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Books by
FREDERIC L. PAXSON
RECENT HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FRONTIER, 1763-1893
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND THE WORLD WAR
VOLUME I. PRE-WAR YEARS, I C) 1 3- 1 <) T J
VOLUME II. AMERICA AT WAR, 1 9 1 7-1918
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY and the WORLD ; WAR:
AMERICA AT
WAR
9 * 7
1918
FREDERIC L. PAXSON
HOUGHTON MI FFLIN COMPANY BOSTON
1939
COPYRIUttl. tO.iO, t*V f''Rl''?t Kt' t , VA.
ClirS Rl'SI- KVl-"T I < S*l"Utf>JV<. f$U f?t(I(f
THIS tt)OK OR TARTS TII5''WI'' IN ANY I
IN rn* WAA.
TO
J., E., and P.
COMRADES
PREFACE
DEMOCRACY is a vehicle so lumbering that a part of the world
has come to doubt whether It is a dependable carrier for a national
interest. As a consequence of its basic principle a little less than
half of any democratic nation is commonly engaged in partisan
struggle to prevent the little more than half, which constitutes the
majority of the moment, from achieving a purpose. Yet the be-
havior of the United States in its war years, 1917-18, should be
a reminder to Americans and a warning to the world that when
emotion whittles the minority down to nearly nothing and makes
citizens agree among themselves, even a democracy may act with
speed,, directness, efficiency, and weight. One kind of victory, at
least, was blocked by the American intervention in the World
War; and for once in history a great nation went whole-heartedly
to combat, shared in the labor to defeat an enemy, and marched
its men, home carrying no plunder and asking none.
The war years of the United States are a necessary chapter in
the history of the World War. They constitute an even more
important chapter in the history of democracy in action.
FREDERIC L. PAXSON
Margaret Byrne Professor t>f I htitfd States
History in the tJnwfrsily of Cit
BKKKUUW, CALIFORNIA
Dcc&nbcr, 1938
CONTENTS
CHAPTER FAOE
I. THE WAR OF 1917 i
II. THE CIVILIANS' TASK ig
III. THE MIND OF THE CITIZEN 43
IV. THE WAY TO WIN: SHIPS AND FOOD 66
V. THE YANKS ARE COMING 88
VI. THE UNARMED FORGES 115
VII. THE SINEWS OF WAR i^y
VIIL WAR AIMS I5 6
IX. INTER- ALLY j8*2
X. *HE SHALL BE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY* 202
XI. THE 'SEPARATE COMPONENT* 227
XII, *WORK OR FIGHT*
XIII. WAR MADNESS
XIV. THE ATLANTIC FERRY
XV. THE TEST OF QUALITY 2 r
XVI. THE PROGRAM OF ONE HUNDRED DIVISIONS 340
XVII. THE FIRST ARMY, A.E,F. 368
XVIII. THE MEUSE-AROONNE
XIX. PEACE AND POLITICS
XX, VICTORY
MAPS AND TABLES
THE WESTERN FRONT End papers
THE AMERICAN BASE IN FRANCE 93
GAMPS AND CANTONMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 104
TABLE: DIVISIONS IN FRANCE AND AFLOAT 307
THE MAHNE SALIENT 324
AREAS OF DIVISIONAL OPERATION, A.E.F., JULY 18
NOVEMBER i r, 1918 334
THE ROADS TO GERMANY 369
ST. MIHIEL, SEPTEMBER it, 19 18 371
THE LAST Pit ASK, SEPTEMBER ;>6- -NOVEMBER ri, 1918 388
THE ADVANCE OF THE FIRST ARMY, MKUSK--ARGONNE,
SEPTEMBER a(i -NOVEMBER ,11, 1918 393
'FABLE: DAILY BATTLE FRONT OF AMERICAN DIVISIONS
IN THE MEUSK--AROONNK 396-397
I. THE WAR OF 1917
jfjL BRIEF period of twenty hectic months was long enough to
cover the experiences of the American democracy as a participant
in the War of 1917. With its mind at last made up, the United
States entered the World War, designed its weapons, created them,
stabilized its doctrine, forwarded its men to France, used them at
the end of a line of communications whose three thousand miles or
more in length connected every American household with the
remote trenches, and delivered a military blow without which it is
hard to believe that a German victory could have been avoided.
The people of the United States, in these twenty months, passed
through all the mental phases from a chainbcr-of-commercc
'business as usual' to an avid 'work or fight;, 9 They discarded the
reservations with which a domestic order had been built up inside
the framework of the Constitution and revealed the driving capac-
ity of democracy in the rare moments when democrats agree
among themselves. They stopped their war with the enemy
defeated; and their withdrawal affected the world as greatly as
their entry. They saw, or their effective majority saw, nothing
grotesque in the substitution of 'back to normalcy 9 for the exalta-
tion of "safe for democracy.* Their retreat was as much a part of
democracy as was the hesitation with which the United States
watched its interests for three years before April 6, 1917, or the
onc-mindcdncss with which it helped to win the war.
! The story of this war must at least be three-dimensional
The narrative of events, from which no historian may long disso-
ciate himself, is packed with episode; and it should never be for-
gotten that each episode depends as much upon the atmosphere
in which it happens as upon those of its causes that run directly
THE WAR OF 1917
back into the past. Cross-purposes and traffic jams become in
themselves new causes to complicate the story.
In the second place, the institutions of the war, created for the
purpose or expanded from existing agencies, were events when
they emerged, each representing a crystallization of the opinion of
the moment; but as institutions they kept on growing; and the
description of their enlargement, their structure,, and their overlaps,
not to mention their success or failure, gives another dimension to
any picture of the war.
A third dimension has to do with intangibles ideas of demo-
cracy., of world order, of war aims, of reform to be squeezed out of
life because of the crisis. Like the institutions of the war, these
grew. Not the same in any two consecutive months, their impact
affected at all times the institutions of the war, the civic experi-
ences at the rear, and the military operations at the front. The
American mind that looked into war in April, 1917, was not the
mind that looked back upon it in December, 1918. Whatever the
War of 1917 may display respecting war, it affords impressive
exhibits illustrating the functioning of democracy^
The Congress, voting war on April 6, 1917, signed a blank
check upon the future. Ignorant of American resources, of the
need to use them, and of the mechanisms that might bring them
into operation, it did not know the war that was and could not
foresee the demands upon its strength.. The most effective mem-
bers of Congress had been trained in the Progressive decade, whose
philosophy found more social advantage to be gained through the
restriction of combination than through the development of
centralized and efficient authority.
Better than the Congress or the Administration, the Allies were
aware of the completeness of American inexperience. They knew
their own man-power was weary and their young-man-power was
exhausted. They knew how near they were to the limit of their
financial resources. ^They knew what private national aims lay
screened behind their slogan of a war of democratic governments.
They knew that not only their objectives but perhaps their
existence depended upon the power of the American reinforce-
ALLIED WAR MISSIONS
ment, and each of them knew what form it would prefer to have
that reinforcement take. When Congress passed the war resolution,
they hurried their War Missions out upon the Atlantic to proceed
to Washington to welcome the United States as an associate.
Missions these were with impressive figures at their head
Balfour for England, Joffre and Viviani (who was mortified because
Americans did not know how important he was) for France.
Behind the heads of Mission limped lesser men, broken in action,
perhaps, but mentally acute to the need, ready to explain to those
who were at work upon the American program what war meant,
how the United States might avoid the errors the Allies had made,
how American democracy might co-operate so as to permit the
Allies to win the war.
A fortnight after the passage of the war resolution the earliest of
the congratulatory War Missions were nearing the Atlantic ports
of their destination. The lesser Allies followed the greater, with
delegations whose receptions were spread into the summer weeks.
But those of England and France alone captured the American
imagination; and among the members of these, Joffre stole the
show. Enthusiasm for the France whose Lafayette had been friend
and associate of Washington could be poured without stint. Joffre,
at the Marne, was believed to have turned the Germans back, and
this belief was as effective as though it were entirely based on fact;
it fully justified c une mission., plus sentimentale et exceptionnellement
decorative^ to carry greetings. It was even more useful because en-
thusiasm for England was not everywhere negotiable.
lr rhe available documents do not yet reveal how fully calculated
was the indiscretion ofjoffre, who turned American attention to an
angle of the war that had been generally outside the picture in the
weeks of entry. On the day of his arrival at Hampton Roads, it
was permitted to be said that he was prepared 'to discuss the
sending of an American expeditionary force to France.^ He pro-
ceeded to Washington, to be the guest of the nation in the home of
Henry White, and talked to the waiting correspondents. "He
asked for troops when he met the President in the White House,
suggesting in his appeal the French sense for concrete reality, the
THE WAR OF 1917
sense that would recognize assistance in the form of goods and cash,
but that would know it to be real only when men and flags were
visible in Paris. France was bled and tired, "the Nivelle drive was
a greater failure than had been disclosed. French morale needed
every support, and if the gaps in the French armies could not be
filled with Americans in uniform, they could not be filled at all.
'Let the American soldier come now/ he pleaded^
To the Congress, wrestling with its third week of war legislation,
the new idea was disturbing. That an army must be organized was
obvious; but participation with an army heavy enough to weight
its side was not part of the first intention. It could not be floated,
for there were not ships enough. It could not be supplied, even if
it could be floated; for transporting a soldier was only the first step
in a long process of provisioning him, outfitting him, and providing
him with the heavy tonnage of war goods that could not be inter-
rupted while he lived. Every new increment of troops to be sent to
France would add to the permanent burden on a tonnage already
inadequate to the minimum needs of the Allies themselves. Indeed
JofFre did not ask for a great army at once nor had he any idea as to
how it should cross the ocean, but he wanted troops to be seen in
France.
The Administration Army bill was already under consideration
before the Allied War Missions made their appearance, and in-
volved as much shock to established notions as Congress could
well stand, for it was based upon a draft. Conscription was odious
among Americans; among even those who were less emphatic than
Speaker Clark, who declared that 'in the estimation of Missourians
there is precious little difference between a conscript and a convict.'
^The experience of England provided the talking point for the
advocates of compulsory service, for England in the early years of
war had filled the ranks with volunteers, only to learn too late the
dire consequences of promiscuous volunteering. Worst of these
was the injury done to war industries which must not be crippled if
the armies were to survive. Many men were of greater use in the
shops than in the trenches, and when their enthusiasm and
patriotism took them to the front as volunteers, industry was dis-
SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT
organized behind the lines, j Victory in a war like this depended
upon the even development of all parts of the national effort.
Government could know little enough of how to plan for a proper
equilibrium; but the results when it selected its servants were more
useful than when each citizen chose his own duty after emotional
appeals made in a campaign to swell enlistments. The next dire
consequence had to do with officer material. At least one man in
every twenty, fifty thousand in the million, must be an officer;
and to learn the simplest duties of the officer, so that his men
might not be murdered through his ignorance, called for an
aptitude at lessons that was most commonly shown in lads of
college age, with formal education^ But these very lads rushed
first to the colors in 1914, and so many of them were dead after two
years of war that England lost a generation of its normal leaders,
and was crippled immediately by a lack of material for junior
officers. England, with an inhibition as great as that of the United
States, had come reluctantly to the draft. J The War Department
followed suit, and set itself to establish the principle of selective
service in the face of a history of consistent volunteering practice.
The Civil War draft was a device to stimulate volunteering rather
than a means of filling ranks. War was no longer amply served
by professional officers and patriotic volunteers; it called for the
whole of national strength, with men at their best jobs, not those
that they preferred.^
rThe Selective Service Act, as it was finally called, came into the
two houses simultaneously and just as the English Mission reached
American soil. It had been ready for introduction early in April,
but the committee had to digest its novelties before they could de-
fend it in open debate. The chairman of the Senate committee,
Chamberlain of Oregon, was for it. His counterpart in the House
committee, Dent of Alabama, was so sure that a draft ought not to
be used until after an attempt to raise an army of volunteers that
the management of the measure passed out of his hands and into
those of Julius Kahn of California, a German-born Republican.
The measure was under violent argument in both houses during
the week of public entertainment of the Missions, with its purpose
THE WAR OF 1917
becoming more concrete as the idea of an expeditionary force
seeped into public consciousness. The two bills, simultaneously
discussed, passed by great majorities on the same day, April 28;
but they were different bills, and original passage was only the
prelude to a long struggle in conference for three weeks more. The
size of the minorities voting No eight in the Senate, twenty-
four in the House gives no indication of the bitterness of the
opposition, but shows only that in the prevailing American state
of mind the more courageous alone, or the more obstinate, were
willing to be counted as opposing basic measures of the war.
The principle of the draft was accepted, as unbeatable. The final
fight turned upon the age limits for registrants, the negation of
volunteering (apart from enlistment in Army or in National
Guard), and the attempt of prohibition profiteers to get something
for their reform out of the emergency. The last succeeded. The
final bill forbade the sale of liquor in the vicinity of army camps or
to soldiers in uniform. \
r The other last controversies became matters of compromise
after conference reports had shuttled back and forth. The age
limits within which citizens should be liable for service were
fought throughout the whole debate. The War Department
preferred that these should range from nineteen to twenty-five, but
Dent declared from the beginning that he, and those who agreed
with him, 'would never vote for a bill ... to conscript a boy nine-
teen or twenty years of age . . . who did not have the right to vote.'
The adjustment in conference was between the House demand that
the ages should be twenty-one to forty so that mature citizens
should bear their share, and the Senate preference for twenty-one
to twenty-seven because as men pass out of their twenties their
usefulness as private soldiers lessens rapidly. It was not proposed
to use the physically unfit, or certain classes of constitutional
objectors, or to call at once men with heavy domestic responsibili-
ties. All great armies have been built on boys, and professional
opinion regarded boys of nineteen as mature enough. The conflict
of principle and opinion finally came to rest in a compromise at
twenty-one to thirty.
PROBLEM OF VOLUNTEERS
The issue of volunteering threatened to wreck the whole debate
and increased in intensity when it appeared that some troops at
least would go at once. It was a sentimental issue, congressmen
believing that their constituents would resent conscription. It
was hardly justified by actual failure to accept the volunteer, for
the armed forces, Army, National Guard, Navy, and Marine
Corps, were all actively recruiting, and could absorb nearly a
million men before they reached their maximum authorized limits.
New recruits were being enlisted and trained in existing units more
quickly than they could be turned into soldiers in any training
camps; and this sort of volunteering was not discontinued until the
Selective Service Act was passed and put into operation. Volun-
teers for officer duty were welcomed, too. Under the National
Defense Act of 1916 training camps for junior officers were ar-
ranged as soon as war became a fact. On May 15 some fourteen of
these were opened to give an intensive three months' course to the
second lieutenants, who would in turn train the first half-million
drafted men. But the issue between the houses was more than a
conflict between sentiment and efficiency; it contained its measure
of politics, and in this it revolved around the ambition of Theodore
Roosevelt to lead an armv^ *
Roosevelt, devoted to a sound Army as he had shown himself to
be as President, died unconvinced that a volunteer army raised
around his name would have been inconsistent with either effi-
ciency or the principle of selective service. He supported the draft,
always believing in it; but having raised one volunteer unit in the
war with Spain he wanted now to raise another. 4Se was afraid the
United States would fight a war with no troops at all upon the line.
There were plenty of officers ready to accompany him, anywhere,
on any basis. His name would undoubtedly have attracted private
enlistments in sufficient number., He allowed a preliminary en-
rollment to be made; and on AprTl 10, the 'most eminent and able,
if not most bitter critic' of the President (Longworth's words), he
called at the White House to urge the acceptance of his force.
Said Gardner in the House: 'The people want the Stars and
Stripes waving over those trenches . . . [and] if Roosevelt or any
8 THE WAR OF 1917
other Pied Piper can whistle 25,000 fanatics after him, for Heaven's
sake give him the chance. He may whistle his division into the
trenches half trained, of course; but I will wager that they will
make up in nerve what they lack in drill. Roosevelt is no fool.'
In his enthusiasm Roosevelt, who had already before 1914
described himself as 'a stout, rheumatic, elderly gentleman,'
brushed aside the objection that he was fifty-eight years old and
without the training of a general. He did not advertise the fact that
he was blind of one eye (lost through a boxing accident while
President) and intermittently slowed down "due to the poisoning
of his system by the equatorial fever that he had incurred while on
his Brazilian trip.' His chosen biographer, Joseph Bucklin Bishop,
made these matters public when he died, in Theodore Roosevelt and
his Time (1920). Roosevelt approached his old enemy with a
packet of letters from Europe, welcoming him as a companion in
arms. Clemenceau volunteered advice that he should be allowed
to come.
But for once a war of the United States was being fought as war,
with plans drafted by professional soldiers (of whom the best owed
their chance for training largely to Roosevelt) . The evils resulting
from the use of political commanders had been sufficiently dis-
played in the Civil War. The casualties due to ignorance of un-
trained line officers had been a scandal during mobilization for the
war with Spain, and quite as scandalous, though less well ad-
vertised, in the war of 1861. The War Department had decided to
resist the admission of young men to commissions until they had
been selected after stern competition in the officers' camps.; These
schools gave little enough of training, but it was better than no-
thing, and vastly superior to any previous American practice.
The President supported the Department in this determination and
fought for freedom to avoid the necessity to accept any but trained
commanders at the top.
The friends of Roosevelt held out in the Senate through a long
debate as they sought to make the acceptance of volunteer units
mandatory upon the President. Rooseveltians supported it, and
Republicans, and some who opposed any draft, and a few who
APPOINTMENT OF PERSHING 9
were ready to press for anything they were sure the Administration
did not want. Three weeks after the separate bills passed their
respective houses the conferees were still in deadlock. c The delay
in Congress is becoming a scandal/ wrote one of the Washington
correspondents, as this earliest controversy over war policy reached
its crisis. Other measures, nearly as necessary as the army act,
were held back until the friends of Theodore Roosevelt surrendered.
By the terms of the surrender that freed the Army from the
menace of political commanders, the President was left at liberty
to accept volunteer units or to refrain from accepting them. The
President signed the Selective Service Act on May 18, 1917, re-
leasing at once a statement settling the matter: 'It would be very
agreeable to me to pay Mr. Roosevelt this compliment But
this is not the time or the occasion for compliment or for any action
not calculated to contribute to the immediate success of the war.'
He announced, as well, that on June 5 men over twenty-one but not
yet thirty-one would be called upon to register near their homes
and that c at as early a date as practicable' a force of Regulars
would be sent to France under the command of Major-General
John J. Pershing.
Pershing had surmised that something of this sort was about
to happen. On May 3, he had received from his father-in-law
Warren, stalwart Republican Senator from Wyoming, a cryptic
telegram: c Wire me today whether and how much you speak, read,
and write French.' He wrote this hint into the opening paragraph
of his My Experiences in the World War (1931). Roosevelt, who had
made My Experiences possible when he promoted Pershing from
captain to brigadier-general in 1906, accepted the adverse decision.
He disbanded his division on May 20, published his correspond-
ence with the War Department in the Metropolitan in August, and
plunged into an oratorical co-operation with the war that was
interrupted only by sickness and ended only by his death.
Even the announcement that an American expeditionary force
was to be sent to France did not convince the Government or the
people that the American reinforcement was to be military in
character. The ocean tonnage at the disposition of the United
io THE WAR OF 1917
States was too small to make this possible. The hope of Joffre for
a fighting army was a dream, on whose coming true no military
realist could rely. The new commander, who likewise had no right
to dream that his command was for the first time in American
experience to be free from political hobbies, was already quietly
back in Washington and at work upon the details of organization.
Common opinion held it that the force was to be sent to France
chiefly for the purpose of parade, yet the orders being formulated
treated it as though it might become an army. The War Depart-
ment set to work to draft and train a National Army. Congress
plunged into other business. And the Administration kept to its
course of preparing a program that should be largely material and
economic.
~ Only one measure of consequence for the conduct of the war
reached the White House earlier than the Selective Service Act.
This was a loan act, passed without effort, which was signed on
April 24.
The financial basis of the war had been under discussion during
the weeks preceding the declaration, for, however the United
States should participate, it was certain that the cost of American
effort would be great, and that the supply of materials to the
Allies must not be stopped. The public knew less well than the
Treasury how nearly the Allies had reached the end of their own
financial resources. They had bought supplies in the United
States since 1914; paying in credit and gold, commandeering
American securities held by their citizens and sending them to the
United States for sale to pay the bills, and borrowing in loans
floated in America by the Morgans and their associates. The
Missions arriving in Washington in April spoke their congratula-
tions in public, and in private asked for cash. They would have
been glad to be placed on regular monthly allowances suited to
their own statements of their needs.
Wilson recognized the need for 'adequate credits' in his war
message and the Very practical duty ... of supplying the nations
already at war with Germany 3 with the things they could use. But
when Professor E. R. A. Seligman of Columbia, perhaps the most
'ADEQUATE CREDITS' 1 1
distinguished of the financial economists, suggested that the war
would cost at least ten billion dollars in its first year, he was
'greeted with a smile of incredulity. 3 The Treasury was accus-
tomed to a scale of operations far below this. During the three
preceding fiscal years, 191416, it had averaged 737 millions in
receipts and 718 millions in disbursements. It was hard driven to
find sufficient revenue to enable it to avoid deficit finance. War
had interfered with the flow of trade and with the revenue derived
from trade through the tariff. Only the new income tax, increasing
in productivity since its first assessment against incomes of 1913,
had enabled McAdoo to meet Federal obligations out of taxation.
In the next three fiscal years, 1918-20, expenditures were to be
stepped up to an average of 12, 538 millions, against taxes of 41 per
cent of the amount, 5 1 70 millions a year. The readiness of the
United States to cast its fortunes by the side of those of the Allies
was not accompanied by any realization of the cost in dollars or by
any plan to meet the deficit.
Economists had studied the financial aspect of war as they
watched it after 1914. In England there had been made the
most vigorous effort to pay a large fraction of its cost out of current
taxes. On either side of the Western Front the Central Powers as
well as their enemies had preferred to rely upon loans rather than
upon taxes; for the latter would mean immediate burdens upon
their citizenry, while it might be hoped, as each side hoped, that
the defeated adversary could be compelled to assume and pay the
loans as war indemnity. And the cynical observed that, in the event
of defeat, repudiation would not add greatly to the other unavoid-
able burdens.
Discussion of the ways and means of war broke out in the
United States not as a part of war preparation, but as one of the
fighting fronts of the opponents of American entry. It was Social-
ist doctrine, in which most pacifists and many Progressives con-
curred, that wars were fomented by capitalists for their own ad-
vantage; and that one of the ways of dissuading capitalists from
this was to make war costly. As the new Congress convened for its
war session, the American Committee on War Finance, self-
12 THE WAR OF 1917
nominated, advertised its demand for a 'pay-as-you-go' war that
should have the advantage of throwing the cost upon the wealthy
who provoked it, of redistributing some of their too-large accumu-
lations, and of freeing posterity from an enduring burden of taxa-
tion. The connotations implicit to this found acceptance among
many to whom the very word Socialist was anathema; even among
many in the Government. I hope,' said the President on April 2,
that the necessary credits may be sustained, c so far as they can
equitably be sustained by the present generation, by well-con-
ceived taxation.' The demand that the whole cost of the war be
borne out of current taxes was impracticable with all, sincere
with some, and a convenient method of obstruction with a few.
The fiscal proposals brought in at once were based on an assump-
tion that about one dollar out of three could be raised as spent.
The Secretary of the Treasury says, in Crowded Years: The Reminis-
cences of William G. McAdoo (1931), that he gave up the idea of tax-
ing half the costs out of the people because he thought 'such a scale
would be excessive, and perhaps destructive ... of the capitalized
energy which keeps the wheels turning. 3 During the Civil War the
proportion was approximately one to five.
Three aspects of immediate finance, as distinguished from
permanent policy, confronted Treasury officials and the con-
gressional leaders before Kitchin opened the brief debate on an
emergency loan measure on April 13. Perhaps first in importance
of these was the requirement of the Allies for funds. They were
about drained dry. They did not expect, much as they might
desire, immediate military aid; but the United States was an un-
touched storehouse of supplies if only the Government would con-
tribute the financial key. Second was the certainty that Treasury
requirements would run ahead of tax collections under existing
laws. The Committee on Ways and Means was busy with proposals
for a new revenue law, written in the language of war necessity, but
until this should be worked through (six months it took), there
could be no revenues except those to be collected from the opera-
tion of pre-war laws. No one yet knows how far commitments by
the Government ran in advance of appropriations, but everyone
LOANS AUTHORIZED 13
then knew that tax receipts would be both insufficient and slow.
The Treasury must have authority for short-term borrowing in
anticipation of taxes and the proceeds of bond sales.
And third, there were the needs of the immediate future in excess
of anything that taxes could be speeded up to provide. However
the war was to be financed after new legislation should become
productive, it would entail spending of great sums in excess of
. Bonds were to be authorized; and with a sharp recollection
tf\ of the obloquy incurred by Cleveland because of his marketing of
^-bonds through bankers 5 syndicates, both Administration and
t Congress were aware that these bonds must be placed through the
mechanics of popular subscription.
^ With a unanimity unscratched by any single adverse vote in
<T\ either Senate or House, the loan act was passed in less than two
weeks from the date of its introduction. The House accepted it,
upon report from the Committee on Ways and Means, on April 14,
N the day after the debate opened. The Senate passed it three days
o later. The slight matters of difference between Senate and House
were ironed out in time for conference reports to be accepted
\ April 23, two days after the British Mission rolled into the United
^States. And the President signed it April 24. The very next morn-
fO ing Baron Cunliffe of Headley, Governor of the Bank of England
L and one of Balfour's associates on the Mission, was at the Treasury
for the signing of British notes to the amount of 200 million dollars
against the credits voted in the bill. And shortly after him came
f^Jusserand, borrowing for France, but so piqued that he declined
> the proffer of the pen with which his check was signed. He re-
^ ceived but 100 millions at the start and, like the Italian Ambassa-
" dor, thought that, all being first-class powers, c all should be treated
* 'Mr. McAdoo is the most active and enterprising member
of the Cabinet, 3 the British Ambassador, Spring Rice, wrote to
^Balfour: 'It is he who distributes proceeds in the forms of loans to
the Allies.* The American reinforcement was in operation.
The loan act authorized the addition of five billions to the debt
of the United States, in the form of bonds drawing three and one-
half per cent interest. Two of the five billions were earmarked for
14 THE WAR OF 1917
the use of the Treasury, for the costs of war. Three billions were
pledged for loans at the same rate to nations 'engaged in war with
the enemies of the United States/ The comments made upon the
proposal for financial support to the Allies did not challenge the
underlying idea. It was accepted that this was to be the nature of
American aid. The Supreme need of our own Nation and of the
nations with which we are co-operating/ declared the President
while the bill was in the Senate, 'is an abundance of supplies. 9
The critics of the bill expected to vote for it, and did; but they
wanted to make sure that the loans would be offered directly to
the public, without the intervention of bankers or bankers' per-
centages, and that the advances would be made only to the
associated enemies of Germany. To associated enemies, not to
Allies of the United States; for it was made clear that the United
States would not attach itself to that Pact of London whereby
Britain, France, and Russia, in the first instance, pledged them-
selves to common war and common peace. Balfour was explicit in
assuring the United States that his country had no desire to entrap
the United States or to detach it from its traditional policy of
avoiding alliances. There came into being a clumsy title for the
enemies of Germany the Allied and Associated Powers. When
inquirers invited Kitchin to explain the nature of the security that
could be pledged to the United States for the repayment of the
loans, he replied simply: 'We have to trust the Governments to
whom we loan the money,' and his answer was accepted as
sufficient. Administration, Congress, and the people adhered to
the policy of loans throughout the war. The upper limit was raised
as later loan acts authorized more borrowing. Nearly all of the
ten billions thus made available was before the Armistice con-
verted into obligations of the enemies of Germany.
The provision permitting the Treasury to sell short-term notes as
needed, with an upper limit of two billions to be outstanding at any
time, was sometimes erroneously interpreted as making the loan
act one of seven billions rather than of five. This was, however,
only a device for flexibility in finance, vital in its effectiveness and
less well understood than its importance called for. There was no
RESULTANT INFLATION 15
need for paper money, and no legacy of greenbacks was left for ad-
justment after the war. As the commitments of the Government
reached the moment of necessary payment, the Treasury, under
this and later acts, thirty-one times before the Armistice, sold its
certificates of debt, to run for not more than twelve months. It
sold them to the banks which took their quotas automatically,
knowing that the funds in payment would stay on their books to
the credit of the United States until the cash was actually dis-
bursed. As the inflow of receipts, whether from taxes or loans,
built up the Government deposits, certificates were retired. What-
ever inflation the war produced was an inflation of credit, less
visible than if in paper money, but quite as real. When the time
came to buy back the certificates out of the proceeds of the great
war loans, it was only the form of the obligation that was changed,
A large share of the money for the purchase of war bonds was
raised by buyers who borrowed from the banks up to the face
value of the bonds, with the bonds as collateral and the interest
rate the same. But as the financial burden of the war was spread,
much of what began as Government debt to the banks was con-
verted into private debts to the same banks, secured by the evi-
dences of public credit as collateral. How far this constituted in
fact a money inflation tending to raise the level of prices is a matter
for nice measurement.
The requirement that the bonds, when sold, should be disposed
of by popular subscription taxed the inventiveness of the Treasury,
and gave another opening to its ingenious and driving Secretary.
The loan act left to his discretion the dates of issues, and the
amounts to be called for at each loan. He consulted banking
opinion as to the capacity of the people to absorb the bonds.
Every adviser thought it impracticable to get as much as three
billions upon a single call; and McAdoo quotes Morgan as believ-
ing one billion to be enough, and one dollar in five enough of the
total cost to be borne by taxes. It was guesswork at best. The
Spanish War had not caused a ripple in financial circles. The
Civil War, a desperate business, had baffled Chase until he dis-
covered Jay Cooke and paid him well. McAdoo, with a keen
16 THE WAR OF 1917
sense for slogans and before he revealed its dimensions, named his
loan The Liberty Loan of 1917 . . . because the money will be
spent to the last dollar in the fight which democracy is waging
against autocracy. 3
On May 2 the Secretary of the Treasury announced that two
billions would be required, to be subscribed through the gratuitous
services of financial institutions, to be paid for by subscribers in
installments, and to run from June 15 for thirty years, though
callable sooner. He announced as well that he would himself go on
the stump, beginning with Chicago, to explain in the Middle West
the need for the money, connecting it always with the purpose of
the war. As he did this, says Mary Synon (the author of what
might have been his campaign biography in 1920), c to hundreds of
little communities . . . the tall, thin, hollow-cheeked, blazing-eyed
man on the rear platform . . . symbolized the Government of the
United States. 9
A director of publicity in the Treasury represented the Secretary
at the head of the war loan organization; and beneath him the
Federal Reserve Banks adapted their structure to the new sort of
business. The paper work passed through the banks. Local com-
mittees to promote sales were instituted in every region and local
talent provided the speaking at public meetings except upon the
occasions when McAdoo, or another with a known name, was
passing that way. The stock and bond men served willingly as
private solicitors, with the energetic assistance of local volunteers.
Subscribers wore on their lapels the buttons indicating that they
had done their part. Newspapers gave space to report the progress
of the campaign, with regional rivalries built up by quotas allotted,
and with daily diagrams showing progress in meeting quotas.
Bankers had told McAdoo that his task would be made difficult
because not over 350,000 Americans were in the habit of investing
in bonds. He and his coadjutors, however, when the books of the
first loan were closed on June 15, had persuaded more than four
million subscribers to offer to take 3035 million dollars' worth of
Liberty Bonds. The doctrine of the salesmen, reiterating the
phrases and sentiments of Wilson and his Secretary, permeated
LIBERTY LOAN CAMPAIGN 17
every backwoods of the United States. Participators in the work
acquired the interest that came from participation and responsi-
bility. The citizen who had supported the war when it was voted,
without always knowing why, began to have a rationalization of it
satisfactory to himself as the loan drive brought it home. And the
popular War Message and the Facts Behind It, issued and annotated
by the Committee on Public Information, was in circulation as a
reference text. Before it had gone far, the President reinforced its
argument when he spoke at Arlington Cemetery on Memorial
Day; and colloquies in the Senate bore a warning to obstruction-
ists and critics.
Not all the orators on Memorial Day were as confident or as
emphatic as the President. The junior Senator from Ohio,
Harding, allowed himself to tell an audience in Columbus that he
regarded the Liberty Loan campaign as 'hysterical and unseemly.'
James Hamilton Lewis, Senator from Illinois, descended upon
him for partisanry when the report of the address reached Wash-
ington. James A. Reed of Missouri, far from unswerving as a
follower of Wilson, belabored him with sarcasm. And Harding,
outmatched in forensics, slipped out of the discussion, to the final
words of Reed taunting him with ambition c to preside as Chief
Executive. 3
The day before the drive was ended, on Flag Day, June 14, the
President spoke again, at the foot of the Washington Monument in
a driving rain. Pershing was received in Paris that day, after a
brief pause in London. Root was in Petrograd, where Russia
had a few days before declared against annexations and indemni-
ties. Northcliffe was in Washington, directing a permanent British
War Mission there. And Wilson explained again the aims of the
United States. He drove farther in the wedge between the German
people and their Government. He set another wedge among the
Central Allies by describing Austria-Hungary as the dupe of
Germany. House had urged him to clarify the issues in the absence
of 'intelligent or co-ordinate direction of Allied policy 5 ; and Wilson
responded so effectively that Creel, now his publicity manager,
could dispose of 6,813,340 copies of the address in the United
i8 THE WAR OF 1917
States. The President avoided statements to which the Associates
of the United States might object (as he had avoided discussing
war aims with the Missions lest argument defer victory), and
directed the American effort against 'the military masters' of
Germany: e if they succeed, America will fall within the menace.
We and all the rest of the world must remain armed . . . if they fail,
the world may unite for peace and Germany may be of the union.'
The subscription to the Liberty Loan closed a first phase of the War
of 1917.
II. THE CIVILIANS' TASK
JORD DEVONPORT, whose title gilded a successful tea merchant,
set up an office as British food controller in the Ministry of Lloyd
George in December, 1916. He was engaged in the task of adjust-
ing public need to scant supply of food during the months through
which the United States prepared its mind for war. England was
slower in the regimentation of its citizens than the Central Powers
had been. Yet the necessity to see that all be fed, and that visible
supply be rationed fairly, grew with the war. No country could
escape it. Lloyd George urged it in vain until as Prime Minister
he was in a position to have his way. The fact that modern war
and regimentation go hand in hand impressed itself slowly upon
the United States, but not too slowly for it to receive consideration
while the preparedness measures hung in Congress in the summer
of 1916.
War had become a national effort in which no citizen was too
unimportant to have a part. Success was a matter of armed forces,
to direct which there was adequate professional skill in every
country. It takes training and experience to make a soldier, but
the raw material is everywhere as extensive as manhood, and there
are more potential marshals in every army than there are batons
to be distributed. Success was a matter, too, of material supplies,
in which the combatants differed widely and of which none had
enough. But success was, even more, a matter and here the
World War provided new tests of human adaptability of the
ingenuity and effectiveness with which resources of men and things
were conserved, rationed, and delivered against the enemy. This
process was civilian at one end and military at the other. In 1914,
in neither civil nor military life, were there many men who were
so THE CIVILIANS' TASK
competent to plan and administer the process. As the United
States watched the warring nations experiment with conservation
and procurement, those who knew what was happening could
appreciate how completely the success of American performance
would depend upon American handling of similar experiments.
The Council of National Defense emerged among the prepared-
ness measures of 1916 as a war agency to bridge the gap between
what the armies needed and what the civilians possessed. Some
of its powers had been anticipated in clauses of the National
Defense Act which enlarged the discretion of the President in
matters of procurement. He was authorized to commandeer
plants in the national interest and to create an industrial mobiliza-
tion board. The Council was designed to be a latent arm of the
Government, and while there was no war there was no pressure to
hurry its activities. There was, indeed, no one who could hurry
them until the President was ready; and he was slow to fight.
A modest sum of $200,000 was appropriated, and the Council
was empowered 'to supervise and direct investigations and make
recommendations to the President and the heads of executive
departments ... for the co-ordination of industries and resources
for the national security and welfare. 5 The Council, embracing
six members of the Cabinet, organized formally in the autumn of
1916, named its operating agent which was described in the law
as its Advisory Commission, and met with the Commission a few
times to discuss procedure. But neither Council nor Advisory
Commission set to work upon war plans until a week after the
dismissal of von BernstorfF. In the eight weeks thereafter, until
war became a fact, the civilian specialists of the Advisory Commis-
sion heard much of what they must learn to do and of what they
could do only at their peril.
Regimentation by the Federal Government was a novelty that
must be based upon principles hostile to the American trend. For
a generation the best political thought of the United States had
been devising means to give fuller effect to the prohibition of
'conspiracies in restraint of trade. 3 Regimentation would reverse
much of this policy as the citizen should be called upon to co-
THE ADVISORY COMMISSION 21
operate, not compete, and to accept the decisions of bureaucracy
in place of individual free choice. It could not be foreseen how
readily Americans would adopt the principle of selective service
in the field of military duty, or how completely their approval of
the war brought with it a desire to be told how best to be of use.
Not foreknowing the answers that were apparent only after the
Selective Service Act had been passed and the Liberty Loan had
been absorbed, the Advisory Commission faced a war, aware that
controls must be set up along every walk of life, and that these con-
trols would be unworkable if they were not welcomed by so many
of their victims that the minorities could be ignored. It was quite
another matter to devise controls that would produce the ends
desired.
Hard as it was to chart a course, it was just as hard to fit the
existing frame of government into its requirements; to make the
Commission supplement, not block, the military effort; to avoid
the jealousies of professional soldiers certain that they knew all
there was to know about war. Civilians had to blunder because
of their ignorance of simple military fundamentals. Military men,
competent and devoted as soldiers, were rarely possessed of the
training or imagination to enable them to organize and manage
production in the field of manufacture. They were hampered, too,
by snarls of the red tape of peace time and by that fear of mistakes
that keeps junior officers silent in the presence of their seniors.
It was only Theodore Roosevelt, a temporary colonel with no
military future, who could engineer the 'round robin' in the
trenches before Santiago; regular officers knew its need but dare
not be insubordinate.
In bridging the gap between civil production and military
procurement, there was no established competence. The pick of
the military men could not be spared to learn a new trade. As
in the other countries at war, so now in the United States, business
and professional men must be detached from their jobs and con-
verted into public servants in an unfamiliar field.
The seven specialists of the Advisory Commission *each of
whom shall have some special knowledge,' said the law opened
22 THE CIVILIANS* TASK
their minds to the task. They learned its dimensions, realized
the thin legal foundation upon which they must operate, and
experienced the reluctance with which military opinion accepted
civilian intrusion. They were hampered, also, by lack of funds
and by the unreadiness of the Administration to permit them
to make definite commitments until war had been declared. For
two months they made tentative arrangements, waiting for the
declaration to give them definition. They waited even longer
before the departments had money with which to do the things
they recommended. Still longer they waited for Congress to ad-
just law to necessity and to empower the Government to break
away from conventional methods. Daniel Willard, president of
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, was elected chairman of the
Commission. Walter S. Gifford, of the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company, as its director, opened and organized its
temporary offices in the Munsey Building. Grosvenor B. Clarkson,
who was to turn historian in his Industrial America and the World
War: The Strategy Behind the Lines, iQij-iQig (1923), was installed
as secretary.
Even before the Advisory Commission decided to set up and to
function through as many grand committees as it had members,
it recognized the dependence of any military program upon rail-
way transport. Willard was armed with knowledge and at his own
suggestion was set to work. The Adamson Act was in the courts,
with both roads and men exasperated. And even if the hazard of
a strike during mobilization should be avoided, there remained
the question of the capacity of the railroad net to bear its load.
Operating in legalized mandatory competition, the American
railroads were uneven in their ability to serve the peace needs of
the United States, let alone the requirements of war. Thirty-two
systems, no two organized alike, operated 201,000 of the 261,000
miles of c first main track 5 in the United States, and collected
seven-eighths of the operating revenues. They provided a steady
market for a third of the soft coal and for even a larger share of the
output of iron and lumber. Among them were competing lines,
dividing without profit what was too little traffic to justify a single
EMERGENCY RAILROAD CONTROL 23
line. Regions were not evenly served with reference to area, popu-
lation, or produce; some were over-built, some under-built. The
rolling stock was watched jealously by parent lines lest it be ap-
propriated by their rivals. Some of the older railroad servants
could remember a time when gauge was not standard and when
a road built deliberately to a gauge different from that of connect-
ing lines in order to keep its rolling stock on its own tracks. There
resulted yards of empty cars, kept empty by the owner when
a neighbor line could have used them. There were trains of
empties rolling past freight crying for a carrier. War business was
already congesting some of the Eastern terminals, with others
nearly bare. The two and a quarter million freight cars of the
United States were insufficient for the cargoes war would crowd
into them, yet were lessened in their capacity by private control,
regional demand, and lack of plan.
The Interstate Commerce Commission had complained of this
inadequacy, and Congress had endeavored to correct it by grant-
ing the President power to take over the railroads in an emergency;
but there was no existing organization through which he could act.
The railroads themselves, nervous before the threat, were eager
to avoid Government ownership. In the autumn of 1915 the
American Railway Association, at the request of Garrison, created
a special committee to advise the Secretary of War on troop move-
ments; for troops have a habit of needing to be moved along un-
anticipated routes to unexpected destinations. No railroad man
would willingly have picked Tampa, with its single-track line, as
a suitable place for the mobilization of the force destined for Cuba
in 1898; and the traffic mess at Tampa became a horrible example.
After experience with the small-scale activities of Pershing's cam-
paign in Mexico, a car-service committee was created on February
2, 1917, three days before Pershing moved his column back into
the United States on its own legs. The Interstate Commerce Com-
mission was pressing on Congress for an act permitting it to pool
and control the use of cars without reference to their ownership.
It received this addition to its authority, May 29, 1917, but the
emergency had already carried the railway lines several steps
farther toward unity and system.
24 THE CIVILIANS' TASK
Willard, by direction of the Council of National Defense, began
in January his conferences with the officers of the American Rail-
way Association. This was some weeks before his Committee on
Transportation and Communication was formally authorized.
While the Council and the Advisory Commission were still feeling
out their theory of operation, he got action. The Railway Associa-
tion named Fairfax Harrison, president of the Southern Railway,
as chairman of a committee which, it was hoped, might both be
adequate in the crisis and prove that voluntary co-operation could
keep ahead of public control. From the Attorney- General assur-
ances were asked and received that the members would not be
rewarded for their effort by being prosecuted under the Sherman
Act for illegal conspiracy. Harrison proceeded during March
to work out the details of what became on April 1 1 the Railroads
War Board.
The executive officers of the railroads approved the action of the
Association. The railroad corporations ratified it, to 'co-ordinate
the operations of the railroads in a continental railway system in
aid of the Government during the war.' Harrison, with the assist-
ance of four other presidents as an executive committee, operated
the Railroads War Board for eight months, until at the end of the
year the President exercised his power to take over the railroads
and substitute national administration for that of private owner-
ship. The Board had a hand in the troop movements to more than
thirty camps and cantonments. Each of the new cities of 40,000 or
more had itself to be hauled into position, piece by piece, before it
could be occupied.
The Board co-ordinated the troop trains moving men from their
camps to the Atlantic ports of embarkation. It assembled con-
struction material and workmen at the camp sites and hauled an
increasing tonnage into war plants for manufacture and out of
them for shipment to France. It did its best against the natural
inhibitions of the solvent railroads which stood to suffer by
divergence of rolling stock or traffic to the lines of less successful
rivals. Whatever the larger men of the Railroads War Board
recommended on the basis of national advantage had to be filtered
GOMPERS AND THE ADVISORY COMMISSION 25
through the minds of others, less well-informed than they, but
immediately responsible to stockholders and balance sheets. No
voluntary agency could quite forget the fact that operating officers
were bound to show the greatest possible profit to their corpora-
tions.
But it was not the fault of the Board that war traffic jammed the
yards at Atlantic ports, that cars ran east full and west empty,
that Nature froze the congested terminals in December, or that
the users of transportation complained because the service was not
better than it was. Through the long summer of trial-and-error
approach to a policy, the Railroads War Board was among the
busiest of the new organizations for the advancement of the war.
It had an advantage over other war organizations in that it pos-
sessed a plant ready to be operated. It did not have simultaneously
to construct and to produce. Before its internal organization was
complete, the Advisory Commission had paralleled the Committee
on Transportation with six other topical committees and a miscel-
laneous group of specialized boards and bureaus.
Quite as important to the business in hand as was the attitude
of railway managers was the disposition of railway employees and
of all Americans who worked for wages: c my boys,' Gompers
called them, as he begged the Council to be patient with their
attitude. Samuel Gompers went upon the Advisory Commission
as ambassador for labor, and as such he was accepted even by the
railway men who held aloof from the American Federation of
Labor. He sat under Willard, with whom he had been in bitter
conflict during 1916, until the latter said to Commissioner Martin,
who kept a diary; c lf anyone had told me that my personal antago-
nism toward Samuel Gompers would change within one week to
ardent admiration and real affection, I would have pronounced
that individual a fit candidate for an insane asylum.'
The close association Gompers had had with the Democratic
Party since 1908 (when he was peddling his anti-injunction plank),
and the protection that party had extended to his 'boys' in the
Clayton Act and the Adamson Act, made it easier for him to work
with the Administration than it might otherwise have been. His
26 THE CIVILIANS' TASK
task, and that of his Committee on Labor, was to keep labor be-
hind the war and in agreement that though war was bad a German
victory would be worse. As early as March 12 he had arranged and
sat in a conference with the leaders of the Federation and the rail-
way unions, and with them he had adopted a labor platform for
the war. The Government recognized the principle of unioniza-
tion and the right of labor to be protected against disastrous
changes in the price level. In return, union men agreed that work
should proceed, uninterrupted by basic strikes.
After the war was over, the Department of Labor made a list
of some six thousand strikes occurring during the nineteen months
of hostilities; most of the interruptions were brief, many were the
outgrowth of no more than misunderstandings arising from
emergency changes, and nearly all were ended on terms acceptable
to labor. The Government increasingly became the ultimate
customer. It could and did press its contractors to settle with their
men, and was willing to allow a price out of which labor could be
paid. As the draft came into operation, the principle of deferred
classification protected workmen who were indispensable on their
jobs. Pay, allotments from pay, family allowances, and insurance
took care of the dependents of those who were called to the colors.
The American Federation, inspired by Gompers, made it its
business to fight labor radicals and to meet propaganda with
counter-propaganda. And in every Government venture in war
production the labor side of the business was managed by labor
men, drawn into the Government, but not forgetting that the
crushing of labor was not to be a consequence of the war.
Out of the experiences of 1917 there emerged a more formal
arrangement of labor relationships in 1918. But through the
formative months, as policies were maturing, the Advisory Com-
mission kept labor willingly in step with the great body of citizens.
Deliberating and resolving through March into April and May,
the agencies of the Commission were commonly well ahead of
enabling laws. Their full powers were not released for war until
actual war was declared. The Congress had the unfinished duties
of the preceding session to perform before it could give its undivided
EDUCATIONAL BOARDS 27
attention to new business, and the loan and the draft took pre-
cedence of all else that was new. The various boards concentrated
their efforts on matters that could be reached without law, upon
the shaping of the American mind, and upon the suggestion of
tasks for Congress.
In its first Annual Report., the Council of National Defense covered
its activities through June 30, 1917, listing the long series of com-
mittees, boards, and sections through which it began its task 'of
mobilizing the national resources.' It had 408 persons on its staff,
only 1 68 of whom drew compensation. Two of its seven major
committees were largely educational, as were many of its special
groups. Godfrey and Martin, of the Commission, presided over
such activities, working chiefly in the field of national morale.
The Commercial Economy Board, the Food Committee, and the
State network operated in the same field, partly because that was
the field in which they could operate best, partly because the
controls they advocated must await the assent of Congress.
Godfrey's Committee on Engineering and Education made it
its business to act as liaison between the Government and the
professional specialists. Beside it stood the National Research
Council, created in 1916 by the National Academy of Sciences on
request of the President, to put scientific research at the disposal
of the Government. The National Research Council moved its
offices into the Munsey Building, next to the Advisory Commission,
and at its beck a procession of chemists, physicists, and engineers
moved out of their college jobs; sometimes into uniform, some-
times into laboratories, but always into war duty. The Committee
on Education reached out toward the colleges and universities
to bring them into the line of co-operation, but found them already
so much better organized than it was itself, and so eager to work,
that this remained perhaps the least significant of the subdivisions
of the Advisory Commission. Even so non-military a group as the
historians organized on its own initiative, borrowed a Washington
office, installed a National Board for Historical Service, and asked
for work to do. Its members helped to shape Creel's course.
Medical preparedness came within the scope of the Committee
2 8 THE CIVILIANS' TASK
on Medicine and Sanitation. Doctor Franklin H. Martin, chair-
man of this committee, was a Chicago surgeon, something of
a medical statesman with a gift for organization already revealed
and so successful in his practice that when the press thought at all
of his politics it assumed, erroneously, that he must be a Repub-
lican. He soon became a colonel in the Medical Corps and directed
his professional efforts into the General Medical Board, created as
an official body to correlate the work of the medical divisions of
Army and Navy, the Public Health Service, and the body of medi-
cal practitioners. He remained an active member of the Advisory
Commission, but his committee was overshadowed by his board.
There was an abundance of medical work to be done sanitation
for the civilian population, procurement of medical officers for the
service, maintenance of medical education in spite of war. He
found the Surgeon-General of the Army, Major-General William
C. Gorgas, ready and eager for co-operation, and his professional
associates were already so well organized that his committee only
had to point the way.
Throughout its career the Council of National Defense had no
interest in administering the services that it conceived. It sought
to launch them, to see that someone was attending to them, and
to turn to the next job not yet being done. It was a civilian parallel
to the military general staff except that it gladly abandoned all
control of its creations once they were at work.
The Commercial Economy Board was born on March 24, in an-
ticipation of the moment when the war program would demand
more raw materials and supplies than could be provided; a mo-
ment when civilian industry must economize and learn to do
without. The word 'conservation' was applied at a later date to
the realm within which this board sought to operate, but it was
early recognized that war would compel a curtailment of many
peace activities, an abandonment of others, and a conversion of
non-essential branches of production to the novel requirements of
war. Arch Wilkinson Shaw of Chicago, an enthusiast for office
'system' as well as a publisher, was enlisted for this work, 'to guide
and co-operate with business men in this planning and in making
HOOVER FOOD ADMINISTRATION 29
the necessary readjustments. 3 The aim of the Commercial Eco-
nomy Board was to draw a line which might separate essential from
non-essential activity. The line once found and few manu-
facturers who found themselves near it were happy in the dis-
covery it was the business of the Board to eliminate the non-
essential or to convert it to useful work.
The Board began modestly with a campaign to stop the waste
involved in the return to bakeries after each day of some four per
cent of their bread, unsold and stale. It went on to a survey of
duplicating deliveries by retail stores and losses involved in the
return and money-back privilege after retail sales. Before many
weeks it was studying the conservation of wool and leather, and
destroying the notion of the early weeks of war that 'business as
usual 3 could be a guiding maxim. By its side another committee
which the Council of National Defense did not even list in its first
Report was applying similar philosophies of conservation in the
field of food.
Herbert Hoover, fresh from Belgian experience, was in Washing-
ton to inform the Council of National Defense as it made its first
chart in February and to insist upon the importance of food pro-
duction and food conservation. If feeding the Allies was to be
a major part of the American reinforcement, it was necessary to
know what could be shipped, what would be left for consumption
in the United States, and what could be done to stimulate produc-
tion. Hoover returned to Belgium in March to transfer the Com-
mission for Relief in Belgium to the control of neutrals, and he
declared from London in April that c the foremost duty of America
toward the Allies in this war is to see that they are supplied with
food.' The Council of National Defense had already resolved to
set up a food committee, inviting him to be its director. Back in
Washington in May, Hoover became chairman of that committee.
He appears to have been the whole committee, too, for it is not
evident that the membership was named. Events were moving
rapidly. All that a committee of the Council could have done was
limited to those things that could be accomplished by exhortation.
There was no statutory basis for either stimulation or control or for
30 THE CIVILIANS' TASK
the moderation of gamblers' prices: and nothing was more foreign
to the American habit than a bureau in Washington with power to
control the farm or to restrict the breakfast table. Hoover took
the problem directly to the White House, food was detached from
the jurisdiction of the Council, and Congress was importuned for
an adequate grant of powers. While the President waited for
Congress to confer authority, he installed Hoover at the head of
a voluntary Food Administration on May 19.
But between those things that the Council of National Defense
had no right to do, and those that it knew not how to do, lay a wide
range for co-operative activity. Every one of its active committees
projected itself throughout the United States with a maze of sub-
committees, by region, by craft, or by theme. And as it built its
network, the States undertook to erect, of their own authority,
State councils of defense. Sometimes by direction of the law, some-
times without its explicit sanction, the governors began to appoint
committees headed with impressive names. It was uncertain what
authority these might have, or grasp, but every community was
bustling with citizens who desired in some way to serve. On the
day of the declaration of war, the Council established a Section on
Co-operation with States, as a staff agency of the director rather
than as one of the ordinary committees. The several State coun-
cils, already created on paper, were asking what to do and besieg-
ing the Council with requests for tasks.
Baker, Secretary of War and chairman of the Council of Na-
tional Defense, recognized the benefit, moral if not concrete, to be
derived from this co-operation. He invited all of the States to do
what some had already done, and called their representatives to
conference in Washington on May 2, 1917. Twelve governors
came in person, every State sent some representative, and for two
days officers of the Government outlined the work accomplished
and the work ahead. Before the end of June the 'national chain
of State councils' was complete; and each in turn penetrated with
its committees into even the voting precincts. In these the draft
boards had already set an example of decentralized participation
as they arranged for the registration under the Selective Service
LOCAL CO-OPERATION 31
Act; and the local committees soliciting subscriptions in the
Liberty Loan Drive had not only knocked at every door, but had
given average citizens a chance to show good- will. There were
now added county councils of defense, city councils, speakers'
committees, and women's committees. Those whose local stand-
ing required it were given place and title; those who could organize
were given work; those who could talk were given audiences; and
all looked back to Washington, to be told just what to do and what
to say. A Woman's Committee of the Council of National Defense
was created only a few days after the States' Co-operation Section
to affiliate with the women's clubs and to tighten the local organi-
zation so that recommendations as to individual conduct emanat-
ing from Washington might with little loss of time reach the citizen
in his home. Home-known women were to be connected with
every step. Nationally known names were at the head of the list,
with that of Doctor Anna Howard Shaw at the top.
The wide publicity earned by the women who had led the suf-
frage fight was harnessed into the Government. The list, crowned
by Doctor Shaw, included Ida M. Tarbell, Carrie Chapman Catt,
Maude Wetmore, and various women whose official position al-
ready gave them leverage. On June 19 delegates from sixty of the
women's organizations met in Washington with the Woman's
Committee. The agreement at home with the effort in Washington
was profound: so profound that what distrust there was acquired
painful prominence. The anti-war minority suffered an isolation
and unpopularity, and even danger, unknown to the objectors
during earlier American wars.
But at least three members of the Advisory Commission with
their committees found immediate duties whose connection with
matters of general morale was less intimate than their connection
with actual services. The Committee on Raw Materials, organized
by Bernard M. Baruch, knew from the beginning that the success
of a procurement program would hang upon the ability of the
United States to obtain somewhere the specific commodities not
to be found at home. The Committee on Supplies, under Julius
Rosenwald, knew that an army must use nearly every commodity
32 THE CIVILIANS' TASK
that its individual members would require as civilians, and that
someone must do its buying. Both committees knew that, of all
supplies called for, the munitions of war came first. Howard
E. Coffin, an automotive engineer from Detroit, was the specialist
on the Advisory Commission charged with munitions, but as the
dimensions of this program outgrew all power of imagination, he
soon found himself assigned to one of its essential elements.
'Here in America mechanical flight had been born, 5 wrote
Benedict Crowell in his report as Director of Munitions in the
War Department, whither he had been advanced by the end of
1917, after service with the munitions committees. But when the
war came, American feet had not learned to leave the ground,
however far the American head may have been projected into the
clouds. Few officers of the Army could fly, and flying was still
largely an acrobatic stunt for display at county fairs. There was
no important airplane industry in the United States. There were
not even designs and patterns upon which such an industry could
be erected. The aviation engineers, who were to conceive and
produce the Liberty Motor after twenty-four days of drafting in
June, were engaged until then working as rivals under a system in
which each producer guarded his secrets from his competitor.
Yet the military planners issued a call for 22,000 planes to be
delivered for use in the twelve months after June 30, 1917; men
who knew manufacture knew also that such a program would
entail in fact the 'securing of the equivalent of 40,000 airplanes in
twelve brief months.' The National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics, a creation of Congress in 1915, working in close
contact with the Signal Corps of the Army, the Bureau of Stand-
ards, and the aviation industry, recommended that the Council of
National Defense give aid. A new quantity industry was to be set
up; and it must be built upon automobile foundations, as nearest
to its needs. The Council asked Coffin to undertake the task a few
days after war was declared, and on May 16 the Aircraft Produc-
tion Board was in existence under his chairmanship. This was
another of the concrete things that soon slipped away from the
control of the Council. While Coffin remained one of the members
SPECIFICATIONS STANDARDIZED 33
of the Advisory Commission the functions of his Committee on
Munitions passed largely into other hands and under another name.
Raw materials, supplies, and munitions were basic. And the
Advisory Commission would have been less than American if its
members had not believed that in approaching the problems of
supply they should approach them in the American fashion.
Nothing in manufacture was more American than the principle
of interchangeable parts. This had brought out of Connecticut
cheap watches for the million. It had spread agricultural ma-
chinery designed for the American prairies over the plains of
Russia and the Argentine. It had more recently made of Henry
Ford's assembly line a symbol of a new principle in quantity
production.
In this spirit the Council of National Defense acted in March,
creating the Munitions Standards Board to aid in speedy produc-
tion by standardizing munitions specifications. There is a large
chapter that might be written around the task later assigned to
a National Screw Thread Commission, whose mission was to
discover whether every screw and bolt ought to have an identity
of its own, or whether types might be so simplified that any
machine might be repaired by parts taken from another. So far
as the work of the Munitions Standards Board was concerned,
there was a better legal basis than in other of the projects of the
Council of National Defense. The National Defense Act of 1916
had specifically authorized the Secretary of War to provide for
the manufacture of arms and munitions a full equipment of
specifications, plans, gauges, jigs, and tools. He had only to decide
what weapons he wanted, to bring these powers into life. The War
Department had ideas of its own on the processes of manufacture,
for as recently as January 4, 1917, Colonel Francis J. Kernan had
presented an elaborate report on 'Government Manufacture of
Arms 3 to which the Senate had given publicity as a public docu-
ment. The Munitions Standards Board proposed to supplement
and advise and to bring into the departments in Washington the
accumulated experience of those American manufacturers who
had for more than two years been working on Allied account.
34 THE CIVILIANS* TASK
A Cleveland manufacturer of instruments of precision, Frank
A. Scott, was called in as chairman of the new board, and was
surrounded by a group of similar manufacturers, only to learn
before the Board had begun to function that the task called for
broad powers and wide representation which his committee
lacked. There could not be much useful work in the standardizing
of specifications until it could be known what was to be procured.
There could be no knowledge of this until the fighting agencies
had decided what they wanted. And there could be no decision
upon the size of orders until it had been learned what were the full
resources of the United States. The Scott board could not stand-
ardize production unless it could persuade the fighting forces to
accept the standards. Rapidly and inevitably the technical pro-
blems beginning with so abstruse a matter as the pitch of screw
threads expanded into the whole problem of war industry; and
war industry, growing in its demands, became before long the
whole of national industry in war time.
A second phase of the activities of Scott began on April 9, wKen
his establishment was renamed the General Munitions Board and
his membership was enlarged by officers from Army and Navy ap-
pointed to serve with it. His efforts were now directed 'toward
co-ordinating the making of purchases by the Army and Navy, and
assisting in the acquisition of raw materials, and establishing
precedence of orders between the Departments of War and of the
Navy, and between the military and industrial needs of the
country. 3
In the set-up that emerged in April there was such intimate
correlation among the parts of the General Munitions Board and
the Committees on Raw Materials and Supplies that the respective
chairmen could not be certain where the boundaries of their
authority began and stopped. Industry that had to do business
with them had difficulty in discovering where final power lay.
Each of the military departments had its own system of procure-
ment and pride in its own departmental efficiency. The Navy,
with an always simpler problem and incapable of revolutionary
expansion, gave what co-operation it must to the new machinery
QUARTERMASTER PROBLEMS 35
of survey and control, but escaped the unsettlement to which the
Army had to submit. The Army, due at the first estimates for
a fivefold increase, and destined to cope with further increases
that came more rapidly than the War Department could estimate
them, lacked personnel and plans.
In spite of the real advance in control following the creation of
the General Staff of the Army, no satisfactory balance had ever
been established between the General Staff as adviser of the
Secretary of War and the permanent bureaus of the War Depart-
ment through which the peace Army was actually governed, fed,
clothed, and armed. There was a perpetual feud between the
Chief of Staff and the Adjutant-General, and competition among
the several supply bureaus of the Army, each of which bought for
itself. Procurement in the Civil War was a costly mess, less hamper-
ing than it might have been because most of the supplies of the
Army in 1861 did not differ greatly from commodities of ordinary
manufacture and use. The war with Spain lasted only long enough
to indicate how complete would have been the defects of manage-
ment had it lasted longer. Neither war presented the necessity
to convert to military use the maximum power of the nation, or to
create for this use elaborate machines and weapons unknown
to peace. War manufacture in 1861-65 was peace manufacture
expanded; in 1917-18 it was new manufacture upon an unknown
scale.
Until the spring was well advanced there was not even agree-
ment upon the supplies to be required. In so simple a matter as
the uniforms of troops there was but a loose knowledge of the sizes
that must be ordered, and the proportion of each. The tables of
sizes, based on experience with soldiers in the old Regular Army,
broke down. The uniform prescribed in existing regulations was
so close-fitting that the better it fitted the less was it suited for field
service; yet to maintain military smartness it must fit. The quar-
termasters carried coats in eighteen sizes, breeches in thirty-two,
and protested in vain that the adoption of a more suitable and
comfortable uniform would reduce the number of sizes to six or
eight. Not until the draft men began to come to camp was it
36 THE CIVILIANS' TASK
learned that their distribution of sizes was different from expecta-
tion. Small men were enrolled, whom the old Army would have
rejected as undersize; the Granger States sent large men in such
numbers as to leave many of them for a time unclad. Even had
there been agreement as to the type of shoe best suited to field
service there was no experience that would have brought into the
depots the extremes of sizes necessary for the comfort of patriotic
feet. It was equally undesirable to leave a soldier out of uniform,
or to interrupt manufacture to make his clothes to order.
There was no foreknowledge of the rapidity of the consumption
of uniforms. The War Department knew how rapidly uniforms
wore out in time of peace, but had no means of estimating their
deterioration and loss in time of war, or the size of the reserve that
must be maintained. When Pershing cabled back from G.H.Q.
in France that uniforms disappeared four times as fast as in the old
Army, the news was slow in reaching the Quartermaster-General,
whom Army regulations made responsible for their procurement.
Even the number of men in France from day to day was kept back
from him, as a military secret, until his task became next to im-
possible.
The specialized needs that the United States was unready to
meet produced the Aircraft Production Board, an Automotive
Transport Committee, and an Emergency Construction Com-
mittee to advise upon the building of nearly two score new cities to
house the recruits. All of these originated in actions of the Council
of National Defense, as did a Storage Facilities Committee to
house the supplies. But the procurement of the supplies themselves
had in many cases to wait until Army boards had agreed upon the
types of weapons to be used, and until chemists, who were in time
to become the Chemical Warfare Service, had determined what
gases to use for offense and for defense. The organizations created
for purposes in connection with these supplies run to nearly five
thousand titles in the Handbook of Economic Agencies (1919), pre-
pared when most of them had become only historical. While they
operated, they got in each other's way, experimented and blun-
dered, showed all the weaknesses of emergency organizations
BERNARD M. BARUGH 37
manned by the willing but inexpert; but they performed an
unavoidable service as the Army prepared for war.
In the end, the preparation of the Army depended upon raw
materials and their use. This was foreseen in the committees of
the Advisory Commission as Baruch and Rosenwald mobilized
their assistants to supply the General Munitions Board with know-
ledge and to speed the letting of contracts for the Army and Navy.
Bernard M. Baruch had no special fitness for the task assigned
him except a devotion to Woodrow Wilson, a long experience in
building his own fortune on the treacherous bottoms of Wall
Street, and an uncanny set of hunches that had served him well
when he bought a mine or sold its stock. He talked the language
of business so that men who must adjust themselves to new condi-
tions could get his meaning. And he had no respect for the red
tape with which conventional government must ordinarily sur-
round itself to protect the public interest.
But his was a new kind of task for which there did not exist the
kind of specialist called for in the statute. His Committee on Raw
Materials utilized the machinery of the Bureau of Mines and of the
Department of Commerce as it studied available resources in
nitrates, rubber, tin, manganese, and those other key materials
without which the production of munitions must stand still. He
discovered what had been thus far only an academic fact that
many of these lay outside the United States, and could be procured
only through a control of trade for which no legal authority ex-
isted. Ocean tonnage was still as scarce as though the United
States had remained at peace. Allied merchant ships carried only
the cargoes acceptable to Allied interests. Until Congress should
make it legal for the Government to bargain for bottoms and to
exercise the power to stop trade unless conducted on American
terms, the United States program must remain secondary to that
of the Allies in the war against Germany.
Baruch was aware that steel and coal would shape the program,
and that the requirements of the Government for munitions would
immediately produce a clash between the fighting needs of the
United States and the operating needs of the factories and rail-
38 THE CIVILIANS' TASK
roads that must supply the people as well as equip the forces.
He learned, if he did not know it already, that the price level
would have much to do with the volume of possible output. In-
dustry could not produce and sell below the rising costs of produc-
tion. If Government conceded reasonable wage increases to
workers, it must allow reasonable price increases to those who paid
the wages. With the total supply of raw materials insufficient for
all the demands (and the Government was soon demanding for its
exclusive use more steel than all the furnaces could produce), some
must come first, some last, and some not at all. This involved
priority.
As the Committee on Raw Materials brought forth its organiza-
tion, its sub-committees were manned with men drawn from the
industries and set to serve the Government. Before the end of
June there were co-operative committees in nearly forty basic
industries working under Baruch. They ranged from alcohol and
aluminum to wool and zinc. Their rosters carried key names. By
their very completeness they raised new problems, for the Govern-
ment must buy from the firms whose employees were the only
persons who knew enough to advise the Government whence to
buy. In many cases Baruch's men, working for a dollar a year and
planning to frame their pay checks, were still carried on the pay-
roll of the firms that lent them to him. It was, indeed, possible to
detach some of them from their old jobs, and eventually this was
done. But in the early stages in procurement the Government was
always subject to embarrassment. It could be charged that such
men as these could not serve two masters and that contracts went
by favoritism. Yet as experience produced a completer under-
standing it could not be dodged that the program in hand com-
pelled the Government to reach down into every basic industry,
to learn its resources and methods, and to devise means for secur-
ing tmcolored advice that would be good enough to act on.
The Committee on Supplies had at least the advantage of
a chairman who already knew his trade. President of Sears,
Roebuck and Company, Julius Rosenwald had felt the intense
unpopularity with which retail trade regarded the mail-order
ROSENWALD COMMITTEES 39
house. But he knew, as perhaps no other American knew, the
whole range of requirements of ordinary life: where to get the
goods, where quickly, where cheaply. For nearly forty years,
after the depression of 1873 brought the agricultural machinery
makers into such disrepute that mail-order houses got a toe-hold,
his firm and a few others had studied the market. The Bible might
be lacking on the rural table, or the photograph album, or the
county history, but the fat mail-order catalogues were almost
certain to be there, embellished with picture and price of every-
thing from nutmeg graters to gas engines. And shopping by lamp-
light had become a major indoor sport after rural free deliveries
made it easy for the Post Office to serve these firms.
Baruch concentrated on raw materials. The finished products
over whose purchase Rosenwald set up a supervision did not in-
clude actual munitions of war, but ran to food, textiles, leather,
and the multitude of little gadgets with which life operates. The
Rosenwald committees, less numerous than those of Baruch, could
operate promptly, for the Army needed much of many things al-
ready under production. Orders here need not await long techni-
cal discussions about jigs and gauges. Nevertheless these commit-
tees were formed under conditions that brought them under the
same suspicion that embarrassed those of Baruch. No chief of
a sub-committee was of use to Rosenwald unless he knew his trade.
If he knew this, he had an attachment to some one of the producers
anxious for contracts. And this made him suspect.
But the Army had no unified buying system, no trained per-
sonnel to be spared to build one; and each of its bureaus had a long
series of unimportant specifications for simple items to which it
clung. The items had so wide a range as to call for reinforcement
by specialists; whether in the name of Sergeant Irving Berlin to
oversee the equipment of sheet music for 390 bands in the A.E.F.,
or in that of the unknown aide who designed the 9,224,210 brushes
with which the Army fought the enemy and which had to be ex-
tracted from fifty-nine factories in the United States. As costly
as this variation in specifications was the competitive buying that
brought different bureaus into the market for the same inadequate
supply.
4 THE CIVILIANS' TASK
Charles Eisenman, vice-chairman of the Committee on Supplies,
became at once the shadow of the Quartermaster-General., and
took on so much substance that it became difficult to differentiate
him from his chief. Under ordinary circumstances each contract
for supply would have been required by law to be advertised,
subjected to competitive bidding, and awarded to the lowest
bidder. There had grown up around the Army bureaus a shoal of
middlemen, bidding for contracts that they could not fill, and that
they intended to sublet when and if their bids were accepted.
These were in opposition at once to any scheme by which the
Government should buy directly from the producer; they told their
tale of disappointment, suggesting favoritism, to every ear that
would listen under the dome of the Capitol Their criticism be-
came more plausible when, on April 12, as the law allowed in the
emergency, the Secretary of War permitted contracts to be let
without competitive bids. Henry G. Sharpe, the Quartermaster-
General, appreciated help and needed it. But in the rush of busi-
ness the contractor hardly knew whether he was bound to the
Government of the United States or to a volunteer official of no
legal standing. At times he delivered his goods subject to adjust-
ment of price when someone had time to get around to it. In
theory the Committee on Supplies advised, in practice Eisenman
determined, in the early weeks of war.
While Congress authorized loans and enacted the draft, and its
committees deliberated upon next steps in war policy, the Council
of National Defense presided as best it could over a patriotic
madhouse. Honest devotion and hard work were the redeeming
features in a job that had no precedents. In 1919 and after, a mul-
titude of Republican-controlled investigating committees, hopeful
of the worst, scrutinized the performance. They uncovered igno-
rance and error, but found few and unimportant evidences of
malfeasance. Every day brought the announcement of new war
organizations and more committees. The managers of fresh
ventures, virgin to the ways of Washington, worked each as though
he were the only bearer of responsibility. The permanent em-
ployees of the Government, slowed to the easy stride of civil serv-
ENTHUSIASM IN WAR SERVICE 41
ice. often could not understand new colleagues who did not know
there was a time-clock. When the new enthusiasts failed, no one
had time to eliminate the wreckage. When they succeeded, bat-
teries of desks crowded their gorged offices, overflowed into the
corridors, shifted into apartment houses whose occupants were
turned into the streets between dawn and bedtime, and migrated
soon to mushroom buildings on vacant lots. Men who had lived
their business lives in bitter competition and worked for money
learned to love the thrills that came when working on an unpaid
job for the sake of the job. And the members of the Advisory Com-
mission, responsible for much, and watching it all, fed Congress
with so many proposals for helpful legislation that a bewildered
Congress wondered whether they or it bore the responsibility.
But the effective work of the civilian volunteers, like that of the
Government itself, had its limits. These were set at the frontier
where legal authority was necessary for further action. The morale
work of the committees, operating among intangibles, had an im-
portance to be guessed at but never measured. Their administra-
tive powers, as the law stood, were unimportant. Neither they
nor the Government could go safely far beyond the law.
Upon the return of Herbert Hoover to the United States in May,
it took but a fortnight for him to work out of the Food Committee
of the Council of National Defense and to receive status as volun-
tary Food Commissioner under the President. The powers needed
before he could work with the sanction of the law behind him were
asked of Congress and began to be discussed as soon as the Selec-
tive Service Act was passed. But the discussion was long and
tedious, continuing until the planting season had given way to the
harvest. The first important addition to the powers of the Presi-
dent, in the field in which Baruch, Rosenwald, Scott, and Hoover
were operating, was attached as an amendment to a law that
happened to be passing the Espionage Act, signed on June 15.
By this enactment exports were brought under the control of the
Government.
There were various reasons for the control of exports by the
United States. One of these was the continuance, in spite of
42 THE CIVILIANS' TASK
American entry, of the trade restrictions by which the Allies
endeavored to conserve tonnage and to narrow the opportunity
of the enemy to derive advantage from trade borne in Allied or
neutral bottoms. Until the United States should assume similar
responsibility with reference to its own exports, the Allies were
unwilling to lift the vexatious hand which their control of the seas
had enabled them to lay upon all American trade.
Another of the reasons was the American need for the home-rule
of native tonnage, for the procurement of raw materials obtainable
only outside the United States, and for the control of the destina-
tion of American-produced supplies. Under the new empowering
act an Exports Council was at once created, with Vance G. Mc-
Gormick as its agent. McCormick had been chairman of the
Democratic National Committee in 1916; he now turned his
organizing ability to the management of a Bureau of Export
Licenses, with law behind him.
The date of the Espionage Act marks the end of another of the
chapters of American preparation. Just a month earlier Nivelle
had been relieved of his command on the Western Front where his
drive had broken down. Petain replaced him, and in his turn was
succeeded as French Chief of Staff by Foch. France needed help
more bitterly than was revealed or than has been remembered
with victory won. On the day of the passage of the act, in the
Picpus Cemetery in Paris, Pershing laid his wreath at the tomb of
Lafayette. He might have uttered, had he thought of them, in his
French that Harbord has described as 'not exactly God-given . . .
but never misunderstood,' the famous words 'Lafayette, we are
here.' They were, indeed, uttered in his behalf by one of his
colonels after a parade battalion of the Sixteenth Infantry had
marched to the same cemetery on July 4. But such words, on
either occasion, were a reckless promise for whose fulfillment the
means had only just begun to be devised.
III. THE MIND OF THE CITIZEN
A HE keen wits of Secretary Baker were not deceived as to the
reality that lay behind the 'physical manifestations' accompanying
the American preparations for war. 'There is nothing great in the
world but man,' he has said; 'and nothing great in man but mind.'
He foresaw that 'the future historian' would find a 'mental cause'
behind the material consequence, and that 'the thing which
ultimately brought about the victory of the Allied forces . . . was
not wholly the strength of the soldier . . . but . . .was rather the
mental forces that were at work . . . producing . . . that unconquer-
able determination that this war should have but one end.' The
minds of the citizens of the United States, working for the moment
in close harmony, were assisted in maintaining that harmony by
the activities of a Committee on Public Information.
It would have been possible to let the military mind prevail; to
clamp down the lid of a tight censorship upon all news and opinion
lest some of it, released, give aid and comfort to the enemy. It
would have been equally possible to erect a propaganda agency to
speak as dogmatic truth the doctrine most acceptable to the
Government. For nearly three years the United States had been
flooded with documents emanating from every Government at
war, telling, each of them, the story of official wish, attacking the
good faith of the enemy, and shading off at the margins into lies
too clumsy for belief except where the will to believe had doped
the conscience and stupefied the intellect. The President had been
blamed as obtuse; but there was deep irony in the sentence of his
peace circular of December 18, 1916: 'The objects which the
statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war
44 THE MIND OF THE CITIZEN
are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own
people and to the world. 5
It was not possible for the United States to escape the danger
that the leakage of military secrets might be disastrous, or the
necessity to inform the mind that asked for facts and reasons.
The United States lacks that condition of parliamentary govern-
ments, in which the ministers of the moment sit with the lawmakers,
able to challenge the irresponsible, and subject to interrogation
every day. It has no official mouthpiece except as the President,
from time to time and on occasions of his own choice, may address
the people. Possessing a written Constitution with a mandatory
statement that 'Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, 5 it was impracticable to prevent
the utterance of statements and opinions such as snarl the processes
of government, misinform the public mind, and confuse the issue
on every public question. Less misleading than propaganda, more
liberal than censorship, there was need for a channel through
which facts might be used to wash away the foundations of false-
hood or misconception and to establish liaison between the Govern-
ment and the citizens upon whose minds democratic government
must stand or fall.
Seven days after the declaration of a state of war, the Secretaries
of State, War, and Navy addressed to the President a letter urging
him to erect an 'authoritative agency 3 for the publication and
dissemination of facts about the war. Wilson acted the next day,
April 14, naming the same secretaries as a Committee on Public
Information, for which a contentious journalist, George Creel,
was appointed executive. *A man of primitive violence/ as Collier's
described him somewhat aptly in the autumn, Creel had been an
editor and free-lance writer for nearly half of his forty years. His
literary urge was to range from Quatrains of Christ (1907) to Ireland's
Fight for Freedom (1919). He gloried in the duty he now undertook
and when it was done he described it in How We Advertised America
( 1 920) . In his journalistic career Creel had trod on many political
toes; he continued so to tread, and not always discreetly. His
tongue was too restive for easy control. Men whose plans he had
DEGREE OF CENSORSHIP 45
impeded sat too numerously in Congress for his comfort in the
months to come. But he could act quickly. Within a few days of
his appointment he took over an old-fashioned dwelling on Jackson
Place, opposite the White House. His warrant gave him easy ac-
cess to all the departments, and in the White House he could
always reach the President. He sent his fellow craftsmen every-
where, searching for news.
The appointment of Creel was described as that of a censor by
newspapers afraid their freedom to print would be curtailed.
Censor he was not, in any exact sense; for censorship implies
scrutiny and control in advance of publication or utterance. At
no time during the war was such a censorship in existence except as
military commanders prevented release of news from within their
lines, and as the foreign-language press was required to submit
translations. At no time was there an antecedent barrier to utter-
ance and publication for the individual ready to risk the legal
consequences in case his action became the cause of injury. The
right of Congress to punish military crime is quite as complete as is
the freedom of the citizen in speech and in press; and there is no
reason for supposing that the latter freedom carries with it release
from the consequences of publication. Libel and slander remain
actionable even under the First Amendment to the Constitution;
sedition comes about when the free tongue and pen do damage to
the State. In a unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court, Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes (whose opinions even in dissent have come
to be treated as inspired) declared:
It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hin-
drance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long
as men fight, and that no court could regard them as protected by
any constitutional right.
Under a censorship an anonymous censor determines in advance
what shall be printed; under the First Amendment it becomes the
duty of the courts to determine whether damage has been done.
There is a difference.
It was the view of Creel, and of the group of journalists who
46 THE MIND OF THE CITIZEN
made up his staff, that their business was to release the news.
Every department of the Government was nervous, fearful lest a
slip should give information to the enemy, and disposed to treat
innocent news as vital military secrets. Creel conceived that full
news of the American effort would add another to the weapons of
offensive war. He entered into a prolonged campaign to lift the
lid, to compel the departments to give his men the news, and to
procure for this news the widest publicity. His offices were open
twenty-four hours of the day. As rapidly as his staff assembled
material, the piles of mimeographed releases were made ready for
distribution to the newsmen for whom access to the bureaus was
generally barred. Correspondents used the releases in their
stories. A 'country editor 5 was brought to Jackson Place to pre-
pare a weekly digest of the news for rural papers, whose mailing list
soon reached 12,000 offices. It became desirable to keep track of
the news released, so on May 10 appeared the first number of the
Official Bulletin, in which the items were printed the day after the
correspondents had used them and which reached a daily circula-
tion of 1 18,000 in the summer of 1918.
Much led to more; as men came to the C.P.I, with plans to help
disseminate fact and argument, Creel took them on. A volunteer
from Chicago brought him the idea of a brigade of speakers; men
with self-restraint enough to stop in four minutes, who should be
briefed with appropriate material from Washington, and who
should slip to the stage in front of the screen in movie theaters.
Creel thought, when he summarized the work of the Four-Minute
Men, that 75,000 such had addressed 7,555,190 audiences carrying
their message. A speaking division was created to send more
formal orators on tour. Advertising men were mobilized to con-
tribute their technique. Artists were tied into the organization to
draw posters and cartoons. Films were prepared showing the
nature of the American effort. Far from suppressing the foreign-
tongued as though they were a class apart, Creel turned his
material into as many dialects as he could find, fed the foreign-
language press, and found it as anxious as any to co-operate. He
sent his agents abroad to advertise the United States and to force
PUBLICITY WORK 47
through the close lines of the enemy an explanation of the Ameri-
can cause and a picture of the preparation. He pressed everywhere
the wedge that Wilson had started between the enemy peoples and
their Governments, and among the allies of the Central Powers.
From Jackson Place his staff assembled the raw materials of
news, publicity, and propaganda. Pamphlets soon began to
appear, explaining and interpreting with more good conscience
than men are apt to keep in time of war: How the War Came to
America; The War Message and the Facts Behind It; Why Working
Men Support the War; War Cyclopedia; and a multitude of others
until the C.PJ. could count 75,099,023 pieces of printed matter
that it circulated. An extra-legal agency, created without author-
ity and supported out of the President's special fund, the Com-
mittee on Public Information invited criticism and received much
of it. Creel became 'whipping boy 3 for the President, his every
utterance searched hopefully for flaws, his every slip and all
journalism is full of these treated as of the heart. Once or twice
his overconfidence in the accuracy of offices describing their own
work betrayed him when the performance did not come up to
promise. But the Official Bulletin became not only an experiment
in government journalism, but also the best of single sources upon
the flow of daily events.
Apart from the work of the C.P.I, as publicity bureau and as
impresario, the doctrine that it held and spoke, and offered for the
adherence of the citizen, was a weapon of the war. This was freed
at the start from one of the adulterations most deadly to European
propagandas. The United States had none of what was commonly
described as 'ulterior aim.' The defeat of the enemy was the single
objective: and this only in order that an American vision of a
world without war might be raised to reality. No belligerent on
either side of the European contest, except perhaps Belgium, could
be entirely sincere in its statements of war aims. Each had national
cravings dressed up as though their satisfaction were in the
interest of the world. Until the Czarist regime crashed in Russia
there was incongruity in arguing that the war was one of demo-
cratic governments against autocracy. Russia and Italy, at least,
48 THE MIND OF THE CITIZEN
had received promises of ultimate compensation inconsistent with
the claim that they were fighting for peace alone. The complaint
of the Central Powers that the war was forced upon them by an
encirclement by their enemies was as inconsistent with the aggres-
sive mood of Austria-Hungary when invading Serbia, as it was
with the speed of Germany when grasping a military initiative at
the expense of Belgium, Before the entry of the United States it
was equally possible to think of the Allies as determined to elimi-
nate Germany from the map, and of the Central Powers as inspired
by deliberate lust for conquest. Each was in error in describing
the motive of its enemies: neither was entirely frank in stating its
own. The temper of the century compelled every Government to
speak the language of a nation loving peace. This war lacked the
simplicity of motive that makes earlier wars more easy of historical
explanation.
The United States craved no dominion and asked no indemnity.
Its aim was freed from the taint of earthly desire, however it
might be inflated with impracticable vision. The Wilson doctrine
was the doctrine of his C.P.I. It was elaborated in the war of
pamphlets and was explained out of the history of the United
States and of the world. It was rationalized as a reasonable out-
growth of United States experience. It was grounded in the ideas
implicit in the phrase, 'a world safe for democracy.'
Neither picture as presented to the people was entirely fair.
The antithesis of democratic governments and autocracies was less
than complete. The assumption that went with each was less than
warranted. It was lacking in historicity to assert that the aims of
democracies had habitually been those of peace and useful to the
world, or that the aims of autocracies were of necessity those of
conquest. It is hardly likely that historians can ever drag from the
record of the past material sufficient to provide adequate sailing
charts for the future. Most causes briefed out of history have only
rationalizations behind them; and even when it is done with more
than average sincerity, as it was in the C.P.I., there still runs
through all of it the distorting influence of a state of mind. The
historians who saw in the United States a democracy of peace were
THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 49
hopeful rather than authoritative. They were helpful, however,
for it was possible to pick out of the American story validated
events with which to construct the sort of picture that Americans
wanted to believe; and that, believed, made firmer their willing-
ness to carry out the war.
The main thesis of the Allies, hardly challenged in the United
States except by those who w T ere discredited as pro-German before
they spoke, was that Germany, a military nation, 'Prussianized 3 by
a ruling class, was ready for war and craving it was a means of in-
creasing national glory. It was easier to overlook flaws in the
argument of the Allies than to argue away the implications of
compulsory military training, the c goose-step,' and the Junker
officer caste, which indeed were facts. Upon the American devo-
tion to a theory of peace and upon the positive aversion to con-
scription or rule by an army, the ideal of a world c safe for demo-
cracy' could be built, and was. War became less distasteful when it
was believed to be a war to end war. Victory by Germany might
be the first phase of a menace to American safety. Gerard, back
from Berlin, threw his recollections as ambassador first into My
Four Years in Germany (1917), and then into Face to Face with
Kaiserism (1918). He told of an Emperor waiting only to finish
with European enemies before dealing with the Monroe Doctrine
and the United States. A peace that would last formed the positive
side of the American doctrine; the reverse displayed a United
States which, to be safe, must live armed to the teeth.
The reasons for American entry, the validity of the picture
sketched by Wilson and disseminated by Creel, came in due time
to be challenged by a younger generation and disputed in the in-
terest of the doctrines of the American minority. C. Hartley
Grattan inquired into the matter, delivering a verdict hostile to
the official view in Why We Fought (1929). Walter Millis, in Road
to War (1935)5 discarded much of Grattan, but found reasons of his
own for believing the United States to have been misled. Charles
C. Tansill, first to make careful use of the great mass of manuscript
already available, brought all students into his debt in America
Goes to War (1938), yet failed to see eye to eye with either of his
50 THE MIND OF THE CITIZEN
predecessors as he displayed his grounds for distrust of the intelli-
gence or sincerity of much of the American war leadership. It
remained for Secretary Baker to make a documented restatement of
what Americans of the war generation thought to be the American
case in Why We Went to War (1936).
With every medium at his disposal Creel displayed the American
case. His staff elaborated it. As an hypothesis it was as close-knit
and coherent as most political hypotheses are, and it was largely
true.
Perhaps as convincing for the moment as any of the illustrative
material brought forward to support the major theses of the war
was the material believed to bear upon the 'war guilt' of 1914.
Georg Michaelis had much to say about it. Speaking as new
Imperial Chancellor in the summer of 1917 (for von Bethmann-
Hollweg was retired in July), Michaelis repudiated e war guilt' and
clung to the official German story that the war had been forced
upon his country. Subsequent investigations by the horde of
historians who tried in the next two decades to fix the matter of
guilt have made it reasonable to believe that Germany did not
'will the war' to occur when and as it happened. Berlin slipped
when it underwrote an arrogant Austria-Hungary in the demands
on Serbia. But at the last minute, in the fatal days of July, 1914,
the German Government made great efforts to prevent the local
struggle from spreading across the map. The subsequent in-
vestigations are far from establishing the fact that Germany was
victim of a plot to destroy its power. This, however, was official
doctrine among the Central Powers as was the opposite among the
Allies.
As the first flurries of bewilderment subsided in the autumn of
1914, the Allies built upon the obvious truth of German readiness
to fight and presented a picture of unnecessary war, precipitated
, deliberately by a military caste, and threatening the world. None
of the immediate diplomatic publications of the various combat-
ants was inclusive enough to prove the truth of this. Many of the
official collections published on both sides sinned by omission, part
statement, and even fraud. All suffered from lack of full know-
'DEMOCRACY VERSUS AUTOCRACY' 51
ledge. But the Allied picture helped make up the American mind.
Wilson eventually accepted it and after the breach presented its
details in his public utterances. Henry Morgenthau, his ambassa-
dor at Constantinople, sustained it by recalling utterances quoting
the Kaiser as saying in May, 1914, that war was inevitable. He
made this more specific by recalling details passed to him at his
post; details of a conference at Potsdam, July 5, 1914, only a few
days after the funeral of the archduke and the opening of the re-
built Kiel Canal, at which it was said to have been decided that der
Tag had come. The elaboration of this conspiracy, with Germany
in the leading role, had propaganda values whether true or not.
And elaborated it was. The War Cyclopedia fell for it, though cau-
tiously prefacing its summary with the caveat c it is asserted. 3 How
far a belief in the conspiracy cooked up at Potsdam turned men's
minds can only be guessed at. But it was unsound. The events
recalled by Morgenthau had not occurred as he related them.
Much sounder and as useful was the proof of the intrigue by
German officials in the United States; to destroy plants, to deceive
labor, and to do sabotage. Here there were official records and
cross-examined facts. And as useful, too, informing the mind that
sought to know why democracy and autocracy were in clash were
descriptive pamphlets of the C.P.L, such as German War Practices;
The German War Code; The Government of Germany, in which was
brought out the undemocratic character of the German Govern-
ment. The war-practice booklets showed the degree to which the
modern German officer had carried war away from the wise mod-
eration of the earlier German, Francis Lieber, who prepared for
the use of Union armies in the Civil War the first rule book of its
kind: Instructions for the Government of Armies in the Field. This had
been published as General Orders 100, in 1862.
The American hypothesis of democracy versus autocracy had its
considerable, if incomplete, basis in fact. It was, however, an
affair of the intellect, and like most structures of the intellect it had
less influence than fear or hate upon men's minds. The hate mills
set to work. Not often did their output bear the imprint of the
C.P.I., but private names and private organizations were enthusi-
52 THE MIND OF THE CITIZEN
astic sponsors. The National Security League, founded in 1914 to
advance preparedness, loaded itself now with the duty to keep
America loyal, saw traitors behind Teutonic names, and suspected
dangerous liberalism when Creel and his men were moderate in
their denunciations. It launched a campaign for 'Patriotism
through Education,' published a Handbook of the War for Public
Speakers (1917), and hardly concealed a deep Republican suspi-
cion that a Democratic Administration could not be loyal. The
Wilson distinction between the enemy peoples and their Govern-
ments was disruptive as it worked across the lines. At home, by its
very moderation, it ran counter to a human tendency to hate an
enemy and to distrust those who were moderate in their hates.
At one point the C.P.I, paused and by the pause it established
itself as different from many of the propaganda agencies whose
pages had been thrust before American eyes since 1914. It did
almost nothing with 'atrocities. 3 The War Cyclopedia, prepared for
the use of speakers, referred in general terms to these and spoke,
indeed, more than it knew, but it refrained from citation of specific
cases, although it referred the reader to the Bryce report on Bel-
gium. Nothing in the war argument worried the American Ger-
man more than the allegations of murder and maltreatment done
by his relatives in Belgium and France. A documented proof of
these would have had superlative value as a propaganda docu-
ment, and to prepare this Creel set a distinguished historian to
work. It was supposed that the material would be easy to find,
but no Atrocities' were discovered sufficiently documented to be
used and nothing was faked. The matter was dropped to the
lower temperature of a technical study of military illegalities. It
was neither hatred of Germany that did most of the work as binder
of minds, nor affection for the Allies. As involvement in the war
progressed a conviction grew that somehow or other a better
world was within reach once victory was won.
Alongside the positive doctrines of the war, the C.P.I, worked
to resolve doubts, and at particular points to counteract and com-
bat specific oppositions. Before the war session of Congress met,
most of the groups opposing participation had dwindled, because
THE SOCIALIST PARTY 53
they were convinced, or were In hopeless minority, or were un-
willing to incur popular hostility. The organized Socialists, how-
ever, had issued an anti-war manifesto In the spring, and called an
extraordinary national convention that met in St. Louis the day
after the declaration. Here Morris Hillquit advised some two
hundred delegates that 'the country has been violently, need-
lessly, and criminally involved in war.'
The nature of the Socialist Party, based upon dues-paying
members, was such as to make it uncertain how much weight
ought to be ascribed to party pronouncement. Its voting strength,
always much in excess of its registered membership, had never
been large enough to influence a national election. Beginning
with some 94,000 in 1900, at the first candidacy of Eugene V.
Debs, this was built up to 897,000 at his fourth candicacy in 1912.
There was no reason to suppose that so many voters espoused his
doctrine. His totals were increased by protest votes of persons dis-
satisfied with trends or candidates of the major parties, as the
totals of the Prohibition Party had sometimes been. In 1916, be-
hind a candidate less inspiring than Debs, and after many Pro-
gressive protest votes had dropped away, the Socialists polled but
585,000. Socialist doctrines had never spread greatly in the United
States. Labor held itself aloof. Socialist leaders were so often of
foreign birth German, Austrian, or Russian that the party
hardly appeared to be an American body. Not pacifist by convic-
tion, the Socialist Party was against all wars but its own, Hillquit
describing it as a 'militant, revolutionary organization.' In the
weeks before its anti-war convention many of its supporters
dropped out, making public explanations why they could not op-
pose this war. After the St. Louis convention more retired. Upton
Sinclair and John Spargoleft it voluntarily. Charles Edward Rus-
sell was expelled. A. M. Simons denounced it as scuttled by 'Ger-
man nationalistic jingoes and anarchistic impossibilities.' Debs
and Victor L. Berger stood by their doctrine and faced the growing
unpopularity of their position.
Socialists nowhere had held generally to their avowed determi-
nation not to fight for their countries. In Europe they marched
54 THE MIND OF THE CITIZEN
off with their regiments at mobilization with rank and file hardly
depleted by conviction. Some of their leaders had in all countries
stood out longer, forming even in Germany an opposition critical
of national aims and methods. The utterances of these brought
to many of them quick punishment as seditious; and to all of them
wide publicity, as quotations leaked across the borders to be
handled as though they were expressions of responsible minorities.
The events in Russia, from the deposition of the Czar until the
Bolshevik triumph in November, 1917, were inspiring to Socialists
wherever they found themselves. As the succession of Russian
provisional governments side-stepped to the left through the sum-
mer, the Russian radicals claimed to speak for all common people
who bore the burden of capitalist and imperialist war, and called
upon proletarians of the world to unite with them for revolution
and peace. In May, a few days after Kerensky had taken over the
ministries of War and Justice, their Council of Workmen's and
Soldiers' Deputies came out for peace based upon twin doctrines:
e no annexations, no indemnities,' and 'the right of all nations to
determine their own destiny.' Leaders as far apart as President
Wilson and the German Socialists could accept these. The latter,
for the moment allowed to get out of hand in the Reichstag, put
through a resolution, July 19, demanding the former of the aims.
It was inevitable that in the United States those who stayed
Socialist should desire to co-operate in this, and that many who
had been reluctant to enter war were ready to accept these utter-
ances as made in good faith. A People's Council for Democracy
and Terms of Peace was born in Madison Square Garden at a
Memorial Day conference, shortly after the Russian plea was
heard. Hillquit and Berger were there; as were Lochner, who had
steered the Ford peace mission in 1915 and who now thought this
was a 'ground swell,' and Oswald G. Villard, whose Nation was
now out of sympathy with most of the group who had been its
mainstay. Tumulty refused to procure an audience with the
President for the committee of the conference: but headquarters
appeared, and its propaganda stayed in the limelight until the
autumn.
SOCIALIST PEACE PLANS 55
The immediate objective of the People's Council was represen-
tation of the United States at a Stockholm Conference, called by
Russian Socialists for September, at which plans were to be formu-
lated for the people to take over their governments and end the
war. It had been announced, even before the People's Council
was formed, that the United States would send no agents, and
that the State Department would withhold passports from persons
desiring to go as delegates from private organizations. The Lon-
don Saturday Review opined that the conference would doubtless be
attended by 'a considerable number of tricksters and traitors. 3
When the German Government gave support to the conference, as
though in sympathy with its proponents, the project was de-
nounced as a plot for a German peace. Lincoln Steffens was re-
ported as convinced that Germany desired it not for peace but to
save kaiserism.
The Stockholm Conference was postponed from time to time,
because its international character was blocked by general passport
trouble. But the People's Council continued its advocacy of terms
of peace as urged by Russia and endorsed by the Reichstag, and
determined to hold its own convention in the Middle West about
the time the conference at Stockholm ought to have met. It was
easier to call such a convention than to find hosts who would wel-
come it. North Dakota was considered, whither Governor Lynn
J. Frazier was said to have invited it, and thither a special train,
jeered at as the 'rabbit special,' departed August 30 from New
York. Ex-Senator John D. Works held a meeting in its favor in
Los Angeles, but he resigned from the Council when he became
convinced that it was a Socialist annex. Fargo, the North Dakota
destination, was abandoned as a meeting place in favor of Minne-
apolis, whose mayor extended an invitation without reckoning
with the Governor of Minnesota, who forbade the Council to as-
semble in his State. Two Wisconsin towns, Hudson and Mil-
waukee, were suggested and abandoned, until at last Mayor
William Hale Thompson permitted it to come to rest in Chicago.
Here it met and passed its resolutions, surrounded by a hostile
publicity that defeated its purpose and challenged by another
56 THE MIND OF THE CITIZEN
organization launched by Gompers with the aid of Creel for the
specific purpose of combating radical movements.
The American Alliance of Labor and Democracy was put to-
gether in New York before the end of August to be a militant fly-
ing squadron, with a mission to challenge every statement that
labor did not support the war. Gompers knew much about the
left-wing movements within the American Federation of Labor.
These had long sought to turn labor into a political party, a move-
ment that he distrusted and despised. He had opposed them suc-
cessfully in his annual conventions. He now fought the People's
Council when it attempted to detach labor from the war. When
the 'rabbit special 5 left New York on its devious search for a place
to meet, the 'red, white, and blue' special of the American Alliance
followed it on September 2, with a welcome assured. Invited to
Minneapolis, there it went. The President wrote Gompers a letter
of congratulation upon the effort: and the Minneapolis resolutions
were drafted as though the authors had the war speeches of the
President under their eye. The American Federation of Labor,
at its annual meeting in November, sustained the policy of Gom-
pers by a vote of 21,579 to 402, and listened to Wilson expound his
own ideas in person. There was no room for pacifism in the Ameri-
can Federation: to avow one's self interested in peace as immedi-
ately obtainable was to invite denunciation as pro-German.
The intensity of the fight to keep the American mind behind the
war was out of proportion to the importance of the various minor-
ity movements that were either critical or in open opposition.
Ready to accept war in April, convinced that it knew why it was
right to accept war in midsummer, American loyalty was exasper-
ated by opposition however slight. Toward the end of the war
session of Congress, and soon after the collapse of the demonstra-
tion of the People's Council, Senator La Follette spoke before
another of the out-of-step brigades and fell victim to the burdens
of opprobrium.
The Nonpartisan League, a Western offshoot of the Progressive
movement, flared up in North Dakota in 1915. Capturing its
State with the ease with which any angry electorate can always
SENATOR LA FOLLETTE 57
capture Its State, It was proceeding upon its course of economic
self-help when war broke out. It was not greatly interested in the
war. It was willing to suspect that any policy approved by finance
and business in the East was wrong. It readily absorbed a part of
the doctrine preached by La Follette and his associates in the
Senate that the war was one of big business in which the United
States ought not to be involved. Having fought big business the
North Dakota voters liked to believe the worst about it. But when
the People's Council tried to bring the Nonpartisan League Into
Its organization, the leaders of the latter stayed out. When La
Follette addressed the annual convention of the Nonpartisan
League in St. Paul, September 20, the Nonpartisan Leader endorsed
his utterances upon free speech, but declined to accept him when
c he speaks of the causes of the war and gives his interpretation of
the events leading up to it. 3
There was no concealment of La Toilette's bitter opposition to
American entry. He had used in his remarks upon the war resolu-
tion the words: 'Germany has been patient with us.' And he had
made the words even more deliberate by withholding the draft of
the speech from immediate publication in the Congressional Record,,
and by leaving the words in the copy finally provided for the pub-
lic printer. He now repeated at St. Paul what every reader of the
Congressional Record knew by heart; but he did not say what the
Associated Press attributed to him: c We had rio grievances.' Too
late for it to do him any good, the Associated Press acknowledged
its interpolation of the word c no/ and made apology. Another of
the storms of denunciation to which La Follette was accustomed
broke about him. His constituents passed resolutions repudiating
him. There was a movement in the Senate to expel him. Vierectfs
was doing his reputation no good by declaring that the 'stars seem
to point to Robert M. La Follette as the leader in the fight to make
democracy safe at home*; a distinguished historian wrote to the
New Tork Times that only Aaron Burr was 'more ready to betray
democracy for his own selfish ends'; Roosevelt was quoted as say-
ing that La Follette was loyally and efficiently serving one country
Germany. 9 La Follette kept his head up through the storm.
58 THE MIND OF THE CITIZEN
The Senate, for once getting good out of its stubborn insistence on
its privilege, postponed action upon the demand for his expulsion
until the wave of emotion changed its course. But the extreme
isolation into which he and those who thought more or less like
him were thrown became a measure of the unanimity of thought,
in the directing of which the G.P.I. had a hand.
Aversion to the necessity for war was one of the American moods
from which could be evoked a willingness to sustain the 'war to end
wars. 3 Along with this marched a desire to relieve suffering, which
helped to harden the morale.
From the beginning of combat in Europe relief movements of a
sort had grown in popularity in the United States. The German
efforts to send food and milk back home were only in part a de-
vice to bring about an embargo by embroiling the United States
with Britain. They received the sympathetic co-operation of
many who had no sympathy with the German Government. A
similar sympathy created ambulance services and hospitals and
efforts to reconstruct the desolated areas that began to rebuild
almost before the echoes of the guns were silenced. The American
Society of the Red Gross took advantage of this emotion to extend
its chapters and strengthen its organization before 1917.
