command of one.

Meanwhile the commanding officer of the Inniskillings, who
had been invalided home, was placed on half-pay, and Riming-
ton was promoted to command the regiment. This was un-
doubtedly something of a disappointment to Allenby (though
his letters to his wife voice no word of complaint), for Riming-
ton, although senior to him, had been away from the regiment
for over a year, in command of his own corps of Rimington's
Guides. Allenby, who had been with the Inniskillings ever
since they left England a year before (he was the only one of
the original officers who had not been killed, wounded, cap-
tured, or sent home sick), might reasonably have hoped that
Rimington would receive promotion outside the regiment,
and that he would be confirmed in the command of the unit
he had led so ably for the last nine months. One who com-
manded a squadron under him for those nine months 1 writes
of him:

I had the privilege of commanding a squadron under him during
the whole of this period, and I am sure that every one in the regi-
ment agreed that it was a pure delight to serve under Mm. We
were in the field without a rest during the whole time of his
command. There were constant anxious periods against the
formidable, cunning, and elusive foe, but Allenby was more than
equal to each emergency as it arose. He was always quiet and
cool, and knew just what to do, and how to do it. Daring and
cautious as the varying occasion required, he ensured that every
task the regiment was ordered to perform was achieved with
success and credit. As a result the Inniskillings used to be de-
tailed for more than their fair share of advanced and rear guards
when trouble was expected. Where Allenby differed from so
many other commanders at that time was that, while having
himself a better general appreciation of each situation than anyone

1 Lieutenant-Colonel J. Stevenson-Hamilton.

ALLENBY

else present, lie was always ready to listen without prejudice to
any reasonable objection which might be made to an order given
under a misapprehension of the situation, and he never rejected
any information merely because it did not happen to fit in with
his preconceived ideas. He never committed the mistake, respon-
sible for so many unfortunate incidents in the South African
War, of failing adequately to support detached units. Thus, if a
squadron was sent to seize a hiU, which might or might not be
occupied by the enemy, Allenby never failed to be ready to cover
it with fire from the main body should resistance be encountered.
Also to any officer sent on detached duty he was always careful
to give the widest latitude " These are merely general orders;
don't be tied to any definite line; carry out the work in the way
that seems best." In cases of failure he always gave careful con-
sideration to the explanation, and if satisfied, not only said so
plainly, but took entire responsibility, and * saw the officer
through * with Higher Authority, if the latter was inclined to be
critical. A subordinate leader, therefore, always carried with him
the right sense of responsibility in every detached duty he under-
took, and had no fear, so long as he acted reasonably, of being after-
wards found fault with for not having carried out the letter of his
orders. Apart from his own skilled leadership, I believe Allenby's
habit of trusting his subordinates formed one of the reasons for
the reputation which the regiment acquired during the campaign
with the cavalry division. During the advance on Pretoria three
squadrons of the ist Brigade, acting under the direct orders of
the brigadier, were placed in an impossible position, and were cut
to pieces. The enemy came on, and for a time the situation of the
brigade itself seemed a perilous one, and there was even some
temporary confusion. It was Allenby's complete sang-froid and
his unhesitating grasp of the right thing to do that re-established
confidence and enabled the advance to be continued after only a
slight delay.

During the temporary lulls of an action he used to display his
well-known power of detachment, and would talk with animation
on any and every subject, quite divorced from the business in
hand, from the Descent of Man to the habits of insectivorous
birds ; ready, however, at any moment to * change gear,' and snap
out the right emergency order. It was this power of temporary
detachment of mind, coupled with the ability to pick up the
dropped thread in a moment, which, with his never-failing sense
of dry humour, kept him always cheerful and free from the out-

100

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

ward appearance of worry which in the South African War showed
itself in so many commanders of less ability.

He showed his innate love of wild-life preservation even during
the stress of the campaign, and I recollect being amused at
the consternation of the subalterns when he rebuked them for
shooting buck out of season. During the many hours we used to
spend during an advance sitting by our horses awaiting the order
to move on he liked nothing better than to study the habits of the
termites whose small mounds covered the ground everywhere,
and I have seen him so engrossed in a fight between rival parties
of these creatures, or in a raid on them by bkck ants, that one
would imagine he had nothing else in the world to think about. 1

An officer in another regiment who was attached to the
Inniskillings for some time gives the following impressions of
Allenby and the regiment :

Allenby going into action (he was a magnificent figure on a
horse) seemed to radiate courage from his whole face. We were
all a little afraid of him, but he really was terribly kind. There is
no doubt in my mind that the Inniskillings was then the finest
, fighting cavalry regiment in the Army. But their methods were
those of the bushrangers ; every officer had his own Cape cart,
which he had to maintain himself as best he could on the country.

THE COLUMN COMMANDER
(January 1901- May 1902)

The * column ' period of the war, which now began, lasted
for nearly eighteen months. The area of operations, which
included the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, and Cape
Colony, was approximately equal to the combined areas of
France, Germany, Belgium, and Holland. There were few
towns or railways and no made roads, the most part was open,
rolling plain with few obstacles, admirably suited for the

1 A friend who met him shortly after the South African War and questioned him on
his experiences found that the subjects on which he was willing to discourse were not
his engagements or any aspect of the war, but the habits of a peculiar form of cater-
pillar which he had encountered and studied there.

101

ALLENBY

tactics of mobile riflemen, and there was bush country for
shelter and hill country for refuge when the commandos
were too closely hunted. *The Boers made full use of their
advantages. No people in its hour of need has surely pro-
duced a company of leaders in the field superior in skill and
constancy to Botha, De Wet, De la Rey, Smuts, Beyers,
Kemp, and others. And the men they led were the refined
essence of their people, the core from which the dross had
fallen away. There may have been 50,000 burghers still under
arms at the beginning of 1901 ; at the final surrender in May
1902 there were little more than 20,000. To effect this reduc-
tion Great Britain had to spend something like a million and a
half pounds a week and to maintain over a quarter of a million
troops in the field. No other people than the South African
Dutch could have withstood privation, danger, and ruin so
long ; no other nation than the British would have spent blood
and treasure so stubbornly for so little apparent result.

This period of the war, during which Lord Kitchener was
in chief command, passed through several phases. At first it
was hoped that the numerous small, mobile columns would so
hustle and harry the commandos remaining in the field that
they would recognize the futility of further resistance and sue
for peace. The failure of this hope led to the policy of clear-
ing the country of all means of subsistence, of destroying the
farms, of concentrating the women and children in camps, of
driving off or slaughtering all cattle and sheep, and of burning
the crops and grass. This policy of destruction was much
condemned, and was, naturally, distasteful to the men who
carried it out ; but it was a stern necessity. If it hardened the
enemy's resistance at the time, it broke it in the end. (" It's
beastly work, but ought to be done thoroughly if done at all,"
wrote > Allenby.) Finally, in the latter part of 1901 and begin-
ning of 1902, the country was fenced into areas by the great
blockhouse lines ; and the system was introduced of * driving 9
an area by a line of columns, till the Boers in it were penned
against some natural obstacle or some part of the fortified line
of blockhouses. This ended the long war at last.

IO2

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

The Boer leaders meanwhile, some of whom, though not
all, were wise in strategy as well as in tactics, had seen that
the last hope of tiring out British endurance or closing British
purse-strings was by carrying the war into British territory.
Accordingly the main efforts of their best men and b$st leaders
centred on the invasion of Natal and Cape Colony.

Natal, with its rampart of hills, was comparatively easy to
defend, and the enemy never penetrated beyond the borders ;
but the great open spaces of Cape Colony were never cleared
of small parties of Boers, who rode to within sight of the sea,
and once almost to within raiding distance of Cape Town.
The problems and difficulties of dealing with the elusive
enemy may, perhaps, be compared with the difficulties of
combating the submarine campaign in the Great War. The
commandos moved over the trackless veldt to raid a convoy
or attack an isolated column with the secrecy of U-boats on a
trade route, and after their attack disappeared as silently and
swiftly from the columns that gathered to net them. They
were sometimes destroyed or crippled, as the U-boats were;
but, like them, they took a heavy toll of their slower, less
wary opponents.

AJlenby was one of the 'few original column commanders
whose military reputation and physical endurance survived
to the end of that wearing test. 1 Almost alone of them, he
never suffered a reverse or lost a convoy, yet few were as
active or daring in search of the enemy. He maintained the
same coolness and vigour in action, the same trust in and
support of his subordinates, the same vigilance in protective
measures, that had gained him so high a reputation as regi-
mental commander. His lack of personal ambition and
absolute loyalty both to the orders of his Chief and to his
fellow-commanders were qualities by no means universal

1 " The war about to be waged required commanders possessing attributes but rarely
associated with advancing years : the power of remaining long hours in the saddle, of
enduring extremes of temperature and of climate, of bivouacking on sodden ground
with no covering but a blanket, of thriving on hard biscuits and bully beef, and of
yet remaining fresh and alert, ready to risk their reputations and their lives in the keen
pursuit of a skilful foe." (" The Times " History of the War in South Africa^ vol. v.)

103

ALLENBY

among the column leaders of the time, of whom a number
were striving jealously for distinction and reward under a
strict and exacting Chief, who excused no failures and did not
discourage competition among his subordinate commanders.
There were few who could write with perfect truth, as Allenby
wrote to his wife when a somewhat over-coloured account of
his captures appeared in the Press, " I always try to state in my
reports exactly what happened without any ornamentation,
so I am not responsible for the exaggerated form of the
official version " ; or who had the loyalty and sense to recog-
nize, on receiving an order which completely upset his plans,
that " My column is only one pawn in the game, and the man
with the chessboard in front of him has a bigger view than I,
who can only see one square on the board, or at most two."
Towards the end of the war he wrote, perhaps with some
justification, " I am beginning to think that I am one of the
few commanders out here who do not play to the gallery, and
tell lies to push themselves. But this is blasphemous ! "

The strength and composition of his column varied a little
from time to time ; its essential elements were two regiments
of cavalry, a battery of Horse Artillery, a long-range gun, one
or two pom-poms, and half a battalion of infantry. The Scots
Greys were with Allenby till the end of 1901, when they were
transferred to another column, 1 being replaced by the i3th
Hussars; the Carabiniers (6th Dragoon Guards) were with
him throughout. The infantry was changed more frequently ;
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, Lancashire Fusiliers, and Durham
Light Infantry were with the force at various times. The role
of infantry with a mobile column was monotonous and weary-
ing hard marching by day, outpost work at night, and little
prospect of even seeing the enemy unless he attacked the
supply-wagons or the camp. An officer of the Royal Innis-
killing Fusiliers, who was in after-years closely connected
with Allenby, describes thus his first sight of him :

1 The Scots Greys after leaving Allenby were twice involved in small affairs in
which they were somewhat heavily punished by the enemy. Was different luck or
different leadership responsible ?

104

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

As a second lieutenant of eighteen I was ordered to South
Africa to join tny regiment, which formed part of a mobile column
commanded by Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) Allenby.,
operating in the Transvaal. News of its whereabouts was difficult
to obtain, but I eventually joined it one evening after dark. Next
morning the battalion paraded at daybreak; while we were
waiting to move off three or four officers galloped to the front
of the column, led by a big man on a bkck horse. As they passed
groans and uncomplimentary exclamations arose from the ranks,
and I naturally inquired from my colour-sergeant the reason of
the extraordinary reception accorded to my future commander.
The explanation came : " Well, you see, sir, when Mr Allenby is
going to march us twenty miles he always rides the big black
horse, and when we are not g"oing far he rides the wee pony.
Glory be to God, he has ridden that big horse for the past three
days ! " Two days afterwards the " wee pony " was ridden, and
he and his rider were greeted with loud cheers. 1

Allenby's Brigade-Major was Major Paul Kenna, of the
zist Lancers, a cheerful little man and a dashing soldier, who
had won the Victoria Cross at Omdurman. 2 His signal officer,
who became Brigade-Major when Kerma was appointed to
command a column, was Captain Bailey, of the izth Royal
Lancers. Sir John Jetvis commanded the artillery, and Major
Leader, 3 of the Carabiniers, the brigade scouts ; both of these
later received command of columns. Father Knapp, who had
gone home in 1900,* came out again in April 1901, and was
with Allenby till August of that year. He ran the staff mess.

Any detail of the column's trekking would be as wearisome
to read as it often was to perform. A brief summary will
suffice. In the early part of 1901 the column was one of a
number which operated under Sir John French in the Eastern
Transvaal against Louis Botha. March was spent on the
Swaziland border, where heavy rains had swollen the rivers
and made movement difficult, men and horses being reduced

1 Allenby's sobriquet with some of the troops in his column was * c Old Knobkerrie,"
from the stick he carried.

2 He was killed in Gallipoli as a brigade commander in 1915.

3 The late Major-General H. P. Leader, drowned in a yachting accident in 1934.
* See pp. 92-93.

105

ALLENBY

to half-rations. In April the column moved north and oper-
ated for a time near Middelburg (on the Pretoria-Delagoa
Bay line). In May it returned to Pretoria, and from then till
the middle of September operated in the Western Trans-
vaal about the Magaliesburg range of hills. Allenby and his
column had been promised a rest after a hard spell of work,
but were immediately railed south to Natal to assist in repelling
Botha's threatened invasion. Most of October was spent on
the borders of Zululand, in a country Allenby had known well
in 1888.

At the end of that month he went with his Brigade-Major to
Pretoria to ask from Lord Kitchener a rest for his tired horses
and an opportunity to get them fit. This was a constant and
justified complaint of the commanders of mobile forces at this
period that they were kept so continually on the move and
transferred so often from the direction of one General to that
of another, all in a hurry to make a bag of Boers and their
own reputation, that their horses were always overworked and
weary, and no district was ever thoroughly and systemati-
cally cleared. (" They are in such a hurry they can't finish a
job, but rush off on another chase, like a half-broken pointer,"
complained Allenby.) Lord Kitchener promised a fortnight's
rest; but on return to his column Allenby found it hurriedly
on the move for a forced march to Bakenlaagte, near Ermelo,
where Benson's column had suffered disaster. For the re-
mainder of 1901 the column was in the Eastern Transvaal,
usually working as one of a group of columns under General
Bruce Hamilton.

Towards the end of the year even AUenby's iron constitu-
tion and imperturbable spirit showed signs of the strain of
over two years' continuous warfare in the field, during which
he had had no holiday and had never had a roof over his head
for more than a very occasional night or two. He went down
with influenza, and after a week in hospital at Pretoria spent
ten days' leave in Durban. About the same time Mrs Allenby,
sensing from his letters his weariness of spirit and need of her,
determined to embark for South Africa. She arrived at Durban

1 06

DURING THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

The officer standing next to Allenby is Captain J. W. Yardley.

&IEUTENANT-COLONEL ALLENBY IN 1904, WHEN IN COMMAND
OF THE 5TH LANCERS

Photo Adclphus Tear 107

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

early in 1902. Allenby, whose column was engaged in the
final great ' drives * in the Transvaal and north of the Orange
River Colony, did not find opportunity to meet her till the
middle of May, when the negotiations which ended the war
were in progress and operations were in suspension. Peace
was declared on May 31, a peace which paved the way to
eventual reconciliation of the two peoples who had fought
so stubbornly, and to a united South Africa.

No one welcomed the end of the campaign with greater
delight and relief than Allenby. He had spent two and a half
years continuously in the field with hardly a rest and without
sight of his wife and small son, who were so constantly in his
thoughts. There is hardly a letter that he wrote home during
that period that does not express his distaste for war and his
longing for peace and the gardens of England. His accounts
in those letters of his fights and marches are brief and per-
functory, but a new wildflower receives affectionate and
understanding description, as in this extract from a letter
written in October 1901 from the Zululand border:

1 found the most gorgeous wildflower to-day that I have ever
seen. Imagine a brilliant golden-yellow marguerite, rather cup-
shaped, measuring 4^ inches across I measured it with a tape.
The outer petals are in two layers, springing from a neat corolla
of green spines. The centre is a deeper gold colour, and is rather
like the orange centre of a white water-lily. The plant is low
ajid bushy, its leaves growing in spikes like a young spruce fir.
Each spine of the leaves is edged with sharp prickles that one
can't handle comfortably* The leaves when squashed smell like
a mixture of juniper and myrtle. A lot of it is growing on a little
hill near here, but I only saw one flower. Unfortunately it is
spring; 1 and if I dug up a root it would die; and we shan't be
here in the autumn (at least I hope not !). I have never seen the
plant at home. I may have made a discovery. If so, I should
name it Mabella Aureal I enclose some of the spines off the flower
stem. There is a very fine gladiolus about these parts, pretty
plentiful : primrose yellow, with deep orange-red spots and strip-
ings. That too I have never seen at home; but it is probably

1 October is in the South African spring,

2 Mabel was Mrs AJlenby's name.

107

ALLENBY

known, as it is well distributed in these parts. The scenery here
is good, but Boers are too numerous. I am off, at an early hour,
to try for some of them.

Again, in the same letter :

Only a few Boer scouts seen to-day. The country here is
covered with spring flowers ; mostly of the marigold or marguer-
ite type, of all colours, white, scarlet, mauve, purple and bright
yellow. All the bush is green, too, and the grass sprouting ; so
that the country is quite good to look at. If there were no Dutch-
men about, and one had not to be always on the look-out and on
the move, I should like to bring you here to look at this part
of the world. I always think it is the most picturesque corner of
South Africa. I know it pretty well too, and could guide you as
well as any native. I should like you to see the c Kaffir-Boom * in
flower. The flower comes on before the leaves ; and the tree is
like a big fig-tree, clothed in brilliant, scarlet, sweet-pea flowers.
It glares in the bush like a red lamp. In about six weeks the whole
of the valley will be golden with the thorn-bush (mimosa) blossom.
There are about a dozen different kinds of this mimosa bush,
native to the land, all thorny and all with the yellow mimosa
bloom, but the blossoms are of different shapes.

And, after a few lines about the operations and a grumble
at the way his horses ate overworked by ambitious infantry
Generals, he goes on :

To change the subject. This would be a lovely site for a house,
if there were no Dutchmen about. Beautiful scenery; and a
quick-running river, full of fish. Climate good, as long as you
are in a house. Everything will grow here. Pineapples, bananas,
roses, trees of all sorts, beautiful grass and endless numbers of
wildflowers. If this war ever ends, you and I must come here
and live cheap, while Mick's doing his schooling. I saw yesterday
the most beautiful bell heather. The bells were coral-pink in
colour; growing in clusters, each bell about two inches long.
The veldt here is now carpeted with flowers. I have seen a lot
of the yellow flower I told you of at the beginning of this letter.
It is very free-flowering. Yesterday I saw one clump about z feet
across, with 30 full-blown blossoms. I expect to get to Vryheid
to-morrow evening or next morning.

These extracts have been given at some length since they

108

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

show so clearly Allenby's love of flowers and interest in
nature. War was to him a tedious, distasteful business, which
interfered with enjoyment of the quiet and beautiful fruits
of the earth. Yet, since soldiering was his profession and
thoroughness was the very root of his character, he ended the
war acknowledged as one of the best younger leaders it had
produced. He received as rewards for his services a Com-
panionship of the Bath, brevet promotion to Colonel, and
appointment to command the 5th Lancers. 1 He had cele-
brated his forty-first birthday just before the conclusion of
hostilities by having a * salute * of forty-one pom-pom shells
fired at a small party of Boers seen at long range in the open.
The other future Army commanders of the Great War
besides Allenby had been among the column commanders of
South Africa. Haig led a group of columns in Cape Colony;
Smith-Dorrien, the future commander of the Second Army,
already a Major-General, was at the beginning of 1901 in the
North-eastern Transvaal ; 2 Plumer, who was to succeed
Smith-Dorrien in the Second Army in 1915 and to lead it to
the end of the War, was usually to be found working quietly
and efficiently in the Eastern Transvaal with a column or
group of columns ; Rawlinson (Fourth Army) had a roving
commission in the Orange River Colony or Transvaal;
Byng, who took over the Third Army from Allenby when he
went to Palestine in 1917, normally ranged over the Orange
River Colony; and Gough, the future commander of the
Fifth Army, had a small force of Mounted Infantry, which his
impetuosity led to defeat and capture in a trap carefully pre-
pared by the Boers during Botha's attempted invasion of
Natal. 3

1 His service in the Great War, of course, brought further honours to Allenby. In
1915 he was created a Knight Commander of the Bath (he became Knight Grand Cross
in 1918), and in 1917 a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St Michael and St George.
In 1919, after the close of the War, he received the thanks of Parliament, a grant of
50,000, promotion to Field-Marshal, and a Viscounty. He chose as his title Viscount
AJIenby of Megiddo and Felixstowe.

2 He left South Africa in May 1901 to take up an important appointment in India.

3 Gough himself was captured, but escaped and was picked up by AHenby's column,
which had gone to the rescue.

109

CHAPTER V

PREPARATION FOR ARMAGEDDON
(1902-14)

COMMAND OF THE 5TH LANCERS
(August lyoz-October 1905)

ALLENBY was quartered in England during the whole twelve
years between the South African War and the Great War.
He never soldiered in India. These were quiet, peaceful years,
but years of hard work and thought for soldiers who had the
efficiency of the Army at heart. The South African conflict
had revealed our complete lack of organization for any war
larger than an expedition against a savage tribe, and had
shown how far behind the times was much of our equipment
and training. Allenby, as regimental and brigade commander,
and later as Inspector-General, had a large part in the re-
organization and training of the cavalry arm, a greater share
in which, however (as in all our preparations up to 1914),
must be credited to his single-minded fellow-student at the
Staff College, Douglas Haig. 1

Allenby took over command of the 5th Lancers at Col-
chester, to which station they had proceeded on their return
from South Africa. He quickly proved that he could train a
regiment in barracks and on the manoeuvre ground as ably as
he could lead one in the field : the two faculties by no means
always go together. The root of Allenby's method in peace

1 Haig after the South African War to6k over the command of his regiment, the
lyth Lancers, but in 1903 Kitchener, now Commander-in-Chief in India, asked for him
as Inspector-General of Cavalry. He accordingly went to India, and was promoted
Major-General in 1904, five years before Allenby, though both had received Brevet-
Colonelcies in the same Gazette at the end of the South African War. In 1906 he
returned to the War Office, as Director of Staff Duties, to assist Haldane in his reorganiza-
tion of the Army.

1 10

PREPARATION FOR ARMAGEDDON

as in war was trust in his subordinates ; he gave his squadron
commanders a clear picture of what he expected, and then
left them a free hand. He once said that he would like to
see inscribed in the room of every commander this precept
of Confucius: "My people become good of themselves."
Though strict, he was no martinet, and maintained discipline
rather by the force of his personality than by the severity of
his awards in the orderly room. Some officers used, in fact,
to think him too easy with the men, by the standard of those
days. He had always hated punishment; as a squadron
commander he had been heard to say to a malefactor, " Go
away ! I am far too angry with you to trust myself to punish
you." And, indeed, the fear of Allenby's wrath was a greater
deterrent to many than the cells. A dressing down from him
was not an experience that the hardiest cared to repeat.

A characteristic that some found singular in Allenby, with
his broad and independent rnind, was his strict insistence on
conformity with Regulations. He would say that as long as
an official regulation was in force it must be obeyed; if it
was a bad regulation one should try to have it altered. There
is a type of mind which sticks narrowly and pedantically to
written regulations, rather than exercising personal judgment;
this, naturally, was not the cause of Allenby's attitude, which
was simply an expression of the scrupulous loyalty to superior
authority which was one of his guiding principles throughout
life.

An account of Allenby from one of the officers of the 5th
Lancers shows how he impressed those who served under him :

Under a brusque manner there was unbounded human sym-
pathy. He expected all one could give, but was always ready to
help in sickness or in trouble. He had a keen sense of humour
and was very quick at repartee. 1 He was intolerant of any pre-
varication and insisted on an answer yes or no. But he was

1 This gift of formidable repartee ksted him to the end of his military career. A
Medical Officer in Egypt, who sought to excuse the presence of flies in a cookhouse
for which he was responsible by saying that the battalion using it had only been there
a few days, was met by the instant retort: " I didn't ask how long the battalion has
been here. I asked how long these damn* flies have been here, and why ! "

III

ALLENBY

sympathetic with ignorance, and was a most willing and capable
teacher. " Think to a finish," was a very favourite remark of his.
He would shoulder full responsibility for any fault found by
higher authority, and had consequently the unfailing loyalty of
all ranks.

He had a great grasp of the smallest details of regimental life,
and during an inspection nothing escaped him. His questions
were sometimes most disconcerting, but behind them lurked
often a great sense of humour, which though not apparent at the
time would be revealed later by a hint.

On manoeuvres his ability to use ground as cover was quite
uncanny. Once on Salisbury Plain he surrounded with the
regiment the headquarters and transport of an opposing division;
the blank surprise on the face of the divisional commander when
called upon to surrender was interesting. He commanded the
Cavaky Brigade during the manoeuvres when troops of the
Aldershot Command landed at Clacton. The brigade was always
early afield, and the standing joke amongst the men was : " Well,
what did Allenby capture for breakfast this morning ? "

He was an intensely keen fisherman and good with the dry
fly. When the regiment was at West Down Camp on Salisbury
Plain for manoeuvres, there was many a gallop to Netheravon
after the day's work, rod in hand, fishing till the last streak of
daylight, then a gallop home in the dark, in which rabbit-holes
seemed to have no terrors for him.

After two years at Colchester the jth Lancers joined the
ist Cavalry Brigade at Aldershot, of which Kenna, Allenby' s
staff officer in South Africa, was Brigade-Major. A year later,
in October 1905, Allenby returned to Colchester as Brigadier-
General in Command of the 4th Cavalry Brigade.

In August 1905, just before he gave up command of the
5th Lancers, Allenby was awarded by the Royal Humane
Society a testimonial for saving life. He was staying on a
yacht which his father-in-law had chartered for Cowes Week,
and went out for a sail in the yacht's dinghy with a. Miss
Papillon, the mate of the yacht, and the cabin-boy. It was a
rough day, and a sudden squall capsized the boat, which
sank. Neither Miss Papillon nor the mate could swim, and
Allenby supported them both for twenty minutes, at the same

112

PREPARATION FOR ARMAGEDDON

time encouraging the cabin-boy, who was becoming ex-
hausted. But for his strength and coolness some at least of
the party would have been drowned. They were rescued by
boats from another yacht just when Allenby was contem-
plating the desperate venture of trying to swim ashore with
his burden.

THE 4TH CAVALRY BRIGADE
(October lyoj-Otfober 1909)

On the military side there is little to write of the four years
during which Allenby commanded a cavalry brigade. The
brigade was a scattered one, with regiments at Colchester,
Norwich, and Hpunslow. One of these, the i9th Hussars at
Norwich, was commanded from the beginning of 1908 by
one of the most brilliant of the rising generation of soldiers,
Sir Philip Chetwode, 1 who was to be Allenby's principal
lieutenant in Palestine. Each was quick to recognize the
worth of the other, and from now until the end of the Great
War their careers were closely associated. Allenby trained the
brigade with his usual ability and common sense, and com-
manded it with decision and vigour.

Here is, perhaps, the place to say something of the rough-
ness of manner, the violence of temper, and the vehemence of
speech which became commonly associated with his name in
the Army, and gave him his title and reputation as " the Bull/*
There is a certain irony in the qualities of this gallant but
low-brow animal being attached in the general mind to one
who was the most highly informed and scholarly of soldiers
and at heart the most kindly and tolerant of men. Nor was
Allenby's courage the blind, unreasoning impetuosity of the
charging bull : he was cool and observant in danger. Yet the
name fitted him in some ways. He looked as solid, as un-
changeable, and often as dangerous as his namesake; and at

1 Field-Marshal Sir PhiHp Chetwode, Bart., G.C.B.; O.M., aC.S.L, K.C.M.G.,
D.S.O.

H 113

ALLENBY

certain well-known c red rags * would charge as unhesitatingly.
Also it cannot be denied that in Allenby increasing authority
brought increasing asperity. He who had been a noticeably
easy-going young officer and a good-humoured squadron-
commander, was a strict Colonel, an irascible Brigadier, and
an explosive General.

* Explosion * best describes the typical manifestation of
AUenby's wrath; it was sudden, violent, and disastrous
soon over, but it usually left the victim or victims visibly
shaken and unnerved. What was the explanation of this
flaw in AUenby's fine and generous nature ? For it must be
judged a flaw that he failed to curb his anger. Curious as it
may sound to many, Allenby's lack of control was, originally
at least, due partly to shyness. He had never been a good
mixer * ; he admitted few to friendship and almost none to
intimacy ; he would have preferred in many ways the life of
a recluse and a scholar. It was an effort and an embarrass-
ment to him that as he rose in rank he had continually to deal
with an increasing number of fresh, sometimes uncongenial,
personalities. His great contemporary Haig, also a shy and
lonely man, met the same problem by withdrawing coldly
into an impenetrable armour of restraint and reserve ; Allenby,
with less self-discipline, exploded outwardly.

Two causes chiefly provoked his outbursts a lack of zeal
for the King's service and a want of frankness in conduct or
of directness in speech. He, who always gave unsparingly of
his best, was deeply angered by any slackness or carelessness
in the performance of duty or by neglect of orders ; the most
straightforward of men, he was exasperated by any subterfuge
or evasion. Failure, if genuine effort had been made, he
pardoned easily; nor did he treat ignorance harshly. At his
most blustering he seldom used an oath, but his anger was
none the less formidable. In his later years, when he was
aware of his reputation, he sometimes consciously lived up
to it; but to the end he never realized quite how alarming
he could be. One officer, of considerable service and experi-
ence, collapsed altogether while being reproved by him, and

114

PREPARATION FOR ARMAGEDDON

had to be led hastily away. Allenby was genuinely surprised :
" What affected him like that ? I wasn't even really angry with
him/ 3 His gusts of temper cleared Allenby 5 s mind of all
rancour ; he never bore a grudge, and would often go out of
his way to do a kindness to one who had been the object of
his unsparing condemnation shortly before.

In his home life these years between the two long wars
were very happy ones for Allenby. He watched his deeply
loved son Michael grow up into a boy after his own heart,
fearless, unspoilt, intelligent, and healthy. Michael was in-
directly the means of sowing the first seed of the Boy Scouts
organization. His governess, Miss Loveday, had been trained
to use for children's outdoor occupations a little red book,
Aids to Scouting., written by General Baden-Powell for soldiers.
One day she and Michael had climbed a big cedar-tree in the
drive from which to make observations of birds and animals
and to note the sounds of the countryside. Allenby happened
to return home on horseback and rode under the tree. He did
not look up, and as he passed below Michael cried out, " Father,
you're shot 1 A soldier should look above as well as around
him ! " General Baden-Powell, on a visit to the AUenbys,
was told of this incident and of the use to which his book was
being put. He decided to rewrite the book as Scoutingfor Boys,
and from this grew the Boy Scout movement. 1

The AUenbys' home at Colchester, Roman Hill House, had
a pleasant garden, open fields, a small wood full of wildflowers,
and a stretch of water (which they stocked with rainbow
trout 2 ), so that they were enabled to live the country life that
both loved. Colchester was within easy distance of Felix-
stowe, where Allenby had spent so much of his boyhood,
and where his mother still lived. For recreation he hunted,
fished, or shot in due season; but he gave up polo, as his
weight made him too expensive to mount. In all his pursuits
his wife was his constant companion. Together they taught
their son the love that both had inherited of country life and

1 Lord Baden-Powell has related this story in his book Lessons from the * Varsity ofUfe.

2 According to the gardener, Allenby caught them all before he left.

ALLENBY

of books and learning. On a New Forest pony, a present
ftom his grandfather, Michael was instructed in horsemanship
by a sergeant-major in the riding-school and by his father in the
hunting-field. 1 Presently he went to his first school, at West-
gate-on-Sea.

Allenby and his wife spent much of his leave in foreign
travel. In February and March 1908 they made a trip to East
Africa, visiting Mombasa, Nairobi, and the Victoria Nyanza,
in those days a much more unusual journey than now. This
interest in travel and in seeing fresh parts of the world, not
those usually visited by tourists, remained with Allenby to
the end of his life. His robust frame and health enabled him
to stand the fatigues of travelling better than many much
younger men, and his keen interest in new sights, and especially
in new bird-life or animal-life or strange plants and flowers,
never flagged. He had given up smoking soon after the
South African War, for fear of its effect on his eyesight,
which was remarkably keen. One of his outdoor accomplish-
ments was the throwing of a boomerang, which he could
manage expertly.

Ill

INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF CAVALRY
(1910-14)

He was wont to speak plain and to the purpose, like an honest man
and a soldier. , 7 A , - ,

SHAKESPEARE, Much Ado about Nothing

Allenby was promoted Major-General in September 1909,
at the age of forty-eight. Of the cavalrymen who were more
or less his contemporaries and were destined to hold high
posts in the Great War, Haig reached General's rank at
forty-three, Byng at forty-seven, and Robertson (who spent
ten years in the ranks) at fifty-one. After a period of half-
pay, part of which he spent travelling in South America,
Allenby was appointed Inspector-General of Cavalry in the

* On leaving Woolwich in 1915 Michael showed the profit of his instruction by
being second in the riding competition.

116

PREPARATION FOR ARMAGEDDON

spring of 1910. His work took him to all the cavalry stations
in Great Britain and Ireland ; his headquarters were in London,
at the Horse Guards. He had to give up the country life he
loved so much and take a house in London,, in Onslow Square.
He never again had an English garden of his own. Pressure
of work and reasons of economy (Allenby's private income
was small, and much of it was spent on his son's education)
led him at the same time to give up hunting.

Allenby's training of the cavalry was on sound and prac-
tical lines. He held a middle course between the hotheads
who would have it that the * cavalry spirit ? demanded the
solution of all problems by shock action and those who would
have discarded the lance and sword altogether and treated the
cavalry merely as mobile riflemen. 1 He supported the intro-
duction of machine-guns and stressed the value of fire-power, 2
but taught that many opportunities for intervention by
mounted action and the sword would still occur on the modern
battlefield. He may not have been gifted with that foresight
which enabled some critics, writing years after the War, to
predict so accurately its tactical course; but he did help to
produce a mounted arm that was in 1914 more realistic in its
outlook and more effective in the field than any of the other
cavalries of Europe.

A staff ride which he ordered and directed in 1911 in the
Eastern Counties gives proof of considerable prevision. It
was based on a Blue Force (Germany) invading Redland
(France) by passing through a neutral state (Belgium), while
the army of an overseas Power, the Hibernians, with a strength
and organization corresponding to the British Expeditionary
Force, landed at Newhaven (Boulogne) to support Redland.
The exercise studied the action of the Hibetnian Cavalry

1 Erskine Childers, the author of that best of all spy stories, The Ttiddfe of the Sands*
had raised a heated controversy on the rdle of the cavalry by a cleverly argued book,
War and the Arme 'Blanche, based on the events of the Boer War and the war in Man-
churia, and introduced by a foreword from Lord Roberts.

2 In his remarks at a lecture on cavalry given at the Royal United Service Institution
in November 1910 Allenby said, " We do not make sufficient use of machine-guns.
The weapon is not properly understood. . . . Personally I believe that it is going to
have an enormous future before it as a cavalry weapon.**

ALLENBY

Division throughout the phases of disembarkation, an
approach march to the north, reconnaissance of the advancing
Blue Force, and then withdrawal in face of superior numbers
to avoid envelopment a very intelligent anticipation of 1914.

Cavalry in retreat was a subject which Allenby frequently
discussed before the War, and in which he constantly exercised
his brigades. The last staff ride of the Cavalry Division was
held in May 1914. The final day of this exercise dealt with
retreat ; and the last words of the official address given by
Allenby to the officers of the Cavalry Division before the War
recommended them to study the c manoeuvre in retreat/ He
once turned to a civilian friend while riding with him on
Salisbury Plain and said suddenly, "How would you set
about firing a forest to cover a retreating army ? "

But if the British cavalry was better trained than any of
its contemporaries, and at least as well equipped, there were
serious faults in its organization. A division of four brigades,
each of three regiments, besides artillery and other auxiliary
arms, was a most unwieldy formation for a divisional staff to
handle. The German cavalry division had six regiments only,
in three brigades of two regiments each ; this was considered
by the nation which had studied war most deeply the largest
number of mounted men that could be handled by a divisional
staff. And the overgrown British division, twice the size of
the German, was not even allowed a permanent staff in peace-
time, and was seldom assembled for training. In the four
years preceding the War it was trained as a division twice
only in 1910 on Salisbury Plain and in 1912, when Army
manoeuvres took place in the Eastern Counties. In 1911 a
drought caused its concentration to be cancelled, and in 1913
considerations of economy. The Inspector-General of Cavalry,
who became commander of the division in war, had no staff
officer in peace and took over a war staff formed by officers
taken from various appointments and brought together for the
first time on mobilization.

It was a serious blot on our otherwise admirable prepara-
tions for war that the formation likely to take first contact with

118

PREPARATION FOR ARMAGEDDON

the enemy should be so unhandily organized and so freshly
staffed. 1 Of soldiers, Haig, who did more than anyone to
shape our 1914 expeditionary force and was himself a cavalry-
man, must bear the primary responsibility ; and Allenby must
share it for his acquiescence. But the real fault lay in the false
financial economy which insists on the limitation of staffs in
peace to the bare minimum required for peace-time routine.
The limitation of the peace strength of units is a grave dis-
advantage in training for war, but the limitation of staffs is an
even more dangerous economy. The starved body can more
quickly and easily be recuperated than the starved brain.

While the soundness of Allenby 9 s teaching and the effective-
ness of his methods were recognized and appreciated by all
thinking cavalrymen, it cannot be said that he was a popular
Inspector. To begin with, though a strong horseman, he was
not a polished one, and hardly the cavalry's idea of how a
dashing leader of British chivalry should ride. And to the
great majority of cavalry officers, who had no opportunity of
knowing him closely, his manners seemed as rough as his
horsemanship. The average cavalry officer, though just as
keen and efficient as his infantry comrade, and usually quicker-
witted, did not take so kindly to strict discipline. To him
Allenby's insistence on the exact observance of detail seemed
irksome and needless. There was the chin-strap rule, for
instance. No previous Inspector had ever deemed it necessary
that the cavalry should always wear the chin-strap of the
service cap actually on the chin. To Allenby it seemed ob-
vious ; why was the chin-strap there except for use ? And
when the cavalry were operating at speed, as cavalry ought to
operate, caps frequently fell off unless properly secured.
Either the man lost his cap and had to pay for it or time
was wasted and the cohesion of the formation was spoilt by
men or officers falling out to recover their caps. 2 Logic and

1 The danger had been emphasized in a report by the then Inspector in 1907, and
was doubtless expressed also by other Inspectors.

2 " I have seen regiments charge, waving their swords in the air, some of the men
holding their helmets or their caps on with their sabre hand." (From remarks by Allenby
at a lecture on cavalry.)

ALLENBY

common sense were on AHenby's side when he decreed that
the chin-strap should be worn under the chin at all times, but
to many the rule seemed tiresome, and it was at first evaded.
Allenby, of course, had his way, and woe betide the officer
or man who appeared before him without his chin-strap
down ! But it did not enhance his popularity. 1 Another order
of which Allenby demanded strict observance was that the
rifle should be thrust right down in the rifle-bucket. The
soldier was fond of placing an old sock or rag at the bottom of
the bucket, but Allenby had an unerring eye for rifle-butts
which were even a sock's width above the normal level. It
was useless for the soldier to protest that the rifle was driven
home to the bottom; Allenby insisted on investigation, and
in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred some foreign body was
found at the end of the bucket.

Allenby's inspections were famed, and often dreaded, for
their thoroughness, for the searching nature of the questions
to which he expected an immediate and direct answer, and for
the explosions which might follow a vague or unsatisfactory
reply. But, as the 5th Lancers had found, 2 behind the most
awkward questions there often lurked a sense of humour.
On one occasion, when inspecting a regiment, he stopped
suddenly and said to the squadron commander, " Do all your
men wear socks ? " " Why, of course, sir/' said the scandal-
ized commander. " I wonder/' replied Allenby. " Dismount
that trooper " (pointing to a man in the ranks), " and let him
take off his boots." The man was found barefooted. " There
you are, you see," said Allenby. " Not at all what I would
have expected in a well-conducted squadron ! " Later, when
the inspection was over, the crest-fallen squadron commander
summoned courage and asked Allenby, " General, how did
you know that man had no socks ? " " Well," said Allenby,
" he was my batman once. I could never make the fellow

1 This resistance to the wearing of chin-straps marks an odd change in military
fashion. Up to the beginning of the twentieth century at least, the line of the chin-
strap on a sunburnt face was a recognized trade-mark of the soldier. And " lean on
your chin-strap " was an ironical adjunction of the old soldier to the tired recruit.

3 Seep. 112.

120

PREPARATION FOR ARMAGEDDON

wear them; I wondered whether you had been more suc-
cessful."

On another occasion at the conclusion of an inspection he
demanded to see the regiment's pioneer stores. After some
delay the key was found and the store opened, to reveal a
floor covered with cabbage-stalks, on which a number of
black and white rabbits were contentedly browsing, their
hutches being formed by the canvas collapsible boats which
were one of the principal items of the pioneer stores. The
Colonel looked at Allenby in consternation, to find with relief
that he was rocking with laughter.

Allenby was no respecter of persons, and senior officers,
even his Brigadiers, sometimes suffered reproof in public
and felt his barbed force of repartee. On one occasion, for
example, when training the Cavalry Division, he set an exer-
cise for a Saturday morning. It was timed to conclude by
noon, and many officers had made arrangements for week-
end leave. But the operation went wrong, and Allenby
ordered it to be repeated. The afternoon was well advanced
when he assembled the officers for his criticism of the exercise.
As he began his opening remarks, the Brigadier chiefly con-
cerned stepped forward and interrupted him with, "I am
ready to admit at once, sir, that what occurred was entirely
my fault." If he hoped by thus taking the blame to cut short
the conference, he was mistaken. Allenby merely turned to
him with the remark, " But I have yet to hear a suggestion,

General , that it was anyone else's," and proceeded with

his detailed criticisms. To another Brigadier he once re-
marked, more crudely, " There are fools, dam' fools, and you,
General ."

On the tactics, discipline, and general readiness for war of
the cavalry AUenby's four years as Inspector left a wholesome
and invigorating impression. On the human side, while the
force and straightforwardness of his personality were recog-
nized and respected, he did not succeed in gaining the full
confidence of the cavalry. The last thing he ever sought was
popularity, and he was right ; but he was too careless of the

121

ALLENBY

effect Ms brusque manner and occasional roughness had upon
his subordinates. " Roughness . . . ," wrote that wise man
Francis Bacon in his essay on Great Place, " is a needless cause
of discontent." And AUenby's opportunities in peace of
commanding the division as a whole were too few to enable
him to prove himself as its leader. On the manoeuvres of 1 9 1 2,
indeed, his handling of the cavalry was somewhat severely
criticized ; he was held, in spite of an advantage in numbers,
to have been outmanoeuvred in the enclosed fields of East
Anglia by the commander of the mounted forces on the other
side.

Allenby himself had little doubt for some years before 1914
that Germany intended war when an opportunity came. He
paid several visits to France, watched the French troops on
manoeuvres, and made himself acquainted with the probable
theatre of operations on France's northern frontier. In 1912
he had been nominated as commander of the Cavalry Division
if war came. In August 1914 he was fifty-three years of age,
in foil mental and bodily vigour, as well fitted to meet the
physical fatigues and mental shocks of active service as any
commander in any of the great armies that faced each other.
The longest day's work could not tire him, the most unexpected
and unwelcome news could not shake his iron nerve. Neither
his courage nor his common sense was likely to desert him in
the gravest peril or in the most sudden emergency. He had
proved himself in the field during the long years of the South
African War, and that experience was still fresh in his memory.
He always slept well and ate well. He had read much and
thought much of war, especially of the war that was now to
begin. He was well prepared for the leadership of a force in
the field, and those who knew Mm best could foresee his rise
to greatness if chance favoured him. The most loyal of sub-
ordinates, he had nevertheless the strength of mind and
character for independent command. In one respect only was
his readiness for war lacking : he had failed to win the con-
fidence and liking of those under him. Only the few who
knew him well recognized his mental powers. To the Army

122

PREPARATION FOR ARMAGEDDON

at large, and to the majority of the cavalry he was to lead,
he was " the Bull/' a rough, violent, headstrong soldier, a
c bonny fechter/ perhaps, and a man not likely to lose his head
in a tight place, but hardly a great general. Such was the
penalty in reputation that his brusqueness in manner, the result
largely of a natural shyness, had brought him,

In the so-called " Curragh Incident," shortly before the
outbreak of war, in which the officers of one of the cavalry
brigades were closely concerned, Allenby had no part, and was
not called upon to take any action. With his unquestioning
loyalty to superior authority, there can be no doubt what his
views were. Actually he was at the Curragh inspecting the
Third Brigade at the time of the incident. He at once returned
to London, and was sent for by Sir John French, then Chief
of the Imperial General Staff. AUenby's subsequent account
of the interview was that he related to Sir John all that had
occurred, so far as he knew it, and that the C.LG.S* strode up
and down the room, and every time he passed Allenby, who
was standing by the fire, hit him in the chest and said, ** Damn

that " (an officer who had been specially prominent in

the refusal to serve in Ulster). In view of the respective sizes
of Sir John and Allenby the scene has a comic side.

123

BOOK II
SWORD AND BATON

The badge of rank for general officers is a crossed sword and baton, the
point of the sword to the front and the edge of the bkde outwards. The
badge of rank for a Field-Marshal is crossed batons on a wreath of laurel.

Dress Regulations for the Army

CHAPTER VI

THE CAVALRY IN FRANCE
(August i$i4-May 1915)

MOBILIZATION AND ENGAGEMENT
(August *~z^ 1914)

THE Great War saw the virtual passing from the battlefield
of the cavalry aim, though not, it is hoped., of the cavalry
spirit, which will still find expression in controlling and ex-
ploiting the mobility of armoured vehicles. The fighting
power of men on horses, who have dominated war or taken
an important share in it since the days of Alexander of
Macedon, has fortunately for the horse practically vanished
in face of modern weapons, Alexander was the first great
commander to show how battles and campaigns could be
won by the speed and endurance of horses and the boldness
given to their riders by that speed. The exploits of Allenby's
mounted men in Palestine, twenty-two and a half centuries
later, are likely to be recorded as the last decisive successes of
cavalry dependent on horses, and Allenby himself as the last
great cavalry general. From Alexander to Allenby may be the
title of some future history of the horsed cavalry arm. Yet it is
alleged that Allenby failed as a leader of cavalry in 1914, that
his Cavalry Division did not cover the British retreat as it
should have done, that he lost control of it at the most critical
moment, and that it missed its opportunity in pursuit when the
Germans in their turn retreated from the Marne. To refute
or uphold these accusations it is necessary to examine closely
the conditions in which the cavalry had to work, the orders
Allenby received, and the human and personal circumstances
of the opening stages of the conflict. Man adapts himself
rapidly even to the shocks of a world war ; but the atmosphere

127

ALLENBY

of the first collisions is strange and tense, and brings many
surprises. The events must be judged accordingly. The
British cavalry in 1914 at least accomplished more than the
horsemen of any other of the armies at war.

