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THE

AMERICAN

Journal of Psychology

EDITED BY

G. STANI.EY HALL

Edmund Clark Sanford Edward Bradford Titchener

Clark University. Cornell University.

AND John Wai,i;ace Baird

WITH THK CO-OPERATIOlf OF

F. Angei,!*, Stanford University; H. Beaunis, Universities of Nancy
and Paris; I. M. Benti^ey, Cornell University; A. F. Cham-
beri<ain, Clark University; C. F. Hodge, Clark Uni-
versity; A. Kirschmann, University of Toronto;
O. KuEiyPE, University of Wiirzburg; W. B.
PiivLSBURY, University of Michigan ; A.
D. WaIvLER, University of I^ondon;

M. F. Washburn, Vassar Q

College.

VOL. XXII

CIvARK UNIVERSITY, WORCESTER, MASS.
Florence Chandler, Publisher

191 1

v. XX

THB COMMONWEALTH PRESS
WORCESTER, MASS.

TABLE OK CONTENTS

Rudolph Achkr

Recent Freudian Literature 408-443

Frank Angell

Note on Some of the Physical Factors Affecting Reaction

Time, together with a Description of a New Reaction Key 86-93
Sarah B. Barnholt and Madison Bentley

Thermal Intensity and the Area of Stimulus .... 325-332
Madison Bentley and Sarah B. BarnhoIvT

Thermal Intensity and the Area of Stimulus .... 325-332
Dorothy Ci^ark, Mary S. Goodell, and M. F. Washburn

The Bffect of Area on the Pleasantness of Colors . . . 578-579
Helen Maud Clarke

Conscious Attitudes 214-249

Ruth Collins and C. B. FerrEE

An Bxperimental Demonstration of the Binaural Ratio

as a Factor in Auditory Localization 250-297

ISADOR H. Coriat

The Psychopathology of Apraxia 65-85

Dorothy Crawford and M. F, Washburn

Fluctuations in the Affective Value of Colors during Fixa-
tion for One Minute 579-582

June B. Downey

A Case of Colored Gustation 528-539

Knight Dunlap

Terminology in the Field of Sensation 444

C. B. FerrEE and Ruth Collins

An Bxperimental Demonstration of the Binaural Ratio as

a Factor in Auditory Localization 250-297

L. R. Geissler and B. B. Titchener

A Bibliography of the Scientific Writings of Wilhelm

Wundt 586-587

Mary S. Goodell, Dorothy Clark, and M. F. Washburn

The Bffect of Area on the Pleasantness of Colors . . . 578-579
Samuel P. Hayes

The Color Sensations of the Partially Color-Blind, A Cri-
ticism of Current Teaching 369-407

H. L. Hollingworth

The Psychology of Drowsiness 99-1 1 1

Bdmund Jacob son

Consciousness under Anaesthetics 333-345

Bdmund Jacobson

On Meaning and Understanding 553-577

Brnest Jones

The Psychopathology of Bveryday Life .... 477-527

Hikozo Kakise

A Preliminary Bxperimental Study of the Conscious Con-
comitants of Understanding 14-64

IV CONTENTS

Horace M. Kali^en

The Esthetic Principle in Comedy 13 7-15 7

Ethel L. Norris, Ai^ice G. Twiss, and M. F. Washburn

An Effect of Fatigue on Judgments of the Affective Value

of Colors 112-114

IvOuisE Ellison Ordahl

Consciousness in Relation to Learning 158-213

F. H. Sapford

Precision of Measurements Applied to Psychometric Func-
tions 94-98

Alma de Vries Schaub

On the Intensity of Images 346-368

W. T. Shepherd

The Discrimination of Articulate Sounds by Raccoons 1 16-119

W. T. Shepherd

Imitation in Raccoons 583-585

E. B. TiTCHENER

A Note of the Consciousness of Self 540-552

E. B. TiTCHENER and L. R. GeisslER

A Bibliography of the Scientific Writings of Wilhelm Wundt 586-5 87
Alice G. Twiss, Ethel L. Norris, and M. F. Washburn
An Effect of Fatigue on Judgments of the Affective Value

of Colors 112-114

F. M. Urban

A Reply to Professor Safford 298-303

M. F. Washburn

A Note on the Affective Values of Colors 114-115

M. F. Washburn and Dorothy Crawford

Fluctuations in the Affective Value of Colors during Fixa-
tion for One Minute 579-582

M. F. Washburn, Mary S. Goodell, and Dorothy Clark

The Effect of Area on the Pleasantness of Colors . 578-579

M. F. Washburn, Alice G. Twiss, and Ethel L. Norris

An Effect of Fatigue on Judgments of the Affective Value

of Colors 112-114

Frederick Lyman Wells

Practice Effects in Free Association 1-13

Book Reviews 120-132,304-318,445-467,588-599

Book Notes 132-136,319-324,468-474,600-604

Commemorative Note — Dr. Edmund Montgomery . . . 475-476
Note 604

THE AMERICAN

Journal of Psychology

Founded by G. Stani^ey Hai.1, in 1887
Voi,. XXII JANUARY, 1911 No. 1

PRACTICE EFFECTS IN FREE ASSOCIATION

By Frederic Lyman Wells, Ph. D., Psychiatric Institute, Ward's Island,

N. Y., formerly Assistant in Pathological Psychology in the

McLean Hospital, Waverley, Mass.

From the Psychological Laboratory of the McLean Hospital.

While it is difficult to believe that any extended series of
association experiments could be made without the appear-
ance of some trace of practice effect, there has yet been no
occasion, within the writer's knowledge, for the presentation
of any systematized study of these effects. To make such
a study with any degree of satisfaction requires a much larger
series of stimulus words than is usually requisite for the im-
mediate purpose of association experiments. For the present
study, a list was constructed to consist of one thousand differ-
ent stimulus words, which should be so far as possible un-
ambiguous, and familiar to the class of subjects dealt with.
These words were written on as many separate slips of paper,
which were then placed in a large box and thoroughly shaken
together for 15 minutes. The slips were then drawn from the
box at random, one at a time, and made up into twenty series
of 50 words each. A revised list will be an improvement
over this one, which has, however, shown entirely sufficient
adaptability to the present experiments.

One series of 50 words was given to each of six subjects
each day, six days in the week, until the entire twenty series
had been given. On the next two days the first two series of
50 words were repeated. The present results are based essen-
tially upon these experiments, totalling 6,600 observations;
especially on the two series that are repeated. Two other sub-
jects reacted to 500 words each. About a third as many

2 WELIvS

more observations were made with each of the first six sub-
jects, with reference to special points in the experiment, but
these results have only a limited application for the present
purpose since the experimental material was here varied some-
what for the different subjects.

While regretting that there is no more accurate method of
timing than the stopwatch, which permits other essential con-
ditions of the experiment to be satisfactorily preserved, it
must be acknowledged the most useful method available for
timing the individual responses of the experiment. It was
employed in all the observations here recorded. I have else-
where spoken very distrustfully of this method, and it cannot
be used for the interpretation of single measures on a minute
scale. This is owing partly to the inherent coarseness of the
measure, partly also to the inaccuracies of operation. In the
present discussion the changes are sufficiently great as to be
reliably reflected in this method of timing, which modifies the
external conditions for the subject less than any other.

Of the six subjects with whom we are principally concerned,
one is a highly educated physician in middle life, the remainder
are women nurses, with one exception under 30 years of age.
In Jung's classification of association types, four of the sub-
jects belong to the Sachlicher Typus tending in different
degrees towards the more subjective types; one is a fairly
distinct Pradikattypus, and one rather a Konstellationstypus.
The two other subjects, VII and VIII, are also women nurses
under thirty, one being a Sachlicher Typus, the other a less
marked Konstellationstypus.

The progressive changes in the time of the response, and
the qualitative changes shown by the responses in the repeated
series, form the basis of the present discussion. The most
noticeable practice effect is that in reaction- time ; the changes
in the content of the responses are perhaps of an equally
interesting nature, but hardly so well defined.

The accompanying cut illustrates the practice curve of the
association time for each subject during the twenty consecu-
tive daily series. The time unit, here as elsewhere, is 1/5 of
one second.

The range of individual differences at the beginning of
practice is here about 2 : i , a range that is seen in many mental
measurements, but in other observations with a larger number
of subjects, this range is seen to be much nearer 3:1. The
fastest subject here is about as fast as the writer has ever
observed, but in other subjects from this group the median
of 100 association times may run as high as 20 fifths, as in
several of the series with subject VIII. The reaction times in
the present experiments also run somewhat longer than those

r
> ^

PRACTICIS EFFECTS IN FREE ASSOCIATION 3

reported by Jung, which, however, is amply accounted for
by the greater difficulty of the individual series of words.
A random selection of fifty from a thousand available words
is naturally more difficult than a list of one hundred or two
hundred words selected immediately.

The effect of practice seems to be towards a diminution of
the individual differences in association time, although such
a diminution is far from being what is found in all mental
functions. Between three of the subjects (Red, Orange and
Green) there is practically no such individual difference at
any stage of practice, but in general the effect of practice
seems to be to bring all the subjects near together at a certain
psychological limit of quickness, which limit shows compara-
tively little individual variation. There are, therefore, very
great individual differences in the closeness with which the
different subjects approximate to this limit at the beginning
of their practice. Thus subject Blue starts well below any
level which most of the subjects ever attain, and remains at
this level throughout, the practice effect being almost absent
so far as the association time is concerned. Other individuals
have been observed, who, during the first observations with
this test approximated to the short times here given by Blue,
and might be expected in further experiments to show as
little practice effect. It seems fair to infer that the limit of
quickness which any subject can attain by practice in this
experiment, is equalled, if not surpassed, by other subjects
at the beginning of practice, and these subjects then show
little change during special practice. Some are born with the
capacity for the promptest reaction, others achieve it only
with special practice, and in very different degrees; still others
perhaps not at all. And the general mental characters which
give to one individual an inherently short association time
are probably of a much more fundamental nature, and more
important factors in the individual's make-up than those
special characters which, developing during special practice,
may give to another subject a somewhat greater facility in
reacting.

Of the two subjects reacting to 500 words only. Subject VII
shows nothing out of the ordinary, but the case of Subject VIII
who shows an actual reverse of practice effect, is naturally
of special interest. She seems to have a fairly good idea of
the cause of the difficulty, which she describes as essentially
a difficulty of choice between the large numbers of responses
that would present themselves. Of this she is able to give
quite detailed introspection in individual cases. She spoke
of a difficulty in sufficiently focussing the "attention" verho
ipso. She said that the novel experimental conditions had

WEI.I.S

Subi/.Tnr

Soh^rSJL

Plate II.

*' rattled" her a little only on the first two days, when as a
matter of fact she was quickest. She denied absolutely that
any conscious suppression of disagreeable associations had
influenced the results and was able to definitely assign such
a process in but one specific instance. It may be added that
the subject is of an entirely normal make-up, and in education,
mental balance, and professional efficiency, will bear com-
parison with any other member of the group.

One of the most unfortunate limitations of the median as
a measure of central tendency is the fact that, unlike the
average, it has no convenient index of the variability of the
distribution about it. As a rough and ready index of the
variability of the association times in each of the different
series of fifty words, has been taken the smallest number of
steps required to include 50% of the cases. Like the median
itself, however, this measure takes no account for the extra
long times but gives only an indication of how closely the
central reaction-times are crowded together. In magnitude,
this figure varies between 1.5 and 9 fifths of a second. As the
time decreases with practice, the variabilit}^ naturally drops
also, although the record of Subject Bi^ack, in whom the

PRACTICE) SJ^FECTS IN FREE ASSOCIATION 5

variability remains practically constant throughout, shows
that it does not necessarily do so. The fluctuations in varia-
bility are more marked, and the individual differences less
distinct, than in the curves of the reaction-times themselves.
The variability of Orange is somewhat, that of Black, very
disproportionately low. These are also the two most intel-
lectual subjects in the group, although widely differing in
their association types.

The distribution of the individual reaction-times in the
single series of fifty words show a rather interesting fact that
is contrary to what is ordinarily expected in such distributions.
At no time during the practice is a distribution of marked
skewness the rule. The mode is frequently as many as five
steps away from the shortest reactions, and even during the
final stages of practice there occur distributions exhibiting
considerable skew towards the long end. Beyond the above
decrease in variability, it is difficult to state any specific
effect of practice on the form of the distribution. The natural
interpretation of this is that an indefinite amount of practice
would still leave us a considerable distance from the physiologi-
cal limit of association time (which is more nearly approached
in the controlled associations), and the limit of free asso-
ciation time, dependent as it is upon the most delicate interplay
of the higher mental processes, is of too fluctuating a nature
to leave any characteristic impress on the form of the distribu-
tions.

Contemporaneous with the free association experiment, the
first five women subjects underwent practice in two other
psychological tests. These were the Kraepelin addition test
and a special form of the ^-test, both of which belong to the
general group of controlled association experiments. It is
interesting to compare susceptibility to practice in these
tests, which involve the continual repetition of the same or
a few different associations, with the susceptibility to practice
in the free association test, where the experimental task is
a novel one in each individual observation. For present
purposes it will suffice to compare the mean performance of
the first two records with that of the last two for the period
of twenty days. In the number-checking test it is more
desirable to take the last two of the entire thirty days for
which the function was practiced. This comparison gives us
the following table:

6 WEI.I.S

Figures Expressing the per cent, of Practice Improvement in the

Free Association, the Addition, and the Number Checking

Tests, indicating their Comparative Susceptibility

TO Practice

{The Lower the Figure, the greater the Practice)

Subject

Free Association

Addition

Number c

Brown

Red

Orange

Green

Blue

In the case of the physician (Black) the practice in free
association was 75%. In these figures it appears that while
the practice improvement is practically always least in the
free association test, it is nevertheless of the same order of
magnitude save only, perhaps, in Subject Blue. This is a
striking result in view of the essential dififerences in the ex-
perimental tasks. In the individuality of the successive situ-
ations it presents, the free association test is unique among
psychological experiments. It affords small opportunity for
making any given association path more open through fre-
quent use. Such a conception of practice fails when applied
to the results indicated in the present experiments. It is
therefore a question how far the practice in the number-
checking test and in the addition test is of the same type, and
the product of the same causes, as that in the free association
test. The essential features in the free association practice
can probably be cleared up only through the most accurate
introspection, although it is a very natural interpretation to
conceive of it almost wholly in terms of a removal of inhibi-
tions. These decreasing inhibitions can for the present be
only loosely figured as a greater accustomedness to the ex-
perimental conditions, a lessened emotional reaction to them,
feeling freer and more at ease, less liability to distraction,
and the like. They are essentially conscious inhibitions,
although it is not easy to describe them accurately unless one
has had some practice in introspection. We can probably
reduce all these factors to the general term of the elimination
of the inessential. The part which is necessarily played by
this elimination of the inessential in the reduction of free
association time throws a not uninteresting side-light upon
its possible importance in other sorts of practice, where,
owing to the fact that there is more repeated traversal of the
same association paths, we may tend to place the burden of
explanation rather upon decreased resistance in the path
itself.

PRACTICE EFlfBCTS IN FREE ASSOCIATION 7

So much for the practice effect on association time. With
regard to any possible effect on the nature of the responses,
may be first noted the number of times the same response
is repeated during the same hundred words at the beginning
and end of the practice. This per cent, of the repetition is
calculated for the two series that were repeated, thus for the
same stimulus words, and forms a basis for some striking
comparisons. The per cent, of repetition before practice and
after practice is as follows for the different subjects:

Subject . . Black Brown Red Orange Green Blue
Before Practice 8 11 14 16 17 13

After Practice 8 7 7 4 22 8

The regular tendency is to reduce the number of repetitions.
In the case of GrEEn the increase is essentially a matter of
the subject's developing a ''set" towards reacting with such
responses as large, small, and grand, whenever they were
available. With the exception of the physician, the remainder
tend to particularize their responses more, as their practice
in reacting gives them greater Sprachfertigkeit. It seems
likely that Black, with his much greater initial Sprachfertig-
keit, had already developed the quality that makes for de-
crease in repetitions beyond the point where practice would
bring out any special change. The general trend towards
greater particularization of the responses by practice, of
which the decrease in repetitions is an aspect, will be dis-
cussed below in greater detail.

Further individual difference appears in the frequency with
which a given stimulus word elicits the same response in both
the initial and the repeated series, the figures on this point
being as follows:

Number of Cases in which the Same Response was given both Before
AND after Practice^

Black Brown Red Orange Green Blue
Average number of identical re-
sponses in the two repeated vSeries 16 22.5 20.5 9,5 21.5 22.5
M. V. of this average ... 2 2.5 4.5 .5 1,5 1.5

Save for the probably negligible incidence of the memory
factor, the number of times in which a different response is
given is in the nature of an indication of the adaptability of
the individual's thought processes; that is, of the capacity
for differential response in relatively similar external situa-
tions. This is somewhat complicated by the factor of special
education, because an educated subject possess an artificial

^ There are a few cases in which the stimulus word was not understood
the same in the repeated as in the original series, but these are negligible
for the results. While it is not strictly a practise phenomenon, it is
worth quoting for comparison with the above. (Fuhrmann.)

8 WKI.LS

capacity to differentiate his responses more than an unedu-
cated one. Thus, as above, the physician again gives a
relatively small number of repetitions of the responses under
these conditions. But of the women subjects who have ap-
proximately equal education. Orange differentiates her re-
sponses a great deal more than any of the others, more even
than the physician; and she is the same subject who made
the greatest gain in differentiation in the previous table.
It may or may not be a coincidence that this subject has been
placed in more responsible positions, also credited with more
than ordinary resourcefulness in her professional work. And
however much one might naturally incline to stress the merely
educational explanation of this greater differentiation of
responses, one must never forget that superior education to
a certain extent implies superior ability to acquire it, in the
fundamental dynamic correlation between superior innate
endowments, and superior opportunities for developing the
powers which they confer.

For these differentiated responses, there then presents itself
the question of whether they are differentiated along any
particular lines; i. e., of whether the response, besides changing
in form and in content, tends also to change in association
type.

Before attempting to consider any possible effect of practice
on the form of association, it must be thoroughly understood
that the ordinary means of classification are at best very
subjective. Such categories as the Sachliches Urteil and
Werturteil are wholly continuous, even though they may
cover a considerable range, as from a commonplace predicate
like handkerchief — white, to such a highly particularized re-
actions as journey — distasteful. These last are what Jung
calls the "egocentric predicates." The same continuity
exists, of course, between the Eingeiibte sprachliche Ver-
bindungen and the Sprichworter und Zitate; thus one might
with equal justice assign citizen — Roman to either group.
The most unfortunate confusion, however, is that likely to
arise between these language-motor responses and those
from the upper associative categories. Every experimental
series is replete with reactions where this vital distinction is
itself largely a matter of " personliches Werturteil." O^ily —
chance and never — settled may be harmless Gelaufige Phrasen
or highly egocentric predicates. Betray — criminal may be a
Subjectverhaltniss, an Objectverhaltniss or an Urteil; spread —
feast an identity or a predicate; lady — gentleman an opposite
or a co-existence. The stimulus cart may elicit the response
horse through the medium of word-compounding, familiar
phrase, or co-existence. Shall we call itch — scabies an identity,

PRACTICE EFFECTS IN FREE ASSOCIATION

a co-ordination, or a Kausalabhangigkeit? Fun — loving a Wor-
terganzung or an Urteil?

Such examples could be multipled indefinitely but are,
perhaps, sufficient to show the character of the difficulties
encountered in attempting an impartial classification of asso-
ciative responses along the conventional lines. If available,
reliable introspective data would go far towards removing
them, but the very nature of the experiment usually renders
this aid impracticable. With the more recondite responses,
such classification is nearly meaningless. The interpretation,
without reliable introspective data, of such reactions as pole —
legSy satisfy — savage^ almost — conditional, enough — period, ex-
pect— to-morrow, justice — execution, and the like, is little more
than guesswork.

Subject to these reservations, then, the forms of association
here justifying separate consideration may be enumerated as
follows :

Description

1 . Failure of response

2. Egocentric

3. Egocentric predicate

4. Judgment of quality

5. Simple predicate

6. Subject relation

7. Object relation

8. Causality

9. Co-ordination

10. Subordination

11. Supraordination

12. Contrast

13. Co-existence

14. Identity

15. Language — motor

Approximately corres-
ponding to Jung's
Ausbleiben des Reaktions-

worts
Egozentrische Reaktion

Direkte Ichbeziehung
Egozentrisches Pradikat
Werturteil

Sachliches Urteil
Substantiv-Verbum Sub-

jektverhaltniss
Substantiv-Verbum Objekt

verhaltniss
Kausalabhangigkeit
Beiordnung
Unterordnung
Ueberordnung
Kontrast
Koexistenz
Identitat

Example

Eingeiibte sprachliche
Verbindungen, etc.
Word-compounding or Wortzusammensetzung,
completing Worterganzung

succeed — I must
lonesome — never
rose — beautiful

spinach — green

dog — bite

deer — shoot
joke — laughter
cow — horse
food — bread
rat — animal
sunlight — shadow
engine — cars
expensive — costly

town — state
side — board

17. Pure sound associa-

tions

18. Syntactic change

Reime

Syntaktische Veranderung

pack — tack
deep — depth

The categories are divided into three groups. In the first
group are those usually implying a special emotive element in
the association; the second contains the more intellectual
associations, while the very superficial associations are summed
up in the third group. The associations from the present

lO W^LLS

material not falling into any of the above categories, it is
impracticable to classify with any pretence of objective valid-
ity. They are also negligible in number, and indeed, several
of the specified categories are very meagerly represented.

The tables indicate that in Black the type of association
has undergone no particular change, except for trebling the
number of contrasts, and halving that of the subordinates.
The number of supraordinates, however, is remarkably small,
which is significant in connection with this subject's superior
education, and the tendency elsewhere for the supraordinates
to decrease with practice. In Brown, the responses show a
slight tendency downward in the scale, and a considerable
decrease in the supraordinates. In Red, this downward ten-
dency of the associations is more marked, there being also a
loss of half the supraordinates, which become mainly co-exis-
tences, these trebling in number. There are six of the third
group of associations in the repeated series, to none at all
in the original ones. And in respect to form of association,
Orange again shows the most marked change of all. The
predicates, many of which are quite egocentric in character,
are decreased by about one-half, being relegated mainly to
the language-motor, the word-compounds and the co-exist-
ences. There are also less than a third of the original number
of supraordinates, these again becoming mainly co-existences
and language-motors. Consequently these lower forms of
reaction are greatly increased in number, there being 47 of
them in the repeated series compared with 16 in the original.
Notable is the total absence of contrast associations, also
in Subject Green. The reactions of GrEEn show no special
change in type, except for the same decrease in the supraordi-
nates, which here change to such responses as large^ small,
grand (as noted previously), technically predicates, but it is
doubtful whether they are actually much more than language-
motors. BivUE, however, shows a peculiar tendency to change
the associations originally supraordinates to predicates of a
higher order; e. g., donkey -animal, donkey-bray. The lower
categories are also better represented than at the start, so that
the general result is to make the association type more vari-
able than before. The remarkable shortness of the times in
this subject will be remembered, and the responses themselves
show rather greater superficiality than can be indicated in
the classification.

In the totals, two main trends are apparent, which, how-
ever, cross, and to some extent mask, each other. First, the
tendency, especially mentioned for some of the individual sub-
jects, for the whole body of responses to move down in the
scale of associations, and secondly, the tendency to greater

PRACTICE EFFECTS IN ^RH^ ASSOCIATION

According to this system, it seemed that the associations
in the two repeated series were most reasonably to be classified
as follows:

aDI^DBJJ

Thio|»/3»-<-^0'^c<ONioO»oio|]5r<»o

N M ro >o lo cs r>.oo looo fo

M C< MM

to M r^ Ti-00 (s lo to o<

M M c*

lO WMtoOO J^>0

CO CO tJ- M fO J^VO vO 00

OT 4-» rt ;m

f fl fl d

Vj (U (U c

3 o o So

^ 9 P'd
rt bo bo 3

CS CO

^WO S.o

'S-S

(~> 't? +-> -»-> ^ Ui V-i

.9 ;3 ;3 .cd O ;j

xnmmOOm

^ ^ ^

>OVO 1^00 On O

8
bo.2

p rt (u a

*^ S o fa c

WEI.I.S

particularization of the response as indicated mainly in the
decrease of over 50 per cent, in the supraordinates. The
latter is closely related to the decrease in repetitions described
on page 7, for these repetitions consist largely of such supra-
ordinate responses as animal, food, and the like, which have
many subordinates among the stimulus words. For obvious
reasons, these classifications do not lend themselves readily
to further illustration of this tendency. It is plain what great
individual differences there are in the amount of change of
association type, but it is not easy to say just what ultimately
constitutes these differences; they are not closely related to
education. One is practically reduced to the tautology that
as practice tends to lower the association type and to decrease
the supraordinates, those individuals are most liable to practice
effects who show the upper levels of association type, or a
marked tendency to generalization in their responses. The
Sachlicher Typus certainly shows the less change in associa-
tion form, and probably also in reaction time.

The precise nature of these changes will perhaps be made
clearer by the following illustrations. The comparative asso-
ciation times before and after practice are given, as usual, in
5ths of a second.

Stimulus word

Response before
Practice

Response after Practice

Greater Particularization

ancient

man 11

and Honorable Artillery 10

bank

building 13

England 9

contrast

judgment 46

black and white 8

dog

animal 22

Airedale 16

engine

machine 10

Morris Heights 21

herald

king 8

Globe 7

little

child 16

statue 12

parlor

room 8

sitting-room 7

swift

runner 12

Mercury 17

wheat

vegetable 24

cream of wheat 15

Greater Superficiality

axle

hub II

grease 6

axle

wheel 9

tree 6

bank

money 7

banker 5

discretion (twice) wise 22, 42

valor II, 6

lady

refined 2 1

man 19

pancake

tough 12

fl^our 9

shadow

shade 16

wall 6

spread

distance 17

bed 7

suffer

weak II

pain 4

weak

frail 10

strong 13

PRACTICE EFFECTS IN FREE ASSOCIATION 1 3

In Spite of the tendency to greater particularization, it is
not unnatural, in view of these latter instances, that such
actual " Komplexmerkmale " as are given in the reaction time,
and in the form of the association as well as in the content of
the response, should also be somewhat reduced by practice.
The subjoined instances will serve to show what is meant,
though some of the most striking examples of this tendency
are not included.

Stimulus word Response before Practice Response after Practice

breast

face 22

milk 10

common

loose 14

Boston 8

flirt

disgusting 26

bird 9

heaven

peace 18

hell 6

person

woman 40

body 9

rat

ugly 27

large 10

sister

(Anna) 25

brother 7

virtue

good 18

reward 7

want

cherish 38

wish 9

whiskey

dangerous 13

Bourbon 7

The "complexual" character of the responses is apparently
much diminished. This phenomenon should be attributable
mainly to decreased emotive value in the stimulus-words, and
only very sparingly to any greater expertness in dodging.
In the above instances, the time is rather short for dodging,
even though the occasion had presented itself. In this con-
nection, it is well to bear in mind that special emotional reac-
tion to a stimulus word may be a product of long association
time as well as a cause of it, since the greater the tendency to
hesitation, the greater the opportunity for emotive associa-
tions to be introduced. With greater facility of response,
whether inherent or gained through practice, the importance
of such a process is much reduced.

In brief, then, these experiments indicate the usual effects
of practice on free association to be:

1 . To decrease the association time to a limit approximat-
ing 6 fifths of a second for the median of 50 associations. At
the beginning of practice, the subject may be any distance
from this limit up to 15 fifths or more.

2. To further differentiate and particularize the responses,
by increasing the readiness with which the subject's entire
vocabulary becomes available for the purpose of such response.

3. To "flatten," or make more superficial, the form of
association which the responses take.

4. To decrease the emotive value of the experiment, and
consequently its applicability for all purposes involving its
emotive value.

A PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE

CONSCIOUS CONCOMITANTS OF

UNDERSTANDING

By HiKOZO Kakisb

Introduction .......... 14

Part I. Conditions of the preceding concomitants . . 19

§1. Audito-motor reproduction of the stimulus . . . 19

§2. Visual reproduction of the stimulus .... 22

Part II. Conditions of the succeeding concomitants , . 23

§1. Memory images ........ 24

§2. "Indicative images" ....... 26

§3. "Organic images" ....... 28

§4. "General visual-object images" ..... 29

§5. "Suggested verbal images" ...... 29

§6. Images with unfamiliar stimuli . . . . . 31

§7. The "Ausfrage method" and the customary method in

the study of associations . 37

Part III. Analysis of the simultaneous concomitants . . 42

§1. Historical sketch of the various views of thought . . 42

§2. Contents of "meaning" with familiar stimuli . . 49

§3. Selective experiences with unfamiliar stimuli . . 53

§4. Ultimate constituents of "meaning" .... 56

Introduction

When a word or a phrase is presented to an observer for a
certain interval of time, it will awaken a succession of various
events in his mind, such as inner reading of the word, "sense
of meaning," suggested images of objects or of other words,
and so forth, attended by various feelings and emotions.
In the succession of these experiences, some will precede,
others succeed, and still others occur simultaneously with
understanding. The purpose of the study about to be re-
ported is to examine, by a special method of experimentation,
first the relations of the events preceding and succeeding
to understanding, and then to investigate the nature of the
simultaneous events, i. e., the consciousnesses of meaning.

The method of experimentation was the same as that
used by Marbe,i Messer,^ Biihler^ and others in their studies
of thought, the so-called ''Ausfrage experiment" by which

^Marbe, K.: Experimentell-psychologische Untersuchungen iiber das
Urteil, 1 901.

^Messer, A.: Experimentell-psychologische Untersuchungen iiber das
Denken, Archiv fur die gesamte Psychologie, 1906, Vol. VIII.

^Biihler, K.: Ueber Gedanken, Archiv fitr Ges. Psychol., Vol. IX.

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 1 5

the total introspection of observers in reaction to words or
phrases is taken down in the form of protocols upon which
the conclusions are based.

Remarks on the Method: In spite of certain objections against the
method from the side of certain psychologists, as Wundt, who calls it
a "pseudo experiment" {Scheinexperiment) because it satisfies none of
the four requirements of a psychological experiment, viz.: concentration
of attention, repetition of the experiment, methodical change of the con-
ditions, and the observer's own determination of the phenomena to be
observed,^ yet the present writer had recourse to this method partly as a
kind of trial, and partly because there are no other methods which seem
better suited to the present purpose. The reasons for this belief are:
(i) That this method leads to division of labor, in that the experimenter
and the observer are different persons, and thus permits the observer to
observe the mental phenomena more freely than in ordinary introspection
in which the observer and the experimenter are one and the same person
and so attention must be divided between two different tasks, one active
and one passive, which fact itself is of great detriment to the efficacy of
introspection, especially when it has to do with merginal conscious experi-
ences, as is the case with the present study. Galton^ in his early experiments
on association was surprised to find so many associations connected with
a single word, when he separated the active and the passive attitudes
by a special device. (2) As a comparative study, it is freed from any
individual peculiarities or prejudices of the investigator. And lastly, (3)
as the totality of the introspection is set down, it permits the investigator
to take a fairer view of the position and significance of any particular
element in the totality of the mental reaction than would be possible in
any other way. This last characteristic brings this study into connection
at some points with the three important studies of the present time, viz. :
the study of mental types, the study of thought-processes, and the study
of associations. The study of individual types deals principally with
the individual differences of the means to understanding. The study of
thought-processes deals with the direct conscious concomitants of under-
standing. And the study of association deals with the suggested con-
scious experiences after the understanding. Each of these studies con-
siders only one section of the conscious concomitants independent of the
others, all of which can be found in the preceding, simultaneous and suc-
ceeding concomitants of understanding.

Thk Technique of the Experiments

Three series of experiments were made in succession for
the same purpose and mainly under the same conditions, ex-
cept for differences in observers and apparatus and in some
added elements in the third experiment.

Stimuli. The stimuli were words and phrases familiar and
unfamiliar (or easy and difficult), concrete and abstract, mostly
English or foreign. For abstract phrases proverbs were
mostly used. For example: (familiar concrete words), snake,
hand, mountain, etc.; (familiar abstract words) philosophy,
psychology, fatigue, etc. ; (unfamiliar concrete words) timbrel,

^Psychologische Studien, Vol. Ill, No. 4, Sept., 1907.
2F. Galton: Inquiry into Human Faculty and its Development. Lon-
don, 1883, chapter on "Psychometry."

1 6 KAKIS^

nostrum, nabob, etc.; (unfamiliar abstract words) pistology,
oneirology, noumenon, etc.; (familiar concrete phrases) The
sea is calm; The milk smells sour, etc.; (familiar abstract
phrases) Union makes strength; Duty before pleasure, etc.;
(unfamiliar concrete phrases) Long tongue, short hand; One
man is no man, etc.; (unfamiliar abstract phrases) A sin con-
cealed is half pardoned; Time enough is little enough, etc.
A new kind of stimulus (meaningless visual stimulus), in the
form of Chinese characters, was added to the verbal stimuli
in the third experiment. The account and description of
these will be given later (Part III, § 3).

Forms of Reaction. Two forms of reaction, an active (or
short) and a passive (or prolonged) were used. In the active
reaction the observer was asked to react by vaying "yes"
in the first experiment, and by pressing an electric key in
the second and third experiments, as soon as he understood
the word or phrase, and immediately afterward to report in
the order of its occurrence the whole process (or as much
as he could recall), which took place in the interval between
the sensory perception of the stimulus and the reaction. In
case he did not understand the stimulus the observer was
asked to give in the same way his introspection as to what
occurred in the interval between the perception of the stimulus
and a signal which was given by the experimenter after the
lapse of five seconds from the presentation of the stimulus.
In the passive reaction, the observer was asked to remain
passive without reacting, but to let the processes go as they
would until a signal for ceasing (which was given by the
experimenter this time at the end of three seconds) and then
to give his total instropection for the interval as before.

Presentation of the Stimulus. Two ways of presentation
were used: an auditory, in which it was spoken by the experi-
menter, and a visual, in which it was exposed.

Apparatus. The apparatus for the exposure of the stimulus and the
measurement of the time in the first experiment was simply a set of cards
with typewritten words and phrases and a stopwatch reading to one-
fifth of a second. In the second and third experiments this simple appara-
tus was replaced by a more elaborate one constructed for the purpose.
It consisted of three principal parts, i. e., (i), an exposer; (2), a registering
apparatus, and (3), a control pendultmi. The exposer consists of a large
board with an opening about in the centre, behind which stimulus-cards
were exposed in turn by means of the rotation of a large wheel attached
behind the board. Between the stimulus-card and the opening there
was a sort of fan which closed the latter until it (the fan) was raised.

The fan was attached to one end of an electro-magnetic lever and was
raised and lowered under the following conditions: (1), in case of the
passive reaction, it was moved automatically by means of the control
pendulum which made and broke the circuit to the lever, the circuit being
kept closed, and at the same time exposed the card for an interval of
three seconds; (2), in case of the active reaction, the experimenter moved

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 1 7

the fan by a make-key; and (3), in case the observer did not react, owing
to the difficulty of understanding, the experimenter lowered the fan at
the end of five seconds. Two mercury contacts at the free end of the
lever made, and the reaction key of the observer broke, another circuit
passing through an electro-magnetic marker which traced the reaction
curves on the smoked surface of the drum of a Zimmermann kymograph.
The marker of a Jacquet chronograph cut time units on the curve
which could be read by one-tenth of a second. Between the fan and the
opening there were two shutters or slides meeting at the middle of the
opening when both were closed, and exposing one-half of the whole sur-
face, when one was opened, which was done for words. With phrases
both slides were opened. Special care was taken for the prevention of
all distracting noises. In its rotation the apparatus made but very slight
noise which was almost totally shut off from the observer by the large
board of the exposer. The most comfortable position of the observer
was obtained by the adjustable inclinations of the board and the height
of the chair.

Observers. Of the 14 observers, 3 were Japanese students
reading and speaking English fairly well, all others were
English speaking people. The distribution of the observers
and their qualifications were as follows:
Experiment I.

An. Outsider.

Cff. Student of psychology.

Gl. Student of psychology.

Hi. (Jap.) Outsider.

Kk. (Jap.) Student of psychology.

Kn. (Jap.) Student of psychology.
Experiment II.

Ac. Student of psychology.

Ky. Student of psychology.

Sm. Student of psychology.

St. Student of psychology.

Experiment III.

Ac. Student of psychology.

Ch. Student of psychology.

E. M. Student of psychology.

L. M. Student of psychology.

Sn. Professor of psychology.

Remark: Several auxiliary experiments and minor tests
with some of these observers and several others were made
for special points. The description of these experiments has
been omitted owing to the limits of space, and references only
will be made to them.

Samples of the Protocols. The following are a few samples
of protocols from among nearly five hundred thus obtained.
They represent about the average length or amount of the
reports, some being shorter and simpler, while others are
longer and more minute. They are the reactions of three

JOURNAI, — 2

1 8 KAKISB

observers, one from each experiment, to familiar abstract
words, (A) by the active form of reaction, and (B), by the
passive form. The stimulus-words for observer Cff., in the
first experiment, were spoken, while those for others were
exposed. Even by reading these few, which are typical in
many respects, the reader may find traces of the general
influence of these conditions upon certain of the concomitants.

A. Active Reactions

Fault. (lexp. word spoken; Obs. Cff. No. w. 20, time, i. 5'.) ' 'While
you were saying the first half of the word I wondered what you were say-
ing. Then the sound Hngered. And I got the consonant at the end,
and the meaning at the same time. No image, but just feeling of mean-
ing. There was a feeling of satisfaction and at the same time dissatis-
faction. It is hard to analyse."

Peace. (II exp. word exposed; Obs. Ac. No. iii-5, time, 0.5''.) "Ex-
pectant attention keyed up owing to the delay of the arrival of the stimulus
word. I read it in inner speech and grasped the word and relaxed. I
grasped it at once in a very vague way, but at the same time with a feeling
of assurance that I was right although I had very little of any imagery. "

Psychology. (Ill exp. word exposed; Obs. Ch. No. iii-15, tune, 0.5'.)
"First feeling (of recognition of the form of the word) was followed in-
stantly by the feeling of familiarity. There was no imagery. In this
particular case it appears that the feeling of recognition and the feeling of
familiarity are the same thing. There was n't any imagery, any attempt
to define the word. I recognized the word. Absolute certainty."

B. Passive Reactions

Philosophy. (I exp. word spoken; Obs. Coif. no. w. 11.) "I got the
apperception of the word at once. It came in connection with a recent
little discussion with a fellow student on some question on philosophy.
It occurred just this morning. I had just the sound of his name, very
vague, and hardly any visual image of the place where we had discussed.
Then I began to pronounce the name of 'Weber'. Also the word 'ex-
amination' was present. But no definite visual image of anything."

(Remark : The date of the experiment was shortly before the observer's
doctor's examination and he was then reading Weber's History of Phi-
losophy.)

Apperception. (II exp. word exposed; Obs. Ac. No. w. 36.) "Read it
in the same way as before. I at once thought of Dr. Sanford in the lecture
room giving the definition of the word. I had a vague visual image of him
and the room."

Apperception. (Ill exp. No. iii — i, 16, word exposed; Obs. Ch.) "Pro-
nounced the word. There was no feehng of effort, but just feeling of
familiarity which came at once. I did n't put the meaning in words, but had
simply a feeling of what it meant. Then I got a peculiar visual image of
myself taking notes of the lectures in the classroom. The name 'Wundt'
came into my mind in auditory form. The feeling was rather neutral."

On the Working up of the Protocols. These protocols were
read with the following two points in view: First, the influ-
ence of the conditions upon the frequency of the concomitants.
The conditions were divided into, a, material {i. e., concrete-
ness-abstractness of stimuli, etc.) b, experimental (whether
the stimuli were exposed or spoken, etc.) ; c, individual (wheth-

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 1 9

er the observer belonged to the visual or auditory type, etc.).
The primary or vital influences were taken chiefly into con-
sideration though sometimes secondary influences were also
considered. The second point was to examine the relative
positions of the concomitants with reference to the under-
standing and to each other in the temporal sequence of their
occurrence.

Part I

Conditions of the) Preceding Concomitants

These concomitants were reproductions of the sensory com-
ponents of the stimulus word or phrase, i. e., audi to-motor
reading and visual imagery of the stimulus. In ordinary
introspection these events are often overlooked by many, as
we are accustomed to attend only to the meaning and not to
the means by which we reach it. According to their kind
and frequency they have been sometimes used as criteria for
individual differences. Sometimes they have been identified
with meaning itself. In our experiments they were first to occur,
following directly after the sense perception of the stimulus,
excepting some cases with the visual reproductions which
frequently followed, or occurred simultaneously with, the
understanding. With easy or familiar stimuli the understand-
ing followed immediately without any intermediary imagery.
With unfamiliar or difficult stimuli there occurred often inter-
mediary imagery such as the appearance of other verbal
images in the form of synonymes, translations, definitions,
etc., or suggested object images. As these were in their
nature exactly identical with suggested images or those
occurring after the understanding with easy stimuli we shall
consider them later in Part II.

§ I. AUDITO-MOTOR REPRODUCTION OF THE STIMULUS

Influence upon the frequency of audito-motor reproduction
of the stimulus (i. e., the reading of the word in inner speech)
when (a) the stimulus was exposed and (b) when it was spoken.

The influence of these conditions was so marked and definite
that the results of the three successive experiments showed
the same tendency and the influence of other conditions was
almost negligible.

The total number of cases of this form of imagery in ten
observers was 291 out of 311' or 93% when the stimuli were

^ From this total, the first one or two (tentative) reactions by most
observers are excluded. Also the reactions of four observers An. Kk. Sm.
St. are excluded, for the reason that in case of the first two, the stimulus
was spoken only. In the case of Sm. the tendency was not clear in the
earlier reactions, with St. it was not clear in any of the reactions ; about these
see the succeeding accounts.

20 KAKIS^

exposed; while it occurred in only 17 out of 176* cases, or
9%, when the stimuli were spoken. And these 17 cases oc-
curred mostly when the stimuli were rather diflficult or the
pronunciation by the experimenter were indistinct.

We may conclude, therefore, that the inner reading of the
word generally occurs when it is exposed, and occurs seldom
when the stimulus is easy and spoken. In other words, the
appearance and non-appearance of the reading of the stimulus
in inner speech is primarily conditioned by the way of pre-
senting the stimulus.

For the determination of the secondary influences affecting
the frequency of this imagery, i. e., influences arising from
individual differences and from qualities of the material,
some minor tests were made. The first thing to be mentioned
is the fact that at the start the majority of our observers
did not know about this tendency, but became aware of it
after a few reactions, owing, perhaps, to the summation of
the faint impressions occurring repeatedly at the same place,
i. e., at the beginning, in each reaction. One observer (Hi)
belonging to a very pronounced motor speech type was not
aware of this tendency at first, but a simple test of reading
with the mouth open, etc., brought his attention, to his great
surprise, to what he was actually doing. A lady (extra ob-
server) who when asked about this tendency denied it, or
was at least doubtful about it, was also surprised to find it
after a simple test, and confessed that in her whole life she
was never aware of it before. With another extra observer
(Ms), to whom the presence of this tendency was doubtful,
a test with simultaneous counting or speaking of a word
showed that he could not read understandingly while they
were continued. With two observers (Sm, St) who said
they read by eye, the results of a test in the instantaneous
grasping of a list of unconnected words or phrases showed
no differences from other observers, either in the amounts
of reproduction or in the ways of reading, i. e., instead of
grasping the whole at once at a glance they also read the words
one by one in the same way as others. One of them (Sm),
who denied the presence of this tendency in the reading of
some phrases, found it later almost always with words.
There was thus only one observer remaining who did not yet
find in himself this tendency. No further tests with him
have yet been made, so I cannot absolutely decide at present
whether this process is really lacking in him or he is only

^ This smaller number of spoken stimuli is due to the fact that in the
majority of the second and the whole of third experiment the stimulus
was only exposed.

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 91

not yet aware of what he actually does, but from the results of
the test above stated and from the reports of many about
the difficulty of the introspection of this tendency, the most
probable supposition is that he is subject to it in spite of
himself.

The distinction between the auditory and motor elements in
inner reading our observers found it hard to make. But if
we call the inner reading with the consciousness of the inner-
vation or movements of the organs of speech motor, and the
inner reading without these auditory, then there was at
least one observer (Hi) who belonged to a pronounced motor
type, like that of Strieker. With difficult words or phrases
most of our observers went over to the motor speech form,
and inner reading became pronounced. With familiar words
of many syllables or with familiar phrases, mutilated reading
was not uncommon. In the repeated reading, in inner speech,
of unfamiliar and difficult phrases (mostly proverbs), reading
with emphasis upon the principal words, or first a quick
reading of the whole followed by a return to the principal
words, was also frequent.

The conclusions suggested by these studies are: (i) that
motor reading in the sense above defined is not universal as
was believed by Strieker ^ and assumed by Max Muller,^
but is limited to some individuals only, and with average in-
dividuals, to the reading of difficult words. (2) Auditory
reading in the above sense, on the contrary, seems universal
and necessary for the understanding of exposed words or
phrases, which favors the view that the connection between
the auditory and "concept centres" is immediate, while
that for the other senses, i. e., motor and visual, is indirect.'
(3) Expressed in terms of conditions, the occurrence of audi-
tory reading is mainly conditioned by the method of experi-
mentation (i. e., exposure), while that of motor reading is
influenced by (i), the method,'' (2) the material, and (3), in-
dividual differences.

^Strieker: Ueber die Sprachvorstellungen. Wien, 1880. One of his
tests is: "Keeping the mouth open and the tongue firm try to think the
words papa, morning, stammer, etc. ; If you do not succeed it means that
a motor image is necessary to your inner speech."

2 Max Miiller: Lectures on the Science of Thought. 1887 (ist ed.1883),
Chicago, In his letter to Galton he unconsciously betrays his type in
these words: "Yet if we watch ourselves, it is very curious that we can
often feel the vocal chords and the muscles of the mouth moving as if we
were speaking," Ibid., Appendix, p. 8.

3 Cf. Dodge: Die motorische Wortvorstellungen, Wien, 1896, p, 62.
^ The writer thinks it very likely that even persons of pronounced

motor type would not experience innervation or movements of speech-
organs in the case of hearing easy or familiar words.

22 KAKISe

§2. VISUAI. REPRODUCTION OF THE STIMULUS

Influence upon the frequency of visual reproduction of the
stimulus when (a) it was exposed and when (b) it was spoken.

There occurred 30 cases of visual imagery of the stimulus
out of 81 reactions with 3 observers {Gl, Hi, Kn) when the
stimuli were spoken, and not a single case occurred in 6 1 reac-
tions, with the same observers, when the stimuli were exposed.
With two other observers {Ac, Cf) no case occurred — neither
when the stimuli were exposed (71 reactions) nor when they
were spoken (65 reactions). With the rest of the observers
none occurred in 179 reactions to the stimuli which were
exposed.

Of the three observers with whom this form occurred, two
were Japanese. This naturally led to the suspicion that the
frequency of this imagery for them might perhaps be the
result of unfamiliarity with the English language, and not
to individual peculiarity. This suspicion was, however, soon
dispelled by an extra test with a number of Japanese words
as stimuli which showed the same results; the only difference
being that with Japanese words orally presented, the visual
image of the stimulus was directly followed by understanding
or suggested images, while with English words, the visual
image of the stimulus was sometimes succeeded by the image
of the corresponding Japanese word before the arrival of
understanding or suggested images.

For instance: 'Traveller* — (Obs. Hi.). "First I heard distinctly the
sound 'travel'. There was a moment of hesitation and doubt. Then I saw
the printed image of the word 'traveller' accompanied by the images of
the Chinese characters, and at the same time full realization of the
meaning. Then I saw mentally a traveller walking on Main Street. "

The form and localization of the image were almost con-
stant in the same individual. All three localized the image,
usually at a distance of one or two feet in front. Two ob-
servers saw the image in handwritten form, the other in
printed form.

About the frequency and conditions of suggested (associated)
verbal imagery we shall see later.

These results lead to the conclusion: (i) that the visual
image of the stimulus word occurs only occasionally when the
stimulus is spoken, and scarcely occurs at all when it is exposed.
(2) There are great individual differences in this experience
as in the case of motor speech; in other words, this imagery
is especially conditioned by the method of experimentation
and individual differences.

The results of the above study in so far as they bear
upon the validity of the customary method for the deter-
mination of individual types are, in certain respects, negative,

A STUDY OP UNDERSTANDING 2$

viz.: (i) We cannot wholly rely upon the questionnaire
method in the study of types, because there are many people
who are not aware of what they are actually doing. (2) Be-
cause the frequency of these speech forms primarily depends
upon the manner of the presentations of the words, we can-
not at once label an individual as, for instance, of the
auditory or the motor type simply because he says that he
pronounces when he reads or when he writes, etc.^

Part II
Conditions of the Succeeding Concomitants

When the stimuli were easy and familiar, the images of
other words than the stimuli and the images of objects or events
suggested by the stimuli, or, in short, what I might call "sug-
gested images"^ usually followed the understanding. When
the stimuli were difficult or unfamiliar, they frequently pre-
ceded the understanding, but followed the images of the
stimulus words or phrases. These cases of preceding sug-
gested images I will call "intermediary images." All these
images, the preceding, intermediary and succeeding sug-
gested images, were of the same kinds dififering only in their
temporal relations to understanding.

All the suggested images which we need consider may be
divided into two main classes, according to the nature of their
constituents : ( i ) object images, which are the representations
of, or references to, concrete objects or events; and (2) verbal
images, which are the visual or audito-motor representations
of suggested or associated words.

I shall begin with the succeeding suggested images or
images following the understanding of familiar stimuli, and
first with one of the object images, namely with memory
images.

^ These considerations seem to be neglected by the following authors
Patini, K. : Contributo alio studio sperimentale della formula endophasia.
Napoli, 1907. Cf. p. 26, observation xlv, and others. Ribot, T.
L 'evolution des idees generales. Paris, 1897. Cf. Eng. tr. 1899, p. 114 ff.
Max Mtiller, op. cit. Appendix p. 26. There in his answer to Romanes he
wants to prove the universality, among all individuals as well as under all
circumstances, of motor speech in thinking, by referring to special cases,
and says : ' 'How could I hold pronunciation necessary for thought when
I am silent while I am reading, while I am writing?" When one listens,
it is not necessary for understanding to pronounce each word.

^The term "image" is used here in the broadest sense including faint
and indefinite experiences if they refer to concrete objects or events which
can be in other cases distinctly represented. For instance, such experiences
as, "I thought of that typewriter," or, "I thought of my buying a type-
writer at a store about a year ago," etc., were also included as images
though it is by no means clear in these cases what kinds of sensory imagery,
(«. e., visual, auditory, kinesthetic, etc.), were actually present. For
further analysis of these experiences see Part III.

24 KAKISE

Experimental conditions. The numerical results given in
the following discussion are from the records of reactions to
familiar stimulus words (not phrases) ^ by the ten observers
who assisted in the first and second experiments. Results
from the third experiment, which confirmed those of the
preceding ones, are sometimes referred to. The frequency-
ratios of various sorts of imagery are regarded merely as
representing general tendencies or main proportions and not
at all as expressing exact or even approximate relations.
The total number of reactions to easy words^ in the first and
second experiments under the different conditions, whose in-
fluences we are about to examine, was 285.

§ I . MEMORY IMAGES

By memory images here are understood those which refer
to particular personal experiences with the objects or events
indicated by the stimulus. They can always be localized in
space (where) and time (when). They are sometimes called
reminiscent associations.

Results of the Experiments. 1. This imagery not only fol-
lowed the understanding, but also made the terminus of the
reactions in which it was found, i. e., other suggested images
when they occurred generally preceded, and seldom succeeded,
the memory imagery in the allotted intervals of the time,
owing, perhaps, to the richness of contents or the vividness
of the latter.

For instance: Wheel (passive, spoken stimulus, Obs. Gl. No. w. 22).
"First thought of all kinds of wheels, blurred and indistinct images of
multitude of wheels. Then the one I saw recently emerged very clearly
in mental picture."

Vacation. (Passive, word exposed, Obs. .4c. No. w. 5.) ' 'I read and spelt the
word twice mentally. I thought of week-after-next and the work that I
planned to do then. I think I thought of that because I have been re-
cently thinking about the work to be done. And then I recalled the con-
versation I had in the Bloomingdale hospital a few minutes ago. Dr.
C, proposed to meet his class next week. Some one said we had vacation
then and Dr. C. had trouble to understand on account of his ear trouble .

1 The results with phrases were not calculated for the following reasons :
(i). The number of words used as stimuli, was greater than that of phrases;
(2), there were no new kinds of suggested images found in phrase-reac-
tions, those in the word-reactions and phrase-reactions being practically
the same (Ribot found the same results; Cf. op. 114 ff.) the only definite
difference being that with phrases the suggestions were more definite a
matter which we shall consider later; (3), furthermore with phrases, not
only the suggested images were less in number and more limited in variety
but very frequently there occurred none at all, perhaps because the reac-
tions took more time and energy than those with words.

2 Ease and difficulty are only relative distinctions, some of the easy
stimuli turned out to be rather difficult or unfamiliar ones to some obser-
vers. Cf. the remark under I 6 (Difficult stimuli).

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 2$

The scene of the classroom was pretty vivid, and it was rather inter-
esting, amusing. "

2. This imagery in the case of passive reactions oc-
curred in more than tw^o-fifths of all the reactions of all the
observers, the figures being 102 cases out of 242 passive reac-
tions to easy words for ten observers with no considerable
individual variations among them. The active reactions
with easy words (not phrases) in the first experiment were in
all but 37, made by three observers (An, Gl, Kn). In these 37
there were four cases of the sort of imagery now under consid-
eration, all in the 15 reactions of observer ^w alone. The results
of the third experiment, in which the majority was of active re-
actions, showed also very definitely that a memory image
seldom occurs in active reactions. In all the cases in which it
occurred, the observers reported it as occurring after the reac-
tions or at any rate after the understanding.

3. Abstractness in the stimulus words had little or no in-
fluence on the frequency of this imagery in passive reactions
to easy stimuli, or, if any, tended more toward inducing
recent memory images than did the concrete words. Of 50
cases of recent memory images^ out of 151 reactions in the case
of five observers {Ac, Gl, Hr, Kn, Ky) 30 cases occurred with
74 abstract words and 20 with 77 concrete words with no con-
siderable individual variations. The same general tendency
is shown in the results with the rest of the observers. Like-
wise, whether the stimuli were spoken or exposed made no
noticeable difference with the frequency of imagery of this
sort.

4. Beside the passivity of reaction, the most important
factor for the occurrence of this imagery was the recency of
association, (a) Out of 106 memory associations in 285 total
reactions 82 were recent associations or reminiscence of events
falling within a period of not more than one or two years
previous, 2 1 of remote associations, and only 3 of boyhood
associations.^ (b) Quite insignificant and accidental associ-
ations, alone, without any emotional excitation or logical
connection or repetition, by sheer power of recency, occurred
frequently, pushing other images aside.

^ These were the most frequent of all memory images ; for details, see
the sections to follow.

2 These results rather contradict those found by Galton. The numbers
which he found were: boyhood associations 48, manhood 57, while "quite
recent events" had only 19, in his four times repeated experiment with 75
words. These are, of course, the combined results of the pure revivability
and the fixity or tenacity of associations as they were repeated. But even
in his series of the first reactions the frequency of recent associations is
quite low. Cf. ibid., p. 195.

26 KAKISE

For instance: Ink (Obs. Ky), "Pronounced the word. Idea of the
blackness was the first thing. Then I thought of those ink-blotters I got
this morning at a down- town store. There was a vague image of blotters.
I had also clear image of my fingers being dabbled with ink which occurred
a couple of days ago."

Vacation. (Obs. Sn.) "I think I saw the middle of the word and
noticed the syllable 'cat'. Then I read the whole word to myself. I
think I had an incipient pronunciation of it in inner speech. Then I re-
membered that this word was the word which Dr. Bolton read when we
came here yesterday. I didn't get any definite image except that asso-
ciation. I just thought of it, an idea of direction rather than a visuali-
zation. That idea of direction is very frequent with me as the first thing
to come in case of such an association as that."

(c) With such words as vacation, memory, fatigue, pedagogy,
philosophy, apperception, etc., which were purposely selected
and used in the third experiment (mixed among other words),
the observers had in nearly all reactions, in spite of the ab-
stractness of the words, a concrete image in the form of a recent
memory association which the experimenter could often pre-
dict from his own share in the same recent and repeated
experiences, e. g., the images of certain professors, the class-
rooms, certain authors, etc.

For instance, Apperception (Obs. E. M.). "First slight tension and ac-
tion on the motor side with the pronunciation of the word. Then the mean-
ing came, but there was an effort to get the psychological meaning. I had
a rather clear visual image of pages in Wundt's 'Outline of Psychology'
in which the thing is treated. And then the visual image of Dr. S. in the
lecture room and also some auditory image of his voice."

Pedagogy. (Obs. Sn.) "I was not quite ready. I read the word in inner
speech but not very loud, and was not quite sure whether I read it correctly.
So I read it again and I had a faint feehng that I knew the word. Then
I thought of the direction of Dr. B's room and probably had also
a very vague suggestion of Dr. B. himself. The consciousness of direc-
tion was very clear. I had the word 'teaching,' probably in inner
speech."

Remark. Ribot's "thinking by analogy" by which he
means such reactions as "I thought of Hume's theory of
causality", for the stimulus ''cause''; or the recalling of
"Littre's definition" for the word ''Justice'', and so forth
{ih., I i4ff .), is merely our "memory imagery," and cannot there-
fore be regarded as a special mark of individual differences.
The whole matter rests upon the duration (slowness or quick-
ness) of reactions. Besides, with these familiar words, and
especially in scholars, the understanding of what the words
mean precedes any suggested images, so that such memory
images are not means to understanding but the results of
natural and spontaneous associations.

§ 2. INDICATIVE IMAGES.

For the lack of a better name, I have called "indicative
images" those which referred to particular objects found in the

A STUDY OP UNDERSTANDING 27

room at the time of the experiment. For instance : Typewriter,
I thought of that typewriter on the table. Experiment, — I
thought of this experiment, etc. In their psychological nature,
a strict line of demarcation between this sort of imagery and
recent memory imagery is hard to draw as the one gradually
passes into the other; yet I found a separation, by the con-
ventional definition above given, necessary in the treatment
of the results for, in the first place, the frequency of indicative
magery was markedly more pronounced under certain con-
ditions than that of memory imagery ; and in the second place,
it seemed to be influenced by a new factor soon to be mentioned.
So that, when, for example, the word Entrance suggested
to some observers the aperture of the experimenting apparatus,
and to others the door of the experimenting room, while to
a third the gateway of the university or that of the library, and
to a fourth the entrance to the court house of this city, and to
a fifth the entrance to the capitol in Washington and finally to
a sixth some front steps leading up to a building, I put the
first two into the category of the indicative imagery, the
third and the fourth into the recent, the fifth into the remote
memory imagery and the sixth into the general visual object
imagery described later on.

Sometimes one and the same response, therefore, may be-
come the one or the other of these types of imagery according
to circumstances. For instance, with the word Seminary, if
one thinks of Dr. H — 's seminary, or Dr. S — 's or Dr. B — 's,
it will be a case of indicative imagery when the word was given
there, while it will be recent memory imagery when the ex-
periment was performed at some other place, and remote
memory imagery when it was made years after the personal
experiences of the observers.

But a very small number of appropriate stimulus words
for the arousal of imagery of this sort, such as room, window,
entrance, watch, hand, typewriter, experiment, etc., happened
to be found in our list of stimulus words. Nevertheless the
following tendencies were rather definitely brought out. i.
The occurrence of imagery of this sort is primarily conditioned
by a special k-pd of stimulus words which I may call "in-
dicative words," such as those just mentioned. 2. With
these words this imagery occurred in far greater number of
cases when the words were spoken than when they were ex-
posed, the frequency ratios being respectively 89% and 19%.
Further inferences with reference to this sort of imagery are
impossible from the data at hand, but the following one is also
suggested by the results, namely that this sort of imagery is
determined by a new factor which I might call "implicit
context"; in other words, the spoken stimulus word becomes

28 KAKISE

virtually in its effect a phrase especially adapted to induce
imagery of this kind. In daily life we are accustomed to react
to a singe word under such circumstance when the object indi-
cated by the word is near at hand and the speaker wants
something to be done with the object. A single uttered word
then is, in fact, an imperative sentence, meaning, for instance,
'Please give me that thing', or 'Look at it', etc., and the per-
son addressed turns his attention instinctively to the object
mentioned. Now in the experiment when an "indicative
word" is uttered the observer falls unconsciously into this
attitude, because of the similarity of situation; while, when
it is exposed, this link of habitual associations becomes broken,
whence the less frequency of this sort of imagery.

In the temporal order of occurrence, this imagery was, in
general, the promptest of all suggested images, occurring
immediately after, or sometimes simultaneously with, the
understanding.

Remark. In this kind of reactions, which were, as a rule,
rather reflex, the full reahzation of the meaning, such as rich-
ness of concept, came often later than the arrival of this
imagery, though the understanding of the word in the sense
of recognition obviously preceded it. To these varieties of
meaning we shall return in Part III.

§ 3. ORGANIC IMAGES

Under this term I understand a reference to, or becoming
aware of, the organic sensations or feelings either produced
directly or revived, which are habitually associated with the
words. The term organic sensations is used here in its broad-
est sense, comprising kinesthesia or sensations of muscular
movements or innervation, as well as sensations attending
the conditions of internal organs.

For instance: Excitation: {Ac) "Read it in the same way. I tried
to state it in the sense given by Wundt. Then I tried to think about
the psychological evidences of excitation, and simulated to myself its
bodily state unconsciously." Rain. {Ky) "First pronounced the word
inwardly. Next there was a visual image of raining just outside of this
window (of the experimenting room). There was also an idea of wetness
just in the form of bodily sensation in which no visual or' ^uditory elements
were discernible."

Results. I . This imagery occurred in a very small number
of cases. 2. It occurred only, (a) with a special class of
stimulus words suggestive of this imagery or what I might
call "Organic words", with which the organic associations
(or components) more or less predominate, such as, respiration,
suffocation, fatigue, uneasiness y etc., and (b) with passive (or
prolonged) reactions. 3. It seldom occurred alone but

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 29

usually accompanied by other suggested images, such as verbal
and visual imagery. In cases of its concurrence with these
images it usually succeeded the latter, i. e., it was less prompt
in its occurrence than visual and verbal suggested images.

§4. GENERAI. VISUAI^-OBJECT IMAGES

These images, instead of referring to any particular object
or event of past experiences like memory images, represent,
predominantly in visual terms, merely types or concrete ex-
amples of objects designated by the stimulus words. For
instance, Box — I had a visual image of a wooden box. This is
a case of simple object imagery in which only a single object
is represented. It occurred often that many objects belong-
ing to the same class were visualized simultaneously or in quick
successions, producing VN^hat I may call "complex object
imagery." In such cases the visualizations were, as a rule,
faint and incomplete. For instance. Animal {An) — I thought
of all sorts of animals moving alive, etc. Vacation (L. M.) — (I
had a very rapid visual impression of landscapes. The ideas
or faint visual images of a whole summer.

Sometimes these general visual images, which as a rule
preceded memory images, turned out to be the first stage of
the latter, in the same way as free associations are sometimes
traced to particular incidents. For instance. Cross, {Ac) —
When I heard the word, there came at once the picture of a
crucifix. It seemed to be traced to those pictures of cruci-
fixes which Dr. H — showed us in his lecture on Christ. It
impressed me at that time.

Results. I. There were great individual differences in the
frequency of this imagery, ranging from zero to 53%, in the
percentages for the ten •observers. 2. In the case of this
imagery, reversing the case with memory imagery, the con-
creteness and abstractness of the stimulus word influenced
the frequency of the imagery in a marked degree, the frequency
with concrete words being nearly three times as great as that
with abstract words. 3. The frequency of imagery in all
the reactions was 51 cases in a total of 286, falling thus far
below that of the memory imagery, but rising far above that
of the organic imagery. 4. In cases of concurrence this
imagery always preceded memory imagery.

§5. SUGGESTED VERBAL IMAGES

By a "suggested verbal image" is meant here a visual or
audito-motor reproduction o^ a word associated with the stimu-
lus-word. It must be distinguished, therefore, from the verbal
imagery of the stimulus word itself the conditions of which
were treated at the beginning of this paper. Suggested

30 KAKISE

verbal imagery may occur either with or without correspond-
ing object imagery, i. e., dependently or independently. All
independent imagery which appeared in our records was in
the nature of either sensory or conceptual associations (i. e.,
those having a sensory or a conceptual relationship with the
stimulus words). In sensory associations we found only
"klang associations," or associations by the similarity of
sound. In conceptual associations there were roughly three
kinds: i, synonyms, 2, contrasts, and 3, co-ordinations, sub-
ordination and super ordination. For instance (co-ordination)
dog — cat; (subordination) city — New York; (superordination)
cat — animal.

Results: 1. There were very marked individual differ-
ences in the frequency of this sort of imagery, as in the case
of general visual imagery, the ratio ranging from zero to 100%;
for instance Obs. Ac. had no cases of this imagery in all his
reactions, while Obs. Sm always had it. Some observers had a
few cases, others many. 2 . The frequency of this imagery like
that of general visual imagery was also markedly influenced by
the nature of the stimulus word (abstractness or concreteness)
and in this case in inverse relation. It occurred three times
as frequently with abstract words as with concrete words.
3. As to "klang associations" there were only three of them
in all the reactions, and only in the case of one observer (5w),
so that this form must be regarded as rather exceptional,
at least with easy stimulus words. (Of the frequency of this
form with unfamiliar words we shall speak later.) We had
now and then phrase reactions from four observers most of
which appeared in the form of definitions of abstract scientific
terms. Conceptual associations in the form of synonyms,
etc., however, made the majority of the cases. 4. As to the
time of occurrence: With independent imagery, it was one
of the quickest to occur; in case of concurrence with other
images, it generally preceded the general visual image and
the memory image. With dependent verbal imagery, the
time depended on that of object imagery which the verbal
imagery accompanied.

On the Tracing of Verbal Imagery

With independent verbal images the observer in the ma-
jority of cases could not give introspectively any account
of their origin owing to the lack of conscious background.

For instance. Excitation: (Obs.Sm) "Pronounced. The word psychol-
ogy came which was pronounced and visualized in typewritten form.
Then I saw the German word Erregung printed in black. Then in inner
speech I said 'I wonder why I selected these words.'"

This imagery though difficult to be traced subjectively is yet

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 3 1

easily traced objectively in the sense that it can be easily
brought under conceptual or logical classifications. The
dependent verbal imagery, on the contrary, is easy to trace
subjectively and hard to trace objectively.

Suppose the observers reacted by uttering just the dependent
verbal images in response to the stimulus words (without giving
their total introspections) and then the experimenter or any
outsider attempted to trace them objectively, as best as he
could. Then compare the results obtained by conjecture with
the actual connections found in the total introspections of
the observers. Such a comparison is easily made by placing
all such verbal imagery found in the protocols directly after
the stimulus words. For instance, Horse, (Obs. Cf.) [sug-
gested verbal images] "The name of a friend of the observer"
and "horse."

Introspection: "The sound of your voice lingered. Then there was
a sort of general idea. Then a rather pleasurable feeling due to the recog-
nition of a favorite animal. There was a complex vague association there,
such as a vague notion of a useful domestic animal. Then I had a visual
image of being on horseback, with a sort of inner speech in auditory terms,
going riding with a friend of mine who suggested it to me. I heard or pro-
nounced his name and also the word 'horse' pretty distinctly. The
localization of the scene of the riding was far down in the direction he
(my friend) has suggested. The suggestion of his occurred but two days
ago. "

Turkey, (Obs. Sm.) "Bronze." Introspection: "First strong visual
impression of the typewritten word and its color. Then came the word
'bronze ' in the form of inner speech and at the same time a rather imper-
fect image of one of those big bronze cqjored turkeys. The color was more
distinct than the outline. Not well localized, hovering somewhere around
in the air. The color came out distinctly, the shimmer of the iridescent col-
or. Considerably later, i. e., after the shutter was closed, there came the
thought that wild turkeys were once abundant in New England, but now
almost extinct. Then came the idea of Thanksgiving, but not well defined,
just a general idea of festivities."

§6. IMAGES WITH UNFAMIUAR STIMUI.1

It is known in a general way that the grades of acquaintance,
i. e., familiarity and unfamiliarity, with stimulus words or
phrases have an important influence on the modes of reaction.
Here we propose to examine in particular their influence,
especially upon images.^

By unfamiliar stimuli is meant here those words or phrases
in the case of which understanding either did not occur directly
(soon after the sensory reproduction of the stimulus) or did
not occur at all.

The criterion is thus totally subjective (i. e., according to
the observers' modes of reaction) though a number of so-

^ Their influences on the "feelings", we shall consider later in Part III.

32 KAKISE

called unfamiliar as also familiar stimuli^ were provisionally-
fixed and used by the experimenter.

Some of these objectively fixed unfamiliar stimuli were
naturally, by some observers, found to be familiar and some
of the objectively fixed familiar stimuli were found by other
observers to be unfamiliar, so that the following account of
the influence of unfamiliar stimuli is taken from the results
of all experiments (as we have seen in the treatment of the
images of stimulus words). ^

Results. The following results show that there is a strik-
ing similarity in the conditions of some images which attend
the reactions to unfamiliar words and of those attending
unfamiliar phrases.^

The influence of unfamiliar stimuli upon the the images
(auditory, motor, and visual) of the stimulus-words, such as
their increased frequency, accentuation, repetition, etc., we
have already seen in Part I, §-i. The tendency to such
imagery already exists in normal reactions, and merely be-
comes accentuated in difficult reactions owing to the retard-
ation of understanding.

A more important and characteristic influence of an un-
familiar stimulus is its awakening of intermediary (or, pre-
ceding suggested) images which were i, klang- associations,
2, paraphrases, 3, memory images, and 4, synonyms.
. I. Klang-associations. With absolutely unfamiliar words
there occurred quite frequently klang-associations. In the
case of some stimuli, different observers had often the same
associations: such as, nosology — nose, mousquetaire — mosquito,
pistology — pistol, hyle — hyla, cabala — cable, timbrel — timber,
timbre — timber, synergism — syllogism, monad — Monadnock (a
mountain in N. H.), etc.

Examples. Nosology: (Obs. L. M. Ill — i, 5). "The pronunciation
suggested 'noseology'. Then I found myself saying, 'nose-ology ', which
made me laugh. The mind was blank. I hadn't any effort or tension,
but rather relaxation. I had a feeling of the amusing, comical."

Nosology. (Obs. Ch. Ill — i, 5.) "First feeling of total unfamiliarity.
But this unfamiliarity was a little bit different from the first one because
I recognized the first part of the word. I pronounced it two or three times.
The word first suggested nose and made me think of a science of the nose,
which I knew, of course, was not the correct meaning of the word. "

Hyle (Obs. L. M. Ill — i, i). "I got no reaction. I just foimd myself
saying 'hyla', 'hyla'. There was a great deal of tension."

Hyle (Obs. Sn. Ill — i, i). "I was attending to the movement of appara-
tus just before. Then as soon as the word appeared I pronounced it men-

^For examples, see Introduction.

2 Part I, §§ I and 2.

^ Ribot states that he found practically the same conditions of imagery
in both word and phrase reactions, and so dismissed the latter in his later
experiments. Cf. op. cit., p. 114 ff.

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 33

tally several times. My first thought was that it was connected with hyla,
a tree-frog. And then I read it again and thought you gave it because of
its philosophical meaning — the word is the same as the Greek {JXt; which would
be spelt in the same way. And after that I repeated it several times and
was repeating it. There was feeling of concentration particularly marked."
With unfamiliar phrases, however, this form of association
by similarity of mere sounds, perhaps something like parody,
did not occur.

2. Paraphrase. With unfamiHar and apparently com-
pound words, it was a common tendency to analyze them
first into familiar elements and then to make out the meaning
of the whole. For instance, synergism: syn-energy "working
together", uUramontanism — u !tra-mont-ism^ ''doctrine be-
yond the mountain" ; pachydermata: pachy-derm-ata^" a class
of thick-skinned animals"; Millenarism: Miller-ism^ "a doc-
trine of Miller, " etc.,

Example: Millenarism. (Obs. Ch. Ill, ii, 17, Time — ( — }) "Read
the word through half a dozen times and at the last time I divided the
word into two syllables. Feeling of effort throughout the whole experi-
ment; tension and the same feeling of hunting. The suggestion that came
to me was a man named Miller who had a peculiar theological doctrine
something about the end of the world at a certain time, I think. And so
the feeling was not a feeling of total strangeness, but it was a feeling of
recognition of the word. I suspected the word was probably constructed
after the name of that man and stood for his system. Feeling of unpleas-
antness attached to the strain. Feeling of uncertainty and ignorance.
The mind is not yet quite free from work. There seems something still
working. "

Pistology. (Obs. Sn. Ill, ii. 7, Time — ( — ^.) "Read the word in inner
speech and tried to think of what it could possibly mean. I had that
feeling of strain, of unfamiliarity, and then I began groping about. I
looked at the first part of the word and recognized the word 'pistol' there,
and then, I think, I formulated it in inner speech as 'the science of pistol. '
And then I rejected that. At the same time there was some sense of humor.
Then the words 'science of fishes' came perhaps by way of analogy with the
word 'piscatology' (this word did not come into consciousness). But I
realized that that is not the meaning of the word. And so I was still trying
further and was thinking that I was not able to make out what the word was
when the shutter was closed. A feeling of unf amiliarty, and a feeling of grop-
ing about for something were there, but the feeling of unfamiliarity was
the only one which was in the centre of consciousness. There was also a
certain feeling of helplessness though not clearly developed. These feel-
ings of strain and eftort passed off more gradually this time than in the
other one. There was a little curiosity whether it was not a nonsense
word. "

With unfamiliar and difi&cult phrases, this tendency to
paraphrase was more frequent and common than with words.
An important feature is the fact that here two kinds of inter-
mediaries, a verbal and a visual, with rather definite individual

^ The sign " — " signifies that the understanding did not take place within
5 seconds. For details see Introduction.

Journal — 3

34 KAKISE

differences, were pretty clearly brought out. In the case of
the verbal intermediary, the mind works mainly with syno-
nyms, for the principal words in a phrase, or with inner speech
in the making out of the meaning. There is seldom any trace
of visual images of objects.

For instance: "Truth seeks no corner." (Obs. Ms. ph, 4. Time — )
"Read it in the same way as before. Turned back to the two words 'truth'
and 'comer'. I had no visual image. From the word 'comer' the words
'square place' came by association. Interpreted 'Truth spreads itself.'
There was a slight feeling of effort or tension. The mental operation
stopped with the understanding."

"A sin confessed is half forgiven." (Obs. Cf. I, Ph. 7, Time — .) "A
little doubt still remains with this too. Some almost audible inner speech
with distinct articulation and movements. A rapid comparison with the
last one but no pronunciation of it. Everything was almost auditory,
i. e., words dealing with an imagined sin of a child who confesses to his
father some fault he had done. That kind of thinking or imagination
seems to bring forth the meaning, namely: 'If you tell him about your
wrong yourself, it wakens the good disposition of the person you have
offended'."

In the case of the visual intermediary, the mind works
mainly with more or less vivid visual images of objects des-
ignated by the principal words of a phrase, or with visual
imagination, in the making out of meaning.

For instance: "Riches have wings." (Obs. Kn. I, Ph. 3, Time — .)
"Internal reading. Then I had a very clear image of a bird with wings.
Then the image of the flying away of the bird, which brought the idea,
not image, of the going away of riches. Then the feeling of the conviction
that the problem was correctly understood. This feeling was accompanied
by a peculiar feeling of relaxation and ease. "

"Truth seeks no corner." (Obs. Hi. 1, Ph. 4. Time — .) "Inner reading
with movements of speech organs as before. I imagined and constructed
a square in my mental vision. Then smoothing the four corners of the
square I shaped it into a circle, and got the following interpretation.
'Truth is perfect.' (After having reported his introspection, the ob-
server confessed that he began to doubt about his interpretation.)

With some few observers the use of one of these types of
imagery was so constant and so firmly established that they
seldom went over to the other form, regardless of the con-
creteness or abstractness of stimulus.

An extra observer had visual (or concrete) intermediary imagery nearly
all the time as shown in the following protocol:

Obs, Osh. Ph. No. i . ( Union is strength) 3"(stimulus spoken) . ' 'Saw white
grasping hands, immediately followed by the recollection of the scene of
the bridal ceremony in Longfellow's 'Launching of the Ship.' Then I
had the sense."

Ph. No. 2. ( Use makes perfectness) 3" (spoken) . ' 'I had a mental image of
each word in the sentence. The style of letters appeared in the form be-
tween printed type and handwriting. Then followed the visual image of
a vague shadowy human figure. Then the meaning.

Ph. No. 3. {Riches have wings) 4." (spoken). "Spoken sound remained.
I had a mental image of himting, and saw the white wing of a bird. Then
the meaning flashed in.

A STUDY OI^ UNDERSTANDING 35

Ph. No. 4. {Truth seeks no corner) 1' (spoken). I had an image of a
comer. There was no repetition of the heard words. I payed very little
attention to the words. The sense flashed.

Obs. Cff. on the other hand, had verbal imagery or inner
speech in most occasions in the understanding of unfamiliar
phrases.

Several of the other observers approached, in varying
degrees, to one or the other of these extreme cases, while
the rest represented the middle or neutral class, having no
special preference or inclination to either sort of imagery.
It was the imagery of this last class that was influenced
markedly by concreteness or abstractness in the stimulus.

Here we have, therefore, in these images a pretty definite
and also rather important criterion — important because it
directly concerns the thinking — for individual differences.
The general tendency seems to be that the frequency of verbal
and visual intermediary images corresponds nearly to that
of verbal and visual suggested images in cases of easy under-
standing.

3. Memory images. If the words or phrases were such
as had been experienced once, or a fe# times, before, memory
images often occurred in the form of the recollection of the
circumstances under which the words had been experienced,
regardless of individual differences and of the concreteness
or abstractness of the stimulus words. This kind of memory
images usually preceded the understanding, but sometimes
succeeded or occurred simultaneously with it.

Example: Synergism. (Obs. E. M. iii — i, 10.) "First a visual impression
of the word, then the pronunciation of the word. Then I saw vaguely
the place in a book where the word was treated, but the meaning did not
come to me. There was quite a noticeable feeling of strain on account of
my hard effort to recall the subject of the treatment in which the word
appeared. "

Noumenon. (Obs. Ky. II, w — 19.) "First the tendency to pronounce.
Then the realization that it means the opposite of phenomenon came.
It reminded me that I looked up that word in the dictionary about two
months ago. I had a distinct visual image of the place; I had been look-
ing at the dictionary in the library."

Thinking is so hard that many prefer judgment to it. (Obs. Ac. Ill — iv,
9, Time — 3.0".) "I read it and the meaning flashed into my mind at
once. But it was just a feeling. Then I had a very vague image of
the lecture room and of Dr. S. I felt the statement to be easy and
reacted. After I had reacted, in second thought I found it was not
sure. The reason of the occurrence of this image is that Dr. S talked about
the difficulty of thinking in common people who would rather decide with-
out thinking. I did not recall the idea of it very clearly, whence my hesita-
tion afterward. The tension was only kept up while I was reading and
considering. With the reaction it went away and some sense of satisfaction
came with it. But it was soon dispelled by the sense of uncertainty and
its accompanying feelings which persisted as in other cases of difficult
reactions.

36 KAKISE

The frequency of such memory imagery, with not quite
famiHar words or phrases, is well known to every one of us
especially in the study of a new language. With frequent
repetitions these definite associations fall away giving place
to mere feeling of recognition or of familiarity.

4. Synonyms. A. With words. With rather, but not
quite, familiar words, there occurred sometimes other more
familiar verbal images having similar meanings, or synonyms
in widest sense. They were synonyms proper, definitions,
and translations.

a, Synonyms proper, or words having similar meanings.

Apperception. (Obs. St. II, w — 18.) "There was a slight surprise.
The word was familiar. It brought the word 'attention'. Then I thought
of Dr. S explaining the meaning of the word as mental grasp of the whole.
I visualized Dr. S in his recitation room. "

b, Definitions : This form occurred especially with technical
terms, such as, apperception, parallelism, noumenon, etc.

These forms occurred mainly in observers belonging to the
verbal type. The observers belonging to visual or concrete
type visualized, in such cases, a concrete instance mostly in
the form of memory imagery.

For instance: Parallelism. (Obs. Ac. II, w — 32.) "I spelled and pro-
nounced the word mentally. I saw mentally Dr. S drawing on the black-
board the diagram on parallelism, and speaking of the theory, of the state-
ment of the relation between body and mind."

c, Translation. With foreign words this form frequently
occurred regardless of individual differences.

Color. (Obs. Kn. I, w — 10.) "Sound continued. Translated into
Japanese 'iro' which was internally spoken. Then the understanding,
and I thought of the red color of this card-box on the table."

B, With phrases. With unfamiliar phrases there occurred
similiar forms of synonyms nearly in the same way as in the
case of words.

a, Similiar phrases.

Example. A chariot will not go on a single wheel. (Obs. Cff. I, B — I,
Time — .) ' 'I tried to recognize the phrase, but failed. Then I recalled a
similar expression, 'A college without a library is like a wagon with three
wheels. ' The situation in which I had heard the proverb came into my
mind. I had a slight vague image of a chariot as described in a book.
Then I tried to compare two wheels to two qualities in a person's nature,
which balance each other. The word 'balance' was internally spoken.
I decided that the only meaning I can get out of it was that 'Balance is
necessary for success. ' The sentence was internally spoken. Feeling of
dissatisfaction with reference to my explanation. A feeling that something
is wrong with my interpretation."

The translation of foreign phrases was quite common.

For instance: Lahorare est orare. (Ill — ii, 6. Obs. Ch, Time, 1.9') "First
read it through and understood it without translating it. The under-

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 37

standing was not complete, so I read it second time translating into
English and I got the sense. I experienced two sorts of certainties, the
certainty about my knowledge of the Latin words, that is about what
they mean in English, and that of the sense, I was at the beginning a
little surprised to find a Latin phrase."

To conclude: Unfamiliarity with the stimulus has an im-
portant influence on the frequency and kinds of images.
I. Unfamiliar stimuli accentuate the images of the stimuli
in general. 2. Intermediary images in the forms of klang-
associations, memory images, synonyms, translations, defi-
nitions, etc., are direct results of unfamiliarity. 3. In the
paraphrase, there is a marked tendency to individual differ-
ences in the use of verbal and visual intermediary images.
4. The kinds and conditions of intermediary images both
with unfamiliar words and phrases seem, in the main, nearly
the same.^

§ 7. AUSFRAGE METHOD AND THE CUSTOMARY METHOD IN
STUDIES OF ASSOCIATION

The results of our study lead to the belief that the Ausfrage
method, such as was applied in the above study, is more
adapted, in its passive form of reaction, to the study of the
actual phenomena of association than the customary method
of the so-called association-experiment, because it has the
following advantages over the latter : i , Naturalness of asso-
ciations; 2, Clearness of the term suggestion; 3, Introspection;
4, Change of conditions. The customary method lacks almost
all these conditions essential to the study.

I. Naturalness of associations. The observer has only to
remain passive to the stimulus letting the associations or
suggestions go as they occur without interruption or dis-
turbance by will. With the customary method, on the con-
trary, the course of associations becomes complicated or
jeopardized in a double way: i, By the observer's mere inten-
tion or will to fulfill the artificial requirements of the experi-
ment, and 2, by the actual fulfillment, of them, a, The re-
action must be given in one word; b, The reaction- word must
be different from the stimulus- word ; c, The reaction- word
must stand for the first association; d, The reaction must be
as quick as possible. It is clear that the mere idea of fulfilling
these numerous requirements is itself sufficient to change the
observer's attitude from a passive or neutral state to an active
or selective one. As to the results of actual fulfillment of
requirement a, it may be asked how, in case the observer has
as an associated idea, a complex visual image or memory

^For the conditions of concomitant feelings see Part III, ^ 3.

38 KAKISK

image, he could express them in a single word without select-
ing at random the name of one of the represented objects or
a part of one or some idea such as could be promptly expressed.
Of requirement b, it may be said that the association existing
between an image and its name (as well as that between a
perception of an object and its name) is one of the strongest;
and the two operate reciprocally; a name usually calls up its
object-image and the object-image usually calls up its name.
When a name calls forth its object-image in the observer's
mind, the natural tendency is to name it again. But this
tendency must be checked, for a reaction by repeating the
stimulus word is forbidden, though, in such cases, it is psycho-
logically quite different from mere mechanical repetition or
imitation of speaker's voice. The result of the fulfillment of
the requirements c and d, i. e., of "the first association" and
of "promptness," is that the majority of reactions will neces-
sarily consist of independent verbal associations or what
Wundt calls articulatory or pseudo-associations (Scheinassocia-
tionen), since they are in general the first to arrive, but are
deprived of all psychical traits.

2. Clearness of the term ''Suggestion.'' Of whatever kinds
they may be, all conscious events are "suggestions" when
they succeed the perception of the stimulus-word. Their
classification and sorting and sifting are all left in the Ausfrage
experiment to the experimenter. The observer has only to
state all he has experienced in a certain interval of time, and
there is no room for ambiguity in the meaning of terms as such.
The term "associations," as it is used in the 'instruction'
in the common association experiment, is, on the contrary,
ambiguous and capable of more than one interpretation.
It may mean purely articulatory associations. It may mean
"real" associations i. e.y those with object-images. It may
mean associations between two object-images, as in the case
of so-called "association of ideas. " Finally, it may mean the
mixture of all these, the most natural to occur in real associ-
ations. Not only does each observer differ in these varieties
of possible interpretations, but also one and the same observer
may fluctuate, sometimes voluntarily sometimes involuntarily,
from one to the other of these interpretations according to
circumstances.^

^Sometime ago, to see how far the results would differ in the same obser-
vers according to the differences of these interpretations, I made tests with
several observers, in the first series of which the observers were requested
to react under the conditions of the traditional association-experiment.
In the second series, they were required to react, if possible, after having
some suggested object-images or ideas. The protocols, which were taken
by the observers after each reaction, show the result that in the first series

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 39

3. Introspection. In such complex processes as word-re-
action, nothing gives a more direct and trustworthy account
than the introspection of the observer himself. Objectively
alone (i. e. without this essential help of introspection), it is
almost impossible even to distinguish an immediate, or artic-
ulatory reaction from an intermediate, or object-reaction,
not to mention the tracing of the same reaction-words to
different sources, or of any further exploitation of associations
in general.

4. Change of Conditions. The occurrence of a special asso-
ciation or suggestion to the exclusion of others is directly con-
ditioned by the resultants of the three factors: Procedure
of experimentation, Kinds of material, and Individual differ-
ences. Change of conditions reveals to us the real causes of
certain forms of associations, which is not only ignored by,
but also will be difficult for, the customary method because
of the complication of many other factor^ such as were men-
tioned in item i.

So much for the comparison of the new and the customary
method in their application to the study of association. The
disadvantages of the latter are clear.

On Association Experiments in Applied Psychology

No one can deny that some important contributions to
psychology as well as to practical life have come from associa-
tion experiments in applied psychology. Their method, how-
ever, is not absolutely free from weaknesses, as it is based on
the same principles as the preceding.

Its study of individual differences of normal and abnormal
mentality consists of two processes: i. The collection of a
number of reaction-words by the customary association
method; and 2, the interpretation of the reaction- words.
This is undertaken as follows: First, such a logical scheme
!or classification of associations (according to the conceptual
relations of the reaction- words to the stimulus- word) is pre-
pared, as will comprehend all possible forms of reactions
under these categories. Then the relative frequency with
normal subjects of associations of the different sorts thus
classified is taken and serves as a standard with which to com-
pare the frequency with abnormal subjects. Now, regarding
some of the interpretations or generalizations attained through

the reactions consisted of diverse kinds of imagery, with the majority of
articulatory associations (purely verbal). In the second series, the ma-
li'jority of the reactions consisted of memory associations. This illustrates
how easy it is to get totally different kinds of associations from the same
observer by the mere difference in the interpretation of the term ' 'associa-
Ition. "

40 KAKISE

such steps the following remarks may be made. In the gener-
alization that children, imbeciles, idiots, epileptics, etc., react
frequently in phrase form, whereas with adults and normal
persons this form occurs very seldom if at all, the probable
interpretation is that the former do not perhaps understand,
or forget, or neglect the requirement for the use of a single
reaction- word, whereas the latter observe the rule. This fact
of disobedience, etc., itself may sometimes be regarded as a
sign of abnormality, etc., but nothing more , because phrase
associations are quite natural and frequent under certain
conditions, as is shown in our study. In like manner, the
generalization that children and imbeciles, etc., react frequently
by egocentric associations, whereas normal persons react very
seldom, if at all, in this form, cannot be interpreted as an
expression of a fair comparison of the actual associations,
because a single word by itself seldom furnishes a clue of
egocentricity to an onlooking psychologist, unless it is accom-
panied by a personal pronoun or some other word, that is,
unless it is put into a phrase form which a normal person
suppresses. This fact perhaps accounts for the exceedingly
small number of egocentric or personal associations with
normal persons which is reported in these studies. In some
cases its frequency goes as low as the ratio of once in two
thousand reactions.^ In fact with passive reactions in our
experiment and according to the direct report of the
observers, this form, which is merely our memory imagery,^
occurred in the ratio of once in every two reactions. A large
discrepancy indeed !

Reactions by repetition of the stimulus word, which are
regarded in association studies, as characterizing the reactions
of children and imbeciles, etc., were found as common and
natural associations with normal subjects in our experiment,
as was just stated. Reactions in the form of explanation or
definition, another characteristic of children, imbeciles, etc.,
were often found in our experiments, especially when the
stimulus word .was not quite familiar or it was a technical
term of the meaning of which the observer was not perfectly
sure. So that this tendency to explanatory reaction can
hardly be regarded as more than an indication of the degree
of acquaintanship with words, i. e., literacy or illiteracy.

To sum up, these so-called characteristic forms in children
and the abnormal can all be found in normal adults in their
natural associations, i. e., when they react according to natural

^Jung und Riklin: Diagnostische Assoziationsstudien. Leipzig, 1906-
Cf. p. 108.

2" Die Einstellung ist eine egozentrische, in sofem das Reizwort
vorziiglich subjective Erinnerungen anregt." Ibid., p. 117.

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 4 1

and spontaneous suggestions, as was the case with our experi-
ment, and do not react according to artificial and "sophisti-
cated" associations, i. e., by mere verbal associations, as is
the case in the customary experiment with normal observers
who are expert enough to obey the "rules. "

Remarks on association experiments as a means of diagnos-
ing crimes as well as diseases. The criteria for a so-called
significant or critical reaction are: i. Prolonged reaction
time, considered as due to the disturbances of the "emotional
complexes"; 2, Apparently unconnected reaction words
(having no conceptual connection with stimulus) considered
as a "Deck" or "evasive" reaction, when the experimenter
is unable to account for it, and as a suspicious reaction when
he is able to do so. Sometimes a succeeding reaction is ex-
amined according to these criteria, on the ground of the
phenomenon of "Perseveration." The final or crucial test
is furnished by the confession of the (supposed) criminal
or patient.

Now, most of our cases of dependent verbal imagery ac-
companying memory imagery, if they alone were announced by
the observer (i. e., memory associations), no matter whether
they are emotional or neutral, significant or insignificant,
would satisfy the two conditions just mentioned, for they
were slower than the simple articulatory associations and
lacked, as a rule, logical or outward connection to stimulus words. ^

These criteria are thus helpless in the distinguishing of
^emotional or significant memory associations from neutral
tor insignificant memory associations. They are effective only
[when the observers always react in the form of articulatory
or purely verbal associations with insignificant words and in
the form of memory associations with significant words. This
may naturally occur in laboratory tests, as the observers are
[trained to articulatory reactions with ordinary words, and are
laturally struck by recent memory associations of a few min-
futes date which, of course, are the strongest and most likely
j^to revive, no matter how insignificant the events were. But

^Experiments were made recently by Yerkes and Berry {Am. J. of

^sychoL, Jan., 1909) and also by Henke and Eddy (Psy. Rev., Nov., 1909)

to test the certainty of the diagnostic method in the discovery of certain

;ts executed by the observers shortly previous to the tests, with the same

isults in both studies, namely: that the method was certain when it had

do with the determination of two alternatives, even if the observers

'sometimes tried to "fool" the experimenters. In these cases, it must be

remembered, we are not dealing with the two forms of reactions, emotional

and neutral, as is commonly presumed, but, in fact, with only the two forms

of reactions, articulatory associations and memory associations (in these

cases, with very recent memory associations), as also is plainly seen in the

reading of the tables and introspections in these articles.

42 KAKISB

such is hardly to be expected in the case of patients and crimi-
nals in actual practice, because they may be expected to
react very frequently in the form of real or memory associa-
tions to ordinary words.

Part III

Analysis of run Simultaneous Concomitants

The foregoing studies have dealt with the conditions of the
frequency of images which either preceded or succeeded under-
standing. In this last part of the study I shall examine the
nature of "meaning" as a simultaneous concomitant of under-
standing, tracing up the following three questions, i . Whether
the concomitants precede or succeed or occur simultaneously
with understanding. The preceding and succeeding con-
comitants may be eliminated from the experience of under-
standing itself, whatever relations they may have to the latter.
2. Whether or not the simultaneous concomitants are pe-
culiar to understanding or meaning. Those which occur as
fully even when there is no understanding may be eliminated
from the characteristic constituents of meaning, no matter
whether they are constant or not. 3. Whether or not the
constituents of meaning can ultimately be reduced to the
psychological elements, i. e., pure sensations and feelings.
The protocols of the foregoing experiments directly answer
the purpose of the first question, i. e., the temporal succession
of the concomitants. For the second question an additional
experiment was made. The answer to the third question
consists mainly of inferences from all the preceding results
of introspections. But before entering on the discussion of
our results let us take a glance at the main views on the psy-
chology of thought and especially of meaning held by the
modern psychologists to whose work we shall have frequent
occasion to refer.

§ I. AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE VARIOUS VIEWS OF
THOUGHT

I . Thought as identical with concrete representations (images) .
Locke speaks of the possibility of our having pure general
ideas free from any particular representations, for instance,
of "a triangle which must be neither oblique nor rectangle,
neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and nony
of these at once."^ Berkeley who was quite surprised be
this conceptualistic view of Locke, says, "the idea of man
that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black,
or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a

^Essay, Bk. iv. ch. 7.

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 43

middle-sized man."^ For him meaning, concept or general
ideas, as such, have no psychical existence except in concrete
representations .

Among modern psychologists James, siding with Locke in
opposition to Berkeley, says, "The note so bravely struck
by Berkeley could not, however, be well sustained in the face
of the fact patent to every human being that we can mean
color without meaning any particular color, and stature with-
out meaning any particular height."^

Binet in regard to Berkeley's proposition takes, like James,
the negative side and refers to two cases as an e^perimentum
cruets against it, i. e., cases where we have particular and precise
images without having any meaning or thought, and cases
where we have thought or meaning without having any partic-
ular or precise images. He maintains, also, that ' pensSe
generale' can be properly explained by neither conceptualism
nor nominalism though probably by " intentionalism " which
he himself proposes.^ Biihler speaks of both being right and
wrong, that Berkeley is right in his negation of sensuous
representation of a general triangle, and Locke is right in
his assertion of the existence of the pure meaning of a triangle
without any sensory element, and also that the question of
general ideas is totally different from that of abstract ideas
or (his) thought or knowledge {Wis sen). ^

2 . Thought as identieal with the verbal image. This question
first took its definite shape in the controversy between Max
Miiller on one side and Galton, Romanes and others on the
other. The former maintains that all thinking when intro-
spectively viewed is merely inner speech. The latter refer,
to cases of chess playing, of the construction of machines in
purely visual terms, and also to the framing or searching
for the words for an existent thought, a fact quite common
to us, as insurmountable difficulties in the way of this propo-
sition.^

Identity of abstract thought and verbal image. Taine speaks
of his abstract ideas as quite different from a particular repre-
sentation or even from the "confused and floating repre-
sentation of particular araucaria," alluding to the general
ideas of Galton and Huxley.*^ He says, "We think the ab-
stract character of things by means of abstract names which
are our abstract ideas, and the formation of our ideas are

^Principle, Introduction, lo, 13.

^Ibid., Vol. I, p. 470.

^Binet A.: L'etude experimentale de I'intelligence, 1903, p. 151 ff.

*Ibid., p. 363-364-

*Max Miiller: ibid., appendix (1887).

^^'intelligence, II, 139.

44 KAKISE

merely the formation of names which substitute them."^
Among present authors, Wundt says, "We do not always
think in words; we can easily recall actually experienced or
dreamed events in mere visual terms. But with abstract
ideas, we usually think in words often involuntarily accom-
panied by the visual image of the words. "^ Decidedly op-
posing this theory, James says, "The opinion as stoutly
professed by many that language is essential to thought
seems to have this much of truth in it, that all our inward
images tend invincibly to attach themselves to something
sensible, so as to gain in corporeity and life. Words serve
this purpose, gestures serve it, stones, straws, chalk-marks,
any thing will do . . . * The bricks are alive to tell the
tale'."^ Biihler refers to the fact that the verbal image
occurs in thinking only in a sporadic way and is broken and
fragmentary without running parallel with thought processes.*
Ribot discards the theory simply as "inaccep table. "^ The
other authors of the school of Wurzburg, e. g., Marbe, Orth,
Ach, Watt and Messer, seem to agree in the rejection of this
theory. On the other hand, recently Dearborn has attributed
the utmost importance to verbal images even in the compari-
son of ink-blots by the eye. He reports that he found in
his experiment the presence of verbal images, in cases where
the judgments were correct, in all of the numerous observers,
except one, who had just a "true feeling" of likeness and un-
likeness. This observer was, nevertheless, the most successful
of all in the judgments.^

3. Thought as identical with the compounds of the three
dimensional feelings. Wundt calls those "intellectual feel-
ings" which attend complex intellectual processes. "They
are in general complex total feelings, into which simple feel-
ings and ideational feelings {Vorstellungsgefuhle) enter as
components."^ "The feeling of doubt is an oscillating emo-
tional state (Gemutzustand)."^ The "feeling of agreement
(which is a kind of Vorstellungsgefuhl) is introspectively
merely a feeling of relaxation with heightened intensity."'
"The feeling of recognition (Wiedererkennunsggefuhl) is a

^Ib., I, ist ed., 254.

^Grundziige der Physiologischen Psychologic, 1902, 5th cd.. Vol. Ill,

p. 543-

^James, W.: Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, p. 305.

'lb., 317.

•^"Idees Generales," p. 100.

^G. V. N. Dearborn: Experiment on the Judgment of lyikeness and Un-
likeness of Visual Form, Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific
Method, Feb., 19 10, p. 60.

Ub., Vol. III. p. 264. 8/6., 265. m., 510.

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 45

subjective symptom belonging not to the ideational pro-
cesses but to the subjective side of the processes," — the
processes of assimilation of ideas. ^ Its subjective quality
"seems a sudden and unhindered change between tension and
relaxation, which under circumstances can be joined by other
feeling qualities."^

Most of the Wiirzburg authors discredit this Wundtian
view of intellectual or cognitive feelings. Orth in his analysis
of *' Bewusstseinslage" (another name proposed by Marbe
for intellectual feelings) as introspectively observed by him-
self and others while serving as observers in Marbe's study
on judgment, finds them related to cognition and therefore
implicitly to sensation rather than to feeling, and having
reference to the object rather than to the subject.^ Doubt,
according to him is, introspectively, thoroughly different from
sensations, representations, and feelings proper; and the same
with feelings of certainty, contrast, agreement, etc.* "What
Bewusstseinslagen really are," he says in summarizing, "re-
mains to be investigated. So much seems to be certain,
that they resisted our analysis and that they are not at all
merely another name for the psychical facts that Wundt
comprehends under his two new feeling directions, for this
contradicts, not only self- observation, but also their great
manifoldness."^

4. Thought as judgment and as knowledge is beyond psy-
chical experience. Marbe in his study on judgment arrived
at the conclusion that "there are no psychical conditions of
judgment in general that give them the character of judgment
as such."^ And the same with understanding of judgment.^
Accounting for this, he says, "thus we see very easily that
understanding of judgment can never be found in conscious-
ness, because it rests upon knowledge, and knowledge is never
given in consciousness."* As the processes of judgment are
totally beyond consciousness, so in its study there is as little
left for psychologists as of physiological chemistry for chem-
ists.® Later authors of the Wiirzburg school agree in criti-
cising Marbe's reflexive theory of judgment as due to too
easy stimuli. Biihler simply speaks of his "thought" as
actual Wissen and not such potential Wissen as Marbe means. ^°
James speaks of his feeling of tendency (such as feeling of
familiarity, recognition, etc.) as not a "psychical zero," but
a "psychical fact" though vague and difficult to name.^^

^Ih., 536.

'Ih; 537.

^Orth, J.: Gefuhl und Bewusstseinslage. Berlin, 1903, p. 73.

*Ib., 71. ^Op. ciU, p. 42, 43. 8/6., p.92. "0/>. cit., p. 361.

Hh., 128. Uh., p. 83. Hb., p. 96. "/6., Vol. i, p. 254.

46 KAKIS^

5. Thought as identical with reproductive tendencies. Ach
calls imageless thought or pure cognition free from any
" phenomenological constituents, such as visual, acoustic,
kinesthetic sensations or images," ''Bewusstheit,*'^ He says,
"When a word, for instance, 'bell' is presented to me and I
apperceive the symbol, I understand what it means. I have
the Bewusstheit of meaning. According to the theory of
Bewusstheit, it is not necessary for understanding that one
have representations . . . such as auditory or visual images
of a bell . . . Bach representation which is given in con-
sciousness, for instance, the impression of the stimulus word
'bell,' puts, as is well known, a number of associated repre-
sentations into the state of readiness. This putting-into-
readiness of representations, or excitation of reproductive
tendencies, suffices for the conscious experience (representa-
tion) of what we call sense or meaning."^ In criticism of this
view. Watt, speaking of meaning as different from the vague,
reverberating associations or tendencies, says: "Some main-
tain that this is a mass of vague associations, word-associa-
tions or others, but this is not clear according to the protocol.
It rather points to the fact that a concept, such as appear in
free self-observation, is something different from vague re-
verberating associations or a certain number of them.'"
Biihler excluding the mere consciousness of tendencies from
his 'thought' or 'meaning,' says: "Thought is nothing vague
or half-conscious but something clear, and not a sum but a
unity. "^ Titchener speaks of the necessity, in the awareness
of meaning, of the co-operation of the both Ach's awareness
of reproductive tendencies or 'meaning' and his awareness
of relation.^

6. Thought as identical with ''fringe' '-experiences. Accord-
ing to James, thought as well as meaning is the feeling of
relation which is the felt "glow," "fringe," "echo," or "re-
verberation" and the transitive experience of mind in dis-
tinction to substantive or static experience, e. g., images,
sensations, etc. He says, "The meaning of the words which
we think we understand as we read, is a sign of direction, . .
or, a bare image of logical movement which is a psychic
transition, always on the wing, so to speak, and not to be

^Ach, N.: Ueber die Willenstatigkeit und das Denken. Gottingen,
1905. p. 210.