Congress had not incorporated the American Society of the Red
Cross until 1905, although it had been privately chartered since
1 88 1. Saint Camillus de Lellis, founder of the Agonizants, whose
sixteenth-century badge it used, had been designated as patron
saint of nurses by Leo XIII in 1886. It pushed its membership on
war emotion and raised funds for Washington headquarters, a
memorial to the women of the Civil War. The President spoke at
the dedication of its building, May 10, 1917. Plans were already
afoot to make the Red Cross an auxiliary of the armed services.
As he looked back upon the war, Secretary Baker avowed that
were it to be done by him again he would not permit auxiliaries
under independent management to take the part assumed in 1917
by the Red Cross, the Young Men's Christian Association, the
Knights of Columbus, the Young Men's Hebrew Association, and
the Salvation Army. He would instead perform these services as a
THE RED CROSS DRIVE 59
part of the military organization. But in this reflection Baker was
thinking as administrator of the Army and not in connection with
the contribution of these volunteer associations to the morale
behind the lines. The overworked Army in 1917 was ready to take
aid where it could get it. Before long Baker accepted as an
Assistant Secretary of War Frederick P. Keppel, a dean from
Columbia University, who knew about social workers, college
professors, and the sorts of people who could work better in the
auxiliaries than in the regular service. Looking after these became
a large part of his duty. The citizens whose boys must go to war
let them go the more contentedly when they themselves had a
chance at home to advance the Army welfare.
Himself honorary president of the Red Cross, Wilson announced
on May 10 the erection of a Red Cross War Council, to take over
large responsibilities, human and financial. He borrowed a
Morgan partner, Henry P. Davison, to direct the work. Davison,
used to thinking in millions, announced that during the week
June 18-25, on the heels of registration and the floating of the
First Liberty Loan, they would raise by voluntary contribution
$100,000,000 to enable the Red Cross to be in fact what its charter
stated: c a medium of communication between the people of the
United States of America and their Army and Navy. 3
The Red Cross drive was a financial success. It overshot its
mark by three millions. It accumulated at once five million en-
rolled members whose Red Cross buttons joined the Liberty Loan
buttons and the Service Stars as badges of co-operation. At the end
of the war it claimed twenty million members organized in 17,186
branches. The speakers in the drive, the new members, the local
officers of local chapters, added another layer to the mesh of
patriotic organizations. The other auxiliaries followed with their
own drives, until the Salvation Army doughnuts, hot from the
sizzling kettles just behind the trenches, became a symbol of
service.
The statutes of the United States did not grant enough authority
even to dig out and restrain sabotage and conspiracy while the
neutral status lasted. Conspiracy to obstruct the operation of law
60 THE MIND OF THE CITIZEN
was indeed forbidden, but there was lack of power to differentiate
among those acts which, done in time of peace as no more than bad
manners or misdemeanors, became threatening in their possibility
of evil in time of war. Other nations at war had found it necessary
to revise their criminal statutes in order to reach war crimes.
DORA, the English Defense of the Realm Act, was already a
widely known intrusion upon the affairs of private citizens.
Congress conceived that there would be need for such law. No
one in the United States had foreseen that public opinion, so
nearly unanimous, would do most of its own policing. This was
not visible as fact until Congress had ended its own debate upon
what to do about it.
In the preceding Congress the Senate had considered and passed
a revision of the neutrality act, carrying new provisions for a better
prevention of espionage and sedition, and for a control of the
dissemination of such military information as might be useful to an
enemy. The attempt had lapsed with the end of the session in
March. The fighting departments, and the Attorney-General,
continued to lament the inadequacy of the law and made new
drafts of their desires for the consideration of the new Congress. In
the letter of the three secretaries urging upon the President the
creation of the Committee on Public Information, it was suggested
that the two functions of censorship and publicity might be com-
bined in one body, without any legal authority beyond that of the
commander-in-chief. The censorship functions were thought of as
involving a restraint upon 'premature or ill-advised announce-
ments.' The President went on record, in a letter to Arthur
Brisbane, against a 'system of censorship that would deny to the
people of a free republic like our own their indisputable right to
criticize their own public officials.' But he needed a law to expand
the existing provisions of the criminal code so as to cover sedition
in its various forms, and he did not interpose objection to the pro-
jected censorship and sedition law presented to the judiciary com-
mittees by the Department of Justice.
Debate upon the project was under way even before the declara-
tion of war. It took much of the time of Congress in the fortnight
THE ESPIONAGE ACT 61
after the completion of the loan act. It did not end until the
Espionage Act received the approval of the President on June 15.
In the early days of May both houses were hard at it, giving simul-
taneous consideration to the Administration proposals, as modified
by their committees before introduction. The rider to the measure,
granting a power to control exports, was discussed as a risky con-
centration of discretion in the hands of the President, but the real
fight was upon a group of sections vesting in him the equivalent of
a censorship.
The offensive words, upon which debate turned, came in 'Title
I, Section 4,' which the House reached on May 3. In these, during
war or a threat of war, as declared by the President, the latter was
empowered to 'prohibit the publishing or communicating of . . .
any information relating to the national defense which, in his
judgment, is of such character that it is or might be useful to the
enemy. 3 There was a proviso that nothing should be construed as
restricting criticism of the Government or its agents; but there was
a violent opposition to even so much of a restriction of a free press
as the words contained. Republicans in the House, and some
Democrats, attacked it as inconsistent with the guaranty of the
First Amendment. The Hearst papers gathered and presented a
petition of a million and a half signers against it. The American
Newspaper Publishers' Association opposed it. And editorial
writers went back to the sad history of the Sedition Act of 1798 to
show how contrary it was to the spirit of American institutions.
In this, they were in harmony with American preference. The
Sedition Act, passed by the harassed Federalist Administration
during the naval war with France, had expired in 1 80 1, by a limi-
tation stated in itself. It had never been repeated. There were
none to defend the right of any newspaper to sell for its profit the
military news upon whose secrecy national safety depended; but
the arguments decrying any grant of authority to restrict the press
carried far. Much was made of the useful exposures of British
military incompetence by the Northcliffe papers, and of the
injury to public interest inherent in the military desire to repress
criticism of military performance. It could be shown with con-
62 THE MIND OF THE CITIZEN
siderable soundness that the President already, as commander-in-
chief, possessed large authority to control the dissemination of
military secrets. George S. Graham, a Republican member from
Philadelphia, moved to strike out the offending section, and had in
this the support of Speaker Clark. The House sustained the
motion by vote of 221 to 167, with most of the consistent supporters
of the Administration in the minority. The evidence hardly bears
out the assertion of Josephus Daniels: 'Woodrow Wilson saw to it
that there was no censorship of the press in the United States dur-
ing the World War. 5
It was one thing for the House of Representatives to kill the
censorship, and quite another thing to keep it killed. The Senate
liked it and had its own bill with censorship intact, completed at
the moment when the House bill was brought to it on May 9. In
the interest of simplicity and speed the Senate struck out all of the
House bill but the enacting clause, substituted its own measure,
passed it and sent it to conference on May 14. There were only six
dissenting Senators (three had been 'willful men' and had voted
'no' on the war resolution Gronna, La Follette, and Vardaman)
to oppose the seventy-seven who advanced the measure. It came
from conference with censorship modified, but kept alive by
insistence of Senate conferees; and it went back to conference upon
a House refusal, 184 to 44, to accept the Senate amendment. At
the second conference the Senate surrendered, yielding to House
determination not to vote a censorship. The Espionage Act as
passed gave much new authority to the Government, but not this.
In addition to power to control exports, and a revision of
neutrality details, now unimportant, the Espionage Act gave a new
definition of crimes against the public interest in time of war, and
enlarged the power of the Postmaster-General to see to it that
enemies of the Government did not make use of the mails in ad-
vancing their arguments.
Under its heading Title I, Espionage,' it not only defined
espionage and provided penalties for those convicted of being
spies, but also defined crimes of obstruction or conspiracy that were
likely to interfere with the execution by the Administration of the
'USE OF THE MAILS' 63
acts of Congress. To most of these no serious objection was raised
in either house. The sections granting power to control enemy
aliens and to punish for industrial sabotage, desired by the
Department of Justice, were not included, and the Attorney-
General lamented this omission for several more months. But
the operations of such as might oppose the war were made more
difficult by a section on false reports and false statements, made
willfully, 'with intent to interfere with the operation or success of
the military or naval forces'; and by penalties running to ten
thousand dollars' fine and twenty years' imprisonment for those
who should 'willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination,
mutiny, or refusal of duty ... or shall willfully obstruct the re-
cruiting or enlistment service.'
A remote equivalent of a censorship made its appearance in
'Title XII. Use of the Mails.' It was no new thing for the United
States to get at offenses otherwise, perhaps, outside its jurisdiction,
by exercising its power to control the character of material passing
through the mails. Lotteries had been attacked by this technique.
Obscene literature was similarly banned. The definition of c un-
mailable matter' was now enlarged to include every letter, writing,
circular, postal card, . . . newspaper, pamphlet, book ... in viola-
tion of any of the provisions of this act/ It was made also to include
material of any kind 'advocating or urging treason, insurrection, or
forcible resistance to any law of the United States.' Attempts- to
use the mails for these forbidden purposes were awarded penalties
up to five thousand dollars and five years; and the duty devolved
upon the Postmaster-General and his staff to apply the rule to
matter offered to the mails.
Critics of the measure urged as an objection to it the necessity to
open and examine first-class mail matter in order to determine
whether the law was being violated. This innovation struck at a
cherished right, based upon the sanctity of the mails. Printed
matter, sent unsealed, offered no difficulty to enforcing officers ex-
cept the great labor of examination, but letters were sacred.
Under existing laws there was no right to open a sealed letter
without a search warrant; and while there was some doubt
64 THE MIND OF THE CITIZEN
whether this matter was covered by the constitutional guaranty of
the 'right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable
searches and seizures/ it was certain that indiscriminate examina-
tion of sealed first-class mail would be so unpopular as to defeat its
purpose. The law made it clear that only a duly authorized
'employee of the Dead Letter Office 5 or 'other person upon a
search warrant authorized by law' might 'open any letter not ad-
dressed to himself. 5
The Post Office was not the best place in which to conduct the
filtration of material called for by Title XII. In nearly every case
the determination upon the character of the material called for
information, judgment, and poise not certain to be part of the
equipment of postal inspectors. As the summer advanced, Burle-
son was in increasing controversy with the owners of periodicals in
which he found matter apparently in violation of the law. When he
ruled that a given issue was unmailable, his action prevented its
distribution and the regularity of issue upon which second-class
mailing privilege was based was broken. The next number could
not exercise the privilege thus lapsed, and the owner was forced
again to make application for admission to it. This involved great
loss to the owners and increased the penalty. The American
Socialist was out of the mails immediately upon passage of the law.
Jeremiah A. O 5 Leary 5 s Bull lost its privilege in July. Max East-
man's Masses followed it in August, and Victor Berger 5 s Milwaukee
Leader in October. None of the journals barred under the law was
of wide circulation or influence, but such censorship by indirection
gained them sympathizers in circles that disapproved their policy.
In spite of the complaint of the Attorney-General that the
powers to protect the Government were inadequate, the evidence
of the cases rising under either the exclusion powers of the Post-
master-General or the new definitions of sedition indicates that
sedition was uncommon. Whether it was in fact necessary to pro-
ceed against it is open to debate. The sharp criticism of Govern-
ment and courts by those who disliked any legal coercion was out
of proportion to either the extent of the dislike or the burden of the
coercion. Public opinion settled the matter, for public opinion
EFFECT OF PUBLIC OPINION 65
supported the war and the effort of the Government to carry it to a
successful end. The Espionage Act, as applied, went further than
the words on the statute book., for it was administered by officials
earnest in the war. The powers conferred were extended by
another law, the Trading with the Enemy Act, in October, 1917.
And the Sedition Act, May 16, 1918, incorporated in the statutes
something of the growing impatience with dissent. But the
Espionage Act became a tool to trim the margins of public
opinion. Arrests were made by patriots irritated by any opposi-
tion. Juries, and the panels from which they were selected, had
their ideas about proper behavior in war time, as their indictments
and verdicts proved. Attorneys and judges had too little of that
dispassion that should go with law enforcement. And before final
judgments could be obtained from the Supreme Court upon the
propriety of verdicts, the war was over. Zechariah Chafee, a
professor of law at Harvard, brought out his Freedom of Speech
(1920), lamenting the damage done to the spirit of the First
Amendment. But it was a damage in which neither the Congress
nor the Administration had the first responsibility. The personnel
of bench, bar, and jury were moved; and being moved they gave to
law a scope that those who drafted it had hardly had in mind.
IV. THE WAY TO WIN: SHIPS AND FOOD
JLN THE early days of war, between the delivery of the war message
and the passage of the loan act, while it was still not to be expected
that American armies would fight in France, and before the Allied
Missions arrived with brief-cases bulging with good advice, the
most absorbing question in the United States was how to win.
Woodrow Wilson had recited in his message the matters he could
think of as involved in war. He had indeed mentioned military
participation on the battle front; but he dedicated c our lives and
our fortunes' to victory without more than a guess at the drafts
that were to be drawn upon both. In the war message he signed
a blank check, to be paid by the United States. He stood ready to
write in upon it whatever amount the necessities of the Allies might
call for and already some of the Allies were prepared to tell him
what to do.
David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of England, was one of
these. George had come into Downing Street at the head of his
own Cabinet after his successful dislodgment of Asquith in Decem-
ber, 1916. He had already made his name a synonym for action
and his tongue one for blunt speech. His six fat volumes, War
Memoirs of David Lloyd George (1933-36), bristling with criticisms of
the incompetence of others, have caused more than one reviewer
to inquire: 'Can any statesman in the fog of war have been so often
right? 5 On the Thursday after the declaration he ate with the
American Luncheon Club in London, welcomed his hosts as com-
rades in arms, and told them the duty of the United States: The
road to victory, the guaranty of victory, the absolute assurance of
victory, has to be found in one word, ships, in a second word,
ships, and a third word, ships.' He was at least explicit. Even at
ALLIED SHIPPING LOSSES 67
this, however, he did not reveal to his hearers the terrible damage
done to Allied shipping by the German submarines. Had the
Imperial Government been a little more careful and much less
arrogant in the matter of neutral right and life there is good reason
to suppose that it might have carried its maritime campaign to
success against its enemies. Its blunders brought the United States
into the war. Yet its submarines sunk their millions of tons with
only occasional loss to non-resistant crews. There need not have
been any loss; or at least no more than by prompt avowal and
indemnity would have prevented neutral anger from rising into
war spirit.
In the quarter in which Lloyd George spoke, the second quarter
of 1917, the merchant marine of England alone lost 1,360,000 tons
of ships, making a total of 5,360,000 lost since the beginning of the
war. Every day for the Allied shipyards could not launch new
keels as rapidly as the enemy could sink them the deficit in
tonnage was growing worse. In the very fortnight of the address,
c one out of every four ships leaving the United Kingdom for
overseas' never came back, wrote Edward N. Hurley in The
Bridge to France (1927).
Even before Lloyd George pointed the duty, the United States
had seen an opportunity to win the war by building ships faster
than the U-boats could sink them. The 'bridge of ships' became
one of the slogans of the war, gratifying to those who could feel a
good slogan to be half the victory, and there were few in the United
States to doubt the national capacity for large-scale production.
The existing shipyards did not promise this, for the sixty-odd yards
with some 215 ways had room for an occasional new way, but no
elasticity sufficient to enable them to get beneath the load. Edward
A. Filene was not far wrong when he stated, somewhat later, that
it would take four tons of shipping in continuous operation for
every American soldier in France.
It was not easy for Filene, or anyone else, to speak with precision
of the carrying capacity of ships. World practice had not reduced
ship dimension to a numerical notation intelligible to laymen, or
revealing clearly the capacity of a vessel to carry freight or men.
'68 THE WAY TO WIN: SHIPS AND FOOD
This was the only thing that mattered: the number of actual net
tons of freight that could be packed away in holds. But even tons
could not tell the whole story, for light and bulky freight takes
ship space, and the trick the loader must learn is to fill his hull with
as many tons as his ship can carry, filling at the same time its
cubic capacity so as to waste no space. The men in charge of the
American effort soon learned that little was on record about
'stowage factors' the weight-space requirement of each type
of freight except as seamen by rule of thumb had mastered
them. Locomotives, shipped fully assembled, had one factor; steel
rails another; fodder another; even sausage casings were impor-
tant; and no yarn of the war had more pertinence than that of the
yardmaster with wooden piles to ship to France who cut them
into short lengths so that they would go neatly into the hold.
Existing usage spoke of ships' capacity in four ways, all misleading,
as Hurley had later to explain to Senator Hiram Johnson.
In the United States marine men preferred to talk of "dead-
weight 5 tonnage, or the weight of cargo, coal, and supplies carried
in a fully loaded ship. This was a figure much less than 'displace-
ment* used chiefly for ships of war in which the total weight
of ship, stores, and cargo was given. British usage clung to 'gross
tonnage,' a maritime fiction ascertained by dividing the cubic
space of a ship by an arbitrary 100, on the assumption that 100
cubic feet of freight weighed a ton; but since the cubic space in-
cluded superstructure as well as hold, and there was no uniformity
in the measurement of space, the gross tonnage was an inaccurate
estimate of the capacity of a ship. The term 'net tonnage* meant
the pay-cargo space divided by 100. Net, gross, and deadweight
tonnage were related to each other, only approximately, as 3:5:8.
Ten days after the declaration of war the Emergency Fleet
Corporation took a charter from the District of Columbia and
faced its task. C A separate corporation was formed and I am it,'
wrote Major-General George W. Goethals, builder of the canal at
Panama, to whom the President assigned the post of general
manager. Good-will and a readiness to accept ship contracts
spread far beyond the fences of the existing yards. Construction
THE SHIPPING BOARD 69
companies, with the demand for office buildings checked, were pre-
pared to turn to ships and build new yards. The timber in the
South and West, with 'birds still nesting in their tops/ stood ready
to be logged and fabricated. If ship carpenters had passed out
with the shift from wood to steel, house carpenters might learn the
work. Ingenuity was ready to prove that it was possible to make a
ship of concrete, and have it float. Steelmakers, in the interior of
the country where no navigable water ran, saw no difficulty in
standardizing a type, making the parts wherever there were steel
and factories and labor, and shipping all to assembly yards along
the coast. And Henry Ford, no longer pacifist, conceived an
assembly line at River Rouge from whose ways an endless pro-
cession of light vessels should slide to sea.
The organization of this industrial enterprise, the preparation
of plans, and the operation of the ships when built fell to the duty
of the United States Shipping Board, one of the creations of the
preparedness movement. The Administration had not been blind
to the condition in which the advent of war in 1914 had left the
United States. For a generation, since the steel merchant ship
became the type tool of maritime trade, the United States had per-
mitted the carriage of its exports to be generally in foreign bottoms.
War kept the vessels of the Central Powers locked in port. Sub-
marine excesses lessened the number of neutral carriers that dared
to go to sea. Insurance rates became prohibitive, until the United
States set up war-risk insurance of its own. The Allies needed most
of their own tonnage for their own business, and hired it to Ameri-
can shippers on their own terms or not at all. They carried what
they pleased, whither they pleased, and were able to make their
'blacklists' a death warrant to neutral firms. In 1914 Wilson
urged the creation of a shipping board to build and operate a
merchant fleet under the United States flag, thus to lessen the
painful dependence upon the ships of others. In 1915 this was
made a party measure, but could not be pushed through Congress.
More successful, in September, 1916, when the wave of willingness
to prepare for emergencies pressed upon the constituents of
congressmen, his bill went through.
70 THE WAY TO WIN: SHIPS AND FOOD
It was in late December that Wilson named to the Senate the five
members who were to compose the Shipping Board. He could
hardly have named them much earlier since the law was signed
only on September 7, the day before the session adjourned, while
the new session did not meet until December 4. He named as
chairman William Denman, of San Francisco. It took tact to
get confirmations from the Senate. The Board had a fund of
$50,000,000 with which it was authorized to buy the stock in
a corporation to be formed to build the ships, and it had large
powers in the control of their operation.
The use of the corporation, as a means of avoiding the red tape
incident to construction by the United States, was a novelty whose
advantage had been revealed at Panama where the Government
had had to acquire the stock of the Panama Railroad. A corpora-
tion president was vastly more agile than any bureau chief could
be, for Congress was solicitous to guard against misappropriation
of funds expended by a branch of the Government. American law
surrounded every operation of a financial character with specifi-
cations and accounting rules which slowed it down. Here, speed
was needed: a speed and flexibility comparable to that with which
a United States Steel Corporation or a Pennsylvania Railroad
could meet emergencies and get results.
The Emergency Fleet Corporation was owned by the United
States through the Shipping Board which could control its policy
by voting its stock. Its officers were much the same as those of the
Board; but when they acted as agents of the Emergency Fleet they
acted, not under the restrictive laws of Congress, but under the
general incorporation laws of the State of their incorporation.
What any private corporation could do, they might do. Denman
was president of both Board and Emergency Fleet at the start.
Goethals was general manager of the Fleet, less 'it 5 than he antici-
pated; and before the end of May he was telling the Iron and Steel
Institute in New York that he regarded 'all boards as long, narrow,
and wooden.' In July both he and Denman were thrust aside and
the ship program passed to other hands which could take advan-
tage of the spade-work the first crew had done in preparing for a
SHIPS COMMANDEERED 71
fleet. Wilson delegated Edward N. Hurley, a Chicago Democrat,
to disentangle the snarl. Hurley had been a go-between for the
Wilson proponents and the machine of Roger C. Sullivan, as well
as chairman of the Federal Trade Commission and one of Davison's
co-workers on the Red Cross Board. He remained at the head of
both Shipping Board and Emergency Fleet throughout the war.
Hurley readjusted the relations between the governing Shipping
Board and the operating Fleet Corporation so that a deadlock like
that of Denman and Goethals could not recur. He provided him-
self with the beginnings of a merchant fleet by commandeering on
August 3 for the use of the United States all hulls of twenty-five
hundred tons under construction in American yards. There were
431 of these, aggregating three million deadweight tons, that
might carry cargoes when once they were completed. So far as the
immediate moving of freights was concerned this was no more than
a bookkeeping order. It transferred the ships from the owners who
would have operated them to the United States which would only
slightly modify their use. Many of the hulls were under contract
for foreign owners, so that the commandeering became an inter-
national matter in which the Shipping Board stood fast to its right.
Of a different international slant was the use of the ninety-seven
interned German merchant ships, running in size from the
gigantic Vaterland which was soon to figure in the news as the
Leviathan. These had to be repaired before they could be sent to
sea, for Bernstorff had attempted their disablement.
Yet another international complication was developed in March,
1918, upon the seizure of eighty-seven Dutch ships, of some
533,746 tons, which were at the moment within the jurisdiction of
the United States. Holland, between two deadly belligerents, was
in a jam. The freight the Dutch ships might carry had been dic-
tated to them for many months by the Netherlands Overseas Trust.
Now the very ships were taken from their owners. There had been
tedious negotiations conducted by England and the United States
in a hope that a way might be found whereby the inactive Dutch
tonnage could be utilized, for the owners had preferred loss of
revenue while keeping them in port to loss or damage to ships in
72 THE WAY TO WIN: SHIPS AND FOOD
the war zone. The negotiations were dragged-out and futile since
Germany made it clear that voluntary compliance by the
Dutch, whereby the ships should be used for Allied advantage,
would be followed by German retaliation. And the Netherlands
lived throughout the war in fear of a violation similar to that of
Belgium. The ships concerned, tied to dock in British and Ameri-
can ports, were now seized. Those within the United States were
operated thereafter by the Shipping Board, and since the Dutch
had not been a voluntary part to the seizure the provocation given
thereby to Germany was softened. They were taken subject to
compensation to the Dutch owners for hire and damage, and the
transaction was justified under an old principle of international
law, the right ofangaria, whereby in time of war a nation may turn
to its own use such of the physical property of neutrals as may be
within its jurisdiction. The Dutch Government complained
loudly of the seizure, largely for the German ear. The owners were
fully compensated, even for damage done by Germans which
Germany would have been unlikely to reimburse. Even the insur-
ance liabilities for the dispossessed Dutch crews, under Dutch law,
were assumed by the Shipping Board.
The bookkeeping by which an American merchant fleet was
put on paper counted as part of the fleet the ships not yet com-
pleted, those of the enemy, those taken under angaria, and also
those requisitioned from private American operators and placed
at the control of the Shipping Board. In October all American
ships of over twenty-five hundred tons, fit for use, were taken over
for the account of the Emergency Fleet, to be operated under char-
ters by the owners. Even a few steamers from the Great Lakes
runs, ore boats and grain boats, too long to pass the locks of the
Welland Canal, were cut in two, brought through in halves, re-
united, and sent to sea.
Beginning in April with 'three small rented rooms, 5 the Emer-
gency Fleet Corporation had within a year a score of buildings in
Washington alone. In June, 1918, the Army Quartermaster moved
two hundred truckloads of office material and the personal equip-
ment of the twenty-four hundred central office employees to new
EMERGENCY FLEET CORPORATION 73
working space in Philadelphia, where there was room to grow.
But as yet it had chiefly a paper fleet, without adding many tons
to the available supply of ships.
The real task of the Emergency Fleet was to enlarge this supply,
and upon this problem Denman and Goethals had concentrated
before they parted. To add the fifteen million tons their program
called for (seventeen hundred steel ships, one thousand wood) they
must build an industry up from vacant lots, get steel from the mine
and lumber from the forest, find labor where they could, and let then-
contracts to men whose pre-war business had been something else
than building ships. The chief novelty of the program, beyond a
few fantastic experimental types, was the designing of a 'fabricated'
steel ship a standard vessel whose parts need not be built upon
the ways in crowded yards, but could be manufactured to specifi-
cations anywhere in the United States and put together at tide-
water. Weeks ran to months before the designers could agree upon
shape, type, and engines for the standard ships, so that the specifi-
cations and blueprints could go to fabricating plants. A straight-
line, flat-plate ship, largely the design of Theodore Ferris, set a new
type of which the seven seas knew nothing. It was not good enough
to survive the war in competition with vessels more deliberately
put together, but it was capable of freight service and could be con-
structed quickly.
While wooden shipyards were budding on Southern and Western
waterfronts the Emergency Fleet Corporation prepared the
assembly yards for the new steel ships. Under its contracts, at
Wilmington, North Carolina, at Newark, New Jersey, at Bristol,
Pennsylvania, and on the unoccupied mud flats of the Delaware
River below Philadelphia which the early settlers called Hog
Island, ninety-four new shipways were built. Fifty of these were at
Hog Island alone. The Shipping Board had its vision of a con-
tinuous stream of bottoms slipping into the water, if only the war
should last long enough for the builders to get into their stride.
The engineering and human difficulties of building the yards
through a hard winter made them costly. But the Hog Island yard,
out of a contract let September 13, 1917, laid its first keel five
74 THE WAY TO WIN: SHIPS AND FOOD
months later, February 12, 1918. It had eighty miles of new rail-
road track to serve its two hundred and fifty buildings, and
through its telephone central passed the calls of a c city of 140,000'
people. Before the peace stopped its operation, it was laying six
keels a week. Yet it did not launch its first ship, the Quistconk,
until August 5, or deliver it until December 3, 1918, the day before
Wilson sailed for Paris to make a peace. Much was made of the
fact that from the several American yards nearly one hundred
ships were launched simultaneously on July 4, 1918; but few of
these carried cargoes to help win the war. As an heroic effort to
create an industry, the shipping venture was a great success,
expensive as it was; but had the war waited to be won by these
ships it must have lasted longer. The intriguing melody of George
Cohan's 'Over There, 5 sung when the Costigan, first of the Newark
brood and named by Cohan for his grandfather, took the water,
had little reference to the matter in hand. By this time the 'Yanks'
were indeed coming, but in other bottoms.
But the hand of the United States had been laid upon what
shipping there was, or what might come into being, and the
Shipping Board was soon forced to determine upon what principle
to operate the fleet so as to conserve tonnage and help win the war.
Its experiments with the chartering of ships, whether its own or
those of neutrals that could be hired, built up experience. It
worked in co-operation with the War Department, as principal
shipper, and with the British agencies of ship control. Early in
1918 it brought into command of its Shipping Control Committee
the president of the International Mercantile Marine Company,
P. A. S. Franklin, and gave him a free hand. Franklin worked for
a 'liquid fleet' one whose units should be detached from exclu-
sive control by any single agency of the Government and, being
pooled, should be available as needed. This was what the Car
Service Bureau of the Interstate Commerce Commission was trying
to do with railroad rolling stock. The Shipping Control Commit-
tee attacked the 'turn around' as the weak spot in the use of ships,
for vessels lay too long in port while waiting for their cargoes. By
shortening this to half its duration they multiplied their tonnage.
EFFICIENT SHIPPING 75
They studied economical packing, giving weight to stowage factors,
and cut the time while saving space. In April, 1918, they loaded
thirty-three locomotives, 'practically ready for steam, 5 into the
hold of the Feltore; jammed them tight between bales of hay; and
delivered them at St. Nazaire ready to be lifted bodily from hold to
track.
In the reorganization of the Shipping Control Committee under
Franklin a new type of office was set up in Washington, full of
implication for a future when government should be called upon
to plan. Professor Edwin F. Gay, economic historian and dean of
the Graduate School of Business Administration at Harvard, be-
came director of a Division of Planning and Statistics. In his office
figures were analyzed, upon which the decisions of Franklin ought
to be made. Independent development based upon enthusiastic
effort had gone the limit, and the men responsible for results were
getting time to think about co-ordinating their efforts. Divisions
similar to that of Gay made their appearance in departments other
than the Shipping Board and they interchanged their figures and
interlocked their effort. They conceived as a goal a work-sheet
showing program and performance. If they could mar age to get
the gist of it on a daily sheet for scrutiny at the White House, so
much the better. Planning to win a war was in a way a simple
matter, for all knew the nature of the enemy and the common aim.
Planning to run a government was to be a more complex affair,
as was later to be seen; for aims are overlapping and inconsistent
in periods of prosperity and may become murderously antagonistic
during the dark days of a depression. The economic planners,
with their wits whetted, never quite left Washington, and never
forgot the days when war gave them their earliest chance. *Gay
. . . was our economic mentor,' wrote Hurley; 'the work of
restricting unessentials and allocating ships was centered in a
single body/
All tasks in the preparation of the war machine were interlocked,
as the Emergency Fleet Corporation learned while pushing the
construction of its new yards, and as every maker of munitions
discovered as he speeded up Ms plant. The working gangs were
76 THE WAY TO WIN: SHIPS AND FOOD
assembled with difficulty, and to the Draft Boards it had to be
made clear how important it was to leave key workers on their
jobs. Every enlistment and every draft took potential workers from
the labor market at a moment when the market needed more
rather than fewer. The Four-Minute Men were put to the task of
drumming up industrial recruits. Girls began to slip into the jobs
their brothers vacated; some of them even into overalls beside the
lathes. But when workers reported to new factories and yards they
found no beds. Housing was none too good in well-established
industrial communities. Around the new projects there were no
dwellings for executives, no small houses for workmen, no board-
ing-houses and restaurants, no garages. And to this problem the
Council of National Defense turned its attention early in the
spring of 1917. It foresaw housing scarcity, and that the hiring of
labor to build residences for war workers would add still another
difficulty to the task of getting men to work.
Conceiving it as a welfare matter, and before the several pro-
duction establishments had created their own housing sections, the
Council of National Defense had a sub-committee studying the
problem before the end of June. It held open hearings in October
to prove by figures how greatly war work was being held up by lack
of housing; and it recommended to the Government action on a
scale larger than it could start itself. The Department of Labor,
through a new bureau under Otto Eidlitz, took charge in Febru-
ary, 1918. As the various appropriation bills came along, funds
were allotted for industrial housing and transportation work.
The Fleet Corporation was allowed ninety-five millions for this
before the spring was gone. It had twelve thousand workmen to
crowd into Bristol alone. It was soon drafting a program to house
56,296 of its workers with their families near its various plants, and
it included in this scheme 8774 dwellings and nearly one thousand
apartments, not to mention dormitories, cafeterias, and stores.
New snarls in the law and new concepts of public policy came to
view with reference to the taxation of this sort of Government
property; for each new venture placed a burden upon the com-
munity near which it was erected. There were streets to be built,
HOUSING 77
and schools; and police and fire protection must be provided.
Yet Government property, as such, was untaxable by local
authority, and if left untaxable the cost of serving it might smother
the community concerned. In July, 1918., the Secretary of Labor
was allowed to incorporate in New York a Housing Corporation in
which as agent for the Government he held the whole of its hun-
dred million of stock. Red tape was cut again, and the corporation
as a tool of government took on a larger significance. New houses
called for new designs, new city plans, new architectural and
engineering efforts by the United States, as well as new standards
of living for the working folk. Before peace rang the bell another
field for public planning had been reconnoitered.
Before Denman and Goethals had explored the woodenness of
boards, and before experience with Liberty Loan and registration
and the Red Cross drive had demonstrated that public opinion
was abundantly able to enforce itself, the solvency of Lloyd
George's formula to win the war had been challenged from
another quarter. Herbert Hoover had come into the picture.
Acting in front of the vast prestige of the Commission for Relief in
Belgium, a prestige too great to be forgiven when the Post Office
delivered to him a letter addressed to 'Miracle Man, Washington/
he demanded calories as the first of the munitions. 'Food will win
the war 3 became a slogan. It had a drive whose force was equal to
that for ships, and one whose consequences pushed farther down
to the grass roots. Ships could be built only by captains of industry,
with huge yards and plants, vast capital resources, and throngs of
workmen. But every citizen could appreciate the need for food and
do his bit. Wherever he was he could do it: whether at the break-
fast table with bran muffins and a trifling pat of butter, or in his
garden as he nursed a potato patch, or on a local committee of the
Food Administration, explaining and exhorting, or in the mails,
writing his congressman to let the food bill pass.
It was service of a sort for the Treasury to lend the Allies cash to
pay for what they needed to buy in the United States. It was
another to hurry ships to carry the necessities to Europe. But at
the bottom, the food must be raised, the right sorts saved and
78 THE WAY TO WIN: SHIPS AND FOOD
shipped, and the rest eaten with patriotic zest. Spinach and
cabbage, as they appeared at dinner, could be made into symbols
of patriotic co-operation. 'Wheatless' and 'meatless' days tested
devotion.
The President had anticipated that Hoover should do what
must be done about food and that the Department of Agriculture,
instead of being expanded into a war administration, should stick
largely to its peace-time activities. He had called Hoover home
even before the declaration and named him commissioner in
charge of a voluntary body on May 19, since Congress was not
ready for immediate action upon a food bill. Hoover accepted c on
the condition that he is to receive no payment for his services and
that the whole of the force under him, exclusive of clerical assist-
ance, shall be employed as far as possible upon the same volunteer
basis.' Three days later, Lever presented to the House a bill that
was described as an Administration measure to encourage agri-
culture and to regulate the marketing of food and other necessaries.
Hoover gathered about him a staff recruited from among the
men who came back with him from Belgium, from the agricultural
colleges, and from where he could find them, and set about to
make the United States food-conscious. In the absence of legal
authority it was for nearly three months a matter of advertising,
the only addition to the power of the Government being in the
control of exports attached to the Espionage Act. The Allies buy-
ing food with part of the loans extended through the Treasury
were willing to act in co-operation with him, law or no law. A
fear of rising prices, injurious to both war finance and to the
standard of living, was one of the chief reasons for an effective food
control. The matters to be impressed upon the public mind were
the need of the Allied countries for huge food exports from the
United States, the necessity upon the people to increase the yield
of crops, the importance of consuming at home the food unsuitable
for shipment, and the iniquity of profiteering. Even the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs was brought into the campaign, advising
his wards 'that the careless paring of potatoes' was wasteful and
that 'every spoonful of left-over gravy can be used in soups. 5 And
GOSPEL OF THE CLEAN PLATE 79
the Bureau of Fisheries was Inspired to advocate c the use of the
meat of whales, porpoises, and dolphins . . . for food. 3
The rapid progress in organizing the localities made it possible
to use the State councils of defense and the Woman's Committees
under the Council of National Defense in spreading the food mes-
sage. The Official Bulletin, at the end of June, made public a circu-
lar from Anna Howard Shaw, as chairman of the Woman's Com-
mittee, advising the local groups: 'If you have not already extended
the organization of your State to the counties, cities, and towns,
will you undertake to do so at once? 3 she asked. She advised a
house-to-house canvass to secure signatures to food pledges, and
the posting in front windows of a sign to indicate compliance.
The Blue Eagle of N.R.A. in 1933 had a technique already com-
pletely worked out before it left the egg. Hoover issued bulletins
preaching the 'Gospel of the clean plate' and warning that 'full
garbage pails' mean 'empty dinner pails.' More fruit and vege-
tables, he urged, less wheat, meat, milk, fats, sugar, and fuel. 5
In sober vein the Food Commissioner addressed the President
on July 10 'with regard to wheat.' He believed that his conserva-
tion measures were taking hold and that they had saved for ex-
port some eighty million bushels that would ordinarily have been
eaten in the United States. He was alarmed, however, at the
prospect of only 678,000,000 bushels in the 1917 harvest and
others were distressed at labor troubles in the wheat harvest and
found there aground for deep suspicion of the loyalty of the I.W.W.
Should the American diet not be checked, Americans would con-
sume all but seventy-eight millions of the new harvest. If they had
saved the eighty, these, with the seventy-eight, would make only
158,000,000 bushels, too little for the export need. The harvest
had been bad in 1916, leaving less than a normal carry-over. It
was 'absolutely vital' to stimulate an enlarged planting for 1918
and at the same time to insure the farmer who broke new ground
for wheat against a slump in price in case there should be a glut.
It was as important to keep the crop out of the hands of specula-
tors. But Hoover had no powers. 'We ar practically helpless to
safeguard either the farmer or the consumer until the pending
80 THE WAY TO WIN: SHIPS AND FOOD
legislation is passed. 5 Congress was genuinely busy, but it had
many doubts to overcome before it was willing to ask the free
American farmer to accept regimentation.
With the Espionage Act out of the way, the House Committee
on Agriculture, of which Asbury F. Lever of South Carolina was
chairman, was free to claim the attention of Congress. The com-
mittee had received Lever's own proposal and had worked out of
it and other proposals and the testimony given at its hearings a
bill for food control. The House settled down to consider this
June 1 8. *In the short space of a few months/ said Lever, opening
the debate, c the foundation of a great army has been laid, the
expenditure of $7,000,000,000 has been authorized, and the
machinery for the mobilization of this stupendous sum is well
under way That a democracy can be organized ... is being
demonstrated.' His bill proposed to erect c a governmental control
of necessaries which shall extend to and include all the processes,
methods, activities of, and for the production, manufacture, pro-
curement, storage, distribution, sale, marketing, pledging, financ-
ing, and consumption of necessaries, which shall be exercised and
administered by the President.' It was hardly necessary for the bill
to have gone further, though it did to the extent of twenty-one
sections. In this one sentence lay a grant of power unknown to
American experience and so generous as to need no elaboration.
The other sections were admittedly no more than explanatory and
designed to limit the exercise of the powers to the period of the
war with Germany and one year thereafter. 'To delay,' said
Lever, 'is but to stay temporarily the day of wrath. . . . The wrath
... is not going to be appeased by the screams and squalls about
conferring autocratic powers upon the President.'
Lever was no sooner back in his seat than another Democratic
member, Young of Texas, was on his feet to challenge the whole
proposal and to denounce a dictatorship c that will go to the remot-
est precincts . . . And take charge of the little, humble farmer who
is seeking to eke out an existence for himself and his hungry
children. 5 And the parliamentary fight was on.
It was not a long fight so far as the House was concerned. With
HERBERT CLARK HOOVER 81
its representation based on population, and giving full weight to
urban and Eastern groups, it was easier for the House to rule the
farmer than for the Senate, which received the bill six days later.
Through these six days the Representatives talked about shortage
and price, about constitutionality and the sins of profiteers and
the war powers of the President; but they did not fundamentally
change the grant. The term 'necessaries' was indeed brought
down to earth by the enumeration of the chief commodities con-
cerned; and a prohibition of the use of food for the manufacture of
alcoholic liquors was accepted. But the measure passed the House
by a vote of 365 to 5. Few were prepared to test the reality of the
'day of wrath. 5
The Senate received the Lever Bill from the Committee on
Agriculture and Forestry on June 25, and three days later entered
a debate that ran intermittently for twenty-four days. Chamber-
lain of Oregon had it in hand, hurrying it as best he could, but
even with the possibility of a cloture at his hand he could neither
expedite action nor prevent fundamental amendment. He used
the threat of cloture, in order to force on July 10 a unanimous-
consent agreement that the Senate should vote on July 21. He
could do no more. The fiscal year ended and a new year began,
there was inconvenience for the Administration and uncertainty
for the people, an abnormal share of the wheat crop was held on
the farm in hope of higher prices; but the Senate could not be
hurried. Most of the matters that Senators talked about were
worth discussing, peace or war, but the delay was heart-breaking
to those with an immediate responsibility for victory. The urban
East was content with regulation and fearful of rise in prices.
The farmer West and South wanted the farmer to get his price,
wanted no regulation unless it be applied to industry as well as to
agriculture, feared a dictator who might restrict freedom and save
the cities or the Allies at the cost of him who raised the crop.
The fight against a food dictator brought into the debate the
personality of the Food Commissioner, who was by common con-
sent to be designated Food Administrator when the bill should
pass. This was Herbert Clark Hoover, whose self-made life, out of
8s THE WAY TO WIN: SHIPS AND FOOD
his origin on an Iowa farm, had been the theme of a multitude of
writers since he first broke into the news in connection with an
American relief committee in London in 1914. An enthusiastic
article by Will Irwin, in the Saturday Evening Post,, brought the
matter to a head. Reed of Missouri, a distinguished jury lawyer
and a parliamentarian of ingenuity and persistence, found reason
to dislike Hoover, as he called to the attention of the Senate the
details of the Food Commissioner's career. What he wanted (and
the Senate was with him) was to amend the Lever proposal by
throwing the control of food and fuel into the hands of a commis-
sion of three instead of leaving it to the discretion of the President,
which meant Hoover.
Reed took the floor, on a question of personal privilege, to deny
the truth of a charge that he was treating Hoover c as if he had
been up before a police court for stealing chickens in Kansas City 5 ;
but the testimony of the Congressional Record hardly clears him of
the bad manners that Senators have too often shown to incon-
venient outsiders. He sought to discredit Hoover by doubting his
status as American voter, if not citizen. Johnson of California,
however, regarded his fellow Californian as c a distinguished world
figure . . . particularly fitted for the task.' But to Reed, Hoover
was quite too much of a 'world figure. 5 In the forty-three years
that Hoover had lived, most of the last twenty had been lived out-
side the United States. His work as mining operator and pro-
moter had carried him whither mineral or capital could be found.
He had a house in London. He had even been talked of as a pos-
sible cog in the English war machine; and there were some to say
that had he been a British subject he might have hoped to end his
days as Sir Herbert. It was nonsense to talk of him as English, but
it was true that he had no special knowledge of food in advance of
the studies thrust upon him by the German occupation of Belgium.
He was, as he admitted, Very much of a stranger in my own
country, as I have been away since the war began.' The Senate
added the commission of three as one of its amendments.
If the farmer felt safer to have the food control vested in a com-
mission, he was encouraged, too, by Senate insistence upon a price
HOOVER'S BELGIAN EXPERIENCE 83
for wheat. Hoover, in Belgium, was said to have used his food
stocks not only to feed the hungry but also to break the speculator.
He felt free, the story ran, and if true it was to his credit, to
throw part of the Belgian food back into the market when speculat-
ing bulls forced it to an artificial rise. He knew as much about
markets as the speculators did, and was said to have made a tidy
profit for the Commission for Relief in Belgium out of the transac-
tions. Fear was in the air that, with control unchecked in his
hands, he might whittle down the price the farmer received. The
Senate added another amendment guaranteeing a minimum
price of two dollars a bushel for 1918 wheat. The price of the
current crop, that of 1917, was stabilized by the President at $2.20,
upon recommendation of a commission headed by President Gar-
field of Williams College.
Republican Senators were ready to exalt Congress at the expense
of Wilson, and found Democrats ready to co-operate. Restrained
by the pressure of their own consfituents from too open obstruction,
they were yet loath to leave the war in presidential hands. They
had been quite willing to let the last Congress expire, March 4,
with appropriations unvoted, for this made a special session neces-
sary. Now, through Weeks of Massachusetts, they asked for the
creation of a committee on the conduct of the war.
Such a committee as Weeks proposed had watched and bothered
Lincoln through the Civil War. It had been a joint committee,
created in December, 1861, and sitting long enough to turn in
eight great volumes of testimony and report. Benjamin Franklin
Wade, a fire-eating Republican Senator from Ohio, had directed
its affairs. Its earnestness in prosecuting the war had been too
clear to doubt, but its deep fear that Lincoln did not know enough
to prosecute the war provides full testimony to prove that the fame
of Lincoln was less than complete while he lived. Wade came to
know so much more about the war than Lincoln did, and so much
more about reconstruction, that by the summer of 1864 he led a
coalition against a too-moderate peace. While Lincoln was candi-
date for re-election, Wade, in his own party, denounced him for a
'studied outrage on the legislative authority' and asserted a duty
84 THE WAY TO WIN: SHIPS AND FOOD
to 'check the encroachments of the Executive.' The Committee on
the Conduct of the War had pretty generally escaped the attention
of the historians, of even so thorough a student as James Ford
Rhodes or so charming a writer as Professor Wilson. But Lincoln
had known how difficult it had made his work, and Wilson as
President had no doubt about it. It will 'make my task of conduct-
ing the war practically impossible/ he declared when the Senate
added the suggestion of Senator Weeks to the Lever Act. The com-
mittee which it was now proposed to revive had more than the
support of critical Republicans. There were fifty-three Senators
who voted aye when the 'joint committee on expenditures in the
conduct of the war' was added as a rider to the act for food control.
Five Senators and five Representatives (three to be Democrats in
each case), constituting the committee, were to keep themselves
informed, to confer with all departments and voluntary boards, to
take testimony as needed, and to advise Congress upon 'expendi-
tures and contracts. 5
The amended Lever Act, with only six negative votes on its final
passage in the Senate, went back to the House. It was nearly three
more weeks before it could become a law. A food-survey bill
directing the Secretary of Agriculture to make a food census, which
passed by both houses and was sent to conference earlier in the
session, was now brought out of conference and offered as a part of
the food program. The conferees on the Lever Act wrestled with
the Senate amendments until the House members of the conference
committee had their way and forced the adoption of a report from
which had been stricken both the commission to have charge of
food and the joint committee to watch expenditures. But this took
time. When the report came back in August, the House accepted
it without a recorded W; it passed the Senate with but an ill-
assorted seven voting in the negative: France, Gronna, Hardwick,
Hollis, La Follette, Penrose, and Reed. The dissenters were acri-
monious as they protested the necessity to accept the bill, leading
Oscar S. Straus, Republican though he was, to declare that there
was 'no politics in this country now except on Capitol Hill.'
Signed by the President on August 10, 1917, the Lever Act gave
THE LEVER ACT IN FORCE 85
him authority to erect controls over foods, feeds, fuel, and fertiliz-
ers, and the machinery and equipment for producing them. It
prohibited the use of food in the manufacture of c distilled spirits
for beverage purposes/ and authorized the President to forbid such
use for c malt or vinous liquors.' It fixed the base price for the 1918
wheat crop at two dollars a bushel and empowered the President
to set in advance a minimum price for succeeding years.
There was no news in the announcement coming immediately
from the White House that Herbert Hoover had been appointed
Food Administrator. His volunteer organization was complete,
and ready to be regularized with law behind it. He was already in
agreement with the assistants through whom he was to throw an
additional network of public service across the United States.
War industries, without specific law, had been reorganized a fort-
night earlier, and with the new War Industries Board he could set
up intimate co-operation. A Purchasing Commission for the Allies
was nearly ready to be launched. Foreign trade, imports, and ex-
ports were heading into an organization of their own. The Presi-
dent was in agreement, too, upon the technical method of manag-
ing wheat, most important of the food commodities.
Four days after the signature of the Lever Act an executive order
directed the incorporation in Delaware of a fifty-million-dollar
structure, to be known as the United States Food Administration
Grain Corporation. Under the presidency and direction of Julius
H. Barnes the business of the Grain Corporation was to build up
stocks of grain, to facilitate the export of flour, and to stabilize the
price. When the time came to fix the price for the 1919 harvest,
the Grain Corporation did not do it, or Hoover, although the latter
received the odium of it when it proved unpopular. The President
entrusted it to a special group selected for the purpose. A corpora-
tion similar to the Grain Corporation, and also subsidiary to the
Food Administration, was created in 1918 to buy, hold, and allo-
cate raw and refined sugar, under the name of the Sugar Equaliza-
tion Board. By this time Government-owned corporations were so
common as to attract no considerable attention.
Part of the mandate of the Lever Act dealt with fuel, which was
86 THE WAY TO WIN: SHIPS AND FOOD
described in some detail. Coal and oil, produced under conditions
far different from those of agriculture and having different con-
nections with labor, capital, and transportation, were not suitable
for handling in the Food Administration, even if the work of that
body were not already as complex as one man could hope to
master. The Council of National Defense had in the spring gone
farther than the law allowed in the effort to stabilize the price of
coal. Here was a commodity in which price was closely connected
with volume of production. The coal deposits, whether hard or
soft, range from great veins of high-grade fuel cheaply mined to thin
and inaccessible deposits of low-grade coal. The normal price, set
by normal consumption, always kept low-grade mines out of
production. Yet these inferior mines could be worked if the output
could be sold. The anti-trust laws had made it difficult if not im-
possible for the coal companies to adjust production to demand,
and there were not, when the war began, adequate figures to indi-
cate the rate at which coal moved to mine mouth and was shipped
to market. The Federal Trade Commission, set to many studies of
price in connection with war supply, had been assigned coal as a
subject for investigation. The Lever Act vested in the President
power to fix a price that would bring coal into the market. He did
this in August, and followed the action by erecting a Fuel Adminis-
tration parallel to the Food Administration on August 23. Harry
A. Garfield, son of a former President of the United States, and
President of Williams College, was made Fuel Administrator. And
oil, as a type of fuel requiring special treatment, became the busi-
ness of a new division of the Fuel Administration under Mark L.
Requa in January, 1918. Petroleum products had become one of
the most important of the munitions of war.
In the closing stages of the debate over the Food Administration
it was an added argument for a one-man direction that the division
of authority in shipbuilding had broken down. The clash of per-
sonalities between Denman and Goethals brought about the
elimination of both. On the very day that the Lever Act went to
conference, Hurley was placed in full authority over Shipping
Board and Fleet Corporation. What Goethals thought of boards
NECESSITY FOR ONE-MAN CONTROL 87
was true, when there was work to do; and for the next eight months
the trend of war work was in the direction of assignment of key
tasks to powerful personalities^ each 3 under the President, in
charge of his own job, and with boards and committees mostly
engaged in clearing the ground so that their chiefs could act.
V. THE YANKS ARE COMING
Hn
Jl HE Baltic Society, one of the most exclusive organizations of
military reminiscence, one that differs from the Cincinnati or the
Aztecs, which took shape when the job was done, still holds its
occasional reunions. Its membership is limited to the little group,
fifty-nine officers and twice as many more field clerks and enlisted
men, who sailed as inconspicuously as possible on the White Star
Baltic, May 28, 1917, headed for London, Paris, and the uncertain
future. Those who were to be its members sailed not too perfectly
disguised as civilians. In London they put on their uniforms, in-
cluding the side arms that had nearly disappeared from the
Western Front. They were so far behind the times that they had as
yet no Sam Browne belts. They had no army, and hardly a pro-
mise of one. Yet when they paused in England to be received by
royalty, and crossed to Boulogne where the welcoming French
tongue wrestled with what sounded most like Tuerchigne,' they
were hailed as though they were a host.
The major-general in command of the American Expeditionary
Forces had a more intimate experience with troops in the field
than any of his several seniors on the active list of the Army. It is
interesting to conjecture who would have been in his place if the
Administration had anticipated the full dimensions to which his
military adventure would grow. Perhaps it would still have been
John J. Pershing, for the only other major-general flexible enough
to be considered was Leonard Wood. But Wood had himself
destroyed the possibility that Wilson could work happily through
him. Pershing, indeed, did not desire him to come to France in
even a subordinate command. Baker thought he had been Very
indiscreet 5 ; the President thought him, in spite of great attain-
PERSIIING IN FRANCE 89
ments, a trouble-maker. Wood stayed at home, bitterly disap-
pointed, to have Hermann Hagedorn, fighting friend of both him
and Roosevelt, record his great services to the army Pershing led,
in Leonard Wood: A Biography (1931).
But that army was non-existent when Pershing arrived in
France; and the best military opinion, whether behind him or
at the front, did not see any way in which a considerable army
(conceding that the United States was competent to assemble it)
could ever be transported. The English and French Missions had
not even suggested a co-operation in which American troops
should play a large part. Later, when the A.E.F. had become a
fact, some of their leaders imagined that they had expected it
from the first, and had counted on it. Joffre had desired marching
units, to display the flag to doubting Frenchmen. Pershing was
followed by these. Their first regiments, under the immediate
command of William L. Sibert, an engineer officer who had done
well at Panama, began to disembark on June 26. Their landfall
was at the mouth of the River Loire, at St. Nazaire. The appear-
ance of a few of them in Paris on Independence Day was an emo-
tional success. Already tentative names were preparing for them,
for poilu, Boche^ and Tommy were convenient short cuts to a new
vocabulary. 'Sammies' was tried, perhaps from a free rendering of
les amies, perhaps a derivative from Uncle Sam, but only 'Yanks 5
stuck, after George Cohan set the word to music.
There is nothing in the prosaic but enlightening pages of My
Experiences in the World War (1931) to indicate that the commander
of the A.E.F. believed in fairies; but within a few days of his
arrival at his headquarters in the Rue Constantine Pershing had
convinced himself that he was to command a fighting army and
win the war if it should last long enough to be won. There was
doubt of this. The Missions had not revealed all that he now
learned in Paris: the collapse of the Nivelle drive, the mutinous
weariness of some of the French divisions, the exhaustion of man-
power, and the prevalence of defensive tactics in both French and
British armies. They were holding on; none could guess how long.
Pershing built his policy upon the assumption incapable of
go THE YANKS ARE COMING
proof today, but not proved wrong that the Allies were bank-
rupt in a military sense. They might postpone exhaustion or
defeat, but in his judgment they were too tired to win, and the
long necessity for economical defense had destroyed the capacity
of either high command to turn the armies out of the trenches and
by military maneuver destroy the power of the enemy.
It was his mission, as he saw it in the intervals between state
entertainments, to prepare to receive and operate an army; an
army large enough for its weight to turn the tide, an army trained
for other than trench warfare and not exhausted or blunted by a
long defense, an army that could win the war only by keeping its
method and its morale apart from anything he found in France.
This was an army that none but he anticipated, and only a capac-
ity to believe in fairies could have let him believe in it. But he
formulated the idea, stuck to it through thick and thin, and being
a stubborn man had his way to the extent that the Allies gave lip
service to the project. Three weeks after his arrival in Paris he
upset the forecasts of Washington by a calm notification that his
requisitions would begin with the requirements of his first million
men, with additional millions to follow as needed and with the
first million to be ready to take the field within a year. His training
directions contained the mandate that *all instruction must con-
template the assumption of a vigorous offensive.' While Washing-
ton gasped at his determination to make up the mind of the War
Department, the Allies gasped at his inquiry where he should
begin and at what spot along the front he should prepare to
launch his non-existent army.
His orders warranted his assumption, although there is still
some mystery about the drafting of a paragraph that read as
though someone at home had anticipated his conclusion. James
G. Harbord, his chief of staff, doubts whether he ever read it, and
has told much of the story sensibly in The American Army in France,
1917-1919 (1936); but the words were there. Pershing, while in
Washington picking his associates and making preliminary
arrangements, had among other things foreseen the necessity for
orders to himself. He had them drafted. Tasker H. Bliss, then
C A DISTINCT AND SEPARATE' ARMY 91
acting Chief of Staff in the absence of Hugh Scott who was with
the Mission in Russia, signed where he was told, for no one desired
to obstruct the commander. Baker had not heard of this, yet he
had the same idea and confided to Brigadier-General Francis J.
Kernan the duty of drafting an order for the A.E.F. Kernan dis-
carded the suggestion filed in a memorandum by Hoover recom-
mending that Americans going to France should go simply as
c man-pow T er. 3 He made some study of the problems of earlier
expeditionary forces, recalled the way in which the armies sent to
the relief of Peking had wrestled with the question of command,
and was aware that each of the Missions then in Washington
wished there were some way in which American manhood might
fill the gaps in its own battalions. As a safeguard against seizure,
rather than as a chart for combat, Kernan penned the words:
In military operations against the Imperial German Government
you are directed to co-operate with the forces of the other countries
employed against that enemy: but in so doing the underlying idea
must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a dis-
tinct and separate component of the combined forces, the identity
of which must be preserved.
As Pershing said farewell to the Secretary, with the orders he
had himself prepared properly approved by the Chief of Staff,
Baker surprised him with the other set, bearing an endorsement of
the President, and ranking into oblivion his own. It was as well
that it should be thus, for Pershing had been less explicit than
Kernan. But the fundamental relationship was hardly embodied
in either of the drafts. It was contained in what Baker later told
his biographer, Frederick Palmer. C I said . . . that I would . . .
give him only two orders, one to go to France and the other to
come home. ... If you make good, the people will forgive almost
any mistake. If you do not make good, they will probably hang us
both from the first lamppost they can find.'
The demand for an American front was annoying to the military
authorities of both France and England, who wanted no such
front and who did not believe there would be an army, or, if it
existed, that it could be trusted. They had seen fighting and
92 THE YANKS ARE COMING
thought they knew this war. But they were in no position to meet
the demand with blunt refusal, for already the action of Congress
had insured a steady flow of those supplies which they expected
were to be the real American reinforcement. They could not dam
good-will by refusing to tolerate what, after all, was unlikely to
happen. They discussed the front.
It was by a sharp and obvious course of elimination that the
front was found. Ever since the first battle of the Marne in 1914
marked the failure of the German plan to rush France off its feet,
the trenches of the Western Front had stretched unbroken from an
anchorage at the Swiss border to a point some 466 miles away, on
the Strait of Dover midway between Calais and Ostend. The
chain of trenches had been often deflected, swinging a little either
way, but it had been, unbreakable. From the Swiss border, run-
ning west of north to the French fortresses around Verdun, it lay
close to the pre-war boundaries of France and Germany. This
was a region made nearly impassable for large armies by act of
nature, and impregnably fortified since the Franco-Prussian War
by the hand of man. The war had not been fought here.
West of Verdun the trenches cut across the roads leading into
France, the lines of invasion and attack used by armies since the
days of Rome. To get an easier terrain than that of the Franco-
German frontier, Germany violated Belgian neutrality. The Im-
perial armies entered France in 1914 north of the Belgian High-
lands (unfriendly to large-scale operations) and followed the more
moderate grades between the Meuse and the Somme. Nivelle's
drive failed to break the German line in 1917, as Germany had
failed to break the French at Verdun in 1916; the English, nearer
the Channel, had advanced and fallen back with the tides of
battle; and no unit on this front could sleep in certainty that
attack was not impending.
The English forces, by obvious right, held the end of the Western
Front next the Strait. By this route might come an attempt to in-
vade England, which Britain must always be in a position to fore-
stall. Here, too, the services of an army from an English base ran
over the shortest routes. The Channel had been kept swept clear
"\ KUt,Htu.t,fr jyr, \ /
LA PALLICEl8^IG8.EF.Eyii ; l 3 fr y
?OCHEFORT^^ TONN 'AY CHARANTE
PRINCIPAL FREIiCH PORTS AMD RAILROADS
USED BY ATCRICAH EXPEDlTIOnART FORCES
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS @ H Q. SERVICES OF SUPPLY
PRINCIPAL. PORTS S ECONDARY PORTS IMPORTANT TOWNS
MAIN LINES Saams SECOND LINES *3d3Ct THIRD LINES ****** OTHER LINES
NOTE: LARGE. NUMBERS INDICATE SUBDIVISIONS OF THE BASE SECTION
INTER.INTERMDIAT SECTION ABV. ADVANCE SECTION
Map drawn from Pershing, Final Report (1919), Plate 8
94 THE YANKS ARE COMING
of mines, and pretty free of submarines, and was still a highway of
the Allies. It was so certain that England could not surrender
any part of this sector to Pershing that it was not even asked.
East of its junction with the British right lay the French left,
with such acute problems of liaison brought to a focus at the place
of meeting as to give to this word a new definition and a new im-
portance in the English tongue. The soldiers of the two great
Allies did not always fraternize easily; their officers were often
embarrassed by difference in language, temperament, and point
of view. Wherever the weld was at the moment, there was the
weak spot on the line. This was somewhere above Amiens, near
the basin of the Somme, and east of this the French armies guarded
the roads into Paris. It was unthinkable that this position of im-
portance and sentiment should be entrusted to an ambitious new
general with an untried army.
By elimination, the American front was pushed to the east of
Verdun, where war was expected to be quiescent, where an army
as incompetent as the A.E.F. was expected to be, if it should be at
all, could do no damage too bad to be repaired before it wrecked
the enterprise. By a quaint coincidence this sector may have
been the one portion of the front of which some of the American
officers had a detailed knowledge. It is said that in the Var
games' played at Leavenworth, and in the Army War College,
the only good military maps that could be procured for purposes
of instruction were maps of the Toul sector. Here Pershing was
permitted to aspire to independent operations.
Acting relentlessly upon his own judgment, Pershing accepted
cheerfully what was offered with reluctance, and published in
July the basic orders for the concentration and training of an
army east of Verdun, and for its continuous supply. As obvious as
the place where he might operate were the conditions of his opera-
tion. Europe was short of goods. It was never so short as legend
made it out, but only American prices could tempt supplies into
the market. It was accepted in the undertaking that the A.E.F.
must fetch its own supplies. The railroads north of Paris were too
vital to the French war to be clogged by these, or by the troops to
THE TRANSPORT SITUATION 95
use them. Both must find entry Into France by lines running to
the south of Paris and through ports not already working to a full
capacity with English business.
But France is so organized that Paris is the heart and head. All
of the great railroad systems radiate from the capital of the
country to the borders. There did not exist any main lines of rail-
road running where the Americans and their supplies must travel.
There were local and branch lines over which it was physically
possible to move trains from Brest and seaports farther south to the
Toul sector: but none was equipped for heavy through service,
none could carry the locomotives and rolling stock that the A.E.F.
must bring to France to move its goods.
The ports themselves, south of Brest, had been allowed to fall
behind as French commerce concentrated at Marseilles or in the
Channel ports. St. Nazaire, La Pallice, and Bordeaux were ill-
equipped to carry modern traffic, but they were at least available
for use, not being underfoot. The Toul sector was nearly as remote
from the seacoast as Louisville is from Washington, and to bring
reality to Pershing's dream of c a distinct and separate component'
there was work to be done along every mile of the intervening
country. The call went home for engineer regiments, railroad
regiments, forestry regiments: not as yet for men to fight, but for
technicians to get ready for men to fight. The cables were soon
crowded with requisitions, not always harmonious, but all In-
dicative of a scheme of activity that Washington had not antici-
pated. There were harbors to be dredged, docks to be built, piles
to be cut to build the docks, unloading cranes, dredges, freight
yards, storage sheds, refrigeration plants, and all the equipment to
be provided without which a million Americans, not to mention
the second or third million, could not operate. Frederick Palmer,
seasoned as a war correspondent and wise beyond most, crossed
with Pershing on the Baltic. Here he renewed an acquaintance as
old as the Russo-Japanese War, in which he had been a reporter
while Pershing was a military observer. He was soon in uniform
and a colonel, and mouthpiece for G.H.Q., which came to be
heard of as 'somewhere in France.* He reversed his mechanisms
96 THE YANKS ARE COMING
of a journalist to become something of a military censor, learned
what not to tell, dealt with visitors (for he knew everyone) and
guided their footsteps, and wrote of the vision while memory was
fresh. The story has not been better saved than in his America in
France (1918), and Our Greatest Battle (1919)- with war over > he
turned to more deliberate things as he arranged the papers of the
Secretary of War in Newton D. Baker, America at War (1931).
With the keen eye of the reporter, Palmer saw not only what
was in building, but in what the character of the preparation for
the A.E.F. differed from French ways of doing things. There were
many miles of land travel before any American could be floated;
the first contingent averaged 2392 miles per man. There were
three thousand miles of ocean and after this a journey. All other
American armies, operating in the field, and drawing their supplies
out of the War Department, had learned to hate the bureaus in
Washington. Pershing's orders set up an equivalent for the War
Department under his own command in France. He could not
control actions in the United States, but he managed to maintain
his authority once men and supplies had been landed in Europe.
Kernan was before long made chief of what was called the Line
of Communications, which was a heavy responsibility after the
goal had been set of ninety days' supply in France (forty-five days 5
at the base, thirty at intermediate stations, fifteen in the hands of
the fighting army at the very front) . The War Department hunted
for a railroad man to manage the specialized activities of the lines
between the ports and the front, and found one in a vice-president
of the Pennsylvania Railroad, William Wallace Atterbury, who
was given rank as a general. Atterbury was not the man Pershing
had decided upon, but he was accepted for the sake of peace, and
soon learned to live in the Army, while the Army eventually be-
came aware of his unusual capacity. Out of one of the engineer
regiments Pershing picked an old Nebraska friend, Charles G.
Dawes, made of him as unmilitary a brigadier-general as ever was,
and used him as buyer in the Army and as financial negotiator
with the Allied supply services. And Dawes found in war-starved
France so much of value that A.E.F. funds could bring to market
PERSHING PLAN IN OPERATION 97
that he nearly cut In two the freight that the crowded sea lanes
would otherwise have had to carry.
The first plan for the organization of the A.E.F. was drawn up in
Paris in July. But Pershing had no intention of staying in Paris, He
accepted the Toul sector, prospected the region, received assign-
ment of the barracks in a garrison town in eastern France, Chau-
mont, and on September i he moved his G.H.Q. thither. There-
after until the end of the war his place of residence was hardly
named in the United States. Much of the time he was personally
on the move in his general's special train or in his motor car. But
the name of Ghaumont was the kind of military secret that was
kept secret from everyone except all Europe and the enemy. The
initial force of about 143500 men grew gradually, less than a thou-
sand men a day, and in nine months still had too few men trained
to arms to matter. But the technical troops kept at their work of
building the matrix for an army as though their commander ex-
pected the Allies to hold the line until he and it were ready; and
the Allies kept nagging at his idea that he was to have and lead an
army. The 'black spot' of the American reinforcement, Clemen-
ceau thought and said was 'the fanatical determination of the great
chiefs of the American army to delay the arrival of the Star-
Spangled Banner on the battlefield. 5 Had Germany won the war,
Pershing's vision would have made him the scapegoat of the
military historian.
It was on September I that G.H.Q; was moved to Chaumont,
in the heart of what was to be the training and operations area for
the A.E.F. This was five months after American entry; but it was
four days before the first of the young men selected for the National
Army were due to report to camp to begin their study of the duties
of the soldier. The War Department had received and read, with-
out entirely grasping its implication, the bombardment of cables
and dispatches in which Pershing had sent home tables for this and
specifications for that. It was quite as much as it could manage to
expand rapidly enough to carry the load of the Regular Army and
the National Guard, as these grew by enlistment.
No military personality, with a drive equal to that of John J.
98 THE YANKS ARE COMING
Pershing, had yet appeared to bring Into order the chaos of the
War Department. Scott and Bliss, who in turn performed the
duties of Chief of Staff, were fine old officers. They had shown
adaptability in understanding the meaning of the change in Army
theory that was basic in the Root reforms. Since the erection of the
General Staff and the opening of the Army War College, profes-
sional study had become the channel to military advancement.
But many of the older officers, too stiff to change (some of them too
fat to ride a horse, as Theodore Roosevelt had discovered) , had
resisted the new order, only to find themselves far from the center
of things when war came. The younger men, eager for professional
study, set a new pace. In Army circles they were regarded as self-
admiring. Since much of their work was done in the schools at
Fort Leavenworth, the epithet "Leavenworth clique' was attached
to them by their seniors and by the lazy, who poured too many
tales of woe into the ears of friendly congressmen for the General
Staff to have an easy life. The National Guard interests, with
much State politics in reserve, were equally hostile to the Leaven-
worth professionals.
Although the organization of the Army had advanced far from
its status of 1898, it was still uncertain whether the heads of the
permanent bureaus of the War Department would be able to run
the war, or the untested General Staff. The law forced Army pur-
chases to follow 'channels' different from those the General Staff
would have liked. The post of Chief of Staff was still so lightly
regarded that Scott was lent to Root's Russian Mission. Bliss was
detached in October for other work abroad. The desk was occu-
pied by an acting Chief of Staff until Pershing reluctantly sent
back to Washington in 1918 a tested officer, Peyton C. March, son
of a distinguished lexicographer, organizer of the artillery for the
A.E.K, and a man with a backbone as rigid as Pershing's own.
It was not until March took office, March 4, 1918, that Baker
had the advantage of a military adviser who was part of the new
adventure and capable of rising with its demands. He spent bis
time thereafter, he lamented, soothing the souls in Washington
that March had brusquely bruised. He had continuously to
REGISTRATION FOR DRAFT 99
mediate between two strong men who served him Pershing, who
could never forget that it was the chief business of the War Depart-
ment to meet his every need, and March, who felt that the Chief
of Staff because he was Chief of Staff had temporary rank superior
to that of the officers to whom he transmitted the orders of the
Secretary of War. March took his temporary rank overseriously,
regarded Pershing as a subordinate to be upheld c as long as we
kept him in command in France/ acquired grievances against the
A.E.F., and poured out many of them in The Nation at War (1932).
But with him the War Department caught its stride. It was still
stumbling when in September the drafted men were due in camp.
In Enoch H. Crowder's office, that of the Judge-Advocate-
General of the Army, the draft provisions of the Selective Service
Act were born. The General Staff had worked with the idea for
many months, sending forward memoranda in favor of the only
principle of recruiting in which military men had confidence; but
it could not break from the notion that as in the Civil War draft
the Army itself was the agency to select the men. Crowder, a
bureau chief, did a truer job, using for the purpose a young captain
of cavalry, Hugh S: Johnson. Johnson, who took a law degree
(1916) while on duty at his post in San Francisco, could be used in
the law department of the Army and was assigned as a judge-
advocate with Pershing 3 s column. Back from Mexico in February,
he was shifted to Washington where Crowder worked him hard.
He had shown himself to be a handy man with Funston at the
Presidio, caring for the aftermath of the San Francisco earthquake
and fire. He was handy now. His draft became the basis upon
which the law was written, and he outlined the memorandum
issued by the President when he signed it.
The law threw the draft out of Washington and outside the Army
to be administered by committees of the neighborhood in which
the draftees lived. This was done partly because centralization in
Washington would crowd the Capital, which was already too
crowded. A more compelling motive was that the people should
select themselves, through registration at their voting places, under
the eye and understanding of their neighbors. The classification of
ioo THE YANKS ARE COMING
the registration cards was to be carried out in 4557 local boards.
June 5 was set as the day for registration, with the War Depart-
ment less nervous than Reed of Missouri, who said, 'Baker, you
will have the streets of our American cities running with blood on
Registration Day. 3
Johnson had cut red tape, too. Before the law was signed, he
persuaded his immediate chief and talked the public printer into
the illegal preparation of the millions of forms and questionnaires
needed for enrollment. When Baker, after signature, took up the
ways and means of administering the act he could be informed
that through a courageous breach of discipline it had been ad-
ministered. The bales of blanks, already printed, were also already
in the sheriffs' offices throughout the United States, only awaiting
the organization of the draft boards to be opened and put to use.
Four days after signing the Selective Service Act, Wilson gave
Crowder a new desk, reviving the Civil War office of Provost-
Marshal-General to look after recruiting and enlistment. Crowder
kept Johnson with him until the episode of registration was passed,
when the bubbling energy of his junior procured for him a different
field in which to operate. This was not the combat field which
Johnson hoped for and intrigued to get and the lack of which he
bewailed in his Blue Eagle, from Egg to Earth (1935). But on any
job he helped to make things move.
The registration on June 5 was more than a step in building an
army. It was a test of public opinion, proving that obstruction
was not to add to the difficulties of war administration. In the
debates over the Selective Service Act, the Civil War experience
with draft riots was cited to suggest how hard it would be to en-
force the draft. But the draft, harmonizing with a state of mind
that was impatient of even vocal opposition to the war, enforced
itself. The bloodshed anticipated at the registration places did
not occur. There was some crowding, to get through with it.
There was some bewilderment, because the forms were too hard
for many of the boys to understand at first reading. There was
later some wa'ste motion because of unnecessary medical examina-
tion of men who would not have been used, whether fit or not.
NUMBER DRAWING 101
General Crowder could state, In his Spirit of the Selective Service
(1920)5 that 9,586,508 men, over twenty-one but not yet thirty-
one, filed their blanks. There was no important group that evaded
because of affection for the enemy. There were few who resisted
duty because of conscience; and fewer like the Rhodes scholar,
Haessler, who went the whole way with conscience because to
accept c "bombproof ' service on my part would give the lie to my
sincerity.' Out of 2,810,296 men inducted into service, only 3989
claimed exemption on the ground of 'conscientious objection';
and of these only 450 failed to find e some form of service, satis-
factory to the Government.' Norman Thomas had sympathy for
them, but in his Conscientious Objector in America (1923) he stated
that their objection 'created a stir . . . entirely out of proportion to
the number of objectors.' How many disapproved this war, with-
out rejecting all war, is beyond proof. But they did not impede the
operation of the draft.
The steps in the process of selection advanced in a routine after
June 5. Once filed, the registration papers went to the draft
boards, receiving serial numbers in the order of filing. The
longest list of any board ran to 10,319. When this was known, as
many numbers were sealed in capsules, mixed in a large bowl, and
drawn in a careful lottery. On July 20, Baker drew out the capsule
containing the number 258, giving first place in the order of calling
to every registration card bearing that number. In a few days
the checked official lists were in the papers. The calls for men to
go to camp were apportioned among the States according to popu-
lation after the number of registrants in each State had been en-
larged by the addition to it of the number of citizens from each
State already in military service. Until his serial number, estab-
lished by the lottery, was called, the registrant remained at liberty
as yet to anticipate the call and enlist directly. Both Regular
Army and National Guard were swelled by this free choice, as
well as the Navy and the Marine Corps. It was contemplated that
the Regulars should be allowed to grow to 488,000, and the Guard
to 470,000, and that troops in excess of these numbers should be
provided through the draft. As it worked out, neither Guard nor
IO2 THE YANKS ARE COMING
Regular Army was filled In this fashion, but both were raised to
final strength by troops transferred to their divisions from the
National Army camps. The first contingent called to the National
Army included 687,000 names.
Selective Service was new to the United States, but it was not
more novel than the principle of organization which was an-
nounced in July. Previous wars had generally been fought by
military units whose titles bore at the moment of entry and of dis-
charge an ascription to the States of their origin. There had indeed
been troops of the Continental Line in the Revolution, and of the
Regular Army in later wars, but most of the fighting men had been
organized in regiments of the States and State pride had been
touched by the success of State units. But State grief had been
aroused when the accident of combat brought into murderous
action several regiments from a single State with casualty lists that
wiped them out, appearing back home to indicate an unfair dis-
tribution of the loss of war.
The Army weighed the alternatives of localized units supported
by State pride and interchangeable units trained alike and as
nearly uniform in quality as facts permitted. It overrode senti-
ment, searching for efficiency. The new notation accepted the
division as the unit in place of the regiment. Pershing soon fixed
the strength of the division at 979 officers and 27,082 enlisted men,
upsetting thereby the estimates of the War Department, for his
divisions were twice the size of those of the enemy or of his associ-
ates. But he gained his point. And back of each fighting division
he hoped to have at least half its number of officers and men to
operate the lines of communication and the indispensable services
of the rear.
The lowest numbers in the serial of divisions were set aside for
those to be formed around Regular Army units, distended by en-
listment or transfer. Sibert's force was organized in France as
First; the Second was built around other Regulars likewise with
the A.E.F. It was never practicable to use all of the numbers
reserved for Regulars. Divisions whose original components were
National Guard units drafted into the service of the United States
DEVELOPMENT OF ONE ARMY 103
(and the whole National Guard had been so drafted by August 5)
began with the Twenty-Sixth. This was composed of New Eng-
land Guardsmen. Fifteen other divisions, running through the
numbers to forty-one, received the Guardsmen of the other
States, each on a regional basis at the start. The first of the divi-
sions of drafted men, constituting the National Army, was the
Seventy-Sixth and received registrants from New England. Six-
teen of these were contemplated in the beginning, but it was under-
stood that the number would be added to as war might require.
The State ascription was abandoned, although neither the
Guard divisions nor those of the National Army ever quite forgot
the locality of their origin; and their regions continued to claim
them. Men were transferred and officers were interchanged as the
War Department worked for uniformity of quality and took ad-
vantage of transport space. In France some of the divisions were
assigned to depots. The Forty-First was grounded near Le Mans,
had 227,000 men pass through its roster, yet never saw the enemy.
Others retained a considerable degree of individuality until the
Armistice. But when this came, the handful of Regular officers
was spread through the whole army, leavening it all, while new-
comers from civil life swamped the enlisted men who had been
trained before April, 1917. In August, 1918, the distinctions
among the divisions, always irritating, had become unreal, and all
troops were merged in one Army of the United States. There was
hardly one chance in twenty that a soldier on the rolls at the
Armistice had seen duty before the declaration of war.
Around nuclei of Regulars and Guardsmen new troops made
fastest progress. These were the units likely to be sent first to
France. The National Guard divisions were sent for training to
cantonments in the South, whence, it was hoped, transportation
might be available to move them abroad before winter. Pershing
had asked for a million before the end of June, 1918; the War
Department saw no way of getting to him more than two-thirds
that many, and these only if new tonnage should be discovered.
The sites chosen for the cantonments were commonly near
Army posts already in existence, none of which had housing capac-
EMBARKATION 105
ity for a complete division. There was an abundance of hurried
work in new construction, complicated by shortage of labor and of
tentage, and difficult to manage even on the assumption that the
troops would soon be moved to France. There was political
pressure, too, for many States were eager to know that their
troops had gone. Only the Twenty-Sixth (Yankee) Division was
ready for early shipment, and there was political trouble to antici-
pate if any one region was to be singled out to lead the reinforce-
ment. The Twenty-Sixth became the third division to arrive in
France; but an additional division of Guardsmen was improvised,
to be built out of units selected from the Guard at large. This was
the Forty-Second, bearing the appropriate name of 'Rainbow,'
and concentrated at Gamp Mills on Long Island, near the 'At-
lantic port' of embarkation. It paraded in its first review Sep-
tember 30, and then dropped out of the news until it could be
announced that it was with the A.E.F. in France. By Thanks-
giving it was proceeding to its training area. The First, Second,
Twenty-Sixth, and Forty-Second were all the combat divisions
Pershing had that were reasonably ready for the field when
activities were resumed in the spring of 1918. His dream was still
a dream. He had, in all, less than a third of his million, and of
these half were service troops.
It was not the immediate duty of the War Department to get
the troops to France. That duty fell between the Navy, convoying
the transports, and the Shipping Board, mobilizing tonnage. But
it was imperative to the Army that the troops be moved. For this
purpose an Embarkation Service was created in August. Kernan
had charge of this for the first few weeks, before he went to France
and was assigned the Line of Communications between the ports
and the A.E.F. Created as a General Staff agency to 'supervise'
and to co-ordinate, the Embarkation Service actually operated
the United States end of the long trip. It was bad theory for the
General Staff to operate it, for the raison d'etre of that body is to
advise. But there was no organization in the old Army fitted to
the work, emergency pressed, and high co-ordination was impera-
tive. The Washington Post, near enough to the center of co-ordina-
106 THE YANKS ARE COMING
tion to know something of its problems, feared that 'It will be
humanly impossible to get 250,000 men on French territory
within a year,' Hoboken and Newport News became the 'Atlantic
ports' of mystery whence the Embarkation Service shipped the
men, 45,000 by the end of August, and 142,000 more before
January. The Navy protected the transports once at sea: 'su-
perbly efficient, 3 Baker described the protection. But the Navy
could as readily have protected more had there been transports to
carry them. Seven hundred men a day made a depressing record
between the declaration and the end of 1917.
The sixteen camps, designed to receive the first increments of
the National Army and subsequent drafts as they might be called,
were expected to be as permanent as the war Itself. In them the
recruits were to receive the general training of the soldier, leaving
for France the final polishing. Additional training in the special-
ized camps of the A.E.F. was in the scheme, to be followed by
duty on quiet sectors of the front before going into the line of
battle.
In ordinary Army practice, the erection of the camps would
have been the duty of the Quartermaster Corps, one of the
permanent service bureaus of the War Department. But it was
clear to the Council of National Defense in April that this bureau,
already overburdened with more explicitly military work, would
have difficulty in handling as lavish a building program as the war
would make necessary. An Emergency Construction Committee,
Council of National Defense, began to function, drawing its
executives from the ranks of large contractors. If these men knew
their business well enough to be of use, they were so closely inter-
locked with the contractors who would build the camps that they
were open to attack as being improperly involved. It was a matter
for shrewd guesswork to sketch the unavoidable equipment of
each of the cities of 48,000 to be built for the training of National
Army divisions. There were barracks and mess halls, service
offices, recreation places, water systems, sewage, and telephones to
be provided. Before these could be spread upon any blueprint the
War Department was forced to a hurried examination of sites as
CAMP CONSTRUCTION 107
offered, and to an annoying struggle with local interests each
craving a camp near home.
The Quartermaster Corps permitted the Emergency Con-
struction Committee to select contractors to build the camps,
awarding each camp to a single well-established firm. By the end
of May it was ready to inaugurate its own Construction Division to
sign contracts and take legal responsibility for the work. Since
speed was of the essence of the contract, and work must begin be-
fore plans were completed, contracts were let on a cost-plus basis,
whereby the contractor was allowed a profit of seven per cent, but
not over $250,000 on any one camp. Every contractor entered
into competition with shipbuilders and munition-makers for labor
and for materials. Construction could not be begun until near the
end of June, 1917, which was too soon for accuracy and too late
for the military need. Rushing the work as best they could, the
contractors were not completely ready for troops when the day of
mobilization arrived, September 5. Not all of the 687,000 drafted
men were in camp before Christmas. It was never necessary to
build the fullest estimated capacity into the camps, for troop ship-
ments in 1918 left room for new recruits.
With small prospect of shipment, the War Department built up
an army and the camps to house it. Of the sixteen National Army
camps, only one was on the West Coast, Camp Lewis in Washing-
ton. Only four others were west of the Mississippi: Dodge in Iowa,
Funston in Kansas, Pike in Arkansas, Travis in Texas. Four were
in the Middle West: Grant in Illinois, Custer in Michigan, Sher-
man in Ohio, and Taylor in Kentucky. The remaining seven were
lined up near the Atlantic Coast: Devens in Massachusetts, Upton
in New York, Dix in New Jersey, Meade in Maryland, Lee in
Virginia, Jackson in South Carolina, and Gordon in Georgia. It
was a triumph of skill and energy to have the camps as nearly
ready as they were: a triumph for W. A. Starrett of the Emergency
Construction Committee and Brigadier-General I. W. Littell of
the Quartermaster Corps. It would not have been unreasonable
for Congress to have foreseen that war would entail such work, or
to have profited from the sad experience of the training camps in
io8 THE YANKS ARE COMING
the war with Spain, Congress might have learned from the record
of the Civil War that disease is more deadly than bullets, and have
made provision for an accumulation of foreknowledge about camp
sites.
The need for the equipment of the soldier was as pressing as that
for his housing, and would have been hard to meet even if the
nature of the equipment had been determined in advance. Food,
clothing, bedding, and all the ordinary requirements of a million
men were to be procured, a process in which the Rosenwald com-
mittees did their share. These things did not in most cases call for
commodities unknown to trade, such as would require the erection
of new factories to make new kinds of goods. They could be
bought, and the Quartermaster Corps welcomed the aid of the
committees. The usual provision of the Revised Statutes, forbidding
any servant of the United States to let a contract if he had any
financial interest in the commodity concerned, got in the road of
the process. The provision was made more specific during the
summer, and much of the debate on the Lever Act was in criticism,
of members of voluntary committees who passed contracts to their
own firms. It was possible to make the technical point that the
voluntary committees did not legally let the contracts, but merely
passed upon their suitability so that officers in the Army might act
more quickly and with better judgment. But the Council of Na-
tional Defense found it necessary to revise its whole committee
structure, under the new prohibition, and to require its agents to
cut themselves away from their former business connections.
The difficulty was transitory since, once the flurry of the first six
months of war was over, the structure of the Army grew up to its
task. In this Goethals found his final job. Out of the Emergency
Fleet in July, he was back in the War Department in December, as
acting Quartermaster-General, solidifying a buying organization
that was competent enough to dispense with the services of the
committees that had helped it at the beginning. The men who
did the work were often the same, but they were encased in uni-
forms and detached from business.
The tools of the soldier were another matter. New weapons
ARMY EQUIPMENT 109
had made their appearance since 1914, old weapons had changed
in relative importance, and none could be manufactured in
quantity until military opinion had approved the plans. Pershing
was not convinced that war had so changed as to lessen the need
for infantry. He still thought of the individual rifleman as the
backbone of an army. Not blind to aviation or to machine-gun-
nery, or to the changes due to the use of gas and gas defense, he
made the rifleman who could both shoot and use the bayonet his
indispensable unit. He called for such, and the stress his requisi-
tions placed upon bayonet drill emphasized his notion that the
A.E.F. must be trained to fight close to the enemy, in the open.
Trench warfare was inescapable, but the trench was not a weapon
of aggression.
The old Army was equipped with the Springfield (1903) rifle,
made in United States arsenals, and believed to be as good a gun
as was; but it was one for which no factories existed capable of
turning it out by the million. There was a stock on hand sufficient
for the first million men, a total soon passed by the Regular Army,
the National Guard, and the first increment of the National Army.
At this point Congress had not been completely blind to necessity.
But as the Pershing vision permeated the War Department, and his
estimates suggested second, third, and even fourth millions of men
in arms, the question rose whether it would be quicker to build new
factories for Springfields, or to make use of American plants that
had, since 1914, been engaged in quantity production of the
British Enfields. England had passed the crest of man-power,
which meant that some of the capacity of the Enfield factories was
available for the use of the United States. The decision was to
modify the Enfield, so that it could use Springfield shells whose
large-scale manufacture was relatively simple. Without abandon-
ing the American guns, all of which were put to use, the American
Enfields were put into production in August, 1917, so that two and
a half million of them were available at the Armistice and the
supply was ahead of the requirement. When the draft men came
to camp there were not enough rifles for all of them and, until the
factories had speeded up, this absence of weapons made mobiliza-
tion appear to be less effective than in fact it was.
1 10 THE YANKS ARE COMING
Machine guns had been used with such success in the European
armies that there was no difference of opinion about their lavish
issue to an American force. The only question was one of type.
The allowance of machine guns per regimen t, fixed at four in 1912,
was 336 in 1919. The selection of types, accelerated by the war,
had been made possible by a large appropriation for machine guns,
voted by Congress in 1916. The various boards of officers, sitting
to determine type, had to consider not only absolute efficiency but
ease of manufacture, for the machine gun is a complicated
weapon. Unless it could be put easily into quantity production it
was not suitable for adoption. Officers of equal intelligence and
experience were capable of violent partisanship for different guns,
and laymen had no opinion worth notice. The friends of an
American inventor, Colonel Isaac N. Lewis, could not understand
why his guns did not become the standard for the A.E.F. The
Allied armies were using them in thousands. But the War Depart-
ment thought them not dependable. It bought whatever guns it
could get for temporary use, but deferred final decision until it was
convinced. 'We added the Browning gun in May, 19 17,' testified
Baker, during an investigation of the War Department after the
war was over. Two models of this gun, light and heavy, were put
into production as soon as factories could handle them; a slow
process, since before guns could be made, machines to make them
must be designed and made, and machines to make the machines,
and factories to house them. Not until 1918 were Brownings avail-
able in large numbers. And even then their use was retarded be-
cause of their superiority. Not until several divisions had been
fully equipped with Brownings did Pershing want to risk the
chance that a captured gun might reach the enemy and give away
its secret. Brownings were not in use until the last three months of
war. Whether this was speed or sloth depends largely upon the
temperament of the inquirer.
Artillery was vital, and was the subject of a battle of its own,
once war was over. The first program of divisions called for 2100
field guns of standard type, not to mention many specialized
varieties. There were some 554 of these on hand; not enough for
AIRCRAFT 1 1 1
the training of the artillery brigades. What there were were kept
at home for this use. A program of American manufacture was
launched, but was not pressed to the injury of other programs,
since there was plenty of artillery in sight. Both France and Eng-
land were prepared, in their own factories, to turn out more bat-
teries than their own armies could use. There was double econ-
omy in buying these: it relieved the United States of a degree of
congestion and saved some cargo space. The Allies were ready to
guarantee guns for American artillery as it might arrive, in return
for American assurance that steel and other raw materials for their
manufacture should come to them in steady flow. Before the
Armistice the American factories were turning out complete
artillery units of 75 mm. guns as rapidly as needed; but the A.E.F.
in action used foreign guns. This was a condition to be approved,
not blamed.
The provision of aircraft was a matter not of question, but of
creation. The industry did not exist in the United States. At the
declaration the Army had two air fields and fifty-five 'serviceable
planes 5 (of which, however, the National Advisory Committee on
Aeronautics said fifty-one were obsolete and four were obsolescent) .
The supply of aviators was no better than that of planes. But after
this start from scratch there were, at the Armistice, n,ooo flying
officers in the Army, with 4300 of them in France.
The program for aviation would not have been American if it
had not been expressed in large numbers and quantity production
of standard types. It could not, like artillery, be worked up
gradually, in confidence that the Allies could carry it until the
American factories were in operation. France, not inviting an
army to fight as such, demanded planes and aviators as soon as the
United States entered the war. The aircraft factories of the Allies
could not build planes as rapidly as they cracked up in use, and had
no reserve strength with which to build squadrons to overwhelm
the enemy. Carrying a part of this load was part of the reinforce-
ment, but no organized industry was ready for it. There was
plenty of clean spruce in the forests of the Northwest, but it had to
be logged and fabricated. There were plenty of skilled wood-
ii2 THE YANKS ARE COMING
workers, who could be diverted from billiard tables and barroom
equipment to the manufacture of planes. But this would take
time, even were there plans available. There were no plans or
models. There was not even a known engine adapted to quantity
production. Aviation was everywhere so new that it was still true
that each new model launched against the enemy was obsolete in
the designing-room before it took the air. Yet the vision of a
bridge of ships had hardly faded before another vision of swarms of
airplanes took its place. -
A joint Army-Navy board agreed easily that 22,000 planes were
needed for the year, and the press took up the announcement of
intent and need as though it were one of promise and fulfillment.
Congress was willing, voting $640,000,000 for the purpose, July
24, 1917, and the Aeronautical Division of the Signal Corps went
hard to work. 'The Liberty Engine, 5 says Crowell in his America's
Munitions, 1917-1918 (1919), 'was America's distinctive contribu-
tion to the war in the air, and her chief one. 3 England was working
with thirty-seven types of engines, France with forty-six. It was
determined that the United States should design a standard type.
In a few days in May, 191 7, in a private suite of the Willard Hotel,
a handful of aviation designers blocked it out. It was adopted
June 4. The first engine was delivered in Washington just a month
later. It proved to be a great engine, was hurried into production,
and deliveries of 31,814 were made before the Armistice. But it
could not be delivered in quantity for a year after the first experi-
mental model had been made, and the engines shipped were too
few for the equipment of the A.E.F. Until the end, the eyes of
the Army went aloft in foreign planes. Here, too, it is a question
of temperament whether the program was a huge achievement or a
failure. The Aircraft Production Board gave its advice in the early
days of the program, but full responsibility rested upon the
shoulders of Brigadier-General George O. Squier, chief of the
Signal Corps.
The eighteen months of war fall easily into three periods of about
six months, in each of which a special phase of the work that was to
be done was dominant. For six months after Congress convened in
THREE PHASES OF THE WAR 1 13
April, 1917, program was in the air the large planning for the
kind of war that could be guessed, and the ways to win it. It was a
war in which the United States might never get to fight in France,
but it might be necessary to carry on the struggle if the Allies
cracked. By the time Congress ended its session in October the
larger plans had been made; overlapping, some of them, and often
inconsistent and impracticable, but on large scale and indicating a
determination that had no limit. For the next six months, the
problem was administration making plans work, eliminating
deadlock, and constructing the physical and human machines
needed for victory. Such schemes as ships and planes, too complex
for improvisation in an age in which miracles were rare, absorbed
money and good-will. But the struggle was over before their
weight was on the line. By the spring of 1918 most of the plans
were working, and the operation of the American war machines
became the striking feature of the picture. The war lasted long
enough for Pershing to figure in the victory, and for the army of his
dream to become reality. But at the moment in September, 1917,
when the earliest of the drafted men were sent to their uncompleted
camps, and when Pershing established G.H.Q. in eastern France,
the first phase of war was only just changing into the second.
There was room at every part of the program to wonder if it was
sound.
When the men arrived at camp they found that the army they
were in was such as the United States had not seen before.
A distinctive feature of the National Defense Act of 1916 had
been its emphasis upon the Officers 5 Reserve Corps, and the prin-
ciple that thereafter the line commands in the Army (the com-
mands that had to do with fighting men) should not be assigned
through politics or influence, but should go to officers who at least
knew more of the duties of the soldier than the recruits they com-
manded. The propriety of this had always been obvious; the
practice, the reverse. Volunteers had been allowed to choose their
own officers. Politicians had been given line commands. The need
for a reform in this direction had been emphasized by what had
been heard of the struggle of the English to procure trained
ii4 THE YANKS ARE COMING
officers. Leonard Wood, while Chief of Staff, had utilized interest
and apprehension to launch his series of civilian camps. The
military requirements in the land-grant colleges had taken on a
new seriousness, once young men felt themselves under the shadow
of impending war. The President indicated his adherence to the
new principle when he declined to make Theodore Roosevelt the
greatest possible of political generals.
The War Department acted upon the new principle in advance
of the passage of the Selective Service Act. On May 15 it assembled
at some sixteen army posts a series of training camps whose
graduates might hope three months later to be qualified to receive
officers' commissions in the National Army. Nearly 40,000
students contested for the chance to be tested and trained. They
came from the upper groups in the university regiments and from
private life, and 27,341 of them received commissions.
The first camps, graduating their classes in time for the mobili-
zation of September 5, were followed by a second series August 27,
and by a third and fourth. The process of officer training there-
upon became continuous. At every divisional camp it was the in-
tent to maintain an officers 5 training unit, whose candidates were
selected by merit from among the drafted men to create both a
democratic army and a competent command. A camp for Negro
officers was conducted at Des Moines. It was not possible in
ninety days to make a finished officer out of a civilian, but the
young lieutenants into whose hands were entrusted the drafted
men in September had learned more in their three months than
officers old in the service believed young men could learn. Plan-
ning of program was transmuted into execution when the men
reported and the drill began.
VI. THE UNARMED FORCES
JL HE Yanks were indeed coming. But no one who was not in the
know knew the painfully small figures of their embarkation.
What was happening in France, as the Pershing program took
definite shape, was screened from view. Not even the newspapers
knew much about it, and that which they knew was withheld from
publication. The voluntary censorship, agreed to without a law,
worked well. The news releases from the Government were deliber-
ately vague, full of preparations for great things, but not revealing
detailed events.
Men were moving to camp. One could see the trains. Red
Cross women met them at the stations and distributed cigarettes.
Letters home told of camp experiences. Large numbers of troops
were shifted from camp to camp without apparent reason. The
public was aware of the numbers of the divisions as originally
assigned to cantonments and camps, but no great comment was
made when it was discovered that a shift had occurred. The
Forty-First (Sunset) Division of Western National Guard was first
assembled in Gamp Fremont near Palo Alto, but was taken away
after the War Department had quarreled with the local powers
over the cost of a necessary sewer. Hunter Liggett, detached from
his Presidio command, escorted it to a new location at Camp
Greene, near Charlotte, North Carolina. In October, Baker ad-
dressed the division, which was noted without comment, though it
was significant enough for comment. Next came the news that the
tents at Greene were occupied by a newly organized Third Division
and that Joseph T. Dickman was in command. But when and
how Liggett took the Forty-First to France, no one was told. When
the Eighth Division, successor at Camp Fremont to the Forty-First,
1 1 6 THE UNARMED FORGES
was moved east its men were carried in forty-two special trains
spread over six days.
Even the War Department did not know too much. When the
drafted men began to move in September, the camps were too
uneven in their advancement for an exact schedule to be main-
tained. Much, however, was made of the ceremony of mobiliza-
tion. On Tuesday the fourth, the day after Labor Day, Wilson
inarched again, this time at the head of a Washington procession
escorting the draftees from the District to the railroad. In a
Western State the group of draftees entertained their whole
neighborhood in recognition of the honor conferred upon them.
Civic celebrations and parades were the order of the day. Yet it
was impossible to predict the numbers made available or how the
687,000 of the first draft would be assigned. The adoption of the
Pershing division of 28,000 as the American type compelled a
revision of War Department tables and made necessary the assign-
ment of drafted men to fill the Regular and Guard divisions.
Great numbers were detached for the specialized services air,
forest, medical, engineer, and the rest. What were left after all the
drains upon them became the nuclei of National Army divisions
whose commanding officers could not know from day to day what
men or officers they were to have.
In spite of hesitant beginnings the preparation of the armed
forces was in motion with men in charge whose whole professional
life had had to do with troops. The War Department was compe-
tent to convert its civilian recruits into soldiers, given time. It was
now ready to raise an army of maximum size and to think of
Europe as a destination, although the new Embarkation Service
was ever short of ships. What worried most in the seclusion of the
council chamber was the growing problem of procurement, and the
necessity to add to the fighting equipment of the United States a
proper quota of those unarmed forces whose utilization by the
Allies had in three years brought the Central Powers into a tight
investment and state of siege. Procurement passed into a new
phase in July, with the creation of a War Industries Board. Con-
gress, at the end of the war session, provided the last legislation
THE PAGE OF PREPARATION 1 1 7
necessary as a preliminary to the erection of a War Trade Board.
Through the whole session the legislative brain was racked as it
sought to devise means to pay the bills. And, uninformed of much
that was going on in Europe, it could not keep away from the
intriguing question of war aims. As more and more was being
authorized, and more and more had to be taken on faith, the need
increased to make it clear why the United States was fighting.
The hard-pressed Sixty-Fifth Congress deserved more sympathy
than it received. For one hundred and ninety-two days it labored,
as no other Congress had worked. Nearly every aspect of war
legislation was novel; most of the methods urged by the Adminis-
tration were 'un-American' if judged by any pre-war experience
in the United States. The great laws, without which the United
States could not have fought a war, were ground out with what
seemed under the dome of the Capitol to be surprising swiftness.
Looked at from Main Street, the deliberation with which they
came resembled culpable delay.
The acquiescence of Congress in the needs of war lagged behind
the need. Unavoidable as this was, it aroused acid comment.
Congressmen, working without let-up and in a fog, became acid
themselves when called upon to solve the unsolvable and when the
proportions of a war measure kept growing while the measure was
under consideration. The war was in its forty-seventh day before
an army was authorized; and in its one hundred and fifty-seventh
day before the drafted men were due in camp. And it was only
three days before adjournment on October 6 that the revenue bill
was passed.
Behind the protective wall of the Allied armies and the British
Navy the United States remained safe while it deliberated and took
the steps in the conversion of a peaceful democracy into a war
machine. Yet in thirty-seven days in 1914 most of Europe had
sprung to arms, Belgium had been overrun, and the invader had
been turned back from the gates of Paris with his Schlieffen plan a
failure.
No aspect of the process of preparation is more interesting than
the way in which the people crowded the Government. They were
n8 THE UNARMED FORGES
the most effective of the unarmed forces of the war. The official
mind was hesitant as it faced the crisis. The non-official, not know-
ing enough of red tape to be bound by it, stumbled over what it
Ignored, yet became a continuous prod upon Government action.
All conceded that a democratic war could not be fought without
popular approval, but none had guessed how much more popular
desire would ask than the Government could accomplish.
The civilians' task at the beginning was to advise and to do odd
jobs; to supplement the efforts of the Government; to assist in
planning things for the Administration to carry out. In this work
the Council of National Defense had no difficulty in enlisting
whom it wanted. The busiest of men, called to Washington at their
own expense., came at the call, many to remain until the Armistice.
The committee system,, hurriedly assembled, crowded some of the
Government offices so as to impede their work. In others it rein-
forced the effort and provided the fresh point of view that bureau-
cracy tends to lose. As Congress approached the end of the session
many of the committees had done all they could do, and were ready
to be thrust aside because the departments concerned had caught
up. In any event they would have had to be shoved aside, since
they lacked legal authority and Congress was properly critical of
their interlock with business. The post-war investigations of their
behavior produced no important testimony to indicate either
favoritism or malfeasance, but they did not represent an orderly
procedure. As its committees receded from the picture the Coun-
cil of National Defense itself lost some of its prominence. Con-
ceived as a sort of civilian general staff, to advise and launch but
not to execute, the Council had done its work when its advice had
been taken or declined. Its large proposals came quickest iii the
first three months of war. Thereafter, Its planning refined the
margins of the war program or was brought to focus upon un-
expected developments in the execution of it. Many of the com-
mittees c seem to have had but short life, but in reality they were
governmental creations in the process of integration/ Gifford
remained director of the Council until the war was over, but he
never sought or received the prominence adhering to the quasi-
dictators of the war administrations.