Headquarters of the Cavalry Division mobilized at Alder-
shot. As already noted, it had no peace-time staff, and the
members of its war staff came together for the first time on
mobilization. The General Staff consisted of Colonel John
Vaughan, 1 from the Cavalry School, a well-known horseman,
who had perhaps been more occupied with equitation than
with staff work in the years immediately preceding the War;
Major A. F. Home, 2 of the nth Hussars, an instructor at the
Staff College; and Captain H. C. L. Howard, 3 of the i6th
Lancers, from an appointment at the War Office. The chief
administrative staff officer was Colonel E. R. O. Ludlow, of
the Army Service Corps, from a staff appointment in the
Northern Command at York. A valuable addition to the staff
was made during mobilization in the person of Colonel G.
Barrow, 4 of the Indian cavalry, whom Allenby met in the
passages of the War Office and annexed as his principal
Intelligence Officer.

The Cavalry Division landed at Havre, and there entrained
for Maubeuge, in the vicinity of which it was concentrated
by August 20. Allenby himself sailed from Southampton
on the 1 5th in the Minneapolis. The Cavalry Division con-
sisted of the ist, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Cavalry Brigades, com-
manded by Brigadier-Generals Briggs, 5 de Lisle, 6 Gough, 7 and

1 Major-General John Vaughan, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.CX He had been Brigade-Major
of the brigade in which Allenby served in South Africa (see p. 82).

2 Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Home, K.C.V.O., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.CX
8 Colonel H. C. L. Howard, C.M.G., D.S.O.

4 General Sk George Barrow, G.C.B., K.C.M.G. After the War he held high
commands and appointments in India, and retired in 1929.

5 Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Briggs, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., who later in the War
commanded an Army Corps.

6 General Sk Beauvok de Lisle, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., commander of an Army
Corps in the War and of the Western Command after the War.

7 General Sir Hubert Gough, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., commander of the
Fifth Army from 1916 to the early part of 1918.

128

THE CAVALRY IN FRANCE

Bingham 1 respectively; two brigades of Horse Artillery
(four batteries of four guns each, armed with 13 -pounders);
a field squadron of Royal Engineers ; and a signal squadron.
A 5th Cavalry Brigade, under Sir Philip Chetwode, had
also been mobilized, but was independent of the Cavalry
Division.

The brigades were living organizations., the division was
not. The brigades had usually been quartered as a whole, had
trained as a whole, and were commanded and staffed in war as
they had been in peace. But since the brigades lay far apart
at Aldershot, Salisbury Plain, in Ireland, and in the east of
England and the Treasury was economical, the division had
rarely been collected or exercised as a whole, and its staff was
improvised. The one permanent element, its commander,
had impressed his personality on the training of the cavalry,
but had failed to win their liking or their confidence. As a
result, the division was a collection of four brigades, well
trained, well equipped, well mounted, and confident, but
owing a somewhat critical and suspicious allegiance to
divisional headquarters, which had thus an almost impossible
task to handle this unwieldy formation in circumstances of
the utmost difficulty and danger, into which they were plunged
at once without any opportunity to settle down.

The British Expeditionary Force that landed in France in
August 1914 was tied to the French war plan. The British
Command had had no hand in framing this plan nor know-
ledge of its strategy. It is remarkable that a great military
nation like the French should have produced, after much study
of the possibilities of a conflict so long foreseen, so vicious a
project as this Plan XVII, based on faulty Intelligence and
a faulty conception of war. More remarkable still were the
skill and fortitude that enabled them to recover from it. If
plans made in peace could ensure success in war France was
doomed. If ever a plan deserved victory it was the Schlieffen
Plan ; if ever one deserved defeat it Was Plan XVII.

The late Msijor-General the Hon. Sir Cecil Bingham, G.C.V.O., KX.M.G., C.B.

i 1*9

ALLENBY

In the original deployment the Cavalry Division was placed
behind the British right. This disposition has been strongly
criticized ; it has been said that Sir John French should have
placed it from the outset on the exposed left flank. 1 This is
to ignore the Intelligence available and the plan to be executed.
There was at this time no suspicion that the right of the
German wheel through Belgium extended so far west as to
overlap the British left. On the contrary, the information
furnished by Joffre's headquarters indicated that the British
Expeditionary Force was outside the right of the German
Fkst Army; and the plan was that it should pivot on its
right and attack the German flank. The position of the
cavalry is therefore intelligible: it was to pass across the
front of the B.E.F., and thus reach its left flank, after the
intended wheel, by the shortest route (see map opposite). On
August 21, in execution of the first stage of this plan, the
cavalry moved forward. All five brigades, including Chet-
wode's, were under Allenby on this day. Contact was gained
with the German cavalry patrols, which were roughly handled,
the superior training of the British horsemen being early
obvious. The only disquieting factor from the tactical point
of view was that the 13 -pounders of the Royal Horse Artillery
were outranged by the guns with the enemy cavalry. The
information gained during the day (mainly by his Intelligence
Officer, Barrow, who with another officer sat in Mons rail-
way-station and rang up every likely place in Belgium where
they might get news of the Germans) convinced Allenby that
the German right extended much farther west than was
suspected. He reported accordingly, but his reports seem to
have had a somewhat sceptical reception at G.H.Q.*

1 There was a complete misunderstanding between Sir John French and Lanrezac,
commander of the Fifth French Army, as to the use to be made of the British cavalry!
The latter got it into his head that the cavalry was to be employed as mounted infantry
and kept as a reserve, (See Brigadier-General Spears* book Uarnn, Chapter VI and
Appeadk XH.) *

* A message to the Cavalry Division from the General Staff at G.H.Q. on this date
read: The information which you have acquired and conveyed to the Commander-
in-Chief appears to be somewhat exaggerated. It is probable that only mounted troops
supported by JSgers are in your immediate neighbourhood."

130

DIAGRAM TO SHOW INTENDED MOVEMENTS OF B E F
AUGUST 21^25" 1914. AS ORDERED ON AUGUST 2O?

I POSITION ON THE 21 * T r
POSITION ON THE 22** ft EM
POSITION ON THE 23*
RAILWAYS
INTER NATIONAL. BOUNDARY

ALLENBY

Next day, however, it became obvious that there was some
miscalculation in the French appreciation; the British right
wheel was cancelled, or at least postponed, and the cavalry,
except Chetwode's 5th Brigade, was ordered to move to the
threatened left flank. This move, begun in the late afternoon
of August 22, meant a long, wearisome march, over cobbled
roads, through the endless streets of mining villages, and was
not completed until 3 A.M. on the 23rd, the day of the battle

of Mons.

At Mons the cavalry was hardly engaged at all, for the
German attack did not reach beyond the left of the Second
Corps, which it was protecting. Allenby, however, who
motored to Valenciennes during the morning and saw the
French commander there, realized (thanks to the efficiency of
his Intelligence Officers) quicker than anyone else on the
British side the scope and menace of the German advance.
On the evening of the 23rd, in spite of an order from G.H.Q.
that the cavalry were to be prepared to move forward towards
Valenciennes at 5 A.M. on the 24th, he filled the wallets of his
saddle with all the maps of the country towards Paris on which
he could lay hands and with spare handkerchiefs, in anticipa-
tion of the baggage being out of touch.

Meanwhile Lanrezac, commander of the Fifth French
Army, on the right of the British, attacked in front by the
German Second Army and on the right flank by the Third, had
ordered a retreat. Not only did he omit to inform his ally,
but he actually sent a request to Sir John French to advance
to the attack, an action which would have exposed the B.E.F.
to certain disaster. Fortunately, however, Sir John French
became aware, late on the 23rd, of Lanrezac's retreat. Staff
officers were summoned to G.H.Q, at Le Gateau, and orders
for retreat were issued at i A.M. on the 24th. Lanrezac's
conduct on this occasion made the British Commander-in-Chief
deeply suspicious of his allies and influenced his attitude
towards them for some time to come.

132

THE CAVALRY IN FRANCE

THE RETREAT
(.August z^-Sepf ember 5, 1914)

In all the trade of war, no feat
Is nobler than a brave retreat.

SAMUEL BUTLER, Httdtbras

To covet a retreat is a traditional role of cavalry, but in
actual history there are few instances of its having done so
if the retreat has been prolonged or closely pressed. In
theory mounted men should have more endurance than in-
fantry, and be better fitted for the strain of constant rear-
guard actions ; in practice they become used up sooner. The
infantryman who gets a respite has only to care for himself
and his rifle ; the cavalryman has also to forage for his horse.
Thus, while cavalry may sacrifice themselves to give the re-
mainder of the army a clean break away, as at Koniggratz in
1866, in any prolonged retreat the brunt of the rearguard work
has usually fallen on the infantry. Ney covered the last tragic
stages of the retreat from Moscow, and Craufurd the retreat
to Corunna, each with a handful of riflemen; and cavalry
played no great part in Wellington's retreat from Burgos*
It would, in fact, be difficult to find any instance where cavalry
have shown greater skill and endurance in retreat than the
British cavalry did in the withdrawal from Mons to the Marne.

The retirement could hardly have started in more un-
favourable conditions for cavalry, who require room for
manoeuvre if they are to exploit their principal weapon of
mobility. This manoeuvre room they never had till the
Second Corps turned and shook itself free of its pursuers
at Le Cateau. On August 24, when the retreat began, the
Second Corps, which the Cavalry Division had to cover,
was in close contact with the enemy, and the German mounted
troops were already beyond its left flank and threatening its
line of retreat. To add to his responsibilities and to the cares
of his already overloaded staff, the i^th Infantry Brigade was

133

A.LLENBY

now put unde Alleaby's orders. The brigade had been
formed from battalions intended to protect the lines of com-
munication, was but aewiy arrived in France, and was not
fully equipped.

Since there was no room for cavalry on the closely engaged
front of the Second Corps, .Allenby's chief preoccupation on
the morning of the 24th -was with the threat to the left flank
and rear. At about 7 A.M., when all seemed to be going well
with the retirement of the Corps, he withdrew the cavalry
some miles, to take up a position well to the flank and
guard the further retreat of the infantry against any threat
from the west. This withdrawal, as it turned out, was pre-
mature. The jth Division became hard-pressed, and its com-
mander, Sir Charles Fergusson., 1 asked Allenby for assistance.
AUenby's response -was immediate. He at once went back
with the znd and 3rd Cavalry Brigades, who took prompt
action to relieve the pressure at the cost of somewhat heavy
losses. This was the rearguard action of Blouges, which
caused more casualties to the British Expeditionary Force
than had the Battle of Mons on the previous day.

August zj was a most difficult day for the Cavalry Division.
The obstacle of the Forest of Morrml, with no good roads
from north to south, lay diagonally across the line of retreat
and separated the two Corps of the B.E.F. The Second Corps
and the Cavalry Division "were forced into a narrow corridor
between the forest and the enemy columns, and the cavalry
had again little room for manoeuvre. The direction of retire-
ment imposed by the roads "was not straight to the rear, but
diagonally towards the dangerous west flank, threatened by
the progress of the great German wheel. In addition, delay
and congestion were caused by the French Cavalry Corps of
Sordet, which marched from east to west across the British
line of retreat, and by the crowds of refugees flying from the
German invasion. The diiection of retreat was towards Le
Gateau, near which town a position had been reconnoitred

1 General Sir Charles Fergusson, Bart., G.CJB,, G.C.M.G., D.S.O., later commander
of the Seventeenth Cops.

134

ALLENBY

and had been very partially dug by French civilian labour. 1
A reinforcement was available in the 4th Division, which had
just arrived at Le Gateau from England. It had been ordered
to take up a position near Solesmes, north of Le Gateau, to cover
the retreat of the Second Corps on to the Le Gateau position.
By order of G.H.Q. the Cavalry Division was divided on
the 25th: two brigades, the ist and 2nd, under de Lisle, were
to cover the Second Corps; the remaining two, with the
1 9th Infantry Brigade, were to protect the left flank under
Allenby. It was a trying day. The enemy horsemen hovering
on the flank would not come to grips, when the superior
training and marksmanship of the British would have told,
but stood off and shelled them at long range, where their guns
had the advantage. And the progress of the Second Corps on
the congested road was slow. In the afternoon the Cavalry
Division was collected north-east of Solesmes, as the German
cavalry seemed at length about to close and give the oppor-
tunity of close combat. Instead, however, the division sud-
denly fell under heavy shell-fire, and became somewhat scattered
as a result. Gough's 3rd Cavalry Brigade made off south-east,
and got out of control of divisional headquarters. General
Cough's own explanation of his action may be read in his
book The Fifth Army :

I felt compelled to safeguard my own brigade, and I moved it
off towards the right flank (east). I intended to retire southwards,
avoiding Solesmes so as not to add to the congestion there, but
we had not a map among us and were obliged to take our general
direction from the sun. This was not a sufficiently accurate
guide, and I moved out more to the east than I intended.

The 3rd Brigade eventually reached Catillon, east of Le
Gateau, and spent the night of the 25th there, without in-
forming the Cavalry Division of its whereabouts. Next day
it did good work in helping to cover the retreat of the right of
the Second Corps. It never again came under control of the

1 " These ttenches were long, straight ditches without turns or traverses, and quite
unusable* but the German artillery shelled them mercilessly, so perhaps they were of
some service after all." (Brigadier-General Spears, Liafsott.)

THE CAVALRY IN FRANCE

Cavalry Division, being eventually attached, with Chetwode's
5th Cavalry Brigade, to Haig's First Corps, of -which General
Cough's brother was the principal staff officer. De Lisle, with
part of his 2nd Cavalry Brigade and most of the ist Cavalry
Brigade, also became separated, and spent the night east or
south of Le Cateau.

Meanwhile Solesmes, a long, straggling village which
formed a defile on the main route of the Second Corps'
retreat, had become congested with men and transport, and
there was considerable danger that the advanced German
troops would arrive before the village could be cleared.
Allenby enlisted the assistance of the rearmost brigade of the
3rd Division, McCracken's yth Infantry Brigade, to aid the
cavalry in keeping the enemy at arm's length till Solesmes was
clear. This was successfully done, and between sunset and
midnight the Second Corps settled down on the high ground
west of Le Cateau, with the men considerably exhausted and
drenched by a heavy storm of rain which broke about dusk.
The 4th Division, which had been in position on the high
ground west of Solesmes, did not reach their bivouacs to the
west of the Second Corps till long after midnight.

The original intention had been for the First and Second
Corps to reunite south of the Mormal Forest about Le Cateau,
and to make a stand on the line of high ground to the east
and west of that town ; and the troops of the Second Corps
had reached their bivouacfs with that intention still in the
minds of their leaders. But late in the evening of the 25th
Sir John French issued orders for a continuance of the retreat,
directing ^Jlenby to cover the Second Corps. The igth
Infantry Brigade, which was by this time in Le Cateau, was
transferred from Allenby's command to the Second Corps.
The orders reached Allenby at Beaumont, five miles west of
Le Cateau, a little after n P.M., just when he had received re-
ports of the withdrawal of the cavalry rearguard from the
heights to the north. He quickly realized the seriousness of
the situation. To cover the first stages of the Second Corps'
retirement from its present positions it would be necessary

137

ALLENBY

for the cavalry to hold the high ground to the north, about
Solesmes and Viesly, which they and the 4th Division had
held on the previous afternoon and evening. But they had
withdrawn at nightfall, when the last of the Second Corps
had passed through, and the ridge was now in German hands.
Even had Allenby had the whole of the Cavalry Division
closely under his control he could hardly have won back the
ridge from the German advanced guards. Actually, as we
have seen, a large part of the cavalry had escaped from his
control, and was a considerable distance away.

As soon as the facts were clear to him Allenby motored to
the headquarters of General Smith-Dorrien, commanding the
Second Corps, at Bertry. He arrived at 2 A.M. on the 26th.
The meeting, on which the fate of the greater part of the
British Expeditionary Force hung, might have been dramatic.
But both Smith-Dorrien and Allenby were direct, courageous,
and quick of decision in a crisis. Allenby stated at once that
his cavalry was scattered, and that it was impossible for him
to interpose a screen between the Second Corps and the enemy
next morning ; unless the Corps could move before daylight
the enemy would be in a position to attack it before it could
get clear. After ascertaining from the commander of the 3rd
Division, whose headquarters lay near by, that it was quite
impossible for the exhausted infantry, some of whom had only
just arrived, to move earlier than 9 A.M., Smith-Dorrien made
his famous decision to stand and fight, asking Allenby and
Snow (4th Division) to act under his orders, to which Allenby
gave instant acceptance and Snow so soon as he could be
communicated with.

Early next morning the battle of Le Cateau began. Smith-
Dorrien hoped that his right would be covered by the First
Corps, which should by G.ELQ. orders have marched towards
Le Cateau. But the action, unimportant in itself, at Landrecies,
on the evening of the 2 5th, in which some German troops
stumbled in the dark on to the billets of the ist Guards
Brigade, had a most unfortunate effect on the mind of Sir
Douglas Haig, the commander of the First Corps. He was

THE CAVALRY IN FRANCE

persuaded that large German forces were akeady between him
and the Second Corps > and marched south-east on the 26th,
instead of south. Thus the right flank of Smith-Dorrien*s
force was exposed and suffered heavily.

The obvious task of the cavalry at Le Cateau was to cover
the flanks of the infantry battle. The battle was, however, no
ordered affair ; as has been seen, the decision to fight was taken
only a few hours before the action began, and orders to stand
had barely reached the troops in the front line before they
became engaged. On the right wing, where the main brunt
of the German attack fell and losses were heaviest, the truant
3rd Cavalry Brigade and the greater part of the ist and 2nd
Brigades assisted in somewhat haphazard fashion to protect
the flank and to cover the withdrawal, but they acted inde-
pendently and were for the time being outside Allenby's
control. On the other flank, where he had one complete
brigade (the 4th) and some portions of the ist and 2nd at his
disposal, he was in a better position to influence the course of
the action. But this flank was akeady covered by the French
Cavalry Corps of Sordet, and was in consequence never
seriously threatened. Sordet, in response to the British re-
quest to protect the flank, advanced towards Cambrai and
engaged enemy columns with his artillery and some cyclists,
delaying their advance with little loss to himself. AJlenby
meanwhile held a watching brief with the 4th Brigade. His
chief personal action in the battle was when Snow, command-
, ing the 4th Division, asked for the support of some cavalry*
Allenby refused. He had only one complete brigade available,
and he judged that the crisis was not yet come. His manner
of refusal was typical of the man. A staff officer had written
a reply to Snow's request, and showed it to Allenby for
approval. Allenby insisted on writing the reply in his own
hand and signing it himself. " When I take such a step," he
said, " as to refuse assistance to another commander it must
be made quite clear to him that the decision is mine and the
responsibility mine."

The retreat continued for another ten days after Le Cateau.

139

ALLENBY

The Cavalry Division, except the 3rd Brigade, which con-
tinued to act under the First Corps, was reunited under
Allenby's hand by August 30, and continued to cover the
western flank and rear. But the German pursuit had slackened,
and von Kluck's First Army was in the course of those erratic
movements which were soon to expose it to the French
counterstroke. The cavalry were continually in action,
occupying rearguard positions and exposed to shell-fire, but
had little further close contact with the enemy during the
retreat, except for the brilliant episode of Nery in the early
morning of September i, when Briggs' ist Cavalry Brigade,
surprised in its bivouacs by a German cavalry division, which
had passed through a gap between the Second and Third
Corps, held its own until the arrival of reinforcements, drove
off the Germans, and captured their artillery.

The record of the Cavalry Division during the great retreat
from Mons may not sound brilliant. The fact remains that
the British flank and rear were protected from a greatly
superior force of hostile horsemen, who were roughly
handled whenever they came within reach. That Allenby
partially lost control of his command during the crisis of the
retreat, from the afternoon of the 25th till the morning of the
3oth, cannot be denied. The reasons, technical and human
a clumsy organization, insufficient means of intercommunica-
tion, his failure to command the confidence of all his brigadiers
have been indicated. Allenby himself never for a moment
lost his head or his sureness of judgment ; he realized from
the first that the danger lay on the left flank, and did all he
could to safeguard it. He resisted all urgings from above that
the cavalry should undertake some spectacular intervention to
ease the pressure. His clearness of vision and quickness of
decision on the night before Le Cateau probably saved the
Second Corps and 4th Division from disaster. His personal
courage was evident to all. Here is testimony from one of his
squadron commanders :

He was an extraordinarily brave man personally. I remember
on the Mons retreat when Divisional H.Q. had taken refuge with

140

THE CAVALRY IN FRANCE

the 4th Cavalry Brigade and we nearly had an unfortunate experi-
ence, being almost surrounded. He took charge, and I remember
his words of command being spoken with, if anything, less con-
cern than most fellows would show at a field day at home.

Another staff officer has a vivid recollection of seeing Allenby
gallop along a line of dismounted men when there was a certain
amount of unsteadiness under heavy shelling. His voice and
example immediately checked the drift towards the rear and
restored confidence. He never tired, in spite of long days in
the saddle, a heavy load of responsibility, and short rations.
He still insisted on the same details of peace discipline
chin-straps down, rifles home in the bucket, limbers properly
drawn into the side of the road. This had a curious moral
effect ; a subaltern who had been sharply checked because some
of the chin-straps in his troop were not down consoled himself
with the reflection, " If the General still has time to worry us
about his old fads things can't be as bad as they look." 1

A letter written by Allenby to his wife on August 30, the
first he had had time to write since the zoth, is worth quoting
to show the equanimity he preserved during the strain of the
retreat :

We have had a strenuous time, and have been fighting every
day for a week, very short of food and sleep. I, personally,^ have
done well in the way of food, and have had two good nights*
sleep ; but the men had a very bad time. Their spirit is splendid,
and they have fought like tigers. We are in close touch with the
French, and hope to go forward soon with them again. We are
in a lovely country now, and I have been billeted in one or two
magnificent chateaux. Even the poorer houses are very clean and
comfortable, and the French women are kindness itself, and often
refuse any payment for food, etc. . . . IVe had a good many
casualties in the division, but not as many as you would expect.
These Germans fight chiefly, so far, at long range, with artillery;
and the shells are not very effective, though they are alarming at
the time.

i The retreat showed the justification of Allenby's insistence on the chin-stmp rule.
A number of men had lost their caps through disobedience of his order, and either
suffered from the hot sun or wore any form of headdress, such as old French straw
hats, or had handkerchiefs on their heads.

141

ALLENBY

An illustration of Allenby's sense of humour may be
quoted here. Some years after the War he was present at a
lecture by a distinguished military writer, who spoke of him
as one "who had taken a leading part in the retreat from
Mons." When asked to speak at the end of the lecture
AHenby said, " I must contradict the somewhat equivocal
statement of the lecturer that I took a hading part in the retreat
from Mons. I was on a very slow horse."

THE ADVANCE TO THE AISNE
(September 6-30, 1914)

On September 5 the long retreat ended, and on September 6
the French and British turned about and began to advance.
There is no need here to retell the story of the counterstroke
of the Marne. It was a manoeuvre rather than a battle, and
the decisive thrust was the advance of the British Army,
which the Germans had discounted as beaten, into the gap
between the armies of von Kluck and von Billow.

During the advance the cavalry operated in two portions.
The ist, 2nd, and 4th Brigades, on the right flank, formed the
Cavalry Division under Allenby; the 3rd and 5th Brigades
worked together under Gough on the left flank. The in-
structions to the Cavalry Division were " to guard the front
and flanks of the First Corps, connecting with the Fifth French
Army." Similar instructions were given to Gough on the
left flank. Thus the mission of the cavalry was entirely pro-
tective, and their principal task to keep touch with the French
forces on the flanks, which were throughout the advance half
a day's march behind the British. The truth is that Sir John
French, having been so badly let down by the commander of
the Fifth French Army at the opening of the campaign, had
no mind to be exposed again to a similar experience. It was
not till September n that any hint of aggressive purpose came
into G.H.Q. orders in the words, " Every endeavour will be

142

THE CAVALRY IN FRANCE

made by the cavaky in co-operation with the French cavalry
on right and left to harass the retreating enemy/'

There is no doubt that the cavalry missed opportunities
during this advance, especially on September 9, the day that
the B.EJF. crossed the Marne, when there was a gap in the
German front and a confused mass of transport was retreating
with little protection, at the mercy of boldly handled mounted
men. The opportunity is easy enough to see now, with all
information at our disposal, but at the time there was little
to indicate it. The " G in * gap * " was as elusive then as it
was found to be later in the War. Critics of these lost oppor-
tunities are apt to assume fresh horses, fresh men, fresh minds.
In truth, all were weary. After a fortnight's constant retreat
in the face of an active and greatly superior enemy it was
difficult to realize that the same enemy was in confusion and
on the run. A trap was suspected, so that a mistaken air
report was sufficient to halt the First Corps half-way across
the Marne and to place it on the defensive. The fighting on
the Petit Morin and elsewhere had shown the vulnerability of
horsemen to modern fire power, and the German use of Jager
battalions, well equipped with machine-guns, to support thek
cavalry put an effective brake on mounted action. Great
difficulty was being experienced in keeping the horses shod,
since the pave roads of France and Belgium wore out shoes
so quickly. But it was the instructions to the cavalry from
G.H.Q. that formed the greatest bar to bold offensive action.

During the advance to the Aisne the separation of the
cavalry into two bodies was confirmed by the creation of
a 2nd Cavalry Division under Gough, Allenby becoming
commander of the ist Cavalry Division. His chief General
Staff Officer, Vaughan, took Gough's place in command of
the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, and Barrow became his G.S.O.i.
When the obstacle of the Aisne river was reached the cavalry
were soon checked, and close infantry fighting began again.
During the Aisne battle the cavalry did much useful work as
a mobile reserve. Presently the stalemate which had been
reached in the operations was recognized by the phrase which

143

ALLENBY

began to appear regularly in the G.H.Q. reports, " There is no
change in the situation," and was more tersely telegraphed to
lower formations as " Situation unchanged." It was to re-
main practically unchanged on the Aisne for the next two and
a half years. Allenby, with his usual foresight and common
sense, ordered his cavalry to collect bayonets and entrenching
tools. The brief period of open fighting was over, and trench
warfare had begun.

Here are two vignettes of Allenby under fire on the Aisne.
The first is from a regimental officer :

On the Aisne one day I was sent from Brigade H.Q. to Divi-
sional H.Q. with some message or other: they were well up
somewhere near Paissy and in the open lying down, except
Allenby and one or two others who were standing up, being
shelled to hell by a 5-9 gun or howitzer. A shell fell close- to
where he was standing, and my horse sat down backwards with
terror. I was watching Allenby; he stood looking towards the
Chemin des Dames and merely turned his head slowly and looked
back for a second. Fve never forgotten it.

The other is from an officer attached to divisional head-
quarters :

One morning advanced headquarters was established in a barn
on the heights above the Aisne. All seemed quiet, and the
General was reading a newspaper. Presently heavy shells began
to fall near the barn, and it became obvious that the German
observers had noted the occupation of the barn and were deter-
mined on its destruction. Obvious, that is, to all except the
General, who had never even looked up from his paper as the
shells came gradually closer, and who seemed quite unconscious
that anything unusual was happening. When, to the great relief
of the junior members, a senior staff officer explained the situation
to him and recommended instant evacuation, he rose, took off his
spectacles, placed them in the case, deliberately folded his news-
paper, and made a slow and dignified retreat, without once looking
back. We junior members, as soon as the General was gone,
stood on no ceremony, and our retreat was neither dignified nor
slow. The next salvo of shells, a few seconds later, burst fairly in
the barn.

144

THE CAVALRY IN FRANCE

THE CAVALRY CORPS
(October 1914-^% 1915)

Towards the end of September 1914, when the battle on
the Aisne had trenched itself into immobility, both French
and Germans naturally sought a new decision by outflanking
movements to the north, with troops freshly raised or with-
drawn from parts of the line where trench warfare had already
set in. This " Race to the Sea/* as it was termed, continued
throughout the first half of October. Neither side could gain
any decided advantage, but the initiative generally remained
with the Germans, who had more fresh formations available,
so that the French were hard-pressed to hold them. By the
middle of October the transfer of the British Expeditionary
Force from the Aisne to Flanders filled the gap between the
French armies of the north and the Belgian army retreating
from fallen Antwerp, and a practically continuous front from
the sea to Switzerland was thus formed. Then began the
long, desperate struggle of the Germans to break the British
line at Ypres and to gain the Channel ports. The first great
crisis of the War, the Marne counterstroke, had been decided
by a manoeuvre, in which the advance of the B.E.F. had
turned the scale ; the second great crisis, the defence of the
Channel ports, so vital for Great Britain and thus for her
allies, was determined by sheer hard fighting, of which the
brunt fell on the British, and not least on the British cavalry.
It is not too much to say that the fate of the War depended on
the fact that this cavalry had been trained to use the rifle with
an effect that no horsemen or infantry in the other European
armies could match.

Towards the end of September, soon after the extension
northward from the Aisne began, Sir John French urged
that the British force should be transferred to the left of the
line near the coast. There were good reasons for the request.
Fresh British troops, a Marine Brigade, the yth Division 3 and
K 145

ALLENBY

3rd Cavalry Division, were being landed in the north in the
hope of preventing the fall of Antwerp ; it was obviously
desirable that all the British forces should be united, if possible ;
the move would shorten their lines of communication, and the
defence of the Channel ports was a specially British interest.
Accordingly, early in October the British began to leave the
Aisne. The Second Corps and the cavalry divisions moved
first, the former by train, the latter by road. It was a week's
march for the cavalry. They gladly left the Aisne, where
the trenches were close-locked and the only employment for
cavalry was as a mobile reserve of riflemen, and welcomed
the prospect of a renewal of open warfare. The weather,
which had been wet and cold on the Aisne, improved;
Picardy was pleasant, and the plains of Flanders were pictured
as a fair field for mounted action. None realized the grim
work ahead of them and the approaching fate of cavalry on
the Western Front. They were halted for one day as a reserve
to a hard-pressed French force, but did not come into action.
On October 9, while covering the concentration of the
Second Corps, which had detrained at Abbeville, the two
cavalry divisions were formed into a Cavalry Corps, of which
Allenby received command. Barrow became his principal
General Staff Officer, with the rank of Brigadier-General. 1

After covering the concentration of the Second and Third
Corps the cavalry advanced into Flanders on their left. On
October 12 they drove a German cavalry corps from the
high ground about Mont des Cats and Kemmel, south-west
of Ypres. In the following days they advanced to the line of
the Lys between Armenti&res and Menin, but found the river
too strongly guarded to cross. On October 20 they were com-
pelled to fall back from the line of the river and dig in on the
high ground to the west. The great German thrust for Ypres
and the coast was now about to be made. The First Corps,
the last British troops to leave the Aisne, had just time to de~

1 He received a higher appointment in January 1915, and was succeeded by Brigadier-
General Birch (the late General Sir Noel Birch), an artillery officer. Later Brigadier-
General Birch was principal artillery officer in France, and after the War Master-General
of the Ordnance.

146

THE CAVALRY IN FRANCE

train and advance to the east of Ypres before the fateful con-
flict began. The Cavalry Corps found itself lying in the line of
battle between the Third and Fourth Corps, 1 like a frigate
between two ships of the line. Opposite it was the great mass
of the German cavalry, similarly wedged between two bodies
of infantry. Thus in the first stages of the Battle of Ypres the
German and British cavalry strove for mastery on foot, instead
of on horse. In numbers, and especially in artillery, the odds
were heavily against the British, Allenby's two divisions,
some 9000 strong, held a front of six miles, and were opposed
by six German divisions with four Jager battalions, a total of
over 24,000 men. The 1 3 -pounder guns of the R.H. A. were not
only heavily outnumbered and outranged, but were also very
short of ammunition. Yet the Germans completely failed to
make any impression; in truth, except for the Jager batta-
lions, they were poorly equipped and trained for fighting on
foot.

The 3rd Cavalry Division, fighting on Allenby's left, was
now placed under his orders and included in the Cavalry
Corps; and the Ferozepore Brigade of the Indian Lahore
Division was sent to him as a reserve. After taking part on
October 26 in an abortive attempt of the corps on their left
to advance, the cavalry had a few days 3 comparative quiet,
since the German cavalry opposite them had acquired too
shrewd a respect for British musketry to make any farther
attempt to push to close quarters. But on the night of the
29th/3oth German infantry relieved the cavalry; and on the
3oth Allenby's widely extended force had to withstand the
buffet of the Fourth Bavarian Corps and the 26th Division of
the Thirteenth Corps. 2 The Cavalry Corps lost some ground,
but prevented any breach of the line. From now on the prin-
cipal fighting in this part was for possession of the villages of

1 The Fourth Corps consisted of the yth Division and 3rd Cavalry Division, under
Sir Henry RawKnson (afterwards General Lord Rawlinson), which had landed in
Belgium and advanced south,

2 To continue the naval metaphor, the frigate which had up till now been engaged
with an enemy frigate, though a much heavier one, had now to fight a three-decker
ship of the line. By all the rules of war the frigate should have been blown out of
the water.

147

ALLENBY

Messines and Wytschaete, standing on the high ground over-
looking Ypres.

The 3 ist was the most critical day of the whole battle. The
Germans brought yet another infantry division into line
against the cavalry, and attacked vigorously. But the weak
and scattered squadrons still held on. Some infantry arrived
from the Second Corps as reinforcement, and only part of
the village of Messines was lost, though the odds against the
British were five and six to one. On this same day on the
First Corps front Gheluvelt was lost, and the line breached
till the last reserve, the Worcesters, re-established it by
counter-attack. Repulsed by day, the Germans on the cavalry
front tried again at night, hoping under the cloak of darkness
to avoid the deadly British rifle-fire ; and by sheer weight of
numbers they drove the cavalry from the village of Wytschaete
in the early hours of November i. With the help of a French
division the village was eventually retaken, but Messines, to
the south, had to be evacuated at last. Wytschaete was finally
lost by the French next day. The battle continued for almost
another fortnight, but the crisis had passed. The Regular
forces of Great Britain had been almost annihilated, but they
had saved Europe from German domination. The Cavalry
Corps, which had fought as infantry and had suffered as heavily
as the infantry, was gradually relieved from the trenches and
became a mobile reserve.

In such a battle, where the resources were barely adequate
even for defence, the commanders had no opportunity to
show their skill in manoeuvre. They could influence the
fight only by using such scanty reserves as they could collect
or borrow to patch the rents in their line and to prevent it
from breaking altogether; and by maintaining their belief in
victory and inspiring their subordinates with that belief.

Allenby, needless to say, remained cool and confident.
The men in front of him required little urging or encourage-
ment to do their best, but the knowledge of their leader's
strength of purpose and courage was invaluable to them.
They need fear no weakening or panic orders from above,

148

THE CAVALRY IN FRANCE

need expect no mildness if their own nerve failed. The sight
of him and he visited his forward units frequently was
enough to show that here was a man who would never lose
heart and did not give ground easily. He managed usually to
have some reserves, however small, at the critical moment,
and parcelled them out shrewdly with an instinct for the
* sore spots * in his line. He was generous in lending aid when
other corps were in greater danger than his own. At one of
the crises of the battle he was wakened at night by his staff to
hear that one of the most important points in his line had been
lost ; it was typical of his calmness and strength of spirit that,
after ascertaining that everything possible was being done to
restore the situation, he returned to bed and slept till dawn.

AUenby's letters to his wife at this period, written in the
stress of the fighting, say little of war or of himself. As in
South Africa, a garden or a flower is more likely to move his
pen than any incidents of battle. He is generous in praise of
his men and of his staff:

I have now the biggest command of cavalry that anyone has
had in the history of our army, and am sure that I have the best-
trained and most efficient officers and men that have ever taken
the field in European war. I have also a first-class staff. So I have
no excuse if I do badly.

Of his A.D.G, Marshall, of the nth Hussars, who was
killed during the battle by a shell while visiting Ypres, he
writes, " My poor little A.D.C., Marshall, was killed to-day.
He was a good little lad; and was very kind to me, though I
was always pitching into him." As in the South African Wat
he had expressed his admiration for his enemy, the Boers, so
now he writes of the Germans, " It is not true that the German
officers have to drive their men into battle. The men come on
like lions."

After the battle the Cavalry Corps went into reserve round
Hazebrouck, south-west of Ypres ? On his way up to the battle

1 An Indian Cavalry Corps was formed in December 1914, and placed under the
command of General Rimington. Thus both Cavalry Corps were commanded by
officers of the Inniskilling Dragoons,

149

ALLENBY

Allenby had had his headquarters for a night at the Chateau
de la Motte au Bois, on the edge of the Forest of Nieppe. To
this billet he now returned. Its chatelaine was a remarkable
Frenchwoman, the Baroness Ernest de la Grange, aristocratic,
witty, capable, and charming, a widow whose son was serving
with the French cavalry. Her book Open Home in Flanders
tells much of Allenby, whose character she greatly admired,
and whose firm friend she became. Of his love of observing
birds and fishes she writes :

Very susceptible to the beauties of nature, he seems to know all
the birds, their songs, plumage, and habits. He watches the ways
of the fishes in our little Flemish canals and irrigation creeks, and
he has shown me a nest of perch. The eggs were hanging to the
water weeds, for the mother seemed to be resting, while the
father rushed to catch a big grasshopper and then to fight a fish
twice his own size.

Of another great characteristic, his love of children, she
tells the following tale :

He never goes out on foot without stuffing his pockets with
sweets and oranges. All the vilkge children run after him,
search his pockets, and feast* He has adopted two little refugees
called Marthe and Sidonie. He has brought them dolls from
London, and one day early in the week he met them out without
the cherished dollies. When asked where they were, they said
tearfully that their mother was keeping them as a " Sunday toy."
The General took a hand of each, and, going to their home, said
they must have their dollies every day, and if they got broken he
would bring them others.

Another firm friendship that Allenby established at this
time was with a man much younger than himself, Lord
Dalmeny, 1 who had become his Camp Commandant. He
served on Allenby's personal staff for the rest of the War,
first as A.D.C and then as Military Secretary; and when,
after the War, Allenby became High Commissioner for Egypt^
remained for some time on his staff at the Residency in Cairo!
AJle0by did not make friendships easily, nor often confide in

1 Now Lieutenant-Colonel the Earl of Rosebery, D.S.O., M.C.
150

THE CAVALRY IN FRANCE

others ; to Dalmeny in these years he probably spoke more
freely than to any other man.

There is little to chronicle of the doings of the Cavalry
Corps in the winter of 1914-15 and the spring of 1915. For
the abortive attack by the Second and Third Corps in the
middle of December 1914 it was placed under the Second
Corps, but was not engaged. In February each division in
turn spent ten days in trenches in a part of the French line in
the Ypres Salient. Otherwise there is nothing to record till
the first use of poison gas in warfare, by the Germans on
April 22, 1915, caused a panic among the French black troops
and set the whole Ypres Salient alight again. Allenby was at
this time on leave in England; while there he had a severe
attack of influenza, and he did not return to France till May 3.
Within a few days of his return he was appointed, on May 6,
to command the Fifth Corps, in succession to General Plumer,
who took over the Second Army from General Smith-Dorrien,
the hero of Le Cateau. The latter's relations with the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Sir John French, had never been happy,
and had now culminated in his removal from his command at
the crisis of a battle.

151

CHAPTER VII

CORPS AND ARMY COMMANDER
(May lyi^-June 1917)

THE FIFTH CORPS
(May-October 1915)

THE spring of 1915 and, indeed, the whole of that year
was a period of disappointment and disillusion for the British
people and the British Army. Having checked the first great
German onslaught in 1914, and having lived through a winter
of discomfort and inaction, they looked forward to driving
the Germans out of France as soon as the weather per-
mitted large-scale operations. The French were confident ; the
enemy, who had counted on a speedy victory, must surely be
disheartened; and the great Russian masses would be irre-
sistible when they got on the move. The initial success of the
attack at Neuve Chapelle on March 10 seemed to show that
the enemy lines could be broken if the lessons learned in that
attack were applied. But that day was almost the last of
success ; thereafter it was a year of triumph for the enemy and
of defeat, almost of disaster, for the Allies. The two great
French efforts to pierce the German line failed with heavy
loss; the Russian hosts., fat from invading Germany, were
driven back many marches into their own territory; the
attempt to force the Dardanelles, which might have shortened
the War by two years, met the failure that irresolute strategy
deserves and usually receives; the Italian decision to join the
Allies brought little advantage; and at the end of a gloomy
year Serbia was overrun. The British army in France had
dose on 300,000 casualties, and lost on balance more ground
than it gained. It was not yet ready for a great effort, and was

152

CORPS AND ARMY COMMANDER

short of the guns, ammunition, and trained men necessary
for a blow heavy enough to break through the defences that
German skill and industry had set up in France. Perhaps the
one great good fortune of the year, though it could only be
appreciated in retrospect, was that the Germans chose to use
their reserves in the east, where the Russians could retire
almost indefinitely without suffering a vital loss, rather than
on the Western Front, where French and British could not
have yielded much ground without exposing the Channel ports
or Paris.

In the Ypres Salient, where the Fifth Corps front was
during the whole of Allenby's five months of command, con-
ditions were especially onerous. O the three great battles
that were fought over that small parcel of Flanders and bear
the name of the Battles of Ypres, the second, in April and May
1915, was the most dolorous and unsatisfactory. In the first
battle, in 1914, the old army died grimly, confident in its war-
craft and giving harder punishment than it received; and in
1917 at Passchendaele, the third battle, our forces had at
least the impetus of the offensive, however bloody and un-
convincing. But the troops that fought in the Salient in 1915
had neither confidence of skill nor hope of gaining ground.
The old army was dead; the new armies and the new equip-
ment were not yet ready. Struggling in a muddy plain, with
the enemy holding the advantage of higher ground almost
everywhere, they were overlooked, outgunned, outman-
oeuvred, and not a little bewildered by the new weapons of
gas and liquid fire used against them. Only their obstinate
courage kept a footing in that cramped semicircle and held the
Germans from setting foot on the ramparts of Ypres.

When Allenby took over the Fifth Corps from Plumer
the battle had already been raging for a fortnight. The
first phase began with the German gas attack of April 22
and the abandonment by the French black troops of the
northern face of the Salient, thereby exposing the Canadians
at the eastern extremity and the British zjth and 28th
Divisions on the southern face. It ended on May 3 with the

153

ALLENBY

withdrawal of the British forces from an untenable position
at the apex of the Salient, when it became obvious that the
French were unwilling or unable to carry out the promises
repeatedly made by them to recapture the ground lost on the
northern face. The second phase began on May 8, with a
violent attack on the new positions of the Fifth Corps, within
twenty-four hours of Allenby's assuming command, before
he had had time to become acquainted with the troops or
the ground. The Corps comprised the 4th, 2yth, and 28th
Divisions, 1 all in the line. Several of the commanders who
fought in them were to serve under Allenby in Palestine:
Bulfin, who now commanded the z8th Division, became
commander of his Twenty-first Corps ; Longley, who com-
manded the 8 ind Brigade, was to lead the loth Division;
and Bols, his future Chief of the Staff, was commander of the
84th Brigade.

The battle of Frezenberg, as it was called from the ridge
which was the main objective of the German attacks, lasted
from May 8 to 13, and cost the Fifth Corps over 9000 casual-
ties. But they lost little ground. In the words of the Official
History :

Assisted by less than a dozen modem heavy guns, handicapped
by kck of ammunition, the miserable condition of the trenches,
and the unquestioned domination of the German artillery, the
British had by their endurance and tenacity made even such a
small success too costly to be continued.

After a pause of ten days the Second Battle of Ypres was
brought to a close by a gas attack on the Fifth Corps line
just north of the Menin road. 2 Two days* hard fighting
with heavy casualties brought the Germans but slight gain
of ground, and exhausted their battle-worn troops. By the
end of May the fighting had died down, and the battered
Salient had a short rest. As in the defence of the Messines-

1 The zSth Division was relieved during the fighting by a dismounted cavalty force
tinder General de Lisle.

^ * Allenby used to say of this period that the only meteorological service which told
him whether the wind favoured a German gas attack or not was whether the smell
from a pigsty near his headquarters was strong or faint.

154

ALLENBY

Wytschaete position by the Cavalry Corps in 1914, there had
been little that Allenby could do to influence the fight except
to place his scanty reserves at the disposal of his divisional
commanders and to exhort them vehemently to recover by
counter-attack the ground lost. This policy of counter-
attack, which undoubtedly led to heavy losses, often with
no corresponding gain, was laid on Allenby from above. It
was, in fact, the accepted procedure of the British Army at
the time. Allenby differed from other commanders only in
the degree of his obstinacy. The policy had succeeded at the
First Battle of Ypres in saving a desperate situation on many
occasions. In 1915 the balance was changed: the Germans
were better trained and equipped for siege warfare; our
troops and junior leaders were, except in bravery, the shadows
of the men of 1914; and equipment, especially heavy artillery,
was almost totally lacking. There was, however, little margin
for retirement if Ypres were to be held.

Meanwhile farther south the French were making the first
of their great efforts to break through the German front in
what they call the Second Battle of Artois. The support by
the British of their allies involved them in the bloody battles
of Aubers Ridge (May 9) and Festubert (May 15-27). In
mid- June the French effort was drawing to a close, but the
First Army was directed to aid its final struggles by an attack
at Givenchy, and the Second Army to support it by an opera-
tion in the Salient. The Fifth Corps, which now consisted
of the 3rd, 5oth, and i4th Divisions, accordingly made an
attempt on June 16 to improve its line by a minor operation at
Bellewaarde, in the very apex of the Salient. The attack, which
was well planned, failed to reach its final objectives through no
fault of the attackers; the German superiority in observation
and in heavy artillery practically doomed such efforts in advance.

A characteristic story of Allenby relates ,to this offensive.
He visited the division responsible for it while the preparations
were being made, and asked if all their requirements were
being met. He was told by the artillery commander that it
was essential to triplicate all cables if artillery communications

CORPS AND ARMY COMMANDER

were to be maintained in the battle. Allenby asked how many
miles of cable were required, and was told ninety. The staff
officer with him said that such a request was unreasonable and
quite impossible of fulfilment. But Allenby merely said to the
gunner, " You shall have your ninety miles/' and to the staff
officer, "You will see that it is supplied/' in a tone that
admitted of no further discussion. The cable duly arrived in
good time, and artillery communications held throughout the
engagement.

Fighting continued in the uneasy Salient during July and
August, and on July 30 the Germans, who apparently con-
sidered it a suitable area for experiments in frightfulness, won
a few hundred yards of trenches near Hooge by the first use
of machines for spraying liquid fire (Flammenmrfer).

The autumn saw the second great effort by the French, an
attack by four armies northward from Champagne, supported
by another attempt of the troops in Artois to storm Vimy
Ridge and advance eastwards. The British would have
desired postponement of a general offensive till the spring of
1916, when their requirements in guns and ammunition had
been manufactured and their new formations trained. But
Joffre was still confident of the power of the French armies
to break the German line, and perhaps end the war before
another winter set in; also the situation of the Russian
armies, battered and retreating, demanded some effort by
their allies. The British forces in France accordingly became
committed to an offensive not only for which they had in-
sufficient resources in materials and men, but in an area,
towards Lens, which they regarded as unsuitable ground for
attack. In spite of the protests of Sir John French and Haig,
Joffre insisted that the British attack should be made immedi-
ately north of the French army in Artois. Thus, unwillingly,
the British,, to aid the French, prepared the Battle of Loos.
To support the offensive at Loos a series of small local attacks
was ordered at various points of the British line, on the wholly
mistaken theory that they would draw in or contain the enemy
reserves. Allenby received instructions to carry out such an

ALLENBY

attack in the Ypres Salient, and chose to renew his effort of
June 1 6 against the Bellewaarde position, near Hooge. In
face of the German superiority in artillery and grenades the
attack failed with heavy losses.