2/6., 216-217.

'Watt, J.: Experimentelle Beitrage zur einer Theorie des Denkens,
Archiv f. d. gesamte Psychologie, 1905 (4), 289 fif., p. 434.

'^Ibid, p. 326.

^Titchener, E. B,: Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the
Thought-processes, N. Y., 1909, p. 107.

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 47

glimpsed except in flight."^ Further characterizing meaning
as feeHng of tendencies, he says, "The sense of our meaning
is an entirely peculiar element of thought . . . It is one
of those evanescent and transitive facts of mind which in-
trospection cannot turn round upon ... . It pertains to
the fringe of the subjective state, and is a feeling of tendency,
whose netu'al counterpart is undoubtedly a lot of dawning
and dying processes too faint and complex to be traced. "^
He further characterizes this feeling of tendency as a tendency
of a "nascent image, "^ as a feeling antecedent to recall, such
as a "ringing in the ear," or "dancing in one's mind" of a
forgotten name or word, or of the rhythm of a verse, as the
feeling of recognition or familiarity which is a "submaximal
excitement of wide-spreading association brain-tracts."^

Thus we see Ach's conception of * reproductive tendencies '
is quite similar to the "fringe" experiences of James. Ribot's
view seems also to approach these conceptions when he con-
siders meaning or concept as an "unconscious substratum,
organized and potential knowledge, harmonics which give deto-
nation to the word."^ Hoernle referring to James, says that
James reverses the fact of ordinary experiences where "we
notice more of meaning than words. Meaning stands in
the foreground and images or ideas or sensory elements in
the background of consciousness."^

7. Thought as well as meaning as a "transcending" experience.
According to Messer, sensations and sensation-complexes
are perceived merely as contents of consciousness; "they
exist or do not exist, but do not point beyond themselves;
they do not mean." Thought as also perception, etc., on
the contrary, possesses a characteristic attribute of 'tran-
scendence.' "No thought thinks upon itself, i. e., on the
[constituents of consciousness which we can examine in direct
retrospection." "He who, thinks," he continues, "that he
lould sufficiently characterize thought and perception simply
)y looking at the existent sensations and images, is like one
[who believes he could find the value of money by merely
[examining its material."^ Further, in regard to the experience
)f understanding or meaning, he distinguishes two forms
Lttending the reaction to the same stimulus word: i, general
mderstanding which is further unanalyzable; and 2, more
Iconscious and definite understanding which, he says, some-
times is "not conditioned by the Aufgabe [problem or instruc-
tion], but is such as would be explained by the predominance

^Ib., Vol. I, p. 253. ^Ib., p. 132.

^Ib., Vol. I, p. 472. ^Mind, Jan., 1907.

5/6., Vol. I, p. 254. Ub., 113.
^Ib., p. 258.

48 KAKISE

of the reproductive tendencies in the general constellation."^
But "the reaction wherein the Aufgabe enters and the acts
of acceptance and rejection take place, apparently cannot
be explained by the mechanism of mere reproduction and
association, and herein lies the justification for distinguishing
the processes of thought from those of pure associative
reproduction. "2

8. Thought as a third psychical element. Biihler, as the
result of his study on thought, came to the conclusion that
thought-experiences are neither analyzable to sensations nor
feelings but so unique and specific that they should be con-
sidered as compounds of a third psychical unit or element,
i. e., Gedanke.^ Thought, according to him, is act of knowing
{Wissensact) ^ Meaning, which is a conscious knowing, can-
not be represented, but only known.* He says that to ask
one to explain knowing or thought merely by the terms of
the quality and intensity of existent sensations is the same as
asking one to explain depth by the terms of height and width.®

9. Thought as indescribable. All the preceding authors who
regard thought as something different from image or feeling
proper, agree in finding it as further indescribable. Marbe,
in regard to his Bewusstseinslage speaks of conscious facts
whose contents either totally escape from further characteri-
zation or are difficult to approach. Orth says, "Those
Bewusstseinslagen which were observed by Marbe and by us
are of diverse kinds and have only this point in common that
they represent psychical facts which could not be further
analyzed by us.*" Ach says, the description of these Bewusst-
heiten by the observers is very difficult because of the difficulty
of verbal expression, as they lack " phenomenological repre-
sentations" (sensations and images, etc.).* Watt, toward the
end of his study says," An analytical introspection in this direc-
tion is exceedingly difficult . . . We know psychologically as
much as nothing about the nature of meaning-consciousnesses
which accompany an abstract word."^ Messer speaks of
thought-experiences as further unanalyzable. James speaks
repeatedly of the difficulty of description of fringe- experiences ;
their multitudinous nuances or configurations can be only
felt.

10. Thought, also meaning experiences, as identical with
kinesthetic images. Taking a quite different view from the
preceding authors, Titchener, in his recent book on thought-
processes, declares that all these authors or their observers
who find thought-experiences something different from the

17&..

, 82

*ib.,

361.

Uh.

, p-

70.

Uh.,

> p.

122.

Uh.,

363.

^Ib.

,p.

41.

m.,

329-

m..

361.

m.,

435.

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 49

existent elements, e. g., sensations, images, etc., are victims
of stimulus-error; that they do not separate or abstract what
they infer from what they actually experience or have, but
think them together, just as an observer in color-experiments,
instead of reacting to an abstracted red sensation, reacts to
the red paper, an object, the result of both sensations and
inferences; and that the results of their introspections are
mere intimations or indications, and not the descriptions of
what they have experienced*.^ Referring to James's feeling of
relation, he says "the phrase 'feeling of relation' is no more
unequivocal, as a psychological term, than the phrase 'idea
of object' or 'consciousness of meaning.' It carries an inti-
mation, an indication, a statement-about ; it does not describe.
And the question for psychology is precisely that: what we
experience when we have a feeling of relation? "^ The con-
sciousnesses of thought when described are merely kinesthetic
images or sensations. All other consciousnesses are not the
direct data of introspection but the results of addition by
reflection and inference.^ "And all such 'feelings,' he says,
— feelings of if, and why, and nevertheless, and therefore,
normally take the form, in my experience, of motor empathy.
I act the feeling out, though as a rule in imaginal and not in
sensational terms. "^ Regarding the distinction between kin-
esthetic images and sensations, he says, "Actual movement
always brings into play more muscles than are necessary,
while ideal movement is confined to the precise group of
muscles concerned. ' ' ' ' The sensed or actual nod (that signifies
assent to an argument, and frown (that signifies perplexity)
are coarse and rough in outlines; the imagined or mental
nod and frown are clean and delicately traced."^ He wonders
why James does not take the same introspective view of
his ' feeling of relation ' as he does with the feeling of a * central
active self' in which he (James) finds nothing but 'bodily
processes for the most part taking place within the head.'^

§2. CONTENTS OF MEANING WITH FAMILIAR STIMULI

What are the actual contents of consciousness at the instant
of understanding, the direct psychical experiences which con-
stitute the experience of understanding familiar and easy words
or phrases? The protocols of all the foregoing experiments
show that there was not one kind of such content only but
several. Arranged according to the general order of succession
or quickness, they were : i , Feeling of familiarity or recogni-

^Ib., p. 145. *lb., p. 186, 187.

'/6., p. 185, ^Ib., p. 20-22.

Ub., p. 185. «/&., p. 30.

Journal — 4

50 KAKISE

tion of the stimulus; 2, Feeling of concept; 3, Feeling of content;
4, Feeling of direction; 5 Half- developed or indefinite images;
and lastly 6, Fully developed or definite images.

1. Pure Feeling of Familiarity. With a very familiar
word or phrase, or in repeated reaction to a stimulus pre-
viously understood, the occurrence of just the feeling of
familiarity alone or the recognition of the stimulus as the one
understood before, was sufficient to release the reaction or
cause the stimulus to be felt as understood.

For instance: Mountain. (Obs. Sn. Ill — ii, Time — 0.9".) "I read it in
inner speech and reacted as the word seemed famiHar to me, i. e., when the
feeling of f amiUarity came. I did n't get any further meaning. No imagery,
no associations until after I reacted."

Psychology. (Obs. Ch. Ill — iii — 15, Time — 0.5".) "The first feeling
of recognition of the form of the word was followed instantly by the feeling
of familiarity. There was no imagery. In this particular case it appears
that the feeling of recognition and the feeling of familiarity are the same
thing. There wasn't any imagery, any attempt to define. I recog^nized
the word. Absolute certainty as to understanding."

This type of meaning was quite common and frequent with
all observers and regardless of the concreteness or abstract-
ness of the stimulus word. It was the first and quickest to
occur of all the types of meaning. It seldom occurred,
however, with the mere visual perception of the stimulus word
or phrase. Audi to-motor reading of the stimulus was necessary
to release the reaction even in this type. In active reactions
and with familiar abstract stimuli, it was seldom followed by
any suggested images in any observers. In active reactions
with familiar concrete stimuli, it was sometimes followed,
especially with observers of concrete (or visual) type, by
suggested images which, however, always occurred after the
reaction. And such was the case with all the passive reactions
where the suggested images made the terminus of the reaction
occurring long after the entrance of the feeling of familiarity
or recognition.

2. Pure feeling of Concept or Meaning. In the preceding
case both sensory and conceptual familiarity or recognition
fused so closely together that there is difi&culty of analysis,
though sensory familiarity evidently predominates in such
reflexive reactions. With less familiar stimuli, or when the
observers waited longer with very familiar stimuli, these two
generally became separated and occurred in succession, the
sensory recognition always preceding the conceptual.

Example: Pomology. (Obs. Ac. II, w — 10.) "Recognized the word
and thought it familiar, but on closer examination, I found that I could not
understand its meaning."

Heaven, (Obs. Cf. II, w-5.) Did not apperceive the word for a minute.
I was not quite attentive. Then I got a purely verbal meaning of it with-
out imagery. By verbal meaning I mean I first recognized it. Then I

A STUDY OP UNDERSTANDING 5 1

had a slight feeling. It was not at all a sort of tridimensional feeling, but
an idea of something sacred. But I call it a feeling because it was not
definite. "

In its frequency and conditions of occurrence, this type of
meaning was practically the same as the preceding one except
that the latter always preceded the former in case of con-
currence.

3. Pure Feeling of Content. To this belong the experiences
which the observers expressed as "full of meaning, " or "con-
tent," having "rich associations, " or " coming associations, "
etc., which were accompanied by no particular images or
associations. The chief marks were the richness and poorness
of content. A feeling of rich content was generally found
with stimuli designating topics which observers were interested
in or familiar with, and a feeling of poor content with the stimuli
indicating uninteresting or unfamiliar subjects.

Example: Peace. (Obs. Sn. Ill, — iii — 5. Time — i.o".) "I read it in
inner speech. But the inner speech was not very clear this time. And
I think, I had a feeling of the meaning of the word. Whether it was
different from the feeling of familiarity I am not sure. But it seems to
have been something more than a mere feeling of familiarity. This some-
thing may be some feeling of moving toward something, or of some possi-
bility of development and is very hard to describe."

House. (Obs. Cff. I, w — 3.) "Perception of my voice [inner speech].
Then came the feeling of familiarity. That feeling seems to me to be
composed of various kinds of images not yet actual. I would call it almost
composite. If I should think about it longer I would have some particular
images out of it. "

4. Feeling of Direction. This feeling is the experience of
the mind's pointing to or turning in the direction of the place
where a particular object or event referred to by the stimulus
was experienced. It is an incipient form of object imagery.

Pedagogy. (Obs. Sn. Ill — ^i — 14.) "I read the word in inner speech but
not very loud and was not quite sure whether I read it correctly. So I
read it again and had a faint feeling that I knew the word. Then I thought
of the direction of the Dr. B's room and probably also had a very vague
suggestion of Dr. B himself. The consciousness of direction was very clear.
I had the word 'teaching, ' probably in inner speech. "

Example: Head. (Obs. Cff. I.) "Always an after effect of sound. I
listened for the after effect before the recognition of the meaning. Then
came the feeling of familiarity followed by a vague idea, almost a feeling of
location of upward, top of human head, idea of something above. I had
no definite image."

This experience occurred frequently, especially among ob-
servers belonging to a rather non-visual type. In passive
reactions, and especially with observers belonging rather to
the visual or concrete type this experience was, in general,
replaced by rather fully-developed object images.

5. Half-developed Images. These were faint and vague
representations of objects or circumstances, which, on account

52 KAKISS

of faintness or indefiniteness of imagery, were sometimes
termed by the observers "ideas, " something "thought of, ' 'etc.
This was especially the case with a quick recapitulation of
many particular past experiences.

Example: Memory, (Obs. L. M. Ill — i, 4.) "First a visual impression
of the word. Then reading in inner speech. And then I had a bird's-eye
view of all that I have been working at for several weeks; I have that
subject. Some pleasure and satisfaction in seeing the word. This word
was very full of meaning, but there were no particular visual images. Its
meaning could not be expressed in so short a time."

Philosophy. (Obs. Ac. II, w— 65.) "I thought of Plato, Aristotle, Kant
and Hegel in connection with their productions. No definite visual or
auditory elements.

6. Fully-developed Images. These are suggested object-
images as well as verbal images such as have already been
described (Part II, above). They were in general the slowest
to occur. They were generally found in passive (or prolonged)
reactions and seldom in active (or quick) reactions to familiar
stimuli. In case of concurrence with the preceding experiences,
they were the last to occur, that is, they made the terminus
of the reaction.

Conclusions

1. These results negate the theory of the identity of
thought with concrete representations and also the theory of
the identity of thought with verbal images so far as meaning
experiences are concerned, as these images are a part only of
our fully-developed images, — one of the six types of meaning.

2. A chief condition determining whether or not one shall
have a definite image (visual or verbal or other), in under-
standing familiar words or phrases, is the length of time the
process continues. If one reacts quickly, i. e., at the stage of
familiarity, or concept, etc., one will not have, as a rule, any
definite images, regardless of individual differences, and of
the concreteness or abstractness of the stimulus. If one
dwells longer upon the stimulus one will usually have some
particular representations, the majority of which will be re-
cent memorial associations, in predominantly visual form, in
the case of visualizers, and in predominantly verbal form in
the case of verbalists, regardless of the concreteness or ab-
stractness of the stimulus.

Remark: Ach suggests that pure meaning appears most prominently
in the quick reading of a text (op. cit., p. 261). James speaks of the two
kinds of meaning, i. e., dynamic meaning which attends the understanding
of a phrase and is "usually reduced to the bare fringe," and static mean-
ing which attends the understanding of an isolated word and is usually
accompanied by object-images when the word is concrete and by nothing
except word-images when it is abstract." (op. ciL, p. 265). Wundt says,
' 'Whether the complication of these elements, ideas, word-sound and word-

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 53

script, occurs completely in our consciousness depends besides on which
of these elements acts upon us directly in sense perception. The ideas can
stay isolated under certain circumstances. The word-sound generally
calls forth the object-image. The word-script awakens the word-sound
with the object-image." {Op. cit., vol. Ill, p, 543.) John Mill commenting
upon Locke and Berkeley's difference of opinion, says, ' 'While the concen-
tration of attention lasts, if it is sufficiently intense, we may be temporarily
unconscious of any of the other attributes, and may really for a brief in-
terval have nothing present to our mind but the attributes constituent of
the concepts " (Examination of Hamilton, p, 393). This last view seems
to come the nearest to the above result of ours if we change the indefinite
expression "intense" in the quotation into "brief".

I §3. SELECTIVE EXPERIENCES WITH UNFAMILIAR STIMULI

In the understanding of unfamiliar stimuli where the mean-
ing did not come promptly there appeared in consciousness
a new group of experiences in the form of judgments, i. e.,
of approval or rejection of the contents or suggestions as
right or wrong. They were experiences or consciousnesses of
searching, waiting, selection, rejection, certainty, uncertainty,
hesitation, etc., generally attended by feelings of tension
and relaxation. These are sometimes regarded as character-
istic constituents of meaning. A special test was therefore
made in connection with the third experiment to determine
how far these experiences are alike and how far they are differ-
ent in different types of thinking, i. e., in the understanding
of phrases and words and in the identification of non-sense
stimuli.

Procedure. In the third experiment, beside English words
and phrases, a number of Chinese characters, as a kind of
nonsense stimulus, were added. With these characters, in-
stead of understanding, the process was one of identification.
The five English speaking observers were requested to com-
pare the second of the two stimuli with the first, or standard,
and to tell whether the two were identical or different. The
standard was exposed for one second and immediately after-
ward the comparison stimulus which was sometimes identical
and sometimes not identical, but always quite similar in
shape to the standard. The reactions, all active, were made
by pressing an electric key. Introspections were taken in
the same way as with understanding-reactions. Easy and
difficult stimuli were made by different combinations of com-
plexity and irregularity in the shapes and in the degree of
resemblance between the standard and comparison stimulus.
For instance the following are some of the pairs thus matched,
having shapes apparently similar but not identical.

54 KAKISE

These identification-reactions and the two forms of under-
standing-reactions, i. e., of words and of phrases, were arranged
in such a way that a difficult reaction of one form was fol-
lowed by a difficult reaction of the other form; and the same
with easy reactions. The observers were requested, after
giving the introspections of each reaction, to report, in addi-
tion, what processes (or experiences) in the two successive
reactions they found similar in their abstracted forms and
what different.

The following is a sample of such protocols:

A. Comparison of Difficult Reactions

Understanding. Nostrum, (Obs. Ch. Ill — iii, 2, time — 2.0")- "Feel-
ing of having seen the word came first. I read the word through once.
First suggestion was that of the Latin word. And there I got the mean-
ing of the word but not quite certainly. A little bit of feeling of tension is
staying. I was n't quite sm^e of the content. I interpreted it as a sort of
fake medicine. "

Identification. ^ ^ (Obs. Ch., time—) "Not sure. What I tried
to do was to look at the separation of the figure rather than to judge by
general impression, and found that some are the same while others are
doubtful. So that the feeling is one of uncertainty, doubt in this case.
Also there was a feeling of strain, tension with unpleasant coloration. "

Comparison of the experiences. ' 'The feeling of searching for something,
of groping is quite similar with the cases of hard English words. And also
the feeling of strain, tension with unpleasant coloration, is just the same. "

B. Comparison op Easy Reactions

Identification. "^ JF^ (Obs. Ch. time, i.o") "Different. The im-
pression came from the general form and not from any one particular line.
Feeling of certainty is rather complete. At first there was a feeling of
strain and tension which dropped as soon as I reacted. The experiment
ended with a little pleasure, because I recognized the difference. So this
was a personal feeling attached to the consciousness of success. "

Understanding. Peace. (Obs, Ch. time — i.o") "I read it and rec-
ognized it at once. No feeling of tension. There was slight visual
imagery. Feeling of certainty as to the meaning of the word. In this
feeling of certainty there was the feeling that rich associations could be
started."

Comparison of the experiences. "The feeling of certainty with the
Chinese characters lacks the feeling of rich content. In the Chinese char-
acters there is a feeling of recognition in the strict sense, while in the Eng-
lish there is no revival of the occasion when I first saw it. Thus the
recognition of the Chinese character is much more a matter of sensory
form than of content."

Results of the Comparison

A. Feeling of tension and relaxation. In regard to the
qualitative differences of these feelings, all observers agreed
in finding them very similar or even identical in character
in the three types of thinking: identification of characters,
understanding of words, and understanding of phrases. In

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 55

regard to the quantitative dififerences, they found, as a rule,
more tension in difficult understanding than in difficult iden-
tification, and in difficult understanding of phrases than in
that of words. 1

B. Feeling of content. All observers agreed in finding
decidedly richer content feelings with words and phrases in
general and very poor content feeling or none at all with the
characters. ^^ In words and phrases, they found words fre-
quently to have richer content than phrases. The content
feeling differed according to the particular words and phrases.

C. Feelings of certainty and uncertainty, i. e., of under-
standing and of judgment. Three observers found these
feelings quite similar or identical in the three types of thinking,
whereas the other two observers found them rather different,
not only among the three types of thinking, but also from
stimulus to stimulus in each type of thinking.

It appears that the other two observers, instead of com-
paring these feelings in their pure and abstracted forms,
compared them in their complex and concrete forms. This
is plainly seen from the fact that in accounting for the differ-
ences they referred either to the differences in content feelings
or to those in associations or images. For instance:

Obs. Ch. (Ill — iv, 2.) Comparison — "As to the feeling of certainty
this experience [Chinese character] is very much less complex. It simply
consists in the recognition of the visual image and practically no associa-
tions at all."

Obs. Sn. (Ill — iii, 13 — 14.) Comparison — "This feeling of certainty
[with the Chinese character] in my mind is connected with the seeing very
clearly the whole space where I expected to see a black spot. The cer-
tainty in the case of the word is connected with the feeling of easy associa-
tion. In this case it is only a feeling of difference."

The following is a typical case of the comparison of these
feelings in their abstracted form, which was the method of the
other three observers.

Obs. L. M. (Ill — iii, 3.) "There was no meaning except the visual
impression. When my eye traversed the second figure and came to the
place where it differs I felt that there was something wrong. And then I
called up the visual image of the first one and recognized the difference,
with a feeling of certainty. This feeling itself is just the same as in the
cases of the recognition of English words. "

The author thus believes this discrepancy is merely an

^ The maximum effort or tension was experienced not with absolutely
difficult or unfamiliar stimuli but with partially unfamiliar ones. With
totally difficult stimuli, observers abandoned the attempt as hopeless or
too complex and therefore promptly relaxed.

2 When the reproduction of the standard was faint or merely felt, it
was sometimes regarded as having a very poor content; when the reproduc-
tion was more or less distinct it was regarded as having no content, but
simply as an image.

56 KAKIS^

apparent one arising out of the differences in the ways of
abstracting the phenomenon to be observed/

So much for the experiences compared by all observers.
The other similar experiences, which were compared by some
observers and viewed as similar, or practically the same, in
their abstracted forms, were feelings of searching, groping,
waiting and the peculiar, though frequent, experience of the
sudden appearance of images or ideas, feelings of satisfaction,
dissatisfaction, etc. These results point to the following
conclusions: i. Selective experiences, as also feelings of
tension and relaxation, cannot be regarded as either the
sole or the characteristic constituents of the meaning of
words or phrases, for they were found as well in reactions
to nonsense stimuli. 2. On the other hand, as the feeling
of content was found to be not merely different but totally
lacking in the reactions to meaningless stimuli, this feeling may
with great probability be regarded as one of the characteristic
constituents of the meaning of words and phrases.

§4. UI^TIMATE CONSTITUENTS OF MEANING

What are the ultimate psychical constituents of the six
types of meaning mentioned above, i. e., can they be reduced
to psychological "elements," to three dimensional feeling and
sensation having two attributes, quality and intensity, or to
a specific image or feeling? This point the observers were not
asked to decide. But from the results of all the foregoing
study, the writer may make certain inferences. Let us start at
the last type of meaning.

(i.) Fully Developed Images. Of these, visual images of
objects, verbal images (in audito-motor or visual terms),
suggested organic (as well as kinesthetic) images are so clear
in their ultimate constituents as to need no comment here.
The constituents of memory images were complex and their
dominant factors, moreover, varied according to individual
observers and circumstances; but, it seems, a visual factor,
though sometimes faint and incipient, was a constant one, for a
memory image has always a spatial localization, i. e., repro-
duces the place where the object or event was experienced.,
The same thing may be said about the constituents of the

*It is interesting to note that Rousmaniere had the same result in a
similiar experiment. The report says in part: "The subjects did not
agree in their answers to the first problem. Some found not only that the
certainty connected with their belief in the results of their addition seemed
to be of a distinct type from that connected immediately with the sense
of sight itself .... Others found but one kind of a feeling of
certainty." (Harvard Psychol. Studies, Vol. II, p. 279.)

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 57

"indicative images" which are the representation of, or a
pointing to, the concrete objects near at hand.

(2.) Half-developed Images. Their constituents, in the
main, seem to be the same as those of fully developed images,
except that in the former they are faint and incipient.

(3.) Feeling of Direction. This made an incipient stage
of object-images having particular localizations, i. e., memory
images and indicative images. Consequently a visual factor
in its faint and incipient form seems to be a constant factor.
In the case of some observers the feeling was sometimes ex-
perienced predominantly in kinesthetic terms.

For instance: Duty before pleasure. (Obs. Sn. Ill — ii — 15.) "I expected
a sentence. I read it in inner speech and had the familiarity-feeling for
it and at about the same time, perhaps a little bit later, I had that sort of
classification which I frequently have in such cases, and thought this is a
moral maxim. Then I tried to get more special cases of some duty which
I have. I tried to think, as an example of this, of something connected
with my own affairs, but I did n't succeed very well, I had a very vague and
indefinite idea of 'duty ' and 'pleasure ' and there was a kind of location
here in the direction of my office. I didn't get any further idea about it,
except the thought about something I had planned. But I think it may
be this that I had some letters this morning which I wished to read, and
was thinking that I would not be able to read them until after my lecture.
There was only a tendency to run in that direction without any actualiza-
tion of the circtunstance. "

Victory or Westminster Abbey. (Obs. Cff. I, A — 14.) "Feeling of sur-
prise because I expected something more, and also because of the peculiar
construction of the sentence. The name Nelson came up almost at once,
partly because his ship was called 'Victory ' and partly because it suggested
a saying such as he might have uttered. A vague almost visual image of
the picture of Westminster Abbey and feeling of direction, i. e., from the
sea where the battle was fought to London as if my eyes were moving from
one point to another — I felt inner movements of the eyes. Feeling of
meaning was of a great warrior determined either to win or die. In this
case there was n't much inner speech. The visual image took the place of
the auditory though it was not very definite."

Sometimes the description of this feeling was too indefi-
nite to surmise.

For instance: i^/ta/)^^^/^. (Obs. ^w. Ill — i — 17.) "First my attention was
good. I read the word in inner speech, and I had a suggestion of it in a
musical sense, a certain piece of music called a rhapsody. I think there
was a sort of direction toward Mechanics Hall where the concert was held.
Two or three years, or it may be one year ago, I heard the Hungarian Rhap-
sody there. There was a sort of vague association with other concerts.
Then I read the word again in inner speech and then I tried to get a mean-
ing for it and that time a very faint, shadowy suggestion of a person in a
state of rhapsody was seen. The direction of it was different from that
to Mechanics Hall. It was very indefinite and faint and hardly can be
called an image at all.

Heaven. (Obs. Gl. 1 — w — 15.) First sound, next understanding. And
third, a vague image of the sky or rather opening above. The mind went
upwards. No visual image of the color.

(4.) Feeling of Content. The observers often described

58 KAKISK

this feeling as one of coming associations, incipient suggestions,
etc., as already mentioned. This introspection is corrobo-
rated by the following considerations in regard to the rela-
tion of the feelings of richness and poorness of content to
their concomitant conditions, i. e., i, to the material or kind
of stimulus; 2, to the duration of the reaction; and 3, to the
conditions under which the stimulus was given.

a. Material conditions. With absolutely difficult or un-
familiar stimuli when the observers had no definite suggestions
or associations and their minds were "shut up" or "blank,"
no content feeling was present. Uninteresting or unfamiliar
words usually awoke poorer content feeling than interesting
or familiar ones did. Chinese characters (the ones to be com-
pared in the identification experiments) awoke no proper
content feeling. With a single definite and vivid general
object-image (no matter whether it was visual, organic or
kinesthetic), excepting memory images, the observers seldom
experienced a rich content feeling, excepting in some cases of
passive reaction where the observers exceptionally dwelt long
on the suggested images.

b. Duration of reaction. Content feeling was not present
in the reflexive type of reaction released by the pure feeling
of familiarity or recognition alone. It was replaced or weak-
ened on some occasions by a definite or vivid image occurring
later in the development, which shows that proper time
relations are essential for the appearance of this feeling.

c. Conditions under which the stimulus was given. Fa-
miliar words or phrases presented simultaneously in number
and for a short interval awoke no content feeling. ^ Isolated
words as a rule awoke richer content feeling than those given
in phrases. A single noun awoke frequently a richer content
feeling than did a short phrase.

These phenomena of the concomitances of the subjective
and objective changes will be difficult to account for ade-
quately in any other way than to assume a content feeling as a
consciousness of the actual, simultaneous, and incipient ex-
citation of a number of past experiences or images related
to the stimulus. If a large number of such associations is
actually excited, the result will be the feeling of richness of
content. If the number is small, the result will be the feeling
of poorness of content. If there is no association, the result
will be the feeling of no content. The lack or poorness of
content feeling in the case of sensory familiarity, "pure con-
cept," and a number of simultaneously exposed words and
phrases, is simply due to the insufficiency of necessary time

' This test was made in one of the auxiliary experiments.

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 59

for the actual reinstatement of past experiences, even in an
incipient way. Familiar words or phrases have, of course,
numerous potential associations, but to have a content feeling
it is necessary to actualize some of them, at least. Too vivid
or too definite single images work detrimentally to the feeling
of rich content, because they absorb too much of the mental
energy to awake at the same time numerous other incipient
reproductions. Isolated words give richer feeling than phrases
under the same circumstances, because there the associations
are not circumscribed and the mind can welcome what-
ever related associations may revive, and the result is the
crowding together of these associations in their incipient
forms which is felt as richness of content. But this state of
experience does not long endure, for one of the strongest of
them, such as a recent memory association, will soon push
itself up completely, as was often the case in our experiments.
When a word is interwoven in a context, only such associations
are tolerated by the mind as will conform to the general pur-
port or meaning of the phrase, and all other incoherent asso-
ciations are suppressed. ^ The richer feeling often attending
a single word in comparison with a short phrase is perhaps
due also to insufficiency in the time allotted to each word
of the phras% for the development of its own content feeling,
i. e., the mind moves on too quickly to the next word. The
rich content feeling of a memorial association, in spite some-
times of its comparative vividness and definiteness, is very
likely due partly to the details and variety of the imagery
and partly to emotional excitations. The following instances
will illustrate this point.

Philosophy. (Obs. L. M. Ill, ii — 2.) "Sense came very quickly; not
with the reading of the word but immediately after; and it seemed to have

great deal of meaning, perhaps because of the fact that I had been read-
fing philosophy last night. There was feeling of tension and excitation
fiuntil I got the sense. The feeling was agreeable. "

Sleep is necessary for health. (Obs. Ch. Ill — ii — 9.). . ."The feeling of
familiarity was pretty complete because it suggested my own condition,
■that is, I did not sleep last night very well. So there was a pleasure in it,
|;and thus the feeling of familiarity had a rich content, for it refers to per-
gonal interest. "

Sleep is necessary for health. (Obs. E. M.) "Perfect feeling of famili-
^arity and certainty of judgment. It awoke a good deal of association with
lit, because I have made an effort without success to sleep after dinner this
fcafternoon.

Regarding the ultimate analysis of this feeling which is
le awareness of numerous simultaneously excited incipient

^ C/. Huey's result: "The words given in isolation gave a greater
tyariety of association than did the context words." Am. J. of Psychol.,
^ol. XII, p. 282 ff.

6o KAKISE

images, it is clear that this feeling has nothing to do with
the tri-dimensional feelings which may, or may not accom-
pany it by way of addition. Again, as it is the direct aware-
ness of images themselves, it cannot be called a subjective
affection or emotion, excepting in cases of emotional excita-
tions in memorial association which give the meaning a
"sense of reality" or "warmth." Emotions in these cases,
however, only emphasize and do not make up the content
itself, which is constituted of memorial associations. There
is need always of incipient images for meaning, whether it is
cool or warm, dry or rich. Whereas, emotions of various
form can exist without understanding or sense of meaning.

Neither can we describe the content feeling in terms of a
definite and specific image for it is, first, the resultant of
many images or associations, each of which consists of more
than one specific or sensory image (such as a visual, an audi-
tory, a motor, etc.); and, secondly, these images are all only
incipiently awakened. The pure feeling of richness or poor-
ness of content, without any subjective trace of images, may
be, in the meanwhile, called a "total feeling," not in the sense
of the fusion of feelings proper, but in the sense of the fusion
of faintly excited different images.

(5.) Pure Feeling of Concept or Meaning. Owing to the
vagueness of the customary terms "concept" or "meaning"
as regards their psychical constituents, the writer has no
direct basis for analysis when the observers simply speak
of a concept or meaning without further description. So
that so long as there is given no positive description of this
experience, the only way at hand is to infer it. The inference
is made from the nature of other types of meaning which
generally immediately precede or succeed the feeling of con-
cept, or sometimes replace it. The type which precedes is
the pure feeling of familiarity, or recognition of the stimulus
as the one already familiar. The type which succeeds is the
pure feeling of content. So that a pure feeling of concept,
meaning or knowing, without any further configuration or
content may be identified with the pure feeling of recognition
or familiarity, or with something quite similar in nature. If
the feeling of concept or meaning has something more sub-
stantial, it may be identified with the content feeling. If its
nature becomes more materialized, so to speak, it will be
found identical with the feeling of direction, or with half or
fully developed images. But in such cases it is no more
pure.

(6.) Pure Feeling of Familiarity or Recognition. This feel-
ing, as already stated, was the first and quickest to appear of all
types of meaning, and attached directly to the stimulus with-

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 6 1

out any intermediary except audito-motor reading when the
stimulus was exposed. It thus makes the first or the most
primitive stage of the series of reproductive processes. As
a reproductive process, there seems to be no important differ-
ences between the experience (as such) of familiarity with
the stimulus as one experienced before (whether understood
or not) or "sensory recognition," and the familiarity with
the stimulus as one understood before or known, or "con-
ceptual recognition."!

In the earlier stage of this feeling there was often no sub-
jective difference between the "sensory familiarity," i. e., the
recognition of the stimulus as one experienced before (whether
understood or not), and the "conceptual familiarity," i. e.,
the recognition of the stimulus as one, the meaning of which
is known to the observer. This fact is shown in the cases of
premature or mistaken reaction, as mentioned before. Thus
in their first stage of reproduction both sensory and conceptual
familiarity must be very much alike or identical.^ The sub-
jective criterion by which the observers became soon after
aware of their mistakes must very likely be the presence and
absence of content feeling or "coming associations."

So much for the psychological nature of pure knowing as
meaning; now regarding the ultimate constituents of sensory
familiarity. Let us take the simplest case. Perhaps the
simplest, purest and at the same time the most durable type
of this feeling is that which was experienced by the observers
in the recognition of the Chinese characters in the forms of
purely visual nonsense stimuli practically free from associa-
tions. Though obviously this feeling is thoroughly originated
by the previous impression of the same stimulus, the observers
found it difficult to give any positive description of it in terms
of psychical elements. By way of negative description, it
may be noted that not only was there no one of our observers
who ever positively identified this experience with tridimen-
sional feeling but also there were many who reported it as
decidedly different. That this feeling is not a mere alterna-
tion of the feelings of tension and relaxation is seen in the

ict that observers often relaxed (thinking the characters too

>mplex to identify and so giving up the attempt) without

^The reader should not confuse this case of the reproduction of the
feeling of knowing of once known (or easy) stimuli with the processes of

lowing for the first time of unfamihar stimuH.

^ ^ It must be remembered that we are dealing here with the reproduc-

^on of the feeling of knowing awakened by the perception of once known

understood, i. e., familiar or easy stimuli, and not with the processes of

lowing for the first time of unfamiliar or difficult stimuli which are quite

)mplex.

62 KAKISE

having the experience of famiUarity or recognition. Nor can
it be regarded as a specific image, for it occurred earlier than
any definite image. Even organic imagery or sensation which
is more primitive and undifferentiated and consequently
more all-embracing than kinesthetic imagery, will no more
cover this feeling than do feelings of tension and relaxation.
One will, perhaps, find this feeling in its bare form to be localized
centrally rather than peripherally, as "spiritual" rather than
corporeal. I may say, therefore, that this feeling is a funda-
mental, not further reducible, retrospective quality of a present
impression, i. e., a coloration or configuration given to the
present impression by the rudimentary revival of its past
experience. The present impression may be any existing
content, sensation, feeling, image, idea, thought, etc. It is
thus different from ordinary quality or intensity of sensations.
It is not an independent element, as it attaches always to
sensations or feelings and never occurs alone. The pure feeling
of knowing awakened by familiar stimuli is only a special
case of this feeling of familiarity; consequently "thought"
in such a sense is neither a third element^ nor a highly ele-
vated something, but merely the most primitive and rudi-
mentary form of reproduction. Thought in the sense of ' * tran-
scendental" reference^ which seems to have more content than
pure recognition or knowing, may be found in our content
feeling if its introspective aspect is indefinite, or in the feeling
of direction or the indicative images if it is more definite.
Biihler's "intention"' in the sense of condensed thought or
quick recapitulation may be foun,d in our complex memorial
associations as half -developed images. In short all varieties
of meaning-experiences are found as belonging to one or
other of the different stages of the revival of the related past
experiences.

Social and practical custom attaches a certain cluster of
associations to a word or phrase as its meaning to the exclusion
of others, so that our understanding of a word or phrase,
which is a direct or indirect,* incipient or full recalling of
such related associations, is, in all cases, a selective or pur-
posive action from the logical or outer point of view. With
easy or familiar words such selected associations are, however,
ever ready and come promptly without any subjective or
psychological experiences of the sort which usually character-
ize the selective processes, so that psychologically, or from

1 Cf. Biihler: Op. cit., p. 329.
^Messer: Op. cit., 113.
^Op. cit., p. 346 ff.

* That is, through the associations of intermediary images whose mean-
ings are well known.

A STUDY OF UNDERSTANDING 63

the inner point of view, a cluster of selected associations or
meaning once mechanized becomes identical with a cluster
of random associations, or pure reproductions. What is then
the meaning in case of an unfamiliar or difficult word or
phrase the comprehension of which is attended by a series
of selective experiences, such as, feelings of effort, suspense,
hesitation, searching, rejection, doubt, uncertainty, etc.? The
answer is that a meaning, as a resultant, remains always
the same whether it is reached through a strenuous or an easy
process, whether it is consciously selected or mechanically
reproduced. These selective experiences were not only
common in all types of active or volitional thinking, whether
it is understanding of abstract phrases or comparison of sense
impressions, but are also found in their pure forms to be very
much alike or identical. They were found to be stereotyped and
did not develop to such successive series as did the reproductive
tendencies, excepting that they showed changes in intensity
and oppositions like those of feeling proper. Their apparent
configurations and development must be, in reality, those
of the content or reproductive series to which they attach.
Clearness and unclearness of meaning, abstracted from con-
tent-feeling or reproduction, may be reduced to the mere
feelings of certainty and uncertainty.

Further inquiry into the ultimate constituents of feelings
of certainty and uncertainty and other selective experiences,
which can be found in simpler and purer forms in the identifi-
cation or comparison of purely sensory stimuli, is left for
later studies.

Summary of the Principai, Resui^ts of the Study

1. Whether we have audito-motor or visual imagery of
the stimulus word depends primarily upon whether the word
is exposed or spoken.

2. The kinds of imagery, the frequency of which seemed
markedly influenced by the individual peculiarities of the
observers, were as follows: i, Motor speech; 2, visual speech;
3, associated (suggested) word-images; 4, associated object-
images in visual terms.

3. The frequency of memory images is primarily condi-
tioned neither by the concreteness or abstractness of the
stimulus word nor by individual peculiarities, but by the
slowness or quickness of the reaction.

4. The customary method of association experiments
seems to be too artificial for the study of natural or real
associations. Whereas the Ausfrage method seems to be
better adapted both to the study of the general laws of asso-
ciation and to the study of individual peculiarities of asso-
ciation.

64 KAKISE ,

5. Whether or not one has in the understanding of a word
or phrase a concrete representation depends primarily upon
the duration, i. e., upon the time one dwells upon it.

6. The characteristic constituents of the meaning of a
word or phrase are not selective experiences, but series of
different phases of reproduction.

7. " Feeling of concept" may be reduced to either "feeling
of familiarity " or " feeling of content. " " Feeling of content, ' '
which is the awareness of the more or less fused aggregate
of incipient associations, seems to be hardly reducible to any
specific images. "Feeling of familiarity," which is the most
fundamental and elementary form of the reproductive experi-
ence and seems to be reducible neither to the feelings proper
nor to the so-called intensity-quality attributes of sensations,
may be regarded for the present as a third or retrospective
quality of sensations or other psychic experiences. ^

1 1 wish here heartily to thank Dr. R. Acher, Mr. C. Ankeney, Dr. H. W.
Chase, Dr. E. W. Coffin, Dr. C. Guillet, Mr. G. Hirose, Mr. S. Kanda,
Mr. M. A. Kaylor, Dr. T. Misawa, Dr. E. Mumford, Mrs. L. Mumford,
Dr. C. A. Osborne, Dr. E. C. Sanford, Dr. T. L. Smith, and Dr. G. H. Steves
for their kind services as observers. I desire especially to acknowledge
my great obligation to Dr. E. C. Sanford for his kind assistance in many
ways essential to the completion of this paper.

THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF APRAXIA

By ISADOR H. CoRiAT, M. D., Boston, Mass.

It is only under special and favorable circumstances, either
of experiment or of disease, that certain complex psychic or
motor disturbances can be traced to an exact cerebral local-
ization. The most interesting and at the same time the most
complicated of these disturbances seem to be localized in
some portion of the left hemisphere, particularly those con-
ditions in which there seems to be a loss of the various types
of speech images (aphasia) or a loss of the motor memories
of the limb movements for a definite act or purpose (motor
apraxia) . According to recent researches, the left hemisphere
seems to preponderate, in certain requested or spontaneous
movements of the limbs in the same manner that it prepon-
derates in speech. For instance in many lesions of the left
hemisphere in which the right arm and leg are paralyzed, there
may result a motor apraxia of the non-paralyzed left arm, thus
indicating the existence of a special action of the motor centres
of the left side of the brain. It seems likely that these various
complex phenomena are really disorders of associative memory,
either for identification or motility. There are not only dif-
rerent types of these disturbances but also different varieties
of the same type, from the simplest to the most complex.

It is the purpose of this paper to review the recent literature
on apraxia, to attempt to determine what light these studies
throw upon a complicated psychic disturbance which seems
to have a fairly definite cerebral localization and finally to
study two cases of apraxia which have come under personal
observation. The harmonizing of certain anatomical data
with mental disturbances is of the greatest psychological im-
portance, and nowhere can this be better done than in the
problem of apraxia.

Apraxia was a term formerly applied to the intellectual non-
recognition of objects, but the more recent investigations have
shown that the term had best be limited to certain essential
disorders of voluntary acts and movements. The chief dis-
turbance in motor apraxia is an inability to make movements
for the purpose demanded by the will, although the subject
may understand commands and the use of objects; memory
and attention may be normal and the limbs may be free from

Journal — 5

66 CORIAT

paralysis, ataxia or tremor. Liepmann's case of unilateral
apraxia which was studied clinically and anatomically in a
most thorough manner, has formed the basis of the modern
conceptions of the condition. In this case there was success-
ful correlation of the clinical symptom-complex with the
pathological findings. Later Liepmann extended his studies
to comprise all the motor disturbances of brain disease.^

Previous to the work of Liepmann the ideas concerning the
nature of apraxia were in a very unsatisfactory condition.
It was looked upon as a form of a disorder of identification
related to mind blindness. Hughlings Jackson's ideas con-
cerning imperception or Allen Starr's description of the loss
of object memories, are instances of the older interpretations.
Monakow had also observed that certain aphasics showed
either an inability to execute certain movements on command
or misused familiar objects. Under the name of asymboly
there also was described a loss of images of palpation, of kin-
etic movements and of the use of objects. The term asymboly
has also been applied to an imperfect grasp of the nature and
use of common objects, such as occurs in confusional or deli-
rious states. In a review of the question of tactile aphasia,^
I pointed out that the term can also be used to designate not
only a failure to know the shapes of objects and their cardinal
qualities, but also the ultimate recognition of the objects

1 The following is a bibliography of Liepmann's principal writings on
apraxia.

A. Das Krankheitsbild der Apraxie (Motorischen Asymbolie) auf Grand
eines Falles von einseitiger Apraxie — Monat. f. Psychiatric u. Neu-
rologic—Bd. VIII.

B. Der wcitcre Krankheitsverlauf bei dem einseitigen Apraktischen und
der Gehimbefund auf Grund von Serienschnitten — Ibid. — Bd. XVII
and XIX.

C. Ueber Storungcn des Handclns bei Gehim-Klranken — 1905.

D. Drei Aufsatze aus dem Apraxiegebiet — 1908.

(This monograph is a collection of three previously published articles
on apraxia — Kleine Hilfs-Mittel bei ber Untersuchung von Gehirn-Krank-
en — (1905). Ueber die Function des Balkens beim Handeln und die
Beziehungen von Aphasie und Apraxie zur Intelligenz. (1907) Die
linke Hemisphere und das Handeln (1905).

B. The section Die Krankheiten des Gehirns in Lehrbuch der Nerven-
krankheiten (Herausgegeben von Hans Curschmann — 1909) is by
Liepmann and contains a summary of his latest views on apraxia.

F. Bin Fall von Hnksseitiger Agraphie und Apraxie bei rechtsseitiger
Lahmung (Liepmann and Maas) — Jour, f . Psychologic u. Neurologic —
Bd. X, 1908.

G. Ein neuer Fall von motorischer Aphasie mit Anatomischen Befund
(Liepmann and Quensel) — Monat. f. Psychiatric u. Neurol. Sept.,
1909.

2 The Question of Tactile Aphasia — ^Journal Abnormal Psychology —
Vol. I, No. 6, 1907.

THS PSYCHOPATHOIyOGY OF APRAXIA 67

themselves. In its broadest sense, therefore, basing it at least
upon the available data of our clinical analyses, we may say
that apraxia in general is motor perplexity plus a disorder of
identification. Apraxia may be divided into the motor and
ideational forms. In motor apraxia the limbs do not obey the
psychical wish : there is pure motor perplexity. The motor
memories for movements of the limbs may be preserved but
these memories are distorted, isolated or insufficiently con-
nected with other portions of the cortex. In motor apraxia
there is also a defect in the use of objects, although the objects
may be perfectly recognized. The subject merely fumbles
with objects; he is unable to translate a subjective purpose
into an objective action. In ideational apraxia or agnosia
the subject misuses objects because there is a disturbance of
identification. For instance, he may think a comb is a cigar
and so put it in his mouth as if smoking it. The term apraxia
should therefore be limited to certain motor disorders, and
it is best to refer to the ideational disturbance as agnosia.

Before the case of unilateral apraxia came under Liepmann's
observation, the patient was believed to be suffering from
aphasia and post-apoplectic dementia. The principal physi-
cal symptoms in this case were left facial paralysis, unequal
pupils and weakness of the left leg, but no real paralysis of any
of the limbs. There was pure motor aphasia and some alexia,
but no word deafness, mind blindness, hemianopsia or uni-
lateral psychic blindness. There was a marked disorder of
the stereognostic sense and slight hypoesthesia of the left
hand. Orientation, memory and attention were normal.
The movements of the right arm were poorly executed, ill-
directed and fumbling. With the left leg and arm, however,
everything was correctly done. It was demonstrated, after
careful study, that a typical right-sided motor apraxia was
present. The analysis of this peculiar psychic condition pre-
sented many difficulties, but it was at last successfully accom-
plished. With the right hand responses to simple orders,
such as touching the nose or buttoning the coat, and the
imitation of movements were incorrectly done and with much
fumbling. All commands, however, were correctly and prompt-
ly executed with the left hand. The patient blundered at
every attempt to use objects with the right hand. For
instance when a comb was placed in his right hand he would
put it behind his ear like a penholder. Writing was defective
with the right hand; the left hand produced mirror writing.
For further clinical details the original monograph should
be consulted.

The interpretation of the symptom complex in this case is
a striking example of what may be accomplished by careful

68 CORIAT

clinical observation. Word blindness and word deafness were
both absent, as all orders, movements and likewise the imita-
tion of movements, were correctly performed with the left
hand. The question may be raised that because the patient
identified and correctly used objects with the left hand, and
not with the right, there existed a right unilateral psychic
blindness. This objection had no basis in fact, because ob-
jects placed in the right visual field were promptly identified.
Because of the above condition Liepmann believed that the
apraxia was not dependent on defective recognition of objects.
In attempting an explanation of the condition he stated that
the centripetal stimuli from the limbs on the right were per-
ceived in the left sensory-motor area of the brain (the anterior
and post-central convolutions and probably a portion of the
parietal lobe), but on arriving there the impulses were blocked
and therefore not transmitted to other cerebral centres. The
left sensory motor area was therefore cut off from all communi-
cation with the rest of the cortex. The patient had lost the
kinetic memories of movements of the right side because the
left or leading hemisphere was isolated. He perceived the
position, movements and tactile sensations of his limbs on
the right, but was incapable of synthesizing these elements.
The localizing diagnosis of the condition based on the clinical
symptoms, showed how carefully the case was observed and
analyzed, particularly if this be compared with the later
anatomical findings. Because of the absence of word deafness,
paralysis, sensory disturbances, hemianopsia, or psychic
blindness, the corresponding brain centres must have been
intact. The motor aphasia indicated a lesion of the third
left frontal convolution and probably of the insula. The
motor area and the gyrus angularis could not have been
involved, because there was no paralysis and no symptoms
pointing to the central optic tracts. The supra marginal
gyrus and superior portions of the parietal lobe were probably
destroyed. The corpus callosum was probably also involved
in the process, because of the interruption of communication
with the right hemisphere.

The patient died two years later from an apoplectiform
attack. The anatomical findings corresponded in a re-
markable manner with the earlier localizing diagnosis. The
autopsy showed in the left hemisphere two foci of softening
in the third left frontal convolution and a subcortical cyst
in the inferior portion of the ascending parietal convolution.
In the right hemisphere there was a destruction of a majority
of fibres for the face and limbs on the left side, and foci of
softening in the supra-marginal and angular gyri. The corpus
callosum had entirely disappeared, with the exception of

THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF APRAXIA 69

the splenium. The serial sections of the brain showed these
lesions with great clearness. The degeneration of the corpus
callosum and of the tapetum, the softening and degeneration
of the right internal capsule, the cyst of the insula and the
shrunken inner nucleus of the right thalamus, were well
marked. This degeneration of the corpus callosum is an
important point, for Liepmann has shown that the left hemis-
phere is influenced by the motor region of the right cortex
through the fibres of corpus callosum, and when these fibres
are destroyed, the left hemisphere becomes isolated.

It was not long before lyiepmann's work was confirmed by
other investigators. The fundamental difference between
apraxia and aphasia was recognized by Oppenheim, and later
Pick reported an arterio-sclerotic and senile case in which
apraxic symptoms were episodic. In a case reported by Liep-
mann and Maas, there was a right-sided paralysis with a
left-sided agraphia and apraxia. The agraphia may be re-
garded as merely one of the manifestations of the apraxia.
The right hemisphere was intact. In the left hemisphere,
however, there was an area of softening involving the whole
of the left half of the corpus callosum. In the serial sections
of the brain the softening could be traced along the whole
left side of the corpus callosum from the knee through the
body to the splenium. In interpreting their case the authors
stated that the left-sided apraxia was due either to the separa-
tion of the left hand from the memory centres of the left
hemisphere, or perhaps the direct pathway for impulses to
the sensory-motor area of the right brain had been destroyed.
In "Strohmayer's case,i in which aphasic and ataxic symptoms
were absent, and the muscular and palpation senses intact,
the patient recognized and named objects correctly, but mis-
used them. Anatomically there was found a lesion of the
left inferior parietal lobe, the supra-marginal gyrus, the for-
ceps major and the superior longitudinal bundle. The gyrus
angularis was not involved. Abraham^ observed apraxic
phenomena in two general paralytics and in a later contri-
bution he reported a case of unilateral apraxia which on
autopsy showed a lesion of the superior parietal lobe on the
left. In Marcuse's case the apraxic symptoms were due to
a general senile brain atrophy. 3

^^B^ ^Strohmayer: Ueber subcorticale Alexie mit Agraphie und Apraxie,
|^K)eut. Zeit. f. Nervenheilkunde, Bd. XXIV, 1903.

^^K^^K. Abraham: Ueber einige seltene Zustandsbilder bei Progressiver
^•aralyse — Allg. Zeit. f. Psychiatrie, Bd. LXI. 1904.

^^H Ibid.: Beitrage Zur Kenntnis der motorischen Apraxie auf Grund
P^pnes Falles von einseitiger Apraxie — Centralbl. f. Nervenheilk. u. Psy-
I - chiatrie. Mar, 1-15, 1907.

I ^Marcuse: Apraktische Symptome bei einem Fall von Senile Demenz.

Centralbl. f. Nervenheilk. u. Psychiatrie, Dec., 1904.

70 CORIAT

Here the defects of the voluntary acts were caused by a
continuous amnesia. The patient would probably forget the
course of a movement after it was once started, in the same
way that the tactile asymboly reported by Bourdon and Dide,
was due to a kind of a continuous amnesia for tactile impres-
sions. ^ However, very extensive amnesias may be free from
any form of apraxia, as in the Lowell case of amnesia, a
proof that these particular disorders of memory play little
or no part in the mechanism of apraxia. 2 Pick insists strongly
on the psychic element in all cases of apraxia. ^

D'HoUander^ has reported two cases of apraxia. The first
of these occurred in a case of focal general paralysis and was
bilateral. Anatomically nothing was found which could ex-
plain the condition other than the significant point that the
left hemisphere of the brain was smaller than the right. In
the second case, one of alcoholic dementia, there gradually
developed a slight paralysis of the right arm and leg with a
left-sided apraxia, thus showing the supremacy of the left
hemisphere in the execution of voluntary movements. For
localizing diagnosis the author suggCvSted a lesion on the
left side of the brain extending to the central semiovale, and
involving the callosal fibres that go from the left to the right
hemisphere.

Goldstein^ has reported a case in which after the disap-
pearance of a left-sided paralysis there appeared a motor-
apraxia limited to the same side. For localizing diagnosis
he suggested a lesion in the subcortex of the right central
convolution, damaging its connections with the frontal lobe
and involving the fibres of the corpus callosum. A year
later, an anatomical examination disclosed, among other
things, a complete destruction of the corpus callosum through-
out its whole extent.®

In Rhein's^ case the right hand was apraxic; apraxic phe-
nomena were present in chewing and walking while the left
hand was capable of only elementary reflex acts. The pos-

^B. Bourdon and M. Dide: L'Annee Psychologique, 1904. (See my
abstract in the American Journal of Psychology, April, 1905, pp. 252-254.)

^Isador H. Coriat: The Lowell case of Amnesia, Journal Abnormal
Psychology, Vol. II, No. 3, 1907.

^A. Pick: Studien ueber Motorische Apraxie, 1905.

^F. D'Hollander: Bulletin de la Soci6t6 Medicine Mentale de Belgique,
1907-8 (an excellent summary of all the literature, with a report of two
personal observations).

^K. Goldstein: Zur Lehre von der motorischen Apraxie, Journal f.
Psychologic u. Neurologic, Bd. XI. H. 4-5-6-.

^Der makroskopische Hirnbefund in meinem Falle von linksseitiger
motorischen Apraxie, Neurol. Centralblatt., ySept. i, 1909.

' /, H. Rhein: A case of apraxia with autopsy. Journal of Nervous and
Mental Disease, Vol. 35, Oct., 1908.

THE PSYCHOPATHOIvOGY OF APRAXIA 71'

terior portion of the corpus callosum was found degenerated
at autopsy.

In Vleuten's^ case, there was a sarcoma in the left hemis-
phere, which by invasion and pressure destroyed the cingu-
lum, the whole of the left half of the corpus callosum and part
of the right genu. The right hand and arm was tremulous,
while the left hand and arm showed apraxia. Here the left-sided
apraxia was produced by a lesion which destroyed the callosal
fibres. Bychowski^ has reported a case in which the apraxia
was found to be due to a cyst in the left hemisphere which
destroyed and displaced a portion of the left side of the corpus
callosum. In Hartmann's^ three cases of apraxia, one was
due to a tumor in the left frontal region, and the second to a
tumor involvement of the corpus callosum. In a case re-
cently reported by Tooth^ there was an inconstant motor-
apraxia of the left hand. At autopsy there was found a
tumor occupying a portion of the right frontal lobe, involving
the anterior half of the corpus callosum.

In discussing the psycho motor disturbances of various
mental diseases Kleist has shown how apraxic phenomena
may appear in the hyperkinetic and akinetic motility psy-
choses. He thinks that these disturbances are probably due
to psychic factors and that they may have a definite cerebral
localization, particularly in the parietal lobe.^ This is of
interest if we remember that in some cases of unilateral
motor apraxia, the parietal lobe was found involved as well
as the corpus callosum. For instance in one case of an akinetic
motility psychosis which came under personal observation,
it was noted that the subject had lost all knowledge of the
use of simple objects. Stransky^ has shown how apraxic
phenomena may appear in dementia praecox. In these cases
he interprets it as due to a loss of unity between the under-
standing and the will.

Apraxia may also occur as a disorder of consciousness in
delirium and post-epileptic states and under both these con-
ditions without any definite focal lesion. Here the apraxia

^C. F. V. Vleuten: Linksseitige motorische Apraxie, Kin Beitrag zur
Physiologic des Balkens, AUg. Zeit. f. Psychiatric, 1907.

2Z. Bychowski: Bcitragc zur Nosographie der Apraxie — Monat. f.
Psychiatric u. Neurologic. Bd. XXV, 1909.

^E. Hartmann: Bcitragc zur Apraxidchrc, Monat. f. Psychiatric u.
Neurologic. Bd. XXI, 1907.

W. H. Tooth: (Abstract in Review Neurology and Psychiatry, July,
1909, pp. 475-476.)

'^K. Kleist: Untcrsuchungen zur Kenntnis der psychomotorischen
Bewegungsstorungen bei Geistcskranken, 1908.

^E. Stransky: Zur Auffassung gewisser Symptomeder Dementia Praecox,
Neurol. Centralbl., Dec, 1904.

72 CORIAT

is ideational, in the sense of a disorder of indentification. In
these cases the phenomena tend to disappear as the mental
state improves. In my study of a delirious state associated
with vestibular disturbances, apraxic phenomena were present. ^

Motor apraxia has been found to occur in aphasia. The
disorders of movement which one frequently finds in aphasics
are very likely not due to any intellectual defect as claimed
by Marie, but to a disorder independent of aphasia, namely
apraxia. Cases of dementia very rarely show symptoms of
apraxia. It cannot be said that apraxia is due to any in-
tellectual disorder because in disturbances of motility where
the apraxia is limited to one side of the body, the other side
of the body will be found to be absolutely normal. This
shows that intellectual defects may be practically ruled out
in motor apraxia, at least in the unilateral types, unless it
is absurdly assumed that only one side of the brain is demented.
In one of my cases of sensory aphasia the patient was bright
and alert and yet he ridiculously insisted on eating an egg,
shell and all. Here we have an example of apraxia occurring
in an aphasic subject without mental defect. Ideational
apraxia (agnosia), however, may occur in certain abnormal
mental states, such as in delirious conditions or in multiple
brain lesions.

There are many striking points of similarity between motor
aphasia and motor apraxia. The motor speech mechanism
is really a form of movement without objects. The centre
for motor speech is located in the left hemishpere and it has
also been shown how the kinetic memories for co-ordinated
movements likewise preponderate in the left hemisphere, at
least in right-handed subjects. In complicated movements
which through habit and evolution, have become bilateral,
such as the lip-tongue-larynx movements in speech, there is
usually a loss of these movements in a lesion of the motor
speech area. In the limb movements which as a rule are not
bilateral, but in which right and left are independent and in
marked contrast, there results a unilateral apraxia when a
lesion on one side of the brain is favorably situated.

How then are we to explain these complex phenomena and
what light can be thrown upon them by brain anatomy and
physiology? Certainly the subject of apraxia opens up one
of the most inviting and at the same time one of the most
diflScult fields in psychopathology. At first it will be well
to attempt to analyze apraxia on the basis of the data fur-
nished by those cases where it was possible to make an anatomi-
cal examination of the brain.

iThe Cerebellar- Vestibular Syndrome, American Journal of Insanity,
Vol. LXIII, No. 3, Jan., 1907.

THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OP APRAXIA 73

The point of significance in the majority of apraxic cases
was the involvement of some portion of the corpus callosum.
The corpus callosum must then be possessed of a definite
function, as its involvement seems to have been as invariably
present in motor apraxia as a lesion of Broca's convolution
in motor aphasia or of the central optic tracts or the cuneus in
hemianopsia. What then is the function of the corpus callo-
sum and how are we to harmonize the motor and psychic
disturbances with the anatomical findings?

The fibres of the corpus callosum connect the two opposite
sides of the brain. In fact in experimental lesions of the
thumb centre in monkeys, the degenerated fibres could be
traced directly through the corpus callosum to a similar area
on the hemisphere of the opposite side. The knee of the
corpus callosum sends its fibres to the fore brain as the for-
ceps anterior. The fibres of the splenium go to the hind
brain (occiptal region) and to the temporal lobes as the for-
ceps posterior and make up the greater part of the tapetum.
The body of the corpus callosum connects the two hemis-
pheres in the mid position. Both the left and the right hand
centres, corresponding respectively to the movements of the
right and left hands, are connected by means of the fibres of
the corpus callosum.

By reason of its wide connections, the corpus callosum
plays an important part in the execution and association of
voluntary movements. In tumors of the corpus callosum,
disorders of movements are frequently seen, such as apraxia,
tremor and ataxia. In a case of tumor of the splenium of
the corpus callosum which came under personal observation,
there was a paralysis of the right arm and of the right side
of the face and a continual coarse tremor of the left arm.
A lesion of the corpus callosum alone causes a left-sided
motor apraxia without paralysis or apraxia on the right.
A lesion of the left hand centre causes paralysis on the right
side and apraxia on the left. It seems that certain left-sided
lesions produce a left-sided apraxia because the control of the
right hemisphere over the innervation of the left arm by means
of the corpus callosum has been cut off. The left hemis-
phere thus becomes isolated and leaderless.

The following diagram will indicate the various brain
lesions which may produce motor apraxia.

(See figure I.)

A lesion at I (the left brain centre for the right arm) will
produce a paralysis of the right arm and an apraxia of the
left arm because this centre is either isolated or is deprived
of the guidance of the right hemisphere. A lesion at II
(in the subcortex of the left Rolandic area), injuring the

CORIAT

projection and callosal fibres to the right hemisphere, will
also produce a paralysis of the right arm and an apraxia of
the left for the same reason as indicated under lesion I. A
lesion at III (the left internal capsule) will cause a right-
sided paralysis, without any apraxia on the left, because the
corpus callosum is not injured. A lesion at IV (in the corpus
callosum) will cause a left-sided apraxia. A lesion at V
(in the left centrum ovale, catching only callosal fibres) will
likewise cause a left-sided apraxia. In both these conditions,

ie.H;>

Fig. I

A diagrammatic horizontal section of the brain, to illustrate the ana-
tomical basis of motor apraxia.

L. H. Left brain centre for right hand.
R. H. Right brain centre for left hand.
The anterior and posterior and the lateral course of the fibres of the
corpus callosum are shown diagrammatically.

the apraxia is due either to a loss of the guiding influence of
the right-hand centre over the left hand or to an isolation of
the hand centre from the rest of the left hemisphere. A lesion
at VI may cause a right-sided apraxia from an interruption of
the callosal fibres passing to the left side of the brain. (Liep-
mann 's first case.) A lesion at VII (Broca's convolution) would

THK PSYCHOPATHOI.OGY OI? APRAXIA 75

produce motor aphasia, and if the lesion be of sufficient size
and extent to catch the radiations of the genu of the corpus
callosum (or forceps anterior), there will be likewise caused
a left-sided motor apraxia. That this latter combination is
not impossible, is shown by the case recently published by
Liepmann and Quensel and also by the second of my reported
cases.

We must admit that the psychical condition of apraxic sub-
jects presents great difficulties of analysis, even more so than
the analysis of disturbances of the language mechanism in the
various types of aphasia. Probably with increasing knowl-
edge of apraxia some of these difficulties may be overcome.
Motor apraxia in its strictest sense is rarely bilateral as can
be easily seen from the reported observations. It is in idea-
tional apraxia or agnosia that the bilateral nature of the dis-
turbance may be detected. In fact, agnosia seldom or never
occurs as a pure isolated disorder in focal brain disease. When
it does occur in focal disturbances of the brain, it is merely
as a complication of the motor type of apraxia. Agnosia is
most frequently found in diffuse brain affections (senile
dementia), in delirious states particularly due to epilepsy or
alcohol or in the motility psychoses. Hence agnosia is a more
general disturbance, while apraxia is a focal disorder limited
to certain limbs or to muscle groups.

In motor apraxia the limbs do not obey the psychical wish,
although that wish and the motor image of the willed move-
ment may be clearly present in the mind of the subject. It
is this inability, on the part of the subject, to transfer the
psychical wish into a specified innervation of a limb, which
causes motor apraxia. In ataxia it is the elementary condi-
tion of the movements which is at fault, while in apraxia
there exists a disharmony between the purpose of the move-
ment and the idea of the object with which the purpose is
carried out. In other words, in motor apraxia there is a de-
ficient adjustment to a purpose. In motor apraxia the co-
ordination of movements is normal, but there is a faulty
intrapsychic process and so the ultimate purpose of these
movements becomes incorrect. The motor apraxic cannot
translate the subjective idea of a movement or of the use of an
object into its objective reaction. Motor apraxia therefore
may originate from either an insufficiency of the directing
idea, from derailment or irradiation of the directing idea upon
the neighboring ideas, from the omission of portions of the
motor act and the predominance of the last portion of the
act or from the substitution of the directing idea by another
idea.

All normal voluntary activities seem to be due to two

76 CORIAT

mechanisms — the representation in the sensory sphere of the
successive series of partial acts which make up the entire act
(the kinetic formula for movements) and the faculty of chang-
ing this sensory representation into external movements (the
ability of exteriorization). The kinetic formulae for move-
ments are really the memories of successive movements and can
be compared to certain chain or sequence reflexes, a point upon
which I had previously insisted in my studies on amnesia. In
motor apraxia, this kinetic formula is defective. Therefore it
acts in an abnormal manner upon the innervation of the specific
action, according to which of the kinetic elements is disturbed.
Motor apraxia consists, therefore, in a rupture of the physio-
logical connections between the* innervation of a specified
limb and the ideas concerned in the carrying out of a specified
purpose. It is really a motor dissociation, in which special
kinaesthetic memories lie outside of the field of general motor
innervation. This isolation of the kinsesthetic memories is
probably due to an isolation of a certain portion of the left
hemisphere in which these motor memories are stored up, an
isolation resulting in most cases, from a rupture in the con-
duction of the fibres of the corpus callosum. The centripetal
stimuli reach the centrifugal pathway without entering the
special ideational or motor centres by a kind of "short cir-
cuit." This is pure motor apraxia; when in addition there
exists a disorder or identification, we have motor apraxia plus
asymboly or ideational apraxia (agnosia). In all cases of
motor apraxia the chief difficulty seems to lie in the inability
of the subject to transfer the directing ideas or rather the will-
ing of the directing ideas to the motor sphere because they
are partially cut off, isolated or derailed.

The behavior of apraxic patients is a subject of much
interest. Movements of substitution which are so common
in motor apraxia, may be compared to paraphasia. Occasion-
ally the subject may begin a movement and only partly com-
plete it. Here the reaction is referred to as curtailed. Some-
times a movement may bear no resemblance whatsoever
either to the usual acts of everyday life or to a specially
skilled reaction. Unde these conditions we describe it as
a formless or an amphorous reaction. On still other occa-
sions the first part of the movement may be immediately
followed by the last part without any intervening motions.
This is called a short circuited reaction (" Kurzschluss Reak-
tion"). Perseveration is the monotonous automatic repe-
tition of an act. Sometimes indeed the subject becomes petri-
fied, as it were, in the attitude of executing a simple or a com-
plex act either requested or spontaneous. To the first form
is applied the term clonic perseveration; the latter is known

THK PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OI^ APRAXIA 77

as tonic perseveration. Clonic perseveration strongly re-
sembles the recurrent utterances of sensory aphasia, while
tonic perseveration is analogous to the mutism of a severe
motor aphasia.

Scheme of disturbances of kinetic formula for movement.
A — > B — ) C — ) D = Normal Motor Reaction.

A ) D := Short Circuited Reaction.

A — ) B = Curtailed Reaction.

A — ) A — ) A — ) = Clonic Perseveration.
A = Tonic Perseveration.

Fig. II.

A graphic analysis will make this clearer (see figure II).
Let A. B. C. D. represent the kinetic formula for a certain
movement, each letter indicating one element of the action.
The normal movement could occur only when the individual
elements acted serially. Any change in the position of the
elements or any omission, would result in disordered activity
or apraxia. For instance if the action took place as A-D.
with the intervening elements omitted, we would have a short
circuited reaction. If the movement was A — B. with the
other two elements omitted, then the action ceases soon after
it has been started; in other words, it has become curtailed.
If the action should be A. A. A, the first portion of the action
will then tend to be indefinitely repeated. A clonic persever-
ation could result. If the action was A. alone, and no further
elements of the kinetic formula followed, the subject then
would become stuck at the first of the series. Here we have
a tonic perseveration. Many apraxic subjects show a marked
lack of spontaneity, a condition which strongly resembles, if
it is not identical with tonic perseveration. As a rule most
requested or spontaneous movements in apraxic subjects are
ill directed and fumbling, show a deficient adjustment to a
purpose and yet they are not ataxic.

Von Monakow^ has brought forth an ingenious theory to
explain certain focal disturbances of the brain, particularly
aphasia and apraxia. According to this theory, mere anatomi-
cal interruption of the continuity of fibres in the central ner-
vous system will not fully explain the various form of focal
disorders. Therefore there must be a special form of action
at a distance from which may arise temporary or permanent
suspensions of function. To this action at a distance, von
Monakow applies the term " diaschisis. " This diaschisis re-
sembles certain physiological irradiations, in which a reflex
effect can spread in various directions from a focus of reflex
discharge.

1 Von Monakow: Neurol. Centrablatt, Nov. i6, 1906.

78 CORIAT

The study and analysis of two cases of motor apraxia which
came under personal observation will now be taken up. The
difficulty of correlating the motor reactions with the mental
state of the subject will excuse the lengthy details of the
reports. In fact, in apraxia as well as in aphasia, a rigid ex-
amination scheme has but a limited value, as not only do the
types and the conditions vary, but the same type may present
different aspects in different subjects. Our present knowledge
of apraxia is due entirely to minute clinical investigations, to
which, when possible, the anatomical findings have been added.

Case I. When the patient K., who was twenty-four years of
age, first came under observation he had been suffering from
severe headaches for two months. On several occasions the
headaches became so intense that vomiting followed. Up to
this period the patient had been perfectly healthy. An exam-
ination disclosed the following condition. Only the essential
neurological details are given. Tongue tremulous and pro-
truded to the right, tremor of outstretched hands, the right
knee jerk and right Achilles jerk were brisk; while the left
knee jerk and the left Achilles jerk were absent. There was
a subjective sense of weakness and numbness on the left side
of the body. There was no ankle clonus or Babinski reflex.
The pupils were equal and reacted promptly to light and
accommodation; there was no paralysis of the ocular muscles
and no nystagmus, but an ophthalmoscopic examination dis-
closed a blurring of the optic disc without swelling (beginning
optic neuritis).

About three weeks later a sudden but transitory paralysis
of the left arm and leg took place. Within a few days this
improved until only a slight weakness could be detected.
The physical condition has since remained the same with the
exception of a blunted sensation in the left hand, associated
with a weakness of grasp. Word deafness and motor aphasia
were absent during the entire course of the disease. The
patient was right-handed.

There was no hemianopsia and no unilateral mind blind-
ness, because objects placed in each visual fields were promptly
recognized. An analysis showed a typical motor apraxia of
the left arm, while the right arm was entirely free from any
motility disturbance. This unilateral apraxia was not de-
pendent on any defective recognition of objects, because the
patient could correctly select objects with either hand, but
did not know how to correctly use them with the left hand
after they had been selected. He was always oriented, and
there was no disorder of memory either for recent or remote
events. Unilateral agraphia was absent; he was able to write
spontaneously and to dictation fairly well with either hand.

THB PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF APRAXIA 79

There was no apraxia of the left leg or of the muscles of facial
expression for either side. This appearance of a motor apraxia
in a limb from which a previous transitory paralysis had dis-
appeared, resembles the observation of Goldstein, to which
we referred above.

Examination for Apraxia, Motility and
Sensation of the Left Arm

The general movements of the left arm were weak and
fumbling. The dynamometer for the right hand registered
seventy, while for the left hand it was twenty. The left arm
was not paralyzed and all the movements could be fairly well
performed but they were ill-directed and awkward. The abnor-
mal motor reactions of the left arm on analysis seemed to be
entirely due to a motor apraxia and not to any motor weakness
or ataxia. With the eyes closed the movements of the left
arm were decidedly more fumbling and ill- directed than when
the eyes were open. In spite of the fumbling and slight weak-
ness and spasticity of the left arm, he could spontaneously
lift it above his head, flex, extend, pronate, supinate, fairly
well extend and flex the fingers and give a fair grasp, although
there was a disinclination on the part of the subject to spon-
taneously use this left arm. This tendency to akinesis was
probably due partly to the patient's appreciation of his local-
ized motor apraxia and partly to a state of tonic perseveration.
An examination of the sensation of the left arm, forearm and
hand showed anaesthesia and hypoalgesia.

The testing of the muscular sense of position showed that
when the right forearm was placed at a right angle to the
right arm, after some fumbling he was able to correctly imi-
tate the position with the left arm. When the right arm
was placed vertically above the head he promptly placed the
left arm in the same position. With the eyes closed, when
the right arm was passively elevated above the head and the
patient was requested to imitate the position with the left
arm, he merely placed the latter horizontally on the same
level with the shoulder. Right arm passively extended hori-
zontally forward with the palm upwards; he imitated it by
placing the left arm in the same position but with the palm
downwards. Right index finger placed at right angles; with
the left hand he merely made a fist.

Reaction to Requests

R. Hand L. Hand
Buttoning coat Correct Grasps edge of coat
Touching tip of nose with right fore-
finger " Puts palm to mouth
Touching right ear with right fore
finger " Places finger back of head

8o CORIAT

R. Hand.

L. Hand.

Movement of sewing Correct

Fumbles

Movement of cutting with scissors "

Fumbles

Snapping fingers

Makes fist

Turning hand-organ

Makes fist

Movement of turning key in lock

Makes fist

Movement of shaving

Places hand behind ear

Movement of combing hair "

Rubs head with palm of hand

Movement of use of cork-screw "

Fimibles

Military Salute "

Fumbles

In the three successive reactions with the left hand in which
the patient made a fist in response to different requests, we
have an example of clonic perseveration or the frequent mo-
notonous repetition of an act.

Reaction to the Use of Objects

R. Hand L. Hand

Comb Correct Rubs hair with smooth back of comb

Tooth brush " Correct but fumbles

Hair brush " Holds back of brush several inches above head

without any brushing motion
Key " Cutting movements as though it were a knife

Match " Correct but fumbles

Spoon " Cutting and stabbing movements

Cigarette " Grasps it clumsily, puts it to chin and then puts

wrong end in mouth

In the reaction to requests and to the use of objects the
left-sided apraxia became more marked when the patient's
eyes were closed. The same fact was noted in testing for the
sense of position in the apraxic limb. For instance, in one
series of tests a key, a match and a drinking glass were used
correctly with the right hand and decidedly awkwardly and
fumblingly with the left. When attempts were made to use
these same objects with the eyes closed, the left hand seemed
to become petrified, as it were, after an abortive start. In
other words we seem to have here the phenomenon of tonic
perseveration. On other occasions, even with the eyes open,
he would start to use an object correctly with the left hand,
and then would hopelessly fumble, either going into a condi-
tion of tonic perseveration or would finish up with a substi-
tuted movement, as if the object or the request had been
changed. Sometimes, too, in the use of objects with the left
hand, the movements would bear no relation to the nature of
the object; they would become decidedly amorphous. The
stereognostic sense was entirely lost on the left hand and to a
certain extent, at least for larger and coarser objects, on the
sole of the left foot. The increase of apraxia when the eyes
were closed, was not due to any astereognosis, because the
patient was always told the nature of the object. At no time

THE PSYCHOPATHOI.OGY OF APRAXIA 8 1

was there any loss of the knowledge of the use of objects.
He was always able to describe their uses and from a number
of objects spread before him he was able, on request, to pick
out the correct one with either hand. The patient always
knew when he used an object incorrectly with the left hand.
The apraxia seemed therefore not dependent on any defective
recognition of objects; in other words, it was not ideational
but was almost entirely a motor disorder. His knowledge of
the use of objects was always correct, even when he was not
permitted to touch the objects.

In order to further show that there was no disorder of identi-
fication and that the inability to correctly use objects with the
left hand was purely a motor disturbance, the following ob-
servations are of interest. When the patient was shown a
match and requested to describe its use, he replied "To make
fire." When asked to show the use of a match he did so
correctly with the right hand. With the left hand, however,
he clumsily grasped the entire match in his fist, leaving only
a small portion of the head exposed and then made stabbing
instead of scratching motions with it. When a cigarette was
given to him, with the right hand he correctly placed it in
his mouth. With the left hand he grasped the cigarette so
clumsily in his fist that it was almost broken in half, then he
placed it to his chin, then after some hesitation brought his
fist to his mouth, still holding the cigarette tightly and with
the mouth end completely covered up with his hand. When
a match-box was placed in the left hand he promptly opened
the cover, took out a match and showed correctly how to use
it. When the match-box was placed in the right hand,
attempts to repeat the performance with the left hand brought
out a very typical motor apraxia. After considerable fum-
bling and perplexity he opened the cover, took out each match
separately and allowed each to fall back into the box without
any attempt at scratching them. When a pipe was placed
in the right hand he promptly put the stem in his mouth.
With the left hand, however, he took it by the bowl and plac-
ing the bowl to his chest said ** I know it is a pipe, but I can't
use it with this hand." It appears that these details point
out the significant fact that the inability to use objects with
the left hand was due not to any lack of knowledge or identi-
fication of the object, but to a derailing of a motor wish into
a false motor reaction.

The imitation of movements also brought out a left-sided
motor apraxia as follows:

R. Hand L. Hand

Saluting Correct Fumbles

Shaving " Merely places hand on cheek

Shining shoes " Grabs ankle

Journal — 6

82 CORIAT

When requested to perform these same actions with the
left arm and the eyes closed, fumbling and lack of direction
in movements became greatly increased. It seems from these
observations that visual impressions could partially correct
the left-sided motor apraxia. When the visual stimuli were
cut off by having the patient close his eyes, he went completely
off the rails. The movements of the left hand without objects,
were as apraxic as when objects were used.

In this case we are probably dealing with a brain tumor for
with the following localizing diagnosis may be suggested. The
tumor is probably in the right motor sub-cortex or centrum
ovale, involving a portion of the fibres of the pyramidal tract
and of the parietal region and probably a large portion of the
fibres of the corpus callosum. A lesion here from its position
could cause the motor disturbance of the left side of the body,
that is, a transitory paralysis and weakness of the left arm and
to a slighter extent of the left leg, aiid also a typical motor
apraxia of the left arm. This latter is due to a loss of the
guiding and directing influence of the right arm centre upon
the left arm through a destruction of the fibres of the corpus
callosum.

In the second observation we have the combination of an
aphasic speech disturbance and a lef t-vSided motor apraxia,
both occurring in a right-handed subject. Such a combi-
nation is of importance, for it demonstrates that a left-sided
brain lesion may be so situated as to cause an aphasia and a
left-sided apraxia.

Case II. The patient L., 57 years of age, a right-handed man,
began to suffer with a severe headache localized on the left side
of the head, combined with dizziness and a weakness of the right
arm. Shortly afterwards he suddenly began to repeat * * oilcloth,
oilcloth" spontaneously and in reply to all questions. This
recurrent utterance lasted about an hour, after which speech
became normal, although a little dysarthric. Somewhat later
that same day he again suddenly began to talk in a jargon.
In this jargon German sounds (his native language) pre-
dominated, while all knowledge of English (an acquired lan-
guage) was completely lost. This condition lasted for four
days and during this time the left-sided headache, dizziness,
weakness and numbness of the right arm and leg continued
although no actual paralysis was ever noticed. All requests
and commands were understood. He knew the hours for
meals and his various wants of his everyday life. At the end
of four days he suddenly regained his normal speech in both
languages. Since then when fatigued or frequently in the
late afternoon he will forget the names of objects in English
and will call them only by their German names. This is a

TH^ PSYCHOPATHOI.OGY OF APRAXIA 83

feature of interest which I had previously pointed out in the
Lowell case of amnesia. It is indicated that the acquired
memories in certain forms of amnesia were the first to dis-
appear, while the deeper and more closely knit associations
were preserved.

The neurological examination may be briefly summarized
as follows: Marked arterio-sclerosis with a high blood press-
ure, speech occasionally dysarthric, no hemianopsia, grip of
right hand decidedly weaker than that of left, no paralysis,
pupils slightly unequal, the right reacting slightly to light,
the left rigid, the right knee jerk diminished as compared to
the left, no Babinski reflex, no facial paresis or deviation of
the tongue. The gait was weak but not hemiplegic while the
station was normal. There were no sensory disturbances in
any of the extremities. All objects were quickly and correctly
recognized and named and their uses accurately described.
The amnesic aphasia was episodic and usually appeared only
after the fatigue of a long examination or in the late afternoon.
The patient was clearly oriented and showed no signs of in-
tellectual defect.

An examination of the motility of the left hand showed
that while it was slightly weaker than the right, it was free
from paralysis, ataxia or tremor. All voluntary movements
were present, yet it was possible to demonstrate a typical
left-sided motor apraxia. The false motor reactions of the
left hand were due to a motor apraxia and not to any inability
to understand requests, because there was no intellectual de-
fect and no word deafness. The facial muscles were free from
apraxia. The inability to name objects, although he could
indicate their uses with the right hand, took place only during
the temporary anmesic aphasia due to fatigue. Repetition
of printed letters was normal. Copying was correctly done
with each hand. All objects were correctly recognized in
each visual field and therefore there was no unilateral mind-
blindness. Astreognosis was absent. The apraxia may be
tabulated as follows:

Reaction to Requests

R. Hand L. Hand

Making a fist Correct Correct

Spreading the fingers " Shows palm of hand

Using cork-screw " Fumbles, first part of action correct, then

makes cutting instead of pulling move-
ments

Saluting " Correct

Smoking a cigar " Saluting movements

The attempt to show the use of a cork-screw with the left
hand is an example of a curtailed reaction, while the persist-

84 CORIAT

ence of saluting movements to different requests indicates a
clonic perseveration.

Reaction to Use of Objects

R. Hand L. Hand

Scissors Correct Fumbles but correct

Key " Turns it upside down and holds it there

Match " Holds it like a pencil and makes writing

motions
Pencil " Correct

Shoehorn " Rubs it against leg

A number of other objects were correctly used in the left
hand but in a fumbling and awkward manner. The imitation
of movements was also somewhat apraxic on the left. The
imitations of movements of the right arm with the left arm
led to some interesting reactions. When the patient was
requested to make certain movements with the left arm alone,
an apraxia always resulted, but this apraxia practically dis-
appeared if the patient was allowed to imitate the movements
of the right arm with his left. The apraxia to imaginary
movements or in the use of objects was increased when the
eyes were closed ; or if apraxia was absent when the eyes were
open, it tended to appear when the same tests were made with
the eyes closed. These observations, demonstrated as in the
previous case, that visual impressions are able to partially
correct a motor apraxia in the same manner that a subject is
less ataxic when the eyes are open.

For an anatomical localizing diagnosis we would suggest a
probable area of softening at the angle of the third left frontal
convolution and the Sylvian Fissure, extending below to the
white matter of the corona radiata and to the radiations of
the genu of the corpus callosum (forceps anterior). A lesion
here would cause a motor aphasia and also a motor apraxia of
the left arm, because the guiding influence of the right side
of the brain upon the left side of the body would be cut
off. The motor centre would thus become isolated. Here
again we see the importance of the integrity of the cal-
losal fibres from preventing any motility disturbance. The
weakness and numbness of the right arm is probably due to
either a backward extension of the lesion or to a pathologi-
cal irradiation involving the anterior central convolution on
the left.

Any analysis of these two cases demonstrated that the chief
difficulty lay in an inability to transfer a subjective choice
process into an objective reaction. The cause of this dis-
order could be easily traced to a definitely localized lesion in
the brain, which disturbed the kinetic memories for move-

TH^ PSYCHOPATHOI^OGY OF APRAXIA

ments and produced new and abnormal combinations. The
disordered movements and misuse of objects could be partially
corrected through visual impressions, probably because these
impressions may have stimulated certain non-affected por-
tions of the brain, to function in a normal manner.

NOTE ON SOME OF THE PHYSICAL FACTORS

AFFECTING REACTION TIME, TOGETHER

WITH A DESCRIPTION OF A NEW

REACTION KEY

By Frank Angell,

The history of reaction-time investigations discloses a curi-
ous combination of painstaking accuracy in regard to the
functioning of the time-measuring apparatus together with a
more or less happy-go-lucky arrangement at the other end of
the experiment.

Thus the chronoscope and its standardizing instruments
have been the subjects of minute and laborious investigation,
whilst the reagent, after assuming his 'convenient and com-
fortable position' has usually been left to his own devices in
carrying out the reaction prescriptions. Whether however the
reagent obeyed the directions, whether, for example, wrist
and forearm movements did not enter into play where finger
movements were prescribed, are matters which the experi-
menter has rarely been in a position to determine. Indeed it
has only been of comparatively recent date that investigation
has been directed to the initial pressure, the "antagonistic
motion" of the break reaction.

Among other neglected factors in these experiments has been
the effect of the tension of the reaction key spring. This has
usually been set at a ' comfortable and convenient' resistance,
and variations within these 'comfortable and convenient' limits
have been regarded as negligible. This may be the case, but
it is a minor question quite as well worth investigating as a
variation of 2 or 3 sigma in the readings of the chronoscope.

The question was taken up as a "minor study" by two
students in the advanced course in psychology — Miss Lank-
tree and Miss Morrison. The lever arm of a Morse key was set
at tensions of 10, 20, 50, 100, and 200 grams respectively, and
for each tension 10 series of 10 reactions each were taken.
The first of these series does not enter into the averages given
in Table I as the fall-hammer showed irregularities in the
chronoscope at the time this series was taken. Each day the
5 series were run through twice — the second time reversing
the order of the first, the order of the several series changing
from day to day. The 15 volt current was furnished by a
mercury rectifier and maintained at the same strength for

FACTORS AFFECTING REACTION TIME

each day, usually at 0.47 amp. The mean variation of
the hammer readings ran from one to three sigma — not very
accurate but sufficiently so for the purposes of the experiment/
The stimulus came from a sound-hammer placed behind the
reagent, who occupied a room adjacent to that of the experi-
menter. The reagents noted the condition of attention as
good, moderate or strained (the last referring to the accom-
panying muscular tension) and in addition marked the reac-
tion as sensory or muscular. Almost all of the reactions were
characterized as sensory; — seemingly from strain sensations
in the ear adapting it to the direction of the stimulus. L. had
already been reagent in another investigation for more than
a semester and both had been experimenting on reaction time
in the second year's course of laboratory work.

Table I gives the results of the experimentation for the
several tensions of the reaction key. It shows noticeable
differences for all tensions in case of L. and a noticeable differ-
ence between the tension of 200 grams and the remainder of
the series for M.

Table I

Reaction times for different tensions of spring of telegraph key.
Reagents L. and M.

L S M '

Tension

Grams

r. t.

m. V.

r. t.

m. V.

: 10

129.8

8.0

136.9

8:6

127.3

7-5

136.I

6.6

122.4

4.9

135.2

9-1

100

120.8

7-7

135. 1

10.9

200

I16.O

4.7

127.0

7-9

The introspections do not indicate any marked change in

le attitude of the reagents for the stronger pressures of the

:ey. Once M. notes a strain in the hand with 200 grams, but

{the reaction itself is noted as sensory, i. e., the sensory content

|of consciousness at the moment of reaction was strain sen-

itions in the head or ears directed toward the source of sound.

*he increase in tension, therefore, would not seem to result

for the reagent in a direction of attention to the hand and a

change to the muscular form of reaction. L. asserted that there

'It is, perhaps, worth while to note that the chronoscope "neuerer
Construction" used in this investigation, with only 4 years of use is a
luch less steady instrument than our old chronoscope; also "neuerer
Construction" which has weathered 20 years of general laboratory service.

88 ANGELL

was no noticeable difference to her in the set of the hand for
the lo, 20 and 50 grams of pressure, but that the transition
from any of these to 100 grams and from 100 to 200 was marked.
Nevertheless L's reactions show a steady decrease in quickness
from 10 to 200 grams. The shortening of the reaction time
with increase in tension of the key spring is, therefore, probably
physical and due to an acceleration of the motion of the reacting
finger imparted by the recoil of the spring. The tension at which
the acceleration would be noticeable would depend on the
manner of reaction: ten grams pressure might accelerate a
finger reaction but not one from the wrist or elbow. As a
result of long practice, L. had become skilled in the finger re-
action. This is possibly the reason why, for this reagent,
the effects of each tension were noticeable. A measurement
of the rapidity of the free recoil of the spring for 10 grams of
tension showed that a separation of the contacts of 3^ of a
millimeter — more than sufficient to break the current — took
place in 0.0005 sec. which of course is considerable faster than
the reacting finger can move at the beginning of its course.
This is to answer the possible objection that for the weaker
tensions, the reacting finger moved up faster than the key-bar.

Part 2. Experiments with Trigger Reaction Key.

As is the case with much of its apparatus, experimental
psychology found the ordinary telegraph key already in use
and adopted it for its own purposes. The key is very con-
venient in manipulation and the motion it calls for is 'natu-
ral.' Serious objections to it are the antagonistic motion
with the break reaction and variability of extent of the reaction
motion. Another easy and natural motion is that of the fin-
ger in pulling a trigger, with the advantage of a very slight
tendency, if any, towards the opposed reaction, though it
may well permit an anticipatory contraction. The experi-
ments presently to be described were carried out with a new
key of the trigger type.

The elimination of the antagonistic reaction would, in itself,
hardly be a sufficient reason for adding another instrument to
the already long list of reaction keys. This trigger key, however,
measures the force and extent of the reaction movement as
well as its time. As is evident from the accompanying figure,
the key is simple in construction. A cylindrical, self -register-
ing spring balance is mounted horizontally. The movable end
is provided with a ring for the reacting finger and in front of
this stands an adjustable post serving as a brace for the hand.
Electrical contact is made through the horizontal adjustable
rod R. mounted parallel to the cylinder. This rod is con-
nected with the binding-screw S" the other binding post S!^.

FACTORS AFFECTING REACTION TIME 89

Fig. I.

being connected with the index of the balance. In reacting, the
reagent closes the hand around the post P. — adjusted to the
proper distance from the 'trigger', and inserts the forefinger in
the ring as far as the first joint. When the stimulus comes the
reagent pulls the 'trigger', which breaks the contact between the
rod R. and the scale index. The pull carries along the register-
ing ring C. which is left in place at the forward end of the pull
thus showing the force and extent of the reaction movement.
If it is desired to change the initial tension of the spring, the
rod R. can be pushed along the side of the scale and the spring
set at any tension. In this way the influence of the initial
tension on the reaction movement can be easily ascertained.
Any anticipatory pull for o grams of tension is signalized by
the failure of the chronoscope hands to move.

For the sake of comparison of the keys, pairs of series of
reactions were taken with each of 10 reagents, each key being
used in one series of a pair. The number of reactions in a
series was 20, and one series in each pair was taken in halves
with the other series sandwiched in between the halves to
compensate possible practice effects. As the object of this
experiment was merely to test the relative trustworthiness
of the two keys, it will be sufficient to make a general state-
ment of the results.

Although the reagents were inexperienced in reacting, the
eaction times as well as the variations differed in no marked
egree from those of experienced reagents with whom the
processes of reaction had not passed over into the mechanical
stage.

The figures showed the shorter reaction time for 7 of the 10
reagents with the telegraph key. If we were to 'guess' at
the reason for this difference we should say it might in part,
be due to the upward push of the key spring, and in part to
the stronger tendency towards muscular reaction involved in

90 ANGELI.

the reacting position for the telegraph key. With the trig-
ger key, the hand and arm He in a position producing less mus-
cular strain than is the case with the Morse instrument,
and no tension is required to hold in place the moving part
of the instrument. Accordingly the content in consciousness
of muscular strain is usually less for beginners with the trigger
form of key and the reactions tend more to approach the sen-
sory form.

The differences of proportional mean variation between the
two keys were less marked than differences of reaction time and
in general, so far as the data go, we should be inclined to
say that taking merely the question of the time factor into
account, the trigger key is as trustworthy an instrument as
the old key.

Force and Extent of the Reaction Movement

So far no attention has been paid to the other factors of
the reaction given by the trigger key, i. e., to the factors of
force and extent of pull. The object so far has been merely to
compare the time data of the instruments, and with such
VersuchsLiere as beginners in psychology there is every in-
centive to keep the conditions of investigation as simple as
possible.

The experiment that follows is a preliminary survey with
one reagent of all the data given by the trigger key — the
force and extent of the reaction movement in relation to
each other and to the reaction time. The reagent for this
purpose was Miss Shumate who had done much reacting both
in the regular course of laboratory work and in investigations.
Before coming to this work and during it, she had been using
the telegraph key for reacting to light stimuli with variable
signal. Under these conditions her reactions were of the
sensory type. She had also taken part in the comparison
experiment along with the unpracticed reagents, but had re-
acted eight periods instead of one. The results for seven of
these periods (omitting the first where the data are imperfect)
were:

Tel. Key Trig. Key

Reaction time — median of 7 series 257 225

Av. of m. V. of 7 series 26 22

A number of series was next taken with the trigger key set
at different tensions from o grams to 1,000 grams — the re-
agent noting each time the extent, and consequently the
force, of the reaction pull. The instructions to S. were simply
to mark the condition of the tension — classing it as "high,"
"medium," or "low" and to note extent of pull. Reactions

FACTORS AFFECTING REACTION TIME 91

which the reagent classed as of "low attention" are not included
in results. The interval between signal and stimulus was
varied slightly to prevent reactions from becoming mechan-
ical. In response to inquiry, the reagent said that her motions
were not influenced through noting their extent and force;
in the process of reaction she had in mind chiefly the time
factor with no thought of making the pulls uniform in extent.

About 40 reactions were taken each period, distributed in four
series corresponding to four different tensions of the key.
Under these regular conditions, with but slight interruption
for introspections, the effects of practice became very notice-
able, so that at the end of a month the reagent's average reac-
tion time had decreased 75 to 100 sigma. Table II gives the
figures for all the reactions of this experiment. Taking the April
result, where practice effects practically disappeared, we
find with this key, too, an increase in reaction time with in-
creasing tension of the spring and along with this a tendency
towards a decreasing absolute mean variation. With the
weaker tensions the reactions were fairly mechanical ; the reac-
tion motion followed the stimulus without a conscious will
impulse. With the higher tensions this was less the case,
but whether with 1,000 grams, for example, each reaction
motion was preceded by a deliberate impulse, or whether a
general state, or *set' of preparation for stronger impulses pre-
ceded the entire series, we do not yet know. In order to get
mental conditions that were as far as possible constant, the
introspections were reduced to a minimum. The tendency
towards a smaller m. v. with the stronger tension indicates
however, that the latter condition was the case.

To what is the increase in r. t. with increased tension due : —
to the greater time required for the greater impulse or to the
greater resistance to the movement of reaction? The in-
dications from the table are that the latter is the case. The
columns headed atS ap^ at^ ap^ give the averages of the three
quickest and the three slowest reaction-times respectively, to-
gether with the averages of the length (and strength) of pulls
corresponding to these reactions. The table shows no agree-
ment for any given resistance between length of reaction time
and strength of pulP; of the 32 series tabulated, the quickest
reactions give 16 longer and 14 shorter pulls than the slowest,
while for 2 series within the limits of error of reading, the pulls
are equal. In one of these series (10 reactions) the times ranged
from 133 to 177 sigma, while the pulls were all of 1,775
grams; in the other, the time range was from 144 to 183,

^Curiously enough Ach (Willenstaetigkeit und Denken, S. 158) assumes
that the opposite is true: i. e., he regards it as "sicher" that the quicker
reaction follows the stronger impulse.

ANGELL

TABI.E II. TriggBR-Kby
Reaction data of S for different tensions of spring

at^ means average of }/i of shortest reactions
at^ means average of 3^ of longest reactions
ap^ means average pulls for at^
ap2 means average pulls for at^.

Grams

No.

av.

av. pull.

tension

react.

Date

r. t.

m.v.

ati

ap'

at2

ap2

m. m.

o grams

Apr. 20

139

123

608

153

650

o "

" 22

135

125

812

179

787

o "

'" 25

143

129

767

158

742

o "

" 27

132

116

800

145

782

o "

" 29

154

124

717

169

733

av.

141

IOC grams

Apr. 20

146

133

875

154

862

200 "

" 22

139

127

908

155

925

200 "

" 25

176

135

887

187

900

200 "

" 27

145

124

908

169

975

200 "

" 29

159

149

825

172

833

200 "

" 18

149

125

883

167

871

av.

152

10
17

167

955

207

960

300 grams

Mch. 2

190

300 "

" 14

172

162

955

185

860

400 grams

Mch. 16

185

163

970

209

1075

2,2>

400 "

" 21

176

153

1075

211

1050

500 grams

Apr. 8

154

124

1070

198

IIIO

600 grams

Apr. II

162

139

1200

184

1225

600 "

" 18

153

143

1250

160

1242

600 "

145

13.S

1 167

173

1133

600

" 22

153

128

1275

184

1287

600 "

" 25

176

162

1208

189

1200

600 "

" 27

139

129

1283

147

1312

600 "

" 29

157

129

1175

147

1175

av.

155

12
24

148

1388

800 grams

Mch. 23

177

215

1360

800 "

Apr. 13

138

116

1370

161

1395

800 "

" 15

162

144

1435

185

1425

av.

159

1000 grams

Apr. 18

159

141

1567

171

1583

1000 "

163

145

1542

188

1525

1000 "

" 22

176

146

1566

203

1533

1000 "

" 25

169

158

1600

186

1550

1000 "

" 27

163

149

1600

173

1600

1000

" 29

171

157

1567

184

1575

av.

167

FACTORS AFFECTING REACTION TIM]© 93

with a uniform pull of i ,600 grams. There is therefore here no
proportion between the reaction-time and strength of motor
impulse for any given resistance. In addition, the m. v.
show no increase with increase in resistance ; indeed there is,
for this reagent, a slight tendency towards a decrease of this
quantity. If the observed increase in reaction time with in-
creased tension were due to increased time in the discharge
of the motor impulse, there would probably be an increase in
the resulting m. v.

The last column in Table II gives in millimeters the average
distance pulled for the several tensions. The length of the re-
acting scale for 2,000 grams of weight is 105 millimeters. Con-
sequently the distance pulled may be found from the formula
d=i .0525 {l-t) where / is the strength of the pull and t the initial
tension at which the index was set. For this table / is taken as
the average of ap^ and ap"^ which is very close to the average pull
for any tension, and in some cases coincides with it. The
table indicates a tendency to decrease the distance pulled with
increase in initial tension t the falling off amounting to about
one centimeter in going from o grams initial tension to 1,000
grams. We have accordingly with increased tension of pull
an increased reaction time with a tendency towards smaller
mean variation and a decrease in distance pulled. As this
article is merely a preliminary survey of the field with one
reagent, any attempt to evaluate the results would be pre-
mature. It is hoped that experiments with additional reagents
supplementing those already performed, will show that the
trigger key is helpful in the investigation of reaction processes.

PRECISION OF MEASUREMENTS APPLIED TO
PSYCHOMETRIC FUNCTIONS

By F. H. S AFFORD

In three closely related articles/ Dr. F. M. Urban has
treated Psychometric Functions by the aid of statistical
methods. For convenience these articles will be referred to
as /, //, ///, respectively. The object of this paper is to dis-
cuss his use of these methods from the standpoint of physical
measurements only, and not to enter into the psychological
questions involved.

In considering the results of physical measurements it is
necessary to keep in view the precision of the observations,
the extent to which deductions may be carried, and the
methods of computation which will give the results without
unnecessary labor. It is of course useless to expect good re-
sults from insufficient data, and equally useless to sacrifice
good data by an incomplete analysis.

In order to be able to discuss the three articles intelligently
it is desirable to refer to several fundamental principles of
computation.

In most cases the term "precision" should be restricted to
fractional precision, i. e., the ratio of the error of a quantity
to the entire quantity. When a result of a measurement of
any kind is stated as 25,306, it is understood to show that the
result lies between 25,305.5 and 25,306.5, or that the value is
known with an error of not over one unit in the last digit.
The fractional precision is this case is thus, approximately,
one part in 25,000. Had the original result been 2,530,600. j
the fractional precision would have been the Same. The two
ciphers at the end are "insignificant" digits, serving only to
indicate the position of the decimal point. The cipher be-
tween 3 and 6 is a significant digit, and the same is true of the
ciphers in such a result as .12500. If the last two digits are

^I. The Application of Statistical Methods to the Problems of Psy-
chophysics. The Psychological Clinic Press, Philadelphia, Pa., 1908.

II. Die psychophysischen Massmethoden als Grundlagen empirischer
Messungen, Archiv f. d. ges. Psychologic, Vol. 15, Part 3 and 4, Leipzig,
1909.

III. Die psychophysischen Massmethoden als Grundlagen empirischer
Messungen, Archiv f. d. ges. Psychologie, Vol. 16, Part i and 2, Leipzig,
1909.

PRECISION OI^ MEASUREMENTS 95

written, they indicate, as before, that the result is between
.124995 and .125005. When the result lies between .1245
and .1255 the correct form is .125. But in .0012500 the first
ciphers are now "insignificant," serving as before to locate
the decimal point. When a measurement is actually a count-
ing of individuals, the last digit is not subject to an error in
the sense used above. In general, the last digit of a measure-
ment is liable to an error of one half-unit in that place, and to
an average error of a quarter-unit. The precision of a measure-
ment may be indicated for practical purposes by stating the
number of significant digits, and it is not influenced by the
position of the decimal point.

