^■,- vJ ■,:.j^ .»...> >-.■
DATES OF
ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC POSTS
BY UNITED STATES
• Posts established between 1776 and 1815
O " " " 1816 and 1829 —
O " " " 1830 and 1861
O " " " 1862 and 1891
• " " "___1892jamli;3U-- "^N
Longitude 60° East from 90^ Greenwich 120°
THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
RIVERSIDE
GENERAL EDITOR
CHARLES H. HASKINS
Pro/eaaor of History in Harvard University
Hmerican l)istorical Series
Umder the Editorship of Cbaklxs H. Haskins, Professor of History in
Harvard University.
A series of text-books intended, like the American Science
Series, to be comprehensive, systematic, and authoritative.
Ready
Europe Since 1815. '
By Cbailis D. Hazen, Professor in Columbia University.
Modem European History.
By Chaxlbs D. Hazen.
The Expansion of Europe.
By Wilbur C. Abbot. Professor in Yale University.
Historical Atlas.
By William R. Shefhexd, Professor in Columbia University.
Atlas of Ancient History.
By William R. Shifhxkd.
History of England.
By L. M. Labson. Professor in the University of Illinois,
History of American Diplomacy.
By Cabl Russell Fish, Professor in the University of Wisconsin.
In preparation
Medieval and Modem Europe.
By Chables W. Colby. Professor in McGill University.
The Reformation.
By Pbeserved Smith.
The Renaissance.
By Ferdinand Schevill. Professor in the University of Chicago.
Europe in the XVII. and XVIII. Centuries.
By SiDNBY B. Fay. Professor in Smith College.
History of Greece.
By Paul Shorey, Professor in the University of Chicago,
History of Germany.
By Guy Stanton Fobd. Professor in the University of Minnesota.
History of the United States.
By Fbederice J. Tubneb. Professor in Harvard University.
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
BY
CARL RUSSELL FISH
FBOFESSOR OF BISTORT IN THE TJNrVEBSITT
OF WISCONSIN
WITH SIXTEEN MAP8
THIRD EDITION, REVISED
NEW YORK
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
1919
JX 14
'' on
COPTBIOHT, 1915
8T
BENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
TO MY MOTHER AND SISTER
Digitized by tine Internet Arciiive
in 2007 witii funding from
IVIicrosoft Corporation
littp://www.arcli ive.org/details/americandiplomacOOfisliiala
PREFACE
This book was prepared before the outbreak of the Great
War, at the earnest request of many persons who felt the
need of a brief but comprehensive survey of the field. The
basis for it rested on a course of lectures given at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin nearly every year from 1901 to the present
date. In its preparation advantage was taken of the great
number of monographic studies which exist on many special
phases and topics.
To catch the spirit and changing atmosphere of American
diplomacy, the author read nearly all the published corre-
spondence and documents, and studied various critical
periods in semina. In the case of some neglected points,
original investigation of MSS. was undertaken in London and
Italy, but the chief aim was not that of a new contribution
to knowledge, but of a comprehensive and balanced account,
and an attempt at interpretation.
As it is intended to present ascertained conclusions drawn
from the work of many students, the footnotes are, for the
most part, designed not so much to support the text as to
suggest to the reader material for further study, either in
the more important sources, or in monographs.
Since the pubUcation of the book, the Great War has
caused so many inchoate tendencies to take form, revealed
the significance of so many things that have happened in
the past, and opened so many new avenues for future de-
velopment, that an expansion of the period treated has
seemed imperative, even though the handling of matters so
recent, and in some cases so controversial, makes impossible
the same standard of accuracy aimed at in the periods that
viii PREFACE
have been thrashed out in their details by the scholars of the
several nations involved.
At the same time the occasion has been taken to revise
the whole text to accord with further study, and with the
suggestions of many scholars who have, either in reviews
and personal letters, suggested reconsideration of certain
points, or called attention to inaccuracies and ambiguities.
Special thanks are due to the Hon. John W. Foster and to
Professor Albert Bushnell Hart.
CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. Phases and Problems op American Diplomacy . . 1
II. Pre-Revolutionary Boundaries .... 10
III. Recognition 21
IV. Spain and Holland 31
V. Peace 40
VI. Religion and Commerce 51
VII. The West . . , 63
VIII. Old Problems in New Hands 79
IX. The Establishment of Neutrality .... 94
, X. The Jay Treaty 108
XI. War and Peace with France 126
XII. The Louisiana Purchase ...... 140
XIII. The Embargo 152
XIV. War with England 163
XV. Peace 176
XVT. Commerce and Boundaries 188
XVII. The Monroe Doctrine 203,
XVIII. Reciprocity, Claims, Boundaries, and the Slave
Trade 220
XIX. Expansion 243
XX. Annexation 260
XXI. Diplomacy and Politics 280
XXII. The Civil War 304
XXIII. The Civil War and the Monroe Doctrine . . 324
XXIV. The Aftermath of the Civil War .... 386
XXV. Routine, 1861 to 1877 849
XXVI. Baiting the Lion, 1877-1897 370
XXVII. Blaine, Olney and the Monroe Doctrine . . 384
XXVIII. Growth of American Influence in the Pacific . . 396
CONTENTS
Chapteb Page
XXIX. The Spanish War 408
XXX. Imperialism and Great Britain .... 423
XXXI. Spanish America 439
XXXII. The Pacific 454
XXXIII. Routine and Arbitration 464
XXXIV. Mexico 480
XXXV. The Great War 491
XXXVI. Success and its Causes 506
MAPS
IN COLOR
Establishment of Diplomatic Posts by the United States, 1776-1914
Inside front cover
West Indies, 1776 to 1898 20
United States, 1783 to 1790 70
Changes on Southeast, 1760 to final establishment of United States
ownership ......... 218
Possessions and Dependencies of the United States and other great
Powers in the Pacific . . • . . . . . 460
Development of United States Consular Service, 1876-1891 Inside back
cover
IN TEXT
Boundary Discussions, 1763 to 1783
Northeastern Boundary Controversies
Northwestemmost Head of Connecticut River
Rouse's Point Controversy ,
Oregon Boundary Controversies
Texan Boundary .
Central America, 1850 to 1860
Alaska Boundary Controversy
West Indies, 1898 to 1916
Territorial Expansion of the United States
47
229
231
232
268
272
294
433
445
488
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
CHAPTER I
PHASES AND PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY
Before the Spanish war most Americans regarded diplo-
macy as a foreign luxury. Some thought that we should
import a little of it; others regarded it as a
deleterious appendage of effete civilizations erican diplo-
which we, in our young strength, had forever J^g^/' ^"'^^ *"
cast aside. Not that this had always been our
attitude. During the Revolution and the Confederation
diplomacy was recognized by the intelligent to be as essential
to the establishment of our national existence as arms, dip-
lomats were as carefully chosen as generals; the news of the
negotiations of Franklin, Adams, and Jay was as anxiously
awaited as that from the army, and their successes brought
almost as great a reward of popular acclaim as did those of
commanders in the field.
By 1789 the joint efforts of our soldiers, diplomats, and
constitution-builders had assured our national existence,
but the broader question as to whether we
,j . 1 ^ J . .• 1 Development
could gam real freedom to pursue our national ©f the Mon-
development in our own way remained. Euro- iTgg^o'iaM*
pean statesmen regarded us but as a weight
to be used in fixing or unfixing the balance of power. The
strong wind of the French Revolution swept across the
Atlantic and divided our own citizens. Foreign affairs
absorbed attention that was needed for domestic problems,
the fate of administrations came to hang upon their foreign
1
2 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
policy. Dissertations on diplomatic problems created polit-
ical reputations. Of the five presidents who succeeded
Washington all had had diplomatic experience and four
had served as secretaries of state. Practically devoid of a
permanent army or navy, we relied for defence upon our
diplomats and the ocean. The Treaty of Ghent in 1814,
followed by the peace of Europe in 1815, gave us real free-
dom, and our struggle left as its by-products an intelligent
public opinion, and a staff so well trained that the period
from 1815 to 1829 may in many ways be regarded as the
golden age of American diplomacy. As Marshall was during
those years codifying the constitutional practices of the
past in form to serve as a guide for a considerable future, so
John Quincy Adams was codifying our diplomatic opinions.
By 1829 we had not only shaken ourselves loose from the
entanglements of European international politics, but we
had formulated rules of conduct designed to make that
separation permanent.
Our isolation achieved, diplomacy ceased to attract our
ablest men or to interest the public. Of seventeen presidents
between 1829 and the Spanish war, two only.
Subordination ttt» it>i t-j j'j'i
of diplomacy Van Buren and Buchanan, had served m dipio-
i829°to*iM4 ^^^^^ P<*s*s- Between 1829 and 1844 a few
episodes gained a momentary attention; but
not many persons took the trouble to connect them with
one another and with the past, or to free their vision from
the blurring mist t>f internal politics. Between 1844 and
Expansion, I860 a consciousness of our growing strength
1844 to I860 ^jj^j "manifest destiny" began to arouse a
new interest in diplomacy not as a protective art but as a
weapon of acquisition. Fearless, often shameless, and with
little deference for the feelings or conventions of others,
our diplomats helped to extend the boundaries of the re-
public; but they were unable to win for their labors much
applause from a people absorbed in its home concerns and
the coming storm of civil war.
PHASES AND PROBLEMS 3
By the war the work of diplomacy was once more rendered
vital. If our diplomatic policy had failed then, the country
would inevitably have been divided, and the _ a v .
system of equipoise which causes all Europe construction,
to vibrate to the slightest international hap-
pening, that balance of power to which we had by such
earnest effort avoided becoming a party, would have been
established in America. Again we were successful; but the
clang of battle for the most part deafened the public ear
to the diplomatic struggle, while the political, social, and
economic reconstruction of the next few years gave the
public time for only an occasional glance at the diplomatic
reconstruction, which was satisfactorily completed in 1872.
The period from Reconstruction to the Spanish war marked
the lowest point in the quality of our diplomacy and in the
amount of public attention devoted to it. -. .. ,
With no fear of foreign powers and with no diplomacy,
definite international aspirations, most of our
leading men ignored foreign affairs. Some to be sure, used
them to add ginger to their public speeches, but only a hand-
ful devoted any gray matter to their management. The
situation, however, was gradually changing, the world was
growing closer together; nations were actually becoming
more intimate than English counties were a century ago;
isolation was no longer possible, at least to the degree in
which it had existed when the Monroe Doctrine was an-
nounced. During the nineties there was a growing apprecia-
tion that our national life must become less secluded, and
in 1898 the Spanish war brought us suddenly tj •* a
and dramatically upon the world stage. Our States a world
policies, no longer those of the anxious pigmy ^°^"'
of a hundred years before, but of a great power seeking in-
fluence and opportunity, became of moment to the world
and to ourselves. In an atmosphere of growing intelligence,
statesmen with a broader grasp of international relations than
had been held for three-quarters of a century emerged to
4 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
undertake the readjustment, with the result that the United
States has become a world power and an international in-
fluence, though without losing its tradition of living mainly
to itself and letting others do the same. Never again in the
future, however, can we ignore our international relations
as we did from 1829 to 1898.
The popular interest aroused by the questions of policy
of the last fifteen years has furnished incentive for a wide-
Study of diplo- spread study of our diplomatic activity in the
™**^^ past. Monographs, essays, and books on
diplomatic history and international law have been rapidly
multiplying, and it is upon these studies that this book is in
large part based. It is hoped that its brief outline will be
supplemented by the intensive works to which reference is
made, and that it may thus serve to broaden the basis of
public opinion upon which the usefulness and ultimate safety
of the United States must depend.
It is, of course, apparent that popular interest alone has
not been the measure of our diplomatic activity. At no
Continuity of time have we lived wholly to ourselves. When-
diplomacy ^^^j. ^^^ American citizen or an American prod-
uct crosses a neighbor's border, or whenever foreigners and
their goods cross ours, there is material for diplomacy. Prob-
lems, some perennial, some transient, have at all times con-
fronted our administrations, however ill-manned, however
feebly supported.
When in 1783 we won recognition of our independence,
we possessed scarcely one undisputed boundary line, and.
Boundaries even had every contention been decided in our
and expansion f^yor, the territory enclosed would not have
sufficed for a well-rounded and self-sufficient national growth.
Our boundaries have only just been adjusted, and whether
the limits of our national expansion have been reached must
still be regarded as an open question. At no time in our his-
tory have these problems been absent, and at no time have
they failed to influence other nations in their attitude toward
PHASES AND PROBLEMS S
us; in some periods they have been the very pivots upon
which our national policy has turned.
American citizens have never been content with the re-
sources of their own land; to protect them, therefore, in the
pursuit of the cod and mackerel of the north- E^tj, t^^.
east coast, of the seal of Behring sea, of the *°"*^ '•■ .
. f . sources uia
oceanic whale, and of the guano deposits of the intematioMl
islands of the sea, has been an unending task.
Of greater difficulty, however, has been the eflfort to free
the paths of intercourse. For many years the products of
our lower Middle West were bottled up by Spain's hold on
the Mississippi, till the nation itself was in peril of disruption
on that account. Then, too, many of our northern water out-
lets east of the Rockies run through Canada, while west of
the mountains the Canadian outlets run through our terri-
tories; and, further, the most tempting road between our
Atlantic and Pacific coast lies far south of our own bound-
aries. From problems such as these we have never been
free, and with regard to no others have we changed our mind
so often. Generally favoring liberality, we have done much
to free the lanes of commerce in which our interest is only
general, such as the international rivers of South America,
the Danish straits, the Scheldt, and many other paths.
More impyortant and more varied have been the problems of
our trafficking. The direct exchange of our own products for
those of other countries has in itself occasioned ^
... '11 11 Commerce
little controversy with other nations, and has
been steady and increasing; but whether these exchanges
should be carried in our own vessels or in those of other
countries has always been a matter of concern and difficulty.
Mainly a question of diplomacy in the beginning, it has
become more and more one of economic conditions and in-
ternal policy. In the matter of opening up the colonies of
other nations to our ships and exports, however, diplomacy
has found no respite; the situation in the foreign spheres of in-
fluence in China to-day is as knotty as was that of West
6 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Indian trade in the early years of the last century. Our
merchants, moreover, have not always been satisfied with
handling our own business. They have acted as carriers
for others, sometimes in open competition, sometimes by
seeking to make a profit from our neutrality.
For no other nation has neutrality assumed such protean
shapes as for the United States. For more than half of our
national existence we have been either a neutral
or else a belligerent interested in the neutrality
of others. After independence had been established the vital
question was whether we could remain neutral in the struggle
that divided Europe, From our effort to remain so grew our
positive policy of isolation, which, designed to guard our weak-
ness, still governs the use of our strength. Coincident with this
problem was that of the protection of our rights as a neutral,
in behalf of which we were in 1812 stirred to war. As soon
as the general peace in Europe in 1815 assured us that our
earthen jar had floated safely through the contest of the
iron pots, we became concerned in the problem of our duty
as a neutral in the strife of weaker neighbors, and from that
time to this the question has presented itself in every con-
ceivable form, — in the struggle of Spain with her colonies,
in which the latter so much engaged our sympathies; in the
later struggle between Spain and the Cubans, where desire
was added to sympathy; in revolutions and petty wars in
which our only interest as a people was in peace but into
which many of our citizens entered on one or the other or
on both sides. The protection of lives and property during
these conflicts, the securing of damages for the loss of the
one or the other after peace was reestablished, has been the
unending task of our diplomats and foreign oflBce. Then in
the Civil War we were violently confronted with the reverse
side of the proposition, — with questions as to the duties
which neutral nations owed to us as belligerents. The ex-
periences of the United States in handling neutrality have
been uniquely varied, its record on the whole is honorable,
PHASES AND PROBLEMS 7
and the experience of the past has been a growing force to
guide the future.
Our experience in affording protection to our citizens has
been unique and trying. A nation made up of emigrants, we
have not always found other countries as willing ^ ...
, . , . „ , Naturalization
to give up their claims to allegiance as we are to .
welcome the newcomers. Since we achieved independence
the whole question of naturalization and change of nationality
has been completely reviewed, and, largely by our insistence,
the conclusions of international and municipal law have
been almost directly reversed. New phases have lately
arisen, however, from our wish to discriminate in our wel-
come between the various races; hence, while the problems
of emigration — that is, the relationship of the individual to
the country he is leaving — are fairly well settled, those of
the immigrant with the country to which he desires to shift,
remain uncertain.
Besides establishing our national identity and making
elbow room for the activities of our citizens, we have been
obliged to assume a social position in the world, international
Since the rise of the Spanish-American nations *ssociation
our policy of individualism has been modified by a feeling of
special interest in their welfare. While avoiding entangling
alliances with them, as with others, we. have always- desired
a close, association from which the nation? of other continents
should be excluded; and over the states that lie between, us
and the equator we have increasingly exhibited a tendency
to assume a modified guardianship. Moreover, we have
never been able to avoid connections with the nations out-
side the American continents. Deeply concerned in the
formulation of international law, we have been forced to
recognize the weight of international opinion, and have con-
tributed not a little to give it its present form. At first a
matter of separate treaties and of diplomatic and judicial
precedents, it has in the last thirty years exhibited a striking
tendency to codify results by general agreements reached by
8 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
international congresses. From these developments we have
not stood aloof, and we have shared fully in the still more
recent establishment of an international judiciary. Whether
international law as interpreted by the Hague court will ul-
timately be provided with a police to carry out its decisions,
and whether we will cooperate in this extension, are ques-
tions that will inevitably concern us in the future.
The diplomatic problems of the United States have always
had more than an intrinsic interest for the rest of the world.
The method of their handling has been more
unique than their quality. To those who,
whether with approval or with apprehension, believe that
civilization is tending more and more toward democracy, the
experience of this country, which has been more democratic
than any other in the control of its diplomacy, has the value
of an experiment.
To the casual observer, as to the close student, it is obvious
that our democracy has not abolished personality. More
than in any other branch of our activity has
the personal element counted in determining our
diplomatic controversies. Great figures like Franklin, John
Quincy Adams, and Hay stand out by their achievements
more conspicuously than do any of our legislators and than all
but a few of our administrators; and the encounters of Madi-
son and Napoleon, Adams and Canning, Charles Francis
Adams and Russell, Blaine, Olney, and Lord Salisbury have
all the fascination of the days of the tournament and the
duel.
Personality has perhaps shone all the more conspicuously
because our democracy has not chosen permanently to equip
Diplomatic itself with a trained staff. In selecting our
■***^ champions we have been governed at best by
opportunism. When great crises have arisen we have usually
sent great men, who have in most cases outclassed their op-
I)onents; when the stake has been or has seemed to be of
minor importance, we have allowed the exigencies of internal
PHASES AND PROBLEMS 9
politics to dictate the choice. The result has been represent-
ative perhaps, but representative of the worst as well as of the
best that was in us. Quite as disturbing a factor as the
motley composition of our foreign corps has been the unfor-
tunate circumstance that our foreign minister, the secretary of
state, is expected, under the President, to be the poUtical head
of the administration. Insuring, as this fact does, the hand-
ling of foreign affairs by a man of abiUty and power, it does
not always involve special fitness for the task. Although some
selections have been ideal, others have been seriously bad, —
seriously, but not impossibly so, for the permanent force of
the state department has been able to guide the willing but
untutored secretary and to modify the eccentricities of the
obdurate.
More fundamental than differences in the choice of the
protagonists has been the difference in the location of the
power that has determined the policies upon Control by the
which they have acted. Has the broadening P*op^®
of the basis upon which the expression of the national will
rests meant loss or increase of power, fluctuation or steadi-
ness of purpose? On this point all sorts of opinions have
been held. It has been said that the people, without ability
to acquire the information necessary to form intelligent
opinions on questions so remote from their daily life, would
be at the mercy of every whiff of opinion which a designing
or a shifting press might express; that, swept away by sud-
den passions, they would rush into wars from which the sage
reticence of experienced men of affairs had previously saved
them; or, on the other hand, that if those who suffered the
pains of war could control it, there would come an era of peace
on earth from which universal good will might ultimately
flow. At all events, the controlling element in our diplomacy
has been the people at large; and if our policy has on the
whole secured us what we wanted, and done so without un-
necessary friction, it is a justification of our democracy and
an argument in favor of democracy in general.
CHAPTER II
PRE-REVOLUTIONARY BOUNDARIES
The return of Columbus in 1493 at once brought his dis-
coveries before the forum of the world's diplomacy, Rome;
The papal for the first thought of his "Most Catholic"
^^* sovereigns, Ferdinand and Isabella, was to
secure a title to these new lands from the pope. Alexander
VI was a Spaniard by birth and feeling, and at the instance
of the royal ambassadors he promptly issued two bulls giv-
ing to Spain "all and singular the aforesaid countries and
islands thus unknown and hitherto discovered by your en-
voys and to be discovered hereafter, providing however
they at no time have been in the actual temporal possession
of any Christian owner." These bulls were issued almost as
a matter of course, as the confirmation of a miner's claim
would be granted by the United States government to-day;
but they were unsatisfactory to Spain in that they did not
prohibit discoveries and the establishment of claims by
others. To meet these wishes a third bull was accordingly
issued. May 4, 1493, which fibced a meridian one hundred
leagues westward of "any" of the Azores or Cape Verde
islands beyond which all other nations were prohibited from
voyaging for the purposes of fishing and discovery.^
The general bearing of these bulls upon American diplo-
macy seems to have been greatly exaggerated. They did
not prevent that good Catholic, Henry VII of England, from
Their general sending out John Cabot to emulate Colum-
significance ^^^g j^ ^49^^ j^oj. j^jg " ^^^^ Christian " Majesty,
Francis I of France, from attempting to found a French
colonial empire thirty years later. The most peremptory
* E. H. Blair and J. A. Robertson, The Philipjnne Islands (55 vols., Cleve-
land, 1903-09), i. 97-129.
10
PRE-REVOLUTIONARY BOUNDARIES 11
challenge to Spain's claim, moreover, was to come from Prot-
estants, to whom the pope's grant was rather an incitement
than a restraint. As a matter of fact the bulls were not much
relied upon by Spanish diplomats in their general negotia-
tions, although they may have contributed to the feeling
on their part, remarked in 1565 by one of the Venetian am-
bassadors, that like Israel of old, the Spaniards were a people
chosen of God to occupy a promised land.^
In determining the relations between the two great oceanic
powers of that day, Spain and Portugal, however, the third
bull proved to have a great and lasting influ- Demarcation
ence. Accepting its principle, the two countries ^® *"* BrazU
agreed in the treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 to make the merid-
ian fixed by the pope, or rather one somewhat to the west of
it, the dividing line between their "spheres of influence," each
respecting the rights of the other to the exclusive enjoyment
of everything discovered within its sphere, Spain taking
what lay to the west, Portugal to the east. As the drawing
of the line was beyond the scientific abilities of the day, its
exact location was never determined. Nevertheless, to the
surprise of both nations it soon became evident that, even
allowing the most easterly position possible for the bound-
ary, a portion of South America projected beyond it into the
Portuguese sphere. To this line of demarcation laid down
by Alexander VI in 1493 and modified by the treaty of Torde-
sillas in 1494 the existence of the Portuguese language and /
civilization in Brazil to-day is distinctly traceable, and the
first event in American diplomacy is thus still a factor in
our daily life.^
When Magellan circumnavigated the world and made
"east" and "west" relative terms, it was at once realized
that if the demarcation line were to remain useful it must
^ C. R. Fish, Guide to the Materials for American History in Roman and
other Italian Archives (Washington, 1911), 239.
* Henry Harrisse, The Diplomatic History of America, itt first Chapter,
im-UH, London, 1897.
12 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
girdle the globe. The matter was one of great scientific
difficulty, and national interests did not leave science to
_ ^ work unfettered, but by the treaties of Vi-
Demarcatton . . \ rw -
line and the toria m 1524 and Zaragoza m 1529 the bound-
^'"^* ary was reduced to terms. In point of fact the
Jine was incorrectly drawn, but, as is often the case when
an accident occurs in times of flux and uncertainty, the error
has become embedded in history. The Philippines, properly
Portuguese, became Spanish, and, being Spanish, ultimately
became American. This second permanent result of Pope
Alexander's demarcation line can, of course, hardly be at-
tributed to its influence alone; for Spain by discovery and
occupation, and by her actual power, helped produce the
error in location. In spite of inaccuracies, however, the
existence of the principle of a dividing line, aided in the
early and peaceful settlement of the question.^
In America the effect of the treaty of Tordesillas was to
leave Spain a free hand west of Brazil. By voyages of dis-
Spanish em- covery, followed up by conquests and settle-
P^* ments, she speedily established a firm hold
on all the territory as far north as Mexico and Florida, and
presently came to regard the entire continent and adjacent
seas as hers by all rights divine and human. In 1555 Charles
V on relinquishing his authority to his son Phihp II drew
up a set of instructions to guide him in his government, in
which, among the problems relating to the various portions
of his vast territories, he discussed the situation in the Indies.
In 1558 he issued another instruction, dealing for the first
time with the subject of the defence of the Indies.^
We may, therefore, believe that during this interval the
Spanish government first became seriously alarmed for the
safety of its American possessions. Although the attacks
1 Blair and Robertson, Philippine Islands, i. 159-164, 222-SJ39; Justin
Winsor, Narrative and Critical History of America (8 vols., Boston, 1834-89),
ii. 441.
'Fish, Guide, 113.
PRE-REVOLUTIONARY BOUNDARIES 13
upon them which excited the apprehension of the dying states-
man were not at that time such as to test the strength of
his son's empire, yet the enormous extent of Rise of the
Spanish dominions rendered defence difficult, P^****
and its riches attracted the hardy adventurer. The assail-
ants, moreover, — Mohammedans from Barbary, French
Huguenots, and, a little later, Dutch and English Protest-
ants,— were in a position to give to their plundering expedi-
tions the sanction of religion. But although they rendered
property unsafe, they were not powerful enough to cope
with the organized forces of Spain, their only serious attempt
upon the integrity of the empire being thwarted in the awe-
inspiring massacre of the French Huguenots on the river
St. John in 1563.
With the defeat of the Spanish Armada by England in
1588 the situation changed. Fear of Spain was almost for-
gotten, and information spread as to the pos-
sibilities of the vast areas to the north of French,' and
Spanish settlement. To these regions Eng- ^^^ ""'«-
land, France, and Holland set up rival claims,
based on the discoveries of the Cabots, Verrazzano and
Cartier, and Hendrik Hudson respectively; and each country
began permanent settlements. By 1625 the English were es-
tablished in Virginia and New England, the French in Canada
and Acadia, or Nova Scotia, and the Dutch on the Hudson;
but there was as yet no mutual recognition of each other's
rights, and no recognition of any alien rights by Spain.
The next treaty of importance which referred to America
was that of St. Germain in 1632, according to the terms
of which England restored to France the international
post of Quebec and other American forts reception of
taken in the preceding war, and which may
therefore be taken as a recognition by each country that the
other had American possessions.^ By royal patent of 1645
* Thomas Rymer, Foedera, etc. (3d ed., 10 vols., The Hague, 173&-45),
14 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Spain tacitly acknowledged the presence of the English In
America by permitting them to import into Spain certain
products peculiar to America;^ in the famous treaty of
Munster, in 1648, she recognized the American possessions
of the Dutch; ^ and by the treaty of Madrid in 1670 she form-
ally acknowledged the existence of the English colonies.^ By
1670, therefore, the colonial empires of these four rival
countries had acquired international standing, but no defi-
nite boundary line in North America had international
recognition.
Of these rivals the Dutch were the first to disappear. Al-
ready by the treaty of Breda in 1667 Holland had ceded to
_ . ^ , England not only her own settlements about
Dutch from the Hudson but also those of the Swedes on
the Delaware which she had seized in 1655.*
Recaptured by the Dutch a few years later, these were
finally ceded by the treaty of Westminster, in 1674, to remain
united forever with their English neighbors.^ Almost more
important was the fusion of Dutch and English interests
in 1688 on the accession of the stadtholder of Holland to the
throne of England as William III. United by strict treaties,
by which the Dutch practically conceded naval supremacy
to England in return for the profits to be derived from a
liberal grant of rights to their neutral vessels when England
was at war,® the latter rose to world power, while Holland
sank into a desuetude which was innocuous to all except her
own citizens.
* George Chalmers, A Collection of Treaties between Great Britain and
other Powers (2 vols., London, 1790), ii. 27.
* P. J. Blok, Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Volk (8 vols., Groningen,
etc., 1892-1908), iv. 444; translated by O. A. Bierstadt, History of the People
of the Netherlands (5 vols.. New York, etc., 1898-1912), iv. 148.
» Cambridge Modem History (1908), v. 105.
* Comte de Garden, Histoire generate des traites de paix (15 vols., Paris,
1848-87), ii. 52.
* Cambridge Modem History, v. 161.
' Garden, Traites de paix, ii. 129, iii, 9-10; Charles Jenkinaon, CoUeetion
of . . . Treaties (3 vols., London, 1785), i. 190, 279, 364.
PRE-REVOLUTIONARY BOUNDARIES 15
Of the rivals that remained Spain was on the defensive.
To the effort to fortify and defend that which she had already
occupied she devoted great energy, and, with Spanish de-
the assistance of Rome, was in the miain sue- '*"*^*
cessful for over a hundred years. It was not so easy to monop-
olize the commerce of her possessions in the face of the per-
sistent intrusions of Dutch and English merchants; but by
concentrating it in certain ports and confining ocean traflfic
to the regular passage of great protected fleets, she went
far toward accomplishing her purpose.
France and England confronted the situation in a dif-
ferent spirit. The conspicuously great powers of the day
both aimed at world empire, and regarded France and
America as a field for contest and a prize ^°8l*"<^
for the victor. Between 1688 and 1815 they seven times
engaged in war, and for sixty-three years out of the one
hundred and twenty-seven they were in open conflict. All
these wars involved America, and out of them emerged
American boundaries, American foreign policies, and to a
considerable extent the spirit of American nationality.
The first two of these wars grew out of European causes, and
the third from Spanish- American trade; but in each case the
French and English colonists of North America „ , , .
• 1 n' All II Colonial wars
were drawn mto the conflict. Although the
two groups were still separated by hundreds of miles of wil-
derness, the Indians constituted a medium by which the
shock of hostility was communicated: the burning of Schenec-
tady in 1690 by the French and Indians caused a first thrill of
mutual dependence and helpfulness to run through the north-
ern group of English colonies. The point of closest contact,
however, was in the northeast, where ever since 1613 the
absence of a boundary between the French and English
spheres of influence had given rise to occasional encoimters.
In particular the depredations of the French privateers, first
from Port Royal, later from Louisburg, made the possession
of those ports a practical question to the New England
16 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
merchants, who in each war, and mainly by their own
efforts, captured the offensive seaport but were foiled in
their designs on the seat of French power, Quebec.
Peace treaties, or more properly truce agreements, however,
were made in Europe and in accordance with European
European trea- conditions. The first, that of Ryswick in 1697,
**•' restored Port Royal to France.^ The second,
that of Utrecht in 1713, marked a defeat for France as well
as the first attempt to define by treaty North American
boundaries.^ France gave up all claim to Newfoundland
and to the Hudson Bay country, and a commission was ap-
pointed to draw a boundary for the latter region. Of more
immediate interest was the cession to England of Acadia or
Nova Scotia, including Port Royal; but in this case a bound-
ary controversy resulted instead of a boundary, for the
country was granted "with its ancient boundaries," which
can scarcely be said to have existed. In 1745 the colonists
captured Louisburg, the French substitute for Port Royal,
but by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748, they had to
return it to France.^ The disadvantages of their European
connection were beginning to unfold themselves to the
British settlers.
With this peace a new condition began to develop, which
resulted in the first American war fought for American
_. ^ ^ causes. The centre of interest was now shifted
The contest
£or the Ohio to the Ohio valley. This region the French
*' claimed on three grounds, — because by their
settlement at New Orleans they held the mouth of the Mis-
sissippi which drained it, because in 1749 they officially ex-
plored it and left formal evidences of their claims, and
because they had at Vincennes the only actual white settle-
ment in the main valley. For three reasons, too, they were
1 William MacDonald, Select Charters (New York, 1899), 223.
« Ibid.. 229-232.
• R. G. Thwaites, "France in America" {American Nation, vol. viH.),
122.
PRE-REVOLUTIONARY BOUNDARIES 17
willing to fight to maintain their claims, — ^because of the
value of the fur trade of the region, because the valley was
necessary if they were to weld Canada and Louisiana into
one imperial colony, and because by holding it they would
restrict the English to the seacoast. They prepared, there-
fore, to establish a chain of forts from the lakes to the gulf.
The English colonists, on the other hand, desired the valley
in order to thwart the plans of the French, and because the
far-sighted were already anticipating that the westward
push of American settlement would at no distant period
turn its rich lands into pioneer farms. Their claims they
based partly upon the right of a nation occupying a coast
to possession of the back country, — a view of international
law early incorporated into the colonial charters, — ^partly
upon what would to-day be called a protectorate over the
Iroquois Indians, whose visionary claims extended over
nearly all the Northwest, and partly upon their trade rela-
tions with the valley Indians.
Not by such arguments but by arms alone could so great
a controversy be decided. In 1754 the French secured the
strategic point, the junction at which the An American
Monongahela and the Allegheny unite to ^"
form the Ohio. A body of Virginia militia advanced against
them. The French awaited them in ambush without the
fort. Warned by an Indian, the Virginians surprised the
French, and the first battle of the war took place. As Vol-
taire said: "A torch lighted in the forests of America set
all Europe in conflagration. " How essentially this was an
American war is illustrated by the fact that, although hos-
tilities began here in 1754, it was not till 1756 that France
and England oflScially broke off diplomatic relations. It is
not without significance that the command for the first shot
was given by Major George Washington.
In William Pitt, the great English war minister, the colo-
nists found a leader who brought out their comparatively
great resources. By 1760 Canada was conquered. In this
18 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
emergency France called upon Spain for assistance. These
two monarchies had since 1702 been united dynastically by
The " Fanuly the succession of a French prince to the Spanish
Alliance throne, and in 1761 they became by treaty
diplomatically bound together in what is known as the
Family Compact.^ In accordance with this agreement either
country might, if engaged in a defensive war, call for the
assistance of the other. It was directed particularly against
the maritime powers, and chiefly against England. This
union, though unable to check the progress of English arms,
yet brought Spain and her possessions into the peace negotia-
tions and caused readjustments of fundamental importance.
The war resulted in four documents which together con-
stituted the basis of American territorial diplomacy till well
The cession of into the nineteenth century. First came the
Canada treaty between England and France, made
at Paris in 1763.^ For a long time the English government
hung in uncertainty as to whether it should take as part of
the spoils of war the rich sugar island of Guadaloupe in the
West Indies, or Canada. Fortunately for the colonies, how-
ever, they were at this crisis represented in London by an
agent of exceptional force and adroitness, Benjamin Frank-
lin of Pennsylvania, who made it clear that they would be
greatly dissatisfied, if they should again be deprived of their
conquests. ..The English government therefore concluded. to
hold Canada, but" not without some misgiving that it might
have been safer to face discontented colonists than to free
them from the continual menace of French hostility, a point
of view which gave some consolation to the French states-
men, who confidently predicted that England could not long
hold colonies to whose safety she was not necessary.
* Comte de Flassan, Histoire generale et raisonnee de la diplomatie fran^
Qaise (2d ed., 7 vols., Paris, 1811), vi. 314-320.
' From this point all treaties mentioned to which the United States was
not a party may be found in G. F. de Martens's Recueil de traites des pui*'
sances et etats de V Europe, which begins with 1761 ^nd is continued by 8up>
plements and new editions to 19lS.
^/
PRE-REVOLUTIONARY BOUNDARIES 19
In addition to Canada, France ceded all her claims to the
Ohio valley and all of the province of Louisiana east of the
Mississippi and north of the little river Iber-
ville, which ran from the Mississippi to the iana and
gulf, retaining to the east of the Mississippi ffo^d^
only the He d'Orleans, which contained the
city now called New Orleans. The eastern limit of this
French cession was not defined by treaty, but by custom had
been established at the river Perdido, halfway between the
French Mobile and the Spanish Pensacola. This boundary
was for the present, however, obliterated by the second docu-
ment in the series, the treaty between Spain and England,
by which the former ceded to England all of Florida, thus
absorbing also the boundary disputes between that province
and its northern neighbor, Georgia.
By a third document France gave to Spain what remained
of Louisiana, the He d'Orleans and an undefined territory
west of the Mississippi, to indemnify her for Spanish
the loss of Florida.! Thus the whole mainland Louisiana
of North America came to be divided between Spain and
England by the waters of the Mississippi and the Iberville.
The far-sighted, however, realized that, with the French
navy in existence, with a French population in Canada and
Louisiana, and with so wide a difference in the relative
strength of Spain and France, the latter was not yet elimi-
nated as a factor in American development.
The fourth document was an English royal proclamation,
issued October 7, 1763, dividing the new conquests into ad-
ministrative provinces.^ Florida was extended The English
to include the portion of French Louisiana ^lo"^*^
ceded to England, and was divided into east and west prov-
inces by the Appalachicola river, Pensacola thus falling to
^ B. A. Hinsdale, The Establishment of the First Southern Boundary of the
United. States, Amer. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1893, pp. 329-366.
* William MacDonald, Documentary Source Book of American History (New
York, 1908), 113-116, see also C. E. Carter, "Some Aspects of British Admin-
istration in West Florida," Mississippi Valley Hist. Review, 1914, i. 364-375.
«0 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
the western province. The boundary between East Florida
and Georgia was fixed as it stands to-day; the northern bound-
ary of West Florida was set at the thirty-first parallel. In
1764 this boundary was shifted to a line running from the
mouth of the Yazoo, or 32' 28".
To the north the province of Quebec was created, with a
southern boundary extending from the "South end of lake
Nipissing." Thence the said line, crossing the
river St. Lawrence and the lake Champlain in
45 degrees of north latitude, passed along the "High Lands,
which divide the rivers which empty themselves into the river
St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the sea, and also along
the North coast of the Bayes des Chaleurs." In 1774, by
the Quebec Act, the province was enlarged by the inclusion of
the region north of the Ohio river. The area between Quebec
and Florida, bounded on the east by a line connecting the
head waters of the rivers flowing into the Atlantic, was left
unorganized, a preserve for Indians and fur-bearing animals.^
With this settlement the ground plan of American diplo-
macy was laid. Indians, English, French, and Spanish colo-
Factois and nists, as well as the mother countries with their
problems rivalry of interests and traditions, were all
alert to their positions. Nor may one overlook the situation
in the West Indies, so much more important at that day than
at this, and so much more closely connected with the con-
tinent by ties of business and of government. There all the
rival nations had footholds, and there the fate of European
and American wars was sometimes determined. Under
these circumstances were to be settled such great questions
as the direction of English and Spanish-American commerce,
the governmental relationship of Europe and America, and
the racial ownership of the Mississippi valley and the region
of the great lakes.
* C. E. Carter, Great Britain and the Illinois Country (Washington, 1010),
lS-«6.
CHAPTER III
RECOGNITION »
The early diplomatic successes of the Americans are often
enhanced by the commentary that the first representatives
of the new country faced, as untrained novices, -.. . -
Europeans who were masters of their art. international
This lack of preparation, however, extended
only to lack of practice in the formal art of diplomatic inter-
course and to lack of acquaintance with international law.
Of these apparent defects the first was a distinct advantage,
for the diplomatic code of the eighteenth century had be-
come rigid and formal to the point of breaking, and the
directness of the Americans was like a fresh breeze under
which it began to totter to a fall. International law, on the
other hand, was proportionately more a matter of principle
and less of cases than it is to-day, and was consequently
easier for amateurs to grasp.
Of men trained in the more essential elements of diplomacy,
the colonies had a greater proportion than any other country
of the time. They had been engaged in con- colonial ex-
tinual negotiations, almost independently of perience
Great Britain, with the Indian tribes, and frequently with
the French and Spaniards. Every colony had had semi-
diplomatic disputes with its neighbors, and all had supported
agents in England whose functions included virtually all the
elements of a diplomatic mission. Almost continuously from
1758 to 1774 Benjamin Franklin, as general agent, had
occupied a post in England essentially equivalent to minister
* For a general bibliography of American diplomacy to 1901, see A. B.
Hart, Foundations of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1905), 241-293;
also Channing, Hart, and Turner, Guide to the Study of American Hiiiorjf
(Boston, etc, 1912), which has special sections on diplomacy to 1912.
21
22 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
to that government. Moreover, the whole movement toward
union between the colonies was diplomatic in its character,
and constantly involved the most delicate questions of
management.
The colonists had therefore had experience with alliances,
with treaties of peace, of boundary, and of cession, with the
conduct of joint military expeditions, and with
Arbitration ii> 'i pi*/t* ii> i
deahng with men of airiermg habits and customs.
They were thoroughly at home with the great American ques-
tions of boundary, fisheries, Indians, and foreign trade. They
were accustomed to discuss difficult problems with able men,
and to recognize the necessity of compromise. In one re-
spect their peculiar experience as colonists prepared them
to take the lead in an important branch of international
law, — the science of international arbitration. Accustomed
as they were to see intercolonial disputes ultimately settled by
judicial process in England, they thought of arbitration as a
natural expedient. Further, having no trained diplomatic
stajff, they sent over their ablest men of affairs, who usually
overmatched in ability the men with whom they had to deal.
This diplomatic readiness was indeed an essential resource,
for without foreign aid the cause of the colonists would have
Necessity for been well-nigh hopeless. In the final event
foreign aid ^Y^e French army was a decisive factor at York-
town; but the French army was less significant than the
French navy, which rendered the situation at Yorktown pos-
sible.^ Still more important, however, was the fact that the
colonies were not self-sufficing industrially, and so could not
have withstood the first shock of war without the supplies
of arms and other manufactured goods which from the be-
ginning of the conflict found their way into the country
through the lax neutrality of Holland, Spain, and France.^
1 A. T. Mahan, The Infltience of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (Bos-
ton, 1890), 382-400.
* J. F. Jameson, "Saint Eustatius in the American Revolution," Amer.
Hist. Review, 1903, viii. 683-708.
RECOGNITION 23
From the meeting of the Continental Congress, Septem-
ber 5, 1774, until the Declaration of Independence, July 4,
1776, the position of the colonists was extremely Groping for
delicate. Professing loyalty to George III, ^^
they realized more and more the necessity of foreign assist-
ance, for which, however, it would have been treason to
apply. Groping for support. Congress on October 21, 1774,
sent an address to the other continental British colonies,
on June 3, 1775, it addressed the people of Ireland, and on
June 16 it appointed a committee to secure the friendship of
the Indian nations. On November 29, 1775, though veiling
its design in ambiguity of language, it took a more decisive
step by appointing a committee of five to correspond with
friends of the colonies in Great Britain, Ireland, "and other
parts of the world"; and finally, in the spring of 1776 it sent
Silas Deane as agent to France, his mission, however, dis-
guised under a pretence of private business.^
Before following Deane in his delicate task it is de-
sirable to have some understanding of the general conditions
under which diplomatic intercourse was con- Diplomatic or-
ducted during the Revolution. In general the s&oiz&tioa
development of diplomatic organization resembled that
of other departments. The committee of correspondence
lasted till April, 1777. It was succeeded by a committee on
foreign affairs, which gave way in October, 1781 to a secre-
tary of foreign affairs, Robert Livingston. Under all these
successive regimes, however, the main questions were de-
bated in Congress itself, which received foreign ministers,
and whose president sometimes acted as the national repre-
sentati\^e before the world. Communication Communica-
between the directing body and its agents *^°°
abroad was slow and uncertain. Even in summer two
months was considered good time between Philadelphia and
^ The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, ed.
Francis Wharton, 6 vols., Washington, 1889; also Secret Journals of Congress,
1775-1788, 4 vols., Boston, 18581.
24 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Paris, and in winter there were few opportunities lo send
letters; moreover, if they escaped the constant peril of cap-
ture by the English, they were liable to be read by the
foreign postal authorities. Months often passed without
the successful exchange of a letter, and some of the most
imj)ortant papers fell into the hands of the enemy. Under
such circumstances the American representatives abroad
were to a remarkable degree thrown upon their own respon-
sibility, and might well feel that the fate of a nation de-
pended upon their wisdom.^
More important than such facts was the attitude in which
Deane would find Europe waiting. Primarily that at-
European in- titude was one of intense interest. From the
terest gj,g^ moment that the Revolution took form
the chancelleries of Europe watched with minute attention.
The press of Amsterdam teemed with translations of Amer-
ican pamphlets and original discussions of the American
situation. From 1774 half the bulk of the Paris and London
correspondence of every court of Europe consisted of Amer-
ican news; the ministry of Naples knew in detail of every
happening in Philadelphia; at Rome Mgr. Lazzari began a
diary of the American Revolution. Never since then, unless
possibly in 1900, has this country absorbed so much of the
attention of continental Europe.^
The vogue of America rested largely on the belief that in
that far-off non-contagious land the vision of Rousseau was
Sentimental being materialized. The American leaders,
sympathy g^,]^ g^ Patrick Henry and Samuel Adams,
were picturesque and appealing in their sentiments and elo-
quence; in one section of French society liberalism was
fashionable; if one may judge from the conduct of the no-
bility early in the French Revolution it was more than fash-
ionable. Even to those to whom it did not appeal, the liberal
experiment was compelling in its possibilities. Sympathy
' See page 23, note 1.
* Fish, Guide, 74, 75, 118, 233-235, 240-241, 246, 250.
RECOGNITION 25
hung in the balance, but the audience was on tiptoe follow-
ing the action.^
If America seemed less picturesque to the men of affairs,
it seemed also less remote. For a hundred years every war
had tended to become a general war. Since Hatred of
1763 England had been regarded as the bully England
of Europe, and the strength of England was believed to lie
in her commerce and her colonies. The possible disintegra-
tion of the British empire was a subject that nearly touched
that holy of holies of the European statesman, the balance
of power. To France the situation came not entirely as a
surprise. Choiseul had predicted it in 1763, France had
maintained secret agents in the colonies from that time, and
the king himself had attended to their reports. Toward
France, therefore, the eyes of the nations were directed as
closely as toward London and America.
In France Louis XVI, "the Good," had succeeded to the
throne in 1774. Neither he nor the prime minister, Maurepas,
was the driving force; the energy of the govern- Vergennes and
ment lay with Turgot, the minister of finance, '^'"'so*
and Vergennes, the minister of foreign affairs. Both intent
upon revenge on England, Turgot wished for a longer period
of recuperation, whereas Vergennes was eager to take advan-
tage of this unique opportunity. In two papers entitled
"Reflexions" and "Considerations," the latter urged his
views. The colonists, he said, must be supported. If they
were conquered, England would turn her armies in America
upon the French and Spanish West Indies. It was more
likely, however, that the war would cause the overthrow of
the existing British ministry and the recall of William Pitt,
now earl of Chatham. That sinister genius, the idol of the
colonies, would probably effect a reconciliation, and, with
* For a running account, see J. B. Perkins, France in the American Revotu-
tion, Boston, etc., 1911; for the documents, Henri Doniol, Histoire de la
participation de la France d V etahlissement des Etais Unis d^Amerique, 5 vols.,
Paris, 1886-92.
26 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
the combined forces of England and America, "une ep^
nue dans les mains d'un furieux," would devastate the
world. ^
France, however, could not well act openly without Spain.
Their fleets together might hope to meet that of England,
Spain delays but that of France alone could not. Spain,
French action y^^j^y Charles III and his minister Florida
Blanca, was somewhat more energetic than usual. She was
still united with France in the Family Alliance, and she de-
sired to regain Florida and Gibraltar. On the other hand,
it seemed rash for the greatest colonial power to encourage
revolting colonies; besides, she was not fully ready for war,
and again the habitual Spanish procrastination stood in the
way of prompt action. While goading Spain into activity,
Vergennes advised Louis XVI to await her decision before
going to war, but meantime by secret succor to prevent the
colonies from falling before British arms or promises.
It was possibly the opening of this middle way, rendering
unnecessary a definite decision, from which Louis XVI
Tentative as- shrank almost as nervously as did Charles III,
sistance ^^lat secured for Vergennes his victory over
Turgot and the direction of French policy. On May 2, 1776,
he was authorized to use a million francs for the colonies,
to which Spain soon added another million. To employ
these sums for the colonists, without the knowledge, or at
any rate without the proved knowledge, of England, Ver-
gennes had recourse to Pierre de Beaumarchais, a playwright
and litterateur, who escaped being a charlatan by being some-
thing of a genius, and who had served as a special agent for
Vergennes in England.^
Beaumarchais organized a commercial company, under
the name of Rodriguez Hortalez and Company, to deal in
American products. Through Dumas, a Dutch friend of
^ Charlemagne Tower, The Marquis de La Fayette (2 vols., Philadelphia,
1895), i. 74, 92-97, 108-113.
' C. J. Stille, Beaumarchais and " The Lost Million," (Philadelphia, 1886).
RECOGNITION 27
Franklin, he was put in touch with Arthur Lee, an Ameri-
can just then in Paris. When, therefore, Deane arrived in
France he found everything prepared for him. Beaumarchais
The initiative came from neither side alone, but *"^ Lafayette
each putting forth its antennae encountered the other. Nor
was the preparation confined to that of the government. In
that military age war anywhere attracted the adventurous.
Soldiers of fortune looked to America as a field for possible
glory and emolument, while some men, like the young Mar-
quis de Lafayette, burned to baptize their swords in the cause
of liberty. Deane was overwhelmed with offers of assistance,
as well as with requests for commissions in the American
army; and he sent home not only a number of oflScers, good
and bad, but, what was still more necessary, arms from
French arsenals, paid for by the French and Spanish millions
or to be paid for by cargoes of tobacco. Beaumarchais wrote
to Congress, "Your deputies, gentlemen, will find in me a
sure friend, an asylum in my house, money in my coffers,
and every means of prosecuting their operations whether of
a public or a secret nature."
Meantime the Declaration of Independence had been issued
and the new United States could reveal its policy. Its repre-
sentatives need no longer be inconspicuous; „
!• I • o 1 • x^ . Franklin
accordmgiy, in September it sent to France its
most illustrious citizen, Benjamin Franklin. From his arrival
in 1776 till his departure in 1785, sometimes as one of several
commissioners, sometimes as sole minister to France, Frank-
lin was universally thought of as the representative of the
American cause in Europe. Arriving in Paris at the age of
seventy, and preceded by his reputation as a statesman, but
still better known as the author of Poor Richard's Almanac
and by his discoveries in electricity, he presented to the
curious gaze of those who thought to see for the first time in
the flesh one of those Arcadians who were becoming the sup-
port of conversation, a benignant countenance with gray
locks "appearing under a martin fur cap." His lack of ac-
28 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
quaintance with French court etiquette he concealed under
a cloak of agreeable eccentricity, which he knew how to
render interesting and not too strange, just as he kept his
costume simple but not too simple. Honesty had so long
been his policy that it shone from his face, and he captured
at once, and contrived to deserve, the complete confidence of
the entire diplomatic corps. Perhaps only those who had
business with him realized that his disarming ingenuousness
of appearance was not unaccompanied by a subtlety based
upon a knowledge of human nature more comprehensive
than that of Lincoln, though not so profound. All, however,
came to realize that the intellect under the fur cap was
unique, and that of all great minds produced by America
his was the most nearly akin to the Gallic. His pregnant wit
passed rapidly from mouth to mouth. His satiric skits were
expressed with an artistic delicacy as pleasing to the Parisian
as unusual among Americans. Moreover, his artistic sense
for language seems but to have reflected his mastery of the
art of living. His tact and sympathetic consideration won
those who associated intimately with him, while he did not
disdain to employ a nicely calculated breadth of acting which
gained the remote spectators of the gallery.^
Franklin took Paris by storm. His piquant sayings and
writings caught the public attention, his shoe buckles be-
Frankiin cap- came the fashion, his pictures were everywhere
tures Pans j^j. ^^^e. The best Latin verse since the Augus-
tan age was forged in his honor: "Eripuit caelo fulmen,
sceptrumque tyrannis," "He snatched from Heaven the
thunderbolt, the scepter also from tyrants." Hesitant soci-
ety swimg to the American side, and society was at that
period the public in France. That Franklin enjoyed himself
is clear, and that he liked the French, who liked him, was
only natural. It is true that he became very close to those
^ E. E. Hale and E. E. Hale, Jr., Franklin in France, 2 vols., Boston,
1887-88; and, more particularly, Franklin's Works (ed. John Bigelow, 10
vols., New York, 1887-88), vols, vi.-ix.
RECOGNITION 29
in authority, but that the glamor blinded in any way his
clear view of American interests may well be doubted. In
December, 1776, it was said of him, "That popular man be-
came more powerful than power itself;" and Jefferson wrote
later, "He possessed the confidence of that government in
the highest degree, insomuch that it may truly be said that
they were more under his influence than he under theirs."
Franklin's success rendered the triumph of Vergennes's
policy comparatively easy. American merchant ships, priva-
teers, and war vessels found harborage in Friendship and
French ports; and finally, after the news of the "^^i*^*^®
surrender of Burgoyne reached France, early in 1778, the king
consented to act without waiting upon Spain. On February 6
of that year two treaties were signed between France and
the United States, — one of amity and commerce, and, in
case England should resent that, one of alliance. The
treaty of amity was framed upon principles of free mutual
intercourse which were somewhat in advance of the time,
and incorporated certain rules of international law, as that
free ships make free goods, long laid down by the Dutch audi
French writers but denied by the English. The treaty of
alliance guaranteed, on the part of France, the independence
of the United States; on the part of the latter the existing
possessions of France in America. To the United States
it gave a free hand in the conquest of British continental!
possessions and of the Bermudas; to France it granted similar!
rights in the West Indies. "Neither of the two parties," it
ran, " shall conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain
without the formal consent of the other first obtained; and
they mutually engage not to lay down their arms until the
independence of the United States shall have been formally
or tacitly assured by the treaty or treaties that shall ter-
minate the war." ^
1 For these and all subsequent treaties to which the United States was a
party, see Treaties, Conventions, etc., ed., W. M. Malloy and Charles Gar-
field, 2 vols, to 1909, and supplement to 1913 (Senate Doc., 61 Con. i sess.,
No. 357).
30 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
England, on hearing of the recognition of American inde-
pendence by France, did not accept the view of Louis XVI,
France enters who wrote to George III that he was assured
the war ^j^g^^ ^^le latter would regard it as one more
manifestation of his friendly disposition; and in April war
between France and England began. Thanks largely to the
tact of Franklin, the alliance worked smoothly. The French
government loaned money and guaranteed other loans; it
sent ships and troops to America. As the chief American
authority in Europe, Franklin was financial and purchasing
agent for the states; he directed the employment of the
American navy under Commodore John Paul Jones; and,
through his friends, the Foxes of Falmouth, he looked after
the welfare of the American prisoners in England. American
trade was legitimatized, and the final independence of the
United States became a reasonable certainty.
CHAPTER IV
SPAIN AND HOLLAND
Two parties arose in Congress. One, which came to be
known as the Gallican, or French, party, favored the en-
trusting of American interests in Europe to Diplomatic
France, advised by Franklin. The other, skirmishing
sometimes known as the party of the Lees and Adamses,
distrusted French sincerity and Franklin's ability and wished
to preserve an independent course. The friends of Franklin,
who in domestic affairs were also in general the supporters
of Washington, succeeded in maintaining him at Paris, but
their rivals obtained the appointment of a swarm of agents
commissioned to other countries. Silas Deane was recalled
in 1778, and in 1779 Franklin was appointed sole minister
to France; but from time to time Ralph Izard was sent to
Tuscany, Arthur Lee was for a time co-commissioner to
France and was appointed to undertake missions to Spain
and Prussia, William Lee was sent to Berlin and Vienna,
Francis Dana to Russia, Henry Laurens to the Netherlands.
None of these were received at their posts, but at Paris and
in their wanderings about Europe they now and again touched
wires in a manner disturbing to the controlling authorities. It
was, however, at Paris, and by Franklin and Vergennes, that
the international status of the alliance had to be determined.^
The first essential was the Spanish fleet, and the Spanish
negotiation at once became the central point of diplomatic
interest. Charles III was annoyed at the in- Spain enters
dependent action of France; the Spanish gov- *^® ^"
ernment was irritated at the persistent attempts of Arthur
Lee to gain admission to the Spanish court, and vacillated
with the success or the failure of American arms. Spain
^ Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, introduction.
SI
32 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
was still unready; she asserted that France was the offending
party and that the Family Alliance did not compel her to
assist France in an offensive war. Instead she offered media-
tion, in return for which she was to receive the cession of the
Floridas and a considerable proportion of the territory be-
tween the Floridas and the Ohio, a proposal which was vir-
tually an offer to accept a bribe from England for her inac-
tivity. The offer was refused, but European opinion still
believed that she would remain at peace, when rather un-
expectedly, in 1779, she declared war on Great Britain.
Thus united, the French and Spanish fleets for some years
neutralized British naval supremacy. Since Spain, however,
though allied with France, had not as yet even
recognized the United States, in the autumn of
1779 Congress sent John Jay to treat with her. Jay was
thirty-four years old, a man of decided talent and great
energy. Although a gentleman in the conventional sense
and descended from French Huguenots, he was provincial
in experience and point of view and retained no spark of
appreciation for French civilization. Given to self-confidence,
he was alert to American interests up to the point of being
suspicious of all who opposed his view of them. He was in-
structed to offer Spain permission to take the Floridas from
Great Britain and to hold them; but in return he was to
insist on the right of the Americans to navigate the Missis-
sippi to the sea, — a right in respect to which he declared in
1780, "The Americans, almost to a man, believed that God
Almighty had made that river a highway for the people of
the upper country to go to the sea by," — and he was to re-
quest permission to use similarly the rivers flowing into the
Gulf of Mexico to the eastward. In 1781 under the pressure
of accumulated woes. Congress released him from that part
of his instructions relating to the Mississippi; but he disre-
garded the modification.^
^ John Jay, Correspondence and Public Papers (ed. H. P. Johnston, 4 vols..
New York, 1890-93), i. 5848-461, ii. 1-296.
SPAIN AND HOLLAND S3
Jay was not oflBcially received in Spain, but he was put
in touch with Don Diego de Gardoqui, a Spanish merchant
versed in American affairs, who represented Spanish
the Spanish government. It soon appeared P°^"**
that Spain was as insistent on closing the Mississippi as Jay
was on opening it. One great boon which she expected to
obtain from the war was the banishment of all foreign com-
merce from the Gulf of Mexico. Ever timid as to her Amer-
ican possessions, she wished to hold all neighbors at arm's
length. Indeed, she was not satisfied with the narrow fringe
of coast afforded by the Floridas; but in the project of a
treaty presented in her behalf to Congress by Luzerne, the
French minister at Philadelphia, she renewed the suggestion
contained in her mediating offer to England, that she receive
a portion of the region between the Floridas and the Ohio.^
Money she was willing to offer; vital concession she would
not make.
Fully cognizant of Spanish views, and with his suspicions
excited by an outside view of a negotiation with England
which took place at Madrid during his stay, g • ^
Jay, having obtained nothing but some slight tiation in
pecuniarj'^ aid, returned to Paris, where in
1782 he renewed negotiations with the Spanish minister at
that capital, Count d'Aranda. To assist in these negotia-
tions Vergennes delegated his secretary Rayneval, who
seemed to Jay to support the Spanish contentions.
Meantime the question was not left to diplomatic con-
troversy alone. In 1778 and 1779, the American, George
Rogers Clark had captured Kaskaskia on the war in the
Mississippi and Vincennes on the Wabash, ^*^*
within the territory added to Quebec by the act of 1774.
Between 1779 and 1781 Spain captured the British forts
in West Florida. At Natchez on the Mississippi between
the parallels of 31' and 32' 28", in or out of West Florida as
one might view it, the Spaniards and Americans almost
* Secret Journals qf Congress, ii. 310, etc
34 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
came to blows. In the winter of 1781 a Spanish expedition
from St. Louis penetrated to the British fort of St. Joseph
in Michigan and burned it.^ Jay wrote to Livingston, " When
you consider the ostensible object of this expedition, the
distance of it, the formalities with which the place, the coun-
try, and the rivers were taken possession of in the name of
His Catholic Majesty, I am persuaded it will not be neces-
sary for me to swell this letter with remarks that would oc-
cur to a reader of far less penetration than yourself."
By 1782 Jay was, therefore, thoroughly convinced that
Spain wished no good to the United States, but rather that
Jay's conclu- she would curtail it within the narrowest
^*°°^ limits. He believed also that France was
co-operating with Spain and was moved by similar desires.
John Adams writing in November of that year confided to
his diary : " Mr. Jay likes Frenchmen as little as Mr. Lee and
Mr. Izard did. He says they are not a moral people; they
know not what it is; he don't like any Frenchman; the
Marquis de Lafayette is clever, but he is a Frenchman.
Our allies don't play fair, he told me." Adams's reference to
allies is a little ambiguous; but he must have referred to the
French alone, for by the close of 1782 there was still no
agreement between Spain and the United States. France
was the ally of each, but they were not allies of each
other.
While Jay was negotiating with Spain, the centre of interest
had shifted to the Netherlands. With the only comparatively
free press on the continent, that country, and
particularly Amsterdam, was a centre for the
publication of polemical literature; and as the chief money-
lender of Europe, the Dutch bourse reflected all shades of all
the diplomatic changes of the world. The interest of the
Dutch in America, and of the Americans in the Dutch, how-
ever, was far from being wholly platonic. Until our treaty
* Justin Winsor, The Westward Movement (Boston, etc., 1897), 116-202;
Doniol, La participation de la France, iv. 101.
SPAIN AND HOLLAND 35
with France, Dutch neutrality was the chief foreign asset
of the colonies.
Dutch smugglers had always been the bane of honest Eng-
lish oflficials in the colonies ; the smuggling question had, indeed,
been one of the causes of irritation that produced „ „
, . , , St. Eustatius
the Revolution. In the event of mdependence,
the Dutch seemed most likely to inherit the American trade.
When communication between England and America was
cut off and British war vessels began to patrol the American
coast, the safest expedient was to drop with the generally
favoring winds into the maze of West Indian islands to seek
a market for sale and purchase; and the Dutch merchants
took care that the Americans should find what they came
for. European goods could be safely shipped from Holland
to some Dutch island, and in particular the little island of
St. Eustatius became from 1776 to 1779 the entrep6t of
American trade. Lying in close juxtaposition to St. Chris-
topher, which was British, St, Bartholomew, which was
French, St. Croix, which was Danish, and Spanish Porto
Rico, and enjoying the privileges of a free port, it was a
natural depot of exchange. Through St. Eustatius, Amster-
dam took the place of London as the market for American
tobacco and indigo; she exported to London instead of re-
ceiving from her. Through St, Eustatius, also, cloth and
iron and war material from Europe, and even from England
herself, reached the colonies. In thirteen months of the years
1778-79, 3182 vessels sailed from the island, and through
its ports was carried on most of the American correspondence
with Europe.^
England was naturally exasperated at this situation, which
was enriching her most important rival in merchant tonnage
and at the same time rendering her task in America the
more diflScult. Particularly irritating was the fact that the
^Jameson, "Saint Eustatius," Amer. Hist. Review, 1903, viii. 683-708;
also Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, xxii. 218-262, May 14, 1781 (discus-
sion by Burke).
36 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
treaties made in the time of William III when the relative
position of the two powers was quite different, gave the
England and Dutch ships special advantages by allowing
the Dutch ^.j^g principle of free ships, free goods, and by
confining contraband within narrow bounds. In terms
Holland and England were practically allies, but the Dutch
refused to carry out the agreement by lending England
troops, which the latter had the treaty right to require. The
Dutch government did indeed send out instructions calling
for the strict enforcement of neutrality on the part of its
colonial officers; yet one governor of St. Eustatius ordered a
salute to an American vessel, and of his successor the Amer-
ican agent. Van Bibber, wrote in 1776, "We are as well fixed
with him now as we were with the former." During 1777
the British naval vessels off St. Eustatius were ordered to
search for contraband all vessels entering and leaving the
island, and to send those found with it to an admiralty court
for adjudication. In 1779, a further cause for complaint was
given by the refuge afforded to John Paul Jones in the Texel
after his raid in English waters. In 1780, therefore, England,
after due notice, announced the suspension of the Dutch
treaties and began to seize and confiscate Dutch vessels
carrying American goods or any kind of war material.
Meantime the Netherlands drifted, anxious to secure the
last dollar from the neutral trade, and unable to determine
^ which side to take up when neutrality ceased to
Dutch parties .
be possible. The stadholder was pro-English,
but was without energy or power. Of the people, a very
strong party, sedulously encouraged by the skilful diplomacy
of Vergennes, had for many years been coming to favor France;
and this faction was now supported by an emotional body of
"patriots" who felt a sentimental sympathy with American
republicanism. In 1778, during this deadlock, the city of
Amsterdam, on the responsibility of its burgomaster. Van
Berkel, had the draft of a treaty with the United States
drawn up by a M. de Neufville, who secretly at Frankfort
SPAIN AND HOLLAND 87
met William Lee, who acted on his own responsibility. This
draft, utterly without standing in diplomacy, was sent to
repose in the archives of Amsterdam and the United States;
but it did not sleep,^
While affairs were in this state, Catharine of Russia sud-
denly entered the lists. England had at first counted upon
Russian support, and had sent her ablest dip- Catharine of
lomat, Sir James Harris, afterwards earl of ^'"^
Malmesbury, to cajole the capricious empress. When, how-
ever, George III in an autograph note asked for Russian
mercenaries, Catharine, who posed as a ruler of advanced
ideas, replied that she was not in that business. Moreover,
since France was also ably represented at the court, Harris
was not able to efface the ill effect created by the English
treatment of the vessels of the northern neutral p)owers,
Denmark, Sweden, and Russia, a subject especially aggra-
vating to Catharine because among her many aspirations
was that of making Russia a great mercantile power. This
difficulty, however, arose chiefly after the entrance of France
and Spain into the war, as ships of these northern countries
seldom reached America.
Under these circumstances Catharine resolved upon a
dramatic stroke which should at once enhance both her power
and her prestige as a leader of liberal thought. The Armed
On March 10, 1780, she announced to the world We«f *«ty
the following principles of international law: that neutral,
vessels may engage in the coast trade of a belligerent country \
so long as the ports are unblockaded; that enemies' goods
in neutral vessels are free from seizure; that contraband isi
limited to goods directly used in war; and that a blockade i
must be maintained off the port blockaded. To enforce the
observance of these views by the belligerent powers she pre-
pared a strong fleet, and united with Denmark and Sweden
in* what is known as the Armed Neutrality.^
» H. W. van Loon, The Fall of the Dutch Republic, London, 1913.
* Francis Wharton, Digest of the International Law of the United States (S
38 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
France and Spain joyfully accepted this declaration which
would open their ports to neutral vessels, and Frederick the
Great approved. England, though protesting, could observe
the rules with little hurt so far as the signatory powers were
concerned; but, should the Dutch come under them, trade
with the United States would become a pastime for the traf-
ficker, and the policy of attrition which she had been at-
tempting since 1779 would be nothing but a dead letter.
War with Holland without offence to the northern powers
was the necessity of English diplomacy, and, while the slow
wheels of Dutch governmental machinery were rolling toward
incorporation in the alliance, luck threw in England's hands
an instrument which secured her first diplomatic victory
since hostilities began.
In 1779 Henry Laurens had been elected minister to the
Netherlands. With his papers he naturally carried the draft
VT u *^ ^^ the treaty which William Lee had made.
WflT DCtWCCn 111*
England and Captured on the ocean, he threw his papers
overboard, but they were rescued by the
British, the draft among them. This was sent to Holland,
November 11, 1780, with a demand for an explanation. The
Dutch were not able to satisfy the British minister, York, who
was accordingly withdrawn on December 16. On the 19th,
Holland acceded to the alliance, but it was too late. St.
Eustatius received the first news of war from the British ad-
miral, Rodney, who demanded its surrender; and the Dutch,
in ceasing to be neutrals, ceased forever to carry American
trade.
The task of establishing relations between the United States
and England's new enemy fell to John Adams. A substantial
, . . , lawyer of forty -five, he had been in France for
John Adams *'. . /. . .
a brief period m 1778 as co-commissioner, and
had now returned as commissioner to secure the peace with
England which as yet was only a hope. On April 6, 1781,
vols., Washington, 1886), iii. 26Sd-264; Paul Fauchille, La diphmatie fran-
gaite et la ligue dea neutres de 1780, Paris, 1893.
SPAIN AND HOLLAND 39
he received a further commission to treat with Holland. Of
Puritan breeding and ideas, he was American to the back-
bone. With a fund of solid information and a penetration
and sound judgment which marked him out among his con-
temporaries, he was also conceited, obstinate, and disagree-
able. His disapproval of the frivolities of Philadelphia when
he attended Congress there foreshadowed his opinion of
Paris, and indeed of Franklin. Referring to the latter, he
wrote, "Congress will not be put to any expense for my
family, for my coaches and retinues of servants." July 13,
1780, he wrote to Vergennes, "The United States are a great
and powerful people, whatever European statesmen may
think." On August 9, 1780, Franklin wrote to the president
of Congress, "M. de Vergennes, who appears much offended,
told me yesterday that he would enter into no further dis-
cussions with Mr. Adams."
Happy in the thought that an understanding with Holland
might render the United States "less dependent on France,"
Adams was also happy in the quieter atmos- Treaty with
phere of the Dutch capital and the substantial ^o^and
methods of her statesmen, who on their part appreciated his
qualities. On October 8, 1782, therefore, an admirable treaty
of amity and commerce was signed, and an American loan
was floated on the Dutch market. In his diary he records
the remark made to him, "Sir, you have struck the greatest
blow in the American cause, and the most decisive." ^ ,
^ John Adams, Works (ed. C. F. Adams, 10 vols., Boston, 1850-56), iii.
94-304.
CHAPTER V
PEACE
During the spring of 1779 Congress devoted much of its
time to a consideration of the terms upon which it would
American de- consent to make peace. It decided that the
*""" recognition of independence must precede ne-
gotiation and not form part of the treaty. On the subject
of boundaries it determined to make the cession of the un-
organized Indian country between the Floridas, the moun-
tains, the Ohio, and the Mississippi an ultimatum. To the
north it wanted the 1763 boundary of Quebec, that is, Lake
Nipissing to the point where the forty-fifth parallel crosses
the St. Lawrence, then along that parallel to the highlands,
and then along the highlands, giving us the country from
Lake Nipissing westward to the source of the Mississippi; but
the whole portion of the line west of the St. Lawrence it was
willing to leave subject to negotiation. To the northeast, the
line was to descend from the highlands along the river St.
John, but some more western river might be chosen if thereby
the war could be shortened. Congress expressed its readiness
to take Nova Scotia and the Bermudas, and made other in-
teresting suggestions which were, however, not to be insisted
upon.^
In the discussions two points of dispute arose. New Eng-
land could not conceive of happiness without the Newfound-
Fisheries and land fisheries. Her representatives demanded
the Mississippi ^Yie right to fish on the " Banks," and in addi- ^
tion the privilege of landing on unoccupied coasts to dry fish
and for other purposes. The southern states, on the con-
^ Secret Journals of Congress, ii. 132-261 ; Diplomatic Correspondence qf
the United States, from 1783 to 1789, 3 vols., Washington, 1837.
40
PEACE 41
trary, were unwilling to prolong the war for such ends, but
demanded on their part that the free navigation of the V
Mississippi be an ultimatum, a grant for which the New
Englanders were not prepared to fight. When Congress
voted to include in the ultimatum merely the common right
of fishing on the "Banks" without the in-shore privileges,
Samuel Adams was heard to say that one saw more and more
that the separation of the East and the South was in-
evitable.^
The French minister, Gerard, not unnaturally urged that
the fixed points in the instructions be as few as possible, and
the final draft, August 14, 1779, left out both Final instrac-
fisheries and Mississippi. Two years more of *'*'°*
war, with the disasters in the South, still further broke the
spirit of Congress, and June 15, 1781, the commissioners
were informed that, although the desires of Congress re-
mained the same they were not to be insisted upon. "We
think it unsafe at this distance," ran the instructions, "to
tie you up by absolute and peremptory directions upon any
other subject than the two essential articles [independence
and the observance of the French treaties]. . . . You are
therefore at liberty to secure the interest of the United States
in such manner as circumstances may direct, and as the state
of the belligerent and disposition of the mediating powers
[Russia and Austria were offering their mediation] may
require. For this purpose, you are to make the most candid
and confidential communications, upon all subjects, to the
ministers of our generous ally the king of France; to under-
take nothing in the negotiations for peace or truce, without
their knowledge and concurrence; and ultimately to govern
yourself by their advice and opinion." ^ John Adams was in
1779 appointed to carry out the negotiations, and in 1781 four
other commissioners were added, — Franklin, Jay, Laurens,
and Thomas Jefferson. Of these Jefferson did not cross the
* Doniol, La participation de la France, iv. 105-107.
* Secret Journals of Congress, ii. 424-439.
4^ AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
ocean, and Laurens was in the Tower of London until just
before the signing of the preliminary articles.
From the beginning of the war till the end of 1778 Great
Britain was continually and increasingly anxious to negotiate
o * T. •* • with the colonies on some basis less than that
Great Britain
opens negotia- of independence. These attempts were a con-
stant source of anxiety to France, and were in
fact given by Louis XVI to Charles III as his excuse for recog-
nizing our independence without waiting for action by Spain.
The attempt of 1778 was earnestly undertaken but was un-
successful, and after that date such negotiations were not
seriously renewed. The surrender of Cornwallis at York-
town, October 14, 1781, brought England to the point of
acknowledging independence. On March 20, 1782, Lord
North resigned, and was succeeded by the marquis of Rock-
ingham, whose program was peace. The new ministry, how-
ever, was divided as to method. Lord Shelburne, secretary
of state for the colonies, held that the Americans were still
colonists, that independence should be granted as a valuable
concession, and that the negotiations should be conducted by
his department. Charles James Fox, secretary of foreign af-
fairs, the friend of the colonists and the avowed enemy of Shel-
burne, wished to recognize independence at once, to make the
terms so generous as to reconcile America to England and alien-
ate her from France, and desired to conduct the negotiation
himself. In this deadlock, in the spring of 1 782, Thomas Gren-
ville appeared in France from the English foreign office being
known as Mr. Fox's minister, and Richard Oswald from the
colonial office being known as Lord Shelburne's minister.^
^ For negotiations in the field, see Washington's Works (ed. W. C. Ford,
14 vols., New York, etc., 1889-93), iii. 77, 79, 90, 248. 282. For peace ne-
gotiations with Howe, see ibid., iv. 249, 263, 309; Wharton's Diplomatic
Correspondence, ii. 98, 103; Franklin's Works (ed. Bigelow), vi. 28; Secret
Journals of Congress. For negotiations of 1778, see Secret Journals, vol. ii.
13; Franklin's Works, vi. 124-238,
* Winsor, America, vii. 89-184; Lord Fitzmaurice, Life of William Earl of
Shelburne (2d ed., 2 vols., London, 1912), ii, 111-223.
PEACE 48
The central figure in the diplomatic situation was the
Count de Vergennes. The pivot of European affairs from
1776 to 1783, leader of France in her only sue- The objects of
cessful war with England during the long Vergennes
struggle between 1688 and 1815, master of a distinctly noble
style of correspondence, active, and successful in the choice of
agents, he has failed to impress history as has Necker, who
was less able, or Turgot, who was less powerful. Possibly
his failure in half of his main conception has blurred his im-
press on our memory: in separating the American colonies
from England he succeeded, in binding them to France he
failed. To accomplish the latter purpose he counted on a
gratitude that was not forthcoming, on a trade that did not
develop, on a dependent weakness that was avoided.^
Certainly his position in 1782 must command our sym-
pathy. The ally of Spain and of the United States, who were
not on terms with each other and who had dif- Vergennes's
ferent and conflicting purposes, he felt also p^s^*™
responsibility for the Netherlands, whom he had incited
to enter the war. On the side of the United States he was
bound to conclude no treaty without her consent, to obtain
independence "formally or tacitly," and also to secure her
possessions and conquests; moreover, the United States
would not be content with the territory actually occupied
nor without further stipulations, such as those concerning
the Mississippi and the fisheries. On the side of Spain he
was bound to conclude a simultaneous treaty, and Spain
would not be satisfied without Gibraltar, which the allies
had been for years besieging, and the Floridas. His policy
was to compel England to offer terms. To Oswald he wrote:
"There are four nations engaged in the war against you, who
cannot, till they have consulted and know each other's minds,
be ready to make propositions. Your court being without
allies and alone, knowing its own mind, can express it im-
mediately; it is, therefore, more natural to expect the first
1 For Franklin's opinion of Vergennes, see his Works, viii. 305-307.
44 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
proposition from you." To Franklin he wrote, May 28:
" You will treat for yourselves and every one of the powers
at war with England will make its own treaty. All that is
necessary for our common security is that the treaties go
hand in hand, and be signed all on the same day." As to
the necessity of standing together Franklin agreed with him.
He wrote Congress, "The firm united resolution of France,
Spain and Holland, joined with ours, not to treat of a par-
ticular, but a general peace, notwithstanding the separate
tempting offers to each, will in the end give us command of
peace." The first commission to Grenville having been to
France alone, Vergennes refused to treat with him; where-
upon, June 15, Grenville was invested with additional power
to treat with any other prince or state that might be con-
cerned. This seemed sufficient to Vergennes, and the final
negotiations appeared about to begin. ^
Kaleidoscopically the situation changed. On June 23
Jay arrived from Spain, and at about the same time Franklin
Jay's suspi- became to a considerable degree incapacitated
"""^ by an attack of gout. Jay's suspicions of
France, already aroused, were rapidly augmented. He in-
sisted that Grenville's new commission was still unsatisfac-
tory, that it must acknowledge the independence of the
United States, but Vergennes argued that this was not neces-
sary. Early in September the same Rayneval who was de-
fending the views of Spain in the negotiation between Jay
and d'Aranda was despatched on a secret mission to Eng-
land. Actually sent over to test the English views about
Gibraltar, he refused to discuss the affairs of the United
States; ^ but Jay not unnaturally suspected that he was sent
to bargain for a peace on the terms of dividing the West
between England and Spain. At about the same time Jay
received from British sources the translation of a memo'lre
^ For the opening negotiations, see particularly Franklin's Works, riiL
1-119.
* Doniol, La pariieipation de la France, v. 132-183, 255-256, 605-626.
PEACE 45
of Barbe Marbois, French secretary of legation at Philadel-
phia, which, like the Dutch treaty, had been rescued from
the waves into which it had been thrown from a captured
ship, and which presented an argument against the American
claim to share in the Newfoundland fisheries. Jay concluded
that France was planning to buy a peace from England
favorable to Spain and at the expense of the United States.
He believed that his country must depend upon itself alone,
and that, in the illness and pro-French weakness of Franklin,
the responsibility rested on him. Accordingly, on Septem-
ber 11, without consulting Franklin, he sent Vaughan, one
of the English agents in Paris, on a secret mission to the
English government. The cooperation between France and
the United States was no longer complete.^
In England, also, the situation had changed. The death
of the Marquis of Rockingham in June left no Whig leader
who could manage Fox and Shelburne together, shelbume
Fox retired, and the control of the ministry treats with Jay
fell to Shelbume on July 2. Grenville was recalled from
France and AUeyne Fitzherbert was sent in his place. A
master of finesse, Shelburne, who had been seeking an oppor-
tunity to separate England's enemies, welcomed the news
brought by Vaughan, and accepted the suggestion of Jay.
Independence was recognized in a new commission to Oswald,
and instructions were given as to terms which seemed to in-
sure success. The negotiation was to be secret from France.
Shelburne told Oswald, September 23, "We have put the
greatest confidence, I believe, ever placed in man in the
American commissioners. It is now to be seen how far they
or America are to be depended upon. ... I hope the public
will be the gainer, else our heads must answer for it, and de-
servedly."
On September 27 Vaughan returned to Paris, and the
American commissioners had to decide whether to accept the
o£fer. To do so involved the breaking of their instructions
^ Jay, Papers, ii. 366-452.
46 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
from Congress, which authorized them to treat only with
the full knowledge of the French ministers and to govern
themselves by their advice. The very form of
gotiate sepa- these instructions seemed to Jay to confirm his
F«mce*'°™ suspicions of a malign and pervasive French in-
fluence in Congress itself, and he hesitated not
a moment. On October 26 John Adams arrived from his
successful mission in Holland, and proved to be, as Jay wrote,
"a very able and agreeable coadjutor." He sided with Jay,
and together they outvoted Franklin. The negotiations
therefore began, their progress being kept secret from Ver-
gennes.^
In the conduct of the negotiations the American had the
advantage over the British representatives both in ability and
in local knowledge. They might have obtained
even better terms than they did, had not the
British government from time to time braced the backbone of
its commissioners. The boundaries agreed upon were almost
identical with those described by Congress. On the north-
east the St. Croix was substituted for the St. John, a change
that somewhat curtailed the limits of Massachusetts. West
of the St. Lawrence it was agreed to compromise between the
1763 and 1774 boundaries of Quebec. The American com-
missioners offered to accept either the extension of the forty-
fifth parallel to the Mississippi, or a line through lakes On-
tario, Erie, Huron, Superior, and the Lake of the Woods,
to the northwestern point of the latter, and thence due west-
ward to the Mississippi. Fortunately the British chose the
latter, a selection which ultimately proved even more ad-
vantageous to the United States than the line from Lake
Nipissing would have been. The western boundary was the
Mississippi, the southern was the northern boundaries of the
Floridas, that of West Florida being considered as the thirty-
first parallel. By a secret article, however, it was agreed
that, should Great Britain retain West Florida, the northern
1 John Adams, Works, iii. 300-887.
PEACE
47
48 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
boundary of that province should run eastward from the
mouth of the Yazoo, or m other words along the parallel of
32' 28".
The question of the fisheries fell to the lot of John Adams,
who had special instructions on that subject from the legisla-
_. . . ture of Massachusetts. Master of the facts, he
Fishenes, , , . . . .
debts, and succeeded m mcorporatmg into the treaty a
recognition of American rights to fish on the
"Banks," and sufficient in-shore privileges to make fishing
profitable. The navigation of the Mississippi was also ob-
tained. Adams also induced the American commissioners to
agree that creditors on either side should "meet with no
lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling
money of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted," a pro-
vision which had special reference to debts due by Americans
to British merchants when hostilities began. The most
troublesome question was that concerning the loyalists,
whose property had been confiscated and who had been sub-
jected to various persecutions. Naturally, the British govern-
ment felt a proper regard for their interests; but, since the
laws against them had been made by the states. Congress
could not promise restitution. A compromise was finally
reached by the agreement that Congress would "earnestly
recommend" restitution and the repeal of all laws not in
harmony with "that spirit of conciliation which, on the
return of the blessings of peace, should universally prevail."
With a provision for the mutual restoration of property the
preliminary articles were concluded and signed, November 30,
1782.
Triumphant in their negotiations with England, the com-
missioners had now to face France. Although they had
Eff t fth broken their instructions from Congress, they
treaty on had not violated the letter of the French com-
pact, for they had not signed a definitive
treaty. In spirit and in effect, however, they had done so.
When the news of the articles reached London, the British
PEACE 49
cabinet was on the point of exchanging Gibraltar for Guada-
loupe, a transfer ardently desired by Spain, and by France
in behalf of Spain. ^ From this proposal it immediately
withdrew and gave orders for an amnesty with the United
States in order that the British troops there might be em-
ployed in the West Indies.
Upon Franklin, who disagreed with his colleagues as to the
sinister designs of the French, and who believed that by
cooperation with Vergennes he could have Franklin and
obtained terms equally good, fell the burden Vergennes
of reconciliation. When the question of forwarding the
articles to America came up, the commissioners again acted
with secrecy, hastening to send the good news although
Vergennes wished delay. The latter wrote to Franklin in
terms of surprise and of dignified reproach. The letter of
Franklin in reply, December 17, was a masterpiece of diplo-
matic art, even to the adoption of a certain touch of pathos
in its slightly rambling quality, natural to his age but not
characteristic of his writing even later. " But," he explained,
"as this was not from want of respect for the king, whom we
all love and honor, we hope it will be excused, and that the
great work, which has hitherto been so happily conducted,
is so nearly brought to perfection, and is so glorious to his
reign, will not be ruined by a single indiscretion of ours. And
certainly the whole edifice sinks to the ground immediately
if you refuse on that account to give us any further assist-
ance." He lays down his pen, but taking it up again,, adds:
"The English, I just now learn, flatter themselves they
have already divided us. I hope this little misunderstanding
will therefore be kept a secret, and that they will find them-
selves totally mistaken." ^
It was indeed true that if Vergennes stood in the way of
this generous treaty, his whole work would turn to ashes in
his hands: England and America would again unite against
* Fitzmaurice, Shelbume, ii. 214.
» Franklin, Works, viii. 228-230.
50 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
France. Accordingly, on December 21 he wrote to his
representative in Philadelphia, Luzanne, not to complain
Vergennes's to Congress of the action of the American
conclusions commissioners, and he arranged a new loan of
six million francs to the United States.
Meantime the French and Spanish treaties gradually
progressed, till on September 3, 1783, definitive treaties of
The end of the peace were signed between Great Britain and
^" France, Spain and the United States. The
latter was identical with the provisional articles, except
for the secret article, which was left out as no longer neces-
sary, since the status of the Floridas was determined by
their cession to Spain. France gained Tobago. The Nether-v/
lands, after a long negotiation, made their peace in 1784,
accepting the loss of their mercantile privileges and of several "^
colonies.
The peace meant that our national existence, announced
to the world by the Declaration of Independence July 4,
-nrt. . 1. J 1776, had been established. Further, the treaty
What had . .,,,., i
been accom- gave US a territory, not indeed logical and
^ satisfactory, but ample for present needs.
We had not won our independence and our field for growth
by the force of arms alone, but by our success in manipulat-
ing the divisions of Europe to our advantage, a success
largely due to our diplomats. Elate though they were, their
task was by no means finished; for the boundaries of our
territories were nearly all vague or questionable, and we were
still a weak nation among the strong. Until we could develop
our own strength it would continue to be necessary to take
wise advantage of the divisions of Europe in order to insure
our safety and our winnings.
CHAPTER VI
RELIGION AND COMMERCE
Independent and at peace, the United States faced the
diplomatic problems of national existence. One of these,
which still continues to vex some nations, was _, „ .^ .
. 1 1 mi T^* United
at once and definitively settled. The connec- states and the
tion of a portion of their subjects with a non- *^**^^
resident religious authority had always been a matter of
national concern. Expecting that such would be the policy
of the new government, and that it would wish to free its
Catholic citizens from English control, the papal nuncio at
Paris addressed Franklin, July 28, 1783, with the proposal
that Congress consent to the establishment in some city
of the United States of "one of its Catholic subjects" with
ecclesiastical authority as bishop or apostolic prefect. Frank-
lin properly informed the nuncio that neither Congress nor
any state could take action on such a matter, but that a
dignitary thus appointed by Rome would nevertheless be
cordially welcomed, a position in which he was upheld by
Congress. Less wisely he recommended that Roman con-
trol be exercised through the medium of some French ec-
clesiastic, who would thus replace the vicar-general at Lon-
don. This latter plan was heartily embraced by the French
government, which hoped by French education and connec-
tion to render the Catholic element a weapon of French in-
fluence, and possibly had in mind the prestige accruing to
France from the French protectorate of Catholics in the
Orient. The Roman Propaganda investigated the question,
however, and, after testing the sentiment of the American
Catholics, decided to appoint an American bishop, John
51
52 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Carroll, and thus deal with its members without the media-
tion of any foreign nation.^
These two wise decisions were paralleled in what was per-
haps the more trying case of the American adherents of the
Anjdi Church of England. They at once assumed
Church in the position that national independence should
be reflected in a national church organization;
but to secure a continuation of the apostolic succession it
was necessary to have recourse to the mother country, since
there were no bishops in America. In order to obtain con-
secration, moreover, a bishop must swear allegiance to the
English crown, and the colonial opposition to the appoint-
ment of a bishop before the Revolution caused England to
doubt the reception of one now. Samuel Seabury, the first
applicant, was forced to accept his consecration from a small
independent branch of the church in Scotland. The attitude
of Congress, however, and a declaration to the same effect
by Connecticut soon removed apprehension as to American
opposition; and John Adams while minister in England
exerted himself unoflficially, as Franklin had done in Paris,
to make matters smooth. The result was the consecration,
in 1787, and by English bishops, of two additional American
bishops without the hampering oath.^
With religion thus freed from foreign governmental con-
trol and not interfered with by the home government, reli-
gious questions were practically removed from
religious prob- diplomacy until, with the beginning of the
<u^o^^ missionary movement, they reappeared in the
form of demands for the protection of Amer-
ican religious workers and property in foreign countries.
Meanwhile popular interest in diplomacy was chiefly di-
rected toward commercial affairs. One reason why the
* C. R. Fish, "Documents relative to the Adjustment of the Roman
Catholic Organization in the United States to the Conditions of National
Independence, 1783-1789," Amer. Hist. Review, 1910, xv. 800-829.
* Richard Hildreth, History of the United States of America (6 vols.. New
York, 1880-82), iu. 479-481.
RELIGION AND COMMERCE 58
colonies had chafed against dependence on England was f
the fact that their trade had for the most part been cur- '
tailed by the limits of the British empire, and, j _ . ,
worse still, had been regulated within those; necessi^ for
limits by an authority in which they did not!
share. One of the chief advantages of independence was to be/
the opening of new channels of trade. International trade,
however, is as dependent upon legalized relationships as is
domestic trade upon the preservation of law and order; and
in the eighteenth century such legal basis must depend, even
more than in the twentieth, upon special treaty agreements;
for general international law was at that time less uniform
and less pervasive than it is to-day, besides including many
rules and regulations discriminating against foreigners which
lingered on from the middle ages.
At the commencement of peace such treaties existed only
with France and the Netherlands. It did not, however, seem
diflScult to extend the series, for every nation
of Europe was intent on diverting to itself the sire°for°treat-
golden current of American trade to which so ^^1^°^ *^°""
much of England's prosperity was attributed.
No sooner was American independence assured than Frank-
lin was besieged with requests to enter into negotiation. On
December 24, 1782, he wrote to Livingston, "The Swedish
ambassador has exchanged full powers with me." In Feb-
ruary, 1783, the Danish minister was instructed to arrange
a treaty similar to that between the United States and Hol-
land. In July Franklin wrote that the electors of Saxony
and Bavaria, the king of Prussia, and the emperor were
thinking of treaties, and in September that Russia wanted
trade. April 15 of the same year he wrote to Livingston
that he had received offers to serve as consul for America
from merchants in every port of France and from most of
those of Europe.^
Not all these projects materialized into treaties; but in
1 Franklin, Works, viii. 172-313.
54 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
1783 Franklin concluded one with Sweden, and in 1785 I
Adams, Franklin, and Jefferson made one with Prussia. |
. These compacts, like those with France and
our early Holland, were exceeding liberal in their pro-
visions. They granted freedom of religion to
the citizens of one country who were occupied in the other,
and abolished the droit d'aubaine, or tax on the estates of
deceased foreigners. With regard to trade during time of
war, these treaties aligned the United States with the Dutch, ^
or continental, views rather than with those of the English.
The interests of most European nations were similar to those
of the United Stat^^s in opposition to those of Great Britain, v
they were the interests of nations weak at sea against the
strong. In the end the continental views for the most part
triumphed, but they can scarcely be regarded as accepted
international law in the eighteenth century. They expressed
desires rather than accomplished facts. Among the provi-
sions bearing on the subject were those by which the belliger- |
ent right of search was strictly limited, contraband was nar- j
rowly interpreted, neutral ships were allowed to carry [
enemies' goods, and in the case of Prussia privateering was '
prohibited between the two powers. The French treaty,
however, allowed the capture of neutral goods on enemies'
ships. In 1788 Jefferson, then serving as minister to France,
concluded an elaborate treaty with that country regulating
the rights of consuls.
Meanwhile, not waiting for treaties, adventurous Amer-
ican merchants were striking out for trade beyond the limits
Trade in Asia of Europe in the Far East, which had beckoned
and Africa Columbus, and whose most cherished product,
tea, had caused one of the dramatic preludes of the Revolu-
tion. Previously debarred from this trade by the monopoly
granted to the East India Company, the colonists were
nevertheless somewhat familiar with it, and had long used
Asiatic commodities. Once free, they hastened to make use
of their opportunities. In 1784 the first American vessel
RELIGION AND COMMERCE 55
reached Canton, in 1786 an American commercial agent
was in residence there, and soon American vessels were fre-
quenting the northwest coast of America in search of the
furs and ginseng which the Chinese wished in exchange for
their tea and silk. Moreover, on the coming of peace, Amer-
icans had resumed their traffic on the slave coast of Africa,
where there were no governments with which they must
come to terms. ^
In the Mediterranean, however, no progress was made.
This was not due to a neglect on the part of the Italian
powers to cultivate the United States. The Mediterranean
papal nuncio, while writing of religion in be- *^***®
half of the church, had also mentioned trade in behalf of
the states of the church; and Naples, Venice, and Malta
all made similar advances. Nor was it because the United
States was unfamiliar with trade conditions in that inland
sea; for as colonists the Puritan New Englanders had con-
stantly supplied the Mediterranean countries with salted
cod for fast-day fare, and wheat and rice, and had smuggled
away ribbons, silks, Leghorn hats, and other commodities.
The difficulty lay in the fact that here was encountered one
of the disadvantages of separation from England. The
English navy no longer protected American ships from the
Barbary pirates.^
The North African states, Morocco, . Algiers, Tunis, and
Tripoli, constituted an anachronism that was a blot upon the
civilization of Europe. Their official navies The Barbary
consisted of pirate craft, which swept down s***®^
upon peaceful trading- vessels and sold, with ship and goods,
the sailors and passengers into captivity. So well recognized
was their activity that there existed an active "Society of the
Holy Trinity for the Redemption of Captives," whose work
' Katharine Coman, The Industrial History of the United States (New
York, 1910), 135-137; Hildreth, United States, iii. 510.
'Eugene Schuyler, American DijdoTnacy (New York, 1886), 198-208;
E. Dupuy, Americains et Barbaresques, Paris, 1910.
56 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
went on from century to century. At the time of the Revo-
lution these pirates respected the flags of certain countries,
as England, France, and Spain, in return for heavy pay-
ments. That these nations, whose fleets could have cleared
the sea as Pompey's did in 67 B. C, failed to do so, was for
reasons similar to those which cause the police of some large
cities to tolerate "gunmen" and vice. FrankHn wrote,
July 22, 1783, that it was a maxim among English merchants
that, " if there were no Algiers, it would be worth England's
while to build one." By preventing the smaller nations from
competing in trade, the pirates increased the employment of
the protected merchant marines.
In July, 1785, an American schooner, Maria, and the ship
Dauphin were captured, and American trade in the Mediter-
-, ., . ranean ceased. The United States had hoped
Failure to open . *^
the Mediter- to substitute the French navy as protector in
place of the English, but France would prom-
ise nothing except assistance in making a treaty. In May,
1784, Adams, Franklin, and Jefferson were empowered to
negotiate with them; but negotiation was expensive and the
agents themselves were not agreed as to method. Adams
favored the European practice of buying peace, whereas
Jefferson was opposed to such a policy, and broached the
impractical scheme of forming a general confederation to
put the pirates down. In July, 1787, Thomas Barclay, being
specially delegated by Adams and Jefferson, had the as-
tonishing good luck to conclude a treaty with Morocco
without tribute. Success, however, failed to attend the
negotiations with the other powers, and at the close of the
Confederation trade in the Mediterranean was still closed to
American vessels and a number of Americans still remained
as slaves in Algerian households.
Spain and Portugal, however, were accessible. To these
countries had always gone the best of the colonial fish, and
when fishing was resumed after the war it was again sent
there for sale. Meal, lumber products, rice, and some other
RELIGION AND COMMERCE 57
goods also sought these markets. With independence it was
hoped that this trade might be made more profitable by
the securing of return cargoes, which had for _ . .^
the most part previously been prohibited by Spain and
the English navigation acts. Both countries
permitted trade, but American merchants and sea-captains
found themselves under disadvantages due to the absence of
the treaty protection which they had enjoyed as English sub-
jects. Rates and regulations were now arbitrarily changed,
and religious difficulties kept arising. It was hoped to settle
these discords by negotiation, and also to induce Spain to
open up, in some degree, a direct trade with her colonies, /
for much of what Americans sold in Spain was reexported
to the Spanish settlements.
In 1784 Jay succeeded Livingston as secretary of foreign
affairs, and Spain sent over Gardoqui to continue the negotia-
tions which had been begun in 1779. They
, J . • 1 . . Failxire of ne-
found agreement on commercial matters easy; gotiations with
but the old difficulty of the Mississippi per- g'g^ """^ ^*"'-
sisted, and Spain's ambitions with regard to
the West assumed a new phase, so that no treaty was con-
summated. As none was made with Portugal either, the
Confederation government thus failed to satisfy the demand
of the commercial community that trade with these two
nations be put upon a solid basis.
However great might be the future development of the
new channels of trade opened up by independence, the great-
est present change felt by the people of the _ . .^
United States was that concerning their rela- the British
tions with the British empire. Heretofore they ^"^
had been free of the empire, but debarred from the rest of the
world; now they had the world before them, but were stran-
gers within the empire. Unless diplomacy could secure them
some of their old advantages, the new might not suffice to
make good their losses. Trade with Great Britain itself /
was still allowed, and afforded a market for tobacco, tar and '^
58 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
turpentine, and some other products; but our exports to that
country had never paid for our imports, and did not bid fair
to do so in the future. The balance had been paid by the
excess in our favor resulting from the trade with the British
West India islands.^
This trade had been the most important of all branches of
colonial commerce. Those islands were devoted to raising
British West staple products, such as sugar, and they relied
Indies jjj large measure on the continental colonies
for food, including wheat, cheese, and salt pork; for lumber,
including barrel staves and framed houses ready to set up;
for horses, and for many of their slaves; and particularly
they bought for their slaves the poorer qualities of cod and
mackerel which, indiscriminately with the good, were caught
by the fisherman but which could not be sold in Europe.
This trade had not only afforded a market for our farms and
industries, but had also given employment to our ships, and
thereby fostered ship-building and all the gamut of subsidiary
occupations. It had been the corner stone of American
commerce, and its preservation was a primary object of
American diplomacy.
As soon as the preliminary articles of peace were signed
in November, 1782, work upon a treaty of commerce was
_. ,, , begun. The Duke of Manchester and David
Shelbume's ° . .
plans and de- Hartly were commissioned by the English
government for "opening, promoting, and
rendering perpetual the mutual intercourse of trade and
commerce between our kingdom and the dominions of the
United States." Lord Shelburne was deeply influenced by
the views of Adam Smith. He was inclined to continue the
policy which he had adopted in response to Jay's offer, and
by liberal arrangements with America to prevent the per-
* Edward Channing, History of the United States (vols, i.-iii. New York,
1905-12), iii. 412-424; Phineas Bond, Letters, Amer. Hist. Assoc., Report,
1896, i. 51S-659; Stephen Higginson, Letters, ibid., 711-841; Marquis of
Buckingham, Letters to Sir John Temple, Mass. Hist. Soc., Proceedings,
1866, pp. 69-80.
RELIGION AND COMMERCE 59
manent alignment of the United States with France. His
power, however, was limited. To some degree, it may be
said, his ministry was tolerated by Parliament for the sole
purpose of performing the disagreeable task of sanctioning
the partition of the empire. On February 24, 1783, he was
forced to resign, and was succeeded by an incongruous com-
bination headed jointly by the inveterate contestants. Fox
and North. Vaughan wrote to Franklin the next day, "But
the overthrow of parties is nothing to the overthrow of sys-
tems relative to English commerce, which was intended to
be placed on a footing that would have been an example to
all mankind, and probably have restored England to her
pinnacle again." ^
The new government was to a considerable extent influ-
enced by Lord Sheffield, whose "Observations on the Com-
merce of the United States," published in change of
1783, set forth the long-established view of ^^^^^ P°"<^y
England's policy with regard to trade and navigation. On
July 2, 1783, a royal proclamation confined the West Indian
trade to British ships; July 27, the commissioners found "it
best to drop all commercial articles in our definitive treaty."
The subject, however, was one which the United States
could not afford to drop, and John Adams was sent as minis-
ter to England to renew negotiations. Arriving in February,
1785, as first representative from America to the British
crown, himself a leading figure in the struggle for independ-
ence, he was in a position of some delicacy, but nevertheless
he found his new post eminently congenial. The ponderous
seriousness of English public life sufficiently resembled re-
spectability to win his lively approbation. On examining
the library of George III., he felt that it contained every
book which a king should have and no other. His sturdy
Americanism, however, asserted itself. When the king some-
what jocularly remarked upon Adams's well known dislike
of the French, the latter replied, "I must avow to your ma-
1 Franklin, Works, viii. 261.
60 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
jesty, I have no attachment but to my ovm country." The
king responded, "quick as lightning," "An honest man will
never have any other." ^
In spite of this auspicious opening Adams's mission failed
of its main object. In fact, in 1788 an act of Parliament
Adams's mis- made permanent the policy of the proclama-
^°" tion of 1783, and this in spite of the succession •
to the premiership of William Pitt, who in 1783 had shared
Lord Shelburne's liberal convictions. Not only were Amer-
ican ships prohibited from engaging in the West Indian trade,
but the policy of encouraging Canada to supply the islands
with the goods they needed was adopted, with the result
that British ships were allowed to carry United States goods
to the islands only at such times and to such a degree as
was absolutely necessary.
One reason for this policy was explained in the following
words by the Duke of Dorset, with whom Adams was treat-
„ , „ .. . ing: "The apparent determination of the re-
Great Bntain ° . '^^ i i •
distrusts the spective states to regulate their own separate
Confederation . , , j -i i i x i
mterests, renders it absolutely necessary,
towards forming a permanent system of commerce, that my
court should be informed how far the commissioners can
be duly authorized to enter into any engagement with Great \/
Britain, which it may not be in the power of any one of the
states to render totally useless and ineflBcient." This point
was well taken to the extent that the sole power over com-
merce given to Congress by the Articles of Confederation
was that of preventing the states from levying discriminating
duties against nations with which the country was in treaty
relations. Moreover, England had practical demonstration
of the inefficiency of Congress in the fact that, in spite of
the treaty of peace, various states still put obstacles in the
way of the collection of British debts and refused to heed
the recommendation of Congress for a greater leniency
toward loyalists. This impotence of Congress not only
^ J. Q. and C. F. Adama, John Adams, vol. ii.
RELIGION AND COMMERCE 61
caused the British government to doubt the efficacy of a
treaty on commercial subjects with the United States, but
relieved it from any apprehension of effective retaliation.
Congress could not pass retaliatory laws; and although some
of the states, as Virginia and Georgia, did so, the English
statesmen correctly judged that any universal agreement to
such an end was not within the realm of practical politics.^
Still more conclusive to the English mind was the fact
that Great Britain, without a treaty, was nevertheless enjoy-
ing the most essential advantages of American -, ♦«•♦«•
trade. The Americans were familiar with Eng- holds Amer-
lish goods, liked them, and found them on the
whole the cheapest in the world. The British merchants more
easily resumed American connections than other nations
established them; and particularly they were willing to grant
the long credits which the Americans desired. London,
moreover, was actually the most convenient distributing
centre of the world, and its merchants continued to handle
many articles, such as German linens, which the Americans
desired from the continent. In 1789 probably three quarters
of our imports came from Great Britain, who in turn re-
ceived perhaps half of our exports. France, although coax-
ing our trade by liberal concessions to our whale oil, fish,
grains, and such products in 1787, and seeking earnestly to
develop in the United States a taste for French brandy,
secured but a small and not increasing portion of the Amer-
ican traffic. Naturally, therefore, England saw no neces- ;
sity for granting favors, when without them she continued
to enjoy that market for her factories and employment for '
her vessels of which Vergennes had thought to deprive
her.
Thus the government under the Confederation was not -
able to reopen the British West Indies to trade. Although
the trade of the French islands was open to small Amer-
^ Secret Journals of Congress, iv. 185-286; W. C. Fisher, American Trade
ftegulationa before 1789, Amer. Hist. Asspc.^ Papers, 1889, iii. 467-493.
62 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
ican vessels trading directly there and back, yet it was sub-
ject to such disadvantages that it by no means took the
Failures of the place of what we had lost. In fact this was not
Confederation entirely a gain after all, for the colonies had to
some degree engaged in it before the Revolution, albeit ille-
gally. With the loss of the Mediterranean traffic and the un-
certainties in Spain and Portugal, the total effect of the Rev-
olution on commerce could in 1789 hardly be said to have
been satisfactory, and the failure of negotiations was rightly
felt to have been due in large measure to the lack of a
strong national government capable of making itself re-
spected abroad.
CHAPTERVII
THE WEST
The failure of the negotiations with Great Britain and
Spain on the question of commerce was not by any means
due entirely to the intrinsic difficulties of the Conditions on
subject. Both nations were our neighbors, and *^* frontier
the problems of territorial propinquity were in both cases
more complicated and disturbing than those of oceanic traffic.
The cession to the United States of the region bounded by
the Appalachian mountains, the Great Lakes, the Missis-
sippi, and the Floridas was not regarded by European states-
men as finally determining the future. As it stood, more-
over, this area did not constitute a satisfactory territorial
unit; for, as conditions of transportation then were, its com-
mercial outlets fell to the control, not of the United States,
but, as to the southern half, to Spain, who held the mouth
of the Mississippi, and as to the northern half to Great
Britain, who held the St. Lawrence, Its population was
during the period of the Confederation about equally divided
between Indians, who held themselves to be independent,
and frontiersmen, whose loyalty to the central government of
the United States was yet to be created and would depend
upon the ability of that government to solve their problems.
Thus, as Washington said, the western settlers "stood upon a
pivot, the touch of a feather would turn them any way."
At the close of hostilities Great Britain still held important
posts in the ceded area, at such strategic positions as De-
troit, Michilimackinac, Niagara, and Oswego. „„ ,,
In July, 1783, Washington sent Baron Steuben " debts," and
to General Haldiman, the governor-general of
Canada, to accept the surrender of these forts. The latter
said that he had received no instructions on the point and
68
64 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
refused to discuss the question. In June, 1784, instructions
did indeed reach him, but they were to the effect that the
posts should be held, a position that was later justified by
the British minister, Hammond, on the ground that the
United States had failed to live up to the terms of the treaty
as to the payment of British debts and the treatment of the
loyalists. The balance of evidence would seem to indicate
that the refusal to give up the posts preceded any definite
information as to the disregard by the states of the injunc-
tions of the treaty and the requests of Congress. If this
excuse had not been afforded, however, it is possible that
the British might later have yielded the point; in fact, the
British foreign office carefully framed its own dispatches on
this view of the matter. But the first refusal was based on
other grounds.^
One of these was the complaint of the British fur-traders,
who protested as soon as the terms of the provisional articles
„. . , were announced. Their trade made London
The fur-trade i <• i i i i
the most important fur-market of the world; the
carrying out of the treaty, they claimed, would practically
destroy their occupation; for half their furs came from the
forests and streams allotted to the Americans, and the best
trails, portages, and river channels were on the American
side of the boundary.
More important than the fur-traders were the Indians,
who, though in many tribes, comprised only two main groups.
. One of these was the Iroquois, who had so long
maintained themselves in the fair valleys of
central New York, exercising by their valor and their shrewd-
ness in diplomacy a potent influence on the struggles between
the French, Dutch, English, and Americans. Although the
real power of the Iroquois confederacy had been broken by
the expedition of the American army under General Sullivan
in 1779, they still retained the title to their lands and a great
* A. C. McLaughlin, "The Western Posts and the British Debts," Amer.
Hist. Assoc., Report, 1894, pp. 413-444.
THE WEST 65
name. During the period of the Confederation they divided
into two groups, one of which made friends with the Amer-
icans and retained their homes, while the other and larger
band preferred their traditional friendship with the British
and removed to a grant given to them by the British
government west of the Niagara river. The leader of this
portion was the famous Joseph Brant, a man of ability
and distinction who stood high in the councils of the
English.^
The other main group, consisting of the Delaware, Wyan-
dot, Shawanee, Miami, and other tribes, and comprising
about five thousand warriors, was known col- _. „ _^.
The North-
lectively, although there was but slight co- western In-
hesion among the several tribes, as the North-
western Indians. They occupied, geographically, the region
which is to-day Ohio and Indiana, and politically held the
same strategic relation to boundaries and settlements which
the Iroquois had formerly held. By the British they were
regarded as still under the influence of the Iroquois, but as a
matter of fact, being less civilized and more independent,
they were no longer inclined to accept the leadership of that
confederation or of Brant.
When the tribes heard of the treaty of peace their anger
against the British was intense, because they were not in-
cluded in its terms. They had for the most xhe Indian
part been engaged in the war as allies of the p®"^
British, the treaty left them at the mercy of the Americans.
So violent was their tone that the British feared some such
general and concerted movement among them as had taken
place under Pontiac in 1764, when the Indians had been
similarly deserted by the French. Against such an attack the
feeble British garrisons along the lakes would be but a frail
defence; but, should these be withdrawn, the little settle-
ments of French about the trading centres, and of American
* I. J. Cox, "The Indian as a Diplomatic Factor in the History of the
Old Northwest," Ohio Archceol. and Hist. Quarterly, 1909, xviii. 542-565.
66 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
loyalists who were beginning to occupy what is now Ontario,
would fall like brush before the fire. To prevent such a
catastrophe, the British commissioners in Paris had suggested
that Great Britain retain the forts for three years, or until
American garrisons arrived; but this proposition had been
rejected.^
Angry as the tribes were with the British, they felt a more
fundamental hostility to the "Long Knives" or Americans,
Indians and whose advancing settlements drove wild life
Americans before them. They were loath to make peace
with them particularly because to the Americans a treaty
with Indians meant acquisition of territory. The Indians
continued to trade with the British agents, to frequent the
British forts, to speak of George III, the great chief with the
Ted coat, as father; but if they were to be obedient children
they wished protection from their enemies. The Indians
were, therefore, a weapon for the British, but one which re-
quired careful handling.
The policy of the British government was one of peace
and pacification, but it could not command the Indians to
The British accept American terms without the danger of
Indian policy g^ great uprising. Nor could it entirely control
its Own agents So far away on the frontier and necessarily
invested with large personal responsibility. Many of these
were American loyalists, as bitter against their former coun-
trymen as were the Indians. Guns and ammunition were
sold, indiscreet utterances were made, ardent young Eng-
lishmen and Canadians occasionally joined the Indian forays;
and the Americans interpreted British policy as a careful
nursing of the tribes to be used as a lash to castigate the
United States frontier when occasion should arise.^
The most important European settlement in the drainage
basin of the St. Lawrence, except for the French Canadian
* Papers drawn from the Canadian archives, the Simcoe papers, and the
British Public Record Office, by Miss Orpha Leavitt, for use in a Wisconsin
doctor's thesis as yet unpublished.
THE WEST 67
farmers along the main river, was that of the "Green
Mountain Boys" in the valley of Lake Champlain. Their
position was a peculiar one. Although they were
organized as a separate state, their lands were
claimed by both New Hampshire and New York and their
government was not recognized by Congress. During the
Revolution they had fought on the American side, but they
had negotiated with Great Britain independently. With
peace, their great desire was incorporation into the American
Union, within whose boundaries they were living; and yet
they realized that Great Britain held their welfare in her
hands, for the only outlet for their lumber and grain was
down the Richelieu, or Sorrel, river to Montreal.^
To obtain the privilege of this route they determined to
negotiate on their own account, and in 1786 sent three com-
missioners to frame a treaty of commerce with _ _
1 1 . Influence of
Lord Dorchester, then governor-general of the St. Law-
Canada. In 1787 and 1788, the British govern- "°"
ment granted them certain privileges by proclamation and
ordinance; but the Vermonters, wishing a formal treaty,
continued negotiations through 1790. On April 17, 1790,
Cattrell, in behalf of the Canadian government, wrote to
W. W. Grenville of the British foreign oflSce: "It belongs
not to the Committee to decide how far any article in the late
Treaty of Peace, by which the Independence of the United
States was acknowledged and the extent of their Territories
defined, may make it improper for the government of this
Country to form a separate Treaty with the State of Ver-
mont, or whether it may be politically prudent all circum-
stances considered, to risk giving offence to the Congress of
the United States, by such a measure." He thought, how-
ever, that it would certainly be of commercial benefit to
Great Britain "to prevent Vermont and Kentuck and all
the other settlements now forming in the Interior parts of
^ F. J. Turner, "English policy toward America in 1790-1791," Amer.
Hist. Review, 1902, viii. 78-86.
68 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
the great Continent of North America, from becoming de-
pendent on the Government of the United States or on that
of any Foreign Country, and to preserve them on the con-
trary in a state of Independence, and to induce them to form
Treaties of Commerce and Friendship with Great Britain."
Great Britain had less to offer Kentucky than she could
give to Vermont; moreover, her relations with the Indians
_ ^ ,_ . caused the settlers there to be, some of them
Kentucky and . . . .
the St. Law- suspicions, and an mcreasing number violently
hostile. Yet the portages between the northern
branches of the Ohio and the Great Lakes might be used
as an outlet for Kentucky products, and in 1788, according
to the report of John Connolly, a British agent in that region,
the p>eople were thinking of bargaining for this outlet down
the St. Lawrence.^
It is not necessary to suppose that the Vermonters and
Kentuckians were actually planning local independence, in
Possibilities of order to realize that the continued failure of
British control ^^le United States to open a channel for their
commerce, combined with the possibility of accomplishing
such a result by their own endeavors, was calculated speedily
to develop a desire and a purpose for independence. Furtjor-
more, whUe the British government had no direct policy for
bringing about a dissolution of the Union, it is evident that
it was closely observing conditions in the West and was not
inclined to relinquish anything that it held. With its con-
trol of the Indians and of the St. Lawrence, it remained a
factor in the development of the whole Northwest, irrespec-
tive of boundaries. The future of the valley of the Great
Lakes and of the northern part of the Ohio valley might yet
prove to lie with Great Britain rather than with the United
States.
Of more immediate interest was the problem of the South-
west, where the situation was similar to that in the norths
* Theodore Roosevelt, Winning of the West (4 vols., New York, etc,
1889-96), vol. iii. chs. iv.-v.
THE WEST e&
although the various factors differed in their relative weight
and the need for a solution was more urgent. The future
of the Mississippi valley probably lay in the Kentucky and
hands of the American pioneers who were pour- Cumberland
ing into that region. Their settlements constituted two oases
in the wilderness. The more important, consisting of Scotch-
Irish mountaineers and Revolutionary veterans largely from
Virginia, was in the blue-grass district of Kentucky. In-
creasing with great rapidity throughout the Confederation,
it had in 1790 about 70,000 inhabitants. The other settle-
ment, one hundred and fifty miles to the southwest, was in
the Tennessee blue grass, about Nashville, and was known
as the Cumberland district. Settled more exclusively by the
mountaineer type, it had in 1790 less than half as large a pop-
ulation as Kentucky, and was also more exposed, being sur-
rounded by the powerful tribes of the southwestern Indians.
Like the Vermonters, these invaders of the wilderness had
shown their patriotism during the Revolution by fighting
against the British; they had assisted George spirit of in-
Rogerc Clark in the capture of Kaskaskia and dependence
Vincennes, and had themselves delivered the great blow at
King's Mountain of which the story in ballad and fireside
tale enlivened many a forest cabin for years to come. Like
the Vermonters, however, it was independence that fired
them, and not particularly loyalty to the American Union
or even to their states. Tennessee had a government, headed
by John Sevier, which claimed separation from the parent
state of North Carolina; and Kentucky was anxious to or-
ganize separately from Virginia.
Their virgin farms produced abundant crops, and nearly all
\/ere on the banks of rivers hurrying to meet the Mississippi
and the sea. The forests furnished ready ma- _
Traffic
terial for rafts and rude boats, and all nature
invited to this easy path of export. It was only necessary to
obtain the permission of the Spaniards to drift down to some
point near the gulf, there tranship their goods at some place
70 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
of deposit, and to return with the proceeds, either by sea
to Philadelphia and thence home across the mountains, or
buying a horse at New Orleans or Natchez ride home through
the forests. During the Revolution, when we were to some
extent cooperating with Spain, they had tested the advan-
">«' tages of this traffic; but in 1786 Spain closed the route. To
reopen it was the work of Congress.^
Jay, treating with Gardoqui at Philadelphia, pointed to
the treaty of peace with England, which specifically declared
The "right" that the navigation of the Mississippi should
of navigation j^^ ^^^^ from its source to the ocean, and to the
treaty of 1763 between Great Britain and Spain, which had
given England this right. Gardoqui claimed that the con-
cession to England was a specific grant, which she had no
power to transfer to another country. He refused to accept
Jay's argument that the United States had a natural right
to follow to the ocean all rivers on which any of its territory
bordered; as a matter of fact, moreover, free navigation
was of comparatively little use unless accompanied by the
privilege of a place of deposit where rafts could be broken up
and transhipment to ocean-going vessels made.^
Spain was the more tenacious of her position because of
a misunderstanding regarding the Florida boundary. The
The Florida treaty of 1783 between England and Spain
boundary ^.^^^ "jjjg Britannic Majesty likewise cedes
and guarantees, in full right, to His Catholic Majesty East
Florida, as also West Florida." In the treaty of even date
between England and the United States the northern bound-
ary of West Florida was fixed at the thirty-first parallel.
As between these two documents, the one indefinite, the
other definite, the latter would naturally govern. Spain,
however, claimed that "West Florida" was a definite term,
that England had in 1764 extended the province to a line
running through the mouth of the Yazoo. Moreover, her
' Winsor, Westward Movement, 247-256.
* Secret Journals of Congress, iv. 42-132.
THE WEST 71
claim in equity is improved by a study of the preliminary
articles of both treaties; for those of the American treaty
agreed to the Yazoo boundary in case England remained in
possession of West Florida, whereas the agreement with
Spain was that she should "continue" to hold West Florida.
Now, she actually did hold Natchez, the only important
post in the disputed region. Technically the arguments
balanced, but Spain "continued" to hold Natchez, which
not only was a Spanish garrison town, but was peopled for
the most part with American loyalists, who were averse to a
transfer of authority. Congress was, therefore as unable to
clear the national territory of foreign control to the south-
west as to the northwest.
Meantime the commercial interests of the coast were im-
patient at having an agreement held up because of these
western questions, which they felt to be of Uttle « East " and
concern. Not all, moreover, favored the open- " ^®^* "
ing of the Mississippi. In addition to a feeUng that western
emigration weakened the older parts of the country, there
was a distinct fear, voiced by such men as Rufus King, that,
should the West learn to face down the Mississippi^ the
country would be divided into two spheres so distinct that
union would cease to be possible. He believed that the de-
velopment of the West had best wait on the slow process of
creating transportation routes across the mountains.
The position of Congress had been vacillating. In 1779 it
had made the navigation of the Mississippi an ultimatum in
any treaty with Spain; in 1781 it had withdrawn ,
this condition; in 1784 it had returned to it.
In 1786 Jay, who had ignored the instructions of 1781, con-
cluded that he could not carry out those of 1784, and arranged
a treaty with Gardoqui on the basis that the United States
should forego the navigation for twenty-five years, without
prejudicing her rights. This plan he recommended to Con-
gress, with whom the question assumed a sectional aspect.
The commercial regions, New England and the middle states.
72 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
were in favor of it, the southern states, less interested in
general commerce and more closely in touch with the West,
were opposed. On one vote seven states out of the thirteen
favored the proposal, but the decision was ultimately left
over to the new government under the constitution.