SEQUENCE OF PROBLEMS 119
The Emergency Fleet Corporation, operating agency of the
Shipping Board, was the earliest of these war administrations to
take shape by the side of the pre-war Government. Next came the
Food Administration in its voluntary phase, before Congress
legalized it in the Lever Act. Before this legal benediction was
bestowed the third war administration arose, never to have status
in law, but to become in fact the greatest of them all. This was
the War Industries Board, conceived in the Council of National
Defense and erected with the approval of the President, July 28,
The sequence of problems to whose solution the War Industries
Board was assigned went back at least to Kernan's report upon the
manufacture of arms, made early in the year. The Council of
National Defense first attacked this with its Munitions Standards
Board; and Scott, who was drafted as its chairman, stayed by the
problem and grew with it until his health gave way under the
strain. In the second phase of the problem the General Munitions
Board took on a list of military and naval associates and broadened
Its vision to the 'equipping and arming 3 of whatever forces might
be raised; bound to bear in mind at the same time the need of
general industry to carry on. It endeavored to co-ordinate the
needs of the Army and Navy with the industrial requirements of
the country, and learned each day how broad these were and how
far down they penetrated into the ordinary life of the United
States.
It was easier to comprehend the ends to be obtained than to
devise workable means for reaching them. Priority came first of
all. The most elementary of the surveys of procurement revealed
probable shortage of materials that could not be done without. It
was obligatory to devise a method by which prior needs should be
met first, and secondary needs held back. It was impossible to
gauge the importance of any demand for material by the vehe-
mence with which it was pressed, since every office believed that
the success of the war centered around itself. In the determination
of priority it was essential to have a picture of all the needs, of
various degrees of intensity, and to consider them dispassionately
120 THE UNARMED FORGES
upon their merits. There was no way in which a volunteer agency
could, of itself, possess this knowledge. Some principle of repre-
sentation had to be worked out whereby each of the war agencies
could submit its table of requirements so that these could be
appraised by the side of those of industry and normal life. Army
and Navy needs were most visible. The Emergency Fleet was
insistent. The railroads could not get along without their steel,
coal, and timber. And there was always the pressure of the Allies
for their supplies. Once priority was determined soundly, it was a
simple matter to give clearance to such contracts as were approved
and to permit the contract to be fulfilled. It was less simple to
persuade industry, deprived of its requirements, to like to live
without them. More firms than admitted it agreed with the sharp
Washington Post that priority was the Vermiform appendix' of the
war machine, and would have been glad to cut it out. The many
committees of the Advisory Commission, C.N.D., and in particular
its Committee on Raw Materials, were all the eyes the Govern-
ment possessed through which to glimpse a view of what supplies
there were. And these committees, as the weeks wore on, became
suspect to war contractors and to Congress.
By the middle of June, Gifford had been assigned the task of
devising a reorganization of the committee system that would both
work and escape the criticism inherent in the original set-up. He
was asked to draft a modification of the General Munitions Board
so that it might have an adequate knowledge of requirements.
The Public Ledger noted that c a profound change in the civilian
conduct of the war 5 was imminent, and guessed that Baruch, in
charge of raw materials, might develop into a general purchasing
agent. The unity of management that Wilson was working toward
for the Shipping Board and its Emergency Fleet needed to be
applied to the problem of procurement. Goethals and Denman
could not get along together. It was uncertain whether Scott and
Baruch could be made into a team. At the same time, negotiations
were proceeding among the Treasury and the Allies in the hope of
lessening the competition in buying. McAdoo was restive. Meet-
ing the demands of the Allies, under the loan act, for advances to
NEED FOR PRICE-FIXING 121
cover their purchases in the United States, he watched them take
the money into the American market and bid against the United
States for supplies of which there were not enough for both. The
advancing prices resulting from this hurt everyone, and in the end
increased the financial burden upon the Treasury. It affected
price levels, increasing the cost of living so as to lower real wages
and start rnutterings of labor trouble in every branch of war work.
On July 1 1 the President announced that price-fixing would be-
come a weapon of the war, and as he made this announcement he
had in hand Gifford's proposal for the reorganization. The rear-
rangements were agreed upon before July was over.
The General Munitions Board disappeared from the organiza-
tion chart of the Government when its chairman, Scott, became
chairman of its successor, the War Industries Board, July 28, 1917.
The six men associated with Scott in the new arrangement repre-
sented the larger facets of the procurement problem, beginning
with Baruch, whose genius for contacts and hunches kept him still
in charge of the search for raw materials. Already his people were
beginning to survey the world sources of those raw materials
essential to manufacture and lacking within the United States.
Where these were to be found on Allied soil, it was a matter for
bargain, with the Allies indisposed to give anything to the United
States without full compensation. Rubber and manganese were
among the most necessary of the raw materials. No other country
was perhaps as nearly self-sufficient as the United States in its
native supply of raw materials, but not even the United States
possessed them all. It began to be suspected that world politics in
the future would revolve more and more around the necessity of
industrial nations to get access to the indispensable supplies that
others owned. The Bureau of Mines in the Department of the
Interior threw its experts into the search for minerals, and eco-
nomic geologists began to think that they were to be the coming
statesmen.
Robert S. Brookings, who joined the crew as expert in finished
products, was a self-made St. Louis business man with a typical
'success* career until he turned in middle life from profits to public
122 THE UNARMED FORCES
service. His greatest achievement had been the rebuilding of
Washington University; he was, before he died, to erect in Wash-
ington an institution bearing his name whose function was to be to
watch and inspect the operation of government and to report upon
it to the people. Hermann Hagedorn has recorded his passion for
facts in Brooking*: A Biography (1936). When the price-fixing
business was split off to a separate committee, it was under the
direction of Brookings. Robert S. Lovett, who was the new com-
missioner with special oversight of railroad and priority matters,
was a railroad president who had directed the Union Pacific and
Southern Pacific systems. Lovett had come out of Texas into New
York as a young lawyer without backing. He had caught the
attention of E. H. Harriman, had administered the estate of his
benefactor, and had stepped into the management of the Harri-
man railroad interests. There were two military commissioners on
the War Industries Board. Colonel Palmer E. Pierce of the
General Staff represented the Army: Rear Admiral William B.
Fletcher, who had commanded at Vera Cruz in 1914, the Navy.
Labor had a spokesman in the person of Hugh Frayne, a veteran of
the American Federation, who had so often been spokesman for
Gompers that the same language came from the lips of each.
The staffs of assistants organized around the seven commis-
sioners were required to separate themselves from business and
industry so that in giving their advice in procurement they might
not fall foul of the law. The third section of the Lever Act was
detailed and mandatory in its prohibition of the dual relationship
that had hampered the old committees. In organizing the many
sub-committees under the new Board the commissioners recog-
nized how fully their policies would depend upon the accuracy of
the knowledge possessed by the various 'commodity' sections.
These sections grew in number and varied in importance as the
need of the moment shifted; but the end a government advisory
agency whose staff was separate from trade yet was thoroughly
informed about it was kept in view. The Rosenwald committees,
borrowed from trade in the opening days, were finally dissolved in
November, 1917, with members thanked and either returned to
ADVISORY BUREAUS FROM INDUSTRY
their jobs or taken wholly into the Government. And industry,
now that Government was becoming able to inform itself, under-
took a new organization of its resources so as to be able to deal with
the Government.
Under the anti-trust laws the proscription of combinations in
restraint of trade had effectively prevented frank organization
among the American industries. There was undercover agree-
ment, treading so close on the borders of conspiracy that the law
officers were ever on its heels. But little had been done to build up,
trade by trade, well-informed organization through- whose eyes
any craft could be looked at as a whole. The new set-up for war
industry required the Government to look upon each industry as a
unit, and the pressure of necessity brought it about that as Govern-
ment reached down to control, industry should reach up to serve.
The United States Chamber of Commerce, formed in 1912 and
maintaining Washington offices close to Lafayette Square, had
stuck to generalities and had avoided anything that might be
interpreted as illegal conspiracy. It now placed itself at the head of
a movement to bring business into line. In a special convention at
Atlantic City in September, Gifford told it what the War Industries
Board wanted, and resolutions were adopted asking each of the
industries to create a Washington bureau, manned by its own
people, and able to reveal to the appropriate commodity sections
of the War Industries Board the business version of the facts upon
which the Government must act. The commodity section mem-
bers had not been out of business long enough to forget trade
secrets that their former business associates might be indisposed to
reveal.
There were a few organizations, already in existence and
nearly enough what was wanted, able to serve this need. The
Chemical Alliance was a Connecticut incorporation. The Iron
and Steel Institute was already nearly ten years old. The Textile
Alliance (1914) had a mass of information at its disposal respecting
fibers and their use. A Tanners* Council was created to meet the
call for help. And the rest of industry followed in the train of
these. By December, 1917, enough of their bureaus were beyond
124 THE UNARMED FORCES
the original genesis for it to be possible to assemble their chiefs in
general conference in Washington. Before the Armistice, under
the oversight of the War Service executive committee of the
Chamber of Commerce, some four hundred central offices were at
work, and the War Service Committees had become a necessary
part of business. The titles of many of them revealed a service to
be rendered or a sacrifice to be made. Business was either essen-
tial, to be nursed, or non-essential, to be stifled. The committees
ranged the alphabet from that of the Brewing Industry to that of
Wrapping Paper; Sheet Metal Ware had its War Service organiza-
tion, as did Wooden Boxes. It is not certain what the Brassiere
War Service Committee contributed to the winning of the war, but
the Corset Industry took a steel or two from women's waistlines
and claimed credit for releasing many thousand tons of steel for
more essential use. A less serviceable contribution was that of one
of the 'damned professors 5 whose duty led him to revise a list of
non-essential cotton manufactures. He came to 'corset laces, 5 and
with an innocence unusual in married men disposed of them with
the comment: 'Corset laces are certainly not essential. They can
just as well wear them without any trimming.'
Before Congress met in December, ready for a new session and
vexed by the shroud of secrecy that veiled the field of battle, the
War Industries Board was beginning to understand its problem.
It had lost Scott and received Willard in his place. The air was
full of suggestion of mistake and mismanagement, but the War
Department was nearly ready to run itself. A new War Council,
created in the War Department on December 15, provided pro-
motion upstairs for certain of the bureau chiefs. In the place of
Sharpe, Quartermaster-General, who was thus moved up,
Goethals directed the supervision of procurement from an office in
the General Staff, and as acting Quartermaster-General saw to it
that the Staff advice was followed. The War Industries Board
remained a creation of the Council of National Defense and, in
theory, was still subordinate to it. Its commissioners were in fact
working informally at every place of friction where military need
rubbed hard against industrial capacity.
THE PURCHASING COMMISSION FOR THE ALLIES 125
Of the seven original members of the War Industries Board,
three were known to be specially concerned with the Allied com-
petition for the output of American farms and factories: Baruch,
Brookings, and Lovett. The 'beneficiaries of the huge American
loan 3 were crowding the market. Army and Navy buyers found
essential supplies sold out before they could prepare their own
specifications. The specialists in raw materials, finished supplies,
and priority were the natural members of the War Industries
Board to be hampered by the competition and to be called upon to
control it; and the greater Allies were working out an agreement
with the Treasury while the Council of National Defense was
revamping its structure in July. On August 25 an agreement was
signed whereby Baruch, Brookings, and Lovett, and Hoover where
food was concerned, should constitute a Purchasing Commission
for the Allies. Through this agency their needs were to be brought
into harmony with those of the American Government at the
requirements office of the War Industries Board. There is no
earlier step than this in the direction of a single organization
among the enemies of Germany. From this beginning the next
steps follow in a direct path until in April, 1918, Foch of France
came into command of all the armies on the Western Front. But
before these steps could be planned or taken, the unarmed forces of
the United States had been added to by the creation of other
organizations.
To the three major war administrations of ships, food, and
industry, that of coal was added before the end of August. Gar-
field, in fuel, like Hoover, in food,, had to meet most of the same
problems that confronted industry, and each interlocked his
organization with that of Scott. The fifth of the great war adminis-
trations received a name when in an Executive Order of October
12 the President created a War Trade Board, assigning its manage-
ment to Vance McCormick. A sixth was still to come; a Railroad
Administration under McAdoo which was not launched until
December.
There was power behind the Purchasing Commission for the
Allies from the moment of its creation, for the Espionage Act had
126 THE UNARMED FORCES
vested in the President full authority over the flow of exports.
Out of this grew the War Trade Board. In the interval between
June 15 and the signature of a Trading- with-the-Enemy Act on
October 6, the things that were needed to constitute a strangle-
hold on trade were considered, asked of Congress, and granted, so
that McCormick and his Board had a legal status which the War
Industries Board always lacked.
The steps in the development of .the new policies followed
closely upon the law. The President assigned his authority over
exports to an Exports Council, whose members were Cabinet
officers. The Exports Council entrusted the administration of
exports to a Division of Export Licenses in the Department of
Commerce, in connection with whose management McCormick
learned the requirements of his job. On July 15, by proclamation
of the President, the new power was in operation a c new weapon
against Germany a noiseless and unseen weapon.'
There was some real danger that uncontrolled exports might
have done both of two things: given aid to the enemy and drained
from the United States its vital and necessary supplies. The
routine figures of foreign trade showed this as they made it pos-
sible to compare the pre-war averages of wheat, beef, sugar, and
fats with the totals for the first and second quarters of 1917.
Within the United States a consequence of this drainage-off of
food was already showing itself in rising prices. There was in-
creasing pinch wherever Americans were living on narrow in-
comes, and among wage-earners whose continuous and cheerful
labor was a necessary part of war the rising cost of living upset the
balance of the wage scale. Union labor was uneasy enough as it
was asked to accept non-union workers, women, untrained
apprentices, and new methods of management. High cost of
living made things worse. The Government was daily called upon
to mediate in strikes or to avert more strikes. The labor leaders,
affiliated with Gompers, were keeping their pledge to hold their
followers upon the job, but with increasing difficulty. At many
places in the war program events now pointed to the need for a
war-labor policy that should be an integrated part of the war
TRADING-WITH-THE-ENEMY ACT 1 2 7
administration. The informal agreement made with labor through
Gompers meant either this or nothing. Quite apart from this it
was desirable that every effort be made to prevent such rises in
food prices as might be prevented. The Exports Council prepared
to co-operate through the control of sales abroad.
The need to conserve food for home use was balanced by an
equal need to prevent enemy use of American food, or neutral use
that might indirectly prove to be of enemy advantage. It was
only a year since the publication of the British blacklist of Ameri-
can firms had stirred up all the anti-English elements in the
United States. It had then seemed to be an unwarrantable inter-
ference with American trade for the Allies to forbid their subjects
to deal with American firms merely because these were suspected
of having a German connection. The United States had traveled
a long way in a year. As a belligerent now, it was gripped by the
inexorable logic of war in an industrial age. It was bound to defeat
its enemy whether in the field or by economic siege. It was bound
to use its right over its own ships, ports, markets, and resources so
as to prevent indirect aid from passing to the enemy through the
neutral and to bargain with the neutral for whatever advantage
could be extorted from him through trade restriction. The United
States had departed from its status as neutral when the pressure
of the belligerents became too great to be borne. The neutrals
that were now left lacked the power to resist, without which
neutral right is empty. The control of exports was only the
beginning of trade pressure.
Before the control of war trade could be converted into a com-
plete and flexible weapon there was need for a grant of additional
authority that would, in one direction, bring imports within the
scheme, and, in the other, make a clear legal definition of the
word 'enemy.' The former was simple enough. It required merely
the passage of a law containing the word. Early in July, Andrew J.
Montague of Virginia advised the House that 'this is not a war of
soldiers so much as a war of economic forces/ and opened a very
brief debate upon a Tradmg-with-the-Enemy Act. What little
debate there was did not revolve about the clause conferring power
is8 THE UNARMED FORCES
over imports. The House finished with it all in parts of only three
days; the Senate in only two. The bill did not become a law until
the President signed it at the end of the session, October 6. But
the delay was due to crowding occasioned by other bills, and to
matters much more complicated than either exports or imports.
The more difficult parts of the act fell under three heads: the
definition of the word 'enemy/ so that it might correctly describe
those enemies outside the United States with whom all trade was
banned; the treatment of such subjects of the enemy as might be
resident within the United States; and a rider attached to the bill
in the Senate on motion of William H. King of Utah for the pur-
pose of enlarging the powers over opinion that had been voted in
the Espionage Act. Even these did not prolong the debate. The
Senate adopted the conference report 48 to 42, and the House
accepted it without a roll-call.
It was conceded in the discussions that, during war, trade with
the enemy became automatically illegal, and that the ordinary war
powers of the President authorized its prohibition, with only so
much exception as might be for public advantage and conducted
under public license. It was conceded, too, that the word c enemy 5
included not only the Government of the enemy, but also persons
and corporations lying within its control, whether in the enemy
country or in regions occupied by its army; and whether the per-
sons or corporations were enemy subjects, or neutrals, or even
those of the Allies or the United States. The bill so defined the
word, and broadened it to include 'allies-of-enemy, 5 for the
United States was not yet at war with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria,
and Turkey. But the bill did more than this, because the auto-
matic powers of the President did not clearly embrace the right to
forbid trade with those in neutral or Allied countries who might
be suspected of having an enemy connection. It was this suspect
trade that the Allies had sought to strangle. It had brought about
the blacklists, the control of bunker coal, and the arbitrary refusal
to tolerate trade with neutrals in even innocent matters unless the
Allies were assured of a military advantage to themselves.
As the provision came back from conference and was embedded
c ENEMY ALIENS* 129
In the new law, it forbade any person In the United States (except
with license from the President)
to trade, or to attempt to trade, either directly or indirectly, with 3
to, or from, or for, or on account of, or on behalf of, or for the bene-
fit of, any other person, with knowledge or reasonable cause to
believe that such other person is an enemy or ally of enemy, or is
conducting or taking part in such trade, directly or indirectly, for,
or on account of, or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, an enemy or
ally of enemy.
The normal definition of 'enemy/ in its widest form, included
enemy subjects and corporations resident in the United States.
The policy of the United States in inviting or permitting immigra-
tion had brought within the country great numbers of such enemy
aliens who had neglected naturalization, kept peacefully at
their useful jobs, and were too highly regarded to be proscribed.
When these disregarded the hospitality they enjoyed, they were
subject to criminal law if they committed crime, or to internment
if they threatened danger. But there was no intention of inflicting
upon them as a class the full rigor of permissible international law.
Spy scares' were numerous, and enough intrigue was known to
warrant close observance of the behavior of these enemy aliens.
But the millions of subjects of Germany and Austria-Hungary in
the United States showed no sign of disloyalty as a class. Nervous
American neighbors tattled about them in more cases than the
Department of Justice has ever been willing to reveal, but when
the American Protective League or the Division of Military Intel-
ligence made quiet investigations they found few facts to justify the
charges. The law was mitigated with respect to these aliens.
They had trouble enough without it, for they were objects of a
suspicion that often cost them jobs. The President directed them
to keep away from camps and munition factories. They were not
permitted to enter or leave the United States without special
permission. They were required to register themselves and report
their movements. But they were not interned, denied the protec-
tion of the law, or generally molested.
One group of enemy aliens possessed a special protection as old
130 THE UNARMED FORCES
as the earliest treaty made with Prussia in 1 785 and continued in
the revisions of that treaty made in 1799 and 1828. These were
Prussian merchants residing in the United States, who were
specifically allowed, in the event of war, 'to remain nine months
to collect their debts and settle their affairs . . . [and to] depart
freely, carrying all of their effects without molestation or hin-
drance.' And other Prussians, similarly residing, 'whose occupa-
tions are for the common subsistence and benefit of mankind, 3
were entitled to an unmolested existence.
But the promise of an 'unmolested existence' did not go so far as
to permit them, or other alien enemies, to keep up communication
with the Fatherland, or to send money home, or to engage in
ventures useful to Germany. It did not promise that property
within the United States, owned by enemies outside, should con-
tinue to be productive to the owners, and thereby to Germany
itself. The sixth section of the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act
authorized the appointment of an Alien Property Custodian c to
receive all money and property in the United States due or belong-
ing to an enemy, or ally of enemy . . . and to hold, administer, and
account for the same.' Germany had already, in the months
before April, 1917, provided for the registration of enemy property
within the Empire, had ordered its sale wherever convenient, and
had brought about the liquidation of British and French firms or
corporations doing business there. Its various decrees were de-
signed to 'prevent the removal of such property from German
jurisdiction.' Its policies had matched and had been matched by
the similar policies of its enemies; and from both sides had come
the claim that what was being done was being done only in retali-
ation. The claim was not valid enough, wherever advanced, to
receive much consideration. Segregation of enemy property was
too obvious a duty of a belligerent to constitute a special offense or
to need special justification. It was a part of modern war. When
the United States became one of the enemies of Germany the Ger-
man controls were broadened to embrace American-owned pro-
perty and the United States of necessity set up similar restrictions.
The new Alien Property Custodian was A. Mitchell Palmer of
ADMINISTERING ALIEN PROPERTY 131
Pennsylvania, whose office was launched in an Executive Order of
October 12. An 'original Wilson man/ Palmer might have been
selected as Secretary of War in 1913 had not his scruples as a
Quaker barred this sort of service. He deserved well of his party
for having sacrificed his seat in the House in order to contest the
seat of Boies Penrose in the Senate in the election of 1914. De-
feated in the three-cornered contest with Penrose and Pinchot, he
had gone back to his law office after a few weeks as a judge of the
Court of Claims. He now undertook as trustee to search out and
seize all enemy-owned property in the United States. What was to
be done with it in the long run was left to the determination of
Congress and to the reciprocal action of Germany after the peace.
In the short run, it was to cease to constitute a menace to the war
effort. Palmer managed to set up and administer more than 32,000
separate trusts, aggregating in value $502,000,000, and he
reminded Congress at the end of his service that he had more than
paid the costs of his office by uncovering and collecting for the
Government tax obligations that had been evaded.
Different types of property were treated differently. That of
Bulgarian and Turkish allies of Germany was generally untouched.
That of private persons, some of them Americans caught within
German lines, or Allies within occupied areas, was segregated,
conserved, and held subject to return when owners could divest
themselves of 'their technical enemy character.' But the property
of enemy-owned corporations doing business in the United States
was made e a part of America's great fighting machine.' Palmer's
scruples against war did not go so far as to prevent vigorous work
in co-operation with the armed forces. He found the enemy
corporations more numerous than he anticipated, larger, and
more penetrating in their industrial character. Their real owner-
ship was often obscured behind false names and faked transfers
that compelled 'painstaking investigation. 5 They owned much
actual war material, bought and stored in the United States in
absence of means of shipment to Germany. There were factories
making magnetos, surgical instruments, chemicals, and drugs.
Palmer's explorers uncovered a German penetration of American
132 THE UNARMED FORGES
industry that he regarded as his duty to dissipate. His original
powers as public trustee were insufficient for this, but he soon
procured an amendment to the law whereby he was enabled to sell
such property to new and loyal owners and to convert the proceeds
into Liberty Bonds. These he held to the account of the alien own-
ers and subject to action of Congress. He thus avoided the neces-
sity to account for the high war profits that the enemy would have
earned within the United States. He was proud c to make the
Trading-with-the-Enemy Act a fighting force in the war.'
No single class of enemy property created more difficulty than
the German-owned patents, taken out in the United States before
the war, and sometimes operated in the United States, sometimes
abroad, and sometimes not operated at all. German industry, like
American, had often bought competitive patents to suppress them.
American war industry needed the service of all useful inventions
to which the protection of the United States patent laws had been
extended. Manufacture under them must continue, but without
profit to the enemy while war lasted. Where the German owners
had elected to manufacture only in Germany the war cut off
supplies that could not well be spared: dyes, chemicals, and above
all salversan the famous C 6o6' of Professor Paul Ehrlich which
was without rival as a specific against syphilis. The act permitted
the President to license the use of German patents by American
firms; the President in turn vested the administration of these
licenses in the Federal Trade Commission.
Congress was in some doubt, as it debated the Trading- with-the
Enemy Act, where to assign the various powers over trade. It dis-
covered that there were jealousies and rivalries among the depart-
ments, and here, as in many other cases, it avoided the issue by
conferring most of the authority upon the President. On October
12, Wilson made his distribution of duties, giving the largest share
to McCormick and a War Trade Board, upon which should sit
representatives of the Treasury, State, Agriculture, and Commerce
Departments as well as those of the Food Administration and the
Shipping Board. The power over the export of 'coin, bullion, or
currency' he retained for himself, assigning shares in administration
WORK OF THE WAR TRADE BOARD 133
to the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System; it escaped repeal
when the war laws had done their work, and a later President
found this within his arsenal of powers when panic in 1933 pro-
duced a crisis hardly second to that of war. The other powers to
license imports and exports and to block enemy trade were ad-
ministered by McCormick through what became fifth among the
war administrations.
The aim of the War Trade Board was to complete the com-
mercial and financial isolation of the enemy, to obtain supplies
essential for the United States, and to conserve ocean tonnage.
In the last projects it worked in close association with the Shipping
Board and the War Industries Board* For the purposes of the
others it built up an organization in Washington and sent its agents
around the world.
Its bureaus of exports and of imports broadened their control as
the war ran on. Beginning with limited lists of commodities and
limited areas of origin or destination, their duties and powers were
extended until in February, 191 8, all imports and exports were
required to be licensed. The detailed knowledge of commodities
upon which license control was operated was drawn from trade
advisers, from the Food and Fuel Administrations, and from the
commodity sections of the War Industries Board. The bureaus
co-operated with British and French agencies of like character, to
dig out knowledge about enemy firms in neutral countries and to
make blacklists comprehensive and effective. The 'enemy cloak
lists 5 provide interesting testimony to the efforts of the enemy to
hide his hand.
The applicants for licenses had to meet the scrutiny of an intelli-
gence bureau, which exchanged information with the intelligence
divisions of Army, Navy, and the Department of Justice. Persons
who desired to be permitted to trade were investigated. The in-
vestigations were carried into neutral countries by agents, open or
under cover, who used their wits to develop devices with which to
baffle the efforts of enemy firms to disguise themselves. By Novem-
ber, 1918, the War Trade Board had 2789 employees at work, with
its largest units devoting their attention to exports and war trade
intelligence.
134 THE UNARMED FORCES
There was no logical reason for adding to the Trading- with-the-
Enemy Act the clauses dealing with opinion and elaborating the
powers conferred upon the Government by the Espionage Act.
The Senate, however, was worried by expressions of dissent and
was driven by constituents whose intolerance grew upon them.
Numerous proposals to crack down upon radicals, pacifists, and
pro-Germans found their way to the Senate files, and a selection
from them was attached as a rider to the bill under consideration.
The Senate insisted and the House yielded, with the result that the
war powers of the Government were crowded more closely upon
the constitutional guaranties of free speech and free press.
The President was authorized, whenever he should 'deem that
the public safety demands it,' to operate a censorship over all
channels of communication between the United States and other
countries. The law forbade (unless under license from the Presi-
dent) any international communication 'except in the regular
course of the mail/ and made it unlawful to communicate or at-
tempt to communicate with c an enemy or ally of the enemy.'
The unmailable varieties of communication were defined in detail
so complete that a mails, cable, and radio censorship could be
operated with whatever rigor appeared desirable. There was no
doubt, upon constitutional grounds, of the right of the Govern-
ment to exercise this power. It was entirely expedient, in time of
war, to have a means of blocking disloyal or indiscreet transmission
of information. But the result, an outrage in the mind of radicals,
was a shock to the feelings of many who gave complete support to
the fact and aims of war. In the Executive Order of October 12,
Wilson vested in a Censorship Board (representatives of War,
Navy, Post Office, War Trade, and the Committee on Public
Information) the administration of rules governing communica-
tion between the United States and any foreign country by any
means.
The last section of the act, section nineteen, was assigned to the
Postmaster-General for enforcement, and rounded out the powers
to exclude unmailable material that had already been conferred
by the Espionage Act. It was in the fourth week of September
CENSORSHIP BY THE KING AMENDMENT 135
when the amendment of Myers of Montana (whose State was soon
to set a bad example with violent criminal syndicalism and sedition
laws) was pressed upon the act in the Senate. The People's
Council was in the papers. There were incipient strikes through-
out the West. The I.W.W. was responsible for much loose talk and
was charged with more. There was still suggestion that the alien
enemies in the United States were treacherous. If Myers had had
his way it would have become unlawful during the war "to utter
any disloyal, threatening, violent, scurrilous, defamatory, abusive,
or seditious language about 3 the Government, the President, the
Constitution, the flag, the Army, the Navy, the soldiers, or the
sailors, or any language calculated to bring any of them into
'contempt, scorn, contumely, or disrepute.' The Myers amend-
ment failed now to be adopted (although Congress caught up to it
in six months), but in its place King of Utah submitted and
secured the adoption of a less sweeping proscription of utterance.
The King amendment struck at the foreign-language press,
requiring it to file, in advance of publication, a correct English
translation of any material dealing with the countries at war or
with their policies. The local postmaster was to receive the trans-
lations, and the Postmaster-General was permitted to waive the
requirement in the case of such publishers as were not likely to
cause 'detriment to the United States in the conduct of the present
war. 3 The new authority over the foreign-language press and the
new definition of unmailable communication, added to the powers
previously conferred upon him, gave to the Postmaster-General a
set of duties incongruous with Ms principal task. Persons who
violated the law did not generally receive the trial and conviction
to which even law violators are entitled. They were punished by
administrative order without easy redress. Those who needed
restraint were enraged, as was to be expected. Those who feared
bureaucracy and the loss of reasonable freedom were made nerv-
ous. But section nineteen was additional evidence of the solidity
of opinion that supported the war effort.
At their worst the various restrictions were less severe than
their counterparts prevailing among the other belligerents.
136 THE UNARMED FORCES
Secretary Daniels was among those cross-examined before com-
mittees of Congress, when that body convened for the winter
session. Fred A. Britten of Chicago, with enough Germans
among his constituents to make him responsive to their rights,
heckled the Secretary of the Navy mildly, and evoked from
Daniels the reply: 'The facts are we have no censorship of the
press. . . . We request the press not to print certain things . . .
there is no law or power to compel them to comply . . . but that
mere request as to 98 per cent of the newspapers is absolutely as
good as law ... if a paper should be treasonable, it can be denied
the mails . . . [but] they are very few. 3 And to this Britten rejoined:
Thank God for that/
VII. THE SINEWS OF WAR
I
NTEREST on the First Liberty Loan began to run on June 15,
1917, with the Treasury still uncertain how much it could raise
during the first year of war or how much it could spend. Both had
limits. Wars can be fought only with goods on hand or with goods
manufactured while the war is waged. The economic strength
that backs armies and produces the sinews of war is an intangible
existing at the moment of any declaration, and is certain to be
depleted if war is prolonged toward the moment of exhaustion.
The fiscal bookkeeping whereby the ownership of this economic
strength is transferred from the citizen to the nation becomes a
matter of public policy. It may make the rich richer and the poor
poorer, or it may wipe out the rich to the disadvantage of the poor.
No fiscal system is sound, in the long run, unless it leaves the tax-
payer who has paid his tax in a position in which he may hope to
earn enough to pay another tax next year. Single cropping, too
long indulged in, bankrupts the farmer; unsound taxation defeats
its own intent by destroying the very base upon which it is levied.
'The power to tax' is indeed c the power to destroy.'
If perfect fiscal wisdom were procurable it might conceivably
spread the whole profit and loss of war upon the whole population,
in precise proportion to the suffering and advantage of every
individual and every group. But if there were perfect wisdom in
control of governments, there would be no war. In an imperfect
world, however, the imperative need to spend, driven by fear of
defeat, compels a fiscal policy based more upon the immediate
productiveness of measures than upon their ultimate wisdom.
There is some small chance of correcting the injustices of war
finance by subsequent taxation, whereby "unwarrantable profits
138 THE SINEWS OF WAR
are recaptured by the nation; but the chance Is weakened by the
slight political mobility of the small citizens who pay the taxes and
the extreme agility of accumulated wealth. There cannot be great
accuracy in any laws passed under pressure. There has been no
war in which the suffering was ended at the peace.
For the Treasury of the United States, as the scope of war
expenditures broadened, it was a matter of guessing how much
could be raised, and upon what terms. The people had to pay.
It was both right and politic to make them pay as much of current
cost out of current taxes as could be accomplished; but no one was
so innocent as to believe that debt could be avoided. This debt,
owed by the Government to the people, could be got rid of only
by shifting it upon the shoulders of the people. There were only
two ways of making this shift: those of taxation and of repudiation.
And here every interest would pull or push to save itself. McAdoo
could not hope to spend more than he could raise.
It was doubtful whether he could spend, during the first year,
even this much. The people of the United States had a high stand-
ard of life, as standards went, and could tighten the belt many
times before exhaustion. The credit of the Government was nearly
perfect, reinforced by the policy that restored gold payments in
1879 and by the vote that rejected free silver in 1896. The size of
loans that could be raised was limited only by the terms of the
contracts and the interest rate. But the expenditure of billions
could not start at top speed from scratch. The first six months of
war were months of planning how to spend with war producers
not yet in quantity production. Not until the second year of war
could it be expected to spend as much as was desirable to invest in
victory.
The ease with which the first loan was raised testified to the
abundant resources of the United States, to the fluidity of its
wealth, and to the usefulness of the Federal Reserve System. The
banking reforms of 1913 had produced a financial mechanism able
to meet the calls of war finance. There was no need for any
finance-in-desperation such as Chase had operated in the Civil
War; no need to find a twentieth-century Jay Cooke to persuade
THE SECOND LOAN ACT 139
and bully; no need to fill an empty Treasury with outright fiat
money like the greenbacks. The four million buyers of the first
loan became as many promoters of the next. The Federal Reserve
Banks knew from the first experience how to improve upon it in
the second. The volunteers who solicited bond subscriptions put
their organization upon a permanent basis, to endure through the
war, and got more pleasure from their work than they anticipated.
The short-term loans (Treasury Certificates) authorized in the
loan act of April 24 proved their usefulness before it became
necessary to make a second drive for bonds. Sold through the
Federal Reserve Banks, they simplified the transfer of funds and
spread the financial load so as to prevent undue crowding at single
dates. They provided a basis for estimate of the amount that must
be raised by bonds. Eight times before Congress adjourned in
October, the Treasury w r ent to the banks for from two hundred to
four hundred millions at an issue, without running over the maxi-
mum of two billions permitted to be outstanding at one time.
Four of the issues, maturing, had been paid off before Congress on
September 24 passed a second loan act in anticipation of a second
drive.
No pressure was needed behind this second act. McAdoo held
off his request for authority as long as possible, so as to have the
fullest picture of his need. The critics of war finance, and those
who desired to produce out of revenue legislation something
more than sinews of war, raised no serious objections. They with-
held their fire for the revenue measure, recognizing that until a
tax was voted there was no way of avoiding loans.
The second loan act gave the President authority to borrow at
four per cent (raising the rate from the three and one-half per cent
of April) and left the bonds tax-free with respect to ordinary taxes.
There was no convincing reason why Government bonds should be
tax-free, except that they were thereby made more attractive to
investors. The exemption had originated at a time when there
were so few taxes to be escaped that it had meant little. Now, in
an age of income taxes, estate taxes, and progressive surtaxes, the
freedom from deduction by either Nation or State gave an ad-
140 THE SINEWS OF WAR
vantage to the rich investor that made Mm a target in politics.
The 'bloated bondholder' of Civil War days was bloated because
he was paid in gold when other creditors of the Government were
forced to accept depreciated greenbacks. The bondholder was
now to value his exemption as worth more to him than the gold
clause. The bonds of the first loan were free of everything but
estate and inheritance taxes. The new bonds were somewhat less
desirable and were therefore entitled to a higher rate, since in
addition to estate and inheritance taxes they were liable for in-
come surtaxes thereafter to be imposed.
Like those of the first act, the new bonds were made convertible
by the holders into bonds of later issues. Congress fixed the
authorized total of the new four per cent loan at $75538,945,460.
In addition to this amount, it authorized a new type of loan, in
small sums covered by War Savings Certificates, to a total of two
billions. It raised the maximum of short-time loans to four
billions outstanding at one time. And it authorized the Treasury
to continue the policy of loans to those countries 'engaged in war
with the enemies of the United States. 5 Four billions were ear-
marked for this.
McAdoo was preparing for his second loan while Congress com-
pleted the draft of the enabling act. The drive began on October
i, with interest on the loan to run from November 15. Subscrip-
tions were invited for three billions in four per cent bonds, due in
twenty-five years but callable earlier. The first loan had been
oversubscribed, and the Treasury had rejected oversubscriptions.
The Secretary now reserved the right to accept half of the over-
subscriptions, and took again to the road to inspire his solicitors
and the co-operating committees. Sergeant Arthur Guy Empey,
back from service with the British and author of Over the Top by an
American Soldier Who Went (1917), went on the road also, a thrilling
speaker with grewsome descriptions that built up hate. Donald
M. Ryerson's Four-Minute Men, under the auspices of the Com-
mittee on Public Information, mobilized themselves in the
theaters. The speakers' bureaus, whether of the Treasury, the
C.P.I., the Food Administration, or the councils of defense, helped
WAR SAVINGS CERTIFICATES 141
in the push. The State Department provided more testimony
against the enemy by releasing more intercepted dispatches,
among them the famous spurlos versenkt advice from Luxburg,
German charge in the Argentine. In this it was suggested that
certain merchant ships at sea 3 whose destruction could not be
defended if discovered, be c sunk without a trace being left. 5
The Second Liberty Loan was a success, oversubscribed by half,
with more than twice as many buyers as the first. To 9,400,000
Investors McAdoo finally assigned bonds to the amount of 3,808-
766,150.
The War Savings Certificates were launched in December with
a drive directed by Frank A. Vanderlip. Like the Liberty Bonds,
the certificates had their place in morale as well as in finance. It
was Hamlltonian doctrine, and sound doctrine, too, to spread
among the citizens a financial interest in the solvency of the State.
Every holder of a bond payable, principal and interest, c in United
States gold coin of the present standard of value' (the acts were
identical In this), held a stake in the Government. Patriotism and
profit were combined. It gave no small stability to opinion when
four million creditors were listed. There were well above twice
that many now, and more than half as many as had voted for
President in 1916.
But even so little as fifty dollars, the minimum amount of any
bond, was too much to be swung by every American. Vanderlip
undertook to bring the war home to the citizen of petty savings
and to inculcate thrift as a by-product. War savings could be
accumulated twenty-five cents at a time, in the form of stamps
pasted on a card; the same to be turned in at prices ranging from
$4. 12 to $4.23 for certificates with a face value of five dollars and
a maturity of January I, 1923. Every post office and every rural
carrier soon had the stamps for sale. More than $834,000,000 was
borrowed by this device in twelve months, leaving the Secretary
so happy with the venture as to hope that it might become c a con-
tinuing feature of the Nation's financing even after the restoration
of peace.'
At no time was Congress compelled to go slowly on appropria-
142 THE SINEWS OF WAR
tlons for fear of lack of funds. The Treasury had closed the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1917, with an excess of receipts for the year
of $788,000,000 over disbursements. It had paid out in all
$2,0803000,000 (of which $932,000,000 went to the Allies), and
had taken in $ 1,118., 000,000 from taxes and $1,750,000,000
from loans. But it had not begun to spend. McAdoo made his
estimates for the fiscal year 1917-18 a jump at a time, as he
learned of new requirements, and ended at about twelve billions,
exclusive of foreign loans. The Congress, in its appropriations,
gave reality to the estimates. It authorized expenditures or com-
mitments up to twenty-one billions, with the leading items run-
ning in millions to 891 1 for the Army, 1875 for the Navy, 1889 f r
the Emergency Fleet, and 7000 for loans to the Allies. The com-
mittees concerned, those on Ways and Means in the House and on
Finance in the Senate, began early in the session to work upon
such a revision of the taxing laws as would be entailed by the
expenditures; but the drafting of the measure had to be postponed
repeatedly because of the discovery of some huge new cost or
some new deficiency in revenue. Their work was not done upon
the introduction of the measure. It had to be steered, and rebuilt
as steered, until the very end of the session.
From a fiscal standpoint, the greatest uncertainty was alcohol.
Long, with tobacco, a heavy contributor to the internal revenue,
its standing as a fiscal reliance was threatened from two sides,
and shaken from each while the revenue bill was under debate.
The advance of prohibition had been persistent and successful
for the last decade. From local option to State-wide prohibi-
tion, and thence toward national prohibition by constitutional
amendment, it had been driven by an organized pressure of dry
forces. Every year showed a larger dry area upon the map. War
did not stop the drive. On August i, 1917, the Senate surrendered
to the demand, sending to the House the Sheppard amendment.
Half the States voted solid delegations for it when it passed the
House. Thirty-three States were dry by their own choice when
the amendment was ready for submission on December 18. By
the terms of the amendment the States had seven years in which
INCREASED TAXES ON ALCOHOL 143
to ratify It; it took them only thirteen months. It was far from
certain how successful the measure would be as a social reform,
but it could be foreseen that upon ratification the Government
would lose a source of certain revenue.
The other attack upon alcohol was grounded on the belief that
its manufacture was a non-essential use of foodstuffs in time of war.
The distilling of alcohol for beverage purposes was forbidden by
the Lever Act in August, and the President was authorized to
prohibit the use of grain for brewing. Until Congress had shown
its hand on these matters it was not possible even to guess at the
revenue that might be derived from alcohol. The prohibition
upon manufacture did not extend to the sale of alcoholic liquors
already made and in bond. These could be taxed, and were. They
were made to yield, in the last months before the Eighteenth
Amendment went into effect, more revenue than ever before.
Spirits and fermented liquors had contributed 283 millions in
1917; they were stepped up to 433 millions in 1918, and to 483
millions in 1919. Behind both attacks upon the manufacture of
alcohol was an increasing demand that the consumption as well
as manufacture ought to be forbidden as a war measure, even in
advance of the adoption of the amendment. But compliance with
this was avoided for another year.
The revenue bill came into the House early in May, with Ford-
ney of Michigan opening the debate for the Committee on Ways
and Means on the eleventh. It was significant that he opened,
rather than Kitchin of North Carolina, the chairman, for Fordney
was a Republican. They had a unanimous report to present
unusual in financial legislation. Members of the committee,
whether majority Democrats or minority Republicans, went out
of their way to praise the patriotism of their normal opponents.
They were consciously breaking new gound in American taxation,
and labored as diligently and as crudely as pioneers must. When
the House finished with the bill May 23 (with a vote of 329 to 21),
the Senate Finance Committee worked as resolutely as the Com-
mittee on Ways and Means had done, thought as highly of the
patriotic diligence of all concerned, but fell short of unanimity
144 THE SINEWS OF WAR
when at last ready to report the measure to the Senate. Yet the
Senate passed the bill September 10, by vote of 69 to 4, the
quartet of dissenters being Borah, Gronna, La Follette, and
Norris.
It was war compulsion rather than a coming together of minds
that produced near unanimity. More than one Republican in
either house made his apology for agreement with Democrats.
Fordney covered his unusual alliance with the story of a lad dig-
ging potatoes, of whom a passer-by inquired, e "My son, what are
you getting for doing this?"' To which replied the boy, CC I get
nothing for doing it, but I will get hell if I do not do it." ' The
House received his confession with laughter, and settled down on
May 1 1 to a task that was not completed until the President signed
the bill October 3. The bill, as introduced, proposed to raise by
taxation in the next fiscal year the sum of 1800 millions, but there
was no visibility along its ceiling. Within a week McAdoo raised
his requirement to 2245 millions, and all Kitchin could reply to
inquiries as to maxima was, e We can find out as we go along/
When the Senate Finance Committee was ready to report the bill
(after the passage of the food bill had settled the fate of the alcohol
schedules), Simmons thought the measure would add 2009 mil-
lions to the resources of the Government, and it was estimated that
taxes would run alongside loans at about the ratio of 35 to 65.
It passed the Senate estimated at 2416 millions. The conference
report left it at 2535 millions, these in excess of the measures of
internal taxation already in force. When, however, the final
figures for the revenue of 1917-18 were available in the report of
the Secretary of the Treasury at the end of 1918, the fact proved
to be better than the guess. The total receipts from taxation
amounted to 4174 millions, of which 3694 came from the internal
revenue, as against 809 millions from the same source in 1917.
The new law worked an increase of 2885 millions over the internal
revenue total of the previous year.
There was agreement upon the fundamental basis of the tax, an
agreement in which President and Secretary of the Treasury con-
curred with both parties and all factions in Congress as well as
LA FOLLETTE DISSENT ON FINANCE 145
with, vocal comment upon the measure as it was driven along.
The war was to cause as small a burden for posterity as was pos-
sible. It was to be carried out of current taxes as far as could be
done without wrecking the business that must pay the tax. Dis-
agreement began, after the acceptance of the principle, as soon as
a place was suggested at which to stop taxing and to begin to
borrow. The dissension prevented a unanimous report to the
Senate from the Finance Committee. It was best expressed and
most effectively led by La Follette, who was never able to be quite
convincing as to his motive. There was so much indubitably
sound finance in his minority proposals that he commanded re-
spect as he heckled, however greatly he irritated. But he could
not persuade either his colleagues or the public of the complete-
ness of his interest in war finance, since there was so much that
looked like a hang-over from his prolonged antipathy to big busi-
ness, its habits, and its social tendencies.
As the debate drew to a close in the Senate his numerous
amendments were rejected one by one. At the very end he offered
a complete bill, constructed in his office, as a substitute for the
project upon which the Senate had been w r orking for a month, and
upon which the Finance Committee had worked eleven weeks
before the Senate took it up. The fourteen Senators who stood by
him when the Senate turned this down, 65 to 15, read like a roster
of Progressives and near-Progressives. The speeches they made,
rarely as sound as his, contain much to suggest a social rather than
a fiscal aim as dominating their minds. They were Borah, Brady,
Gore, Gronna, Hardwick, Hollis, Husting, Johnson (California),
Jones (Washington), Kenyon, McNary, Norris, Reed, and Varda-
man.
La Follette was not content to carry as little of the cost as thirty-
five per cent from taxes. He would have paid the whole cost out
of current receipts had it been possible. His philosophy was not
far from that which Amos Pinchot, through his American Com-
mittee on War Finance, had urged upon Congress. If a 'pay-as-
you-go* war should make wealth regret that it had helped to make
the war and this both Pinchot and La Follette believed there
146 THE SINEWS OF WAR
would be some satisfaction in voting taxes. If it should prevent the
war from increasing the concentration of American wealth in the
hands of those to whom the Progressives had already given painful
prominence as 'money trust/ it would work some social benefit.
The supporters of the La Follette proposals, and those made under
his wing, were left cold by the contention of business that a pay-as-
you-go war would destroy both it and the power of the United
States to carry on the war. They had long since ceased to believe
what business said about itself.
Differing with the majority forces upon the ratio between loans
and taxes, the opposition differed also upon the subjects for taxa-
tion. The House proposal, and the bill as passed, taxed everything
in sight. Chewing gum and soft drinks, automobiles and bank
checks, postal rate for letters, graphophones, moving-picture films
and theater tickets, as well as incomes, war profits, and estates,
were made to pay their share. La Follette worked earnestly to
avoid the excise and nuisance taxes bearing directly upon the small
consumer and to place the whole burden of special war taxation
upon incomes, excess profits, alcohol, and tobacco. The most
significant debates, becoming sharper as they were prolonged from
May into October, turned upon the ratio of loans to taxes, the in-
come tax, the treatment of excess profits, and upon an attempt to
take away from the publisher the subsidy he had enjoyed since
1885 in the form of a flat one-cent-per-pound rate on second-class
mail.
It was protested in both houses that a reform of the postal system
was not properly to be included in a revenue measure. There was
no serious objection to an increase in the letter rate from two to
three cents, but the attempt to readjust the rate for newspapers and
periodicals, in the second-class schedule, aroused concerted oppo-
sition that was met by violent advocacy of the change. The project
was politically explosive, even in war time. When the matter was
under discussion in the first Wilson Administration, the editor of
the American Tkresherman emitted a warning to Democrats: 'If you
desire to bring the same fate upon your party which befell the Taft
Administration and caused its downfall, increase the second-class
DEBATE ON POSTAL REVENUE 147
postage rates.' It was common gossip that Taft owed many of his
misfortunes to his unpopularity with the newspapers, an unpopu-
larity earned by the failure to put print paper on the free list in
the Payne-Aldrich Tariff. The newspapers were sensitive to any
change in the law likely to cost them money. They were disposed
to claim a greater virtue than they had, disavowing self-interest,
and to base their arguments upon the importance of an untram-
meled press. They were the medium through which the congress-
man knew his constituency, and his constituency him; and their
power to wreck careers made legislators cautious. Their anger at
the Payne-Aldrich bill, said Fordney, put some of my best friends
out of Congress. 5 But the House bill proposed to take from them
the subsidy, repeal the flat rate, and base postal charges on a zone
system.
It would be possible to take the one-cent rate as a text, and to
write beneath it much of the cultural history of a generation.
It was avowedly a subsidy. Except for it, 'Cyclone' Davis once
declaimed, the buffalo and the Indian would still be roaming over
the West. It was true that the Indian and the buffalo had generally
ceased to roam before the subsidy was first voted in 1885, kut
Davis* s statement was perhaps not too inaccurate for oratorical
purposes. It belonged to that view of the postal service in which
the dissemination of knowledge was a proper national function.
When the rate was made, American periodicals dealt in news; now,
when it was proposed to change it, they dealt in advertisement,
with news in many cases only a side line. The rate was not based
on cost of service when voted; in 1917 most of the speeches re-
peated the charge that it yielded only eleven millions in revenue
yet cost one hundred millions to operate. The small-town papers,
delivered by carrier, thought it a graft. The small-town merchant
resented the advertisements of the great papers and the magazines
that lured away his customers.
Trade and life had changed in a generation; business had be-
come national; great corporations assembled incomes that made
them targets of jealous fear. The United States was indeed spend-
ing large sums to make it easier for big publishing business to get
148 THE SINEWS OF WAR
bigger, yet there was some truth in the contention made by the
publishers. The subsidy earned an indirect profit, shown in first-
class postage receipts as the result of correspondence stimulated by
national advertisement. The desire to use the revenue act as a
means of correcting an abuse persisted through the debate.
The House passed the bill carrying the new zone rate. The
Senate listened to long debate in which the Saturday Evening Post
was generally the villain, and contented itself with a moderate
increase in the flat rate. As the bill came from conference and
became a law it carried a compromise unsatisfactory to everyone
and timidly deferred its operation until July z, 1918. Thereafter, a
new basis was to be reached gradually through a period of four
years. The act placed one rate upon reading matter and a higher
rate upon advertising matter, and established a zone system in
which the rate increased with the distance. But it permitted the
publisher to evade the higher distance rates by shipping his
periodical by freight to the town of delivery, and paying only
minimum postage to the Government. Burleson objected to 'the
use of the postal system for raising war revenue 5 ; Simmons did not
believe in it and hoped that before the clumsy scheme became
operative a better law would have been enacted as a postal meas-
ure.
There was running debate upon the ratio of loans to taxes
throughout the whole engagement. The pay-as-you-go war, in
which the whole of the extra cost should be raised while the war
was being fought, was only an ideal. Its proponents had no
expectation that it could be realized. When they alluded to it, as
some of them did at every turn of the debate, it was for the purpose
of strengthening their argument that the proposed taxes were too
light. But probably those who believed it to be a fiscal possibility
were more numerous than those who openly advocated leaving
taxes as they were and placing the whole burden of war finance
upon the loans.
Between the two extremes, the congressional veterans of both
parties were in pretty good agreement upon the necessity for heavy
new imposts, differing chiefly in their judgment as to how heavy.
How HEAVY THE TAX ON BUSINESS 149
The Republican elder statesmen, Penrose, Smoot, Lodge, and the
others who had gone through the mill with earlier revenue laws,
were unwilling that the business which must pay the tax should be
rendered unable to pay it because of the burden of the tax itself.
Lodge, who agreed with La Follette in little else, agreed with him
that the 'two vital questions' were the proportion to be raised by
taxation and the imposition of such taxation c so as to maintain
business in the highest state of productivity and activity.' Said
Lodge: c a just mean must be found . . . between John TrumbulFs
often-quoted line, "What is posterity to us," and the proposition to
raise all the expenditures by taxation.' The Republican Senators
made much of the need of industry, expanding to do war business,
to retain a large share of the profits for capital investment. They
were on firm ground when insisting that unless business could com-
mand capital by offering a prospect of earning income on the in-
vestment it could not serve the Nation. They resented as dema-
gogic that part of the opposing argument that connected guilt with
wealth and treated war taxation as a proper punishment for those
who paid the tax.
There were valid questions to be asked which remained un-
answered, as to the amounts that could be raised. Before the de-
bate had continued many weeks the minimum requirements of the
Treasury had gone beyond all experience. The statisticians who
computed probable yields were forced to guess. The British experi-
ence with war taxes was studied for the light it might throw upon
the problem of the United States, but it threw too little to illumine
it. Nowhere else was there to be found quite the same complex of
overlapping State and Federal taxes with the result of double taxa-
tion for some and possible evasion for others. Upon neither side of
the argument did the sensible legislators estimate largely enough
the financial strength of the American people or suspect the ease
with which the war levies were finally to be paid. They might,
perhaps, have drawn more fully from Civil War experience,
noting the rapidity with which revenues were built up between
1 86 1 and 1865, the deep penetration of prosperity in spite of war,
and the willingness with which their constituents had paid the
150 THE SINEWS OF WAR
bills. Fear of what the voters might do to them was as much of a
deterrent as fear that they might lay on the people burdens heavier
than could be borne. But they could not well know more than
they knew, as they blazed new trails through the financial woods.
Their pioneer predecessors might have told them that between
the squeals of a pinched pig and his actual suffering there is no
dependable connection. Not until the taxes they voted now were
collected could they have a realization of the full American
economic strength. So long as Senators continued to be uncertain
about this, they feared to advance beyond popular willingness to
accept or financial ability to meet the levy.
The Progressive-minded group, with most of the Administration
Democrats at its head, pushed steadily for greater revenues. It
believed, beyond its capacity to prove the matter, that business
could pay. It was responsive to the idea that, whatever the system
or the rate, the small-income American was paying and would
continue to pay a larger tax in proportion to his ability to pay than
Americans of wealth.
Wages and tables of average prices were studied and quoted.
Government had gone a long way toward 'dead reckoning' in
finance since the publication of the Aldrich Report a quarter-
century earlier, even if the law-makers could not agree on the
interpretation of the tables of statistics. Amos Pinchot maintained
that in the years 1900-14 the wages of 'small people' had ad-
vanced some twenty-seven per cent, lagging always behind the
cost of living which had risen forty per cent. This was before the
war. The cost of living was now advancing even more rapidly,
while the mutterings of wage-earners were turning into labor con-
troversy which embarrassed war production in every branch. It
was sound finance and policy not to tax business so heavily that it
could not pay; it was even sounder to protect the average American
in his economic status. The figures were not yet available to meas-
ure that status with precision, but in 1921 the National Bureau of
Economic Research worked it out that in 1913 the average per
capita income of Americans was $354, a little less than a dollar a
day per person. Out of an income of this dimension citizens must
INCOME TAX COLLECTION 151
maintain themselves, meet the costs of casualty, and support their
Government in peace or war. In the final construction of the
revenue act of 1917 the party leaders were pressed by extremists
from either side, and the major controversies turned upon the
fiscal treatment of profits derived directly from war and upon the
income tax. Few things that were taxable were able to escape a
share of the tax. La Follette's contention that the whole of the tax
must come from income,, excess profit, alcohol, and tobacco was
rejected.
War profits made an appearance in American legislation before
the United States became involved in war. It had been necessary
to reconstruct the revenue laws after the outbreak of war in Europe
in 1914 because the immediate consequence of the war was a
decline in American imports which resulted in a decline in the
revenue derived from the tariff. In October, 1914, the internal-
revenue schedules were revised upward, and stamp taxes were im-
posed in a stop-gap measure that remained in operation until the
end of 1916.
The income tax was still in the experimental stage, subject to
more experiment. Each year that the income tax was collected
added to the skill of the Treasury in refining definitions and
recovering losses due to fraud or confusion. Each additional
annual return made by corporations or individuals made it a little
harder next year to evade the imposition. In the Treasury accu-
mulation of annual dossiers the history and dimension of every
important fortune was written and checked. When in 1916 estate
taxation was imposed, the work of the field examiners upon the
inventories of estates was made to supplement and support the
efforts of the income-tax collectors. No estate could get clearance
until it was shown that income-tax requirements had been met.
For the fiscal purposes of the United States it made no difference
whether the income was honestly procured or came from crime.
It was required to be declared, and in due time the Federal peni-
tentiaries opened to welcome, on the charge of tax evasion, crimi-
nals whose crimes had been too subtle for grand and petty juries.
The internal-revenue laws were revised again in September,
152 THE SINEWS OF WAR
1916, greatly to the advantage of the Federal income, and estate
taxation was built into the system. The individual income tax of a
single person, based in 1913 upon one per cent of the net income
above three thousand dollars, was raised to two per cent, with
graduated surtaxes upon the larger incomes. The corporation
income tax, first voted in 1909 at one per cent on net, was doubled
to two per cent and the manufacturers of what the law defined as
'munitions' were required to pay in addition a tax of twelve and
one-half per cent upon net income derived from such manufacture.
With war business booming and its high prices creating unusual
profits, the beneficiaries of war were an easy and appropriate
mark. They had quick profits that could be reached. They were
in a trade which drew its gains from human misfortune and which
had few friends outside its participants. The European belligerents
discovered in these war profits a rich source of revenue, and
Congress, discovering it in 1916, tapped it again in an amendment
to the revenue laws in March, 1917. But it had been discovered
also that other industries than those of munitions derived swollen
profits from the state of war, and the European effort to seize a
share of these was now reflected in the imposition by Congress of
an 'excess-profits' tax. It was necessary to assume for the purpose of
an excess-profits tax but it had to be an arbitrary assumption
that a certain amount of income was 'normal' income. Among
small corporations managed by their owners the rate earned had
little reference to capitalization, yet little or none of it was 'excess.'
To protect these small concerns and to establish the arbitrary
point at which profits should cease to be 'normal' and should
become 'excess,' the act of March defined normal profit sub-
stantially as five thousand dollars plus eight per cent on 'the actual
capital invested in the property or business.' The new law took, in
addition to all other taxes, eight per cent of so much of the net
income as was in excess of this amount. The total new revenue to
be gathered in by this attack upon excess profits was not yet known
when the war Congress debated the revenue act of 1 9 1 7. But book-
keeping and accounting were becoming a skilled and controversial
profession as Government was requiring business to know what it
EXCESS PROFITS TAX 153
was doing well enough to explain its methods and its resources.
As the problem was uncovered through the long summer of 1917,
a realization of the gross amount of excess profits and their ripeness
for taxation grew upon Congress, but sharp differences developed
as to the proper approach. The House, which had managed to
force its own proposal upon the Senate in the revenue act of March,
adhered to the idea that 'excess' profits were both real and taxable,
and asked that an additional eight per cent (making sixteen per
cent) be levied upon them.
The Finance Committee rejected the House proposal, holding
that while a new surtax was of course to be levied upon incomes
there was no place at which a defensible line could be drawn be-
tween profits that were normal and those that were excess. Its
counter-proposal, in the bill first reported to the Senate July 3,
embraced a graduated tax (rising by stages from twelve to fifty per
cent) upon net profits in excess, not of an arbitrary eight per cent,
but of the average net income for the calendar years 1911, 1912,
and 1913.
The final statute was a compromise, reached only after these two
bases for taxation had been talked out. The House, and the
Progressive critics in the Senate, maintained with reason that an
excess-profits tax based upon average earnings in 1911-13 would
leave untouched great businesses whose earnings in these years
were already unreasonably high. The United States Steel Corpo-
ration and Henry Ford were cited, and re-cited. Many concerns
like these were not earning in 1917 a higher rate upon their capi-
talization than they had earned in the three pre-war years, yet
their ability to pay was notorious. The Senate majority, with
equal reason, insisted that no flat rate of earning, such as five
thousand dollars and eight per cent, had logical validity in a tax
whose intent was to seize for the Government a part of the excess
earnings due to war. No two corporations or individuals earned at
the same rate. What would mean prosperity for one might mean
poverty for another. The Senate clung to its idea that the only
way to measure war excess profits was to measure them against
the average earnings shown upon the books in time of peace.
154 THE SINEWS OF WAR
If Senate and House had continued to cling each to Its doctrine of
war taxation, there could not have been a revenue bill. The con-
ferees, who received the measure after the Senate had rewritten
the House provisions and passsed its bill September 10, knew they
must find a middle course and compromise. There is little evi-
dence that any of them liked the compromise forced upon the com-
mittee and upon the two houses by this necessity. The final law
continued the normal two per cent upon net income of corpora-
tions and added to this four per cent more similarly assessed. In
addition also, a new name was coined out of the discussions: 'war
excess-profits taxes.' These were levied at rates running from
twenty to sixty per cent. The lower rate was applied when net in-
come did not exceed fifteen per cent upon invested capital; the
higher was reached when it exceeded thirty-three per cent. In
computing the 'war excess-profits taxes' deductions were allowed,
taking into account the profits of the three pre-war years, before
assessing the appropriate rate upon the surplus of net income.
Business did not know what the new law meant. The Treasury
could not be certain. However, a squad of experienced financiers,
economists, and business men were hurried into the Treasury as
c excess-profits tax advisers' to draft the forms and regulations, to
comfort uneasy industry, and to counsel with the Treasury upon
its duty under the law.
The dissenters dissented in part because the high surtaxes were
not high enough. None went so far as La Follette in drafting a
complete new law, but they filled the Congressional Record with
tables showing how large incomes would fare under one rate or
another and where inequalities in the incidence of the tax would
pinch. In the same spirit they entered the debate upon the clauses
of the revenue act in which the individual income tax was stepped
up to the new necessity.
A vain belief that large incomes were large enough to carry all
emergency expenses leaving small folk untouched played its part
in income-tax discussions. This belief was to grow in popularity
through two decades after the war and was to become a fiscal
reliance of financial demagogues. The danger of impoverishing the
EFFECT OF INCOME TAXES 155
poor and destroying their willingness to persist in the war was
played up as a reason against lowering the minimum net income
upon which taxation should begin to operate. The implicit
wickedness of large incomes was hinted at when it was not
openly charged and was made a justification for rates in the
higher brackets that should be punitive rather than fiscal. The
House finally agreed to lower the minimum from $3000 (in the
case of an unmarried person) to $1000 and to leave the normal
rate where the act of 1916 had fixed it, at two per cent. But the
surtaxes were increased. The act of 1916 had imposed surtaxes
advancing from one per cent upon incomes above $20,000 to
thirteen per cent on those above $2,000,000. To these were now
added new levies, beginning with one per cent on incomes above
$5000 and rising to fifty per cent on those above Ss,ooo,ooo; so
that now, in addition to the normal two per cent collected from all
taxable incomes, the maximum incomes were required to pay
sixty-three per cent into the Treasury.
Whether the rates were too high or too low was beyond proof,
but not beyond impassioned argument. They at least set new
levels of responsibility upon the citizen and produced revenues
that made new records. The Government did not run out of
money. Before the revenue act was signed, congressmen were
announcing where and how the rates should again be raised. The
next session kept revision under running fire, but no new law was
passed until February 24, 1919. And when the books were bal-
anced in the summer of 1920 a greater share of war costs had been
raised by taxes in three years of war condition than the world had
seen before.
VIII. WAR AIMS
nn
JL HE Revenue Bill came into the House in May, supported by a
unanimous Committee on Ways and Means. When it reached the
Senate the unanimity was gone. The favorable report of the
Finance Committee was trailed by a minority report whose signers
fought stubbornly for a different kind of act until they were at last
overridden. While the law was under consideration the aims of the
war thrust themselves into the debate and demands were made
that, as a condition precedent to taxes and appropriations, there
be a clarification of objectives.
Russia raised the question. The first provisional government,
formed in March upon the deposition of the Czar, was of a mind to
continue in the war and to respect the obligations of the secret
treaties as well as to claim their benefits. There was nothing novel
in secret treaties; they were a part of the ordinary implementation
of war. The United States was party to one with England at the
close of the Revolution when the American peace commissioners
deserted the French allies and made a secret treaty containing a
still more secret proviso. The Russian provisional government was
dislodged in May as the mind of the people shifted leftward, and its
successor came to power on a pledge to promote a peace based on
the self-determination of peoples and without annexations or con-
tributions. The manifesto declaring this intent harmonized with
the American desire for a peace that would last, but it embarrassed
the chancery of every nation that either hoped to make conquests
or had made contracts assuming them. Lord Cecil avowed in
Commons that Britain had no imperialistic purpose and desired
only a secure future. The Hearst papers, opposed to entering the
war, immediately demanded that Congress state the aims of the
United States.
C A PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY' AIM 157
Germany took up the cry for terms. The Reichstag resolutions of
July 19 supported the Russian demand at a moment when Keren-
sky barely escaped being overthrown by the embattled Bolsheviki.
The text of the resolutions harmonized well enough with the
desires of the German Socialists and Liberals, whose coalition put
them through the Reichstag, but it was hard to believe that the
Imperial Government, allowing the document to pass the censors,
accepted its philosophy. It was more reasonable to suppose that
trickery in the world of ideals w r as being used as a war weapon.
Yet the language was such as must be welcome to those who
wanted to believe that aims of conquest had been abandoned.
The Vatican urged that the war be ended. On August i
Benedict XV circularized the leaders of the belligerent peoples.'
The Pope had been Cardinal-Archbishop of Bologna when the
war broke out, and was enthroned by his Conclave after the death
of Pius X, just as the French Government slipped away from Paris
to Bordeaux. He disclaimed 'particular aim 5 and suggested a
basis for a 'just and durable peace. 5 But before the Papal circular
was published on August 16, La Follette had issued a manifesto of
his own, asking the Senate to accept a concurrent resolution (which
would not require the signature of the President). In his resolu-
tion La Follette recited the various hints of a possible peace,
reminded his colleagues that these bespoke 'a willingness to adopt
the doctrine of "a peace without victory," proclaimed by President
Wilson on the 22nd day of January, 1917,' and asserted that
Congress had the 'authority to determine and to declare definitely'
the objects and purposes of American participation. He wanted
Congress to announce that the United States would not aid in
any prolongation of the war c to annex new territory' or to 'enforce
the payment of indemnities to recover the expenses of the war' for
any of the belligerents. He urged also a 'public restatement of the
allied peace terms,'
The La Follette concurrent resolution was allowed to die on the
table. A few minutes after its introduction, the Senate took up the
revenue bill, which was to have priority for the next month.
It was unavoidable that the Senate discussions should embrace
158 WAR AIMS
both the method of taxation and the motive for it and that those
who disliked the former should be the more insistent on being
assured upon the latter. Senators, like their constituents, read
the papers; and like them, also, they interpreted what was printed
in accordance with their hopes. Out-of-doors, the peace feelers
were the subject of wide examination. No Government, in the
United States or elsewhere, could completely ignore the deep
popular hope that the war would stop. So deep was the hope, and
so widely was it held, that many who examined the proposals
were content to accept the words as uttered, to assume that they
fairly represented intentions, and to decide that the war had been
won, leaving now only the incorporation of the generous senti-
ments in a general treaty of peace.
The words of the proposals certainly contained lip service to the
doctrine of 'peace without victory.' So far as Russia was concerned
it was soon certain that the manifesto of May, not fairly represent-
ing the desire of the provisional government, was a price paid by it
for support by the councils of soldiers and workers; and that these
councils, not permanently content with either the compromise or
the leaders in power, were swinging into line behind a revolution-
ary socialism that disavowed patriotism in the ordinary sense and
aimed at a class dictatorship beginning in Russia and extending to
the world.
The German endorsement was soon subject to interpretation in
the light of German behavior in the treaty negotiations of Brest-
LitovsL It was not in harmony with the quotable parts of German
official utterances made since 1914. Unless one could believe that
the Empire had experienced a change of heart which called for
a powerful will to believe it was impossible to see in the Reich-
stag resolutions much more than a trick, clumsily designed to
deceive those whose hope for peace was stronger than their power
of discrimination. Those who directed official thought among the
Allies insisted that Germany had provoked the war as a deliberate
stroke of policy and that the establishment of a German hegemony
in Europe was the motive behind it. Obviously since 1914,
German opinion had dwelt more and more upon the compensa-
THE WILSON AIMS 1 59
tions the Empire was to obtain by conquest and the punishment it
was to inflict upon its enemies. The German advance across the
Balkans and into Asia Minor was no mere matter of self-defense.
Conquest was the object now, whatever had been in the German
mind when the war began. Those who believed in German sin-
cerity were regarded as pro-Germans or pacifists and in either
capacity as unworthy of trust.
War for its own sake had no party in the United States. Peace
had so strong a party that if the proposals were to be disregarded it
was necessary that the reasons be explained so that Americans
could understand them,
It is impossible, in matters of the mind, for the historian to prove
the connection between what is heard and what is thought. It is
not often possible to determine what it is that an individual or a
group regards as its own best interests, and even with best
interests determined the causal relations between interest and
action are no more than conjectural. The best the historian can do
is to present such a circumstantial case as the facts and events
appear to warrant, and judgments upon motivation must remain
matters of probability rather than of proof. In spite of the eco-
nomic determinists the most interesting thing about man is his
capacity to ignore what all prudent thought would guess to be his
own best interest, and to risk his life, his family, and his nation for
no better reason than the grip of an ideal.
Ideal and interest were both imbedded in the utterances of
Wilson, and the steps by which opinion in the United States was
built up to the near unanimity for war prevailing in the spring are
best to be traced in these utterances. He had at least a reasoned
doctrine. How well reasoned it was, and how long it had been
germinating in his mind, have been abundantly documented
in The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson (1937), in
which Harley Notter, one of the few to know the Wilson papers,
has analyzed their content. He had, too, the audience. More
people, more of the time, in more countries, listened to him with
approval through the nineteen months of American participation
in the war than listened to any other leader.
160 WAR AIMS
He had seen neutrality through to its end. It is still conceivable
that there is no better course for a neutral nation than neutrality,
although it has been demonstrated that if this be not a submissive
neutrality its logical end is war. Acute critics of American neutral-
ity in 1914-17 as at heart unneutral, Edwin Borchard and William
P. Lage, have in Neutrality for the United States (1937) developed the
thesis that anything but a stern neutrality is in fact an intervention
friendly to one side or the other. They have shown how hard it is
for Government to dissociate its corporate attitude from the
mental status of its people or its administrators. Yet Wilson's
neutrality, whatever its defects, was so distasteful to both sets of
belligerents as to invite for itself high credit for sincerity.
Wilson had at last accepted war only as an evil less disastrous
than submission. His mind was set to a world of peace and of equal
rights that had seemed to be ripening in the nineteenth century,
only to wither in the twentieth. The two chief aspects of the
dialectic upon which peace had advanced had been the use of
arbitration as a measure in avoidance of war and the insistence by
neutrals upon the enjoyment of normal rights even in time of war.
War itself was a blow to all measures short of war. Belligerent
encroachment upon neutral right was a menace to neutral interest
which, if submitted to, would in a few years destroy the gains of a
century of protest. Wilson went to war, among other things, to
defend his right to stay out of war.
More than this, the President had to fear what the military in-
dices indicated as probable, a victory by the Central Powers and a
post-war militant attitude by the conqueror. Irritated though the
United States was by the excesses of the Allies, there was no wide
fear that the safety of the rest of the world would be endangered
if they won. But the Pan-German extremists talked a doctrine
calculated to encourage suspicion that Germany sought world
domination. As a consequence, the forecast of the future con-
tained for the United States the shadow of still more pressure to be
endured or as an alternative to endurance a fully armed existence.
Within a lifetime the Continental countries had been driven by
their fears to continuous preparation for war and to compulsory
BELIEF IN THE GERMAN THREAT 161
military training for their men in time of peace. The United
States revolted at the thought of similar readiness. Paradoxically
again, Wilson accepted compulsory selective service in order to
defend the privilege of the United States to avoid compulsory
service.
It was the easy route of declamation to declare that the United
States fought for absolute principles of justice; these were indeed
the principles without whose general acceptance by the world the
United States could not live the life it wished to live in safety,
But behind this abstraction lay the concrete matters of self-defense
and national interest that no government may ignore in a world of
competitive nations.
The first steps in the formulation of an American doctrine of
war aims were taken in the 'peace without victory' speech; but the
last steps could not be taken until the war was over, whether the
peace should be shaped by the cravings of the victor or not.
Successful war was the only way to procure a peace without a
master. No public statements m'ore deftly or more soundly as-
sembled the evidence to this than did those of the President, It
became his business to prove the obligation upon the United
States to defend its kind of existence. The war message of April 2
and the elaboration of it on Flag Day became the common
divisor for most American minds. The addresses were weak in
historicity where they stressed his belief that Germany had in cold
blood provoked the war. But they were strong in realism where
they displayed the dangers to the United States from war or from
threats of recurrent war.
Whatever other reasons there were for American entry, what-
ever war-wickedness on the part of munitions-makers who were
also making money, whatever solicitude of bankers to save in-
vestments, whatever skillful chicanery by the Allies to hypnotize
the American Government all these were minor to the reasons
detailed by Woodrow Wilson and accepted with overwhelming
concurrence by his people. The consequences of staying out
looked to be more deadly than those of going in; and there was
room to hope for a better world after peace.
1 62 WAR AIMS
The official copy of the letter of the Pope came to Washington
in August by way of London. This was at the request of Cardinal
Gasparri, Papal Secretary of State, because the Vatican did not
maintain diplomatic relations with the United States. The circular
opened with an affirmation of the pacific mission of the Church, its
affection for all peoples, and its impartiality toward all belligerents.
Citing now the fear of the Church that the civilized world become
'nothing more than a field of death,' it made what it described as
'a concrete and practical proposal 3 for a 'just and durable peace. 5
First, was a demand for disarmament, the substitution of arbitra-
tion for war, and the establishment of e true liberty and com-
munity of the seas.' It saw no solution for the question of in-
demnities other than the general principle of Complete and
reciprocal condonation. 3 Belgium, next, was to be evacuated and
to receive guaranty of complete independence. Occupied France,
also, was to be evacuated, as well as the German colonies seized
by the Allies. The territorial questions of Italy and Austria, of
Poland, the Balkans, and Armenia, were to be examined in a
'spirit of equity and justice. 5 And upon these bases 'the future re-
organization of the peoples ought to be built. 3 c The whole world
recognizes that the honor of the armies of both sides is safe, 3 said
the Pope. 'Incline your ears, therefore, to our prayer. 3
For several days before the note was published, it was known in
private to the Governments and, according to their respective
interests, some feared that Wilson would fail to answer it, others
that he would answer it. That it should be answered by any of the
Allies was out of the question because the fifteenth article of the
Treaty of London, whereby Italy joined the Allies in 1915, con-
tained the specific promise that Great Britain, France, and Russia
would 'support such opposition as Italy may make to any pro-
posal in the direction of introducing a representative of the Holy
See in any peace negotiations. 3 It was Italian conviction that the
Vatican was an affiliate of Austria.
The immediate disposition of the President, not an Ally or tied
by any pact, was to be curt, to give the appeal a mere acknow-
ledgment, and to proceed with the affairs of war administration.
WILSON'S REPLY TO THE VATICAN APPEAL 163
The Allies would have preferred such response (unless they had
themselves been permitted to draft the answer), for their leaders
were becoming sensitive lest Wilson gain in his growing status as
spokesman for their own constituents, and fearful lest he should
express a liberalism inconvenient for them to accept. But the
Senate had begun to discuss war aims, making it desirable for
Wilson to maintain his grip on the American doctrine; and Colonel
House pointed out the opportunity to do more wedge work and, by
stating the reasons for rejecting the appeal, to strengthen the Ger-
man Liberals and spread the gap between the enemy peoples
and their Governments. The only way to avoid, if it could be
avoided, a controversy among the Allies over national ambitions
was to build up a picture of the future that should outrank national
aspiration in its attractiveness and universal appeal. 'Utopia/
Owen had said in the Senate, 'is better than hell. 5 'We are now/
said Lodge after Wilson had transmitted his reply, 'in a war that
is purely idealistic.'
The Official Bulletin carried the reply August 29, two days after
Robert Lansing had signed and transmitted it. House had seen it
in draft, had approved it, and had advised an action the President
took in substituting 'inexpedient' for 'childish* where he referred
to the 'punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the
establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues' that had
been suggested among the Allies. The Rathenau plan, so to
conduct the war as to delay the revival of Belgium as an economic
competitor of Germany, had been matched in an economic con-
ference of the Allies in 1916 by a plan to secure their economic
independence of Germany after the war. The word 'childish 3
appeared to House to be needlessly provocative. He had under
his eye, as he suggested the amendment, a note from Jusserand in-
dicating that to France the Vatican appeal was of 'Austro-Ger-
manic inspiration/ and was no more than 'the German note of
December last, in a new garb. 5
Touched by the appeal of His Holiness for a 'stable and enduring
peace/ the President made Lansing say: 'This agony must not be
gone through with again/ He noted that the Papal basis of con-
164 WAR AIMS
donation would throw the world back to the status quo ante, from
which he believed had come the deliberate German attack.
'The object of this war/ he said, e is to deliver the free peoples of the
world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military
establishment controlled by an irresponsible government. 5 Not
the 'German people' but the 'ruthless master of the German people'
was the enemy who must not be permitted by the peace of the
Pope to rebuild his strength. He saw, and he spoke for 'responsible
statesmen' as though they admitted him to be their spokesman,
that no peace could rest securely on vindictive restrictions; for the
United States he desired 'no reprisal upon the German people';
peace must be based upon the equal rights of peoples 'great or
small, weak or powerful' and the test of peace must be whether
it was based 'upon the word of an ambitious and intriguing
government,' or upon that of free peoples. 'We cannot take the
word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything
that is to endure,' he concluded; if peace were now made with the
German Government, 'no man, no nation' could depend on it.
He awaited 'some new evidence of the purposes of the great peo-
ples of the Central Powers. 9
This evidence was slow to come; but evidence came promptly
that Wilson's reply had kept his car of doctrine on the track. The
Senate proponents of immediate negotiation could not be kept
from talking, but they talked to empty benches. The People's
Council was shunted from town to town around the Middle West,
with labor's American Alliance upon its heels. Any expression
of opinion that peace was within reach was generally taken as near-
treason or pro-Germanism. Villard noted the wedge work and
his Nation detected some measure of success for it: 'President
Wilson put his faith in this liberal Germany when he wrote his
recent answer to the Pope.' The London Spectator read it with
interest, and then with admiration: 'A second and longer perusal
of the answer of the United States has shown the document to be
not merely worthy of a great statesman and a great nation, but
one of the most momentous utterances in the History of Mankind.'
But the hard-boiled London Saturday Review was annoyed. It was
BARRED THE ALLIED WAR AIMS 165
soon to snap out: "Instead of twaddling about democracy,, If
Messrs. Wilson and George would talk the only universal lan-
guage,, viz., .s.d., the Germans would respond immediately.' It
noted ruefully, in the face of Wilson's disclaimer of punitive
damages, dismemberment, and economic boycott: 'But these
negations bar the war aims of England, France, and Italy, as up
to date they have been promulgated by statesmen. 3
It was well enough to thrust aside the suggestion that Russia
and Germany had between them put forward a sufficient reason
for an immediate conference on terms of peace. There had been
good reason, too, for the decision reached by the President while
the War Missions were in Washington in May. He had then let
the aims of the war pass without argument lest, if they were in-
jected into the discussion of the form of American aid, the latter
might be disastrously postponed while the aims caused deadlock.
From the minute the Missions landed, House advised him 'to
avoid a discussion of peace settlements.' Out of his travels as
friend of the President in the past four years Colonel House had
built up a more extensive acquaintance with practicing statesmen
in Europe than any other American possessed. They trusted him;
sounded him before they entered the White House; appraised
with him their interviews there after they were over. c lf the Allies
begin to discuss terms among themselves, they will soon hate one
another worse than they hate Germany/ he wrote the President;
and he argued out the wisdom of his recommendation with Bal-
four, discussing with him in private the treaties existing among
'the Allies as to the division of the spoils after the war.' Those who
knew anything about the network of secret treaties, whose details
the Bolsheviki smeared over the world after the final revolution in
November, knew enough to realize the contentious nature of the
issue they would some day raise. The United States had even less
than an interest in the territorial promises of the treaties; it had a
positive aversion to them.
The issue presented by the agreements must be faced. Wilson
was emphatic in rejecting the Papal suggestion of an immediate
negotiation, yet his mind opened to the importance of preparing
1 66 WAR AIMS
for an informed discussion when the time should be ripe. At the
end of September., House admitted (and the Department of State
confirmed) that the President had asked him to arrange the data
that ought to be ready for the peace commissioners when the war
should end.
No facts give an unhappier picture of the inadequacy of the
foreign service of the United States, a foreign service kept starved
by Congress with the approval of the constituents it served, than
the facts connected with the organization and work of what was
soon informally known as the 'House Inquiry.' The Inquiry had
no other name. It was supported by Wilson out of the President's
fund. It recruited its workers among journalists and professors.
House entrusted its administration to his brother-in-law, Sidney E.
Mezes, president of the College of the City of New York, who
passed its executive management to Isaiah Bowman, director of the
American Geographical Society, in whose New York building its
headquarters were housed. Walter Lippmann, who had been
doing odd jobs for Baker, and in whose mind was the approach to
the world prevailing in the offices of the New Republic, became its
secretary. Justice Brandeis seems to have breathed doctrine into
its ears. Shotwell of Columbia and Haskins of Harvard were right-
hand men. And the American specialists in history, geography,
economics, and government plunged into the task of doing under
pressure what ought already to have been done, digested, and
docketed in the files of the Department of State. They reviewed
the history of the European and Asiatic world, for nearly every
rivalry of the war dated back to the Middle Ages, if not to Rome
and Greece. As the Socialist Call said, House was c to prepare a
"who's who and what's what" for the use of the American Govern-
ment.' Lansing made no public protest against this encroachment
upon the proper business of his department. It was insisted that
the Inquiry had no connection with the notion of immediate peace
negotiations, but even though the mere existence of the organiza-
tion should suggest more than was intended, the study needed to
be made, and at once. It began to be gossiped in Washington that
the President would himself go to the peace conference when it
should be held.
THE HOUSE INQUIRY 167
There were, however, many things to be done in the realm of
ideas before a peace conference could be more than a dream.
The machinery that was to produce an army was in motion and
the men who were to constitute it were in camp, although there
was no known way of getting them to France. The reorganization
of life, industry, and government for the purpose of supporting the
army was beginning to produce results. The sinews of war were
in sight and were to be adequate. But there was no compulsion
behind it all in the United States except the general conviction
that the war must be ended in victory before the abolition of war
could be undertaken. That conviction needed to be kept firm and
unified. Page was quoting Balfour's fear that c the American energy
and earnestness in getting into the war, 5 might 'cool with the first
wave of war-weariness. 5 Only the President could give the cue to
policy or rationalize it.
Before the House Inquiry had got beyond listing the names of
men who might be set to work, Wilson added another unit to the
structure he was erecting. He had stayed close to his desk in the
White House through the spring and summer, since he was busy
and his advisers were not anxious for him to incur the risks of un-
necessary travel. But in November, after a Tammany mayor,
John F. Hylan, had with the support of Hearst been elected in
New York, he slipped quietly out of Washington to Buffalo. There
he stated the American case to the American Federation of Labor
assembled in its thirty-seventh annual convention.
Samuel Gompers was both the figure head of labor in the
United States and the actual head of the most important organi-
zation of American workmen. He had presided over the American
Federation during all but one year of its existence without weaken-
ing in his conviction that American labor desired economic rather
than political objectives. Labor radicals, who hoped to shift the
movement into partisan politics, had short shrift with him between
conventions and at the annual gatherings he defeated their
motions on the floor. He came with labor into support of the war,
although there is no evidence that it needed to be 'brought/ for
the workers were as American as any other citizens. Gompers
1 68 WAR AIMS
worked out the formulation of the understanding that the Govern-
ment would keep labor from becoming victim to the war. Behind
his leadership the unions accepted as war duty the admission of
women apprentices and non-union workers to the shops. What
was called 'dilution' advanced under war conditions more rapidly
than could otherwise have been the case without war. The trend
toward industrial mechanization, obscured though it was by war,
was already threatening the integrity of the craft unions. Mechan-
ized factories, with a few skilled workmen in charge and a horde
of unskilled, were easily set up for war work.
Gompers did not live to see the open battle in labor ranks be-
tween the two union points of view, but the advance skirmishes
in their engagement helped to complicate the status of labor in the
war. The persistent nagging of Socialist-Labor minorities added
to the complications, for some of these were pro-German or pro-
Russian, and others looked as though they were. But the status-
of unions and the workers was most threatened by the rising cost
of living which by gradual encroachment nibbled at real
wages.
Labor adjustment, necessary if labor was to be protected, raised
complicated problems. There were Government factories, facto-
ries on Government contract work, and establishments of private
industry. What touched one tended to touch all, for all drew their
labor from the same reservoir of manhood. It was possible in the
first two classes to raise wages as required, either to do justice or to
satisfy demands, and to add the cost to the war budget. The cost-
plus contracts, such as prevailed in camp construction, made this
a simple matter, eliminating employer-objection to increases in
the wage scale. But every shift in the wage scale for Government
work brought trouble to private business and made the whole
labor market uneasy. The disposition on the part of much of the
public to regard all labor controversy as traitorous made it worse.
The pledge to look after labor had to be implemented.
Bisbee, Arizona, became an inconvenient object lesson in July.
Here the I.W.W. was at work in the company towns of the Calu-
met, Arizona, and Copper Queen mines, whose annual output of
THE BISBEE, ARIZONA, STRIKE 169
some seventeen million pounds of copper was an essential part of
the war supply. Wherever the I.W.W. made trouble it was likely
to be worse trouble than that of ordinary labor controversy because
the I.W.W. even in time of peace was regarded as revolutionary in
its objective. Wherever strife broke out in company towns,
whether in the anthracite counties of Pennsylvania, or those of the
precious metals in the Coeur d'Alene, or here in the copper camps
of Arizona, the trouble was worse than normal, since in company
towns there was no group of neutral citizens to mediate and act as
buffer between contending forces. In the absence of a neutral
population labor strife often comes close to civil war. The Bisbee
strike w r as called on June 126, and two weeks later the owners
brought about a measure of peace by a forcible deportation of 1 186
men. In similar manner Moyer and Haywood of the Western
Federation of Miners had in 1906 been kidnaped in Colorado
and carried into the jurisdiction of the Idaho courts.
Interned at Columbus, New Mexico, the I.W.W. was a festering
spot regardless of the merit of the labor claim. The strike dragged
on until in August the Council of National Defense began to think
out devices. It announced the creation of its own Labor Adjust-
ment Commission to look after disputes arising under the Federal
eight-hour day law, and urged the President to send special mis-
sions to terminate such disputes as that at Bisbee. Baker, for the
War Department, created a Board of Control of Labor Standards
for Army Clothing, to keep clothing from the sweatshops, to re-
move the causes of strife, and to ensure a continuous flow of goods.
Shipyard labor was entrusted to a joint commission representing
the Navy, the Emergency Fleet, and the American Federation,
headed by V. Everit Macy, president of the National Civic Federa-
tion, with Assistant-Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt sitting for the
Navy. The President sent the Secretary of Labor to Bisbee in per-
son. He went at the head of a President's Mediating Commission,
whose secretary was Felix Frankfurter, and which brought peace to
Bisbee before winter came. In its report to Wilson the Frankfurter
Commission dealt sympathetically with the problems of war labor.
In January, 1918, it recommended that he set up a 'unified direc-
1 70 WAR AIMS
tion of the labor administration of the United States for the period
of the war.'
The state of mind of labor was a fundamental charge upon the
President, not only because it bore upon the continuous flow of
goods from the factories, but also because the American workman
preferred status as a citizen to status in an economic class. It was
wholesome for democracy that he should continue to prefer it.
In both Ally and enemy countries labor was showing a war weari-
ness, strengthening thereby the labor parties and giving an opening
to the penetration of revolutionary socialism from Russia. There
were two issues before the world: that between the nations, with an
alliance endeavoring to prevent domination by a military govern-
ment, and that between classes, with Russia at the spearhead driv-
ing the purpose of an international socialist revolution. Upon
those who rejected the latter it was mandatory to convince labor
that its interest was tied into the former. Wilson was one of these.
Baker, in unity with him, urged him to go to Buffalo: *I have
found labor more willing to keep step than capital,' Baker wrote on
November 10.
That same evening it was announced that Wilson would address
the Federation. He left Washington the next day, and on Monday,
November 12, made his appearance in Buffalo. The visitation
was timely, for the papers over the week-end were still wrestling
with the interpretation of what had just happened in Petrograd.
There, the Navy had joined forces with the Maximilists (who
wanted all reforms at once) in the great Bolshevik Revolution.
How great it was, was still in doubt. Without entirely believing it,
editors ran the story from Kerensky that Russia was still in the war;
but few of them would have dared to imagine how completely
Russia was lost as an Ally, or how fundamentally the Russian
Revolution would shake the world. Trotsky and Lenin had
come into their own.
'I want peace, but I know how to get it, and they do not,' said
the President, speaking of the pacifist agitators, as he addressed
the American Federation on Monday morning. He recited what
had become the official story of the origins of the war, and then
WILSON TO THE A.F. OF L. 171
moved to firmer ground as he described the Pan-German objec-
tives 'absolute control of Austria-Hungary, practical control of
the Balkan States, control of Turkey, control of Asia Minor' and
expressed his revulsion against that 'bulk of German power in-
serted into the heart of the world. 5 He thrust aside the idea that
peace was near. "What I am opposed to is not the feeling of the
pacifists, but their stupidity. My heart is with them, but my mind
had a contempt for them.' What must be done, he said, was to
stand together "until the job is finished, 5 to make and keep labor
free and to keep production uninterrupted. He inquired who
could believe "that any reforms planned in the interest of the
people can live in the presence of a Germany powerful enough to
undermine or overthrow them by intrigue or force. 5 He made
occasion to cast another hook into the labor interest as he referred
to mobs that at Bisbee and elsewhere took law into their own hands.
He entered a protest 'against any manifestation of the spirit
of lawlessness anywhere or in any cause, 5 and hurried back to
Washington leaving the American Federation to re-elect Gompers,
to resolve against strikes on Government jobs, and to continue the
part it was playing on the American single front.
Distrust of the adequacy of the basis of peace proposed by the
Vatican, and distrust of the honesty of the enemy when talking
peace, were enough to justify the rejection of a negotiation then
and there. But distrust provided no positive material out of which
to build the skeleton of a peace. The time was sure to come when
such a skeleton would be required. The world had moved since
the end of the preceding January when von Bernstorff had handed
to House his confidential memorandum stating the terms Germany
would have demanded had its request for a conference, made in
December, 1916, been received with favor.
The Vatican terms of condonation, with the evacuation of
Belgium and the release of the occupied departments of northern
France, would have been unacceptable to the Empire in January,
1917, for Germany was then thinking of a peace with victory.
The Bernstorff memorandum mentioned special guaranties and
compensations before Germany would consider giving up Belgium
172 WAR AIMS
or returning French territory; it asked for a 'safe 3 frontier, behind
which Germany and Poland might be 'economically and strategi-
cally' protected against Russia. It demanded colonies, not only
the return of those occupied by the Allies, but colonies enough to
be 'adequate to her population and economic interest'; and it
wanted also for German business and German subjects compensa-
tion for their suffering during the war. Far from revealing the
conviction of sin and the repentance that Allied thought de-
manded as a condition precedent to negotiation, the German
memorandum was written in a feeling of just deserts and military
success. The gap between the German program and peace without
victory was too wide to be bridged by any negotiation. It became
wider with the collapse of Russia, the German victories of 1917
along the Eastern Front, and the failure of Allied effort to break
the Western lines.
Yet rumor had it that Austria-Hungary was tired enough to
quit. When Congress met after the autumn recess for the winter
session of 1917-18, it gave to the principal ally of Germany addi-
tional reason for quitting by declaring war against the 'Imperial
and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government/ Wilson had advised
against a declaration aimed at Austria-Hungary in April. But
now, in his annual address, he asked that such a declaration be
adopted. He was not ready to take the same logical action against
the other allies of Germany, Turkey and Bulgaria; they were 'also
the tools of Germany,' he said, but they were 'mere tools' and not
'in the direct path of our necessary action. 3 It was embarrassing to
be at war with Germany and at peace with Austria-Hungary, for
both were fighting along the fronts where some day the A.E.F.
would begin to operate. The embarrassment had increased within
the weeks immediately previous to the message, as Germany had
injected its own divisions among the tired Austrian units, and with
new leadership had made possible a drive down the passes of the
Alps, around the head of the Adriatic, and almost up to the lines of
Venice. Logic and fact forbade further treatment of the Dual
Monarchy as a friend.
The Government of Austria-Hungary, Wilson conceded, 'is not
THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 173
acting upon its own Initiative or In response to the wishes and
feelings of Its own peoples 5 ; but since it had become simply the
'vassal of the German Government' we must 'face the facts as they
are and act upon them without sentiment/ Congress responded
Immediately with a declaration of war that the President signed
December 7,1917.
It had been eight months since Wilson last spoke to Congress,
face to face. After his address of April 2 he did not again visit It in
person until In December he summed up the progress of the sum-
mer and began to be more specific upon the requirements of a
peace than had been appropriate at earlier dates.
When in 1916 he gave his adherence to the doctrine upon which
the League to Enforce Peace had been founded a year earlier, he
endorsed the fundamental idea of his foreign policy of the war, for
in his mind the only alternative to self-help and the continuance of
war was some sort of league with power to do justice. He took a
league for granted now as he had taken It for granted In the Janu-
ary address. His chroniclers, too, took it for granted. Working on
The Foreign Policy ofWoodrow Wilson, 1913-1917 (1917)9 which they
had ready for the public at the end of the year, Edgar E. Robinson
and Victor J. West found that his papers revealed an articulated
structure on the foundations of neutral doctrine and super-league.
When the New York Times reviewed the book, January 6, 1918, it
noted the harmony of the doctrine with the American past, the
completeness of It, and the skill with which Wilson the teacher had
built up the following of Wilson the politician. Wilson was now
taking the difficult step from broad generalization to specific
formula. He was catching the voices of humanity that are in the
air/ as they became articulate in insisting that the peace should
not be based on annexations, contributions, or vindictive In-
demnities. The present task was to c win the war,' but It would not
be won until the German people "through properly accredited
representatives* should right the wrongs 'their rulers have done/
The President agreed with the Pope that in a fair peace the
peoples and land of Belgium and northern France must be de-
livered from conquest and menace. The peoples of Austria-Hun-
1 74 WAR AIMS
gary, too, and those of the Balkans and Turkey must be delivered
Trom the impudent and alien domination of the Prussian military
and commerical autocracy. 5 But he repelled, as 'grossly and
wantonly false/ the idea that the existence of Germany was at
stake. The worst that could happen to it, in spite of what its leaders
said to scare its people, was a temporary exclusion from the part-
nership of nations and from the free intercourse that would grow
from that partnership if the German people 'should still, after the
war is over, continue to be obliged to live under ambitious and
intriguing masters/ Here was a clear invitation to the German
people to overthrow the Government of the Empire for the sake of
peace. This was the object of the wedge.
The same forces that brought Wilson from the generalities of
international philosophy down to practical conditions to be at-
tained were playing upon all the statesmen of the war in the
autumn of 1917. In England, only a week before Congress met,
Lord Lansdowne had said his say. In a letter that the London
Daily Telegraph printed on November 29, after the Times had
declined it space, this veteran statesman, who had retired from
the Government only with Asquith in 1916, risked his repute to
counsel his people to a negotiated peace. He was afraid that in
crushing Germany with the thoroughness promised by Lloyd
George, the Allies would crush the world. He was willing to do
one thing that Wilson did not make specific in the message: to
consider the matters involved in the freedom of the seas.
The Lansdowne letter was a straw in a gusty wind that might
develop disruptive power. Within a few days the British ministers
were trying to harness the wind and to undo the damage done to
solidarity by a responsible elder statesman talking peace. Clemen-
ceau, who had no illusions, blurted out: "My war aim is to conquer. 5
But across the Channel the leaders were explaining to their audi-
ences that the British aim was still no more imperialistic than it had
been in 1914, and that there could not be peace until after victory.
At Birmingham, Asquith, whose Government had made the
decision for war, defended the decision, defended its necessity,
thought much of the criticism of Lansdowne unfair, but deplored
INDICATIONS AT BREST-LITOVSK 1 75
the letter. Bonar Law condemned its author Immediately at a
Unionist meeting. Lloyd George embedded Ms comment in a
speech at a dinner of the Gray's Inn Benchers, called a negotiated
peace a farce, saw great danger in the Russian truce, and asked
how confidence could be put in new treaties until those were
vindicated whose violation caused the war.
Within a few days, too, the Bolshevik Government was in con-
versation with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk, railway center In
Russian Poland which Germany had occupied in 1915. Here they
were learning by experience how much of a peace without annexa-
tions or contributions could be obtained. From temporary cessa-
tion of fighting on parts of the Eastern Front, to truce, and from
truce to general armistice on December 15, they progressed after
they decided on a peace. On December 22 their plenipotentiaries,
at a 'solemn sitting, 5 met the Germans to work it out. They found
the Central Powers somewhat divided In their counsels; von
Kuehlmann, civil head of the German mission, playing to the
moderates, while General von Hoffmann talked the stern language
of conquest; but they were not enough divided for the net result
In German terms to be recognizable as a compliance with the
Bolshevik proposals. One of the Administration Senators a little
later played upon the fame of Luther Burbank as an 'assistant
secretary to nature 5 : the Germans at Brest-Litovsk, he said, had
put him In the shade, for they were able *to make a large crop of
lemons grow on an olive branch.' A doctrine of Voluntary separa-
tions' was devised by the Austro-German negotiators to save them
from some of the odium of the dismemberment of Russia which
they encompassed.
Poland, overrun in 1915, had already been declared autono-
mous by Germany in 1916. Finland, just east of whose border
ran the Murmansk railway which Germany coveted, had defied
Petrograd In July, 1917, and declared its independence. Lithuania
and the Ukraine, breaking from Russia, were prepared to make
separate treaties (which meant, substantially, annexation) with
Germany. Having proclaimed the self-determination of peoples,
Russia was caught in Its own net. And as to the temper of the peace
1 76 WAR AIMS
that the German envoys announced on Christmas Day, It was not
misrepresented by the words put into the mouth of William II by
an Amsterdam dispatch to the London Times: 'The year 1917,
with its great battles, has proved that the German people has in
the Lord of Creation above an unconditional and avowed ally, on
whom it can unconditionally rely.' Leon Trotsky may have said
(he was so reported) that the 'German and Austrian Governments
have agreed to place themselves in the dock'; but if they had, it
was not a dock of Russian making.
The battle of opinions is in full swing,' wrote one of the corre-
spondents from London as the Russian conversations opened.
The battle had the effect of cutting through party lines with no one
could tell how much injury to solidarity. Wilson had this in mind
when he summarized the aims of the United States to Congress on
December 4; House, sitting in Paris with the Allied Conference,
tried in vain to procure from the conferees an authoritative state-
ment of aims to close the breach, but he could get nothing that the
United States could be expected to endorse. He was back in Wash-
ington by December 15, and was at once in conference, persuading
the President that only he could command attention or state the
case. The Inquiry, still in its swaddling clothes, was called upon to
aid in 'remaking the map of the world, as we would have it'; and
in a fortnight, helped by the measured data the Inquiry had as-
sembled, the President completed the task.
While all this was progressing in secrecy a secrecy so secret
that the Washington correspondents were writing home that
Wilson's utterances of August 27 and December 4 were so compre-
hensive as to make additional American statements unnecessary
more voices were raised in the 'battle of opinions.* British labor
spoke, indicating two things: that it was prepared to fight off war
weariness if satisfied as to the aims of the war, and that its ideas
concerning war aims were so close to those of President Wilson as
to be almost indistinguishable from them.
Arthur Henderson, a Newcastle molder in his early years, bore
to British labor somewhat the relationship that Gompers bore to
labor in the United States. Henderson was, however, a labor
BRITISH LABOR'S WAR AIMS 177
politician rather than an abstainer from politics, and after the
arrival of the Labor Party In Commons he was consistently a
leader. Not as much of a pacifist as Ramsay MacDonald, he suc-
ceeded the latter as the head of the party in 1914 and in 1915
Asquith took him Into the Ministry. He looked after labor and Its
co-operation In the war, surviving the shake-up of 1916 to become
one of the little War Cabinet under Lloyd George. His duties
took him to Russia after the March Revolution. Here he was Im-
pressed by the mutual misunderstandings of new Russia and the
Allies and grew to the conviction that the Allies ought to co-
operate In the Stockholm Conference of Socialists rather than per-
mit It to fall Into German hands. He told this to his British labor
associates so effectively at a conference August 10, that he was out
of the Cabinet August 1 1 . British opinion was not ready to let
British subjects talk with Germans. Out of office, he and the labor
group re-aligned their ideas in the light of the various peace sug-
gestions. They began at once the drafting of a labor manifesto,
continuing Its revision as new proposals came to light and as
American leadership began to assert Itself.
The resolutions of the American Alliance of Labor and Demo-
cracy, based on the doctrine of the reply to the Pope, blazed the
way. The address of the President at Buffalo carried it farther.