In the case of the four arithmetical processes the precision
of the result is usually the same as that of the least precise
element, a principle which may be deduced as follows. The
product of .234 and 126.5 is 29.6010; but if the given numbers
are measurements, they should be considered as .234:k; and
126.5X, where x indicates unknown digits. In adding the
several partial products, each column containing an x must
be rejected, leaving the result 29.6. This result is not as im-
pressive as the former, but it is the only one justified by the
data. The proof of the rule for division is similar. When
a child is taught to annex ciphers to a dividend to facilitate
division, he learns a rule which has no place in computation
of physical measurements; and a division which is carried on
after all the digits of the original dividend have been "brought
down" presents a familiar exhibition of false accuracy. In
addition and subtraction, the position of the decimal point
affects the precision of the result, which is usually the preci-
sion of the numerically largest element, the use of an x at the
end of each measured element affording a quick and reliable
means of testing a result. When two elements in a subtrac-
tion are nearly equal, the result is often disappointingly in-
accurate, so that an original precision of seven digits may be
reduced even to one digit. Of course, logarithmic work is
•subject to similar criteria. The logarithm of 54.32 taken from
a seven-place table may range from 1.7349 198 to 1.7349997,
so that 1.7349 o^ I -7350 is as accurate as the given number
will permit. If the given number were 54.32000, indicating
a precision of seven digits, the seven place table would be
properly chosen for use. Conversely, if the logarithm of a
number is 2.34127, the number is anywhere from 219.4143 to
219.4194, i. e., is correct to five digits only. Thus, in general,
the number of places in the log. table should be that of the
digits in the number. With few exceptions the precision of
a result is not more than that of the data, and it is usually
less.

96 SAFFORD

It will be necessary later to employ the term average devia-
tion of the mean. If the sum of n quantities is divided by w,the
result is the arithmetic mean. The sum of the differences
between the arithmetic mean and the quantities, taken with-
out regard to sign, and divided by w, is the average deviation
of a single observed quantity. If this deviation is divided by
\/n, the result is called the average deviation of the mean and
gives a precision measure in common use by physicists. It
is customary to compute this to two places of significant figures
and then to retain in the arithmetic mean no digit be3^ond
this second digit, since more than these are useless. The
combined result is often written in the form 35.123 ± .012.

The experiments which were the basis of Dr. Urban' s
articles are described in /, page i, and in II, page 261. A
set of brass cylinders externally identical and of weights vary-
ing by four grams from 84 to 104 gms. was arranged at equi-
distant intervals determined by numbers from i to 14, around
the circumference of a circular table. Standard weights of
100 gms. were placed at the odd numbers. The individual to
be tested was requested to lift each weight in turn, and to
give his judgment as to the relative weight of each cylinder at
an even number and the standard cylinders at the preceding
odd number. The table was rotated so as to bring the weights
in succession under the hand of the observer, who stated his
judgments at the rate of eleven and one-half per minute.
Bach experiment consisted of 50 comparisons of each weight
with the standard, and the results of each experiment were
separately tabulated, the judgments being classified as heavier,
lighter or equal.

Seven observers were employed, of whom the first three
performed nine experiments, and the others six. The "fre-
quencies" for each of the three types of judgment were com-
puted by dividing the total number of judgments of each type
and for each weight by the total number of judgments in the
nine or six experiments. Observer 1° gave the judgment
"equal" 28 times for the 84 gm. weight and 56 times for the
88 gm. weight. So that the two frequencies were 28 -^450 and
56-V-450 respectively. This process gave eventually a table
of frequencies having seven entries, one for each weight. By
interpolation, frequencies were found corresponding to weights
varying by single grams from 84 to 108, but only the seven
original entries were experimental results. After the plotting
of these extended results for each observer and for each type
of judgment, smooth curves were drawn through the twenty-
five points of each plot. The curves for equality judgments
were somewhat like the ordinary probability curve, while those

PRECISION OF MEASUREMENTS 97

for lighter and heavier judgments were low and high respec-
tively at the right ends and vice versa at the left ends.

The equality curve for observer 1° was treated most elabo-
rately and so will require the most attention in this paper.
The original frequencies for observer 1° (/, table 85) were:

.0622, .1244, .3311, .4422, .4644, .0911, .0533.

The number 28 above mentioned, which is the total for
nine experiments, is the sum of widely varying components,
viz., 4, 3, 4, 4, 2, 5, 2, 3, I. If we follow the procedure pre-
viously explained and compute the average deviation of the
mean, these values give 3.11 ± .34. In this manner the orig-
inal frequencies revised and with useless digits omitted are:

.0622 ± .0067, .124 ± .019, .331 ± .045, .442 ± .025.

.464 ± .045, .0911 ± .0061. .0533 ± .0099.

Thus a three place log. table is sufficiently accurate for the
computation, though it must not be inferred that this means
rough approximation ; for, on the scale adopted by Dr. Urban,
a change of a unit in the third decimal place of an ordinate
is not visible to the naked eye. Granting the use of these
ordinates to four digits and no further, it should be observed
that these ordinates and the corresponding abscissae 84, 88,
etc., give seven points and no more for the purpose of defining
the psychometric curve of this observer.

At /, page 1 2 6, Dr. Urban proceeded by the use of Lagrange's
formula to obtain the equation of this curve in Cartesian
co-ordinates, since in that form the result is easily differen-
tiated, thus enabling one to locate the maximum ordinate. In
this computation the seven ordinates were treated as if exact
to any desired extent, i. e.y in the divisions, zeros were added
to the dividends giving some quotients to twenty-four signi-
ficant figures. Such precision is equivalent to stating the
volume of the earth with an error of not over one cubic inch.
On an inserted sheet (/, p. 129), giving only a portion of the
details, there are over fifteen hundred digits, and but for two
accidents the equation of the psychometric curve would have
coefficients correct to eighteen digits. One accident is that
certain of the results are computed to only eleven digits; the
other is an error in the computation of a,<^ (x): (x — 84) mi,
where the coefficient of X^ is given as .003035422096*013889,
when it should be .003035422092013889. This error gives the
ordinate of the point for which X^ 100 the value .4650 instead
of .4644 as in the data. Newton's method of differences
gives a formula which is theoretically the same as that by
Lagrange, and requires about one- tenth of the labor. While
this is not in a form for easy differentiation, the method of
approximation will quickly locate the maximum ordinate,
giving its location far closer than the data will warrant.

Journal — 7

98 SAFFORD

Certain theoretical topics about this curve must now be
treated. In /, page 139, this statement occurs. "Inter-
polation by Lagrange's formula has not the character of a
definite hypothesis on the nature of the psychometric function
but it is rather a method of completing a set of observations. "
Lagrange's formula gives the equation of a curve through n
points, whose degree is not greater than n and the n points de-
determine the curve completely. In fact, for any set of n points
only one curve exists of the type which Lagrange's formula as-
sumes. The use of Lagrange's formula certainly makes a definite
assumption about the type of the psychometric function, which
is all the more open to objection because all of the probability
curves, both symmetrical and asymmetrical, are definitely ex-
cluded. An infinity of curves of the same general form, if
desired, but of higher degree may be made to pass through any n
points, so that it seems utterly useless to spend energy in locat-
ing within one one-thousandth of an inch the maximum point of
a curve whose only claim for consideration is the fact that its
equation is simpler than that of other curves. Circles were once
considered the only perfect curves; hence it was argued that
heavenly bodies must have circular orbits. As a last comment
on the quotation above, if Lagrange's formula enables one to
complete a set of observations, why not make fewer observa-
tions and use the formula instead? Thus from two observa-
tions one could obtain an indefinite number of new "observa-
tions," but unfortunately all would lie on a straight line
through the two original points.

Without detracting from the very able mathematical treat-
ment of the theoretical psychometric curves, it is important
to notice that the observation curves in / and // show such
divergence from the theoretical curves in /// that deductions
from the latter are not applicable to the former. But the
former are not a necessary conclusion from the seven points.
From a mathematical standpoint it is desirable to have more
points for the curves, and these must not be obtained by any
formula of interpolation, since this process introduces an
assumption about the curves, in fact is equivalent to defining
the curves completely. Under the conditions provided in
these experiments the deductions may quite as well be ob-
tained from the plots themselves, since the observations are
not sufficiently precise to justify such exhaustive mathematical
treatment.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DROWSINESS
An iNTRosp^cTivie AND Anai^yticai. Study

■ By H. L. Hoi.iyiNGWORTH, Barnard College, Columbia University

' The investigation of sleep and dreams seems to the writer
to have neglected to explore in an adequate way a region of
normal conscious life which merits more attention. This
region is the state of drowsiness, which usually precedes the
sleep state, and which is especially prominent and long
drawn out in conditions of over work or unduly protracted
waking hours. Much, of course, is known of the dreamy
mental states so clearly described by Crichton-Brown^ and
intimately related to the aurse which frequently precede
epileptic seizures, and of the various disturbances of sensation
and perception in neuraesthenia, psychaesthenia and the
many pronounced types of alienation.^ Something is known
of the variously named hypnoid, hypnagogic or pre-sleep-
ing state which is often found to precede the hypnotic
trance, and of the dissociations found in hysteria. The
"dreamy mental states" described by Crichton-Brown in
his Cavendish lecture were such experiences as "double con-
sciousness— loss of personal identity — a going back to child-
hood— vivid return of an old dream — losing touch with the
world — deprivation of corporeal substance — loss of sense of
proportion, — momentary black despair — being at the Day of
Judgment," etc. And they are asserted to be "abnormal in
their essence and morbid in their tendencies."

But references are few in the literature to the suggestive
and quite common hallucinations and perceptual complica-
tions experienced by supposedly normal people in the state of
drowsiness, and such search as the writer has been able to
make has disclosed no careful description or analysis of this
state. Prince^ has recently asserted that the pre-sleeping state
has "certain marked characteristics which distinguish it
from the alert state of waking life and is worthy of study in
itself." M. Maury^ in the report of his experiments on dream

^Dreamy Mental States — The Lancet, July 6, 13, 1895; Nos. 3749-50.
^Paton: Psychiatry, pp. 26-127.

^Mechanism and Interpretation of Dreams. Jour. Ab, Psy., 19 10, p. 139.
*Le Sommeil et les R^ves. p. 42, etc.

lOO HOIvUNGWORTH

production describes the so-called "hypnagogic hallucination"
which he regarded as constituting "the chaos out of which
the dream cosmos is evolved," and HerscheP has described
"sensorial visions" which occur during the waking state,
but these seem to be merely the familiar entoptic phenomena
of waking life. Sully2 calls attention to the presence of transi-
tion states between sleeping and waking and to the compara-
tive ease with which sense illusions occur in these states.
These seem to be the "hypnagogic states" of Maury, "states
of somnolence or sleepiness in which external impressions
cease to act, the internal attention is relaxed, and the wierd
imagery of sleep begins to unfold itself." But Sully's chief
emphasis is on the persistence of the dream hallucination
proper into the postsomnial condition.

Conceivably the state of drowsiness might throw consider-
able light on dream formation, the relation between the latent
and the manifest content of dreams, and the various ways in
which external impressions and central dispositions are trans-
formed and related in the serial dream. Drowsiness is the
transition state between waking consciousness and dream life,
and careful observation of this state should be able to catch
dreams in the making and to disclose the tendencies which
attain their maximal operation in the sleep state proper.
Whether or not it be true that the genuine dream is experi-
enced only in moments of awaking from or falling into the
sleep state is immaterial. The dream as a more or less
systematic articulation and fabrication is quite distinguish-
able from the unique fusions which come in moments of drowsi-
ness. In the experience of the writer and his observers these
latter are more often momentary perceptual states, flashlights
of imagery of unwonted vividness which may as such be
repeated in successive moments but which do not tend to
lead on to new situations as do dream states. And yet these
perceptual fusions show striking points of similiarity in their
composition to the various units of the serial dream.

The purpose of this paper is to describe several typical
cases of the drowsiness hallucination and to analyze out some
of the principles which clearly contribute to their formation.
Two observers, the writer (H) and his wife (L), have for the
last two years been recording these experiences, with the
result that an accumulation of cases has been acquired which
seem to show sufficiently pronounced characteristics and
similiarities to make their discussion worth while. The ob-
servations have invariably been made in the pre-sleeping

^"On Sensorial Visions" in Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects.
^Illusions, p. 184.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DROWSINESS lOI

state, for neither of the observers has the drowsiness hallucina-
tion in any marked degree in the pre-waking state. In all
cases the observer has been aware of the hallucinatory char-
acter of the experience, and has immediately written out the
description or narrated it to the other observer.

The imagery type of the observer, as will be shown later,
seems to be to some extent, a determining factor in the com-
position of the hallucination content, in that modes which
are only vague and seldom used in the waking state become
vivid and active in the drowsy condition, while the type
modes fall into the background. It will then be of interest
to know that according to frequent imagery tests L is pre-
dominately visual and visual-verbal in type with almost no
auditory or motor tendencies, while H is very highly auditor-
motor, both as to imagery and memory type, has frequently
had auditory and motor hallucinations, especially marked
in childhood, but is a very poor visualizer. Typical cases
are given in the following paragraphs, and in the subsequent
analysis these cases will be referred to by number.

Case I. Observer H. On board ocean-liner, dressing for
dinner in suit purchased abroad, sitting drowsily on edge of
berth and thinking that the suit had turned out to be a bad
investment and had been forced on to me by a tricky salesman.
Planning to buy cloth this time to be made up in United States
and wondering if it would pass Customs. Suddenly the rush
of water heard through the porthole becomes transformed
into the husky voice of a salesman trying to sell me a suit.
I fall to musing in the process, wondering, while he talks, at
his husky voice and why he has no more inflection.

Case II. Observer H. At Victor Herbert's opening con-
cert, 1 909, L — , E — , and myself were talking of the cartoons of
Mr. Bug in "Life." L — described a cartoon in which the
six legs of Deacon Fire-fly were represented as grasping
different objects such as a Bible, a prayer book, etc., while
Mr. Bug held playing cards, a bottle, a cigar, etc. I had been
working all day on comparative nervous anatomy, preparing
a lecture on complications of stimulus and response, and had

y head full of segments and nervous arcs. The orchestra
layed Grieg's "Wedding Day at Hegstad." In the last
bar there were three finishing blasts with full orchestra.

had become very drowsy and these blasts seemed to me

be movements of some huge bug which came sailing from
ehind the wings, suddenly alighting on the stage, first on
the two hind feet, then bringing down the middle pair, and
finally the two front feet with the final blast. The visual
elements present were of huge, vague, rather reddish brown
jointed legs, the feet not clear and only the lower ventral side

I02 HOLI.ING WORTH

of the body dimly suggested, but flashing out at each "land"
of the feet.

Case III. Observer H. In bed, winter '09, with "grippe."
Kept tossing from side to back, then to other side. As I tossed
the numbers 50, 2, 36 kept running in my head, appearing
clearly visually as 5236, and auditorially as "fifty two — thirty
six." Now these (50, 2, 36) were the combination numbers
of my gym locker, which I opened by turning the knob left-
right-left-right, four turns, very much as I now tossed in bed.
In my tossing the numbers rang and rang in my head, the
left side seeming 52, the right side 36, the back 5236. It
seemed that if I could juggle these numbers into the right
combination I could find a comfortable position.

Case IV. Observer L. Tossing experience similar to above,
but seemed to be going to Brooklyn and back, Mrs. M. —
who lives there having lately been uppermost in mind through
conversation, letters and a recent visit.

Case V. Observer H. Played checkers nearly all day on
steamer. Retiring to cabin before sleeping time, threw myself
drowsily on my bunk and fell to ruminating over some pro-
jected experiments on the comic, wondering whether to follow
method of order of merit or that of assigning numerical grade
to each comic situation. I decide, but in my half awake con-
sciousness the decision takes the form of a move in checkers. I
I decide to move my white man up to the king row and men- "i
tally see C — jump it with his black.

Case VI. Observer H. Lying in bed talking. In a pause
I see a large marble toad-stool which seems to stand on a hill
and to resemble the dome of the New York University Library,
around which runs the Hall of Fame. On top of the toad-
stool bell were stamped in large black letters, three names,
"Jastrow," "Gillis," and another blurred one which I could
not make out. At once I told my companion of the vision,
saying " I see a curious hall of fame," etc. That evening I had
read some comments on Jastrow's magazine article on" Ma-
licious Animal Magnetism" and had also seen in a comic paper a
picture called "The Annual Ball of the Mushrooms." Psycho-
analysis threw no light on the name "Gillis" nor on the
blurred name.

Case VII. Observer L. Had a bad toothache, and though
very sleepy and worn out could not sink into a sound slumber
because of the pain. For several hours I lay in a state of
semi-consciousness, tossing from side to side in a drowsy
effort to find a comfortable position. All day I had been
very intently working on a coat which I was making, and
my tossings back and forth were all in terms of the seams on
the coat, i. e., as I turned to the right the seam down the

THS PSYCHOLOGY OF DROWSINESS IO3

right side of the garment was inspected, then as that position
gradually grew unbearable the seam began to wrinkle, to
pucker, and to become quite unmanageable. Thereupon I'
decided to work awhile on the other seam, and turned to the
left side and carefully basted and pressed the seam on the
left side of the coat. But, though it behaved very satis-
factorily for a time, it too, soon began to wrinkle and the
thread to snarl. In despair I attacked the seam on the right
side again, that is, I turned over to my right side once more.
This continued for an indefinite time. I was in despair.
I feared the garment would be quite ruined. All through
these hours I was conscious of the slight flapping of the window
blind and twice I replied quite sensibly to the questions of
my companion, and noted the striking of the hours on a clock
in another apartment. But the illusion that I was wrestling
with the seams of a refractory garment was not dispelled till
I fell asleep at daylight.

Case VIII. Conversations during the drowsy state.

(a) L — Let's hurry and get there by ten o'clock.

H — That's easy. I could get there by a nickel to ten.
(It was then 9.50)

(b) H — (As L rises from the sofa where she has been
resting and leaves the room) So you want some water, huh?

t, — (Entering again) What did you ask about a drink?

H — Nothing.

L — But you asked me something about water.

H — (drowsily) It was n't an asker, it was just a sayer.

(c) H is said to behave when drowsy much like a child
;.or like a half-intoxicated man, — thus: he approaches an old
Ipillow spotted with ink blots and asserts in a child-like way
iquite without provocation or connection, — "Red ink! black
fink!" pointing to the spots meanwhile.

(d) L asks question to which H replies, quite without
relevance, "I don't think you could see the manuscript."

(e) L — "How curious the moon looks behind the clouds !"
H — Yes, just like a thin place in the sky."

Case IX. The writer has frequently recorded fantastic
[periments and conclusions developed either alone or during
liscussions, late at night. At the time of their conception
11 of these plans and insights seemed highly rational, strikingly
[original and wonderfully significant, and the observer has usu-
lly marvelled that nobody had ever seen the thing so clearly
)efore. He has frequently gone ahead after the midnight
|hours and prepared the material for one of the revolutionary
ixperiments or demonstrations just conceived. But when
the plan or conclusion has been gone over on the following
lorning the most striking thing about it has been its splendor

I04 HOLIylNGWORTH

as a work of unbridled imagination, but its absurdity as a
scientific achievement. The argument is found to abound
with fallacies or the experimental procedure with sources of
error that were lightly bridged over the night before. The
experience is no doubt a very common one. It seems much
like the nocturnal aereonautic inspection of a line of march
which must be gone over on foot when daylight comes.

Case X. The reason for citing the two following literary
references will be seen later. They are typical drowsiness
figures.

(a) This passage from Stevenson's letters to Henry James
(Stevenson, Letters, p. 435) must have been written late at
night and in a state of drowsiness. In fact Stevenson says
earlier in the letter "my wife being at a concert and a story
being done," indicating a late hour, and (especially in Steven-
son's case) fatigue. Speaking of the "Henry James chair"
the writer of the letter says, "It has been consecrated to
guests by your approval and now stands at my elbow gaping.
We have a new room, too, to introduce to you — our last
baby, the drawing room; it never cries and has cut its teeth.
Likewise there is a cat now."

(b) De Balzac, who wrote the following passage must
have been a night worker, — "He saw his teeth departing one
by one like brilliantly dressed ladies from a ball room."

The experiences here recorded can hardly be classed as
dream states though it is true that only a little elaboration
would be needed to make them develop into such states.
They all occurred during waking moments, and frequently
(See Cases 2, 5, 7) there is clear evidence that the observer is
actively engaged in some waking employment or lively thought
process or is conscious of external events. Yet most of them
are hallucinatory in character. Examination of such cases as
those given above reveals several rather clearly defined princi-
ples of composition or general tendency. Chief among these
are the following, the exposition of which seems to constitute
a fairly true, though perhaps, only partially complete analysis
of the state of drowsiness. Other experiences of much the
same kind could be given, some of which are withheld only
because of their close personal character, but all point in the
same direction as the cases here given, some of them even more
definitely.

I. Transformation of Imagery Type

Modes ordinarily vague and feeble become here dominant
and vivid, even tending to replace customary imagery habits.
Thus H, who is predominantly auditory and motor in type and
can only with difficulty summon up visual images of even

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DROWSINESS IO5

the most moderate vividness, has, in the drowsy state, visual
experiences which constantly amaze him by their clearness.
(See Cases 2, 3, 5, 6.) L, to whom sharp visual imagery is
a common habit, but who, in her waking consciousness cannot
understand what kinesthetic imagery is like, tends, in the
drowsy state, to relive motor experiences almost exclusively.
(See Cases 4 and 7). Along with this emphasis of unusual
modes goes the subordination of dominant modes, so that in
the drowsy state as in dream life, images even of these unusual
types seem to exceed by far in intensity the clearest images
of the waking state.

It seems to be generally true that with increased age, in-
creased book learning and, in general, with practice in verbal
modes of thinking, sense imagery gives way to word imagery
of one kind and another.^ Parallelling this fact, many
people have complained to the writer that with maturity they
lose their long drawn out delight in books, and especially in
descriptive literature. They tend more and more merely
to scan such passages and hence to read books much more
quickly. They may regret the loss of the old source of sat-
isfaction, the character of which they do not understand.
Evidently what happens is that sense imagery is waning
and description no longer has its old power of awakening
interest or calling forth emotion. In drowsiness this state
tends to disappear. The dominant modes in which one has
become accustomed to think in the more rigorous sense, seem
to tend toward sleep more quickly, while the lower, more
strictly sensory centres remain active or go to sleep more
slowly.

{Note. Since the preceding paragraph was written the
writer, in re-reading Professor Titchener's striking analysis^
of his own imagery processes, has found what seems to be
another clear instance of the transformation of imagery
type. Although this observer says it is possible for him to
*' trust to the guidance of kinaesthesis," this mode of imagery
does not seem to predominate in his daily life. The following
statements show the apparent superiority of his visual and
auditory imagery. "I rely in my thinking upon visual
imagery ..." etc. "My visual imagery, voluntarily
aroused, is extremely vivid." " . . . visual imagery which
is always at my disposal and which I can mould and direct
at will." But he also has "vivid and persistent auditory
imagery" and never sits down to work without a "musical
accompaniment." Kinaesthesis seems to play a rather sub-

^Galton: Inquiries into Human Faculty, p. 60.
^Experimental Study of the Thought Processes, 1909, p. 9.

I06 HOI.UNG WORTH

ordinate r61e, although we do find the remark, "As a rule I
look to all three kinds of prompting in the course of a single
hour." But, and this is the interesting point in the present
connection, " . . . when I am tired (italics mine) I find
that vision and audition are likely to lapse, and I am left
alone with kingesthesis.")

In this state the condition of early childhood is reproduced
and sense imagery may become vivid, intense and grotesque.
This tendency, along with the absence of sensory stimulation
probably accounts as well for the greater vividness of images
in dreams. The frequency and character of dream imagery
has sometimes been taken as an index of the type habits of
waking life, but the transformation tendency shown in the
observations here presented seems to show clearly that this
is not the case on the state of drowsiness. The difference
may, perhaps, be explained by supposing that in sleep all
the centres are more nearly equally quiescent, while in drowsi-
ness the type centres slumber first, thus giving prominence
to modes not usually relied on.

2. Substitution

Within the content of the drowsiness fusion it will be seen
that a present impression, a preservative tendency or, perhaps,
even a pure memory element often substitutes itself for some
other datum whose r61e it fills in the perceived composition of
the hallucination. Illustrations of these forms of substitution
are afforded by the cases here reported.

(a) Sensory Substitution. Here a present sensory im-
pression takes upon itself the task of impersonating more
ideal or memory contents, of bearing their qualities, carrying
out their behavior and in a general way acting for them.
Thus in Case I the sound of the waves washing against the
sides of the boat assumes the role of the foreign salesman,
becomes his voice and seems to constitute his conversation.
In Cases 3, 4, and 7 present motor processes (tossings, turn-
ings and other changes of position) become the vehicle on
which are borne memory experiences of a day or two before.

(b) Perseverative Substitution. Case V in which the
thinking out of the technique of an experimental problem
seemed to be carried on in terms of the manipulation of the
white men on a checker board, affords an excellent illustration
of the tendency of perseverative impressions to play the role
of other data.

(c) Ideal Substitution, — in which an ordinarily revived
image becomes the substantive for experiences more or less
remote or assists in the interpretation of a present impression
is rather difficult to demonstrate for two reasons. In the first

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DROWSINESS I07

place it is not easy to draw the line between perseverative
impressions and supposedly revived images. Thus in Case I
the huge bug which was conceived as alighting on the plat-
form in order to apperceive the three successive orchestra
blasts, was evidently a pure object of "creative imagination,"
for no previous impression had corresponded to a creature of
such dimensions. Yet the character of this imagery content
was probably determined by certain perseverative tendencies
arising from the prolonged consideration of the various types
of nervous anatomy. In the second place, substitutions of the
sensory and perseverative type usually involve a correlative
displacement of the ideal content for which they act, and in
setting up ideal substitution as a third type, on the basis of
the data at hand, one is perhaps, merely paraphrasing what
he has already said.

At any rate it is clear that interchange of ideal with both
sensory and perseverative content and interchange of sensory
with perseverative content occurs. Whether one pure ideal
datum may act as substitute for another, future observation
may show. DeBalzac's simile (x, b) which sounds much like
the conversation of a drowsy man, seems to be a case of such
substitution. More will be said of such literary figures in
the following paragraphs.

3. Fluid Association on a Sensory Basis

with removal of constraining mental sets and controls. This
leads to bizarre analogies, naive statements and unusual
verbal combinations. In this respect the state of drowsiness
seems to be quite like genuine dream consciousness, in which
such free association tendencies are so pronounced. Thus De
Manaceine^ points out "the tendency which compels us during
sleep and during enfeebled states of consciousness generally
to associate everything which presents some common resem-
blance, for example — words according to their sound, and
images according to some accidental and external resem-
blance. The same tendency is observed in the uneducated
and very markedly in the insane. . . Any resemblance in
color or form is enough to associate images which are alto-
gether (i) heterogeneous." Again, "There is a well known
tendency in dreams for the perpetration of bad puns, sound
leading sense, as happens frequently with the insane, idiots
and young children." Prince^ in referring incidentally to the
characteristics of the pre-sleeping state has written, "ideas
course through the mind in what appears to be a disconnected
fashion, although probably determined by associations.

^Sleep, p. 283 £f. ^Op. cti.

I08 HOLUNG WORTH

Memories of the preceding day and of past thoughts which
express the interests, desires, fears and anxieties of the psy-
chological life and attitudes of the individual float in a stream
through the mind like a phantasmagoria."

Examples a, b, c, d, and e under CaseVIII afford concrete
illustrations of such uncontrolled accidental association.
Formal, practical and conceptual constraints being removed,
resemblances of a sensory and ordinarily unnoticed kind, which
seem to involve only lower nervous centres become predomi-
nant, verbal plays (b), naive confusion of related concepts
(a), absurd juxtapositions (d) and attention to irrelevant
details (c) abound in the state of drowsiness. Not infre-
quently similes and affective chords are hit upon which with
only a little treatment would become adequate literary figures
(e).

Indeed, many of the choicest paragraphs to be found in
the works of imaginative writers bear all the birth marks of
a drowsiness conception. The illustration from Stevenson's
letters (loa) is clearly a case of unusually vivid imagery,
sensory substitution and uncontrolled association. In this
connection Marsh's study^ of the favorite work hours of i6o
eminent writers is extremely interesting. Some of Marsh's
conclusions are as follows :

"If the poets and novelists are roughly designated as an
imaginative class and the historians, clergymen, essayists,
critics, journalists, philosophers, etc., as a broader intellective
class we shall find the former predominant in the morning
and night groups and the latter in the day ones;" " . . . of
the after midnight workers all are of the imaginative type;"
" . . . excitation of some sort is most often the precondition
of the highest imaginative work." " . . . numerous and
well-patronized methods of mental stimulation — from ordinary
walking, riding or music to hourly service of blackest coffee,
greenest tea or strongest opium or to constant use of tobacco,
before and during composition. The extensiveness of this prac-
tice among the imaginative writers is striking."

One might mention in the same connection the fact that
Mark Twain is said to have done most of his writing in bed,
if not while actually sleepy at least in the sleeping posture,
and the further fact that certain favorite poets have pro-
duced nothing of note since they were induced to sign the
temperance pledge. The use of drugs and the preference for
night hours both point in the same direction. It seems to
have been shown plainly that the apparent stimulating effect

^Diurnal Course of Efficiency, Archives of Psychol. No. 7, 1906, pp.
59-69.

THS PSYCHOLOGY OI^ DROWSINESS IO9

of such drugs as are used depends on the fact that they nar-
cotize the higher centres, on the functioning of which depend
our control processes and constraining mental sets. And
much the same condition seems to be the cause both of the in-
volved serial dream states and of the vivid perceptual drowsi-
ness complications. The similarity of these states to the oft
described alienation psychoses will at once remind the reader
of Nordau's fervent chapter^ on Mysticism.

The artist and the poet must in some way get out of the
world of percepts and into the world of pure sensory qualities.
And this is npt an easy thing for most of us to do. Most
of us were there when we were children and the most prosaic
of us tend to slip over the frontier in the pre-sleeping state
or when under the influence of artificially induced drowsiness.
A very few of us are vagabonds enough to be able to wander
back and forth at will, and these are the artists and poets.

4. Isolation of Association Trains

This characteristic of drowsy states is closely related to
that described in the foregoing section. The difference lies
in the fact that there we were dealing with single percep-
tual or ideational contents while here we have to do with
such serial chains of associations as may sometimes be set
up. In the drowsy state proper, in the experience of the
writer, these chains do not develop, — the genuine drowsiness
complication being either a simple "flashlight" hallucina-
tion or else a sort of "boomerang" composition, tending
to return always upon itself rather than to lead on to further
and new associations. But such experiences as those de-
scribed under Case IX seem to belong to much the same
state. These fantastic thought systems evolve most easily
in times of fatigue, loss of sleep or unduly prolonged intel-
lectual work. When the drowsy state is thus extended over
a long period of time, association chains and reasoning
show much the same behavior that perceptual or ideational
states do in the drowsiness state proper. The essential thing
is the release of all intellectual inhibition. An idea, plan
or desire is thus able to make unimpeded progress from stage
to stage of its development with what seems at the time to
be unerring logic. Its evolution is accompanied by the strong
emotion and the feelings of exuberance, bouyancy, confidence
and eager enthusiasm characteristic of the night worker.
In my own case the feverish plans, insights and conclusions
developed in midnight hours have almost invariably faded into
pale grays on the arrival of the next "waking consciousness"

^ Degeneration, Ch. I.

no HOI.UNG WORTH

much as did Maeterlinck's "Bluebird" when brought into
the sunlight.

The drowsiness thought process behaves much as do the
familiar dream states in which cosmic riddles are solved and
impossible mechanical devices evolved. One recalls in this
connection the oft-told case cited by Crichton-Brown of the
man who determined to write out the solution arrived at in
order to preserve it from the amnesia which usually developed
on awaking. When morning came he looked eagerly for the
paper on which he had written during the night and read
there only the single mystic sentence, "A strong smell of
turpentine pervades the whole."

Rivers and Weber^ have shown that mental fatigue, an-
sesthetization of the muscle involved, or small doses of alcohol
may have the same effect, viz.: a momentary falling off of
fatigue due to disregard of secondary afferent impulses which
are the basis of the fatigue feeling. Much the same situation
seems to be present in the drowsy state and the disregard of
obstacles and treacherous points in the chain of reasoning
is probably due to quiescence of the higher centres which
control both motor output and processes of inference. Such
a condition is reconcilable with any of the current theories
of sleep and with most theories of epilepsy, to the intellectual
aurse of which the drowsiness hallucinations seem to bear a
close resemblance.

5. Grandeur and Vastness

Closely connected with the transformation of imagery type
and the isolation of association chains is the tendency toward
grandeur and vastness which usually characterizes the drowsy
states. This is true of the simpler perceptual complications
as well as of the further developed thought processes. Thus
in Case II the idea of a gigantic insect, and in Cases 3, 4,
and 7, the interpretation of limited motor processes in terms
of long journeys or of complicated activities such as dress-
making and opening combination locks, and in Case I the
personification of monotonous noises, show the tendency
to magnify simply sensory impressions. In another case, not
recorded here, a space of perhaps three feet was taken to
represent the ocean.

When a chain of reasoning is involved, all projects are fer-
tile and all outcomes expansive. The common tendency for
the disagreeable, the undesirable and the unfavorable fact
to oblivesce seems here to be especially strong. The drowsi-
ness experience, in the case of the present observers at least ^ ]

^On the Effect of Small Doses of Alcohol. British Journal of Psychology,
Jan., 1908.

TH^ PSYCHOIvOGY OF DROWSINEJSS III

resembles that following upon the inhalation of diluted nitrous
oxide gas, — "the mental symptoms consist in convictions of
emancipation, relief and happiness, in grand and sublime
ideas which in their expansion seem to break down all barriers
of doubt and difficulty and to make a wish and its realization

one It is at the point where the habitual control

or check of the highest centres is withdrawn and where sub-
ordinate centres are free to indulge in unwonted activity
that the expansive dreamy thoughts and exalted feelings
present themselves in the progress of nitrous pxide gas intoxi-
cation."^

6. Amnesia for Processes and Events

occurring during the drowsy state comes quickly. This is
shown by the tendencies of these experiences to escape obser-
vation unless special interest directs attention to them.
Further, unless they are recorded or reported promptly they
are soon forgotten or elaborated by the retrospective attempts
of waking consciousness.

7. Absence of Symbolism

So far as the writer has been able to discover there is no
evidence of special symbolism in these states except in so
far as they reflect the recent experiences or occupations of
the individual. The composition of their content seems to
consist chiefly in "flashlight" perceptual complications of the
memories of recent experiences with perseverative tendencies
and present sensory impressions. Only in so far as the data
from these three sources is somewhat dependent on the funda-
mental interests of the observer can the drowsiness psychosis
be said to be symbolical.

{Note). Sidis (Experimental Study of Sleep) has given
"extreme suggestibility" as one mark of the hypnoidal state.
This state bears a close resemblance to the condition of
normal drowsiness, and may, perhaps, be identical with it.
But suggestibility seems to be a general statement of the
possibilities of the pre-sleeping state, rather than an intro-
spective description of the drowsiness consciousness.)

By way of summary we may say, finally, that the drowsi-
ness hallucination seems to be a "flashlight" perceptual
fusion or complication, and is further characterized by trans-
formation of imagery type; sensory, perseverative and ideal
substitution ; fluid association chiefly on a sensory basis ; and by
isolation of association trains when they develop ; and that it is
accompanied by tendencies toward grandeur and vastness, by
rapidly developed amnesia and by absence of symbolism.

^Crichton-Brown : op. cit.

MINOR STUDIES FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
LABORATORY OF VASSAR COLLEGE

XIV. An Effect of Fatigue on Judgments of the
Affective Vai.ue of Coi^ors

By Ethel L. Nokris, Alice G. Twiss, and M. F. Washburn

A state of fatigue may naturally be expected to lessen the pleasantness^
of pleasant experiences and to increase the unpleasantness of unpleasant
experiences. The present study is an attempt to get experimental con-
firmation, within a certain very limited sphere, of this conclusion drawn
from general experience. As the source of pleasant and unpleasant affec-
tion we chose colored papers. With regard to the source of fatigue, evi-
dently a number of possibilities were open : we might have used some form
of physical fatigue, but we chose mental fatigue instead. Here, again, we
might have produced fatigue in our observers by means of some kind of
mental work, such as mental arithmetic, quite different from the work of
judging the affective values of colors. We undertook, however, the prob-
lem of finding how far judgments of the affective value of colors are in-
fluenced when the observer is required to perform a long series of such
judgments. That is, the fatigue was produced by the same kind of mental
process as that upon which it was supposed to act.

Our method was as follows: A piece 2.9 cm. square was cut from each
of the ninety colored papers in the Bradley series, comprising eighteen
saturated colors, namely, red violet, violet, blue violet, violet blue, blue,
green blue, blue green, green, yellow green, green yellow, yellow, orange
yellow, yellow orange, orange, red orange, orange red, red, violet red; to-
gether with two shades and two tints of each color. Bach piece of paper
was placed on a white background before the observer, who was required
to look at it for ten seconds and to record her judgment of its affective
value in nimierical terms, using the ntunbers from i to 7 to designate
respectively the following degrees : very unpleasant, moderately unpleasant,
slightly unpleasant, indifferent, slightly pleasant, moderately pleasant,
very pleasant. The colors were shown in wholly irregular order. After
judgment had been passed upon the whole ninety, without any pause
in the operations the observer was given in succession the first six colors
of the experimental series, in their original order, and required to record
anew her judgment of their pleasantness or unpleasantness. In no case
did the observer report remembering what her previous judgment had
been. The whole proceeding took from three-quarters of an hour to an
hour. The effect of fatigue upon the affective tone of the six colors selected
to begin the series was then calculated as follows. When the number
assigned to a color at the end of the series differed from the number assigned
to the same color at the beginning, the amount of the difference together
with its sign, i. e., whether it was an increase or a decrease, was noted, and
these differences were averaged, regard being paid to signs. Thus for one
observer the affective value of one of the six colors dropped two numbers,
that of another color dropped one number, that of a third rose one number,
and that of three colors showed no change. The total change for all the
colors tested was then i — 3, or — 2 ; and dividing this number by 6, the number
of colors tested, we find the average fall in affective value to be .3.

MINOR STUDIES II 3

There were thirty-five observers, all women and all but four college
students. Out of these, the averages of seven showed a rise instead of a
fall in the affective value of the colors at the end of the series, and for three
the affective values were exactly the same at the beginning and at the end.
Twenty- three observers show an average drop of from .i to 1.5. In the
case of three observers every change in the affective value of a color was
an increase: in the case of ten, every change was a decrease.

It is unnecessary to point out that we cannot be sure of producing uni-
form degrees of fatigue by this method. Aside from individual differences
in physical condition and previous fatigue, the process of judging required
is undoubtedly more fatiguing to some people than to others. Thus one
of the three observers for whom the affective values were greater at the
end than at the beginning of the series was an artist, to whom the (tolors
had probably more interest than to the other observers. Again, in the
case of those observers who were acquainted with the method the knowl-
edge that the end of the series was approaching produced a cheering up
which might have been expected to counterbalance fatigue; although this
did not prove to be the case with two out of the three authors of this study.
When a drop in the affective value of a color does appear at the end of the
series, we have no assurance that it is produced by fatigue; but since the
other sources of variation might be expected to produce a rise as often
as a drop, the results do indicate that for sixty-five per cent, of our observers
fatigue was the prevailing source of change.

Two further facts may be noted. The total number of points by which
the saturated colors were raised in affective value at the end of the series
was 29; the total number of points by which they were lowered was 35;
the excess of lowering over raising is then only 6. The corresponding
excess for tints is 31, and for shades, 40. Shades, tints, and saturated
colors were selected with about equal frequency for use as the test colors
at the beginning and end of the experimental series. These results, then,
seem to mean that under the experimental conditions described, the effect of
fatigue in lowering affective value is very decidedly less marked in the case of
saturated colors than in that of shades and tints.. On the other hand, the
variations from other sources than fatigue seemed to influence saturated
colors, shades, and tints to nearly the same degree, if we may judge from
the fact that the percentage of cases where the affective value of a color
was the same at the beginning as at the end of a series was, for saturated
colors, 40; for tints, 34, and for shades, 45. It looks, however, as though
the affective impression made by saturated colors, whether pleasant or
unpleasant, were so definite that fatigue induced by this method alters it
but little; although we might expect that continuous experience with a
saturated color would cause a rapid drop in its pleasantness.

Secondly, we undertook to find what kind of judgments were most in-
fluenced by fatigue. When we counted the number of times each numer-
ical judgment from 2 to 7 appeared in connection with the first six colors
of the series, and found in what percentage of this number the judgments
were lowered at the end of the series, there appeared to be no uniform
relation between the degree of pleasantness or unpleasantness in the first
experience and the amount of lowering of affective value in the second.
We noted that other sources of variation appeared to affect extreme judg-
ments, I and 7, more than moderate judgments: the percentage of cases
involving no change whatever in affective value was highest for the judg-
ments 7 and I . We at first thought that this result pointed to a conclusion
regarding the variability of a given individual's affective reaction to a
given color, which might be expressed in some such terms as that we are
less likely to change our minds with regard to the objects of our extreme
likes and dislikes than with regard to those which produce more moderate
affective reactions. But later reflection showed us that the real cause of

Journal — 8

114 NORRIS, TWISS AND WASHBURN

the fact that the extreme judgments appeared to be more constant than the
moderate ones lay in the conditions of the experiment. If the first judg-
ment upon a color has been a moderate one, there are three possibilities
with regard to the second: it may express the same affective value as the
first, or a greater affective value, or a less one. If on the other hand the
first judgment has assigned either the highest or the lowest affective value
to a color, there are only two possibilities with regard to the second judg-
ment: it may be the same as the first, or it may vary from it in one direction
only. It naturally follows that the percentage of cases showing no change
will, if there is no constant tendency present, be greater where the first
judgment has assigned the highest or the lowest affective values.

XV. A Note on the Affective Values of Colors

By M. F. Washburn

In the preceding study each of thirty-five observers was required to
record in numerical terms her judgment on the pleasantness or unpleasant-
ness of ninety colors, each color being presented in the form of a paper
square 2.9 cm. a side, on a white background, and looked at for ten seconds.
From the results thus obtained the verdicts of the different observers on a
given color have been selected out, and their average calculated together
with the mean variation. The whole series contained ninety saturated
colors besides two tints and two shades of each color. To avoid what
seemed unnecessary labor, the calculations to be discussed were made only
for the lighter tint and the darker shade of each color: thus for eighteen
tints and eighteen shades.

It appears that for our thirty-five observers, all women and nearly all
college students, the affective value of the tints is highest (average from all
observers, 4.7); that of the shades is next (average from all observers, 4.1),
and that of the saturated colors is lowest (average from all observers, 3.6).
Further, that the affective reaction to saturated colors, whether pleasant or
unpleasant, is more positive than that to shades and tints, and that to tints
more positive than that to shades, is indicated by the fact that the total
number of judgments '4' (indifferent) is for saturated colors, 50; for tints,
89, and for shades, loi.

Among saturated colors, the order of increasing pleasantness, together
with the average affective value assigned to each color by our observers,
is as follows: green yellow, 2.1 ; orange and yellow green, 2.6; red violet and
green, 3; yellow, 3.3; yellow orange and blue green, 3.4; red orange, 3.6;
violet red, 3.7; violet blue and blue, 3.8; orange yellow and blue violet, 4;
violet, 4.4; orange red, 4.5; green blue, 5.3; red, 5.6. Pure red is the
pleasantest saturated color, and green blue comes next. There is a tendency to
dislike yellows and yellow greens.

Among ti'nts, the order of increasing pleasantness is the following: violet
red, 3.4; green yellow, 3.8; orange, 4.3; yellow and orange yellow, 4.4;
yellow orange, 4.5; blue green, red orange, and red, 4.6; green blue and
orange red, 4.7; green, 4.3; yellow green, 5; violet blue, 5.1 ; blue violet, 5.5;
red violet and violet, 5.9; blue, 6, Bltce is the pleasantest light tint, and in-
deed the pleasantest color in the whole series.

Among shades, we have the following order of increasing pleasantness;
yellow, 2.3; orange yellow, 2.7; blue green, 3.7; red violet, green yellow,
yellow orange, and orange, 3.8; violet red, 3.9; red orange and orange red,
4.3; violet, 4.4; blue violet, green blue, and green, 4.5; red and violet blue,
4.8; blue, 5; yellow green, 5.3. Yellow green is the pleasantest dark shade
£Lnd blue comes next.

It might seem that a study of the mean variations of these averages

MINOR STUDIES II 5

would be of interest, as indicating the amount of unanimity in the tastes
of our observers. But further thought reveals the fact that the mean
variations are necessarily involved with the degree of pleasantness or un-
pleasantness indicated by the averages, and can have no independent
significance. The smallest mean variations must belong to the highest
and lowest averages, the largest mean variations to the averages of medium
amount. For evidently if the average affective value of a color is four, the
mean variation of that average may rise as high as three, since jndgments
from one to seven are possible: but if the average affective value of a color
is six or two, the mean variation can hardly rise above one and a fraction,
since there can be no judgments above seven or under one.

THE DISCRIMINATION OF ARTICULATE SOUNDS
BY RACCOONS.

By W. T. Shepherd, Ph.D.

The present paper in some respects may be considered as
a supplementary report to one on the same subject made by
Professor L- W. Cole, and published by him about three years
ago.^ In the work reported by Professor Cole, in which I
assisted, four raccoons were used and in this later work, now
to be presented, the same animals were employed. The
results which are given here have not previously been pub-
lished, and only in a minor degree can they be considered
merely supplementary to the work of Cole. The experiments
to be reported are concerned with the Discrimination of
Articulate Sounds by Raccoons.

It is commonly believed, and with some degree of reason,
that the higher mammals can be taught to respond to their
names, or to express it more accurately, to discriminate articu-
late sounds and to make appropriate motor responses thereto.
It is well known that cats, dogs, horses and other domesti-
cated animals learn to respond to their given names ; but it is
not known, from well conducted experiments, whether there
is in these cases a discrimination of quality, of loudness, or
of time of the sound. The results that have been obtained
with animals under experimental conditions have been few,
and in some cases the differentiation of tone, and intensity
has not been made. Thorndike, it will be remembered,
found that cats were apparently able to discriminate sounds
made by him, though not with a great degree of delicacy .^
The sounds that Thorndike used were quite complex in
character, such as, "I must feed those cats" and "My name
is Thorndike." In his work on the functions of the tem-
poral lobes Kalisher reported^ having been able to get dogs
to discriminate sounds made by an harmonium, but he was
more interested in producing the association for the purpose
of determining (after extirpation of different parts of the

^Concerning the Intelligence of Raccoons, Jour. Comp. Neur. And Psych.
Vol. 17, p. 211.

^Animal Intelligence, 1898.

^Eine neue Horpriifungsmethode bei Hunden, Sitz. d. Kgl. Ak. d. Wiss.,
X, 1907. p. 204 S.

ARTICUI^ATE SOUNDS BY RACCOONS II7

cerebral cortex) the cortical centres for sound perception
than ability in his animals to discriminate sounds.

At the time the experiments were begun the raccoons were
about six months old, and they had been trained for two
months on various motor acts, reported in Cole's paper.
In the early training period we had spoken to the animals,
using different names, but the naming and calling was not
done regularly and systematically. During the course of
these preliminary experiments some of the animals had given
indications of associating the sounds with reactions, and one
in particular reacted often. Since no record of these experi-
ments was made we cannot say how often the stimuli were
given, and how well or poorly each animal reacted. For a
period of two months following these trials no experiments
on sound discrimination were made. Then the present work
was begun.

For these tests each raccoon was placed in a separate cage
which had a wire netting front. The four cages were arranged
in different parts of the room and I sat at a distance of from
four to eight feet from the cages. The names of the raccoons
were called in irregular order, and I noted whether each
responded only to the sound of his own name or to all the
names. Each animal was fed when he responded to his own
name (and was not fed when the other names were called).
The animals were named. Jack, Jim, Tom, and Dolly. During
these experiments all were kept very hungry.

ist day: In 168 experiments (42 trials for each animal)
in which the reaction of turning and looking at me was taken
as response. Jack reacted correctly 6 times, 3 doubtfully
correct; Jim, 11 correct, 3 doubtful; Tom, 9 correct, 5, doubt-
ful; Dolly, I correct, 2 doubtful. All the animals responded
to the first call, but it is likely that was only an attention
reaction; i. e., a movement following a stimulus given by
one familiar to the animals.

2nd day: After the preliminary trials of the first day I no
longer fed the animals for this simple reaction. Responses
were only noted correct when they climbed up the side of
the cage, in addition to looking at me. Each raccoon was fed
after his name was called, whether or not he gave the proper
reaction. In 188 experiments (47 for each animal) Jack
reacted correctly 21 times; Jim, 9; Tom, only 2 doubtful;
Dolly, I correct with 4 doubtful. The results of these two
days' experiments indicated that Jack and Jim could easily
learn to respond to their names.

3rd day: Throughout the remainder of the experiments
each animal was tested separately and the other three were
kept out of his sight. I called the name of the animal, waited

Il8 SHEPHERD

lo seconds, if need be, for response, and then, whether or
not a response was obtained, the animal was fed. Alternately
with the name, the words "no feed' ' were called, and at these
times the animal was not fed. In each case, as noted above,
the correct reaction was considered to be obtained only when
the raccoon looked at me and climbed up the side of the cage.
In 50 trials on each kind of auditory stimulus Jack correctly
reacted to his name 39 times and to "no feed" 22; in 30
similar trials Jim correctly reacted to his name 21 times and
to "no feed" 15; Tom in 30 trials correctly reacted to his
name 16 times, to "no feed" 10, with 13 doubtful in all;
Dolly in 30 trials correctly responded to her name 15, to
"no feed" 5, with i doubtful.

The experiments were continued in this way for 18 days,
at the end of which time all the animals appeared to know
their names perfectly. Thirteen days after the beginning
of the experiments Jack correctly reacted to his name every
time (25 trials), and incorrectly to the "no feed" signal only
3 times (25 trials). About the same percentages of correct
and incorrect responses were obtained for Jack during the 8
succeeding days of the experiment. It appeared to me that
Jack's few errors from this point might be accounted for by his
eagerness for food.

After the names appeared to be well learned, as further test
of auditory discrimination, I called other names, in addition
to the individual's name, such as "box," "floor," after each
name: i. e., 1 called Jack, "box," "floor" in succession, and
not alternately. No substantial difference in the percentage
of proper responses was noted. It seems evident, therefore,
that the animals had formed the habit of responding only
when the appropriate sound was heard, and of not responding
to other sounds. To further test the animals, I called the names
and sounds in varying tones of voice, the lowest to the highest
possible to me, and also had other persons call the words
and names. With all the animals the responses were strik-
ingly characteristic of discrimination.

May we, therefore, conclude that raccoons discriminate
names or articulate sounds? The answer to this question
will depend to a large extent upon the acceptance of the later
experiments as conclusive. A serious objection to such a
conclusion may be urged by some. It may well be said that,
in the major part of the experiments, where the name and
"no feed" were called alternately, the raccoons had learned
to react alternately and that they reacted only to the rhythm
of the stimuli. On the other hand, it must be remembered
that following those experiments of alternate calls, there was
a series in which the names were not called in any regular

ARTICULATE SOUNDS BY RACCOONS

119

order, and there was the same percentage of correct responses.
Moreover, the addition of extra sounds to the names did
not alter the proportional number of responses. Both of
these later tests permit us to conclude, therefore, that the
discrimination did take place.

It is of some interest to note that. Jack, which judging from
the results of the earlier tests and from others to be reported
in a later paper, was the most intelligent animal of the four,
learned to associate the name with the proper response
in 270^ trials, Tom took 375 trials, Jim 425, while 500 trials
were required for Dolly. This individual difference in animals
experimented upon has been a noticeable feature in other
experimenters' work, but to the mind of the writer not sufficient
attention has been paid to it, and therefore animal psycholo-
gists have been content to work with a small number of ani-
mals (four, two, or even one) and to draw from their results
too broad conclusions.

^That is to say I called Jack's name 270 times and the other words
'no feed," etc., in addition.

BOOK REVIEWS

Die Sprachstdmme des Erdkreises. Von Prof. Dr. Franz Nikolaus Finck
in Berlin, Druck und Verlag von B. G. Teubner in Leipzig, 1909. p.
viii, 143. Aus Natur und Geisteswelt. Sammlung wissenschaftlich-
gemeinverstandlicher Darstellungen. 267. Bandchen.
Die HaupUypen des Sprachbaus. Von Dr. Franz Nikolaus Finck,
Professor an der Universitat Berlin, Druck und Verlag von B. G. Teub-
ner in Leipzig, 1910. pp. vi, 136. Ibid., 268. Bandchen.
These two latest additions to this excellent series of German handbooks on
all manner of topics from superstition to forestry, and from the theatre to
electro-chemistry, cannot fail to be of value to all interested in the com-
parative study of languages, although it is quite evident that a number of
the problems raised of late years by the special investigations of the speech-
forms of the American aborigines have not come to the author's attention.
The first volimie, "The Linguistic Stocks of the Globe," is a decided im-
provement upon the list in the second edition (1879) of Friedrich MuUer's
"Allgemeine Ethnographic, " as may easily be proved by a glance at the
indexes of the two books, and Miiller's list has long remained the most
complete and accessible to the German public. But the investigations of
the last twenty-five years have put it altogether out of date, both as to
accuracy and as to completeness. Dr. Finck classifies the languages of man-
kind under four races : Caucasian, American, Mongolian, Ethiopian (African
and Oceanic Negroes). Under the Caucasian he lists the Indo-Germanic, the
Hamito-Semitic, the languages of the peoples of the Caucasus (Caucasian
in the minor sense), the Dravidian tongues of India and the Basque and
Etruscan, besides certain other long extinct forms of speech belonging to
Asia Minor, etc., such as Elamite, Chaldic, Hittite, Lycian, etc. There is
too much mixtiwe of race and speech in this classification. While, doubt-
less all the peoples of the Caucasus belong to the Caucasian or "white"
race, ethnologists will hardly follow the author in separating the Dravidians
entirely from the Australian aborigines and making them full-fledged Cau-
casians, against which view there are also arguments of a linguistic character.
As members of the Mongolian race, the so-called Austro-Asiatic tongues
(Kolarian, Mon-Khmer, Khasi, Nicobar, Semang, Senoi), Austronesian
(Indonesian, Melanesian, Polynesian, — Malayo-Polynesian), Indo-Chinese
(Tibeto-Burmese, Siamo-Chinese), Ural-Altaic (Samoyed, Finnic-Ugric,
Turkic, Mongolic, Tungusic, Japanese, Korean, etc.), Arctic or Hyperbo-
rean (Yenesseian, Jukaghir, Chukchee-Kamtchatkan, Ainu, Aleuto-Eskimo),
a classification impossible to justify in the light of the most recent
investigations. The studies resulting from the Jesup Northwest Pacific
Expedition, under the direction of Dr. Franz Boas, have rendered it ex-
tremely probable that the languages of the so-called Paleo-Asiatic peoples
of Northeastern Asia (Koriak, Kamtchatkan, Chukchee, Yukaghir, etc.)
will be finally classed with the American IndiaA tongues. The Ainu must
still be recognized as isolated among the Asiatic peoples, but there is more
reason for affiliating them with the Caucasian race, than there is for so doing
with the Dravidian. The inclusion of the Kolarian, the Mon-Khmer and
the Melanesian in one group is open to fatal objections, while the Semang
and Sakai of Malacca are hardly to be looked upon as Mongolian, nor
can one be sure in placing there the Nicobarese, etc. And there is no good
reason for cutting off the Eskimo from the rest of the American aborigines

BOOK REVmWS 121

as Dr. Finck does. The Sumerians of ancient Babylonia, about whose
ethnological relations there is still not a little doubt, are here listed as
Mongolian. The languages of the American race receive the most lengthy-
treatment (pp. 68-105) of any of the groups, the author following the regional
method of cataloguing the chief stocks (North Pacific, North Atlantic,
Central, Amazonian, Pampas, Andine or South Pacific), with indications
of many of the smaller isolated tongues within these large areas. For
North America Powell seems to have been followed generally, with some
reference to later authorities (to judge from certain portions of the text).
The modifications in the Powellian list, made necessary as the result of the
more recent investigations of American philologists (and not included in
Dr. Finck's siunmary) will be found in the articles on ' 'Linguistic Stocks' '
in the "Hand book of American Indians North of Mexico" (Washington,
Vol. I, 1907) and in the article on "North American Indians" in the forth-
coming new edition of the "Encyclopedia Britannica." Dr. Finck, how-
ever, notes some of these latter results, e. g., the inclusion of the Adaizan
with the Caddoan, the Piman with Uto-Aztecan, etc. The latest researches of
Lehmann in the Central American region seem likely to lead to some changes
in the arrangement of the linguistic stocks between Mexico and Panama.
To the linguistic stocks of South America the writer of this review has
devoted considerable attention, and a monograph on that subject is pre-
paring for publication. Dr. Finck's list of South American stocks, while,
of course, not exhaustive, takes in such comparatively recent items as the
recognition as independent forms of speech of the Trumaian, Bororoan,
Makuan, Miranhan, Guatoan, etc. The Onan of Tierra del Fuego is,
without justification, classed as a dialect of Tsonekan (Patagonian) ; the
evidence in hand still makes it necessary to list it as an independent stock.
The independent character of Atacamenan, is however, recognized. On
the whole, the list of South American stocks is fairly accurate so far as it
goes, and free from any important errors. The languages of the Ethiopan
race include those of the Negroes of Africa (Paleo-African, i. e., Bushman,
Hottentot; Neo- African: Bantu, West-Sudan, Central-Sudan, Nilotic, etc.)
and the Oceanic Negroes (Australian andTasmanian, Papuan, Andamanese).
The most recent studies of the linguistic relations of the peoples of New
Guinea and adjacent islands will necessitate some modifications of the lists
in this region. In the introduction the author touches upon the question
of the hrnnan "Ursprache," but wisely remarks in conclusion (p. 7) "dis-
cussion of the temporal sequence of the various linguistic stocks is im-
possible, and even the degree of their antiquity cannot be settled, since we
are altogether ignorant of the supposed unitary primitive tongue of all man-
kind." In the second volmne on "the Chief Types of Language," Professor
Finck selects and discusses, with considerable detail, the grammatical and
morphological peculiarities and characteristics of types of human languages
(Chinese, Greenland Eskimo, Subija, — a language of the Zambezi region in
South Africa, Samoan, Arabian, Greek and Georgian of the Caucasus).
These eight languages are treated as "typical representatives of eight
groups, to which, in my opinion, can without any great violence, be assigned
the languages of the whole earth (p. v.)." If one takes as criterion the
idea-content of the word, these languages, "with the gradual strength-
ening of the fragmentary character and the increasing morselizing of the
idea masses present before the beginning of speaking," the languages in
question can be arranged in the following order: Eskimo, Turkish, Georgic,
Arabic, Chinese, Greek, Samoan, Subija. From another point of view,
that of the organization of the elements of the sentence, etc., quite another
order is necessary, and Dr. Finck distinguishes them thus: Root-isolat-
ing (Chinese), stem-isolating (Samoan), root-inflecting (Arabic), stem-
inflecting (Greek), group-inflecting (Georgic), subordinating (Turkish),
incorporating (Eskimo), and ordinating (Subija). ^till other arrange-

122 BOOK REVIEWS

ments, from other points of view are of course possible. The difficulties
of such a type-theory as that set forth by Professor Finck are apparent
from consideration of the languages of the Old World, but they multiply
and intensify themselves when the linguistic stocks of the New World are
carefully examined. The "Handbook of American Indian Languages
North of Mexico," soon to be published by the Bureau of American Eth-
nology, under the competent editorship of Dr. Franz Boas, will, for the first
time, present accurate and convincing evidence upon many points connected
with the speech-types of the aborigines of the United States and Canada.
Suffice it to say, for the present, that the Eskimo of Greenland can hardly
serve as representative for all the Indian tongues of that region, much less
for all those others of Mexico, Central and South America as well. Under
any system of type-listing there must be many more than one type among
the many scores of linguistic stocks hving and dead in primitive America.
A valuable part of this volume, and one especially interesting to psycholo-
gists, will be found in the analyses of texts accompanying the discussion of
each linguistic type. The first volume has an exhaustive index, and the
presence of one of some sort would not have injured the second,

Alexander F. Chamberlain.

Studies in Spiritism, by Amy E. Tanner, Ph, D,, with an introduction
by G. Stanley Hall, Ph. D„ LL. D. New York, Appleton, 1910.
408 pp.

This volume records the findings and verdict of a patient investigation
sustained by a scientific conscience and enthusiasm. It represents con-
structively a logical interpretation of a group of phenomena whose psycho-
logical importance, though distinctive, seems modest when compared with
the far-reaching conclusions attached to them by the popular verdict
in favor of the supernatural. The convincing emphasis of the book is
its indication that the "psychic research" platform is not only logically
inadequate but psychologically perverse.

While the psychology of Paladino has been relegated to the limbo of
fraud and credulity, the psychology of Mrs. Piper remains; for there
seems no doubt that her sittings, whatever their more subtle or question-
able implications, represent distinct if evasive phases of a secondary
personality. Therein lies their interest, and not in their supposed evi-
dential revelations. For exhibiting clearly and with illustrative detail the
evidence that mediumistic trance is psychologically a form of lightly or
deeply held secondary personality. Dr. Hall and Miss Tanner deserve
credit and gratitude. Though the position, — and it would be surprising
to find it otherwise, — has been favored and presented by other psycholo-
gists, it has not as yet received so clear a statement, so full a demonstra-
tion, nor indeed so original an exposition.

It is difficult soberly to take space to recount the endless records by which
the advocates of Mrs, Piper's supernormal powers support their claim.
In the "test" messages some objective control is exercised; and complex
coincidences, — difficult, if not impossible to appraise, — enter to make
or mar the case. Miss Tanner pursues the only way open to the dauntless
critic: she analyzes the incidents, lays bare the constant sources of error,
the looseness of interpretation, the ready play of chance, and with the
structure thus stripped of prejudicial veneer she displays its card-board
architecture. For the apologetics that have been used to make coinci-
dence startling, and to read mysteries into commonplace trifles are no
less amazing when one considers the intellectual standing of the protago-
nists. The psychological transgression is no less astounding; the credence
given to long-range memories, the scant appreciation of the efficiency
of suggestion, the neglect of control experiments, as well as the amateurish
attitude towards such every-day foibles as "fishing," fooling, and lying,
arouse pity or irritation, according to temperament.

BOOK REVIEWS 123

Yet the great bulk of the "evidence" is of yet looser construction,
and depends upon the presumption that Mrs. Piper's inspired hand can
write messages revealing details that the terrestrial Mrs. Piper could
not normally have acquired. Once more the truth is simple. It is abun-
dantly clear that Mrs. Piper's auditory centres are keenly alert when her
eyes are closed in trance; her surviving consciousness listens acutely,
"fishes" adroitly, and her reeling in to suit the sporting impulses of the
victim is nothing less than professional. As in dreams, the subject un-
wittingly contributes the data for the solution, and then marvels at the
revelation when it appears. As for the spiritual hypothesis, why not
be frank and say with Dr. Hall: "It is an utter psychological impossibility
to treat this subject seriously."

Mrs. Piper pretends to be controlled by the actual disembodied Richard
Hodgson. Not only, however, does the latter fail to prove his identity,
but he is vSuggestible, ignorant, inconsequential and Piperian. With
alacrity he summoned from the spirit-world wholly fictitious personages,
as well as the shades of the known departed; he fell into the most simple
logical traps, and through Mrs. Piper's organism exhibited pique and ill-
temper at being exposed, — quite out of the r61e of the shrewd exposer of
mystery that Hodgson was. A few whiffs of this atmosphere sends one
back gasping to the fresh air. ' 'Spiritism is the ruck and muck of modem
culture, the common enemy of true science and of true religion; and to
drain its dismal and miasmatic marshes is the great work of modem culture.

We have largely evicted superstition from the physical

universe, which used to be the dumping-ground of the miraculous. Super-
stition to-day has its strongest hold in the dark terrae incognitae of the
unconscious soul of man towards which researchers to-day are just as
superstitious as savages are towards lightning, eclipses, comets and earth-
quakes."

Taking seriously the proposition that telepathy is supported by pre-
monitions and experiments, that trance messages really foretell the future
and reveal the past, that the controls of mediums bring back credentials
which are adequate for the identification of the recently departed, psy-
chology accepts the challenge and undertakes to show that a pervasive
bias and a defective insight have shaped the data to distorted or imaginary
significance. The evidence for this position cannot be summarized.
Those who are interested in acquiring a hold upon it have now available
Miss Tanner's presentation. On the other hand, recognizing that sub-
conscious abnormalities arise spontaneously, and grow by what they feed
upon, psychology finds in the encouragement given to the medium's
sittings, in the serious systematic acceptance of the spiritistic hypothesis,
and in the devout personal reactions of sitters, the hot-house atmosphere
and the coddling ministration that such parasitic growths absorb.
The conspicuous suggestibility of such temperaments makes them assume
the forms that excite interest and claim attention. They are allied to a
recognized group of hysterical manifestations in the nearly normal, which
in turn grow to troublesome intmsion or withdraw to manageable control
according to the wisdom and insight with which they are met. The
modern attitude towards such phenomena is a therapeutic one. The
mediumistic or secondary personality is to be appeased, persuaded, sup-
pressed, and the patient's resources united and made to see and to live
life steadily and whole. Such a consummation can never be, if the ab-
normality is displayed, cherished, and embraced as a means of livelihood.

Dr. Hall is confident that ' 'the mysteries of our psychic being are bound
ere long to be cleared up. Every one of these ghostly phenomena will
be brought under the domain of law. The present recrudescence here
of ancient faiths in the supernatural is very interesting as a psychic atavism,
as the last flashing up of a group of old psychoses soon to become extinct.

124 BOOK REVIEWS

When genetic psychology has done its work, all these psychic researches will
take their places among the solemn absurdities in the history of thought;
and the instincts which prompted them will be recognized as only psychic
rudimentary organs that ought to be and will be left to atrophy. "
University of Wisconsin. Joseph Jastrow.

The Metaphysics of a Naturalist; Philosophical and Psychological Fragments.
By the late C. L. Herrick. Bulletin of the Scientific Laboratories
of Denison University, Vol. XV. Granville, Ohio, 1910. 99 pp.
This book aims to supplement and, to some extent, to unify such of the
distinctive philosophical teachings of Professor Herrick as have already
been published, by adding to them and correlating with them material
brought together from papers and manuscripts hitherto unpubhshed.
The first chapter is entitled "The Summation-Irradiation Theory of
Pleasure-Pain." It gives an analysis of feeling and of emotion, and
explains them in terms of physiological tensions and adjustments, basing
the arguments on bodily structure and function and upon introspection.
There is also included a table of the other classes of mental processes,
with their physiological parallels. At the end of the book are four short,
less technical and less distinctive, chapters on the freedom of the will,
the problem of evil, immortality, and ethical conclusions. The book is
chiefly concerned to present the metaphysical theory of dynamic monism,
and to explain, in terms of this theory, the concept of consciousness, the
relation of mind and body, individuality, matter, life, etc. Some of the
fundamental conclusions are: Existence (being) and energy are identical;
Energy is pure spontaniety; Unimpeded infinite energy would seem to us
indistinguishable from non-existence; Force arises from the interference
of energy, and implies resistance; The complexity of resistance measures
the quality of the force, the degree of resistance measures the quantity
of the force; Matter is a subjective interpretation of forces in a state of
relative equilibrium; Consciousness is the focussing of diverse forces upon
the complicated neural equilibrium; Conscious states are epiphenomena,
due to the constant becoming between energy and force. The writer
makes frequent reference to the theories and results of the natural sciences,
especially those of physics, physiology, and mathematics, and he takes
over into his metaphysics, almost directly, such scientific concepts as
inertia, resistance, motion, energy, vortices, vectors, etc. According to
the editors, the book is intended as a contribution to work on the method-
ology of the sciences, of the sort done by Tyndall, Huxley, Kelvin,
Helmholtz, Mach and Ostwald. W. S. Foster.

Les rSves et leur interpretation. Par Paui^ MeuniBr et Rene Masselon.

(Collection Psychologic Exeprimentale et de Metapsychie). Bloud

et Cie, Paris, 19 10. 211 p.
This is an essay in morbid psychology, both of the authors being psy-
chiatrists. The first chapter, entitled the psychological mechanism of
dreams, gives a partial resume of the scientific literature of dreams, chiefly
of French work, supplemented by contributions from the authors' own
observations. The second chapter discusses the diagnostic value of dreams.
V/hile there is much difficulty in distinguishing the truly prodromic or
symptomatic dream from accidental dreams without pathological signifi-
cance, the authors, nevertheless, conclude that dreams are in some cases
of considerable value in diagnosis and the following chapters are devoted
to a discussion of the distinguishing characteristics of dreams in infections
and intoxications, neuroses and insanities, which have diagnostic signifi-
cance, e. g., the color, red, persistently appearing in dreams is a frequent
phenomenon in premenstrual periods, cardiac affections, premeningeal
attacks, inflammatory infections of the eye and the aura of epileptic attacks.
Terrifying hallucinations and zooscopy are characteristic not only of

BOOK RKVmWS 125

alcoholism but are liable to occur in all toxic affections. Stereoptyped
dreams occur in epilepsy and hysteria.

In psychoses, the dream may reveal an obsession or an impulsive tendency
before it has been manifested in the waking state. Finally, in mental
pathology the persistence of dreams is a sign of the manifest activity of
morbid processes and in convalescence, the type of dreams may be of great
importance for determining the state of the patient.

The book is disappointing in that it takes no account of Freud's
Traumdeutung or of De Sanctis' later work, by far the two most important
contributions to the psychology of dreams and without consideration of
which any discussion of the subject must be inadequate.

Theodatb L. Smith.

L' annie psychologique, publiee par Alfri^d BinET. Paris, Masson, 19 10.
500 p. Seizieme annee.
Besides the usual literature, the author himself has monographs upon
the physical signs of intelligence, on Rembrandt in relation to the new
style of art criticism, the mental states of the insane; while with Simon
he gives us an extensive study of hysteria and on insanity with conscious-
ness of it, of the maniacal depressive type, the systematized form, and
dementia, retardation, formulating a new classification. Finally comes
a brief article on judicial diagnostics, while the bibliography occupies
pages 382 to 500.

A beginner's history of philosophy, by Herbert Ernest Cushman.

V. I . Ancient and mediaeval philosophy. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin

(1910). 406 p.
This work is dedicated to Professor Palmer and is intended as a text-
book for sketch-courses in the history of philosophy. It is for the student
rather than the teacher; and is written on the background of geography
and literary and political history and uses many tables. The present
volume begins with the early Greeks and ends with Ockham.

Psychologie des Kindes, von Robert Gaupp. 2d enl. ed. Leipzig,
Teubner, 19 10. 163 p.
This work is divided into three parts. The first treats the psychology
of the little child, beginning with a brief historical sketch of child psychol-
ogy, a discussion of its methods, literature, the development of the first
year of attention, speech, Gemtit, will, thought, lies, impulses, sense play,
etc. The second part is on the psychology of the school child, beginning
with entrance, and discussing memory, attention, power of achievement
and control, fatigue, power of jtidgment, writing, the child and its relations
to art. The third part treats of children who are psychically abnormal.

Trick methods of Eusapia Palladino, by Stanley LE Fevre Krebs. Re-
printed from The Reformed Church Review, Vol. XIV, July, 1910.
Phila., 1910. p. 331-3^3-
This author concludes that Palladino uses no confederate, that there
are no traps or sliding panels, that all her phenomena are produced in an
area within the stretch of her arm or leg, certainly if lengthened a little
by the use of a flower stand as a reacher and a shoe-ledge as a fulcrum for
levitation. The author does not believe that she has any extraordinary
or telekinetic power. If she had she ought to be ' 'lifted out of the realm
of showdom;" nor does he believe that the hypothesis of survival after
death will be proven by any phenomena like hers. It is all a deception
of sight and touch, ' 'the psychological atmosphere being helped along by
intentional suggestions." She always dresses ii; black and her cabinet
is painted black inside ; he would have her dress in white. He thinks, too,
that if she were placed at the broadside of a table and had only one per-

126 BOOK REVIEWS

son control both her hands and both her feet, "John," her control, would
be put out of business. He would tie her ankles and wrists with a slack
of only four or five inches, but none of these she will allow,

ijber Ermii dungs stoffe, von Wolfgang WeichardT. Stuttgart, Enke,
1910. 66 p.
This is an interesting and compendious account of the large subject
treated. Symptoms of extreme general fatigue are first described; then
the fatigue of special parts and organs, investigations on immuni^ and
fatigue stuffs, the attempts to apply chemical and physical means to
muscle extraction and to albumen, how kenotoxine can be influenced,
active immunization, anti-somatic influences, how pathological processes
can be influenced by antikenotoxine.

An introduction to the study of hypnotism, experimental and therapeutic,
by H. E. WiNGFiELD. London, Bailli^re, Tindall & Cox, 1910. 175 p.
This book is an attempt to supply a simple answer to the question
What is hypnotism? and makes no effort to range itself with the many
larger works on the subject but intends rather to serve as an introduction
to these. The matter is treated mainly from the experimental point of
view and the author does not attempt to include anything that those
already familiar with the subject did not already know. Its chapters are
on the subconscious, the methods of inducing hypnosis, its phenomena
and stages, other hysterical phenomena, treatment by suggestion, and
the case against hypnotism.

The concept standard, a historical survey of what men have conceived as
constituting or determining life values ; criticism and interpretation of
the different theories. By Anne M. Nicholson. Teachers College
Columbia University Contributions to Education, No. 29. New York,
Teachers College, 19 10. 138 p.
The chapters are : the fundamental categories and principles, the standard
in primitive societies and the genetic point of view, review of the concep-
tion of the standard and its method of functioning from the first historic
to present time, standard as conceived in epochs Judaean, Medieval,
Renaissance, Protestantism, Cartesian, the English School, German ideal-
ism, the materialistic concept of this standard, its function in national
crises.

A text-book of psychology, by Edward Bradford Titchener. New York*
Macmillan Company, 19 10. 565 p.
This work was written to take the place of the author's Outlines of
Psychology in 1896 which has passed beyond the possibility of revision.
Still it follows the general lines laid down in the Outline, although with
less space devoted to nervous physiology. The work in its present form
will be gratefully received by teachers and it is unquestionably the best
in its own specific, if restricted, field.

The qualities of men, by Joseph Jastrow. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin Co.,
1910. 183 p.
A study of the qualities of men in which a physiological interest in
humanity is prominent may properly be expected to undertake the analysis
of the fundamental factors in human nature, their transformation, values
in growth, education and vocation. This is the basal problem in the
psychology of human traits. For the elucidation of this theme, the author
is preparing a work entitled Character and Temperament, but in the prepa-
ration for this work he found the more general bearing of the problems of
human quality of growing importance and felt the need of a more general
form and statement and a wider appeal. Hence this book, the chapters
of which are the sensibilities, the ideals of appreciation, the support of the

BOOK REVIEWS 127

sensibilities, the analysis of quality, quality in circumstance, compatibili-
ties of quality, the poietic qualities, the social encouragement of quality,
its upper ranges, its interactions with environment, its relation to careers
and the realm of practice.

Die Phantasie nach ihrem Wesen und ihrer Bedeutung fur das Geistesleberi'
von A. ScHOPPA. Leipzig, Diirr, 1909. 144 p.
The chief topics here are the essence of phantasy, its relations to psychic
life, with a good section on the playing, speaking, narrating, drawing,
child, on the instruction of the fancy in childhood, phantasy in everyday
life, in poetry, rhyme, rhythm, saga, legend, idyll, romance, fable, drama,
phantasy in music, in the plastic arts, in science, and finally in religion.
The author's psychology is mainly under the influence of Wundt, Lipps
and Mach.

Die Sinnesorgane der Pflanzen, von G. Haberlandt. Sonderabdruck

aus der vierten Auflage der physiologischen Pflanzenanatomie, S. 520-

573. Leipzig, Engelmann, 1909.

This reprint is an excellent little epitome of its subject, discussing the

relations of the organ to the stimulus, with many cuts of sensory hairs,

bristles, statoliths, stalks, leaves, with experimental observations on the

connection of statoliths and geopterception. The writer discusses the

light sense in leaves, the nature of their papillary epidermis and of optical

spots, etc.

The metabolism and energy transformations of healthy man during rest,
by Francis G. Benedict and Thorne M. Carpenter. Washington,
Carnegie Institution, 19 10. 255 p.
The first part of this book is introductory, telling what has been done
before and elsewhere. The second is statistics of experiments; and the
third and most elaborate is the discussion of results, which are not, un-
fortunately for the reader, summarized.

Der Traum und seine Deutung, nebst erkldrten Traumbeispielen, von E. J. G.
Stumpf. Leipzig, Mutze, 1899. 188 p.
This book, although not new, may have a certain added interest just
now on account of the prominence which the problem of dream psychology
has assumed in this country owing to the recent influence of Freud. Stumpf
treats in the successive chapters, day and night in their reciprocal rela-
tions, and the nature and essence of dreams. These are the two sections
of the book. If the author had designed to block every one's endeavor
to get at the root idea of his treatment without reading every sentence
in the book, he could hardly have succeeded better, for there is no index
or titles of any kind, apparently no summaries or epitomes, nothing itali-
cized; so that as it is the book stands like a castle, attractive outside and
doubtless full of good things within, but open under no conditions to
casual visitors but only those who desire to reside in it.

first book in psychology, by Mary Whiton Cai^kins. New York,
Macmillan, 19 10. 419 p.

This book is written under a growing conviction that psychology is
2st treated as a study of conscious selves in relation to other selves and

outer objects. This book differs from an introduction to psychology,
rith which it is liable to be confounded, for here the approach is simpler
id more direct. In the former book, psychology is treated both as a
nence of selves and of ideas and all is discussed from both points of view,
[ere the double treatment is abandoned. Here, too, the author has tried

embody the results of functional psychology, that is, taking an account

bodily reactions and environment which accompany thought, feeling
id will. An appendix, too, treats of the physiology of the nervous system

128 BOOK REVIEWS

and the senses and abnormalities. "This is, then, a new book, not the
condensation of an old one, yet it does not teach a new form of psychology,"
The chief sections here are, methods and uses, perception and imagination,
other sensory elements, their combinations and differentiations, effect,
attention, productive imagination, memory, selective association, recogni-
tion, thought, conception, judgment, reason, emotion, will, faith and belief,
the social and religious consciousness. The appendix includes pages 273
to 417.

Straight goods in philosophy, by Paul Karishka. New York, Roger
Brothers, 1910. 207 p.
This name, we take, it, is a pseudonym. The author, who has already
written several other very stimulating but inadequately appreciated works,
is evidently a thinker born and trained. He here gives up the more erudite
subtleties of metaphysics and speaks to the plain man and tells him that
philosophy simply means wisdom in work. It is really impossible to give
an adequate conception of this work, which certainly shows a very wide
repertoire of insights and interests on the author's part. It has nearly
forty chapters. Some of them are loving everybody, the professional
philosophy, healing the body by mind, posing, the things we hate, sympa-
thy, the funeral of a living corpse, weeds, man and woman, thoughts that
kill, food, why women are sly, old age, the law of opposites, privileged
people, the essentials of a philosophic life. The book is certainly original,
suggestive and stimulating.

Educational psychology, by Edward L. Thorndiku. 2d ed., rev. & enl.
Teachers College, Columbia University, N. Y., 1910. 248 p.
This book is a revision of a work which appeared in 1903. Its primary
purpose is to provide students in advanced courses in educational psychol-
ogy with the material which thej' would otherwise have to get at lectures
at great time and cost. The author has admitted the influence of special
training upon more general abilities. He treats the measurement of in-
dividual differences, the influence of sex, of remote ancestory or race, of
immediate ancestry or family, of maturity and environment, the nature
and amount of individual differences in single traits, the relation betvvreen
the amounts of different traits in the same individual, the nature and amount
of individual differences in combinations of traits, types of intellect and
character, extreme individual differences, and exceptional children, with
several appendixes.

The World a Spiritual System. An outline of metaphysics. By JamBS
H. Snowden. N. Y., Macmillan, 1910. 316 p.
The author is evidently in an apologetic state of mind, at least in his
preface, quoting various definitions of metaphysics, such as "a blind man
looking on a dark night for a black cat that isn't there." However he
tells us that the difficulties and the confusion are more apparent than real.
He discusses in successive chapters the nature of metaphysics, including
its definition, method, assumptions, spirit, object and system. He then
discusses the different points of view from which the world is regarded,
viz.: from that of plain men, the scientist and the metaphysician; the
subjectivity of space, with its theory and reasons, that of time, subjec-
tive reality, the soul's knowledge of itself, its fundamental character,
general character; how we reach objective reality; its nature, including
the world as phenomenon; as life, as thought, sensibility, will, the general
character of the world and man as its key. Then follow the relations of
the world and God as revealed as cause in its relations to man, and finally
the applications of idealism as seen in the relations of mind and body, im-
mortality, problem of evil, ideahsm in religion and Hfe, with a brief sug-
gestive course of reading and some account of the chief modern writers
upon these subjects.

BOOK REVmWS 129

Tlie use of the Theory of Correlation in Psychology. WiIvLiam Brown, Cam-
bridge, Printed privately at the University Press, 19 10. p. 83.
Some Experimental Results in the Correlation of Mental Abilities. William

Brown. The Journal of Psychology, Vol. 3, 1910, 296-322.
An objective Study of Mathematical Intelligence. William Brown. Bio-

metrica. Vol. 7, 1910, p. 352-367/
The use of the Theory of Correlation in Psychology. William Brown.
Cambridge. Printed privately at the University Press, 1910. p. 83.
The paper, which is a doctor's thesis, consists of three parts, the first of
which contains an exposition of the theory of correlation, the second the his-
tory of the use to which this theory has been put in psychology, and the third
the description of a series of investigations undertaken by the author. The
third part has appeared separately under the title "Some Experimental
Results in the Correlation of Mental Abilities" in the British Journal of
Psychology, 1910, Vol. 3, p. 296-322.

Starting from the notion of the regression curve and regression line the
author develops formulae for the coefficient of correlation, for the correla-
tion ratio, for the probable errors and for multiple correlation and then pro-
ceeds to discuss some other methods of measuring correlation. The method
of ranks and its critisicm by Pearson is discussed in some detail. Pear-
son's objections against this method are directed (i.) against the use of
rank as a quantitative measure of character, and (2.) against the formulae
derived by Spearman, for which new ones are substituted. Rank must
not be used as a quantitative measure of character, because this assumes
that the unit of rank is the same throughout the scale, which is not the case
since the unit of rank between mediocrities is practically zero, while it is
very large between extreme individuals. This argument of Pearson gains
additional interest in view of Cattell's classification of men of science
according to ranks attributed to them by a number of more or less prominent
men. If Pearson's argument should turn out to be correct, the suppo-
sition for averaging the ranks attributed to the same man in the different
classifications are not given. Brown's short presentation of the theory
of correlation is all the more significant, because it carries with it the author-
ity of Pearson who read the proof. The notation used is the one cus-
tomary in biometric treatises, which is perhaps not the most fortunate. The
difficulties for the reader increase, if new signs are introduced without
definition, as happens to be the case on p. 7.

Brown's discussion of the significance of the coefficient of correlation
is very interesting. He insists on the fact that this quantity has a signifi-
cance as a measure of the degree of community or identity of causation, if
the regression curve is linear. He considers a general answer as to the sig-
nificance of the coefficient of correlation impossible, but he tries to make it
clear by an example known by the name of Weldon's experiment. A
dozen dice are cast a number of times and the number of dice showing four
or more spots is recorded. The results of the ist, 3d, 5th, . . . throws
obviously will be in no relation to those of the 2nd, 4th, 6th, . . . throws.
We now make the results of the even throws dependent on those of the
uneven. We stain six of the dice red and we make the even throws only with
the six white ones, leaving the red ones on the table but counting indiscrimi-
nately the dice which show four or more spots. The results of the even
throws will be correlated to those of the uneven throws and it is shown that
in this case the proportion of factors common to the two series is given
b}" the coefficient of correlation itself. This, however, is an exception since
the extent of identity of causation as a rule is measured by an unknown
function of the coefficient of correlation. Brown thinks that "a general
lack of knowledge of the mathematical theory of correlation among psy-
chologists" is responsible for the fact that in psychology, comparatively

Journal — 9

I30 BOOK REVIEWS

little use is made of this theory, but it is the reviewer's opinion that this lack
of interest may be attributed largely to the difficulty of explaining the real
significance of the coefficient of correlation. Bruns, Lipps and Lachmann
have supplied examples, where this quantity is void of significance and
almost every one can construct examples where it is misleading. The special-
ists ought to give us a clear presentation of the theory of correlation and its
applications to psychology and demonstrate at least the conditions under
which the extent of community of causation is measm-ed by an uneven
function of the coefficient of correlation, because in this case one would be
sure that a negative value of the coefficient of correlation does not indicate
a positive correlation.

The historical part of the paper shows that the theory of correlation has
been used in psychology chiefly for the study of the relation of different
mental abilities to one another and to general intelligence. The first in-
vestigation showing any mathematical precision was undertaken by Clark
Wissler, and was followed by one by Aikins and Thomdike; the cor-
relations between mental abilities were generally low. Spearman, instead
of working on large groups, took groups of small size, making up for
this deficiency by subjecting his raw data to a mathematical treatment.
He finds a hierarchy among the different school subjects and concludes that
these different mental activities are saturated with one common fundamen-
tal function (or group of functions). This essential element in intelligence
is supposed to coincide with the essential element in sensory functions.
Spearman's results were tested by Thorndike, Lay and Dean, who
concluded from their results that there exists a complex set of bonds
between the formal side of thought and its content, and that there is nothing
whatever in common to all mental functions or to any half of them. C.
Burt confirmed Spearman's results in so far as he found a hierarchy
in the subjects tested, but he believes that the central factor is voluntary
attention. The author then mentions the paper of Pearson on the re-
lationship of intelligence to physical and mental characters, the work of
Miss Elderton, who evaluated the data collected by Heymans and
Wiersma and those of Ivahhoff, the later work of Thomdike and of
his pupils and his own Objective Study of Mathematical Intelligence (in
Biometrica, Vol. 7, 1910, p. 352-363). He found that algebra and geome-
try show hardly any correlation, a result which coincides with the one ob-
tained by Burris that the coefficients for the correlation between algebra and
geometry is nearly as low as that between mathematics and a non mathe-
matical subject.

The author's own experimental investigations were undertaken with a
view of ascertaining the correlation of certain very simple mental activ-
ities to one another and to general intelligence as measured by school
marks, teacher's judgments, etc. The experiments were made on tolerably
large and fairly homogeneous groups of students, who were as far as possible
identically situated in respect to previous practice, general training and
intelligence. The tests comprised crossing out letters (two letters, four
letters and all the letters) in a page of meaningless words, adding up
digits in Kraepelin's Rechenhefte, bisecting and trisecting lines, measuring
the Mueller-Lyer and the vertical-horizontal illusions, memorizing non-
sense syllables and memorizing poerty, and combination (tested by the
method of Ebbinghaus). The observation that a large proportion of
the subjects show a negative vertical-horizontal illusion (i. e. underestimate
the vertical line) is curious and of interest to the experimentalist also. The
table of the coefficients of correlation shows no hierarchical arrangement
except in one case where spurious correlation may be suspected. Extrane-
ous sources of correlation, such as, e. g., differences in the discipline, may
influence the results in a constant direction and thus produce the hierarchi-
cal arrangement. The question as to the existence or non-existence of a
central function is not answered definitely, but a number of results may be

BOOK REVIEWS 131

taken as arguments against its existence. A definite answer can be given
only on the basis of experiments on much larger groups, which will give re-
sults with smaller probable errors. Brown's results may be considered to
bear out to some extent the views of Thomdike and to contradict those
of Spearman. F. M. Urban.

Der Begriff des Instinktes, einst und jetzt; eine Studie uber die Geschichte und

die Grundlagen der Tierpsychologie. Hkinrich Ernst Ziegi^ER-

Zweite, verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage. Jena, Gustav Fischer.

1910. VI+112.

This book sketches the historical development of the concept of instinct

and discusses the modem significance of the term. The author points out

that in early Greek thought no sharp distinction was made between the

characteristics which were attributed to human and to animal conscious-

Iness. But in the system of Plato abstract thought was held to be the essen-
tial activity of mind ; since this capacity cannot be ascribed to animals a sharp
line of demarcation was now drawn, for the first time, between the human
and the animal mind. And perhaps the most valuable contribution which
the author ofters to his readers is his elaboration of the thesis that ever since
the time of Plato there have existed side by side, a tendency to magnify
or even to humanize the animal mind, and a counter-tendency to relegate
it to a low level on the scale of consciousness, if not to deny its existence.
The doctrines of the Christian church were influenced by Greek idealism,
and the Platonic conception of the animal mind was appropriated and em-
phasized by the theologians. But if animals are wholly lacking in intelli-
gence how is one to explain the manifest appropriateness and efficiency of
their behavior^ The question was answered by an appeal to instinct, — a
concept which had been introduced by the Stoics, — and instinct was con-
ceived to be an institution of nature in virtue of which animals are enabled
to react appropriately without themselves being able to foresee, or even
to perceive, the appropriateness of their reactions. Instincts were held
to be divine creations, and they were even cited as proofs of the wisdom of
their creator. This view was defended by Aquinas, Descartes and others,
and it came to be a dogma of theology, — and Ziegler cites Altum and Was-
mann as its modern representatives. The position which the vitalists as-
sumed was not essentially different. This dogma was opposed by Montaigne
and by Gassendi; and subsequent contributions to the humanizing or an-
thropomorphic movement were made by Leibnitz, Condillac, La Mettrie,
Brehm, Vogt, Biichner, and numerous others. A new era in the history
of instinct begins with Darwin. Instinct is no longer regarded as the pecu-
liar characteristic of animal endowment; numerous hirnian instincts are
shown to exist and to be of profoimd significance. Moreover the fact that
instincts are appropriate and serviceable is now explained from natural
causes. Ziegler discusses and rejects Lamarckianism, — among whose repre-
sentatives he mentions Haeckel, Preyer, Hering, Wundt and Semon. His
own view of instinct is based upon the Weismann conception, and has, as
the author shows, much in common with the view of Lloyd Morgan. He
umerates a list of criteria which differentiate instinctive from intelligent
ehavior, but the list contains nothing which is essentially new. The
fference between instinctive action and intelligent action is referred to
the assumption that the former is due to inherited paths in the nervous
system, while the latter is due to acquired paths.

In an (illustrated) appendix Ziegler discusses the brain anatomy of the

bee and the ant, and points out that the three classes within the colony

(queens, drones and workers; males, females and workers) which manifest

ypically different instincts, also possess typical differences of brain structure.

The book is written by a zoologist, whose discussions frequently display

lack of critical insight into the problems of comparative psychology. But

is historical sketch is a valuable contribution to the literature.

J. W. Baird.

132 BOOK REVIEWS

The phenomenology of mind, by G. W. F. Hegel. Edited, with an intro-
duction and notes, by J. B. Baillie. London, Swan Sonnenschein,
1910. 2 V.

The translator well says that this has long been recognized as a unique
product of Teutonic genius, "on the whole perhaps the most remarkable
treatise in the history of modem philosophy." This is true both as to the
style of thinking, its expression and the comprehensiveness of its theme. It
is an attempt to give an exhaustive analysis of the life history of the human
spirit, to reduce its complex and involved harmonies to their elemental
leading motives, and to express these controllong ideas in an orderly and
connected system. The courage that made this effort possible was due to
the state of the intellectual atmosphere of the times, which was charged with
grandiose ideas that were capable of stimulating and sustaining philosophical
enthusiasm and exciting and intoxicating speculative ambition. The writer
thinks that Hegel was inspired by Kant to sail these unknown speculative
seas with only a fraction of his scientific knowledge and none of his philo-
sophical prudence. Still there is an enormous wealth of presentative material
behind this treatise which shines through it. The discussion is often fore-
shortened and the scheme of the work is out of proportion, some points
being treated with great elaborateness and others very concisely. The last
part of the work is especially unsatisfactory and it is no excuse that it
was written hastily just before the battle of Jena in 1806.

The translator certainly had a difficult task before him and he merits
the very hearty thanks of all students of philosophy who have for years
looked, no matter how well they read German, to this work with mingled
feelings of curiosity and awe.

Manual of mental and physical tests; a book of directions compiled with
special reference to the experimental study of school children in the
laboratory or classroom, by Guy Montrose Whipple. Baltimore,
Warwick & York, 1910. 534 p.
All psychologists will be grateful to the author for the compilation of this
manual. The general groups of tests are anthropometric, those of phsyical,
mental and sensory capacity, of attention and perception, of effort and de-
scription, of association, learning and memory, of suggestibility, of imagina-
tion and invention, of intellectual development, besides general tests.

A text-book of psychology, by Edward Bradford Titchener. N. Y.,
Macmillan, 1910. 565 p.
The present work has been written to take the place of the author's ' 'Out-
lines of Psychology," which was stereotyped in 1896 and which, owing to
the rapid progress of the science, has long since passed beyond the possibility
of revision, despite the continued demand for the book. The author would
have preferred to let it die a natural death, feeling that it would be impossible
to recover the freshness and vigor of the first reading, but finally deciding
to re- write, a first part, containing about half of this work, appeared in 1909,
and we now have the remainder of it. The author and publisher intend
to withdraw the "Outlines" from the market in the near future in the hope
that this work, which follows the same general lines, will take its place.

Psyche: a concise and easily comprehensible treatise on the elements of
psychiatry and psychology for students of medicine and law, by Max
Talmey. N. Y., Medico-Legal Publishing Co., 19 10. 282 p.
The writer divides the work into several parts, as follows : the psychology

or physiology of the mental functions and their pathology, following under

this latter section the rubrics of feelings, ideation, will and consciousness.

Part three treats of the etiology of insanity; part four, its therapy; part

five, special pathology.

BOOK REVIEWS 133

The psychology and training of the horse, by Count Kugenio Martinengo
CesarESCO. London, Unwin, 1906. 334 p.
The chief sections of this book are headed, the mind of the horse, how the
horse learns and how he must be taught, how he is taught obedience, fear
and how to overcome it. The work is attractively written, bound and
printed.

Ueber den Traum. Experimentel-psychologische Untersuchungen, von J.
Hourly VoIvD. Herausgegeben von O. Klemm. Erster Band. Leip-
zig, Barth, 19 10. 435 p.
This is a very interesting experimental study by a man who long practised
upon himself and others binding limbs and otherwise restricting freedom of
movement, noting the effect upon the dreams. The conclusion shows a
very systematic relation and suggests the desirability of further experiments
upon others.

Dogmatism and evolution. Studies in modern philosophy. By ThEdorE Db
Lacuna and Grace Andrus De Lacuna. N. Y., Macmillan, 1910.
259 p.
Dogmatism here denotes the body of logical assumptions which were
generally made by the thinkers of all schools before the rise of theories of
organic and social evolution. Its application is therefore very wide, includ-
ing the empiricism of Berkeley and Hume as well as the rationalism of Des-
cartes and Leibnitz. These studies do not claim systematic unity.

The science of poetry and the philosophy of language, by Hudson Maxim.
N. Y., Funk & Wagnalls, 1910. 294.
After laying down some fundamental principles, the author proceeds to
describe the evolution of analogical speech and discusses the question what
poetry is and what not. Then follows an interesting chapter on profanity.
Still others on the application of fundamental principles, the dynamics of
hiunan speech, philosophy of English verse, oratory, poetry, etc. The work
is illustrated by a dozen or more quaint and mystic illustrations. The re-
viewer feels that it is difficult to do justice to this book.

The reasoning ability of children, by Frederick G. BonsER. N. Y., Colima-
bia University, 19 10. 133 p. (Coliunbia University Teachers College.
Contributions to Education, No. 37.)
The author tested children chiefly of the middle and upper grades in
problems of simple arithmetic, in supplying omitted words or completing
sentences, in scoring out wrong words, in writing opposites, in selecting
the best from ten reasons given for four different things, in selecting defini-
tions, in giving in their own words the substance of poems. Returns were
obtained from 757 children. The best test of general ability was that of
opposites and the poorest of interpreting poems. The work is careful and
painstaking in a high degree, but it tells us very little about children's power
of reasoning and should have been designated a test of general ability among
children.

Muscle-reading; a method of investigating involuntary movements and mental
types, by June E. Downey. Reprinted from the Psychological Re-
view, July,|i909. Vol. XVI, no. 4, pp. 257-301.

The central tendency of judgment, by H. L. Holi^incworTh. Reprinted from
the journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific methods, Aug.
18, 1 9 10. Vol. VII, no. 17, pp. 461-469.

The perceptual basis for judgments of extent, by H. L. HollincworTh. Re-
printed from the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific
Methods, Nov. 11, 1909. Vol. IV, no. 23, pp. 623-626.

134 BOOK REVIEWS

The suggestive power of hypnotism, by L. Forbes Winsi^ow. London,
Rebman, Ltd., 1910. 90 p.

This work, which is dedicated to the officers and members of the Psycho-
therapeutic Society, regards its work as an old prophecy fulfilled, for Sir
James Paget long ago said that some day some clever quack would dis-
grace physicians by curing by his will what they could not do by their
remedies. After giving a general account of suggestion, duality of mind,
the differences between subjective and objective, the author gives us the
history of hypnotism, tells us of its schools and those of therapeutics,
pays his respects to the pioneers of psychotherapy, discusses the rules
governing its use, relations between crime and hypnotism, auto suggestion,
hypnotism in the courts, power of suggestion in causing illness, the case of
EUiotson, explains the secret of the pilgrimages to Lourdes, describes the
effects of suggestion in dealing with inebriety and the drug habit, describes
transference, fashion, which is purely suggestion, and concludes with a
felicitation to the profession upon the fact that nearly all inteUigent and
progressive physicians have now accepted the main facts in this field.

Les lots morhides de Vassociation des iddes, par M. Pei^I/ETier. Paris,
Rousset, 1904. 148 p.
After discussing the place of association of ideas in the psychic processes
in general, the author characterizes them in the normal state and then
discusses symptoms of mania and the incoherence of ideas that character-
izes it and the causes of this incoherence. A final chapter treats of debility
and how incomplete coherence affects them. The work is written essen-
tially from the standpoint of a clinician.

Bulletin No. 2, Government Hospital for the Insane, Washington, D. C.
Edited by Wiluam A. White. Washington, Gov't Printing Office,
1910. 135 p.

This work contains the following articles by Dr. S. I. Franz. The knee
jerk in paresis, sensations following nerve division, touch sensations in
different bodily segments, and Some considerations of the association
word experiment. Dr. Achucarro writes on some pathological findings
in the neuroglia and in the ganglion cells of the cortex in senile conditions,
on elongated and other cells in the Ammon's horn of the rabbit, plaque
lesions in the ependyma of the lateral ventricles. The work ends with a
final article by Dr. W. H. Hough on the comparative diagnostic value of
the Noguchi butyric acid reaction and cytological examination of the
cerebro-spinal fluid.

Die Frommigkeit des Graf en Ludwig von Zinzendorf. Bin psychoanaly-
tischer Beitrag zur Kenntnis der religiosen Sublimierungsprozesse und
zur Erklarung des Pietismus, von Oskar Pfister. Leipzig, Deuticke,
1910. 122 p.

This work is dedicated to Professor Jung of Zurich and is an interesting
new contribution to the rapidly growing number of Freudian interpreta-
tions 9f life.

Nature and man, by Edwin Ray Lankester. The Ro mane's Lecture
1905. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1905. 61 p.

Criticism and beauty; a lecture rewritten. Being the Romane's lecture for,

1909, by Arthur James Bai^four. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1910.
48 p.

The judgment of difference with special reference to the doctrine of the threshold ^
in the case of lifted weights. By Warner Brown. University of Cali-
fornia Publications in Psychology. Vol.1, No. I, pp. 1-71. Sept., 24,

1910. Berkeley, the University Press.

BOOK REVIEWS 135

Biological mechanics. Book I, Psychology as a natural science. By
M. CuNE. Oct., 1910. 75 p.

An experimental study of sleep. (From the physiological laboratory of the
Harvard Medical School and from Sidis' laboratory), by Boris Sidis.
Boston, Richard G. Badger, 1909. 106 p.

My life as a dissociated personality, by B. C. A. With an introduction
by Morton Prince. Boston, Richard G. Badger, 1909. 47 p.

Die psychologene Sehnstorung in psychoanalytischer Auffassung, von Sigmund
Freud. Sonderabdruck aus Aerztliche Standeszeitung. Jahrgang,
1910. No. 9, 7 p.

Uber den Gegensinn der Urworte. Referat tiber die gleichnamige Broschure
von Karl Abel, 1884, von Sigmund Freud. Sonderabdruck aus dem
Jahrbuch fiir psychoanalytischeundpsychopathologische Forschungen.
Band II. pp. 179-184.

Die zukitnftigen Chancen der psychoanalytischen Therapie, von Sigmund
Freud. (Vortrag; gehalten auf dem zweiten Privatkongress der
Psychoanalytiker zu Niirnberg 19 10.) 9 p.

The metaphysics of a naturalist; philosophical and psychological fragments,
by C. L. Herrick. Granville, O., 1910. 99 p.

Kleine Schriften, von W. WundT. Bd. i. Leipzig, Engelmann, 1910. 640 p.

Der Begriff des Instinkts, einst und jetzt, von H. E. ZiEglER, 2d. rev. and
enl. Jena, Fischer, 1910. 112 p.

Leitfaden der experimentellen Psychopathologie, von Adalbert GrEgor.
Beriin, Karger, 1910. 222 p.

Evolution and Consciousness, by C. H. Judd. Reprinted from the Psy-
chological Review, March, 19 10. Vol. XVII, pp. 77-97.

Der Begriff des Ideals. Empirisch-psychologische Untersuchung des
Idealerlebnisses. (i. Lieferung), von A. SchlEsinger. Sonder-
abdruck aus dem Archiv fiir die gesamte Psychologic, Bd. XVII, i and
2 Heft. Wilhelm Engelmann, Leipzig, 1910. pp. 231-309.

Die taktile Schdtzung von ausgefMlten und leeren Strecken, von HELEN
Dodd Cook. Mit. 2 Figuren und 17 Kurven im Text. Sonderabdruck
aus dem Archiv fiir die gesamte Psychologic Bd. XVI, 3 and 4 Heft.
Wilhelm Engelmann, Leipzig, 19 10. pp. 130.

Mitbewegungen beim Singen, Sprechen und Horen, von Felix KruEgER.
Breitkopf & Hartel, 1910. pp. 22.

Rassenhygiene. Eine gemeinverstandliche Darstellung, von Hugo Rib-
BERT. Mit. 4 Figuren. Bonn, Friedrich Cohen, 1910. pp. 65.

Die Variabilitdt niederer Organismen. Eine deszendenztheoretische Studie,
von Hans Pringsheim. Berlin, Julius Springer, 1910. 216 p.