It was Allenby's last operation with the Fifth Corps. Early
in October General Monro, commander of the lately formed
Third Army, was sent on a mission to the Dardanelles, 1 where
the landing at Suvla had ended in failure ; and AUenby was
appointed to succeed him in command of the Third Army.
It was the last big appointment made by Sir John French,
who was induced after the failure at Loos to retire from the
command in France. He was succeeded by Sir Douglas Haig.

Allenby's period of command of the Fifth Corps, with its
heavy losses both in defence and attack, confirmed in the eyes
of the majority of the Army his reputation as " the Bull/'
Yet the policy of continual counter-attack to recover lost
ground and of local offensives on a limited front was not
Allenby's; he merely carried out the orders of superior
authority. Nor was that policy, nor the losses that resulted,
confined to the Fifth Corps, At Neuve Chapelle, at Aubers
Ridge, at Festubert, Givenchy, Loos, at all the battles fought
by the British army in 1915, attacks and counter-attacks were
ordered where failure was already obvious to the troops in
the line; and the slaughter was as heavy as in the Salient.
But Allenby's gospel of absolute loyalty to the orders of those
above made him wholehearted in his persistence to push in
while any possible chance of success remained. He never
apologized, explained, or whittled down the orders received
from above, and his strong, rough personality identified him
in the eyes of the troops with the policy of * drive at all costs.' 2

The character of the Corps and Army commander, General
Wayland-Leigh, nicknamed " the Buffalo/' in C. S. Forester's

1 General Monro returned to France in 1916 to take over command of the First

2 A senior staff officer has said of this period, " Allenby's silent loyalty to his superiors
had the effect of leading his subordinate commanders to assume that the responsibility
for a mistaken policy was his own, and in certain instances some endeavoured by
approach to G.H.Q. behind his back to effect his removal. AUenby was fully aware of
tHs, but never allowed his knowledge to affect his treatment of the culprits."

158

CORPS AND ARMY COMMANDER

well-known novel The General,, is undoubtedly intended to
represent Allenby. To those who knew him it is a grotesque
caricature of the man, but it is possibly no more than a slightly
exaggerated picture of him as he appeared to those who knew
him by reputation only. The characteristics of the real man, his
love of nature and of children, his disregard of danger, his
loyalty and modesty, were recognized, as usual, by those who
stood in close contact with him. His principal Staff officer of
those days, General Jeudwine, 1 has written thus of him :

During the time that I served under Allenby he was always a
bulwark to his side and seemed a guarantee of the impossibility
of defeat. He took care to explore personally the positions held
by his troops, and on such expeditions he seemed regardless of
danger from the enemy's observation. In any ramble with him
about the lines we were then holding one of the pleasures of
companionship with him came from his knowledge of animals,
birds, trees, and flowers. He would often strike off from the safer
route to follow a bird among the scrub surrounding a communi-
cation trench, or to examine a plant in a deserted cottage garden
not far behind the front line. . * . When I call up memories of
this great soldier, there comes before me a picture, not of a battle-
ground, the grim and dreary waste of Flanders trenches, riven
trees, and shattered houses, but of the enclosed yard of a girls*
convent school at Abeele, in Belgium, the headquarters of the
Fifth Corps in the latter part of 1 9 1 5 . In the school yard some two
or three score of little Belgian girls are merrily executing compli-
cated dance figures to the accompaniment of their own quite
tuneful voices their favourite air often haunts me still. And in
a small, plain, square room, furnished with a table and a couple of
chairs, his office, sits Allenby, glancing out occasionally with
kindly interest from his window, commanding a view of the yard,
at the noisy throng outside, and totally undisturbed by their
chatter in fact, often enjoying it. To him as he sits there come
instructions from higher commanders, officers of his staff with
reports or for orders, messages from his front needing immediate
decision and action. Most men would have been hopelessly
rattled by such incongruous surroundings at such a time. But not
Allenby; he remained, as always, serene and unruffled, his brain

1 Lieutenaat-General Sir Hugh Jeudwine, K.C.B., Director-General of the Terri-
torial Army after the War.

ALLENBY

working as clearly as ever. THs serenity of disposition was an
outstanding feature of Ms character; it never deserted him and
helped to give the impression of a special dignity to his imposing
figure. His mental qualities I will not discuss : they are apparent
from his deeds. But for his great virtues of loyalty and modesty
one cannot fail to record one's deep admiration. He was a great
man and a great soldier, body and soul, and may perhaps come to
be generally reckoned, as I reckon him myself, the greatest figure
of the greatest war ever waged.

THE THIRD ARMY (TO THE BATTLE OF ARRAS)
(October lyi^-November 1916)

AUenby's period of command of the Third Army, a little
over eighteen months, falls into three phases of approximately
six months each. During the first of these, from October 1915
to March 1916, the Third Army lay immediately north of the
Somme, holding the front that was to be the future Somme
battlefield, and initiating the preparations for that battle. No
action of any importance took place during this period. The
second phase began in March 1916, when the Third Army
was moved north to take over part of the front of d'UrbaFs
Tenth French Army, while the newly formed Fourth Army
under Rawlinson took over the Somme front and became
responsible for the Somme battle. This phase lasted till the
end of the Somme battle in the early winter of 1916, and was,
from the Third Army point of view, also a period of compara-
tive inaction. The final phase covers the preparation and
conduct of the Battle of Arras during the winter of 1916-17
and the spring of 1917. This was the main event of Allenby's
command.

The Third Army, when AJlenby assumed command of it,
consisted of two Corps, the Seventh and Tenth, to which were
added a little later two more, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth.
The Army had been formed in August 1915 to take over from
the French fifteen miles of front from the Somme northward,
so as to free French troops for their autumn offensive in

160

CORPS AND ARMY COMMANDER

Champagne. By January 1916 the front hdd was twenty-two
miles, from the Somme to near Arras, North of it, between
it and the First Army, lay the Tenth French Army on a
twenty-mile front. In March this front was taken over from
the French, the First Army extending southward and the
Third Army northward. At the same time the Fourth Army,
under Rawlinson, took over the right of the Third Army front,
from the Somme northward for some twenty miles. The
British forces then held a continuous line of about ninety
miles, from the east of Ypres down to the Somme, the
order of the Armies from north to south being Second, First,
Third, Fourth. The Third Army consisted by this time of
the Sixth, Seventh, and Seventeenth Corps. The Corps com-
manders were: Sixth, Lieutenant-General Keir 1 (afterwards
Lieutenant-General Haldane 2 ); Seventh, Lieutenant-General
Snow; 3 Seventeenth, Lieutenant-General Byng 4 (afterwards
Lieutenant-General Fergusson). The Army front stretched
from Hebuterne, some twelve miles east of Doullens, past Arras
to near the Vimy Eidge. During the remainder of 1916, and,
indeed, up to the Battle of Arras in the spring of 1917, there
was little change in the front held or in the composition of the
Army.

It was undoubtedly a disappointment to Allenby when the
Fourth Army was put in on his right instead of on his left,
and thus became responsible for the front immediately north
of the Somme, which had been chosen some time before as
the scene of the main British effort for 1916. Allenby had
during the winter been studying plans for an offensive in that
area, and naturally expected to have the command of the
troops engaged. Now the battle was handed over to Rawlin-
son's Army; and the share of the Third Army was to be one
of those subsidiary attacks to draw in reserves which had

1 The late Lieutenant-General Sir" John Keir, K.CJB,

* General Sir Aylnier Haldane, G.C.M.G., KX.B,, D.SXX, afterwards G.O.C in
Mesopotamia (192,0-2.2).

8 Lieutenant-General Sit Thomas Snow, K.C.B., KX.M.G.

4 The kte Field-Marshal Viscount Byng of Vimy> who succeeded Allenby in com-
mand o the Third Amy, aad was subsequently Governor-General of Canada (1921-26)
and Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police (1928-31).

ALLENBY

already proved so costly and so fruitless. This attack, made
by two divisions on July i, 1916 the opening day of the
Somme battle against the Gommecourt salient, on the right
of the Third Army front, was intended to assist the main
offensive of the Fourth Army, " by diverting against itself the
fire of artillery and infantry which might otherwise be directed
against the left flank of the main attack/* as the official oxder
put it. A thankless operation, for Gommecourt was prob-
ably the strongest point in the whole German line. Allenby,
though he did not approve, was not the man to shirk such a
task. As the Official Historian says :

Neither General Snow of the Seventh Corps nor his Army
commander were men of half-measures. If the enemy's attention
was to be attracted to Gommecourt in order to ensure the success
of the Fourth Army, they were ready to take all risks, but they
did go to the length of suggesting that a threat from Arras would
be more effective and less costly. 1

In spite of some initial success, the attack ended in complete
failure, so far as gaining any ground went, though it certainly
fulfilled its mission of attracting fire. Both divisions lost
heavily, and were compelled to fall back to the line from which
they had started. The attack by the left Corps of the Fourth
Army, which the diversion at Gommecourt was designed to
assist, was equally ineffective.

During the autumn and early winter of 1916, while the
Somme battle continued on its right, the Third Army front
was comparatively quiet. The left of the Fourth Army front
was taken over by the Fifth, under the command of Sir
Hubert Gough, who had commanded the 3rd Cavalry Brigade
and later the 2nd Cavalry Division under Allenby in the early
part of the War. Gough had never at any time made a secret
of his dislike of Allenby or of his poor opinion of him as a
commander. Allenby was perfectly aware of what Gough
said of him, but took no notice by word or deed.

In contrast to the continual storm of his six months with

1 Official History, vol. v, p. 454.

162

CORPS AND ARMY COMMANDER

the Fifth Corps in the Ypres Salient, Allenby's command o
the Third Army during 1916, the year of the ' attrition battles *
of Verdun and the Somme, was uneventful. The Gomme-
court operation, described above, was the only considerable
fight on his front during this period, and any detailed account
of the process of holding the line would be tedious. The
trenches originally taken over from the French were poor,
and required much improvement before they could be held
on the British * offensive * system; x but the chalk downs of
Picardy were certainly better than the waterlogged fields
of the Salient. Minor fighting above ground by artillery
fire, raids, and sniping, and underground warfare by gallery
and mine, continued on a smaller scale the attrition process
which was taking place on so ruthless a scale at Verdun and
on the Somme, but produced little decisive result, 2 During
the Somme battle, by the process known as 'roulement/
exhausted divisions from the Fourth Army were constantly
being exchanged for fresh ones from the other armies. So
that the Third Army during the period consisted largely of
divisions resting and recuperating from the Somme battle.

" Situation unchanged " was the normal daily report of the
Third Army in 1916. But the life of an army commander,
even though the front for which he was responsible might
be comparatively quiet, was a busy one, especially for one like
Allenby, who insisted on knowing men, places, and events at
first hand so far as possible. Some account of the daily life
and atmosphere of Third Army headquarters during AUenby's
command will be sketched in the following pages*

The Army's original headquarters were at Beauquesne, a
village about five miles south-east of Doullens. Allenby's
residence was a small chateau about a mile outside the village.

1 The thrifty French held a trench line on the * Live and let live * principle as far as
possible; the motto of the prodigal British was usually * Kill and be killed/

8 The following figures show the relative pugnaciousness of the three Armies not
engaged in the Somme battle. During the period from July i to November 15 the
First Army made 166 raids on the Germans, and were raided 37 times ; the Second
Army made 104 raids and received 21 ; while the Third Army made 40 raids against the
German 7. The average of casualties per week were: First Army, 1000; Second
Army, 2000; Third Army, 400.

163

ALLENBY

With Mm lived Ms two principal staff officers, Bols 1 and
Sillem, 2 and Ms personal staff Dalmeny, who had become Ms
Military Secretary, and Ms two AJD.Cs. Bols, the Major-
General General Staff, was a gallant, sprightly little man, with
a quick sense of humour, whose ready optimism and willing-
ness suited Allenby. The principal officer on the admims-
trative side (Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General was
Ms foil official title) had broken down in health soon after
Allenby took over the Army, and was succeeded by Major-
General SiUern, an able and kindly staff officer, a little in awe
at first of Ms formidable Chief, but soon on very good terms
with him. AJlenby's practice, by no means universal with
generals, of never interfering with the work of his staff, and
trusting them absolutely once he knew them, made Mm easy
to serve in spite of his occasional gusts of temper. And Bols
and Sillem were both men of sunny and attractive disposition,
under whom it was pleasant to work; so that the TMrd Army
staff, by the testimony of all its members, was a singularly
happy body.

The headquarters mess in the chateau was a cheerful one.
Allenby, though never faddy about food, liked a good table, 3
and liked good talk; Bols was always lively, and Dalmeny
had a very quick, if mordant,, wit. Allenby, who kept personal
contact with the whole of Ms staff, often had one or more
members to dine, and every officer on first joining the Army
staff was invariably summoned to dinner. For the junior
officer who found himself on the right hand of tMs large
general with the alarming reputation tMs was apt to be some-
thing of an ordeal. Allenby, with Ms very wide general
knowledge and dislike of loose thinking, was not an easy
conversationalist for a young or nervous man, who might,
if te ventured on some conventionally held opinion, based
on no sound knowledge, find himself flatly contradicted or
sharply cross-examined on his reasons for advancing such

1 The late lieutenant-General Sk Louis Bols, K.CB., K.C.M.G., D,S,O., afterwards
Governor of Bermuda.

* Major-Geaeral Sir Arnold Sillem, KX.M.G., C.B.
3 He had succeeded in borrowing a cook from the French Army.

164

CORPS AND ARMY COMMANDER

views. But if he had anything to say or special knowledge
of any subject AUenby would listen with interest and bring
out his knowledge by shrewd and kindly questions. His
personal contact with and interest in his staff did not end with
this first dinner. He frequently visited quite junior members
of it in their offices, and questioned them on thek work.

One of the chief anxieties of the A.D.Cs in this chateau was
the lamps. There was no electricity, and the oil-lamps, unless
very carefully tended, were apt to smell and to smoke, to
Allenby's extreme annoyance. One evening, when this had
happened, Bols came from Allenby's room, where he had left
him in a state of great irritation, and told an A.D.C. that the
Chief was complaining of a smell. The A.D.C, a newcomer
who was unaware of the lamp troubles, suggested that it was
probably the smell of the cider press in the cellar under the
Chiefs room, and that what he smelt was the cider-making.
Bols, with his impish sense of humour, was delighted, " I
should go and tell him that at once," he said; "he'll be
very pleased to know." The unsuspecting A.D.C. went into
Allenby's room and informed him that the smell was due to
apples. Allenby looked up, surveyed him for a moment ovet
his glasses, and then dismissed him in one explosive sentence.
The crestfallen A.D.C made a hurried exit, to find Bols and
the rest of the staff assembled outside in great merriment,
anxious to hear exactly what the Chief had said to the cider
suggestion.

When the Third Army went north, in March 1916, head-
quarters moved to Saint-Pol, a small town about twenty miles
west of Arras. Allenby and his personal staff lived in a small
and not very convenient villa on th^e west of the town, which
had been previously occupied by the French general d'UrbaL
The water in the well which served the house was afterwards
found to have been contaminated, and, probably from this
cause, Allenby soon began to suffer badly from neuritis in the
arm. In the autumn he moved to Bryas Chateau, a few miles
north of Saint-Pol, where King George V had stayed while
visiting the Front in the summer. This was a spacious and

165

ALLENBY

comfortable billet, and the senior artillery and engineer
officers, General Holland 1 and General Kenyon, 2 joined the
Chief's mess. The chateau had central heating, and was lit by
electricity, so that the AJD.C/s troubles over oil-lamps were
ended, except when a gale broke the overhead wires that
brought the supply. But by this time Lady Allenby had sent
out from England an oil-lamp proof against smell and leak.
Allenby remained at Bryas Chateau till after the middle of
April 1917, when he moved, during the Arras battles, to
Noyelle-Vion, some ten miles farther east.

During the whole of his command of the Third Army
Allenby spent the greater part of most days with his troops,
visiting the front line, the headquarters of his Corps and divi-
sions, or the administrative establishments behind the front.
His frequent appearances in the trenches were a source of
considerable anxiety to commanders and to the troops. In
the first place, he never displayed the least concern for his own
safety, and was not to be deterred from inspecting any trenches
he wished to see because they, or the approaches to them,
were being shelled; and, in the second place, Allenby's
sudden explosions of temper, if he found anything wrong,
were to be dreaded almost as much as an enemy bomb.
These unfortunate outbursts, often over some comparatively
trivial breach of discipline, did much to destroy the good im-
pression that the sight of the Army commander in the front
trenches made, and to confirm the legend that " the Bull "
was merely a bad-tempered, obstinate hot-head, a c thud-and-
blunder * general.

When steel helmets were introduced Allenby was as in-
sistent that they should be worn at all times as he had been
over the matter of chin-straps when he commanded the
cavalry. Again Allenby was right in principle. Steel helmets
saved numerous casualties, and enemy shelling might begin
at any time. Again, in the careless British way, the order,

1 The kte lieutemnt-Geneial Sir Arthur Holland, K.CJB,, K.C.M.G., M.V.CX,
D.S.O.

s Major-General E. R. Kenyon, CB., CM.G.

166

CORPS AND ARMY COMMANDER

because irksome, was often ignored. Men, and officers,
preferred the chance of additional risk to the certainty of
additional discomfort. 1 Again Allenby met with unsparing
condemnation any laxity that came to his notice, whatever
the circumstances. On one of his visits to the trenches he
found the body of a man, recently killed, on which was a cap
instead of a helmet. He called attention to this with his usual
anger at such breaches of discipline. The senior commander
present pointed out, on the De mortuis principle, the indis-
putable fact that the culprit was dead. Allenby insisted, with
force, on the equally unchallengeable fact that the corpse
was proof that his frequently repeated orders were not being
obeyed.

The story of this incident was widely told to illustrate what
was supposed by many to be Allenby's rough, unfeeling
nature. Actually it was part of the unsparing thoroughness
to which a naturally kindly and sensitive man had schooled
himself, to overlook no least disobedience of orders at any
time. The same characteristic had caused him during the
retreat from Mons to rate tired troopers, riding out from a
hard-fought action, because their chin-straps were not down.
His tours of the front line were, of course, by no means all
sound and fury; but Allenby in his wrath was so notable a
phenomenon that it was remembered as a thunderstorm is
remembered, and the hours of fair weather forgotten* On
one of these visits Allenby had found, while passing down a
trench, a man sitting on the fire-step deeply engrossed in the
delicate, or indelicate, task of delousing his shirt. He paused
opposite him and remarked, " Picking them out, I see/* " No,
sir, no," said the man, without looking up ; " just taking
them as they come/* The reply appealed to Allenby, who was
himself meticulous in the use and meaning of words, and he
related it with amusement.

In the back areas of his Army Allenby saw for himself every

1 A London hat-maker specialized in a light papier mdchl helmet painted to resemble
a steel helmet. It is said to have been advertised in his shop-window " As worn in the
rear areas of the Third Army."

167

ALLENBY

establishment that ministered to the welfare of the troops, and
satisfied himself on its working. Few generals of high rank
have been more scrupulous administrators. Especially was he
careful with regard to the medical arrangements ; and when, as
frequently happened, there were conflicting claims between
the ordnance, supply, and medical services for the use of a
site or building, Allenby insisted always that the safety and
comfort of the sick and wounded should be the first con-
sideration. He issued strict orders that no ammunition depot
or similar military store which might invite enemy shelling
or bombing was ever to be within near range of a hospital or
casualty clearing station. His care for the sick and wounded
was shown outside rather than inside the hospitals, and was
known to the medical staff rather than to the troops. For,
though he frequently inspected the wards, he seldom spent
much time in talking to the men in hospital. Perhaps he felt
that bedside visits would accord ill with his reputation.

It was different with children. 'When a small girl was
injured during a German bombardment of Saint-Pol and had
to have her hand amputated Allenby visited her almost daily,
and sent home to England for toys for her* After his visits
he would drive round by her mother's house to give her the
latest reports of her daughter and reassure her of her progress*
This love of and gentleness with children seemed strange to
those who did not know Allenby well. A staff officer who had
with awe and pity listened to his furious denouncement of
some comparatively trifling delinquency was surprised a few
hours later to see the same man's encounter with a small
child. The redoubtable Chief was striding up and down
outside his headquarters when there appeared on the scene a
small baby, two or three years old, cruising about on its own
and crying. Allenby, thinking himself unobserved, picked it
up and walked up and down with it, rocking it, talking to it,
and soothing it till it stopped crying.

Till he left France Allenby continued his interest in the
two small refugee children, Marthe and Sidonie, whom he had
adopted as friends during his command of the Cavalry Corps*

168

CORPS AND ARMY COMMANDER

He had made another small friend Aline, about four or five
years old, at his headquarters of the Fifth Corps ; and he used
to correspond with her through one of the nuns. He always
showed consideration and friendliness to those on whom he
was billeted. The nuns at the Mont des Cats when he was
commanding the Cavalry Corps, and those at Abeele when he
commanded the Fifth Corps, always remembered gratefully
k bon general Allenby, and Allenby always visited them when
he passed that way. His friendship with the Baroness de la
Grange has already been described.

The kindly side of Allenby's nature was often unsuspected
by those who knew him only slightly, and came as a surprise
when it was revealed. One of his staff officers has recorded a
typical experience. He writes :

When I first came to Army headquarters I saw little of him
except when he came casually into the office ; on these occasions
he always gave one the impression of being very gruff. Later I
had to drive alone with him on several occasions to the Army
School, which was an hour or more away by car. The first time
we did the drive I was horror-struck at the idea of spending an
hour alone with "the Bull"; but I soon found that we had
a common interest in birds, animals, and flowers, and that his
knowledge of them was considerable ; also that he enjoyed talking
about them; so our other drives passed most pleasantly. I
remember being impressed in the various things he said by ids
kindly outlook towards people, which seemed so much at variance
with Ms brusque manner.

The year 1916 was not altogether a happy year for Allenby.
To begin with, his health, almost for the first time, bothered
him. The contaminated water at Saint-Pol had, as already
mentioned, induced a severe attack of neuritis in the arm.
To cure this he was advised to take a course of electrical
treatment at Boulogne, where he went for a fortnight in July. 1
This treatment did little good to his neuritis, and the rays
burned his skin and started boils, from which he suffered the
greatest pain for several months. It was a marvel to his staff

1 His absence caused a tumour that he had been Ai^mmi as a result of the Gomme-
coutt failure.

169

ALLENBY

that he bore It so patiently, with so little increase of irri-
tability.

Secondly, his relations with the Commander-in-Chief, Sir
Douglas Haig, and with the staff at General Headquarters
were increasingly difficult. The difficulties were none of
AUenby's making. It did not take any member of the Third
Army staff long to discorer that the surest way to c ship a
green sea 9 (the term current at Third Army Headquarters for
incurring Allenby's displeasure) was to criticize or question
in any way, in speech or on paper, any order or decision from
General Headquarters. But at the periodical conferences of
Army commanders it was obvious that Allenby's opinion
carried little weight, and received scant attention, especially
if Gough, commander of the Fifth Army, had a different view.
Often Sir Douglas Haig would turn to one of the other Army
commanders and ask his opinion on some point while AUenby
was still speaking. Such treatment naturally disconcerted
Allenby, who was never a very quick debater few soldiers
are and caused him to show himself at a disadvantage. He
and Haig had never been congenial to each other, and there
probably was some touch of jealousy in Haig's attitude. He
must have known by the end of 1916 that others were being
considered for his place at the head of the British forces in
France, and that the new Prime Minister, Mr Lloyd George,
would be gkd to find a commander more tractable to his
ideas. AUenby obviously was a possible rival, and his qualifica-
tions for the appointment were certainly reviewed by those
who directed policy in England. Allenby, needless to say,
did nothing whatever by word or deed ever to put himself
forward.

To add to AJlenby's anxieties, his only son, Michael, had come
to France in the autumn of 1916 and was constantly engaged.
Though still under nineteen he had already a year's service
as an officer. He had joined the Royal Military Academy in
the spring of 1915, a few months after his seventeenth birth-
day. Six months later, on October 26, 1915, he was com-
missioned in the artillery. Within six months he had the

170

CORPS AND ARMY COMMANDER

distinction of being specially selected for posting to the Royal
Horse Artillery. He came to France at the beginning of 1916,
and in February 1917 was awarded the Military Cross. The
record in the Gazette runs :

For conspicuous gallantry in action. He ran out communica-
tions to the two forward companies and sent back very useful
reports on the situation. Later he rescued a wounded man under
heavy fire. He displayed marked courage and determination
throughout the operations.

The battery to which he belonged was in the Third Army,
and whenever there was heavy fighting Allenby would come
stamping down the corridor in the evening to the office to
which the casualty reports came, push the door open with
his stick, and would say, looking out of the window with his
back to the room, " Have you any news of my little boy to-
day ? " When the officer in charge replied, " No news, sir/'
he would stamp out without ever showing his face. He knew
only too well the rate of mortality of second-lieutenants in
France.

THE BATTLES OF ARRAS: PREPARATION AND EXECUTION
(Winter i$i6-Jme 1917)

Even, so my sun one early mom did shine
With all-triumphant splendour on my brow ;
But out, alack ! he was but one hour mine.

SHAKESPEARE, Sonnet xxxm

The idea of the Arras battles was first formed in October
1916, when the Allies began to lay their plans for the following
year. The experience of the long struggles at Verdun and on
the Somme seemed to show that neither side could obtain
quick results, and Joffre's proposals for 1917 amounted to no
more than an extension of the Somme battle and a continuance
of the wearing-down process. On the British front the dent
made by the Fourth and Fifth Armies opposite Albert had
placed tibe German defences in front of Bapaume in a salient
which invited attack. The Third Army was to break into the

171

ALLENBY

north side of this salient and move south-east in conjunction
with renewed attacks by the Fourth and Fifth Armies, while
the First Army covered the northern flank by an assault on
the Vimy Ridge, for which the French had striven so often
and so vainly. To the south the French armies were to broaden
the front of attack still further by an assault between the
Somme and the Oise. The opening of the offensive was to be
on February i. Joffre promised no quick, cheap, or easy
results. But the battles of 1916 had obviously gone far to sap
German endurance; the Allies were still capable of a great
effort, though for the French, in view of their waning man-
power, it was probably the last great effort. The technique of
attack had greatly improved during 1916, and the front of
attack would be broader than ever before. If the Russians
and Italians by simultaneous offensives could hold the enemy
divisions in their theatres the German defences in the West
might well collapse under the strain.

It is probable that Joffre's plan, though unspectacular, was
the best available, and might have had a great measure of
success. But it was never to be tried. The French had grown
restless, feeling themselves near the end of thek resources,
A large part of France had lain under the invader's heel for
over two years, and to win it back piecemeal, as the shattered
fragments of an endless battlefield, was a repellent prospect.
Theirs was not the British method of fighting, to take punish-
ment grimly for round after round and to wear down the
opponent by heavy, if clumsy, body blows and tireless in-
fighting. Their genius lay in the Hghtning attack, a quick
rain of blows on a bewildered adversary, and victory by a
knock-out. Their headlong attempt in 1914 had brought
them to the very edge of disaster, and had led them to
trust in the solidity of Joffre for over two years. Now their
patience was wearing thin, and at the crucial moment a new
prophet of the unlimited offensive and of quick victory was
found.

Nivelle, like Brusilov on the Russian side, is known to
the casual reader of war histories only as the author of the

172

CORPS AND ARMY COMMANDER

offensive which bears his name. He was an artillery officer
whose courage and skill had brought him rapid advancement
during the War. In the summer of 1916 he succeeded Petain
as commander of the Verdun front, and on October 24 won a
great success by a brilliant stroke which recovered much of
the ground lost to the German attacks of the previous spring
and summer. He persuaded himself, and all those whom he
met, that he could repeat the same success on an unlimited
scale for the whole Western Front. He was the type of soldier
who appealed to the civilian statesmen who directed the War.
He was sympathetic in manner, clear and fluent in exposition,
supremely confident of success. Joffre seemed to offer only
the nightmare of heavy losses and slow progress ; this new
commander had dreams to sell, dreams of quick and crushing
victory. 1 On December 12, 1916, he was appointed to succeed
Joffre in command of the French armies, and at once issued a
fresh plan of campaign. On December 15 he appeared to
confirm his reputation by a second and even more successful
attack at Verdun.

By Nivelle's plan the main battle was moved south, to the
Aisne front, and was to be purely a French effort. The
British share was to consist of a holding attack on the Arras-
Somme front, a little before the French attack. Further, the
British Commander-in-Chief was to relieve French troops on
some twenty miles of front south of the Somme, in order to
enable Nivelle to form the * mass of manoeuvre * of twenty-
seven divisions with which he proposed to exploit the initial
break through. Haig reluctantly agreed under pressure from
the Prime Minister, Mr Lloyd George^ who had been so
captivated by Nivelle's confidence and eloquence (he spoke
English perfectly) that he made an attempt to place the British
army directly under his command. This extension of the
front meant that the Fourth and Fifth Armies would have

1 The state of mind that Nivelle had induced in some French officers is illustrated
by a visit paid to AHenby*s headquarters by some senior French officers shortly before
the battle. When they saw his map with the various objectives marked in colours
they threw up their hands and with much Gallic gesture exclaimed, " What is it,
this green line, this black line, this brown line ? The word is, * To Berlin, to Berlin 1 * **

173

ALLENBY

little strength available for offensive operations ; and thus the
brunt of the British effort fell on AHenby's Third Army,
though the First Army, on his left, was still to secure the Vimy
Ridge.

Allenby submitted his plan to General Headquarters early
in February. The project shows clearly his realization of
the importance of administrative questions. The necessity for
dose control of traffic on the roads is one of the first essentials
that he mentions, and he rightly insists on the supreme im-
portance of the road problem. He knew that if troops were to
maintain their energy over a long day's fighting they must
start well fed; and the time of the original assault was to be
" at an hour which will admit of the troops having a satis-
factory breakfast in daylight before attacking care is to be
taken that this meal is a good one/' He saw that if rapid pro-
gress was to be made rapid decisions would be necessary, and
announced that " staffs will move with the troops, and staff
and other officers will require horses/' But the principal
feature of his plan was the determination to secure surprise as
far as possible by a short, intensely violent artillery bombard-
ment. His artillery chief, General Holland, was a man of
ideas, and, like his Chief, had the character to put his ideas
into practice. By experiment he satisfied himself, and Allenby,
of the feasibility of maintaining a continuous rate of rapid fire
without exhausting the personnel or causing undue wear on
the guns. A week was at this time considered the minimum
period of artillery preparation necessary for a great battle.
In Allenby's plan it was to last for forty-eight hours only.

G.H.Q. was profoundly shocked at these revolutionary
ideas. The reply sent to Allenby objected that h6 had mis-
calculated the factor of wear on the guns, that the artillery
personnel had not sufficient training to maintain rapid fire for
so long, that it would be impossible to observe the effects of
the fire, that the wire on the further objectives would be in-
sufficiently cut, and that in any case the attempt to obtain
surprise was useless, since other preparations would betray
to the enemy the imminence of an attack. Allenby stood firm.

174

CORPS AND ARMY COMMANDER

He was satisfied with his experiments in sustained rapid fire ;
he did not believe that even a week's bombardment could
guarantee fully cut wire on distant objectives; he thought
that a rapid advance by surprise would be likely to find such
defences so thinly manned that the cutting could be completed
by hand, and that, while absolute surprise as to the front of
attack was probably impossible, it was quite possible to sur-
prise the enemy completely as to the date and time of attack,
and thus to make use of this most powerful, but sadly neglected,
element of war.

G.H.Q., faced by the unpleasant prospect of having to
change either its laboriously acquired ideas of war on the
Western Front or the commander of the Third Army, hit
on a brilliant compromise. General Holland was promoted
to command a Corps, and Allenby was given in his place
an artillery commander of orthodox views. Thus outflanked,
Allenby consented to doubling the period of preparation to
four days. But he still sought by every means to obtain as
great a measure of surprise as possible.

While the Allies were slowly elaborating their plans, the
Germans, who were usually a move ahead of their opponents
strategically and tactically, were quietly preparing to slip away
from what threatened to be a deadly falL Soon after the
middle of February they evacuated the dangerous Bapaume
salient, and in the middle of March began their retreat on a
fifty-mile front to the famous Hindenburg Line. Joffre's
plan, had he still been in power and had it been possible for
his plan to be executed punctually, might have caught the
Germans at a disadvantage. As it was, their withdrawal was
unmolested, and the Allies could only push forward slowly
through a countryside devastated with Teuton thoroughness
and with a ruthlessness that had not been seen in Europe for
some hundreds of years.

The effect on the Allied plans in general, and on the Third
Army plan in particular, was considerable. The Fourth and
Fifth Armies had to move forward opposite new and un-
reconnoitred positions of great strength over an area in which

175

ALLENBY

all communications had been systematically destroyed. Their
power to assist the Third Army's attack was very materially
reduced, almost negatived. The same applied in a lesser
degree to the southern front of the Third Army, in which the
right-hand assaulting Corps would now have fresh positions
to face and an entirely new problem. As it turned out, it
would have been better if this Corps had not attacked at first,
and if the whole weight of Allenby's initial blow had been
shifted farther north. But it was late for recasting plans on
which so much preparation had already been spent.

Nivelle professed that the German retirement was entirely
favourable to his project. But Nivelle's stock was already
falling. Not only were the French army commanders critical
of his panacea for victory, but the Government which installed
him had fallen, and some of the new Government were scep-
tical. There was even some talk of a fresh Commander and a
fresh plan ; but it was rightly decided that it was too late to
change. The German move had been well timed. By the
sacrifice of a pawn they had disconcerted the whole of their
opponent's game. Not only had they escaped from a danger-
ous position, but by shortening their line they had made
available more guns and reserves to meet the impending
attack; and it was this fact that in the event was to limit the
British advance and to swell thek losses.

The Arras battles were fought on the eastern spurs of the
Artois plateau, astride the river Scarpe, a slow, marshy
stream. It was the scene of Marlborough's most admired
manoeuvre, the piercing of the Ne Plus Ultra lines in 1711.
The country sloped downward to the Douai plain, and was
open for the most part, with few woods or features. The
village of Monchy-le-Preux, by reason of its position on high
ground commanding an extensive view, formed one of the
most important tactical points. The enemy defences were
strong and deep, and there were three main systems. The
front system comprised a network of three or four lines,
connected by communication trenches. From three to five
miles farther back was a reserve system; and some four miles

176

BATTLES or ARRAS, 1917

ALLENBY

beyond this was a system known as the Drocourt-Queant
switch, recently constructed by the Germans as a northward
extension of the Hindenburg Line, to provide against the
contingency of the breaking of their lines opposite Arras.

Arras itself formed an important feature of the battle. It
lay under the enemy guns only two thousand yards from the
front line, and all roads and communications in the district
centred on it. Through it would have to pass practically all
reinforcements of men and material. This danger was partly
obviated by the use of the great cellars of the town and of
some large caves discovered near by. Cellars and caves were
lit with electric light and prepared to accommodate about
25,000 men. From them shafts were tunnelled to the front
line, so that a large proportion of the assaulting troops were
enabled to emerge on to their starting-line without being
exhausted by a long trudge through muddy trenches, and
with nerves unshaken by enemy artillery fire. To prevent the
streets and roads round Arras being blocked by artillery fire
all enemy batteries were to be heavily shelled. So confident
was General Holland in the success of his counter-battery plan
that he is said to have offered to stand on a chair in the Grande
Place in Arras during the opening attack with a noose round
his neck, the chair to be kicked away when the first enemy shell
fell there.

The assault was to be made on a front of about ten miles
by three Corps, the Seventh (Snow), Sixth (Haldane), and
Seventeenth (Fergusson), with ten divisions in first line and
two in reserve. The Cavalry Corps (Kavanagh 1 ), less one
division allotted to the Fifth Army, stood close behind, ready
to exploit success; and the Eighteenth Corps (Maxse), with
three divisions, formed the reserve of the Army. Two more
divisions were nominally allotted to the Third Army, but
were actually under G.H.Q. control. A total of over seven-
teen hundred guns supported the attack, of which nearly
seven hundred were of medium or heavy calibre. Only forty
tanks, of a primitive type, were available, and they were distri-

1 Lieutenant-Goieral Sir Charles Kavanagh, K.C.B., K.CM.G,, C.V.O., D.S.O.

I 7 8

CORPS AND ARMY COMMANDER

buted along the front and worked in small groups. Though
they did some useful work in the Arras battles, they were on
the whole a disappointment. The technique of a mass attack
by tanks had not yet been evolved; the weapon and its tactics
were still in the experimental stage.

The following is from a book written by the officer in
command of the Tank Corps unit supporting the Third Army,
a man of very independent and outspoken views :

It was an anxious moment when I took my seat at the first
conference held by General Allenby, commanding the Third
Army, in whose area the main battle was to take place.

I already had the pleasure of knowing General Allenby, but
never before had I been called upon to serve under him officially.
He was reputed to be outspoken in the highest degree, to put it
mildly, and woe betide anyone who was unable to give a concise
and satisfactory answer when questioned by him. It was, there-
fore, not without some inward qualms that I took my place at the
conference table in company with Ms senior staff officers and the
G.O.s C. Army Corps.

From the outset there was only one person in the room, and
that person was Allenby. He completely dominated. With the
utmost clearness and a minimum expenditure of words, he out-
lined his plans. He put a few queries to various members of the
conference and noted their replies. I was asked one or two ques-
tions concerning my proposed co-operation, which, fortunately,
I was able to answer without hesitation.

After the conference was over Allenby detained me for a few
moments and told me how confident he felt that the tanks would
prove of great value, and assured me that he, personally, would
give all the help he could and would watch the activities of the"
new arm with the keenest interest. It was a most thoughtful and
encouraging gesture and served to spur us on to further efforts to-
wards success, if that, indeed, were possible. It is small things such
as these which distinguish the great man from the lesser and ensure
a loyalty and devotion which go far to bring about the best results.

At one time or another I served under most of the senior
commanders in France during the War, but I never met one under
whom I would serve so gladly again as under General Allenby.

Of all the commanders in the field who occupied high positions
in the British Army during the War, General Allenby must be

X 79

ALLENBY

regarded as the greatest. Not only was he a born leader of men,
^with a most determined and resolute character, but he possessed
an extremely Imaginative and far-seeing mind and was not afraid
to depart from the stereotyped methods of warfare. 1

The date of the assault was originally fixed for Easter
Sunday, April 8. It was to precede the great French offensive
on the Aisne by about a week. At the last moment, after the
bombardment had begun, the French asked for a postpone-
ment of twenty-four hours, and the attack actually began on
the morning of Easter Monday, April 9.

Easter Sunday was fine and sunny, and facilitated the final
stages of the artillery preparation. But during the following
night the troops waiting in the trenches to assault were
drenched with heavy rain and sleet, a presage of the unfavour-
able weather which was to continue throughout the Arras
battles. Next day storms of sleet and snow, fortunately
driven into the enemy's face by a strong wind, alternated with
fine intervals. The success of the initial attack was the greatest
yet achieved by British arms on the Western Front, and the
action ranks with the Messines battle two months later, the Battle
of Cambrai at the end of the year, and the day of August 8,
1918, as one of the most considerable victories won by the
British on the Western Front in a single day's fighting. The
artillery preparation had been well done (the enemy was
undoubtedly surprised by its comparative shortness); and
the assaulting battalions, of whom over one-third were
Scottish, went forward with great dash. Over 6000 prisoners
and many guns were taken, and on part of the front an advance
of some three and a half miles was made. On the left the
First Army stormed the famous Virny Ridge, which had
resisted so many assaults.

It seemed for a moment as if the fabric of the enemy defence
had at last been irretrievably torn. Undoubtedly much ground
could have been won at Ettle cost on the loth had the leading
troops pushed on at once. Allenby's orders were clear that
the advance was to be continued on that day, but were per-

1 From Chauffeur to Brigadier, by Brigadier-General Baker-Cart.
1 80

CORPS AND ARMY COMMANDER

haps not sufficiently emphatic on the need for vigorous action,
and valuable time was wasted. Next day the order was given
for a c pursuit/ but it was twenty-four hours too late. The
cavalry brought forward for exploitation jammed the roads
and accomplished little.

Progress on the loth and nth was both slow and costly.
The commanding height of Monchy4e-Preux was won, where
a brigade of cavalry suffered heavy loss in attack, but
did valuable work in defence. The enemy had sewn the
rent in his line, hastily and crudely, but strongly enough to
resist anything but a full-dress attack. On the i4th Sir
Douglas Haig ordered the opening stage, known officially as
the First Battle of the Scarpe, to be brought to an end. Over
7000 prisoners and more than a hundred guns had been
collected. He announced that he himself would make the
plan for the next stage, which was to be a combined attack
by the Fifth, Third, and First Armies. But the intended
offensives of the Fifth and First Armies were reduced or post-
poned for various reasons. The Second Battle of the Scarpe
(April 23-24) became for all practical purposes an attack by
the Third Army alone, with troops already tired, and thinned
by hard fighting and hard weather. Two days* fierce struggle
brought comparatively small gain of ground, but inflicted
heavy loss on the enemy, who yielded over 2250 prisoners,
at a cost to the Third Army of some 8000 casualties. The
battle was fought under the shadow of the failure of the
French offensive, which had begun on April 16, and, in spite
of some success, had completely failed to achieve the break-
through which Nivelle had promised and on which his whole
plan depended. By April 23 it was even doubtful whether
the French would persevere in their offensive at all. Unless
the French could break through, the Arras battles had no
strategical objective; and unless the French offensive was to
continue they had no tactical meaning, since their main pur-
pose was to draw the enemy reserves from the French front.

There were some isolated actions during the remainder of
April, at the end of which the total British captures were

181

ALLENBY

18,000 prisoners and 250 guns, of which the Third Army share
was 11,300 prisoners and 185 guns. But the casualties had
been heavy, and the troops were desperately weary. They
had been fighting in appalling conditions of weather and
ground for nearly a month without relief, Yet they were
called on for a final effort. The First Battle of the Scarpe had
been fought in sure faith of victory ; the Second in good hope
of success ; but this Third Battle, on May 3, was mere charity.
It was now practically certain that the French effort was spent,
though it was not yet known that it had resulted in the
mutiny of a large part of the French Army. The main object
of the new British battle was to gain a good defensive line on
which the struggle could be stayed. It was again planned by
G.H.Q. as a combined effort by the First, Third, and Fifth
Armies; and this time all three Armies attacked. But the
fatal mistake was made of fixing the hour of attack in the dark,
to suit the ideas of the Fifth Army, against the advice of the
commanders of the First and Third Armies, who wished to
wait for the dawn. Allenby protested strongly, but Gough
had the ear of the Cbmmander-in-Chief, and his protests were
overborne. The result, owing largely to the confusion of un-
trained reinforcements in the darkness, was a complete and
costly failure.

Desultory fighting continued for a little longer on the
Third Army front, and the Fifth Army still battered at Bulle-
court, but by the middle of May the Battles of Arras were
over. By that date Nivelle had fallen, and Petain, a general of
the sound aad stubborn type, with little mind for brilliancies,
had succeeded him. The policy of attrition was again the
order of the day, and the British Commander-in-Chief, Sit
Douglas Haig, turned with a sigh of relief to the prepara-
tion of his long-cherished Flanders offensive. The Battles of
Arras and the high-flown projects of Nivelle had never been
to his taste. He was confident of British ability to endure
and outstay, but was mistrustful of short cuts and unorthodox
schemes. The whole history of this April offensive, like many
an April day in its brilliant, treacherous promise and bleak

182

CORPS AND ARMY COMMANDER

ending, had been unfortunate. In Joffre's original plan for
1917 it had a clear strategical purpose, which became less
clear in Nivelle's grandiose scheme, and almost vanished
when the Germans withdrew to the Hindenburg Line. What
was designed as a three-act drama became a mere curtain-
raiser- a curtain-raiser to Nivelle's failure that was hissed from
the stage.

The Third Army, on which the brunt of this spring offensive
fell, bore the consequence of the change of policy and of the
Commander-in-Chiers attitude to the battle. Haig, with an
eye always on his Flanders offensive, would not relieve the
hard-ridden Third Army divisions with fresh divisions from
the Second Army in the north. He was never very sympathetic
to the Third Army and its commander. Shortly before the
battle began he suggested the removal of one of Allenby's
Corps commanders, who was alleged to be tired. Allenby
refused to change him. On the eve of the original attack
Allenby was informed that his plan of battle appeared faulty
to the Commander-in-Chief, and that the responsibility for
failure would lie on him. After the success of the first attack
the Chief of General Staff at Haig's headquarters visited
Allenby with a proposal that he should hand over his right-
hand corps to the Fifth Army for better co-ordination.- The
proposal brought an explosion in which Allenby relieved
himself of much pent-up feeling, and was not renewed.

The Arras offensive left Allenby's personal reputation much
as before. The brilliant opening, which vindicated him in the
eyes of those who knew his true abilities, was obscured by
the subsequent lack of success a#d heavy losses, which were
ascribed by many to his violent obstinacy. A shrewd critic,
writing at the time, 1 shows how he puzzled the outside
observer :

Opinions vary about Allenby almost to the very extremes as
regards his capacity. His nickname " the Bull ** represents one
side the idea that he can simply bang forward in a blind sort of
fashion, but won't be turned ; the other rates him very much more

1 F. S. Olivet, in The AmM of War.

183

ALLENBY

highly as a scientific soldier. I don't know which is the true
estimate, perhaps neither.

Meanwhile events on the borders of Palestine were leading
up to AHenby's translation from France and his vindication
as a skilful soldier and great leader of men. The Egyptian
Expeditionary Force, under Sir Archibald Murray, had
during the latter half of 1916 driven the Turks from the Sinai
Desert by a series of skilful actions, and had bridged the
hundred and twenty miles of desert by a railway and pipe-
line. These successes brought the force in the spring of 1917
up against Gaza, the historical gateway of Palestine on the
south. The army was twice repulsed in attacks on this natural
stronghold, and came to a halt. The Prime Minister, Mr Lloyd
George, who was always seeking a strategical * soft spot * and
a way of escape from the slaughter of the Western Front,
demanded that this campaign should be set going again with
fresh troops and a new leader. He offered the command to
Smuts, the South African, lately returned from East Africa,
where he had driven the Germans ftom most of the territory
they held, but had failed to end the activities of their enter-
prising leader, von Lettow-Vorbeck, and had lost a large
proportion of his men and animals through sickness and over-
work. Smuts refused the Palestine command. His own
account of the reasons for his refusal is that an interview
with Sir William Robertson, the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, convinced him that he would not have the backing of the
War Office, who disliked the idea of diverting troops from the
Western Front for a ' side-show/

On Smuts's refusal Robertson recommended Allenby. He
must have known that the relations between Haig and Allenby
were not happy; and if the Prime Minister wanted a man to
put fresh movement into a stagnant campaign there could
be no better choice than Allenby. Early in June, while the
Third Army was taking over the front of the Fifth Army,
which had been ordered north for the Flanders offensive,
Allenby was summoned home, preparatory to receiving the
command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. His first

184

CORPS AND ARMY COMMANDER

reactions were those of dismay. He believed that he was
being removed from France and relegated to an unimportant
command because of the limited success of the Arras battles.
To his successor in the Third Army, Byng, he unburdened
himself bitterly; and it was not till after he reached London
and had interviews with the Prime Minister and the Chief of
the Imperial General Staff that he began to reconcile himself
to the change.