The message to Congress continued its development, until the
British labor leaders were ready to submit to a national labor con-
ference called by the parliamentary committee of the trade-union
conference the reasons why they should stand by the war rather
than accept the Russian leadership, heading Into a peace at Brest-
Litovsk. Lloyd George regarded the conference as so important
as to require a letter emphasizing his position that victory must
precede peace, and that the precise terms of a peace must be based
upon concurrence among the Allies. 'The Labour Party have
from the beginning kept the country to the best of its war alms,'
said the London Nation a week later. The war aims manifesto
adopted in Central Hall, Westminster, on December 28, showed
Henderson In Its drafting and Wilson In its paternity.
The British Prime Minister, as sensitive to currents of opinion
1 78 WAR AIMS
among his constituents as any politician could be, sensed the aims
of labor and dared not disregard them if he would. Having put
Henderson out of the War Cabinet in August, he now danced to
the tune of labor, with Henderson as leader. He seized the occa-
sion created by a man-power conference with labor on January 5
to harmonize his aims as Prime Minister with those expressed in
the Labor Manifesto. It was as obvious to Lloyd George as to
Woodrow Wilson that there could not be victory unless the aims of
the war could be translated into terms acceptable to the great
masses of working people who did most of the suffering, most of the
dying, and most of the voting in democratic countries. Balfour,
too, and Wilson were alike in understanding this and in appreciat-
ing the need for team-work in such statements as might be made.
They differed chiefly in that Balfour hoped Wilson would stick to
'the lines of the President's previous speeches/ while Wilson hoped
that no British utterance would 'sound a different note or suggest
claims inconsistent with what he proclaims the objects of the
United States to be. 3 Without detailed knowledge of each other's
doings, Lloyd George said to labor very much what, on the same
day, Wilson was preparing to say as he digested the advice of House
and the memoranda of the Inquiry. This was a Saturday. On
Sunday the President completed his draft. On Monday he
showed it to Lansing for Verbal corrections. 5 And on Tuesday
morning he took it to Congress c at an hour's notice. 5
The testimony assembled by Professor Seymour out of House's
diary indicates a more serious than usual preparation of the ad-
dress, but does not suggest foreknowledge or indeed fore-hunch
that the document in hand was to shake the world. To declare
the general aims of democracy in the war had been a simpler and a
safer matter than it was now to set up heads of business for the
readjustment of the balance of nations and the correction of the
map. But if Wilson regarded this address as of much greater
significance than that of his previous speeches, the evidence does
not as yet display it.
The President reminded Congress as the excuse for his unex-
pe"cted visit that the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk had pro-
'THE ONLY POSSIBLE PROGRAM' 179
fessed an interest in a general peace while announcing the terms
upon which they were ready to enter into negotiation with Russia.
But the conditions whose acceptance by Russia was demanded
were not those which Russia had proclaimed in the spring, or even
those voted by the Reichstag liberals in the summer. Not the
proposals of a people craving peace, they were the impositions of a
Government after victory. They raised for Wilson the question:
With whom is Russia treating and for whom are the emissaries of
the Central Powers speaking? He asserted it as his opinion that
the answer was 'the military and imperialistic minority* which had
thus far dominated German policy. He was unwilling to consider
peace with this party, but he saw no reason why the challenge to
state aims should not be responded to in complete candor. He was
not averse to the sound 'instinctive judgment 5 behind the Russian
doctrine. In December he had declared that Germany was using
this to lead Russia astray, and had asserted that 'the fact that a
wrong use has been made of a just idea is no reason why a right
use should not be made of it.' He now alluded to the need of the
Russian people to know truly what the Allies were about; to the
admirable candor and spirit of Lloyd George three days before;
and to the entry of the United States 'because violations of right
had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of
our own people impossible* unless they were corrected and the
world secured. In order that c the world be made fit and safe to
live in 3 he proposed as the only possible program 5 of its peace:
1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at. ...
2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas alike in
peace and war except -as- the -seas -may be closed in whole and
in part by "international action for the enforcement of inter-
national covenants.
3. The removal, -so-far-as possible, of aM economic barriers and
the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among ait
tfee" nations consenting- to the -peace and, associating them-
selves fi>r its maintenance,
4. Adequate guarantees ... that national armaments wili be
reduced. . . .
5. A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of
all colonial claims
1 80 WAR AIMS
6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and . . rmr = -unham-
pered'-and .unembarrassed- opportune tyfer the independent
determination of her own political development -and na-
7. Belgium, tbe-whole-woridwill^a^ree, must be evacuated and
restored wkhout-any attempt to limit the sovereignty which
she enjoys. . . .
8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions
restored and the wrong done in France by Prussia in 1871
in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine . . . should be righted. . . .
9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along
clearly recognizable lines of nationality.
10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, -whose- place among the
nations we- wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be
accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.
11. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated;
occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure
access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan
states to one another determined by friendly counsel along
historically established lines of allegiance and nationality ____
12. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should
be assured a secure sovereignty [with autonomous oppor-
tunity for the rest] . .r^ndJbe^Dai^nell^ be per-
manently -opened- -as- a-fcee.^ .passage to the ships and com-
merce-of all nations ----
13. An independent - Polish state should be erected ... which
should be assured a free and secure access to the sea. . . .
14. A general association of nations must be formed under spe-
cific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guaran-
tees of political independence and territorial integrity to
the great and small states, alike.
The address of January 8 was hardly on the wires (over which
the Committee on Public Information promptly dispatched it,
securely translated, to foreign lands) before reactions lifted it to
first place among the rationalizations of the war. The London
Spectator saw in it at once c the minimum terms of the Allies, 3 but
used the word Minimum 5 ; while a part of British opinion was
restive at the inclusion of the item on the freedom of the seas.
Colonel House liked all the rest of it better than the paragraph on
the Balkan problem, for, as Seymour put it, 'historically established
OPINION ON THE FOURTEEN POINTS 181
lines of allegiance and nationality' did not exist In the Balkans.
Republican Senators were uneasy because of implications under
the third head that might suggest free trade. But the voices of
statesmen and of the press were in a close harmony. Scott Xearing,
of the People's Council, approved it. And when a British paper
called it a 'great charter,* the San Francisco Chronicle (which none
could accuse of anything but unrepentant Republicanism)
countered: "Why not the greater or the greatest charter? Magna
Charta [sic] was a small-town franchise compared with the pro-
clamation of international liberty and democracy contained in the
Presidential deliverance. 3 Whether the President so designed it
or not, his summary contained the texts for the diplomatic discus-
sions of a generation. Viereck, w r ho dealt in superlatives, desig-
nated it as 'The most effective piece of propaganda ever designed
by any human brain in the history of mankind.' It was read in
Germany, as it was intended to be read, as a basis for settlement
only after Allied victory. Three days after it was delivered, the
Norddeutsche Allgemeine %eitung was quoted as summing it up as c a
real symphony of a will to no peace/ It gave to the content of the
address the title thereafter universally ascribed to it: 'The Four-
teen Points.'
IX. INTER-ALLY
JL HE Fourteen Points, by popular acclaim, became the mani-
festo of the war. In fundamental doctrine they summed up Ameri-
can aspiration so completely that militarist and pacifist alike took
them to be obvious. They detoured around the tangle of secret
agreements, of which no one could have been ignorant in the
summer or oblivious after the Bolshevik Government began to
publish them in November, 1917, to smear its Czarist predecessors.
Labor and liberal groups found in the Fourteen Points something
more attractive to fight for than either national advantage or war
indemnities. The manifesto failed in its purpose so far as Russia
was concerned because the leaders there had world revolution in
view rather than reasonable peace. Wilson's concrete suggestions
as to territorial rearrangement were not in every case workable.
They developed defects in fact defects to be embarrassing some
day in conference but at their erroneous worst, the Fourteen
Points did not threaten destruction or mutilation to defensible
objectives of even the enemy.
The last of the fourteen, promising an association of nations,
promised by inference an orderly mechanism for the cure of prov-
able evils. France found in the eighth what it had been eagerly
looking for: a clear endorsement of the claim for the return to
French sovereignty of Alsace-Lorraine. The wave of approval
overflowed Allied boundaries in concentric bands. The doctrine
of the freedom of the seas made it easier for neutrals to commend
the manifesto. The approval passed even the barriers of the
Central Powers. As well as among the Allies, there was war weari-
ness east of the Western Front, where will to war was kept alive by
attributing to the Allies a determination to dissolve Austria-
Xo PART OF THE OFFICIAL POLICIES 183
Hungary and to wipe out Germany as an entity* As the reason-
ableness of the Fourteen Points percolated the censorships and the
interpretations of Imperial officials, the common folk of the Central
Powers turned their minds toward this sort of peace. Wilson had
set a text.
The leaders of the Allies, one by one, gave personal approval to
the Wilson doctrine, for its general purpose could not be rejected
by one who was unwilling to proclaim himself to be imperialist at
heart. Nevertheless, in spite of widening support and wordy ad-
miration it remained the manifesto of only Wilson. It was less than
Revolutionary Russia w r anted, than the American pacifists called
for in the summer, than the Central Powers invited at Brest-
Litovsk, than British labor asked from its haH at Westminster. It
was not a pledge. The approvals w r ere no more than personal.
They could not be national, for the Allies were bound to unity by
bond. No statement of endorsement was made under that bond.
The Pact of London, by wiiicfa the first enemies of Germany
became the Allies, involved a pledge by each of them not to talk
peace separately. Until the Allies should act in agreement, no
statement of the opinion of anyone could bind even the country
from which the statement came. Only the President of the United
States was a free agent, able to speak with reasonable assurance
that what he said was in fact the intention of his Government.
Not until the Allies and Associated Powers at last permitted their
general in command to receive the German envoys asking peace
(and this was when the war was over and Germany had no option
but to ask it) was a binding statement given out. Until this
moment all expressions of opinion except those of Woodrow Wil-
son fell short of being binding or dependable. Lloyd George is
right in insisting that the Fourteen Points 'constituted no part of
the official policies of the Alliance. 3 Co-operation in the expression
of war intent, or, better, victory intent, could not be procured.
The war was a group of wars on the part of the Allies, with
freedom of action limited only by the pledge not to talk peace
separately. Said Clemenceau, not many days after the statement
of the Fourteen Points: 'Since I have fought in coalitions myself,
184 INTER- ALLY
I have come to think less of Napoleon' Depuis qui je pratique les
coalitions f admire moins Bonaparte. But his recognition that his
coalition was weak did not impel him to admit a sacrifice to make
it stronger. It was eventually to be vital that the Allies shape their
minds to an agreed pattern and adhere to it, else there could never
be a peace. But before peace could become more than a philo-
sophic abstraction it was even more vital that the Allies make up
their minds to fight a single war. The position of Germany in its
alliance gave to the Central Powers what approached a unified
command., contributing to the military advantage gained in 1914
and retained since then. The four great Allies had made their
drives and defended their trenches, each on its own, and some-
times with as much desire to conceal intent from friends as to hide
it from the enemy. Their separateness now broke down, threaten-
ing them with defeat. The United States, outside the Allies and
outside the net of interest, pressed into their counsels the con-
viction that unless they united they could not win. Germany, by a
master stroke delivered in the late fall of 1917, served notice that
unless they unite they must be beaten.
The German blow came out of the Julian Alps on that north-
eastern frontier of Italy where the ninth of the Fourteen Points
was to declare that there should be rectifications c along clearly
recognizable lines of nationality.' Italy was determined that this
rectification should bring into the kingdom the region east of the
head of the Adriatic known as the Trentino, from Trieste to Fiume,
where indeed the 'lines of nationality' appeared to be chiefly Ger-
man, but where possession of the littoral would give to Italy a con-
trol of great strategic value. The Italian armies had been nibbling
their way at the eastern end of the Venetian plain until blocked
by mountainous country where the Austrian defenses could main-
tain their line. Cadorna, in charge, had been pressing the Allies
for troops and guns to advance his campaign and had been so in-
adequately supplied as to be unable to do his part when the needs
of the Western Front called for him to create diversions on the
Italian Front. He started on a new drive eastward immediately
after the appeal of Benedict XV. His drive slowed down among
CAP.ORETTO 185
the mountains In September, with his armies spread over the upper
tributaries of the Isonzo and In possession of the bridgehead at
Gorizia. He was, with reason, worried about the morale of Ms
troops, some of whom were too young and some too tired. There
were no quick returns to reward Italy for joining the Allies.
Germany, fearful that the Austrian lines would break, was suffi-
ciently fearful to send picked divisions and to lend German com-
manders for a counter-movement. In a campaign at Riga earlier
In the year von Hutier had experimented successfully with a new
process of attack calling for specialized troops and precise rehears-
als. Preparations were made to apply this method on a larger
scale on the Austrian Front. On October 24 the bombardment,
overture to the battle of Caporetto, began in a heavy storm. The
ensuing attack was successful beyond expectation; so successful as
to clog Its own mechanism. If, as Pershing feared, the Allies had
been driven by trench warfare to forget how to maneuver In the
open, Germany remembered how. For the next two weeks every 7
day brought news of the disintegration of Italian defense. Udine,
the Italian headquarters, was taken at once; the Austro-German
drive crossed the Isonzo, crossed the Tagliamento, and threatened
the line of the Piave, until the defenders of Venice hid the bronze
horses of St. Mark's, carried the other treasures of art into safe-
keeping, and prepared to abandon Venice itself.
As the Italian armies broke, rumors spread that prior to the
drive propaganda had done a major stroke among the troops,
appealing to the men in the ranks with an assurance that the
Central Powers would give an easy peace, and that Italy was being
used only for the special interests of the Northern Allies. Coin-
cident with the disaster, making defense more difficult, was the
fall of the Italian Ministry October 25, and the entry upon the
scene of a new Prime Minister, Vlttorio Emanuele Orlando.
Orlando brought with him some reputation for defeatism, and
was believed, as Minister of the Interior in the fallen Cabinet, to
have tolerated the Socialist propaganda that weakened army
morale. A few days later Cadoma was removed from his com-
mand and Diaz took over and began the reorganization of the
Italian Front.
1 86 INTER- ALLY
The advance of the enemy around the head of the Adriatic was
retarded, and stopped short of success. From Italy to England and
France there went cries for help, with the result that divisions and
guns were hurried into the new line. Early in November the
Prime Ministers of the Allies followed their reinforcements in
order to hold counsel with Italy at Rapallo, a resort on the Italian
Riviera a little east of Genoa. Here on November 5 the new Prime
Minister, Orlando, received Lloyd George whose tenure was now
eleven months old, and Paul Painleve who had for two months
presided over the fifth French Ministry since 1914 (and who was
due to return to Paris and give way to Clemenceau at the head of
the sixth). While the ministers were in conference on the dire
necessities of the Italian Front, the news came of the triumph of the
Bolsheviki, with the accompanying suggestion of a separate peace
by Russia. At Rapallo the question uppermost was whether or not
the war was lost.
The near-success of the attack on Italy and the prospect that
the Russian lines would soften, if they did not evaporate, con-
tributed to make the military picture at the end of 1917 more
favorable to Germany than it had been a year earlier when a peace
conference had been asked for. For the fourth year Germany had
made gains away from the Western Front to compensate for the
failure to conquer there. In the autumn of 1914 Russia had been
mired in East Prussia, with crushing losses. In 1915 Serbia was
overrun and put out of the war. Rumania entered by the side of
the Allies in 1916, only to be eliminated in the autumn and dis-
membered by a peace at Bucharest. And now Italy had narrowly
escaped the same elimination process. While Germany made
gains elsewhere than in the West, the Allies, holding in the West,
experienced losses in the East. Here the school of Allied strategy
that thought to win the war by turning the left of the Central
Powers at Constantinople made an attempt at Gallipoli in 1915,
from which the unsuccessful forces were withdrawn at the end of
the year. The Dardanelles remained closed to the Allies, which
opened to Germany a vision of new gains across the Dardanelles,
in Asia Minor and beyond. British operations in Mesopotamia in
THE MILITARY SITUATION IN 1917 187
1915 were not only unsuccessful but resulted In the surrender
at Kut-el-Amara of a British army In April, 1915. The 'Berlin to
Baghdad* aspiration was too near to realization to be nonsense.
The year 1917 saw German consolidations along the whole
length of the Eastern Fronts except at the southern end. In
Mesopotamia, after the surrender of Townshend at Kut 3 the British
armies were reorganized and once more taken Into the field against
the Turk. Baghdad was occupied by Maude In March, 19 17,
setting a southeastern limit to German hopes. Arabia revolted
against Turkey, held on to Mecca, and created a resource for the
Allies. In Palestine, too, there were gains which somewhat soft-
ened Allied disappointment. Allenby's entry Into Jerusalem,
December n, 1917, was the brightest spot In the military vision
of the enemies of the Central Powers as winter set in.
The probability of additional German expansion southeast of
Asia Minor was slight with Jerusalem and Baghdad taken by the
Allies, and with the intervening Arabia In successful revolt. But
from the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus north to Finland, the
gains were great. The collapse of Russia opened vistas that had
not been In prospect until after the deposition of the Czar. Even
more than in 1916, If the gains In hand could be consolidated,
Germany was in a position to let the West go and yet end the war
with profit.
But it was by no means certain, as autumn turned into winter in
1917, that the Central Powers would have to let the West go. The
victories in Italy were an Inspiration, giving hope that, with the
Eastern rear safe, the war might be turned Into victory In the West
in 1918.
The year 1917 was Inconclusive as far as the Western Front was
concerned. The trenches had held. Retaining the strategic grip at
Verdun in the spring of 1916, the Allies had been unable to break
through the line in the Somme campaign In the summer. The
great French offensive of Nivelle collapsed in the spring of 1917,
leaving the French forces in the confusion Pershing sensed when
he reached Paris In June. At the French left and never happy
with his liaison, Halg was prepared to co-operate with Nivelle,
1 88 INTER- ALLY
driving up the valley of the Somme; but the plans of both armies
were upset when Ludendorff, anticipating them, made a strategic
withdrawal from the front trenches to a new Hindenburg Line,
devastating the terrain as he evacuated it. The British offensives
of the last half of the year, whether in Flanders or at Cambrai, left
the German defenses still intact. The prospect of the Allies for
1918 would have been dark enough without the emergency call
from Italy in November. Pershing, just as the Italian line was
struck at Caporetto, found it necessary to issue a stern warning to
his officers lest they spread to visitors c an impression that the war is
already well along toward defeat for our arms. 3 He had visitors in
shoals there were newspaper men, whom Palmer could handle,
major-generals from the new divisions sent to observe the war, and
congressmen whose discretion broke down when they picked up
the interesting gossip at officers' messes. When the premiers
gathered with their military advisers at Rapallo, it was clear that
heroic measures were in order. Unity was involved.
Pershing did not go to Rapallo. Just back from an Inspection of
ports and services along his line of communications, he had break-
fast with Lloyd George as the latter paused in Paris on his way to
Italy and in the afternoon he called on Painleve. With each he
discussed the steering committee that was proposed to be erected
to bring better order out of the Allied chaos.
There were three or four ways of securing team-work. Pershing
thought rather well of honest conference and co-operation among
generals of the several countries in the field; however, this called
for a higher degree of self-denial than was usual among com-
manders with careers at stake. There were also possibilities of a
council of war in the field (which commanders dislike); of a single
commander (which France would have welcomed if assured that
he should be French and which Pershing welcomed in principle) ;
and of a steering committee in the rear, with some of the attributes
of a consolidated general staff.
The last device was the best that it was practical politics to dis-
cuss, since English military opinion would not consider the sub-
ordination of the British Army to a French commander. Reason
ALLIED CO-OPERATION AT THE FRONT 189
underlay this reluctance, for In Flanders lay the gateway to Eng-
land, and none could be sure that In a moment of stress the road to
Paris might not be regarded by a French commander as more
Important than the road to England. It might. In fact, be more
Important. German military skill had jolted British opinion Into
some compliance, but not enough for a complete surrender of
control. The steering committee Idea, a favorite of Lloyd George,
was In weaker shape than Pershlng liked, because the logical
national representatives on such a committee would have been
the chiefs of the several general staffs; whereas the British Prime
Minister had a deep distrust of generals (even of his own) and In-
sisted that the determination of policy should be, in the last
analysis, political.
Lloyd George suggested to Pershlng that he, too, ought to go to
the Italian conference; but Pershing, having no specific instruc-
tion, suspecting the conference to be more political than military,
and having no army ready for immediate use, preferred to stay
away. He did not conceal, however, his desire for real co-opera-
tion between the English and the French, for 'when one was
attacking the other w r as usually standing still. 5
The Paris conversations were on Sunday, November 4. On
Monday the Prime Ministers and their advisers met at Rapallo.
On Wednesday they signed an agreement for the better co-ordina-
tion of military action on the Western Front,' in which they pro-
mised to set up in Versailles a Supreme War Council, with
monthly meetings. The Council was to consist of the Prime Minis-
ter and a member of his Cabinet for each of the powers, with a
permanent military representative of each to go to Versailles and
act as technical adviser to the Council. The group of military
advisers thus permanently installed was to receive reports and
proposals, watch the day's battle, and consider the means at the
disposal of the Allies. It was presumed that, upon their technical
advice, the Supreme War Council would plan a common policy
at its monthly meetings. The conduct of operations and the con-
trol of each army was left, specifically, in the hands of its Govern-
ment. The crisis of the Austro-German drive had passed before the
1 90 INTER- ALLY
Rapallo conference met, and the drive itself was shortly stopped
with the Allied line in Italy mangled but not ruined. The business
of the new Supreme War Council was with the future.
A month later the Supreme War Council met in the Trianon
Palace Hotel for the first of its periodic sessions at Versailles. In
the weeks since Rapallo the venture had been exposed to opinion
in the constituent countries. Hindenburg joked about it: 'Such
institutions are always a sign of helplessness. When they are at
their wits' end, a war council is established. 5 The difficulty of
popularizing even this much co-operation had become apparent.
Cadorna, sent to Versailles as the Italian military representative,
came with the handicap that he had been relieved of his command.
France detailed Weygand (an assistant of Foch), who was the
selection of a new Prime Minister, Painleve being out. Clemen-
ceau, now come to power, the bad boy of French politics, had at
the age of seventy-six a single aim ahead of his driving power
France. Lloyd George sent Henry Wilson without trusting him;
he nearly sent no one because his own outspoken remarks upon the
ineptness of command and the need for oneness almost upset his
Government. He might have been a less insistent co-operator if
his distaste for the generals had not impelled him toward whatever
course they disapproved. But a Paris speech, on his return from
Rapallo, was so brutally frank as to necessitate a full explanation
to Commons on November 14. His explanation was convincing
to his majority, and it was reinforced shortly by a statement from
Colonel House, who had arrived in England November 7. House
put into words the substance of an instruction from the President:
c We not only approve a continuance of the plan for a war council
but insist on it.'
Clemenceau desired to modify the Supreme Council, when it
met on December i, by bringing in the chiefs of staff, and he
threatened if this could not be done to let the Council die in the
hands of mediocrities. He acted, however, less destructively than
he threatened and took part in the formal opening of the offices
with their permanent military secretariat. House represented the
President, having in his train Tasker H. Bliss who now wore the
GENERAL TASKER H. BLISS igi
four stars indicating his rank as general. The rank had been
revived In the autumn, so that Pershing, in command of the A.E.F.,
might hold his own with the leaders of the Allies, and so that the
Chief of Staff might have at least a temporary 7 rank as high as that
of any of the officers to whom he might have to transmit the orders
of the Secretary of War. Although on the verge of retirement,
Bliss was being retained as Chief of Staff until a suitable younger
successor could be found.
Bliss returned to the United States with reports for the War
Department only to be sent back to Paris in time for the next meet-
ing of the Council, to act as Permanent Military Representative.
Pershing was not sure he wanted him, having preference for
Hunter Liggett, and it took them some days to reach an under-
standing. But there Is no note of criticism among the comments
upon the service of BKss once he w r as Installed. He not only took
an immovable position in support of Pershing, but also impressed
his wisdom and fairness upon the military group regardless of
nationality. Sometimes as a 'mountain/ sometimes as a 'benevo-
lent pachyderm, 3 he earned the friendly judgment expressed by
his biographer, Frederick Palmer, In Bliss,, Peacemaker: The Life
and Letters of General Tasker H. Bliss (1934).
Pershing was dubious about the Council when he joined the
other commanders at its ceremonial opening; he thought it a
'kind of super-parliament.' He was more interested at the moment
in getting troops to France than in the politics of their utilization.
The Prime Ministers had no difficulty In completing the mechan-
ics of the continuous services of the Council, but they were as yet
unprepared with any plan for the military operations of the cam-
paign of 1918. It was nearly two months before they were again
in session, still without a program.
The third meeting of the Supreme War Council, at Versailles
on January 30, 1918, found the Allied armies facing trouble, and
the English Chief of Staff, Sir William Robertson, thinking that
c our only hope lies in American reserves/ Robertson was within
a few days of resignation because of distrust of the principle upon
which the Council was constructed. His office was out of it. He
192 INTER- ALLY
was offered either post: that which he held or that of Military
Representative; but he wanted both, which Lloyd George would
not let him have. Pershing and the generals anticipated so little
from the Council that Clemenceau was asked to assemble the field
commanders a week before it met, at the headquarters of Petain at
Compiegne. Here Petain foresaw a necessity to stick to the
defensive. Foch wanted a counter-offensive to be ready to start
when the enemy opened in the spring. Haig and Robertson
wanted independent offensives to be prepared. And Pershing
discussed the obstacles interfering with his construction of his rear
and with the shipment of his troops. Except that American troops
could not be counted on for any early operations (the English
thought that as an 'autonomous unit' they would be useless
throughout the year), the generals had not come to an agreement
when the Council met.
The Military Representatives made their report to the Council,
which thereupon decided to establish an Allied military reserve,
and created an Executive War Board to direct its operations.
The reserve could not be more than a principle, since none of the
commanders either admitted having enough troops for his own
minimum needs, or released for duty in the reserve the divisions
promised it. Adjournment came without a program. Nervous
souls at home had to be reassured by Bonar Law in Commons
that the Council had not created a generalissimo. The co-operation
in counsel, inspired by nearness of defeat, went only thus far. It
might never have gone farther had not the next German blow,
falling in March, driven the Allies the rest of the way to unity and
Foch.
Inadequate as the Supreme War Council was, it promised in
military affairs a completer team-work than had been attained
in diplomacy. The commentaries on the Fourteen Points had
multiplied between the day of their announcement and the end of
January. But there was no assurance that if the military picture
should change, the terms of peace would not change with it. The
spokesmen for the Central Powers were disposed to treat the Four-
teen Points as destructive of their nations. The Allied Govern-
ALLIED FINANCIAL CO-OPERATION 193
ments 3 and that of the United States, could not hear among the
enemy voices anything that sounded like a note of acceptance.
There was nothing for the war to do but to go on.
Yet the enemies of Germany were growing tow r ard a unity.
The Fourteen Points constituted a new outpost thrown in the
general direction of the purpose of the war. The Supreme War
Council, by the mere fact of Its existence, recorded the making of
some concession from the principle of national separateness.
Moreover, a series of conferences held in Paris in December
brought the Allies and the United States Into a more businesslike
relationship with reference to their joint support of the armies In
the field.
The United States had assumed the position of banker to the
Allies; but as such It lacked full knowledge of the resources,
liabilities., and projects of Its debtors. It had begun to earmark
funds for their expenditure within a few hours after the signature
of the loan act on April 24. However reluctant the Allies were to
bind themselves to any joint purpose, beyond that of military
victory, they were of one mind and conduct In the use of the
resources between winch and themselves stood only the necessity
to procure the signature of McAdoo upon their paper. By Novem-
ber they had drawn 2717 millions against credits established to
the amount of 3131 millions. McAdoo was guessing that they
would need about 500 millions a month for the duration of the war.
They would have welcomed an automatic allowance of this
dimension, in place of the requirement to state the specific case
every time a requisition was accepted. England was conscious of a
status different from that of the Continental Allies, since it passed
on to them, in loans of Its own, substantially as much as It bor-
rowed in the United States. Out of the responsibility resting upon
the Treasury in authorizing these acceptances came much of the
American pressure for co-operation in the rear of the Armies.
The Purchasing Commission for the Allies began to function In
midsummer, lessening the losses due to indiscriminate competition
among the several buyers in the American market. There was, at
best, some doubt whether at the end of the year there would be
1 94 INTER- ALLY
anything left to buy, since war needs gobbled up the visible output
and still clamored for more. The permanent British and French
Missions (which were left behind in order to supplement the
work of the Embassies) when the congratulatory Missions went
home in the spring of 1917 had as detached a view of the pos-
sible volume of American material as the United States Govern-
ment possessed. They were willing to make some sacrifice for
the sake of output and economy; and for their own purposes they
soon saw virtue in the idea that co-operative boards in Europe
should do for their combined requirements something of what
was being attempted in the United States by the War Boards.
In advancing this idea the Treasury took an enthusiastic part.
It had reasons of strictly American character to make its support
enthusiastic. Even had there not been American loans, the Allies
must have continued to buy in the United States. International
law had never even frowned upon the purchase of military sup-
plies in neutral countries. Neutrality had never been construed to
suggest that the neutral should prohibit profitable trade merely
because the buyer was at war. What would have continued per-
missible had the United States refrained from war became obvious
with the United States itself a belligerent. The War Missions per-
suaded themselves and confessed to the United States that the
Allies had reached the bottom of their strong-boxes; but had the
loans not been authorized they would have made additional effort
to build up collateral in the United States against which to raise
the credits for American purchases. The Allies would not have de-
clared their bankruptcy and dropped the war.
In proportion as funds were lent by the United States to the
Allies the strain upon the treasuries of the latter was eased. Moneys
and resources that might have had to go for American food and
munitions became available at home for whatever purposes
seemed advisable. There were many fields of opportunity beyond
the cash resources of the Allies which could be exploited when
bought on credit. Not all of their purposes were revealed to the
creditor. Their conception of the 'justice' to be done at the peace
treaty involved in most cases some readjustment of the map to their
THE AMERICAN MISSION 195
own advantage. In some cases they were rivals for the same terri-
torial booty, and were ready to spend money, If they had It, to
entrench themselves or to head off the competitor. The American
Treasury could not avoid feeling, as the loans were poured out,
that the United States was in spite of Itself assisting Its associates to
fight each other. Such competitions were not part of the American
objective in the war.
When Jusserand or Spring Rice asked for loans It was both
embarrassing and non-productive to Inquire too much. The
Secretary of the Treasury was In no position to be Inquisitorial
about the purpose of the expenditure, or about the work to be
done at home by the funds which his loan released. A clearing
house in Europe, In which representatives of the several Allies
should check the requirements of each other and give them pri-
ority according to their deserts, promised to relieve the embar-
rassment. Charles H. Grasty, whose dispatches from Europe pro-
vided the United States with much of what It thought it knew,
was asking in August for an Inter- Ally council. He was suggesting
that House, or Franklin K. Lane, be the American member.
The Trading-with-the-Enemy Act, and the War Trade Board
formed in pursuance of It, gave power to the American pressure.
They carried implications entirely clear to the practical borrowers,
who did not want to dam the flow of credit.
On the night of October 28 Colonel House boarded In New
York the special train carrying an American Mission to Halifax
on its way to London. He traveled at the head of an Impressive
delegation that in a way returned the visit of the War Missions of
April. Each branch of the war effort was represented among his
associates. Benson, Chief of Naval Operations, and Bliss, Chief of
Staff, went with him. Oscar T. Crosby, who had been clearing
the loans, was detailed by the Treasury and took along the best of
legal advice in the person of Paul T. Cravath. Vance McCormick,
chairman of the War Trade Board, was his own delegate; the War
Industries Board sent Bainbridge Colby. Alonzo E. Taylor, a close
associate of Hoover, could speak for the Food Administration.
The American Mission arrived in London on the very day, Novem-
196 INTER-ALLY
ber 7, when the Allied premiers sat at Rapallo In the Supreme
War Council set up as a last sacrifice for the sake of victory.
Northcliffe, who knew much, and whose papers dealt with him as
knowing all, was being quoted to the effect that half the effort of
the Allies was being lost through cross-purposes and waste.
The steps leading to the decision for the Inter-Ally Conference
for which the American Mission was heading had been taken in the
interval since August. Its germ was in the financial conference
asked by McAdoo. The Allies desired it, not only to secure
orderly continuance of supplies, but also to bind the United States
to themselves in the matter of policy. They were repeatedly in-
viting American representatives abroad to sit in with their coun-
cils, not so much because they craved American advice as because
the United States having taken part in the discussions might feel
bound by the decisions. The reply to the Pope indicated a tend-
ency of the President to go his own way in stating policy; he might
go too far.
The negotiations between England and the United States at the
time the American Mission was determined upon had their center
in New York and Washington and ran through irregular channels.
Roosevelt had thought well of Page, admiring him as he had
admired 'no other Ambassador in London . . . with the exception
of Charles Francis Adams.' However, Page had little to do with
the negotiations. He had long since ceased to represent the Presi-
dent, and he was blocked out of the picture before ill health ended
his embassy and he came home to die. Lansing, technically the
correct channel for diplomacy, had little to do with this angle of it.
It was Colonel House who was the tool, and in House the affection-
ate confidence of the President was unqualified through the
autumn of 1917. Sometimes in the White House but oftener in
his apartment in New York, House was no farther from Wilson
than his arm could reach to their private telephone. Next him, in
an apartment not far away, Sir William Wiseman had been
planted by the British Government to receive and expedite de-
cisions on matters of state. It was an unusual circuit, but one
that was highly effective. As with Page, it lessened the importance
THE INTER- ALLY CONFERENCE 197
of Spring Rice, who, crowded out of the business he ought to have
conducted, died suddenly in 1918. The British War Mission In a
large degree superseded the embassy. Northcliffe, and after him
Reading, had the reality of authority if not the trappings; while
Spring Rice was distressed by the tactics of the great newsman
and chagrined by his own ousting. Unfitted for his post of am-
bassador because of his personal identification with American
groups unfriendly to the Administration, Spring Rice occupied
himself with an honorary degree from Harvard. He wrote
intimate letters to the Roosevelts, and for Henry Adams he made
graceful sonnets. He was carefully expressing no opinion 'unless
I am asked for it.* But he admitted ruefully, No one has asked me.'
In the autumn of 191 7, NorthclifFe yielded his post as head of the
British Mission to Lord Reading and took his penetrating know-
ledge of the United States back to London, while Reading pressed
upon the American Government the idea of participating in the
next inter-Ally conference on the conduct of the war. Wiseman
briefed the arguments for such participation, and Wilson assented
to them about the time he directed House to launch the Inquiry.
The lack of an effective army made it inappropriate for the
United States as yet to do much about strategy; the President
was unwilling to be let into what might be described as diplomatic
alliance, yet the logic of economic co-ordination was convincing,
and Balfour was right in believing that 'tonnage conditions will be
the deciding factor 5 in the spring operations of 1918. In mid-
October Wilson agreed to participate in the conference. He asked
House to lead the American Mission, and on October 24 he gave
him his letter of credentials.
House had three weeks for deliberation and arrangement before
the Inter-Ally Conference held its opening session in Paris,
November 29, 1917. He had laid his foundations in London be-
fore he crossed the Channel, and In advance of his coming he
had passed the word ahead: c No public functions.* The days
were spent in conference with those from the King down, who
controlled the larger strategy. He had nearly a week before Lloyd
George arrived back from Rapallo. In this week it was believed
198 INTER- ALLY
that Venice was sure to fall and that the whole war was at stake.
House was more than ready to permit the Prime Minister to use
him as reinforcement in the demand for a superior unity and to
give to American pressure a somewhat greater credit than it de-
served.
While House was occupied at the top, the lesser members of the
Mission found their way into the subordinate British offices similar
to their own, to talk the business of the war. They found this
business in confusion, with each of the problems interlocked with
all the rest. Military plans were in abeyance because of ignorance
of the extent of the American reinforcement. Numbers could not
be stated with any precision, because of ignorance of the tonnage
that would be available for transportation. Shipping matters
remained in doubt, because neither the freight requirements of the
next year nor the amount of new tonnage that could be expected
from the efforts of the Emergency Fleet Corporation could be fore-
told. But through the confusion ran a clear purpose that England
and the United States should go to Paris arm in arm to advance the
unity of all. The days in London were crowned by a sitting of the
American Mission (without House, who stayed away) and the
British War Cabinet in the very room at the Foreign Office in
which, said Lloyd George, 'Lord North engineered some trouble
for America, but a great deal more trouble for himself. 5 It was
'purely a business gathering/ from which Lloyd George sent the
Americans to Paris with 'man-power and shipping as the two first
demands. 9 Nothing had occurred to change his view, expressed in
April, that ships would win the war.
The American Mission had a week in Paris before the first
plenary session of the Inter-Ally Conference was held, clogged
with the representatives of the little Allies. The clogging was
unimportant, for the formal sessions were only decorative. Much
of the real work had been accomplished in the week of waiting, so
that what was left for the full gatherings was only the recording of
decisions reached in private. Even the usual speeches were lacking.
House engineered an agreement with Clemenceau and Lloyd
George that the leaders should restrain themselves which was
RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE 199
less of an effort for him than for them. They adhered to the ar-
rangement, and left time for the committees to do their work.
Out of the Inter- Ally Conference came projects for co-operation
behind the lines. As to the lines themselves. House learned that a
great controversy would shortly arise: whether the A.E.F. should
be used as such or be broken up into companies and battalions to
be directed by officers of the Allies. But with this left in abeyance,
the plans for supporting the Allies in their efforts comprised a
finance council, a shipping council, a naval council, a munitions
council, a food council, and an understanding upon common
policy in the maintenance of the so-called blockade. Blockade
was still as inadequate a name for the investment of Germany as it
had been before the United States entered the war; the maritime
controls of trade continued to be based upon an inflation of the
law of contraband rather than upon the rule of blockade.
The leaders of the Conference adjourned their sessions to assist
in the inauguration of the Supreme War Council at Versailles on
December i. They completed their w r ork two days later, and a
month after landing in England the American Mission was afloat
on the Mount Vernon, bound for home. Said Colby to House: 'We
have been so used to potentates and kings that the first thing we
should do ... is to take a week's course at Child's Restaurant, sit-
ting on a stool, and getting down again to our own level.' The
stools at Child's, on Pennsylvania Avenue, could tell a long story
had they tongues.
The seeds planted at the Conference budded and fruited as the
weeks ran on. First of all, the Inter-Ally Council on War Purchases
and Finance retained Crosby in London to complete its organiza-
tion, open its offices, and preside over its deliberations. It proved
to be less important than its prospectus, for the Allies in this tight
winter could not find things to buy upon which to use up the funds
easily available. There was no shortage of American funds. The
Second Liberty Loan had been a success, and there were no fears
for the Third when it should be expedient. But Crosby's Council
was ready for business December 15, 'the first permanent Inter-
Ally body in which the United States is represented.! From his
2OO INTER-ALLY
offices in St. James's Palace an American directed priorities in the
matter of finance, and his Council met alternately there and at
Paris in the Palace of the Legion of Honor.
Naval co-operation had been a fact since the arrival of Sims,
who did not gain rank of Admiral, equivalent to that of General,
until the war was over. The presence of Benson with the House
Mission made it possible to make the co-operation more specific
and fruitful than it had been, but the Inter- Allied Naval Council
did not add much to the unity of direction already in existence.
To the destroyers already operating in European waters it was
agreed to add a squadron of American battleships; and even before
Benson had left Washington he had placed on the desk of the
President, for immediate approval, a memorandum on a new
variety of American effort. The submarines while still a menace
were less of a menace than they had been because the system of
convoys had drawn some of their teeth, while the barrage and
patrol at the Strait of Dover had greatly lessened the availability
of that exit from North Sea waters into the ocean. The ordnance
men in the Navy had proposed that the northern end of the North
Sea be blocked as well, and had undertaken studies of the two
hundred and thirty miles of rough water lying between the Orkney
Islands and the coast of Norway which, after the closure at Dover,
the submarines must traverse. No surface patrol was able to close
this highway, and attention shifted to the possibility of a tight
barrage of anchored contact mines. After the war was over, the
British Navy believed the conception of the North Sea mine bar-
rage to have been its own, but it could not weaken the conviction
of the American ordnance men that only their pressure had over-
ridden British despair at the magnitude of the enterprise. At any
event, a mine was designed in the Navy, a mine-firing device was
improvised, arrangements were made for quantity manufacture in
a hundred different plants of which none was aware of the nature
of the job, and plans for lading the barrage were proposed to the
Admiralty in July. With the approval of the Admiralty and the
Navy a laying base was opened by the latter on the coast of Scot-
land in February, 1918; and on June 8 the first field was laid.
FIELDS OF CO-OPERATION 201
Lines of the mines made navigation of the exit from the North Sea
hazardous at the surface, at periscope depth, at submergence
depth, and at deep-sea depth; 70,263 mines in all, of which the
American Navy anchored 565611 in their position.
The Allied Maritime Transport Council was the response to
the need for ocean tonnage. With four sections, one for each
Government reporting directly to its Government, it did its first
work in London on March 13. The basic decisions that were to
provide for the needs of the United States were not yet made, but
it was possible to set in motion the machinery for tabulating ton-
nage and estimating the requirements of the principal commodi-
ties of trade. The studies that Americans had begun in the plan-
ning and statistics section of the United States Shipping Board
were expanded upon the larger scale of total tonnage. The busi-
ness of war was at a stage at which politicians could not do their
work without the aid of statisticians who knew their stuff. The
adding machine had become a significant item in the list of war
munitions.
The munitions Council and the Food Council were delayed in
their inauguration, but became real when the summer of 1918
brought about a new series of inter- Ally conferences upon the
campaign projected for 1919. Before the economic councils were
far advanced in their work, the interest of the war shifted from
planning to operations in the field. But when these operations
began, with the German attack of March 21, the German high
command found itself facing a coalition that had considerably
changed its tricks since the close of the last campaign.
Organization of the effort abroad had caught up to and passed
the organization of the effort at home. Before the United States
could profit greatly from the improved unity toward which its
argument had been directed, it was necessary to reach other
decisions as vital to victory as those concerning war aims or inter-
Ally war organizations. It had to be decided, by rough method of
pull and push, who should command the American effort, the
President or the Congress; and who should command the Ameri-
can field forces, PersWng or the Allied generals. It had to be dis-
covered whether the American war machine could be made to work.
X. 'HE SHALL BE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
OF THE ARMY 5
JL HAT unity of purpose and that co-ordination of effort, to whose
promotion abroad the endeavors of the American Government
were directed, were brought near to breaking at home. The dis-
ruptive forces threatening the success of the domestic undertaking
were generated variously. They were derived from political inter-
est that could not be overlooked even during war, from the struc-
ture of human character, and from the Constitution of the United
States.
The third of these disruptive forces was inherent in the Ameri-
can frame of government. The plain meaning of the words of the
Constitution, c he shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States,' was hard to accept when things went
wrong or failed to go right. Congress cannot sit quiet and permit
the President to lose the day or save it. What interference its pa-
triotic zeal does not inspire is inspired quite as easily by its self-
esteem as a co-ordinate branch of the Government. To the Presi-
dent belong the executive power and the responsibility, but upon
the Senators and Representatives falls the double burden of voting
resources and of explaining in detail to constituents why resources
have been voted or withheld. Congressional leaders, reassembled
in December, 1917, after a brief recess since October 6, could not
ease out of their minds the attractive picture of a committee on
the conduct of the war or its equivalent through which their hand
might be in every pot.
Human character has a hard time in war. The strain of respon-
sibility upon ministers, as they exercise their powers, is matched
by the strain of hope or suspicion upon the lesser breed of states-
CONGRESSIONAL COMPLAINTS 203
men. Into the ears of congressmen, during the recess of 1917,
were poured fact, gossip, and insinuation concerning the status of
the war. Lawmakers knew little of what was going on behind the
screen of voluntary censorship. Their constituents had boys in
camp; boys so fresh that they would not have known when things
were going well and so unused to war that every inconvenience or
shortage was soon reported from mouth to ear, growing as it went.
Congressmen came back to Washington ready to believe that
everyone was incompetent and doubting the capacity of the Presi-
dent, and Baker, and Daniels, and the group of emergency chiefs,
to bring order out of chaos. They were sure it was chaos, but
lacked agreement as to the order they desired. Jealousy grew out
of the constitutional structure; suspicion out of human necessity.
The United States had had only eight months in which either to
flounder or to succeed. Congressmen might have been less uneasy
(or perhaps more) if they could have known that the driving
Prime Minister of England was convinced that his country had
floundered hopelessly for twenty-eight months before he came to
office In December, 1916. In the middle of November, when the
admitted insight and power of Lloyd George had been in charge
of England for eleven months, Lord Northcliffe declined the Air
Ministry, warning the Prime Minister of the 'obstruction and de-
lay* of London, in contrast with the 'virile atmosphere of the
United States and Canada 5 ; he stayed out of the Cabinet that he
might not be 'gagged 3 by loyalty, and warned that c unless there Is
swift improvement in our methods here, the United States will
rightly take into Its own hands the entire management of a great
part of the war. 5
If it was easy for Administration congressmen to doubt the
capacity of the American leaders. It was much easier for members
of the Republican minority to distrust the capacity, if not the
devotion, of any Democrats. Accepting the position of a minority
party was a trait only partially acquired by the Republicans of
1917. The tradition of Democratic incompetence had been re-
stated so often that it was believed. Republicans were now, more-
over, facing the preliminaries of a congressional election due in
204 COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY
19185 an election that might leave them still a minority or redound
to their advantage. The political schism of 1912, healing in 1916,
was still less than completely healed; the scars of party battle left
the party stiff. But the Republican leaders had no notion of let-
ting themselves be left after the World War in a discredited ob-
scurity like that from which Democrats had suffered after 1865.
Their Congressional Campaign Committee was due to be renewed
in February, 1918, and the National Committee was ripe for a
reorganization with 1920 in view. The party must close its ranks.
Issues that would be both profitable and safe must be discovered.
And thus it happened that political interest reinforced human in-
stability and the mechanics of the Constitution to create entangle-
ments from which the President must extricate himself before he
might carry the War of 1917 into its third phase that of opera-
tion. Six months, roughly, had gone into planning; and another
six were going into setting up an organization which was now in
many directions farther advanced than that of England had gone
in twenty-eight months. Congress reassembled in December,
1917, prepared to challenge Wilson's constitutional position as
Commander in Chief.
Only one American division had taken its place on the line of
battle when Congress took up the business of the new session,
with its mind crowded with doubt as to the effectiveness of what
had been done. The First Division, whose initial units William
L. Sibert had taken to France (and from whose command he was
about to be relieved by Robert Lee Bullard), had moved into its
sector on October 21, but its successors were not yet in sight.
Lloyd George, with an interest in comparisons, could point out
that in a similar six months in 1914 England had sent more than
350,000 men to the front. He could not understand why the
United States had sent so few or had sent them so slowly. Nor
could Pershing understand. The curtain whose folds of secrecy
concealed the front from the rear concealed also the rear from the
front. It seemed strange to the American general that troops did
not come faster. He was aware that in Allied counsels the convic-
tion was deepening that the next great aggressive must wait upon
SLOW MOVEMENT OF TROOPS 205
Ms army, and that the war would be won only with the Americans.
He agreed with this, differing from the other commanders only in
his idea as to who should command the Americans in battle; they
or he. In conferences held in London in December it was agreed
that he ought to have in France at least twenty-four divisions by
the end of June, 1918, but there was no schedule of shipments that
as yet promised any such total. The men were In camp. He knew
that, the Allies knew it, and there was every reason to suppose the
enemy knew It; but he distrusted their training. He had sent back
Sibert, the earliest of his divisional commanders, and he would
not have been of the old Army if he had not believed the War
Department always to be lax.
It was certain that the performance after eight months was far
less than had been hoped or enthusiastically promised. The Ad-
ministration was bound to find out why and Congress could not
fail to make Its own inquiry and come to its own conclusion.
Either more had been promised than could be delivered or the
creakings of the mechanism of the war machine Indicated funda-
mental errors of schemes or men.
The Adjutant-General knew that there were more than one
million soldiers in various stages of preparation in the United
States when Congress met. The Initial notion that American
participation would not Include fighting in France had been for-
gotten. Statesmen, when they have turned to write their memoirs,
have been disposed to forget they ever held it. Pessimists were
now restating the notion in a different form: that progress was so
slow that It would be better to send only goods and cash, and not
waste ships on driblets of troops. A second American division was
not expected to be ready for any front before March, and the train-
ing program in the United States was already under criticism from
G.H.Q. at Chaumont on the ground of inadequacy .
It was a large program. The easiest of its parts was what had
been feared as the hardest: the enrollment of men under the draft
law. It was now open to debate whether the hardest part was the
housing of the levies in their new camps, the equipment of them
with uniforms and weapons, or their instruction in the duties of
206 COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY
the soldier. Many things that had not heretofore been included
among the essential processes of mobilization were absorbing time
and attention, complicating the strictly military details.
The protection of the soldier, once he was drafted, had implica-
tions touching the effectiveness of the Army, the future of the
Treasury, and the politics of the war. Every process in mobiliza-
tion was somewhat retarded by the determination to make it
adequate. The War Missions, full of advice, were full of warnings
of mistakes to be avoided. Men who were taken by law from the
normal channels of their lives, and who were to be exposed to
death, were entitled to every safeguard that the Government could
provide. This was both fair and prudent. Soldiers were entitled
to be treated as willing components of a democratic army, and
obvious treatment of them as such stilled many of the doubts and
worries that would be inconsistent with their freest performance in
the line.
Gompers, in his Labor Committee of the Council of National
Defense, was one of the starting points for the consideration of
soldiers' insurance. Early in July the insurance men were brought
into conference since the action to be taken might involve an
intrusion of the Government upon the field of private insurance.
Judge Julian W. Mack of Cincinnati was commissioned to work
out a scheme of compensation, and the insurance companies were
found quite ready to let the Government undertake the special
risks involved in war hazard. Baker accepted the idea; McAdoo
gave it his approval because the Treasury was not only already
involved in insurance matters through its duty to carry the war
risks of shipping, but was certain to become more heavily involved
if history should repeat itself after the war. The cost of the Civil
War was only begun when the fighting stopped. Thereafter, until
the last veteran died, the Pension Bureau was the protector of the
old soldier and the target of raid after raid. Pension attorneys
and 'professional' veterans, backed often by the Grand Army
of the Republic, made a great demonstration of the power of
pressure politics as they drove Congress into pension legislation.
The Treasury had a keen interest in the adoption of a considered
SOLDIER'S INSURANCE 207
policy respecting claims before the claims should be sentimental-
ized by blood and suffering, or exploited by pressure.
The Importance of soldier protection In the larger politics of
war management was obvious. In a war for democracy and
In the United States the World War had taken on this aspect
It was necessary to avoid the appearance of loading the cost upon
a single class of citizens. The young men who went to war had
burden enough In the physical risk that they alone would carry.
The family solicitudes behind them were too real to be ignored.
The honest distaste for any draft procedure had been overcome;
there remained an equally honest reluctance to send an army to
fight abroad. The bodies and the souls of the fighting men must
be conserved wiiile the w r ar was on; their interest thereafter must
be protected by a national pledge.
Judge Mack's committee drafted its project so promptly that
it was ready for Introduction in Congress early in August, and his
bill was so adequate that Its progress w r as not retarded by debate.
It was delayed only by the cro\vded docket of the houses. The
Bureau of War Risk Insurance, created in 1914, w r as accepted
as the nucleus around which to assemble the machinery for ful-
filling the obligations now for the first time accepted in advance.
It would have been less easy to define them had not the long
agitation of the Progressive period for employers' liability, or
workmen's compensation, prepared the public and the congres-
sional mind. As the bill became a law on October 6, at the end
of the session, Its principal headings touched upon family allow-
ances, soldier allotments, compensation, and Insurance, To ad-
minister all of these the Treasury bureau in charge was expanded
to include some thirteen thousand employees, whose filing cases
soon held more than four million separate accounts that must
be kept accurate to the last cent, and in a condition to be explained
by correspondence to the soldiers themselves and to their ex-
pectant dependents.
The family allowance was an obligation assumed by the United
States in recognition of Its responsibility to the dependent family
of the fighting man. It was less important in fact than in appear-
2o8 COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY
ance, for the draft boards were in the habit of giving deferred
classification to married men, even when their greater average
age would not have made them as a class less liable to duty than
the younger bachelors. Up to fifty dollars a month, from enlist-
ment to one month after death, was to be paid to dependents,
according to a scale beginning with fifteen dollars to a wife.
The soldier's allotment was in recognition of the soldier's
obligation to his own dependents. Where allowances were granted,
allotments to supplement them were held back from soldier pay
and passed directly to the dependents. At least fifteen dollars
per month in every case, the allotments could not run to more
than half the pay.
Compensation was a Government obligation. If the soldier died
in the line of duty his widow, until remarriage, might draw a
monthly income with a seventy-five-dollar maximum. Should
he be disabled, the compensation during disability was based
upon an elaborate table of rates; and behind it all was an assump-
tion that the obligation of the Government to its mutilated de-
fenders had no limit.
Insurance was another matter. The commercial companies
had no basis upon which to compute the war hazard and shrank
from entering upon a speculative venture that might result in
disaster if the war should be long and the death rate high. The
Government accordingly prepared to provide insurance at cost,
carrying the overhead as a charge of war. It not only became
permissible for every member of the armed forces to buy term
insurance up to ten thousand dollars, with the premiums de-
ducted from his pay, but earnest campaigns were engineered to
persuade all of them to take advantage of the attractive specula-
tion. In 1919 it was reported that 4,561,974 individual policies
had been written aggregating insurance in excess of thirty-eight
billion dollars.
The organization of the bureaus to carry the obligations inci-
dental to the war taxed the Army and Navy, whose records of
service and title must be complete and accurate, and the Treasury,
whose duty to account for every cent could not be evaded, war
OTHER OBLIGATIONS TO THE SOLDIER 209
or peace. The obligations other than financial assumed with
reference to the armed forces touched upon the character and the
morale of the soldier and induced trial -and-error approach to
conditions of war that had never been portrayed by the romantic
historian.
Raymond B. Fosdick was well known in the War Department
before the draft law was passed, and even before war was declared.
He had been sent by Baker to the camps along the Mexican
Border in the summer of 1916, and upon his advice the Secre-
tary had accepted as another of his duties that of lessening the
scourge of venereal disease. The 'women of the army 3 had hereto-
fore been regarded as the unavoidable accompaniments of war,
and at times they had provided the themes for literature as though
they were heroic. Commanding officers had never known what
to do with them or how to get along without them. They had
filled the armies with venereal disease, breeding long sick-lists to
lessen effectiveness in action, and impregnating soldiers so that
the curse of war descended to their children and their grand-
children after the war was over. The result was both indecent
and expensive. It was now no longer necessary, for medical
prophylaxsis had learned how to eliminate the disease, and needed
only to be allowed to strip from it the hypocrisy behind which
even the name of syphilis was rarely mentioned. Writing to
Funston in August, 1916, after Fosdick had reported upon the
open prostitution and the segregated districts of the Border towns,
Baker had promised to 'support and sustain 5 every effort the
commander should make to clean his camp. Fosdick carried by
word of mouth the warning that a failure to eliminate venereal
disease would bring about a change in command.
The Army had learned that Baker was in earnest before it
undertook to prepare for war. The civil authorities near the
camps learned it when in August, 1917, Baker warned the mayors
that if they did not control alcohol and prostitution he would
shift the camps from their vicinity to other sites. So far as the
disease was concerned, the Surgeon- General was able to equip
the forces with medical officers prepared to treat it. Fosdick con-
210 COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY
tinned at Baker's side, throwing his strength into an effort to
prevent it. Prompt medical treatment was indeed to be provided,
but the opportunity for infection was to be cut down, and a wide
assortment of decent and wholesome occupations was offered to
fill the soldier's mind and time when he went off duty.
A Commission on Training Camp Activities was at work before
Congress met in December. Morale work around the camps was
entrusted largely to the local fraternal organizations, Maccabees,
Odd Fellows, and the rest. They were encouraged to organize
activities in recreation. Athletic enterprises were promoted; so
successfully in the United States and in France that a new heavy-
weight champion was in due time manufactured out of a private
in the Marine Corps, Gene Tunney. And the service agencies
that were allowed to go abroad, whether in the uniform of the
Y.M.C.A. or that of the Salvation Army, were given the mission
to keep the mind of the Army clean.
It added complications to the already overcomplicated task
of Army administration to have numerous civilian services work-
ing with the men, but it lessened the sick-list. It added difficulties,
too, in France, where sexual irregularities and morals were less
closely connected than in the United States, but it contributed
a new chapter to the history of mass sanitation. The effort to
support the morale services provided a basis for new drives to
raise funds in the United States for their maintenance; and each
of the drives had its results in solidifying still more completely the
public opinion behind the American enterprise. But through the
late autumn of 1917, when criticism of every aspect of war en-
deavor was getting ready to erupt in open attack, the determina-
tion to make war safe for the soldier added another to the long
list of things that must be done. The Allied armies had escaped
some of this confusion and experiment as they grew in size, for
the emergency before them had been too pressing to admit of
non-vital essentials, and their administrators had not before them
for their guidance the experiences and mistakes of their associates.
The Congress resumed its work on Monday, December 3; the
President addressed it on Tuesday; the declaration of war against
SENATE INVESTIGATION 2 1 1
Austria-Hungary became a law on Friday; and on Wednesday
of its second week the Senate Committee on Military Affairs
began a searching investigation of the American effort in mobiliza-
tion. Crozier, the Chief of Ordnance, was the first witness called
to testify upon the capacity and intelligence of the Administration.
In his cross-examination began the debate upon the fitness of the
President to command the Army and to direct the war. There
was politics in the investigation, but there was more concern.
There w T as no obvious way by which the Congress could itself
take the command from hands which it might believe to be in-
competent; but the suspicion that the American effort had thus
far miscarried drove members to a search for a way to speed the
work.
The Committee on Military Affairs did not wait for a resolution
of the Senate to direct it to its task. Senator George E. Chamber-
lain, its chairman, knew his own mind and had used his interest
and driving power to advance the Army bills as they had come
along during the first session. For fifteen weeks now, he and his
associates listened to the testimony of men who were under fire
and who often believed with him that there was something funda-
mentally wrong. They plowed through testimony bearing upon
the activities of the War Department until it took twenty-five
hundred pages to carry the record of the hearings. Chamber-
lain pursued the investigation until the winter changed to spring,
until grave doubt had given way to hope, and until the War
Department had by its own internal reforms increased its capacity
to do its duty. But before the attack was abandoned, it had pro-
duced schemes for the reorganization of the war agencies and
counter-schemes for strengthening the hand of the Commander
in Chief.
The tales told by the witnesses carried more interest for con-
temporaries than value for the historian. They brought out details
of what had or had not happened during eight months of effort.
Many of the details were fresh to the public, however stale they
were to workers in the Government. They related mostly to
conditions prevalent earlier than December, and no longer in
212 COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY
existence at the date of the hearings. They indicated both the
enthusiasm of the effort and the inexperience of many of those
who had to make it. And they were news. The press followed
Chamberlain's string of witnesses, giving them much space in the
dispatches out of Washington during the winter. The testimony
had a tone different from that pervading the daily releases of the
Committee on Public Information. It reflected long-restrained
grievances of subordinates whose advice had been disregarded,
and the tendential questions asked by the inquisitors indicated a
willingness to believe that the grievances were well-founded.
It was all the easier to believe the worst because when questioners
approached what were to them the present conditions in the
War Department there were good military reasons for withholding
specific replies.
While the headlines carried the story of the unpreparedness
with which the war started and related new details respecting
attempts in organization that had failed, the current news of
December and January fitted nicely into a picture of general
incompetence. It was stated that production of war materials
lagged, that clothing supplies for the troops were inadequate,
that arms and equipment were insufficient. If Pershing's opinion
of the War Department had been known to the public, and if the
small total of troops in France had been revealed, the reaction
adverse to the Government would have been even more bitter
than it was. The curtain of secrecy concealed these things, but it
could not hide a breakdown in the basic matters of railroad
service and coal supply. Tive months of crippled endeavor have
passed, 5 wrote George Harvey as early as September. In December
he asked: c Are we losing the war?' In January he began the
publication of his War Weekly, inquiring: 'How long can he [the
President] carry the whole burden of war alone?' It is hard to
reconcile his bitter criticism of the Administration and Baker
in their conduct of the war with his avowed desire to assist them,
but the very existence of his weekly vituperation testified to the
earnestness of the doubt prevailing in many quarters during these,
the darkest weeks of war.
RAILROAD CONGESTION 213
The railroads were overburdened in spite of the desperate
efforts of the Railroads War Board to operate them as a team.
They had too much to do during the summer as camp materials
were moved to camp sites and as men were moved into camp and
out again. When in the late autumn the factories began to dis-
gorge, long trains of coal, iron, and lumber, and of finished goods,
started to the ports of shipment, and congestion swamped all
facilities. Ships were too few, of course. Docks and warehouse
space were inadequate. Freight yards could not hold the trains.
And when snow and frost crippled the switches and impeded the
operation of the terminals, the wiiole system of transportation
in the United States began to creak and crack.
The Interstate Commerce Commission reported to Congress
at the beginning of December that a strong arm was needed to
direct the railroads and that unification w r as imperative. The
lines east of Chicago, at least, needed to be operated as a national
unit, regardless of ownership. The pooling of freight cars, an
essential part of unification, was already authorized by law r , but
it was impossible for the roads under private management to
pool the revenues and make fair compensations to the lines that
were sure to suffer if competition w r as abandoned. The conditions
prevailing in the Eastern freight yards, as Christmas approached,
suggested a greater degree of confusion than really existed, and
brought more blame than was reasonable, for neither private nor
public management could have controlled the weather. But
yardmasters could not receive the loaded trains as they pulled in
or unload the freight. Warehouses could not hold it, even if un-
loaded. Ships could not hurry their c turn-around* so as to move it.
There were stories of consignments stored on the wheels, in trains
that were routed back to the West still carrying the goods they
bore from factories to ports.
On December 26 the rumors of impending seizure were con-
firmed by announcement that under the law of August 29, 1916,
the President would in two days take over the management of
all the railroads. The administration of the system was vested
in a Director-General of Railroads, to which post McAdoo was
214 COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY
named. The tireless energy of the son-in-law of the President
seemed to have no limits as he now assigned a share of his strength
to the railroad job. Before many weeks he took away from the
officials of the roads the responsibility for their immediate manage-
ment and vested the operation in his own appointees, who were
sometimes the same persons, but who were now clothed with the
authority of the United States. The railroad presidents became
merely the executives of corporations owning property that the
United States had leased. When Congress reassembled after its
short Christmas recess it found an additional duty awaiting per-
formance. Not until March was nearly over did it complete the
law regulating the time and terms of Federal management of
railroads.
The average earnings in the three fiscal years 1914-17 were
made the basis for the rent to be paid by the Government during
the period of control by the Railroad Administration. The private
companies had found it hard to borrow for betterments. But
betterments could not be avoided, and the law of March 2i 5 1918,
put at the disposal of the Director-General a revolving fund of
five hundred millions for capital investment. It was one of the
consequences of war finance that the Government occupied the
money market, making it next to impossible for private industry
to borrow at reasonable rates; the Government accordingly as-
sumed the task of financing the railways as a war cost. The Rail-
road Administration became the sixth of the great war agencies
with which the normal mechanism of the Government was sur-
rounded.
Railroad labor, as well as railroad finance, became a responsi-
bility of the United States, for the unions felt the cost of rising
prices, and their incessant demands for wage increases were
among the burdens that made private management totter. And
what had to be done by the Government In matters of railroad
finance and labor became precedents for an extension of its
authority into all the fields of finance and labor before the spring
was gone. The railroad crisis, coining at a moment when doubts
were strong as to the success of mobilization, made the doubts
CRITICISM OF FUEL CONTROL 215
more serious. One of the specialized worries had to do with fuel,
bringing Garfield and Ms Fuel Administration into the picture
during January.
When the Fuel Administration was created, August 23, 191 7,
It was more clear that something must be done than just what
it should be. Harry A. Garfield, blessed with a well-known name
but cursed with academic connection, was not a coal man, and
because of this he had to struggle against an expectation that he
would be incompetent. The President, having rebuked the
Council of National Defense for transgressing Its powers In an
attempt to fix the price of coal, had fixed it under his own powers
just before Garfield was installed. To Garfield he left problems
of production, labor relationship, and distribution. Price had a
vital connection with the gross supply, because In addition to the
great deposits of high-grade coal In the United States there is a
wide distribution of inferior coal that can be mined and sold only
when prices are above the average. There was a broad sector
of the Industry that could be occupied by producers who normally
did not produce coal at all, but who could, under stress, mine
the more easily worked veins of poor coal If the price were high
enough. Since the highest price of the last ton mined would fix
the national price of coal, It w T as certain that a price high enough
to bring all the deposits Into use would bring also unwarranted
profits to the more fortunate producers. Some of these might be
recaptured by the war excess-profits taxes, but not until after
an Inflated price of coal had done damage to the coal consumer.
It was a nice task to set the price at the proper level.
The distribution of coal, one of the greatest charges upon the
railroad system, w r as the crux of fuel control; and this became
jammed In December with the rest of the program. McAdoo,
hopeful that his Railroad Administration would work well, was
optimistic about the fuel problem early In January. Garfield was
pessimistic; and specially pessimistic because one of the causes
of the congestion at the ports was the inability of the steamships
to fill their bunkers. He was not ready as yet for the system of
zone distribution that was later adopted to eliminate cross-haul
216 COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY
by requiring each major division of the United States to get along
on its own coal supply. He had appreciated the difference be-
tween the conditions governing coal as fuel and those of oil, and
had on January 10 appointed Mark L. Requa of California, one
of Hoover's associates, to be chief of an oil division of the Fuel
Administration. But nothing had forewarned the country of the
summary action taken a few days later in the announcement of
the coal-less days.
On Friday, January 18, and for four days thereafter, and then
on Mondays for nine more weeks, industry east of the Mississippi
was directed to go slow on coal. Plants were required to close
down to a Sunday basis. Exceptions were made for essential
industries and for war manufacture; but the intent of the order
of the Fuel Administration was to lighten traffic, clear the lines,
and let coal get to the ships at the ports of embarkation. A wave
of indignant protest was set off by the publication of the fuel
holiday order. It brought home the war. Said the Outlook: it
was a c call of all hands to the pumps'; said the President, when
efforts to induce him to overrule his subordinate reached the
White House: We are on a war footing.' And the order stood.
But the necessity for the order, if it was necessary, or the outrage
of it, if it was not needed, gave new acerbity to the discussions of
the inadequacy of the Administration. Republicans, who might
be expected to be critical, became more critical. Many Democrats
were sunk in despair. And one of the latter, Chamberlain, the
director of the investigations, went to New York on the second
coal holiday, Saturday, January 19, to talk about the war before
an audience assembled by the National Security League. Root
was at the speaker's table, as was Roosevelt, who led the cheering
at the end of the address, after the chairman of the Senate Com-
mittee on Military Affairs declared 'that the Military Establish-
ment of America has fallen down. There is no use to be optimistic
about a thing that does not exist. It has almost stopped function-
ing . . . because of inefficiency in every bureau and in every de-
partment of the Government of the United States/ The issue
was joined on Monday when the President, after securing from
CHAMBERLAIN ATTACK 2 1 7
Chamberlain a verification of Ms words, declared the charge to
be an astonishing and absolutely unjustifiable distortion of the
truth, 5
The degree to which the military effort had broken down was
and must remain largely a matter of subjective judgment. The
whole program was too vast for any but the President to know
or comprehend its whole, and Ms personal responsibility made
his personal opinion of Its success insufficient to establish It. But
he, more completely than any of his critics., knew what It was
about. For nine months the United States had been at war.
The accomplishment, with all Its defects, was distinguished when
judged against the background of unreadiness as it existed In
April, 1917. But the United States, after nine months, was still
far from ready to meet the enemy on the battlefield. This seemed
like failure to those who thought In terms of what there was,
rather than in terms of distance gone.
At the moment when Wilson gave the He to Chamberlain there
came into clash two sets of forces out of whose combat was to
emerge the solution of the problem of command. The President
was himself steadily remodeling the war machine. He began this
about the time when Scott retired from the War Industries Board
and when Baker determined to let Bliss remain Chief of Staff
until a younger general should establish himself as an adequate
successor. The specific conditions displayed by the Chamberlain
Investigations no longer existed on the day they were brought to
light. They had become historical. "While Chamberlain was at-
tacking set-ups that had been abandoned, the Administration
kept its own counsel and continued to adapt set-up to changing
conditions and experience. Chamberlain, as Inquisitor, was
forced into a greater prominence than he desired. It Is possible
that he had not yet forgiven Wilson for selecting Baker rather
than himself to be Secretary of War upon the retirement of Garri-
son. He could not avoid being widely advertised by such political
forces as were seeking grounds to attack the Administration.
What he sought was not politics, but some new principle of com-
mand, consistent with the Constitution and better than that of
218 COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY
sole presidential authority. Rumors of this search had floated
through Washington in December when Congress reassembled,
and had evoked from Charles Michelson, who was signing his
dispatches as a Washington correspondent, the comment that a
'war council 5 idea 'jibes with the President's notions of carrying
on the war like pickles in ice cream.' War council, coalition
cabinet, munitions ministry, or something of the sort was in the
air.
Theodore Roosevelt, whose friends were warranted in believing
that behind the authority of his name the Republican Party would
present a united front in 1920, reached Washington on Tuesday
morning, January 22, with the slogan: Tell the truth and speed
up the war.' At Longworth's home he was visited by those who
agreed with him. He spoke the words of patriotism; meant them;
but his conferences with Republicans in Congress gave a political
color to his mission that could not be explained away. He could
not forgive the military decision that kept him from the battlefield.
He could not believe that good could come from Wilson. Even
before he arrived, the news of his coming coupled with the Presi-
dent's rebuke of Chamberlain set tongues wagging in Congress.
Stone of Missouri, who had been unwilling to fight Germans in
April, was more than ready to fight Republican hecklers in Janu-
ary. He charged partisanship against them all; against Roosevelt,
as 'the most seditious man of consequence in America 5 ; against
Wilcox, chairman of the Republican National Committee, who
had called an unusual meeting for St. Louis on February 12, to
name a new chairman and to prepare for both the congressional
election of 1918 and the presidential campaign of 1920; and
against Penrose, whom the course of the war had thrown into an
unusual sympathy with the course of Roosevelt. Roosevelt coun-
tered the charges as a private citizen. Penrose countered them in
the Senate, defending the duty of the minority c to remedy inef-
ficiency and abuses' by criticising them, and to maintain the
integrity of their party in opposition. He and Roosevelt were
alike in discarding one of the suggestions for improvement: that
of a coalition Cabinet. Neither believed that bi-partisan ad-
THE SUGGESTED WAR CABINET 219
ministration had succeeded in England or desired to attempt it in
the United States.
\Vhen the dust of combat subsided it revealed a concrete pro-
posal for an improvement in administration to be obtained by the
creation of a munitions minister or ministry. To this end Chamber-
Iain presented to the Senate on January 21 a bill c to create a war
cabinet, to be composed of three distinguished citizens of demon-
strated executive ability . . . through which war cabinet the Presi-
dent may exercise such of the powers conferred on him by the
Constitution and the laws ... as are hereinafter mentioned and
described.' Chamberlain had discussed his project at the White
House a fortnight earlier, and had been advised by the President
as early as January 1 1 that the latter was fundamentally opposed
to it. The British experiments with a munitions ministry and a
small war cabinet were attractive precedents to those w r hose under-
standing of the British system of government was less complete
than that of Woodrow Wilson. When Wilson now challenged the
truth of the charge of breakdown, and indicated that it would be
fought to the end. Chamberlain's bill was lost before it was printed,
It was conceivable that the President was incompetent to wage
the w T ar, yet it w r as he and not Congress that was designated as
Commander in Chief. His Cabinet was what he conceived to be
a War Cabinet; and, lacking the power to take from him his con-
stitutional right of appointment, Congress was impotent to elevate
to control better men than he could be induced to name. It was
not possible to dislodge him from the position of President as
described In the Constitution.
While Chamberlain, losing confidence in the agents of the
Government, was assembling testimony to indicate inept admin-
istration, and was advancing toward his explosion point, the
President was shuffling the cards and arranging new combinations
to advance the war. It is not possible to separate the part of this
shuffling that may have been Inspired by fear of trouble with
Congress from the part induced by the experience of the eight
months since the war began. The opposition declared that the
changes were forced upon the Administration by criticism; it is
22O COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY
not necessary to believe that the Administration told the whole
truth in claiming them to have been entirely spontaneous. How-
ever they came about, they put the administration of the war
upon a new plane between December and May.
The Chamberlain investigations were only a few days old
when Baker announced the creation of a War Council, consisting
of the Chief of Staff and the more important bureau chiefs, whose
function was to 'oversee and co-ordinate all matters of supply
of our field armies and the military relations between the armies
in the field and the War Department. 5 He explained the new
agency as not inspired by either the investigations or the situation
reported from the Inter-Ally Conference. He told the Chamber-
lain Committee a few days later that it was a next step, now that
'initial supply and organization had been substantially disposed
of. 3 When, eight months later, he dissolved the War Council and
assigned its rooms to the statistical branch of the General Staff,
George Harvey noted the disappearance in his War Weekly. Harvey
was not sure whether the Council had been created because of
the incompetency of Baker or as a device to get rid of inadequate
bureau chiefs by promoting them upstairs. The fact that the
chiefs were relieved of routine duties on account of their new
responsibilities gave support to the latter interpretation. But
whatever the reason, the War Council had outlived its usefulness
by July, 1918. Two of its members had come to cast so long a
shadow as to obscure their colleagues. March and Baruch had
the American end of the war in hand. It had been more than
suspected in the winter that one of the reasons for the creation of
the Council was the impotence of the General Staff, with its
brains picked for duty abroad. There may have been a chance
that the Council, dominated by the bureaus that never liked the
General Staff, would come to dominate it. But nothing could
overshadow Peyton C. March, once Baker had chosen him and
had installed him in the office of Chief of Staff.
At the desk of Sharpe, who moved upstairs into the Council,
a place was at last found for Major-General George W. Goethals,
as acting Quartermaster-General. The Emergency Fleet Corpora-
NEW AIDES APPOINTED 221
toon was not the place for the builder of the Panama Canal to
function happily; In the War Department 5 however, and as chief
of a section of the General Staff with oversight of the whole
quartermaster business, Goethals found Ms role. He brought a
young cavalry officer with him, Robert E. Wood, who had been
his quartermaster at Panama, who speedily became a brigadier-
general and who later turned his war experience Into post-war
advantage by rising to the head of Sears,, Roebuck and Company.
He borrowed another cavalryman, when Crowder was through
with him Hugh S. Johnson. Goethals drove the business of
procurement with a maximum of courage and a minimum of
red tape until his P.S. & T. the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic
Division of the General Staff controlled the whole field. Even
If he could not work with 'boards* he knew how to work under
military superiors., the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War.
His admirers and the admirers of Bernard M. Baruch have not
been able to agree which of the two, the military head or the
civilian, was the great master of the material side of the American
reinforcement. But between them, they were *it. s
Goethals, who rounded out Ms career as a procurement officer,
was as such only an experiment when In December he became
acting Quartermaster-General. He was only one of Baker's
guesses at good management. Stettlnius was another guess, and
one equally well grounded. Edward R. Stettinius had made him-
self head of the Diamond Match Company before the house of
Morgan found him. The finding was consequence of a deliberate
search for a new partner to take charge of the investment of Allied
money in the materials of war. Stettinius had spent three billions
of this money, to the satisfaction of the Allies and of the Morgans,
before Baker annexed him to the War Department as Surveyor-
General of Army Purchases. This was announced In the midst
of the Chamberlain drive, and was hailed as the creation of the
equivalent of a director of munitions. It preceded by a few days
the announcement that March was to come back from France
to be acting Chief of Staff. Stettinius was made an Assistant
Secretary of War in April, and fulfilled with meticulous exactness
222 COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY
the demand of Chamberlain for 'distinguished citizens of demon-
strated executive ability.' A third of the good guesses as to per-
sonnel had been made in November when Major Benedict Crowell
had been induced to resign his commission in the Army to become
an Assistant Secretary of War, with general oversight over muni-
tions. Crowell was a Cleveland mining engineer, who had been
with the General Munitions Board before entering the Army.
He became Director of Munitions in 1918.
Unruffled by the investigations and keeping his temper under
the barrage of criticism, Baker continued upon the job in hand.
There was no sign of wavering on the part of Wilson, who stood
behind him. The tactic of the Administration in meeting the
storm when it broke was worked out promptly. Confidence in
its success was so complete that, having called new aides to his
side and having summoned March, the Secretary of War quietly
disappeared from the news at the end of February. He arrived in
France upon an inspection trip on March 10; and soon there-
after his black civilian derby and his unimpressive stature made
their appearance in the illustrated papers among resplendent
generals, as he visited the front and the rear to see with his own
eyes what the A.E.F. was doing. He had not only set the War
Department upon a new and final course, but he had also drawn
enough of the teeth of the Chamberlain investigation to lessen
the hurt of its bite.
The hearings before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs
increased in interest from December into January. They brought
the inquiry to a crisis over the week-end of January 19-21, and
they declined in consequence during the next few weeks. Public
tension relaxed as it was discovered that heatless days did not
mean disaster, as new news gave new subjects for thought, and
as the rigors of winter were softened by the approach of spring.
The relaxation was advanced by the appearances of the Secretary
of War before the Chamberlain Committee to give direct testi-
mony upon the state of preparation.
After extracting from his subordinates their impression of the
difficulties under which they had worked and the lack of unison
REASSURING THE PUBLIC 223
from which they had suffered through the summer, the Committee
summoned Baker. He went on the stand on January 10; and
thereafter he was In and out of the Committee until the end of
the month. The first days of his testimony suggest to the reader
that he underestimated the Importance of congressional and public
uneasiness and that he treated the hearings as routine and the
Inquisitors as contentious. He was well aware of personal and
political hostility, such as that of Senator Sherman of Illinois,
who described him as "half pacifist and the other half Socialist. 5
But he was conscious., too, of White House backing, for on the
day after his first session Wilson wrote emphatically to Chamber-
lain In disapproval of the war cabinet idea.
It was not easy for those who lived, worked., and slept with the
war to realize how little the public knew of what was going on.
But the flare-up set off by Chamberlain In New York reminded
the Administration that the state of the public mind was as Im-
portant as the condition of the Army, and that the distrusts, how-
ever ungrounded, were genuine. The Secretary, who had not
done himself much good by his first appearance, asked for a
second appointment with the Committee, returned to it on Janu-
ary 28, and at that time turned the drift of thought and feeling.
He had a better text than on the earlier occasion, for Chamberlain
had now not only launched his charges and Introduced his law,
but he had also elaborated both at great length before the Senate
as he made a personal defense against the retort of the President.
There were few Americans more effective In exposition than
Baker, when he took the occasion seriously; and now, as he re-
viewed nine months of war in the presence of the Committee on
Military Affairs, he looked over the heads of his hearers to the
great public that needed to be reassured. Even yet he spoke with
caution; for In the background was an enemy watchful for every
fragment of testimony that might reveal a military secret. He
was, Indeed, as Palmer has said, 'walking on eggs. 9 He could at
least tell his hearers that instead of having, as Roosevelt had
demanded, five hundred thousand men who could be sent to
France In 1918, he would have that many actually there early
224 COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY
in the year. He dared not say how bitterly the Allies were urging
the American reinforcement, but he could tell of the million and
a half who would be ready to be shipped If tonnage could be found.
He could describe the welfare of the Army and ask, c Has any
army In history ever, since the beginning of time, been so raised
and cared for as this army has been? 5 He could not tell precisely
what he was soon going to inspect in France, but he could check
the Impatience of his audience by recollection 3 and remind it that
Trance was a white sheet of paper, so far as we were concerned,
and on that we had not only to write an army ... we had to go
back to the planting of corn in France in order that we might
make a harvest. 9
The Secretary was not willing to reveal the uncertainty of the
Supreme War Council, whose members were at the moment en
route to a meeting at Versailles. If they had even yet no affirmative
program of military affairs for 1918, he could not make one for
them; but he could tell what Pershing had found in the preceding
June, when France was demoralized and Petain was at work
restoring its morale. And his description of the day when first
the advance guard of the A.E.F. appeared upon the streets of
Paris still tingles the reader of the Official Bulletin, or of the Con-
gressional Record in which the testimony was reprinted in spite of
Republican objection, or of the daily press through which reas-
surance reached the citizen. Two days later Baker took lunch
publicly with Chamberlain in the Senate restaurant; and on Feb-
ruary 6 Overman of North Carolina introduced in the Senate a
War Department draft that was the Administration alternative
to the corrective legislation of the Military Affairs Committee.
It was the contention of the critics that the Administration was
too lax to run the war; the reply of the Administration was that
the war was well run, that it was out of the confusion of the first
half-year of planning, that it was nearly out of the second half-
year of organization, and that it was on the verge of operation.
la place of new laws to tie the hands of the President and teach
Mm his duty, the Administration asked a relief from red tape and
statutory interference. Few statutes have in so few words sur-
THE OVERMAN ACT 225
so much; and none has vested more discretion in the
President than was done by the Overman Act, which received
his signature on May 2O 9 1918.
In the controversy over the command of the Army It was
Wilson, backed by public opinion, who prevailed. Republican
factionalists, so far as they were factionalism sniped at him from
party committees and from editorial sanctums. Democratic party
leaders had difficulty in moving with him as rapidly or as thor-
oughly as he conceived that the public desired him to move.
Leader of a party that had through three Congresses gained and
retained the whole of the law-making machinery of the United
States, Wilson was nevertheless, at one time or another, driven
to lead without the support of his partisan lieutenants. Sometimes
Clark was against him, though Speaker of the House; sometimes
Claude Kitchin, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means;
sometimes Stone of Missouri, chairman of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations. And now Martin of Virginia, party leader
in the Senate, declined to stand sponsor for the measure vesting
in the President full power of action. Burleson took the draft to
Overman,, who consented to manage it. Crowder had drawn it
up for Baker, two weeks before.
The Overman Act remained in committee from February 6
until Overman called it up at the end of March. It passed the
Senate April 19 by a vote of 63 to 13, amended only by a specific
grant of authority to rearrange aircraft production. The House
accepted It without amendment, with but two votes In opposition
to a majority of 294. It cut through checks and balances. For the
continuance of the war, and for six months thereafter (unless the
President should designate an earlier date), the Overman Act
authorized him to redistribute the functions of executive agencies
as he saw fit; c to utilize, co-ordinate, or consolidate any executive
or administrative commissions, bureaus, agencies, offices, or
officers now existing by law'; to create new agencies; to transfer,
redistribute, or abolish the functions of others; and to utilize funds
voted for any purpose for the accomplishment of that purpose by
whatever means might to him seem good. The text of the act
228 COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY
justified the jocose amendment hurled at It by Brandegee as it
left the Senate: 'If any power, constitutional or not y has been
inadvertently omitted from this bill, it is hereby granted in full. 1
It was possible to joke about it, and from the floor of either house
to criticize its concentration of authority, but public opinion had
made up its mind about the management of the war, and few
members of Congress desired to be left in the uncomfortable
isolation of opposition.
The American reinforcement was in full flow before the bill
became a law; the First Division was in the line in front of Can-
tigny, ready for its earliest independent venture; and the war
machine at home was functioning.
XL COMPONENT'
JL ULL executive responsibility for the management of the war
was left with the President after the discussions and the legislation
of the winter of 1918. He demanded that he be left unhampered,
and that he be granted sweeping new powers, and Congress
acceded to both demands. Thereafter, he was In complete com-
mand. For whatever went well or badly, his became the accepted
and unshiftabie responsibility. The Federal Government, muscle-
bound by American preference, had been freed from peace-time
restrictions In the process that began with the President's fund of
one hundred millions and ended with the passage of the Overman
Act. The half-dozen huge war boards were as many evidences of
American willingness to meet emergency with emergency meth-
ods.
The war boards were all functioning before the Overman Act
was signed. Their directors were called in to meet with the Presi-
dent on March 20, at which time it w r as suggested that they were to
constitute a War Cabinet, supplementary to the regular Cabinet,
with its ten secretaries. The War Council, created by Baker in the
War Department in December, w r as on its way out, since the new
Chief of Staff had no use for it. Neither it nor the War Cabinet
managed to become a creative entity, but each did Its service as a
symbol of Improving team-work. Each had to do with the Ameri-
can reservoir of men and things out of which a military spearhead
was being fabricated.
The direction of the military spearhead at the front in France
was a matter In which the effectiveness of the American reinforce-
ment was involved. Pershing did not become sure of his status as
co-commander until July, 1918. In February, when the Overman
228 THE "SEPARATE COMPONENT'
Act was introduced,, his pretensions to be a co-commander were an
annoyance to the military authorities of the Allies. They had
given up of an American reinforcement large enough to
count before 1919, and he had presumed to sit In judgment upon
It is as well that the men who had to work together
the morass of plan and execution were not fully informed
of what each of them thought about the others. This revelation had
to wait until their memoirs saw the light. The reader of the
memoirs and the correspondence can leara more about them than
they about themselves. Knowledge at the time might easily
have destroyed their capacity to work at all. s The Allies are very
weak/ wrote Pershing, "and we must come to their relief this year
[1918]. The year after may be too late. 5
Pershlng, like the President, had on his hands a fight for per-
mission to do his work Ms own way. Though he did not know the
words in which his associates expressed their acid comments upon
his plan or his capacity, he was aware that through his period of
command he had against him most of the weight of professional
wisdom as the Allies possessed It, He differed from the President
In that the latter must rely chiefly on himself In conducting the
fight, whereas the commander of the A.E.F. had behind Mm,
persistently and loyally, the authority of the President of the
United States as well as that of the Secretary of War. Neither
Washington nor Grant could have believed in the possibility of an
American commander whose hand should be so well upheld by
the political agencies of the Government. Neither of them had
been so upheld.
The course of Pershing, in building an organization to cany a
great American army as a "distinct and separate component/
met with disapproval and sabotage from the Allies, The Adminis-
tration backed him up, but he had to bear full responsibility for
his decisions. When he Issued his basic orders from Paris in July,
1917, it was not suspected on either side of the Atlantic that the
United States would fight in force. When he demanded an
American sector on the Western Front, he raised a question that
the Allies would have preferred unraised, but one for which there
PERSHIXG'S ACTIVITY 229
was no easy way to deny compliance. When he settled down In
Chaumont, saw the Importance of the reduction of the German
salient at St. Mihiel and the road to Metz behind that salient^ and
directed his staff to begin the paper work for a first army enter-
prise at this spot, he had escaped for the moment from the menace
of amalgamation. When he began the consolidation of his lines of
communication, south of Paris^ connecting Ms Atlantic ports
with Ms Toul sector, his wisdom might be challenged, but not Ms
certainty of purpose. He, like the military authorities of the
Allies, had regrets over the thin stream of troops that landed in
France even after the War Department had more than a million
men In camp; but they, unlike himself, did not until after the
close of their disastrous season of 1917 come to count on any heavy
reinforcement. Thereafter, Lloyd George persuaded himself that
they had all along been 'waiting for the Americans/ Eventually
the British Premier convinced himself that the delay in providing
what had not been contracted for constituted culpable delay.
Pershing never lost sight of his ultimate army. His requisitions
for its first million poured Into Washington and overwhelmed the
bureaus and the committees. His specifications, of necessity, were
amended repeatedly as Ms officers worked their way Into the
details of training and equipment. Equally of necessity, the pro-
curement officers in the United States were driven crazy by
changes In specifications after they had let contracts and ar-
ranged for the construction of new plants in which to make the
munitions PersHng required. After his conference with House
and Bliss, and the Supreme War Council, In December, 1917,
PersMng set a specific goal for Baker: "We should plan to have
In France by the end of June [1918] ... four army corps, or twenty-
four divisions. In addition to the troops for the service of the rear/
This meant approximately a million men, for one man was
needed at the rear for every two men at the front. The million
men were, in fact, in France or on their way thither before July,
but when PersMng demanded them he knew no way to get them.
As the deliberations of the Supreme War Council revealed the
impossibility of a major Allied aggressive against the enemy until
230 THE 'SEPARATE COMPONENT*
or if the Americans should arrive, the disapproval of Pershing's
determination to command them when they came forced Its way
Into In Europe, and back to Washington. Few Intima-
tions of It reached the public, but on the very day that Pershlng
for his twenty-four division program, Lloyd George appealed
Ms to House for x4merican troops 'even half-
trained' to be mixed with seasoned veterans. He did not
repudiate the desire for an army with a "national Identity/ but he
wanted more than this. To this end he suggested that troops be
shipped In excess of Pershlng's program, to become replacements
in the British ranks. Haig had a plan for using them this way.
By the time House and Bliss were back In Washington In mid-
December the Administration was facing a choice between Persh-
lng and Haig as Its military adviser, or Petaln, for the French
commander was pressing Pershlng to let his regiments as they
arrived be attached to French divisions. On Christmas Day
cabled Pershlng, for the President, 'full authority to use the
forces at your command as you deem wise/ This left the full
responsibility for decision upon the table at Chaumont.
The British had powerful leverage In all matters connected with
the decision, for they controlled the ships. So long as the extent of
the reinforcement depended on American bottoms it was little
more than academic because the bottoms were too few to carry
the men and their supplies. It was too much to expect that Britain
would sacrifice Indispensable tonnage to carry troops to a destiny
that Britain distrusted. When England, however, offered to find
the ships for the carriage of troops In excess of Pershing's program,
on the condition that Haig have a temporary right to use them, It
provided a basis for a bargain. It did more; the admission that
ships could be found made It increasingly harder for Sir Joseph
Maclay, British Shipping Controller, to withhold on any ground
of shortage the transport needed. Without the use of much British
tonnage it was unlikely that even the minimum of twenty-four
divisions would ever get to France.
The bargaining over troops and tonnage was never ended.
Between December and March it provided many opportunities for
OPPOSITION TO PERSHING PLANS
the Administration to overrule Pershing, or even to displace him,
it been so disposed. Repeatedly the met, the
American genera! stood firm. Often the Permanent Military
Representatives of the Supreme War Council, united in February
as the Executive War Board in charge of the Allied (though non-
existent; reserve, discussed amalgamation. Bliss sat on this Board^
with Rawlinson, Weygand, and Cadorna as colleagues. Even the
Prime Ministers tried their hand. Lloyd George Clemenceau,
convinced that Pershiog's was not the way to win the war, at-
tempted persuasion upon his chief. They might have been more
persuasive had they been in agreement upon a better way.
Lloyd George was an "eastern/ thinking always of turning the
German left wing in the Balkans or beyond; Clemenceau ? a * west-
ern/ saw victor}" to be reached somewhere along the direct route
between Paris and Berlin. Jusserand and Reading (who replaced
Spring Rice as ambassador in February) exerted pressure for
their masters In Washington. The bargains reached in France
sometimes received an unanticipated construction at the White
House, and the conversations in Washington sometimes led hope-
ful ambassadors to believe that the President would overrule his
commander in the field. Pershing found that in addition to the
burden of preparing for his army he must take continuous part in a
diplomatic fight to retain command of it.
He was saved, in part, by a determination in Washington to
back him up. He was helped, from time to time, by jealousies
between England and France, which led each of them in turn to
assist him a little in evading the encroachments of the other. He
was ready, in a pinch, to fight back. Early in January he cut
across 'military channels' to rebuke Clemenceau for trying to settle
with Washington by cable matters that could be settled only by
conference among the generals in the field. Clemenceau^ ad-
monished, avowed himself ready to 'exercise all the patience 3 of
which lie was capable which was not too much but insisted
that upon the settlement of the matter might depend the outcome
of the war.
By the time the Supreme War Council held its third session, at
232 THE "SEPARATE COMPONENT'
the of January Pershing was certain that there would not be
any Allied offensive until his men were In France. He
to his position against amalgamation, noting that his
colleagues, Haig and Petain, made their own bargain and main-
It against the directives from the Supreme War Council.
He had brought Bliss Into full support of his position before the
Council met. Since Bliss, still Chief of Staff, was technically his
superior officer, this was vital; but It was not difficult, for Bliss had
no delusion of greatness to make him think his four stars were
superior to those of Pershing. The most that Pershing would
promise was that if divisions should be brought over as a whole
(rather than only the infantrymen and machine gunners whom
the Allies craved;,, the regiments of Infantry might receive pre-
liminary training with the British while the artillery received
training with the French; all of this conditioned upon the delivery
to him of divisions as units after training. He was willing to let the
troops take their chance with combat forced upon them while
engaged In such training, but he refused to let them be counted as
parts of the armies of either of the Allies.
In the face of Pershing's opposition to anything looking like
amalgamation, the Supreme War Council had no option but to
arrange matters as best It could with what It had. The American
army was, after all, only a when-if-or-as reinforcement; not a
certainty. Haig and Petain, each in his own way, were as recalci-
trant as the American commander. The recommendation of the
Permanent Military Representatives was approved In principle,
but was modified by the Allied commanders Into a moderate ex-
tension by Haig of the lines he held, and a mutual agreement that
each should come if needed to the aid of the other. The vision of
an Executive War Board under a French chairman looked so
much like a first step to a generalissimo that the 'black coats' of the
Supreme War Council felt impelled to issue public denials that a
generaEsslmo had been created.
In the British army, which had not been able to bring about
effective amalgamation with its own colonial troops and yet
desired to amalgamate the A.E.F., feeling ran high against any
DISCORD AMOXG ALLIED LEADERS 233
inter-Allied arrangement that might le^eri the discretion of the
field commander, or that of the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff. In a fortnight Robertson was out of office over the of
the Executive War Board and Sir Henry Wilson was In Ms place.
In the middle of M arch the Supreme War Council met again, in
London, to face the fact that neither of the existing armies would
contribute Its quota of divisions to the reserve. There was a real
question whether the scheme of pooling the interests at Versailles
had not broken down. So far as It depended upon the functioning
of the Executive War Board, it had collapsed. The Board lasted,
even In name, only until midsummer.
This fourth session for which Clemenceau came with bad grace
to London,, began as the Supreme War Council and ended as a
political conference of the Allies. Foch, as French Chief of Staff,
came with Ms Premier^ and with Weygand, Ms ego y as Per-
manent Military Representative. The new British Chief of Staff,
Wilson, was In harmony with Rawlinson who had taken Ms place
as Permanent Military Representative. Bliss was there, an "un-
swerving advocate of the army of maneuver under Foch/ as Lloyd
George has described Mm; and hoping In vain that the Executive
War Board might somehow come back to life and to the command
of a real reserve.
The United States, absent from the political conference of the
Premiers, had no political spokesman In Europe,, and wanted
none. Wilson, his own agent, had addressed Congress again on
February n, reiterating Ms aims In the war and summing up the
comments that had reached Mm since Ms Fourteen Points address.
The definitive peace between Germany and Russia, under dicta-
tion at Brest-Iitovsk since December, was signed in March a few
days before the Prime Ministers came together, and only awaited
ratification by the Bolshevik revolutionists. Pressure was already
upon the United States to provide troops for a venture at Vladivos-
tok in an Allied effort to lessen the consequence of the with-
drawal of Russia from the war. On March 11, as though he sus-
pected the intention of the Allies, Wilson again stepped out alone,
sending to the Russian congress which was about to meet a message
234 THE 'SEPARATE COMPONENT'
of Interest in the unimpaired sovereignty of Russia. Without his
presence or approval the Allied statesmen In London proceeded to
denounce the German deception of Russia and to prepare their
Intervention In eastern Siberia In support of a Russian minority
against the Soviets.
Pershing had an opportunity to freshen his contacts with the
War Department during the week In which the Premiers met In
London. Secretary Baker was at hand. Wrestling with the con-
gressional attempt to take the management of the war out of the
hands of the President, Baker had kept on with his own revamping
of the war machine. With Crowell, Goethals, and Stettinius
attached to It and finding their level, and with the President on
the verge of assigning to Bamch the management of the War In-
dustries Board 5 and with March on his way home to take In hand
the General Staff, some of the business on his desk began to thin
out. He had found time, during the worst of the fight over a muni-
tions ministry, to approve a new scheme of organization from the
General Staff, which was published to the Army in General Order
14, February 9. In this the advisory functions of the General
Staff were more clearly defined than before and the work was dis-
sected topically in the Interest of speed and accuracy. The war did
not last long enough for the General Staff to be detached entirely
from the jobs In administration that were foreign to Its theory, or
to be set free for the exercise of exclusively advisory functions.
But the progressive reorganizations worked in that direction. As
now redefined, the Chief of Staff, military adviser of the Secretary
of War, was to work through five principal aides, each an Assistant
Chief of Staff. These aides were charged respectively with ad-
ministration, war plans, purchase and supply, storage and traffic,
and operations. The assistants were to deal directly with the line
units In the Army and with the various staff services, and out of
what they thus learned they were to inform the Chief of Staff so
that he might give sound advice to the Secretary. In practice the
resulting orders commonly began: s The Secretary of War directs
. . .*; but whether or not a given order was important enough for
the Secretary to have seen it, he took the responsibility for what
BAKER VISITS THE A.E.F 235
Ms military counsel him say. The work was beginning to
run through the new grooves when March reported for duty. He
modified the procedure In detail during the next few months, but
his military contribution was more In the field of dynamics in
of mechanics.
With his reorganization started and with his dramatic appear-
ances before the Senate Committee a matter of record. Baker
slipped out of Washington to inspect the A.E.F. On March 10
he was reported in Paris; and here he began to take account of
stock, with Bliss to write an attractive picture of their conference
In a cellar under the hotel during a night air raid. When Bliss went
off to London for the meeting of the fourteenth s Baker went on
tour, leaving with the military authorities of France what comfort
they could get out of his statement that his trip was that he might
the better know how to support the commander of the A.E.F.
PersMng had much to show him; not much in the way of divi-
sions ready for the field, but much already accomplished In pre-
paring for the army when It should arrive. He had., In France^
been doing work closely resembling that which Baker had left In
Washington. His most recent job had been the erection at Tours
of a new headquarters, bearing to his army something of the
relation held In the United States by the War Department to the
whole military establishment.
No more In France than In Washington did American officers,
laboring for their first time over the vast problems of mobilization,
supply, training, direction, and fighting, manage to settle to their
satisfaction the relations between part and part that are most
likely to help to win a war. Probably these are Incapable of settle-
ment and must depend In the last analysis upon the particular war
and the personalities in charge of it. The first great question of the
relationship between the political heads of a nation and its fighting
force was settled basically in Washington. The second, that of the
relationship between the commander and Ms subordinates^ was
worked out in the field. There can be little doubt that the com-
mander should keep Ms desk free from detail In order to have time
to survey the broad lines of his mission. There is as little doubt
236 THE "SEPARATE COMPONENT'
each of his chief subordinates, being human, craves to hang
directly on the word of the commander,, without the Intermediary'
or the meddling of the officials whose business is to free the
commander from detail. The black braid on the cuff of the officer
on the General Staff had not made that officer popular In the
United States; It kept Mm unpopular in France. Many of the
officers who were Invaluable cogs In Pershing's machine were as
much aggrieved by the Inability of his personal staff to comprehend
their needs as he was aggrieved by the Inability of Washington to
understand his requirements.
\\Tiile the A.E.F. continued to be no more than a dream, for
whose realization the headquarters group was busy drafting plans,
It remained possible for the direction of the American venture to
remain at Chaumont The time had to come \vhen the Inevitable
cleavage between those who directed the battle, those who fought
it, those who brought up to the line the men and their supplies
would call for a decentralization of functions and control; all,
however, remaining under the hand of the commander. When
Pershing moved his G.H.Q. to Chaumont in September, he left
behind him in Paris the subordinate headquarters of what was
then called the Line of Communications. This needed every day
to work In most intimate contact with the French authorities
through whose towns and across whose country the lines would
run. But Paris was no place for the Line of Communications after
its plans were made and its blueprints drawn when It became con-
cerned with construction first and operation next. And Chau-
mont was no place for It; for Chaumont must concern Itself with
combat, while the work of the Line of Communications w r as com-
pleted far In the rear when it delivered to the agents of the field
commanders their men and tools.
During January, the American papers, naming no names ac-
cording to their practice under the voluntary censorship, began to
hint at the probability of a shift of the headquarters of the Line of
Communications to a 'beautiful little city In central France. 5
Keman 3 commanding the L.O.C., recommended this; a Chau-
mont board approved it; and In February the orders bringing it
TOURS HEADQUARTERS 237
about were Issued. Tours was the city. Situated on the Loire^
with ,g;ood railway connections to Paris, to St. Xazaire through
which supplies were coming, and to the training behind the
Toui sector. It was convenient. Being relatively empty of French
administration, it gave room for growth. In a most attractive part
of France, its environment gave to the officers detailed to work in
Tours what compensation they could get to make up for absence
from the front. Even Harbord 5 who later came to command it,
felt that the physical separation from Ghaumont deprived him of
the direct contact with Pershing that he needed; but Harbord's
argument against the possibility of keeping everything at Chau-
mont is conclusive against even his own dissatisfaction. The order
directing the shift from Paris provided a new name for the Line of
Communications^ which now became the Services of the Rear,
Before long this was amended to Services of Supply.
What could be decided at Tours was decided there. Pershing's
general oversight was maintained by direct contact between the
several divisions of the Tours staff and the similar divisions at
Chaumont. The sections of the staff at Chaumont received a new
nomenclature resembling that of the French Army, without
greatly changing the functions distributed by Baker in the Ameri-
can reorganization of February 9. The five c Gs 5 made their ap-
pearance; and military lingo used C G-1 5 or s G-5' with complete
understanding of what was meant. The principal duties of the
Eve Assistant Chiefs of Staff, thus designated, and their counter-
parts at Tours, and in armies, corps 3 and divisions as far down as
the system extended, comprised all the great functions of the Army.