The people of the West had been anxiously watching these
negotiations, and were growing restless at the protracted de-
Westem dis- lay of Congress in securing what they wished,
content 'j'jjg news of Jay's proposed abandonment of
what they considered their birthright, turned restiveness into
distrust. They were not a patient race and their impatience
was heightened by the similar failure of Congress to deal
eflfectually with their Indian enemies.
The Southwestern Indians were more numerous than the
Northwestern, and better organized; the five great tribes,
Cherokee, Creeks, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and
States and the Chicamauga, could together furnish perhaps
fadil^s*^*^™ twenty thousand warriors. The close of the
war found these tribes at enmity with the
Americans. In 1785 commissioners arranged a treaty with
the Cherokee, but the boundary provided was not satisfac-
tory to the frontiersmen, and North Carolina stood by her
citizens. The articles of Confederation gave Congress con-
trol of Indian affairs only in the case of tribes not living within
the limits of a single state. North Carolina, therefore, claim-
ing to comprehend the Cherokee, denied the validity of the
treaty. To the failure of Congress to open the Mississippi
was thus added the failure to quiet the Indians upon satis-
factory terms, and the people of the West came to believe
that their happiness must depend on their own exertions.
Under these circumstances the West became fertile ground
for the development of plans and plots and conspiracies.
Western proj- They grew up, withered, and revived again;
*''** they adjusted themselves to times and condi-
tions; they flourished now successively, and now simulta-
neously even in the same mind. They stretched their threads
THE WEST 73
to Congress and the coast, and across the ocean to Madrid,
Paris, and London; they connected themselves with the
general history of the age. At times secret and unobserved,
at times the central objects of attention, they together form
one of the two leading themes of our diplomatic history until
after 1803. During the Confederation they were practically
all directed to the solution of western problems by some one
of the following four methods, — by the self-reliant seizure of
New Orleans, a task somewhat beyond existing resources;
by submission to the control of Spain; by independence and
alliance with Spain; or by independence and alliance with
Great Britain. It is probable that the majority of the in-
habitants were at most times disposed to follow a fifth
course, — the obvious and legal one of urging their grievances
upon the government of the United States in the hope that
it would acquire the power to redress them. The supporters
of this view, however, were often discouraged, for they were
not sustained by any such deep-seated loyalty as developed
when the nation had proved itself deserving of their de-
votion.
Fully aware of the situation, Spain was disposed to pull
every string of intrigue in order to manipulate it to her own
advantage. Her Indian policy was well con- The Spanish
ceived and well executed. The government ^^^ P^^cy
encouraged the great Scotch firm of Panton, Leslie and
Company, whose American headquarters were at Pensacola.
It saw to it that traders frequented the Indian villages, and
that their rates for goods were moderate. It allowed a secret
trade in firearms. It distributed generous presents. To
the great chief of the Creeks, the most powerful man among
the Indians, Alexander McGillivray, it paid a yearly pension.
Of this man, Navarro, intendant or civil oflBcer of Louisiana,
wrote, April 15, 1786: "So long as we shall have this chief
on our side, we may rely on having established, between
the Floridas and Georgia, a barrier which it will not be easy
to break through. The Indians are now fully convinced of
74 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
the ambition of the Americans; the recollection of past m-
juries still dwells on their minds, and, with it, the fear that
these greedy neighbors may one day seize upon their lands,
and strip them of a property to which they consider them-
selves as having a right derived from nature herself. It
ought to be one of the chief points in the policy of this Gov-
ernment to keep this sentiment alive in their breasts." Upon
these Indians, with the Creole population, the Spanish gov-
ernment placed its greatest dependence for the defence of
Louisiana, and through Louisiana of the mines of Mexico.^
It hoped, however, by intrigue with the western settlers
to create a still more advanced barrier, namely, to acquire
The coloniza- or to control the region which it had endeavored
tion plan ^^ obtain in the negotiation of 1779 with Eng-
land and of 1782 with Jay. Alert and eager as it was, how-
ever, the Spanish government lacked unity of purpose. One
of the plans considered was that of Navarro, who wrote,
December 19, 1787: "It is necessary to keep in mind that,
between this province and the territories of New Spain,
there is nothing but the feeble barrier of the Mississippi,
which it is as easy to pass as it is impossible to protect, and
that, if it be good p>olicy to fortify this province by drawing
a large population within its limits, there are no other means
than that of granting certain franchises to commerce, leaving
aside, as much as possible, all restrictions and shackles, or
at least postponing them to a future time, if they must exist.
In addition, the government must distinguish itself by the
equity of its administration, the suavity of its relations with
the people, and the disinterestedness of its officers in their
dealings with the foreigners who may resort to the colony.
This is the only way to form, in a short time, a sohd rampart
for the protection of the kingdom of Mexico." ^
* Charles Gayarr€, History of Louisiana (Sd ed., 4 vols.. New Orleans,
1885), iii. 175 and passim; Roosevelt, Winning of the West, vol. iii.; Winsor,
Westward Movement.
' Gayarr6, Louisiana, iii. 189.
THE WEST 75
This plan was fostered by Gardoqui, who at Philadelphia
entered into relations with Colonel George Morgan and ar-
ranged a deal with him. Morgan received a grant of land
and undertook to establish a colony, New Madrid, at the
strategic point in what is now Missouri, opposite the mouth
of the Ohio. George Rogers Clark was interested in a scheme
to organize a similar colony on the Yazoo, and similar plans
engaged James Wilkinson, John Brown, a delegate in Con-
gress, Harry Inness, the attorney-general of the Kentucky
district, and other men of influence and ambition. To make
settlement in these new grants desirable it was proposed to
allow emigrants to bring in their property free of duty and
to enjoy religious tolerance; but of course the main induce-
ment would be freedom to use the Mississippi. The essential
point was to keep the river tight closed to those living in the
American districts.^
With regard to the wisdom of this plan it may be remarked
that, as immigrants of this kind would change their flag only
for their personal advantage, the durability of james Wilkin-
their loyalty to the Spanish crown might well be ^°°
suspected. It was like asking the fox to guard the chickens.
Something like this was felt by Miro, the governor of Louis-
iana, to whom the tempter came in the form of James Wilkin-
son. During the winter of 1775 a few hundred Americans,
suffering sickness, icy cold, and want, had besieged Quebec.
That little group must have possessed distinguished courage
and a spirit of high adventure, but it contained also the
three well-known traitors of our history, Benedict Arnold,
Aaron Burr, and James Wilkinson. One can hardly refrain
from supposing that over their camp-fires conversation often
ran to the fascinating possibilities of Spanish America, to the
mines of Mexico and Peru. Of the three, Wilkinson was the
least, but the most enduring.
Settling in Kentucky, this man no sooner won confidence
* C. H. Haskins, The Yazoo Land Companies, Amer. Hist. Assoc., Papers,
1891, V. 395-437.
76 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
by a successful raid against the Indians than he began to
tread the shady paths of forest diplomacy. In 1786 he
Independence visited Natchez and estabhshed relations with
and aUiance Gayoso, the Spanish commandant. The next
year he descended the river with a cargo of tobacco, flour,
butter, and bacon. He secured an interview with Miro, to
whom he presented a plan for allowing a few prominent men
of the American settlements the privileges of commerce, in
return for which they would devote themselves to persuad-
ing the whole region to declare its independence and form an
alliance with Spain. Miro wrote, January 8, 1788: "The
delivery of Kentucky into his Majesty's hands, which is the
main object to which Wilkinson has promised to devote
himself entirely, would forever constitute this province a
rampart for the protection of New Spain." Wilkinson was
allowed to complete his transactions, and with such of his
profits as he did not hand over to Miro he went home by
way of Philadelphia.^
It is obvious that this project was somewhat at variance
with the colonization scheme, for it would furnish relief to
Kentucky un- some at least of the inhabitants of Kentucky,
decided Instead of deciding definitively upon one plan
or the other, however, the Spanish authorities tried to ride
both. They somewhat distrusted Wilkinson, as they did
the proposed colonizers, and by limiting trading privileges
to a few they hoped still to attract immigration. Wilkinson,
meantime, whatever his ultimate intentions may have been,
pushed his plans. He hoped to secure the consent of Vir-
ginia to the organization of Kentucky as a separate state,
and then to apply the process later known as secession. In
July, 1788, he made his proposals to the Kentucky constitu-
tional convention, and, although he did not win their adop-
tion, he secured a postponement of the final decision. In
June, Miro had written home that he heard from Kentucky
that in various conversations " among the most distinguished
* T. M. Green, Spanish Conspiracy, Cincinnati, 1891,
THE WEST 77
citizens of that State," it had been said "that the direction
of the current of the rivers which run in front of their dwell-
ings points clearly to the power to which they ought to ally
themselves."
Miro did not neglect Tennessee. Of the settlers in the
Nashville region the most prominent was James Robertson.
Restless under the restraint of trade, but even Miro and
more under the Indian attacks, he at any rate Tennessee
coquetted with the Spaniards. McGillivray wrote, April 25,
1788, that the Cumberland settlers had asked for terms, "and
added that they would throw themselves into the arms of
his Majesty as subjects, and that Cumberland and Kentucky
are determined to free themselves from their dependence
on Congress, because that body cannot protect either their
persons or their property, or favor their commerce. They
therefore, believe that they owe no obedience to a power
which is incapable of benefiting them." Even in the valleys
of East Tennessee, John Sevier, foremost man of the dis-
trict, in 1788 offered his services to Miro and Gardoqui,
although he subsequently withdrew from the connec-
tion.^
The government under the Confederation, therefore, not
only failed to open up commerce with the Mediterranean v
and the West Indies, and to put that with Diplomatic
Spain upon a desirable basis, but it was unable ^^^^
to occupy the territory granted to the United States by the
treaty of 1783, either in the northwest or on the Florida
border. It was unable to quiet the Indians of north or south,
or to provide commercial outlets for the trans-Appalachian
settlers. Its failure was causing not only discontent but
disloyalty, and to such a degree that, although the racial
control of the great valley was probably determined by the
character of the aggressive population already on the spot,
its governmental future was still uncertain.
* Roosevelt, Winning ofth$ West, iii. chs. iii.-v.; Win3or, Westtoard Move-
ment, 334,
78 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
While the western situation was not widely appreciated
in the older portion of the country, the financial plight was
The danger of fully realized. Owing to the lack of national
the debt resources, the interest on our foreign debt was
met only by occasional sales of such portions of the Dutch
loan arranged by Adams as had not been immediately taken
up.^ The loans from France were still unprovided for, and
it was the gossip of diplomatic circles that France might take
the island of Rhode Island as her payment.^ To the public
mind of Europe in 1789, the acquisition of a French naval
base on the United States coast seemed no more improbable
than the acquisition of a United States naval base in Cuba
seems to-day. It was by no means an accepted opinion
that the United States would prove to be more than what we
call to-day a protectorate, under French or English influence.
The public debt was one of the weapons of France, as it has
since so often been the key to European interference in the
weaker countries of the world. Even though we were not
actually in danger of being forced into political dependency,
Europe had yet to be convinced that we were not. The fu-
ture independence as well as the future limits of the country
were in 1789 felt to be undetermined.
* John Adams, Works, see index under loans.
* For the French position, see " Correspondence of the Comte de Moustier
[French Minister in the United States] with the Comte de Montmorin,"
Amer. Hist. Review, 1903, viii. 709-733; for rumors, see Buckingham's letter
to Temple, Mass. Hist. Soc., Proceedings, 1866, p. 75.
CHAPTER VIII
OLD PROBLEMS IN NEW HANDS *
Under the Articles of Confederation the administration
had proved too weak to perform the duties of a national
government in maintaining the rights and
interests of its citizens among the nations powers of the
of the world. This failure in diplomacy was l^^^i *°^'
one of the causes for the formation of a stronger ^
central authority. Naturally, therefore, the constitution,
gave the new government a freer hand in dealing with inter-
national affairs. The states conceded to the nation almost^
complete control of war, peace, treaty-making, army and j
navy, commerce, naturalization, and Indian affairs; and j
treaties were made the law of the land, enforceable by the i
national supreme court. The only limitations were that the
importation of slaves was not to be prohibited for twenty
years, that no taxes should be levied on exports, and no prefer-
ence given to the ports of one state over those of another.
In actual practice, these limitations proved to give rise to
little controversy and to hamper the national government
^ J. D. Richardson, Mestages and Papers of the Presidents, 10 vols., to
1899, with continuations by other editors (contains valuable summaries
and discussions); Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate, 1789-
1901, 32 vols, in 34, Washington, 1828-1911 (contains votes on treaties
and appointments) ; Compilation of Reports of [Senate] Committee on Foreign
Relations, 1789-1901, 8 vols., Washington, 1901 (Senate Doc., 56 Cong., 2
sess.. No. 231) ; American State Papers, Foreign Relations, 6 vols., Washing-
ton, 1832-59 (gives such correspondence as was submitted to Congress
from 1789 to 1828; that between 1828 and 1860 is not collected [see Hasse,
Index . . . foreign affairs, 1828-1861]; since 1860 selected material has been
published each year, although further papers are still presented to Congress
on call from time to time); J. B. Moore, Digest of International Law as
embodied . . . especially in Documents . . . of the United States, 8 vols.,
Washington, 1906 (House Doc., 56 Cong., 2 sess.. No. 551; an invaluable
aid, discussing all points involving questions of law).
79
80 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
very little in its negotiations; but the failure to give the
government full control of aliens within the limits of the
states, coupled with the fact that foreign nations have held
it to be responsible for them, has occasionally caused trouble.
Within the government, the direction of foreign affairs
was given to the President, but the appointment of " ambas-
The executive sadors, other public ministers, and consuls"
and Congress requires the confirmation of the Senate, and
treaties must be ratified by a two-thirds vote of the same
body. The relation of the House of Representatives to
diplomacy has proved one of the most baffling ambiguities
of the constitution. A minister appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate is an official of the United
States. He can, however, draw no salary unless one is pro-
vided for by Congress as a whole. In the same way a treaty
confirmed by the Senate is the law of the land and enforceable
by the supreme court; but if it provides for the expenditure
of money it cannot be executed unless the House consents.
A treaty, moreover, often fixes rates to be paid on imported
articles and on the vessels carrying them; but of no power
are the representatives more jealous than that of regulating
customs duties, a function clearly granted by the constitu-
tion to Congress as a whole. Although these questions have
never been authoritatively adjudicated upon, and perhaps /
never can be, it may be said that Congress as a body has
directed the expansion of the diplomatic service, that the
House, although it has sometimes delayed discharging finan- /
cial obligations laid upon the nation by treaties, has never
failed to do so eventually, and that, on the other hand, it y
has never yielded its direction of commercial policy.
When Washington took office in April, 1789, he found no
organization by means of which he could execute his diplo-
The determin- matic powers. Congress, however, speedily
ation of policy provided for a department of state, charged
chiefly with that function, its secretary becoming in effect
foreign minister. The natural selection for this office was
OLD PROBLEMS IN NEW HANDS 81
John Jay, but he preferred the position of chief justice.
Washington therefore appointed Thomas Jefferson, who had
served on the committee of correspondence of the Continental
Congress and since 1784 had been minister to France. For-
eign affairs were, however, of such critical moment through-
out the Federalist period that many questions of policy were
discussed by the whole cabinet, together with Jay and the vice-
president John Adams. As a matter of fact, Jefferson's opin-
ion was seldom followed; his influence was modifying rather
than directing. The responsibility and the credit belong
primarily to the presidents, Washington and, later, Adams.^
Although conditions of intercourse were better than dur-
ing the Revolution, they were still poor, and a close-knit
policy was impossible. It was very difficult, v a ^- *
moreover, to induce fit men to accept appoint- diplomatic
ments in the regular diplomatic service. Sala-
ries, while perhaps more adequate than they are to-day, were
smaller than during the Revolution. The social allure which
now renders so many patriots willing to spend abroad for
their country was not strong enough to cross the Atlantic
in the cheerless barks of that day. Old men feared the voy-
age; young men like John Quincy Adams disliked to aban-
don their professions for positions of "nominal respecta-
bility and real insignificance." Consequently it was found
impossible to keep first-class ministers except at London and
Paris. Spain was ill-supplied, and the missions to Holland,
Portugal, Russia, and Prussia were only occasionally filled.
In this situation the government resorted to the expedient
of sending special missions in important crises, and at such
times it was well served.
The consular service was still less satisfactory. The only
positions that carried salaries were those to the Barbary
states, which were semi-diplomatic in character. In all
1 On organization, see Schuyler, American DiploTnacy, chs. i-iii; J. W.
Foster, The Practice of Diplomacy, Boston, 1910: Gaillard Hunt, Depart-
ment of State, New Haven, 1914.
82 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
other cases compensation came from fees alone. The result
was that consuls usually had to be chosen from merchants
The consular trading at the ports, who in many cases were
semce j^^^ Americans, The whole idea of using con-
suls as a means of advancing national commercial interests
was of later growth in the United States. At that time
their services were purely those of trade regulation and
registration.
The strength of the new government was first apparent at
home, and next appeared in the handling of those diplomatic
Financial problems which were also in part domestic,
strength r^j^g financial resources developed by Hamil-
ton's management at once settled the question of credit,
and never since that time has the United States offered an
excuse for foreign interference by failing to meet its financial
obligations, or even by being in danger of such failure. The
repudiation of portions of their debts by some of the in-
dividual states, however, has at times caused trouble,
though never danger.
While settling its finances, the new government took a
first step toward developing the loyalty of the frontier by
P admitting Vermont, Kentucky, and Tennessee
tionofthe to statehood, the first two in 1791 and 1792
West
respectively, the last in 1796. Now repre-
sented, the new states were inclined to await somewhat more
loyally, if not more patiently, the solution of their special
problems.
The Indian question was taken up vigorously, though not
with entire success. Various laws were passed to diminish the
friction between the savages and the pioneers
^ *^^ and traders; and finally Washington, in his fifth
annual message, recommended the establishment of govern-
ment trading-houses among them "to conciliate their attach-
ment." In 1796 this system was adopted, in the hope thereby
to detach them from the Spaniards and English. Tackle
wrote to Lord Bathurst, November 24, 1812: "Of all the
OLD PROBLEMS IN NEW HANDS 83
projects of Genl. Washington, after effecting the separation
of those Colonies from the mother country; I apprehend
this of the Trading houses, best calculated to undermine the
influence of Great Britain, with the Indians." ^
While this general policy was being worked out, negotia-
tions were carried on with the various tribes. McGillivray
and other chiefs were brought to New York, f^ted, and
bribed. In spite of obstacles which the Spaniards were sup-
posed to, and probably did, interpose, a treaty was arranged
with the Creeks in 1790; ^ and in the same year orders were
given that the treaty of Hopewell, made in 1785 with the
Cherokee, be observed by the white settlers. Peace was thus
established in the southwest, although the situation was not
conducive to slumber.
In the northwest, negotiation proved futile, and Washing-
ton advised that economy would "point to prompt and deci-
sive efiFort rather than to defensive and linger- , ..
„ rm 1 • 1- 1 Indian wars
ing operations. Ihe means at his disposal
were, however, insuflScient. In 1790 General Harmer was sent
against the Indians and disastrously defeated, and the fol-
lowing year a more formidable expedition under St. Clair,
governor of Northwest Territory, went down in utter rout.
General Wayne, whose nickname " Mad Anthony " is appro-
priate only if it is considered as implying the presence of
dash and not the absence of judgment, was then appointed
to the command of the western department. It was the
spring of 1794 before he moved against the Indians. In
February they had been encouraged by an injudicious speech
of Lord Dorchester, and they now took their stand near a
newly-established British fort at the rapids of the Maumee,
twenty miles within American territory. General Knox,
secretary of war, wrote to Wayne: "If, therefore, in the
^ Wisconsin Hist. Soc., Collections, 1911, xx. 4-5; Washington, Works
(ed. Ford), xi. 465.
*John Marshall, Life of Washington (5 vols., Philadelphia, 1804-07),
V. 274.
84 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
course of your operations against the Indian enemy, it should
become necessary to dislodge the party at the rapids of the
Miami, [sic] you are hereby authorized, in the name of the
President of the United States, to do it." Wayne, however,
succeeded in inflicting a decisive defeat upon the Indians in
the battle of Fallen Timbers, without becoming officially in-
volved with the British, though he notified General Knox,
"It is with infinite pleasure that I announce to you the bril-
liant success of the Federal army under my command, in a
general action with the combined force of the hostile Indians,
and a considerable number of the volunteers and militia of
Detroit." Peace with the Indians, however, did not come
until the next year, 1795, after the Jay treaty had been
framed and continued peace between Great Britain and
America seemed assured. Defeated and deserted, the In-
dians agreed to the treaty of Greenville, which granted the
Americans a large portion of what is now Ohio and a part of
Indiana. By 1795, therefore, the new government had ac-
complished one of its tasks in restoring peace to the frontier
and making itself respected by the Indians. It could not,
however, put an end to the inevitable conflict between the
onward-pushing forces of American civilization and the
inhabitants of the forest, who continued to lean for support
upon the less aggressive Spaniards and English, This peace
constituted merely a truce, but a truce which allowed tens
of thousands of American pioneers to establish themselves
in the wilderness and to tip the balance substantially in favor
of the United States before the hostile forces closed in final
struggle.^
One problem did not wait upon another, and during these
same years the questions of commerce were being discussed.
With regard to the Barbary states the administration adopted /
the European practice of purchasing peace. Yet, even with
^B. A. Hinsdale, Old Northwest (New York, 1888), 184flF.; also unpub-
lished theses by Shong and Groves in the library of the University of Wis-
consin.
OLD PROBLEMS IN NEW HANDS 85
money and a willingness to use it, the difficulties remained
serious. It was not till 1795 that a treaty was arranged
with Algiers, to be followed in 1796 by a Mediterranean
similar one with Tripoli, and finally, in 1799, *'*'**
by one with Tunis. Then the coast seemed clear. In spite
of these treaties and the expenditure of nearly two million
dollars, however, there continued to be such constant trouble
that the Federalist administration can hardly be said to
have made the Mediterranean a safe route for American
commerce.^
But far more important was the question of general com-
mercial policy, the source which was expected not merely to
provide the government with most of its reve- The merchant
nue, but also to advance the interests of Amer- ™*""®
ican merchants and ship-owners. It was a question which
lay with Congress rather than with the administration. The
first point, after the imposition of a customs tariflF, was
whether there should be discrimination in favor of American
as opposed to foreign vessels, a policy that was opposed by
the agricultural interests on the ground that it would inevi-
tably mean higher freight rates. By the commercial interests
it was of course strongly urged, and with them sided what
we may call the nationalists. Jefferson, although from an
agricultural state, argued: "In times of general peace, it
multiplies competition for employment in transportation,
and so keeps it at its proper level, and in times of war, that
is to say, when those nations who may be our principal car-
riers, shall be at war with each other, if we have not within
ourselves the means of transportation, our products must be
exported in belligerent vessels, at the increased expense of
war freights and insurance, and the articles which will not
bear it, must perish on our hands." It was finally voted f
that American vessels should pay six cents duty per ton on
entering a port, and foreign vessels fifty cents. To encourage
American ship-building, American-built, foreign-owned ves-
^ J. B. Moore, American DipUmiaq/ (New York, etc., 1905), 63-7£.
86 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
sels were to pay a middle rate, thirty cents. In addition,/
American vessels were to receive ten per cent rebate from the,'
duties imposed on their cargoes. '
Keener discussion raged on a second point, — whether
there should be discrimination between the vessels of various
Discrimina- foreign countries according to their treatment
**°° of our vessels. The strongest advocate of this
policy was Jefferson, who in December, 1793, submitted to
Congress a remarkably able report setting forth his views.
"Our commerce," he declared, "is certainly of a character
to entitle it to favor in most countries. The commodities
we offer are either necessaries of life, or materials for manu-
facture, or convenient subjects of revenue; and we take in
exchange, either manufactures, when they have received the
last finish of art and industry, or mere luxuries." He thought
that by discrimination we could force the nations of the
world, and Great Britain in particular, to throw open their
ports on our own terms.^
By the commercial classes this plan was opposed as imprac-
ticable. They realized that trade is seldom much more profit-
_ ... able to one nation than to another, that actually
Retaliation , » n • • i /-.
the greater bulk of our commerce was with Great
Britain, and that she might retaliate. Fisher Ames wrote,
July 2, 1789: "But are we Yankees invulnerable, if a war
of regulations should be waged with Britain? Are they not
able to retaliate? Are they not rich enough to bear some loss
and inconvenience? Would not their pride spurn at the idea
of being forced into a treaty?"^ Jefferson's plan, there-
fore, although supported warmly by Madison in the House
of Representatives, was defeated, and he was forced to
pigeon-hole it among those policies which were await-
ing the day, which he believed certain to come, when
the people would confide their welfare to his willing
hands.
» Amer. State Papers. Foreign, I 300-S04.
« Fisher Ames, Works (ed. Seth Ames, 2 vols., Boston, 1854), i. 57-60.
OLD PROBLEMS IN NEW HANDS 87
These measures for fostering the American merchant ma-
rine actually worked, and, in combination with circumstance,
worked marvellously. American ships rapidly Diplomatic
secured not only our whole coasting trade ^*^"^**
but about eighty per cent of our foreign trade, and held it
for many years. The commercial classes became enthusias-
tic for a government that could do so much by its own
regulations. In matters which required the mutual con-
sent of other governments, however, success was not
so immediate. Spain could not be persuaded to open the
Mississippi, and Great Britain allowed the use of the
St. Lawrence only by highly exceptionable special agree-
ments with Vermont. The British West Indies remained
closed.
While these essential matters were still unsettled, we did
force from Great Britain an important courtesy. That
country had steadily refused to commission a First minister
minister to the United States, her commercial ^"^ England
interests being well attended to by a consul-general. Sir
John Temple, and the active Phineas Bond, consul at Phila-
delphia. With the return of Adams in 1788 we were equally
unrepresented in England, nor could we, consistently with
our self-respect, again appoint a minister until Great Britain
was willing to reciprocate. To meet the situation, which
was not only inconvenient but, considering all conditions,
dangerous as well, Washington sent Gouverneur Morris
unoflBcially to England. He succeeded in impressing the
English ministry with the friendliness of the American
administration, and the probability of hostile commercial
legislation by Congress if England remained obdurate, with
the result that in 1791 George Hammond was appointed
minister just in time, as Lord Grenville was informed, to
prevent the passage of an act discriminating against English
commerce. The next year Thomas Pinckney was sent as
American minister to Great Britain. Although neither
Pinckney nor Hammond accomplished definite results, the
88 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
exchange of ministers somewhat enhanced the prestige of
the United States.^
While formulating these general policies, the government
found itself confronted by an episode which for a moment
N tk s d P^^^^d t^^t ^^ t^® strings of American diplo-
macy. The situation quickly relaxed, it is true,
but in that moment were brought to view motives and forces
which were to play a vital part in the history of the United
States for many years to come. In the same month in which
Washington was inaugurated, two Spanish war vessels, un-
authorized by their government, seized some goods left by an
English company which intended upon its own responsibility
to form a permanent commercial settlement at Nootka
Sound, on what is now called the island of Vancouver, at that
time one of the most remote spots on the sea-washed earth.
As fast as the wind could carry the ships of the day, the
news was brought to the courts of England and Spain.^
The affair was accidental, but it involved the fundamental
interests and the long-established views of both countries.
The verge of England could not let the seizure go unnoticed
""" without recognizing the Spanish claim to the
unoccupied coast of North America, a claim resting entirely
upon a questioned discovery. A virile growing power, §he
had for two hundred years denied such prescriptive rights.
Spaio, on the other hand, could not make amends without
either giving up her claims to ownership or acknbwledging
the breakdown of her policy of commercial exclusion. Both
nations prepared for war. Spain called on France, who,
although the Revolution had begun, was still bound to her
by the Family Alliance. Pitt made ready to regain the
^ E. D. Adams, The Influence of Grenville on Pitfs Foreign Policy, 1787-'
1798, Washington, 1904; Dropmore Papers (British Hist. Mss. Commission,
Report. 1894, xiv. pt. v.), ii. 228, 250, 263, 444.
* W. R. Manning, The Nootka Sound Controversy, Amer. Hist. Assoc.,
Report, 1904, pp. 279-478; W. E. H. Lecky, England in the Eighteenth Cen-
tury (8 vols., London, 1878-90), v. 206-209; H. H. Bancroft, Northwest
Coast (2 vols., San Francisco, 1884), i. 180-225.
OLD PROBLEMS IN NEW HANDS 89
golden colonies of Spain won by his father but lost through
the policy of George III.
To Pitt's hand lay many strange instruments. Among
them was William A. Bowles, a fantastic American loyalist, a
portrait-painter, an actor, a soldier, who was pitt and the
at this time adventuring for a fortune in trade ^<^"^s
with the southwestern Indians. A rival of the Spanish-
sympathizing McGillivray, he offered to organize among the
Indians a force to capture the mines of Mexico. "I should
inform your Lordship," he wrote to Lord Grenville, January
13, 1791, "that these Speculations would meet with other
support than the force of the Creek and Cherokee Nation.
There are now settled in the Cumberland Country [a] set of
men, who are the Relicts of the American Army; These people
are weary of their Situation. ... I have had a request
from . . . [them] to lead them on an expedition to the
Spanish settlements, that being the object of adventure now
most thought of, in that part of the world. . . . These
people are desirous on any terms, of coming to settle
amongst us, as well for the objects of peace as those of War.
For, at present, they are shut out from the sea. They feel
no attachment to the Americans and would be glad to
abandon everything for a situation near the Sea in our
Country [the Indian lands]." ^
More formidable than Bowles was the mysterious Francisco
de Miranda. A native of that hive of revolution, Caracas of
Venezuela, he left a Spanish post in 1782 and ... ,
devoted his life to the cause of freeing Spanish
America. Had he directed his efforts toward internal prepara-
tion rather than to securing foreign assistance, he might
perhaps have anticipated Bolivar as the successful leader of
that movement; but, again, he might have been shot sooner
than he was. From 1790 till 1810 he is always to be found
hovering about the courts of whatever powers seemed most
^F. J. Turner, "English Policy toward America in 1790-1791," Amer.
Hist. Review, 1902, vii. 706-735.
90 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
likely to welcome a project against Spain. A man of ability
and with an unusual capacity for winning confidence, he
was successively in close contact with England, France, Eng-
land again, and at times with Russia and the United States.
His plan at this time was the formation of a great independent
Spanish-American constitutional monarchy in commercial
alliance with Great Britain.^
It is obvious that such proposals touched the United
States very nearly, and would have much disturbed its
g . „ government had it known of them. Still more
land, and the important, however, and more apparent was
the prevalent feeling that, should a general
war break out, the United States would necessarily become
involved in it. Spain sought American favor by failing to
seize two American ships that were at Nootka Sound. She
also began to speak soft on the Mississippi question. Pitt,
however, brought the subject up in more concrete form.
Influenced by Miranda or by his own designs, he made ar-
rangements for a descent upon New Spain. He had agents
at Charleston and New York; he considered the advisability
of sending troops from India against the west coast of Mexico;
and particularly he thought it possible to use the troops at
Detroit against New Orleans. As this project involved cross-
ing American territory, he sent an agent to sound the Amer-
ican government as to its attitude. This agent. Major Beck-
with, met Hamilton in July, 1790, and requested permission
thus to use American territory should it prove desirable. He
spoke of the cause of the expected rupture, observing that
"it was one in which all commercial nations must be sup-
posed to favor the views of Great Britain, that it was there-
fore presumed, should war take place, that the United States
* F. J. Turner, " English Policy toward America in 1790-1791," Amer.
Hist. Review, 1902, vii. 706-735; also W. S. Robertson, Francisco de Miranda
and the Revolutionizing of Spanish America, Amer. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1907,
i. 189-539; Hubert Hall, "Pitt and General Miranda," Athenceum, April 19,
1902. pp. 498-499.
OLD PROBLEMS IN NEW HANDS 91
would find it to their interest to take part with Great Britain
rather than with Spain."
This was the first question of high diplomacy presented
to the new government. Our two neighbors were apparently
about to go to war. Should we side with Spain, united States
or with Great Britain, or remain neutral? ^^"^^
What would be the obligations of neutrality? what its rights?
On August 27 Washington asked his advisers for their opin-
ions on the crisis. They discussed it broadly. Jefferson
feared an English conquest of Florida and Louisiana. " Em-
braced from the St. Croix to the St. Mary on jefiferson's
the one side by their possessions," he wrote, "®^*
" on the other by their fleet, we need not hesitate to say that
they would soon find means to unite to them all the territory
covered by the ramifications of the Mississippi." Under
such circumstances he looked forward to "bloody and
eternal war or indissoluble confederacy" with her. "In
my opinion," he said, "we ought to make ourselves
parties in the general war expected to take place, should
this be the only means of preventing the calamity." He
hoped that by way of compromise England might allow us
Florida and New Orleans; and on the immediate question
of permission to cross our territory he advised delay. ^
Hamilton inclined toward England. "It is not to be
doubted," he wrote, September 15, 1790, "that the part
which the courts of France and Spain took in Hamilton's
our quarrel with Great Britain, is to be attrib- ^®''*
uted, not to an attachment to our independence or liberty,
but to a desire of diminishing the power of Great Britain
by severing the British empire," a view in which Jay naturally
agreed with him. Although Hamilton recognized the danger
of permitting Great Britain to take Florida and Louisiana,
he felt that our refusal to allow the expedition would
not prevent it, but would involve us in the war on the
* Thomas Jefferson, Writings (ed. P. L. Ford, 10 vols.. New York, etc^
1892-99), V. 228, 238, August 28, 1790.
92 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
side of Spain, who was sure to lose. He too would delay,
but would grant the permission if the issue were forced.^
John Adams alone struck the note of absolute neutrality
which was to characterize American diplomacy. Already
Adams and in 1782 he had written Livingston: "America
neutrality j^g^g been long enough involved in the wars of
Europe. She has been a football between contending nations
from the beginning, and it is easy to foresee, that France
and England both will endeavor to involve us in their future
wars. It is our interest and duty to avoid them as much as
possible, and to be completely independent, and to have
nothing to do with either of them, but in commerce." He
therefore advised refusal. Should the troops be sent with-
out permission, we could remonstrate.^
Fortunately the real issue had already been decided by
the defeat of Mirabeau in the debate of May 20-22 in the
„ _^ , National Assembly of France. Louis XVI and
War averted , . , . , , i i , , . •
his advisers had hoped by war to turn the rising
tide of revolution into patriotism. In that case the King
needed to retain the right of making peace and war, and to
this end Mirabeau exerted himself. When, however, the
Assembly voted that it alone possessed the right, the chance
that France might join Spain passed, and Spain was forced
to seek terms of England.^
The treaty between them, signed October 28, 1790, was
of importance to the United States both immediately and
Nootka Sound subsequently. The third and sixth articles
*'***y allowed freedom of trade and settlement on v
the coasts of the Pacific, "in places not already occupied,"
north of "the parts occupied by Spain," that is, practically
above San Francisco bay. Although this relaxation of
^ Alexander Hamilton, Works (ed. J. C. Hamilton, 7 vols.. New York,
1850-51), iv. 48-69. September 15, 1790.
* John Adams, Works, viii. 9, 497-500, August 29, 1790.
* F. M. Fling, Mirabeau and the French Revolution, N. Y., 1908. Albert
Sorel, L'Europe et la revolution JranQaise (8 vols., Paris, 1885-1904) il. 61,
84-95,
OLD PROBLEMS IN NEW HANDS 93
Spanish control applied specifically to England, the Ameri-
cans profited by it. Already frequenting the coast for
its furs and gingseng, they would in the long run at least
have been annoyed by Spanish interference, had it not been
for this treaty. As it was, in the year 1792 Captain Gray
sailed, the first white man. into the great river of the region j
and named it after his ship, the Columbia, thus establishing
the first link in the chain of claims which was to bring Oregon
to the United States.
It is plain that, when the end of Washington's first term
approached in 1793, the diplomatic situation did not warrant
his withdrawal with the sense of leaving a task Uncompleted
accompHshed. Nearly everything was still **^^^
unsettled, and he consented to serve again in hope of carrying
the various problems to solution. Nevertheless, the govern-
ment was feeling the good influence of improved stability,
the administration had determined its policy on some im-
portant questions, and on most others its individual mem-
bers had begun to find themselves.
CHAPTER IX
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEUTRALITY
Thus prepared, the United States was in the spring of 1793
overtaken by a hurricane of diplomatic disturbance which
D f th ^^^ ^® blow with increasing violence for twenty-
French two years. The revolution which began to
take form in 1789 was, in the minds of its
leaders, only accidentally French. Its ideals were equally
applicable to all nations in which the people were oppressed
by their rulers. This international character of its profes-
sions, which it retained to the end, was at the beginning in
some degree actually true. It was welcomed by liberals
in all countries. It crossed the channel into England. As
Wordsworth wrote,
" Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive.
But to be young was very heaven."
When the Bastile fell Lafayette sent its keys to Washing-
ton, a recognition of the indebtedness which the cause of
revolution owed to America. French fashions for the first
time invaded our country; and civic feasts, liberty caps,
and the salutation of "citizen" and "citizeness" became
common in our streets.
As one wave of radicalism succeeded another in France,
each raising the tide of revolution higher toward the final
_ , ^_ fury of the Terror, the enthusiasm of the more
War between "^ , , ,. i , ,
France and moderate cooled, died, and turned to opposi-
tion. By 1793 England had become in effect
a unit in resisting the spread of Revolution, and for the ma-
jority of Englishmen Revolution had come to be embodied
in France. The inoculation of humanity was not able to ,
cope with the traditional antipathies of French and English.
94
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEUTRALITY 95
France continued to fight for the ideal of "Liberty," but
England had come to personify for her the forces of oppres-
sion. In February, 1793, she anticipated a declaration of
war on the part of England by declaring war with that
country herself.
In America sentiment divided. Jefferson liked the French,
as had Franklin. He had played a part in the beginning of
their revolution and knew many of their American
leaders. He had a French cook, and he intro- sympatJ^es
duced from France the revival of classic forms of architec-
ture. Himself as peaceful as a Quaker, he was not troubled
over a little blood-letting. He had said at the time of the
Shays Rebellion that the tree of liberty must from time to
time be watered by the blood of patriots and tyrants; "it is
its natural manure." Serene in his belief in the ultimate
triumph of right and reason, he looked without flinching
upon the excesses of the Terror, and maintained his sympathy
with the fundamental purpose of the movement. Hamil-
ton, on the other hand, to whom civilization seemed based
upon the slow and precarious triumph of informed intelli-
gence over brutish ignorance, saw the whole structure totter-
ing in France with the successes of the sans culottes, and
imperilled in the world at large. Between the two was every
shade of opinion, and in fact many were more radical than
either. To the danger that would inevitably come to the
United States of being drawn into the vortex of any war
between France and Great Britain was added the peril of
being divided within itself over the issue. It was probably
fortunate that at this crisis both opinions were represented
in the cabinet, and it was incalculably advantageous that
the government was presided over by Washington's force,
prestige, and balance.^
France, taking arms against the " impious hand of tyrants,"
— the governments of England, Prussia, Austria, Holland,
* C. D. Hazen, Contemporary Arruirican Opinion of the French Revolution,
Baltimore, 1897.
96 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
and Spain, — did not lose sight of America. Even in the
kaleidoscopic whirl of Paris Americans were conspicuous.
Thomas Paine sought to become the essayist
of the United of the new revolution, as he had been of the
American; John Paul Jones was ready to repeat
his naval triumphs in its behalf; the poet, Joel Barlow, dab-
bled now in land speculation, now in politics. Brissot de
Warville, "who ruled the council," had in 1788 completed
a voyage through America. When, therefore, the French
republic was proclaimed, September 22, 1792, there was a
reasonable hope on the part of its leaders that it would find
sympathy and support from the sister republic across the
ocean. The two countries were bound together by the inti-
mate treaties of 1778 and 1788; the United States owed
France money, the hastened payment of which would ease
her finances; the American merchant marine could be use-
ful to France in many ways and would find such occupation
profitable. To announce the new republic, to realize these
advantages, to replace the existing treaties by a still closer
one, by "a true family compact" on a "liberal and fraternal
basis," Edmund C. Genet, an enthusiastic patriot, only
twenty-eight years of age and yet trained for many years in
the foreign oflBce under Vergennes, was sent as minister to
the United States.^
But Gen^t was not to be a mere diplomatic representative,
as that term is now understood. French ministers during the
Revolution felt themselves commissioned, not
Genet's task
from government to government, but from
people to people. They embodied revolution; their functions
were unlimited; and in this case Genet's instructions definitely
launched him into colossal enterprises. All America was his
province. Miranda was now high in the counsels of the
French; Dumouriez wrote to Lebrun, November 30, 1792,
of the "superb project of General Miranda" for revolu-
* McMaster, History of the People of the United States (8 vols.. New York,
188S-191S), ii. 89-141.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEUTRALITY 97
lionizing Spanish America. The foreign office, however,
was somewhat more conservative and more French: "To
embrace all at once the immense country which stretches
from New Mexico to Chili to make revolutions, is to be will-
ing to lose realities, to occupy oneself with Chimeras. With-
out doubt these immense possessions will not remain always
under the yoke of Spain, but it does not depend upon us
to-day to deliver them."
Permanent national interests, however, survive all changes
in the form of government. The recovery of Louisiana had
been constantly in the mind of the French France and
ever since its loss in 1763. No longer ago than I^'"s»»"*
1787, indeed, a project for the accomplishment of this end
had been presented to the French government. With the
new vigor of the Revolution throbbing in her veins France
was not likely to forget that she had once had a vast American
empire, that tens of thousands of French were living in
Louisiana, to say nothing of Canada. On the contrary,
the old end was sought with new energy. The recovery of
Louisiana was among the duties assigned to Gen^t.
His means were to be found in the United States: first,
money, which Hamilton was to give in repayment of the
French loans; second, an army, which was to Gen«t's in-
consist of the An^erican frontiersmen, spurred structions
by promise of abundant loot and by that persistent motive,
the navigation of the Mississippi. The foremost of the
frontiersmen, George Rogers Clark, anticipated the desires
of France by offering his services. His letter probably
reached France before Gen#t sailed; at any rate, the latter
counted upon him.
Even to the French enthusiasts of 1792 it occurred that
this plan of organizing within the United States, and by the
resources of the United States, forces to attack Gen«t and the
Spain, with whom the nation was at peace, ^'"*®'* States
involved delicate questions. Nor were they unaware that
a reaction had taken place in this country, for the foreign
98 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
office took care to inform Gen^t, "The enjoyment of liberty
has rendered them [the Americans] more calm, they no
longer treat it as lovers but as husbands." He was to be
cautious, therefore, in revealing his plans, and the more
so in view of the possibilities of the future. Was Louisiana
to become free, French, or part of the United States?
France was concerned with the future, not of Louisiana
alone, but of all the rest of the West as well. "Nature,**
Prance and Gen^t was instructed, "has traced the future
the West revolutions of North America." It is divided
into two parts by the Appalachian Mountains. "The East
part is peopled, that of the West is almost not. The climates
of the two countries offer as many differences as are found
in the interests of the inhabitants. The one direct their
speculations toward New Orleans, which will be their only
outlet, the other toward the cities established on the borders
of the Atlantic sea. ... This liberty of navigation and the
independence of Louisiana will draw into this country an
immense population at the expense of the United States.
By the progressive growth of this population the schism
between the Atlantic states and those of the West will be
inevitable. The Americans know it and do their best to
delay the epoch." The question might, therefore, he was
told, be safely left to time. Louisiana would need French
aid, and the West would ultimately join her; but naturally
such plans were not for the ears of the American cabinet.
On April 8, 1793, Gen^t arrived at Charleston. Welcomed
with official sympathy by Governor Moultrie and by popular
Gen6t'8 ex- demonstration, he devoted himself, perhaps
'*'** more openly than was intended, to the or-
ganization of operations against the enemies of France.
Against English commerce he issued a number of privateer-
ing commissions (of which he was said to have brought
three hundred) to American vessels manned by Americans;
and in accordance with a decree of the National Convention,
he authorized the French consuls in American ports to act
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEUTRALITY 99
as courts of admiralty for the trial, condemnation, and sale
of prizes. The business of these courts was not long in be-
ginning, for unwarned British vessels promptly fell into the
hands of the French-commissioned American privateers.
Against Spain, he arranged an expedition of southeastern
American frontiersmen to attack St. Augustine. To pro-
mote the cause of Revolution, he also organized a Jacobin
club. Leaving these affairs at Charleston in the hands of
the consul, Mangourit, he then started north. In an atmos-
phere warm with popular sympathy, to which he knew how
to respond in a manner piquant and provocative, he rode to
Philadelphia, which he reached May 16, prepared to repeat
the part which Franklin had sustained in Paris.^
On April 8, the day on which Gen^t made Charleston,
the American cabinet, chilled by the news of the proscrip-
tion of Lafayette and the beheading of Louis Cabinet dis-
XVI, heard of the war between France and «"s**o"*
England. They had five weeks for consultation before
Genet would reach the capital. The questions which Wash-
ington presented to the members included the following:
Whether Gen^t should be received; whether the republican
authorities should be recognized as the government of France;
whether the treaties were still binding, and, if they were,
whether the guarantee of the French West Indies was still
obligatory; and exactly what the favors granted to the
French consuls, war vessels, and privateers involved. The
primary question, however, was whether a proclamation of
neutrality should be issued, and, if so, what jeflerson ver-
form should be given to it. The answers to *"' Hamilton
these questions brought out clearly the opposing views of
Jefferson and Hamilton. Over the validity of the French
treaties they were particularly at odds. Jay had already,
*F. J. Turner, "The Origin of Genfit's Projected Attack on Louisiana
and the Floridas," Amer. Hist. Review, 1898, iii. 650-671; Correspondence of
Clark and Genet, Amer. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1896, i. 930-1107; Mangourit
Correspondence, ibid., 1897, pp. 569-679.
100 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
in 1788, maintained that the treaty of alliance terminated
with the war, that is in 1783, and Hamilton had supported
him. The latter now held that the treaty had been made
with the government of Louis XVI, and could not be re-
garded as binding with the new government of France.
Jefferson more correctly maintained that a treaty was the
action of a nation, not of a government, and therefore sur-
vived all changes of form. Madison expressed the same idea
in the words, "A nation, by exercising the right of changing
the organ of its will, can neither disengage itself from the
obligations, nor forfeit the benefit of its treaties." A more
promising lever, however, for releasing us from the uncom-
fortable obligations resulting from the warmth of our rela-
tions with France during our own Revolution lay in the
disregard, by the new French government, of some of its
corresponding obligations; but the facts were not yet suffi-
ciently well ascertained to justify more than a protest. On
neutrality all were agreed; nor did its preservation seem to
them so difficult as it had at the time of the Nootka Sound
affair, for they were as yet in ignorance of the territorial am-
bitions of France.^ In this case it seemed to be a problem of
the sea alone.
The final decision lay with Washington, and his first step
was to issue, on April 22, a proclamation of neutrality. In
Proclamation deference to Jefferson's wish, however, the
of neutrality word neutrality was omitted, as it was thought
that some uncertainty in regard to our position might be of
advantage. This document, announcing "a conduct friendly
and impartial towards the belligerent powers," and warning
all citizens of the United States to avoid hostilities and not
to trade with the powers at war in any of "those articles
which are deemed contraband by the modern usage of na-
tions," has assumed unique position in the development of
American diplomacy. It really represented not merely an
» Hamilton, Works (ed. H. C. Lodge, 9 vols.. New York, etc., 1885-86),
iv. 20-135; Jefferson, Writings (ed. Ford), vi. 219-231.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEUTRALITY 101
intention to keep out of the war then in progress, but also
the national determination to resist the centripetal forces i
of European politics and to be left free to work out our na- <
tional development. As the first public announcement of i
this determination, it forms the basis of our most characteris- '
tic diplomatic policy.^
It was further resolved to receive Gen§t, a step which
ultimately meant recognition of the French republic. This
instance became a precedent, which the United «/Recogiiition of
States has nearly always followed, for promptly *^® republic
recognizing accomplished changes of government in foreign
"countries. It is a policy equally consistent with our pro-
fessed belief in the right of revolution and with the practical ^
common sense which has usually been found in American
diplomacy. The other questions at issue were left for future
decision. That of the West India guarantee, which Hamil-
ton claimed could not hold in case of an offensive war such
as France was then waging against Great Britain even if the
treaties were still in force, was soon happily settled by the ^
decision of France not to insist upon it. The validity of the
treaties, and their exact bearing upon the neutral rights and y
duties of the United States, remained topics of controversy
until Napoleon cut the knot in 1801.
Genet was probably more incensed than disappointed by
the proclamation, and he was still further angered by his
official greeting at Philadelphia, where he was Reception of
received by Washington in a room decorated ^®°**
with medallions of Louis Capet and Marie Antoinette, and
with a rather frigid bow in place of the fraternal embrace
and kiss symbolic of the Revolution. Hamilton, moreover,
courteously explained the impossibility of anticipating in
any large way the payment of the French loans, and Gen^t
was thus left without the financial resources upon which he
had relied. Nevertheless, he proceeded with his plans. He
^ Washington, Writings (ed. Ford), xii. 281-282; Moore. American Diplo-
macy, 33-62.
102 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
forwarded a commission of commander-in-chief to George
Rogers Clark, and stirred the Kentucky settlements on the
Ohio and those of Tennessee on the Cumberland with the
preparation of flat boats and provisions. On June 19, he
wrote to Lebrun that he was provisioning the West Indies,
inciting the Canadians, arming Kentucky, and preparing
an expedition by sea to assist in the attack on New Orleans.
On July 5 Genet discreetly unfolded his Louisiana project
to Jeflferson. The latter, understanding that the rendezvous
Jefferson and was to be outside of the United States and
Gen«t ^jj^|. Ix)uisiana was to be independent, ex-
pressed indifference, but warned him that the halter would
be the fate of the participants in such an expedition. Never-
theless, he gave a letter to Michaux, who under the guise of
an explorer was to act as French agent in the West, com-
mending him to Governor Shelby of Kentucky.
Meantime Genet was involved with Jefferson in constant
discussion on questions of neutrality. The treaty with France
declared that in time of war it should not be
lawful for citizens of other countries "to fit their
ships in the ports of either the one or the other of the afore-
said parties." This certainly forbade the fitting out of
British war vessels in American ports, but Genet claimed
that by implication it allowed that privilege to the French.
This Jefferson denied; indeed, to have held otherwise would
have meant immediate war with England. Again, the seven-
teenth article of the treaty of commerce provided that prizes
should not " be arrested or seized when they come to or enter
the ports of either party." Gen^t claimed that this conceded
complete jurisdiction over prizes to the French consular
courts, Jefferson, that the United States retained in full the
rights necessary to enforce her own neutrality regulations
in case of captures in violation thereof. Jefferson held that
Americans enlisting in French privateers, were violating our
declared neutrality and should be punished. On this charge
Henfield and Singleterry, Americans enlisted on one of
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEUTRALITY 103
Genet's Charleston privateers, were arrested. Gen^t pro-
tested, "The crime laid to their charge, the crime which my
pen almost refuses to state, is the serving of France, and the
defending, with her children, the common and glorious cause
of liberty."
The inevitable crisis came in July, when V Ambuscade, the
French frigate which had brought Gen^t, captured within
the capes of the Delaware, and hence cleariy The Little
illegally because within American waters, the I^«™o"**
British vessel Little Sarah, and brought her to Philadelphia.
The government ordered her surrender, but instead of
complying, Genet renamed her the Little Democrat and fitted
her out for a privateer. Brought to task for this by Jefferson,
he promised that she should not sail until the matter was
adjusted. Nevertheless, she secretly dropped down the
river and put to sea, whereupon the government, in a letter
of August 23, demanded of France the recall of Gen6t.
Pending an answer. Genet remained in the country. A
large portion of the press sympathized with France, and
attacked the government for its lack of syra- Gendt's appeal
pathy. Particularly Freneau's National Gazette ^ *^* ^^^^^
lashed Washington with scorpions, until he doubted whether
free government and free speech could coexist. Thus spurred,
Gen^t resolved to turn from the government to the people,
and straightway addressed the President in a letter of bom-
bastic insult which found its way into the newspapers. When
Congress came together in December the whole correspond-,
ence was submitted to it, and then Gen^t found that the
Americans had indeed cooled to the passions of liberty. He
received some applause but no effective support; even the
Democratic societies formed upon the model of the Jacobin
club were unwilling to push to extremes.
In February his mission ended. His friends, the Girondists
had fallen; and their successors the Jacobins, Danton and
Robespierre, were anxious for his head and did not hesitate
to recall him. He failed to respond, however, remaining to
104 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
become a citizen of the United States; but he ceased to be
minister and to figure in the national life. As a balm to the
Recall of pride of the republic, France asked the cor-
*'*'^** responding recall of Gouverneur Morris, since
1792 our minister there. An aristocrat to the finger-tips,
Moms had not badly maintained himself in a difficult
position during those two dreadful years in Paris; but his
Recall of sympathies with the king and the nobility
Moms were well known, and he was not persona grata
to the French government. The United States, therefore,
properly acceded to the request and withdrew him.
On December 31, 1793, Jefferson resigned from the cab-
inet. The strain of acting as a spokesman of a policy which
Retirement of came steadily to be directed more and more
Jefferson y^y Washington in accordance with Hamilton's
advice was too great for him, and he was also torn within
himself between his sympathy for France and his belief in
neutrality. Genet complained, perhaps not unjustly, that
he had an official and a confidential language which widely
differed. His service in remaining throughout the Gen^t
affair, however, cannot be overestimated. The majority
still sympathized with France, and the fact that the position
of the government had been expounded by a known French
sympathizer did much to maintain confidence at home and
to present to foreign nations an appearance of national
solidarity.
Jefferson was succeeded by Edmund Randolph of Virginia,
who as attorney-general had, on the whole, supported him,
Randolph and although he was somewhat aptly described by
Monroe John Quincy Adams as "a body devoid of
weight dragged along by the current of events." To succeed
Morris, Washington appointed James Monroe, another
friend of Jefferson and an avowed sympathizer with France.
He had desired to send Jefferson's leading supporter, Madi-
son, who declined; the pro-French senators had urged Aaron
Burr; yet Monroe's appointment was regarded as conciliatory
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEUTRALITY 105
both at home and abroad, and it was hoped that he would
inaugurate an era of friendly understanding with France
on the basis of absolute neutrality.
Meantime the government was developing the details of
its system. News of the still active western preparations
reached it, and in March Washington issued a Enforcement
supplementary proclamation dealing with this °* neutrality
phase of the situation. Governor Shelby expressed his un-
willingness to act under a proclamation against " men whom
he considered as friends and brethren," in behalf of the king
of Spain, whom he viewed as "an enemy and a tyrrant"; but
General Wayne, by occupying a strategic position at the
junction of the Cumberland and the Ohio, succeeded in
separating Clark's Kentucky and Tennessee forces. Whether
the government could have held its own had the issue been
forced, is a question; but at least it showed vigor and purpose.
In regard to the ocean still greater energy was exhibited.
The only advantage allowed to the French over the English,
as a result of the treaties, was that the former were allowed
to sell prizes in American ports and the latter were not.
Thus far the enforcement of neutrality had been wholly by
executive discretion; but there was some criticism that
this had been stretched too far, and the courts had
in some instances refused to enforce executive orders.
The government's position was therefore strengthened
when, June 5, 1794, Congress passed our first neutrality
act.
This law made all persons entering the service of any
foreign state, or enlisting others in such service, liable to a
fine of $1,000 and three years' imprisonment; Neutrality law
it likewise made punishable the fitting out, ^^^*
or increasing the armament, of any foreign ship or cruiser.
The government's good faith was further indicated by the
appropriation of eighty thousand dollars for the purposes
of enforcement. This act, taken in connection with the
president's proclamations and the rules adopted by the cab-
106 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
inet on August 3, 1793, "as to the equipment of vessels in
the ports of the United States by belligerent powers," was
important not only in establishing the American policy, but
also in developing the general principles of international
law. The American position represented the most advanced
views of the day in regard to the obligations of neutrals, and
its practice far exceeded that of any other nation up to that
time.
Fortunately, the attitude of France was for the moment
complaisant. Genet was succeeded by a commission of which
Fauchet's J* A. J. Fauchet was chief with the title of
mission minister, its instructions being dated No-
vember 25, 1793, at the very abyss of French fortunes.
Hostile armies, insurrections, and famine were pressing in
upon the new republic. Genet's actions were disavowed, the
western plans were given up, and American neutrality was
recognized. France was, in short, coming to an appreciation
of the fact that American neutrality was one of her strongest
assets. The chief need was food, and the carrying of provi-
sions in neutral American vessels was the chief concern of
the commissioners. Desirable as such provisions were for
the famine-stricken capital, they were a matter of absolute
necessity for the West Indian colonies of France. Fauchet
wrote, February 4, 1795: "You recall. Citizen, that when
the legation was sent, the Republic was in danger. We saw
in the United States a point useful for our provisioning which
caused us not a little alarm, and other political interests were
entirely subordinated to this powerful consideration." In
the same letter he wrote: "'The force of things,' said Mr.
Jefferson, 'delivers the French colonies to us; France enjoys
the sovereignty, we the profit.' Mr. Jefferson thought
justly," he went on. " Colonies which America can cast into
famine in time of war . . . must form close bonds with a
people which can from fortnight to fortnight satisfy their
needs. . . . France has to fear for her colonies." To assist
in this emergency Hamilton did advance some money not yet
V
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEUTRALITY 107
due. Monroe was welcomed in France with lively satisfac-
tion, and for the moment cordiality reigned,^
The Genet episode, therefore, passed. It had threatened
to drag the United States into the general war of Europe
either directly through sympathetic attraction close of the
for France, or indirectly by the use of her soil, *pisode
citizens, and waters for the military purposes of that country.
It had threatened to divide the United States into two war-
ring factions. Instead, it left her resolute in the possession
of a well-developed policy, and still presenting a united front
to a divided Europe.
* F. J. Turner, Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States,
1791-1797, Amer. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1903, vol. ii.
CHAPTER X
THE JAY TREATY
While relations with France were thus assuming a quiet
tone, a new episode was taking shape. In 1793 it seemed that .
Changed con- • we might be stampeded into war with England i
ditions j^y ^^j. French sympathies; in 1794 it looked j
as if England might force us into war by her aggressions. In !
1793 it was a question of our obligations as neutrals, in 1794 1
of our rights as neutrals.
The trade between France and her West India colonies
constituted perhaps two-thirds of her sea-borne commerce.
The French It provided France with her breakfast, — coffee.
West Indies sugar, and chocolate. In return, France sup-
plied not only manufactured goods, but also, until the de-
moralization of agriculture in 1793, grain. The French
fishermen of Brittany, moreover, caught on the banks of
Newfoundland the short cod and mackerel which fed the
slaves of San Domingo, Guadaloupe, and Martinique, while
the best were taken across the ocean to serve the lenten fare
of the French at home. Should these branches of trade be
cut oflF, it would cause financial loss and inconvenience in
France, it would cause starvation in the colonies. In fact,
the Revolution increased the needs of trade, since for a time
France ceased to be able to feed herself and so became an
importer of foodstuffs.
The protection of this trade was the underlying function of
the French navy. While, however, the French fleet was strong
„ . and efficient, it was less powerful than that of
Neutral trade _, . , ' . , ^ , , »
England. Except m the war of the American
Revolution, when it joined forces with Spain, it proved un-
equal to the task, and direct trade in French vessels was
108
THE JAY TREATY 109
generally in time of war so insecure as to be impracticable.
To meet this situation, it had been the custom of France in
such emergencies to open the colonial trade to neutral nations,
and the Dutch, protected by their English treaties, had en-
joyed the lion's share. The natural convenience of the Ameri-
can granaries, however, the hunger of San Domingo, and the
seamanship and commercial spirit of the American colonists
often overcame the obstacles of legality and enmity. During
the Seven Years' war colonial vessels laden with grain often
dropped down to the vicinity of the French islands, and, by
collusion with the authorities, allowed themselves to be cap-
tured, their cargoes being ostensibly seized but actually paid
for.i
For these precarious advantages the new war promised to
substitute a legal and extensive trade. Almost simultane-
ously with the declaration of hostilities France *^
opened her colonial ports. The Dutch no states and the
longer had their treaties with England; in fact, ^'^^^ ^^^^
they may scarcely be said to have had a mer-
chant marine. To the Americans, therefore, possessing as
they did the world's most important neutral marine, was
offered the opportunity not only of provisioning the islands,
but of serving as intermediaries between the colonies and
the mother country, in addition to supplying the latter with
provisions. Our merchants were quick to take advantage
of the situation. They carried our products to the islands,
exchanged them for island products, and carried the latter to
France, or brought them back to the United States and then
took or sent them to France. In 1791 we exported 2,000,000
pounds of coffee and 1,200,000 pounds of sugar; in 1793,
34,000,000 pounds of coffee and 18,000,000 pounds of sugar.
Merchants throve, ship-owners turned their capital with
unprecedented rapidity, shipyards were pressed to complete
^ T. L. Stoddard, The French Revolution in San Domingo (Boston, 1914);
A. T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire,
1793-1812 (10th ed., 2 vols., Boston, 1898), vol. i. ch. iv., vol. ii. chs. vii.-viii.
110 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
new vessels, sailmakers and ropemakers were busy; farmers
opened new fields to supply the demand for grain, salt pork,
hemp, butter, and other staple articles; fishermen enlarged
their ventures and their catches to supply what the Bretons
could no longer furnish. In part, but not mainly, the sym-
pathy for France was due to the general prosperity which ^
resulted from the outbreak of hostilities.
To England the situation was doubly distasteful, first
because it was of advantage to France, and second because
English atti- it served to build up the American merchant
*"*** marine, the only one, since the fall of the Dutch,
which endangered the supremacy of her commercial fleet,
upon which rested her naval power, her colonies, and her
wealth. Her navy was of little use to her if American vessels,
in an impenetrable armor of neutrality, could serve all the
customary routes of French commerce. It was not thus that
the first Pitt had made commerce flourish by means of war.
England had never shown a disposition to stand passive
before an international opinion, which had been formulated
by Dutch publicists, was without the backing of effective
force, and could hardly be dignified by the name of interna-
tional law. She had rather, as a result of her experience,
so bent the common law of the sea as to furnish her navy
with weapons as effective against neutrals as against enemies,
and she was prepared to use them.
The first of these was the principle that enemies' goods at
sea might be seized and confiscated even when carried in
" Free ships, neutral ships. There was a growing sentiment
free goods" ' ^^iSi^ "frgg ghips" should make "free goods."
This had been one of the declarations of the Armed Neutral-
ity, and was embodied in all the commercial treaties of the
United States. England's practice, however, was the older,
and she refused to recognize the new idea as having the force
of law. Neutrals could escape the consequences of her rule
by becoming the actual owners of the cargo, but to do so •
involved a large capital. Such a purchase, moreover, was
THE JAY TREATY 111
looked upon as collusive; hence, being subject to examina- /
tion in the English admiralty courts, the practice involved
no little risk.
A second difference in England's policy had reference to /
contraband. It was universally admitted that for a neutral
to carry war material to a belligerent was law-
less, and justified the seizure of the material in
question, the freight, and possibly the ship itself. There was,
however, disagreement as to what constituted war material.
The weaker maritime powers thought that the term should
be narrowly interpreted; England, on the contrary, except
when bound by treaty, as in the case of Russia, held for a
broad interpretation. On June 8, 1793, she issued an order
in council authorizing the seizure of "all ships laden with
com, flour, or meal." This measure she defended as being
not only within her rights but in retaliation for a similar
French decree of May. The French claimed that their decree
had been of a special rather than a general character and
had already been withdrawn when the British order had
been issued. Failing to secure the withdrawal of the latter,
the French in July renewed their decree, and provisions be-
came seizable by both parties. In September, however, the
British ordered that provisions so seized be paid for and the V
vessels released. The provision trade continued to grow,
but its fortunes were checkered and its success a gamble.
It should be observed that while Great Britain and France
were ostensibly pursuing the same policy, it was, of course, \/
the British navy which made the most seizures and won the
most hatred.
Another point upon which England maintained a position \
at variance with that of most nations was regarding blockade. *
All nations recognized that a vessel endeavor- ^^ ^ A
ing to enter a port publicly blockaded incurred •
the risk of capture and confiscation. The continental school
of international law held that in such cases the blockade must "^
be properly announced, and that it must be effectively main-
112 AMERICAN DIPLOIVIACY
tained off the actual port. England upheld what her enemies
derisively called the "Paper Blockade," to the effect that a ,•
considerable area of coast might be blockaded by a single
fleet cruising along it, and that the rule might be enforced
upon any vessel, anywhere, whose papers indicated that it
was destined for one of the blockaded harbors. In accord-
ance with this policy, England in 1793 blockaded numerous y
West Indian ports.
In addition to these interpretations of general principles,
England had another rule adapted to meet the special case
" Rule of of the French West India islands. Announced
1766" ^y ^^ order in council of 1756, it is known as }
the "Rule of 1756." Briefly, it meant that, when a nation
closed its colonies to other nations in time of peace, it had no
right to open them in time of war, and that, if it did, all such
commerce was liable to seizure. English instructions of
November 6, 1793, ordered naval oflScers to "stay and de-
tain all ships laden with goods the produce of any colony
belonging to France, or carrying provisions or other supplies
for the use of any such colony, and" to "bring the same, with
their cargoes, to legal adjudication in our courts of ad-
miralty." This instruction was modified January 8, 1794,
in such a way as to leave open the trade between the United /
States and unblockaded ports in the West Indies, in articles
not contraband and not of French ownership. The goods
thus introduced into the United States might then be shipped /
to unblockaded ports in France. The West Indian trade
was thus not destroyed, but it was hampered. Moreover,
one hundred and fifty American vessels had been seized
under the first instruction, and in the spring of 1794 were
condemned by the admiralty courts of various British West
India Islands.
It is obvious that a British war vessel cruising in the open
sea had many questions to ask of any merchantman it met.
The display of a flag was not suflBcient answer; in fact, the
standard of morality concerning the use of national emblems
THE JAY TREATY 113
at sea has never been high. In such cases international law
permits the war vessel to "visit" the merchantman to ex-
amine her papers. It was unquestionably true " visit " and
that these papers often failed to tell the whole * search "
story: the port of destination was frequently given falsely,
and the captain often took on questionable cargo after the
clearance papers had been made out. The British, therefore, y
claimed the right to "search" the cargo. This privilege the
United States and most other powers strenuously denied.
On this point America was perhaps in worse case than other
countries, for their merchant vessels often sailed in fleets
under convoy of a war vessel, which assumed responsibility,
whereas we had no navy, and our commerce was too scat-
tered to allow such concentration.^
Such searches, moreover, brought up another vexed point of
dispute which was peculiarly our own, and which waxed con-
stantly in importance until it overshadowed all ,
. . . - , Impressments
the rest, it is only by an appreciation of the
rock-bottomed beUef of Englishmen that everything which
they held sacred rested upon their fleet, that we can com-
prehend the spectacle of a people, on the verge of the nine-
teenth century, submitting to the "press." Every British-
bom subject was bound to serve the nation, if the fleet needed
men. British war vessels, if short-handed, might stop any
British vessel and take off such sailors as it needed, leaving
only the absolute minimum number required for naviga-
tion. In their searches of American vessels, British officers
often saw British subjects aiding to build up ^ merchant
marine which, if not indeed belligerent, was, they believed,
sapping the strength of Great Britain. In such cases they
took them off. Misled by similarities of language and ap-
pearance, they sometimes took native Americans. Such in-
stances were more annoying than serious, for the Americans
were returned when nationality was proved, — a matter, to
* Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812 (2 vols., Boston,
1905), i. 42-99.
114 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
be sure, of delay and sometimes of difficulty, owing to our
lax methods of registration. More often they took British-
born subjects who had been naturalized in the United States.
In such instances the chasm of misunderstanding was un-
bridgable. England claimed that a man British-born could
never expatriate himself; whereas the United States held
that all her citizens, native and naturalized, stood upon the
same basis and were equally entitled to protection.
When one remembers that the British naval officers were
spurred in the performance of their duties by the distribu-
,^. tion among them of the major portion of the
Pnze money i r i • i 111
proceeds 01 the prizes they captured, and that
nearly every little British West India island had its own
prize court, often incompetent and sometimes venal, at least
to the extent of preferring a condemnation with fees to an
acquittal without them, one sees that the opportunities for
friction were countless. Added to all these considerations
was a maladroit action of the British government, as a result
of which the Portuguese fleet, which customarily guarded
the straits of Gibraltar, was in the summer of 1793 with-
drawn from that duty. Algerian corsairs now dashed out
into the Atlantic, and by the end of the year ten American
vessels had fallen into their hands. The final pitch of excite-
ment was reached when, in March, 1794, came the reports
of the speech of Lord Dorchester, the governor general of
Canada and just back from London, to the Canadian
Indians, predicting war with the United States and bidding
them prepare.
As news of one unfriendly act after another reached Amer-
ica, excitement increased day by day. Congress was in ses-
United States sion, and in the spring of 1794 came to be di-
^ ^^ vided between those who hoped for and those
who dreaded a war with Great Britain. Fisher Ames, an
ardent sympathizer with England, wrote, March 26: "The
English are absolutely madmen. Order in this country is
endangered by their hostility, no less than by the French
/
THE JAY TREATY 115
friendship. They act, on almost every point, against their
interests and their real wishes." The House voted to suspend
commercial intercourse with Great Britain until restitution
should be made, but by the assistance of the Senate, the
administration was enabled to carry out its own less bellig-
erent policy. A general embargo was passed, on the ground
that the seas were unsafe for American shipping; the first/
steps were taken in the construction of a navy; and, most im-
portant of all, a final solemn embassy was sent to Great!
Britain to present the case of the United States and demand i
satisfaction.^
For this task the chief justice, John Jay, was chosen. It
seems to have been felt that, since in Monroe a friendly
minister had been sent to France, so an Eng- , .
To Y 8 miSSlOll
lish sympathizer should be sent to England.
Hamilton was distrusted by the Republicans. Jay had
more experience than any other American except Adams,
who was disliked by many Federalists; but even Jay was
attacked because of his Mississippi proposal of 1786. He was
now instructed to adjust all the multifarious diflficulties
growing out of the treaty of 1783, particularly the continued
occupation of the posts by the British. He was to arrange
a treaty of commerce. He was to secure compensation for
seizures of American vessels, and agreements concerning
impressments, blockades, and other points of international
law. On these latter points he was to accept no settlement
except along the line of his instructions, which in each case
laid down the American view of the matter. With this
heavy burden, and weighted down with the sense of his re-
sponsibility to prevent a war which he felt to be almost in-
evitable. Jay set sail for England.
The "madness" of England was twofold. In so far as it
related to her principles of maritime conduct, it was basic,
four-square with her conceptions of national safety. From
* Trescot, W. H., The DiplomcUic History of the Administrationa of Wash-
ington and Adams (Boston, 1857), chs. ii.-iv.
116 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
these she would not move while a war-ship was afloat.
Her vexatious conduct in other matters, however, was very
England's largely connected with her belief that war with
" madness " ^^^ United States was sure to come. Equally
unable with France to understand the American desire for
isolation, she felt that France would ultimately win our
alliance.
Her greatest anxiety was in regard to the West. The
Northwestern Indians still called upon her for support against
English appre- the Americans, and threatened to turn on
hensions Gresii Britain if aid was refused. The fur-
traders were more distressed than before, because of the
discovery that the source of the Mississippi probably lay
south of the Lake of the Woods, a circumstance that rendered
the British right to navigate that river worthless. To meet
both difficulties, Hammond had in 1792 urged the formation
of an Indian buffer state to stretch everywhere between
the United States and Canada, or at least to include the
country northwest of the Ohio. This means of settlement
was then rejected by the Americans, even in spite of the
sting of St. Clair's recent defeat; and now, in 1794, the situa-
tion was in their favor. Wayne's army, which seemed to the
Americans a valiant David going into the wilderness to meet
the Goliath of Indians and British, was known by the latter
to be larger than the combined British forces in all the posts,
and seemed to loom menacingly over all British America.
England's real efforts to bring about peace between the
Indians and the Americans had caused both to be suspicious;
and the mistake of a subordinate had furnished the United
States with a new grievance by the establishment of the fort
on the Maumee. Finally, Lord Dorchester's speech to the
Canadian Indians, which had been made public, had roused
the hope of the Indians on American soil, while hardening
the American distrust into conviction. In the early summer
of 1794, therefore, Pitt and his foreign minister. Lord Gren-
ville, feared that there could be no escape from a clash on
THE JAY TREATY 117
the frontier which would bring the United States into the
war.^ Nor did England want war. From the abyss of No-
vember, 1793, France was emerging triumphant; her armies
and Revolution were everywhere advancing. The first
coalition against her was falling to pieces.
Jay, therefore, was warmly welcomed when he reached
England. In estimating his chances of success, one feels
that he was under some psychological dis- jay and Gren-
advantage. His mere arrival reassured Lord ^^®
Grenville, who was at once convinced that a treaty could
be made, and who even anticipated that the United States,
recoiling from France, might actually join England. Jay,
on the other hand, was to the end fearful lest no treaty could
be arranged and that war would result. Throughout the
negotiations the fortunes of France rose higher, and in the
midst of them came news of Wayne's victory over the In-
dians. Of this international situation Jay, trembling for his
treaty, seems to have taken no advantage.
The treaty which was signed on November 19, 1794, was
most comprehensive. It embodied for the first time two
principles since then common in American „ ^i x *
1- 1 <> rr.1 r Settlement of
diplomacy.^ The settlement of many vexed the treaty of
points it left to commissions authorized to i
determine results by judicial or semi-judicial process, and
it provided for the mutual extradition of persons " charged ^
with murder and forgery." The difficulties arising out of the
treaty of 1783 were compromised, but to the advantage of
the United States. Great Britain agreed to evacuate the
posts on or before June 1, 1796. A commission provided to
determine what river was intended to be described as the
"St. Croix" on the northeast boundary ultimately accepted
^ Unpublished thesia on the Jay treaty, by Orpha Leavitt; also Dropmore
Papers, ii.
* For this and all subsequent instances of arbitration, to 1897, see J. B.
Moore, History and Digest of International Arbitrations, 6 vols., Washington,
1898 (House Misc. Doc., 53 Cong. 2 sess.. No. 212). In every case this work
gives an admirable sketch of the origin and settlement of the dispute.
118 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
the river now known by that name, although an additional
convention of 1798 was required to determine its source. A
commission was to ascertain the source of the Mississippi, »/
which, however, failed in its object. Another commission
was to adjudicate on the question of the pre-revolutionary ix
debts due to British merchants, of which the United States
was to assume the obligation. Difficulties arising on this
subject, a new convention became necessary in 1802, and ,
ultimately we had to pay something over two million and
a half dollars. The question of compensation by the United
States to loyalists was dropped, and also that of indemnity
by Great Britain for slaves carried away in 1783, a demand
which we based on the general provision for the mutual
restoration of property. It is probable that Jay might have
obtained the latter point, had he forced the issue. ^
A commission was also charged with the settlement of '
claims by British merchants because of the failure of the
s tti t f United States to perform properly her neutral ;
violations of duties during 1793, and of those by American
merchants because of "irregular or illegal cap-
tures or condemnations" by the British in violation of our
neutral rights. After many delays, this commission awarded
American claimants nearly six million dollars and British
claimants about one hundred and fifty thousand.
A permanent commercial provision in the treaty allowed /
trade from Vermont to Montreal and Quebec, and freedom
Commercial of trade with the Indian tribes across th^
clauses border, except in the Hudson Bay region, — \
reciprocal advantages. For a limited time the British East ^
Indian trade was opened to Americans. That of the West
Indies, so long and earnestly desired, was made free to Amer-
ican vessels of seventy tons' burden, — that is, those that were
too small to cross the ocean and so were confined to direct
voyages. This provision, however, was bound up with a-
* F. A. Ogg, Jay's Treaty and the Slavery Interests of the United States,
Amer. Hist. Assoc, Report, 1901, i. 273-298.
THE JAY TREATY 119
promise on the part of the United States to refrain from
"carrying any molasses, sugar, cojffee, cocoa, or cotton in
American vessels, either from His Majesty's islands or from ^
the United States" to any country except the United States,
a promise that was an utterly inexcusable error on the part /
of Jay, for in the case of cotton it forbade us to export our
own products in our own vessels. The Senate cut this article
from the treaty, and trade with the British West Indies re-
mained subject to temporary regulations. Between England
herself and the United States commerce and navigation were /
to be for twelve years on the basis of the most favored nation.
Jay was soon and properly convinced that he could not
obtain a recognition of the American position on any points
of international law. In the event of such an international
emergency he had been instructed to conclude P™<^ces
nothing on the subject. He felt, however, that minor modi-
fications of the English position and definite understandings
would be advantageous; and he had always been accustomed
to break instructions. He therefore concluded articles, to
last twelve years, admitting that provisions might in some
cases be contraband although they should be paid for, and
that enemies' goods on neutral vessels might be seized.
Article xvii. provided . that due notice of blockade should
be given, but said nothing of "paper" blockades,; article xxiv.
forbade "foreign" privateers .to sell prizes in the ports of v-
either, party; article xxv. admitted British prizes to Aiperiean ^
harbors; but these articles were not to be construed in such
a way as to violate any previous treaty, the fact being that
they apparently clashed with our treaties with France.
Once signed, the Jay treaty began a series of adventures
that remind one of a Baron Munchausen tale. Not till
June, 1795, did it reach America. The Senate, Acceptance by
promptly called in special session, ratified it *^® Senate
June 24, with the exception of the West Indian article. For
a time it was doubtful what the effect of such partial ratifica-
tion would be; but in the end England accepted the change, ^
120 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
and a precedent was established which has many times been
followed. Meanwhile the treaty itself had been kept secret,
but a copy was presently furnished to the press by Senator
Mason of Virginia. Instantly there followed an outburst
of popular indignation which swept from one end of the coun-
try to the other, and for a moment united all classes of the
population. Jay, according to the cheerful custom of the
day, was burned in eflSgy, and Hamilton, who attempted to
defend him, was stoned.
While the popular tumult was raging, Washington was
at Mount Vernon, deferring his signature. He chafed at
Randolph and Jay's disregard for his instructions, and was
Fauchet disturbed over a new British order for the
seizure of provisions, which, the United States claimed, was
not warranted by circumstances. Randolph, the secretary of
state, was urging that he withhold his signature altogether.
At this juncture the sea once more gave up its prey, this
time dispatches of Fauchet thrown overboard to avoid cap-
ture by the British but secured by their sailors. One of these.
No. 10, which Hammond handed to Hamilton, referred to the
"precious confessions" of Randolph disclosed in a previous
letter. No. 6. Despite the subsequent publication of the
latter, with a letter of explanation by Fauchet and a Vindica-
tion by Randolph, the exact nature of these precious confes-
sions remains unproved. Randolph and Fauchet claimed
that they had to do with internal affairs, the Whiskey Rebel-
lion in particular. From the internal evidence, however,
John Quincy Adams concluded, and not without some force,
that they had reference to the enforcement of neutrality.
At all events, that there was revealed an amazing condition
of confidential intercourse between the secretary of state
and a foreign minister, is undoubted. This circumstance,
to be sure, appears less remarkable in view of later revela-
tions of the astonishing intimacy of Hamilton, secretary
of the treasury, and other Federalists, with the British
minister; but there is this difference, that Randolph en-
THE JAY TREATY 121
deavored to obtain money from Fauchet, a fact which turns
his indiscretion into moral obliquity.^
At any rate, Washington considered that the new situa-
tion demanded immediate action, and decided to sign the
treaty in spite of his dissatisfaction with it. Washington
With a grimness closely allied with humor, he signs the
ordered Randolph to complete a protest to
Great Britain at the seizure of provisions, and, when it was
completed, showed him the dispatch. Randolph at once re-
signed, and, after a succession of attempts to bring in some
notable personage, was replaced by Timothy Pickering, a de-
cided partisan of England, a man able and honest, but with-
out poise.
Not even yet was the treaty safe. It called for the appoint-
ment of commissioners and the appropriation of money, and
the latter must come by vote of the House of jhe House ac-
Representatives. Should the appropriation cepts the
fail, the treaty could not be executed. All the
forces hostile to England, favorable to France, and opposed
to the administration and the treaty, rallied for a final strug-
gle. The year before Fisher Ames had said of certain resolu-
tions that they had French stamped on their face, and Parker
of Virginia had replied that he wished everybody had a stamp
on his forehead to show whether he was for France or Great
Britain. Now the feeling was even more intense. The House,
led by Edward Livingston, demanded that it be furnished
with copies of the papers in the case. This request Washing-
ton refused. It could not force him, nor could he force it.
He could refuse the papers, but it was more important that
the House could refuse the money. The debate became the
leading question of the session. On the whole the treaty
gained support as the commercial classes came to accept
Washington's view, that, although the treaty was not a
* Edmund Randolph, Vindication of Mr. Randolph's Resignation, Phila-
delphia, 1795; M, D. Conway, Omitted Chapters of History, disclosed in the
Life and Papers of Edmund Randolph, New York, etc., 1888.
122 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
good one, the existing choice lay not between it and a better ^
one, but between it and war. This view was most forcibly ex-
pressed by Fisher Ames in the greatest speech till then made
in Congress; and at length, on April 30, 1796, the appropria-
tion was passed and the treaty became an established fact.^
The Jay treaty worked more satisfactorily than was ex- ^
pected. Grenville had promised Jay some concessions not
Working of formally mentioned, and these were fulfilled,
the treaty -pj^g admiralty courts in the West Indies were
reorganized and made respectable. Hammond was replaced
by Liston, who proved to be somewhat more pleasing
personally. From 1796, moreover, in spite of the excision ,
of the West Indian article from the treaty, that trade
was thrown open to American vessels under certain lim-
itations. Best of all was the quieting effect on the north-
ern frontier. Vermont was relieved by the opening of trade ■
to Montreal, the national power was vindicated by the oc-;
cupation of the whole national territory, and with the Jayi
treaty added to Wayne's treaty of 1795 came sixteen years;
of comparative peace with the Indians. On September 8,
1796, the British consul. Bond, wrote to Lord Grenville that
the treaty had a " tendency to retain this infant country in a
state of peace with the most powerful empire in the universe."
The effect of the Jay treaty was not confined to the rela-
tions between the United States and Great Britain. The
European document was observed by all the cabinets of
opmion Europe with varying emotions, but everywhere
from the point of view of the obsession that the United States
must be upon one side or the other. If she had rejected the
overtures of France and made a treaty with England, it
must mean that she was to be counted on the side of England.
Nowhere, was the effect so immediate and pronounced as
in Spain.*
* S. B. Crandall, Treaties, their Making and Enforcement, New York, 1904.
* C, C. Pinckney, Thomas Pinckney, Boston, etc., 1895; Schuyler, American
Diplomacy, 271-281.
THE JAY TREATY 12S
Important as were the questions at issue with that coun-
try, no progress had been made in solving them. In part
this was due to the inadequacy, nearly always Relations with
characteristic, of our representation at that ^p"^
court. Carmichael exhibited a nonchalance that excites
suspicions as to his good intent. His industrious successor.
Short, was persona non grata. At length, in August, 1794,
Spain distinctly declared that "at least His Majesty ex-
pected that the ministers appointed by the United States
should be persons of such character, distinction, and temper
as would become a residence near his royal person."
Meantime Spain had continued her various policies, keep-
ing on good terms with the Indians and bribing Wilkinson.
In 1794 Gayoso had hopes of Kentucky, but Spanish poli-
feared that, if the settlers there knew of the "®°
Spanish relations with the Indians, they would, instead of
continuing their negotiations, "become our most cruel ene-
mies." Washington wrote in September, 1794: "Spain by a
similar conduct to that of Great Britain has imposed the
necessity of sending an envoy extraordinary to her. They
cooperate; cordial in their hatred, they have agreed to em-
ploy the Indians against us."
The envoy selected was Thomas Pinckney, the resident
minister at London, whose position was perhaps rendered
slightly invidious in consequence of Jay's mis- pinckney's
sion. The attitude of Spain always varied ""ssion
with the changes in European conditions. By her defeats of
1794 she had been forced to turn from England to France;
the treaty of Basle, July 22, 1795, revived the old "family"
alliance, although the dynastic situation had so tragically
changed. It was in this new condition that news of the Jay
treaty found Spain. Her court, believing that it meant
the alliance of the United States and Great Britain, saw in
imagination irresistible forces descending upon her frail de-
fences in Louisiana and attacking the mines of Mexico.
Although convinced of the necessity of coming to terms, her
1^4 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
ministers could not shake off their constitutional habits of
delay, until on October 24, 1795, Pinckney announced his
immediate departure for London. His bluff was successful,
and on October 27 the treaty of San Lorenzo was signed.
As the first treaty between United States and Spain, it
laid down the general rules of intercourse upon liberal terms.
Treaty of San In regard to neutral rights it provided that
Lorenzo provisions should not be contraband of war,
and that free ships make free goods. Until 1794 the Spanish
fleet had cooperated with that of Great Britain, and had
acted upon somewhat the same principles. To settle ques-
tions arising from this conduct, a commission was arranged
for, which came to an end in 1800 after having awarded
over three hundred thousand dollars to American claimants.
But these questions were of less interest than those relating
to boundaries and the use of the Mississippi. As to the ,
former, Spain accepted the American contention, the thirty-
first parallel, and agreed to evacuate her posts in the disputed '
region. She opened the navigation of the Mississippi to the /
Americans, and engaged that for three years New Orleans }
was to serve them as a "place of deposit" with the right to {
export their goods therefrom free of duty. "And His Maj-
esty promises either to continue this permission, if he finds
during that time that it is not prejudicial to the interests of J
Spain, or if he should not agree to continue it there, he will
assign to them on another part of the banks of the Mississippi
an equivalent establishment."
With the prompt ratification of this favorable treaty,
Washington could indeed feel that the new government had
. ^ justified itself to the people as their representa-
national gov- tive before the world. The diplomatic prob-
lems that had helped cause the fall of the
Confederation had all been solved. Commercial treaties
had been made with Spain and Great Britain. If the latter
had not permanently opened her West India islands, at any
rate they were open now. The Indians north and south had
THE JAY TREATY 125
been quieted. Outlets had been obtained down the St.
Lawrence to Montreal and Quebec, and down the Mississippi
to the Gulf of Mexico. The occupation of the entire national
territory had been provided for. In addition, the policy of
national independence from European disputes had been
effectively laid down, the worst irregularities of belligerent
interference with our commerce had been done away with,
and compensation for our losses provided for. If these settle-
ments were not all to prove permanent, at least they estab-
lished precedents which we were steadily gaining added
strength to enforce. For many of these sue- Washington's
cesses Washington could take personal credit, "^^"*^<^«
over and above that of choosing the men who accomplished
them. The Indian policy was peculiarly his own. His selec-
tion from the various alternatives proposed by Hamilton
and Jefferson for handling the Genet affair made the policy
adopted essentially his. In view of the conflicting forces
within him and without, his decision to sign the Jay treaty
was a great act which proved to be a wise one. Finally in
his farewell address he gave the policy of neutrality a con-
secration in the minds of the people which still persists. The ,
points on which he might have done better were compara-
tively minor. He was able to retire in March, 1797, not,
to be sure, leaving all problems solved, but having settled
all those, except the opening of the Mediterranean, that
he was chosen to deal with, and more.
CHAPTER XI
WAR AND PEACE WITH FRANCE
The Jay treaty, which settled so many of our difficulties,
served to intensify those with France. That country, in
Permanent addition to a continued insistence on the execu-
FrenchpoUcies ^^^^^ ^f ^Yie treaties of 1778 and 1788, was press-
ing two lines of policy which animated her diplomacy through-
out the period of her final struggle with England. One
was the claim, which gradually took clearer and clearer form,
that the rights of the neutral were the possession of the bel-
ligerent. She held that it was the duty of the United States
to maintain in full her neutral rights against England, that
the failure to do so constituted practical alliance with Eng-
land and justified retaliatory disregard of neutral rights by
France. Her second policy was the attempt to destroy Eng-
lish trade by attacking her commerce, "to force the English
to a shameful bankruptcy." John Quincy Adams wrote,
August 21, 1796: "But the French Government are evi-
dently making their preparations to put in execution their
singular plan of war against Britain, the season ensuing.
That they will succeed in cutting off the communication
between that island and all the rest of Europe, is not at all
impossible." ^
The mission of Monroe had been accepted as an indica-
tion of regard for France. He had been publicly and en-
Monroe in thusiastically received by the convention in
France August, 1794, and had pleased it by his re-
sponse. "America and France," he said in effect, "have
the same interests and principles, the recollection of common
1 Volume ii. of his Writings (ed. W. C. Ford, New York, 1913, etc.) throws
much light on this period.
12S
WAR AND PEACE WITH FRANCE 127
dangers and difficulties will cement the union. The United
States is sincerely attached to the liberty, prosperity, and
happiness of the French Republic. I know that in perpetuat-
ing the harmony between the two republics, I shall promote
the interests of both." Nor had the mission of Jay as ex-
plained by Monroe caused any alarm, for he was sent to assert
American neutral rights.^ The French believed that he
would be unsuccessful and that his mission would result in
war with England.
Under these circumstances Monroe had been successful
in obtaining some useful concessions. In July, 1795, the
retaliatory decree of France making English French friend-
goods in American vessels seizable was re- ^*^"
pealed. "It is amidst her triumphs that the Republic loves
to give this striking mark of its fidelity. Victorious France
knows no other concern than that of justice; no other diplo-
matic language than that of truth." P. A. Adet, who arrived
in America in June, 1795, to replace Fauchet, had received
most amicable instructions. Monroe had even encouraged
France to hope for a loan from the United States, and had
urged it on our government alleging that France was fighting
our battles.
The news of the signature of the Jay treaty alarmed
France, and the Committee of Public Safety turned to
Monroe for information as to its details; but The Jay treaty
since, as the result of a policy rather difficult "i^'*"<=*
to account for, he had been left uninformed by Jay and by
the United States government, he could give only vague as-
surances that the compact was not inconsistent with our
obligations to France. Confident rumor, however, speedily
detailed its terms, and a copy of the treaty itself, sent by
Adet, reached France in the summer of 1795. Monroe and
the French leaders equally were stunned. Instead of vindi-
cating the status of neutrality laid down in our treaties with
* James Monroe, A View of the Conduct of the Executive in the Foreign Af'
fairs of the United Stales, Philadelphia, 1797.
128 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
France, it accepted a totally different status, permitting to
England practices against which we had protested in the
case of France. The English had just touched France to the
quick by their second order for the seizure of provisions as
contraband, and it was seen that they were justified by the
new treaty. Monroe was unable to meet the situation. In
February, 1796, France declared her alliance with the United
States at an end. On July 2, 1796, a decree of the French
executive Directory announced that France would treat
neutrals as England did, and actually went further by de-
claring all goods destined for England contraband. In No-
vember, Adet announced to the American government that
he had been ordered to terminate his mission.
On August 22, 1796, the American government had re-
called Monroe and appointed in his place Charles Cotes-
Recall of worth Pinckney. Monroe's recall was due
Monroe partly to his failure to press American claims
in all cases to the satisfaction of the government; particularly
the claim for compensation for captures under the decrees
ordering the seizure of English goods in American vessels and
making provisions contraband, both of them in violation of
the treaty of 1778, but defended by France on the basis of
retaliation. Still more was his recall due to the general tone
of his correspondence, which constituted a protest against the
policy of his own country and a defence of France. It may
be said, however, that he did secure more concessions from
France than Jay could obtain from England, and that he
had been instructed to cultivate French friendship. He was
undoubtedly indiscreet, but part of the blame must be laid
to the policy of sending in sucb a delicate crisis a minister
known to be out of touch with his superiors. The most
serious fault of Monroe was his conduct after he became ac-
quainted with the details of Jay's treaty, and still more after
his own recall. In close touch with the French leaders,
he impressed upon them the difference, which they were
only too prone to believe, between the government of the
WAR AND PEACE WITH FRANCE 12d
United States and the people. He acknowledged that the
government was hostile to France, but he urged them to wait
for justice until after the next presidential election, which
he was sure would bring Jefferson into the presidency. He
assisted in destroying that impression of national solidarity
for which Washington had labored so hard, and which Jeffer-
son himself had confirmed by his correspondence with Genet.
France and Monroe were not without some justification
for believing that the existing American government was
not only anti-French but to some degree pro- pfo.En-i}sh
English. Washington, indeed, remained im- policy in the
partially American, but he had been forced to
give up his vision of an administration comprehending all
parties. His assistants were Federalists, and they sympa-
thized with England. In 1796 Thomas Pinckney was re-
placed at London by an ardent English partisan, Rufus King.
In 1797 John Quincy Adams was commissioned to reframe
our treaties with Prussia and Sweden, of which the first had
expired and the other was about to expire. He was instructed
by Pickering to leave out the former provisions regarding
free ships, free goods. "It is a principle," wrote Pickering,
"that the United States have adopted in all their treaties
(except that with Great Britain), and which they sincerely
desire might become universal: but treaties formed for this
object they find to be of little or no avail, because the prin-
ciple is not universally admitted among the maritime na-
tions." He was also to enlarge the definition of contraband.
Against these changes in the American policy, showing so
marked a leaning to the English practice, Adams vigorously
protested, but his instructions remained unchanged. Al-
though such details were not generally known, the atmos-
phere of the administration became increasingly hostile to
France.
Under these circumstances the French government took
occasion to show its friendliness for Monroe upon his with-
drawal as minister. It refused to receive his successor.
130 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Pinckney, and on February 3, 1797, ordered him to leave the
country. Although it withdrew Adet from his mission, it al-
France and lowed him to remain in the United States in the
the election of hope that he might influence the presidential
election of 1796. Adet announced his with-
drawal in a letter which he published in the press, explaining
it not as "a rupture between France and the United States,
but as a mark of just discontent, which was to last until the
government of the United States returned to sentiments and
to measures more conformable to the interests of the alliance;
and to the sworn friendship between the two nations." His
interference was perhaps not without some weight, but it
did not secure the election of Jefferson. John Adams was
chosen to the presidency, and the officials as well as the
policy of the old administration bade fair to be continued
for at least four years more.^
Hopeless of American friendship, France turned with
more energy toward other plans. In February, 1795, Fauchet
France and had in a long letter advised that the only way
Louisiana ^f offsetting the effects of the Jay treaty, of
which he did not then know the details, was by the acquisi-
tion of Louisiana. That colony could feed the islands and
so wrench them free from their dependence on the United
States. This familiar policy France determined to pursue.
With Spain as an ally, cession and not capture, mu^t be the
method. Accordingly, the French commissioner^ for . the
treaty of Basle were instructed, "The restitution of Louisiana
is of all the conditions we have proposed the one to which
we attach the greatest importance." Failing at that time,
France instructed General Perignon, her ambassador at
Madrid, March 16, 1796, to urge the point: "Our possession
of Louisiana would give us the means to offset the marked
predilection of the Federal government for our enemy and
keep it within the line of duty by the fear of a dismember-
ment, we might cause."
» McMaster, People of the United States, ii. 209-416, 429-476.
WAR AND PEACE WITH FRANCE 131
This dismemberment of the United States, so clearly fore-
shadowed in the instructions to Genet, continued to haunt
the minds of the French ministers. Adet, New French
while striving to excite the French Canadians ^^t^'fi^^s
against England,^ sent his ablest agent. General Collot, into
the American West. He was to nourish sentiments of dissen-
sion among the leaders "by observing that the interests
of the eastern and western parts of the United States were
in collision, that the period was not distant when a separation
must take place, and the range of mountains on this side of
the Ohio was the natural boundary of the new government,
and that in the event of separation the western people ought
to look to France as their natural ally and protector." On
July 15, 1797, Talleyrand became French minister of foreign
affairs. Just returned from banishment in the United States,
he had recently read before the Institute papers on "The
Commercial Relations of the United States" and "The
Colonial Interests of France." Although primarily con-
cerned at the moment with Bonaparte's plan to divert at-
tention to Africa, he maintained that the eastern part of the
United States was irrevocably bound to England by lan-
guage, habits, and trade, but that the country beyond the
mountains would in time separate and need France.^
The American government only suspected these western
designs; but the official insult involved in the treatment of
Pinckney was patent, and the constant seiz- Adams's com-
ure and condemnation of American vessels un- mission to
der successive decrees, unjustifiable and often
contradictory, demanded attention. As experiments with
Monroe, a Republican, and Pinckney, a Federalist, had
proved unsatisfactory, Adams, with general approval, de-
cided to send a joint commission of three, — to Pinckney,
1 Canadian Archives, 1891, pp. 63-79; 1894, p. 527.
* A. Cans, "Les idees de Talleyrand sur la politique coloniale de la France
au lendemain de la Revolution," Revue d'Histoire Modeme, 1900, ii. 58-63;
F. J. Turner, "The Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley," Amer.
Hist. Review. 1905, x. 249-279.
132 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
were added John Marshall, a Federalist, and Elbridge Gerry,
a Republican. On the day on which Talleyrand took office
they received their instructions.
Arriving in Paris at the very crest of the Revolution,
they found themselves confronting a situation unparalleled
since the last century of the Roman republic.
French revolu- rn • ^ -m i i i
tionary dipio- Triumphant France was surrounded by na-
°"*^^ tions buying peace; the dazzling private ex-
penditure which betokened the coming empire tempted pub-
lic officials to demand private douceurs for the favor of their
nod. The world seemed melting into new shapes at the
whim of those who from moment to moment dominated
Paris. America was a minor consideration; she was treated
as were other powers. Even the astute Talleyrand, master
of finesse, could see the need of no more subtile weapon
than the threat, to be parried by the bribe.
He refused to receive the commissioners until redress of
grievances was made and the President's message of May 16,
Secret negotia- 1797, dealing with the French situation, atoned
**°°^ for. Privately, however, he met them, and
introduced them to certain individuals as possessing his con-
fidence. These persons explained that as a preliminary to
negotiation France expected the United States to buy from
her, at par, certain Dutch bonds worth about fifty cents
on the dollar, — two satellite republics were to combine to
feed the great one. To set the whole in motion, a million
francs, it was hinted, would be expected by the proper of-
ficials. This proposal was not so likely to surprise a trained
diplomat at that time as now, if indeed anything in the
Paris of 1798 could have surprised a trained diplomat. It
was in effect a renewal in a different form of the loan prop-
osition of 1794 so warmly endorsed by Monroe. We had
not hesitated to buy peace from the Barbary pirates, and
there was really no need of being more scrupulous about
corrupting Talleyrand's morals than theirs. Pitt himself
was at this very time seriously considering the purchase of
WAR AND PEACE WITH FRANCE 133
peace on similar, but dearer, terms. ^ I believe, however,
that Americans remain glad that their commissioners were
shocked, and that Pinckney replied, "No! no! no! not a
sixpence!" Pinckney and Marshall at once broke off nego-
tiations. Gerry lingered for three months more, but with-
out being trapped into any concessions by Talleyrand; then
he too left France, in August, 1798.
Meanwhile the commissioners' dispatches had been re-
ceived in America. On March 19 Adams announced that
they rendered peace no longer possible. In xh x Y z
April they were published, the letters X, Y and correspond-
Z being used to designate the intermediaries;
and their contents convinced a large majority of Americans
that Adams was right. Congress authorized an increase in
army and navy, and on June 21 Adams was widely applauded
for his announcement that he would "never send another
minister to France without assurances that he will [would]
be received, respected, and honored as the representative of
a great, free, powerful, and independent nation."
Although peace was at an end, war was not begun. It was
hoped that we might hang between the two. On July 7
Adams declared our treaties with France sus- American re-
pended. An act of June 12 had already sus- P"^*^^
pended all commercial intercourse with her, and on June 15
merchant vessels were authorized to arm and to defend
themselves against search, seizure, or interference by French
vessels. On July 8 authority was given to naval vessels to
capture any armed French vessels, and the president was
empowered to commission privateers to do the same. As
practically all French merchantmen sailed armed, this licence
offered a wide field. Three hundred and sixty-five privateers
were commissioned, France lost ninety ships, and sevetal
naval duels were fought.^
^ Adams, Influence of Grenville on Pitt's Foreign Policy, 67.
2 G. W. Allen, Our Naval War vnth France, Boston, etc., 1909; G. N.
Tricoche, "Une page peu connue de I'histoire de France, la guerre franco*
americaine (1798-1801)," Revue Historique, 1904, Ixxxv. 288-299.
134 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
In order to avoid the losses to American merchants which
would come from a closing of the trade with the West Indies,
West Indian Adams, June 26, 1799, declared suspended the
^^^^ suspension of French commerce in the case of
certain ports of San Domingo, That colony was then under
the control of Toussaint L'Ouverture, and its political con-
nection with France was but slight. It is probable, also,
that American merchants even continued to supply the
more loyal islands of Guadaloupe and Martinique by means
of collusive captures. Hostilities therefore brought little
inconvenience to the United States, and, as for danger, Adams
said that he no more expected to see a French army in
America, than in heaven.^
Although we did not consider ourselves at war with France,
we were fighting her. The policy of isolation had been in
The Blount part deviated from. Were we going to give it
conspiracy ^p wholly by becoming the ally of England,
and so be enmeshed in the general European conflict? There
were many circumstances that rendered such an event prob-
able and many men who desired it. The new British minis-
ter, Liston, proved pleasing. He won confidence at once,
in 1797, by helping to disclose a project of William Blount,
senator from Tennessee, for a joint expedition of frontiers-
men and the British fleet to seize Louisiana and put it under
the control of Great Britain. Impeached by the House of
Representatives, Blount resigned to escape conviction, and
was promptly elected governor of his state; his plan serves
to show how minds in the West were turning. Since Spain
was loath to live up to the treaty of 1795, it was becoming
doubtful whether that settlement would prove permanent;
Great Britain, therefore, in becoming the enemy of Spain,
became the natural friend of the frontiersman.
For similar reasons Miranda left France, now the ally of
Spain, and sought England, where in 1797 he was once more
deep in the confidence of Pitt. His plans resembled those
1 Hildreth, United States, v. 267-270.
WAR AND PEACE WITH FRANCE 135
of 1790, except that the United States had swum into his ken.
He would now give the Floridas and New Orleans to that
country, "the Mississippi being in every re- Miranda's
spect the best and most solid barrier that one ''*"
can establish between the two great nations which occupy
the American continent." England was to have Porto Rico
and other islands. To all these nations — England, the United
States, and Spanish America — the use of the isthmuses of
Panama and Nicaragua was to be guaranteed. The instru-
ments to secure all this were to be the United States army,
the English navy, and Spanish-American discontent.^
These plans were accepted with enthusiasm by Rufus
King, who communicated them to Pickering, our secretary
of state, and to Hamilton, who under Washing- Federalists'
ton commanded the new army. The plan P'*"^ **"" ^"
pleased Hamilton. He wrote to Senator Gunn of Georgia,
December 22, 1798: "This, you perceive, looks to offensive
operations. If we are to engage in war, our game will be
to attack where we can. France is not to be considered as
separated from her ally. Tempting objects will be within
our grasp." King wrote, October 20, 1798, "Things are
here, as we could desire: there will be precisely such a co-
operation as we wish the moment we are ready;" and again,
on January 21, 1799: "For God's sake, attend to the very
interesting subject treated of in my ciphered dispatches to
the Secretary of State of the 10th, 18thi & 19th instant.
Connect it, as it should be, with the main object, the time
to accomplish which has arrived. Without superstition.
Providence seems to have prepared the way, and to have
pointed out the instruments of its will. Our children will
reproach us if we neglect our duty, and humanity will escape
many scourges if we act with wisdom and decision." On
March 22 he wrote less hopefully to the secretary of state,
"one is tired with beholding, and with endeavoring in vain to
account for the blindness that even yet prevents an honest
^ Robertson, Miranda, Amer. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1907, i. 189-539.
136 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
and general confederacy against the overbearing Power of
France." On March 12, 1799, Dr. Edward Stevens was ap-
pointed consul-general to San Domingo, to enter into rela-
tions with Toussaint L'Ouverture, and to cooperate with the
English consul in encouraging the independence of the island.
It is significant that Hamilton was at this time in touch with
Wilkinson.^
Whatever advantages this plan might have secured to
the United States, it certainly involved the abandon-
, ment of the policy of neutrality. It involved
mission for also the risk of internal disunion. How widely
apart the opposing factions in the nation were
already leaning is indicated by the mission of Dr. Logan, a
Philadelphia Quaker, who went to France in 1798 to treat
for peace upon his own account. Instead of passports he
carried letters from Jefferson and from Thomas McKean,
chief justice of Pennsylvania. In 1799 such private missions
were prohibited by law, but his action is symptomatic of
the way in which a war with France would have divided the
nation.
Talleyrand had intended by his bullying to produce, not
war, but money. American hostility was inconvenient to
_ . , France; actual war and alliance with England
fers to nego- on the part of the United States might be dan-
gerous to her. Moreover, the French expedition
to Egypt had proved disappointing, and in his brain were re-
volving American projects which required, for the time, peace
with the United States. On September 28, 1798, therefore,
he informed William Vans Murray, our minister at The Hague,
that any minister whom the United States might send would
* George Gibbs, Memoirs of the Administrations of Washington and John
Adams, 2 vols.. New York, 1846; J. Q. and C. F. Adams, John Adams, i.
516 ff.; John Adams, Works, vols, iii., viii., app.; C. R. King, Life and Corre-
spondence of Rufus King (6 vols.. New York, 1894-1900), vol. 11.; Hamilton.
Works (ed. Lodge), vol. viii. (ed. Hamilton), vol. v.; "Letters of Toussaint
Louverture and of Edward Stevens, 1798-1800," Amer. Hist. Review, 1910,
xvi. 64-101.
WAR AND PEACE WITH FRANCE 137
be received with the respect due to the "representative of a
free, independent, and powerful nation." This letter was
at once seized upon by Adams as complying with the condi-
tions that he had laid down in his message of June 21. His
sturdy and persistent Americanism had accepted hostility,
not from preference, but as necessary to the national honor
and prestige. He was anxious to return to neutrality and
diplomatic isolation, and on February 18, 1799, he nomi-
nated Murray to the Senate, as minister to France.
Of all personal decisions in American diplomacy, this
was the most important, unless it be that Jay was justified
in his suspicions of Vergennes in 1782 and ,.
^ ° . Adams accepts
so deflected the course of history at that the opportu-
point. Of the wisdom and justice of Adams's °' ^^^^^
course there can be no doubt. He could, however, be
counted upon to be as disagreeable as he was right. He
sent in the nomination without consulting even his secre-
tary of state. For this unusual discourtesy it is, how-
ever, possible that there was some excuse. Had the prop-
osition been submitted to his cabinet, dominated as it was
by Hamilton, it would undoubtedly have been rejected and
further action would have been difficult. Once Talleyrand's
offer became public, however, an overwhelming public opin-
ion, all Republicans and the moderate Federalists, demanded
its acceptance. Pickering, Hamilton, and their associates
were aghast, but did not dare oppose the mission. Yet they
succeeded in substituting for a minister a commission, com-
prising, in addition to Murray, the chief justice Oliver Ells-
worth, and Patrick Henry, upon whose refusal Governor
Davie of North Carolina was substituted. Concerning the
instructions to this commission, Pinckney wrote to King,
March 12, 1799: "These terms are what we have a clear
right to, and our interest and honor oblige us to insist on.
Yet I very much doubt whether France will yield them. I
am morally sure she will not; and this has put us all much
at our ease."
138 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
In spite of this confidence, however, Adams had personally
to intervene to secure the departure of the envoys. Pickering
Cabinet dis- did not choose to take the course of resignation,
sensions which his difference of purpose and his personal
relations with Adams made obvious. He clung to his position
until May 12, 1800, when Adams removed him. With him
went also Hamilton's influence over diplomacy, which since
1789 had largely controlled details. Yet none of the great
decisions or policies of the period had been Hamilton's,
although in some such cases his view had coincided with
that followed and had often helped to shape it. In this final
clash, however brilliant and fascinating were his ideas and
however great his capacity to realize them, it cannot be
doubted that Adams, bred of the soil, stood for the desires
John Marshall and best interests of his country. Pickering
secretary ^^^ replaced by John Marshall, whose term
was too short and quiet to test his diplomatic abilities.
In Paris the negotiations, having the good will of Talley-
rand and of the rising Bonaparte, progressed rapidly. On
Conyention of September 30, 1800, a convention was con-
eluded. This agreement was generally satis-
factory on points relating to navigation. It laid down the
French view, which was also the American, with regard
to free ships making free goods, and also with regard to con-
traband. In one point, however, we were obliged to accept
the French view, as Jay had accepted the English, — namely,
the provision that neutral goods on enemies' vessels might
be seized. The chief difficulty lay in the American demand
that indemnity be paid for illegal condemnations by the
French, on which were based nearly twenty-three hundred
sound claims, and the French demand for the execution of
the treaties of 1778 and 1788. The commissioners finally
decided to leave these questions for future negotiation "at
a convenient time," the treaties meanwhile to be inoper-
ative. This proposal the United States Senate amended by
the provision that the convention should remain in force
WAR AND PEACE WITH FRANCE 139
for eight years. Bonaparte, by this time Napoleon and
consul, with his usual clear headedness accepted this amend-
ment, "provided that by this retrenchment the two States
renounce the respective pretensions which are the object of
the said article."
Thus were disposed of forever the treaties which consti-
tuted our first "entangling alliance." The advantage that
accrued to the nation is obvious. The justice v a t
of thus exchanging private claims for national '' French trea-
gain has since then many times engaged the
attention of Congress, but these particular "French Spolia-
tion Claims" became henceforth a domestic problem.
The end thus arrived at is to be attributed not only to
Adams's decision to make peace, but to his willingness, pre-
viously shown, to make war. The brief brush _ . . .
with France had, moreover, brought other " French spoli-
results. Fearing some such scheme as Miranda
was elaborating, Spain at length, and reluctantly, in March,
1798, evacuated her posts between the Yazoo and the thirty-
first parallel, and the United States for the first time actually
possessed in full the boundaries awarded her by the peace of
1783.
To the achievements noted at the close of Washington's
administration, therefore, the Adams administration added
that of meeting the most acute crisis that had
yet confronted the nation, and of emerging eriUst period"
from it with the fundamental policy of neu-
trality still intact, and relieved from treaty complications.
It left the affairs of the nation in a condition superficially
satisfactory and actually strong.
CHAPTER XII
THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE
The succession of Jefferson to the presidency made less im-
mediate change in the current of American diplomacy than
A change of was expected, much less than in domestic af-
r6gime fairs. The formal etiquette with which Wash-
ington had surrounded himself was modified and its neg-
lect caused some friction with the foreign ministers at Wash-
ington; but the essential practice of having all governmental
intercourse with them pass through the hands of the secre-
tary of state was retained. Jefferson, moreover, was a gen-
tleman and of cosmopolitan experience; and on the whole the
administration was well-mannered, Jefferson had long held
that ministers should not be retained abroad more than six
or eight years, for fear that they would cease to be true repre-
sentatives of Americanism, a principle for which there was
much to be said in those days, when foreign politics tended
so to engage American sympathies and antipathies and com-
munication was so scant. Charles Pinckney was therefore
nominated minister at Madrid, "vice David Humphreys,
recalled on account of long absence from the United States,"
and Robert Livingston was substituted for Short, in France,
for the same reason; but comparatively little more was heard
of the practice.^ In the interests of economy the missions to
Prussia, Holland, and Portugal were discontinued, a step
which John Quincy Adams considered a mistake, as it left
us at the mercy of the two great belligerent powers by putting
us out of touch with our natural friends, the neutral maritime
nations; but the neutral nations were so weak that the loss
cannot be considered great. Most of the men appointed by
* C. R. Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage (New York, etc., 1905),
88.
140
THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 141
Jefferson were of ability and training, though his leading
agent, Monroe, seems to have been framed for other tasks
than diplomacy. Jefferson's most important advisers were
James Madison, secretary of state, and Albert Gallatin,
secretary of the treasury; but his own power, ability, and
experience served to give him control.^
The first question which confronted the administration
resulted from a tangle in that particular thread of diplomacy
which the Federalists had failed to unravel. Mediterranean
Our treaties with the Barbary states were not *^**^®
highly regarded by those powers. The Dey of Algiers had
objected to making one. "If I were to make peace with
every body," said he, "what should I do with my corsairs?
What should I do with my soldiers.'* They would take oflF
my head for the want of other prizes, not being able to live
upon their miserable allowance." Nor did the treaty once
made lie very heavily upon him; it seemed in fact to offer
him some amusement. In 1800 Captain Bainbridge, arriv-
ing at Algiers with the usual tribute, was ordered to carry
dispatches to Constantinople. "You pay me tribute," ex-
plained the Dey, "by which you become my slaves, and there-
fore I have a right to order you as I think proper." Jefferson
had long been familiar with the situation, and had always
opposed the policy of tribute. Now he proposed to use force
to exact respect. Inconsistent as this policy seems to be
with his general belief in the supremacy of reason, it was
probably based upon a still more fundamental sense of
honor, and a somewhat emotional reaction from so barbaric
an anachronism as the Barbary coast. At any rate, he sent
a squadron to the Mediterranean, where for several years
American ships and men, captains and consuls, performed
their parts in romantic adventures which smack of the
^ Jefferson, Writings, ed. Ford, 10 vols. ; James Madison, Writings, ed.
Gaillard Hunt, 9 vols.. New York, 1900-1910; Albert Gallatin, Writings, ed.
Henry Adams, 3 vols., Philadelphia, 1879; James Monroe, Writings, edt
S. M. Hamilton, 9 vols., New York, etc., 1898-1903,
142 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Arabian Nights rather than of the nineteenth century. Inde-
pendent of home support, as only saiHng-vessels can be, they
so successfully impressed the rulers of the several states that
^ by 1805 the sea was comparatively safe for American traders.^
Even at JeflPerson's inauguration the great event of his ad-
ministration was taking shape behind carefully closed doors.
There was no novelty in what was being
rand and Na- planned; except what lay in the ability of the
^ *°" actors and the strength of the forces at their
command. Talleyrand and Napoleon had definitely taken
up the plans for dominating the Mississippi valley, and
through it the western world, with which so many men had
been playing now for fifty years. At their back they had the
virility and enthusiasm of revolutionary France, now disci-
plined into military effectiveness; they had the defeated and
demoralized, but still powerful, French navy.^
The first step was to get Louisiana, to get it quickly and
undamaged. Talleyrand wrote to his representative at
- . , Madrid in the summer of 1798: "The Court of
Cession of .
Louisiana to Madrid, ever blind to its own interests, and
never docile to the lessons of experience, has
again recently adopted a measure which cannot fail to pro-
duce the worst effects upon its political existence and on the
preservation of its colonies. The United States has been put
in possession of the forts situated along the Mississippi,
which the Spaniards had occupied as posts essential to arrest
the progress of the Americans in those countries." The
Americans, he said, must be shut up within "the limits
which nature seems to have traced for them," — ^the same
limits, of course, which Rayneval had traced for d'Aranda
and Jay in 1782. Spain, continued Talleyrand, should
"yield a small part of her immense domain to preserve the
* G. W. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs, Boston, etc., 1905.
* Gustav Roloff, Die Kolonialpolitik Napoleons I, Munich, etc., 1899;
Henry Adams, " Napol6on ler et Saint Domingue," Revue Historique, 1S84,
xxiv. 92-130.
THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 14S
rest." Let Spain cede the Floridas and Louisiana to France,
"and from that moment the power of the United States is
bounded by the limits which it may suit the interests and
tranquilHty of France and Spain to assign her." Spain still
resisted the inevitable, but at length on October 1, 1800, the /
treaty of San Ildefonso was signed, " retroceding " Louisiana
to France in exchange for some Italian provinces. With a
persistence worthy of a more hopeful cause Spain still clung
to the Floridas.^
Twenty-four hours before, the convention bringing about
the necessary truce with the United States had been signed.
There remained necessary, peace with Great Reduction of
Britain to free the ocean for French operations. ^"^ Domingo
On October 1, 1801, preliminary articles were signed with
that country, and on March 27, 1802, the peace of Amiens
was concluded. One detail was still incomplete, but it seemed
to offer small difficulty. The key to the new colonial empire
of France must be the island of San Domingo, still dominated
by the negro Toussaint L'Ouverture, whose loyalty to France
was insufficient for the purposes in view. In January, 1802,
Napoleon's brother-in-law, Leclerc, with ten thousand men
and a large fleet, arrived off the island to restore it to its
dependence. His military successes paved the way for the
reestablishment of slavery, and Toussaint L'Ouverture was
sent prisoner to France. Napoleon then prepared his expedi-
tion to Louisiana, and drew up instructions to General Victor,
who was to command it.
The central feature of this plan, the cession of Louisiana,
was still a secret; Talleyrand even denied it, yet rumor
spread. In April, 1801, John Quincy Adams -^^
had heard of it at Berlin. In 1802 Godoy, reaches
" Prince of the Peace " and the leading figure in
Spain, being pressed by France for the Floridas, seems to
have allowed a copy of the treaty to fall into our hands. In
* See F. L. Riley, Spanish Policy in Mississippi after the Treaty of San
Lorenzo, Amer. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1897, 175-192.
144 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
November, 1802, a premonition was given of what might
happen should the transfer take place. The Spanish intend-
ant at New Orleans, at French instigation, as it was believed,
forbade the Americans the use of that city as a place of de-
p)osit, and refused to designate another. The first action was
in accordance with our treaty with Spain, more than the
three years specified having elapsed; but the refusal to assign
a new port was a violation of that treaty. It again clogged
the Mississippi and stirred all the forces of the restless West.^
Fortunately, Jefferson was familiar with every factor of
this new combination of long-existing conditions. He flour-
Jefferson ished before France the danger of an alliance
threatens between the United States and England. In
a letter intended to be read by the French leaders he wrote:
"The day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes
the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low
water mark. It seals the union of two nations, which in
conjunction can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean.
From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British
fleet and nation." He showed marked favoritism to the
British representative, Thornton, and scared the French
minister, Pinchon, into a promise to endeavor to secure the
opening of the Mississippi from France. Yrujo, the Spanish
minister, did obtain a temporary restoration of the right
of deposit at New Orleans.
For the serious handling of the question Jefferson reverted
to the method thrice employed by the Federalists, a special
Jefferson's mission; and he chose Monroe for the office.
^^^y The latter was instructed to purchase New
Orleans and the Floridas, being allowed to bid anything up
to ten million dollars. Congress had just appropriated two
million for the purpose. If the purchase could not be made>
* Henry Adams, History of the United States during the Administrations of
Jefferson and Madison, 9 vols.. New York, 1889-91 (gives an incomparable
account of the diplomacy of the period). See also F. A. Ogg, The Opening
of the Mississippi, New York, 1904.
THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 145
he was to secure an acknowledgment of the right of deposit.
If this could not be obtained, he was to await new instruc-
tions. The cabinet decided that in such case negotiations
should be protracted until the next inevitable war between
England and France broke out, and then cooperation should
be arranged with England. In accordance with this policy
of delay the departure of Monroe was not hurried, and he did
not leave till March 8, 1803.
JeflFerson's policy was exactly adapted to the situation.
The only criticism is, that he ought to have overcome his
scruples against a navy and have strengthened j^ . ,
our position in order that we might be in change of
readiness for the war which was so definite a
possibility. The event, however, was in no wise dependent
upon him, and had practically been consummated before
Monroe reached Paris. Meanwhile news had reached
France of the death, from disease, of Leclerc and a large
part of the French army in San Domingo and of the revival
of revolt. Napoleon, while steadfast in the pursuit of funda-
mental purposes, never shot a second arrow to recover one
lost in a side issue. He was already interesting himself in
the prospect of a new European war. On March 12, 1803,
he practically broke with England. Under such circum-
stances he was not so foolish as to squander another army on
America. The colonial empire was dropped.