It was characteristic of his departure that he went out of
his way and made himself late for dinner at General Head-
quarters in order to say farewell to one of the children he had
befriended. During the Battles of Arras his staff had once
sought him for some time in vain, to find him at the bedside
of his child friend who had been maimed by a bomb. One
last incident of this final journey to Boulogne is worth record-
ing. On his arrival in France in 1914 he had been allotted a
somewhat ancient Rolls-Royce, which he had used ever since.
During the campaign a new body, much too heavy for the
chassis, had been put on it in Paris, and breakdowns had been
frequent. Now it broke down irretrievably on the final stage,
and his driver, who had set his heart on bringing him safely
in this same car to the port from which they had set out in
1914, was left disconsolate by the roadside.

CHAPTER VIII

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM
(June-December 1917)

THE PREPARATION OF A CAMPAIGN
(June-October 1917)

AFTER handing over command of the Third Army Allenby
spent about a fortnight in England. At an interview with the
Prime Minister, Mr Lloyd George, he was told that Jerusalem
was wanted " as a Christmas present for the British nation,"
and that he was to ask for the reinforcements he found neces-
sary to take it. He left Charing Cross on June 21, 1917. On
this day, at Aleppo, Enver Pasha was holding a conference
of the Turkish commanders on the Caucasus, Palestine, and
Mesopotamian fronts to discuss the future of Turkish opera-
tions in the Eastern theatre. The plan was to recover with
German assistance the city of Baghdad, which General Maude
had captured in the previous March. Jemal Pasha, the
Governor of Syria, struck a discordant note by insisting that
the Palestine front first required reinforcement. The problem
was to form the subject of acrimonious discussion in the
Turkish Higher Command for some months, and was to be
decided too late.

Allenby's party for Egypt consisted of his personal staff
Dalmeny as Military Secretary and two AJD.C.s and
Major-General J. S. Shea, 1 an officer who had spent most of
his service in the Indian Cavalry. The fact that he was of
the party throws an interesting light on AUenby's character.
Shea had been one of his divisional commanders in the Third
Army. During the Battles of Arras he had gone beyond the

1 Geaetal Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., ktet Adjutant-General in
India (1924-28) and G.O.C.-in-C, Eastern Command, India (1928-32).

186

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

permissible in questioning and criticizing the orders he re-
ceived from above, and Allenby had removed him from his
command and sent him home. While Allenby was preparing
for Egypt Sir William Robertson, the Chief of the General
Staff in London, brought to his notice, at the suggestion of
Lord Derby, Secretary of State for War, that Shea was with-
out employment, and asked whether he would be prepared
to take him to Egypt for a Major-General's appointment on
the Palestine front. Allenby readily agreed. He never bore
a grudge. He knew Shea for a most efficient and thrusting
commander, and judged that he was not likely to offend again.
In fact, he became the most successful and enterprising divi-
sional commander of Allenby's campaigns.

The party travelled by Paris and Rome to Brindisi, where it
embarked on a cruiser, H.M.S. Bristol., on June 25, arriving
at Alexandria two days later. According to the Official History,
Allenby assumed command of the Egyptian Expeditionary
Force "at midnight on June 28, 1917." * His predecessor,
Sir Archibald Murray, was still in Cairo, and remained for a
few days after AUenby's arrival* Murray had broken up the
Commander-in-Chief's mess, and had got rid of house and
servants shortly before Allenby 3 s arrival. After about a week
at an hotel Allenby took over a house, the Villa Heller, at
Gezira, and re-engaged Murray's chef, a Frenchman, pro-
prietor of a cafe at Alexandria, who had been called up for
service in the French Army. He was discovered occupy-
ing one of the most expensive suites at Shepheard's Hotel.
Within less than two months he was cooking excellent meals
in a hut on the Sinai Desert.

AUenby's arrival undoubtedly caused some "alarm and
despondency " at headquarters in Cairo. His reputation was
not a comfortable one for a staff which had become accustomed
to the fleshpots of Egypt. The fact that he had brought with
him a spare Major-General was not held to be a good augury ;
and as Shea was a Staff College officer, with considerable

1 In strict military parlance there could be no such time. It should be " at midnight
June 28-2.9."

187

ALLENBY

experience on the Staff, the range of uneasiness in the higher
ranks was wide. Nor did the first actions of the new Com-
mander-m-Chief restore their peace of mind. He went round
aH the rooms in General Headquarters and, as was his custom,
ascertained personally what each officer on his staff was doing.
He at once formed the impression that the General Staff
officers were too junior and inexperienced, and should be
replaced. The senior officer of the Adjutant-General's branch,
a Major-General, brought him on his first morning in the
office a formidable pile of papers, dealing with details of
dress, discipline, the administration of martial law, and such
matters. Allenby studied the first two or three with rising
irritation, and then asked if they were all of a similar nature.
He ended by pitching the whole pile into the far corner of
the room and forcibly forbidding that his time should ever
again be wasted on details that a junior officer should decide.
Within a week of assuming command he departed on a visit
to the front, leaving behind a slightly shaken staff.

The Egyptian Expeditionary Force lay some three hundred
miles from Cairo, on the southern borders of Palestine, with
its main body opposite Gaza, on the coast, where it had twice
suffered defeat, and with its right extended towards Beersheba,
of the Seven Wells, the desert gateway of Palestine. The
original mission of the Force had been to safeguard the Suez
Canal ; and in pursuance of this object, and to gain elbow-
room for manoeuvre, the Desert Column, consisting of the
mounted divisions, the Camel Corps, and two infantry
divisions, had advanced across the Sinai Desert during the
autumn and winter of 1916, driving the Turks before it and
pulling behind it a railway and pipe-line. It was a well-
organized and well-conducted little campaign, which ended
in an unexpected and somewhat unlucky repulse at the First
Battle of Gaza in March 1917. Murray's strangely optimistic
account of this battle led the Cabinet at home to believe that
an easy success would attend a renewed effort, and he was
ordered to advance into Palestine, with the capture of Jerusalem
as his objective. The result was another and heavier reverse,

188

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

at the Second Battle of Gaza, against the now strongly fortified
Turkish position ; the indirect consequence was the substitu-
tion of Allenby for Murray.

The Force on the Palestine front (known at this time as
" Eastern Force ") comprised three mounted divisions (An^ac,
Australian, and Yeomanry) and four infantry divisions (52nd,
53rd, 54th, 74th). The Anzac Mounted Division consisted
of two Australian Light Horse brigades and the New Zealand
Mounted Rifle Brigade, the Australian Mounted Division of
two Australian Light Horse brigades and a Yeomanry brigade,
and the Yeomanry Mounted Division of three Yeomanry
brigades. There was also a brigade mounted on camels (the
Imperial Camel Corps Brigade) and an independent Yeomanry
brigade (yth Mounted Brigade). The 5*nd (Lowland), 53rd
(Welsh), and 54th (East Anglian) were first-line Territorial
divisions which had fought in GallipoB and in the campaign
across the Sinai Desert; the 74th was formed of dismounted
Yeomanry units, and had taken as its divisional badge a
broken spur. A fifth division, the 6oth (London), was in
process of arrival from Salonika ; it was composed of second-
line Territorial battalions, and had fought in France before
transfer to the Salonika front. A sixth division, the 75th, was
being formed in Egypt from Territorial and Indian battalions
from India and elsewhere. The material of the Force was
magnificent. The men, for the most part, were seasoned
troops, who had not suffered the crippling casualties of the
Western Front, and who still retained a good proportion of
the personnel with whom they had begun the War. Such men
were veterans, with nearly three years of experience. At
present they were discouraged and cynical : they had lost faith
in the Higher Command and in themselves, and were, like
the Israelites of old, weary of the hardships of the desert.
Moreover, they were weak in numbers, having received few
reinforcements from home. The Force was in the doldrums,
becalmed and dispirited, held between failure and success. It
needed the wind of Allenby's tremendous personality to fill
the sails and give it steerage-way.

189

ALLENBY

AHenby's arrival and this first short visit to the front made
a remarkable change. Word went round that he had the
backing of the War Cabinet and could command reinforce-
ments in a way that Murray never could. The news that
General Headquarters would move from Cairo to the front
meant that the requirements and difficulties of the troops
would at last be seen at close quarters and properly under-
stood. But more than anything it was AUenby's personality
that stirred their imagination and roused their hope. The
Australian Official History writes thus of his coming :

He went through the hot, dusty camps of his army like a strong,
fresh, reviving wind. He would dash up in his car to a Light
Horse regiment, shake hands with a few officers, inspect hurriedly,
but with a sure eye to good and bad points, the horses of, perhaps,
a single squadron, and be gone in a few minutes, leaving a great
trail of dust behind him. His tall and massive, but restlessly
active figure, his keen eyes and prominent hooked nose, Ms terse
and forcible speech, and his imperious bearing, radiated an
impression of tremendous resolution, quick decision and steely
discipline. Troops who caught only one fleeting glimpse of him
felt that here at last was a man with the natural qualities of a great
driving commander who, given a great task and supplied, as
Allenby was, with a great scheme for its accomplishment, would
relentlessly force it through to its conclusion. At last they had a
commander who would live among them and lead them. Within
a week of his arrival Allenby had stamped his personality on the
mind of every trooper of the horse and every infantryman of
the line.

An officer of a Yeomanry regiment wrote, " Seldom in the
course of military history has the personality of a new com-
mander had such a marked effect on his troops/'

The commander of Eastern Force, Sk Philip Chetwode,
who had succeeded Dobell after the Second Battle of Gaza,
was an old friend of Allenby, and had served under him
twice previously as commander of a regiment in AUenby's
brigade before the War and as a brigade commander in the
Cavalry Corps in France. Each man knew and appreciated the
qualities of the other. Chetwode had one of the keenest and

190

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

quickest brains in the Army and a remarkable eye for ground.
He now presented Allenby with one of the shrewdest apprecia-
tions made during the War, the details of which had been
worked out by his staff officer, Guy Dawnay. 1 The obvious
line of advance into Palestine for a force with full command
of the sea was along the coast. It was the most direct; it
secured the advantages of naval co-operation; it covered
the main line of communication to Egypt; and it presented
comparatively little difficulty in the matter of water-supply.
But Gaza, which barred the coast route, had become a fortress
to be taken only by slow and costly process of siege. The
Turkish centre was also strong, and the approaches to it lay
over a bare, open plain, dominated by the ridge on which
stood the Turkish works, and almost devoid of water. There
remained the Turkish left. Their main position ended at
Hareira, some four miles west of Beersheba. The works here
were weaker and less complete and the ground more favour-
able to attack. Also there was here an open flank round which
the great mass of mounted troops might be passed to operate
against the Turkish rear. The Turkish detached garrison of
Beersheba would have to be reduced by a preliminary opera-
tion and the water-supply of that place secured. The diffi-
culties were many, but Chetwode recommended this as the
most promising line of operation. He estimated the mini-
mum force required at three mounted divisions and seven
infantry divisions at full strength, with a considerable increase
of artillery. Allenby, after inspection of the whole front,
including a reconnaissance towards Beersheba between the
British and Turkish lines, accepted Chetwode's view of the
situation and adopted his plan. On July 12, on his return to
Cairo, he cabled home an outline of the plan and his require-
ments in additional troops.

Even in this hurried visit, when almost every moment
was taken up by interviews and reconnaissances, Allenby
took his usual interest in the plants, animals, birds, and people
of a new land. His letters to Lady Allenby, written from a

1 Major-General G. P. Dawnay, C.B., CM.G., D.S.O., M.C.

ALLENBY

train lying in a siding at the railhead, contain observations
such as the following :

Of birds, there are larks, wheatears, shrikes, bee-eaters, hawks,
vultures. Flamingoes frequent the mouths of the wadis. There
is a merry bird, the rufous warbler, who haunts the locality. He
is pert and friendly. Looks like a big nightingale, has the manners
of a robin, and flirts his tail like a redstart. I saw one to-day
attack a locust nearly as big as himself. There are also jackals,
jerboas, lizards and scarab beetles. . . . The country is now
parched and dry. In the spring it is covered with verdure, fields
of barley, grass, flowers of many sorts red-hot pokers, irises, etc.
In the* oases, and near the villages, are date-palms, and great
quantities of fig-trees, apricots and almond-trees. There are great
patches of an inferior sort of water-melon. One of the camps is in
a fig and vine plantation, near the sea. Great fig-trees, 100 years
old, grow right up and on to the sand dunes. The vines either
sprawl on the sand or cover the fig-trees. ... I was astounded
to-day to see the camels browsing on prickly-pear cactus. I had
always thought that the prickly pear was proof against any
animal that had a palate and a tongue. But I see the camels eating
it greedily, and paying no more heed to the awful spines than
if they were bloom on a peach. . . . The people all look like
Biblical characters. Face, dress, and everything like pictures
from the Bible. Keen, handsome faces ; picturesque Arab dress ;
ornaments of beads, coins and enamel, much as one sees in the
Egyptian museums. The children are beggars, all. Very pretty,
some of them. All attractive to me.

Otherwise these letters are a simple chronicle of his move-
ments ; there is not a word of the momentous plans he was
discussing, or of military operations. This was characteristic.
It was not just discretion, nor was there any affectation about
it* It was simply that birds, beasts, and flowers interested
htm more than soldiering. Allenby was a conscientious
correspondent : he answered almost all letters, usually in his
own handwriting. But he was not a brilliant or even an
interesting letter-writer. His letters kept strictly to the point
at issue, and contained no gossip or commentary; they were
usually mere "situation reports/ never epistles. Whenever
there is in them a flash of illumination, a telling phrase, or a

192

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

clue to the writer's personality, the subject is almost invariably
some new bird or flower or trick of Nature that has caught his
notice.

It was while AUenby was returning from this first trip that
the strange character who was in public estimation to share
his fame in the Palestine campaigns, T. E. Lawrence, first
saw him at Ismailia " a very large and superior general." *
In the same chapter of Seven Pillars of Wisdom Lawrence also
describes his first meeting with Allenby at Cairo. His account
ends:

Allenby could not make out how much was genuine performer
and how much charlatan. The problem was working behind his
eyes, and I left him unhelped to solve it. 2 ... At the end he put
up his chin and said quite directly, ** Well, I will do for you what
I can," and that ended it. I was not sure how far I had caught
him; but we learned gradually that he meant exactly what he
said; and that what General Allenby could do was enough for
his very greediest servant.

Allenby spent the next fortnight in Egypt, arranging for
the transfer of G.H.Q. to the Palestine front, and inspecting
the Base establishments, hospitals, and workshops in Cairo,
Alexandria, and elsewhere. He showed his usual thorough-
ness in making himself personally acquainted, so far as possible,
with every one and with everything that ministered to the
efficiency of his army, and his usual common sense in deciding
where change was required and where confidence could be
reposed. One of his first orders permitted the wearing of
trousers for office work and while on leave in Cairo, in place
of the breeches and boots enjoined by his predecessor.

This is a suitable place to introduce an account of Allenby
written by a famous ophthalmic surgeon. 3 It shows how
Allenby impressed an extremely able civilian, and also illus-
trates well Allenby's inquisitive mind in any matter that might

1 Seven Pillars of Wisdom* Chapter LVL

2 Allenby never quite solved it, but always suspected a strong streak of the charlatan
in Lawrence.

3 H. L. Eason, C.B., C.M.G., MJX, M.S., Principal of the University of London, and
former Superintendent and Senior Ophthalmic Surgeon, Guy's Hospital.

N 193

ALLENBY

forward his campaign and the well-being of the soldiers under
his command.

I first met General Allenby soon after he came to Egypt, when
he consulted me about his eyes in Alexandria. I had heard much
of his alarming personality, but, possibly because I was an inde-
pendent civilian, a soldier only as regards my uniform, I was not
in the least terrified by him, though he struck me at once as a
great man both in mind and stature. He asked me about my
job. . . . He told me that he had not had much time to acquire a
knowledge of all the work which was being done by civilian
specialists in the Egyptian Expeditionary Force since he arrived,
but that I must go and see him when he had moved General
Headquarters from Cairo and Ismailia to just behind the front.
Shortly afterwards he moved General Headquarters up to the
neighbourhood of Rafa, and no one who was in Egypt at that
time will forget the fresh current of hope and inspiration which
swept through the Egyptian Expeditionary Force after he had
been in Egypt for a few weeks.

In due course I went up to General Headquarters, and within
twenty minutes of reporting my arrival I was invited to dine
with Allenby that evening. He put me next to him and began
pumping me on my subject. Did I know anything about diseases
of the eye in previous campaigns in Egypt and Palestine ? Had
I written anything about it or published it ? I told him that I
had just been translating that part of the memoirs of Larrey,
Napoleon's famous chief medical officer, which dealt with
ophthalmia, and had sent a paper on this subject home. I told
him something about the disastrous epidemic of ophthalmia which
blinded so many of Napoleon's army in Egypt during the cam-
paign of 1798-1801. He asked me to send him a copy of my
paper. . . .

His interest in everything appertaining to Egypt or Syria which
might affect the troops or the progress of the campaign was
insatiable. Whether it was a fly expert from the British Museum,
a railway engineer, an expert on town-planning, or a naturalist
who could tell him something about the flora or fauna of the
country, he had them all up and sucked their brains of anything
they could tell him. If they had something to tell him, he never
forgot them : if they had not, heaven help them ! He borrowed
from me Myres' Dawn of History., Hogarth's Ancient East, volumes
of Herodotus, a history of the Crusades, and other books, carried

194

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

them off with him to the front, and when he returned them asked
me for more. 1 He was so convinced that in the unchanging East
history would repeat itself that from the beginning he said that the
decisive battle of the campaign would be fought at the Pass of
Megiddo. Going round one day in the neighbourhood of Ludd,
he drifted (well, 'drifted' is not quite the word to describe
Allenby's entry anywhere) into a bacteriological laboratory of
which an old fellow-student of mine was in charge. He saw some
charts on the wall, and asked their meaning. " Well, sir/* said
the bacteriologist, " those are charts of the seasonal incidence of
malignant malaria in the Plain of Sharon, and I think that is the
reason why Richard Cceur de Lion never got to Jerusalem. His
army was nearly destroyed by fever, and I find that he came down
the coast in September, when malignant malaria was at its height/*
This sort of information was manna from heaven to Allenby, and
he never forgot it. ...

After the Armistice, when Allenby came to live in Cairo, I
occasionally had the pleasure of lunching with him and Lady
Allenby. Nothing was more striking than the entire absence of
formality, parade, and ceremonial when he was, so to speak., in his
own home. He unbent entirely, was cheerful and merry, with an
acute sense of humour, and, as during the campaign, he was
keenly interested in anything connected with the country or with
the welfare of the troops. When I said good-bye to him on going
home in 1919 I felt that I was leaving one of the few really great
men that I have met in my life. He had determination, a strong
will, an imposing and imperious personality, but he was a lasting
friend to anybody who knew his job and gave them credit for all
that they had done. Though it is nearly twenty years ago, my
memory of him, is still quite vivid, and I have seen no reason
after this lapse of time to vary my original impression that he
was one of the few really great men I have met in the course
of my life.

In the last week of - July Allenby made another tout of
inspection on the Palestine front. He returned to Cairo on
July 31 to meet a cable from Lady Allenby telling him that

1 An incident which occurred shortly before the Third Battle of Gaza shows the range
of AHenby's knowledge. A discussion arose about the site of the ancient historical
route across Sinai. Allenby suggested reference to a passage in Strabo, Extracts from
his works were obtained from Cairo in the original Greek, and Allenby translated the
passage without difficulty.

ALLENBY

their only child Michael had been killed in France. He had
been hit by a splinter of shell which went through his steel
helmet while he was walking from a detached gun to the
remainder of the battery. He lived five hours, but never
recovered consciousness. He was half-way through his
twentieth year, and had won the Military Cross and been
recommended for promotion to the rank of captain.
His battery commander wrote of him :

He had absolutely no notion of fear, and in every operation
wished to go forward as Forward Observing Officer, but, of
course, was only allowed to do it in his turn. He was the finest
practical gunner of his rank that I have ever seen in France. The
men all loved him and would do anything for him. In the mess
he amused us greatly with his socialistic views and his defence of
conscientious objectors. He was a good rider and a thorough
sportsman.

This testimony is confirmed by others ; there is no doubt
that young Allenby's personality made a deep impression on
all who knew him. Of all that generation of youth from
whom the Great War took so terrible a toll in death or dis-
illusion, to Britain's grievous loss, there were few of more
promise than Michael Allenby. 1 Allenby took the shock with
his unquenchable courage. He went on with his work and
asked no sympathy. Only those who stood close to him
knew how heavy the blow had been, how nearly it had broken
him, and what courage it had taken to withstand it.

After his son's death Allenby obtained, with some difficulty,
permission for Lady Allenby to go to Egypt. She arrived in
October., and went to the Villa Heller, at Gezira. Her in-
fluence in the English community in Egypt was in its way as
great as Allenby's at the front. She took a part in the direc-
tion of Red Cross work, in finding occupations and interests
for convalescents and for officers and men on leave, and
similar activities. Her imperturbable serenity was as effective

1 Young Allenby's memory is preserved in the battery in which he served (T Battery,
Royal Horse Artillery) by a fund -which Allenby and his wife established after the War
from the money Michael had left. The fund is used mainly to provide and keep up a
sitting-room and library for the men of the battery*

196

LIEUTENANT MICHAEL ALLENBY

PMo Lafayette

196

VISCOUNTESS ALLENBY

Photo Hay Wrightson, F.R.S.A^ London

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

in inspiring coinage as was her husband's dynamic energy.
She had in her gentle way as much strength of will and purpose
as he had.

By the middle of August the first and most important
steps in the preparation of the campaign had been taken.
Allenby had received from the War Cabinet sanction for his
proposals and a promise of nearly all the reinforcements he
required; he had reorganized his army into three Corps; he
had outlined his plan to his Corps commanders ; and he had
moved G.ELQ. from Cairo to the front. The camp was a
little north of Rafa, at Umm el Kelab (" the mother of dogs ").
It consisted partly of wooden huts and partly of tents, on a
slight rise in the bare, sandy plain. 1 Summer conditions on the
Palestine borders were extremely trying. There was no shade,
and the temperature often rose to no degrees; sometimes a
hot wind from the desert, the Khamsin, blew for days on
end; there was constant dust; all cuts, even scratches, turned
septic; and c sand-fly fever/ which, though not dangerous,
left its victims weak and exhausted for many days, was
prevalent. Only a regular sea-breeze kept the heat down and
made the nights reasonably cool. The roads were sandy
tracks, negotiable only by the power and majesty of Rolls-
Royce or the irrepressible mobility of Ford the old-model
* tin Lizzie ' that bumped and banged its way across Egypt,
Sinai, Palestine, and Syria, often where nothing else mech-
anical would go, and was an invaluable asset to the Egyptian
Expeditionary Force.

The Commander-in-Chief, in spite of the dust and the heat
and the roughness of the tracks, was constantly round all
parts of the front. His first visit to the headquarters of the
Corps on the coast was made in a particularly disreputable
Ford truck, as his own cars had not arrived. He sat perched
up on the front seat alongside the driver, an Australian, who
was clad only in a sleeveless vest and very attenuated shorts.
The picture of these two, with one of the personal staff

i It was curious to leatn that a krge proportion of Scotch whisky was distffled from
barley grown on this dusty plain, which became green with the rains of winter.

197

ALLENBY

bumping painfully in the body of the truck behind, remained
long in the memory of those who witnessed it.

There was much to be done and much to see. The increase
of the force involved great administrative changes and
developments, from the advanced base at Kantara, on the
Suez Canal, to the front line. The railway was being doubled ;
and special construction gangs were trained to enable it to be
rapidly pushed forward when the advance began. Pipe-lines
for water were developed and extended. Depots of ammuni-
tion and stores of all kinds had to be accumulated. Allenby
was fortunate in having as his Quartermaster-General one of
the most capable and experienced administrative officers in
the Army at the time, Major-General W. Campbell. 1

As usual, Allenby saw everything for himself trench line,
camps, hospitals, depots, watering arrangements, and all
administrative establishments. His constant presence and
obvious determination to do everything possible for their
comfort heartened the troops ; but so sudden and frequent
became his appearances that Corps staffs suborned a signal
officer at G.H.Q. to broadcast a warning whenever the
Chief set out from camp* The warning was conveyed by
the letters " EX.," the interpretation of which was " Bull
loose."

His temper was under better control than in France, or he
found things ordered more to his liking. Still, there were
occasional explosions which showed that he had lost nothing
of his forcefulness. The habit of carelessly lighting fires where
they might cause damage was anathema to him. Soon after his
arrival he found a fire lighted in the shelter of a pile of boxes
of ammunition, and after an outburst of wrath that shook the
culprits almost as much as if the ammunition had exploded he
directed a senior staff officer to issue an order that any similar
carelessness would be followed by a court-martial of the officer
responsible. Not many days later he was inspecting the largest
depot of ammunition on the front, stacked in the open near

1 The kte Lieutenant-General Sir Walter Campbell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.,
afterwards Quartermaster-General at the War Office (1923-27). He died in 1936.

198

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

the coast. All went well till ia the centre of the depot the
guard were found cooking their midday meal within a few
yards of a large pile of ammunition. AUenby, who was riding,
flung himself from his horse, and strode up to the sentry.
" Repeat your orders," he commanded abruptly. The sentry
gazed in consternation at the large and obviously angry
General, but at a second impatient command started hurriedly
with the routine orders for a sentry : " Take charge of aU
Government property within view of my post ; pay the cor-
rect compliments to all field officers ; in case of fire, alarm

the guard " He got no further. " Well, there's a fire,"

roared AUenby, pointing to the dinner. " Why don't you
alarm the guard ? " The guard was eventually turned out,
and made to stamp out the fire which was cooking their meal ;
whereupon AUenby remounted, observing grimly to the
officers accompanying him, " Well, you've read my order.
The officer responsible will be tried by court-martial, whatever
his rank." On his return to camp, however, he found that the
staff officer concerned had forgotten to issue the order, and
there was a second, and louder, explosion.

On days when he did not visit the front AUenby rode in the
afternoon or evening. Whatever his route, it almost invari-
ably included a smaU copse in the desert, a mile or so from
the camp. The southern border of Palestine is on one of the
principal lines of bird migration, and in this copse were to be
found specimens of many different birds. AUenby would ride
round the copse for a quarter of an hour or so, naming the
new species that had arrived since he was last there and re-
marking on thei habits. 1 A passage from a letter to Lady
AUenby shows his usual interest in men, birds, and flowers in
new places :

I was up yesterday looking at the enemy's lines between Gaza
and the sea-coast. I rode some miles along the beach, past the
mouth of the Wady Ghuzzee. Beautiful sands and brilliantly
dear blue sea. At the mouth of the Wady Ghuzzee is a brackish

1 There were on AHenby*s staff two well-known ornithologists, Colonel R. Melnertz-
hagen and Lord William Percy,

199

ALLENBY

lagoon, wherein two or three natives were fishing. They have a
circular net, with leaden weights on its rim. This they carry loose
on their shoulder. When a fish is seen usually a sole they
throw it over the top of him and catch him under it. The water
must be clear, as it always is, and not more than about 2 feet deep.
All along the beach, at the foot of earthy cliffs some 20 or 30 feet
high, grow quantities of delicate white lilies ; like krge white
daffodils. Along the water's edge are queer crabs, big and little,
many sandpipers and stints and some lovely blue kingfishers. They
are the Spanish kingfisher ; very like the English, but bluer. They
pick up the little fish in the pools, and are quite tame and friendly.

The seven infantry divisions required by Allenby were to
be made up by the transfer of the loth Division from Salonika
and the completion of the 75th Division in Egypt. But the
former could not arrive till the end of August, and the latter
was not likely to be fit to take its place in the line till the end
of September. Meanwhile the Force was reorganized into
three Corps the Desert Mounted Corps, under Chauvel, 1 an
Australian ; the Twentieth Corps, under Sir Philip Chetwode ;
and the Twenty-first Corps, "which was given to Bulfin, 2 a
stout-hearted warrior, but lacking Chetwode's brilliance. He
had come to Palestine in command of the 6oth (London)
Division, which was now entrusted to Shea. There was no
general * purge * of commanders, as some have supposed. A
few elderly and obese colonels of mounted regiments were
replaced by more active men; one divisional commander,
whose abilities were not quite equal to his position, was sent
home; but Allenby was always content to make the best of
the material available, and probably dismissed fewer senior
officers than did any other of the Army commanders of the
Great War. 3 There was one important change at Head-
quarters. The Chief of the General Staff, Major-General Sir
Arthur Lynden-Bell, was temperamentally unsuited to work

1 General Sit Henry Chauvel, K.C.B., G.C.M.G.

2 The kte General Sir Edward Bulfin, K.C.B. He died in 1939.

s Allenby found at first that there was a tendency to offer him the failures who had
been d^mm^ in France. The formula usually ran, " So-and-so has been found unable

to stand the strain of operations in France, but it is thought that he would do better
in a warm climate."

200

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

with Allenby, and the relations between the two men were
never happy. It was a relief to both when the doctors decreed
that Lynden-Bell had been too long in the East, and that his
eyesight would suffer unless he was transferred home. Allenby
at once cabled for Bols, who had served him well in the Third
Army and was now commanding a division in France. As
assistant to Bols Brigadier-General Guy Dawnay came to
G.H.Q. He had been Chetwode's staff officer in Eastern
Force, and had helped him to prepare the appreciation on
which the plan of the new campaign was based. He now
became responsible for working out the details to give effect
to the plan, a task for which he was admirably qualified.

The plan itself was simple, as are almost all good plans in
war : to concentrate a superior force against the enemy's left
flank, while inducing him to believe that his right would
again be attacked. The Twentieth Corps and Desert Mounted
Corps were to form the striking force against the Turkish left,
while the Twenty-first Corps kept the enemy's attention fixed
on Gaza. It was in essentials almost exactly the same plan as
Roberts had exploited against Cronje in the relief of Kimberley
in the Boer War some seventeen years before ; and it is certain
that Roberts' move had stayed in AUenby's memory, since it
was the first big military operation in which he, then a squadron
commander, had played a part. Roberts* difficulties then were
almost exactly the same as his own now transport, water,
and secrecy. The tracks towards Beersheba and the Turkish
left were not practicable for the mechanical vehicles of the day,
except the Holt tractors, so that the striking force was mainly
dependent on horsed transport and camels. This greatly
increased the difficulties of the second main problem, the
supply of water. Not only had a great deal to be done in the
development of water-supply before the enterprise could begin,
but during the actual operation water would have to be carried
for the greater part of the striking force. There were 30,000
camels employed, mainly in carrying water. When all calcula-
tions and preparations had been made the ruling factors as
regards transport and water were found to be these : by the

201

ALLENBY

employment of all the transport available, including that of the
Twenty-first Corps opposite Gaza, the striking force could be
supplied from railhead up to Beersheba and for one march
beyond ; but it could be watered only up to Beersheba, and
its advance beyond Beersheba was dependent on the supplies
of water at that place. The early capture of the Turkish
detached post of Beersheba, with wells intact if possible, was
thus a keystone of the plan.

The third great problem was to move the striking force
some ten or twelve miles over open country, capture Beer-
sheba, and attack the Turkish left without the enemy becoming
aware of the intention. There could be no question of con-
cealing entirely the preparations for a move against Beersheba ;
but it was hoped to persuade the enemy that this move was
only a feint, and that the main attack would come, as before,
against Gaza. The steps taken to deceive the Turk were varied
and ingenious ; the most spectacular and successful was the
famous * haversack ruse/ in which a staff officer contrived to
be chased by the Turkish outposts, pretended to be wounded,
and dropped, with other articles, a haversack stained with
fresh blood containing papers, letters, money. The papers and
letters had been very skilfully prepared, firstly to give the
impression that they were genuine, and secondly to convey the
information that the main attack was coming at Gaza, and that
the preparations against Beersheba were only a feint. 1 It is
now known that these papers were one of the principal in-
fluences that determined the action of the Turks before and
during the battle. But this was only one of the many steps
taken to conceal the real plan and to implant a fictitious reading
of it in the minds of the enemy.

The details of the plan were developed at a series of con-
ferences. Allenby presided at these and made his qualities as
a commander very evident. He had a complete grasp of all
sides of the plan, strategical, administrative, and tactical, and
gave any decision required with authority and without hesita-

1 A foil account of this celebrated ruse is given in the Official History (vol. ii,
pp. 30-31) and, more dramatically, in Aston's Secret Service and Tuohy^s The Secret Corps.

2O2

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

tion. Then he left his staff to work out the details without
interference*

The date at which the operation should begin was a difficult
point for decision. It had been AUenby's original intention to
attack in September, but the lateness of arrival of certain parts
of the force soon made it clear that neither the training of the
troops nor the administrative arrangements would be com-
plete till well on in October, There were risks in postponing
the operation for so long. Heavy rains might be expected
from the middle of November which would turn the coastal
plain of Palestine into a sea of mud; and there was evidence
that the enemy was bringing down reinforcements from the
north and was planning some counter-measure. AHenby
sensibly preferred to wait till his preparations were complete
and his troops handy at their rok y and to risk being forestalled
by unusually early rains or an unnaturally active Turk.

The loth Irish Division, when it arrived from Salonika, in
the middle of September, presented another problem for
decision. It had suffered much from malaria in the Sttuma
valley, and the medical authorities advised AHenby that it
should have a three months 7 rest before being used for any
operations. Allenby went and inspected the division for him-
self, and liked its look. He cross-questioned the divisional
commander, Longley, who had served under him in France,
on the fitness of his men to march and fight ; and thereupon
rejected the advice of the doctors, and trusted to his own
judgment that the division would do its job. His judgment
was fully justified by events; the division stood up to the
hard work of the campaign without undue sickness. Allenby's
decision was probably also based on psychology; he knew
that to leave an Irish division at rest when fighting was toward
was likely to be destructive of its morale and discipline.

A curious Arab prophecy was discovered by some one
about this time; it was to the effect that the Turks would be
driven from Jerusalem only " when a prophet of the Lord
brought the waters of the Nile to Palestine. 3 * Now, the pipe-
line laid across the desert by Murray had already .brought Nile

205

ALLENBY

water to the very boundaries of Palestine, and was to be con-
tinued forward as soon as operations began; and Allenby's
name transliterated into Arabic could be read as " Allah en
nebi " (" the prophet of the Lord ").

Early in October there was an interchange of telegrams
with the War Office which has some historical and biographical
importance. In his previous instructions in August Allenby
had been given no geographical objective. He had simply
been told to defeat the Turkish forces opposite him, in order
to " strengthen the staying power and morale of this country/'
to increase the dissatisfaction of the Turks with their German
masters, and to remove the danger to Baghdad, threatened by
the Turkish concentration at Aleppo. Now he was informed
that the War Cabinet desired to eliminate Turkey from the
War altogether, and that it was thought that the occupation
of the Jaffa-Jerusalem line, followed by suitable diplomatic
action, might accomplish this purpose. Allenby was accord-
ingly to report what additional troops he would require to
make, certain of reaching Jaffa and Jerusalem.

The strategical ideas of the Prime Minister, Mr Lloyd
George, formed the background of this request. In France
Haig's Passchendaele battle had been in progress for two
months, with heavy losses and small gains. Mr Lloyd George,
always seeking for a way round the iron fortifications in the
west, had the conception of abstracting divisions from France
during the winter, when large operations were impossible,
using them to knock out the Turks in the east, where climatic
conditions were more favourable, and then transhipping them
back to France in time for the spring campaign. His strategical
imagination, however, outran the practical possibilities of
shipping, communications, and the time factor. Allenby's
reply, which asked. for thirteen additional divisions, settled
the matter, since reinforcement on such a scale was obviously
impossible. Mr Lloyd George in his disappointment accuse^
the C.I.G.S., Sir William Robertson, of prompting such a reply
by giving Allenby a deliberately exaggerated account of the
potential Turkish numbers. In fact, both the War Office and

204

SOME OF ALLENBY S OPPONENTS IN THE PALESTINE

CAMPAIGN

(1) KRESS VON KRESSENSTEIN, commander of the Eighth Turkish Army.

(2) MUSTAPHA KEMAL PASHA (afterwards Ataturk, first President of the
Turkish Republic}, commander of the Seventh Turkish Army, August-October 1918.

(3) JEMAL PASHA, Governor of Syria.
(4) FEVZI PASHA (now Marshal Cakmak), commander of the Seventh

Turkish Army before Mustapha Kemal. 207

GENERAL ALLENBY's HEADQUARTERS DURING

The building is the German school at Bir Salem.

VON FALKENHAYN WITH TURKISH GENERALS AND OFFICIALS
AT THE RAILWAY-STATION AT JERUSALEM

206

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

AHenby's Intelligence staff had a false Idea of the Turkish
strength, or, rather, an incomplete knowledge of their weak-
ness. They reckoned by divisions, and had not realized how
pitifully weak many of the Turkish divisions were. Even so,
Allenby's demand for thirteen more divisions seems, in the
light of what he accomplished with the force already available,
to indicate a grave error of judgment. There was, of course,
no question of collusion between him and Robertson to
frustrate the Prime Minister's plans. The real explanation of
the size of his request lies in the wording of the War Office
telegram which required him to say what force he required to
" make certain " of reaching Jaffa and Jerusalem, and in the
estimate of twenty divisions, including two German, which his
Intelligence produced as the maximum force which the enemy
might bring against him.

The date for the attack on Beersheba, which was to be the
opening act of the operations, was eventually fixed for Octo-
ber 31. The bombardment of Gaza was to begin some days
earlier. The date was the latest possible, and involved some risk
of forestalment by weather or by foe ; but it enabled all the
elaborate administrative preparations to be completed and the
troops to come to their starting-places trained, fit, and con-
fident. The training had included long marches over heavy
going and practice in working on a limited water ration. The
ground between the front-line posts and Beersheba, a wide No
Man's Land of some ten miles or more, had been thoroughly
explored by commanders and staffs under cover of a series of
reconnaissances in force by the mounted troops. There were
five of these between August z4 and October 3 . Their purpose
was twofold : they enabled the staffs to work out the somewhat
intricate arrangements for moving the troops into position for
the assault on the Beersheba defences, and they accustomed
the Turks to such demonstrations. It was hoped that the real
attack might be mistaken at first for another reconnaissance,
an impression which the Intelligence skilfully endeavoured
to foster by means such as cipher messages intended to be
deciphered by the enemy. These reconnaissances were not

205

ALLENBY

altogether popular with the mounted troops, who were not.,
of course, aware of their significance in the general plan, and
suspected a desire of the staffs to c picnic * at the expense of
their sweat and blood. The senior commanders were irrever-
ently termed " the Royal Party/' The Turks usually reported
these reconnaissances as attempts to assault Beersheba which
they had repulsed with heavy loss.

While the British stroke was being prepared with solid,
expensive efficiency, typical of the nation when aroused by
defeat and difficulties, the counsels of the enemy were divided
and troubled. As already stated, the Germans had determined
in the spring of 1917 to aid their disheartened Turkish ally to
recapture Baghdad, which Maude had taken in March. The
best Turkish troops remaining were assembled round Aleppo ;
a German force was specially formed, trained, and equipped
to provide a stiffening when required; and von Falkenhayn,
one of the ablest and most experienced of the German com-
manders, 1 with a German staff, was sent to take charge of the
force, to which the Turks had given the boastful name of
Yilderim (" the Thunderbolt "). It was to be transported down
the Euphrates to strike at the British left flank in Mesopotamia
suddenly, a bolt from the desert. Mustapha Kemal (the late
Ataturk, first President of the Turkish Republic) was offered
the command of the Turkish portion of the force, but declined
to serve under a German staff.

Not only, however, was the concentration of the force at
Aleppo very slow, but doubts as to the practicability of the
scheme began to arise. News of the British preparations on
the Palestine front and reports on the condition of the Turkish
forces in Palestine caused grave doubts whether they could
withstand a British offensive without reinforcement. And it
was too dangerous to pursue the Baghdad adventure unless the
Palestine front was secure : if it collapsed Aleppo and the
communications to Mesopotamia would be exposed.

1 He had succeeded von Moltke as Chief of the General Staff (virtually Commander-
in-Chief of the German forces) in 1914, and had held this appointment till 1916, when the
failure of the attack on Verdun led to his removal.

206

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

There followed long and acrimonious discussions between
Enver Pasha at Constantinople, Jemal (the Turkish Com-
mander-in-Chief in Syria), and von Falkenhayn at Aleppo.
Enver stood for the Baghdad project being carried out without
delay ; Jemal demanded reinforcements for the Palestine front,
but had no desire for yon Falkenhayn and the German head-
quarters of Yilderim to invade his sphere of command ; von
Falkenhayn rightly decided, after a visit to the Palestine front
early in September, that its security must be the first considera-
tion. He proposed to transfer the whole Yilderim army to
Palestine and to drive back the British by a blow at their right
flank. But he had utterly failed to grasp the poorness of the
Turkish lines of communication and the impossibility of trans-
ferring troops rapidly from one point to another, as he had
done in his European campaigns. It was too late when he
made up his mind, much too late by the time he got his views
impressed on Enver and grudgingly accepted by Jemal. The
Yilderim army could never teach Palestine in time to meet,
much less to forestall, the British blow. A mightier thunder-
bolt, launched by a surer hand, was about to strike the Turkish
armies on the Gaza-Beersheba line.

BREAKING THE LINE
(October z~j~November 7, 1917)

The Third Battle of Gaza is the official name for the operation
by which the Turks were driven from their defences on the
southern frontiers of Palestine. It is a misleading title. The
operation consisted in a crescendo of blows alternating at either
end of the Turkish line, over twenty miles apart, and should
more properly be called the Gaza-Beersheba battle. Thus the
first act was a heavy bombardment of Gaza by land and sea,
designed to fix the enemy's attention on Ms right; it was
followed after four days by the assault on Beersheba, the out-
post covering the enemy's left; two days later an attack on

207

ALLENBY

Gaza captured a large portion of its defences, and agaki left
the enemy uncertain where to expect the next blow; it fell,
after another short interval, on his left flank at Hareira, and
threw his whole plan of defence into ruin. Then once more
the weight was transferred to Gaza and the sea-coast and the
pursuit was pressed up the coastal plain. It was an unorthodox
battle, for the two wings of Allenby's army which struck these
alternating blows were fifteen to twenty miles apart, linked
only by a screen of one mounted division, and open to a
counterstroke in the centre. But Allenby had rightly judged
that the nature of the ground and of the enemy made the
danger of such a counterstroke an acceptable one.

As already explained, the whole plan hinged on the capture
of Beersheba with the greatest possible speed, so that its water-
supply might be intact, or at least only subject to hasty damage.
Hence a force quite disproportionate to the garrison was to be
deployed against it. Practically the whole of the Twentieth
Corps, four divisions, was to be placed within striking distance
of the main defences, on the south and west of the town;
while the Desert Mounted Corps (less one division guarding
the centre) was to ride round to the east of the town, by a night
march of twenty-five to thirty miles over stony tracks, and
enter the town from that side, where the defences were com-
paratively slight. It was like taking a county cricket eleven to
play a village team ; but the pitch was a difficult one, and there
was much at stake. There had, indeed, been some discussion,
during the period of preparation, about the size of the force
to be employed against Beersheba, some thinking that so large
an army would cause the enemy to destroy the wells and with-
draw without a fight. But Allenby decided to employ the full
force available and to trust to ruse and secrecy to keep the
Turk from divining the plan. Hence the many devices, some
of which have been related, to deceive the enemy and to con-
ceal the weight of the blow for as long as possible. The bulk
of the striking force was kept near the sea-coast as late as
possible and moved over to the eastern flank by night, the
troops remaining concealed in wadis during the day. Their

208

ALLENBY

vacated tents in the coastal area were left standing and were lit
up by night. How far these measures of concealment were
successful is debatable. A reinforcement of new-model air-
craft had enabled the E.E.F. to wrest from the German pilots
the ak superiority which they had long enjoyed on this front ; 1
the only hostile machine that was able to make a thorough
reconnaissance of the great movement from the coast was
chased and destroyed before it could get back with its possibly
vital news. But there were many Bedouin in Turkish pay who
could not be prevented from seeing the movement, 2 and the
enemy seems to have had reasonable warning of the strength
of the force approaching Beersheba. It was the measures that
had been taken to deceive him, and especially the * haversack
ruse/ that blinded the eyes of Kress von Kressenstein, the
German commander of the Eighth Turkish Army, to the real
plans of his opponent. It is not often in war that a general, on
a bare, open plain, has misled his enemy as successfully as did
Allenby in this operation.

On the night of October 30-31 some 40,000 troops of all
arms were on the move, taking up positions for the assault on
the Beersheba defences next morning, garrisoned by some
5000 Turks. Thanks to the care with which the previous
reconnaissance had been done and to the extremely able staff
work, a complicated and difficult movement was made without
a hitch, over a roadless and almost featureless country. It
was possibly the biggest night march which has ever taken place

1 The authorities at home were apt to be short-sighted in the distribution of new
aeroplanes. When a new type was produced they usually insisted on equipping all the
squadrons on the Western Front before any of the new machines were sent East. It
took many squadrons to produce much effect in France, while a single squadron could
change the whole balance of air-power on the Palestine front in a few days.

3 It was confidently believed in the E.E.F. at the time that the Turks had as spy a
Palestinian German, Frite Franks, who could speak fluent English and was frequently
behind the British lines, disguised as an English or Australian officer. Many were the
hunts for him; and a tale was told of two senior officers, unknown to each other,
meeting in the desert and riding many miles together, each convinced that the other
was the redoubtable Franks and seeking an opportunity to draw his revolver unobserved
and challenge him. Actually, we have it on the authority of Kress himself that no
German officer in disguise was ever behind the British lines at the time, and that, though
there was a Fritz Franks, he was only employed on survey work and knew no word of
English.

210

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

in war, made entirely across country, and the credit for its
success belongs to Brigadier-General W. H. Bartholomew, 1 of
Chetwode's staff.

The main defences were captured by the infantry of the
Twentieth Corps soon after midday on October 3 1 with com-
paratively small loss. It was a fine success, well earned by the
skill of the staff and the dash of the troops. But it was a
secondary success only: the day was still to contain much
anxiety for Allenby. The captured works were some three or
four miles from the town and from the wells, which were the
chief prize, and it was no part of the plan that the infantry
should advance farther. 2 Their attack had been designed to
fix the garrison while the mounted troops seized the town and
the wells by a swift stoop from the east. On this hung the
fortunes of the day. The night ride of the Desert Mounted
Corps had brought them to the east of Beersheba, within a
few miles of the town, early in the morning. There was
a strong defensive post between them and Beersheba, the
Tel es Saba, a small mound which commanded the eastern
approaches to the town over an almost open plain. The
mound, entrenched and stoutly held, proved a formidable
obstacle. 3 It was past three o'clock in the afternoon before
it was carried. Meanwhile Allenby, who had gone up to
Twentieth Corps headquarters, was growing impatient, and
sent a peremptory order to Chauvel that he was to seize
Beersheba before dark. Before receiving the message, how-
ever, Chauvel had ordered a brigade of Australian Light Horse
to advance straight on Beersheba; and the Brigadier, though
the ground was unknown and the enemy resistance unsubdued,
determined to make the attack mounted. In the last hour
of daylight the brigade rode over the Turks who still stood

1 General Sir William Bartholomew, G.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., later Commandant
of the Imperial Defence College, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence at the
War Office, Chief of the General Staff in India, and G.O.G-in-G, Northern Command.

2 The reason for stopping them was that any further advance was taking them away
from their next objective, the Hareira trenches ; and also that it was desired to reserve
all the water in Beersheba for the mounted troops.