G-i was administration; G-2, military intelligence; G-3, opera-
tions; G-4, co-ordination and supply; G-5> training. The railroad
men and those in charge of army utilities were never satisfied; and
Atterbury, ever a railroad man in spite of being a general, believed
that the Services of Supply ought to have been a civilian organiza-
tion, dependent directly on the commander. There were some in
Washington who thought that they might better have been directly
dependent on the War Department. But, for better or worse 3
Pershing had organized the American effort Ms own way, and
238 THE \SEPARATE COMPONENT'
his scheme of things to show when Baker undertook to see
with his own eyes what had been done and what remained to be
done. The army was taking shape before Its men arrived. It had
even its "house organ. 5 The first number of the Slars and Stripes^
edited In the army by its men for their morale, made its appearance
February 8.
saw It all: from the stacks of piles waiting to be driven at
the ports to the staff offices at Chaumont and to the front-line
trenches . Sometimes he had Pershing for a guide, but he hardly
one, and with his lack of swank left many to wonder who
the inquisitive little man could be. Always he had words with
in immediate command and with their men. Often he had
to pause and speak to groups; and when he did this even Frederick
Palmer, more or less his custodian and entirely case-hardened to
official eloquence, was stirred to listen. The culmination of his
tour brought him to the headquarters of Petain, for luncheon at
Chantilly, on Thursday, March 21. The program for that after-
noon was to have been the Somme battlefield, which Palmer knew;
but the program was modified, for the battlefield was again occu-
pied by battle. That morning a desperate German blow, planned
to end the w r ar before the Americans arrived in force, broke upon
the British Fifth Army which held the new extension of the line of
Haig. Amiens was the objective of the drive, and the splitting of
the Allies at their point of junction its immediate purpose. The
Valley of the Somme provided the route of the advance. The first
stroke drove Allied troops from their trenches along some fifty
miles of front, with the spearhead advancing a little to the north
of St. Quentin. During the next week Baker carried his tour to
London, while the daily war maps showed the growth of the new
German salient, with its base widening and its tip reaching almost
to Amiens, through which ran the sole dependable line of com-
munications between the French armies in front of Paris and the
British forces in Flanders. On Sunday, the fourth day of the drive,
Petain let Haig know that he need not hope for immediate rein-
forcement if their line should break; that in such case it would be
the duty of the French to cover Paris, leaving the British to shift
for themselves between the German divisions and the Channel.
GERMAN SPRING DRIVE, 1918 239
If the war had ended now, and for several days it had a fair
chance of being ended, the historical post mortem would have
attributed German victory to the inability of the Allies to subject
themselves to disciplines other than their several own. The
scheme for an Allied reserve, directed as a unit by the Executive
War Board, had broken down. Perhaps there could not have been
a reserve, since each of the principal Allies was a little beyond the
crest of its man-power. Certainly there was none that could fill
the breach at the left of the British Fifth Army. The agreement
for mutual help, between Haig and Petain, left each general the
judge of the time and manner of the help, and in the crisis of the
German drive neither felt warranted in endangering the national
purpose represented by his army for the sake of the safety of the
other. This could hardly have been otherwise so long as France
and Britain were fighting separate wars. The American pressure
for concentration of the command, so that there might be a single
war, was interesting as evidence of American belief, but in the
absence of an American army there was no military contribution
of importance for Pershing to have made, even had there been a
generalissimo. And the absence of an American army was due to
the lack of ships in which to transport it, with Britain pardonably
reluctant to invest ships in an unwise, or what it believed to be
unwise, American adventure.
Six months later, had Germany won the war, with Pershing
commanding his 'separate component,' the post mortem might have
been justified in placing the onus all on him and his personal am-
bition to command an army. But in March, 1918, a collapse of
the Allies, with their resources and man-power still far ahead of
those of Germany, would have been fairly attributable to defective
team-work.
The Allies did not lose. The British Fifth Army, weary when it
received the blow, and perhaps not adequately supported during
its engagement, fell back before the German thrust. It lost contact
with the neighbor British army on its left, until there was a gap
with nothing in front of the enemy but the road to Amiens. The
French neighbor on its right was slow to appreciate the full
240 THE c SEPARATE COMPONENT'
urgency of the call for reinforcement. In the end, Haig healed his
own breach, and the advance of the apex of the German salient
slowed down. It slowed down as much because all salients tend to
bring themselves to a standstill as because the barrier of resistance
was too tough to be overcome. One of the German officers plan-
ning the drive had warned his superiors that
in a successful offensive, the attacker will be forced to cross
a difficult and shot-to-pieces battle area and will get gradually
farther away from his railheads and depots, and that, having
to bring forward his masses of artillery and ammunition columns,
he will be compelled to make pauses which will give time to
the defender to organize resistance.
The preparations for the drive, noted by the intelligence officers of
the Allies, had produced suspicious warning movements along
one hundred miles of German front, most of the way from Armen-
tieres to Reims. The German divisions themselves, making their
adjustments, had not been allowed to know just where they would
begin. The concentration had displaced the Allies, beginning with
a thirty-mile front and widening to fifty; the penetration as the
salient was advanced ran beyond thirty miles, far enough to have
reached Amiens had not Haig managed to deflect the apex a little
to the south, where it came to rest. Montdidier, in front of the
French armies, and only some forty miles from Paris, was in
German hands when the line of the new salient was stabilized.
At the week-end, the drive having begun on Thursday, the
crumpling of the Allied line attracted attention in London even
before Haig was stirred by great fear, and before Petain warned
him that he must close the gap or lose connection. If Lloyd George
or Henry Wilson had trusted Haig more, they might have watched
him less closely, or had less disappointment at his unwillingness to
find divisions for the proposed reserve. On Saturday, after a meet-
ing of the British War Cabinet, the Prime Minister asked Milner to
go to France, and was ready to accept a French commander as
less disastrous than defeat. On Sunday, Haig came to the same
decision. Making desperate effort to back up the Fifth Army and
restore the line, and warned by Petain, Haig summoned Wilson
CO-ORDINATION UNDER FOGH 241
and Milner, who was already on his way, to come to France to
negotiate a better team-work which might mean a unified direction
of the war. The historians will long debate the responsibility for
the near-victory of Germany whether it was an undue extension
of the British front, or the incapacity of Gough with his Fifth
Army, or the default of Petain upon his promise to send aid if
needed, or the general unimaginativeness of Haig, or sabotage by
Lloyd George because of his interest in 'eastern 5 adventures.
But there is already agreement that the nearness of defeat broke
down resistance to the theory of the war that President Wilson had
endorsed when he said of the Supreme War Council: c we ... in-
sist on it. 5 On Monday, with the fate of Amiens still uncertain, the
generals and the politicians scurried from conference to confer-
ence; on Tuesday, March 26, they came together for action at the
town hall of Doullens-en-Picardie.
Pershing stayed on his job, for he was not involved in the battle
except in so far as a handful of engineers, caught by the advance,
exchanged picks and spades for weapons, turned themselves into
scratch troops, and helped resist it. Poincare, President of the
Republic, presided at Doullens, back of the British front, and
some eighteen miles north of Amiens. Clemenceau was there,
bringing with him Ferdinand Foch, whom he had boosted to
opportunity ten years before. In an earlier Cabinet, Clemenceau,
free-thinker and radical, had elevated Foch, conservative and
conscientious Catholic, to his brigadier-generalcy and the post of
director of the ficole Superieure de la Guerre. Already Foch's
Principes de la Guerre (1903) and De la Conduite de la Guerre (1905)
were the textbooks of the officers of France. Foch represented the
theory of the war which had prevailed in France since the elevation
of Petain to the command of the Army in the spring of 1917 and
his own resultant advancement to Petain' s post as Chief of Staff.
Peter Wright, a member of the English staff at the Supreme War
Council, thought he looked 'like a rustic French cure/ At Doul-
lens, also, were Milner, and Haig, and Sir Henry Wilson. As the
result of their out-of-conference discussions, Milner ass ;nted for
England to the elevation of Foch to more than had been intended
242 THE 'SEPARATE COMPONENT*
for him when the chairmanship of the Executive War Board was
in hand. He was charged with 'co-ordinating the action of the
Allied Armies on the Western Front.'
Foch left the conference still five months from his baton as
marshal of France; he was still far less than commander in chief;
his mission to co-ordinate the action of the commanders was less
than sufficient to get the co-ordination carried out; and he had no
reserve at his disposal. But resistance had been broken down at
the very edge of defeat, and unity was in sight.
Insufficient as was the authority conferred on Foch on March
26, there was only one course indicated for the United States;
this was approval and compliance. From Washington on the
twenty-ninth Wilson cabled his congratulations to the new co-
ordinator; and the press, when it received and carried the story,
magnified co-ordinator into commander. It assumed, not knowing
otherwise, that an extensive reserve was already in existence and
would come at once within the jurisdiction of the new Allied chief.
Compliance came from Chaumont, too. The authority of
Pershing to dispose of the troops under his command was such that
even without the word of the President he was competent to act.
On that Monday, when others were working out the agreement for
the twenty-sixth, he drove to the field headquarters of Petain at
Compiegne, to offer the French commander the use of the divisions
that could be sent into the line. These were the First and Twenty-
Sixth, quite ready; the Second and Forty-Second, nearly enough
ready. Behind these the Thirty-Second was due to be ready by
the first of May. The plans of Petain did not admit of their use in
the active line at once.
On Thursday, the twenty-eighth, Pershing drove off again.
The Doullens agreement was now in effect. This time he paid his
respects to the co-ordinator at his headquarters at Clermont-sur-
Oise. He took Foch out of conference with Clemenceau and Pe-
tain, and in private repeated his gesture of temporary surrender:
c At this moment there are no other questions but of fighting.'
The brief French sentences which he spoke, touched up for publi-
cation, stressed the honor of taking part c in the greatest battle of
AMERICAN TROOPS WITH THE ALLIES 243
history/ and placed his whole establishment 'all that we have is
yours 5 at the disposal of Foch. It was promised that the First
Division should go shortly to the front* The front could now be
talked of. It was no longer a withdrawal to the rear, but had been
frozen facing Montdidier. Before April was over the trains and
camions brought the First Division into the line, opposite Cantigny.
There were many fingers in the pot in these days of acute crisis,,
including those of Secretary Baker and of the British War Cabinet,
with whom Baker was in conference. Lord Reading had already
been directed to advise President Wilson of the importance of the
battle, to urge him 'to drop all questions of interpretations of past
agreements/ and to appeal to him to send over infantry c as fast
as possible. 5 Pershing was already in agreement with Lloyd George
that the battalions of the twenty-four-division program, if brought
over by the British, should for the time be trained and used by
them. Baker, on Monday, restated the matter to Pershing and fol-
lowed his telegram in person. He relayed the British desire that
divisions in France be given to the French, that engineers of the
Line of Communications be lent to the British, and that infantry,
to the exclusion of other types of troops, be forwarded from the
United States. The American leaders were in personal conference
in Paris on the twenty-sixth, they conferred with Pershing before
the latter visited Foch on the twenty-eighth, and on the same day
they considered the words and implication of a joint note to which
the Permanent Military Representatives were driven in their
desire to play a part. The promotion of Foch, who preferred to
work with a French staff around him, was already raising some
question of the future of the four secretariats assembled by the
Supreme War Council in the Hotel de Trianon at Versailles.
The joint note No. 18, destined to arouse considerable contro-
versy as to its formulation and meaning, was agreed to on the
twenty-eighth, after Pershing had withdrawn from its discussion.
It had to be an expression of the unanimous agreement of the
Permanent Military Representatives in order to become a "joint
note'; and Bliss assented to it. It recited the crisis, recommended
the 'temporary service' of American units (other than the divisions)
244 THE 'SEPARATE COMPONENT'
in the Allied armies, and urged that 'until otherwise directed by
the Supreme War Council, only American infantry and machine-
gun units ... be brought to France.' Bliss thought it embodied
the idea of Pershing; Pershing thought it implied a retreat from
his position that a separate army was the American objective.
Jusserand and Reading, in Washington, thought the Allies had
won out over Pershing, and in this conviction they explained the
note at the White House, where they called on April i. The
President did not seem to have seen in the joint note any departure
from Pershing 5 s desire, agreed that 120,000 men should sail per
month (roughly half on English ships), and sent Reading to March
to work out details. He cabled to Baker, approving the joint note
with the reservations Baker and Pershing had made in transmitting
it, without taking specific note of the fact that in these reservations
they had been willing to concede the change in plan of shipment
'only in view of the present critical situation. 3 They had empha-
sized the temporary character of the new plan, and had kept in
mind c the determination' as speedily as possible to have an
independent American army.'
March, when Reading was sent to him for immediate action,
had his own difference in interpretation, for he regarded 'men'
as meaning troops of any kind, whereas Reading thought of 'men 5
as infantry. The differences in interpretation were never quite
ironed out. But the essential of the matter was that, in the crisis,
Britain found ships whose existence it had hitherto denied; the
Embarkation Service used them, so far as troops were concerned;
the Shipping Control Committee filled up the cargo ships and
hurried their turn-around; the Allied Maritime Transport Coun-
cil, set up after the November conference, dug tonnage out of its
hiding-places; and all foreign trade of the United States was
operated under licenses of the War Trade Board. The corner
was turned, which must somehow have been turned before
Pershing, or anyone else, could ever have had an American army.
Before Baker was back at his desk in Washington on April 16 the
accelerated flow was under way.
At each of the three corners of the negotiation, Washington,
UNIFIED COMMAND 245
London, and Paris, there was some confusion as to the meaning
of joint note No. 18, and the President's assent to it. But Pershing
had no confusion in his own mind, whatever misgiving or irritation
he felt. He agreed that the situation might force some of his
infantry units to serve temporarily with the British, but he in-
sisted that they must not be treated as replacements; and no
orders were issued depriving him of authority over his troops. He
suggested to the President that England was trying to get American
troops so as to avoid sending to France its own men who were held
in England to defend the island against invasion from across the
Channel. He clung to his divisions and his army corps, and to a
policy of keeping his artillery ready to be assembled with the
detached infantry in complete divisions 'when called for.' And on
April 3 he went at call of Clemenceau to meet in Beauvais with
much the same body that had reached the critical decision at
Doullens on March 26.
Lloyd George came this time, as well as Clemenceau; and the
meeting might easily have been listed as a session of the Supreme
War Council, although it partook in fact more of the character of
an inter- Ally conference. It was here that Pershing learned of
what Reading thought Woodrow Wilson had agreed to on April
i, learning it when Lloyd George informed him that the President
had assented to the shipment of 120,000 infantrymen and machine
gunners monthly, beginning in April.
Here at Beauvais Clemenceau raised the question of a redefini-
tion of the powers of Foch. Baker had advised the President that
Pershing would accept under Foch any position that Haig and
Petain would accept. Foch pointed out that the Doullens agree-
ment had defined his duties as 'co-ordination of action 9 ; that the
action was now over, since the drive had stopped, and that he
was left with nothing to co-ordinate. Lloyd George agreed that
the powers vested at Doullens did not c go far enough. 3 Bliss and
Pershing spoke out in favor of a supreme commander, believing
that 'the success of the Allied cause depends upon it.* They
agreed to a resolution vesting in Foch c the strategic direction of
military operations of the Allied Armies on the Western Front';
246 THE 'SEPARATE COMPONENT'
but Lloyd George and Glemenceau would have left out of the
resolution any reference to an American army had Pershing not
insisted on its inclusion. He conceded that there was no army yet,
but demanded that e this resolution apply to it when it becomes a
fact. 5
The conferees left Beauvais with the position of Pershing em-
phasized to the point of irritation. His determination was un-
shaken and his backing unweakened, but his achievement of a
'distinct and separate component* was still in the lap of the gods.
Yet the conferees did not leave until a unified command had been
attained. The Beauvais agreement permitted the several army
commanders to exercise c the tactical direction of their armies'
under Foch's strategic hand; it gave to each commander a right
to appeal to his Government if by this strategic direction 'in his
opinion his army is placed in danger. 5 By April 17 the President
had confirmed Pershing's approval of a French request that with
the strategic direction should go to Foch the title of Commander
in Chief of the Allied Armies. The title did not as yet extend over
the Italian Front, or over that of the Belgian army, of which the
King of the Belgians remained in personal command.
XII. 'WORK OR FIGHT 5
JL HE Secretary of War returned to the War Department on April
16, the day before the night on which the First Division moved
into position opposite Cantigny on the Montdidier front. For it,
and for the A.E.F., as well as for the Secretary, the war at this
moment passed into its final phase. It became for the United
States a matter of combat.
The veil of secrecy which had thus far kept citizens at home
from knowing what was going on in France continued to obstruct
vision from either end of the effort, and it was still not discreet
to tell too much. The casualty lists, beginning now to come to
hand, revealed the fact of operations. They were small lists at
first, but they were more than lists of accidental casualty, and they
were of imperative interest to the folks at home. Yet the news-
papers kept pretty well to their pledge of voluntary repression of
news that might aid the enemy., while the War Department sought
to find a way to give the prompt notice that a death demanded
without at the same time publishing data from which the intelli-
gence officers of the enemy could compile lists of American units
in action and their places along the front. Much of what the
newshawks would have liked to print, they knew, but much of
what they would have liked to know was kept from them. The
new Chief of Staff, who was now very much at work, as well as
Baker who now joined him, believed that this secrecy could be
overdone. They were annoyed at the way in which officers,
returning to the United States from observation trips in France,
leaked* indiscreetly, telling what they ought to have forgotten,
or, worse, what they did not know; but now that fighting was to
become the order of the day they knew that the news of fighting
248 WORK OR FIGHT
had to be revealed. March had already begun to loosen up with
congressmen, holding weekly meetings with the military com-
mittees at which the veil of secrecy became progressively thinner.
For the remaining months of the war the history of American
democracy became the history of war. The supply and operation
of the Army took precedence over all else, and all else was judged
less on its own merits than on its relation to the military effort.
Policies had been formulated during the first six months, by a
people not yet aware how completely absorbing war would be.
Agencies had been constructed during the second half-year, with
a people as Impatient for results as those had been who sent
McDowell to Bull Run in 1861. Operations dominated now,
with no McGlellan to hold things back while he waited for abso-
lute perfection.
Peyton C. March put the War Department on a twenty-four-
hour day and a seven-day week. Bliss had described him as a
'man of positive and decided character, 3 and he lived up to the
description. He had taken office saying: *I know no gentle
method of conducting a war of this magnitude' ; and he was as
rough with himself as congressmen and subordinates complained
that he was rough with them. One of the congressmen, bitter
because of the removal of a favorite major-general from command
of his division, relieved himself by calling March the 'high priest
of Prussianism' without realizing how much of praise his epithet
contained. Even Baker, who did not often try to override, could
not break down his Chief of Staff's determination that the man-
agement of the war should continue to be a military task rather
than one distorted by politicians. As the last six months moved
on, the regimentation of the American people behind their com-
mon purpose permitted the novel instruments of their purpose to
function at increasing speed. The accepted slogan was c work
or fight.'
It was the Provost-Marshal-General who lifted these words to
prominence by rulings made in connection with the second regis-
tration under the Selective Service Act. JJnder that act, on June
5, 1917, there had been a peaceful and willing enrollment of
SELECTION OF CLASS I 249
9,586,508 young men. From this list the first draft had been taken
by lot. Before those who had been drawn had all been sent to
camp, there had come to light a good deal of waste motion be-
cause of preliminary work done on men who were finally left in
'deferred, classification/ on such grounds as nature of employment
or personal dependents. In November it was decided to classify
by questionnaire the men who had not been drawn and probably
would be left at home, Hugh S. Johnson, still working with
Crowder, drafted the new rules, making as nearly automatic as
possible the selection of the Class I men, those who were young
and without dependents and who constituted the normal reservoir
of man-power. After December 15 the new questionnaire classi-
fication was in operation; but immediately after June 5 the man-
power reservoir had begun to be recruited from younger men, as
each of these passed his twenty-first birthday. It was guessed that
these would number three-quarters of a million, almost all Class I,
before the first year after registration had elapsed. In May, 1918,
Congress directed that the names of these be added to the list.
The anniversary of the first registration was proclaimed by the
President for the second. In July, when the new questionnaires
had been counted, the Official Bulletin reported that 744,865 new
names had been made available for selection.
The new names, arranged again by lottery, went to the bottom
of the existing lists of which the several draft boards were custodian.
In issuing rules to govern the draft boards as they certified numbers
upon call of the Department, Crowder declared: c We shall give
the idlers and the men not effectively employed the choice be-
tween military service and effective employment. Every man
in the draft age, at least, must work or fight.' He classed as idlers
such as had no job, or made their living by gambling, clairvoy-
ance, bucket shops, or race tracks. The 'non-useful 5 callings,
carefully classified, were such as those of waiters, passenger ele-
vator operators, footmen, ushers, domestic servants, and clerks.
He opened, by indirection, a new range of occupations for women,
and helped construct the new social classification that prevailed
even after the men came back from war. Men not at work, or
250 WORK OR FIGHT
non-usefully at work, were to be listed immediately in Class I,
instead of receiving the deferred classification to which their age
or domestic responsibilities might otherwise have entitled them.
And the Secretary of War, in July, pointed up the ruling by hold-
ing professional baseball players to be non-useful. Before any
considerable number of Americans had seen the enemy, the War
Department was carrying on in the expectation that the war
might be prolonged through 1919 into 1920, that the A.E.F.
might at the end be leading the fighting, and that all legal limits
would be set aside as Congress brought the whole available man-
power into the Army.
Between the critical days when the Allies gave Foch his com-
mission and the day of the second registration, the war machine
caught its stride. Crowell and Stettinius had fitted into the War
Department. March, who was only acting Chief of Staff at the
beginning, put on his four stars when Congress legalized the
rank of General for the Permanent Military Representative at
Versailles, thus enabling Bliss to be relieved as Chief of Staff and
yet retain his stars in France. The Secretary's appeal for office
aid through the authorization of two additional assistant secre-
taries was granted. Crowell was already first assistant and had
presided over the Department while Baker was away. Stettinius
became the second, in April. Keppel, the third, was specially
entrusted with the relations of the Army to the civilian auxiliaries.
On the day that Baker reappeared, Goethals was given his final
position in the hierarchy.
Since December, 1917, Major-General George W. Goethals
had been seeking a way out of the disorganization among the
procurement bureaus of the War Department and the sections
of the General Staff. The old battle between the heads of the
permanent bureaus and the General Staff was not yet over, and
at the time of Goethals' appointment as acting Quartermaster-
General it was not yet certain which side would win. Knowing
Goethals, it was easy to prophesy that the case of the side with
which he was connected would be advanced, regardless of wounded
feelings. He was now on both sides, being a bureau chief and at
SPEEDED BUYING AND SHIPPING 251
the same time his own principal superior in his capacity as head
of a General Staff section on Storage and Traffic. The fight was
adjusted for the time by merging bureau management with the
General Staff, whose theoretical function was only to advise
concerning management.
The decision to bring March back to Washington was a victory
for the staff theory. Goethals annexed the Embarkation Service,
at the immediate head of which Frank T. Hines functioned with
distinction. He controlled the warehouses at the ports of embarka-
tion and saw that smooth management called also for control
of the Inland Traffic Service, for which in January he found a
place on the organization chart under his direction. The coalless
days in January at least made it possible to relieve some of the
congestion at the ports. Thereafter Goethals 3 establishment fed
cargoes into the ports while P. A. S. Franklin's Shipping Control
Committee moved the ships In which they went to France.
Storage and Traffic had chiefly to do with the supply side of the
business of the Quartermaster-General The procurement side,
as indispensable as one blade of a pair of shears is to the other,
was also normal business for the Quartermaster-General, except
as munitions procurement had been specialized out to be the
concern of the Chief of Ordnance. The functions, in orderly
sequence, were those of purchase, inland traffic, storage, and
embarkation. All of these, on April 16, were ordered into the
hands of Goethals, now an assistant Chief of Staff and head of a
Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division of the General Staff.
P. S. & T., as his division came to be called in the language of
Washington, thereafter had control of what was needed, once
quartermaster material came into the hands of the War Depart-
ment. Its scope grew relentlessly under its driving head, swallow-
ing up other separate agencies with each new revision of the
organization chart, and functioning better every month. It took
over much of the work to which the committees of the Council of
National Defense had originally devoted themselves, while the
organization of American industrial life so that it might the better
produce goods for the War Department to use, also an original
252 WORK OR FIGHT
function of the C.N.D., was concentrated in hands as capable in
their way as those of Goethals. Bernard M. Baruch was given
custody of the War Industries Board on the day that March re-
ported for duty at the head of the General Staff.
Lack of effective team-work between civilian production and
Army use of American resources was never as complete as its
critics made it out to be, although it was real enough to justify
much of the worry when in December and January the war
machine appeared to have frozen up and broken down. Frank A.
Scott, destined for decades to continue to be an appreciated
adviser of the War Department in procurement matters, cracked
under his war labors. Retiring on October 17, his place as chair-
man of the War Industries Board was taken by Daniel Willard,
who had on his hands also the railroad activities of his private life
and heavy duties as chairman of the Advisory Commission,
C.N.D. Just before the announcement in January of Stettinius
as Surveyor-General of Purchases, Willard surrendered the War
Industries Board so that he might give more of his time to the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, now taken over by the Railroad
Administration. He testified to the Senate Military Committee
that the management of the civil end of procurement was a one-
man job. The War Industries Board, however, did not receive a
new chairman in his place until Woodrow Wilson decided that
Willard's colleague on the Advisory Commission, Baruch, was
likeliest of the men available. From January 16 to March 4 the
Board had no head, and even then Baruch could not be given
legal authority for action that Willard deemed necessary. Never-
theless he found it possible to wield power in fact by a shrewd
reliance upon patriotic desire, indirection in the use of minor
powers, and an element of bluff.
The Senate Committee on Military Affairs had been told by
both Willard and Baruch, as it was told by the political critics
of the Administration, that the handling of industry ought to
be centered in a single office. From the Council of National
Defense had come the statement that if the work was to be in-
telligently done 'somehow we should have a system for clearing
BARUCH AND BROOKINGS 253
the needs of the Army and Navy, and for having the needs brought
before the people, 5 The word superman was sometimes used as
suggesting the kind of man required. Clarkson, with wisdom
after the event, is not far wrong in writing that the chief needed
to be able to look any man in the face and tell him to go to helL'
Baruch could certainly do this, and he could keep his mind on a
large objective without getting snagged in administrative detail
or complexity of organization.
The President accepted the theory of concentration in a letter
to Baruch which constituted the charter and commission of the
War Industries Board after March 4, 1918. He wrote, c the ulti-
mate decision of all questions, except the determination of prices,
should rest always with the chairman. 5 Upon this understanding,
priority in its largest sense became the principal business of the
Board. The Government was determined to procure the largest
possible amount of material supplies for the support of the war
program. The War Industries Board was to be kept informed as
to the needs and hopes of the several 'purchasing agencies/ in-
cluding those of the Allies. It was to encourage 'the studious con-
servation of resources and facilities'; to create new facilities and
open up new sources of supply; to convert existing facilities c to
new uses'; and to advise the Government concerning the prices
it should pay. The actual fixing of prices was the one matter
kept out of the exclusive possession of the chairman. Power for
this had by the Lever Act, August 10, 1917, been vested in the
President, who now required the chairman of the War Industries
Board 'in the determination of prices' to be governed c by the
advice of a committee.' This Price-Fixing Committee began to
operate under Robert S. Brookings ten days after the appointment
of Baruch. It received its instructions directly from the White
House and made its reports to the President.
The Requirements Division, W.I.B., began to do business in
April. A representative body, it included spokesmen for the
several sections of the War Industries Board as well as agents of
the buying departments of Army, Navy, Emergency Fleet, Rail-
road Administration, Food, Fuel, Red Cross, and the Purchasing
254 WORK OR FIGHT
Commission for the Allies. Through these agents the war buyers
were expected to keep the Requirements Division informed con-
cerning not only their emergency needs and the requirements
of their respective programs, but also their plans in formulation
so far as these could be foreseen. It was the ideal that these needs
should be balanced with the total capacity of American industry
to produce. In practice the ideal was never reached; but out of
the discussions in the Requirements Division came better know-
ledge of the bottle-necks, a clearer view of what might safely be
let alone, and some modification of extreme and overlapping
demands.
In the scheme of things, as the Requirements Division came
into action, the contracts laid before it for approval were rejected,
modified, or cleared. When cleared they were passed to a Clear-
ance Committee where they were registered in order, after which
they were permitted to be fulfilled. In the process of passing
them to clearance, the various subsidiary agencies of the War
Industries Board were drawn upon according to the necessities
of the case.
The Commodity Sections, whose creation had been begun in
some of the sub-committees of the Council of National Defense,
were indispensable in nearly every negotiation. Where price
was involved, the matter was referred to the Price-Fixing Com-
mittee, which drew upon the technical knowledge of the Com-
modity Sections and used the Federal Trade Commission in
coming to its conclusion. The Commodity Sections, in their turn,
did business with the War Service Committees, representing the
various industries, and bringing to the attention of the Govern-
ment the inside knowledge in the possession of the industries.
Where priority was as important as approval, the Commodity
Sections were again drawn upon to advise the Priorities Board.
Under Judge Edwin B. Parker there were drawn into this Board
the powers and much of the personnel that had been used in the
earlier phases of the war. As now reconstituted the Priorities
Board determined not only what needs must be met first when
the supply was inadequate for all, but also what demands were
THE PRIORITY BOARD 255
non-essential to the conduct of the war. In the light of these
decisions the Priorities Board advised the War Industries Board
upon the treatment of requirements as submitted to it. There
was law behind priority. The right of the Government to seize
and operate manufacturing plants was broad enough to cover
lesser interferences with their operation. The Railroad Adminis-
tration was in a position to back up the Priorities Board by with-
holding transportation. The Capital Issues Committee of the
Federal Reserve Board might In its discretion withhold approval
of demands for capital to finance private business. The law worked
on priority somewhat by indirection, but it could be made to work.
The Priority Board found great reluctance among the industries
to be damned by the classification 'non-essential.' It managed
to avoid that term yet reach the same result by adopting a dif-
ferent technique in which its lists gave prominence to industries
that were indispensable. By September the Priorities Board had
reached a point at which it could implement the work-or-fight
order of the Army by publishing a Preference List, classifying
Industries, with munitions, food, fuel, ships, and railroads at the
top. The service of these was not to be interrupted by demands
contemplating a different use for labor, capital, fuel, or transpor-
tation. The Preference List provided, also, a basis for 'industrial
exemption 5 from the draft, and locked the war effort into a
vigorous unit.
In the course of determining how needs should be met, the
War Industries Board did much to give comfort to both war In-
dustry and less essential industry. It steered the war industries
into channels whereby they reached access to new capital for the
construction of new plants or the reconditioning of old ones. It
advised owners of non-essential plants how they might convert
their property so that it might become useful. Its Conservation
Division, taking over the task of the older Commercial Economy
Board, brought continuous pressure upon industry to economize,
to manufacture fewer styles, to cut the yardage in men's clothes
and women's dresses, to standardize such things as paving-bricks
and bedsprings. It sought economies by lessening stocks carried
256 WORK OR FIGHT
on hand; persuading jobbers and retailers to reduce their in-
ventories, and urging manufacturers to speed delivery of goods
from the factory, so that local stocks might be kept low. Some
of its short cuts, tried for the sake of war, provided guidance for
peace industry when, after the war, the Department of Com-
merce undertook to lessen the waste motion in business.
The Government met business across the council tables of
the Commodity Sections, which varied in size and importance and
in competence. The administrative skeleton of the War Industries
Board remained flexible to the last, with never an official organi-
zation chart to freeze its processes to any pattern longer than
Baruch believed the pattern to be productive. When the per-
sonnel of the Board, demobilized upon the return to peace, came
together again at the parties where Baruch entertained his as-
sociates, the members could not always agree as to which of them
had really won the war. They gossiped a little about the inef-
ficiency shown in some corners. Yet they retained a high esprit
as they looked back upon their share in the first real American
experiment with a planned economy. Some of them remained
flexible enough to help construct the next, when the lame-duck
panic 5 made the United States, in 1933, willing to attempt the
New Deal.
Always behind the sections and the organization was Baruch
himself, shuttling between the White House and the business
conferences. He was there to advise and to devise, to be called
into any meeting to sweep away difficulties, or to be as rough with
business in the interest of the Government as business was when
it faced the Government. March approved him and his methods,
commenting in his memoirs that 'the stage of the dictators had
been reached. 5 The Washington Post, often chary of praise, gave its
editorial blessing: e The transformation of this country into a
colossal war-making power, and the co-ordination of the manifold
parts of this tremendous machine, have been accomplished with
remarkable celerity and absence of friction. 5
So far as the War Industries Board was anything more than
the power of the President exercised through a structure of
SHORTAGE OF INVESTMENT CAPITAL 257
Baruch's co-ordination, it was still a creation of the Council of
National Defense and dependent upon its creator. As soon as
the Overman Act gave the President the right to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Government, he broke this con-
nection and by Executive Order converted the Wax Industries
Board into an independent agency under himself.
At many points in its work the War Industries Board was
brought up against the problem of business which was expanding
into war production at a time when the financial needs of the
Government dominated the money market. Business had an im-
perative need for more capital if it was to undertake to execute
war contracts. The Liberty Loans, and the short-term Treasury
Certificates preceding them, absorbed more than the capital
available for investment. To a considerable extent they were
raised by credit inflation at the banks as purchasers of bonds
borrowed from the banks the money with which to pay for the
bonds. The needs of local governments and business for credit
could not be met. There was good reason for discouraging capital
flotations in so far as these were nonessential, with the war always
the measure of necessity. There was equally good reason for
permitting necessary activities of both local government and
business to be carried on.
On the recommendation of McAdoo, the Federal Reserve
Board, in January, created a Capital Issues Committee with
branches in the reserve districts, to dissuade promoters of new
loans from entering into competition with the Government for
capital. They were also to approve necessary refunding operations
and essential new issues. Working without power but with a
strong public opinion behind them, these committees operated
for three months before Congress took steps to back them up.
A bill was drafted in the Treasury to make capital available to
contractors who otherwise, unable to borrow, might have been
unable to execute their contracts. The Senate and House debated
simultaneous bills in March, worrying considerably over a new
step in finance in which, through a Government-owned company,
the War Finance Corporation, the Government was to borrow
258 WORK OR FIGHT
from the people In order to lend to business. A precedent for
this was established, in the same month, when Congress made
half a billion dollars available to the Railroad Administration to
help finance the railroads. Another half-billion was now appro-
priated, in an act signed April 5, to be the working capital of the
War Finance Corporation, which body was authorized to borrow
three billions more in income-tax-free bonds. It was not to lend
directly to war contractors, but indirectly it was to aid them by
loans to banks which had taken the responsibility of making loans
to business. The Capital Issues Committee was given legal status
by the War Finance Corporation Act and received power to
scrutinize and pass upon new financing in amounts above one
hundred thousand dollars. It checked non-essential demands by
business on capital and restrained States and local government
from continuance upon local non-war building programs. The
school boards accepted it reluctantly, and wildcat promoters
properly disliked it. Yet it helped to make definite the economic
intent behind the slogan, work or fight.
There were no accepted tables to guide either those who ad-
vocated work or fight, or those who would have liked to oppose
the principle. Before 1914 there had been no war in which the
power of armies to destroy was as great as modern ordnance
made it in the World War. There had been no war in which,
through a prolonged struggle, it had been the desperate effort
of each contestant to keep in the field (with gaps promptly closed
by newly grown man-power) the largest number of soldiers the
productive effort of the whole people could maintain. It was im-
possible to say how many fighting men per million of population
any country could keep recruited and supplied without depriving
those who stayed at home of necessaries of life without which they
could not continue to produce.
It is still unknown how long a nation so organized can continue
to keep up its effort. Numbers of men do not provide the answer;
nor do things. The prevailing standard of life is involved. The
state of mind of the individual and the zeal with which he ap-
proves what he conceives to be the object of the war may take
APPORTIONING WORK AND ARMY SERVICE 259
the place of men and munitions and put off the day of final
collapse. The relentlessness of the governing class may have
something to do with it; and the determination of a few to continue
to survive may enable them to coerce the many into extinction.
The future of civilization may belong to fatalistic peoples with
low regard for human life. Certainly the form of government
and the understanding of its people must affect military outcome
and endurance. Perhaps the Tightness of a cause may be enough
to carry a staggering nation through the one last day that results
in victory. But in a democracy, staying democratic through the
duration of a modern war, every menace directed at the enemy
must be matched by explanation directed at the constituent so
that the latter may continue approval and support.
Whatever number of men per million may be detached from
the work of normal life and sent against the enemy, a larger
number, even better skilled, must be diverted from their occu-
pations of peace in order to provide those who fight with the sup-
plies and weapons they must have. And what is left of the popula-
tion, after these deductions, must, by a balance of production
and conservation, support the nation while keeping alive them-
selves. There are no tables of proportion to which rulers may turn
for guidance at the beginning of a war. Only experience, tempered
from day to day by the nature of the war, can be their guide.
The Selective Service Act, designed in part to prevent the
uneven wastage of productive strength through voluntary enlist-
ment, made it the duty of the Army to select the men. whom it
could best use and to leave at home those who could best work
there. The administration of the draft was intensely localized
in the draft boards and the State boards of appeal. The definitions
upon which these local bodies acted were handed down from the
head of the Army. In these, as reordered in December, and
amended before the second registration, the principle was laid
down that young men should do the fighting.
Men of draft age were soon in the clutch of registration, tied
to the fate of their numbers, to be used as needed. Those who
received deferred classification and were left on the job at home,
s6o WORK OR FIGHT
and those, younger than twenty-one or older than thirty who
were not listed, were in no one's clutch. They could seek work
as they pleased. Often the work sought them at fancy prices.
Those of them who constituted the body of organized labor con-
tinued to support the organizations which they had created in
order to bargain for wages and working conditions. The Govern-
ment was ready to deal with organized labor to a degree to which
business had not accustomed itself. Under the patronage of
Government the unions grew in numbers. Never yet more than a
small fraction of the men who worked, the organized unionists
who claimed to speak for all workers reached a total of 2,371,434
dues-paying members. Their delegates met for their thirty-eighth
annual convention in St. Paul on June 10, 1918. They had grown
a quarter-million since their last meeting in Buffalo; they were to
grow half a million more by the time they met in Atlantic City in
June, 1919. At no time did their total reach that of the men and
women in the military service, enrolled in the War Risk Bureau
of the Treasury.
In general, although there were many individual exceptions
where men went to war undriven by legal obligation, organized
labor was not even asked to fight. The union workers, steady
professionals in their crafts, with family obligations and definite
places in the industrial machine, were commonly above draft
age or in classes whose calling was deferred and never reached.
The men who volunteered or who were drafted, again with many
exceptions, were likely not to have acquired heavy domestic
obligations or to hold key positions in their shops. Sixty per cent
of those who had filed their blanks before the second registration
for the draft declared that they had no dependents. War is a
class business, in which those most likely to be maimed are the
very ones whose influence in determining their service is least.
It results from these conditions that the organization of an army
moves with military precision. Men march because they must.
But the organization of the people who maintain the army is a
matter of continuous negotiation. The men who work the shops
and railroads, so long as their right to refrain from work is con-
FREE TO WORK. OR TO REFRAIN 261
ceded, may do much to determine the conditions of their contri-
bution. What they do not get by bargaining they may reach at
when they vote. They bargained in 1917, inspired by the fear
that war necessity would fall upon them more heavily than upon
other classes, that hours of labor would be lengthened, that low
wages would be forced upon them and made a matter of patriotic
duty. The assurance of the Government, in the arrangements
made through Gompers, that these disasters should not strike
them, carried less than complete conviction. The mere confusion
due to the shifting of labor to serve war needs and to the recruiting
of labor from classes that had been accustomed to different work
provided an abundance of occasions for controversy. Every war
job, every war agency, found that before it could reach the stage
of quantity production it must come to terms with individual
citizens who, being free to work, were free to refrain from working.
The labor adjustment agencies of 1917, put together piecemeal
as emergencies arose, had the common quality of a desire to main-
tain the continuous flow of production without the intermissions
caused by strikes. If they had done no more than preserve a
reasonable peace they would have served. One of them did much
more. It brought into the picture Felix Frankfurter, who, as an
assistant to Baker, was sent in September, 1917, to Bisbee and
elsewhere in the West. The Secretary of Labor, William B. Wilson,
was chairman of the President's Mediation Commission, but
Frankfurter, its secretary, was the motive power. In the report,
which he filed January 9, 1918, the Commission recommended
to the President a 'unified direction of the labor administration
of the United States for the period of the war. 5 The Council of
National Defense came to a similar conclusion at the same time,
advising that Wilson, one of its members and one whose Cabinet
Department was of fact-finding rather than of administrative
character, should reorganize his Department. This was to become
a War Labor Administration, and approximated it before the
year was over. It did not take on distended war functions com-
parable to those of the six great war boards, but it enlarged old
activities and undertook new ones that proved to have more than
a war importance.
262 WORK OR FIGHT
As a part of the reorganization. Secretary Wilson called upon
the American Federation of Labor and the National Industrial
Conference Board to name five representatives each, as spokes-
men for labor and its employers. Each of the groups so named
chose a sixth from civil life. The selection of the labor group was
one of its own kind: Frank P. Walsh, recently chairman of the
Committee on Industrial Relations, who had had a turbulent
career as labor lawyer. The employers' group chose William
Howard Taft. Appointed in February, the National War Labor
Conference Board, so constituted, debated in March and reported
in April. At the heart of its recommendation was provision for
something resembling a supreme court for labor controversy, to
sit in a case only when all other machinery for settlement had
been tried without success, and to give relief only in cases in which
work was continued during the period of litigation.
On April 8 the appointment of the National War Labor Board
to be such a court was made public. The conference members
who had recommended it were named as members. Taft and
Walsh were designated as joint chairmen, and in the procedure
of the Board they presided alternately. Both Gompers and the
National Manufacturers' Association approved the venture. In
more than a year of service the Board listened to more than one
thousand disputes, acting always as a buffer between the Govern-
ment and the capital and labor that were serving the Government.
The National War Labor Board was without legislative authority,
being created without action of Congress, but the powers of the
President were enough to give it teeth. When the Smith and
Wesson plant at Springfield declined to accept a ruling it disliked,
the War Department commandeered its plant. When the work-
men at Bridgeport resisted a ruling they provoked from the
President a sharp letter to the International Union of Machinists
pointing out the fact that deferred classification or industrial ex-
emption under the draft implied an obligation to work without
interruption.
The Taft-Walsh Board was a court; but the great need of the
Government was a procedure which might prevent cases from
THE UNITED STATES AS EMPLOYER 263
arising. In May the Board was supplemented by a War Labor
Policies Board, with Frankfurter as chairman. In this body
policy was discussed, that the Government might be advised.
Each of the chief departments had its representative associated
with Frankfurter' as they worked out uniform standards of labor
conditions and adjustment methods, since the United States itself
had now become the greatest American employer of labor. By
midsummer, as one of the activities of the reorganized Department
of Labor, a United States Employment Service was in operation.
In its regional offices the common labor of the United States was
pooled and through its influence the competition of employers
for labor was moderated. It claimed to have registered 5,300,000
laborers, and to have placed 3,700,000 of them in jobs.
The inability of boards to function sharply had become in-
creasingly visible during the experimental period of the war,
in 1917. They clashed with the unwritten law of administration
that authority must be complete and that lines of command must
not be clogged a law not inconsistent with democratic control
of policy. Above the whole machine the power of the President
was completely established by the surrender of the opposition
and the passage of the Overman Act. The delegation of great
sections of this authority was administratively impossible until
the task had shown its shape, and impossible politically until
public opinion was ready to accept it. The magic of great names,
or names that could be built up until they looked great, helped;
but it did not make supermen out of the holders of the names.
The notion that the day of supermen or dictators had arrived was
bolstered by the concentration of power in the hands of such as
March, Goethals, Baruch, and the chairmen of the various war
boards. They were not supermen. They were dictators in only
the loose sense that responsibility was concentrated upon their
shoulders.
The program of the United States Shipping Board, to be
brought into being by the Emergency Fleet Corporation, was
audacious. On the inspiring idea of a 'bridge of ships' the Fleet
Corporation had launched its schedule. With every existing
264 WORK OR FIGHT
yard fully at work, it became a matter of new facilities before
there could be new bottoms beneath the freights of the A.E.F.
No offer of assistance could be rejected if there were even a gam-
bler's chance that there might be a contribution behind it. Yards
were enlarged, which must be completed before the first new
keels could be laid. New yards were authorized, which had to be
worked up in blueprints before contracts could be let. Steel ships
and wooden ships were authorized wherever builders thought
they could construct them. Concrete ships, too, ultimately took
the water and managed to keep afloat. And the great assembly
plants, upon whose multiple ways ships would be put together
out of parts fabricated in inland factories, were hurried toward
completion while the naval architects sketched the ship patterns
suitable for quantity production. But assembly plants had to be
designed before they could be built. All the difficulties of site,
labor, material, transportation, and capital had to be met for
ships as for training camps. Moreover, the frigid winter, which
froze coal in the open freight cars into solid blocks of ice, froze
as well the river marshes through which piles had to be driven
before any shipway could be built on firm foundation. Between
1914 and 1917 each of the Allies had had enough of confusion and
waste motion in its own war plans, but each of the enemies had
been similarly held back. The whole scheme of American prepara-
tion had to be telescoped into twelve months, as against the
three times twelve months in which the Allies had advanced to
the stage of fitness in which the United States found them upon
joining the war in 1917.
Difficulties were inherent in the program of the Shipping
Board because of the fact that the tonnage of the American
merchant fleet, after a year of war, was only a bookkeeping tonnage
reached by transfer to the Shipping Board of ships which would
in any event have served some master. They were made more
embarrassing by the American facility in exaggeration.
Those who issued grandiloquent press releases about the pro-
gram often managed to believe themselves. Those who read them
read only the totals without realizing what they meant. The
BUILDING SHIPS 265
Allies, with a despairing readiness to believe the worst, found in
the discrepancy between estimate and performance either decep-
tion or incompetence. The Shipping Board had given wide
publicity to its intention to requisition some three million dead-
weight tons of ships already under construction and to build about
fifteen million tons more on its own account. But no new ship
of its own had been delivered to it before the Allied Maritime
Transport Council began in March, 1918, to take account of stock.
By September I, 1918, the Shipping Board claimed 8,693,579
deadweight tons of ships upon its roster. Most of these had been
taken from their other owners by seizure, angaria^ or requisition;
I >344> 2 4 2 tons represented the requisitioned hulls that had been
on the ways when war was declared; only 465,454 tons were in
the form of new ships built for the Fleet Corporation. The war
could not wait for quantity production of ships in United States
yards to become a fact or a factor. Dissatisfaction with the visible
results after great promises needed to be assuaged whether ships
were built or not.
Charles M. Schwab was drafted the day Baker returned to
Washington, April 16, 1918, with a new title of Director-General
and full authority over the ships and shipyards of the Emergency
Fleet. Hurley, chairman of the Shipping Board since July, con-
tinued as chairman, and he had at last found a head who was
likely to make things move, or at least to make them look like
movement. Schwab had had three predecessors since Goethals
dropped the task. He was one of the wonder boys of steel, who
had not ceased to be a boy when he became a magnate. Brought
up among the mills, he began as a lad to drive stakes for the
Carnegie companies. Before he was much more than a boy he
was managing their plants; and when his master sold out to the
great consolidation, Schwab was ripe to be president of the United
States Steel Corporation. Always more interested in making steel
than in managing corporations, Schwab left the Steel Corporation
after a few years to devote himself to Bethlehem Steel. In 1918
he was as busy with contracts for munitions and steel shapes as
it was possible to be, when the White House drafted him for the
266 WORK OR FIGHT
duration of the war. His heavy contribution in 1916 to the
Hughes campaign fund made no impediment in Wilson's mind
or in that of the new Director-General.
Schwab found that his predecessors had started what it now
became his business to hurry along. Unfortunately, the program
had never a chance of fulfillment in a war that was over in nine-
teen months. Before he took the job he had an understanding
with Baruch that his yards should get their steel, and with the
Shipping Board that his hand should be free. The Board had
removed one of his predecessors for overstepping his authority
by ordering the Fleet Corporation out of Washington. Schwab
moved it immediately to Philadelphia where it might have room
to grow. He explained to a House committee that he did not
regard shipbuilding as a matter of engineering: C I regarded as
the essential feature in producing ships the enthusing of the work-
ing people . . . making them realize the importance of what they
were doing in conjunction with the men in the trenches.' If the
President had been able to command a similar personality to give
new tone to the other delinquent program, it would have been
well. Aircraft production was notoriously behind promise, and
was perhaps behind reasonable expectation.
On a single day in March, above a single training field in Texas,
as Mark Sullivan wrote in Colliers, one hundred and thirty-seven
airplanes flew more hours than had been flown by all the military
planes of the United States before April, 1917. An air service
was in the making, but the fleet of planes whose innumerable
wings were to darken the sun had not yet been built. The estimate
of 1917 that twenty-two thousand airplanes with their proper
spares would be required before July I, 1918, was as far from
fulfillment as was the estimate of a bridge of ships. The tour de
force of the designers, in producing plans for the Liberty engine
in a few hours, was an encouragement to morale when announced.
But, in proportion as anyone had assumed that hopes would be
fulfilled, the disappointment was keen when the news broke in
January, 1918, that the planes had not arrived. A misleading
press release in February announcing the shipment of the first
DIFFICULTIES OF THE AIRCRAFT PROGRAM 267
American battle planes to France, five months ahead of schedule,
made disappointment worse. Few were aware of the dispropor-
tion between the American promise and the reality on the Western
Front, where, said Baker, neither side had ever had at once as
many as twenty-five hundred planes. Rumor spread that a private
investigator for the President, Gutzon Borglum, had claimed to
have found dishonesty as well as incompetence in the execution
of the program. In any event, the effort to expend the aircraft
appropriation of 1917 did not produce until April 8, 1918, the
completed model that was to be the 'main reliance of our service-
plane program,' the De Haviland-4, with a Liberty twelve-cylinder
engine. Benedict Crowell has described the welter of confusion
and the pressure salesmanship from European manufacturers
in the midst of which the War Department selected its types for
quantity production.
During the midwinter period of reorganization the air program
as a subject of gossip and suspicion would not down. When
Stettinius went into the War Department it was hinted that
perhaps he was to be placed in charge. Neither the public, nor
congressmen who knew more than the public, could believe that
American ingenuity was insufficient for the execution of the
program. There had been change after change as the program
expanded. When the Council of National Defense had launched
its Aircraft Production Board in May, 1917, the responsibility
for army aircraft had been only one of the many responsibilities
of the Chief Signal Officer, Brigadier-General George O. Squier.
Naval aviation belonged to the Chief of the Bureau of Construc-
tion. The two chiefs were legal sponsors for all contracts, but in
neither Department had the work been specialized. When the
aviation appropriation, $640,000,000, was made in July, the
need for specialization and team-work became more clear. In
October, an Aircraft Board representing both Departments was
created by law and given the duty to advise both Army and
Navy. But early in 1918 the law officers pointed out the strict
limits within which the Board could give even advice. The old
difficulty which had wrecked the sub-committees of the Council
2 68 WORK OR FIGHT
of National Defense helped to wreck aircraft. If the civilian
advisers were not suspect among the manufacturers because of
their connection with rival firms, they were suspect to Congress
as having some interest in the execution of the contracts upon
whose drafting they gave advice.
The uncertainty as to what to do retarded the program more
than did the administrative organization of the Government.
Whatever the type of plane and engine, there remained the
problem of spruce. The wooden propellers and the wooden
struts of the aircraft wings required the finest wood available,
which was found only in small amounts in the logs as cut. Just
as Pershing's men had to go into the forests of France to cut the
piles for the docks at the American ports, the Army had to go
into the Northwest forests to get its spruce. The American lumber
industry was none too happy even before the war. Wood substi-
tutes were beginning to change its balance with its market.
Lumber fortunes, built up among the stands of pine and hard-
wood in the Northern States, had been swung into fir and spruce
on the Pacific, and also into Southern pine. The industry was
bothered by freight rates, by Sherman Act restrictions upon
combination, by Government ventures in conservation, and by
labor. The labor difficulty was harshest in just the region where
stood the spruce needed to be logged for the airplanes. Here the
migrant labor of the lumber camps, much of it American, had
welcomed the organizing efforts of the LW.W. It was mutinous
and unpopular, threatening by its disposition to block the program.
As one of the preliminaries to building planes, the Army sent
an officer, Brice P. Bisque, into the Northwest to see what could
be done. Upon his recommendation a Spruce Production Division
was created in the Aircraft Board, and through his efforts an
anti-I.W.W. labor organization was set up in the Northwest
forests. His L.L.L.L. Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumber-
men reduced labor turnover and brought out the logs. Thir-
teen railroads had to be built before the logs reached the mills.
Even then the lumber had to wait for plans before it could be
fabricated into final shapes. A Spruce Production Corporation
SECURING AIRCRAFT ESSENTIALS 269
(Government-owned) came eventually Into existence to manage
the business and to dispose of the greater fraction of the cut be-
cause only perfect lumber could be used.
The supply of cloth to cover the wings gave out. When England
was unable to produce linen in quantity sufficient for this, the
Bureau of Standards was invoked to draw specifications for a
cotton substitute. This involved chemical search for a suitable
'dope' with which to dress the cloth. Factories had to be con-
verted before they could turn out either 'dope' or cloth. Lubrica-
tion presented its problems, because the engineers believed that
no other lubricant possessed all the advantages of castor oil. There
were stories afloat concerning the vain efforts of an air officer
to get from the wholesale druggists the castor oil, for it was in a
medicinal way that the castor-oil bean had hitherto served society.
It was not to be had in tank-car lots. Before the spring planting
season arrived in 1918, an officer of the Signal Corps was placing
contracts for acreage of castor-oil beans. The San Francisco Call
believed (and the cautious Christian Science Monitor confirmed it)
that as many as one hundred thousand acres were to be planted.
The birds had been nesting in the trees that were to make the
Shipping Board's wooden ships; the seeds that were to raise the
beans that were in turn to make the oil for airplane engines had
not themselves been harvested when the airplane program was
first conceived.
In the intervals between his efforts to placate the politicians
raging In committee. Baker was searching for a man big enough
to direct the aircraft program yet in no way connected by business
interest with automobiles or aircraft. He found him in the Red
Gross organization. John D. Ryan, brought up in the Michigan
copper country, had been picked young by Marcus Daly and
made president of the Anaconda Copper Company in 1909.
He left his business to work with the American Red Cross in 1917,
was believed to be a Republican, and was scrutinized by Baker
during the weeks in which the latter was deciding that Baruch
was best choice for the War Industries Board. Ryan was placed
in charge of the Aircraft Board in April, as another of the super-
270 WORK OR FIGHT
men. General Squier was left in charge of the Signal Corps, but
was separated from his duties respecting aviation which were en-
trusted to a Bureau of Military Aeronautics with Major-General
William L. Kenly in command. As soon as the Overman Act
gave the President the power (in this matter the act was almost
mandatory). President Wilson set up Aircraft Production as an
independent bureau in the War Department. As head of this
Bureau Ryan built on the labors of his predecessors and brought
order, becoming in the summer Director of Air Service and an
Assistant Secretary of War.
In large measure the defects of either head or heart that had
occasioned criticism were on the way to a cure even before they
became matters of gossip and suspicion. Borglum became a
public figure as he maintained both the accuracy of his charges
and his claim that a letter of introduction from the President
had made him an official investigator. His allegations figured
noisily during the last debates over the Overman Act; but five
days before that act was signed the President permitted the
Attorney-General to announce that Charles Evans Hughes had
been retained, with full authority and a free hand, to investigate
the execution of the aircraft program by the Signal Corps. The
name of Hughes carried assurance that the investigation would
be genuine, and the Senate Military Committee at his request
called off a public investigation. When at last the Hughes report
was given to the public in the autumn the power of initial igno-
rance and error to block the aircraft program had been nullified.
Thus in the air and on the sea the American contribution to the
war was one of promise rather than of performance.
Throughout the spring there was continuous discussion of a
third appeal to the people for loans to carry on the war. The
periodic emission of Treasury Certificates reached an accumulated
total at which it was prudent to let the banks shift the load to the
citizens as holders of bonds. How far the effect of criticism might
blunt the popular willingness to carry on the drive for bonds and
to subscribe to them was beyond prophecy.
On the first anniversary of entrance into the war McAdoo
THE THIRD LIBERTY LOAN 271
opened the drive for the Third Liberty Loan, asking for three
billions. Citizens marched the streets in local parades to give it
publicity. Wilson had two days earlier signed the bill authorizing
four and one-fourth per cent bonds, non-convertible, to run for
ten years. The preparations, more intense with each successive
drive, had been long in the making. Howard Chandler Christy
and his co-artists had drawn their posters. Lapel buttons had
been prepared by millions. The Four-Minute Men had been
briefed for their appearances in movie theaters. Arrangements
had been made to take care of private needs for finance, so that
Government need might monopolize the field. The National
Security League had put its private troupes of speakers on the
road. And the President, speaking at Baltimore, had for the
moment abandoned his Vedge' that distinguished between the
German people and their rulers, as he used the words 'force, force
to the uttermost.' When the returns were in, in May, the loan was
oversubscribed. In the four weeks' drive 18,376,815 subscribers
had signed for $4,176,516,850 in Liberty Bonds. And when a
few days later Crowder issued his work or fight ruling on the draft,
it and the United States were in as nearly complete harmony
as possible.
XIII. WAR MADNESS
by the resounding roar of approval of the war
doctrine were some discordant notes. When the war was over, and
peace with victory appeared to be no peace at all, these notes
were caught up with avidity, amplified by hate and hope, and
used to the discredit of the doctrines that had overwhelmed them.
In building up the case for a relentless prosecution of the war until
victory should make it possible to organize a peace, there was
hysteria that went beyond the need. It was unusual for democracy
to find itself acting in agreement without a minority strong enough
to impede it. As a consequence of this unusual agreement and of
the intensity of its expression, democracy became a mob, ruled
by mob psychology and injured by it.
The people of the United States, in their enthusiasm, lost sight
of rights, whether of the individual or of the minority. Determina-
tion to defeat an enemy was stiffened by growing hatred of the
enemy, by apprehension lest there be enemies at home, by con-
tempt for the American who picked his words, maintained his
balance, and by being less indiscriminate than the orator of the
day appeared to be the opponent of the orator. At times volunteer
speakers allowed themselves to denounce as traitorous audiences
that did not applaud enough. Coercion supplemented persuasion
as salesmen pushed the Liberty Bonds. The weeks during which
the work-or-fight basis was established were also weeks in which
American moderation was permanently threatened by the mad-
ness which goes with war.
The week in which the War of 1917 passed into its second year
was a week of landmark events upon the several fronts. No one
person in this week saw even all of the single front on which he
THE PRAGER MURDER 273
fought. No one of the sequences of events was unrolled without
Involvement with all the rest. No individual could measure the
degree to which they interlocked or know their course. No one
yet knows.
In Flanders the German army let loose its second terrific
wave of 1918, desperately determined to end the war before the
American divisions should arrive. At Chaumont and Tours the
A.E.F. plodded with its program, unable in the crisis to throw its
weight. At Beauvais Pershing was shocked to hear the British
opinion that his Administration had let him down. It had not let
him down; but until he realized that his authority was still intact
the shock was as great as though fully warranted. In Washington
the Third Liberty Loan Drive was set for launching, and the War
Finance Corporation began to function; both were to test the
degree to which public spirit was behind the war. In sundry
offices at the Capital, Goethals was preparing to step out in one-
man charge of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic; the Emergency
Fleet was getting ready to receive a new headpiece in the guise of
Schwab, as near-dictator; and Taft was being drawn out of his
prolonged campaign for the League to Enforce Peace to take over
judicial functions in the field of labor. Under the dome of the
Capitol and harried by their constituents, congressmen were
deliberating laws to tighten the hold of the Government over war
dissenters. In California the Hindoo plotters, admitting that
German money had financed them, were being hurried to con-
viction. In Wisconsin, the election of a junior Senator to sit next
Robert M. La Follette was measuring the intensity and the direc-
tion of war emotions. Philadelphia was preparing to receive,
without blare of trumpets, a final convention to liquidate the affairs
of the National German-American Alliance. And in a mining
town in Illinois, one Robert Prager was done to death.
Robert Prager, as his Senator, Sherman of Illinois, explained
on the Monday after he was lynched, had lived in the United
States since 1905, and worked in a zinc smelter at Collinsville.
He was by birth a German, by preference a union worker, and by
conviction a Socialist. He was unpopular among his fellows before
274
WAR MADNESS
he was arrested, and on Thursday, April 4, he was in the local jail
where he and others had been gathered on suspicion of disloyalty.
Congress, while Prager lay in the lock-up, was debating amend-
ments to the Espionage Act, in order that the crime of sedition
might be so defined that juries could indict and courts convict.
In case after case, when arrests on suspicion occurred, it was dis-
covered that nothing that was actionable was capable of proof;
and it was not practicable to bring suspects into court on mere
suspicion. The dismissal of suspects, when the law provided no
ground upon which to hold them, served the ends of justice but
embittered the opinion of the mob. Fall of New Mexico was warn-
ing his colleagues in the Senate to describe crimes in clear lan-
guage unless they wished direct action by the people or interven-
tion by courts martial. Another Senator, Chamberlain, was pre-
paring to support a bill entrusting to Army courts the suppression
of sedition.
A dismissal of suspects had occurred in Collinsville at the end of
March. Prager, unfortunate, was still in jail when a mob of miners
succumbed to enthusiasm and alcohol and took him from his cell.
No violence was needed. An officer at the jail testified at the in-
quest that he refrained from drawing a revolver on the mob
because the telephone rang and he had to answer it. Other
officers averred that they would have shot had the mob tried to
hang its victim within city limits. Outside these, they disclaimed
jurisdiction. The mob gave its victim time to write a pathetic
letter to his parents in Dresden, then killed him.
The proponents of anti-lynching laws treated the Prager murder
as another reason for a Federal statute. The temperance forces
found in it another reason for* the proscription of alcohol. The
Cabinet, when it discussed the press reports of the disgrace on
Friday morning, found in it further evidence of a rising tide of
intolerance and pressed upon Congress for a law that should give
explicit definition to crimes of sedition, enable courts to do their
duty, and at the same time save the innocent from death. Myers
of Montana, always extreme in demanding action against sabo-
tage, syndicalism, and sedition, found reinforcement for his argu-
TREATMENT OF GERMANS 275
men! that Congress should take the laws of his own State as a
model and put down dissent.
It was another matter to put it down without running foul of the
Constitution and doing to free government more damage than any
dissenter could inflict. The mobs, whose excess was feared, were
less concerned with proof than with direct action. The American
population of German or Austro-Hungarian origin, whether
naturalized or not, had fallen victim to the unpopularity of its
countries of origin. Enemy aliens were already under presidential
regulation, but they had little more to bear than any Americans
whose names testified to German parentage. Lutheran clergymen
were delivering their sermons in English to avoid the curse upon
the German tongue. School boards were eliminating the German
language from their curricula, and university trustees, under
compulsion, were investigating the loyalty of such of their pro-
fessors as were of German birth. The foreign-language press was
filing with the local postmaster translations of such of their columns
as might have a bearing upon war issues. The volunteers who fed
into the Department of Justice their comments upon the suspicious
acts of alleged traitors were flooding the dockets with cases that
must be investigated. German societies, however innocent they
may have been in fact, were finding it difficult, if not impossible, to
operate.
Greatest of all the incorporated objects of distrust, the Deutsch-
Amerikanische Nationalbund, folded up its tents. When this society
was formed in Philadelphia in 1901, there were already in existence
in several States local German-American alliances for the preser-
vation of the German traditions of their members. Delegates came
to Philadelphia from twenty-two States to make an alliance na-
tional in scope. The avowed purpose was cultural and reminis-
cent, but around the written program there began to accumulate
at once a suspicion that here was an agency of dangerous propa-
ganda. 'The German Government cannot well prevent rattle-
headed Germans from talking and writing 7 ran an immediate
editorial, but there was some evidence that the German Govern-
ment did in fact encourage it. William II, when the National
276 WAR MADNESS
German- American Alliance was formed, was engaged in courting
not only the Government of the United States but the Germans
overseas. The visit of his brother. Prince Henry, in 1902, was used
to strengthen the bond of sentiment. There was some doubt
whether the Imperial Government regarded the duty of a German
to the Fatherland as quashed by his acceptance of naturalization
in the United States. And it was alleged that the Emperor had
declared that no Government could stay in power in the United
States in opposition to the German vote.
But the United States welcomed the Alliance. Congress had
often provided for the incorporation of tradition. It had accepted
the American Historical Association as a subsidiary of itself. It
had given recognition to the Sons and Daughters of the American
Revolution. It gave incorporation to the National German-
American Alliance in 1907. The political parties, in the era before
the United States became race-conscious, had found it expedient
to set up sub-committees to carry their gospels to their foreign-
language adherents.
The War of 1914 started the Alliance upon a course at variance
with that of general American opinion, while the officers and chap-
ters, fighting defamation of the Fatherland, brought the hyphen
into disrepute. The German-language press, organized openly to
block Wilson in 1916, had asked for the trouble that came to
Germans when peace was replaced by war. The funds the Ger-
mans raised for the relief of suffering were easily believed to have
been diverted to subversive ends in the United States. After 1917,
no argument could convince American opinion that the incor-
porated Germans were not a menace.
Everything German was banned, in spite of the evidence that
Germans were accepting the draft, buying Liberty Bonds, and
serving on war committees wherever Americans of non-German
names would let them. It was esteemed as patriotic to sign
pledges never again to buy goods of German manufacture. Even
the physical markers of the German past became objects of hostil-
ity. The statue of von Steuben, commemorating loyal service
to the Revolution, could not escape disapproval as it stood across
CHARGES OF DISLOYALTY 277
Pennsylvania Avenue, opposite the White House. The statue of
von Steuben's master Frederick the Great, presented to the
United States when William II courted Theodore Roosevelt,
became an embarrassment as a symbol of Prussian militarism.
This statue, hardly welcomed when thrust upon the Capital, had
been erected in an out-of-the-way corner in Washington on the
terrace of the Army War College. When excited patriotism
launched a resolution in the Senate to remove it, the Army did
not wait to be driven. From Washington Barracks, where the
Engineers held sway, a gang of men came quietly with a derrick to
the terrace of the War College, lifted the statue from its base and
stored it in the basement out of sight.
It was inevitable that among the minor actions of the war the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary should investigate the charges
of disloyalty clustering around the German- American Alliance,
that the officers of the organization (when they had not already
resigned) should testify to its innocence and loyalty, and that
the repeal of the charter should become a law. The President
signed the repeal on July 30, but the Alliance had already been
dissolved. On April 1 1 it met in the city of its origin, voted to
disband, emptied its treasury into the coffers of the American
Red Cross, and became a victim of war intolerance.
The lesser victims of the mob had no redress. In more than one
parade that celebrated the launching of the Liberty Loan they
marched under compulsion, some of them forced to wear stulti-
fying placards. The larger victims, with greater power to evade or
to fight back, became subjects of intemperate debate. Greatest of
these, La Follette, had recently suffered the humiliation of a re-
jection by his own State. It was not he who had been a candidate
in the special election of Senator held on April 2, but his personal-
ity had with increasing prominence dominated the political dis-
cussions in and about Wisconsin since the unfortunate September
meeting of the Nonpartisan League in St. Paul, where the Associ-
ated Press had mistakenly made him say c we had no grievance.*
Within a few days of the St. Paul speech the demand was upon
the Senate to expel him. The Minnesota Public Safety Committee
278 WAR MADNESS
formulated the demand. Senator Frank P. Kellogg read the
speech to the Senate with grave disapproval and made the mo-
tion. The Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections was
directed to investigate, and La Follette, on a matter of personal
privilege, made a defense on October 6. More than his status in
the Senate was involved; his control of his State was in danger.
He brought suit at home against his detractors, while his friends
prepared for him a militant mouthpiece in the Madison Capital
TimeSy which made its appearance in December. It developed
that the fight against him in the Senate was the lesser of his wor-
ries, since his colleagues, of whatever party, so valued their own
personal right to be obstinate that they were reluctant to take
extreme measures even against a Senator who blocked their action.
And Republicans, however deeply they disapproved his war views
or his Progressive principles, were not unwilling that someone
should take the unpopular lead in baiting the Administration.
The Senate Committee held meetings, received floods of tele-
graphic advice, heard testimony, took recesses, and managed to
put off a report until, with the war a matter of history, it could
safely recommend a dismissal of the charges. His case took a more
painful slant when in October the junior Senator, Paul Husting,
was accidentally shot while on a hunting trip and Wisconsin faced
a showdown on its emotions in a campaign to elect a successor.
It was not usual for Wisconsin to have a Democratic Senator.
Husting, a progressive Democrat, had won his seat in 1914 only
because of Progressive votes given to him in the absence of a
Republican candidate whom La Follette Progressives would ap-
prove. An American-born son of a Luxemburger father and a
daughter of Solomon Juneau, who had a trading post on the site of
Milwaukee long before there was a town, Paul Husting trained in
politics with Woodrow Wilson. His speeches during the period of
neutrality separated him from the La Follette wing of his sup-
porters, since they made few concessions to the German- American
point of view. His death let loose a struggle of Democrats to
replace him with another Administration man, of La Follette to
elect a Progressive, and of conservative Republicans to prevent the
THE WISCONSIN LOYALTY ELECTION 279
selection of a La Follette adherent. Every candidacy offered for
party consideration at the primary, March 19, 1918, was tested by
its bearing on the issues of the war and on those of local politics.
It was the strategy of the opponents of La Follette to make use of
his unpopularity, and to make the issue one of loyalty in order to
belittle whatever effort the Senator might make in behalf of a
candidate agreeable to him.
While the primary contest was under way the fight on La Fol-
lette reached its height. No public institution was closer to his
heart than was his State University; yet most of its faculty turned
against him in resolutions which just escaped denouncing him as
traitor. The Madison Club expelled him. School boards and
boards of supervisors resolved against him. The State legislature,
in a joint resolution which it sent to Congress, affirmed the loyalty
of the State, and condemned La Follette 'and all others who have
failed to see the righteousness of our Nation's cause. 3
In the primary vote in Wisconsin the loyalty' candidates re-
ceived a clear majority over those cast for either La Follette's
candidate or for Victor Berger, who took the Socialist nomination
without opposition. La Follette failed to secure the nomination of
a supporter. The election brought into three-cornered fight
Berger, whose anti-war stand was open and avowed; Joseph E.
Davies, a useful Wilson Democrat who resigned from the Federal
Trade Commission to be a candidate; and Irvine L. Lenroot, once
a La Follette lieutenant, who had abandoned his leader on the
issue of the war. The President wrote a letter in support of Davies,
who belittled Lenroot as a war supporter. J. Hamilton Lewis was
sent into the State to speak for the Democratic candidate, and the
Vice-President, Marshall, came for a great rally in the University
stock pavilion, where his indiscriminate abuse of the opposition to
Davies cost his candidate votes.
Since no La Follette candidate survived the primary, there was
doubt as to the redistribution of the La Follette vote, but no one
received it all. Lenroot was elected Senator, fully committed to
the war. He and the other loyalty' candidate, Davies, received
together 313,000 of the 423,000 votes cast, which came within a
280 WAR MADNESS
few thousand of the presidential vote cast in 1916. The 110,000
going to Berger (showing marked increase from his primary vote
of 38,000) suggest perhaps the extreme dimensions of the anti-war
spirit in the most German of the States. The Chicago Tribune
thanked God for Marshall who had spilled the beans for the
Democrats. The San Francisco Chronicle rejoiced that 'Wisconsin
has voted herself loyal. 3 La Follette was more than ever a scape-
goat, nursing wounds that rankled, which his followers kept open.
Victor Berger, whose vote on April 2 ran far ahead of the voting
strength of Socialists in Wisconsin, was victim of a different sort.
His Milwaukee Leader was excluded from the second-class mailing
privilege. He was, even before the primary, under indictment by
a Chicago jury for violation of the Espionage Act, but his offense
was substantially that of being a Socialist in war time. There was
hazard in this, for verdicts and sentences reached against a back-
ground of war emotion were taking on an aspect of persecution
rather than punishment. Berger was not convicted until the war
was over. His constituents had meanwhile re-elected him to Con-
gress where he forced the House to decide what to do with Social-
ists and with members under indictment or conviction.
Jeremiah A. O'Leary, who had received uncomfortable pub-
licity in 1916, was caught in the prosecutor's net. His Irishry
had impelled him to join hands with any of the enemies of England
and had made him an ally of the German intrigue before von
Bernstorff was sent home. His Bull continued anti-English until
Burleson ruled it out of the mails in August, 1917. When the
State Department, in the autumn, released documents from its file
of German dispatches his name was mentioned and a true bill was
found against him. When his case was at last called in Judge
Hand's court, on the day Wilson signed the Overman Act, May
20, it was discovered that he had jumped his bail. He became the
objective of a little man-hunt, until he was picked up in the North-
west and brought back to New York to plead not guilty and to be
tried.
In the period of stress in 1918 many of the critics of the war
were not courageous enough to fight the currents of opinion. Not
CRITICS OF WAR AND THE ADMINISTRATION 281
so Debs 5 whose convictions could be neither coaxed nor silenced.
On June 16, 1918, he attended a Socialist convention at Canton,
Ohio, and spoke out against the war in words that could be inter-
preted as obstructing enlistment. War justice moved promptly
against him, for he was too w r ell known ever to be inconspicuous.
He was arrested in a fortnight, tried at Cleveland in the autumn,
and there convicted and sentenced to a ten-year term. When the
Supreme Court, in March, 1919, upheld his conviction he went to
prison. President Harding released him from Atlanta on Christ-
mas Day, 1921; but while in prison he had received in 1920 more
than 900,000 votes for President.
The popular nervousness and the frenzy against spies and so-
called traitors outlasted the period of work or fight. In the week
in which Debs w r ent on trial, Oswald G. Villard's Nation., carrying
a leader under the caption 'Civil Liberty Dead, 3 was held up in
the New York Post Office. The Government was pressing heavily
upon critics and dissenters, and war extremists were, in turn,
training their guns upon members of the Administration as luke-
warm in the prosecution of the war.
There were three chief points in the indictment of the Adminis-
tration as the nagging continued after the field-days before the
Senate Committee in January. The first of these was incompe-
tence; second, was softness with traitors and pro-Germans; third,
was softness with the enemy. In varying degrees these provided
themes for those who desired to criticize without risking the odium
of disloyalty. No other public character attained the prominence
of Theodore Roosevelt as he prodded the Administration by
editorials in the Kansas City Star, or let himself be sent on speaking
tours. Root, Taft, and Hughes had found tasks in connection with
the work of the war Government, but Roosevelt had been unac-
ceptable and remained equally devoted to the war and implacable
in his criticism of the Administration.
None of the minor characters took up with more verve than
George Harvey the role of volunteer gadfly, to teach the President
the responsibilities of his office. Harvey used the editorial section
of the North American Review until his earnestness outran its flexi-
282 WAR MADNESS
bility. In the month of contest for a different kind of war govern-
ment, January, he turned these pages into a personal journal, the
War Weekly, and used his skilled pen without restraint. Had any of
the proposed laws, forbidding words used in 'disrespect 9 been in
force, Harvey would have become a weekly culprit. He professed
that he brought support to the President to win the war. Occa-
sionally he spoke well of Wilson or of others in the Government, but
the tenor of his comments, apart from his hostility to the enemy and
to the league that was to enforce peace, was to undermine their
repute and their authority. He used the word 'mannikins'; with
the result that Lodge urged him to use it oftener and to stress the
idea that Woodrow Wilson feared to have around him any but
little men. He was going at high speed when Baker came back
from the inspection tour in France, derided the Secretary as c cooty 5
Baker, denounced him as 'shockingly and dangerously unfit for
his job, 5 and expected from him 'nothing but piffle, piddling,
pacifist piffle. 5
The fate of Leonard Wood provided material for many of the
critics who believed that the Government was afraid of big men.
The other of the two major-generals who might have been sent to
France, Wood had become a sort of martyr for even those who
had no fault to find with Pershing. Work had been found for
him to do at Camp Funston, where under his command the
Eighty-Ninth Division was prepared for embarkation. He was in-
cluded among the officers sent abroad to see war as it was fought,
but he was no sooner abroad than word dribbled back that he was
too important to be a subordinate. He had been Chief of Staff.
On the rebound from Pershing 5 s stubborn insistence, his European
hosts played Wood as a favorite. He talked too much until
finally Pershing hurried him home. At home he still talked to
committees, to Republicans, and to the young men who found his
magnetism irresistible. His division was moved to Hoboken in
May. Baker had decided to keep him at Camp Funston, but Wood,
moving without specific orders, preceded the Eighty-Ninth to
New York. Detached from his command at the very port of
embarkation, the blow appeared to be more cruel than it was
LEONARD WOOD AND PERSHING 283
intended to be; but neither the Secretary nor the President would
yield to Wood's personal appeal to be allowed to fight. His
rejection could be interpreted as a rejection of ability, and it was so
treated. It could also be interpreted as politics intruding upon
war policy, for talk had begun to deal with him as a Republican
candidate in 1920. The footnote to the episode, revealed only
when the President was dead, w T as written In a personal letter to
the editor of the Springfield Republican, in which Wilson gave praise
to Wood's great ability, but recorded the belief that he was
troublesome and insubordinate. Even if the Administration had
wished to use him, it would have refrained, for it was aware that
Pershing did not want him. It may even have known of Pershing's
intention, should Wood appear, to order him home.
The attack upon Baker was a one-sided battle as he refrained
from answering back. Others in the Administration, when picked
out to be whipped, sometimes indulged themselves in retorts that
made the matter worse. George Creel, at a post of danger since
he stood between the press and its prey, was as often as any in
trouble and at times could not restrain himself.
Baker had inadvertently invited trouble when he suggested that
the American preparation should be interpreted in the light of the
fact that the battle line was three thousand miles away. Wilson
had invited it as early as the Lusitania sinking, in the words, 'too
proud to fight. 5 Creel, with the same ideology in his mind., gave
an opening at the beginning of the Liberty Loan drive. Speaking
to an audience of lecturers, he declared himself c proud to my dying
day that my country was inadequately prepared.' His congres-
sional critics took it up, the press repeated it with zest; and Creel
forgot himself and yielded to indiscretion at the Church of the
Ascension in New York, early in May, before a radical forum
whose members heckled him after an address. If relentless Sena-
tors thought he was soft and socialistic, the left wing thought he
was an oppressor who delighted in the suppression of free speech.
One of his hecklers demanded his opinion about 'the heart of
Congress/ He flashed back with a wise-crack, C I have not been
slumming for years/ The newsmen picked it up. His critics
284 WAR MADNESS
roared In denunciation when the words reached the Congressional
Record and were not appeased by his abject apology. The papers
of the Committee on Public Information found their way eventu-
ally into the National Archives, but Congress had taken its revenge
by bad-tempered scrutiny of Creel's accounts and by refusing funds
to let the affairs of the Committee receive orderly liquidation when
its work was done. The official propaganda under Creel's direction
was never violent enough to please the extremists; the National
Security League at times diverted part of its strength from fighting
the enemy to fighting Creel, the mouthpiece of the Government.
The battle on the domestic front would have been easier to fight
if it had been possible to see under the Constitution a sharp margin
at which the right of the United States to repress sedition came
into contact with the right of the citizen to freedom of speech, of
the press, and of petition. The First Amendment to the Constitu-
tion is explicit and peremptory; yet there was no serious doubt of
the duty of the Government to maintain the United States against
subversive attack. The complete right of the citizen to argue for
his policy and to vote for his candidate was never denied. It was
no more complete than his obligation not to interfere with the
operation of a law, once passed. The dangers to the common pur-
pose arising from overt acts in interference must be avoided with-
out alienating too roughly those who saw in the measure of avoid-
ance an attack upon the American theory more dangerous than
the attack by any enemy. No one could have satisfied the extrem-
ists on either side.
The result was that the two ends were led into grotesque union
to play against the middle. On the left, the minority more im-
portant in their individual quality than in power of influence
kept up a continuous attack under the banner of free speech.
They had addressed the President in a round robin while the
Espionage Act was still in Congress. And the President, just
before his powers were enlarged in the Trading-with-the-Enemy
Act, had written convincingly to Max Eastman on the theory of
free speech in war time. On the right, the advocates of relentless
war fought under the same banner, with such as Theodore Roose-
ATTACKS FROM LEFT AND RIGHT 285
velt and George Harvey urging that Congress refrain from putting
into the hands of the President more power to curb opinion. When
the left took to the rostrum it attacked the Administration as
fighting a war to save dollars at the cost of liberty. From the right
came charges that the Government was brave with small enemies
and cautious with large ones. Torn Watson's little Jefersonian had
been excluded from the mails, as had other journals of small reach
like the Masses and the Milwaukee Leader. Why, the right wing in-
quired, was Hearst let alone? Roosevelt collected anthologies of
utterances, some over the pen of Hearst, some from the editorial
columns of his chain of papers, and declared that from the press of
a little publisher they would have led to jail. On May 2, Hearst
absorbed the Chicago Herald, thus bringing its Associated Press
franchise into the hands of the resulting Herald-Examiner. When it
was discovered that out of the White House Tumulty had promptly
written in congratulation, anticipating from the Herald-Examiner
the c same good Democratic fight, 5 it became impossible to con-
vince right-wing critics that politics was not being played. The
right wing and the left had nothing in common but their deter-
mination to resist the demand of the Administration for a better
definition of existing crimes and an extension of the law.
With the passage of the Trading- with-the-Enemy Act, October
6, 1917, the power of the Government to cope with interfering
dissent was considerable though insufficient. In the Espionage
Act, in June, c willfuP attempts had been struck at, whether their
intent through false statement or argument was to interfere with
the prosecution of the war, to cause insubordination in the ranks,
or to slow down the recruiting of the armed forces. The law gave
no power over those opinions expressed in public which were not
aimed at individuals or things, but whose presumed consequence
might be conviction in the mind of another leading to an overt act.
Conspiracy requires a coming together of minds. Obstruction
requires that the obstructer be shown to have been in some kind of
contact with the thing obstructed; and a denouncing of a law as
bad, or an administrative act as evil, may not be treated as
obstruction if government is to be free. Altgeld of Illinois, pardon-
286 WAR MADNESS
ing the anarchists of 1886, brought reproach upon himself as an
enemy of government; but the conviction, spread by his passionate
argument against a doctrine of 'constructive conspiracy/ was
accepted even by those who were human enough to feel that he
had, somehow, let society down.
The Revised Statutes contained provisions helpful in the prosecu-
tion of such interference with the laws as might be tangible; but
what was resented and feared in 1918 was opinion out of harmony
with mass conviction, and the expression thereof. The Selective
Service Act had put additional weapons in the arsenal of prosecu-
tion, but did not touch opinion and its mere expression.
The new powers of the Postmaster-General, conferred by the
Espionage and Trading-with-the-Enemy Acts, reached out to con-
trol what the courts could not yet touch. Using the admitted right
of the Government to refrain from carrying in the mails what it
regarded as unmailable, these laws permitted Burleson to make
administrative rulings based on his personal opinion. He could
exclude, and exclusion from the mails was a near-equivalent for
silencing. It was no concern of his whether or not the courts fol-
lowed up his rulings by attempts to convict those against whom he
ruled. His victims, if they sought to compel him to display and
prove his reasons for action in the courts, were impeded by the
cost and delay accompanying litigation, and while they sued for
redress, the exclusion orders continued to operate. The alleged
subversive activities against which the Post Office ruled were
precisely those which the law forbade; Burleson had no power to
define new crimes and no right to act on mere suspicion of guilt.
But to his opinion was given the force of law, unchecked by the
safeguards that inhere in courts. Not only the second-class mailing
privilege, which is the very life of newspapers and periodicals, was
under control of his judgment, but the law directed him to refuse
to carry subversive matter of any kind. It gave him large powers
in the examination of private correspondence.
In the opinion of the Department of Justice, these powers,
sweeping and unchecked as they were, were insufficient. Gregory,
the Attorney-General, complained in April, 1918, of 'the lack of
ACTION AGAINST THE I.W.W. 287
laws relating to disloyal utterances,' attributing to this lack the
'danger of disorder 3 and the growth c of disrespect for legally con-
stituted authority. 5
The excesses of the I.W.W., and the general willingness to be-
lieve in the power of mischief possessed by this labor union, con-
tributed much to the further protection of loyalty by law. Frank
Little, one of the inner circle of the I.W.W., was on August i, 1917,
taken from his boarding-house in Butte, Montana, and hung from
a railroad trestle. Little had recently arrived in the Northern
copper country after an active career as agitator ranging from the
San Joaquin Valley in California to Bisbee. He preached labor
war against the Anaconda Company. That company attributed to
labor strife a twenty-three per cent decrease in its output of copper
during 1917. There was the disorder usual when labor conflict
broke out in company towns. Facing this disorder, Montana, like
the other States, was less than usually able to preserve the peace
because its organized militia was outside the State. The complete
drafting of the National Guard for service in the United States
Army occurred on August 5. Mob violence ran unchecked. Some-
one fastened to the garments of Little a legend in code which, being
translated, was the symbol of those vigilantes who had done rough
justice when Montana was a mining camp.
Deep distrust of the purpose of the I.W.W. was not dispelled by
the avowals of the union leaders that they fought capitalism, not
the United States. The files of Solidarity, their journal, were in-
discriminate in attack, so that Burleson issued an exclusion order
without arousing loud protest. The liberals of the left defended
the right of Socialists to exist; but having to draw a line somewhere
they left Solidarity outside. What purported to be actions of the
executive board of the I.W.W. ordered the expulsion of those
members who joined the armed forces of the United States,
On the day preceding the departure of the drafted men to camp
in September, 1917, Charles E. Hughes assured the members of
the American Bar Association at Saratoga that Congress had
ample power under the Constitution to protect the country. c The
power to wage war/ he said, 'is the power to wage it successfully. 5
288 WAR MADNESS
On that same day the Department of Justice was putting the final
touches upon its preparation to strike a blow. At 2 P.M. (C.S.T.)
on September 5 the local offices of the I.W.W. were raided
throughout the West. Officers were arrested, papers were im-
pounded. William D. Hay wood, the president, was picked up in
Chicago, For seven months the evidence was studied as the
Attorney-General prepared against more than one hundred
members, large and small, the case of the United States. The case
came to trial in the court of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis on
April 1,1918. As a result, during the weeks when assertive loyalty
was most intense, each day brought to the press new excerpts from
the testimony upon which the charges of disloyalty were based.
The trial dragged out through four months, but it ended as
abruptly as the raids had been sprung, for the jury came back
quickly to the courtroom with a verdict of guilty as charged. A
fortnight later Landis distributed sentences among the hundred,
according to the degree of their guilt, beginning with twenty years
at Leavenworth for Haywood.
Myers of Montana, inspired by the lynching of Little, offered the
Senate a sedition bill two weeks after the hanging. He proposed
to eliminate the requirement that the words complained of have a
provable connection with an overt act, or a provable intent.
Words that were 'calculated' to 'incite or inflame 3 were for him
enough to constitute a crime, leaving it to the jury to determine
whether such was their tendency. He was well ahead of Congress,
but he renewed his proposal in various forms until at last, in the
tense spring months of 1918, the Congress was ready to revise the
law. Meanwhile his own State, with patriotic emotion and in-
dustrial pressure forcing it on, amended its own criminal statutes.
The Montana legislature met in February to bring its law down
to date. In a brief session it gave definition to 'criminal syndical-
ism' in an act signed by the governor on the twenty-first. On the
next day Governor Samuel V. Stewart, later to be elevated to the
supreme court of Montana, signed a sedition law which opened a
new chapter in American criminal jurisprudence. The Montana
statute protected the form of government in the United States,
SABOTAGE 289
the Constitution, the flag, the soldiers and sailors and their uni-
form against 'disloyal, profane., violent, scurrilous, contemptuous,
slurring, or abusive language ... or any language calculated to
bring [them] . . . into contempt, contumely, or disrepute.' It did
all that law could do to take the place of conscience and good
manners, and it provided a text for debate when Congress, pressed
by the emergency, prepared to amend the law of the United
States.
Driven by the rising spirit of intolerant loyalty, guided by an
Administration anxious both to save the innocent and to convict
the guilty, held back by a coalition whose recruits were drawn
equally from the extreme left and the extreme right, Congress
provided the Department of Justice with two new laws. The first
was passed easily and signed on April 20. It concerned sabotage,
the weapon of the syndicalists. American labor had not taken
kindly to this newest importation from the ideology of European
class warfare. Among the avowed intentions of syndicalism was
the expulsion of the capitalist from his plant. Among the methods
were those of slowing down production and mutilating the product
until the ownership (5f the plant would have no value and the
workers might come into possession of it. This was sabotage, an
industrial weapon which the I.W.W. endorsed as soon as the word
reached its organization, and with which neither State nor
Federal law was phrased to cope. When the war raised the possi-
bility that it might be practiced as a seditious crime, the Attorney-
General without avail recommended a law to Congress in 1917.
A year later he reminded Congress that the Government had no
law under which it could 'prosecute men who attempt to destroy
factories, munitions, and other stores necessary for our armies. 5
So distinguished an historian as Albert Bushnell Hart wrote in the
New York Times to allay the" fear of the nervous that pro-German
workmen in the bakeries were putting ground glass in the bread.
The Sabotage Act fixed pains and penalties for the willful injury
or destruction of war material, or of utilities or tranportation,
whether public or private. It was a useful law, but it caught small
fish. The first reported arrest was that of a worker in a factory
290 WAR MADNESS
making waterproof cloth for gas masks, a German lad of seventeen,
who slashed two bolts of cloth. He confessed, asking to be believed
that his intention was loyal, and avowing that he slashed the cloth
to symbolize the appearance of Germany when the wearers of the
masks had done their job.
If Army opinion had had its way the laws against sedition would
have been entrusted for enforcement to the hands of military
authorities and summary processes would have reached ends not
attainable by jury trials. The section of the General Staff devoted
to Military Intelligence had a large field over which it operated.
Counter-espionage was one of its natural duties. The names of
candidates for commissions in the Army, by tens of thousands,
were passed through Military Intelligence for investigation of the
background and loyalty of the applicants. The correspondents and
agents, necessary for these inquiries, covered the United States
with a close net, so close that it would not have had to be made
much closer if the whole matter of sedition had been in hand.
The files of Military Intelligence never perhaps to be made
public were filled with names and reckless suspicions. One of
the assistants of the Attorney-General went so far as to prepare a
law giving jurisdiction over disloyalty to courts martial, but his
chief disavowed him and the President wrote explicitly against it.
Except on the field of actual combat American tradition ran
contrary to toleration of any courts other than the ordinary civil
courts of justice. More important than tradition, the Fifth Amend-
ment guaranteed: 'No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a Grand Jury/ except within the armed forces. And the Sixth
Amendment added to this guaranty the promise that c in all
criminal prosecutions' there should be 'the right to a speedy and
public trial.' The militant minority which wanted courts martial
for the citizen faced a hostile majority in Congress, backed up by
the prospect of a veto should such an act reach the White House.
The Attorney-General felt that his was the obligation to enforce
the law, if only Congress would enact it. He believed in the
effectiveness of his machinery for investigation and discovery.
SEVERE SEDITION LAW 291
In April, 1918, he was receiving and checking 'upward of 1500
complaints per day' caught In the dragnet operated by the 200,000
or more voluntary coadjutors whom he had begun to attach to the
Department of Justice even before war w r as declared. Most of
the complaints were based on mere suspicion and most of the
suspicion was unfounded sometimes hysterical, sometimes
malicious. Enough probable cases w r ere left on his docket to lead
him to urge Congress to give him more power. A week after the
lynching of Prager he begged for authority to deal with ^disloyal
utterances/ and thereby he reinforced the pressure from the
Government that the Liberty Loan be protected from the luke-
warm and the malevolent.
The Sedition Act, not to be signed until May 16, 1918, was
called up in the Senate on April 4, two days before the Loan
Drive began. Overman, who had it In charge, urged haste, not
only to aid the loan, but because The people of this country are
taking the law in their own hand.' That night, some of them
lynched Prager. The bill was brief, containing matter that
Congress had been unwilling to incorporate in the Espionage Act
a year before. The House had passed it in March without a roll-
call or a dissenting voice. To support It in the Senate, Myers
presented from the legislature of Montana a memorial praying for
a more rigorous punishment of sabotage and sedition with copies
of the Montana laws of February as models. His colleague Walsh
explained the route by which Montana came to Its enactment.
In the District Court, in the case of the United States vs. Hall, the
Federal judge had spoiled a prosecution, in which disloyal and
bitter language was admitted, by charging the jury that the act
committed must have some reasonable connection with ensuing
event. The defendant had scolded against the war, speaking to
rural neighbors sixty miles away from a railway. Such behavior,
however improper in war time, could not be treated as a willful
attempt to interfere with the operation of any law. The judge con-
ceded that such language ought to be criminal, but found nothing
in the Espionage Act to warrant a conviction.
It was impossible to hurry the Senate, and the course of the drive
292 WAR MADNESS
showed that the Liberty Loan needed no protection. Not until
April 10 did the Senate accept an amended bill. Not until April
24 did the bill come back from. the conference committee. It was
May 9 before the House sent it to the White House, and another
week before it received the approval of the President.
The debate was harsh, uncovering in the Senate an opposition
to further increase in the powers of the President, a solicitude for
free speech, and a disapproval of the Postmaster-General as a
censor of opinion. Senator William J. Stone, ten days before he
died, feared that even Joe Cannon might be caught within its
sweeping prohibition of language disrespectful to the Government,
for Cannon had told the world why Volunteer swivel-chair war-
riors wore spurs. 5 It was 'in order that their heels might not slip
off the desks so easily.' Roosevelt joined the fray. The Associated
Press had carried, mistakenly, a story that the President was by
title to be protected against contemptuous language, whereupon
the ex-President hurried into the Kansas City Star a vigorous editorial
protesting against anything that might make that office sacred.
The measure was generally supported by the Northwest Senators
Jones of Washington, Chamberlain of Oregon, King of Utah,
and both Myers and Walsh of Montana among whose constitu-
ents the I.W.W. was a menace. The Senators of Progressive mind
were generally against it: Johnson of California, Borah of Idaho,
Norris of Nebraska. In the Senate 46 yeas overrode 26 nays to
pass the conference report. In the House only Meyer London,
Socialist, stuck to his nay.
The final text of the Sedition Act extended the power of the
United States over speech and opinion, regardless of provable
resulting consequence. It retained the word 'willfully 5 in the in-
terest of the culprit who might be brought to trial. But once his
willful intent to speak or utter was established, it became un-
necessary to prove any intent to injure or impede or any ability to
do either. The list of adjectives describing the proscribed language
was impressive: C disloyal 3 profane, scurrilous, or abusive/ 'Con-
temptuous' was stricken out in conference.
The law forbade the abuse of c the form of government of the
PROVISIONS OF THE SEDITION ACT 293
United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the flag
of the United States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy of the
United States. 5 And since the lexicographers of the Senate could
not agree how sweeping was the meaning of the word 'calculated 9
(which the Montana law used), they substituted a more definite
word 'intended 5 ; forbidding language 'intended to bring 5 the pro-
tected ideas and institutions into 'contempt, scorn, contumely, or
disrepute.' They gave point to their legislative determination by
rejecting a safeguard clause advocated by France of Maryland:
That nothing in this act shall be construed as limiting the
liberty or impairing the right of any individual to publish or
speak what is true, with good motives, and for justifiable ends.
The Department of Justice joined hands with Military Intelligence
in protesting that the specific guaranty of a right to prove the truth
of utterances would so impede prosecutions as to destroy the useful-
ness of the statute.
Sweeping as it was, "the new clause on dangerous utterance
aroused less spirited opposition than the new clause enlarging the
power of the Postmaster-General. This officer was empowered,
'upon evidence satisfactory to him/ to close the mails to persons
using them in violation of any provisions of the act. The phrase
'upon evidence satisfactory to him 5 was old; as old as the lottery
and fraud laws, under which the control of the mails was used to
retard the circulation of material injurious to public welfare. The
Postmaster-General was directed, with no more right of protest
than he might himself permit, upon such evidence to return to the
sender as 'undeliverable under espionage act' all mail directed to
the culprit against whom the evidence might point. He was not
given the right to examine this mail, or to open it without a search
warrant, but by returning it unopened he cut off the individual,
in non-guilty matters as well as in guilty, from postal contacts.
Hiram Johnson, who had supported in vain the France amend-
ment, opposed also this extreme administrative privilege. He was
willing to punish those proved guilty, but he could not reconcile
with freedom of speech and of the press an administrative ban upon
294 WAR MADNESS
free action. The minorities, whether on the left or on the right,
whether Inspired by conviction or prodded by politics, were
voted down until finally the Sedition Act became a law. In the
interest of the war, and driven by an excited opinion out-of-doors
the majority in Congress pushed aside the sound comment of the
California Senator: 'There is a difference between refusing a man
a privilege and holding him responsible if he abuses it.' Modera-
tion and reason had a hard time with democracy at war. Work or
fight, established among the agencies of government, reached out
to control the actions of the mind.
XIV. THE ATLANTIC FERRY
JL HE Allied Maritime Transport Council, conceived in No-
vember, 1917, at the conference of the Allies, was formed in
February, 1918, and met at Lancaster House in London to begin
business on March 1 1. Its task was to balance the bottoms afloat
with the tonnage requirements of the enemies of Germany, to
fix priorities among different kinds of freight, and to uncover and
bring into use 'concealed 3 tonnage. The only important incre-
ments in sight were the Dutch ships whose seizure was in train and
the output of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, on which no
prudent planner dared to build. The British yards were clogged
with ships which had been damaged by submarines and required
emergency repairs.
The maritime burden had fallen heaviest upon England.
England not only possessed the lion's share of ships, but also had
lost more than half the total war losses, whether to the submarine
or to other war risks. In the month of American entry, April,
1917 the 'darkest hour, 5 as C. Ernest Fayle has described it
in Seaborne Trade (1924) the losses through enemy action reached
for the British a ceiling at 545,282 gross tons out of a total of
881,027. Prior to this month the accumulated losses had mounted
to 5s45>3^3 tons 3 of which 3,155,186 had earned the flag of
the British merchant fleet. It had never been safe to tell the truth
about the sinkings. The German submarine had nearly fulfilled
the guaranty of its proponents almost winning the war before
the Allies managed to set up a defense against it. The monthly
losses steadily declined after April, 1917, although still in excess
of monthly replacements. They averaged for Britain alone 265,000
tons a month during the next year, but April, 1918, was the
296 THE ATLANTIC FERRY
last month in which the British losses ran above 200,000 tons.
Thereafter, they continued to decline.
The Council could do little more at its first meeting than gasp
at the magnitude of its assignment and order the paper work
upon which it might try to take action when next it could meet.
When it assembled for a second session, in Paris on April 23, the
tide was turning. The basic decisions on which depended the
dimensions of the A.E.F. had been reached. The submarine
showed signs of being brought within control. There was still
ahead a race between the sadly depleted maritime equipment of
the Allies and their increasing requirements which was made
harder by the certainty that every American soldier who came to
France would occupy the space of two deadweight tons of freight,
and would keep perhaps one ton of well-managed shipping busy
thereafter until the war should end. One of the possibilities was
that the war would be lost through inability to carry sufficient
ocean freights, but the future threats against maritime success
were less those of enemy inteference than those of internal in-
adequacy.
The decision to fetch an army from the United States, impelled
by fear that one of the German drives might end the war and
recorded in the complicated four-cornered negotiations of London,
Paris, Washington, and Chaumont, was clearly reached by the
time of the joint note No. 18 which was signed by the Permanent
Military Representatives on March 28. There was painful lack
of unanimity as to the way in which the American troops were to
be used, but the Allies had come round to Pershing's view that
the war could not be won without them. With the crisis as it was,
no future need of the Allies could be as great as the need for help
at once. There were too few ships for what the Allies were sure
they needed for themselves in order to feed their people or to
outfit their forces. In the decision to risk future maintenance for
the sake of immediate reinforcement, England upset all shipping
schedules in the month between the first and second meetings of
the Allied Maritime Transport Council. The hope that American
ships or the commandeered Dutch ships might aid in provisioning
FOILING THE SUBMARINE 297
the Allies was laid aside, since now all shipping from the United
States must concentrate upon the requirements of the A.E.F. and,
more than this, out of European tonnage troop and cargo tonnage
must be diverted to the Atlantic Ferry. When the decision was
made there was no way of foreseeing that after April, 1918, the
submarine would be tamed.
The submarine brought Germany near to victory and filled
the filing cases of the Allies with gratuitous suggestions of how to
cope with it. There were no tested naval tactics that could be
depended on to foil it, and no ready-made precedents in interna-
tional law to cover and to regiment its use. From the beginning
of the submarine 'blockade 5 in 1915 until the earliest flotilla of
American destroyers reached Queenstown in May, 1917, the war
against the new weapon was one of trial and error mostly error.
Thence, up to the Armistice, more trial and error brought success,
without uncovering any certain panacea. In The Victory at Sea
(1920), Rear- Admiral William S. Sims stressed the secrecy that
went with the experiments. Tactics on land and the new weapons
of the war became common property as soon as used. Those of
the ocean, on it or beneath it, w r ere sometimes so effective that
neither of the combatants knew 7 the full extent of success or loss.
And neither told the public what it knew. Even eternal vigilance
was no guaranty of safety against an enemy who was often invisible
until after he had struck.