Napoleon was too able an economist to keep intact ma-
chinery for which he now had no use: he would scrap it for
what it would bring. On April 10 he spoke of ^ .
Louisiana to Barbe Marbois, who, familiar scraps Louis-
with American affairs from our own Revolu-
tion, was negotiating with Livingston. England, he said,
would seize it at the first moment of war, and added: "I
think of ceding it to the United States. I can hardly say
that I cede it to them, for it is not yet in our possession.
If, however, I leave the least time to our enemies, I shall
only transmit an empty title to those republicans whose
146 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
friendship I seek. . . . Irresolution and deliberation are
no longer in reason; I renounce Louisiana. It is not only
New Orleans that I cede, it is the whole colony, without
reserve. I know the price of what I abandon." Marbois was
to get at least fifty million francs for the cession.
On April 11 this proix)sal was broached to Livingston, and
the next day Monroe arrived. Negotiations proceeded with
. . the rapidity customary when Napoleon was in
command, and on April 30 the treaty was signed.
In return for the cession we agreed to pay sixty million francs,
and we assumed the payment to our own citizens of claims
against France to the extent of not over twenty million francs.
That Napoleon made a good bargain must be conceded.
He received more money than the minimum he had set;
Napoleon's he won, too, some of that feeling of friendship
bargain which he had mentioned ; and he kept Louisiana
out of the hands of England. Moreover, there seems to be
no reason to believe that he had any idea that he was re-
nouncing Louisiana. Perhaps his mind saw things too
simply: his struggle was with England; once England was
downed, the world was his to command. The very difficulty
in disposing of Louisiana which even he had with his ad-
visers and with public opinion illustrates the hold which
the vision of America had on the French mind. Actually
with the delivery of New Orleans to the United States, De-\
cember 20, 1803, and the independence of Hayti, or western)
San Domingo, proclaimed November 29 of the same year,\
France was eliminated as a territorial factor in our history; j
but although the crisis had passed, her policies and ambi-j
tions continued to be of moment.
In America the news of the treaty was confounding. It
was more than had been hoped for; it was not exactly what
Problem of the was desired. It raised a score of opportunities
treaty £qj. dispute and distraction. In the first place,
there was no specific power to annex territory granted in the
^constitution, although it was easily inferred from the power
THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 147
to make treaties. More seriously discussed was the clause .
of the treaty providing that the inhabitants of the ceded
territory should be "incorporated in the Union." The Fed-
eralists were willing to annex territories to govern, but not
to give them a share in the government. By the acceptance
of the treaty, however, this question was at least quieted.
The treaty also provided that France and Spain be exempted^
from discriminating duties in the ports of Louisiana for;
twelve years, and that France remain forever after that on
the basis of the most favored nation. The first of these ,
provisions was of doubtful constitutionality, while the second i
was long a source of dispute with France.
These were problems that could be settled at leisure, and
they were but pin-pricks compared with those which the
purchase solved. The navigation of the Mis- Results of the
sissippi was now completely freed, and its *^«**y
future was not dependent upon the continued favor of any ,
foreign nation. All the interests which had drawn the fron- |
tiersmen toward Spain or Great Britain, dividing their >
allegiance, now were added ties to strengthen their natural ;
bonds of race and sympathy with the American government. ;
The completeness of the change was shown by the utter i
collapse of Burr's conspiracy in 1806.
What his plans were is not entirely clear; probably he
himself changed them so often that they lost their definite-
ness. At any rate, he played on all the cus- Burr's con-
tomary strings of western adventure. His ^piracy
objective was Spanish America. England's cooperation he
sought, offering through the British minister. Merry, in
1804 "to effect a separation of the western part of the United
States from that which lies between the Atlantic and the
mountains, in its whole extent." Closing his vice-presidency,
he journeyed through the West and collected material for
an expedition; he was also in touch with Wilkinson, now in
command of the western department. The latter, however,
was more weatherwise than Burr, and, bribed by Spain, he
148 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
betrayed Burr, and the whole bubble burst. In fact, It
never had any semblance of real strength, for there was
no motive for disloyalty, or even lack of loyalty, in the West.
The government of the United States had obtained for it
its most conspicuous desire.^
So much the purchase of Louisiana had accomplished,
while it was not yet clear just what Louisiana was. To
Western limits the westward it had never had a boundary;
of Louisiana even such boundary agreements as had once
existed had been absorbed by the Spanish annexation of
1763, and were lost to memory. Napoleon had ordered
Victor to occupy to the Rio Grande, and this fact was
known to the American government. Jefferson's imagina-
tion, moreover, stretched to the uttermost limits of the op-
I>ortunIty. Even before he had acquired Louisiana he had
planned its exploration, and in 1804 started the Lewis and
Clark expedition westward, up the Missouri, across the
mountains, and beyond any conceivable limits of the pur-
chase, to the Pacific. In 1805 the expedition descended
the Columbia and thus added a link to the chain of our
claims to the Oregon country, the first of which had been
forged when Captain Gray in 1792 had entered the mouth
of that river. The record of the expedition, put in popular
form by Nicholas Biddle In 1814, engaged the imagina-
tion of the far-seeing In dreams which made the purchase of
Louisiana seem but a step In our progress. In 1806 and 1807
Captain Zebulon Pike was sent into the region south of the
Missouri, where he felt the Spaniards, and gained an Idea
of the actual limits of what we had acquired.^
To the eastward the situation was more definite. In fact
it was definite. Our treaty of cession recited as its definition
of Louisiana the description given in the treaty of San
^ W. F. McCaleb, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy, New York, 1903.
* Henry Gannett, Boundaries of the United States and of the several States
and Territories. 2d edition, 1900 (U. S. Geological Survey, Bulletin, No. 171);
H. E. Chambers, West Florida, Baltimore, 1898.
THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE I4ff
Bdefonso between France and Spain: "The Colony or Prov-
ince of Louisiana with the same extent that it now has in the
hands of Spain, and that it had when France „
possessed it, and such as it should be after boundary of
the treaties subsequently entered into between
Spain and other states." This definition was obviously
self-contradictory. Louisiana, when France possessed it,
stretched eastward to the Perdido river and included
Mobile; the province as it was in the hands of Spain ex-
tended only to the Iberville. The meaning, however, was
clear enough. The treaty was entitled one of "retrocession."
Spain could retrocede to France only what she had received
from France; that is the region from the Iberville westward
given her in 1763. Although in 1800 she held that between
the Iberville and the Perdido, it was by cession from England
in 1783, and was separately organized as part of the province
of West Florida. This was well understood by the French.
Berthier wrote, "After the general peace, the King might
decide to cede a part of the Floridas between the Mississippi
and the Mobile, on the special demand which the First
Consul might make of it." Talleyrand wrote to Napoleon,
November 18, 1802, "West Florida suffices for the desired
enlargement of Louisiana, it completes the retrocession of
the French Colony, such as it was given to Spain." The
instructions to General Victor ordered him to take posses-
sion only to the Iberville.
Madison, Livingston, and Monroe, however, seized upon .
the ambiguity. In a small way each of the rivers flowing
into the gulf presented the same problem as United States
the Mississippi. Population was occupying <^*""*
their upper banks, and desired to use them as outlets for
their products. So far as immediate utility was concerned,
the securing of the territory beyond the Mississippi, which
no one had thought of buying, was not a compensation for
the gulf fringe of West Florida, which Livingston and Monroe
had been instructed to purchase. Our relations with Spain,
150 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
moreover, were sure to be unpleasant whether we pressed
this additional claim or not, for Napoleon had promised
Spain never to give Louisiana to a foreign power. This
promise, to be sure, was not incorporated in the treaty of
San Udefonso and did not impair our title, but it afforded
a starting-point of disagreement. Under these circumstances
the government decided that we had actually purchased the
territory to the Perdido, the wish having a very close rela-
tion to the thought.
The dispute, of course, was with Spain, but as a matter of
fact Napoleon controlled Spain. Except for a brief and un-
Napoleon's successful mission of Monroe to Madrid, the
game American government recognized the logic of
the situation, and directed its efforts to the fountain head
at Paris. Though claiming title, it was nevertheless willing
to pay for the recognition of it, and to purchase other por-
tions of the dereUct Spanish empire. Napoleon might have
settled the question as to the boundary by opening his records.
He preferred, however, mystery and confusion. Talleyrand
said to Livingston, "You have made a noble bargain and I
suppose you will make the most of it." From 1804 to 1812,
indeed, the Florida question became a barometer of European
conditions. When pressure was heavy, Napoleon was ready
to treat for a money consideration: December 24, 1804,
Armstrong wrote to Madison, "This country has deter-
mined to convert the negotiation into a job, and to draw from
it advantages merely pecuniary to herself." When pressure
was light. Napoleon was shocked at the assumption that he
might sell property belonging to his ally. When by the ac-
cession of his brother Joseph to the throne of Spain the pos-
sessions of that crown became part of the estate of the
house of Bonaparte, he warned the United States against
interference.
On the whole, it may be said that Napoleon used the
Florida question as a bait to keep the United States in
the vicinity of his hook, and that he was not without some
THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 151
success. In the end, however, fate and Madison got the
better of him. That portion of the disputed region on the
east bank of the Mississippi between the thirty- o ti f
first parallel and the Iberville was being oc- (disputed terri-
cupied by American settlers, regardless of its
international status. In September, 1810, these people
proclaimed their independence and asked for annexation to
the United States. October 27, 1810, Madison, acting on
the supposition that it was already United States territory,
ordered its occupation, whereupon Claiborne, governor of
Orleans territory, took possession to the Pearl river, the
present boundary between the states of Louisiana and Mis-
sissippi. In 1813 General Wilkinson occupied Mobile and
the region eastward to the Perdido. From that time the
United States remained in possession of. its utmost claims
as to the eastern boundary of Louisiana, but its title to that
part of it between the Iberville and the Perdido had yet
to be determined.
1/
V
CHAPTER XIII
THE EMBARGO
The war renewed between France and England in 1803,
the shadow of which brought us Louisiana, had many other
Change of con- things in store for us, both pleasant and un-
ditions pleasant. The course of the struggle from 1803 \
to 1815 parallels in many ways that between 1793 and 1802. /
Some of the factors, however, had changed. Our own West
had become strong enough to master its own destiny; it was
now so firmly attached to the government that it ceased
for the present to enter into the plans of European states.
The policy of our government continued to be that of neu-
trality, but its sympathies were now French instead of Eng-
lish. Its methods of preserving neutrality, moreover, were
so decidedly different as to change the whole character of
our diplomacy. In the case of both France and England,
the preceding war had witnessed experiments; the new one
found determined policies. The defeat of Napoleon's navies
at Trafalgar in 1805 gave England a more complete control
of the sea than she had ever had before, while his victories
by land isolated her from the continent in a manner new and
menacing.
With the diplomatic elimination of the W^est, American
commerce with the belligerents became the focus of attention.
American com- Its steady-going element consisted in the ex-
'^^^^^ change of our raw products for England's
manufactures. Carried on largely in our own vessels, it was
safe, fairly unvarying in quantity, and brought in reasonable
profits to respectable established firms. Less important was
that carried on with the British colonies under temporary
suspensions of the navigation laws and by special licences.
152
THE EMBARGO 153
Part of this trade, it is true, was practically regular and suited
to the conservative temperament. As however, the permis-
sions were based on the needs of the moment, there was a fluc-
tuating margin, which gave opportunity to those with a keen
scent for special venture and quick turnovers. News of
crops and markets was eagerly read, and the British govern-
ment was besieged with special applications. In 1809 it
refused a licence to export ice and snow from the United
States to the West Indies; those were commodities sufliciently
abundant in the loyal colony of Canada.
More adventurous, and after 1805 partaking somewhat of
the nature of speculation, was the continued attempt to
supply France with her breakfast of West American car-
Indian coffee, sugar, and cocoa. Hayti was 'y"i8-trade
now practically free, but its market continued to be France;
and the other islands furnished their quota. In return the
islands wanted provisions, which we ourselves could furnish,
and manufactured goods, which should have come from
France but which we often secured for them from England.
This trade demanded high freight rates and protected itself
by insurance. It produced both fortunes and bankruptcies.
By 1805 it overshadowed the safer trade with England.
Between 1803 and 1806 our exports of domestic goods sank
from $42,206,000 to $41,253,000; those of foreign goods rose
from $13,594,000 to $60,283,000.^
Still choicer titbits invited those who frankly disregarded
business principles and resorted to speculation pure and sim-
ple. To add to their lading of French colonial Speculative
products some of the manufactures of England '*"*'""
so eagerly desired and so highly priced on the continent, and,
protected by licences from England and France, to carry on
trade between the enemies, or to carry it on unprotected,
induced many to risk ships and liberty. To disregard the
* Mathew Carey, The Olive Branch, Philadelphia, 1815 (contains many
original documents and statistics); British and Foreign State Papera (an
annual series).
154 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
restrictive laws framed with such rapidity by the United
States government, to gamble on a change of regulation
before reaching port or on the possibility of bribing officials,
to coast from one French port to another, to rove at will
over the ocean using whatever flag and papers were con-
venient at the moment, involved serious risks, but not suf-
ficient danger to exclude such practices. Everywhere the
Americans found and made business. Gallatin estimated
that our merchant marine grew seventy thousand tons a
year and called for over four thousand additional men; and
Phineas Bond had already in 1796 referred to the enter-
prising spirit of so many of our traders in "forcing the pre-
scribed channels of commerce." To shepherd such a reckless
crew was no easy task for an administration so firmly based
on the idea of self-government, but at heart so paternalistic,
as was that of Jefferson.
The attitude of Great Britain toward this trade was not
a simple one. Underlying all her actions was a sensitive
Great Britam's national jealousy at the growth of a rival mer- /
^^*^^ chant marine, and a constant purpose to give
every possible advantage to her own. She did not wish to
cut off all trade with the enemy; she was especially anxious
to sell all the manufactured goods possible. She tried, there-
fore, to confine trade to channels favorable to herself, and
to cause it to pass under her watchful eye. Agricultural
conditions had so readjusted themselves on the continent
that there was less chance of starving France into submis-
sion; hence the question of regarding provisions as contra-
band of war was not so important as in the previous war.
In the execution of her policy she showed an arrogance and
a carelessness of others that often caused her to persist in ^
practices not essential to her general policy and yet provoca-
tive of retaliation. England's policy cannot be considered
apart from her bad manners.
The policy of Napoleon toward neutral trade was based
on the ideas of the Directory. It was subsidiary to his cen-
THE EMBARGO 155
tral idea of destroying England by destroying her commerce.
He would close all the ports of the world to British trade,
he would cause her ships to be idle and her Napoleon's
factories to be glutted with unsalable goods; ^^'^^
then bankruptcy and submission would be inevitable. This
was the fundamental purpose which underlay his entire
foreign policy from 1805, and which resulted in the climatic
tragedy of the Russian invasion. While he undoubtedly
miscalculated the tenacity of the British will, and thought
that less pressure would be necessary to bring a nation of
shopkeepers to terms than proved to be the case, his plan was
not fantastic and he may have come within sight of success.
He himself, when at Elba, reviewing and magnifying, like
so many lesser of the fallen, the turns of fortune against
him, said that he would have succeeded had not the Spanish
revolt opened up to England, after 1808, the trade of Spanish
America which she had so long desired and which gave a
new market for her surplus products.^ It should not be held
against him as an inconsistency, or as an evidence of the im-
possibility of his plan, that his armies were often clothed in
British goods. He realized the temporary necessity, but
under the protection of his system he expected to develop
self-suflficing industry on the continent. Indeed, one of the
most permanent results of his rule has been found to be pre-
cisely this development. With such a policy Napoleon knew
no neutrals: trade with his enemy was vital assistance to
his enemy. This policy, however, was diplomatically veiled
so as to enable him to employ neutral vessels for his own pur-
poses. The details of his regulations therefore change from
time to time. Without a navy, he was driven to such meas-
ures as could be enforced in his own ports.
In the United States the policy formulated to defend our
trade was emphatically Jefferson's, although it so closely
resembled Napoleon's that it was attributed to French in-
^ T. B. Richards, "An Unpublished Talk with Napoleon," Earper't Maga-
Tine, January 1911, pp. 165-175.
156 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
fluence. If there was any connection, however, it was JeflFer-
son who originated the plan. Even as a youth he had
Jefiferson's been much impressed with the rapidity with
P**^*^^ which the colonial non-importation agreements
had brought England to terms, and he believed that similar
pressure would be as effective between nations as it had
proved between colony and mother country. He may well
have discussed the matter with the French revolutionary
leaders during his residence in France. Certainly on his re-
turn he urged it upon Congress in his report of 1793. Now
as president he intended to use it as the bulwark of defence
for our commerce and our merchant marine.
The first serious diflBculty arose with England over the
trade of the French West Indies. As a result of decisions
_ , . . of Sir William Scott in the cases of the Emanuel
England and
the French m 1799 and the Polly m 1800, that trade had
been allowed to the Americans if carried on
from the colonies to the United States and from the United
States to France. July 23, 1805, in the case of the Essex,
Scott practically reversed himself, declaring that on an inno-
cent voyage between the United States and Europe th6
neutral owner of such colonial goods must be able to prove
by something more than evidence of a custom-house entry
that his original intention had been to terminate his venture
in an American port. Upon this theory several American
vessels were condemned, and the trade, while not prohibited,
was rendered uncertain and difficult; for it was, of course,
almost never the intention of the American owner to ter-
minate his venture in the United States, and he was actually
in most cases owner merely in form and not in substance,
a situation that might be revealed by the British courts
which it was framed to deceive. This trade, as well as other
branches of traffic, was soon additionally hampered by a
British order in council of May 16, 1806, blockading the coast
from Havre to Ostend and prohibiting the coast trade to
neutrals from Havre to the Elbe.
THE EMBARGO 157
Another source of difficulty arose from the discovery by
the British that this blockade could be more effectively
and conveniently enforced off the American -,, . .
1 T-i 1 T^ • 1 Blockade of
than the French coast. For years, it became American
customary for every American vessel leaving
New York, the Chesapeake, and other harbors to heave to,
and submit to a vigorous search. If the result created sus-
picion, the vessel was put in charge of a British officer and
sent to Halifax for adjudication by the admiralty court
there. In 1806, in the execution of this police duty, the
British accidentally shot and killed an American sea-captain.
Usually the vessel was allowed to proceed, but in a
large number of cases with the loss of members of its
crew. The impressment problem gave in-
creasing trouble. Of the four thousand new
seamen demanded each year by the merchant marine
twenty-five hundred, it was reckoned, were British born,
most of them sailors who preferred the better wages,
food, and treatment to be found on American vessels.
Such transfer of allegiance in the heat of the national
hfe-and-death struggle was regarded by British public opin-
ion as no less than desertion; hence the navy vigorously
resorted to impressment to redress the balance. It is esti-
mated that there were a thousand cases annually.
It was in this state of affairs that the clauses of the Jay
treaty relating to neutral rights expired. Jefferson pre-
pared to substitute for them a new and better ,, ,
'^ Monroe and
treaty. To brmg pressure to bear upon Eng- Pinkney in
land, he had Congress pass a non-importation
act, prohibiting the entry of certain British goods which
he esteemed not necessary to our happiness. Its operation
was not to be immediate, but it was to hang like a sword of
Damocles over the negotiations. Many doubted its effi-
ciency. John Randolph derided it as "a milk and water
bill, a dose of chicken broth to be taken nine months hence."
To bring it to the attention of England, Jefferson appointed
158 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
a commission consisting of Monroe, who had succeeded King
as minister, and William Pinkney. Their instructions,
drawn up by Madison, insisted upon three ultimata,—
namely, an agreement regarding impressments, indemnity
for American vessels and cargoes condemned, as we held,
unjustly, and a satisfactory provision regarding the trade of
the French West Indies. "We begin to broach the idea
that we consider the whole Gulf stream as our waters," said
Madison, a remark which reminds one of Fauchet's comment
in 1795, that America "puffs itself up with its position and
the future power to which it can pretend."
Happy in beginning their negotiations under the auspices
of Charles James Fox, always the friend of America and now
foreign minister, they found their hopes soon dashed by his
death. It is probable, however, that this made little differ-
ence, for on the subjects upon which they desired acquies-
cence no British minister would have dared offer even com-
promise. Unable to obtain a single important concession
they nevertheless signed a treaty on December 31, 1806,
which was as unsatisfactory as that of Jay on matters of
international law, besides affording none of the compensa-
tions which that treaty offered, for there were no outstanding
matters at issue of a character not thought to be necessary
to England's national existence. The treaty was not con-
summated; Jefferson never presented it to the Senate.
With the failure of the treaty, the lightning began to
play in dead earnest. In November, 1806, Napoleon had
Napoleon's de- issued his Berlin decree declaring the British
"** isles blockaded, with the result, as concerned
neutrals, that no vessel coming from England or her colonies
should after a nine months' notice be admitted into any
French port. This was followed by the Milan decree of
December 17^ 1807, which declared that any vessel submit-
ting to search, by a British ship, paying duty to the British
government, or coming from or destined for a British port
should be good prize.
THE EMBARGO 159
Meantime an English order in council of January 7, 1807,
known as Lord Howick's order, forbade neutral vessels
to engage in the French coasting trade, even British orders
between unblockaded ports. The British at- ^^co*^*^
titude is indicated in a dispatch from Lord Howick to
Erskine, the British minister to the United States: "His
Majesty, with that forbearance and moderation which has
at all times distinguished his conduct, has determined for the
present to confine himself to the exercise of the powers given
him by his decided naval superiority in such manner only
as is authorized by the acknowledged principles of the law
of nations." On November 11, 1807, an order known as
Spencer Perceval's established a "paper" blockade of the
whole European coast from Trieste to Copenhagen. No
neutral vessel could enter any port from which British ves-
sels were excluded, unless clearing from a British port and
under British regulations, including the payment of duties,
a condition which ipso facto rendered it liable to seizure by
France.
While this clash of decrees and orders sounded but dimly
in the ears of most Americans, uncertain as yet as to what
they portended, an episode on the coast of _. . .
America roused the nation, so observers said, Chesapeake
more than anything had done since Lexington.
The Chesapeake, an American frigate fitting for the Mediter-
ranean, enrolled a number of men whom the British ad-
miral off the coast claimed as deserters. Commodore Barron
satisfied himself that such was not the case, and on June 22,
1807, set sail. The Chesapeake was followed by the Leopard,
one of the vessels enforcing the blockade of Europe off Chesa-
peake Bay, and was ordered to heave to. After a formal
resistance, she lowered her flag, officers from the Leopard
took off the men in question, and left the Chesapeake, which
promptly returned to Norfolk.
This extension of the practice of impressment to national
naval vessels found no support even in the elastic interna-
160 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
tional law of the day. The British government did not at-
tempt to defend it, but it handled the matter with so un-
popular indig- pardonable a stupidity that the episode re-
nation mained an open sore for four years. Jefferson
expressed his indignation in a proclamation of July 2, which
forbade the use of American harbors to British war vessels,
and on July 30 he called a special session of Congress.
The measure that he recommended was not war, but it no
less reflected the seriousness of his view of the situation. War
^ , he believed a barbarism; for it he would substi-
The embargo . . . * i i »• i ,
tute the appeal to interest. As he believed that
under normal conditions commercial discrimination was an ef-
fective instrument, so he believed that under abnormal condi-
tions a total cessation of trade would exert all the compulsive
efforts of war without its horrors. In other words, *he would
have us withdraw from the commerce of the world, in the
belief that it would not be long before the nations would be
clamoring for us to reopen our ports on our own terms. As
a result of his recommendation, on December 21, 1807, a
general and indefinite embargo was established. No vessel
was to leave port, except (1) foreign vessels in ballast, or
with such cargo as they had laded before the passage of the
act, and (2) vessels engaged in the coasting trade. This
embargo seemed to resemble that established at the time of
Jay's mission to England; but it is to be differentiated from
that because it was regarded by those who adopted it, not
as a temporary expedient providing for the safety of our
shipping, but as a weapon to conquer favorable terms from
our adversaries.
So it happened that, before our merchants could be sure
what effect the rival orders and decrees might have upon
Eff t f th their business, — although they felt certain that
embargo on there would be loopholes in both the French
and English systems, — their own government
laid a restraining hand on all their ventures. It was the
steady-going merchants who suffered most, those who were
THE EMBARGO 161
engaged in the regular trade with England and her colonies,
and so were comparatively untouched by the regulations
either of that country or of France. The more adventurous
could always find opportunities for traflSc by evading or dis-
regarding the law. Until stopped by a supplementary act,
many vessels cleared for an American port but found them-
selves driven by stress of weather to the West Indies. Once
there, they sold their goods. Even when this practice was
stopped, some preserved freedom by remaining away from
home. April 11, 1808, an English order in council forbade
the seizure of American vessels in the West Indies and South
America, even if without papers. In March, April, and May
sixteen American vessels were allowed to enter English ports.
Although numbers of American vessels thus found employ-
ment it was, however, in carrying on the business of others,
not in supplying the United States with what she desired
and taking from her ports what she had for sale. Our com-
merce was dead.
Whether or not Jefferson was right in claiming that Amer-
ican commerce was more essential to other nations than to
ourselves, at any rate we had a governmental Faaure of the
organization more sensitive to public distress *™*'"«o
than other nations. The embargo did cause suffering in the
British empire: Newfoundland was on the point of starva-
tion, and English mills shut down, with all the attendant
woes. England, however, remained firm.
In the United States opposition swept down the coast.
In New England the criticism of the commercial classes,
unappreciative of this attempt to clear the Repeal of the
seas by forbidding the use of them, rose to ^^^"■go
fury. New England statesmen talked of disunion. In the
middle states the farmer, for whose crops the home market
was inadequate, added his voice to that of the merchant of
New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. Washington Irving,
in his Knickerbocker history of New York, ridiculed the
embargo: "Never was a more comprehensive, a more ex-
162 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
peditious, or, what is still better, a more economical measure
devised, than this of defeating the Yankees by proclama-
tion— ^an expedient, likewise, so gentle and humane, there
were ten chances to one in favor of its succeeding, — ^but
then there was one chance to ten that it would not succeed, —
as the ill-natured fates would have it, that single chance car-
ried the day." Even the Virginia planters, groaning under
the burden of supporting their slaves, whose products re-
mained unsold on the plantation, protested. On February 28, .
1809, the embargo was repealed, having brought about no "^
amelioration of our international position.
CHAPTER XIV
WAR WITH ENGLAND
The succession of Madison to the presidency on March 4,
1809, meant no change of ideas. In fact, it hardly involved a
change of personnel; for Jefferson was still Non-inter-
consulted, and the new secretary of state, '^^^^^
Robert Smith, was scarcely more than a figure-head, Madi-
son himself often writing his dispatches. The embargo had
failed, but a substitute had been provided. This took the
form of a non-intercourse act, which opened up commerce
to the rest of the world but prohibited it with France, Eng-
land, and their colonies. To them America remained tight
closed. The law set forth, however, that should England
withdraw her orders, or France her decrees, the President
could resume intercourse with the complaisant power.
In spite of the importance of the restrictions that remained,
the merchant marine soon found unparalleled opportunities
for employment. That of Massachusetts in- Prosperity of
creased from 310,000 tons in 1807 to 352,000 co°^«f"
tons in 1810. The British armies in Spain and Portugal
needed provisions, and those countries were open to our
trade. To the north, Russia was free to neutrals after De-
cember 31, 1810, and we were practically the only neutrals.
This opportunity was not too far afield for our enterprize.
By way of the Baltic and the port of Riga, and even by the
Arctic port of Archangel, the route to which had the ad-
vantage of lying far from the haunts of the British navy, we
sent to Russia, in 1810, $3,975,000 worth of goods, in 1811,
$6,137,000 worth. To guard this new trade, we exchanged
ministers with that country in 1809, sending thither John
Quincy Adams, who had now affiliated with the dominant
;i63
164 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
party. Holland and Naples, moreover, and other stretches
of European coast, though actually under Napoleonic con-
trol, were not legally French and did not fall within our
prohibition. To them we could send such things as Napoleon
wished and England did not object to. Fish and oil were
permitted, but cotton England banned as tending to build
up French manufactures. Nor did prohibition by law ac-
tually prevent American vessels from dropping into the
harbors of France herself, when the way was open. In addi-
tion, our ships were licensed by the belligerents to carry on
some of that exchange between them which was so beneficial
that it defied the dictates of policy. Increasingly, however,
this trade was given to their own vessels, and it never was so
large as the unlicensed smuggling carried on by the boatmen
of the Channel in the teeth of the authorities of both coun^
tries. If by this description the ocean may seem to have
been a smooth road to the Americans, it must be borne in
mind that there were always the perils of search and im-
pressment, and the chances of sudden changes in regulations,
involving delay, seizure, and confiscation. Worse still, the
standard trade of bringing English manufactures into the
United States, and of exporting tobacco and other goods to
England and provisions to her colonies, was practically
ended. ^
It was Under these circumstances that George Canning,
now British minister of foreign affairs, resolved to take ad-
Erskine ar- vantage of the offer contained in the non-
rangement intercourse act in order to reopen the American
market to British manufactures. This negotiation was to
take place in America, and he instructed his minister at
Washington to announce that the orders would be recalled
on condition that we withdraw non-intercourse with Eng-
* For the study of the actual course of commerce during these years the
Guide to the Material in London Archives for the History of the United States
since 1783, by C. O. Paullin and F. L. Paxson, is useful. It describes the
papers to the period of the Civil War. The records of the Board of Trade
are found to contain the most novel material.
WAR WITH ENGLAND 165
land, that we forego trade with the French West Indies, and
that we allow England to enforce our non-intercourse act
with France, The British minister at this time was David
Montague Erskine, a young Whig appointed by Fox in
1806, very friendly toward America and married to an Amer-
ican wife. With him an agreement was made which dealt
with the Chesapeake affair and the recall of the orders, and
looked to the formation of a general treaty of commerce
between the United States and Great Britain, but which
left out Canning's last two conditions. In accordance with
this arrangement, Madison, on June 10, 1809, declared inter-
course with Great Britain restored.
Canning at once rejected the agreement, recalled Erskine,
and sent in his place Francis James Jackson, who was not
expected to repeat Erskine's mistake of over- Canning dis-
friendliness to America, and who lived up to *^°^^ Erskine
his reputation. After five weeks' exchange of notes, which
grew increasingly unpleasant, the American government re-
fused to deal further with him. Canning, however, had
promised him a year in America, and he was not recalled
until the end of it. Until the autumn of 1810, therefore, the
United States and Great Britain were provided with a burr
under the saddle which the tact of Pinkney, our minister at
London, could scarcely be expected to make comfortable.
Meanwhile Napoleon had not been unconscious of the
United States, though he had not needed to give her much
of his attention, since her policy conformed Napoleon and
to his own, and he seemed to be reaping tlie«™''*'8o
the reward for the sale of Louisiana. As if in accordance
with his desires, — but in reality because of the southern
objection to recognizing a republic founded on a slave in-
surrection,— intercourse had in 1806 been prohibited with his
revolted colony of Hayti, in which he took a fleeting in-
terest. The embargo again, though a measure based on
Jefferson's philosophy, exactly fitted into Napoleon's con-
tinental system. Although he objected to it as regarded
166 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
France, he could not have devised a plan better suited to
his purposes had he been dictator of America. "The Em-
peror applauds the embargo," said Turreau, French minister
at Washington. On April 5, 1808, Napoleon issued from
Bayonne a decree ordering the sequestration of all American ■/'
vessels arriving in France, as presumably British property
sailing under false papers, no American vessels being legally
afloat.
The repeal of the embargo was therefore a rebuff, and its
form, by grouping England and France together and differ-
Naool and ^ntiating between France and her dependent
non-inter- states, was still more so. Moreover, the pro-
hibition of Haytian trade, which had never
been effective, lapsed about the same time. Napoleon there-
fore ordered his minister to withdraw from Washington.
On August 4, 1809, after Canning's disavowal of the Erskine
agreement had assured a return to non-intercourse and a
period of aggravation between England and the United
States, while the battle of Wagram gave him command of
Europe, he drafted the decree of Vienna, ordering the seizure
and confiscation of "every American ship which shall enter '' \
the ports of France, Spain, or Italy." This step he justified
by the arguments that those entering French ports were
violating the law of the United States, and that the other
countries under French control should not be allowed to
enjoy trade forbidden to France. The decree was kept secret,
apparently in order to induce American vessels to enter.
Thiers says: "To admit false neutrals in order to confiscate
them afterwards, greatly pleased his astute mind, little
scrupulous in the choice of means, especially in regard to
shameless smugglers who violated at once the laws of their
own country and those of the country that consented to
admit them." ^ Napoleon himself wrote to Danzig: "Let
the American ships enter your ports ! Seize them afterwards.
* M. J. L. A. Thiers, Histoire du consulat et de fempire (21 vols., Parish
etc., 1845-69), vol. xii.
WAR WITH ENGLAND 167
You shall deliver the cargoes to me, and I will take them in
part payment of the Prussian war debt." On March 25,
1810, he published the Rambouillet decree, which was prac-
tically a public announcement of that of Vienna, but with
this difiFerence, that it merely sequestered the American
vessels instead of confiscating them. He thus held in his
hands over eight million dollars' worth of American property
as hostage for our behavior. The number of vessels seized
in the various countries indicated the state of trade: 51 in
France, 44 in Spain, 28 in Naples, and 11 in Holland. To
carry out this vigorous policy he was forced to depose his
brother Louis, king of Holland, and annex that country to
France, as well as to drive from the cabinet his valuable
assistant, Fouch^, He still continued, however, to license
American vessels to import specified goods, and they con-
tinued to pay high for such licences.
In spite of the attention that he devoted to it, American
trade can hardly be said to have been a leading consideration
with Napoleon at this time; his main desire, j- . ,
the closing of the American market to British Macon Bill
goods, was still fulfilled. Very different, how-
ever, was the situation created by the next change in the
American system. Restive under our own regulations, public
sentiment, after a hard struggle, at length. May 1, 1810,.ob-,
tained a practical abandonment of the restrictive system;
by means of an act popularly known as "Macon Bill No. 2/*
which allowed trade with all the world. The only continu-
ance of the policy of using commercial regulation as a weapon
of diplomacy is foimd in the provision authorizing the Presi-
dent, in case either Great Britain or France should, before
the third day of March following, "so revoke or modify her {/
edicts" as to "cease to violate the neutral commerce of the
United States," and the other country should not do so, to
renew the non-intercourse act against the obdurate power.
This was indeed a blow to Napoleon's continental system,
for it reopened to England her most valuable single market.
^
168 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
It is said that he devoted three days to a consideration of
the situation. The result was a letter from his foreign minis-
ter, Cadore, of August 5, 1810: "In this new state of things,
I am authorized to declare to you, sir, that the decrees of
Berlin and Milan are revoked, and that after the 1st of No-
vember they will cease to have effect; it being understood
that, in consequence of this declaration, the English shall
revoke their orders in council, and renounce the new prin-
ciples of blockade which they have wished to establish; or
that the United States, conformably to the act you have
just communicated, shall cause their rights to be respected
by the English. It is with the most particular satisfaction,
sir, that I make known to you this determination of the
Emperor, His majesty loves the Americans. Their pros-
perity and their commerce are within the scope of his policy.**
But Napoleon's purpose was not the abandonment of his
system. "It is evident," said he, "that we commit ourselves
to nothing." He explained to his council that, should the
English withdraw their orders, he could achieve his results
by customs regulation. What he hoped was that by the
ambiguity of his letter he might once more embroil England
and the United States. Meantime, to clean the slate of
the past, he ordered the American vessels sequestered by \/
the RambouUlet decree to be confiscated. This order was
not published; but, when its effects became evident, Cadore
explained that it did not affect the future, that it was in
reprisal for our non-intercourse act, and that the law of
reprisal was final.
Madison seized upon this letter with avidity. He at once
demanded that Great Britain withdraw her orders, including
Napoleon and the blockade of 1806, and threatened non-
Madison intercourse should she fail to do so. The Mar-
quis of Wellesley, who had succeeded Canning, was more
favorably disposed toward the United States; but as he read
the Cadore letter it contained a conditional offer, not a state-
ment of fact. He thought it meant that, if Great Britain
WAR WITH ENGLAND 169
should withdraw her orders, Napoleon would withdraw his
decrees; that if she should not do so the decrees would also
remain in force unless the United States made her neutrality
respected, that is, unless she forced England to recall her
orders. In this impasse the United States would not, he
believed, be justified in differentiating between the belliger-
ents until she received evidence of the withdrawal of the
decrees. He also found in the letter an additional condition,
— namely, that Great Britain must renounce her principle
of blockade. Madison, however, understanding that the
decrees were actually withdrawn, — ^for Napoleon failed to
answer the riddle which he had set, — declared non-intercourse y
with England reestablished after February 2, 1811, He was
sustained by an act of Congress of March 2, 1811, and in '
April, as an expression of his discontent, he withdrew Pinkney
from London. Once more, therefore, Napoleon closed the ^
American market to England.
His wall, however, was crumbling at its opposite extremity.
It has been noted that on December 31, 1810, Russia opened
her ports to neutral vessels. American ship- Napoleon and
ping straightway crowded her ports, and much ^"^^*
that they brought was British. Of our exports to Russia in
1811, amounting to over $6,000,000, only $1,630,499 were
of our own products. Nor did the total amount given in
our figures include cargoes taken in England and admitted
by Russia because of the American flag borne by the ship
carrying them, a flag which in many cases it had no right to
fly. Napoleon called upon the czar to close this breach. The
Russian court was divided, torn by factions. Curiously,
Romanzoff, who was sympathetic with France, wished to
encourage the American merchant marine in order to release
Russia from her former dependence on England; Nesselrode,
whose inclinations were English, objected to extending privi-
leges to the United States not granted to Great Britain. He
wished alliance with the latter power. American trade, long
torn by the dogs of war, thus became the bone of contention
170 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
to set them fighting among themselves. John Quincy Adams
found himself at St. Petersburg, — familiar to him as a boy-
hood memory from his stay there while secretary to Francis
Dana, our first minister, — more vitally involved in European
entanglements than had been any American minister since
Franklin. Napoleon would assent to no compromise, the
czar would not close his ports, and events marched rapidly
toward war and Napoleon's invasion.^
In behalf of our commerce, Russia was preparing for war
with France and alHance with England; Napoleon was pre-
paring to force Russia to close her ports to neutral trade.
Could we still preserve our neutrality in this supreme mo-
ment of struggle? To which side did our interests ally us?
To Russia, fighting to defend our rights but allied with Eng-
land, our great commercial rival? or to Napoleon, endeavoring
to shut us out of Europe, but professing himself, if he won
and brought England to terms, willing to establish peace on
earth and freedom on the seas? Even if these professions
were not to be accepted at their face value, at any rate it was
probable that a victorious Napoleon would not be lenient,
should one have stirred his wrath.
During the spring of 1811 Madison and Monroe, the latter
of whom had just replaced Smith at the state department,
Napoleonic debated over the question. The immediate
tnumph issue was whether we should send a minister
to France to take the place of Armstrong, who had returned
to America. Evidence accumulated that Napoleon's decrees
still operated and that the sequestered American vessels
were actually confiscated. The balance turned against
France. At this critical moment, however. Napoleon once
more proved himself equal to the emergency. His foreign
minister, the Duke of Bassano, informed Jonathan Russell,
our secretary of legation, that the emperor had authorized
"the admission of the American cargoes which had been
» J. Q. Adams, Memoirs (12 vob., PhUadelphia, 1874-77), ii. 491-662, iii.
1-144.
WAR WITH ENGLAND 171
provisionally placed on deposit." This turned the scale;
Joel Barlow was appointed minister, and relations were con-
tinued.
The administration still hoped for peace, although lean-
ing toward France; but its plans were set at naught by the
entrance into national politics of two new The "War
factors. The first was a general fighting spirit ^^^^ "
brought to Congress, when it met in the autumn of 1811, by a
number of young men who soon began to act together and to ^
be known as the "War Hawks." The aroma of war had for
twenty years floated across the Atlantic, but it had brought
only its glories and not its sorrows. To the younger genera-
tion war seemed to be almost the normal condition, and to
offer opportunities of distinction and advancement which
peace denied. If, however, the wars of Europe had an effect
on American youth, the effect was general. No longer, as
in 1793, did the particular issues of European politics divide
the majority of Americans into partisans of France and of
England. The new war leaders were nationalists; they I
wished to fight to vindicate the honor of their country,
smirched, they believed, by her long supine submission to
the whacks and blows of the belligerents. Isolation they
accepted, but they did not believe that it must necessarily
be passive. Many of the leaders were indifferent as to whom
they fought; Calhoun, the logical, with the enthusiasm of
youth, would fight both.^
Direction was given to this warlike spirit by the second fac-
tor. Once more western problems became vital : they were to
determine the issue. This time it was primarily »«,■«, .^
a question of the northwest, though its views
were voiced in Congress by Henry Clay of Kentucky, speaker
of the new House of Representatives.^ The most obvious
1 J. C. Calhoun, Works (ed. R. K. CraU6, 6 vols.. New York, 1853-55),
vol. ii.
» Henry Clay, Works (ed. C. Colton, 7 vols., New York, 1897), voL I
cb. iz.
172 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
motive for discontent resulted from the Indian situation.
Steadily since 1796 the pioneer had pressed into the wilder-
ness, steadily the government had made broad his way by
contriving one purchase of Indian land after another. The
Indians, grumbling, had yielded to necessity; but dissatisfac-
tion grew among them, and recently had resulted in com-
bination to resist encroachment. Under the leadership of
two brothers, Tecumseh, the war chief, and Olliwochica,
_. , ,. the prophet, the beginnings of a confederacy
The Indians . i i i i . • -
were formed, the leaders conceivmg of a union
not only of the northern tribes but also between the northern
and southern groups. In 1811 war began in the battle of
Tippecanoe, near the Wabash.
That the Indian hostility was encouraged by the British,
and that the latter would aid the savages in the coming war,
British and In- was firmly believed by the sanest heads on
^*°' the frontier. William Henry Harrison, gover-
nor of Indiana territory and in command at Tippecanoe, said
that he could always tell the state of relations between
United States and Great Britain by the behavior of the
Indians. Great Britain's policy was actually not different
from that pursued during Washington's administration.
There was on the part of the government no incitement to
hostility; rather, the effort was to keep the peace. On the
other hand, it maintained, though not entirely of its own
choice, relations with the Indians which, considering the fact
that these tribes were within the limits of the United States,
were not compatible with any principle of international
comity. Moreover, as was natural on so wild a frontier,
its control over its own agents and subjects was so lax that
it was sometimes involved by their acts in complications
for which it was not directly responsible but which it was
by its international duty required to prevent.
The British subjects concerned in these relations were
nearly all fur-traders. Scotch, French-Canadians, English,
and half-breeds, they led lives of the most unfettered free-
WAR WITH ENGLAND ITS
dom, with the exception of an almost complete economic
dependence upon the two great British companies, the Hud-
son Bay, and the Northwestern. Together these Fur-trade ri-
companies dominated the whole region west- ^*^**
ward from Lake Michigan, including what is now Wisconsin
and the upper reaches of the Mississippi and the Missouri.
Wide as was the area, its paths, the rivers and trails, were
none too numerous, and the traders of the two companies
were continually encountering each other, as well as the
rivals of both, the Americans. The latter had hitherto not
been so well organized as the British subjects; but of late
the American Fur Company, of which John Jacob Astor was
the leading spirit, had been bringing order out of chaos.
Astor's imperial plans were now taking the form of estab-
lishing a permanent settlement on the Pacific coast. He
engaged experts from the Northwestern Company, and in
1811 founded the post of Astoria on the Columbia. This
distant enterprise did not, however, diminish the rivalry
nearer home. From St. Louis and Michilimackinac went
forth better and better equipped bands of American traders,
who competed with those sent out by the British companies.
The emulation in the forests and plains was transmitted,
with the skins, to Montreal and to New York, which sup-
plied the capital for the expeditions and for the establish-
ment of the posts, and which competed in the disposal of the
furs. Relatively the British were losing ground; they asked
for government support; they bemoaned the influence of the
United States government factories which had been estab-
lished at Washington's behest. To the American frontiers-
men, their own government seemed inert and spineless as
compared with that of Great Britain, and particularly they
protested at the free use of American soil which the British
companies enjoyed under the Jay treaty. This growing
rivalry was temporarily embittered by the fall in the price of
furs as a result of the European wars. The pressure for
assistance was equally strong upon both governments, but
174 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
it was most effective at this time in strengthening the call
for war from the American frontier.^
It is not to be supposed that the purpose of the virile
West was purely self-defence. To north, to west, to south.
Conquest of it felt nothing stronger than itself, except the
Canada bonds of the United States government which
held it in. It strained at the leash. It felt competent, if
left alone, to settle all its difficulties in the completes! man-
ner by wiping out opposition. It wished merely permission
to use its strength. February 22, 1810, Henry Clay said
to the Senate: "The conquest of Canada is in your power,
I trust I shall not be deemed presumptuous when I state
that I verily believe that the militia of Kentucky are alone
competent to place Montreal and Upper Canada at your
feet."
The new national 'spirit, thus directed by the West, swept
the administration fluttering before it. The breeze was fanned,
„ , . , to be sure, by some new episodes, such as the
War declared . .
encounter in 1811 of the President and the Little
Belt, in which the former avenged our navy for the maltreat-
ment of the Chesapeake by the Leopard, and the publication
by Congress in 1812 of the papers of John Henry, a British
secret agent; but these things counted little. On April 1,
1812, in a secret message, Madison recommended an em-
bargo preparatory to war. On June 1 he recommended war,
and on July 18 Congress accepted the recommendation.
England at the eleventh hour sought to preserve peace.
She sent over the comparatively agreeable Augustus John
England's ef- Foster. Apology and reparation for the
fort for peace Leopard-Chesapeake affair were at length ar-
ranged. On June 16 the recall of the orders was voted by
Parliament. Madison, however, deemed this insufficient.
He demanded assurance that blockades should not be made
* Washington Irving, Astoria, 1 vols., Philadelphia, 1836; H. M. Chitten-
den, The American Fur Trade of the Far West, 3 vols.. New York, 1902;
The Fur-trade in Wisconsin, Wisconsin Hist. Soc., Collections, 1911, vol. xx.
WAR WITH ENGLAND 175
to do the duty of the orders, that the enforcement of English
blockades off the American coast should cease, and that the
impressment of seamen should be suspended, pending a treaty
which should settle the matter definitively. In the election of
1812 the country supported Madison by reelecting him. It
is noticeable that the commercial states voted ^
, . 1 • n 1 e Causes of war
agamst him, protestmg at this nnai attempt of
an administration of agriculturists to protect our commercial
interests. The West solidly supported him. The causes of
the war were not Great Britain's failure to agree with us as
to the position of neutrals, nor did they spring from the
jockeying of Napoleon; they lay rather in the national anger
roused by twenty years' disregard of our neutral rights.
It was not detailed arguments, but accumulated woes, that
moved the "War Hawks" of the East, while those of the
West felt the added impulse to obtain a free hand for the
settlement of their own problems.
CHAPTER XV
PEACE
Until the spring of 1814 Great Britain did not blockade
the coast north of Cape Cod. In part this forbearance may
_ t B 't • have been due to a hope, based upon the re-
and New Eng- ports of secret agents like John Henry and
John Howe, her consuls, and Jackson her
minister, that the discontent of that region might find ex-
pression in separation from the United States.^ It was true
that its leading men doubted whether they could forever
endure a government so distasteful in its policies; and their
anger mounted higher when, in this supreme moment of the
contest between Napoleon representing the forces of revolu-
tion, and England the supporter of order, the administration
threw its weight into what they believed was the wrong
scale. Their view was expressed by Pickering's toast to
Jackson in 1810, "The world's last hope, — Britain's fast-
anchored isle." This feeling extended to heckling the govern-
ment, and later to action looking toward a break-up of the
Union; but it did not reach the point of treating with the
national enemy, nor did it prevent New England from doing
its fair share in the war.^
Great Britain did not lose by her leniency, however, and
probably her motive was less political than commercial. The
^ ^ West Indies and the armies in Canada needed
War trade
supplies, and New England could furnish them,
and did. As, in the wars between England and France when
we were colonies, our ship-captains helped supply the French
* "Secret Reports of John Howe, 1808," Amer. Hist. Review, 1911-12, xvii.
70-102, 332-354; see also PauUin and Paxson, Gwicfe,"Lady Jackson Papers."
* Edmund Quincy, Life of Josiah Quincy (Boston, 1867), 242-306.
176
PEACE 177
West India islands,* so now, under one disguise or another,
the New England ships brought to Halifax and other ports
the needed provisions, and from one point or another gath-
ered cargoes to import into Boston and other open ports. In
fact, war proved to have less effect on New England com- ^
merce than the embargo had had. South of Cape Cod the
blockade was so far from being of the "paper" variety that
practically no trade could go on without the assent of Great
Britain. Her armies in Spain, however, must be fed, and
they continued to draw their supplies from the ample gran-
aries about the Chesapeake, brought to them in American
vessels equipped with special licences. Privateering, more-
over, was not much more hazardous than were many other /
branches of the trade which Americans had been pursuing.
Many merchants strengthened their craft, enlarged their
crews, and scoured the seas for British merchantmen. The
national balance of captures and losses was not very unequal,
about seventeen hundred captures of merchant vessels being
credited to the Americans as against about fourteen hundred
losses; but wealth changed hands rapidly. Fortunes running
over a million were won. The losses made less impression
because, owing to various kinds of insurance, they actually
did not fall with corresponding heaviness upon individuals.
Most avenues of trade, however, were closed, and par-
ticularly the ordinary unromantic routes. The severest
blow was the cutting-oflf of the coast trade, . changed con-
which had been steadily growing since the end <^*^o°s "* ^8^*
of the Revolution, and which alone had escaped the dead
hand of the embargo. The Newfoundland fisheries also
were closed. With the fall of Napoleon in the spring of
1814, England, on the day after her final peace with France,
shut up the United States so completely that during that
summer her commerce was represented on the ocean by
nothing but some forty or fifty privateers.
^ G. S. Kimball, Correspondence of William Pitt . . . vnth Colonial Goth
emors, 1 vols.. New York, etc., 1906.
178 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
To the West, which had wanted the war, it brought both
satisfaction and disappointment. The Indians were thor-
Westem cam- oughly and, as it proved, finally overwhelmed,
P***^^ both to the south in the battle of Horseshoe
Bend, and to the north in the battle of Thames. This latter
result, however, was not due to the unassisted efforts of the
frontiersmen themselves, as Clay had boasted that it would
be. The navy, which after a brilliant and important struggle
had been driven from the ocean, sent of its personnel to the
lakes, where, in the battles of Lake Erie and Lake Cham-
plain, it established a control, which it continued to main-
tain, over all the border lakes except Ontario, where neither
side obtained supremacy. Even with this assistance Upper
Canada remained unconquered. The western leaders had
overlooked one element in the situation, — the people of the
region which is now Ontario. The nucleus of this sturdy
population consisted of American loyalists and their de-
scendants. Hearty in their hatred of the United States, they
were situated nearer the strategic points than were the Amer-
icans, and they afforded a substantial support to the British
troops, which until 1814 were none too numerous. After
the release of Wellington's veterans by the closing of the
European wars, conquest by the Americans was of course
out of question. In fact, in that year the British held points
on American soil all along the northern boundary.^
While these events were taking place negotiations for
peace were in progress.^ It was displeasing to the czar that,
Russia offers just when Napoleon was invading Russia to
mediation close her ports to American trade, the United
States should go to war with Great Britain, his friend and
leading ally. He, therefore, September 21, 1812, offered
» C. P. Lucas, The Canadian War of 1812, Oxford, 1906.
*For the peace negotiations; J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, and Writings;
Gallatin, Writings; Bayard, Papers, Am. Hist. Assoc, Report, 1913, vol. II;
Clay and Crawford, Correspondence, Am. Hist. Review, XX, 108-129; and
American Slate Papers, Foreign Relations. The best historical account is that
in the last chapter of Mahan's Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 181S.
PEACE iro
mediation, and Adams at once sent word of the offer to
Washington. It reached there with the news of Napoleon's
reverses. We had bet on the wrong horse. We had care-
fully refrained from allying ourselves with Napoleon, but
the fact that he too was fighting England had undoubtedly
lent us courage. Madison did not relish the idea of carrying
on the war alone. Indeed, there was no reason why he should
not negotiate, or why he should not accept the mediation of
Russia, whose useful friendship our commerce had experi-
enced. The offer was therefore accepted, March 11, 1813,
and a mission was appointed consisting of Albert Gallatin
and Adams of the administration party, and James A.
Bayard, a Federalist.
When Gallatin and Bayard reached Europe they found the
offer of mediation rejected by England. Although Great
Britain and Russia were united in fighting Russia versuB
Napoleon, their ideas did not harmonize on ^"** ^'^**"*
many other subjects. Particularly on those involved in the
dispute between Great Britain and the United States were
they poles apart, Russia clinging to the pronouncements of
Catharine's Armed Neutrality, England to the principles
that had so long controlled her conduct. "Maritime law!"
said Lord Walpole at one time to Adams. "Why, Russia
may fight us till she sinks, and she will get no maritime law
from us; that is no change in the maritime law. Maritime
law submitted to the Congress! What can there be upon
earth more absurd?" Alexander, moreover, became less
intent upon pressing the matter as the allies became more
successful and it was seen that the weight of America was
not sufficient to prevent the balance tipping against Na-
poleon. Mediation failed.
On July 13, 1813, Castlereagh offered to negotiate directly.
This offer, made while victory in Europe was still undeter-
mined, was eagerly accepted by Madison after the defeat
of Napoleon in the campaigns of that year had become pat-
ent. He added to the American commission Henry Clay to
180 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
represent the West, and Jonathan Russell, who had served in
France. After some troublesome preliminaries it was ar-
Opening of ne- ranged that the negotiations take place at Ghent,
gotiations rpj^^ ^.^^ commissions were well chosen and rep-
resentative. On the British side Lord Gambier was an ad-
miral, Henry Goulburn was member of Parliament and under-
secretary for the colonies, and William Adams was a doctor
of law. Expert and skilful as they were, however, they were
no match for the American commissioners. Three of these,
Gallatin, Bayard, and Clay, were without diplomatic ex-
perience, but Gallatin and Clay, with Adams, were among
the ablest half-dozen men of our country. They were thor-
oughly at home in handling American questions; they were
used to dealing with men; and they had an intellectual power
and a driving force which utterly overshadowed that of their
opponents. England was at the disadvantage of having her
best talent diverted to the more important Congress of
Vienna, but even her delegation there could not have over-
matched the Americans at Ghent. Though Adams was the
head of the American commission, Gallatin was its most
influential member. A French Swiss by birth and education,
and of noble family, he was regarded by Europeans as one of
themselves, familiar with their standards and mode of life,
a solace in their intercourse with the, if not untutored at
least differently tutored, Americans. At the most critical
moment of the negotiation the duke of Wellington did not
hesitate to write to him privately of his wish for peace.
Gallatin acted as mediator between the members of the
commission and between the commission as a whole and
European public men.^
Our best efforts were indeed needed. England was at her
pinnacle. The Times, in June, 1814, when Gallatin and
Bayard were in London, said: "Having disposed of all our
enemies in Europe, let us have no cant of moderation. There
* A Oreat Peace Maker, the Diary of James Gallatin, New York, 1914,
34-85.
PEACE 181
is no public feeling in the country stronger than that of
indignation against the Americans. As we urged the
principle of no peace with Bonaparte, so we English opin-
must maintain the doctrine of no peace with *°"
James Madison." The same paper, announcing the American
victory at Plattsburg, said, October 14, 1814: "This is a
lamentable event to the civilized world. The subversion of
the whole system of the Jeffersonian school . . . was an
event to which we should have bent and yet must bend all
our energies. The present American government must be
displaced, or it will sooner or later plant its poisoned dagger
in the heart of the parent state." Again it declared, "Mr.
Madison's dirty swindling manoeuvers in respect to Louisiana
and the Floridas remain to be punished," The British were
at this time in Spanish Florida; they threatened Mobile; and
throughout the negotiations news was awaited of the fleet
and the army under Pakenham which was advancing upon
New Orleans. Louisiana had as yet but a small American
population, it was isolated from the settled West, and the
loyalty of its Creoles was in doubt. It seemed possible,
therefore, that the mouth of the Mississippi might be lost
and all the attendant problems once more arise.
More definite was the danger to the northward. The
Canadian Gazette insisted that the United States surrender
the northern part of New York State, so as The "buffer
to give Canada both banks of the St. Lawrence ^***® "
and of the Niagara. It insisted also on a guaranteed buflFer
Indian country, bounded toward the United States by a
line from Sandusky to Kaskaskia. This old idea, which
Hammond had been instructed to act upon in 1792, was
now being continually urged upon the British ministry.
Tackle wrote to Lord Bathurst, November 24, 1812, suggest-
ing that the Indian territory extend to the Maumee and the
Wabash. "It would be, in my feeble judgment," he urged,
"if occupied exclusively by Indians, an all important barrier
to the designs of the United States against the influence.
182 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
and intercourse of the British, with the immense regions
extending Westerly even to the Pacific Ocean." The fur-
traders and the Indians had fought well during the war,
the latter especially had suflFered; now both demanded that
protection which they had persistently been claiming from
the British government since 1783.
Under these circumstances, Castlereagh issued his in-
structions, July 28, 1814. Maritime law was not to be
The rival in- touched. The boundary should be "rectified"
structions g^ ^^ g-^^ ^j^^ British a road from Halifax to
Quebec, with Sackett's harbor to command the St. Lawrence,
Fort Niagara to command the river of the same name, and
Moose island and Eastport to command the mouth of the
St. Croix. The Indians should be included in the treaty,
and should be assured of a mutually guaranteed boundary, —
that fixed by Wayne's treaty of 1795. The United States
must give up its privileges in the fisheries, and the naviga-
tion of the lakes; England, having access to the Mississippi
through the Indian country, must continue to enjoy its
navigation. The American instructions, prepared by Mon-
roe, January 14, 1814, were to obtain first of all an acknowl-
edgment of the American position on points of maritime law,
though a compromise was suggested on the subject of im-
pressment whereby Great Britain was to yield the right
and the United States was to forbid British born sailors to
serve in American vessels. Indemnity was to be secured for
illegal captures. The commissioners were to urge "the ad-
vantages to both countries which are promised by a transfer
of the upper parts and even the whole of Canada to the
United States," and were to point out that experience had
shown that Great Britain could not "participate in the
dominion and navigation of the lakes without incurring the
danger of an early renewal of the war."
These differences seemed to preclude the possibility of
agreement, especially since the British terms were presented
in the form of an ultimatum. On August 24, the American
PEACE 183
commissioners returned a "unanimous and decided negative,"
in a very able note setting forth that the English claims were
"founded neither on reciprocity, nor any of the
usual bases of negotiation, neither that of uii
possedetis nor of status quo ante helium." Openly, but not
hastily, they prepared to leave Ghent. While thus delaying
they talked much with the British commissioners, par-
ticularly in regard to the buffer state. Gallatin asked what
would become of the hundred thousand Americans already
living within the boundary proposed. Goulburn, perhaps
hearing of them for the first time, thought that the line
might be slightly changed, but that on the whole the Ameri-
cans could shift for themselves : the Indians would treat them
well; he knew an Indian who was very intelligent. Adams
said that such a treaty provision was opposing a feather
to a torrent. Population, he declared, was increasing: "As
it continued to increase in such proportions, was it in human
experience, or in human power, to check its progress by a
bond of paper purporting to exclude posterity from the
natural means of subsistence?" Bayard, the Federalist, told
Goulburn that, when it became known that the negotiation
had broken off on such terms, the Federalist party in the
United States would be overwhelmed.
In the end the Americans succeeded in making an impres-
sion on the British commissioners, and through them on
the ministry. Since England had been put _ . .
in the position of continuing the war for con- peace in Eng-
quest, the ministry became satisfied that if
the negotiations ended at this point the war would become
"quite popular" in America. "It is very material," they
said, "to throw the rupture of the negotiations, if it take
place, upon the Americans." It was, indeed, feared that the
war might become unpopular in England: the Times did
not represent the whole nation. The same elements of
distress which, anxious for the American market, had all
too late forced the recall of the orders in council, would be
184 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
little inclined to forego their trade much longer for remote
accessions of territory in the wilds of America. The minis-
try, moreover, was full of anxiety over the wrangles of the
late allies at the Congress of Vienna, where events were
rapidly shaping themselves for a new European alignment, —
England, France, and Austria against Russia and Prussia —
and a new war. Moved by these considerations, it sent new
instructions to Ghent, September 1. Far from satisfactory
in themselves, these new terms put the British in the awk-
ward position of having retreated from an ultimatum. The
American commissioners were quick to take advantage of
this weakness. They refused to treat on the proposed new
basis of uti possedetis, that is to say the situation then exist-
ing. Under these circumstances the duke of Wellington
was asked if he would go to America. He expressed his
willingness, but declared that nothing could be accomplished
while the Americans held the lakes, and said that England
was not justified by the military situation in demanding any
territory. The ministry once more receded, and offered to
negotiate on the basis of status quo ante helium, or the con-
dition before the war. Indeed, it is difficult to see how they
could do anything else. If they doubted the support of
public opinion in demanding important posts and a buffer
state, they could scarcely expect it in fighting for the aj>-
parently trivial bits of American territory which they were
holding in 1814.
On the other hand, the American commissioners found that
in insisting on an adjustment of maritime law they ran into
„ , . . the stone- wall of British determination. For-
Mantune law , , . . , ,
tunately, however, they were mstructed from
America, where Madison was oppressed by the impending
British attack on New Orleans, the harrying of the coast
and burning of Washington, and the prospect of the Hart-
ford convention, to omit such clauses from the treaty if
necessary.
With these points out of the way, negotiations progressed
PEACE 185
rapidly. On the question of fisheries, it is true, the Amer-
ican commission divided. Adams and Russell wished to re-
state the terms of 1783, which meant that the _,. . .
.... Fishenes ver-
British right to navigate the Mississippi must sus the Mis-
be conceded also. Clay, mindful of the use-
fulness of that river to the British fur-traders, and afraid
that such a right would be used by Great Britain to back a
claim for territorial access to the Mississippi by pushing
south the northern boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, was
unwilling to admit the privilege. Finally, at Gallatin's
suggestion, both points were omitted, and on December 24,
1814, the treaty was signed.
Great triumph of American diplomacy as the treaty was
in the light of the British instructions, yet, considered from
the point of view that the Americans began the ' Gains and
war to obtain satisfaction for what they con- bosses
sidered infractions of maritime law, it registered a defeat, i
It is more important, however, to note that from 1815 until
the present year (1914), Great Britain was at war with
European powers for only three years (1853 to 1856), and
so the treaty marked the end of our suffering as neutrals
from her exactions for a hundred years. The West more
nearly obtained what it wanted. The treaty provided:
"The United States engage to put an end, immediately after
the ratification of the present treaty, to hostilities with aU
the tribes or nations of Indians," on the basis of 1812, if
they should agree. No provision guaranteed these bound-
aries, however, and though the United States continued to
press them westward, Great Britain never after meddled in
the matter. The Indian power east of the Mississippi was
broken, and never again within the United States did any
Indians play a part as a factor in American diplomacy. The
general restoration of property, moreover, included the rais-
ing of the United States flag over the post of Astoria, al-
though the property title to it had passed into the hands
of the British Northwestern Company, to be absorbed later
sy
186 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
into the Great, or Hudson Bay, Company. By this recogni- v/
tion was added a third link to our claim to Oregon.
The treaty provided also for the settlement of the numer-
ous points of dispute that had arisen regarding the exact
Boundary location of the boundary between Canada and
commissions ^^ United States. Once more, as in the case
of the Jay treaty, these questions were to be determined by
semi-judicial process, — that is, by commissions of two mem-
bers each, or, if the commissions failed to agree, by arbitra-
tion. Four such commissions were arranged for. The first
one was to divide the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, in "^
submitting one of which. Moose island, to question, the
Americans suffered the only defeat, so far as details were
concerned, in the framing of the treaty. This commission
worked satisfactorily on the whole, although the final water
boundary was not determined until an arbitration of 1908.
Another commission ultimately fixed the boundary from ^
the crossing of the forty-fifth parallel and the St. Lawrence
through Lake Huron. The problems of the boundary from
the St. Croix to the St. Lawrence and from Lake Huron to
the Lake of the Woods proved too complicated; the com-
missions charged with them failed to agree, and subsequent
arbitration was unsuccessful. Nevertheless, another long
step had been taken in clearing up the ambiguities and
vagueness of the treaty of 1783.
From the peace of Ghent the United States emerged, not
a "great power" in the conventional sense, but a nation of
Our position in assured position. Thereafter our strength was
^^^^ suflBcient for our defence, and our safety ceased
to depend on the oscillations of the European balance of
power. The way was open for us to enter into the European
N ti ai • t system as a participating member, or to pursue
ence and terri- our own path without serious molestation.
There were just as many unsettled stretches of
our boundary as in 1783, but their vagueness was now an ad-
vantage to our growing power rather than a danger. The
PEACE 187
area of dispute, moreover, had been pushed back and our ter-
ritory was much more self -sufficing than it had been. We had
secured the outlet of our greatest river, and we actually pos-
sessed the mouths of nearly all those flowing from our terri-
tory into the Gulf of Mexico. The great western expanse of
the Louisiana Purchase assured us that the Mississippi was
destined to become what a river should be, a magnet to unite
and not a boundary to divide. Had we rested where we were
in 1815 our destiny as a great nation would have been cer-
tain; but we were already pushing our claims across the
mountains to the Pacific, and it required no great prophetic
power to foresee that our forty-five degrees of longitude
'vould irresistibly grasp the almost uninhabited ten degrees
)f the Pacific slope.
Our commerce for years had been abnormal, and was for
the moment almost swept from the seas; international law
Tiad been so strained and broken by twenty _. ,
~ '' Commerce and
years of ceaseless strife that one might have international
feared that two centuries of development in
the regulation of mternational relationships would be lost
and anarchy return. A world-wide readjustment must fol-
low the overthrow of Napoleon, and we must share in it.
Fortunately, we were increasingly producing things that
other nations needed, besides affording a growing market
for their products. Fortunately, too, we entered into the
new era of negotiation free from entangling agreements, and
with a remarkably consistent record of action in the past
from which we could develop policies for the future.
CHAPTER XVI
COMMERCE AND BOUNDARIES
The period from the treaty of Ghent to the inauguration
of Jackson is notable for the continuity and the brilliancy of
The diplomat- our diplomatic service. In 1817 Monroe, hav-
ic service j^^g jjggjj secretary of state, became President.
Unsuccessful in all his early diplomatic undertakings except
the purchase of Louisiana, which was in no wise due to him,
he had nevertheless an experience dating back to 1793, and
he showed improvement.^
But, although the responsibility was Monroe's, the burden
fortunately fell on John Quincy Adams. As a boy Adams had
Characteristics known the diplomatic circles of Paris and St.
of Adams Petersburg. From 1795 to 1801 he had con-
ducted negotiations with England, Holland, Prussia, and
Sweden. At the close of his work at Ghent, he became minis-
ter to Great Britain, to return home in 1817 as secretary
of state, an office which he retained until his elevation to the
presidency in 1825. Although perhaps not intended by
nature for a career in diplomacy, by intellect and industry
he forced himself ahead of all his contemporaries and made
fundamental contributions to American diplomacy on a
par with those of Franklin, Washington, his father John
Adams, and Hay. Unprofitably obstinate and exacting,
and without personal charm, he had a more comprehensive
view of our national future than any of his associates, a
view somewhat obscured in later life, it is true, when his
emotions were stirred by his opposition to slavery and his
imagination by his fear of the slavocracy. His chief opi>onent
* Monroe, Writings, 7 vols, N. Y., 1898-1903.
188
COMMERCE AND BOUNDARIES 189
was George Canning, after 1822 foreign minister of Great
Britain. Both players of consummate ability, Adams
showed perhaps more genius. Canning more
adaptability. If neither definitely triumphed
over the other, at least neither lost tricks; each won when
he held the cards.^
Of subordinates, Gallatin gained golden opinions during
his mission to France from 1816 to 1823, and served as
minister to England in 1826 and 1827.^ Clay, ^^^^
as Adams remarks, had been much influenced
by his residence abroad on the peace commission. With his
ready adaptability he had added a polish of manner to his
natural magnetism, and had acquired interest
in foreign affairs and a broad, if somewhat
superficial, knowledge of them. Disappointed at not re-
ceiving the state department in 1817, he was for years
a thorn in the side of the administration; but during
his service as secretary of state, from 1825 to 1829,
he was a sympathetic coadjutor of Adams. Richard
Rush and Rufus King, ministers to England „ , ,„.
, , , , Rush and King
from 1817 to 1825, were highly competent
representatives of the country.^ In general, indeed, the
service had begun to attract men of a high class, and the
administration was willing to employ them.
This condition was both a cause and a result of the higher
standing which the United States had taken in the world's
estimation. Perhaps no one thing had con- Enhanced
tributed more to this added prestige than the P^®stige
glorious, though apparently futile, record of our navy in the
war. Not since the French Revolution beheaded the naval
oflBcers of the old regime had the British found rivals able to
stand before them on any basis approaching equality. The
' J. Q. Adams, Memoirs. 12 vols., Phila., 1874-77. H. W. V. Temperley,
Life of Canning, London, 1905.
* Gallatin, Writings. 3 vols., Phila., 1879.
* Richard Rush, Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London. Phila-
^phia, 1833; C. R. King, Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, 6 vols.
190 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
successful naval duels fought by the Constitution, the Wasp,
and the United States, to say nothing of the battles on the
lakes, amazed Europe. England sought to minimize this
wnpression by pointing to inequalities in the strength of the
vessels, and by claiming the crews as renegade Englishmen;
but she failed to shake their effect. The potential strength
of the American navj% and the actual strength of the mer-
chant marine on which it rested, gained us a hearing at every
court. ^
The problems that engaged the attention of the govern-
ment during this period were less vital than those which
Decline of occupied our diplomacy before 1815, and conse-
Commerce quently attracted less public interest. To a
large degree our long-sought isolation had been attained.
The European situation was also less absorbing, and our
growth had rendered us less malleable to European intrigues.
Moreover, Jefferson's restrictive policy had hastened the
same natural process here which Napoleon's continental
system had brought about in Europe. Manufacturing had
developed. We were less dependent upon foreign imports,
and our own markets consumed a greater proportion of our
agricultural products. We were approaching more nearly
to an economic equilibrium, and commerce was not so im-
portant to us as it had been. Our diplomacy was less in-
teresting and less vital, and it was conducted under less
pressure.
The treaty of Ghent had so rigidly excluded contentious
matters that many subjects were left to the future. This
Continuation was on the whole to the advantage of the
witlf*^reat°" United States. In fact, the statesmen of the
Britain rising generation, conscious of our steadily
growing power and not confronted by the pressing necessity
of the Confederation and early constitutional periods, were
usually ready to let issues drag, confidently believing that
» C. F. Adams, "Wednesday, August 19, 1812, 6:30 p. m. the Birth of a
World Power," Amer. Hist. Review, 1913, xviii. 513-521.
COMMERCE AND BOUNDARIES 191
time was working with them. The settlement of many of
these problems, however, was not long delayed; for the treaty
proved to be not the end of agreement, but merely the first
step toward it.
In 1817 Bagot, the British minister at Washington, and
Richard Rush, the acting secretary of state, exchanged
notes dealing with the navigation of the Great use of the
Lakes. This simple arrangement provided for ^*^®'
the maintenance of small and equal armed forces by the two
powers. Although revocable at six months' notice, it has,
adjusted to meet the changing conditions of ship-construction
and revenue patrol, lasted to the present time.^
A disagreement arose over the interpretation of the treaty
of Ghent. The Americans claimed that its provision for the
return of property of all kinds included slaves, indemnity for
many of whom had been taken on board by "*''®^
British war vessels in the Chesapeake and elsewhere; Great
Britain, on the contrary, maintained that they ceased to be
slaves on entering a British war vessel and so could not be
returned. By a convention of 1818 this question was sub-
mitted to a true arbitration by the emperor of Russia, who
decided that we could claim indemnification but not restitu-
tion. In accordance with this decision, a new claims conven-
tion was framed in 1822, by which we ultimately received
nearly a million and a quarter dollars in compensation. The
demand for the restitution of slaves taken at the close of the
Revolution was not pressed.
A more disturbing question was that of the status of
previous agreements between the two nations. The effect of
a war upon earlier treaties is a subject which Effect of war
had not then, and indeed has not yet, been o°*r«»ti«s
reduced to rule. The courts of this country and of others
have continued to enforce provisions respecting individual
rights established under earlier treaties, though this does not
* J. M. Callahan, Agreement of 1817; Reduction of Naval Forces upon the
American Lakes, Amer. Hist. Assoc, Report, 1895, pp. 369-392.
192 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
include a recognition of the power to create fresh rights from
the provisions of an earlier treaty after a war has intervened.
Again, many treaties contain provisions relating to conduct
during hostilities which would be meaningless were they
supposed to lapse with a declaration of war. Special priv-
ileges and arrangements, on the other hand, are commonly un-
derstood so to lapse. In discussing this problem, Adams was
particularly anxious to obtain recognition of the rights and
privileges accorded to American fishermen on the coast of
British America by the treaty of 1783. The British held that
these clauses had ceased to operate; consequently fifteen
hundred New England vessels previously employed in this
occupation were now barred from it. Adams could not
press his point as he might have wished; for we on our part
treated as void the permanent clause of the Jay treaty giving
mutual privileges in the fur trade, by passing, April 29, 1816,
an act forbidding licences for trade with the Indians to any
except United States citizens, unless by special permission
of the President. Adams attempted to draw a distinction
between the two treaties, on the ground that the first "was
not, in the general provisions, one of those which, by the
common understanding and usage of civilized nations, is or
can be considered as annulled by a subsequent war." This
Lord Bathurst denied; but he admitted that this treaty,
"like many others, contained provisions of different charac-
ter— some in their own nature irrevocable, and others of a
temporary character."
Upon this basis the convention of 1818 dealt with the
question. The "right" of Americans to fish off the Banks of
Convention f Newfoundland, "acknowledged" by the treaty
1818 and the of 1783, remained acknowledged; the "liber-
ties," however, were treated as void, and a
substitute arrangement was entered into. This contract
gave us the right to take fish within the three-mile limit on |
the coast of Labrador and certain specified coasts of New- i
foundland, and to use for drying fish the same shores so long I
COMMERCE AND BOUNDARIES 193
as they remained unsettled. Our fishermen might also use
the settled harbors "for the purpose of shelter and of repair-
ing damages therein, of purchasing wood, and of obtaining
water, and for no other purpose whatever." But, runs the
treaty, "they shall be under such restrictions as may be
necessary to prevent their taking, drying or curing fish
therein, or in any other manner whatever abusing the priv-
ileges hereby reserved to them."
Under this convention, which is still in force, the American ^
fishermen at once resumed their occupation. In spite of
its apparently liberal provisions, however, the ^ .
document proved to be a Pandora's box of lems of the
discords, and its ambiguities have been sources
of dispute almost to the present day. There were stretches
of coast where we wished to fish which were not included in
the treaty definition. Here we certainly could not encroach
within the three-mile limit, but it was not certain what the
three-mile limit meant. Great Britain insisted that a number
of bays, even though their mouths exceeded six miles across,
were closed waters; and we desired to use the Gut of Canso,
separating Nova Scotia from the island of Cape Breton,
although it was less than six miles broad. The important,
almost necessary, privilege of purchasing bait was not men-
tioned in the treaty and was often denied, as was that also of
using the harbors for transshipment of fish from one vessel
to another.
The local port regulations admitted of being made very
burdensome, and the spirit to make them so developed, for
the rivalry between American and Canadian Fishermen's
fishermen became constantly keener. Hereto- "^""®^
fore the Canadians had had the best of it, for the most
important common market for both countries, the British
West Indies, had been regulated to their advantage. Now
the United States was developing into the most important
market, and here the Americans had the aid of tariff protec-
tion. They also received bounties from the national govern-
194 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
ment, as an offset to the duty on the salt they used and In
recognition of the fisheries as a "nursery of seamen." The
less fortunate Canadians were eager to embarrass the Ameri-
cans by disagreeable regulations, but they were not unwilling
to sell them fish, upon which many Americans unblushingly
collected bounties and which they sold at prices enhanced by
the tariff.^
A somewhat similar question, which can hardly be said
ever to have risen to the surface of diplomacy, related to the
annuities granted by the United States, in
Indian claims i« x i- i i
payment for Indian lands, to certam tribes
which subsequently removed to Canada. Although paid
before the war, the annuities were discontinued afterwards,
and are now (1914) the subject of arbitration.
The most important unsettled question, however, though
not of so immediate concern as the fisheries, was that of
Northwestern boundary. At the "most northwestern point
boundary ^f ^^ie Lake of the Woods" the dividmg line
between the two nations vanished into thin air. The direc-
tion of the treaty of 1783 to continue a line westward until
it struck the Mississippi could not be carried out, as such a
line would not strike the Mississippi. Perhaps the most
logical thing would have been to draw the shortest line to that
point, but there was no entirely obvious course. Moreover,
the matter had been further complicated by our purchase of
Louisiana, which had no northern boundary. Finally, how-
ever, the two questions were combined and settled in the
convention of 1818, by the dropping of a line due south from I
the termination of the boundary to the forty-ninth parallel,
along which it continued westward to the "Stony," or, as we'
say. Rocky Mountains. This adjustment was eminently
satisfactory, as it gave us almost exactly the natural drainage y
basin of the Mississippi, which practically constituted our
claim by the Louisiana purchase. Although some commun-
^ Raymond McFarland, A History oj the New England Fisheries, New
York, 1911.
COMMERCE AND BOUNDARIES 195
ities along the northern border might to-day be somewhat
better accommodated had the natural line been followed, the
national area would not be noticeably different, and the
national temper would have been many times tried, and
might have been lost, in the attempt to locate it. Astro-
nomical boundaries have the advantage of being ascer-
tained by mechanical rather than by human instruments,
although, as we shall discover, astronomers may themselves
go wrong.
The obscuration of the Mississippi by this line, which left
it entirely within United States territory, gave a curious and
final twist to the problem of its navigation, _.
until then a perennial question. Had the tion of the
Mississippi taken its rise in British territory,
the clause of the treaty of 1783 giving Great Britain its free
use must probably have been interpreted as on a par with
that giving us the "right" to fish on the Banks. As the river
lay wholly in our territory, however, we successfully asserted y
that the clause in question lapsed with the one that gave us
fishing "liberties." Subsequent discovery, it is true, has
shown that the Milk river and a few other branches of the
Missouri do rise in Canada; but their navigation will scarcely
serve to revive the question, although their use for irrigation
is perhaps not without diplomatic significance.
In the same convention a fourth link was added to our
claim to the Oregon country by Great Britain's recognition
of our pretensions to it. Neither side ac- joint occupa-
knowledged more than the fact that the other *^°° °^ ^'^s**" ^
had a claim, and it was agreed that the subjects of both might
for ten years jointly use the whole region.
With the convention of 1818 practically all the immediate
and special questions between the United States and Great
Britain had been put in process of settlement. Permanent
The issues that remained were for the most part *^^"®8
in the nature of permanent conflicts of interest and opinion*
which do not admit of final determination.
196 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Of these, commercial intercourse was the most important.
The commercial problem of diplomacy was now less than
Commercial previously one of opening up markets for our
conditions goods. Our fish, that bone of contention, we
were coming to eat ourselves; most of the rest were raw
materials eminently desired by other countries. England
had a small duty on our cotton, but it was soon removed
because of internal policy. The foreign products that we
handled, as tea from Asia, occasioned more difficulty. The
main problem, however, was to protect and encourage the
employment of our vessels. For years Great Britain and the
United States, the former under the protection of her navy,
the latter as the sole important neutral, had almost monop-
olized the world's shipping. Both suffered from the peace.
The neutral trade had been a constant source of embarrass-
ment, but now there was no neutral trade. Our feelings were
relieved, but we suffered in pocket. The vessels of other
countries came out of their seclusion, and their governments
sought to encourage and favor them. One result of this
general revival of interest in navigation was that at length,
and with difficulty, international cooperation was brought to
bear on the Barbary states, till by degrees that pest was
wiped out and the Mediterranean was opened to all nations.
We did not join in the cooperation, which was under the
direction of the quadruple alliance; but we sent a squadron
there, and we shared the advantages.^
Our method of favoring the merchant marine rested on
Jefferson's idea of commercial discrimination. It was em-
Commercial bodied in what was called a policy of reciprocity
policy which was based on an act of March 3, 1815, /
providing for the abolition of all discriminations against/
foreign vessels in our ports in the case of those nations who
would reciprocally abolish their discriminating duties. The
execution of this policy was to be by means of diplomacy. On
this basis, a convention was in the same year arranged with
1 Moore, American Diplomacy, 63-130.
COMMERCE AND BOUNDARIES 197
Great Britain which included her European possessions and
enumerated ports in the East Indies, but which applied only
to goods that were the produce of the respective countries
or colonies involved. In 1822 a somewhat similar conven-
tion was arranged with France. In 1826 a treaty with Den-
mark, in 1827 treaties with the Hanse towns, Hamburg,
Liibeck, and Bremen, and with the kingdoms of Sweden and
Norway, and in 1828 a treaty with Prussia opened up com-
plete reciprocity in all kinds of goods. By an act of 1828
the President was authorized to abolish such discriminating
dues by proclamation alone in the case of any country where
he should become convinced that a similar freedom was
offered to American vessels. Under this law successive proc-
lamations gradually admitted one country after another to
reciprocity. The discriminations of 1789 disappeared, but
with them disappeared also the countervailing discrimina-
tions of other countries.
One demand was for an agreement concerning British
North America. With the extinction of the permanent
clauses of the Jay treaty vanished the right The St. Law-
which it gave to Vermont and northern New "^'^^
York to take their goods to Montreal and Quebec.^ The
loss of this privilege did not destroy the trade, which con-
tinued to be allowed under British regulations till 1822; but
no permanent agreement could be reached. Great Britain
wished to blend the matter with the general question of
colonial trade; the United States insisted on our natural
right to navigate to the sea a river on which we bordered.
We were as unable to obtain a recognition of this principle
from Great Britain as we had been to secure the assent of
Spain in the case of the Mississippi, and a deadlock ensued.
Fortunately, the completion of canals from Lake Champlain
to the Hudson and from Lake Erie to the Erie canal un-
bottled those districts, and so diminished the importance
of the question.
* Schuyler, American Diplomacy, 282-291.
\/
198 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
The old question of trade with the West Indies continued
to be the most vexing issue between the two governments.
The British Here again it was our shipping and not our
West Indies exports that caused trouble. Under the reci-
procity convention of 1815 British vessels brought British
goods to the United States, took aboard United States prod-
ucts needed in the West Indies, and there exchanged them
for island products which they took to England. The Amer-
ican ships, on the contrary, were in general barred from the
islands, and even in the direct trade with England they felt
the competition of the British vessels, which in the greater
flexibility of their opportunity enjoyed a substantial ad-
vantage.
Though loath to do so, the United States submitted to
the exclusion from the trade between the colonies and Great
Policy of the Britain, but she insisted on the privilege of
United States carrying on trade between the colonies and
countries mutually foreign. Believing that her products
were so essential to the existence of the West Indian colonies
that she could force her owti terms by prohibiting trade there
entirely, she passed acts to that effect in 1818 and 1820, with y
the qualification that the President was to suspend them
when he was convinced that their object had been attained.
In 1822 they were in part suspended pending further nego-
tiations under a new British act.
Meanwhile, under the leadership of Huskisson, who in
1823 became president of the Board of Trade, Great Britain
Change in Brit- was undergoing a change of heart, or at least
ish pohcy q£ mind, on the subject of the navigation laws.
The old system was breaking down, but, like all other British
institutions, it did not break down suddenly. The ultimate
result, ultimate that is for this period, of the change in British
jMjlicy was reached in the acts of June 27 and July 5, 1825,
which opened the colonies to the direct trade of all nations,
that is, to trade in the products of the colony and of the na-
tion to which the vessel employed belonged. The traffic
COMMERCE AND BOUNDARIES 19D
between the colonies and Great Britain was retained as
"coasting trade" for British vessels, as was all indirect trade,
as for instance, that in China tea by way of New York.
Enjoyment of the benefits of the acts was to depend upon
reciprocal advantages granted to Great Britain within the
year.
These terms seemed to offer an opportunity for a final
settlement, but the United States would not take them as
they stood, insisting on the right to take _^ ,
British West Indian goods to all countries ex-
cept Great Britain. Accordingly, the year having expired
before an agreement was reached. Great Britain withdrew her
offer. Adams thereupon let the acts of 1818 and 1820 go once
more into operation. The West Indian trade was therefore
again absolutely closed, as to both products and shipping.
Moreover, with the greater eflBciency of governmental action,
the laws were now so vigorously enforced that there was less
commercial intercourse between the United States and the
islands than ever before, whether in peace or in war.
More important than these negotiations with Great Brit-
ain concerning commerce were those with Spain in regard
to boundaries. When in 1815 the Spanish Disputes with
monarchy reemerged from the blanket of ^P*"*
French and English control, it found itself confronted by
issues with the United States which would have excused a
war had it been in a position to undertake one. Although
Spain held title to West Florida, we occupied most of the
province; furthermore, though Spain now accepted the
validity of the Louisiana Purchase, its western limits were
still undetermined. We, on our part, insisted upon the
execution of a claims convention framed in 1802, we were
fully of a mind to keep West Florida, and were equally de-
termined to obtain East Florida.
Our claim to the latter territory was inherently grounded
in that "Manifest Destiny" which was to play so important
a part in our history. More concretely, it was based on the
200 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
argument that Spain was not able to take care of the coun-
try,— on the self-constituted right of the stronger nations
United States of the world to demand and enforce the
claims elimination of international nuisances, an idea
which succeeded "Manifest Destiny" as the chief diplomatic
slogan of "imperial" statesmen. This argument found its
justification in the use of East Florida by the British during
the war of 1812, the use of Amelia island just south of Georgia
by Spanish American privateers until a later period, and the
incursions of Florida Indians into the United States after
cattle and slaves.
The negotiations were conducted at Washington by
Adams with Don Luis de Onis, whose titles fill nine lines
. . of the treaty. They were assisted by the
French minister, Baron Hyde de Neuville to
whose tact success was in part due. The United States em-
phasized its views in 1817 by ordering the temporary occupa-
tion, for the suppression of piratical privateering, of Amelia
island on the one side and Galveston on the other. More
important were the orders given to General Andrew Jackson,
commanding the southern department, to follow across the
border, and chastise in their homes, any Indians marauding
United States territory. Jackson, misconceiving the scope
of his orders, invaded Florida in the winter of 1818, and not
only dealt with the Indians but seized the Spanish forts of
St. Marks and Pensacola, and hanged, after a court-martial,
two Englishmen, Arbuthnot and Ambrister, who were ac-
cused of assisting the Indians.^
This episode, which under other circumstances might have
embroiled us with both Spain and England, Adams used to
quicken the negotiation. Knowing that the latter country
did not care to trouble itself over two cosmopolitan adven-
* H. B. Fuller, The Purchase of Florida, its History and Diplomacy, Cleve-
land, 1906; James Schouler, Historical Briefs (New York, 1896), "Monroe
and the Rhea Letter"; R. C. H. Catterall, A French Diplomat and the Treaty
with Spain, 1819, Amer. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1905, i. 21; Frances Jackson,
Memoir of Baron Hyde de Neuville, St. Louis, 1913.
COMMERCE AND BOUNDARIES 201
turers, he set up the claim that they had expatriated them-
selves by their activities. To De Onis he wrote: "If, as the
commanders both at Pensacola and St. Marks Adams de-
have alleged, this has been the result of their **"^' Jackson
weakness rather than their will; if they have assisted the
Indians against the United States to avert their hostilities
from the province which they have not suflBcient force to
defend against them, it may serve in some measure to ex-
culpate, individually, those officers; but it must carry demon-
stration irresistible to the Spanish government, that the right
of the United States can as little compound with impotence
as with perfidy, and that Spain must immediately make
her election, either to place a force in Florida adequate at
once to the protection of her territory, and to the fulfillment
of her engagements, or cede to the United States a province,
of which she retains nothing but the nominal possession, but
which is, in fact, a derelict, open to the occupancy of every
enemy, civilized or savage, of the United States, and serving
no other earthly purpose than as a post of annoyance to them."
Meantime the settlement of the western boundary was
under discussion. We claimed to the Rio Grande, on the
basis of French exploration under La Salle. The Texas
Since, however. La Salle went there by mis- ^"^stion
take, and was intent upon leaving as rapidly as possible
when he was murdered, the claim was lacking in convincing
force. A slightly stronger basis for our claim is found in
Napoleon's instructions to Victor in 1802 to occupy to that
river, but this instruction did not control Spain. Spain,
on her part, claimed to the watershed of the Mississippi, a
limit which would have brought her close to its mouth and
made her an inconvenience if not a menace to its navigation.
De Neuville suggested that Spain give up Florida and that
Adams compromise to the westward. This the latter was
unwilling to do, but he yielded to the pressure of Monroe
and others, and, after discussing nearly every river of the
coast, accepted the Sabine. Curiously, this boimdary gave
202 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
us more nearly what we had purchased than any other would
have done ; for although there had never been a western bound-
ary to Louisiana, the most western French fort had been at
Natchitoches, about forty miles east of the Sabine, and the
most eastern Spanish post had been Adaes, between Natchi-
toches and the Sabine.^ The Sabine, moreover had been
agreed upon as a temporary military boundary in 1806.
In return for the cession of the Floridas we released Spain
from all claims under the convention of 1802, which had just
Terms of the been renewed, and agreed to assume the pay-
treaty ment of them to the amount of five million
dollars. The treaty resembled that relating to the purchase
of Louisiana, in providing that "The inhabitants of the
territories which His Catholic Majesty cedes to the United
States, by this treaty, shall be incorporated in the Union of
the United States, as soon as may be consistent with the
principles of the Federal Constitution, and admitted to the
enjoyment of all the privileges, rights, and immunities of the
citizens of the United States."
To Adams's mind, the most important provision of the
treaty was that which described the boundary between the
Boundary to United States and the possessions of Spain
the Pacific north of the Sabine. This line zigzagged by
rivers and parallels of latitude, until it followed the forty-
second parallel to the Pacific. Instead, therefore, of com-
pleting the bounding of Louisiana, it departed from that
purchase and, running westward, created the first inter-
national boundary-line that touched the western ocean.
It thus added a fifth link to our claim to Oregon.
The treaty was signed February 22, 1819, but its ratifica-
tion was delayed both in the United States, because of op-
position to the so-called surrender of Texas,
and in Spain; so that ratifications were not
finally exchanged until February 22, 1821.
> Bolton, H. E., Texas in the Middle of the Eighteenth Century (1915),
S6ff.
CHAPTER XVII
THE MONROE DOCTRINE »
The elevation of Joseph Bonaparte to the throne of Spain
in 1808 snapped the worn bands that held her American colo-
nies. Miranda was correct in his diagnosis of spanish-
sentiment in Spanish America. Innumerable American
causes, local and general, preventable and in-
evitable, had long nourished a discontent that but awaited
an opportunity to manifest itself. In 1812 Miranda, who
had of late been making his headquarters in the United
States, lost his liberty in a tragic effort to start the blaze in
his home province of Venezuela. In the same year a more
successful beginning was made at Buenos Ayres by leaders
who still professed loyalty to the Spanish nation, which also,
with the fostering aid of England, was resisting the Bonapar-
tist dynasty. When, however, in 1815 Ferdinand VII was
restored, this loyalty disappeared; Buenos Ayres never per-
mitted the exercise of his power, and soon the flames of
revolt were sweeping over the continent. In 1822 the con-
flagration raging northward from Buenos Ayres met, in
Peru, that which Bolivar had kindled in Venezuela from the
ashes of Miranda's movement. In 1821 Mexico had thrown
off the yoke; and there was left of the Spanish empire almost
nothing except an army in the heights of the Andes which
was to succumb in 1824, and the islands of Cuba and Porto
Rico. Brazil separated from Portugal in 1822.
To the European mind this outbreak seemed a continua-
tion of the revolution that had begun in the United States and
had swept through Europe under the leadership of the French.
* D. C. Gilman, James Monroe, revised ed., Boston, etc., [1900]. The
appendix contains a bibliography of the Monroe Doctrine to 1897.
203
204 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Brazil, indeed, established an empire; but Spain's former
possessions broke up into federal republics based on the
European model of the United States. In 1820 the move-
revolutions ment seemed to rebound to Europe, and insur-
rections and revolts broke out in Spain herself, in Naples,
in Sardinia, and in Greece.
This time, however, revolution found monarchy organized
to resist it. September 26, 1815, there had been signed at
The Holy Al- Paris, at the earnest solicitation of Czar Alex-
^^^^ ander, the so-called Holy Alliance, by which
Russia, Austria, and Prussia united to defend religion and
morality, and, what they believed to be the only sure founda-
tion for them, government by divine right. While the Holy
Alliance of itself did little, it inspired with its principles the
quadruple alliance, of which France was a member and with
which England sometimes cooperated, as in the joint demon-
stration against the Barbary pirates. In 1821 the meeting
of the allies at Troppau authorized Austria to quench the
revolts in Italy, and it was done. In 1822 the meeting at
Verona commissioned France to restore the Spanish mon-
archy, and that task was accomplished in 1823.
The Congress of Verona resolved "that the system of
representative government is equally incompatible with the
European in- monarchical principles as the maxim of the sov-
tervention ereignty of the people is with the divine right " ;
and the members engaged, "mutually and in the most
solemn manner, to use all their eflForts to put an end to the
system of representative governments in whatsoever country
it may exist in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced in
those countries where it is not yet known." It is to be
observed that the qualifying clause "in Europe" applies to
the suppression of representative government where it then
existed. It does not apply to the countries into which its
future introduction should not be allowed. This precise
reading of a phrase which was probably carefully framed
leaves the United States unthreatened, but it seems to
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 205
imply a purpose to interfere in Spanish America. Nor was
there any reason why European statesmen should recognize
the Atlantic as a dividing line. Ideas crossed it all too
readily for their taste, and they had always looked upon the
whole world of European culture as one. It was the rumor,
also, that France expected reward for her services to Spain in
the shape of a Mexican kingdom for one of her princes, or in
the cession of Cuba,^ Besides, Russia was certainly advanc-
ing along the northwest coast, and might find cause and
power to demand California from a grateful Spain.
Great Britain, although she had opposed Revolution as
exemplified in France, was as little in sympathy with Divine
Right. She was alarmed at the disturbance Great Britain
in that delicate adjustment, the balance of *"** ^^'""
power in Europe, which the alliance of all the great powers
brought about. Her special interests, too, differed from those
of continental Europe. If the Spanish- American revolutions
of 1810 had not saved her from bankruptcy, as Napoleon
believed, they had at any rate opened a rich and long-sought
opportunity for wealth. If the dreams of Hawkins, of the
speculators in the South Sea Bubble, of the colonists to
Darien, were perhaps not fully realized, they at least became
substantial. Ferdinand VII, after his restoration, though
profuse in his rewards to his protector Wellington, was less
obviously grateful to the nation that had sent Wellington
to help him. He restored the old colonial system.^
No longer bound by any ties of consideration for Spain,
Great Britain was unwilling to let Spanish-American trade
slip through her fingers. She had no territorial ambitions; in
a free competition she would gain the trade which was her
principal object. Consequently she looked with pleasure on
* Marquis de Chateaubriand, Oeuvres complHes (12 vols., Paris, 1865-73),
X. 359, etc.
2 J. R. Seeley, The Expansion of England, Boston, 1883, and later editions;
Montagu Burrows, History of the Foreign Policy of Great Britain, New
York, 1895; Viscount Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, etc. (liJ
vols., London, 1850-53), vii. 257-456, etc.
206 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
the progress of the revolution, one of the impulses of which
was the desire to do business with her. England's interests ,
tain ^^^ ^^^ moral convictions generally coincide, /
and Spanish and she has never spared her blood to advance 'i
them both. English volunteers, therefore,
flocked to the banners of the revolutionary leaders. Admiral
Cochrane commanded the fleet, practically a British one,
which turned the tide on the Pacific coast, and a British
legion was one of Bolivar's strongest weapons.^ In 1819 the
government passed a neutrality act, ordering its subjects to
stand aloof; it did not recognize the independence of the new
states, but its sympathy was well known, and when Canning
became foreign minister, in 1822, he made the question his
leading interest. England would object to any action which
might close the ports of Spanish America to her, she would
object to the acquisition of Cuba by France, and to the exten-
sion of Russian territory. How she would object was not
known.
For the United States the situation was a difficult one.
Our republican sympathies were aroused by the vision of a
g ^ . people shaking off the yoke of a European
the United country. Our pride was touched by an appar-
ent effort to imitate our methods. In 1811 both
houses of Congress resolved "that they beheld with friendly
interest the establishment of independent sovereignties by the
Spanish provinces of America." In 1810 Joel Poinsett was
sent to Buenos Ayres "to ascertain the real condition of the
South American peoples, as well as their prospects of suc-
cess." His report published in 1818 was unfavorable; but we
maintained an agent at that city, and Clay made his sym-
pathy for the movement his chief political instrument in
attacking the administration. In 1818 trade with Spanish
America was authorized.^ Adventurers threw themselves
* Winsor, America, vol. viii.
* F. L. Paxson, The Independence of the South American Republics, Phila*
delphia, 1903; C. J. Still6, The Life and Services of Joel R. Poinsett, PhiUr
delphia, 1888.
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 207
into the cause of the revolutionists. In fact our concern in
the cause did not stop with the Atlantic. Dr. Samuel Howe
joined the forces of the Greeks; and in 1824 Webster delivered
an oration in their behalf. Sympathy with revolution was not
unassociated with dread of the forces of oppression. Par-
ticularly was Roman Catholicism coming, in the popular
mind, to be connected with Divine Right, and the European
support of the American missions of that church was for
many years regarded as an insidious attack on our institu-
tions.
To this popular interest in Spanish-American affairs the
administration obviously could not give free rein without
sacrificing the Spanish treaty, which was at Sympathy ver-
this time being negotiated. Yet we could not bus neutrality
ignore a situation which filled the Caribbean with Spanish
and Spanish-American warships and privateers, and with
pirates who were taking advantage of the new flags. These
vessels did not respect the rule of free ships, free goods, and
some of them did not respect any rule at all. As a maritime
nation we were bound to recognize the divergence from the
normal, but to induce Spain to make her cessions we must
at the same time preserve the fairest appearance of neu-
trality. We were, in fact, confronted by a new aspect of
neutrality which has troubled us often enough since, namely,
our duty in a neighboring contest of forces less strong than
our own. In 1815 the President issued a neutrality proclama-
tion, and in 1817 Congress passed a new neutrality act,
which, amended in 1818, set a new and higher standard of
national obligations.
Fearful of having his hand forced by Congress under the
leadership of Clay, Adams, in December, 1817, wrote to his
friend Alexander Everett furnishing him with neutrality ver-
the gist of a scathing indictment of the new re- ■"' '•co«»»ition
publics which he hoped he would put in form for the news-
papers.^ He was not, as he explained later to the cabinet,
» Letters to Everett, 1811-1837, Amer. Hist. Review, 1905, xi. 88-116.
208 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
willing to see the new governments fall, but they were not
going to fall, and our record must be clear; the European
powers were attempting peaceful mediation, which we must
allow. In March, 1818, however, he told the cabinet that,
since the Holy Alliance had had a free opportunity to
attempt a peaceful adjustment and had failed, as he had be-
lieved it would, we must not commit ourselves against recog-
nition of the new republics, for we should ultimately recog-
nize them. At the same time, feeling confident that England
sympathized with our position, he assured her minister that
we would cooperate with her in preserving the independence
of the states, though not in alliance. He had divined the
separation of Great Britain from the allies, and he sought
to widen the breach. From that date our recognition of the
new republics hung on the Florida treaty, and it was not
till March 8, 1822 after the final ratifications had been ex-
changed, that the President recommended it to Congress.
Recognition did not, of course, mean a departure from neu-
trality, which we still professed. It was in this situation,
with our Florida chestnuts out of the fire, without having
by our acts given the allies any handle for interference, and
with a comfortable assurance as to the position of England,
that we awaited whatever action might be taken when the
pacification of Europe was complete.
The enthusiasm of many of our statesmen for the revolu-
tionary movement had been dampened by other considera-
Our reversion- tions than those of our relations with Spain,
ary interests Ever since our beginnings as a nation certain
portions of Spanish America had been earmarked as ulti-
mately ours: the Floridas, Texas, and certainly Cuba — it
was unnecessary to define exactly. As early as 1790 we con-
sidered the question of asserting our reversionary interest
in the Floridas, and from 1808 we were prepared to assert
it in Cuba. Afraid that that island might fall either to
France or to England, Jefferson wrote to Gallatin, May 17,
1808: "I shall sincerely lament Cuba's falling into any hands
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 209
but those of its present owners. Spanish America is at
present in the best hands for us, and 'Chi sta bene, non si
muove should be our motto.'" In April, 1809, he wrote to
Madison that Napoleon might let us have Cuba " to prevent
our aid to Mexico and the other provinces. That would be a
price," he added, "and I would immediately erect a column
on the southernmost limit of Cuba, and inscribe on it a Tie
plus ultra as to us in that direction. . . . Cuba can be
defended by us without a navy, and this develops the prin-
ciple which ought to limit our views." We were clear that
we could not with equanimity see Cuba taken by either
France or England; but how inconvenient also would it be
should that island, or indeed Texas and possibly California,
fall from the hands of Spain, out of which we could so honor-
ably rescue them, only to assume an independence which
it would be sacrilege for us to violate! These views were
embodied by Adams in a dispatch to Nelson, our minister
to Spain, April 28, 1823. They have constituted the rift
in the lute of our Spanish-American relations which has
until to-day prevented those republics from dancing to
our piping.
To the situation, already complex, another element was
added by Russia's independent action. Her traders, coming
south from Alaska, had in 1816 established a The Russian
fort m what is now California. In 1821 the ^^^^an^e
czar issued a ukase, or proclamation, giving to a Russian
company exclusive right to territory as far south as the
fifty-first parallel, and excluding foreigners from the sea
for a distance of one hundred Italian miles from the coast.
The Russian minister. Baron de Tuyll, also informed Adams
that his sovereign would not recognize the independence
of Spanish America, and on November 16, 1823, communi-
cated to him a manifesto of the czar, as mouthpiece of the
Holy Alliance, setting forth the advantages of Divine Right
and the inadequacy of republics. The ukase was as dis-
tasteful to Great Britain as to us, and the ministers of the
210 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
two countries were ordered to cooperate in remonstrance.
The manifesto was our own affair.^
It was at this juncture that Adams received from Rush,
our minister at London, a proposal from Canning. The
Canning's latter conceived that it was hopeless for Spain
^^^' to try to recover her colonies, but he was not
opposed to an amicable arrangement between them and the
mother country; the question of the recognition of their
independence, he said, was one of time and circumstance.
Great Britain, he declared, did not aim at the possession of
any portion of Spain's territory herself, but she could not with
indifference see the transfer of any portion of it to another
power. He informed Rush that he had received unofficial
notice that a proposal would be made "for a Congress [of
the allied nations], or some less formal concert and consulta-
tion, especially upon the affairs of Spanish America." If
the United States acceded to his views, a declaration to
that effect, concurrently with England, would, he thought,
be "the most effectual and the least offensive" mode of
making known their joint disapprobation of the suggested
interference of Europe in the affairs of America.
This proposal reached Washington October 9, 1823, and
at once precipitated one of the most critical cabinet discus-
Cabinet dis- sions in our history. There can now remain
cussion jjQ doubt that the policy adopted was that
continually and aggressively urged by Adams. Monroe was
at first in favor of accepting the advance. Adams argued
that England and the United States did not stand on an
equal basis, because we had recognized the Spanish-American
republics and she had not, because we did want portions of
Spanish America, and, most significantly, because we were the
most interested party. His attempt to put the question " to a
test of right and wrong" reads curiously in view of his
dispatch to Nelson regarding Cuba; and his objection to co-
^ Georg Heinz, Die Beziehungen zvoischen Russland, England und Nordr
amerika im Jahre 1823, Berlin, 1911.
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 211
operation on the ground that it was contrary to our policy of
abstaining from entangling alliances seems hardly consistent
with the union of American and British interests at St. Peters-
burg. Yet this latter point really constituted the chief ground
of opposition to Canning's proposal; it restruck the note of
isolation sounded by John Adams, Washington, and Jeffer-
son. The negotiation with Russia might be defended on the
basis that the territory threatened by Russia was legally
in the joint occupation of the two countries; but to cooperate
in a matter of this importance and publicity, where not spe-
cial interest but general American policy was at stake, was
to throw isolation overboard, to admit that Great Britain
was a partner in American affairs. Moreover, cooperation
was not essential. Since Great Britain was moved by per-
manent interests, these would not change because we refused
to join her. The British fleet would still stand between
Spanish America and united Europe.^
The exclusion of cooperation with Great Britain carried
with it the use of Canning's idea of a self-denying ordinance
as the basis of objection to the proposed inter- „ . . ^
ference. It was necessary to find a different Monroe Doc-
one, and that employed was none other than
an extension of the very policy of isolation because of which
we refused to cooperate with Great Britain. This policy
was extended beyond the primary idea that we as a nation
should not be involved in European wars; it was extended
beyond Madison's instruction to Monroe that we ought to
begin to broach the idea that the whole Gulf Stream is our
waters; it was extended to include the whole of both the
American continents. As a basis for this extension, and at
the same time as an answer to the czar's defence of Divine
Right, there was inserted in the President's message a declara-
tion that the political systems of Europe and America were
different and incompatible. "Our policy in regard to Europe,
^W. C. Ford, "John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine," Amer.
Hist. Review. 1902, vii. 676-696, viii. 28-52.
212 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have
so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless re-
mains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal
concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de
facto as the legitimate government for us. . . . But in regard
to those [the American] continents circumstances are emin-
ently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the
allied powers should extend their political system to any
portion of either continent without endangering our peace
and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern
brethren, if left to themselves would adopt it. . . ," This
policy forced Monroe to leave out of his message a recom-
mendation for the recognition of revolutionary Greece, as
that would have been an interference in European affairs;
yet the stand taken was so obviously but a stretching of our
oldest policy, of the movement begun by our own Revolution,
that it was heartily approved.
So far the policy outlined dealt with the right of the settled
portions of the American continents to choose their own
End of coloniz- governments; it remained to deal with the
mg era Russian advance on the unsettled northwest
coast. On this point Monroe announced that "the occasion
has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which
the rights and interests of the United States are involved,
that the American continents, by the free and independent
condition which they have assumed and maintain, are hence-
forth not to be considered as subjects for future coloniza-
tion by any European powers." The era of claim-making /
was past; in the future boundaries were to be found, not
made.
The confidence with which these bold declarations were
made in Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, rested more
European in- on the efficiency of the British navy than on
terrentton ^^j. q,^^^ strength. At the same time, it is
evident that in theory they bore as heavily on England as on
the powers of the Quadruple Alliance, in actual fact even v
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 21S
more heavily, for Great Britain was more interested in Amer-
ica than they were, was in fact as great an American power
as we ourselves. Thus to use for one's own purposes the
resources of a rival power, while yielding nothing to her y
rivalry, is daring; but, if justified, it is the highest manifesta-
tion of the diplomatic art. In this case Adams proved to be
as safe as he believed himself to be. Even before Monroe's
announcement, on October 9, France informed England that
she would not endeavor to obtain territory in America and
did not consider that Spain had any opportunity to regain
hers.^
While the message did not, therefore, contribute to the
defeat of united Europe, it did enable us to gain a. succes
d^estime in the Russian negotiation. The czar check to Rus-
was not sufliciently interested in the north- sia's expansion
west coast to inconvenience himself over it. He refused
the bribe of California which Mexico offered for a recogni-
tion of her independence. Willing to yield to the combined
protest of England and the United States, he was actually
more favorable to the latter in spite of her form of govern-
ment, because of the traditional Russian desire to build up
anywhere a rival to England's merchant marine. When,
therefore. Canning withdrew from cooperation with us be-
cause "the principle laid down with respect to colonization
in the speech of the President of the United States (to which
Great Britain does not assent) must be so particularly dis-
pleasing to Russia," the czar took the opportunity to con-
clude a treaty with us before he did with Great Britain.
This treaty, signed in 1824, was entirely satisfactory to us.
By fixing the parallel of 54° 40' as the southern limit of Rus-
1 A. C. Coolidge, The United States as a World Power (New York, 1908),
95-120; J. A. Kasson, Evolution of the Constitution . . , and History of the
Monroe Doctrine, Boston, etc., 1904; T. B. Edington, The Monroe Doctrine,
Boston, 1904; W. S. Robertson, The Beginnings of Spanish-American Diplo-
macy, in Turner Essays (New York, 1910), 231-267; J. H. Kraus, Monroe-
docktrin, in ihren Beziehungen zur amerikanischen Diplomatie und zum Volker'
recht.
214 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
sian America, it checked her expansion and thus added a;
sixth link to our claim to Oregon.^ I
Canning's withdrawal from cooperation in the Russian
negotiation was the result of a thorough discontent with
Canning's the whole doctrine of Monroe's message, which
opposition asserted the primacy of the United States in
American affairs. It was not for this that he was bringing
"a new world into existence"; and, rightly claiming that
Monroe's message was but the prelude to an active anti-
English, or at least Pan-American, policy on our part, he
at once entered into a contest with Adams for the leadership
of Spanish America. In 1823 his instructions to his com-
missioners to the various states direct their attention to
danger from France, those of 1824 to danger from the United
States. On January 16, 1824, his Mexican commission re-
ported, "Hence the Mexicans are looking anxiously around
them in quest of an alliance with one of the great maritime
powers of Europe, and if they should be disappointed in their
hopes, they will ultimately be forced to throw themselves into
the arms of the United States." ^
The fears of Canning and the hopes of Adams were equally
aroused when, in 1825, after Adams had been elected to the
Adams's am- presidency and Clay had become his secretary
bitions ^^ state, the Spanish American powers extended
to us an invitation to meet them in the congress to be held
at Panama. Adams at once accepted the invitation, and
announced to our Congress that he would commission minis-
ters to attend. Canning wrote: "The other and perhaps
still more powerful motive of my apprehension is the ambi-
tion and ascendency of the United States of America. It is
obviously the policy of that government to connect itself
with all the powers of America in a general Transatlantic
League, of which it would have the sole direction. I need
* "Correspondence of the Russian Ministers in Washington, 1818-1825,"
Anur. Hist. Review, 1918, xviii. 309-345, 637-562.
* Temperley, Canning, chs. viii.-x.
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 215
only say how inconvenient such an ascendency may be in
time of peace, and how formidable in case of war." Again
he wrote that Great Britain would not object to a Spanish-
American league; "but any project of putting the United
States of North America at the head of an American Con-
federacy, as against Europe, would be highly displeasing to
your government . . . and it would too probably at no very
distant period endanger the peace both of America and of
Europe." ^
At this point Canning had the best cards, and he played
them with a shade more skill than Adams did his. The latter
had made a point by granting the first recog- Adams versus
nition to Spanish America; Canning, however, Canning
rightly judged his own later recognition the more potent.
December 17, 1824, he wrote of this act, " The deed is done,
the nail is driven, Spanish America is free, and if we do not
mismanage our affairs badly, she is English." Of the two
countries, England was able to exert the greater influence
with Spain to secure her recognition of the independence of
her former colonies, and she also had more capital for the^^
loans needed by both government and people. Canning
referred to such investments in Buenos Ayres as not "mere
commercial speculations." Mr. Hervey, the commissioner
in Mexico, wrote home, March 30, 1824, "Without the tem-
porary aid aflForded by Mr. Staples, the government would
have labored under the greatest embarrassment, and must
indeed have stopped payment altogether." For an attempt
to guarantee this loan Mr. Hervey was recalled, but he him-
self believed that his recall was due to "the peculiar circum-
1 British Public Record Office, Foreign Office Records, Mss., Mexico,
iii., iv., vi.; also Colombia and Buenos Ayres. In regard to mediation, in 1826
and 1827, between Buenos Ayres and Brazil regarding Montevideo, Can-
ning instructs his minister: "As to taking part with either side in the con-
test your Lordship cannot too peremptorily repress any expectation of that
nature. . . . There is much of the Spanish character in the inhabitants of
the colonial establishments of Spain; and there is nothing in the Spanish
character more striking than its impatience of foreign advice, and its sus*
picion of gratuitous service."
216 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
stances which have given publicity to correspondence marked
with the Stamp of Secrecy." How great was the financial
opportunity is indicated by the plan of the Mexican Con-
gress to Open bids for a canal across the isthmus of Tehuan-
tepec.
Still more important than the need of money, which Eng-
land alone could supply, was the fact that Great Britain and
. - Spanish America were commercially supple- ^
Britain's in- mentary to each other, the one a manufactur-
ing country, the other a producer of raw ma-
terials. While the United States could use some South
American tropical products, there was nothing which she
could supply in return more cheaply than could Great Britain.
Adams's obstinacy, too, was somewhat apparent in his com-
mercial negotiations with the new powers; he was extremely
loath to admit any deviation from Our usual policies. The
Spanish-American republics wished to retain the right to
discriminate in their commercial relations between Spain
and other countries, in hope of thus buying recognition of
their independence. Adams would make no treaties except
on the basis of most favored nation, while Canning was,
within limits, complaisant. The latter, however, had his
troubles also, because of his insistence on the suppression
of the slave trade. As a result, the year 1829 found us enjoy-
ing commercial treaties only with Central America, Brazil,
and Colombia, while England had them with Buenos Ayres,
Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico.
Meanwhile Congress had been debating the proposition
to send ministers to Panama. The administration finally
Difficulties in won, and the delegates were sent; but the delay
thI'uSed*'' caused them to be too late, and the oppor-
States tunity did not come again. The instructions
growing out of the debate, however, make it doubtful if
their presence would have been profitable, for the United
States was not prepared to assume the lead in the direction
toward which the ambitions of the new republics tended.
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 217
Their great purpose was to free Cuba and Porto Rico from
Spain; but as this plan was directly opposed to our wishes,
our ministers were instructed not to discuss it. Canning,
quick to see his advantage, wrote, March 18, 1826, that,
while Great Britain also preferred the existing state of things,
" So far from denying the right of the new states of America
to make a hostile attack upon Cuba ... we haye uniformly
refused to join the United States in remonstrating with
Mexico against the supposed intention. . . . We should in-
deed regret it, but we arrogate to ourselves no right to control
the operations of one belligerent against another. The govr
emment of the United States, however, professes itself of a
different opinion, ..." He adds: "Neither England nor
France, could see with indifference the United States in oc-
cupation of Cuba." On October 15, 1826, he wrote: "The
general influence of the United States is not, in my opinion,
to be feared. It certainly exists in Colombia, but it has been
very much weakened even there by their protests against the
attack on Cuba."
It was still farther weakened among the racially mixed
population of Spanish America, which was marching under
the banner of universal emancipation, by the influence of
widespread publication which the debate over ^^^^^
the Panama congress gave to our racial prejudices, nota-t
bly the opposition of a strong element among us to negro
emancipation, particularly in Cuba, and our unwilling-
ness to sit in the congress with delegates from the negro
states of Hayti and the Dominican Republic.
The plan for a United States hegemony of the Americjan
continent, therefore, fell before the greater resources bf
England, and because of our divided policies, tj »« « <
England continued until the present genera- the Monroe
.. . . • 1 J • J Doctrine
tion to enjoy commercial predommance and a
certain political leadership. Those policies, however, to
which Monroe's message was confined — the separation of
the American and European spheres of influence, and the
/
218 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
closing of the era of colonization — were grounded on facts,
permanent interests, and the waxing strength of the United
States. Although not incorporated in law, either national
or international, they have stood. Europe has actually re-
spected the territorial integrity and political independence
of the Americas, and our people have until to-day em-
braced as one of their most cherished ideals the statement of
Monroe's policy, founded as it was on their fundamental
desire to pursue untrammelled the course of their own de-
velopment and to hold Europe at ocean's length. Possibly
its association with the venerable and non-contentious figure
of Monroe gave it quicker and more general hold on the
public mind than if it had taken its name from its real author,
the belligerent Adams. From time to time the mantle of
the Monroe Doctrine has been spread over additions and in-
terpretations, till the name now stands for much that was
not imagined at its announcement. It is possible that, by
tending to crystallize our ideas, it has in the long run hamp-
ered our adjustment to conditions; for national interests are ,
only relatively permanent, and their relationship with one(
another changes constantly. There can be no doubt, how-
ever, of the advantage that it was to us, in the period of
untutored democracy upon which we were just entering,
to have out a sheet anchor of fixed and respected
policy.
In the fifteen years between 1815 and 1830 our territory
had been further consolidated by the acquisition of Florida,
A rfi h great reaches of our boundary had been de-
ments, 1816 to fined, and our claims to a Pacific coast line had
been vastly strengthened. We had opened the
world so far as it interested us to our exports and, with
the exception of the British West Indies, to our shipping.
We had passed the crisis of the Spanish-American revolution
in such a way that the probability of European interference
in our affairs was diminished rather than increased, as it had
at one time seemed likely to be. Russia was eliminated
THE MONROE DOCTRINE «19
as a potential American power. Threads had been tied to-
gether, disagreements healed or bandaged, and our national
experience had been crystallized into a policy to guide future
manifestations of the national will.
CHAPTER XVIII
RECIPROCITY, CLAIMS, BOUNDARIES, AND THE
SLAVE TRADE
By 1815 diplomacy had ceased to shape poHtics; after 1830 /
politics began to shape diplomacy. With Jackson, "shirt-
Change of per- sleeve" diplomacy began, but it did not reach
sonnel j|.g ggnith till after the Civil War. The most
important change in personnel took place in the state de-
partment itself: in 1833 only two old officials remained; it
was the most nearly complete break ever made in the con-
tinuity of that staff. This weakening of the central adminis-
tration was accompanied by a remanning of the diplomatic
corps that was quite as sweeping. Appointments were now
eagerly sought, and there were few more satisfactory methods
of paying political debts. Many choices were not without
merit, but for the most part they reflected the general tend-
ency of politics to rely on mediocrity. Still more apparent
was the lack of familiarity with European conditions, which
was the product of our realized isolation. Less than the
men of 1775, with their colonial interest in "home" affairs,
many of them, like the Pinckneys, with an English
education, did the new ministers understand world poli-
tics.
Of the secretaries of state for the next fifteen years, Van
Buren was tactful and suave, but in diplomacy colorless.
Van Buren, Louis McLane was without distinction. Ed-
ingstonf For-^' ward Livingston was every inch a diplomat, but
^y*^ his service was cut all too short by his death.*
Forsyth, who served Jackson and Van Buren for seven years,
was skilful and had had experience, but he left no impress.
* C. H. Hunt, Life of Edward Livingston, New York, 1864.
RECIPROCITY, CLAIMS, BOUNDARIES, ETC. 221
Legar§ and Upshur together were in office only about a year.