Die Evolution der Materie auf den Himmelskdrpern. Eine theoretische
Ableitung des periodischen Systems, vqn N. A. MorosoEF. Auto-
risierte Uebersetzung von B. Pines & Dr. A. Orechoff. Dresden,
Theodor Stein-Kopff, 1910. 41 p.

Vierteljahrsberichte des Wissenschaftlich-humanitdren Komitees. April,
1 910. Jahrgang i. Heft 3. Fortsetzung der Monatsberichte und
des Jahrbuchs fiir sexuellen Zwischenstufen mit Beriicksichtigung
der Homo-sexualitat, von Magnus Hirschfeld. Leipzig.

136 BOOK REVIEWS

An experimental Study of Dementia Prcecox, by L. C. Gatewood. The
Review Publishing Co., Baltimore. 70 p. (Reprint from The Psy-
chological Review, November, 1909, Vol. XI. No. 2. Ohio State
University Psychological Studies, Vol. I, No. i.)

Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Southern Society for Phi-
losophy and Psychology, Charlotte, N. C, December 28, 1909. (Re-
print from The Psychological Bulletin, February 15, 1910, Vol. VII,
pp. 65-74.)

Beitrag zur Lehre vom Querulantenwahn, von Max Lowy. J. A. Barth,
Leipzig. (Sonder-Abdruck aus Zentralblatt fiir Nervenheilkunde
und Psychiatric, neue Folge, 21. Band, 1910. pp. 81-97.)

A nnali della Clinica delle, Malattie Mentali e Nervose delta R. Universita di
Palermo diretta del Rosolino Colella. Vol. III. Stabilimento tipo-
grafico Virzi, Palermo, 1909. 435 p.

A Report on the Circulation of the Lobar Ganglia, by H. F. Aitken. The
Fort Hill Press, Boston. (Reprint from the Boston Medical and
Surgical Journal, Vol. CLX, No. 18, May 6, 1909.)

Die Methoden der Immunodiagnostik und Immunotherapie und ihre prak-
tische Verwertung, von Julius Citron. Leipzig, George Thirme,
1910. 232 p.

Die Haupttypen des Sprachbaus, von Franz Nicholaus Finck. B. G.
Teubner, Leipzig, 191 o. 156P. (Aus Natur- und Geisteswelt.
Sammlungwissenschaftlich-gemeinverstandlichenDarstellungen.Band-
chen 268.)

Das Beharren und die Gegensdtzlichkeit des Erlebens, von Juuus PiklER.
Franckh'sche Verlagshandlung, Stuttgart, 1908. pp. 40.

Die Stelle des Bewusstseins in der Natur: eine hypothesenfreie Zergliederung
desselben in rein objektive Elemente. Von Julius PiklER. Johann
Ambrosius Barth, Leipzig, 19 10. pp. 34.

Ueber die biologische Funktion des Bewusstseins. Estratto della Rivista
di Scienza "Scientia, " Vol. V, Anno III (1909) N. X. 2. Wilhelm
Engelmann, Leipzig, pp. 13.

Die Psychanalyse: ihre Bedeutung fiir die AufiFassung und Behandlung
psychoneurotischer Zustande, Vortrag gehalten in der Versammlung
schweizerischer Psychiater in Ziirrich am 21 November, 1909., Von
L. Frank. Ernst Reinhardt, Miinchen, 19 10. pp. 42.

Les Ddgdndrescences Auditives, par A. Marie. Bloud & Cie., Paris, 1909.
103 p. (Bibliotheque de psychologic experimentale et de meta-
psychie.)

Les Folies a Eclipse, par Le Docteur LEGrain. Bloud & Cie., Paris,
1910. 117 p. (Bibliothdque de psychologic experimentale et de
m^tapsychie.)

The land of living men, by Ralph Waldo Trine. N. Y., Crowell, 19 10.
288+14 p.

Esquisse d'une science pedagogique; les fails et lots de I'ddu^ation, par LuciEn
Cell^riER. Paris, Alcan, 1910, 393 p.

La psychologic de Vattention, par N. Vaschidb et Raymond MeuniER.
Collection experimentale et de metapsychie. Nos. 18-19. Paris, Bloud,
n. d. 199 p.

THE AMERICAN

Journal of Psychology

Founded by G. Stani^ey Hai^i, in 1887
Voi,. XXII APRIL, 1911 No. 2

THE ESTHETIC PRINCIPLE IN COMEDY ^

By Horace M. KallEn, Ph. D., Harvard University

Although it is fashionable nowadays to praise the 'sense of
humor, ' there is a traditional role for critics of art which con-
sists in deploring and cavilling at the human love of laughter.
To pursue the laughable is almost invariably, according to
this tradition, to sacrifice the high for the low, the excellent
for the perverse. Supremacy, in art as in all walks of life,
is taken to be isolated and sorrowful; beauty's majesty must
wear the buskin. The marriage of aesthetic excellence with
tragedy is indeed not only a legend of the elect, it is a common-
place of popular culture. The acclaimed art of our human
inheritance has the power to awaken sadness; the acclaimed
masters are masters of the mournful note, — -^schylus, Eu-
ripides, Michael Angelo, Dante, Shakespeare, Goethe, and
who else you will, — their best is their most funereal. Never-
theless increase in humane quality may be fairly gauged by
gain in the scope of laughter. While it is untrue that savages
are without a sense of humor, it is true that their derision has
a narrow range and fixes itself upon the more fleshly if pro-
founder aspects of the common lot, — upon the pursuit and
capture of food, upon the business of marriage and child-
bearing, upon the enhancement and glory of the self. These
great central interests are, no doubt, the piteous matter of
amusement for civilization also, and our populace has hardly
attained a wide vision of the comedy in the residual world;
but it nevertheless has such a vision, and is appreciative of

^This paper is part of the third chapter in a book — "Beauty and Use:
Outlines of a Pragmatic Philosophy of Art" — now in preparation.

138 KAIyl^KN

the range of the comic through institutions and ideas, through
the sacred and the lofty, as well as through the natural and
the instinctive. Civilized mankind has gained on the un-
sophisticated in so far as it can laugh and command where the
savage trembles and is afraid, while the greatest master
of life seems to be he who, like Democritus, understanding the
world's nature, laughs at its manners.

A profound and vital reason exists for this human love of
the comic, for this increasing power to find and to place it,
for the fact that the majority pursue it, if not more eagerly,
as eagerly as they pursue beauty; for the fact that the cult
of the 'sense of humor' has perhaps more shrines and a greater
body of worshippers than the institutional cult of beauty. The
love of beauty is the love of happiness; its possession in the
aesthetic experience is the joy of successful self -conservation.
Beauty is the directly-felt goodness of the environment.
The environment arrests you as you plod or scurry in your
daily routine; it holds you, brings all the faculties of your
organic self to play upon it instantaneously, integrates them,
sums them, until you attain whatever enduring optimum of
value the environment offers. Beauty is this optimum of value,
this realized entelechy of harmonious and instant interplay in
adaptation of your whole self with that particular environment.
Now the behavior of the comic is much the same. It, too,
comes upon you suddenly during the affair of living; it, too,
arrests and deploys your life, compelling it to take hold of the
comic essence it offers you, and to it also you are adapted in
the instant, harmoniously, completely, directly. On the
other hand, there are certain well-marked differences between
the experience of the comic and the experience of the beauti-
ful. The former seems more complex, both with regard to
your own state and the condition of the object. Their ele-
ments are harder to grasp and more difficult to hold. For
yourself, — you smile, at the very least; ordinarily, you laugh.
For the object, there is something that corresponds to your
own condition, — an uncertainty, a movement, in character
and in form.

Consider these differences more closely, of course only so
far as they are ordinary, healthy and normal; the trans-
normal marvels of laughter are not our affair. In your own
attitude the most striking point is the fact that it is an action;
this smiling and laughing is something doing, and it is a doing
which you love, which you prefer and persist in. To laugh
is a privilege and a delight; and to be laughed at is, signifi-
cantly, a degradation and a pain. It is not so with beauty;
to be beautiful is even more agreeable than to enjoy beauty.
This irreversible direction of laughter, well-exemplified in its

THK i^STHBTlC PRINCIPI.^ IN COMEDY 1 39

contagion, becomes still more significant when we observe its
details. There is first the smile; the corners of the upper lip
are drawn up, the canines and the incisors, the renders and
the cutters, are laid bare, wrinkles form under the eyes, which
narrow and brighten; there is a slight heightening of the res-
piration. There is also, perhaps, a barely perceptible out-
ward movement of the hands. Very little is needed to pass
from this smile, which may of course be reduced to mere up-
ward twitch of the lips or a mere wrinkling of the eyes, to the
quiet, audible laugh, — just a deep, not frequently noticed
inspiration, then expiration in short, quick puffs, or chuckles
or gurgles, accompanied by more noticeable wider expansive
movements of hands and legs. If the laughter grows farther,
is less restrained, then the head is thrown back as when swallow-
ing a very agreeable morsel, the alternating inspiratory and
expiratory processes grow more and more obvious and pro-
longed, the explosion of sounds louder, of varying pitch; the
eyes are narrowed to a frown, tears come, the limbs are thrown
far out, or the body sways back and forth rhythmically, in
wider and wider arcs, the hands are extended and slapped
together. If the occasion or witness of the laughter is a per-
son, he may be slapped on the back, poked in the ribs, or
even embraced. Withal the blood-vessels are dilated, the
blood comes faster through the system, more oxygen reaches
it. In a word, the general vitality is heightened, the basis of
being extended. The whole phenomenon of laughter seems
expansive, enlarging, vitalizing; all its movements appear
as if intended to embrace and absorb their occasion.

And that occasion, — supplied by nature, created and mod-
ified by art? However it occurs, it must be given whole
before it can evoke its laughing response. The maker of an
unpremeditated joke does not laugh when he makes it, he
cannot; he laughs like his auditors, after he has heard it,
after he has taken in the comic substance for what it is. And
the apparently frequent anticipatory laughter of the auditor,
that is in no sense directed upon what is not yet but will be;
it is directed upon a content already offered and found comic.
The essential condition of laughter, — paradoxical, common-
place as it may be, — is the actual apprehension of the con-
cretely present laughable.

This, both in nature and in art, has many forms, widely
diverse, disparate and difficult of comprehension under a
single rubric. In nature there is earliest of all, the eleemosy-
nary 'laugh' of the well-fed, replete, resting child repeating in
its contentment the pleasurable movements of sucking, so much
like laughter, so essentially a smile. The object which es-
pecially evokes it is said to be the rise of the food in the gullet,

I40 KALIy^N

SO that the action would be Hke chewing a vicarious cud. But
this is the mere beginning of laughter, and its occasion is
problematic. A far more certain occasion is tickling. Now
tickling seems to be a pleasure both sought and dreaded.
The child's responsive actions to the tickling stimulus are
partly defensive, opposing, mainly expansive and embracing.
It seems to contain two elements uncertainly mixed, alter-
nating, undirected, carrying both menace and safety, with the
element of safety predominating. Under favorable conditions
the whole or any portion of the body responds to it. An
expected contact of an unknown and thus far discomforting
stimulus turns out to be a contact of pleasure and delight.
There is an essential conflict and titillation between two di-
verse elements of which the personality-feeling, whatever
that be, finally finds itself free and master.

The daily life offers many instances which are determinable
as complications of the characteristic contents of tickling.
The laughter which follows fear, emotional or intellectual
tension, is such. So when a child laughs after having been
frightened by a dog, a woman after having heard bad news
or on the shock of some vision or encounter, the terrifying
object has seized on the mind, disorganized it, upset its equili-
brium, emotionally or otherwise, is a menace to its proper
character. When for whatever reason, it lapses, when this
process dies down, when the organism has, with temporary
or permanent success, resisted and vanquished its enemy,
the engaged energies are released, the disturbed equilibrium is
restored, the organism is again in possession of itself, and in
a single instant or a longer period, it does not matter, appre-
hends the whole of the lapsed situation with the failure of its
enemy and laughs, spontaneously, instinctively. Literature
affords many instances of the same thing, — the typical
laughter of mad Ophelia, Hamlet's curious ironical play with
the ghost:

"Well said, old mole. Canst work i' the ground so fast?
A worthy pioneer"

are instances. The preceding experience seems, so to speak,
to break off and to constitute an object in which an element
formerly a menace or a terror, exalted above the protagonist,
has been thrown in the dust and made of low degree.

The laughter of sheer health might seem to be almost an-
tithetical to this, — frequent, free, easy, evoked by the most
trifling instances, — the sight of food, of friends, of strangers,
the most ordinary events and actions. But it is not intrinsi-
cally different. Joyous though this laughter is, it is most prone
to break out upon sudden stimuli, the overflowing energy of
health seizes its unsuspecting object, is master of it ah initio,

run i^STH^TlC PRINCIPLE IN COMlBDY I4I

and perverts its natural and proper relations to the world in
which it belongs. The apparently meaningless laughter of
sturdy children is such an action, the laughter of savages who
are sufi&ciently familiar with strangers no longer to fear them,
the very confident laughter of crowds, the careless laughter
of people in power. Health, which is self-assured, stable,
optimistic, finds everything grist for its mill of laughter,
that is in the least different from it, — that is less stable than
it. Health is literally wholeness, a self-sufl&ciency and com-
pleteness. The laughable, in so far as it is like tickling, is con-
versely not sufficient in itself, nor complete nor balanced nor
stable. It seems less than health, and at its mercy.

This is perhaps nowhere so apparent as in play and make-
believe. Those who have watched children at it must remem-
ber pleasantly how, wherever this play is collective, it is
punctuated by continual bursts of laughter, sometimes ac-
companied by screams of it. Those who have questioned
children about the persons and objects of their simulation,
the characters they and their playthings assume, will not fail
to recognize how deep a sense of the stability and reality of
their customary environment children really have, and how
rare are illusions on their part concerning the status of their
fictions. For most of them, even the youngest, there is
nothing magical or strange even in the most mechanical toys.
Their sense of mechanism, indeed, seems stronger than their
sense of mystery, of personality, of faerie. They do with
their make-believes what suits their convenience; and what
essentially suits their convenience is the domination and
supremacy of the person they are. If they "play school"
they insist either on being teacher, or on being victoriously
troublesome pupils; if they personate characters, they insist
on being the gloating all- vanquishing champion ; Tom Sawyer
as bold Robin Hood must kill the sheriff of Nottingham, but
then Bill Harper, who was the dead sheriff of Nottingham,
must also subdue Robin Hood. He cannot endure to be
dead, even imaginatively. The laughter of play, then, apart
from the physiological elements which like tickling depend
upon titillation of expectancies, of physical contacts aimed
and missed, of purposes crossed and frustrated, is a laughter
directed upon an immediately apprehended difference between
fiction and reality; and is the sense of vital power of control
over both. In that more malicious form of play known as
teasing, this becomes still more evident, — for teasing is play
on the edge of earnest, pleasure on the edge of pain. Both
the teaser and the teased laugh, — the teaser because he sees
the contrast between the expectations of his victim and the
character of his own intentions, because in that respect his

142 KALL^N

victim is at his mercy; the teased, because he recognizes the
deceitful nature of his ostensible danger, because in his alarm
at its on-coming he can still take it for what it is and so cause
it to fall short of its intent. If he succeeds in doing so utterly,
he turns the tables on his persecutor who thereby himself be-
comes the victim; if he fails in doing so, he becomes angered
and the situation turns from fun to gravity. And with what
ease, so often! A wink, a look, a word, may serve to turn a
play of wit into a quarrel, a friendly game at cross purposes
into a struggle for life.

Laughter, indeed, is intimately and often the clearest ex-
pression of victory in such vital struggles. The shouting
laughter of partisans at great spectacular games in which
their sides are successful, the wide, expansive, absorbing
movements of throwing arms and limbs far out into the air,
swinging hats and dancing attest this relation. It is evinced
in the traditional report of the sucessful prize-fighter who to-
ward the end of his combat 'comes up smiling.' Usage in-
dicates it in 'the self-confident smile' attributed to any one
who is master of an art or of a situation. Popular wisdom ex-
presses it in the proverb 'He laughs best who laughs last.'
Victory in combat of any sort whatsoever may be accompanied
by laughter, — when the tension of the combat is relaxed,
when the mind erects itself and surveys the event and the pros-
trate enemy. The laughter does not occur during the battle ;
during the battle there is silence, grim absorption in the
business at hand. The occasion of laughter is not the combat,
but the fallen in combat, the vanquished enemy, the mighty
laid low, the peer reduced, the apparent strength unmasked
and laid bare for the weakness it really is, while the victor re-
mains firm, unshaken and laughing in his might.

The denudation or exposure of things, the inversion of
appearance by reality before a witness whose own 'reality'
remains firm, whose seeming and being are by contrast one,
is indeed the basis, together with this envisagement of the
defeated enemy, of the most universal matter of laughter
nature supplies, — the laughter of sex. Fully nine-tenths of
the witticisms of daily life, and more than half the wit of
literature plays on sex. Sex is laughable because social life
requires that it be hidden, set aside, submerged; while the
natural endowment of man impels the instinct to raise its
head out of the darkness, to peer into the light of day. This
traditional throwing-off of linguistic, sartorial or customary
convention causes laughter. The peasant and the boor, by
use of language, do so directly, — the mere mention of matters
allied to the reproductive function brings laughter; the more-
trained, self-controlled, sophisticated individual is indirect.

THE .ESTHETIC PRINCIPI.E IN COMEDY 1 43

He proceeds by innuendo, ambiguities, covert references.
The submerged intent has farther to travel, more inhibitions
to vanquish, in order to reach the open field of consciousness.
But all classes of society laugh at suddenly discovered lovers,
at amatory irregularities, directly and without thought.
When they take thought they condemn them; and often,
even in condemning, laugh.

Something like denudation or exposure is involved in the
laughable character of novelties. The comedy of newness
is almost universal. Even if the newness is circular and
seasonal, it is still funny, — so the 'first straw hat' is every sea-
son an object of derision; a boy's first 'long trousers,* or first
dress-coat. Savages are said to laugh continually at their
first white visitor and his appurtenances; children and even
adults will tease and persecute people with an unaccustomed
beard, a different cut of clothes, another accent. The new is new
just because it is distinctive, different, a variation from the
habitual and customary. It is a little thing, isolate, against
a massive tradition, a universal manner, a cumulative habit.
It is a deviation from the type, a deformity like the tradi-
tionally laughable hunch-back, club-foot, magnified nose or
hare-lip. At the moment of its appearance, it is at an evident
disadvantage. It is an intruder, without the power to make its
intrusion good. It is laughed at. To it may be assimilated the
whole assemblage of little drolls which people and diversify the
daily life — irruptions of irregularity, violations of the per-
vasive conventions which constitute the economy of social
intercourse, — such are wearing the wrong clothes, using the
wrong utensil, petty misfortunes, clumsiness of manner or
of speech, — the whole host of disharmonies and incongruities
at which we laugh. Of these the essence is the irruption
of an unexpected, a new and discordant yet impotent factor
into a harmonious and well-balanced situation.

The occasions of laughter, then, as they naturally arise in the
events of the daily life are occasions which contain at least
two elements, not in harmony with each other. In tickling
we have given the dual nature of a stimulus; in terror the
sudden fall or breaking-off and lapse of a dominating tension ;
in pure health, the weakness of other things; in play and
teasing and battle and victory, the contrast between make-
believe and actuality, apparent strength and real weakness;
in sex and novelty, the conflict of the natural flux and the
social order. In each case the occasion offers us a contrast
or conflict between two elements in which the spectator does
not participate. In the course of life they appear impure,
adulterate with extraneous elements, not altogether detached
from the residual flux. Their arrestive and vitalizing power

144 KAI^I^^N

is restrained by other and ulterior conditions, by almost
equally potent simultaneous impetus from interests looking
in other directions, toward other ends. The art of comedy
consists in abstracting these essentially comic complexes
from their habitations in the flux, in freeing them of extranei-
ties, and throwing them into relief. The comic of art, hence,
has a rather different character from the comic of life, — it
accumulates a certain desiderative value which is akin to
beauty. In art, the comic might, indeed, be called the beauty
of disintegration.

Although comedy has chiefly been associated with letters
and the stage, there is no telling with what degree of adequacy
it might not be expressed in the other arts. A limit is sug-
gested in the fact that movement, action, invariably intensifies
comic effect, but the least degree of movement required is
perhaps impossible of determination. It is certain, however,
that painted and carved objects are more laughable either
when they are very simple, or when they occur in a progressive
series. They appear either to tell stories, which need to be
supplemented by verbal rubrics, or to present very obvious
direct contrasts, exaggerations, novelties, whimsicalities,
oddities. They involve an essential paradox which is, at
one of its extremes, caricature, at another, grotesque sym-
bolism. Animals with human expressions on their features;
human beings with bestial characteristics; inanimate objects
with some of the attributes of life; living beings with the
appurtenances of the non-living; inverted natural propor-
tions; and so on to no end, — these constitute the material
of the plastic comic. Sculpture is one of the arts perhaps
least amenable to the comic ideal. Most laughable sculpture
is caricature, often caricature by accident, not by intention.
The material of sculpture, in spite of modern practice and am-
bition, does not readily lend itself to the representation of that
disintegrating essence which is the comic material. It is more
adequate to the representation of repose than of action, and the
movements it most successfully represents are the integrative
and co-operative movements that enhance poise and stability,
not those that express inner diversity and disintegration.
Grotesque sculpture is not, by nature, comic; for the genuinely
grotesque is the harmony of the extraordinary. Comic
sculpture, when intentional, is caricature ; when unintentional
is maladroitness of the sculptor. That it has a larger capacity
for comic expression than it has thus far exhibited must
nevertheless be admitted. But such larger expression would
need to be serial and cumulative, not instantaneous. It
would require explanatory legend, and would approximate
very closely to the comic of painting. Painting which shall

THE ESTHETIC PRINCIPI.E IN COMEDY 1 45

be intrinsically comic by virtue of its coloring or design is
not ordinarily conceived. There is no inherent exclusion of
such laughableness; the famous Schopenhauerian example
of the comic, — the curve and its tangent, — indicate that in
one instance, at any rate, pure geometrical form was appre-
hended as laughable. There is no reason why minds habit-
uated to the apprehension of forms and colors as such should
not discover an infinite deal of the laughable in them. There
might be a pure comedy of design and of landscape, as well
as of human feature and action. Hogarth, indeed, approxi-
mates some such thing in his ludicrous example of the conse-
quences that follow on ignorance of the laws of perspective.
But taken as a whole, comic pictures are mainly caricatures;
they have a social subject-matter, and are most effective in
series. Our 'humorous' literature is full of illustrations of
this principle; the daily newspapers teem with them; they
are the essence of the "comic supplement." They appear,
significantly, to be studies of manners. The rich comedy
of such series as Hogarth's 'Hudibras,' 'The Rake's Progress,'
'The Good and the Idle Apprentice' seems to lie in the cumu-
lative integration of cross-intentions with caricature; and
it is doubtful whether this integration would be so funny
without the attached verbal legends, and the presence of
laughing or smiling human faces. The latter constitute a
very important element in the comic effect of pictures; and
their presence is usually a drawback to the determination of
intrinsic comic quality.

The enhancing effect of movement on comic quality indi-
cates clearly why comedy is more frequently a matter for
literature and the drama than for the plastic arts. Literature
and the drama are intrinsically serial and climactic; while
painting and sculpture are simultaneous and sudden. Music,
the other temporal art, whose very essence is time, is not so
often said to contain or to offer comic content. Nevertheless
music has its distinctly comic material and method, and its
characteristic comedy. This seems mainly to be provided
by a combination of light, staccato instrumentation with deep-
pitched notes, by the use of uncompleted phrases, and latterly
by imitative natural noises like the crowing of cocks, the
cries of children, the whistling of birds, — all in careful 'har-
mony' with the theme of the composition. That the first
I two devices are musically amusing may be granted. But
jiirhether the comedy of the last device springs from the nature
mi the art itself or from the more apparent intrusion of a
loreign element into the musical complex is an open question,
Kiough barely so. But whatever the basis of the laughter,

146 KAIvLEN

In drama and literature, the nature of the mirth-provok-
ing object is less open to question. The material of laughter
is here purely human, purely relevant to complex or simple
human interests. Indeed, according to one writer the human
is the only material that laughter can have. This material
may be internal or external ; it may offer itself in the individ-
ual solely, or in the confrontation of individuals with each
other or with their environments. The outer marks of the
comic individual may be merely clumsiness or deformity;
may be speech incompatible with gesture, gesture with speech,
the merest physiological malapropism, the lisp, the stutter,
the bare misuse of language. Any one of these may be amus-
ing; all of them taken together constitute the representative
comic figure, Mr. Punch. Falstaff is funny by his mere avoir-
dupois, Bardolph by his flaming nose, Pistol by his rhodo-
montade. Bring them into action, and these purely external
traits may distort purpose, and throw the most excellent in-
tention out of gear. A fat man makes a shadowy trooper; a
ranting rascal cannot tell a straight story.

But this derailing of a swift-moving intention need not de-
pend merely upon the external characteristics of the comic
protagonist. Loosely interpreted, it is the essence of every
comic situation, which is in Aristotle's excellent simile "in
the nature of the missing of a mark." The situation is created
by the fact that the characters do not hit it off. Its clearest
type is perhaps Mr. Pickwick chasing his wind-blown hat.
The situation has come upon him suddenly, out of the blue.
The orderly march of his life has been broken up. His hat,
which properly belongs on his head and should protect him
from the wind and weather, has betrayed him to the wind and
weather; and to add insult to injury, leads him a sorry
dance away from his proper affairs, for the purpose of restor-
ing the disturbed balance without which they do not easily
go on. The hat must be back on the man's head before the
man can return to his business. This is very laughable; but
normally the laughter is killed if the man is compelled to re-
turn hatless to the routine of his life. Where hatlessness
begins, tragedy begins; and this is a very significant feature
in all comedy. The hat may not be utterly lost if the laughter
is to be saved.

The hat-hunt runs over us from practically every cranny of
the comic scene. Its principle is an inversion of the ordinary,
— an inversion shocking, fresh and unexpected. Instead of
a trick or perversity of things, it may be an encounter of
limps or persons. The runner who trips over his own feet
is funny; but the clown whose running is brought to a sud-
den stop by the identically similar running of an identically

THE .ESTHETIC PRINCIPLE IN COMEDY I47

similar clown is funnier. The classic comedy, so well re-
presented by the 'Comedy of Errors,' is based fundamentally
upon this sort of inversion, — the kind of inversion that a per-
son undergoes in a mirror. He is there, he is himself; yet
he is not there, he is another, opposed and inimical. The
alter-ego is the source of the deeds for which the ego suffers or
is rewarded. The Syracusan and Ephesian Dromios are so
related in practical life that the mere mirrored image of the
one, having a dijfferent history, different antecedents, and a
different status pays for the defects of the other. It is as if
the image in the mirror were beaten for the impudence of the
grimace it reflected. It is the "sudden glory" of the insig-
nificant, the irruption and domination of the irrational.

Still another variant of it is the direct inversion of catas-
trophe, as the sudden and unprophesiable ups-and-downs of
Face and his crew in the 'Alchemist,' the reversals of Epi-
coene, the inversions of the 'School for Scandal.' This is so
obvious that more than to mention it is superfluous. The
persistent repetition of such an inversion, always reconstitut-
ing the same situation, is another typical mode of the comic
process. The battle between Punch and the devil is its key-
form. Punch strikes the devil down with a blow that should
deal him his eternal quietus; and the obstinate devil rises
unharmed again and again and yet again to return to the
attack as horrible as ever. Or perhaps the condition of the
protagonist is that of the jumping- jack. Its limbs appear
to move so spontaneously, so freely, so irresponsibly, while
in reality they obey the inexorable leverage of strings and
pulleys. I cannot think of a better instance of this type of
inversion than Malvolio, so apparently pursuing his own
freely-chosen purpose, so clearly the dupe and the toy of
Maria and her fellow-conspirators. The comedies of Ben
Jonson are full of such types, from the La Fooles, the Dappers
the Druggers, to the Voltores and Moscas and Volpones.

Seek where you will in the comic of the stage or of letters,
and invariably you will find something corresponding to one
of these forms of inversion. If it is the comedy of mere in-
cident, it will consist of the irruption of the unusual, an upset
or reversal, of some sort, in nature essentially a disharmony like
that of the man chasing his hat. In the comedy of manners,
one : finds private habit opposed to public usage, the mode
to good sense, the individual preference to the social sanction :
the comedy consists of the titillation, the see-sawing of the
one with the other. In the comedy of character one finds
no less the same thing, with another emphasis. The individ-
ual idiosyncrasies which are the deep-sunk well-springs of
motive, pressing up action after action, with inexorable con-

148 KAI^I^BN

sistency, are exhibited in conflict with social norms and con-
ventional preferences. Here we are face to face with the
comic object whose ludicrousness is internal first of all. It
is the source of all else that is laughable, infecting with its
distortions all that it touches. The comic of character is the
internal homologue of the comic of person. It is founded
on the internal disharmony of traits, on malproportion,
moral deformity, as the other is based on physical deformity.
The theory of humors, on which Ben Jonson has based all his
comic pieces, fantastic and untrue though it be, has neverthe-
less grasped the secret of ludicrous character. It offers as
the standard excellence the nature in which each of the four
humors is present in right measure, just sufficiently choleric,
phlegmatic, sanguine and melancholic to be of nice balance,
poised for any flight you will. But change the proportion of
any one of these humors, and you upset this excellent balance,
and destroy the fine poise. The greater humor is at war with
the others, perverts them to its own uses, interferes in their
business, and ultimately breaks up the nature it distorts.
The inner disharmony is expressed outwardly in a thousand
ways, and this outer expression is comedy of character. Now
multiply these humors a thousand fold, consider the relation
of any one of the numberless preferences, habits, desires, in-
tellections, tricks of speech, manner and gesture as well as of
soul, to the remainder, and you cannot help seeing that this
relation is identical with the relation between the weightier
humor and the others. It is a combat, a distortion, a dis-
integrative maladjustment. The consuming passion for
silence in Morose, the self-conceit of Malvolio, the didacticis-
ing stupidity of Polonius, the avarice of Harpagon, the mag-
niloquent aimlessness of Mr. Micawber, the hypocrisy of
Tartuffe, the subtly rigid self- worship of Willoughby Patterne,
and I care not what other trait of what other person you will, —
each is a trait which is comic only because disproportionate,
and hence, wherever it appears, disorganizing. Harpagon
loses his wealth because he loves it so; and, by the way, is
made altogether ridiculous because his moral deformity in-
trudes and operates where it should not. Had Shylock loved
revenge less, he would have suffered less; and Malvolio,
certainly an efficient steward, had nothing but his cancerous
self-love to thank for his degradation and misfortune. Hy-
pertrophy of imagination over common sense in the Knight
of La Mancha, the atrophy of imagination in Sancho, the flesh-
ly weakness in Falstaff, — such are the fountains of comedy in
these heroes of the sock. Whenever any one quality is called
into play, this forestalls it, snatches its action from it, or spoils
it by its influence. Perhaps all comic traits are no more

THE iESTHKTiC PRINCIPLK IN COMEDY 1 49

than the love of life, the instinct for self-preservation, no more
than the spontaneous and natural egoism of mankind, taking
a perverted direction, so eager to live well as to belie fantas-
tically the most fundamental conditions as well as the most
subtle of right living. The greatest of all ruinous mispropor-
tions is, of course, that of self-deception. Invariably by its
means diverse social and natural antagonisms are exhibited
and made explicit, whether in the adventure on Gadshill, the
wind-mill tilt, the tantalizing dinner, or the cross-gartering.
What "moves men merrily" is the far-spreading infectious
disharmony.

This patent malproportion in character which is the prime
source of comedy has led to an opinion, variously held, that
the comic figure is an abstraction, that he is less individual
and more 'universal' than the protagonist of tragedy; and
that the function of comedy is that of social correction. There
are some grounds for this inference. The practice of the
Greeks in the use of types and type-names, — names like
Phidippides, Dicaeopolis, Mania of the Aristophanic comedy,
or Gly cerium. Palaestra, Bombomachides of the Plautan
comedy, the Vol tores and Corbaccios, the La Fooles and
Moroses, the Mammons, Subtles, Faces of Jonson, the similar
practice of his successors far into the eighteenth century,
attest that dramatists seemed to be dramatizing moral quali-
ties and types rather than persons. The very titles of the
comedies: "Wasps," "Birds," "Volpone," "Kpicoene," "L'-
Avare,' ' "Les Precieuses' ' bespeak traits rather than persons.
But moral tragedies like "Everyman" and "Ghosts" are
no less typically and abstractly named; and there is scarcely
a tragic character that cannot, as properly as any protagonist
of comedy, be labelled by the peculiar trait which constitutes
his tragic nature. In point of fact, comedy has no monopoly
over these forms of art in the chastisement of the anti-social.
And what, moreover, is anti-social? A convention, a mode or
habit which has attained universality is as often the object
of laughter as an isolated individual, a group as often as a
habit. And these are as frequently condemned by tragedy as
by comedy. Satire and irony, 'indeed, are correctives. But
the corrective principle of these is not their comic quality,
but their tragic earnestness. Satire is a battle, not a joke;
comedy turns the battle into a joke. Where comedy becomes
corrective it is no longer truly comic. For the subject of a
joke there can be no sting if he is to laugh; and if it stings
he cannot laugh. The laugher can have no portion in the ruin
which moves him to mirth.

That it is a ruin which moves to mirth, and that the merry
man must have no share in it, is most patent in the comic of

I50 KALI^^N

words. Civilized comedy is at its highest in words. These
alone can render the very refinements of mal-adjustment,
the delicate disharmonies of the spirit. They reveal the range
of battle between mind and mind as nothing else can. Yet
what target of a poisoned verbal dart ever responded to the
impact with laughter or admired the accuracy of the aim or the
sharpness of the missile? Invariably his first action is the
aggression or withdrawal of defence. A return shot, scorn-
ful silence, — but no broadside of laughter. The play of wit
has always imminent over it the play of the sword. The
quip becomes the stab with a turn of the hand, and this just
because the object of witty play is a ruin, or like to be one
in that play. Recall by way of example that superb witti-
cism of Heine's at a certain Parisian salon, where he, Souli^
and an enormously wealthy parvenu were guests. The par-
venu naturally received more attention than the two men of
letters, — which moved Souli^ to remark: "Even in the nine-
teenth century, they still worship the golden calf." "Yes,"
assented Heine, "but this one is much older." This charac-
teristic Heinesque remark makes of its subject an ox; and
*ox' is the German Schimpfwort for stupidity, dullness, mala-
droit idiocy. To call a man an ox is to insult and to degrade
him; it is, by a stretch of meaning, to ruin his reputation for
intelligence, to destroy his human dignity, and to make him
like the beasts of the field. This Heine has done. Moreover,
he has not done it by a direct aggression. He has ostensibly
referred only to the age of the parvenu; he has ostensibly
even defended him against attack. He has said nothing
overtly insulting, yet he has called the man a calf of advanced
years. In the phrase, "much older," therefore, there are two
ideas not compatible, not belonging together, titillating the
attention of the auditor. And this enhances the excellence
of the witticism. Of wit which is impersonal, which is the
play of ideas as such, and has no moral lilt against another
person, the essence is this unstable union of thoughts, this
conflict, incongruity, crush, and interference of two or more
ideas, struggling for place in one word. The pun is, of course,
the most obvious example of tTiis fact ; but it may be brought
about in many ways, — by a slight diflference- in emphasis,
metonymy, inversion, metaphor. Invariably there is an
ambiguity between denotation and connotation, between
figurative and literal meaning, which is the soul of the double
entendre, as well as of the bald disharmony of ideas or of
objects. Much of its quality is evident in the reply of one
soldier to another who had called his attention to the bold
escape and. the immediate pursuit of a spy. "He is running
for dear life" said the one, and the other replied "He *11

THE ESTHETIC PRINCIPIvK IN COMEDY 15I

never buy it at that rate." It will be seen here that the
literal and the figurative intention are jammed together
in a strange and not incongruous contact. The pleasure and
the taste of it are due to the jam. Still more potent does this
become where there is no relevance whatever between objects,
as in the wide perversion of the Twainesque humor, or in the
attempt of the Scotchman to make his friend understand
the meaning of 'miracle.' Tam had tried hard to teach him,
but with ill-success. Finally he resorted to parable. * ' Look ye, ' '
he said, "when ye see a coo sittin' doon, that's no' a mirrecl.
When ye see a thistle standin' up, that's no' a mirrecl neither.
An' it's no' mirrecl when ye hear the throstle whistlin' in the
tree. But when ye see the coo sittin' on the thistle, and
singin' like the throstle, that 's a mirrecl mon, that 's a mirrecl."
The incongruities are here obvious. Their violent refusal
to hang harmoniously together is the strength whereby they
"move men merrily." A most subtle form of it is the famous
" 'T was brillig . . . "in 'Through the Looking Glass.'

From the coarse and obvious comedy of the clown with his
falls and tumbles, to subtle and recondite plays of wit the
material of the laughable remains invariably a disharmony,
a maladjustment ranging from the impact of bodies to the
clash of souls. No less do the depth and scope of philosophy,
where surely there should be little place for laughter, offer
the great and eternal disharmony, a spectacle which, as
poets have more than once sung, moves the gods merrily.
But men are so moved no less than gods. The cosmic vision
may stir the thinker to cosmic laughter. History offers us
one strange and wonderful figure, isolate among his kind,
whom tradition names ' ' the laughing philosopher, ' ' Democri-
tus of Abdera saw the great contrast between man's hopes and
his condition, his conceit of himself, his belief in his own power,
his headlong passion and pursuit of his petty ends as though
they were the world's will and the world's purposes, as though
his struggle were the cosmic joy and sorrow. But the cosmos
is a void, and a hurly-burly of atoms. Against the volume of
their inexorable tumult, man's cries are as utter silence;
against the background of their fatal onward rush his willings
and achievings, but the uncouth jerkings of the jumping-
jack's limbs when the strings are pulled. Man is the ruined
victim of his own illusions. His destiny is death because it
is self-deception. Therefore Democritus laughed. Laughter,
cheerfulness, evOvjxLa, is a restoration of the true propor-
tions. It rests upon a recognition of the narrow limits and
the eternal conditions of human well-being. It is a turn-
ing of destiny to scorn by accepting it, as one destroys the
sting of rebuke and the violence of anger by offering them no

152 KAX,I«EN

resistance. They are turned to derision because they are
spent on a void, losing meaning and purpose. Thus the
laughter of the sage is a double laughter. Its subject is the
self-deception of man which combats the inexorable cosmos,
but its subject is also the rage of the cosmos spent upon
nothing at all. In both cases there is an inversion, a disin-
tegrating disharmony, outside of which the sage stands, and
the master of which he feels himself to be. He is upon the
Lucretian rock, watching and enjoying the storm and the
shipwreck below.

The range of the comic scene, we gather, is no less than the
cosmos itself. The occasion of the laughter may be the
compass of one small baby's toe, or the unbounded universe.
It plays over the whole gamut of human relationship and cos-
mic disharmony. Nothing may escape it, from the attenu-
ated malproportions of abstract mathematics to the terribly
weighted deflections of the universe. But of laughter two
things seem true. The first is the fact that it cannot endure.
Custom kills comedy. What is habitual, what we are well-
adapted to, what is for a long time a part of our own lives
cannot move us merrily. To do so, it must exclude us,
make us foreign to it. It must become something in which
we no longer have a portion, and which for the time, has no
portion in us. The traveller is likely to feel this most keenly ;
that is, if he is a laugher, rather than a creator of laughter.
The creator of laughter, the professional humorist, can
scarcely be a laugher. He is not a humorist because he sees
the comedy in things, but because he twists things and distorts
them so as to make them comical. He is invariably a pre-
ternaturally solemn person. Laughter must be free, but the
cause of laughter is always bond. The maker of the laughable
is the servant of his vocation; he cannot laugh and render
service at the same time. The laugher is served, but serves
not. Hence, then, the traveller who can laugh finds all
things in a new country ludicrous at the beginning. Customs
and modes, habits of life and manners, the very scenery move
him to laughter. But as his stay is prolonged, the dis-
harmonies seem to rub off; the articulation of life becomes
smoother and less noisy. He himself has now become, to
some degree, a part of the structure ; speech, manners, dress, —
his own have somehow become confluent with them, have set
him at their centre, where he once was at the periphery. He
can no longer laugh; nor can he understand his original
laughter. This process is true no less of an oft-repeated game,
a witticism, a relieved nervous tension or a philosophy.
Familiarity breeds seriousness or indifference before it breeds
contempt. The second characteristic of laughter is that it

THE iESTHETIC PRINCIPLE IN COMEDY 1 53

enhances or preserves the laugher's impHcit values, not
always obviously or directly, but invariably. The outcome
of the comic situation is an alterative outcome, not a des-
tructive outcome. The disintegration which is the object of
laughter leads to re-distribution, re-adjustment, harmony,
not to real human loss. The upshot of any comedy shows a
harmony attained by attrition and elimination of excres-
cences, by the reduction of the evil, by a restoration, even
if only a momentary one, of things to their normal, — one
may even say, to their normative, — relationships. The in-
version of the natural order in which most comedy begins,
proceeds in the course of the action, by the mere inertia of
the comic disharmony, to right itself. Don Quixote is led by
the effects of his madness to realize and see it truly. Har-
pagon is led by the operation of his avarice to comprehend
its evil nature; Willoughby Patterne loses some of his self-
love, Volpone passes from his dishonorable bandages to his
more dishonorable chains. The new harmony may not be
enduring, but it ends the comedy. And it is, of course, true
that not always are the normal social standards re-asserted
and the habitual conceptions of virtue victorious. In Epicoene
the punishment of Morose is to our modern sense perhaps
harder than his deformity of spirit deserves; the enrichment
of Sir Dauphine by a swindler's trick, our contemporary moral
sense will hardly stomach. But, notoriously, nothing is so
variable as the actual social standard of mankind from period
to period. Whenever we look more closely at the post-
comedial harmony, we find that the standards of the age to
which the comedy belongs have been vindicated. The
standards of all time have little to do with comedy. It is
sufficient that any prized thing shall be preserved or enhanced,
that any distortion or evil shall be destroyed or decreased,
even if for the moment only, not alone in the drama but
wherever the comic occurs in sculpture, in painting, in the
events and routine of daily life. The hat-chaser must re-
cover his hat if he is to remain merely a comic figure.

Considering all of these facts together, what do they yield
as the aesthetic principle in comedy? What is there identical
between the tickled toe of a suckling infant and the philoso-
phy of a Democritus ? Students of the comic have given this
question widely varying answers. There has been perhaps
as much confusion in the definition of the comic, as in the defi-
nition of the beautiful. Theories may be roughly divided
into three classes, yielding a certain minimum of unanimity.

The first group of theories may be called "degradation
theories." They conceive the object of laughter as reduced
in worth; and the laugher as enhanced therein. As Hobbes

Journal — 2

154 KA.IvI.EN

has it: "Laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from
some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves by
comparison with the infirmities our own formerly. . . . (It)
proceedeth from a sudden conception of some ability in
himself that laugheth. Men laugh at the infirmities of
others, by comparison of which their own abilities are
set off and illustrated." Laughter here is self -enhancement
at the cost of one's fellow. The self-enhancement is as
important as the degradation of the other. Other writers,
however, take only the degradation to be significant. So
Bain finds the "occasion of the ludicrous" to be "the deg-
radation of some person or interest possessing dignity, in
circumstances that arouse no other strong emotion." The
dignities, moreover, must not "command serious homage;"
and Groos finds the comic object to be one in a topsy-turvy con-
dition, and hence regarded with a feeling of superiority. But
for all three the object of laughter has in some way been reduced
from its high estate. Something of the same sort may have
been in Spencer's mind when he wrote that laughter naturally
comes when there is "a descending incongruity," a turning
from great things to small, a degradation.

The theory of degradation fails, however, to square with the
obvious fact that degradation is a matter of geography, in-
clination, breeding and incidental affection. As one man's
meat is another man's poison, so what may seem degradation
to one may be exaltation to another. The mental state of
the laugher is hardly one which feels the sentiment implied
in degradation. It does not seem, in most cases, to possess
what the Germans call Tendenz or Schadenfreude. As comic
sense it carries detachment and freedom rather than malicious
intention. The correct envisagement of fact which the
theory offers is more simply because more freely offered in
those explanations of the comic whose key- word is " contrast."
The "contrast" theories emphasize differently the elements
contrasted, but their intent is the same throughout. One
author finds the contrast to consist in the complete exposure
of weakness through the presence of a superior power. Scho-
penhauer sees it as the "unexpected subsumption of an object
under a conception which in other respects is different from
it." Hence he infers that "the phenomenon of laughter al-
ways means the sudden apprehension of an incongruity be-
tween such a conception, and the real object thought under
it, thus between the abstract and the concrete object of per-
ception." Bergson finds it in the opposition of the suppleness
of life with the stiffness of mechanism, the substitution of one
for the other; Freud in the release of repressed and submerged
— chiefly sexual — complexes. And there are many other ways

TH^ ^STHieTlC PRINCIPIyK IN COMEDY 1 55

of Specifying contrasts. But they are, it will be seen, no
more than specifications; their common element is the
"contrast."

The contrast theory of the comic defines the comic by
considering its objective nature. Aristotle's description of it as
"in the nature of a missing of the target" stands between this
objective description and the more directly psychological
theory of Kant and his followers. This theory might be
called the theory of ' ' disappointed expectation. " " Laughter, ' '
writes Kant, "is an affection arising from a sudden transforma-
tion of a strained expectation into nothing. ... A
jest must be capable of deceiving for a moment. Hence
when the illusion is dissipated, the mind turns back to try
it once again, and thus through a rapidly alternating tension
and relaxation, it is jerked back and put into a state of os-
cillation." The first of these Kantian suggestions is hardly
more than paraphrased by Lipps for whom "the comic arises,
if in place of something expected to be important and strik-
ing, something else comes up (of course under the assumption
of the ideas we were expecting) which is of lesser significance."
The other half of the Kantian description has been more pop-
ular. We might call it the "oscillation theory" although it
is essentially a form of contrast. It has received the endorse-
ment of Hecker and of Wundt, and has been attached by
them to the term "contrast."

The variations in these fundamental notions are innumera-
ble. Writers have found the comic to be only that which vio-
lates social usage, or only that which conflicts with established
moral, intellectual or aesthetic standards. The net result of
a review of all of these theories is that they are all true, and
I in so far as they deal with unrelated facts, all exclusive of one-
another. They are specifications of comedy under special condi-
I tions and in various fields. They contain the essence of the
j comic ; but they have not really isolated it. Our journey through
! the field of laughter has shown us that this essence may reside
I anywhere in the universe. It is not confined to human
I beings or to social norms, as certain authors believe; nor is
i it limited to the merely living. Its habitat is as wide as ex-
i perience. It ranges from the tangent which so stirred the
jocund Schopenhauer, to the universe which amused Democ-
I ritus. As anything may be beautiful, so anything may be
! comic. It becomes comic, as all the comic objects which we
j have examined have shown us, and as the theories of the com-
ic which we have considered obviously afl&rm, when somehow
it is at a disadvantage, out of proportion, mal-adjusted. It
becomes comic when it constitutes a disharmony. This dis-
I harmony is the basis of contrast, the cause of oscillation, of

156 KAI.I.KN

disappointed expectation, the essence of degradation. But
by the mere fact of being a disharmony the object is not yet
comic. The daily Hfe and the arts offer the mind an infinity
of disharmonies which are either tragic or indifferent. In-
trinsically, things are no more comic than they are beautiful.
The comic, like the beautiful, is not a property which things
possess, but a relation which they bear to the mind. We do
not laugh at a thing because it is funny; it is funny because
we laugh at it.

An examination of the nature of laughter itself will show us
that which more specifically constitutes comedy. We have
found laughter to be a wide-ranging action, corresponding
to the active character of its object. But this action does
not have the purposeful, rapt nature of other human activities.
It seems to be a detached and free thing, — a thing which is
leisurely and secure. Even when it ensues upon absorbing
fear, upon the madness of anger, the anguish of passion, it
seems to have this liberty and security, this leisure, as opposed
to the precedent breathlessness and extreme intentness. It
seems indeed often to be a cry of freedom, of relief, a roulade
of triumph. When we seek the earliest semblance of an appre-
hension of the comic, we find it in the replete child, repeating
the pleasurable act of sucking. Its normal expression in the
\ smile requires the baring of the rending and cutting teeth,
* the assumption of an appearance which, when well-considered,
bears a startling resemblance to an animal about to rend and
devour its prey. In the hungry beast of the jungle, that
has fought for its life in a double sense, and has triumphed
in its struggle, may lie the ultimate parentage of laughter.
The explosions of breath, the gurgitations, the throwing
back of the head as if to swallow, the sprawhng, expansive
movements of the limbs, — those are actions that beasts still
perform when they have their prey completely at their mercy.
And this prey, up to the moment of possession, was a peer.
The struggle to live matches not kind with kind, but every kind
with all other kinds; its may be a contest of strength against
swiftness, ear against eye, eye against nose. And the strugglej
invariably carries its essential hazard which makes even th«
weakling his enemy's peer. There is therefore the inevitable
absorption and tension and breathlessness. In no mattei
how unequal a combat, there is even for the victor one mo-"
ment of dread and menace, and there is the final triumph and
relief in laughter. The primeval laugher is the triumphant
beast, with its paw upon its defeated enemy, and its jaws^
set for the act of devouring. The first laughter is life's earliest *
cry of victory over the elemental world-wide enemy that wages
the titanic battle with it. Laughter is perhaps a mutation

TH^ i^STH^TlC PRINCIPIvR IN COMEDY 1 57

from feeding, and it serves the same result : it strengthens
life by heightening its vitality. Its scope has expanded as
the world has expanded. The laughter of man has all things
for its object, — all things that may enthrall him or do him hurt,
in whatever sense. It 'degrades' them, makes them man's
proper food; it contrasts them with what they were; it de-
stroys their power over him. He stands outside and beyond
them; they cannot touch him. The object of laughter is
ridiculous, not in so far as it is good, but in so far as it is danger-
ous. It is the frustrated menace in things, personal, social
or cosmic, — that moves men merrily, when their power for
evil is turned to emptiness. The novel, the dark, the cancer-
ous in the life of the spirit and in the life of the body becomes
ridiculous when we recognize that it is ineffectual. And
conversely, to turn a thing to ridicule is to make it ineffectual,
to throw it out of gear, to rob it of its place, to compel it to
spend its energy in a vacuum. This is true degradation, and
the laughter in it is not appreciation but malice. It is for
this reason that even to so intelligent and sympathetic a
student of the comedy as Bergson or Meredith, comedy seems
to be a social corrective. But they fail to see that the comic
force lies not in the correction, but in the joy of the corrector.
There is always the possibility of a certain cruelty in comedy,
an utter brutish joy in victory which is ethically more out-
rageous than the thing it destroys, until one remembers that
what laughter consumes, laughter first finds evil.

This observation yields the key to the right definition of
comedy. Beauty, it has been noted, is the relation between
the mind and the environment when the two are adapted to
each other harmoniously, perfectly and immediately. And
the environment which beauty presents to the mind is good
in itself, an intrinsic and direct excellence. Now the environ-
ment which comedy presents to the mind is primarily an evil,
full of discord and unrest. This evil comes to us, however,
not as our peer, but as our slave, bankrupt and stripped of
its power to harm. And to it, as to the thing of beauty, we
are adapted directly and instantly. Comedy, then, like
beauty, is a relation, but it is a relation in which we are harmo-
niously "and ^onipletely adapted to what is in itself a dishar-
mony, a mal-adjustment. It is a relation which converts
evil into goodness. It adapts us adequately to disharmony
and mal-adjustment, snatching as it were, life's victory from
the jaws of death itself.

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO LEARNING

By LouisB Ei^LisoN Ordahi,

CONTENTS

I. Introduction 158

II. The Concepts of Consciousness, Unconsciousness and Sub-
consciousness 159

Unconsciousness 161

Subconsciousness 161

Unconscious and Subconscious as used by Psychopathologists . 1 66

General Discussion of the above mentioned Concepts 1 68

Consciousness in Animals 1 72

III. The Relation of Consciousness to Learning 172

The Learning Process 1 72

Clear Consciousness and Learning 174

Subconscious and Unconscious Learning 176

IV. An Experimental Study of the Relation of Consciousness to

Learning 179

1. Do Unnoticed Items assist in the Formation of Associative

Links? 179

2. The Effect of Attention and Distraction on the Formation of

the "Motor Set" (Motorische Einstellung) . . . .181

3. The Role of Consciousness in the Acquirement of Muscular

Skill 188

4. Learning to write in Unaccustomed Ways 189

5. Learning to multiply Large Numbers Mentally . . .194

6. Results of the last three Series 202

V. Summary 203

VI. Conclusions 205

VII. Appendix: Detailed Statements with regard to the Experiment

on the Learning of Meaningless Syllables 206

I. Introduction
The question of the relation of consciousness to learning, in
the case of man, was suggested by the disagreement among
psychologists as to the value of ** ability to learn" as a cri-
terion of consciousness in animals. From a purely metaphysi-
cal standpoint, those who accept the doctrine of psychophysi-
cal parallelism would admit consciousness of some sort as
an attendant of the activities of all animals. Those who
attack the problem from a purely empirical standpoint^

^Bethe, A.: Die anatomischen Elemente des Nervensystems, und ihre
physiologische Bedeutung, Biol. Cent. 1898, XVIII. pp. 863 ff.

Nuel, J. P.: La psychologic compar^e, est-elle legitime? Arch, de psy.,
1904. V. p. 320.

Ziegler, H. E.: Theoretisches zur Tierpsychologie und vergleichenden
Neurophysiologie, Biol. Cent., 1900, XX. p. i.

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO LEARNING 1 59

either attempt a complete explanation of animal behavior
from the physiological side without the assumption of mental
qualities, or else they argue that consciousness is present only
when the animal is able to profit from experience, or to profit
from it rapidly enough to argue the presence of a psychic re-
sultant of former experience.^ Still others assume that con-
sciousness may be present in all animal forms ; but the power
of associative memory is a measure of its grade, or a proof of
its existence.2 Those^ who deny the possibility of a compara-
tive psychology are met by the answer that the ascription of
consciousness even to human beings rests upon inference and
assumption, no mental states being capable of proof but our
own/ Before considering the question of the possibility of
learning without consciousness, and the relation of learning
to consciousness, — which are the main themes of this study, —
we shall consider briefly a few definitions of the term ** con-
sciousness," and the related terms "unconsciousness," and
* ' subconsciousness. ' '

II. The Concepts of Consciousness, Unconsciousness
AND Subconsciousness

Practically all admit that "consciousness,' ' being an ultima-
mate, is incapable of definition; yet it has been variously
described and explained.** For Descartes it was equivalent
to self-consciousness; Wolff was the first to give it the mean-
ing of "ultimate property of the soul;" while others consider
self-consciousness to be only a particular form of conscious-
ness. For Lipps it is identical with the ego." Usually it is
broadly an equivalent for awareness or experience, and an
opposite to the unconsciousness of coma, fainting, dreamless
sleep, etc. Some writers make it synonymous with atten-
tion, or a general term for that experience of which attention

^Loeb, J. : Comparative Physiology of the Brain and Comparative Psy-
chology, New York, 1903. p. 12; p. 118.

Washburn, M. F. : The Animal Mind. New York, 1908. p. 33.

Romanes, G. J.: Animal Intelligence, New York, 1883. p. 4.

^Wundt, W. : Grundziige der physiologischen Psychologic. (Fifth
Edition.) Leipzig, 1902. III. pp. 324 ff.

Romanes, G. J. : Op. cit., p. 4.

'Ziegler: Op. cit., p. 2.

Nuel: Op. cit., p. 343.

^Yerkes, R. M,: Objective Nomenclature, Comparative Psychology and
Animal Behavior. Jour. Comp. Neurol, and Psy. 1906. XVI. p. 383.

Forel, A.: Ants and some other Insects. (Trans.) Chicago, 1904. p. 2,

^See Horwicz, A.: Psychologische Analysen, Halle, 1872- 1875, for
review.

•Lipps, T.: Leitfaden der Psychologic, Leipzig, 1909. p. 6.

l6o ORDAHIy

is only a high degree, or with selective consciousness. De-
fined as "meaning" it is almost equivalent with appercep-
tion. Memory and consciousness are sometimes identified,
but on the other hand, memory and unconsciousness are also
identified, memory being regarded as a function of all matter,
and perfect memory a characteristic of automatized acts
unconsciously performed. Consciousness is frequently an
equal term with "experience" and "psychic." It describes
the "sum- total of our mental experience."^ It is the inter-
connection of our psychic processes,^ or a series of ideas con-
nected with each other.' It is "co-ordinated psychic activity,"*
synthesis, change, or an "orderly succession of changes."
It is characterized by the pursuance of future ends, and is
a synthetic unity. ^

Consciousness is supposed to accompany only afferent im-
pulses sent in from a moving organ,^ or "neural processes of
peculiar organization," or complex constellations of neurones.'^
It is supposed to arise "only when the motor cells are ready to
discharge toward the periphery,"* when the sensory impression
is being followed by the motor reaction;^ "it involves not
only the sensory side, but the motor discharge."^" "It va-
ries with the novelty of the neural processes concerned,

and accompanies new connections;"" it "attends new complex
functions."i2

Since any definition of consciousness touches either di-
rectly or indirectly upon the disputed question of "uncon-

^Wundt: Grundziige, III, p. 321.

'Wundt: Ibid.

Titchener, B. B.: An Outline of Psychology. New York, 1908. p. 13.

'Calkins, M. W. : An Introduction to Psychology, New York, 1901, p. 150.

^Marshall, H. R. : Instinct and Reason, New York, 1898, p. 43.

^James, W.: Principles of Psychology, New York, 1890, I, p. 8; p. 139.

Morgan, C. L.: Introduction to Comparative Psychology, New York,
1906. (Second Edition.) p. 154.

^Morgan, C. Iv.: Animal Behaviour, London, 1900. p. 45.

''Sidis, B. and Goodhart, S. P.: Multiple Personality, New York, 1905.
pp. 3 ff.

^Kirkpatrick, E. A.: The Part Played by Consciousness in Mental
Operations. Jour, of Phil., Psy. & Sci. Methods, 1908. V. pp. 421-429.

Breese, B. B.: On Inhibition. Psy. Rev. Mono. Supp., 1899, Vol. 3, No.
I, pp. 1-65.

'Maudsley, H. : The Physical Basis of Consciousness, Jour, of Mental
Science, L, 1909. p. 12.

^"Munsterberg, H.: Grundzuge der Psychologie, Leipzig, 1900. I. 53i- ff-

"McDougall, W.: A Contribution towards an Improvement in Psy-
chological Method, Mind, 1898. N. S., VII, p. 366.

"Royce, J.: Outlines of Psychology, New York, 1903. pp. 81-2.

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO I^EARNING l6l

scious" or "subconscious" mental processes, a brief dis-
cussion of the two terms is expedient.

UNCONSCIOUSNESS

" Unconsciousness" is a negative term denoting the oppo-
site of consciousness. It is employed in describing states like
fainting, epilepsy, or dreamless sleep where every mental
quality is wanting. It is also applied to psychophysical
processes which lack their normal conscious accompaniment,
as pain or deep emotion temporarily forgotten during great
excitement, and to perceptual processes such as the uncon-
scious inference of depth from the fusion of the two retinal
images, and the perception of a clang of definite quality from
the fusion of partial tones which analysis alone discloses.
Automatic acts are "unconscious." The word is also loosely
used for "unreflective," "unintentional," or "inattentive."
"Unconscious mental process" may have various meanings.
It may indicate the physiological process correlated with a
conscious process, or a physiological process with no psychic
accompaniment, but determining consciousness later, or a
neural process with psychic accompaniment of which for some
reason the individual possesses no awareness. These uses
will be discussed later. Whatever the metaphysical implica-
tions, the term when carefully used is a limiting concept
opposed in its significance to "consciousness."

SUBCONSCIOUSNESS

"Subconscious" is more ambiguous in meaning than either
of the two preceding terms, and though it is frequently inter-
changeable with "unconscious," it usually implies something
more definitely psychic. It denotes (i) the forgotten, (2)
the purposeless, (3) the unnoticed, (4) the mechanized, (5)
the reproducible, (6) the productive, (7) the psychic real.^
It is also used to describe (8) simultaneously existing secondary
streams of consciousness thought to appear in the pathological
phenomena of divided personality, (9) and dissociated states
which some writers believe to be synthesized into a sublimi-
nal, submerged self and to constitute a large part of mind.*
The first three uses of the term subconscious (or unconscious)
are descriptive of facts of experience, the 5th, 6th and 7th
are metaphysical interpretations of results whose causes are
unknown, and the fourth and fifth are a mixture of facts and

^Hellpach: Das Unbewusste, Centralblait f . Nervenheilkunde u. Psychia-
trie, 1908, XXXI, pp. 65-66.

^Summary by Prince. A Symposium on the Subconscious. Jour, of Ab-
normal Psy., 1907-8, II, pp. 69 ff.

I 62 ORDAHL

interpretation; the last two uses are descriptive and explan-
tory of anomalies of consciousness and will be considered later.

Used in the sense of unnoticed or unattended, "subcon-
scious' ' (or "unconscious' ') belongs to the realm of experience
and is used in the sense of "least consciousness." As such
no metaphysical implications are involved. But it is an easy
step from dim consciousness to complete loss of consciousness,
and many authors make the transition, including, as psychic,
processes beyond the point where we are even dimly aware
of them. Discussion as to the psychic nature of processes of
which we are not introspectively aware began with Leibnitz^
and the later treatment of Hamilton, Mill, Brentano and
Carpenter. The use of the conception in explanation of the
pathological phenomena of multiple personality, hysterical
manifestations, hypnotism and other anomalies of conscious-
ness has more recently brought the question into prominence
again. The following are most of the representative argu-
ments for the hypothesis that the mental life is wider than ex-
perience, with the opposing views:

(i) Total perceptions must be composed of an infinite num-
ber of infra-conscious sensations. The roar of the ocean is
made up of the imperceptible sound of each wave, the greenness
of the forest of the color of each separate leaf.^ "But," it
is answered, "this is not necessarily so, for a sum of magni-
tudes differs from its parts, not merely quantitively, but
qualitatively." A lesser degree than zero changes water not
partially, but completely to ice.^ A sufficient quantity of the
cause may be necessary to produce any of the effect.* The
infra-sensible stimuli affect the nerve and help the birth of
the sensation when other stimuli come, but it is a matter till
then of the nerve-cell only.**

(2) By far the larger part of our spiritual possessions are
not in consciousness, but are the forgotten memories, un-
conscious habits and the results of early experiences. That
these are really concerned is shown by cases where delirious
patients speak the forgotten language of early childhood,

^Leibnitz: New Essays Concerning Human Understanding (trans.),
N. Y. 1896. pp. 47-52.

Hamilton, Sir Wm.: Lectures on Metaphysics, Edin., 1877, Vol. i,
p. 339 ff.

Mill, J. S. : An Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy, London,
1878, Vol. I, ch. 8.

Brentano, F.: Psychologic, Leipzig, 1874, Ch. 4.

^Leibnitz: op. cit., pp. 47-52.

Hamilton: op. cit. p. 339 f.

'Brentano : loc. cit.

<Mill: loc. cit.

^James, Wm,: Principles of Psychology, N. Y. 1902. Vol. i, p. 159.

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO lyEARNING 1 63

and idiots remember things they have heard but not under-
stood, also the oft cited case of the ignorant servant who
quoted in deHrium passages of Hebrew she had heard her
master read. Contrary opinion contends that not the ideas,
but the power of reproducing them remains latent, physio-
logical modifications only being concerned. Understanding
what one hears is different from consciousness, and probably
the idiots and the servant were aware of the sounds, but not
of their import. In memories, not the concept is conserved,
as Herbart believed, but "molecular habits of the brain. "^
" Unconscious psychic dispositions' * would have to be assumed
just as much for newly produced as reproduced ideas.

(3) Habitual actions which are at first entirely conscious
become mechanized and imconscious. Complete activities
formerly requiring a voluntary initiation of every act in the
series, now run on of themselves when consciously started.
One party holds this fact to be evidence that the psychic side
exists unconsciously; the other, that the process has become
merely a matter of physiology.

(4) Unconscious psychic processes are manifested by re-
sults existing in consciousness — results whose underlying
processes are entirely unknown to us. Examples are the per-
ception of depth from the fusion of simultaneous double
retinal images, the perception of direction of sound by its
relative intensity in the two ears, and other judgments or
inferences spontaneously made without consciousness of the
reasons or of the underlying principles. Also, there are
sometimes present in the after-image details which were not
seen in the original image.^ Against the last example Bren-
tano urges that the after-image is really due to a prolongation
of the physiological excitation. In the original perception
consciousness was occupied with something else, but is free
later so that the unnoticed phase makes itself evident in the
after-image. A similar argument, i. e., that details of which
we were unconscious in the original experience are frequently
observed later in the memory image, might be met by the
explanation that such details were actually present, but were
not in the focus of attention.

A physiological explanation is thought to meet the next three
arguments.

(5) By turning our attention to something entirely different
we are frequently enabled to recall a forgotten name, etc.,
which has been supposed to prove that an unconscious pro-

^Miinsterberg, H.: Grundziige, d. Psychologic, Leipzig, 1900, pp. 223-224.
^Helmholtz: Handbuch d. physiologischen Optik. Hamburg, 1896. pp.
602, 962.

164 ORDAHL

cess has gone on to call it up. Profound sleep may recover
lost ideas, because, it is held, the process goes on undistiwbed
by our fruitless efforts. (A refreshed and rested brain may
be responsible for quicker association.)

(6) The same thing is seen in the recall of forgotten facts,
and even unnoticed details of a former experience, while a
different stream of conscious thought flows along beside it.
Automatic writing, "crystal gazing" or "shell hearing" may
make known to us facts which it has been impossible for us
to recall or even of which we were "unconscious" before.
(The automatic writing is explained as a purely physiological
process, with no "detached consciousness" and the "un-
conscious' ' perceptions as conscious but rapidly forgotten.)

(7) Activities similar to conscious activities except that
they are carried on during abstraction and so lack the con-
scious quality are supposed to show unconscious psychic pro-
cesses. For example, one may take one's way along the
street, choosing one of many possible directions, while one
is so absorbed in deep thought that he is unconscious of what
he is doing. Or one may hear a sound, detect an odor or feel
a pressure while absorbed without being conscious of it, but
when the engrossing thought is past it may come to full con-
sciousness. Bleuler, who thinks consciousness occurs only
with the association of a complex with the ego-complex,^ ex-
plains such cases by saying that the object was perceived by
the psyche, but not so associated. The explanation by
those opposed is that what we have is perception with rapid
oblivescence.

(8) "Mediate associations where ideas arise which have
no causal connection in consciousness show the efficiency of
unconscious links." Jerusalem reports such a case, as fol-
lows: A man was busy at his work when suddenly there
flashed before him a scene witnessed many years before, which
was totally out of keeping with his present occupation.
Search for the connecting link finally resulted in finding a
tiny hidden flower, which he had not known was present, and
which had been directly associated with the earlier experience.
The odor, of which he was "unconscious" had probably been
responsible for the association. Wundt answers to this and
like cases that the odor was conscious but unnoticed,^ and
other opponents take the same attitude. Scripture per-
formed a series of experiments which seemed to show that
associations were formed between nonsense syllables by iden-

^Bleuler, E. : Bewusstsein und Assodation, Journal f. Psy. u. Neurol. VI,
1906, 154. Re-published in C. G. Jung's Diagnostische Associationsstu-
dien, Leipzig, 1906. I. 257.

"Wundt's Philosophische Studien, X, 1894. S. 326-8.

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO LEARNING

165

tical characters written on the outer part of the cards used so
that they were not noticed.^ Cordes and Messer think they
find cases of mediate association, but Munsterberg,^ W. G.
Smith and Howe^ get only negative results. Pierce* sug-
gests as an explanation for cases like finding one's self saying a
word which later we discover to be written somewhere but
which we have not "seen," as the 'translation' of the image into
another field than that in which it was received. Out of 892
observations of "free rising" ideas Kiesow reports that 41%
could be accounted for, and believes that his experiment
proves all such links to be conscious and either ideational or
emotional in character.^ By some, "free rising ideas" re-
ceive a physiological explanation.

(9) Closely connected with mediate associations are the
sudden flashes and insights — ideas which apparently come
from nowhere — and the exaggerated and more brilliant form
of the same thing seen in the inspirations of the genius and
the fancies of the poet. Not an unconscious ideational con-
nection, but a purely physiological basis of the association
satisfies the opponents of the "unconscious."

(10) Decisions have sometimes been reached or problems
worked out in sleep. In dreams the result may be arrived
at, but the setting may be fantastic or absurd. Here, too,
the physiological mechanism may been have started and
carried the whole thing out by itself, or if the process is accom-
panied by dreaming it is none the less conscious for the fact
that associations are lacking to make the setting normal.

(11) Development of emotional states is often unconscious.
Prejudices are formed for no conscious reason; appreciation
of art rests on unconscious factors; a man may be in love
without being conscious of it. Here the usage of the term
rests on the identification of consciousness and self-conscious-
ness. Because an attitude is "unreasoned" it is not necessa-
rily unconscious. Experiencing an emotion or idea and
having it as an object of consciousness are two different

^Scripture, K. W. : Uber den associativen Verlauf der Vorstellungen,
Leipzig, 1891. Diss. pp. 76-87.

Cordes, G. : Experimentelle Untersuchungen liber Association. Philos.
Studien, XVII. 1901. S. 73.

Messer, A. : Experimentell-psychologische Untersuchungen iiber das Den-
ken, Arch. /. d. gesam. Psy., VIII. 1906, 63 ff.

^Miinsterberg, H. : Beitrdge, Bd. 4 1892 S. 2-8.

Smith, W. G.: Mind, N. S. III. 1894. p. 301.

^Am. Jour. Psy., VI, 1894. pp. 239-41.

^Jour. Phil. Psy. &* Sc. Meth., 1, 1904. pp. 400-3.

^Kiesow, F.: Ueber sogenannte "freisteigende" Vorstellungen, usw.
Arch. f. d. Gesam. Psy., VI, 1906. 357-90.

1 66 ORDAHL

matters. (James.) The man in love is conscious of each
feeling and sensation, but not of the fact itself (Brentano).

Unconscious and Subconscious as Used by
psychopathologists

The use of the terms "unconscious" or "subconscious"
by the psychopathologists to describe anomalies of con-
sciousness deserves special attention because the sense is
somewhat different from any of the preceding cases. Con-
sciousness is conceived as split into two consciousnesses, one
usually more firmly knit together and predominant than the
other, the secondary consciousness, "co-consciousness," or
"subconsciousness." These two (or sometimes more) con-
sciousnesses may exist simultaneously or alternate with each
other. Prince explains the phenomena thus. Ideas mak-
ing up an experience tend to become organized into a complex
which may be a subject, time or mood complex. Dissociation
of personality may take its line of cleavage along any one of
these three complexes and in abnormal conditions a complex
which is only one side of a character may become the main or
sole complex of the new personality. Complexes may be ar-
tificially organized in hypnosis, trances, etc. The formation
of complexes has its basis in the organization of the neurones
into complexes, which retain their organization so that stim-
ulation of one element starts the whole process. Physiologi-
cal complexes can be conserved despite absence of awareness in
the original experience. Strong organization of physiological
complexes together with lowered physiological threshold and
decreased inhibition, might render them accessible to minimal
stimulation, whether peripheral or central, and cause them to
function automatically as different groups of ideas. If the
threshold were sufiiciently low, it might become "co-con-
scious," without entering the field of personal consciousness.
This co-conscibusness is really conscious because it behaves
so, being able to solve problems, and because it says it is con-
scious. For Prince there is no normal "subconscious or sub-
liminal self or hidden self."

Janet^ who likewise limits "subconscious" to the patho-
logical co-activity of divided personality, thinks there may be
a group of co-existing ideas in the normal individual because
"pathological phenomena have their germ in normal physio-
logy." This aggregation is due to weakness in power of
synthesis. In hysteria the power of psychic synthesis is so
weakened and consciousness so narrow that when one per-

1 Janet, P.: A Symposium on the Subconscious. Jour. Abnormal Psy.,
1907-8, II, p. 62.

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO LEARNING 1 67

ceives an impression he is inaccessible to others. Sometimes
he is unable to receive impressions from more than one sense
realm, or he may even be able to obtain data from im-
pressions from one side of the body only. Ideas are not asso-
ciated with one another as with normal people, but every idea
takes up the whole narrow activity of consciousness.

Sidis, on the other hand, considers a sub-conscious self the
possession of every individual normal and abnormal. The
subconscious is not an unconscious physiological mechanism,
it is a secondary consciousness, a secondary self.^ It may
possess some degree of self-consciousness, may grow and de-
velop. "As a rule the stream of sub- waking consciousness
is broader than that of waking consciousness, so that the sub-
merged, sub-waking self knows the life of the upper, pri-
mary, waking self, but the latter does not know^ the former.
This self is manifested by all the facts of "crystal gazing,"
"shell hearing," automatic writing and the like. They "re-
veal the presence of a secondary, submerged, hyperaesthetic
consciousness that sees, hears and perceives what is outside
the range of perception of the primary personal self." This
sub-awaking^ self shows itself present in post-hypnotic sugges-
tion, "shell-hearing," "crystal vision," etc. It is extraor-
dinarily plastic and devoid of all personal character. The
subconscious is by no means identical with states of low in-
tensity, but includes psychic states ranging from the lowest to
the highest tension and vividness of mental activity.^ In the
functional relation of nervous elements he finds the physio-
logical basis for the disaggregation of consciousness. The
neurons form combinations of ever increasing complexity,
and the more complex their organization the greater the or-
ganization of psychic units into systems. The individual
mind is therefore a complex system of many minds. "There
may be as many different personalities, parasitic or secondary,
as there are possible combinations and disaggregations of
psychophysiological aggregates." A neuron aggregate, enter-
ing into association with other aggregates and being called
into activity from as many different directions as there are
^-ggregates in the associated cluster, has its neuron energy
kept within the limits of the physiological level. A dissociated
neuron aggregate, on the contrary, is not affected by the
activity of the other aggregates; it is rarely called upon to
function and stores up a great amount of neuron energy, —

^Sidis, B. and Goodhart, S. P.: Multiple Personalty, N. Y., 1905, p. 128.
"^Ibid., p. 138.
^Ihid., p. 45 and 184.
*Ibid., p. 45 and 184.

1 68 ORDAHL

with the equihbrium of the neuron aggregates, with the syn-
thesis of the dissociated systems, the subconscious eruptions,
attacks or 'seizures* vanish never to return.^

The explanation of Breuer and Freud for like phenomena is
similar to that of Sidis. In some cases we find that "great
complexes of ideas and complex psychic processes, rich in
consequences, remain completely unconscious in many
patients and coexist with the conscious psychic life."^

Cleavage is usually caused by the suppression from con-
sciousness of a painful experience. Ideas producing the
hysterical phenomena, though of long standing, are lively and
actually present, their continued liveliness being due to a
dearth of associations and external impressions. Cure con-
sists in associating the suppressed experience with the rest of
consciousness, for when an emotion is denied expression in
reaction the intra-cerebral excitation is greatly increased but
used neither in motor nor associative activity, and in some
cases abnormal reactions enter and there is an "anomalous
expression of the emotional life." When the complex is
associated with other neural complexes, its excess energy dis-
charges itself. Phenomena of daily life show the repression
of painful memories and evidences of the effect of unconscious
ideas, such as forgetting good resolutions or the return of a de-
sired but borrowed book, and many symptomatic and accidental
acts. Unconscious motives determine many of our actions.
Dream work is a complex thought structure formed in the
daytime and not discharged, leaving a remnant which persists
and would disturb sleep were it not converted into dreams.

Jung' finds longer reaction times when the stimulus word
is associated with an idea complex possessing a strong feeling
tone. This complex, momentarily separated from conscious-
ness, exercises an effect which concurs with the ego-complex.
The "constellating" of an association is mostly unconscious,
the complex playing the r6le of a quasi-independent existence,
a "second consciousness."

GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED CONCEPTS

The above are the representative uses of the terms "con-
scious," "subconscious' ' and "unconscious,' ' with the disputes
therein involved. Objections to speaking of "unconscious
psychic' ' processes are mainly on the logical ground that un-

^Sidis, B.: Psychopathological Researches, N. Y., 1902, p. 212.

^Breuer and Freud: Studien iiber Hysteric, Leipzig, 1895, p. 194.

'Jung: Ueber das Verhalten der Reactionszeit beim Assoziationsexperi-
mente. Journal /. Psy. u. Neurol., VI. 1905. 29. (Republished in C.
G. Jung's Diagnostische Assoziationsstudien, Leipzig, 1906, I. 221 ff.)

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO LEARNING 1 69

conscious and psychic are contradictory terms. Metaphysical
considerations on the other hand are responsible for the con-
trary opinion, for it is held that the law of universal causa-
tion must hold for the mental as well as the physical world.
Changes often occur in consciousness with no consciousness,
i. e. , with no consciously observable cause ; therefore they must
have an unconscious mental cause. The problem reduces
therefore to one of epistemology;^ the identification of con-
sciousness and the psychic or the extension of " psychic" to
cover the accompaniment of all material changes. As Hellpach
points out, the unconscious can never be discovered by investi-
gation, but only by hypothesis, by analogy, or metaphysics.
He who denies the unconscious retreats to the empirical and
has to explain all from the conscious side in which there are
vast gaps. If he makes any assumptions he must say that
consciousness causes physical changes and these again con-
scious ones, which is the interactionist's position, or that
physical and mental changes are parallel, which is the posi-
tion of either monistic or dualistic parallelism. ^ The attitude
one takes reduces, therefore, ultimately, to a question of his
temperament. Practically, it makes little difference whether
one assumes the changes going on without consciousness but
later affecting it to be complex neural changes only,^ or changes
possessing the conscious character in structure but lacking
the conscious quality, or a psychic reality accompanying
all existence, or a psychic accompaniment of molecular
changes different in degree from those underlying conscious
experiences.

Let us consider somewhat more fully the use of the terms
"unconscious psychic process" in this metaphysical sense of
the psychic accompaniment of physical processes lacking
the conscious quality. By consciousness we mean that in-
definable ultimate best described as experience or awareness.
It is not identical with self-consciousness, which is only con-
sciousness of one's past states of consciousness, immediate or
remote. Consciousness is the broader term. Conscious states,
however, are those which can become self-conscious later.
Consciousness is always more or less complex, the elements
entering therein contributing to the character of the whole,
which is qualitatively different from these elements. It is
the interconnection of the psychic processes, i.e.yit is the associa-
tion of the elements constituting it. Where association is

^Miinsterberg, H.: Symposium on the Subconscious, Jour. Abnormal Psy.
II. 1907-08, p. 28.

'Hellpach: Das Unbewusste, Central, f. Nervenheilkunde und Psychiatrie,
1908, Bd. 31, S. 65-6.

'Miinsterberg; Psychotherapy, N. Y., 1909, p. 140; p. 147.

Journal — 3

lyo ORDAHL

strongest consciousness is most intense. We assume the exist-
ence of a psychic side concomitant with all material changes,
both conscious and unconscious. "Unconscious" we use as
diametrically opposed to "conscious," "psychic process" in
the metaphysical sense of the psychic side of a process possess-
ing a concomitant physical side. Such a psychic side we con-
ceive to be present in all organic matter, if not in all matter.
With the activity of each neuron, therefore, there is psychic
process, but consciousness probably does not occur until there
is a complex functioning of neurons in one system or pattern.
The pattern may change and shift in its organization, now
dropping out some elements now taking up others, but the
whole is usually in a more or less close functional connection.
It is however conceivable that two or more different complexes
may be functioning with sufficient intensity to give different
alternating or simultaneously existing streams of conscious-
ness. Association of an aggregate with the personal ag-
gregate is probably necessary for consciousness — in other
words, association of elements with the general bodily sensa-
tions and feelings which constitute the fundamental part of
our personality — what Bleuler probably means by "the asso-
ciation with the ego-complex."

According to this view ideas out of consciousness do not
become physiological processes any more than they were such
before. We must assume some disintegration of the neuron
aggregates underlying the idea and with this disintegration
some change in the idea itself, according to which it no longer
possesses its former character, but is the psychic accompani-
ment of the physiological process.

As for the objection to the term "unconscious psychic pro-
cess," we agree with Lipps^ that every psychic process is
unconscious. All that is given in experience is each separate
state of consciousness, the process underlying the sequence
of ideas or feelings never being a matter of consciousness, but
something which is merely inferred. The inspirations of the
poet and the associations of the genius are not more spontaneous
than those of the ordinary man, only richer and more varied.
The ordinary man may be able to trace and explain the se-
quences better than his more fortunate brother, but the pro-
cesses underlying them are none the less unconscious.

As for "free-rising" ideas, or "mediate" associations,
conscious connective links, rapidly forgotten, without doubt
exist in many cases. When the idea can be traced to an
association started from some external cause, of which the
subject was absolutely unconscious, a peripheral physiological

*Ivipps, T.: Leitfaden d. Psychologic, I^ipzig, 1909, p. 83 f.

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RlSlyATlON TO I^EARNING 171

excitation has probably set into action a neuron complex out
of connection with the main system, which is concerned in
some other different state of consciousness. When this widens
and the emphasis of activity shifts, the aggregate stimulated
peripherally, without conscious, but with psychic, accom-
paniment may be taken up in the new arrangement of neuron
complexes and become conscious. But sometimes an idea
enters with no traceable connection. Here aggregates con-
cerned in the ''free rising' * idea may be in a state of functional
activity of a greater or less degree but separated from the
centre of activity. Cells concerned but slightly in the con-
scious processes of the moment may set in activity others in-
volved in the detached aggregate, which functions then with
such completeness as to shift the centre of activity from the
original to the new position, the new idea becoming the centre
of consciousness.

The divided consciousness of multiple personality, and
similar states sometimes experienced by normal individuals
in dreams or abstracted conditions where consciousness seems
to be divided into two alternating or coincident streams, is
of the same general character as consciousness. The term
' * co-consciousness' ' is a better name for this experience than
"subconsciousness," and is more definite in its meaning.
Used in such a sense "subconscious" is too easily extended,
even by the writer who so uses it, to cover something which is
literally under consciousness, out of which consciousness
arises and into which it descends. Used in such a way, it takes
the place of the older concept of the "soul' ' as an independent
creative entity. Just as the soul was responsible for our
actions or looked out upon our thoughts, so its successor, the
"subconscious self" is supposed to do.

Consciousness does not fade off from distinctness by ever
fainter degrees into unconsciousness. Facts in the margin
of consciousness are qualitatively the same as those in the
focus, but the difference between the outer limits of the mar-
gin and the region beyond is absolute. "Subconscious,"
when used to denote the periphery of the conscious field,
is a term descriptive of a condition of actual consciousness,
different in degree; but as it is too easily extended to de-
scribe processes outside of consciousness, "perceptual" is
a better term.

Analysis shows that expressions like * ' resting back on the sub-
conscious" in prayer and meditation mean the relieving of
mental tension by widening attention, so that activity can
shift from newer, less firmly established association com-
plexes to older, well developed complexes which have had
survival value. The individual is "larger than his conscious-

172 ORDAHIy

ness,* ' in that consciousness at best is so narrow as to embrace
but a small part of the results of his own past habits and ex-
periences, and those of the race seen in tendencies, appetencies
or instincts. In such a sense any present experience is only to
a small degree determined by conscious factors. One's
motives for action are seldom clearly analyzed or made focal
in consciousness. Oftener they are entirely without conscious-
ness, being the results of past experiences and training which
have developed characteristic modes of spontaneous response.
•

CONSCIOUSNESS IN ANIMAI^S

No objective proof of consciousness in animals is possible,^
but the assumption of consciousness in them rests on in-
ference, just as it does in our fellow beings, for the only place
it can be positively known is in the individual himself. Deny-
ing the possibility of comparative psychology would there-
fore logically result in a like attitude toward human psychol-
ogy.2 Any objective criterion of consciousness must be
arbitrary. "Learning" or "modifiability of behavior" as
an indication of its presence is not good, for there is evidence
that plants learn,^ and even material* objects adapt them-
selves to repeated stimuli or changed conditions as the season-
ing of a violin to strains of the master. There are also some
indications that human learning goes on unconsciously.

III. The REI.ATION OF Consciousness to Learning

The relation of consciousness to learning has received some
discussion as well as experimental testing. The problem of
learning in general I have reviewed elsewhere^ and shall
consider here only the results bearing directly on the subject
in hand.

THE LEARNING PROCESS

We may define learning as the formation of associations
between certain stimuli and definite modes of reaction. The
simpler and less varied the stimuli the simpler the learning
process will necessarily be, and the more permanent the value of

^Yerkes, R. M. : Objective Nomenclature, Comparative Psychology and
Animal Behavior, Jour Comp. Neur. and Psy., 1906, XVI, p. 388.

'Clapar^de, E.: La psychologic comparee, est-elle legitime? Arch, de
psy., 1905-6, V. p. 34-

^Darwin and Pertz: On the Artificial Production of Rhythm in Plants.
Annals of BoL, 1903, XVII, pp. 93-106.

*Washburn, M. F.: Animal Mind, N. Y., 1908, p. 33.

Claparede, E.: The Consciousness of Animals. Internal. Quart., 1903-4.
VIII, pp. 296-315.

"Ellison, L. : The Acquisition of Technical Skill, Fed. Sent., 1909, XVI, pp.
49-63.

CONSCIOUSNESS IN R^I^ATION TO LEARNING 1 73

the associations formed, the simplest form probably being that
in the case of lower animals where the association is between
a single stimulus and a simple movement, the highest and
most complex form in man, where complicated movements
must often be preceded by a train of thought possessing little
motor accompaniment. The simplest form of learning in-
volves, then, direct motor response to a simple stimulus, the
highest, however, lacks much of this motor element, being
for the most part an association of symbols, such as the growth
in meaning of words, and the power of generalization from
previous experience. Most learning involves both these
factors.

Observation and experiment goes to show that learning
to meet any new situation involves a specialization and per-
fection of some part of an already existing habit or mental
possession. As Morgan points out, effective consciousness^
finds itself a partner in a "going concern." The perform-
ance of the instinctive act whose co-ordinations are heredi-
tary, and the consciousness such a performance evokes, are
simultaneous.^ The behavior and the conditions producing
it occupy consciousness, but "the effects of the behavior,
as the animal becomes conscious of the acts concerned, serve
to complete and render definite the conscious situation. Con-
sciousness, however, probably receives information of the
net results of the progress of behavior and not of the minute
and separate details of muscular contraction."^ As Sherring-
ton puts it, "the controlling centres can pick out from some
ancestrally given motor reaction some part of it so as to
isolate that as a separate movement, and by enhancement
this can become a skilled adapted act added to the powers of
the individual."'* When a new movement is initiated an ex-
cess of energy is expended and with it occur many more or
less random movements; of these, as the effort is repeated,
a special movement, or a special series, finally stands out
from the scattered mass. The clearer its separateness from
the rest, the more vivid its conscious accompaniment and
the power of conscious control. Consciousness of the way
a movement feels is necessary for its voluntary performance,
hence, as Judd's^ experiments show, an abstract idea cannot

^Morgan, C. L.: Introduction to Comparative Psychology, N. Y., 1906,

P- 51.

^Ibid., pp. 99, loi.

^Ihid., p. 105.

^Sherrington, C. S. : Integrative Action of the Nervous System, N. Y.,
1906, p. 389.

5Judd, C. H. : Practice and its Effects on the Perception of Illusions, Psy.
Rev., 1902, IX, pp. 27-59.

174 ORDAHI*

take the place of direct perceptual experience. The way to
get control of a movement as the experiments of Bair^ and of
Swift^ show, is by working outward from some general move-
ment over which we already have control. In Bair's ex-
periment on learning to move the ears, the subjects began
with the muscles over which they had conscious control,
such as raising the brow, clinching the teeth, making more
and more strenuous effort to get closer to the ear, an excess
of motor energy being discharged with proximate muscles.
"As soon as the sensation arising from the movement of the
ear was associated with the concomitant sensations of muscles
close to it, over which there was already voluntary control,
there was a basis for learning the voluntary control of the ear."
The definite idea of the movement given by electrical stim-
ulation of the retrahens muscle was not sufficient to produce
the movement, but it gave a general idea as to the direction
the innervation was to take. As control developed attention
was narrowed down from the general sensation of the adjacent
muscles to that of the specific movement sought for. Like-
wise, in the control of the reflex wink, Swift found it necessary
to begin with the muscles around the eyes over which there
was conscious control. What Bair' says in regard to the
general ability given by special training, e. g., "to a new
situation we react by a general discriminative reaction and
are more likely to hit on a favorable response than without
this special training," is true of all learning. For no matter
what new acquisition is undertaken, if it is possible to master
it, some previous general training has either been developed
by the individual or through the inherited co-ordinations of
his ancestors. Experiments on acquisitions of a more complex
kind show the same fact — attentive consciousness cannot
be directly and advantageously applied at first, because of
the multiplicity of details which overwhelm it. The new
experience calls up too many old associations which are not
pertinent. Such facts account for the rapid rise of the learn-
ing curve at first, when responses are selected from a mass of
older habitual reactions, and its slower ascent later, when
associations really new are being formed.

ClyKAR CONSCIOUSNieSS AND LEARNING

The importance of clear consciousness in learning is shown
by the following facts. Experiences causing greatest atten-

ifiair, J. H.: Development of Voluntary Control, Psy. Rev., Yllh
p. 499.

^Swift, E. J.: Studies in the Physiology and Psychology of Learning,
Am. Jour. Psy., 1903, XIV, pp. 200-251.

^Bair, J. H.: The Practice Curve, Psy. Rev., Mon. Sup., 1902 V.

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RBLATION TO I.EARNING 1 75

tion are best remembered. Desire to succeed and intense
effort are necessary for progress, which means that one must
attend closely to the matter at hand. Even in learning of a
purely muscular sort, where attention to the movement it-
self has been found to be a hindrance, attention to the object-
ive features of the task is required for the perfection of the un-
conscious or dimly conscious part of the reaction. The fact
that subjects of a given mental type are most interfered with
in their learning, by distractions appealing to that type of
imagery, shows that undisturbed consciousness is essential.
Trying to recite a syllable series is more effective in establish-
ing the syllables than merely reading them,^ because of the nar-
rower attention required. Figures drawn with the left hand
are better remembered than those drawn with the right, for
the same reason ;2 the greater ease of remembering sense
material as compared with nonsense is also probably due in
part to the easier application of attention.

Results from experiments on cross education point to like
conditions, for the more similar the training and the test
material the greater the transference.^ Improvement con-
sists in more economic methods of work,* and is essentially
"attention training." Transference consists in the carrying
over of right hand "methods" to the left hand. Perhaps
the most adequate study of this problem is a recent one by
Fracker,^ who finds that the most essential element in trans-
ference is imagery and that improvement occurs if imagery
is developed in the training series which can be transferred
and advantageously used in the test series. It may be sub-
consciously developed, but if it comes to be consciously
recognized, the improvement is more rapid. "The rate of im-
provement seems to depend directly upon the conscious rec-
ognition of the imagery and upon attention to its use. The
transference of elements is a conscious transference." Im-
provement during intervals of no practice seems to be due
in part to freshness and better attention, in part to the fact
that interfering habits are forgotten, so that better and more

^Witasek, S. : Ueber Lesen tind Rezitieren. . Zeits. f. Psy., 1907 Bd. 44;
pp. 161-185; 246-282

Katzaroff, D.: Experiences sur le r61e de la recitation, ^rcA. de Psy.,
1908, VII, pp. 255-8.

2Rowe and Washburn: The Motor Memory of the Left Hand, Am. Jour.
Psy., 1908, XIX, p. 243.

^Ebert u. Meumann: Ueber einige Gnindfragen der Psychologic der
Uebungsphanomene, Arch.f. d. ges. Psy. 1905, IV, S i — 232.

*Swift: Op. cit.

^Fracker, G. C: On the Transference of Training in Memory, Psy. Rev.,
Mon. Sup., IX, 1908, 56-102.

176 ORDAHL

practiced ones may be free to assert themselves.^ Then, too,
attention is not distracted by the new elements of the situation,
but can be more economically applied. The value of clear
consciousness in learning is that it assists the selecting of
good elements from the complex reaction and the eliminating
of disadvantageous factors. When the subject is weary he
is apt to fall into bad habits which are more difl&cult to modify
because unconscious.

Consciousness of details and elements of a process grad-
ually gives place to consciousness of larger and more complex
diflSculties. These elements gradually form themselves into
larger wholes and consciousness works with greater units.
This is true not only of muscular learning, but of more in-
tellectual activities such as typewriting, the telegraph lan-
guage and chess. As Cleveland^ puts it, with reference to
chess, " learing requires the perfection of the elements and their
organization into ever larger groups, so that attention is not
bound to details, but left free to forge ahead and anticipate
difi&culties." In the writing processes, first letters, then
words, then sentences are grasped. In chess one grasps the
situation by larger and larger wholes. Cleveland puts it thus,
"Progress in chess consists in the formation of an increas-
ing symbolism which permits the manipulation of larger and
larger complexes. . . . There is something in the purely
intellectual life corresponding to motor automatism, which is
shown in the ability to think symbolically or abstractly, and
thus to handle large masses of detail with a minimum of con-
scious effort. It involves the increasing ability to take in
during a single pulse of attention a larger and larger group
of details which means, of course, that the attention is no
longer needed for each one."

The importance of the 'motor element in learning verbal
material is without doubt due to clearer consciousness of the
task, the material appealing not only to vision, but to hear-
ing and the kinsesthetic senses.

SUBCONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS LEARNING

Such are some of the observations as to the r61e of conscious-
ness in learning, but much of our learning goes on below con-
sciousness. As Kuhlmann^ points out, much of our most im-
portant learning — the use and functional activity of our own

^Book, W. F.: The Psychology of Skill, U. of Montana Bull., No.
53, 1908, p. 6 £F.

^Cleveland, A. A. : The Psychology of Chess and Learning to Play it.
Am. Jour. Psy., 1907, XVIII, pp. 269-308.

^Kuhlmann, F.: The Place of Mental Imagery and Memory among
Mental Fimctions. Am. Jour. Psy., 1905, XVI, p. 337-356.

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO LEARNING 1 77

bodies — goes on with no conscious direction. The digestive
apparatus must learn to do its work, and so must other internal
organs Early reflexes such as the reflex wink and mimetic
expressions, binocular vision, the co-ordination of voluntary
muscles, develop without voluntary use of incoming stimuli
for their guidance.

The very possibility of learning rests on an unconscious
basis of physiological endowment. The dullard and the
genius are alike dependent upon their physiological inherit-
ance, and the quick wits of the healthy child are as much
beyond his conscious control as are those of the feeble defective.

We are not conscious of the "process" underlying our
associations, but merely of the results as they present them-
selves to consciousness. In fact learning may progress with-
out our knowledge of the fact, as is seen in the development
of unconscious automatisms. For example, one may develop
peculiar manners of gait or expression without knowledge,
having unconsciously imitated some one possessing a like
peculiarity. Through the ever present suggestions of a new
environment we may develop new ideals and new apperceptive
attitudes of which we are unconscious until we are taken back
to our old surroundings. In learning of a muscular sort we
may have been conscious of every sensation leading up to the
subsequent habit, without consciousness of the method in
which we work, or of the existence of the habit itself. An
example is given by Pfungst.^ Having directed his subjects
to think of one of two similarly sounding words of a series
to which he would respond with certain arm movements,
he was able to tell by the direction of the head or eye move-
ments, of which word they were thinking and to which they
expected him to react. By changing his manner of respond-
ing he obtained a similar change in their movements. He was
also able to tell by head movements of which direction, left
or right, his subjects were thinking. He concludes that "the
changing of natural movements of expression and the acquisi-
tion of new ones are both possible without knowledge of the
person."

Our environment is one of the strongest factors in training
us, whether it operates consciously or unconsciously. One
hears good language continuously, and easily forms the habit
of using it himself. The development of our ethical ideals and
aesthetic feelings and our very forms of thinking unfold before
we are conscious of their existence. Such habit formation
rests on instinctive imitation and forms one of the most im-
portant classes of learning.

^Pfungst, O.: Das Pferd des Herrn von Osten, Leipzig, 1907, p. 77 ff.

178 ORDAHL

Learning may also progress without consciousness of the
end or purpose. Such a fact has its best illustration in the
instinctive activities of animals and the play of children
and animals. Play is a training process for life where most
of the activities required in later life have their initial, though
unwitting, development.

The formation and strengthening of associations below con-
sciousness is indicated by some of the laboratory experiments
on learning. This must be the explanation of the fact that
scattered repetitions, which deal with older associations,
give best results. Miiller and Pilzecker think the greater
strength of the older associations is due to the tendency of
an excitation to outlast the stimulus — to a "perseveration
tendency" — as a result of which an idea rises of its own accord
into consciousness without associative connections. Illus-
trations other than those found in learning nonsense syllables
are the following: The histologist's illusion which occurs
after working long and intently with the microscope; images
seen with closed eyes often have then the character of the micro-
scopic forms. Similarly when one studies or thinks intently
of any subject, carelessly perceived objects tend to take on
its character. While studying the anatomy of the internal
ear every gas jet or twisted twig was a cochlea, for the writer.
It is not uncommon to see, before sleeping, scenes which have
passed before the eyes while traveUing, or on a tramp. " Crys-
tal vision' ' may illustrate the same phenomenon, freeing the
mind for the appearance of ideas underlying which is this
perseveration tendency. This fixing of the association
probably goes on physiologically whether the ideas crop out
into consciousness or not, for Miiller and Pilzecker found that
attention to any other engrossing matter prevented their re-
call, although free reproduction was not a tendency with all
their subjects; nor was the hindrance due to preventing the
subject from thinking over the series. They conclude that
"after the reading of a syllable series, certain physiological
processes which serve for the strengthening of the associations
formed by the reading of a series continue for a certain time
with gradually diminishing intensity."^

"Retroactive amnesia" or the forgetting, after a shock,
of incidents extending backward from the shock to several
hours or more, likewise points to the probability of the phy-
siological fixing of associations.^

Experiments on the acquisition of skill show that uncon-
scious habits are developed which consciousness either selects

^Miiller u. Pilzecker: Zeit.f. Psych., Erganzungsband I, 1900. p. 196.
^Bumham, W. H.: Retroactive Amnesia. Am. Jour. Psy., 1903, XIV,
p. 386-7.

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO LEARNING 1 79

or represses. As Swift says, "Consciousness discovers certain
methods in operation and approves or disapproves them."^
Subjects improve by "hitting upon" better ways of working,
without any further conscious selection, at first, than the
general effort to succeed. Book's experiment shows the same
thing. "A mass of old associations are called up, only a few
of which are directly serviceable for the work. From these there
are unconsciously built up, by the double process of elimination
and selection and reorganization, the first elementary associa-
tions (letter associations) used, and from these in turn the later,
higher order habits. There comes to be . . .a sort of uncon-
scious struggle for existence among the many modes of action,
ending in the survival of the one direct and economic way of
reaching the goal desired.' '^

Automatization of elements previously conscious occurs
in the perfection of all activities, leaving consciousness free
to undertake more difficult features.

IV. An Experimental Study of the Relation of
Consciousness to I^earning

Our own investigations undertook to discover by experiment
(i) whether learning is helped by factors which never come
into consciousness, or are present only to a minimal degree,
(2) whether the formation of a habit of whose existence and
development one is unconscious can progress as well under dis-
traction, when consciousness is removed as completely as possi-
ble from all the elements which go to make up the habit forma-
tion ; and finally, to find the r61e of consciousness in learning
simple tasks involving, (3) almost no intellectual factor, (4) a
complex co-ordination of muscular impluses, and (5) learning
of purely intellectual character.

I. Do Unnoticed Items Assist in the Formation of Associative

Links ?

Experiment i was suggested by Scripture's experi-
ments on the associative course of ideas,^ and work of
a similar sort,^ which seemed to show that unnoticed
features of a total impression (like an inconspicuous Jap-
anese symbol or a numeral placed beside a word or a picture)
could serve as a bond to connect the given word or picture
with another word or picture which had been elsewhere
accompanied by the same symbol or numeral. The theoreti-

^Swift, B. J. : Studies in the Psychology and Physiology of Learning. Am.
Jour. Psy., 1903, XIV, p. 201-251.
^Book, W. F.: Univ. Montana Bull., No. 53, 1908.
'Scripture: Op. cit.
*Sidis: The Psychology of Suggestion, N. Y., 1898, p. 171.

l8o ORDAHL

cal importance of the question and the fact that most attempts
to repeat Scripture's work had led to negative results invited
a new attack. The plan which we undertook may be illus-
trated by the following scheme, though the actual execution
of the experiment was carried out with greater refinement
and in a different way as to details.

The observer is presented with a triple series of meaning-
less syllables, as in Group I below, and is required to read
series b a certain number of times and if possible learn it.
Series a and c are of course all the time before his eyes though
not involved in his task. After reading b the required number
of times, his knowledge of it is tested by the " Treffer method,' '
and his success in giving the required syllables recorded.
Then after a brief interval he is presented with Group II of
which the middle series is the same as one of the side series
in Group I, e. g., series a, and he is required to read (and learn)
series a in the same manner in which he has just read (and
learned) series b.

Group I Group II

jex

mil

peb

yal

hud

yom

bup

gib

lur

dof

dep

zal

tem

voz

bic

fuj

POg

vop

nen

lek

loh

gop

gaj

nat

riz

fiv

jof

mod

yem

wam

miv

jex

hal

sem

yal

coj

bup

pom

fet

dof

das

dib

tem

lef

vil

fuj

roj

buj

nen

zup

hix

gop

fab

kug

riz

uls

len

mod

veb

If a is on the average learned with greater ease or complete-
ness than by the inference is that the previous presentation of
a in indirect vision has somehow been helpful — directly by
rendering the syllables individually more familiar, or in-
directly through their association with the syllables of series
b which have in the learning been associated with each other.
If a is not learned on the average more easily or perfectly than
b the inference is either that no assistance is gained by the
"unconscious" perception of a or that the gain is not of
sufficient amount to be determined by this method of experi-
mentation.

Such experiments were carried out on two trained observers
through a considerable number of days, but it may be said at
once that the results were on the whole negative. There was
no clear evidence of any advantage. The presumption is that
the assistance gained is small in amount — too small to be deter-

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RKI.ATION TO I.KARNING l8l

mined by this method. Later experiments undertaken ex-
pressly to determine the deHcacy of the method showed that
one reading of the a series with full attention had no beneficial
effect upon the learning of the a series after an interval of
ten minutes during which the b series had been learned.

Though the results of this series of experiments must there-
fore be set down as inconclusive, they may have, perhaps, a
certain value in other connections and are therefore given in
the Appendix of this paper.