Most concrete of the American contributions to the defense
against the submarine, and most impressive as a structure, was
the North Sea Mine Barrage which had been approved before the
November conferences. The Navy Bureau of Ordnance was
secretly at work upon its component parts before Senators began
to ask embarrassing questions in January. To the lay mind the
attempt to 'bottle up' the submarines was continuously attractive,
but the navies knew that whatever could be planted could be
swept away. The barrages fixed by the British at the Dover Straits
were repeatedly cleared by the German destroyers while escorting
submarines to sea. Yet the British kept on replacing the Dover
mine fields and accepted the American lead in building across
298 THE ATLANTIC FERRY
the northern outlet of the North Sea. Here the first mines were
not planted until June, 1918, and the task, so far as it was capable
of being completed, was nearly done by November. What help
the North Sea Barrage might have rendered after 1918 is beyond
determination. Its undertaking is evidence of the thoroughness
of the anti-submarine effort rather than a contribution to victory.
The barrages and the mine fields were of less importance than the
endless cruising of destroyers, the depth charges, and the organiza-
tion of ocean traffic in protected convoys.
At the Admiralty offices in London, where was concentrated
the completest information about the submarines, it was known
from day to day where most of them were at work. Corrected
each morning, the ocean map told the story. The observations
made by ships at sea and wirelessed in provided some of the data
for the map, but since these ships reported in good faith many
times as many submarines as were ever built their information
was of greatest use in checking what was already known. The
best data for plotting the position of the submarines were submitted
by" the submarines themselves. They persisted in conversing
with each other by wireless. They made reports to Germany
almost daily or nightly, when it was safest to rise to the surface
and lift the antennae masts. And whether British naval intelli-
gence could decode their messages or not, the direction finders
made possible a system of triangulation by which the submarine
gave itself away. Knowing the speed, and hence the possible
cruising radius of the submarines, it was possible for the Admiralty
to draw a circle on the map showing the limits within which the
next day's operations must take place. The circles showed as well
the hunting grounds for chasers.
The arming of troop and cargo ships with guns with which
to repel submarine attack was a measure whose effectiveness
remains in doubt. A matter of political and diplomatic controversy
during the period of American neutrality, it became a naval con-
troversy after entry. It gave to Germany ground for contending
that the submarine must attack without warning or else run the
risk of destruction. On many of the merchant ships it was difficult
ARMING MERCHANT SHIPS 299
to find deck space clear of rigging where naval gun crews could
have free room to operate. If guns were placed amidships their
use swung the vessel broadside to the enemy, improving the target.
If fore and aft, their range was somewhat limited, and their
presence anywhere aboard was too often a temptation to fight
the submarine instead of running away. British regulations were
explicit, directing ships to run when attacked and in no case
to come to the rescue of another ship in danger from the submarine.
The American instructions were less explicit; but sound tactics
were the same. After 1917 the use of convoys placed the burden
of defense upon agUe little fighting ships built for the work.
During 19 17, before the convoy system was standardized, four
American sinkings out of five came from torpedoes that could
not have been stopped. Yet no possible system of defense could
be ignored and the Navy armed the ships.
A dozen merchant ships with gun crews and guns for use against
illegal submarine attack went to sea between March 13, when
arming was ordered, and the declaration of war. With six-inch
guns as the chief reliance, some three hundred and sixty-seven
merchant ships were similarly equipped during the war. The
troop transports, which were never seriously attacked, were
more heavily armed than the cargo ships, but all owed their
increasing safety to defenses other than their guns.
The destroyers and chasers were the best means of protection.
England was working to the limit to guard the approaches to
Europe when the first six United States destroyers reported for
duty. By July, 1917, there were thirty-five of them, and the
Navy was planning for a fleet of chasers that could be fast enough
to outrace the submarines, quickly built, and constructed out of
light, stamped plates. Henry Ford took a contract, set up an
assembling plant at Piver Rouge, launched Eagle I'm July, 1918,
and promised a fleet of two hundred by February, 1919, with
unlimited more to follow. But only seven of the Eagle boats had
received their guns when the Armistice was signed; and so this
effort joined the long list of enterprises for whose impact against
the enemy the war was too short. More than four hundred smaller
300 THE ATLANTIC FERRY
ships of other type, chasers of the i lo-foot class, were put to work.
Much of the loss of merchant shipping could be charged to the
necessity of England to concentrate the British destroyers as a
curtain around the Grand Fleet and at the Channel ferries.
Even England was desperately short of the small craft made un-
expectedly necessary by the submarine campaign. Neither the
Grand Fleet nor the Channel transports were got at by the enemy.
It was sound strategy to let the need of the fleet come first and
that of the ferry next, but it left merchant shipping as a bad third.
Until American aid arrived, the approaches to British waters
from the Atlantic were the scene of a vast guessing game with a
few submarines on one hand and too few destroyers on the other.
By the end of 1918 Daniels could report to Congress that Navy
patrolling ships under the commander in Europe were cruising
516,000 miles a month; and the tonnage sunk declined steadily
after April.
Promiscuous cruising by destroyers and chasers brought an
element of chance into the guessing game, but left the advantage
still with the submarines. It was the use of the small craft as
guards for convoys that made shipping safe. The relative safety
of the Grand Fleet and the Channel transports, both always
guarded by destroyers, had pointed to the convoy as the best
defense even before American entry. Sims pressed the point,
but its adoption was blocked by the belief of the British merchant
captains that their ships could not steam in formation suitable for
convoy. It could be insisted that the speed of the slowest vessel
must determine the speed of the convoy, with the result of slowing
down the voyage. Daniels believed that about twenty per cent
of theoretical efficiency was lost in convoy; but against this,
the ships were saved.
Over the disapproval of the merchant captains, England ex-
perimented with a convoy from Gibraltar in May, 1917, which
escorting destroyers brought safely into port. A Hampton Roads
convoy was tried with equal success. The first dozen transports
carrying the A.E.F. sailed as convoy on June 14 and reached
St. Nazaire in safety, and, except for the great fast passenger liners
CONVOYED TRANSPORTS ^ 301
canning troops, which trusted to their own speed until they
reached an escort off British shores-, the United States sent its
men to France on transports and In convoy groups. Eighty-eight
fleets, averaging a dozen transports, sailed from the United States
to the war zone, losing no transport on Its way to Europe. Es-
corted out of American waters and to the edge of the zone by a
cruiser, the convoys were picked up at prearranged spots by the
destroyers and zigzagged their way to Brest or St. Nazalre or
Liverpool.
The work of the camouflage artists, widely advertised as a
device to fool the submarine by lessening visibility and blurring
the edge of the target, gave a circus aspect to every harbor where
shipping congregated. Yet it deceived the submarine less than
did the habit of zigzag cruising. The problem of the submarine
captain, having sighted his victim, was to identify its course.
His torpedo moved slowly through the water, often slowly and
visibly enough to permit maneuvering to escape it. To get the
course, the simplest method was to cruise ahead of the intended
victim until its masts came into line and then to lie hidden a little
to sunward off the course until off its beam. By frequent and
Irregular changes of direction the convoy upset many of the cal-
culations, while its enveloping little fleet of destroyers, racing
around it, made it dangerous for a periscope to break the surface.
By the spring of 1918 the defenses against the submarine pro-
duced results. It helped, when in April the exits from the German
submarine base at Bruges were directly attacked. Zeebrugge was
closed on April 23, Ostend on May g. Quite as significant was the
regularization of the convoys. To avoid some of the loss due to
the uneven speed of ships, the vessels came to be grouped according
to their ratings. A fast convoy (thirteen to fourteen knots) left
New York for Liverpool on Its first regular run on April 9, 1918,
with the convoy committees determined to deliver 140,000 troops
a month and to increase the capacity of the sixty ships assigned
them by cutting down the round trip to an average of forty days.
There were slower convoys, also running on regular schedules,
out of Halifax, New York, and Hampton Roads. Their schedules
302 THE ATLANTIC FERRY
were so timed that their destroyer escorts could deliver a fleet at
Dover or Liverpool and instantly pick up a fleet of empties going
back for more troops and cargoes. Shuttling more rapidly as
troop ships, the Aquitania, Mauretania, and Olympic, assigned by
England to the carriage of the A.E.F., and the Leviathan, which
the Navy had repaired, overtook and passed the convoys. Among
them they carried more than a division on every turn-around.
The Navy took much pride in the speed with which it had
converted into effective carriers the interned German ships
'completely disabled/ as the German Embassy had overhopefully
reported to Berlin before Bernstorff left. The sabotage upon them
had been badly done by wrecking crews who failed to take into
account the skill of Navy artificers at electric welding. Cylinders
that had been burst, boilers burned out, connection lines askew,
set new problems and called for the devising of new techniques.
Yet twenty of the ships were back on runs before November, 1917,
and the renamed Vaterland on December 15 sailed with its first
installment of the nearly 100,000 men it was to take to France.
Because it could get into Liverpool only at high tide, it was shifted
in April to the run to Brest. By bunking its men in relays it once
transported nearly 11,500 on a single trip.
It is difficult to disentangle the share of credit and responsibility
for the ocean services due to the British Admiralty, the Navy
at home, Sims and the Navy overseas, and, in a lesser degree, to
France. Each had its independent organizations. All were linked
in co-operation. The Allied Naval Council, reinforced after the
conference in November, pooled their wisdom. The Allied Mari-
time Transport Council acquired a specialized job and served it
after March. The officers and men at sea worked more as in-
dividuals than Army men could work. But they made a team.
The assembling, classification, identification, and loading of
men and stores was a problem in itself, and sometimes it had to
happen that fodder for Army animals went to Brest with the men,
and rations for men went to St. Nazaire with the mules. But
when ships were waiting for cargoes the cargoes that were waiting
for ships had to go aboard. It was another matter to recruit the
WILLIAM S. SIMS 303
able-bodied highly able-bodied longshoremen to load and
unload without delay. Released from Army duty though they
were, it was not easy to keep them happy. At the British docks
there was petty trouble when the laborers on night shift clamored
for access to their beer at midnight and asked why they should be
inconvenienced by the early-closing law, whereby the c pubs 5 were
locked when they came off duty. They got their beer.
The actual navigation of convoys and escorts called for high
seamanship. Sims pointed with pride to the emergency Navy
training that converted landlocked college boys into capable
watch officers and navigators within a few w T eeks. He was equally
pleased with the work of their professors of physics who took up
the challenge of underwater listening devices. The latter made it
possible for the navigator to make a fair guess at the distance and
direction of an approaching submarine.
With official title as 'Commander of the U.S. Naval Forces
Operating in European Waters, 5 William S. Sims had a position
analogous to that of Pershing 5 yet different in that his degree of
independence was less and his necessity for co-operation more.
Daniels declined to agree that Sims, directly under the Secretary,
was as free from Navy 'channels' as Pershing was from those of
the War Department and the General Staff, Sims went to England
as rear-admiral, was at once given temporary rank as vice-admiral,
and was made temporary admiral only in December, 1918, when
all was over. Upon his return he reverted to his pre-war rank of
rear-admiral. A Republican Administration made him Admiral
of the Navy in 1930, eight years after he had retired. He had a
restive mouth which even before the war had let escape senti-
ments inappropriate to be spoken by an important naval officer;
it continued to be restive after the war, when he engaged in a
too-free discussion of the Irish and entered into controversy with
Daniels over war policy. But his skill and his congeniality with
his British colleagues made him an effective servant of the Ameri-
can determination to defeat the submarine.
Sims could not have fought such a fight for a separate command
as Pershing fought. By naval necessity, the investment of European
304 THE ATLANTIC FERRY
shores was indivisible. He worked under the British or himself
commanded British forces as occasion required. His American
units on all the ocean fronts, but most numerous in British waters,
filled his headquarters with business. He was forced to be an
admiral whose flagship was a block of 'remodeled dwelling houses
in Grosvenor Gardens. 3 Yet he had forty-five naval bases under
his control at the Armistice, all of which he kept in harmony
with the British Admiralty offices in Whitehall.
The British Grand Fleet, held together in the North Sea with
a mission to prevent the German fleet from reaching the high
seas, was at the heart of the naval strategy of the Allies. Stationed
there, waiting, in an inaction that irked its men and irritated lay
critics, it did its work by continuing intact. Its existence was a
guaranty that the smaller craft could do their share. Sims con-
tributed to its strength. A squadron of five American battleships,
under Hugh Rodman, was as much a part of the Grand Fleet as
any of Pershing's divisions while fighting with the British or the
French was part of the army with which it was associated. But
there could be no intention of withdrawing them, since they
would be helpless if alone and their effectiveness lay in their rein-
forcement of the British strength. In addition to this squadron,
three American dreadnaughts were kept on emergency station
off the southwest coast of Ireland, at Berehaven, to be ready in
case a naval disaster in the North Sea permitted the escape of
the German dreadnaughts or the emergence of any powerful
raiding vessel.
The naval mission of the Allies was to prevent the enemy from
provisioning himself, to keep his High Sea Fleet from doing
damage, and to keep the sea lanes open for the supplies of the
Allies and of the American reinforcement. Had this reinforce-
ment continued to be only what was envisaged in April, 1917
a reinforcement in money and supplies both the merchant
tonnage and the power of naval defense of the Allies might still
have been insufficient. The submarine at that time appeared to
have established a control. As this control was progressively
broken by an improving organization of Allied strength and by
PRESSURE ox NEUTRALS 305
American assistance, the Allies postponed defeat without much
improving the guaranty of victory. Replacements could not
repair the damage done or even make good the continuing new
losses. Without the foodstuffs and military supplies that must be
brought across the seas, the Allies could not maintain either their
home populations or their armies In the field. Without an Ameri-
can military reinforcement It seems probable that the Allies must
have lost their war.
Yet this reinforcement of their strength on the line of battle
made every aspect of Allied supply more difficult to manage.
There was no increase In effective merchant tonnage; what the
United States Shipping Board promised was not delivered before
the Armistice. Upon what was left of merchant tonnage, as of
April, 1917, fell the additional burden of moving American troops
and keeping them fed and armed. It was possible by strong-arm
work upon the neutrals to get access to some of their shipping,
but neutrals were squeezed in such a way that, yielding to pres-
sure from one side, they were likely to experience retaliation from
the other. Before American entry England began to coerce the
Continental neutrals by cutting off their supply of bunker coal
at British coaling stations unless they carried freights and served
ports agreeable to England. The danger of destruction by sub-
marines or at the mine fields impelled the neutrals to keep their
ships at home. Their vital need for coal and food forced them to
make some sort of terms with the Allies, although there was always
danger of armed intervention from Germany. Sweden, Denmark,
and the Netherlands, most threatened by this intervention, were
slowest in yielding to Allied pressure. After the organization of
the War Trade Board the United States joined in exerting the
pressure, as whole-heartedly as though the United States as
neutral had not resented it. But the neutral ships, chartered,
coerced, or commandeered, met only a fraction of the Allied
need.
Every American soldier put on the line put as well a permanent
burden on the ocean trade. It took only simple arithmetic to
compute the tonnage, sorely needed for Allied use, that must be
306 THE ATLANTIC FERRY
kept busy on A.E.F. supply when there should be a million
Americans in France, or two millions, or even more. If each
American required fifty pounds of overseas freight per day (and
the requirement was not far from this), the first million would
pre-empt twenty-five thousand deadweight tons per day for
American use alone. The curves of requirement, when the
statisticians superimposed them upon the curves of Allied neces-
sity and the sagging curves of tonnage in hand, pointed to a
moment when ocean supply would collapse, inadequate. If
Germany should not have broken down before the war reached
this moment, the war was lost. So many different factors 'won
the war' that it is invidious to single out any one for emphasis;
yet it is certain that on the Atlantic Ferry was fought as critical a
battle as any fought on land.
It was late in the autumn of 1917 before the War Department
quite realized that it had been committed by Pershing to the
delivery of twenty-four divisions, which with supporting troops
would make a round million, by the end of June, 1918. Three
months later, when the great drive opened March 21, there were
in Europe only five divisions that could by any stretch of the
imagination be regarded as ready for the front. The Allied dis-
trust of an American army that should be a 'separate component'
was so great that the British Government had not ventured to
endanger the endurance of England by diverting tonnage to
the carriage of the A.E.F.
Pershing was clearer in his mind about what he wanted than
was the War Department about what it could accomplish or
what could be shipped. Immediately upon laying down his
scheme for a headquarters organization in France, Pershing had
in July, 1917, demanded his million. To this, the War Department
replied with an estimate of maximum possibility, which comprised
twenty-one divisions (small divisions of 20,000 rather than the
larger divisions of 28,000 which Pershing specified and finally
obtained) and a grand total of 634,975 men by the middle of
June. In addition to the First Division, its schedule of shipment
provided for some 288,000 men to be floated before March i.
THE DIVISIONS AFLOAT OR IN FRANCE*
1917
19
18
Je Jy Au Se Oc Xo De
Ja Fe Ma Ap My
Je
Jv
Au
Se
Oc
22222
22222
2
2
2
2
2
26 26 26 26
26 28 26 26 26
26
26
26
26
26
42 42
42 42 42 42 42
42
42
42
42
42
32 32 32 32
32
32
32
32
32
'Combat divisions,* of which.
333
3
3
3
3
3
twenty-nine saw active service
5 5
5
5
5
5
5
77 77
77
77
77
77
77
82
82
82
82
82
82
35
35
35
35
35
35
28
28
28
28
28
28
4
4
4
4
4
4
27
27
27
27
27
27
6
6
6
6
6
6
33
33
33
33
33
33
30
30
30
30
30
30
80
80
80
80
80
80
78
78
78
78
78
89
89
89
89
89
92
92
92
92
92
90
90
90
90
90
37
37
37
37
37
29
29
29
29
29
79
79
79
79
91
91
91
91
36
36
36
36
7
7
7
81
81
81
88
88
88
Six depot, training, or re- 41
41 41 41 41 41
41
41
41
41
41
placement divisions
83
83
83
83
83
76
76
76
76
85
85
85
39
39
39
40
40
40
Seven late divisions; broken up
87
87
and reassigned
84
84
86
86
34
34
31
38
8
* Table based on War College handbook, Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the
World War, American Expeditionary Forces (1931); Leonard P. Ayres, The War with Germany (1919).
308 THE ATLANTIC FERRY
There was no certainty that tonnage for so many as this could be
assembled by the United States or borrowed from Great Britain.
But the War Department substantially fulfilled this portion of
its estimate when before March i it had shipped 291,000 men.
Despite the reluctance of the War Department to promise more
than it could hope to fulfill, Pershing continued to hope. In
October his 'shipping schedule No. i' contained the order of
shipment of the components for a force of thirty divisions, gross-
ing 1,328,448 men, whom he asked to have in hand before the
next July. He asked for more than he expected to receive, and
each month when his receipts came up only to his expectations
he allowed himself to be a little disappointed in the War Depart-
ment. After he had attended the November conference and had
conversed with the chiefs of staff, Bliss, Robertson, and Foch, he
wired Washington of the 'utmost importance 5 of having at his
disposal by the end of June 'twenty-four divisions, in addition to
the troops for the service of the rear. 5 He was immediately in-
volved in bargaining with the British for ships, and in fighting
off their attempt to get mere man-power in exchange for tons.
And when whispers of the bargains reached the French, they
showed grievance and demanded man-power for themselves.
His army in sight continued to be depressingly small, while his
conviction grew that without a great American army the war
must be lost.
The flow of troops was accelerated in March. No more than
twenty-seven transports had carried troops from the United
States in any month before March, but in that month there were
forty-five, with more than 85,000 troops aboard. The tables of
Vice-Admiral Albert Cleaves, who commanded the convoy
operations and recorded them in A History of the Transport Service
(1921), account for 2,079,880 in the American personnel taken
overseas before the Armistice. Eighty-two per cent of these
were convoyed by the Navy; forty-three per cent were carried
in ships of the United States. The record of March, 1918, seventy
per cent better than that of any preceding month, was broken by
the April total of 120,000 men; and April was left behind by
FIRST ARMY CORPS 309
each of the next six months, with top figures of 31 1,359 in July 5
and a monthly average of 263,000. The Allies, driven to find the
ships by their fear of defeat, did not give up their hope that they
could drive or bargain Pershing from his contention that he would
command the men. But once the ships were found, the army
came.
The Atlantic Ferry had fetched most of the components of the
First Army Corps before the German drive began in March.
Major-General Hunter Liggett, who had organized on the West
Coast the 4ist Division which was arriving in France between
November and February, was given command of the First Army
Corps In January. He proceeded with the organization work
necessary in anticipation of the time when the corps should com-
plete its training and take the field. It was July before this time
arrived and his command became tactical as well as administrative;
meanwhile it remained administrative over such of Its troops as
were not specifically under French command. Six divisions were
In theory allotted to an army corps, and sometimes a corps had
that many; but It took more than divisions to make a corps.
There were also c corps troops/ not a part of any division, but at-
tached to corps headquarters to be used directly under the corps
commander. Most prominent among these were air service,
artillery, engineers, medical, and signal troops, and a little cavalry.
The tables of organization, printed In Order of Battle of the
United States Land Forces in the World War (1931, 1937)5 make it
possible to determine with considerable accuracy where divisions
and smaller units were at work from day to day, but the com-
manders of division or of corps rarely knew of what their com-
mands consisted until they saw the day's table of strength. De-
tachments, transfers, and replacements were such as progressively
broke down the entity of units, and approached an ideal of inter-
changeability of parts for the whole A.E.F.
Basic for the First Army Corps was the 4ist Division, which
never fought as such. Its fighting units were used as needed, but
the headquarters organization was kept near the Loire, a little
east of Tours. Troops poured into it from the docks of St. Nazaire
310 THE ATLANTIC FERRY
and Brest. It did depot duty, maintained a reservoir from
which men and units were dispatched toward the front and kept
its fluid personnel busy with drill and instruction through the
interval between arrival in France and allocation to duty. If
divisions had come as divisions, ready to be sent immediately to
the training areas around Chaumont and Neufchateau, its duties
would have been lessened. But men came in large numbers,
ascribed to non-divisional tasks, or simply as 'casuals. 5 They
must be trained and sorted out before they could go forward.
After fighting began, there were continual calls for replacements.
Grouped around the St. Aignan area, where the 4ist was
stationed, were numerous service establishments, halfway between
the ports and the front. Tours, itself, was made headquarters of
the whole Services of Supply in March, 1918. Northeast was
Blois, where officers were sorted out. If they came as casuals,
here they remained until work was found them. If they proved
inadequate at the front, hither they were sent to wait until some
different task was found, or until, not needed, they were returned
to the United States. A little east was Gievres, rapidly becoming
a huge warehouse center. Southeast was Issoudun, where the
aircraft schools were concentrated.
The combat divisions, sufficient for the initial set-up of the
First Army Corps, were all on hand by March. Beginning with
the ist and sd Divisions, whose units were not assembled as
divisions until after their arrival in France, the First Army Corps
received also the 26th (New England National Guard), the 32$
(Michigan and Wisconsin National Guard), and the 42d (Rainbow)
Divisions. Describing the divisions as Regular Army or Na-
tional Guard, which was somewhat misleading from the first,
became deceptive within a few weeks after the opening of head-
quarters.
The Army scheme, contemplating the use of troops derived in
three ways, included sixteen divisions in which were to be grouped
the partly trained militiamen of the National Guard. It was
sought to bring the National Guard regiments to full strength by
voluntary enlistment before the Selective Service men were sent
GUARDSMEN AND REGULARS 311
to camp. After the National Guard had been distributed among
Its sixteen divisions and these, on August 5, 1917, had been drafted
m masse Into the Army of the United States, It was determined to
form a seventeenth division, known as the 42d 5 to go to France
earlier than any of the rest and to join the Regular Army ist and
ad. This was announced August 14, the 42 d Division being com-
prised of selected units from twenty-six States, all presumably
more advanced in their training than the rest of the Guards-
men,
There were recently enlisted raw recruits, in all of the units,
whether In name from the Guard or the Regulars. There were so
many. Indeed, that certain of the units looked like awkward
squads when they reached France and none of them were Instantly
ready for the front. Even their officers included quotas of second
lieutenants fresh from the Officers' Training Camps. They were
not professional soldiers, whatever they were called.
There was even more dilution of the pre-war trained soldiers
than that Involved in new recruits and training-camp officers.
As the divisions were headed toward Hoboken and the Embarka-
tion Service they were rarely of full strength. Their ranks were
filled to something resembling strength by drafts drawn upon
other divisional camps, not yet ready to sail. It was a heart-
breaking experience for divisional commanders to have their
ranks repeatedly depleted in order to meet such levies and to
have to start anew upon the training of men inducted under the
Selective Service. At least a quarter of the men who sailed in
National Guard divisions came to them through the draft. What-
ever character the divisions started with was weakened by the
scrambling process.
The ist Division^ whose people were both flattered and em-
barrassed by its designation as the 'nursery of the High Com-
mand/ set up its headquarters in the Gondrecourt training area,
within striking distance of both Chaumont and Neufchateau, in
mid-July. This was a month after sailing. The division suffered
endless losses as officers and men were set to other tasks than
that of training, but it managed, alone among the twenty-nine
312 THE ATLANTIC FERRY
combat divisions, substantially to complete its period of training
according to schedule.
It was hoped that divisions might be seasoned by at least three
months of experience in France before they were sent to the front.
The schedule provided for a month of drill as division, after ar-
rival, while officers and men were getting used to France. There
was a second month planned to be spent in training with the
French, for which purpose the division was broken into small
groups. A third month was assigned to training as a reassembled
division. And after this the division was expected to be ready for
introduction to actual war on a quiet front under its own officers.
Participation in combat began for the A.E.F. when on October
21, 1917, the earliest battalions of the ist Division moved into
the line of the French army, on the Sommerviller sector, north-
east of Luneville. Pershing has described them as short of winter
clothing, rolling kitchens, horses, and officers. Out of the line at
the end of November, they resumed divisional training at Gondre-
court, changed commanding officers, and found themselves
operating a sector on the south face of the St. Mihiel salient on
February 5, under the command of Major-General Robert L.
Bullard. Here they were kept until, after Pershing had placed
his force at the disposal of Foch on March 28, they were shifted
to the Montdidier front.
The 2d Division, only less than the ist, was a training school.
Its organization was directed in September, 1917, after the draft
men had begun to report to camp and while its component units
were variously in the United States or in France. Some of the
Marine Corps men (the 5th and 6th regiments of which were to
constitute its 4th infantry brigade) had gone to France with the
first convoy. Its divisional headquarters were assembled in France
in October, and in January its divisional training was well under
way. The German drive in March found the %d Division brigaded
with the French on the west face of the St. Mihiel front. There
was reason in training the divisions on the quiet sectors east of
Verdun, and special reason in permitting them to serve on the
faces of St. Mihiel; for the elimination of this German salient had
IST 5 2D, AXD 26TH DIVISIONS AT THE FRONT 313
already been ticketed as the first independent assignment of the
A.E.F., when there should be an army.
Third in seniority of the divisions of the First Army Corps,
which Pershing could offer to Foch in March, was the 26th, which
Major-General Clarence R. Edwards commanded. Edwards had
had thirty-four years of service in the Army, had been long in
Washington at the head of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, and was
in command of the Northeastern Department (headquarters in
Boston) when assigned to the division. The division was never
together in the United States but was shipped in fragments from
Montreal, New York, Hoboken, and Newport News. Its roster
was unusually free from men acquired by transfer, and it was at
sea before draft men were available at the National Army camps.
It began to arrive in September, was trained in the Neufchateau
area, and on February 5, when the ist Division received its own
sector, the 2 6th moved in with the French along the Chemin des
Dames, northw r ard from Soissons. Its historian for most of the
divisions and many smaller units have historians of considerable,
though uneven, merit admits that its men still had many of
the tricks of war to be learned, 'from calculating fire data to
burying garbage. 3 But he speaks with enthusiasm of the French
troops of liaison under whose experienced eyes every activity was
conducted at the start. The division was historical-minded enough
to save and send back for preservation in Massachusetts the case
from which its artillery fired its first shell on the afternoon of
February 5. On April 3 it replaced the ist Division at St. Mihiel,
when the ist was sent to Montdidier.
Much as all the divisions tended through interchange to become
alike, there was a difference between those derived from the
National Guard and those assembled in the Regular Army.
Some of this was in the matter of junior officers. In the Regular
divisions the lieutenants and many of the captains were Training
Camp men, who did not pretend to know the art of war, and who
took counsel avidly from the Regular officers who commanded
them. The Regular officers whom they saw most had commonly,
up to April, 1917, at least, been in the grades they occupied them-
314 THE ATLANTIC FERRY
selves, because war expansion resulted in the speedy elevation of
the Regulars one, two, or three grades above their peace-time
rank. It is to be borne in mind that throughout the months of
American participation every officer, from Pershing down, was
trying to function in a rank for which peace had not fully pre-
pared him and that only the rigorous activity of the Inspector-
General's force kept inexperience from doing damage.
The junior officers in such a division as the 26th were earnest
amateur soldiers, many of them with years of service in the
National Guard. Their units, some with a military past extending
to the Revolutionary War, had an esprit based upon tradition,
local residence, and sometimes social standing. Among them there
was an undercurrent of resentment at a military policy which
broke down local connection and which appeared to be based on
a belief that National Guardsmen could never be more than
amateurs. The long legislative struggle to fit the organized militia
into a scheme of national defense had left scars on both sides.
The draft of the National Guard, effective August 5, had destroyed
the Guard. Its personnel retained a recollection of long service,
but in the Army of the United States they had no history prior
to induction.
Before the 2 6th was ready for the front its officers had come to
feel that Regular officers were prejudiced against them, and that
the cards were stacked. When, in the midst of the Argonne
fighting, Edwards was relieved of his command and a brigadier-
general froixi the ist Division replaced him, a long post-war con-
troversy was started in which the grievances of the National
Guard had a field day. It was Army policy, when vacancies oc-
curred among the officers, whether from death or transfer, to fill
only a few of them by promotions from below. In a great army,
with uneven incidence of vacancies, it would have produced great
unevenness of rewards had the officer below invariably gone up.
But the 26th felt that too many of the vacancies were filled by
new officers transferred to the division and inferior to the juniors
over whom they took command. Too many of the Guard officers,
for their happiness, were allowed to end the war in the rank in
NATIONAL GUARD GRIEVANCES 315
which they entered It. Too many others, because of proficiency
In some civil craft, were sent away to work behind the lines at
what were essentially civilian duties, even though performed
by men In uniform. They ran the railroads, and the camp utili-
ties, the laundries and the warehouses. Better men than they.,
indeed Regular officers unfortunate enough to be skillful
were taken from jobs at the front to serve the rear or to return
to the United States to train recruits. The Chief of Artillery,
A.E.F., March, was sent home to be Chief of Staff; the Chief of
Staff of the A.E.F., Harbord, w r hom Pershing seems to have
regarded as his best, was sent back to Tours to run the Services of
Supply. But the Guardsmen, prepared to be unhappy with the
Regulars, based their complaints upon the rapid promotions
accruing to Regular officers, particularly from the ist Division.
In the American scheme, the direction of a fighting army must
be In the hands of the professional officers found in the army at
the beginning of the war. This sets up an unavoidable conflict
between the officer caste and the mature and accomplished
civilians who have taken commissions of their own volition.
The belief In deliberate discrimination sharpened the grievance.
The Rainbow Division, fourth to arrive, followed the 2 6th to
France. Its personnel included Charles P. Summerall and Douglas
MacArthur, both destined after the war to become Chief of Staff.
Its first commander, Major-General William A. Mann, although
on the verge of retirement, assembled it at Camp Mills and brought
it overseas. Major-General Charles T. Menoher, who succeeded
him, had risen from colonel to major-general in a few months,
and was to rise farther, for in November he was shifted to com-
mand of the Sixth Army Corps, in the Second Army. The ^d
was brigaded with the French near Luneville, until at the end
of March it relieved a French division in the line, taking over the
Baccarat sector as its own.
It was not allowed to be known while the divisions were training
in the camps In the United States what use would be made of them
overseas. But it was known at Chaumont. Here it was early
decided that the first four divisions to arrive should be groomed
316 THE ATLANTIC FERRY
for combat; that the fifth, which proved to be the 41st, should be
assigned to odd jobs around the depots, and that the sixth should
be kept in the immediate rear of the front to hold replacements
for the First Army Corps. When, in February, 1918, the units of
the 32d Division came in by way of Liverpool and Le Havre, they
came prepared to fight, only to learn that their destiny was dif-
ferent. They were the sixth to arrive.
Some of the regiments of the Michigan and Wisconsin National
Guard were still near the Mexican Border when the forces of these
States were merged in the ssd Division and assembled at Camp
MacArthur, near Waco, Texas. The first commander, Parker,
was soon shifted to Battle Creek, Michigan, to train the Michigan
and Wisconsin draft men in the 85th Division at Camp Custer.
His successor, Major-General William G. Haan, rescued the
32d from its fate as non-combat division only by convincing
Chaumont that it was fit to fight. It had been equipped to sail
only by stripping the less happy 33d (Illinois National Guard, at
Camp Logan, near Houston) of its 'ordnance, and all its over-
seas supplies,' and of its reserves of clothing. It served for a few
weeks as replacement, losing meanwhile a Wisconsin regiment
that was filtered into the ist Division; but after the crisis of March
21 it was redesignated for combat. By the middle of June, Haan
was in tactical command of a sector of his own, facing Mulhouse,
at the extreme right of the front in Alsace. First of the divisions
to get on German soil, its men had an advantage over most, in
that German was for many of them a second tongue. Its divisional
performance was a rebuttal of the German belief that Americans
of German parentage were still a reliance for the Fatherland.
When Pershing went to Foch on March 28 offering his divisions,
the Atlantic Ferry was still working only as though there was no
real intention to bring a fighting army to France. The ist Divi-
sion, alone, had been tested on a sector of its own. The 2d, 26th,
and 42d were still learning how to behave on quiet sectors, under
their French tutors. The 32d had not escaped its destiny as a
replacement division; three of its infantry regiments had been
detached from it before it took station at Prauthoy, in Haute-
LACK OF COMPLETE TRAINING 3 1 7
Marne; and It lost seven thousand men as replacements during
March, Including its fourth infantry regiment, which It lost for-
ever. When Pershlng believed he had four divisions ready to
fight, and a fifth nearly ready, he was more sanguine than were
the French officers who had watched them train. These had ad-
mired the spirit of the men and the energy of the new officers,
while marveling at their Initial Ignorance. The new men coming
were progressively less well trained, for the confusion in American
camps, caused by repeated transfers back and forth and repeated
drafts of divisional men for special services, was breaking up
programs of Instruction as fast as they were planned. No one of
the divisions in France had undertaken an Independent action,
worked out by its own staff and directed by Its own commander.
Service on quiet sectors good service, which the French Intelli-
gence officers praised in their reports was different from Inde-
pendent action. Six days after offering the divisions as they were,
Pershlng went to Beauvais.
He left Beauvais not quite sure that Bliss had not let him down
by agreeing to joint note No. 18, and that President Wilson had
not deserted him by accepting the British interpretation of its
recommendation. To Allies, who could see how slowly the divi-
sions were arriving, it seemed ridiculous to wait for American
man-power until Pershing's craving for divisions, army corps,
and army should be gratified. They had information from every
level of the American effort. Their officers in the American
camps described the confusion prevailing in many of them. Other
officers with A.E.F. troops after arrival reported on their rawness
and the unevenness of their equipment. The liaison officers knew
nearly as much about Pershmg's force as Pershlng knew. There
was more than mere delay involved, for there was no certainty
that the staff work at Chaumont would be good enough for the
safe direction of an army once in action. But whatever rumors
came through to Pershing from Washington, no orders came
directing him either to surrender his men or to give up his idea
of a separate component. Baker left him on April 7 to sail for
home 3 leaving him still in complete command, and stating ex-
318 THE ATLANTIC FERRY
plicitly that neither the British nor the French were to get c an
exaggerated idea 3 that the transport arrangements were to provide
means c by which their losses will be made up in the future. 5
Pershing went to London for a conference with Lord Milner on
April 24.
If the Allies thought the American commander was too stub-
born, Pershing was convinced that they were c at last thoroughly
alive' and that America was their reliance.' Just as the ist
Division moved to its station near Montdidier, he pressed Foch
to name the day when the six divisions might operate as a corps
and found the Generalissimo ready to accept in principle but un-
able to fix a time or place. When., during the next few weeks, it
became possible that the accelerated divisions (nine reached
France in May) might end by reinforcing the British, it became
easier to persuade the French that Pershing ought to have his way.
A separate army would fight on the French front, whereas a
brigaded army would stiffen only the British lines. At the London
conference Pershing concluded with Lord Milner the details re-
specting the shipment of the May divisions and the degree upon
which the British, behind whom they were to train, might rely
upon them as a reinforcement. He was met, in conference, by
the British interpretation of joint note No* 18, but he clung to his
power of command despite the 'heavy "verbal artillery" ' that
was turned upon him.
At Abbeville, where the Supreme War Council held its fifth
meeting on the first of May, it was apparent that the Council,
as a technical co-ordinating agency, was breaking up. Its diplo-
matic aspect, given it by the ministers, was cle.arer than ever before.
The Permanent Military Representatives were falling into the
background, since the personal staff of Foch was doing their work.
The Executive War Board, upon which they had had an institu-
tional existence, was abolished. By common consent the principal
tasks of this session were to weigh the relative disadvantage of a
loss of the Channel ports as against the breaking of the Western
Front by German penetration, to expedite American arrivals,
to reconcile the rivalry of France and England for the use of
ABBEVILLE CONFERENCE 319
American troops while training them, and to work on Pershlng.
Despite pressure from Clemenceau and David Lloyd George that
the May agreement giving preference to infantry and machine
gunners be extended through June, Pershlng declined to commit
himself, Washington he thought, had already yielded too much.
He refused to let the Council dictate his course.
The bitterness of the struggle for his power of command, not
publicly sensed while the war was on, was first clearly displayed
after the close of the Washington conference in 1922, when George
Pattullo published his papers on c The Inside Story of the A.E.F.*
in the Saturday Evening Post. When Pershing retold the tale in the
chapters of My Experiences serialized by the New York Times In the
spring of 1931, he quoted freely from the record of the Abbeville
session and said something about striking the table to emphasize
the point he made. Upon assembling the articles in book form,
he edited the table-thumping out of the text; but its spirit is as
of the record. To Foch's point-blank question whether, holding
to his Independence, he w r as willing to let the line be backed down
to the Loire, he answered, 'Yes, I am willing to take the risk. 5
In one of the most intelligent critiques of the A.E.F., It Might
Ham Been Lost (1929), Thomas C. Lonergan measured the sig-
nificance of Pershing's decision, and the burden there would have
been upon him had the venture failed. That it succeeded in the
way It succeeded was largely due to Pershing's insistence.
They ended at Abbeville in an agreement that through June
the May shipments, at least, should be continued, and that the
matter of shipments in July should be considered later in the
light of conditions as they might then exist. They agreed, as
well, that an American army should be formed as early as pos-
sible under its own commander and under its own flag.'
The events of May shook the Allies again. After holding off
defeat in March, at Amiens, and in April, in Flanders, they faced
Its possibility once more when Germany poured down in May and
broke the line along the Chemin des Dames. When the Supreme
War Council met on June i to take its inventory and make its
plans, the German advance was at Chateau-Thierry on the
32O THE ATLANTIC FERRY
Marne. It was c the very crisis of the war,' wrote Bliss, who had
time to put himself on paper since most of his business as Perma-
nent Military Representative had been drawn from beneath him.
The British and French found themselves in too warm a contro-
versy over the cause of the French collapse along the Ghemin des
Dames to give undivided attention to Pershing. They even agreed
with him that the character of the American troops was not a
proper concern of the Supreme War Council, but was suitable for
consideration 'outside the Council' by the persons most involved.
They listened to his statement of the embarrassment caused to
President Wilson by hearing through the British and French am-
bassadors in Washington 'representations' on matters that were
proper to be settled directly between himself and Foch. Upon
this, Foch urged him to ask of Washington an army of one hundred
divisions, combat troops, to be forwarded at the rate of 300,000
men per month. The June agreement was, in substance, ex-
tended over July, but since it committed only 140,000 troops, and
311,359 were actually floated, it was no longer a serious interfer-
ence with the plans of the A.E.F.
The ministers of the Allies, and Foch himself, were discouraged;
but Pershing left the Council on June 3 not dissatisfied the
Atlantic Ferry had come to life. This was the last important meet-
ing of the Supreme War Council until the very end, when armistice
terms came into sight. The July meeting, which Pershing at-
tended only because of a personal urging by Lloyd George, was
concerned with marginal matters. Troop shipment agreements
were now settled elsewhere. Pershing had in hand work more
important than any the Council could put on its agenda. On the
third of June his divisions were on the line at the very tip of the
German salient, at Chateau-Thierry. And on the twenty-eighth
of May his ist Division had been tested at Cantigny and had
proved itself.
XV. THE TEST OF QUALITY
/ANTIGXY was not featured in the Guide to the American Battle
Fields in Europe (1927). That convenient handbook for the patri-
otic tourist prepared by the American Battle Monuments Com-
mission, to which General Pershing gave many years of service
after withdrawing from more active duties allowed it only one
page out of the many which were devoted to the field activities of
the fighting troops. As the war went, it was a trifling encounter.
Cantigny was just another town. But as a test of quality its capture
was undertaken by the staff of the ist Division, and was watched
by solicitous officers from Chaumont and by the various Allied
officers of liaison. On May 29, w T hen it was of the past and the
division was consolidating the fragment of new line it had estab-
lished, there was no longer any question whether American troops
could fight or whether civilians in uniform could be taught some-
thing of the technique of command. Major-General Hunter
Liggett, in administrative charge of the division, since he com-
manded the First Army Corps, wrote about it in Commanding an
American Army: Recollections of the World War (1925). Cantigny was,
he said, c the first cold foreboding to the German that this was not,
as he had hoped, a rabble of amateurs approaching.'
Within a week the Allied argument against a separate American
army began to shift. Beneath it thus far had been the assumption,,
not always masked, of American incapacity except under Allied
lead. Now entered the note that the fine fresh soldiers were so
great an inspiration to the wearied Allied troops as to make them
invaluable to boost the effort. It suited Pershing to magnify the
usefulness of his force, although he had no delusion as to the
miEtary significance of one village. It suited the Allies as well to
322 THE TEST OF QUALITY
advertise the fact that Americans were on hand and could be used.
It has been rumored that German orders directed immediate
recapture of whatever Americans should gain, lest news of prowess
should penetrate the censorship. A prompt communique let the
United States know in the morning papers of the twenty-ninth that
on the Picardy front, a little west of Montdidier, a village had been
taken, and was held.
The region around Montdidier, at the tip of the Somme salient,
became a quiet front when the German drive slowed down at the
end of March. The ist Division was shifted hither in April to
relieve French troops, and to build up a nucleus in reserve for an
Allied counter-stroke which Foch was never able to advance
beyond the stage of contemplation. Near the end of April, he
slipped the infantry into the line opposite Cantigny, where Bullard
received command of a sector on the twenty-seventh. Facing the
division, the German holders of the village not much more
than a crossroads sat on a low plateau, with an uncomfortably
clear vision of the American line and with their own artillery and
services well masked behind them. In the middle of May the 2d
infantry brigade did a week of service on the line, after which its
28th regiment (the regiments in the Regular Army divisions
retained their old Army numeration) passed to the rear to rehearse
on selected ground, in full scale, the task assigned it. It was back in
line in time for 'H-hour 5 at 5.45 A.M., on the morning of May 28.
With French artillery covering the assault, the occupation of
Cantigny was complete and successful in time for early breakfast.
There were seven different and unsuccessful German attempts,
within the next day or two, to reoccupy the village. The victors
held their position, widened their sector, built up its systematic
defenses, and remained in place until they passed back to the rear
on July 8. Petain cited the regiment. Hanson E. Ely, its colonel,
rose to command his own division, the 5th. Beaumont B. Buck,
the brigade commander, rose to the 3d. Bullard, divisional
commander, received the Second Army. It is possible to mini-
mize the significance of the enterprise, though without destroying
its value as a symbol, by stressing the preoccupation of the German
GERMAN ADVANCE, MAY, 1918 323
forces In the larger venture to which they devoted themselves the
day before Cantigny became a station on the line of the Allies,
Battle was expected somewhere, sometime. In May. The first
German attempt, In the Sornme, the second In Flanders, made
certain a third, because the German determination to break the
Allied line was not doubted. The investigations from the German
side s since 1918, have confirmed this. Where the next thrust would
come, and when, were kept from the knowledge of Foch. Few
maneuvers of the war were more perfectly concealed than those
connected with the German concentration of forces north of a
line that might be drawn from Gompiegne, through Solssons, and
east to Reims. The Intelligence officers of the A.E.F. diagnosed
German intentions and were right enough, but their contribution
was disregarded at French headquarters. The valley of the Alsne,
which runs westwardly through Solssons to Compiegne, was in
French hands. North of that valley, parallel to it, the rough
heights of the Chemin des Barnes were too rough to be taken easily
from the Allies. They commanded too good a view of their own
northern slopes, of the Ailette at their foot and of the German
center across the Ailette at Laon, to be easily surprised. Tired
divisions had been parked there to recuperate, including five of
British troops wearied and torn by the battles of the early spring.
Newspaper strategists in the American press discussed the impend-
ing attack, studied their maps of France to pick the spot, and fore-
cast it for any other place than where it struck.
But on the early morning of May 27 the heights of the Chemin
des Dames and the slopes behind It, down to the Aisne, were
drenched with gas and enveloped in German artillery fire that
cleared the way for infantry. The batteries came from nowhere,
unknown until they spoke. The infantry came from nowhere,
brought up at night and kept deceitfully under cover by day.
The aircraft photographs had not discovered the concentration.
Rushing across the Chemin des Dames, meeting little resistance
because little that could resist was left, the Germans reached the
Aisne itself before noon; and before sundown the advance was
heading for the Vesle, which runs through Reims to enter the
THE MARNE SALIENT
GERMANS AGAIN ON THE MARXE 325
Aisne, above Soissons, from the south. On a front of about forty
miles the Allied line was penetrated some twelve miles on the
first day; penetrated so easily that the Germans fell over them-
selves, missing chances to penetrate more deeply and more
widely. Yet they were ready on the second day, along the Vesle,
midway between Reims and Soissons, to continue the advance.
The second day w r as as dreary for the Allies as the first had been.
On the third, with the German left washing around the fortifica-
tions of Reims these held the German right enveloped and
occupied Soissons, wiiile the center pushed the tip of the salient
past Fere-en-Tardenois, where the French railroads met and
where were great dumps of supplies. On the fourth day of the
drive. May 30, the center crossed the ridge north of the Marne and
could look down upon Chateau-Thierry and Dormans, and the
rail and highway systems which follow the Marne and constitute
the great east road to Metz.
It was again no time for Pershing to stand upon his dignity.
The German gain was greater than the High Command had
anticipated. As the troops at the tip of the salient raced ahead, the
plan of battle was developed in accordance with the gains. Since
Reims resisted, the armies pushed beyond it, risking their left for
the sake of greater penetration. Soissons, yielding, let the salient
widen on the right among the woods and hills between the Aisne
and the Ourcq. Across the line of advance, all the river valleys
sloped to the right in the general direction of Paris. By the fourth
day, the Mame was within reach, and once across the Marne a
swing to the west made Paris a possibility. South of the Marne
lay the battlefield on which the war had, in 1914, changed from
one of maneuver in the field to one of attrition in the trenches.
Between Dormans and Chateau-Thierry was the place to cross.
Southward and westward was the thrust, and ahead of the German
line the roads were clogged with farmers hurrying from trouble and
with French units in various stages of retreat. It was mostly one-
way traffic; Allied divisions were not pressing against it to the
front. Bliss had trucks in readiness to move his files, in case Paris
should have to be abandoned.
326 THE TEST OF QUALITY
The ist Division, busy at Cantigny, was too busy to be of use
elsewhere. The 26th was still in charge of a sector at St. Mihiel.
The 42d was on its Baccarat sector in Lorraine. The 320!, now re-
considered and made a combat division, was on the line in front of
Mulhouse. Only the 2d was ready for heavy duty. It had com-
pleted an assignment on the west side of St. Mihiel and had been
moved, ten days before the drive, to the vicinity of Beauvais.
Here, Major-General Omar Bundy was continuing its training
with the French. It was near enough the ist Division for it to be
suspected that it was part of a concentration that Foch was pre-
paring for use east of Montdidier. When Petain on the fourth day
of the drive asked for troops, the 2d Division was put on trucks,
spending the last day of May en route to Meaux, on the road to
Metz.
There were no other divisions ready for use. The 5th Division,
arriving in installments like the rest, through April and May, had
not yet had the experience of a quiet sector and was training near
Chaumont. Major-General Joseph T. Dickman, with the 3d,
which had arrived a month earlier in France, was also near Chau-
mont, where Pershing had watched his maneuvers within the week.
The commander had been to the British area to see something of
the still fresher arrivals, the 4th, 28th, 35th, yyth, and 82d, when
he wrote in his diary on the last day of the month: c The French
situation is very serious.' But such as he had, he handed his men
to Foch. Even before the sd Division was started east to Meaux,
the 3d, as man-power and without artillery, was started west. It
began to move on the 30th of May. One of its units, the yth
machine-gun battalion on its own motor transport, arrived at the
Marne on the afternoon of the thirty-first, and as the German ad-
vance pushed down the right bank of the river toward Chateau-
Thierry the machine-gunners crossed the bridge, took station on
the north edge of the town, and set to work. While they awaited
the rest of the division, which was temporarily attached to a
French division, they covered the retreat through Chateau-
Thierry, retarded the German advance, held their stations on
June i, and on June 2 retired slowly through the town. They
ADVANCE CHECKED 327
crossed to the south bank just before the bridge was destroyed by
General Jean-Baptiste Marchand, of Fashoda fame, commanding
the loth French Colonial Division. Along the south bank of the
Maine the 3d Division filtered into place. By June 6, Dickman
had a sector to the left of the loth Colonial with his own left
touching the sd Division, which had followed the 3d into action.
The sd Division, in its trucks on May 31 when the units of the
3d went into action, came up to Meaux in the afternoon and was
sent ahead astraddle of the Paris-Metz road. Bundy, by protest,
kept it from fighting piecemeal among the French. His men
marched all night, corning into line on the morning of June i,
without knowing w'here the line was, or whether it had even an
existence. The German divisions in the salient were swinging
westward, and between them and the retreating French there
was no fixed force. As, after the event, eloquence grew more im-
passioned and less careful, Daniels was one of many to rejoice
that the Marines had saved Paris. The regiments of Marines
attached to the sd Division had an advantage in publicity over all
other varieties of troops. When the censors passed the word
'division' in the stories of the correspondents no reader could tell
w r ho was meant thereby since censors 5 rules forbade the nam-
ing of specific units. But when they passed the word 'Marines'
(which no one had thought to forbid) everyone recognized at once
the regiments that had been taken over with the earliest troops.
A Marine legend was built up at the expense of troops just as useful
and many times as numerous. The recruiting officers of the
Marines made much use of the words 'first to fight'; and the
Secretary of the Navy, their commanding officer, played them a
close second. The gallant units on the road to Metz were headed
toward an overstuffed legend as misleading as that of the Rough
Riders in the war with Spain. But neither the Marine Corps, nor
the 2d Division as a whole, seems to have saved Paris.
The saving of Paris may have been accomplished south of the
Marne, where the German armies, once through between Chateau-
Thierry and Dormans might have swung west around Hill 204,
had not the French, with American assistance, checked the ad-
328 THE TEST OF QUALITY
vance. It may have been accomplished north of the Paris-Metz
road, where the French constructed a new line which left the %d
Division in command of the sector to the right by June 4. But it
was more probably done by the decision of the German High
Command. As the salient advanced, it was hampered by its own
success and endangered by its long and exposed flanks. Chateau-
Thierry and a line running nearly north from the Marne at that
point were as far west as it was safe to press, or intended to press,
until the salient should be sufficiently enlarged to allow room for
maneuver for the crowded attacking divisions and for the opera-
tion of the services of the Germans.
Yet the zd Division, weary as it was with all day in the trucks
and all night on the march, managed to establish a line where
there had been no semblance of a line. It held its stations while
refugees poured through it, escaping the invaders; it listened to
the talk of dire calamity on the heels of the refugees; and it
watched a new French front being pushed up alongside it. It
waited for the Germans, but the latter did not strike it in force on
the first, the second, or the third of June. In front of the sector of
the zd the new German line enclosed Hill 204, just west of Cha-
teau-Thierry in the angle between the Marne and the road to
Metz, and Vaux, upon that road, and the villages of Bouresches
and Belleau together with the wooded hill in front of the latter.
To the left of the zd the new line ran north, crossing the Ourcq,
passing well in front of Villers-Cotterets and the forest behind
which it was hidden, and on to a crossing of the Aisne about seven
miles west of Soissons. From the Marne to the Aisne is about
twenty-seven miles, of which the zd held some five. Not until
June 9 did the Germans undertake seriously to widen their salient
on this western side, and from this effort they were beaten back
by the Tenth French Army under General Mangin.
On June 6 the 2d Division began a corrective operation of its
own to bring within its lines Vaux, Bouresches, and the woods in
front of Belleau. Here for the first time an American division
undertook a protracted enterprise. The terrain was difficult, the
resistance stout, and the regiments were so green that they blun-
BELLEAU WOODS 329
dered into each other, lost contact, and got lost in the woods.
Beginning at Bouresches, which was taken without great difficulty
on June 6, the fight dragged out, with troops learning their business
as they fought. Hill 204 to the right of Vaux, and the Belleau
Woods to the left of Bouresches, tested the endurance of the divi-
sion and the skill of its officers. The hill was taken bv Tune 10, in
* tj 3
co-operation with French forces and the left of the 3d Division.
The Belleau Woods were cleared out, clump by clump, and gun-
pit by gun-pit, but were not fully in American possession until
June 25, when the Marine Brigade finished what was Its particular
task. The enterprise had sentimental values which the French
recognized by renaming the woods as Bois de la Brigade de
Marine. The division had suffered some 9500 casualties. Con-
gress In due time incorporated the Belleau Wood Memorial
Association which bought the ground on which they fought. Vaux
was at last taken on July i, and in a few days more the responsibil-
ity for the sector passed to the 2 6th Division. The command of the
2d was changed on July 15, giving to Major-General James G.
Harbord his brief moment in the field. He had been Pershing's
chief of staff from the organization of the A.E.F. until May, had
then commanded the Marine Brigade until July, and was reluc-
tantly to accept non-fighting duty before the month was out,
Bundy went up, to command in turn the Sixth and Seventh Army
Corps.
The position of Foch, Commander in Chief on the Western
Front, became stronger every day. The mythical reserve, which
was to have been contributed by the Allies and managed by the
Executive War Board of the Supreme War Council, had remained
without reality except in the minds of news writers outside of
France. While the heavy pressure was upon the line in March and
April the Generalissimo could do little but watch and hope, and
contemplate the action he might some day take if he should have
the strength. The three months after the line was stabilized around
Montdidier brought him the strength, such as it was. The At-
lantic Ferry, in these months, carried 648,000 American troops.
It is an impressive list of divisions, seventeen in all, that made
330 THE TEST OF QUALITY
appearance in France in these same months. If they had been
divisions trained as in the schedule, and floated as complete units,
they would have been more impressive. But they came as the
convoys could receive them, with the first and last units of many of
them two months apart. They came faster than the War Depart-
ment had provided, until camps in the United States were drained
and divisional strength was made up at the last minute by trans-
ferring men, wherever they could be found. The case of the 33d
Division, arriving mostly in May, is to the point.
Not all the war units were as happy in their historians as was the
division put together at Camp Logan, in Texas, out of the Illinois
National Guard. Frederic L. Huidekoper, adjutant of the Divi-
sion and a lawyer by trade, had written a textbook of controversy,
The Military Unpreparedness of the United States (1915), before he
took a commission. He served with the Illinois troops through the
war and was commissioned by the State to write The History of the
3$d Division A.E.F. (1921). His four volumes have none of the
college-annual spirit that lessens the usefulness of many divisional
histories. They contain weighed text and reprint a large share of
the official orders on which the text is based; and they reveal the
tribulations of Major-General George Bell, Jr., as he sought to
prepare his troops for service.
The 33d was in motion overseas from April 23 until June 15,
1918. Its first units had begun to arrive at Gamp Logan on
September 10, 1917. Here they had found an incomplete camp
and General Bell with his divisional staff waiting to receive them.
Before Bell had more than a fraction of his men in hand, he was
sent abroad on the inspection tour with other divisional com-
manders, and was away from September 19 until December 7.
While he was in France his understudy rearranged the units as
they came in accordance with the divisional structure and size
preferred by Pershing. Some were enlarged, some reduced, some
broken up. All were short of men, and the complement of officers,
of whom nearly one thousand were required, suffered all the time
from the loss of selected groups sent away for special instruction or
ordered away to other military units. Short of personnel as the
THE 330 DIVISION 331
division was, it was overwhelmed by the way in which its shortage
was relieved. Drafted men, 6600 of them, were sent it from the
86th and 88th Divisions; and with these men instruction had to
begin again from scratch. Among these, moreover, were so many
'unable to speak English' and so many physically unfit (2189
were discharged for physical disability) that they could not be
assimilated. The weather went back on them and their canvas
tents were no protection against heavy snow and a temperature of
11, which is low for Texas.
When intimation of early shipment came at the end of Novem-
ber, it was necessary to report to Washington on the unreadiness
of the division, and the shipment was cancelled. But its supplies
were sent, being transferred to the 32d Division. When Bell
returned in December, organization and training began again,
with numbers still inadequate and with many alien enemies
among the drafted men, whose disposition the War Department
was slow to settle. In March, Bell was protesting to the Chief of
Staff, urging that his letter get to General March himself and not
to some assistant (Bell 'having been a Staff officer' and knowing
the procedure), and reminding him that Pershing had 'personally
declared to me that no divisions should be sent overseas unless they
were thoroughly disciplined and equipped. 5 It was no wonder
that members of Congress, who had visited their home camps,
went to the December session in Washington full of grievance and
dismay.
The 33d Division moved at last in April. Its gaps were hur-
riedly filled by robbing the 84th, 86th, and 88th Divisions.
Arriving variously at Brest, Bordeaux, and Liverpool, they settled
with the English near Abbeville, and a few companies fought with
the Australians at Hamel on July 4. Not until mid- August did
the division, still without its artillery, go into action with the
British.
A division on the roster was not always a division for the field
the more rapidly the men were shipped, the less was there to be
expected of their readiness when they arrived. But the acceptable
performance of the earlier divisions at their first test made good
332 THE TEST OF QUALITY
news at home. Cantigny, Chateau-Thierry, and Belleau Wood
heartened the citizen. If the achievements were as dangerously
magnified as the complaints of maladministration had been six
months earlier, it was no more than was to be expected under war
stresses. The half-knowledge with which men wrote and the gaps
in fact due to the military censors at the European ends of the
cables distorted the story for a public mind that was too greatly
disturbed to have drawn correct conclusions from the whole truth.
No one, in office or out, was in a position to know the whole truth.
The 'supermen' installed during the spring were by June appear-
ing to get results; and results were being got, whether because of,
or in spite of, the supermen. Schwab's launching party of July
4, with its nearly one hundred ships, conveyed a promise that the
tonnage need would be met at last. The American camps had
a soldier population of nearly a million and a half, while Baker
timed for the Fourth of July a letter to the President informing him
that on July i '15019,000 men had been embarked for France. 5
His figures were interpreted in the light of the performance of
those who had led the way. Foch had his man-power in sight.
A young Virginia officer, Jennings C. Wise, watched the
operations near the Marne and wrote of them while memory was
fresh. His Turn of the Tide (1920), one of the earliest measured
narratives of American participation, is still of value. His title fits.
The tide of the World War, flooding against the Allies since 1914,
slackened when the Marne salient was stabilized in June. It turned
to ebb in July, as the enemy attempt to enlarge the salient and
to put it to use broke down, and as Foch brought into action what
was now his superior man-power. The testing of the quality of
the new American divisions was continued and extended as the
dynamics of the war reversed direction.
There are few advantages inherent in the military possession of
a salient. Its external lines are of necessity longer than the base
from which it has been thrust, and more costly to defend. They
run where the enemy has held them, rather than from point to
point determined by sound strategy and the convenience of the
attacker. The terrain within the salient^ likely to be cut up by
MARNE SALIENT PROBLEM 333
shell fire, must, at the least, be reorganized to carry the services
behind the new fronts. It may easily happen that by advancing
into the salient the successful troops have walked within range of
defenders' guns.
All of these disadvantages came to Germany with the less than
success of the May attempt to gain territory and to break the
Allied line. Unless one of these objectives could be attained, the
drive to the Marne was a liability rather than an asset. The
German documents have made it clear that this was the last huge
liability which Germany was able to assume. The only specific ad-
vantage gained was the interruption of communication on such
highways as ran eastwardly from Paris toward Reims or Verdun
and on the roads along the south bank of the Marne. This gain
to Germany was less than fatal to the Allies. The German armies
could not advance south of the Marne without broadening the
base north of the Aisne from which they operated; could not with-
draw without confessing defeat; must broaden the base or charge
off a loss.
In the Valley of the Oise, above the junction with the Aisne,
the result of May was to leave French forces in a blunt angle be-
tween the south face of the Somme salient and the west face of the
Marne salient. A German advance here would straighten the
German line, shorten it a little, and perhaps make practicable a
renewal of the thrust at Paris. The advance was attempted on
June 9, in what is sometimes described as the fourth drive of 1918.
It was so promptly stopped by Mangin that the effort makes an
unimportant showing beside those which preceded it. There was
a slight gain on either side of the Oise, but none along the Aisne;
and the German situation was not materially improved.
It was so certain that life was inconvenient for the German
divisions crowded in the Marne pocket and that the thrust must be
renewed that the faces of the salient were kept under closest
scrutiny. Concentrations were found on the east side, toward
Reims, where a companion effort to that in the Oise was in pre-
paration. Pershing, dining with Petain on Saturday, July 13,
recorded the opinion of his host that the advance was near at hand.
PARIS
AREAS OF DIVISIONAL OPERATION, A.E.F.,
JULY iS-NOVEMBER II, IQlS
FOCH'S PLAN OF BATTLE 335
The intelligence officers had assembled evidence of activity on
either side of Reims, where success on either side would bring
about the fall of that city even though it were not itself attacked.
A convenient prisoner, taken on the evening of Bastille Day, July
13, carried the time schedule for the artillery fire and the infantry
advance. It is possible that the German High Command had
counted upon overcelebration of Bastille Day as likely to produce a
Monday morning slackness. But when the advance began on
Monday morning, July 15, the Allied forces were so disposed as to
receive it where and as it came.
The American divisions along the Marne had a share in the
reception of the drive. They had been readjusted since the original
salient took shape. Liggett had taken command of the front west
of Chateau-Thierry on July 4, in tactical control of his First Army
Corps. The 26th Division, having relieved the sd, was in the line,
with the 2d in second position, and Liggett had also a French
division. There were French troops on his right, with elements of
the 28th among them. This 28th (Pennsylvania National Guard)
had arrived in May, trained a few weeks with the British, and been
stationed with the French since July i . The 3d Division, still bri-
gaded with the French, was farther to the right, south of the
Marne, where it had prepared trenches in the open for the Ger-
man artillery to fire upon and positions under cover to be used.
East of Reims the 42d Division was slightly behind the line in a
position to be reached by the Germans on the second day.
For the first time Foch fought a battle on his own terms. His
front lines, lightly held, were made to be abandoned. Behind
them, in prearranged positions, his artillery was fixed to range
over the river crossings and, more important, the next positions
where German divisions, tense to take trenches, would be relaxed
when they found the trenches empty. To the east of Reims, Gou-
raud yielded on July 15, but held the Germans on the second day.
West of Reims, the heavy fighting was at the Marne crossings,
well below Dormans. The country directly between Reims and
the Marne was too rough for advance and compelled the German
armies to detour west around it, before they could push east, up the
336 THE TEST OF QUALITY
valley. They made their gains in the Dormans region, against the
French. Where the 3d Division held the line on the Marne bank,
east of Chateau-Thierry, the line held. Both fact and legend built
up the fame of its 38th infantry regiment, which found itself alone,
fought simultaneously on its front and both flanks, and held its
ground. Jusserand was wont to tell American audiences of one of
the American generals, insubordinate when ordered to withdraw,
basing his disobedience on a point of honor: that he had still
three thousand shells in his possession belonging to the enemy and
that he was bound to return them to the owner. The German drive
made its little gains on July 15, was on the sixteenth stopped on
ground determined for it in advance, was uncertain on the
seventeenth in face of a new kind of reception, and on the eight-
eenth was abandoned because Foch had made it futile.
The Germans were embarrassed in the occupation of a salient
that they dare not deepen without widening and that they could
not widen. Their embarrassment was visible to amateur strate-
gists as well as to those, Pershing among them, who advised that an
attack upon the flank would be appropriate. The east flank,
where Reims sat among the hills which had compelled the Ger-
man armies to make a detour, was strategically impossible. But
the west flank, from which further drives toward Paris might be
anticipated, was inviting. Not far within the German lines the
roads, once carrying French supplies between Soissons and Cha-
teau-Thierry, were now congested with German supplies essential
to the troops at the tip of the salient. They were already within
range of the French guns, while the advance west of Soissons had
brought the German troops nearer to the dumps where Foch had
been concentrating supplies against the abandoned project of a
drive east of Montdidier. Knowing where the blow of the fifteenth
would strike, Foch arranged to let it take its course, confident that
it could lead to nothing. He planned to break it, not only by
tactics at its tip where it was best prepared to win, but on the side,
robbed to serve the tip.
Two days before the blow he caught the ist Division, en route
from its Cantigny sector to a rest region which it badly needed,
TROOP MOVEMENTS ON ALLIED LINE 337
and shunted it back to his line west and south of Soissons where it
slipped in behind the ist Moroccan Division on Monday night.
On Wednesday night it sidled alongside that division, on its left,
upon the line of battle. Major-General Charles P. Sumnierall
became its commander while it was in motion, relieving Bullard
who had been lifted to the command of the Third Army Corps, to
administer American troops in this new adventure. He had been
assigned the promotion a week earlier, while Pershing had in mind
a grouping of divisions and corps near Chateau-Thierry in an
American First Army. He was given the sd Division as well as the
ist, and also the French ist Moroccan; but since the rearrange-
ment was too recent for the staff to be ready, the tactical direction
of the corps remained with the French.
The sd Division, relieved by the s6th in its Chateau-Thierry
sector on July 10, had its rest broken by orders on Sunday, July 14,
to join the Third Corps in the French Tenth Army southwest of
Soissons. Harbord relieved Bundy in its command on Monday,
organizing his staff as he moved into a position of which he was
not fully informed. The forest of Villers-Cotterets, facing the
German lines, had held them back a little, so that it constituted a
small salient for the French. It provided cover in which the con-
centration of troops could be concealed by day and a near-jungle
through which it was almost impossible for troops to find their way
as they moved to station by night. Mangin, of the Tenth Army,
commanded the projected operation. Gouraud, east of Reims,
was reinforced and directed to prevent German gains in his direc-
tion. This he did on Monday and Tuesday of the drive, with con-
siderable assistance from the 42 d Division.
Wise speaks of Foch's determination upon a counter-offensive
as 'superb audacity. 3 It was bold enough, but it was less than this;
sound strategy pointed to it when the time should come and when
there should be troops at hand. Troops were at hand when the
early testing of the American divisions revealed their enthusiasm,
if not their experience. The time had come as soon as it was clear
to Foch that the German drive of July 15 was proceeding upon his
schedule rather than upon its own. He borrowed British divisions
THE TEST OF QUALITY
as well as Bullard's army corps, concentrated fifteen divisions
between the Aisne and the Ourcq, and selected the American
units for the spearhead. When his attack began at 4.45 A.M. on
Thursday, July 18, of the nine divisions to advance only three had
been close to the front the day before. They started fagged by a
night march. They were unheralded and unsuspected.
The whole line pressed on the morning of July 18. On each of
the three sides of the Marne salient it was demonstrated that the
tide had turned. The Germans knew it before Foch sensed it; von
Hertling writing later: 'even the most optimistic among us under-
stood that all was lost. 3 So far as the American component was
concerned, there were three active divisions in addition to the
Third Army Corps. The 4th Division, south of the Ourcq, ad-
vanced with the French. The s6th, a bit farther south, from its
Belleau Wood sector pushed into the heart of the salient. East of
Chateau-Thierry the 3d moved in a parallel direction across the
tip. The s8th Division, also on the line, to the right of the 3d, kept
close to the Marne. With the enemy busy on all of his Marne
fronts, the chief business of the effort was to penetrate the German
flank at Soissons, to endanger the highways around that city, to
advance the Allied guns until they could reach the transportation
lines at Fere-en-Tardenois. Not Petain who urged, or Foch who
approved, or Mangin who executed, foresaw the penetrating power
of the troops at the spearhead, tired though they were; or that what
was now begun was to continue, with ever-broadening front,
until the German armies were stalemate and the Imperial Govern-
ment was broken.
The withdrawal of the German armies from the Marne 'pocket 3
is likely long to provide material for case study of tactics. It was
professional in the highest sense. During the first two days of
Foch's counter-thrust the whole west face of the salient was
pushed back from six to eight miles, endangering the rest of the
salient through interference with the transportation lines. The
artists who translated the Allied advance into maps and cartoons
for readers of war news in the United States pictured the pocket as
a bag, with a drawstring along the Aisne and Vesle, from Soissons
GERMAN WITHDRAWAL 339
to Reims. They had Foch pulling the drawstrings, with von
Boehn's Seventh German Army as the catch. But the catch
escaped, losing to the Allies what stores they could not burn or
move, yet saving the force. As soon as the meaning of the first two
days was appreciated, resistance stiffened around Soissons, for here
was the hinge at the German right on which the front must swing
back. Not until August 2, the sixteenth day of pressure, did the
French lines reach the outskirts of Soissons, and by this date the
town had been evacuated because the German line had swung in
brilliant and orderly retreat from the Marne to the hills south of
the Vesle. On August 4 the 32d Division came to Fismes and on
the next day Bullard took tactical command of the Third Army
Corps along the Vesle. The salient was off the map.
The behavior of the American troops in the Marne pocket was
more significant than the performance of the same number of
men could be in any later phase of combat. The maneuver here
was first fruit of the Supreme Command under Foch, the first con-
sequence of a superiority in man-power given to the Allies as the
result of the shipping decisions of March, the first testing on a con-
siderable scale of the raw divisions for whose command Pershing
was waging so persistent a battle. While the engagement was on,
the Supreme War Council held its meetings on the first of June, and
of July, with Pershing gaining in his power to insist through the
behavior of his men. It no longer required persuasion to get ships
to move more men as fast as they could be brought to Hoboken.
The enemy made discovery that the A.E.F. was real and noted in
the intelligence reports that some of the units behaved 'almost like
shock troops. 5 The discouragement in Allied headquarters turned
to hope until it was almost forgotten that in January the wisest of
the military men had agreed that American troops could not be
relied upon as important in action until at least 1919.
American opinion, quickened by the realities it knew about
for the censors were generous and by the exaggerated forms in
which realities were magnified, caught a glimpse of victory and of
a grateful Europe. The investigations of mistake and incapacity
in war preparation were no longer worth pushing; their reports
340 THE TEST OF QUALITY
fell flat. The political opponents of Woodrow Wilson lost hope,
until even the kindly persuasiveness of Will H. Hays could hardly
divert their attention from the war maps and the casualty lists.
With the war a-winning they could not hope to turn the Demo-
cratic majority out of office. Against war Democrats it seemed al-
most impossible to run a serious competitor without inviting a
charge of disloyalty. Against Democrats of the South, whether
they were for the war or lukewarm, no Republican could hope to
have much chance. And there were Republicans coming up for
re-election in November who could not even be supported, if they
survived the primaries, without suggesting that the party preferred
politics to victory. Wilson, speaking for the Liberty Loan on the
day the Germans crossed the Chemin des Dames, had uttered the
phrase 'politics is adjourned. 5 It was more than possible that the
adjournment was 'without day.' The American mind, geared to
its war acceptance of work or fight and impatient with either in-
difference or dissent, lost its inhibitions as to scale or cost and w r as
prepared to see things through.
While the early divisions were undergoing their test, more troops
were floated in July than in any other month of the war. It was
not, chiefly, as divisions that they went. Indeed, after the end of
June, only six of what were to figure as combat divisions arrived
in France; three in July and three in August. The high figures
were high because of the great number of casuals packed into the
ships and specialized troops badly needed behind the lines or in
the equipment of corps or armies. As the operation in the Marne
pocket came to an end in early August, with the pocket gone, and
with the 4th and 32d Divisions abreast on the Vesle at Fismes,
the American force in France was intricately engaged. In every
process, save that of army fighting, from elementary instruction to
heavy combat, it was spread along the front from Ypres to Mul-
house. The conveyance of the force to Foch, in March, had not
been recalled.
As of August 4, when Bullard took tactical command of the
Third Army Corps, three of the combat divisions were mostly at
sea, fifteen were behind the lines resting or preparing, eleven were
PERSHING'S ARMY A REALITY 341
at the front. It was as well that Pershing had insisted on his large
division, twice as large at least as those of the Allies or of the
enemy, for he had trouble enough in providing twenty-nine with
adequate command and staff. Had he, with smaller divisions,
possessed twice as many, he would have had to outfit them with
officers unready for the burden of responsibility. Only in the early
divisions had officers revealed enough of quality to warrant promo-
tion. Most of the divisional assignments were based on pre-war
records and hunch, not always happy. Half of the pre-war officers
had been left at home for indispensable duty there.
The eleven divisions on the front on August 4 began at the
extreme left with the 30th (Tennessee, North Carolina, South
Carolina, National Guard) and the 27th (New York, National
Guard), brigaded with the English at Ypres. Next, on the north
face of the Somme salient, the 8oth (Virginia, West Virginia,
Pennsylvania, National Army) and the 33d (Illinois, National
Guard), who were training with the British on the line. On the
Vesle, the drive through the center of the Marne salient, begun by
the 2 6th (New England, National Guard) and the 3d (Regular),
continued by the 42d (Rainbow) and the 32d (Michigan, Wis-
consin, National Guard) with the assistance of the 28th (Pennsyl-
vania, National Guard), had been completed by the 4th (Regular)
and the 32d, both now ready for relief.
One division, not figuring in the tables because it was struck
from the list in May, was represented on the line of August 4 by
three regiments fighting with the French. This was the 93d, a
Negro division, built around Negro units from the National Guard,
but never filled to strength. It had been a matter of delicacy and
difficulty to deal with the Negro citizen, whether he was called to
duty by the draft or already enrolled as a Guardsman. An
officers* training camp for Negroes was organized at Camp Dodge,
whence came junior officers to command troops of their own race,
it being the intention of the War Department that all of their
higher officers should be white. By December the Department
had decided to concentrate in Negro units the Negroes as they
came to camp and to group these units in two Negro divisions.
342 THE TEST OF QUALITY
The idea for the 93d was abandoned, its regiments being per-
mitted to remain with the French. The other Negro division, the
gsd, was assembled while on the way to France, sent overseas in
June, and stationed in a Lorraine sector at the end of August.
Most of the Negro troops to reach France were sent in labor units,
without divisional organization, and served behind the lines.
Of the eleven divisions on the line of August 4, five were in
quiet sectors, east of Verdun. Of these, the 8sd (Georgia, Ala-
bama, Tennessee, National Army) stood on the south face of St.
Mihiel. The 37th (Ohio, National Guard) was directly east of
Nancy; the 5th (Regular) had the St. Die sector in Lorraine; the
35th (Missouri, Kansas, National Guard) and the sgth (New
Jersey, Virginia, Maryland, District of Columbia, National
Guard) were in Alsace, in front of Mulhouse.
It was not an Army of the United States that Pershing as yet
commanded in France; it was in truth only a great armed force.
But as fighting in the Marne salient ceased, events were in train
to make Army a fact. In Washington, March had announced an
impending change at the end of July, following on August 7 with
an order whereby the several designations as Regular, National
Guard, and National Army were stricken from the record. The
whole force became the Army of the United States. The scram-
bling process had already made the special designations misleading
in the case of most of the units. The collar insignia were changed,
dropping the qualifying initials C N.G.' and { N.A/ which all but
Regulars had hitherto been forced to wear. There was less than
one chance in twenty that an officer or private, in uniform, had
known its feel before April 6, 1917. All, hereafter, looked alike;
and so far as they were able behaved alike.
And there was recognition in France, that could not be delayed
indefinitely after the ist and 2d Divisions had moved toward
Soissons on July 18. On August 10, at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre,
where Liggett on July 4 took tactical command of the First Army
Corps, Pershing was permitted to assume a new duty. Remaining
Commander in Chief of the A.E.F., and with the consent of Foch,
he became also commander of the First Army.
XVI. THE PROGRAM OF ONE HUNDRED
DIVISIONS
JL o WIN the victory in 1919* ran the first sentence of a cable
to the War Department, sent on June 23 from Chaumont. Here
Pershing had been in conference with Clemenceau and Foch,
and with Andre Tardieu whose knowledge of Washington affairs
was perhaps more intimate than that of the Commander in Chief.
It is not always remembered that after fighting has begun there is
little the commander can do about any particular battle. It has
passed out of his hands and into those of the field commanders
on the line. The Commander in Chief may watch and worry, or
interfere (if interference be his habit), but his chief business is
to be ready to deal with its result. While the troops fight, he must
prepare for the next battle, and the next.
The insistence of Pershing for the separate army was partly
based upon knowledge that as the war should be protracted it
would become increasingly a burden upon his component among
the Allies. The insistence of the Allies for American troops was
as reasonably based upon their recognition of the need for man-
power. They knew their limits. They had fear, too, that the
collapse of Russia would make possible the transfer to the line in
France of German divisions from the Eastern Front, whose pres-
ence might make the German rifles more numerous than their
own. This was a reason for the Vladivostok adventure, and that
at Archangel, to which the United States contributed unwilling
aid. Both fruitless efforts were based on a hope to lessen the conse-
quences of Russian defection. When the British and French
ministers came together in the Supreme War Council to make
their plans in what the American officers sometimes described
344 THE PROGRAM OF ONE HUNDRED DIVISIONS
as the 'town meeting 5 they spent time in bickering upon their
relative performance in calling to the colors all the men they had.
Each felt certain that the other was somehow holding back. Yet
they agreed, and rightly, that neither possessed any considerable
source of recruits except as growing boys reached military age.
The personal literature of the war is full of bitter pictures of
schoolboys forced too early into uniform. That of the European
belligerents. Allies or enemy, is equally full, with equal bitterness,
of tales of older men kept long in the line after they had lost their
resilience. The only untapped reservoir of man-power was in the
United States.
Neither British nor French, nor Pershing, now expected to win
the war before 1920. Within two years without setback, they
foresaw an advance across the Rhine that should bring the enemy
to terms. The American factories were preparing heavy muni-
tions for this advance, which would first have to crush the German
forts. For 1919 the commanders craved a preponderance in the
field with which they might drive the Germans back from France
and Belgium. To this end, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and
Orlando, at the Versailles meeting of June i, had addressed them-
selves to President Wilson, urging 'the raising of fresh American
levies' and their shipment at 'not less than 300,000 a month' until
there should be in France c a total American force of 100 divisions
at as early a date as this can possibly be done.' At the Chaumont
conference of June 23 the demand was reduced to schedule.
Pershing and Tardieu doubted that the demand could be met.
But Pershing was ready to join in asking it, to set a goal. His goal,
attested by his signature and that of Foch, called on the United
States for troops at the rate of six divisions a month, which, with
troops for army, corps, and rear, would mean 250,000; and for
replacements which, accepting the French experience, would
call each year for twenty per cent of the total strength. Eighty
divisions were demanded for April, 1919; one hundred by the end
of June.
Before the turn of the tide was visible in 1918, the battle of
1919 was in preparation. Its first skirmishes were in France, where
SERVICES OF SUPPLIES 345
the estimates were made and where Pershing had in hand a com-
prehensive reorganization of his services of the rear. He had
reached a point at which upon this would depend the effectiveness
of everything in the zone of advance. The second of the skirmishes
was in Washington, where the new demands confused every
schedule in preparation in the War Department and frightened
by their scale. The third was again in Europe, whither hurried
in the early summer the representatives of every branch of the
procurement services to work out with the Allies an international
co-ordination of effort. The American war machine was working
on both sides of the Atlantic. Each crew believed its own to be
the better effort and thought critically of the deficiencies of the
other, but both could join in a certainty that victory would strain
the powers of each.
Just as the American mind had accepted from the start the
principle of a supreme commander for the armies in the field,
it now accepted the comparable principle of a complete team-work
in the supply of the armies. The United States differed from the
Allies in that it had a single goal: victory. Freed from desire to
save something, or to attain some end directly useful to itself, it
was freer than the Associated Powers to press for solidarity.
Before the line of August 4 could even be guessed at, the basis of
a solidarity had been laid down.
It was in March that the Lines of Communication behind the
A.E.F. were redesignated as Services of Supply and shifted to
Tours, where Kernan set up headquarters. Here was done the
planning, and hence came the directions, described in sympathetic
detail in Johnson Hagood, The Services of Supply: A Memoir of the
Great War (1927). Hagood was on the board to recommend the
organization and became a fluent (and insuppressible) advocate
of the principle emphasized with new solemnity in the World War.
With the whole nation in arms, devoted to the maintenance on
the front of the whole fighting power, and with the civilian popula-
tion in the rear devoted to war effort, the connecting links between
front and rear, procurement and supply, had become more im-
portant than military direction in combat. The Services of
346 THE PROGRAM OF ONE HUNDRED DIVISIONS
Supply would have preferred an organization scheme in which
they might have depended immediately upon the Commander in
Chief instead of being physically apart and restricted in com-
munication to channels running through G-4, the assistant chief
of staff in charge of co-ordination. They always felt hampered
because of this, even after Harbord, personal intimate of Pershing,
became their chief. But segregation, with consolidation at Tours
where the supply agencies were within reach, was a master step,
and Harbord knew ways to cut red tape and get through to the
commander in matters of emergency. The S.O.S. was a little
hampered, too, by another control, which cut across military
channels and was saved from doing damage only because of the
remarkable skill of its chief, Charles G. Dawes.
Not many generals went to war with a terrier and a piano, or
did distinguished service from a residence in the Ritz Hotel in
Paris. Dawes was the exception. A prominent banker and old
enough to have shown his skill in organization by preparing the
capture of Illinois for the nomination of William McKinley,
Dawes took a commission in an engineer regiment, coming to
France as major. He and Pershing were youths together when
Dawes was struggling for a law practice in Lincoln while Pershing
was studying law and commanding the cadet corps at the Uni-
versity of Nebraska. An incorrigible civilian (he tells of Harbord,
by the direct order of the Commander in Chief, buttoning him
up to military propriety in public), Dawes never permitted his
modest rank to handicap him in dealing with the great. Pershing
took him from his regiment in the summer of 1917, made him
General Purchasing Agent for the A.E.F. and chairman of a
General Purchasing Board. In due time the Commander pinned
his eagles on him, and the War Department permitted his promo-
tion to the rank of brigadier-general. But Dawes remained the
business man in uniform and retained a diaristic habit that pro-
duced an enlightening document in his Journal of the Great War
^
The jurisdiction of the General Purchasing Board spread over
all of the buying agencies of the Army in France as well as over
GENERAL PURCHASING BOARD 347
those of the Red Cross and the Y.M.C.A. The same reasons which
induced in the United States the creation of the War Industries
Board and the consolidation of buying in the Purchasing Com-
mission for the Allies made it reasonable to consolidate the buying
abroad. The principal supply branches of the Army (Quarter-
master, Engineer Corps, Ordnance, Signal Corps, Air Service,
Chemical Warfare, Medical Corps, and Navy) did their procure-
ment under the critical eye of Dawes. They contributed represen-
tatives to his General Purchasing Board, whither the representa-
tives came not to discuss but to be told. They debated only such
trifles as the allocation of office space. Dawes made the policies
ever with the idea: c to save shipping space from America/ He
reported at the end of 1918 that, as against 7,675,410 ship-tons of
trans-Atlantic freight unloaded in France, there had been bought
in Europe, under his eye, 10,192,921 ship-tons.
The unification of buying, which the War Department had
not before the war worked out in the United States, added another
layer to the controls upon the S.O.S. Kernan had a complete
organization at Tours, with a staff to direct the service depart-
ments behind the line. He was under the oversight of the General
Staff at Chaumont and for a long time the S.O.S. was not per-
mitted to deal directly with Washington, whence came its men and
much of its material. Its buying in Europe was under a third
control: that of Dawes, who as General Purchasing Agent was
subordinate to S.O.S., but whose General Purchasing Board was
of the whole Army in France. Behind the complex scheme was
the determination of Pershing to keep in his own hands the control
of his rear as far as the ports. When the time should come that the
A.E.F. was carrying the heaviest of the burdens, this would be
unavoidable. If the time should come, and come it might, when
the Allies should crack, the surest safeguard of the A.E.F. would
be an unbroken line of communications. The S.O.S. protested,
and even Dawes had his complaints, but Pershing stood his ground.
He could not let it lose its identity any more than he could let it
be commanded from Washington or give to it his undivided
attention. As the priority tables were studied with reference to
348 THE PROGRAM OF ONE HUNDRED DIVISIONS
the one hundred-division program and estimates were figured for
tonnage requirements of the second million, and the following
millions, it became ever more certain that the war might have
to be won from the rear. With all the buying that could be done
in France the fraction of supplies that must still be carried over-
seas was larger than any tonnage in sight for 1919, even if the
Shipping Board should reach its schedule of production.
To the dual relationship of Dawes to Chaumont and to Tours
there was added a third. He became in a sense an ambassador
of the A.E.F. in Paris. His purchasing duties required him to
maintain close and continuous liaison with all of the French
supply departments as well as with Allied and neutral business.
Paris was the place for him. His presence in Paris and his close
connection with the Commander in Chief made it possible for the
latter to use him for various contacts that he would otherwise
have had to make himself. There was a basic difference between
the Allies and the United States in relations with their armies.
The Allied ministers handled directly their inter- Allied business,
while President Wilson left to Pershing such a complete control
over the A.E.F. that the latter spent much time in diplomatic
duty. Dawes could help with his skill in organization and his
facility with men. He took pains not to make the task of his
official superior at Tours impossible by going over his head, but
with his varied functions he was outside the ordinary scheme of
Army organization. The Army does not produce in either peace
or war generals who can be expected to be as competent in busi-
ness as they are in military matters.
The co-ordination of purchases was perhaps the simplest of the
tasks. The several bureaus did their own buying, with Dawes
pressing on their chiefs for common action. It was his special
task to uncover resources in Europe, whether in Allied countries
or among the neutrals, and to tempt them out with dollars. In
buying in these markets it was essential to have understanding
with the Allies, lest they and the United States should bid against
each other. It was useful to persuade the supply departments to
use as many 'standard categories* as possible and to buy them
DAWES' PLAN OF CENTRAL SUPPLY 349
in common. It was helpful to France to provide work for French
women and mutiles in the factories and repair shops working on
A.E.F. account. Dawes was called upon to run a labor office,
recruiting civilian labor from neutral countries, and to make
arrangements with the Allies for the interchange of supplies and
the incidental bookkeeping. He acquired valuable experience in
procuring mules from Spain, for it took diplomatic ability to
manage both the mules and the Spanish. He found in Tardieu,
who had been High Commissioner in Washington, a sympathetic
coadjutor. When the War Trade Board had reached its stride,
he negotiated through Sharpe, the American Ambassador in
Paris, for pressure to be exerted through the War Trade Board to
make neutrals more accommodating. The General Purchasing
Board and the General Purchasing Agent, Pershing's own ideas,
were created by the Commander in Chief on August 20, 1917,
over the adverse recommendation of a staff committee to which
the idea had been submitted.
As the dimensions of the job grew and as useful results followed
the closer co-ordination of purchase, the mind of Dawes expanded
with reference to the conduct of the war and of the critical cam-
paign of 1919. He found each of the three great armies in France
living out of its own warehouses and upon its own independent
supply system. Here again was reason for an independent Ameri-
can army, for when the exigency of March to May compelled the
dispersion of the A.E.F. units along the whole line it became
almost impossible for the S.O.S. to serve the force. There were
fleets of motor trucks belonging to one army lying idle while the
neighbor army was immobilized from lack of trucks. There were
dumps and storehouses belonging to one while another needed
the supplies they held in dead storage. In the middle of April, as
the ist Division was preparing to operate on the Montdidier
front, Dawes addressed the Commander in Chief with an argu-
mentative memorandum in favor of a military control of Allied
supply systems; a control that would place a single service behind
all the armies, under the direction of a general, in the rear, who
would have an authority comparable to that which was at the
350 THE PROGRAM OF ONE HUNDRED DIVISIONS
moment being fully vested in Foch. Pershing responded favorably.
He may, indeed, have asked for the memorandum. On May 22
he joined with Clemenceau in signing an approval of the principle
of unification of policy. He offered as his contribution, as he had
done with respect to the Generalissimo, to join the Allies in
placing the whole rear under a single commander other than
himself. He did not see in this a complete amalgamation of the
rears, but rather a military co-ordination of their policies. Dawes
took the agreement to London. The mission was delicate and
diplomatic. England was as solicitous of the British rear in France
as Pershing could be about his own. Dawes secured an accord.
It was less than a single commander, yet was far in advance of
current practice. The British Quartermaster could not surrender
his initiative. France, whose military rear was inextricably in-
volved with the whole economic life of the country, could not
merge civilian business in the Army or go as far toward this as the
United States had gone in the development of the War Industries
Board. But as the result of the effort a Military Board of Allied
Supply came into existence and held a first meeting in Paris on
June 28. Dawes thought that in it he had found the 'beginning
of an inter-Allied Staff. 5
Hereafter Dawes' duties included service with this Board in
addition to his other responsibilites. As its American member he
reported directly to the Commander in Chief, communicating to
Chaumont for execution the decisions of the Board. When the
representatives of the three armies were in agreement, their
decisions, through military channels, had the force of orders.
Communication and transport, whether by train, truck, or
wire, were among the earliest 'must 5 tasks of the Military Board
of Allied Supply. Ammunition was pooled, forage for animals
was regulated, gasoline was conserved, labor was studied. As
proud parent of the scheme, Dawes believed that even the chiefs
of the independent armies and their General Staff officers learned
from their occasional sittings with the Board 'how their activities
. . . could be conducted in better co-ordination' and were better
for learning it. The Executive War Board of the Supreme War
MILITARY BOARD OF ALLIED SUPPLY 351
Council fell apart as Foch, once Generalissimo, drew controls
into his own hand. Having no commander, the Military Board of
AlHed Supply functioned until the end.
Before the end of June, 1918, the organization of supply was
approaching system, while the one-hundred division program of
June 23 promised to test it to the limit. Dawes 5 new Board was no
sooner a fact than a threat to the new system was heard from
Washington. Here, General March, well set in his saddle, was
no better satisfied with Pershing than Pershing was with the
War Department. He believed that Pershing was no diplomat
and had no right to be entrusted with the inter- Allied negotiations.
He fitted himself to the War Department idea that the Depart-
ment should serve all of the rears, while the Commander in Chief
should concentrate his attention upon the fighting. If Baker and
the President had acceded to this idea there might have come about
a sweeping change in the structure of Pershing's machine; but
Baker, though he wavered, did not yield. There came, however,
a letter from Baker, dated July 6, c desiring in every possible way
to relieve you of unnecessary burdens' and wondering whether
General Goethals might not, if sent to France, 'take charge of the
services of supply' and thereby leave Pershing free to be a c fighting
general.' The Secretary wondered, too, whether Bliss (now with
lessened duties as Permanent Military Representative) could not
become a clearing-house for diplomatic matters.
Gossip had named Goethals to Pershing even before Baker
suggested him. There are bits of testimony indicating that
Goethals was directed to get ready, and that he was even packed
and on his way to Hoboken, when the Secretary withheld his
hand and ordered Goethals back to his duties as director of
Purchase, Storage, and Traffic for the General Staff in Washing-
ton. Pershing replied to Baker's letter (the exchange was made
by the carriers who shuttled with important pouches between
Washington and Chaumont) telling how he had worked to 'get
our troops out of leading-strings,' and how Foch had at last con-
sented to the organization of the First Army. He regarded as
unimportant the burden of his diplomatic work, since it was
352 THE PROGRAM OF ONE HUNDRED DIVISIONS
chiefly concerned with troop shipments in which under any ar-
rangement he must have a hand; but he had no objection to the
use of Bliss for other diplomatic matters. As to Goethals., he was
emphatic: c Mr. Secretary, our organization here is working well.'
He emphasized the importance of full power on the spot and that
if his rear were controlled from Washington 'it would be im-
possible to make it function.'
The Commander in Chief was 'puzzled' about Goethals; had
believed that he was necessary in Washington to handle P., S. & T;
and was in any event certain that General Harbord could ad-
minister S.O.S. and c pull in the team.' Whether he feared that
Goethals, probably as lone-handed as he was himself, could not
pull in his team, he did not say. He had already acted as Com-
mander in Chief before the messenger carried his letter back to
Washington on July 28. Having cabled to Baker objecting to the
Goethals mission and asking that action be deferred until the
arrival of his letter, he terminated Harbord's service with troops
in the field. Brigadier-General John A. Lejeune, with rank in
the Marine Corps, took over the command of the 2d Division
ad interim on July 26, and permanently on July 28. Harbord was
ordered to Tours to meet Pershing on July 29, and to assume at
once command of the Services of Supply. On the same day they,
with Dawes, started upon a week of thoroughgoing inspection of
ports, railroads, service establishments, and storehouses. On
August 7 Pershing cabled to the Secretary that with Harbord
in command 'I am as confident of the organization ... as I am
of ultimate military victory.' He had acted so promptly that it
was impossible for Washington to send him Goethals unless it
was prepared to humiliate him in public. It held its hand. Three
days after this, Pershing took command of the First Army, having
conferred with Foch about the future of its use and having secured
agreement that it should be concentrated in the region of St.
Mihiel.
The formal appeal for one hundred divisions, forwarded on
June 23, was earmarked for the attention of the President. It
received attention in every office having to do with the prepara-
LULL IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY 353
tions for 1919. It was 'studied 5 the Army word for deliberation
upon a proposal and the framing of the reply. March replied
in a few days, warning the Commander in Chief not to hold out
expectations that the United States could meet the requisition.
Conferences brought into the study the War Industries Board,
the War Trade Board, and the Shipping Board, as well as the
General Staff of the Army. The problem proved to be 'full of
burrs/ as Baker soon wrote Bliss; for the shipping men reported
that all the ships' berths in France would be insufficient for the
vessels that would be required to meet it. Before the study was
completed, the delegates of the War Boards had been sent to
France for sessions with the inter-Ally boards created by the
November conference, for heart-to-heart discussion with Pershing
and for planning schedules in connection with the next campaign*
As the war passed into its last half-year there remained for the
political agencies in the United States few things to do, and
many to watch. So, too, with the people. There was no more
voting to be done until November. The missteps in preparation
were crowded out of the news by reports of success in action.
A large fraction of those whose normal capacity and tendency
was to help build public opinion were attached to the several
networks whose sole excuse was winning the war. Hays cut short
his visit to the Indiana Republican convention on May 29 so as
to be free to go on the stump for the Third Liberty Loan. Roose-
velt and Taft, meeting by chance in a Chicago hotel while both
were on war tours, made of the meeting a public reconciliation
in the interest of the war. If there had been more serious issues
to divide the public mind in the third half-year, it is unlikely that
the small amount of uncovered sedition could have produced the
noisy uneasiness about 'loyalty 5 in the spring. If Congress had
not completed its basic work, it would have been too busy with
more pressing legislation to give its time and its passion to the
Sedition Act. It was in April and May that the structure of
work or fight was substantially completed and that emotion took
its fling at dissent. Public opinion thereafter, as it watched the
war, dealt more and more with terms of peace: Wilson's terms.
354 THE PROGRAM OF ONE HUNDRED DIVISIONS
And Congress, with little on its docket except a revenue act which
could not be completed because no one could say how much
money would need to be raised, took partial recesses through the
summer. It was not until autumn, September 6, that Claude
Kitchin brought from the Committee on Ways and Means what
was to grow into the Revenue Act of 1919 and found there was no
quorum on hand to receive it.
Between July 13 and August 19 the two houses obeyed the
constitutional injunction not to adjourn for more than three days
at a time, protecting itself by a gentlemen's agreement that no
business should be brought into the semi- weekly meetings without
full notice. A handful of members would meet twice a week,
discover that no quorum was present, and adjourn for three days.
Most of the members went on vacation, some of them going as far
as the battle-front, where their parties visited trenches, were re-
ceived at headquarters, and picked up what they could. When
the hundred-division program reached the United States there
was little that Congress need be asked to do about it.
The minor events of the summer, which were putting only
finishing touches upon the war structure, were designed to im-
prove the working of the machine. The Emergency Fleet Corpora-
tion, crowded for space in Washington, had slipped away to
Philadelphia, leaving Washington still overcrowded. Every War
Board and every bureau that grew with its load brought to the
Capital its clerks by the thousand; to the profit of house-owners,
but to the despair of those who sought lodgings. Wherever there
was a new munitions plant, or one enlarged, there was the same
trouble and performance was slowed down. To remedy the
housing shortage Congress in May allocated to the Department
of Labor fifty millions; and ten millions more for expenditure in
the District of Columbia. Another of the red-tape cutting devices
of the emergency made its appearance in July as the result. This
was the United States Housing Corporation, chartered in New
York, with all of its stock owned by the Government. By Novem-
ber the Housing Corporation had ninety-four projects under way,
and nearly as many more under contract or ready for bids. In the
NEED FOR MORE MAN-POWER 355
District, the plaza before the Union Depot blossomed with more-
or-less Georgian apartments, of wood and plaster, to provide
residence for the girls who did the paper work in the Departments.
In July, too, the United States Sugar Equalization Board was
incorporated under the laws of Delaware, to deal in sugar for the
Food Administration, to control its price, and to capture the
whole of the Cuban sugar crop for the use of the United States and
the Allies. Two months later, wheat was dealt with again. Con-
gress and the President, between them, had already taken care of
the guaranteed minimum price for the crops of 1917 and 1918.
Now, to be certain that the planting for 1919 might be ample to
the need, a board advised and the President fixed a guaranty at
$2.126, based on No. i Northern at Chicago. On August i the
telegraph and telephone services passed into the hands of the
Postmaster-General to be administered as a unit by the United
States, while radio and cables remained within the power of the
President to take over at his discretion. The action was em-
powered by a law of July 16, which Wilson demanded. He was
hurried to this by a strike already ordered for July 8. With the
help of Gompers the strike order was recalled and senatorial fears
that taking over the wires would mean a censorship of opinion
were assuaged. Burleson was more than willing to assume the
responsibility, since he regarded the wire services as natural
adjunct of the Post Office. He permitted the actual operation of
the lines to remain in charge of the existing officers of the com-
panies.
The need to provide more man-power brought the Senate back
from its intermittent recess and was the most important matter
upon which action by Congress was asked and taken during the
summer of 1918. Some action in this direction would have been
necessary even if the demands for 1919 had not loomed up so
sharply, for the list of Class I eligible^ under the Selective Service
Act was approaching exhaustion.
The initial registration, June 5, 1917, as corrected by the ad-
dition of late-comers to the list, ran to 9,925,751. A supplementary
registration brought in 735,834 more, who reached the age of
356 THE PROGRAM OF ONE HUNDRED DIVISIONS
twenty-one before June 5, 1918. A second supplementary en-
rollment found an additional 1 59,161 who had come to military
age by August 24. The grand total of 10,820,746 represented
the discoverable man-power in the age range twenty-one to thirty,
but there was neither possibility nor expectation that the whole
of the group could be called to the colors. When the process of
selection was revised, in December, 1917, and the registrants
were classified by their questionnaires in five groups according
to their availability, Class I became the reservoir from which
troops were to be drawn. In the other four classes were those
whose family or industrial status entitled them to deferred classi-
fication. About thirty-five per cent of the registrants, 3,706,544
in all, proved to be in Class L Most of these were ready to serve;
conscientious objectors were few and deserters and evaders were
believed by the Provost-Marshal-General to be under two per
cent.
With no greater difficulty than was involved in finding beds in
camp and uniforms, the first levy of 687,000 men was raised from
Class I (or from its equivalent, since most of them had gone to
camp before the five classes were differentiated). The number in
Class I was more than sufficient even after nearly one in three had
been disqualified on physical grounds before induction or sent
home from camp after passing the local medical examinations.
Not all of the first levy could be received in camp until the end of
February. In subsequent levies, drawing from the same Class I,
the basis of State responsibility was shifted from total population,
which proved to be unfair because of uneven distribution of ex-
empt aliens and physical defectives. The new basis was the better
one of total Class I registrants, with credit allowed for voluntary
enlistments. By the end of March more than 750,000 men had
been drafted; by the end of June 850,000 more. The bottom of
the reservoir of Class I men was in sight.
There were only two ways to get more men: to summon those
of the twenty-one to thirty age group whose call had been deferred,
or to enlarge the age group. It was apparent before June that
more troops would be needed than the original Class I could
EXTENSION OF CLASS I 357
provide, even when recruited by the supplementary registrations.
No one could tell how rapidly it might become necessary to
summon them. General Crowder's work or fight rule of May 17,
19185 carried a warning that non-essential work was not a sufficient
excuse for deferred classification, but this could not greatly enlarge
Class I. Baker took the problem to the military committees in
May, vague in mind as to the correct age limits for a larger group,
and hopeful for a grant of authority to the President to call men
as needed without legislative limit.
Except for moral advantage in the minds of men already regis-
tered or called, there was little to be gained by age extension at
the top. Men above thirty were likely to fall within the deferred
classes or to be less than effective if within Class I. The ages below
twenty-one had positive military advantage, offset in part by
sentimental disadvantage in calling out boys who could not vote.
Boys of nineteen and twenty were mentally and physically fit
for service and most of them would have Class I status.