Webster and Calhoun are the only really great names, and
they, properly, are remembered for other thmgs. They
serve in fact to illustrate two of the more general weak-
nesses of the whole service. Webster handled cases; the
adaptation of a general policy to the whole
field of diplomacy he did not attempt. He was
primarily a lawyer, only incidentally a diplomat. Hardly any
one was primarily a diplomat, or primarily Literary ap-
mterested in diplomacy. When a President P«"^*™«°t8
wished to gain applause, he appointed an author, like James
Fenimore Cooper or Washington Irving, who was expected
to repay the nation by writing a book. Of all
the statesmen of the time, Calhoun was prob-
ably the best endowed for diplomatic work, but he sacrificed
diplomacy to politics. The only really great American who
was greatly interested in diplomacy was Henry .„^
fx-n 1 1 • • 1 • • Wneatoii
Wheaton, who spent this period m various
German posts. Performing perfectly the difficult, but not
very important, tasks allotted him, he devoted his leisure to
the cognate study of international law.^ He was recalled in
1845, and the fruit of his preparation was never gathered by
the nation.
The rank and file of the service possessed characteristics
similar to those of the chiefs, except that some of Jackson's
appointments, as that of John Randolph to _. . ^
Russia and of Butler to Mexico, were con- and consular
spicuously bad, and Tyler's on the whole con-
spicuously good. During this period both the diplomatic
and the consular service grew rapidly in numbers. An at-
tempt to improve the consular system was made in 1833;
but it failed, and the staff continued to decline in quality.
In spite of these defects, it remains true that American
^ See his History of the Law of Nations, New York, 1845; and his Elements
of International Law, Philadelphia, 1836, which has been many times edited
and brought up to date.
222 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
diplomacy, although its wheels creaked and rumbled, ac-
complished its main ends. This attainment was, however,
e- .• •*_ t due more to situation than to merit. We had
Simplicity of 1 • 1 /-, T. . •
the American only one strong general rival, Great Bntam,
^^ °° and with her, after years of controversy,
Webster finally dealt. The other countries with whom we
had intimate relationships were too weak to make our errors
painful to us. American commerce was simpler than it
had been, consisting more and more of the exchange of our
non-competitive agricultural products for manufactures
which other nations were anxious to sell us. Such direct
commerce needs much less governmental protection than the ]
carrying trade, which had previously been of so much greater
relative importance, or than the disposal of competitive j
goods such as we now produce.
Jackson, like Jefferson, found the diplomatic board for
the moment almost swept clean of complications. Yet, as
British West Jefferson had been able to reap some glory
Indies from a new handling of the Barbary question,
so Jackson scored an early triumph by restoring trade with
the British West Indies. Van Buren, as senator, had opposed
Adams on that point, claiming that he was too stiff in main-
taining non-essentials, a fault which was certainly Adams's
characteristic weakness. He promptly instructed McLane,
our new minister to Great Britain, to assure the British
government that with the change of administration in the
United States had come a change of policy, and to offer to
renew trade on the basis of the British acts of 1825. Great
Britain was complaisant, and by proclamation this long- {
vexed question was finally settled on terms that gave the
United States complete freedom of direct trade, but not of 1
trade between the islands and British territory. Van Buren
failed to win the plaudits for which he had hoped, owing to ,
his unusual and improper reference to domestic politics in a
dispatch intended to be read to a foreign minister.^
* E. M. Shepard, Martin Van Buren (Boston, etc., 1900), chs. vi.-viL
RECIPROCITY, CLAIMS, BOUNDARIES, ETC. 22S
Partly as a result of the same greater flexibility, the for-
mation of commercial treaties with Spanish America now pro-
ceeded more rapidly; in 1831 one was made The Mediter-
with Mexico, in 1832 one with Chili, compacts '*"«*"
with Peru, Bolivia, and Venezuela followed in 1836, and one
with Ecuador in 1839. Probably the policy of the adminis-
tration had less to do with the framing of our first treaties
with Mediterranean powers than had the general ameliora-
tion of commercial conditions, especially the final quelling of
the Barbary pirates after the capture of Algiers by the
French in 1830. At all events, treaties were made with the
Ottoman empire in 1830, with Greece in 1837, Sardinia in
1838, and the Two Sicilies, or Naples, m 1845. In 1840 a
first treaty was made with Portugal. In 1833 a
roving commission to Edmund Roberts resulted
in our first Asiatic treaties, — one with Muscat and one with
Siam. In 1842 we officially expressed an interest in Hawaii,
and in 1844 our first treaty with China was concluded. This
latter was relatively satisfactory from a commercial point of
view, for it opened the five ports of Kwang-Chow, Amoy,
Fuchow, Ningpo, and Shanghai to commerce and residence
and elaborately regulated trade. It did not open the way
to missionary enterprise.
Throughout the period the policy of reciprocity was
actively pursued. In so far as the employment of vessels
was concerned it was embodied in most of the „ . .^
. . Reciprocity
treaties already mentioned, and it was m some
cases extended to reciprocity of customs dues. By a con-
vention of 1831: "The wines of France, from and after the
exchange of the ratifications of the present convention, shall
be admitted to consumption in the States of the Union at
duties which shall not exceed the following rates," and "the
proportion existing between the duties on French wines thus
reduced, and the general rates of the tariff which went into
operation the first of January, 1829, shall be maintained, in
case the Government of the United States should think proper
224 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
to diminish those general rates." France in return agreed to
establish the same duties on long staple cotton as on the short
staple, if carried in French or American vessels, and in "con-
sideration of this stipulation, which shall be binding on the
United States for ten years, the French government abandons
the reclamations which it had formed in relation to the
eighth article of the treaty of cession of Louisiana."
This last clause was in settlement of a dispute regarding
the significance of the "most favored nation" provision,
*' Most fa- which affected our whole reciprocity campaign,
vored nation " Nearly all our treaties were on this basis. If
thereby every nation on such terms with us were to enjoy
every favor granted to any nation, our bargaining power
would be much reduced, John Quincy Adams had argued j
with France that it applied only to favors freely granted, not
to special concessions given in exchange for other special
favors. This interpretation was incorporated into our
treaty with Mexico in 1832, which qualified the "most
favored nation" clause by providing that the nations mu-
tually, "shall enjoy the same [favors] freely, if the concession
was freely made, or upon the same conditions, if the conces-
sion was conditional." ^
The most important commercial negotiations were those
conducted in Germany by Henry Wheaton. At the very
German trea- end of the period he secured the abolition, by
^^^ numbers of the sovereign German states, of the
droit d'aubaine, or tax on estates of foreigners, and of the
droit de detraction, or tax on emigration. Meantime he was
working for commercial reciprocity on the basis of Adams's
interpretation of the "most favored nation," which he may
be said to have incorporated into international law. In 1840
he arranged a treaty with Hanover. Most of the other North
German states were united in the Zollverein, or customs
union, of which Prussia was the head. This group of states
^Max Farrand, "The Commercial Privileges of the Treaty of 1803,"
Amer. Hist. Review, 1902, vii. 494-499.
RECIPROCITY, CLAIMS, BOUNDARIES, ETC. 225
consumed half of our tobacco crop and much of our rice.
In 1838 Wheaton secured a reduction m the duty on rice.
Our tariff of 1842, however, incited retaUation, and in 1844 he
made a new arrangement on a reciprocal basis. By this
agreement the United States was to impose only rates fixed
in the treaty on certain products of the ZoUverein, which in
return was to reduce to a stipulated rate its duties on tobacco
and lard, to forego its contemplated increase in the tax on
rice, and to impose no duty at all on raw cotton. These
provisions were to apply only to direct trade in German or
American vessels.
This treaty, commercially very favorable, was in 1844
recommended by President Tyler to the Senate. Rufus
Choate reported for its committee on foreign « • x. ^
affairs: "The Committee . . . are not pre- Zoiiverein
pared to sanction so large an innovation
upon ancient and uniform practice in respect of the depart-
ment of government by which duties on imports shall be
imposed. . . . The . . . committee believe that the general
rule of our system is indisputably that the control of trade
and the function of taxation belong, without abridgment or
participation, to Congress." Calhoun, who was secretary of
state, maintained on the other hand that such rate-making,
whether by treaty or by international agreement, was a well-
established practice: "The only question it is believed that
was ever made was, whether an act of Congress was not
necessary to sanction and carry the stipulations making the
change into effect," Many considerations intervened, such
as the unpopularity of Tyler and the Whig objections to
any lowering of the customs rates; and the treaty was re-
jected. Constitutionally the episode is of importance, be-
cause the Senate, moved by outside considerations and for
once forgetting its esprit de corps, put itself on record as
supporting the contention of the House as to the limitations
on the treaty-making power. ^
^ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Re-ports (Senate Doc., 56 Cong.
v/
226 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
A more exciting occupation than that of commercial
negotiation was that of gunning for claims. These claims
Claims trea- were of two classes. One kind had arisen, and
**** continued to grow, from the disturbed condi-
tion of Spanish America. Revolution had already become
chronic and American citizens and their property were often
in the way, often in fact were actively involved on one side
or the other. Recognition of the resulting claims for dam-
ages was obtained, and indemnity provided for, in treaties
with Texas in 1838, Mexico in 1839, and Peru in 1841.
The other class of claims was grounded on the maltreat-
ment of American shipping during the Napoleonic wars.
Such claims made the basis of a treaty with Denmark in 1830,
with France in 1831, with the two Sicilies in 1832, and with
Spain in 1834. With the addition of Portugal in 1851 the
list was complete and the slate clean. Our claims against
Great Britain had been wiped out by the war.
The signing of the treaty with France did not, however,
secure immediate payment of claims. On the contrary, its
Claims treaty execution involved us in the only strictly
with France diplomatic embroglio which aroused public
interest between 1829 and 1840. Although rising at one time
to a point at which even sane men expected war, the affair
must in reaUty be considered as opera bouffe rather than
drama. The king and peers of France constitutionally
agreed that the nation would pay us, for the release from all
our claims for seizure and destruction of property, five
million dollars in six annual instalments; but the Chamber of
Deputies, as our House of Representatives has so often
done, refused to grant the money. Jackson mentioned the
matter to Congress in 1833, and sent Livingston as minister
to France, especially charged with obtaining payment.
It is said that an intimation came from France that Jackson
2 sess.. No. 231, pt. 8), viii. 86-37, June 14, 1844. Cf. S. M. Cullom, Fifty
Yeara of Public Service (Chicago, 1911), 368-374; and E. S. Corwin, National
Supremacy, New York, 1913.
RECIPROCITY, CLAIMS, BOUNDARIES, ETC. 227
had better assume a stronger tone in his next message, of
1834; at any rate, he did so. In seven pages he discussed the
question with all his peculiar frankness. "Our institutions,"
said he, "are essentially pacific. Peace and friendly inter-
course with all nations are as much the desire of our govern-
ment as they are the interest of our people. But these
objects are not to be permanently secured by surrendering
the rights of our citizens or permitting solemn treaties for
their indemnity, in cases of flagrant wrong, to be abrogated or
set aside." ^
Interpreting this as a threat of war, French public opinion
went up in the air. The government of Louis Philippe,
conciliatory but dependent on public opinion, war clouds
was forced to prepare for war. French fleets **^*"*
sailed for our coasts. The French Chamber, with a charac-
teristic Gallic touch, voted the money, but would not pay it
until an apology for Jackson's message was tendered. The
French minister at Washington was recalled, and Livingston
was given his passports. Our government maintained that a
presidential message was a domestic document and hence
neither justified official umbrage nor allowed official ex-
planation. John Quincy Adams, now a member of the House
of Representatives and chairman of its committee on foreign
affairs, supported Jackson and reported in favor of retaliatory
legislation, thereby losing an election to the Senate from
Whig Massachusetts. In the Senate, the placating Clay
delayed war preparation and caused conciliatory resolutions
to be adopted.
In his next annual message, December 7, 1835, Jackson
explained that of the year before. "The conception," said
he, "that it was my intention to menace or Reconciliation
insult the Government of France is as un- ^tliFf*nc«
founded as the attempt to extort from the fears of that na-
tion what her sense of justice may deny would be vain and
^ Richardson, Messages of the Presidents, iii. 126-223; A. Danzat, Du rdle
det chambres en matiere de traites intemationatix.
228 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
ridiculous." After some demur and an informal mediation
by Great Britain, this explanation was accepted by France
as satisfactory, relations were resumed, and payment was
made. For this result the credit was claimed by the friends
of Adams, of Clay, and of Jackson. It certainly belonged
to whoever made the happy suggestion of explaining one
domestic document by another. If presidential messages
are not to be considered as international declarations, we
neither insulted France nor apologized; our honor was secure.
If they are to be so considered, whatever insult the first
contained was atoned for in the second, and French honor
was satisfied.
Meanwhile our always existing difficulties with Great
Britain were again approaching a head: they seem to re-
Northeastem quire lancing about every quarter of a century,
boundary /pj^^ most important of these concerned the
boundary between the crossing of the St. Lawrence by the
forty-fifth parallel, and a line drawn due north from the
source of the St. Croix. The treaty of 1783 provided that
this line run "to the Highlands; along the said Highlands
which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the
river St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic
Ocean." The question arose as to whether the St. John,
emptying into the Bay of Fundy, flowed into the Atlantic
ocean in the sense of the treaty. If it did, then the highlands
referred to were those dividing its waters from the tributarieis
of the St. Lawrence, and quite near the latter; if not, the
highlands would be those separating its valley from those of
the rivers of Maine. About twelve thousand square miles
were involved. The British contended for the second inter-
pretation, holding that the intention had been to divide the
river basins, and that this line would give them the whole
of the St. John valley. The Americans claimed that the
treaty had attempted to define a line already existing, —
the southern boundary of Quebec as defined by the proclama-
tion of 1763, in which the highlands were expressly men-
RECIPROCITY, CLAIMS, BOUNDARIES, ETC. 229
NORTHEASTERN
BOUNDARY CONTROVERSIES
Scale of Miles
10 6 0
M«WI>CV<OIli 9MiX BIT tO»«
70*
68*
230 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
tioned as running to the Bay of Chaleurs, and so were un-
doubtedly the northern chain.
The dispute was somewhat clouded by the hundred-and-
fifty-year-old dispute between Massachusetts and French
Border diffi- Acadia, which British New Brunswick now
culties claimed to represent, and by the presence of
an old French fief, Madawaska, situated in the middle of
the district and granted by the governor of Canada in 1683.
This settlement had unfortunately been overlooked by the
United States census of 1810. Obviously it had never de
facto been a part of Massachusetts, as the United States
claimed the whole region had been de jure. In the thirties
the district was no longer overlooked. In 1831 a riot fol-
lowed an attempt on the part of Maine to hold an election
in Madawaska, and later the British planned a road through
the region, connecting Halifax and Quebec. Lumberjacks
of the two nations began to clash. In 1838 and 1839 occurred
the "Restook war," in the valley of the Aroostook, a branch
of the St. John. Congress authorized the President to call
out the militia and to accept fifty thousand volunteers, and
gave him ten million dollars credit. Maine voted eight hun-
dred thousand dollars for forts. General Scott was sent
to the frontier. In 1839 a modus Vivendi was arranged by
the governors of Maine and New Brunswick: "That the
civil posse of Maine should retain possession of the valley of
the Aroostook, the British denying their right; the British
authorities retaining possession of the valley of the Upper
St. John, Maine denying their right." The difficulty seemed
the more serious because, although in 1827 Gallatin had suc-
ceeded in arranging an arbitration, the result had proved
unsatisfactory. The arbiter, the king of the Netherlands,
had suggested a compromise and both parties had rejected
his suggestion. Subsequent attempts at arbitration or com-
promise had equally failed.
Although the most important, this was not the only un-
settled portion of the boundary line. The highlands once
RECIPROCITY, CLAIMS, BOUNDARIES, ETC. 231
agreed upon, the line was to descend to the "North-western
most head of Connecticut river." What was the "North-
western most head"? There were several Minor bound-
that might with no great stretch of the con- ^ disputes
science be so described. About one hundred thousand acres
were in dispute. More annoying, because a preventable
error, was the fact, discovered by one of the commissions
NOETHWE8TEBNMOST HEAD OP CONNECTICUT RIVER
under the treaty of Ghent, that the forty-fifth parallel had
been incorrectly surveyed in 1774 and the report ever since
had been accepted. The error was not great, but the tipping
of the parallel northward as it went west had given us Rouses
Point, which commanded the outlet of Lake Champlain,
and upon which we had built a costly fortress. This was now
found to be in territory properly British.'^
^ J. F. Sprague, The North Eastern Boundary Controversy and the Aroostook
War, Dover, Me., [1910]; W. F. Ganong, Evolution of the Boundaries of the
233
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
These disputes were rendered the more serious by the situ-
ation in Canada and the attitude of the United States toward
The Canadian it. The years from 1837 to 1840 mark a period
insurrection ^f unrest in that colony. There were French
Canadian movements and Republican movements to throw
oflF British rule. Until the report of Lord Durham, in 1839,
Great Britain was not decided in her attitude. In the United
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TtXi'
BOUSES POINT CONTBOVEBSY
States there was sympathy for the revolution and hope of
annexation. Once more confronted by the question of neu-
trality, the government on the whole did its best, and did
well. In 1838 Congress strengthened the neutrality law by
giving the collectors of customs power to prevent the de-
parture of military expeditions when there was "probable
cause to believe" they intended to violate neutrality.^
Before the government could bring its force to bear on the
frontier, however, the Niagara river had been the scene of
actual hostilities. In 1837 forces equipped in
New York gathered on Navy island, in Ameri-
can waters, and were supplied from the United States by the
little steamer Caroline. On December 26 a party of Canadian
militia crossed the river, boarded the Caroline^ and sent her
Province of New Brunswick, Royal Soc. of Canada, Trans., 1901, vii. sec. ii.
139-449.
^ William Kingsford, History of Canada (10 vols., London, 1888-98), x.
430-457; Shepard, Van Buren, 350-356; House Exec. Docs., 25 Cong., t
seas.. No. 74.
The Caroline
RECIPROCITY, CLAIMS, BOUNDARIES, ETC. 233
drifting and afire over the falls. In the scrimmage one Amer-
ican was killed. The excitement which this violation of our
territory caused among the border population, already afire
with sympathy for the Canadian movement, was intensified
by a new episode which grew out of it. In 1840 Alexander
McLeod, a Canadian, boasted in a New York „ , ^
McLeod
saloon that he had been of the boardmg party
and had killed the American. He was at once arrested and
put on trial for murder. The British government demanded
that he be released on the ground that whatever he had done
had been done under orders. The United States replied that
he was being tried in a state court and that the national gov-
ernment could not interfere. Webster, who became secretary
of state in March, 1841, wrote to President Tyler in July,
that "Hunters' Lodges" were organized along the border
from Maine to Wisconsin, that they were said to number ten
thousand members and to desire war with Great Britain,
that they were likely to attempt violence against McLeod,
and that, if a " mob should kill him, war would be inevitable
in ten days." ^
The coming in of Webster at this juncture was fortunate,
and it happily coincided with the new British ministry of
Sir Robert Peel, favorably inclined to a settle- „ ^
. Webster
ment with the United States. Webster was
well known to the ministry, which sent Lord Ashburton over
to treat with him. The latter was a member of the firm of
Baring Brothers, his wife was an American, and he p)ersonally
knew Webster, to whom he wrote truly, January 2, 1842,
"The principal aim and object of that part of my life devoted
to public objects during the thirty-five years that I have had
a seat in one or the other House of Parliament, has been to
impress on others the necessity of, and to promote myself,
peace and harmony between our countries." Under such
pleasing auspices the settlement was undertaken, but the
mutual friendliness and good fellowship did not prevent either
1 Daniel Webster, Letters (ed. C. H. Van Tyne, New York, 1902), 233.
SS4 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
party from sturdily maintaining his case, or from withholding
from the other evidence which he believed to be damaging to
his own position.^
The McLeod affair was for Webster to arrange. Great
Britain was right about it, but our national government
Settlement of was without authority to interfere. Webster
and ** Caroline followed the trial with great interest, used his
*ff*ir influence with the state government, and was
not uninfluential in obtaining the final discharge of McLeod,
although he was dissatisfied with the form which it took — ■
the acceptance of an alibi. He also saw to it that precisely
such cases should not arise in the future, by securing an act
of Congress providing that a subject of a foreign power on
trial in a state court might be brought into a United States /"
court on a writ of habeas corpus, and dismissed if the latter
court judged proper.^ The Caroline affair was settled by an
exchange of notes. Webster admitted that such a violation
of our territory was permissible if necessary for self-defence, —
we could not well take the opposite view considering our
several invasions of Spanish Florida, — ^but he denied the
necessity in this case. Lord Ashburton maintained that
the necessity had existed, but nevertheless apologized.
The boundary controversies were settled by a treaty of
August 9, 1842. Webster and Ashburton abandoned the
Webster-Ash- attempt to discover the boundary intended in
burton treaty j^gg^ ^j^j agreed to foUow the suggestion of
the king of the Netherlands and compromise. To compro-
mise, however, meant the giving up of territory without first
ascertaining whether we had title to it or not. It is conceiv-
able that, when the territory in question is part of a state,
this exceeds the constitutional power of the national gov-
ernment. It was at any rate necessary to recognize Maine,
* E. D. Adams, "Lord Ashburton and the Treaty of Washington," Amcr.
Hist. Review, 1912, xvii. 764-782; J. W. Foster, A Century of American
Diplomacy (Boston, etc., 1901), 282-286.
* Daniel Webster, Writings and Speeches (National edition, 18 vols.,
Boston, 1903), xi. 247-269; United States Statutes, 27 Cong., 2 sess., ch. 257.
RECIPROCITY, CLAIMS, BOUNDARIES, ETC. 235
which was officially represented at the conference and of-
ficially compensated by a provision of the treaty. Although
Maine assented to the terms, it is possible that her dislike
for the settlement cost Webster his last chance for the presi-
dency in 1852. Massachusetts was also involved, having
retained, when she permitted the erection of Maine into a
separate state, the ownership of certain lands. She too was
represented and recognized.^ The compromise divided the
region disputed between Maine and New Brunswick in such
a way as to give the former the valley of the Aroostook and
the southern part of the valley of the upper St. John. Both \
nations were admitted to equal use of the St. John for the j
purpose of logging. This arrangement gave the United j
States 7,015 miles and Great Britain 5,012, a settlement a I
Uttle less favorable to us than that suggested by the king j
of the Netherlands. Our contention as to the head of the i
Connecticut river was allowed, and the old incorrect loca- /
tion of the parallel of 45 was allowed to stand, as so many
vested rights would be disturbed by moving it. The line of \
the boundary from Lake Huron to the Lake of the Woods, '
which the Ghent commission had not completed, was also
drawn. Thus at length, in 1842, the northern boundary!
provided by the treaty of 1783 was reduced to intelligible
terms, except where it was frankly departed from. The few
disputes that have since arisen have been of a minor char-
acter and seem now all to be settled.
The treaty also revived and expanded the extradition
article of the Jay treaty, which had expired by limitation in
1808. As it did not yet, however, cover em- „
bezzlement, " gone to Canada " was for many
years the epitaph of the dishonest American who had been
found out.
On one subject with which it dealt the treaty proved un-
satisfactory. This was the slave trade, which had been
^ Report and Resolves in relation to the North-eastern Boundary (Massachu-
setts General Court; Senate Doc., No. 67), Boston, [1838].
i/
236 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
the subject of a dispute that for a quarter of a century had
been growing more acute. In 1807 Great Britain, as the result
of a long philanthropic agitation, abolished
the trade as respected her own subjects. Once
having repudiated it herseK, she was moved by every motive,
philanthropic and philistine, to secure its abolition elsewhere.
While it continued anywhere, not only were her citizens de-
prived of its profits, but her colonies were hampered by the
competition of other regions where the slave supply was
plentiful and cheap. Thus the wily Castlereagh and the
beneficent Clarkson together urged abolition before Euro-
pean congresses.
Civilized public sentiment was ready for the movement,
at least when unaffected by special considerations. Den-
Difficulty of mark had preceded Great Britain in 1802, the
suppression United States followed in 1808, Sweden in
1813, France in 1815; Spain and Portugal yielded to financial
and other inducements in 1817. The trade soon became
illegal among all so-called Christian powers. Sub rosa,
however, it continued to exist. It was necessary for a na-
tion to possess a navy and the will to achieve, if she were to
prevent adventurers, either of her own or of other nation-
alities, from misusing her flag. So long as slavery existed in
Brazil, Cuba, and Porto Rico, and the southern states of
our country, the rewards of the trade were sufficient to induce
men to engage in it despite the law and even in the face of
considerable risk.
During the last years of the Napoleonic wars England had
almost stopped the trade by using her belligerent right of
Great Brit- search. With peace, however, this right van-
ain's policy ished, and her navy saw the flags of other na-
tions fraudulently used to protect a fraudulent traffic and
were impotent to interfere. Her great admiralty judge.
Sir William Scott, declared in the case of Le Louis, 1817,
that the slave trade was not piracy, and that no right of
search existed. Great Britain, therefore, sought to obtain a
RECIPROCITY, CLAIMS, BOUNDARIES, ETC. 237
general agreement to a mutual right of search or visit in
times of peace; but although she succeeded in making such
arrangements with Spain aind Portugal, she failed to obtain
them from the Holy Alliance in 1818 and again in 1822. As
the greatest naval power, she would obviously profit much
by a regulation that would give her navy in time of peace
almost as effective a police power over the ocean as it exer-
cised in time of war, including a rich harvest of prize money.
Interest combined with the highest ideals of patriotism and
altruism to press her to the attainment of her goal.
In the United States these ideals stood in a rivalry which
grew year by year more bitter. We had agreed in the treaty
of Ghent that both the contracting parties Attitude of the
should use " their best endeavors to accom- ^'"**<1 States
plish" the abolition of the slave trade. An act of Congress
of May 15, 1820, declared the slave trade piracy, and a
growing element among the people of the North urged a
continuation of this policy of exterminating a trade which
had already been branded by all the European world. The
nationalist spirit, however, was not prepared to permit
Great Britain to police our flag, to renew in time of peace
those practices which had in time of war driven us to fight.
In the case of the Antelope, in 1825, John Marshall denied
that our law of 1820 made the trade piracy in the interna-
tional sense, or gave other nations any rights over our vessels,
however employed. Between 1823 and 1825 Congress dis-
cussed the subject of cooperating with Great Britain on the
subject. Adams, though forced by a resolution of Congress
to negotiate on the basis of a mutual right of search, was
personally opposed. He wrote to Gallatin: "The admission
of a right for the officers of foreign ships of war to enter and
search the vessels of the United States in time of peace, under
any circumstances whatever, would meet with universal
repugnance in the public opinion of the country." The con-
vention drawn up by Rush and Canning in 1824 was rejected
as unsatisfactory, and when Webster and Ashburton met
tS8 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
we had not yet come to an understanding with Great Britain.
The United States was so lax in the enforcement of her own
law that much of the trade was carried on under the protec-
tion of her flag, and some of it in American vessels.
This main diflBculty was augmented by questions arising
from our domestic maritime slave trade. Vessels carrying
DomMtie iUt* slaves from one of our Atlantic ports to the
*"*• gulf states were often forced by stress of
weather or other circumstances into British West Indian
ports. In 1831 and 1833 slaves from the Comet and Encomium
were released and freed by the British authorities there.
During the Van Buren administration indemnity was paid in
these cases, on the ground that, as slavery was permitted in
the islands the principle of British law that slaves on reaching
British territory or war vessels became free did not apply
there. When, however, in August, 1834, the British West
Indian slaves were freed, the application of the principle was
extended to those islands. New cases occurred, as those of
the Enterprise and Hermosa, and satisfaction was refused.
The most important was that of the big Creole, in 1841, whose
cargo of slaves arose, killed a passenger, took possession of the
ship, and made the port of Nassau. Those guilty of the
murder were executed and the remainder freed.
These cases aroused great excitement in the United States.
In 1840 Calhoun secured the passage by the Senate of resolu-
Caihetm'i tions declaring that a vessel " in time of peace,
proyodtioiM engaged in a lawful voyage, is, according to the
laws of nations, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state
to which her flag belongs," and that, if forced "by stress of
weather, or other unavoidable cause " into the port of another
friendly power, "she could, under the same laws, lose none
of the rights appertaining to her on the high seas." In his
ipeech defending these resolutions he laid down the doctrine
that the constitution made it the duty of the national govern-
ment, solely charged with the foreign relations of every state,
|o defend before the world the institutions of every state;
RECIPROCITY, CLAIMS, BOUNDARIES, ETC. 9S9
that the protection of the domestic slave trade was a matter
of national obligation, and not of choice.
These positions would seem so reasonable and clear aa
hardly to need statement, but public opinion was blurred by
an apparent similarity with another case which L'AmitUi
during 1840 was being argued by John Quincy ***•
Adams in the supreme court. Thb case concerned the
Spanish vessel, VAmistad, engaged in the Spanish domestic
slave trade, whose cargo revolted and which was brought into
a United States port. As it developed that these negroes had
been recently and illegally captured, it was held that they
were not properly slaves, but free persons kidnapped, and
they were restored to Africa. It is possible that in strictness
we should have turned the whole case over to the Spanish
authorities; but the distinction between these facts and those
involved in the Creole case, in which the negroes were without
doubt legal slaves by the laws of Virginia and of the United
States, was sufficient to bar its use as a precedent.*
Webster entered upon the discussion of these problema
with little apparent enthusiasm. In a letter to Lord Ash-
burton enclosing his statement of the Creole case, he said
" Using the words of Walter Scott when he sent one of
his works to his publisher — I send you my e **i — • «#
Creole — D — n her." No agreement was reached th« Cr**!*
as to this and the other vessels, until after
his return to office under Fillmore; then, in 185S, a claima
convention submitted the matter to arbitration, and Great
Britain paid indemnity. More important was the question
of making arrangements for the more effectual suppression
of the slave trade. Great Britain was as insistent as ever on
some such provision. The United States was as loath as it
had been under Adams to permit the British navy to search
our vessels. Finally, at the suggestion of President Tyler
there was incorporated into the treaty a plan for the main*
^ W. E. B. DuBois, Suppression of the African Slave-trade (New Yor^
etc., 1896), 131-146, 162-167; Schuyler, American Diplomacy, ck. r.
240 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
tenance by the two powers of a joint squadron off the coast
of Africa.
This agreement was promptly attacked by Lewis Cass,
our minister to France, on the ground that Great Britain
had not definitely admitted that she did not
the quintuple possess the right of search, and hence that she
* would in all probability actually exercise it.
His fears had been excited by the attempt of that power in
1842 to effect a quintuple agreement by joining with her
Austria, Prussia, France, and Russia for such a mutual
right. On the basis of this powerful support he believed that
Great Britain would assert the right as established inter-
national law. Cass therefore wrote a pamphlet attacking the
proposal, and, acting without instructions, protested to the
French prime minister, Guizot, and secured the defeat of the
British plan, France finally adopting the American scheme
of a joint squadron. In this action he was endorsed by
Webster, and was supported by an article written by Henry
Wheaton, entitled "An Inquiry into the Validity of the
British Claim to a Right of Visitation and Search." ^
Nevertheless, by 1849 Great Britain had secured treaties
with twenty-four nations, all, except those with the United
G t B 'tain ^^^^^^ ^^^ France, permitting a mutual right of
yields visita- search. With this great weight of international
support behind her, she justified Cass's fears by
acting upon a claim, not indeed to search, but to visit any
vessel suspected of the traffic in order to ascertain its na-
tionality, a course to which she was provoked by the facts
that otherwise any vessel flying the American flag was
immune, and that most vessels used that flag in places where
American war-ships were not to be found. If the vessel
visited was not American, we did not suffer; but when, as
often happened, it was ours, we, with our special sensitiveness
to such liberties taken with our flag, resented the visit and
^ Daniel Webster, Works (ed. Edward Everett, 6 vols., Boston, 1851),
V. 78-150; A. C. McLaughlin, Life of Lewis Cass (Boston, 1891), 174-192.
RECIPROCITY, CLAIMS, BOUNDARIES, ETC. 241;
became increasingly angry. Finally in 1858, Cass himself
having become secretary of state, the issue was forced, and
the British government, with the advice of its law oflScers,
admitted that no right of visitation existed.^
The American government thus successfully met the
attempt of Great Britain to continue in time of peace a
practice which we had unsuccessfully resisted The conflict of
in time of war. It is uncontestably true that **^**^*
in accomplishing this object we delayed the abolition of the
slave trade to which we stood committed. It was a question
of conflict between the national ideal of the freedom of our
flag, strengthened later by the rising pro-slavery movement,
and the ideal of humanitarianism. With the outburst of the
Civil War the latter element got the upper hand in the
national government, and in 1862 Seward ar- _ . ...
ranged a treaty providing for a limited mutual manitarian
right of search, but protectmg American
interests by a provision for mixed courts to try the cases.
Seward said that, had such a treaty been made in 1808, there
would have been no Civil War; but Seward was apt to be
h3T)erbolic in expression.
The achievements of the period from 1829 to 1844 were the
final settlement of the difficulties growing out of the Na-
poleonic wars, and the passing of another mile- The period
stone in the adjustment of our relationships 1829 to 1844
with Great Britain. The latter transaction was a conven-
tional agreement, in which it is doubtful if Webster did as
well as John Quincy Adams would have done. The former
was the work of Jackson, whose fearless, mannerless method
of procedure marks the dominance of the frontier element in
political life; it was not in accordance with rule, but it was
characteristic and it was effective. More was done for the
furtherance of commerce than one would have expected from
the ruling elements in the United States at that time. To no
small extent this progress must be considered as due to the
1 McLaughlin, Lewis Cass, 323-330.
t4f AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
presence on our staff of a man of Henry Wheaton's pre-
eminent ability; but a factor still more important lay in the
character of the commerce itself, now almost wholly non-
competitive and universally desired. The period as a whole,
however, would be barren were it considered in relation to
mctual achievements alone. Its chief interest lies in the rise
of new problems which it left for the future to solve.
CHAPTER XIX
EXPANSION
In a report to the Mexican Congress in 1830, the secretary
of foreign affairs, Lucas Alaman, analyzed the process of
American expansion: ^ Alanum'f
"The United States of the North have been JSiriilm *L-
going on successfully acquiring, without awak- P»n«io*
ening public attention, all the territories adjoining theirs.
Thus we find that, in less than fifty years, they have suc-
ceeded in making themselves masters of extensive colonies
belonging to various European Powers, and of districts, still
more extensive, formerly in the possession of Indian tribes,
which have disappeared from the face of the earth; proceed-
ing in these transactions, not with the noisy pomp of con-
quest, but with such silence, such constancy, and such uni-
formity, that they have always succeeded in accomplishing
their views. Instead of armies, battles, and invasions, which
raise such uproar, and generally prove abortive, they use
means which, considered separately, seem slow, ineffectual,
and sometimes palpably absurd, but which united, and in
the course of time, are certain and irresistible.
"They commence by introducing themselves into the
territory which they covet, upon pretence of commercial
negotiations, or of the establishment of colonies, with or
without the assent of the Government to which it belongs.
These colonies grow, multiply, become the predominant
party in the population, and as soon as a support is found in
this manner, they begin to set up rights which it is im];>o»<
sible to sustain in a serious discussion, and to bring forward
ridiculous pretensions, founded upon historical facts which
1 House Exec. Docs., 25 Cong., 2 sess.. No. 851, pp. S12-S22.
£43
244 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
are admitted by nobody. . . . These extravagant opinions
are, for the first time, presented to the world by unknown
writers; and the labor which is employed by others, in offer-
ing proofs and reasonings, is spent by them in repetitions
and multiplied allegations, for the purpose of drawing the
attention of their fellow-citizens, not upon the justice of the
proposition, but upon the advantages and interests to be
obtained or subserved by their admission,
"Their machinations in the country they wish to acquire
are then brought to light by the appearance of explorers,
some, of whom settle on the soil, alleging that their presence
does not affect the question of the right of sovereignty or
possession to the land. These pioneers excite, by degrees,
movements which disturb the political state of the country
in dispute. . . . When things have come to this pass, which
is precisely the present state of things in Texas, the diplo-
matic management commences: the inquietude they have
excited in the territory in dispute, the interests of the colo-
nists therein established, the insurrections of adventurers
and savages instigated by them, and the pertinacity with
which the opinion is set up as to their right of possession,
become the subjects of notes, full of expressions of justice
and moderation, until, with the aid of other incidents, which
are never wanting in the course of diplomatic relations, the
desired end is attained of concluding an arrangement as
onerous for one party as it is advantageous to the other."
In the History Teachers' Magazine for February, 1914,
Dr. Jameson of the Carnegie Institution analyzed the
Process of ex- natural history of American expansion. He
pansion omitted the stage of diplomatic claim-making
by the United States and added the final step, — ^that of
popularizing annexation by arousing our fears that some
other power would annex if we did not. Otherwise these two
analyses harmonize completely, except that Alaman finds
the motive force in the malevolent scheming of the govern-
ment, Dr. Jameson in the working of natural forces. Al-
EXPANSION 245
though the process described is, not entirely realized in every
case, and has not always been crowned with success, it may
well be used as a basis for the study of the development of
our interests in the territory of the Indian tribes, in the
Natchez district, West Florida and East Florida, Texas,
Oregon, California, Nicaragua, Cuba, Hawaii, Samoa, the
Philippines, Panama, and even Mexico.
From the time of the Florida treaty, in 1819, germination
began which was to result in the addition of several of these
branches to the mother trunk. The imagina- Frontier char-
tion of the pioneer had already passed the ^cteristics
limits of the Louisiana Purchase, and, unrestrained by its
western bounds, had begun to busy itself with the lands be-
yond. The Americans engaged in these movements were sim-
ilar to those who took the field in the long struggle for the
Ohio valley, except that unlike them they were character-
ized by a loyalty to the United States that at times over-
rode their immediate material interest. At this period the
diplomatic problem never took the form of defending our
own undisputed territory, as it had from 1783 to 1815; rather,
it was a matter of struggling for disputed regions, as in the
case of Oregon, or for those undeniably belonging to other
nations, as in the case of Texas and California. The issue
was never so vital to our existence as was the struggle for
the mouth of the Mississippi, and it only intermittently held
the attention of the public or of most political leaders.
The signing of the Florida treaty was immediately fol-
lowed by the rush of far-sighted speculators into Texas.
Linking the old order with the new. General Texan colon-
Wilkinson joined the number. These men were *^*^
attracted by the fact that now for the first time could secure
land titles be obtained in that region of which the ownership
had previously been so uncertain. They were attracted, too,
by the Spanish land system, which was based on the principle
of granting favors to managers, or empresarios, who on their
part guaranteed to introduce a specified number of colonists.
246 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Nothing, except possibly bribes, had to be paid down, and
the terms were such that land could be offered to the in-
dividual settler at twelve and a half cents an acre, as against
the United States price of a dollar and a quarter.^
Mexico, succeeding Spain, continued the same liberal
policy. No less anxious than Spain had been during the Con-
Mexico's federation to people her frontiers, she encour-
liberality aged the incoming settler by an absence of
curiosity concerning his religion, by allowing the importa-
tion of slaves from the United States, and by an almost
entire governmental neglect. In return for his land the
settler had only to accept Mexican citizenship.
This halcyon period did not last long, for Great Britain
was pressing upon Mexico an anti-slavery policy. In 1823
gradual emancipation was adopted, in 1824
importation of slaves was prohibited. In 1825
and 1827 Adams, who as secretary of state had resented the
failure to insist on our claim to Texas, now as President at'
tempted to cover the error by purchasing the country. He
urged Mexico to sell all or part of the region between the
Sabine and the Rio Grande, using the same line of argument
he had employed with Goulburn in 1815 concerning the Indian
buffer state, and with de Onis in 1819 concerning Florida.
He pointed out that the American settlers would never submit
to Mexican authority, that the natural progress of American
settlement could not be stopped by paper bonds. "These
immigrants," said he, "will carry with them our principles
of law, liberty, and religion, and, however much it may be
hoped they might be disposed to amalgamate with the ancient
inhabitants of Mexico, so far as political freedom is concerned,
it would be almost too much to expect that all collisions
would be avoided on other subjects. . . . These collisions
may insensibly enlist the sympathies and feelings of the
two Republics and lead to misunderstandings." Mexico
had better now, he urged, accept compensation for territory
' G. P. Garrison, Texas; a Contest of Civilizations, Boston, etc., 1903.
EXPANSION 247
which she would soon lose without it. Adams's arguments
were emphasized by the proclamation of the "Fredonian
republic" in 1826. Although this proved to be a premature
movement, since the Americans were not yet "the predomi-
nant party in the population," it nevertheless foreshadowed
what their grumblings at the anti-slavery policy of the gov-
ernment, which was as yet unenforced in Texas, would lead
to when the settlers became strong.^
Impelled by these facts, by the warnings of Ward, the
British minister, and by its Cassandra, Alaman, the Mexican
government changed its policy. In 1826 it Alarms and
forbade the importation of colonists from coter- "c^»"»o»"
minous nations; after 1828 it encouraged the formation of
colonies on the border composed of persons not from the
United States; in 1827 it joined the territory of Texas to
the state of Coahuila to keep the former under better con-
trol; in 1829 it declared the immediate emancipation of
slaves; and jBnally, in 1830, it prohibited immigration from
the United States. The first actual manifestation of this
policy in Texas itself was the establishment of Mexican
military posts in 1831. Immediate revolt followed, and
separation would probably have resulted, had not the re-
volting Texans combined with Santa Anna, who was con-
ducting a simultaneous revolution in another part of Mexico
to defend the constitution against President Bustamante.
The two movements triumphed in 1832, and for a moment
the Texans posed as Mexican patriots, defenders of the
Mexican constitution.
Meantime the colonists began to be succeeded by the
"explorers" mentioned by Alaman, men drawn to Texas not
only by the cheapness and richness of the soil, but by the
prospect of military glory and political advancement in the
iSir H. G. Ward, Mexico in 1825-7; L. G. Bugbee, "Slavery in Early
Texas," Political Science Quarierly, 1898, xiii. 389-413, 648-668; John and
Henry Sayles, A Treatise on the Laws of Texas relating to Real Estate, 2 vols.,
St. Louis, 1890-92.
248 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
conflict which it did not require great acumen to foresee
Foremost among them was Samuel Houston, the picturesque
Houston and governor of Tennessee, who in 1829 had pictur-
Jackson esquely vanished from that position, to be dis-
covered later living among the Indians on the Texan border.
A friend and proteg6 of Jackson, he occasionally visited
Washington. Undoubtedly the two talked of the future of
Texas, which both expected to become part of the United
States. There is no evidence or probability that there was
collusion between them to hasten that movement, or in-
deed that Houston himself did hasten it. Nevertheless, his
appointment by Jackson, in 1833, to negotiate with certain
Indian tribes in the region introduced him commandingly to
the Texans when, in 1835, they felt the imperative need of a
leader.
Santa Anna tired of the constitution that he had revived,
and overthrew it. In the civil war which followed, the Tex-
Texas declares ans took the losing side, and soon found them-
independence selves the sole armed supporters of the Mexicrn
constitution. Thrown thus upon their own responsibility,
they could draw upon the experience of scores of groups of
Americans similarly situated. Their first step was to or-
ganize a committee of safety, then they called a convention,
and finally, in 1836, after halting for a moment with a dec-
laration of independence from the state of Coahuila, they
declared their entire separation from Mexico, established a
republic, and chose Houston as commander-in-chief.
Ever since 1830 "unknown" writers had been exciting
the interest of the people of the United States in the affairs
^. . of Texas, and now the first and ablest of the
Sjrmpathy in • o i * •
the United empresanos, Stephen Austm, came as ambas-
Stfltes
sador to the people to solicit aid. The tragic
and heroic stories of the Alamo and Goliad, with the death
of David Crockett, the ideal frontier hero of the time, roused
sympathy for the Texans and hatred for the Mexicans.
During this period there were always thousands of Americans
EXPANSION 249
spoiling for a fight, and in this instance, as in most other
cases, sympathy was not the only fuel relied on to kindle
the flames. Those who came to the rescue were promised
not glory and gratitude alone, but land as well, — three hun-
dred and twenty acres for three months' service, twice that
amount for six months, four times as much for a year. The
war fever spread over the southern states, and with decreas-
ing violence as far north as New York. Thousands volun-
teered to assist their late fellow-countrymen, whom, after
an interval of Mexican citizenship and one of independence,
they expected to welcome into what was now the "Old**
Union. ^
As individuals, companies, regiments, and even fleets left
the country, either crossing the frontier on the road from
Natchitoches to Nacogdoches or sailing from p ^
New Orleans, their departure was triumphantly tion of neu-
heralded by the press. Yet, when the collectors
of customs were asked to enforce the neutrality act, they
explained that they could discover no organized expeditions,
but only ships with individual passengers and cargoes of
arms. It was not, indeed, till 1838 that the law authorizing
them to detain vessels on "probable cause" was enacted.
Still, a nation is responsible if its laws are not suflScient, and
Mexico had good reason to complain. The record of the
administration, however, was clear, its orders were correct,
and probably no administration could have repressed the
determination of the people to aid Texas.
If the responsibility for this volunteer assistance rested
fundamentally upon the people, the executive was more
directly responsible for the action of its agents. Gaines and the
In the sprmg of 1836, when Santa Anna was ^^'^^
sweeping northward over Texas and Houston was retreating
before him, the frontier of the United States was disturbed
by rumors of impending Indian outrages to the southeast
1 G. L. Rives, The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848, 2 vols.. New York,
1913.
250 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
among the Seminole, and to the west along the Mexican or
Texan border. General Gaines was authorized to call out
militia to aid the regular army, and to take proper measures
to defend our citizens on both frontiers, even to occupying
Nacogdoches, a Mexican town, but within territory to which
the United States maintained a rather fantastic claim. This
town occupied an important strategic position, for it was at
the junction of the coast and inland roads through Texas.
Gaines so far deviated from his instructions as to concentrate
on the Texan border, paying little attention to Florida, and
in July he occupied Nacogdoches.^
This occupation had no actual effect on the Texan move-
ment, for the crucial and final battle of independence had been
Jackson and won by Houston at San Jacinta on April 20.
Games Nevertheless, the Mexican minister withdrew
from Washington by way of protest. Here again the ad-
ministration was able to show a clear record. It repri-
manded Gaines for calling more militia than was needed
to the western frontier; and, although it justified the occupa-
tion of Nacogdoches as necessary for self-defence, it ordered
the town to be evacuated now that danger from the Indians
had passed. When we remember, however, that Gaines knew
he was acting under a President who had been elected, if not
because of, at any rate in spite of, a similar over-interpretation
of orders to defend the frontier by entering foreign territory,
and that Jackson knew that Gaines had that knowledge, it is
hard to escape the belief that an excess of zeal was expected
of him. Gaines's misfortune was that his action came too late
to be significant.
As the Nacogdoches episode reminds one of the invasions of
Florida before annexation, so the whole conduct of the
Texan affair seems like a less able imitation of Adams's han-
dling of that question. Jackson's administration had for years
* H. von Hoist, Constitutional and Political History of the United States
(8 vols., Chicago, 187&-92), ii. 548-714; T. M. Marshall, A History of the
Western Boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, 1819-18^1, Berkeley, 1914.
EXPANSION 251
been carrying hand in hand negotiations for the purchase of
Texas and for the settlement of American private claims
against Mexico. Adams had secured acknowl- jackson and
edgment of the claims in the first place, and ^<^*™^
had paid for the territory by assuming them; during the
negotiations he had preserved neutrality between Spain and
her revolting colonies. On December 21, 1836, Jackson,
having received the report of a special agent sent to in-
vestigate the condition of Texas, left the question of the
recognition of the new republic to Congress with the words,
"Prudence, therefore, seems to dictate that we should still
stand aloof ... at least until the lapse of time or the course
of events shall have proved beyond cavil or dispute the
ability of the people of that country to maintain their
separate sovereignty." On February 6, 1837, he sought to
bring the question of claims to an issue by a message one
stage more advanced than that which led to trouble with
France — that is, by recommending reprisals. At the same
time he was discussing unofficially with Santa Anna, who was
at Washington, and with the Texan representatives, a re-
newed proposal of purchase.
The plan was too delicate for its originators to carry out
and broke down altogether. Mexico, with a persistent de-
termination to reconquer Texas, refused to sell. Congress
decided that one more solemn demand for jus- Policy of Con-
tice be made upon Mexico for our claims before ^®^'
reprisals should be authorized, but voted recognition of the
Texan republic. With the strings thus tangled, the proposal
to secure Texas from Mexico became impracticable.
Promptly upon recognition the new republic made formal
a request for annexation which had already been in-
formally presented. This request at once Annexation
revealed those fundamental differences which ^^^^^^°^
were threatening the United States with disunion. Monroe
had in 1819 refused to press our claims to the region because
of the effect which such action might have upon our national
252 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
existence at a time when passions were inflamed by the
struggle of pro- and anti-slavery forces over the Missouri
question. Those forces were in 1837 and 1838 more bitter
than ever before. Webster wrote, May 7, 1836: "We are in a
peck of troubles here, and I hardly see our way through. My
greatest fear at present, is of a war about Texas. . . . This
whole subject appears to me to be likely to bring into our
politics new causes of embarrassment, and new tendencies to
dismemberment." John Quincy Adams, who in 1819 had
been unwilling to give up our chance to Texas, now, in a
speech running from June 15 to July 8, 1838, put all his
IK)wers into opposition to the acceptance of annexation.
He believed as firmly as Alaman did that our whole move-
ment into the region was a conspiracy; the only difference
was that Alaman believed it a conspiracy of the government
and included Adams among the conspirators, whereas Adams
believed it a conspiracy of the "Slavocracy" supported by
Jackson. Van Buren, to whom the decision came upon his
succession to the presidency in 1837, was not inclined, in the
face of a divided opinion at home, to press the question of
annexing territory still claimed by Mexico; and the party
managers were unwilling to take up an issue that was sure to
divide their organizations. The question of annexation was
dropped.^
Texas was therefore left to shift for herself, a juvenile
republic with American frontier energy and a dash of Spanish
braggadocio. She quickly accumulated a navy
independent and a debt. Always at war with Mexico,
hostilities were intermittent. Her soldiers
when unfortunate, as when captured in an expedition against
Santa Fe, remembered their United States origin and often
sought its intervention. At other times they threatened to
plant their banners in the halls of the Montezumas, to annex
^ G. P. Garrison, Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas, Amer.
Hist. Assoc., Reports, 1907, vol. ii., 1908, vol. ii.; also his "First Stage of the
Movement for the Annexation of Texas," Amer. Hist. Review, 1904, x. 72-96.
EXPANSION 253
California, and become a transcontinental nation. Though
ever prepared for and expecting annexation to the United
States, they nevertheless grew contented with independence.
Indeed, the actual disadvantages were not great; when the
history of Texas is compared with that of one of our states at
the same stage, as Arkansas, the difference is not apprecia-
ble.i
Internationally there were even advantages in her position.
In 1837 France recognized her independence and Great
Britain accorded trading privileges to her. Texas and
The latter country delayed recognition until Great Britain
1842, but negotiation was constant. Texas and Great
Britain were commercially complementary : the one produced
cotton, the other manufactured it. Great Britain, while
anxious for political reasons to prevent the United States
from acquiring the long Texan coast line which would give
command of the gulf of Mexico, was equally unwilling to see
Texas fall under the United States tariff system, again after
1842 dominated by the manufacturing interests of the North.
She also wanted to secure an independent source of cotton
supply. The Texans, on their part, realized that Great
Britain's influence in Mexico was potent, and that she might
exert it to secure Mexican recognition of the new republic.
It was, indeed, largely by her good offices that an amnesty
was in 1843 arranged between the two countries.
The element of discord was slavery. Texas assented to a
treaty on the maritime slave trade which granted a mutual
right of search, but she maintained slavery and slavery in
the overland slave trade with the United '^""
States. A strong English public opinion resented the crea-
tion of a new slave-holding republic out of the free territory
of Mexico. Lord Aberdeen, the British minister of foreign
affairs, July 31, 1843, instructed his representative in Mexico
to urge the Mexican government to make the "absolute
* E. D. Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-18^6, Balti-
more 1910; J. H. Smith, The Annexation of Texas, New York, 191 J,
254 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
abolition of the principle of slavery" a condition of her final
recognition of Texan independence. In August, 1843, in
reply to a question by Lord Brougham as to the attitude of
the government toward slavery in Texas, he said that his
unwillingness to tell what was being done "did not arise
from indifference, but from quite a contrary reason." This
reply naturally aroused interest in the United States. The
retention of slavery might prevent a harmonious understand-
ing between Great Britain and Texas; but, should slavery be
abolished, their interests would be cemented together, as
against the United States, by the strongest ties. The fear of
British influence was spurring the United States to renewed
interest in annexation.
Texas was not the only fruit that hung ripe, unpicked, and
threatened by alien hands in 1843. In 1795 Fauchet had
, . ^ written of the explorations of Alexander
Jomt occu- . .
pancy of Ore- McKenzie in the Oregon country. "If this
*^°" discovery is followed up," said he, "the English
will hasten without doubt to forestall the Americans by
establishments to put them in a position to secure possession
of this important point." Neither government, however,
seemed disposed to press the matter. In 1818 the United
States and Great Britain had agreed to a joint occupancy for
ten years, and by 1828 this agreement had been continued
indefinitely, but made terminable by a year's notice. Spain
and Russia had been eliminated from the question by their
treaties with the United States and Great Britain, and by
the same treaties the bounds of the territory we jointly
occupied had been fixed by the parallels of 42° on the south
and 54° 40' on the north. ^
Although American vessels frequented the coast, and
Astoria had been founded in 1811, the use of the territory
* H. H. Bancroft, Oregon, i, vols., San Francisco, 1886-88; Robert Green-
how, Memoir, Historical and Political, on the North-west Coast of North Am'
erica, Washington, 1840; Sir Travera Twiss, The Oregon Territory, New York,
etc.. 1846.
EXPANSION 255
under the joint occupancy fell at first chiefly to Great Britain,
represented by the Hudson Bay Company. The only posts
for many years were its fur-trading establish- Early interest
ments, and the only settlements those of its "* Oregon
retired French-Canadian trappers; the only government was
that of its factor, Dr. McLaughlin. During the twenties our
government concerned itself somewhat with the subject.
A Virginian representative, John Floyd, sought to have Con-
gress secure our rights by the formation of military establish-
ments, and Monroe recommended such action in his message
of 1824. With the retirement of Floyd in 1829, however, the
matter dropped out of public notice.
That basis of actual occupancy which always seems to
be necessary in order to arouse a genuine interest in such
questions in the United States was furnished The mission-
by a new type of pioneer. The wave of mis- "^ movement
sionary impulse whose beginning was marked in 1819 by
Bishop Heber's hymn "From Greenland's Icy Mountains"
touched all Christian organizations; it started anew the
attempt to Christianize the world. In such movements, as in
other things, there are fashions, and among the most popular
subjects for conversion in the thirties was the American
Indian. A series of events attracted the missionary interest
to Oregon. Various American denominations sent mis-
sionaries to the region, till by 1840 not only were there some
seventy or eighty Americans in the country, but the raising
of the money which sent and kept them there had aroused a
widespread popular interest. Oregon had become a house-
hold word.^
This renewed interest was naturally reflected in the gov
ernment. In 1835 Lewis F. Linn appeared as senator from
Missouri, the state which, by means of the river of the same
name, was most closely, or rather least distantly, connected
with Oregon. He at once made himself champion of the new
^R. E. Speer, Missions and Modem History, 2 vols.. New York, etc.,
[1904].
256 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
country by bringing in a bill to organize the Columbia
river region as Oregon territory. The bill itself was re-
, , ported adversely; but, as ten thousand copies
Renewed in- *^„ , ' . ., , . i ^ i
terest in Ore- of the report were distributed, it proved to be
^°° a new organ for arousing popular attention.
In 1840 a squadron under Captain Wilkes was sent to visit
the coast; in 1842 Tyler called attention to the problem;
and in the same year, Adams, as chairman of the house com-
mittee on foreign affairs, urged the sending of a special
mission to Great Britain to negotiate. Linn pressed his bill
offering a square mile of land to every settler. Benton said
of it: "I now go for vindicating our rights on the Columbia,
and as the first step toward it, passing this bill, and making
these grants of land, which will soon place thirty or forty
thousand rifles beyond the Rocky Mountains."
While the material reason for immediate legislation was the
desire for land titles, which could not be secured until the
British and question of sovereignty was determined, there
valries in Ore- developed a further motive to hasten action.
8°" The same impulse which moved Protestant
American denominations to enter the Oregon field stirred the
church of Rome also. French Canadian priests, under the
protection of the Hudson Bay Company, were active there,
and in their work with the Indians were more successful
than the Protestants. Their American rivals, therefore,
scented a great conspiracy of the priests, the Hudson Bay
Company, and the British government to drive the Amer-
icans out of Oregon and secure it for Great Britain, and en-
deavored from 1839 onward to impress their views on the
government at Washington.^
The degree to which popular interest had been stimulated
was shown in 1842, when an Indian agent, sent out to treat
' W. I. Marshall, Acquisition of Oregon and the long suppressed Evidence
about Marcus Whitman, 2 vols., Seattle, 1911; E. G. Bourne, The Legend of
Marcus Whitman, in his Essays in Historical Criticism (New York, 1901),
8-109; Joseph Schafer, Oregon Pioneers and American Diplomacy, in Turner
Essays, 35-55.
EXPANSION 257
with the tribes of the region, was joined as he went west
from Washington by nearly one hundred and fifty prospec-
tive settlers. In the spring of 1843, other Settlement of
groups of emigrants from Missouri, Arkansas, Oregon
Illinois, and neighboring states began promptly, without pre-
concert, to direct themselves toward Independence, the
starting-point for the long journey to the Pacific. With
wagons labelled "For Oregon," and with all their possessions,
about a thousand came together and pushed on to their
goal. In Oregon they found a self-formed provisional gov-
ernment of the American settlers, begun in 1841 and per-
fected in the spring of 1843. When, in 1844, the French
Canadians and British took a hand in this government,
Oregon, Uke Texas, was ready for picking. The difficulty
lay in the rival British claims, and in the inability of Great
Britain and the United States to agree upon a division of
territory.
More desirable in the minds of many than either Texas
or Oregon was the California country. Although it was an
undisputed portion of the Mexican republic, „ ,., ,
, , , , Cahfonua
the same elements were nevertheless present
here as in other regions, but in different proportions. Settlers
from the United States were few. There were some mer-
chants on the coast, merchant vessels touched its ports, and
after 1843 some pioneers came down from Oregon. Few as
they were, however, they were not without importance, for
the Mexican population itself was so inconsiderable that it
would take but a small influx of Americans to make the latter
the "predominant party." In 1844 the British consuls at
Tepic and Monterey wrote of the rapid American emigration
to the coast. ^
The interest of Great Britain in California was keen.
British subjects as well as Americans were resident there,
in 1842 a consul had been sent to Monterey, and a British
naval officer had been commissioned to investigate condi-
» Paullin and Paxon, Guide, 178-187.
258 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
tions. In 1844 the British consuls reported that a speedy-
separation from Mexico was inevitable. Already Great Bri-
Great Britain tain had been asked if she would aid a revolu-
and California ^.j^j^^ g^^^j ^-^e foreign oflSce had considered the
possibility of California's putting herself, when free, "under
the protection of any other power whose supremacy might
prove injurious to British interests." In 1845 the foreign
oflSce tendered its advice to Mexico with regard to the safety
of California. Great Britain, it was said, desired that Cali-
fornia remain Mexican, she feared that France might secure
it, and still more that it might fall to the United States.
The latter country was awake to the situation, or at least
to a situation. Here again she believed that Great Britain
_ J. . . not only barred her way but sought the prize.
States and In 1842 an American squadron was sent to the
California i j t i e i. x'
coast, and, on a false rumor of war between
the United States and Mexico, seized Monterey; an act for
which, of course, apologies were tendered. From 1842 Cap-
tain Fremont was in and about the region at the head of a
formidable exploring expedition of United States troops.
The government, moreover, was considering the ques-
tion. In 1842 Waddy Thompson, our minister to Mexico,
wrote to Webster expatiating on the desirability of annexing
California. "Our Atlantic border," he urged, "secures us
a commercial ascendency there. With the acquisition of
•Upper Calif orniai we should have the same ascendency on
the Pacific. ... I believe that this [the Mexican] govern-
ment would cede to us Texas and California, and I am thor-
oughly satisfied that this is all we shall ever get for the claims
of our merchants in this country." Webster authorized a
negotiation: "You will be particularly careful," he wrote
to Thompson, "not to suffer the Mexican Government to
suppose that it is an object upon which we have set our hearts,
or for the sake of which we should be willing to make large
remuneration. The cession must be spoken of rather as a
convenience to Mexico, or a mode of discharging her debts.'*
EXPANSION 259
Possibly our willingness to use our pecuniary claims to secure
the cession of California made us the more ready to accept
the rumored statements that Great Britain was endeavoring
to do the same.^ On April 4, 1844, B. E. Green wrote to
Calhoun that California was organized for independence.
The year 1844, therefore, found three great diplomatic
problems pressing for solution. Different as they were in
their details, they all concerned the acquisition Diplomacy and
of new territory, and they were all urged not P*''**'*^*
only as desirable in themselves but as necessary to check the
advance of British interests. Of the three, that relating to
Texas was in itself the least difficult; for after eight years of
independence, and an independence that was recognized
by the leading nations of Europe, Mexico's claim to her ter-
ritory had nothing to rest upon. The reason why Texas
was still out of the United States was not diplomatic, but
political; it lay in the institution of slavery. Her problem
could not be solved without a linking of diplomacy and
politics such as there had not been since 1815.
^ J. S. Reeves, American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk (Baltimore,
1907), 100-102.
CHAPTER XX
ANNEXATION
When Tyler succeeded to the presidency he privately an-
nounced his determination to annex Texas. His secretary
^ , . of state, Webster, however, was unenthusiastic,
Tyler's nego- . i .n mi
tiation with and no action was taken till 1843. Then
Webster resigned. Tyler was at this time un-
connected with either political party; he had nothing to lose
by a disturbance of political conditions, and he decided to
press the matter. He was still delayed, however, by the
death of Webster's successor, Hugh S. Legare, after six
weeks' service; but the next secretary, Abel P. Upshur, took
the negotiation seriously in hand. It was conducted in se-
crecy, with the ostensible purpose of preventing speculation
in Texan securities. The Texan administration, with Hous-
ton at the head, was slow to take the bait. It feared that
the treaty might be rejected by our Senate, and Texas thus
be left in an embarrassing position, an objection that Upshur
met by arguments which appear to have been more satisfying
to Texas than they could have been to his own conscience.
The treaty drawn up, there remained the question as to the
status of Texas between the signing of the treaty and its
acceptance by the Senate. This would be Mexico's last
chance, her amnesty with Texas would be at an end. Great
Britain would no longer stand in the way of hostile action,
and the probability was that she would at least reek her
anger on the frontier, if not her vengeance on the nation.
At this point Upshur was killed.^
In seeking to replace him, Tyler's primary object was to
obtain political strength, for the diplomatic task was almost
* Reeves, American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk.
260
ANNEXATION 261
finished. Unfortunately for him, however, he was brought
by the intervention of friends to ofiFer the position to
John C. Calhoun, probably of all his genera- _^. . _
tion the man most capable of diplomatic great- comes secre-
ness, but one whose name alone was sufficient
to defeat the treaty, and who did not leave his name to
work alone. Calhoun, having obtained by inquiry the opin-
ion that both the Texas and the Oregon question could be
settled, accepted the office.
On April 11, 1844, he answered the question as to the pro-
tection of Texas during the discussion of the treaty, by the
following note: "During the pendency of the t tv f -
treaty of annexation, the president would deem nexation con-
it his duty to use all the means placed within
his power by the constitution to protect Texas from all
foreign invasion." An enumeration of these powers might
have been less impressive than the general statement of
them; but the latter proved sufficient for its purpose, and
on April 12 the treaty was signed.
Calhoun came into office with a firm conviction of a pur-
poseful policy of aggrandizement on the part of Great Britain.
He wrote to Francis Wharton, May 28, 1844: _^, ,
"As to myself, I am of the impression, if we views of Great
shall have the foUy or wickedness to permit
Great Britain to plant the lever of her power between the
U. States and Mexico, on the Northern shore of the Gulph
of Mexico, we give her a place to stand on, from which
she can [brave?] at pleasure the American Continent and
control its destiny. There is not a vacant spot left on the
Globe, not excepting Cuba, to be seized by her, so well cal-
culated to further the boundless schemes of her ambition
and cupidity. If we should permit her to seize on it, we
shall deserve the execration of posterity. Reject the treaty,
and refuse to annex Texas, and she will certainly seize on it.
A treaty of alliance commercial and political will be forthwith
proposed by Texas to her, and I doubt not accepted. This
262 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
for yourself." On April 29, 1844, he had received a letter
from a Texan friend announcing: "We are all prepared if
we are spurned again from the Union to enter into a com-
mercial free trade treaty with G. B. and France on a guar-
anty of our Independence which we can now have and the
advantages it promises us in the cotton trade renders it very
desirable." With free trade the United States would lose
its market for manufactured goods in Texas. The Texan
planters, supplied with low-priced British goods, could
produce more cheaply than those of the United States.
Texas would therefore draw away from us population and
wealth, and, backed by the British navy, become our political
as well as economic rival. ^
Although having to his hand such nationalistic argu-
ments, based on a sincere conviction, which would have
Lord Aber- been absorbed by most of our population on
deen's note suspicion, Calhoun chose to rest his case on
totally different grounds. He found among Upshur's papers
a letter of Pakenham, the British minister at Washington,
enclosing a note from Aberdeen written in answer to a re-
quest from Edward Everett, our minister at London, by di-
rection of Upshur, for an explanation of Aberdeen's state-
ment in the House of Lords concerning his interest in the
question of Texan slavery. Aberdeen, admitting an interest
in Texas, denied that Great Britain had any "occult de-
sign . . . even with reference to slavery in Texas." He
said, however, that it was well known that Great Britain
wished to see slavery abolished "throughout the world.
But," he added, "the means which she has adopted and will
continue to adopt, for this human and virtuous purpose, are
open and undisguised. . . . The Governments of the slave-
holding states may be assured that, although we shall not
desist from those open and honest efforts which we have
constantly made for procuring the abolition of slavery . . .
* Calhoun, Correspondence, ed. J. F. Jameson, Amer. Hiat. Assoc., Rep.
1899. vol. ii.
ANNEXATION 263
we shall neither openly nor secretly resort to any measures
which can tend to disturb their internal tranquillity, or
thereby to affect the prosperity of the American Union."
This note, though cleverly guarded in its language at
essential points, was substantially untrue, for it was intended
to appear to deny the rumor that Great Britain was urging
Mexico to insist upon abolition in Texas as a condition of
recognizing her independence. It was also discourteous in its
reference to our established domestic institutions. The
disclaimer of any intention to disturb our "internal tran-
quillity " could certainly not be accepted by our government
on its face value : we could scarcely allow Great Britain to be
a judge of what would create such a disturbance. When a
nation deliberately asserts a policy of meddling with the rest
of the world, other nations have a right to demand, not
general assurances as to her methods, but explicit itemization.
Lord Aberdeen's note came to Calhoun both as a confirma-
tion of suspicion and as an instrument of action. He at once
engaged Pakenham in a correspondence grow- Calhoun-
ing out of it, which afterwards formed his case correspoiS-
before the Senate for the support of the treaty. *°'^®
He stated that upon hearing of the avowed determination of
Great Britain to attempt the abolition of slavery throughout
the world, the United States had to consider her own safety;
since, therefore, the abolition of slavery in Texas would
imperil the internal tranquillity of the nation, a treaty of
annexation had been arranged as the only means of prevent-
ing such a misfortune. To Aberdeen's expressed hope for
abolition in the United States he replied .by an argument
designed to show that emancipation would prove a national
calamity. He did not even refrain from making use of the
hackneyed comparison between the American slaves and the
British laboring classes.^
Calhoun's statement that Aberdeen's note had caused the
making of the treaty was, of course, imtrue. Essentially,
* Calhoun, Works, vols, iv.-v.
264 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
however, it represented the truth, for the note put into defi-
nite public form rumors that had been coming to his ears.
Critique of particularly from the London letters of his con-
Calhoun's case fidant, Duff Green, who quoted the assertion of
the Texan representative, Ashabel Smith, that England would
guarantee a loan to Texas to pay the expenses of emancipa-
tion. To Calhoun, though not to the President, the main
motive for action lay in the danger to slavery. His defence of
slavery as an institution has been criticised, and perhaps in
form is open to criticism; but Aberdeen's remarks on the
subject demanded some answer. There is no doubt that
Calhoun believed in the case as he presented it. He wrote to
James H. Hammond, May 17, 1844: "There is not a doubt
in my mind, that if Texas should not now be annexed, she
is lost to our Union. The Senate has been furnished with
evidence to that effect, perfectly conclusive."
The defect in Calhoun's argument was that his reasoning
was logical rather than political, and that his logic did not
Failure of Cal- reach to his conclusion. His basis was that of
houn's case j^jg slave-trade resolutions, — the obligation of
the national government to protect any institutions of any
state. His second step, that it was the duty of the national
government to protect the internal tranquillity of the state,
was just as soimd; it had been used by Dana in 1809 in
reference to the South when he was discussing trade with
the negro state of Hayti. His slip came in asserting that
the one method of performing these duties was the annexation
of Texas. The national government has discretion as to
methods, and annexation was not the only one possible. The
fact is, Calhoun was so anxious to fix the doctrine of national
protection upon the country that his eagerness blinded him
to this weakness in his logic. He sacrificed Texas to political
theory.
The unpopularity of Tyler and the fear of the slavery issue
brought to the front by Calhoun combined to defeat the
treaty. Annexation, however, could no longer be held off.
ANNEXATION 265
Wiser politicians took it up and changed the basis of argu-
ment. In a strong letter Jackson roused the public apprehen-
sion of England's political ambitions, and the Defeat of the
Democratic convention had the good sense to *^®**y
unite northern with southern interests by joining Oregon with
Texas. Referring to our lost settlement at Astoria and our
claim to Texas abandoned in 1819, the convention resolved,
"That our title to the whole of the territory of Oregon is
clear and unquestionable; that no portion of the same ought
to be ceded to England or any other power; and that the re-
occupation of Oregon and the reannexation of Texas at the
earliest practicable period are great American questions."
The election of the Democratic candidate, James K. Polk,
was accepted as a national mandate in favor of annexation.
But, if annexation was to come, many believed , ^ t.
*' Annexation by
that it must come quickly. Texas was now the joint resolu-
scene of a dramatic contest between the Amer-
ican representative. Duff Green, specially sent to hold the
republic in line, and Elliot and Saligny, the British and
French representatives respectively, who, backed by their
governments, had dropped the slavery question and were
promising recognition by Mexico on condition of a promise
by Texas to maintain her independence. In order to hasten
action by the United States, it was proposed that, since a
two-thirds majority for a treaty could not be secured in the
Senate, annexation be brought about by a joint resolution of
the two houses. The constitutionality of such a method was
at least obscure, for previously the power to annex had been
implied from that to make treaties. The constitutional argu-
ment, however, played little part in the discussion of the
main question, which absorbed most of the session from
December, 1844, to March, 1845. At length, on March 1,
the resolution was passed, but added to it was a curious
amendment allowing the President either to proceed with
annexation by the authority thereby given or to negotiate a
treaty.
266 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
This double-headed proposition was accepted by a bal-
ancing number of senators with the understanding that the
Tyler annexes whole matter would be left to Polk for settle-
Texas ment, and with the purpose that he should
find himself fully empowered to act quickly. Tyler, however,
anticipated action by Polk by dispatching a messenger to
Texas announcing that she might enter the union on the
terms of the joint resolution. Polk acquiesced in the accom-
plished fact, and the centre of interest shifted from Washing-
ton to Texas.^
The proposal to Texas was that she be admitted as a state, i
with such government as should be adopted by the people!
Struggle for and assented to by the United States. This
Texas plan, in contrast with Calhoun's treaty, which
resembled previous annexation treaties in merely providing
for admission to statehood at some future time, virtually
constituted an enabling act, pushing statehood one step
further forward. It provided that Texas should hold her
public lands for the payment of her debt; whereas Calhoun
had agreed that the United States would receive the lands and
pay the debt. The question of boundary it left open to /
settlement by the United States. It further provided that
Texas was not to be divided into more than four states, of j
which those north of the parallel of 36° 30' should not permit i
slavery, — ^points for which there were no equivalents in the
Calhoun treaty. The president of Texas, Anson Jones, re-
ceived the proposal with dignity. He encouraged Elliot to
press Mexico for recognition, and when the Texan convention
met, July 4, 1845, he offered it the alternatives of independ-
ence, recognized by Mexico on condition that it be main-
tained and with the special friendship of Great Britain and
France, or annexation. Without hesitation the convention
chose the latter, and in December Texas became a state of
the Union. Although chagrined at the result. Great Britain
and France were nevertheless, as they had indeed repeatedly
1 T. H. Benton, ThiHy Years' View, 2 vols., New York, 1854-56.
ANNEXATION 267
declared, not prepared to resist forcibly; hence nothing now
remained necessary for a complete settlement of the question
but acceptance by Mexico.^
Polk came into office with the intention of securing Texas,
Oregon, and California. To the accomplishment of this
formidable task he brought, not great intellec-
tual ability, but an iron will, a directness of
purpose, and a conviction of the morality of his intentions
inherited from his Scotch-Presbyterian ancestry, — ^just the
equipment for the man of action after discussion has cleared
and defined the issue. ^ He found the first part of his
three-fold undertaking practically finished, and he ac-
cepted the results. Of the two remaining tasks, the
Oregon controversy, of which the details had been worked
out by Gallatin in 1827, had just been still more closely
defined in a correspondence between Calhoun and Paken-
ham.^
In these letters the British practically acknowledged our
title from the forty-second parallel to the south bank of the
Columbia, and we practically acknowledged The Oregon
their rights north of the forty-ninth parallel, question
Within the undistributed middle lay Puget Sound and the
tip of Vancouver island. Both countries claimed Spanish
recognition of their claims, the British by the Nootka Sound
convention of 1790, we by our treaty of 1819. By discovery
and exploration we had the stronger claim to the Columbia
valley, the British to that of the Fraser. In actual settle-
ments Great Britain had held the advantage; but the United
States was gaining, though most of her settlers sought the
valley of the Willamette, a southern branch of the Colum-
bia. In 1844 Aberdeen offered to arbitrate, but the
United States refused.
' Anson Jones, Memoranda and Official Correspondence relating to the Re-
public of Texas, New York, 1859.
» J. K. Polk, Diary, ed. M. M, Quaife, 4 vols., Chicago, 1910.
* Calhoun, Works, vol. v.
268
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Calhoun expected that Polk would request his continuance
in the position of secretary of state, but Polk failed to do so,
Polk's Oregon for his views differed fundamentally from those
poUcy q£ Calhoun. Calhoun feared both the inten-
tions and the power of Great Britain, he believed that she
could and would maintain her views by force. He was of
OREGON BOUXDABY CONTROVERSIES
that generation of American statesmen who, confident in our
growing strength, preferred to leave such disputes open,
trusting to the future. Polk intended to settle the question at
once, and chose as his secretary James Buchanan, a man of
like mind.
The latter offered Great Britain the line of 49°, which had
been satisfactory to Calhoun. Upon its rejec-
tion, which had been anticipated, Polk took up
the question in his message of December, 1845.
Referring to the Monroe Doctrine, which he was the first "^
President to revive, he said: "It should be distinctly au-
Polk revives
the Monroe
Doctrine
ANNEXATION 269
nounced to the world as our settled policy that no future
European colony or dominion shall with our consent be
planted or established on any part of the North American
continent." He rejected the idea of any balance of power as
applied to America. Finally he asked Congress to authorize
the termination of the joint occupancy with a year's notice,
as provided in the convention of 1828. He declared that our
title "to the whole Oregon Territory" had already been
"asserted, and, as is believed, maintained by irrefragable
facts and arguments."
Congress debated the proposal with unusual seriousness
and ability. Polk's views found an echo in a style of ex-
pansionist oratory new to the country and not Oregon policy
confined to Congress. The phrase "Fifty- o^ Congress
four-forty or fight" rang through the land. Calhoun and
Webster, on the other hand, pleaded for moderation, express-
ing their belief that the President's policy would result in
war, and that war would end in the loss of Oregon to the
British fleet. In the end the President was authorized to give
notice of the termination of the joint occupancy; but this
notice was to be joined with the declaration that it was
hoped that the step would lead to a speedy amicable adjust-
ment of the differences between the two governments, — an
apparent invitation for a proposal of compromise. -
The British government was still under the leadership of
Sir Robert Peel, whose friendliness to the United States
had resulted in the Webster-Ashburton treaty. «... ,.
It was, indeed, the same government whose
machinations, real and exaggerated, in Texas and Cali-
fornia had been so effectively used in furthering Texan
annexation. The desire of Great Britain to prevent
that annexation, however, had been no more inimical
than the desire of a merchant to secure a new cus-
^ See speeches by Calhoun and Webster in their Works; also Joseph Schaf er,
"The British Attitude toward the Oregon Question, 1815-1846," Amer,
Bist. Review, 1911, xvi. 273-«94.
270 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
tomer rather than let him go to a rival. Her methods
in the use of her influence with Mexico had perhaps been
"unfair"; but if these did indicate a slight moral obliquity,
and if Aberdeen's letter on slavery was lacking in tactfulness,
such lapses did not come from any hostility or from a failure
to realize that the friendship of the United States was more
important to Great Britain than that of any other country
on the American continent. Great Britain was looking after
her own interests to be sure, but her ministers, Aberdeen and
Peel, were friendly to the United States. Their friendship,
moreover, was greatly stimulated in 1846 by the fact that
both nations were just taking the first steps in the new policy
of free trade, which, if persisted in, would cement their
destinies by an ever-increasing bond of trade.
The British government, therefore, having previously
ascertained that its proposal would not be contumaciously
Oregon agree- rejected, offered to compromise on the forty-
"*°* ninth parallel to the strait of Georgia, and
thence to the ocean, with the right of free navigation on the
Columbia. This was more than Great Britain had ever
before offered, though less than the United States had ex-
pressed its willingness to accept. It gave us Puget Sound, it
gave Great Britain the tip of Vancouver island, thus dis-
tributing the best harbors on the northwest coast. Polk
accepted this proposal as a basis, and a treaty was drawn up.
Before concluding it, however, Polk endeavored to relieve
himself of responsibility for compromising in a case in which
he had asserted our title to the whole to be "clear and un-
questionable," by resorting, as has so seldom been done, ^
to the "advice" of the Senate. That body advised signing,
and thereby practically committed itself to ratify the treaty,
which was promptly done in June, 1846.
Thus was settled the last stretch of our northern boundary,
although the division of the smaller islands caused more
trouble, which was adjusted by arbitration in 1871. Polk's
bluster and the wild speeches in Congress probably made
ANNEXATION 271
some difference in the result. Whenever we have encoun-
tered Great Britain we have been obliged to compromise,
but bluff on our part has often hastened agree- _,
ment. The Ime decided upon was a reasona- issue in Ore-
ble one, and, after the following of the forty-
ninth parallel to the Rockies in 1818, was probably inevita-
ble, regardless of claims or of diplomacy. The protrusion of
Vancouver island south of forty-nine was disagreeable, but
on general principles the island was best considered as a
whole. In rousing popular agitation Polk was playing with
fire; it was a typical example of "shirt-sleeve" diplomacy.
On the other hand, a continuance of the joint occupancy in
the face of the actual settlement of the region might well have
given rise to frontier squabbles more dangerous than the
whiff of spread-eagle oratory.
On April 28, 1846, Polk accepted the British offer as to
Oregon, subject to the consent of the Senate; on May 11 he
advised war with Mexico. The conjunction ^ . .
of the events was fortunate, but probably not Texan annexa-
vital, for Great Britain had already signified
her intention not to support Mexico. At Polk's inauguration
the war had not been expected by those best informed.
Webster wrote to his son, March 11, 1845, that Mexico would
doubtless "be very angry" over the annexation of Texas,
but, he added, "that she will plunge at once into a war,
though it is possible, is as yet not thought probable, by the
best informed here. . . . Mr. Polk and his cabinet will
desire to keep the peace."
Although Mexico withdrew her minister, as she had done
in 1837, she did not rush into war. There existed, however,
at the outset a question that required careful The Texas
handlmg on the part of the United States. As ^<»^'^^
usual, we had annexed not territory alone, but a boundary
controversy. The Mexican territory of Texas had been
bounded to the south by the Nueces river; the republic of
Texas had actually occupied the south bank of this river; the
272
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
constitution of Texas described the national boundary as the
Rio Grande to its source, and thence northward to the forty-
second parallel. This constitutional boundary, which
swept in Mexican settlements on the north bank of the Rio
Grande near its mouth, together with the important post of
Santa ¥k in New Mexico, had been jBxed in order to provide a
basis for compromise. Calhoun had recognized its lack of
actuality, and the joint resolutions, seeking to avoid any such
difficulty as had arisen with Maine two years before, had
^ven the United States power to settle the boundary. Mean-
time, the question as to the protection of Texas until her
formal admission, which could not be consummated till
December, 1845, came up. Calhoun, after the rejection of
his treaty, had promised such defence as the President could
give while negotiations were in process; but this did not mean
much. Polk was in an easier position; for the United States
had assented to the annexation, but until July 4, 1845, Texas
had not. During the interval he wished to send troops, but
President Jones said they were not necessary. When Texas
ANNEXATION 273
accepted our ofiPer this difficulty was removed,* and Polk
could do as he wished.
On June 15, 1845, Polk ordered General Taylor to "select
and occupy, on or near the Rio Grande del Norte, such site as
will consist with the health of the troops, and Taylor in
will be best adapted to repel invasion, and to '^®^*8
protect what, in event of annexation, will be our western
frontier." Against this order our representative in Texas,
A. J. Donelson, protested on the ground that, since Texas had
previously accepted a truce leaving Mexico in possession of
the north bank of the Rio Grande, and had evinced a dis-
position to settle the question by negotiation, things might,
"to say the least ... be left by the United States in the
same condition." On July 8 Taylor was ordered not to inter-
fere with existing Mexican military establishments in the
disputed region, "unless a state of war should exist." On
August 30 he was instructed as follows: "The assembling
of a large Mexican army on the border of Texas, and cross-
ing the Rio Grande with a considerable force, will be regarded
by the executive as an invasion of the United States, and the
commencement of hostilities. An attempt to cross the river
with such a force will also be considered in the same light."
It was obviously the intention of the administration to
insist upon the Rio Grande boundary, at least near the
coast. It was not, however, till January 17, 1846, that
Taylor was explicitly ordered to the Rio Grande.
During the same period Polk was endeavoring to open an
approach to negotiation with Mexico. An agent, Parrott,
accompanied the withdrawing Mexican minis- siidell's in-
ter, and in June reported that Mexico would ^tractions
not go to war over Texas. Polk thereupon appointed John
Slidell minister to Mexico. He was, first of all, to warn
Mexico of the insidious designs of foreign nations and of our
^ Rives, The United States and Mexico; William Jay, Review of the Causes
and Consequences of the Mexican War, Boston, etc., 1849; C. H. Owen, The
Justice of the Mexican War, New York, etc., 1908.
274 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
determination to prevent them. Then he was to insist upon
the payment of the claims of American citizens, which had
been recognized by a convention of 1839 but which re-
mained unpaid. Realizing the financial inability of Mexico,
the government instructed Slidell, "Fortunately the joint
resolution of Congress for annexing Texas to the United
States presents a means of satisfying these claims, in perfect
consistency with the interests as well as the power of both
republics." The indisputable character of the Texan claim
to the Rio Grande near its mouth, was to be asserted; but
a question concerning the right to New Mexico was ad-
mitted, and Slidell was authorized to oflFer to assume claims
for five million dollars in return for the title to that ter-
ritory.
The most important portion of the instructions, however,
referred to the reopening, but in a new spirit, of the question
Polk and Cali- in regard to California which Thompson and
fomia Webster had broached in 1843. Under the
pressure of events the situation there was rapidly ripening.
Rumors of revolt were multiplying, and Polk did not seek to
blast the growth. In October, 1845, Larkin, our consul at
Monterey, was instructed: "Whilst the president will make
lio eflFort and use no influence to induce the Californians to
become one of the free and independent states of this Union,
yet if the people should desire to unite their destiny with
ours, they would be received as brethren, whenever this can
be done without affording Mexico any just cause of com-
plaint." Lieutenant Gillespie was sent to confer with Larkin,
Commodore Stockton was ordered to report with his squad-
ron at Monterey, and Fremont was exploring California.
In the midst of these happenings, Slidell was instructed to
call the attention of Mexico to the fact that she had small
Mexico and chance of maintaining her hold upon California,
California ^^^ ^j^g^^ Great Britain and France were both
ambitious to obtain it. He was to say that the United States
would never permit its cession to either of these powers, but
ANNEXATION 275
would herself pay Mexico liberally for possession, — from
twenty to twenty-five million dollars according to the inclu-
sion or the exclusion of the peninsula of Lower California.
Polk was himself determined to secure at least the bay of
San Francisco.
With such instructions Slidell arrived in Mexico. The
government of that country was expecting the United States
to explain the annexation of Texas; that, to its siidell in
mind, was the primary question. Accordingly, Mexico
it refused to treat except with a commissioner sent for that
express and sole purpose. As a fresh revolution was in
progress, Slidell awaited the result, hoping for reception by
the new government. Paredes, the successful contestant,
was, however, more hostile than Herrera, whom he had turned
out. He at length did what had been so often surmised with-
out foundation, — offer California to Great Britain to hold as
a security for a loan. When the offer reached her, however,
she declined; the security was no longer Mexico's to offer.
Toward Slidell he pursued the policy of his predecessor by
persistently refusing to receive him, till by the middle of
March Slidell gave up hope of accomplishing anything on the
existing basis of facts and returned to the United States.
Polk and Buchanan had long before reached this decision,
and determined to change the facts. The change was to be
not in the instructions themselves but the _.
, , - . , -J,, , Tuning war
method of pressmg them. War was to be rec-
ommended. Such drastic action, however, must, to receive
popular support, have been preceded by a patient negotiation
such as to their minds Slidell had just carried out. It should
also come after a settlement of the Oregon question, not be-
cause Polk expected war with Great Britain, but because the
possibility of such a war would serve to enhearten Mexico and
diminish the moral effect which he hoped would follow his
threat. Both these conditions being fulfilled, on Saturday,
May 9, the decision was taken, although there was still reason
to fear the reception of the message by Congress.
276 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
On Sunday news arrived at Washington from Taylor on
the frontier. Since January he had been in camp on the
Rio Grande, "right in the enemy's country,
** ^Oygf exists " t/ V
and actually occupying their corn and cotton
fields," as one of his oflBcers wrote. Mexico took the
attitude that this occupation constituted war. On April 24
Paredes declared, "Hostilities then have been commenced
by the United States"; but he disclaimed the right to
declare war until the Mexican Congress assembled. The
tinder was ready, however: on April 26 Mexican and
United States troops met and fought. It was of this
encounter, that Polk heard. It afforded a more appealing
if not more solid cause for war than the failure of negoti-
ation. Contrary to his usage, therefore, he prepared his
message on Sunday, and sent it to Congress the next day.
May 11, 1846. " The cup of forbearance had been ex-
hausted even before the recent information from the frontier
of the Del Norte. But now, after reiterated menaces, Mexico
has passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded
our territory and shed American blood upon the American
soil . . . war exists, and, notwithstanding all our efforts to
avoid it, exists by the act of Mexico herself."
Polk regarded war not as an object, but as a means: he
believed that his ends could be obtained without fighting.
Polk and Having deprived Mexico of the hope of British
Santa Anna assistance, he entered into negotiations with
Santa Anna, the exiled Mexican hero, who was in Havana.
On June 7 Commander Alexander Slidell MacKenzie, who
had been sent to confer with him, reported that he had ex-
plained to Santa Anna the President's intentions as to bound-
aries and other questions, and that Santa Anna had expressed
his friendship for the United States as well as his enlightened
views for the government of Mexico, and had given certain
advice with regard to General Taylor's movements. Ac-
cordingly the United States allowed Santa Anna to pass the
blockade, and watched with pleasure his rapid success in
ANNEXATION 277
establishing himself in control of Mexico. She anticipated
a speedy ending of hostilities, and a prompt and happy
negotiation with the new Mexican government. Santa
Anna, however, on gaining power, sought to establish it
upon the only basis on which it could continue to exist: he
put himself at the head of the national forces to resist the
United States. Thus we not only were at war but were also
obliged to fight.
On May 13, 1846, Buchanan proposed in the cabinet that
our announcement to foreign nations of the fact that we
were at war with Mexico be accompanied by -. -
a declaration that we would acquire nothing Guadaloupe
but the Rio Grande boundary. Polk, however, * ^^
refused to sanction such a promise. "I will not tie up my
hands by any such pledge," he declared. "In making peace
with our adversary, we shall acquire California, New Mexico,
and other further territory, as an indemnity for this war,
if we can." In accordance with these ideas, Nicholas P.
Trist, chief clerk of the state department, was in April, 1847,
commissioned to accompany the army and to make peace
whenever he got the chance. Santa Anna twisted him about
his fingers throughout the summer, and in the autumn Polk
recalled him. The successes of the army, however, rendered
Santa Anna's intrigues useless, except as a means of securing
money for himself. When, September 14, 1847, the city of
Mexico fell, the whole of Mexico became demoralized and
its government became anxious to negotiate. Trist, although
having now no official position, nevertheless negotiated a
treaty at Guadaloupe Hidalgo on February 2, 1848.
By the time this document reached the United States that
country was a hustings for the discussion of war. Those
who opposed it and its conduct and its pur- Anti-war feel-
poses were of the better-educated class; they "^
possessed the greater literary ability; they produced careful
briefs, studied histories, and imperishable satires, and their
voices have outlasted those of their opponents. The loudest
278 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
voices at the time, however, and the most popular pens,
were those that became more and more imbued with the war
spirit. A clamor for the whole of Mexico arose.
The "Hard" faction of the New York Democracy said
of the war: "It is no more than the restoration of moral
Expansionist rights by legal means"; the field for work is
feeling "opened to us by the conduct of Mexico, and
such moral and legal means are offered for our use. Shall we
occupy it? Shall we now run with manly vigor the race that
is set before us? Or shall we yield to the suggestions of a
sickly fanaticism, or sink into an enervating slumber? . . .
We feel no emotion but pity for those whose philanthropy,
or patriotism, or religion, have led them to beheve that
they can prescribe a better course of duty than that of the
God who made us all." Nor was the feeling sectional. The
National Era, an antislavery organ, favored the absorption
of Mexico, state by state. From England, George Bancroft,
our minister, wrote to Buchanan: "People are beginning
to say that it would be a blessing to the world if the United
States would assume the tutelage of Mexico," — the first
appeal of the British investor for United States protection.
Buchanan himself in cabinet discussion said, "We must
fulfill that destiny which Providence may have in store for
both countries."
With this rising wave of enthusiasm Polk had no sym-
pathy. From the beginning his purpose had been to annex
Texas, Oregon, and California, and so his pur-
pose remained. He would not imperil what he
had won, by waiting for the doubtful result of the next elec-
tion. Distasteful and irregular as Trist's conduct had been,
and his negotiations feeble and even improper, Polk seized
upon his treaty as the only means of bringing a prompt end
to the war and of checking projects of further conquest. He
sent it to the Senate on February 21, 1848, recommending
the striking out of one article; on March 10 it was accepted^
against the vote of Webster, who wished to acquire no ter-
ANNEXATION 279
litory at all, and of Hannegan of Indiana, who wanted all
Mexico.
The treaty gave us Texas to the Rio Grande, New Mexico
including Arizona, and California, with the free navigation
of the Colorado and other rivers. Mexicans re- ^
. . . , 11- 1 Terms of peace
mammg m the ceded territory were to become
incorporated into the United States. We agreed to pay
Mexico fifteen million dollars, to exonerate her from all claims
of American citizens up to the date of the treaty, and our-
selves to satisfy such claims to the extent of three and a
quarter million dollars. Two articles were of special interest,
the seventeenth, which specifically provided for the revival
of the treaty of commerce of 1831, and the twenty-first,
which in a lame and hesitating manner introduced into our
diplomacy the idea of permanent arbitration.
With the acceptance of this treaty the third great acces-
sion of territory within three years had been consummated.
In each case movements long germinating had Poik's accom-
reached fruition. Texas was over-ripe, Oregon P^ishment
at practical maturity, California was hastened by the hot-
house influence of the other two. Polk, the "dark horse,"
whom "no one knew" at the time he was nominated, had
pushed through with relentless energy and indiflFerent skill
the most ambitious diplomatic program with which any
President had ever entered oflSce. It is evident that his
task had consisted, not in the delicate manipulation of con-
flicting interests, but in the constant reiteration of the will
of a dominant power.
CHAPTER XXI
DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS, 1848-1861
Exhilarated by our annexations, we no longer, in the
period between the Mexican and Civil wars, feared Europe.
The star of empire had crossed the Atlantic.
"European monarchies" had become "effete."
They were still malevolent, but it was no longer necessary
for us to defer crises. Our hour had struck; destiny indi-
cated our line of march. Expansion had become a national
conviction; the American continents would become united,
not under our influence, but under our flag.
This belief in expansion, however, was not imperialism.
Our faith in the universal applicability of our political sys-
,., . tern was as strong as ever. The Spanish-
Repubhcamsm . . . i . , • i
Americans were to be incorporated into the
Union, not to be subject to it. For a time, indeed-^ our ardent
republicanism, no longer forced to be on the defensive, seemed
likely to involve us in a policy of interference in Europe. The
revolutions of 1848 stirred us almost as much as had the first
French revolution or that of Spanish America. The Demo-
cratic Convention of that year resolved "that, with the recent
development of this grand political truth of the sovereignty
of the people and their capacity and power for self-govern-
ment" which was "prostrating thrones and erecting republics
on the ruins of despotism in the Old World," it felt a renewed
duty to defend liberty at home. This was extremely discreet,
and our action was confined to a prompt recognition of the
new government of France, and the sending of our first
diplomatic representative to the Papal States in appreciation
of the liberal sentiments with which Pius IX. came into the
pontificate. When, however, in 1851, Louis Kossuth came
280
DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS, 1848-1861 281
to this country with the avowed object of securing aid for
a new struggle in Hungary designed to established repub-
licanism and independence, sympathy seemed about to
plunge us into European politics. It may have been for-
tunate for us that Polk had recently revived our interest in
the Monroe Doctrine; but it was probably the fundamental
popular conception on which the doctrine rested that held
us in check and caused the enthusiasm which Kossuth
aroused to exhaust itself in champagne and oratory.
Our expansionist spirit, self-limited by the ocean and
based on republicanism, was also non-military. Seward, most
genial of expansionists, said in 1860 at St. Paul , ., . .^
that he saw Russia and Great Britain building versus im-
on the Arctic Ocean and in Canada the out-
posts of his own country, and that he expected that the
future capital of our expanded native land would be in the
valley of Mexico; but he continued to assert what he had
said in 1846, "I would not give one human life for all the con-
tinent that remains to be annexed." The action of Congress,
moreover, continued to be based on the principle that the
army should be just sufficient to maintain order on the
frontier and the navy to protect our merchant marine. Pres-
ident Pierce's first message does show a tendency to stretch
the principle to cover a substantial increase in the navy, but
the most ardent of the expansionists, Buchanan, showed no
appreciation of a connection between a policy of expansion
and prepared military strength. Destiny was to furnish
her own instruments, of which the peaceful infiltration of
armed American immigrants was the chief.
That this popular conviction did not materialize during
this period into actual acquisition is in part due to external
obstacles, and in part to the fact that diplo- .^ .
macy was not only subordinated to politics politics on di-
but was even actively employed for political p*'™*'^^
ends. Politicians and statesmen alike endeavored to relieve
the pressure of the conflict over slavery by pointing to ques-
282 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
tions which would rouse a national interest; they feared those
subjects that would embitter sectionalism. Webster wrote
in regard to a grandiloquent dispatch which he had sent to
Hiilseman, the Austrian representative, that his purpose was
to "touch the national pride and make a man feel sheepish
and look silly who should speak of disunion." The habit of
making stump speeches in diplomatic documents became
common; Everett made his in a declaration against European
interference in Cuba, Marcy his on the case of Martin
Koszta. Diplomatic policies, therefore, stood always at-
tendant upon those of politics and fared as secondary inter-
ests always do.
Of the men who directed affairs, Buchanan was the most
conspicuous. Secretary of state under Polk, minister to
„ . Great Britain from 1853 to 1856, and President
Buchanan , i i i •
from 1857 to 1861, he had experience and con-
siderable dialectic skill. He had also purpose; oblivious of the
necessity of domestic policies, he made expansion his pro-
gram, and himself the leader of the movement. He lacked
force, however, to push his policies to conclu-
sion or even to an issue.^ President Pierce was
a lesser light of the same group. Of the secretaries of state,
Clayton is remembered chiefly for his treaty
with Bulwer, which has proved to be our
most entangling agreement with a foreign power since
Webster, our first treaties with France. Webster and
Everett Everett were both worthy of the reputation
of the office, though neither particularly enhanced his own.
Cass, under Buchanan, had already made
his career and now added to it merely his
extinction of Great Britain's claim to the right of visitation.^
William L. Marcy, serving under Pierce, caused a ripple
of amusement and annoyance by his famous circular order
* James Buchanan, Works, ed. J. B. Moore, 12 vols., Philadelphia, etc.,
1908-11.
' McLaughlin, Lewis Cass.
/
DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS, 1848-1861 283
of June 1, 1853, that all our representatives were to confine
their sartorial ambitions to "the simple costume of an Amer-
ican citizen." The diplomatic uniforms which „
had been developed by the practice of our min-
isters were accordingly discarded for trousers and frock or
evening coats; we became sans culottes. The long-lived joke
about the American minister who was mistaken for a waiter
was soon born. With this exception, Marcy was not trivial;
he became more fully secretary of state, more conversant
with the whole field of our diplomacy, and more universally
active in dealing with it than had any secretary since John
Quincy Adams.
During the fifties there were rumblings of administrative
reform along many lines, but there was neither the will to
perform nor the evolution of any practicable _^.
scheme. In 1856 a general act was passed and consular
systematizing the whole diplomatic service.
The positions were graded, salaries were fixed, fees were
regulated, and a method of control was outlined. Never-
theless, appointments grew to be more and more at the mercy
of politics and more and more unsuitable. Most notorious
was that of Pierre Soule to the court of Spain, in the face of
the fact that his personal history, to say nothing of his per-
sonal characteristics, was sure to produce trouble. The ex-
pansion of our commerce began to arouse a special interest
in our consular service, with the result that in 1856 an act
was passed providing for the appointment of twenty-five
"consular-pupils," who were, on showing themselves com-
petent, to be promoted. This act was repealed in 1857, but
it indicated a desire to release that service from the perils
of rotation in office.^
Commerce, though but lamely supported by our consuls,
was flourishing without interfering with our isolation. Our
exports still consisted of non-competitive products, but in
bulk these had increased beyond expectation. The growth
1 Fish, Th Civil Service and the Patronage, 13&-140, 183.
284 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
of cotton production and of its consumption in Europe had
made that commodity one of the leading features of inter-
Character of national trade. Europe had passed the point
our commerce ^f self -sufficiency in food supply, and drew
more and more from our farms. The development of our
manufactures rendered a corresponding increase in our im-
ports unnecessary, and for the first time the balance of direct
trade was in our favor. The indirect trade was of steadily
diminishing significance; our exports of foreign goods in 1836
amounted to about fifteen per cent of our total exports, in
1856 to about five per cent only. This did not mean that
we imported fewer of such articles of trade as Chinese silks
and teas; it meant that we kept them.
This commercial prosperity was shared by the merchant
marine. Seventy-five per cent of our imports and exports
Merchant were carried in American vessels, and owing
marme ^^ ^j^^ bulky character of the exports, this meant
an immense tonnage. By 1860 we had surpassed Great
Britain, Maintained since 1828 on a basis of equal treat-
ment as to port and customs regulations in the case of nearly
all countries, our merchant marine was also fostered by the
government, which not only continued the bounties on fish-
ing but inaugurated in 1846 a short-lived policy of subsidies
to assist in our competition for the fast-mail traffic. The
subsidies were, however, discontinued before the end of this
period.^
Chiefly, however, the energy of the government was dis-
played in preparing the way for commerce by means of di-
Commercial plomacy. Between 1845 and 1861 the United
treaties States continued her policy of making Amer-
ican commerce respected by enforcing the claims of her
citizens, mainly for injuries to person and property received
in Spanish- American countries. The integrity of commerce
she better assured by the formation of extradition treaties
with most of the German states, Austria, France with whom
1 Coman, Industrial Bistory, 264-266.
DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS, 1848-1861 285
a first treaty on the subject had been made in 1843, Sweden
and Norway, Colombia, and the Two Sicilies. First treaties
of commerce were made in Europe with Belgium, Mecklen-
burg-Schwerin, Oldenburg, and Switzerland; in Spanish
America with the Argentine Republic and Paraguay, as well
as with Bolivia and Peru, which had now separated, and
with Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Salvador, which had for-
merly been included in our general treaty with Central
America. In the near East we made a first treaty with
Persia.
The most important commercial treaty was that nego-
tiated by Marcy, in 1854, with Great Britain in behalf of
Canada. Some disputed problems regarding Reciprocity
the fisheries were submitted to adjudication, ^^ Canada
which in most cases resulted in interpretations favorable to
us. The reciprocal rights of inshore fishing and of free im-
port of fish intentionally offset each other, as the first was
in our favor, the second an advantage to Canada. It also
reciprocally exchanged, subject to a reservation of rights,
the navigation of Lake Michigan by the British for that of
the St. Lawrence and the canals between the Great Lakes
and the ocean by the Americans. The arrangement was
for twelve years. ^
The most interesting field for diplomatic effort, however,
was the Pacific. That ocean was filled with our shipping.
The whale fishery was at its height, whale oil Trade in the
was the most prized illuminant, and we were the ^^^^^
foremost nation in the pursuit. The whalers, often three years
away from home, were forced to frequent the islands and
coasts of the whole ocean, and the American flag became
everywhere familiar. Amid these sturdy little craft shifting
nervously about, following their quarry, passed the superb
clippers, whose voyages, never deviating, from New York to
^ Chalfant Robinson, A History of Two Reciprocity Treaties [New Haven,
1904]; C. D. Allin and G. M. Jones, Annexation, Preferential Trade, and
Reciprocity, Toronto, [1912].
286 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Canton could be measured almost to the day, to whom disas-
ter was a word almost unknown. Sailing with the others to
the Horn, but then hugging the west coast of South America,
had lately come the nondescript fleet bearing adventurers
to the newly discovered gold mines of California. From
the Isthmus up, the number increased, and the Caribbean
was livelier than ever with vessels carrying from the Isthmus
to the United States the goods brought down to its Pacific
ports, and to the Isthmus those from the United States des-
tined for California. The occasional wrecking of American
vessels on the ocean coasts, as in Japan, the employment of
islanders (Kanakas) on our vessels, and the use of Kanakas
and Chinese labor on the Pacific slope added material for
diplomacy.
It is not surprising, therefore, to find these growing in-
terests fructifying into treaty relations. In 1849 a first
Treaties with treaty of friendship and commerce was made
Pacific powers ^^^.j^ ^j^^ kingdom of Hawaii, in 1850, one
with the sultan of Brunei in Borneo. In 1856 a new treaty
was made with Siam. In 1858 a treaty with China very
much increased the opportunities in that empire which had
been offered to us by the treaty of 1844. In particular it
granted religious freedom in China, and provided that "any
person, whether citizen of the United States or Chinese
convert, who, according to these tenets, peaceably teach and
practice the principles of Christianity, shall in no case be
interfered with or molested." In 1854 a treaty opened up
the tightly closed islands of Lew Chew; but most important
of all was that made in the same year by Commodore Mat-
thew Perry with the empire of Japan, which, till then closed
for generations to the outside world, dates its new life from
that event. This treaty was followed by others in 1857 and
1858, the ratification of these last being exchanged with a
pomp and circumstance at Washington, by a special embassy
from Japan, which did much to arouse popular interest.
A more special endeavor of American diplomacy during
DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS, 1848-1861 287
this period was to establish the principle, to which we were
now fully committed, of the free use of international rivers
and narrow waterways. One of the most im- Free use of
portant of such straits was the sound between waterways
Denmark and Sweden, for the passage of which Denmark
charged dues. About one hundred of our vessels passed
through every year, paying on an average about ^ . .
a thousand dollars apiece. Against this we had
long protested, and finally in 1855 we abrogated our treaty with
Denmark. Our action was widely approved, and Denmark
herself suggested a convention to discuss the matter. She
finally agreed to give up her right or claim upon the payment
of a lump sum, of which our share was about a million dollars.
We declined thus to recognize the existence of her right by
paying for its surrender, and in 1857 established our point
in a new treaty by which we agreed to pay about four hun-
dred thousand dollars in consideration of Denmark's service
in lighting and buoying the channel. Meantime we were
urging the countries of South America to open to the world
the navigation of La Plata and its branches South Amer-
and of the Amazon, broad streams flowing ^cannvers
past several countries, and the former indeed the only outlet
for Paraguay and for most of Bolivia. These two countries
were naturally willing to accede to our principle, and in 1853
the Argentine Republic opened the Parana and Uruguay,
the essential feeders of La Plata. Brazil, however, remained
obdurate, and was the centre of an active diplomatic pres-
sure throughout the period.^
Analogous to this subject was our controversy with Great
Britain as to the limits of marine territorial jurisdiction within
bays more than six miles across. The ques- « -x.
tion was brought up by the seizure of our fish- ritorial juris-
ing vessels within such bays, and in 1853 was
submitted to arbitration. The decision was on the whole
1 Schuyler, American Dtplomaq/, 265-366; T. J. Page, La Plata, the
Argentine Confederation, and Paraguay, New York, 1859.
288 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
in our favor, thus marking another step toward the freeing
of the world's waters for general use.
Prevalence and expectation of peace on our part did not
cause us to lose our interest in the international law of war.
International In 1854, indeed, we again became a neutral
cooperation owing to the Crimean war between Russia and
Great Britain, France, Sardinia, and Turkey. As usual, our
shipping was involved; J. M. Forbes of Boston made a for-
tune by helping provision Sevastopol. The enlistment of
British subjects resident in America violated our position as a
neutral, and led to a long controversy between Marcy and the
British minister, Crampton, whom we ultimately dismissed.
Whenever possible, we endeavored to advance our views as
to the rights and duties of neutrality in our general treaties,
and we made two specially on the subject, one with Russia
in 1854 and one with the Two Sicilies in 1855. Yet, though
we had long desired an international agreement on such
matters, we refused to co-operate in the most hopeful move-
ment which had ever appeared. In the Declaration of Paris
of 1856, by which the principal nations of the world agreed
to our long-maintained doctrine that free ships make free
goods, that neutral goods in enemies' ships are free, and that
blockades to be legal must be effective, we refused to join.
Marcy gave as his reason our desire to exempt from capture
all private property at sea, except when used in violating
the laws of blockade and of contraband. We also objected
to the first article of the Declaration, which abolished pri-
vateering. With our large merchant marine and small navy,
it would have been a disadvantage to us to surrender the
right of commissioning our private vessels, unless we were
compensated by the freedom of movement in time of war
which the principle of immunity of enemies' goods in enemies'
vessels would give. Nevertheless, the Declaration marked
an important step toward that view of neutral rights upon
which we had always, except perhaps while Pickering was
secretary of state, insisted.
DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS, 1848-1861 289
The position of our naturalized citizens began to be so
important as to force our statesmen to adjust our legal
theories the better to protect them. The rising gx^^^ #
tide of immigration which the lessening of the uraKzed dti-
European food supply and revolutions, indus-
trial and political, were impelling, and our redoubled pros-
perity was attracting to our shores, now that ocean transpor-
tation was more rapid, brought up the question with almost
every country in Europe. The fact that these naturaUzed citi-
zens had votes made the question political. The seizure of
Martin Koszta, a Hungarian revolutionist who had declared
his intention of becoming an American citizen, in Turkish
waters by an Austrian war ship brought the problem to a
head in 1854. Urged to drastic action by Congress, Marcy
cleverly based his case on accepted international law, but he
added generous phrases on American citizenship, and he se-
cured the return of Koszta. The public believed he had es-
tablished a precedent for the theory that one of man's inalien-
able rights is that of changing his nationality. All party
platforms began to contain assertions that it is "the duty
of the United States to afford ample and complete protection
to all its citizens, whether at home or abroad, and whether
native or foreign." Nevertheless nothing tangible was ac-
complished. Foreign nations still clung, though with differing
modifications, to the theory of indefeasible allegiance, and
our own government was not committed to the opposite.^
While these problems of the past and the future were not
neglected, the special task of this period received due at-
tention. With the extension of our population pj^y^Qj ^f
to the Pacific coast, the question of transpor- transcontinen-
tation between the East and the new West
assumed an importance almost as great as that of an outlet
for the Mississippi valley had possessed until the purchase
of Louisiana. Our territory was continuous, but the titanic
bulk of the Rockies, the aridity of the western plains, and
^ Moore, American Di-plomacy, 168-199.
290 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
the vastness of the distances rendered, not indeed communi-
cation, but trajQBc by our own roads impossible. All the easier
routes lay in foreign countries, and to secure the use of them
was the duty of diplomacy.
The favorite idea of the later fifties was that of a railroad.
Experts decided that the best line was to the south, involving
Gadsden the use of Mexican territory; but to trust
*''***y such an enterprise, which must be launched
with government aid, to the protection of that still distracted
nation seemed impossible. Finally, by the manipulation of /
a boundary dispute and a liberal use of money, a treaty/
was arranged in 1853 by James Gadsden which granted us i
the territory needed in northern Mexico, in return for a pay- 1
ment of ten million dollars. By the same treaty we secured
the equal use, even for the passage of troops, of the isthmus >/
of Tehuantepec, over which, the earlier plan for a canal
having been given up, it was hoped to run a railroad.
A real transcontinental railroad, however, was during
this period merely a rather wild hope. The more practical
Importance of improvement of the situation lay in a canal
American across one of the narrower isthmuses, as that
isthmuses Qf Panama or of Nicaragua, entirely outside
of our own territory. Even as things were, the greater bulk
of our commerce and travel from coast to coast passed over
these isthmuses, and its protection was a national obliga-
tion.
The importance of these points at which the two great
oceans approached each other so closely had been appreciated
Formulation of from the time of their discovery; it had been
our policy more and more appreciated as it became clear
that except here the two continents stretched continuous
and immense from the Arctic ice almost to that of the Ant-
arctic. Charles V had considered the possibility of a canal.
Miranda had envisaged their international status, and,
liberal with his paper kingdom, had offered them to the free
use of commerce. Clay, in his instructions to the delegates
DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS, 1848-1861 291
to the Panama Congress, had said of the isthmus there, "The
benefits of it ought not to be exclusively appropriated to any
one nation, but should be extended to all parts of the globe."
We did not quite venture to claim this as a right analogous
to that of navigating narrow waterways; but the principle
was similar, and formed the basis of our policy.
To turn this policy into action, desire for immediate use
was necessary. Our first step was to draft a treaty with
New Granada or Colombia in 1844, after the ^
_. . . Guarantee of
Oregon migration had begun. Tliis arrange- the neutrality
ment was never accepted, and another treaty
was drawn up in 1846. It provided absolute equality of use
for the commerce and the citizens of both countries; "and,"
it went on, "in order to secure to themselves the tranquil
and constant enjoyment of these advantages, and as an es-
pecial compensation for the said advantages — the United
States guarantee, positively and efficaciously, to New Gran-
ada— the perfect neutrality of the before-mentioned isthmus,
with the view that the free transit from the one to the other
sea may not be interrupted — and, in consequence, the
United States also guarantee, in the same manner, the rights
of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and
possesses over the said territory." Polk defended this guar-
antee on the ground that the interests of the United States
were highly involved, that capital would not be invested
without such security, and that New Granada would not
grant us the needed rights on other terms. ^
With the discovery of gold in California and the influx of
population that followed, the situation became more press-
ing, and a canal seemed an immediate prob- The Nicara-
ability. The advantages of the route through ^*° ''°"*®
Nicaragua over that at Panama were, however, coming to be
1 W. F. Johnson, Four Centuries of the Panama Canal, New York, 1906;
J. H. Latane, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish
America (Baltimore, 1900), 176-220; L. M. Keasbey, The Nicaragua Canal
and the Monroe Doctrine, New York, etc., 1896.
292 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
strongly urged.^ By the organizing ability of Commodore
Vanderbilt, that route came to be the more frequented, and
arrangements for its protection became necessary. At this
point we once more encountered our constant rival. Great
Influence of Britain. She must supply a portion at least
Great Britain q£ ^j^g capital required, and she was in the pos-
session of certain special interests that seemed to many in
1849 to give her control of the situation. Of these the first
was the settlement of Belize, now British Honduras, an an-
cient logwood-cutting establishment with elastic boundaries.
Englishmen also were living on the islands of the Bay of Hon-
duras. Moreover, Great Britain had a protectorate, vague
but of long standing, over the, considering the trouble they
gave for forty years, appropriately named Mosquito Indians.
Since these Indians were claimed as subjects by Nicaragua,
the situation was similar to that which would have existed
in the United States when Great Britain was intriguing with
our Indians, had the United States been as weak as Nicar-
agua was. The Indians professed to own the mouth of the
St. Juan river, the first step in the overland journey; in 1848
the British seized its port, Greytown, as Mosquito territory.^
Under these circumstances, Clayton began negotiations
with Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer. Fearing a British protest,
Clayton- he failed to press treaties made without gov-
Bulwer treaty ernment authorization by our representatives
in Nicaragua and Honduras which promised us exclusive
rights there, and considered himself fortunate to have the
matter taken up on a basis of equality. On April 14, 1850,
Clayton and Bulwer agreed to a treaty which provided that
neither the United States nor Great Britain was to exercise
any exclusive control over any canal that might be con-
structed, that no fortifications should be erected to command
' D. K. Pangbom, "A Journey from New York to San Francisco in 1850,"
Amer. Hist. Review, 1903, ix. 104-115.
* I. D. Travis, History of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, Michigan Political
Science Assoc., Publications, 1900, iii. No. 8.
DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS, 1848-1861 293
it, and that neither party should colonize or assume or exer- /
cise dominion over any part of Central America. The '
prospective canal was to be absolutely neutral, even in case of
war between the two countries; and this neutrality was mu-
tually guaranteed, other nations being invited to join in /
maintaining it. These general principles were also extended
to all the other isthmuses of the region.
The Clayton-Bulwer treaty was at once attacked as a viola-
tion of the Monroe Doctrine. Buchanan declared that it
established the doctrineagainst ourselves rather The Clajrton-
than against European governments. The and^Uie Mon-
Democratic platform of 1856 said, "We can, "« Doctrine
under no circumstances, surrender our preponderance in the
adjustment of all questions arising out of [interoceanic com-
munication]." Though it may well be doubted whether
John Quincy Adams would thus have admitted Great Britain
to equal partnership, it may be observed that the invidious-
ness of this partnership might have been somewhat amel-
iorated had other nations accepted the invitation to join in
the guarantee. Adams's second and more practical objection
to cooperating with Canning in 1823 had been that his own
country wished to acquire territory and Canning's did not.
In Clayton's case, the long-expressed intention of the United
States was to acquire nothing which all the nations of the
globe could not share with us, the free use of the isthmus
and its improvement. Subsequently we changed our minds
on this latter point, and the treaty became an obstacle.
The fundamental question was, however, lost sight of
through the irritating failure of Great Britain to live up to
the spirit of the treaty. Clayton acknowledged, p « r tral-
before ratification, that Belize should not be American ne-
regarded as part of Central America, — a sensi-
ble decision, as this was one of Great Britain's oldest Amer-
ican settlements. This, however, did not content England,
who continued to uphold and extend her interests in the
region that was undoubtedly covered by the term Central
294
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
America. She continued to exercise her protectorate over
the Mosquitoes and began to organize a government in the
Bay Islands. In so doing she was not even justified by any
deep-laid scheme of villainy, it was mere needless trouble-
making. Her excuse, that the self-denying section of the
treaty was prospective and not mandatory, could not bear
examination in light of the text of the treaty, "assume or
ISTHMIAN CONTROVERSIES
exercise dominion over." Webster and Everett handled the
case over delicately, and Great Britain continued in posses-
sion of what she claimed were her rights. Pierce sent Bu-
chanan to England charged with the matter, but in the opin-
ion of the latter the decision to treat Canadian questions
separately at Washington rendered a settlement impossible.
The incoming of Lord Palmerston as Prime Minister in 1855,
brought an English administration prone to indulge in the
art of bluff into opposition with an American administration
DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS, 1848-1861 295
with similar characteristics. The nervous feared war, though
neither side intended to fight. The American bluff won, as
has usually been the case in games of that character with the
mother country. In 1856 Buchanan's successor, Dallas, ar-
ranged with Lord Clarendon that Great Britain should with-
draw her protectorate of the Mosquitoes and surrender her
control of the Bay islands which were to become a practically
independent state, though nominally under Honduras, and
that the boundary of Belize should be definitely fixed. This
convention was not formally accepted; but in 1860 Great
Britain acted upon its terms, and Buchanan, in his annual
message of the same year, announced his satisfaction.*
The Clayton-Bulwer treaty, lying between the United
States and Great Britain, referred only to their joint policy
toward any isthmian canal that might be con- _. _ ^ *
*' ® . The extent of
structed. Arrangements for construction, and our accom-
for the protection of traffic before the canal
was built, must be made with the several countries concerned.
Under the protection of the Colombian treaty of 1846 a rail-
road was built over the Panama route in 1856, an arrangement
that proved reasonably satisfactory and drew the trade from
Nicaragua. Since, upon investigation, the project of a canal
seemed too immense an undertaking to be practicable, it was
dropped, and diplomacy went little farther. A treaty was
made with Nicaragua in 1856, but was not ratified. With
Honduras, whose isthmus presented another possible thor-
oughfare, none was made. Up to the Civil war, therefore,
the achievements of diplomacy toward the solution of the
problem of transcontinental transit consisted of the formu-
lation of a policy, with the securing of the free use of Panama
for our commerce and travel, of Tehuantepec for commerce,
travel, and troops, and of a route for a railroad through the
Gadsden Purchase.
^ The best account of this episode is that in Anglo-American Itthmian
Diplomacy, 1815-1914, by M. W. Williams, 1914.
296 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
It was not, however, upon these routine problems and
these solid accomplishments that public attention centred.
Interest in ex- but upon what proved at the time to be the
pansion will-o'-the-wisp of expansion. The first in-
stance arose from the chaos of the Mexican war. On
April 29, 1848, Polk informed Congress that the government
of Yucatan, which claimed to be independent of
Mexico, was in deadly peril from Indians and
requested protection and annexation, that similar appeals
had been sent to Great Britain and Spain. He declared that
action by those powers would be inconsistent with the Mon- V
roe Doctrine, and that to prevent it we must ourselves assume
the burden. Although nothing came of this proposition, for
Mexico and Yucatan became reconciled, it is nevertheless
of interest because Polk made use of it to add the first corol- /
lary to the Monroe Doctrine, — namely, our duty to occupy ^
territory if necessary to prevent the introduction of the
European political system, — and to enunciate the principle
of the white man's burden.^
Equally futile were the not entirely haphazard attempts of
William Walker, between 1855 and 1858, to secure control of
„, Nicaragua and bring it into the United States.
Nicaragua ... , . .