3 It was held by a Turkish regiment, while the garrison of the main defences of
Beersheba was Arab.

211

ALLENBY

between them and Beersheba, and entered the town. The fruits
of this gallant exploit were that the wells were secured almost
intact, although all had been prepared for demolition, many
prisoners were taken, the Turkish morale was badly shaken,
and that of the mounted troops, already high, was raised to an
even higher pitch. Next day Allenby visited Beersheba and
saw the scene of the charge ; on the field of battle he decorated
Brigadier-General Grant, whose brigade had made the charge,
with the ribbon of the D.S.O. It was well earned : the charge
had saved the wells, without which the further operations might
have suffered fatal delay.

The first day of battle had gone well. Beersheba had been
captured with its water-supply almost intact, an enemy
division had been destroyed, and the greater part of Allenby's
force had been placed where a short march would enable it to
strike the left flank of the enemy's main position. The next
object was to assault and turn that flank before the enemy
could reinforce or withdraw it. It will be remembered that
limitations of transport prevented the Twentieth Corps being
supplied for more than one march beyond Beersheba, so that
even a short withdrawal of the threatened wing would place
it beyond reach. All now depended on the speed with which
the blow could be delivered, and how the enemy commander
would meanwhile react to the loss of Beersheba. It had always
been foreseen that there must be an interval of at least forty-
eight hours between the capture of Beersheba and the delivery
of the main blow, to develop the water-supply, to reconnoitre
the Turkish position, to move the guns into action, knd to
complete the other measures necessary for the assault on an
entrenched and wired position. The plan provided that
during this period of preparation the attention of the Turkish
command should be fixed on Gaza by an attack by the Twenty-
first Corps.

This attack the date of which had been left open till after
the fall of Beersheba was ordered for the night of Novem-
ber 1-2, It was made on a front of nearly three miles, in the
sandhills along the coast. It reached practically all its ob j ectives

212

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

and fulfilled its mission of attracting enemy reserves to Gaza.
But the losses of the Twenty-first Corps were just double
those that the Twentieth Corps and Desert Mounted Corps
had suffered in the capture of Beersheba, and showed how slow
and expensive an attempt to break through on the coast would
have been.

The second act of the drama had thus also gone well. But
there was now an awkward and unrehearsed pause before the
curtain could rise on the third act. The water in Beersheba
proved unequal to the demands on it; 1 a hot Khamsin wind
blew, which increased the demands ; and the flank-guard of
the force became involved in heavy fighting in the hills north
of Beersheba, which distracted the staff from the preparations
for the attack on Hareira. The enemy commander had mis-
conceived the purpose of the force at Beersheba, and believed
that a dash on Jerusalem up the Hebron road would be made
by the mounted troops. This misreading of Allenby's inten-
tions was due partly to the exploits of a small force of seventy
men on camels, under Colonel Newcombe, R.E., 2 which had
made a wide detour through the desert east of Beersheba and
had cut all communications on the Hebron-Beersheba road.
They caused much alarm before they were surrounded and
captured, and convinced the enemy that a large force might be
expected to raid Jerusalem. Hence considerable reinforce-
ments including the first of the Yilderim divisions, recently
arrived from the north were sent into the hills north of
Beersheba, where they became engaged with the flank-guard
of the British force. There was much bitter fighting in the
steep, rocky hills, and two divisions (one of the Twentieth
Corps and one of the Desert Mounted Corps) became locked
in this struggle, in which water again played a large part. At
the time the Turkish effort was believed by the British to be
an attempt to recapture Beersheba, which had, in fact, been

1 All shaving and washing had to be forbidden.

2 Colonel S. F. Newcombe, D.S.O. He had been engaged with T. E. Lawrence and
L.Woolley on a survey of the Sinai Desert just before the War,and had been with Lawrence
in the Hejaz in the early part of 1917. He came back to Egypt in July on account of
sickness, and himself suggested and organized the raid on the Hebron road.

213

Phase I: DEPLOYMENT (October 24-30)

The Twentieth Corps moved east towards Beer sheba, the Twenty-
first Corps remaining opposite Gaza. The Twentieth Corps had
practically the whole of the transport of the army, the Twenty-first
Corps being left immobile. One mounted division covered the gap
between the two corps. The remainder of the Desert Mounted
Corps moved south to Khelasa and Asluj. From October 27 the
Twenty-first Corps, assisted by warships, carried out a heavy
bombardment of Gaza.

Phase II: CAPTURE OF BEERSHEBA (October 31)

The Twentieth Corps captured the main defences of Beersheba
while the mounted troops, after a night march of thirty miles,
attacked the town from the north-east. Colonel Newcombe's detach-
ment placed itself astride the Hebron-Beersheba road* The Twenty-
first Corps continued the bombardment of Gaza.

Phase III: ATTACK ON GAZA (night of November 1-2)

While the Twentieth Corps was preparing to attack the left of
the Turkish main line the Twenty-first Corps assaulted a portion of
the Gaza defences in order to attract the enemy reserves. Mean-
while the flank-guard of the Twentieth Corps became heavily
engaged in the Mils north of Beersheba, at Khuweilfe.

Phase IV : EXPLOITATION AS INTENDED BY G.RQ.

While the Twentieth Corps broke the Turkish left, the Desert
Mounted Corps was to pass round this flank and intercept the
retreat of the whole Turkish army.

Phase IV: EXPLOITATION AS IT ACTUALLY OCCURRED

(November 6)

Owing to the fighting at KJfciuweilfe and the water difficulties,
the mounted troops were scattered and tired, instead of collected
and fresh, when the moment came. As the Turks still held out at
Khuweilfe the mounted troops had to pass through a comparatively
narrow gap, instead of round a flank. Only four brigades out of
ten were immediately available.

Phase V : PURSUIT (November 7 onward}

Owing to the supply and water problem, the Twentieth Corps
had to halt after November 6 and transfer all its transport to the
Twenty-first Corps, who took up the pursuit along the Plain of
Philistia.

THIRD BATTLE OF GAZA

Phase i- DEPLOYMENT. Oct. 24-30

HARE1RA

Desert HtdCarps less I Division

Phase 4- EXPLOITATION

(As intended tyG.H.0)

BHAREJRA \

8EERSHEW

Phase2-CAPTUREofBEERSHEBA. Oct.31

Phase 4- EXPLOITATION

(As ft actually occured Nov. 6}
KHUWEJLFE

tHAREIRA

f -

O.M.CJesslOtvtsiw

Phase 3 - ATTACK ON GAZA. Nov. 1/2

Phase 5- PURSUIT Jov. 7 onward

KHUWEILFE

_. r >

ALLENBY

ordered by Yilderim Headquarters, Actually it seems now
that it was dictated by fear of a British raid on Jerusalem, and
was a defensive rather than an offensive move. Whatever
the object, the fighting was hard and continuous, both sides
making efforts to gain ground with little success; and it
absorbed much of the attention of the Twentieth Corps staff.
The attack on Hareira, in the plain, could hardly take place
until the position in the hills was secure.

Ailenby at G.H.Q. had a hard part. He knew well the
dangers of delay, yet he could do little or nothing to hasten
the stroke. For one of his temperament it must have been
difficult to remain inactive while the fate of the operation
hung in the balance. He must have thought of his initial
success at Arras, succeeded by days of stalemate, and have
wondered whether a complete success was again to elude
him. Yet he remained outwardly calm and composed, and
showed no sign of his anxieties till November 4. This was the
day when he had hoped that the attack on the Turkish left
would be made. Instead he received a message from Chet-
wode that it could not take place till the 6th. Ailenby felt
that at least he must satisfy himself that this delay was essential,
and went to Beersheba in his car, determined that if will-
power was required to urge the attack forward it should not
be wanting. One who drove with him that day can testify
to the force and energy that he radiated, and felt that it
would require good arguments indeed to convince him that
the attack could not be launched earlier.

The Twentieth Corps staff was a strong combination:
Chetwode's brilliance was supported by an extremely able
General Staff officer in Bartholomew and a solid, shrewd, and
humorous chief administrative officer in Evans. 1 There was
not likely to be much error in their calculations. Ailenby
listened attentively to Chetwode's exposition of the situation,
and after a little deliberation gave his consent to the post-
ponement of the attack till the morning of the 6th. He left

1 Major-General Sir Edward Evans, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., afterwards
Major-General in charge of Administration at Aldershot.

216

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

with a characteristic word of encouragement (" You'll be all
right; I never knew a really well-prepared attack fail yet "),
and went back to wait on events with his usual cool courage.
His patience was rewarded. The attack on the 6th, made
with great dash by the 6oth, 74th, and loth Divisions, broke
the Turkish left and forced the hurried retreat of their whole
line. On the morning of the yth the Twenty-first Corps found
the fortress of Gaza abandoned. The position that had held
up the British force for nearly eight months had fallen, and
the enemy was streaming north along the coastal plain in hasty
retreat. Now was the opportunity for a swift pursuit by the
mounted troops.

PURSUIT IN PHILISTIA
(November 8-18, 1917)

To the uninitiated pursuit seems the easiest possible form of
war. To chase a flying, presumably demoralized enemy must
be a simple matter, promising much gain at the expense of
some exertion and hardship, but little danger. Yet the suc-
cessful or sustained pursuits of history have been few, the
escapes from a lost battle many. The reasons are partly
material, but mainly moral. A force retreating falls back on
its depots and reinforcements; unless it is overrun, it is
growing stronger all the time. And there are many expedients
besides fighting by which it can gain time : bridges or roads
may be blown up, defiles blocked, supplies destroyed. The
pursuer soon outruns his normal resources. 1 He may possibly
be able to feed himself at the expense of his enemies or of the
countryside; he is not likely to be able to replenish his am-
munition and warlike equipment in the same way. But the
chief obstacle he has to overcome is psychological. The
pursued has a greater incentive to haste than the pursuer, and,
unless he is demoralized, a stronger urge to fight. It is only

1 The British soldier's pampered stomach is his worst handicap in pursuit of a
soldier like the Turk, who can live on the smallest and simplest ration.

217

ALLENBY

natural that the soldier who has risked his life and spent his
toil in winning a battle should desire relaxation in safety as his
meed of victory, and that the general and staff should feel a
reaction from the strain. So that, while coolness in disaster
is the supreme proof of a commander's courage, energy in
pursuit is the surest test of his strength of will. Few have
carried out pursuits with such relentless determination as did
AUenby in 1917 and 1918.

An incident illustrates his attitude in a pursuit. One of his
staff brought to him early in a pursuit a draft order to the
Twenty-first Corps to move to a certain line. Allenby at
once scratched out the line indicated, and substituted two
places much farther north. The staff officer, who considered
the line indicated by Allenby beyond what could be expected
of the troops, pointed out that he was making no allowance
for any difficulties or unavoidable delays, due to the enemy's
resistance or to other causes. Allenby said, " Is it impossible
for the troops to reach the line I have given ? " The staff

officer replied, " Not necessarily impossible, but " " There

must be no buts," replied Allenby. " In pursuit you must
always stretch possibilities to the limit. Troops having beaten
the enemy will want to rest. They must be given as objectives,
not those that you think they will reach, but the farthest that
they could possibly reach." And on this principle Allenby
always acted.

The proper exploitation of victory by mounted troops is an
interception rather than a direct pursuit. They should aim to
avoid the tail of a retreating column, where the rearguard's
sting lies, and to strike in from a flank on to the line of retire-
ment, cutting off as large a part as possible of the pursued force,
and holding it at bay till the infantry can come up to complete
its destruction. This was the manoeuvre that Allenby had
always contemplated as the climax of the battle that his
mounted troops from Beersheba should cut across the Turkish
line of retreat in the plain of Philistia. And this aim he con-
tinued to urge on them with all his force while any hope
remained of its accomplishment. It was not to be. He had to

218

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

wait till the following year to show how mobility could be
used to its right true end, the complete destruction of the
enemy armies. When it was obvious that the Turkish Eighth
Army on the plain, which had seemed at one time within
the grasp of the Desert Mounted Corps, had eluded their
pursuers, Allenby showed no disappointment and made no
recriminations. To a staff officer who remarked that the pro-
gress of the mounted troops was slow he turned with an angry
challenge : " And what do you know of the difficulties of
mounted troops in pursuit ? Have you ever commanded such
a force? I have, and can tell you what it means. The mounted
troops have done all that they could, and have done it
admirably."

It was the matter of water-supply more than anything else
that hampered the mounted troops. When the time for pur-
suit came, after the Twentieth Corps had broken the Turkish
line at Hareira, the Desert Mounted Corps, mainly because of
water, was scattered and tired, instead of fresh and collected.
One division had had to be sent back to its starting-place after
the capture of Beersheba for water. Only four brigades out
of ten were immediately available, and only two more could
be added quickly. The other four could not be disengaged
from the hill fighting north of Beersheba without considerable
delay. During November 7 and 8, the two critical days,
progress was slow. The Turkish rearguards fought stoutly,
and, in spite of one of the most gallant charges in the history
of cavalry, made by some Worcestershire and Warwickshire
Yeomanry at Huj, the Desert Mounted Corps could nevet
break through thek screen. By the 9th the greater part of the
corps was brought to a standstill by the necessity for water,
few of the horses having drunk for forty-eight hours and many
not having been watered for much longer periods. 1 The effort
at interception had failed.

Meanwhile the Twenty-first Corps, after occupying Gaza

1 Though there were wells in most of the villages, they were sometimes two hundred
feet deep, and the only method of watering from them- was to lower a canvas bucket on
telephone cable. In such conditions it sometimes took a whole night to water a
squadron.

219

ALLENBY

on the yth, had been pressing a direct pursuit up the Plain of
Philistia. The Corps commander, Bulfin, had drive and energy
above the ordinary, and could be trusted to second the resolu-
tion of AHenby, who himself was constantly forward, watching
events and ready to give a decision. The pace and strength of
the advance was dictated largely by the supply problem. Of
the seven infantry divisions in the E.E.F. only two could be
sent forward, and their supply strained the transport resources
to the utmost. The four divisions of the Twentieth Corps
were halted three round Beersheba, to be fed from railhead;
one, the 6oth Division, at Huj, up to which point it had sup-
ported the mounted troops. One division of the Twenty-first
Corps was also halted, at Gaza. All available transport of the
army was gathered on the coastal plain to feed the three
mounted divisions and two infantry divisions which now
formed the pursuing force, the Twentieth Corps being left
immobile.

The tactics of the pursuit consisted in keeping the weight on
the left, near the coast. The three great watercourses on which
the enemy might stand the Wadi Hesi, the Nahr Sukhereir,
the Nahr Rubin, all dry for the most part at this time of year
could be more effectively turned near their mouths. The
Navy could protect and support the left flank, and supplies
could be landed near it. Also, the farther the force was kept
away from the hills the less it was exposed to a counterstroke
from the Turkish Seventh Army, which had retreated into the
hills after the Gaza-Beersheba battle. Marshal von Falkenhayn
and his German staff had now reached Jerusalem, and were
endeavouring to control and restore the battle. To the Ger-
man eye the board seemed set for an effective counterstroke.
Here was a comparatively small fraction of the British force
hurrying up the plain, intent on overwhelming the Turkish
Eighth Army, while the Seventh Army in the hills was within
striking distance of their flank and rear. The Turks them-
selves, better conscious of their weakness and disorganization,
counselled retreat without fighting, till the British had to halt
for lack of supplies, and a solid line of defence could be

220

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

re-established in front of Jaffa and Jerusalem. But the German
persisted in his chessboard combination.

On November 9 G.H.Q. received warning of the impending
counter-offensive through an intercepted wireless message.
AUenby was unimpressed, and may be said to have done little
more than give a contemptuous glance over his shoulder at his
great opponent's threat, though he warned certain of his
reserves to stand by to meet the thrust if required. He neither
checked nor slackened the pursuit. He had gauged Turkish
exhaustion and disorganization better than had von Falken-
hayn, and was not the man to be turned from his purpose by
a threat. His judgment was right, The Seventh Army's
counter-attack, made on November n from the direction of
Tel es Safi (probably the Gath of the Bible, and certainly
Blanchegarde of the Crusaders, the fortress that held the
entrance to the Vale of Elah), was held, after a critical hour or
two, by the flank-guard of the Australian Mounted Division,
and soon petered out from sheer weariness.

Meanwhile the Eighth Army made a last effort on the line
of the Nahr Rubin to halt the pursuit and to cover Junction
Station, where the branch railway to Jerusalem joined the
main line to the north. This position was assaulted and taken
on November 13 by the 75th and 5 2nd Divisions and the
Desert Mounted Corps, which had been transferred to the left
flank after its effort at interception had failed. This action was
remarkable for a dashing charge by a Yeomanry brigade at El
Mughar, and for the very gallant assaults by the 5ind (Low-
land) Division on the strong villages of Katrah and El Mughar.
Next day Junction Station was occupied; and a day later the
same Yeomanry brigade that had charged at El Mughar over-
whelmed a Turkish rearguard by another dashing mounted
attack at Abu Shusheh, the site of the ancient fortress of Ge2er
(Mount Gisard of the Crusaders) the strong place that from
titie earliest times in the history of Palestine has guarded the
western passes into the Jucbean hills. Allenby, with his know-
ledge of history, had early recognized the importance of this
position.

221

ALLENBY

With the occupation of Jaffa on the i6th the pursuit up the
Plain of Philistia came to an end. The Eighth Turkish Army
withdrew behind the river Auja, and the Seventh Army sought
shelter in the Judsean range. AHenby had driven an effective
wedge between the two ; there was no good road to connect
them farther south than Nablus-Tulkeram. In the ten days of
pursuit since the breaking of the Gaza-Beersheba line the
E.E.F. had advanced over fifty miles. It had taken 10,000
prisoners and a hundred guns. Thanks to the stout fighting
of their rearguards and the water difficulties of the pursuing
mounted troops, the Turks had avoided complete disaster.
But they had suffered a crushing defeat and were in sorry
plight. It is curious to find it recorded by a Turkish observer
that Enver Pasha, who visited von Falkenhayn at Jerusalem
at this time, was " more gay and more optimistic than usual."

AJlenby had intended to halt after reaching Jaffa, and to
strengthen his precarious communications before making any
attempt on Jerusalem. Now he decided to advance into the
"hills at once. It was a bold decision, typical of the man.
His line of communication could with difficulty support the
force he already had at the front; in order to bring up the
third infantry division of the Twenty-first Corps it was neces-
sary to send back one of the mounted divisions. The
Twentieth Corps remained immobilized fifty miles from the
front. And, besides its lack of capacity, the tenuous line of
communication was in no way solid; it was tied with string
in many places, and might easily break, especially if the winter
rains, due now at any time, should fall heavily. Lorries,
horse transport, strings of camels, surf-boats, the botched and
patched Turkish railway, were all links in the dubious chain
that brought supplies from railhead to the front. The troops
too were weary, and their ranks were becoming thin. No
good maps of the difficult hill country were available ; and
Allenby from his study of history had plain warning of the
fate that had befallen many rash attempts to reach Jerusalem
by these rugged western passes, where Assyrian, Roman, and
Crusader had all failed. In the two books he studied almost

222

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

daily, the Bible and Sir George Adam Smith's Historical
Geography of the Holy ~Land^ he could read of the defensive
strength of these hills. George Adam Smith writes of this
face of the Judsean fortress :

Everything conspires to give the inhabitants easy means of
defence against large armies. It is a country of ambushes,
entanglements, surprises, where large armies have no room to
fight and the defenders can remain hidden, where the essentials
for war are nimbleness and the sure foot, the power of scramble
and of rush.

Lastly, a telegram Allenby had received from the War
Office on November n might have given a less resolute
commander an excuse for prudence. The War Cabinet,
mindful, perhaps, of Townshend's disaster in Mesopotamia
two years earlier, had cautioned him against involving his
army in commitments too extended for its strength, and had
warned him that it might become necessary to withdraw
troops from him in 1918.

Allenby weighed all these factors which prompted caution
and delay against the wisdom of allowing his disorganized
enemy no respite to recover nor time to organize a defence of
the passes. With no hesitation he chose the bolder, but wiser,
course, and ordered an immediate advance. November 17
was a day of rest. On the i8th the advance into the MUs
began. Simultaneously, as if to emphasize the risks of his
resolution, the winter rains began.

JERUSALEM
{November i^-December 31, 1917)

The two Turkish armies were divided and disordered, over
twenty miles apart one in the hills, the other in the plains.

1 At least three distinguished persons, one of whom is Mr Lloyd George (see his
Memoirs ; vol. iv), have claimed the credit of introducing this book to AHenby's notice.
Since it was AHenby's invariable practice on going to a new country to obtain and
study the best books available on it, he had already discovered George Adam Smith for
himself.

223

ALLENBY

But the scarcity of roads and the difficulties of the supply
problem forbade anything but the simplest form of manoeuvre
against them. AHenby left only one mounted division and one
infantry division to face the Eighth Turkish Army across the
Auja and to cover the line of communication in the plain.
He launched the remainder of his available force, one mounted
division and two infantry divisions, into the hills, at right
angles to the line of communication. Only one metalled
road existed, that which ran from Jaffa to Jerusalem. There
were some tracks on the forty-year-old map (the latest avail-
able), marked deceptively " Roman Road/' which the local
inhabitants declared fit for transport ; it was realized later that
by this they meant a track up which a donkey, the local means
of carriage, could scramble. It was fortunate that some fore-
sighted administrative officer had in September obtained
AUenby's approval to form companies of donkey transport,
in anticipation of the possibility of a winter in the Judxan hills.
But these did not become available till early December;
meantime the querulous camel, in conditions of cold and wet
among unaccustomed hills and rocks that for once at least
justified his attitude to life, was the means of transport for the
great majority of the troops advancing on Jerusalem.

They were troops fit for a great enterprise. The 75th
Division the last British division to be formed in the War
consisted of West Country Territorials many of whom had
spent the eady years of the War garrisoning India men from
Hampshire, Dorset, Somerset, Wiltshire, Cornwall brigaded
with some Indian battalions. They had their spurs yet to win,
and were resolute to do it. The 5 2nd Division (Lowland
Scottish) had been in practically every action of the E.E.F.
since Romani, and had acquitted itself gallantly in them all.
Since the fall of Gaza, ten days before, it had marched over
seventy miles, and had fought nine actions, its ranks were
getting thin, but its spirit was indomitable. The Yeomanry
Division was drawn from the best manhood of the English
countryside, and many of the troopers had three years' ex-
perience of war. Allenby knew he could trust these divisions

224

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

to force the passes and to win Jerusalem, if skill and courage
could do it. Nor would the leadership be found wanting.
Bulfin needed no urging to get the utmost out of his infantry ;
Barrow, the commander of the Yeomanry Division, was one
of Allenby's most trusted lieutenants, and had been on his
staff in France during the retreat from Mons and the struggle
at Ypres. Though a passionate believer in cavalry and in
mounted action, he could fight a dismounted action as skilfully
and tenaciously as anyone, and proved it now.

The general plan was to reach the main Jerusalem-Nablus
road north of Jerusalem and, by thus cutting their principal
line of supply, to force the Turks to evacuate the city. Allenby
was determined to avoid any fighting in the vicinity of Jeru-
salem itself. Accordingly the 75th Division, to which was
allotted the Jaffa- Jerusalem road, was to halt some miles short
of Jerusalem and to turn north-east to Bireh, while the Yeo-
manry Division was to advance through Beit Ur el Tahta and
Beit Ur el Foka (Lower and Upper Beth-horon) to Ram Allah,
on the Nablus road, some ten miles north of Jerusalem. The
5 2nd Division, advancing up the Vale of Ajalon to Beit Likia,
was to keep touch between the 75th and Yeomanry Divisions
and to act as support to them.

The skill and hardihood of the troops brought good pro-
gress at first, despite the appalling difficulties of weather and
of ground. The 75th Division, on the main road, forced its
way through the difficult defile of the Bab el Wad ; and on the
following evening, by a charge in mist and rain, stormed
Kuryet el Enab, almost within sight of Jerusalem. Next day
they left the main road, turned north-east, and captured NeB
Samwil (the reputed burying-place of the prophet Samuel),,
a commanding height which overlooks Jerusalem. 1 That
marked the limit of their progress. The next obstacle in their
path was the village of El Jib (Gibeon of the Bible), set on a

1 The division subsequently took as its badge a key, in token that they had captured
the " Key of Jerusalem," a claim which was justified by the eight or nine attempts
which the Turks made to recapture the height in the succeeding days. It was the
scene of some of the most determined and bitter fighting that occurred anywhere in
the War.

P 225

. ALLENBY

rocky knoll which made of it a natural hill fort, flanked by
fire from a spur to the south. With inadequate artillery-
support neither the West Country men of the 7 5th nor the
tough Lowlanders of the 5 2nd, who relieved them, could
win the village, gallantly as their thinned and weary ranks
attacked it.

Farther north the Yeomanry Division had found only a
goat-track through the Beth-horons, and had had to send
back all wheeled transport and all guns, except the camel-
carried Hong-Kong and Singapore battery. But they pushed
on to a steep hill feature called the Beitunia spur, within a
mile or so of their goal, the Nablus road. Here they met a
numerous and strongly posted enemy, backed by a powerful
artillery which completely outranged and outweighed the
little guns of the camel battery, gallantly and skilfully handled
as they were. The division was counter-attacked and driven
down to Lower Beth-horon (Beit Ur el Tahta). That it had
got as far as it did and held on so far forward may be accounted
a great feat of arms,

By November 24 it was obvious that neither Bulfin's fiery
determination nor Barrow's resolute skill could make any
further headway; and Allenby ordered a halt till fresh troops
could be brought up. He was himself well forward, having
established a small headquarters in tents a few miles from
Junction Station. He sent congratulations to the troops " on
the unflinching determination which has led to great successes
under the most adverse circumstances." They had been
earned. The three divisions in the hills had been fighting
and marching continuously for three weeks, in extremes of
heat and cold, over dusty plains and in harsh, stony hills,
often on short rations of food and of water. Allenby, so
careful of his men's well-being when at rest or when preparing
for an operation, spent their endurance ruthlessly if it seemed
possible to gain an advantage over the enemy. He applied
to his soldiers the old hunting maxim, " Care for your horse
in the stable as if he were worth five hundred pounds ; ride
him in the field as if he were not worth half a crown."

226

ALLENBY

By great exertions the lines of communication had now
been improved to enable the remainder of the force to be
brought up ; and the Twentieth Corps was ordered to relieve
the Twenty-first Corps in the hills, the latter to take charge
of the line in the plain north of Jaffa. But the relief was not
accomplished without much anxiety and some hard fighting.
Again, to the keen eyes of the German Marshal, the British
situation invited a counterstroke. There was a gap of some
five miles between the right of the line in the plain and the
left of the force in the hills. Close behind this gap lay the
route by which the Yeomanry Division was supplied, and the
Yeomanry Division was only a thin screen of tired men, with
no reserves. There was a week's fighting while the best
Turkish troops available strove to exploit the British weakness
and to penetrate the gap, or to break through the Yeomanry.
But their efforts were piecemeal, and were always checked in
time, often by a mere handful of weary men. The line held
till the fresh divisions of the Twentieth Corps arrived, 1 and
a solid defensive position was established. The counter-
attacks had gained nothing and had spent the best reserves of
the Turks. Once again AUenby had proved to his German
opponent that the apparent rashness of his position was based
on sound calculation of the respective abilities and qualities
in manoeuvre and action of his own troops and of the
Turks.

By the first week in December three divisions of the
Twentieth Corps, under Sir Philip Chetwode, were established
in the hills, and the Twenty-first Corps had taken over the line
in the plain. The fourth division of the Twentieth Corps, the
5jrd, was north of Beersheba on the Hebron-Jerusalem road.
All was set for a second attempt on Jerusalem, which by a
coincidence was being defended by the Turkish Twentieth
Corps. The date was fixed for December 8. Chetwode, who
had a shrewd tactical sense and a keen eye for ground, changed
the line of attack. The first attempt had failed largely owing

1 The 6oth Division had already been sent on by forced marches from Huj, and had
come temporarily under the Twenty-first Corps.

228

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

to the lack of roads in the country north-west of Jerusalem,
which had made it impossible to move artillery to the support
of the infantry. The new attack was to centre on the one good
road available. It was to be made by two divisions, the 74th
and the 6oth, with the left pivoting on Nebi Samwil and the
right swinging up past the western outskirts of Jerusalem till
the Nablus road was reached. The 53rd Division was to
advance up the Hebron road to Bethlehem and to protect the
right of the attack, and then to pass east of the city and cut
the road to Jericho.

The brunt of the attack, which was made in wretched
conditions of cold and wet, fell on the Londoners of the 6oth
Division. After a night march down the hillside south of the
main road they carried the principal Turkish defences west of
Jerusalem soon after dawn. These defences were strong, and
had in places been carved out of the rock; they should have
been formidable works to storm. But the Londoners attacked
with their usual dash, and the Turks defended with less than
their usual tenacity. Little further progress was made that
afternoon. Fog and rain delayed the 53rd Division, so that
the 6oth could advance no farther without exposing their right
flank. The day closed in some disappointment and anxiety.
But actually Jerusalem was won. The fall of their principal
works had disheartened the Turk ; and when the advance was
resumed next morning it was found that the enemy had gone.
The old, historic city, sacred to three of the world's chief
religions, had fallen to yet another conqueror. It had often
gone down in blood and ruin ; this time its surrender had a.
touch of comedy. The mayor came out with a white flag to
hand over the keys of the great city to the British ; he offered
them in succession to some cooks of a London regiment who
had lost thek way, to a sergeant on outpost duty, and to some
artillery officers intent only on getting their guns into action
against the Turkish rearguards. None of these felt themselves
quite equal to so historic an occasion. In the end the surrender
was accepted by General Shea, the commander of the 6oth
Division, on behalf of Allenby. Meanwhile the Turks were

229

ALLENBY

driven from the Mount of Olives after a sharp rearguard
action.

Two days later, on December n, Allenby made his official
entry into Jerusalem, It was a simple but impressive cere-
mony. He entered the Jaffa Gate on foot, with the French and
Italian representatives on either side of him, followed by some
of his principal staff officers and by Sir Philip Chetwode, the
commander of the Twentieth Corps. Among those who
walked in the same procession, of twenty officers only, was
Colonel (then Major) T. E. Lawrence, who had come to
G.H.Q, to report on the progress of Feisal's operations shortly
before the fall of Jerusalem, after his gallant, though un-
successful, attempt to interrupt the Turkish communications
by blowing up a railway bridge in the Yarmuk valley. 1 Guards,
representative of the troops which had taken part in the
campaign (English, Scottish, Irish, Welsh, Australian, New
Zealand, French, and Italian 2 ), were drawn up at the Gate, and
the streets were lined by men of the 6oth Division. A guard
of Indian Mohammedan troops had been established over the
Haram-esh-Sherif (Temple Area). 3 At the Citadel a short
proclamation was read in various languages, and the notables
of the city were presented to Allenby. The procession then
returned to the Gate, and the ceremony ended. Israelite,
Assyrian, Greek, Roman, Jew, Arab, Crusader, Turk, had
entered Jerusalem as conquerors before the British. None of
these nations can have been represented by one more impres-
sive or worthier of his race than was Allenby, physically or
morally.

The capture of Jerusalem stirred the imagination of the
whole world. Congratulations and honours poured in to
Allenby, and left him quite unaffected. He was no more
moved from his usual composure by praise and success than

1 See Seven 'Pillars of Wisdom, Chapter LXXVI.

2 Small Ftench and Italian contingents with a political rather than a military pur-
pose had taken part in the campaign.

8 It always annoyed Allenby if anyone referred to his campaign as a * crusade/ He
pointed out that a number of his troops, and such valuable assistants as the Egyptian
Camel and Labour Corps, were Moslems, not Christians.

230

READING THE PROCLAMATION AT THE CITADEL ON GENERAL

ALLENBY'S E;NTRY INTO JERUSALEM

230

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

he had been by dislike and criticism. He gave little outward
sign of elation, and remained unmoved and aloof as before.
As a curious instance of his obedience to orders and loyalty to
the wishes of superior authority it may be noted that, though
he wrote to Lady Allenby on December 9 and 10, he did not
mention the fall of Jerusalem till the nth, because he had
received a telegram that the Cabinet wished the news kept
strictly secret till it could be announced in the House of
Commons.

Allenby's letter to his wife, written on the evening of this
historic day, is worth quoting in full to show the calm, matter-
of-fact way in which he described his triumph of capturing
Jerusalem :

nth December

Jerusalem surrendered to me on the 9th. I informed the War
Office, but was not allowed to publish the news before the
P.M. had announced it in the House. That was done yesterday.
To-day I entered Jerusalem, on foot; with the French and Italian
Commanders Lt. -Colonel Piepape and Major Agostiao of the
detachments in my Army; and the Attache and a few Staff
officers. We entered at the Jaffa Gate; and, from the steps of the
Citadel hard by issued a prockmation in many languages to
the assembled multitude. Great enthusiasm real or feigned
was shown. Then I received the notables and the heads of all the
Churches of which there are many, including Abyssinian. After
this we re-formed our procession and returned to our horses
which we had left outside the walls. While in Jerusalem I re-
ceived the enclosed from the King; and I sent a suitable reply
from the Holy City. The Turks are driven 3 or 4 miles down the
Jericho road, to the East, and some 6 or 8 miles to the North.
To-day we occupied Bethany. It was a brilliant day; hoar frost
here, in the early A.M., and then iced sunslaine; with no wind.
We could see, from the top of the house where I met Chetwode,
the mountains of Moab ; deep blue and huge. The Dead Sea ky
too low to be seen. Chetwode's Corps; and the Divisions of
Generals Shea and Mott, in that Corps, were the lucky ones who
had the honour of capturing the Holy City. You remember
Mott; as a Major in the 6oth Rifles, at Colchester. It was a great
feat; and our losses were light. The rocky and mountainous
country they fought over is indescribable. Guns could give little

231

ALLENBY

support; and the Turks were driven out by rifle and machine-gun
fire, followed by the bayonet. A great number of Turks were
killed, and about 400 or 500 taken prisoner.

The fighting of 1917 did not end with the fall of Jerusalem.
More elbow-room was required in front of both Jaffa and
Jerusalem before the position could be considered secure. On
December 20, in the plain, the 5 2nd Division forced a crossing
of the river Auja and drove the Turks well away from Jaffa.
In the hills an advance had been arranged fot December 24,
but the weather caused a postponement till the zyth. Mean-
while an intercepted Turkish wireless message showed that
Falkenhayn had ordered a counter-attack on Jerusalem. This
was made early on the zyth, and, though pressed with all the
gallantry and self-sacrifice of which the best Turkish troops
were capable, was soon checked. When the British advanced
in their turn the Turks gave way and were driven back to the
north of Ram Allah, over ten miles from Jerusalem. The War
Cabinet, ignorant of the conditions, was now urging the
immediate occupation of the remainder of Palestine, and had
inquired the possibilities of an advance to Aleppo . But further
operations were for the moment out of the question. Heavy
rains had flooded the plain and made all movement on the
lines of communication precarious ; and the troops were sorely
in need of rest and refit. The weather culminated in a great
storm on Christmas Day, which halted all movement in plain
or hills. In the Commander-in-Chief s camp near Junction
Station the tents were with difficulty kept standing.

So ended 1917, a year that brought Allenby as commander
of an army a taste of outstanding success in the first stage of
the Arras battle, to be followed by disappointment, a change
to an entirely independent command (in which his qualities
had at last full scope), his greatest personal fame as captor of
Jerusalem, and his deepest personal loss in the death of his son.

The Jerusalem campaign will always be a classic for the
military historian ; it embraced almost every form of operation
in almost every variety of terrain and climate. To some extent

232

THE TAKING OF JERUSALEM

it may be said that Allenby found a success teady made for
Mm. Murray had laid the foundation of it by his organization
of the communications across Sinai, Chetwode had devised
the plan, and Dawnay had worked out the details. The
War Cabinet had provided the troops he asked for, and had
given him a great numerical and material superiority over the
Turk. Yet all these would have been vain without the master-
hand. His was the driving-power, the inspiration, and the
responsibility during the eventful, often anxious, days that
ended with the capture of Jerusalem. He had many big and
difficult decisions to make, and he made them cleanly, without
hesitation, once he had advised himself of the situation, usually
by a personal visit. His energy and endurance were remark-
able; long drives in heat and dust over bumpy tracks left
him still fresh in mind and unfatigued in body. No one who
served in the E.E.F. during the campaign had any doubt that
he had served under a very great commander.

233

CHAPTER IX

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN
(January September 1918)

INTERVAL
(January-March 1918)

EABXY in 1918 the main G.H.Q. camp was moved from
Kelab to Bit Salem, near Ramleh, on the Jaffa-Jerusalem road,
about ten miles from Jaffa and twenty-five from Jerusalem.
Allenby had fot his quarters a two-storey, stone-built house
which had been a German school. It stood on a slight rise in
sandy soil just above an orange-grove, and commanded an
extensive view of a typical section of Palestine. To the west
could be seen the stretch of sand-hills that fringed the coast-
line, beyond which was the deep blue of the Mediterranean ;
to the north the white minarets of Ramleh marked the position
of a purely Arab town ; to the south were the fields and fruit
groves of old-established Jewish colonies. But it was the line
of the Judaean hills to the east that caught and held the eye.
They stood up straight and solid out of the plain, a challenge
and a warning. Their colour varied ever with the changing
lights, from a hard, barren brown to a soft twilight blue:
changes that seemed to illustrate their history the hopes and
promises they had inspired, the disappointments and cruelties
they had seen, the attraction they always exercised. It was a
setting that appealed to Allenby; he was little given to re-
collection and had a mind that seldom looked back, but he
always remembered with enjoyment his headquarters at Bir
Salem.

The house was a comfortable one, sufficient to hold himself
and his personal staff and to lodge occasional distinguished

234

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN

visitors. The remainder of the staff and the offices were in
huts or tents a short distance away. G.H.Q. remained here till
the final battle of September 1918. It was within a short
distance of the railway, of the Jaffa- Jerusalem road (the
principal artery of communication from east to west), and of
the main aerodrome at Ramleh. Not far off was Lydda, or
Ludd, the traditional home of St George, who may be re-
garded as patron saint to Allenby, born on St George's Day.
Allenby, as ever, took the keenest interest in his new sur-
roundings in the birds, the flowers, the buildings, and the
people. A happening of this period is worth relating to illus-
trate his interest in architectural remains. Somewhere near
the camp he found a small, half-ruined house with a stone
arch, which he identified from its form as a relic of Crusader
building. He was fond of taking guests to admire this arch
and of speculating on its antiquity. At last one day, when a
distinguished visitor was taken to view the remains, the arch
and, indeed, the whole ruin had completely disappeared.
Investigation showed that a zealous young subaltern of
Engineers, who had been told to construct a store of some
kind in the vicinity, finding that the stones of the ruined
house suited his purpose well, had used them in the construc-
tion of his work. AJlenby's rage at this act of vandalism was
great. An interesting architectural relic had been destroyed,
and his strict orders for the preservation of ancient monu-
ments had been disobeyed. The unfortunate subaltern was
ordered back to the base in disgrace. Efforts made on his
behalf with Allenby only raised a fresh storm of anger.
Finally Bertie Clayton, Allenby's political adviser, 1 agreed
to approach him, after making careful local inquiries about
the arch. At first Allenby would hear no further word on
the subject; but Bertie Clayton was never afraid of him, and
Allenby had learned that Clayton never spoke without reason.
When he agreed to listen Clayton told him that the * Crusader '
arch had been constructed less than fifty years before as part of a
local wineshop. When Allenby had recovered from the shock

1 A very fine character ; see Seven Pillars of Wisdom, p. 57, for a good estimate of him.

235

ALLENBY

to the antiquarian knowledge on which he prided himself he
took it very well and remitted all penalties on the zealous
subaltern.

An incident which occurred about this period may serve
to illustrate his interest in and knowledge of Biblical history.
Sir Philip Chetwode was conducting him round the line of the
Twentieth Corps north of Jerusalem, when he realized that
his explanation of his dispositions was receiving scant atten-
tion, although Allenby was gazing intently at the surrounding
country. Suddenly the Commander broke out, " Look at that
big rock in front of us ! That must be just about the place
where Jonathan and his armour-bearer climbed up anxi attacked
the Philistine garrison." A graphic description of Jonathan's
feat followed, 1 and Chetwode realized that the defensive
arrangements of the Twentieth Corps in that quarter stood
little chance of receiving consideration for the moment. So he
removed the Chief to another part of the line, where he got a
detailed description of one of Joshua's battles that had taken
place there !

With the entry into Palestine and capture of Jerusalem
political as well as military problems began to occupy Allenby.
Palestine presented some very thorny and difficult questions.
The awkwardness of reconciling our pledges to the Arabs, our
undertakings to our Allies (the Sykes-Picot Agreement), and
the Balfour Declaration to the Zionists was already becoming
evident to those who knew of them. And the French and
Italians put forward on traditional grounds certain immediate
claims to the protection and administration of the Holy Places
in Jerusalem and elsewhere. Picot, who was attached to
AUenby's staff as French Political Representative, had gone so
far as to say to Allenby on the day of the official entry into
Jerusalem, " And to-morrow, my dear General, we will take
steps to set up an administration in this city." Allenby's chin
went up and out just a little farther than usual as he replied
that Jerusalem was and would remain under martial law, for
which he alone was responsible.

1 See i Samuel xiv.

236

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN

A lesser man might easily have become so harassed by the
many and complicated problems of administration and by the
disputes and jealousies of the various creeds and sects in
the Holy Land that his conduct of the campaign would have
suffered. But Allenby refused to be in any way distracted from
his primary business of beating the enemy. He held to certain
simple rules. He insisted on the conquered portion of Pales-
tine being administered as occupied enemy territory, strictly
on the principles laid down by international law, which enacted
that as little change as possible be made from the existing
methods of government. He chose as Administrator a man
whom he knew and trusted ; he allowed him a free hand, and
he never interfered in detail. As an example of his common
sense may be quoted his decision on the vexed question of
what flags might or might not be flown in Jerusalem and
elsewhere a matter explosively charged with religious and
national jealousies. Allenby at once decreed that the only flag
permitted in Palestine during the period of military occupation
was the Union Jack flown by the Commander4n~Chie He
refused to allow the Balfour Declaration to be published in
Palestine. 1

For a short period Clayton exercised the functions of a
Military Administrator, and then Major-General Sir Arthur
Money, an artilleryman well known to Alleaby, with con-
siderable experience of foreign service, arrived in March and
took over the work. He was a wise, patient, and firm adminis-
trator, who held the appointment till the end of the War and
for some time after. Allenby, as was his way with one who
had his trust, gave him a completely free hand in the adminis-
tration of the country, requiring only a brief report in writing
once a month, and that death sentences should be referred to
him for confirmation.

The verbatim report of an interview with Allenby illustrates
his habit of wasting no time in coming to the point and of
leaving all details to the subordinate concerned. It had been

1 It had been made on November 2, -when the Third Battle of Gaza was in full
swing. Few realized its significance or danger at the time.

237

ALLENBY

decided early in 1918 to start an Army newspaper (The Palestine
Nem\ and a certain officer had been recommended to Allenby
as suitable to conduct the enterprise. His record of his meeting
with Allenby runs as follows :

Commander-in-Chief*s study at f>ir Salem; Wednesday ',
February 6, 1918

Enter General Bols with visitor

BOLS. This is the officer, sir. [Exit.

CHIEF. Good morning.

VISITOR. Good morning, sir.

CHIEF. I understand that in private life you were on the staff
of The Times.

VISITOR. Yes, sir.

CHIEF. Good 1 Then you will produce an Army newspaper
weekly [takes up list and reads\ in English, Arabic, Hebrew,
Hindi, Urdu, and GurmukhL All necessary arrangements
will be made by you. Thank you. Good morning.

VISITOR. Good morning, sir.

[Exit, slightly surprised at the number of languages in
which the Army requires its news.

In the early months of 1918, while the Egyptian Expedi-
tionary Force was waiting for weather conditions to improve
and for the communications byroad and rail to be strengthened,
the future of the campaign in Palestine was the subject of high
debate in the councils of the Allies. The dominant factor in
the military situation was the complete collapse of Russia,
which had freed sufficient German forces to give the Germans
a superiority in numbers in the western theatre and thus a last
gambler's chance of defeating the French and British armies
before American troops could arrive in sufficient strength to
restore the balance. In the meantime, therefore, it was essential
for the Allies to stand on the defensive in the west. But Mr
Lloyd George had always believed that the shortest road to
victory lay not in the main western theatre, but by eliminating
Germany's lesser allies in the subsidiary theatres the policy
of * knocking out the props/ as it was sometimes called. He

238

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN

overlooked the fact that her allies "were in no sense the * props *
of Germany (in fact, the converse was the truth), and "was also
inclined to disregard geographical difficulties of communica-
tions, distances, and climate. He demanded for 1918 an offen-
sive policy in Palestine, directed to driving Turkey out of the
War altogether, and wished to supply Allenby with sufficient
men and material to enable him to reach Damascus and if
possible Aleppo.

The Prime Minister was supported on the military side
by Sir Henry Wilson, British Military Representative at the
Supreme War Council at Versailles; he was opposed by
the C.I.G.S., Sir William Robertson, and by the Commander-
in-Chief in France, Sir Douglas Haig, The arguments of these
latter ran somewhat as follows : The security of the Western
Front was absolutely vital; defeat in France meant inevitably
the loss of the War. Whereas an advance in Palestine, even to
Damascus and Aleppo, could have little real effect; Aleppo
was still many hundreds of miles from the heart of Turkey.
It was doubtful, too, whether the Turks could shake off the
German yoke if they wished, so strong was the German hold
on the Government and Army ; and Constantinople itself lay
under the guns of the German warships Goeben and Bres/au.
Even if Turkey did sue for peace, and opened a passage through
the Dardanelles, it was too late now to bring aid to Russia.
To reinforce the army in Palestine would throw an additional
strain on shipping, since the narrow waters of the Mediter-
ranean formed some of the worst zones of submarine activity,
and shipping was our most anxious need at the time, to main-
tain our food-supply and to transport the American troops to
France. Turkey, already mortally wounded, could safely be
left to bleed to death ; and all effort should be concentrated on
resisting the German blow in the west. If Turkey saw the last
German effort held up she would speedily make terms ; if, on
the other hand, she saw her ally at or near the gates of Paris
not even the loss of Aleppo would force her from the War.
The Egyptian Expeditionary Force, if it remained on the
defensive, could safely spare two British divisions to strengthen

ALLENBY

the Western Front, and much shipping and treasure could be
economized by reducing our commitments here.