2. The Effect of Attention and Distraction on the Formation
of the Motor ''Set'* (Motorische Einstellung)

Experiment 2. The purpose of the second series of ex-
periments was to find the effect on the ''Motorische Einstel-
lung** of attention and distraction. The term "Motorische
Einstellung** indicates the effect which repeated lifting of a
heavy weight has in making subsequent lighter weights seem
too light. It is probably due to a temporary habit of the
nervous system. The problem in our case was to discover
whether a neural habit of this sort, of whose existence the
subject was unaware, would be more readily formed when he
was attending to the lifting of the heavy weight than when he
was inattentive to it.

The phenomenon of "Motorische Einstellung** was first
reported by Miiller and Schumann.^ They lifted a moderate
weight of, say, 600 grams and, after it, lifted a heavier weight
of 2,400 grams to an equal height a certain number of times,
in a definite rhythm. Then a weight of 800 grams was lifted
and found to seem lighter than the 600 grams, lifted before
the training with the weight of 2,400 grams. They explain
the illusion by saying that the 800 grams, which is lifted with
an unusually powerful impulse after the work with the weight
of 2,400 grams, rises with unusual speed and therefore seems
lighter than the first weight, because we are apt to judge as
lighter a weight which raises more quickly. The repetition
of the lifting of the heavy weight has set up a tendency in
certain sub-cortical centres to discharge automatically with
a somewhat extra intensity. Experimentation of this kind
was carried further by Steffens.^

The apparatus used is pictured in the accompanying cut.
Two boards measuring about eighteen inches long were
clamped to the sides of the bottom of a chair so that the ends

^Miiller u. Schumann: Ueber die psychologischen Gnmdlagen der
Vergleichung gehobener Gewichte, Pfiiiger's Archiv, XLV, 1889, 37-122.

^Steffens: Ueber die motorische Einstellung. Zeits. f. Psy., Bd. 23,
S. 240-308.

1 82 ORDAHI,

extended about seven inches beyond the front edge. Holes
were bored near the forward ends of the boards and through
these were passed the ends of two handles by which the weights
were lifted. The upper parts of the handles were made of wood
and were provided with grooves into which fitted the fingers
of the observer, enabling him to hold the handles firmly and
in the same way each time he lifted. The handles below the
board consisted of brass rods having at their lower ends
disks of wood, on which the weights rested. An iron needle
was passed through each brass rod in the middle, making it
possible to raise the handles only a given distance. To pre-
vent the needles hitting against the boards with a jar, a
string was fastened in front of the chair, by means of two iron
standards clamped to the table, at such a height that the ob-
server's hands would touch the string before the needles came
in contact with the boards; as soon as the hand touched the
string the weight was lowered. A disk of cork was used on
each handle to prevent the clinking of the weights against
each other. The entire weight of each handle with the
cork disk was loo grams.

The chair stood on one of the large laboratory tables. As
far as possible from the observer a metronome was placed,
its noise being deadened by a cloth pad between it and the
table. The experimenter sat at the side of the table to the
observer's left, and changed the weights as the experiment
required. These were flat and circular in form with a rather
large slit so that they would slip on and off the handles easily.

The method of the experiment was this: The right-hand
weight was always the standard, and was always kept at 300
grams, i. e., a 200 gr. weight plus the weight of the handles.
By trying different weights a weight was found for the left
hand which usually seemed equal to the right-hand weight.
Owing to the difference in strength between the right and
left hands this was actually a weight much smaller than the
standard. Since practice was apt to increase the strength
of the left hand, it was necessary to determine what this weight
was before every experiment; and doing this counteracted
also any influence which might have been carried over from
lifting heavy weights in the experiment of a previous day.
After determining the apparently equal weight, twenty judg-
ments were made, upon weights offered for comparison with the
standard (300 grams in the right hand), four with the weight
which had been judged equal, and four each with weights ten
and twenty grams above and ten and twenty grams below
the "equal" weight. If the judgments were perfect the
results would of course show four judgments "equal," eight
"heavier" and eight "lighter." As a matter of fact they

Fig. I.

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO LEARNING 1 83

varied a little, this way and that, as is common in such ex-
periments. The lifting was done rhythmically to the stroke
of the metronome, which beat at about four per second for
the different observers, some requiring a slower rhythm than
others. The rhythm was constant, however, for each subject.
At * * one* ' the standard was raised, at ' * two' ' lowered, on * ' three' '
the comparison weight was raised and on "four" lowered.

The results of the twenty lifts just described served as a
basis of comparison for similar lifts after a period of lifting a
heavier weight to establish the Einstellung. This heavy weight,
which was called the "training" weight, was for all subjects
a weight twice as great as the one which had seemed equal.
The experiment here differed a little in its method for the
lifting "with attention" and "with distraction," though
the actual weight lifted and the rhythm for lifting were the
same for each. In the experiment "with attention," the
subject was told that he must determine, by estimation, a
weight twice that of the standard, and that he would be given
two weights above and two weights below this double weight,
and sometimes the double weight itself. He was to raise
the standard just as he had done in the previous judgments
of equals, which would aid him in his judgment, and he was to
judge as quickly as possible. Here the standard was raised
on "one,* ' lowered on "two," a pause on "three," the variable
raised on "four," lowered on "five,** and the judgment given
immediately. While the judgment was being given the ex-
perimenter shifted the weights, and the subject began to
raise the standard in nearly all cases after the sixth count.
The method of lifting was at first not carried out in this three-
six rhythm, but in a two-four rhythm ; but was changed after
three days of experimentation to make the rhythm the same
for the experiments "with attention*' and "with distraction.'*
All the results are incorporated in the tables which follow, as
the change of rhythm seemed to have no disturbing effect.
Ten judgments w^ere made, four of the weights being greater
than the "double** weight, four less, and two the "double
weight* * itself, so that the actual weight lifted amounted to
lifting the double weight ten times. Immediately after
giving the tenth judgment the five original {i. e., nearly
"equal* *) weights were compared with the standard, to test the
Einstellung, and the results recorded. After a rest of from one
to two minutes the double weight was raised five times more,
in the manner just described, to refresh the Einstellung; and
immediately after, the original (nearly "equal'*) weights were
again compared. This was done until the training weight had
been raised twenty times in all and the original weights had
been compared twenty times. In schematic form the ex-

184 ORDAHL

periment was: (i) to determine a weight which when lifted
by the left hand should seem equal to the standard weight,
when lifted by the right hand. This was done by offering
the original weights in such a way that the "equal" weight
was raised four times, the ten and twenty grams "heavier,"
four times each, and the ten and twenty grams lighter, four
times each. (2) Ten lifts of the training weight, followed by
five comparisons of the original weights arranged according
to a regular permutation. (3) Five lifts of the training weight,
with five judgments of the original weights. (4) Repetition of
(3). (5) Repetition of (3).

The experiment ' ' with distraction' ' differed from that with
full attention only in so far as lifting the training weight
was concerned. Here the "double" weight only was lifted
ten times, with a pause, then five times with a pause, and so
on, until twenty lifts had been made ; the actual weight lifted,
however, amounted to the same for both forms of the ex-
periment. While the observer was lifting the training weight
in the "distraction" experiment, the experimenter read as
distinctly as possible from some interesting reading matter.
After the lifting of the original weights, which immediately
followed that of the training weight, the subject was asked
to give the content of what had been read, and a record was
made of his success.

Four university students of psychology, two men and two
women, served as observers. The number of experiments
per observer varied from 14 for observer I, to 28 for observer
IV, owing to modifications made necessary by the differences
of the individual observers. Each experiment represents
twenty lifts for the original weights, twenty for the training
weight, and twenty again for the original weights.

The Einstellung was present unmistakably in the case of
each observer. Observer I showed a clear and decided differ-
ence in the intensity of the Einstellung under the two condi-
tions of the experiment, the effect being much greater when
the training weight was lifted with attention than where dis-
traction was used. This is true for the total and also for all
except one of the single pairs of days on which experiments
with attention and with distraction were made. The other
observers, however, showed this difference but slightly or not
at all. The difference was so clear for observer I that an
explanation was sought for the indefiniteness of the records
of the other three observers. As none could be found at first
for observer IV, his work was continued until 18 complete
experiments had been performed. The difficulty was dis-
covered for observers II and III and the experiment modified
after 12 complete experiments. The following table gives the

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO LEARNING

185

results obtained from the work just described. The first
column represents the observer, the second the number of

I "

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lifts, the third (Ra) the results before training on days when
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the results after training on days when the training weight

JOURNAI*— 4

1 86 ORDAHI^

was lifted with attention. Column Rd contains the results
from the lifting of the original weights before training on the
days of the "distraction experiment," and Td, those ob-
tained after lifting the training weight on the same days. Dif.
a shows the difference between the results before and after the
training weight, in other words the amount of the Einstellung,
for the experiments with attention. Dif. d gives amount of
the Einstellung for the distraction experiments. Column a — d
gives the difference between the Einstellungen in the two
cases. ly, E, H, stand for "lighter," "equal," and "heavier"
cases respectively. It will be noticed that some superiority
of the Einstellung with attention exists over that with distrac-
tion except for observer IV, in whose case the opposite is true.

The Einstellung came out so clearly in both forms of the
experiment with observers II and III, that it was thought that
the training weight was so heavy as to give a tolerably intense
Einstellung, irrespective of attention and distraction. It
was therefore reduced a hundred grams to make the Ein-
stellung more moderate, and the greater effect "with atten-
tion" immediately showed clearly against that "with dis-
traction." The explanation for observer IV was different,
and was obtained by an examination of the columns giving
the results before the training weight had been lifted (columns
Ra and Rd). The equal cases should number something near
one-fifth of the total number and the heavier and lighter
about two-fifths each; but the proportion is almost reversed,
showing that weights just above and just below the "equal' '
weights were not discriminated from the "equal." To rem-
edy this difficulty the training weight was kept as before,
but the original weights were decreased (and increased) from
ID and 20 grams below and above the "equal" to 20 and 40
grams below and above, in order to make the possibility of
discriminating greater. His results then showed the same ten-
dencies as the other observers. Table II gives the results.
The lettering of the columns has the same significance as for
the preceding table. The first line of figures for each observer
reading across the table gives the results of the modified
experiment. The second gives the combined results of the first
and second form. Observer I, performing the experiment only
in its original form, is represented by but one line of figures.

After the experiment was closed a final test was made with
each observer both with distraction and with attention, but
the observer was asked to notice his manner of lifting, and to
see if it differed subjectively in either case. Observers I and II
reported them the same. Observer III held the weights a
little looser in the lifting with attention but the lifting itself
was the same. Observer IV raised the weights a little more

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO LEARNING

187

00 QO

t>.vo

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00
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irply and slightly higher "with distraction." This differ-
ice was too slight to be detected by the experimenter. Ob-

I 88 ORDAHL

server IV was the only one who had any idea as to the pur-
pose of the experiment, and he had surmised it.

Taking all facts into consideration it seems certain that
with a training weight which gives a moderate Einstellung
and original weights which are different enough in value to
render discrimination easy, hfting the training weight with
full attention produces a more intense Einstellung than lifting
the same weight in the same manner, but with distraction.

J. The R6le of Consciousness in the Acquirement of
Muscular Skill

The third series of experiments was of a very simple character
and useful chiefly in furnishing opportunity for introspection.
It consisted in learning to throw balls at a target about eight
feet in diameter, from a distance of 14 to 18 feet. Two uni-
versity students of the psychological department served as
observers. One, the writer, had almost no previous ex-
perience of the sort; the other, a gentleman, had thrown
some, but "not enough to amount to anything." Ten throws
were made in close succession, then a pause until the observer
was rested, then ten more throws until fifty had been made.
The experiment covered 16 days of 50 throws each, these days
occurring, with few exceptions, in uninterrupted succession.

The experiment was not prolonged far enough to give a
satisfactory learning-curve, such as has been found for similar
work by other experimenters, e. g., Bair, Book, Swift, and
others, since general introspective results were the main
object of our work. It may be said, however, that the great-
est gain, both in uniformity and amount of score, came for
each subject in the first few days.

In learning to throw at a target one must specialize and
perfect certain elements of the complex mass of neuro-muscular
co-ordinations of which he is in possession through inheritance
and his own practice in general activities. His conscious-
ness is taken up primarily with the target and the ball in his
hand and vaguely with those particular and general bodily
sensations which enter in to make up the "set' ' of the situation.
Only gross errors, such as standing too far to the right or the
left, or throwing with too great or too little force, are consciously
corrected. The minuter, more skilful adjustments developed
of themselves out of the larger, less perfect ones already exist-
ing, and were then perhaps consciously continued or avoided.
Attention to the mechanical side of the throwing only resulted
in inferior work; yet clear consciousness was necessary for
good results, but it was consciousness of objective elements —
the target and to a certain extent of the ball — rather than of

CONSCIOUSNESS IN REI.ATION TO I.EARNING 1 89

one's arm or its movements. After a little practice both ob-
servers mentioned the fact that greater concentration and
fixation of attention on the target resulted in better throws.
When greater effort consisted in deliberate attention to the
mark, good throws resulted; but when, as occasionally hap-
pened, the observer tried to regulate the process and attended
to the hand, arm, or ball, random shots were sure to occur.
One observer remarked: " I don't believe thinking of the thing
will do any good. All I can do is to stand before the target
and wish to throw well;" the other said that he was simply
trying to make good throws but did not know how he did it.

Good physiological condition, interest in the work and a
tonic muscular condition seem to be concomitants of success,
for when observers are ill they lack energy and interest, throw
almost listlessly, and with poor results. On good days they
stand erect with muscles tense and eyes fixed on the target
and do their best work. One observer at such a time even
found himself forcibly squeezing the ball. The amount of en-
ergy put forth grew more regular with practice, i. e., there
was better co-ordination.

The introspections show that, in such an almost purely sen-
sory-muscular process, skill develops without consciousness
of the details. The peripheral sensations accompanying or
preceding the reaction contribute to form the background of
consciousness and to produce feelings of satisfaction or dissatis-
faction according as the movements are rightly or wrongly
made. Consciousness has little place "as guide," save in the
grosser features of the task, but attentive consciousness of the
end was necessary for the development of these peripheral
adjustments. Clear consciousness seemed to be accompanied
by a general neuro- muscular tonicity favorable to the best
work. Probably with clear consciousness the organism is act-
ing more as a unit of closely knit parts, each of which is then
more effective on every other part while it is active, than
in a state of disintegration where association is loose.

4. Learning to Write in Unaccustomed Ways

The experiments of this series were, like the last, of a simple
sort, though they involved skill of a somewhat greater com-
plexity. They consisted in learning to write ordinary script
with the left hand, and mirror script with both the right and
left hands.

Left-hand Writing, In the normal script experiments eight
observers assisted, four of whom were men and four women.
All were trained psychologists, except one woman who, never-
theless, had had much practice as an observer and was

I90 ORDAHI,

excellent at introspecting. One observer was almost ambi-
dextrous, two were left-handed. No definite tests of mental
type were made, but the indications are that two observers
were, in this sort of work, predominantly motor.

The conditions of the experiment were kept as nearly con-
stant as possible for each individual during all his work The
experiment covered a period of about fourteen days. The
standard sentence, written by all, was, "Motives are like
chemicals. The more you analyze them the worse they smell."
This the observer repeated several times before beginning to
write in order to learn it. The sentence was written three
times with the right hand with timing (with a stop watch) ;
then once without, and three times with the left with timing
and once without, with sufficient pauses between tests to
avoid fatigue. It was explained to the observers beforehand
that the timing was merely an incidental matter and that
they should write at a convenient speed, merely writing
each sentence continuously. After each sentence had been
written, the observer was asked to give introspections as to
methods used, points attended to, and any other items which
might be of interest.

Inference as to the part "unconscious" factors play must
rest partly on the fact that the observer fails to mention them
and it is therefore open to the error of supposing that facts
not remarked upon are unconscious, whereas the fault may be
due to incomplete introspection or report. Yet it was im-
possible to ask definite questions as to position or methods,
for then entirely unnoticed factors became clearly conscious
and the subsequent course of procedure was apt to be changed.
Exact objective measurements of improvement in writing
are naturally, impossible, but must be judged in a rough way
by greater uniformity in the slant and strength of the charac-
ters, and by their greater clearness and legibility.

The different observers manifested individual differences
in their adaptation to the task, their methods of procedure
and the speed and proficiency acquired ; yet there are elements
common to all. It is evident that easy and natural writing
movements with the left hand cannot be made unless one
assumes a position nearly symmetrical to the customary
right-hand position and lets the hand take a free and un-
cramped movement. This will result in script with a "back
hand' * slant of a rather uniform character if one writes on a
horizontal plane. It was to this position and writing that
all observers tended, though they arrived at it in various ways
and adopted it to different degrees.

Only three observers assumed an entirely symmetrical
position from the start. Two of these, who were left-handed

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO LEARNING 191

observers, did so unconsciously, guided purely by the "feel"
of the thing. The other observer analyzed the situation,
discovered that this would be the proper way, and so took the
position voluntarily. A fourth observer assumed a position
almost symmetrical, and one which was little changed dturing
the progress of the experiment. This he said he did "con-
sciously and unconsciously," i. e., semi-consciously. Of the re-
maining four observers all began with the paper in exactly the
position used for the right hand, with the body turned at the
same angle to the table and the left hand and arm twisted into
an awkward position, the wrist cramped over to the right side of
the body. With one observer the right hand held the paper
at the upper left corner, taking the position which the left
hand had always used, thus showing that each hand had
changed places with the other.

All observers, save one, finally used some finger movements
for the left hand, but only four began with them. Two of these
were left-handed and one ambidextrous, and used the move-
ments unconsciously. Observer V, who analyzed his position
and assumed a symmetrical one consciously, used finger
movements at first, but after the first sentence the natural
tendency to use larger arm movements manifested itself,
and the finger movements disappeared. One observer made
them to get out of a difficulty and after that tried for them;
another noticed her right hand carefully while writing, ob-
served the finger movements, realized that skill could be
obtained only if the finger movements were used in the left hand,
and therefore consciously adopted them, but with considerable
effort, and it was only when attention was directed to the
hand that they were constantly made. Another observer
"found finger movements coming of themselves" and con-
tinued them because the writing as a result was better, but
even then they were hard to keep. Of the observers who did
not use finger movements at the start, one adopted them on
the second day, one on the fourth and one on the fifth. The
only observers using finger movements naturally are those
possessed at the start of some skill with the left hand.

Four observers went from a larger to a smaller hand, three
to a slightly larger one, and for one, size remained about
the same.

The large movements at the start may be due to one of two
things. They may be the result of a general tensing up of
all the muscles in the intense effort of the new occupation,
and a general spread of energy over the whole body — a thing
which could be observed in the tense muscles of the hand in
five cases; in the digging and scraping of the pen in three
cases; and in tension about the mouth, head-movements or

192 ORDAHI^

raising the heels from the floor, some of which were noticeable
in all but the left-handed subjects. Or they may be due to
the fact that the muscles involved in the larger movements
have been trained in many daily occupations while the finer
movements have been very little practiced. In the progress
of the race one hand has been specialized for the more skilful
work, the other hand (in most people, the left) being used far
less. The left hand of an adult just learning to use it in left-
hand writing, is in about the same condition as the right
hand of a child who learns writing for the first time. The
child's arm and hand have been used in larger activities, but
the finer adjustments have not been practiced. When, there-
fore, the child and the adult begin the new task there is in both a
general innervation of all the muscles and the larger move-
ments are first made. The finer ones together with economy
of energy appear later.

Writing in reversed slant appeared to a greater or less
degree with all the subjects. In three cases the natural
tendency was noticed in a few strokes and consciously con-
tinued; in two it was the result of letting the hand take its
own position and "swing." Another tried to let the writing
take its natural slant, which finally resulted in "back hand"
script.

Improvement is characterized subjectively by a freeing of
attention from the writing itself so that the observer is
able to attend to details, to correct errors, and to make im-
provement in methods. Attention at first is so absorbed
in the writing that the observer is not aware of his awkward
methods. One by one he notices these and corrects them.
Observers starting with good methods have fewer difficulties
at the beginning and are able to anticipate them sooner.
Attention is not only differently directed, but far narrower at
the beginning than at the end of practice. As skill begins
to develop, consciousness is wider and attention can shift from
the task to extraneous matters with little disadvantage; where,
as in the beginning, wandering of attention means distraction,
and the work suffers. The relation, which exists between
late and early conditions, exists also between the right and
left-hand writing. In the latter, attention is easily disturbed ;
a strange pen, a slight illness, or a simple external hindrance
have far more effect.

The general results of these tests with left-hand writing show
the role of consciousness in learning of this kind to be correct-
ive, its function being to criticise, to eliminate habits pro-
ducing either physical discomfort or dissatisfaction with the
product, and to make permanent any favorable variations
which may chance to occur. The fociis of consciousness

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO LEARNING 1 93

changes during the learning, attention at first being on the pro-
cess itself, the details existing in consciousness only marginally
or not at all. Later the learner attends to his methods and at
the same time is more clearly aware of the elements leading to
his satisfaction or dissatisfaction. As the methods are per-
fected they in turn become automatic, the learner assuming
automatically the position which he has acquired consciously.
As the process becomes still more automatic, attention wan-
ders from it from time to time to foreign matters, without
interference.

Mirror Script Experiments. Experiments in learning to write
mirror script (that is, writing which begins at the right-hand
side of the paper, and may be read by holding it up to a mirror
or from the reversed side of the sheet) were carried on for a
period of fourteen days with six observers, all of whom had
served in the above mentioned left-hand experiments. The
general conditions were the same as before. The subjects wrote
the standard sentence three times with the right hand and
three times with the left, and vice versa on alternate days, the
writing of each sentence being timed as before except in two
cases. No untimed tests were taken save in the case of two
observers. As timing seemed to have no effect, untimed
experiments were not made by the others.

The greatest diflSLCulty was noticed by all observers in the
first few trials, and consisted in knowing what the form of the
letters should be. A certain amount of extraneous practice
was allowed in order to meet this peculiar hindrance. Two
observers began by writing on the blackboard with both hands
at once, mirror script with the left hand and normal script
with the right. This was easier than the writing with the
pen, which required smaller movements. The other observers,
seated at a desk with paper before them, were told to write the
sentence in mirror script, after it had been explained to them
what mirror script was, and were allowed to write the sentence,
to hold the paper to the light and to correct mistakes.

Attention at the start was confined to the writing as a whole,
but soon general difficulties decreased and particular ones
were attended to, certain letter combinations being more
difficult than others. After trying to make a letter of a certain
more difficult form, the observers consciously chose a simpler
style. As in the normal script experiments, excessive muscular
tension was shown at first but later disappeared. With ease
in writing, foreign ideas again begin to enter in every case;
but attention cannot get too far from the process without
disastrous results. One observer, for example, became so
absorbed in a train of thought that he stopped writing.
Ease of writing and freedom of attention, as before, allowed

194 ORDAHL

difficulties to be anticipated and overcome before they
were met. One observer consciously pronounced the difficult
letters, because he found himself doing this in one instance
with good results. Two observers visualized the movements,
in difficult places, before making them. No observer men-
tioned attending to the process itself as a means to improve-
ment, but two stated that attention to the process brought
confusion.^

Had there been a good copy to give an idea of the letter
forms, and had instruction been given as to position and re-
laxation of muscles in hand and arm, much of the difficulty
would probably have been obviated.^

Learning to write, as evidenced in the above experiments,
depends on consciousness mainly for perfection of methods.
Adjustments which are at first "unconscious" become highly
conscious then later automatic, a great degree of perfection
requiring the third stage — automaticity. It is only as the
grosser elements become automatic that attention is free to
consider the finer ones.

A certain degree of difficulty is necessary to interest. As
the task becomes automatic and easy, it is impossible to keep
foreign ideas out of mind.

Progress is from coarse to finer muscular adjustments, and
from larger to finer writing in most cases. This means a
specialization of the smaller finger and hand movements, and
a saving in energy, since less exertion is needed to call these
into use, than for the larger arm movements.

Progress may take place without a high degree of con-
sciousness, yet it will not go so far nor proceed so rapidly as
when there is consciousness of the process itself.

5. Learning to Multiply large Numbers Mentally

The experiments of this series consisted in learning to
square three-place numbers mentally, and were suggested by
recent work of Thorndike in multiplying mentally a three-

^The matter of increased speed in the writing does not especially con-
cern us here, though the records were kept and tabulated. It may be men-
tioned in passing, however, that there was very often to be observed an in-
crease in speed in the left-hand writing, in the mirror script and even
in the normal writing with the right hand, from the first to the third execu-
tions of the standard sentence in a single test — a transient gain in skill by
practice of a particular set of movements.

2In any instruction it is just this which should be the function of the
teacher, i. e., to provide good methods and to call attention to errors which
the narrow attention of the learner will not enable him to see. In a task
like writing much mechanical repetition is needed; yet repetition without
attention will not result in improvement but merely in the strengthening
of abilities then possessed, and even of awkward procedures.

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO LEARNING 1 95

place number by a three-place number.^ He found in the 33
observers who did from 28 to 96 examples of that sort, a gain
of over 50 per cent, in skill, but gives no introspective results,
except that strength of visual imagery was not responsible
for the improvement, and that more individuals reported de-
crease than increase of visual imagery. My own experi-
ments were carried out in a manner similar to his, except
that for simplicity's sake my observers squared one number
instead of multiplying two different numbers together. This
made it necessary to hold but three digits in mind at the start,
instead of six. In making the number list, digits above two
were written on cards and drawn at random from a box. If
a number contained the same two digits as the number before
it, it was given a later place in the list, in order to avoid the
distraction, or aid, of too great similarity.

The manner of conducting the experiment was as follows:
A number was read to the subject, the observer repeated it,
and the stop-watch was started. When he finished the ex-
ample he gave the result, the watch was stopped and the time
recorded. In the first day's trials the observer was asked to
work aloud, but in some cases this proved a distraction and
was not required later, though those who wished to work
aloud were permitted to do so. In reckoning the results
Thorndike's arbitrary method of transmuting errors into
time by adding to the watch time one-tenth of its amount for
each error made, was used.

Preliminary tests consisting in running through the forty-
nine two-place numbers possible from combinations of digits
above the digit three were carried out with two observers,
and took six and five days respectively. In this short time
great improvement was made; for observer A the average
daily score in seconds for each multiplication was 51.1, 40.1,
35, 43.1, 41.9, 30.6, and for B, 81.7, 29.1, 26.2, 16.3, 21.4.
(B's last score was raised by one exceptionally long time where
the example was worked twice. If this one case be left out
the last score is 16.2.)

Introspection showed that the gain was partly the result of
the refreshing of the mathematical associations, i. e., practice
in multiplying and adding, but far more, of choosing and using
new methods to avoid obvious difficulties, and of improvement
of methods already in use. Ideas as to means of improve-
ment were not the result of analysis previous to work, but
came after some practical experience, when the observer was
oriented and realized his deficiencies. The formulation of

iThoradike: The Effect of Practice in the Case of a Purely Intellectual
Function, Am. Jour. Psy., XIX, 1908, 374-384.

196 ORDAHL

such improved procedures was really a process of generaliza-
tion. When the same peculiarity occurred several times, the
observer recognized its universal character spontaneously,
and not as the result of conscious search after it. The com-
mon element seemed to drop out of itself. Then, because of
his strong desire for improvement, he consciously made use
of it; but had he not been alert, it might easily have escaped
his notice, and have been of no profit to him in his progress.

Instances of this process are the following : After a few examples A real-
ized that, with the niunbers in use, the answer must always have four digits.
Visualization for this observer was at first impossible, the whole process
having to be carried on in auditory-motor terms. The two partial products
were retained as a sound whole ; and to get the separate digits for the addi-
tion the observer must run through these products several times till the
required digit was found. After several such experiences she realized that
it was only in an auditory-motor way that work could be done, so in adding,
she repeated the first partial product through as far as the units digit, held
that in mind as the units digit of the complete product, repeated the first
partial product again as far as the third digit from the left and the second par-
tial product as far as its final digit, added these two and placed them in the
tens place of the complete product, and so on. Later, visualization increased
to some extent as the result of extreme effort, but remained almost entirely
visualization of a special "form" into which the digits were fitted as they were
required. ? After practice in addition, it was noticed that the first digit from
the left of the second partial product and the last of the first partial product
had no digits above or below them to add to them; and consciously less
attention was given to them and more to the other four digits. Again,
having worked slowly and deliberately so that one partial product escaped
her by the time the other was obtained, she worked more rapidly in sub-
sequent multiplications, spending more time repeating and emphasizing
the results.

Observer B worked a single day, multiplying the numbers out by full
multiplication. He then served as experimenter, with A as observer, and
while so doing realized that the binomial method might be used, and used
it in going over A's work. In his next work as observer the change of
method reduced his record from 81 to 29. The process was first as follows:
Required to square 35. a^ + 2ab+ b^, 35^ = (30 + 5)2 =30^ -f- 2.30.5 + 52.
Later he noticed that a^ always ended in two zeros and simplified the pro-
cess by simply setting together a^ and b^ then adding 2ab. Then the method
unconsciously came of getting 2ab while repeating a^ + b^, was recognized
as a method and continued. Later, while making notes, it occurred to him
that in multiples of numbers ending in 5, 2ab will be the first digit X 100.
This was then consciously used with success. Superfluous words fall away
in the process, only numerical results being given. This last was uncon-
scious, however, as to intent. In all such work, a rule which is first conscious
becomes an unconscious habit.

In squaring three-place numbers six persons served as ob-
servers, three men and three women, all of whom were univer-
sity students. Observer V is the same as observer A of the
two-place number experiments. The observers were practiced
for two days on two-place numbers and three-place numbers,
each subject working three three-place problems before the
regular experiments began. The results included in the
tables are only those of the regular experiments. The rec-

CONSCIOUSNESS IN REI^ATION TO LEARNING 1 97

ords are based on the fifty examples worked by each subject,
and cover between ten and fifteen days. Each worked half
an hour a day. The method of timing was that described
above for the two-place numbers. A rest of from two to
five minutes between problems was given. If the original
number was forgotten in the midst of the work, that problem
was given up, and after a rest, a new one taken. As the ob-
servers worked at different rates, and as some forgot more num-
bers than others, the number of days taken varies. The
following tables give the average results in errors, time and
combined result for the six observers.

A decided gain is clear as far as speed is concerned, though
accuracy seems to remain about the same, unless in the case
of observer IV, where there is slight improvement. This,
however, may be a matter of chance. The accuracy corres-
ponds to one's skill with the addition and multiplication
tables, which have been so much practiced that they have
reached a "plateau stage" where no further improvement
is likely. Improvement, in this experiment, is not in accuracy
of work, not in the speed of computing (at least not to an
observable extent) but in the ability to hold more things in
mind and to attack the work directly and with more advan-
tageous methods. The asterisks in the table indicate the
points at which new methods were introduced. An asterisk
occurring before the first day's score indicates that a method of
work peculiar to the observer was developed in the preliminary
three-place examples. Observer VI began the first day's regular
experiments with a method which required the retention of
but a few numbers at a time and made use of no new method.
Observers I, II, IV had developed methods before this day,
but made improvements in them during the progress of the
experiment. It will be noticed that introduction of new
methods resulted in a large drop in the time, except in the
case of observer IV, who did not continue methods used
after they were once developed, except the general method
used on the first day.

The most difficult part of squaring three-place numbers by
full multiplication was found, by all observers, to be the reten-
tion of the partial products long enough to add them, and to
add the proper digits together. As they were allowed to
work in any way they chose, the effort of each was to find
some way to lessen this difficulty. Visualizers, as might be
expected, had less difficulty than observers with little visual
imagery. A brief account of the procedure of each of the
six observers will best show the methods of improvement.
Fatigue or distraction made retention difficult for all the
observers and affected chiefly that part of the work.

198

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200 ORDAHL

Observer I. This subject possessed no visual imagery for this sort of work.
By the second example of the preliminary practice, he was consciously
repeating the first partial product to the last digit, setting this in the
answer; then the third digit of the first and the last of the second were ob-
tained in the same manner and added, etc. As the required figures were
taken out and embodied in the sum they were forgotten. The next day
he tried to add two columns at once. On the day before the regular ex-
periment he was permitted to make writing movements with his pencil,
which he did henceforth, finding it an advantage. On the second day
of the regular tests he tried remembering the numbers by pairs. (Notice
the decrease on this day from 504.1 to 265.7.) On the fifth day the very
advantageous idea of adding the first two partial products and adding the
third to their sum was hit upon, thus having at no time more than two
numbers to keep in mind. After this the drop is decided. The increase
in time in the last three days was due to fatigue from other work earlier
in the day.

Observer II. This observer is a good visualizer and has had experience
in teaching mathematics. On the first day the observer tried to square
two numbers, but did not succeed in either case, and refused to work. The
next morning while thinking of other things, a method occurred to her, which
she used with success throughout the work. It was to multiply the number
by the multiple of a hundred which stood nearest, then by the hundreds
digit multiplied by ten, and adding or subtracting the result, according as
the first multiplier was below or above the original number, then mul-
tiplying by the units digit and adding or subtracting. Thus only two sets
of numbers had to be retained and work was considerably in ciphers. For
the first two days of the regular experiment a few seconds were taken to
think out the method of work, but later this became unnecessary and the
problem was attacked directly. The method had grown automatic. On
the fifth day a permanent modification occurred in adding or subtracting
by thousands, tens, and imits visually. A question by the experimenter as
to the way the work had been done suggested this.

Observer III — A visualizer. The first three-place number was declared
to be "terrible," the greatest difficulty being to retain and add the partial
products. In the second example she added the first two partial products
and then the third. The next day the method was improved further, con-
ciously, by getting the sum of the first two partial products before multiply-
ing for the third. The regular experiments were begun with this method,
which was afterward modified but slightly. The modifications were as
follows: "putting" the first partial product on all the four fingers of the
left hand and the second on all but tie little finger and including the simi.
This resulted in the thumb and little finger having only one digit, and the
others two; this method was not continued. The third partial product
was ' 'put' ' spatially above the sum of the first two on the fourth day. On
the eighth day she ' 'put the first sum in the left ear' ' and got it again when
needed. From the first, the observer automatically made writing move-
ments on the table to accompany her work.

Observer IV (no visual imagery for this sort of thing). The observer
developed no method until the sixth day except the repetition of the partial
products until he came to the digit required for the addition, as described
for observer I. He consciously hurried through the process of multipli-
cation in order to spend the time on repetition and emphasis of the result.
Notice the decided decrease in the score after the sixth day when the new
method was taken by adding the figures as soon as they were obtained in-
stead of first multiplying for each partial product. Subjectively the work
was much easier after this way was taken.

Observer V (the writer, little visualization for this sort of work). The
method of observer III, namely, the addition of the first two partial pro-
ducts was deliberately borrowed and used in the first day's work. The

CONSCIOUSNESS IN REI.ATION TO LEARNING 20I

calculation was consciously made as rapidly as possible that the parts might
not be forgotten before the whole had been secured. On the fourth day
the last two digits of the first sum were discarded leaving only a three-
place number to add. Figures when they were required for addition were
fitted into a visual ' 'number-form' ' which had unconsciously developed. On
the sixth and eighth days new methods were tried which worked well at the
time, but were used only on that occasion. The first was to add the first
and third products first, the second to place the digits on the fingers of
each hand and set in proper juxtaposition. It was evidently forgotten.
Two column addition was consciously tried and used in instances when the
numbers to handle were not too large.

Observer VI. This subject developed his method in the practice tests
and did not change it; improvement for him therefore consisted in practice
in the use of his method. It was to break the mmiber up into two numbers,
the first consisting of the hundreds and tens and the last of the units, and to
use the binomial method of squaring; in obtaining the square of the first
(two-place) number, the a^, the binomial formula was also used. This
method occurred to the subject after he had gone to bed on the first day of
squaring a three-place number by full multiplication, and he considered it
an original method until several days later a distinct visual image of his
old arithmetic book with its thumb-worn page bearing an illustration of
a formula similar to this for extracting the square root, flashed up before
him. Part of the original experience, without its localization in time or
place, had been recalled, and given him what he considered an original
idea. Stronger stimulation of the complex brought it back in all its
original setting. By the third day introspection shows less attention and
strain than at first, the method had become spontaneous and it was easier
to keep two different sets of numbers in mind. Practice had resulted in
a widening of the field of consciousness. The sixth day the observer said
the work was easier because he got his results almost at a glance and when
they came he saw the figures under the ones to which they should be added.
When he added a certain column he saw only these figures distinctly; the
others were hazy, but he could call them up when he wanted them.

At the close of the experiment, each observer was asked to
give a report as to what he thought his improvement had
consisted in, what part of the processes was conscious and what
unconscious. All said the task was easier at the close than at
first. Observer II, who developed a very simple method at
first, said that after the first few days she was conscious of
little improvement. Three observers attribute most of their
improvement to the adoption of an easier method, and three
assigned "practice" a large place. For all, the calculation
itself was a highly conscious affair, though for three, the re-
sults sometimes seemed to come spontaneously. Adoption of
new methods was in every case clearly conscious, and not
from falling into a certain habit, noticing, and continuing it,
as was the case in the target throwing and the writing. Very
slight suggestions from one's own work or from outside were
often responsible for the idea of the new way of working, or
it "just popped in" as one observer stated. However it
came, the idea had to be there to effect the change. After
the method was practiced a little, it was used directly and with-

J0URNA1.--5

«02 ORDAHIv

out thought. "Unconscious" improvement came in the
widening of the conscious field, adaptation to the experiment
and the Hke, so that the feeUng of strangeness and awkward-
ness disappeared. What at first seemed an impossible task
no longer looked so when one became oriented. Possibly
another "unconscious' ' factor was the gain in speed in making
computations as the result of greater familiarity with, or rather,
refreshing of, the addition and multiplication tables. Mere
practice caused improvement in the use of methods con-
sciously adopted.

6, Results of the Last Three Series of Experiments

The results of the last three series of experiments seem to
agree in showing that the function of consciousness in learn-
ing is to improve the process by bringing errors to light and
correcting them, and by adopting improved methods suggested
by some habit fallen into, or by some idea as to better possi-
bilities. The more purely muscular the process to be learned,
the less conscious the learning of it. In the target throwing
improved methods of throwing came about of themselves
and were not noticed until later. Attention to the mechanism
only resulted in disaster. The most one could do consciously
was to attend closely to the bull's-eye and throw, the proper
co-ordinations seeming to take place of themselves; gross
errors only were consciously corrected. In the writing ex-
periments, consciousness played a greater r61e in supervising
and correcting the process, and for some observers in starting
an advantageous method. In the intellectual task of squar-
ing a three-place number every decided step in advance was
the result of a conscious change.

But these three grades of learning all showed "unconscious' '
improvement as the result of repetition (even the arithmeti-
cal computations), improvement which was entirely at the
physiological level. Improvement, therefore, does take place
without the control of consciousness. Yet even at the grade
of learning where this is the truest, we cannot say that one is
unconscious, but perhaps rather that marginal awareness, in
the sense of organic and peripheral sensations, and feelings
of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, is always present and affects
the result. It is, one may conjecture, a feeling of dim aware-
ness akin to this unanalyzable, undifferentiated state which
accompanies the learning of animals low in the scale. That
it directs the learning is at least not certain, if one reasons
by analogy from human learning where only the higher,
more specialized acts are under conscious control. The sim-
pler and more "muscular" the learning, the more vague and

CONSCIOUSNESS IN REI^ATION TO LEARNING 203

indefinite the subjective accompaniment. Practice alone is
the improving factor. In more complex processes like writ-
ing the learner is able to assume an objective attitude and
direct and criticise his own activities and to shorten, by choos-
ing new methods or avoiding observable mistakes, a process
which would otherwise require much mechanical repetition.
In still higher operations, like arithmetical calculations, con-
sciousness of the process is still clearer. It acts vicariously
for practice, which takes a subordinate r61e. The r61e of
consciousness is similar to that of the teacher who can do little
for one learning feats of muscular skill save give a few simple
instructions, leaving the rest for the pupil to get by the hit
and miss of practice; but in more complex activities he can
act as a pattern, giving methods and pointing out deviations
from them. Since right methods and easier work result in
a widening of consciousness, this will leave the pupil's atten-
tion free for still further advances.

Summary

In Part I we have considered consciousness as an ultimate
fact, undefinable, identical with awareness. Unconscious-
ness denotes for us its opposite — entire absence of awareness,
that which is entirely outside of our experience at any moment
of time. Subconsciousness, for which we prefer to substitute
"perceptual" factors, gives focal consciousness its qualitative
character. Subconsciousness is consciousness of a less distinct
degree. Divided consciousness, such as is present in cases of
multiple personality, is best called "co-consciousness."

The question of the existence of "unconscious psychic
processes," i. e., psychic accompaniments of physiological
processes lacking awareness, depends for its answer on one's
metaphysical concepts, which are in the end a purely tempera-
mental matter. Denying them leads to the interactionist
position. Throughgoing psychophysical parallelism demands
the assumption of psychic factors accompanying physiological
changes, and this position we have taken, insisting, however,
that such "psychic" processes are qualitatively different
from anything which enters into consciousness. According
to such a view one may speak of physiological processes in
addition to "unconscious psychic processes."

We have incidentally reviewed the arguments pro and con
as to the presence of "unconscious" factors and their influ-
ence on mental phenomena. Our main interest was, however,
in the relation of consciousness to learning. From general
observation we have seen no case of learning where one is
absolutely unconscious, yet one may be unconscious of the

204 ORDAHL

end, the process and even of the development of the habit
or association itself.

Our own experimental results are the following :

1. Our experiments on the nonsense-syllable material
give chiefly negative results, but justify, so far as the conditions
of the experiment permit, an inference that what is entirely
outside of consciousness, though it is in such a position that it
might easily become conscious, has no great effect, positive
or negative, on the learning of the same material when it is
presented later to clear attentive consciousness.

2. In the experiments on the "Motor Set" (Motorische
Einstellung) we find that a habit may be formed despite the
fact that one is unconscious that one is forming it. Yet, withal,
attention to the task produces in all cases a more definite
habit, a stronger "Einstellung," than that which is caused when
one is almost unconscious of his performance. Attentive
consciousness without doubt is accompanied by greater ten-
sion in the particular muscles involved in the current activity
of the organism and in their nervous connections. Here
activity is concentrated. The more fully the physiological
mechanism is thus put into activity the more it is affected
in the direction of easier and more efl&cient activity of the
same sort.

3. The experiments on throwing at a target involved
learning of a sensory- motor kind, the doing of a definite thing :
it was practice with a fixed aim in view. Here focal con-
sciousness was almost entirely projected on the target, the
ball and hand occupying a peripheral place. Conscious con-
trol was exercised only over the grosser parts of the process.
Methods gradually changed, and improvement appeared, with-
out conscious change or control. The sensations from the arm
and body no doubt contributed to the improvement, but these
were always at the "perceptual" level and consisted rather
of an undifferentiated background.

4. In the writing experiments conscious direction of the
process and methods was more marked. At first consciousness
is bound down to the general execution of the task. The
more general, larger elements, becoming automatic, leave
consciousness free to turn to details, when disadvantageous
methods are noticed one by one and eliminated. Un-
consciously modifications in the method crop out, and as
consciousness becomes freed from details these are noticed,
practiced, and improved upon. This sometimes results in
a considerable change of adjustment of the different factors.

5. In the experiments on mental multiplication conscious-
ness had a more immediate effect than in the more "muscular "
sorts of learning. Here advantageous methods occurred to the

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO LEARNING 205

subjects while they were working, or between the experiments,
and when these were adopted the improvement was immediate
and permanent, whereas in the more ''muscular" sorts of learn-
ing one's muscular co-ordinations had to be practiced somewhat
before the new method was perfected. In the number experi-
ments, just because one is alive to the situation, he notices
clumsy methods and slight errors, and is therefore ready to
improve upon them. After a method was consciously developed,
however, it was soon used unreflectingly — it became a habit.
In proportion as an activity is conscious, consciousness is an
aid or even an essential factor in its acquisition. This applies
to details and part-processes as well as to the larger units of
activities.

Conclusions

In conclusion we may say that in learning of any sort both
conscious and unconscious factors exist. Unconscious fac-
tors are those involved in the fixing of the association by
practice, and the cropping out of modifications of behavior
subsequently utilized by consciousness.

The more intellectual and highly conscious the material
to be learned, the more direct and immediate the effect of
conscious control. Practice results in a standing out of
common features of the process; these are focalized, and
generalized into rules for new and better procedure, which
immediately takes place.

In complex processes involving both an intellectual and
a muscular side, the activity as a whole is conscious. Details
are gradually mechanized, leaving attention free to attack
new difficulties. Factors of the activity which are at first
only at the "perceptual" level become clearly conscious, are
then practiced and improved upon, and finally become
mechanized and unconscious again. Consciousness is a
corrective agent, eliminating errors, improving on elements
unconsciously developed, and organizing the whole procedure.

In learning simple muscular co-ordinations consciousness is
focussed entirely on the end — on the outcome of the move-
ment. One is only dimly aware of the different sensations
and feelings entering into his bodily adjustment, and should
any of these become the object of attention, disturbance of
co-ordination results.

Learning can progress, however, without consciousness of
the end or of the fact that one is learning, but even here a
high degree of attention to one's task brings more marked
results than work under distraction.

2G6 ordahl

So far as our experiments go, factors never entering con-
sciousness have neither a beneficial nor hindering effect on the
learning.^

^The writer wishes to express iher obligation for the faithful service of
those who served as observers in the above experiments, and particularly
to Dr. E. C. Sanford, in whose laboratory the work was done and at whose
suggestion the subject was begun.

Appendix
Experiments with Meaningless Syllables

The general plan of these experiments has already been described in the
body of the paper (pp 179 ff). It is only necessary here to record the details
of procedure. The work was done with twelve-syllable series of meaning-
less syllables prepared in accordance with the method of MuUer and
Schumann's "verschdrft normal" series,^ except that additional letters
were used to increase the possible number of syllables and to adapt them to
English speaking observers familiar with German. There were 20 initial
consonants and double consonants, (b, d, f, g, h, j, k, 1, m, n, p, r, s, t, v,
w, z, th, sh, ch), 19 finals, (b, d, f, g, j, k, 1, m, v, p, r, s, t, v, x, z, th, sh, ch)
and 14 vowels and diphthongs (a, e, i, o, u, y, a, 6, ii, ai, oi, ee, 00, ou).*
These syllables were presented by means of a rotating dnun of the inter-
mittent-movement type, manufactured by Spindler and Hoyer of Gottin-
gen, which permitted the syllables to remain at rest during the greater
part of the time of their exposure. (See Fig. II which shows the
apparatus from the back and side.) The syllables were seen through the
opening of a suitable screen (See Fig. Ill) in such fashion that a single
syllable of the series to be learned appeared each time between two
syllables of series with which at the moment the observer had nothing
to do. Thus the syllables

tarn pog hex
would be shown, the observer being required to learn the middle series to
which pog belongs, but having nothing to do at the time with the series
to which tarn and hex belong.

The observer sat before the screen and read the syllables of the middle
series as they appeared through the slit. The experimenter sat at the
side of the machine to the observer's right, his movements being entirely
concealed from the latter by a large screen of gray cardboard. Directly
in front of the apparatus and resting on the same table was a second drum,
a portion of the surface of which could be seen through a slit in the black
cardboard screen before it. (See Fig. III.) The syllables were all learned
by the "Treffer method," and the "TrefTer syllables" were shown on
this drum, which was turned by the subject as the syllables were required.

The syllables to be learned were written on strips of white paper 123^
X 3 inches, ruled with fourteen lines and so proportioned to the drum, that
after one complete presentation of the series, two blank spaces were
shown before the first syllable of the series reappeared. The odd ntmi-
bered members of the series — the "Treffer syllables" — were also written on
strips lo]/^ X 3 inches to fit the smaller drum.

The experiments fell into three series. A, B, and C, and were carried
out with two trained observers S and E.

1 Mullet u. Schumann : Experimentelle Beitrage zur Untersuchuog des Gedachtnisses,
Zeit. f. Psych.. VI, 1893-94, 106.

2 The series were prepared throughout the greater part of the work by a competent assist-
ant not otherwise connected with the cucperiment.

Fig. II

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO LEARNING 207

Experiment A. Problem: If a series of syllables is presented within
the range of clear vision alongside of a second series which is to be learned,
and engages the observer's attention, to find whether such a side series
to which no especial attention has been given will later be more easily
learned because of its exposure to possible "unconscious" perception.
If Sidis's and Scripture's experiments are vahd in their results, it was
judged that we should find evidence of ' 'subconscious' ' learning in the more
ready memorizing of series which have been so exposed.

Three of the above mentioned twelve-syllable series were written in
three vertical columns, so that the first syllable of each series appeared
to the observer through the slit at the same time, then, as the dnma turned,
the second syllable of the three series together, and so on to the end.
These series we shall call a, b, c, reading from left to right, h being the
middle series, and the one learned.^ On a second strip were written three
series, d, a, e; d and e being entirely new series and a, the one which had
stood to the left of b, the first series learned. On a third strip was written
an entirely new set of three series, /, g, h; on a fourth strip, i, h, j, of
which h had stood to the right of g, the series previously learned. All ten
of these series were "verschdrft" series, and the ten together constituted a
regular set.

The number of series which could be used for each subject was, from
the nature of the case, limited (11 sets for 5 and 12 for E). The method
of obtaining syllables enough for all the experiments and avoiding familiar-
ity with the syllables as much as possible was this. Syllable series which
had been side syllables for E, but not learned (there were 6 such in every
set), were transposed so that they occupied the places of b, a, g and h which
had been learned, and were then given to S, and vice versa. Thus, if
series retained their former lettering they would read j, i, h; g, j, f; e, d, c;
h, c, a. After each subject had learned these transformed series, E. was given
the transformed series for S, and S for E. Then each was given the series
the other had learned first, but the syllables of the individual series were
shifted. This made a possibility of 552 new syllables for each subject.
When these had been run through, the second and third permutation
(which the subject had learned before) was repeated.

An extra series (indicated in what follows by x) was also used each day
and was obtained by taking a strip from an unused set and learning the
middle series. One set thus divided furnished extra series for four days.
This extra series was given sometimes first, sometimes third and sometimes
fifth in the order of the day, each subject being kept in ignorance of its
position, so that he was never aware of which series he was learning. The
order which was maintained for the learning was, therefore, either: x, b,
fl, g> h; or b, a, x, g, h; or b, a, g, h, x.

The odd nmnbered syllables of the middle series of each strip were
written in the centre of a slip fitting the "Treffer" drum; here, therefore,
there appeared through the slit only one syllable at a time instead of three.
For the first three days, the "Treffer" order was given according to the
permutations of Muller and Pilzecker* but afterwards the "Treffer*^ sylla-
bles were written in a direct order from one to eleven, as it was decided
that a varied scheme would give less uniform results with a moderate num-
ber of experiments, and would not in any case influence the point at issue
in the experiment.

The average time taken for ten revolutions of the drum during the practice
work and for two days of regular work was 87.1 seconds for ten revolutions
or 0.62 -I- seconds per syllable. This speed was accelerated on March 10
(the third day), and from then on was 80.2 sec. per 10 revolutions or 0.57 -f
second per single syllable.

^ The middle series is always the one learned in these experiments.

^MilUer u. Pilzecker: Experimentelle Beitrage ztir Lebre vom Gedachtniss. Zci/. /. FjycA.
Erg. Bd. I. 1900.

208 ORDAHL

Each observer served as experimenter when the other was observer.
Both knew the object of the experiment, but neither knew the results
until the experiment was finished, as no accounts were cast until the end.
With the exception of the first two days of regular experimentation, when
E. worked at 2 p. m., E. served as subject from 8 until 9 a. m. and 5. from
12 to I p. M. (The time for E. was changed because syllables which 5. had
recited at 12 persisted and acted as a disturbing factor.)

From January 24, 1909, to March 7 practice work was carried on every
day except Sunday and four days of the Easter Vacation. Regular work
began March 8 and was carried on every day except Sunday and one day
when 5'. was out of town and another day for E. when the machine was out
of order, making 25 days of regular work for 5. and 24 for E.

At the words "In your place" the observer took his seat before the ma-
chine. This was started and the drum allowed to make one revolution
to get its speed; as the first blank space appeared the experimenter called
' 'ready," and lowered a shutter previously hiding the drum. The observer
began to read as soon as the first syllable appeared, reading through the
whole series of twelve syllables. After the two blank spaces had passed
the series was read through again, and so on, imtil it had been repeated
twelve times. The syllables were read pair-wise, at first in trochaic
rhythm; later both observers fell into the iambic. When the last syllable
was read on the twelfth revolution, the experimenter raised the shutter
and started a stop watch. The observer began immediately to turn the
' 'Treffer' ' dnmi, which was adjusted so that a single blank space preceded
the first "Treffer" syllable, and read each "Treffer" syllable as it came up,
giving, if possible, its associated syllable {i. e., the syllable which had
formed the other half of the pair) ; when he could not recall a syllable he
said ' 'don't know' ' and passed on to the next. When the last associated
syllable had been given (or given up) the stop watch was stopped. This
made a somewhat rough method of timing, but was effective enough for
this experiment in which time was only a minor consideration. The obser-
ver was neither hindered nor helped by the fact that he was being timed.
A list of each series to be learned had previously been written in a blank
book and opposite each syllable was placed a check mark, if the correct
syllable were given, a dash if none came, or the syllable which was given if
a wrong one was given. After testing his associations with the "Treffer"
syllables the observer's introspections were taken on such items as the
difficulty of the series, the conditions of his attention, and influences which
might have favored or been disadvantageous to the learning or reproduc-
ing of the series. The whole process — repeating the series, giving the
associated syllables and the introspections — took, on an average, two and
a half minutes. Ten minutes after the first series was begun, the experi-
menter again called, "In your place," and began the second series by
starting the drum and, at a ready signal, letting down the shutter. Be-
tween the learnings a free time of about seven and a half minutes elapsed.
In this interval the observer was allowed to relax as he pleased, either in
looking over books, walking around the room, or gazing out of the window.
But any taxing occupation which absorbed the attention to a considerable
degree was avoided as it was found to have an unfavorable effect on suc-
ceeding series.

In computing the results a unit was allowed for each perfect syllable,
6 therefore being the score for a perfect record, i. e., the recall of each of the
six even numbered syllables. An average was taken for each of the
series for the whole period of the experiment (24-25 days). A modified
average was also made in order to include partial successes as follows:
One-third was given for each vowel, diphthong, consonant or double
consonant correctly given. Thus a syllable having only the vowel
correct would sctwe i and one having its two consonants or a consonant
and the vowels, |.

Fig. III.

Fig. III. In this figure the screen of the upper drum is arranged to show but a single syl-
lable, an arrangement used in Experiments B and C below. In Experiment A it was open
full width horizontally and showed three syllables at a time. The treffer drum is seen
below behind the black cardboard screen.

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO LEARNING

209

The average of these results gives the modified average. Stated in
tabular form the results are as follows: The figures in parentheses stand
for the averages reckoned from perfect syllables only, and those standing
free, for the modified averages.

«o

Ph'

-H

^_^

•^

"«*•

0»

«o

" — '

v-^

-H

' '

-H

t-t

T»-

Tt-

«o

c«

«o

-M

-w

»o

^_^

M
CI

-H

c«

OO"

«o

v!2

For observer 5 the a series has a slight advantage over the b series, btit
the P. E. is so large that its advantage is quite uncertain. The h series is
inferior to the g series. Taking account of subjective conditions we find
that the a series was on the average learned under more favorable circum-

3IO

ORDAHL

Stances than the b series, and the g series than the k series; i. e., there were
more "mnemonics," the syllables were easier, or attentive conditions were
better. For E the a series is poorer on the average than the b series, but
the h series is better than the g series, if only perfect syllables are considered ;
if the modified averages are compared the two are equal. Here subjective
conditions are slightly in favor of the g series. We may therefore infer
from the results of both observers that tie mere fact of having been shown
as a side series does not favor that series when that series itself is to be
learned — at least not to a degree suflBcient to be detected by this method
of experimentation.

If we arrange the averages of each series according to the position it
occupied in the day's programme we have the following table:

Observer 5

Table II

Observer E

Place in
day's pro-
gramme

I St

2nd

3rd

4th

5th

I St

2nd

3rd

4th

5th

3-2

2.5

3.0

2.9

2.8

2.3

3.37

2.9

325

3.19

2.6

3-3

2.68

2.43

2.42

3-3

2.75

329

2.77

Average

3.0

2.6

3.18

2.99

2.62

3.18

3 09

2.64

2.85

2.80

The figures on the first line, reading across, denote the place in the day's
work; the first column gives the name of the series. The partial successes
are included in the figures used for this table. These figures show that
when series of a certain denomination come early, they almost without
exception show better results than when they occupy a later place in the
experiment, and there is also a tendency to a general decrease from the
first to fifth place as the X series and the averages show. We find a slight
exception for S, where there is a rise for the third series of the set after a
low score for the second series. Subjective conditions probably account
for the increase here. What we had therefore in Table I is probably only
the result of this general tendency.

Experiment B was next undertaken. The problem was to find whether
a side series actually read a single time with full attention would be learned
more readily for that fact, if between the reading and the learning, another
series were learned. The apparatus and conditions of the experiment
were those for experiment A with the following changes: Two pieces of
black cardboard were made to fit in a groove under the slit in the screen.
One was a straight piece which was just long enough to cover the middle
and one side syllable, letting the other side syllable show. This could be
slipped to the right or the left, exposing the syllables of whichever side
was desired. A second piece of cardboard had a square hole cut in the
middle, so that when it was slipped into the groove, only the middle one

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO LEARNING

211

of the three series appeared. One or the other of these pieces of cardboard
was kept before the slit all the time, so that only one syllable ever appeared
to the subject at a time, and that a syllable of the series being read or
"learned." The cardboards were manipulated by the observer. The
procedure was as follows: One series was read a single time by the ob-
server, the shutter was closed by the experimenter and the cardboard
changed or shifted so that the series to be "learned" would show; the
experimenter lowered the shutter at the end of the one intervening revolu-
tion, and the observer then began the reading of the series to be "learned."
As before, ten minutes intervened for rest and introspections between the
beginning of successive series. The programme in outline is as follows, —
Read a once, and wait i revolution of the drum
"Learn" b, i. e., read 6 12 times

" a " "a " " beginning 10 min. after beginning b
g " " g " " " " " " " a

h " " h " " " " " " " g

Read i beginning 10 min. after learning h; wait i turn of the drum
"Learn" j, i. e., read j 12 times

" i, " " i" " beginning 10 min. after beginning J.

The a series was always written at the left of one strip, the b series in
the middle, the g series in the middle and h on the right of a second strip,
the i and j series on the left and right, respectively, of a third strip of paper.
No extra series were used. The g and h series, which were learned without
having been previously read were used as a check on the results of the
other four series.

The experiment extended from April 14 through April 24, omitting the
intervening Sunday, making ten days of experimental work. Twelve
repetitions were used for each series except for S, for whom the number
of repetitions was reduced to ten on the seventh day, because he was fre-
quently getting more than half the syllables right.

The results are given in the following table:

Table III

Series b (P.E.)

a (P.E.)

g (P.E.)

h (P.E.)

j (P.E.)

i (P.E.)

Obs. S4-7 36

4-7 36

3-7
3-5

•15
.23

4.6
4-3

3.2
30

19
27

24
23

4-5
41

3-3
30

.26
■15

•30
•17

3-7
3-5

3-4
31

26
23

17
21

3.7
3-3

3-2
2.8

.26
•23

.28
.28

4.7

4-5

3.4
Z2>

24
31

The second line of averages, reading across, are those for perfect syllables
only.

If a single reading of the series before learning a second series has helped
the first series when it was learned ten minutes later, the a series will be
better than the b and the * than the j. But considering the large P. E.
neither series for E is helped by its reading, nor the a series for 5. But
for the latter the * series shows a marked superiority to the j series. This
is in part explained by the introspective accounts which show that this
series was favored by slightly better conditions, as ease of syllables and
attention paid while learning the series. The superiority of the g over the
h series is also to be explained in the same way.

212

ORDAHIy

It was thought, after obtaining these results that perhaps the a series
did not show an increased average because the average of the b series was
kept high by the fact that it was the first series and, for that reason, learned
with special energy; also, the i series might have been favored above the j
series because of a renewed impulse to succeed which often comes when
one is almost at the end of his task. Therefore, a third variation was
tried as follows:

Experiment C. The two indifferent series, g and h, were made respectively
the first and last series learned. The places of the a and b series on the
drimi were interchanged, and also those of the i and j series to avoid any
effects which position at the right or left of the paper might have had.
The principle of the experiment is, however, precisely that of Experiment B,
viz., one series was read, a second learned, and then the series which had
been read was learned. The time intervals are those of Experiment B.
The scheme in outline is:

Learn g Read j

Read b Learn i

Learn a Learn j

Learn b Learn h

In order to get as exact information as possible as to the relative ease

of the series compared, account was taken of all the "mnemonics" and

of slight associative aids. After giving the syllables associated with the

"Treffer" syllables, the observer was shown the series again and asked to

give with that help any ' 'mnemonics' ' or other aid he had had in learning

the series, and these the experimenter noted down.

The experiment extended from April 28 through May 10, omitting Sun-
day, May 2, and covered ten experimental days. The results are given
in Table IV. The second line of averages for each subject takes account
of perfect syllables only.

Tablk IV

Series

g (P.B.)

a (P.E.)

b (P.E.)

i (P.E.;

j (P.E.)

h (P.E.)

Obs. S
E

4-7 .17
4.2 .14

4.2 .21
4.1 .21

4-5 .22
4.2 .23

4-3 .24
4.1 .26

3-9 .23
3-6 .25

4.1 .30
3.9 .32

3-4 30
3-1 .32

2.9 .40
2.6 .42

4.2 .33
3.7 .26

4.0 .24
3.7 .23

3.7 .20
3-5 .25

3-7 .31
3.5 .31

If reading the series were a help, the b series would show better results
than the a series, and the j than the i, but this is not the case except for
the i and j series when learned by E, where, despite the large P. E., the j
series shows a real superiority. This is due to the fact that on two of the
experimental days the j series was extraordinarily better than the i, and
if these two days are left out of consideration the difference is too slight
to be of importance. As experiments B and C are really two divisions of
the same experiment, there being no difference in character, we may average
the results of the two, which will give the results for twenty days experi-
mentation. Series i and 3 are those learned without previous reading,
and 2 and 4 those learned with one reading before an intervening series
was learned. They are contained in the table following; only the averages
including partially correct syllables are given.

CONSCIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO LEARNING
TABI.B V

213

Series

I (P.E.)

2 (P.E.)

3 (P.E.)

4 (P.E.)

Obs. S Av.
Exper. B
C
Av.

Observer E
Exper. B
Exper. C
Av.

4.7 .36

4.5 .22

4.6 .29

3.7 .15
4.3 .24
4.0 .20

4.6 .19
3.9 .23
4.3 .21

3.2 .24
4.1 .30

3.7 .27

3.7 .26
3.4 .30
3.6 .28

3.2 .17
2.9 .40
3.1 .29

4.7 .24
4-2 .33
4.5 29

3-4 .32
4.0 .24
3.7 .28

If the extra reading was of advantage. Series 2 should be better than
series i, and 4 than 3. This is indeed the case with series 4 for 5 and to a
slighter degree for E, but for series i and 2 the required relation is exactly
reversed. Unless one is willing to infer that the preliminary reading is a
hindrance at the beginning of the day's session and a help at its close (for
which there seems no obvious reason), one is forced to regard the result
of the experiment as negative. Subjective conditions, such as better
attention, will perhaps explain the difference.

In conclusion we may say, then, that the results of all our experiments
with meaningless syllables were negative. The presence of a series on
the side of a series learned did not cause this side series to show more
facile learning than the series not so aided, at least to a degree discoverable
by our method. Nor did actually reading the series before learning a
series give clearly better results for this series when it was learned later.

CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES'

By H0LSN Maud Clarke

CONTENTS

Introduction 214

Incidental Analyses 215

1. Types of Observers 216

2. Attitudes Analysed 217

3. Gradation of Imagery 221

Detailed Analyses 224

I. Explicit 224

Surprise 225

Seeking 225

Doubt, Hesitation, Uncertainty . . , . . .227

2. Genetic 230

Aufgabe or Task 230

Recognition 232

Understanding 236

Relation 242

Conclusion 247

The term Bewusstseinslage^ in the sense of 'conscious atti-
tude,* was introduced into experimental psychology, at Marbe 's
suggestion (1901), by Mayer and Orth, who employed it to
characterise certain conscious phenomena, describable neither
as determinate ideas nor as volitions, which appeared in the
course of a quaHtative study of association. These phenome-
na are referred to by Marbe himself (1901) as "obvious facts
of consciousness, whose contents, nevertheless, either do not
permit at all of a detailed characterisation, or at any rate are
difficult to characterise;" instances are doubt, difficulty,
effort, assent, conviction. Marbe offers, then, no definition
of the conscious attitude; he gives only a negative criterion
and a list of examples. Messer (1906) adds to the list, and at
the same time extends the range of the term, using it to in-
clude experiences of logical relation, of the meaning of words
and sentences, etc. Biihler (1907) restricts the attitudes to
the "mehr zustandlichen Erlebnisstrecken, die als Zweifeln,
Besinnen, Abwarten, Erstaunen, usw. beschrieben werden."
Marbe seems not to approve of the restriction: "die neuer-
dings versuchte Einschrankung des Begriffes der Bewusstseins-
lage entspricht nicht den Ausfiihrungen Marbes," declares

> From the Psychological Laboratory of Cornell Uniyersity.

CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES

215

a recent writer from the Wiirzburg laboratory; and the im-
plication is that Marbe holds to his original ideas. ^

It is clear that to attempt a definition of 'conscious attitude*
at the present time, would be premature. We use the phrase
to denote certain large and comprehensive experiences, not
evidently imaginal in character; and it is our aim, in this
study, to bring these experiences to the test of introspective
observation, and thus to discover whether or not they are
analy sable. Whatever be the outcome of the discussion of
'imageless thought,' it is probable that the name 'conscious
attitude' will be retained as a descriptive term; but how the
attitudes are to be distinguished, analytically, from 'thoughts'
on the one hand, and 'emotions' on the other, must be left for
the future to decide.

Incidentai. Analyses

The conscious attitude is, in general, an elusive experience,
which it is difficult to secure in isolation; we therefore re-
sorted in the main to an indirect method, and sought to arouse
conscious situations in which various attitudes would be likely
to occur. The observers were instructed to give complete
introspections. Th6 stimuli in the first series of experiments
were letters or words which were written in the blind point-
alphabet, and were perceived tactually. At the first sitting
the observer was given a slip bearing several letters in their
alphabetical order, and was allowed to feel them, and to
associate the name to the tactual perception in any way that
he chose. Then letters or words were given him to be rec-
ognised. The experiments by this method fall into two
periods. Those performed during the spring term of 1909
were tentative, and their results were used for the improve-
ment of the method. The stimuli for single experiments
were short words or nonsense-combinations of letters. The
introspections were written by the observers.

When the work was taken up again in October, the method
was somewhat modified. Only single letters, the first ten
of the alphabet, were used as stimuli. The whole of a word,
perceived tactually, cannot be 'taken in at a glance' as in visual
perception. If the letters were mere nonsense-combinations,
each letter had to be recognised separately; the experiences
thus became complex, and the introspective report might be
incomplete. If the letters made a word, the observer tended
to interpret from context, which further complicated the prob-
lem. In the new series, the reports were dictated, and writ-

^On conscious attitudes in general, see E. B. Titchener, Exp. Psychol, of
the Thought-processes, 1909, 98 fif., 270, etc.; E. von Aster, Zeits. f. Psychol.,
xlix., 1908, 60 fif.; on Marbe's position, M. Beer, ibid., Ivi., 1910, 265.

2l6 CLARKE

ten down by the experimenter. The most important change in
method, however, was the measurement of the reaction-time.
The instrument used was a Vernier chronoscope, one key of
which had been replaced by a lever arranged just above the
letter to be felt. When the observer touched the letter he
moved the lever, and thus broke a current and released the
pendulum. A finger of the left hand rested throughout on
the other reaction key; as soon as the observer recognised the
letter, he pressed this key, and released the other pendulum.
In these, as in the earlier experiments, the observer was given
the letters, in alphabetical order, to feel at the beginning of
every hour, unless he declared, of his own accord, that the
letters were clear in memory. There was constant instruc-
tion to reduce all experience to its lowest terms.

The observers were Dr. Pyle (P), Dr. Okabe (O), Mr. Foster
(F), and Miss de Vries (V). The first was at the time assist-
ant in psychology, and the other three were graduate students
of considerable experience in introspection. When the ex-
periments were given in their changed form. Dr. Geissler (G),
instructor in psychology, took the place of Dr. Pyle. Miss
Mary Clarke (MC) and the writer (HC) were observers in
some later experiments. MC was untrained in psychology,
though advanced in other lines.

I. Types of Observers

P is predominantly verbal in type. He reports verbal ideas
in sentence form, with a few visual images, sensations of strain,
organic sensations and feeHngs. Thus, CAB. cab. "I per-
ceived the first letter and said C, but had verbal ideas like *I
am not sure whether it is or not.' "

V represents a mixed type. Visual images play a large part
in her consciousness, and many of these are colored. Rec-
ognition is often mediated by a tactual image on the finger.
Verbal ideas, affective processes, kinaesthetic and organic sen-
sations are also numerous. Thus, DC. dc. "Felt the dots and
said d, c. Unpleasant. Got visual image at once from the
feel, and then said the letter." B. e, i. 20. " Very pleasant.
Sensations from mouth in smiHng. The dot fitted into a hole
in my finger which corresponded to E. Reaction automatic
and hardly conscious. I visualised the round dot and a printed
E. Smiled at the similarity of these."

O is also of a mixed type, reporting visual, verbal and audi-
tory images in great numbers. Organic sensations and strain
play a great part in his consciousness, as do also affective
processes, kinaesthetic and tactual images, pain and tempera-
ture sensations. Thus, I. i, 5.12. "Attention well concentra-

CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 217

ted and body well adjusted. When I touched the lever, shock
from muscular contraction. Vacant consciousness, state of
waiting. Organic sensation like irritation in back. Stamp-
ing of foot, frowning, extreme unpleasantness. Feeling of
motion on left finger; probably a real motion, not an image.
Suddenly a visual- verbal image I."

F reports verbal, visual and auditory images ; more auditory
than any other observer except O. Kinaesthetic images and
organic and strain sensations are also reported, as well as a
few affective processes. Thus, IF. if. "The two letters
have different organic sensations. I cannot describe them
except by saying that that which is with I is long, and that
which is with F is broad; both are narrow, like the letters
themselves."

In the introspections of G, all imagery except verbal is al-
most entirely lacking. Sensations, both kinaesthetic and or-
ganic, and affective processes are prominent in conscious-
ness. When G felt the alphabet in order to learn the letters,
he described every letter aloud, and associated the verbal
description with the tactual perception. G reports that his
consciousness in general is almost without images, and his
memory of scenes and events is in verbal form. He places
things spatially by means of eye-movements, which are un-
accompanied by images. Thus, B. b, 4.42. "At the first
touch perception of a long row of dots with absolute clear-
ness. It confused me, that is, it excited a complex of organic
sensations, and the verbal idea. Why can't I tell what it is?
Organic sensations especially from diaphragm. I said, I have
to see whether there is a dot below or a changed dot at the
end. Then another careful touch of the letter, with the little
dot below most prominent. Verbal ideas: ph, yes, that is
B. The whole strongly pleasant."

MC is of a pronounced visual type, but reports some imagery
from other senses.^ Thus, Symposium. "Verbal image of
the word with sensations in throat. Visual image of a pic-
ture of a Greek symposium from a Greek history, followed
by image of a table with people seated around it. Image of
a convention and auditory image. Round table."

HC is of the same type of imagery as MC. Thus, Re-
liability. "Visual and verbal images of the word. Very vague
visual image of some kind of support bearing a heavy weight."

2. Attitudes Analysed

In going over the introspections, to discover what attitudes
have been analysed by the observers, we meet with some am-

^For the method employed with MC and HC, see p. 236 below.
Journal — 6

2l8 CLARKE

biguity and confusion of terms. So far as attitudes have been
named, they have been listed under the name appHed by the
observer. With this word of caution we proceed to consider
the analyses of various attitudes to be found in the reports.

Approval. V. Pleasantness, with some general kinaesthesis.

AwFULNSSS. G. Once analysed as a strong unpleasantness and frown-
ing, and again as the same with the addition of inhibition of breathing.

Baffled Expectation. O. Visual image of face and frowning fore-
head. Left foot stamped. Slight burning sensation in back. Bodily
and mental attitude was adjusted to a more difficult letter. Partial re-
laxation and muscular strain in upper part of body. Organic sensation
and muscular strain which I could not localise.

Caution. V. Verbal idea. Be careful.

Comfort. V. Organic sensation and smiling.

Comparison. HC, The two things were side by side, visually.

Confidence. O. A good adjustment of muscles, and sensations from
them. Agreeable organic sensations. V. "I sat up straight and took
deep breaths, and had a sense of stiffness in the spine, and pleasantness."

Confusion is analysed by G as ' 'a complex of organic sensations, and
verbal idea, Why can't I tell what it is?" "Unpleasantness, organic
attitude of inhibited movement of diaphragm and of breathing." F
analyses it once as a munber of conflicting strains.

O reports the repeated appearance of conflicting verbal ideas: "It may
mean B and it may mean C," unpleasantness, and organic sensations in
abdomen which seemed to travel upward and to be checked by some ob-
stacle. "Several initial associations of auditory-kinaesthetic images.
Muscular strain in head, organic sensation in trunk." V reports holding
of breath and blank consciousness.

Consciousness of Fitness. O. Relaxation of organic and muscular
strain, stretching of back, long breathing.

Consciousness that the Letter was too Small. O. Muscular strain
and organic sensations.

Decision. O. Slightly agreeable feeling and successive auditory images,
It must be so. — Auditory image. Kinaesthetic bodily attitude. Oganic
sensations. — Bodily attitude and relaxation of muscular strain. — Memory
image, visual or tactual or both, of E. Change of organic and muscular
sensations. (This attitude is analysed several times by the same observer
in the same way.)

Decision to Disregard the Lever. F. Visual and kinaesthetic
images of this action. I saw myself doing it.

Determination. G. Pleasant mood. Verbal idea, I am going to do
that well. F. Nodding of head toward finger, and attending to tactual
image of coming sensation. V. Verbal ideas, biting the teeth and jerking
the head.

Difficulty. G. Trouble to get a verbal idea. Three ideas a, e, and
i were ready, but I do not know how.

Disappointment. V. Organic and verbal. I said Oh. My muscles had
been strained, but were now relaxed all over. Sensation from frowning.
Very unpleasant.

Disgust. O. Organic sensations throughout the body. Unpleasantness.

Dissatisfaction. O. Reported twice. Once not analysed. Once re-
ported as consisting of muscular strain, organic sensations, and impleasant-
ness.

Distance and Direction. MC. In almost every experiment this ob-
server reports a sense of distance and direction towards a place that is
thought of. The two usually occur together, though sometimes the one
is reported alone. "Direction goes on in front of my head, and it feels as

CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 219

if something inside of my head were moving in the given direction. I think
this is an image, not a real movement." "Distance is a visual image of
the space, boiled down, which lies between the two places. It is a schematic
visual image." In one case, in which the observer had been thinking of,
picturing, scenes in the east, these were replaced by images of places in
her home town, and she says: "In going from one to the other my mind
distinctly moved west. This movement is located in the top of the head,
and seems like a movement of something inside of the head." In some
cases MC says her mind 'flew' to a certain place, and this experience seems
to have been a seen motion across a visual area with some kinaesthesis.

Ease op Recognition. G, LocaUsed once in the trunk, and again as
vaguely organic.

Easiness. (This is partially analysed by O fifteen times, and is men-
tioned without analysis four times.) Agreeableness, and motor tendency to
say Easy. — Motor tendency to say Quite easy. Faint but massive organic
sensation in background. — Verbal idea, This is easy, and visual image of
my smiling face. — Bodily attitude and relaxed muscular sensation. (In
the remaining analyses the same factors are repeated.)

Expectation. Analysis agrees with those of Pyle's observers (this
Journal, XX, 1909, 530 ff.).

Fear That I had Reacted too Quickly. F. Slight sinking in the
stomach or diaphragm. Lack of clearness of perception, and sensations
from breathing.

V reports a state which she calls Fright, and which usually occurs at
the beginning of an experiment. This is analysed three times as consisting
of a shiver down the back, and a shrinking backward. Once it consisted,
in addition, of holding the breath and gasping; and once it is described as
a feeling of nervousness and a shiver. The state of Scare, which might
be supposed to resemble fright, is reported only once, and is described as a
sudden muscular contraction. C twice reports fear as an unsteady or-
ganic sensation.

G-CoNSCiousNESS is reported by G three times. Once it is not analysed;
once, said to be motor; and once, to consist of the muscular setting of the
tongue.

Have Finished my Work. O. Bodily attitude which cannot be local-
ised. Tendency to straighten up the body.

The I-CoNSCiousNESS. C. Was a kinaesthetic sensation in the back
of the mouth.

I Ought to Know That. O. Organic sensation and disagreeable
feeling.

Impatience. O. Frowning, and the verbal idea Let 's go.

Injustice. V. Gasping for breath. I started back and threw my head
back.

Irritation. O. Sensation from frowning. Visual image of frowning
face. Tendency to lower and shake the head. Hot sensation in head and
back. [In the fotu* rather full analyses that follow, the above facts are
repeated, and in addition strain in back and neck (three times), disagreea-
ble feeling (three times), organic sensation throughout the body (three
times), verbal ideas This is hard (once) are reported.]

It Must be C. G. A pleasant touch-motor complex, with a horizontal
movement, and a downward movement at the end. In the same report,
this statement was followed by the attitude / had C before, which was
verbal-kinaesthetic. The articulation was inhibited. This again gave place
to the attitude That is C ail right, which was a touch-motor complex with
clear articulation.

Meaning. G. A single dot below the line means a broken T. This
is a motor complex. O. Elinaesthetic and auditory image of the letters.
Meaning carried by the shape of the figure itself.

220 CLARKE

The MEANING OF C is reported by G as an attitude, and is analysed as
a complex of tongue-sensations and temperature in the mouth. Tendency
to say the letter; pleasantness.

Newness. F. "It impresses me as a cutting edge, as a bit of a knife
blade turned up. Definite organic sensations. The whole complex I
should call newness."

Non-Recognition. F. Includes vague visual image.

The Passage of Time. V describes this three times as a perception
resembling that of air currents, passing around and over the observer from
back to front; in one case there was the verbal idea That was slow.
O says that a feeling of length of time came in kinaesthetic terms, and re-
sembled fatigue.

Fastness. HC. The image was projected back into the past. Fast-
ness is more visual than anything else. It seems far away, and foreshort-
ened.

FowERLESSNESS. HC. This was a peculiar tingling sensation all over
the body, with sensations similar to fatigue, and warmth.

Pride. O. Slight tendency to straighten up my neck and smile. Fleas-
ant feeling.

The Readiness to say a Certain Word is in one case localised by G
in the lower part of the head, and again analysed as a disposition or set
of the muscles of the mouth.

HC. Reasoning that, if Canute was connected with 1026, Alfred was
in the loth centtiry. This was partly represented by a visual schema of
the centuries. Canute was in white at 1026, Alfred in dark, therefore
in the loth century.

Reflection. O. Thought turned alternately from A to B. (No
further analysis.)

Relief. G. Pleasiu-e, and disappearance of organic complex. Pro-
nounced exhaling. O. Consists of organic sensation.

Satisfaction. C connects this with pleasantness. O. Instantaneous
pleasant feeling; faint visual image of my smiling face. Organic sensations.
— Pleasant feeling, tendency to smile, organic sensations. — Tendency
to smile. Verbal ideas: Yes, it is quite sure. (These analyses are re-
peated a number of times, while there are also cases in which satisfaction
is named but not analysed.)

Security. V. Long, easy breathing and straight position of body; re-
laxation.

Strangeness. F. Weak organic feeUng all over the body. Strain,
and sensations from breathing, and special sensation from diaphragm.
This last is not a strain. It must be one of the sensations that we get when
we fall in dreams. O. Insufficient adaptation of body, fingers, and hand.
General inhibition, which was a kind of organic sensation; inhibition of
arm-movement.

Tendency to Stay and Find Something Else. O. Consisted of
bodily attitude.

Conviction That I was Right. V. Reappearance of the verbal im-
age of the letter to which I had reacted.

The attitude That I Should Have Pressed Sooner, V describes as
a twitch in the finger, organic sensation, and catching of breath.

The conviction That it Was Not any of the Others. G. An in-
hibited motion of the lips to say B, and the fact that I did not move hori-
zontally and therefore it could not be H. This was partly kinaesthetic, in
the fingers and mouth.

That it was Probably Not G. V. Verbal ideas, and visual and kinaes-
thetic images, of the other letters.

Thinking over. O. Consisted of bodily set, and of associations which
were not perfected. D and J were repeated several times in auditory terms.

CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 221

Uneasiness. O. Reported four times. Once identified with uncer-
tainty. Once includes image of frowning face, and sensations in back of
head and neck. Once is a verbal idea, That has no meaning. Once is
not analysed.

UnfamiIvIArity, G. The touch-motor complex was unfamiliar and un-
pleasant. It led to movements of tongue and lips in whispering: Oh me,
that must be H. Organic attitude in trunk; unsteady shutting of eyes
and horizontal movement of eye-balls. V. Rapid mental comparison of
feeling of C now with feeling of C last year, though I do not remember
how C felt then.

The Upper Row was Too Short for J. O. Tactual memory of J.
Bodily attitude.

Waiting. O. This is described twice, in almost exactly the same words.
Sensation of heat in back, stamping of feet, and extreme unpleasantness.

Wondering. V. Once not analysed; once organic attitude, holding the
breath and strain. HC. Once merely reported ; once described as a com-
plex of sensations in the top of the head.

Attitudes Named but not Analysed. Besides the attitudes named,
there are others which are merely reported and not analysed. They include
one case each of identity of self with the lever (G), the motive to distinguish
the dots (G), the consciousness that I had reacted (G), the C-consciousness
(G), not being right (F), curiosity (O), relation (O), that has no meaning
(O), indecision (O), consciousness of an obstacle (O), unknownness (V),
fast reaction (V), contrast (MC), sense of past time (HC) ; and two cases
each of certainty (V), wondering (MC), and ownership (MC; this was at
least partly visual).

Many of these incidental analyses are, evidently, imper-
fect. Even at the best, the observers might report in large
and sweeping phrases, such as 'bodily attitude* or 'organic
sensation.' There is, however, no doubt that the reports
were intended at the time to represent the attitudes them-
selves, and not merely incidental or concomitant occurrences.
After the second set of experiments, the observers were con-
fronted with an outline of their reports upon various atti-
tudes, and were asked to say whether, so far as they could
remember, the analyses read were, as analyses, correct. The
regular answer was that they were correct, and in several
cases the observer added, of his own accord, that he could
reproduce the attitude, at the moment, and that it corres-
ponded with the analysis given.

While, therefore, we readily admit that introspective
analysis might, under more favorable conditions, have been
pushed further, we believe that the descriptions given are
reliable, and that more detailed work would simply resolve
the complexes mentioned into their elements.

3. Gradation of Imagery

Messer finds five stages in the Entfaltung of visual images:
(i) mere spatial direction or externality; (2) a trace of visual
localisation; (3) vague and schematic images; (4) images
just named, and not characterised as to degree; (5) very

222 CI.ARKE

clear and strong images. In addition, he distinguishes general
and particular, partial, changing and moving, and symbolic
images. The stages found in the observers in our own ex-
periments are as follows:

P mentions only two stages, and these were only in visual
and verbal imagery. The two stages were the vague, and
those merely named.

F distinguishes the following stages . For visual images, mere
localisation, vague, and just named. For verbal images, which
do not lend themselves to exactly the same classification,
very vague, just named. Auditory images fall into the
same two classes. The idea of movement, which is both vis-
ual and kinaesthetic, is very often merely named. Organic
sensations were faint, and just named.

V. For visual images: faint, just named, very clear, partial
image, change, and movement. For verbal: faint, just
named, and very clear.

MC. For visual images : vague, schematic, very clear, par-
tial, change, generic. For verbal: vague, just named, very
clear, aloud, partial. For auditory: very vague, just named.

HC's images are in general much like MC's. Visual: lo-
calisation vague, just named, very clear, partial, change.
Verbal: very clear. Kinaesthetic: vague, just named. Motor:
very clear. Auditory : vague, just named.

O has for visual images: localisation, vague, just named,
clear, incomplete, movement. He also speaks on several
occasions of 'initial associations,' which seem to have been
inhibited tendencies toward the articulation of words. For
verbal: faint, just named, very clear, aloud, partial. Audi-
tory : same as the verbal, and usually connected with them.
Organic: faint, just named, very clear, changing, movement.

G reports for visual imagery only three cases ; for kinaesthetic
other than verbal, five; and these are all described as vague.
His organic sensations are mostly merely named, but a few are
faint. On any page of G's reports the verbal stages just
named, whispered, and aloud, may be found; yet there is an
unmistakable general tendency which, as in the case of V, is in
the opposite direction to the order here given. G invariably
read the letters aloud when they were being felt for the first
time. As they recur again and again, the verbal ideas involved
in recognition fade out, from whispered to vaguely verbal,
and finally to a mere setting of the mouth or right breathing
for the utterance or a certain letter.

Illustrations of the Stages of Imagery.

These typical illustrations of visual imagery represent a large body of
similar cases, which cannot be quoted for lack of space. No one of the

CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 223

observers was instructed to report on the intensity of his images; the ex-
perimenter had not this specific problem in mind at the time when the in-
trospections were taken. As the illustrations show, it is extremely difficult
to draw a sharp line between the consciousness which is rich in images and
that which is 'imageless.' Images may be so vague as to be noticed only
by the most careful introspection; and there is every reason to believe
that some may escape notice entirely; that, in certain cases, the intro-
pections even of trained observers may not be complete.

MC.

Vague. Vague image of a Massachusetts street. Vague image of a drug
store. Schematic. Visual schematic image of June in my representation
of the months. An image of an environment, a sort of mist, but very
vague. Very Clear. An image of the girl, including details with much
distinctness, such as her fight, fluffy hair, bright pleasant eyes, and short
dresses.

Partial. Detached image of a face with no setting. Image of a man in
the rigging of a ship, but no setting, even of a whole ship. Change. Image
of the man stepping into the room from the street and looking at himself
in the glass. This picture was painted before me. It was not distinct at
first, but one part became clear and then another, till the whole was clear.

Localisation. Localisation of the letter in the alphabet sfip. (This
is repeated many times.) Vague. Vague pyramidal image of something.
Just named. Image of H in point. Clear. Clear image of the letters.

Incomplete. Incomplete image of a Japanese key. Movement. Image
of a worm moving.

V on the recognition of A

The illustrations begin at the point where color is first associated with A.
Oct. 22: Visual image of A written in red; Oct. 26: Very briUiant red; Oct.
28: Vivid flash of red; Oct. 30: Visual image of red A in front of me; Nov.
2: A red flash and a little visual written A; Nov. 4: Visual image of A in
front of my eyes, and a flash of red ; Nov. 6: Faint flash of red; Nov. 6,
later: I visualised the two dots; Nov. 9: Slight red blot. After the re-
action, a faint visual A. (See p. 234.)

To demonstrate a series of gradual steps from clear images to
'imageless' thought may not prove conclusively that the latter
is a fiction; but, at any rate, it suggests an origin and deri-
vation. Imageless thought, as its name implies, is, so far
at least, an entirely negative concept. We perform acts of
thought in which we can discover no imagery in conscious-
ness, and hence we infer that thought may be 'imageless.'
Just what an imageless thought is like, or how it differs from
that in which images are present, has never been shown, or
even attempted to be shown, except by way of classifications
fsuch as that of Buhler. In fact the term 'imageless' is unfor-
[tunate; it lends itself easily to misunderstanding. 'Image,'
iin popular parlance and often in psychology, means a cen-
[trally aroused representation of a visual impression. We
[must, of course, recognise also the place of auditory, tactual,

ind kinaesthetic imagery, and theoretically of images of taste
[and smell, though these appear to play but a small part in con-

riousness. The verbal image, which is especially important

224 CLARKE

in the thought-process, may itself be visual, auditory, kinaes-
thetic, or mixed. Even this list, however, does not exhaust
the contents of thought. It is becoming increasingly apparent
that our conscious states take much of their peculiar quality
from the organic sensations, the felt bodily adjustments,
which enter into certain situations. The affective pro-
cesses are also often present, even in thought. It is obvious,
therefore, that the term 'imageless' is inadequate to designate
a thought from which all these elements are absent. Even
the term *non-sensory, ' which is better, disregards the part
played by feeling. We all know in a general way, however,
what sort of state is meant by 'imageless thought,' and it is
just this state which the above introspections tend to discredit.
For they show that imagery does not need to be specific
and elaborate in order to carry thought. We may repeat an
argument, or review an article, in a very small part of the words
used in the original, without sacrificing the essentials of the
content. When we are thinking in verbal images, it is by no
means necessary to say every word which we should use if we
were talking aloud. Again, just because we are not speak-
ing aloud, it is not necessary that every word should be clear-
ly articulated or completed, either in actual throat movements
or in images of such movements. The reports of G, especially,
show that the mere setting of the mouth, or the right mode of
exhalation, serves as well as the complete word. A young
child just beginning to read gets no meaning from his words
unless he reads them aloud. Thought consists for him in the
sound of his own voice or that of another, or in the feeling
of the throat movements involved in speaking. When he
first learns to read quietly, he whispers; then he confines
himself to a mere lip motion; and later, he can dispense with
this expression. The reports of our observers take up this
progress where the child leaves off, or from an even earlier
point, when the. words are still spoken aloud, and show that
and how the suppression of sound and the shortening of the
total process may be carried in the adult to a stage yet more
remote from the starting point. ^

Detailed Analyses
I. Explicit
The attitudes so far analysed have been those which oc-
curred only a few times. It shall be our task now to consider

^We are able, owing to limitations of space, to print only the few samples
of visual Entfaltung given in this section. We have a very considerable
amount of introspective material bearing upon the gradations, not only
of visual, but also of auditory, kinaesthetic and verbal imagery, and of or-
ganic set or adjustment. We hope to present this material in a later article.

CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 225

some of the more common attitudes in greater detail. One
of those which is most often reported is surprise. Surprise,
of course, may have various occasions, and whenever these are
stated by the observer, they are given in the following quo-
tations.

G. Surprise at the smallness of the letter. Kinaesthetic adjustment, or
inhibition of movement, in finger and back.

That I did not feel the letter. Organic sensation, involving inhibited
breathing and fixity of the diaphragm.

At not feeling the letter. Something moving along inside the body, a dull
pressure goiug upward from the stomach to the back of the mouth.

Check of horizontal movement and change to vertical.

Peculiar movement of mouth, dropping of jaw, and slight sensation in
chest.

'inhibition in diaphragm and setting of the mouth to say Oh. [This last
is repeated several times in almost exactly the same words. In two cases
the attitude is not analysed at all, and in others it is merely localised.]

O. Muscular strain and visual image of a working nerve. Unpleasant
feeling.

Change of position. Organic and muscular sensations somewhere, and
blank consciousness.

Relaxation of muscular strain, and a tendency to change the bodily
attitude,

V. Holding of breath and kinaesthetic sensation at finger tips.

Rimning of warm currents all over the body, and tingling sensation.
Very pleasant.

Verbal exclamation.

Kinaesthetic and verbal. I dropped my jaw, and opened my mouth.
Sudden muscular contraction, a gasp, and turning the head.

Muscular contraction.

Held my breath and gasped and contracted muscles.

On comparing these reports, we find that surprise is, in
general, an inhibition of movement, or change in its direction,
often accompanied by sensations from inhibited breathing,
organic sensations, verbal exclamations, and affective pro-
cesses. The important thing seems to be the change or in-
hibition of muscular reaction. Surprise may be called the con-
scious aspect of the adjustment to a new and sudden event
in the environment.

The consciousness of seeking for something, of trying to re-
member, is called by Marbe a Bewusstseinslage, and is classed
by Messer as an affective attitude, in which the relation of the
Aufgabe to the object recedes, leaving a subjective state for
whose solution the Aufgabe suffices. Watt affirms that the
consciousness of seeking for the reaction-word is not present
in every experiment; when present, it consists of a conscious-
ness of direction, and an emptiness of consciousness, with
a repetition of the Aufgabe, and sometimes a visual image.
Orth says that the attitude of striving to find is a complex
of organic sensations, bound up with the representation or
immediate consciousness of a goal. Messer assumes an at-

226 CLARKIS

titude of seeking, which is unanalysable, but finds with this
in the whole situation motor processes, movements of the
head and eyes or representations of such movements, organic
sensations, strain and obstructed breathing.. All these com-
ponents may not be present in a given case. In his "Snap
Shot of a Hunt for a Lost Name," Bailey finds three stages,
which include visual images, kinaesthetic and organic sensa-
tions, and pleasure, beside several complexes such as belief.^
As the experiments on point-letters were not suited to
bring out this attitude, special introspections were taken.
The observers were MC and HC. Some of the analyses
occur in experiments given for another purpose, and in a few
cases the occasion for trying to recall arose incidentally, and
the descriptions were written down immediately. Since these
cases did not promise to be very numerous, however, a special
method was devised. The observer was shown an old and
almost forgotten picture of her classmates in the High School.
All of the picture was covered except one face, and the ob-
server was asked to recall who the person was. Whenever
the response was immediate and no seeking was required, the
case was thrown out, and another face exposed.

MC. Visual image of the face, and verbal idea of the name X. In trying
to think of the right name, I experienced a kind of working or agitation
localised in the top and back of the head. Several names came to conscious-
ness, and visual images of persons that I associate with this girl.

Visual image of the picture and also of the girl. The first glance brought
a verbal image of a name XY, followed by images of XY in two situations.
I have also a feeling of time, that is that XY was much farther back in
time than the subject of the picture. I do not know what this is. It
seems to be chiefly a series of instantaneous pictures. —

In other cases, events and scenes which might suggest the name are re-
called visually, laughter and voices are heard in image, and even the pe-
culiar carriage and gesture of the person are imaged by the observer. In
most of the cases recorded the attempt to recall was unsuccessful. The
reports contain also frequent reference to sensations from squinting and
closing the eyes, sensations of 'drawing' in the top of the head, 'emptiness
in the head caused by the inability to recall the name.' Again: "The
brain working seems in this case to be in the front of the head instead of
the back as before. Sensation in the eyes and vaguely in stomach. Feel-
ing of impleasantness caused by inability to remember."

The sense of seeking for something occurs about thirty times in the same
observer's later introspections upon the meaning of words, and is invaria-
ably described as a groping feeling in the top of the head, with sometimes
a knitting of the brows, wrinkling of the forehead, squinting of the eyes,
and sometimes a visual experience which is described as staring into a blank
field. Occasionally the object of search finally appears as a small object
in the middle of this field. Consciousness seems less rich in content in
these latter reports than in the earlier.

The introspections of HC were obtained under exactly the same con-
ditions as those already discussed. The common element in them all
is sensation from the diaphragm, though that from head and eyes is often

^Journal of Philosophy, etc., iv., 1907, 337.

CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 227

present. In the cases of seeking which occurred incidentally, the strain is
very often in the eyes and forehead. Visual images abound, while kinaes-
thetic and auditory imagery is sometimes reported.

It is evident that the consciousness of seeking consists of
strain in the head and eyes or internal organs, and a feeling
of effort localised in the head, together with images of any
kind which have any connection with the required fact and
would be likely to recall it.

The attitude which occurs most often incidentally is doubt.
No sharp line can be drawn, it seems, between doubt, uncertain-
ty, and hesitation. The term used by the observer has, how-
ever, been preserved in the quotations, so that, if there is any
inaccuracy in this interchangeable use of terms, it affects the
deductions alone, and not the results from which they are
drawn. It is certain, at all events, that in many cases the
observers themselves did not distinguish the three attitudes,
and that the same kind of analysis is given under all three
names.

Doubt is one of the attitudes most often named by Marbe,
Orth, and others; and in Ach's separation of Bewusstseinslage
from Bewusstheit, it is included in the former class. It is
assumed in general, all through this series of papers, that
doubt cannot be analysed. Thus, Orth finds doubt accom-
panied by sensations in the head, organic and kinaesthetic
sensations, images and feelings. "Doubt is not a feeling, but
a complex state, whose constitutive element is the Bewusst-
seinslage peculiar to it." Here is really an analysis of doubt,
plus the assumption that the analysis is incomplete, and that
there is a central thread running through the experiences, which
is indescribable except by the phrase that it always charac-
terises doubt. Whether or not there is such an element is
a question for introspection to decide.

The following accounts are taken from the introspections of G. Uncer-
tainty. Slight organic excitement in the abdominal region. Verbal
ideas: Well, what is that? The movement changed from the B to the C
movement, which was actually repeated. Long dwelling on one impression.
The disturbing other dot was always there. There was nothing pleasant
after the reaction, because I was not sure. — Suspension of verbal associa-
tion, or inhibition of movement in the mouth. The mouth did not set
itself till the recognition was complete. — Verbal idea: What the deuce is
that? The letter seemed too short; inhibited breathing, and pressure in
larynx. — Hesitation. Hesitation between B and J. I set my mouth for B,
then for nothing at all. Renewed touch-motor complex. — Familiar, then
unfamiliar aspect. Kept finger on letter and pressed harder on last dot.

F, I was not certain. It did not feel quite right. I compared it with the
tactual images. The perception had a blank place in it which did not be-
long to H, and the real H was in this space, — It was not a clear cut G and
did not come forcibly. — Doubt. A came, but it was not exactly as it ought
to be ; E came, but I could not decide which it was. Strain from hesitation.
I was not sure. Kinaesthetic sensation high up in arm. Not being sure
was not anything in consciousness; I just did not react. — Hesitation. It

2 28 CLARKE

was not clear, and I kept feeling it. It was not H because not bulky
enough; I said J, but it did not seem to be J because too big. I said C,
but it was too big for C. Visual image of a triangle. J came, but it still
seemed too big. — Kinsesthetic image in forearm and finger. Tactual
sensation not very clear. I did not react.

It will be noticed that the element common to almost all of
these cases is one which may be called negative: the failure
to move on, and to complete the reaction. When there is no
doubt, the process proceeds without interruption; but in
doubt there is "long dwelling on one impression,' ' "the finger
is kept on the letter," there is "renewed touch-motor com-
plex." In addition to this, there is, especially in hesitation,
a vacillation between two tendencies; two aspects alternate
in consciousness, or the mouth is set to say now one letter and
now another, without saying either. Verbal ideas and or-
ganic sensations may be present. Doubt is connected with a
lack of clearness of the tactual perception. As the reaction
is delayed, the attempt to recognise is repeated, and the re-
action is prepared for again and again.

O. Uncertainty. Swift succession of auditory-kinaesthetic verbal images,
initial movements of tongue, and faint sounds. Queer sensation from
bodily and facial attitude. Visual image of my face full of confusion and
unpleasant feeling. — Doubt. Several initial associations, consisting of sen-
sations from irregularly contracted muscles, and a visual image of them;
unpleasant feeling, organic sensation above abdomen, and sensation from
irregular breathing. Interruption of breathing, organic sensation in
chest, and pain in back of neck. Organic sensation in back and spine. —
The same, with verbal images. — Organic sensation in head, chest and
abdomen, unpleasant excitement, faint visual image of my vexed face, or-
ganic sensation in both shoulders, muscular strain in neck. — Auditory-
kinaesthetic images of A, and something unclear tried to come into con-
sciousness but was inhibited. Organic and muscular strain in head and
chest. (This is practically repeated several times.) — Initial tendency to
produce B, C, or D. Faint verbal and auditory image of J, then "it can
not be," with organic sensation. (This last is often repeated, sometimes
with unpleasant feeling.) — Unsteady and recurring organic sensations,
which continued a long time. — Organic sensation like heat in the brain,
holding of breath, muscular sensation and pain. Absence of relief, the
muscular strain persisted. Verbal idea "I might be mistaken." (Almost
every introspection given here is reported a number of times. There are
three unanalysed cases of doubt.) — Hesitation. Verbal image of D and C
alternately. Verbal idea that the dots are very strange, disagreeable feel-
ing, sensation in back. (This is essentially repeated several times.) —
Tendency to stay and find something else. (Hesitation is once unanalysed.)

O's consciousness is made up very largely of organic sen-
sations and strains, and shows much more affective coloring
than those of G and F. Doubt and uncertainty were unpleas-
ant and irritating.

P gives introspective accounts of the attitudes of doubt,
uncertainty and hesitation; the analyses agree almost com-
pletely in being verbal. P's consciousness is so strongly
verbal that whatever else was present seems, in most cases,

CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 229

to have been so far in the background as to be overlooked.
There are a few references to organic and kinesthetic sensa-
tions, unpleasantness, holding of breath, and general strain.
The fingers were sometimes moved over the letter again and
again.

V's analyses of uncertainty are meagre.

I frowned and held my breath. — Unpleasant and annoying. — I could
not tell the number of dots. I tried to count them separately, but finally
had to rely on the image I got from the whole sensation. — Doubt. The
dot seemed flat and did not fit well into the finger. — The letter did not fit.
I held my breath and muscles stiffened. Muscular strain and verbal
idea. Perhaps it was D. — Frowning, vague organic complex, and verbal
idea: I am not sure. (These are all repeated several times. For V the
doubt in these recognition experiments usually came after the reaction,
so that it could not consist in the inhibition of reaction. V's recognition,
whether right or wrong, was usually immediate, and the reaction time was
very short. In the few cases in which doubt occurred before the reaction,
the time is increased above the average. As the feeling of fitting on the
finger is the most common element in V's recognition, so the absence of
this fitting most often marks doubt, but it is very often accompanied by
an inhibition of breathing, muscular strains, and verbal ideas of doubt.)

Doubt does not occur in MC's reports, and occurs only three times in
HC's. It is here analysed as a feeling of displeasure, organic sensations
from stomach and diaphragm, and alternation of attention from one visual
image to another.

Although the observers differ strongly in type, it is easy to
see that there is a general agreement in the analyses of doubt.
It involves an inhibition of the reaction, a checking of the
habitually smooth-running process. So far, it might seem
that doubt and surprise are alike; but there is a difference.
Surprise involves a sudden checking or changing of the motion
begun, whatever it is. Doubt tends to check the reaction, if
it has not already taken place, — to lengthen the reaction time.
The motion involved in feeling the letter, however, is not
checked, but is prolonged or repeated. The observers of verbal
type have verbal ideas of doubt ; others have organic and strain
sensations, and often unpleasantness. There is a marked
tendency to use the term hesitation when there is a vacillation
from one word, image or form of reaction to another. The
organism meets a situation to which it is not prepared to react
promptly. This may be because a particular reaction is
begun, and then inhibited, or because several are initiated in
swift succession, and inhibit one other. We may recall
Washburn's derivation of the feeling of "but." The incipient
movements of developed consciousness, in which the mouth
sets itself to say now one word, now another, or the hand to
make this or that reaction, may be vestiges of larger move-
ments following one another in swift succession and tending
to carry the body in opposite directions or to set it for in-
compatible acts.