Again it is the comment of the President which
renders the matter interesting. January 7, 1858, Buchanan
announced to Congress: "It is beyond question the destiny
of our race to spread themselves over the continent of North
America, and this at no distant day should events be per-
mitted to take their natural course. The tide of emigrants
will flow to the south, and nothing can eventually arrest its
progress. If permitted to go there peacefully. Central Amer-
ica will soon contain an American population which will con-
fer blessings and benefits as well upon the natives as their
respective Governments . . . whilst the different transit
routes across the Isthmus . . . will have assured protec-
^ Calhoun, Works, iv. 478-479; Eligio Anacona, Historia de Yucatan deade
la Spoca mas remota, iv. 15-170; W. O. Scroggs, Filibusters and Financiers
(New York, 1916).
DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS, 1848-1861 297
tion. . . . Had one-half the number of American citizens
who have miserably perished in the first disastrous expedi-
tion of General Walker settled in Nicaragua as peaceful
emigrants, the object which we all desire would ere this
have been in a great degree accomplished." ^
Buchanan was not unaware that Mexico lay between the
United States and Central America. In 1848 he had come to
sympathize with the popular desire for all .
Mexico. As President, he looked with distress
upon her growing disorder, and despaired of her ability to
govern herself. In 1859 he said, "She is now a wreck upon
the ocean, drifting about as she is imi)elled by different fac-
tions." Foreign vultures were awake. Our claims had again
accumulated. He recommended that he be granted author-
ity to take possession of " a suflSlcient portion of the remote
and unsettled territory of Mexico, to be held in pledge."
Congress, however, failed him.
Marcy's treaty of annexation with Hawaii, in 1854, raised
still another point, by tacitly including those islands within
the sphere of influence of the American con- „
tinents. Although the treaty did not succeed,
we continued to maintain the principle of a dominant in-
fluence over the group.
The chief treasure that we sought, however, was the pearl of
the Antilles, Cuba. In 1848 it seemed to many that the period
had arrived, predicted in Adams's instructions
to Nelson in 1823, when the annexation of Cuba
to our Federal republic had become "indispensable to the
continuance and integrity of the union itself," when we could
cease our constant ward of Spain's sovereignty and grasp
the prize ourselves. The position of the island, though per-
haps not, as was often asserted, essential to the navigation
of the Mississippi, nevertheless strategically commanded
' J. P. Rhodes, History of the United States (7 vols.. New York, 1893-1906),
ii. 242, 288-290. A good account, as are his descriptions of other diplomatic
episodes from 1850 to 1877.
298 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
much of our commerce. The existence of slavery was an
inducement to annexation sentiment in the South, and the
fear of emancipation in Cuba by English influence affected
thousands now as it had Calhoun in the case of Texas. This
sectional interest, however, did more to weaken the influence
of the nationalistic argument in the North than to strengthen
the cause in the South. From 1848 the press teemed with
articles on Cuba, till that island became more familiar to
Americans than any other portion of Spanish-America ever
has been, except itself again forty years later, and Mexico
since the recent outbreak of revolution there. This news-
paper interest rested on the diplomatic situation, and not
on actual bonds between us and Cuba. Of tangible relation-
ships the most important were trade and the fact that many
Cubans sent their sons to be educated in the United States.
The real reason for our change from a passive to an aggres-
sive policy was within ourselves: we felt able to handle the
question.^
During the next twelve years three methods of securing
Cuba were conceived, — by purchase from Spain, by conquest
. from Spain, or by annexation after a real or a
forced revolution. The effort to apply the last
of these means was naturally the work of individuals. Fili-
bustering became the fashion of the day, and engaged men
of social and political standing. The Cuban leader was
General Narcisco Lopez; among the Americans the fore-
most was General Quitman, a dashing hero of the Mexican
war. "Cuba once free," said the latter, "the regeneration
of Mexico and of the distracted governments to the south
of it would follow, and a new empire, the centre of the world's
production and commerce, governed by the great principle
of unrestricted free trade, would soon be established." Such
* A bibliography of Cuba has been published (1898) by the Library of
Congress, as is customary when such questions assume general importance.
There are similar bibliographies on the Interoceanic Canal, Hawaii, Neutral-
ity (1914), etc. The most nearly complete account of this period is J. M.
Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, Baltimore, 1899.
DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS, 1848-1861 299
movements were widely heralded by the press, and in New
Orleans and New York expeditions were openly fitted out.
Spain was naturally alarmed. We assured her that our
neutrality laws would be enforced, but to at least one of the
invasions, that of 1849, our state department was privy.
This attempt failed, as did that of 1850, in which many
Americans were captured, whose fate held the country in
suspense. They were eventually pardoned; but those cap-
tured during the unsuccessful attempt of 1851 were shot in
cold blood. Nevertheless in 1854 Lopez led a final band to
their doom, and lost his own life. With him died for the time
the attempt to revolutionize Cuba.
Alarmed by these efforts, in 1851 England and France
ordered their navies to prevent the landing of unauthorized
vessels in Cuba, and requested us to join in a Everett's dis-
tripartite agreement to secure the island to p****
Spain. It was this request which gave Edward Everett his
opportunity for a dispatch ringing with patriotism, in which
he asserted the primacy of our interests, our determination ^
that no foreign power should succeed Spain in possession
of the island, and our intention to regulate our own conduct
toward it as we thought fit.
The failure of irregular attempts to secure it, coupled with
the assertion of our interest in the island by a man who
could certainly not be regarded as a pro-slavery advo-
cate, turned attention, if it needed turning, to acquisition
by more regular means. In 1848 Buchanan had offered to
buy it from Spain. In 1852 it was proposed to link its an-
nexation with that of Canada as a Democratic campaign is-
sue; but the second half of this proposition was too risky, and
without some sop to the North Cuba was not suited to ap-
peal to a nation sectionalized as we were at that time. The
proposal was therefore dropped and expansion was left out
of the platform.
This fact, however, did not prevent the new administration
from taking it up. Buchanan advised Pierce to make Cuban
300 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
annexation the distinctive measure of his administration, and
wished, as secretary of state, to have the handhng of it.
Pierce, preferring to gain the glory himself, sent
Buchanan to England, and, unfortunately for
his purposes, chose Marcy as secretary. In his inaugural he
announced his purpose. "The policy of my administration,"
he declared, "will not be controlled by any timid forebodings
of evil from expansion. Indeed, it is not to be disguised that
our attitude as a nation and our position on the globe render
the acquisition of certain possessions not within our jurisdic-
tion eminently important for our protection."
In the spring of 1854 Pierce seemed likely to win Cuba
by conquest. The Black Warrior, a United States merchant
Black Warrior steamer engaged in the Cuban trade, was
*^*^ seized by the Spanish customs officials for a
trifling violation of some new port regulation. Marcy in-
structed Soule, our minister in Spain, to demand three hun-
dred thousand dollars damages. Meantime the island au-
thorities withdrew from their position, restored the vessel,
and returned to their former rules. Before this news, unas-
sisted by cable, reached Spain, however, Soule had acted.
Intent on bringing about war, he presented his demand as
an ultimatum to be answered in forty -eight hours. His note,
nicely calculated to arouse all the Spanish pride and obstinacy,
produced its result, for the answer met the tone of the de-
mand with an eloquent refusal. Straightway public opinion
in the United States, just quieted from the episode itself,
again took fire. General Quitman, now in the House of
Representatives, moved that the neutrality laws be sus-
pended and our fighting spirit let loose. Marcy, however,
realizing that the situation did not warrant war, instructed
Soulfe to take no further steps in the matter.^
It was decided to undertake the formulation of a com-
plete program. Distrustful of Soul6, Marcy wrote to him that
* H. L. Janes, "The Black Warrior Affair," Amer. Hist. Review, 1907,
xii. 280-298.
DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS, 1848-1861 301
the President thought that "weight and perhaps efficiency"
would be gained if "two other of our most distinguished
citizens" should be associated with him. Renewed ne-
These two were James Buchanan, minister to goti^t^ons
Great Britain, and John Y. Mason, minister to France. A
revolution in Spain seemed to offer an occasion, and in the
Fall after the Black Warrior affair the three met at Ostend
to formulate a policy.
This took the form of the "Ostend Manifesto," a declara- (.
tion setting forth that the position of Cuba made its acquisi- 1
tion necessary to the United States. We Ostend Mani-
should offer Spain one hundred and twenty , *®^*°
millions for it. If she refused the offer, "it will then be time /
to consider the question, does Cuba in the possession of;
Spain seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence^
of our cherished union." This, it was urged, was actually
the case, because emancipation was threatened by the over- ^
whelming influence of Great Britain on Spain. The situation
was similar to that which existed when emancipation was
threatened in Texas, but it was more serious because of the
number of the Cuban negroes; emancipation meant "African-
ization," which would be a constant incentive to negro revolt
in the United States. "Then, by every law, human and
divine," concluded the manifesto, "we shall be justified in
wresting it from Spain if we possess the power; and this upon
the very same principle that would justify an individual in
tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there were
no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his
own home." It was another combination of the arguments
of "manifest destiny" and international nuisance which
were becoming so familiar to us.
The force of these arguments was, however, counteracted
in the United States by the development of the slavery
struggle. Politicians and statesmen alike were divided be-
tween the possibility of distracting public attention from in-
ternal conflict by pointing the way to national glory, and the
302 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
fear that the sections would divide all the more quickly in
fighting for the spoils. Spain refused to sell, the foreign min-
Cuba and ister declaring that "to part with Cuba would
slavery j^g ^^ pg^j.|. ^j^j^ national honor." Yet Marcy
would not follow the policy of the manifesto, and Congress
during the next administration steadily refused to endorse
Buchanan's earnest plans for action.
An attempt was made to inject the subject into the cam-
paign of 1860. Both branches of the Democracy declared
, in favor of annexation, upon terms "honorable
Expansion and , .
the failure of to US and just to Spain." Although forced out
compromise t .-> • j* • -l j.t. •
of the campaign discussions by other issues,
it reappeared conspicuously between December, 1860, and
March, 1861, in the deliberations over the question of com-
promise. In fact, it was the universal belief that we were
destined to absorb the country to the south of us, or at least
that the question of such absorption would continue to be
pressed, that created the final obstacle to compromise. The
sections were able to agree upon the status of slavery in all
our then existing territory, but not upon that in future
annexations to the south.
One dominant fact characterizes the period from 1844
to 1860, — ^the national territory had expanded about fifty
Territorial ex- per cent. The result was our possession of a
pansion region consolidated and self-contained, so
situated that we could never have a neighbor, unless with
European connections, strong enough to cause us anxiety,
and giving us outlet on both oceans. To this diplomacy
had contributed but little. The people had expanded, diplo-
macy was expected merely to justify and confirm their ac-
tion. This it had done with decided success. Never before
had our boundary been so unquestioned; only at the ex-
treme northwestern corner was controversy still serious.
In its attempt to extend our territory beyond the limits
of actual expansion, however, diplomacy had signally
failed.
y
DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS, 1848-1861 803
Commercially our eflForts had been mainly devoted to
securing equality of rights for the shipping of all nations on
such pathways of commerce as were indis- Commercial
pensable to world trade but yet fell territorially *""
under the jurisdiction of some one power. In this field de-
cided progress had been made, and even the question of
isthmian transit seemed solved. The opening of Japan and
the increased use of the Pacific had presented less difficulty,
and our success had been even more marked and momentous.
We had definitely refrained from using our strength to
play a part in world politics. The question of our diplomatic
quietude seemed to rest almost wholly with Prospect of
ourselves. Unless we decided to press forward P®"®
our territorial expansion beyond the limits which our citizens
actually occupied, the only important question that remained
was that of establishing the status of our naturalized citizens
when abroad. When Lincoln came into office he found, as
had Jefferson and Jackson, a sky which seemed to be almost
clear of foreign complications.
CHAPTER XXII
THE CIVIL WAR ^
November 10, 1862, Lincoln wrote to Carl Schurz, "The
administration . . . distributed to its party friends as nearly
all the civil patronage as any administration
diplomatic ever did." This was certainly no exaggeration
of the break in the diplomatic service which
the triumph of the Republican party brought about. Not
only were those found in office Democrats, but a very large
proportion were from the South; for Buchanan had aimed to
give the slave states, not a proportional representation in
the higher civil posts, but an equality. The almost complete
change in personnel was less important than the change in
weight and character. Until 1861 there had never been a
time, except for brief periods under Jackson and Taylor, when
some member of the administration had not been possessed
of direct experience in foreign affairs. From 1861 until
John Hay became secretary of state in 1898 the only mem-
bers of any administration who had such experience were
Carl Schurz under Hayes, and Levi P. Morton and J. W.
Foster under Harrison. While there continued to be brilliant
men and occasionally accomplished diplomats in foreign
posts, it is obvious that they were not called upon to share in
the outlining of our national foreign policy. It seems also
a safe conclusion that the aggregate of ability employed in
^ For the history of the Civil war, historians are as much indebted to
the late Charles Francis Adams, son of the minister to Great Britain at
that time, as they are to Henry Adams, another son, for the diplomacy of
the Napoleonic period. His researches and conclusions, which have ap-
peared in many essays, will shortly be combined in his forthcoming life of
his father. Rhodes's History of the United States, vols, iii.-vii. is also strong
on the diplomatic side.
8M
THE CIVIL WAR 305
diplomacy, relative to that in other forms of politics, was
not so great as previously.
Of the men who took charge in 1861, Lincoln was not only
without diplomatic experience, but without such knowledge of
American international interests as most public
men had previously possessed. Fortunately he
knew it, and seldom intervened; when he did, it seems to have
been in all cases beneficially. His profound understanding of
human nature reached below diverging national characteris-
tics and touched the common basis of humanity. In a crisis
when public opinion so largely controlled the international
situation, such an endowment was of inestimable value. ^
His secretary of state, William F. Seward, was one of the
most complex personalities of his perplexing generation. With
an absolute conviction of the ultimate triumph
of what he believed to be right, he was perfectly
ready to compromise principle for temporary convenience.
Yet he was never content to let Providence work alone, but
aided it with all the finesse of which his astute mind was
capable. With a practicality thus genially founded in philos-
ophy, he nevertheless at times surrendered himself to an
intellectual emotionalism as dangerous to a man of his re-
sporisibiUty as it is useful to the orator. The only such de-
flection during his diplomatic career occurred at its very
opening. Before assuming office he said, in an address to
the New England Society of New York, that if we were at-
tacked by a foreign power "all the hills of South Carolina
would pour forth their population to the rescue." Becoming
secretary, he advised, on April 1, 1861, the development of
quarrels with Great Britain and France as a means of re-
storing unity at home. Lincoln made no comment, but
when, on May 21, he looked over the draft of Seward's dis-
^ Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works, ed. J. G. Nicolay and John Hay,
2 vols.. New York, 1894; Abraham Lincoln, a History, by Nicolay and Hay,
10 vols.. New York, 1890; Gideon Welles, Lincoln and Seward, New York,
1874.
306 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
patch to our minister in England incorporating this policy,
he took the sting out of it. He cut out a reference to "that
hour" when we should "cease to be friends, and become once
more, as we have twice before been forced to be, enemies of
Great Britain"; in the description of her conduct he changed
"wrongful" to "hurtful"; and he added, "This paper is for
your own guidance only and not to be read or shown to any
one." From this time Seward's handling of affairs was
always competent and sometimes masterly, though he con-
tinued to evince an even greater penchant for writing dip-
lomatic notes to be read at home than had the secretaries
of the fifties.^
The dispatch of May 21, thus modified by Lincoln, was
further toned down by our minister, who wrote that he " tried
to act up to [his] instructions at the same time
that [he] softened as well as [he] could the sharp
edges." The appointment of Charles Francis Adams to the
court of St. James was as fortunate, in its lesser way, as the
election of Lincoln to the presidency. Of a family, education,
and manner to compel the respect of the English, he had, if
not the genius of his father John Quincy Adams, at any rate
high ability, all the family backbone and sturdy Americanism,
and added thereto a somewhat greater tact. Treading a
path where any slip was apt to lead to war, and where many
of those with whom he associated hoped to see him slip, he
maintained himself immune from criticism. His business was
to see that nothing happened, and his career was marked by
many important things that failed to happen.
Confiding more and more in Adams abroad, Lincoln and
Seward relied at home chiefly on Charles Sumner. With a
background of foreign travel and a wide Eng-
lish acquaintance, he became in 1861 chairman
of the senate committee of foreign affairs, a post which he
held till 1871. A scholar, with some knowledge of intema-
1 Frederick Bancroft, The Life of William H. Seward (2 vols.. New
York, etc., 1900), vol. ii.
THE CIVIL WAR 307
tional law, and a cultured gentleman, he was a favorite with
the foreign diplomats at Washington, who found him the most
congenial of the men high in office. Throughout the war his
advice seems to have been sound and useful.^ As important
in routine matters as Sumner on critical occasions was Wil-
liam Hunter, chief clerk of the state depart- „
Hunter
ment. Holding office from 1829 to 1886, he
contributed a continuity of knowledge and practice the value
of which it is hard to exaggerate.
On April 12 this new administration found itself confronted
by a condition of domestic hostility. On April 19, without
intending to do so, it recognized that this hostil- _
T 1 • M X Blockade
ity constituted civil war. It was its purpose to
treat the movement as a rebellion, a purely domestic affair.
The first essential, however, was to cut off the hostile states
from all connection with the outside world. Devoted to the
raising of great staple crops, the South purchased many of
its necessities instead of producing them; its commerce cut
off, therefore, exhaustion would be but a matter of time.
Secretary Welles thought that we could accomplish this end
by declaring the ports closed; but, as we did not hold the
ports, such a regulation would obviously have to be enforced
at sea. Accordingly the cabinet decided upon a blockade,
which Lincoln proclaimed April 19. In the leading case,
that of the Amy Warvnck, our own supreme court declared
that this blockade could rest upon no other basis than that
of a change of status in the South making it enemy's country,
and hence that the government's act constituted a recogni-
tion of belligerency or a state of war. Upon the maintenance
of this blockade depended, so far as human judgment can
tell, the success of the attempt to restore the Union by arms.
Its effectiveness, as against the South, depended on the navy,
as against foreign nations, upon diplomacy.^
» Charles Sumner, Works (15 vols., Boston, 1875-83), vi. 153-242, 474-
486; "Letters of Richard Cobden to Charles Sumner, 1862-1865," Amer.
Hist. Review, ii. 306-319.
* Gideon Welles, Diary (3 vob., Boston, etc., 1911), i. 165, 172 3.
308 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
The United States now found herself in the reverse of the
situation that she had occupied during the Napoleonic wars:
Maintenance she was now interested in the rights of bel-
of blockade Ijgerents rather than in the rights of neutrals.
This change of position did not lead to a change of policy,
but to a change of stress. We now admitted, as we had pre-
viously contended, that to be legal a blockade must be effec-
tively maintained off the ports blockaded. Questions of
course arose as to the definition of effective, but on the whole
the navy relieved the diplomatic department of any great
anxiety on this point. The blockade, at least after 1861,
was reasonably efficient.^
Still, it was not proof against the alert blockade-runner
willing to take the risk of capture. It became the custom to
Continuous send goods to and from the Confederacy by
voyage ^^y ^^ nearby neutral ports, as Nassau in the
British Bahamas, a device that made the actual running of
the blockade a short though perilous undertaking. A route
still safer was that by way of Matamoros, a Mexican port
just opposite Brownville in Texas, but communication from
this distant border to the interior of the Confederacy was so
poor, that the volume of such trade was small. To meet
this situation our courts evolved a doctrine of "continuous
voyage," asserting that, if the ultimate destination of the
cargo was the Confederacy, the vessel carrying it might be
seized even on a voyage between two neutral ports, as Liver-
pool and Nassau. This doctrine somewhat resembled that
applied by Sir William Scott, in the case of the Essex, to our
trade between the French West Indies and France. Its ap~
plication during the Civil war, however, was confined to the
carrying of contraband. Numerous cases occurred in the
Nassau trade, as those of the Dolphin and the Bermuda, which
resulted in the condemnation of vessel and cargo. In the
case of the Springbok the cargo was condemned, but the ship
1 H. L. Wait, "The Blockade of the Confederacy," Century, 1898, xxxiv.
914-928.
y
THE CIVIL WAR 809
was released on the ground that there was no "fraudulent
connection on the part of the owners with the ulterior des-
tination of the goods." A leading case was that of the Peter-
hqff, seized on its way to Matamoros. The supreme court
released the vessel on the plea that the blockade did not ap-
ply to the inland trade from Mexico to the Confederacy;
but as this decision was not rendered till 1866, it did not
affect the conduct of the war. On the whole, the doctrine
of "continuous voyage" was acknowledged by European
powers and did something to assist in the maintenance
of the blockade, though seizures under it were actually
few.
Our purpose now being to prevent commerce rather than
to prey upon it, we had reason to regret our failure to adhere
to the Declaration of Paris, which had abolished Declaration of
privateering among its signers. While we, in ^'^
this new crisis, made use of our merchant marine by pur-
chasing vessels and incorporating them into the navy, Jef-
ferson Davis, on his part, issued commissions to privateers.
Seward, therefore, promptly announced that we would now
adhere to all the rules of the Declaration, without amend-
ment. France and England, however, while welcoming our
adhesion, properly reminded us that these rules could not
be held to apply to the Confederacy, whereupon Seward,
failing in his purpose to have the Confederate privateers
declared pirates, withdrew his offer to join in the agree-
ment.
On the important question of the belligerent right of
search our position was developed with the progress of the
war. On the other hand, we firmly insisted ^ ,.
from the beginning on a rigid interpretation rights and
of tha duty of neutral nations to prevent their
citizens from aiding our opponents. With regard to this
duty, however, there was no such general concurrence of
opinion as in the case of continuous voyages, and the issue
was left to the course of diplomacy.
310 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
As the main purpose of the national diplomacy was to pre-
vent interference with the blockade, so that of the Con-
Cotton as federate diplomacy was to break it up. The
' ^"^^ situation had long been regarded as possible,
and the South faced it with confidence. In the twenties it
had been argued that, in case of secession, the North would
blockade the southern coast but that European demand for
southern cotton would force the opening of the ports. Since
then cotton had grown steadily more important to the in-
dustrial life of Europe, till by 1861 few southerners doubted
that cotton was "king." Their strength lay in the posses-
sion of the monopoly of a necessity of life. Complementary
to this club which would compel Europe to intervene was
the inducement of free trade, which would win the active
friendship of some great maritime power. On December 15,
1860, R. Barnwell Rhett, of whom the Times correspondent,
William Russell, said, "Rhett is also persuaded ■ that the
lord chancellor sits on a cotton bale," sought an interview
with the British consul at Charleston. He offered a recip-
rocal freedom of trade as an inducement for an English
alliance, and threatened that if Great Britain made difficul-
ties the South would seek France.^
To make proper use of such weapons demanded a high
degree of diplomatic skill. This the South did not evince.
Jefferson Davis attempted more of an oversight of diplomacy
than Lincoln did, and failed to show either Lincoln's patience
or his good judgment. His secretaries, R. M. T. Hunter and
^ J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, i vols.,
Nashville, 1905; M. L. Bonham, The British Consuls in the Confederacy,
Columbia University, Studies, xliii. No. 3; J. M. Callahan, The Diplomatic
History of the Southern Confederacy, Baltimore, 1901, and his Northern Lake
Frontier during the Civil War, Amer. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1896, i. 335-359;
J. D. Bulloch, The Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe, 2 vols..
New York, 1884, and J. R. Thompson, Diary (accounts of Confederate
naval agents in England); "Dispatch from the British Consul [Robert
Bunch] at Charleston to Lord John Russell, [Dec. 15,] 1860," Amer. Hist.
Review, 1913, xviii. 783-787; J. R. Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisert,
N. Y., 1883.
THE CIVIL WAR 311
Judah P. Benjamin,^ were both able men, but by no means
of the first rank. James M. Mason made a good impression
in England as Confederate commissioner there, confederate
but he annoyed her government by undue per- diplomatic
service
sistence. John Slidell in France apparently
did what was possible, but Paris was not the key to the
situation as it had been when Franklin had served there.
The accepted method of making diplomatic use of cotton
was to prevent exportation in order to bring pressure to
bear upon the industrial classes, and through them upon the
governments of Great Britain and France. This policy,
reminding one of Jefferson's embargo, may be said to have v
been enforced with rigor: during the four years of war about
half a million bales only were exported, as against three
million bales in 1861. This disparity, however, was due
more to the Federal navy than to the Confederate govern-
ernment, for during most of the war that government despite y
its policy was exporting all the cotton possible in order to
purchase necessities. On the whole, however, one may say
that the cotton argument was applied, and that if it did not
succeed failure was owing to defect in the theory rather than
in the detail of its application.
While the main reliance of the South for relief from the
blockade was upon foreign intervention, she hoped to use
her cotton actively as well. In fact, Alexander Conuncrce
H. Stephens held that all available cotton destroying
should be purchased by the government, sent to Europe,
held for scarcity prices, and the proceeds employed to build
a fleet. Davis also wished a foreign built fleet, as a sub-
sidiary weapon against the North and because of the weight
he believed it would have with foreign nations. To circum-
vent the neutrality laws of the great ship-building nation,
Great Britain, by technicality, fraud, or favor, became the
second great aim of the diplomatic force. The vessels thus
to be secured were to be heavy fighting craft to break the
^ Pierce Butler, Judah P. Benjamin, Philadelphia, [1907].
312 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
blockade and possibly to bombard northern ports, and fast
steamers to harry United States commerce. The latter
were to supplement the crowd of private ventures which
Davis somewhat too optimistically hoped to call out by his
oflFer to commission privateers.
Desirous of worrying, yet not hopeful of destroying. United
States commerce, Davis had to adopt a policy with reference
jj . , J. to neutral rights. In so doing he decidedly
toward neu- overplayed his hand. His great card was in
offering immunity to neutral ships, at the same
time making the hazard of capture to United States vessels
high. This would drive United States trade into the hands
of British vessels. On the strength of this favor he sought to
adhere to the Declaration of Paris, except, however, as to
the abolition of privateering. He would continue to use his
privateers to endanger United States merchantmen, arid
yet would bind Europe to insist that our blockade either be
impeccably effective or be raised. The first result that he
aimed at, the transfer of our commerce from our own to
British vessels, was largely attained. American merchant-
men were forced to pay high insurance rates and charge ^
high freights, in many cases their owners transferred them
by actual or fraudulent sale to the British flag.^ Great
Britain, however, did not show her gratitude. Insisting that
an adhesion to the Declaration of Paris must be to the whole,
she did not consider his offer, and the blockade remained.
In 1863, obviously provoked, Davis threatened to change his
regulations and allow the capture of enemies' goods in neu-
tral vessels. In view of the fact that the commerce de-
stroyers at his disposal were British-built, largely British-
manned, and were subsisting in British ports, his threat to
turn them loose on the British merchant marine overreached
the limits of practical diplomacy. It was ignored, nor did
^ The old French practice of forbidding such transfer of ownership to
escape risk, has been generally adopted since the Civil War. The United
States follows this rule as embodied in the Declaration of London of 1910.
THE CIVIL WAR 31S
he act upon it. Had he done so, the Confederate warships
would have been swept from the ocean.
The field of contest for southern and northern diplomacy
was practically confined to Great Britain. Of the European
powers, Russia, Germany, Italy, and Den- Attitude of
mark were friendly to the North, but the last ^'^OP®
two were not substantially important. Germany bought
northern bonds. Russia was moved not only by her tradi-
tional desire to see the United States rival Great Britain as
a maritime power, but by the sympathy which her humani-
tarian czar, Alexander, the liberator of the serfs, felt for the
efforts to abolish slavery. Her only active manifestation of
friendship, however, lay in the visit of her fleets to this coun-
try at what seemed to be a critical moment, September, 1863,
— a visit undoubtedly as convenient to her as it was pleasing
to us. In fact, the only nations whose policies were really
interesting at this time were the maritime powers, France
and Great Britain.
Of these, France was distinctly anxious to secure the
break-up of the Union. Louis Napoleon was nursing a new
last plan for some kind of French colonial empire „
• A • J- • • ij -a. I,- • X French poUcy
m America; division would assist his projects.
He would have welcomed a chance to take part in the war on
the side of the South, to renew that policy of liberating na-
tions which, as pursued in Italy, had conferred a lustre on
the Second Empire. He was, however, not in a position to
disregard Great Britain with whom he was cooperating; for
America was primarily a British problem.^
The leading political figure in England at the time was
Lord Palmerston, the prime minister, well known, to use
a word not then coined, as a jingo. He was English public
distinctly favorable to the South, and was not op""o>i
loath to interfere. His foreign secretary. Lord John Russell,
was less decided in his sympathies and less inclined to action.
^ John Bigelow, Retrospections of an Active Life, 1817-79, 5 vols.. New
York, 1909-13. Bigelow was consul-general at Paris.
314 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Both recognized the necessity of waiting upon public opinion.
This force, more potent in Great Britain than in any other
country except the United States, and more complex there
than with us, seemed at first overwhelmingly pro-southern.
The Times, at the zenith of its prestige, if not of its power,
was outspoken, and it represented the opinion of the governing
class. The Earl of Malmesbury wrote, May 23,
1862: "There is a rumor that the Confederates
have been defeated and Beauregard taken prisoner, which
everybody regrets. The feeling for the South is very strong
in society." ^ This was due partly to an aristocratic elation
at the failure of democracy and partly to sympathy with the
apparently kindred culture of the plantation aristocracy of
the South. Diplomatically the advantage to Great Britain
of dealing with two republics in place of one was keenly ap-
preciated. There was an almost imiversal feeling in England
that the South could not be subdued. Edward A. Freeman,
the historian, brought out, in 1863, a History of Federal
Government from the Foundation of the Achaian League to the
Disruption of the United States. It was obviously important
to stand well with a new nation that possessed no qualms
about using British manufactures, an argument just then
pointed by the passage, in the national Congress, of the
highly protective Morrill tariff.
To the upholders of the great Whig tradition, which from
Burke to Trevelyan has so emphatically championed our own
_. . , ^ Revolution, the spectacle of the North attempt-
mg to bmd to itself a reluctant South seemed a
new contest of freedom against oppression. To them Lincoln
stood in the place of George III. Many of this faction, to
be sure, felt that individual freedom was more important
than collective, and would have favored the North had its
object been emancipation; but that object was expressly
denied by Lincoln.
* Earl of Malmesbury, Memoirs of an Ex-minister (2d ed., 2 vols., London,
1884), ii. 273, May 23, 1862.
THE CIVIL WAR 815
The Dissenters, headed by John Bright, stood almost
alone, at the beginning, in favor of the North. Strong forces,
however, were working to prevent hasty ac- d- ♦ d
tion. Bad harvests in 1860, 1861, and 1862 mercantile
caused northern wheat to be more essential v
than southern cotton.^ The philosophic, moreover, saw a
possible good in the cutting-off of the American supply of
the latter commodity, since thereby production in other
parts of the world might be stimulated and England thus be
relieved of her dependence on whatever power possessed
our black belt. The great mercantile class seemed to profit
more by the continuance of war than it could hope to do by
participation or by the triumph of either side. Inasmuch
as British-built ships and British crews were already, under
the Confederate flag, destroying the only rival merchant
marine in existence, the risks of war were unnecessary. These
non-sentimental arguments favored a passive policy. The
balance of opinion thus created was dangerous, for, since
the subject did not appeal to the average Englishman as
one of such importance that it must be thought through to a
decision, the result might depend upon the fortuitous stress
of apparent accident.
England's first act was to issue May 13, 1861, a neutrality
proclamation recognizing that a state of war existed. This
step certainly seemed to be called for by _ ,
Davis's invitation to privateers and Lincoln's recognizes
proclamation of blockade. It was evident
that hostilities would take place at sea and neutrals be in-
volved. Great Britain wished " to bring the management of
it within the rules of modem civilized warfare." W. E. Foster
sought to hasten the issuance of the proclamation, believing
it to be of advantage to the North. Although undoubtedly
inevitable, its appearance was perhaps a little hasty, es-
pecially in view of the fact that it was known that Adams
1 E. D. Fite, Social and Industrial Conditions in the North during the Civil
War (New York, 1910), 17-21.
/
316 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
was due to arrive within a day or two and would undoubt-
edly expect to be consulted. The news of England's recog-
nition of belligerency came to the North like a slap in the
face. Conscious of its own rectitude, northern opinion had
not for a moment contemplated the possibility that Great
Britain would not sympathize. The North had counted
on the fact that we were fighting to free the slave as heavily
as the South had counted on cotton. The leaders of opinion
seemed to forget that their government had asserted that
we were not fighting to free the slave. Indifference in
England they could not understand. By a large portion
of the North, Great Britain's assertion of neutrality was
as little credited as Washington's similar declaration in
1793 had been by France and England. Her recognition
of belligerency, taken in connection with the tone of the
British press, was believed to indicate an intention to assist
the South.
In this situation, on November 8, 1861, Captain Wilkes,
commanding the San Jacinto, which he was bringing back into
, home waters, heard that the Confederate com-
missioners. Mason and Slidell, were sailing from
Havana to Europe on the British steamer Trent. Without or-
ders, he "searched" the vessel, took off the commissioners, and
brought them to Boston. The North went wild with an un-
reasoning joy. But the mere capture of the two men could
hardly have occasioned the lavish outburst of oratorical ex-
uberance in which men ordinarily so sane as Edward Everett,
R. H. Dana, and Governor Andrew indulged, even though
southern statesmen were supposed to be possessed of some
uncanny power of turning black into white. The rejoicing
was rather due to the satisfaction of getting a return stroke
against England for her belligerency proclamation.
The British government had already considered the pos-
sibility of some such exercise of the right of search. British
precedent, coming from her practice during the conflict with
Napoleon, was favorable to its broadest extension. Lor4
THE CIVIL WAR 317
Palmerston had asked what could be done if an American war
vessel stationed itself oflF Southampton to intercept all out-
going shipping, and the law officers of the crown „ . . .
could find no answer. Owing to the develop-
ment of ocean transportation and the regularity of steam
communication, the situation was very different from what
it had been forty years before. It was, of course, palpably
absurd to imagine any belligerent regularly stationing ves-
sels to query every channel packet, but legally it seemed
possible.^
When a specific case arose, however, it was obvious that
the interference could not be tolerated. Entering the cabinet
meeting, Lord Palmerston threw down his hat British de-
and said, "I don't know whether you will °^*"<*s
stand it, but I'll be damned if I do." He hit the popular
feeling; all England was ablaze with resentment. Parlia-
ment took war measures, troops were ordered to Canada,
and Lord Russell wrote a ringing demand for the surrender
of the commissioners within seven days. There were those,
however, who labored for peace, among them Prince Albert,
who, when consulted by the queen, modified Russell's dis-
patch, as Lincoln had Seward's.
Fortunately, in the absence of a cable these national out-
bursts were not simultaneous and could not quickly react
on each other. By the time Russell's ultima- „ . -
tum reached the United States, public opinion Mason and
there had cooled by its own reflection and by
the advice of men like Sumner. The administration was
anxious to get out of the scrape if it could do so without
violating the national sense of honor. Appreciating the situ-
ation, therefore. Lord Lyons, the British minister, presented
Russell's note without reference to its being an ultimatum.^
^ T. L. Harris, The Trent Affair, Indianapolis, 1896; R. H. Dana, Trent
Affair, in Wheaton's Elements of International Law, 8th ed., 1866, pp. 644 ff.;
C. W. Battine, The Crisis of the Confederacy, London, 1905.
* Lord [T. W. L.] Newton, Lord Lyons: a Record of British Diplomacy,
% vols., London, 1913 (this work, however, makes little use of Lyons's enor-
318 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
On December 26, Seward replied that the capture of the
Trent was justified by the fact that the commissioners were
contraband of war engaged in a continuous voyage from the
Confederate states; that Captain Wilkes, however, had failed
to conform to international law in allowing the Trent to
proceed and thus preventing a judicial review of his action;
and consequently that the United States would surrender
Mason and Slidell. In this affair, Seward, or public opinion
coercing Seward, perhaps lost to the United States an op-
portunity for securing British assent to our nation-old chal-
Result of the lenge of the indiscriminate extension of the
Trent affair belligerent right of search. The prompt sur-
render of the commissioners on the ground that Captain
Wilkes had exceeded his belligerent powers would while
conciliating British opinion, at the same time have obtained
a national triumph. Yet the actual result was satisfactory
in that it prevented war if it did not restore good feeling.
James Russell Lowell put in the mouth of Jefferson Davis
the words :
" *T wuz a beautiful dream, an' all sorrer is idle, —
But e/ Lincoln icovld ha' hanged Mason an' Slidell!
They ain't o' no good in Eur6pean pellices.
But think wut a help they'd ha' ben on their gallowses!
They'd ha' felt they wuz truly fulfillin' their mission.
An', oh, how dog-cheap we'd ha' gut Reecognition!"
This episode over, the British government had an op-
portunity to deliberate on its policy. Its next step, if it
Significance of Were to take one, would be recognition of the
of Sde^d-'^ independence of the southern Confederacy.
*°*^* Such recognition need not involve hostilities
with us. It would give the Confederacy prestige, which
doubtless could be cashed in the form of a loan; but, if Great
Britain accompanied her recognition with an assurance of
neutrality, as she doubtless would, it would give the South
mous correspondence within the United States); Edmund Fitzmaurice,
The Life of . . . Second Earl Granville, 1815-91 (3d ed., 2 vob., London,
1905), vol. i.
THE CIVIL WAR 819
no belligerent rights that it did not already possess. When
France acknowledged our independence in 1778, Great Brit-
ain considered the act cause for war; but when we first, and
after us Great Britain, recognized the independence of the
Spanish-American states, Spain did not consider it cause for
war. The difference lay partly in the fact that Spain had
less chance to recover her colonies than Great Britain had,
and partly in the relative standing of the nations. In the
present case, the United States was not prepared to acknowl-
edge that she had no hope of recovering the South.
Recognition of the Confederacy by Great Britain must
almost inevitably have been met by war on our part. Public
sentiment, already bitter, was during 1862 England's *t-
constantly exasperated by the disastrous ac- ***"•*« awaited
tivity of the Confederate cruisers built in Great Britain with
what we considered the connivance of that government.
The floating of a Confederate loan in the spring of 1863 was
regarded as still further evidence of malintent. After the
battle of the Monitor and Merrimac we began to be over-
confident of our naval strength; even Secretary Welles con-
sidered himself ready for the British navy.^ No small por-
tion of the press carried a chip on its shoulder. Regardless
of the exigencies of the military task already before us, a
controlling fraction of the North undoubtedly felt, as the
West had felt in 1812, that, if it was obvious that we had
to fight Great Britain, we might as well do so openly; — that
her recognition of the Confederacy would be the throwing
down of the glove. The ingrained hatred of European
interference was perhaps still more fundamental. Seward
instructed Adams to suspend his diplomatic functions in the
event of an announcement of recognition.
With the British government it was a question of time
and circumstance. In November, 1861, Adams had told
Palmerston that the North would probably not try to coerce
a hostile population, that it merely wished to give the latent
» Welles, Diary, i. 495.
320 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Union sentiment in the South opportunity to develop.
The defeat of McClellan before Richmond in July, 1862,
Cabinet pro- seemed to show that this attempt had failed.
^"^ September 14, Palmerston wrote to Russell
favoring recognition. Russell replied with the suggestion
that mediation be offered first, and that a cabinet meet-
ing be held September 23 or September 30 to discuss the
matter. Lord Granville, who was absent with the queen,
proposed further delay, and a meeting was finally arranged
for October. Russell set to work on the preparation of a
memoir to present the case for mediation and subsequent
recognition.
In the interval W. E. Gladstone, chancellor of the ex-
chequer, the coming man but many years junior to Palmerston
and Russell, touched on the subject at Newcas-
tle. "There can be no doubt," said he, "that
Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an
army; they are making, it appears, a navy, and they have
made what is more than either, they have made a nation."
His position was promptly attacked by a fellow cabinet mem-
ber. Sir George Cornwallis Lewis. For cabinet members in
Great Britain thus to commit themselves on subjects which
have not yet been decided by the cabinet as a whole, and
thus to differ, is not unknown, but it is always indiscreet.
As a result it was decided that recognition could wait awhile,
long enough to allow the party chiefs to assert themselves and
to discipline Gladstone. The matter was dropped for the time.
The cabinet therefore met Parliament, February 5, 1863,
without a declared policy. Interest thereupon centred in
Parliamentary an attempt to force its hand through Parlia-
discussion ment. A member, Mr. Roebuck, had an inter-
view with Napoleon, who urged him to press the matter.
On June 30 he introduced a motion instructing the govern-
ment "to enter into negotiation with the great powers of
Europe for the purpose of obtaining their cooperation in
the recognition " of the Confederacy.
THE CIVIL WAR 321
This seeming climax, however, is deceptive; the real crisis
had passed. The final argument had always been in the
hands of the North, and had by this time been Emancipation
made effective. Great Britain could not take Proclamation
action perpetuating slavery. Universal emancipation out-
weighed cotton. With the advantage of its sentimental ap-
peal, this consideration was equally strong from a practical
standpoint. Between 1854 and 1860 the northern working-
man had been brought over from a passive to an actual op-
position to slavery, by insistence on the economic disadvan-
tage to free laborers of competition by labor-owners. The
British laboring-man had gone through his education earlier,
with such effect that the very population most severely hit
by the cotton famine, the operatives of the Lancaster mills,
had nevertheless steadily stood by the North. Supported
through their distress by the splendid organization of British
philanthropy, they found their situation begin to improve
with the coming of Indian and Egyptian cotton in 1863; ^
and if they had any doubt as to the purpose of the North it
was absolved by Lincoln's preliminary emancipation proc-
lamation of September 22, 1862.
Whether this proclamation had anything to do with the
postponement of the critical cabinet meeting it is impossible
to say, but it is noticeable that the news of it Effect of
reached England between the calling of the *°^<^p***°°'
meeting and its postponement. Between that time and
June, actual emancipation was proclaimed, January 1, 1863.
Lincoln did not allow the effect of the proclamation to be
lost upon English opinion. Throughout the war he and
Seward were continually sending abroad all kinds of informal
representatives upon all sorts of missions. The influence of
John Bigelow on the French press, and of Thurlow Weed
on the English, was probably not great, and many of these
roving emissaries caused as much annoyance to Adams as
their counterparts had given to Franklin during the Revolu-
^B.. A.. Amold, History of the Cotton Famine, London, lS64i.
322 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
tion. Henry Ward Beecher, however, was a real ambassador
to the people, and Lincoln himself wrote a public letter to the
working-men of London. On the whole, the development of
a pro-northern sentiment was rather by a raising of interest
in the indifferent or the uninformed than by a converting
of the pro-southern classes, although the Whig element began
to turn. Many moderates moreover, were decidedly in-
fluenced by the northern victories of Gettysburg and Vicks-
burg, July 3 and 4, 1863. It was, however, on July 13, three
days before the news of these victories reached England that
Roebuck, realizing the change in the balance of opinion,
withdrew his motion. It was Lincoln, not Grant and Meade,
who prevented recognition.
Even with the crisis past, there still remained a twofold
danger. With the proceeds of their loan the Confederates
The Laird were having built by Laird, the great British
" "itts " iron-master, war vessels, rams of such formid-
able fighting capacity that they caused the sensitive quills
of our press to stand erect with horror as they saw them,
omnipresent, destroying our poor blockading fleet, laying
the Atlantic coast under tribute, and ascending our rivers
and creeks for the devastation of the interior. There was
more chance, however, that some episode would arise out of
their building that would tip the still swaying balance of
British opinion, or would impress that of the United States
as an act of war. Adams, with growing confidence, pressed
upon Russell the duty of preventing these vessels, whose
progress was regularly reported in the newspapers, from
being delivered into the hands of the Confederacy. Russell
promised to investigate, but his law officers discovered that
the vessels had been sold to a French firm, and that there
was no "evidence capable of being presented to a Court of
Justice" that they were intended for the Confederacy. Ac-
tually they did not know that a contract existed by which
the French firm was to turn them over to Confederate agents
when they were once beyond British jurisdiction. Adams,
THE CIVIL WAR 828
however, rightly believed that this was the case. On Sep-
tember 5, therefore, hearing that one ship was about to de-
part, he wrote to Russell : " I can regard it no otherwise than
as practically opening to the insurgents full liberty in this
Kingdom, to conduct a campaign against the northern sea-
ports. ... It would be superfluous in me to point out to
your Lordship that this is war." Russell had no intention
thus to provoke war. Two days before Adams's letter was
written he had ordered the rams detained. This closed the
episode; the rams never afterwards were within reach of the
Confederacy.
With September, 1863, the triumph of northern diplomacy
was complete. Davis's next message to the Confederate
Congress is a petulant admission of defeat. Triumph of
Nevertheless, the Confederacy did not give up *^* North
its hope of foreign aid or its attempt to secure it. Alexander
H. Stephens even favored abolishing slavery to win it.^ All
subsequent plans, policies, and projects, however, were ac-
tually dependent upon military success, which could not
come on any grand scale without foreign aid, without the
breaking of the blockade. The situation was an impasse.
Chance might work for the Confederacy, but no diplomatic
skill would avail for rescue.
^ See also M. D. Conway, Autobiography (2 vols., Boston, etc., 1904),
ch. xxi.
CHAPTER XXIII
THE CIVIL WAR AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE
From the date of President Monroe's message of 1823 to
the Civil war there had been no new European colony estab-
Pra tical ffect ^^^^^^ ^^ America, no transfer of territory from
of the Monroe one European nation to another, nor had any
Doctrine -•-< i i • i i>
liiUropean i)ower secured real control oi an
American State. This inactivity had not been due to any
unwillingness to interfere, or even to a lack of desire, but to
a recognition of the fact that owing to its position, the United
States was actually stronger over most of the continental
area than any European power could be, and that her friend- v/
ship was more valuable than the spoils that might be snatched
in a general scramble for plunder.
In answering questions as to the national policy asked by
the governments of Argentina and Brazil in 1825, Clay had
_ ^ ^ ^. been careful to state that "our declaration
Interpretation
of the Monroe must be regarded as having been voluntarily
Doctrine j j j. • i j
made, and not as conveymg any pledge or
obligation the performance of which foreign nations have a
right to demand." Until the Mexican war our policy was
negative, and we avoided entanglements in the ever-changing
complications of Spanish- American politics. This left a
field open for the exercise of European influence, and by
mediation and advice European governments sought to
gain a hold without actually coming into collision with us.
In 1827 Austria and Great Britain sought to arrange peace be-
tween Brazil and Portugal; in 1845 France and Great Britain
intervened between Buenos Ayres and Montevideo. After
1845, our ministers often oflfered to mediate in such disputes,
324
CIVIL WAR AND MONROE DOCTRINE 325
but without any strong insistence in our exclusive right to
tender such good offices.
The centre of European interest was the mouth of La
Plata, the bone of contention between Argentina, Brazil,
and Uruguay. In the latter country French ^ h infl
influence was strong, and from 1838 to 1849 ence in Uru-
was constantly on the alert. This foothold
was seized upon with vigor by the second French republic
in 1848, and Eugene Guillemot was sent to represent her.
He reported, December 12, 1848, "Two opposed elements
contend at present in all South America, the local element
and the European. . . . Around the first group all the
tendencies, stationary and retrograde . . . ; around the other,
colonization, expansion, in all good senses, agricultural, in-
dustrial, and commercial. But let the local element prevail,
and a new element, influence, and perhaps control, the
Anglo-American, will not be long in appearing in the midst
of the social torpor, if not anarchy, and will produce a
complete and without doubt violent renovation, and more
or less our exclusion as well as that of Europe."
March 19, 1849, Guillemot advised that France send six
thousand troops to Montevideo: "It is not a conquest that
France will make for herself, it will be only a Second Re-
vast rendezvous of emigration for the use of Monroe° Doc-
Europe that she will open, . . . South Amer- *""®
ica is occupied nearly entirely by natives of Iberian descent.
A fruitful germ of our nation ought to be deposited among
them, and if some day the Anglo-Americans pretend to pass
over Panama and descend towards Cape Horn, it is well
that they find at least on the route a people of our race, not
less hardy than theirs, which may serve to head the column
of the others." He was not unmindful of the Monroe Doc-
trine, just then being insisted upon by Polk; but he put too
much stress upon its temporary, humanistic element of
opposition to monarchy, and too little on the fundamental
opposition to European influence. April 10, 1849, he wrote.
326 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
"Let France declare her disinterested views in the matter,
and the Americans of the North will find nothing to say,
especially as republican France has rights other than those
of monarchical France, they know it and they say it." No
permanent establishment of French power or population
came from this program; but its formulation at a period
when the French people, released from administrative con-
trol, found opportunity to express their national enthusiasms,
shows that the vision of an American empire had not died.^
The division of the United States in 1861, and the conse-
quent paralysis of her forces, therefore released European
Seward's ad- ambitions and projects which her power had
justable poUcy repressed. The first country to take ad-
vantage of the new situation was Spain. In 1861 either
Spain or the Spanish authorities in Cuba managed by some
method to receive from the Dominican Republic, the eastern
and formerly Spanish portion of the island of Santo Domingo,
a request for annexation. This voluntary reincorporation
of a former colony raised a delicate question with reference
to the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine; and the dif-
ficulty was increased by the fact that, owing to southern
opposition to the recognition of a negro republic, we had
never been on terms of diplomatic intercourse with the island
government which thus determined on suicide, although we
had maintained a consul there for most of the period since
1800. Nevertheless, Seward hesitated not a moment as
to the applicability of our traditional policy. April 2, 1861,
he wrote to the Spanish minister at Washington that, should
Spain sustain this action, the President would "be obliged
to regard" her "as manifesting an unfriendly spirit towards
the United States, and to meet the further prosecution of
enterprises of that kind in regard to either the Dominican
Republic or any part of the American continent or islands
* Eugene Guillemot, La politique et Vavenir de la France dans VAmerique
du Sud: also British Public Record Office, Foreign Office Records, Bueno*
Ayres, 1846.
CIVIL WAR AND MONROE DOCTRINE 327
with a prompt, persistent, and, if possible, effective resist-
ance." Spain disregarded the threat, and on July 1, 1861,
the Spanish minister announced to Seward the annexation
of Dominica. Carl Schurz, our new minister in Spain,
asked for instructions, and in August, 1861, Seward wrote
to him that circumstances prevented him from giving a def-
inite answer. This change of tone needed no explanation,
but it illustrates the influence of the Civil war on the Monroe
Doctrine. In refraining from answering Schurz's question,
Seward alike saved himself from offending Spain when he
had not the power to awe or oppose her, and left open the
door for future protest. Meanwhile, by an indirection of
statement, he attempted to lead Spain to suppose that this
tolerance of a situation which we had so often declared in-
tolerable, was due to her "observance of the blockade and
the closing of Spanish ports to the insurgent privateers."
The supreme test of our passivity came when, in 1863, war
broke out between the Spanish government and the islanders.
Seward promptly declared our neutrality.^
Although Spain was interested in this undertaking to the
extent of sending more than thirty thousand troops to the
island, the task of maintaining her local hold, Spain leaves
in spite of the neutrality of the United States, Dominica
was so exhausting that in 1865 she voluntarily surrendered
her claim. Spain's attempt at reoccupation seems to have
been part of a general, though vacillating, purpose on her
part to take advantage of our weakness in order to inaugurate
an active American policy. In 1864 she went Spain and
to war with Peru, and some of her representa-
tives claimed that, as she had never recognized Peru's inde-
pendence, she might without violation of any established
sovereignty recover the Chincha islands. Seward, more at
ease than in 1861, ordered our minister at Madrid, now
G. Koerner, to make known to the Spanish government that
* Carl Schurz, Speeches, Correspondence, and Political Papers (6 vols.
New York, etc., 1913), i. 185-205.
328 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
we could not accept such an argument or "regard with m-
difference" an attempt at re-annexation. The Spanish gov-
ernment disclaimed any idea of encroachment, but occupied
the islands, and in 1866 announced that it might take posses-
sion of them without any intention of acquiring territory, but
merely to reimburse itself for the expense of the war by the
sale of guano. It was now too late. Our new minister in
Spain, J. P. Hale, was instructed that, in case of even such
a temporary occupation, the United States could not be
expected "to remain in their present attitude of neutrality."
The Civil war was over, and Spain withdrew. '
The same successive adjustment of our policy to circum-
stance that has been observed in the case of Spain is to be
„ , ^ found in the more important issue of the ar-
Second Em- , , • nr - mi i
pire and tivity of France m Mexico. The latter coun*
try was the scene of constant revolution and
guerrilla warfare. The claims of United States citizens that
in Buchanan's administration had seemed to him to warrant
our interference were paralleled by those of the citizens of
all other foreign nations doing business there, particularly
those of Great Britain, France and Spain. These nations
were in 1860 moving toward interposition, and Buchanan,
in his message of December 3, 1860, regretted that we had
not taken action earlier. "We should thus," he said, "have
been relieved from the obligation of resisting, even by force
should this become necessary, any attempt by these Govern-
ments to deprive our neighboring Republic of portions of her
territory — a duty from which we could not shrink without
abandoning the traditional and established policy of the
American people."
In 1861 the Mexican Congress voted to defer the payment
of interest on foreign bonds; whereupon Great Britain,
Convention of France, and Spain decided that action must be
^°*^°° taken. They invited the United States to join
them, but she refused. In a convention signed at London,
October 31, 1861, they decided forcibly to demand "more ef-
CIVIL WAR AND MONROE DOCTRINE 329
ficacious protection for the persons and the properties of their
subjects, as well as the fulfillment of obligations." The high
contracting parties engaged "not to seek for themselves . . .
any acquisition of territory ... or any special advantage,
and not to exercise in the internal affairs of Mexico any influ-
ence of a nature to prejudice the right of the Mexican nation
to choose and to constitute freely the form of its govern-
ment." Nevertheless, Schurz wrote to Seward, November 16,
1861, of the intriguing rivalries for the throne of Mexico.
The importance of the movement of the allies was indicated
by the choice of General Prim, the leading man in Spain, to
head it. He assured Schurz, before embarking, of his sym-
pathy with the United States.
Once in Mexico, the allies occupied a number of customs-
houses and collected the duties, but in April, 1862, Spain and
England made an arrangement with the gov- .
ernment and withdrew.^ France was left. French ques-
This was the opportunity for which Napoleon
had been working. His basis for interference was not so
much the French claims, which consisted chiefly of bonds
with a face value of fifteen million dollars, purchased by the
firm of Jecker for seven hundred and fifty thousand from an
ephemeral revolutionary government, as the hope that the
Second Empire might, by carrying out the French national
aspirations, successfully fulfill the colonial vision of the
First. Morny, Napoleon's relative and confidential adviser,
believed that the United States was a menace to Europe, and
wished to create in Mexico an empire that would become
the protector of all the Latin republics and with them con-
stitute a power capable of resisting us.
With such views in mind. Napoleon, on the withdrawal of
the other powers, presented an ultimatum and ordered his
army on to the city of Mexico. Finding no stable govern-
ment with which to treat, the French commander called an
^ H. Leondaron, "L'Espagne et la question du Mexique, 1861-1862,"
Annales des Sciences Politiquea, 1901, xvi. 5&-95.
330 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
assembly of Mexican notables to deal with the situation.
Amid the confusion of local factions and personal rivalries
_ ^ . that divided the land there ran one main
Formation of .
the Mexican line of division, — that between the Church
^ party and the Liberal party. The latter, under
Juarez, was in the field fighting the French; the other Na-
poleon hoped to use as the local basis for French influence.
His notables were chosen with that end in view, and they
proved docile to his leading. Under his tutelage they de-
cided that an empire on the Napoleonic plan afforded the
best basis for security, and asked the Archduke Maximilian
of Austria, to rule over them. Napoleon calculated on estab-
lishing in America an empire that would be strong and yet
dependent upon his support, and on gaining in Europe the
gratitude of the pope and of Austria.^
The situation thus presented to us was, both technically
and practically, more difficult than that produced by Spain
Danger of our in Dominica. Technically it was so because
situation ^jjjg ^g^g jjq|. g^ question of annexation, but
prima facie an exhibition of popular sovereignty. Napoleon's
was plainly the guiding hand, yet to the eye the marionette
notables moved of their own volition. Practically it was
more dangerous because of the greater strength of France.
Spain was simply no longer afraid of us, of France we our-
selves were fearful. We could not acquiesce in such a way as
to find our hands tied after the war was over; on the other
hand, if we protested too vigorously we should not only be
making useless threats, but might give Napoleon an excuse
for breaking from England's lead and interfering in our CivU
war. On February 3, 1863, he offered to act as mediator
between the North and South, and, when the North firmly
rejected that offer, it was only England's influence that pre-
vented his recognition of the Confederacy. Napoleon and the
Confederacy mutually cultivated each other; Slidell was con-
' Lettre d M. Duchon Doris, Bordeaux, 1864; "'Mme. Adam's Reminia-
cences," Nation, 1905, Ixxxi. 521-522.
CIVIL WAR AND MONROE DOCTRINE 331
cemed in the Napoleonic attempt to influence the British
ParHament through Roebuck; Benjamin attempted to bribe
Napoleon by a million bales of cotton. Almost to the day
of Lee's surrender the hope of Napoleon's intervention per-
sisted in the South. Of Seward's first dispatch on the
subject, in which he assured France of our neu- Seward and
trality in her war with Mexico, and with refer- Napoleon
ence to the new empire said that it would be neither easily
established nor useful, his friend Weed wrote to him: "Your
dispatch on Mexican matters breaks no eggs. It makes a
record, and there, I hope, you are at rest." Napoleon, on
hearing that Seward's dispatch had arrived, eagerly asked if
there had been a protest. Rather annoyed than relieved
by its mild indefiniteness, he asked that we follow the ex-
ample of the powers of Europe except Russia, by recognizing
Maximilian as emperor. Seward replied that he imderstood
there was still opposition to the Austrian, and that he should
prefer to err on the side of neutrality.
Seward's policy of avoiding offence to France and yet of
leaving the future unpledged, was undoubtedly wise, but
in pursuing it he was forced to deal not only Seward and
with Napoleon but with our own newspapers Congress
and with Congress. In April, 1864, the House of Representa-
tives unanimously resolved that it could not accord with
United States policy to acknowledge a monarchical govern-
ment established under the auspices of any European power
on the ruins of an American Republic. The French foreign
minister, Drouyn de I'Huys, learning of the resolution,
greeted our minister, Dayton, with the question, "Do you
bring us peace or bring us war?" He brought Seward's
explanation that the foreign policy of our country was di-
rected by the President.
The close of our war left us masters of the situation; but
the task of getting rid of Maximilian was a delicate one,
for there was the chance that our aroused and militant pub-
lic sentiment would force Napoleon into war to defend his
332 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
prestige. General Grant looked on the whole movement as
a "direct act of war," and it was proposed that an army
Seward and of our volunteers, Union and Confederate, be
the army reenlisted across the Mexican border to serve
under Juarez in driving out the French. General Schofield
was detached for twelve months to head this organiza-
tion.
Seward met this dangerous proposition by finesse. He
called Schofield to him and asked him to go to France in-
Seward allows stead. "I want you to get your legs under
dipfoiMtic * Napoleon's mahogany," said he, "and tell him
victory jjg mugt g^t out of Mexico." Schofield did
not happen to dine with Napoleon, but Seward informed
France that peace would be put in "imminent jeopardy"
by the further retention of French troops in Mexico. Realiz-
ing, however, that Napoleon, by reason of the domestic sit-
uation in France, could face war more easily than a confessed
defeat, Seward gave him a seeming victory by assuring him,
February 12, 1866, that after the French evacuation the
United States would continue the same neutrality between
Juarez and Maximilian that she had previously preserved
between Juarez and the French. This recognition constituted
a triumph of French diplomacy, though a triumph that every
one knew was hollow, for Maximilian could not stand a year
unsupported by France. Accepting this way out, so wisely
prepared for him, de I'Huys replied. " We receive this as-
surance with entire confidence and we find therein a suflScient
guarantee not any longer to delay the adoption of measures
intended to prepare for the return of our army." ^
Hearing of the probable abandonment of Maximilian by
the French, his countrymen of Austria prepared to enlist
an army for his defence. Seward promptly directed John
* C. A. Duniway, Reasons for the Withdrawal of the French from Mexico,
Amer. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1902, i. 312-328; Latane, Diplomatic Relations of
the United States and Spanish America, 221-265; Henry Wheaton, Elements
of International Law, 8th edition by R. H. Dana, London, etc., 1866.
CIVIL WAR AND MONROE DOCTRINE 333
Lothrop Motley, our minister at Vienna, to challenge such
an attempt peremptorily. Motley, the least satisfactory of
our literary appointments, raised many diffi- Seward and
culties in carrying out this policy, among others Austria
that it did not harmonize with the earlier tone which we
had adopted. Seward replied, "I refrain from discussing
the question you have raised, whether the recent instruc-
tions of this department harmonize entirely with the policy
which it pursued at an earlier period of the European in-
tervention in Mexico." Europe understood, if Motley did
not, that the close of our war had changed the situation.
Austria promised to prevent the departure of the volun-
teers.
The American residuum of European interference soon
vanished with the withdrawal of the support which had
brought it into being. Maximilian's native pate of Maxi-
Mexican forces yielded to those of Juarez, and °"^*^
he himself was captured. Upon learning that he was con-
demned to be shot in the back as a traitor, Austria, France,
and Great Britain appealed to the United States to save
him. We expressed sympathy and recommended clemency
to Juarez, but we would not intervene in a matter domes-
tically Mexican. Maximilian was shot. The Monroe Doc-
trine was once more established, and more firmly established '
than it was in 1860, for it had practically been recognized;
by France, Spain, and Austria. The Austrian court, however,
has never since been an altogether pleasant residence for
an American minister.
That Great Britain does not appear in this crisis of the
Monroe Doctrine seems strange to many critics. Bernhardi
wrote in 1901: "Since England committed the q + « -x^^
unpardonable blunder, from her point of view, and the Mon-
of not supporting the Southern States in the
American war of Secession, a rival to England's world-wide
empire has appeared ... in the form of the United States
of North America." In part this apparent neglect of oppor-
334 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
tunity was due to the fact that, although her prime minister
was jingoistic, there was in England at this time a strong
sentiment that colonies were unprofitable, and that it was
the universal tendency for them to ripen and drop from the
parent tree. Still, Canning himself would probably not
have acted otherwise. What Great Britain wanted was
commercial opportunity, and of that the independence of
Spanish America was sufficient guarantee to the cheapest
producer in the world. The only portions of America that
England might desire were Cuba and the Isthmus; but the
first was Spain's, the second was protected by the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty. If Great Britain showed a lack of enterprise
in not pushing her interests during the Civil war, at least
she was spared recognizing the Monroe Doctrine at its
close.
It was probably more nearly a deviation from British
policy to allow other European powers, like Spain and France,
to acquire permanent interests in America,
and European On that point England had been in agreement
with us since 1823; the conflicts between us had
arisen when we were endeavoring to extend our interests.
Her acquiescence in this case was due to her practical alliance
with Napoleon, and perhaps to a well-justified cynical belief
that nothing would come of it.
Just after the war, in 1867, the House of Representatives
endeavored to hoist Great Britain on our favorite petard by
-^ declaring that the organization of the Domin-
Doctrine and ion of Canada, the union of the several British
provinces, constituted such a change of status \l
in American affairs as to constitute a violation of the Monroe
Doctrine. The failure of the administration to urge this
forced interpretation upon Great Britain deprived her of an
opportunity of replying to it.
In 1870 Grant gave expression to a corollary of the Doc- \
trine which had for some time been recognized: "Hereafter I
no territory on this continent shall be regarded as subject to 1
CIVIL WAR AND MONROE DOCTRINE 335
transfer to a European power;" that is even by one European
power to another. In fact, from 1823 to the present day
the only violation of this principle has been Grant's corol-^
the unimportant cession of the island of Saint Monroe Docl
Bartholomew by Sweden to France in 1878.^ *^« I
» Coolidge, The United States aa a World Power, 113.
CHAPTER XXIV
THE AFTERMATH OF THE CIVIL V^AR
The resolution protesting against the formation of the Do-
minion of Canada was indicative of a feeling of hostility to
Anti-British Great Britain which was the most absorbing
sentiment ^^^^^ ^^ ^^j. diplomacy from 18C5 until 1871.
Based primarily upon our disappointment at England's lack
of sympathy with the national government during that
struggle, nourished by the frank unfriendliness of a large
section of the English press and much of her literature, it
found many substantial issues which gave occasion for its
expression.
The direct loss that we sustained by the depredations of
the Confederate commerce-destroyers, which Great Britain's
- j^. lax interpretation of neutrality allowed to
merchant range the ocean to the very end of the war,
was less than the indirect loss which they
caused by imperilling aU vessels bearing the American flag.
Eight hundred thousand tons of American shipping were
transferred to foreign flags, chiefly that of Great Britain, and
what was left to us found itself hampered by almost prohib-
itory insurance rates. Both these sores were kept open and
irritated by the failure of the American merchant marine to
rise again. Its decline, which was due to a variety of causes
unrelated to the war, had begun about 1857. The most im-
portant was the introduction of iron ships, which could be
more cheaply constructed in Great Britain. To the natural
advantages which that country possessed was added our
protective tariff system, which increased the cost of our
ship-building without being able to offer any compensatory
protection to the ship-owners, engaged as they were in a free
336
THE AFTERMATH OF THE CIVIL WAR 337
international competition. Quite as important, too, was
the terrific drain upon our resources of capital, credit, and
labor produced by the era of internal expansion which the
close of the war ushered in. The rewards coming from the
development and exploitation of our own country were in-
comparably greater than those from any industry competing
directly with that of foreign nations. The transfer of his
fortune from shipping to railroads, made at this time by
Commodore Vanderbilt, was the act of a far-seeing business
man. His example was followed by many other Americans
concerned in shipping, whether as owners or sailors, and few
natives now embarked in the old profession.
These considerations, however, did not at the time sink
into the national consciousness, which perceived merely
that until the Civil war our merchant marine _, ^ « .. •
Great Bntain
had been a leading American interest, and that held responsi-
after it our flag had almost disappeared from
competitive trade routes. The events of the war afforded a
simple explanation, and anger was hot against Great Britain
as the instrument of the change.^
Other subjects of dispute naturally arose with a nation
with which our connections were so numerous. It became
a question, for instance, whether the main Boundary and
channel of the strait of Juan de Fuca ran north *^® fishenes
or south of the archipelago of San Juan, whether the islands
fell to us or to Great Britain. The activities of the American
and British representatives on the spot might at any time
cause an explosion.^ Then, too, in 1866 Marcy's reciprocity
treaty with Canada ran through its prescribed course, and
we notified Great Britain that we did not care to continue
it. This reopened the wasp's nest of the fisheries question
in an atmosphere provoking irritation.
^ W. L. Marvin, The American Merchant Marine, New York, 1902.
* This is one of the questions that might have afforded a basis for Seward's
foreign-war panacea. See Mrs. G. E. Pickett's "Wartime Story of General
Pickett," Cosmopolitan, vol. Iv, pp. 752-760.
338 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
To these problems was added that of the Fenian agitation.
An Irish nationalistic and republican movement, its leaders
Fenian move- planned to make the United States the basis
"*'^* for their effort to invade Canada, spread
terror in England, and force the independence of Ireland.
Archbishop Hughes had visited Ireland during the Civil
war, and had successfully stimulated the emigration of
young men to the United States for the purpose of enlisting
in the Union armies. As an additional motive he urged that
they would secure military training that would prove useful
for "ulterior" purposes. He meant the defence of the Papal
States; but he was supposed to refer to the freeing of Ireland,
and that was the hope that fired thousands of Irish volunteers.
In 1866 the Fenians invaded Canada across the Niagara
river, but accomplished nothing. In April of the same year
an attempt was made to seize the island of Campo Bello,
just across the New Brunswick border from Maine, to pro-
claim a republic, and to secure recognition from the United
States; but this expedition also came to nothing.^ It is not
without significance that in July the House of Representa-
tives passed a bill to allow the sale of ships and munitions of
war to foreign citizens and governments at peace with the
United States though at war with other countries.
The chief danger of the Irish movement arose from the fact
that many of the Fenians were naturalized American citizens,
and many were veterans of our Civil war. When
they got into difficulties, therefore, they appealed
to an American public sentiment already alert to take offence
against the British government. The political influence of
the Irish leaders, moreover, was so potent that few politicians
dared oppose them. In 1868 the House passed by 104 to 4
a bill authorizing the President, in case American citizens
were arrested for political reasons by a foreign power, to
suspend commercial relations and detain a corresponding
* John Rutherford, The Secret History of the Fenian Conspiracy, 2 vela.
London, 1877.
THE AFTERMATH OP THE CIVIL WAR 339
number of the citizens of the offending government, indiscrim-
inately selected. This bill Sumner succeeded in modifying in
the Senate, but still it passed in good round terms. Seward,
always on close terms with the Irish leaders, in this case
found any temptation that he may have had to play up to
them checked by the weightiest of balancing considerations.
Just when we were urgently pressing upon Great Britain
our claims for damages based on her failure to perform her
neutral duties, we could not permit ourselves to be lax. The
government, while protecting as far as possible the rights of
American citizens, vigorously enforced the laws that pre-
vented the use of our territory as a base of hostile operations.
The crux of the negotiations between the two govern-
ments was our demand for damages arising from what we
claimed to be Great Britain's violation of _ x « -^
. . - , Great Bnt-
neutrality. Her statutory provision for the ain's practice
performance of her neutral duties was found
in her foreign enlistment act of 1819. Although this forbade
the fitting out of armed vessels, the Confederate commis-
sioners were legally advised that the purchase of vessels and
the purchase of arms were both legal, but that the two could
not be combined in British waters. Acting on this advice,
Captain Bullock, the Confederate naval representative, con-
tracted for several vessels, of which the Florida, the Shenan-
doah, and most important, the Alabama got to sea in the
manner suggested. Although in April, 1863, the British
government prevented the Alexandria from being similarly
handed over, the courts sustained the Confederate agents.
In this latter case the lord chief baron instructed the jury:
" If you think the object was to build a ship in obedience to
an order, and in compliance with a contract, leaving those
who bought it to make what use they thought fit of it, then
it appears to me the Foreign enlistment act has not been in
any degree broken." The American claims for damages
rested not only on the construction of these vessels, but
also upon the fact that, by a liberal interpretation of the
340 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
right of belligerent vessels to take on enough provisions to
reach a home port, they were allowed to use British ports as
bases for their operations.
On October 23, 1863, the detention of the Laird rams hav-
ing shown that the British government had changed its
Futile negotia- practice with regard to the building of hostile
^^^^ warships, Adams offered to submit to arbitra-
tion our claims for damages caused by those already buUt.
Lord Russell said that the construction of British statutes
could never be submitted to arbitration, that the question
involved the honor of the country and so was not appro-
priate for arbitration. It was, of course, obvious that the
question was not the construction of British statutes, but the
adequacy of those statutes, as interpreted by the British
courts, to the maintenance of neutrality; but the negotiation
dropped. It was renewed under Russell's successor. Lord
Stanley, but agreement was at first prevented by the ques-
tion as to the limits of the arbitration, — whether it should
be confined to claims for damages directly inflicted, or should
be extended to include those suffered indirectly, such as in-
surance, cost of pursuit, and the commercial loss of our
merchant marine.
In 1868 Reverdy Johnson, who succeeded Adams, ar-
ranged a convention with Lord Stanley dealing with this
^ , _ and other subjects. It gave up our claims for
Clarendon indirect damages, and so was not entirely satis-
factory to Seward; nevertheless it was sub-
mitted to the Senate. February 10, 1869, Seward wrote to
Johnson: "The confused light of the incoming administration
is already spreading itself over the country. . . . With your
experience in legislative life, you will be able to judge for
yourself of the prospects of definite action upon the treaties
during the remainder of the present session."
The confused light broke in a lightening flash when, on
April 13, 1869, Sumner reported the convention unfavorably
from the committee on foreign affairs. In one of his most
THE AFTERMATH OP THE CIVIL WAR 341
carefully prepared orations he denounced the agreement
and proclaimed his policy. Our direct claims, he contended,
were no compensation for our losses; the in- Sumner's
direct claims, particularly those based on the ^^'^y
substitution of the British merchant marine for our own, were
greater and must be made good. Fundamentally, however,
our grievance against Great Britain rested on the fact that
by her premature and injurious proclamation of belligerency
she had prolonged the war for at least two years; and for the
cost she should pay. Sumner's total bill amounted to two
and a half billion dollars. "Whatever may be the final set-
tlement of these great accounts," he declared, "such must
be the judgment in any chancery which consults the simple
equity of the case." ^
The explanation of this preposterous demand is revealed
in a memorandum of Sumner's of January 17, 1871: "The
greatest trouble, if not peril, being a constant source of
anxiety and disturbance, is from the Fenians, which is ex-
cited by the proximity of the British flag in Canada. There-
fore the withdrawal of the British flag cannot be abandoned
as a condition preliminary of such a settlement as is now pro-
posed. To make the settlement complete the withdrawal
should be from this hemisphere, including provinces and
islands." As Adams had purchased Florida and Polk New
Mexico with our claims, as Jackson had proposed to buy 1/
Texas, so Sumner would purchase all British America.
Fantastic as was his proposition, it was the result of
thought, it rested on facts, and to its execution he devoted
his utmost skill; as much may be said of any Sumner's vi-
conscientiously constructed house of cards. """^
He knew that his English friends, many of them highly
placed and whom he regarded as the real men of that coun-
try, believed colonies to be a burden, that they would in
time become free, that Canada would ultimately become
part of the United States. Cobden had written to him in
1 Sumner, Works, Boston, 1874-1883, 53-93.
342 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
1849 : " I agree with you that nature has decided that Canada
and the United States must become one for all purposes of
intercommunication. Whether they also shall be united in
the same Federal Government must depend upon the two
parties to the union. I can assure you that there will be no
repetition of the policy of 1776, on our part, to prevent our
North American colonies from pursuing their interests in
their own way. If the people of Canada are tolerably
unanimous in wishing to sever the very slight thread which
now binds them to this country, I see no reason why, if
good faith and ordinary temper be observed, it should not
be done amicably." As a matter of fact, Gladstone, who be-
came prime minister in 1869, fifteen years later surrendered
British authority in the Transvaal and withdrew from the
Soudan. Sumner's plan to remove all causes for dispute
with Great Britain, to take another step in our inevitable
expansion over the continent without a drop of blood, to
assure the dominance in the United States of northern views
by thus adding to the northern element, was fitted together
from the best thought of his generation.
As Calhoun in his absorption over the Texas question
failed to see the fallacy in his syllogistic argument for annexa-
Sumner'smad- tion, so Sumner, rapt in his vision, utterly
°®" failed to take cognizance of human nature.
To inaugurate an era of brotherly love and lavish exchanges
of brotherly favors by presenting a bill for two billion and a
half dollars, was not tactful. To suppose that his friends
in England would cooperate in fixing everlasting stigma
upon the name of Great Britain by acknowledging that she
had injured us to that extent, was to lose sight of realities.
To imagine that a people strong and dominant as the Eng-
lish would leave those friends in power one minute after they
made such a proposition was to display inexcusable ignorance.
The only palliation of Sumner's conduct was that he lived
in a generation which saw such visions, and that even the
more conservative often yielded to them, as Seward had
THE AFTERMATH OF THE CIVH. WAR 343
done when he evolved his foreign-war panacea at the opening
of the Civil war. One would more readily grant him excuse
if he had not regarded with such self-righteous horror others
who had been or were endeavoring to carry out such visions,
as Jackson, Calhoun, Polk, and Grant.
The importance of Sumner's speech was enhanced by its
popular reception and by the fact that it might be presumed
to voice the sentiments of the new administra- closing of ne-
tion. The Johnson-Clarendon convention was 8oti*t'o°s
rejected by a vote of 54 to 1 ; Grant, the new President, being
a military hero, was expected by many to favor an aggres-
sive policy; and Motley was sent to England as distinctly of
Sumner's choice. When the latter, in his first interview,
told Lord Clarendon that the belligerency proclamation
was "the fountain head" of all the woes caused "to the
American people, both individually and collectively, by the
hands of Englishmen," the British government concluded
that we would insist on Sumner's views, and put an end to
the negotiation.
This result was unfortunate, for as a matter of fact the
two governments were just approaching an understanding.
Not only was the Gladstone ministry friendly ^ • ai tti-
to the United States, but British public senti- tude of the two
ment was beginning to perceive that it was ad-
vantageous for Great Britain to yield. Sir Thomas Baring,
inheriting the friendly sentiments of his house, argued that
Great Britain, with her immense commerce and her prepared
navy, was the last power to admit the extemporizing of com-
merce-destroyers in neutral ports. In time of war, even with
a land-girt power, every neutral harbor, he urged, would
be a safe lurking-place for her enemies; the only method of
prevention would be universal war.^ The American ad-
ministration, also, was inclined to agreement. The new
secretary of state, Hamilton Fish, had actually instructed
Motley to speak of the belligerency proclamation merely as
* John Morley, Life of Gladstone, 3 vols., London, etc., 1903.
344 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
indicating "the beginning and the animus of that course of
conduct which resulted so disastrously to the United States;'*
and even this clause was inserted only because of the violent
insistence of Sumner.
In spite of this approach in the views of the two govern-
ments, it was a delicate task to reopen the negotiation as
Reopening of neither government wished to take the first
negotiations g^-gp Fortunately it happened that Caleb
Cushing, for the United States, and John Rose, for Great
Britain, two able and accomplished diplomats, were in Wash-
ington negotiating in regard to certain claims of the Hudson
Bay Company recognized by the treaty of 1846 and by a
convention of 1867. Finding by informal conversations that
the ground was secure, Rose on January 11, 1871, presented
a memorandum suggesting that all questions in dispute be
made the subject of a general negotiation and treaty. It was
at this time that Sumner, being invited as chairman of the
committee on foreign affairs to read Rose's note, revealed
his plan for securing Canada. It was obvious that he stood
in the way of any settlement. Grant had already been
incensed by Motley's disregard of his instructions and by
Sumner's opjjosition to his own favorite project, the annexa-
tion of Santo Domingo, an irritation which became mutual
when Grant requested Motley to resign, and, on his refusal,
removed him. The climax was now reached, and Grant
successfully used his influence with the Senate to secure
Sumner's removal from his chairmanship. The ground was
ready for another of our great clearing-house agreements
with Great Britain.^
The negotiation was conducted at Washington by a com-
mission of marked distinction. On the American side were
Fish, secretary of state, Schenck, minister to Great Britain,
^ This whole negotiation has been the subject of much controversy. In
addition to Moore's Arbitrations and the forthcoming life of C. F. Adams,
see D. H. Chamberlain, Charles Sumner and the Treaty of Washington,
Cambridge, Mass., 1902; Caleb Cushing, The Treaty of Washington, New
York, 1873; and Rhodes, United States, vi. 337-368.
THE AFTERMATH OF THE CIVIL WAR 345
Justice Nelson of the supreme court, E. R. Hoar of Massa-
chusetts as interested in the fisheries, and G. H. Williams
of Oregon to present the San Juan controversy. The commis-
Although certainly less able than our dele- "*"*
gations at Paris in 1783 or at Ghent in 1815, the body
was skilled and representative. The British commission
far exceeded in dignity, as probably in ability, any previously
sent to us by a foreign power; its makeup was significant
of our growth in international importance. The chairman
was Earl de Grey, president of the privy council. Sir Stafiford
Northcote, the reformer of the civil service. Sir Edward
Thornton, British minister at Washington, Sir John Alex-
ander Macdonald, minister of justice for Canada, and
Mountague Bernard, professor of international law at
Oxford.
After thirty-seven sittings the treaty was signed. May 8,
1871. It dealt first with claims for damage done by the
Alabama and other British-built commerce- "Alabama
destroyers. This question was to be submitted <^**™'' "
to a tribunal of five arbitrators, one each to be selected by
the president of the United States, the queen of Great Britain,
the king of Italy, the president of the Swiss confederation,
and the emperor of Brazil. This tribunal was to meet at
Geneva, and was to base its decisions on three rules for the
conduct of neutral nations: "First, to use due diligence to
prevent the fitting out . . , within its jurisdiction, of any
vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to
cruise . . . against a Power with which it is at peace . . . ;
secondly, not to permit . . . either belligerent to make use of
its ports or waters as the base of naval operations . . .;
thirdly, to exercise due diligence in its own ports and
waters ... to prevent any violation of the foregoing obli-
gations and duties." The insertion of "reasonable ground
to believe," taken from our neutrality act of 1838, was a
distinct American triumph. Great Britain would not ac-
knowledge that this had been the rule during the Civil war.
346 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
but was now willing to have the cases decided on that basis,
in order to establish it as the rule for the future.
Another but less elaborate tribunal, of one commissioner
appointed by each country and one by both together, was
Other CivU to decide upon all other claims, British and
w«r claims American, that had arisen during the Civil war.
Articles xviii to xxi of the treaty dealt with the fisheries.
The principle of reciprocity was again applied, Great Britain
granting us the privileges necessary for the con-
duct of our fishing industry, and the United 1
States conceding free entry of fish oil, and sea fish. Upon the
contention by the British government that the privileges
granted to us were more valuable than those which its sub-
jects received, it was left to a commission, the third and arbi-
trating member of which was to be appointed by the Austrian
minister at London, to investigate the matter and assess the
compensatory sum, if any, that we should pay.
Article xxvii gave the United States the free navigation ;
of the St. Lawrence forever, and Great Britain similar use
Border ques- of the Yukon, Porcupine, and Stikine. With,
***"** England's free use of the Columbia estab-
lished in 1846, this agreement opened up all the important
international rivers with which the two countries were con-
cerned. By the same article the government of Great Bri-
tain agreed to urge the Dominion of Canada, and that of
the United States promised to use its influence with those of
the states concerned, to open up all their respective canals \/
connected with the navigation of the Great Lakes on terms
of equality to both nations; and by article xxviii the United ^
States allowed the free navigation of Lake Michigan. Ar-
ticles xxix and xxx provided for the shipping of goods in
bond across the border and back under regulation. By ar-
ticle xxxi Great Britain engaged to urge the Canadian gov-
ernment to impose no export duty on Maine lumber floated
down the St. Johns under the provisions of the treaty of
1842.
THE AFTERMATH OF THE CIVH. WAR 347
By article xxiv the question of the San Juan channel
was submitted to the decision of the emperor _
*^ Boundary
of Germany.
Comprehensive as was this treaty, and unique in calling
the direct attention of most of the crowned heads of Europe
to our affairs, it was overshadowed in interest Geneva arbi-
by the Geneva arbitration which it evoked. *^***°"
Never before had such important and irritating international
disputes voluntarily been submitted to judicial settlement.
The commission was equal to the significance of its task.
Grant appointed as our representative Charles Francis
Adams, and Queen Victoria chose Sir Alexander Cockburn,
lord chief justice of England; the commissioners from Italy,
Switzerland, and Brazil were also men of note. The Amer-
ican case was prepared by William Evarts, M. R. Waite,
and Caleb Cushing, the first the leader of the bar, the second
later to be chief justice, the third as brilliant in law as he
was erratic in politics. The case which they prepared was
presented by J. C. Bancroft Davis.
At this time the American public sentiment that had ap-
plauded Sumner was still in existence, Sumner himself,
a power of unknown strength, was still watch- Arbitration in
ful, the Fenian agitation was again attracting <^"^*r
attention, and a presidential campaign was coming on. The
administration, therefore, did not venture to admit that it
had surrendered all our indirect claims in the treaty of Wash-
ington. It instructed our counsel to insist, not indeed on
those for the cost of two years of war, but for compensation
for the transfer of our commerce to the British merchant
marine, as covered by the clause of the treaty that read,
**acts committed by the several vessels which have given
rise to the claims generally known as the 'Alabama Claims."*
British public opinion considered this instruction an act of
bad faith, and the Gladstone government proposed to with-
draw from the arbitration, knowing that, if it consented to
submit the consideration of this question to the tribunal.
348 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
it would itself be instantly overthrown. There was no pos-
sibility that these claims would be allowed by the tribunal;
yet the United States would not give over presenting them,
nor Great Britain allow their presentation.
A point of honor in each case, backed by a public senti-
ment vociferously led, and in our case at least certainly not
Adams's solu- representative, seemed likely to wreck the
***"^ work. Such factors, however, seldom have
decisive weight in controversies between Anglo-Saxons. The
solution in this case was found by Adams. At his suggestion
the arbitration tribunal itself announced, June 19, 1872,
that it would not consider such claims. Great Britain was
satisfied, and the United States acquiesced; we could at least
assert that they had been considered. Our direct claims
were granted, and by the final decision of September 14, 1872,
the sum of fifteen and a half million dollars was awarded us.
The commission on other Civil war claims granted British sub-
jects about two million dollars for illegal imprisonment and
other such losses incidental to war. The emperor of Ger-
many decided in our favor in the case of the channel through
the strait of Juan de Fuca, giving us the islands in dispute.^
Thus the diflSculties between the United States and Great
Britain growing out of the Civil war were settled, the treaty
. ,. . of 1846 was clarified, some standard ques-
Accomplish- . . . 1. 1 o T
mentsofthe tions, such as the navigation of the St. Lawr-
**^ ence, were settled "forever," and some, like
the fisheries, were settled for a period of years. The terms of
the treaty itself reveal a new factor in the relations of the
two countries that was liable to be a disturbing element in
the future, namely, the deference of the government of
Great Britain to the Dominion of Canada. On the other
hand, and most important of all, the form of the treaty
marked it as the longest step yet taken by any two nations
toward the settlement of their disputes by judicial process.
» T. W. Balch, The Alabama Arbitration, Philadelphia, 1900.
CHAPTER XXV
ROUTINE, 1861-1877
While tl\e problems peculiar to the war received most of
the attention that the public had to spare for diplomatic
affairs, between 1861 and 1877, they did not relieve the
administration from the necessity of handling routine busi-
ness and continuous policies.
One immediate result of the passing of governmental con-
trol to the North was the recognition and establishment
of diplomatic intercourse with the negro gov- The negro
ernments of Hayti, now a republic after a sue- s***®^
cession of empires, and of Liberia. The latter had been a
protege of the United States ever since it was founded in
1819 to serve as a home for our emancipated slaves; we had
protected it from foreign interference, but had not so to
speak, recognized it socially. The other American negro na-
tion, Dominica, we recognized as soon as Spanish control
was withdrawn, and we have never since refused recognition
to any nation because of its race. We made a first treaty
with Liberia in 1862, with Hayti in 1864, with the Dominican
Republic in 1867; and possibly our first treaty with the king-
dom of Madagascar in 1867 should come under this head.
A similar change is to be found in our policy toward
the slave trade. Seward's convention of 1862, allowing mu-
tual search in certain specified parts of the The slave
ocean, with trial by mixed courts, has been *'**^®
mentioned. The area of ocean subject to this arrangement
was extended in 1863, and in 1870 the provision with regard
to mixed courts was dropped. In 1890 we joined in a general
international act for the suppression of the trade, and in \y
1904 in a similar act for the suppression of the trade in white
women. After our own abolition of slavery we readily co-
S49
S50 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
operated in stamping it out everywhere. It is of course to
be noted that the danger of an arbitrary and dangerous use
of the mutual right of search in times of peace, of which
there were grounds to justify fear in the earlier period, had
disappeared by 1870, owing to the change in our relative
strength and the development of international law.
The sweep of our treaty relations was already so compre-
hensive that the only first treaty we made with any nation
aside from the negro governments was that
with Orange Free State in 1871. The formation
of the kingdom of Italy in 1861 and of the German empire in
1871 did not require special attention, for they inherited
treaty obligations from their controlling or constituent states;
but, as new questions arose, treaties were made, with Italy
in 1868 and with Germany in 1871.
Even during the Civil war we did not drop our pursuit of
claims, and we hotly renewed the chase when the war was
Claim °^^^' ^^ ^^^^ ^"^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^"^ *^^ United
States submitted their mutual claims to arbitra-
tion, the balance in both cases being in our favor. In 1866
the American claims against Venezuela were arbitrated, and
about a million and a quarter dollars were awarded to us.
A mutual arbitration with Mexico, begun by a treaty of 1868,
gave a balance of about four million to our citizens. In 1871
our claims against Spain based on the revolution in Cuba
were started on their long history by the consummation of a
treaty. Finally during the Franco-Prussian war we came
near becoming liable for a violation of neutrality by our own
government in the sale of arms owned by the nation to
France,^ but the episode resulted in no ill consequences.
The area covered by our extradition treaties was increased
by the addition of Belgium, Ecuador, Italy, Nicaragua, the
Ottoman empire, Salvador, and Spain. Where treaties did
not exist, the surrender of fugitives from justice by virtue
* Adolf Hepner, America's Aid to Qermany in 1870-71, St. Louis, 1905;
Schurz, Speeches, etc., v. 33-87.
ROUTINE, 1861-1877 351
of international courtesy was a delicate matter for us. We
would not surrender those fleeing from punishment for politi-
cal ofiFences or from military service, and so we
were loath to ask other nations for the return
of our own fugitives. The action of the Spanish government
in turning over to us the notorious Boss Tweed, in 1876, be-
fore the formation of oiu- treaty with her, was therefore
much appreciated.
A new line of diplomatic activity was represented by trea-
ties for the protection of trademarks, made with Russia
and Belgium in 1868, France in 1869, and Trademarks,
Austria in 1871. A still more remarkable ex- mSfil?eJ°ind
tension of the scope of diplomacy and of our copyrights
acceptance of the principle of international cooperation was
our participation, in 1875, in an international convention
for the establishment at Paris of a bureau of weights and
measures to be maintained at the joint expense of the con-
tracting nations. Diplomacy, however, was not allowed to
take any steps toward similar protection for authors by
means of international copyrights. As the most conspicuous
example of the use of the same language by two great na-
tions. Great Britain and the United States really occupied
a unique position with reference to this question, and the
latter was the greatest pirate in that form of theft. The
matter had long been urged upon us by Dickens, the greatest
suflFerer, and by many of our own authors and public men.
Collectively, however, we showed no more disposition to
surrender our profits than had the pirates of Barbary.
The sums involved were greater than those at stake in
our relations with the North African states, and the moral
delinquency must probably be judged to be about the
same.*
Continuing the policy of freeing the navigation of great
international rivers, the United States, acting in agreement
but not in formal cooperation with other powers, made
^ R. R. Bowker, Copyright, its History and its Law, Boston, etc., 1912.
S5^ AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
a treaty with Hanover in 1861, and one with Belgium in 1863,
facihtating the international use of the Elbe and the Scheldt.
Freeing river In each case we paid a proportional part of a
navigation capital sum which was divided among various
nations "pro rata to their navigation."
Although the definite undertaking of the first transcon-
tinental railroad through our territory in 1862 diminished
Transcon- *^® interest in the isthmus routes, and its
tinental com- completion in 1869 lessened their importance,
munication . . . . ,
we continued our policy of obtaining the right
of free use and the guarantee of their neutrality. In a treaty
with Honduras in 1864 we undertook a guarantee of the
proposed "Interoceanic railroad" through that country in
return for the establishment of free terminal ports for trade
and commerce, but we made the agreement conditional upon
our right to withdraw on six months' notice if dissatisfied
with our treatment by the company. A treaty with Nicara-
gua in 1867 gave us free use of her isthmus even for troops,
in return for a guarantee of neutrality in which we agreed
to ask other nations to join. Now, with the change in the
conditions of transportation, it was a question whether such
treaties might not be more of a burden than an advantage.
Fish wrote to Baxter, our representative in Honduras,
May 12, 1871, "The guarantee to Honduras of neutrality
of interoceanic communication does not imply that the
United States is to maintain a police or other force in Hon-
duras for the purpose of keeping petty trespassers from the
railway."
Although we made numbers of commercial treaties during
this period, we pressed the policy of reciprocity less con-
Hawaiian red- spicuously than heretofore. In the treaty of
procity Washington the fisheries were dealt with on
that basis, but in much more restricted form than in Marcy's
treaty on the same subject. The treaty with the Hawaiian
islands in 1875 was a conspicuous exception. This was the
most thorough appUcation of the principle into which we
ROUTINE, 1861-1877 353
had ever entered. It was on the basis of entry customs free,
and included practically all articles of exchange, the most
important being Hawaiian-grown sugar. It amounted prac-
tically to a customs union, and represented not so much a y
general commercial policy as our growing conception that
Hawaii was another of our special interests.
Although in the Pacific, Hawaii is for purposes of our policy
to be regarded as connected with the American continents.
With the further side of that ocean we continued
to develop our diplomatic relations, although
with the passing of our merchant marine and the substitution
of petroleum for whale oil, our material interests declined.
With Japan we entered into a convention in 1864, fixing her
duties on certain of our exports; but this agreement cannot
be considered as an example of reciprocity, for we made no
corresponding concessions. The most interesting point in
our Japanese relations, however, was our apparently uncon-
scious adoption of a new practice with regard to interna-
tional relations. In America we refused to admit European
interference; in Europe we refrained from interfering; in
Asia we began to show a willingness actively to cooperate
with European powers. In 1864 we took part with Great
Britain, France, and the Netherlands in "chastising" Mori
Daizen, feudatory prince of Najato and Suwo, who, in de-
fiance of the Tycoon, closed the straits of Shimonoseki; and
we united also in demanding compensation from the Tycoon,
receiving our fourth share of the three million dollars that
he paid. In 1866 we joined the same powers in exacting
from Japan a revision of her tariff, the rates being fixed by
the treaty. This regulation proved burdensome to Japan
after the revolution and the establishment of the power of
the Mikado, and in 1872 a Japanese embassy made a cir-
cular tour to secure its reconsideration, as well as that of the
earlier treaties which excepted foreigners from the jurisdic-
tion of the native courts and gave the various consuls judi-
cial power over their respective citizens. Secretary Fish
354 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
wrote, September 14, 1874, "The President is impressed
with the importance of continued concert between the treaty
powers in Japan, at least until after the revision of the trea-
ties, and until the government of Japan shall have exhibited
a degree of power and capacity to adopt and to enforce a
system of jurisprudence and of judicial administration, in
harmony with that of the Christian powers, equal to their
evident desire to be reUeved from the enforced duties of
extraterritoriality. ' '
With China our relations were particularly pleasant. An-
son Burlingame, whom Lincoln sent as minister, was so highly
regarded there that in 1868 he returned to the
United States accredited Chinese minister to
her and other western powers. Representing China, he con-
cluded a treaty with us in 1868. This granted China the right
to appoint consuls to reside in the United States, but without
such extraterritorial powers as our consuls exercised in China.
We agreed, in case China wished aid in internal improve-
ments, to designate suitable engineers and to recommend
other nations to do the same. The most important clause
was that prohibiting the importation of coolies or forced
emigrants. This precaution was called for by the bringing
into this country of thousands of laborers who were prac-
tically slaves, many of whom were employed in the con-
struction of the Pacific railroads. The prohibition is prob-
ably more to be connected with the attempt to stamp out
the last remnants of slavery than with the feeling against
Chinese labor. The latter sentiment, however, was daily
growing stronger on the Pacific coast, and the Burlingame
treaty was violently attacked because of its failure to deal
with the broader question.*
By far the most important routine duty of diplomacy,
* M . R. CooHdge, Chinese Immigration, New York, 1909; G. F. Seward,
Chinese Immigration in its Social and Economical Aspects, New York, 1881 ;
F. W. Williams, Anson Burlingame and the first Chinese Mission to Foreign
Potoers, New York, 1912.
ROUTINE, 1861-1877 355
however, was that of establishing the international status
of our naturalized citizens. Seward wrote, August 22,
1867, "The question is one which seems to <,^ ^ . ^
' ... . ,. . Status of n«t-
have been ripening for very serious discussion uralized dti-
when the breaking out of the Civil war in this
country obliged us to forego every form of debate which
was likely to produce hostility or even irritation abroad."
The bill of 1868 providing for the defence of American cit-
izens abroad declared that the "right of expatriation" was
"a natural and inherent right of all people," and that
naturalized citizens of the United States should receive the
same protection as native citizens. It was obviously neces-
sary for the administration to press our position upon the
attention of foreign countries, and it was fortunate that the
handling of this delicate problem fell to the historian George
Bancroft, from 1867 to 1874 minister first to the
several German states and then to the German
empire. Educated in Germany and a scholar of repute, he
possessed the kind of ability and distinction that particularly
appealed to that nation. His relations with Bismarck were
very friendly. Once kept waiting for an audience because
the Turkish representative was granted precedence based on
ambassadorial rank, he protested that our national impor-
tance gave us the right to equality of treatment in matters of
business regardless of rank. He was never again kept wait-
ing, although his claim to equality of treatment had no basis
in diplomatic custom.^
In 1868 he obtained a treaty with the North German
Union. The German governments acknowledged the right
of their citizens to transfer their allegiance by five years'
uninterrupted residence accompanied by naturalization. A
subsequent residence of two years in Germany was to be
' M. A. D. Howe, The Life and Letters of George Bancroft, 2 vols.. New
York, 1908; J. S. Wise, A Treatise on American Citizenship, Northport,
N. Y., 1906; F. G. Franklin, The Legislative History of Naturalization,
Chicago, 1906.
N/
356 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
held as a renunciation of United States citizenship, and
naturalized citizens remained liable to punishment for acts
Treaties with committed before emigration. This treaty was
German states rapidly followed by similar agreements with
other German states, Baden, Bavaria, Hesse, and Wurttem-
burg, all in 1868. Treaties were made with Belgium and
Mexico in the same year, with Sweden and Norway in 1869,
with Austria in 1870, and with Ecuador in 1872.
Our agreement with Great Britain was almost as impor-
tant as the one with Germany. The impressment problem
Treaty with was not likely to come up again, but the Fenians
Great Britain ^gre giving the question of the international
status of our British-born citizens every twist of which it
seemed capable. The acts for which they were arrested in
Great Britain were generally criminal, such as the dynamit-
ing of public buildings, an offence for which our native citi-
zens would have been equally punishable; but cases did
arise in which the question of nationality was important.
The Gladstone government rightly determined that the
doctrine of indefeasible allegiance was inapplicable to exist-
ing world conditions, and evinced its willingness to take the
question up. Most appropriately the American negotiator
was Motley, Bancroft's professional colleague. In this case
he successfully carried out the purpose of the government
and in 1870 concluded a treaty more satisfactory than those
with the German states, in that it contained no reference
to punishment for offences previous to naturalization or
to an automatic relapse of nationality after two years' resi-
dence in one's native land.
These treaties provided for most of our naturalized citi-
zens at the time, and the United States has since success-
Questions un- fully insisted upon similar principles in the
settled ^g^gg ^j£ nearly all other countries from which
she has recruited her population. Bancroft's treaty with
Germany really marked the turning-point in the world's
attitude towards the question of allegiance. Many details,
ROUTINE, 1861-1877 867
however, remained unsettled. The status of a foreigner who
had declared his intention of becoming a citizen and had
not completed his naturalization was anomalous. Many of
our states, moreover, admit to the suffrage in less than five
years. Questions have arisen as to the liability of a foreigner
subject to military conscription who leaves home before
reaching the age of service but does not become an Amer-
ican citizen until after passing that age. The question of the
validity of naturalization papers has proved annoying, as they
have been bought and sold for the protection they afford.
One of the most trying problems has arisen from the un-
doubted right of any nation to exclude foreigners. This
right we have not denied, but we have objected to dis-
crimination between our naturalized and our natural cit-
izens. In 1912 we denounced our treaty with Russia be-
cause of her discrimination against our citizens of the
Jewish race.
Such questions have from 1868 to the present day taken
up a large proportion of the time and attention of our state
department and diplomatic service. No num- Present posi-
ber of precedents seems able to prevent the ^5ized°*dti-
development of new situations. In general zeos
the government has insisted upon its sole right to determine
the validity of its papers, but it is always willing to investi-
gate cases brought to its attention. It has not conceded
the right of foreign governments to punish our citizens for
the act of emigration, but it has admitted that evasion
of military service is a punishable act. It has not con-
tinued to extend its protection to naturalized citizens
who are known to have taken up their permanent resi-
dence in their native countries. Upon the whole, these
questions, though still handled by the diplomatic staff and
liable at any time to cause an international rupture, may
be said to have become matters of legal detail, their fun-
damental principles being well understood and generally
accepted.
S58 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
With all these matters of routine upon his mind, in addi-
tion to the pressing necessities of the Civil war and its
Seward and results, and with a weather eye always di-
expansion rected to politics, Seward, most indefatigable
of our secretaries of state, did not lose his vision of peaceful
expansion.^ One stroke of luck enabled him to confirm his
prophecy of 1861 with regard to Russia's building on the
Arctic the outposts of the United States. Our interest in
Alaska was not new. Senator Gwin of California had brought
up the question of its purchase in 1859, and the matter was
talked over with the Russian minister. The latter did not
express indignation at the suggestion, but
thought that the five millions mentioned as a
price was too small. After the war interest reappeared in
the Pacific coast states, but was not sufficiently strong to set
our machinery in motion. In fact, when in 1867 Russia
offered Alaska to us, the general sentiment of the country,
viewed our acceptance of the proposition as a favor .^
Seward, however, leaped to the opportunity, yet not so
far as to lose his diplomatic address. Stoeckl, the Russian
Seward's ac- minister at Washington, suggested ten mil-
^^^ lions as a proper price, Seward five millions.
Stoeckl proposed to split the diflference, and Seward agreed
if Stoeckl would knock off the odd half-million. Stoeckl
finally said that he would do so if Seward would add two
hundred thousand as special compensation to the Russian
American Company, making the price seven million two
hundred thousand. Elate, Seward roused Sumner from bed
at midnight, and the three drew up the agreement between
then and four o'clock. The treaty ceded all Russia's terri-
tory in America, and ran a boundary through Behring
strait and sea, dividing the islands. It provided, as usual,
»T. C. Smith, "Expansion after the Civil War, 1865-1871," Political
Science Quarterly, 1901, xvi. 412-436.
* H. H. Bancroft, Alaska (San Francisco, 1886), eh. xxviii.; see also O. S.
Straus, The American Spirit, New York, 1913, and in Providence Journal,
June 4. 1905.
ROUTINE, 1861-1877 851^
that the civilized inhabitants were to become United States
citizens, but said nothing of their incorporation into the
Union.
To secure the acceptance of the treaty seemed to be more
difficult than to make it. To this task Sumner devoted
himself. He delivered a speech setting forth Russia tnd the
with learning and appreciation the possibil- ^°^**<* Sutes
ities of the territory, but his success was perhaps due less
to his material arguments than to the general impression
that we owed a favor to Russia, to an undercurrent of
belief that this was our part of a secret bargain, as a result
of which Russia had lent us her fleet in 1863. From this hazy
impression two facts emerge; in the first place, there was no
such bargain; in the second place, one fleet did actually come
to New York and another to San Francisco with sealed in- ^
structions to put themselves at our service in case of inter-
vention by Great Britain and France. While the czar prob-
ably was sympathetic with the North and saw with regret
the disappearance of our merchant marine, it is doubtful
whether his action was chiefly prompted by these considera-
tions. Russia was in 1863 as much alarmed at the prospect
of intervention by Great Britain, France, and Austria in
her affairs as we were at the possibility that England and
France might interfere in ours. The Poles were once more
writhing under Russian rule and most of Europe was protest-
ing at Russia's atrocities. When, therefore, in May, 1863,
Seward refused an invitation from France to join the pro-
test, his reply, based on the Monroe Doctrine, may well have "^
excited the czar's gratitude. Moreover, the Russian fleets
more probably came to our harbors for their own protection
than for ours; that of the Pacific had no winter harbor in
the East and dared not go home, that of the Atlantic, lying
on the Spanish coast, dared not go through the English Chan-
nel. From our harbors, also, they could, if war broke out,
harass English commerce, whereas at home they would be
blocked completely.
360 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
The legend of Russia's aid, however, was apparently the
decisive factor in securing the acceptance of the treaty, and
Success of the has afforded the main basis for a somewhat
*'***y curious friendship between the two nations
ever since. When, in 1871, the grand duke Alexis visited this
country, OUver Wendell Holmes greeted him with the lines,
" Bleak are our coasts with the blasts of December,
Throbbing and warm are the hearts that remember.
Who was our friend, when the world was our foe."
Seward also thought of securing the annexation of Hawaii,
but his main interest was devoted to the Caribbean. The
„ .. National Democratic Convention in 1856 de-
HawHU
clared, "That the Democratic party will expect
of the next administration that every proper effort be made
to increase our ascendancy in the Gulf of Mexico and to
• maintain permanent protection to the great
outlets through which are emptied into its
waters the products raised out of the soil and the com^
modities created by the industry of the people of our
Western valleys and of the Union at large." It was true
that, with Florida far flung to the south and untravers-
able, our Mississippi commerce must in time of war run
the gauntlet, by one exit of five hundred miles threat-
ened by Spanish Cuba and the British Bahamas and pro-
tected by our solitary and isolated port of Key West, or
else must, by the other exit, pass Cuba and the British
Jamaica, with no harbor of refuge. This danger was brought
so vividly before the minds of those in authority by the
exigencies of the Civil war, that at that time we actually
leased the harbor of St. Nicholas from Hayti.
In January, 1865, Seward broached the question of pur-
chasing from Denmark the island of St. Thomas, whose splen-
^ . , . , , did harbor, just to the east of Porto Rico, would
Danish islands i • r i
secure us a convenient naval station for the pro-
tection of the eastern route. After much bargaining, a treaty
was at length drawn up ceding both St. Thomas and St. Johns
ROUTINE, 1861-1877 JJ6l
for seven and a half millions, subject to a popular vote by the
inhabitants in favor of annexation, a condition upon which
Denmark vigorously insisted in opposition to the views of
Seward. After some contest a vote was taken which resulted
in our favor. To the effort to get the treaty ratified, how-
ever, the same popular opposition was demonstrated that
encountered the Alaska treaty, but in this case popular sen-
timent was not caught by Denmark, though she too had
proved to be our friend in the war. The House voted that
it would not appropriate the money, the Senate laid the
treaty on the table, and when Grant came in he dismissed
it as a "scheme of Seward's." ^
Meantime, in 1867 George Bancroft was instructed to
stop at Madrid, on his way to Berlin, to attempt the purchase
of Culebra and Culebrita, islands in the same Spanish
locality belonging to Spain; but as usual, *^*"<*8
that country would not entertain the proposal to sell her
colonies.
A more important undertaking, however, was taking shape.
In 1866 Admiral Porter was sent to inspect Samana Bay, in
the Dominican republic, with reference to its „
, . , Samana Bay
use as a naval station. It was situated near the
islands already considered, and proved to be in many ways
ideal for the purpose. In February, 1868, a convention was
drawn up with the Dominican government providing for a
twelve years' lease, in return for a million in gold and a million
currency in the form of arms. President Baez, who wanted the
arms, was not uninclined to sell out the whole republic while
his government still had a going value, and proposed annexa-
tion, to be carried into effect without the formality of a pop-
ular referendum. Sewar^, taking a different view of the latter
question from that which he had assumed in the case of the
Danish islands, demanded a popular vote; but it still seemed
possible to bring the negotiation to a head in an acceptable
form.
1 James Parton. The Danish Islands, Boston, 1869.
362 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
President Johnson, who left Seward a very free hand in
diplomacy, referred to the subject in his annual message of
_ ^ 1868: "Comprehensive national policy would
annex San seem to sanction the acquisition and incorpora-
tion into our Federal Union of the several
adjacent continental and insular communities as speedily
as it can be done peacefully, lawfully, and without any viola-
tion of national justice, faith, or honor. ... I am satisfied
that the time has arrived when even so direct a proceeding
as a proposition for an annexation of the two Republics of
the island of St. Domingo would not only receive the con-
sent of the people interested, but would also give satisfaction
to all other foreign nations." Seward took up the question
with General Banks, chairman of the House committee on
foreign affairs, and a resolution favoring it was introduced.
A test vote, however, was defeated 110 to 63. In the summer
of 1868 Seward wrote to our representative in Hawaii, "The
public mind refuses to dismiss" domestic questions "even
so far as to entertain the higher but more remote questions
of national expansion and aggrandizement."
Although Grant threw aside the Danish treaty, and his
secretary. Fish, refused to entertain a proposition from the
Swedish Swedish minister for the purchase of her West
islands India islands, the San Domingo proposal took
on a new lease of life with the new administration. Grant
made it his particular policy; perhaps he felt safer with a
Grant and scheme of Baez's than with one of Seward's. He
San Domingo proceeded like a cavalry officer on a raid. He
sent as his secret and personal agent General Babcock, who
speedily concluded a treaty. This document provided among
other things that the United States should pay a million
eight hundred thousand dollars, assume the national debt
in return for the public lands, and protect the Dominican
republic until a free expression of the public will could be
given. This promise was made concrete by the fact that
Babcock was accompanied by three men-of-war, instructed
ROUTINE, 1861-1877 86S
to protect the Dominican government, and "if Haytians
attack the Dominicans with their ships, destroy or capture
them." If one compares this policy of protection during the
pendency of annexation with the cautious words of Calhoun
in the case of Texas, one is reminded of the remark, "What is
the constitution among friends?" But probably Grant him-
self did not even consider the constitution in this connection.
The agreement continued, the President "promises pri-
vately to use all his influence in order that the idea of annex-
ing the Dominican Republic to the United Defeat of Bab-
States may acquire such a degree of popularity ^^''^ treaty
among members of congress as will be necessary for its ac-
complishment." Grant presented the treaty to the Senate,
January 18, 1870, and by message and interviews faithfully
carried out his word. Nevertheless, the treaty was rejected,
June 30, by a tie vote.
Meanwhile President Baez had busied himself with floating
a loan on the London market, which would be assumed by the
United States in case of annexation. British Renewal of
financial interests strongly favored annexation. *^* proposal
In spite of the rejection of the treaty and the outbreak of do-
mestic revolution, he assured his congress, "The measure will,
nevertheless, succeed in the end, for it is a necessity in the
progress of humanity, whose unseen agent is Providence it-
self." The seen agent in this case was Grant. He extended
his protection for a year, and in his next message to Congress
applied the lash of foreign intrigue. Should the treaty be
ultimately refused, he said, "a free port will be negotiated
for by European nations in the Bay of Samana. A large
commercial city will spring up, to which we will be tributary
without receiving corresponding benefits, and then will be
seen the folly of our rejecting so great a prize." At last he
secured from Congress authority to send a san Domingo
commission to report on conditions, and, con- comnussion
fident in the value of his proposal, appointed for the mission
able and honorable men, — Benjamin F. Wade, Andrew D.
364 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
White, and Samuel S. Howe. They were accompanied by
A. A. Burton and Frederick Douglass, who served as secre-
taries. The commission made a well-balanced and not un-
favorable report, but the proposition was dead.
Fruitless as it proved in itself, the San Domingo question
influenced many other things. Sumner reported it unfavor-
ably from the Senate committee, and thereby
against ex- earned Grant's enmity, a fact which largely
* accounted for the latter's willingness to depose
him when he stood, next winter, in the way of the treaty of
Washington. The debate, too, was the only exhaustive one
on expansion between the Mexican and the Spanish wars.
In a great speech in the Senate, January 11, 1871, Carl
Schurz summed up the reasons that defeated, in this period,
the dream of expansion which Seward and others had brought
over from the last. He feared that this was but a step in a
general campaign of expansion that would stretch us through
the West Indies and Mexico to the isthmus. He feared the
incorporation into the Union of these tropic territories,
where self-government had never flourished, where free labor
was never successful. Our true expansion had been west-
ward, migration followed isothermal lines, and we now em-
braced the habitat suited to the nations from whom we had
drawn and should continue to draw our people; San Domingo
was not a proper home for them. He believed that the pro-
tection of a naval station so far away would raise more prob-
lems than it would solve. The irregularities of the Presi-
dent's conduct he condemned, foreign ambitions he scouted,
and he made easy fun of "manifest destiny." He did not,
however, call attention to a fact which undoubtedly had
much to do with the popular sentiment against expansion,
namely, that the movement had just before the war become
so identified with southern interests that the North was
suspicious of every such suggestion.^
Meanwhile, from 1868 to 1878 insurrection in Cuba the
, ^ Schurz, Speeches, etc., ii. 71-122.
ROUTINE, 1861-1877 365
desired invited our attention. As Grant made San Domingo
his specialty, so his secretary of state assumed direction of
the Cuban question. Although Grant first ap- Grant and
pointed Elihu Washburne to this position, it ^^^
was merely with the idea of honoring an old friend. After
five days' service Washburne resigned and was promptly
appointed minister to France, where he played a useful and
distinguished part during the Franco-German war and the
Commune. He was succeeded as secretary by Hamilton
Fish, who outserved Grant three days. A less aggressive
man than Seward, serving under a more interfering President
than either Lincoln or Johnson, he played less to the public
eye. Nevertheless, his handling of the Alabama dispute
gives him an enviable place in history, and the long drawn-
out case of Cuba he managed with triumphant patience.^
The Cuban situation was particularly complicated by
reason of the rapid change of governments in Spain, — the
overthrow of Isabella in 1870, the formation Cuban insur-
of a constitutional monarchy under Amedeo ^^'^^^^
of Savoy in 1871, the proclamation of a republic in 1873,
and the return of the Bourbons under Alfonso in 1874. In
Cuba also the population was divided, the native "volun-
teers" fighting the insurrectionists even more bitterly than
did the Spanish troops. Sympathy for the insurgents was
keen in the United States, and the presence of native Cu-
bans in our country and of American naturalized Cubans in
the island led to constant agitation for us to take a hand in
the conflict. To these considerations were added the tradi-
tional, though not then dominant, belief that Cuba was
eventually destined to become part of the United States.
The three questions which we had to consider were neu-
trality, mediation, and intervention. On the first one our
policy was to some extent dictated by our contemporary dis-
pute with England. Criticizing her issuance of the bellig-
^ F. E. Chadwick, Relations of the United States and Spain — Dijilomacy
(New York, 1909), chs. xiv-xix.
366 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
erency proclamation. Fish desired to restrain us from taking
similar action, particularly as the insurgents possessed no
ports or marine. In this object he was suc-
Belligerency .
cessful, although the President and Congress
were restive. Grant, it is said, had for a long time a proc-
lamation ready to sign, in his desk. The fact that we did
not recognize belligerency did not, however, relieve us of
our neutral duties, which we vigorously performed, although
we were not able entirely to prevent aid from this country
reaching Cuba.
Mediation was offered by Fish in 1869, Marshal Prim hav-
ing expressed his willingness to consent even to Cuban inde-
„ ^. . pendence. The exigencies of Spanish politics.
Mediation , , , . . m i 7^ i
however rendered it impossible for her govern-
ment to agree to any terms upon which we would act. In 1874,
we made another offer, in which, a year later, we asked Great
Britain, Germany, Prussia, Italy, and Austria to join. The
United States "neither sought nor desired any physical force
or pressure, but simply the moral influence of concurrence
of opinion as to the protraction of the contest." Italy did
act, but again there was no result.
Intervention by force we did not try, though Fish used
the possibility of it as a goad to move Spain to activity in
meeting our demands. Peaceably, however, we
Intervention ° , . . x i •
were constantly intervening. In the instruc-
tions to Caleb Cushing, who was sent to Spain in 1874, — the
situation having at length convinced the government that we
needed a minister of ability there, — Fish explained our Cuban
policy and our special interest in the island. Commercially
as well as geographically, he argued, it was more closely con-
nected with us than with Spain; civil dissension there pro-
duced an effect on us second only to that produced in Spain;
the local Spanish government was able to injure our citizens,
but we could obtain reparation only by the slow and cum-
brous method of applying to Spain. The United States had
no desire for annexation; but "the desire for independence
ROUTINE, 1861-1877 367
on the part of the Cubans" "is a natural and legitimate
aspiration of theirs, because they are Americans, and while
such independence is the manifest exigency of the political
interests of the Cubans themselves, it is equally so that of
the rest of America, including the United States."
With these special interests as a reason and the possibility
of intervention as a motive force, we successfully insisted on
maintaining a certain supervision of the con- influence in
test. Partly at our instance, Spain finally ^"''*
adopted a system of gradual emancipation of slaves, a step
which Buchanan had so feared she would take at the in-
stance of Great Britain. Spain also promised us reform in
local government, and modified her methods of conducting
the war. In 1871 a convention was signed submitting to
arbitration the claims of our citizens growing out of the
hostilities in Cuba. Spain, however, would not admit her
responsibility for losses by act of the insurgents, though we
claimed that, since we had not recognized a state of war,
her responsibility was complete.
In 1873 the seizure on the high seas of the Virginius, flying
an American flag and with American papers, caused an out-
burst of popular indignation that seemed likely „. . .
, . - ,. . , « , Virgmius aflfair
to drive us from our policy of watchful peace.
The incident was rendered still more acute by the summary
trial and condemnation to death of the crew. The fact that
the Spanish government ordered a suspension of the sentences
illustrated Fish's point with regard to the diplomatic incon-
venience of the situation; for many executions took place
before the reprieve was delivered in Cuba. Our attorney-
general decided that the Virginius was improperly using
our flag, and that she was engaged in filibustering contrary
to our law, but that Spain had no right to seize her while
flying our flag on the high seas, belligerency not being recog-
nized. We demanded indemnity, the return of the Virginius,
a salute to our flag, and the punishment of the oflScers guilty
of the execution of the crew, an act " inhuman and in viola-
868 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
tion of the civilization of the age." Spain called attention
to the fact that in the case of VAmistad our supreme court
had exercised the right of going behind the oJBBcial papers
and examining the actual status of the vessel. On this point
we yielded, omitting our demand for a salute. Our other
conditions were accepted. In carrying them out, however,
Spain almost drove us into war. The trial of her officers
was not pressed, and the general responsible for the execu-
tions was promoted. On being returned, moreover, the
Virginius straightway sank, by the machinations, it was be-
lieved, of the Spanish officers in charge. The administra-
End of insur- tion, however, kept its hand on the situation,
rection ^^^ Grant in his annual message of December,
1875, announced that our relations with Spain were friendly.
General Martinez de Campos, the new governor-general of
Cuba, proved tactful and efficient, and the insurrection
gradually died out.
The diplomatic problems of the Civil war had practically
been solved by 1872, but the continuity of personnel and of
Significance of domestic conditions serve to give a unity to
the Civil war ^^le whole period from 1861 to 1877. The most
important in our diplomatic history since independence, its
record was marked not so much by progress as by our suc-
cess in outriding a storm. Our stake was not independence
but unity, and our success in preserving unity was not solely
and perhaps not mainly of domestic importance. Division
meant not only the severing of established ties, but increased
liability to quarrel. Peaceful acceptance of secession in 1861
would have been followed, not by perpetual peace between
North and South, but by perpetual imminence of war, un-
ceasing preparation for war, and ultimately not by one war
but by many. The freedom to expend all our resources upon
our own internal development would have been sacrificed,
and the military system of Europe would have been trans-
ferred to America. And not the system only. Our pre-
dominance in America once lost, there were abundant in-
ROUTINE, 1861-1877 369
dications that the powers of Europe would have extended
the scope of their poUtics to our continents; foreign armies
and navies would have been within striking distance. Amer-
ica would no longer have escaped that dualism of European
politics, that tricky balance, in which every domestic con-
cern of European royalty, every street broil in a European
capital, becomes a makeweight which, if not instantly ad-
justed, may upset the whole. Our escape was due to a partly
unconscious but wholly determined national will which em-
ployed our armies, our navies, and our statesmen for the
purpose. Diplomacy was not our savior, but it performed
its full duty, and those who shaped it deserve eternal
gratitude.