So advised the c Westerners/ Mr Lloyd George and his
supporters thought otherwise. They held that it would be a
counsel of despair to stand on the defensive everywhere, and
madness to take seasoned troops from a theatre where great
advances could still be made and great advantages won, to
fling them into the profitless slaughter of the Western Front.
One more defeat and Turkey would be only too ready to
make terms; an advance to Aleppo would cut the main
Turkish communications to the Mesopotamian front, and
enable that campaign also to be liquidated. Further, the
collapse of Turkey would induce Bulgaria, also tired of the
War and of the German domination, to make peace. Thus
two of Germany's allies would be removed, a great step
towards victory taken, and a road opened through Bulgaria to
the flank and rear of Austria and Germany. The danger on
the Western Front was being deliberately exaggerated, the
Prime Minister declared. All the fighting of the last three
years, in Champagne, in Artois, on the Somme, at Arras,
in the Ypres Salient, showed that even with considerable
superiority in numbers and gun power only limited advances
were possible, and those at terrible cost. Why should the
Germans, with a smaller advantage in numbers, and that only
for a. short time, be able to break through the fortified zone,
when all the French and British efforts had failed ? Let them
beat out their strength, if they would, against the iron wall ;
and let the Allies meanwhile dispose of two of Germany's
supporters, Turkey and Bulgaria. Such was the policy of the
* Easterners. 3

The Prime Minister had his way. A meeting of the Supreme
War Council at Versailles, held at the end of January, endorsed
the plan for a decisive offensive against Turkey in the spring
of 1918. Smuts was dispatched to Egypt by the War Cabinet
with instructions to consult with AJlenby and with a repre-
sentative of the Mesopotamian Force and to formulate a plan
for a united effort to drive Turkey out of the war, AUenby,

240

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN

needless to say, had taken no part in the controversy. His
attitude was his customary one of complete loyalty and
readiness to play his part in the War Cabinet's general plan of
battle. If required to inflict another decisive defeat on the
Turk he would make every effort to do so ; if asked to reduce
his force to a defensive basis for the benefit of the Western
Front he would let no personal ambition for further distinc-
tion affect his judgment. When pressed by the War Cabinet,
immediately after the fall of Jerusalem, for plans for a further
advance he had replied that extensive operations were im-
possible in the wet season, that his immediate objectives would
be to secure control of the Jordan valley and then to cut the
Hejaz Railway at Amman and isolate the 20,000 Turkish troops
between there and Medina, and that a movement towards
Aleppo would necessitate considerable reinforcements and be
dependent on the rate of advance of railway construction.

Smuts arrived early in February. With him were Mr
Amery, 1 who was a member of the Versailles War Council
and a protagonist of the plan for the offensive against Turkey,
Brigadier-General J. Stewart, an expert in railway construc-
tion, and Colonel Kirke, 2 Deputy Director of Military Opera-
tions at the War Office. Of these Smuts and Amery were
Easterners/' while Kirke represented the views of the C.LG.S.,
a confirmed c Westerner/ From the Mesopotamian Force
came Major-General Gillman, 3 Chief of the General Staff in
that theatre.

The mission visited Palestine and viewed the front, and
Smuts drafted a pkn which was cabled home by the middle
of February. He began by stating that with the resources
available it was impossible to take the offensive in Syria
and Mesopotamia simultaneously ; he recommended that the

1 The Bight Hon. L. S. Amery, P.C., M.P., afterwards First Lord of the Admiralty
(1922-24), Secretary of State for the Colonies and for Dominion Affairs (1924-29), and
Secretary of State for India (1940).

2 General Sir Walter Kirke, G.C.B., later Chief of the General Staff in Indk and
Director-General of the Territorial Army (1936-59).

3 The late General Sir Webb Gillman, K.CB., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., late* Master-
General of the Ordnance (1927-31) and G.O.G-in-C. Eastern Command (1931-33)-
He died in 1933*

ALLENBY

Mesopotamian force should remain on the defensive and
transfer to Allenby all the troops that could be spared. The
yth Indian Division had already reached Egypt; it was pro-
posed that Mesopotamia should send a further two divisions
and a cavalry brigade, which would give Allenby a total of
ten infantry divisions, his own three mounted divisions, an
Indian cavalry division which was being sent from France, and
the cavalry brigade from Mesopotamia. Smuts had accepted
Allenby's views on the course of future operations, and com-
mended them to the War Cabinet. They consisted of an
immediate extension of his right flank to the Jordan and then
across it into the hills of Moab, to destroy the Hejaz Railway;
this was to be followed by an advance to the line Tiberias-
Haifa which would give Allenby control of practically the
whole of Palestine, with the harbour of Haifa and the Turkish
railway that ran from east to west across the Plain of Esdraelon.
Thereafter the main advance would be, not directly on
Damascus, but along the coast by the ancient ports of Tyre
and Sidon to Beirut, and possibly beyond it to the Tripoli-
Horns gap, by which Damascus could be turned and isolated.
The sea would facilitate supply, and the mountains would
protect the right flank. Meanwhile a smaller column would
advance into the Hauran south of Damascus to co-operate
with the Arabs and Druses. Allenby held out no prospects
of a rapid movement ; the rate of advance would be dependent
on railway construction, which would demand large quantities
of additional material and rolling-stock and large numbers
of labourers. Stewart considered that the railway could be
advanced at the rate of a mile a day, a somewhat optimistic
estimate.

The plan was, as the Official History remarks, sound
enough, but stiff and mechanical Allenby was always better
at performance than at promise. His estimates on paper of
future possibilities were on the cautious side, while his action
in the field was daring almost to rashness. He had seen the
results of Nivelle's easy optimism and extravagant promises
in France a year before, and was aware of the unfortunate

242

GENERAL SIR EDMUND ALLENBY AT G.H.Q. AT BIR SALEM
(MARCH 1918)

/ / /

J.-A, /^'H^./^C, t

A PAGE OF A LETTER WRITTEN BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL
ALLENBY DURING THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN

consequences for the Egyptian Expeditionary Force of his
predecessor, Murray, having consented, against his better
judgment to attempt the invasion of Palestine with forces
that he considered insufficient.

After the discussions in Palestine which had produced this
plan the mission went with AUenby to Egypt and up the Nile
to Luxor, partly for sightseeing, partly to complete their plans
free from the distraction of other events. While the party was
at Luxor news was received of the resignation, as Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, of Sir William Robertson, the principal
opponent of the Palestine offensive, and of the appointment
of Sir Henry Wilson, at this time a supporter of Mr Lloyd
George's plans and a convinced c Easterner/ in Ms place.

Almost before the Smuts mission had left Egypt the first
stage of the operations was being executed. Between Feb-
ruary 19 and zi the tough, active Londoners of the 6oth
Division advanced directly from Jerusalem on Jericho, while
farther south the Anzac Mounted Division scrambled down
rocky tracks that led from near Bethlehem towards the Dead
Sea, with the object of trying to reach the valley in time to
cut the retreat of the Turks. The fighting needs no long
description. It was a struggle against the ground as much as
against the enemy. The eastern scarp of the Judaean range falls
steeply, in places precipitously, to the Jordan valley, and is
seamed with deep ravines, of which the most striking is the
Wadi Kelt (the Brook Kerith) ; it is one of the most desolate
and yet impressive parts of the earth. The men and horses
of the Anzacs had had some strange experiences since leaving
the Canal, and had been in some strange places for mounted
men marches and battle across the scorching sands of the
Sinai Desert, combat in the rocky hills north of Beersheba, the
waterless pursuit after the fall of Gaza, close-range fighting
among the orange-groves south of Jaffa. They were to march
and fight in some strange places yet. But that scramble down
the eastern face of Judaea, from the chill summits of the range
to the warmth of the valley, more than a thousand feet below
sea-level, must have been the strangest of all their experiences.

ALLENBY

Their effort was in vain: the Turks withdrew across the
Jordan in time to escape their blow.

Before the next stage, the advance on Amman, could be
carried out it was necessary to gain more room to the north,
both in the Jordan valley itself and in the Judasan range
above it* Consequently the next operation was a general
advance on the whole front of the Twentieth Corps, up the
Jordan valley on the right and astride the Nablus road in the
Mils. The objective in the valley was the Auja stream (a
namesake of the river north of Jaffa), and in the mountains the
general line of the Wadi Jib the ancient frontier between the
kingdoms of Judah and Israel, between Judaea and Samaria.
On the left the Twenty-first Corps was to swing forward its
right in the foothills north-east of Jaffa, to conform to the
advance of the Twentieth Corps.

The operation lasted from March 8 to 12, and was com-
pletely successful. But the slowness and comparative costli-
ness in casualties of the advance of the Twentieth Corps along
the spine of the Judsean range convinced Allenby that his next
great attack, if he wished for speedy or decisive results, must
be made in the plain, and not in the hills.

Just before this operation began Allenby became aware
that he had a new enemy Commander-in-Chief to oppose him.
Liman von Sanders, the defender of Gallipoli, had replaced
von Falkenhayn. Allenby's other principal adversary in the
Jerusalem campaign, Kress von Kressenstein, had already
been removed from his command, and Jemal, the autocrat of
Syria, had been recalled to Turkey. The disappearance of all
these three was a measure of Allenby's success in discomfit-
ing his opponents. Liman von Sanders had less brilliance in
manoeuvre than Falkenhayn, but was a staunch fighter on the
defensive, and had better knowledge of the Turks and their
methods . He worked through a Turkish rather than a German
staff. He took to himself great credit at this time for stopping
a British advance on Nablus, though no such advance was,
of course, intended. It is interesting to note that the line
now reached, the * line of the two Aujas/ had been chosen by

244

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN

Allenby, from his reading of history, in the previous autumn,
while the army was still on the southern border of Palestine,
as the best line on which to cover Jerusalem and Jaffa, should
he get as far.

On the British side there was also an important change.
Guy Dawnay, whose clear and logical brain had been invalu-
able in the planning of the Jerusalem campaign, had been
taken for an appointment at General Headquarters in France*
He was succeeded, after a short interval, by another extremely
able staff officer in Bartholomew, who had been with Chetwode
during the Jerusalem operations. Allenby had the knack of
choosing his assistants well.

TRANS-JORDAN
(March-May 1918)

The stage was now set for the crossing of the Jordan
and an advance into the hills of Moab. To understand the
strategical significance of this operation it is necessary to look
at the map and to consider the lie of the railways that served
the Turkish armies. For this purpose only the lines south of
Damascus need be regarded. North of Damascus it is enough
to know that a single, inefficient, incomplete line of railway
connected Syria with Turkey.

The Hejaz Railway, the destruction of a section of which
was one of the objectives of the operation, ran from Damascus
through the Hauran to Deraa junction and on to Amman,
the capital of Transjordania to-day (Rabbath Ammon and
Philadelphia of old times) ; thence along the edge of the desert
by Maan into the Hejaz, to the holy city of Medina still held
by a Turkish garrison. At Deraa a branch ran westward down
the Yarmuk valley ; this branch, which went by way of Nablus
and Tulkeram, with a spur to Haifa, was the principal line
of communication of the Turkish armies west of the Jordan.
It will be seen that an extension of the British right flank to

245

ALLENBY

Amman would place it In a position to strike notth along the
railway to Deraa junction, and thus to cut the Turks' main
line of communication. This line of advance had, in fact,
been advocated by some members of the Smuts mission as
the most rapid and effective means of outflanking the Turkish
defences in Palestine and of securing Damascus. An examina-
tion of the ground had, however, shown the impracticability
of laying a railway from Jerusalem to the Jordan valley and
up into the hills of Moab across the Jordan ; and without a
railway it would be impossible by the single indifferent hill
road to supply a force of sufficient strength to advance on
Deraa and Damascus. Allenby realized, however, how sus-
ceptible the Turkish Higher Command would be to a threat
at Deraa, and the use he could make of this threat to draw a
large part of the Turkish forces east of Jordan and thus weaken
them on thek western flank, where his next thrust could most
profitably be made.

The principal object of the advance on Amman, which
began in the third week of March, was to assist FeisaFs Arabs
by completely destroying the Hejaz Railway about Amman
and thus isolating all Turkish troops to the south. The Arab
revolt, which was to become, by the strange genius of T. E.
Lawrence in action and in description, one of the most
picturesque and popular episodes of the War, had begun
some eighteen months previously, and had by now spread
northward, with Akaba as its base, to the region south-east
and east of the Dead Sea. So persistent and menacing had
been the Arab raiding in this area that in January the Turks
had dispatched an expedition to deal with it, which had been
annihilated at Tafila (in the engagement so well described in
Chapters LXXXV and LXXXVI of Seven Pillars of Wisdom}.
To avenge this reverse the greater part of the Amman garri-
son had gone south, so that a rapid move on that town would
find it almost -undefended, Allenby hoped.

The enterprise was entrusted to General Shea, who had
under him the experienced Anzac Mounted Division, the
hard-bitten Camel Brigade, and his own 6oth Division of

246

ALLENBY

keen, active Londoners. His instructions were to cross the
Jordan on March 19, to occupy Es Salt with his infantry,
and to push on his mounted troops to destroy the railway near
Amman. He was told that he would then probably be ordered
to withdraw his main body across the Jordan, leaving a strong
detachment at Es Salt and troops to protect the mountain
road from the Jordan valley to that place. From Es Salt, it
was hoped, touch could be kept with FeisaPs Arabs.

From its start the operation was marred by unfavourable
weather. The heavy rains of the winter should normally have
ceased before the end of March, but in 1918 it rained almost
incessantly throughout the last fortnight of the month. The
raid was peculiarly dependent on the weather, since speed was
an essential element of the plan ; and the road and the tracks
by which the advance was to be made, rough and difficult
enough when dry, were almost impassable in the wet. The
first stage, the bridging of the Jordan, had to be postponed
fot two days, from the i9th to the 2ist, owing to the flooded
state of that tortuous, narrow river, which rose nine feet
during the night of the 2oth-2ist. It was the 23rd before the
main body was across. The enemy holding the river were not
numerous, but the river itself was running bank-high in swift
flood. The crossing was watched by H.R.H. the Duke of
Connaught, who^was on a visit to Palestine.

The force reached and occupied Es Salt on the evening of
March 25 ; the opposition had been slight, but the weather
atrocious. A large proportion of the inhabitants of Es Salt,
a picturesque old town perched on the hillside, were Christians,
who welcomed the invaders with open but unwise delight.
The mounted troops, reinforced later by a brigade of the
6oth Division, then strove for four days, from March 27 to 30,
to capture Amman. But the delay on the Jordan had been
fatal: it had given the enemy time to reinforce the garrison,
for whom the group of hills round the town formed a strong
natural position, too strong to be forced by troops with little
artillery or ammunition. On March 30 the withdrawal began.
It was decided not to attempt to maintain a detachment at

248

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN

Es Salt, which had been attacked by Turkish forces from
west of the Jordan; and the whole force, except a bridge-
head detachment at Ghoraniyeh, had recrossed the Jordan by
April 2. The withdrawal was never in any difficulties except
from the weather and from the state of the tracks. A large
number of refugees from Es Salt, who had too vociferously
and prematurely acclaimed the entry of the British, accom-
panied the troops in their withdrawal, from well-founded fear
of Turkish reprisals. Mathematically the operation might be
claimed a success for the British, who brought back a thousand
prisoners and inflicted heavy loss on the Turks at a cost to
themselves of only 1350 casualties. Morally and tactically it
was a reverse ; the troops of the E.E.F. had failed in their
object, and had turned their backs on their enemy for the
first time for nearly a year. The ultimate strategical gain, in
drawing a large body of Turks to the eastern flank, could
not yet be recognized. Neither the handling of the force nor
the qualities of the troops were in any way to blame for the
failure ; the conditions of weather and ground had made their
task impossible.

While the force was crossing the Jordan and struggling
up the hills of Moab news came of the German successes in
France and of the great British retreat. The effect on the plans
of the E.E.F. was immediate. Allenby was at once warned
that all the troops he could spare would be required for France.
He was actually at the time forming a third Corps headquarters,
the Twenty-second, in view of the increase of his force to
nine divisions by the arrival of the 3rd and yth Indian Divi-
sions from Mesopotamia. The Twenty-second Corps, the
highest-numbered British Corps ever formed, during the few
days of its existence consisted of General Barrow and one
staff officer only. Its formation was then cancelled, and two
divisions, the 5 2nd and 74th, were put under orders for em-
barkation. As Sir Archibald Murray had done two years
before, Allenby responded generously, both in numbers and
in quality, to the call from France. The 5 2nd and 74th were
two of his best fighting divisions ; and he sent, besides nine

249

ALLENBY

Yeomanry regiments, twenty-four British battalions, five and
a half heavy batteries, and five machine-gun companies* For
the time being the E.E.K ceased to be an effective offensive
force.

Nevertheless AUenby did not at once adopt the defensive.
While the troops for France were being withdrawn for em-
barkation he undertook two offensive operations, one on
either flank of his line. The first of these was carried out by
the Twenty-first Corps on the left, from April 9 to u, and is
officially known as the Action of Berukin. It had been planned
as a stage in the general advance of the army when the E.E.F.
expected to receive reinforcements instead of sending them
away. The idea of the operation was to force a gap in the
Turkish line just where the plain and the foothills joined, and
to pass through a mounted division to cut off the Turkish
forces between the foothills and the sea. The plan, which
had been drawn up by the Twenty-first Corps, was not re-
garded with any great favour by some of Allenby's advisers,
who were doubtful of its practicability or of its value in the
changed circumstances. The operation was finally approved
somewhat in the spirit in which Bunyan claims to have
published The Pilgrim's Progress* It was a failure. The attack
of the 75 th Division in the foothills, which was the pre-
iiminary stage, made little headway. It was opposed by the
German units with the Turkish Army, who, as usual, fought
stoutly and skilfully. The preparations had been too obvious,
and the original attack did not achieve surprise, while the
whole plan was disclosed to the enemy by the capture of a
marked map from the body of an officer on the first day.
The action was broken off after three days' hard fighting in the
foothills. It confirmed AUenby's impression, from the March
advance in Judaea, that a rapid breach in the enemy line could
only be made in the plains.

The second expedition across the Jordan, which was the

1 *' Some said, John, print it; others said, Not so;
Some said, It might do good; others said, No."

(Author's apology for The Pilgrim' } s Progress)

250

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN

next move, was no more successful tactically than the first,
but was shorter and more dramatic. Allenby had always had
in mind another attempt to establish his right flank in the hills
of Moab when the weather became more settled. The Turks,
suspecting this, had delivered a strong attack against the
bridgehead at Ghoraniyeh on April n, but had been repulsed
with heavy loss. Their main force on this flank then en-
trenched itself in the foothills by Shunet Nimrin, where the
road to Es Salt entered the hills.

The advantages Allenby hoped to gain by an extension of
his right into the hills were several. The harvest was now
ripening in Moab, and was of considerable importance to the
ill-provided Turk; if the British could seize and hold Es Salt
they could stretch out a hand to FeisaPs Arabs, encourage
their activities, and deprive the enemy of the grain he was
counting on to supply his forces. A force posted at Es Salt
could protect the flank and threaten the railway from Amman
to Deraa, without being exposed to the summer heat of the
Jordan valley. Also, the Turkish force at Shunet Nimrin,
isolated from immediate support, seemed to have placed itself
at the mercy of a swift stroke at its communications by
mounted men; the Turks had probably not realized that
bold horsemen could operate in the hills as well as on the
plains.

Allenby had designed the operation for the middle of May,
when the reorganization of the Yeomanry Mounted Division *
would be complete. But in the last week in April an excep-
tional opportunity seemed to offer itself. Envoys from the
powerful Beni Sakhr tribe presented themselves, announced
that they were encamped at Madeba, nineteen miles south-east
of Ghoraniyeh, and were prepared to co-operate with the
British in an operation against the Turks at Shunet Nimrin,
provided it was carried out before May 4, after which date
lack of supplies would compel them to disperse. This seemed
to fit in so well with Allenby's projects that the expedition
was staged forthwith, without waiting for the Yeomanry.

1 See p. 259.

251

ALLENBY

Chauvel had the command of it, with the Anzac and Aus-
tralian Mounted Divisions and the ever-ready London
Division. Besides the main road through Shunet Nimrin,
where the Turks were posted, there are three bridle tracks
from the Jordan valley to Es Salt. The first of these left the
valley too close to the Turkish position to be usable; the
second ran from the Umm es Shert ford over the Jordan, and
the third from the Jisr ed Damieh bridge, in Turkish hands.
The plan was for the infantry to make a direct attack on the
Nimrin position, while the mounted men, riding swiftly up
the valley, reached Es Salt by the Umm es Shert and Jisr ed
Damieh tracks. The main communications of the Turkish
force at Nimrin would thus be cut, and their only other
connexion with Amman was by the Ain es Sir track, which
had been found on the previous raid to be barely passable for
pack animals. This track the Beni Sakhr promised to bar, so
it was hoped that the enemy at Nimrin, surrounded and cut
off, would be compelled to surrender or be destroyed. The
danger of a Turkish attack on Es Salt from west of the Jordan
was to be guarded against by leaving a brigade in the valley
to seize and hold the Jisr ed Damieh bridge, or, if this were not
possible, to hold a position astride the track. It was a bold
plan that promised well had it not been based on faulty intelli-
gence of the enemy and misplaced trust in the unstable Arabs.
The Beni Sakhr made no effort to fill the rdk they had under-
taken, 1 while the Turks reacted with unsuspected swiftness
and strength.

1 Actually the sheikhs who had come in represented only a small section o the
Beni Sakhr, and never seem to have expected their offer to be taken seriously. Sir
Hubert Young in his book The Independent Arab writes of the incident from the
Arab side :

" Marzuq told me that he had sent over a small party of Beni Sakhr sheikhs from
Madeba to General Allenby's G.H.Q. with a letter saying that he only needed a little
assistance from the British to destroy the entire Turkish army east of the Jotdan
On the 2$>th Apdl one of ^ Beni Sakhr sheiklls ^ m& back from G>H Qt He brought
a letter purporting to come from General Allenby, in which he said that he hoped to
co-operate with Mamiq, and that the hearer would give necessary details. According
to the bearer, General AUenby proposed to advance on Shunet Nimrin on the very next
day ; Mounted troops were at the same time to attack and capture Es Salt, and the
Bern Sakhr were to rise immediately and join in. Marsuq was much perplexed by this
letter. He had acted without any authority in sending across to General Allenby, and

252

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN

Operations began at dawn on April 30, and at first went
well. The Australian Division moved swiftly north up the
valley, and the leading brigade arrived near Jisr ed Damieh
by 5 .30 A.M* It could not capture the bridge itself, so took up
an extended position to cover the track to Es Salt, up which a
second brigade rode to the capture of that town, which was
occupied by the evening and its garrison captured, a fine
exploit. Three other mounted brigades rode up to Es Salt
by the^Umm es Shert track. Meanwhile two brigades of the
London Division, with the New Zealand Mounted Brigade
on its right, captured the outpost line of the Shunet Nimrin
position, but could make little impression on the main line,
which was strongly posted and entrenched. General Shea
hoped, however, that some of the mounted troops descending
from Es Salt on the Turkish flank and rear, coupled with the
Arab closing of the Ain es Sir route, would compel the Turks
to retreat next day.

These hopes were not fulfilled. The mounted troops could
make little progress down the road from Es Salt against a
strongly posted Turkish flank-guard in difficult hills, and the
enemy throughout the operation used the Ain es Sir track,
which he had made fit for wheels, without let or hindrance
from the Beni Sakhr. So that the gallant efforts of the 6oth
Division were made in vain.

Meanwhile disaster overtook the flank-guard in the valley.
Unsuspected by the Intelligence and unseen by the airmen, a
strong Turkish force was close to Jisr ed Damieh. A division
of Turkish cavalry had lain skilfully concealed in broken
ground just west of the river for some time past, in anticipa-
tion of a fresh British advance on Es Salt; and a Turkish
division had been moved up close, the day before that advance
began, with the intention of attacking the British outpost at
Musallabeh, west of the Jordan* Further, a bridge had been

was rather frightened at the result of his move. He knew perfectly well that the Beni
Sakhr would do nothing without guns, and no guns had arrived."

Lawrence in Seven Pillars (Chapter XCVI) makes some pungent comments on the folly
of initiatirig an operation on the unverified promises of unknown sheikhs ; but it was
difficult for G.H.Q* at the time to realize the complete irresponsibility of Arab warfare.

253

ALLENBY

made at Mafid Jozele, which had escaped the notice of the
Air Force, and had not been discovered by the mounted
troops till late on the 3oth. The result was that on the morning
of May i the Light Horse brigade in the valley, spread on an
extended front from near the Nahr es Zerka (Jabbok) stream
to Red Hill, was suddenly attacked from three sides by a
greatly superior Turkish force. It was soon driven off the
Jisr ed Damieh~Es Salt track and up against the trackless
hills behind. It was only with great difficulty and the loss of
nine guns and a quantity of transport that it succeeded in
extricating itself. With the help of reinforcements a line was
established a mile north of the Umm es Shert track, the only
communication now open to the mounted troops in Es Salt.
It has since become known that the situation might have been
more critical still but for a Turkish mistake which caused the
counter-marching of a regiment which would otherwise have
added its weight to the attack.

During May 2 and 3 the attacks on the Shunet Nimrin
position were continued without success, and meanwhile the
mounted troops in Es Salt were being pressed from west,
from north, and from east. There seemed at one time a
danger of their being completely cut off from the valley, and
a scheme was even contemplated by which Lawrence, who
was at G.H.Q. at the time, should be flown to Es Salt to
lead the mounted troops east towards the area controlled
by FeisaTs Arabs.

Allenby went down to ChauveFs headquarters in the valley
on the afternoon of the 3rd, and after hearing a somewhat
alarming report of the situation at Es Salt gave orders for
withdrawal.

On the night of May 5-4 the four mounted brigades from
Es Salt scrambled down the narrow Umm es Shert track with
surprisingly little difficulty, and by the evening of the 4th
the whole force had recrossed the Jordan. Again a thousand
prisoners were brought back, and the balance of losses was
much in favour of the E.E.B. ; again the tactical victory
was with the enemy; again AUenby's strategical objective was

254

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN

accomplished, since from now onwards about one-third of the
whole Turkish forces was maintained east of the Jordan.

Allenby had taken the loss of the guns with great calm.
There were plenty more guns in the ordnance depot, he re-
marked ; it was the trained gunners who had fallen who were
the greater loss. On the afternoon of the 3rd, however, when
the position of the troops in Es Salt was reported as critical,
he had for the first time in the campaign betrayed signs of
anxiety. His final reaction was typical. When Chauvel ex-
pressed to him his regret for the failure he replied, with his
usual emphasis, " Failure be damned ! It's been a great
success/' It had, from the strategical point of view, but it
required a farseeing man to realize it and to discount so
lightly the tactical failure. A great nation is said to forget its
defeats easily : the same is true of a great general.

III

REORGANIZATION AND PLANNING
(M.ay~-A.ugust 1518)

" Nothing is known of the climate in summer-time, since
no civilized human being has yet been found to spend summer
there." So said the official Intelligence handbook about the
Jordan valley. Yet Allenby, after the two failures to establish
a position in the hills east of Jordan, was practically compelled
to maintain a considerable force in the valley, both for the
protection of his right flank and to keep alive the enemy's
apprehensions of another thrust at Amman and Deraa. He
did so with his eyes open to the risks he ran. It was mainly a
medical problem, and AUenby's dealings with his doctors
were typical of his methods. Few commanders of large
armies have consulted the heads of their medical services more
regularly and earnestly than did Allenby; few have more
boldly overruled their advice than did Allenby when his plans
demanded a course of action that they regarded as dangerous.
No general, probably, has ever given fuller assistance and

255

ALLENBY

support to his doctors in their measures for combating the
risks of disease. Here are two opinions of AUenby from
senior Medical Officers of his Army. The first is from Major-
General Sir Richard Luce, a Territorial officer who became
Chief Medical Officer of the Twentieth Corps and afterwards
Chief Medical Officer of the whole Army :

We were all greatly impressed both with his appearance and his
grasp of things. From a medical point of view the most interest-
ing point in his conduct of the Palestine campaign was his policy
with regard to the question of malaria. The Jordan valley had
always been regarded as an impossible habitat for Europeans in the
late summer months, and the Maritime Plain almost as bad. With
full realization he boldly faced the dangers of occupation, which
he considered essential to his strategy ; but and here he showed
his greatness he gave unstinted help in carrying out every
method of mitigating the danger that was put forward. Work on
anti-malarial schemes was given priority over all other work
behind the lines. Thousands of Egyptian workers were put at
the disposal of the aati-malarial authorities for draining marshes
and training the course of streams, such engineering projects
as had never before been undertaken in the face of an enemy.
The result was that the mosquito population was marvellously
diminished, and malaria, troublesome as it was, never became a
menace to the general health or morale of the troops.

Sir James Barrett, the distinguished Australian, has written :

In all these matters the Commander-in-Chief was quick to
understand the essentials of the difficulties and prompt to act.
I found that I was dealing with a man of scientific instincts;
courteous, considerate, and appreciative of the service the Medical
Staff could render. He never interfered in detail, but supported
the Army Medical Service thoroughly, finding out where he could
repose confidence. He was, as far as I know, the first Commander
in that malarial region in which many armies have perished to
understand the risk and to take measures accordingly.

Apart from malaria, the Jordan valley in summer was a
horrible place. The historian says that Cleopatra once had
a palace there, where she entertained Antony. It seemed an
incredible tale to those who knew the valley in summer. The

256

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN

daily temperature was over 100 degrees, the atmosphere, at
more than a thousand feet below sea-level, humid and oppress-
ive; and hot winds, or the least movement of troops or
transport, sent choking clouds of fine dust along the valley ;
scorpions, huge spiders, centipedes, and flies were the prin-
cipal representatives of animal life. The positions were held
almost entirely by the mounted troops at first by the
Australian or Anzac divisions, and later, after the reorganiza-
tion, by the newly formed 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions.

Allenby visited the valley frequently. If all the stories
that are told of his appearances there were true they would
seem to indicate that he was like a naval depth-charge, set to
explode at a certain distance below sea-level, since so many of
them record his outbursts of anger at some breach of dis-
cipline. The best known is of the Australians and their
* cut-shorts/ Allenby had issued a stringent order against
anyone riding in shorts. The reason was a good one; it was
probable that the bare knees of the rider would be rubbed,
and almost every sore in Palestine became septic and had to
be treated in hospital. The Australians, in the heat of the
valley, wore a minimum of clothing, and Allenby was almost
bound to encounter one riding in cut-shorts whenever he
appeared. His explosions at the sight became notorious. 1

It was typical of him, of his strength and of his weaknesses,
that he would make no allowance for the conditions in the
valley, nor for the characteristics of the Australian. His
temper had mellowed with success ; and though he still lived
up to his reputation as "the Bull/* and always remained a
very formidable personality, the explosions were perhaps less
frequent and his natural kindliness reasserted itself sooner
than in France. He was motoring in the valley one day when
he passed a small depot of ammunition which did not conform
to his ideas of arrangement or concealment. He stopped and

1 After the War Allenby was presiding at a meeting to decide on a suitable monu-
ment to the E.E.F. " I think we want something simple," he said, " something rather
rude and rough/* A distinguished General present whispered to his neighbour,
** Then what about a statue of the Chief when he has seen an Australian riding in
shorts ? "

R Z57

ALLENBY

sent for the officer in charge, who happened to be shaving
and arrived with one side of his face covered with lather.
Allenby at once burst out with a very forcible exposition of
the shortcomings of the ammunition depot. The unfortunate
officer was almost paralysed by this onslaught ; but just as he
was expecting to be placed under arrest he was amazed to
find the Commander-in-Chief 's large hand thrust out to him,
as he concluded, " Well, those are my orders. See that they
are carried out. Good-bye 1 I am very pleased to have made
your acquaintance/'

On another occasion his car, descending the steep and dusty
Jerusalem-Jericho road, nearly ran into the mess-cart belong-
ing to a certain General's headquarters. Then, said the men
in charge of the cart, " out of the dust appeared a large and
angry man with a lot to say." As he got back into his car
Allenby said to his A.D.C., " I fairly let myself go that time,
didn't I ? What a joke it would have been if we had knocked
old So-and-so's mess-cart over the side 1 "

Of this quickness with which he recovered equanimity
after one of his outbursts many stories could be told. On one
occasion in Palestine, furious at a breach of orders which he
discovered during an inspection, he informed an officer that
he would be tried by court-martial; half an hour later, at the
conclusion of the inspection, he shook him by the hand and
complimented him on what he had seen. Nothing more was
said of the court-martial. It is unlikely that Allenby forgot
about it; more probably he realized that he had been hasty,
and the handshake was his method of withdrawal. At
another time, on a visit to a training establishment in Egypt,
he disapproved strongly of the methods of a sergeant-in-
structor in bayonet-fighting. Taking the rifle from him, he
gave an impressive exhibition of thrusting and parrying.
With his great strength, he handled the rifle like a toy. As he
finished he said to the commandant, " Send that sergeant
back to his regiment he's useless." But the rest of his
inspection was satisfactory, and as he left he told the com-
mandant he could keep the sergeant if he wanted him.

258

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN

The chief business of the summer was reorganization.
Some 60,000 British troops had left the E.E.F. for France,
and were being gradually replaced by Indian units. It was a
complicated process.

To take the mounted troops first. The Yeomanry Mounted
Division, together with the 5th and yth Mounted Brigades,
were broken up on the departure of nine Yeomanry regiments
to France. So was the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade, which
was outpaced and had lost much of its usefulness now that the
Sinai Desert had been passed. From its Australian personnel,
supplemented by a French Colonial cavalry regiment, was
formed the 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade, to replace the
5th Mounted Brigade in the Australian Mounted Division.
The Indian cavalry regiments which had been in France since
1915 had been sent to Palestine in March 1918 ; both climate
and conditions of warfare there would suit them better than
the bleak, close-locked warfare in the west. From them and
from the remaining Yeomanry regiments were formed the
4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions. General Barrow, the former
commander of the Yeomanry Mounted Division, took over
the 4th Cavalry Division; and Major-General Macandrew,
another Indian cavalry soldier, received command of the 5th.

The brigades in these formations consisted each of a Yeo-
manry regiment and two Indian cavalry regiments (except
the Imperial Service Brigade of the 5th Division, which
consisted of three Indian regiments). All regiments were
armed with sword or lance, and were thus cavalry in the true
sense. The Australians of the Australian Mounted Division
also added the sword to their equipment during the summer.
Their training in the use of the sword and in shock tactics
was slight, but the dash and spirit of cavalry was in their blood
and upbringing. The Anzac Mounted Division, though lack-
ing nothing of the spirit and enterprise of the Australian
Division, elected to remain Mounted Rifles.

Thus Allenby had four divisions of mounted troops, all
of high quality and experience, of which three were armed
and trained as cavalry. He was, in fact, stronger in mounted

259

ALLENBY

troops than at the beginning of his Jerusalem campaign. His
new commander, Macandrew, was a skilful leader, of forcible
personality and sanguine temperament.

It was otherwise with the infantry. Though there were
still seven divisions, and five of them bore the same numbers
and names as before, their composition and quality had greatly
changed. Only the 54th remained unaltered, and retained all
its British battalions. The 52nd and 74th, two proved and
trusted divisions, had gone to France, and had been replaced
by the 3rd and yth Indian Divisions from Mesopotamia.
These two had formed the original Indian contingent to
France, had fought there in 1914-15, and had then gone East
again, to share the failures and the hardships of the attempts
to relieve Kut and the triumphs of the avenging campaign
that won Baghdad. They were seasoned formations, but they
had now, as will be seen, to give up a large proportion of
thek trained and experienced personnel to leaven the new units
which had to be formed to complete the remaining divisions.
These were the loth, 5jrd, 6oth, and 75th; each of these was
to keep only three British battalions, one per brigade. -Of the
others, twenty-three had gone to France, and ten were to be
broken up in Palestine as reinforcements. In their place the
divisions were gradually completed by Indian battalions;
some of these came from India, and the remainder were
formed in Palestine by the process of withdrawing a company
from each of the existing seasoned battalions, leaving these
to expand to four companies again by absorbing recruits.
The process of reorganization was complicated by the
battalions and drafts from India arriving at intervals ; the last
ones did not land till August. The Official History writes of
the Indian battalions that completed the "New Model" E.E.F.
as follows :

Twenty-one of them (belonging to the 3rd, yth, and 75th
Divisions) had proved their value in war, but each of them had
given up at least one company. Ten, though composed to a great
extent of men who had seen active service, had seen none as
battalions. The other twenty-two had seen no service; some of

260

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN

their commanding officers, even, were in the same case. These
battalions were largely in some instances as to one-third of their
strength made up of recruits who had done no musketry. One
had never seen the service rifle, having been armed with the Ross
rifle in India. They landed in Egypt with hardly any signallers,
few Lewis gunners, no bombers, often no transport drivers with
experience in handling animals. Their junior British officers were
almost all in need of further instruction, and few of them spoke
Hindustani, while the Indian officers had for the most part been
recently promoted. It is on record that in one battalion there
were only two British officers who could understand their men
and only one Indian officer who spoke English. Intensive training
was required, not only of the units as a whole, but still more of
all the specialists without whom a battalion is almost useless in
modern warfare. There was indeed much to be done, and for
the late arrivals little time in which to do it.

The details of this reorganization have been set out at some
length, since the part played in a great victory by organization
and preparation behind the lines seldom receives proper
recognition in military history, which is apt to concern itself
solely with the more spectacular movements and clashes of
the campaign itself. 1 Yet this preparation is as important to
the result of the campaign as work in the stable and on the
training gallops is to the production of a Derby winner.
Without it the skill of the general, as of the jockey, would be
of little avail. The youthful Napoleon won his first campaign
in 1796 as much by the energy and organizing power that
turned a ragged, half-starved rabble of men into an army fit
to march and fight as by his skill in battle ; and Wellington's
successes in the Peninsula would have been impossible without
the tireless, careful work behind the lines of that master of
detail.

Allenby was no great organizer himself, in the way that
Napoleon and Wellington were ; but he knew how to set his
staff to work, and was always watchful to see what fruits
their labours were producing not by studying returns in an

1 Thus AUenby's predecessor in command, Sir Archibald Murray, has never received
full credit for his great work in reorganization, in the spring of 1916, of the troops
evacuated from Gallipoli.

26l

ALLENBY

office, but by constant visits to the camps, training grounds,
and administrative establishments. The details of this com-
plex reorganization of the Force were due mainly to Bar-
tholomew, the sub-chief of the General Staff, under whom
worked an officer with an exceptional talent for organization,
Lieutenant-Colonel Spencer. 3 - To him and to Brigadier-
General A, B. Robertson, 2 Commandant of the Training
Camp at Zeitoun, in Egypt, near the Canal, is due much credit
for the fact that divisional and brigade commanders received
in due course units that were at least organized and trained
on sound lines, so far as was possible in the time available.
These commanders and their staffs had in turn much to do
to incorporate the new units into the old framework, and to
fashion them into a workable formation. In this the shortage
of trained signallers was perhaps the most serious handicap.
So much could not have been done in so short a time but for
the keenness of the troops themselves, who were mostly young
men of the good physique and fine traditions that the fighting
races of India provide. They were eager to learn the trade of
the soldier, a'nd learned quickly.

Allenby had other accessions to his army during the
summer. The French contingent was increased by some
battalions formed from Armenian refugees, whose discipline
was perhaps more doubtful than the vehemence with which
they would be likely to attack their hereditary oppressors, the
Turks, if given the opportunity. There came also to Palestine,
as the first-fruits of the Balfour Declaration, three battalions
of Jews the 38th, 39th, and 4oth Royal Fusiliers recruited
mainly from the Jewish population of the big English cities.

Thus the army as finally organized for Allenby's last great
campaign contained representatives of many countries. Of
the great Dominions, Australia, New Zealand, and India

1 Brigadier-General J. A. W. Spencer, C.M,G., D.S.O., later Assistant Adjutant-
General at the Wat Office (1927-31), commander of the i^rd Infantry Brigade (1931-

2 Brigadier-General A. B. Robertson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O,, later Assistant Quarter-
master-General at the War Office (1925-29), commander of the loth (Jubbulpore)
Infantry Brigade (1929-33).

262

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN

provided a large proportion of the force; South Africa was
represented by a brigade of artillery in the 54th Division and a
battalion of Cape Boys (ist Cape Corps) in the 53rd Division;
Canada was to have sent two battalions of railwaymen, had
the advance planned by the Smuts mission been carried out,
but their departure had been cancelled after the German
successes in France. Two battalions of sturdy West Indian
negroes represented the Colonies, and some Rarotongan
islanders from the far Pacific used their skill as boatmen in the
landing of supplies through the surf of the harbourless coast.
The French and Italian contingents emphasized that the War
was an Allied effort; there had even been suggestions of
Japanese and Chinese troops being sent to join the E.KF.
The tale was completed by two corps of auxiliaries without
whom Allenby's campaigns could never have prospered as
they did the Egyptian Labour Corps and the Camel Trans-
port Corps. Their patience and skill were of inestimable value
to the E.E.F. from the defence of the Canal to the final triumph
in Syria.

In June, while the Force was at its weakest the British
units having gone and the Indian units being not yet ready
AUenby received a demand to send to France his one remain-
ing British division, the 54th, and the Australian Mounted
Division, to be used as reinforcements for the Australian
infantry. For the first and only time he protested, and the
proposal was dropped.

There was little fighting during the summer. The British
were too busy with reorganization to undertake more than
active patrolling and occasional raids to test the Turkish
defences and the new Indian units. Early in June a small
advance was made on the coast by troops of the jth Division
in order to capture two low hills which gave some advantage
in observation. On August 12 a night raid on a large scale
was carried out by the loth, Division against the Turkish
defences just west of the Nablus road. It was well planned
and executed, and resulted in the capture of nearly 250
prisoners and fourteen machine-guns, as well as inflicting

263

ALLENBY

heavy loss on the enemy. The losses of the raiding brigade
were only just over a hundred.

The one serious offensive operation was undertaken by
the enemy. In the middle of July Liman von Sanders ordered
a determined attack in the Jordan valley, with the object of
cramping the British hold on the valley and thus making a
fresh advance east of Jordan improbable. The main attack
was directed against the salient west of the Jordan, north of
the Auja stream; this had been the scene of a previous attack
in April, and would have been attacked again in May had not
Allenby's second Trans -Jordan raid upset the Turkish plans.
It was, in fact, an obvious target, and had been strengthened
by the Desert Mounted Corps accordingly. The assault was
made by the best troops the enemy had available, the German
battalions. Owing to the stubbornness and skill of the defend-
ing Australians and the failure of the Turkish divisions to
support the German attack it ended in complete and costly
failure. The Germans, passing between the scattered Aus-
tralian posts in the dark, gained a momentary footing on the
high ground in the rear, but were promptly counter-attacked
and driven out, losing nearly 400 prisoners. The engagement
was a valuable indication to Allenby both of the continued
sensitiveness of the enemy Higher Command to the threat of a
move east of Jordan and of the decline in the morale of the
Turks, who had made little effort to second the attack of their
German allies.

The plan of his final great battle had gradually been taking
shape in Allenby's mind during the summer. It was based
partly on thought and study of the history of previous
campaigns, of the topography of the land, of Intelligence
reports on the state of the Turks and partly on personal
observation and experience during the fighting in the first
half of the year. The elements of the plan must have unfolded
themselves in something like the following sequence. All the
fighting in the hills, from the advance to Jerusalem onward,
had warned him that a quick decision and rapid progress were
impossible in them, even with the aid of surprise and superior

264

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN

numbers ; he must attack on the coastal plain, where he could
employ his mounted troops to the full, if he wanted to make a
speedy end of his enemy. The two Trans-Jordan raids had
shown him how his adversary could be made by the threat to
Amman and Deraa to stretch out his weak and wasting re-
sources over an extended front. Liman von Sanders' willing-
ness in his July attack to risk his best troops in an attempt to
weaken the British position in the Jordan valley was proof
that the Desert Mounted Corps had not endured the heat
and dust of the summer in vain. The conduct of the Turkish
troops in that action, together with the steady stream of
deserters, was evidence of the sorry state of their forces, and
an encouragement to take risks beyond the ordinary against
them.

Allenby at first set his aims no higher than the occupa-
tion of the remainder of Palestine. When the new C.I.G.S.,
Sir Henry Wilson, telegraphed to him early in July renewing
his proposal a favourite strategical idea of Mr Lloyd George's
to send divisions from France in the autumn to carry out a
winter campaign in Palestine and return to France in the
spring, Allenby would promise no farther advance than the
line Tiberias-Acre /.<?., approximately the present northern
frontier of Palestine. And when, at the beginning of August,
after the War Cabinet's proposal had been dropped, Allenby
outlined his plans to his Corps commanders, they were for a
limited operation only. After a break-through on the coast by
the Twenty-first Corps the cavalry were to make for Messudieh
Junction, about half-way between Nablus and Tulkeram, while
the Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps advanced to the line of
those two places.

The scheme promised victory, probably a considerable
victory, but would permit the retreat and escape of the greater
part of the Turkish force. A much bigger conception was
already in Allenby's mind, and soon came to birth. One
morning, not long after his announcement of the original plan,
he returned from a morning ride, strode into his office, and
informed his Operations Staff that he had decided on an

265

ALLENBY

extension of Ms plan which aimed at nothing less than the
complete destruction of the Turkish armies. The cavalry ,
instead of turning inland at the level of Tulkeram, were to
continue their ride up the Plain of Sharon, cross the spur of
hills that ran from the main Judsean range to the sea at Mount
Carmel near Haifa, and break into the great Plain of Esdraelon
some thirty to forty miles in rear of the Turkish armies, of the
railway that served all Turkish forces west of Jordan, and of
their main lines of retreat.

It was a daring plan, even against an enemy so inferior in
numbers and morale. It would involve a continuous ride of
over fifty miles for the majority of the horsemen, and over
sixty for some, in the course of which they would have to
cross a range of hills in the enemy's possession, passable only
by two difficult tracks. There is no parallel in military history
to so deep an adventure by such a mass of cavalry against a
yet unbroken enemy. But Allenby had not made up his mind
lightly, and there was no shaking it by the suggestion of
difficulties. He left it to his staff and to his Corps commanders
to work out the details of the design, but of the main frame-
work there was to be no alteration. The long Turkish
domination of Syria and Palestine, and the military power on
which it was founded, were to be given their death-blow in
the grand manner.

THE EVE OF MEGIDDO
(August-September 1918)

An incalculable element in all war planning is the inten-
tions of the enemy. But there was little uncertainty about the
powers and intentions of the Turkish forces in Palestine.
With an effective fighting strength of only about 33,ooo, x

1 The figures, as usual, are in dispute, Liman von Sanders claiming that his effective
strength was much lower. It is krgely a matter of difference in methods of calculation
of * fighting men.* The ' ration strength ' of the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Armies
was shown in a captured return at over 100,000; this can hardly have included less
than 33,000 combatants. The ration strength of the three British Corps was under

z66

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN

they were spreadeagled, thanks to Allenby's strategy, over a
front of seventy-five miles, from the Mediterranean coast
to Amman. The Seventh and Eighth Armies were west of
Jordan, with headquarters at Nablus and Tulkeram respect-
ively, and the Fourth Army in the Jordan valley and on the
hills of Moab, with headquarters at Amman. These so-called
* armies ' contained little more than 10,000 effective rifles each.
Their strength and morale had steadily deteriorated during
the summer.

The collapse of the Russians in the spring of 1918 had
released the Turkish armies in Asia Minor, and had provided
an opportunity to strengthen the Palestine front. But Enver
Pasha, the irresponsible gambler who dictated the policy of
Turkey at this time, trusting to his German allies to win the
War, and anxious, as is the way of dictators, to display some
cheaply won successes, embarked on grandiose schemes of
conquest in the Caucasus. He squandered Turkey's last
reserves in seizing Batum, Kars, and Tiflis, places which had
once, long since, owned Ottoman rule. Far from reinforcing
Palestine, he had even attempted to withdraw from Liman
von Sanders all his German troops. And so poorly organized
were the lines of communication to Syria and Palestine that
the Turkish soldiers at the front lacked even the means of
proper subsistence. 1 They were ragged and half-starved;
and the transport animals were incapable of hard work owing
to insufficient forage.

Obviously the troops of Liman von Sanders could under-
take no serious offensive action; the only question was
whether they would * stay put * till the day chosen for the
battle. Did Allenby, perhaps, recall the fisherman he had
watched a year before on the shore near El Arish 2 flinging his
net over a flat-fish, his one anxiety that the fish should remain
supine till the net fell round it ? He was like that fisherman

150,000, and their fighting strength was reckoned at 66,000. The British captured
75,000 prisoners during the operations.