230 CIvARKB

2. Genetic

The fact of development has already been recognised by the
writers on attitudes, though its whole bearing upon the
question has apparently not been seen. This statement holds
in particular of the case of the Aufgabe or task. Marbe re-
ports a Bewusstseinslage which the observer called 'memory
that it must be answered in a sentence,' and again one that the
observer called 'recollection of the problem.' The first of
these is referred to, with approval, by Orth, and is placed by
him in the second group of his classification. If we turn to
Watt's work, in which the course of the experiment is divided
into four parts, we find that the Aufgabe is not only clearly
recognised, but is also analysed and genetically developed.
Watt is specific upon the point that the task (or part of it)
gradually drops from consciousness as the series proceeds,
but that the degree of consciousness of the preparation has
no relation to its effectiveness. Messer is, in this matter, in
entire agreement with Watt and Ach.

The course of our own experiments was at no time divided
into parts, and in general little attention was paid to the con-
sciousness of the task. Sometimes, however, voluntary re-
ports were made, and at other times the observer was asked,
at the time of introspection, if the task had been present before
the reaction. The instructions were not repeated at the
beginning of every hour. At the time, this fact did not seem
worthy of notice; but we believe that they were never spe-
cifically repeated, to any observer, after the first hour of work.
The instruction to recognise a letter is so simple as not to need
repetition. The letters in alphabetical order were usually given
to the observer at the beginning of the hour; but sometimes
he reported, as we have remarked, that he did not need them
again. This reminder may have served as a renewal of the
general consciousness belonging to the task. Again, the
general position of the body must be resumed at every sitting ;
that is, one finger must be on the reaction key, another at the
edge of the card holder, the eyes shut. In so far as the Auf-
gabe is carried by bodily position, it must always have been
present.

The TASK is specifically reported in a few instances.

G. Verbal ideas : I must make up my mind to react, and an uncomfort-
able bodily attitude, very unpleasant. (This was not reported as a part of
the fore-period. The recognition and reaction seem to have been delayed,
and the task is recalled in order to hasten reaction. This occurs in the sec-
ond experiment of an hour, the ten letters having been felt at the beginning.)
In a second case, the task is analysed as the organic setting in saying:
Hurry up, don't be so long. (This too is a case of delayed reaction, and
is the seventh of a sitting, the letters having been felt at first.) V reports
the task to press the button as being present in kinaesthetic terms. This

CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 2 3 1

is in the fourth experiment of the first hour of the second series. The
recall to consciousness does not seem to have been occasioned by any
difficulty. In the third reaction of the next hour V "forgot the Aufgabe
to react," and therefore did not react as soon as she recognised the letter.
The whole present purpose was to recognise the letter, and this purpose
was a muscular adjustment, and concentration of attention on the finger tip.
In the second experiment of the next hour the task was present in motor
terms, and especially in a strain sensation in the finger, which relaxed
after the reaction. F reports what he calls the ' 'hurry-up' ' consciousness,
and again the Bewusstseinslage that I must do it quickly. The former is
analysed thus: Strain became noticeable in the abdomen, as if two sen-
sations came from the sides and met. The ' 'hurry-up consciousness' ' is
mostly strain. Again : Organic sensations from diaphragm. The muscles
of the diaphragm seem to come up and press the lungs, and the muscles of
the ribs seem to tighten. (This always comes with the strain of waiting.)
Again : Strain when I heard some one walking. The strain meant ' 'hurry
up." (This is often repeated in the same terms. The "Aufgabe to do it
quickly" is described twice as consisting of muscular strain.)

Nearly all these cases occur early in the second series, and the Aufgabe
is not later reported by name. It does not follow, of course, that it was
not in consciousness at any other time, or that it was not reported in its
elements. The conscious contents occurring before the perception of the
stimtdus were often complex and important, and in some cases occupied
much more space than the rest of the introspection.

In the early part of the series O reports sensations from the difi"erent
parts of the body, as the bending of the neck, stamping of the feet on the
floor, pressing together of the teeth, and auditory images of the sound
made by the finger in moving over the paper. About the middle of the
series he several times remarks: "I did not notice the bodily adjustment
of attention," and in the last thirty or more experiments the introspection
usually begins with the perception of the letter. If there is anything
before this, it is usually the auditory sensation from the rubbing of the
fingers over the paper. The strained condition of the body is mentioned
only once in the last thirty cases. In the reports of F, also, we notice a
marked f alling-off in the number of conscious contents occurring before the
appearance of the stimulus. The first introspection is almost entirely an
account of the fore-period, and includes strain, breathing sensations, kin-
aesthetic, temperature, verbal and visual images, some of these occurring
several times. In the experiments immediately following, the contents of
this waiting period are only slightly decreased. Later the observer reports :
Kinaesthetic and visual images of moving fast over the letter, later,
again: The 'ready' set me off without a conscious Aufgabe. The idea of
movement with the tactual image is repeated a great many times, but to-
ward the last is described as vague, and does not appear at all in some of the
latest observations of the series.

The conclusions to be gathered from these data are in
entire agreement with the findings of Watt, Ach, and Messer,
who offer us not only avowed analyses of the Aufgabe-con-
sciousness at the beginning of a series, but also repeated
proof that it is shortened and modified and tends entirely to
disappear. If any observer were stopped just before a re-
action, and asked to state in words what he was about to do,
he would doubtless be able to reply. We may reason, logic-
ally, that he could not state what he did not know, and
that here is therefore a case of 'imageless' knowledge. It

232 CLARKE

may be answered: (i) that such a statement would be a clear
case of Kundgabe, a report of the significance of a total state
and not a description of contents; (2) that, even if such a
report be conceded to be the verbal expression of an 'im-
ageless' state, it is nevertheless shown to have derived by
direct development from a consciousness whose contents
could easily be isolated; and (3) that, so far from any in-
dication that the Aufgabe was present in other than sensory
terms, it is specifically said not to have been consciously there
at all, and yet to have been active. The reports throw us back
upon unconscious tendencies, but not upon an unanalysable
attitude or an imageless thought.

The attitude which in our experiments shows best from a
developmental point of view is recognition. From the na-
ture of the point-letter experiments, it follows that every
introspection is really an analysis of the recognitive conscious-
ness. It may not be complete, and it may on the other hand
contain experiences that were incidental, but in the main it
represents recognition. The letters were absolutely new to
the observers when the experiments were begun, and when
they were ended most of the letters were recognised both
accurately and promptly. Our conclusions will, however,
be based chiefly upon the second series, in which the time was
measured. To part of the observers the letters at the begin-
ning of this series were not entirely unfamiliar.

It is to be supposed a priori that, as the experiments pro-
ceed and a letter is given again and again, it becomes more
and more familiar. This inference is supported in a general
way by the curves of accuracy and of time, which show that
on the whole all the observers make fewer mistakes toward
the end of the series than toward the beginning, and that the
time required for reaction becomes progressively shorter.
Sometimes, it is true, cases of false recognition or of long
reaction-time occur at the end of a series. These can usually
be explained, however, as due to accidental causes. For
example, the raised letters tended to become worn off, and to
grow less distinct with repeated rubbing. Care was taken
that they should be replaced before this injury occurred, but
sometimes it escaped notice. The introspections enable us
to trace most of the irregularities to these and other causes.
Even without this allowance, however, the curves show a
striking similarity of form, and, with one exception, an in-
variable tendency to decrease both of mistakes and of re-
action-time as the series advances. Curves of the length of
the introspections, in lines or words, would show the same
general slant from left to right. Of course, such a result
could have only the most general application, but the differ-

CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 233

ence in length of introspections is sticking, and, taken with the
other indications of shortening, has a certain significance. At
the beginning of any series there are usually one or one and a
half introspections to a type- written page, while at the end
they average from five to ten, according to the observer.

The letters chosen, which were the first ten of the alphabet,
turned out to vary greatly in degree of difl&culty. E, being a
single point, was the easiest of all. F, I, and A were also easy,
while G, D, H, and J were difficult, and B and C stood mid-
way. The intermingling of these difficult and easy letters
brings irregularities into the times, and makes it necessary to
study the letters separately.

The letter which gave O the most trouble was D. The average time
for D was longer than that for any of the other letters, and the letter was
usually not correctly recognised. In fact, it was called D only once, the
last time that it was given. The reaction-times are very irregular, in-
creasing gradually from the beginning, suddenly dropping about the middle
of the series, and then again increasing. At first D is confused with G,
but later consistently with J. The nimiber of elementary experiences
reported varies roughly with the reaction- time. When D first occurs
(p. j, 4.42), the introspection includes perception of shape, organic sensa-
tion, disagreeable feeling, and images. In the next case (D. g, 8.40) the
image of the reaction-letter comes verbally as well as auditorily, and there
is doubt. Otherwise the report is essentially the same. In the third case
(D. j, 11.62), consciousness is still more complex, and includes repeated
perception, more complex verbal images, and several visual images, of which
some are merely associative. In the fourth (D. j, 10.24), there are added
frowning, irritation, organic sensations throughout the body. "Very
disagreeable. So many sensations and images that I cannot remember them
all." In the next, there is a marked decrease. In the next three or four,
there is increase again; and in the final case (D. d, 15.42), the observer
says: ' 'Auditory image J, or D. I thought it over again and again. This
was bodily setting, and associations which were not perfected. The whole
was accompanied by strains and organic sensations, verbal and visual
images, and unpleasantness, especially at the last." Evidently the ob-
server himself was not satisfied, and the reaction to D was not a true rec-
ognition.

This series will serve as an example of the correspondence between
amount of content and reaction time. It is evident that we have not
here before us a growth of the recognitive consciousness. As the letters
in alphabetical order were given to the observer at the beginning of the
hour, he could not form a closer and closer association between the letter
D and the name J, which the repeated wrong reactions might otherwise
have caused. So we find irregularities, with a tendency toward increase
rather than decrease. The result shows, so far as one case may do, that
the shortening to be observed with increasing ease of recognition is not to
be attributed to a general habituation to this form of experiment. The
change due to habituation can be observed, but it occurs mostly in the
fore-period, and it is not sufficient to account for the progressively shorter
reactions to particular stimuli.

The letter A, which for most observers was one of the easiest, was for
O next in difiiculty to J. It shows, however, a different change in conscious-
ness. A is always recognised correctly except in one place, in spite of its
difficulty, and consciousness shows a general though very irregular prog-

JOURNAL— 7

234 CLARKE

ress from complexity to comparative simplicity. In the beginning (A. a,
14.78) O reports difficulty of perception, organic sensations in abdomen,
spine and back, disagreeable feeling, verbal ideas, auditory-motor images,
and doubt, which last was a tactual memory image of the former size of
the dot and a comparison of this with the sensation. In an introspection
chosen from the latter part of the series, there are only tactual perception,
visual image of dots, verbal idea A, and surprise. In this case the letter
was rightly recognised, and the time was 2.78 sec. F and E show the
shortest times, but they are not very regular. Practice was not carried
far enough with O to reach automatic and prompt recognition. With
every letter except D there is a change toward simplicity of consciousness
and shortening of reaction time.

The letter C was one of the easiest for the observer F. The introspec-
tions may be compared with the time curve. C. c, 3.20. The reaction
was unnecessarily long, I forgot to react. Tactual images as I moved my
finger, especially an image of touching the lever. Sensation of strain in
shoulders and chest, slight interruption of breathing. Attention all on
tactual images. As I was moving across I had the verbal idea: Tactual
images. C is a movement across and down. It is kinaesthetic and tactual.
C came up verbally and auditorily. Saying C recalled the Aufgahe to
react, in what form I do not know. C. d, 3.30. Visual and kinaesthetic
image of movement. I said 'as before' while I was moving across. Tac-
tual image of a point. Touched the letter, and I came up verbally. I
knew that it was not clear enough; it did not fit into what I know I is.
The whole complex was not just right to produce reaction. I felt twice
more and D came up. The reaction still seems just like saying the letter.
'As before' meant going over it without attending to the lever. C. c, 2.16.
Idea of movement, partly visual and involving eye movement. D came
up at first; then I felt the rest of the letter, and C came up verbally and
auditorily. The breathing was right to say C. I was trying to catch the
verbal image and noticed the breathing. C. — 1.96. Strain when I heard
some one walking. This strain meant 'hurry-up.' I touched the letter
and it was not clear at first. I felt it again. It was familiar, but I could
not think what it was. C. c, 2.10. I felt two dots above. Attention
on upper dots, then vague perception of lower one, and I moved down to
feel it. This motion named the letter. C. c, 0.96. Tactual and kin-
aesthetic image of feeling the letter. The location of the letter in advance
is kinaesthetic and tactual. C was visualised as a dark mark. C. — 1.16.
I did not recognise the letter. It was very clear. I reacted to the tactual
sensation. C. c, 0.62. I set myself muscularly, touched the letter, and
moved part way over it. F came up auditorily. I moved the rest of the
way and C came up. Reaction and relaxation. C. c, 0.44. Vague tac-
tual image and muscular set. Clear tactual and kinaesthetic sensation.
There is an image of the kinaesthetic sensation which enters in and makes
a part of the C. When I move my finger straight across, it seems as if I
had moved it down. This is an image. Auditory image C after reaction.
C. c, 0.36. Idea of movement. I felt it, and the letter C came up.

The reaction times of V are uniformly short, but show a very regular
decrease. There is a striking similarity among the curves, some of them
being scarcely distinguishable. Early in the series there are mistakes,
and some entire failures to recognise the letter. In far the larger number
of cases, however, the recognition is unerring and the reaction times are
short. It has already been shown (p. 223)that the color images, which accom-
pany certain letters for V, gradually fade out. In the introspections, of which
we give but the briefest sample, there is a corresponding disappearance
of other conscious contents.

In the case of H, V reacted to a vague mass. The voluminousness
seemed to be the one thing recognised; and she recognised the letter in
a fraction of a second just from its voluminousness, long before the shape

CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 235

began to be definite. J was associated verbally at the beginning with the
strange thing which did not fit, but this letter too came later to have more
definite outlines.

As G had done no experiments in the first series, the introspections here
given represent the whole course of improvement from the first presentation
of a letter to its almost automatic recognition. I. i, 1.86. At first a touch
complex which was focal. Repeated movement in the vertical direction,
which led at once to recognition and verbal idea I; movement and verbal
idea focal, organic complex vague. Feeling of recognition pleasant.
I. i, 2.82. Horizontal movement with complex touch led to no recognition
but to vertical movement over the dots. Visual image of I and very
pleasant mood, localised in trunk. This might be called ease of recogni-
tion. I. i, 2.60. Slight surprise, that is a check of the horizontal move-
ment, and a change into the vertical, with peculiar movement of the mouth,
a dropping of the lower jaw, and slight sensation in chest. The setting
of the mouth led involuntarily to saying I aloud, and reaction. Last
slightly pleasant. I. i, i . 40. I is recognised by the checking of the horizon-
tal movement and the substitution of the vertical. Setting of the mouth
to say I. Reaction automatic. I. i, 1.14. Inhibited horizontal move-
ment. Strong setting of the mouth to say I, which lasted after the reaction
and led to saying I. SHghtly pleasant. I. i, 2,40. Slight setting of the
mouth to say I. Indififerent or slightly pleasant. I. i, 1.16. Different
from the usual I-consciousness. Motion not inhibited. Vertical motion
replaced by tactual perception of two dots, one above the other. Slight
pressing down of the lower part of the mouth, vaguely localised. I. i, 1.60.
Movement horizontal, then vertical. Organic and affective inhibition of
horizontal movement. As soon as this vertical movement was established,
slight pressure of the larynx in setting of the mouth to say I. I. i, 2.22.
Touch-motor consciousness, with change from horizontal to vertical very
clear. Vague pressure in back of mouth. This was the I-consciousness.
Slightly pleasant. I. i, 1.36. Stereotyped I-consciousness. I. i, 1.36.
Stereotyped I-consciousness. Kinaesthetic part in back of mouth more
pronounced than usual. Auditory image: I again. I, i. 1.60. Surprise.
This was inhibited breathing and setting of the larynx and back of mouth
Later the common I-consciousness.

There can be no doubt that the introspections given, and
the far larger body from which they are taken, represent
recognition in the making. In the whole number of reports
there are at most only one or two cases of the comparison of a
percept with a memory image. There is not a single allusion
to a quality of knownness attaching to the perception. The
feeling of familiarity is reported thirty-five times, but in all
but four it is analysed. The introspections of any observer
show, in general, a dropping out of conscious contents, and a
shortening of reaction-time going parallel with increased ease
of recognition. Only one case was noted in which the process
was reversed; the reaction-times here become longer instead
of shorter, the conscious contents increase in complexity, and
the letter is continually mistaken for another.

The cases of reported familiarity almost all occur in the
first half of a series. Their analyses show that they are complex
states, consisting mostly of strain and organic sensations,
with some affective processes and accidental associations.

236 CLARKB

Among the final experiments of most series, where we may
assume that complete recognition occurs, we find cases in
which the reaction is said to be automatic, and the letter may
be represented in consciousness by a setting of the mouth to
say it, a visual image, a flash of color, or by nothing at all.

If the terms 'familiarity' and 'recognition' are used inter-
changeably by writers on the subject, it may well be that they
were also confused by our observers. We should not lay too
great stress upon the names applied to the attitude.
With all allowance made for inaccuracy, however, there are
suggestions here for the arrangement of familiarity and rec-
ognition along a scale of continuously varying complexity.^

If recognition has received considerable attention from
psychologists, so also has understanding. In fact, the two
approach each other so closely in experience that it is impossible
sharply to distinguish them. Our own experiments combined
the methods of Ribot, Binet and Taylor. The stimuli were
words, sentences, and paragraphs cut from magazines, which
were read sometimes to the observer, sometimes by her. The
stimuli were varied in two directions, from simplicity to com-
plexity by means of the length of the passage to be read, and
from sense to nonsense, some of the stimuli being strange
or impossible words. If there is a special consciousness of
understanding, it ought to stand out, by contrast, in a series
in which part of the stimuli are not understood. The ex-
periments were performed during the summer of 1909 with
the observers MC and HC. The latter wrote introspections
on only 100 single words; MC was given the same number of
words and, in addition, 50 sentences and 20 paragraphs. The
general procedure was that the observer drew a slip from an
envelope, read the stimulus, and wrote the introspection.
When the report was dictated, or the stimulus read by the
experimenter, the fact is noted. The words used include
nouns, both abstract and concrete, and various other parts
of speech. In almost every case MC reports verbal and visual
images of the word as the first thing in consciousness; and
sometimes, if the word is not very familiar or is one whose
meaning does not easily appear in visual images, it is repeated
several times.

MC. It was invariably the case that, if the word was unknown to the
observer, she immediately associated it verbally to some known word of
similar sound, and the other contents of consciousness referred to the
meaning of the known word. Sometimes only a part of a word was con-

*Lack of space, again, forbids a discussion, in this and the following sec-
tions, of the views and results of earlier investigators. General reference
may be made to Titchener, Exp. Psychol, of the Thought-processes. We
hope to recur to the theory of recognition, in particular, in a later article,

CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 237

cerned in this association. Metappos. Visual image of Italy and Switz-
erland on the map, accompanied by sense of direction. Verbal image of
the words Matterhom and Metaphysics. Frostilla. Visual image of a
frosted cake, then of frost on a window pane. I do not know the meaning
of the word, but think it may apply to some kind of extract.

Even when the word was understood, it was sometimes associated to
others of similar sound, or divided into parts and then connected with
images which referred to but a single part. This verbal association oc-
cured most often when the word was a pronoun or preposition whose
meaning was hard to grasp apart from context. Display. Visual image
of the two syllables separately, and of a stage at the theatre. Later visual
image of a woman overdressed, not very distinct. Which. Verbal image
Witch, with visual image of a volume of Scott and of Meg Merrilies.
Then repeated verbal image of the stimulus word, with slight groping in
mind, followed by image of a page in a grammar.

By far the greater number of meanings were represented by visual
images, and these were most likely to occur with words denoting concrete
objects, though they were not confined to them. Compartment. Image
of a train, and of the words 'train' and 'European.' Sense of direction
and distance. Visual image of some pigeon-holes.

The contents of consciousness were usually far poorer in the understand-
ing of such words as prepositions, which have little meaning apart from
context. From. Repeated visual and verbal images of the word. Sense
of distance and direction in going from one place to another. Visual
image of a country road between two familiar places. The. Visual image
of the word, then again in big letters at the top of a newspaper; no par-
ticular one. Then a blank. I shut my eyes and looked into a blank field.
Consciousness of 'seeking,' but nothing came.

Sometimes the setting which the word called up was verbal rather than
visual, and sometimes the verbal ideas constituted a definition. Adjacent.
Word at first seen sidewise and not recognised. The J was most con-
spicuous, and this came as a visual image, followed by verbal image; Dr.
Jekyl and Mr. Hyde. Then visual and verbal image of the word, the latter
many times repeated, and a sense of groping and looking into a blank held,
though less blank than usual. It seems at times to be dotted with con-
spicuous black letters such as made up the stimulus word. Later verbal
idea: Things close to each other. Marvelous. Visual image of a house
occupied by Prof. M (name similar in sound to stimulus). Later verbal
image: Wonderful. Rose. Visual image of a rosebush, and of two girls
named Ross. Verbal idea: Roman de la Rose. Images were unusually
numerous here, and I cannot recall the others. They seemed to be present
all at once.

As might be expected, there are cases reported in which the word was
understood, but the observer could not analyse the understanding. There
are, however, only seven or eight of these among the hundred words, and
in most of the exceptional cases there is some indication that sensations
or images were present. Right. An immediate consciousness of the idea
'to do right.' ' 'This was partly verbal, but I seemed also to see something
of a schematic nature. I looked downward to see this." (Whatever the
observer looked down to see must have been of a visual nature.) In-
dividuals. Image of a light place (probably an after-image) with the word
in it. It all seemed to be inside my head, then I seemed to try to get it
out. Paralysed feeling, I knew what the word meant, but it did not
suggest anything. Then visual image of individual people walking. They
bowed. Knowing what it meant was a kind of comfortable feeling, a feel-
ing that I could define the word. This was in the back of the head and
throat. (The feeling that she could define the word, localised in the back
of the throat, was probably the setting of the vocal cords to articulate the
definition.)

238 CLARKE

These introspections, like those of Binet, Ribot, and Bagley, show cases
in which the images were inadequate or contradictory to thought. Noise-
less. Visual image of a house, of a very noisy family of boys who occupy
it, also an auditory image of the noise of those children. This was ac-
companied by a sense of contrast, but I am too tired to analyse this.
Electric. Visual image of a park that I once visited which, however, was
not electric. There seemed to be in the background images of several
electric parks but the other was more distinct.

In the next series, of 50 experiments, the stimuli were sentences of va-
rious lengths. Here, too, the meaning is most often represented by visual
images, if the sentence describes a visible object or a scene. In such cases
the whole scene may be painted before the observer's eyes, a part at a
time, as the words come. The engineer and fireman and one or two
others were standing by the engine staring at it; and so they hastened thither,
well ahead of the outpour of people behind them. (Read by E.) The series
of visual images came during the reading. Verbal images of first two or
three words. Visual images of engineer, fireman, engine and crowd.
He climbed up the straight iron steps to the gangway. Visual image of iron
filigree work. Verbal image of whole sentence. Image of a person going
up a gangplank in the Brooklyn Navy Yards. Second verbal repetition
of the whole sentence.

For this observer all sentences, even of an abstract natiu-e, arouse visual
images which represent, more or less schematically, the meaning of the
whole or of single words. Sentences which are not descriptive may never-
theless be represented visually. Every vigorous state pursues two principal
aims: to enlarge its dominions and to preserve its independence. Visual and
verbal images of sentence. Words 'principal,' 'territory,' and 'independ-
ence' stood out most prominently. Even while I read, I connected it
with my history work. Visual image of table at which I work, and a
'feeling' that the sentence belonged to me. Visual image of the Mississippi
valley, schematic and a good deal in the background. The country was
being extended into this valley. Sense of distance and direction to Atlan-
tic states. The word 'independence' meant the Revolution. This was
mostly direction and distance, and a schematic image of the Revolution.
Independence Hall was included.

Some sentences arouse very little imagery, and yet are understood.
Life is ruled by the power of the deed. 'Deed' was at first read as 'dead,'
and gave an image of Egypt and some mummies. When I read it again,
I knew what it meant,- but it was not as clear as usual. Slow repetition
of the sentence. Emphasis on 'life', 'rules', power', and 'deed'. 'Life'
called up an image of a Chicago street. 'Deed' gave an image of myself
doing something.

The third series was similar, except that the stimuU were whole para-
graphs, varying in length, but all longer than the sentences. Here again
a description of anything which could have been seen is very fully illustrated
by visual images. In some cases these are added as the words come, and
make a whole pictiu-e; in others the images seem to refer to individual
meanings of the words, and not to the whole situation. An arduous task
must have been that of the first ministers of the Jamestown Church. A part
of religious services enjoined were as follows: on week days, early in the morn-
ing, the captain sent for tools in place of arms, when the ' serjeant-major' or
captain of the watch, upon their knees, made public and faithful prayers to
Almighty God for His blessings and protection to attend them in their busi-
ness for the whole day after succeeding. Visual image of some ministers.
Sense of distance and direction to Jamestown, visual image of the town,
and vaguely of a church. At 'religious services,' image of a chiu-ch.
'Early in the morning' gave an image which seems to grow or develop.
First there was what I call the representation of a morning, which was partly
visual but included other sensations, such as the pressure of air on the

CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 239

face. Visual images of captain, tool, army, etc. 'Upon their knees,*
image of people praying. — Even when the meaning is abstract, there is
still imagery.

The second series shows an interesting case of the process by which a
visual image becomes stereotyped and loses its particular quaUty as it re-
curs repeatedly in the same connection. Several of the sentences were
from an article on Buddhism, and this word called up the same association
each time, with some modification, as follows, (i) Visual image of the
word Buddhism and of a Dr. X whom I once heard lecture on this subject.
Visual image of something brown, which represents India, and contains an
idol. (2) 'Buddhist' gave image of Dr. X. A long row of idols and
something brown. (3) Image of a sort of conventionalised Dr. X. Any
reference to Buddhism always calls up Dr. X, and this has happened so
often that the image seems to have ceased to be personal. (4) Visual
image of Dr. X; it was rather an image of an image. (5) Schematic image
of Dr. X.

The 100 introspections written by HC on the understanding of single
words need not be discussed in detail. Some of the reports show that tiie
meaning of a word may be carried, in whole or in part, by a motor image
or an organic sensation. Grip. Visual image of a hand reached out to
grasp something, and muscular image of the sensation in right arm and hand
when something is grasped. Approval. Image of a person vaguely seen
nodding his head and smiling. This was accompanied by motor images
of the action, which were much stronger than the visual, and yet the latter
was not of myself. Stroke. Swift motor image of striking something.
Wanted. Organic sensation in stomach.

Several of these reports show well how the mind goes from one to another
of several possible meanings when the word is presented without context.
Glasses. Visual image of spectacles alone, then on a person. Then of
ttmiblers on a table. Reproduced. Verbal image of the word. Visual
image of my abbreviation for 'reproductive tendencies,' then of some eggs,
then of two sheets of typewritten matter with a carbon sheet between.
Verbal image 'manifold.'

Perhaps this is the least inappropriate place to say a few
words about a series of experiments which do not belong ex-
clusively to the discussion of any particular attitude, and yet
throw some light upon the whole subject. Their only con-
nection with the preceding is the fact that they were per-
formed by the same observer (MC) at about the same time;
their bearing is rather on imageless thought than on the at-
titudes proper. It will be remembered that Marbe used the
Ausfragemethodey and that his questions were criticised upon
the ground that they were too simple, and could be answered
merely associatively, without any thought. Buhler avoided
this danger by giving aphorisms, which offered some diflSculty
to understanding, or asking questions, which required, for
instance, the consideration of whole periods in the history of
philosophy in a brief time.

The object of the present series was to combine these meth-
ods into a differential or contrast method in order to bring out
the difference in consciousness between the answer which re-
quired thought and that which did not. The subject chosen
was history, because this was of special interest to the obser-

240 CIvARKE

ver. She was asked 50 questions, chosen indiscriminately
from many periods of general history, and ranging in diffi-
culty from "When was America discovered?" to "What
were the constitutional difficulties in the way of reconstruc-
tion after the Civil War?"

We find that visual images play an important part in this observer's
memory of history. Centuries and special dates within them are seen sche-
matically and often in colors, while persons and events are assigned to
certain periods because they are seen to be in them or like them in color.
Name the first five presidents of the Uiiited States. Answer: Washington,,
J. Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe. Visual image of each man as his
name was given. Jefferson was especially clear. With Adams, image of
date 1 801. Schematic image of length of terms. It was dark colored and
had some spaces marked off, twice as much for two terms as for one. In
connection with Madison, image of War of 1812 and of an old book on the
subject. Adams seemed to stand in a comer, a turn between two centuries.

The facts of history as well as their dates are in many cases apparently
read off from visual images which had represented them in the past. Was
there any connection between th^ French and American Revolutions'^ Answer:
Yes, The French assisted the American Revolution and are said to have
incited it. The French Revolution was influenced by the example of the
American. Visual image of a book on the subject. Image of the American
Revolution and of arms and ammunition on a ship being sent by the French
to America. Then of a Frenchman sitting in a coffee-house finding out
public opinion about the Revolution. I seemed to see the two wars at the
same time, and to know that the American happened first and was an ex-
ample. What became of the Celts when the Teutons invaded England ?
Answer: They were partly absorbed, partly exterminated, partly pushed
into Wales. Image of Wales and of Celts and Teutons fighting. Then
of the whole country with some Celts and Teutons intermingled. This is
what made me say 'absorbed.'

Sometimes the answer is so familiar and comes so readily that there is
very little else in consciousness. When was America discovered} Answer:
1492. Visual image of the date with a red halo, also of Columbus in Spain
with distance and direction to Spain. Who first sailed around the globe}
Answer : Magellan. Visual image of Straits of Magellan, of the man, and
later of the name. When was the fall of Rome? Answer : 476. Image of
date, and of Rome surrounded by barbarous hordes.

Let us summarise the facts which the two hundred and
seventy introspections show in regard to the understanding
of words and sentences.

(i) A word which is not familiar calls up others which are
similar to it in sound, and the images are appropriate to these
familiar words. (2) Words like 'to,' 'which,' 'of,' which do
not ordinarily occur without context and do not refer to an
object that can be represented by an image, also show to some
extent the tendency toward mere auditory association. Their
appearance in this strangely unconnected position is usually
followed by groping or blankness of consciousness. They often
form a context for themselves, by verbal association with some
word which could grammatically follow them. (3) Words
which refer to objects of sense, visual or otherwise, are often
represented by images. (4) Words which are capable of more

CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 24 1

than one interpretation usually excite in quick succession
images appropriate to the different meanings. (5) In com-
paring the average length of the introspections on words, sen-
tences, and paragraphs, we find that they are in no sense pro-
portional to the length of the stimulus; on the contrary, they
are all of about the same length.

The very fact that the single words stood alone, out of all
connection, introduced an unfamiliar element, and gave
opportunity for all sorts of associations. Experiments upon
single words are, in fact, comparable to 'free associations.'
When a word comes without context, and the time which the
introspection is to cover is not definitely limited, the images,
visual, verbal and other, which are aroused, are likely to be
numerous and varied. Most of them refer in some way to
some meaning of the word, or to its connection with events
of our own lives; but some may be irrelevant. If now, we
read the same word as part of a short sentence, we get some-
what the same effect as when an association is guided by a word
just heard, or when the observer adds to the Aufgabe an ad-
ditional self-imposed condition. The Aufgabe now is not
"Get any meaning of the word," but "Get a meaning which
goes with these other words." Moreover, the time is short-
ened; the words follow one another in quick succession. This
limitation in time tends to inhibit part of the images, and the
context determines which of them shall be suppressed.

It may be objected that it is not always the wrong associa-
tion that is inhibited. Our introspections, as well as those
of previous writers, show that often the images are inad-
equate, irrelevant, or even contradictory. So far as inad-
equacy is concerned, however, we have no criterion, save the
facts themselves, by which we can decide how clear or com-
plete an image must be in order to carry a meaning. Again,
the image which is logically contradictory may yet have enough
in common with the meaning of the word to be psychologically
adequate to this meaning. Two words cannot, indeed, be
spoken of as contradictory, unless they have something in
common; they must at least belong to the same universe of
discourse, to the same context; and it is just this context
which, recalled in any form whatever, constitutes a more or
less general meaning. Logically, it is not easy to see why a
bird, described as white with a black ring around its neck,
should be imaged in its ordinary colors; or why a description
of dogs carried in a basket should give rise to images of cats
jumping out of a panier. Our own experiments are not free
from such anomalies. The word 'noiseless' arouses an image
of some particular noisy children; 'electric' is followed by an
image of a park which is not electric; 'home' recalls France,

242 CLARKB

and the idea that the language of that country has no word of
the same meaning. In every one of these cases, however,
there is sufficient connection between the logical meaning
of the word, and the psychological content of the act of under-
standing, for the latter to carry a general meaning.

The third case, that in which the imagery is neither inade-
quate nor contradictory, but irrelevant, is less easy to ex-
plain. It is a fact of observation that the wrong meaning
is not always inhibited by the setting and the additional
Aufgabe, but runs along parallel with the understanding of the
sentence. Every word, however, is not of equal importance
for the understanding of the whole; and even if a single word
is given a wrong interpretation at the time of reading, the
meaning of the whole may be fairly clear. The introspections
show cases in which the word was seen only in part, or was
at first misread, and the context of the wrong reading immedi-
ately appeared in consciousness. This often occurs in every-
day experience, without attracting attention. The mistake
is corrected as we go on, and the wrong image is replaced by
others which are more consistent with the meaning of the
situation.

These attempts at explanation are tentative only. We
have the fact that understanding may at times be mediated,
psychologically, by images which logically are inadequate,
irrelevant or directly unsuited to their office. The road to
final explanation lies through a detailed study of the condi-
tions under which such representations of the act of under-
standing take shape. Their appearance in experiments like
our own probably depends, in many cases, upon ingrained
habits of reproductive tendency, which by lapse of time are
inaccessible to introspection. Our aim must be to catch
them in the making, — either by casual observation in every-
day life, or by way of specially shaped observations in the
laboratory.

Unanalysable feelings of relation have been postulated
by various writers. Woodworth, in particular, has made
experiments with words and with papers of different colors
and shapes, arranged according to the rule of three, which, as
he believes, show that a relation is sometimes conscious as an
*imageless* thought. His verbal stimuli were presented in
the form London: England : : Paris: X. The observer
was to supply the fourth term of the proportion, and to give
a complete introspection. The reports fall into four classes,
(i) When the relation is easy to grasp and the missing term
is readily found, very little consciousness appears. "There
was nothing in my mind," said one of the subjects, "except
that I wanted to answer your question right." The answer

CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 243

comes immediately, on the hearing of the three given terms.
(2) When there is more difificulty, the relation sometimes re-
ceives a name before the answer is found. (3) Sometimes
the relation is pictured, in some form of imagery. (4) Some-
times the subject reports that he felt the relation, but did not
name it or have an image of it.

Unfortunately, the author does not tell us what fraction of
the whole number of experiments belongs to the fourth class.
If the reports of this group were numerous, they might offer
some evidence for the existence of unanalysable feelings of
relation. If they were not, they may well be explained by
the incompleteness of introspection. All observers probably
fail at times to analyse into simplest terms, or to report all the
contents of consciousness.

We have ourselves made several series of experiments on
this subject, all of which, in form at least, are based on those
of Woodworth. In the first series, the stimulus consisted of
three words in the form of a proportion with the fourth to be
supplied, exactly as in Woodworth's experiments. In fact,
a few of the examples were taken bodily from his paper. The
observers were V, G, and F.

The relation is sometimes present in consciousness as a word.

V. A book: a magazine: : a chair: a stool. Visual image of a red book and
a magazine side by side. At hearing the word 'chair' great surprise, — a
muscular contraction and a gasp. I looked at a chair in the room, then
at a table. Tendency to say 'table,' because I had a kinaesthetic idea that
a book is squarer and higher than a magazine. Same of table and chair.
This was inhibited, I don't know how. Visual image of a footstool.
Then I said 'less than a chair.' Then said 'stool' aloud. No balance.
The whole took effort.

F. Red: blue:: green: yellow. I started to say this automatically. Then
I repeated the stimulus and said 'intermediate' verbally. Some kind of
consciousness that meant 'principal colors'. I did not say 'principal.'

G. Family : individual : tree : fruit. Verbal completion in background.
Said 'group to one.' When you said 'tree,' I said 'tree is individual itself.'
This was in the background. Articulated 'Tree produces what? Fruit.'
There was no association ready, and I had to make one by making a new
sentence. 'Species' also present verbally. Verbal part in background.

Sometimes the relation is represented visually, as in Wood-
worth's third division.

F. Book: chair :: table: floor. I saw a chair with a book on it. Visual
image of a table on the floor. The relation was kinaesthetic and visual.

y. Man: boy :: woman: girl. Visual image of a small boy in a blue
sailor suit. Meaning of 'woman' carried by a vague image of a red plaid
skirt. Then a blank. I said 'girl,' but I don't know why. I was surprised
when I said it. This was vaguely organic, and a little gasp occurred. The
relation between man and boy was one of height, — a tall and a short line
side by side. Just after I finished, I thought perhaps I should have said
'little girl.' This was vaguely verbal.

By far the larger number of relations which were carried
in sensory terms could not be put strictly in either of these

244 CLARKE

classes, but were combinations of images from different sense
departments. Organic sensations were prominent for all the
observers.

V. London: England :: Paris: France. I did not think of London till
I heard 'England.' Vague image of the map of England with a black
dot standing for London. Kinaesthetic image of drawing a circle and
putting a dot inside it. At 'Paris' I had a kinaesthetic image of making a
dot, and visual image of a black dot. Without any effort I said 'France,'
and had image of drawing a circle around the dot. Very pleasant. The
pleasantness included a kind of balance which was vaguely visual and
organic. At 'London' image of a capital L, and at 'France' image of a
capital F.

F. To: fro :: back: front. Repeated the stimulus twice. Organic and
kinaesthetic images or sensations of swinging arm in a circle while saying
'to and fro.' I marked the rhythm with words and breathing. Very
vague visual images. A thin black thing which was moving like a pendu-
lum. I could not see the whole pendulum, but only the arc that it described.
Organic sensations with the pendulum. Suddenly 'back' coincided with
one swing, and 'front' with the return swing. The visual part was six
or eight feet off and below me.

G. /; we :: he: they. This was kinaesthetic. I put 'I' in the first line,
'we' in the fourth, he (he, she, it) in the third, and 'they' in the sixth.
This was the declension in an old grammar. I did not see 'he, she, it,'
but the line was long kinaesthetically, while 'I' and 'they' were dots.

Woodworth's fourth class, of cases in which the relation was
present in consciousness but not analysable into sensory or
affective terms, — the class upon which he bases his whole con-
clusion,— reduces, in our own experiments, to two equivocal
instances.

G. Color: brightness :: tone: intensity. (G thought of intensity as an
attribute.) Short period of confusion, which was muscular contraction.
I repeated verbal stimulus and completed it almost automatically. Back-
ground filled with vague memories, in visual images and eye-movement,
of experiments and discussions on brightness and intensity,

F. London: England :: Paris: France. I fell into the swing as soon
as you started to read. It was familiar. This was a real change of muscular
attitude, a sort of relaxation.

Woodworth's first class, in which the relation is not present
in consciousness in any form, is abundantly illustrated.

G. Father: son : : mother: daughter. Purely verbal. The vaguest ar-
ticulation of 'mother.' No relation about it.

G. Red: blue : : green: yellow. No relation. I was listening to the
colors, and added the one you did not name, as I should have been ready
to mention any one.

F. Is: are :: was: been. Verbal rhythm. I used to say 'is, are, was,
been.' There was just the swing.

F. Boy: man :: girl: woman. Verbal. No image.

V. Is: are:: was : (am) were. Strong tendency to say 'am,' though I
knew it wasn't right. This was kinaesthetic. When the stimulus was
repeated, the 'r' in 'are' caused me to say 'were,' the two r's balanced. I
did not think of the meaning till afterwards.

These seemed to be cases of mere association, in which the
relation had no part. In order to test this conclusion, the
method was slightly modified in two ways. Mingled with the

CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 245

other stimuli were proportions made of pairs of familiar ex-
pressions, in which there was either no relation or one that
could be recognised only with some ingenuity. The question
implied was, whether these pairs would be replied to as prompt-
ly as the true relation pairs. Almost invariably this was the
case. The other modification was the introduction of pro-
portions in which the relation was reversed, that is, in which
the third term really corresponded with the second and the
fourth (to be supplied) with the first. In a few cases the ob-
server refused to react ; but this inhibition occurred only after
such a proportion had already been given, and automatically
reacted to. After the reaction, the observer sometimes saw
that the order was wrong, and was therefore more careful the
next time. In some instances, the change was never dis-
covered at all. The following will illustrate the reactions to
familiar phrases.

V. Up: down :: out: in. I responded immediately without reason-
ing, then wondered aloud why this was right. Felt tired.

G. Loud: soft :: dark: light. Almost reflexly. A little pause of hesi-
tation during which I quickly went over the whole again in abbreviated
form. No relation conscious.

F. Live: die :: sink: swim. Mere verbal association. When I stop
to think, there is opposition, but this was not conscious. (F. can repeat the
quotation from which this proportion is .taken, but was not conscious of
it when the reaction was made.)

Some of the wrong proportions were reacted to as follows:

F. Father: mother :: aunt: uncle. Quite verbal. I don't know whether
the answer is right or not.

F. Day: night :: winter: summer. It is a muscular attitude which
makes me answer. I was set for the rhythm, and reacted just as I should
fill out an incomplete line of metre. The word came up of itself; winter
and summer go together.

V. Day: night :: winter: summer. I said 'summer' because it seemed
to belong there. I heard myself saying it before I said it. Later had a
kinaesthetic feeling that it was backwards, — lack of balance and a feeling
of twisting around.

A few experiments were performed, with the same obser-
vers, by means of little slips of colored paper. Three colors
were given, and a fourth was to be added that would have the
same relation to the third as the first to the second. The
relations were not complicated by the introduction of different
shapes and sizes. The method was not promising, and was
soon discarded. When three of the four principal colors of the
spectrum were given, the fourth was added without any
'feehng of relation.' It was simply the 'fiUing out of the
series.' In the remaining cases, the relation was represented
visually, verbally, or kinaesthetically.

The next series was intended to approach the problem of
relation from a genetic standpoint. The purpose was to

246 CIvARKE

establish some arbitrary relation, and to observe what took
place in consciousness as it became more and more familiar.

The observer was told that
S is the cause of T
H" " " " K
L " " " " M
The proportions then combined three of the letters, in various ways, and
the observer was asked to add the fourth term. The association was
made by G originally from the written page. He was given the above
statement to read and fix in mind. He disregarded the word 'cause' en-
tirely, and remembered the letters as related merely by spatial arrangement,
not visually, but by eye-movement. A movement of the eyes across and
down must be followed by another in the same direction in order to make
the relation correct. When the proportion H : M : : S : ? was given, G reacted
with K because this reply made two parallel diagonal lines. Although the
proportions were too easy at the start to give the method a fair trial, the
76 experiments done with G show some effect of habit. At the beginning,
the whole relation was carried by eye-movement; it was movements that
were equated and that therefore represented the relation. Verbal ideas
sometimes entered in. As early as the fourth experiment, H: K :: L: M,
G reports: 'I did not jump to L. I went down from K to M.' Abbrevia-
tion is beginning. From the twenty-eighth, the verbal reactions are nu-
merous, though the eye-movement continues to some extent to the end.
When H: K :: L:? was given, G simply went down the alphabet automat-
ically.

In order to prevent this unforeseen possibility, different letters were given
to F.

D is the cause of E

R " " " " L

tr\ n II II 11 /~v

The statement was read to him, in order that a merely spatial relation
might not fix itself in the mind. Nevertheless, this result appeared, to
a certain extent; the causal idea was entirely forgotten. Two letters of
a pair were associated, and at first F did not distinguish the first from the
second. If both numbers of one pair were given and only one of another,
the missing term was immediately added. F also tended to read meanings
into the letters. These methods of association made the reaction so easy
that it was automatic, and conscious content was lacking from the first. F
explained his reactions by saying that they 'just go together.' As the series
offered no chance for improvement, it was abandoned after the nineteenth
experiment.

The same letters were read to V. She visualised the top pair with
'cause' written between them, and the others below with ditto marks
under the 'cause,' though she had not seen the paper. Sometimes the re-
actions were merely read off from this image. The fourth term was often
supplied because it went with the third; there was no reference to what had
come before. Only fifteen tests were given.

In all the experiments by this method, there is not a single
case of a relation being consciously carried in non-sensory
terms. Either it is definitely describable, or it is not conscious
at all and the reaction is automatic. In the latter case it
was usually immaterial to the observer whether the answer
was right or not. Sometimes it was worked out carefully
afterwards, and judged as to correctness; but in that event
the relation was represented in some form of imagery.

CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 247

As this method had proved too easy to exhibit the automatic
reaction in process of development, another was devised.
This time the stimuU belonged to three sense-orders, auditory,
tactual and kinaesthetic. The observer sat with his right
arm on a Sanford elbow-board, and the index-finger of his
left hand on a small lever which moved up and down. The
tactual stimuli, large and small pieces of sand-paper and of
felt, were presented by being laid under the fingers of the right
hand on the arm rest. A low and a high tuning-fork stood
near by. The observer was told that the low tone was to be
thought of as large, the high as small, while each one might
be either strong or weak. The sand-paper was intended to
represent strength or harshness, the felt weakness or softness ;
each might be either large and small. The arm movement was
large, the linger movement small, while each might be either
strong or weak. This arrangement was, no doubt, arbitrary,
but it was arbitrary for a purpose. Easily perceived re-
lationships had proved inadequate, and it was hoped that the
artificiality of these new ones would make the reactions suffi-
ciently difficult. Only G and V took part in this series of
experiments.

G's reactions were at first almost without exception mediated by verbal
expressions of the relation. He would say 'loud-soft' or 'strong- weak,'
and the reaction followed. The verbal ideas were sometimes more com-
plex than this, or the relation was partly kinaesthetic. It will give some
idea of the progress of mechanisation if we fractionate the results. In the
first 24 experiments there is not a single automatic reaction. The relations
are carried in verbal terms. From the twenty-fifth to the forty-eighth
there are 1 1 automatic reactions, in which the relation was not conscious.
From the forty-ninth to the seventy-second there are 13, and from the seven-
ty-third to the ninety-sixth, 17. The reactions are most often automatic
when the three given stimuli are from the same sense department. There
were only four possible variations in one sense department, and when
three were given the fourth followed automatically. The series was
carried so far, however, that even proportions between stimuli of different
sense orders were sometimes reacted to automatically.

V made 40 experiments by this method but with no new result. The
relation was usually verbal, once or twice kinaesthetic, and several times
purely associative.

When we consider all of the relation experiments, we see
that by far the larger part of the reactions were accompanied
by some 'consciousness of relation* in terms of sensory or
verbal images, and that the rest prove to be mere associations
or else tendencies to fill out a group, by adding the inevitable
fourth member, without any consciousness. Woodworth's
fourth group is not paralleled in our experiments.

C0NCI.US10N

In conclusion, we may attempt to sum up the arguments
which make against the simplicity of the 'conscious attitude'

248 CLARKE

and the existence of 'imageless' thought. These may be
divided into the negative or critical, and the positive or those
based upon our own experimental work. Under the former
head the following may be noted:

(i) Having been named and negatively defined by Marbe,
the Bewusstseinslagen are henceforth taken for granted.
They are reported, along with sensation and image and feeling,
in the analyses of complex states, and little or no attempt is
made to analyse them.

(2) Nevertheless, they are, on several occasions, at least
partly analysed, as witness Orth's account of doubt, Messer's
and Watt's of trying to remember, and the discussions of the
Aufgabe, which show it to be an attitude derived by practice
from an analy sable situation.

(3) The cases in which thought-elements or imageless
thoughts or attitudes are reported as the 'consciousness that,'
etc., are cases not of psychological description, but of the
translation into words of the meaning of a conscious state
(Kundgabe).

(4) Our own conclusions are based upon the introspec-
tions of seven observers, of whom all but one had had several
years of psychological training. These observers were not
all of one type, but ranged from the strongly visual to one
who almost never has visual images, and from those who al-
most never report kinaesthetic sensations to those for whom
these sensations and images are essential. These seven
persons wrote, altogether, somewhat more than fourteen
hundred introspections. In the series with point-letters
alone, over four hundred cases of attitude are specifically
reported, — aside from recognition, which is assumed to be
present in all observations. Of these four hundred, about
one fourth were merely named, while the remaining three
fourths are more or less completely analysed. When the
attitudes occur often enough to give a basis for generalisation,
there is striking agreement between different observers and
for the same observer at different times, and we are thus able
to pick out, with a fair degree of assurance, the pattern of con-
sciousness which represents a given situation. The introspec-
tions of any one observer show different stages of clearness
and intensity of imagery, which allow us to connect, by a
graded series of intermediate steps, a complex of vivid and
explicit imagery with a vague and condensed consciousness
which we suppose to represent what is called 'imageless'
thought. The Aufgabe, recognition, and the feeling of relation
are shown to be capable of development, by a process of
change and mechanisation, from states which are obviously
complex and imaginal.

CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES

249

It may, we think, be fairly said that the attitudes here ana-
lysed are typical of the whole class ; they are certainly among
those most often mentioned by writers on the subject. But,
if part of the class can be reduced to simpler terms so often, so
definitely, and so uniformly, there is every reason to believe
that the rest will show themselves similarly complex, when they
are subjected to the same analytical treatment. The general
conclusion to be drawn from the sum of our results is that
conscious attitudes can be analysed into sensations and
images and feelings, or traced genetically to such analysable
complexes, and therefore do not warrant the proposal of an
additional conscious element.

JOURNAI, — 8

AN EXPERIMENTAL DEMONSTRATION OF THE

BINAURAL RATIO AS A,^ -FACTOR IN AUDITORY

LOCALIZATION

By C. E. FerrEE and Ruth Goli^ins, Bryn Mawr College

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Historical 250

II. Experimental 271

A. The Demonstration of -the Binam-al Ratio as a Factor 271

(a) Lines of Argument 271
(i) Observers having a natural difference in sensitivity

for the two ears show a constant tendency to dis-
place the sound in the direction of the stronger
ear; and, conversely, observers without this differ-
ence show no tendency toward right or left dis-
placement

(2) Changes in the ratio of sensitivity produced by plug-

ging either of the two ears are followed by corres-
ponding displacements of the sound toward the
stronger ear

(3) A natural tendency toward right or left displace-

ment can be corrected by making the proper
change in the ratio of sensitivity of the two ears

(b) Description of Method and Apparatus 273

B. The Relative Importance of Intensity and Timbre as Fac-
tors in Localization 282

C. Individual Preferences^ and Their Explanations for the
Observers Used 290

D. The Question of Changes in these Preferences with Lapse of
Time^ 293

III. Summary of Results 294

I. Historical

It is difficult to ascertain just when the belief in the binaural
ratio as a factor in auditory localization came into vogue.
The experimental arguments offered in favor of this belief,
however, are not so hard to trace. They began with the
tuning-fork experiment of Weber,'' and have been continued

^Vide von Kries: Ueber das Erkennen der Schallrichtung, Zeitschr. f.
Psychol, u. Physiol., I, 1890, 236-251; and Dimlap: The Localization of
Sounds, Psychol. Rev., Monog. Suppl., Vol. X, No. i, 1908, pp. 5, 8, 15.

^Vide Dimlap: Op. ciL, pp. 5, 10, and 15.

2 Weber: Programm. Coll., 4 2. This experiment was not offered by
Weber as an argument for the binaural ratio of intensity, although it has
frequently been cited as furnishing such argument.

AUDITORY LOCAUZATION 25 1

by the work of Fechner,^ Rayleigh,^ Politzer,' von Kries
and Auerbach/ Tarchanoff/ Steinhauser/ Urbantschitsch/
Thompson,' KesseP von Bezold/" Schaefer^S Smith," Bloch,"
Pierce/* Matsumoto,^^ Melati,^'Stenger," Starch," and Wilson
and Myers."

A r^sum^ of this work down to 190 1 has been given by Pierce
It will be sufficient, therefore, for the purpose of this report
to continue the r^sum^ up to the present time, and to make a
brief statement of all the lines of argument that have been
advanced for the binaural ratio as a factor in auditory locali-
zation.

^Fechner, G. T. : Ueher einige Verhdltnisse des binocular en Sehens (Chap*
XVIII, Ueber einige Verhdltnisse des zweiseitigen Hdrens). Abhdlg. d'
Sachs. Gesellsch. d. Wiss. (Mathemat. Klasse V), Bd. V, S. 543. i86i*

'Rayleigh, Lord: Our Perception of the Direction of a Source of Sound,
Trans. Mus. Ass. 1876; Acoustical Observations, Philos. Mag. (5) Vol. Ill,

1877. p. 456.
'Politzer: Studien iiber die Paracusis Loci, Archiv. f. Ohrenheilk. 1876,

XI. 231.

*von Kries u. Auerbach: Die Zeitdauer einfachster psychischer Vorgange,
Archiv fiir Anatom. u. Physiol,, 1877, 321-337.

^Tarchanoff: Das Telephon als Anzeiger der N erven und Muskelstrome
beim Menschen und den Thieren, St. Petersburger med. Wochenschrift,

1878, No. 43, pp. 353-354.
®Steinhauser, Anton: The Theory of Binaural Audition: A Contribution

to the Theory of Sound, Philos. Mag., Ser. 5, Vol. VII, 1879, pp. 261-274.

'Urbantschitsch, V. : Zur Lehre von der Schallempfindung, Pfiuger's Archiv,
XXIV, 1 88 1, 579.

^Sylvanus Thompson: The Pseudophone, Philos. Mag. (5), VIII, 1879,
385-390. On the Function of the Two Ears in the Perception of Space, Philos.
Mag. (5), XIII, 1882, 406-416.

^Kessel : Ueber die Functionl der Ohrmuschel, bei den Raumwahrnehmungen,
Archiv f. Ohrenheilk. XVIII, 1882, p. 120.

*°W. von Bezold: Urteilstduschung nach Beseitigung einseitiger Hartr
hdrigkeit, Zeitschr. f. Psychol, u. Physiol., 1890, pp. 486-488.

"Schaefer, K. L. : Lokalisation diotischen Wahrnehmungen, Zeitschr. f .
Psychol, u. Physiol., I, 1890, S. 300-309.

"Smith, G. : How do we Detect the Direction from which Sound Comes?
Cincin. Lancet- Clinic, n. s., XXVIII. 1892, p. 542.

^^Bloch: Das binaurale Hdren,Wiesha.de.n, 1893, pp. 61 ; Zeitschr. f. Ohren-
heilk., XXIV, 1893, pp. 25-86.

"Pierce, A. H. : Studies in Space Perception, 1901.

^^Matsumoto: Researches in Acoustic SpCLce, Studies from the Yale Psy-
chological Laboratory, V, 1897.

^^Melati, Gino: Ueber binaurales Hdren, Philos. Studien, XVII (3), 1901,
431-461.

^^Stenger: Zur Theorie des binauralen Hdrens, Zeitschr. f. Ohrenheilk.,
XLVIII, 219.

^^Starch, D. : Perimetry of the Localization of Sound, Psychol. Rev., Monog.
Suppl. (Univ. of Iowa Studies), Vol. IV, No. 28, 1905, pp. 1-45; ibid..
Vol. IX, No. 2, 1908, pp. 1-55
_ "Wilson, H. A. and Myers, C. S. : The Influence of Binaural Phase Differ-
IBj ences in the Localizations of Sound, The British Journal of Psychology,
■■i 1908, II, pp, 362-386.

252 FERREE AND COLUNS

Since 1901 reports of work on the general subject of auditory
localization have been published by the following investiga-
tors: Lobsien,^ Angell and Fite,^ Melati,^ Gamble,* Angell/
Seashore/ Bing/ Urbantschitsch/ Stenger/ Bard/° Starch,"
Rayleigh/^ More and Fry," Bowlker/* Wilson and Myers,"
and Hicks and Washburn. ^^

Of these only six bear with sufficient directness and defi-
niteness upon the subject of this report to warrant consider-
ation here; namely, the papers of Angell, Angell and Fite,
Starch, Rayleigh, More and Fry, and Wilson and Myers.

In 1903 Angell," in furtherance of the suggestions and ob-

^Lobsien, Marx: Ueher binaurales Hdren und auffdllige Schalllocalisation.
Zeitschr. f. Psychol, u. Physiol., XXIV, 1900, S. 285-295.

^Angell, J. R. and Fite, W: The Monaural Localization of Sound, Psychol.
Rev., VIII, 1901, pp. 225-247; Further Observations on the Monaural Lo-
calization of Sound, ibid., 449-459.

'Melati, Gino: Op. cit.

^Gamble, E. A. McC. : The Perception of Sound Direction as a Conscious
Process, Psychol. Rev., IX, 1902, 357-373; Intensity as a Criterion in
Estimating the Distance of Sounds, Psychol. Rev., XVI, 1909, 416-426.

^Angell, J. R. : .4 Preliminary Study of the Significance of Partial Tones
in the Localization of Sound, Psychol. Rev., X, 1903, pp. 1-15.

^Seashore, C. E.: Localization of Sound in the Median Plane, Univ. of
Iowa Studies in Psychology, 1899, 11, 46-54; A Sound Perimeter, Psychol.
Rev., X, 1903, pp. 64-68; The Localization of Sound, Middletonian, 1903
(Dec), pp. 15.

'Bing, A. : Bemerkungen zur Lokalisation der Tonwahrnehmung, Monatschr.
f. Ohrenheilk., XXXVIII, 1904, 220-225.

^Urbantschitsch, V.: Ueber die Lokalisation der Tonempfindungen,
Archiv. f. d. ges. Physiol. (Pfliiger's), CI, 1904, 154-182.

^Stenger: Op. cit.

i°Bard, L. : L' orientation auditive angulaire, Archiv. gen. de Med., CXCV,
1905, 257.

"Starch, D.: Op. cit.

"Rayleigh, Lord: On our Perception of Sound Direction, Philos. Mag.,
XIII, Ser. 6, 1907, pp. 214-232; Acoustical Notes, Sensations of Right and
Left from a Revolving Magnet and Telephones, ibid., pp. 316-319; Acoustical
Notes, Discrimination between Sounds Directly in Front and Directly Behind
the Observer, ibid., XVI, 1908, pp. 240-241.

"More, L. T. and Fry, H. S. : On the Appreciation of Phase of Sound Waves,
Philos. Mag., Ser. 6, XVII, 1907, pp. 452-459.

**Bowlker, T. J. : On the Factors Serving to Determine the Direction of Sound,
Philos. Mag., Ser. 6, XV, 1908, pp. 318-332.

"Wilson, H. A. and Myers, C. S. : The Influence of Binaural Phase Differ-
ences on the Localization of Sounds, British Journal of Psychology, II, 1908,
pp. 362-384.

^^Hicks, J. and Washburn, M. F. : A Suggestion towards a Study of the
Perception of Sound Movement, Am. Jour, of Psychol., XIX, 1908, 247-248.

"Angell. J. R.: Op. €it.

AUDITORY LOCALIZATION 253

servations made by Rayleigh/ Thompson,^ Mach,' and Pierce,*
undertook a systematic investigation of the influence of timbre
on the localization of sound. Careful observations, in the
open air, were made of the accuracy of the localization of sim-
ple tones and of clangs. The sounds employed were a tuning-
fork of 1,000 vibrations per second, a stopped pipe of 768 vibra-
tions, a reed pipe of 768 vibrations, a bell with a fundamental
tone of 2,048 vibrations, and the noise made by a telegraph
sounder. An interpretation of his results, based on the relative
accuracy of localization at different points in the vertical, hori-
zontal, and transverse planes, led him to conclude that intensity
differences alone are sufficient to enable our confident and cor-
rect assignment of the sound (even in case of pure tones) to the
median plane, the lateral hemisphere, and, in a general way,
to the transverse plane. But accuracy as regards altitude in
the transverse plane, or in the region between the transverse
plane and the median plane, is apparently dependent upon the
modifications of timbre which complex sounds, coming from
different directions, undergo, through changes in the intensity
of their partials. Considered with reference to its bearing
on the binaural ratio, the paper, in its general tone, is against
the ascription of too much importance to this ratio as a factor
in localization. This position is further supported by ex-
periments conducted by Angell and Fite.^

The object of these experiments was to determine the lo-
calizing power of subjects who were deaf in one ear. In the
first series, only one subject was experimented upon; in the
second, several were used differing in age and varying in the
length of their period of deafness from one to thirty years.
The results of the experiments are as follows, (i) These
subjects, especially when practiced, are not greatly inferior,
in their power to localize, to subjects of normal hearing.^ Dis-

iRayleigh, Lord: Transactions of the Musical Association, 1876; and
Philos. Mag. (5), III, 1877, p. 456.

2Philos. Mag., XIII, 1882, p. 415; ibid. (5), VIII, 1879, pp. 385-390.

'Mach, E. : Bemerkungen uber die Function der Ohrmuschel, Archiv f .
Ohrenheilkunde, IX, 1875, p. 72; Bemerkungen ilher den Raumsinn des
Ohres, Poggen. Annalen, CXXVI, 1865, p. 331; Ueher einige der physiolo-
gischen Akustik angehorigen ErscJieinungen, Sitzungsberichte der Wiener
Akademie, Abth. 2, L., 1864. pp. 342-363; Zur Theorie des Gehor organs,
ibid., Abth. 2, XLVIII, 1863, pp. 283-300.

*0p. ciL, pp. 92 and 163.

^Angell, J. R. and Kite, W. : Op. cit.

•^It is assumed here that these writers would exercise caution in drawing
conclusions, with regard to the relative importance of timbre and the bi-
naural ratio of intensity in normal subjects, from the localizing power shown
by subjects who have been deaf in one ear for a number of years; because
the latter, deprived of the use of the binaural ratio as an aid to localization,
would doubtless develop a discrimination of direction based upon diflference

254 FKRREE AND COLUNS

tinctions between front and back may be even sharper for
these subjects than for those of normal hearing. The locaHza-
tion, however, is generally not so prompt for them as for the
normal subject, nor are these subjects so accurate in dealing
with unfamiliar sounds. (2) Complex sounds, especially
those in which qualitative differences can be introspectively
distinguished for the different positions, are localized best.
The more nearly the sound approximates a simple tone, the
more inaccurate is the localization. "Genuinely pure tones
are essentially unlocalizable." (3) There is a marked in-
crease in accuracy with practice. The accuracy of the prac-
ticed monaural subject, for example, was found to compare
very favorably with that of the unpracticed normal subject.
(4) Accuracy was also observed to sustain a close relation to
the length of time the defect had existed, and to the age at
which it began. For example, subjects of advanced age who
had recently become deaf showed much poorer ability to
localize than younger subjects who had been deaf for a num-
ber of years.

Working in 1905 and again in 1908, Starch^ carried out an
extended series of experiments on the localization of simple
tones and clangs. Both monaural and binaural hearing were
investigated. In the experiments with clangs, a singing flame,
a Galton whistle of 10,000, 20,000, and 30,000 vibrations, the
human voice, an electric hammer, a wooden clapper, and a
whiff of air were used as the sources of sound. In the experi-
ments with simple tones, a tuning-fork of 100 vibrations per
second was used. In the latter experiments, tests were made
at different points in the different planes of direction, (a) of
the accuracy of localization, (b) of the size of the j. n. d. of
direction, (c) of the limen and j. n. d. of intensity, and (d) of
the j. n. d. of pitch. A number of conclusions were drawn
relative to intensity and timbre as factors in localization.

Space will be taken here only for a r^sum^ of the evidence
bearing upon the binaural ratio as a factor in normal hearing,
and upon intensity difference as a factor in monaural hearing.
No new evidence is advanced in support of the binaural ratio,
the object of the experiments apparently being a testing of
the arguments already advanced by Rayleigh, Thompson,

in timbre, considerably beyond that possessed by the normal subject. This
supposition is, in fact, borne out by their own results, which show how poorly
subjects recently deaf localize as compared with those in whom the defect
had existed for a nimiber of years. For example, Case F. {Op. cit., p. 453).
aged 60 years, deaf one year, gave correct judgments of location in only
19.5 per cent, of the total number of cases; while Case C, deaf from 26 to
30 years, gave 55 per cent, of the total number correctly.
^Starch, D.: Op. cit.

AUDITORY I.OCAUZATION

255

Bloch, and others. Starch finds these arguments confirmed by
his own results. The arguments are: (a) the presence of
front-back confusion, and its special case, the difficulty of
median plane localizations; (b) the inferiority of monaural
localization ; and (c) the occurrence of the greatest accuracy of
localization at points where slight changes in the binaural
ratio are most readily perceived, i. e., in front and back
near the median plane, and the poorest where these changes
are least readily perceived, i. e., at the sides near the aural
axis. Starch disagrees with Angell as to the factors in mo-
naural localization. He maintains that, in addition to changes
in the quality of a sound when it comes from different direc-
tions, there are systematic changes in intensity, which serve
as a localizing clue.^ The following evidence is given for
systematic changes in intensity: (i) the limen for intensity,
which is lowest in the region of the aural axis, and highest in
front and back; (2) the observers' introspections with supra-
liminal sounds; (3) the distance tests, which showed that a
sound is estimated to be nearest in the region of the aural
axis. That these changes of intensive serve as a localizing
clue is attested (i) by the introspection of the observers, and
(2) by the poor localization when the intensity of the stimulus
was varied frequently during the course of a series of experi-
ments. The smaller j. n. d. of direction for front and back, as
compared with the region near the aural axis,^ he thinks, how-
ever, cannot be due to the intensity factor, for there is no
corresponding difference in the intensity j. n. d.'s in these
positions. He seems inclined to attribute this smaller j. n. d.
of direction in front and back, at least in the case of his own
experiments with the tuning-fork, to the qualitative factor;
for his results show a smaller j. n. d. for pitch in front and back
than in the region of the aural axis. Starch interprets his re-
sults as, on the whole, favoring the intensity theory. The
traditional intensity theory is in the main correct; but, in
order to account for monaural localization, and localization
in the median plane and the planes parallel to it, this theory
must be supplemented by the quality and the monaural in-
tensity factors.

In February, 1907, Rayleigh^ published an article in which
he attempted to show that the binaural ratio cannot be
a factor in the localization of sounds with a vibration fre-

^Starch: Psychol. Rev., Monog. Suppl., No. IV, Vol. VI, 1905, pp. 11-
'12; ibid., No. V, Vol. IX, 1908, pp. 52-53.

^ Vide Bloch: Op. cit., p. 55-58; Matsumoto: Op. cit., p. 65-69.

•Rayleigh, Lord: On our Perception of Sound Direction, Philos. Mag.,
Ser. 6, XIII, 1907, pp. 214-232.

256 FBRRBE AND COLLINS

quency of 128 per second, or less. In a previous article, pub-
lished in 1876,^ he had shown by calculations relating to the
incidence of plane waves upon a rigid spherical obstacle, that
a sound-wave of that vibration-frequency travelling in the
line of the aural axis could not differ in intensity at the orifices
of the two ears by as much as one per cent, of its total intensity.
It is difficult for him to see how so small a difference could play
a very important part in localization; yet he finds, at least
within the limitations of his somewhat rough tests, that the
tones of forks of 128 and 96 vibrations per second are localized
as accurately as those of higher frequency. He infers, there-
fore, that there must be some other localizing clue for tones
of low pitch. The only alternative to the intensity factor,
he thinks, is a direct recognition of phase differences by the
auditory organ.^

He discusses phase difference in its relation to localization
as follows. When the stimulus is at one side, in the line of the
aural axis, the opposite ear is "roughly about one foot"
(measured on the circumference of the head) farther from the
stimulus than the nearer ear. For a fork of 128 vibrations
per second, this would make the phase difference between the
ears about Vs period; for a fork of 256 vibrations, about J^
period ; for a fork of 5 1 2 vibrations, about 3^ period ; and for
a fork of 1,024 vibrations, about a whole period. "Now it is
certain," he says, "that a phase relationship of J^ period
furnishes no material for a decision that the source of sound
is on the right rather than on the left, seeing that there is no
difference between a retardation and an acceleration of }/2
period. It is even more evident that a retardation of a whole
period or any number of whole periods would be of no avail."

Having shown that sounds of 128 vibrations or less per
second reach the ears in a difference of phase which a priori
might be considered recognizable in sensation, Rayleigh next
attempts to show that these differences actually furnish the
clue for the localization of the graver tones. He works with
two slowly beating tones of near 128 vibrations per second.
In completing a cycle or beat, the phase differences of these
tones assume all possible values. When the tones are led to
the two ears simultaneously, but separately, he finds that in-
stead of getting plainly recognizable beats, as would have
occurred had both the sound-waves been given to each ear, the

^Rayleigh, Lord : Our Perception of the Direction of a Source of Sound.
Transactions of the Musical Association, 1876.

^The sound wave coming directly to both ears from a single source could
show differences only in complexity, intensity, and phase. The first of
these differences is ruled out of consideration by the use of the tuning-fork ;
the second, by his mathematical calculations.

AUDITORY IvOCALIZATlON

257

whole sound mass seems to be transferred alternately from one
side to the other. In order to interpret these results, he con-
ducted a second series of experiments. The following results
were obtained, (i) It was shown that the transference of
the sound from one side to the other came directly after ("fol-
lowed") the maxima and minima of sound as heard by a
second observer, for whom the beats were allowed to occur.
This established a correlation between the maximal changes
in phase of the sound-waves received by the two ears and the
phenomenon of transfer. (2) It was found, in addition, that
when the wave of greater frequency was received by the right
ear, for instance, the transfer to right occurred directly after
agreement of phase, and the transfer to left came directly
after the maximal opposition of phase. "The transitions
between right and left effects correspond to agreement and
opposition of phase, not usually recognized. When the vi-
bration on the right is the quicker, the sensation of right fol-
lows agreement of phase, and (what is better observed) the
sensation of left follows opposition of phase." The writer in-
terprets this quotation to mean that the sound is heard on the
right from agreement to opposition of phase, and on the left
from opposition to agreement. Now a consideration of the
phase relationships of two sound-waves differing in frequency
shows that the wave of greater frequency leads in phase from
agreement to opposition, and the wave of lesser frequency
leads from opposition to agreement.^

^The writer can best show in the following manner what he conceives
Rayleigh to mean by leading in phase. The vibrating particles forming
each sound-wave execute simple harmonic motion. They may thus, in
each case, be considered as moving on the circumference of a circle whose
diameter is equal to the amplitude of vibration. For the sake of ready
comparison, their amplitudes of vibration may be assumed as equal; and
both may be considered as moving on the circumference of the same circle.

Fig.

Fig. 2

but at different rates of speed. Taking any two corresponding particles
of the two waves, he considers that when the angle 6 (the angle separating
the radii at the outer termini of which the two moving particles are located,
measured in the direction in which the particles are moving) is less than
180°, the particle moving at the greater rate of speed, considered with ref-
erence to the direction in which both are moving, will be ahead of the

258 FERRKE AND COLLINS

Thus it can be inferred that the sound was referred through-
out in these experiments to the side receiving the wave
leading in phase. Rayleigh proposes to make of this a locaHz-
ing clue, and applies it as a principle of explanation to the
phenomenon of localization, as ordinarily observed, for all
tones of low pitch. For example, when the source of sound
is situated to the right or left of the median plane, the sensa-
tion is referred to the right or left, as the case may be, because
at any given instant the wave acting upon the ear in question
leads in phase the wave acting upon the other ear. And when
the source is in the median plane, the sound is referred to that
plane because the wave reaches the two ears in phase agree-
ment. Continuing his experiments with forks of higher pitch,
Rayleigh finds that the right and left effects occur without
considerable diminution up to pitches of 320 vibrations per
second. At this point the phenomenon begins to become in-
definite and confused. After careful variations of his condi-
tions, he concludes that 768 vibrations per second furnish the
limit beyond which no trace of the effect is observed.

In a later report of work,^ Rayleigh says : "When the sounds
proceed from tuning-forks vibrating independently, the phase
differences pass cyclically through all degrees, and if the
beat be slow enough there is good opportunity for observation.
But it is not possible to stop anywhere, or in some uses of the
method to bring into juxtaposition phase relationships which
differ finitely." He then describes a method of experimenta-
tion which allows any particular phase relation to be main-
tained at pleasure. Two telephone receivers were used as sources
of sound. They were excited by a revolving magnet which
acted indirectly upon two coils, one in each of the telephone
circuits. The planes of the coils were vertical, their centres
being at the same level as the magnet. One was fixed, and the
other was so mounted that it could revolve about an axis
coincident with that of the magnet. The angle between the

slower particle; and, conversely, when the angle 6 is greater than 180°, the
faster particle will always be behind the slower particle. To illustrate
(Fig. i), let /I represent the position of the faster particle on the circle
of reference and B the position of the slower particle, both moving in a
counter-clock- wise direction. When angle ^ is less than 180°, A will be
ahead of B; but when angle 6 is greater than 180° (Fig. 2), B will be
ahead of A. When angle 8 is 180°, or 360°, neither will lead in phase.

The phase relations which any two partides vibrating at different rates
will sustain at different times can be very prettily shown for class demon-
stration by two hands geared to move at the required speeds around a
graduated dial.

^Lord Rayleigh: Acoustical Notes, Sensations of Right and Left from a
Revolving Magnet and Telephone, Philos. Mag., Ser. 6, XIII, 1907, pp.
316-319.

AUDITORY I^OCAUZATION 259

planes of the coils represents the phase differences of the peri-
odic electro-motive forces, subject it may be to an ambiguity
of half a period, dependent upon the way the connections are
made. If the circuits are similar, as is believed, the phase
differences of the circuits and the electro-motive forces are the
same. The circuit of one telephone included a commutator
by means of which the current through the instrument could
be reversed, corresponding to a phase change of 180°.

In conducting an observation, the sounds given by the two
telephones are brought to equal intensities by a proper regu-
lation of the distances between the magnets and the inductor
coils. The telephones are thus brought into simultaneous
action, and differences of phase are produced by rotating the
movable coil; or if complete reversal is wanted, it may btf
got by means of the commutator. The results, he says,
confirm those obtained with the tuning forks. A lead in phase
was followed by the reference of the sound to the side receiv-
ing the wave which led in phase, and when the planes of the
coils were parallel, i. e., when the phases were in agreement or
opposition, the sound was located in the median plane.

It may be of interest to note here the results of other observations
made under conditions similar to those obtaining in Rayleigh's experiments.
Thompson, working in the following way, reports beats, but makes no men-
tion of right and left effects, (i) Tuning-forks, unresonated, were held
one to each ear. (2) The sound of one fork was conducted to one ear
through a rubber tube and the second fork was held to the other ear. (3)
The forks were placed in different rooms and the sound was conducted
separately through rubber tubes to the ears. The sounds had no opportu-
nity of mingling externally or of acting jointly on any portion of the air
columns along which the sound travelled. Speaking of this observation,
he says (Philos. Mag., Ser. 5, III, 1877, p. 274): "The beats were most
distinctly heard, and seemed to take place within the cerebellum." So
W. H. Stone reports (Ibid., p. 278) that he has been in the habit of using
both ears, with a tuning-fork applied to each, in counting beats; and that
he finds no difference between the results of this method and that of Hsten-
ing to both forks with one ear. Rayleigh (On our Perception of Sound
Direction, Philos. Mag., Ser. 6, XIII, 1907, p. 220), speaking of Thompson's
results, says: "In an observation of my own (Philos. Mag., Vol. II, 1901,
p. 280; Scientific Papers, Vol. IV, p. 553), when tones supposed to be moder-
ately pure were led to the ears by means of telephones, a nearly identical
conclusion was reached. But although the cycle was recognized, in neither
case, apparently, was there any suggestion of right and left effect. In re-
peating the experiments recently, I was desirous of avoiding the use of
telephones or tubes in contact with the ears, under which artificial condi-
tions an instinctive judgment would perhaps be disturbed. It seemed that
it might suffice to lead the sounds through tubes whose open ends were
merely in close proximity one to each ear, an arrangement which has the
advantage of allowing the relative intensities to be controlled by a slight
lateral displacement of the head toward one or the other source." This
apparently was the only difference in the conditions between the experi-
ments which gave beats and no right and left effects, and the experiments
which gave right and left effects but not "plainly recognizable beats."
Hermann {Zur Theorie der Comhinationstone, Pfliiger's Archiv, XLIX,

26o FERREE AND COLUNS

1 89 1, pp. 499-518) found that when the waves from two tuning forks were
conducted one to each ear, he heard both beats and combination tones. In
this case he supposed that the tones, through the mediation of the bones
in the head, both acted together on each ear. No mention is made of right
and left effects. Cross and Goodwin (Charles R. Cross and H. M. Goodwin:
Some Considerations Regarding Helmholtz's Theory of Consonance, Proc. of
the Am. Acad, of Arts and Sciences, XXVII, 1891, pp. 1-12) found beats
and apparently the phenomenon of transfer from ear to ear. The meatus
was closed with beeswax, leaving an air column between it and the tympanic
membrane. The conduction under these conditions they think was directly
to the tympanic membrane by means of the air column and not through the
bones of the head to the middle ear or cochlea, because the sound of the
fork, when the stem was touched to the wax, was heard long after it had
ceased to be audible when the stem was touched to the pinna of the ear.
It was also found that it could be heard longer when the stem was touched
to the wax than when it was held against the teeth. When two small tono-
meter forks, tuned to four beats per second, were struck and their stems

held against the teeth, ' 'loud beats were heard in the ears The

forks were held in this position until the beats had entirely ceased to be
audible, when they were removed and the stem of each was touched to the
wax closing the two ears. Instantly the two notes were heard, faintly but
distinctly, in the ears to which they were held, and accompanying them
were faint beats seeming to wander in the head from ear to ear, as is always
the case with binaural beats." The experiment was then varied slightly
as follows. One ear only was closed with wax; the other was immersed
in a large basin of water. ' 'The experiment was then repeated as above,
with the difference that one fork, instead of being touched to the ear, was
touched to the marble basin, its vibrations being transmitted to the en-
closed ear through the water. The same results were obtained as before."
One of the conclusions drawn from these experiments, which is especially
of interest relative to Wilson and Myers' experiments and their explana-
tion of the localization of tones of low pitch {Vide this paper, pp .266-69), is
that ' 'aerial vibrations acting upon the ear are not transmitted through the
skull, or bony parts of the head, from one ear to the other."

The phenomenon of beats has also been reported in this connection by
the following experimenters, but none of them has mentioned a right-left
transfer: Dove (Repertorium der Physik, Bd. Ill, 1839, S. 494; Fogg.
Annal., CVII, 1859,8.653); Seebeck (Fogg. Annal., LIX, 1841, S. 417;
ibid., lyXVIII, 1846, S. 449; Akustik, Abschn. II, Gehler's Repertoriimi der
Physik, 1849, S. 107); Mach (Wiener Sitzungsber, L, 1864, p. 356.); Stumpf
(Tonpsychologie, Bd. II, S. 208, 458, 470); Bernstein (Ffliiger's Archiv.,
LIX, S. 475); Ewald (Ffliiger's Archiv, LVII, 1894, S. 80); Schaefer
(Zeitschr. f. Psychol., u. Physiol., I, 1890, 81); and Melati (Philos. Stu-
dien, Bd. XVII, 1901, pp. 431-461). Sanford (Experimental Psychology,
1898, p. 82), however, working with forks beating once in two or three
seconds notices, a shifting of the sound from ear to ear corresponding to the
rate of beating.

It is with considerable reluctance that the writers present
the preceding brief exposition of Rayleigh's theory and its
experimental confirmation, because neither of these is worked
out in the original article with sufficient detail to warrant the
risk of a definite interpretation. In every case, therefore,
where more than one interpretation has seemed possible, the
one most favorable to the theory has been chosen. Until all
the points involved both in the theory and in its confirm-
ation have received more definite treatment by Rayleigh

AUDITORY LOCALIZATION

261

the writers feel that positive criticism, either favorable or
adverse, is out of the question. The following comments,
however, may not be out of order, (i) The theory is purely
physical. No attempt is made in any of the points to bridge
over the gap between stimulus and sensation. In the treat-
ment of lead and lag, for example, no consideration is given
to what the ear, as a sense-organ, might be assumed to recog-
nize as lead and lag. The mathematical propriety of Rayleigh's
use of the terms is granted. And by mathematical definition,
the faster wave will lead when angle 0 is less than 180°. There
will always be this characteristic phase relation between the
waves coming to the two ears. But to grant that the ear can
discriminate which is leading and which lagging, when no
position or motion of any of the vibrating parts of the ear can,
in the complete cycles of its changes, characteristically stand
for lead or lag, and when no lead and lag aspect can be dis-
covered in the sound sensation itself, seems to be ascribing to
the auditory mechanism a logical or mathematical power which
not even all educated beings possess as an item of culture.
For example, when angle 0 is say 160°, the faster wave may,
at different times when this angle of separation occurs, be in
every conceivable stage either of condensation or of rarefaction.
During a part of this time, the slower wave will be at appro-
priate points in rarefaction when the faster is in condensa-
tion, and vice versa; and the rest of the time both waves
will be either in rarefaction or condensation. Thus there is
nothing in the position or motion of the vibrating structures
of the ear that can be seized upon as characteristic of the lead
or lag, as Rayleigh uses the terms, except a relation between
direction of motion and angles of separation, and this is dis-
covered only by a mathematical consideration of simple har-
monic motion.^ Just as Helmholtz's theory of vision has

^There is, for example, an alternative interpretation of lead and lag,
which, it seems to the writers, the ear might more plausibly be assumed to
recognize; namely, neither particle might be said to lead or lag unless
both be moving either in condensation or rarefaction. Then the vibrating
structures of the ear will be moving in the same direction, and at any given
moment will be displaced in the same direction. Thus, as far as sensations
of motion or position are concerned, if such sensations can be assumed for
any of the vibrating structures of the ear, there would be a better chance for
comparison than by the former interpretation. The writers, however, do
not consider that this is the interpretation Rayleigh means to be taken for
lead and lag; because (i) it is not the interpretation commonly given to the
terms, and (2) in his experiments, it would leave the ear apart of the time
in both halves of the cycle of changes without a localizing clue, for there will
come times both from agreement to opposition and from opposition to agree-
ment when one wave will be in condensation and the other in rarefaction,
and conversely. Thus for a part of the time, in both cases of reference,
right and left, there would be no localizing clue. This interpretation would

262 FERREE AND COLUNS

been called pre-psychological, so may this theory of localiza-
tion be called pre-psychological.

(2) Speaking of the difference in phase in which the
sound-wave from a source to the right on the aural axis
would arrive at the Orifices of the two ears, Rayleigh says '}
**It is easy to see that the retardation of distance at the left
ear is of the order of the semicircumference of the head, say
one foot. At this rate, the retardation for middle C (C'=256)
is nearly one quarter of a period; for C" (512) nearly half a
period; for C^" (1024) nearly a whole period, and so on. Now
it is certain that a phase retardation of half a period affords no
material for a decision that the source is on the right rather
than on the left, seeing that there is no difference between a
retardation and an acceleration of half a period. It is even
more evident that a retardation of a whole period or of any
number of whole periods would be of no avail. ' ' In the pre-
ceding quotation just two stages of phase relationship are
ruled out as furnishing no localizing clue ; namely, a difference
of a half period, and a difference of a whole period. A differ-
ence of a half period furnishes no clue, because the angular
separation of corresponding particles of the two waves is 180° ;
hence it would be the same whether considered as acceleration
or retardation. Similarly, a difference of a whole period fur-
nishes no clue, because the angular separation of the corres-
ponding particles of the two waves is 360°, hence would be the
same considered either as acceleration or retardation. But in
the scale of pitches, there are only certain members higher
than 512 and i ,024 vibrations whose sound-waves coming from
a given direction would always arrive at the two ears with a
difference of 180° or 360°. Phase difference, so far as can be
readily seen, should furnish a clue for the localization of the
higher just as well as of the lower pitches. There seems to be
no good reason, then, for making the direct recognition of
phase difference a localizing clue for the lower pitches only,
and for giving over to difference of intensity the exclusive
r6le for the higher pitches. And again, if a direct recognition
of phase difference be a localizing clue, it is not easy to see
why the right and left effects in Rayleigh's experiments should
suffer considerable diminution when the tones were as high as
320, and should cease entirely near 768 or above. It is just
as clear that the faster wave will lead from agreement to op-
position and the slower from opposition to agreement in
this case as in the case of lower tones. And if the tones

work even worse in localization as ordinarily observed, for in every direction
there would be certain distances from the ear for which there would be no
localizing clue.
^Op. cit. p. 218.

AUDITORY LOCAUZATION 263

were near together in pitch, the transitions from right to
left effects should have come just as slowly and should
therefore have been just as easily observed. That is, if
768 and 769 forks were used, for example, the change from
agreement to opposition and from opposition to agreement,
and the corresponding right-left, left-right transfers, should have
occurred only once per second, just as would have occurred
with forks of 128 and 129 vibrations per second. (3) Phase
difference must make itself felt in consciousness either by
means of some change in the sound sensation itself, or by set-
ting up some new sensation alongside the sound sensation ; for
example, a sensation of position or movement of some of the
vibrating structures of the ear. Wilson and Myers^ conclude
that phase difference makes itself felt as a difference in
the intensity of the sound heard by the two ears. They ex-
plain the localizations in Rayleigh's experiments in terms of
this difference in intensity produced by cyclic changes of inter-
ference between the sound-waves coming directly to the two
ears and those transmitted from one ear to the other through
the bones of the head. Rayleigh, however, obviously considers
that the effect of phase difference is extra to any differences that
may occur in the intensity aspect of the sensations given to
the two ears. The question arises as to whether either expla-
nation can be applied further than to the special phenomenon
created by the experimental conditions under which they
worked. This point will be taken up in a later section of this
paper. (4) Until more sensitive tests than those conducted
by Rayleigh are made to find out the relative sensitivity of
direction-discrimination for low and high tones, it is not dem-
onstrated that there is any need for a supplement to the in-
tensity theory, to account for the localization of low tones.

Later, in 1907, More and Fry^ also attempted to show that
phase difference serves as a clue for the localization of sound.
They worked with tuning-forks of 320 and 512 vibrations per
second. The observer was seated at the centre of a large
circle marked on the floor of a room. The zero point in the
circle was taken directly behind the observer, the 180° point
in front, and the 90° points at the sides. A glass funnel 13.5
cm. in diameter was mounted horizontally on a table at the
zero point, about 7 ft. behind the observer. Heavy rubber
tubing with an inner diameter of about 1.2 cm. connected the
funnel with the stem of a glass Y-tube, on the two branches of
which rubber tubing of the same size was fitted. These branch
tubes ended in glass tubes bent so as to fit into the ears of the ob-

^Vide pp. 267-68, this paper.
^Op. cit.

264 FERREE AND COLUNS

server. Each of the branch tubes was cut in two at the middle ;
and by inserting pieces of glass tubing, the experimenter
readily altered their lengths without the listener's being aware
of the change. Fourteen observers were used. The sound
was given at the mouth of the funnel, and the observer was
asked to indicate the direction from which it came. This
direction was estimated by means of the graduated circle at
the centre of which the observer sat. Before each observa-
tion, the length of one of the tubes was changed }/s, 34, %,
3^» %} M> or J^ of a wave-length of the sound used as stimulus.
The results, expressed in general terms, showed that when the
tubes were exactly equal in length, the sound seemed to come
directly from behind; but if one tube was made shorter than
the other, by as much as 2 cm., the sound was referred to the
side having the shorter tube. These results were taken to
indicate that sound is localized by a direct appreciation of the
difiference of phase of the waves coming to the two ears.

With regard to this work, the writer would point out the
following facts, (i) The forks employed were both above the
pitch limit at which Rayleigh claims the difference in intensity
becomes too small to serve as a localizing clue. Hence these
writers, in their support of the phase difference theory, work
with tones for which Rayleigh claims the localizing clue is
difference of intensity and not of phase. (2) Their results,
stated in general terms, do not seem to have any differential
value. When one tube is made shorter than the other, the
stimulus received by the ear on that side is more intensive than
that received by the other ear ; hence, by the intensity theory,
as well as by the phase difference theory, the sound should
be referred to that side. The sounds worked with had a wave-
length of 64 (512 fork) and 104 (320 fork) cm. per sec. A
change in the length of one of these comparatively short tubes
by from J^ - J^ of a wave-length of these sounds would pro-
duce a considerable change in the ratio of the distances the
sound had to travel to reach the two ears ; hence it would pro-
duce a considerable difference in the energy of the stimulation
given. As nearly as the writer can determine, by comparing
the measurements and localizations given by More and Fry
with the measurements of the direct paths of transmission of
the sound to the two ears from these locations in his own
sound-cage, the change of ratio is quite of the same order in
the two cases.

(3) Although it may be considered that the results in general
are not differential as between the two theories. More and Fry
find a crucial argument in the fact that as one tube was pro-
gressively made longer than the other, there was not a constant
increase in the displacement of the sound toward the ear sup-

AUDITORY LOCALIZATION 265

plied with the shorter tube. In a few cases, for example, the
90° displacement was made when the change in the length of
the tube was only %-5^ of the wave-length; and from that
point on to a change of a whole wave-length, there was even,
in certain cases, a decrease in the angle of displacement. This,
they say, on the basis of the intensity theory, ought not to be.
There should be, following a change in the relative lengths of
the tubes, a regular increase of displacement. To quote:
"If it were a question of change of intensity, the change in
direction would increase continually and not reach an angle
where further increase in the length of the tube produces
either a doubtful increase in angle or even at times a decrease."
In reply to this, it may be pointed out {a) that a sound cannot
be displaced more than 90° to either side, and the ratio of the
length of the tubes which gave their observers a displacement
of the sound 90° to the right was of the same order as the ratio
of the lengths of the direct paths of transmission to the two
ears when the sound is actually given 90° to the right in the
sound-cage used in our own experiments. Moreover, as lo-
calizations ordinarily occur in everyday life, the ratio of the
distances the sound travels in order to reach the two ears is,
in most cases, not even so great as it is with the Titchener
sound-cage. The above result, then, is all that could be ex-
pected by the intensity theory, {b) To account for the de-
crease in the angle of displacement in a few cases mentioned,
it may be said that when the ratio of intensity, by the condi-
tions of the experiment, is made to exceed any ratio that could
occur in our daily life, there is no basis for the association of
any given direction with that ratio; hence, once this limit is
exceeded, regularity of results should not be expected. Under
such conditions, one might expect almost any irregularity,
but certainly not regularity.

(4) The discrepancy between More and Fry's and Wilson
and Myers's^ results should not be ignored. In both cases
apparently the same method of working was used, yet very
different results were obtained. For More and Fry's observers
a change in the relative lengths of the tubes was followed uni-
formly by a displacement of the sound toward the side of the
shorter tube; while for Wilson and Myers's observers, changes
in the length of the tubes were followed by a cycle of changes
of localization, — first to the side of the shorter tube, then to
the median plane, to the side of the longer tube, back to
the median plane, and so on. So great a discrepancy cannot
but throw both sets of results open to question, until more
work is done under similar conditions.

^Vide this paper, pp. 266-67.

JOURNAl, — 9

266 FERREE AND COLLINS

In October, 1908, Wilson and Myers reported a series of
experiments suggested by the work of Rayleigh. The general
plan of experimentation was similar to that used by More and
Fry. The apparatus/ however, was more carefully designed,
and the effect of changes in the ratio of the length of conducting
paths was possibly more minutely tested out.^ The sound
was led to the ears separately by the two arms of a rectangle
made of tubes of glass and brass joined at the corners by India
rubber tubing. The observer's head, in position, occupied the
mid-point in the back of this rectangle. Opposite his head,
in the mid region of the front of the rectangle, a section 120 cm.
long was removed and in its place a section of T-tubing was
inserted, the horizontal arm of which was small enough in
diameter to slide freely within the main tube, and long enough
to permit the perpendicular arm to be moved 60 cm. on each
side of the median plane. The perpendicular arm ended in a
funnel-shaped collector, in front of which the tuning-fork was
sounded. A centimeter scale was mounted behind the T-tube,
upon which could be read the displacements of the perpendic-
ular arm to the right or left of the median plane. The tubes
leading to the ears ended in wooden receivers or ear-caps,
which were pressed against the observer's head, and held in
place by retort stands fastened to the table in front of the ob-
server. The movements of the experimenter were shut off
from the observer's view by a large screen across the median
plane. When the funnel receiving the sound was placed in
the median plane, the arms leading to the ears were of equal
length, in most cases 317 cm. each. In this position it was
found that the sound was located in the median plane. When
the funnel was displaced by amounts varying from o — A./4 (^^=
wave length) or A./2 — 3V4» the sound was referred to the side
toward which the displacement had been made. When it

^Apparatus somewhat similar to that used by Wilson and Myers is
described by Urbantschitsch (Arch. f. d. ges. Physiol., 1881, XXIV,

579-585).

2Sylvanus Thompson (Philos. Mag., Ser. V, Vol. VI, 1878, pp. 386-387)
worked in much the same fashion as Wilson and Myers, but with less
minute measurement. The ends of a curved copper wire 3 ft. long, bent
into two rings, were inserted one into each of the observer's ears. It was
found that when the stem of a vibrating fork was set on this wire at the mid
point, the sound seemed to come from the ends of the wire in each ear. A
change of an inch and a half from this position produced a sufficient differ-
ence in the length of the path travelled by the sound to cause it to reach the
two ears in complete difference of phase. Given in this position, the sound
seemed to come from the back of the head. When the sound was given in
intermediate positions, the effect was of a mixed character; part of the
sound seemed as if located in the ears themselves, and part of it seemed to
come from the back of the head. No change in this result was observed
with forks of different pitches, providing that the proper differences in
length of path were chosen.

AUDITORY I.OCALIZATION 267

was displaced by amounts varying from X/4 — X/2 or 3 V4 — K
the sound was referred to the side opposite to that toward which
the displacement had been made. The same relations between
the reference of the sound and the displacements of the stimu-
lus were observed to hold for simple multiples of A. Thus it
was found that when the stimulus is displaced either to the
right or left of the median plane, the sound is successively
referred, as the displacement is increased, first to the side to-
ward which the displacement is made, back to the median
plane, to the opposite side, and back to the median plane, re-
peating the cycle when the displacement reaches an amount
exceeding one wave length.

In explaining these results, Wilson and Myers agree with
Rayleigh that the localization of tones of low pitch is depend-
ent upon the difference in the phase of vibration in which the
sound waves reach the two ears. They do not, however, be-
lieve it is necessary to assume that the localizing clue is a direct
recognition of phase difference by the two ears. They con-
tend that "while binaural differences in phase are a primary
cause of the observed lateral effects, these effects are ultimately
referable to binaural differences in intensity." The stimulus
in either ear is a resultant of two vibrations, one communicated
directly to the ear, the other indirectly, through bone conduc-
tion from the opposite ear. The resultant, now stronger in
one ear, now in the other, now equal in both ears, because of
progressively changing phase differences between the direct
and transmitted waves, determines the direction-reference.
Suppose, as in the case of the Rayleigh experiments, two
sound-waves of equal amplitude but of unequal frequency
enter the two ears. Then from agreement to opposition the
faster wave will lead the slower in phase, and from opposition
to agreement the converse will be true. When the faster is
leading, the resultant of the direct and transmitted waves in the
ear receiving the faster wave will be of greater intensity than in
the ear receiving the slower wave, and the total sound mass
will be referred to that side. Similarly, when the slower
leads in phase, the resultant will be stronger in the ear receiv-
ing the slower wave, and the localization will occur on that
side. When, however, the two waves are in opposition or
agreement, the resultants in both ears will be equal, and the
localization will be in the median plane, as the intensity theory
requires. Since, as they believe, this hypothesis satisfactorily
explains the results of Rayleigh's experiments, they do not
think that these experiments should be considered as afford-
ing differential evidence for the phase-difference theory. Nor
do they claim differential value for their own experiments.
With reference to physical features alone, both hypotheses are

268 FERREE AND COLUNS

capable of explaining both sets of results. Wilson and Myers,
however, claim an advantage for their hypothesis on the ground
of its greater plausibility and of the auxiliary facts that can be
cited in its support. On the ground of plausibility, they main-
tain that their hypothesis is in better accord with the prevailing
conception of the origin and nature of nervous impulses. For
example, Rayleigh states:^ "It seems no longer possible that
the vibratory character of sound terminates at the outer ends
of the nerves along which the communication with the brain
is established. On the contrary, the processes in the nerve
must in themselves be vibratory, not in the gross mechanical
sense, but with the preservation of the period and retaining
the characteristic of phase — a view advocated by Rutherford
as long ago as 1886." Wilson and Myers believe that there
is too much evidence of the specific functioning of end-organs
to be overweighed by the results of Rayleigh' s experiments.
A special sense-organ may be excited not only by the stimuli
to which it is especially adapted to respond ("adequate"
stimuli), but also by "inadequate" stimuli; for example,
electrical, chemical, and mechanical. " Inasmuch as the
sensations are similar despite the diverse character of the
stimuli, we have hitherto believed that the impulses ascending
a sensory nerve depend on the mode of response of the end organ
and not directly on the character of the stimulus." By way of
auxiliary facts, they cite theresultsof Mader,2the tuning-fork ex-
periment of Weber, and its modification suggested by Schaefer,'

^Philos. Mag., Ser. 6, Vol. XIII, 1907, pp. 224-225.

'In Mader's experiments (Sitzungsber. d, kais. Akad. d. Wissens., Wien,
1900, Bd. CIX, Abth, 3, S. 37-75) two tones of neariy identical pitch were
separately led one to each ear hole of a skull. A microphone applied to
the roof of the skull gave evidence of beats. This is cited as presumptive
evidence that the tones were actually passing across the roof of the skull
from one ear to the other. (Both tones, however, were generated in the
same room, hence there is no guarantee that the microphone was not acted
upon by beats in the air wave.)

^Schaefer, K. L.: Zeitschr. f. Psychol, u. Physiol, d. Sinnesorg. 1891,
Bd. II, S. 111-114. Wilson and Myers {Op. a7., p. 318) describe this
experiment as follows: "A fork, fixed at some distance from one side of
the observer, is very gently struck. The observer listens, and notes when
the dying tone has become quite inaudible. He then inserts an appro-
priately attuned resonator into the ear which is nearest the fork ; whereupon,
the tone is at once softly heard again on that side, as if it came from the
resonator. If the meatus of the more distant ear be now closed, the tone
becomes at once stronger, and its localization approaches the median plane.
If the meatus be then re-opened, the tone immediately leaps back again
to the ear in which the resonator is inserted."

Mach has suggested that when a tuning-fork is placed on the vertex,
and the meatus of one ear is closed, the tone is localized to that side, be-
cause the sound travelling by bone conduction to that ear not only stimu-
lates the cochlea, but sets up in the meatus vibrations which are reflected
back and intensify the sound in that ear.

AUDITORY I^OCALIZATION 269

as evidence of bone conduction^ under conditions similar to
those in their own and in Rayleigh's experiments.^

As was stated earlier in the paper, this review will be con-
cluded by a brief resum6 of the arguments Khat have been
advanced, up to the present time, for the binaural ratio as a
factor in auditory localization. They are as follows. ( i ) Con-
fusion points are found in the median plane and in the planes
parallel to it on either side (Rayleigh,^ von Kries and Auer-
bach,^ Pierce,^ and Starch®). (2) Monaural localization is
inferior to binaural localization. (Politzer,^ Arnheim,* Preyer,'
Bloch,'Von Bezold,ii Smith,i2 AngellandFitc^^and Starch.^*)
Politzer, Arnheim, Preyer, and Bloch worked with cases of
monaural hearing artificially produced ; von Bezold, Angell and
Fite, and Smith worked with pathological cases. Starch worked
with two observers in which the defect was artificially produced,
and two in which it was pathological. For Politzer, Arnheim,
Preyer, Smith, and Angell and Fite, the test used was ac-
curacy of localization; for Bloch it was the size of the j. n. d. ;
and for Starch it was both accuracy of localization and the
size of the j. n. d.

(3) The greatest accuracy of localization occurs at points
where a change of direction produces the greatest change in

^Against bone conduction vide the experiments and conclusions of Cross
and Goodwin (this paper p. 260.)

^There may be cited additional casual advantages, so obvious, however,
as to be scarcely worthy of mention, (i) Wilson and Myers's explanation
does not involve the assumption of any new power on the part of the ear,
hence it has the advantage of systematic simplicity. (2) Introspective
analysis does not show any aspect of the sound sensation, or any new
sensation simultaneous with the sound sensation, corresponding to differ-
ence of phase.

'Rayleigh, Lord: Acoustical Observations, Perception of the Direction of
a Source of Sound, Philos. Mag., Ser. 5, Vol. Ill, 1877, pp. 456-458.

*0p. cit., p. 330, 336.

^Op. cit., pp. 56-78.

^Psychol. Rev., Monog. Suppl., Vol. IX, 1908, p. 53.

"^Op. cit., p. 231-236.

^Arnheim: Beitrage zur Theorie der Lokal. von Schallemp. mittl. derBo-
gengange. Diss. Jena, 1887.

'Preyer: Die Wahrnehmung der Schallrichtung mittelst der Bogengdnge,
Pfliiger's Archiv, XL, 1887, pp. 618-619. It will be remembered, however,
that Preyer and Arnheim believed that the localization is in terms of space
feelings aroused directly by the action of the sound wave upon the semi-
circular canals.

»"0^. cit., p. 59-73-

"0/>. cit., p. 486-487.

"0/>. cit., p. 542.

^^Op. cit., pp. 225-246 and 449-458. Angell and Fite claim that a con-
siderable degree of inferiority of monaural hearing exists only in the case of
unpracticed monaural subjects. Monaural subjects can be practiced up
to the point of locaUzing almost as well as the unpracticed normal subject.

"Psychol. Rev., Monog. Suppl., IX, 1908, pp. 40-48.

27© FERREB AND COI.UNS

the binaural ratio, i. e., in front and back near the median
plane; and the poorest localization occurs where a change of
direction produces the least change in the binaural ratio, i. e.,
at the sides, near the aural axis^ (Bloch,^ and Starch^).

(4) A difference in the amount of collection of the sound-
wave at the orifices of the ears determines the localization to
the side receiving the greater energy of the wave (Thomp-
son,^ and KesseP) .