Devoted primarily to this great task, the period was not
barren of routine progress. The most notable advance lay
in the defining of the relationships of our Progress, 1861
naturalized citizens to the countries of their *° ^®^''
birth; the most interesting new policy was that of interna-
tional cooperation in the Pacific. Our various accepted
policies were adjusted to meet the needs of the time, and
current matters were kept well in hand. The continual agi-
tation for expansion resulted in nothing but the addition of
Alaska, and that was one of the most nearly accidental hap-
penings of our history. The people were satisfied with their
territory, and by 1877 the idea had developed that expan-
sion was contrary to our national policy and our indisposi-
tion to expand had become almost a passion. The United
States showed an increasing willingness to cooperate with
other nations for international ends; for which no small
degree of credit belongs to Clara Barton and the Red Cross.
Seward at the beginning of the period was strongly opposed
to European agreements; Garfield, just after its close, gave
them his sympathetic support!^
1 M. T. Boardman, Under the Bed Cross, Philadelphia, 1915.
CHAPTER XXVI
BAITING THE LION, 1877-1897
The period between 1877 and 1897 marks the lowest point
in the conduct of our diplomacy. The long and able services
Break in con- oi Seward and Fish had given dignity and con-
^^^ tinuity to the period from 1861 to 1877, and
their previous experience in public life had reduced to a
minimum the deflection from policies previously developed.
In the new period, administrations of short duration reversed
each other and paid little attention to the past. There was
some continuity between the policies of Evarts, secretary
under Hayes from 1877 to 1881, and those of Blaine, who
served under Garfield in 1881, though Evarts would not have
admitted it. Frelinghuysen, coming in under Arthur in
December, 1881, changed Blaine's policies, only to have his
own reversed by Bayard, whom Cleveland appointed in 1885.
Bayard was inclined to conform to the traditions of our his-
tory, but he was seriously hampered by Congress. Harrison
brought in Blaine again in 1889, and the two united in dis-
carding what their predecessors had done, but otherwise for
the most part pulled diflFerent ways, until Blaine resigned in
1892, to be succeeded by John W. Foster, who was well
equipped but served too short a time to make himself felt.
In 1893 Cleveland and his party effectually checked what the
Republicans had set in train.
Never before had diplomacy been so much at the mercy
of politics. In the fifties the attempt was to arouse national
Politics and interest in general policies; in this period par-
diplomacy ticular questions of diplomacy were thrown into
the balance to turn a few votes. Particularly popular was
the diversion of twisting the tail of the British lion, which
870
BAITING THE LION, 1877-1897 371
animal proved to be peaceable, though not easily led by this
method to any useful end.
During these years we did not put into office any really
great diplomat. The secretaries of state were all excep-
tionally able men, but the position had become Lack of great
primarily political. James G. Blaine seems to ^plo°"ts
have had some genius for diplomacy, as well as a real pur-
pose, but his superficiality was so much greater than that of
Henry Clay, whom he imitated, that comparison is odious.
His lack of knowledge of international law was conspicuous
even in his own generation, and the influence of his splendid
and magnetic personality which might have compensated
for this defect was lost by the ineptness of his agents, some
of them forced upon him and some for whom he was himself
responsible.
The whole mechanics of diplomatic intercourse had been
changed by the laying of the Atlantic cable in 1866. This
was particularly true of our own service. Effect of the
Owing to distance and the frequent difficulty Atlantic cable
of communication, our representatives abroad had always
enjoyed a remarkable degree of freedom and responsibility,
which they had used to the uttermost, as is illustrated by
the careers of John Jay and Soule. As Mr. Dooley says of
our ministers, they " led a free an' riochous life, declared war,
punched Prime Ministers in th' ey', an' gin'rally misbehaved"
themselves, "an' no wan at home cared. ... Be the time
they knew anything about it it was old news an' " they were
"up to some other divilment. But now, how is it? Sure
an Ambassador is about as vallyable as a tillyphone op'rator.
He has to make connections an' if he listens or cuts in he's
fired. He's a messenger an' a slow wan fr'm wan Government
to another." With the concentration of business at the home
department, the position of foreign representative became
less attractive to able men with a future. They accepted it
as a vacation or an honorable retirement, or because of the
social ambition of their wives.
372 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
With the flooding of Europe by Americans of wealth, bent
upon pleasure or social advancement, a chief occupation
Social distrac- of the American ministers became the securing
**°" of introductions for their countrymen at the
courts to which they were accredited. It was in general a
thankless task, as the absence of fixed social rank in America
left their selections for the honor to the caprices of their
own choice; consequently every capital city became the
fighting-ground of cliques of Americans for and against the
embassy. Involved in society as they were, such offices
could be used as stepping-stones to social position at home;
hence they came to be sought by men of wealth, whose easiest
method of securing them was by contribution to the party
campaign funds. Cleveland's appointment to Italy, in 1893
of James J. Van Alen, who had given fifty thousand dollars
to the Democratic fund, aroused such a storm of protest
throughout the country, that he was barely confirmed by the
Senate, and in decency was forced to decline the position.
This was not the only case of the kind, however, nor the last.
The competition of the rich for these posts doubtless had
something to do with the failure of Congress to raise the sal-
„. . , aries to meet the increased cost of modern living,
Rich and poor , . , , . -i i c • i
and it became almost impossible for a man with-
out private resources to accept appointment. On the other
hand, the eclat of some embassies did not prevent the exigen-
cies of domestic politics from forcing the appointment of many
men whose social training was as lacking and more obvious
than their intellectual deficiencies.
There were always exceptions however,^ and in partic-
ular the mission to Great Britain maintained its distinc-
Mission to tion. With John Adams, Thomas Pinckney,
Great Britain j^j^j^ j^y^ Ruius King, James Monroe, Wil-
liam Pinkney, John Quincy Adams, Richard Rush, Albert
Gallatin, Martin Van Buren, Edward Everett, George Ban-
croft, James Buchanan, Charles Francis Adams, Reverdy
* A. D. White, Autobiography, 2 vols.. New York. 1905.
BAITING THE LION, 1877-1897 373
Johnson, and John Lothrop Motley among its previous
holders, the line was continued by James Russell Lowell,
Edward J. Phelps, Robert Lincoln, and Thomas F. Bayard.
The loss of diplomatic responsibility was here more than made
up by the growing sense that the American minister in Eng-
land was representative of one people to the other; and the
position was regarded as one of eminence.
While the importance of the diplomatic service was de-
clining, that of the consular service was increasing with the
change of trade conditions. Not only was inter- Commercial
national exchange assuming larger relative changes
proportions, but American trade was becoming less special-
ized. With the development of Argentina, our exports of
provisions encountered more active competition. In many
lines of manufacture, moreover, as in leather goods and
agricultural machinery, the supply was coming to exceed
the needs of the home market, and a foreign market was
demanded. The aid of the government was therefore once
more called in, as it had been in the early days of the republic,
to assist our commercial interests. This could be done in
part by national policy, and Blaine and Cleveland proposed,
the one reciprocity, the other free trade. Much of it, how-
ever, must be done by the collection and diffusion of informa-
tion by our consuls, and by their activity in establishing
friendly relations with foreign business men.
Although the consular service had grown to cover almost
every port and shipping point of the world, its selection re-
mained at the mercy of politics. With the Consular
adoption of civil service reform in 1883, efforts service
were made to extend the merit system to this branch; but
they were unsuccessful. On the whole, however, the results
were better than might have been expected. The lack of
special training and experience was not so important here
as in diplomatic positions, and the politicians who were ap-
pointed were by profession shrewd and apt at dealing with
men and clever at picking up information. Although they
374 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
did not particularly command the respect of the educated
classes of other countries or of their own, and though some
of them created difficulties that. might not otherwise have
occurred, they were on the whole eflScient in promoting
business.^
While no advances in the routine of diplomacy are to be
looked for, developments already started continued to make
progress. For one thing, the range of our ex-
Extradition ... . .11 mi
tradition treaties was extended. Ine passage
of an act by the Canadian Parliament in 1889, authorizing the
government to surrender fugitives from justice even where no
treaty existed, seemed to close that haven to our embezzlers.
Although for certain reasons it failed to be put into operation
for some time, it appears to have deterred many recreants
from taking refuge there. With the toils of international
agreement closing round them, criminal fugitives of all kinds
continued to furnish much of the business of diplomacy.
The movement for the protection of trademarks contin-
ued, and many treaties were made on the subject. More
Trademarks important was our adhesion, in 1883, to a con-
and copyright yention for the International Protection of
Industrial Property, which covered patents, trademarks,
and commercial names. In 1891 Congress at length au-
thorized the President to enter into agreements regarding
international copyright, which he could make valid by proc-
lamation. This step was speedily followed up, and copyright
has become practically universal in its extent.
We also joined, in 1886, in an international agreement
for the protection of submarine cables, and in 1890 in an
International international union for the publication of cus-
coOperation toms tariffs. Our participation in the latter
year in an international act for the suppression of the African
slave trade has already been noticed. This tendency to enter
freely into agreements with foreign countries on general sub-
jects was a natural result of the improvement of communica-
* Consular reports have been published monthly since 1880.
BAITING THE LION, 1877-1897 375
tlon and the increase of intercourse, conditions which made
the necessity for mutual understanding greater and more
apparent. It was in no wise in opposition to our fundamental
doctrine of avoiding entangling alliances, though a certain
sensitiveness developed by our isolation caused many Amer-
icans to feel that such communications might corrupt our
manners.
First treaties we made only with Servia in 1881, with
Corea in 1882, and with Egypt and the new Congo Free State
in 1884. Claims we followed up with our ac- First treaties
customed zeal. Our bag was not so large as "^'^ claims
usual, and proved rather troublesome. It included numerous
conventions with Hayti beginning in 1884, and with Vene-
zuela beginning in 1885. In the case of Portugal, in 1891,
we joined Great Britain in an arbitration fixing the compen-
sation which Portugal should pay to each of us as a result of
her taking possession of the Lourengo Marques railroad.
The treaty with Ecuador in 1893 concerned only one claim-
ant, an Ecuadorian naturalized in the United States. The
convention with Chili in 1892, had almost cost a war before
it was concluded. A mutual arbitration convention with
France in 1880 recoiled, giving her a balance of over six hun-
dred thousand dollars. Our several treaties with Spain,
and one with Mexico in 1897, produced nothing during this
period.
The standard question of the fisheries had seemed to be
settled by the treaty of Washington, but circumstances
worked against the permanency of this agree- Treaty of
ment. The mackerel suddenly changed their and^the °
habits, deserting the Canadian waters for our fisheries
own. In 1882 only one of our vessels took advantage
of our privileges. The arbitrators under the clause of the
treaty providing for special compensation to Great Britain,
of whom the umpire was chosen by Austria, made their esti-
mates on previous records and ordered us to pay five and a
half million, or $458,333.33 per year, for our supposed ad-
376 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
vantage. Not unnaturally we did not care to renew this
bargain when the fixed period of its duration expired.^
Congress ordered that notice of the termination of the
agreement be given and in 1885 it came to an end. There-
„ ., ^ upon the Canadian authorities began to make
Failure to re- ^ . °
new red- themselves disagreeable to our deep-sea fish-
^ °*^^' ers, who, although they did not need to fish
within the three-mile limit, were obliged to use Canadian
harbors. In 1886 the David J. Adams was seized for buying
bait and ice, and other cases soon followed. The purpose of
the Canadians was to force a renewal of reciprocity, which
would allow free entry of their fish into the United States.
Cleveland was desirous of treating on these terms. In fact,
the American government had generally favored even more
extensive reciprocity with Canada, and under Grant had en-
deavored to bring it about. In 1888 the administration sub-
mitted a treaty to the Senate on the old basis. American
fishermen, however, were unwilling to admit equal competi-
tion, particularly as fishing bounties had been discontinued
in 1866; and their representatives in the Senate succeeded in
defeating the treaty. The fishermen's proposal for the pay-
ment of a lump sum by the nation, on the other hand, was
opposed by the western interests, which felt that it was
enough to pay a higher price for their dried cod without
paying additionally in the way of taxes. Consequently no
new treaty could be agreed upon, and for many years, the
fishing industry rested on a modus vivendi agreed to in 1888
pending the acceptance of Cleveland's treaty. This tem-
porary agreement was based on the principle of exacting a
payment of a license fee of a dollar and a half per ton for
those vessels whose owners wished the freedom of the Cana-
dian harbors. This method of allowing those who used the
privileges to pay for them worked satisfactorily, and under
it the fishery flourished. With the introduction of steamers
to supply the fleet, the industry became more self-sufficing,
* J. B. Henderson, American Diplomatic Questions, New York, etc., 1901.
BAITING THE LION, 1877-1897 377
till in 1898, out of 1427 New England schooners, only 79
took licenses.
While we were struggling for in-shore and harbor privi-
leges on the east coast of America, we were assuming a very
different position in the west. The first fruits The Alaska
of Alaska were seal skins. In 1870, in order ^®*^^
to regulate the industry and prevent the extermination of
the seals, the sole right of killing was granted to the Alaska
Commercial Company, which was limited to one hundred
thousand a year. These were to be killed at the breeding
grounds on the Pribilof islands, and were to be bachelor seals.
The government royalties seemed destined to pay the pur-
chase price of the islands.
The seals, however, had no appreciation of these provisions
for their own safety. Once a year they took a cruise of
many months into the Pacific, returning up Destruction of
the coast of British Columbia. When at home, ^^ ^^^ ^^^^^
moreover, they sported recklessly beyond the three-mile
limit and the protection of the American flag, thus exposing
themselves to the unregulated attack of adventurers from
all the Pacific coasts, but particularly of Canadians. With
dynamite, undistinguishing between bachelors and mothers
of families, indiscriminately tearing up many of the valuable
skins, they laid waste the herds.
The herds diminished; whether owing to the annual slaugh-
ter of one hundred thousand prospective fathers, or to the
uncounted slaughter of whole families, became .
ultimately a burning issue between British and United states
American scientists. In 1881 the collector of marine^^juris-
San Francisco, grieved at the prospect of the g^^^ °''^^
extermination of another native American race,
propounded the theory that all of Behring sea, to the line
of the treaty of 1867 dividing Russian territory from Amer-
ican, "is considered as comprized within waters of Alaska
territory." In 1886 the United States revenue cutter Corwin
seized three British vessels, which were later condemned
378 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
by the United States District Court at Sitka for violating
American waters. This action the secretary of state. Bayard,
refused to sustain diplomatically, but seizures continued to
be made. To meet the actual situation, Bayard wrote to
France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and Great Britain, asking
them to cooperate "for the better protection of the fur-seal
fisheries in Behring Sea." Negotiations went on rapidly
and a general agreement seemed probable, when, on May 16,
1888, Lord SaUsbury, the British minister of foreign affairs,
announced that the Canadian government had asked him to
suspend action. As our Senate had rejected the northeastern
fishery treaty on May 7, it seems reasonable to suppose that
this was a counter stroke.
In March, 1889, the House, largely through Blaine's in-
fluence, asserted that Behring sea was under the territorial
^ jurisdiction of the United States. This asser-
Blame's poucy . t,, . , ■, i <• i t,
tion Blame undertook to deiend. It was op-
posed to the policy of free navigation of rivers and bays,
which we had almost consistently pursued from the year of
Independence, and ran counter to the general current of the
world's opinion, which we had done much to set in motion.
Both Great Britain and the United States had protested the
czar's ukase of 1821, which had asserted territorial control of
Behring sea and part of the northern Pacific. Our treaty of
1867 did indeed run a boundary line through the waters of
that sea, but this division could not be held binding on other
nations unless it could be shown that Russia had owned the
sea. Blaine's argument was based on historical misinforma-
tion, questionable instances drawn from British practice,
and the supposed good of humanity.
After a rather quarrelsome negotiation, a modus Vivendi
was arranged in January, .1891, forbidding all killing of
... . seals, except seven thousand five hundred for
ArbitrAuon
the sustenance of the natives. February 29,
1892, an arbitration treaty was signed. The commission
created was to take up the whole question, historical, legal.
BAITING THE LION, 1877-1897 379
and economic. If it decided that the United States had no
exclusive right to the sea, we were to pay damages for the
seizure of British vessels. In this case also the commission
was to decide upon measures suitable for the preservation of
the seals. The arbitration tribunal was a dignified body of
seven members. It met at Paris, and the American counsel
were James C. Carter, Edward J. Phelps, and Frederic R.
Coudert. John W. Foster presented the case.
The issue narrowed down to the meaning of "Pacific
ocean" in the treaties of the United States and Great Britain
with Russia in 1824 and 1825. Our claim that The decision
Behring sea was by nature mare clausum was "^^ **^ ®*®'^*
given up. Stress was also laid upon the common-law pro-
tection for domestic animals when beyond their owner's
land; but Lord Salisbury's argument that seals were fercB
naturoe, and so res nullius, seems to have been nearer the
fact. The decision was not unnaturally against us, and we
finally, though reluctantly and not- until 1898, paid about
half a million dollars' damages. The protective regulations,
providing for a closed season, no killing at sea within sixty
miles of the Pribilof islands, no use of steamers or of explo-
sives, and special licenses and flags for the vessels engaged,
proved ineffective. Great Britain and the United States
disagreed as to the changes necessary to make them so, and
other nations were not bound by even the existing regula-
tions. During this period, therefore, diplomacy failed to
protect the seal herds. Our attempt to sacrifice a cherished
principle to obtain this end had succeeded with regard to
neither the end nor the principle. Although agreement had
in 1888 halted because of the dispute concerning the fisheries
on the opposite coast, it seems probable that the note of
bombast introduced by Blaine, and the national antagonisms
thus aroused, were the weightiest causes of final failure.
In 1878 Lieutenant Wyse received a concession from the
government of Colombia, formerly New Granada, for a
French company that desired to build an interoceanic canal
380 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
across the isthmus of Panama. Ferdinand de Lesseps,
director of the Suez canal, was put at the head of the new
company, and the scheme was launched with
French con- . . .„
cession at effusion. In 1879 a scientific congress was
assembled at Paris to discuss the engineering
problems involved, and the United States government was
represented by two distinguished naval officers. Our interest
in the canal problem, long dormant, suddenly revived, the
most effective spur being De Lesseps's suggestion, in 1879,
of a joint international guarantee of neutrality.^
March 8, 1880, President Hayes announced in a message to
Congress: "The policy of this country is a canal under
, American control. The United States cannot
consent to the surrender of this control to
any European power or to any combination of European
powers. . . . An interoceanic canal across the American
Isthmus will essentially change the geographical relations
between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United
States. ... It would be the great ocean thoroughfare be-
tween our Atlantic and our Pacific shores, and virtually a
part of the coast line of the United States. . . . No other
power would under similar circumstances fail to assert a
rightful control over a work so closely and vitally affecting
its interest and welfare." Evarts proposed to Colombia that
all cessions be considered as subject to the treaty of 1846, and
that we have the right to erect fortifications at the mouths of
the canal.
This certainly had not hitherto been the policy of the
United States, who has always asserted the general principle
„ of universal freedom of use, analogous to our
Blaine's policy • • , , - , . . . , <
idea of the freedom of international waters and
of a joint international guarantee. It was, however, endorsed
in 1880 by Congress, which based it on the Monroe Doctrine,
^ Freeman Snow, Treaties and Topics in American Diplomacy (Boston,
1894), 337-347; T. J. Lawrence, Essays on some Disputed Questions in Modem
International Law (Cambridge, Eng., 1884), Nos. ii-iii.
BAITING THE LION, 1877-1897 381
and was joyously taken up by Blaine in 1881. He announced
to our representatives in Europe that it was " nothing more
than the pronounced adherence of the United States to prin-
ciples long since enunciated." Our guarantee, he maintained,
needed no "reinforcement, or accession, or assent from any /
other power; " a pledge that during a war in which either
the United States or Colombia was engaged hostile military
forces should be permitted to pass through the canal was "no J
more admissible than on the railroad lines joining the At-
lantic and Pacific shores of the United States"; we should
object to any concert of European powers for guaranteeing
the canal.
The last two positions at least were in direct contravention
to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which seems to have escaped
Blaine's attention. On November 1, however, Blaine's case
he took it up. That treaty, he said, was more cfayton-Buf-
than thirty years old; it was for the special wer treaty
purpose of facilitating the construction of a canal which
had never materialized; conditions had now changed with
the development of our Pacific slope; by forbidding the
fortification of the canal, we practically gave it to Great
Britain, as she could control it with her fleet; the treaty
was not consistent with "our right and long established
claim to priority on the American continent;" the entrance
of France had changed the situation; finally, we wished to
fortify the canal, and, in company with the country in which
it was located, to control it. Frelinghuysen, on becoming
secretary, added that the English occupation of British
Honduras constituted a violation of the treaty, and repeated
that "a protectorate by European nations" would be a
violation of the Monroe Doctrine, which we had declared
"at the suggestion of the official representative of Great
Britain."
It must have been a joy to the British foreign office to
answer such dispatches as these, of which it received so many
during this period. Lord Granville replied in a series of
382 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
notes. He pointed out that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was
not a special contract, that it distinctly stated, indeed,
B *ti h f ^^^ ^*^ purpose was to declare a general policy,
the Clayton- The United States, he was able to show,
had specifically agreed that British Honduras
should not be considered a part of Central America. He
remarked that the Monroe Doctrine had not prevented the
formation of the treaty; and he might have added that
Canning, so far from urging its declaration, had immediately
upon its announcement set about to defeat it. He called
attention to the development of the Pacific slope in Canada
as well as in the United States, and in one note Lord Salis-
bury added that the building of the transcontinental rail-
roads had actually decreased our special interest in the canal.
With regard to the age of the treaty, thirty years probably
seemed less in England than in America. Lord Granville
might also have referred to Seward's instructions to Adams
in 1866 when we were seeking a naval station at Tiger
island in Honduras, suggesting that, although the treaty
was really out of date, yet, so long as its binding force
"should remain a question, it would not comport with
good faith for either party to do anything which might
be deemed contrary" even "to its spirit." He might
have shown, too, that Fish in 1872, and Evarts in 1880,
had recognized its existence. The discussion closed with-
out result.
Meanwhile we did not confine ourselves to argument.
We proposed to construct a rival canal on the Nicaraguan
Nicaragua route. In December, 1884, Frelinghuysen
P^*° negotiated a treaty with that country, providing
that such a canal be built under United States auspices and
practically under her control. This treaty was withdrawn
by Cleveland, who reverted to our traditional policy of a
canal internationally guaranteed. Such a highway, he said,
"must be for the world's benefit, a trust for mankind, to be
removed from the chance of domination by any single power.
BAITING THE LION, 1877-1897 383
nor become a point of invitation for hostilities or a prize
for warlike ambitions."
Had Cleveland shared the desire of his Republican pred-
ecessors to find the Clayton-Bulwer treaty void, he might
have attacked it during his second administra- The Mosqui-
tion on better grounds than Blaine found. *°®®
The irritating question of the Mosquitoes seemed to have
been settled in 1860 by a treaty between Great Britain and
Nicaragua. With the revival of interest in the mouth of
the San Juan river, however, adventurers among the tribe
began to scent the possibility of profit in emphasizing the
semi-independence which that treaty, as interpreted by an
arbitrating decision of the emperor of Austria in 1881, gave
them. Nicaragua, unwilling to allow interference with the
bargain which she seemed to be driving with the United
States, asserted her authority, whereupon the Mosquitoes
called in Great Britain, who answered the call. In spite of
protests from the United States, British marines were
landed at Bluefields in 1894. Complicated as were the legal
arguments in the case, there seems to be no doubt that this
interference on the part of Great Britain was in violation of
the spirit of the treaty which she was trying to uphold. In
fact the point was apparently appreciated by her govern-
ment; the marines were withdrawn, and in 1895 the matter
was temporarily settled, but not beyond the possibility of
revival, by the submission of the Mosquitoes to Nicaragua.
The agitation over the canal question did not, during
this period, accomplish any definite result. The canal was
not built, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty remained, „
, - ^_ . , J^ - , 1 /» • 1 **o progress
and the United States had not even definitely
changed its mind.
CHAPTER XXVII
BLAINE, OLNEY, AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE ^
The development of our policy toward Spanish America
during this period was, to 1892, almost entirely the work
of Blaine, whose handling of this subject
Intervention , ° ' ^w^^
in America to was comprehensive and constructive. The
negative influence of the Monroe Doctrine
in preserving the territorial integrity and independence of
the free nations of our continents had undoubtedly been
great, but the hope of Adams and Clay for a sympathetic
union with them, accompanied by a leadership on our part,
had not been realized. Great Britain had won and held the
imp)ort trade, her rivals being France, Spain, and to an in-
creasing extent Germany. The United States actually lost
ground between 1860 and 1880, although she consumed
more and more Brazilian coffee. The immigration of Ger-
mans into Brazil and of Italians into Argentina was laying
a more substantial basis for influence than any we possessed.
The first part of Blaine's policy was developed under
Garfield. He planned to have the United States assume the
M di ti b position of sole mediator in the disputes con-
tween Europe tinually arising between the several American
powers, and between them and European
powers. On this subject we had not previously taken a
definite stand. In 1851 we had joined with France and Great
Britain in mediating between Hayti and the Dominican
Republic; and sometimes our representatives had acted in a
mediating capacity, but more often those of France or Great
Britain had done so.
Blaine's first opportunity appeared in the dispute between
* Latan^, Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America.
384
BLAINE, OLNEY; MONROE DOCTRINE 385
France and Venezuela. The former country had claims
against the latter, and proposed to seize the customs houses
and collect the sum due, a proceeding by no means unusual.
To prevent this desecration of American soil by French
marines, Blaine vigorously urged Venezuela to acknowledge
the French claim, and suggested that the money be paid to
our agent at Caracas; if it were not paid within three
months, he threatened, the United States herself would
seize the customs houses and collect the money. This pro-
posal to act as collecting agent came to nothing at the time,
for Frelinghuysen did not continue the policy; as foreshadow-
ing a course of action later much discussed and sometimes
followed out, it is, however, important.^
With regard to disputes between American powers Blaine
did not claim exclusive authority. June 25, 1881, he wrote to
Fairchild, minister in Spain, protesting against objection to
the proposal to submit to Spain the arbitration European
*^ ^ *^ , mediation be-
of the boundary between Colombia and Costa tween Amer-
Rica. He based his protest on the fact that,
since in the treaty of 1846 we had guaranteed Panama
to Colombia, we should have been consulted. In using
this special ground, he obviously refrained from deny-
ing the right of Spanish-American states to ask European
states to serve in such a capacity under ordinary circum-
stances or that of European states to accept the invitation.
He planned, however, to make such recourse unnecessary
by having the United States serve as a permanent and im-
partial umpire. Already in 1880 Colombia and United states
Chili had agreed to make the president of the *^ «^<^" "^*"
United States a permanent arbitrator between them. In
1881 the settlement of a dispute between Chili and Argentina
is said to have been "due to the unremitting efforts of the
representatives of the United States in both countries."
In 1881 Mexico and Guatemala having a boundary dispute,
the latter applied to us as the "natural protector of the
* Edward Stanwood, James Gillespie Blaine, Boston, etc., 1905.
386 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Central American territory." Blaine offered to arbitrate.
He told Mexico that we were satisfied with our own territory
and that she should be content with what was justly hers;
that he should consider any hostile movement by Mexico
against Guatemala as "not in harmony with the friendly
relations existing between us, and injurious to the best in-
terests of all the republics of this continent. This country,"
he declared, "will continue its policy of peace even if it can-
not have the great aid which the cooperation of Mexico would
assure; and it will hope at no distant day to see such concord
and cooperation between all the nations of America as will
render war impossible."
His greatest chance came in the war raging between Chili
and Peru and Bolivia for the possession of the nitrate mines
_. p situated near the junction of their national
Bolivia-Chili boundaries. Evarts had already offered media-
tion and protested against European inter-
vention. Blaine emphasized both points. He informed
France that the American republics were our younger sisters,
removed from the European system. To Chili and Peru he
sent messengers of peace. They were not, however, well
chosen, for each became the partisan of the country to which
he was sent. Blaine, deeply in earnest, at length sent a
competent man, William H. Trescot of South Carolina,
whose diplomatic experience dated back to 1852 and whose
skill and scholarship were everywhere acknowledged. He
was instructed to warn Chili against making excessive de-
mands as a result of her victories, and to suggest that, if
she did, we would secure the cooperation of other American
powers to coerce her into reasonableness.
These instructions are to be taken in connection with
the second great principle upon which Blaine was acting,
Pan-American that of Pan-Americanism. November 29, 1881,
arbitration j^^ invited all the independent nations of
America to meet for a discussion of arbitration. They were
not, to be sure, to take up "exciting" questions, but were to
^
BLAINE, OLNEY; MONROE DOCTRINE 387
inaugurate an era of peace in America for the future, and
the emanation of their good will might serve to assuage
present passions based on past lawlessness. This opportunity
was lost. Frelinghuysen feared that this meeting of a "par-
tial group of our friends" might oflFend Europe; accordingly,
although many nations accepted the invitation, he indefinitely
postponed the conference, and he discourteously recalled
Trescot.
Blaine employed the leisure between his two terms of office
in preparing the public mind to support his Pan-American
plans on a basis even broader than he had Blaine's influ-
suggested in 1881. In 1882 he wrote The gress^dpX
Foreign Policy of the Garfield Administra- ^^ opinion
tion. He secured the passage by Congress of an amend-
ment to the consular bill of 1884, providing for a commission
of three to obtain information as to the advisability of a
Pan-American Congress. Charlatan and genius, he sought
to recommend his plan of peace and cooperation in America
by a persistent baiting of Europe. He fostered the dispute
with Great Britain concerning the fisheries and Behring sea;
he became discredited among the intellectual class at home
as a jingo; and when he returned to office the Spanish min-
ister of foreign affairs moved an increase in the West Indian
fleet.
Nevertheless he made progress. Congress had already,
in 1888, passed a bill calling a Pan-American Congress,
which Cleveland allowed to become a law _ „ . _ ^
Call for first
without his signature. It was to discuss not Pan-American
arbitration alone, but customs union, weights
and measures, copyright, trademarks and patents, communi-
cations, common coinage, and indeed anything that seemed
suitable. Europe scoffed, and Spanish America was not en-
thusiastic. The president of Chili told his congress that he
had accepted "out of polite regard for a friendly govern-
ment." Senor Romero, the veteran Mexican minister at
Washington, said that there was a general fear that its object
388 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
was "to secure the political and commercial ascendency of
the United States on this continent." ^
The congress was well attended and ably managed by
Blaine, who was elected its president. The delegates had
Meeting of the HO power to bind their governments; but uni-
Congress form sanitary regulations were drawn up, the
survey of an intercontinental railroad was arranged, the
principle of the free navigation of international rivers was en-
dorsed, and agreements, not quite universal, were made con-
cerning trade-marks, patents, and extradition, and treaties
of arbitration and reciprocity between the several nations
were recommended. One thing of real importance was ac-
complished,— the foundation of the Bureau of the Ameri-
can Republics, located at Washington, supported jointly
by the nations concerned, and charged with the collection
of information. Actually permanent, its functions grew till
it became a lasting, though not a strong element of union. ^
The vitality of the whole scLeme rested on the develop-
ment of commercial relations, a process that Blaine sought
^ . . to stimulate by treaties of reciprocity. Such
Reciprocity • , , i , • i • ,%.r,. i ,
treaties had been authorized m 1884, and a few
were drawn up under Arthur, but they were withdrawn by
Cleveland. In 1890 the Republican majority in Congress was
working over the McKinley tariff bill. In this document
sugar, coffee, hides, and other such commodities, our most im-
portant assets for international customs bartering, were put
on the free list. If the bill passed in this form, therefore, we
should have no favors to offer American countries. Blaine
threw himself into opposition. July 11, 1890, he wrote to
Senator Frye, "There is not a section or a line in the entire
bill that will open a market for another bushel of [American]
wheat or another barrel of pork." His position was supported
by western sentiment, and Senator Hale of Maine offered an
^ Romero, M. "The Pan-American Conference," North American Review,
1890, cli. 354-367, 407-421.
* Bureau of the American Republics, Bulletins, 1891, etc
BLAINE, OLNEY; MONROE DOCTRINE 380
amendment representing his views. His plan provided for
a duty on the commodities in question, but empowered the
President " to declare the ports of the United States free and
open to all products of any nation of the American hemi-
sphere upon which no export duties are imposed, whenever
and so long as such nation shall admit to its ports, free of all '*
duties of whatsoever nature, certain enumerated products
of the United States, or such other products as might be
agreed upon. This amendment was not passed, but in sub-
stitution for it one proposed by Senator Aldrich was adopted,
which left the enumerated articles on the free list, but au-
thorized the President, when in his judgment the duties
imposed on the agricultural and other products of the United'
States by nations producing the enumerated articles were
"reciprocally unequal and unjust," to declare in force a pre-
scribed list of duties.^
This rule, being applicable to all the world, deprived
Blaine of his weapon for specially cementing together the
nations of America. Nevertheless he went Reciprocity in
to work actively to use it to open markets for operation
American exports, and his efforts were continued by his
successor, Foster, with the result that agreements were en-
tered into with Brazil, Spain (for Cuba and Porto Rico),
Austria, Nicaragua, Honduras, and with France for herself
and her colonies. Colombia, Hayti, Venezuela, and Spain
with reference to the Philippines, were informed that unless
certain specified duties were removed by March 15, 1892,
the President would enforce the duties provided by the act.
In 1894, before it was possible to determine what effect this
policy was to have on our trade, the Democratic Wilson tariff
was enacted, and Cleveland's first secretary of state in his
new term, Gresham, informed the countries concerned
that the duration of these agreements depended on the dura-
tion of the act, and were therefore void.
1 F. W. Taussig, "Reciprocity," Quarterly Journal of Economics, ii. 314-
346 (1893), vii. 26-39.
390 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
The great tragedy of Blaine's ambition, however, resulted
from the civil war in Chili. In that contest we had not
The Chili em- taken part, but once more our minister had
broglio been ill selected to represent us at so critical
a point. His name being Patrick Egan, he sympathized with
the anti-English party, and was sufficiently demonstrative
to have stirred up decided feeling among its victorious op-
ponents. This feeling had been increased by our over strict
interpretation of our neutral duties in seizing the Itata, a
vessel carrying arms to the successful party. It happened
that under these circumstances, on October 16, 1891, some
sailors from our cruiser Baltimore, who went ashore at Val-
paraiso, were assaulted, one officer was killed, and seven
seamen were wounded. Blaine and Harrison were both being
talked of for the next Republican nomination. The latter
insisted upon dealing with the matter with a high hand in
order to win votes, particularly the Irish ones. Blaine could
not be left behind, and a blustering policy was adopted, with
primary reference to the effect that the episode would have
at home. For a time war seemed imminent; diplomatic
relations were suspended and an ultimatum dispatched.
Chili grudgingly yielded, but the suspicions with which the
Spanish- American states had regarded Blaine were confirmed,
and the memory of his pleasing personality and eloquent ap-
peals for kindliness and cooperation vanished.
Although Blaine seemed to make little impression on the
solid opinion of his time, some of his policies have proved
_ , to be permanently American. The idea of
strength and United States control of the canal, which was
not original with him but which he made his
own, returned later, and apparently to stay. So, too, the
conception of the United States as an intermediary between
American and European nations is incorporated in our
statute books in the case of San Domingo. He was among
the first of our public men to observe the changing conditions \J
of our commerce. That with this ability he should have com-
BLAINE, OLNEY; MONROE DOCTRINE 391
bined the arts of the blatant hawker after votes, thereby
uselessly aggravating the powers of Europe; that, with
the splendid scope of his plan of international cooperation
in America, he should in the eighties have imagined that the
two hemispheres could be divided, not in political ideals
as Adams in the twenties has said they were, but commer-
cially, were evidences of a power of intuitive perception un-
accompanied either by comprehensive knowledge or by a
capacity for thinking things through.
Richard Olney, who formulated President Cleveland's
conception of the Monroe Doctrine, was Blaine's opposite
in every respect. Clear-cut and logical, he The Vene-
thought his problem through to the bitter end, ^"«'* question
and did not have the imagination to see that the end was
bitter. The occasion for the declaration of the Olney doc-
trine arose out of a dispute between Great Britain and
Venezuela. It was a question of boundary, and ran back
to the demarcation line of Alexander VI. More particu-
larly, the situation was that the Spaniards had settled on
the Orinoco, the Dutch on the Essequibo, without ever de-
termining the line between them. In 1814 the Dutch had
ceded western Guiana to the British, and a little later the
Spanish settlements had declared their independence as
Venezuela.
Both Great Britain and Venezuela had extended their
claims to the uttermost, the former to the mouth of the
Orinoco, the latter to the mouth of the Ese- Rise of the
quibo; from 1841 they had been at controversy, controversy
Of the two, Venezuela, fearing Great Britain, was the more
anxious for a fixed line. In 1876 she appealed to us, as "the
most powerful and oldest of the Republics of the new con-
tinent," to lend to the others our "powerful moral support
in disputes with European nations." Evarts, Frelinghuysen,
and Bayard all expressed their interest. Blaine was collect-
ing material on the subject in 1881, and probably would have
taken some action had he continued in office. In 1890 he
392 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
instructed Lincoln to proffer our good oflSces and to suggest
an informal conference of the three countries.
Meantime the question had become acute, owing to the
discovery of gold in the region in dispute and the probabil-
Cleveland and ity of actual occupation. Cleveland therefore
Venezuela proposed to handle it with vigor. He referred
to it in his message of 1894, expressing his hope for arbitra-
tion, and Congress recommended such action to both parties.
England refused, as she had in the case of Lincoln's sugges-
tion, to submit the whole question, but she would arbitrate
within fixed limits. It was at this point that Secretary
Gresham died and Olney took oflBce. It was not, however,
as a result of Gresham's death that the United States policy
showed that sudden acceleration which became a nine days'
wonder for the whole world; the change had already been
determined upon by Cleveland. He believed that, in ac-
cordance with the non-colonization pronouncement of Mon-
roe, the boundaries of foreign colonies in America had be-
come fixed, that they were determinable by judicial process,
and must be so determined lest in a contest between a strong
European nation and a weak American one the line might be
pushed back and the area of freedom curtailed. To insist
upon such a judicial settlement was, he urged, our duty and
privilege.
June 20, 1895, Olney sent his dispatch setting forth these
views. To the more usual phrases of the Monroe Doctrine
The Olney he added, "That distance and three thousand
doctrine miles of intervening ocean make any permanent
political union between a European and an American state
unnatural and inexpedient will hardly be denied." Not
content with thus proclaiming the ultimate extinction of
European colonial possessions, he announced with reference
to the present, " Today the United States is practically sover-
eign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects
to which it confines its interposition." Great Britain, he
declared, could not be considered as a South American power;
BLAINE, OLNEY; MONROE DOCTRINE 303
if she advanced her frontier, she would be acting contrary
to the Monroe Doctrine. In order that we might know that
no such extension was taking place, full arbitration was neces-
sary. The President, he said, must be informed of her policy
before the next meeting of Congress; "if he is disappointed
in that hope" the result will be "calculated to greatly em-
barrass the future relations between this country and Great
Britain."
Lord Salisbury in a long dispatch controverted these
statements, and refused to admit the intervention of the
United States between Great Britain and Vene- Cleveland and
zuela. In a special message of December 17, ^'®** Bntain
1895, Cleveland dealt with the matter in a manner similar
to that which Polk had made use of in connection with Ore-
gon, but more vigorously. He recommended that we ap-
point a commission of our own to investigate the facts. If
its report should show that Great Britain was extending her
territory, nothing would remain but to accept the situation,
to recognize its plain requirements, and to deal with it ac-
cordingly.
War spirit ran high, but it is only fair to President Cleve-
land to say that he was throughout probably conscious of
the irresistible weight of the forces making for The settle-
peace between Great Britain and the United ™®°*
States. He was not bluffing, for he was prepared to meet the
call; but he did not expect to be called. Like Polk, he was
"looking England in the eye." Venezuela prepared her case
for the benefit of our commission, and Great Britain brought
out a timely parliamentary Blue Book, which answered the
same purpose. February 27, 1896, Sir Julian Pauncefote,
who long and ably represented Great Britain at Washington,
was empowered to discuss the question. In order to avoid
yielding, Lord Salisbury suggested a general arbitration
tribunal to adjust all questions between us; but this was re-
fused. After a year of negotiation, February 2, 1897, an
arbitration between Great Britain and Venezuela was ar-
394 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
ranged. Although to a degree Great Britain's action in
treating of the matter with us constituted an acknowledg-
ment of our special position on the continent, she did not
formally recognize it, and she did not conclude without
having forced a compromise, — namely, that the arbitrators
were to act on the rule that adverse possession for fifty years
should make good title, a limitation upon which she had long
insisted. The tribunal met at Paris in 1899, and was dis-
tinguished by the presence of Ex-President Harrison as
counsel for Venezuela. The result was largely favorable to
Great Britain, but it gave Venezuela control of the mouth
of the Orinoco. A dispute between Great Britain and Brazil
concerning the southern boundary of Guiana was in 1901
submitted to arbitration without controversy.'^
As an exposition of the Monroe Doctrine, Olney's dispatch
pushed interpretation to an extreme. It was as much an
Blain d extension of the original intention as was
Olney com- Blaine's. If Blaine could see nothing but /
America, Olney could see nothing but the
United States. If his statement that colonies in America
were but transitory was provocative to Europe, his assertion \/
that the fiat of the United States was law upon this continent
was equally provocative to other American powers. They
could not grasp its consistency with Cleveland's statement
that the Monroe Doctrine found "its recognition in those
principles of international law which are based upon the
theory that every nation shall have its rights protected and
its just claims enforced." They considered our assertion of
authority in connection with what they believed to be our
designs. The really harmless statement of President Hayes,
that an isthmian canal would be part of the coast line of the
United States, they regarded as a threat to all countries
* Henderson, American Diplomatic Questions, 411-443; Grover Cleveland,
Presidential Problems, New York, 1904; Richard Olney, "International
Isolation of the United States," Atlantic Monthly, 1898, Ixxxi. 577-588;
Hiram Bingham, The Monroe Doctrine an Obsolete Shibboleth, New Haven,
\913.
BLAINE, OLNEY; MONROE DOCTRINE 395
between us and it. Our protection of Venezuela, therefore,
failed to increase our popularity in America. In this respect
Olney seems to have been guilty of an ignorance which
Blaine avoided. His remark that "the states of America,
South as well as North, by geographical proximity, by nat-
ural sympathy, by similarity of governmental constitutions,
are friends and allies, commercially and politically, of the
United States," could scarcely have compressed more errors
into fewer words. It contrasts with Blaine's eflPort to make
precisely those hopes, facts.
CHAPTER XXVIII
GROWTH OF AMERICAN INFLUENCE IN THE
PACIFIC
While both political parties were doing their best to
deepen the Atlantic, and the careless words of so many of
. . . our statesmen were preventing any diplomatic
American in- . . ^ . . .
fluence in the understanding with Spanish America, our influ-
ence in the Pacific, unbacked by policy and
largely unnoticed, was rapidly extending. Foremost among
the pioneers were the missionaries, who were carrying their
ministrations to every coral isle and penetrating the vast
bulk of China, to whose awakening they were ultimately to
contribute so much. In China their ministry was distinctly
recognized by the treaties of 1858 and 1868, and everywhere,
as American citizens, they carried the protection of our
name and extended the duties of our diplomacy. The whaler
had become a less customary visitant in the Pacific, but the
trade was not entirely dead. Regular commerce with the
East was not relatively so important as in the first part of
the century, but absolutely it was growing and demanded
the constant attention of our state department and our
representatives abroad.^
In Japan we took a benevolent interest. In returning to
her in 1883 our portion of the Shimonoseki indemnity, we
^ J. M. Callahan, American Relations in the Pacific and the Far East, 1784-
1900, Johns Hopkins University, Studies in Historical and Political Science,
1901, xix. Nos. 1-3; J. W. Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, Boston,
etc., 1908; W. E. Griffis, America in the East, a Glance at our History, Pros-
pects, Problems, and Duties in the Pacific Ocean, New York, 1899; A. T.
Mahan, The Problem of Asia and its Effect upon International Policies,
Boston, 1900; A. R. Colquhoun, The Mastery of the Pacific, New York, etc.,
1902; E. E. Sparks, National Development, 1877-1885 {American Nation^
Vol. xxiii.), chs. xiii-xiv. All these were written after the Spanish war.
396
OUR INFLUENCE IN THE PACIFIC 397
performed an unusual act of international courtesy. With
Japan's desire for commercial autonomy we exhibited sym-
pathy, which was checked, however, by our in-
ternational convention of 1866, and by our sus-
picion as to her readiness for the judicial autonomy for which
she was equally desirous. In 1878 we concluded a commer-
cial treaty with her, surrendering our tariff rights; but, as it
was not to go into effect until the other treaty powers had
similarly surrendered theirs, it served merely as an expression
of our good will. We finally left it for Great Britain to be
the first absolutely to recognize the accomplished modernity
of the empire in 1894, but we followed with a treaty of the
same year. Our general relations continued to be of special
friendliness.^
With China there was much the same spirit, but just as
our territorial acquisitiveness, actual or suspected, has always
prevented that sympathy for which we have Chinese im-
hoped in America, so the vase of our friendship n^s^^t^o"
with the Far East began to show a flaw. As subjects for mis-
sionary effort, and as honest merchants with whom to deal,
we respected the Chinese while we condescended to them.
As competitive laborers in our country we both disliked and
feared them. Concentrated as it was on the Pacific coast,
this sentiment had the advantage of being the dominant po-
litical issue there. The electoral vote of California began to
veer with the attitude of parties on this question, and by 1880
the Californian position became the embodied national will.
In 1879 Congress passed a bill excluding the Chinese, but,
as this action was in contradiction to the Burlingame treaty.
President Hayes vetoed it. To accomplish Chinese ex-
the same end by diplomacy he sent a special <^"s'<>°
commission. Following the precedent of calling upon the
best talent in the country to deal with such emergencies,
instead of relying on our regular diplomatic staff, he selected
* W. E. GriflSs, Tovonsend Harris, First American Envoy in Japan, Boston,
etc., 1895.
398 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
President James B. Angell of the University of Michigan,
and Trescott, with John F. Smith to represent Cahfornia.
They succeeded in obtaining a treaty permitting us to limit
or suspend, though not absolutely to prohibit, the immigra-
tion of laborers. In accordance with this treaty we passed
an exclusion act in 1882.
Successfully evading the law, however, the Chinese con-
tinued to come. More vigorous measures being necessary
Treaty of 1894 to carry out our purpose, we again nego-
with China i-jj^^g^j ijj 1888, and in spite of the failure of the
treaty passed a new and more effective act in that year.
Other laws followed, the most important being the Geary
act of 1892, requiring the registration of all Chinese in this
country. The question as to the return, after leaving the
country, of those once resident here added to the diplomatic
difficulty of the situation. At length in 1894 a new treaty
was signed prohibiting by its own terms the immigration
of Chinese laborers for ten years. "Officials, teachers, stu-
dents, merchants, or travellers for curiosity or pleasure"
were exempted, but they must carry certificates. This took
the question through the period, but our success was not
without the loss of some regard.
Our interest in the Pacific, however, was not confined to
our relations with other nations resident upon it: we were
T t ai becoming one of the most important resident
pansion on the nations ourselves. The definite acquisition of
Oregon with Puget Sound in 1846, and of
California with the bay of San Francisco in 1848, gave us the
best commercial coast line on its western shores, and the
annexation of Alaska in 1867 stretched a finger round toward
Asia.^
From time to time the American flag was raised over a
number of the Pacific islands. In 1812 Commodore Porter,
cruising in the Pacific, named and annexed Madison island;
^ F. H. Skrine, The Expansion of Russia, 1815-1900, Cambridge, Eng.,
1903.
y
OUR INFLUENCE IN THE PACIFIC 399
but name and flag alike soon vanished from it. Ephemeral
national occupation was taken from time to time of guano
islands. By a succession of United States laws The Pacific
the President was authorized, after proper for- inlands
malities, to maintain these as national possessions while the
guano was being extracted, but without incurring any obliga-
tion of perpetual possession. Although some of them were
situated in the Caribbean and elsewhere, the majority were
in the Pacific; in the eighties over fifty were reported as
claimed by Americans in that ocean. The hold of the United
States in such cases was not only temporary but slight; still
conflicting claims of persons and nations, and complaints
as to conditions on them, demanded constant attention by
the department of state. The occupation of the appropriately
named Midway island by the navy in 1867 has been held to
have brought it permanently within our sovereignty.
More important was our connection with the inhabited
islands, the first general interest being excited by the island
kingdom of Samoa. This earthly paradise,
which Stevenson has made the home of ro-
mance and faery, was the scene of diverting wars between the
natives and of Gilbertian intrigues between the American,
German, and English consuls. Like the "three kings of
Chickeraboo," they smoked at Apia, the capital, and
dreamed of circumventing their rivals. Three hundred
foreigners, mostly of the beach-combing variety, divided the
trade of the islands. That of the United States and Great
Britain had ceased to grow, but the Deutsche Handels-und
Plantagengesell-schaft fiir Sudseeinseln zu Hamburg was ex-
tending its sales and taking in payment therefor land titles
of the significance of which the natives had as little idea as
the American Indians had had of theirs. The tendency,
therefore, was for the American and English consuls to co-
operate against the German.^
^ R. L. Stevenson, A Footnote to History: Eight Years of Trouble in Sanuxif
New York, 1892.
400 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
In 1872 one of our naval officers secured an agreement
with a local chieftain giving us harbor privileges. In 1875
a German agent named Steinberger obtained a commis-
sion of inquiry from the United States government, and
o fir t d' 1 ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^ authority attempted to set up
matic relations a government under our protection; but our
consul secured his deportation. In 1878 we
made a treaty with the kingdom. This gave us the right
to use the harbor of Pagopago, in the island of Tutuila, as a
naval station. We on our part agreed, " If, unhappily, any
differences should have arisen, or shall hereafter arise, be-
tween the Samoan government and any other government
in amity with the United States, the government of the latter
will employ its good offices for the purpose of adjusting those
differences upon a satisfactory and solid foundation." Al-
though this pledge did not constitute a protectorate, it was
from time to time so interpreted by our consuls. At any
rate, it seems to have been somewhat of a departure from our
tradition of avoiding entangling obligations.
In 1884 the German consul, on pretext of an agreement
with King Malietoa, hoisted the German flag over the
Approach of royal hut. In 1886 the American consul once
the crisis more proclaimed our protectorate. Our govern-
ment, being appealed to under the treaty of 1878, sent a
commission to investigate, and in accordance with their
report Bayard sought to come to an agreement with the
German and British ministers at Washington. A conference
was arranged, but failed to agree. Meantime a quarrel
between King Malietoa and the German consul culminating
opportunely at the time of the arrival of a German warship,
the consul deposed and deported the king, and substituted
for him another, Tamasese. Uprose at this point Mataafa,
a native champion of island rights, and refused to recognize
Tamasese. The German warship Adler bombarded Mataafa's
villages, while the American consul, Sewall, steamed his
launch between the Adler and the shore. Finally, De-
OUR INFLUENCE IN THE PACIFIC 401
cember 18, 1888, Mataafa surrounded a German landing
party, and killed fifty of its members.
German public opinion demanded satisfaction and the vin-
dication of German arms; American public sentiment, touched
by the heroism of the Samoans, demanded that The crisis and
our government protect them; Great Britain, *^« hurricane
jealous of Germany as a new rival in the colonial field,
stood with the United States. All three sent warships, and
it was a possibility that any day might bring news that
their animosities, stimulated by the tropic heat, had resulted
in hostilities. On March 16, 1889, a hurricane descended
on Apia, blowing bad feeling away before it. Every one,
the sailors of the three nations as well as the natives, showed
helpfulness and good feeling, and the air in Samoa cleared.
Meantime, in the real world Bayard and Bismarck were
trying to reach a permanent solution of these troubles.
Bayard, in accordance with American tradi- General Act of
tions, insisted that the basis of such a solution ^«'^
must be the authority of the natives; Bismarck could see
no permanence for trade except in European control. At
length, and after rather heated controversy, the Washington
conference was revived in Berlin. The United States sent
a commission headed by John A. Kasson, another veteran
in diplomacy, who, like Trescot, was often called in for
critical service. In 1889 there was concluded the General
Act of Berlin, which recognized the independence of Samoa,
but gave preponderance of authority to a chief justice and a
president of the municipal council of Apia, to be chosen by the
three powers, the United States, Great Britain, and Germany.
Trivial as was this affair, its significance as illustrating
the interplay of old and new forces in American diplomacy is
great. Some importance attaches to the ap- t i .._• *
. . Impbcations of
pearance of a new bogy, the German empire, the Samoan
In 1871 that power was supposed to want ^^^°
Samana Bay; the first actual evidence of rivalry with us
appeared in the Samoan affair, and other instances were to
402 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
arise. In this case, the real obstacle to agreement was the
traditional American belief in the right of local self-govern-
ment. Had we believed in the extension of the colonial
system, division of the islands and compromise would have
been easy. In the end, however, the United States, though
she saved the form of independence for Samoa, was forced to
consent to its violation in substance, thereby becoming her-
self involved in a very spider's web of entangling alliance.
It was the third such international agreement into which we J
had entered. The first, the treaty of 1866 between Great
Britain, France, Holland, Japan, and ourselves, was per- /
haps only an agreement by concert. It was, however, al-
ready proving troublesome, and would doubtless have
entangled us seriously in the future had not rising Japan
shaken it off. The second was an agreement concerning
Morocco, entered into in 1880. including most European ,
powers, and having to do with the protection of foreigners
and their native prot6g6s in that country. Apparently harm-
less in itself, it involved us, though not materially, in the
great Algeciras conference that bid fair to plunge Europe
into war in 1906. It is important to note that none of these
agreements had to do with Europe or the Americas, and
that two were concerned with the Pacific.^
Richest and most strategically important of the island
groups of the Pacific was Hawaii, where we had possessed
^. . . _ from the beginning the really predominant
terests in interest. As early as 1820 we had appointed
an "agent . . . for commerce and seamen,"
and in the same year the first of our missionaries arrived
there. The latter was particularly well received by the King
Kamamaha, the Napoleon of the Pacific, who had consoli-
dated the whole group of islands into a strong kingdom.
The missionaries aided him in establishing a civilized govern-
ment, reduced the language to writing, and codified the laws;
their children became land-owners and sugar-planters, an
^ Schurz, Speeches, etc., v. 1-10.
OUR INFLUENCE IN THE PACIFIC 40S
opulent and fascinating aristocracy, preserving their Amer-
icanism of race and education. Our interests there were
still further advanced by the establishment of reciprocity
in 1875, and our commerce offered a substantial basis for a
claim to priority.^
This we had put forth as early as 1842, when Webster said
that the government of Hawaii should not be the object
of interference by foreign powers. In 1843 j^. ^ ^^^.
a British naval officer made one of those un- protection of
authorized seizures of the islands which so
often result in the permanent extension of British territory.
Legare instructed Everett to protest, and declared that, if
Great Britain persisted, we might be justified even in using
force, a warning which practically included Hawaii within
the American continents and under the protection of the
Monroe Doctrine. The British withdrew. An appearance
of interest by France in 1851 led Fillmore to reiterate our
views. Although Blaine, or some subordinate, forgot to
invite her to the Pan-American Congress in 1889, it may be
said to have been the American contention from the time of
Webster that Hawaii was constructively and in the general
sense American. Because of the priority of our interests.
Bayard in 1888 refused to join with England and France in a
joint guarantee of the government.
Our protection was several times asked, and while any such
formal arrangement was refused, it was practically extended.
Marcy and Seward were anxious for annexa- Discussion of
tion. Fish summed up the situation well in ^^exation
1873: "There seems to be a strong desire on the part of many
persons in the islands, representing large interests and great
wealth, to become annexed to the United States. And
while there are, as I have already said, many and influential
1 W. F. Blackman, The Making of Hawaii, New York, etc., 1899; L. A.
Thurston, A Hand-book on the Annexation of Hawaii, [St. Joseph, Mich.,
1897]; M. H. Krout, Hawaii and a Revolution, New York, 1898; Liliuokalani,
Hawaii's Story by Hawaii's Queen, Boston, 1898; Chalfant Robinson, History
of txvo Reciprocity Treaties.
404 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
persons in this country who question the policy of any insular
acquisitions, perhaps even any extension of territorial limits,
there are also those of influence and of wise foresight who see
a future that must extend the jurisdiction and the limits of
this nation, and that will require a resting spot in the mid-
ocean, between the Pacific coast and the vast domains of
Asia, which are now opening to commerce and Christian
civilization." The feeling against expansion was too strong
to be overcome, however, especially since the advantage of
reciprocity made it seem unnecessary. Without annexation,
even the navy was provided for: by a Senate amendment to a
renewal of the reciprocity treaty in 1884, which was accepted
by the Hawaiian government, we were to have the exclusive
right to use Pearl harbor as a coaling and repair station.
Nevertheless, Blaine in 1881 seriously considered annexa-
tion, for the bogy of foreign influence was appearing. In a
Blaine and confidential dispatch to our minister, Comly, he
Hawaii ^^^^ ^^^^ ^g must take the islands if the native
population continued to decline. "Throughout the con-
tinent, north and south," he wrote, "wherever a foothold
is found for American enterprize, it is quickly occupied, and
this spirit of adventure, which seeks its outlet in the mines of
South America and the railroads of Mexico, would not be
slow to avail itself of openings of assured and profitable enter-
prize even in mid-ocean."
Before Blaine came in again foreign influence had taken
on a definite form. The king had died, and had been suc-
British influ- ceeded by Queen Liliuokalani, who had married
ence in Hawaii ^ Scotchman, and whose successor, the crown
princess Kaiulani, was the daughter of an Englishman and
had been educated in England. Blaine appointed a personal
friend, J. L. Stevens, as minister. On February 8, 1892,
Stevens wrote: "At a future time, after the proposed treaty
shall be ratified, I shall give you a more elaborate statement
of facts and reasons why a 'new departure' by the United
States as to Hawaii is rapidly becoming a necessity, that a
OUR INFLUENCE IN THE PACIFIC 405
protectorate is impracticable, and that annexation must be
the future remedy or else Great Britain will he furnished rjoith
circumstances and opportunity to get a hold on these islands
which will cause future serious embarrassment to the United
States. At this time there seems to be no immediate pros-
pect of its being safe to have the harbor of Honolulu left
without an American vessel of war. Last week a British
gunboat arrived here, and it is said will remain here for an
indefinite period." Foster, succeeding Blaine, June 29, 1892,
asked Stevens for two series of reports, one public and one
confidential. On November 20, 1892, Stevens in one of the
latter discussed the terms of annexation. Scenting a revolu-
tion, he asked how to use the United States naval force
which had been sent to the harbor.
On January 14, 1893, the queen abolished the constitution
drawn up and administered largely by the American element,
and proclaimed a new one based on absolutism _ , ^
. . , . Revolution
and native home rule. At 2 p. m., January 16, and anneza-
the American element organized a committee
of safety; at 4:30 p. m. the United States forces landed at the
request of Stevens. The next day a provisional government
was organized and was at once recognized by Stevens; the
queen surrendered under protest. Envoys of the new govern-
ment were sent to the United States by the next steamer,
and passage was refused to the envoy of the queen. Febru-
ary 14 a treaty of annexation was drawn up at Washington.
On March 9 President Cleveland withdrew this treaty
from the consideration of the Senate and soon after sent a
commissioner to investigate the facts of the _,, . .
revolt. The latter could not obtain evidence jects annexa-
that Stevens was in collusion with the men who
held the very quiet meeting at 2 p. m., January 16, although
the landing of our troops at 4:30 p. m., seemed to indicate
his complicity. It was clear, however, that the only solid
force behind the revolt was the presence of United States
marines, and that the leaders had counted upon them. More-
406 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
over, although the only proper pretext for the landing of the
seamen was the protection of American citizens and property,
yet they were stationed in a portion of the city where there
was nothing American to protect. Cleveland recalled Stev-
ens, and December 19 requested the new government to re-
store the queen. This it refused to do; and even if the ma-
jority of the population preferred the native dynasty, their
preference was not strong enough, at any rate, to drive them
to serious revolt, nor did Cleveland venture to use force.
The provisional government became permanent, waiting for
a return of Republican control in the United States and a
renewed opportunity for annexation.^
Even if Hawaii was theoretically part of the American
continent, practically it was far out in the Pacific, and even
Our position in if it was still independent, its government was
"^ as American as that of Texas between 1836 and
1845. With Alaska and Midway island in our possession,
with Hawaii American, and Samoa under our joint control,
we were by 1897 halfway across to Asia.
The period from 1877 to 1898 was one of flux. No strong
current of popular interest or purpose was apparent, and
1877-1898 a the surface of diplomacy was choppy with the
penod of fltxx wind of circumstance, but some eddies in the
stream indicated new conditions not fully understood. The
most important development was that of our interests in
the Pacific, a process which had gone on for the most part
independently of diplomacy, but which must before many
years involve diplomatic action. Similarly, the impending
changes in our commercial position arising from the growth
of an export trade in manufactures was sure to concern the
diplomat sooner or later. Of more immediate moment was
the oscillation of our opinions as to the status of the isthmian
canal which had become an imminent possibility. Our in-
terest in Spanish America was increasing; there were some
signs of a more special interest in the Caribbean, but no one
* Senate Reports, 53 Cong. 2 sess., ii. No. 227.
OUR INFLUENCE IN THE PACIFIC 407
felt certain what our policy there would be. In a general
way, also, it was evident that international associations were
becoming closer; but whether we should be a dog in the manger
or a gracious participant, and whether participation would
mean the abandonment of our policy of self-contained ab-
stinence from European politics, no one could tell.
CHAPTER XXIX
THE SPANISH WAR
When William McKinley became President in 1897, he
shared with an overwhelming majority of Americans the
_ . . view that our destiny was peace and our in-
The war spint , . i mi c i
hentance complete. Ihe fact that we had,
without becoming involved in war, passed through a period
when diplomatic leadership was vacillating when it was not
weak, and when the virile manhood of the country had been
trained to battle, seemed to assure the future. It is possible,
however, that the spiritual impulse to war is strongest when
the horrors of past struggles have had time to become blurred,
when the veteran, respected and reminiscent, embroiders its
glories and its satisfactions. Neither the war of 1812 nor the
Spanish war was necessary. Those responsible for both jus-
tified themselves by referring to causes which had long been in
existence. The development of the crisis in each case was in
large measure due to the rise of a new spirit.
The pugnacity and nationalism of Blaine and Olney were
due in part to an apprehension, in part to a reflection, of a
_ general militancy and a demonstrative pa-
tions of pa- triotism. During the later eighties and nine-
ties public schools began to teach respect for
the flag, assemblies began to rise at the playing of the na-
tional anthem or to be chidden for not rising, the comic opera
began to exhibit the national emblems and to be condemned
for so doing. American history and military drill came to
be commonly taught in schools and colleges. A new genera-
tion of historians dedicated themselves to the study of our
past; patriotic societies awakened the popular interest in the
deeds of their ancestors. In a material way this sentiment
406
THE SPANISH WAR 409
found expression in the regeneration of our navy, which,
from its Civil war bulk and efficiency, had sunk to such a
point that in 1891 the prospect of war with Chili caused not
entirely unjustifiable panic on the Pacific coast.
The occasion that gave point to this national assertive-
ness was the outbreak of a new levolt against Spanish rule
in Cuba. This began in 1895, and in character Cuban insur-
resembled the ten years' insurrection of 1868 ^^^^°°^
to 1878. Cubans themselves were divided, hence the strug-
gle took on the nature of a civil war. The Spanish troops
and volunteers were able to drive the insurrectionists to the
mountains; but these, running in a long ridge from one end
of the island to the other, offered countless fastnesses for
refuge and for use as posts from which to attack the plan-
tations in the plains at their foot.^
Innumerable causes of friction between the United States
and Spain were inherent in the situation. The Cubans
planned to conduct the war from the United American as-
States as a base. Many Cubans of wealth "Stance
resided in the United States, and that sympathy for revolu-
tion which has never failed among us promised assistance.
A Cuban committee headed by the inspiring name of Ethan
Allen raised the Cuban flag over its headquarters in New
York. Cuban bonds were sold, and the press generally ex-
pressed its hope for the success of the movement. Irritating
as all this was to Spain, she had no cause to complain unless
words were transmuted into action. This Cleveland tried to
prevent, by ordering our neutrality laws to be enforced. In
spite, however, of an administration that seemed to be con-
scientiously rigid, aid did reach Cuba. The Spanish govem-
^ Chadwick, Relations of the United States and Spain, Diplomacy; Louis Le
Fur, Etude sur la guerre hispano-amiricaine de 1898, Paris, 1899; J. H.
Latan^, America as a World Power 1897-1907. (American Nation, vol. xxv.),
chs. i.-iv; E. J. Benton, International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-
American War, Baltimore, 1908; Achille Viallate, Les prSliminaires de la
guerre hispano-americaine et V annexation des Philippines par les Etats-Unis,
Revue Uistorique, 1903, Ixxxii. 242-291.
410 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
ment asserted that its delay in quelling the insurrection was
due to this assistance.
The causes for irritation on the part of the United States
were numerous. American capital was invested in the
American in- island, particularly in the tobacco industry,
terests ^^^ ^^^ therefore subject to loss. Many of our
citizens, particularly natives of Cuba naturalized in the
United States, were residents and were doing business there,
and these were continually in trouble. Official complaints
and inquiries by our government included such subjects as
the maltreatment of naturalized Americans, their irregular
trial and condemnation for participation in the revolt, the
destruction of American property, the expropriation of prop-
erty of United States citizens for military use, the methods
of dealing with American vessels thought to be running the
blockade, the Spanish prohibition of the export of leaf to-
bacco to the injury of American interests, the withdrawal of
Spanish protection from American plantations and other
property, to say nothing of the harsh treatment of the cor-
respondents of the American press recklessly seeking news
in the dungeon's mouth.
The fact that Spain had not yet settled our claims arising
out of the last war did not diminish our insistence. These
Disputes be- claims were actually paid in 1898, but we were
and*United"^ at odds not only over Spanish delay but also
States Qygj. theory. Since we had recognized no state
of war, we still held her responsible for the acts of the insur-
gents, such as the destruction of some property and the levy
of assessments to secure the exemption of still more, a respon-
sibility which Spain continued to deny, as she had done in
1871. This conflict of opinion was, however, less provocative
of bad feeling than the annoyance to which we were con-
stantly subjected in the delay caused by the necessity of
dealing with every petty case through Madrid. Complaints
came to our consul-general at Havana, from him went to
Washington, and thence to Madrid; Madrid sought the
THE SPANISH WAR 411
facts from Havana, and on receiving them, if there were no
controversy, sent its orders to Havana.
While such calls by the hundreds almost clogged our state
department, the people did not confine their attention to
the sufferings of our own citizens. The conduct American
of the war itself was the leading topic of their sy™P*t^^y
comment. After Martinez de Campos had driven the in-
surgents from the fields but failed to dislodge them from
the mountains, he was succeeded by General Weyler, the
" Butcher," as he came to be known in America. He adopted
two methods of subduing the rebels. One was that of the
corral, a system of wire fences and blockhouses stretched
across the island, and gradually pushed forward with the
hope of penning the insurgents up in one end. The other
method was that of starving them out by destroying every-
thing eatable within their reach. To accomplish this ob-
ject, Weyler caused the population of infected areas to be
brought together in reconcentrado camps, and crops and
granaries to be burned. This policy involved the virtual
imprisonment of many American citizens and the giving
over of their property to destruction. Executed with all
the Spanish indifference to suffering, the prevailing lack of
sanitary knowledge, and the inadequacy of Spain's financial
resources, the reconcentrado camps became pest-holes filled
with starving unfortunates.
The horror of the American public at these atrocities so
near their own territory was inflamed, as the pressure of
their opinion upon tlie government was con- influence of
stantly increased, by the attention which the *^® '^*^^
press devoted to Cuban affairs. The boast of an important
American journalist that it cost him three millions to bring
on the war need not be taken seriously. In spite of the bril-
liancy of his sensational strokes, it was upon other papers
than his that the solid elements which pushed Congress to
action based their opinion. It was by no particular design
that the press as a whole exploited the Cuban question; it
412 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
was the question of the day upon which Americans wanted
news. It was on the reports of such men as Consul-General
Lee and Senator Proctor, and of reliable and known corre-
spondents, that the eflPective majority formed its views. If,
however, the American people had not possessed such an
instrument as their press to circulate the opinions of Lee and
Proctor, to ascertain the facts that they wished to know,
their interest might have remained dormant and the war
might not have occurred.
Cleveland, intent on peace, enforced neutrality, refused to
recognize belligerency, but offered mediation and threatened
Development intervention. Sherman, McKinley's secretary
ofpoUcy q£ state, followed the example of Fish by as-
serting our right to oversee the conduct of the war. June 26,
1897, he wrote: "The inclusion of a thousand or more of our
own citizens among the victims of this [the reconcentrado]
policy, the wanton destruction of the legitimate investments
of Americans to the amount of millions of dollars, and the
stoppage of avenues of normal trade — all these give the
President the right of specific remonstrance, but in the just
fulfillment of his duty he cannot limit himself to these formal
grounds of complaint. He is bound by the higher obligations
of his representative office to protest against the uncivilized
and inhuman conduct of the campaign in the Island of Cuba.
He conceives that he has a right to demand that a war, con-
ducted almost within sight of our shores and grievously af-
fecting American citizens and their interests throughout the
length and breadth of the land, shall at least be conducted
according to the military codes of civilization." In a later
dispatch he called attention to the fact that conditions in
the camps imperilled our own health. On July 16 he wrote
to Woodford, our minister in Spain, that public opinion
strongly demanded recognition, and that beyond recognition
lay intervention. He asked whether Spain could offer a
solution.
The death of the Spanish prime minister, the conservative
THE SPANISH WAR 413
Canovas, in the following fall, and the appointment of the
liberal Sagasta, seemed to promise alleviation. In November,
Spain promised to break up the reconcentrado change of
camps; the queen regent issued decrees for the Spanish poUcy
establishment of legislative autonomy in Cuba and sub-
stituting Blanco for Weyler; and on December 6, McKinley
told Congress that we must allow time enough to determine
the success of the new system. Our government, however,
more and more earnestly urged upon Spain that the struggle
in Cuba could not be indefinitely prolonged without necessity
for action on our part ; and in March it began to grow restive.
During this watchful pause in the development of our
policy two episodes inflamed the pubUc mind. Dupuy de
L6me, the Spanish minister at Washington, in De Lome epi-
a private letter to a Madrid editor visiting *°***
Havana, characterized McKinley as a vacillating and time-
serving politician. This letter fell into the hands of the
American press. On the same day on which it was published,
February 9, 1898, Woodford was instructed to demand his
recall. De Lome, upon seeing the facsimile of his letter in a
newspaper, cabled his resignation. It was accepted, and
he thus escaped the punishment he should have received.
Although our state department expressed satisfaction, it
would have been more conducive to peace had he been re-
called.
On January 24, 1898, we expressed our intention of send-
ing a warship on a friendly visit to Havana, the Maine was
sent, and on February 15, in Havana harbor, _. . j ^^^^
an explosion utterly wrecked the ship and up of the
killed 266 of the crew, besides wounding 60.
A large portion of the American public at once attributed
this catastrophe to the action of Spain, the more conserva-
tive laid it to the individual action of Spanish officers. T. B.
Reed, speaker of the House of Representatives and an oppo-
nent of war, suggested, but not openly, that the insurgents
blew up the vessel in order to bring on war. Spain naturally
414 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
urged internal combustion as the cause. Among these con-
flicting theories, that of Spanish responsibihty was the most
general in the United States, and "Remember the Maine"
became a popular call to action. Responding to the new
impulse, Congress could no longer be held in check. March 9
J. G. Camion introduced a bill granting fifty million to the
President for war preparations; and still more definite action
was inevitable unless it were prevented by some decided
change in the situation.
The administration exerted itself to change the situation.
In the age and infirmity of Secretary Sherman, the manage-
Last effort for ment of the negotiation at Washington was
peace undertaken by the assistant secretary of state.
President McKinley's close friend, William R. Day. The
cable was kept hot with messages between him and Wood-
ford, who was in constant touch with the Spanish adminis-
tration. The latter did not want war any more than we did,
but feared humiliation. It regarded Cuba as already lost,
but it must save its face with the Spanish public.
March 27, 1898, Day enumerated our demands to Wood-
ford: anmesty until October 1, during which negotiations
United States should be conducted through the President of
demands ^j^^ United States; immediate abolition of the
reconcentrado policy, and admission, which had heretofore
been refused, of relief from the United States for the suffering;
should the negotiations prove unsuccessful, the President
was to act as arbiter. The demand for facilities to examine
the Maine in order to ascertain the cause of the explosion
had already been made. Under these terms the Spanish
government writhed, fearing to yield completely, and yet
realizing the necessity of yielding in substance. March 31
it abrogated the reconcentrado system in the western prov-
inces and offered to refer the question of the Maine to arbi-
tration. April 3, Woodford cabled that, should the President
ask the Pope to intervene, the latter's suggestion for an im-
mediate anmesty would be accepted. Spain would also, he
THE SPANISH WAR 415
intimated, feel less humiliated in yielding, if we withdrew our
fleet now in Cuban waters. "I can get the peace that you
have worked so hard for," he protested. Day replied,
" Would the peace you are so confident of securing mean the
independence of Cuba? The President cannot hold his mes-
sage longer than Tuesday."
On April 5 Day was informed that the reconcentrado policy
was abolished over the entire island, and Woodford cabled
asking if an amnesty by the queen regent, g • , j^ |
dated April 6, and prefaced, "at the request tating accept-
of the Holy Father, and in sincere hope and
belief that during this suspension permanent and honorable
peace may be obtained," would be sufficient. "Please read
this," he added, "in the light of all my previous telegrams
and letters. I believe that this means peace, which the sober
judgment of our people will approve long before next Novem-
ber, and which must be approved at the bar of final history."
Day said that the President would lay the whole matter before
Congress. On April 6 a joint note of the powers was pre-
sented, appealing "to the feelings of humanity and modera-
tion of the President and of the American people." A similar
note was presented to Spain, and at length, on April 9, an
amnesty based on this appeal was granted and negotiation
with the insurgents authorized. On April 10 Woodford
cabled that the negotiation would result in autonomy,
independence, or cession to us, according to our wishes.
By this time, so far as our government knew, there re-
mained no American citizen in a Cuban prison, the recon-
centrado policy had been stopped, American „, d' i -
relief had been admitted, most questions arising matic status,
in Cuba could be settled directly through our ^ '
consul at Havana, Fitzhugh Lee, arbitration on the Maine
controversy had been offered, and amnesty had been granted.
In two respects our terms had not been exactly met, that
the negotiation during the amnesty be conducted officially
through the President, and that the President be arbi-
416 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
ter if the negotiation failed. Our minister, however, as-
sured the government that its decision would govern the
result. This solution McKinley seems to have been content
to accept; yet it may be well questioned how valuable was the
assurance of a government that dared not announce its
decision to its own people. Spanish public opinion was as
excited as our own. The less educated beUeved that war
would be successful; and many of those who realized that it
would not, preferred war to the revolution which they feared
if the crown should yield to the United States. However
sincere the government of Sagasta, there was no guarantee
that Sagasta could remain in office. Under these circum-
stances the President would not have been justified in resist-
ing the sentiment of Congress that war was necessary.
On April 11 he sent in his message, already delayed a few
days in order to allow Americans to leave Cuba and to permit
McKinley and the completion of war preparations. He
Congress recommended forcible intervention, but recog-
nition of neither belligerency nor independence; whereupon
Congress, entirely out of hand, adopted joint resolutions, on
April 17, calling upon Spain to withdraw from Cuba and
authorizing the President to use our forces to compel her to do
so. It was further resolved that the United States did not
desire Cuba, and "that the people of the island of Cuba are
and of right ought to be free and independent." In this last
resolution vanished, apparently forever, the cherished hope
and frequently expressed conviction of our statesmen from
Jefferson to the Civil war, that Cuba must inevitably become
part of the United States.
Since neither Spain nor the United States had adhered to
the Declaration of Paris, they were free to practice pri-
_ , , vateering. On April 26, 1898, however, the
Rules of war _, . , , , . .... , . *
President of his own mitiative proclaimed the
principles of that declaration, and on May 7 a proclamation
of the queen regent announced that practically the same rules
would be observed by Spain.
THE SPANISH WAR 417
The administration had already determined, in the event of
war, to attack the Spanish empire not only in Cuba but also
at its other extremity, the Philippines. Those The Philip-
far-away islands had appeared in our diplomacy P"^®*
as early as 1786, when Rufus King suggested that trade con-
cessions there might be obtained from Spain in part payment
for Jay's proposed surrender of the navigation of the Missis-
sippi for a term of years. ^ Historically they might have been
supposed to fall under the wing of the Monroe Doctrine, for
the Spaniards regarded them as part of the western hemi-
sphere; in fact it was the supposition that they fell within the
continuance of Alexander VI's demarcation line that gave
Spain her first title to them. Actually, moreover, their con-
nection with Europe had been westward until the independ-
ence of Spanish America barred the way. But it is not
probable that such considerations as these influenced young
Captain Dewey when, at the time of the Virginius afifair,
he proposed, in case war should break out, to take the ves-
sel which he was commanding on the west coast of Mexico
across the Pacific and attack Manila.^ To him it was merely
that Manila was a vulnerable point; and it was probably the
same reason that moved the administration in 1898 to order
Commodore Dewey and his fleet to attack that port. It is
also to be observed that for a belligerent American fleet in
Asia there were but three alternatives, — to return home, to be
interned in a neutral port, or to occupy an enemy's harbor.
Moreover, it was doubtless felt that a natural result of
peace might be the concession to us of a harbor of our own
in the East, which would prevent the recurrence of a simi-
lar situation. On May 1, by the battle of Manila Bay,
Dewey made good his position in the best harbor of the
archipelago.
The war having gone against her, Spain, on July 22, 1898,
through the French ambassador Cambon, made the first
* King to Gerry, June 4, 1786, Mass. Hist. Soc., Proceedings, 1866, pp. 9-12.
* George Dewey, Autobiography, New York, 1913.
418 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
approach for peace. On July 30 Day replied, stating our
general terms; Spain was to relinquish all her claim to Cuba
^ . . and immediately to withdraw; she was to grant
peace negotia- us as indemnity all her remaining West India
islands and a selected island in the Ladrone
group, in the mid-Pacific; "the United States," he declared,
"will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila,
pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall de-
termine the control, disposition, and government of the Phil-
ippines." These terms Spain accepted, August 7, with the
statement that she did not ipso facto relinquish the Philip-
pines; and on August 12 a protocol of agreement was signed.
The treaty of peace was to be drawn at Paris. The Presi-
dent appointed as president of the commission Day, who had
The peace succeeded Sherman as secretary of state on
commission ^pj.jj gg^ ^^^ ^^lo on September 16 resigned
that post to undertake this new service. With him were sen-
ators Davis, Frye, and Gray, and Whitelaw Reid. The
commission was conspicuously fortunate in having as its sec-
retary the publicist John Bassett Moore, who had been con-
nected with the state department from 1885 to 1891, thus
overlapping the long tenure of Hunter, and who had just
now been serving as assistant secretary of state. The Spanish
commissioner least unknown to America ^as Don Eugenio
Mohtero Rios.
The negotiations from our point of view were the simplest
in which we had ever been engaged, for we stood in a position
to demand what we wanted. The trouble was, we were not
entirely certain what we did want. The Spanish delegates
were particularly disturbed over the debt secured by Cuban
revenues. The other Spanish- American States had, on re-
ceiving recognition from Spain, assumed their debts; but, as
this one had been incurred in the eflFort to subdue Cuba
rather than in an attempt to improve her condition, our
commissioners would not consent that the new island govern-
ment should be saddled with it. The United States, never
THE SPANISH WAR 41d
avaricious of money from a defeated enemy, released Spain
from all claims resulting from the insurrection, and agreed to
adjudge and pay them herself. It is interesting to note that
the domestic commission appointed for their settlement
adopted the Spanish contention that Spain was not responsi-
ble for the acts of the insurgents and that "concentration and
devastation are legitimate war measures." On one point we
yielded to the desires of Spain. She was unwilling, on
abandoning Cuba, to deliver it to the insurgents, a sense of
honor and prudence combining to urge her to this position.
We therefore agreed to receive the island in trust. The island
which we selected in the Ladrone group, Guam, was ceded
to us.
By far the chief feature of the negotiation, however, was
the disposition of the Philippines. McKinley stated in
August: "I do not want any ambiguity to be status of the
allowed to remain on this point. The negotia- PJ^^^PP^^es
tors of both countries are the ones who shall resolve upon the
permanent advantages which we shall ask in the archipelago,
and decide upon the intervention, disposition, and govern-
ment of the Philippines." On October 31 the American
commissioners formally suggested the cession of the whole
group to the United States. Apparently the chief evidence
before the commission to lead to this decision was the report
of General Merritt, who brought directly from Manila the
views of Admiral Dewey. He pointed out that we wanted
one of the islands as a coaling station, and that what we left
some other nation, stronger than Spain, would take. He
felt that the actual situation in the islands was bad, and that
in some way we were responsible for its cure.
The foreign bogy in this case was Germany. It is quite
possible that Germany, on the lookout for colonies, had
before our war considered the acquisition of the „.
• 1 1 mi r 1 T% -n n i • MinOf poilltS
islands. Ihe action of her Pacmc neet during
our occupation of Manila harbor was calculated to excite such
suspicion, and, her prompt purchase, in 1899, of everything
420 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
that we left to Spain in that ocean is further evidence of
her desires. As the Philippines were not in America,
our non-transfer corollary of the Monroe Doctrine did
not apply to them; but it was obvious that the value
of a naval station there would be much diminished if sur-
rounded by the possessions of a strong naval power like
Germany.
That the question of the disposition of the islands was not
more complicated was due to Admiral Dewey's knowledge of
Conditions in international law and his tact. He found an
the islands insurrection going on there similar to that which
we had found in Cuba; but, while maintaining friendly
relations with the insurrectionists and cooperating with them,
he refrained from recognition. It was evident that, should
the forces of Spain be withdrawn, widespread murder and de-
struction of property would take place; on the other hand,
should we leave the islands in the hands of Spain, we would
leave civil war, and would abandon the islanders, who under
their leader Aguinaldo had been cooperating with us. The
suggestion of Carl Schurz, that we turn the islands over to
Belgium or Holland, was hardly within the cognizance of
practical international politics, if indeed it was consistent
with international morality. It was this situation which
seemed to Admiral Dewey to involve us in some responsi-
bility.
It can hardly be that a question of this magnitude was left
to the commissioners, particularly under a President so
American pub- notably characterized by keeping his ear to the
Uc opinion ground as was McKinley. It is impossible to
believe that the decision was not made at Washington, and in
accordance with the pressure of what the administration
believed to be public opinion. When Dewey won the battle
of Manila Bay, the idea of expansion so far afield was novel
to the great majority of Americans. As the sentiment for
"all Mexico" developed during our war with that country,
so an expansionist feeling developed in the United States dur-
THE SPANISH WAR 421
ing the summer and fall of 1898. Engendered by the reasons
already given, it received direction from two forces par-
ticularly powerful at the White House — the influence of
capital seeking new fields for exploitation, and the enthu-
siasm of the missionary element filled with the idea of
the good that we might do there. With many to whom
the diffusion of Christianity by the organized work of
religious bodies was not a leading purpose, a general belief
in the civilizing function of our race, just then set forth
in Kipling's White Man's Burden, was a deciding con-
sideration.^
The Spanish commissioners were forced to accept the
American proposition, sugared as it was by the payment of
twenty millions. The annexation of territory Terms of the
not a part of the American continents, thickly *^®**y
populated by a foreign race, and not likely ever to become
predominantly American constituted in each particular a
departure from our previous policy. The last two differences
the Philippines shared with Porto Rico, included in the same
treaty.^ An additional divergence was made in the provision
that the civil rights and political status of the inhabitants " of
the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be
determined by the Congress." Their religious freedom only
was secured by the treaty. In all previous annexations provi-
sion had been made for incorporation into the United States,
except in case of Alaska, and there all except the native
Indians were to have the rights of citizens of the United
States.^ For the first time we were acquiring colonies. What
» Herbert Croly, M. A. Hanna (New York, 1912), 279-280, attributes
much influence to Senator Orville Piatt.
^ Whitelaw Reid, Problems of Expansion, New York, 1912; H. von Hoist,
The Annexation of our Spanish Conquests, Chicago, 1898.
'The Russian treaty provided: "The inhabitants of the ceded terri-
tory . . . with the exception of unciviHzed native tribes, shall be admitted
to the enjoyment of all the rights ... of citizens of the United States."
The Spanish treaty declared of native Spaniards that, if they did not assert
their Spanish citizenship, they should be considered "to have adopted tha
nationality" of the territory in which they might reside; and it addedi
422 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY ;
the Federalists had contended for in the Louisiana debate
was now the national policy. The treaty was signed on
December 10, 1898.
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the ter-
ritories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Con- i
gresa." \
CHAPTER XXX
IMPERIALISM AND GREAT BRITAIN
The Spanish war brought to light, and accelerated in
progress, a spirit which may properly be called imperialism.
That democratic regard for simplicity which ,
, , . f p • Impenausm
had prevented the appomtment of foreign rep-
resentatives of the highest official rank yielded, in 1893, to
the appointment of ambassadors, though not so far as to
provide for their maintenance on an equality with those of
other nations. The attempt to give a similar titular prece-
dence to our naval officers, who often perform semi-diplomatic
functions, made slower progress; Dewey, as a special re-
ward, was made admiral (1899), and the grade of vice-admiral
has just (1915) been created. After the war, moreover,
the regular army was increased to double its previous
size. Although this enlargement had special reference to
the occupation of the Philippines, the steady and very much
greater increase of the navy has been based on more general
grounds.
This spirit was voiced by Rear-admiral Alfred Thayer
Mahan, and by Theodore Roosevelt. Both trained histori-
ans, and with a wide knowledge of other peo- Mahan,
pies and of world politics, they were able to
avoid many of the errors and inconsistencies which had
marred the programs of Blaine and Olney. Mahan in a
series of studies of naval history published between 1883 and
1913, pointed out the importance of sea power in the world's
history, its relations to the future of the United States, and
the necessity of our maintaining a large navy and securing
strategic bases for naval operations. He tried to bring
public sentiment to a realization of the fact that the United
423
424 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
States could not safely remain forever aloof, and that it
should not confide too trustingly in the hope for universal
peace. His books received even more attention abroad than
at home, and belong as much to the international literature of
the discussion of peace and war, which now began to divide
the world of thought, as to the literature of American history.
These views were shared by Roosevelt, who from his return
from Cuba at the close of the Spanish war for a dozen years
rode a wave of popularity whose crest seemed ever to mount
higher. As President from 1901 to 1909, he was able to
give them effect. The navy, whose record against Spain
had made a profound impression on international opinion,
was increased until it eventually ranked just after those of
Great Britain and Germany; its efficiency was tested and at
the same time thrust upon the attention of the world by
its circumnavigation of the globe by order of the President
in 1907. The impression which this latter event made
whether at home or abroad, was scarcely so great as that
created by the brilliant and dashing personality of President
Roosevelt himself. It seemed evident that a nation so
equipped and so led, and that of its own choice, would play
a larger part in world movements than the United States
had done in the past.
The war probably had no effect on the fact or the form of
Hawaiian annexation. McKinley, to be sure, shortly after
„ his inauguration, conveyed to Carl Schurz the
impression that the subject would not be
pressed; ^ but those best informed realized that the return of
the Republican party meant annexation. The war, neverthe-
less, hastened the process. July 7, 1898, a treaty negotiation
was cut short by the passage of a joint resolution providing
for annexation on the old terms of incorporation into the
United States. A new note was struck, however, by the pro-
test of the Japanese government, based on the disturbance of
the balance of power in the Pacific, and on the possible effect
^ Schurz, Speeches, etc., vi. 270, 271.
IMPERIALISM AND GREAT BRITAIN 425
upon the large number of its citizens who were laborers and
merchants in the islands.^
Of the influence of the Spanish treaty on the final settle-
ment of the Samoan question, on the other hand, there can
be no doubt. Constant difficulties having
arisen under the General Act of Berlin, and
our scruples at the extinction of native rule having become
deadened, we agreed, on December 4, 1899, to a treaty of
division. This gave us the island of Tutuila, _ ..
Tutuila
whose fine harbor of Pagopago we had had the
right to use since 1878. Germany took the other islands, and
Great Britain received compensation elsewhere. This treaty
contained no provision for incorporation or civil rights.
While this negotiation, with the reassertion of our claim to
Midway island, or rather islands, and the occupation of the
neighboring Wake island in 1900, completed the Midway and
tale of our acquisitions, it does not indicate the W*^® islands
extent to which the colonial policy was applied. A treaty
was once more negotiated for the purchase of the Danish
islands, but it was rejected by the Danish parliament. As
there was some doubt whether the Isle of Pines, to the south-
west of Cuba, belonged to that government, the matter was
left open in our treaty with the new nation in 1903. Negotia-
tion, however, resulted in giving it to her.
More important than all the rest was the action of Congress.
That body made use of the discretion left it by the treaty
with Spain to establish the Spanish cessions colonial gov-
upon a basis definitely colonial, without refer- er°™e'its
ence to their future incorporation into the United States.
In the case of Cuba we conscientiously carried out our ob-
ligations both to Spain and to the islanders, by handing its
government over to the latter as soon as they were organized
to receive it and competent to protect persons and property.
In so doing, however, we insisted on certain permanent con-
ditions prescribed by Congress and known as the "Piatt
^ Moore, Digest, i. 504.
426 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
amendment." These conditions provided that Cuba should
never allow any foreign power or powers to impair its inde-
Platt amend- pendence in any way; that the government
™®'^* should contract no debt which could not be paid
by a sinking fund from the ordinary revenues; that the United
States should have the right to intervene in Cuba "for the
preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a
government adequate for the protection of life, property,
and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations"
with respect to the rights and property of Spanish subjects
under the treaty of Paris; that Cuba should provide for the
sanitation of her cities, and should grant the United States
"lands necessary for coaling or naval stations" and for cog-
nate purposes. By the treaty embodying these provisions
we practically added a protectorate to our colonies.
The change involved in the sudden extension of our terri-
tory almost to the Asiatic coast, and still more in our new
Attitude of spirit, did not escape the attention of Europe.
Europe 'pj^^ general sentiment was at first one of dis-
approval. In France, Spanish bondholders were at first
alarmed by the war, and then were indignant
at our refusal to impose the Cuban debt on the
island government. German opinion was influenced by the
fact that we apparently had forestalled its gov-
ernment in taking over the Philippines, and it
was kept excited by the exchange of discourtesies between the
oflBcers of the two fleets. Austria, never friendly, remember-
ing the fate of Maximilian, was distressed at the
losses of the queen regent of Spain, a member
of the Hapsburg house. The feeling of Italy had been con-
tinually aggravated by repeated lynchings of
Italian subjects in the United States. In affairs
of that kind the United States government was unable to af-
ford the protection of its courts, as the punishment for such
offences fell within the jurisdiction of the states, whose courts
often failed to do their duty. The most important ease was
IMPERIALISM AND GREAT BRITAIN 427
that at New Orleans in 1891, but others occurred in Colorado
in 1896, at Hahnville, Louisiana, in 1896, and at Tallulah in
the same state in 1899. In each of these instances. Congress
voted indemnity, but this wergeld did not entirely assuage
the national ill-feeling.
To these special sources of discontent was added a general
resentment at the sudden apparition of a new world power
which might upset the nicely adjusted balance „ .
of international politics. More immediately power and bal-
alarming was the fact that the balance of trade
seemed already upset. In 1895 we had exported less than
fifty millions more than we imported, in 1900 over five
hundred million more; and much of the surplus consisted of
manufactured goods. Credits accumulated at New York,
which seemed likely to become the financial centre of the
world.^ Our bankers began to talk of the financing of the
loans of foreign governments, an industry which had pre-
viously been monopolized by London, Paris, and Berlin,
and which carried with it a vast influence in world politics.
This condition was in part temporary, due to the "dump-
ing" by our trusts, at under-cost prices, of the accumulated
supplies of overproduction, a practice very unpopular at
home where prices were kept up behind the protection of our
tariff wall, but equally unpopular abroad, where it was feared
that these low prices would undermine established industries.
Joined with the fear of German competition, it formed the
basis of Joseph Chamberlain's somewhat later campaign for
protection in England. The United States loomed so gigantic
on the horizon of industrial and diplomatic competition,
which are always closely connected, that during the years im-
mediately following the Spanish war, talk of European com-
bination to oppose her advance was in the air.
Great Britain was the one great power who, in spite of
her industrial fears, welcomed the rise of the United States.
Her population had more appreciation of the humanitarian
* Coman, Industrial History, 327-331.
428 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
impulse that lay behind our intervention in Cuba. Her states-
men hoped much from our moral assistance. She was at that
. time diplomatically in a position which Lord
Salisbury described as one of "spendid isola-
tion," but which was not without its dangers, particularly in
view of the impending Boer war. Somewhat exaggerating the
Anglo-Saxon character of our population, her orators called
attention to the ties of blood and the world destiny of our
common race. For the first time in our national history there
was a real cordiality between the two peoples, though it was
most demonstrative on the part of the English. An alliance,
formal or informal, with the United States they would have
greeted with enthusiasm.
The task of adapting American foreign policy to these new
conditions raised our diplomacy to an importance equal to
Diplomatic that which it had possessed in the early days of
**^^ the republic and during the Civil war. To
adjust the nation to its new position without sacrificing the
principles developed in the past was an operation of a deli-
cacy hardly exceeded by that of preserving our neutrality
during the French revolutionary wars, or of keeping Europe
neutral while we ourselves were fighting. It was the more
difficult because of the divided tones in which the voice of
the past came down through the confusion of the eighties and
nineties. That its importance was appreciated is evident
from the struggle for control which was almost continuously
waged between the administration and the Senate. In the
Executive latter the leadership was generally with Sen-
versus Senate g^^^j. Lodge, long a member of the committee
on foreign affairs; but his leadership did not mean control.
Except in one case, in which it acted alone and in one other
in which it joined with the House, namely, in ordering the ab-
rogation of the Russian treaty, the power of the Senate has
been confined to checking or modifying the policy of the ad-
ministration. The direction of policy has been with the
executive.
IMPERIALISM AND GREAT BRITAIN 429
*
Fortunately, at this time the main burden fell upon John
Hay, secretary of state from September, 1898, to June, 1905.
Beginning public life as private secretary to » j^ »,
President Lincoln, he had passed the years since
that time in minor diplomatic posts, in journalistic and lit-
erary work, and in an advantageously placed social position
at home and abroad, until his appointment by President Mc-
Kinley as ambassador to Great Britain in 1897. Somewhat
predisposed by his European associations to think in the
terms of the great powers, he was least successful in his deal-
ings with the Spanish- American nations. His knowledge of
international law, of historic tendencies, and of men was, how-
ever, in its combination unsurpassed in his day. He pos-
sessed such an Americanism as can exist only when based on
a complete knowledge of American development. Most of all,
during his tenure he divorced the oflEice of secretary of state
from politics. Under McKinley he was left with a free hand
in his own department, and he himself did not interfere in
others; under Roosevelt the latter's vigorous personality
asserted itself on particular questions, but the general policy
remained Hay's. In diplomatic ability and accomplish-
ment he is to be ranked with Franklin and John Quincy
Adams. His successor, Elihu Root, who served „... „
Elihu Root
till January, 1909, brought to the office an un-
rivalled legal knowledge and a compelling geniality of ap-
proach.
From 1897 to 1913 there was an unusual degree of conti-
nuity in the diplomatic service, accompanied by some reg-
ularity of promotion. Thus Henry White, Diplomatic
employed in minor but responsible posts from ^®'^*^®
1879 until Cleveland's second term, was again called into
service and appointed successively as secretary of the London
embassy, as ambassador to Italy and later to France, and to
many special missions and international conferences. David
Jayne Hill, an eminent student of diplomatic history, served
in Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Germany. John
430 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Barrett was minister to Siam in 1894, and later to Argentina,
to Panama, and to Colombia; he took part in many inter-
national conferences, and became director-general of the
Pan-American Union in 1905. C. P. Bryan was minister
successively in China, Brazil, Switzerland, Portugal, Belgium,
and was ambassador to Japan; Charlemagne Tower was
ambassador to Austria, Russia, and Germany; J. G. A.
Leishman was minister to Switzerland and Turkey, and
ambassador to Italy and Germany. The triple embassy of
Oscar Straus to Turkey, 1887-1889, 1898-1901, and 1909-
1910, and the long service of Whitelaw Reid in England,
1905 to 1913, are noticeable. All these were men of ability,
and they had an opportunity to acquire diplomatic experience
of which most of them took advantage. If some of them in-
dulged in an ostentation of extravagance a bit offensive to
good taste, at least they were representative of an important
element among their countrymen, and they spent their
money on the whole with grace.
The action of President Wilson, in 1913, in removing
nearly all the heads of missions shows that the elements of
^„ . continuity and promotion found between
the diplomatic 1897 and 1913 were due to the maintenance
in power of one political party, and that it is
still our policy, as it always has been, to have the ministers
represent the administration rather than constitute the cul-
minating rank of a permanent staff. The creation of a bran-
new staff resulted as usual in success and failure. The Flood
Act of 1916 systematized the lower ranks of the service.
The consular service has still more markedly improved.
In 1864 the proposition of 1856 for the appointment of a per-
Consiilar manent staff was revived in a very modified
service form. Thirteen consular clerks or pupils,
removable only with the consent of the Senate, were there-
after to be appointed. The substitution of salaries for
fees also made gradual progress, until it was made complete
in 1906, with the unimportant exception of consular agents.
IMPERIALISM AND GREAT BRITAIN 431
Meantime the development of civil-service reform led to a
continuous attempt to include the consular service under
its provisions. Although this attempt has failed, it has not
been without its results. President Cleveland announced
a system of appointment by examination and promotion.
Although McKinley was hardly rigid in adhering to this,
President Roosevelt returned to it with emphasis, and the
decision of President Wilson to treat the service as out of
politics promises permanence.^
This administrative systematization has fortunately been
accompanied by an effective backing of popular support.
The industrial, interests of the country have _ .
•^ . Interest in
urged improvement, and have cooperated in consular
bringing it about. Educational institutions
have also responded to the national need, especially in the at-
tention devoted to the study of modern languages, Spanish in
particular, and in the offering of courses designed to equip
students for consular positions. With the promise of a con-
tinuous career, it has become possible to advise many young
men to take up the service as a life work, and at the same
time the position by becoming businesslike has become less
attractive as a vacation for the exhausted politician.
Working under these conditions. Secretary Hay under-
took to achieve a new settlement of outstanding disputes
with Great Britain, such as had been accom- Relations with
plished in 1794, 1815 to 1818, 1842, and 1871. ^"** ^"*«^
The friendship of Great Britain for the United States, still
represented at Washington by the veteran Sir Julian Paunce-
fote, was an advantage, though it required some caution
to prevent that friendship from becoming entangling. This
situation became particularly delicate during the Boer war,
but our experience in the art of neutrality prevented any
real difficulties. The main obstacles were the now definite
decision of the American people to have an American canal,
and the fact that, since many of our disputes were between
^ Civil Service Commission, Reports, annual.
432 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
the United States and Canada, Great Britain was obliged
to defer in large measure to that powerful colony.
A commission appointed in 1898 to agree upon questions
at issue between the United States and Canada found twelve
Canadian dis- topics for discussion: seals, fishing, the Alaskan
P"*®° boundary, transit of goods through each other's
territory back to the original country, or to a third country,
transit of criminals, wreckage and salvage, alien labor, —
particularly the importation of Chinese into the United
States across the Canadian boundary, — ^reciprocity, mining
rights, the navigation of the Great Lakes, and the marking
of the boundary line. These matters the commission failed
to settle outright, but negotiation was continuous. In 1908
the transit of criminals, the question of wreckage and salvage,
and the marking of the frontier were provided for.
The more exciting question of the Alaskan boundary had
already been settled. This had first assumed importance
Alaskan with the discovery of gold on the Yukon in
boundary jggg -pj^^ dispute grew out of the treaty of
1825 between Russia and Great Britain, and chiefly out of
the provision that the boundary was to follow the crest
of the mountains parallel to the coast from the parallel of
latitude of 56 to the intersection of that line with the parallel
of longitude of 141 , but was never to be more than ten marine
leagues from the coast following its sinuosities. This arrange-
ment was sufficiently complicated, but it was rendered more
so by the deep and irregular indentations of the Alaskan
coast line. Great Britain claimed that the line ran along
the crests nearest the ocean, from peak to peak, crossing the
bays, giving her the heads of several of them and thus access
to the sea. The United States held that the line must be
everywhere ten leagues from sea water, thus entirely cutting
off a great part of Canada from the ocean. A modus vivendi
was agreed upon in 1899, and in 1903 the question was sub-
mitted to arbitration, but by a commission composed of
three members from each nation, without an umpire. The
IMPERIALISM AND GREAT BRITAIN 433
60
141 140
138
la6 134
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434 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
American commissioners were Senator Lodge, Elihu Root,
and Senator Turner to represent the Northwest. Maintain-
ing the American position in all except a few minor points,
they were supported by Chief Justice Alverstone of England;
and so the boundary was fixed according to our views. ^
The question of fishing was threefold, involving the pro-
tection of the Alaskan seals, the securing of privileges from
the Dominion of Canada, and the securing of
Fur seals ... . . . . i. . ,
privileges Irom the separate jurisdiction of
Newfoundland. In case of the seals, the British legislation
resulting from the Behring sea arbitration lapsed in 1899, at
the end of the prescribed five-year period, and the sea was
thus open to Canadians to within three miles of the Pribilof
islands, with no limitation as to methods. In 1897 we had
prohibited our own citizens from engaging in open-sea killing,
but Canadian opinion would not permit Great Britain to re-
ciprocate in any way. In the United States the feeling among
those interested was so strong that at one time it was pro-
posed that we kill off all the herds. It was not until the ad-
ministration of President Taft, in 1911, that the matter was
settled by a joint treaty with Japan, Russia, and Great
Britain, whereby pelagic killing was for the time being alto-
gether prohibited and these countries were to have pro rata
shares of the kill on land. An act of Congress of 1912 pro-
hibited all killing whatsoever on land for a term of years.
Our fishing difficulties with Canada were settled by a
treaty of 1908, which provided a permanent international
Canada and fisheries commission. It was with Newfound-
Newfoundland i^jjjj ^jjg^^. i-jjg jjjQg^ trying situation existed,
rendering negotiation and fresh causes of irritation constant.
In 1902, in accordance with a new diplomatic method ac-
cepted by Great Britain, Hay negotiated a treaty with
Premier Bond of Newfoundland on the familiar basis of ad-
mitting fish from the Banks to our markets free of duty in
return for the privileges that we desired. Again, however, as
^ George Davidson, The Alaska Boundary, San Francisco, 1903.
IMPERIALISM AND GREAT BRITAIN 435
in 1888, the fishing interests in the Senate were strong enough
to defeat the treaty, by insisting that it was the national
duty both to afford economic protection to the industry
and to obtain such international advantages as might be
necessary. The final defeat of this treaty in 1904 led to
retaliatory legislation by Newfoundland in 1905 and 1906,
in which every possible port regulation that could distress
our fishermen was resorted to. While the governments of
Great Britain and the United States temporarily quieted
matters by an annual modus Vivendi, they sought agreement.
Great Britain maintained the right of Newfoundland to
make any port regulations which ostensibly applied to both
nations equally, and which were in its judgment, necessary
to the preservation of the fijshing or to the maintenance of
order and morals. The United States admitted that there
must be such port regulations as were necessary for the pres-
ervation of the fishing, but claimed that, as these determined
the conditions under which she was to enjoy the privileges
accorded to her by the treaties of 1783 and 1818, her assent
to them was necessary. In 1909 the matter was submitted
to a tribunal composed of members of the Hague Permanent
Court of Arbitration, which was, in addition, to recommend
rules for the conduct of the fishing. The decision was mainly
in favor of Newfoundland, but in accordance with the recom-
mendations an agreement between Great Britain and the
United States was reached. It seems probable that this
century-old dispute is happily ended. The Americans are
to enjoy such privileges as the right to buy bait and take
on necessary water, without suffering undue annoyance
from local laws.*
The all-important subject of trade relations with Canada
reached no special crisis until, in 1911, a reciprocity treaty
was concluded under Taft's administration and largely by
his personal influence. The rejection of this treaty as the
*P. T. McGrath, "The Atlantic Fisheries Dispute," Review of Reviews,
1910, xli. 718-724.
436 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
result of a nationalistic uprising in Canada and the defeat
of the Laurier government, seemed to presage a period of still
greater strain than in the past. Some of the
Reciprocity , . • i . i • • i i
thmgs aimed at by reciprocity, however, the
new United States tariff bill of 1913 accomplished withQut the
exaction of specific compensation, and it may lead to a better
understanding. Only five of the twelve questions of 1898
remain to be settled, but in regard to all of them except
alien labor and mining rights the existing agreements are not
unsatisfactory. The new questions that have arisen, such as
the use of international rivers for irrigation, seem not to be
serious.
The other important British interest in America has been
the interoceanic canal. It had finally become obvious
Clayton- that such a canal would be constructed, and
Bulwer treaty gj^jjgp ]jy^ qj. under the auspices of, the United
States government. Yet the Clayton-Bulwer treaty still
held. In 1900, therefore. Hay and Pauncefote arranged a
compact to meet these conditions. This new treaty, like
that of Clayton and Bulwer, was based on the prin-
ciple of international neutralization, and it asked other
nations to join in the guarantee. As this arrangement was
unsatisfactory to public opinion in the United States, the
Senate amended it by specifically abrogating the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty, by allowing the United States to fortify the
canal, and by leaving out the general invitation to adhere
to the agreement. In consequence of these amendments,
Hay and Pauncefote drew up, in 1901, a new treaty providing
for the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. In return
for this concession by Great Britain, which allowed the United
States to acquire territory in Central America, the last-
named power adopted certain prescribed rules. The second
of these forbade the blockade of the canal, but allowed the
United States to "maintain such military police along the
canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness
and disorder." Under a rather liberal interpretation of this
IMPERIALISM AND GREAT BRITAIN 437
permission, the United States plans to fortify the canal
in the hope of rendering it impregnable to attack. Rules
three to six regulated the use of the canal in time of war.
Rule one ran: "The canal shall be free and open to the
vessels of commerce and of war of all nations observing these
Rules, on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no
discrimination against any such nation, or its citizens 6r
subjects, in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic,
or otherwise. Such conditions and charges of traffic shall
be just and equitable."
This last rule became the subject of much controversy
after 1912, when Congress, in jfixing the rates of traffic,
exempted from all charge vessels engaging
under certain conditions in the coastwise, or
rather coast-to-coast, trade of the United States. Primarily
intended to decrease the cost of transcontinental freight, and
to have its effect on the rates of the transcontinental rail-
roads, the law plainly violated the provisions of the treaty.
Great Britain promptly protested, and President Wilson in
1914 recommended that Congress repeal the discriminating
exemption. The acceptance of the recommendation by Con-
gress was a notable manifestation of our intention of rec-
ognizing treaty rights.
It is not only in thus preventing our carrying out of a
domestic policy that the Hay-Pauncefote treaty has proved
a stumbling-block in our way. The purpose Military use of
of our change of canal policy was not so much *^*"*^
commercial as military. A canal internationally guaranteed
would need no fortification, but would be equally available
to all nations. The policy of making the canal American
involved the expense of fortifying it and of maintaining a
garrison there, the compensation being that our fleet could
do double duty, could be available for use in either ocean.
By the terms of the treaty, however, it is probable that the
value of any other fleet with which we may be contending
^ill equally be doubled, as the canal is open to the war
438 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
vessels of other nations even when at war with us, Lf those
nations observe the rules laid down in the treaty. This
being the case, it might seem that, since we are not allowed
to exclude their war vessels, we need not be at the expense
of fortification. In the absence of the uiternational guarantee
arranged for in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and in the first
Hay-Pauncefote treaty, however, it is obvious that the only
means we have of seeing that the rules are observed is the
ability to enforce them on the spot. By the terms of agree-
ment all we have secured by our canal diplomacy is the
obligation to maintain by our own power, and without any
compensating exclusive use, a neutrality which the nations
of the world would have been glad to guarantee. The canal
has become a vulnerable spot, at the mercy of any power
able to seize it, except Great Britain which is bound by the
treaty. Authority and power are of course not synonymous.
Having made use of our right to acquire territory and to
fortify the canal, we have acquired the power to exclude
other nations, if we care to disregard our treaty obligations.
Such disregard, however, is always provocative of trouble,
and may be dangerous. The experience of the United States
with the Clayton-Bulwer treaty should emphasize the ad-
vice of Washington and Jefferson, to avoid entangling alli-
ances, if we wish to maintain our freedom to change our mind.
It is apparent that the questions at issue between Great
Britain and the United States have since the Spanish war
been much less critical than those of earlier periods, that
most of them have been settled, and that the diflBculties
of the future are likely to be of diminishing significance.
CHAPTER XXXI
SPANISH AMERICA
In clarifying her relations with Great Britain, the United
States removed only one diplomatic obstacle from the path
of the canal. It remained for her to decide Nicaragua ver-
whether she wished a canal by way of Nicaragua ^"* Panama
or of Panama, and then to make arrangements with the
nation that owned the chosen isthmus. In Congress there
was a strong sentiment in favor of the former way, and
Nicaragua was willing to grant us such conditions as we con-
sidered necessary. By the Spooner act of 1902, however,
the President was authorized to proceed with the Panama
route, which he preferred, if he could make satisfactory ar-
rangements within a reasonable time. President Roosevelt
determined to build the canal by Panama, and he at once
made the enterprise his particular policy. The first step was
to obtain the concession which was still legally held by the
successor of de Lesseps's company. This was bought for forty
million dollars, and title to the Panama railroad was sub-
sequently purchased.
More difficult was the negotiation with the republic of Co-
lombia, of which Panama was one of the constituent states.
We regarded as essential to the construction Position of
and operation of the canal full possession of a Colombia
strip of territory on each side, with ample rights of fortifica-
tion and police, and for this we were willing to pay. Hay ac-
cordingly arranged a satisfactory treaty with Herran, the Co-
lombian minister, giving us, not sovereignty, but control for
ninety-nine years, with privileges of renewal, of a six-mile
strip. After two months' debate, however, this treaty was
rejected by the Colombian senate in August, 1903. Although
439
440 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Colombia had a perfect right to do this, and though her
motives were not properly open to question, President Roose-
velt prepared a message recommending to Congress that we
dig the canal without awaiting her permission. His justifica-
tion was given in later documents, in which he argued, or
at least asserted, that Colombia, in rejecting a reasonable
and generous offer, had violated the treaty of 1846. He
believed that her motive was to obtain more money, and de-
clared that the world could wait no longer on her sloth and
avarice. An agreement, he believed, might be made with the
state of Panama.^
To those who are ready for the fray weapons are sent. Like
Polk, Roosevelt was able, when Congress met, to present a
The state of simpler course, for which, however, unlike
Panama p^jj^^ j^^ ^jj^j ^^^ ^iave to incur the direct re-
sponsibility. Not unnaturally, the citizens of Panama were
deeply incensed that their only prospect for future greatness
was likely to be blocked, perhaps forever if the Nicaraguan
route should be chosen. The situation was attractive to
adventurers, and offered all the possibilities of intrigue famil-
iar to the readers of Richard Harding Davis. When in
August, 1903, it was announced that Panama would revolt,
the attitude of the United States government was not such
as to discourage action.
October 10, 1903, President Roosevelt wrote to Dr. Albert
Shaw, editor of the Review of Reviews: "I enclose you, purely
Roosevelt's for your own information, a copy of a letter of
policy September 5th, from our minister to Colombia.
I think it might interest you to see that there was absolutely
not the slightest chance of securing by treaty any more than
we endeavored to secure. The alternatives were to go to
Nicaragua against the advice of the great majority of com-
petent engineers — some of the most competent saying that
^ W. L. Scruggs, The Colombian and Venezuelan Republics, Boston, 1900;
Achille Viallate, Les Etats-Unis et le canal interocianiqu^, in his Essait
d'histoire diplomatique amSricaine (Paris, 1905), 57-206.
SPANISH AMERICA 441
we had better have no canal at this time than go there — or
else to take the territory by force without any attempt at
getting a treaty. I cast aside the proposition made at this
time to foment the secession of Panama. Whatever other
governments can do, the United States cannot go into the
securing by such underhand means the cession. Privately,
I freely say to you that I should be delighted if Panama were
an independent state; or if it made itself so at this moment;
but for me to say so publicly would amount to an instigation
of a revolt, and therefore I cannot say it." ^
Fully alert to the possibilities, the administration watched
the Isthmus. November 2 the naval officer commanding
our observation squadron was ordered : " Main- _,. -dminis-
tain free and uninterrupted transit. . . . Pre- tration and the
vent landing of any armed force with hostile
intent, either government or insurgent, either at Colon,
Porto Bello, or other point." At 3.40 p. m., November 3,
the acting secretary of state telegraphed to the Isthmus that
an uprising was reported to be taking place there. A reply of
8.15 p. M. stated that there had been none yet, but that it was
rumored that there would be one during the night. On Nov-
ember 4 independence was proclaimed. The only active hos-
tility was in the city of Panama, on the Pacific, beyond our
reach, where the Colombian gunboat Bogota dropped a few
shells on the morning of the 4th and killed a Chinaman. At
noon we warned the commander to shell no more. At
11.55 A. M. on November 6, the state department was in-
formed: "The situation is peaceful. Isthmian movement has
obtained so far success. Colon and interior provinces have
enthusiastically joined independence. Not any Colombian
soldiers known on isthmian soil at present. Padillo equipped
to pursue Bogota. Bunau Varilla has been appointed officially
confidential agent of the Republic of Panama at Washington.'*
At 12.51 p. M. Hay acknowledged the receipt of this note.^
1 Nation. 1904, Ixxix. 328.
' Senate Docs., 58 Cong. 2 sess.. No. 51.
442 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
On the same day Hay instructed our acting consul on the
spot to negotiate with the new government. November 13
Recognition of Bunau Varilla was received at Washington;
Panama December 7 a treaty, drawn up by Hay, was
signed; December 12 a minister was appointed. This quick
recognition of the new repubhc was contrary to our consistent
practice of waiting till independence was soundly established,
as illustrated by our conduct in relation to the Spanish-
American revolutions from Spain, the Texan revolution, and
the government of Maximilian, and as emphasized by our
attitude toward the contemplated recognition of the Con-
federacy. To be sure, the Isthmus was quiet; but it was
because we had prevented the Colombian forces, amply
able to restore order, from intervening. Such interposition
on our part was not, as President Roosevelt subsequently
claimed it was, in accordance with local precedents.^ We had
a number of times, under the treaty of 1846, landed troops
to protect the railroad, but we had successfully protected
it without occupying the whole Isthmus. Senator Hoar
seems to have been justified in his statement of December 17,
1903, that no revolution had up to that date interfered with
the isthmian traffic.^ Such previous interventions, more-
over, had been to carry out the treaty; in this case the pur-
pose was to overthrow it. In compensation for the right of
free transit we had guaranteed the Isthmus to Colombia,
we now intervened to prevent Colombia from enforcing her
sovereignty. These points were cleverly met by Roosevelt
in his message to Congress, and by Hay in his correspondence
relating to the episode. They urged among other things that
the validity of the union of the several states of the Colom-
bian republic, and particularly of Panama, was extremely
complicated from a constitutional point of view. The rela-
tion of Panama to Colombia had actually varied from inde-
pendence to incorporation as a department. To suggest that
^ House Docs., 58 Cong. 2 sess., No. 1.
* Congressional Record. 58 Cong. 2 sess., pp. 316-318; 2191-2000.
SPANISH AMERICA 44S
an outside power might take cognizance of such internal con-
ditions was of course obviously inconsistent with our policy,
and before the Civil War cemented our own union would have
been dangerous. It was not, however, the real defense upon
which the administration relied. Its real excuse was, rather,
the plea by which Jefferson justified to himself the Louisiana
purchase, a transaction so contrary to his constitutional scru-
ples,— the plea that the situation was one which never could
happen again, and was of such unparalleled importance as to
exempt it from the ordinary laws of morality and of nations.
The new republic met our needs more completely than
Senor Herran had done. The United States received full
rights, as "if it were the sovereign," of "a zone The republic
five miles on each side" of the canal; she Sie'unUed"
also secured the right to fortify the canal, and States
to obtain additional naval stations within the republic. In
return she paid ten million dollars down, and agreed to pay a
quarter of a million a year, beginning nine years from date.
The United States guaranteed the independence of Panama.
The constitution of Panama contains the following clause:
"The Government of the United States of America may
intervene anywhere in the Republic of Panama for the re-
establishment of constitutional peace and order if this should
be disturbed, provided that by virtue of public treaty said
nation should assume or have assumed to guarantee the in-
dependence and sovereignty of this Republic." Though our
guarantee was made in the light of this clause, intervention
is merely a right that has been granted to us, not a duty that
we have assumed. Yet it can hardly be denied that by the
events of 1903 we acquired in the canal zone a colony, and
in Panama a protectorate. It is worth noting that between
1846 and 1903 there were fifty-three riots and revolutions on
the isthmus, and since then, peace.^
^ Aragon, Republica de Panama y la diplomada contemporanea, Retitta
Positivista (Mexico), 1904; Schurz, Speeches, etc., vi. 389-40S, 434-436;
Rafael Reyes, The Two Americas, New York, 1914.
444 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Until the Spanish war it had been one of our unrealized
ambitions to dominate the Gulf of Mexico, and thus secure
Control of the the outlet of the Mississippi. Although we
Caribbean Sea f^jig^j ^q ^j^ (^^^a in that war, we obtained
enough hold on that island to give us the control we wished,
a control which has recently been strengthened by the com-
pletion of the railroad to Key West. With the undertaking
of the canal as a national enterprise, the control of the Car-
ibbean became equally necessary. By 1903 we had already,
with our naval station at Guantanamo in Cuba, in addition
to Porto Rico and Panama, a strategic preponderance in
that sea which it has been the apparent intention of the
government to maintain and strengthen. The only danger
lies in the possibility of European influence over some of the
republics situated about it, a peril that has involved a careful
consideration of the exact bearing of the Monroe Doctrine
upon the situation.
European interference with the political affairs of those
states it obviously remains our intention to prevent, and
European this policy doubtless extends to the exclusion
mediation ^^ European mediation in the case of a revolu-
tionary contest in any one of them, a policy underlying our
present (1915) attitude with respect to Mexico. Other pos-
sible avenues of European approach would be mediation
between two warring republics, and the collection of claims.
With regard to the first, no case has yet arisen clearly indi-
cating whether the administration would follow the earlier
practice of allowing mediation, or whether it would adopt
Blaine's policy of discouraging it, or whether we would ab-
solutely prevent it. There can be no doubt, however, that
in any such case our own good offices would be promptly
offered, and that we should resent their rejection in favor of
any other country. The existence of the Permanent Court at
The Hague, estabUshed in 1899, has simplified this problem
by providing a recourse equally acceptable to Europe and
America.
445
446 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
The question of claims is more diflBcult and important.
These are of two kinds. One rests upon the duty of every
European government to protect with all its power the
claims hves of its citizens legally resident in a foreign
country. The recent (1914) attitude of the Wilson adminis-
tration in connection with the killing of a British subject,
Benton, by the Mexican revolutionists indicates that we
do not assume responsibility in such cases, but that under
certain circumstances we do undertake to act as intermediary.
The question of property is a different one; or at least, if the
destruction of personal and tangible property is analogous
to the destruction of life, that of public debts may be differ-
entiated. Such debts give rise to many perplexing questions.