The Class I man-power, so far as the administration of the
draft was concerned, was less than it appeared to be. Volunteering,
as a substitute for which the Selective Service Act had been ac-
cepted, had been permitted in part to break down the principle
of selection. Before the numbers of Class I men were called, they,
as well as others in the deferred classes, and others not of draft age,
had been able to enter the armed forces on their own initiative
and choose their service. It was part of the theory that Regular
Army, National Guard, Navy, and Marine Corps should be filled
by recruiting, which could be hurried along before the draft
machinery could be put in motion. Some of their recruits came
in under the same stimuli that have always built up volunteering;
others sought to escape odium by avoiding the draft. Permission
to enter in this fashion meant some loss of men who were too useful
to be spared from industry. In a large proportion of cases it meant
also a diminution of Class I, in which these volunteers would have
found themselves had they waited for their numbers. By December
the Army had closed most of its doors to volunteers; but the Navy
and Marine Corps continued to accept them until on August 9,
358 THE PROGRAM OF ONE HUNDRED DIVISIONS
1918, all volunteering was stopped. By this time nearly 15360,000
had already entered the services by enlistment, while 2,288,000
had by the end of August been inducted under the draft. Class I,
as originally conceived, was empty.
Early in August the man-power bill went to Congress. It was
socially unwise to recruit Class I by throwing into it men with
heavy family burdens. It was doubly difficult to enlarge it by
lessening the number receiving deferred classification on industrial
grounds. The industrial need of the war was greater than ever,
with 1919 in sight, and labor was disposed to resent a revision
of burdens aimed at its exemptions. The bill, signed on August 31,
carried the extended age limits, eighteen to forty-five, both inclusive.
It promised to add more than two and a quarter million Class I
effectives, and it probably fulfilled the promise. The registration
on September 12 added i3>395>7 6 names, making in all 24,234,-
021. Never in the history of the United States had so much in-
formation been accumulated about so many citizens as was con-
tained in their questionnaires. Their education, their health,
their intelligence according to the new Army tests, their aptitudes,
their financial and domestic status, all became matters of record,
from which Crowder drew conclusions of far more than military
significance in his Second Annual Report of the Provost-Marshal-
General (1919), and his Final Report (1920). But he never knew
how completely Class I was reinforced by the spread of age limits,
because the classification of the new registrants, done in the
several States, was no more than in process at the Armistice, and
was never completed. On November n, however, whether by
draft or by enlistment, there were 4,791,172 in the various military
and naval services; thirteen times as many (378,619) as were in
all of them when the war Congress met on April 2, 1917.
It was possible when the call for one hundred divisions arrived
to forecast the willingness of Congress to assent to the enrollment
of total man-power and to the military employment of so much
of it as might be necessary. It was equally possible to deliver to
the Embarkation Service as many men as Pershing desired. They
could not be completely trained on sailing, as he demanded, for
SUPPLIES TO AN OVERSEAS ARMY 359
too few weeks elapsed between the calling of their numbers and
their departure for Europe, and hardly enough competent divi-
sional staffs could have been found to do the training had they
had time for it. But possibility was thrown into doubt, if not de-
stroyed, when it came to estimating the burden on the Atlantic
Ferry. No estimate of overseas freight required by the force in
France ran below thirty pounds per man per day. The guesses
ranged between thirty and fifty pounds between full supply
with ample reserve and minimum supply with shortages to be
filled up by Dawes. But at the lowest figure the requirements of
four million men would indicate sixty thousand tons that must
every day arrive in France. There was no month before the
Armistice in which as many as half this number of tons reached
Pershing daily; and there were only five months in which a daily
average of twenty thousand tons was attained.
Facing these facts, and they were facts even though precision
was impossible in the forecast, the War Department could not
promise one hundred divisions by the end of June, 1919. A much
smaller number might prove to be too many to be supplied. In
the event of military reverses, even fewer might yet be completely
at the mercy of the enemy and without friends among the Allies
because of the certain Allied conviction that Pershing's demand
for an army of his own had caused debdcle. There was some
gambling to be done which could not be too reckless in July,
1918, since with all the turn of the tide there was as yet no promise
of early victory. But the good news coming in daily from the
Soissons sector after July 18 warranted a risk. A week later the
President approved a War Department program of eighty divisions
to be in France in June, 1919. Allowing 27,000 to the division,
and 13,000 more to serve behind it, this made a total of 3,200,000
men. The ships were not in sight to move the freight for these,
but the United States took the chance. Pertinent to the decision,
and so preserved by Dawes, was Dwight Morrow's description of
a father telling his little boy a story: c "The alligator had his
mouth open and was about to close it on the turtle, when the
turtle suddenly climbed a tree and hid himself in the foliage. 53
360 THE PROGRAM OF ONE HUNDRED DIVISIONS
"But, papa," said the little boy, "a turtle can't climb a tree. 5 '
To which Papa replied, "But this turtle had to." '
The Government in Washington had trouble in adjusting itself
to the fact that the scene of war was far away and that its own
task was to follow the leader, not to call the tune. The President
left Pershing in command of the military effort. The military
censors relaxed much of their rigor after American troops began
to appear in action, and before the summer was over the War
Department permitted publication of complete lists of divisions
in France and of their higher officers. The publication was, how-
ever, historical. The news was not released until the enemy was
as fully aware of the facts as the Department. Plans for the future
were kept in the realm of military secrets; at times because the
Army censors would not pass them to the cables, at times because
Washington was not even aware of them. Pershing's quick shift
in the management of the Services of Supply put an end to what-
ever move there was to relieve him of the control of his rear;
and Washington continued to be forced to confine its work to
the home end of the line that had become closely articulated from
the trenches back to every citizen in the United States.
But Washington could not do its end of the work without a
clearer view of the underlying purpose than could be gained
through correspondence or through the distorted picture of events
brought to the Department of State by the honest efforts of Lord
Reading or Jusserand. It could not plan for the battle of 1919
without face to face contacts with both Pershing's assistants and
the Allied agents who were at work on the French and British
programs. With inspection and conference as objectives (and
perhaps with curiosity), the procession of war work representatives
on the road to Europe grew to impressive dimensions, until
Rudyard Kipling could speak jocularly of an American invasion
of England.
The health and morale of the troops were not lost sight of as
their number grew. Behind the lines the American plant devoted
to rest, recuperation, and recreation increased in size with every
increment of troops.
HEALTH AND MORALE 361
No more in Europe than in the United States did the Army
concede that venereal disease must remain a necessary accompani-
ment of war. The taboos which had hitherto defeated the effort
to control it, by preventing the public mention of its name, were
broken down. The people wanted their sons to come home well.
It was wasteful for the Army to carry men to France in order to
keep them there on sick-list from preventable causes. Education
and prophylaxis did what could be done to keep the army clean;
recreation and rest helped to keep young minds in wholesome
habits. The Stars and Stripes had a sound editorial policy when it
dealt with its readers in the tone of the sporting page and as
though they were college boys. Forty or more camp papers in
the United States did much the same thing on a smaller scale.
Singing masters were taken over to encourage release of emotion
through the lungs. Dawes, a skilled musical amateur as well as
banker, engineered the assembly of a gigantic Army band, for
which Pershing summoned Walter Damrosch as adviser. Base-
ball, boxing, and field sports established their therapeutic values
in the camps behind the lines, while no body of troops could
move far without bringing in its train the Red Cross worker and
the huts of the Young Men's Christian Association.
It was customary to swear at the Y.M.C.A., but it was in most
cases kindly profanity. Katherine Mayo, asked to come to France
and to report, produced in 'That Dam T (1920) a homely picture
of its work. There were snarls and harsh judgments, arising largely
from the accident that the army canteens were handed over to
the Y.M.C.A. for administration and that the supplies there were
sold instead of given out as rations. But the shelves of the C Y'
carried the stock of sweetmeats and cigarettes dear to American
youth, and the men and women in charge, in uniform but not
with military rank, kept their stocks wherever there might be
men off duty.
The Red Cross, close to the army, had gone far since the drive
for a hundred million which it undertook under Henry P. Davison
in 1917. It went out for another hundred in May, 1918, when the
President marched down Fifth Avenue at the head of its proces-
362 THE PROGRAM OF ONE HUNDRED DIVISIONS
sion. Davison was among those in France in the early autumn
to work out with Pershing a closer relationship between the
medical personnel of the Red Cross and the Army Medical
Corps.
The other volunteer agencies ran second to Red Cross and
Y.M.C.A. tending to become something of a nuisance because
of their earnestness and their insistence that weeks must be al-
lotted in the United States to their drives for funds. The Salva-
tion Army, the Knights of Columbus, and the United Hebrew
Charities were all in the picture, while within the Army the
chaplains' service was expanded under Charles Henry Brent, an
Episcopal bishop whose flexibility Pershing had known in con-
nection with the Philippine Opium Commission.
The morale services, borne with gladly for the help they gave
and doubly useful because of their effect upon the mind at home,
were essential in a democratic war; but they and the men who
went out to inspect them were but a small link among the many
between the American effort and the armies in the field.
Late in July it was announced that the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy was abroad and that on the twenty-second he had begun
his tour of inspection of the Navy establishment by lunching in
London with Balfour, Milner, and Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of
the Admiralty. For the next two months Franklin D. Roosevelt
was up and down the front. His travels took him in public to
Italy, in semi-public to the destroyer base and to the fleet, in
private to the offices where contracts were to be inspected and to
the ports where the facilities for handling ships were nearly ade-
quate to the load then on them, but in need of expansion for the
eighty divisions when these should come. Before he was reported
home again, September 19 sick with what was beginning to
be called the 'Spanish flu' he had in his mind the picture of the
Navy need.
Most important of the visitations of the summer were those
having to do with food and munitions; the former accompanied
with wide publicity because the success of the food program de-
pended on publicity; the latter almost kept from the news because
ADMINISTRATION OF FOOD 363
its business was secret until the time should come to make It public
with projectiles.
Herbert C. Hoover (the middle letter still in his name) was re-
ported in England the day after the arrival of Roosevelt was noted.
The Food Administration had a more sweeping commitment
than that of most of the American War Boards. Its reason for
existence was less the American need than the need of the armies
in the field and of the civilian populations of the Allies. The
American machinery of the Food Administration was functioning
in all the States, where its branches were carrying out its rules In
close co-operation with the State Councils of Defense. Hoover
went abroad to arrange the quotas for the next crop year, to
discover minimum requirements, to search for tonnage, and to
discuss the balance in which it would be safe to gamble civil
sustenance against military maintenance. There were no fears
about sufficiency of food for the United States. War gardens had
been added to the patriotic efforts of co-operators. The con-
sumption of sauerkraut had picked up. Banned for its German
name in the first surge of patriotism, it had been saved as liberty
cabbage.' The acreage under contract with the farmers north of
Chicago made it already clear that in 1919 the cabbage plant
was enlisted for the war.
The Food Administrator was already a notable figure in Allied
circles where to the courtesy extended to him because of his past
performance there was added more consideration because in his
hands were future benefits. He was lunched at the Mansion House,
dined by the Government, and received as key member of the
conference of Allied food controllers which opened on July 23.
He took with him a considerable staff. Alonzo E. Taylor, who
had been one of his agents abroad since the war began, joined
him in England. Hoover opened the conferences with the com-
forting assurance that the food crisis was past. During the next
few weeks he repented somewhat of this assurance and reminded
the public through his press releases that it was past only if economy
continued to be practiced. However, his tables and graphs showed
wheat, meat, sugar, and fat in sight in quantities sufficient for the
364 THE PROGRAM OF ONE HUNDRED DIVISIONS
minimum needs of the Allied populations and the armies in the
field. With the submarine danger subsiding, it had become chiefly
a matter of getting the cargoes overseas; but that was a matter
of maritime transportation, not of food production and conserva-
tion. c lt might be said/ said David Lloyd George, who introduced
him at the Government dinner, c he represented Providence.'
Out of the conference of food controllers an Inter- Allied Food
Council was set up as a permanent agent in London, with offices
in Trafalgar House,, Waterloo Place. It was promised that war
bread in the future would be better bread, but those who ate it
were admonished still to regard it not as bread but merely as
consumable food. American hotels were released from their no-
wheat pledge. Consumers were told they might eat as freely as
they chose of c light' beef. From both sides of the line the food
information was such as to give hope to the enemies of Germany.
As against the Hoover assurance of sufficiency, the figures from
Germany told enough of the true story to warrant a belief that
the German Army ration was kept up only by the starvation of
the population at home. Dieticians began to figure and guess
about the point at which food and the lack of it would win the
war. Back in New York before the end of August, Hoover told
the reporters little of his detailed plans, but he let it be known
that Germany was not yet hungry enough to surrender, that food
was clearly in sight, and that the remaining problems were those
of building up a reserve for 1919 and of getting ships. By 'conserva-
tion measures/ he said, reverting to the slogan of April, 1917,
'the Allied cause has been saved/ But victory was more than
ever a matter of ships.
The arrival of Edward R. Stettinius, Second Assistant Secretary
of War, was made public simultaneously with that of Hoover and
Roosevelt. Coming into the War Department in January as
Surveyor-General of Purchases, Stettinius had with Goethals
reorganized the procurement work. He came now to France to
stay, soon vacating his Washington position, when Crowell and
Ryan absorbed his job and divided the work. He had with
him Samuel M. Felton, a railroad expert, specializing in military
COMPLICATIONS OF BUYING 365
railways; Walter S. Gifford of the Council of National Defense,
specially skilled in telephones and telegraphs; and Charles Day,
a mechanical engineer from the Emergency Fleet Corporation.
The munitions conference, for which he was headed, became a
permanent body under the name of the Inter-Allied Munitions
Council. Giving no publicity to its deliberations, it worked for
the future, worried by the difficulty of getting to France the
material needed by the eighty divisions without at the same time
reducing the food supplies below a safe reserve. The munitions
problem, like that of the War Industries Board in the United
States, had advanced far beyond the implements of war as such.
It was concerned with basic raw stuffs without which munitions
could not be made and whose uneven distribution made bargain
and balance prerequisite to any program.
The War Industries Board had on hand to take part in the
commodity discussions a delegation of its own headed by a con-
sulting engineer, Leland L. Summers. The complicated nature
of the arrangements they had to make resembled poker quite
as much as war. They were illustrated by the case of the Spanish
mules which Dawes so urgently required. Spain had the mules,
needed them, and was indisposed to sell for cash. But Spain was
short of fertilizers, whereas the Inter- Allied Nitrate Executive had
control over the whole available supply. By withholding nitrates
it was possible to persuade Spain to see reason in the matter of
mules. But before the transaction was finished and the Army
drivers had the mules, the War Trade Board, with its power to
control the issuance of export and import licenses, had been
brought into the arrangement.
The complications were not limited to those due to the reluctance
of neutral dealers. There was the matter of jute for bags, par-
ticularly for sand bags to be used in the trenches, of which the
United States had ordered 100,000,000 for delivery in France.
Most of the world supply of jute was raised in India, whither the
war demand had brought great profit and where the native peoples
had rallied loyally to the British Empire. England was reluctant
to impose on India either an allocation of the crop or less than a
366 THE PROGRAM OF ONE HUNDRED DIVISIONS
competitive price, while the jute farmers and the merchants who
controlled the trade were slow to accept a regimentation. It
happened, however, that India had been short of silver for use as
currency and had turned to the United States to remedy the
shortage. When the United States now found difficulty in releas-
ing more silver, India found a way to co-operate. An Inter-Allied
Jute Executive was about to be set up when time was called at
the Armistice.
Inter-Ally 'executives' and agreements to pool and ration the
common stock of basic commodities became nearly as numerous
as the commodities themselves. Tin, rubber, manganese, and
platinum none of which Nature has distributed conveniently
to the great industrial nations were key commodities, and in-
sufficient at best. The task of the Munitions Council, supple-
mented by the 'executives/ was to compare needs, to maintain
control of supply, and to keep down the costs. Some of the intri-
cacies of the business are revealed in American Industry in the War;
A Report of the War Industries Board (1921), which Bernard M.
Baruch filed with Wilson on his last day in office; and Report of
the War Trade Board (1919), which its chairman, Vance C. Mc-
Gormick, transmitted when his organization had been reduced to
a dimension small enough to be absorbed in the State Department.
In the last analysis, in matters of munitions as well as food, ships
were the neck of the bottle.
The Allied Maritime Transport Council met again at the end
of August, after its preliminary sessions in March and April, to
consider shipping in the light of the enlarged needs of the American
program. In spite of the checking of the submarine the tonnage
deficit was still alarming. The building of new ships was slowing
down because of the diversion of labor to the repair of injured
shipping. British labor was overshadowed by the threat of
strikes, which evoked from the Prime Minister the counter-threat
that exemptions from military service must be cancelled if men
refrained from work. American bottoms, on which reliance had
been placed after the glowing initial prospectus of the Shipping
Board, were not to be supplemented by much new United States
ENLARGED NEED OF TONNAGE 367
tonnage during 1918; and what new tonnage there was, instead
of relieving the pressure upon Allied tonnage for Allied necessity,
was insufficient for the enlarged American need.
There were, at the end of August, 1842, ocean-going steamers
under some form of control by the United States. They aggregated
6,405,388 gross, or 8,693,579 deadweight tons; but only five per
cent of these represented new ships built to the order of the
Emergency Fleet. The Council could do little in August with
the commitment for 1919. When it next met, at the end of Sep-
tember, Secretary Baker was on hand as advocate of an even
larger allocation of tonnage to the American service. Hines was
there, too, from the Embarkation Service, stating troop and cargo
need. The war had passed into a phase in which quick returns
ousted the long run from consideration. Baker was ready (if not
quite safe in doing it) to promise that after April, 1919, the new
American tons would become a reality.
The procession from Washington to the front and back to
Washington to take up again the conduct of the American end
of the contract was ended by Baker. He had once more made his
rearrangements at home. On August 27 he named Benedict
Crowell Director of Munitions and elevated John D. Ryan to be
Second Assistant Secretary of War and Director of the Air Service.
He slipped away to France, with his departure a secret until his
arrival was noted on September 8. With him were Ryan, Hines,
and Gorgas from the Medical Corps. He came to put the capstone
on the agreements for the battle of 1919, and arrived in time to
join Clemenceau and Petain on September 13, in entering the
town of St. Mihiel, from which on the preceding day the First
Army, A.E.F., had driven the enemy. The last sharp German
salient had been eliminated from the Western Front.
XVII. THE FIRST ARMY, A.E.F.
A,
LMONG the most intriguing of the battles that have never been
fought is the one that might have been just beginning when the
Secretary of War entered St. Mihiel on the heels of the departing
Germans. The first engagement of the First Army was completed,
with the army held on leash by Foch. But in the mind of the
army, from the commander down, a belief lingered that the second
day, September 13, 1918, might as well have been the first day of a
definitive movement leading to a peace coming earlier than it
came in fact. Liddell Hart has had the same idea. Author of an
admirable first-aid to the uninformed. The War in Outline (1936),
Captain Hart developed his critical skill upon a long series of
special writings on personalities and strategy. In one of these, he
considered the consequences after St. Mihiel *if Foch had listened
to Pershing instead of Haig'; and since the attack on Metz did not
take place it remains possible to conjecture concerning its possible
success. A seasoned correspondent of the New York Sun, Thomas
M. Johnson, weighed the matter in Without Censor: New Light on
Our Greatest World War Battles (1928), and inclined to believe that
events would have proved Pershing to be right.
St. Mihiel, on the right bank of the Meuse, was at the tip of a
salient projecting into France after the field armies of 1914 settled
down to a war of attrition in the trenches. South of the southern
face of the salient the country rises to the Vosges Mountains and to
the Plateau of Langres, progressively rougher as it rises and un-
manageable for large modern armies. Only at one spot near the
Swiss border, where Belfort guarded against Mulhouse and
Spinal against Colmar, and where Mulhouse and Colmar guarded
mm
*V \\
Touie
Ep/ NA |jk GCOjlMAR
CHAUMONT
0MULHOUSE
BELFORT
THE ROADS TO GERMANY
370 THE FIRST ARMY, A.E.F.
Germany against French invasion, was a major operation even
conceivable; and none took place. Flowing from the hill country,
northward and roughly parallel for sixty miles or more, the Moselle
and the Meuse start on their journey to the Rhine. They separate
only when the Belgian Highland the Forest of Ardennes
interposes its bulk to force them apart and its rough terrain to
forbid large-scale maneuvers across its hills. The roads from Ger-
many to France were only three; or from France to Germany if
the time should come to cross the Rhine. The approach at Mul-
house-Belfort remained a quiet zone of war; that which ran north
of the Ardennes through Belgium brought upon Germany, for its
use, the reproaches of the world; the third was in the region where
the Moselle and the Meuse begin to separate in order to circle the
borders of the Ardennes.
Through this middle highway the German armies came in 1870.
Confronted on the Upper Moselle by the French fortifications
around Metz, they laid siege to the fortress, circled around it, and
accepted its capitulation in the end. They passed across the nar-
rows between the rivers to Verdun, marched down the valley, and
at Sedan captured the town, the French army, and the Emperor
Napoleon III. Metz was the guardian at the gates of France; but
failed to guard. Verdun had slight military importance in 1870.
But when the armies moved again in 1914, Metz had been rebuilt
into an impregnable German fortress, while France had selected at
Verdun the point, around which to construct every manner of
defense that military science could command. Built to hold back a
German invader, it held him back. The whole power of the enemy
could not reduce it when its reduction was made the major German
effort of 1916.
Between Verdun and Metz, a distance of about thirty-five miles
from river to river, the invasion of 1914 was checked by the outer
fortifications of Verdun. To the north the German armies swept
around them, across the Meuse, to the region of the Aisne. To the
south they pushed a salient reaching the Meuse twenty miles above
Verdun, and they could get no farther. Metz became a German
center of supply, key to access to the armies in northern France.
il
PONT-A-l^USSON
Scale In Miles
5 10
ST, MIHIEL, SEPTEMBER 12, 1918
372 THE FIRST ARMY, A.E.F.
The mineral fields, Briey and Longwy, northwest of Metz, were
worked by the invader. Germany was short of iron and determined
to retain these fields. The salient at St. Mihiel was treated as a
correction of the borders of the German Empire, fortified to be
held, and filled with military cemeteries that were designed to
last forever. Along the south face of this salient, from the Meuse to
the Moselle, the American divisions took their tours of service in
the trenches. The American officers let their minds range over the
nearness to Metz whose fixed guns could reach the country at
the base of the salient and over the military significance of the
reduction of Metz. They had a hope that this might be the mission
oftheA.E.F.
Upon the erection of headquarters at Chaumont the reduction
of the salient became the objective of the war plans unit of Persh-
ing's staff. Before Christmas, 1917, Petain was apologizing to
Pershing for having revealed this to Colonel House as to be the
first American venture in the field. And when at last the First
Army took shape the strategists at Chaumont conceived St.
Mihiel to be but the first paragraph in a chapter which might end
with Metz and peace. The doubts as to American ability which
pervaded the atmosphere of the French and British headquarters
were not entertained at Pershing's headquarters.
When the salient was at last cleared away in two days' fighting,
the army in motion could not forgive the leash that held it back.
It was natural to forget the defenses encircling Metz, which might
have made it as impregnable as Verdun had showed itself to be,
and to think instead of the short mileage and the value of a
victory. But Foch listened to Haig instead of Pershing; as the re-
sult, when Baker visited the captured town of St. Mihiel, the battle
was at its end instead of at its beginning. Haig had put forward
arguments for continuous pressure in the west, in which Verdun
should be the pivot, so as to compel German withdrawal. He
feared that failure by the A.E.F. might lessen what was now a
chance to win; also that initial success might set up a new position
whose maintenance by the Allies would interfere with more
profitable progress elsewhere. He argued against the American
RUSE AT BELFORT 373
desire, rejected it coming and going, and won his point. The
battle of Metz remains only a theme for speculation.
Second, much second, among the battles never fought, was one
whose paper work Bundy directed. When he was removed from
the command of the sd Division on July 15 he did more than make
a place for Harbord. He was given the Sixth Army Corps in the
Neufchateau area, and in August he was sent with the headquar-
ters of his corps to Belfort. Here, planning on the use of seven
divisions, he prepared for a drive on Mulhouse to begin in Septem-
ber. His divisions moved toward the new center; or at least their
headquarters radio outfits moved, ever talking, and triangulated
daily by German military intelligence. Each day brought them
closer to Belfort. The evidence of their movement was mystifying
at German headquarters, for military opinion could not believe in
a major venture near Belfort. Yet it had not believed that a mil-
lion could be transported to France, and had been forced to ac-
cept reality. It could not completely disregard the evidence.
There was more evidence. A colonel in Pershing's confidence
carelessly lost the corps orders in his hotel. A military attache in
a neutral country (Kahn of California told the story in the House)
lost his papers in a cafe, and was publicly distressed by his careless-
ness. Each relied successfully upon the vigilance of the German
secret services. The troops of the Sixth Corps, who reconnoitered
the front line, let themselves be seen. It was Pershing's conviction
that the ruse succeeded to the point of confusing the enemy. When
St. Mihiel had been taken he called the Sixth Corps off its task, set
its staff to the creation of a Second Army, and found a place for
Bundy in command of the Seventh Corps.
The Genesis of the American First Army (a monograph published
by the Army War College, 1928) relates the sequence of events in
which the Abbeville decision of May i is an early step. Here the
Supreme War Council agreed to the principle of an American
army under its own commander and its own flag; though naming
no day and hoping none would come. At Beauvais, early in April,
Pershing had been obliged to insist that the American army
should be named among those over which Foch was to act as co-
374 THE FIRST ARMY S A.E.F.
ordinator. The interferences with Pershing's plan, apart from
those based on Allied distrust, were not yet end.ed. He had sur-
rendered his divisions to Foch on March 28 , in the face of emer-
gency. He must surrender them again at the end of May when
the Germans neared the Marne. The renewal of the drive on July
15, and the counter-stroke of Foch three days later, delayed him
again: but since he could not bring his divisions to his corps, he
had sent his corps to his divisions, with Liggett taking command
behind them on July 4. As the German retreat from the Marne
pocket became visible, and as the American divisions showed their
mettle, his bargaining power grew with the Allied hope of victory.
On July 24 he sat in a conference at the headquarters of Foch,
and emerged with authority to proceed.
Haig and Petain were at the conference. Pershing attended with
a draft of an order creating an army ready for signature, but with
an acquiescence with which to sweeten the Allies. He bore to Foch
the news that the President would take a part in the occupation of
the Murmansk Coast. Neither March nor Pershing regarded this
as anything but an improvident waste of troops, but the Allies
were set upon it. With the other commanders Pershing listened to
Foch in exposition of a program for the rest of 1918; and for 1919,
when it was beginning to be hoped the war could be won. With
man-power now at his disposal, Foch was disposed to keep the
enemy at work along his whole line, to wear out his front-line divi-
sions, to keep the German Staff guessing, and to keep immobile
what reserve divisions the Germans yet possessed because of the
impossibility of determining where they might best be used. The
thrust at Soissons had been started only as a minor operation to
retard the drive across the Marne. Its success had started a general
withdrawal which must be followed up. From the British view-
point the most profitable field for military investment was at the
extreme left of the line, along the Channel, Here Haig needed
room for maneuver, wanted reinforcements, was conscious that
Lloyd George distrusted him, and was sensitive at every suggestion
of the withdrawal of the American divisions with him and at his
rear. The assent of the French to the creation of the First Army,
ASSEMBLY OF THE FIRST ARMY 375
A.E.F., was unpopular with the English and irritating to the
British Prime Minister who allowed himself to threaten to cut
down American tonnage if the American armies were to operate
east of Verdun. But the conference reached its decision; Haig and
Petain went back to their armies to prepare for advance in con-
cert, and Pershing returned to Chaumont to sign that night his
order, effective August 10, for the assembly of the First Army.
The components of the First Army were still in the Marne
pocket, where on July 24 the German line still sagged down to the
Marne although it had everywhere been withdrawn from its
advanced positions of July 18; or they were in quiet fronts, Lor-
raine and elsewhere, learning how to be soldiers, or in training
camps behind the armies. Those on the Marne were functioning
in and out of the line as the French Sixth Army pushed across the
salient to the Ourcq and to the Vesle in the seventeen days before
the order became effective. The new staff of the First Army had
been hand-picked at Chaumont, where the General Staff itself had
never before organized an army or directed its use.
The personnel of the army staff faced a new task in organizing
it; and Hugh A. Drum, its chief, had been at work near Liggett's
First Corps since the day, July 4, when Liggett took tactical com-
mand. It was proposed that the First Army, when assembled and
organized, should relieve the Sixth French Army wherever that
army should find itself. Since the latter was advancing every day,
the staffs pursued the component troops from Marne to Vesle,
never knowing the line on which the First Army might take over.
And when at last, after the elimination of the Marne pocket, the
line was smoothed about August 4, Foch and Pershing were on the
verge of a decision to defer still longer the tactical functioning of
the First Army. They were considering its shift to a different mis-
sion on another front.
On August 10 Pershing took command, to retain it until there
should be a Second Army. But he deferred tactical control,
informing his staff that the outfit was at once to be removed to
the sector north of Toul, facing St. MihieL The French Eighth
Army became the one to be relieved. Army headquarters were
376 THE FIRST ARMY, A.E.F.
moved to Neufchateau, whose location made It possible for watch-
ing Germans to suspect that its effort might be at either St. Mihiel
or Belfort, without being certain of either until the blow should
fall.
The opening of the frontier railroads to unimpeded" Allied use
was the immediate objective. Haig took the responsibility for the
line north from Paris, through Amiens to the Channel ports.
Pershing was at least to free the east line, Paris-Nancy, with its
connection along the left bank of the Meuse through St. Mihiel to
Verdun. During the last week of August the units of the First Army
came into control of the line on both sides of the salient, from the
vicinity of Verdun, around the apex on the Meuse, and across the
narrows between the rivers to Pont-a-Musson on the Moselle.
Pershing commanded the whole enterprise, his army constituting
one among the armies of the French group 'of Armies of the North
and Northeast' commanded by Petain. Petain issued a directive
making Pershing's plan his own. The French agreed to lend
artillery, airplanes, and tanks, and to place French divisions as
needed in the First Army under the American commander.
The army and the army corps were operating mechanisms
rather than military entities, and neither was certain to retain its
components for more than a military moment. The fighting en-
tities were the divisions, whose number in the A.E.F. was now
sufficient for Pershing to include fourteen (plus two French
divisions) and a French army corps in the First Army as it was
put together in the three weeks after August 10. Grouped in army
corps, and subject to transfer as need suggested, the resources of
the divisions were supplemented by those of 'corps troops'; artil-
lery, engineers, aircraft, and what not, which were administered
through corps headquarters. The number of divisions to the corps,
normally six, was often proved to be five or seven.
Administering the corps, and through the corps the divisions,
the army organization at the top directed operations. There were
army troops under the direct command of army headquarters.
These, like the corps troops, were mostly air and artillery units,
with detachments from all of the service corps such as tank a signa! 3
PREPARATION FOR OFFENSIVE 377
medical, chemical warfare, and occasionally even a little cavalry;
but this was not a war in which the cavalry commander had a
chance to ride around the enemy and earn distinction. John
Buchan, however, in his well-informed and contemporary History
of the Great War (1922), has a footnote on the Surprising adven-
tures' of a cavalry substitute, a whippet tank, surnamed 'Musical
Box/ which pushed through the German front and cruised on its
own behind the lines.
Above all line organizations and army services, the General
Staff from Chaumont represented the Commander in Chief and
scrutinized everything. Staff officers were everywhere, always
resented by men of the line, and were like the men of the line in
being not too well grounded in their business. On their recom-
mendation commands were changed and orders interfered with
on slightest suspicion. The whole process of A.E.F. fighting was so
telescoped in time that while there was much occasion for inter-
ference there was rarely time to correct injustice. The Commander
in Chief was a relentless disciplinarian. There was no chance that
war popularity with his men would lay a foundation for post-war
politics.
That action was in the air was certain. The enemy knew it;
perhaps somewhat confused by the demonstration staged around
Belfort. The correspondents in France knew it; but the censors
would not pass the news. The press in the United States suspected
it, if for no other reason than that the flow of detail which had
accompanied the reduction of the Marne salient shrunk suddenly
at the end of August. Only half a dozen of the American divisions
had had much combat experience, as such experience went in the
A.E.F. On the capacity of these, and the untested capacity of the
others, the success of the enterprise must depend. Getting them to
the new front was a matter of complex paper work, and much
explicit profanity on the part of the military police, as they moved
on crowded roads with truck transport never adequate. Dawes
was working with his Military Board of Allied Supply upon an
Allied pool of trucks; but he could not improvise them.
While the preparation for the St. Mihiel offensive was under
378 THE FIRST ARMY, A.E.F,
way, the whole front of the Allies came Into action, in general
accord with the directive which Foch discussed with the com-
manders on July 24. There was plenty of news for the American
press even though the American divisions were for the moment
out of it.
Haig put the British armies in motion on August 8. Ever since
the line was stabilized in the Somme after the drive of March, the
railway running north from Paris through Amiens had been in
danger. Direct communication between the French and British
armies had been impeded. The German front, crossing the Oise
above Compiegne, had swung around Montdidier and run nearly
north across the Somme and its branches to Albert. A third battle
of the Somme now began here, to relieve the railway line and
recover the ground lost in March. It was successful from the
start, confirming for Germany what had been foreseen since July
1 8 the end of the hope of a German victory. Montdidier was
.retaken early in the drive, with the French helping on the British
right. The 33d Division, brigaded with the British, had days of
fighting on the left before it was withdrawn and entrained to join
the First Army. By the end of August the Somme salient was
blunted, the Hindenburg Line was crossed in front of Arras, and
the German withdrawal was accelerated by continuous pressure,
not ending until the war was over. This was what Haig regarded
as the major operation, and was the basis for his reluctance to
approve what he regarded as wasting of the American divisions
in American adventures.
Ten days after Haig put on the pressure, up the Somme, prepa-
rations were completed to supplement his pressure at either side.
The movements on Soissons (July 18) and on Montdidier (August
8) had shifted the stresses in the valley of the Oise, where the line
crossed the river a little above Compiegne. There, back of the
German front, Noyon was important to the whole region as a rail-
way and supply center. Mangin, with the Tenth French Army,
was started up the Oise on August 18. Eleven days later Noyon
fell, but the pressure did not stop. The fighting in this advance
confirmed the growing impression of the temper of the A.E.F.
BEGINNING OF GERMAN RETREAT 379
The 32d Division took Juvigny on August 30; 'fighting for three
days,' as Petain cited its 64th infantry brigade, 'without stopping,
without rest and almost without food. 5 Juvigny was not much of
a village, but was important as an approach to the western end of
the Chemin des Dames. Well to the right of Juvigny as it fell, the
28th and the 77th Divisions were advancing across the hills from
the Vesle to the Aisne, making the eastern end of the Chemin des
Dames equally precarious. The 28th and 77th had continued on
the course set across the Marne salient, in the revival of pressure
here following the lull of August 4.
On the day after Mangin started up the Oise, August 19, the
British left moved in the Ypres salient in the direction of Armen-
tieres. They had feinted here, to mislead the enemy, when Haig
delivered his main blow above Amiens. The 27th and 3Oth
Divisions were with the British and were soon on the line. Lille
and the industrial region of northern France were the Allied
objectives, while every mile the British could gain would relieve
the severe compression under which they had labored in Flanders
from the first. But upon the retention of Lille the orderly evacua-
tion of the German right depended. Less than twenty miles from
Ypres, it was not occupied by the British until the middle of
October, when the Belgian coast had been freed as far as Ostend;
but the activity on Lille was both continuous and ominous.
Meanwhile, from Amiens north, the British armies had been
advancing toward St. Quentin, and were near Peronne before the
end of August. The Foch directive of July 24 had called for experi-
mental pressure in many places to be kept up until resistance in
any one spot should make it useful to deflect it to another point.
As things worked out, with 286,000 Americans floated in August,
and 259,000 in September, pressure once started was not obliged
to cease. German strategic withdrawals became a general retreat,
with confusion and collapse certain unless the retreat should be
prompt.
By the end of August the Allied line was active all the way from
Reims to Ypres, and the hope was born that the Germans might be
out of France before winter stopped fighting in the field. The line
380 THE FIRST ARMY, A.E.F.
of the Western Front was smoothed, except for the salient at St.
MihieL More than this, a renewal of the drive behind Saloniki
was impending, and the Bulgarian front was believed nearly ready
to collapse. Allenby, in Palestine, was preparing to attack Damas-
cus. Diaz was considering a resumption of the Italian effort on the
Piave. But not until the German documents emerged after the
war was it known that on August 14, following a conference at
Spa, Ludendorff offered to resign his command and urged the
Imperial Government to make what peace it could.
Before the end of August the evidence of success compelled a re-
examination of the decision taken July 24, whereby the First Army
was to assemble north of Toul, and to fulfill its mission at the St.
Mihiel salient. Pershing was again compelled to fight to retain the
army for whose creation he had so long and so obstinately strug-
gled. The existence of the salient at St. Mihiel indeed marred the
symmetry of the Western Front as now reshaped; but the salient
had lost much of its significance with the German armies yielding
ground. If the pressure from Reims to the Channel should be con-
tinued and if reinforcements in quantity should enable it to be in-
creased, the German withdrawal might be turned to rout. As a
matter of professional strategic skill the retreat was winning the
commendation of all military experts. But every mile from which
the German line drew back, no matter how deadly the rear-guard
actions, shortened the distance between the battle front and the
railway lines from which the German force was served. And be-
hind these railway lines, the Belgian Highlands forbade direct
retreat. The Germans must go out of France as they came in:
north of the Highlands or to the south. If Allied artillery should
be advanced until the lines, and freight yards, and warehouses
came within range, these last would become untenable. The vital
flow of men and supplies would cease. German unity would be
superseded by confusion as the forces crowded on the detours that
would take them home.
The need for heavy mobile guns was among the problems of the
ordnance departments of both Army and Navy. Several months
before the German long-range guns, from fixed emplacements in
RAILWAYS AT THE FRONT 381
the vicinity of Laon, threw their shells sixty-eight miles into
Paris, both branches of the American services were constructing
mounts, designing guns, and converting heavy calibers built for
coast defense or Navy use so that they might follow the armies in
the field. Pershing had requisitioned many to be available in 1919.
The Navy had five such, fourteen-inch guns, sixty feet long, ready
to take their place behind American line in September, 1918.
Heaviest of all the field guns available to the Allies, they had
shorter range than the 'Big Berthas' which shelled Paris on March
24, 1918, but unlike the German guns which required built-up em-
placements they were mobile, each on its own special train.
Manned by Navy gun crews they could fire within ten minutes of
bringing the train into position. Foreknowledge of these affected
Pershing' s view of strategy. The Navy guns had a range of twenty-
five miles; the distance from the base of the St. Mihiel salient to
Metz was considerably less.
From Metz to Lille, vulnerable wherever they could be reached,
ran the French railways whose seizure in 1914 had enabled Ger-
many to convert them to the service of its own armies. Whereas
the French front was commonly served by lines at right angles to it,
which could be simply shortened when retreat was unavoidable,
the continuance of the German armies in France was based upon
the continuous operation of a railroad system parallel to the Ger-
man front. The system made a first-class base for victorious
action, but its very nature made retreat doubly hazardous.
On August 30, Pershing as commander of the First Army took
over his sector, and on the same day he was visited by Foch who
bore proposals that the St. Mihiel enterprise should be modified
because of the change in the military situation. It was of con-
sequence that the French railways along the Upper Meuse should
be regained, and that communication should flow unimpeded
from Paris to Nancy. But the French had managed for four years
to get along with this line blocked. It could endure it a little
longer. St. Mihiel was no longer feared as a base from which
Germany could throw confusion among the Allies. The salient
was reputed to be impregnable. If effort upon it should fail, it
382 THE FIRST ARMY, A.E.F.
would entail useless loss. If it should succeed, it could do little
more than make a beginning of an attack upon Metz, where Al-
lied investments might yield less valuable returns than could be
got by reinforced pressure west of Verdun. It was in the Valley
of the Aisne, Foch believed, that the Tate of the 1918 campaign
will be decided.' He wanted Pershing to get through with what he
had to do at St. Mihiel as cheaply and as quickly as he could, so
that most of the American divisions might be shifted to participate
in operations on the front between Verdun and Noyon. Noyon
had fallen to the Tenth French Army the day before Foch's visit,
and the line ran almost straight thence to the Meuse at Verdun.
Forty miles ahead of it lay the German railway junctions, Hirson
and Mezieres, upon whose smooth operation depended the security
of the German front.
There was merit in the contention of Foch, even though it in-
volved one more postponement of action by the 'separate com-
ponent.' But it involved, also, the near certainty that if independ-
ent action should now be stopped, the time to undertake it would
not recur.
Between the Aisne-Vesle front, a new line every day, and the
railways of German supply, lay the French Departement of Ar-
dennes, up whose grades the French battle was to be fought. It had
been fought over in 1914, occupied by the invader ever since, dug
into fortifications, and was to be shot to pieces as the autumn of
1918 advanced. When the French reconstruction services took
over the task of reimbursement of citizens who had suffered loss, it
was found that of 741,993 houses destroyed or damaged in the ten
invaded Departements, 78,000 were in Ardennes. From the owners
of these, and of other property damaged in Ardennes, came
247,567 claims for restoration, to be passed through cantonal
commissions, to be heard on appeal, and to be awarded more than
four billion francs by the Republic. L. Lucien Hubert, in La
Renaissance d*un departement devaste (1924), has told the story, typical
of all of northern France. To get the Germans out of France, and
to bring back into production in farm and factory the sixteen per
cent of the population who had paid eighteen per cent of all French
DEBATE ON STRATEGY 383
taxes before 1914, was vital to French interest; more vital than the
feelings of the American commander who had appeared to the
Republic to come too late and to want too much.
The reaction of Pershing to the new proposal was immediate
and determined. Foch wanted to limit the attack to an advance
upon the south face of St. Mihiel, in place of simultaneous ad-
vance upon both faces and at the tip. When the operation was
over, the A.E.F. was to have to hold only another quiet sector.
Metz and the mines of Briey and Longwy were out of the picture
as Foch saw it. It may be true that he desired to get the enemy out
of the mines by maneuver rather than by combat which would
destroy them. He clung to his demand for a limited attack even
on the south face, while Pershing clung to his point of the inde-
pendent army and complete maneuver. The latter was ready to
fight where needed, but only c as an American army, and in no
other way. 3 When Foch reproached him for his shortage of artil-
lery and service troops, he reminded the Generalissimo that
France had begged to supply the artillery, having more than it
could use, and that the shipment of service troops had been cut
down to meet what the Allies described as temporary emergency.
There was a show-down on the thirtieth. Pershing believed that
when Foch left his headquarters Very pale and apparently ex-
hausted' the latter had allowed himself to be persuaded by some-
one to take the stand he did, and he thought Petain agreed with
him as to the importance of complete action at the salient, but
believed that it would be unwise to proceed toward Metz.
Three days later, September 2, Pershing and Petain went into
conference with Foch, at the Bombon headquarters of Petain, and
there the atmosphere was cleared. The Metz project was cancelled,
in order to permit the First Army under Pershing to take part in a
general movement west of the Meuse after St. Mihiel. The whole
of the St. Mihiel salient was left under American command for the
completion of the First Army operation which Pershing had been
preparing since August 10. The Commander in Chief went back
to American headquarters with double weight of responsibility
upon him: he must not only win his battle, but he must also win
384 THE FIRST ARMY, A.E.F.
it so completely as to justify his determination not to let it be inter-
fered with by the different strategic desire of Foch. He carried on
two operations for the next two weeks; in one capacity he made
the arrangements for a shift of his whole fighting strength to the
new field west of Verdun; in the other he safeguarded the St.
Mihiel operation upon whose success his status as a commander
probably depended. No one has brought to light the alleged
memorandum in which Foch asked that Pershing be relieved by
an American more pliable; but it may exist. What the British
really felt about the enterprise Pershing learned when Lord Read-
ing talked with him on September 6, stressing the advantage to
be derived by having the American force in operation near the
British; and when General Diaz, asking for twenty American
divisions for the Italian front, interrupted himself to ask for
twenty-five. But Diaz himself did not expect to be able to attack
on his own front until the spring of 1919. There was satisfaction,
though melancholy, to be derived by Pershing from the informa-
tion of his Chief Surgeon, Merritte W. Ireland, that 100,000
hospital beds were ready.
While Foch and the American Commander in Chief were
debating whether the battle of St. Mihiel should not be number
three among the American battles never to be fought, the staff of
the First Army was bringing additional divisions from the French
and British rears, to supplement the efforts of the divisions already
north of Toul. Once the decision was reached on September 2,
Foch did his part. Artillery and aircraft sufficient for the attack
were made available; the latter to be commanded by Colonel
William Mitchell, Chief of Air Service; the former to be under
Major-General Edward F. McGlachlin, Jr., Chief of Artillery.
The First Army was short of tanks; and those which it had were
French.
As the salient lay within the wings of the First Army, its western
face along the Meuse below St. Mihiel was on high hills east of the
river, from which German artillery could cover both the Valley of
the Meuse and the Woevre Plain sloping behind the hills toward
Metz. The south face cut across between the rivers to the Moselle,
ATTACK ON ST. MIHIEL 385
just below Pont-a-Musson. Behind the German front lines were
fortifications, wire entanglements, defensive positions in the rear;
and behind all these the defenses of Metz. There were enough
defenses to throw doubt upon the ability of the drive, once started,
to have been continued to victory at Metz. It was later learned
that Germany was prepared to evacuate the salient if it should be
attacked. Sharp German writers have blurred the success of the
First Army by insisting that withdrawal was under way when the
blow fell. American critics of the engagement have found captured
German orders contradicting the claim, while the troops partici-
pating had no reason to believe they were taking part in a rear-
guard action.
The four corps of the First Army, as they faced the salient, had
various functions assigned them in the orders which were drafted,
examined, redrafted, and handed to their commanders. On the
extreme left, and nearest to Verdun, the Fifth Corps, with the 4th,
French Colonial i5th, and 2 6th Divisions (from left to right), held
the angle where the salient jutted south from the main front.
They were to cross the heights, and the 2 6th was to press into the
salient. On their right the Second French Colonial Corps held the
tip at St. Mihiel and ten miles on either side, with mission to keep
occupied the German divisions which they faced. The main ad-
vance was entrusted to the Fourth Corps, at the right of the
French, and to the First Corps extending from its right to the
Moselle, and designed to act as pivot. On the line for the Fourth
Corps were the ist, 42d, and 8gth. Of these the 8gth, well trained
by Leonard Wood, had completed no more than its tour of quiet
duty on a sector in Lorraine. The First Corps had on the line the
2d, 5th, goth, and the 82d. The 5th, goth, and 82d, like the 8gth,
had not seen duty on an active front. Of the nine divisions upon
which Pershing staked his untried reputation as a field com-
mander, four were untried in action. In all of the divisions there
were troops newly assigned, and of these some had not even re-
ceived the full training of private soldiers.
The main attack, launched early on the morning of September
12, fell upon the center of the south face, midway between the
386 THE FIRST ARMY, A.E.F.
rivers. There was enough preliminary artillery fire to disturb the
enemy without giving him time to bring up reserve divisions before
the infantry advanced. The most experienced of the divisions, ist,
sd, and 42d, were at the spearhead. The Secretary of War, Trom
his observation point near the battlefield/ was given the chance to
watch more of a battle than was usually possible. Before night on
the twelfth the divisions on the south face had reached the lines
drawn on the staff maps for the second day's objectives. Before
daybreak on the thirteenth the German divisions in the pocket
were in confusion and the roads out of the salient were blocked
to north and west. Pershing reported the capture of some 450
guns and 16,000 prisoners, at a cost of 7000 casualties. By after-
noon on the 1 3th all that was left to be done was to correct the new
line across the base of the reduced salient, so that it could be held
after the First Army shifted its position across the Meuse to get into
place for the next engagement.
There remains some reasonable doubt as to the military neces-
sity of the risk taken at St. Mihiel, considering the situation along
the Allied front in the first week of September; doubt not entirely
dispelled by complete success. But there is no doubt that the
existence of the 'separate component' depended upon the risk
being taken. The success gave inspiration to men and leaders,
and to the Americans at home, who, after the event, heard
enough about it to compensate for the mystifying silence that had
preceded the first independent operation of the First Army.
XVIII. THE MEUSE-ARGONNE
nn
JL HE character of John J. Pershing, rather than his military
ability as a commander, stands out in clear visibility. It was his
persistence that gave to the American effort in France the shape it
took. No one can prove that the effort might not have been more
effective if of a different shape. No one can know enough about
Pershing to know where to place his professional talents in com-
parison with those of his colleagues in command, Haig and
Petain, or with those of his superior, Foch. There is material
enough to provide foundation for a first-class military reputation
in his administrative achievement whereby two million men were
brought to the support of the Allied line of battle, and in his direc-
tion of a battle lasting for seven weeks. But he had no chance to
uncover talents in the larger strategy, or to reveal lasting qualities
through the ups and downs of successive campaigns in the
field.
It is as impossible to prove Pershing's rating as a general as it is
to prove the degree to which the American reinforcement made it
possible to defeat the enemy. Thrown by the strategy of his chief
into a holding position not of his own choosing in the last engage-
ment of the war, Pershing did more than hold. The human
weight of the forces under his command was at least a vital factor
in victory; the economic weight contributed by the American
Government was another; the unity of direction, to which the
United States had contributed greatly, was still a third. But the
victory in the field which broke the Central Powers was the victory
of a team in which the abstraction of co-operation was perhaps
more significant than the weight of any single concrete factor.
Upon the elimination of the salient at St. Mihiel, Foch acquired
THE LAST PHASE
September 26-November n, 1918
FINAL ALIGNMENT OF TROOPS 389
control of the final chapter of the war. The picture of the Ameri-
can share in the events of the last seven weeks gives, of necessity,
some distortion of its significance; for great and successful as the
American effort was, it was only one among many efforts, and
owed as much to the timing of the others as they owed to it.
On the Allied left, as the American divisions were pulled out of
the St. Mihiel line and redistributed, the King of the Belgians was
preparing for a major effort. The one monarch to take the field in
person, Albert had a group of armies, Belgian, British, and French.
He had also, eventually, the syth and gist American divisions
which contributed something to his success. The Allied gains of
August, pushing the Germans back from Amiens, Montdidier, and
Chateau-Thierry, had so endangered the German right that its
withdrawal was begun early in September as the German High
Command sought some defensible line in France upon which to
come to rest for the winter months. As Foch came progressively
into control of the initiative, the hope grew that the enemy might
be out of France before winter; and one by one the lines prepared
in the rear of the German armies were reached and passed.
Aggressive pursuit made it impossible for the retreating armies to
stop. While Pershittg did his job with the First Army at St.
Mihiel, the armies of Albert were making ready to leave the
trenches for a follow-up in the open. The decision reached at
Bombon on September 2 called for similar and simultaneous
action along the whole Western Front, On the early morning of
September 28 the armies on the left began to move; and to move so
successfully that after three days they were forced to pause to
organize a new rear, to marshal into prison camps their thousands
of captives, to dispose of 'materiel of war abandoned by the German
armies as they yielded ground, and to build service roads across
country so fought-over that it was desolate. In October Albert's
armies advanced again, reaching by the eighteenth Ostend and
Bruges, with the whole Belgian Channel coast in Allied hands.
On November 1 1 the 37th and -gist Divisions were in the line when
it came to rest across the Scheldt River, east of Audenarde.
The right wing of Albert's group was the British Second Army,
390 THE MEUSE-ARGONNE
which advanced from the vicinity of Ypres. Lille, in its front, was
evacuted by October 18.
Next to the right, in the general advance at the end of Septem-
ber, the British armies under Haig resumed activity in the recovery
movement which they had begun on August 8. The British Fourth
Army (Rawlinson) had started it, east and southeast from Amiens,
heading toward St. Quentin. In the ensuing weeks the fan-shaped
movement had broadened, right and left. French armies on the
right had extended it toward Reims. Left of Rawlinson 5 s army
the British Third Army (Byng), First Army (Home), and Fifth
Army (Birdwood) spread the engagement to Armentieres on the
River Lys. Here Birdwood's left joined the right of Plumer's
Second British Army which was under King Albert. As all pre-
pared in mid-September for the British part in the general ad-
vance, they had immediately in their front, behind the German
lines, Lille on the left, Cambrai on the River Scheldt, and to the
right of Cambrai the St. Quentin tunnel through which passes
the canal connecting the headwaters of the Scheldt with those of
the Somme.
If there was any one 'key 5 to the Hindenburg Line, back to
which the German armies had made a strategic withdrawal early
in 1917 and from which had started the opening drive of March
21, 1918, it was here. The ancient tunnel built by Napoleon
and its canal were worked into the defensive system. The deep
cut through which the canal runs was a fortification in itself.
The tunnel provided coverage for troops and storage for supplies,
and ingenious death-traps for enemy troops that might try to
penetrate it. The adjacent country was netted with wire, ranged
by machine-gun nests, and covered by artillery on the heights.
It lay in the zone of Rawlinson's Fourth Army; and two days be-
fore the British action became general Rawlinson sent against the
outposts two American divisions borrowed from the A.E.F.
The syth and 3Oth Divisions, both organized around National
Guard units, and the former unusual" in being still commanded by a
general officer from the National Guard, Major-General John F.
O'Ryan, saw their combat service as the Second Army Corps
BRITISH SECTOR AT ST. QUENTIN 391
under Major-General George W. Read. Not always trusted by
the High Command of the A.E.F., the National Guard divisions
were used profitably by the British and the French, when they
could get them. The British had learned how to deal with Austra-
lian and other Dominion levies under their own commanders.
Continuously with the British, these two divisions were attached
to the Second British Army in front of Ypres at the end of August.
Transferred to Rawlinson's Fourth Army in September, they were
selected by him for a preliminary testing of the German defenses on
September 27, and for the advance upon the canal and tunnel
when the British armies moved in force on September 29. There
were thirty British divisions fighting with them. John Charteris,
biographer of Field Marshal Earl Haig (1929), counts 35,500
prisoners taken on September 29-30, when the Hindenburg Line
was crushed. The Guardsmen had an admirer in their gallery, who
came to see the front and found a battle. Sir Arthur Conan
Doyle, there on a visit, opened his letter to the London Times
about it with 'Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the
Lord.' Doyle returned to London to complete six volumes of a
popular History of the Great War (1920), in which he mingled his
pride in the Americans with that in the Australians, who fought
beside them; but he left it to 'some Antipodean historian 5 to tell
the story in detail. For more than three weeks the American
divisions stayed in the line and out as the British armies kept up
their pressure until on November 9 they entered Maubeuge, and
on the eleventh, Mons. Maubeuge was significant as a railway
junction on the main retreating line, north of the Ardennes, upon
which Germany relied for its service through Liege to Cologne.
Mons had a more sentimental value. Here the legendary angels
had appeared in August, 1914, when the Germans pressed Haig
back in the first British battle of the war.
To the right of the British armies, the armies of France in the
last week of September held the line from St. Quentin to the edge
of the Argonne Forest, east of the Aisne. In a long, smooth, con-
cave curve they faced St. Quentin and Laon at their left; but east of
Laon was no near town of importance. The great curve of the
392 THE MEUSE-ARGONNE
westward-flowing Aisne ran across most of their front, cutting a
southern segment off the Departement of the Ardennes. A northern
segment of the same departement, cut off by the Meuse,, contained
the railway junction of Mezieres, where the main military railway
of the German front was reached by a branch running down the
Meuse to Namur, and thence through Liege to Cologne. Here,
too, was Sedan; and no Frenchman could fail to pray that be-
fore the war should end, the humiliating surrender of 1870 might
be avenged by the recapture of Sedan. It was one of the minor
ironies of the war that when it did end, Sedan had not been
entered by the Allies. American troops had been near enough to
take it, but had been ordered back. The French, after warning
their 'brave neighbors 5 to stand aside with the grim sentence, T
am obliged to use my artillery in that region,' had failed to do
more than look down upon Sedan, on November n, from the
hills across the Meuse. Mezieres, however, had been taken, giving
France the reality of victory if not the sentiment.
Of the four French armies in the group to the right of Haig,
those of Debeney, Mangin, Berthelot, and Gouraud, it was the
last that headed toward Mezieres and Sedan, with the additional
mission of keeping in touch with the First American Army at its
right. Petain had made free use of American divisions during the
reduction of the Marne salient, surrendering them as they were
drawn away in August to be used against St. Mihiel. Moving across
Champagne toward the Meuse and the French border, the
French reborrowed two divisions. Gouraud was timed to resume
his advance as Pershing opened his own battle on September 26.
The French right was retarded by resistance unexpectedly de-
sperate along the Upper Aisne. Pershing sent Gouraud the 2d
and the 36th; the former staying on the line for a week to take
Blanc Mont and St. Etienne-a-Arnes, the latter relieving the sd
and continuing to the Aisne at Attigny on October 27. For the
sd Division this was but one of many assignments. For the Texas
and Oklahoma Guardsmen of the 36th, their three weeks with
Gouraud constituted their first engagement and their last. By
mid-October Gouraud' s right and Pershing's left were out of the
THE ADVANCE OF THE FIRST ARMY, MEUSE-ARGONNE
September 26-November n, 1918
394 THE MEUSE~ARGONNE
Argonne Forest and in co-operation between Grandpre on the
Aire and Vouziers on the Aisne, above Attigny.
The American part in the general engagement at the end of Sep-
tember was on the pivotal position at the extreme right of the ad-
vancing line, which was to play 'crack the whip'; with the armies
of Albert on the free end at the left. The quiet sectors east of the
Moselle were expected to remain quiet, although after the Ameri-
can bluff at Belfort the Germans anticipated a drive upon Metz.
Where the front line crossed the heights east of the Meuse, below
the fortifications of Verdun, the pivoting was to begin. West of the
Meuse, and thence to a junction with the army of Gouraud on the
farther edge of the Argonne Forest, was the front across which the
American First Army was designed to swing north and north-
east, keeping its left in step with the wider swing of the French,
British, and Belgian armies. Of the two hundred miles of active
front between Verdun and the Channel, twenty-four were in
Pershing's hands.
The terrain facing the First Army, when the whole line was set
in motion, was the most refractory section of the front. Most
difficult to take, with its hills, ravines, rivers, and forests, it was
easiest to hold. Easiest to hold, it was for the German armies the
most important sector to be held, since here the Allied front lay
nearest to the railway arteries upon which depended the free circu-
lation of German army life. Heavy guns at Verdun could almost
reach the freight yards of railway lines connecting Metz with
Sedan-Mezieres. Only a few miles of Allied advance here were
needed to make the railways untenable and to break the German
front. The country in front of the Americans was fortified to be
held until the end. Beyond it were concentrated German troops
perhaps twice as heavily as elsewhere on the line; not because of
fear of American prowess, but in recognition of the vital nature of
the spot.
The A.E.F. had been pulled back from the attack on Metz
because Metz was deemed impregnable. The region of the Meuse-
Argonne was equally impregnable so far as military foreknowledge
could anticipate. If the American forces had merely held their
AFTER ST. MIHIEL 395
line, enabling the extension of the Allied front to swing without
fear of being flanked from the right, they might have fulfilled a
reasonable mission. That they should do more than this, and
make an essential stroke for victory, was assumed at Chaumont,
whether or not it was expected at Senlis and Bombon. When they
did much in the forty-seven days, having been counted on for
little, they were censured for not doing more. The concentration
of American divisions in the First Army was begrudged by Allied
commanders, who had taken samples of the divisions and would
have been glad to use them all. Pershing had, after all, a limited
experience as a commander; but it was of the hardest.
After the Bombon decision of September 2, the commander of
the First Army had two operations on his agenda. The first was
vital to him, the second to the war. So much depended upon the
reduction of St. Mihiel that the operation must not be allowed to
fail. But while he prepared to make the operation a success it was
necessary to arrange a new First Army crew to open the new en-
gagement, drawing heavily upon divisions which had not seen
even as much of combat as those used at St. Mihiel. Foch watched
with both understanding and apprehension the shifts necessary to
'all improvised armies,' recognizing the degree to which the
American commander lacked not only experienced commanders
of corps and division, but also trained staff officers to direct their
work.
With the St. Mihiel salient eliminated, it was not possible to
withdraw divisions for several days, lest a serious German counter-
stroke should undo the victory. The nine divisions engaged in the
reduction nine out of the twenty-nine that were used in com-
bat required reorganization hardly to be completed in a fort-
night. It was impracticable to refill their ranks, reshuffle their
officers (no one of them received a new commander), and shift
them to positions on the front line west of the Meuse, in time for
action again on September 26.
Back of the twenty-four-mile front whence the new line was to
be set in motion, divisions were to be brought up for the line, for
the corps reserves, and for the army reserve. They came from
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398 THE MEUSE-ARGONNE
other positions on the fighting fronts, from quiet sectors in Lor-
raine, from training areas where they had not yet learned how to
function as divisions. They came with borrowed artillery, bor-
rowed aircraft, borrowed tanks. Army trucks carried 428,000 of
their men, with an average haul of forty-eight miles. In all,
600,000 troops were moved into the line to replace 220,000 who
had held it until now.
The railways and the roads that carried them had to have each
its time-table and its military police to handle traffic at every
intersection. The movements had to be in as profound secrecy and
silence as are possible in a war where the enemy has eyes in the air
and tapped telephone wires on the ground. At St. Mihiel military
necessity had compelled the use of four out of nine divisions that
had not seen battle. Four out of nine, again, as the line was ar-
ranged for the morning of September 26, had had no more experi-
ence than could be got from trench occupation on an inactive
sector.
The arrangements for the general advance, in which the A.E.F.
was to co-operate, assigned to the First Army a zone extending
from the western edge of the Argonne Forest eastwardly to the
Moselle, where some of the American divisions were still on guard
along the new line established after St. Mihiel. Over some ninety-
four miles of front, Pershing was in command; but the ninety-
four miles broke down into three sections of variant character.
The moving front, twenty-four miles, ran from the junction with
Gouraud to the Meuse River, nine miles as the crow flies below
Verdun. East of the Meuse, the fortified area around Verdun was
occupied by the Seventeenth French Army Corps, for which no
immediate advance was contemplated. Farther east, the Second
French and the Fourth American Army Corps (each embracing
troops of both nationalities) held a generally quiet line, with the
Fourth Corps (Dickman) having its right on the Moselle.
It was behind the moving front, ready to slip into position as
few hours as possible before the guns began, that the nine Ameri-
can divisions were prepared for the 'jump-off.* They were lined
up:
FIRST CORPS AT ARGONNE 399
77 th-2 8th-35th 9 1 st-3 7 th-ygth 4th-8oth-33d
First Corps Fifth Corps Third Corps
Liggett Cameron Bullard
Each of the divisions had its mission, described in orders and
illustrated with maps which, unhappily, would not always check
with the terrain. Each had before it a e no-manVland/ almost
without roads, beyond which lay the enemy. Each had an ob-
jective, to be reached over unfamiliar country. There had been
little reconnoitering, since reconnaissance on any large scale would
have advertised intention to the enemy. And each corps was held
to the rule that any advance beyond the objective named in the
orders was forbidden.
The line of the A.E.F. began on the left with the 77th, 2 8th, and
35th Divisions, constituting the First Army Corps (Liggett). Of
these, the 77th, whose affectionate commander, Major-General
Robert Alexander, characterized his men as c hardy backwoodsmen
from the Bowery, Fifth Avenue, and Hester Street, 5 was to hold the
forest while the other divisions of the corps should 'reduce the
Foret (TArgonne by flanking it from the east. 3 The 77th took off
in the middle of twenty-two miles of a forest six miles wide,
covering the hogback between the Aisne and its tributary, the
Aire. Until the common front should have been pushed north of
the forest and the junction of the rivers just beyond it, the hogback
would constitute a bastion impeding operations. Alexander had
four and a half miles of divisional front, and discovered, once
started on his way, that the flanking process was a failure. Neither
the French division on his left nor the 28th Division on his right
could do on schedule the work assigned it. Gouraud had troubles
of his own; and the portion of the gad Division charged with
maintaining connection between his right and the left of Alex-
ander failed to connect. The New York troops (New York, by
courtesy only, since at the last minute the 77th had absorbed
nearly 4000 replacements, mostly California men) found them-
selves bound to flounder through the forest, picking out by hand
and in detail the enemy that should have been flanked from his
ravines and machine-gun nests. It continued at the task through
400 THE MEUSE-ARGONNE
fifteen days of uninterrupted work, in a little war of its own, with-
out contact on either flank. It had its high spot when a New York
lawyer, Whittlesey by name, found himself with a lone battalion
ahead of the divisional line, and isolated. Whittlesey dug in, and
defied the world (in the form of German guns on all four sides)
until after six days the line caught up to him. Famed as the e lost
battalion/ his battalion was never lost. It knew only too well just
where it was, and its division knew. It put up white signs for air-
craft beacons; and when the enemy construed these as overtures
for surrender, it pulled them down, and preferred to starve until
relieved.
Next to the 77th, the 28th Division (Pennsylvania, National
Guard) undertook to advance down the right edge of the Argonne
Forest, on the left bank of the Aire. The 35th (Missouri, Kansas,
National Guard), new to fighting, was across the Aire to its right.
Working as a team, the two were commissioned to flank the enemy
out of the hogback; it being assumed that Gouraud, on the other
side of the Argonne Forest, would carry out his half of the flanking
operation, until the German troops occupying the bastion should
be withdrawn from their untenable position. The 35th, at the
right of the First Corps, was also to maintain contact with the left
of the Fifth Corps (Cameron). From Vauquois, immediately in
front of the 35th at the 'jump-off,' to Varennes, two miles north,
where the main road crosses the Aire and descends the river on its
right bank, the team advanced. But the Germans in the forest,
far from being flanked out, discovered that the enemy had ad-
vanced into easy range. Deadly gunfire from the left cut across
the 28th and the 35th. What was intended to be carried with a
rush had to be taken in detail. The left of the 28th could not get
far enough into the forest to establish liaison with the right of the
77th. The advance of the First Army, on its left, bogged down.
Cameron's Corps (Fifth) was expected to make the major ad-
vance. The hill, Montfaucon, four miles in front of it was the
immediate objective. Before great reinforcements could be thrown
into the German line, it was hoped to reach the road beyond
Montfaucon which cut across between the Aire and the Meuse,
FIFTH CORPS AT ARGONNE 401
from Varennes to Dun-sur-Meuse, and to take Romagne
heights, forest, and village. On the line of the Fifth Corps were
the gist (Pacific Coast, National Army), 3yth ('Buckeye/ the
Ohio National Guard), and ygth (Middle States, National Guard)
Divisions, none of which had been in action. Pershing thought it
reasonable 'to count on the vigor and the aggressive spirit of our
troops/ and let these take the place of 'technical skill. 3 The initial
orders of the corps assigned it more than could be accomplished
in the time allowed. The ruins of the town of Montfaucon, after
the greatest of American battles had swept across them, were to
provide a site for the most impressive of the American war memori-
als in France. On the outskirts of Romagne-sous-Montfaucon,
the geometric ranks of fourteen thousand marble crosses were to
tell something of the story of the men who fought in the battle and
remained forever in France. The height of Montfaucon, at the
least a dangerous enemy observation post, proved to be a center of
resistance, holding back the Fifth Corps long enough for the
whole German front to be stiffened. Stiffened here, and held per-
sistently in the Argonne, the German line prevented the First
Army from completing in a rush the first operation which was to
have set up a new line north of the Argonne, from Grandpre to
Romagne, ten miles from the 'jump-off. 3
The Third Corps (Bullard) came into position at the right of
Cameron, with a mission to pivot on the Meuse. At its left, the
4th Division (which had taken part at St. Mihiel) made the longest
advance, with Montfaucon well on its left. The 8oth Division at
the corps center, with drafted men mostly from Virginia, swung to
the right as it advanced, until it faced the Meuse. The 3$d (Bell,
Illinois, National Guard) pivoted on its own right, through ninety
degrees, until it was lined along the Meuse and facing east. Only
the Third Corps reached its objective on time. Its order directed
it to 'assist in neutralizing hostile observation and hostile fire
from the heights east of the Meuse.' But just as the German guns
on the east slope of the Argonne ridge held to their stations to en-
filade the s8th and 35th, the other German guns, on the heights
east of the Meuse and not even attacked^ enfiladed the Third
402 THE MEUSE-ARGONNE
Corps from its right as its divisions changed the direction of the
First Army front.
The memoirs of the commanders and their official reports,
naturally enough, emphasize the dimensions of the accomplish-
ment of the First Army when it went into action on the morning
of Thursday, September 26, 1918. Just as naturally they fail to
stress the difference between the hope of Ghaumont while the
orders were being drafted and the reality in the field at the end of
the first, second, third, and fourth days of combat. The divisional
historians, and they are legion, dwell upon the difficulties due to
inexperience, poor liaison, slack team-work with the artillery, and
refractory terrain. Every mile gained made it harder to bring up
supplies and to evacuate the wounded. The artillery at the begin-
ning had selected positions and acknowledged range. As divisions
advanced into the forests, not knowing themselves quite where
they were, the guns could not know how to cover them. As the
guns were advanced over roadless devastation, to catch-as-catch-
can new stations, the artillerymen were late in readiness to resume
their fire, and when ready were uncertain where to shoot. Signal
corps crews trailed wires to batteries and outposts with personal
heroism greater than their accuracy. Runners started with mes-
sages through the woods without getting to their destinations.
Officers lost their units. Units mislaid their posts of command.
The writers, loyal to their units, pass the buck, each to the flanking
divisions, for failure to keep step. From one side is stressed the in-
experience of training-camp officers and the stubborn ineptness of
National Guard officers; from the other, the unfitness of many of
the Regulars who were ordered to relieve Guardsmen alleged to
have broken down. Pershing has described 'the vast network of
uncut barbwire, the deep ravines, dense woods, myriads of shell
craters, and a heavy fog 5 that impeded advance. The difficulties
of the first hours were chiefly due to these factors and to the factor
of inexperience, for Pershing testifies that 'the strength of the
attack came as a complete surprise to the enemy and his forward
positions were quickly overrun by our troops.*
At the end of four days the gains were great, though less than
NEW PLANS SUGGESTED TO PERSHING 403
had been hoped; and to the west of the First Army the whole
Allied front was busy at its task. The outcome of the initial push
was a new line where German resistance had held it, fatigued
divisions of which some had to be replaced, and a restive Foch who
still believed that Pershing was less competent than another to
command the American effort. A letter was sent, with Weygand
to reinforce it, suggesting a change in mission and scope for the
First Army. Let it surrender the divisions of its left to a French
army that should command both sides of the Argonne, and let it
concentrate what divisions remained upon its right, on both sides
of the Meuse. The letter was written on Monday, September 30,
the day after Clemenceau had followed up victory by visitation.
He had started for Montfaucon, taken later than expected, yet
taken on Friday. Prime Ministers were not welcome anywhere in
the midst of battle or close behind a dangerous front, but the old
man had insisted on going. He was turned back by traffic. In
addition to the heavy congestion due to ordinary supply from rear
to front, the First Division was making a difficult march across the
lines serving the Fifth Corps to a new station at the right of the
First Corps. A less experienced observer than Clemenceau, and a
less stubborn one (for he liked to do what he liked to do), might
have been forgiven for carrying home the notion that American
supply had broken down. Between Sunday, when Clemenceau saw
the jam, and the next Friday, the service of the front was obscured
by the cloud of traffic as tired divisions were pulled back and relief
divisions were sent ahead. Pershing was clear in his vision of what
was happening and what he proposed to do. There was no com-
pliance with the suggestion Weygand discussed with Pershing on
October i. There was no pressure from Washington for compli-
ance. Baker, in Europe on the business of the 1919 campaign and
fresh from exposure to all the British arguments for amalgamation,
wrote to Pershing on October 2 the comforting words: 'that the
American Army as such was the thing we were trying to create. 9
He had been blunt with Lloyd George, telling him that 'we had no
intention of feeding our soldiers into the French or British Army.*
The Argonne and the Meuse remained for the American com-
404 THE MEUSE-ARGONNE
rnander essential parts of an Indivisible whole and his army re-
mained his own. The line between the 77th and the 336. con-
stituted the base of a triangle, whose right side was the River
Meuse, and at whose apex forty-five miles ahead was Mezieres.
Instead of breaking the unity of the operation by assenting to the
detachment of his left, Pershing drew upon his reserves to reconsti-
tute his line. The 77th was allowed to work out its mission in the
Argonne. The 28th was left in place, patched with dependable
Regular officers. The 35th, which had gone to pieces as, with
both flanks exposed, it had pushed for four days down the Aire,
was withdrawn, to be sent after rebuilding to a quiet sector. In its
place the ist Division, which had been held in army reserve, was
pushed in between the 28th and the gist. The 37th was replaced by
the more experienced 32d, and before the end of October it was
dispatched with the gist to the assistance of the King of the Bel-
gians. The 7gth was replaced by the 3d Division, of Chateau-
Thierry fame. The Both was temporarily withdrawn.
Delayed, but not at all dismayed, Pershing prepared to resume
advance in force. The enemy had imposed upon him a line and
had reinforced it. On his left the 77th was still to be brought out
of the forest to Grandpre. In his center the heights of Romagne
blocked the advance of the Fifth Corps, as it faced the Kriemhilde
Stellung. On his right, the Third Corps, with some eight miles of
front along the Meuse, was under continuous gunfire from German
batteries. The line of Grandpre-Romagne had to be established
and the German guns had to be dislodged east of the Meuse, before
the next grand phase of his battle could be undertaken. He held
stubbornly to Mezieres-Sedan as his destination, but until he could
construct a smoothed front, until Gouraud should project it to
the west, and until the heights of the Meuse should be in Allied
hands, he could not advance upon it. He depleted his reserves by
lending Gouraud the sd and 36th Divisions, and he counted on the
line before him twenty-seven depleted German divisions, all of
which were smaller than his when they were full. He had in the
A.E.F. on September 30, 71,172 officers, 1,634,220 enlisted men.
On October 4 he struck again with his line repaired and with
SECOND AMERICAN ADVANCE 405
all participants educated by the experiences of the first week to the
supreme necessity for liaison. There were eight divisions on his
revised front, still in the same three army corps:
77th-s8th-ist
First Corps Fifth Corps Third Corps
Liggett Cameron Bullard
He was approaching now the complicated positions of the Hinden-
burg Line. The four great defense positions of the German armies,
converging upon Metz, were far enough apart at the western end
of the Allied front to permit regions of relatively open country
between them. There was some room for maneuver. But at
Pershing's end, where the positions were packed together east of the
Aisne, the rear of one was interlocked with the front of the one
behind it. The most advanced was the line attacked on September
26. The second ran through Montfaucon. The third, the Kriem-
hilde Stellung, cutting across on the line Grandpre-Romagne-
Brieulles, had been picked by the First Army as the limit of its
first operation. Beyond it, the fourth and last, in front of Buzancy
and Dun-sur-Meuse, became increasingly important to Germany
as the others fell. What had been hoped to be carried in a rush
was not yet gained when after refurbishing the First Army ad-
vanced on October 4. It took a second period of rush, pause,
reorganization, and attack on October 14, before Grandpre and
Romagne were in American hands. And after this, yet another
period of rebuilding the line and reorganizing the rear before at
the end of October the drive on Buzancy could be prelude to
breaking through.
During the ten days after October 4 the active American line
was lengthened, and by freeing each of its ends it gave its center
greater freedom. The 77th at the left, plugging along down the
hogback of the Argonne, was given help. On October 7 the 8sd
Division (All- American), which had been held in army reserve,
was inserted in the line of the First Corps between the 2 8th and
ist Divisions, that the three by increasing pressure down the Aire
Valley toward St. Juvin might pinch the Germans out of the
406 THE MEUSE-ARGONNE
northern extremity of the Argonne Forest. Coming in with the
8zd was Sergeant Alvin C. York, Tennessee mountaineer and
conscientious objector, who proved to be almost a division in
himself. On his second day in the woods, bothered by German
machine-gun nests, he set off in a party of seventeen to smoke
them out. Casualties whittled his squad to eight and lifted him
to its command. Almost single-handed he reported back to his
unit, having impressed a German officer as his interpreter. His
captive, who understood English because he had worked in
Chicago, understood better the language of York's gun in the
small of his back. Through his willing interpreter York had
ordered out of their trenches and nests one hundred and thirty-
two prisoners, and compelled them to carry into the American lines
thirty-five German machine guns, and the wounded Americans.
He was back on duty the next day, to have his story extracted
from him by cross-examination, and in due time to have Foch
commend his feat as the 'greatest thing accomplished by any
private soldier of all of the armies.' On October 10 the yyth came
out of the woods so that it could look down upon the Aire and
Grandpre after what its historian designates as the 'Wilderness
Campaign. 5
On the same day that the 8sd joined the line the 33d Division
was transferred from the Third Corps to the French Seventeenth,
on its right. On October 8 the sgth Division ('Blue and Gray, 5
with Guardsmen from Middle States and Virginia) was put in
between the 33d and its French neighbor; and the Seventeenth
Corps moved over the Verdun battlefield of 1916, to clear the
heights of the Meuse. In the next week the heights were cleared,
relieving the divisions west of the Meuse from the murderous en-
filading fire of German guns. The operation east of the Meuse
lengthened Pershing's active front, costing him troops. But it cost
the enemy more, since it tied more German divisions into active
defense of the Vital pivot' of the German line.
With the battle spreading out before the A.E.F. and with an
extension of activity east of the Moselle under consideration, the
Second Army was created on October 12. Liggett of the First
THE END IN SIGHT 407
Corps, promoted to succeed Pershing in command of the First
Army, was nominated to Washington to be lieutenant-general,
and made way for Major-General Joseph T. Dickman to command
the left. Bullard, from the Third Corps, was given the Second
Army and similar promotion, making room for Major-General
John L. Hines. Cameron of the Fifth Corps was allowed to go
back to the command of his old 4th Division, making room for
Major-General Charles P. Summerall. The new commanders
were finding their way to their new stations, while the front was
undergoing revision for the new wave of advance of October 14.
When Liggett took actual command of the First Army on October
1 6, Pershing reverted to his single status as commander of the
A.E.F.; now for the first time he became in fact a General of the
Armies.
As the commands changed, Pershing was satisfied that the
First Army carried out a splendid achievement in a battle 'sud-
denly conceived' and 'hurried in plan,' fought in harsh weather,
against a desperate enemy, with inexperienced troops. Every
division in the line needed to recuperate. Everywhere there were
local operations designed to 'secure a suitable line of departure 3
for the next advance. Even the raw divisions had been carried
well along the route to veteran status in the eighteen days preced-
ing the fresh advance. Liggett found his divisions under corps
commanders promoted, as he had been, upon confidence in their
proved capacity:
yyth-Ssd 42d-3sd 5th~3d-4th 33d-2gth, plus French
First Corps Fifth Corps Third Corps XVII French Corps
Dickman Summerall Hines (east of Meuse)
The end was in sight by mid-October, when the line advanced
again. Army headquarters could sense its nearness, and Haig,
who had hoped hard enough for it in early summer, thought he
had foretold it. London, Paris, and Washington were conscious
of its approach. In Washington Republican leaders, searching for
an issue, were pointing up their demands for Unconditional sur-
render/ while in Berlin the obvious end was determining policy.
408 THE MEUSE-ARGONNE
An Austrian feeler for informal discussion of terms of peace was
brushed aside in September; declined in sixty-eight words/ as
the Christian Science Monitor reported Lansing's brusque statement
that the United States had already stated the terms. An altered
German Government had approached Washington, asking for a
conference. The Fourteen Points, nonsense to Germany in Janu-
ary, 1918, had by September become the one anchor to windward.
It could not be known until the German archives disgorged their
papers that on the fourth day of the Meuse-Argonne, while
Clemenceau was grumbling about the crowded road to Mont-
faucon, von Hindenburg had notified the Imperial Chancellor that
peace must be sought at once; or that on the seventh day he had
conceded that there was c no longer any possible hope of forcing 3 it.
Between hunger and dissension at home and relentless pressure
along the line of battle, the German front was crumbling. There
was general German retreat, retarded with desperate military
skill only where such retardation was essential lest retreat should
turn into rout and compel surrender in the field. The one great
hope was to get the armies home. That the absence of a surrender
could in twenty years be distorted into a voluntary cessation of
attack was more than any responsible German could have con-
ceived. The officers of the Imperial General Staff knew the facts,
admitted them to each other and to the Imperial Government, and
hoped without believing that they might by bluff of resistance
deceive the Allies into a peace negotiated as though with free
agents.
Germany suffered military defeat, with events along the Allied
Western front determining the time and place. The naval front
was real enough; so real that the high seas were a liability to
Germany rather than an asset. It did not take a victorious naval
engagement to spell victory here. In no other war had the pos-
sibilities of an economic front been conceived or explored. This
new front made life nearly as impossible for the neutral as for the
lesser of the belligerents. No longer a status in which a powerful
nation could remain at peace, neutrality became but a position
to be held until the weight of events should indicate to the neutral
EFFECT OF PROPAGANDA
409
which enemy it must resist. And beyond the economic front,
where a victory was won, lay the even less tangible front of the
human mind. Here, too, campaigns were planned and carried
out, and according to the degree of their success helped by October
to undermine the foundations of the German military power.
There is no way of proving cause and consequence in matters of
the mind. Subsequent action may be established and may plausibly
be connected with an alleged cause, but the line of connection
remains only circumstantial, however plausible it may appear.
It is fact that Caporetto was preceded by a flood of German propa-
ganda within the ranks of the armies of Italy; and it is fact as
well that subsequently many of the Italian units folded up. The
connection may be causal, but the historian cannot prove it.
It is fact that the Allied mind was imbued with the idea that the
Imperial German Government had precipitated a war of con-
quest for its own advantage, naming the very day. To this was
added the fact that the President of the United States, urging a
'peace without victory, 3 had drawn repeatedly a distinction be-
tween the German people^ against whom he professed no war, and
their Government which he alleged to have brought them to disaster.
Propaganda, a weapon of the war, as definitely designed to break
down the will to war as any other weapon, was continuously used
by every Government at war. Its primary purpose was the amalga-
mation of a national will to win the war. Its secondary purpose
was to break down the will to win of the people of the enemy.
There was little in the Allied propaganda, built around the
charge of attempt at conquest and a situation of alleged atrocities,
that had value for the secondary purpose of breaking German
unity. But there was much in that of Wilson. His series of public
statements, before 1917 and after, gilded the picture of a fair
world, without war. His emphasis upon the handful of persons
constituting the German Government as the devils of the machine
produced documents likely to appeal to common folk, hungry and
bereft, and to bring about results weakening their loyalty to that
Government as the German front fell back. Wilson had two
motives as he laid down American doctrine: one, to make it harder
410 THE MEUSE-ARGONNE
for the Allies to ask for a peace unable to win American support;
the other, to divert the attention of enemy peoples and troops from
the channels of their own national propaganda. It may be be-
lieved, though it may not be proved, that he succeeded in the latter
purpose.
George Creel was his agent for this purpose. From the Commit-
tee on Public Information there went to Europe a flood of press
releases comparable to that which had drenched the United
States from Europe in pre-war years. He planted his agents in
the Allied and neutral capitals to disseminate the American version
of the truth. He reached the Allied mind with print, picture
shows, and oratory. Pershmg's Crusaders and America's Answer
(official films) raised some of the hopes in France and Britain
that Pershing found it so difficult to fulfill. It was Creel's belief
that the best propaganda, if he could get it past the German censor,
was the fact of American reinforcement and the doctrine of
Woodrow Wilson. In July, 1918, while the various war boards
were holding their c round tables' with colleagues in Europe,
Creel had one held in Paris, upon ways and means of getting
propaganda into Germany. Advertisement in neutral papers
helped. Translations of dodgers into the languages of enemy
belligerents was undertaken; smuggling them into Germany and
Austria was harder, but was accomplished. Dropped in loose
bundles by aircraft, they settled down upon soldiers in the trenches.
He once sent 400,000 greetings floated by paper balloons, east
across the Belgian border; but he had to lament that he could
not always trust the winds, and occasionally propaganda intended
for Alsace came down in Kent. When the German people set
up a cry for peace, based upon the Fourteen Points, it was partly
Creel who had explained the Fourteen Points and by explaining
them had diverted some of the German mind from conquest.
The prisoners who streamed over the Allied lines during the
autumn drive produced propaganda leaflets when their pockets
were searched. Army Intelligence picked up German orders im-
posing drastic penalties upon soldiers even picking up papers from
the ground. It is impossible to repudiate a connection like that
PEACE WITHOUT DEFEAT 411
between cause and effect. That the weakening of the German
will to win was one of the victories, on one of the fronts of war, is
plausible at least. But it was on the army front that Germany
lost the war.
Liggett took over from Pershing the command of the First
Army two days after it had resumed the drive on October 14,
with its line not yet as far advanced as Pershing had hoped to get it
in the first operation of the battle. From the heights of the Meuse
to the Channel the position changed each day. That line in
France, where von Hindenburg and Ludendorff had once expected
to come to rest for one more winter, had vanished repeatedly
before the German armies reached it. Even better than the Allied
strategists, who could look at the map, read on it the line of the
moving front, the immobile line of the railroads, and the barrier
of the Belgian Highlands at the German rear, the German strate-
gists knew that once the railroad was broken their armies could
not be withdrawn and would lie at the mercy of the enemy. They
placed no confidence in that mercy and surrendered at home
before they yielded at the front. They advised the political leaders
to seek shelter in the phrases of Woodrow Wilson. He had spoken
eloquently about 'peace without victory. 5 What they needed now
was 'peace without defeat 3 ; and that on any terms.
The Allied line, just lengthened by Pershing's operations east of
the Meuse, was correspondingly shortened by German withdrawal
on the left, in the first days of Liggett's command. Moving too rap-
idly to make a stand, to evacuate materiel, or even to destroy all of
it, the enemy pulled back toward the French frontier and the road
home through Liege. Albert entered Ostend on October 17;
Lille was evacuated by the eighteenth; and the streams of German
prisoners testified to the willingness of German soldiers to end their
individual war on any pretext. Across the front from Haig's
armies resistant evacuation was the order of the day. The way out
through Belgium started at Maubeuge. In front of the French
armies, and along the Aisne, the withdrawal was slower and called
for more hurrying by the Allies, because the Upper Aisne is near
the Meuse. But here, too, there was withdrawal. The divisions of
412 THE MEUSE-ARGONNE
Gouraud were turning the eastern end of the Chemin des Dames
and opening for France the road to Mezieres-Sedan. At the west
end Mangin 'hustled 5 the enemy out of Laon on October 14, with
time only to loot the city, not to destroy it. Liaison with the Ameri-
can left was established near Grandpre just as the yyth worked its
way out of the forest. Hence to Sedan was a matter of twenty-four
miles. Petain had been unimaginative when he advised Pershing
that Montfaucon was quite as far as the A.E.F. might hope to ad-
vance before winter.
Liggett took over the conduct of the drive which he found under
way on a front where the enemy made few voluntary withdrawals.
Before the next general advance could be arranged there were
local corrections to be made, or completed, in the face of each
division. The whole line was held back by the hilly country west
of Romagne, which must be occupied before any concerted push
could be directed against the last of the great fortified positions in
the vicinity of Buzancy.
Romagne itself was taken on the fourteenth. And on the same
day the Cote Dame Marie, which Pershing described as 'perhaps
the most important strong point of the Hindenburg Line on the
Western Front,' the 'dominating feature' of the Romagne heights,
was stormed by the 32d Division, in SummeralPs Fifth Corps.
Around the Cote Dame Marie and across the highways converging
on Romagne, and around Romagne, ran the works of the Kriem-
hilde Stellung. The hills were a natural fortress even before they
were covered with trenches and enmeshed in wire. To the 3sd,
which had been working continuously on its problem of ejection
since October 8, the starting of the new drive made no difference:
the old drive had not stopped. The change of corps commanders
was unimportant, since Summerall, until his elevation, had com-
manded the ist Division, working with the 32d, at its left. Worn
out for the moment, the ist Division was replaced by the 42 d Divi-
sion for the final assault on the position. When a regiment of the
32d dashed across the top of Dame Marie, after nightfall of the
fourteenth of October, it found 'the wicked machine-gun nests
deserted by all but the dead.' With Romagne hill within American
FIRST ARMY UNDER LIGGETT 413
lines, Liggett's center could mop up and get ready to move again.
The left was corrected on and after the fourteenth, when the
Aire between Grandpre and St. Juvin along with both of these
towns, was brought within the front. The 77th, replaced by the
78th, took a needed rest, only to be brought back to relieve the
8sd when the advance began again. East of the Meuse, on Lig-
gett's extreme right, there were only local changes to be made on
the extension of the front established by the 33d and sgth Divisions.
The next mission of the First Army was to clear the country north
of the Aire, whose 'wooded bluffs and mutually supporting spurs 5
made it as easy as it was supremely important to hold it; and to
drive the enemy east across the Meuse.
There was no more room on the American front for additional
divisions to be brought into action, although the Atlantic Ferry
had in October contributed a net increase to the A.E.F. of 162,000
men, so that Pershing could note 76,800 officers and 1,790,823 in
the ranks. The divisions that were concentrated on the line, with
corps and army troops behind them, covered the country. Con-
centrated as heavily as space would allow, the troops were con-
centrated more heavily than would have been prudent had the war
been expected to last indefinitely. Harbord, at Tours, complained
that the Services of Supply were undermanned below the point of
safety. Officer shortage compelled Chaumont to rob non-combat-
ant units of their officers, as line officers fell in battle. Ocean ton-
nage was failing to deliver to France the material requirements
now that the battle had taken on its grand dimensions. The Com-
mander in Chief, with the immediate existence of his army on his
soul, had to save corners of his mind for the extension of battle
activity in the near future and for its continuance in 1919 should
the enemy show power of resistance. To the War Department he
had cabled on October 3: 'Unless supplies are furnished when and
as called for, our armies will cease to operate.' Clemenceau had
again tried to get rid of him, citing to Foch 'son invincible obstina-
tion'; and Foch had blocked an appeal to Wilson for a new com-
mander.
It is customary among military historians to write of that phase
414 THE MEUSE-ARGONNE
of the advance which began on November i, 1918, as the final
phase. It proved to be final; but it should be remembered that to
those who took part in it the end of the war was still uncertain in
both time and space. No one could avoid knowing that events
were in train whose results might be the end of the war, but that
knowledge of necessity for instant peace, which inspired German
action, could not be more than suspected by the enemies of Ger-
many. When at last it came, the completeness of the German col-
lapse went far beyond expectation. At the end of October, with no
confidence in the sincerity of the enemy in proposing a truce, it
was necessary for the Allies to consider terms upon which a cessa-
tion of the drive might be profitable; but it was hard even to hope
that Germany would assent to the only terms which the Allies,
with victory in sight, must certainly demand.
Strategically, it was natural to suppose that when service on the
field railroads should be interrupted the German armies would be
endangered, and that they would be unable to make another
serious stand until they should reach new posts along the Rhine.
But it was supposed that the enemy commanders would somehow
get their armies out of France. The Allied counter, growing in
spread and intensity every week, warranted a hope that France
and Belgium might be cleared before winter. There would come a
time when that law of the salient, which bears down upon the
victor as his rear gets clogged with patchwork roads and half-
repaired railways, would operate against the Allies to slow them
down. But victory was inspiring the Allies, as lack of it was
demoralizing the enemy. The request sent through Switzerland
to the United States, October 5, begging truce pending the negoti-
ation of a peace on Wilson's terms was distrusted as a trick. With
Allied armies gaining ground each day and with Germany re-
treating in increasing disorder, it was essential to continue to make
gains while they came easily. Intermission or truce would at least
permit the enemy to regain breath; at worst, it might enable him to
make a new stand and prolong the war.
The Allied commanders proceeded to advise Foch on terms
that would spell victory, whatever they should be called, while
OVERTURE FOR AN ARMISTICE 415
pressing the war as though Germany was to be beaten back to the
Rhine and defeated on German soil. Liggett had for his im-
mediate mission the reoccupation of the line of the railroad and
the forcing of the enemy army back of the Meuse. The A.E.F.
was ready and anxious to proceed upon the road to Metz. East
of the Moselle, encircling Metz, Foch had in contemplation an
extension of the active front. For this, Bullard, with half a dozen
American divisions, was selected to co-operate with twenty French
divisions under Mangin. The name of Second Army was to be
taken with its commander into this adventure. The American
troops on the inactive line between the heights of the Meuse and
the Moselle, which had constituted the Second Army since Octo-
ber 12, were redesignated as the Third Army. Dickman of the
First Corps was assigned to lead them. Orders shifting him to his
new command were issued November 7; Bullard's engagement
was dated for November 14.
It was not until October 23 that President Wilson notified the
German Government that he had transmitted to the Allies its
overture for an armistice. He did not promise that the Allies
would give assent, but made it clear that there would not be any
cessation of hostilities on terms that would permit Germany to
resume the war, and that the military terms of any armistice would
be drafted by the Allied command, which meant Foch. House, as
Wilson's agent, was already at sea, hurrying to take the place of
the President at such meetings of the Supreme War Council as
might be necessary. He reached Paris on October 26, a day after
Foch had assembled his commanders at Senlis, now his head-
quarters, to discuss the military language in which they should
write their determination that Germany should not resume the
war. Pershing attended with the others, convinced that 'sur-
render of the German armies' should be demanded, and willing to
consider less only if the political leaders should so decide. He found
Haig believing that Germany was capable of considerable re-
sistance on a reduced front. He found Foch wary, with Germany
at bay, yet convinced that the German army was, 'physically and
morally, thoroughly beaten.' To Foch and House he pressed the
4*6 THE MEUSE ARGONNE
point that any arrangement should provide 'guaranties against a
resumption of hostilities. 9
Pershing used the word armistice, as all did; and unfortunately.
The only reasonable meaning of the word contains the implication
of an unchanged ability on the part of both parties to resume a
contest, after an interruption of hostilities. What Pershing and
Foch and their associates had in mind, and what Germany was
being driven relentlessly to accept, was something other than
armistice. It contained all the substance of an unconditional
surrender, lacking only the actual transfer to the victor of custody
of the troops of the vanquished. No other word in modern times
has, by its misapplication, caused the world so much trouble as
this word armistice.
The commanders drafted the memorandum on military terms,
while the Supreme War Council held its first formal session on
October 31. 'We can continue it if the enemy desires it to his
complete defeat, 5 said Foch, presenting the draft, to which the
political leaders added political and diplomatic annexes. Not
until November 4 was the last comma in place, so that the Supreme
War Council could formally endorse the terms. The next day
Woodrow Wilson notified the enemy, not of the terms, but of the
readiness of the Generalissimo to deliver terms to the agents of the
defeated enemy, should he be asked directly for them.
Pershing, meanwhile, went back to his two armies, with the pro-
ject for the third ready for announcement, and in agreement with
Foch that if the negotiations should fail or be a fraud no advantage
should be allowed the enemy because of them. His latest rein-
forcement was on hand. Rear-Admiral C. P. Plunkett, with his
fourteen-inch naval guns, had come ashore. Two of the guns, with
the French, had ranged the yards at Laon before that city was
abandoned. Others were in the rear of the American armies ready
to be used. With the operation on Metz in view, two were assigned
stations east of Nancy, to get the range of the eastern projection of
the railroad beyond Metz. Two were brought down the Meuse
below Verdun, and threw their shells into the yards at Longuyon
and Montmedy, interrupting communication between Sedan and
DIFFICULT APPROACH TO THE MEUSE 417
Metz. On November i, as scheduled, the advance began upon
what could not until a later date be described as the last operation
of the war. Italy had on October 24 resumed activity on the
Caporetto front, a year to the day after the debacle of 1917. Bul-
garia and Turkey were down and out, in unconditional surrender;
and it was only a matter of hours until Austria-Hungary should
follow them.
John Buchan Lord Tweedsmuir has recorded his opinion
that now began the hardest part of Pershing's task. Between the
front of November i and the line of the Meuse the country con-
tinued rough and nearly roadless, even though less infested with
fortified positions than the region south of Buzancy. The Ameri-
can troops were better skilled than when they began on September
26, but had lost their freshness. They were so closely crowded on
the field that only superior liaison kept them from mutual inter-
ference; and as they crossed each other's lines in the rear they
created hopeless confusion. To take advantage of the opportunity
they must press ahead, each as far as possible, without waiting to
rebuild or build the roads behind them; and the farther they
got ahead, the greater the hazard if things went wrong. Much was
to be risked if the war was to be won now.
When Liggett moved once more., he had again rearranged the
units of the First Army:
78th~77th-8oth 2d-8gth goth~5th
First Corps Fifth Corps Third Corps (plus Fr. 15, 26, id)
Dickman Surnmerall Hines XVII French Corps
east of Meuse
The First Army and Gouraud's French army to its left were in
a close co-operation now that Gouraud had successfully reached
the Aisne. From Attigny (where the 36th Division had on Octo-
ber 27 completed the assignment which it had shared with the
2d) to the extreme right, where the French I5th and the American
7gth were to widen the front east of the Meuse, was a single
operation. Its intent was to drive the enemy across the Meuse,
away from his railroad, and up against the barrier of the hills in
4i 8 THE MEUSE-ARGONNE
Belgium and Luxemburg. Orders as to objectives had been
changed. The program of limited objectives that had dominated
thus far had been replaced by one of unlimited advance in the
direction of the attack. Foch had published the new doctrine as a
tactical suggestion; Pershing had antedated him in instructions
issued to the First Army.
Across the American front, from the Meuse near Dun-sur-
Meuse and through Buzancy, ran a ridge whose occupation would
bring the Lower Meuse in sight and flank the German armies.
The Fifth Corps faced Buzancy, in the center. The First Corps,
with the Bois de Bourgogne on its left, maintained such connection
as it could with the French army, with the line of the army limit
running east of north from the Bois de Bourgogne to the Meuse
opposite Sedan. The Third Corps, next the Meuse, had still the
duty to pivot on its right until it faced the river between Brieulles
and Stenay, to cross the river, and to push on with Montmedy and
Longuyon as possible objectives. Pershing was human enough to
wish the war might last until he had justified his program by
gaining both Sedan and Metz.
The last fortified German front was broken on November i and
four days later it had disappeared. There was no German strength
left for serious counter-attacks. The divisions abandoned or
were driven from their positions in quick succession, while the
High Command published for home consumption the cryptic
communique: e We have readjusted our position to a depth of ten
miles.'
On the extreme left, Dickman's First Corps found no enemy on
its front after the first day of the new advance, and hurried in
trucks and with motor-cycle units to pursue the retreating German
rear over country whose roads did not invite such methods of pur-
suit. Liggett bewailed the absent arm for which the war had had
no room, the cavalry. Advance was here, and now, a matter for
the 'traffic cops' and was hastened when, on November 5, there
came to Dickman a memorandum from Drum, chief of staff for
Liggett: 'General Pershing desires that the honor of entering
Sedan should fall to the First Army. 3 Sedan was beyond the zone
PURSUIT AFTER NOVEMBER 5 419
of the First Army, on the right margin of the French; but Pershing's
hopes were less orderly than his assignment. 'Boundaries/ Drum
wrote, 'will not be considered as binding. 3
The work of the First Corps was nearly done, since action was to
pause along the new line stabilized on the Meuse while Mangin
and Bullard took it up to the east of the Moselle. Dickman's
y8th Division was withdrawn from his line November 5, and his
Both left for new duties on November 6. The 42 d replaced the y8th
for five days and was gone on November 8, when even the First
Corps organization disappeared. Dickman was on his way to his
Third Army, while the Fifth Corps absorbed what were left of his
First Corps troops. The French had claimed and taken the Meuse
sector opposite Sedan.
Working in front of Buzancy, the Fifth Corps carried its ridge
with the sd and 8gth Divisions, Harbord noting the fact that
there were now no National Guard Divisions on the aggressive
line. The Third Corps had the Meuse to cross. On its left was the
goth Division; on its right the 5th, which had corrected the line by
occupying Brieulles on October 30, was at the river. The railroad
here, the local line from Verdun to Sedan, ran down the left bank
of the Meuse. Across the river, on the east, was the Meuse canal,
and each of the waterways called for pontoon bridges to be con-
structed under fire. By November 3 the 5th Division was across
the river at Brieulles and two days later it had made another cross-
ing at Dun-sur-Meuse. The goth swung with it, lagging a little,
carrying the corps front down the river to the outskirts of Stenay.
By November 7 both were plunging east of the Meuse, 'against the
enemy 3 as Foch had suggested, 'in the direction of attack. 3 They
were within six miles of Montmedy when the Armistice checked
their course on November u.
After November 5 the American advance was a free pursuit of
an enemy who could do no more than worry overeager pursuers
from his rear, as he sought safety. The west of the Meuse had been
cleared well below Stenay, while the First and Fifth Corps were
also pivoting toward the east and the hills along the river, and
while the French had become nervous lest others than themselves
420 THE MEUSE-ARGONNE
should take Sedan. The pursuit was so one-sided that by Novem-
ber 7 Pershing could safely give directions to 'use lights on all
motor transport'; and the advantage was so great as to justify
orders to unit commanders to 'push troops forward wherever
resistance is broken, without regard for fixed objectives and
without fear for their flanks. 5
The spirit of the A.E.F. and the words of the commander ac-
count for one of the most remarkable maneuvers of the war, and
one for which success has perhaps quashed the indictment. The
ist Division, out of the line since October 12, came back. From a
position in reserve behind the central corps, the Fifth, it pushed
out of the corps sector on the afternoon of November 6, occupying
the right of the First Corps, whence the 8oth had just been with-
drawn. Someone misconceived his orders; whether at the issuing
or the receiving end, remaining still in the dark. But through the
night of November 6 the ist Division made a forced march across
the rear of its next neighbor to the left, the 77th; and the next left
neighbor, the 42d; blocking the roads and delaying the advance of
both. On November 7 it raced with the 42d Tor the possession of
the heights south and west of Sedan.' Nothing quite like it had
occurred in an American army since on the night of June 23, 1898,
the First Volunteer Cavalry had marched through the Cuban
jungle to a battle-front of its own choosing, the next morning, at
Las Guasimas.