1 The railways had little or no coal, and many olive- and fig-trees and even vines in
the Nablus valley were cut down at this time to provide fuel for the railways.

2 See p. 200.

267

ALLENBY

now, sure of his ptey if it did not withdraw before he was
ready to make his cast.

The vital points in the Turkish rear over which Allenby
aimed to fling his net were Deraa, the junction where the
railway to Palestine, which fed the Seventh and Eighth
Armies, branched off from the Hejaz Railway, which served the
Fourth Army ; the crossings of the Jordan at Beisan and Jist
el Mejamie ; and Afule, in the Plain of Esdraelon, where the
railway to Nablus and Tulkeram turned south* Deraa was
beyond the sweep of Allenby's horsemen, but was within the
range of his Arab allies, whose mobility was little trammelled
by questions of supply or lines of communication. Allenby
had no expectation of their ability to seize or hold Deraa, but
had entrusted to them the mission of breaking the railway
near Deraa just before his own attack, and had backed his
belief in their assistance by the gift of 2000 riding camels.
Beisan and Afule he intended to seize with his cavalry within
twenty-four hours of the opening of the battle. Thus he
aimed, not merely at the defeat, but at the complete annihila-
tion of the Seventh and Eighth Armies. The Fourth Army,
east of Jordan, would escape the first casting of the net, but
might be caught by a second cast.

The details of the plan were worked out at a series of con-
ferences, over which Allenby presided. Those who attended
them will not easily forget his almost presumptuous con-
fidence about the issue of the operations, the clearness and
incisiveness of his instructions, and his occasional abrupt
impatience at some objection or difficulty. It was not his way
to be content with half-measures, and this was shown clearly
in two aspects of the plan the arrangements for the break-
through on the coast and the measures for the deception of
the enemy. No better example of the old maxim " Concen-
trate all available force at the decisive point " could be found
than Allenby's distribution of force for his last great battle.
In total fighting men he had a superiority of approximately
two to one over the Turk; but when his concentration was
complete he had massed on the left of his line, on a front of

268

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN

some fifteen miles, 35,000 infantry, 9000 cavalry, and nearly
400 guns, 1 while on the same front his unsuspecting ad-
versary had only some 8000 infantry and about 120 guns. On
the remainder of the front, nearly fifty miles, the British, with
22,000 infantry, 3000 mounted men, and 170 guns, faced
about 20,000 to 25,000 Turks with 270 guns.

That such a distribution was achieved without the enemy
becoming aware of it was due to the elaborate measures taken
for secrecy and for deception. Allenby's plan was the exact
reverse of the Gaza-Beersheba battle of nearly a year before.
Then he struck the Turk's left flank, while persuading them
that he meant to break through on the coast. Now that he
meant to break through on the coast he took every possible
step to make them apprehend a blow at their left flank.
Elaborate precautions were made as if to transfer G.H.Q.
from the camp in the plains to an hotel in Jerusalem, which
was cleared and prepared for it, with telephone lines laid,
offices marked, and so forth. This was backed by rumours of a
great concentration in the Jerusalem area and the marking of
billets. New camps were pitched in the Jordan valley and
additional bridges thrown across the Jordan. Fifteen thousand
dummy horses, made of canvas, filled the horse lines ; and
sleighs drawn by mules raised clouds of dust at the times when
the canvas horses should have been going to water. Battalions
marched ostentatiously down to the valley by day -and returned
by lorries at night. Wireless traffic was continued from Desert
Mounted Corps headquarters near Jericho long after the head-
quarters and nearly all the troops had been transferred to
the other flank. Only the Anzac Division, with a brigade
of Indian infantry and some other battalions, was left in the
valley. It was known as " Chaytor's Force/' from the com-
mander of the Anzac Division. Farther east Lawrence's agents
spread news of the large quantities of forage which would
shortly be required by the British in the Amman district.
Such were some of the measures taken to give enemy observers

1 Three-quarters of these guns were concentrated on a front of seven miles near the
coast.

269

ALLENBY

and enemy agents the impression that another advance east
of Jordan was being prepared.

Meanwhile the concentration on the other flank was made
with the greatest possible secrecy. Only a few senior officers
knew the full details. Troops from the Jordan valley and
Judxan hills were moved by night to the coastal area, where
they were carefully hidden in the orange-groves and olive
woods north of Jaffa. No new tents were pitched. With
great foresight the units normally in reserve had during the
summer been widely dispersed, so that reinforcements could
be introduced without any increase in tentage. Thus a
battalion had been quartered in two half-battalion camps :
when reinforcements arrived a whole battalion occupied each
of these camps, and the force was doubled without any change
being visible from the air. No movement of any kind was
allowed to the troops hidden in the woods and groves during
the hours of daylight. The irrigation channels in the orange-
groves provided means for watering most of the horses
without their having to leave their place of concealment.
Fires were forbidden by day or night. Even the local in-
habitants were unaware of the great concentration. And our
Air Force had gained so complete a mastery over the enemy
that few hostile aeroplanes crossed our lines in September.
That the enemy was unaware of Allenby's schemes was
proved by an Intelligence map captured in the course of the
operations. This was dated September 17, two days before
the assault, and showed no suspicion of any great concentra-
tion on the coast; on the contrary, it indicated an increase of
force in the Jordan valley.

A few days before the date fixed for the great assault
Allenby visited all divisions and explained to the assembled
commanders of units his plan of attack and his confidence of
success. He radiated victory, and undoubtedly inspired those
who heard him. He even alarmed his staff with what appeared
as overweening presumption, when they heard him promise
the cavalry 30,000 prisoners. To a defence-minded battalion
commander who inquired what line he should consolidate

270

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN

the Chief replied abruptly, " Aleppo/* Besides animating all
leaders with hopes of victory, Allenby during these visits
discussed with the senior commanders, especially those of the
cavalry, the probable course of operations and the difficulties
that might arise. Thus they started on their great ride with
full knowledge of his intentions and with the certainty that
the boldest action would have his backing. His outlook had
passed beyond Palestine now, and to his Corps commanders
at least he spoke of an immediate advance to Damascus and
even farther,

The campaign had, in fact, been practically won before a
shot was fired, and Allenby realized it better than anyone.
The patient work of reorganization and training in the
summer, the brilliant conception of the Commander, the
handicraft of an experienced staff, had combined to prepare
one of the most crushing strokes ever delivered in war. The
Turkish armies may have stirred a little uneasily on the
evening of September 18, 1918, with, some sense of an im-
pending offensive, but of its imminence and its weight they had
no conception. 1 Their traditional Ottoman stubbornness and
skill in defence were of no avail to them here. 2 This was to
be no soldiers' battle, but the manoeuvre of a great master
of war.

1 A havildar (sergeant) in an Indian battalion had deserted to the Turks on the
and presumably told what he knew of the attack. But his story apparently won little
credence. Perhaps another * haversack ruse * was suspected.

* The Turkish commanders and staff wished, it is believed, to withdraw to a line
farther north before the battle. But Liman von Sanders" would not agree. The tactical
instinct of the Turks was here better than that of the Germans, as it had been the year
before, when they wished to consolidate the defences of Jerusalem, and von Falkenhayn
insisted on manoeuvre and counter-attack.

271

CHAPTER X

CAVALCADE
(September ly-O \ctober 31, 1918)

MEGIDDO

(September 17-22, 1918)

If thou hast run with the footmen, and they have -wearied thee, then
how canst thou contend with horses ? Jeremiah xii 5

THERE were two curtain-raisers to the great drama on the
coastal plain. The first was played, by the Arabs under
Lawrence, who had concentrated at Azrak, an old outpost of
civilization on the edge of the desert. On September 16 and
17 they cut the line between Deraa and Amman,, between
Deraa and Damascus, and between Deraa and Afule. At the
same time the Air Force raided Deraa, The enemy Com-
mander-in-Chief reacted., as was hoped, by sending there a
part of his scanty reserves. The other preliminary operation
was carried out in the Judasan hills by Chetwode's Twentieth
Corps, now reduced to two divisions only. The mission of
the Corps was to advance on Nablus in step with the Twenty-
first Corps and to prevent the enemy escaping eastward.
Chetwode, who had a practised eye for ground, refused to
take the obvious line of advance astride the Nablus road,
where the enemy expected attack and had a series of strong
positions. He assembled his divisions one at either end of
his twenty-five-miles front, leaving in the centre only a thin
screen of a cavalry regiment and two pioneer battalions. He
intended, when the time came, to make a converging advance
from both flanks, thus keeping to the high ground and turn-
ing the enemy's defences of the main road. The preliminary
operation, carried out on the night of September 17-18, was

272

CAVALCADE

designed to bring his right division across a deep ravine in
readiness for the advance on Nablus; it would also secure
an important water-supply, and would serve to distract the
enemy's attention from the main attack in the plain. It was
successful, after some hard fighting at some points.

Not long after the noise of battle had died down in the hills
the assault of the Twenty-first Corps opened with a great
roar of artillery at 4.30 A.M. on the morning of September 19.
The infantry began their advance at the same moment.
Allenby did not believe in long preliminary bombardments
he put more trust in surprise; the Turkish wire, which was
not strong, could be cut by hand, and it was important to
give the enemy no time to think. Simultaneously with the
opening of the battle the Air Force set forth to bomb the
principal Turkish headquarters. It was successful in com-
pletely interrupting all communication between the Eighth
Army headquarters at Tulkeram and Liman von Sanders at
Nazareth, besides greatly delaying communications with the
Seventh Army. Fighting aeroplanes also patrolled over the
principal enemy aerodromes and prevented their reconnais-
sance machines from leaving the ground. Thus the enemy
Commander-in~Chief remained in almost complete ignorance
of the grave events taking place on his front. The arrival
next morning of a British cavalry brigade at his headquarters
at Nazareth, was his earliest intimation that something really
serious must have happened to his army.

The action of the Twenty-first Corps was exactly that of
men pushing open a wide and heavy door of which the hinges
were in the foothills and the handle by the coast. Rightly,
the greatest leverage was exerted at the handle end; here
was the thickest concentration of troops and guns, and here
were the leading cavalry divisions, ready to pass through the
moment the door was even ajar. By a fortunate conjuncture
the two infantry divisions on the left, through which the
cavalry would pass, were both commanded by generals who
had served with Barrow and Macandrew in the Indian
cavalry. This fact did much to resolve the first critical

ALLENBY

problem, the determination of the earliest moment when the
cavalry could pass through the infantry lines. On other
occasions during the War, in France or elsewhere, the horse-
men in search of the " G in * gap/ " as the term was, had
always come too soon or too late to find either that the
infantry had failed to break a passage, or that the enemy had
recovered and re-formed, and that the fleeting opportunity
had already gone. Now at last, thanks to good staff work
and bold handling, the cavalry went cleanly through almost
on the heels of the assaulting infantry. By 7 A.M. the 5th
Cavalry Division began to move forward along the beach
under shelter of the cliffs ; the 4th Cavalry Division, farther
inland, passed through the old front line a little later, just
before 9 A.M. By 10 A.M. both divisions were well clear of all
obstacles and fairly started on their great ride north. The
skill with which the staff of the Twenty-first Corps had planned
and the determination with which the infantry had assaulted
had given the cavalry their great opportunity.

During their break-through they passed over a battle-
field where an English commander had won a notable victory
more than seven hundred years previously. At the battle of
Arsuf (September 7, 1191) Richard Coeur de Lion, who was a
skilful and prudent general, though a rash and unprofitable
king, had outmanoeuvred and outfought a worthy opponent
in Saladin. Saladin's host had included a considerable force
of Turkish bowmen, while Richard's international force of
Crusaders contained an English contingent of horse and foot.
So that it was not the first time that the ground over which
the cavalry now rode had felt the victorious rush of English
chivalry in pursuit of Turks. The marsh they crossed soon
after the start, the Birket el Ramadan, had been used by
Richard to protect his camp the night before the battle
(malaria probably took a deadly toll of his army in con-
sequence) ; but the forest in which the flying Moslems had
taken shelter from Richard's charge had disappeared long
since.

Once fairly through the trench line the cavalry easily

274

CAVALCADE

brushed away the little opposition they met. Their next
obstacle, the real crisis of the whole operation, was the passage
of the seven-mile belt of hills, the great spur that separates
the Plains of Sharon and Esdraelon and ends in Mount
Carmel above Haifa, The tracks through it are few, narrow,
and easily defensible; if the enemy realized his danger in
time and sent his reserves to hold the passes they might easily
impose such delay as would mar Allenby's great design and
give the Turkish armies an opportunity of escape. The risk
was comparable to the risk Allenby took in his plan for the
Gaza-Beersheba battle, that the enemy might have the time
and foresight to wreck beyond speedy repair all the wells at
Beersheba. All plans in the dubious hazard of war must have
such risks; the great commander is he who has both the
courage to accept them and the skill to minimize them.

The 4th Cavalry Division was to attempt the Musmus
Pass, which debouches at the ancient fortress of Megiddo,
Near here, 2500 years before, Josiah, the best of the kings
of Judah, was slain by an Egyptian arrow while fighting for
Ms Assyrian overlord. A thousand years earlier still Megiddo
had been the scene of a great conflict between Egyptian and
Syrian, when Thotmes III took the same road through the
Musmus Pass, to the consternation of his subordinate com-
manders, who feared to be caught in so narrow a defile. The
King's daring was justified, for he led his force safely through
and won a great victory over his astonished enemy.

Barrow also brought the 4th Cavalry Division through
without a fight, but he had some anxious and dramatic
moments. His leading brigade missed the entrance to the
pass in the darkness, and was leading the rest of the division
astray. Fortunately Barrow himself, who had gone ahead,
discovered the mistake in time to divert the last brigade on to
the right road and to turn the remainder. His action saved
his command from a dangerous situation. As the leading
regiment, the 2nd Lancers of the Indian cavalry, shook itself
clear of the hills early next morning and deployed into the
Plain of Esdraelon it met a Turkish battalion which had been

ALLENBY

sent to hold the pass, and promptly charged it with the lance.
The shock of surprise at meeting cavalry at such an unexpected
time and place was probably too much for the enemy's nerves
and musketry ; the fire was so wild that there was only one
Indian casualty, while some fifty of the Turks were speared
and the remainder surrendered. The fate of this battalion
shows the danger of delays in war. It had received the order
to hold the Musmus defile in plenty of time to reach it before
the 4th Cavalry Division, had it acted promptly. The sluggish-
ness of its commander and the energy of General Barrow had
a considerable effect on the course of the operations.

During September 20 the 4th Cavalry Division continued
its ride along the historic Plain of Esdraelon and down the
Valley of Jezreel to Beisan and the Jordan. It reached the
railway junction and depot at Afule about 8 A.M., almost
simultaneously with a brigade of the 5th Cavalry Division,
which had crossed the Mils farther north. A number of
prisoners and many stores were taken. So complete was the
enemy's surprise that a German aeroplane landed unsuspect-
ingly among the British troops.

Meanwhile another brigade of the 5th Cavalry Division had
tidden across the plain straight for Nazareth, with the object
of capturing Liman von Sanders' headquarters and, if possible,
the enemy Commander-in-Chief himself* It reached Nazareth
at 4.30 A.M., before the enemy had received the slightest
warning of its approach, and while the Commander-in-Chief
was still in bed. But the brigade had been weakened by the
pace of the advance, which it had led throughout, and by
various detachments which it had dropped for escorts to
prisoners and othe'r purposes. Nazareth, built on a steep
hillside, is a difficult town to search or occupy, and the brigade
had no guide or knowledge of the exact position of Liman
von Sanders' house or headquarters. Street fighting broke
out in which the German personnel of the headquarters put up
a stout resistance; and the few squadrons which had reached
the town were eventually withdrawn, as it was believed that
Liman von Sanders had escaped. It was disappointing that

, 276

CAVALCADE

so dramatic a stroke as the capture of the opposing Com-
mander-in-Chief within twenty-four hours of the opening of
the battle should have just failed.

After a few hours 3 rest at Afule Barrow's division resumed
its march down the famous Valley of Jezreel, so full of histofy.
To the north could be clearly seen Mount Tabor, whence the
Israelites had swept down on Sisera's labouring host., bogged
in the valley below; where also the giant Kleber, one of
Napoleon's best generals, had been hard beset by a Syrian
horde, so that Napoleon himself had to hasten up from the
siege of Acre to discomfit his assailants. Near Mount Tabor
are the caves of Endor, where Saul visited the woman with a
familiar spirit and learned his doom; on the other side of the
valley stands out Mount Gilboa, where that doom met him
and his son Jonathan, and inspired one of the world's great
poems. Below Mount Gilboa Gideon's three hundred picked
men made the first night attack of which we have a detailed
account; 1 the lessons it teaches the value of discipline, the
need for personal reconnaissance, the moral effect of surprise
are applicable to any night attack to-day. At the mouth of
the valley stands Jezreel itself (the modern Zirki), a natural
fortress on a low hill rising out of the plain, the scene of one
of the most famous dramas of the Bible. Here was Naboth's
vineyard ; here the watchman saw the avenging Jehu driving
furiously up from the valley of the Jordan; here Ahab's
proud, wicked queen, Jezebel, decked herself to meet her
fate, and met it royally with a shrewd taunt " Had Zimri
peace, who slew his master ? " at the upstart military dic-
tator.

The advanced guard of the 4th Division, riding past all
these memories, occupied Beisan (where Saul's dead body
had hung) by 4.30 P.M.: the whole division was concen-
trated there by 6 P.M. It had covered, according to the official
calculation, seventy miles in thirty-four hours, but the greater
part must have ridden at least seventy-five to eighty miles.
Only twenty-six horses had foundered, a remarkable tribute

1 See Judges vii.

277

ALLENBY

to the horse-mastership and staff work of the division. One
regiment went on during the night another twelve miles to
Jisr el Mejamie, and occupied the railway bridge over the
Jordan.

The Australian Mounted Division, less one brigade which
had been detached to work on the left of the infantry advance,
followed the 4th Cavalry Division through the Musmus Pass
and reached the Plain of Esdraelon about n A.M. on the zoth.
Thence it sent a brigade to Jenin, where it made large captures
of men and stores. It then disposed itself to await the retiring
Turks.

Thus by the evening of September 20, thirty-six hours after
the opening of the battle, the natural avenues of retreat of the
Turkish Seventh and Eighth Armies were in the hands of
the British cavalry. Their only way of escape was eastward
across the Jordan by narrow tracks through difficult country;
and even this passage was being hourly contracted by the
action of the infantry in the hills advancing on Nablus, of
Chaytor's Force in the Jordan valley, and of the 4th Cavalry
Division from Beisan. Only the boldest and most fortunate
escaped the fall of Allenby's net.

While the cavalry were occupying the line of butts the
infantry were steadily driving their prey towards them. The
Twenty-first Corps, after breaking a way for the horsemen on
the morning of the i9th, had swung right-handed on a great
wheel towards the hills ; and by evening Shea's 6oth Division,
on the outside of the wheel except for a brigade of Australian
Light Horse had reached Tulkeram. During the next three
days the destruction of the Seventh and Eighth Armies was
completed. The infantry of the Twentieth and Twenty-first
Corps converged on Nablus, which was occupied on the
evening of the zist. A great part of the Eighth Army had
already been captured or killed by the Twenty-first Corps.
Most of the remainder retired on Jenin by the Plain of Dothan,
and were rounded up by the Australian Mounted Division.
Some small remnants of this Army and the greater part of
the Seventh endeavoured to escape towards the Jordan.

278

CAVALCADE

In the narrow gorge of the Wadi Fara, which leads from
Nablus to Jisr ed Damieh, a long column of guns, troops., and
transport was caught and bombed by the Air Force on the
2 1 st. The head of the transport was soon blocked, and all
movement ceased ; nearly a hundred guns and over a thousand
vehicles were captured here when the infantry came up. The
survivors of the demoralized column scattered in the hills,
where the greater part were rounded up by the cavalry in the
next few days. The Air Force had already wrought even
deadlier, if less spectacular, destruction on the road between
Tulkeram and Nablus.

Those of the enemy who broke eastward to the Jordan
from Nablus had only a narrow and difficult passage to safety,
for the 4th Cavalry Division advanced south from Beisan,
and Chaytor's Force in the valley advanced north on Jisr el
Mejamie. Among the few who had the determination and
skill to escape were the commander of the Seventh Army,
Mustapha Kemal Pasha, the future Ataturk, who was to
regenerate the Turkish nation, 1 and Colonel von Oppen, 2
with the remnants of his German contingent, which main-
tained its formation and discipline in spite tf the rout of its
Turkish allies.

Allenby himself he was not a commander who was con-
tent to await news at his headquarters had been well forward
during the operations. Here, from a regimental history, 3 is a
snapshot of him in the early morning of the i9th, while the
infantry fight was still in progress :

A halt was called, and the battalion stood about in groups, dis-
cussing the stupendous fact that they were standing on what had
been Turkish ground only a brief hour previously. Shortly after-
wards there was a stir among the crowds of men, which parted to
allow the passage of a large open touring car, from the radiator
of which flew a small Union Jack. It was die Commander-in-
Chief, thus early up at the front of affairs, to see for himself how

1 He had taken over command of the Seventh Army in August from Fevsd Pasha,
now Marshal Cakmak, head of the Turkish Army, who had become ill.
8 He died at the end of the retreat at Tarsus.
8 The Kensingtons, p. 367.

ALLENBY

things were going. Those fortunate enough to be close to the
car had a clear view of General Allenby, whose features showed
no sign of the great triumph he was now so close to achieving.
The Commander-in-Chief sat straight upright, looking ahead to
where the puffs of smoke showed where our shells were falling
among the flying Turks.

On the zist, a few hours after the capture of Nablus, Sir
Philip Chetwode, who had gone up to the advanced troops
of his Twentieth Corps, met the Commander-in-Chief in the
town, which he had entered from the west in an armoured
car close behind some mounted troops. He at once ordered
Chetwode to dispatch his Corps cavalry regiment,, however
tired it might be, down the Wadi Fara in pursuit of the Turks.
Next day, the 22nd, Allenby was at the headquarters of the
Desert Mounted Corps at Megiddo. Long distances over
indifferent tracks in heat and dust had no effect on his deter-
mination to see for himself how things were going. He was
out almost every day, and often close behind his advanced
troops. On one day he motored more than two hundred miles,
hardly a mile of which was over a properly made road,
between 5,30 A.M. and 8 P.M. The impressions he thus gained
at first hand of the spirit of his troops and leaders and of the
disorganization of the enemy were invaluable to him in his
planning of the next stage in his great design, the advance to
Damascus and the destruction of the Fourth Turkish Army,
east of Jordan.

DAMASCUS
(September z$-0ttober 5, 1918)

Even before the Megiddo battle Allenby had in his mind a
plan for an immediate advance on Damascus, and had cer-
tainly spoken of it to some of his subordinate commanders,
On the 22nd, when he saw Chauvel at Megiddo, he warned
him to be in readiness for a further advance and, as a first
step, to seize Haifa, Acre, and Tiberias, thus completing the

280

CAVALCADE

conquest of Palestine. Haifa and Acre were occupied on the
23rd, the former after a dashing charge by the i5th Cavalry
Brigade. 1 Its capture enabled stores to be landed, and thereby
eased the supply situation. Tiberias was occupied on the
25th, after the most fiercely contested action of the whole
pursuit. Liman von Sanders, after his escape from Nazareth,
still ignorant of the extent of the disaster that had befallen
his armies, ordered them to occupy a defensive line from
Deraa down the Yarmuk valley to Semakh, at the southern
end of the Sea of Galilee, and thence by Tiberias along the
western side of the lake. These orders were quite incapable of
fulfilment, and, in fact, never even reached the Seventh and
Eighth Armies, which had practically ceased to exist. But
Liman von Sanders himself, as he passed through Semakh,
had done something to organize resistance at that pivot of the
defence, putting a German officer in command and giving him
a number of German machine-gunners to stiffen the garrison.
The brigade of Australian Light Horse that approached the
station and village shortly before dawn on the 25th was,
however, in no mood to be checked by any difficulties or
dangers. As soon as the German machine-guns opened they
formed line and charged unhesitatingly over unknown ground
in the moonlight. Their loss in horses was heavy, but they
reached the buildings, dismounted, and cleared them in
some grim fighting at close range, in which about a hundred
Germans were killed and 350 prisoners taken, mostly Turks.
The Australians had some seventy-five casualties to men and
a hundred to horses. Tiberias was then occupied without
further resistance.

Before dealing with Allenby's plan for the advance to
Damascus it is necessary to describe briefly the situation east
of Jordan. Chaytor's Force, which had been left in the valley

1 This is probably the only recorded charge of cavalry in which men of the Royal
Engineers have ridden. The I5th Field Troop, R.E., happened to be alongside the
Jodhpore Lancers just before the charge, and on the invitation of the Lancers* com-
manding officer armed themselves with lances and swords from casualties and rode in
the charge. Though none of them had ever handled such weapons before they claim to
have killed at least one Turk with the arme blanche.

281

ALLENBY

to face the Fourth Army, consisted of his own Anzac Mounted
Division, an Indian infantry brigade, two battalions of Jews,
and two of West Indians. Its first task after the battle opened
was to advance north up the valley to Jisr ed Damieh, which
was captured on the 22nd. By that time it was obvious that
the Fourth Army was withdrawing from its positions in the
valley, and for the third and last time the Anzac Division
advanced on Es Salt and Amman. Amman was taken on the
evening of the 25th, by which time the Fourth Army was in
full retteat for Damascus, over a hundred miles distant from
Amman. It had, in fact, delayed too long for safety, and its
march to Damascus, with the Arabs hanging on flanks and
rear, was an ordeal that few survived. Chaytor did not join
the pursuit of this doomed force : he remained at Amman
to intercept the Turkish Second Corps, which was withdraw-
ing from Maan and farther south. It surrendered without
fighting, 1

Thus by the z6th, when Allenby held a conference of
Corps commanders at Jenin, all Palestine was his. He had
nearly 50,000 prisoners, the Seventh and Eighth Armies were
reduced to a few small scattered columns, and the Fourth
Army was in hasty retreat. There were estimated to be per-
haps 40,000 Turks either between the British and Damascus
or at Damascus itself. At his conference Allenby announced
briefly that the Desert Mounted Corps would advance forth-
with on Damascus, while the Twenty-first Corps would send
a division along the coast to Beirut, to be followed by another
if necessary. Orders to this effect had already been issued.
Those present at the conference will remember chiefly the
summary fashion in which Allenby disposed of the supply
problem* He turned to his senior administrative officer
present with a question : " And what of the supply situa-
tion ? " " Extremely rocky, sir/' was the discouraging reply.
" Well, you must do your best," said Allenby, and proceeded

1 There was a curious interlude after the surrender, when the Turks and a small
body of Australians to whom they had surrendered combined to keep off a horde of
Arabs who proposed to massacre the Turks.

282

CAVALCADE

to impress on his commanders the need for boldness and rapid
action. He was meticulous in his administrative arrangements
before an operation, but in a pursuit like this was prepared to
drive his troops forward on the shortest of rations. He realized
better than anyone that his most dangerous enemy at the time
was disease rather than the Turk, and that his best weapon was
speed. He knew that malaria, which his protective measures
had so hardly held at bay in the Jordan valley and elsewhere,
was bound to take toll of his troops once they had passed into
the lines of the Turks, who had taken no measures of protec-
tion. He told a senior Medical Officer that the knowledge
that in fourteen days from the opening of the campaign
malaria would begin to sap the strength of his force acted
as a spur to his determination to press forward as rapidly as
possible.

Chauvel ordered the 4th Cavalry Division to move on
Deraa, to intercept the retreat of the Fourth Army if possible ;
if not, to follow it to Damascus by the ancient pilgrims' road.
Meanwhile the Australian Mounted Division, followed by the
5th Cavalry Division, was to take the more direct road north
of Lake Tiberias by Kuneitra. The distance to Damascus by
this route was about a hundred miles, while the 4th Cavalry
Division, which started its march a day earlier, had about
140 miles to cover. All three divisions arrived on the out-
skirts of Damascus on September 30 within a few hours of
each other.

There is no need to relate the advance in any detail. The
leading brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division suffered a tempor-
ary check at Irbid, where it tried to dispose in too contemptu-
ous a fashion of a strong flank-guard from the Fourth Army ;
but the division reached Deraa on the morning of the 28th,
to find it already in the hands of Lawrence and the Ajrabs.
The Arab force from Azrak had cut in on the line of retreat
of the Fourth Army and had captured or killed consider-
able numbers of them; and the villagers were also arming
themselves and revenging many years of oppression. The
4th Cavalry Division now followed on the rear of the

283

ALLENBY

Fourth Army, while the Arabs continued to attack the
flanks. 1

The Australian Mounted Division was considerably de-
layed by a German-Turkish rearguard at the crossing of the
Jordan at Jisr Benat Yakub (" the bridge of the daughters of
Jacob "), and did not reach Kuneitra till the night of the 28th.
After some further fighting against the enemy rearguards the
Australians on the evening of the 3oth cut the road and rail-
way leading by the gorge of the Barada river westwards 2 to
Rayak and Baalbek, causing great havoc in a Turkish column
caught in the gorge. The 5th Cavalry Division had come up
on the right of the Australians, and had gained touch with the
4th Cavalry Division. Thus as darkness fell on September 30
all three divisions were on the outskirts of Damascus, while
within the city Turkish rule had already ceased, and some
parties of Arab irregulars had already entered.

Next day, October i, the city was occupied. A brigade of
Australian Light Horse were the first troops to enter, passing
quickly through it in quest of a Turkish column which had
retired north. Damascus, probably the oldest city of the world,
has never been a fortress or walled town, like Jerusalem. It
is famous for trade rather than for war: though its swords
are renowned, its silks and silver-work are better known. It
has never stood a siege, and has usually fallen as a prize to
the victor of some battle fought at a distance. And now its
significance was political rather than military. To the horse-
men of the Desert Mounted Corps it marked a stage in the
pursuit of a beaten foe and towards the ending of a long war ;

1 Lawrence's relation, in Seven Millars of Wisdom, of his meetings and conversations
with General Barrow at Deraa and elsewhere is inaccurate, and his whole account of
these days is tendentious and quite unfair to the 4th Cavalry Division. Sir Hubert
Young in The Independent Arab gives the following picture of the occupation of Deraa :

** We reached Deraa at about ten o'clock, to find General Barrow installed in the
railway station, Sherif Nasir and Lawrence in the town, and a certain liveliness between
the Allied forces. The General had entered Deraa to find it in an appalling state owing
to the excesses of the Bedouin. Until the Sherifian detachment arrived there was no
sign of any organized Arab force, and he naturally hesitated to leave at the mercy of
what he regarded as a pack of ragamuffins a town which had been evacuated by the
Turks as a result of his own advance."

2 The Abana of the Bible,

284

CAVALCADE

to the Arabs and to their leader, Feisal, it was the goal of all
the national hopes, the former capital of the great Arabian
empire that had once stretched from India to the Atlantic.
After many years of foreign rule they dreamed again of
independence and empire, but across their ambitions lay the
shadow of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which gave special
rights to the French in Syria and to the British in Palestine.
Its terms had been published in Russia after the Revolution,
and had been communicated to Feisal by the Turks in the
hope of detaching him from the Allied cause. Hence the Arab
anxiety to stake a claim on Damascus and Syria by right of
conquest, and to show themselves capable of setting up an
administration.

Lawrence worked feverishly to aid the Arabs. He was in a
difficult position for his high-minded but self-conscious nature.
In loyalty to his country and to Allenby he had used all means
and arguments to induce the Arabs to fight on our side, and
had encouraged them to believe that the imperialistic designs
of Britain and France did not exist, or would be set aside, if
they showed their ability as a nation to unite and to rule.
His self-consciousness exaggerated to himself his betrayal *
of the Arabs ; and he was eager to do all he could to help
them to stake a claim for independence. His forwardness in
the Arab cause and his assumption of authority, though his
official position was only that of AUenby's representative
with Feisal, puzzled and troubled Chauvel, the military com-
mander, who was not prepared to deal with delicate political
problems. 1

On October 3 Allenby visited Damascus, and sent at once
for Feisal, who was preparing to make a triumphal entry into
the city. The two men now met for the first time. They
were a striking contrast the burly, confident Englishman,
accustomed to command and to dominate by sheer force of
personality, and the slight, ascetic Arab with his princely
bearing, to whom the arts of the politician were more natural

1 Lawrence's story of the events in Damascus after the entry and of his dealings
with Chauvel is not the whole truth, and is unjust to Chauvel.

ALLENBY

than the vigour of a soldier. 1 Both were men of fine quality,
and appreciated and trusted each other. After greetings
Allenby explained to Feisal that France was to be the protecting
Power in Syria, but that Feisal, as representative of his father,
King Hussein, could set up a military administration of the
occupied enemy territory east of the Jordan, from Akaba to
Damascus. The Lebanon was to be under direct French
administration, and Feisal would have a French officer attached
to him to represent French advice and guidance. It was, in
fact, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which the French Govern-
ment was demanding should be observed. Feisal protested
strongly, but Allenby insisted on his orders being obeyed,
and that Feisal must accept the situation till the peace settle-
ment.

After Feisal had left Lawrence said that he could not consent
to work with a French officer and asked for leave, which was
granted. He left Damascus next day. Into the last year he
had crowded the effort, mental and physical, of several years
for any ordinary man ; small wonder if he was overstrained
in mind and body. He was later to fight for the Arabs at the
council table as vigorously as he had led them in the desert.
His name will always be connected with the Arab campaign,
in which his achievements were as remarkable as his character.
It is a tribute to the greatness of Allenby that Lawrence, who
was no respecter of persons because they held high rank or
place, always gave him implicit obedience. He wrote of him
in Seven Pillars, " Allenby never questioned our fulfilling what
was ordered. Power lay in his calm assumption that he would
receive as perfect obedience as he gave trust." Lawrence had
great courage, versatility, and quickness of mind, but Allenby
was unquestionably the stronger and greater character of the
two outstanding figures in this campaign. Lawrence wrote of
Allenby and himself later as " lion and mouse friends."

1 AUenby wrote to his wife, ** You would like Feisal. He is a keen, sHm, highly
strung man. He has beautiful hands like a woman's, and his fingers are always moving
nervously when he talks. But he is strong in will and straight in principle.**

286

CAVALCADE

III

ALEPPO
(October 5-31, 1918)

When the Desert Mounted Corps left the Plain of Esdraelon
to advance on Damascus there had been some 40,000 Turks
between it and its goal. Of these one-half were now prisoners,
and several thousands had been killed. Less than 17,000
weary, dispirited, disorganized enemy troops had escaped
from Damascus ; and of them only 4000 were believed to be
effective rifles. The enemy had no guns and little transport,
and could obviously offer only slight resistance to a farther
advance. The obstacles to the occupation of the rest of Syria
were now distance, supply, and disease. The last was the
most serious. As AUenby had foreseen, the admissions to
hospital from malaria began to rise at an alarming rate just
a fortnight after the first break-through, a few days after
Damascus had been won. To malaria was added the epidemic
of influenza (the * Spanish 'flu/ as it was called) that swept the
whole world at this time, and was in its total casualty list
almost as deadly as the War. All units were soon much
reduced in strength. The 4th Cavalry Division and Australian
Mounted Division, who had had the harder work and longer
spells of the Jordan valley, suffered worse than the 5th Cavalry
Division.

The War Cabinet had urged on Allenby an immediate
cavalry raid on Aleppo after the fall of Damascus. He wisely
preferred to proceed more methodically, by stages; and he
ordered as the first stage an advance to the line Rayak-Beirut.
The 5th Cavalry Division left Damascus on October 5, and
occupied the railway junction of Rayak next day, picking up a
number of Turkish stragglers and finding some abandoned
stores and rolling stock. The 4th Cavalry Division followed
a day behind; the Australian Division was left to guard
Damascus.

Meanwhile the 7th Indian Division of Bulfin's Twenty-first

287

ALLENBY

Corps had left Haifa on October 3, and was marching up
the coast by Tyre and Sidon to Beirut, which it reached on
October 8. French warships had forestalled it by sea and
Arab irregulars by land. These latter, sent by Feisal to
support Arab claims to the Lebanon, were with some diffi-
culty persuaded to withdraw in favour of a French military
administration.

Horns-Tripoli was the next stage, reached in the middle of
October by the 5th Cavalry Division inland, and a brigade of
the yth Indian Division on the coast. There had been no fight-
ing since Damascus. In fact, this advance northward seemed
rather an anticlimax like walking up a few rabbits after two
drives in which the birds had come high and fast. But it was
not really as simple or safe as it seemed: Damascus was 150
miles from the depots on which the original operation had
been based, and Aleppo was 200 miles from Damascus. The
Turks might well make a determined last stand there. The
gallant von Oppen,' who had kept his Germans together
throughout the retreat, had died of cholera ; but there were
two of the best Turkish commanders, Mustapha Kemal, of
the Seventh Army, and Jemal Pasha, of the Fourth, still with
the Turkish remnant, and the Turk at his most miserable can
put up a stout fight. Even Allenby, when he learned that the
4th Cavalry Division, which was to have followed the 5th,
was completely immobilized by sickness, hesitated for a
moment to send on the 5th Division, also considerably
reduced, without support. But its commander, Macandrew, 1
was a forcible and confident soldier, and telegraphed that he
had no doubts of his ability to occupy Aleppo. He was
allowed to proceed, and justified his boldness by seizing
Aleppo, with the effective aid of a column of FeisaTs Arabs,
in face of a very considerably superior Turkish force, which
had been rallied and reorganized by no less a leader than
Mustapha Kemal Pasha, who was later to rally and reorganize
all Turkey.

The last engagement of the campaign was fought at Haritan,

1 Macandrew died at Aleppo in July 1919 as the result of an accident.

288

CAVALCADE

some eight miles north-west of Aleppo, on October 26, when
a strong Turkish column was charged by two weak regiments
of the 1 5th Cavalry Brigade. After an initial success the
brigade was compelled to withdraw, greatly outnumbered;
the Turks also withdrew, shaken by the boldness of the
attack. A few days later, on October 31, the armistice with
Turkey was announced.

In less than six weeks Allenby's army had captured 75,000
prisoners and 360 guns, and had moved its front forward 350
miles. Its own casualty list had been little over 5000. The
most advanced troops, the 5th Cavalry Division, had actually
covered some 550 miles in the thirty-eight days from the
breaking of the line to the occupation of Aleppo. The
greatest exploit in history of horsed cavalry, and possibly
their last success on a large scale, had ended within a short
distance of the battlefield of Issus (333 B.C.), where Alexander
the Great first showed how battles could be won by bold
and well-handled horsemen. It had taken just four years to
conclude the war with Turkey; it took nearly five more to
conclude peace. Which proves the staying-power of the pen
over the sword.

289

EPILOGUE
ALLENBY THE GENERAL

ALTHOUGH Allenby was to give another eight strenuous
years to the service of his country, and, as Field-Marshal., to
remain on the active list to the end of his life, his career as a
commander of troops in the field virtually ended when the
armistice with Turkey was concluded. Therefore this seems
the appropriate place to attempt some estimate of his general-
ship and of his place on the roll of great British soldiers. He
would have claimed no such place for himself, not because
of any conscious modesty, but simply because he would not
have thought it worth while for anyone to spend time in dis-
cussing his merits or demerits. What he had been given to
do he had done to the best of his ability ; the results, good
and bad, were there for the world to see and judge.

Allenby had been successful. Whether his successes were
due to fortune, to the work of his staff, to the fighting qualities
of his troops, to the weakness of the enemy, or to his own
skill, let anyone decide for himself. He would do nothing,
by speech or writing, to influence the verdict, except to give
most generous tribute to all those who had helped him.
What mattered now was the next job of work, not discussion
of the last. If Allenby had been a bridge-player he would
have permitted no post-mortems \ he would simply have re-
corded the score with a word of praise or condolence to
his partner and would have concentrated on the next deal. 1
And when all work was done it was surely better to spend one's
last years in the study of living birds and beasts and flowers
and in visiting new corners of the earth than in discussing
old, dead events that had passed beyond recall, for good or

1 On drafts of the Official History submitted to him, for instance, he made few com-
ments, unless to emphasize the skill or coolness of one of his subordinates.

ALLENBY

for evil. " Once you have taken a decision, never look back
on it/' was one of Allenby's favourite maxims. Few have
had the strength of mind to act on it as wholly as he did.

Not many generals, certainly few modern generals, can
have had Allenby's experience as a commander in the field and
on the training ground. On active service he had commanded
a troop in Zululand and Bechuanaland; a squadron, a regi-
ment, a column (the equivalent of a brigade), in the South
African War; a division, a Corps, an Army, and finally an
independent Expeditionary Force in the Great War. In
peace he had led and trained a troop, a squadron, a regiment,
a brigade, a division not for a season or so, in the intervals
of staff employment, but each for several years. In addition
to all this practicaLexperience, he had studied the theory of his
profession seriously; he had passed the course of the Staff
College, and had held a staff appointment most efficiently.
It would be difficult for any critic to find fault with his pro-
fessional equipment for command.

He was, however, no narrow-minded specialist; he had an
unusual range of interests and knowledge outside his pro-
fession. And what he knew, military or secular, he knew
thoroughly; there was nothing superficial about Allenby's
store of information, as many a shallow conversationalist or
plausible commanding officer found to his cost. Also he had
travelled widely, and had used eyes, ears, and tongue with
understanding,

In all professions, and especially in the military, character
is of greater importance than brains or experience. Allenby's
character can surely be judged adequate to the most searching
calls that the testing profession of arms could make. He had
absolute courage, physical and moral a courage so complete
that he seemed almost unaware that such a quality existed;
he acted quickly and coolly in danger, not because danger
excited him to action, but because there was work to be done
at once. His loyalty to his superiors went beyond deeds ; he
would brook no word of criticism of their orders or decisions.
He had an even rarer quality, possibly that of trusting his

294

EPILOGUE

own subordinates. Courage, loyalty, trust, straightforward-
ness all these were Allenby's ; and these are surely the prime
qualities required of one in whose keeping the welfare, the
honour, and the lives of many men are placed.

What, then, was wanting in Allenby that his greatness was
so reluctantly admitted by some, that he was so unpopular a
figure for a great part of his military career ? He lacked a
measure of self-control, a little humanity, the power to com-
municate enthusiasm and to inspire disciples. His sudden
explosions of temper, his occasional almost childish petulance,
did his reputation the more harm since he never troubled to
correct the impression they created. Only those who stood
near to him and saw him daily knew how little they represented
the true nature of the man. Allenby never quite realized that
men are governed through the emotions rather than through
the intelligence. There was an aloofness about him, a sug-
gestion of mental superiority, that kept him from the hearts
of his officers and men perhaps designedly, for any show
of affection would have embarrassed him greatly. He lacked
the spur of ambition ; duty was the mainspring that drove him,
and duty is a less powerful motive of action than ambition
for a career or zeal for a cause.

As a general in high command he used surprise and
mobility as his main weapons for the discomfiture of his
adversaries; these, and relentless vigour in pursuit, are the
principal lessons that students of his campaigns will note.
They may mark also his willingness to take chances, though
doing all in his power to minimize them. Allenby was no
reckless gambler ; he calculated the odds carefully, but when
they were in his favour and the gain was great he accepted
risks cheerfully. The soft modern doctrine of c Safety first/
which so often marks the decline of businesses, of govern-
ments, of armies, and of nations, found no place in Allenby's
creed. His skill in planning and in deceiving his enemy was not
the result of sudden flashes of inspiration, but of much reading
and study of past campaigns and of present conditions. His
mind did not work very swiftly, except in action, but surely.

295

ALLENBY

A less obvious quality, but one that was the teal foundation
of his successes, was the care for administration, which has
been emphasized in the course of the narrative. Administra-
tion is not a showy quality, and is apt to receive scant attention
in the writing of military histories. " Where do you read
that Sir Tristram weighed out hay and corn, that Sir Lancelot
distributed billets, or that any knight of the Round Table
condescended to higgle about a truss of straw ? " scornfully
cries a character in one of Scott's novels. But if these knights
had indeed not troubled to supervise such details of interior
economy, be sure that their enterprises would have mis-
carried. Allenby made no such mistake ; he never interfered
in details, but he insisted on being satisfied at all times that
every possible preparation had been made for the supply of
food and munitions and stores, for the health of his troops,
and for the care of the sick and wounded. The exception
was in pursuit; then he was prepared to disregard the warn-
ings of his supply officers and to call on his troops to live hard
and fight hard, so that the enemy should be given no oppor-
tunity to live and fight again.

His method of command was a more personal one than
that of most commanders of great armies modern armies,
that is. Once he knew and trusted his staff he spent as little
time as possible in the office and as much time as possible with
his army by no means always with the forward troops, but
also in visiting bases, hospitals, workshops, training camps,
and all establishments by which the army lived, moved, and
had its being. His physique and appearance stood him in
good stead. He could endure continual long journeys over
dusty, bumpy tracks, often in great heat, without the least
apparent fatigue; and his bearing left an ineffaceable im-
pression on the minds of his troops. No soldier who had seen
Allenby and practically all his soldiers did see Allenby
could have any doubt that he was being commanded, or that
operations would not fail from lack of vigour and decision in
high places.

His ideas on discipline were simple : an order was an order,

296

EPILOGUE

a regulation was a regulation, to be obeyed without question,
at all times, and in all circumstances. His strict enforcement
of certain orders, such as the keeping of chin-straps down and
the wearing of steel helmets, and of certain prohibitions for
example, against riding in cut-shorts or tying horses to trees
has been the cause of many of the stories told of him, and has
left in the minds of some an impression of a senseless martinet
who delighted in petty details of dress and discipline. This is
not the truth: the orders he insisted on had all a reason of
good common sense; he relaxed or cancelled many restric-
tions that seemed to him unnecessary, and never troubled
about small idiosyncrasies of dress or routine. What Allenby
would never consent to do was to turn a blind eye to infringe-
ment of orders, or to make any allowance for circumstances.
Hence his rating of half-dazed men who had been fighting
for hours because their chin-straps were not down, his ban on
cut-shorts even in the tropical heat of the Jordan valley, his
explosion of anger because he found a corpse in the trenches
wearing a cap instead of a steel helmet.

His critics overlook, or do not realize, how seldom Allenby
punished, except with his tongue. When he commanded a
regiment some of his officers thought him unduly lenient; as
a higher commander, when he reviewed the sentences of
courts-martial or other matters of discipline, he always took
the greatest pains to understand any case brought before
him, and was on the side of mercy whenever possible. 1 With
officers, even senior officers, he was often harsh in words and
manner, sometimes in the presence of their juniors; this
was resented by many. But with Allenby duty came first and
personal feelings (his own or anyone else's) much later. " I
do not care if I am fair or unfair to anyone, if I think they do
not do their work/' he once said to one of his staff. At the
same time he gave every one a chance ; and if he was doing his
best he seldom removed him from his post, even though his

1 A senior staff officer said of him, " He was the most just man I have ever served.
In the matter of courts-martial, courts of inquiry, reports on inefficient officers, and so
forth he took the greatest pains to ensure that justice was done, and that no question
of bias or prejudice was allowed to intrude."

297

ALLENBY

best was not very good. Allenby preferred to be served by
an honest mediocrity whom he could trust than by one of
better capacity of whose honesty and loyalty he was not sure.