They are sometimes contracted by governments that fail
to establish themselves; through non-payment of interest
many of them, as those of Santo Domingo and Honduras,
mount to proportions beyond any immediate possibility
of payment; and, worse still, being in most cases contracted
for temporary purposes, they have not usually increased the
capacity of the debtor countries to meet them.
In 1902 Luis M. Dtago, foreign minister of Argentina, pre-
sented to the United States government the view that "the
Drago Doc- public debt cannot occasion armed intervention
*""® nor even the actual occupation of the territory
of American nations by a European power." ^ This "Drago
Doctrine " was a slight modification of the principle advanced
by his fellow country -man, Carlos Calvo, that "the collection
of pecuniary claims made by the citizens of one country
against the government of another country should never be
made by force." It has excited much discussion among dip-
lomats and students of international law. It is true, how-
ever, that capitalists have in the past loaned money with the
expectation that their own country would if necessary help
them collect it, and that the borrowing countries have in con-
sequence received more than they otherwise would have done
^ House Docs., 58 Cong. £ sess., No. 1, p. 4.
SPANISH AMERICA 447
and at lower interest rates. Dr. Drago's proposition was
put forward in the case of Venezuela, when a joint German,
British, and Italian squadron, after repeated negotiations,
undertook a blockade of the coast of that country, in order to
secure a recognition by its government of cer- Forcible col-
tain claims, which included losses caused both Section o* debts
by government loans and by the destruction of private
property. The United States government did not accept
Dr. Drago's view as estabhshed international law, but, fol-
lowing the precedent set by Blaine in 1881, protested with
extreme vigor, on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine. It
forced the European countries interested to withdraw and
actively intervened to cause the whole matter to be sub-
mitted to arbitration. In 1907 the United States submitted
the Drago Doctrine to the Hague Conference, in the modified
form, that force should not be used in such cases unless the
creditor nation had first proposed arbitration and this had
been refused or ignored by the nation against which the claim
was made. In this form it was endorsed by the Conference.
The possibilities of such interference, particularly when
the debts were obviously beyond the unassisted resources
of the debtor country, excited much anxiety „
1 TT • 1 r. o 1 . , Roosevelt's
m the United States. So long as we recognized doctrine of
the principle of the forcible collection of debts, ^ power
the only method of preventing the occasional, and perhaps
at times long-continued, presence of foreign fleets in American
waters was to assume the duty of collection ourselves.
Even the Drago Doctrine would not prevent the enforce-
ment of claims for the destruction of private property. In
messages of 1903 and 1904 President Roosevelt said: "That
our rights and interests are deeply concerned in the main-
tenance of the [Monroe] Doctrine is so clear as hardly to
need argument. This is especially true in view of the con-
struction of the Panama Canal. As a mere matter of self-
defence we must exercise a close watch over the approaches
to this canal, and this means we must be thoroughly alive
448 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
to our interests in the Caribbean Sea." "When we announce
a policy, such as the Monroe Doctrine, we thereby commit
ourselves to the consequences of the poUcy." . . . "Chronic
wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general
loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America,
as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized
nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of
the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the
United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such
wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international
poHce power."
This policy of intervention to prevent wrongdoing, whether
to our own citizens or to those of other countries, resembled
The " Big the policy advocated by Blaine. The absence
Stick" q£ g^jjy. sugar-coating in its pronouncement,
however, justifies the popular differentiation in terms,
Blaine's being known as the "Elder Sister" policy and
Roosevelt's as the " Big Stick. ' '
The conspicuous example of this new extension of the
Monroe Doctrine — our assumption of responsibility for the
Santo Do- good behavior of Latin America — occurred in
°"°*^° the case of the negro republic of Santo Do-
mingo. In 1905 President Roosevelt made a treaty with its
government whereby we were to undertake the adjustment of
its obligations and the administration of its customs houses.
This agreement was not ratified at once, or in its first form, by
the Senate, but in 1907 a convention which preserved the
main features of the plan was accepted.
This action added, at any rate for the time being, a new
protectorate to our list, and thereby increased our territorial
New protec- hold on the Caribbean. In 1911 somewhat
torates similar arrangements were made by Secretary
Knox with Nicaragua and Honduras. Neither was accepted,
but in 1916 a similar treaty, drawn up by Secretary Bryan
in 1913 with Nicaragua, was ratified, and another was drawn
up with Hayti. The policy of trusteeship thus adopted by
SPANISH AMERICA 449
both national parties may, therefore, be regarded as national.
While we do not absolutely prohibit European intervention
for the collection of debts, we aim to make such intervention
unnecessary by acting as intermediary.
The "Big Stick" has also been evident in the frequent
and penetrating applications of our police power for the
defence of our own interests. In Cuba, by United States
intervening in 1906 and by threatening in- "ite"eot»«>°
tervention in 1912, we have, in accordance with the Piatt
amendment, insisted on peace and order. In Venezuela we
threatened to use force to establish our claims, which were
subsequently submitted to the Hague conference. We
forcibly intervened in Honduras, and have continually
used force in Nicaragua in the hope of establishing peace.
In the case of the latter country, at least, we have ourselves
exercised a latitude of interference which we would not
permit to European powers without vigorous protest. It
remains the theory of the United States that such inter-
vention shall not control the right of the people to constitute
their own government, but we approach the position of
insisting that they shall have a stable government. So far as
European powers are concerned, we do not prohibit their
intervention to protect the lives and property of their sub-
jects; but we insist, as against them, that their intervention
shall be strictly confined to that purpose, and as against the
American nation involved, that it shall be in a condition to
render such intervention unnecessary.
It is not, however, European nations alone that we wish
to keep from interference in American affairs. With the
rise to power of Japan and the immense po- _ .
tentialities of immigration from that country Magdalena
and from China, the attitude of these countries
toward America has become a matter of concern. There is
no doubt that we shall apply to them all the prohibitions
that we maintain against Europe, although in their case we
have not the justification of non-interference in Asia. It
450 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
was, moreover, with special reference to Japan that a new
corollary of the Monroe Doctrine was proposed in 1912.
This was in the form of a resolution presented by Senator
Lodge, declaring that, "When any harbor or other place
in the American continents is so situated that the occupa-
tion thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten
the communication or the safety of the United States, the
government of the United States could not see, without
grave concern, the possession of such harbor or other place
by any corporation or association which has such relations
to another government not American as to give that govern-
ment practical power of control for naval or military pur-
poses." Though passed by a vote of 51 to 4, it was not»
however, accepted by President Taft. In 1913 President
Wilson attempted to put it upon less nationalistic grounds
by enlarging its scope so as to make it extend to an opposition
to all special "concessions" to foreign syndicates, for it is
his belief that capital should find ample protection in the
general laws of a country, and that, if it cannot, its invest-
ment will inevitably lead to political complications such
as we wish to avoid. His attitude seems already to have
prevented the execution of the plan of the English Pearson
syndicate in Colombia. A still further method of meeting
this situation has been developed by the attempt to secure
for the United States a preemption of all possible inter-
oceanic canal routes in America. Those of Nicaragua and
Colombia are now covered by treaties, the first ratified in
1916, the second still (1916) unratified.
The intensification of the Monroe Doctrine since the
Spanish war has been confined, as to fact, to the Caribbean.
Scope of new Dr. Shaw, of the Review of Reviews, and very
policies close to President Roosevelt, wrote editorially,
"Control of the canal and dominance in the Caribbean Sea
would suffice to assure the Monroe Doctrine." It is not to
be supposed that the administration intended to withdraw
the Monroe Doctrine from connection with the more southern
SPANISH AMERICA 451
countries; but it certainly did not actually apply to them its
additions to that doctrine, which was in part due to the fact
that their governments were more firmly established than
those about the Caribbean. President Roosevelt said in
1904, "Any country whose people conduct themselves well
can count upon our hearty friendship." We helped mediate
between Chili and Argentine, but we did not protest when in
1902 they made Edward VII. arbiter in their disputes, and
we accepted in 1909 the same monarch, and later George V,
as arbiter between Chili and the United States.
All Spanish America, however, has been included in our
attempts to establish continental cooperation. In 1907, at
our initiative joined with that of Mexico, the « , xj -^
Central- American states agreed to a series of Spanish Amer-
, , 1 1 • 1 • !_ ica in general
treaties and conventions establishing a court
of arbitration, and looking toward a renewal of that union
which existed for a few years after their separation from
Spain. Andrew Carnegie presented them with a palace at
Cartago, in Costa Rica, for the use of their court.
In 1899 President McKinley proposed a second Pan-
American congress, and we endeavored to popularize the
idea by the holding of a Pan-American exposi- Pan-American
tion at Buffalo in 1901. It was there that co^eresses
President McKinley met his death, but as a result of his
initiative a congress was held in 1901 at the City of Mexico.
This congress put on record a number of far-reaching resolu-
tions and adopted a few useful regulations, its most important
undertaking being an effort to make the meeting of such con-
gresses regular. Two have since been held, the third — ^the
second of the new series — at Rio Janeiro in 1906 and the
next at Buenos Ayres in 1910, but they have not yet become
periodical. Although these congresses have steadily improved
the conditions of international intercourse, they cannot be
said to have led to any marked advance toward our goals
of trade supremacy and sympathetic understanding. Our
trade has grown, to be sure, and with it our regular steam-
45« AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
ship connection. It still, however, consists chiefly of impor-
tations, many of them brought to us by tramp steamers,
which, arriving in New York, take on an American cargo for
Europe, where they load with manufactured goods for South
America. Our exports, except those that go to countries
near by, like Mexico, have not generally equalled those of
Great Britain nor has their growth kept pace with those of
Germany and Belgium.^
Sympathy cannot exist without interest, and interest is
languid in the United States, where news from every part of
Lack of in- the world is presented more voluminously
pMt^of°'the * ^°d read more eagerly than that from any
United States p^^t of Spanish America, except, again, Mexico.
Among the Spanish Americans there is plenty of interest in
us, but not understanding, or at least kindly understanding.
The aggressions of the United States against Spain and
Colombia, her decided firmness in deaUng with the countries
of the Caribbean, the threatening and condescending lan-
guage of President Roosevelt, far from changing the opinion
that a majority of their public men have always held in
regard to us, have only confirmed it. They still fear our
continued aggression, a fear from which the repeated asser-
tions of Roosevelt and of Wilson fail to free them. In addi-
tion, the powerful and firmly estabhshed governments of
Argentina, Brazil, and Chili resent the arrogance of our tone.
_ ... They feel no necessity for the defence of the
Suspicion m ,, t-w • i i
Spanish Monroe Doctrme; they deny the assertion that
our fiat is law upon the American continents,
while they realize that in fact that is the basis of our action.
It was with the idea of quieting this apprehension and sensi-
tiveness that Root in 1906, while still secretary of state,
visited South America, and that Secretary Knox in 1912
visited the Caribbean states, omitting Colombia by request.
It is said to have been with the intention of counteracting the
effect of the " Big Stick " on the minds of the people of the
' Bureau of the American Republics, Annual Reports, 1891, etc
SPANISH AMERICA 45S
great South-American powers that Ex-President Roosevelt
undertook his journey to South America in 1913-14. Never-
theless, our not unnatural refusal to submit our differences
growing out of the treaty of 1846 and the revolution in Pan-
ama to arbitration by the Hague court, remains a stumbling-
block. Secretary Knox endeavored to appease Colombia
by a treaty granting her financial compensation and gaining
for us control of a possible canal route though her territory.
Secretary Bryan succeeded in making such a treaty, which
added an expression of our regret that misunderstandings
had arisen. This treaty, however, has not yet been approved
by the Senate.^
The meeting of the Pan-American Scientific Congress at
Washingto» in 1915, a bit of hospitality long delayed by the
failure of our Congress to make the necessary appropriations,
became the occasion for the most effusive demonstration of
Americanism that ever took place in the United States. The
sense of mutual dependence in the great world conflict, and
the realization that the absorption of Europe in its own diffi-
culties must force the Americas to a closer relationship in
trade and finance, created a background of sentiment to
which President Wilson gave forceful expression. United
States banks began to prepare to enter South America, and
Spanish classes in the universities became crowded. Pan-
Americanism is far from an established fact, but it is more
nearly a reality than ever before.
^ For a recent and clear-headed discussion of the whole subject see
John Bigelow, American Policy: The Western Hemisphere in Its Relation to
the Eastern, New York, 1915; cf. R. G. Usher, Pan-Americanism, New York,
1915.
CHAPTER XXXII
THE PACIFIC
Into the diplomacy of the Pacific the new regime plunged
joyously, stripped of past policies and entangling alliances.
New start in By our treaty of 1894 with Japan and the
the Pacific return of the Sinionoseki indemnity we had
freed ourselves from the consequences of joint action under
Seward and Fish, and by the division of Samoa from the
complications of the General Act of Berlin. From the con-
sequences of our situation, however, we were not so free.
No other country possessed so much Pacific coast-line as we
did : the North Pacific was strategically ours. Our possessions
were widely scattered, however, and, in spite of the attempts
of Congress, by customs duties and by education, to knit
them together, they could not be held apart from the current
of Asian development. We were forced to become participants
in the affairs of the Far East.^
We found there England, France, Germany, and Russia,
all strongly entrenched in commerce and territory. Japan,
Interaational modern and ambitious, was already by the
situation jjgjp q£ jjgj. geographical position a great power.
China, inert but containing no one knew what possibilities of
greatness, was prey about which the others hovered ex-
pectantly but somewhat gingerly. With Japan it was a
question of dealing as with an equal. With China the ques-
tion was less of dealing with her than about her, and it
was quickly evident that our only choice was between be-
^ Latan6, America as a World Power; J. W. Foster, American Diplomacy in
the Orient, Boston, etc., 1903; Coolidge, The United States as a World Power,
313-374; A. T. Mahan, The Interest of America in International Conditions,
Boston, 1910; T. J. Lawrence, War and Neutrality in the Far East, 2d edition,
London, etc., 1904.
454
THE PACIFIC 455
coming one of the concert of powers or leaving them to ap-
portion the empire according to their desires.
In 1898 Germany secured by lease from China the port
of Kiauchau, Russia got in the same way Port Arthur and
Talien-wan, France, Kwangchau Bay, Great «« Spheres " of
Britain, Wei-hai-wei and Mirs Bay, and Italy J^ue^"
obtained the right to develop the port of Sanmun. Japan, as
a result of her recent war with China, had already obtained
the separation of Corea from Chinese jurisdiction. In these
transactions, the United States took no part, though she
temporarily profited by the opening of these places to
trade. It was believed, however, that these leased ports
might become the centres of spheres of influence, the com-
mercial advantages of which the respective powers would
seek to monopolize. On the possibility, therefore, that we
might be deprived of our natural share of Chinese commerce.
Hay, on September 6, 1899, instructed our ambassadors at
London, Berlin, and St. Petersburg to ask for declarations
in favor of open trade.
Meantime there began in China a religious and conserva-
tive movement against the "foreign devils," and particularly
against the missionaries. Sweeping all before "Boxer"
them, and winning the support of the empress *'<"*^^®^
dowager, the "Boxers" got possession of Peking and be-
sieged the foreign embassies. Under such circumstances
the only possible policy for the United States was to join with
the other powers in a military expedition for the relief of the
legations. That relief once effected, however, there were
untold possibilities of further interference. The lives and
property of individuals, particularly of missionaries, must
be atoned for in some manner that would render a recurrence
of a similar movement unlikely. France, as protector of
Catholics in the Orient, might demand indemnity for the
native Christians slain; and such demands might easily
assume a bulk that would render payment impossible ex-
cept by cession of territory, or they might take the form
456 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
of putting the empire in a straight-jacket. With these pos-
sibilities in mind, Hay determined to assume the advantage
_ , - of leadership, and on July 3, 1900, announced
China and the the policy of the United States. " If wrong be
pen 00 (Jone to our citizens," he declared, "we pro-
pose to hold the responsible authors to the uttermost ac-
countability." Peking being in anarchy, the power and
responsibility "are practically devolved upon the local pro-
vincial authorities. So long as they are not in overt col-
lusion with rebellion and use their power to protect foreign
life and property, we regard them as representing the Chinese
people, with whom we seek to remain in peace and friend-
ship." The President will cooperate with the powers in pro-
tecting American interests, and "in aiding to prevent a
spread of the disorders to the other provinces of the Empire
and a recurrence of such disasters. It is of course too early
to forecast the means of attaining this last result; but the
policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a
solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace
to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative
entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by
treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world
the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the
Chinese Empire." To this policy he invited the powers to
adhere by similar declarations.
The two fundamental ideas of this circular note, which
was sent to Berlin, Brussels, The Hague, Lisbon, London,
Hay's leader- Madrid, Paris, Rome, St. Petersburg, Tokio,
*^P and Vienna, were the preservation of the
territorial and administrative entity of China, and the "open
door" to the world's trade. These ideas have become almost
as firmly established in the American mind with regard to
China, as the Monroe Doctrine is with regard to America.
Furthermore, by his prompt action and especially by the
manner of it. Secretary Hay established a leadership in the
concert of powers which, although entirely temporary and
THE PACIFIC 457
personal, gave dignity and power to our appearance in this
new relationship. He succeeded in establishing a reputation
for being a man of his word similar and equal to that which
Franklin had enjoyed, and he knew how to seize upon that
exact moment when international opinion rendered the carry-
ing out of an idea practical but needed a strong and respected
leader to make itself effective. He had learned from Lincoln
to step ahead of the crowd without ceasing to step with it.
His thorough acquaintance with diplomacy as it existed, did
not blind him to new currents of thought as yet little recog-
nized by diplomatic staffs, but destined to shape their
activities. The powers promptly concurred in disclaiming
any desire to partition China, and some of them admitted
the principle of the *'open door." On this basis the ex-
pedition for the relief of the legation in Peking was under-
taken.
The matter of negotiation, involving first an agreement be-
tween the powers and then a joint negotiation with China, was
difficult, but it was ably handled, the United ^
•^ Preservation
States being represented by E. H. Conger of China's
and W. W. Rockhill, and China by Prince ^**^*^
Ching and Li Hung Chang. The Chinese agreed, Septem-
ber 7, 1901, to make expiatory punishments and memorials,
to pay an indemnity, and to improve the facilities of com-
munication; both the physical route to Peking and the organ-
ization of the foreign office. Rockhill, the special com-
missioner, reported to Hay, November 30, 1901: "While
we maintained complete independence, we were able to act
harmoniously in the concert of powers ... we retained the
friendship of all the negotiating powers, exerted a salutary
influence in the cause of moderation, humanity, and justice,
secured adequate reparation for wrongs done our citizens,
guaranties for their future protection, and labored success-
fully in the interests of the whole world in the cause of
equal and impartial trade with all parts of the "Chinese
Empire."
458 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Our cooperation in the expedition against the Boxers
not only assisted in preserving the territorial integrity of
.J. j^ China, but helped establish the principle of
of the "Open the "open door." Hay had asked the assent
of the powers that had spheres of influence in
China to three propositions, — that treaty ports within leased
territory be not interfered with, that the tariff charged be that
of China and be under Chinese administration, unless the
leased ports were made "free " of all duties, and that no dis-
criminating harbor dues or transportation charges be levied
in such "spheres." To these propositions he had, by De-
cember, 1899, secured the adhesion of France, Germany,
Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Russia, although the latter
country was somewhat guarded in its commitment. By
thus establishing these important items he confirmed his
leadership in the development of the policy of the powers
toward China.
On February 8, 1904, Hay again assumed leadership by
inviting Germany, Great Britain, and France to unite with
The United the United States in urging Japan and Russia
Russo-Jap- * to recognize the neutrality of China in the war
anese war which they were beginning, and to localize hos-
tilities within fixed limits. This effort was successful. In
January, 1905, Russia announced to us that China was not
neutral and could not preserve neutrality; hence that she
should be forced to consider Chinese neutrality "from the
standpoint of her own interests." Mr. Hay was able to
convince Russia of the inexpediency of such action. His
circular note of January 10, 1905, setting forth our hope
that the war would not result in any "concession of Chinese
territory to neutral powers," brought equivalent disclaimers
from Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain,
and Italy. The culmination of this leadership was reached
in President Roosevelt's offer, in 1905, of our good offices
to bring the war to a close. In the treaty of Portsmouth,
which concluded it, both the territorial and the administra-
THE PACIFIC 459
tlve entity of China, as well as the policy of the "open door,"
were formally respected, although a way was left for their
subsequent violation in spirit.
Philander C. Knox, who became secretary of state in
1909, carried out this policy by a circular note of 1912 pro-
posing non-intervention in the Chinese revolu- Non-interven-
tion, then in progress. Although such was the **°^ "^ ^^^^^
actual conduct of most of the powers, the action of Russia in
recognizing the independence of Mongolia before acknowl-
edging the new government of China was an ominous ex-
ception; while the attitude of Great Britain with reference
to Tibet and that of Japan in Manchuria have long consti-
tuted false notes in the concert for the preservation of China's
territorial and administrative integrity. Japan's action
has also threatened the openness of trade.
Secretary Knox, however, devoted most of his attention
to securing opportunities for American capital to share in
the development of Chinese resources, This "Dollar"
movement, popularly known as "dollar" <^plomacy
diplomacy, though not confined to China, was most impor-
tant there. His treaty of 1911 with Honduras was based on
the assumption of the foreign debt of that country by an
American syndicate, headed by J. P. Morgan, in return for
concessions. In 1910 he attempted to have the Manchurian
railroads turned over to a syndicate, and urged China to
grant to an Anglo-American body concessions in the same
province. These attempts were unsuccessful, but an Anglo-
American, French, and German company received a con-
cession to build a railroad in the Yangtse valley. His most
important effort, however, was to secure a right for the United
States to participate in the loan required by the new govern-
ment in 1912.
As finally arranged, this loan was to be shared equally
by the bankers of Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan,
Russia, and the United States. If its political character was
not rendered sufficiently obvious by the inclusion of Japan
460 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
and Russia, which had no money to lend, it was written
plainly enough in the terms upon which the credit was
"Six power" to be given to China. That government,
^***" though anxious for the money, was unwilling
to be bound by the engagements proposed, a hesitation
which probably caused recognition of the Chinese republic
to be withheld in order that pressure might be brought to
United States bear upon it. On March 18, 1913, President
from "I^ Wilson reversed this policy. lie led the way
power" loan j^ t}jg recognition of the new republic, and
withdrew the government support from the "six power"
loan. "The conditions of the loan," he said, "seem to us
to touch very nearly the administrative independence of
China itself, and this administration does not feel that
it ought, even by implication, to be a party to those con-
ditions." As a result, the American bankers withdrew
from the syndicate. Although this action is in line with his
attitude toward concessions to syndicates in Spanish America,
the administration did not go so far in China as to oppose
the activities of others; and the five remaining powers con-
tinued their negotiations.
Our relations with China herself have been simple and
good-natured, particularly during the agreeable mission of
United states Wu Ting Fang to this country. The question
and China ^^ Chinese immigration has been left on the
basis of the treaty of 1894, which was continued in 1903.*
In the treaty that perpetuated it, new ports, inland naviga-
tion, and mining rights were opened up, and trademarks,
patents, and copyrights were provided for. Missions were
placed upon an exceptionally strong basis, which allowed
societies to rent and lease lands and buildings in any part of
the empire, and exempted Chinese Christians from taxation
for the support of " religious customs and practices contrary
to their faith." An elaborate tariff was made a part of the
* A. P. C. Griffin, Select list of References on Chinese Immigration, labraiy
of Congress, 1904,
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POSSESSIONS AND DEPENDENCIES
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AND OTHER GREAT POWERS in the PACIFIC
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THE PACIFIC 461
treaty. Finally, the use of a portion of the Boxer indemnity
fund to aid Chinese students to study in this country bids
fair to increase the friendliness between the two peoples.
With Japan the situation has been very different. With
that country we now have more points of contact than
with any other nation except Great Britain. United States
The fact is, though it is not yet recognized *"<i J*P*n
politically, that this embassy has taken the position held by
that of Spain until 1898^ pis th'. second in importance. In addi-
tion to tlie direct questions involved by a large trade and an
unpopular immigration, we have to deal with Japan as oc-
cupying Chinese territory in Manchuria, as well as in her
relations to Spanish America, which are founded on a large
and increasing immigration to nearly all of those republics.
The situation is further complicated in the United States by
the belief that Japan desires Hawaii and the Philippines, and
in Japan by a disappointment, to say the least, that we
secured the latter islands, as well as by resentment at our
attitude toward Japanese emigrants.
The first difficulty lay in the objection on the part of
a large element of American public opinion, particularly
on the Pacific coast, to Japanese immigration. Japanese
This objection was partly racial and partly "°™igr*t»on
due to the fear of competition in the labor market with
the overflowing populations of the Orient. The position
and the self-conscious pride of Japan made impossible any
such treaty arrangement as was made with China. In fact
the treaties of 1894 and 1911 both granted a mutual right of
immigration. Under these trying circumstances Secretary
Root succeeded in putting the question at rest, by an agree-
ment, expressed in a series of notes exchanged in 1907 and
1908, whereby the Japanese government itself undertook
to prohibit the emigration of laborers to the United States.
A similar understanding between Japan and Canada prevents
the danger of the smuggling of coolies across the border, and
& United States law prevents Japanese labor already resident
462 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
in Hawaii from migrating to the states. In this way Japanese
pride was saved, and the desire of American opinion was
for the time being met.
The problem of the position of Japanese now resident in the
United States has proved more perplexing. By treaty they
are secured the rights of citizens of the most
Japanese in ,
the United favored nation, but they are ineligible to citizen-
States • •
ship. In the case of the Italians, who were un-
popular in the nineties, the securing of the franchise has,
politically at any rate, secured them full acceptance. The
Japanese, being politically negligible, are at the mercy of leg-
islation in so far as they are not protected by treaty rights.
Their privileges have been interfered with by legislation in
several states, in such a way, the Japanese government claims,
as to violate our treaty obligation. The chief complaint has
been of California. In 1913 the legislature of that state,
after many years of agitation with regard to their use of
schools and other privileges, adopted a small measure of
discrimination by prohibiting leases of agricultural land
for more than three years to persons "ineligible to citizen-
ship." In the actual situation this restriction applies almost
entirely to the Japanese. The qualifications for citizenship
are of course a purely domestic aflFair; but the making of
the standard of eligibility a rule for granting further
favors, when that standard applies almost wholly to one
nation, certainly raises a delicate question under the most
favored nation clause.
This dispute still persists, but otherwise our relations have
been exceptionally friendly. The floating of a Japanese
, loan in the United States at the time of the
Japanese- ... . ,
American un- war with Russia established a tie, and our
"^^ cooperation in China was generally conducive
to good feeling. In 1908 Secretary Root and the Japanese
ambassador exchanged notes to the effect that their wish
was for the peaceful development of their commerce on the
Pacific; that "the policy of both governments, uninfluenced
THE PACIFIC 463
by any aggressive tendencies, is directed to the maintenance
of the existing status quo in the region above mentioned,
and to the defense of the principle of equal opportunity for
commerce and industry in China;" that they both stood for
the independence and integrity of China; and that, should
any event threaten the existing conditions, "it remains for
the two governments to communicate with each other in
order to arrive at an understanding as to what measures
they may consider it useful to take."
In thus defending our interests in the Pacific, and at the
same time exerting a decided influence on international
policy, even to the point of having possibly . -^ *
prevented the dismemberment of China, with entan^ing al-
liflQCfiS
so little resulting international bad feeling
and that of a character practically inevitable and without
becoming involved in any entangling alliance, American
diplomacy has shown itself at its best and worthy of the early
traditions of the republic.^
* W. R. Thayer, Life and Letters of John Hay (Boston, 1915), throws
much light on Hay's personality and on diplomatic problems, particularly
the Alaska boundary and the canal problem.
CHAPTER XXXIII
ROUTINE AND ARBITRATION ^
With our policy of dominance in the Caribbean, of exclu-
sion of foreign influence throughout Spanish America, of
equal compromise with Great Britain in British
North America, of participation in Eastern
Asia, of non-interference in Europe, Africa remains open.
Our joining in an international receivership for Liberia in
1912, must, of course, be attributed to a special parental in-
terest in that little republic. Some persons feared that our
participation in the Algeciras conference of 1906 concerning
Morocco, might involve us in issues both complex and ex-
citing, but it was carefully guarded. The Senate ratified the
"General Act" of the conference with the distinct assertion
that it was not to be deemed a departure on our part from our
traditional policy of having nothing to do with "the settle-
ment of questions which are entirely European in their scope."
We have no African policy.
With Turkey, a power partly European and partly Asiatic,
the United States has also assumed no special attitude. It
„ . has followed the example of European nations in
Turkey . ,,..,..
reserving to its own consuls the jurisdiction over
its own citizens. This matter has been the subject of peren-
nial dispute, as differing texts have been found of our treaty
of 1830, upon which our claim to the privileges of extraterri-
toriality have been chiefly based. Our insistence upon the
practice, however, was placed by Hay in 1900 on the most
favored nation clause, and we have maintained it. What
action will be taken now that Turkey has (1914) abrogated
^ American Year Book, 1910. This annual and the International Year Book
give good accounts of the diplomacy of each year.
464
ROUTINE AND ARBITRATION 465
the privilege in the case of all nations, is uncertain; the
most favored nation clause ceases to have any significance
in the connection, and our treaty is abrogated with the rest.
We have taken no part in the concert of powers which has
so often intervened and remonstrated as a result of condi-
tions within the Turkish empire. In 1894 the Senate passed
resolutions looking to expostulation because of reported
"atrocities;" but President Cleveland stated that, since
the European powers were bound together in the matter
by the treaty of Berlin, we could not take action without
inconvenience, and that he had already declined an in-
vitation of the Turkish government to investigate con-
ditions.
The protection of our citizens there has, however, been
a perpetual source of annoyance and dispute. These con-
troversies have been chiefly of two classes, those ,,. .
, . , Missions
relating to missionaries, and those having to do
with naturalized citizens of Turkish origin. Our missions,
particularly numerous in Syria and including the important
Roberts College at Constantinople, have been permitted,
and have enjoyed protection. By an agreement of 1874,
definitely interpreted in 1910, they have even been allowed
to hold property. Our whole position has been simplified
by the fact that united Europe demands the fullest freedom
in such matters, and that we have since 1903 claimed and
have not been denied, equal treatment. Our position has
been that whatever concessions of this character have been
granted European nations, become automatically ours by
right. In the case of injury to missions or to other American
property during the disorders so frequent in Turkey, we
have never succeeded in making the Sublime Porte ac-
knowledge our claims by formal treaty. In one instance,
however, indemnity was virtually granted by an agreed
overpayment for the construction of a Turkish war vessel
by an American firm.
The situation of our naturalized natives of Turkey is
466 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
extremely disagreeable, and, owing to the increased immi-
gration of Armenians and Syrians to this country, the matter
NaturaKzation ^^^ ^^^ °^ growing importance. Turkey
problem with allows expatriation only by permission and
on condition of renewing Turkish citizenship
immediately upon return to the empire. European nations,
having no large interchange of population with Turkey,
have acquiesced in this position; and the United States has
been obliged to follow their example. Natives of Turkey
who have become naturaHzed in the United States, therefore,
whether with or without the permission of the Turkish
government, cannot expect from the United States that full
protection afforded to native American citizens or natural-
ized citizens born elsewhere than Turkey. This does not,
however, mean that they are neglected. The United States
embassy and consular officials are always on the alert, and
have actually afforded a protection sufficiently efficacious to
make it worth while to forge American passports. It is
this lack of definite agreement and the possibility of ac-
complishing so much by personal effort, that makes the
embassy at Constantinople so important. It is generally
given to a man of personality, and it was here that Oscar
S. Straus did so much to ameliorate conditions. Legally
the conditions with regard to naturalization are similar
in Russia, but there the subject has been handled on the
basis of general understandings, which for a long time worked
fairly satisfactorily. The dangers inherent in the situation
N turaii ti however, are illustrated by the dispute over
problem with Russia's decision to exclude entirely Russian
Jews naturalized in America, which led in
1912 to the denunciation of our treaty of commerce with that
country by Congress.
In Europe itself the shadow of the profound and united
animosity, which succeeded the Spanish War, quickly van-
ished with the realization that our new policy was not aggres-
sive in fields particularly interesting to that continent, — that
ROUTINE AND ARBITRATION 467
we did not threaten the equipoise of European power, that
our gigantic trade balances were not eternal, that New York
did not take the place of European capitals as _j^ ,
the center for foreign loans. Perhaps, too, titude of
there was a feeling that, if we were strong, it
would be good policy to cultivate us. Quick to perceive these
facts, the Kaiser became demonstrative in his friendliness,
sending his brother Prince Henry to visit us, presenting the
nation with a statue of Frederick the Great and Harvard
University with the material to fill a Germanic museum,
leading the way in the cultivation of international good will
by the establishment of exchange professorships, and asking
President Roosevelt's daughter to christen his new racing
yacht, the building of which in America was a compliment
to a national industry of which we are justly proud. France,
less successful in engaging the popular attention, followed
in his wake with a statue of Rochambeau, which recalled to
our people when reading one morning newspaper, the aid
that she had given us under his leadership during our
Revolution. She too provided exchange professorships.
This effusive friendship was harmless, and, if it did
not much affect the stand taken by Germany on Ameri-
can pork, it at least provided a pleasanter atmosphere for
negotiation.
With Europe, the question of immigration to the United
States has far-reaching possibilities. The floods of immi-
grants that have lately come to our shores European
from that contment have excited the appre- im™i«™t»o°
hension of widely differing classes of our population. Senator
Lodge has made himself spokesman of the movement toward
exclusion, and the labor element has complained of being
exposed to the competition of newcomers satisfied with a
low standard of living. This agitation has taken form in the
exclusion of persons with disease, with criminal records, or
those likely to become dependent upon the public for sup-
port. As a further precaution. Congress in 1912 and twice
468 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
in 1914 passed acts establishing a literary test. The first
of these was vetoed by President Taft, and the other two met
a like fate from President Wilson. Nevertheless some
further legislation is probable in the near future.
While such action would not necessarily lead to foreign
complications, yet the laws that we already have give rise
Roumanian to many minor diplomatic problems, and in
"°*® 1902 Secretary Hay took a new stand with
many potentialities. On July 17 of that year he wrote to
our minister accredited to Roumania concerning a proposed
convention in regard to naturalization. After discussing our
general policy, he added: "It behooves the State to scrutinize
most jealously the character of the immigration from a foreign
land, and, if it be obnoxious to objection, to examine the
causes which render it so. Should those causes origiuate
in the act of another sovereign State, to the detriment of
its neighbors, it is the prerogative of an injured State, to
point out the evil and to make remonstrance; for with na-
tions, as with individuals, the social law holds good that the
right of each is bounded by the right of the neighbor." He
found that the action of Roumania made life intolerable to
the Jews. "Removal under such conditions is not and can-
not be the healthy, intelligent emigration of a free and self-
reliant being. It must be, in most cases, the mere trans-
plantation of an artifically produced diseased growth to a
new place." Our opposition was not to Jews, but to out-
casts and paupers. We would make no treaty by which,
under existing conditions, we were forced to take them, or
by which they were to be prevented from returning to
Roumania.^
Our action in this matter was limited to our remonstrance
and our refusal to make a treaty. The suggestion of Secre-
tary Bryan, in 1913, to the Bucharest conference of the Bal-
kan states, that it permit full religious liberty, seems to have
^ Cyrus Adler, Jexoi in the Diplomatic Correspondence of the United State*
Amer. Jewish Hi^t. Soc., Publications, No. 15 il90&).
ROUTINE AND ARBITRATION 469
been in accordance with this policy. Our national annoy-
ance at the forced immigration due to the artificial stimula-
tion caused by the advertisements and solicita- „ .
, , . ,. Undue stunu-
tions of steamship Imes, has not reached lation of immi-
the point of definite diplomatic action; but
we have called the attention of the nations concerned to
the subject, and have met with sympathetic response from
Italy. The prospective opening of the Panama canal, with
the possibility of water transit to the Pacific Coast, caused
the subject to receive special attention in 1914.
The routine problems of diplomacy did not require quite
so much attention during this period as in that from the
Civil to the Spanish war, although the number First treaties,
of actual cases was far greater. We made first ^ ^^ade-'
treaties only with Ethiopia, more commonly °»"i£s
known as Abyssinia, and with San Marino. The area of
extradition practically covered the globe, and the protection
of our trademarks, patents, and copyrights became almost
world-wide. Claims we arranged with Brazil, Chili, Great
Britain, Guatemala, Hayti, Peru, Russia, Salvador, and
Venezuela. These were all submitted to some form of ar-
bitration.
Although our ocean merchant marine remained relatively
small, we took no steps to improve it that involved our rela-
tions with other countries. The era of maritime Merchant
discrimination, except in regard to coasting °^*"°®
trade, had passed. For the maintenance of their commercial
flags at sea, nations had come to rely on subsidies and on
the creation of conditions favorable to ship-building and em-
ployment. Congress was continually and earnestly urged
to adopt a subsidy policy, but refused to do so. Such legis-
lation as was adopted from time to time rather repressed
than encouraged the development of a marine under our flag.
The laws concerning the registration of vessels, granting
the right to carry the American flag, made it difficult to
register foreign built vessels, the intention being to encourage
470 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
domestic ship-building. The various tariffs, however, by
protecting the materials for ship-building, increased its
cost. While thus making American built ships more costly,
the government was not able to afford them compensating
protection, for the competition of the ocean marine is in-
ternational, and equality is the most that can be obtained
by international agreement. It was hoped that the tariff
law of 1913 would remove some of the disadvantages under
which we labored, but conditions since its passage have been
so unusual as to render it impossible to estimate its effect.
The outbreak of the great war of 1914, therefore, found us in
the position that Jefferson described in his report of 1793;
chiefly dependent for our foreign intercourse upon the
marines of warring foreign nations. The situation thus
created led to a widespread interest in the problem, from
which some consistent and effective national policy may
result. Already (March, 1915) the opening of American
registry to foreign built vessels has brought us half a million
tons of shipping. President Wilson's proposal for a nation-
owned marine suggests interesting possibilities.
The attempt to create openings for our commerce was con-
stant and more successful. In 1903 a special reciprocity
. . treaty was made with Cuba. The Dingley tariff
act of 1897, authorized the President to negoti-
ate, within two years, reciprocity treaties providing for a
twenty per cent reduction of duties, such agreement to be
subject in every case to the ratification of the Senate and the
approval of Congress. J. A. Kasson was appointed special
commissioner to secure such treaties, and obtained them
with Great Britain in behalf of Barbadoes, Bermuda, British
Guiana, Turk island and Caicos, and Jamaica, also with
the Argentine Republic, France, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, and Denmark. Although Senator Cullom, chair-
man of the senate committee on foreign affairs, strongly
urged that the treaties should go into effect immediately
upon their ratification by the Senate, that view was not
ROUTINE AND ARBITRATION 471
pressed, and at the suggestion of Senator Spooner each of
them was amended by the addition of the clause "not to
take effect until the same shall have been approved by the
Congress." This admission of the power of Congress as a
whole in these particular cases left open the general ques-
tion of the rights of the President and Senate to make such
treaties. Under these circumstances, only the treaty with
France was accepted, in 1898, with an amendment in 1902.^
In addition, the Dingley act gave the President power to
apply by proclamation varying fixed minimum and maxi-
mum tariffs to different countries according Maximiun and
to their treatment of us. This measure proved niinimum
. . rates
to be a powerful weapon in preventing retalia-
tory and discriminating tariffs. It became the constant
business of our diplomats to watch the commercial policies
of foreign governments, and with the threat of high or the
offer of low rates to secure favorable treatment for our
merchants. Such agreements were made in 1900 with Italy,
Germany, and Portugal, and in 1902 an additional one was
arranged with Portugal; in 1906 one was made with Spain
and a substitute one with Germany; and in 1908 the treaty
with France was supplemented by such an agreement. In
1906 the President, without formal compact, but in con-
sideration of tariff changes in Switzerland, proclaimed a
low rate on our imports of her products. With the passage
of the Payne-Aldrich tariff act in 1909, all these agreements
fell. A similar minimum and maximum provision in the latter
act, however, afforded opportunity for similar agreements,
and a tariff mission was able promptly to make arrangements
with most of the countries with which we trade heavily.
These again ceased to be of force with the passage of the
Underwood tariff of 1913, which nevertheless authorized
the President "to negotiate trade agreements with foreign
nations," providing for mutual concessions "looking toward
free trade relations and further reciprocal expansion of trade
^ S. M. Cullom, Fifty Years of Public Service, Chicago, 1911.
472 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
and commerce." These are to be ratified in each case by
both houses of Congress.
It was only natural that, with our new and wider interna-
tional relationships and the constant progress of international
International agreement, the scope of our international acts
agreements should expand also. In 1898 we adopted
as a modus vivendi during our war with Spain, articles re-
lating to the conduct of hostilities drawn up at a Geneva
convention of 1864. In 1899 we adhered to a Convention
regulating the Importation of Spirituous Liquors into Africa,
and in 1906 to a new agreement on the same subject. In
1900 we were parties to an additional Act for the Protection
of Industrial Property, in 1902 to a Convention on Literary
and Artistic Copyrights, in 1903 to an International Sani-
tary Convention. In 1902 we united with most of the
American powers in a Convention for the Arbitration of
Pecuniary Claims, and in 1905 in an International Sanitary
Convention of which the other signatories were Central
and South American states. In 1904 we joined in an inter-
national exemption of hospital ships from the payment of
dues. In 1905 we shared in the establishment of an Inter-
national Institute of Agriculture at Rome, of which the first
director was an American. In 1906 we were signatory to an
International Red Cross Convention for the amelioration
of the condition of the wounded of the armies in the field,
in the same year to an agreement for the unification of the
Pharmacopoeial Formulas for Potent Drugs, and in 1907
to the establishment of an International Office of Public
Health.
During the whole of this period one of the most absorbing
subjects of our diplomacy, as well as of popular interest
Peace move- in diplomacy, was the movement for the im-
™®°* provement of the conditions of war and for the
customary settlement of international disputes by judicial
process. Arbitration in special cases has been a historic policy
of the United States. Blaine's attempt to establish it as a
ROUTINE AND ARBITRATION 473
general practice for all America showed, as did so many of
his policies, a premonition of the coming movement. In
the period following the Spanish war many of our leaders
welcomed it with enthusiasm. President Roosevelt endorsed
it, and Secretaries Hay, Root, and Bryan, as well as President
Taft, made it a leading purpose. The education of public
sentiment in the direction of universal peace was organized
on a colossal scale as a result of the munificence of Andrew
Carnegie and Edwin Ginn, and of the activity of A. K.
Smiley, who since 1882 has called the believers in peace to an-
nual conferences at Lake Mohonk. The pressure of always-
impending war in Spanish America, however, excited those
countries to a somewhat earlier application of arbitration
as a general practice, and the tremendous cost of war ar-
maments in Europe, combined with the militant patriotism
of its great powers, have given the question a greater popular
vitality there than with us.
The first important step in the direction of peace was the
calling by the Czar of the first Hague conference, which met
in 1899. This body adopted certain principles Hague con-
to govern the conduct of war on land and sea, *«rences
and established a permanent court of arbitration to sit at the
Hague. The second conference, held in 1907, adopted addi-
tional rules with regard to the conduct of war, reorganized
the court, and declared the principle that the contract debts
of one government to another should not be collected by
force. Andrew Carnegie gave funds for the building of a
palace for the work of the court, to the furnishing of which
various nations presented evidences of their regard for
peace. ^
The formation of a permanent court stimulated the resort
to arbitration. The United States joined in sending many
^ W. I. Hull, The Two Hague Conferences, Boston, 1908; Moore, American
Diplomacy, ch. viii.; J. W. Foster, Arbitration and the Hague Court, Boston,
1904; Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, Reports, 1895,
etc., Assoc, for International Conciliation, International Conciliation, 1907,
etc. (issued monthly).
474 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
cases to it, particularly its long-standing claim against Mexico
for the "Pious fund," and suggested the court as a recourse
General ar- agreeable to us for the settlement of Spanish-
bitration American disputes with European powers.
More important was the impetus which it gave to the adop-
tion of general arbitration treaties providing for future
cases. In 1902 Spain and Mexico made a ten-year agree-
ment for compulsory reference to The Hague; in 1903 France
and Great Britain made a similar but less comprehensive
treaty; in 1907 the Hague Conference drafted a model or
"mondial" treaty form for general adoption.
These provided that all differences of a legal nature as
well as all those relating to the interpretation of treaties.
The model which could not be settled by diplomacy, and
treaties which did not affect vital interests, inde-
pendence, or honor, should be referred to the Hague Court.
This reference was not to be automatic, but every dis-
pute which arose between the contracting nations was to be
made the subject of a special protocol or agreement. The
point gained for judicial settlement, was that the contracting
nations bound themselves to make such arrangements. Each
treaty itself was to be of five years' duration. It was a very
tentative step, but it was hoped that if generally accepted, it
would land mankind somewhat nearer the goal of universal
peace. Secretary Hay concluded treaties in general accord
with this model with a number of nations, and President
Roosevelt referred them to the Senate.
In that body there was general approval, tempered by
fear that they might lead to cases involving the bonds which
Attitude of have been repudiated by a number of our states.
Senate rpj^^ Senate was also alarmed because no pro-
vision was made that the special protocols in each case should
be submitted to it for approval. If all such international
disputes were simply to be sent by the President to the Hague,
the prestige of the Senate would be decidedly diminished.
President Roosevelt wrote Senator Cullom, chairman of the
ROUTINE AND ARBITRATION 475
committee on foreign affairs, that it was "absurd and prob-
ably mischievous to treat " the question of state debts " as
possible to be raised." On the subject of reference, however,
both he and Hay were emphatic that it was intended to
be kept in the hands of the President, and that it should be
kept there; whereupon the Senate straightway amended the
treaties by substituting the word "treaty" for "special
agreement," thus removing the doubt and keeping the matter
in its own hands.^
President Roosevelt was so deeply incensed at this action
that he refused to go on with the treaties. Secretary Root,
however, who had the subject much at heart Acceptance of
renewed the project and secured a large number *^® treaties
in the amended form. In 1908 and 1909 we made them with
Austria-Hungary, China, Costa Rica, Denmark, France,
Great Britain, Hayti, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands,
Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Salvador, Spain, Sweden,
and Switzerland.
In 1913 Secretary Bryan sought to extend the scope of
arbitration still farther by carrying out one of the recom-
mendations of the second Hague conference ^
, , . , ri 'f • e Bryan's policy
lookmg to the postponement of hostilities, from
whatever cause, pending an investigation of the facts. This
suggestion, reminding one of the "pause twenty minutes
before you spank" principle, which has done so much to
reduce the corporal punishment of children, would help
oflfset the exciting effect of the telegraph and the cable, which
have enabled the popular excitement in two countries to
react so quickly and so constantly. Secretary Bryan's pro-
posal met with so prompt a response from most of the coim-
tries with which we have habitual dealings, that in the summer
of 1914 twenty such treaties were submitted to the Senate.
The years from 1898 to 1913 may be regarded as a period
by themselves, partly because of the continuity of personnel
in the diplomatic staff, and partly from the fact that prac-
* Cullom, Fifty Years of Public Service.
476 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
tically all terminable diflSculties had been settled by the latter
year. It was a period replete with new policies and with
Period 1898 the development of old ones to suit new con-
to 1913 ditions, and over the whole period hung the un-
certainty as to whether, should the opposing party come to
power, these new departures would be confirmed, or dropped
or changed. The administration of President Wilson does
indeed bid fair to mark a turning point in international rela-
tionships, and to usher in a new period. Mainly, however,
this diplomatic change has been the result of new factors
introduced from the outside, of the great calamity of the
present (1915) world war. The situation has altered, but
American policy has remained comparatively unchanged.
The traditional American policies have been maintained and
the most of the new ideas introduced under McKinley,
Roosevelt, and Taft, having been endorsed by the opposing
party, are in fair way to become traditions. Those few which
were reversed, as Secretary Knox's " dollar diplomacy " may
be considered as still subjects of domestic controversy.
In many respects the outstanding feature of this period was,
as for that from 1815 to 1829, the clearing of the board of minor
Routine and questions of all kinds, — ^boundaries, fisheries, cit-
commerce izenship, claims, and treaty interpretations, —
some of them old problems, some new, but all interfering
with cordial international relationships. Never before had
we been quite so free from such food for quarrelling as we
were by 1913. In this period, as in all others, diplomacy
sought to aid commerce, its attempts were perhaps somewhat
more positive than before, but were of such a character
that it is difficult to estimate their effect.
Much more spectacular was the expansion of territory.
The new acquisitions were more remarkable for the novelty
Expansion of of their characteristics than for their extent,
temtory -poT the first time we violated Jefferson's in-
junction to make no annexations that would require a navy
for their defense. In the case of the Philippines there was
ROUTINE AND ARBITRATION 477
the further novelty that we professed an intention of holding
them only until they should be ready for independence.
In reality far more important than the exten- Expansion of
sion of our dominions was our entrance into "^"•'^ce
the diplomacy of eastern Asia. Although still avoiding en-
tangling alliances, we nevertheless engaged in the problems
of the Far East as an equal participant with the great powers
of Europe. Our purposes were limited to the preservation of
the integrity of China and the open door for trade, ideas that
appealed to the ideals of our own people, and were calculated
to command the acquiescence if not the heartfelt approval
of foreign nations. At the same time we cordially cooperated
with other nations in general measures for the protection of
commerce, for the peaceful settlement of international dis-
putes, and for the humane conduct of war, if war must be.
Our most striking single achievement was the settlement
on a new basis, in accordance with our changed opinion,
of the status of isthmian transit. Although isthmian
this determination of the question has proved P^^^y
its worth by allowing the actual construction of the long-
planned canal, it can hardly be regarded as diplomatically
satisfactory, or as likely to withstand the strain of a war to
which we ourselves should be a party. In connection with
the canal we have developed a distinct Caribbean policy,
which has not been thoroughly differentiated from what we
call the Monroe Doctrine, but which is actually different.
The Monroe Doctrine itself has continued its growth by
accretion; even more than the Constitution has it been
adjusted to meet new wants, while preserving p ■ . <
the sanctity of an established and revered the Monroe
name. Although monarchy and republicanism
cease to stand in such striking opposition as they did in
1823, the European system of alliances and balance of power
is still a real something which we wish to avoid, and have
thus far successfully avoided. Though our relations have
grown, and will continue to grow, increasingly intimate.
478 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
we have not become a part of the European system. It is,
however, still a possibility, as it was in 1823, that we may
by our own action or by the force of circumstances, become
a member of it. It is still the wish of some European states-
men that this may become the case, and some Americans are
not adverse to the idea. The fact that for ninety years,
ever since our declaration against further colonization, there
has been no establishment of new European colonies in
America decidedly strengthens our continued insistence on
that point. On the other hand, the fact that in the same
ninety years the only colonies in America from which Euro-
pean authority has been removed are Alaska, Cuba, and
Porto Rico somewhat deadens the force of Secretary Olney's
declaration that all the colonies are destined to break off
their dependence. Fortunately he set no date. If any new
case should occur, we should probably still maintain the
position announced by Polk in the case of Yucatan, that we
could not with equanimity see even the voluntary passing
of any American territory under European jurisdiction;
and probably, we should also hold the position taken by
Grant, that we should object to the transfer of any colony
from one European power to another, at least where such
transfer was likely to change the status of American affairs.
The development of an American unity to confront the dual-
ity of Europe, which Adams and Clay planned, which Blaine
did so much to promote, was pressed in this period with
vigor and with some success, but must be held to be a long
way from accomplishment. Our American policy is still
the policy of the United States.
The most important new features or corollaries of our
policy were our announcements that, with a view to reducing
New corol- the opportunity for European interference,
Monroe** *® we were willing, by mediation, advice, guardian-
Doctrine ship, and practical protectorates, to insure the
carrying out by American governments of their general
obligations to Europeans. To what extent we are ready to
ROUTINE AND ARBITRATION 479
push this supervision is a matter to be determined in each
case, but there can be no doubt that we would go farther
within the region of our special interest, the Caribbean,
than elsewhere. It is significant that the new corollary of
the Wilson administration, to the effect that we will recognize
only governments founded on justice and law, was not
apphed in the case of Peru, where a military government
was promptly recognized at the very time when we were
protesting against the government of Huerta in Mexico.
CHAPTER XXXIV
MEXICO
When Woodrow Wilson became President, March 4, 1913,
he found himself in a position somewhat similar to that of
Wflson ad- JefiFerson in 1801, of Jackson in 1829, and of
ministration Lincohi m 1861. Most of the diplomatic
problems of the time had been set at rest, and pol-
icies for dealing with routine affairs had been adopted
and were running smoothly. He called to the position of
secretary of state William Jennings Bryan, who, being with-
out experience in matters of state, would naturally be ex-
pected to be chiefly interested in the general politics of
the administration. In selecting John Bassett Moore as
counsellor of the state department, however, he secured the
promise of sound judgment and continuity of action.^
Wilson at once reversed one policy of the previous admin-
istration by withdrawing the assistance of diplomacy to
Change of Americans seeking concessions in China, and
policy announced a new extension of the Monroe
Doctrine by opposing concessions to foreign corporations
by American nations. The second of these new departures
promised to make up to the state department the loss of
labor which the first might cause. Of the three unsettled
and exciting questions left to him, two were the dispute with
Great Britain concerning the canal toll, and that relating
to the position of Japanese residents in this country. Both
these matters he endeavored to settle by domestic action.
In the interest of the second one. Secretary Bryan visited
California and attempted to forestall action by her legis-
lature, but this attempt failed, and the controversy con-
^ Resigned March 4, 1914.
480
MEXICO 481
tinues. In the matter of tolls, the President recommended
Congress to revoke its action. This it did, and that question
has vanished.
The third and most important problem was that of Mexico.
Contiguous, within the range of our Caribbean policy,
and powerful, Mexico had always demanded Relations with
a large share of our diplomatic attention. To M«^<^o
these causes of interest have usually been added those arising
from her internal disorder; but that factor had come to
be excluded from our consideration during the long presi-
dency of Porfirio Diaz, which had given a peace that seemed
established. The intimacy of our relationship is indicated
by forty agreements, treaties, and conventions made in the
forty years between 1868 and 1908. These included, besides
the usual subjects of international negotiation, arrangements
with regard to boundary, the pursuit of Indians, provision
for the navigation of the Rio Grande, and the equitable dis-
tribution of the waters of that river. The agreements finally
culminated in a general treaty of arbitration and the meeting
of Taft and Diaz in 1910.
While the governments were thus intimate, and in general
friendly, the citizens of the United States were infiltrating
Mexico. This infiltration, however, was dif- ^ .
Foreign in-
f erent from that which Alaman saw and feared tei;ests in
in Texas, it was most largely an infiltration of *"*^
capital. Peace had opened up enormous possibilities of
development, for which Mexico could furnish the oppor-
tunity and the labor, but not the accumulated capital nec-
essary to combine the two. The rewards promised to capital
were correspondingly great and it was furnished in large
amounts. Mining companies and railroad corporations
invested enormous sums, and ranching companies, rub-
ber plantation companies, and municipal utility companies
scattered their shares broadcast. Private individuals en-
gaged in great undertakings, and to hasten development
the Mexican government itself borrowed heavily. This cap-
482 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
ital came from all the investing countries of the world, but
chiefly from the United States. In 1912, President Taft esti-
mated that a billion dollars had been invested by Americans.
This capital did not go unaccompanied. It sent its rep-
resentatives to Mexico, and in addition, organizing ability
p . and expert service were needed. Thousands
population in of Americans, with many English, French,
and Germans, found employment there. Span-
iards continued, as always, to be numerous. Although the
foreign colony at the City of Mexico was large, the majority
of these foreigners were not to be found in compact settle-
ments, but scattered about the country, managing mines,
ranches, and plantations, and living in the midst of a pop-
ulation overwhelmingly native. The one important excep-
tion was an agricultural colony of American Mormons in
the north.
When, therefore, in November, 1910, Francisco Madero
inaugurated a revolution, the event became at once a matter
Revolution of of high concern for the United States and for
Madero other foreign powers. While France, Spain,
Germany, Great Britain, and the United States were all
interested in the protection of the lives and property of their
citizens, the United States was additionally disturbed over
the relation of the revolt to the Monroe Doctrine, as well as
over the possibility of frontier disturbances. The latter
question was the more immediately alarming, as the revolu-
tion was to some extent sectional in character and in the
beginning was localized in the north, the strategic points
being those at which the railroads ran out of Mexico
into United States territory. Juarez, Porfirio Diaz, and
Larado ultimately became the scene of fighting, and stray
bullets sometimes crossed the frontier and killed Americans
upon American soil. In March, 1911, therefore, President
Taft ordered the mobilization of twenty thousand United
States troops on the frontier, with a fleet at Galveston. The
rumors that these forces were intended to take part in a
MEXICO 483
forcible intervention, however, Secretary Knox dismissed as
"foolish stories." We did, in point of fact preserve our
neutrality according to our customary principles.
The speedy collapse of the Diaz government was a sur-
prise to most Americans, who were unaware of the general
unrest and dissatisfaction which his failure to Madero's
broaden the limits of popular government and s"<=<^®8^
relieve the distress of the agricultural laborers had excited.
While those with financial interests in Mexico regretted the
passing of a government apparently strong and sympathetic
with their aims, the general pubUc in America came to sym-
pathize with Madero, as the press spread the complaints of the
revolutionists. There was, therefore, general satisfaction in
the United States when, in May, 1911, Diaz resigned and left
the country and, in October, Madero was elected president.
The government of the latter was at once recognized, but
was never able to establish peace. Even in 1911 the United
States warned him that fighting was not to United States
take place where American lives and property *°*^ Madero
would be endangered; and our army was kept ready for
action. Nevertheless, while favoring the new government,
we preserved strict neutrality, and in 1912 Congress took an
additional step in the development of our neutral system by
the passage of an act authorizing the President, whenever
he should "find that in any American country conditions of
domestic violence exist which are promoted by the use of
arms and munitions of war procured fromthe United States,"
to prohibit trade in such articles. Taft acted at once upon
this authority, but he exempted purchases by the govern-
ment of Madero.
In February, 1913, however, Madero was overthrown by
Felix Diaz and General Huerta. Madero and his vice-
president, Suarez, were killed under circum- Revolution of
stances which strongly indicated official assas- ^"®^**
sination, and on February 27 Huerta was proclaimed presi-
dent. His authority was at once rejected by Governor
484 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Carranza of the state of Coahuila, who denied its constitu-
tionaUty and insisted upon a return to the governmental
methods prescribed by the constitution.
It was under these circumstances that Wilson became
President and undertook the management of the problem.
Wilson and Before his policy was developed. Great Britain,
Huerta ^j^ jyj^y 3^ ^nd France, Germany, and other
countries in quick succession, recognized Huerta. This
Wilson refused to do, and in explaining his action he formu-
lated a new policy which remains the latest extension of the
Monroe Doctrine. His purpose was to use non-recognition
as a means of discouraging the establishment of governments
in Spanish America that were based on violence, and on vio-
lation of the constitution of the country involved and of the
laws of morality. "We dare not," he declared, "turn from
the principle that morality and not expediency is the thing
that is to guide us and that we will never condone iniquity
because it is most convenient to do so." This is a departure
from our traditional policy of recognizing de facto govern-
ments, although there exists one precedent in the threat of
the Roosevelt administration not to acknowledge a revolu-
tionary leader in the Dominican Republic even if he suc-
ceeded. Our practical protectorate over that country,
however, together with its size, constituted important
diflFerences.
President Wilson's attitude of non-recognition is by all
odds the most aggressive turn that has ever been given to
_. J. - our Spanish-American policy, as it involves
" non-recogni- practical intervention in the domestic affairs
tion "
of those republics. To ascertain the facts
obviously means investigation. In actual operation the
force created by such a policy of non-recognition consists in
the lack of stability which it gives to the government under
our disapprobation, and the consequent inability of the latter
to borrow money. It is plainly President Wilson's belief
that a government not founded on the popular will consti-
MEXICO 485
tutionally expressed, and without our recognition, is a house
built upon the sands. Should such a government establish
itself, however, the situation might be inconvenient.
In accordance with this policy, Wilson in August, 1913,
sent a special but informal agent, John Lind, to convey his
terms to Huerta. These were immediate "Watchful
amnesty, security for an early and a free elec- ^*^**^
tion, and the assurance that Huerta would not be candidate
for the presidency and that all parties would agree to abide
by the results. These terms were rejected; when, therefore,
on October 9, 1913, Huerta "purged" the Mexican Congress
by imprisoning over a hundred of its members, Wilson in-
formed him that the United States would not accept the
result of the election which was soon to be held. Already
in August the United States had warned Americans to leave
Mexico, the administration had sent war-vessels to assist
their departure, and Congress had appropriated money for
the same purpose. On December 2, the President informed
Congress that his policy was one of "watchful waiting."
Hoping for the success of the insurrectionists, he soon after-
ward withdrew the embargo on arms.
Meantime the administration vigorously, and with some
degree of success, held both the Huerta government and the
insurrectionists to a respect for the lives and ~. ^ ^ .
^ Protection of
property of Americans. It could not, however, life and
insist on restitution and indemnity, since
there was no recognized government to approach on these
subjects. The powers of Europe, having recognized Huerta,
were in a different position, and it was feared that they
might pursue a different policy. This fear was in part re-
moved by a speech of Prime Minister Asquith, on Novem-
ber 10, 1913, in which he announced that, so far as Great
Britain was concerned, there was "not a vestige of founda-
tion for such a rumor;" and other nations assured the
administration of their intention to respect American
policy.
486 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Nevertheless, the presence of British, German, and French
war-vessels on the Mexican coast created alarm lest they
T, .. ^ ox X should feel called upon to land troops to pro-
Umted States , . . . „ „ , .
and European tect their citizens. Senator Bacon, chairman
powerg ^£ ^j^^ Senate committee on foreign affairs,
admitted that we could not deny their right to do so, but
said he considered "it far better that a request be made to
the United States to land marines " when protection was
necessary, "so as to avoid the possibility of the slightest
conflict between the United States and the European Pow-
ers." The killing of Benton, an Englishman, by the rev-
olutionary forces of General Villa in March, 1914, brought
this question of protection to a head. Secretary Bryan as-
serted that, since Great Britain, having recognized Huerta
and not recognized belligerency, could in no way treat with
the Constitutionalists, and yet could not be expected to let
the matter pass unnoticed, we should be allowed to serve as
intermediary, with the understanding, however, that we
thereby assumed no responsibility. This policy was acqui-
esced in by both Great Britain and, after some hesitation, by
Villa's superior oflBcer, General Carranza. Should another
case occur, therefore, the United States will undoubtedly
handle it as next friend of both parties.
The question arose whether the condition in Mexico con-
stituted another of the traditional opportunities for Ameri-
can expansion. The infiltration of American
Expansion ver- . , , . .
8US annexa- capital and Citizens, and the subsequent de-
velopment of occasions for interference, were
already there; the governor of Texas encouraged Texan
citizens to cross the frontier in self-defence, the governor of
Oregon prepared his militia for war with Mexico, and a bill
for the annexation of northern Mexico was introduced into
Congress. Even the final symptom, the fear of the intrusion
of foreign influence in case we did not intervene, appeared.
Japan had for some time been supposed to be seeking an
entrance into Mexico. In 1912 the proposed purchase of
MEXICO 487
Magdalena bay for a Japanese colony excited the Senate
to its adoption of Senator Lodge's resolution on the subject
of concessions to a syndicate that might lead to the establish-
ment of a foreign power on American territory. The send-
ing of Felix Diaz by Huerta on a special mission to Japan
in 1913 seemed to confirm the suspicion of undue intimacy,
but the refusal of that government to receive him somewhat
quieted our apprehension. In March, 1914, Senator Fall of
New Mexico called for immediate intervention to prevent
Germany from taking action in Mexico.
On the other hand, the process of expansion by the growth
of American interests in foreign countries and the subse-
quent adhesion of these countries to the United States
seems, except in case of Hawaii, to have been completed in
1845. The acquisition of the Philippines, although it gave
evidence of our desire to anticipate other countries, was ex-
ceptional. It has been the theory, moreover, that our occupa-
tion of those islands is to last only until they shall obtain the
capacity for self-government, an idea which the Wilson
administration has endeavored to make the basis of its Philip-
pine policy. Alaska was an instance of happy and largely
accidental anticipation; annexation promoted expansion
rather than the reverse. Our other acquisitions belong to
the category of naval stations, and are to be attributed
rather to our imperialistic tendencies than to our traditional
expansive habits.
In spite of the dreams of a continental republic that
Seward reflected, and in spite of our confident expectations
of Cuba, the only settled portion of Spanish Character of
America that we have secured is Porto Rico. spii.^sh°° "^
That island we took possession of because it America
was obviously foolish to have fought the Spanish war without
putting an end to our century and a quarter of diflSculties
with Spain by excluding her, as Sumner said of Great Brit-
ain, from the "hemisphere"; and, having taken it from Spain,
we could do nothing but annex it. In no settled portion of
488
MEXICO 489
Spanish America have we ever established a concentrated
population, or acquired a preponderance of numbers or of in-
fluence, or established a likelihood of such a preponderance;
nor has any Spanish-American population shown an inclina-
tion to become incorporated into the United States. There
has always been lacking, therefore, that local germ which
has been the moving cause of annexation in each natural
case. Financial interests and the temporary residence of
our citizens in a foreign country have never yet led us to
acquire that country. Had Buchanan taken northern Mexico
in pledge for our claims in 1858, it is possible that such a
germ might have developed there; but the possibility of it
now seems remote.
It is evident that we will not allow Mexico to become the
seat of a power threatening our control of the Caribbean;
but there is no probability that we shall ever The Vera
receive from Mexico, or even from a part of ^^^ episode
Mexico, any authentic request for annexation, or that we
shall in this case depart from President Wilson's pronounce-
ment that "the United States will never again seek one foot
of territory by conquest." In fact the very act which seemed
to Spanish-American opinion most indicative of an intention
on our part to conquer Mexico, was turned by President
Wilson into the most convincing demonstration it has re-
ceived of the sincerity of our constant protestation to the
contrary. While our government refused to recognize
either Huerta or Carranza as officially representative of
Mexico, it was in constant relationship with both. In April,
1914 its relations with Huerta became so strained that it
was decided to undertake a military occupation of Vera Cruz.
This was accomplished not without bloodshed. Although
the administration announced that hostilities would not be
carried farther, the opinion was widespread that war and
at least temporary conquest would result. The people of the
United States were strongly divided as to the probability
and wisdom of such action, Europe was deeply interested.
490 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Spanish America was still more intensely aroused, and its
press and public men were very generally convinced of the
ambitions of the United States. In this crisis Argentina,
Brazil, and Chili, known as the ABC powers, offered their
mediation. This the Wilson administration promptly ac-
cepted, subject to certain restrictions, and a conference was
The ABC arranged at Niagara. The Mexican factions
mediation showed themselves less amenable to suggestion
than the United States, and practically nothing was done
towards solving the internal problems of Mexico. The at-
titude of the United States, however, was made clear to
Spanish America, and the subsequent withdrawal of the
American troops from Vera Cruz confirmed the impression,
that it was guided by no motives of territorial aggrandize-
ment.
Huerta soon fell, but the situation in Mexico did not im-
prove. Villa, who had been the leading lieutenant of Car-
ranza, revolted; and again the tide of revolution ran strong
from north to south. The United States continued to co-
operate with other American powers. In August, 1915, a
Pan-American conference met at Washington, which, after
much negotiation and several adjournments, agreed to the
recognition of Carranza, subject to certain conditions
Carranza accepted and made rapid progress. Yet Villa,
though defeated, remained at large, and in the spring of
1916 made an incursion into the United States. He doubtless
hoped to produce a breach between Carranza and the
United States, and to become a national hero by fighting
the " Gringoes." We promptly demanded permission to send
troops across the border to hunt down the bandits; a right
we had always claimed when our neighbors were unable to
prevent their citizens from harassing our territory. Car-
ranza granted it, claiming and receiving the recognition of a
reciprocal right.
CHAPTER XXXV
THE GREAT WAR *
The outbreak of the Great War in August, 1914, took the
overwhelming majority of Americans by complete surprise.
They had no share in the causes that led up ^ . „
, . , , , , , « .1 Public opinion
to it, and few had any knowledge of them.
The first reaction was one of horror, accompanied by a feeling
not unakin to superiority, in that we had passed beyond such
things. Most people took sides, but rather according to
social and racial sympathies than to a knowledge of the
facts. The bulk of those of German stock felt a thrill of
pride at seeing Germany playing for the first time as a nation
the leading r61e in worid affairs. With them were many
Irish who were anti-British above all, and many Americans,
who, having studied in German universities, knew only the
best of that country. The confidence of a large part of the
population in the integrity of Great Britain, and the love
for France, might not have made the sympathizers for the
latter allies the large majority they actually were, had it
not been for the shock to American sensibilities caused by
the violation of Belgian neutrality; and even that left many
doubtful as to whether Germany's claim that she had fore-
stalled her opponents might not receive subsequent justi-
fication. The tales of atrocities were so gross as to seem to
the great majority unbelievable, and did not sensibly affect
^ For tiocuments, see American Journal of International Law; American
Association for International Conciliation, International Conciliation; Car-
negie Endowment for International Peace, Publications; for brief accounts,
see American Year Book and New International Year Book; for history, see
Edgar E. Robinson and Victor J. West, Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilton
(N. Y., 1917); for bibliography, see Historical Outlook (formerly History
Teachers' Magazine), 1917-1918.
491
492 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
public opinion until the report of Lord Bryce brought con-
viction. Only among the intellectuals and the recent immi-
grants was feeling bitter; the great majority remained open-
minded, very many remained uninterested.
If the people of the United States were unprepared to
judge the issues of the struggle, they were nevertheless
American prepared to meet the emergency. The con-
idealism tinuous policy of one hundred and fifty years
had taught them to keep their hands off questions in which
they were not concerned. The Monroe Doctrine and the
natural conditions on which the Monroe Doctrine was based
were almost universally relied upon to keep the nation at
peace, while it was believed that our intrinsic strength was
sufficient to produce more respect for our neutral rights
than in the great conflicts of a hundred years before. To
idealists this condition of inaction was tolerable because
from the days of Winthrop the leading trend of American
idealism has been that of teaching by example. We were
to show the value of our institutions by keeping the peace,
bind up the wounds of the bleeding, and, sane in a war-mad
world, take the lead to just and permanent peace.
The war was first brought home to Americans by the flight
of tens of thousands of their compatriots caught in the war
First effects area. These wanderers flocking to their em-
o£ war bassies found them overwhelmed already by
the second outstanding result of the war. As we were the
greatest neutral power in the world, most of the belligerent
envoys, on leaving the capitals to which they were accredited,
left their archives and the care of their countrymen in charge
of our representatives, so that in Berlin, lines of Serbians,
Russians, British, and other nationalities stretched for blocks
from our embassy, and there and elsewhere staff hours ran
to twenty in the day. Nor did many days pass before the
war began to work internal changes at home. Great orders
for war material gave promise of prosperity to certain parts
of the country, while the curtailment of European industry
THE GREAT WAR 493
sent the prices of some raw materials crashing down. Par-
ticularly was the latter effect felt in the South. Cotton
manufacture was threatened at home as well as abroad by
the possibility that German dye stuffs would be cut off, and
the fall in the price of cotton seemed likely to carry with it
the whole structure of Southern prosperity.
The key to all these problems lay in ocean transportation.
In 1793 we had been in a position to handle all our foreign
trade in our own vessels, and much of that of Ocean
the belligerent countries. Our difficulties lay transportation
in securing what we considered just treatment for our vessels.
In 1914 we were dependent upon foreign merchant marines,
the more important of which were belligerent. The German
marine was at once tied up by fear of capture; much of that
of Great Britain was called into war service. It would be
our problem to create a marine, and in the meantime we
must pay heavy scarcity prices for freight, and we would be
vitally interested in the attitude of the belligerents towards
each other's vessels. One expedient was suggested by our
Civil War experience: the transfer of enemy ships to the
American flag, particularly the splendid fleets of the German
companies tied up in our harbors. Since that time, how-
ever, the doctrine, always strongly held by the French, that
such transfers were contrary to international law had been
generally accepted, and had been embodied in the Declara-
tion of London of 1910, which codified the rules of sea war-
fare, and which, while it had not been as yet generally ac-
cepted, nevertheless had considerable moral weight. To
test this point certain merchants purchased a German ship,
the Dacia, and sent it out from the United States with a
cargo of cotton. It was seized by the French, tried in prize
court, and condemned. Our government did not protest,
and no further attempt was made to utilize this resource
until much later in the war, when various neutral nations
undertook to requisition such vessels. By that time it was
against German interests, and while it was defensible on the
494 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
ground of exigent national interest, it invariably resulted
in war or a state of semi-hostility.
The use of the sea and of belligerent marines was not
a matter which we could settle for ourselves alone; it de-
pended as well upon the policies and legal con-
ceptions of the nations at war. The policy of
Great Britain and her Allies resembled that she had pursued
during the Napoleonic wars, but was simpler. She wished
to keep open the seas for her own commerce, to close them
absolutely to that of her enemies; her economists believed
that the German attempt of the last forty years to build
up a self-sufficing economic life had not been completely
successful, and that she and her allies could be defeated by
attrition. The German policy was that of Napoleon, not
to contest the seas, but by various means to harry and de-
stroy the commerce of Great Britain.
In the dependency of the latter upon imported foodstuffs
lay Germany's great hope. In both cases the intervening
century had made one striking change. Progress in economic
organization had made possible the concentration of all a
nation's resources in the struggle; each policy must be com-
plete. One open port would defeat any policy of exclusion;
no trade was without its relation to the war; the older doc-
trines of limited contraband and partial blockades became
practically obsolete. These policies were self-evident; the
means which would be employed to execute them only de-
veloped with the progress of the war.
The United States Government handled questions of
detail as they appeared. A grant by Congress and the use
President WH- of naval vessels assisted thousands of stranded
son's policies Americans. The new strain upon our diplo-
matic service was met in January, 1915, by a law classifying
all diplomatic positions, except the highest, thus making it
professional in tone and elastic in action. The President
recommended that, in view of the maritime situation. Con-
gress authorize the creation of a national governmental
THE GREAT WAR 485
shipping company. This proposal was not acted upon for
three years, but American registry was opened to foreign-
built ships, and all private shipbuilding yards were soon
filled to their capacity. To preserve peace at home, as
interest grew in width and bitterness, the President urged
that good temper be maintained, and, taking advantage of
a new method of addressing the people, he caused all war
films exhibited to be preceded by a request from him that
the rival elements in the audience should refrain from ap-
plause as varying scenes were shown. As each belligerent
indulged in acts contrary to our understanding of interna-
tional law, he caused the American case to be vigorously
presented. He felt bound to abide by, and called upon to
demand the recognition of, international law as it stood
when the war began, though he offered, as on February 10th
on the question of foodstuffs, always fruitlessly, to be the
agent for securing modifications mutually agreed to by both
belligerents. With each belligerent he dealt separately, re-
fusing to be drawn into any discussion of the acts of the
other, or of our dealing with the other. From the first he
repudiated utterly the idea that one group of nations could
justify acts against us by claiming that they were in retalia-
tion for acts of the other.
Whether we should press our cases at once or by degrees,
or press one and leave another until after the conclusion of
the war, he regarded as a matter of policy, and our policy
alone. He fully recognized that in the existing state of world
organization our power to bring about a reversal of a dis-
tasteful practice rested ultimately upon our willingness to
fight, and as early as February 10, 1915, his phrase, "strict
accountability," contained the germ of war. His secretary
of state, Mr. Bryan, however, refused to recognize this grim
logic, and let it be known that his policy excluded resort to
war. For a time, therefore, the voice of the administration
was confused as to the significance of our protests.
Our difficulties with Great Britain and her Allies arose
496 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
in the first place over the question of contraband. Great
Britain announced that she would regulate her conduct by
the provisions of the Declaration of London
with regard to absolute and conditional contra-
band, except in certain particulars where the development
of the mechanism of war had made new materials war essen-
tials. In the absence of a binding international code and of
treaties, these additions could give rise to little but fruitless
controversy. Cotton she did not actually include until
August 20, 1915. The greatest diflSculty was with regard to
food, which was to be considered contraband only on con-
dition that it was for governmental military uses. Great
Britain regarded the governmental control of food in Ger-
many, established on an important scale on January 26, 1915,
as making all food shipped there contraband. The leading
case was that of the Wilhelmina, which was seized on Feb-
ruary 9, 1915, and sent to a prize court. Its cargo was con-
demned but paid for.
The question of what was contraband, however, was not
so difficult as those raised by the manner of its seizure.
. Great Britain did not reassert the right of
impressment nor did the United States deny
the right of visitation, but new conditions made old methods
inapplicable. Great Britain as early as November 3, 1914,
announced the establishment in certain sea areas surround-
ing Germany and her Allies of "war zones," made unnavi-
gable by fixed mines. Through them ran sea lanes kept free
from mines by British patrols. Neutral vessels using these
sea lanes were to be brought for search into British ports,
the most important of which was Kirkwall in the Orkneys.
This novel poUcy was defended on the ground that Germany
had resorted to the illegal laying of floating mines in open
sea, rendering all commerce dangerous, and that the exam-
ination of ships at sea was impossible under existing condi-
tions. In so far as it was an extension of belligerent rights,
it was partly offset by the fact that it freed neutrals from
THE GREAT WAR 497
the chance of search elsewhere and by the concession that
the vessels carrying contraband should not be condemned
and sold. On the whole the system worked well, though at
first it involved costly delays, and in its central points
seemed a reasonable adaptation of the principles of inter-
national law to changed conditions.
The chief difficulty arose from the fact that contiguous to
Germany were neutral nations, Holland, Switzerland, Nor-
way, and Sweden, so that voyages might be Enemy desti-
made from neutral port to neutral port with nation and con-
1 1 • 1 1 • . /-. 1 M tinuous voyage
goods to be introduced into Germany by rail
or across the Baltic. Great Britain resorted to the doctrines
of the enemy destination and continuous voyage, as inter-
preted by the United States during our Civil War, to justify
the stopping of such cargoes while in transit on the ocean.
It was, however, easy to complicate the situation by ship-
ping the goods to an agent in the neutral country, and, after
they had become part of the stock of the neutral country,
exporting them to Germany. This led Great Britain to
attempt to determine the destination of goods, not by the
form of contract, but by comparing the imports of the neutral
before and during the war, and by prohibiting the passing,
not only of any surplus, but of such amount as had previously
been imported for export to Germany, or as substitutes for
native products so exported. The procedure had some
precedent in the United States investigations of Nassau
trade during the Civil War, but in that case it had been
used only as corroborative evidence. To assist in the ex-
ecution of this policy the British government entered into
agreements with powers, such as Holland, and firms, in-
cluding some American meat packers, which in return for
privileges and compensations agreed to abide by the limita-
tions laid down.
This close supervision of neutral trade culminated in a
joint note of France and Great Britain to neutral nations on
March 1st, 1915, which announced what was practically
498 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
total prohibition of trade with Germany, to be obtained by
complete supervision of the trade of her neighbors. This
Supervision of would have excited less legal objection had it
neutral trade rested upon the principle of blockade, but Great
Britain was loth to resort to this method, because our Civil
War practices, so useful to her as precedents, were not so
clearly applicable in case of blockade as of contraband, and
because of the situation of the Baltic. She could prevent
vessels entering that sea, but not trade from the Baltic ports
to Germany. As one of the legal conditions of blockade is
its impartiality this might affect its legahty. Mr. Balfour,
however, argued that so long as the blockading nation was
impartial in its action, it could not be held responsible for
the accidents of nature. A further obstacle to blockade was
the well accepted principle that it must be enforced imme-
diately off the hostile coast, while contraband could be seized
anywhere on the open seas. The essential element of a
blockade's legaHty, however, is its effectiveness, and this
condition could be fully met; its enforcement four hundred
miles away, instead of off the coast, might well be considered
as an adjustment to meet new conditions. At any rate on
March 13, 1915, Great Britain began to shift to the prin-
ciple of blockade, and in 1916 appointed Lord Robert Cecil
Blockade Minister.
This shift in the basis of her policy simplified many prob-
lems. Many minor causes of friction were settled as time
^ went on. The British policy did not endanger
British policy ... -r i> t • i i • im i
life. It did restrict trade, but, owing to a liberal
system of compensation, the actual loss of property was
probably negligible except in cases where a clear right of
seizure existed. All cases were tried in courts acknowledged
to be honest, and the strain between the two nations was
much ameliorated by the decision in the case of the Zamora
in 1916 that international law must be the basis of judgment,
and by the statement of the British government that it
would submit disputed cases to arbitration. In fact after
THE GREAT WAR 499
three years of war, in 1917, the only important source of
vexation was the controversy with regard to the control of
mail, where a conflict between two principles of international
law gave each nation an opportunity to feel aggrieved.
The closing of the Central Powers to importation, while
the seas remained open to Great Britain and her Allies,
meant that the latter could not only continue Trade in
their usual trade but could draw upon neutral contraband
countries for war materials; and the United States was soon
humming with the manufactiu-e of munitions. This was a
condition which was not of our making but was the result
of the naval disparity between the two groups of belligerents.
It was a fully recognized neutral right to trade in whatsoever
it wished with whomsoever it could; the duty of preventing
such trade lay upon the belligerent, the penalty upon the
individual. To forbid neutrals to supply war material to
belligerents, moreover, would put small or unprepared states
entirely at the mercy of militaristic neighbors. Neverthe-
less to supply one party and not the other had a specious
look of partiality, and the pacifist and Pro-German group
in the United States made a strong effort to have the trade
stopped. Germany had engaged too much in such traflSc
in the past effectively to protest, but in June, 1915, Austria
sent a note on the subject. The United States Government,
adhering to the principles of Washington's first proclamation
of neutrality, refused to act.
In the meantime the first phase of Germany's ocean policy,
raiding by commerce destroying cruisers, had brought about
a clash owing to the destruction of the American Commerce
sailing vessel, William P. Frye, on January 28, ^^^^
1915. The United States protested under our treaties of
1798 and 1828 with Prussia. Germany finally agreed to
compensate for the actual loss, and to submit the question
of right under the treaties to The Hague. The subject, how-
, ever, soon ceased to be of interest owing to the driving of
\ the German cruisers from the seas.
500 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Already Ihe great sea issue which was to form the basis
of the United States' case for war was forming. The main
German sub- rehance of Germany was on the submarine,
marine poUcy q^ February 4, 1915, she announced that her
submarines would torpedo at sight all vessels in certain
zones surrounding Great Britain. Such a policy represented
not a modification of international law to meet a new situa-
tion but a complete reversal of law. Germany defended it
as in retaUation for England's food and zone orders, which
again were based in part on retaliation for Germany's sowing
of floating-mines. At bottom, Germany, like Napoleon,
recognized no law except might but promised to restore law
and freedom when Great Britain should be beaten down;
and her prospective generosity inspired about as much con-
fidence as his. The United States on February 10th pro-
tested this action. To sink without warning merchant ships,
whether belligerent or neutral, had for so long been con-
sidered as a barbarity that many writers on international
law had neglected of late to mention it. To so sink neutral
vessels was a violation of all sea law. To sink vessels at all
without search was opposed to all spirit of law, for it de-
stroyed at once all evidence upon which a judicial review
might be based, and made the commander of the submarine
judge, jury, and executioner. President Wilson stated tliat
should any American vessel or citizen be a victim of this
policy Germany would be held to "strict accountability."
The German government so far heeded President Wilson's
protest as to state that American vessels would not be so
attacked, unless by accident, and asked that they be plainly
marked.
Such accidents did occur promptly in the cases of the
Gushing and the Gulflight, but the next important stage in
^ the controversy arose from the sinking, under
The Lusitama . " , ,. , .. i
circumstances of peculiarly aggravating de-
liberation, of the British steamer Lusitania on May 7, 1915,
with the loss of over one hundred American lives. This
THE GREAT WAR 501
atrocity, celebrated by a medal and paeans of victory in
Germany, brought in America the first strong demand that
we enter the war. It will in fact probably be a mystery to
Americans of the future that we did not do so. The fact
was that not only that portion of the population which pre-
ferred to think well of Germany, but great elements which
hoped that circumstances would make it respectable for us
to stay out of the war, hugged the delusion that the English
control of the sea and her censorship prevented our hearing
Germany's case. The popular ignorance of international
law, also, made it easy to blur the case. It was claimed,
untruly, that the Lusitania was armed; and the policy of
Great Britain in generally arming merchant vessels, although
certainly, within limits, perfectly legal, was cleverly drawn
into the general issue. It is very doubtful if the adminis-
tration could have secured general support for a war on the
issue of an attack on a British vessel, which many believed
was armed and so made equivalent to a war vessel.
The administration, however, was more concerned that
war should not be brought about, if Germany could other-
wise be made to reverse her policy. Our pro- Bryan and
test, however, so obviously held war in leash ^-^°sing
that Secretary Bryan resigned. He was succeeded by Mr.
Robert Lansing, a trained international lawyer, connected
with the traditions of American diplomacy by his marriage
with the daughter of John W. Foster, whose personal reminis-
cences of that service went back fifty years. While the
Lusitania case remained subject to discussion until war
finally broke out, Germany did, on September 1, agree not to
sink "liners," or regular passenger ships, without warning,
and the discussion of general policy continued. "Accidents"
also continued to occur, and the sinking of the Sussex, on
March 24, 1916, exhausted all patience. The American
government sent on April 19th an ultimatum demanding
the immediate reversal of German policy. In a note of
May 4, 1916, whose bitterness of tone was convincing of its
602 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
sincerity, Germany yielded, but stated that she might change
her mind unless we secured from Great Britain some modi-
fication of her policy.
This change of German policy coincided with the presi-
dential election. President Wilson saw that, whatever our
Presidential attitude in the war, the economic and social
election cohesion of the world was now so great that
it was no longer possible for us to remain isolated. He saw
that, whatever its causes, the war had become a conflict of
law against lawlessness, of self-government against autocracy,
in which the defeat of the German imperial dream was a
world necessity. He probably saw little chance of our keep-
ing out of it. So long as that was possible, however, he could
not, as head of the state, speak out. Public opinion was as
yet so little crystalized that the administration was able to
get through Congress a totally inadequate army bill, only in
modified form, and it was only by taking advantage of the
Mexican situation and mobilizing on that border that we
secured any beginning of real war preparation, save in our
always prepared though not large navy. Under these cir-
cumstances issues were confused. Some Pro-Germa&is voted
for the Republican candidate; many voters supported Wilson
because he had "kept us out of war.*' The net result, how-
ever, was an expression of confidence in the president's
leadership; lacking a majority in 1912, in 1916 he carried
the country by half a million.
Strong in this backing he began at once a constructive
policy towards the war. On December 18th, he asked the
End of period Various beUigerent nations to state the terms
of isolation upon which they would conclude peace. On
January 22d, he addressed the Senate on the general question
of national policy. He pointed out that it was apparent
that the world was so knit together that no nation could in
the future live by itself alone, that the terms of the world
peace would inevitably influence so greatly the future of the
United States that we could not stand apart from their
THE GREAT WAR 50S
formulation, that some form of world union had become
necessary for the preservation of world peace and interna-
tional justice. In thus prophesying the close of our period
of isolation, the President spoke in advance of the sentiment
of the majority of his countrymen; the teaching of the
Monroe Doctrine was too deeply impregnated to vanish in a
moment, however great the crisis. His words, however, gave
impetus to thought and discussion, and people began to
realize that the isolation proclaimed in 1823 as desirable was
only a means adapted to the conditions of that time; the
principles of that doctrine, and of all our foreign policy,
were the right of self-determination by peoples however
small and weak, undiminished by the dominance of great
powers or by a world system of balance, which made the
disputes of each a peril to all. That and democracy were
the things which John Quincy Adams had stated in 1823
could only be maintained in America by extending our
interest to all America, and separating our continents from
Europe. In 1917, Woodrow Wilson announced that in the
world of that date they could only be made safe by world
organization.
In the meantime German policy was not stationary.
Whether her acceptance of the Sussex note was a subterfuge
to gain time for preparation or represented 3. p ^ .
triumph of the moderate party, at any rate in submarine
the Fall of 1916 the extreme war party led by
Admiral von Tirpitz demanded that it be reversed. Its
leaders fully realized that such a reversal would probably
bring America into the war, but they believed that America
could be held out of the war by internal agitation and by the
submarines. By an unlimited use of the latter they believed
Great Britain could be starved into submission. Their policy
triumphed, and on January 31, 1917, United States Ambassa-
dor Gerard was informed that unrestricted submarine war-
fare would begin at midnight.
The entrance of the United States into the war was now
504 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
only a question of time and method, but that continued to
be a question of great importance in determining the whole-
Severance of teartedness of the popular response. On Feb-
dipiomatic re- ruary 3d, the President declared diplomatic re-
lations between Germany and the United States
severed, and on February 26th, recommended to Congress
an armed neutrahty like that of 1798. A few days later the
government gave out for publication a note of the German
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Zimmermann,
dated January 17th, in which he instructed the German
Ambassador in Mexico, in case of war between the United
States and Germany, to offer Mexico alliance and the pos-
session of southern portions of the United States, and to ask
Mexico to approach Japan with an offer of the Pacific Coast.
This note, acknowledged by Zimmermann, caused almost a
revolution in the opinion of that diminishing number of
Americans of German stock who still sympathized with their
home country. It capped the stories of German intrigue
which, growing in volume, had till then fallen in many cases
upon deaf ears.
There was indeed no doubt of the constant violation of
American neutrality by the agents of the Central Powers.
V lations of ^ September, 1915, we had demanded and
American obtained the recall of the Austrian Ambassador,
neu ly Dumba, for endeavoring to incite labor disturb-
ances among Austrians working in American munition plants.
In November, 1915, we had sent home the German attaches,
von Papen and Boy-Ed, for plotting the bombing of bridges,
ships, and munition works. The German Ambassador, von
Bemstorff, had, however, succeeded in escaping public con-
nection with these scandals, and those obstinately clinging to
their belief in German good faith refused to find their actions
directly inimical to the United States. The Zimmermann
note, followed by revelations that von Bemstorff himself
had been directing a widespread propaganda to mislead
American opinion, had spent money in the hope of corrupting
THE GREAT WAR 505
Congress, and had been the guiding spirit in murderous
undertakings by which American Hves were lost, allowed no
honest doubt that Germany had been throughout the war
fighting the United States.
Although Congress was prevented by a "Uttle group of
wilful men," assisted by the Senate rules, from carrying out
the President's proposal for an armed neu- Declaration of
trality, an overwhelming majority supported **'
it, and he declared it in force by executive order, for which
authority had been found. In the meantime, however, the
threat of February 1st had become a fact; American vessels
had been sunk. In the meantime, also, the Russian Revolu-
tion had brought a fresh wave of enthusiastic demands that
we definitely take our stand with the Allies for democracy
against autocracy. On April 2d, President Wilson recom-
mended war, and on April 6th, Congress voted it. So over-
whelming was the case for war, and so able had been the
presentation of the case to the people, that never before
had the American people moved with so great a unanimity
as in taking this step that opened a new epoch in the history
of their world relationships.
CHAPTER XXXVI
SUCCESS AND ITS CAUSES
Our diplomacy has, on the whole, served the national
needs and purposes exceptionally well. No other nation
has been confronted so continually by the problem of neu-
trality, and for none has it assumed such protean shapes;
yet it is impossible to see how we could, with foreknowledge,
have improved our handling of it in any large way. For
no other nation has the problem of protecting its citizens
abroad been so difficult, owing to the great numbers of our
naturalized citizens and the variety of their origin; but at the
present day, and for a long time past, an American pass-
port is nowhere inferior to any other certificate of nationality.
Although our merchant flag was ill-treated during the wars
of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period, we
won for it later, in the teeth of Great Britain, a freedom al-
most imique.
The poUcies for the building up of our merchant marine
and the furtherance of our commerce have been chiefly de-
termined by internal considerations, but diplomacy has in
all cases eventually, though with difficulty, laid open the
path for the execution of those policies internationally. The
government has been able to offer our people as great op-
portunities for the exercise of their activities beyond the
national boundaries as any other nation has enjoyed; our
Newfoundland fisheries, for example, have been even more
caressingly watched over than have those of France. It
has also successfully protected them in the enjoyment of
their national resources, the only important exception being
the practical destruction of the seal herd of Behring sea.
The territory desired by our people for their expansion has
506
SUCCESS AND ITS CAUSES 507
been obtained, excepting to the north. There, meeting the
equal force of Great Britain, we are left with a straight line
as the result of the impact. The study of the measuring
of each stretch of that line, however, reveals the fact that we
obtained all that we had the power to demand.
Erratic and experimental divergencies in our diplomacy
have been few. Of these, Jefferson's embargo must be consid-
ered the greatest, and it was diplomatically unsuccessful and
disastrous. To err with Napoleon, however, does not indicate
hghtness of mind; and the embargo in the United States, like
the continental system in Europe, hastened an internal devel-
opment that was sure to come. Our many and varied attempts
at an unnatural expansion failed because they were unnatural,
and left no serious effects. Our foreign wars have all been
turned to account — even that of 1812, which was saved from
being a national calamity only by the skill of our diplomats at
Ghent.
This success has rested upon a continuity, both of detail
and of general policy, which is remarkable in a nation that
in a hundred and fifty years has gone through all the stages
of evolution from a second-rate colony to a great power.
This continuity must in a considerable degree be attributed
to that juristic tone which until very recently has been a
predominating factor in our public life. Well advised in the
beginning, particularly by Franklin, we accepted a system of
international law which appealed to our ethical sense and
fitted our position and interests. To this we clung with an
x^unequaled persistence and exactitude, and it is in large part
/through our efforts that this system has become the basis
of the accepted international law of to-day.
That in handling innumerable petty cases and frequent
pressing crises we were able to preserve an impressive con-
sistency of practice, was not primarily due to the efforts of
our diplomatic staff in foreign countries. Efficient as it was
at some periods, and brilliant as have been some of the men
composing it at every stage, it had after 1829 no element of
508 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
cohesion, unless between 1897 and 1913, and it has at all
times been marred by the presence of incompetent or unsuit-
able individuals. The home administration of diplomacy,
however, has exhibited a continuity of service and a conspic-
uous ability which give it rank with our supreme court. John
Jay, John Quincy Adams, William Hunter, and John Bassett
Moore cover the whole period of our diplomacy, and repre-
sent an almost constant service within the state department
or easy availability for advice to it. Other series equally
striking may be named. Jefferson and Buchanan were al-
ways powerful, and for much of the time in control, from
the beginning of independence to Civil war; Seward and
Hay, from 1849 to 1905. William Hunter and A. A. Adee
together served in the state department from 1829 to the
present day (1915); counting the years when they over-
lapped, their combined service falls just six years short of a
century. Such personal oversight has meant a growth from
precedent to precedent which has gradually resulted in a
self-carrying tradition for those minor matters that do not
reach the public ear.*
The consistency with which general policies have been
applied in the greater episodes, as such have arisen, is due
to the force of a governing public opinion. It is probably
true that the growth of democracy has made diplomacy
more difficult in most countries than it previously had been.
That the reverse has been true in the United States has been
due, in the first place, to the juristic habit of mind already
mentioned. The Monroe Doctrine has been popularly re-
garded as a law; its successive extensions have been looked
upon in the same light as the new powers which the courts
have successively found by implication in the constitution.
More important has been the simplicity of our leading and
essential policy. The harmonizing of conflicting ideas,
when they have presented themselves, has proved beyond our
grasp. The one deliberate purpose which our diplomacy has
* Gaillard Hunt, Department of State of the United States, N. Y., 1914.
SUCCESS AND ITS CAUSES 509
completely failed to bring about has been that of winning
the sympathy and acquiring the leadership of Spanish Amer-
ica. The reason is obvious; not the sentiment of Pan- Amer-
icanism, but the deep-seated nationalistic conception of
United States dominance, has primarily moved us. From
the day in 1794 when Wayne rode round the British fort at
the rapids of the Maumee and dared its commander to fire,
we have, with the exception of brief periods after the first
abdication of Napoleon and during the Civil war, been the
dominant American power. In 1823 we announced the
fact to the world, and at the same time first became generally
conscious of it ourselves. Every corollary added to the Mon-
roe Doctrine has been a renewed assertion of the fact, and
has presented an added means of maintaining it.
Dominance is not a policy but a talent: the responsibility
is for its use. Our employment of our position has rested
upon a feeling that long antedated it, that even antedated
our ancestors' migration to America, They wanted to be let
alone, the colonies in 1776 wanted to be let alone, to seek their
future in their own way. In return they were willing, not
exactly to let every one else alone, but at least to confine
their activities to the limits within which they were actually
in control. Franklin rejected the idea of colonial representa-
tion in the English Parliament; he wished not legislative
participation in the empire, but legislative independence
within the colonial area. This was the reverse side of the
Monroe Doctrine. In America we were dominant; by con-
fining our activities to America we could be dominant
wherever we were active. It is this simple and fundamental
idea that has impressed itself on the American mind, and
has become the touchstone by which public opinion judges
all diplomatic questions. With such a task as keeping ad-
justed a balance of power, democracy is probably incompe-
tent to deal; with its accustomed practicality the democracy
of America determined that it would have no balance of power
in America, and would not meddle with it where it existed.
510 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
When it became plain that neither isolation, nor even
separation of the continents, would longer serve to secure
this self-determination that Americans had always desired
for themselves and respected in others, their natural re-
course was to world organization, which would bring inter-
national relations into the realm of constitutional politics
with which they were familiar. By policy and law they
would avoid the preparation and the clash of armaments,
and by agreements which, by being general, would be dis-
entangling, they would secure for others as well as for them-
selves that freedom to devote their main energy to the
development of their own ideas, for which they had con-
tinuously striven.
INDEX
INDEX
Aberdeen, Lord, Mexican policy,
253. 262, 270; Oregon, 267.
Abyssinia, treaty with United States,
469.
Acadia, French, boundary dispute,
230.
Adams, Charles F., minister to
England, 8, 306, 316, 321, 372;
instructions, 319; protests deliv-
ery of Confederate rams, 322, 340;
successor, 340; in Geneva board,
347; characterized, 306; cited,
322, 382.
Adams, David J., fishing-vessel,
seized, 376.
Adams, John, diplomat, 1, 115, 188;
commissioner to France, 38; Hol-
land, 38; peace commissioner, 41,
46, 48; minister to England, 52,
59, 60, 83, 372; commercial
treaties, 54; treats with Barbary
States, 56; arranges Dutch loan,
78; vice-president, 81; president,
130; appointments, 131, 138;
French policy, 133, 134, 137-139;
views on neutrality, 92; on isola-
tion, 211; characterized, 38, 39;
cited, 34, 39, 59, 60, 92, 133.
Adams, John Q., diplomat, 2, 8,
241. 306, 429, 508; mission to
Prussia and Sweden, 129; at Ber-
lin, 143; minister to Russia. 163,
170, 179, 188; on commission to
England, 179; on Ghent commis-
sion, 180, 183, 185; secretary of
state, 188; president, 188, 214;
fisheries policy. 192; trade. 199;
Florida. 199-202, 208, 341; Span-
ish-American, 207-218, 297; slave-
trade, 237; objects to British co-
operation, 210-214, 293; Pan-
American policy, 214, 215, 284,
478; slave-trade, 237; Texas policy,
246, 247, 250-252; member of
Congress, 227, 256; supports Jack-
son, 228; argues VAmisted case,
239; minister to England, 372;
characterized, 188, 222; opinions
cited, 81, 104, 120, 126, 140, 189.
Adams, Samuel, gains foreign sym-
pathy, 24; predicts separation of
East and South, 41.
Adams, William, peace commission-
er, 180.
Adee, A. A., service in state depart-
ment, 508.
Adet, P. A., minister to United
States, 127; recall, 128, 130;
Canadian intrigues, 131; western,
131.
Adler, German warship, 400.
Admiralty Courts, organized by
Gen^, 99; British, 111, 112, 114,
122, 156, 157, 236, 339.
Africa, trade with United States,
55, 85; Napoleon's dealings with,
131; slaves returned to, 239;
pirates of, 351; international
relations, 464.
Aguinaldo. Emilio, Philippine leader,
420.
Aix-la-Chapelle, treaty of, 16.
Alabama, Confederate cruiser, 339;
claims against, 345; commission
on, 347.
Alaman, Louis, Mexican secretary,
cited, 243; warnings heeded, 247;
Texan views, 252; views on Amer-
ican expansion, 481.
Alamo, story of, 248.
Alaska, Russian fur-trade, 209;
purchase of. 358. 398. 406, 478,
487; seal industry, 377, 434;
boundary dispute, 432; settled,
434; status of inhabitants, 421.
Alaska Commercial Company, seal-
ing monopoly, 377.
Albert, Prince, labors for peace,
317.
513
514
INDEX
Aldrich, Sen. Nelaon, on reciprocity,
388, 471.
Alexander I, of Russia, fosters
Holy Alliance, 204; foreign policy,
179.
Alexander II, of Russia, emancipa-
tor, 312.
Alexander VI, Pope, confirms Span-
ish claims, 10; demarcation line,
11, 12, 391, 417.
Alexis, Grand Duke, visits Amer-
ica, 360.
Alfonso XII, king of Spain, 365.
Algeciras, conference at, 402; United
States takes part, 464.
Algiers, official piracy, 55, 56; holds
Americans as slaves, 56; treaty
with, 85; raids Atlantic, 114;
American expedition against, 141;
French capture, 223; Dey of, cited,
141.
Aliens, control of, 80.
Allegheny River, 17.
Allen, Ethan, head of Cuban com-
mittee, 409.
Alverstone, Lord Chief Justice, on
Alaskan boundary commission,
434.
Amazon River, navigation of, 287.
Ambrister, R. C, hanged, 200.
V Ambuscade, captures Little Sarah,
103.
Amelia Island, privateers use, 200.
American Fur Co., rivals, 173.
American Revolution, diplomacy
during, 1, 23; causes, 35; Euro-
pean interest in, 24, 25; piracy, 56;
after effects on commerce, 62;
frontier loyalty, 67, 69; trade
during, 70, 81, 108.
Americans, relations with Indians,
64-66, 72, 74, 116; sympathies in
French Revolution, 95, 96; man
French privateers, 98, 102.
Ames, Fisher, supports Jay treaty,
122; cited, 86, 144, 121.
Amiens, treaty of, 143.
VAmiated, slave carrier, case tried,
239; as precedent, 368.
Amoy, port opened, 223.
Amsterdam, printing centre, 24;
financial, 34; market, 85; burgo-
master, 36.
Amy Warwick, admiralty case, 307.
Andrew, Gov. J. M., Trent affair
pleases, 316.
Angell, J. B., on Chinese commission,
398.
Anglican Church, position in United
States, 52.
Antelope, admiralty case, 237.
Apia (Samoa), consular intrigues
in, 399, 401.
Appalachian Mountains, as bound-
ary, 98.
Appalachicola River, as bound-
ary, 19.
d'Aranda, Count, Spanish minister,
33; treats with Jay, 44, 142.
Arbitration, familiar to English
colonists, 22; of boundaries, 186;
of slave indemnity, 191; Indian
annuities, 194; northeast bound-
ary, 228, 234; Creole case, 239;
northwest boundary, 270; seizure
of fishing vessels, 287; idea of
permanent, 279; fisheries, 285;
Civil war claims, 344-347; Geneva
court, 347, 348; of Spanish- Amer-
ican claims, 350; Cuban claims,
367; Portuguese, 375; French, 375;
fisheries, 375; sealing rights, 378;
between American powers, 385,
386; proposed in Venezuelan dis-
pute, 392, 393; in Maine affair,
414; of Alaska boundary, 439, 434;
of fisheries, 435; Pan-American
court of, 451; Venezuelan claims,
447; other claims, 469; "Pious
fund" claims, 474; scope, 340,
474, 475; American advocates of,
472, 473; treaties, 474, 475, 481;
Spanish- American practice of, 473,
474.
Arbuthnot, Alexander, hanged, 200.
Archangel, port open, 163.
Argentine Republic, commercial
treaty with, 285, 287; later rela-
tions, 324; European relations,
825; competition with, 373; Ital-
ian immigration, 384; diplomatic
service to, 430; foreign minister,
446; dispute with Chile, mediated,
451; attitude toward United
States, 452; reciprocity treaty
with, 470; offers mediation, 490.
Arizona, New Mexico includes^
279.
INDEX
515
Arkansas, early history, 25S; emi-
grants, 257.
Armed Neutrality. See Neutrality.
Armenians, status in United States,
466.
Armstrong, Gen. John, letter cited,
150; minister to France, 170.
Arnold, Benedict, at siege of Que-
bec, 75.
Aroostook River, trouble in valley,
230, 235.
Arthur, C. A., president, 370; ap-
pointments, 370; reciprocity
policy, 388.
Ashburton, Lord, treats with Web-
ster, 233, 234, 237; views cited,
233; letter to, 239.
Asia, trade with United States, 54,
196, 223; diplomatic activity in,
353, 477; American interests, 464.
Asquith, H. H., premier, Mexican
policy, 485.
Astor, J. J., plans for Northwest, 173.
Astoria (Ore.), founded, 173, 254;
American flag over, 185; prop-
erty title, 185; Americans lose,
265.
Atlantic cable, effect on diplomatic
intercourse, 300, 316, 371.
Austin, Stephen, rouses sympathy
for Texas, 248.
Austria, offers mediation, 41; war
with France, 95; signs Holy
Alliance, 204; quells Italian re-
volt, 204; England seeks alliance,
240; extradition treaty, 284
returns Kotzka to United States
289; mediator, 324, 375, 383
policy toward Maximilian, 333
irritation against United States,
333, 426; trade-mark treaty, 351
naturalization, 356; Russian re-
lations, 359; Cuban, 366; reciproc-
ity with, 389; diplomatic service
to, 430; policy in Par East, 458;
protests munitions supply, 499.
Azores, Islands, as boundary, 10.
B
Babcock, Gen. O. E., San Domingo
mission, 362, 363.
Bacon, Sen. A. C, Mexican pol-
icy, 486.
Baden, naturalization treaty with,
356.
Baez, Pres. Buenaventura, annexa-
tion policy, 861-363.
Bagot, Sir Charles, minister to
United States, 191.
Bahamas, British, trade, S08; posi-
tion threatens Gulf trade, 360.
Bainbridge, Capt. William, brings
"tribute" to Algiers, 141.
Balkan states, conference of, 468.
Baltic Sea, control of, 497.
Baltimore (Md.), trade centre, 161.
Baltimore, marines from, killed, 390.
Bancroft, George, minister to Ger-
many, 355; ability, 255; makes
treaty, 356; mission to Spain, 361;
England, 372; cited, 278.
Banks, Gen. N. P., member of Con-
gress, 362.
"The Banks." See Newfoundland.
Barbados, reciprocity with, 470.
Barbary States, pirates, 13, 55;
consular service to, 81; United
States pays "tribute," 84, 132;
treaties with, 85, 141, 222; piracy
stopped, 196, 204, 223; profits of
pirates, 351.
Barclay, Thomas, concludes Mo-
rocco treaty, 56.
Baring, Sir Thomas, American pol-
icy, 343.
Baring Brothers, firm of, 233.
Barlow, Joel, French sympathy, 96;
minister to France, 171.
Barrett, John, diplomatic service,
430.
Barron, Commodore James, com-
mands Chesapeake, 159.
Basle, treaty of, terms, 123, 130.
Bassano, Due de, French foreign
minister, 170.
Bastile, fall of, 94.
Bathurst, Lord, treaty interpreta-
tion, 192; letters to, cited, 82, 181.
Bavaria, desires commercial treaty,
53; naturalization treaty with,
356.
Baxter, Henry, agent in Hondu-
ras, 352.
Bayard, J. A., peace commissioner,
179, 180, 183.
Bayard, T. F., secretary of state,
870, 378, 891, 400. 403; minister
516
INDEX
to England, 373; Samoan pol-
icy, 400.
Bayonne, trade decree, 166.
Beaumarchais, Pierre de, agent of
Vergennes, 26; cited, 27.
Beauregard, Gen. P. G. T., English
sympathy for, 314.
Beckwith, Maj. George, British
agent, 90; cited, 90.
Beecher, H. W., English in6u-
ence, 322.
Behring Sea, fisheries, 5, 434, 506;
jurisdiction disputed, 377, 378,
387.
Behring Straits, boundary through,
358.
Belgium, commercial treaty with,
285; extradition, 350; trade-mark,
351; navigation, 352; naturaliza-
tion, 356; diplomatic service to,
430; export trade, 452.
Belize, British settlement, 292, 293;
boundaries, 295, 381, 382.
Benjamin, J. P., Confederate secre-
tary, 311; French policy, 331.
Benton, W. S., British subject,
killed in Mexico, 446, 486.
Benton, Sen. T. H., Oregon views,
256.
Berlin, American commissioner to,
31; Samoan conference at, 401;
General Act of, 401, 425, 454;
financial centre, 427; diplomatic
service to, 455; treaty, of, 465.
Berlin Decree, terms, 158; revoked,
168.
Bermuda Islands, ownership, 29;
American acquisition suggested,
40; reciprocity with, 470.
Bermuda, admiralty case, 308.
Bernard, Montague, on claims com-
mission, 345.
Bernhardi, Gen. von, on British
policy, cited, 333.
Berthier, Alexandre, cited, 149.
Biddle, Nicholas, author, 148.
Bigelow, John, in France, 321.
Bismarck, Prince Otto von, relations
with Bancroft, 355; Samoan pol-
icy, 401.
Black Warrior, seized by Spain, 300,
801.
Blaine, J. G., diplomat, 8; secretary
of state, 370, 403; reciprocity ad-
vocate, 373, 388, 389; arbitration.
472; Behring Sea contention, 378,
379; Panama policy, 381, 383;
Spanish-American, 384-386, 391,
394, 444; Pan- Americanism, 386,
478; trouble with Chili, 390;
presidential ambition, 390; Ha-
waiian policy, 404; "Elder Sister,"
448; characterized, 371, 387, 390,
391; cited, 381, 385, 388, 404;
The Foreign Policy of the Garfield
Administration, cited, 387.
Blanca, Florida, Spanish minister,
26.
Blockade. See International Law.
Blount, William, conspirator, 134.
Bluefields (Nicaragua), British ma-
rines land at, 383.
Boer War, impending, 428; diplo-
matic difficulties, 431.
Bogota, American minister recalled,
440.
Bogota, Colombian gunboat, 441.
Bolivar, Gen. Simon, revolutionary
leader, 89, 203, 206.
Bolivia, commercial treaty with,
223, 285, 287; Peru-Chili war, 386.
Bonaparte, Joseph, King of Spain,
150, 203.
Bonaparte, Louis, King of Holland,
167.
Bonaparte, Napoleon, dealings with
United States, 8, 101, 138, 139,
142-146, 148-150, 154, 155, 164-
170, 175, 178, 201, 209; Africa,
131 ; navy defeated, 152; on Louis-
iana, cited, 145, 146; orders to
Dantzig, 166; English policy, 155,
158; at Elba, 155; Russian policy,
169, 170, 179; fall of, 177, 179;
continental system, 165, 167, 190,
494, 507.
Bond, Sir Robert, Newfoundland
premier, 434.
Bond, Pbineas, British consul, 87;
letter cited, 122, 154.
Borneo, commercial treaty with, 286.
Boston, port of, 177, 316.
Boundaries, Northeast, 15, 16, 117,
186, 228-232, 234; Hudson Bay
region, 16; Florida, 19, 20, 124;
Continental Congress discusses,
40, 46; peace commissioners dis-
cuss {1782), 46, 48; {,18U). 182;
INDEX
617
Cherokee, 72; Northwestern, 194;
Western, 201, 202; Louisiana, 148-
151; Canadian-American, 186;
507; commissions appointed, 186,
defined, 218; Texas, 266, 271;
between islands, 337, 347.
Bounties, to American fishermen,
193, 194.
Bowles, W. A., adventurer, 89;
letter cited, 89.
"Boxer" troubles, 455, 461.
Brandy, trade in French, 61.
Brant, Joseph, Iroquois leader, 65.
Brazil, settled by Portuguese, 11, 12;
Portugal loses, 203; empire of, 204;
slavery m, 236; commercial treat-
ies, 216, navigation question, 287;
relations with United States, 324,
452; Europe, 325; German immi-
gration, 384; war with Portugal,
324; represented on Geneva board,
347; reciprocity with, 389; Brit-
ish dispute, arbitrated, 394; dip-
lomatic service to, 430; offers me-
diation, 490.
Breda, Treaty of, 14.
Bremen, commercial treaty with,
197.
Bright, John, favors North, 315.
British America, fisheries, 192;
trade with, 197; Sumner's pol-
icy, 341.
British Guiana, reciprocity treaty
with, 470.
Brittany, fishermen of, 108, 110.
Brougham, Lord, questions British
policy, 254.
Brown, John, colonizing schemes, 75.
Brunei.treaty with, 286.
Bryan, C. P., diplomatic service,
430.
Bryan, W. J., secretary of state,
448, 480; draws up Colombian
treaty, 453; note to Balkan States,
468; arbitration advocate, 473,
475; Japanese policy, 480; Mex-
ican, 486.
Buchanan, James, secretary of state,
268, 282; minister to England,
282, 294, 300, 372; mission to
Spain, 301; president, 282; expan-
sionist, 281, 282, 297, 300; dip-
lomatic policy, 304; Calif omian,
275; Mexican. 277, 278. 297, 328.
489; Central American, 295, 296;
Cuban, 299, 367; opinion of Clay-
ton-Bulwer treaty, 293; diplomat-
ic service, 2, 499; characterized.
282; cited, 278, 297, 328.
Bucharest, conference of Balkan
states at, 468.
Buenos Ayres, revolt in, 203; United
States envoy to, 206; English in-
vestments, 215; commercial treat-
ies, 216.
Buffalo (N. Y.), Pan-American
Exposition at, 451.
Buffer State, of Indians, proposed,
181, 183, 184, 246.
Bullock, Capt. J. D., makes ship
contracts, 339.
Bulwer, Sir H. L., makes treaty,
282, 293.
Bunau Varilla, Panama agent, 441,
442.
Bureau of American Republics
established, 388.
Burgoyne, Gen. John, surrender, 29.
Burke, Edmund, friend of America,
314.
Burliugame, Anson, mission from
China, 354.
Burr, Aaron, at siege of Quebec, 75;
French sympathies, 104; vice-
president, 147; conspiracy, 147.
148.
Burton, A. A., commission secre-
tary. 364.
Bustamante, Anastasio, Mexican
president, 247.
Butler, Anthony, minister to Mexico.
221.
Butter, trade in, 76, 110.
Cabot, John, explorer, 10, 13.
Cadore, Due de, French foreign
minister, letter, cited, 168.
Caicos, reciprocity with, 470.
Calhoun, J. C, a "War Hawk,"
171; secretary of state, 221, 225,
261, 268; on maritime law ques-
tion, 238; Texas policy, 261-266,
272, 298, 342, 363; Oregon, 267-
269; diplomatic ability, 221, 261;
letter to, cited, 259; opinions, 261.
California, Spain holds. 205, 209.
518
INDEX
257; Russian fort in, 209; Russia
gives up claim to, 213; American
interests, 245, 253, 257-259, 274;
British. 257-259; Mexico, 274,
278; gained from Mexico, 279;
gold discovered, 286, 291; Alaskan
interest, 358; coast line impor-
tant, 398; Chinese problem, 397,
398; Japanese, 462, 480.
California, Lower, ownership, 275.
Calvo, Carlos, collection of claims
theory, 446.
Cambon, J. M., French ambassa-
dor, 417.
Campo Bello Island, Fenians at-
tack, 338.
Campos, Gen. Martinez de, Cuban
governor, 368; campaign, 411.
Canada, French colony, 13, 17;
English conquer, 17; ceded, 18;
trade encouraged, 60; governor-
generals, 63, 67, 114, 230; French
sympathies in, 97, 102. 131, 232;
British loyalty, 153, 178; American
trade, 176; desires northern New
York, 181; annexation proposed,
174, 182, 232. 299; Sumner's view,
342, 344; Cobden's, 342; fishing
regulations. 194. 285. 376. 434,
435; revolts in. 232; reciprocity
treaty. 285; expires. 376; (1911).
rejected, 435, 436; Dominion
organized, 334; Americans pro-
test, 336; Fenians invade. 338;
minister of justice, 345; relations
with England, 346, 434, 435;
extradition act. 374; Alaska seal
interests, 377, 378, 434.
Canadian Gazette, policy, 181.
Canals, Hudson-Lake Champlain,
197; Erie Canal, 197; Isthmian,
290, 291, 380, 382, 436-444, 469,
480, 481.
Canning, George, dealings with
J. Q. Adams, 8, 293; minister of
foreign affairs, 164, 188, 206, 237,
293, 334, 382; rejects Erskine's
agreement, 165, 166; Spanish-
American policy, 210-217; ability,
189, 215; cited, 214.
Cannon, J. G., introduces war prep-
aration bill, 413.
Canovas, del Castillo, Antonio,
Spanish prime minister, death, 413.
Canso, Gut of, waters closed, 193.
Canton, trade with. 55, 286.
Cape Cod, blockade south of, 176;
north of, 177.
Cape Horn, route via, 286.
Cape Verde Islands, as boundary, 10.
Caracas (Venezuela), intrigues in,
89; American agent at, 385.
Caribbean Sea, privateers, 207;
commerce, 286, 360; American
interests, 444, 448, 450-452, 464,
477,479,481.489.
Carmichael. William, American min-
ister to Spain, 123.
Carnegie, Andrew, presents arbi-
tration palace, 451; peace palace,
473; pacifist, 473.
Carnegie Institution, historical
study, 244.
Caroline, Canadians seize, 232, 233;
case settled, 234.
Carranza, Gen. Vincenzio, denies
authority of Huerta, 484; consti-
tutionalist leader, 486; not recog-
nized, 489.
Carroll. John, appointed bishop. 52.
Cartier, Jacques. American discover-
ies, 13.
Cass. Lewis, minister to France,
240; secretary of state, 241, 282.
Castlereagh. Lord, in peace negotia-
tions. 179; instructs commis-
sioners, 182; slave-trade policy,
236.
Catherine II of Russia, doctrine of
armed neutrality, 37, 179.
Cattrell, Stephen, Canadian official,
cited. 67.
Central America, commercial treaty
with, 216, 285; route via, 290;
neutrality guaranteed, 293; Amer-
ican immigration, 296; status of
British Honduras, 382; United
States acquires territory in, 436;
arbitration court, 451.
Civil service reform, development,
431.
Civil war, diplomacy during. 8;
neutral rights, 6; encourages hu-
manitarianism, 241; diplomatic
effects, 331, 368; Irish enlistments,
338; commercial straits, 360;
claims against England, 339-348.
Chaleurs, Bay of, boundary, 20, 230.
INDEX
519
Chamberlain, Joseph, protection
advocate, 427.
Champlain, Lake, as boundary, 20;
settlements along, 67; battle on,
178; outlet, 231.
Charles III, of Spain, vacillation,
26, 31, 42.
Charles V, of Germany, colonial
policy, 12; foresight, 290.
Charleston (S. C.) British agents
at, 90, 310; Genfit reaches, 98;
schemes in, 99; French privateers
at, 103; British Consul at, 310.
Chatham, Earl of. See William
Pitt.
Cheese, trade in, 58.
Chesapeake, affair with Leopard, 159,
165, 174.
Chile, commercial treaty with, 223;
relations strained, 375, 390, 409;
accepts mediation, 385, 451;
Bolivia-Peru war, 386; president,
cited, 387; civil war, 390; resents
United States arrogance, 452;
offers mediation, 490.