On the heights west of Sedan, with guns completely com-
manding the city and the German railroad, in a sector reserved by
the French but not yet reached by them, the First Army came to
its goal. That day, the field receiving sets picked up a radio from
Foch, via the Eiffel Tower station, directing the enemy how emis-
saries 'requesting from him an armistice' could safely cross the
lines to reach him. The naughty division, peremptorily ordered
back, disappeared from the active front. That afternoon, un-
founded news that the Armistice had been signed was cabled from
Brest by the United Press. Roy W. Howard, who signed the mes-
sage, has managed to escape moral responsibility for the error;
but the United States broke out at once in riotous celebration of
ARMISTICE 421
the Talse armistice/ only to learn that rejoicing was premature.
The German envoys, delayed in crossing the lines, came to
Foch in his wagon-lit on the morning of November 8, stood embar-
rassed until Foch had compelled them to say they had come asking
for peace, and received from him the ultimatum prepared by the
Allied command. Seventy- two hours later, in the last minutes of
the expiring time limit, they signed as the Armistice what in any
proper military sense was the equivalent of unconditional sur-
render. At ii A.M., Monday, November n, 1918, the American
reinforcement passed into history. The German Emperor was a
political refugee seeking hospitality from the Dutch, and the Ger-
man people, by revolution, had taken over the conduct of their
own affairs.
XIX. PEACE AND POLITICS
JL HERE is reason to believe that the military share of the United
States in the defeating of the Central Powers was great. Without
the weight of the American armies to reinforce the line of the
Allies, and without the pressure which they exerted upon the
sector most vital to the continued operation of German armies in
France, it is not easy to see how Germany could have been brought
to terms acceptable to those who fought. Without this weight it
is quite possible to conceive of a German military victory and a
peace imposed by the Imperial German Government. Any
estimate of the human significance of the Armistice must take into
account the conjectural relative values to the world of a victorious
Germany or a Germany not victorious.
But the military contribution that helped make possible a defeat
of Germany months or years ahead of prophecy was a less
significant factor in victory than was the American contribution
to ideas. Washington alone was not bound by the Pact of Paris.
The United States alone was not paralyzed by a fear of conquest
or a requirement for security. The President of the United States,
alone among the rulers, was able to think and speak of a world
that ought to be, and by his position of disinterest to give voice to
a vision of double purpose. The concept of a 'world safe for
democracy, ' illusory, perhaps, was vital enough at once to give
purpose to fagged majorities among the Allies and to lessen among
enemy peoples the willingness to prolong the war.
From his study in the White House, Woodrow Wilson conducted
the campaign whose result made him the greatest general of the
war. The last chapter of his effective leadership must deal with
a tragic paradox. Most lasting of the war executives in his term
WILSON AS PROPHET 423
of unbroken power, he was first to fall after victory had been at-
tained. While the Allied world acclaimed him as a savior, and
enemy peoples looked to him as their buckler, his own people
turned against his leadership. The greatest demobilization in
history had begun before Foch accepted the German signatures
to the Armistice. Before the battle was quieted on November n,
Wilson, by parliamentary defeat, had been discredited. Dis-
credited, too, he was by a people whose mass mind at the moment
marched with his, and who, like him, beheld beyond victory the
dawning of a better world.
For ten months after his suggestion of the Fourteen Points to a
world unready for them, Woodrow Wilson faced three audiences,
with as many preferences. Never for a day was he able to forget
the requirements of each. All must be carried with him if his
goal was to be attained. He was, in three roles, prophet, President,
and politician.
Before the world, he was prophet. Already he had the ear of
liberal and weary groups as he gave to the war an objective worth
fighting for. British labor had adopted him, American labor
stood behind him, a world league seemed so reasonable an imita-
tion of the American Federal Government that his fellow citizens
could follow him, and the common folk among the enemies began
to sense his meaning. Before a world audience whose willing
consent was essential to the functioning of a new world order he
was bound to elaborate the logic of the order. As the war neared
its end he had much to overcome.
Within enemy countries the Governments struggled not only
for victory but for existence. Ruling classes were against Wilson.
Hence the wedge, repeatedly slipped between the German people
and their rulers.
Among the Allies, each with an end not wholly covered by the
plea for safety, and some quite willing to be party to agreements
to divide the spoils, the American President had to win followers
to outvote their rulers. So long as peace was remote, the latter
bore with him; with victory approaching, general principles were
certain to be threatened by demands for quick returns. The
424 PEACE AND POLITICS
hard-boiled statesmen who persisted in the belief that life is a
succession of temporary equilibria, backed by force, may have
been nearer right than Wilson; but right or wrong they feared the
enemy, distrusted their allies, disliked his program, and evaded
when they dared. They had taken their profits, as his disruptive
program softened enemy resistance, but no Government had
pledged itself to support his terms.
In his own land, American tradition ran against him, for isola-
tion was a habit. To break this down, Wilson had described
'peace without victory' as a 'disentangling' alliance as a Monroe
Doctrine for the world. But at best the American willingness to
think in terms of a league to enforce peace was beset by the
American habit of approving the avoidance of entangling alli-
ances. First among statesmen to appeal to the world constituency
created by growing nearness and instant information, Woodrow
Wilson had yet to learn how easy it is for men to commend world
doctrines and yet, at home, to vote with national groups for more
immediate objectives.
Prophet to the world, he was President at home. As President
his was the task to hold the United States to an undiverted prose-
cution of the war, every part of which was strange in scene, scale,
and method. Accepting the war, Americans stepped above their
parties, leaving no organized opposition to impede it. The rosters
of the armed forces, of the War Boards, of the emergency activities,
show how completely Wilson was President of all the United
States. There was no room for Theodore Roosevelt, or Leonard
Wood, each of whom fell into the pit of his own digging; but Root
was used, and Taft, and Hughes. The organic support from both
parties becomes more striking when the politics of the Civil War,
the War of 1812, or even the Revolution are brought forward for
comparison. The handful of war dissenters, scattered through all
parties, were too few to give their tone to any major group and
remained in painful isolation from start to finish. From the
ranks of the Republican Party came indeed those who had done
the most useful spadework for a league. Even Roosevelt had
given it countenance; Lodge had spoken for it. And William
WILSON AS POLITICIAN 425
Howard Taft, busy with war work, was busy also with public
advocacy of permanent peace based upon a league of nations.
Before the American audience, Woodrow Wilson must act the
President, playing no favorites, and directing the good-will of a
nation in arms.
Prophet and President, he was politician, too. The constitu-
tional structure of the United States, which gives its administra-
tion a continuity unknown to governments of parliamentary type,
creates hazards likewise unknown to them. Parliamentary govern-
ments could, and did, set up coalitions and postpone elections for
the period of the war. But no power in the United States could
defer the mechanical incidence of election days, coming with the
calendar and without reference to the status of pending public
business. With the world on his hands and his people behind him,
Wilson was yet forced to conserve his party structure. None knew
better than Democrats the partisan mendacity of a Congress at
variance with the Chief Executive. They had exhibited it while
Taft was President; and many who had hazed Taft then were in
office now. A congressional election was approaching, and they
had to expect that if they lost it their own political guns would be
turned against them, and that a Republican Congress under a
Democratic President would be racked by the opposing pulls of
patriotism and party gain. A statesman, to be useful as a states-
man, must stay in office. Much more, a politician, to stay politician,
must get re-elected.
The American peculiarity with its automatic days of political
reckoning and its lame-duck sessions, could not be ignored by a
party leader, even though he was also President and prophet.
The Democratic interlude in which Woodrow Wilson did his
work had been prolonged six years. It owed much of its doctrine
to independent men, outside their parties; and much of its power
to a group of legislators sitting in seats captured from normally
Republican constituencies in 1912. The six-year terms of Senators
elected with Wilson were coming to an end. On the ability of the
President, as politician, to hold these seats against the normal
habit of their voters, hung the political fate of the United States
426 PEACE AND POLITICS
for the last two years of his office. Neither before 1918 nor since
has the American Government, on dead center, failed to lag.
Prophet and President depended on the politician.
'Politics is adjourned/ and the election 'will go to those who
think least of it,* said the President, speaking to Congress on May
27, a few hours after the Germans drove the French from the
Chemin des Dames and headed for the Marne. He hoped he
spoke the truth, for it was his duty as politician that was least
consistent with his success as President or prophet. He asked for
quick passage of a second revenue bill, and returned to the White
House to read that night the disturbing dispatches telling of the
French retreat. The next morning came the more encouraging
bulletins on the neatness of the First Division effort at Cantigny.
The Overman Act (May 20) had just given him authority to
adjust the Government to the requirements of the war. The re-
staffed war machine was functioning under the names of super-
men. Roosevelt, the night before, had brought diners to their
feet at the Blackstone in Chicago, as he shook hands with Taft.
Will H. Hays was on his way to Indianapolis to sound the keynote
of a country's war before a State Republican convention. There
he was welcomed as chairman of the Republican National Com-
mittee, yet he spoke not as Republican but as chairman of the
Indiana State Council of Defense. The applause that welcomed
Hays drowned the complaint of Senator Harry S. New, from the
same platform. New, who was not up for re-election in 1918 and
hence was free, called the President "the most uncompromising
in his partisanship of any man who has occupied the White House
since the days of Andrew Jackson.' Hays may have agreed with
New, but he held his words, for it was his business to carry his party
through the war and leave it solvent. Neither he, nor the State
chairmen whom he called into quiet conference in Chicago on
Labor Day, could see a way to contest the November elections
without risking the loyal status of their party.
As spring gave way to summer, and the American divisions
behaved in action creditably to themselves and satisfactorily
to all concerned with them, it became almost possible to believe
POLITICS is ADJOURNED 427
that politics had in fact been adjourned. The President having
stated his doctrine in the Fourteen Points, had concentrated on
the war. The enemy had aspirations at variance with his doctrine,
and the Allies were not ready to commit themselves. Wilson
opened the Third Liberty Loan drive at Baltimore in April with
'force, and force alone. 5 Germany had compelled it. Only force
could determine 'whether Right, as America conceives it, or
Dominion, as she [Germany] conceives it, shall determine the
destinies of mankind. 3 As against this program no important
political group could make headway. Politics lay groggy for the
moment, knocked out by patriotic determination to defeat the
enemy.
The party gatherings of the summer were tame affairs, dealing
with win-the-war oratory, and enlivened only by Wilson's own
effort to purge his party of lukewarm representatives. He called
their numbers, one by one. Jeff: [sic] McLemore was repudiated
in Texas, losing every county in his Seventh District. Slayden, of
the Fourteenth Texas, although he had been eleven times elected
as a Democrat, withdrew from contest when the President de-
scribed him as against the war administration. Hardwick of
Georgia and Vardaman of Mississippi fought it out in their sena-
torial primaries, weighted down by presidential letters favoring
their opponents, and both were dropped. Republican leaders
were cautious with their words, seeing few openings through which
it would be safe to attack sitting Democrats who had voted for
war measures.
The New York Republican conference, held July 18, met just
as the First Division, with a Roosevelt in it, struck the right flank
of the German salient on the Marne. At the conference Theodore
Roosevelt, saddened but not broken by the loss of his aviator son
Quentin, spoke to the leaders on a lofty idealism here at home. 5
He permitted himself only a side remark in abhorrence of c mock
idealism.' Hays spoke from the same platform, and Root, and
Taft (describing himself as a e ghost emerging from the past').
With patriotism dominant, their political depression was measur-
able by the memorial, carrying on one paper the names of Root
428 PEACE AND POLITICS
and of William Barnes of Albany, inviting Roosevelt to become a
candidate for governor again. Said Barnes, explaining his support
of a despised critic. The people will vote for him because he is
Theodore Roosevelt Had this nation been led by vision the
war would have been already won. 3 In the ensuing primary
Whitman was nominated as candidate to succeed himself; the
Democrats brought out a new name, Alfred Emanuel Smith,
after a trial balloon carrying the name of William Randolph
Hearst had been hauled down.
The political staffs in charge of the approaching canvass were
unevenly matched. Woodrow Wilson was his own chief of staff,
and Homer S. Cummings, vice-chairman of the Democratic
National Committee, played no part comparable to that assumed
by Hays in the Republican reorganization of February, 1918.
Vance McCormick, Democratic chairman, was too busy with the
War Trade Board to do much in politics. The chairman of the
Democratic Congressional Committee, Scott Ferris of Oklahoma,
who had sat in the House since the admission of his State, made
little impression on events. There was small hope of winning
new seats from Republican incumbents. It was as much as could
be done to try to retain the normal Republican seats already
held by Democrats; and since most of these were north and east
there was little that Ferris could do about them. When Republi-
cans in Congress made sharp remarks about those individual
Southern Democrats who had been lukewarm, there was no net loss
in sight, since those, if eliminated in primary, would be succeeded
by other Democrats.
The Republican Party, defeated in three elections, in 1912,
1914, and 1916, was determined upon reunion and aimed at 1920.
As nearly as any could foretell, Roosevelt was to run again. His
reconciliation with Root and Taft suggested that the wounds of
1912 were healing or disregarded. It was the business of Hays to
hasten the healing, and until the record of his quiet party talks is
published it will be impossible to do more than guess at how he
went about it. From the moment of his election as chairman of the
Republican National Committee in February, 1918, he moved
REPUBLICAN DIFFICULTIES 429
about the country, scratching none and comforting many. The
picture he might have painted was that of a disintegrated party,
indefinitely out of office should the war be won, the peace be won,
and Woodrow Wilson be allowed to stand on the pinnacle of a new
world order. For the moment it was completely inexpedient to
bare the wounds of party or to do other than support the war to
the uttermost.
The existing set-up of the Republican Congressional Commit-
tee was no help to Hays, because its chairman, Frank P. Woods of
Iowa, re-elected to the post in January, 1918, lost his renomination
to the House in the early summer on his war record. Woods had,
before American entry, written letters early in the war that were
being used to discredit him as though he were pro-German.
Likely to be deposed after his defeat, he resigned as chairman at the
end of August, making way for Simeon D. Fess of Ohio who was
immediately elected to his post. Three days after Fess accepted
the chairmanship, Hays went into conference with Republican
State chairmen, thirty-two of them, in Chicago on September 2.
What he said there and what they planned are not of the record,
since the meeting was given scant publicity. Enough of it leaked
out, however, to inspire Tumulty from the White House to inquire
of Hays whether he really told his associates that the Democratic
Administration 'would even end the war with any kind of com-
promise if that would ensure continuance of the Democratic
Party in power. 5 Hays met the inquiry with indignant denial,
quoting words that said less than those ascribed to him. But before
the Austrian peace proposal of September 15 was received and
rejected, it was clear that the adjournment of politics was an over-
statement. There was, however, even yet no safe aggressive for
Republicans to undertake.
What the party could not do, as such, could be done with less
danger by outside volunteers. The National Security League
was still at work. Having launched itself for preparedness in 1914,
it held successive conventions for 'constructive patriotism' and
'national service 5 thereafter. It announced in midsummer a cam-
paign to eliminate disloyal members from Congress. With Elihu
43 PEACE AND POLITICS
Root and Alton B. Parker as honorary officers on its letterhead arid
with an aggressive secretariat in New York, it compiled an e acid
test 5 for candidates. Eight roll-calls in Congress comprised the
test, ranging from the vote to table the McLemore resolution in
1916, to the vote to eliminate volunteers in 1917. Six of the votes
were taken before American entry, and only forty-seven of the 435
members of the House came clean. Of these only four were
Democrats, and only four came from districts south and west of
Pennsylvania. The League sent its questionnaires to every candi-
date as he raised his head, and flooded with literature the districts
of Northern Republicans of whom it disapproved. It did little in
the South, where Democrats would succeed Democrats, but con-
centrated its efforts upon districts in the Middle West. Attacking
Democrats more numerously than Republicans, its campaign was
suspected as being partisan. It concentrated, too, upon George
Creel and his official publicity which it regarded as too soft with
Germans.
Quite as important as the installation of party chairmen whose
war records were unimpeachable was the installation in August of
a new leader of the Republican minority in the Senate, Henry
Cabot Lodge. Jacob H. Gallinger of New Hampshire, 'stalwart
and standpatter/ in his fifth term as Senator, died on August 17.
Next him among Republicans in seniority was Lodge, most bitter
perhaps of the congressional critics of Woodrow Wilson. Already
Lodge was drafting a personal speech on the Irreducible mini-
mum 3 in terms of peace; a speech which the death of Gallinger
turned into an utterance from the leader of the opposition. With
the Marne pocket cut off and the initiative shifted to the hands of
Foch, it was possible to hope for victory and to suggest that only
Republicans would know what to do with it. The maps in the
papers were showing the daily gains of Haig in the battle of the
Somme, renewed on August 8. The letters from the newsmen in
France, now passed with details of the fighting of the early sum-
mer, set up a picture of victorious Yanks. The world read of the
German conference at Spa on August 14, although it did not know
that the German High Command knew the war was lost. 'We
LODGE MANIFESTO 431
intend/ said Lodge, with irony directed at the President, as he
made his speech on August 23, c to make the world safe for de-
mocracy. But what exactly do we mean by democracy?' He
made it clear that he, at least, was not fighting for democracy
in the meaning of the President. "We are fighting . . . for secur-
ity. 3 And he traversed the Fourteen Points, endorsing only
those that pointed to a Germany 'in a position where she can
never again attempt to conquer and ruin the world.' *In a
word/ he said, c we must go to Berlin and there dictate peace.'
He warned his colleagues, from his position as senior Republican
on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, against a negoti-
ated peace and the treachery of the Hohenzollerns. When the
next day his party conference formally elected him floor leader, the
lines had begun to form for the political campaign. A week later
he told the correspondent of the New York Times why he hoped his
party might win in Maine on September 9, and carry both houses
in November: c it will best promote the one great object . . . speedy
and complete victory'; and he went on to describe his party as the
one best adapted to the intricate task of reconstruction. Fess fol-
lowed him with a formal manifesto: 'Republican success will not
only insure the most vigorous prosecution of the war, but it will be
a guaranty against a compromise, and, therefore, an inconclusive
peace, a "peace without victory." * He declared that after peace
the United States would need in Congress 'the nation's best talent.'
It was impossible for Republican leaders to oppose the war,
even had they desired it, because their constituents had gone fully
to war and would have rejected them. It would have been suicidal
in the party sense, since such a course would have invited the
Administration to turn the election into a test of loyalty, would
have guaranteed a Democratic victory, and would have left the
Republican Party tainted as disloyal. The Lodge manifesto,
suggesting a war loyalty greater than the President's, offered a way
to fight; but it was difficult to determine when and how. The two
houses of Congress, only in intermittent session during midsummer,
had little business on their hands, and many of their members
were on vacation. The Democratic Senate whip, Lewis of Illinois,
432 PEACE AND POLITICS
was abroad, 'whiskers, spats, rainbow vest, and all/ as a caustic
Representative described him. He was making victory speeches to
Allied audiences instead of working on easy renomination at home.
The faithful remnant on the Capitol front had bills involving more
detail than principle while they waited for the revenue law to run
the gantlet of committees. There was a huge deficiency appro-
priation bill; and the eighteen-to-forty-five enrollment bill, which
became a law on August 31; and a matter of war-time prohibition
which made Northern constituencies restive and upset the budget
by cutting off the revenue from alcohol; and the proposed Con-
stitutional Amendment for woman suffrage which was hung up in
the Senate. This last continued hung up, even after the President
visited the Senate on September 30 to urge approval as a war
measure c a vitally necessary war measure.' He needed the
passage as a politician if for no other reason, because militant
suffragists were holding him personally responsible for the delay
in Congress, and Democratic members up for re-election were
facing organized opposition because of the failure of the party to
endorse the vote.
The events of the autumn kept the canvass slow, deferring an
opening for a party fight. Irrepressible voices from either side
attacked the other on its record on the war, making small headway.
But leaders watched their step. By tacit agreement the adjourn-
ment of major politics was prolonged into October, for the Fourth
Liberty Loan was under way and McAdoo had announced the
necessity to raise six billions, by four and one-fourth per cent
bonds, to run for twenty years. The curt rebuff to Austria, re-
leased September 16, was curt enough for Lodge; The Govern-
ment of the United States . . . will entertain no proposal for a con-
ference upon a matter concerning which it has made its position
and purpose so plain.* As politician the President could not have
afforded to speak otherwise. As President he was expected to
speak this way; and Lodge characterized the answer as one to
meet 'with universal approval.*
The fourth drive for funds, organized in the Federal Reserve
Districts with even greater care than its three predecessors had
SPANISH FLU' 433
been, opened on September 28 to the tune of action dispatches
from the Meuse-Argonne, and closed October 19 with the loan
again oversubscribed. There were war trophies now which were
sent on tour to arouse enthusiasm, and American heroes, crippled
in action. Charles Dana Gibson and Howard Chandler Christy
and their coadjutors papered the land with flaming posters. Mary
Pickford did her bit. And success was reached in spite of a handi-
cap that would have obstructed politics as well as patriotism.
The 'Spanish flu' came to America. Whence the epidemic
came, and how, was a matter for harassed doctors, ignorant of its
pathology. It raised huge casualty lists and filled hospitals in
France. It permeated the Army camps in the United States. It
overspread the country until town councils forbade citizens to
appear in public without the muslin masks that were designed to
check infection. Theaters and schools were closed and the movie
producers of Hollywood cut down on their release of films.
Public meetings were ordered to the open air or banned. The
desperate effort to check contagion by preventing crowds cut into
the audiences that had been expected to listen to the orators on
tour. The political meetings which might have given life to the
campaign were curtailed. The President himself gave up the
trip that might, if taken, have done more than float the loan.
He gave it up on the ground of public business and forewent the
last great stroke of political guidance that might have left him in
November still the undisputed leader of his people.
He launched the loan, however, speaking in the Metropolitan
Opera House in New York on the evening of September 27.
Here he faced his three audiences in his three roles, with a message
for each. For his party, he had to stress the note taken in the reply
to Austria. For his country, he had to stress the winning of the
war. For the world, enemy or Allied, he had to restate the aims
with which he had already gripped its masses and softened the
allegiance of enemy peoples to their war Governments.
He repudiated compromise: 'no peace shall be obtained by any
kind of compromise or abatement of the principles we have
avowed/ He stressed a 'peoples' war 5 in which the 'common will
434 PEACE AND POLITICS
of mankind has been substituted for the particular purposes of in-
dividual States'; in which 'the thought of the mass of men, whom
statesmen are supposed to instruct and lead, has grown more and
more unclouded, more and more certain of what it is that they are
fighting for.' The German people/ he said, 'must by this time be
fully aware that we cannot accept the word of those who forced
this war upon us. 3 There must be, he declared, a league of nations;
without which 'peace will rest in part upon the word of outlaws
and only upon that word.' He challenged the leaders of the Allies
to answer their people as to aims as explicitly as he had done it,
and to criticize him should he be in any way mistaken' in his inter-
pretation of the issues. He enumerated five 'particulars' in elabora-
tion of his Fourteen Points:
First. The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimi-
nation between those to whom we wish to be just and those to
whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no
favorites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several
peoples concerned.
Second. No special or separate interest of any single nation or
any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the
settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all.
Third. There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants
and understandings within the general and common family of
the league of nations.
Fourth. And, more specifically, there can be no special, selfish,
economic combinations within the league and no employment or
any form of economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of
economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may
be vested in the league of nations itself as a means of discipline
and control.
Fifth. All international agreements and treaties of every kind
must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world.
Wilson spoke for the loan on a Friday night, and before the week-
end was over the whole two hundred miles of Western Front was
again in motion, with American divisions fighting in each of the
armies. As Americans read his words, they read, too, that Bul-
garian envoys were seeking the headquarters of General Franchet
PEACE DESIRES BEHIND LINES 435
d'Esperey, ready to accept peace without conditions. The
Salonild drive, started September 15, was already over. On
Monday, September 30, Bulgaria laid down arms in unconditional
surrender. The alliance of the Central Powers was broken and the
uninterrupted line from the Baltic to Palestine was no longer in-
tact. Damascus fell to Allenby the next day, his victory pointing
to the near moment when Turkey, too, completely isolated, would
leave the Central Powers to shift for themselves and abandon terms
in search for peace.
At Berlin and at the German headquarters in the field the note
had changed. Screened from Allied observation by the skill of the
command, as the armies backed away from old positions, the note
was now of despair. Memoirs reveal the conviction that the war
began to be lost on July 18. By August 14 the leaders had given
up hope of enforcing German will upon the Allies. They were now
pressing upon the political government for immediate peace lest
they be broken in the field and all be lost. They could not give
guaranties of ability to hold together long enough for orderly re-
tirement to the Rhine front. Behind the screen of the armies began
a battle of the wits to win a promise that the peace should not be
more bitter than the doctrine of the Fourteen Points, as now inter-
preted by the five 'particulars' of September 27. Woodrow Wilson
had thus far been floating his doctrine upon the winds; he was now
compelled to maneuver for it against the avidity of the enemy
ready to accept what it must, and the reluctance of the Allies.
The contest came to a focus on his desk, since he alone was in any
way morally bound by the terms he had phrased, and since his
country alone was completely free to discuss a peace.
Inside Germany, where never was the relentless one-minded
bund that Allied imagery set up, the people were out of hand. The
more liberal groups, not easy to control when battles were won,
became unmanageable when battles were lost. There was validity
in the picture of the German people as something different from
the Government that ruled them. Death, hunger, and politics
had for a year made it increasingly harder for the Imperial
Government to carry on. Demands for parliamentary control of
436 PEACE AND POLITICS
the Government and for electoral reform were impossible equally
to talk down or to suppress. And as it became clear that Wilson
would make no peace with military autocrats, the autocrats sought
to disguise themselves as something else while their domestic
enemies sought to abolish them in fact. At the end of September
the resignation of the Imperial Chancellor, von Hertling, was in
the hands of the Emperor; on October 2 a new Chancellor, Prince
Maximilian of Baden, something of a liberal, was in office to dis-
cover on his doorstep the imperative demand of the army that he
find peace now. Three days later Max announced to the Reichstag
that he had made appeal to the President of the United States.
The first peace note, transmitted through the Swiss charge
d'affaires, did not reach Lansing until Monday morning, October
7; but already its substance had reached the headlines. And when
the Senate convened on Monday the Republican leaders were
convinced that the peace plot was at hand. McCumber was ready
with a concurrent resolution, 'That there shall be no cessation of
hostilities and no armistice until the Imperial German Govern-
ment shall disband its armies and surrender its arms and muni-
tions, together with the Navy, to the United States and her allies in
this war.' Norris of Nebraska read into the Congressional Record the
'unconditional surrender* note of Grant to Buckner. Republican
fears were voiced lest Wilson should allow himself to be hood-
winked. Democratic responses, not less insistent for complete
victory, saw victory embraced within the terms stated by the
President. What Germany asked (and what Austria-Hungary
endorsed) was that the President should 'take steps for the
restoration of peace,' invite the belligerents to name plenipotenti-
aries to discuss it, and bring about 'the immediate conclusion of a
general armistice on land, on water, and in the air. 3 Prince Max
avowed that his Government accepted, 'as a basis for the peace
negotiations, the program laid down by the President of the
United States' in his various utterances from the Fourteen Points
to the five 'particulars.' There was no doubt then, nor is there
now, that the overture was a desperate attempt to get better
terms than would be possible should the war continue. To this
FIRST GERMAN PEACE NOTE 437
extent by the concealment of the German extremity the
overture was indeed a German trick.
While Senators safeguarded the constitutional right of their
body to pass on treaties the President withdrew to his study. In
Allied capitals the principals were nervous lest he, in his freedom
of action, should involve them further than they cared to be in-
volved. He summoned House to Washington and had him pack
his trunks for Paris. House recommended as the response a color-
less note announcing that the President would confer with the
Allies. It could not be believed that Germany was really through;
nor could there be thought of lessening ultimate victory by calling
off the drive. The President took counsel, kept the discussion open
since it might lead to peace, but conceded nothing. On Tuesday
afternoon Lansing handed to the Swiss charge and to the press a
note that called the bluff.
Not showing a diplomatic hand, the President asked certain
things and stated others. First, he inquired whether German
acceptance of his terms was such that 'entering into discussions
would be only to agree upon the practical details of their applica-
tion'; second, he advised that he could not propose an armistice to
his associates while the armies of the Central Powers were 'upon
their soil'; third, he asked, what would have been grievously im-
pertinent in normal times: 'whether the Imperial Chancellor is
speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who
have so far conducted the war/
Each day was bringing a new battle-front in France and crowd-
ing it closer to the line of German communications. Foch was pre-
paring to extend the front into Lorraine, and Liggett was on
October 12 assigned to command the Second Army. The new
Imperial Chancellor was himself discovering the degree of de-
moralization which the army folk had not uncovered to the
political authorities. He had gained no relief by asking for a con-
ference. He could neither draw back nor assert that he was not
speaking for the old 'constituted authorities.' In his second note,
October 12, meeting the inquiries of the President, he omitted the
word 'Imperial' and described the 'present German Government'
438 PEACE AND POLITICS
as having been Termed by conferences and in agreement with the
great majority of the Reichstag.' He declared his proposal to be
supported by 'the will of the majority' and in 'the name of the
German Government and of the German people.' In their name
he avowed that his Government (he spoke also for Austria), Tor
the purpose of bringing about an armistice, declares itself ready to
comply with the propositions of the President in regard to evacua-
tion. 5 He was categorical in asserting that the 'German Govern-
ment has accepted the terms laid down by President Wilson.'
Critics from all parties were quick to note that the Chancellor had
stopped short of saying that his office was the political agent of the
Reichstag majority.
The unofficial text of this second German note, broadcast
instantly from Nauen, was before the President in advance of the
arrival Monday morning, October 14, of the Swiss charge carrying
his decode of the original. House and Lansing were with the
President as he considered which way to turn. Baker was just back
from France and England with eye-witness reports of the Allied
effort. The Republican Senators, assembling Monday morning,
plunged immediately into discussion of the note in language that
drew from Ashurst the hope that their speeches were c not made for
the purpose of securing any partisan advantage in the coming
elections.' Interrupted for luncheon, the discussion ran through
the afternoon, with Brandegee, McCumber, and the Democratic
Reed leading in 'dolorous speeches' in criticism of the corre-
spondence; and with Cummins of Iowa making a proposal for
'capital punishment for a nation.' They were not stopped when
Ashurst, back from a visit to the White House, assured the Senate
'that when the President does speak ... it will be a speech . . .
which will not in any way relax the iron grip which our soldiers . . .
have in Flanders and in France.' Their uncertainty as to the
answer was soon ended. Before the day's work ceased at half-
past six, Hitchcock was able to read the Senate the text of the reply
that had already gone forward. Even Lodge liked it: 'eminently
satisfactory' he described it to the Christian Science Monitor.
In the light of the two notes already received, the President
THE CONSIDERED REPLY 439
was 'frank and direct.' Germany must clearly understand
Austria would be considered separately that evacuation and
armistice were matters to be determined, if at all, not by any
mixed commission, but by 'the military advisers'; and that the
United States would accept no arrangement 'which does not pro-
vide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guaranties of the main-
tenance of the present military supremacy 5 of the Allied armies.
He assumed that the Allied Governments would agree with him
in this. No armistice could be considered while the German
armies persisted in their 'illegal and inhumane practices/ while
they devastated Flanders and France as they withdrew, or while
German submarines sunk 'passenger ships at sea.' And he quoted
his words, spoken at Mount Vernon on July 4, to the effect that at
the peace there must be destroyed 'every arbitrary power any-
where that can ... of its single choice disturb the peace of the
world or ... at least its reduction to virtual impotency. 5 The power
hitherto controlling the German people was of the sort he meant.
'It is indispensable that the Governments associated against
Germany should know beyond a peradventure with whom they
are dealing.' The conversation still lay open; but the war went
on.
The stage-settings of the negotiation were changing while the
actors spoke their lines. The Fourteen Points acquired new mean-
ing and limitation as events developed, in spite of enemy effort
to make of them a specific contract to whose benefits Germany
and Austria were entitled whenever they should choose to claim
them. To Austria-Hungary Lansing indicated an altered attitude
on October 18, pointing out that the 'autonomous development'
of its peoples, demanded in the tenth point, must be considered
in the light of what its peoples had done for themselves. The
Jugo-Slavs had so defended their aspirations for freedom, not
autonomy, as to entitle them to recognition. The Czecho-Slovaks,
with enough of their people in the United States to make a nation,
had declared their independence and as early as September 3 the
United States had recognized their right to it and had conceded
military recognition to their belligerency. Hungary was declaring
44-O PEACE AND POLITICS
its independence of the Dual Monarchy while the German
Chancellor was brooding over his next reply.
It was no longer possible for Germany to acquire merit by
offering a withdrawal from Belgium, one of the much-used baits
for peace. Its army was being ejected thence. Albert entered his
recaptured Channel towns in triumph and the French were ringing
their own church bells in Lille and Laon. There was not much
bargaining value even in the discontinuance of submarine activity,
for the North Sea mine barrage was nearly tight.
Back to Berlin, as the note of October 14 was put upon the
cables, the question of surrender came, and back to German army
headquarters. In Berlin, Prince Max and his Foreign Secretary
Solf could not let go of what they had begun. At headquarters
the army leaders, who had forced Max to open the discussion,
and who saw the United States still outside their trap, were pre-
pared to argue that surrender in the field would be no worse than
the acceptance of all that was stated or implied in the American
notes. Much of what happened in the next six days was revealed
by the German Republican Government, a few months later,
when it published the documents to show how the army had let
the people down. In Vorgeschichte des Waffenstillstandes (1919)
which the Carnegie Endowment translated in 1924 as The Pre-
liminary History of the Armistice it let the papers tell the story
*wie es eigentlich gewesen* from the beginning at the council held
at Spa on August 14. Back to Potsdam, too, went the question of
surrender. Here it took the form of abdication, or something
worse. The dynasty of William II was identified in the German
mind, as in that of Woodrow Wilson, as chief among those masters
who had betrayed the German people.
The answer of Germany, dated October 20, came through
from London in informal shape in time to be carried in the morn-
ing papers of Tuesday, October 22. The official translation, re-
leased by the State Department that night, was printed the next
morning by the side of the response of the President. Wilson
was prompt; so prompt, indeed, that he missed the political ad-
vantage he might have picked from a delay dragging out the
GERMAN NOTE OF SUBMISSION 441
proceedings until after the elections which were only two weeks
off. He was able now to take action, after more than a fortnight
of Inquiry designed to clear the air and to uncover traps.
Solf signed the German note of grieved submission; grieved
because there was no room for negotiation concerning terms of
armistice or of evacuation, but submissive in the hope that the
President would 'approve of no demand which would be irre-
concilable with the honor of the German people and with opening
a way to a peace of justice.' Grieved, too, he was, because of the
charge that retreating troops had done unwarrantable damage
and that submarines had operated heartlessly as well as illegally.
But his Government accepted what it must. He made specific
admission that c Hitherto the representation of the people in the
German Empire has not been endowed with an influence on the
formation of the Government.' But he pledged that the Govern-
ment just formed was different, based on equal and universal
franchise under a new constitutional scheme, and that now and
in the future no Government could stay in office 'without possess-
ing the confidence of the majority of the Reichstag.' Conceiving
this to be a 'clear and unequivocal' response, Solf begged the
President to 'bring about an opportunity for fixing the details' of
armistice and evacuation.
Wilson had gone as far as he could go alone. The nerves of the
Allied leaders, uneasy lest he should go too far, had been soothed
by the stern caution of his notes. But it was beyond his power to
grant an armistice on any terms. All he could do, he had done.
His note of October 23 admitted that he could no longer 'decline
to take up with the Governments with which the Government of
the United States is associated the question of an armistice.'
He had accordingly transmitted to them the correspondence, with
the suggestion that if they were prepared to consider an armistice
on the basis thus proposed they call upon their military advisers
to draft terms to protect their interests and to 'ensure to the As-
sociated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and
enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government
has agreed/ But he warned that Government that the only
442 PEACE AND POLITICS
possible armistice would be one leaving the Associated Powers
"in a position to enforce any arrangements . . . and to make a
renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible.'
Candor forced him, in his concluding paragraph, to remind
Solf that the German statements as to Reichstag control con-
tained no guaranty that the control would last, or that it was even
yet complete. It was not evident that the political government
could control the military, or that the power of the King of Prussia
in the Empire was impaired. The peace of the world called for
plain speaking and he was harsh. The world could not trust
'those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy'
and peace could be made only with Veritable representatives of
the German people who have been assured of a genuine constitu-
tional standing/ If the Associated Powers must deal now with
'the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany*
they must demand 'not peace negotiations but surrender/
In the covering note with which Lansing passed to the Allies
the correspondence, it was stated that the President had 'en-
deavored to safeguard with the utmost care the interests of the
peoples at war with Germany/ and the hope was expressed that
each Ally 'will think he has succeeded and will be willing to co-
operate in the steps which he has suggested/
The matter of armistice and evacuation was thereafter in the
hands of the Associated Powers, with every Cabinet debating
the details, and with Foch, as chief of the military advisers, calling
his generals into conference. The Supreme War Council, mori-
bund since July, was called again to life as the clearing-house for
Allied purpose. House, who had sailed after the drafting of the
note of October 14, was in Paris by the twenty-sixth, bearing
credentials from the President and empowered to engage with
leaders there in conferences while the military advisers drafted
the paragraphs of an armistice agreement. In the United States
there was a lull while the Allies debated; a lull so far as diplomacy
was concerned, but a vacuum to be abhorred by politics. The
day that Colonel House reached France, October 25, the President
did either too much or too little; but whatever its dimensions
POLICY vs. POLITICS 443
his act dug ground from beneath his feet so as to endanger his
ability as President or as prophet to complete the work be had
begun.
The lagging canvass had kept politics largely adjourned during
the period of the loan drive, the flu epidemic, and the exciting
days of conversations with Germany; adjourned, but not sine die.
Each gain of the President as he crowded the German Government
into its corner made it harder for Republican strategists to chart a
battle or to make capital out of a claim to patriotism more stalwart
than his. Sometimes the opposition leaders approved his steps,
sometimes regretted them because they were so successful, and
sometimes they deplored them.
The dilemma of the President was that of every President who
believes in his mission. Confident in the soundness of his policy
as a national policy, he must display it as national and invite
public support regardless of party. Yet the mechanism for its
accomplishment cannot be other than political, and the ability
of any honest President to serve his people hangs on his ability
as a partisan leader to secure enough votes to keep his party friends
in office. When, however, he acts the party leader to defend his
majority he invites the charge of political hypocrisy. Woodrow
Wilson, the professor of government, would have had no difficulty
in making a sound diagnosis of the party need. Woodrow Wilson,
the politician, as he carried through the program of his first two
years, would have known what to do and how to do it. The
historian is driven to choose between a belief that the politician
had lost his insight and a belief that the prophet was so wrapt
in his prophecy that he lost touch with reality. For whatever
reason, the grip on politics was lost.
As minority President, in his first Congress, Wilson had possessed
a congressional majority bestowed upon him by the Republican
schism of 1912, with freshmen Democrats sitting for constituencies
unused to such representation. In 1914 the elections, reinforcing
a little the Democrats in the Senate, had revealed the beginning
of a recovery movement whereby Republicans, without acquiring
a majority of the House had regained some sixty Representatives.
444 PEACE AND POLITICS
The elections in the presidential year two years later, 1916, in-
stalled a Congress that was Democratic only by courtesy. In the
Senate a Democratic majority of under a dozen held on; but in
the House there were more Republicans than Democrats, and the
opposition might have organized the House for the war Congress
had it been able to command the votes of a handful of independent
Representatives. War or no war, the United States was settling
back to its normal Republican control. If the Congress to be
elected in 1918 was to be under Democratic control, permitting
the United States to escape the sabotage inherent in a divided
Congress, it was vital for Democrats to hold all of what they had,
to pick up here and there a few more Representatives, and to
defend in their seats the half-dozen Senators from normally Re-
publican States who still held on. Except as death had thinned
their number, the Senators precariously elected with Woodrow
Wilson in 1912 must be re-elected or replaced by other Democrats.
To crowd them out by any safe procedure was sound Republican
politics; to save them for the party was Democratic necessity.
And beneath the surface lull of politics pressure was turned on in
those Republican constituencies where Democrats were still in
Congress.
When Woodrow Wilson announced in May that 'politics is
adjourned, 5 he had not yet forgotten his disaster in Wisconsin,
where Paul O. Husting had in 1914 profited by Republican dis-
sension to attain the Senate. Dead by his duck-gun in 1917,
Husting was lost to the Administration. In the special election,
in April, 1918, to choose his successor, Administration Democrats
made every effort to retain the seat, although before Paul Husting
there had been no Democratic Senator elected from Wisconsin
since the Democratic interlude of 1891-93. A candidate was
found in Joseph E. Davies. The Vice-President, Marshall, in-
vaded Wisconsin, reinforcing J. Hamilton Lewis, and 'spilled the
beans, 5 as he endorsed Davies against La Follette 5 s old lieutenant
Irvine L. Lenroot. The President did a damaging bit by calling
the 'acid test 5 against Lenroot, who had voted against tabling the
McLemore resolution. He helped elect Lenroot, and provided the
PRE-ELECTION STRUGGLE 445
caption, 'acid test/ for the National Security League to use in
the autumn.
The honors were not uneven between May and October, as
both parties avoided open political aggressives. The President
proscribed Democrats in Democratic constituencies, but otherwise
generally kept silent, save in Michigan. Here he invited Henry
Ford, of no known politics, to enter the primaries as a Democrat.
Ford entered both primaries, seeking also Republican endorsement
for the seat which William Alden Smith had held since Russell
A. Alger had vacated it. Against him in the Republican primary
in August a former Republican Secretary of the Navy, Truman
H. Newberry, was entered. Ford gained his Democratic nomina-
tion, but lost the other to Newberry whose overample financial
backing made a national scandal out of the primary, and gave
body to later Democratic gibes that the Republican majority of
the Senate was e out on bail/ Newberry was elected in November,
not thereby changing the Republican strength in the Senate.
In Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, and Kansas Democratic Sena-
tors first elected in 1912 were under fire. In New Hampshire such
a Democrat did not even seek renomination. In Missouri, nor-
mally Democratic, Republicans had hopes of ousting the tempo-
rary incumbent who had gone in on the death of William J. Stone.
Should Democratic successors fail to get these seats, all of them,
the Democratic majority was likely to be lost for the next two
years, and Henry Cabot Lodge would certainly become chair-
man of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to receive
whatever treaty the President of the United States should transmit
for concurrence.
With the note of October 23 out of the way, the President
yielded to nagging from within his party and to exasperation at
the Republican roll-calling in which speakers asserting a Republi-
can war loyalty recited the difficulties which the Administration
had had with its own partisans: Champ Clark, and Claude
Kitchin, and Stanley H. Dent (who had let the management of
the Selective Service Act pass into the hands of the Republican
Kahn of California), and Thomas S. Martin, the Democratic leader
446 PEACE AND POLITICS
of the Senate, and Stone, chairman of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee. On October 25 the White House issued a political mani-
festo addressed to 'My fellow countrymen/ and thereby brought
politics fully back to life. If the people approved his leadership,
Wilson urged them to permit him to continue it by 'returning a
Democratic majority to both the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives. 3 He paid tribute to the patriotism of the leaders of
the minority, but spoke 'plain truth 5 in describing them as 'anti-
Administration. 9 They had sought to take the conduct of the war
out of his hands; and if they should be returned as leaders to the
next Congress the world would interpret it 'as a repudiation of
my leadership. 5 After his appeal he stayed out of the last days of
the canvass; but he had done too little to arouse a non-partisan
support for his Administration and too much to let it be hoped
that the Republican tacticians would take it without rejoinder.
Hays, gloves off, was instantly in print describing the appeal
as 'ungracious . . . wanton . . . mendacious.' Lodge and Smoot,
Gillett and Fess, subscribed to a counter-manifesto. Republicans
who had urged a party victory that they, better than Democrats,
might support the war, denounced the President for asking that
his own party might receive endorsement. Roosevelt, who had
himself in 1898 demanded a Republican Congress so that William
McKinley might complete his work, thundered defiance from
Carnegie Hall. Having opposed a coalition Government in
January, he now abused the President for not having formed one.
He demanded war continuance until there should be an un-
conditional surrender, and a Republican Congress that might
prevent the writing of the Fourteen Points into the agreements
of the world. He foresaw in a league of nations a United States
outvoted by Asiatics, an outside interference with American im-
migration policies, and, in point three, an abandonment of the
principle of the protective tariff. For a full week the campaign
raged in such a way as to unsettle every Democratic incumbent
of a seat that he had gained with the help of Republican votes and
to accelerate the re-establishment of the normal American equi-
librium of Republican control. Moreover, on the morning, No-
DEMOCRATIC DEFEAT 447
vember 5, when the votes were cast, it was known that the need for
war loyalty to an Administration had passed into history, for the
Allied consent to accede to a request for armistice terms was on its
way from Versailles, through Washington, to Germany. Should
Germany accept the ultimatum, the acceptance would constitute
complete surrender; should Germany reject, the victorious armies
of the pursuit could write their own peace in a victory now within
easy reach.
The votes reflected the national state of mind as well as the
partisan emotion. The Democrats lost the House, with Republi-
cans seating nearly twenty more Representatives than an absolute
majority. They lost the pivotal Senators, not to be compensated
for by taking a Massachusetts seat away from Republicans.
They lost so many that by a majority of one the control of the
Senate passed to those for whom a league of nations built by
Woodrow Wilson had no charm. And while the people voted,
the President relayed to Germany the word that 'Marshal Foch
has been authorized by the Government of the United States
and the Allied Governments to receive properly accredited repre-
sentatives of the German Government, and to communicate to
them the terms of an armistice/
XX. VICTORY
T^
JL HE real significance of the Democratic loss of Congress was
clouded for the laity. The Republican leaders knew what it
meant. In a parliamentary government it would have brought
about at once a new cabinet with a new prime minister. The
political leaders among the Allies had a glimpse of its meaning; a
glimpse brought into focus as private letters from Americans they
knew described the President as a leader without authority. But
the European peoples, seeing Wilson still in office, assumed that he
still possessed the power to lead* And Americans, wrapped up in
victory and peace, with another short session of the Democratic
Congress still ahead, generally forgot that it was only another
c lame-duck' session. The vision of a 'world safe for democracy/ to
be kept safe by a league of nations endorsed by the United States,
continued to have visibility clearer than that possessed by mere
realities of party politics.
The war continued, with an end in sight, but with no let-up.
There was still no certainty that Germany would accept the devas-
tating terms laid down by the Allies. The War Department took a
chance, quietly stopping the sailing of more men and preparing
quickly to cancel unfilled war contracts. But with an enemy in
whose complete collapse it was impossible really to believe,
prudence required that pressure should not be relaxed until the
very end. The Italian armies had started back to Caporetto on
October 24 and Austrian elimination was now at hand.
Paris became the center of the negotiation after the President on
October 23 transmitted the German notes and his responses. And
on October 31 the Supreme War Council held formal session.
The meeting had been deferred until substantial agreement had
THE WILSON DOCTRINE AND PEACE 449
been reached upon most of the matters at issue. So far as armistice
terms were concerned, these were in the hands of Foch and there
was no difference of opinion upon their complete, conclusive
severity. They were to end the war beyond a possibility of reopen-
ing it. From Foch was expected, too, counsel in the matter of
policy: should there be an armistice at all, or should the aggressive
be continued until the enemy surrendered in the field?
Outside the possible competence of Foch was the question of
larger policy, upon which the position of the United States was
firm. The German notes had made desperate efforts to suggest
that Germany was animated by a desire for peace on the Wilson
basis rather than because of inability longer to resist the will of the
victor. But by this time the Allies knew better, and before they
pledged themselves in an armistice to any principles that should
bind them in a subsequent peace, they could not escape the neces-
sity to re-examine the Fourteen Points and the five particulars, 5
and to determine the extent to which they were willing to be
bound. House put it bluntly to the Premiers that if they rejected
the proposals the President would be forced to drop the negotia-
tion. This, said House, 'would leave the President free ... to
determine whether the United States should continue to fight for
the principles laid down by the Allies/ Anticipating, as Wilson
blindly did, that Wilson would retain a majority and might
be present in person at the peace conference backed by his au-
thority over world idealism, the Allies were unwilling to permit
a wedge to be driven between themselves and him. They might
have been less unwilling had the decision been delayed until after
the election. Wilson had for the moment a strong grip on their
weary home constituencies. With victory at hand the world
desired peace.
Hence arose the Allied discussions at home, the talks with House
to get at the inner content of the mind of the President, and the
decision that if Germany should accept the armistice they could
afford to accept most of the Wilson doctrine.
On two points in variation or elaboration of the doctrine they
were immovable. When they told the President they were ready
450
VICTORY
for Foch to receive the German envoys, they told him also of
amendments to his doctrine. These he transmitted to Germany on
November 5. His second point, they said, 'relating to what is
usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various
interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must,
therefore, reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject
when they enter the peace conference. 5 To this extent Wilson's
doctrinal contest with the Allies paused at less than victory for
him; and Germany received the armistice knowing this. In the
second place, and here the President agreed with the Allies as he
transmitted their decision to Germany, they expanded his declara-
tion that 'invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated
and freed.' The Associated Powers removed all doubts: 'they un-
derstand that compensation will be made by Germany for all
damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and to their
property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from
the air.'
Subject to these qualifications, and the acceptance of the
Armistice, they agreed to make peace on the terms laid down by
the President. They were well on the way to their agreement, after
private conference, when Foch advised the Supreme War Council
on October 3 1 that if necessary he could force the enemy to 'his
complete defeat.' In the discussions with his commanders which
he had begun five days before, Foch had found himself between
Haig and Pershing. The former believed an armistice to be
expedient and desired it not to be too harsh to be accepted. The
latter preferred no armistice at all. Foch asserted that such an
armistice as he would draft would accomplish the purposes of the
Allies, and that with these accomplished the war should stop.
Events in the field were making it each day easier to lighten the
demands. Turkey had signed a surrender on October 30, effective
the next day when the Council met. And the papers of November
3 carried in streamer headlines: 'Austria Quits.' The Austrian
surrender was effective at 3 P.M. on Monday, November 4, leaving
Germany in complete isolation before the American polls were
opened. That afternoon the Premiers signed the terms of the
FOGH'S MILITARY MEMORANDUM 451
Armistice, House cabled them in confidence to the President (for
they were to be published only after Germany had asked for them),
and victory hung upon the degree of the defeat of Germany. On
election day the German fleet at Kiel was in the hands of muti-
neers, resisting an order to go to sea, and Germany had no longer
any option. Ludendorff was already out of his command; and on
the night of Saturday, November 9, the Emperor crossed the fron-
tier of the Netherlands, an ex-Kaiser, seeking asylum.
Immediately on the receipt of the American note of November
5 the German envoys started for the frontier, guided by wireless
from Foch who indicated the sector where fire would be stopped
permitting them to cross the lines. French guides received them
late on Thursday night, bringing them early Friday morning to
the private train of Foch, parked in the Forest of Compiegne.
Here, from the posture in which they awaited the offer of an
armistice, they were driven to the humiliation of requesting terms.
No proposal from them was entertained. No immediate cessation
of hostilities was granted. They were given seventy-two hours in
which to sign the memorandum; hours during which Foch con-
tinued his preparations for the extension of his active line into
Lorraine. Hopeful, though without warrant for a hope, since all
they had received was permission to ask for an armistice, the
German delegates were halted by the severity of the military
terms. Their powers to sign were insufficient to warrant them in
signing the military memorandum; and although Foch was
adamant upon the three-day limit, he permitted them to dispatch
couriers to Germany for the additional authority.
The paper handed them by Foch and the British Admiral
Wemyss, who had been delegated to act with him (since the terms
were naval as well as military), called for a complete evacuation of
the West within fourteen days and an occupation by the Associated
armies step by step with the evacuation. It called for the evacua-
tion of the left bank of the Rhine, the occupation by the victors of
bridgeheads and sectors at Cologne, Coblenz, and Mainz, and the
neutralization of a strip east of the Rhine from Switzerland to the
Dutch border, forty kilometers wide at the western end, thirty
452 VICTORY
kilometers next to Switzerland. It called for immediate repatria-
tion of prisoners of war from German camps, without reciprocity,
and of inhabitants of occupied country who had been deported,
for a cessation of damage, a delivery of military establishments and
supplies and rolling stock for the railways, and a surrender of guns
and planes. It called also for the surrender of the German sub-
marine fleet and the battle fleet, and carried detailed annexes
that stripped away all fighting power. It dealt in similar detail
with the various fronts on which Germany was fighting, and also
required the abandonment of the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and
Bucharest, extorted from Russia and Rumania as Germany had
put them out of the war. It reserved to the Allies and to the United
States full right to make claim for damage done, to requisition
property as needed in the German territory their armies should
occupy, and to maintain without relaxation the blockade condi-
tions they had set up. It was to last for thirty-six days, with option
to extend, subject, however, to denunciation on forty-eight hours'
notice. Six hours after its signing the guns were to cease firing.
Harsh as the Armistice was, it must be signed; though by whom
was a matter of conjecture as revolution swept over Germany on
the day after its delivery. The Hohenzollern abdication ended the
Empire on Saturday. The Provisional Government of what was to
become the new Reich was set up on Sunday with Freidrich
Ebert, a Socialist, as first among the six commissaries. Early on
Monday morning, barely within the three-day limit, the envoys
with their full powers were back with Foch. At 5 A.M., Paris time,
Matthias Erzberger signed the first of the German signatures to the
Armistice, pursuant to which at 1 1 A.M., on the morning of Novem-
ber ii, the fighting stopped.
They signed in the Forest of Coinpi&gne early enough for the
news to catch the morning papers of the United States, where
streaming headlines proclaimed that 'Germany Surrenders';
in time to make that day a holiday as riotous as though a 'false
armistice' had not preceded it; in time for the chaplain of the
Senate to thank God 'because Thy power has gotten us the victory'
and to pray for wisdom Tor the problems that confront us.' They
WILSON'S PEACE MESSAGE 453
signed in time, too, for Woodrow Wilson to visit the Congress in
joint session at i P.M. to read the terms of the Armistice:
The war thus comes to an end [he said as he completed the
reading of the terms] ... it was the privilege of our own people to
enter it at its most critical juncture in such fashion and in such
force as to contribute in a way of which we are all deeply proud
to the great result The arbitrary power of the military caste
of Germany ... is discredited and destroyed The great nations
which associated themselves to destroy it have now definitely
united in the common purpose to set up such a peace as will satisfy
the longing of the whole world I, for one, do not doubt their
purpose or their capacity.
He had forgotten himself as politician, forgotten it too wholly for
his own success. But his words were consistent with his language
as prophet. As President, he spoke of victory without undue
elation, but with a 'humane temper and intention* which he
ascribed to the Allied Governments as to his own. He said nothing
of the tour deforce, executed under his hand, which had for the first
time mobilized for a common purpose the imagination, man-
power, and material strength of American democracy.
THE END
INDEX
Abbeville, conference at, 318
Adams, Charles Francis, 196
Adams, Henry, 197
Adamson Act, 22, 25
Administration Army bill, 4
Adriatic, see Italian Front
Advisory Commission, 20 ff., 24, 25;
formation of policy, 26, 28; appoint-
ment of committees, 37; suggested
legislation, 41; 120
Aeronautical Division of Signal Corps,
112, 270
Aeronautics, National Advisory Com-
mittee for, 32, in
Aircraft Production Board, 32, 36, 112,
266, 267, 268-270
Aisne, the, 323
Albert, Kong of Belgium, 389, 411
Aldrich Report, 150
Alexander, Major-General Robert, 399
Alger, Russell A., 445
Alien Property Custodian, 130
Allied Maritime Transport Council, 201,
244, 295, 296, 302; one hundred
divisions program, 366
Allied Powers, 2; control of trade, 42;
purpose, 48, 49, 50; financial demands,
66; western front, 92-94; demands for
supplies, 120, 121, 125; food conserva-
tion, 127; exports, 128; on peace
proposals, 158, 161, 163; 172; on war
aims, 174; 'Fourteen Points/ 179, 182,
183, 185; council at Rapallo, 186;
military program, 187; 'steering com-
mittee/ 188-190, 191, 192, 193; U.S.
loans, 193; War Council, 194-200; on
command, 201, 204, 205; 210, 224, 228;
political conference in London, 233;
German offensive in the Somme Valley,
238-241; appointment of Marshal
Foch, 242, 245, 246, 250, 253; 264;
shipping schedules, 296, 304; arrival of
A.E.F. Divisions, 315 ff.; German ad-
vance at Chateau-Thierry, 319; on
separate American army, 321; German
drive, 322; German advance on
Marne, 325 ff.; use of American troops,
343 J 34 8 ; purchase of supplies, 348 ff.;
food supply program, 363 ff.; opening
of frontier railroads, 376; 390 ff.;
Meuse-Argonne, 391 ff.; beginning of
peace negotiations, 408; American
doctrine, 410; Meuse-Argonne, 410 ff.;
German retreat, 414; proposed armi-
stice, 415; American's share in victory,
422 ff.; peace negotiation, 435 ff., 447 ff.
Allied War Missions, arrival in U.S., 3, 4,
10; 13, 66, 89, 194
Alsace-Lorraine, 180, 182; see also Four-
teen Points
America Goes to War, Charles C. Tansill, 49
America in France, Frederick Palmer, 96
American Alliance of Labor and Democ-
racy, 164, 177
American Army in France, igijigiQy James
G. Harbord, go
American Committee on War Finance, 1 1
American Expeditionary Force, 9, 39, 88,
89; allotted location, 94; preparations for
arrival in France, 96; organization, 97;
formation of divisions, 103, 104; first
arrivals of National Army, 106; weap-
ons, 109; Inter-Ally Conference, 199;
224; Baker's inspection of, 235; 236; the
5 *G's/ 237; 238; First Division of, 243,
247; second draft, A.E.F., 250; shipping
schedules, 297, 300, 306-309; arrival
of First Army Corps, 309; organization
of divisions, 310, 311; participation in
combat, First Division, 312; Second
Division in training, 312; Rainbow
Division, 315; 32d Division, 316; at
Cantigny, 321 fF.; German drive to the
Marne, 325 ff.; at Chateau-Thierry,
326; at Metz, 327; at Belleau Woods,
328 ff.; at Camp Logan, 330, 331;
arrival of 33d Division, 331; at Reims,
335 ff.; First Division sent to Soissons,
337; battle of the Mame, 337 ff.;
recognition of A.E.F., 339; Third Army
456
INDEX
Corps, 340; eleven divisions at front,
341; provision of supplies, 347 ff.; one-
hundred divisions program, 348 ff.; at
St. Mihiel, 368 ff.; ruse at Belfort, 373;
Foch's program, 374 ff.; formation of
First Army, 375 ff.; corps administra-
tion, 376 ff.; third battle of the Somme,
378 ff.; First Army in Toul, 380 ff.; St.
Mihiel salient, 382 ff.; 390; Meuse-
Argonne, 391 ff., 410 ff.; on road to
Metz, 415; at Sedan, 449 ff.
American Federation of Labor, 25;
Gompers's association with, 26; left-
wing movements, 46; 122, 126; Presi-
dent's speech to, 167, 170, 171, 261, 262
American Industry in the War; A Report of
the War Industries Board, Bernard M.
Baruch, 366
American Mission to England, 196 ff.
American Newspaper Publishers' Associa-
tion, 6 1
American Protective League, 129
American Socialist, 64
American Thresherman, 146
Americans Answer, 410
America's Munitions 1917-1918, Crowell, 1 1 2
Amiens, 238-240, 319 ff.
Aquitania, the, 302
Ardennes, 382
Army War College, 98
Asquith, Herbert H. (Lord Oxford), 174
Associated Press, 292
Atterbury, General William Wallace, 96
Austria-Hungary, see Central Powers
Automative Transport Committee, 36
Aviation, 32; program, in; 266-270
Baccarat, 315
Baker, Newton D., conference with
governors, 30; on censorship, 43; Why
We Went to War, 50; on relief" move-
ments, 58, 59; 88; military program, 91 ;
98; work with March, 98, 99; draft, 100,
101; on transport protection, 106; on
weapons, no; address to Forty-First
Division, 115; labor problems, 169; on
military command, 203; on soldiers'
insurance, 206; on army morale, 209;
212, 217; creation of War Council, 220;
appointment of Stettinius, 221; visit
to France, 222, 224; 225, 229; reorgani-
zation of War Department, 234; visit
to Pershing, 235; 243, 244, 245; return
to U.S., 247; second draft, 250; on
aviation, 267; 282, 283; departure from
France, 317, 351; 353; revision of
draft, 357; on additional tonnage, 367;
4<>3> 438
Balfour, Lord, 3, 13, 14, 167, 178, 197,
362
Balkan States, 171, 172, 174, 180, 186;
see also Fourteen Points
Baltic Society, The, 88
Barnes, William, 428
Baruch, Bernard M., 31, 37 ff., 41, i 20 ,
121, 125, 220, 221, 234, 252; organiza-
tion of War Industries Board, 253, 256,
263, 269; American Industry in the War,
366
Beauvais Conference, 244-246; 317
Belfort, 373
Belgium, 180, 246; see also Allies
Belleau Woods, 328 ff.
Bell, Major-General George, Jr., 330
Benedict XV, Pope, 157, 162, 163, 173,
184
Berger, Victor L., 53, 54, 64, 279, 280
Berlin, Sergeant Irving, 39
Bernstorff, Count Johann von, 20, 71, 171,
280, 302
Bishop, Joseph Bucklin, Theodore Roosevelt
and his Time, 8
Bliss, Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of
General Tasker H. Bliss, Frederick
Palmer, 191
Bliss, Tasker H., 90, 98, 190, 195, 229, 230,
231, 232, 233, 235, 243, 244, 245, 250,
308; organization of shipping troops,
317 ff, 320, 325.351
Blockade, 199
Blois, 310
Blue Eagle, from Egg to Earth, Hugh S.
Johnson, 100
Borah, Senator William E., 293
Borchard, Edwin, Neutrality for the United
States, 1 60
Borglum, Gutzon, 267, 270
Bourbon Conference, 395
Bouresches, 328
Bowman, Isaiah, 166
Brandeis, Louis, Chief Justice, 166
Brent, Bishop Charles Henry, 362
Brest-Litovsk, Treaty negotiations of,
158, 175, 183^233
Bridge to France, The, Edward N. Hurley, 67
Brisbane, Arthur, 60
British Grand Fleet, 304
Britten, Fred A., 136
Brookings: A Biography, Hermann Hage-
dorn, 122
Brookings, Robert S., 121, 125, 253
Bryce Report on Belgium, 52
Buchan, John, History of the Great War, 377,
417
Buck, Brig, Gen. Beaumont B., 322
Bull, 64, 280
INDEX
457
Bullard, Major-General Robert Lee, 204,
312 ff.; 322, 337*340; Meuse-Argonne,
392 ff.; 415 ff.
Bundy, Major-General Omar, 326, 327,
337, 373 ff-
Burbank, Luther, 175
Bureau of Standards, 32, 269
Burleson, Postmaster-General, 64, 148,
225, 280, 286, 287, 292, 293; telephone
and telegraph, 355
Cadorna, Count Luigi, 184, 190, 232
Gamps, construction of, 106, 107; organi-
zation, see A.E.F.; location, see map
Cannon, Joseph, 292
Cantigny, 320 ff.
Capital Times (Madison), 278
Caporetto, Battle of, 185; 409, 417
Catt, Carrie Chapman, 31
Cecil, Lord, 156
Censorship, see Committee on Public
Information
Central Powers, 48, 50, 157, 160, 174,
175, 179, 182, 183, 184, 185, 1 86, 192,
193; retreat, 389 ff.; beginning of peace
negotiations, 410 ff.; 422; surrender in
East, 435; 'Fourteen Points, 5 437 ff.;
peace terms, 447 ff.; see also Germany
Chafee, Zechariah, Freedom of Speech, 65
Chamberlain, George E., 5, 8 1, 211, 216,
218, 219, 220, 222, 224
Charteris, John, Field Marshal Earl Haig,
39i
Chateau-Thierry, 320, 326 ff.
Chaumont, 97, 236, 237, 310, 311
Chemicals, Warfare Service, 36; Alliance,
123
Chemin des Dames, 313, 319, 323 "
Chicago Herald, 285
Christian Science Monitor, 269, 408, 438
Christy, Howard Chandler, 271, 433
Civil War, draft, 5; selection of officers, 8;
taxation, 12, 15; procurement of sup-
plies, 35; 51; committee on conduct of
war, 83; enlistment, 100; 108, 138, 140,
149, 206, 424
Clark, Speaker Champ, 4, 62, 225
Clarkson, Grosvenor B., 22, 253
Clayton Act, 25
Clemenceau, Premier Georges, approval of
T. Roosevelt, 8; 97; war aim, 1 74; Tour-
teen Points,' 183; Council at Rapallo,
1 86; 'Steering Committee/ 189, 190;
231, 233; appointment of Foch, 24;
242, 245, 246, 319-344; unification of
purchasing policy, 350 ff.; 403, 413
Coffin, Howard E., 32
Cohan, George M., 74
Colby, Bainbridge, 195, 199
Colliers, 44, 266
Commanding an American Army: Recollections
of the World War, Major-General Hunter
Liggett^ 321
Commercial Economy Board, formation
of, 27; conservation policies, 28, 29
Committee on Public Information, 17;
powers, 43; organization, 44; Official
Bulletin, 46; pamphlets, 47, 51; 52, 58;
censorship, 60, 134; on Loan drive,
140; on 'Fourteen Points,' 180; on
Senate investigation, 212, 284, 410
Commodities, see also Supplies, 124
Communications, Line of, 96, 236, 243
Conduite de la Guerre, De la y Ferdinand
Foch, 241
Congress, war legislation, 2, 4; Selective
Service Act, 5, 6; passage of Loan Act,
13; on railroads, 23; censorship bill,
60, 62; shipping bill, 68, 69, 70; Com-
mittee on Agriculture, 80, 81 ; debate on
food administration, 82, 83; passage of
Lever Act, 84; selection of camp sites,
1 08; war legislation, 117, 118, 124;
assignment of powers over trade, 132;
on taxation, 139, 140; appropriation,
142; on prohibition, 143; financial
policy, 144-151; excess profits tax, 154-
156; declaration of war on Austria-
Hungary, 172; 'Fourteen Points/ 178-
180; on military command, 202204;
Senate Committee on Military Affairs,
2 1 1 ; on proposed war cabinet, 2 18-220;
passage of Overman Act, 225, 226;
organization of draft, 249, 250; organ-
ization of War Industries Board, 252,
253> 2 57> oills on sedition, 275, 277;
on socialism, 280, 288; on sabotage,
289; Sedition Act, 353; Revenue Act,
354; price-fixing on wheat, 255; revision
of draft, 358 ff.; peace negotiations, 431
ff; deficiency appropriation bill, 432;
Wilson's second German note, 436 ff.;
election, 444 ff.
Congressional Record, 57, 82, 154, 224, 284,
436
Conscientious Objector in America, Norman
Thomas, 101
Council of National Defense, purpose, 20,
24; Annual Report, 27-29; co-operation
with States, 30; on aviation, 32; on
munitions, 33; appointment of commit-
tees, 36; direction of purchases, 40; on
housing scarcity, 76; Emergency Con-
struction Committee, 106, 107; enlist-
ment of volunteer service, 118; 119,
124, 125; labor problems, 169, 170;
458
INDEX
206, 251, 252; War Industries Board,
257; on aviation, 267, 269, 365
Cravath, Paul T., 195
Creel, George, 17, 27; appointment by
President, 44; How We Advertised America,
44, 45; policy, 46; publication of pam-
phlets, 47; 49, 50, 52, 56, 283, 284;
national propaganda, 410; 430
Crosby, Oscar T., 195, 199
Crowder, Enoch EL, 99, 100; Spirit of the
Selective Service, 101, 225, 249, 271;
Second Annual Report of the Provost-
Marshal-General, Final Report, 358
Crowell, Benedict, 32, 222, 234, 267,
364, 367
Cummings, Homer S., 428
Cunliffe, Baron, 13
Daily Telegraph (London), 174
Daly, Marcus, 269
Damrosch, Walter, 361
Daniels, Josephus, 62, 300, 303, 327
Dardanelles, The, 186; see also Eastern
Front
Davies, Joseph E., 279, 444
Davis, 'Cyclone,' 147
Davison, Henry P., 59, 71, 361
Dawes, Charles G., 96; Journal of the
Great War, 346; unification of buying,
347 F.; program of supplies, 3596%;
365, 377
Day, Charles, 365
Debs, Eugene V., 53, 281
Democratic National Committee, 42
Democratic Party, association of S.
Gompers with, 25
Denman, William, 70, 71, 73, 77, 86,
1 20
Denmark, 305
Dent, Stanley H., 5, 6, 445
d'Espe*rey, General Franchet, 435
Destroyers, 298 ff.
Deutsch-Amerikanische Nationalbund, 275-
277
Diaz, General Armando, 185, 384
Dickman, Major-General Joseph T., 115,
326, 327; Meuse-Argonne, 392 ff.; 415
ff.;4i7
Disease, prevention of, 108, 109, 361 ff.
Disque, Brice P., 268
Divisions, see American Expeditionary
Forces
Dormans, 335 ff.
Doyle, Sir Arthur Conan, History of the
Great War, 391
Draft, experience of England, 4; see also
Selective Service Act; industrial re-
cruits, 76; operation of, 101; classifica-
tion of industries, 249, 250; 260; revision
of draft, 355 ff.
Drum, Hugh A., 375
Eastern Front, 187, 380
Eastman, Max, 64, 284
Edward, Major-General Clarence R., 310
3*4
Ehrlich, Professor Paul, 132
Eidlitz, Otto, 76
Eisenmann, Charles, 40
Ely, Colonel Hansan E., 322
Embarkation Service, 105, 116, 244, 251,
311,358,367
Emergency Construction Committee, 36
Emergency Fleet Corporation, 68, 70, 71,
7 2 > 73> 75; housing program, 76; 108,
119, 120; labor adjustment, 169; 198,
220, 253; 'bridge of ships,' 263, 266,
295; removal to Philadelphia, 354;
365, 3^7
Empey, Arthur Guy (Sergeant), Over the
Top by an American Soldier Who Went, 140
Enemy property, treatment of, 130 ff.
Engineering, 27
Equipment, 108; see also Uniforms,
Munitions and Supplies
Espionage Act, 41, 42, 61, 62; use of
mails, 63, 65; control of exports, 78,
125, 128, 134, 284, 291
Export Licenses, Divisions of, 126, 133
Exports, 41; Council of, 42; control of,
78, 126, 133
Face to Face with Kaiserism, by James Watson
Gerard, 49
Fayle, C. Ernest, Seaborne Trade, 295
Federal Reserve Board, 256, 257
Federal Reserve System, 138, 139
Federal Trade Commission, 86, 132, 254
Felton, Samuel M., 364
Ferris, Scott, 428
Ferris, Theodore, 73
Fess, Simeon D,, 429
Filene, Edward A., 67
Final Report, Enoch H. Crowder, 358
Finances of war, 11; emergency loan
measure, 12, 13; bond issues, 13, 15;
short-term notes, i^; bidding against
Allies, 120; ^ price-fixing, 121, 137-140,
i -3.5; American Committee on War
Finance, 145-151, 154-156; loans to
Allies, 193, 194; soldier's insurance,
207, 256, 257
Finland, 175
Fiscal policy, 137 ff.; see also Finances of
War
Fisheries, Bureau of, 79
INDEX
459
Fletcher, William B., 122
Foch, Marshal Ferdinand, 42, 125, 233, \
241, 242, 245; Commander in Chief of.
Allied Armies, 246, 250; 308; 318;
German drive to the Marne, 326;
strengthening of forces, 329 ff.; battle
at Reims, 335; counter-offensive, 336 ff.;
use of American troops, 343; at St.
Mihiel, 368 ff.; program for 1918-1919,
374 ff.; 382; projected St. Mihiel salient,
382 ff.; 387; 413, 414; Senlis conference,
4i5ff.; receives German envoys, 421;
437, 447
Food Administration, 27; installation of
Hoover, 30; food conservation, 77, 78,
79; price on wheat, 83; 119, 125; con-
servation, 127, 133, 140, 197, 20^253;
price-fixing, 355; one hundred divisions
program, 363 ff.
Ford, Henry, 33, 69, 153, 299, 445
Fordney, Senator, 143, 144, 147
Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 1913-
*9i7> The, Edgar E. Robinson, 173
Fort Leavenworth, 98
Fosdick, Raymond B., 209
Four-Minute Men, 46, 76, 140, 271
'Fourteen Points,' 178-180, 182, 192, 193,
408, 423, 431 ; 'Five Particulars,' 434 ff.,
446
Frankfurter, Felix, 169, 261, 263
Franklin, P. A. S., 74, 75, 251
Frayne, Hugh, 122
Frazier, Governor Lynn F., 55
Freedom of Speech, Zechariah Chafee, 65
Fuel, 86, 120, 125, 133, 214-216, 253
Gallinger, Jacob H., 430
Garfield, Harry A., 83; Fuel Adminis-
trator, 86, 125, 215
Gasparri, Cardinal, 162
Gay, Professor Edwin F., 75
Geddes, Sir Eric, 362
General Purchasing Board, 346 ff.
General Staff of the Army, 35, 98, 220,
234, 250, 347> 353, 377 , ^
Genesis of the American First Army, The, 373
George, David Lloyd, 19, 66, 67, 77, 175,
I77ff., 183; Council at Rapallo, 186;
'steering committee,' 189, 190; Supreme
War Council, 192; on American Mis-
sion, 198; 203, 204; appeal for American
troops, 230; 231, 240, 241; 243-246.
319, 320, 344; on food supplies, 364:
Gerard, James Watson, My Four Tears in
Germany, Face to Face with Kaiserism, 49
German War Code, The, C.P.I, publication
5*
German War Practices, C.P.I, publication,
5 1
rermany, see also Central Powers; So-
cialists, 54; submarine warfare, 67,1 64;
171, 172; colonial demands, 172;
German people, 173, 174, 180, 186, 201,
233; offensive in Somme Valley, 239 ff.;
drive in St. Mihiel, 312; at Chateau-
Thierry, 319; at Cantigny, 321; at the
Marne, 325 ff.; 335 ff.; Salient at St.
Mihiel, 370 ff.; third battle of the
Somme, 378 ff.; occupation of Metz,
385; retreat in West, 389 ff.; peace
negotiations, 408 ff.; 'Fourteen Points,'
41 off.; Meuse-Argonne, 410 ff.; col-
lapse, 414 ff.; envoys sent to Foch, 421;
surrender in East, 435; 'Fourteen Points,
435 ff-5 note of su omission, 441 ff.;
peace terms, 447 ff.
jibson, Charles Dana, 433
jievres, 310
jifford, Walter L., 22, 120, 124, 365
jleaves, Vice-Admiral Albert, A History
of the Transport Service., 308
Goethals, Major-General George W.,
appointment to Emergency Fleet Cor-
poration, 68, 70, 71, 73, 77; as Acting
Quartermaster-General, 108; 120, 124,
220, 221, 234, 250, 251, 252, 263, 351;
reorganization of procurement, 364
Gompers, Samuel, 25; membership on
Advisory, Commission, 26; fight against
radicalism, 56; 122, 126; support of
war, 167, 1 68, 171, 176, 206, 260, 355
Gondrecourt, 311, 312
Gorgas, Major-General William C., 28,
3 6 7
Government of Germany, The, C.P.I, publica-
tion, 51
Government Manufacture of Arms by Colonel
Francis J. Kernan, 33
Graham, George S., 62
Grasty, Charles H., 195
Grattan, C. Hartley, Why We Fought, 49
Gregory, Attorney-General Thomas W.,
62-64; 287, 289, 290
Gronna, Senator, 62, 144
Guide to the American Battle Fields in Europe,
321
Haan, Major-General William G., 316
Hagedorn, Hermann, Leonard Wood:
A Biography, 89; Brookings: A Biography,
122
Hagood, General Johnson, The Services oj
Supply, 345
Haig, Field Marshal Sir Douglas, 187,
230, 232, 235, 238-240, 241, 245; at St.
460
INDEX
Mihiel, 368 ff.; 374; frontier railroads
376; third battle of the Somme, 378 ff.
Senlis conference, 415 ff.
Handbook of Economic Agencies, 36
Handbook of ike ^ War for Public Speakers, 52
Harbord, Major-General James G., 42
90, 237, 315, 337, 346, 352, 411
Harding, Warren G,, 17, 281
Harriman, E. H., 122
Harrison, Fairfax, 24
Hart, Albert Bushnell, 289
Hart, Captain Liddell, The War in Outline
368
Harvey, George, 212, 220, 281, 285
Hays, Will H., 340, 353, 426, 427, 428
Haywood, William D., 288
Hearst, William Randolph, newspapers,
61, 156, 285; 428
Henderson, Arthur, 176-178
Hillquit, Morris, 53, 54
Hindenburg, Marshal Paul von, 190, 4083
411
Hindenburg Line, 188, 378, 390
Hines, Frank T., 251
Hines, Major-General John Leonard,
Meuse-Argonne, 392 ff., 415 ff.
History of the Great War, John Buchan, 377
History of the Great War, Sir Arthur Conan
Doyle, 391
History of the 33d Division, The, Frederic L.
Huidekoper, 330
History of the Transport Service, A, Vice-
Admiral Albert Gleaves, 308
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 45
Hoover, Herbert Clark, food conserva-
tion, 29; apppointment as head of Food
Administration, 30; as Food Commis-
sioner, 41; on food conservation, 77, 78,
79, 81, 82; work in Belgium, 83; 91,
125; one hundred divisions program,
363 ff.
House, Colonel Edward Mandell, 1 7, 1 63,
171; Allied Conference, 176; 178; 'Four-
teen Points/ 1 80; on 'steering commit-
tee,' 190; American Mission to London,
i95> 196* 19% 198, 199; 229, 230, 292,
437, 438, 441, 449
House 'Inquiry,' 166, 167, 176, 197
Housing Corporation, 77, 356
How the War Came to America, C.P.I, publi-
cation, 47
How We Advertised America by George
Creel, 44
Howard, Roy W., 420
Hubert, L. Lucien, La Renaissance d'w
de'partement de'vasti, 382
Hughes, Charles Evans, 270, 281, 287,
424
Huidekoper, Frederic L., The Military
Unpreparedness of the United States, 320-
The History of the 3$d Division, A.E.F., 320
Hurley, Edward N., The Bridge to France
67; 68, 71, 75, 86, 265
Husting, Paul O., 278, 444
Hylan, John F., 167
Immigration, 129
Industrial America and the World War, 22
Industry, 122, 123, 125; enemy-owned
patents, 132; wage-fixing, 168; see also
War Industries Board
Inside Story of the A.E.F., The, George
Pattullo, 319
Instructions for the Government of Armies in the
Field, Francis Lieber, 51
Insurance, Bureau of War Risk, 206, 207
Inter- Ally Conference, 196, 197-199
Inter-Ally Food Council, 364
International Workers of World, 70 IQK
168,169,268,287,289 *
Interstate Commerce Commission, 23;
Car Service Bureau, 74; 213
Ireland, Merritte W., Chief Surgeon, 384
Iron and Steel Institute, 1 23
Irwin, Will, 82
Issoudun, 310
It Might Have Been Lost, Thomas C. Loner-
g a *i, 319
Italian Front, 184, 185, 186, 246, 384, 417
Jeffersonian, 285
Joffre, Marshal Joseph Jacques, 3, 4, 10,
89
Johnson, Hiram, 68, 82, 293
Johnson, Hugh .,99, 100, 221, 250
Johnson, Thomas M., Without Censor, 368
Journal of the Great War, Charles G. Dawes,
346
Jusserand, Jean,, 13, 163, 195, 231, 244,
336, 360
Kahn, Julius, 5, 373, 445
Kansas City Star, 281, 292
Kellogg, Frank P., 278
SCenly, Major-General William L., 270
iCeppel, Frederick P., 59, 250
JCerensky, Alexander, 54, 157, 170
iCernan, Colonel Francis J., 33, 91; Line
of Communications, 96; 105; report
on manufacture of arms, 119, 235, 345,
347
iCiel Canal, 51
iCipling, Rudyard, 360
Sing, Senator William fiL, 128, 135, 292
Kitchen, Claude, 12, 14, 143, 225, 445
Knights of Columbus, 58, 362
INDEX
461
Labor, relationship with Advisory Com-
mission, 25, 26; adjustment of wages,
1 68; Bisbee strike, 169; railroad labor,
214; 26
La Follette, Robert M., 56, 57, 62, 84; on
taxation, 144-146; 151, 154; manifesto
on peace, 157; 277, 278, 279, 444
Lage, William P., Neutrality for the United
States, 1 60
Landis, Judge Kenesaw Mountain, 288
Lane, Franklin K., 195
Lansdowne, Lord, 174
Lansing, Robert, 163, 166, 178, 196, 408,
436 ft; 443
Law, Bonar, 175, 192
Lejeune, Brigadier-General John A., 352
Lenroot, Irvine L., 279, 444
Leonard Wood: A Biography, Hermann
Hagedorn, 89
Lever Act, 78, 80-84, IQ 8j 119* 122, 143,
253
Lever, Asbury F., 80, 81
Leviathan, 71, 302
Lewis, Colonel Isaac N., no
Lewis, James Hamilton, 17, 279, 432, 444
Liberty Loans: First, 1 6, 17, 21, 30, 31, 59,
77, 132; Second, 137, 140, 141, 199, 257;
Third, 271, 283, 291, 292, 353; Fourth,
432
Liberty Motor, 32, 112, 266
Lieber, Francis, Instructions for the Govern-
ment of Armies in the Field, 51
Liggett, Major-General Hunter, 115, 191,
309; Commanding an American Army, 321;
335> 342, 3755 Meuse-Argonne, 391 ff.,
411,414, 417 ff., 437
Lippmann, Walter, 166
Lithuania, 175
Littell, Brigadier-General L. W., 107
Little, Frank, 287
Loan Act, 10, 66; second, 139
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 149, 163, 282, 424,
430 ff.; 438, 445, 446
London, Meyer, 292
Lonergan, Thomas C., It Might Have Been
Lost, 319
Longworth, Nicholas, 7, 218
Lovett, Robert S., 122, 125
Ludendorff, Erich von, 188, 411
Luneville, 315
Lusitania, 283
MacArthur, Douglas, 315
MacDonald, Ramsay, 177
Mack, Judge Julian W., 206, 207
Maclay, Sir Joseph, 230
Macy, V. Everit, 169
Mann, Major-General William A., 315
March, Peyton C., 98, 99, 220, 235, 244;
'work or fight,* 248; 250, 251, 252, 256,
263; one hundred divisions program,
35 1; 353; Fc-ch's program, 374 ff.
Marchand, General Jean Baptiste, 327
Marine Corps, 312, 327
Marne, the, 325, 336 ft.
Marshall, Vice President Thomas R., 279,
280, 444.
Martin, Thomas S., 225, 445
Masses, 64, 285
Mauretania, 302
Maximilian, Prince of Baden, 436, 437
Mayo, Katherine, That Dam T, 361
McAdoo, William G., n; Crowded Tears,
12, 13, 15; announcement of Liberty
Loan, 16; 120, 125, 138, 139, 140;
Second Liberty Loan, 141, 142-145;
loans to Allies, 193, 196; on soldier's
insurance, 206; on railroads, 213; Third
Liberty Loan, 270-271; Fourth Liberty
Loan, 432
McCormick, Vance C., 42, 125, 133, 195,
McGlacklin, Major-General Edward F.,
384
McLemore, Jeff, 427
Medical Corps, 28, 367
Menoher, Major-General Charles T., 315
Metropolitan, 9
Metz, 326, 327; 368 ff.; 383 ff.
Meuse-Argonne, 391 ff.
Mezes, Sidney E., 166
Michaelis, Georg, 50
Michelson, Charles, 218
Military Board of Allied Supply, 350 ff.
Military Intelligence, Division of, 129, 290
Military Unpreparedness of the United States,
The, Frederic L. Huidekoper, 330
Millis, Walter, Road to War, 49
Milner, Lord, 240, 241, 318
Milwaukee Leader, 64, 280, 285
Mineral resources, 37, 121
Mines, Bureau of, 121
Mitchell, Colonel William, 384
Monroe Doctrine, 49
Mons, 391
Montague, Andrew J., 127
Montdidier, 240, 312 ff.; 378
Montfaucon, 399 ff.
Morale of army, 210, 361 ff.
Morgenthau, Henry, 51
Morrow, Dwight, 359
Mulhouse, 373 ff
Munitions, formation of committees, 31,
32, 34, 37; manufacture of, in, 119 ff.;
20 1, 344; Inter- Allied Munitions Coun-
cil, 365; heavy mobile guns, 380, 381
462
INDEX
Munitions Standard Board, 33, 119
My Experiences in the World War, John J.
Pershing, 89
My Four Tears in Germany, by James W.
Gerard, 49
Myers, Senator, 135, 274, 288, 291, 292
Nation, 54, 164, 281
Nation (London), 177
Nation at War, The, Peyton March, 99
National Academy of Sciences, 27
National Board for Historical Service, 27
National Bureau of Economic Research,
150
National Civic Federation, 1 69
National Defense Act of 1916, 7, 20, 33,
113
National Guard, 313, 342; see also A.E.F.
National Industrial Conference Board, 261
National Research Council, 27
National Security League, 52, 284, 429
National War Labor Board, 262; War
Labor Policies Board, 263
Nearing, Scott, 181
Netherlands, 305
Netherlands Overseas Trust, 71
NeufcMteau, 313
Neutrality for the United States, Edwin
Borchard and William P. Lage, 160
New, Harry S., 426
New Republic, 166
New York Times, 57, 173, 289, 319, 431
Newberry, Truman H., 445
Newton D. Baker, America at War, Frederick
Palmer, 96
Nivelle Drive, 89, 187
Nonpartisan Leader, 57
Nonpartisan League, 56, 277
Norddeutsche Allgemeine ^eitung, 181
Norris, George W., 144, 293
North, Lord, 198
North American Review, 281
North Sea Mine Barrage, 297, 298, 299
Northcliffe, Lord, 17, 61, 196, 197, 203
Notter, Harley, The Origins of the Foreign
Policy o/Woodrow Wilson, 159
Officer training, 113, 114, 311
Officers* Reserve Corps, 113
Official Bulletin, 46, 47, 79, 163, 224, 249
O'Leary, Jeremiah A., 64, 280
Olympic, 302
Order of Battle of the United States Land
Forces in the World War, 309
Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow
Wilson, The, Harley Notter, 159
Orlando, Vittorio Emamiele, 185, 186,
344
O'Ryan, Major-General John F., 390
Our Greatest Battle, Frederick Palmer, 96
Outlook, 216
Over the Top by an American Soldier Who
Went, Sergeant Arthur Guy Empey, 140
Overman Act, 224, 225, 257, 270, 280, 426
Pact of London, 14, 183
Pact of Paris, 422
Page, WalterHines, 167, 196
Paimeve*, Paul, 186, 188, 190, 192
Palmer, A. Mitchell, 130
Palmer, Frederick, 91, 95, 96, 188;
Bliss, Peacemaker, 191, 223, 238
Parker, Alton B., 430
Parker, Judge Edwin B., 254
Pattullo, George, The Inside Story of the
A.E.F., 319
Payne- Aldrich Tariff, 147
Peace proposals, 157, 158, 408 ff.
Penrose, Boies, 84, 131, 149, 218
People's Council for Democracy and
Terms of Peace, 54, 55, 56, 134, 164, 181
Pershing, John J., Major-General, ap-
pointment by President, 9; arrival in
Paris, 17; 23; on uniforms, 36; 42, 88;
My Experiences in the World War, 89; war
program, 90, 91; demand for American
front, 93, 94; organization of military
units, 101; 103; selection of weapons,
109; 113; 185, 187; 'steering committee'
proposal, 1 88-1 92 j delay in shipments,
204, 205, 212; 224; as co-commander,
227, 228; 'Separate Component' plan,
229; 230, 231, 232, 235; the 5 Gs, 237;
238, 239; 241; on appointment of Foch,
242; appealed to for troops, 243, 244;
shipment of troops, 245, 246; 202, 283,
303, 309; organization of training
periods in France, 312; First, Second
and Twenty-Sixth Divisions, 313 ff.;
training of Divisions, 317; conference
with Milner, 318; at Cantigny, 320 ff.;
German drive on the Marae, 325 ff.;
333 ff'5 341; additional command of
First Army, 342; demand for separate
American Army, 343; appointment of
Dawes, 346; policy of purchasing sup-
plies, 347; program of oae hundred
divisions, 348 ff.; revision of draft, 357
ff.; army morale, 361 ff.; at St. Mihiel,
368 ff; ruse at Bdfort, 373; Foch's
program, 374 ff.; formation of First
Army, 375; frontier railroads, 376; at
Verdun, 376 ff.; First Army at Toul,
380; St. Mihiel salient, 382 fF.; 387;
Mcuse-Argonne, 390 E, 411 ff.; Senlis
conference, 415 ff.; at Sedan, 419 ff.
INDEX
463
Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, 9
Pershing's Crusaders, 410
Petain, Henri Philippe, 42, 192, 224, 2303
2322,238-240, 241, 242, 245; request for
troops, 326, 372; 374; 376; third battle
of the Somme, 379 ff.; 383, 411
Piave, see Italian Front, 185
Pickford, Mary, 433
Pierce, Palmer E. (Colonel), 122
Pinchot, Amos, 131, 145, 150
Planning and Statistics, Division of, 75
Plunkett, Rear-Admiral C. P., 416
Poincare, Raymond, 241
Poland, 175, 1 80
Postal regulations; see also Burleson, 134,
135, 146 ff.
Prager, Robert, 273, 274
President's Mediation Commission, 169,
261
Priority, principle of, 119; 254, 255
Prindpes de la guerre -, Ferdinand Foch, 241
Progressive Party, 53, 56, 146, 278, 292
Prohibition, 53, 142, 143
Propaganda, see Committee on Public
Information
Public Ledger, 120
Purchasing Commission, 125, 193
Railroad Administration, 214, 253; 255,
2 .5 8
Railroads, advisory commission action, 22;
discussion of government control, 23;
Railroads War Board, 24, 25; prepara-
tion in France, 96; 120, 125, 212, 214-
216; system at Front, 381
Rapallo, Council of, 186, i88 3 189
Rathenau Plan, 163
Raw materials, plans for procurement,
32, 33, 34, 37; 120, 121
Rawlinson, Sir Henry Seymour, 231, 233,
390
Read, Major-General George W., 391
Reading, Lord, 231, 243, 244, 245, 360,
384
Red Cross, 58, 71, 77, 209, 253, 347, 361
Reed, James A., 82
Regular Army, 313, 342; see also A.E.F.
Reims, 334 ff.
Relief movements, see also Salvation Army,
Red Cross, Young Men's Christian
Association
Renaissance d*un D/partement dt'vaste', La, L.
Lucien Hubert, 382
Report of the War Trade Board, Vance C.
McCormick, 366
Requa, Mark L., 86, 216
Revenue Act, 151, 156
Revised Statutes, 108, 286
Rhodes, James Ford, 84
Road to War, Walter Millis, 49
Robertson, Sir William, 191, 308
Robinson, Edgar E., The Foreign Policy of
Woodrow Wilson, 191319171 173
Rodman, Hugh, 304
Roosevelt, Franldin D., 169, 362
Roosevelt, Theodore, desire to lead army,
7, 8; Wilson's stand, 9; disbanding of
division, 9, 21; 98, 196, 197, 218, 223,
281, 284, 292, 353, 424, 426, 427, 428,
44*
Root, Elihu, 17, 98, 281, 424, 427, 429
Rosenwald, Julius, 31, 37, 38, 39, 41; 108,
122
Russell, Charles Edward, 53
Russia, socialist movement, 54, 55; U.S.
relations with, 156, 157, 170, 175, 179,
182, 183, 1 86, 233
Ryan, John D., 269, 270, 364, 367
Ryerson, Donald M., 140
Sabotage Act, 289
St. Mihiel, 312 ff., 368, 382 ff.
Salvation Army, 58, 59, 210, 361
San Francisco Call, 269
San Francisco Chronicle, 181, 280
Saturday Evening Post, 82, 148, 319
Saturday Review of London, 55, 164
Schwab, Charles M., 265, 266, 332
Scott, Frank A., 34, 41, 252
Scott, Hugh, 91, 98, 119, 120, 121, 124,
I2 5
Seaborne Trade, C. Ernest Fayle, 295
Second Annual Report of the Provost-Marshal-
General, Enoch H. Crowder, 358
Sedan, 392 ff.
Sedition Act, 65, 291, 292
Selective Service, formulation, 5-7; signed
by President, 9, 21; 30, 41, 100, 114,
248, 259, 311; revision of draft, 355 ff.
Seligman, Professor E. R. A., 10
Senlis, 415
Services of Supply, 310, 345, 347 ft.; 352,
360, 413
Services of Supply, The, A Memoir of the
Great War, Johnson Hagood, 345
Seymour, Professor, 178, 180
Sharpe, Henry G., Quartermaster General,
40, 124
Shaw, Anna Howard, 31, 79
Shaw, A. Wilkinson, 28
Sheppard amendment, 142
Shipping Board, 69, 70, 71; operation of
commandeered ships, 72; building
program, 73; Shipping Control Com-
mittee, 74, 75; 86 j mobilization of ton-
nage, 105; 119, 132, 133; *3> 2 447 251*
464
INDEX
263, 264, 265, 266, 269; troop trans-
ports, 300, 301-304, 305-308; shipping of
troops, 335, 340 fF.; program of one hun-
dred divisions, 348 fF.; 353; 359 fF.; 366
Ships, see Tonnage and Transportation
Sibert, General William L., 89, 102, 204
Signal Corps of the Army, see A.E.F.
Simons, A. M., 53
Sims, Rear-Admiral William S., The
Victory at Sea, 297, 300, 302, 303
Sinclair, Upton, 53
Smith, Alfred Emanuel, 428
Smith, William Alden, 445
Smoot, Reed, 149, 446
Socialist Party, and- war Manifesto, 53,
280, 281
Solidarity, 287
Somme, Valley of the, 238-240; third
battle of, 378 fF.
Sommerviller, 312
Spanish American War, 15,32,34, 35, 327
Sparge, John, 53
Spectator (London), 164, 180
Spirit of the Selective Service, General Enoch
H. Growder, 101
Spring Rice, Sir Cecil Arthur, 13, 195,
I97> 231
Springfield Republican, 283
Squier, Brigadier-General George O., 112,
267, 270
Starrett, W. A., 107
Stars and Stripes, 238, 361
State Councils of Defense, 363
StefFens, Lincoln, 55
Stettinius, Edward R., 221, 234, 250, 252,
267; procurement of supplies, 364
Stewart, Governor Samuel V., 288
Stockholm Conference of Socialists, 55,
177
Stone, William J., 292
Storage Facilities Committee, 36
Straus, Oscar S., 84
Submarine warfare, 67, 200, 295, 296;
mine barrage, 297-299, 301
Sullivan, Mark, 266
Sullivan, Roger C., 71
Summerall, Major-General Charles P.,
3*5, 337; Meuse-Argonne, 392 fF., 417
Summers, Leland L., 365
Stm (New York), 368
Supplies, procurement of, 20, 33, 34;
activities of Rosenwald, 39; shortage in
Europe, 94; priority in procurement,
119, 120; 125, 251; estimate in one
hundred divisions program, 359 fF.,
4*3
Supreme War Council, 190; Executive
War Board, 192, 193, 196, 199, 224, 229, |
231, 232, 233, 241, 243, 244, 318, 319,
329, 41 5 ff., 442
Sweden, 305
Synon, Mary, 16
Taft, William Howard, 147, 262, 353,
424,426,427,428
Tansill, Charles C., America Goes to War,
49
Tarbell, Ida M., 31
Tardieu, Andre*, 343, 349
Taxation, income tax, nj 15, 138 fF.;
1 54 fF. ; see also Finances of War
Taylor, Alonzo E., 195
Textile Alliance, 123
That Dam T, Katherine Mayo, 361
Thomas, Norman, Conscientious Objector
in America,, 101
Thompson, William Hale, 55
Times (London), 174, 391
Tonnage, 37, 42; see also Transportation,
67; commandeering of ships, 71, 72;
control by Shipping Board, 74; mobili-
zation of, 105, 125, 133, 197, 201, 230,
264; shipping schedules, 297, 305; 329;
launching of 100 ships, July 4, 1918,
332; 347 ff.; deficit, 366
Toul, 375, 380
Tours, 236, 237, 310, 315, 346, 352
Trading-with-the-Enemy Act, 126, 127,
128, 129, 130; export of currency, 132,
r 33? *34> J 9 6 , 284-286
Training Camp Activities, Commission
on, 210
Transportation, Committee on, 24, 25;
'bridge of ships,' 67; construction of
ships, 69; railroad tie-up, 2i4fF.;
see also Shipping Board and Tonnage
Treaty of London, 162
Trotsky, Leon, 176
Trumbull, John, 149
Tumulty, Joseph Patrick, 54, 285, 429
Turkey, 172, 174, 180; see also Peace
proposals
Turn of the Tide, Jennings G. Wise, 332
Uniforms, 35, see also Supplies
United Hebrew Charities, 362
United States Chamber of Commerce,
123, 124
Ukraine, 175
Vanderlip, Frank A., 141
Vatican, 171
Verdun, 93, 312 fF.
Vesle, the, 323
Victory at Sea, The, Rear-Admiral William
S. Sims, 297
INDEX
465
Viereck, 57, 181
Villard, Oswald, 164
Volunteering, 7
Vorgeschichte des Waffenstillstandes (The
Preliminary History of the Armistice),
440
Wade, Benjamin Franklin, 83
Walsh, Frank P., 262
War Council, 124
War Cyclopedia, C.P.I, publication, 47, 51,
52
War Finance Corporation, 257, 258
War Industries Board, 116, 119, 121, 124,
125, 126, 133, 196, 217, 234; organiza-
tion under Baruch, 252, 253; Require-
ments Division, 254; classification of
industry, 255; Commodity Section, 256,
257; 269, 347, 350, 353, 365
War Labor Administration, 261
War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, 66
War Message and the Facts Behind It, The,
C.P.I, publication, 1 7, 47
War in Outline, The, Captain Liddell Hart,
368
War Savings Certificates, 139-141
War Trade Board, 117, 125, 126, 133, 195,
244. 305, 349> 353> 424
War Weekly, 212, 220, 282
Washington Post, 105, 120, 256
Watson, Thomas, 285
West, Victor J., The Foreign Policy of
Woodrow Wilson, 1913-1917, 173
Western Front, division of troops in 1917,
94; 184, 1 86, 189; training of American
Divisions, 3156.; Marne salient, 337 ff.;
advance in 1918, 389 ff.
Wetmore, Maude, 31
Weygand, General Maxime, 190, 233, 403
White, Henry, 3
Why We Fought, by C. Hartley Grattan,
49
Why We Went to War, Newton D. Baker, 50
Why Working Men Support the War, C.P.L
publication, 47
Willard, Daniel, 22, 24, 25, 125, 252
William II, 51, 176, 276, 277, 421, 444,
45 *
Wilson, Sir Henry, 190, 233, 240, 241
Wilson, William B., 261, 262
Wilson, President Woodrow, selection of of-
ficers, 8; loans to Allied Powers, 10; taxa-
tion, 12, 13; on supplies, 14; Memoria]
Day speech, 1 7; power over railroads, 24:
power over exports, 41; on censorship.
44, 45, 47; doctrine of C.P.I., 48, 49;
50, 52, 54; on labor, 56; on the Red
Cross, 58, 59; on sedition, 60-62; War
message, 66; creation of Shipping Board,
69 70, 71, 74; on food administration,
78, 79; on committee for conduct of
war, 84; 88; on recruiting, 100; mobi-
lization parade, 116; on price-fixing,
12 1 ; on Trading- with-the-Enemy Act,
128; on spy scares, 129; on German
patents, 132; on communications, 134;
Second Loan Act, 139; on prohibition,
143; 144-155; doctrine on peace, 159,
1 60; 'peace without victory* speech,
161; 162-164; war policy, 167; speech
on Bolshevism, 170; on international
policy, 171174; war aims, 176; address
at Buffalo, 177; Fourteen Points, 178-
182; 196; on inter-Ally conference, 197;
on military command, 202-204; on
railroad tie-up, 216, 218, 219, 222;
Overman Act, 224 ff.; political confer-
ence of Allies, 233, 241; on appointment
of Foch, 242; 244 ff.; organization of
second draft, 249; appointment of
Baruch, 252; organization of War In-
dustries Board, 253, 256; on aviation,
267; on Third Liberty Loan, 271; 278,
282, 283; on sedition, 284, 292; shipping
schedule of troops, 3 1 7 ff.; Foch's appeal
for troops, 320; 'politics is adjourned,'
340; Allies' demand for troops, 344; 348;
351; one hundred divisions program,
352; price-fixing on wheat, 355; Red
Cross parade, 361; American doctrine
toward Germany, 409 ff.; note, 415 ff.;
American doctrine, 422 ff.; as politi-
cian, 425 ff.; repudiates compromise,
433; second German note, 438 ff.;
peace terms, 447 ff.
Wise, Jennings C., Turn of the Tide, 332,
337
Wiseman, Sir William, 196, 197
Without Censor: New Light on Our Greatest
World War Battles, Thomas M. Johnson
368
Woman's Committee of Council of Nat'l
Defense, 31, 79
Wood, General Leonard, 88, 282, 283, 385,
424
Wood, Robert E., 221
Woods, Frank P., 429
Works, John D., 55
Wright, Peter, 241
York, Sergeant Alvin C., 406
Young Men's Christian Association, 58,
210, 347, 361 ff. _
Young Men's Hebrew Association, 50
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