The total sound-mass is referred to the side of the stronger
stimulus when two sounds, one stronger than the other, are
given to the two ears. (Steinhauser,® Tarchanoff,' and Mat-
sumoto^).

When two tuning-forks sounding with equal intensity are
placed one on each side of the head, but one nearer to the ear
than the other, the total sound-mass is referred to the side on
which the nearer fork is located (Stenger').

When two tuning-forks, sounding with equal intensity and
located in the aural axis on either side at the same distance
from the ears, are swung in unison from left to right and right
to left, a transfer in the localization of the total sound mass
takes place following the rhythm of the swing. When both are
swinging to the left, the sound is referred to the right, and,
conversely, when both are swinging to the right, the localiza-
tion is on the left. When both are swinging with equal speed
in opposite directions, the localization is in the median plane
(Fechner").

When two vibrating bodies are in contact with the head or
very near to it, and the energy of vibration is unequal, the

^Starch (Op. cit., p. 52.) phrases this as follows. "The accuracy of lo-
calization is greatest where slight changes in the ratio are most readily
perceived, *. e., in front and back. Localization is poorest where changes in
the ratio are not so easily perceived, i. e., on the sides, in the region of the
aural axis."

^Op cit., pp. 31, 35.

'Psychol. Rev., Monog, Suppl., Vol. VI, No. 4, 1904-05, pp. 11-12 and
44; ibid., Vol. IX, No. 2, 1908, pp. 52-53.

^Thompson: Philos. Mag., Ser. 5, Vol. VIII, 1879, p. 386; ibid., Vol.
XIII, 1882, p. 412.

^Op. cit., p. 120.

^Op. cit., pp. 188-189. Steinhauser used as the source of sound an instru-
ment called by him the homophone. This instrument consisted of two
organ pipes of the same pitch, one of which was supported near to each ear
on the level with it. The intensity of the sound was regulated by means
of valves controlling the pressure of the air blast used to excite it.

''Op. cit., p. 354.

^Op. cit., p. 18. Matsumoto used two telephone receivers placed opposite
the two ears, one on each side. The intensity of the sound in each ear was
controlled by a sliding inductorium.

^Stenger: Op. cit., p. 223.

"Fechner, G. T.: Op. cit., p. 543.

AUDITORY LOCAUZATION 27 1

sound is localized within the head but is referred to the side
receiving the greater energy of vibration (Urbantschitsch,*
and Thompson^).

When the stem of a vibrating tuning fork is placed on the
vertex of the skull, the tone is localized somewhere midway
between the two ears ; but if the meatus of one ear is stopped
and the wave is reflected back toward the internal ear, the
sound is transferred immediately to that side (Weber^).

When a tuning-fork is faintly sounded on one side and heard
by the ear on that side by means of a resonator, the sound is
referred to that side; but when the meatus of the opposite
ear is stopped, the sound approaches the median plane
(Schaefer^).

One of two fusing sounds may be placed in either of the
lateral quadrants without altering the localization of the
fusion (Pierce^).

II. ExPERIMENTAIv
A. THE DEMONSTRATION OF THE BINAURAI^ RATIO
AS A FACTOR

(a) Lines of Argument. The object of this paper is to add
three lines of argument to those mentioned above, (i) Ob-
servers having a natural difference in sensitivity of the two
ears show a constant tendency to displace the source of sound
toward the axis on the side of the stronger ear; and, con-
versely, observers without this difference in sensitivity show no
consistent tendency toward right or left displacement. (2)
Changes in the ratio of sensitivity of the two ears, produced
by plugging either ear, are followed by corresponding dis-
placements of the sound toward the more sensitive ear. (3)
A natural tendency toward right or left displacement can be
corrected by making the proper change in the ratio of sensi-
tivity of the two ears.

The principle involved in the second argument is not en-
tirely new.^ It aims at a direct and systematic correlation

^Urbantschitsch: Lehre von der Schallempfindung, Pfliiger's Archiv,
XXIV, 1 88 1, 579.

^Thompson, On Binaural Audition, Philos. Mag., Ser. 5, Vol .IV, 1877,
pp. 274-276; Phenomena of Binaural Audition, ibid., Ser. 5, Vol. VI, 1878,
PP- 383-391.

^Weber: Op. cit., p. 42.

^Schaefer: Op. cit., pp. 111-114.

^Pierce: Op. cit., pp. 63 and 147.

•It might probably be said that the principle involved in the first line of
argument is also not entirely new. Results of monaural localization have
been reported by numerous investigators; and occasional mention has been
made of a suspected influence of difference in sensitivity of the two ears upon
the results obtained in cases of binaural localization. (For the best example
of this, vide Seashore : Localization of Sound in the Median Plane, Univ. of

272 FERRHE AND COIyUNS

between the intensity of the sound as heard by the two ears,
and the direction in which it is referred. This has not been
attempted before, although it has been shown more or less
definitely that a difference in the energy of the sound-wave
delivered to the two ears affects localization. Thompson,^ for
example, with his pseudophone, tried to produce a difference in
the energy of the stimuli given to the two ears by means of the
way in which the shell-shaped collectors were turned with refer-
ence to the direction of the stimulus, and to show thereby that
the localization was determined toward the side receiving the
stronger stimulation. Though the underlying principle of
this general line of argument is not new, the writers have fol-
lowed it up for the following reasons, (i) Its possibilities
for demonstrating the binaural ratio as a factor in localiza-
tion have not been fully utilized. (2) In order to confirm
the intensity theory, it is necessary to show a definite corre-
lation between the ratio of intensity of sensation, and the
direction in which the sound is referred. The method of
varying the sensitivity of the two ears gives a much safer
and more direct means of establishing this correlation than
is given by varying the intensity of the stimuli. The writers
find, for example, that the ears of many people vary greatly
in sensitivity. In fact, so far as his experience goes, it is
more common to find a difference than to find the ears of

Iowa Studies in Psychol., 1899, II, p. 49). But for theory, monaural hear-
ing presents a very different case from difference in sensitivity in binaural
hearing (when working with monaural hearing the binaural factors drop
out entirely) ; and, furthermore, no systematic attempt has ever been made
to utihze differences in sensitivity as a means of demonstrating the influ-
ence of the binaural ratio.

For reports on monaural localization, see Politzer {Loc. cit.); Preyer (Die
Wahrnehmung der Schallrichtung mittelst der Bogengdnge, Pfltiger's Archiv,
XL, 1887, S. 586); Amheim (Beitrdge zur Theorie der Lokal. von Schallempf.
mittelst der Bogengdnge, Diss. 1887.); Miinsterberg {Raumsinn des Ohres,
Beitrage zur Exp. Psy., Bd. II, 1889, S. 182), von Bezold (Urteilstduschun-
gen nach Beseitigung einseitiger Harthdrigkeit, Zeit. f. Psy. u. Physiol. II,
1890, S. 486); Schafer {Ein Versuch iiber die interkranielle Leitung leisester
Tone von Ohr zu Ohr, Zeit. f. Psy. u. Physiol. II, 1891, S. iii); Smith {How
do we Detect the Direction from which Sound Comes ? Cincin. Lancet-
Clmic, N. S. XXVIII, 1892, 542); Angell and Fite (The Monaural Localiza-
tion of Sound, Psy. Rev. VIII, 1910, 225-266, and Further Observations on
the Monaural Localization of Sound, Ibid., 449-458); and Starch (Perime-
try of the Localization of Sound, Psy. Rev. Mon. Supp. IX, 2, 1908, 1-55)-
For mention of a suspected influence of difference in the sensitivity of the two
ears upon localization, see Pierce (Op. cit., p. 106), and Starch (Op. cit., pp.
43-44). An influence of difference of sensitivity of the two ears is suggested
by Amheim (Op. cit., p. 10, note) to explain his results when working with
monaural hearing artificially produced. The left ear was found to have the
superior power to localize correctly. He thought this might be due to its
better blood supply. Pierce speaks against this part of Amheim's work
{Op. cit., p. 107).

^Op. cit., pp. 385-390-

AUDITORY LOCALIZATION 273

approximately equal sensitivity.^ A method, then, which
seeks to vary the intensity of the sound as heard by the two
ears, and does not take into account their probable difference
in sensitivity, is obviously at fault; for there is no guarantee
that a slight difference in the energy of the sound-waves de-
livered to the two ears, such as was produced by a different
setting of the small shell-shaped collectors of Thompson's
pseudophone, will be sensed as the relative intensities of the
stimuli would indicate. If one ear should be more sensitive
than the other, the two sound-waves, although one is stronger
than the other, may be sensed as equal in intensity; or the
ratio indicated by the stimuli may be reversed. Because,
then, of the common occurrence of a natural difference in
sensitivity between the ears, a method that attempts to
measure the ratio of intensity of the sensations experienced
by the ratio of intensity of the stimuli given, does not afford
a safe basis for a correlation between the intensity of the
sound as heard by the two ears and its localization. (3) Apart
from the propriety of method, a third reason for contin-
uing this line of attack is that the results reported from it
have been too vague and uncertain to give much support to
the intensity theory. For example, (a) the shell-shaped
collectors in Thompson's pseudophone were assumed to col-
lect more sound when given one direction than when given
another; but there was no objective determination of how
much they varied the intensity of the wave impinging upon
the tympanum, or whether they varied it at all. No proper
basis was laid even for a correlation of ratio of intensity of
the two stimuli with the direction in which the sound was
referred, (b) The method used for recording Thompson's
localizations was indefinite, and his report of results is vague
and uncertain. In short, a characteristic displacement of the
sound toward the side receiving the more intensive stimula-
tion is expressed (in the paper of 1879) as a matter of belief
rather than as an established fact.^

(b) Description of Method and Apparatus. The writers were
led to make this study by the results of tests they had been
conducting on the relative sensitivity of the two ears in differ-
ent people. The large number of subjects who were found
to have a marked difference in sensitivity seemed to make
possible a determination of whether or not the hearing of a

^Fechner, investigating the relative sensitivity of the two ears ( Ueher die
ungleiche Deutlichkeit des Gehdrs auf linkem und rechtem Ohre, Berichte
der kgl. Sachs. Ges. der Wiss. Math.-phys. Classe, XII, i860, 166-174) »
found that out of 2 15 persons examined only 51 had ears of approximately
equal sensitivity.

^Op. cit., pp. 388-390.

2 74 F^RREE AND COLUNS

sound more strongly by one ear than the other leads to con-
stant errors in localization. Assuming that the binaural
ratio is a factor in localizing, there seem a priori to be two
possibilities relative to this question, (a) The subject so
affected may, in proportion to his defect, show a constant
tendency to displace the sound towards the aural axis on the
side of the more sensitive ear, or (b) this tendency may have
been wholly or in part corrected in the subject's past expe-
rience, through the influence of the space reference of other
sense organs, in such a fashion that the false ratio has shown a
tendency to become associated with the true reference. If so,
the amount of the constant error probably should sustain some
ratio to the length of time the defect had existed. If, for ex-
ample, it were congenital or contracted very early in life, one
might expect less error in localization than if it were of recent
occurrence. Unfortunately the subjects, up to the time of these
tests, were not aware of their defect, consequently no data
of the sort were available. The effect of recency of defect,
however, came out strongly in the experiments in which the
ratio was varied by artificial means. Differences in sensi-
tivity, artificially produced, exerted a much more marked in-
fluence upon localization than did approximately equal differ-
ences due to natural defect.

Artificial variations were produced both upon defective
subjects and upon subjects in whom the sensitivity of the two
ears was approximately equal. In both cases the effect was
marked and consistent. In case of the normal subjects, in
turn first one ear was made more sensitive, then the other.
In case of the defective subjects three variations were intro-
duced, (a) The defect was exaggerated, i. e., the difference
in sensitivity was rendered greater by plugging the less sensi-
tive ear.^ (b) An effort was made to correct the defect by
decreasing the sensitivity of the stronger ear. Our object
here was to establish a ratio of sensitivity that should elimi-
nate any approach to a constant tendency to displace the
sound in either direction. This was a procedure involving
many trials and much patience. Our first idea was that
this result should be attained by equating the sensitivity of
the two ears. This device, however, in case of the subjects

^In all cases of plugging one ear, care was taken that monaural hearing
was not produced. Before the observation began, both ears were firmly
closed by the hands or some other efifective means, until the stimulus used
in the localizing experiments could no longer be heard, whatever position it
might be given in the system used. The plugged ear was then uncovered,
and the stimulus given at the most remote positions to be used in the ex-
periment which was to follow. In no case was the observer imable to hear
the sotmd.

AUDITORY IvOCAUZATlON

275

used, overshot the mark. When the sensitivity of the stronger
ear was decreased until it approximately equalled that of
the weaker ear, a constant tendency to displace towards the
normally weaker ear resulted. A compromise position then
had to be sought. We finally succeeded in getting, with
each subject, a ratio such that the error, roughly speaking,
was apparently about as much and as frequently to one side as
to the other of the true location, (c) A third variation was
to plug the stronger ear until it became less sensitive than the
weaker ear.

In all of our experiments, in order to guard against a wrong
correlation of ratio with localization error, due to possible
variations in sensitivity from day to day, or even from the
beginning to the end of the experiment, sensitivity determina-
tions were made at each sitting both immediately before and
immediately after the localizing tests were made.

The ratio of sensitivity was obtained by comparing the limen
of sound for the two ears. The observer was blindfolded and
required to bite an impression previously made in a wax mouth-
board. A wooden bar was supported in the line of the axis
of the two ears, one end reaching as near as possible to the
ear that was being tested. The other ear was carefully plugged.
A watch was carried out along the bar until the limen was
reached. An average of the results obtained by the method
of approach and recession was taken as the final liminal dis-
tance, and the ratio of these distances was taken to represent
the ratio of sensitivity of the two ears. To make sure that
the plugged ear was not functioning in these tests, the watch
was held as closely as possible to it without touching the lobe
and the observer required to tell whether it could be heard
or not.

The localizing experiments were carried on by means of
the Titchener sound-cage. A Galton whistle set at 20,000
vibrations per second was used for the stimulus. As to de-
vices for indicating the location of the sound, the pointing
method, the chart method, and a combination of the two
were used at different times. The authors have not made an
exhaustive study of the relative merits of these methods but
is inclined to prefer, on the basis of what they have done, a care-
ful use of the pointing method alone. Any method involv-
ing the use of the chart has, in his experience, fostered a tend-
ency on the part of the observer to delay the reference, to
become uncertain and hesitating, to reason and debate with
himself rather than to let whatever sensory mechanism for
localizing with which nature may have provided him work
itself out automatically. The errors arising from this tendency
are, in our opinion, greater and more capricious than those from

276

FERREE AND COLUNS

wrong pointing, if proper care is exercised to make sure that
the observer is pointing as he intends to point. The ques-
tion of methods of recording, however, makes little difference
for or against the validity of our demonstration; for (a)
the constant displacement tendency appears whatever the
method used, and (b) no method, however comprehensive its
faults, could account for the consistent throw in opposite di-
rections in case of different observers, or in the case of the same
observer, when first one ear then the other is made more
sensitive.

fP%.r

itcrr.

fjof?,

fo'nr

Fig. Ill

o°B.

180° F.

45° R. F. or L. F.

135° R. F. or L. F

50° R. F. or L. F.

130° R. F. or L. F

60° R. F. or L. F.

120° R. F. orlv. F

70° R. F. or L. F.

iio^'R. F. orL. F

150° R. F. or L. F.

30° R. F. or L. F

160° R. F. or L. F.

20° R. F. or L. F

Thus far results have been obtained from ten observers in
the investigation proper. In addition, the writers have roughly
used, at one time or another for two years, all of the variations
as a part of the drill course in his undergraduate laboratory.

(c) Results. The following tables have been compiled
from the results of three of these observers, who were selected
as representative: the Misses Friend (F.), Root (R.), and

AUDITORY LOCALIZATION

277

Sharp (5.). Tables I-XII, inclusive, show the results of the
experiments devised to demonstrate the importance of the
binaural ratio as a factor in auditory localization. In all the
tables given throughout the paper, locations in the horizontal
plane are expressed in terms of the readings of the Titchener
sound-cage. In this system of reference, the zero point is
placed in the median plane, behind ; the 90° points in the aural
axis, right and left; and the 180° point in the median plane
in front. It was found more convenient, however, in the
vertical planes, to deviate from the scale of the sound-cage;
the zero point was taken in the plane of the aural axis, and
directions were read 90° up and down. Displacements to
right or left were estimated from the actual position of the
stimulus, or from its corresponding point front or back, as
the case happened to be. For example, a stimulus given at
160° right front (R. F.) might be referred by the observer
either to 160° R. F. or to its corresponding point, 20° R. F.,
without the reference being considered a displacement toward
either ear. But if a stimulus were given at 160° R. F. and

Tablb I

Observer F. Showing the influence of the binaural ratio upon the locali-
zation of clangs. Natural sensitivity series. Liminal distance for right
ear, 40 cm. ; for left ear, 40 cm. Ratio, Left : Right = i . Stimulus, Galton
whistle, 20,000 vibrations per second.

Set

Heard

Displacement

toward axis of
right ear

toward axis of
left ear

Horizontal

Vertical

Horizontal

Vertical

45° RF

0''

50° RF

o°d

5°

135° L F

0°

50° Iv F

8°d

5°

o«B

0°

o^B

5°d

0°

135° R F

0*'

125" R F

5°u

10"

45° LF

45° u

50" L F

5°u

5°

180*' F

O**

20° L F

0''

20*'

135° L F

45° u

40" L F

20*' d

5°

45° L F

45° d

50"' L F

40" d

5°

150° R F

145° R F

5°

o°B

45° u

10'' R F

10"

45° RF

45° u

50° R F

0*"

5°

180** F

45° u

o°B

40° u

0''

0°

135° R F

45° u

135° R F

30" u

o**

150*' L F

45° u

35° L F

25° u

5°

o^B

90** u

20° RF

20** U

20*^

70'' L F

0°

70" LF

o''

0°

0**

50° R F

45° d

120" R F

5°d

10''

70° R F

o'*

80° R F

Q°

10*'

o^'B

0" B

0°

Average displacement from median plane 2.1° (right).

278

FERREE AND COLUNS

were referred either to 140° R. F. or to 40° R. F., the reference
would be considered a displacement toward the axis of the
right ear. Fig. 3 shows a diagram of the horizontal plane
of reference, with two pairs of corresponding points repre-
sented. Below it are given readings in degrees for the corres-
ponding points used in the experiments.

Tables I, II, and III show the results for the natural differ-
ence in sensitivity of the two ears for Observers F., R., and
5., respectively. In each case, the liminal distance for the

Tabids II

Observer R. Showing the influence of the binaural ratio on the localiza-
tion of clangs. Natural sensitivity series. Liminal distance: right ear,
18.5 cm.; left ear, 72 cm. Ratio, Left : Right =4. Stimulus, Galton
whistle, 20,000 vibrations per second.

Set

Heard

Displacement

toward axis of
stronger ear

toward axis of
weaker ear

Horizontal

Vertical

Horizontal

Vertical

45" RF

o''

25° RF

30° d

20**

135" I. F

0°

50" L F

30° d

5°

o^B

0°

15° Iv F

50° d

15°

135° R F

0°

40'' R F

38'*d

5°

45** Iv F

45° u

60** L F

35° d

15°

iSo'* F

0°

35° L F

20" d

35°

135° L F

45° ti

70° L F

38° d

25°

45^ L F

45° d

55° h F

33° d

10°

150° R F

0°

40° R F

42" d

io'»

o«B

45° u

35° L F

35° d

35°

45" RF

45° u

10° R F

45° d

35°

i8o« F

45° u

30" L F

42M

30°

135" R F

45° u

15° RF

45° d

30''

ISO** L F

45° u

40" L F

35° d

io«

o^'B

90° u

50° L F

10'' d

50^*

yo** L F

o**

70° L F

loM

o**

o*'

50** RF

45° d

15° R F

50° d

35°

70** R F

o**

50** R F

38° d

20°

Average displacement toward axis of stronger ear, 20.3°

ticking of a watch was determined for each ear both before
and after the observations, and the ratio of sensitivity was
computed from these distances. For observer F. this distance
was found to be 40 cm. for each ear. Estimated in terms of
these distances, then, the observer's ears were approximately
equal in sensitivity. As the tables show, the ears of observers
R. and S. were found to be of unequal sensitivity. It will
be noted that a rough correspondence holds in each case be-
tween the ratio of sensitivity of the ears, and the observer's
characteristic localizing tendency.

AUDITORY LOCAUZATION

279

Table III

Observer S. Showing the influence of the binaural ratio on the locali-
zation of clangs. Natural sensitivity series. Liminal distance: right
ear, 97 cm.; left ear, 33 cm. Ratio, Right : Left = 2.9. Stimulus, Galton
whistle, 20,000 vibrations per second.

Set

Heard

Displacement

frtMffarcl nvi*? r»f

toward axis of
weaker ear

Horizontal

Vertical

Horizontal

Vertical

Stronger ear

135° R F

o*'

5° RF

5°d

40°

45** L F

o*'

30° L F

o**

15°

ISO** L F

45° d

10° L F

0°

20^

o°B

45° u

o''B

45° u

o*'

o**

180° F

45° d

5°Iv F

35° d

5°

45** RF

45° u

50° R F

35° u

5°

135* R F

45° u

45° RF

52° u

0''

160'' L F

0**

0°

o*'

20''

o-B

90° u

30'* RF

12** U

30°

70^ L F

0°

65° L F

0°

5°

135" h F

25° h F

O**

20»

45° RF

45° d

10" R F

15° d

35°

o°B

90° u

25° RF

12'' u

25°

60* RF

0°

70° R F

18° u

10''

150'' R F

o**

50*^ R F

15° u

20°

45''I. F

45° u

o-B

2''d

45°

60'' L F

45° u

5° I. F

30° u

55°

160*' R F

25° R F

10** u

5°

60** L F

45° d

40° L F

loM

20°

o^'B

0°

o'^B

5°d

0°

o«

Average displacement toward axis of stronger ear, 10.7°.

Tables IV and V show the effect upon localization for ob-
servers R. and 5., produced by exaggerating the natural ratio
of sensitivity of the two ears by plugging the weaker ear. It
will be noticed that in each case the observer's tendency to
displace the sound toward the axis on the side of the stronger
ear is increased. For example, with the natural difference in
sensitivity, Observer R.'s average displacement toward the
axis on the side of the stronger ear was 20.3° (Table II) ; with
the exaggeration of the natural difference, the average dis-
placement became 31.6° (Table IV). For Observer S., the
average displacement toward the axis on the side of the
stronger ear, with the natural difference in sensitivity, was
10.7° (Table III) ; with the exaggeration of this difference, the
displacement was increased to 17.2° (Table V).

Tables VI and VII show the effect upon localization, for
Observers R. and S., produced by plugging the stronger ear
until it became less sensitive than the weaker ear. The re-
sult in each case was to change the characteristic displacement
to the opposite side — now the side of the stronger ear. For

28o

FBRREE AND COLUNS

example, for Observer R., when the ratio was changed from
left: right=4, to right: left = 6.2, the average displacement of
20.3° toward the axis on the side of the left ear was changed
to an average displacement on the side of the right ear of
34.4°. And for Observer S., when the ratio right: left = 2.9
was changed to left : right = 3.8, the average displacement was
changed from 10.7° toward the right to 34.6° toward the left.

Table IV

Observer R. Showing the influence of the binaural ratio on the locali-
zation of clangs. Artificial sensitivity series. Right ear plugged. Limi-
nal distance: right ear, 3 cm.; left ear, 71 cm. Ratio, Left : Right = 23.6.
Stimulus, Galton whistle, 20,000 vibrations per second.

Set

Heard

Displacement

toward axis of
stronger ear

toward axis of
weaker ear

Horizontal

Vertical

Horizontal

Vertical

o°B

0°

30° L F

40*' d

30**

45" RF

O**

10*' L F

35° d

55°

iSo** F

0°

60'' L F

10° d

60''

135" L F

o**

55° L F

15° d

10°

60° L F

o**

70" L F

15° d

10"

o^'B

45" u

40" h F

48° d

40°

135" R F

0''

45° RF

40° d

0°

0''

180° F

45° u

40" L F

50° d

40°

45** L F

45'' d

55° L F

12*' d

lO**

135° R F

45° d

40'' R F

43° d

5°

o**B

45° d

35° L F

25° d

35°

180° F

45° d

30° L F

15° d

30-

45^ RF

45° u

25° h F

45° d

TO''

iSS'' h F

45° u

50" L F

15° d

5°

45" L F

45° u

60^ L F

40° d

15°

135^ R F

45° u

15° L F

32° d

60"

o^'B

90** u

15° L F

15° d

15°

45" RF

45° d

35° L F

18° d

80°

Average displacement toward axis of stronger ear, 31.6**.

Tables VIII and IX show the effect upon localization made
by producing artifi^cial differences in the sensitivity of the ears
for Observer F., whose natural sensitivity is approximately
equal for both ears. When the left ear was plugged until the
ratio right: left = 4.3 was obtained, the average displace-
ment toward the axis on the side of the right ear was found
to be 17°. And when the right ear was plugged until the
ratio left : right = 4.1 was obtained, the average displacement
toward the side of the left ear was found to be 18.2°. It will
be remembered from Table I that the average of the locali-
zations for this observer with natural hearing showed a dis-
placement toward the right of 2.1°.

AUDITORY LOCAUZATION

281

TabIvE V

Observer S. Showing the influence of the binaural ratio on the
localization of clangs. Artificial sensitivity series. Left ear plugged,
iriminal distance: right ear, 97 cm.; left ear, 10 cm. Ratio, Right : Iveft =
9.7. Stimulus, Galton whistle, 20,000 vibrations per second.

Set

Heard

Displacement

toward axis of
stronger ear

toward axis of
weaker ear

Horizontal

Vertical

Horizontal

Vertical

O^B

45° RF

0**

45°

45" R F

0°

35° RF

0°

10^

135" L F

0°

5° L F

7°d

40°

180** F

10" R F

8«d

lO**

135" R F

0''

20° R F

0°

25°

45" L F

45° u

5° Iv F

14° d

40*

o-'B

45° u

50'' R F

15° u

50°

135" R F

45° u

40" R F

8*»u

5°

135" L F

45° u

25° L F

12° u

20**

180° F

45° u

30° RF

20° u

30"

45° RF

45° u

52° RF

30'' u

7°

45° L F

45° d

35" L F

8°d

10"

o*'B

45° d

20** R F

8^u

20«

45° RF

45° d

ao** R F

15° u

15°

135° h F

45° d

45° Iv F

30* u

o**

180° F

45° d

20° R F

15° u

20«

135° R F

45° d

45° RF

10* u

0**

o°B

90° u

40'' R F

10° u

40°

60" L F

0°

40*' L F

10° u

20*'

Average displacement toward axis of stronger ear, 17.2**.

Table X shows the effect upon localization, in the case of
Observer R., of an attempt to equate the sensitivity of the ears.
The natural ratio of sensitivity for this observer (Table II)
was left: right = 4. When this was changed by plugging the
left ear until the ratio right: left = 1.02 (18.5-^18.2) was ob-
tained, there resulted an average displacement 31.4° toward
the axis on the side of the right ear. Results of this kind
were obtained for all observers. A characteristic tendency
to displace the sound to right or left cannot be corrected by
equating the ratio of sensitivity of the ears. A value must
be obtained somewhere between the natural ratio and equal
sensitivity.^

^That the effect of equating the sensitivity should overshoot the mark is
not at all strange. If one ear naturally hears more loudly than the other,
an equal intensity of sensation has never been associated in the observer's
experience with objects in the median plane, but always with some position
displaced from the median plane toward the naturally weaker ear. Then
when the stronger ear is plugged until it is of the same sensitivity as the
weaker ear, sounds which can be heard as equally loud by both ears, i. e.,
sounds coming from the median plane, will not be referred to that plane,

JouRNAi, — 10

282

FERREE AND COLUNS

Table VI
Observer R. Showing the influence of the binaural ratio on the locali-
zation of clangs. Artificial sensitivity series. Left ear plugged. Liminal
distance: right ear, 18.5 cm,; left ear, 3 cm. Ratio, Right : Left = 6. 2.
Stimulus, Galton whistle, 20,000 vibrations per second.

Set

Heard

Displacement

toward axis of
stronger ear

toward axis of
weaker ear

Horizontal

Vertical

Horizontal

Vertical

45" RF

0°

65° RF

0°

20**

o«B

90" U

15° RF

42M

15°

180° F

45° d

25° RF

40M

25°

60** L F

25° RF

40° d

85°

135" R F

40'' R F

25° d

5°

45° RF

45° d

45° RF

18° d

o''

0°

las'' Iv F

45° d

4° RF

40M

49°

o°B

45° d

30" R F

32° d

30°

45° Iv F

45° d

55° RF

20M

100*'

135° L F

45° u

5° RF

35° d

50°

135° R F

0°

40" R F

20** d

5°

45° RF

45° u

SO*' RF

10" d

5°

180" F

45° u

25° RF

38M

25°

45° L F

45° u

45° RF

42''d

90°

135° R F

45° u

45° RF

45° d

0°

o°B

45° u

45° RF

20° d

45°

180" F

0°

25° R F

38° d

25°

135° L F

5° R F

28" d

50°

o^'B

c**

50'' R F

40** d

50''

Average displacement toward axis of stronger ear, 34.4**.

Tables XI and XII show the results of fairly successful
attempts to correct this observer's tendency to displace sounds
towards the left. In Table XII with a ratio left :right = i .5 we
find an average displacement of 2.1° towards the right; in
Table XI with a ratio left: right = 2.1 we find an average
displacement of 1.4° towards the left. The former tables
thus show over-correction; the latter, under-correction.

B. THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OP INTENSITY AND TIMBRE
AS FACTORS IN I^OCALIZATION

In these experiments, tuning forks were used as the source
of sound. The object was to find out to what extent the con-
but will be displaced toward the axis on the side of the weaker ear, because
sounds of equal intensity have always had that connotation in the observer's
past experience. Likewise, when the ears have been made equally sensitive
by plugging the stronger, sounds which come from positions to either side
of the median plane will always be displaced toward the naturally weaker
ear, because now they are heard by the two ears with a relative loudness
which, in the observer's past experience, has always connoted a position
relatively nearer the weaker ear.

AUDITORY lyOCAUZATlON

283

Table VII
Observer S. Showing the influence of the binaural ratio on the locali-
zation of clangs. Artificial sensitivity series. Right ear plugged. Liminal
distance: right ear, 18 cm.; left ear, 70 cm. Ratio, Left : Right = 3.8.
Stimulus, Galton whistle, 20,000 vibrations per second.

Set

Heard

Displacement

friTxrarrl qyic r»f

toward axis of
weaker ear

Hori7:nntal

Vertical

Horizontal

Vertical

stronger ear

o^B

0**

30" L F

5°d

30°

180*' F

O**

30° L F

2o'*d

30"

45" RF

0''

10" L F

5°d

55°

45" Iv F

45^ u

eo** L F

5°u

15°

o'^B

45° u

33° Iv F

22" d

33°

135° R F

0°

20° h F

5°d

65°

135^ I. F

0°

50^* Iv F

15° d

5°

180° F

45" u

30" h F

0''

30''

135" R F

45° u

20'' h F

18" u

65°

135° h F

45° u

65° h F

5°u

20^

o^B

45° d

25° L F

o''

25°

45'' RF

45° u

35° L F

lO** u

80''

45" Iv F

45° d

50° L F

15° u

5°

60° L F

o«

6" L F

5°u

54°

45'' RF

45° d

30" L F

12- d

75°

180° F

45° d

40^ L F

I2«'d

40°

135'' R F

45° d

30'' L F

5°d

75°

o^'B

90 u

30° h F

5°d

30°

Average displacement toward axis of stronger ear, 34.6^.

ditions obtaining in the former experiments influence the
localization of simple tones. Three cases are possible, (a)
These conditions may exert no influence at all. We should
then have to conclude that, in the former experiments, the
binaural ratio produces its effect wholly as a difference in the
timbre of the sound as heard by the two ears. That is, since
timbre depends upon the number and the proportionate
strength of the overtones in the clang, in case one ear is
more sensitive than the other, the timbre of the sound heard
by one ear will differ from that heard by the other ear be-
cause of the different number of overtones present in the two
cases. ^ (b) The conditions may exert some influence, but not

^This view of the way the binaural ratio serves as a localizing clue was
first advanced by Rayleighin 1876, and later by Sylvanus Thompson (Op.
cit.,p. 415) in 1882. Thompson says : "Judgments as to the direction of
sound are based, in general, upon the sensations of different intensity in
the two ears, but the perceived difference of intensity upon which a judg-
ment is based is not usually the difference in intensity in the lowest or
fundamental tone of the compound (or 'clang'), but upon the difference
in intensity of the individual tone or tones of the clang for which the
intensity difference has the greatest effective restdt in the quality of the

sound It is completely open to doubt whether a pure

simple tone heard in one ear could suggest any direction at all."

284

FERREH AND COI^UNS

as much as was exerted upon the sound of the Galton whistle.
In this case, we should have to conclude that diJBferences of
intensity both in the fundamental and in the overtones of the
clang served as a localizing clue in our experiments, (c) They
may exert an equal influence upon the sound of the tuning
fork and upon the clang. This would indicate that differences
in the intensity of the fundamental tone alone were operative
as local signature.

Table VIII.
Observer F. Showing the influence of the binaural ratio on the locali-
zation of clangs. Artificial sensitivity series. Left ear plugged. Liminal
distance: right ear, 39 cm.; left ear, 8 cm. Ratio, Right : Left =4.9.
Stimulus, Galton whistle, 20,000 vibrations per second.

Set

Heard

Displacement

fowrarH nvi^ of

frfsxrari^ qyi*. of

Horizontal

Vertical

Horizontal

Vertical

t^KJ TV <*JL ^A CUkA3 \Jk

stronger ear

weaker ear

45" RF

70« R F

S^'u

30'

135° L F

o**

35° Iv F

o«

IO«

o''B

O*'

35° RF

o«

35°

135*' R F

50° RF

5°

45° LF

45° u

50*^ L F

o*-

180° F

0''

o*'B

o«

o**

135" L F

45° u

45° L F

30** d

0**

o*'

45° LF

45° d

o°B

30'' d

ISO** R F

o**

30** RF

5°d

o»

o^'B

45° u

10" R F

10° d

10*'

45° RF

45° u

45° RF

20* u

0**

180° F

45° u

155° R F

10" u

25°

135° R F

45° u

170" R F

20° u

35°

150° L F

45° u

35° L F

o*"

5°

o°B

90° u

25° R F

0''

25°

45° L F

o^'B

20" d

45°

o^'B

45° d

40** R F

lo^'d

40°

180'' F

0°

15° R F

io*'u

15°

Average displacement toward axis of stronger ear, 17°.

The stimulus was given as follows in these experiments.
The observer, blindfolded, with head firmly clamped and
ears tightly closed, sat in position in the sound-cage. A
heavy unmounted tuning fork of 480 vibrations per second
and a cylindrical resonator were used as the source of sound.
These were substituted for the telephone receiver of the sound-
cage. The fork was plucked by the fingers covered by a
chamois glove, and was allowed to vibrate for a few seconds
to allow possible high overtones, harmonic or inharmonic,
to die out. It was then held over the mouth of the resonator.

AUDITORY LOCALIZATION

28s

As soon as the tone became audible, the observer's ears were
uncovered and the sound was listened to for about one second,
at the end of which time the fork was removed from the mouth
of the resonator, and the direction in which the sound was
heard was indicated by the observer. In no case were any
of the noises attendant upon the stimulation of the fork heard ;
and a tone as simple as a tuning fork is capable of giving was
obtained. The duration of the stimulus was roughly the same

Table IX
Observer F. Showing the influence of the binaural ratio on the locali-
zation of clangs. Artificial sensitivity series. Right ear plugged. Liminal
distance: right ear, 10 cm.; left ear, 41 cm. Ratio, Left: Right =4.1.
Stimulus, Galton whistle, 20,000 vibrations per second.

Set

Heard

Displacement

toward axis of
stronger ear

toward axis of
weaker ear

Horizontal

Vertical

Horizontal

Vertical

45° RF

0°

40** R F

0°

5°

135" I. F

0°

IIO^ L F

25°

o^B

15° L F

10'' u

15°

135** R F

0''

15° RF

20** U

30**

45° L F

45° U

60° L F

5°u

15°

180° F

o*'

50° Iv F

25° u

50''

135° L F

45° u

90** L F

35° u

45°

45° L F

45° d

55° L F

loM

10''

150'' R F

0°

120*' R F

18° u

30*

o°B

45° u

25° L F

30° u

25°

45° RF

45° u

25° RF

30° u

20-

180** F

45° u

35° L F

32° u

35°

135° R F

45° u

15° R F

35° u

30"

150" L F

45° u

90° L F

5°u

60"

o^'B

90° u

5° RF

20° u

5°

70* L F

o**

75° L F

0°

5°

50° RF

45° d

120** R F

15° u

lO*

70° R F

0''

30'' RF

15° u

40°

Average displacement toward axis of stronger ear, 18.2°.

as that of the Galton whistle used in the earlier experiments,
and care was taken to give the stimulus as nearly as possible
the same intensity each time. The stimuli were all given at
the level of the ears, and no account of vertical displacements
was taken in recording the results, since these have no direct
bearing upon the purpose of the experiment.

Tables XIII, XIV, and XV give the results of this investi-
gation. These results, on the average, show that the ratio
of sensitivity of the two ears affects the localization of simple
tones almost, if not quite, as much as it does the localization
of clangs of the degree of complexity of the Galton whistle.

286

F]eRRKE AND COLUNS
Table X

Observer R. Showing the influence of the binaural ratio on the locali«
zation of clangs. Sensitivity of two ears equated. Left ear plugged.
Liminal distance: right ear, 18.5; left ear, 18.2 cm.; Stimulus, Galton
whistle, 20,000 vibrations per second.

Set

Heard

Displacement

fcwwarf^ jiYiQ of

fckwart^ flYiQ nf

Horizontal

Vertical

Horizontal

Vertical

right ear

left ear

o°B

0**

50** RF

42° d

50**

180° F

0''

35° RF

30" d

35°

o°B

45" u

40° R F

30° d

40°

180" F

45**"

50" R F

50''

G^'B

45° d

40° R F

25° d

40°

180° F

45° d

30" R F

25° d

30**

o*'B

90° u

30*" R F

42*' d

30«

o°B

0''

35° RF

40«d

35°

180*' F

0**

30" R F

44° d

30''

o'^B

45° u

20° R F

28** d

20"

180* F

45° u

20** R F

32° d

20"

o°B

45° d

10° R F

35° d

lO**

180*' F

45° d

35° RF

35° d

35°

o^'B

90** u

15° RF

38" d

15°

Average displacement toward axis of right ear, 31.4**.

Table XI

Observer R. Showing the influence of the binaural ratio on the locali-
zation of clangs. Attempt to correct localizing error. Left ear plugged.
Liminal distance: right ear, 19 cm,; left ear, 40 cm. Ratio, Left : Right =
2.1. Stimulus, Galton whistle, 20,000 vibrations per second.

Set

Heard

Displacement

Horizontal

Vertical

Horizontal

Vertical

right ear

left ear

o^B

0''

10° R F

28M

10"

180** F

0°

20° L F

35° d

20«

Q°B

45° U

o°B

32° d

o**

0*'

180*' F

45° U

10** L F

25° d

10*'

o^'B

45° d

o^'B

35° d

0*'

o»

180*' F

45° d

5° R F

35° d

5°

o**B

90" u

5° R F

50M

5°

o^'B

o'*

o^'B

32^ d

0°

180*' F

o°B

20** d

0*'

o«

o^'B

45° u

io*» L F

35° d

IO«

180** F

45° u

5° Iv F

30'' d

5°

o^B

45° d

15° R F

32° d

15°

180" F

45° d

o^'B

20° d

o**

o-B

90° u

10° L F

42«d

10''

Average displacement from median plane, 1.4** (left).

AUDITORY LOCALIZATION
Table XII

287

Observer R. Showing the influence of the binaural ratio on the locali-
zation of clangs. Artificial sensitivity series. Attempt to correct
localizing error. Left ear plugged. Liminal distance: right ear, 19 cm,;
left ear, 29 cm. Ratio, Left: Right = 1.5. Stimulus, Galton whistle,
20,000 vibrations per second.

Set

Heard

Displacement

Horizontal

Vertical

Horizontal

Vertical

right ear

left ear

o°B

0*'

5° RF

30° d

5°

180'' F

0*'

5° L F

15° d

5°

o^-B

45°"

10'' RF

30M

10°

iSo** F

45" U

o°B

ao^'d

0''

0**

o^'B

45'' d

o^'B

15° d

o**

180*' F

45° d

o°B

15° d

0''

0°

o^B

90° u

o^B

40'' d

0°

0**

o^'B

0*"

5° RF

38° d

5°

180** F

5° Iv F

22° d

5°

o^'B

45° u

15° R F

30*' d

15°

180° F

45° u

o«B

35° d

o*'

o**

o^B

45° d

o°B

25° d

0°

180'' F

45° d

o^B

25° d

0°

o^'B

90 u

5° RF

40^

5°

Average displacement from median plane, 2.1° (right).

But the effect is not nearly so consistent in the individual
judgments. When the Galton whistle was used as stimulus,
the sound was displaced toward the axis on the side of the
stronger ear in a very large percentage of cases, and, relatively
speaking, in not widely varying amounts. In the case of the
tuning fork, however, a very large displacement of the sound
toward the axis on the side of the stronger ear was frequently
followed by one toward the axis on the side of the weaker ear,
the variation in the individual judgments from the true posi-
tion being, in general, very much greater than for the Galton
whistle. It would appear then, in these experiments, that the
binaural ratio has exerted its influence both as difference in in-
tensit^^ and as change of timbre.^ For the sake of comparison,

^A few words, further explaining and qualifying the above argument, are
probably not out of place here. The tone of the Galton whistle set at
20,000 vibrations is relatively simple. The first overtone, for example, has
a vibration rate of 40,000, and the second of 60,000, which is above the limit
of audibility. Thus our argument that the above mentioned displacements
have been made in terms of the intensity factor should not rest so much,
probably, upon a correspondence of results when Galton whistle and tuning
fork are used as sources of sound, as upon the fact that the large displace-
ments observed took place both when a vsimple and a relatively simple tone
were used as stimuli. To complete the investigation a comparison should

288

FBRREE AND COLUNS
Table XIII

Observer F. Showing the influence of the binaural ratio on the locali'
zation of simple tones. Liminal distance: right ear, 40 cm.; left ear, 40
cm. Ratio, Right : Left = i . Stimulus, tuning fork, 480 vibrations per
second.

Displacement

Set

Heard

toward axis of

right ear

left ear

135" I. F

70° L F

25°

o*'B

o°B

o"*

45° L F

Go'' L F

15°

135" R F

45° L F

90°

60** L F

60"' L F

o'*

0''

120° L F

50° L F

80" L F

30*'

180" F

o°B

0''

150" L F

65° L F

35°

0° B

o^'B

o''

o"*

135" L F

90*' R F

135°

45° RF

45° R F

0*' B

125° R F

55°

60° R F

15° RF

45*

180*' F

85° L F

85°

120*' R F

60** R F

o**

30° R F

130° R F

20''

150" R F

135° R F

15°

0° B

10^ RF

lO**

45° RF

go*' R F

45°

i8o' F

20'' L F

20*

Average displacement from median plane, 3.09* (left).

the same observers were used here that were used in the experi-
ments with the Galton whistle. In order to show the effect
of the binaural ratio, it was deemed advantageous, in both
cases, to work with observers both of equal and of unequal
sensitivity of the two ears.

Table XIV shows the results for Observer R. The ratio of
sensitivity was chosen so that left: right = 2.3 ; the average dis-
placement toward the axis on the side of the stronger ear was
found to be 15°. A correlation of average displacement
with ratio of sensitivity shows, roughly speaking, for this
observer, quite as much tendency to displace the sound to the
side of the stronger ear as was shown for the Galton whistle.

Results with the Galton whistle are brought forward from
Tables II, IV, and VI for comparison. Table II shows for R.

be made further of the results obtained with these two sources of sound
and one still more complex than the Galton whistle. This comparison will
be included in the work on this problem still in progress in this laboratory.

AUDITORY lyOCAUZATlON

289

a ratio of sensitivity left: right = 4, an average displacement
toward left of 20.3°; Table IV, a ratio of sensitivity left: right
= 23.6, an average displacement toward the left of 31.6°; Table
VI, a ratio of sensitivity right: left = 6.2, and an average dis-
placement of 34.4° toward the right.

Table XV shows the results for Observer S., with a ratio of
sensitivity chosen so that right: left =1.9. With this ratio
it was found that the sound was displaced, on the average,
7.5° : toward the side of the stronger ear. When compared
with a ratio left: right = 2.9 and an average displacement
of 10.7° toward the left ear (Table III), a ratio right: left = 9. 7
and an average displacement toward the right of 17.2° (Table
V), and a ratio left: right = 3.8 with an average displacement
toward the left of 34.6° (Table VII), these results also show
probably as strong a tendency to displace the simple tone
toward the stronger ear as was shown in the case of the clang.

Table XIV

Observer R. Showing the influence of the binaural ratio on the locali-
zation of simple tones. Liminal distance: left ear, 49 cm.; right ear, 21
cm. Ratio, Left : Right = 2.3. Stimulus, tuning fork, 480 vibrations per
second.

displacement

Displacement

Set

Heard

toward axis of

stronger ear

weaker ear

45" RF

85'' R F

4°

las'* R F

30^* RF

15°

o«B

40'' L F

40°

60" RF

40** R F

20"

180" F

o°B

o*»

30^ R F

55'*RF

25°

150" R F

40'' L F

70''

o°B

55° RF

55°

45*' RF

55° RF

lO**

135" R F

50'' L F

95°

.o'^B

85° L F

85°

135" h F

35° L F

ID**

o^'B

35° RF

35°

45° h F

75° I. F

30°

o°B

50° L F

50°

I20*' L F

55° L F

5°

50*" L F

55°!. F

5°

180° F

60° L F

60''

150" h F

40° RF

70°

o*B

45° L F

45°

135" h F

70'' L F

25°

45'' LF

85" L F

40°

Average displacement toward axis of stronger ear, 15**.

290

I^SRREK AND COI.UNS
Table XV

Observer S. Showing the influence of the binaural ratio on the locali-
zation of simple tones. Liminal distance: right ear, 86 cm,; left ear, 46
cm. Ratio, Right : Left = 1.9. Stimulus, tuning fork, 480 vibrations per
second.

Displacement

Set

Heard

toward axis of

stronger ear

weaker ear

135° L F

35° RF

8o'>

o^B

25° L F

25°

45*' h F

35° L F

lO**

o°B

40° L F

40°

60** L F

70'* L F

io'»

I20*' L F

40° R F

100°

50" L F

65^*1. F

15°

180*' F

45° RF

45°

135" R F

o^'B

45°

150*' L F

10° L F

20''

o^'B

50** RF

50**

180*' F

10*' L F

10"

135° L F

120** R F

105°

45° LF

75° h F

30°

45° RF

lo*' R F

25°

o**B

70** L F

70°

60° R F

75° RF

15°

o^'B

15° Iv F

15*

180° F

50'' RF

50°

120** R F

45° RF

15°

30** RF

60° RF

30*

45° RF

45° LF

90»

Average displacement toward axis of stronger ear, 7.5*

C. INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES

Of the individual preferences reported by von Kries^ and
Dunlap,^ the writers find this much evidence. There is (i) a

*The individual preferences mentioned by von Kries (Ueber das Erkennen
der Schallrichtung, Ztschr. f. Psychol., I, 1890, s. 242-243) are confined
to points in the median plane. The results obtained by us bear more spe-
cifically upon the preferences reported by Dunlap.

^Dunlap (The Localization of Sounds, Psychol. Rev. Monog. Suppl,
1909, Vol. X, No. 40, I -16) says: "Several years ago I commenced the
attempt to make comparisons between the location of soimds with both ears
and the location with one ear, the other being stopped as well as might be.
The results of my first tests were rather odd, showing a condition which
made it impossible to get at the comparisons I wished, at least in any
clear way; and subsequent tests which I have made from time to time, and
which students have made for me, on different subjects, have resulted in the
same way. The condition mentioned has had so little (if any) consideration
in connection with the problem of the location of sounds, that I have thought
it important to give some accoimt of my exx)eriments." The condition

AUDITORY LOCALIZATION

291

tendency in case of a stronger ear, to refer the sound in the
direction of this ear; and (2) in the case of his observers, and the
relatively weak stimulus used, there seemed to be a fairly con-
sistent tendency to prefer the back to the front locations ; in fact,
some observers never located a sound in front. The former tend-
ency gave certain observers a decided right or left "preference,"
depending upon their defect; and this, combined with the second
tendency, tended to limit the localizations to a single quadrant.
That is, the back tendency operating to limit the sound to
one hemisphere, and the right or left tendency to a hemisphere
at right angles to this, would tend to confine the localizations
to one quadrant for a given observer. But these tendencies
can hardly be called capricious, as Dunlap apparently found
them to be. To show that the one conforms to law, i. e., is corre-
lated with a definite sensory characteristic, has been the ob-
ject of this paper. The other is still under investigation.^

which discouraged further work on his problem may be summed up in his
own words : * 'The position in the area of location bears precious little rela-
tion to the actual position of the sound. The marks representing the sounds
at the various points might to all intents and purposes be shaken up in a
box and dumped down on the preferred area on the chart. This appearance
is amply confirmed by other series on the subjects. Repeated series give
results which have no uniformity, except in the general area of location.

"The preferred position is not determined by the character of the sound or
by the environment. Two subjects in exactly the same circtunstances may
have quite different preferences. A subject may show the same preference
after six months or a year, or may show a decidedly different one, without
any known reason for the change. The subject shows the same preference
in different rooms, or if he is reversed in the same room. Alterations in
the intensity of the sound produced no definite alterations in the pre-
ferred area. The Galton whistle gives practically the same results as
the buzzer or the telephone receiver. So far I have not found a subject
who does not locaUze in this preferential way. What the causes are, I
cannot say. There are possible theories and nothing more. Meantime,
how to conduct profitable experiments in localization before solving this
problem is another problem."

The writers admit that the irregularity of Dunlap's results is discourag-
ing. After a careful study of Dunlap's charts of results, they also admit
that the factors underlying the evidences of individual preferences of their
own observers fail utterly to solve "the puzzle." They can only repeat
that in their contention for a lawful mechanism, they do not wish to go
beyond the results and conditions of their own experiments ; and merely
suggest that Dimlap may have worked with the subjective type of observer,
and may have fostered this subjective tendency by the use of the chart
method for indicating directions.

^It has been discussed at various times in the literature of auditory lo-
calization whether back reference may not have become associated with weak
intensities of sound. (Thompson: The Pseudophone, Phil. Mag. (5) VIII,
1879, 385-390; Bloch: Das hinaurale Hdren. Wiesbaden, 1893, pp. 52-6;
Pierce: Op. cit. 90-1. A reason for this association has been found in the
shape of the external ear as a collector of sound (Pierce: Op. cit., p. 90;
Bloch: Op. cit., pp. 25-52). But apart from the cause the writers are in-
vestigating the fact in the following way. Observers are selected who.

2 92 FERREE AND COI^UNS

Moreover, no variation that could be called a consivStent
change occurred in these tendencies after a lapse of some four
months. Certainly nothing has come out with regard to the
right or left tendency, from time to time, that cannot be
roughly correlated with the results of the accompanying
sensitivity tests, as will be shown by the results given in the
next section of this paper.

However, in contending for a lawful mechanism, and in
suggesting an explanation, of what, on the surface, might be
considered as capricious, the writer has no desire to go beyond
the results and conditions of his own experiments. Bach case
must be tried out on its own merits.

Table XVI shows the preference for the back locations.
This table was compiled from the results of Tables I-XV in-
clusive and from Table XVII. The number of readings given
back and in front of the aural axis, the number of times the
sound was localized in the correct hemisphere and the number
of times it was displaced to the opposite hemisphere was
determined from the tables; and the ratio of the number of
backward displacements to the number of forward displace-
ments was computed from these results.

with the comparatively weak stimulus used in the preceding experiments,
show a marked tendency to locate the sound behind. A graded series of
stimuli is then provided, ranging from very weak to very strong, and the
regular localizing series is given for each stimulus. If, with an increase
in the intensity of the stimulus, there is found to be a decrease in the per-
centage of back references, the intensity of the stimulus may fairly be said
to sustain an associative relation to this direction reference. This method of
procedure, the writers believe, offers better possibilities of getting results
from which conclusions can be drawn than do the experiments of the kind
performed by Bloch, even though Bloch's principle of working be carried
out imder laboratory conditions. Bloch selected a sound of such intensity
that when it was given behind, it was localized behind by his observers; and
then he tried the effect of an increase of intensity. He claimed thus to be
able to cause a reversal of the localization, or the illusion of front. Bloch's
method of experimenting was extremely crude. The experiments were
made in the open air in a court enclosed on three sides. "The observer
stood 5 meters from the end wall and pebbles were thrown on the stone pave-
ment in front or behind him. The result was that when his face was turned
towards the wall, the legitimate influence of the pinna was merely increased
and the localizations were mostly correct. When, on the contrary, the
back was turned towards the wall, sounds coming from behind were apt to
be falsely located in front, since now the reflection of the sound waves by
the wall produced an unwonted intensity in the sound." Applying this
principle of working under laboratory conditions in various ways, the writers
have always failed to get anything like consistent results. Any attempt to
confirm the association of the back or front reference with the intensity of
the sound, based upon individual judgments, they believe is doomed to
failure. If conclusions are to be reached at all they must be reached from a
comparison of averages got by a systematic variation of intensity.

AUDITORY LOCALIZATION

293

Tablb XVI

Showing, with the comparatively weak stimulus used, the preference of
our observers for back locations.

No. of

No.

No. dis-

No. of

No.

No. dis-

Ratio of
displace-

Tables from

readings

localized

placed in

readings

localized

placed

ment

which data

given

in correct

front of

given in

front of

aural

in correct

back of

back to

are taken

back of
aural

hemis-
phere

atu-al
avis

hemis-
phere

aural
axis

displace-
ment

axis

front

Table I

5 : I

Table II

8:0

Table III

8:0

Table IV

8 :o

Table V

9 :o

Table VI

9 :o

Table VII

8 :o

Table VIII

7 : 0

Table IX

4 '■ I

Table X

6 :o

Table XI

6 :o

Table XII

6 :o

Table XIII

7 : 2

Table XIV

9 : 0

Table XV

8 :o

Table XVII

8 :o

D. THE QUESTION OF CHANGES IN THESE PREFERENCES WITH
LAPSE OF TIME

Experiments were conducted to find out whether any
considerable change occurred in the observer's tendency to
localize during the course of several months, or, more espe-
cially, to determine whether there occurred any change
that could not be correlated with a corresponding change
in the ratio of sensitivity of the ears. No change of any
significance was found to have taken place in any of the cases
examined. Table XVII shows the results obtained for ob-
server R. three months later than those given in Table II.
These results may be taken as representative. In Table II,
the ratio left: right = 4, and the displacement is 20.3° toward
the left; and in the table given below, the ratio left: right =
3.7, and the displacement is 23.3°. This comparison shows
a slight increase in the observer's tendency to refer the sound
to the side of the stronger ear, but in a field where the results
show such a large mean variation the writers have not con-

294

FSRREE AND COLUNS

sidered, either here or elsewhere in the work, that so small a
change in results is at all significant.

By comparing the results of Table XVII with Tables II,
VI, VII, X, XI, XII, and XIV, in Table XVI, it will be found
also that no significant change has occurred in the observer's
preference for the back locations.

Table XVII

Observer R. Showing that no change of any consequence has taken
place in the localizing tendency of our observers after a lapse of three
months. (Compare with Table II.) Liminal distance: right ear, 19 cm.;
left ear, 71 cm. Ratio, Left : Right = 3.7. Stimulus, Galton whistle,
20,000 vibrations per second.

Displacement

Set

Heard

toward axis of

stronger ear

weaker ear

o« B

25° L F

25°

180** F

50** L F

so''

45^* h F

65" L F

20°

130° L F

65** L F

15**

70** L F

70° L F

0°

o**

135" Iv F

80'' L F

35"

o^'B

15" h F

IS''

135** R F

IS** R F

30»

45" RF

25" R F

20"'

150° R F

20** R F

10''

60" h F

TS'^L F

IS**

135" R F

10° R F

SS''

eo** R F

10" RF

SO**

50° h F

eo** h F

lO**

130'' R F

25** R F

2S'*

180*' F

20*' h F

20"

0^ B

20*' L F

20*'

Average displacement toward axis of stronger ear, 23.2".

III. Summary of Results.

(i) Subjects having a natural difference in the sensitivity
of the two ears show a constant tendency to displace the
sound toward the axis on the side of the stronger ear; and,
conversely, subjects without this difference in sensitivity do
not show this tendency. The greater number of subjects
examined showed a difference in sensitivity.

(2) Changes in the ratio of sensitivity, produced by plug-
ging either ear, were followed by corresponding displacements
of the sound toward the axis on the side of the stronger ear.
Differences in sensitivity, artificially produced, apparently

AUDITORY I.OCAUZATION 295

exerted a greater influence upon localization than did approxi-
mately equal differences due to natural defect. This is proba-
bly because, in the case of a natural defect, the localization
error has been partly corrected, in the past experience of the
subject, through association with the direction reference oi
other sense-organs.

(3) In the case of observers who showed a characteristic
right or left tendency, it was found possible to change the
ratio of sensitivity so that the error in localization was cor-
rected. This result was not accomplished by equating the
sensitivity of the two ears. The desired ratio was always
found to have a value somewhere between equal sensitivity
and the old ratio.

(4) The average results showed that changes in the bi-
naural ratio affected the localization of simple tones almost,
if not quite, as much as it did the localization of clangs of the
degree of complexity of the Gal ton whistle. The individual
judgments, however, showed a much larger variation from
the true position in the case of the simple tones. It would
appear, then, that in these experiments the binaural ratio
exerted its influence both as difference in intensity and as
change of timbre, but predominantly as difference in intensity.

(5) The writers find this much evidence of individual pref-
erences in localization (von Kries', Dunlap). (a) There is
a tendency in case of a stronger ear to refer the sound in the
direction of ,that ear. This gave certain observers a decided
right or left tendency, depending upon the kind and amount
of their defect, (b) With the relatively weak stimulus used,
there seemed to be a fairly constant tendency for the observers
to prefer back to front locations. But these tendencies can-
not in any sense be called capricious. One is directly traceable
to the binaural ratio; the other is still under investigation,
and is probably an effect of the intensity of the stimulus used.

(6) No changes of any consequence in these tendencies
were found during the course of several months, as occurred in
the case of Dunlap's observers, — certainly none that could
not be correlated with a definite change in the localizing clue.
For example, a cold, or what not, was sometimes found to pro-
duce a change in the observer's right or left tendency, but
tests of the sensitivity of the two ears always disclosed a
corresponding change in the binaural ratio.

In this study, nothing was undertaken bearing upon the
later aspects of the intensity theory brought out by the papers
of Rayleigh^ and Wilson and Myers.^ The writers, however,

^Rayleigh: On our Perception of Sound Direction, Philos. Mag. (6), XIII,
1907, pp. 214-32.
^Op. cit.

296 FERREJE AND COLLINS

have begun experiments upon three points relative to these
aspects. (i)It will bedetermined whether tones of 128 vibrations
or less per second have a larger j. n. d. of direction than tones of
higher pitch. This the intensity theory would seem to require,
according to Rayleigh's calculations of the relative intensity of
the waves received by the two ears. Rayleigh's tests of this
point were as rough as possible. They consisted, it will be re-
membered, in determining whether stimuli of both low and high
pitch, given in the region of the aural axis, could be judged as
right or left without mistake. Now, working under these condi-
tions, a considerable difference in direction-sensitivity might ob-
tain for the two kinds of tones, and still no mistake be made in
either case. The positions chosen give the largest possible
binaural ratio, and the judgments required are the most
general that could possibly be made. In short, a less sensi-
tive method for detecting small differences in power to dis-
criminate direction could hardly have been devised. The size
of the j. n. d. is obviously the proper criterion to apply. (2)
The series of experiments used in this paper will be repeated,
using forks of low and high frequency. If there is found as
much tendency to displace the tones of low pitch as those of
high pitch, the results should argue that the localizing clue
for low tones is the binaural ratio, instead of the power di-
rectly to detect phase differences ; because (a) the change in the
sensitivity of the ear does not affect the phase of the sound
wave, and (b) it could not affect the detection of the phase
differences by the ear in such a manner as to displace the sound
toward the stronger ear, for by this hypothesis, ratio of effect
has nothing to do with localization. At least, it cannot be
assumed that the binaural ratio, which is computed in terms of
intensive difference, could be translated directly into terms
of recognition of phase difference. Apparently the only effect
that could follow a decrease of sensitivity of one ear would be
a proportionate confusion and uncertainty of localization, not
a definite and characteristic displacement toward the axis on
the side of the stronger ear. (3) The settings given to the
stimuli in Wilson and Myers's experiments will be repeated
under ordinary localizing conditions, in order to see whether
the transfer of the sound from one side of the median plane to
the other takes place when the direct paths of transmission to
the two ears are changed by the amounts they used. If the
transfers do not take place, some evidence, at least, will be
afforded that the experiments they describe and the conclu-
sions they reach do not bear directly upon the phenomenon
of localization as it ordinarily occurs, but only upon a special

AUDITORY LOCAUZATION 297

phenomenon created by their conditions, which favored bone
conduction.

The writers present this report with the hope that their re-
sults establish a more definite correlation between the binaural
ratio and direction-reference than has previously been attained,
and that the experiments described will provide an easily
available means of clearly demonstrating this correlation in
the teaching laboratory.

JOURNAl* — 1 1

A REPLY TO PROFESSOR SAFFORD

By F. M. Urban, University of Pennsylvania

Professor Safford published in the January number of this Journal a little
note containing a criticism of my theory of psychophysical measurements.
His objections are two in number. Thefirst refers to the number of decimals
which have been retained in my tables; he is of the opinion that the compu-
tation should have been carried to the third decimal only rather than to the
fourth. The second objection is of a more complicated nature, and refers
to my use of Lagrange's formula. Professor Safford's ideas are very inter-
esting and I am glad to have an opportunity to explain some considera-
tions, at which my original articles merely hint. My book would have
become very voluminous, had I undertaken to present all the chains of
reasoning which I later found to be wrong, or to describe all the con-
siderations which decided me to adopt a certain manner of procedure.
Both of Professor Safford's objections occurred to me in the course of work-
ing out my data, and I may be allowed to state the reasons why I believe
that they are erroneous.

Before answering the first objection I want to say that in computing
data of this sort it is customary to express one's results in four places of
decimals. The majority of statistical investigations, however, do not use
relative frequencies, as I did, but percentages calculated to the second deci-
mal. Precentages are found from relative frequencies by multiplying by i oo ;
two decimals in percentages, therefore, correspond to four decimals in rela-
tive frequencies. Saying that an event has the relative frequency 0.4422 is
the same as saying tiiat this event occurs in 44.22 per cent, of the cases.
The latter form is, perhaps a little more familiar to the eye ; but relative
frequencies have the advantage over percentages of being the more primi-
tive notions.

The relative frequencies of the different judgments form the starting-
point of my exposition of the theory of psychophysical measurements;
and I naturally gave much thought to the question of how many decimals
should be retained. The mere physical labor of carrying out the computa-
tions— including the unavoidable wild goose chases — was very considerable
indeed, and it seemed highly desirable not to increase the task by carrying
too many decimals. Not being satisfied with the reference to custom and
being acquainted with the theory of physical measurements, my mind
naturally drifted into the channels pointed out by Professor Safford. I
found out very soon that there does not exist a universal agreement as to
the munber of decimals which should be retained in the result, and that
the rules explained by Professor Safford are not the only way of approaching
the problem, for no less an authority than Gauss advocates the rule that
the computations should be carried so far that the final result should enable
one to calculate the actual data of observation with their original precision.

Professor Safford says that it is customary to use the average deviation as
a measure of precision and to retain two significant figures of it. There does
not exist any such general custom. In Germany and Austria the mean error
is in almost exclusive use, while English, American and some French text-
books on the method of least squares recommend the probable error. Some-
thing may be said in favor of each one of these quantities, but this is not the

A REPLY TO PROFESSOR SAFFORD 299

topic of the present discussion, where we only want to see whether there exists
a universal agreement as to the quantity which is to be used as a measure of
precision. Neither does there exist an agreement as to the ntunber of signifi-
cant figures to be retained in the measiu-e of precision. I open the chapter
on the adjustment of observations in Czuber's text-book of the calculus of
probabilities and find on pages 293, 294 and 298 examples in which the
mean error is calculated to one, two, three and four significant figures.
Some of these examples are taken from authoritative sources, so that one
cannot possibly say that there exists a general rule as to the number of deci-
mals which should be retained in the result. Two or three significant
figures in the measure of precision seem to be most frequently used.

There exists a fundamental difference between the data of statistical
observation and the results of physical measurements, which Professor
Safford entirely overlooks. The results of physical measurements are
exact within one-half of the last significant figure. Thus if we put down
29 inches as the length of a line, this result means that the line is not longer
than 29.5 nor shorter than 28.5 inches. When using this result in a compu-
tation, one must not add digits to it, because the following figures are en-
tirely unknown. The case of statistical observation is different. If we
observe that an event takes place 29 times in 100 cases, both these numbers
are absolutely exact. The figure 29 does not indicate a result which may
vary between 28.5 and 29.5; but it means exactly 29 and we may add as
many zeros as seems necessary. The number of decimal places retained is
merely a question of convenience, and one cannot be accused of publishing
a misleading result if the accuracy of the determination accompanies it.

It took me some time to see that the theory of physical measurement is
not the most direct w^ of determining the precision of my observations.
The original data of my experiments are determinations of the probabilities
of the different judgments. The most direct way of finding the precision
of these observations is given by Bernoulli's theorem. This theorem refers
to observations, in which a chance event A occurred « times in a total number
of cases iV; and it gives the most probable value of the unknown probability
of this event and the limits of the accuracy" of this determination. This is
exactly the case of my experiments and I chose the probable error deter-
mined by Bernoulli's theorem as the measure of precision. A table of these
probable errors is printed in the .4 rc^ii//. d. ges. Psychologie, igog, Vol. 15,
p. 287. The probable errors in the determination of the probabilities of
the "greater" judgments for Subject / on the comparison stimuli 84, 88,
92, 96, 100, 104 and 108 were found to be 0.0015, 0.0044, 0.0090, 0.0132,
0.0157, 0.0097 and 0.0076. Admitting that two or three significant figvues
in the measure of precision is a conservative accuracy, I decided to retain
four decimals in the tables of the relative frequencies of the judgments.

It was the traditional custom in statistics and psychophysics to use the
methods of physical measurement uncritically. Lexis and his followers have
shown how statistical data must be treated, and I tried to develop the
theory of psychophysical measurement. That this can be done has been
shown. At present we have a number of psychophysical methods which may
stand alone on their own merit. Neither did I decide hastily, in breaking
away from the old notions. It may be that there is a connection between
the theories of physical and of psychophysical measurement; but at present
we know only little about it, and the only statement which one could make
with any kind of confidence is, that the theory of physical measurement
must be based on that of psychophysical measurement. The so-called law
of the distribution of errors of observation has resisted all attempts at a
purely mathematical demonstration. Innumerable attempts have been
made to explain this law — some of them by the cleverest mathematicians the
world has known — but all have failed in so far as their proofs necessitated
the introduction of some one assumption which is equivalent to the propo-

300 URBAN

sition to be proved. It is only natural to suppose that this law contains
some supposition of non-mathematical natiu-e. It seems that it depends,
in some way, on our method of making observations, and that the so-called
Gaussian coefficient of precision is closely related to the threshold of
difference, a fact which would justify Gauss in putting this quantity directly
proportional to the accuracy of observation. The threshold of difference
is an object of psychophysical investigation, and for this reason I believe
that the theory of physical measurement ought to be based on that of
psychophysical measurement.

We now turn to Professor Safford's second objection. His criticism of my
use of Lagrange's formula of interpolation is twofold: first that the calcula-
tion is carried entirely too far, and second that the interpolation should
have been effected by the graphic method. Before entering upon the
discussion of these objections I want to say something about the general
piupose of interpolation. It frequently happens that the values of a func-
tion are given for a certain number of values of the independent variable,
and that one wants to know something about the values of the function for
intermediate values of the argument. Every procedure which serves this
pmpose is called a method of interpolation. In the graphic method one
plots the results on millimeter paper and connects these points by a smooth
curve. Every point of the curve corresponds to a certain value of the func-
tion, which in many cases may be read off with sufficient accuracy. This
is the method which Professor Safford thinks I should have employed. I
have done so as a matter of fact; but I did not consider such results of
sufficient interest to publish, and only published a notice in the Archivf. d.
ges. Psychologie, 1910, Vol. 18, p. 410, that the charts are at the command
of every scientific investigator, who may be interested in them. The
chief objection against graphic interpolation is that it is too arbitrary; and
for this reason I relied upon numerical interpolation alone.

There is a great variety of methods of numerical interpolation ; but the
essential feature of all these methods is that an algebraic expression is
given, which may be fitted to the course of any function. Two of the best
known methods are known as Newton's method of differences and La-
grange's formula of interpolation. Both methods are essentially identical,
since they both suppose that the function may be represented by an alge-
braic function of degree n. The greater the number of observed values is,
the more reliable is the result of interpolation ; and it is, therefore, desirable
to have as many observed values as possible. In a scientific investigation,
however, one has to take into account that the time and energy of the ob-
server are limited and that it is better to have a few carefully made observa-
tions than a mass of not very dependable results. In planning an investi-
gation one has to strike a happy medium, which gives as many carefully
made observations as possible. Experience shows that in the study of
the psychometric fimctions seven values of the comparison stimulus are
as much as can be handled easily and effectively. I may support in this
respect my own opinion by the authority of G. E. Mueller. It is obvious
that one cannot make observations for every intensity of the comparison
stimulus, and that one has to fall back upon interpolation, if one wants to
know something about the intermediate values. I, therefore, cannot see
the reason why Professor Safford should find fault with my tables, because
only seven entries were original results, a fact which could not fail to be
noted by anybody who read the text. Tables of interpolated values are
plentiful in physics and astronomy, and no one objects to them, if they are
properly pointed out as such.

I now want to call attention to a small error in Professor Safford's text
and a slight inconsistency in his position. He says on p. 97 that the
seven ordinates were treated as absolutely exact. This is not quite correct ;
the abscissae were so treated. He, furthermore, objects to the actual set-

A REPLY TO PROFESSOR SAFFORD 30I

ting up of the equations by Lagrange's formula on account of the great
number of decimals which must be retained in the coefficients, but does not
raise the same objection against the interpolation without setting up the
equation. The advantage of this formula is that the interpolation can be
effected without setting up the equation, but the use of the formula never-
theless implies the equation. To be consistent Professor Safford should
have objected to the use of Lagrange's formula in any shape, but this
would have precluded the use of Newton's formula, which Professor Safford
favors, because it gives the same result "and requires about one-tenth of
the labor." I beg to differ on this score. I tried both methods and found
that the nimiber of figures to be written down to effect the interpolation for
one intermediate value and all my seven subjects was smaller for Lagrange's
formula than for Newton's method of differences.

Professor Safford's clever- criticism of the equation set up for the psycho-
metric function for Subject / is likely to carry the most conviction to the
reader. The discrepancy between the amount of work spent in setting up
the equation and the result obtained is so great that one cannot possibly
help being struck by it. In this part of the work I had the good fortune to
obtain the services of a professional computer, who first set up the equation
with six decimal places of the coefficients only. The results of interpolation
by this formula were fantastic, because the curve did not follow the actual
results at all. The necessity of retaining as many decimals as were actually
used later on, began to dawn upon me only after I had reasoned out that
each one of these coefficients had to be multiplied by high powers of num-
bers around 100. I then realized the necessity of carrying out all divisions to
the bitter end, and incidentally won an insight into the nature of Lagrange's
formula. This formula is a merely artificial construction, the coefficients of
which have not immediate physical significance at all. The formula of
interpolation is a means of achieving a certain purpose and he who wills the
purpose must will the means.

It is very interesting to analyze Professor Safford's criticism of my
statement that the use of Lagrange's formula does not imply a definite
hypothesis about the psychometric functions. The meaning of this ex-
pression, which I explained at some length elsewhere, is this. The psycho-
metric functions give the dependence of the probabilities of the different
judgments on the intensity of the comparison stimulus. We do not know
anything about this dependence, but we have to make some hypothesis
about it for the purpose of interpolation. This can be done in two ways : by
assuming a function which fits any kind of results, or by assuming a definite
law of distribution. Lagrange's formula belongs to the first class, because the
degree of the function depends on the number of observations only. The
form of the function is, therefore, different in different cases. A further dif-
ference between these assumptions and a definite hypothesis about the
psychometric functions consists in the fact that the latter admits of an
extrapolation, whereas the former as a rule, do not.

I may illustrate this distinction by the following example. Suppose that
a table be given, which we know contains the values of either the sine
or tangent for small angles but we do not know which. We may use
Lagrange's formula for interpolating in this table, and we may represent
the course of the function in this interval by this formula, but we fully
realize that this hypothesis is not definitive but subject to correction and that
the formula will not represent the course of the function outside the interval.
If, however, we possess some further information, which leads us to beheve
that the tables contain the values of the function sine, we make a defini-
tive hypothesis about the function. My monograph on statistical methods
contains only a casual mention of this distinction, but the articles in the
Archiv leave no doubt as to the meaning which I wanted to convey by
these words.

302 URBAN

Professor Safford's criticism is this: "Lagrange's formula gives the
equation of a curve through n points, whose degree is not greater than n
(tiiis is not correct, it should read n-i ; remark of the writer), and the n
points determine the curve completely." There is an infinity of ciu^es of
the same type and Lagrange's formula merely ha s the merit of being the
simplest, and it is therefore useless to spend much energy upon it. This is
the standpoint of the mathematician, whose interest Hes in the study of the
properties of whole groups of curves. The standpoint of the practical
calculator is different. He attempts to reach his goal by the shortest
possible route; and I, for one, refuse to consider a method of which I know
beforehand that it has no merit over another excepting that it is more
complicated. Whether in a scientific investigation energy is spent use-
lessly or not, depends upon the importance of the results obtained ; and
this can be judged by the specialist alone. I do not believe that my energy
was wasted in this case, for I am willing to go through all the trouble of
working out my data merely for the sake of fiinding the result, that the
maximum of the psychometric function of the equality judgments must be
related to the threshold of difference.

Professor Safford sees a further objection to the use of Lagrange's formula
in the fact that it excludes at once all probability curves, symmetrical as
well as asymmetrical. In my opinion, this is one of the greatest advantages
of direct interpolation that it fits the actual data of observation without
making the assumption of a definite law of distribution. If the data
follow one of these functions, the interpolation by Lagrange's formula will
follow it closely enough. I may remark that I am at this point in perfect
agreement with W. Wirth, who in his latest publication employs the method
of direct interpolation. One of the most distressing features of the history
of psychophysics is the endless discussion as to the applicability of a definite
law of distribution. It was my purpose to get away from this discussion
and to see how the curves would look, if the data were not adjusted accord-
ing to a definite law of distribution.

Professor Safford's last objection is based on the fact that the results of
direct interpolation do not agree very well with what he calls the theoreti-
cal curves. I may remark here, that I made it a point to speak of hypo-
thetical curves and not of theoretical curves. There is, of course, only
little difference between a theory and an hypothesis, because many theories
should be caHed hypotheses ; but it seems to be a pretty general rule that
one does not call a doctrine an hypothesis, unless one wants to emphasize
the hypothetical element in it. The supposition that the psychometric
functions belong to a certain type has the character of an hypothesis in a
very high degree. There is no possibility of deciding beforehand whether
the data will fit such a curve; and for this reason one ought to insist on
calling such an assumption an hypothesis and not a theory.^ The fact that
the actual distribution does not coincide with the hypothetical one, is very

II may be allowed to state here the reason which prompted me to choose the term 0(7)
hypothesis instead of the customary name of Gaussian distribution. It seems to me that this
term should be restricted to the distribution of errors of observations exclusively. In the
work of Gauss there is no passage known, to me, which could lead us to believe that Gauss
would have applied this law to empirical distributions of all descriptions. Considering the
practical turn of Gauss's mind, it seems very unlikely indeed that he would have favored such
an unwarranted generalization. One, therefore, ought to speak of a distribution according
to the probability integral or to the 0(7) function. To call this function by the name of
Kramp-Laplace, as Opitz has done, makes the name a little clumsy, and is not entirely
justified from the historical point of view. It is entirely inadmissible to call this function
by the name of Gauss; and the chances are that Gauss himself would have been very much
surprised by this honor. In the Theoria Motus Corporum CoeUstium {Werke, Vol. vii, p. 238)
the integral is referred to Laplace, but as a matter of fact this integral was already known
to Euler. Gauss was acquainted with this fact, as may be seen from a letter dated February
10. 1810, and from a manuscript note to the Theoria Motus. To call the function by the
name of its inventor, one has to take one's stand in a complicated historical question, for the
decision of which the complete material is not yet at hand.

A REPLY TO PROI^KSSOR SAFPORD 303

interesting in view of the above mentioned discussion ; but it is not so much
an argument against the use of direct interpolation as one against the use
of some hypothetical probability curve.

After paying me some compliments as to the mathematical treatment of
my problems, of which, as coming from an authoritative source, I am
highly appreciative. Professor Saflford remarks that my data are hardly
sufficient to warrant an extensive treatment. Of course I agree that it
would be eminently desirable to have a more extended material, and that
it would be possible to improve upon my results ; ^ but I must insist that it
is at present the most suitable material for testing [the different psychophy-
sical methods. Other statistical sciences make very extended use of mathe-
matical methods, and their material is not always as good as that of my
experiments. The work of constructing mortality tables requires efforts
compared to which my work — as being done by one individual — shrinks
into insignificance ; but the data used do not always show the high degree of
stability of those found in my experiments. This fact may readily be seen
from the values of the coefficients of divergence: But few statistical invest-
igations deal with data of a similar degree of stability. I do hope that we
may soon possess an experimental material still more extended than my
own; but until then my data are the best available for the specific purpose
of testing the different psychophysical methods. And if one wants to
make such a test one has to make the best of the material at hand.

Professor Safford has iJresented his criticism with admirable clearness
and precision; but I am convinced that his position is untenable, and his
argument is unsound. The methods of physical measurement cannot be
taken over bodily and applied directly to the problems of statistics and of
psychophysics. And while we are always grateful for the mathematician's
interest in psychophysical discussions, yet it is a truism that every science
is obliged to develop its own methods, and to grapple with its problems in
its own way. That the methods and the problems of the theory of obser-
vations and of psychophysics are the same cannot be maintained; whether,
indeed, any intimate relationship obtains between these two fields of scien-
tific endeavor still remains to be determined.

BOOK REVIEWS

Dogmatism and Evolution. By Theodore de Lacuna and Grace Andrus
DE Lacuna. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1910. pp. iv, 259.

The term dogmatism, as employed in the title of this work, is intended
"to denote the body of logical assumptions which were generally made by
thinkers of all schools, before the rise of theories of social and organic
evolution. Its application is therefore wider than common usage would
warrant. The empiricism of Berkeley and Hume, as well as the ration-
alism of Descartes and Leibniz, is induded in its scope" (Preface). This
usage of the term is sufficiently justified by the presentation. The authors
aim to make prominent the fact that empiricism and rationalism, in spite
of their wide divergences, are founded upon a common basis, and that this
identity of assumption is more significant for present-day philosophy than
are the differences. The fundamental dogma behind both standpoints
is also present in the philosophy of Kant, and in absolute idealism. The
pragmatic movement, moreover, which is principally a protest against
these earlier philosophies, is to some extent misdirected, since it perpetu-
ates in a measure this self-same dogma. It suffers further from the
inevitable extravagances and overstatements pertaining to doctrines that
express the irritation of a reaction; and hence, while it represents an im-
portant truth, it requires re-interpretation and correction.

In presentation the first two parts of the book in particular are not only
compact and closely-reasoned, but coherent and lucid. The treatment
of the subject-matter can lay claim to originality, and is splendidly stimu-
lating and suggestive. Historical rationalism and empiricism differ in
that the one makes an appeal to mathematics as its ideal of knowledge,
while the other relies upon introspection. In spite of this contrast, how-
ever, they both assume that experience presents us with certain unanalyz-
able elements, which serve as the foundation for all further knowledge. In
the case of rationalism, these simple elements are imiversal propositions
possessing intuitive certainty; in the case of empiricism, they are particulars
which are capable of entering into various combinations. Hence both en-
counter the same difficulty, for both are committed to the view that re-
lations are external to their terms. This is obviously true of empiricism;
but it is no less true of rationalism, for the relation of inclusion cannot
obtain between simple concepts, and hence rationalism must take as its
starting-point, not concepts, but judgments which are indemonstrable
and sjoithetical. Spinoza, indeed, attempts to start with a concept in
which all other concepts are implicit, viz., that of substance. But
the exposition runs smoothly merely because the concept is at once com-
pletely simple (or indeterminate) and infinitely determined. Rationalism
fails to justify either the syntlietic character of its most fundamental
judgments or the passage from a system of universal truths to the 'in-
finite determinations' of fact in which this system finds embodiment.

This result sets the problem for Kant. The fact, however, that 'syn-
thetic a priori judgments' present a problem at all is due to the assumption,
whidi Kant shares with his predecessors, that analysis must yield final
elements. "No proposition could be determined as synthetic, tmless
a complete definition of' its terms had exhibited their ultimate disparate-
ness" (p. 73). In other words, Kant proceeds on the assmnption that pure
thought suppUes to experience certain universal modes of relationship to

BOOK REVIEWS 305

which every experience must be subject. This assumption persists in ab-
solute idealism. At first sight, the contrast between rationalism and ab-
solute idealism is as great as could well be imagined. The former made
relations external; the latter asserts that ' 'the essences of things are wholly
constituted by their relations" (88). The procedure of rationahsm is a
descent from first premises ; that of absolute idealism is an ascent of which
the fimdamental principle of the entire scheme is the goal. Yet absolute
idealism, like rationalism, is committed to the proposition that ' 'the order
and connection of thoughts and the order and connection of things are the
same" (108). It necessarily depends upon an inner dialectic for the move-
ment of its self-contained system of thought, and hence it has to choose be-
tween the claim of being able to account antecedently for all the contingent
facts of history, or else to accept existing irrational facts, and thus to admit
an irreconcilable contradiction in its theory of actuality.

It appears, then, that rationalism, empiricism and absolute idealism are
all dogmatic, in that they all proceed upon the basis of an untested assump-
tion with regard to the 'simple elements' or constituents of experience. On
the other hand, pragmatism bases itself upon evolution and endeavors to
give a functional interpretation of logical and psychological problems.
With this endeavor the authors profess themselves in sympathy. Their
argument, however, is intended neither as a defense of pragmatism nor
as an attack upon it, but as a justification of the charge that current prag-
matism is "only half -free from the grip of the traditions which it openly
repudiates," and thus untrue to the deeper spirit of its own standpoint.

As a matter of presentation it is unfortunate that the authors do not
connect the discussion of pragmatism more closely with the results of the
preceding exposition. As they themselves admit in the preface, this omission
detracts appreciably from the unity of treatment. The basis for the charge
against pragmatism, it seems, is the fact that the latter has formed en-
tangling alliances with immediatism. While pragmatism is right in its
emphasis upon functionalism, its most prominent advocates have all pro-
fessed their adherence to some form of immediatism. This creed is not
only inessential to pragmatism as such, but is incompatible with its deeper
meaning, for it introduces once more the attempt to base our thinking
upon a 'simple element' or 'given.' A starting-point of this kind neces-
sarily leads to perverted notions regarding the nature of thought. In
effect it means that relations once more become external, as appears most
strikingly in Professor James's contention that "the self -same piece of
experience taken twice over in different contexts" is equivalent to the dis-
tinction between knower and known. The relations are treated as merely
additive, /. e., as exerting no influence upon the character of the ex-
perience. Essentially the same criticism applies to the pragmatic treat-
ment of concepts. While it is true that concepts necessarily have reference
to conduct, it does not follow that the nature of the concept is exhausted
in any direct and 'external' relation of the given experience to a specific
form of conduct. The relation of the concept to conduct is more indirect
and equivocal. ' 'From the standpoint of biological utility it is clear that
the object, so far from meaning a definite type of behavior, is recognized
as an object only as it is associated with important diversity of behavior
in characteristically different situations" (p. 168). In other words, the
concept is of necessity more inclusive than any given type of behavior.
The concept cannot be identified with any conscious process, however
complex, for "the group of associations which constitutes the concept
may never in its entirety be present to consciousness in any single ex-
perience" (p. 170). It follows, furthermore, that "apart from this refer-
ence of thought to conduct, that is to say, in the limitless interrelations
of concepts with each other, thought has as distinctive a form as any ab-
stractly considered entity whatsoever" (p. 207).

306 BOOK REVIEWS

The gist of the matter, then, as regards current pragmatism, seems to
lie in the proposition thatfimctionalism may be divorced from immediatism.
On just this point, however, the position taken in the book does not seem
to be altogether consistent. In the discussion of J, S. Mill's theory of
objectivity (pp. 173-185), it is pointed out that Mill's fundamental mistake
lies in the fact that he takes simple elements of sensation as his starting-
point. These elements are held together by connections which Mill re-
gards as 'real' but as inexplicable. The alternative proposed by the authors
is that sensation is a scientific construct, that the distinction between sen-
sations and relations is simply a matter of logical analysis. In other words,
the relations fall within the experience quite as much as do the sense-ele-
ments. This is only another way of saying that objects are immediately
presented — however we may see fit to interpret objectivity. Earlier in
the chapter, however, the distinction between the 'given' and its relations
is drawn in quite as hard and fast a way as was ever done by Mill. A
passage was quoted in the preceding paragraph to the effect that the con-
cept is never in its entirety present to consciousness in any single experience.
So far as the exposition goes, there is no ground for the belief that it is
ever present to any degree or in any intelligible sense whatever. On page
171 the question is raised:" How, indeed, can given conscious contents
'represent' or 'mean' or 'point to' other possible contents not given?"
The answer which is suggested is that there is a tendency on the part of
the associated experiences to rise to clear consciousness, and that "such
inhibited tendencies to revival may affect in a distinctive manner the
qualitative tone of the existing content." Such an explanation obviously
fails to explain. We must either identify the concept with these nascent
associations, which is incompatible with the general account given of the
concept, or we are forced to recognize that the tendencies in question can,
at most, effect a change in the quality or structure of what is presented or
experienced, a change which may perhaps be interpreted as corresponding
to the function, but which is in no sense identical with it. In other words,
the relations or functions, regarded as such, necessarily fall outside the experi-
ence . That this is the intention is evidenced by the general tenor of the book,
and in particular by the avowed agreement on this point with Berkeley
and by the assertion that the 'real' is never experienced but always re-
mains ideal.

The implication of the foregoing, it is evident, is that Dogmatism and
Evolution is itself in bondage to the tradition which it accuses pragmatism
of perpetuating. It is committed to the very opposition of imiversal and
particular which it charges against the ' 'immediate empiricism" of Profes-
sor Dewey (pp. 244, 246). In the end, the denial of immediatism is purely
verbal, for the relations or meanings which are necessary to constitute
things are opposed to what is 'given.' Hence we have the assertion that
the 'real' is "never immediately experienced at all; it is always ideal"
(p. 245). This charge, however, is significant, for it seems to indicate
the source of the trouble. The immediatism attributed to Professor
Dewey is essentially that of the older empiricism — the immediatism which
constitutes a contrast to all forms of interpretation or mediation. It is
urged, for example, that immediate experience can contain no imcertainty
and doubtfulness; also that the Zollner lines cannot be immediately ex-
perienced as convergent, — the reason in the latter case being that conver-
gent lines are lines which when extended meet in a point, whereas the lines
in question do not meet imless conceived as extended. In other words, if
the lines are conceived as extended, the experience is held to be no longer
immediate. The point of Dewey's contention, however, is that both the
immediate and the mediate of ordinary philosophical usage are enveloped
in a wider immediacy, and that this immediacy is meant when the assertion
is made that things are what they are experienced as. Moreover, as Pro-

BOOK REVIEWS 307

fessor Dewey says, this proposition is not identical with the platitude that
experience is experience, but has the significance of a method of philo-
sophical analysis. If mediation is itsel 1 immediately experienced, the
proper way to find out its nature is to observe its operations as they
occur, instead of applying the mediation ah extra, as has been done so fre-
quently in the past.

In brief, then, it would seem that if the function and content of concepts
are not immediately experienced, we are back at the standpoint of Mill,
and left to derive what comfort we can from the classification of a con-
tradiction as an 'ultimate mystery.' On this ground, moreover, we seem
compelled to choose between the alternatives offered by Professor Royce,
viz., a validism of Mill's type, and a world which is the embodiment of an
"absolute system of ideas." At all events, we can hardly be content to
say merely that the real is always ideal. On the other hand, if mediation
is directly experienced, there seems to be no ground for identifying the
real with something beyond experience or with any particular kind of ex-
perience. One experience is then, to all appearances, as real as another.

In conclusion the reviewer piay be allowed to say that since limitations
of space do not permit comment upon the many excellent discussions con-
tained in the book, the foregoing critisicm may well seem disproportionate,
in view of the many solid merits of the work. But disagreement, even
though pretty fundamental, is entirely compatible with sincere respect and
appreciation. Readers who remain unconvinced by the third part will
nevertheless find the work one of distinct and unusual ability, a work that
will abundantly repay a careful reading. B. H. Bode

University of Illinois

Manual of Mental and Physical Tests. By Guy Montrose Whipple,Ph.D.
Baltimore, Warwick and York, 1910. pp. ix,534.

This manual includes a description of the apparatus and method of ad-
ministration of fifty-four tests or groups of tests, a series of accoimts of the
chief results obtained by those who have used them, and a corresponding
series of bibliographies. There is also a summary of the formulae and
tables useful in calculating central tendencies, variabilities, reliabilities and
correlations from the obtained measures.

Eighty pages are given to means of measuring height, weight, head-shape
and size, breathing capacity, and muscular strength, speed, precision and
steadiness. The next ninety pages concern tests of sensory capacity.
Under the headings 'Tests of Attention and Perception' and 'Tests of
Description and Report,' we have, in the next ninety pages, carefully elab-
orated forms of tests in perceiving letters, words, etc., exposed by the tach-
istoscope, in cancelling words, letters, etc., printed amongst others, in
counting dots, in reading, in adding a one place number to three given mun-
bers in succession, in simultaneous reading and writing, and in describing
and passing a detailed examination upon objects. A fourth portion of the
same length covers tests of association (thinking of a word, of a word to
fulfill certain requirements, and of the facts needed for simple computations),
learning (to copy drawings seen in a mirror and to translate certain char-
acters into nmnbers with the aid of a 'dictionary' printed on the blank), and
memory (of series of digits, letters and words, and of passages). Finally,
in somewhat over a himdred pages we find tests of suggestibility, imagina-
tion, invention, intellectual equipment, and developmental diagnosis.
These include, often in improved forms, the size-weight illusion, Binet's
other tests for suggestibiHty, tests of the effect of suggested warmth, Dear-
born's ink-blot test, the familiar school tasks of including given words in
a sentence, completing sentences and writing compositions, word-building
from given letters, the Ebbinghaus 'Combination' test. Swift's interpreta-
tion of fables, Kirkpatrick's test of knowledge of the meaning of words.

308 BOOK REVIEWS

Whipple's test of range of information and the De Sanctis and Binet-
Simon tests of intelligence.

The tests have been chosen on the basis of thorough knowledge of the
work that has been done in the field and with due appreciation of the uses
to which they will be put. Although probably no student of the subject
will agree with Mr. Whipple 's selections in every case, all will admire their
general worth and timeliness. And those who find the most to disagree
with will perhaps appreciate their general worth most fully. Any one who
plans to measure intellectual abilities of whatever sort, should as a first step
become familiar with the tests recommended in this Manual.

The chief desiderata in means of measuring mental traits are that some-
thing of importance be measured, that the resulting quantity be objective
or verifiable by any competent observer, that the precision or freedom
from variable error attainable from a given expenditure of a subject's
time be reasonably great, that the time and energy of the experimenter be
economized, and that the results be commensurate with those hitherto ob-
tained in measurements of the mental trait in question. There results a
balance of goods in the selection or invention of a test in the case of almost
every mental trait. Consequently, a practically infinite amount of ingenu-
ity can be expended in devising tests to satisfy best these desiderata. A stand-
ard test, in the sense of an imimprovable one, probably does not now, and
will not for a long time, exist in the case of any mental trait.

Professor Whipple has all these facts in mind, but, I think, in two ways
does not quite maintain the most serviceable balance amongst them. In
some cases he perhaps imposes too great a burden upon the experimenter
in order to make too slight a gain in objectivity, precision or comparability
with previous work. He is also too modest in reconmiending a test which
happens to have been used by some one a few times, instead of devising a
far better one himself. For example, counting dots (Test 27), adding a
given number, say 3, in succession to three numbers and continuing with
the sums thus obtained (Test 29), amenability to oral suggestions from the
experimenter (Test 43), and the interpretation of fables (Test 49) have been
very seldom used and could easily be very much improved.

The very difficult task of giving instructions in the administration of all
these tests is well done. Often the desirable plan of printing exactly what
the experimenter shall say is followed. A mass of minor information hither-
to acquired at great cost of time by imitation, can thus be put into the student's
hands once for all. If mental measurements are to be made by others
than trained experts, such detailed instructions (possibly even still more
detailed and rigorous instructions) must be accessible in print.

It would have been a great addition to the usefulness of the manual if
Mr. Whipple had given approximate measures of the nujnber of trials with
each test necessary to secure a given degree of reliability. For individual
diagnosis and prognosis, for measurements of change and for measurements
of the relations between mental abilities, it is of very great importance to
reduce the unreliability of the average or median ability found for an in-
dividual to a small per cent. Investigators commonly err by dispersing
their time over too many individuals, not measuring each one precisely
enough to allow straightforward inferences about anything save group
averages.

Where the author does announce the number of trials to be made, I
fear that he gives too few. For example, in measurements of the delicacy
of sensory discrimination, he commonly requires, after a brief preliminary
series, only ten judgments with the difference chosen, ten with one a little
greater and ten with one a little less. It would seem that if sensory dis-
crimination is to be measured by the per cent, of right judgments, at least
fifty judgments of a given difference should be taken. If only ten are to

BOOK REVIEWS 309

be taken, an arran-gement to use the average error made by the subject
seems preferable in many cases.

I may note also that to give only differences and permit only judgments
of more ... or less . . . relieves the experimenter from very annoying elements
in the latter calculations and on the whole seems better than to allow judg-
ments of 'equal.' The author's instructions vary on this point.

The chapter on statistical methods gives the standard formulae with
illustrations of their calculation. It is made specially useful by including
the later short methods of calculating correlations. I regret that the
author accepts Pearson's speculative assumption that to compare the vari-
abilities of two series each gross variability should be divided by the cor-
responding central tendency. No one method o rendering the variabilities
of the same group in different traits or different groups in the same trait
comparable is universally valid, and certainly not the method of dividing
by the central tendency. Dividing by the square root of the central ten-
dency will be more often and more nearly right.

The summaries of work done and the bibliographies accompanying them
represent a scholarly heroism all of whose sins of commission and omission
will readily be pardoned by any one who has tried to do the like. The
only serious fault, I think, is in quoting as measures of correlations, figures
' got before the effect of the variable errors of the original deviation-measures
in reducing the obtained correlation from the true correlation toward zero
had been discovered by Spearman. The obtained correlations of Aikins,
Thomdike and Hubbell and Wissler were thus necessarily far too low. Mr.
Whipple's interest in the generally neglected subject of correlations also
leads him to mislead the ordinary reader by quoting resemblances of related
individuals in the same trait along with the resemblances of a person's degree
of ability in one trait to his ability in another. The former should be
carefully explained if quoted at all in such connection.

It is to be hoped that this book and the reports that are being issued by
the American Psychological Association's committee on tests will be studied
and used by every investigator of human intellectual performance here and
abroad. The earlier expectations from tests of human faculty on the basis of
the faculty psychology, being too great, were destined to disappointment,
but now that the complexity, variability and relative independence of men-
tal functions are being understood and allowed for, we may hope for a revival
of interest in inventories of individual intellects, in measuring the changes
which they undergo by growth and training, and the causes of their original
capacities. If Professor Whipple's work did nothing more than stimulate
other investigators to measure the reliability of his tests, their susceptibility
to practice effect and their value as symptoms of more general conditions,
and so to amend or even replace them, it would have abundantly justified
itself. It will do much more than this. E. L. Thorndikb

Teachers College, Colimibia University

The Phenomenology of Mind, by G. W. F. Hegel. Edited, with an intro-
duction and notes, by J. B. Baillie. London, Swan Sonnenschein
& Co., 1910. 2 volumes. Vol. i, pp. xHv., 427; vol. ii, pp. viii., 429-
823.

In Professor J. B. Baillie's recent translation we have now before us
Hegel's Phdnomenologie des Geistes in an adequate English dress. The
Teuton has so far failed to make anything worth while out of this unique
intellectual product from a fellow-member of his race. It is now handed over
to a more distant relative, but perhaps none the less close still to the central
intellectual tendencies of the Germanic races for the rapport necessary to
its understanding, in a form to make it more readily accessible, and so to
give the Anglo-Saxon a turn at its interpretation. As is, in part, implied
in these two sentences, we shall probably have to approach the translation,

3IO BOOK REVIEWS

which as adequately represents the original as this is possible in a transla-
tion, on the assumption that it is only a means to an end, for two reasons.
First, the genius of language, reflecting the habits of thought of a race, is
sufficiently diverse in the English and the German to require a closer adap-
tation of the methods of presentation than a mere translation affords.
Secondly, Hegel's presentation is, in fact, inadequate to begin with, and
naturally so because he had undertaken a task to which there were no
established precedents other than mere vague effort; and the great bulk
of modem scientific work giving a training in accurate formulation has all
come after him, so that his work needs first of all to be modernized. But
the present translation will now unite the efforts of interpretation over a
greatly extended area.

In a brief appreciation of such a book as the present there are perhaps
essentially two things of interest to the reader. First comes the
question as to the piu-pose of the book, and as to whether its preparation
is adequate to the purpose. Second, and of equal importance would, in
the present instance, probably be additional suggestions calculated to
enhance the value of the book. The first has probably been sufficiently
considered above; to the second we might now give a little more attention.
In general, the cynical aspersion on Hegel's work of its being an intellect-
ual travesty cannot satisfy an impartial mind upon a glance at the table
of contents and a mere superficial perusal of the text of the Phdnomenologie.
Particularly, great emphasis is everywhere put on the unity of all matter of
experience, and on the need of taking fully into account the presuppositions
implied in our expositions in science through this unity of all matter of
experience. This receives practically no attention in present-day science,
while its recognition would bring about a far reaching revolution in science.
To get into Hegel's analysis in the present work, a very close study of his
Introduction, with all the implications, is advisable for the necessary point
of view. This point of view is not that experience as a whole must be ex-
plained in terms of some single definite conception, as idealism, monism,
materialism, psychophysical parallelism, and so on; but that these very
conceptions themselves are all elements in the form of stages in this experi-
ence, while the single fact of experience as a distinct conception is nothing
for us. Perhaps due largely to its subject-matter, the English rendering
of the Introduction is particularly good, so that not even an original re-
formulation in the English could improve it much. One suggestion might
here be made, which has reference more especially to the genius of the
English language and the Anglo-Saxon habit of mind. If in place of the
abstract noun representing completed action the present participle of
continuing action were more generally used, or if the reader will more
generally supply the sense of a continuing for that of a completed action,
the representation of the original would be more exact; as for instance
near the top of page 78, by putting for die Darstellung des ersckeinenden
Wissens, "the presentation of a developing knowing " instead of "the expo-
sition of knowledge as a phenomenon." This will make awkward EngUsh,
but it more adequately represents the continuous flux of conceptions as
necessary to understand Hegel, contrasting with the fixedness or permanent
demarcation of conceptions in the English.

It might be to the point to consider this flux of conceptions in Hegel's
method a little farther; and the real nature of this flux is best shown by its
formal recognition in the antinomy. In the antinomy, we have a contrast
of two mutually exclusive or incompatible appearances of the same matter
of experience of such a nature that one of them complete and distinct, but
only one, is necessarily present while the other is impossible for the time
being. Upon close examination and analysis of the appearance present,
however, it literally dissolves, as if by magic, under our very eyes ; and its
contrasting opposite appears and immediately takes its place. Moreover,
only at the completion of the actual perversion are the full meaning and all

BOOK REVIEWS 311

implications of each of the two forms of appearance of the experience
wholly understood. Classic among such antinomies are those regarding
the nature of motion in our environment developed among the ancient
Greeks; regarding the innateness of ideas, developed by ways of reaction
between Descartes and Locke; regarding the nature of the reality of the
matter of our experience, developed by Berkeley and Hiune; and the cosmo-
logical antinomies of Kant. Besides these particular instances, the an-
tinomy can, however, be found permeating our experience everywhere.
Through it is revealed an actual single inner movement and unity, in
the universe as it surrounds us, totally different from the cosmic motion
of the Copemican system and not recognized in present-day science but
which alone will account for such perplexing phenomena as the action of
force at a distance. The fixedness of conception, then, as most character-
istic of the Anglo-Saxon mind, here invariably leads to confusion and a
sense of loss of reality with the passing of the forms present, because the
continued presence simply of thi fixed forms is taken to be the reality,
while philosophical analysis invariably shows that the forms cannot be
so retained. The Introduction, from page 82 to 89 of the translation,
read in the light of this suggestion, may prove to be of more value, reference
being had not only to the fact of flux, but also to the mode of flux, of con-
ceptions.

Futhermore, Hegel in his analyses exhibits a kind of pedagogical ungain-
liness, which borne in mind will explain and clear up no small part of his
obscurity. So the following summary may serve to guide and elucidate.
The * 'Meaning " in the section heading on page 90 of the translation should
be understood in the sense of "Supposing;" for this beginning section,
subordinated under the general head of Consciousness, is a discussion of
the sinnliche Gewissheit eines gemeinten Diesen. the sensations or sensuous
awareness of a supposed this as apart by itself, over against the knowing,
which is the beginning of all conscious knowledge. The next sub-section
under the head of Perception (page 104) examines the development and
nature of the unities in things, under another aspect also called universals,
as essentially forming the basis of our conceptions of the nature of things.
The third sub-section under the head of Understanding (page 124) discusses
the formation of a continuous scheme of things constituting our conception
of the nature of things and consisting of two fundamentally distinct parts
or elements, the physical occurrence or fact of experience, and the apper-
ceptive content or metaphysical part in an AristoteHan sense. Following
these three sub-sections under the general heading of Self-consciousness
(page 163) is shown the mode of appearance of a persisting self possible
only through a succession of antinomies or course of antinomic dialectic.
The preceding sub-sections show the essential elements in ordinary know-
ing in their more or less independently distinct character; in this section
we have these elements, mutually dependent, forming an indissoluble
system. The rest of the work, beginning with a section under the head of
Reason (page 220), then shows how out of the movement of successive
reactions between the antinomic moments, in a single movement, of a
persisting self knowing and an other than the self known, develops the
comprehensive structure of science, the conventionalized conscious content
of our experience. A closing section under the head of Absolute Knowl-
edge (page 800) then considers various characteristic incidents of the
independent absolute form attained in our experience by the foregoing
mode of analysis. Hsnry Heitmann

Clark University

De Vorigine et de la nature mnemoniques des tendances affectives. Par K.