China, trade with United States, 55;
commercial treaty with, 223, 286;
five ports opened, 223; open to
missions, 286; Burlingame treaty,
354; missionary interests, 396, 455,
460; Boxer troubles, 455—457;
emigration question, 397, 398, 449,
460; diplomatic service to, 430;
international interests in, 454, 455;
relations with Japan, 455, 461;
United States, 432; integrity of,
456-458, 459, 463, 477; neutrality
recognized, 458; "six power"
loan, 460; revolution, 459; arbi-
tration, 475.
Chinese, employed in Pacific coast,
286; exclusion of, 397, 398.
Canadian problem, 432.
Chincha Island, Spain's claims, 327.
Ching, Prince, represents China,
457.
Choate, Rufus, Senator, report
cited, 225.
Chocolate, trade in, 108.
Choiseul, Due de, predicts American
Revolution, 25.
Christopher Island, ownership, 35.
Church of England. See Anglican
Church.
Claiborne, W. C. C, governor of
Orleans territory, 151.
Claims, Spanish-American, 226, 284,
350, 375. 469; French spoliation,
226-228, 375; Mexican, 251, 274,
328, 350, 375, 474; Civil war,
339-348; British, 344, 469; Rus-
sian, 469; Portuguese, 375; against
Tycoon, 353; Spanish, 410; prob-
lems under Monroe Doctrine,
446; Treaties, 226, 345, 375.
Clarendon, Lord, British minister,
295; convention with Johnson,
rejected, 343.
Clark, G. R., takes western forts,
83, 69; colonizing schemes, 75;
French sympathy, 97; French
commission, 102; forces separa-
ted, 105.
Clark, William, explorer, 148.
Clarkson, Thomas, opposes slave-
trade, 236.
Clay, Henry, a "War Hawk," 174,
178; peace commissioner, 179,
180, 185, 189; attacks administra-
tion, 189, 206; secretary of state,
189, 214, 291; Pan-American pol-
icy, 214, 284, 478; conciliates
France, 228; influence of, 371;
characterized, 189; cited, 291.
Clayton, J. M., secretary of state,
282; English treaty, 282, 292, 293.
Cleveland, Grover, appointments,
370, 372, 389; free trade advocate,
373; fisheries policy, 376; canal,
382; Pan-American, 387; Vene-
zuela, 391; opposes reciprocity,
388; conception of Monroe Doc-
trine, 392, 394; Hawaiian policy,
405, 406; Cuban, 409, 412; Turk-
ish, 465; civil service under, 431;
cited, 382, 394.
Coahuila, Texas joined to, 247, 248;
governor, 484.
Coasting trade, embargo not applica-
ble, 160, 177; cut off by war, 177;
canal tolls exemption, 437.
Cobden, Richard, American views,
cited, 341, 342.
Cochrane, Admiral Thomas, aids
Spanish-America, 206.
Cockbum, Sir Alexander, on Geneva
board, 347.
Cocoa, trade in, 119, 15S.
520
INDEX
Coffee, trade in, 108, 109, 119, 153,
284; in McKinley tariff, 388.
Collot-d'Herbois, Jean M., French
agent, 134; instructions, cited,
131.
Colombia, commercial treaty with,
216; United States inBuence, 217,
385; extradition, 285; Panama
neutrality treaty (1846), 291, 295,
379, 380, 385, 439, 440; grants
de Lesseps canal concession, 379;
boundary dispute, 385; affected
by reciprocity, 389; diplomatic
service to, 430, 440; rejects Her-
ran-Hay treaty, 439; Pearson
syndicate, 450; treaty {1915), 450;
resentment against United States,
452.
Colon (Panama), revolt in, 441.
Colonial wars, causes, 15, 16.
Colorado, Italians lynched in, 427.
Colorado River, free navigation, 279.
Columbia River, 6rst white man
enters, 93; Lewis and Clark, 148;
Americans settle on, 173; claim,
253, 267; navigation free, 346.
Columbus, Christopher, effect of
discoveries, 10.
Comet, carries slaves, 238.
Coraly, J. M., minister to Hawaii,
404.
Commerce, relations with diplomacy,
5, 54-57, 77, 85-87, 222, 506; pi-
rates menace, 55; defence meas-
ures, 156, 281; non-importation
agreements, 156, 157; non-inter-
course, 163, 164, 166, 167; em-
bargoes, 115, 160, 161; prospers,
163, 283; declines, 190; war of
181S affects, 187, 196; encourage-
ment of, 241, 283; consular aid,
373, 476; balance of trade, 58,
284, 427, 467; special licenses, 153,
164, 167, 177; open door policy,
455; in war of 191//., 493; via
Scheldt, 5; Danish Straits, 5;
Spanish colonial 15, 57; Amer-
ican, 53, 62, 109; Dutch, 109; with
British North America, 5, 67, 68,
118, 197; British Empire, 57-62,
119, 152; Latin-America, 5, 161,
286, 287, 452; Asia, 5, 54, 55, 199,
223, 455; Africa, 54, 55; Europe,
61. 62. 152-154. 156. 159. 163.
164, 224, 225; West Indies, 5, 6^
77, 118, 119, 156, 161, 198, 222,
298; Pacific, 92, 93, 118, 197, 285,
396, 398, 403, 461, 462; Mediter-
ranean. 55, 56, 62, 77, 85, 125, 141,
196. See also Reciprocity and
Merchant Marine.
Confederacy, blockade runners, 308,
309; commerce destroyers, 319,
336; rams, 322; diplomacy of, 310,
311, 321, 330; British relations,
316-319, 321-323, 339; recogni-
tion of, 442.
Confederation, diplomacy of, 1;
British distrust, 60; failures of,
62, 68, 71, 72, 77, 79, 124; diplo-
matic problems, 64, 67, 190;
growth of population, 69; West-
ern problems, 73.
Conger, E. H., commissioner to
China, 457.
Congo Free State, treaty with, 375.
Congress, creates departments, 80;
discusses merchant marine, 85-87;
resentment against England, 87;
considers Jay treaty, 122; increases
army and navy, 133; reports to,
156; non-importation agreement,
157; special session, 160; passes
embargo, 160; non-intercourse
act, 169; war sentiment, 171; de-
clares war, 174; Spanish-American
resolutions, 206; neutrality acts,
207, 232; calls out militia, 230;
abolishes slave-trade, 237; recog-
nizes Texan republic, 251; debates
annexation, 265; annexes, 274;
Oregon question, 269; receives
Polk's war message, 276; military
policy, 281; Mexican policy, 297;
Cuban, 302; passes Morrill Tar-
iff, 314; opposes Maximilian's
empire, 331; refuses Denmark
treaty, 361; relations to diplo-
macy, 370; authorizes interna-
tional copyright, 374; Panama
canal action, 380, 439; Pan-
American, 387; Chinese exclusion
acts, 397, 398; Cuban action, 416,
425; Philippine, 425; seal fisheries,
434; votes lynching indemnities,
427; canal tolls, 437; abrogates
Russian treaty, 466; immigration
policy, 467. 468; refuses ship sub-
INDEX
521
sidies, 469; powers over treaties,
471; acts on sale of munitions, 483;
Mexican policy, 485, 486; votes
war with Germany, 505.
Connecticut River, source, S831,
235.
Connolly, John, British agent, 68.
Constantinople, American college
at, 465.
Constitution, strengthens central
authority, 79; executive under,
80, 105; Congress, powers, 80,
2S25; ambiguities, 80, 471.
Constitution, wins fight, 190.
Consular service, early organization,
81, 82; growth, 221; "pupils,"
283, 430; commercial importance
increases, 373; poUtics dominates,
373; bill of 188i, amended, 387;
improvement in, 430, 431; pop-
ular interest, 431.
Continental Congress, first meeting,
23; measures adopted, 23; mes-
sage from Beaumarchais, 27;
parties in, 31, 46; appoints com-
missioners, 32, 33, 41; members,
39, 81; considers peace terms, 40,
41, 44; instructs peace commis-
sioners, 46; treatment of Loyalists,
48, 64; relations with Papacy, 51;
relations with Anglican Church,
52.
Contraband. See International Law.
Convention of 1802, renewed, 202,
Convention of 1818. terms, 192-195;
ambiguities, 193.
Convention of 1828, terms, 269.
Convention of 18S1. terms, 223.
Convention for the Arbitration of
Pecuniary Claims, parties to,
472.
Convention on Artistic and Literary
Copyrights, parties to, 472.
Convention regulating the Importa-
tion of Spirituous Liquors into
Africa, United States adheres to,
472.
Convention of London, terms, 328,
329; United States does not sign,
328.
Coolies, importation of Chinese,
354; smuggling of, 461.
Cooper, J. F., diplomatic service,
221.
Copyrights, international, 351, 874,
469.
Corea, treaty with, 375; separated
from China, 455.
Cornwallis, Lord, surrenders, 42.
Cormn, seizes British vessels, 377.
Costa Rica, commercial treaty, 285;
boundary dispute, 385; arbitra-
tion, 475.
Cotton, trade in, 119, 164, 196, 224,
225. 253, 262, 284; as "King,"
310, 311, 315, 316, 821; contra-
band {1915), 496.
Coudert, F. R., on seal-fisheries
commission, 379.
Crampton, Sir J. F. T., British min-
ister, dismissed, 288.
Creole, slave mutiny on, 238; case
settled, 239.
Crimean war, neutral problems, 288.
Crockett, David, frontier hero, 248.
Cuba, United States reversionary in-
terest, 6, 78, 208-210, 245; owner-
ship, 203, 205, 206; England's
relations, 217; seeks independence,
217; European interest, 282;
slavery in, 236, 297, 301, 302;
revolution in, 350; position threat-
ens Gulf commerce, 360; Santo
Domingo relations, 326; reciproc-
ity with, 389, 470; insurrection
of 1895, 409, 420; methods of
war, 409, 411, 412; American
sympathy, 409; interests, 410;
policy, 297-302, 365, 368, 413-
419, 425, 426, 427, 444, 449, 478,
487; Spain promises autonomy,
413; Roosevelt's service in, 424;
owns Isle of Pines, 425.
Culebra Island, sale refused, 861,
Culebrita Island, sale refused, 1,
361.
CuUom, Sen. Shelby, in foreign
affairs committee, 474; views in
reciprocity treaties, 470.
Cumberland River, settlements in,
69, 102; intrigues of settlers, 77,
89; junction, 105.
Curtis, B. R., on Geneva board,
347.
Cushing, Caleb, diplomat, 844; on
Geneva board, 347; minister to
Spain, 366; instructions, cited,
366, 367.
522
INDEX
Dacia, seizure of, 493.
Dallas, G. M., minister to England,
295.
Dana, Francis, commissioner to
Russia, 31, 170; policy, 264.
Dana, R. H., Trent capture pleases,
316.
Danelson, A. J., United States
agent in Texas, 273.
Danish Islands, sale refused, 360,
361, 425.
Danish sound, right of free passage,
5, 287.
Danton, G. J., French leader, 103.
Dantzig, Napoleon's orders to, 166.
Darien, colonists, 205.
Dauphin, pirates capture, 56.
Davie, Gov. W. R., on French com-
mission, 137.
Davis, Sen. C. K., Spanish treaty
commissioner, 418.
Davis, J. C. B., prepares American
claims case, 347.
Davis, Jefferson, commissions pri-
vateers, 309, 312, 315; as diploma-
tist, 310, 312; appointments, 310,
811 ; message to his Congress, 323;
British policy, 311; neutral pol-
icy, 312; Lowell satirizes, 318.
Davis, R. H., author, 440.
Day, W. R., conducts Spanish nego-
tiations, 414, 415, 418; terms
cited, 418; secretary of state, 418.
Dayton, W. L., minister to France,
331.
Deane, Silas, agent to France, 23,
24; reaches Paris, 27; recall, 31.
Debt, foreign, source of danger, 78.
Debts, collection of British, 48, 60,
64, 118.
Declaration of Independence, effect
on American policy, 23, 27.
Declaration of London (1910),
terms, 493.
Declaration of Paris, terms, 288,
309; not signed by United States,
288, 416; Seward and, 309; atti-
tude of Confederacy, 312.
Delaware River, Swedes settle on,
14.
Democracy, American experience
in, 8, 508, 509.
Democrats, platform of 1856, cited,
360.
Denmark, armed neutrality, 37; com-
mercial treaty, 197 ; claims, 226 ; for-
bids slave-trade, 236; Danish soimd
question, 287; Civil war policy,
313; proposed cession of St. Thom-
as, 360, 361; reciprocity, 470, 475.
Destination, enemy, and continuous
voyage, 497.
Detroit (Mich.), British fort, 63;
garrison, 90; militia, 84.
Deutsche Handels-und-Plantagen-
gesellschaft fUr Siidseeinseln zu
Hambiu"g, interests in Samoa, 399.
Dewey, George, Mexican coast
service, 417; capture of Manila,
417, 420; Philippine views, 419,
420; made admiral, 423.
Diaz, Felix, aids Huerta, 483; Japan
mission, 487.
Diaz, Pres. Porfirio, length of serv-
ice, 481; meets Taft, 481; over-
throw, 483.
Dickens, Charles, urges international
copyright, 351.
Diplomacy, American, birth of, 1;
golden age, 2; aids expansion, 2;
politics dominates, 2, 220, 259,
264. 281, 283, 304, 370; Civil
war problems, 3; nadir of, 3;
study of, 4; protects fisheries, 5;
international routes, 5; popular
control of, 8; first event in, 11, 12;
basic documents, 18, 19; early
problems, 20; colonial experience,
21, 22; direct methods, 21; rela-
tions to Congress, 80, 370; to
parties, 304; service not attract-
ive, 81, 371, 372; special missions,
81; consular service, 81, 82, 373;
organization during Revolution,
23, 24; successes, 50, 139, 185,
213, 222; failures, 77, 79, 87, 188;
gains French support, 31; seeks
that of Spain, 33; religious prob-
lems, 52; Western, 73, 77; bril-
liant period, 188; daring, 218;
bluff, 271, 295; in Nootka Sound
affair, 88, 93; in French claims
case, 226-228; based on neutrality,
6, 100, 101, 152, 428; recognition
of new governments, 101, 208,
484; secures extradition. 117;
INDEX
523
favors international commissions,
117, 397; Hamilton's influence,
138; problems change, 190, 196,
242, 245, 286, 288, 289. 336, 398,
401; "shirt-sleeve," 220, 241. 271,
304, 370, 457; p)ermanent arbitra-
tion policy, 279; service system-
atized, 283; relation to commerce,
196, 284, 286, 406, 471, 476; inter-
national waterways, 287, 351;
marine jurisdiction, 287; trans-
portation policy, 290-295; Cuban,
298-302. 365-368; triumph of
Northern, 323; anti-British feel-
ing a factor, 336, 338; service to
negro states, 349; extension of
field. 351, 353, 357. 396. 406;
significance of Civil war problems,
368, 369; afiFected by Atlantic
cable, 371 ; social side emphasized,
81, 372, 430; appointment of am-
bassadors, 423; represents admin-
istrations, 430; afiFected by Span-
ish war, 428, 438, 454, 477; high
standards, 463; "Open Door"
policy, 458, 477; "Dollar" di-
plomacy, 459, 476; peace move-
ment, 472; continuity, 4, 188, 429,
475, 507, 508; broken, 370; per-
sonal. 8, 22, 137. 180, 188, 189,
220, 221, 242, 261, 283, 304, 507,
508.
Dissenters, favor North, 315.
Divine right, doctrine of, 204, 205,
207, 209. 211.
Dolphin, admiralty case. 308.
Dominican Republic. Cuban rela-
tions, 326; Spanish, 327, 329;
American, 344, 384; first treaty
349; annexation proposed, 361-
364; mediation accepted, 390; rec-
iprocity treaty with; public debt,
446; United States protectorate,
448, 484; revolution in, 484.
Dooley, Mr., on diplomatic service,
cited, 371.
Dorchester, Lord, Canadian Gov-
ernor-general, 67; injudicious
speech. 83, 114, 116.
Dorset, Duke of. cited, 60.
Douglass, Frederick, commission sec-
retary, 364.
Drago, L. M., public debt doctrine,
446, 447.
Droit (Tauhaine, abolished, 54, 224.
Droit detraction, abolished, 224.
Dumas, C. W. F., friend of Frank-
lin, 26.
Dumauriez, Gen. C. F., letter cited,
96.
Durham, Lord, Canadian report,
232.
Dutch, plunder Spanish colonies, 13;
settle in Hudson, 13; cede Amer-
ican claims, 14; England gives
neutral rights, 14, 36; theory of
international law, 29, 54; smug-
glers, 35; neutrality aids American
Revolution, 22, 35; consider
armed neutrality, 38; England
declares war on, 38; relations with
Indians, 65; loan to United States,
78; cede western Guiana, 391.
E
East, sectional interests, 71, 98.
East India Company, monopoly, 54.
East Indies, trade with, 197.
Eastport (Me.), British demand, 182.
Ecuador, commercial treaty with,
223; extradition, 350; natural-
ization. 356; claims, 375; reciproc-
ity, 470.
Edward VII, of England, arbiter,
451.
Egan, Patrick, minister to Chili,
390.
Egypt, French expedition to, 136;
treaty with United States, 375.
Elba, Island of. Napoleon at, 155.
Elbe River, navigation opened, 352.
Elliot, Capt. Charles, British agent
in Texas, 265, 266.
Ellsworth, Oliver, chief justice, 137;
on French commission, 137.
Emanuel, admiralty case, 156.
Embargo, of 179k, provisions, 115;
of 1807. 160; effects, 160-162. 177;
Washington Irving's ridicule of,
cited, 161; repeal of, 162; and
Napoleon, 165, 166; failure, 507.
Encomium, carries slaves, 238.
English Channel, Russians fear to
pass, 359.
Enterprise, carries slaves, 238.
Erie, Lake, as boundary, 46; battle
on, 178.
524
INDEX
Erskine, D. M., minister to United
States, 159; instructions, 164; re-
call, 165, 166.
Essequibo River, Dutch on, 391.
Essex, admiralty case, 156, 308.
Ethiopia. See Abyssinia.
Europe, interest in American Revolu-
tion, 24, 25; opinion of United
States [1789), 78; of Jay treaty,
122; Spanish-American attitude,
203, 204, 324, 325, 328, 385; col-
lection of debts 447, 449; inter-
vention in America, 204, 210-
213, 282, 324, 451; respects
Monroe doctrine, 218, 324; revo-
lutions in, 204, 208, 280; expatria-
tion problems, 289; recognizes
Texas republic, 259; needs cotton,
310; balance of power, 3, 184, 205,
369, 427, 467, 477; interest in Civil
war claims, 347; protests Russian
outrages, 359; military system,
368, 473; opinion of Pan-Amer-
ican Congress, 387; of acquisition
of Philippines, 426, 466; inter-
national agreements, 402; rela-
tions with Turkey, 465, 466; with
Far East, 477; emigration prob-
lems, 467-469; Mexican interests,
485; War of 19U, 491.
Evarts, W. H., in Geneva board,
347; secretary of state, 370, 380,
382, 386, 391.
Everett, Alexander, letter of Adams
to. 207.
Everett, Edward, minister to Eng-
land, 262, 372, 403; dispatch on
Cuba, 282, 299; secretary of state,
282, 294; on TreiU affair, 316.
Executive, relations with Senate,
428, 471.
Expansion, American, Mexican view,
243, 244; historical, 244, 245;
Sumner's, 342; theory of, 280, 300,
801, 486, 487-489; leaders, 282,
297, 300; Central American prob-
lems, 296; Cuban, 300, 302; Alas-
kan, 358, 369; San Domingo, 862;
Hawaiian, 404; Philippine, 420;
Mexican, 486, 489; debated in
Congress, 364; era of internal,
837; territorial, 476.
Expatriation. See International Law.
Extradition. Sc^InteniatioiialLaw.
Fairchild, Lucius, mituster to Spun,
instructions, 385.
Fall, Sen. A. B., Mexican policy, 487.
Fallen Timbers, battle at, 84.
"Family Alliance," provisions, 18,
32,88.
Far East, international interests in,
454.
Fauchet, J. A. J., minister to United
States, 106; dispatches captured,
120; relations with Randolph,
120, 121; successor, 127; cited,
106, 130, 158, 254.
Federalists, commercial policy, 85;
British sympathies, 120, 129;
use of special missions, 144; lose
control, 139; theories, 146, 147,
422.
Fenian movement, American phases,
338, 341, 347, 356.
Ferdinand, King of Aragon, 10.
Ferdinand VIII, restored, 203; co-
lonial system, 205.
Filibustering, Cuban, 298.
Fillmore, Millard, president, 239;
appointments, 239; Hawaiian pol-
icy, 403.
Finances, Revolutionary War debt,
78; French loan, 97, 101; under
Hamilton, 82, 97.
Fish, Hamilton, secretary of state,
343, 362, 365, 366, 382, 412, 454;
in British claims commission, 344;
Isthmian policy, cited, 352; Japan-
ese, 353, 354; Hawaiian, 403, 404;
characterized, 365; length of serv-
ice, 370.
Fish, trade in, 55, 57, 58, 61, 108,
163, 196; free entry conceded, 346.
Fisheries, Congress discusses, 40, 41;
in peace terms (1782), 43, 45, 48;
U81S), 182. 185; protection of, 5,
506; whale, 285; convention of
1818, 192, 193; bounties, 284;
treaty of 185 i, 285; expiration of,
337; treaty of 1871, 346, 348, 352,
375; expiration of, 376; arbitra-
tion of claims, 375; Blaine's
policy, 387; disputes, 432, 434,
435.
Fitzherbert, Alleyne, succeeds Gren-
ville»4d.
INDEX
525
Florida, as boundary, 12; ceded to
England, 19; divided, 19; bound-
aries, 20, 46, 70; Spain desires,
26, 32. 33; seizes forts, 33; regains,
50; England desires, 91, 200;
France, 143; Indians in, 200;
boundaries of West, 46, 48, 70, 71,
124, 149, 150; Pitt's policy, 135;
United States desires, 144, 181;
Spanish claims, 199-201; Jackson
invades, 200, 234; ceded to United
States, 202, 208, 218, 245, 341;
United States reversionary inter-
est, 208, 245; Seminole rising, 250;
position aflfects Gulf trade, 360.
Florida, Confederate cruiser, 339.
Flour, trade in, 76, 111.
Floyd, John, interest in Oregon, 255.
Forbes, J. M., provisions Sebasto-
pol, 288.
Forsyth, John, Secretary of State,
220.
Foster, A. J., minister to United
States, 174.
Foster, J. W., diplomatic experience,
304; Secretary of State, 370, 389,
405.
Foster, W. E., in British Cabinet,
315.
Fouche, Joseph, in Napoleon's cabi-
net, 167.
Fox, C. J., opinion on peace terms,
42; retires, 45; returns to office,
59; foreign minister, 158; appoint-
ments, 165; death, 158.
Foxes, Falmouth family, aid Amer-
ican prisoners, 30.
France, claims in America, 13; Eng-
lish rival, 15; Indians aid, 15; pri-
vateers, 15; treaties with England,
16; claims Ohio valley, 16, 17; alli-
ance with Spain, 18; cedes col-
onies, 18, 19; aids American Revo-
lution, 22, 25-27, 30; American
agents to, 23, 31; secret agents of,
25; urges Spain to aid, 26; treaties
with U. S., 29; war with England,
80, 32; relations with Holland, 36;
Russia, 37, 38; recognizes Amer-
ican Independence, 319; reason
for aiding Americans, 91; attitude
toward neutrals, 38, 108, 109, 126,
138; in American peace negotia-
tions, 42-46, 48-50; protects Catb-
olics in Orient, 51, 455; payments
to Barbary pirates, 56; seeks
American trade, 61; relations
with Indians, 64, 65; loan to
United States, 78; in Family Alli-
ance, 88; National Assembly,
powers, 92; Convention, 98; Rev-
olution begins, 94; republic pro-
claimed, 96; United States recog-
nizes, 101; war with "tyrants,"
95, 96, 99; hopes for United States
aid, 96; instructs Gen^t, 97, 98;
recalls, 104; Spanish-American
policy, 97, 106, 130, 213, 214, 299,
325, 326-333, 384, 385; difficulties
of Republic, 106; successes, 116;
triumph of Revolution, 132; trade
decrees, 127, 128, 166-170; in elec-
tion of 1796, 130; seeks Louisiana,
130; friction with United States,
128, 133, 136; convention of 1800,
138; obtains Louisiana, 142, 147;
English treaty, 143; war with Eng-
land, 152; non-intercourse act
affects, 163-165; colonial trade,
153, 161, 308; diplomatic service
to, 189, 226, 240, 301, 331, 365,
429; restores Spanish monarchy,
204; friction over American claims,
226-228, 375; forbids slave-trade,
236; helps suppress, 240; recog-
nizes Texas, 253; desires Califor-
nia, 274; Revolution of 18-i8, 280;
extradition treaty, 284; in Crimean
war, 288; relations with Confed-
eracy, 309, 311; with Mexico, 312,
331,859; with Russia, 359; Hawaii,
403; gains St. Bartholomew Island,
335; trade-mark treaty, 351; in-
terests in Asia, 353, 402, 454, 455;
de Lesseps canal, 381; Spanish
bondholders anxious, 426; policy
in Far East, 458; friendly attitude
to United States, 467; reciprocity,
223, 224; with, 389, 470, 471, 475;
interests in Mexico, 482, 484, 486;
seizes Dacia, 493; fisheries inter-
ests, 506.
Francis I, of France, sends colonies,
10.
Franco-Prussian war, American neu-
trality questioned, 350.
Frankfort, conference at, 36.
Franklin, Benjamm, diplomat, 1, 8,
526
INDEX
18, 188; general agent, 21, 26, 27,
30; popularity in Paris, 28, 99
French sympathies, 95; tact, 30
minister to France, 31, 311, 321
peace commissioner, 41, 44, 45, 49
dealings with papal nuncio, 51, 52
with Barbary States, 56; makes
commercial treaties, 54; Adams
disapproves, 39; outvoted, 46;
ability, 429; characterized, 27, 28;
influence endures, 507; cited, 39,
43, 49, 53, 56; letter to,
Fraser River, claim to valley, 267.
Frederick the Great, attitude toward
neutrals, 38; statue presented,
467.
"Fredonian Republic," proclaimed,
247.
Freeman, E. A., History of Fed-
eral Government from Foundation
of Achaian League to Disruption
of United States, cited, 314.
Frelinghuysen, F. T., secretary of
state, 370, 385, 387, 391; Panama
policy, 381; Nicaragua, 382.
Fremont, J. C., explores California,
258, 274.
French colonists, negotiate with
English, 21.
French Institute, papers before, 131.
French Revolution, affects America,
1; dawn of, 94; Terror, 94, 95;
effect on trade, 108; diplomacy
during, 132.
French Spoliation Claims, 138, 139.
Freneau, Philip, editor, 103.
Frontier, transportation on, 63;
character of population, 63; In-
dian peril, 65, 66, 82-84, 172, 249,
250; loyalty develops, 82, 147, 245;
friction with British, 116, 172-
174, 230; favors war, 174; Cana-
dian friction, 232, 233; ambi-
tions, 245.
Frye, Sen. W. P., letter to cited, 388;
Spanish treaty commissioner, 418.
Fuchow, port opened, 223.
Fundy, Bay of, tributaries, 228.
Fur trade, in Ohio valley, 16; im-
portance, 55, 93; effect of Treaty
of Paris, 64; nationality of traders,
172, 182; rivalries, 172, 173;
American policy, 192; in Oregon,
255.
G
Gadsden, James, concludes treaty,
290.
Gaines, Gen. E. P., Indian campaign,
250.
Gallatin, Albert, secretary of treas-
ury, 141; estimates, 154; peace
commissioner, 179, 180, 183, 185;
European respect for, 180, 189;
arranges arbitration, 230, 267; let-
ters to, cited, 208, 237; missions
to England, 372.
Galilean party, in Continental Con-
gress, 31.
Galveston (Tex.), United States
occupies, 200; fleet at, 482.
Gambier, Lord, peace commissioners,
180.
Gardoqui, Don Diego de, Spanish
representative, 33, 57, 70, 71, 75,
77.
Garfield, J. A., president, 370; ap-
pointments, 370; foreign policy,
384.
Gayoso de Lenns, Manuel, Spanish
commandant, 76; cited, 123.
Geary Act, passage of, 398.
Gengt, Edmund C, minister to
United States, 96; instructions,
96-98, 131; cited, 98; correspond-
ence, 129; reaches Charleston, 98;
Philadelphia, 99; cabinet discusses,
99, 125; recognized, 101; intrigues,
101-103; recall demanded, 103;
appeals to people, 103; recalled,
104; cited, 103; successor, 106;
disturbing factor, 107.
Geneva, Alabama claims commis-
sion at, 345; international inter-
est, 347.
Geneva Convention, rules of war,
472.
George III, of England, 23; asks
Russian support, 37; letter of
Louis XVI, 30; library, 59; con-
versation with John Adams, cited,
59, 60; Indian regard for, 66; loses
colonies, 89.
George V, arbiter, 451.
Georgia, boundary disputes, 19, 20;
retaliatory laws, 61.
Georgia, Strait of, as boundary, 270.
Gerarid, C. A., French minister, 41,
INDEX
527
Germany, diplomatic service to, 221,
224, 355, 429, 430; commercial
treaties with, 224, 225, 471; extra-
dition, 284; Civil War policy, 313;
arbitrates channel boundary, 347,
848; forms Empire, 350; natural-
ization treaties, 355, 356; Cuban
relations, 366; Spanish- American
trade, 384, 452; Samoan relations,
899-401, 425; colonial ambition,
401, 419, 420, 426, 454, 455; rank
of navy, 424; policy in Far East,
458; friendly feeling for United
States, 467; interests in Mexico,
482, 484, 486, 487; submarine
policy (1915), 500.
Gerry, Elbridge, commissioner to
France, 131, 132.
Gettysburg, moral efifects of battle,
322.
Ghent, peace negotiations at, 2, 180,
188, at5, 507; checked, 183; con-
tinued, 184; concluded, 186.
Gibraltar, Spain wants to regain,
26, 43, 44, 49.
Gibraltar, Straits of, Portuguese
fleet guards, 114.
Gillespie, Lieut. A. H., sent to Mont-
erey, 274.
Ginn, Edwin, paciflst, 473.
Ginseng, commercial importance,
65, 93.
Girondists, fall of, 103.
Gladstone, W. E., colonial policy,
842; American, 348, 347, 356;
cited, 320.
Goderich, Viscount, in claims com-
mission, 345.
Godoy, Don Manuel, Spanish states-
man, 143.
Goliad, story of, 248.
Goulbum, Henry, peace commis-
sioners, 180, 183; British minister,
246.
Grain, trade in, 55, 58, 61, 67, 108,
110, 315, competition in, 373,
tariflF, 388.
Grant, Ulysses S., victories, 322;
opinion of French policy in Mex-
ico, 332, 343; president, 335; Mon-
roe Doctrine corollary, cited, 335,
478; foreign policy, 343, 344, 361,
S65; appointments, 847; message
cited, 368.
Granville, Lord, in British Cabinet,
320; on Clayton-Bulwer treaty,
381, 382.
Gray, Capt. Robert, enters Colum-
bia River, 93, 148.
Gray, Sen. George, Spanish treaty
commissioner, 418.
Great Britain, defeats Armada, 18;
Florida ceded to, 19; Spain makes
war on, 32; negotiates with, 33;
treaties with {1763), 70, {1783),
70; French colonial rival, 15; treat-
ies with France, 16; Canada ceded
to, 18; claims in America, 13, 14;
desires Ohio valley, 17; European
hatred of, 24; Franco- American
alliance against, 29, 30; friction
with Holland, 35, 36; war, 38;
payment to Barbary pirates, 56;
discusses American peace terms,
42-50; distrusts Confederation,
60, 61; first American minister, 87;
in Nootka Sound affair, 88-93;
resists French Revolution, 94, 95,
203, 205; war with France, 99,
152; Napoleon's policy toward,
155, 158, 169; pride in victory
over France, 180; United States,
trade, 57-63, 86, 87, 198, 222,
285; embargo affects, 161; non-
intercourse act, 163, 165; relations
with neutrals, 14, 36-38, 102,
105, 108, 110, 118, 163; interna-
tional law position, 54, 110-116,
124, 129, 159, 168, 169, 179, 183,
191, 193, 197, 236, 241-309, 316,
339, 349, 350; need of impress-
ment, 113; naval supremacy, 14,
108, 152, 189, 237; trade policy,
59, 60, 153, 154, 156-160, 164,
198, 199, 205, 206, 270; orders in
council. 111, 112, 120, 156, 159,
161, 164, 168, 169, 177, 183; holds
frontier forts, 63, 64, 84, 116, 178;
agrees to evacuate, 117; frontier
policy, 68, 116, 147; Louisiana, 134,
135; relations with Indians, 64-
66, 68, 82, 83, 116, 172. 182, 185,
292, 294, 295, 383; friction with
United States, 114, 174; pays in-
demnity, 118; in War of 1812,
174-178; peace negotiations, 178-
185; convention of 1818, 192-
195; dislike of America, 181;
528
INDEX
upholds balance of power, 205;
Spanish-American policy, 206,
209-217, 324, 334, 384; anti-
slavery, 216, 236, 246, 253, 254,
262, 263-265, 298, 301, 321, 333,
367; Oregon, 254-257. 265, 267-
271; Texas, 253, 254, 260-266, 269-
271; California, 257-259, 269, 274,
275; spoliation claims against, 226,
Northeastern boundary dispute,
228-232, 234; Canadian policy;
232, 294, 348, 378, 432, 434, 435,
464; diplomatic service to, 188,
189, 222, 278, 282, 294, 295, 300,
306, 340, 343, 344, 372, 373, 429,
430; high grade of, 372; in Crimean
war, 288; Russian relations, 359;
central American policy, 292-296;
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 293, 381,
882; Cuban policy, 299, 366, civil
war policy, 310-323, 359; after-
math, 336, 339-344; claims com-
mission, 344-348; in relation to
Monroe Doctrine, 333, 343; in-
terests in Asia, 353; expatriation
problems, 356; in seal-fisheries dis-
pute, 378, 379; Venezuela affair,
391-394; Japanese relations, 353,
397, 402; Samoan, 399-401, 425;
Hawaiian, 403, 405; rank of navy,
424; cordial toward United States,
427, 428; exp>orts, 452; policy in
Far East, 454, 455, 458; authorizes
reciprocity with colonies, 470;
Russian treaty (1825), 432; Alaska
boimdary dispute, 432, 434; fisher-
ies, 435; seal fisheries treaty, 434;
Isthmian policy, 436-438; canal
tolls dispute, 480; interests in
Mexico, 482, 484, 486; marine
poUcy {1915), 496.
Great Lakes, navigation rights,
432.
Greece, insurrection in, 204, 212;
Americans aid, 207; commercial
treaty with, 223.
Green, B. E., views in California,
259.
Green, Duff, confidant of Calhoun,
264; in Texas, 265.
Greenville, treaty at, 84, 122.
Grenville, Lord, foreign minister,
87, 89, 90, 116, 117, 122.
Grenville. Thomas, British minister
to France, 42; additional powers,
44; recalled, 45;
Grenville, W. W., letter to, cited,
67.
Gresham, W. Q., secretary of state,
389; death, 392.
Grey Earl de, on claims commis-
sion, 345.
Greytown (Nic), English seize,
292.
Guadaloupe Island, rich in sugar,
18; exhange proposed, 49; traide,
108, 134.
Guam Island, ceded to United
States, 419.
Guantanamo (Cuba), naval station,
444.
Guatemala, commercial treaty with,
285; boundary dispute, 385, 386.
Guiana, boundary disputed, 391,
394.
Guillemot, Eugene, agent to Uru-
guay, cited, 325, 326.
Guizot, F, P. G., French premier,
240.
Gunn, James, Georgia Senator, 135.
Gwin, Sen. W. McK., Alaskan pol-
icy, 358.
H
Hague, The, American minister to,
136.
Hague Conference {1899), called
by Czar, 473; acts of, 473;
(1907), endorses modified Drago
Doctrine, 447; recommendations,
475.
Hague Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration, 8, 453; functions, 444;
settles fisheries dispute, 435; Vene-
zuelan claims submitted to, 449;
established, 473; palace presented,
473; Spain and Mexico resort to,
474; scope of jurisdiction, 474,
Hahnville (La.), Italian lynched at,
427.
Haldiman, Gen. Frederick, refuses
to surrender frontier ports, 63.
Hale, J. P., minister to Spain, in-
structions, 328.
Hale, Sen. W. G., tariff views, 388.
Halifax, American trade, 177; route
via, 182, 230; admiralty court, 157.
INDEX
529
Hamburg, commercial treaty with,
197; interests in Samoa, 399.
Hamilton, Alexander, financial pol-
icy, 82, 97, 106; meets English
agent, 90; English sympathies,
91, 92, 95; French policy, 99-101,
136-138; differs with Jefferson,
99, 104, 125; Republicans distrust,
115; intimacy with British minis-
ter, 120; stoned, 120; commands
army, 135; cited, 135.
Hammond, George, British minis-
ter, 64, 87, 181; frontier policy,
116; successor, 122.
Hammond, J. H., letter to, cited,
264.
Hannegan, E. A., Indiana senator,
vote, 279.
Hanover, commercial treaty with,
224; navigation, 352.
Harmer, Gen. Josiah, Indians de-
feat, 83.
Harris, Sir James, British diplomat,
37.
Harrison, Benjamin, presidential
ambition, 390; counsel for Ven-
ezuela, 394; appointments, 304,
370.
Harrison, W. H., Indian dealings,
172.
Hartford Convention, proposed, 184.
Hartly, David, commission, 58.
Harvard University, Germanic Mu-
seum, 467.
Hats, Leghorn, trade in, 55.
Havana, route via, 316, 410, 411;
Maine destroyed in harbor, 413.
Hawaii, American relations, 223,
245, 286, 297, 352, 353, 360, 362,
402-406, 424, 487; missionaries
in, 402; British, 403, 405; Jap-
anese, 461, 462.
Hawkins, Sir John, colonial dreams
of, 205.
Hay, John, diplomat, 8, 188, 508;
secretary of state, 304, 429; am-
bassador to England, 429; deal-
ings with England, 431, 434, 436;
Canada, 434; Panama, 441; China,
455-458; views on Drago Doc-
trine, 447; Turkey, 464; Rou-
mania, 468; arbitration attitude,
473-475; characterized, 429, 457;
cited, 368.
Hayes, R. B., president, S04; ap-
pointments, 304, 370; on Mon-
roe Doctrine, 394; Chinese ex-
clusion, 397; Panama canal pol-
icy, message cited, 380.
Hayti, negro republic, 217, 264;
diplomatic relations with, 349,
375; affected by reciprocity, 389;
arbitration treaty with, 475.
Heber, Bishop Reginald, mission-
ary zeal, 255; "From Green-
land's Icy Mountains," 255.
Hemp, trade in, 110.
Henfield, Gideon, arrested, 102.
Henry VII, of England, sends Ca-
bot's expedition, 10.
Henry, Prince, visits United States,
467.
Henry, John, British agent, 174,
176.
Henry, Patrick, gains foreign sym-
pathy, 24; refuses mission to
France, 137.
Hermosa, carries slaves, 238.
Herran, P. A., Colombian minister,
arranges treaty, 439, 443.
Herrera, J. J., Mexican president,
275.
Hervey, Lionel, British agent in
Mexico, 215; recall, 215, 216.
Hesse, naturalization treaty with,
356.
Hides, in McKinley tariff, 388.
Hill, D. J., diplomatic service, 429.
History Teachers' Magazine, cited,
243.
Hoar, E. R., on British claims com-
mission, 345.
Hoar, Sen. George, cited, 442.
Holland, claims in America, 13;
decline, 14, 110; trade during
Revolution, 22, 34-36; war with
England, 38, 43; treaty with
United States, 39; in American
peace negotiations, 44-46; peace
with England, 50; diplomatic ser-
vice to, 81, 140, 188; American
trade, 164, 167.
Holland, war with France, 95;
France annexes, 167; neutrality
problems, 497; Japanese rela-
tions, 353, 402.
Holmes, O. W., greeting to Alexis,
cited, 360.
530
INDEX
Holy Alliance, terms, 204; failures,
208; relations with England, 237.
Honduras, Bay of, English in, 292,
294, 295; Honduras, Isthmus of,
route via, 295; treaty concerning,
352; English occupation, 381,
382; Honduras, Republic of, rec-
iprocity with, 389; public debt,
446, 459; American protectorate,
448; forcible intervention, 449;
treaty with, 459.
Honolulu, gunboats in harbor of,
405.
Hopewell, treaty of, 83.
Horses, trade in, 58.
Horseshoe Bend, battle at, 178.
Hortalie, Rodriguez, and Company,
aids American Revolution, 26.
House of Representatives, relation
to diplomacy, 80, 121; to Senate,
225, 428; impeachments, 134; res-
olutions, 331, 334; speakers, 171,
413; members, 86, 227, 300;
Fenian sympathy, 338.
Houston, Samuel, Tennessee gov-
ernor, 248; Texas leader, 248-
250, 260.
Howe, John, British agent, 176.
Howe, S. S., on San Domingo com-
mission, 364; aids Greece, 207.
Howick, Lord, issues order in coun-
cil, 159; dispatch, cited, 159.
Hudson, Hendrik, American dis-
coveries, 13.
Hudson Bay, rival claims, 16; Brit-
ish control trade, 118.
Hudson Bay Company, American
rival, 173; absorbs Northwest-
em Co., 186; in Oregon, 255;
protect priests, 256; claims nego-
tiated, 344.
Hudson River, Dutch colony on,
13, 14.
Huerta, Gen. Victoriano, govern-
ment not recognized, 479, 483,
489; defeats Madero, 483; presi-
dent, 483; European recognition,
483, 486; Japan policy, 487.
Hughes, Archbishop John, visits
Ireland, 338.
Huguenots, massacre of French,
12.
Hillseman, Baron, Austrian minis-
ter, 282.
Humphreys, David, minister to
Spain, 140.
Hungary, revolution in, 281.
Hunter, R. M. T., Confederate secre-
tary, 310.
Hunter, William, service in state
department, 307, 418, 508.
"Hunters' Lodges," organized, 233.
Huron, Lake, as boundary, 46, 186,
235.
Huskisson, William, British trade
policy, 198.
rHuys, Drouyn de, French foreign
minister, 331; cited, 332.
Iberville River, as boundary, 19,
149-151.
He d'Orleans, ceded to Spain, 19.
Illinois, emigrants, 257.
Immigration, Chinese, 397, 398,
449, 460; Japanese, 461 ; European,
467-469; Roumanian, 468; un-
due stimulation of, 469.
Imperialism, United States dis-
claims, 280, 281; tendency toward,
423-426.
Impressment. See International
Law.
Independence (Mo.), emigrant cen-
tre, 257.
Indiana, Indian tribes, 65, 84; ter-
ritorial governor, 172.
Indians, in colonial wars, 15; in
War of 1812, 178; Continental
Congress, seeks support, 23; sell
lands, 172; "buffer state" pro-
posed, 181, 183, 184, 246; fur
trade, 192; annuities, 194; among
frontier population, 63; relations
with English, 65, 66, 114, 116,
118, 172, 182, 185; Americans,
65, 66, 69, 72, 172; Cherokee,
treaty, 72, 83; intrigues, 89;
Chickamauga, 72; Chickasaw, 72;
Choctaw, 72; Creeks, 72; chief,
73, 83, 89; treaty, 83; intrigues,
89; Delaware, 65; Florida, 200,
201, 250; Iroquois, relations with
English, 17; colonial negotiations
with, 21; power of confederacy,
64, 65; Miami, 65; Mosquito,
British relations, 292, 294, 29d.
INDEX
531
88S; Northwestern tribes, 65;
Oregon, missions to, 255, 256;
Texas, 248-250; Shawnee, 65;
Southwestern, 72; Spanish trade
with, 73, 74, 123; raid against, 76;
Wyandot, 65; Yucatan, 296;
wars with, 83, 84, 117; treaty,
122, 182.
Industrial Property, Act for Pro-
tection of parties to, 472.
Industrial Property, Convention
for International Protection of,
374.
Inness, Harry, colonizing schemes,
75.
International co-operation, 374, 378.
International Institute of Agricul-
ture, 472.
International law, tendencies, 7;
affecting colonial claims, 17; in-
formal system, 21; continental
views, 54, 111; rights of foreign-
ers, 53; strain of Napoleonic
wars, 187; armed neutrality, 37,
110, 179; blockade. 111, 119, 159,
168, 169, 174, 175, 177, 288, 307-
812, 315, 494; building enemies*
ships, 340, 342; collection of
debts, 446, 447; continuous voy-
age, 308, 309, 318, 497, 498; con-
traband, 36, 54, 100, 111, 119,
124, 128, 129, 138, 154. 288, 318,
442, 495, 496; embezzlement, 235;
expatnation, see naturalization;
extradition, 117, 235, 284, 350,
851, 374, 388, 469; flag, use of,
240, 312. 367; free ships, free
goods, 29. 36. 54, 110. 119. 124,
129, 138, 207, 288; hospital ships,
472; impressment, 113, 157-159,
164, 175, 182, 289, 356, 496; in-
demnity, 182, 191, 238, 239;
marine territorial jurisdiction,
287; mines. 496; most favored
nation, 224. 464, 465; naturaliza-
tion, 7, 114, 289, 355-357, 466,
468; navigation, right of, 70,
71, 119, 197, 285, 287, 378, 380.
888; neutral goods in enemies'
ships, 288; privateering, 54. 102,
103, 105, 106. 119, 288. 309, 416;
prizes, 102, 105, 118, 119, 124;
recognition of governments, 442,
484; "Rule of 1756," terms, 112;
validity of treaties, 99-101, 191;
violation of territory, 234; visit
and search, 54, 113, 157, 159, 164,
236. 237, 239, 241, 282, 309, 316,
318, 349, 350; waterways, 5, 70,
197, 287, 291; wounded, treat-
ment of, 288, 472.
International oflBce of Public Health,
parties to, 472.
International Red Cross Conven-
tion, signatories, 472.
International Sanitary Convention,
parties to, 472.
Ireland, colonies appeal to, 23;
Fenians plan to free, 338.
Irish, political power in United
States, 338, 390.
Isabella, Queen, of Castile, 10.
Isabella, Queen of Spain, over-
thrown, 365.
Isle of Pines, given to Cuba, 425.
Isolation, no longer possible, 502.
Italy, United States trade, 166;
commercial treaty, 471; revolt
in, 204; Civil War policy, 313;
represented in Geneva board. 347;
Kingdom of, 350; extradition
treaty, 350; offers mediation in
Cuba, 366; emigration to Argen-
tina, 384; United States, 469;
irritation over lynchings. 426, 427;
American ambassador to, 429,
430; interests in Far East, 455,
458; arbitration treaty, 475.
Itaia, seized. 390.
Izard, Ralph, commissioner to Tus-
cany, 31; dislikes French, 34.
Jackson. Andrew, deals with Flor-
ida Indians, 200; seizes Spanish
forts, 200, 201; diplomatic serv-
ice under, 220, 304; methods,
241; problems of policy, 480; ap-
pointments, 221. 248, 250; Brit-
ish policy, 222; French, 226-228;
Texas, 250, 252, 265, 341; mes-
sages cited, 227, 228, 251.
Jackson, F. J., minister to United
States, 165, 176.
Jacobins, American club, 99, 103.
Jamaica, position threatens Gulf
trade, 360; reciprocity with, 470.
532
INDEX
Jameson, J. F., views on American
expansion, 243, 244.
Japan, commerce with, 286; Perry's
expedition, 286, 303; American
relations, 353, 396, 461-463, 480;
European, 353, 402; commercial
treaty with, 397, 454; arbitration,
475; seal fisheries, 434; protests
Hawaiian annexation, 424; dip-
lomatic service to, 430; affected
by Monroe Doctrine, 449, 450;
world-power, 454, 459; relations
with China, 455, 458; war with
Russia, 458; Manchurian policy,
459, 461; Canadian, 461; Mex-
ican, 486, 487.
Jay, John, diplomat, 1; commis-
sioner to Spain, 32, 33; distrusts
Spain, 34; France, 34. 44^0, 91,
137; in peace negotiations, 44-46,
58, 74, 142; secretary of foreign
affairs, 57, 70, 71; mission to
England, 115, 126, 128, 372; in-
structions, 115; welcome, 116;
concludes treaty, 84, 117-119;
error in, 119; burned in eflBgy,
120; views on French treaty, 99;
chief justice, 81, 115; Mississippi
proposal, 417; independent action
371; length of service, 508; char-
acterized, 32; cited, 32, 34.
Jecker and Company, firm of, buys
bonds, 329.
Jefferson, Thomas, peace commis-
sioner, 41; makes commercial
treaty, 54; treats with Barbary
states, 56; minister to France, 54,
81; secretary of state, 81; resigns,
104; views on merchant marine,
85, 86, 196; on validity of treaties,
99, 100; on expansion, 476; on
neutrality, 102, 103, 106; on iso-
lation, 211, 438; French sympa-
thies, 95, 136; fears English, 91
differs with Hamilton, 99, 125
presidential candidate, 129, 130
president, 140; appointments, 141
157, 158; problems of policy, 480
Barbary states policy, 141, 222
Cuban, 208, 209; Louisiana, 144
145, 148; trade, 155-157, 190,
498; closes American harborS;
160; Madison consults, 163
length of public service, 508
theories, 140, 154, 160, 165, 181;
justifies Louisiana purchase, 442;
cited, 28, 85, 86, 91, 95, 106, 208,
209, 470.
Jews, protest against persecution
of, 357; treatment by Roumania,
468.
Johnson, Andrew, president, 362,
365; message, cited, 362.
Johnson, Reverdy, treats with Eng-
land, 340, 373; convention re-
jected, 343.
Jones, Anson, president of Texas,
266, 272.
Jones, J. P., American commodore,
30; enters Texel, 36; French sym-
pathies, 96.
Juan de Fuca, Straits of, channel,
337, 348.
Juarez, Gen. B. P., resists French
in Mexico, 332; captures Maxi-
milian, 333.
Juarez (Mex.), fighting at, 482.
K
Kaiulani, Hawaiian princess, 404.
Kamamaha, King of Hawaii, 402.
Kanakas, employed on Pacific coast,
286.
Kaskaskia (III.), Clark captures,
33, 69.
Kasson, J. A., on Samoan commis-
sion, 401; reciprocity treaty com-
missioner, 470.
Kentucky, relations with England,
67, 68; pioneers, 69; governor, 102;
intrigues with Spain, 76, 123;
France, 102, 105; constitutional
convention, 76; admitted to
Union, 82; militia praised, 174.
Key West, position isolated, 360;
importance of railroad to, 444.
Kiauchau, port leased, 455.
King, Rufus, minister to England,
129, 135, 189, 372; successor, 158;
suggests Philippine trade con-
cessions, 417; fears loss of West,
71; cited, 135; letter to, cited, 137.
King's Mountain, battle of, 69.
Kipling, Rudyard, While Man's
Burden, cited, 421.
Knox, Gen. Henry, secretary of
war, cited, 83; letter to, cited, 84.
INDEX
583
Knox, P. C, secretary of state, 448,
459, 483; visits Caribbean states,
452; proposes Colombian treaty,
453; Chinese policy, 459; "dollar
diplomacy," 476.
Koerner, G., minister to Spain, in-
structions, 327.
Kossuth, Louis, visits America,
280, 281.
Kossta, Martin, case of, 282, 289.
Kwangchau Bay, port opened, 223;
port leased, 455.
Kwang-Chow. See Kwangchau.
Labrador, fisheries, 192.
Ladrone Islands, American inter-
ests, 418, 419.
Lafayette, Marquis de, American
sympathy, 27, 94; proscribed, 99.
Laird, William, British ship-builder,
322, 340.
Lakes, Great, trade route, 68; navi-
gation rights on, 182, 191, 346.
La Plata River, navigation of, 287;
dispute over mouth of, 325.
Lard, trade in, 225.
Laredo (Mex.), fighting at, 482.
Larkin, T. O., consul at Monterey,
274.
La Salle, Robert Cavalier, Sieur de,
explorer, 201.
Laurens, Henry, commissioner to
Netherlands, 31, 38; captured
on ocean, 38; peace commissioner,
41; imprisoned, 42.
Laurier, Sir Wilfred, government
defeated, 436.
Lazzari, Mgr., diary of American
Revolution, 24.
Leather goods, trade in, 373.
Lebrun, C. F., letters to, cited, 96,
102.
Leclerc, Gen. V. E., San Domingo
expedition, 143; death, 145.
Lee, Arthur, deals with Beaumar-
chais, 27; commissioner to France,
31; irritates Spain, 31; dislikes
French, 34.
Lee, Fitzhugh, consul-general at
Havana, 412, 415.
Lee, R. E., surrender, 331.
Lee, William, commissioner to Ber-
lin, 81; meets de Neufville, 87;
drafts treaty, 37, 38.
Legar^, H. S., secretary of state,
221; Hawaiian policy, 403; death,
260.
Leisbman, J. G. A., diplomatic
service, 430.
Le Louis, admiralty case, 236.
Leo Xni, proposed as Cuban me-
diator, 414, 415.
Leopard, affair with Chesapeake,
159, 174.
Leslie. See Panton, Leslie and Co.
Lesseps, Ferdinand de, head of
canal company, 380, 439.
Lew Chew Islands, commercial
treaty with, 286.
Lewis, Sir G. C, American views,
320.
Lewis, Meriwether, explorer, 148.
Lexington, Battle of, rouses America,
159.
Liberia, American relations, 349;
international receivership, 464.
Li Hung Chang, represents China,
457.
Liliuokalani, Queen of Hawaii, 404^
abolishes constitution, 405.
Lincoln, Abraham, compared with
Franklin, 28; diplomatic influence,
305, 306, 310, 317, 322; appoint-
ments, 304-306, 354; proclaims
blockade, 307, 315; English opin-
ion of, 314; Emancipation proc-
lamation, 321; effects, 321; letter
to London working-men, 322;
private secretary, 429; political
wisdom, 457; problems of policy,
480; cited, 304.
Lincoln, Robert, minister to Eng-
land, 373, 392.
Lind, John, mission to Mexico, 485.
Linn, L. F., Missouri senator, 255;
Oregon bill, 256.
Liston, Robert, British minister,
122, 134.
Littie Belt, fights President, 174.
Little Democrat, French privateer,
103.
Little Sarah, captured, 108.
Livingston, Edward, House leader,
121; diplomatic ability, 220;
death, 220.
Livingston, Robert, secretary of
i^S4
INDEX
foreign affairs, 23, 57; minister to
France, 140, 146, 149, 150, 226,
227; letters to, cited, 34, 53, 92.
Lodge, H. C, Senate leader, 428;
on Alaskan boundary commis-
sion, 434; seal fisheries, 379; Mag-
dalena Bay resolution, 450, 487;
immigration views, 467.
Logan, Dr. George, peace mission,
136.
L6me, Dupuy de, Spanish minister,
indiscretion, 413.
London, 73, 81, 123, 129, 165, 180,
210, 262, 429, 455; interest in
American Revolution, 24; loses
American trade, 35; distributing
centre, 61; financial, 362, 427; fur-
market, 64.
Lopez, Gen. Narcisco, Cuban leader,
298; death, 299.
Louis XVI, interest in America, 25;
adopts middle course, 260; recog-
nizes American Independence,
30, 42; powers, 92; beheaded, 99;
American treaty, 100.
Louis Napoleon, Civil War policy,
• 313, 330, 331; colonial plans, 313;
Mexican, 329-333; offers media-
tion, 330; British relations, 334.
Louis Philippe, American policy,
227.
Louisburg, English capture, 15, 16;
give back, 16.
Louisiana, French possession, 17;
ceded to England and Spain, 19;
England desires, 91, 134; France,
97, 98, 102, 130; Spanbh policy,
73, 74, 123, 124; governor, 75;
cedes to France, 142, 143; France
to United States, 145, 146, 165,
188, 199, 224; problems, 147;
boundaries, 148-151, 185, 194,
202; loyalty doubtful, 181; effect
of purdiase, 187; justification of,
443.
LourenQO Marques Railroad, seized
by Portugal, 375.
L'Ouverture, Toussaint, rules San
Domingo, 134, 136; captured, 148.
Lowell, J. R., diplomatic service,
221, 373; "Bigelow Papers,"
cited, 318.
Loyalists, interests safeguarded, 48;
lenien<7 recommended, 60; treat-
ment of, 64; settle in Ontario, 66;
in Natchez, 71; bitter feeling, 66;
in War of 18 IS, 178; compensation
refused, 118.
Lubeck, commercial treaty with, 197.
Lumber, trade in, 58, 67, 846.
Luzerne, Anne Cesar de la, French
minister to United States, 83; in-
structions, 50.
Lyons, Lord, British minister, S17.
M
Macdonald, Sir J. A., on claims
commission, 345.
McGillivray, Alexander, Creek chief,
73; visits New York, 83; rival, 89;
cited, 77.
Machinery, farm, trade in, 373.
McClellan, Gen. G. B., fails before
Richmond, 320.
McKean, Thomas, Pennsylvania
judge, 136.
McKenzie, Alexander, explorer, 254.
MacKenzie, A. S., confers with Santa
Anna, 276.
Mackerel, trade in, 58, 108; desert
Canadian waters, 375.
McKinley, William, elected presi-
dent, 408; api>ointments, 412,
429; Cuban policy, 413; Hawaiian,
424; Philippine, 419, 420; de
Ldme's opinion of, 413; forbids
privateering, 416; civil service
under, 431; proposes Pan-Amer-
ican Congress, 451; foreign policy,
476; cited, 419.
McLane, Louis, secretary of state,
220; minister to England, instruc-
tions, 222.
McLaughlin, Dr. John, Hudson
Bay Co., factor, 255.
McLeod, Alexander, case of, 233,
234.
Macon Bill, No. 2, provisions, 167.
Madagascar, treaty with, 349.
Madawaska, French fief, 230.
Madero, Francisco, leads revolution,
482; elected president, 483; over-
thrown, 483.
Madison, James, diplomat, 8; mem-
ber of Congress, 86; declines oflSce,
104; secretary of state, 141; Flor-
ida policy, 149-151; minister to
INDEX
535
England, 158; president, 163;
re-election, 175; foreign policy,
163, 211; British, 165, 108-170,
174, 179, 184; English resent-
ment, 181; views, cited, 100, 158;
letter to, 209.
Madison Island, annexation, 398.
Madrid, 33, 73, 130. 150, 327, 861,
410.
Madrid, Treaty of, 14.
Magdalena Bay, Japanese interest
in, 449, 487.
Magellan, Ferdinand, circumnavi-
gates world, 11.
Mahan, Rear Adm. A. T., naval au-
thority, 423.
Maine, boundary dispute, 230, 234,
235, 272; lumber trade, 346.
Maine, destruction of, 413; cause
disputed, 413, 414; arbitration
ofiFered, 415.
Malietoa, King of Samoa, 400.
Malmesbury, Earl of. Southern
sympathy, 314.
Malta, desires United States trade,
55.
Manchester, Duke of, commission,
58.
Manchuria, relations with Japan,
459, 461.
Mangouret, M. A., French consul,
99.
" Manifest Destiny," theory of, 199,
200, 296, 301; scouted by Carl
Schurz, 364,
Manila, captured by Dewey, 417,
419; held by United States, 418;
German attitude, 419.
Manila Bay, battle of, 417, 420.
Manufactures, growth of, 284.
Marbois, Barbe, French agent, 145,
146; MSmoire, captured, 45.
Marcy, W. L., dispateh on Koszta
case, 282, 289; secretary of state,
282. 283, 285, 288, 297, 300, 302;
reciprocity treaty, 337; fisheries,
352; relations with Pierce, 365;
Hawaiian policy, 403.
Maria, purates capture, 56.
Marshall, John, constitutional au-
thority, 2; commissioner to France,
131, 132; secretary of state, 138;
court decisions, 237.
Martinique, trade, 108, 134.
Mason, G. T,, Virginia senator, 120.
Mason, J. M., Confederate com-
missioner, 311; captured, 316;
released, 318.
Mason, J. Y., minister to France,
301; special Spanish mission, 301.
Massachusetts, limits curtailed, 46;
interest in fisheries, 48; merchant
marine, 163; whigs control, 227;
boundary dispute, 230, 235.
Mataafa, Samoan leader, 400, 401.
Matamoras (Mex.), port, 308, 309.
Maumee River, British fort on, 83,
84, 116, 509.
Maurepas, Comte de, French prime
minister, 25.
Maximilian, Archduke, Mexican em-
peror, 330, 331; United States
f>olicy toward, 332, 442; death,
333, 427.
Meade, Gen. George, in Civil War,
322.
Mecklenburg-Schwerin, commercial
treaty with, 285.
Mediation, offered, in American
Revolution, 41; in War of 1812,
178; Spanish-American, 208, 324;
French claims dispute, 228; Civil
War, 330; Cuban insurrections,
366, 412; Hayti-Dominican dis-
pute, 384, 390; European, in
American disputes, 384-386, 444;
offered by A. B. C. powers, 490.
Mediterranean Sea, piracy on, 55,
56; abolished, 196; commerce, 85,
141, 159.
Merchant marine, development, 85-
87, 109, 110, 152-154, 157, 163,
169, 190, 284; risks, 154, 156, 161,
164, 177; reciprocity aids, 196,
197; subsidies, 284, 469; regis-
tration rules, 470, 493; in Civil
War, 309, 312; decline after war,
336, 337, 353, 359, 469, 493.
Merrimac, Monitor defeats, 319.
Merritt, Gen. Wesley, advises peace
commission {1898), 419.
Merry, Anthony, British minister,
147.
Mexico, as boundary, 12; mines, 74,
75, 89, 123; revolts from Spain,
203; independence, 213; France
desires, 205; Napoleon's views on,
209; Russian relations, 213; seeks
5d6
mDEX
alliances, 214; English relations,
90, 215, 216, 253, 270, 271, 275,
276, 278, 328, 329; plans of Con-
gress, 216, 276; land policy, 246;
commercial treaties, 216, 223,
224, 279; slavery in, 246, 247; dip-
lomatic service to, 221, 258, 273;
claims treaty, 226, 375; report to
Congress of, cited, 243; American
interests in, 245, 248, 297, 452,
481; defers payment, 328; Texas
question, 248-254, 260, 263, 265,
271-276; California, 257-259, 274,
275, 279; war with United States,
277, 278; terms of peace, 279;
Gadsden treaty, 290; Yucatan
revolt, 296; revolution chronic,
297, 328, 481; trade with Con-
federacy, 309; relations with
Second Empire, 328-333; dis-
courages American settlers, 247;
Spanish relations, 328, 329; allies
collect duties in, 329; Empire
founded, 320; arbitration of claims,
350, 474; naturalization treaty,
356; arbitration, 475, 481; bound-
ary dispute, 385, 386; minister,
cited, 387; favors arbitration
court, 451; relations with United
States 1915. 444, 479, 481; foreign
interests in, 481, 486; American,
482, 485-487; Madero govern-
ment, 482; Huerta, 483, 484, 486.
Mexico, City of, Americans take,
277; French, 329; Second Pan-
American Congress, 451; foreign
colony in, 482.
Mexico, Gulf of, tributaries, 32, 187;
commerce on, 33; control of, 253,
360, 444.
Michaux, Andr6, French agent, 102.
Michilimackinac (Mich.), British
fort, 63; trade-centre, 173.
Michigan, Lake, right of navigation,
285, 346.
Middle West, demands open Mis-
sissippi, 5.
Midway Islands, annexation, 399,
406. 425.
Milan decree, terms, 158; revoked,
168.
Military service, liability of natural-
ized citizens, 357.
Milk River, source, 195.
Mines, Mexican, 74, 75, 89, 90, 12S;
foreign interests in, 4iBl, 482;
nitrate, 386.
Mirabeau, Comte de, defeat in
Assembly, 92.
Miranda, Francisco de, adventurer,
89; revolutionary plans, 90, 96,
134, 135, 139, 203, 290; death,
203.
Miro, Estevem, Louisiana governor,
75; intrigues, 76, 77; cit«l, 76.
Mirs Bay, port leased, 455.
Missionaries, American, in Oregon,
255, 256; in Pacific, 396; China,
286, 455, 460; Hawaii, 402;
Turkey, 465; desire Philippines as
field, 421.
Mississippi River, as boundary, 19,
40, 41, 46,74, 135,151,201; source,
116, 118; Spain holds, 5, 32, 33,
63, 70, 75, 87, 90; French hold
mouth, 16; Americans, 181; free
navigation demanded, 41, 43, 48,
57, 70, 72, 97, 197, 245; opposed
by East, 71; granted, 124, 125,
147; English demand, 182, 185,
195; French designs in valley, 142;
America secures, 194; fur-trade
on upper, 173; outlet for commerce
of, 360, 444.
Missouri, Spanish intrigues in, 75;
slavery struggle in, 252; emigrants,
257; senator, 255.
Missouri River, as boundary, 148;
source, 195; fur- trade on, 173.
Mobile (Ala.), French colony, 19,
149; Americans occupy, 151;
British threaten, 181.
Mohammedans, plunder Spanish
colonies, 13.
Mohonk, Lake, conferences at, 473.
Molasses, trade in, 119.
Mongolia, independence recognized,
459.
Monitor, defeats Merrimac, 319.
Monongahela River, joins Allegheny,
17.
Monroe, James, minister to France,
104; welcome, 107, 115, 126; mis-
sion, 127; recall, 128; indiscretion,
128, 129, 131, 132; poor diplomat,
141, 188; Louisiana purchase, 144-
146, 149, 150; minister to Eng-
land, 158, 372; special mission, 158;
INDEX
537
secretary of state, 170, 188; in-
structs peace commissioners, 182;
president, 188; Spanish-American
policy, 201, 210, 211, 251; Oregon,
255; states "doctrine," 211, 212,
324.
Monroe Doctrine, development, 1,
2; basis, 211; stated, 212, 213;
Canning's opinion of, 214, 215,
882; influence on national policy,
217, 218, 353, 359; extensions of,
218, 296, 334, 403, 417, 420, 448,
450, 477-479, 484, 508, 509; real
author, 218; Polk revives, 268,
281, 325; Polk's corollary, 296;
eflFect of Clayton-Bulwer treaty,
293, 382; practiced efiFects, 324,
826; during Civil War, 324-334;
in Maximilian affairs, 333; Grant's
corollary, 334; base of Panama
policy {1880), 380; Blaine and
Olney's conception of, 384-395;
affects Caribbean situation, 444,
450, 477; question of claims, 446,
448; Roosevelt's corollary, 448;
Lodge's corollary, 450; Wilson's
corollaries, 450, 478, 484; Spanbh-
America resents, 452; Mexican
problems, 482.
Monterey (Cal.), American consul,
instructions, 274; British consul,
257; Americans seize, 258.
Montevideo, French relations,
325.
Montreal, trade centre, 67, 118, 122,
125, 173, 197; Americans desire,
174.
Moore, J. B., Spanish treaty com-
mission secretary, 418; state de-
partment counsellor, 480, 508.
Moose Island, British demand, 182,
186.
Morgan, Col. George, Western
schemes, 75.
Morgan, J. P., interests in Honduras,
459.
Mori Daizen, chastised by Europe,
853.
Mormons, American, in Mexico,
482.
Momy, Due de, Mexican policy,
329.
Morocco, oflScial piracy, 55; treaty
with, 66, 85; international agree-
ment with, 402; Algeciras con-
ference, 402, 464.
Morris, Gouvemeur, mission to
England, 87; minister to France,
104; recall, 104.
Morton, L. P., diplomatic expe-
rience, 304.
Mosquitoes (Indian tribe), 292, 295,
383. See Nicaragua.
Motley, J. L., minister to England,
343, 373; instructions, 844; re-
moval, 344; to Austria, 383; con-
cludes treaty with England,
356.
Moultrie, Gov. William, receives
Genfit, 98.
Mount Vernon, Washington at,
120.
Munster, treaty of, 14.
Murray, W. V., minister to Holland,
136; on French commission,
137.
Muscat, commercial treaty with,
223.
N
Nacogdoches, Americans occupy,
250.
Najato, prince of, 353.
Naples, interest in American Revo-
lution, 24; American trade, 55, 164,
167; insurrection in, 204; com-
mercial treaty, 223; claims treaty,
226; extradition, 285.
Nashville (Tenn.), pioneers, 69.
Nassau, port of, 238, 308.
Natchez (Miss.), possession dis-
puted, 33, 71; American interests,
245; trade centre, 70; command-
ant, 76.
Natchitoches, French fort, 202.
National Era, Mexican policy, 278.
National Gazette, policy, 103.
Naturalization. See International
Law.
Navarro, Martin, Spanish intendant,
cited, 73, 74.
Navigation. See International Law.
Navy, in War of 18118, 178; in Civil
War, 409; rebuilding, 409.
Navy, steady increase in, 423;
efficiency tested, 424; rank, 424;
helps stranded Americans, 494.
538
INDEX
Navy Island, militia rendezvous,
232.
Necker, Jacques, French statesman,
48.
Nelson, Hugh, minister to Spain,
209, 210; instructions, cited, 297.
Nelson, Justice Samuel, on British
Claims commission, 345.
Nesselrode, Count Karl Robert,
English sympathy, 169.
Netherlands, King of, arbitrates,
230, 235; interests in Asia, 353;
diplomatic service to, 429; arbi-
tration treaty, 475. See Holland.
Neutrality, position of Holland
(1688), 14, 22, (1776), 35, 36,
(2779), 38; lax enforcement, 22;
doctrine of armed, 37, 38; John
Adams's views, 92; Jefferson's, 102,
104; Washington's, 125; cabinet
discusses, 99; proclamation issued,
100, 105; law of 17H, 105; prob-
lems {1789-1812), 6, 90-92,95,100,
107, 127-129, 136,152,169,170;ob-
ligations (1789-1812), 106, 118,
169; rights (1789-1812), 14, 108,
110-114, 118, 124, 126, 127, 156,
159, 167, 170, 175; indemnity for
violations, 118, 124; England pro-
claims, 206; United States, 207;
problems (1812-1829), 196, 207,
208; Great Britain's interpretation
lax, 336, 338; American actof iS5S,
845; problems (1829-1872). 232,
249-251, 288, 299, 327, 330, 332,
839; obligations (1829-1872), 288,
809, 339, 345; rights (1829-1872),
288, 308, 309, 312, 342, 345, 390,
495; in Franco-Prussian war, 350;
of Isthmian routes, 352, 380; in
Cuban insurrection, 365, 409, 412;
in Boer war, 431 ; of China, in Rus-
sian-Japanese war, 458; in Mex-
ican revolutions, 483; in Euro-
pean war, 494-499.
Neufville, Jean de, drafts treaty,
36.
Neuville, Baron Hyde de, minister
to United States, 200, 201.
New Brunswick, boundary dispute,
230, 235.
New England, settlement of, 13;
captures Canadian ports, 15;
fishing interests, 40, 41, 19i^ 877;
commercial, 71; embargo hurts,
161; carrying trade, 55, 177.
New England Society, of New York,
address to, cited, 305.
New Granada. See Colombia.
New Hampshire, claims Vermont
lands, 67.
New Madrid (Mo.), proposed col-
ony, 75.
New Mexico, United States claims,
274; obtains, 279, 341.
New Orleans (La.), French settle,
16; ceded to England, 19; trade
centre, 70, 98; Americans desire,
73; English designs against, 90;
French, 102; place of deposit, 124,
144, 145; Pitt's plan for, 135;
Spanish intendant, 144; ceded to
United States, 146; Pakenham's
expedition against, 181, 184;
filibustering expeditions from, 298;
Italian lynched at, 427.
New York, Indian tribes, 64; claims
Vermont lands, 67; Canada de-
sires northern, 181; Canadian
trade, 197; militia equip in,
232.
New York City, Indian chiefs visit,
83; British agent at, 90; trade
centre, 161, 173, 199, 285, 427,
452, 467; filibustering expeditions,
298; Russian fleet visits, 359; Cu-
ban head-quarters, 409.
Newfoundland, ceded to England,
16; fisheries, 40, 41, 45, 48, 108,
192, 285, 434, 435. 506; embargo
hurts, 161; War of 1812, 177; not
a part of Canada, 434.
Niagara (N. Y.), fort, 63, 182; media-
tion conference at, 490.
Niagara River, Iroquois on, 65; in-
ternational waterway, 181; Fe-
nians cross, 338.
Nicaragua, international route, 135,
290; rival of Panama, 291, 292,
295, 440; Indians, 292; British
relations, 292, 383; American
296, 297; extradition treaty with,
850; right of way through, 352
proposed canal treaty, 382, 383
reciprocity with, 889; canal pol
icy, 439; protectorate over, 448
forcible intervention, 449; treaty
(1916), 450.
INDEX
539
Nicholas II of Russia, calls first
Hague Conference, 47S.
Ningpo, port opened, 223.
Nipissing, Lake, as boundary, 20,
40. 46.
Nitrate mines. South American, 386.
Non-importation, colonial agree-
ments, 156; law of 1806, 157.
Non-intercourse act, terms, 163;
effects, 164, 166, 167; renewed,
169.
Nootka Sound, English settlement,
88; Spanish ships raid, 88; con-
troversy over, 89-92; neutrality
difficult, 100; Treaty of, 92.
North, Lord, resigns, 42; return to
office, 59.
North Carolina, settles Tennessee,
69; Indian relations, 72; governor,
137.
Northcote, Sir Stafford, in claims
commission, 345.
North German Union, naturaliza-
tion treaty, 355.
Northwest, British policy in, 68, 116,
172; Indian tribes, 172; north-
west coast, Russian advance, 205,
206, 209, 212.
Northwest Territory, governor, 83.
Northwestern Fur Co., rival, 173;
title to Astoria, 185; absorbed,
185.
Norway, commercial treaty with,
197; extradition, 285; natural-
ization, S56; arbitration, 475;
neutrality {1915). 497.
Nova Scotia, desired by United
States, 40.
Nueces River, as boundary, 271.
O
Ohio, Indian tribes, 65, 84.
Ohio River, claims to valley, 16, 17;
ceded to England, 19; as bound-
ary, 20, 40, 116; branches, 68;
junction, 105; pioneers in valley,
245.
Oil, trade in, 164, 285; free entry
conceded, 346.
Oldenburg, conunercial treaty with,
285.
Olliwochica, Indian leader, 172.
Olney, Richard, secretary of state,
8, S91, 392; Venezuela policy, 391;
conception of Monroe Doctrine,
392-395, 478; characterized, 391,
395; cited, 392, 395.
Onis, Don Luis de, negotiates with
Adams, 200, 201, 246.
Ontario, loyalists settle in, 66; re-
lations with England, 178.
Ontario, Lake, as boundary, 46;
naval fights in, 178, 190.
Orange Free State, treaty with, 350.
Oregon, American claims, 93, 148,
186, 195, 202, 214, 245, 265, 267,
269, 278; joint occupation, 195,
254-257, 269, 271; treaty signed.
270; fur-trade in, 255; mission-
aries, 255, 256; rush of settlers,
257, 291; importance of coast line,
898; attitude toward Mexico
(1915), 486.
Orinoco River, Spanish on, 391;
Venezuelan control of, 394.
Ostend Manifesto, terms cited,
301.
Oswald, Richard, British minister
to France, 42, 43; new commis-
sion, 45.
Oswego (N. Y.), British fort, 63.
Ottoman Empire, commercial treaty
with, 223; in Crimean war, 288;
diplomatic service to, 430; extra-
dition treaty, 350; relations with
United States, 464-466.
Pacific Ocean, commerce, 92, 93;
international co-operation on, 353,
354, 369; interpretation of term,
379; growth of American influence,
396, 402, 463; territorial expansion
on, 398, 454; islands acquired,
898. 399, 404, 418, 425.
Pacifists, against munition trade, 499
Padillo, Panama gunboat, 441.
Pagopago, naval station, 400, 425.
Paine, Thomas. French sympathy,
96.
Pakenham, Sir Richard, British
minister. 262; correspondence
with, 263, 267.
Pakenham, Gen. Sir Edward M.,
New Orleans expedition, 181.
Palmerston, Lord, Central Amer-
540
INDEX
ican policy, 294; Civil War, SIS,
317, 319; cited, 317.
Panama, iaternational route, 135,
286, 290; Spanish- American con-
gress, 214, 291; United States dele-
gates, 216; American interests in,
245; neutrality guaranteed (treaty
of me), 291, 385, 442; Nicaragua
a rival, 291, 439, 440; railroad
built, 295; de Lesseps canal, 380;
title bought by United States, 439;
relations with Colombia, 439-
442, 453; United States recognizes,
442; guarantees independence,
443; constitution, cited, 443; re-
lations with United States, 443.
Panama Canal, fortifications, 436-
438; tolls, 437, 480, 481; strategic
importance, 444; opening, 469.
Panama City, revolt in, 441.
Pan-American Congress, success of
first, 388; Hawaii not included,
403; sessions, 451.
Pan-American Exposition, at Buf-
falo, 451.
Pan-American Union, director-gen-
eral, 430.
Pan-Americanism, policy of Adams
and Clay, 214; of Blaine, 386;
action of Congress, 387; later,
451.
Panton, Leslie & Co., Indian trade,
73.
Papacy, relations with United States,
61, 55.
Papal bulls, confirm Spanish claims,
10; importance, 10, 11.
Papal States, diplomatic service to,
280; plan to defend, 338.
Paraguay, commercial treaty with,
285, 287; arbitration, 475.
Parana River, navigation of, opened,
287.
Paredes y A., Gen. M., Mexican
president, policy, 275, 276.
Paris, 73. 81, 138, 150. 204, 311, 418;
interest in American Revolution,
24; American representatives in,
27, 28, 83, 96, 99, 104, 132, 145,
188, 345; international bureau,
weights and measures, 351; seal
fisheries arbitration court, 379;
Venezuelan, 394; engineering con-
gress, 380; financial centre, 427.
Paris, treaty of (1781S), 18; discus-
sion of terms, 40-50, 66; Indians
angry at, 65 ; interpretation, 67, 70,
115, 117. 139, 186. 192, 194, 195;
(189S), 418-422.
Parker, Josiah, Virginia Member of
Congress, 121.
Parliament, toleration of Lord Shel-
bume, 59; passes navigation act;
{,1788), 60.
Parrott, W. S., United States agent
in Mexico, 273.
Passamaquoddy Bay, islands, 186.
Patriotism, demonstrations of, cul-
tivated, 408.
Pauncefote, Sir Julian, discusses
Venezuelan dispute, 393; friendly
to America, 431; Hay treaty, 436.
Peace movement, growth of, 472,
473, 502.
Pearl Harbor, coaling station, 404.
Pearl River, as boundary, 151.
Pearson syndicate, Colombian plans,
450.
Peel, Sir Robert, American policy,
233, 269, 270.
Peking, foreign embassies besieged,
455, 456; relieved, 457.
Pensacola (Fla.), Spanish colony,
19; trading-post, 73; Jackson
seizes, 200, 201.
Perceval, Spencer, issues order in
council, 159.
Perdido River, as boundary, 19,
149-159.
Perignon, Gen. Marquis de, minister
to Spain, 130.
Perry, Commodore Matthew, Jai>-
an treaty, 286.
Persia, commercial treaty with, 285.
Peru, mines, 75; revolution in, 203
commercial treaty with, 223, 285
claims, 226; war with Spain, 827
arbitration of claims, 350; Bo-
livia-Chili war, 386; arbitration
treaty, 475; new government rec-
ognized, 479.
PcferAoJJ, admiralty case, 309.
Petroleum, supersedes whale-oil, S5S.
Pharmacopoeal Formulas for Po-
tent Drugs, agreement to unify,
472.
Phelps. E. J., on seal-fisheries com-
mission, 379.
INDEX
541
Philadelphia, seat of Continental
Congress, 23, 24, S3, 45, 70, 75;
frivolity of, 39; port, 70, 76. 87,
103; trade centre, 161; Genfit at,
99. 101.
Philip II, of Spain, succeeds to
throne, 12.
Philippines, ownership, 12; relations
with United States. 245; reciproc-
ity with, 389; early history, 417;
negotiations for, 418; American
sentiment concerning. 420, 421,
476. 487; army of occupation,
423; Japanese relations, 461.
Pickering, Timothy, secretary of
state. 121, 135. 288; maritime law
policy. 129; English sympathies,
121, 137; successor, 138; cited,
129. 176.
Pierce. Franklin, president, 281;
first message, 281; expansionist,
282; appointments, 282. 292, 300,
365; Cuban policy. 300; cited, 300.
Pike. Capt. Zebulon. explorer, 148.
Pinchon, L. A., French minister,
144.
Pinckney, Charles, minister to Spain,
140.
Pinckney, C. C, minister to France,
128; not received, 129-131; one of
commission. 131, 137; reply to
Talleyrand. 132; cited, 137.
Pinckney, Thomas, minister to
England, 87, 123; envoy to Spain,
123; concludes treaty, 124; re-
placed, 129.
Pinkney, William, mission to Eng-
land, 158, 372; tact, 165; recall,
169.
Piracy, menace to colonies. 13; of
Barbary States, 55. 114, 132;
slave-trade question, 237.
Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham,
friend of colonies, 17, 25; trade
policy, 110.
Pitt, William, premier, 60, 88, 89;
fears frontier clash, 116; French
policy. 132; Louisiana. 134.
Pius IX, assumes pontificate, 280.
Piatt Amendment, terms, 425, 426;
enforced, 449.
Plattsburg. battle of, 181.
Poinsett, Joel, mission to Buenos
Ayres, 206.
Poles, treatment by Russia, 359.
Polk. James K., elected president,
265; appointments, 273, 282;
Texas policy, 266, 267. 278. 440;
Oregon. 267-271. 393; Mexican,
271-279, 341; California, 267. 274,
277; extends Monroe Doctrine,
296, 325, 478; characterized, 267,
279; cited, 276, 277.
Polly, admiralty case. 156.
Pompey the Great, destroys pirates.
56.
Pontiac. conspiracy of, 65.
Poor Richard's Almanac, author, 27.
Porcupine River, navigation free,
346.
Porfirio Diaz (Mex.), fighting at,
482.
Pork, trade in, 58, 76, 110, 467; in
McKinley tariff. 388.
Port Arthur, leased to Russia, 455.
Port Royal. See Louisburg.
Porter. Admiral David, annexes
Madison island, 398.
Porter, Admiral David D., inspec-
tion cruise. 361.
Porto Bello, Panama town, 441.
Porto Rico, ownership, 35, 135, 203;
effort to free, 217; slavery in. 236;
reciprocity with, 389; United
States acquires, 421 ; strategic im-
portance, 444; change of owners,
478. 487.
Portugal, colonial relations with
Spain, 11, 12; United States trade
with. 56, 57, 163; diplomatic ser-
vice to. 81, 140, 430; guards Gib-
raltar, 114; loses Brazil, 203;
commercial treaty, 223, 471;
claims, 226; forbids slave-trade,
236; war with Brazil. 324; pays
American claims, 375; arbitra-
tion treaty, 475.
President, fights Little Belt. 174. _
Press, influence in causing Spanish
war, 411.
Pribilof Islands, sealing industry,
377, 379. 434.
Prim, Juan, Count de Reus, Mex-
ican expedition, 329; Cuban pol-
icy, 366.
Privateering. See International Law.
Privateers, French, 15, 98, 102, 103;
American, 29; in war with France,
642
INDEX
133; of 18ie, 177; Spanish-Amer-
ican, 200, 207; Confederacy, 309,
312, 315.
Prizes. See International Law.
Proctor, Sen. Redfield, report on
Cuba, 412.
Provisions, contraband. 111. 119-
121, 124, 128, 154, 164, 496; com-
petition in trade, 373.
Prussia, American commissioner to,
31; commercial treaties with, 53,
64, 129, 197; privateering pro-
hibited, 54; diplomatic service to,
81, 140, 188; war with France, 95;
war debt, 167; signs Holy Alli-
ance, 204; head of ZoUverein, 224;
England seeks alliance with, 240;
Cuban relations, 366.
Puget Sound, ownership, 267, 270;
coast importance, 398.
Q
Quebec, province created, 20; bound-
aries, 33, 40, 46, 228.
Quebec Act, provisions, 20.
Quebec, City of, French stronghold,
13, 16; Americans besiege, 75;
trade centre, 118, 125, 197; route
via, 182, 230.
Quitman, Gen. J. A., Cuban filibus-
tering, 298; Member of Congress,
SOO.
B
.Railroads. See Transportation.
Rambouillet, decree of, 167, 168.
Randolph, Edmund, secretary of
state, 104; indiscretion, 120, 121;
Vindication, 120.
Randolph, John, opinion of non-
importation, cited, 157; minbter
to Russia, 221.
Rayneval, Gerard, secretary to
Vergennea, 33; mission to Eng-
land, 44.
Reciprocity, {1815-1829). 196-199;
(18S0-1860), treaties, 223-225,
285, 337, 346, 352, 376, 389, 403,
404; "most favored nation" dis-
pute, 224; policy of Blaine, 373,
888; endorsed by Pan-American
Congress, 388; with Canada, 432,
435, 486; under DIngley tariff,
470; Payne-Aldrich, 471; Under-
wood, 471.
Reed, T. B., opposes Spanish war,
413.
Reid, Whitelaw, Spanish treaty
commissioner, 418; ambassador
to England, 430.
"Restook," 230.
Review of Reviews, editor, 440, 450.
Rhett, R. B., Southern leader, 310.
Rhode Island, France said to desire,
78.
Rice, trade in, 55, 57, 225.
Richelieu River, trade route, 67.
Richmond (Va.), Confederate cap-
ital, 320.
Riga, port open, 163.
Right of search. See International
Law.
Rio Grande, boundary, 148, 201,
246, 277, 279; source, 272, 274;
as American troops on, 273, 276;
navigation of, 481.
Rio Janeiro, Pan-American Con-
gress, 451.
Rios, Don E. M., Spanish treaty
commissioner, 418.
Roberts College, protected by Tur-
key, 465.
Robertson, James, intrigues with
Spain, 77.
Robespierre, M. M. I., French
leader, 103.
Rochambeau, Comte de, statue of,
presented, 467.
Rockhill, W. W., commissioner to
China, report cited, 457.
Rockingham, Marquis of, favors
peace, 42; death, 45.
Rocky Mountains, as boundary,
194, 271.
Rodney, Adm. G. B., seizes St.
Eustatius, 38.
Roebuck, J. A., member of Parlia-
ment, 320, 322, 331.
Roman Catholic Church, aids Spain,
15; first American bishop, 51, 52;
political sympathies, 207; mis-
sions in Oregon, 256; Far East,
455.
Romanzoff, Count, French symp»-
thy, 169.
Rome, diplomatic centre, 10.
INDEX
543
Romero, Sefior Matias, Mexican
minister, cited, 387.
Roosevelt, Alice, christens German
yacht, 467.
Roosevelt, Theodore, voices impe-
rialist spirit, 423; navy policy,
424; relations with Hay, 429; civi^
service under, 431 ; Panama policy,
439-443; doctrine of police powei;
447-450, 452; Santo Domingo in-
tervention, 448; Spanish-American
fears, 452; South American trip,
453; mediator, 458; arbitration
attitude, 473-475; foreign policy,
476, 484; cited, 440, 441, 451.
Root, Elihu, secretary of state, on
Alaska boundary commission, 434;
visits South America, 452; Japa-
nese policy, 461, 462; arbitration
advocate, 473, 475; ability, 429.
Rose, John, English diplomat, 344.
Roumania, relations with United
States, 468.
Rouse's Point, in dispute, 231.
Rousseau, J. J., influence in Amer-
ica, 24.
"Rule of 1766" See International
Law.
Rush, Richard, minister to England,
189, 191, 210, 237, 372; instruc-
tions cited, 210.
Russell, Lord John, foreign secre-
tary, 8, 313, 322, 323, 340; Civil
War papers, 317, 320.
Russell, tfonathan, legation secre-
tary, 170; peace commissioner,
180, 185.
Russell, William, Times correspond-
ent, cited, 310.
Russia, international relations, 37,
178, 179, 209, 213. 240, 313, 331,
857, 359, 379, 432; offers media-
tion, 41, 178, 179; American trade,
53, 163, 169; diplomatic service
to, 81, 163, 221, 430; dealings
with Miranda, 89; British treaty,
111; French invasion, 155, 170,
178; arbitrator, 191, signs Holy
Alliance, 204; policy in northwest,
205, 206, 209, 211-214, 218, 254,
281; Crimean war, 288; neutrality
treaty, 288; Civil War policy,
813, 359, 360; frees serfs, 313;
Alaska treaty, 358. 359; treat>
ment of Jews, 357, 466; Poles, 359;
treaty with England, 432; seal
fisheries treaty, 434; policy in
Far East, 454, 455, 458, 459; Con-
gress abrogates treaty with, 428,
466; war with Japan, 458, 462.
Russian American Company, com-
pensation, 358.
Ryswick, Treaty of, 16.
Sabine River, as boundary, 201, 202,
246.
Sackett's harbor, British demand,
182.
Sagasta, P. M., Spanish prime min-
ister, 413, 416.
St. Augustine (Fla.), French designs
on. 99.
St. Bartholomew Island, ownership,
35; ceded to France, 335.
St. Clair, Gov. Arthur, Indians de-
feat, 83, 116.
St. Croix Island, ownership. 35.
St. Croix River, as boundary, 46, 117,
186; source, 228; command of, 182.
St. Eustatius Island, entrepdt, 35;
governor, 36; British seize, 38.
St. Germain, treaty of, 13.
St. John Island, cession proposed,
360.
St. John River (Florida), Huguenot
massacre on, 13.
St. John river (New Brunswick),
as boundary, 40, 46; valley in dis-
pute, 228; international waterway,
235, 346,
St. Joseph (Mich.), British fort
burned, 33.
St. Lawrence river, as boundary,
20, 40, 46, 186, 228; British hold,
63, 68, 87, 197; settlements in
basin, 66, 67; opened to United
States, 125; international water-
way, 181; right of navigation,
197, 285; granted, 346, 348; trib-
utaries, 228.
St. Louis (Mo.), trade-centre, 173.
St. Marks (Fla.), Spanish fort, 200,
201.
St. Nicholas, port leased, 360,
St Petersburg (Petrograd), American
minister at, 170, 188, 455.
544
INDEX
St. Thomas Island, cession proposed,
360.
Saligny, Alphonso de, French agent
in Texas, 265.
Salisbury, Ix)rd, dealings with Amer-
ica, 8; in seal-fisheries dispute,
378, 379; in Ciayton-Bulwer treaty
dispute, 382; Venezuelan, 393;
cited, 428.
Samana Bay, desirable naval station,
361, 363, 401.
Samoa, international interests in,
399-401, 406, 425; American re-
lations, 245, 399-401, 406, 425; in-
dependence recognized, 401, 402;
division of islands, 425, 454.
San Francisco, Russian fleet visits,
359; collector of port, 377; San
Francisco, bay as boundary, 92;
importance, 275, 398.
San Jos6 (Costa Rica), arbitration
court palace, 451.
San Ildefonso, treaty of, 143.
San Jacinto, battle of, 250.
San Jacinto, stops Trent, 316.
San Juan archipelago, ownership,
337, 345. 347, 348.
San Juan river, mouth of, 292, 383.
San Marino, treaty with United
States, 469.
Sanmun, port leased, 455.
San Salvador, commercial treaty
with, 285; extradition, 350; arbi-
tration, 475.
Santa Anna, Gen. Antonio Lopez de,
revolutionary leader, 247-249,
251; exiled, 276; Polk's negotia-
tions with, 276; intrigues, 277.
Santa F€, Texan expedition against,
252; Mexican post, 272.
Santiago of Chili, Pan-American
Congress at, 451.
Santo Domingo, divisions of, 326;
trade, 108, 109, 134, 165, 166;
leader, 134, 136; Le Clerc's ex-
pedition to, 143, 145; freedom,
153; protectorate, 448.
Sardinia, commercial treaty with,
223; insurrection in, 204; in Cri-
mean war, 288.
Savoy, Amadeo de, king of Spain,
865.
Saxony, desires commercial treaty,
69.
Scheldt River, commerce via, 5;
navigation opened, 352.
Schenck, R. C., minister to Eng-
land, 344.
Schenectady, burned, 15.
Schofield, Gen. J. M., on Mexican
duty, 332; mission to Napoleon,
332.
Schurz, Carl, diplomatic experience,
304; minister to Spain, 327, 329;
speech on expansion, 364; Phil-
ippine views, 420; cited, 424,
Scotch-Irish, in Kentucky, 69.
Scott, Sir Walter, cited, 239.
Scott, Sir William, admiralty deci-
sions, 156, 236, 308.
Scott, Gen. Winfield, on North-
eastern frontier, 230.
Seabury, Samuel, consecration as
bishop, 52.
Seals, fisheries problem, 377, 432,
434, 506.
Sectionalism, influences diplomacy,
71, 282.
Senate, relation to diplomacy, 80;
acts on Jay treaty, 119; members,
174, 222, 225, 364, 428; relation
to House, 225, 428; to executive,
428; acts on Zollverein treaty,
225; Oregon, 270; San Domingo,
363; Canadian reciprocity, 376,
878, 435; Algeciras " General Act,"
464; Turkish atrocities, 465; ar-
bitration, 474, 475; treaty making
power, 471.
Servia, treaty with, 375.
Sevastopol, in Crimean War, 288.
Seven Years' War, trade during, 109
Servier, John, Tennessee leader, 69,
77.
Sewall, H. M., consul at Samoa,
400.
Seward, W. H., dealings with Eng-
land, 241, 318, 319, 321, 339, 340,
382; France, 331-333; Mexico,
329; Spain, 326, 327; privateering
policy, 309; slave-trade, 349;
naturalization, 355; views on ex-
pansion, 281, 305, 306, 326, 333,
358-362, 403, 487; length of pub-
lic service, 370, 508; indiscretion,
305, 317, 342; characterized, 305,
306; cited, 340, 355, 362, 382.
Shanghai, port opened, 223.
INDEX
545
Shaw, Albert, letter to, cited, 440;
editorial, cited, 450.
SheflSeld, Lord, "Observations on
the Commerce of the United
States," influence, 59.
Shelburne, Lord, liberal opinions,
42, 60; controls ministry, 45; re-
signs, 58; cited, 45.
Shelby, Isaac, Kentucky governor,
102; cited, 105.
Shenandoah, Confederate cruiser,
339.
Sherman, John, secretary of state,
414; Cuban policy, 412; successor,
418; cited, 412.
Shimonoseki, indemnity returned,
397, 454.
Shimonoseki Straits, closed, 353.
Ship-building, American industry,
58; government policy toward,
85, 469, 470; growth, 109; de-
cline, 336.
Short, William, American minister to
Spain, 123, 140.
Siam, commercial treaty with, 223,
286.
Silks, trade in, 55, 284.
Singleterry, John, arrested, 102.
Sitka (Alaska), United States court
at, 378.
Slavery, Missouri question, 252;
Texas, 253, 254, 262; in Cuba,
298, 301, 302, 367; growth of
opposition, 321, 354; Alex. H.
Stephens views, 323.
Slave trade, African, 55, 58; pro-
hibited, 79; English opposition
to, 191, 216. 236; European, 236;
American, 236, 237; Mexican,
246; suppression difficult, 236,
238, 239, 241; declared piracy,
237; legislation after 1862, 349,
374.
Slidell, John, minister to Mexico,
273-275; Confederate commis-
sioner, 311; captured, 316; re-
leased, 318; agent in France, 331.
Smiley, A. K., paciflst, 473.
Smith, Adam, influences Lord Shel-
burne, 58.
Smith, Ashabel, Texas representa-
tive, 264.
Smith, J. P., on Chinese commis-
sicn, 398.
Smith, Robert, secretary of state,
163; successor, 170.
Smuggling, by Dutch, 35, 36; be-
tween England and France, 164.
Society of Holy Trinity for Re-
demption of Captives, activity,
55, 56.
Sorrel River, trade route, 67.
Soudan, British withdrawal, 342.
Soul^, Pierre, minister to Spain,
283, 300; independence in office,
371.
South, in diplomatic service, 304.
South America, commerce, 5.
South Sea Bubble, speculation,
205.
Southwest, character of settlers, 69;
trade, 69; relations with Indians,
83, 89.
Spain, holds Mississippi River, 5;
trouble with colonies, 6; papal
aid, 10, 15; colonial relations
with Portugal, 11, 12; extends
empire, 12; pirates molest col-
onies, 13; Armada defeated, 13;
recognizes rival colonies, 14, 21;
colonial commerce, 15; aids
France, 18; cedes Florida, 19; ac-
quires Louisiana, 19; neutrality
lax, 22; aids American Revolution,
26, 27, 108; offers mediation, 32;
war with England, 32, 37; Am-
erican commissioner to, 31, 32,
34; American policy, 33, 91;
seizes British forts in Florida, 33;
Michigan, 34; neutral trade, 38;
in American peace negotiations,
43-45, 49, 50; gains Floridas, 50;
payments to Barbary, 56; United
States trade, 57, 63, 77, 163, 166,
167, 177; controls Mississippi,
69, 70, 71, 87, 147, 197; treaties
with England, 70; Western in-
trigues, 73-77, 123; Indian pol-
icy, 73, 74, 83, 123; diplomatic
service to, 81, 123, 209, 283. 300.
301, 327, 366, 385. 412, 430; in
Nootka Sound affair. 88-93; Fam-
ily alliance. 88; effect of Jay
treaty, 122; vacillation. 123;
war with France. 95, 97, 99;
treaty with United States, 124.
134; international law position,
124, 237; evacuates disputed
546
INDEX
ports, 139, 142; cedes Louisiana,
143, 147, 150; Bonaparte regime,
150, 203; disputed boundary,
199-202; cedes Floridas, 202,
207; insurrection in, 204; mon-
archy restored, 204; relations
witli Spanish-America, 203, 210-
213, 251, 296, 326-329, 361, 384,
387, 391; claims treaty, 226,
350, 375; forbids slave trade,
236; gives up Oregon claim, 254;
Cuban relations, 298, 326, 330,
365-368; domestic situation, 365;
emancipation policy, 367; in
Virginius aflFair, 366, 367; reci-
procity with, 389; commercial
treaty, 471; war with America,
409-417; peace terms, 418-421,
487; Cuban debt problem. 418,
426; arbitration with Mexico,
474; United States, 475; inter-
ests in Mexico, 482.
Spanish- America, mines, 75; rev-
olutionary leaders, 89, 96, 97, 203;
discontent in, 135; European
relations, 385; Burr's designs on,
147; trade valuable, 155; revo-
lutions, 203, 205, 226; United
States trade with, 206; interest
in, 7, 208, 209; relations with,
210-219, 226, 284, 319, 384, 390,
406, 442, 464, 484, 489, 490, 509;
England's relations with, 206, 209-
217, 319, 334; calls a congress,
214; Pan-American attitude, 387,
390, 451; foreign concessions in,
450, 460; relations with Japan,
461; joins in Sanitary Conven-
tions, 472.
Spooner, Sen. J. C, amends reci-
procity treaties, 471.
Spooner Act, provisions, 439.
Springbok, admiralty case, 308.
Stanley, Lord, foreign policy, 340.
Staples, loan to Mexico, 215.
Steinberger, A. B., German agent,
400.
Stephens, A. H., favors fleet, 311.
Steuben, Baron Friedrich von, de-
mands surrender of frontier posts,
63.
Stevens, Edward, American consul
136.
Stevens, J. L., minister to Hawaii,
cited, 404; favors annexation, 405;
recalled, 406.
Stevenson, R. L., interest in Samoa,
399.
Stickine River, navigation free, 346.
Stockton, Admiral R. F., sent to
Monterey, 274.
Stoeckl, Baron, Russian minister,
sale of Alaska, 358.
Straus, Oscar, minister to Turkey,
430, 466; betters conditions, 466.
Suarez, Pino, Mexican vice-presi-
dent, killed, 483.
Suez Canal, director of, 380.
Sugar, trade in, 108, 109, 119. 153;
Hawaiian, 353; in McKinley
tariff, 388.
Sullivan, Gen. John, expedition
against Iroquois, 64.
Sumner, Charles, senator, 306, 339,
340, 364; views in foreign policy,
317, 340-344. 347; removed from
chairmanship, 344, 364; works
for Alaska treaty, 358, 359; char-
acterized, 306, 307, 342; cited,
341.
Superior, Lake, as boundary, 46.
Supreme Court, powers over treat-
ies, 80.
Suwo, prince of, 353.
Sweden, American colonists, 14;
armed neutrality, 37; treaties
with, 54, 129, 197, 285, 356, 475;
American minister to, 188; for-
bids slave-trade, 236; cedes St.
Bartholomew to France, 335;
American cession refused, 362;
neutrality (19^5), 492.
Switzerland, commercial treaty with,
285; represented in Geneva board,
347; diplomatic service to. 429,
430; trade agreement with United
States. 471; arbitration. 475; neu-
trality problems {1915), 497.
Syria, missions in, 465.
Syrians, status in United States,
466.
Tackle, T., British agent, cited, 82,
181.
Taft, W. H., president, 435; seal
fisheries treaty, 434; reciprocity.
INDEX
647
485; immigration policy, 468;
Japan, 450; arbitration, 475;
Mexican, 481, 482.
Talien-wan, port leased, 455.
Talleyrand, C. M. de, American
policy, 131-133, 136-138, 142,
143; cited, 142, 143. 149, 150.
Tallulah (La.), Italian lynched at,
427.
Tamasese, King of Samoa, 400.
Tar, trade in, 57.
TariflF, customs, 85; protects fish-
eries, 193, 194; affects ship-build-
ing, 336, 470; Morrill, 314;
McKinley, 388; Wilson, 389;
Dingley, 470, 471; Payne- Aldrich,
471; Underwood, 471.
Taylor, Zachary, Mexican cam-
paigns, 273, 276; diplomatic serv-
ice under, 304; instructions to,
cited, 273; president, 304.
Tea, commercial importance of, 54,
55. 196, 199. 284.
Tecumseh, forms confederacy, 172.
Tehuantepec, Isthmus of, canal pro-
posed, 216, 290, 295.
Temple, Sir John, British consul-
general, 87.
Tennessee, offshoot of North Caro-
lina, 69; Spanish intrigues, 77;
admitted to Union, 82; French
intrigues, 102, 105; English, 134;
governors, 134, 248.
Tepic (Cal.), British consul, 257.
Texas, Spanish boundaries, 201,
202; United States reversionary
interest, 208, 209, 245, 246; claims
treaty, 226; rush of settlers, 245,
481; land titles, 245; "Fredonian
republic," 247; joined to Coahuila,
247; Mexican forts in, 247; Amer-
ican leaders, 248; Indian negotia-
tions, 248; declares independence,
248; gained American aid, 249;
annexation question, 250, 251-
254, 259-266, 272, 274, 341;
slavery. 253. 262-266. 298. 301;
boundary. 271, 279; truce with
Mexico. 273; United States gains,
279; attitude toward Mexico
(1915), 486.
Texel, John Paul Jones at, 36.
Thames, battle of. 178.
Thiers, M. J. L. A., cited, 166.
Thompson, Waddy, minister to Mex-
ico, cited, 258, 274.
Thornton, Sir Edward, British agent,
144; on claims commission, 345.
Tibet, relations to Great Britain,
459.
Tiger Island, naval station sought,
382.
Tippecanoe, battle of, 172.
Tobacco, trade, 57, 76, 164, 225;
Cuban plantations, 410.
Tobago. France acquires, 50.
Tordesillas, treaty of. 11, 13.
Tower, Charlemagne, diplomatic
service, 430.
Trade-mark treaties, 351, 469.
Trafalgar, battle at, 152.
Transportation, ocean, 63, 70, 289,
317; trans-continental railroads,
289, 290, 352, 382, 437; canals,
290-293, 295, 346, 380-383; Isth-
mian railroad, 295, 303. 352.
Transvaal. British withdrawal, 342.
Treaties, arbitration, 474, 475, 481;
claims, 226, 345, 375; commercial,
14, 29, 39, 53, 54, 118, 119, 124,
129, 197, 216, 223, 279, 285-287,
352, 397; extradition, 350, 374;
model, 474; naturalization, 355,
856; reciprocity, 223-225, 285,
337, 346, 352, 376, 389, 403, 404,
470; seal fisheries, 434; trade-
marks, 351, 374; of Aix-la-Cha-
pelle, 16; Alaska Purchase, 358-
361; Amiens, 143; Basle, 123, 130;
Berlin, 465; Breda, 14; Clayton-
Bulwer, terms, 293, 295, 334, 438;
interpretation, 282, 293, 381-383;
abrogated, 436; Family Alliance,
18, 26, 32; Florida Purchase, 202;
Gadsden Purchase, 290, 295;
of Ghent, 2. 70; negotiated, 178-
185, 235; terms, 185, 186, 190, 237;
interpretation, 191; error in sur-
vey, 231; Greenville, 84, 122;
Guadaloupe Hidalgo, 277-279;
Hay-Pauncefote. 436-438; Holy
Alliance, 88, 123, 204; failures,
208; manifesto, 209; Hopewell,
83; Jay's, provisions, 117, 119, 173,
192, 197, 235; adventures, 119-
122; effects, 122, 123, 126, 127,
130; neutral clause expires, 157;
Louisiana Purchase, 146, 147;
548
INDEX
Madrid, 14; Munster, 14; Nootka
Sound, 92. 267; Oregon, 270; Paris
(1763), 18. 19, 40-50, 77, 115;
Paris (189S), 426; Portsmouth,
458; Quadruple Alliance, stops
Barbary piracy, 196, 204; Spanish-
American attitude, 212; Ryswick,
16; St. Germain, 13; San Ildefonso,
143, 149, 150; San Lorenzo, 124;
Tordesillas, 11, 13; Utrecht, 16;
Victoria, 12; Washington, 345,
352, 364, 375; Wayne's, 122, 182;
Webster-Ashburton, 234, 235, 269;
Westminster, 14; Zaragoza, 12.
See names of countries.
Trent, aflfair of, 316-318.
Trescot, W. H., South American
mission, 386. 387; on Chinese
commission. 398; ability, 401.
Trevelyan, Sir G. O., upholds Amer-
ican Revolution, 314.
Tripoli, oflScial piracy, 55.
Trist. N. P., peace commissioner,
277, 278.
Troppau, meeting of allies, 204.
Tuhl. Baron de, Russian minister,
209.
Tunis, oflBcial piracy, 55; treaty, 85.
Turgot, A. R. J., attitude toward
America, 25, 26; reputation, 43.
Turk Island, reciprocity with, 470.
Turner. Sen. George, in Alaskan
boundary commission, 434.
Turpentine, trade in, 58.
Turreau, L. M., minister to United
States, 166.
Tuscany, American commissioner
to, 31.
Tutuila Island, naval station, 400;
ceded to United States, 425.
Tyler, John, president, 225; foreign
policy, 225, 233, 239, 256; Texas,
260, 264, 266; unpopularity, 225,
264.
Tweed, Boss, surrendered by Spain,
351.
Two Sicilies, commercial treaty
with, 223; extradition, 285; neu-
trality, 288.
U
United States, isolation policy, 1,
2, 125, 134, 137, 139, 171, 187,
190, 211, 212, 220. 324, 375, 407,
438, 463, 477, 492; worid-power,
3, 4; problems of neutrality, 6,
90-92, 100, 152. 154. 156, 169,
170, 175, 207, 208, 232, 249-251.
288. 330. 332. 339, 350, 352, 409,
483; treaty with France. 29; seeks
recognition by Spain, 32; England,
44; in peace negotiations, 43-46;
English trade, 57; foreign debt, 77;
treaties with England, 70. 77;
direction of foreign policy, 81;
financial strength, 82; Indian pol-
icy, 82-84. 172. 194, 245; rela-
tions with Barbary States, 84, 85;
in Nootka Sound affair, 90-93;
French diplomacy in, 96; recog-
nizes French republic, 101; recalls
Morris, 104; neutral claims, 109,
110, 113, 158, 288; England in-
jures trade, 112; naturalization
policy, 114, 289, 355-357; treaty
with Spain, 124; resents British
aggressions, 114, 158, 160, 166;
passes embargo, 115; sends em-
bassy, 115; compromises treaty
difficulties. 117-119; friction with
France, 128. 133, 136, 226-228;
foreign intrigues in, 131; Conven-
tion of 1800, 138, 143; buys Louisi-
ana, 146; carrying trade, 156, 157,
161, 167, 169, 196, 198, 222; in
War of 1812-H, 174-178; peace
negotiations, 178-185; effect on
neutral trade. 185; position in
1815, 186; European prestige, 189;
growth of navy. 189, 190. 424;
in Florida dispute, 199-202; rec-
ognizes de facto governments.
212, 280; Spanish- American sym-
pathy, 206, 207; problems, 210-
219; trade, 223; slavery sentiment,
217, 237; claims treaties, 226-228;
Northeastern boundary dispute,
228-235; abolishes slave-trade,
236; enforcement lax, 238, 247;
public land policy, 246; Texas
sympathy, 248; recognition. 251;
annexation question, 253-254.
260-266, 271-276; Missouri ques-
tion, 252; Oregon, 255-257, 267,
270, 271; California, 257-259, 274;
Mexican War sentiment, 277, 278;
increase of territory, 279; expan-
INDEX
549
sion process, Mexican view, 243,
244; historical, 244, 245; theory of,
280, 281 ; sympathy with European
revolutions, 280, 281; Isthmian
policy, 290-295, 390, 406, 436-
438, 450, 477, 481 ; Cuban, 299-302,
865-368; Southern blockade, 307-
312, 315; irritation at England,
316, 322, 336, 337; Spanish-Amer-
ican policy, 324, 327, 350, 385,
489; dealings with Second Empire,
in Mexico, 329-333; Irish immi-
gration, 338; enlistments, 338;
war claims against England, 339-
348; seal-fisheries dispute, 378,
879; interest in de Lesseps canal,
380; interpretation of Clayton-
Bulwer treaty, 381, 382; proposed
Nicaragua canal treaty, 382;
Venezuela dispute, 391-394; re-
lations with China, 397. 398;
Samoa, 399-401; Hawaii, 402-
406, 424; isolation policy violated,
402; in Spanish war, 409-^17;
peace terms, 418-422; changes in
pohcy, 421, 422, 425; imperialist
spirit in, 424; colonial policy, 425,
443; Chinese immigration ques-
tion, 397, 398, 432; Alaska bound-
ary, 432, 434; fisheries, 435; Pan-
ama treaty, 443; Santo Domingo
protectorate, 448; intervention
doctrine, 449; continental co-
operation, 451; Spanish-American
distrust of, 452, 489, 490, 500; in-
terest in Far East, 455; Chinese
policy, 456-462; relations with
Japan, 461-463, 481; Africa, 464;
Turkey, 464-466; Mexico, 481-
490; international agreements,
472; neutrality problems {1915),
494-499.
United States, wins fight, 190.
Upshur, A. P., secretary of state,
220, 260, 262; killed, 260.
Uruguay, European relations, 325.
Uruguay River, navigation of,
opened, 287.
Utrecht, treaty of, 16.
Valparaiso (Chili), killing of marines
at, 390.
Van Alen, J. J., appointment to
Italy, criticized, 372.
Van Berkel, E. T., Amsterdam bur-
gomaster, 36.
Van Bibber, Abraham, American
agent, cited, 36.
Van Buren, Martin, secretary of
state, 2, 220, 222; president, 252;
minister to England, 372; Texas
policy, 252.
Vancouver Island, English settle-
ment, 88, 270; American claim,
267, 271.
Vanderbilt, Commodore Cornelius,
promoter, 292, 337.
Vaughan, Benjamin, secret mission,
45; returns to France, 45; letter,
cited, 59.
Venezuela, revolution, 203; com-
mercial treaty, 223; arbitration
of claims, 350; convention with,
375; French claims, 385; reciproc-
ity affects, 389; British contro-
versy, 391, 393, 394; American
interests, 391, 393-395; inter-
vention threatened, 449; inter-
national blockade, 447.
Venice, desires United States trade,
55.
Vera Cruz (Mex.), United States
occupies, 489; leaves, 490.
Vergennes, Count de, urges aid to
America, 25; directs French pol-
icy, 26, 28, 31, 33, 36, 39; subor-
dinates, 96; in peace negotiations,
43, 44, 46, 49, 61, 137; difficult
position, 43; characterized, 43;
cited, 25.
Vermont, in Revolution, 67, 69;
sends commissioners to Canada,
67; British control possible, 68;
not recognized by Congress, 67;
admitted to Union, 82; trade
agreements with England, 87, 118,
122, 197.
Verona, Congress of, 204; principles,
cited, 204.
Verrazano, Giovanni de, explorer,
13.
Vicksburg, moral effects of capture,
322.
Victor, Gen. C. P., on Louisiana ex-
pedition, 143; instructions, 148,
149. 201.
550
INDEX
Victoria, Queen, appointments, 347.
Victoria, treaty of, 12.
Vienna, American commissioner to,
31.
Vienna, Congress of, 180; wrangles,
184.
Vienna, Decree of, 166, 167.
Villa, Gen., revolutionary leader,
486.
Vincennes (Ind.), French settle, 16;
Clark captures, 33, 69.
Virginia, English colony, 13; in
French and Indian war, 17; re-
taliatory laws, 61; emigrants, 69;
Kentucky part of, 76; convention
of, 1788, 72; hurt by embargo,
162.
Virginius, affair of, 367, 368.
"Visit and Search." See Interna-
tional Law.
Voltaire, F. M. A. de, cited, 17.
W
Wade, B. F., on San Domingo com-
mission, 363.
Wagram, battle of, effects, 166.
Waite, M. R., on Geneva board, 347,
Wake Island, United States occupies,
425.
Walker, William, Nicaragua in-
trigues, 296, 297.
Walpole, Lord, on maritime law,
cited, 179.
War of 1812. causes, 6, 175; effects, 2.
War Hawks, beliefs, 171, 175.
Ward, H. G., British minister, 247.
Warville, Brissot de, American
voyage, 96.
Washburne, Elihu, secretary of state,
865; minister to France, 365.
Washington, George, president, 1 ; in
French and Indian war, 17; sup-
porters, 31; appointments, 80, 81,
87, 104; foreign, 63, 91, 99-101,
104, 123, 129, 188, 211; success of.
124; Indian policy, 82. 83, 125, 173;
task unfinished, 93, 125; accepts
Bastile Key, 94; neutrality proc-
lamation, 100; supplementary,
105; receives Genfet, 101; press
attacks, 103; disapproves Jay
treaty, 120; signs, 120; contest
with House, 121; farewell address.
125, 438; commander-in-chief,
135; formality of, 140; strength
of character, 95, 125; cited 63, 123.
Washington (D. C), 179, 191, 200,
210, 227, 250, 256, 262, 294, 307,
326, 344, 345, 358, 387, 400, 401,
413, 441, 442; burned, 184; seat
of government, 276; Bureau of
American Republics at, 388.
Wasp, wins fight, 190.
Waterways, international, 5, 70,
197, 287, 291, 346, 351.
Wayne, Gen. Anthony, moves
against Indians, 83, 116; defeats
them, 84, 117; treaty, 122; Cum-
berland manoeuvers, 105; on
Maumee. 509.
Webster, Daniel, oration for Greece,
207; secretary of state, 222, 233;
Ashburton treaty, 234, 237; Brit-
ish policy, 234, 239-241, 294, 403;
Oregon, 269; California, 274;
Mexico, 258, 260, 278; presiden-
tial ambitions, 235; characterized,
221; letters cited, 233, 252, 271,
282.
Weed, Thuriow, in England, 321;
letter cited, 331.
Weights and measures, joint bu-
reau of, 351.
Wei-hai-wei, port leased, 455.
Welles, Gideon, blockade policy,
307; confidence in navy, 319.
Wellesley, Marquis of, minister of
foreign affairs, 168.
Wellington, Duke of, victory over
French, 178; desires American
peace, 180; American campaign
proposed, 184; aids Spain, 205.
West, development, 71; sectional-
ism, 71, 72; discontent, 72, 77, 82,
144, 172-175; foreign intrigues,
72-77, 98, 102, 116, 131; loyalty,
148, 152; in War of 1812, 178.
West Indies, Spanish, 12; owner-
ship, 25; diplomatic importance,
20; England sends troops to, 49;
Spanish claims relinquished, 418;
British, 29; trade important to
America, 58, 77, 161, 176, 193,
198, 199; forbidden, 59-61, 87,
153, 198, 199, 218; temporarily
open, 122, 124; direct trade open,
222; admiralty courts, 112, 114,
INDEX
551
122; slave-trade forbidden, 238;
slaves freed, 238; French, trade
with America, 61, 134, 156, 158,
165, 176, 308; with France, 108;
with England, 156; guarantee, 99,
101; ready for war, 102; need
neutral trade, 106; England block-
ades, 112.
Westminster, Treaty of, 14.
Weyler y Nicolau, Gen. Valeriano,
Cuban campaign, 411.
Whale oil, trade in, 61, 396; petro-
leum supersedes, 353.
Wharton, Francis, letter to, cited,
261.
Wheat. See Grain.
Wheaton, Henry, diplomatic ability,
221; German negotiations, 224,
225; An Inquiry into the Va-
lidity of the British Claim to a
Right of Visitation and Search,
cited, 240.
Whiskey Rebellion, "confessions"
of Randolph, 120.
White, A. D., on San Domingo com-
mission, 364.
White, Henry, diplomatic promo-
tion, 429.
Wilkes, Capt. Charles, visits Oregon
coast, 256; stops Trent, 316;
exceeds powers, 318.
Wilkinson, James, colonizing scheme,
75; at siege of Quebec, 75; in-
trigues with Spain, 76, 123, 136;
Burr, 147; occupies Mobile, 151;
Texas speculations, 245.
Willamette River, American settlers
on, 267.
William III, of England, 14, 36.
Williams, G. H., on British claims
commission, 345.
Wilson, Woodrow, president, 430;
diplomatic policy, 430; civil ser-
vice, 431; canal tolls, 437, 481;
European claims, 446; opposes for-
eign " concessions," 450, 460, 480;
Spanish-American attitude, 452;
Chinese policy, 460; vetoes lit-
eracy test, 468; merchant marine
policy, 470; foreign, 476, 479, 480,
489, 494; Japanese, 480; Mexican,
484, 489; Philippine, 487.
Wine, trade in, 223.
Wisconsin, fur-trade, 173.
Woodford, S. L., minister to Spain,
412-415.
Woods, Lake of, as boundary, 46,
116, 186, 194, 235.
Wordsworth, William, cited, 94.
WUrttemburg, naturalization treaty
with, 356.
Wu Ting Fang, Chinese minister,
460.
Wyse, Capt, concession from Co-
lombia, 379.
X. Y. Z. correspondence, 13S.
Yangtse River valley, railroad, 459.
Yazoo River, as boundary, 20, 48,
70, 71, 139; settlements, 75;
settlements planned, 75.
York, Sir Joseph, British minister,
38.
Yorktown, British surrender, 22, 42.
Yrujo, C. M., Spanish minister, 144.
Yucatan, international relations,
296, 478.
Yukon River, navigation free, 346;
gold discovered, 432.
Zaragoza, treaty of, li2.
180° Longitude 150^ West from 120^ Greenwich 90
-l&J.
/ /A,
T
MAP SHOWING DEVELOPMENT OF
U.S. CONSULAR SERVICE 1776-1891
Since 1891 Posts are too numerous to be represented
• Posts established 1776-1815
• " " 1816-1829
X " " 1830-1861
_L
longitude 60° East from 90° Greenwich 120'
150"