Allenby was a purist, sometimes almost a pedant, in the
use of the English language. His style, both official and collo-
quial, was simple and severe ; good, plain, homespun English,
purged of all superfluous adjectives or adverbs, all neologisms,
colloquialisms, or idiosyncrasies. Once his standard was
known it was easy enough to draft a document for him ; but
officers new to his ways sometimes met rude rebuffs when
they first produced work for him. Such a modernism as
* dump * would be removed with a caustic reproof from any
official document submitted to him; if he met it verbally he
might affect to be ignorant of its meaning. A split infinitive
would be duly castigated, even though it were in a telegram
which had to be enciphered, deciphered, and paraphrased
before it reached its destination, in the course of which process
the infinitive might be unsplit and resplit without the sender
having any control over the matter.

After the Battle of Beersheba and the capture of Gaza the
War Office, feeling that the brief record of these successes
sent by Allenby would not satisfy the thirst of the public for
news, cabled for a fuller account of Allenby *s victories. An
officer of the Intelligence Staff, realizing what was wanted,
wrote a long telegram, rather in the style of an imaginative
war correspondent presented with a ' scoop/ When it was
placed before Allenby he exploded in wrath at the idea that
such florid journalese might be sent in his name. His criticism
having reduced the unfortunate author to a state of collapse,
Allenby himself dictated a stately account of the operations,
in which there was hardly an adjective, and certainly nothing
to satisfy any public demand for picturesque detail.

If the foregoing is a fair summary of Allenby's military
qualities and manners, what of the results they produced in
the Great War ? Some have gained the impression that he
was a failure in France who surprisingly became a success in

EPILOGUE

Palestine, either because the conditions were easier or because
he was better suited by independent command. It was as
though a forward taken out of the scrum and put at wing
three-quarter had showed an unexpected turn of speed and
scored several brilliant tries. But the player must have had
pace and cunning all the time; and a crossing of the Mediter-
ranean cannot have turned Allenby from a bad general into
a good one. His alleged failure in the close-locked, muddy
scrum in France needs further examination. In truth his
record there was at least as good as that of any other British
commander. In the hurly-burly of the Retreat from Mons
and in the sudden rebound to the Aisne he kept his head as
well as any, and better than some; the Cavalry Division may
have done nothing very spectacular, but it covered the flanks
of the army and kept a far more numerous force of enemy
horsemen at a safe distance. In the First Battle of Ypres the
Cavalry Corps under Allenby, in holding at bay so greatly
superior a mass of enemy infantry, performed a feat of defence
unrivalled in history by any other cavalry; and the chief
credit was undoubtedly due to the composure, personal
example, and iron resolution of its leader.

His handling of his next command, the Fifth Corps, has
been much criticized. He is said to have been wasteful of
life in making attacks or counter-attacks in conditions where
there was little or no chance of success. Allenby, it should
be noted, took over the Corps at the crisis of the Second Battle
of Ypres, when fighting had been in progress for some time,
much ground had already been lost, and it seemed doubtful
whether Ypres itself could be held. He had no opportunity of
getting to know the ground or the troops before his Corps
had to withstand renewed heavy attacks. And he had orders
to maintain his position at all costs. In this he was successful,
and the Corps lost little ground in the closing stages of the
battle. In the circumstances Allenby was bound to act as he
did, and his firmness may have saved Ypres. But his harsh
manner gave the unfortunate impression of a rough, obstinate
commander who could only charge blindly forward.

299

ALLENBY

His command of the Third Army showed that he was not
careless of men's lives. In the ordinary day-to-day holding of
the line its proportion of casualties was much lower than in
the other Armies this may have been partly due to better
trenches and Allenby ordered far fewer of the trench raids
that were often the cause of needless losses and of costly
retaliation. But again his roughness and outbursts of temper
were the criterion by which the Army judged him. For the
Arras battle, his one great opportunity in France, he has had
less credit than he deserved. April 9, 1917, was the most
successful day's fighting the British forces in France had yet
had in two and a half years* warfare. Its success has been
obscured by the subsequent slow progress and heavy losses.
So far as Allenby himself is concerned, these later attacks
were made on the plans- of G.H.Q.; and the tired troops of
the Third Army were never relieved by fresh divisions^ as was
done in the great battles of the Somme or Passchendaele. The
last big attack of the Arras battle, an almost complete failure,
was ordered to begin in the dark to suit the ideas of another
Army commander and in spite of Allenby's protests.

While Allenby's reputation with the regimental officer and
soldier was too much coloured by the sight and sound of a
loud and angry man, the opinion of the higher staffs was
influenced by his comparative silence and ineffectiveness at
the periodical conferences of Army commanders. At these
Allenby did not make the impression that his abilities
warranted. He was not a ready debater; his mind, like a
battleship, was powerful and weighty, but required space and
time to turn or manoeuvre. 1 Haig and he were never congenial
and always inclined to be tongue-tied in each other's presence.

Thus Allenby, unlike a prophet, had little honour in France
save in his own circle, the circle of those who worked closely
with him. These all recognized both his abilities and his true
character, but their testimony had no more weight to leaven
the general opinion of the Army as a whole than an article in

1 T. E. Lawrence once said of Allenby, " His mind is like the prow of the Mauretania.
There is so much weight behind it that it does not need to be sharp like a razor."

3OO

EPILOGUE

a staid monthly magazine is likely to change the views formed
by the general public from the popular daily papers. Allenby
had a * bad Press * when he was in France, and his reputation
suffered accordingly. If his actual record of achievement is
studied it will challenge comparison with that of any of his
contemporaries.

There is no need to recapitulate his triumphs in Palestine.
The manner in which they were accomplished surely gives
reason for him to be regarded as the best British general
of the Great War. He had more of the divine spark than the
single-minded Haig, with equal resolution and courage; a
greater driving-power, though less humanity, than Plumer;
more force than Rawlinson and an equal shrewdness; a
broader outlook than Maude; more experience of command
than Robertson; a greater stability than the volatile Henry
Wilson. He was of the same type as Wellington,, with whom
he had many points of resemblance, in his common-sense
realism, in his flair for concealing his intentions and sur-
prising his enemy, in his appreciation of the value of good
administration, in his lack of the human touch.

Should Allenby be placed in the first rank of British com-
manders that small, select band headed by Marlborough,
whose genius for war challenges comparison with that of
Napoleon or any of the world's great captains ? Certainly he
has not many superiors. He may have lacked something of
the passion and creative energy of Cromwell, of the cold
application of Wellington, of the fiery energy of Wolfe, of
the warm humanity of Moore, of the organizing ability of
Kitchener. But the British .Army has had few leaders with
better mental or physical equipment for the rough test of war,
less likely to lose heart in the darkest hour, or more remorse-
less in pressing home an advantage and completing a victory;
certainly none with a greater sense of loyalty and duty or
more of the truth and straightforwardness that mark a great
and generous nature.

301

INDEX

ABEELE, Allenby *s headquarters at, 159,
169

Abu Shusheh, 221

Acre, 265, 280, 281

Adams, , crammer, 3 5-36

Afule, 268, 272, 276, 277

Air Force, Royal, 210, 270, 273, 279

Aisne, river, 143-145, 146, 147, 299;
battle, 143-145

Akaba, base for Arab revolt, 246, 286

Aleppo, Turkish conference at, 186, 206
207; plans for advance to, 232, 239,
240-241, 271, 287; capture of, 288
289

Alexander of Macedon (the Great), 127,
289

Alexander of Teck, Prince (afterwards
Earl of Athlone), 77-78, 84-85, 90

Alexandria, bombardment of, 45 ; Allen-
by's arrival at, 187

Allenby, origin of name, 23

Allenby, A. H., brother, 27 .

Allenby, Field-Marshal Viscount :

Career. Family origin, 17, 23-25; birth,
26; Christian names, 26; childhood,
27-30; schooldays, 30-34; takes exami-
nation for Indian Civil Service, 34-35 ;
at Royal Military College, Sandhurst,
35-38; gazetted to 6th Inniskilling
Dragoons, 38; private income, 39, 42,
117; joins regiment in South Africa,
42; acquaintance with Cecil Rhodes,
45, 51, 85 ; on active service in Zulu-
land, 4748, 57, 294; on active service
in Bechuanaknd, 48, 50-51, 57, 294;
tour of duty at cavalry depot, 52;
Adjutant to the regiment, 54-59 ; enters
Staff College, 60 ; at Staff College, 61-64 ;
Master of Staff College Draghounds,
63; wins Staff College point-to-point,
63; marriage, 64; birth of son, 65;
Brigade-Major to the 3rd Cavalry
Brigade, 65, 66; voyage to South
Africa, 69-71; joins cavalry at Coles-
berg, 71 ; operation against Colesberg
bridge, 76; with Cavalry Division at
Modder river, 80, 82; takes part in

French's ride to Kimberley, 82, 83;
at Cronje's surrender, 86; at Poplar
Grove, 87 ; at Driefontein, 87 ; at capture
of Bloemfontein, 87; in command of
Inniskillings, 90-101 ; releases prisoners
at Waterval, 94; at Battle of Diamond
Hill, 95 ; in advance to Barberton,
97; commands a column, 101-109;
promotion to Brevet Colonel, 109;
receives testimonial of Royal Humane
Society, 112; commander of the 4th
Cavalry Brigade, 113-116; promoted
Major-General, 116; Inspector-General
of Cavalry, 1 17-122 ; commands Cavalry
Division in France, 129-144; at Battle
of Mons, 132; at Battle of Le Cateau,
138-139 ; in advance to the Aisne, 142-
144; commands Cavalry Corps, 146; at
Battle of Ypres, 146148; commands
Fifth Corps, 1 5 i-i 5 8 ; at Second Battle of
Ypres, 153-155; commands Third Army,
158, 160185; prepares Arras battles,
171-179; Battles of Arras, 180-181,
1821 8 3 ; appointed to command E.E.F.,
185; takes over command at Cairo,
187-188; moves G.H.Q. from Cairo
to front, 190, 197; prepares attack
on Ga2a-Beersheba, 201-206; capture
of Beersheba, 210-212; pursuit in
Philistia, 217223; capture of Jerusa-
lem, 224-233; entry, into Jerusalem,
230 ; Trans- Jordan operations, 24525 5 ;
plans Megiddo operations, 267-270;
Battles of Megiddo, 272280; pursuit
to Damascus, 280-285; meeting with
Feisal at Damascus, 285, 286; capture
of Aleppo, 288-289; estimate of, as
general, 293-301

Military Qualities. Administration,
care for, 168, 174, 193-195, 198, 202,
226, 261, 283, 296; Army reorganiza-
tion, views on, 87, 96 ; 'chin-straps* fad,
119-120, 141, 166, 167, 297; com-
manders, treatment of, 121, 200, 297;
confidence inspired by him, 99, 149,
190; coolness in action, 71, 92, 93, 99,
113, 140-141, 144-145, 148, 149, 216;

303

ALLENBY

courage, 59,77* *i> i", 140-141* *44,
196, 294; duty, sense of, 17; foresight,
144, 244-245 ; generosity to enemies,
79 #., 94, 149; generosity to sub-
otdinates, 19, in, 122, 158 .; justice,
32, 297; loyalty to superiors, in,
122, 158 ., 170, 231, 241, 294, 301;
machine-guns, belief in, 117 .; medical
care of Army, 194-195, 203, 255-256,
283, 296; military history, study of,
222, 296; prudence, 76, 89, 100, 103;
pursuit, vigour in, 218, 226, 282-
283, 295; Regulations, insistence on,
65,111, 297 ; rudeness to senior officers,
121; secrecy, measures to obtain, 202,
205, 208, 210, 269 ; soldiers, considera-
tion for, 55, 1 68; tactical skill, 84, 90,
95, 98, 99-100, 103, 112; trust in sub-
ordinates, 100, iio-in, 203, 217, 237,
295; unpopularity, 119-120, 121-122,
129, 295 ; war, dislike of, 78, 106, 108

Characteristics, General. Ambition,
lack of, 17, 1 8, 103, 295; animals,
knowledge of, 101, 116, 159, 169, 192;
architecture, interest in, 18, 235;
Biblical history, knowledge of, 223,
236; birds, knowledge and love of, 55,
77, 100, 116, 150, 159, 169, 192, 199-
200; character, general, 32, 33, 38, 39,
54, 55, 62, 100, 113, 121-122, 159-160,
178-179, 190, 195, 233, 270, 285, 286,
293-301 ^ character, judgment of, 54,
55; children, love of, 19, 71, 150, 159,

168, 169, 185, 192; common sense, 193,
237, 297 ; country life, love of, 30, 3 3,
39, 65, 115, 117; courage, 39, 77, 101,
122, 140, 141, 144, 196, 294; criticism,
disregard of, 15, 158 ., 162 ; endurance,
62, 103, 122, 233, 296; energy, 197-198,
216, 233, 296; flowers, knowledge and
love of, 34, 107-108, 116, 149, 159,

169, 192 ; French, knowledge of, 39 .,
60 n. ; German, knowledge of, 65 ;
Greek, knowledge of, 35, 195 .;
grudge never borne by him, 15, 19,
115, 187, 258; host, qualities as, 195;
humour, sense of, 33, 54, 100, in, 120,
142, 167, 195; kindliness, 17, 33, 101,
113, 115; knowledge, wide range of,
18, 62, 100, 113, 164, 195 ., 294; letters
of, 70-71, 78-79, 89, 95, 99, 102, 104,
106, 107-108, 141, 149, 192, 199-200,
231-232 ; literary style, 78, 192-193, 298 ;
loyalty, 17, 36, 59, 65 ; manner, abrupt,

18, in, 121, 122, 123, 165, 169, 178, 188*
299 ; memory, 17 ; modesty, 32, 160, 293 ;
obstinacy, reputation for, 156, 158, 183,
299; personality, effect of, 18, 101, 190;
punishment, hatred of, in, 297;
reading, wide, 33, 54, 194-195, 222-223 ;
religion, attitude to, 62 ; repartee, power
of, in, 121 ; shyness, 63, 114, 123,
300; temper, violent, 19, 62, 113, 114,

115, 166, 198-199, 257-258, 295, 300;
thoroughness, 38-39, 53, 54, 119, 120,
167; travel, love of foreign, 18, 37, 64,

116, 293

Characteristics, Physical. Appearance,
18, 31, 53, ioi,jti3, 279-280, 285, 296;
boomerang, skill with, 116; drawing,
talent for, 37-38, 55 ; fishing, love of , 18,
65, 112, 115; football-player, 33, 35;
games, lack of interest in, 33,35; health,
26, 39, 99, 106, 116, 169; horsemanship,
33> 34, 39, 46, 63, 101, 119; hunting,
46, 52, 58, 64, 65, 115 ; nicknames con-
nected with, 18, 53, 56, 105 ., 158;
"the Bull," 18, 113, 123, 158, 166, 169,
183, 198, 257; polo-player, 46, 53, 56,
58, 115; races ponies, 53, 58-59;
riding accidents, 52-53, 56; shooting,
30, 33, 39, 115 ; smoking, giving up of,
116; strength, 258; swimmer, strong,
39, 112-113

AEenby, Viscountess, marriage, 64; char-
acter, 64, 196-197 ; letters to, 70-71, 78-
79> 8 9 95> 99> IO 4> *6, 107-108, 141,
149, 192, 199-200, 231-232; goes to
South Africa, 106; arrival in Egypt,
196

Allenby, Captain F. C. H. (Claude),
brother, 27 n., 45

Allenby, Henry Hynman, uncle, 25

Allenby, Hynman, father, 25, 26, 27-28,
38, 39; death of, 27, 34

Allenby, Mrs, mother, 25, 26, 27, 38,
39 .

Allenby, Hinman Raddish, grandfather,
25

Allenby, Michael, son, 79; birth of, 65;
home life of, 115-116; service in
France, 170-171 ; death of, 196

Allenby, Thomas, 24

Amery, Right Hon. L. $., 241

Amman, 245, 246, 248, 252, 255, 265, 269,
272 ; plan to cut railway at, 241 ; H.Q.
of the Fourth Turkish Army, 267 ; cap-
ture of, 282

304

INDEX

Andrew, Canon Henry, 26 #,, 37

Angelo, M, Kenneth, 58, 64

Anzac Mounted Division, 1893 246, 253,

257, 259, 269, 282
Armies:

First, 161, 172, 174, 1 80, 182
Second, 109, 161

Third, commanded by Allenby, 160;
on the Somme, 160; composition of,

1 60, 161; moves northward, 161; line
held by, 163 ; in the Battles of Arras,

171, 174-183, 300

Fourth, 109, 160, 161, 162, 163, 171,

172, 173, 175

Fifth, 109, 162, 171, 172, 173, 175,
182, 183 ; relieved by Third, 184
Army, British, 40, 41, 67, 87, no
Arras, 165, 178; Battles of, 16, 160,

161, 166, 171, 182, 185, 186, 216 232,
300

Arsuf, Battle of, 274

Ashbocking, vicarage of, 31, 32

Ataturk see Kemal, Mustapha

Athlone, Earl ofsee Alexander of Teck,
Prince

Aubers Ridge, Battle of, 156, 158

Auja, river, 222, 224; crossed by the 52nd
Division, 232

Auja, stream, 244

Australian Light Horse, 189, 211, 259,
281, 284

Australian Mounted Division, 252, 253,
257, 263, 278, 283, 284, 287; composi-
tion of, 189; checks Seventh Turkish
Army's advance, 221 ; includes sword in
equipment, 259

Australian Official History, quotation
from, 190

Australian troops, 82 ., 257, 282 n. See
also above and New South Wales Lancers

Azrak, 272, 283

BADEN - POWELL, LIEUTENANT - GENERAL

LORD, 73 ., 115

Baghdad, 186, 204, 206, 207, 260
Bailey, Captain P. J., 105
Bakenlaagte, 106
Balfour Declaration, 236
Barberton, 96-97
Barrett, Sir James. 256
Barrow, General Sir George, 130, 143,

146, 226, 249, 273, 275, 276, 277,

284 .; AUenby's staff officer, 128;

commander of Yeomanry Division,

225; takes over command of 4th

Cavalry Division, 259
Bartholomew, General Sir William, 211,

216, 245
Basutoland, 43

Beauquesne, H.Q. of Third Army, 163
Bechuanaland, 45, 46, 48, 50, 51, 57, 72,

82, 294
Beersheba, 84, 188, 191, 201, 206, 208,

213, 218, 219, 228, 275, 298; attack on,

205, 211 ; capture of, 211-212
Beirut, 242, 282, 288
Beisan, 268, 276, 277, 278, 279
Beit Ur el Foka, 225
Beit Ur el Tahta, 225, 226
Bellewaarde, actions at, 156, 158
Beni Sakhr, Arab tribe, 251, 252, 253
Berukin, action of, 250
Bethel, 97

Bethlehem, 229, 243
Beyers, Christian F., Boer leader, 102
Bingham, Major-General the Hon. Sk

Cecil, 129

Bir Salem, G.H.Q. at, 234
Birch, General Sir Noel, 146 .
Blockhouse lines, 102
Bloemfontein, 73, 74, 79, 80, 86, 88, 89,

90, 92 ; capture of, 87
Bloemfontein conference, 68, 72
Boer War see South African War
Boers, 43, 44, 48, 51, 58, 67-69, 72-74,

76-79, 83, 84, 89, 91, 93, 95, 102, 106
Bols, Lieutenant-General Sir Louis, 154,

164, 165, 201

Botha, General Louis, 94, 102, 105, 109
Bourne, Elizabeth, grandmother, 25
Brackenhurst, Nottinghamshire, Allenby's

birthplace, 25, 26, 30
Bramley, Mr, sergeant-major, 46
Brettle, Mary, grandmother, 25-26
Briggs, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles,

128, 140

Brighton, Inniskillings quartered at, 5 8, 60
'Bristol, H.M.S., 187
Bryas, Chateau, 165, 166
Bulfin, General Sk Edward, 154, 220,

225, 226, 287; commands Twenty-first

Corps, 200
"Bull, the^" nickname of Allenby, 18,

113, 123, 158, 166, 169, 183, 198, 257
Bullecourt, 182
Buller, General Sir Redvers, 73, 74, 80, 86,

Bunyan, John, quotation from, 250

305

ALLENBY

Byng, Field-Marshal Viscount, 109, 116,
161 ; takes command of Third Army, 185

CAIRO, 45, 1 8 8, 191 ; Egyptian Expedition-
ary Force H.Q. at, 187

Cakmak, Marshal, 279

Cambrai, Battle of, 180

Camel Corps (Imperial Camel Corps Bri-
gade), 1 8 8, 246, 259

Camel Transport Corps, 263

Campbell, Lieutenant-General Sir Walter,
198

Cane, Rev. Thomas Coats, 25

Canterbury, cavalry depot at, 52

Cape Colony, 43, 50, 57, 68, 69, 72, 73,
74, 101, 103

Cape Corps, 263

Cape Town, 71, 79, 103

Cape Verde Islands, 69

Capper, Major- General Sir Thompson,
6 1 n.

Carabiniers, 82, 104, 105

Cardwell, Edward, Viscount, 41

Cardwell system, 41

Carmel, Mount, 266, 275

Carrington, Colonel F., 50 n.

Castle, Egerton, 36

Cateau, Le, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137;
Battle of, 138-139, 151

Caucasus, 186, 267

Cavalry, value of training, 57; charges,
83, 219, 221, 281 ; organization, 95-96,
118; power of, 83-84, 86, 266; train-
ing, 117-118, 119, 145; in retreat, 133;
in pursuit, 217218

Cavalry Brigades (in France) :
ist, 136, 137, 139, 140, 142
2nd, 134, 136, 137, 139, *4*
3rd, 134, 136, 139, 140, 142, 143
4th, 139, 142
5th, 129, 132, 137, 142

Cavalry Corps, formation of, 146; at
Ypres, 147-148, 149, 299

Cavalry Division, in France, 127-144;
commanded by AHenby, 122, 127;
mobilizes at AJdershot, 128; staff of,
128; composition of, 129; deployment
of, 130; action during retreat from
Mons, 134-140; in advance to the
Aisne, 142-144, 299

Cavalry Division, in South African War,
74, 82, 91-92, 93, 97, 99; ist Brigade,
82, 84, 86, 88, 90, 94, 95, 99, 100; 4th
Brigade, 95

Cavalry Divisions :

ist see Cavalry Division, in France
2nd, 143
3rd, 146, 147

4th, 274, 287, 288 ; in Jordan valley,
257 ; formation of, 259 ; passes Musmus
defile, 275, 276, 278, 283 ; enters Deraa,
284 n.

5th, 274, 276, 284, 287; in Jordan
valley, 257; formation of, 259; cap-
tures Aleppo, 288, 289
Cetewayo, King of Zululand, 44, 46, 47
Chapman, Miss Mabel see AHenby, Vis-
countess

Charlesworth, Maria, 34
Chauvel, General Sir Henry, 211, 252,
254, 255, 280, 283, 285 andn*', com-
mands Desert Mounted Corps, 200
Chaytor, Major-General Sir Edward, com-
mander of Anzac Division, 269, 278,
281, 282

Chetwode, Field-Marshal Sir Philip, 201,
211, 216, 228, 231, 233, 236, 272,
280; commands I9th Hussars, 113,
130, 132, 137, 190, 191; commands
5th Cavalry Brigade, 129; commands
Twentieth Corps, 200
Childers, Erskine, 117 n.
Chrissie, Lake, action at, 98
Ckyton, Sir Gilbert, political adviser to

Allenby, 235, 237
Colchester, 112, 113, 115
Colenso, Battle of, 72, 74
Colesberg, 72, 74, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 90
Commando (Deneys Reitz), 73 #., 92 n.
Connaught, H.R.H. the Duke of, 248
Cooks, AHenby's, 1640., 187
Corps :

First, 137, 138, 140, 142, 143, 146, 148
Second, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137, 138,
139, 140, 146, 148, 151
Third, 140, 146, 151
Fourth, 147

Fifth, 151, 155, 156, 158, 159, 163,
169, 299; commanded by Allenby, 151,
153, 299; fighting at Ypres, 154
Sixth, 161
Seventh, 161, 162
Tenth, 160
Thirteenth, 160
Fourteenth, 160
Eighteenth, 161

Twentieth, 208, 216, 219, 220, 222,
236, 244, 256, 265, 272, 278, 280; for-

306

INDEX

mation of, 200, 201 ; capture of Beer-
sheba, 211, 212, 213; relieves Twenty-
first, 228 ; captures Jerusalem, 229, 230
Twenty-first, 200, 201, 202, 212, 213,
217, 218, 219, 222, 228, 244, 265, 272,
273, 278, 282, 287-288 ; capture of Gaza,
217 ; in pursuit of Turks, 218, 219-220;
action of Berukin, 25 o ; in final battle, 274
Twenty-second, 249

Cowell, Professor Edward, 34

Cowell, Rev. Maurice, 31

Crawshay, Richard, 45

Cromwell, Oliver, 24, 42, 301

Cronje, P. A., Boer leader, 80, 82, 86, 201 ;
surrender of, 86

Curragh, the, 65 ; incident, 123

Cut-shorts, 257, 297

DALMENY, ALBERT EDWARD PRIMROSE,

LORD (Earl of Rosebery), 150, 151,

164, 186
Damascus, 239, 242, 245, 246, 271, 272;

capture of, 280-288
Davaine, JVC., 37
Dawnay, Major-General G. P., 191, 201,

233, 245, 246

De la Rey, J. H., Boer leader, 86, 94, 102
De Lisle, General Sir Beauvoir, 76 . 5

128, 136, 137, 154 n.
De Wet, Christian, Boer leader, 85, 86, 95,

102

Dead Sea, 243, 246
Delagoa Bay, 96
Deraa Junction, 245, 255, 265, 268, 272,

281, 283 ; pkn to attack, 246

Derby, Edward George, seventeenth Earl

of, 187

Desert Column, 188
Desert Mounted Corps, 200, 201, 208,

211, 213, 219, 221, 264, 265, 269, 280,

282, 284, 287

Diamond Hill, Battle of, 95
Dinizulu, 47, 48, 52
Divisions, Infantry :

4th, 136, 137, 138

5th, 134

loth (Irish), 200, 217, 260, 263

52nd (Lowland), 189, 224, 225, 226,
249 ; assault on Katrah and El Mughar,
221 ; at crossing of river Auja, 232 ;
sent to France, 260

53rd, 189, 229, 260

54th, 189, 260, 263

6oth (London), 189, 200, 217, 220,

228 ., 253, 260, 278; at capture of
Jerusalem, 229; advance on Jericho,
243 ; in advance on Amman, 248 ; at
Shunet Nirnrin,, 252

74th, 1 89, 217 ; sent to France, 249, 260

75th, 189, 200, 224, 226, 250, 260;

at Nebi Samwil, 225 ; sent to France, 249

Divisions, Mounted see Anzac Mounted
Division, Australian Mounted Division,
and Yeomanry Mounted Division

Dobell, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles,
190

Donhead St Andrew, 64, 65

Doornkop, 69, 93

Downe, Hugh Richard, eighth Viscount,

Downes, Sir Arthur, 64 n.

Dragoons, 6th Inniskilling see Innis-

killing Dragoons
Driefontein, action at, 87
Dunmore, Alexander Edward, eighth

Earl of, 77, 79
Dunn, John, 51
D'Urbal, General V. L. L., 165
Durban, 43, 48, 52, 5 6, 72, 73, 106

EASON, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL H. L., 193 n.

East Africa, Allenby in, 116

Eastern Force, 189

Edinburgh, InniskilHngs stationed at,

60
Edmonds, Brigadier-General Sir James,

60 ., 61 .

Egypt, Allenby's work in, 16
Egyptian Expeditionary Force, G.H.Q.

of, 184; at Cairo, 188; transferred to

Palestine front, 193, 194; at Junction

Station, 226-232; moved to Bit Salem,

234

Egyptian Labour Corps, 263
El Arish, 267
El Jib, 225, 244
El Mughar, charge at, 84, 221
Elandslaagte, action of, 73
Ellison, Lieutenant-General Sir Gerald, 37
filouges, action of, 134
Enver Pasha, 186, 207, 222, 267
Ermelo, 97, 106
Es Salt, 251, 253, 254, 282; occupied by

British, 248 ; withdrawal from, 249
Esdraelon, Plain of, 242, 266, 268, 275,

276, 278, 287

Eshowe (Etchowe), 47, 55
Evans, Major-General Sk Edward, 216

307

ALLENBY

FALKENHAYN, ERICH VON, commands
Yilderkn Army, 206, 207, 220, 222, 228,
232 ; replaced by von Sanders, 244

Fanshawe, Mrs, sister, 27 andn,

Feisal, Emir, 230, 246, 248, 254, 285, 286,
288

Felixstowe, 26, 27, 28, 30, 33, 34

Fergusson, General Sir Charles, 134 #.,
161, 179

Festubert, Battle of, 156, 158

Fevzi Pasha (Marshal Cakmak), 279 n.

Fincastle, Viscount see Dunmore, eighth
Earl of

FitzGerald, Edward, 28 n.

Forbes, Patrick, 45

Forester, C. S,, 158

Forestier- Walker, Lieutenant-General Sir
George, 6in.

Franks, Fritz, 210 n.

French, Field-Marshal Sir John (Earl of
Ypres), at Colesberg, 72, 74, 77. 80, 82;
relieves Kimberley, 83, 84; cuts off
Cronje, 86, 89, 93, 95, 105; CJ.G.S.,
123; Commander-in-Chief in France,
130, 132, 142, 145, 151, 157, 158

French contingent with E.E.F., 263

Frezenberg, Battle of, 154

Furse, General Sk William, 61 n.

GAZA:

Fkst Battle of, 184, 188, 201, 202,

205, 219, 220, 224, 243, 298; attack on

Gaza, 212; capture of Gaza, 217
Second Battle of, 189, 190
Third Battle of, 207 et seq.
George, Right Hon. David Lloyd, 170,

173, 184; Allenby's interview with, 185-

186; his strategical ideas, 204, 238-239,

240, 243, 265

German South-west Africa, 48
German troops in Palestine, 250, 267, 279,

288
Germans and Turks, relations between,

1 8 6, 204, 206, 207, 220, 244, 271 n.
Gezer, ancient fortress of, 221
Gheluvelt, 148
Ghoraniyeh, bridge over the Jordan, 249 ;

attacked by Turks, 251
Gillman, General Sk Webb, 241
Gommecou#, attack on, 162
Goshenland, 48, 50
Goth, s.s., 71
Gough, General Sk Hubert, 50 ., 109,

128 ,, 136, 142, 143, 162, 170, 182

Grange, Baroness Ernest de la, 150, 169
Grant, Brigadier -General William, 84,

212

Grey, Sk Raleigh, 45
Greys see Scots Greys

HAIFA, 242, 266, 275, 280; occupation of,

281
Haig, Field-Marshal Earl, 74, 109, no,

114, 116, 119, 137, 138-139. T 57, 158,

204, 23 9-240 ; comparison with Allenby,

61-63; relations with Allenby, 170,

183, 184

Haileybury, 31, 32, 33, 34, 41
Haking, General Sk Richard, 61 .
Haldane, General Sk Aylmer, 161, 179
Haldane, Richard Burdon, first Viscount,

41, no n.

Hamilton, General Bruce, 106
Hareka, Turkish left flank at, 191-208;

attack on, 213, 214; Turkish line

broken at, 219

Haritan, last engagement of Palestine cam-
paign fought at, 288-289
* Haversack ruse/ 202
Heavyside-Peat, Rev. T., 31
Hejaz Railway, 241, 242, 245, 246, 268
Heller, Villa, Allenby's house in Cairo,

187, 196

Henderson, Colonel G. F. R., 80
Hindenburg Line, 175, 17$; German

withdrawal to, 183
Historical Geography of the Holy Land (Sk

George Adam Smith), 223
Holland, Lieutenant-General Sk Arthur,

166, 174, 175, 178

Home, Brigadier-General Sk Archibald,
" 128

Hooge, 157, 158
Horses, overworking of, in South Africa,

84, 85, 87, 90, 91, 92, 105, 106, 108
Howard, Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. L,,

128
Huj, charge by Worcestershire and War-

wickshke Yeomanry at, 219, 220,

228

IMPERIAL CAMEL CORPS BRIGADE see
Camel Corps

Imperial Service Brigade, 259

Indian cavalry, 259. See also Cavalry Divi-
sions, 4th and 5th

Indian Civil Service, Allenby takes exami-
nation for, 34, 35, 41

308

INDEX

Indian Divisions :
3rd, 249, 260
7th, 242, 249, 260

Infantry Brigade, i9th, 133-134, 136, 137
Infantry Divisions see Divisions, Infantry
Innisktlling Dragoons, 6th, 38, 41, 42, 43,

45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 55 #., 56, 58, 61,

69, 72, 84, 91, 92, 94, 97, 98, 99, 101;

origin, 42

Irbid, action at, 283
Irish Division, loth see under Divisions,

Infantry

Issus, Battle of, 289
Italian contingent with E.E.F., 263

JAFFA, 204, 205, 221, 228, 234, 243, 244,
245, 270

Jaffa- Jerusalem road, 224, 225, 234

Jameson, Dr L. S., 58

Jameson Raid, 45, 68

Jemal Pasha, 207; recalled to Turkey,
244, 288

Jenin, 278, 282

Jerusalem, 188, 204, 205, 213, 216, 220,
221, 222, 225, 234; capture of, 229, 232,
233, 236, 243, 245

Jervis, Sir John, 105

Jeudwine, Lieutenant-Getieral Sir Hugh,
159

Jews, battalions of, 262, 282

Jexebel, death of, 277

Jeareel, Valley of, 276, 277

Jisr ed Damieh, 252, 253, 279, 282

Jisr el Mejamie, 268, 278, 279

Joffre, Marshal, 130, 157, 171, 173, 183

Johannesburg, 58, 92, 93, 98

Jordan, river, 242, 244, 245, 249, 253,
255, 264, 267, 268, 269, 276, 278, 279,
280, 286 ; crossing of, 248, 249, 250, 254

Jordan valley, 241, 244, 246, 253, 254;
climate of, 255, 256, 297; attacks
in, 264, 265, 269, 270, 277, 278, 283

Joubert, P., Boer leader, 73

Junction Station, 221, 232; Egyptian
Expeditionary Force G.H.Q. estab-
lished near, 226

KALAHARI DESERT, 48, 50, 57
Kalkheuval Pass, fight in, 93
Kantara, 198

Karee Siding, action of, 89
Katrah, assault on, 221
Kavanagh, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles,
179

Keir, Lieutenant-General Sir John, 161
Kekewich, Major-General Robert George,

Kernal, Mustapha (Ataturk), 206, 279, 288
Kemp, Boer leader, 102
Kenna, Major Paul, 105, 112
Kenwick Hall, seat of Allenby family, 25,

Kenyon, Major-General E. R., 166
Kiggeu, Lieutenant-General Sir Launce-

lot, 36, 38; C.G.S. in France, 183
Kimberley, 43, 72, 73; siege of, 74, 77,

78, 79, 80; relief of, 83, 84, 85, 91, 201
Kirke, General Sir Walter, visit to Pales-
tine, 241
Kitchener, Horatio Herbert, first Earl, 79,

86, 102, 106, 301
Knapp, Father, 93, 105
Komatipoort, 96
Koodoosrand Drift, 86
Kressenstein, Kress von, 21 o; removed

from command, 244
Kroonstad, 92
Kruger, Paul, 44, 50 andn. 9 58, 67, 68, 69,

86,96
Kuryet el Enab, stormed by 75th Division,

225

LADYSMITH, siege of, 73, 74, 80, 86
Lancers, 5th, AUenby's command of, 110-

112, I2O

Landrecies, action at, 138

Lanrezac, General Charles-Louis, 130**.,
132

Lawrence, General the Hon. Sir Herbert,
37,63

Lawrence, Colonel T. E., 246, 253 , 254,
269, 272, 300 n.\ first meeting with
Allenby, 193; enters Jerusalem with
Allenby, 230; atDeraa, 283, 284 n.\ at
Damascus, 285 andn*, character of,
285, 286, 300 n,

Leader, Major-General H. P., 105

Lettow-Vorbeck, Paul von, 184

Uaison (Brigadier-General Spears), quota-
tion from, 1 30 #., 1 3 6 tt.

liman von Sanders, Otto, commander
of Yilderim Army, 244, 264, 265, 266 n.,
267, 271 #.; at Nazareth, 273, 276, 281

Lincolnshire, 23, 24, 26, 27

London Division, 6oth see weUr Divi-
sions, Infantry

Longley, Major-General Sir John, 154,
203

309

ALLENBY

Loos, Battle of, 157, 158

Luce, Major-General Sir Richard, 256

Ludlow, Brigadier-General E. R. O.,

128

Luxor., Allenby's visit to, 243
Lynden-Bell, Major-General Sir Arthur,

MAAN, 245, 282

Macandrew, Major-General, 260, 273, 288 ;
commands 5th Cavalry Division, 259

McCracken, Lieutenant-General Sir Frede-
rick, 137

Macdonogh, Lieutenant - General Sir
George, 60 n., 6in.

M*Kean, Captain A. C, 45

Mackenzie, Major-General Sir Colin, 63
and n.

McMahon, Colonel Sir Henry, 35 #.

Mafeking, 50, 57, 72, 73, 74, 90

Magersfontein, 72, 74, 80

Majuba, Battle of, 41, 43, 44, 69, 86, 93

Malaria, 195, 256, 283, 287

Manchester, Allenby quartered at, 60

Maritzburg see Pietermaritzburg

Marlborough, John Churchill, first Duke
of, 17, 176, 301

Marne, Battle of, 142, 143, 145

Marshall, , A.D.C. to Allenby, death of,

149

Martin, Sir Richard, 45
Matabele, 43, 46, 48, 58
Maude, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick

Stanley, 186, 266, 301
Maurice, Major-General Sir Frederick,

87 n.

Maxse, General Sir Ivor, 179
Medina, held by Turks, 245
Megiddo, 195 ; Batdes of, 272-280
Meinertzhagen, Colonel R., 199 #*
Mesopotamia, 186, 206, 223, 240, 242;

Indian divisions from, 249, 260
Messines, 148, 180
Methuen, Field-Marshal Baron, 50 ., 74,

Middelburg, 96, 97, 106
Milner, Alfred, first Viscount, 68
Moab, hills of, 242, 245, 249, 251, 267
Modder, river, 77; 80, 82, 86, 88, 89
Monchy-le-Preux, 176 j
Money, Major-General Sir Arthur, 237
Monro, General Sir Charles, 158
Mons, Battle of, 132-134; retreat from,

133, 142, 299

Montsioa, Bechuana chief, 5 1
Moore, General Sir John, 301
Motte au Bois, Chateau de la, 150
Murray, General Sir Archibald, 188, 190,
203, 233, 243, 249, 261 .; commands
E.E.F., 184; succeeded by Allenby,
187, 189
Musmus Pass, 275, 276, 278

NAAUWPOORT JUNCTION, 72, 73, 82
Nablus, 222, 225, 229, 263, 265, 268, 272,

273, 278, 279, 280; Turkish Seventh

A.rmy H.Q. at, 267
Namaqualand, 48
Napier, Admiral Sir Charles, 64 .
Napoleon I, 261, 277, 301
Natal, 43, 50, 52, 53, 72, 73, 74, 79, 80,

103, 106
Nazareth, 273, 276; Liman von Sanders*

escape from, 281

Nebi Samwil, capture of, 225, 229
Nery, action at, 140
Neuve Chapelle, Battle of, 152, 158
New Republic, proclaimed by Boers in

Zululand, 48, 52

New South Wales Lancers, 82, 85, 90-91
Newcombe, Colonel S. F., 213
Nile water, prophecy concerning, 203-

204
NiveUe, General R. G., 172, 173, 176, 181,

182, 242; failure of, 183
Noyelle-Vion, AUenby's H.Q. at, 166
Nyasaland, 56

O'DONNELL, MAJOR - GENERAL SIR

THOMAS, 55/2.
Onslow Square, London, Allenby's house

in, 117
Open Howe in Flanders, 1914-18 (Baroness

Ernest de la Grange), quotation from,

150

Orange, river, 50, 67, 73, 80
Orange Free State (afterwards Orange

River Colony), 43, 58, 68, 72, 101, 107,

109

PALESTINE, 15, 80, 127, 184, 186, 188 et

seq.
Papdlon, Miss, saved from drowning by

Allenby, 112

Passchendaele, Battle of, 153, 204, 300
Paterson, A. B., 91 n.
Pennefather, Captain E. G., 45
Percy, Lord William, 199 n.

310

INDEX

Persia, s.s., Allenby's voyage to South

Africa in, 66, 69-71
Pe*tain, General H., Commander-in-Chief

of French Army, 182
Petit Morin, action at, 143
Picot, Georges, 236
Pietetmaritzburg, 52, 53, 55, 73
Pinetown, 43, 48, 50, 52
Pirate, Allenby's charger, 90
Plumer, Field-Marshal Baron, 73 n, y 109,

I 53> 3 01 ; fa- command of Second

Army, 151

Poplar Grove, action of, 87
Porter, Colonel T. C., 82, 84
Porter, Mrs, sister, 27 n.
Pretoria, 73, 91, 93, 94, 96, 100, 106

RAFA, 197

Ram Allah, 225, 232

Rawlinson, General Baron, 109, 147 n. 9

160, 161, 301
Rayak, 284, 287
Rhodes, Cecil, 44, 45, 48, jo., 51, 58,

80, 85

Rhodesia, 45, 57, 58, 73
Richard Cceur de Lion, 195, 274
Riet, river, 82, 86
Rimington, General Sir Michael, 45, 56,

99, 149 .
Roberts, Field-Marshal Earl, 77, 79, 80,

82, 87, 91, 94, 95, 201
Robertson, Brigadier-General A, B., 262
Robertson, Sir William, Chief of the

Imperial General Staff, 116, 184, 185,

187, 204, 205, 239; resignation of,

243

Roman Hill House, Colchester, 115
Romani, 224
Rosebery, Albert Edward Primrose, sixth

Earl of see Dalmeny, Lord
Royal Scots, 50

ST LUCIA BAY, 48, 57

Saint-Pol, Third Army H.Q., 165, 169

St Vincent, 69, 70, 71

Salonika, 189, 200, 203

San Antonio, 70

Sandhurst, Royal Military College at, 34-

Sannah's Post, action at, 89
Scarpe, river, 176; Fitst Battle of, 181,

182; Second Battle of, 181, 182;

Third Battle of, 182
Scots Greys, 82, 84, 104

Scott, Sir Walter, quotation from, 296

Sea-power, value of, 69

Semakh, 281

Seven Lilian of Wisdom (T. E. Lawrence),
193, 230 ., 246, 253 #., 286

Sharon, Plain of, 195, 266, 273

Shea, General Sir John, 186, 187, 231,
246, 253, 278; in command of 6oth
Division, 200 ; at surrender of Jerusa-
lem, 229

Sheba mines, 97

Shepstone, Sir Theophilus, 45

Shomcliffe., 60

Shunet Nimrin, 251, 252, 253, 254

Sillem, Major-General Sir Arnold, 164

Simla, Allenby's house at the Curragh,

Simpson, Miss, governess, 3 1

Sinai Desert, 187, 189, 233, 243; railway

and pipe-line across, 188
Smith, Sir George Adam, 223
Smith-Dorrien, General Sir Horace, 109,

138, 139, 151
Smuts, General J. C, 102, 240; offered

command of E.E.F., 184; visit of, to

Palestine, 241, 242, 243
Snow, lieutenant-General Sir Thomas,

138, 139, 161, 162
Solesmes, 136, 137, 138
Somme, river, 160, 161, 171; Barde of,

162, 163, 171, 300
Sordet, General, French Cavalry Corps of,

134, 139
South Africa, 42-4?, 44> 45, 5*-j8, 65,

67, 69; Allenby's interest in, 45, 46, 51,

57-58, 76, 107-108
South African War, 41, 66, 67-109, 122,

201, 294

South America, AHenby in, 116
Spears, Brigadier-General E. L., 130 n.
Spencer, Brigadier J. A, W., 262
Spion Kop, 5 1 n.
Springfield, 88, 90
Staff College, Camberley, 60, 61-64,

294

Steel helmets, 166-167
Stellaland, 48, 50, 51
Stevenson-Hamilton, Lieutenant-Colonel

J., 45, 54 *., 59

Stewart, Major-General Sk James, 36
Stewart, Brigadier-General J., visit of, to

Palestine, 241, 242
Steyn, President M. T., 86
Stormberg, 72, 73, 74

311

ALLENBY

Sues Canal, 188, 198

Swaziland, 45, 105

Sykes-Picot Agreement, 236, 285, 286

TABOR, MOUNT, 277

Tafila, 246

Talana Hill, action of, 73

Tank Corps, Royal, 16, 179

Tanks, 178-179

Teles Saba, 211

Tennyson, Alfred, Lord, 25

Thabanchu, 89

Thotmes HI, victory of, at Megiddo,

, 27 *.
Tiberias, 242, 265, 280; occupation of,

281
Transvaal, 43, 44, 45-46, 48, 50, 58, 67,

68, 91, 92, 96, 97, 101, 105, 106, 107, 109
Tugela, river, 74
Tulkeram, 222, 245, 265, 266, 268, 273,

278, 279 ; Eighth Turkish Army H.Q.

at, 267

Tupper-Carey, Canon. A. D., 64 n.
Turkish Armies :

Fourth, 266 ,, 267, 268, 280, 282,

283, 284, 288

Seventh, 221, 222, 266 ., 267, 268,

273, 278, 279; rout of, 280, 282, 288
Eighth, 210, 219, 220, 222, 224, 266 ,,

267, 268, 273, 278, 281, 282
Turkish Corps, Second, surrender of, 282
Turks, fighting qualities of, 211, 219,

222, 228, 244, 271, 288; relations of,

with Germans see Germans and Turks

UlTLANDERS, 67-68

Umm el Kelab, 234; Egyptian Expedi-
tionary Force G.H.Q. at, 197
Umm es Shert, 252, 253, 254
Usibebu, Zulu chief, 47, 48

VAAL, river, 50, 92, 93
Vachell, H. A., 37
Valenciennes, 132
Van Niekerk, , 51

Vaughan, Major-General J., 82, 128 .,

143

Verdun, 163, 171, 173
Vimy Ridge, 157, 161, 172, 174, 180
Vryburg, 48, 50

WADI FARA, 279, 280

Wadi Ghuzzee, 199

Warren, Major-General Sir Charles, 48,

50, 51, 82
Water difficulties in Palestine, 201-202,

212, 213, 219, 222

Water Witch, yacht, 28, 33

Waterval, 94

Weekley, Professor Ernest, 23 #.

Welldon, Dr J. E. C, 31

Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, first Duke

of, 17, 37, 40, 42, 133, 261, 301
West Bilney, 27, 28, 30, 33, 34
West Indians, battalions of, 282
Wilson, General Sir Henry, 239; as Chief

of the Imperial General Staff, 243, 265,

301

Witwatersrand, the, 5 8, 67
Wolfe, General James, 301
Wonder Boom Farm, 94
Wren, , crammer, 34, 35
Wynberg, 48
Wytschaete, 148

YARDLEY, J. W., 43, 98

Yarmuk valley, 245

Yeomanry Mounted Division, 189, 224,
225, 226, 228, 251, reorganization of,
259

Yilderim Army, 206, 213 ; H.Q. of, 216

Young, Sir Hubert, quoted, 252 .

Younghusband, Sir Francis, 37

Ypres, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 299;
Second Battle of, 153-154

Ypres, first Earl of see French, Field-
Marshal Sir John

ZULULAND, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53,
1 06, 107, 294

1 26 040