RiGNANO. Estratto da " Scienticia": Rivista di Scienza. Vol. 9,

Anno 5 (i9ii).N. XVII. i.Traduit par le Prof. J. Dubois. 35 P-

In this article the author outlines a genetic theory of the affective states.

The term affective is restricted to the special category of organic tendencies

312 BOOK REVIEWS

which manifest themselves subjectively in man as desires, appetites or
needs, and which objectively, in both man and animals, are translated into
non-mechanized movements. Admitting this definition, the author re-
duces the entire series of the principal affective tendencies to the single
fundamental tendency of the organism toward its own physiological state
of equilibrium. This tendency may be observed in all unicellular organ-
isms, e. g., hunger which is the most fundamental affective state is redu-
cible to a tendency to maintain or re-establish in the nutritive internal
milieu the qualitative and quantitative conditions which permit a station-
ary metabolic state. This tendency toward a state of metabolic equili-
brium has become, in the course of phyletic evolution, a tendency to accom-
plish all the acts necessary to proctue food. The hydra and sea anemone,
for example, react positively to food only if the metabolism is in such a
state as to require more material. The localization of hunger in the higher
animals is a secondary development, and merely one of the multiple aspects
of the part functioning vicariously for the whole which characterizes all the
physiological mnemonic processes. It is the same with thirst, which though
localized in the glands of the throat, is a need of the entire organism. Simi-
larly, the need of elimination of substances produced by general metabol-
ism, which the organism is not able to utilize, whether in the simplest
infusoria or the most complicated vertebrate, follows the same general rule.
In this category of affective eliminative tendencies, the author places the
sex instinct. To this fundamental property that every organism possesses,
i. e., the tendency to conserve the equilibrium of its own normal physio-
logical state or to re-establish it if it has been disturbed, must be added
another which in its turn becomes the source of new affectivities. When
the original state cannot be re-established then the organism tends to pass
into a new static condition adapted to the new external or internal milieu.
In this way, the whole series of the phenomena of adaptation is produced.
The experiments of Dallinger and others on the acclimation of lower organ-
isms have shown conclusively that this secondary state once established
tends to perpetuate itself. This tendency is of a purely mnemonic nature
and implies for the different elementary physiological states, forming
altogether the general physiological state, the faculty of leaving behind a
specific accumulation or mnemonic residue susceptible to revival or recall.
The extension of this faculty of specific acamiulation to all physiological
phenomena in general is in harmony with the hypothesis which posits
nervous energy as the basis of all vital phenomena.

With the extension of this mnemonic faculty to all the elementary physio-
logical processes, we arrive at a somatic or visceral theory of fundamental
affective tendencies. Naturally in organisms endowed with a nervous
system there would gradually be developed along with the affective ten-
dencies whose origin is purely somatic, the tendency, sometimes co-opera-
tive and sometimes vicarious, ' 'represented by the corresponding mnemonic
accumulations, deposited in liiat special zone of the nervous system which is
directly connected with respective points of the body." In man, this zone
would be the KdrperfUhlssphdre of Flechsig, to whidi is added in certain
cases the frontal zone. These mnemonic cerebral accumulations once
established under direct somatic action are able, even after communication
with the body has been severed, to represent the original affective tendency
in which they originated, e. g., Sherrington's "spinal" dog showed the
same repugnance to dog flesh in precisely the same way as a normal dog.
Finally affective tendencies owe their subjectivity to their mnemonic,
physiological origin, from the fact that the organism finds itself endowed
with specific affective tendencies in accordance with the particular environ-
mental history of the species or individual. In support of the foregoing
hypothesis thus briefly sketched, the author cites various examples from
the higher animals and man, e. g., he finds the origin of maternal love in

BOOK REVIEWS 313

the principle of elimination, the need of being nursed. Homesickness is
due to the disturbance of fixed paths of habituation. As a further confirma-
tion of the hypothesis of the mnemonic nature of the affective tendencies
Ribot's principle of transfert is utilized.

In accordance with this principle, in itself of mnemonic origin, all affec-
tivities not directly traceable to a mnemonic source are derived from those
which are thus referable, and are therefore of indirect mnemonic origin, e. g.,
secondary sex affectivities, cruelty as an end in itself, derived from the
original tendency of tearing prey to satisfy hunger, the desire of victory
for itself, originally self defence, the desire of amassing wealth, which is a
transfer from the original simple impulse to satify hunger plus the intellect-
ual element of foreseeing its recurrence.

Emotions according to this theory ' 'are only sudden and intensive modes
of putting in action those accumulated energies, which constitute precisely
the affective tendencies." Emotions and affective tendencies are distin-
guished from each other by the ?act that the same affective tendency may,
under different circumstances, give rise to very diverse emotions; to emo-
tions of different intensities or even, in some cases, to no emotion at all in
the proper sense of the word, e. g., the affective tendency of a dog for his
piece of meat may be translated, according to circumstances, into flight,
anger, or merely a search for a quiet place in which to enjoy it. As all
affective tendencies result in movement, external or internal, the theory is
here in accord with that of Ribot and the Lange- James theory.

The will is only an affective tendency inhibiting or impelling to action
like every other affective tendency. As to pleasure and pain, the theory
is in accord with that which interprets pleasure as the subjective accompa-
niment of unimpeded activity and pain as due to its inhibition.

Th^odate L. Smith

A Text Book of Psychology. E. B. TitchEner. Macmillan Company,
New York, 1910. pp. xx + 565.
Professor Titchener in the present volume has given us more than a text-
book of psychology. The book comes fairly close to being a brief, system-
atic psychology — an earnest, certainly, of what the author will give us
when his more complete study is ready. At the present time, in English,
we have at our disposal many elementary texts on psychology, and many
elementary laboratory manuals; but we are poverty-stricken for advanced
works in general, systematic psychology (based step by step on experiment),
and for advanced experimental manuals on the various sense-fields, — at-
tention, association, etc. Titchener's book, while supposed to be for elem-
entary students, is far from being an easy text. Indeed, the author's own
way of thinking has become so much more complex since the writing of the
Outline that I doubt if he himself clearly realizes just how much of his more
recondite reflections have become incorporated in the book. If I were
seeking a quarrel with the Text-book I should find the grounds for it on the
score of too great complexity. It is a little heavy for the average junior or
senior. But psychological classes differ greatly in the different institutions.
In some, psychology is required; in others, elective. In some the ' 'quarter'
system is in vogue, and only one quarter is allotted to psychology; in others,
psychology runs the year through. It is doubtful whether Titchener's
book can be adapted to meet the requirements of a short course. In institu-
tions where the elective system is in operation, and where a full year can be
given to psychology, I know of no text better to use than the one under dis-
cussion. In view of the fact that the author introduces experiments every-
where and that he discusses methods and results the book lends itself
easily both to systematic and to experimental presentation. Any student
going carefully over the work with a competent instructor will come out at
the end of the year with an increased respect for psychology and with the

JouRNAi, — 12

314 BOOK REVIEWS

ability to think along psychological lines and to read and follow the future
progress of psychology even if he carries his training no further.

In a book which is so full of factual material, we cannot hope in a review
to discuss chapter and verse in any adequate way. Certain interesting
points of view developed by the author, alone can be discussed. In the first
place, Titchener's series of chapters on sensation is excellent — by far the
best treatment we have. For, in addition to the full treatment of the ordi-
nary laws and principles involved in sensation, we have the more recondite
phenomena touched upon. Much additional material over that treated
in the Outline appears. For example, we have a fuller treatment of color-
theories; of the vestibular and ampullar senses; of the sensitivity of the
abdominal tissue; of sensations arising from the digestive and urinary
systems; and from the circulatory and respiratory system.

In discussing the attributes of sensation in general, the author tells us
that there are four distinct attributes; quality, intensity, clearness and
duration. The reviewer is puzzled by the attribute clearness. We all
admit clearness as an attribute of complex conscious experience, but not
as a fundamental aspect of the sensation-process — not in the sense in which
duration and intensity are attributes. He says, "Clearness, again, is the
attribute which gives the sensation its particular place in consciousness;
the clearer sensation is dominant, independent, outstanding ; the less clear
sensation is subordinate, undistinguished in the background of conscious-
ness." This is certainly to be admitted, but surely what Titchener is writ-
ing of here is an attention-state, in which a given "sensation" is focal,
while others appear in what James calls the "fringe." In other words,
clearness is one of the descriptive words which we apply to perceptual,
ideational and other complex mental states. With this given as an attri-
bute of sensation one would expect to find it taken account of somewhere
along with the other attributes of sensation. But in his chapters on the
special senses he speaks only of the usual attributes of each group, introdu-
cing certain changes in terminology, to be sure, as for example, he speaks
now of the qualitative attributes of a color as being hue, tint and
chroma.^ And further, in audition, he speaks of size and diffusion as an
attribute of tone. It would seem in places that he means to use this attri-
bute of clearness in the same sense as we should use clearness in describing a
perceptual state ; but this would carry with it the inference, it seems to me,
that sensation is something more than an abstraction — something that can
actually present itself. Futhermore, in order to reaHze the conditions for
the appearance of clearness, we should have to have at least two such ' 'sen-
sation processes" attempting to run their courses simultaneoulsy. But
this is certainly the process which we know as perception. The confusion,
if I understand Titchener's statements, is similar to that found in
James where sensation is at times discussed as an abstraction and at
others as a process corelative with perception.

It is interesting to note that he treats of the sense-image imder the general
chapter heading of synaesthesia; since the image is the normal process, and
synaesthesia the anomalous one, we should suppose that the traditional
order of treatment were best. One would hardly begin a chapter on
color vision for elementary students with a discussion of red-green blindness.
His early discussion of imagery is rather disappointing. Only two pages
are given over to it. One finds there few statements concerning the ex-
perimental mode of investigating the image, and very little of individual
differences. This lack of emphasis of the image in an early place would
seem to be a real limitation in the use of the book as a text. The average
undergraduate rarely wakes up to real introspective interest in psycho-
logical problems until he has learned that he has imagery and can stand

1 His introduction of the words chroma and tint are of doubtful value, since the word
saturation, now in common use, seems adequate.

BOOK REVIEWS

315

off and look at it, as it were, in the absence of a perceptual world. A brief
study of the image awakens him far more rapidly than does a much longer
drill on sensation-processes. Later on in the book, however, the author
completes the treatment of imagery under the headings, association,
memory and imagination. Here the treatment is full and adequate.

Following the chapter on synaesthesia is one on the intensity of sensation,
which includes a discussion of mental measurement, liminal and terminal
stimuli, just noticeable differences, and Weber's law. The chapter is
concise, but clear, and since these topics are valuable to the student, such
a chapter is a real contribution on the pedagogical side.

Then follows the chapter on affection. He stands by his position stated
in the Outline. "The writer holds that there is an elementary affective
process; a feeling element. . . .'*- "He holds further that there are only
two kinds or qualities of affection, pleasantness and unpleasantness."
Although the reviewer thinks he finds himself in another 'camp,* it gives
him a sense of security to find a psychologist of Titchener's eminence who
admits his position so frankly on such a vexed question as that of affection.
On page 228, in a discussion of the relation between sensation and affection,
he again enumerates the attributes of sensation — qimlity, intensity, clear-
ness, duration. Those of affection on the other hand, are quality, intensity,
duration. On page 231, he uses clearness as the distinguishing criterion
between sensation and affection. ' 'Pleasantness and unpleasantness may
be intensive and lasting, but they are never clear." This is due, in short,
the author says, to our inability to attend to an affection. ' 'The lack of
the attribute of clearness is sufficient in itself to differentiate affection

from sensation " Again, this attribute of clearness attaching to

sensation and not to affection, and further the fact that we cannot attend to
affection, make the author reject the view that affection is really a complex
or fusion of the accompanying organic sensations. While there is no time
to argue the question, I cannot see that Titchener makes his point against
this latter view. If we should grant his premises, namely, that affection
lacks clearness, and that it cannot be attended to, we should be forced to
admit his point. But these are just the questions at issue.

He discusses two methods of investigating affection: that of "paired
comparison," and the method of "expression." He devotes about six
pages to the method of expression, but is in agreement with the majority
of psychologists in denying any great usefulness to it. It seems like a
useless luxiu-y in a text-book to treat so at length of a method which has
absolutely nothing to recommend it. The tridimensional theory of feeling
is well and critically diccussed.

Space does not permit of even a brief review of further chapters; atten-
tion, perception, association, memory and imagination, action, emotion,
and thought. The chapters on attention and on thought are striking and
are both readable and teachable.

In the chapter on action it is with a shock that one again meets with
his earlier expressed view that the first movements of organisms were
conscious movements (agreeing thus with Wundt, Ward and Cope). Ac-
cording to this view, voluntary action degenerates into ideo-motor or sen-
sory-rnotor action, and then into the reflex. But in animal life we find
two kinds of responses, in every organism, beginning with the protozoa
(as shown by the recent work of Gibbs and Smith, of Bentley and others) :
the one type being fixed and definite; the other diffuse, leading itself to
habit-formation. Certainly I should agree with Titchener that conscious-
ness is as old as life, but I should certainly connect consciousness with
the diffuse type of response. I should say further that the very first organism
started with both types of response. Surely nothing is gained, and confu-
sion is introduced by the conception of Titchener that all movement was
first a voluntary acquisition, and that only later do we begin to find fixity

3l6 BOOK REVmWS

in the responses of organisms. There is not a scintilla of evidence thaXfixed
and automatic reactions do not appear with the first appearance of organ-
isms. And there is abundant reason to say that each new species as it
appears, e. g., by mutation (see the work of Tower et al.), gives evidence
of a reflex repertoire and of a plastic repertoire. Titchener argues that the
reason we do not see this complete plasticity (which would be called for
on his theory) in the unicellular form to-day, is that the protozoa have
travelled all the way from plasticity to fixity.

Looking at the book as a whole, it seems to the reviewer that in many
places Titchener has adhered too rigidly to the introspective method.
Surely in his treatment of meaning he could have leaned advantageously a
little way toward the functional side, without giving up the guiding princi-
ples of the book. Nevertheless in this day when, if I can read the signs
aright, the pendulum is swinging another way — toward a study of life-
situations as a whole, and the adequacy, permanency and diff^erent types
of adjustjtnent which such situations call forth — Titchener gives us an envia-
ble example of a man unafraid of his own views of the problems of psy-
chology, and of his own methods of solving them. John B. Watson

The Johns Hopkins University

U annde psychologique, publ. par A. Binbt, avec la collaboration de LarguiER
DBS Bancels et Dr. Th. Simon, etc. Seiziteie ann6e. Paris, Masson et
Cie. 1910, pp. IX, 500.
The introduction reviews the progress of psychology in 1909, treating
especially the work on thought and on pathological states, and the work
in experimental pedagogy and judicial psychology. The first original
contribution, by A. Binet, is entitled "The physical signs of intelligence
in children." Greater or less degrees of correlation are found between
intelligence and size of head, the so-called signs of degeneracy (abnormally
shaped head, ears, etc.), facial expression, and hands. The habit of biting
the finger-nails is found to be without significance in this respect. The
correlations found hold in general only for the group, not always for the
individual. The physical signs are useful for confirming, rather than for
making, estimates of intellectual level. Next in order is an examination
of the art of Rembrandt, by A. and A. Binet. The authors attempt to
show how, by avoiding extremes of contrast and by accentuating unity of
lighting, Rembrandt has succeeded in giving those impressions of distance,
of imity, and of light which characterize his work. "Tachistoscopic
Researches," by B. Bourdon, is an investigation of the times of choice-
reactions made by observers to whom colors, rectangles of different lengths
and figures, have been tachistoscopically exposed. The writer measures
the time of reactions involving judgments of resemblance, identification,
localization, comparison, or combinations of these processes. The eight
following papers, by A. Binet and Th. Simon, are concerned with defining
the various mental derangements. Up to the present, the authors believe,
definitions have been too inclusive and general, have failed to show the
essential characteristic which marks off the disorder, and have been couched
in terms only partly psychological. They themselves classify the de-
rangements as (i) hysteria, (2) derangement with knowledge (fears, im-
pulsions, etc.), (3) manic-depressive insanity, (4) systematized insanity
(paranoia), (5) the dementias (general paresis, senile dementia, dementia
praecox), and (6) subnormality. They consider the history of the con-
ceptions of the various disorders, the theories propounded and the attempts
at definition. They also review the characteristic mental states, symptoms,
and attitudes of patients, both as reported by others, and as shown by the
new data here published. They compare the special derangement under
consideration with the other types of derangement, and finally arrive at a
conclusion as to its essential character. Of hysteria, they find character-

BOOK Reviews

317

istic, separation; of derangement with knowledge, conflict; of manic-
depressive insanity, domination; of paranoia, deviation; of the dementias,
disorganization; of subnormality, arrest of development. The psychologi-
cal significance of these terms is discussed and explained at length, and an
attempt is made to bring them all into relation. "Judicial Diagnosis
by the Association-method," by A. Binet, argues against unlimited con-
fidence in the method for application in practice. The writer reviews the
experiments of Henke and Eddy and of Yerkes and Berry, pointing out
chances for error, and showing on both theoretical and practical grounds
that the method, as used in the laboratory or classroom, is not suited to
the conditions of the criminal court. The psychological literature of 1909
is reviewed by Beaunis, Binet, Bovet, Larguier des Bancels, Maigre, and
Stem, under the headings of physiological psychology, sensations and
movements, perceptions and illusions, associations, attention, memory
and images, language, feelings, aesthetics, thought, suggestion, individual
psychology, child psychology and pedagogy, animal psychology, judicial
psychology, pathology, dreams, treatises and methods, and philosophical
questions. W. S. Foster

// sentimento giuridico. Giorgio dei* Vecchio. Seconda Edizione. Roma:
Fratelli Bocca, 1908. pp. 26.

Professor del Vecchio, of the University of Sassari, who has previously
published several articles on kindred topics, — Uetica evoluzionista (1903),
Diritto e personalitd umana nella storia del pensiero (1904), — discusses in the
present monograph the "feeling (or sense) of justice" in man, its origin
and development. From the time of Aristotle down this ' 'sense of justice' '
has been attributed to man, but the philosophers have disputed much as
to its primary or derived character (these arguments the author briefly
summarizes). According to Professor del Vecchio, "the origin and nature
of the sense of justice is essentially a problem of the metaphysical order"
(p. 12). This, however, does not prejudice in any way the analysis of
the psychic datum and its proper functions. The "sense of justice" is
thus ' 'primary and normal datum of the ethical conscience, an element or
an aspect of it; and its nature is affective and, at the same time, ideological."
A fundamental and distinctive characteristic of the "sense of justice" is
its independence of all exterior sanction, — that is just, which is right in-
dependent of all positive historical sanction. Thus justice and law differ.
No prescription of law can destroy this original faculty of conscience to
oppose itself, as supreme principle, to the authority of constituted law
(p. 23), this, Hobbes to the contrary notwithstanding. The philosophy
of law is rooted in the "jtuidical vocation of conscience." The "sense of
justice" is "the anthropological exigence of law, its primary indication,
and the psychic expression of its human necessity."

Alexander F. Chamberlain
Sulla Craniologia degli Herero. Dorr. Sergio Sergi. Roma, 1908. pp. lo.
(Estr. dal Boll. d. R. Accad. Med. di Roma, Anno XXXIV, Fasc. I).
Contrihuto alio Studio del Lobo frontale et parietale nelle Razze umane. Os-
servazioni sul Cervello degli Herero. Pel DoTT. Sergio Sergi. Roma:
Fratelli Pallotta, 1908. p. 107, i pi.

In the first of these studies Professor S. Sergi gives the results of his
examination (description, measm-ements) of 6 male crania of the Herero
(a Bantu people of Damara Land, German Southwest Africa) , now in the
collection of the Anatomical Institute, Berlin. The skull-capacities range
from 1,315 to 1,590 ccm. (4 are 1,500 or over); the cephalic indices from
67.5 to 72.9 (4 below 71). The Herero have a skull-capacity approaching
that of the Kaffirs of the S. E. coast, — it is a curious fact that the Bantu
peoples of the S. W. and S. E. coasts have a cranial capacity greater than
that of those of Central Africa and the region of the upper Congo. The
cephahc index of the Herero ranks them among the more dolichocephalic

3l8 BOOK REVIEWS

Bantu. Previous to this paper, but two Herero skulls have been studied
(one by Fritsch in 1872, the other by Virchow in 1895).

In his monograph on the brain of the Herero Professor Sergi treats in
detail of 14 young adult brains (male 11, female 3) in the Anatomical In-
stitute of the University of Berlin, with special reference to the frontal and
parietal lobes. A few of these brains had been previously investigated
in a general way by Waldeyer in 1906. Anatomical description and meas-
urements are exhaustive: fissure of Sylvius, fissiu-e of Rolando and the
relative development of the frontal lobe, sulci of lateral surface of the front-
al lobe, sulci of the orbital surface, fronto-parietal median sulci, sulci of
the cranial surface of the parietal lobe, etc. Comparisons are made with
similar data for other races, and the 8 figures in the accompanying plate
demonstrate well the anatomical facts, by reference to the text-descriptions.
The weights of the fresh brains range from 1,146 to 1,470 gr. (the 3 female
are all below 1,200; 6 of the male below 1,300 and 2 above 1,400), — the
Herero are said to average 1,800 mm. in stature, with head relatively small
as compared with the body. Intellectually the Herero are inferior to the
Hottentots, whose skeleton and musculatm-e are of a finer structure (their
average height is 1,700 mm.). Both Herero and Hottentots belong to the
Bantu division of the Negro Race. Some of the facts brought out show
how dangerous it is togeneralize, e. g., for ' 'all Negroes," as Parkerdoes with
respect to the direction of the Silvan fissiu-e. In the method of termina-
tion of this fissure the Herero show 1 7 simple and 1 1 bifurcate, a propor-
tion close to that of the Polish brains studied by Weinberg (Javanese,
Swedish, Lett and Esthonian brains show a large majority the other way).
The development of the upper and lower frontal lobe is more variable in
males; and in both males and females more variable on the right than on
the left. The absolute development of all the frontal lobe is greater in
males than in females. The fissm-e of Rolando is more irregular on the
right in male brains, on the left in female. In male brains left rami, in
female right rami predominate. As has been shown for the Hylobates, the
facts indicate, according to Professor Sergi, the existence in the human frontal
lobes of two distinct zones, an upper and a lower, which follow different
laws of development. Of these "the upper left has in female brains
reached its proportional development with respect to the other parts of
the brain, while in male brains has still a considerable evolution to undergo"
(p. 40). In the greater frequency of the separation of the inferior frontal
sulcus from the precentral and the less frequency of a close anastomosis
between them, the Herero brains differ from those of all other races so far
examined. In the Herero the upper and lower frontal sulcus shows more
divisions than in the European. With respect to the varieties of disposi-
tion of the retrocentral sulcus the Herero brains ' 'reveal neither a condition
of ontogenetric arrest, nor a phylogenetic record" (p. 83). While not
venturing to draw any dogmatic general conclusion from the facts recorded,
the author feels authorized to make this statement (p. 103): "The more
rational analytical method for the determination of the variability of the
cerebral sulci is still in its infancy waiting for the aid of microscopic research;
and at present it can be asserted that we do not know a single morpho-
logical characteristic of the cerebral sidcatiu-e, which belongs exclusively
to a given himian race. But the frequency of determinate variations
indicates sometimes the tendency toward oscillations and divergences,
which, with certain limits, seem to be proper to a given human group;
but more noteworthy still is the tendency toward the persistence of certain
morphological characteristics of the cerebral sulcature in relation to sex
independently of all ethnic differences."

A complete analytic study of all the Herero brains here considered will
be found in Professor Sergi's more extensive monograph Cerebra Hererica
to appear in ' 'Ergebnisse einer zoologischen Forschungsreise in Siidafrika
mit Unterstiitzung der Kgl. Preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu
Berlin von Dr. Leonhard Schultze." Albxandbr F. Chamberlain

BOOK NOTES

Das Bewusstsein, von Johannes Rehmke. Heidelberg, Carl Winter, 1910.
250 p.

Philosophes et penseurs. Buchez {i^g6-i86s), par G. Castella. Paris,
Bloud, 191 1. 64 p.

Institut de Sociologie, Bulletin Mbnsuel. No. i, Janvier, 19 10. Instituts
Solvay, Pare Leopold, Bruxelles.

Philosophes et penseurs. Leonard de Vinci, par le Barron Carra dE
Vaux. Paris, Bloud, 19 10. 62 p.

Kant and Spencer. A study of the fallacies of agnosticism, by Paul Carus.
2d. ed. Chicago, Open Court Pub. Co., 1904. 107 p.

Kant's Prolegomena to any future metaphysics, edited in English by Paui.
Carus. Chicago, Open Court Pub. Co., 1902. 301 p.

The fundamentals. A testimony to the truth. Vol. 4. Compliments of two
Christian laymen. Chicago, Testimony Publishing Co., n. d. 128 p.

The concept of method, by Gerhard R. LomER. Published by Teachers
College, Columbia University, New York City, 1910. 99 p. (Con-
tributions to Education, No. 34.)

Subconscious Phenomena, by Hugo MunsterbErg, TheodulE Ribot,
Pierre Janet, Joseph Jastrow, Bernard Hart and Morton Prince.
Richard G. Badger, Boston. 1910. 141 p.

On the genesis and development of conscious attitudes (Bewusstseinslagen),
by W11.LIAM Frederick Book. Reprinted from the Psychological
Review, November, 1910. Vol. XVII, pp. 381-389.

Transactions of the Congress of American Physicians and Surgeons. Eighth
Triennial Session, held at Washington, D. C, May 3rd and 4th,
1910. New Haven, Conn., published by the Congress, 1910. 456 p.

The influence of complexity and dissimilarity on memory, by Harvey
Andrew Peterson, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago;
Monograph Supplement, No. 49, of the Psychological Review, n.d.
87 p.

Im Kampf um die Tierseele, von J. voN UexkulIv. Separat-Abdruck
aus Ergebnisse der Physiologic, 11. abt., hrsg. von L-. Asher in
Bern und K. Spiro in Strassburg I. E. Wiesbaden, Bergmann,
1902. 24 p.

The first principles of heredity, by S. Herbert. London, Adam & Charles

Black, 1910. 199. p.
This compend on heredity has sections on the germ cell, theories, inheri-
tance of acquired characters, of diseases, Mendehsm and biometrics, with
its conclusions.
Text-book of nervous diseases for physicians and students, by H. OppEnheim.

Authorized translation by Alexander Bruce. Edinburgh, Otto Schulze

& Co., 1911. 2 V.
This is the fifth, enlarged and improved edition with 432 illustrations
in the text and 8 plates.

320 BOOK NOTES

Report of the committee of the American Psychological Association on the
standardizing of procedure in experimental tests. Committee : Charles
Hubbard Judd, Walter B. Pillsbury, Carl E. Seashore, Robert
S. WooDWORTH, James R. Angell, Chairman. Published by the
Association. The Psychological Monographs, Dec, 1910. Vol. 13,
No. I. 108 p.

The evolution of mind, by Joseph McCabe. London, Adam & Charles
Black, 1 910. 287 p.
The writer discusses the lowest and earliest forms of life, appearance of
the brain, development of the fish, invasion of the land, insects and intelli-
gence in them, mind in the bird, growth of the mammal brain, law of hered-
ity, and advance in man.

Die innere Werkstatt des Musikers, von Max Graf. Stuttgart, Ferdinand
Bnke, 1 910. 270 p.
This work treats of the unconscious, how it has affected romantic and
classical productions in the field of art, the creative mode, artistic concep-
tion, outer impulse and inspiration, critical work, the sketch, technique,
the classical and the great style.

Heredity in the light of recent research, by L. Doncaster. Cambridge,
University Press, 1910. 140 p.
The writer considers variation, its causes, a statistical study of heredity,
Mendelian heredity, disputed questions, heredity in man, historical smn-
mary of theories, the material basis of inheritance. The work is all it claims
to be, a simple introduction to the subject.

Vom Selbstgefiihl, von Else Voigtlander. Leipzig, R. Voigtlander, 1910.
119 p.
After a general characterization of self -feeling, the author gives its types,
vital, self-conscious, etc. Then she discusses mirror-consciousness and
its various forms. The writer's point of view is original and naive. She
goes to nature rather than to books for data.

Das vorgeschichtliche Europa, Kulturen und Volker, von Hans HahnE.

Monographien zur Weltgeschichte, herausgegeben von Ed. Heyck.

Bielefeld, Velhagen und Klasing. 1910. 130 p.
This is a very interesting and comprehensive compend, with illustra-
tions on nearly every page, the whole designed to give the beginner a general
survey of the results, up to date, ©f the investigations into prehistoric
times in Europe.
A study of association in insanity, by Grace Helen Kent and A J.

RosANOFF. Reprinted from The American Journal of Insanity,

1 910. Vol. LXVII, Nos. I and 2, 142 p.
This work, on the background of association in normal subjects, passes
to that of a number of insane people, giving stimulus and reaction-words,
and making careful generalizations from a large nimiber of cases, and finally
analyzing out certain symptoms.
Hereditary characters and their modes of transmission, by Charles Edward

Walker. London, Edward Arnold, 1910. 239 p.
This is an interesting text-book beginning with the cell and passing to
instinct, theories of evolution, mutation hypothesis, continuity between
species, protective coloring, law of frequency, immunity to disease, Galton's
theories, environment, trypanosomes, ants and bees, Mendel's experiments,
breeding, sex determinants, etc.
Zeitschrift fiir Psychotherapie und medizinische Psychologic, von Albert

Moll. Ferdinand Enke, Stuttgart, 1909. i Band, 384 p.
In this first volume we have a very imposing array of articles by eminent
experts making original contributions to the subject. The references, too.

BOOK NOTES

321

and the record of sittings, with a miscellaneous section, make a good and
very interesting and attractive collection of view-points in a subject which
at present is rather unusually lacking in harmony.

The age of mammals in Europe, Asia and North America, by Henry
Fairfield Osborn. N. Y., Macmillan, 1910. 635 p.

The writer has here brought together a very valuable report of the state
of the topic under discussion, together with his own investigations which
have been comprehensive. He divides his work by geological periods,
eocene, oligocene, miocene, pliocene, and pleistocene, discussing under
each the characteristics forms found in different countries. He does not
enter the field of man.

The book of the animal kingdom; Mammals. By W. Percivai, WestelI/.
London, Dent, 19 10. 379 p^.

Perhaps the best thing about tihds book is its many and excellent illustra-
tions from life, too often, alas! life in captivity, of the many mammals
described. A number of the best colored cuts are reproductions of extinct
forms of Hfe. Special attention is given, too, to the rarer and remoter
forms. The work is rather popular, and approximates what a boy's ani-
mal book ought to be.

Individualism, by Warner Fite. New York, Longmans, Green & Co.,
1911. 310 p.
This book is four lectures on the significance of consciousness for social
relations, given in 1909 at the Summer School in Chicago, but here very
greatly developed. The author's general position is insistence upon indi-
vidualism, versus the present emphasis laid by men like Dewey and Royce
upon social relations. Indeed, the book is in part a friendly criticism of the
views of these authors.

L'dtat mental des hysterigues, par PiERRE JanET. Paris, Felix Alcan,i9ii.

Deuxieme edition. 708 p. (Travaux du laboratoire de Psychologic

de la Clinique k la Salp6tri^re — Cinquieme serie.)
This is simply a reprint of the first edition of the first volume of the
author's work which was published in 1893 and 1894 and it is here reprinted
almost exactly, without change, because the author found that he must
choose between this method and that of radically reconstructing his work,
and because much of this volmne is devoted to plain descriptions of cases
vaHd under any theory.

Moto-sensory development: Observations on the first three years of a child. By
George V. N. Dearborn. Baltimore, Warwick & York, Inc., 1910.
215 p. (Educational Psychology Monographs.)
This is a study of the author's own child from birth up to the 152nd
week. The frontispiece is the baby itself, and there are notes on observa-
tion, which constitute the bulk of the book; certain inductive considera-
tions; a chronological epitome of observed development which presents
salient facts in a condensed way; and lastly, the various first appearances
are alphabetically arranged.

Mentally deficient children, their treatment and training, by G. E. Shuttle-
worth and W. A. PoTTs. 3d ed. Philadelphia, Blakiston 1910. 236P.
This is a new edition of an almost standard work and contains some addi-
tional material. After an historical retrospect there follows a characteri-
zation of feeble-minded, degenerate and epileptic children; then comes a
description of the instruction they require, pathological classification,
etiology, diagnosis and prognosis, mental examination of children requiring
special instruction, treatment, intellectual, industrial and moral training,
recreation, with results and conclusions. An appendix lists institutions
in England and America, gives speaking exercises, and a bibUography is
appended.

322 BOOK NOT^S

Modern theories of criminality, by C. Bbrnaldo dE Quir6s. Tr. from the

Spanish by Alfonso de Salvio. Boston, Little, Brown, and Co., 191 1.

249 p.

This is an admirable survey and begins with origins, laying special stress

upon Lombroso, Ferri and Garafalo. Then the writer discusses theories of

anthropology, degeneration, pathology, sociology, parasitism, criminal

tendencies. The book was written to furnish Spanish scholars and jiuists

with a general survey of what is being done in this field. This commission

which has been given the author has been admirably executed by him.

Questioned documents. A study of questioned documents with an outline of
methods by which the facts may he discovered and shown. By Albert S.
OsBORN. Rochester, N. Y., The Lawyers' Co-operative Pub. Co.,
1910. 501 p.
This is a comprehensive and excellent work on modes of testing hand-
writing and other topics therewith connected, describing how questioned
documents of various classes have been cared for, the standard of compari-
son,iphotography, the microscope, alignment, pen position and pressure, writ-
ing instnunents, variations in style, forgeries, disputed letters, ink, paper,
folds, erasures, age of dociunents. The work contains over two hundred
illustrations and is written mainly from the legal point of view without
signs of much acquaintance, even in the brief bibliography appended, with
the recent voluminous studies in this field.

Introduction to philosophy, by William Jerusalem. Authorized transla-
tion from the 4th edition by Charles F. Saunders. New York, Mac-
millan, 1910. 319 p.
This translation endeavors to help all who have a real interest in phi-
losophy to an acquaintance with its language and its problems, and
thus to stimulate independent reflection. The author's watchwords
throughout have been "objectivity, perspicacity and brevity." The
Germans have shown their appreciation by the fact that the book went
through four editions in ten years. Its second aim is to examine the prob-
lems themselves and to make contributions toward their solution. The
author's philosophy is characterized by the empirical view-point, the genetic
method, and the biological and social mode of interpreting the human mind.
He first treats preparation, principles, then criticises knowledge and epistem-
ology, passes then to metaphysics and ontology, then to the methods of
aesthetics, and finally to those of ethics and sociology.

Studies in the psychology of sex. Erotic symbolism; the mechanism of detumes-
cence; the psychic state in pregnancy. By Havelock Ellis. Phila-
delphia, F. A. Davis Co., 1906. 285 p.
In this book the phenomena of the sexual processes are discussed before
the attempt is made in the concluding volume to consider the bearings of
the psychology of sex on social hygiene. Under erotic symbolism the
author includes all the aberrations of the sex instinct although some have
been deemed important enough for special volumes. Much stress is laid
upon sexual equivalents. The mechanism of detumescence brings us to
the final climax for which the earlier and more prolonged stage of tumes-
cence is an elaborate preliminary. The art of love is that of preparation.
The author, too, has treated at some length the psychic state of pregnancy,
where the whole process in a sense reaches its goal. Woman in this state
is * 'the everlasting miracle which all the romance of love and all the cunning
devices of tumescence and detumescence have been invented to make
more manifest." This is "the supreme position " which life has to offer
and has its own problems. The book is full of suggestiveness.

BOOK NOTES 323

Die Philosophie der Gegenwart; eine internationale Jahresubersicht. Heraus-
gegeben von ArnoIvD Ruge. Band i (Doppelband), Literatur 1908
und 1909. Heidelberg, Weisssche Universitatsbuchhandlung. 19 10.
532 p.
This is an extremely serviceable book. It divides philosophical litera-
ture into 12 departments, viz., (i) journals, creative works and diction-
aries; (2) texts, translations and critical works; (3) history of philoso-
phy; (4) general philosophy; (5) logic and theory of knowledge; (6)
moral, social and legal philosophy; (7) philosophy of history, language
and culture; (8) natural philosophy; (9) philosophy of rehgion; (10)
art; (11) psychology; (12) more poptdar works, aphorisms and essays.
Two reflections are suggested here. One is that this division of subjects is
far too elaborate. In looking for some special work or article, the writer
of this notice had to look through several of these rubrics before finding
what he wanted, but the chief criticism of the arrangement is that psychol-
ogy is given so small a place and that so many works one would naturally
expect to find under this caption are found under philosophy.

The Journal of Animal Behavior. New York, Henry Holt & Company.
Vol. I, No. I, January-February, 191 1,
This is a new journal in a new topic. The editorial board is composed
of Madison Bentley, of Cornell University, Harvey A. Carr, of The Univer-
sity of Chicago, Samuel J. Holmes, of The University of Wisconsin, Herbert
S. Jennings, of The Johns Hopkins University, Edward L. Thorndike, of
Columbia University, Margaret F. Washbtun, of Vassar College, John B.
Watson, of The Johns Hopkins University, William M. Wheeler and
Robert M, Yerkes, pf Harvard University. It is published by Henry Holt
and Company, of New York, and the first number contains 77 pages. The
first article is an experimental study of the turtle, by D. B. Casteel. Then
follow articles on The Reactions of Mosquitoes to Light in Different
Periods of their Life History, by S. J. Holmes; A Study of Trial and
Error Reactions in Mammals, by G. V. Hamilton; A Note on Learning
in Paramecium, by Lucy M. Day and Madison Bentley; and a note by
Robert M. Yerkes on Wheeler on Ants. Save the last, there is nothing
approaching a book review. We are glad to know that the Journal is
to have a book-review department.

Spiritism and Insanity, by MarcEL Vioi^ETT. Swan, Sonnenschein and
Co., 1910. pp. 134.

In the presence of spiritistic facts men react diversely. Sceptics deny
everything en bloc; serious savants endeavor to apply their scientific meth-
ods, but up to the present their efforts have remained barren; the rest are
essentially believers. An imperious need inclines them to accord a super-
natural origin to what they cannot understand naturally. Such a method
is risky, but where is the science which risks nothing?

At a spiritistic meeting the air fairly vibrates with mystery, and all
believe; but when they leave the seance most become preoccupied with
everyday affairs, and the belief has little practical importance. Far
otherwise is the case with certain ones of instable mental equilibrium.
Here we find those of congenitally weak intelligence, for whom life is at
best difficult, who seek consolation in spiritism, and find there only new
tortures. Here, too, are the paranoiac temperaments, those suspicious of
others, inclined to beliefs in persecution, whose weariness of life leads them
to spiritism. Here are the self distrustful and melancholiac, and especially
the hysterical and neuropathic, who tend to become subjects- Here some
bring actual insanity, senile decay, minds weakened by excesses, all of
which give the best of soils for spiritism to grow in.

324 BOOK NOT^S

For the very core of spiritism is the mystery of its facts; not what the
facts are, but that they seem to be without natural cause. But this is
closely analogous to hallucination. Both appear abruptly, without transi-
tion, without progression, preparation or natural explanation, and as the
hallucination tends to produce automatism in its subject, so does the spirit-
istic phenomenon produce it in the sitters, already predisposed, selected
in many cases as we have seen, from the instable.

To the spiritist, evoking a spirit means to bring back the perispirit, which
is the mean between body and soul and the Intermediary between us and
the invisible volitions about us. Th eidea of this constant entourage,
the uncertainty as to the power of these spirits, of their intentions towards
us, of our possible displeasing of them, of otu- weakness and defenselessness
against them — all this is hypothesis, but hypothesis which offers no barriers,
which can never be refuted, and which opens to infinite other hypotheses
the more it is considered. Its guarantees are the senses of the spectators
and their unanimous consent to the dogma and doctrines. But it may be
compared to deliriiun in these respects: it originates, like delirimn, in a
miraculous fact, and the consequences drawn from this fact are purely
hypothetical. Whether it be actual delirium or not, it constitutes a vast
culture infusion for all errors, disequilibrations and madness.

So we get two classes of spiritistic insanities: i, those evolving among
the predisposed whose attack is referable to spiritistic preoccupations;
and, 2, those who would have gone insane in any case, but to whom spirit-
ism has given its own coloring.

Under the first come those exterior mediunmopaths, who are tormented
by wicked spirits outside themselves; interior mediumnopaths, when the
demon has taken possession. This possession may vary greatly in degree,
the torments of the victim increasing imtil complete possession is attained,
when depersonalization is complete, the delirium of greatness sets in, and
the case passes into mediumnomania. The patient now considers himself
a medium and is glad to be one, the spirit praises him, he has dreams of estab-
lishing a new religion, etc. All sorts of hallucinations may develop, and in
the extreme stages the person loses all memory of his former self, perhaps
even the notion of the existence of his body, becomes immovable and silent,
but shows by the happy and calm expression, the ecstasy at which we can
only guess. But some always remain melancholic.

In all these cases there are hallucinations, but in others there are none.
Such cases rest their beliefs on illusions and delirious interpretations, espe-
cially the latter, and will evolve, according to temperament, towards melan-
cholia, the delirium of persecution or of greatness. The last two are usually
combined, the intelligence is intact on other points, and so the patient
systematizes his delusion with much subtlety. His delusion becomes his
curse, he is the persecuted victim, and he must defend himself by all means,
often, in the end, by physical violence or even murder.

Spiritism may give a coloring to dementia praecox in its various forms,
to general paralysis, to senile dementia, but these diseases would have
evolved in any case.

In view of these facts a word of warning should be spoken, especially
to the spiritists themselves: Sift your seances. Keep out the degenerate
and unbalanced, and thus spare them possible madness and spiritism the
discredit, danger, and fraud involved in having them for supporters.

^i^i.

THE AMEEIOAN

Journal of Psychology

Founded by G. Stani^Ey Hai^i, in 1887
Vol.. XXII JULY, 1911 No. 3

THERMAL INTENSITY AND THE AREA
OF STIMULUS'

By Sarah E. Barnholt and Madison Bentl^y

At present the formulation of a general rule expressing the
relation of sensational intensity to the area of stimulus seems
to be impracticable. The obvious reason is the lack of uni-
formity in the facts; and this lack appears to arise from the
diversity of organic conditions within the several senses. The
spread or multiplication of a tactual stimulus upon the skin is
different from the areal increase of light upon the retina, and
both offer a mode of attack upon the organism which is again
unlike that sustained under the numerical increase of tones or
noises. The problem itself may indeed be given a single for-
mulation, namely: does an areal or numerical increase of
stimulus produce an intensive increment in sensation? But
the solution must be sought separately in the individual de-
partments of sense. And first of all, we must distinguish
between those cases where the increase of stimulus leads to
qualitative increase in sensation (e. g., the musical chord)
and those where it produces a like quality of different locality
or different extent (e. g., the spread of a tactual or gustatory
stimulus). The problem under consideration falls within the
second group of cases.

Stumpf2 found occasion to discuss the matter in his analysis
of tonal fusion. He divides the question into two parts, which
he states as follows : first, *is the intensity of a tone affected by
the presence in consciousness of other tones?' and secondly,
'is a tonal complex stronger than each of its constituent tones?*

^From the psychological laboratory of Cornell University.
'Tonpsychologie, ii, 1890, 416 fF.

326 BARNHOLT AND BKNTI.EY

In answer to the first question, Stumpf asserts that the individ-
ual tone is diminished, not augmented, by the presence of other
tones ; and that the decrease in intensity is a true weakening,
not a phenomenon of attention. Heymans has since main-
tained that intensive 'inhibition' is general among sensory
processes.^ In answer to the second question, Stumpf denies
the intensive summation of different tones. Two tones of
like strength may be fuller, richer, or more 'voluminous' than
one, but not stronger.

In vision, the matter is more complicated. Here one must
inquire (a) whether binocular intensity is greater or less than
monocular; (b) whether two disparate retinal areas, either of
the same or of different eyes, produce an interactive effect
upon intensity; and finally, (c) whether the enlargement of a
single stimulus-area affects the strength of the resultant sen-
sation. The facts are further complicated for vision by the
peculiar relations of intensive to qualitative change. The
dependence of visual sensation upon area appears in such
problems as the spatial limen for colors and the sensitivity of
peripheral vision, and in the facts of contrast and induction.

The intensity of pressure is obviously dependent upon the
size of stimulus. But the mechanics of deformation plays an
important part in determining the excitation of the tactual
organs.^ Von Frey found that the stimulus limen for mod-
erate areas is approximately proportional to the surface
affected and he lays it down that the neural excitation is a
function of hydrostatic pressure. Bruckner, who stimulated
neighboring pressure-organs with the blunt end of a fine
needle, found evidences of physiological (central) summation
under simultaneous stimulation, even where the two points
were discriminated.^

As regards temperature, the traditional view correlates the
size of a heated or cooled area upon the skin with the intensity
of the resulting warmth or cold sensation. This view is
frequently supported by the observation that the finger
plunged into warm or cold water gives a weaker sensation
than the immersion of the whole hand or the entire body.^
The experience itself is undeniable. But whether the obser-
vation may safely be interpreted to mean that the higher

^G. Heymans: Untersuch. ueber psychische Hemmung, Zeitschr.f. Psych,
u. Physiol, d. Sinnesorgane, XXI, 32 1 ; XXVI. 305 ; XXXIV. 15 ; XLI. 28, 89.

^V. Frey, M.: Untersuch. u. d. Sinnes function, der menschlicJien Haut,
1896.

'A. Bruckner: Die Raumschwelle bei Simultanreizung, Zeitschr. f.
Psych, u. Physiol, d. Sinnesorgane, XXVI, 1901, 33.

^E. g., E. H. Weber in Wagner's Handwdrterbuch der Physiol., iii, 2, 553.
Weber explains in terms of cerebral summation. Cf. Stumpf, Tonpsych.,
ii, 1890. 445.

THERMAL INTENSITY 327

intensity rests directly upon the exposure of a larger area is
doubtful. It may rest upon (i) adaptation, (2) an augmenta-
tion of sensory feeling, (3) the presence or absence of such
organic accompaniments as shiver, goose-flesh, or visceral
displacement, (4) the addition of highly tuned temperature-
organs, (5) the confusion of extent with intensity, (6) the
confusion of pressure with temperature, or finally (7) the dif-
ference in cutaneous conduction over large and small extents.
The four methods used in our experiments were designed
to test these various possibilities.

Method I. Immersion

The observer's eight fingers were ringed with indelible ink
}4. iiich and 2 inches from the tips. The forearm was sup-
ported, and the hand was allowed to hang down in a natural
position. Water was kept at a constant temperature (45° C.) in
a small vessel, and the vessel was raised by the experimenter
until the water reached either the first or the second ring upon
a single finger. The observer was not required to move his
hand or fingers. Immersion lasted one second. After it,
the finger was dried gently and without friction, by applying
an absorbent cloth. Then the same or another finger was
immersed in the same way up to the second or first ring. The
usual precautions against the constant errors of space and
time were taken. The observer was asked to report which
sensation was the stronger. Preliminary trials were made in
which the danger of confusing extent and intensity was im-
pressed upon him. In all but two out of forty-eight experi-
ments, the two trained observers (H. and S.) reported an
intenser warmth from immersion of the larger surface. This
result confirms common observation; while, at the same
time, the method makes it clear that the judgment of difference
rests neither upon the repeated use of a common part-area
(adaptation) nor upon the temporal order of comparison.
Furthermore, the introspections indicate that the judgments
were true comparisons of intensity, not of area. It is possible,
however, that the finger-tips are uniformly less sensitive to
warmth than the rest of the hand, and that the results reached
under Method I. are to be referred to this difference. To
eliminate this possibility, and also the strong suggestion of
degree that arises from gradual immersion, a new method was
devised.

Method II. Circular Areas

An area 3.5 x 4.0 cm. was laid off on the palm of the hand
or on the volar forearm and stimulated, under the procedure
of paired comparisons, by a graded series of five brass cylinders,
all of the same weight, and of diameters which ranged from

328 BARNHOIvT AND BENTI^^Y

1.4 cm. to 3.3 cm. The cylinders stood at 5° C. (cold
stimulus). Their flat circular ends were set down at all parts
of the chosen rectangular area mapped upon the skin, so that
the same temperature organs should be brought into function,
in the course of the experiments, by both large and small
cylinders. Altogether, 24 series of 10 comparisons each were
made with three observers (H., S., and F.). Of the 240 com-
parisons, 170 (70%) gave an intenser cold with the larger areal
stimulus (72%, 72%, and 67%, by observers).

The methods of immersion and circular areas have reduced
our list of possibilities as follows, (i) Adaptation is elimina-
ted by the successive stimulation of different areas, (2) af-
fective indifference is secured by the use of small areas and of
moderate intensities of stimulus, (3) organic complexes are
avoided by the same means, (4) inequalities of "tuning" are
partially compensated by the distribution of stimuli over a
common field of exploration (method of circular areas), and
(5) and(6) the confusion of thermal intensity with extent and
with pressure is avoided by practice-series carried out under
definite instructions.

The fourth possibility is only partially provided against;
for the chances that a large stimulus will strike a highly tuned
region exceed the chances for a small stimulus. And the
greater physiological efficacy of a large stimulus through con-
duction (7) may account for the greater intensity of the large
sensation. Let us first consider the fourth possibility.

Method III. Weak and Strong Areas
The direct comparison of areas of high and low sensitivity
seemed to us the simplest way of arriving at the value of
tuning in areal stimulation. So we selected a region upon the
upper arm which gave, under the cylinders, a bright lively
cold and an intensive warmth, and we then instituted a one-
to-one comparison between it and a dull region on the ulnar
side of the palm. Forearm and forehead were similarly com-
pared. The smallest of the five cylinders was used upon the
place of high sensitivity, — designated Ii (cylinder- 1 on in-
tensive area), — and all the cylinders were compared with it,
in haphazard order, upon the weak area (designated Wi,
W2, . . . W5).

The number of intensive judgments in which the small-
strong area was sensed as colder (or warmer) than any one of
the large-weak areas is set down in Table I. The initials of the
Obs. are written at the top. Each place in the columns rep-
resents a total of six judgments. Thus Ii was pronounced
"warmer" than Wi (the same stimulus set on a weak- warm
area) 47 times out of a total of6x9 = 54;Ii "colder" than Wi

THERMAIv INTENSITY
TABI.B I

329

WARM

Total

COLD

]

Total

Ii> Wi

Ii> W2

Ii> W3

Ii> W4

Ii> Ws

(weak-cold area) 44 times out of a total of 6 x 8 = 48. But
Ii> Ws = |f (warm) and J| (cold). Although equality-judg-
ments were discouraged by the instructions and therefore
appeared but rarely, it will be seen from the Table that sub-
jective equality lies just above W3; |f and H; i. e., the thermal
intensity from a cylinder 1.4 cm. diameter set in one certain
region of high sensitivity is approximately equal to the thermal
intensity from a cylinder of 2 cm. diameter applied to a certain
other region of low sensitivity.

Thus the fourth item in our Hst of possibilities is accounted
for by the discovery that a large area of low tuning can actu-
ally be made equal for sensation to a small area of higher sen-
sitivity.

The seve]p.th item is left. Size of stimulus seems clearly to
be translatable into intensity of sensation. It remains, how-
ever, to be seen whether the translation is due to a process of
summation or to the different conduction through the skin of
large and small stimuli. The obvious recourse is to the in-
dividual sense-organ for cold and warmth.

Method IV. Temperature Spots

Three separate organs for cold were found within the radius
of a few millimeters upon the volar forearm. A like group of
warm-organs was also identified and mapped in the same
general region. The organs in the cold group were designated
as a, b, and c, those in the warm group as a', b', and c'. They
were explored with blunt pointed temperature-cyHnders held
at approximately a constant temperature (water at 5° and
45° C) . Again, we proceeded with paired comparisons, taking
one organ with one, and one with two. Thus the intensity
of each sensation was compared with that from the other two
organs, taken singly and also together. The simultaneous
stimulation of two spots was effected by the use of a double v.
Frey stimulator, in which the bristles were replaced by smooth
blunt copper wires of i-mm. diameter. Adaptation was
avoided by taking each organ only once in any comparison;

330

BARNHOLT AND BENTLEY

thus a was compared with h and c, never directly with a or ah
or ac.

The following Table (II) gives the results of 515 experi-
ments from three observers (initials at the left) for cold and
warmth. The columns show the number of times each of the

Table II

COLD

WARM

a>,.

a>,c

.>,c

Totals

a'>.b'

.•><•■

.><e.

Totals

S
F

20 1 10

20 1 12

15 1 9

25
28

5
4
2

21
15

6
II

89
96
70

—

15 8
12 4

9l 7

22 1 2
13 1 2
15 1 I

14 9
10 6

13 3

47
48

~~"~

55 1 31

74 1 II

59 1 25

255

36 1 19

50 1 5

37 1 18

165

420

64I36

87 1 13

70 1 30

65I35

91 1 9

67 1 33

ac>^b

a > >bc

ab> . c

aV>^ b'

a'^^bV

a'b'>^'

H
S
F

4
3
3

2
3
3

3
3
4

3
3
2

5
5
4

I
I
2

18
18
18

4
4
2

I
0

2
3

2
I

4
4
4

2
0
0

12
12

■~^~

10 1 8

14 1 4

10 1 3

7l 7

12 1 2

56I44

78I22

309

77 1 23

50 1 50

86 1 14

206

515

three temperature organs in the group returned the intenser
sensation. Thus in thirty a-h comparisons, H. judged a colder
twenty times, h colder ten times. In twenty-three a'-b' com-
parisons, H. judged a' warmer fifteen times, h' warmer eight
times. Totals, recorded both in numbers and in percentages
for each comparison, are added at the bottom. The last
half of the Table gives the results for the one-to-two compari-
sons. Thus H. judged ac taken together colder than b four
times out of six, and a' c' warmer than b' four times out of five.
The relative tuning of the sense-organs is indicated by
the following results; a was pronounced colder than h ox c
(taken singly) in 75.5% of the comparisons made, and a'
warmer than b' or c' in 78%. The corresponding numbers
for the other spots stand; 6 = 53%, 6' = 51%, c = 21.5%,
c'=:2i%. Thus it becomes evident that the differences in
tuning are considerable. The following order of sensory
intensity may therefore be set down ; a (or a') > h (or h') > c
(or d).

THERMAL INTENSITY

331

Now we are in a position to discover whether reenforce-
ment of one sense-organ by another occurs. If it does occur,
we might expect to find ac^ a when both are compared with
b, bey b when compared with a, etc. The one-to-one and the
one-to-two comparisons are brought together in Table III.

Tabls III

COLD

%DIFF.

WARM

%DIFF.

A > A (b)
A > A cc)
B (c) > B

9
8
8

A' > A' (b')
A' (c') > A'
B' (c') > B'

5
12

(A) b > b

(B) c > c
(A) c > c

8
26

(A') b'> b'
(B') c' > c'
(A') c' > c'

19
44

The upper half of the Table shows the result of adding a
second, weaker sense-organ to a first, stronger; the lower half,
the result of adding a second stronger organ to a weaker first.
For the sake of clearness, the stronger component is indicated
by a capital letter, and the third letter added — in the one-
to-two comparisons — is enclosed in parentheses.

It will be seen (upper half) that bovc (weak spots) added to
A, or c added to B, decreases as often as it increases (3 to 3)
the relative intensity of the cold or warmth; but that, on the
other hand, the addition of a more highly tuned organ (lower
half) to 6 or c invariably raises the intensity of the sensation.
We are led to infer, therefore, that under the given conditions
no sensible process of summation takes place ; that the inten-
sity of the temperature sensation is determined, instead, by the
most highly responsive component in the excitation. This law
may not obtain, of course, where two or more thermal areas
are separately localized. Even within the narrow limits of a
cylinder-area (Method II) the observers noted at times a
plurality of colds or of warmths of unequal degree.

The apparent summation under our cylinders is very likely
a matter of conduction. The excitation- value of a 1.5-cm.
cylinder is different from that of one 3-cm. in diameter. In
the first place, the thermal gradients from centre to periphery
are unequal; and in the second place, the difference in tem-
perature between the skin and the stimulus will naturally be

332 BARNHOLT AND BENTI.EY

more quickly reduced with the stimulus of smaller area.^ Our
punctiform stimulus of constant area (Method III) eliminates
both of these complicating factors.

Temperature-sensations seem to stand, then, as regards
intensity, in the same case as tones. Without analysis, that
excitatory factor which possesses the highest valence deter-
mines the intensity of the sensation. With (local) analysis,
it seems probable that each mental constituent appears in
approximately its own proper strength. Whether mutual
'inhibition,' however, tends slightly to blunt the constituent
intensities under analysis, our results do not clearly inform us.

Summary. The common observation that large surfaces are
sensed as colder or warmer than small suggests that thermal
intensity may be a function of the number of temperature-
organs stimulated. But in working with individual end-
organs we found no evidence of summation; we found, in-
stead, that the strength of sensation is primarily determined
by the most highly tuned of the organs involved. Tuning
does not, however, wholly explain the common observation.
After the consideration of six other possible factors, we con-
clude that the high intensity of the 'large' sensation is also
owing, in part, to the more favorable conditions afforded by
the stimulus of great area for conduction from the surface
of the body to the true organs for temperature.

^In order to demonstrate the difference of conduction we proceeded as
follows. An ordinary thermometer reading to yV° C. was laid upon a flat
horizontal surface. A sheet of cardboard with a thickness slightly in excess
of that of the lower end of the thermometer was cut to receive the bulb.
Then a strip of pliable lamb's leather was stretched over both and tacked
in place. The mercury bulb represented the organs of temperature and
the leather the cuticle of the skin. The thermometer was brought to the
temperature of the room (23.5°) and the five cylinders used in Methods
II. and III. were brought to zero, and then applied in succession to the
leather sheet just over the bulb. Each cylinder remained upon the leather
for one minute, during which thermometric readings were taken every five
seconds. The rate of drop in temperature accorded with the size of the
cylinder, as is shown by the final readings, which stand for cylinders i
(smallest) to 5(largest): 1.6°, 2.1°, 2.7°, 2,9°, and 3.0°. The whole course
of the twelve readings for each cylinder (every 5 sec. for i min.), when
platted, also showed in a very striking way the difference in physiological
efficiency of the five brass areas standing at one and the same temperature.
A repetition of the observations indicated that the differences fell well
within the probable error of observation. To make sure that the thermal
gradient from centre to periphery is likewise a function of the size of stim-
ulus, we took similar sets of readings with the bulb set directly under (i)
the centre, (2) the middle of a radius, and (3) the margin of cylinder 5, and
under (i) the centre, and (2) the margin of cylinder i. The averages of two
sets of final readings (initial temperature 21.°) were the following: for
cyl. 5, (i) 1.85° ±.15, (2) 1.7° ±. 10, (3) 1.15° ±.05; forcyl. i, (i) 1.2° ±
o, (3) 1 .0 ± o. Thus it appears, even from our rough method of determina-
tion, first, that the total conductivity of the different areas is different,
and s'fecondly, that conduction within one and the same stimulus-area varies
from centre to margin.

CONSCIOUSNESS UNDER ANESTHETICS.

By Edmund Jacobson

As yet it has been for the most part left to the surgeons
to describe the nature of experiences under anaesthetics. They
have worked out a semi-popular psychology, and thereby
meet the demands of their practice with such success as a
common-sense method can be expected to secure. But some-
times their problem becomes very delicate, and invites the
subtlest refinements of scientific consideration, — for what
they have to deal with, and what life itself depends upon, is
the employment of tests for the presence or absence of psycho-
neural functions. Now objective tests for consciousness
should, when possible, be confirmed with introspections from
the subject, and in so important a matter as the present it
is desirable that those introspections be as accurate and as
detailed as possible. That the psychologists are commencing
to assist in this introspective task is shown by the fact that
three articles, recounting personal experiences and attempting
to make generalizations, have recently appeared in their
journals. That many more will be needed is evident; and
therefore we add the present report to their number. Cer-
tainly the most startling thing we have to describe is that
the patient was conscious under the anaesthetic at the very
height of the operation.

The case to be cited occurred at Wesley Hospital of North-
western University in October, 1910, upon the occasion of
an operation for the removal of the appendix under the in-
fluence of nitrous oxid and air. The anaesthesia lasted sixteeen
minutes. With reference to the patient's physical and mental
condition at the time, it is important to remark that he had
not recently been ill, so that at the outset both physical and
mental condition were normal, except in so far as he was stimu-
lated by the serious and novel situation. Hence attention
was unusually keen, and the subsequent memories clear and
detailed; so, for illustration, the minuticB of the conversation
between two of the operators concerning the movements of the
meniscus of the sphygmomanometer which they were pre-
paring for use are still, after several months, vividly recallable.
It should be added that the patient had previously half jest-
ingly remarked that he might take subjective observations;

334 JACOBSON

for this virtually constituted an Aufgabe, and hence was one of
the factors which determined his mental attitude toward the
experience/

With some abridgment and alteration to suit present pur-
poses, we shall quote from memoranda which were not written
down until from four to six weeks after the operation, but
which nevertheless are, as we believe, accurate. Here and there
we shall interrupt the account with explanatory comments.
The experienced reader will readily distinguish the points
at which we are unable to give direct descriptions of the psy-
chic processes, and therefore are obliged to substitute impres-
sionistic indications or statements of meaning.

"After I had been placed upon the operating table and while
preparations were under way, I remember that I conversed
with one of the surgeons, that he inquired whether I was
nervous, and that I answered 'No.'

"The time came for the application of the gas. I was told
that air would be given first, and then the gas gradually mixed
with it, but that I should not be able to detect the latter,
since it was odorless. Then the bell was put on, leaving my
eyes partially or wholly exposed. My left arm was extended,
and rested in the blood pressure apparatus, but the hand
grasped the wrist of one of the surgeons, Dr. P. I breathed
and waited. Nothing happened for a short time, and I
squeezed the wrist to show that I was fully awake. Presently
I detected the oncoming of the gas, and I squeezed the wrist
again, and silently thought that they were mistaken in saying
that the gas had no odor. I breathed in the gas for a little
time and worried slightly because it did not seem to affect my
consciousness. Then the gas began to operate, and I reacted
by squeezing the wrist. There was no sense of suffocation,
nor again of giddiness. Objects commenced to slip from the
mental grasp, and there was a sort of blurring of those that
remained in consciousness. My central thoughts remained
perfectly firm. Then came a striking experience. My eyes
were open, and though the bell occupied the centre of the
visual field, yet it did not obscure the rest of the room. Now
gradually the sight began to alter. The outlines of things
became blurred, and at the same time the perspective began
to disappear, until the field became perfectly flat, and what
with the four or five heads of the operators, as they appeared
arranged around the bell, the whole (apart from the blurring)
looked like a picture of the early Florentine school ; though of
course I make this comparison now and did not then think

^Habits of continual self-observation, also, will have to be taken into
account.

CONSCIOUSNESS UNDER ANAESTHETICS 335

of it. A moment later and this also was gone and I saw no
more; excepting that very nearly colorless lights danced out-
ward accompanied by a dull buzzing. I said to myself, *I
don't care; I don't care.' This was in some measure true
and spontaneous; but also, in part, it came as a deliberate
auto-suggestion, and was followed shortly after by a fleeting
and half-developed realization that the suggestion was not
working negatively.

"At one time, when consciousness was perceptibly affected,
the hand of an assistant was pressing heavily, and I muttered
a protest; and when some one said 'Keep quiet,' I laughed in a
guttural manner to show that I was so. At another time — I
do not know precisely when — after vision had gone, the
surgeon laid his hand on the body, and I cried out, 'Not yet!
I am awake!' Again, after I was no longer able to squeeze
the wrist, I tried to show that I was awake by muttering
'um — um' with each expiration. While I was able later to
recall that I had squeezed the wrist and had laughed, the
facts of having muttered and of having exclaimed that I was
awake did not recur to me until I was told of them.

"There were other thoughts during the administration of
the anaesthetic which now escape recall. I remember with great
clearness, however, the way in which the gas seemed to affect
consciousness, for I was deeply interested in it at the time,
and described the processes to myself even while they were
occurring, though not always in verbal terms. So that finally,
when things had almost all fallen away, I said to myself, very,
very slowly, 'Dim-in-ish-ing, dim-in-ish-ing con-scious-ness !'
That was the last word, and I knew nothing more; but as
these words appeared there occurred an intellectual process,
which containd no distinct verbal images, and the meaning
of which was, 'Your personality must be psychological at
its core, if you think of such things at this moment'."

There came a break in consciousness here. The experiences
which we are about to describe are more or less disordered and
confused. Subsequently, in recalling them, they appear
without temporal setting, and as more or less disconnected
from the experiences during the waning of consciousness.

" ' Are you ready, Doctor?' 'Just a minute, please.'^

"Possibly there was a dull whirring and buzzing; voices
moved to and fro; my ideas were confused and troubled. I
did not rightly know where I was, nor what was happening.
One thing stood out clear ; there, in the right side, — the pain !

^When later I repeated the remark to Mr. B., I learned that it was
addressed to the anaesthetist; and therefore it doubtless meant that I
should soon be in the state of deep anaesthesia. I was not able of myself
to recall when I heard these words.

336 JACOBSON

It was sharp, griping; it seemed to be drawing the whole body-
to that spot. It was agony. I have never endured, never
before even imagined such intense torture. I groaned again
and again, in helpless, uncomprehending protest.

' * I had many troubled dream experiences, which afterwards I
could not recall, yet knew that I had had them. The pain
lasted long, long, and around it my dreams centered. Sudden-
ly— I do not know just how suddenly — I realized it all: This
agony I cannot escape ; I am being operated upon ! I am here
on the operating table ! And I am conscious !

"Conscious! I tried voluntarily to suppress the pain and
seemed in some degree to succeed. I stopped groaning.^ I
was thinking now, perhaps with breaks and disordered inter-
ruptions, but yet in fair measure logically and coherently. I
am under the anaesthetic and I am conscious ! It is secondary
consciousness ! Amnesia will follow. I must try to remember
what is happening in order afterwards to relate it and prove
that I was conscious. At about this time I spoke aloud to
those about me, exclaiming, 'I've made a discovery; I've
made a discovery! The secondary consciousness — .' Ac-
cording to my subsequent memory, I said three words more
before I stopped without completing the sentence. It seemed
as if I had said, 'The secondary consciousness is the primary
consciousness — ' and I intended to go on and say that the
same / was present in both, and perhaps to say something
else, which I have since forgotten; but I ceased, owing to the
difl&culty of putting the matter into words and owing to lack
of strength. 2

^In this connection it is interesting to note that Dr. C. reported, 'There
was a time when you (the patient) seemed to reconcile yourself to it, and
you stopped groaning.' I report tliis voluntary suppression because I
have a memory of it; it is not, however, in accord with my waking experi-
ences, since I am not ordinarily successful in suppressing pain in this way.

^Those present state that I never mentioned 'primary consciousness' at
all, but that I repeatedly said 'secondary consciousness' in rapid succession.
In subsequent conversations with the surgeons I stated that I had used the
term 'secondary' not in the usual sense (i. e., of double consciousness), but
rather to signify a type separated from primary or waking consciousness
by amnesia. I trace the associative source of this idea to reading certain
passages in Bramwell a few weeks before, though that author of course
observes the customary usage. (Especially p. 390, Hypnotism. London,
1906.)

I had never had any anticipation that I should be conscious during the
operation. For the sake of completeness a trivial incident may be men-
tioned in this record; a week before the operation a layman had asked
another in my presence whether anaesthetised people ever felt anything
and had got the answer, 'No.' The incident passed out of my mind at once
and did not recur to me until after the operation, when I tried to recall what
remarks about anaesthetics I had recently read or heard. The incident
is entirely negligible, I believe, and I mention it only because the record
requires.

CONSCIOUSNESS UNDER ANAESTHETICS 337

" 'Stop the anaesthetic! ' It was probably just a little after
this was said that marked changes took place. The griping
pain, sharply located in the region about McBurney's point,
was giving place to a very mild pain, different in quality and
referred to the region about the umbilicus. The latter was
quite tolerable, and was the kind of pain which in stronger
form remained more or less continuously for about thirty-six
hours after the operation. I was 'waking up,' and as audition
was present, I commenced to make a series of remarks which
ceased when vision began to come back. Most striking was
the reappearance of the visual field, — at first like a fiat (Floren-
tine) picture, and then gradually regaining perspective and
clearness, — just the reverse of the initial experience. It was
this that prompted me to say aloud, 'It all ends just as it
began!' "^

About two minutes after the stopping of the anaesthetic, the patient
was fully awake and rational. He entered into conversation about his
experiences at once, suggested to the internes not to make the bandages too
tight, etc. Though talking was very difficult, this conversation was for a
while continued after the patient had been put to bed. Temperature and
pulse fairly soon became normal, and recovery was very rapid. The case
had no subsequent history, though it may be mentioned that during dozing
in subsequent nights, there occurred three local nervous spasms, which
were painful and accompanied by slight psychical disturbance.

Excepting where otherwise specified, the report quoted is based upon the
memories of the patient, and there is evidence that they are on the whole
satisfactorily faithful. In support of this may be mentioned that he re-
peated to the surgeons that he had laughed and had periodically squeezed the
wrist he held; although it came as news to him that eventually the lingers
had closed about the wrist with a vise-like grip. At various places in this
paper we specify things not recalled at all, and also things recalled only
after others had first mentioned them. Most important is it to remind the
reader that, while the operation was going on, the patient determined to
remember what was happening, in order later to be able to prove that he
had been conscious. This was virtually an auto-suggestion to remember,
and in the light of current knowledge, we should expect it to have efficacy;
for it is well known that the amnesia which characteristically follows deep
hypnotic states can be prevented, if suggestion to remember be given while
the state is in course ; and again, in normal psychology it has been experi-
mentally verified that the intention to remember and to relate psycho-
logical experiences has a similar efficacy. (Messer, A. Experimentell-
psychologische Untersuchungen iiher das Denken. Arch. f. d. ges. Psy., 8,
1906, 20. Also, Ach, N. Ueber die Willenstatigkeit und das Denken. Got-
tingen, 1905, p. 11.) Therefore it is particularly interesting to state that
immediately after waking, the patient was able to enter into conversation
about "secondary consciousness," "discovery," and the like, without
needing to be informed of having spoken aloud of these things. Further-
more, his memory of the question "Are you ready. Doctor?" and the
answer "Just a minute, please" was corroborated by Mr. B., who was

^This accords with the statement of Hewitt, ' 'When the administration
is discontinued and fresh air admitted to the lungs, a kind of retrogression
in the patient's symptoms commences." Ancesthetics and their Adminis-
tration. London, 1893, p. 327.

338 JACOBSON

present during the operation. But the most interesting verification of all
was the repetition of the groan to Dr. C. and Mr. B., who were able to recog-
nize it without a doubt because of its very peculiar character. It was the
kinaesthetic-auditory memory-image of this groan and the auditory image,
"Are you ready, Doctor? — Just a minute, please," that the patient
found associated with the memory of his conscious determination to re-
member.

We have some brief notes kindly dictated to us by Dr. G. T. Courtenay
and Mr. J. R, Buchbinder, both of whom assisted in the operation, but
unfortunately not given until three weeks after the operation and therefore
somewhat inaccurate and incomplete. We give them, however, since they
are all that we have ; for the sake of clearness we have somewhat altered
their style.

Dr. C. — Before the incision the patient said, "I am not asleep,"
again and again. Dr. R. put his hand on the abdomen and he said, "Not
yet! I am awake!" He was not thought to be under as yet. He had
been muttering. The incision was made. During this time, and up to
the moment when the operator came to the appendix, there was no mutter-
ing and nothing was said, but there was muscular rigidity. Then the
patient cried, "Oh — h!" — groaning. As I remember it, he then cried
loudly, "I am awake!" and repeated this several times. While the skin-
clips were being put in he exclaimed, "It's the secondary consciousness!
I have made a discovery!" (See also p. 336.)

Mr. B. — While the gas was being given to induce anaesthesia, the
patient said nothing. After two minutes Dr. R. said, "Are you ready.
Doctor?" (When the writer reminded Mr. B. that the answer came,
"Just a minute, please," he recalled the remark and supplied the informa-
tion that it was addressed to the anaesthetist.) Before the incision there
occurred inarticulate muttering. Probably during or after the incision
(I cannot positively say which) the patient said, "I am conscious." A
minute or two elapsed, during which the operator was getting the tip of the
appendix and the patient was quiet. While the caecum was being manipu-
lated he said, "I have made a discovery; — an important psychological
discovery!" This was repeated many times, each one faster than before.
The appendix was cut off and the patient squeezed the wrist of Dr. P. with
a very strong grip. Then he repeated ' 'important discovery " and "second-
ary consciousness" a few times. (It will be recalled that the report of the
patient shows no remembrance of the phrases having been thus repeated.
In this respect Mr. B.'s report supplements the former, and is without
question correct; but we doubt that the terms "important" and "psycho-
logical" were used.) After the first skin-clip had been put on, the admin-
istration of the anaesthetic was stopped and the suggestion given, "You
can wake up." During the last few minutes the patient was quiet, and
after waking said to me, "I've made some interesting observations. Did
you take notes?" (Mr. B. amended the above account after the patient
purposely repeated the groan for him. Like Dr. C, he was able to recall
with certainty that it occurred, but unlike him, was not perfectly sure
when it occurred, adding, however, that the balance of probability seemed
in favor of its having occurred after incision.) During the operation the
blood-pressure, as indicated by the sphygmomanometer, remained constant.

Now let us proceed to general matters. — It is more or less
the custom, in treatises on anaesthesia, to include an account of
the order of disappearance of the functions of the nervous
system. So, for instance, Patton says, "There is irritation,
depression, and finally paralysis of the nervous system. The
cerebral cortex, the cerebellum and ganglia of the base, the

CONSCIOUSNESS UNDER ANAESTHETICS 339

sensory tracts and centres of the cord, the cerebrospinal motor
tracts and centres, and the respiratory and cardiac centres
seem to be affected in the order mentioned."^ Experimental
and clinical observations have led to formulae of this sort, which
therefore must have at least a certain rough validity. Every-
day clinical experience makes it familiar that circulation and
respiration almost always remain when other functions have
failed; and it is equally certain that the loss of the conjunctival
reflex is a useful indication of the loss of various other nervous
functions. There are other gross correlations of this sort, the
validity of which is fairly beyond challenge. The principle of
such correlations is, therefore, true and useful — if not carried to
the extreme. But the current formula that the nervous func-
tions disappear in hierarchical order cannot, we believe, be
completely relied upon. It appears that sometimes, at least,
a higher function may remain even when certain lower ones
have gone ; that the absence of certain lower functions is not an
invariable guarantee of the absence of all higher ones. In evi-
dence of this may be adduced our own case as a fair example of
the highest psychoneural function, namely intellection, remain-
ing present even when lower ones such as vision were in
abeyance. Nor does this observation seem to be exceptional,
for the same thing is reported, with respect to the period of
the waning of consciousness, not alone in the psychological
papers of Jones, Johnston, and Hill, but also in Hare's article
in Keen's Surgery"^. Therefore we seem warranted in generaliz-
ing, at least with respect to persons who make habitual use of
the higher intellectual functions, that generally these persist
even after vision and other psychical and physiological lower
functions have gone.

As to the psychological situation, there seem to be some
strange misunderstandings (or else carelessnesses) in certain

^Patton, J. M.: "Anaesthesia and Anaesthetics. " Chicago, 1905, p. 30*
2 "After all sensations were damped down completely there still remained
an inner consciousness which for the most part was perfectly normal.
Memory seemed pretty accurate, and the reasoning powers only slightly
deficient." Jones, B. E. The Waning of Consciousness under Chloroform.
Psy. Rev. 16, 1909, 53-54. "The special sense organs become inactive
long before general consciousness is lost." (Speaking of the process of
recovery of normal consciousness, the same writer says, ' 'Feeling is first
reinstated. Purely intellectual activity- — is next in order." Johnston,
H. J. The Role of Sensations and Feelings under Ether. Jour. Abn.
Psy. 4, 1909, 29. ' ' — there — remained to the final fading out of conscious
experience an awareness of personal identity." Hill, Prof, and Mrs. D. S.
Loss and Recovery of Consciousness under Anaesthesia. Psy. Bull., 7,3,81,
' ' — chloroform, after a brief quickening of the pulse and of respiration,
causes a gradual decrease in the activity of the perceptive portions of the
cerebrum, followed or accompanied by a similar obtunding of the intellect-
ual activities." Hare, H. A. Keen's Surgery, Philadelphia, 1909, V, 1019.
Similarly in the case of ether, 1027.

340 JACOBSON

of the surgical works. For example, in speaking of the second
degree of general anaesthesia, Patton states that it is a "stage
of unconscious reflex activity."^ Here, as he says, he is
following Hewitt, and therefore we shall quote the views of
that writer.^ "Second Degree or Stage. — (Ether) Loss
of consciousness takes place abruptly. The patient passes
into a condition in which, although memory, volition, and in-
telligence are abrogated, he will readily respond to stimuli.
The response may have all the appearance of conscious
response. (N. B !) Questions may be answered; but the answers
will be nonsensical."

If we understand the above passage rightly, it means that
a time comes at which the patient is to be considered uncon-
scious, yet at which he will give answers to questions as well as
simulate conscious response in other ways. This view is so
naive that the psychological reader will not demand that we
argue the matter. Hewitt also says, "Laughing, struggling,
shouting and singing may be met with at the commencement
of this stage if the administration be slowly conducted."
We scarcely believe that he wishes to consider these reactions
also as unconscious. But without making assumptions in this
regard, we may state in reply that, by virtue of analogy with
our general psychological experience, there need be no doubt
that the patient is conscious when such things occur as answer-
ing questions, shouting, singing, talking, laughing, or true
groaning.^ It is absurd to call a stage which may be character-
ized by the presence of such reactions one of "unconscious
reflex activity." Such a use of the term "unconscious" is
lamentable, for it contains the confusion, sometimes popularly
made, between absence of intelligent response and absence of
conscious response.^

^Op. ciL, 33-

^Op. ciL, 153.

^We use the expression true groaning in order to exclude stertor and also
expiratory noises due merely to obclusion of the air and vocal passages by
tongue, mucus, or other foreign substance.

^When a reaction is nonsensical, this indicates the presence of disorganiza-
tion in consciousness ; the processes do not function as usual, relatively to
each other. Complete nonsense would mean utter disorganization of
conscious processes, but it would be incorrect to take it to mean complete
absence of conscious process. This fact being clear, there is left an invit-
ing problem for investigation by psycho-analj'^sis as to whether the utter-
ances of patients under ether or chloroform delirium have not a " latent
meaning" under their apparent absurdity. Apropos of this, the writer
recalls the deep significance possessed by his groan. It meant uncom-
prehending and helpless protest against the pain. Physiologically it
was the development or consummation of the process of uttering ' 'tun —
um," for it was made with the same laryngeal adjustment, except that
instead of an almost constant pitch it had a large rise and fall, was much
higher, and much more prolonged. The former utterance had the meaning
"Not yet! I am awake!"

CONSCIOUSNESS UNDER ANAESTHETICS 34 1

In the light of these considerations, and if even highly-
organized consciousness has the tenacity which we have indi-
cated, it is apparent how great ought to be the caution in judg-
ing that the patient is unconscious on the ground that certain
reflexes are absent and notwithstanding that other ones are
present. To be sure, with sufficiently deep ether or chloroform
anaesthesia, a condition may be attained which is suggestive
of natural sleep; respiration and circulation are the chief
visible activities that remain; there is quiet (except for stertor)
and relaxation, and the spinal reflexes are largely absent and
inelicitable. When things are so, it seems reasonable enough,
on grounds that we shall formulate later on, to assume uncon-
sciousness; for although this conclusion cannot be proved
with absolute certainty, yet at any rate it has high probability. ^
But there are statements in the surgical books which go farther
and assume the absence of consciousness even when such
quiet and absence of function are not attained. So, for ex-
ample, the International Text-Book of Surgery, in arguing
for a sparing use of ether in prolonged operations, says: "A
few whiffs of ether now and again will keep him free from pain,
anxiety and fright. As he knows little or nothing, a moderate
amount of involuntary struggling unattended with suffering
does no harm."^ We submit, however, that it is not safe
generally to affirm that when a * ' moderate amount of invol-
untary struggling" is present the patient nevertheless
"knows little or nothing." It is a very delicate matter indeed
to say when struggling occurs unaccompanied by the conscious
functioning of the higher nerve-centres. For if, on the one
hand, it is fairly certain that such functions as answering
questions are always accompanied by higher consciousness,
while, on the other, it is also fairly certain that such functions
as circulation are accompanied at most by only a very low
form of consciousness, yet the most that it seems fair to concede
with regard to struggling is that it can upon occasion belong to
either class of experiences. Why this is so will be made clear
in the following paragraph.

Jactitation is a phenomenon likely to occur when nitrous
oxid is given without oxygen or air and is described, for ex-
ample, by Ivuke, as consisting of ' ' clonic muscular contractions
commencing in the orbicularis palpebrarum and extending to
the limbs. "^ If, as a test case, one is looking for reasons why

^In judging depth of anaesthesia the surgeon is guided by observation
of some or all of the following : the respiration, the occurrence of swallowing
movements, the lid-reflex, the state of the eye and pupil, the pulse, the
color of the face and lips, the rigidity of the skeletal muscles (Hewitt).

2phil., I, 1902, 448.

^Guide to AncBsthetics, Phil., 1906, 19.

2 — Journal

342 JACOBSON

this activity should be considered unconscious or conscious,
the important fact must be noted that under normal con-
ditions it cannot be consciously initiated (at any rate not in
the absence of a preliminary learning process). By analogy
with normal experience, therefore, there is no compulsion
to assume that jactitation is a conscious phenemenon. And
in general it may be said that there is no logical requirement
to assume consciousness in case of activities which under normal
conditions are incapable of conscious initiation.^ Again, if one
is considering another class of functions, those, namely, of the
autonomic nervous system, — circulation, respiration, secre-
tion, etc., what needs to be taken into account is that under
normal conditions these do not require the attendance of
consciousness in order that they may go on. By analogy
with normal experience, therefore, there is also no compulsion
to assume that these phenomena under anaesthesia are accom-
panied by consciousness. Or, to put this matter also generally,
there is no logical requirement to assume consciousness in case
of activities which under normal conditions may go on without
conscious attendance. It is now clear why it is permissible
to assume that deep states of ether and chloroform narcosis
are probably unconscious; for all the activities that are
observably present in these states are either such as may
under normal conditions go on without conscious attendance
or else such as are normally incapable of conscious initiation.
On the other hand, the phenomenon of struggling does not
fall into either of these two categories; for under normal con-
ditions it can be consciously initiated and it never occurs
without conscious attendance. Therefore there is an element
of hazard in calling it unconscious at any particular time;
and at all events, when it occurs concomitantly with shouting,
true groaning, or the like, it should — like these reactions
themselves — be regarded as conscious.

The mere fact that the patient is subsequently without
memory of his reactions must not be assumed to prove that
consciousness was absent. For his psychophysiological state
is so disturbed — not alone during the administration of
the anaesthetic, but also usually for some time thereafter —
that memory may be expected to be deficient. So it is in the
case of Hill, whose record shows that there was a period follow-
ing the first signs of awakening during which he did such
conscious things as calling for air and chattering more or less
irrationally about his experiences, but of which he subse-
quently had no recollection.^ The fact of forgetfulness was
noted by Buxton in his discussion of chloroform narcosis.

1/. e., voluntary initiation.
^Op. cit., p. 79-

CONSCIOUSNESS UNDER ANiESTHETlCS 343

"In the second stage [Buxton recognized five stages] the mental
powers are impaired although not suspended .... As
a rule struggles or experiences of pain which show themselves
at the time are not subsequently remembered."^ A further
reason for presuming that experiences during gas, ether, or
chloroform narcosis might not be subsequently recalled, even
if conscious at the time, is that amnesia characterizes kindred
psychophysiological states, namely deep hypnosis, deep alco-
holic intoxication, and the dream states of natural sleep.
This tendency toward amnesia, which we must therefore
recognize, is an obvious hindrance to proving that the
patient was unconscious. One must give him a fair chance
to remember: Follow the example of the workeis on deep
hypnosis: experimentally produce a state of ether narcosis
in which involuntary struggling, groaning, and the like
occur; during this state or previous to it, get en rapport with
the patient and suggest to him that he will remember all that
occurs ; next, quickly bring him back to normal consciousness,
avoiding post-anaesthetic disturbance as much as possible,
and learn whether the patient then retains any memory I^
If he does not, this is evidence that he had no high form of
consciousness; not an absolutely conclusive test, however,
since a low or disorganized state of consciousness might be
present and yet fail to respond to suggestion. But at any
rate, in the absence of experimental tests of this kind, it is a
risky hypothesis to assume that such things as struggling and
groaning in anaesthesia are other than what they are in normal
activity, namely, signs of unpleasant consciousness.

In this connection, attention may be called to the fact
(recognized, for instance, by Hewitt) that nitrous oxid does
not give that complete freedom from reflex movement and
phonation which characterizes the third degree of ether or
chloroform anaesthesia.^ Or again, as A. D. Bevan recently
put it, — " (Nitrous oxid) anaesthesia is not as profound as that
of ether or chloroform, and the occasional talking of the patient
may be disconcerting to one not familiar with the method."*

^Buxton, D. W. : Ancesihetics, London, 1888, 69.

^Anaesthetics characteristically produce a state of heightened suggesti-
bility. So in clinical work it is found advisable not do do anything to or
say anything before the patient during the waning of consciousness that
might act as a harmful suggestion. The close relationship which anaes-
thetic narcosis bears to such a state of heightened suggestibility as hypno-
sis is shown on the one hand by the fact that chloroform, for instance, may
be used as a decided aid to suggestion in inducing hypnosis (e. g., Bram-
well, op. cit., p. 45), and on the other hand by the fact that suggestion
may be used as a decided aid to chloroform in inducing surgical anaesthesia
{e. g., Munro, H. S. Influence of Suggestion as an Adjunct in the Admin-
istration of AncBsthetics. St. Louis Med. Rev., Nov., 1908.)

^Op. cit., p. no.

*Jour. Am. Med. Ass., 1907, 49, 3, 197.

344 JACOB SON

What seems to us the probable significance of the presence of
such reactions has already been sufficiently indicated. Talk-
ing does not possess the distinguishing marks that belong to
activities which may permissibly be considered as uncon-
scious; for under normal conditions it is capable of conscious
initiation and it never occurs without conscious attendance.
Therefore the conclusion that it is unconscious when it occurs
during ansesthesia is unwarranted. If nitrous oxid anaesthesia
is characterized by the presence of such reactions, it does not
seem warranted to believe it to be a state of continuous un-
consciousness. Nor, as previously indicated, should the
assumption of unconsciousness be made with regard to chloro-
form or ether ansesthesia unless these drugs be given in suffi-
cient quantity to suppress "involuntary struggling" and the
like.

It goes without saying, however, that the psychologist
can have no opinion on questions concerning the choice of an
anaesthetic for a given operation, or again, concerning the
advisability of permitting slight consciousness in prolonged
operations in preference to running the dangers of exhaustion
and collapse which prolonged and deep anaethesia involves.
Matters of practice concern only the surgeon. The sole inter-
est of the psychologist is to analyze the mental situation.

Before closing the paper, a few words of discussion may be
added in regard to the psychological articles that have recently
appeared. Jones presents the record of three experiences under
chloroform, two of which were produced for observational
purposes alone, and with the aid of simple laboratory devices.
His account is therefore more full than could otherwise be the
case, and is important because of its qualitative descriptions
of sensory processes and its tests as to the order of disappear-
ance of mental functions. That order was: hearing, touch,
gross muscular movement, highly specialized movement
(fingers), vision, reasoning, memory. To be sure, Jones fails
to state whether this order was precisely maintained in all
three cases, and one is frequently at a loss to know whether
a given phenomenon that he describes occurred in only one
of his experiences or in all three. It is to be regretted that
he made the methodological error of failing to be clear and
full as to what were their similarities and differences. Hill is
especially interested in marking the similarities and differences
between his experiences and those of Jones. If we have not
misunderstood the latter's paper, he was awake — able to reason,
and remember — after muscular control had disappeared.^
If so, then Hill scarcely seems justified in saying that "the

^Op. cit., p. 53-4.

CONSCIOUSNESS UNDER ANi^STH^TlCS 345

persistence of motor ability in the observation of both Jones
and myself as witnessed in the waning of consciousness
attests its fundamental position, and also that artificial sleep
as well as natural sleep. . . is most closely related to the
cessation of voluntary motor ability." If one is seeking a key
to the explanation of sleep, and regards 'persistence' as the
road to finding it, why select Voluntary motor ability' in
preference, say, to voluntary memory, — which in Jones' case
was the more persistent? It is relevant to mention the case
of the patient described by Johnson, who becomes awake (to
the extent of having various sensations and feelings) at a
time when the limbs were not under control.^ To be sure,
if voluntary motor ability is absent, one would ipso facto not
expect normal consciousness to be present. But if anything
further than this is to be established, and if voluntary motor
ability is to be exalted over its brother functions, a wider
range of evidence should be offered than that given by Hill.

Johnson's paper is valuable — among other things — for its
description of the waning of voluntary inhibitory power,
wherein it resembles that of Hill, but differs from that of
Jones and our own since the loss is not reported by the latter
two. The order of disappearance of functions, also, differs
from that of Jones : vision went before touch. ^ Johnson termi-
nates his paper with a discussion of the nature of feelings,
imageless activity, and the like; but these are general matters,
better left for laboratory investigation. Efforts should be
focused on the attempt to understand the anaesthetic experi-
ence itself, with special endeavor to describe minutely the
conscious events in their temporal order, and in addition, when
possible, to state the physiological concomitants.^

^Op. cit., p. 23.

2This suggests the matter of individual differences, which vary greatly
with (i) the anaesthetic used, and (2) the temporary and permanent psycho-
physiological conditions of the patient. An adequate account of individ-
ual differences cannot yet be written, although the surgical books furnish
some material. Of particular practical importance would it be to deter-
mine how frequently the pain sense persists during the second and third
stages.

3 An excellent list of problems has been published by Jastrow. Am. Med.^
Philadelphia, 1905, X, 202. Same also in Pacific M. J., San Francisco,
1906, XLIX, 140.

ON THE INTENSITY OF IMAGES*

By Alma de Vries Schaub

CONTENTS

PAGE

Introduction

346

(a) Historical

347

(b) Experimental

349

II.

Difficulties and sources of error

351

III.

Experimental procedure

353

IV.

Results

I. With reference to Intensity

357

(a) Ascription of intensity to images

357

(b) Varying degrees of imaginal intensity

358

2. With reference to the Non-intensive Differences between

Sensation and Image

364

Conclusion

366

Introduction

Until recent years the experimental investigation of images
has been comparatively neglected, and even at the present
time the subject does not seem to receive either the extended
or the detailed study that is given to sensation. Thus, while
there have been studies of the general nature of mental imagery,
of the memory image, and of the image of imagination, these
have treated the subject mostly from the point of view of recog-
nition and recall, and a specific investigation of the attributes
of the image has been neglected. Especially meagre in the
existing experimental work on imagery is reference to its
intensive aspect, a subject that has played an important r61e
in the study of sensation. Our aim in the present investiga-
tion has, therefore, been to attack the problem of images from
the point of view of their intensity. More specifically, we
seek to answer two questions: (i) Do images possess the attri-
bute of intensity? and, if so, (2) Is this intensity comparable
with that of sensations, and in how far? A brief review of the
mention of this subject in psychological literature and in experi-
mental investigation will serve not only to introduce the prob-
lem but also to show the urgent need for its careful examina-
tion.

^From the Psychological Laboratory of Cornell University

ON THE INTENSITY OF IMAGES 347

(a) Historical

Though almost all writers agree in accepting intensity as one of the
attributes of sensation, there is by no means such agreement with regard
to the intensity of images. Indeed, many of the earlier writers, and a few
of the more recent as well, seem to find in intensity the main difference
between images and sensations. They have either denied this attribute
altogether to certain images, or, at best, have granted them but a small
measure of it. The clearest and most concise expression of this view,
perhaps, is that of Hume. "All the perceptions of the human mind," he
tells us, "resolve themselves into two distinct kinds which I shall call
Impressions and Ideas. The difference betwixt these consists in the degree
of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind. ....
Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence we may name
impressions; . . . By ideas 1 mean the faint images of these in thinking
and reasoning. "1 That Hume regards difference in intensity as the dis-
tinguishing mark of the image, appears also in such statements as the follow-
ing: "The first circumstance that strikes my eye, is the great resemblance
betwixt our impressions and ideas, in every other particular except their
degree of force and vivacity."^ "That idea of red, which we form in the
dark, and that impression, which strikes our eyes in the sunshine, differ
only in degree not in nature."^ While Bain is not so explicit in regarding
intensity rather than quality as the essential difference between image and
sensation, he, nevertheless, calls it the most obvious point of difference.*
Hobbes^, John Stuart Mill", and Hamilton^, barely touch upon the subject,
yet indicate their assent to this view. Spencer undoubtedly confuses
intensity with clearness or vividness, but on close examination his doctrine
appears to agree with that of Bain, He divides feelings into "those pri-
mary and vivid feelings produced by direct excitation, and those secondary
or faint feelings produced by indirect excitations," adding that he wishes
to emphasize "not difference in kind, but difference in degree."^

Of the German writers, Lotze seems to deny absolutely that images
possess the attribute of intensity. There has been some discussion with
regard to his statement that ' 'the idea of the brightest radiance does not
shine, that of the intensest noise does not sound, that of the greatest tor-
ture produces no pain."^ Such a statement, in the opinion of Titchener,
reflects a form of the stimulus error.^" Another statement of Lotze's which
must be regarded as doubtful and which, by the way, is not consistent with
the sentence quoted above, is the following: "Only sensations of moderate
intensity allow of a reproduction that is in some measure faithful. "^^ Eb-
binghaus, while not actually denying intensity to images, grants them only
a scant allowance. In one passage, indeed, he says: "The imaged sun does
not shine and its imaged heat with its thousandfold degrees gives no warmth ;
the last spark of a flickering match is far more effective in both respects. "^^

1 David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. bv L. A. Selby-Bigge, 1889, i.
'Op. cit., 2.
^Op. cit.. 3.

*J. Mill: Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 1878, I., 63 note; A. Bain:
The Senses and the Intellect, i888. 338.
'T. Hobbes: Leviathan, 1881, 6.

6 J. Mill: Op. cit., 68; note by J. S. MUl.

7 Sir W. Hamilton: Lectures on Metaphysics, 1859. II., Lect. XXIII., 259 Cf.
*H. Spencer: The Principles of Psychology, 1890, I., 288.

*H. Lotze: Outlines of Psychology, tr., 1886, 28; cf. also Medicinische Psychologie,
1852 477 ff.; Microcosmus, i, 203 f.

i"E. B. Titchener: A Text-Book of Psychology, 1910. II., 398 note.

^^"Nur Eindruecke von mittlerer Groesse scheinen sich einigermassen entsprechend re-
producieren zu lassen." Medicinische Psychologie, 1852, 479.

12 "Die vorgestellte Sonne leuchtet nicht und die vorgestellte Glut ihrer Tausende von
Waermegraden waermt nicht; das letzte Fuenkchen eines verglimmerenden Streichhoelz-
chens leistet in beiden Beziehungen weit mehr." H. Ebbinghaus: Grundzuege der Psy-
chologie, J., 1905, 549.

348 SCHAUB

Statements as strong as this inevitably raise doubts; it seems at least
possible that there should be many to whom the memory of the burning
heat of the summer sun would convey more warmth than the dying glimmer
of a match. We must not neglect, however, to notice those passages in
which Ebbinghaus admits that, in certain cases, images may have a
measure of intensity. He tells us that there are circumstances under which
the intensity of an image may be increased so as to be comparable to that
of the weakest sensation.^

Turning from the German psychologists, we find that Paulhan speaks of
the image as the feeble reproducton of a perception,^ and Rabier states
plainly that the difTerence between sensation and image is one of degree and
not of nature.' Sully tells us that ' 'the most obvious point of difference
is the greater intensity of the sensational or presentative element in the
percept which gives the whole structtue its peculiar vividness (or strength)."*
Baldwin summarizes the general positions held on the subject as follows:
' 'On the one hand it is maintained that there is a specific difference between
presentations and their revived images; a difference of nature.
Others hold that between primary and secondarj'- states, there is only a
difference of degree."^ He proceeds to take his stand with the latter
group, holding that presentations and representations have the same ante-
cedents and effects, and "we are aware in consciousness of no peculiar
marks of revived states by which to distinguish them from percepts except
that they are prevailingly of less intensity."^ So far, then, there is agreement
that certain images either lack intensity except in the case of hallucinations
(which are regarded as abnormal phenomena), or at least have but a small
degree of intensity. The difference between images and sensations is re-
garded as one of intensity or strength, not of nature or quality.

Opposed to the above position are a number of prominent psychologists
who regard nature or texture as the more important differentia of images,
emphasizing the fact that these are incomplete, indistinct, fleeting. They
admit that images are ordinarily less intense than sensations, but maintain
that this is not universally the case. Images, for these writers, have a marked
degree of intensity; indeed, they may be just as intense as sensations. Of
those who uphold this view it is sufficient to mention Wundt, Kuelpe,
Hoeffding, Taine, James, and Ladd. Wundt insists that while images
and sense perceptions usually differ in intensity, it is the difference in ele-
mentary composition that is all-important.^ Kuelpe goes into the matter
at greater length. While admitting that images are usually of lesser inten-
sity, duration, and extension than perceptions, he nevertheless insists that
' 'centrally excited sensations, like peripherally excited, must be accredited
with quality, intensity, and a temporal and spatial character. "^ In tempo-
ral and spatial determination and in their results, centrally and peripher-
ally excited sensations, we are told, differ widely. The position of Hoeff-
ding with regard to the subject is clear. He says: "There is, indeed, as a
rule a difference in the degree of strength of a memory-image and a percept ;
but this difference may be very small, and may even quite disappear."^
Taine seems to confuse intensity with clearness, but may nevertheless be
classed with this group. "We may confidently assert, then," he says,
' 'that the internal event which we call a sensation ... is reproduced
in us without impression from without — in the majority of cases partially,
feebly, and vaguely, but in many cases with greater clearness and force. "^°

^See op. cit., 552.

*F. Paulhan: I^'activit^ mentale, 1889, 106.

^E. Rabier: Lemons de philosophie, I., 1896, 157.

•♦J.Sully: The Human Mind, 1892, I., 283; Outlines of Psychology, 1891, 157.

* J. M. Baldwin: Handbook of Psychology, Senses and Intellect, 1890, 146-7,

6 Op. cit.. 147.

■^W. Wundt: Outlines of Psychology, tr. 1901. 282.

^O. Kuelpe: Outlines of Psychology, tr. 1901, 182.

^H. Hoeffding: Outlines of Psychology, tr. 1891, 130.

"^H. Taine: On Intelligence, tr. 1899, I., 40.

ON THE INTENSITY OF IMAGES 349

Ladd and James discuss our subject only briefly. The former tells us that
the image often lingers persistently in consciousness at a marked degree of
intensity, and that images and perceptions differ mainly in their other
characteristics.^ James asserts that "the difference between the two pro-
cesses feels like one of kind and not like a mere 'more' or 'less' of the same."^
Then he adds: "The subjective difference between imagined and felt
objects is less absolute than has been claimed."^

As a third group we must mention three writers, Stout, Jodl, and Ziehen,
who hold the general view that images and sensations are toto genere dif-
ferent and therefore incomparable things. It follows as a corollary that
their intensities also do not admit of comparison. Stout beUeves that images
have intensity, but that this differs radically from the intensity that we
attribute to sensations.* Sense experience for Stout has an aggressive
character which is essential to its nature and not merely due to concomitant
motor or organic sensations. The image, we are told, may be just as bright
and loud as the sensations, but it lacks the element of aggressiveness which
alone could make its brightness or loudness like that of a sense perception.
Jodl insists that images may have all the degrees of intensity that are to be
found among sensations, but because they are essentially of different com-
position, are made of different material, we can never compare the intensity
of an image with that of a sensation. "Is Oi fortissimo that we image softer
than a fortissimo that we hear, is sunlight that we perceive brighter than
sunlight that we image, is imaged sugar less sweet than tasted sugar? Every
attempt to answer this leads to absurdity. "^ Ziehen's position is more
difficult to define. He regards the nature of images as such that they can
have no intensity, properly speaking. "It is not a difference in intensity
between the idea and the sensation, but above all a qualitative difference.
The sensual vivacity, characteristic of every sensation, does not belong
at all to the idea, not even in a diminished intensity. "^

It is difficult, of course, in any grouping of writers, to avoid a certain
amount of misplacement and complication, since point of view and general
treatment differ widely. We find, however, as has just been shown, three
types of theories regarding the intensity of images. The first takes as its
watch- word the phrase, "Images are faint copies of sensation;" it regards
images as identical with sensations in quality but as much less intense.
The second holds that intensity may differ, but that it frequently does not ;
the textural difference is all-important. The third regards difference in
nature as an insuperable obstacle to any comparison of the intensities of
image and sensation. To abstract consideration it would appear that the
first class slurs those characteristic differences which make mind the rich
and interesting thing it is, and that the third class so overemphasizes these
differences as to do away with that degree of unity which mind seems to
possess. Whether or not the view of the second class mentioned above
IS tenable must be decided, however, not by a priori speculation but by
experimental investigation alone.

{b) Experimental

Thus far there has been no experimental work especially directed to the
question of the intensity of images. Mention of the subject has been made
incidentally, in connection with the discussion of other problems. It will

^G. T. Ladd: Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, 1894, 239, 241.

' W. James: The Principles of Psychology, 1905, 70.

^Op. cit., 72.

* G. F. Stout: A Manual of Psychology, 1899, 399.

^" 1st ein Fortissimo welches wir vorstellen leiser als ein Fortissimo welches wir hoeren.
ist Sonnenlicht das wir sehen heller als Sonnenlicht welches wir vorstellen; vorgestellter
Zucker minder siiss als geschmeckter? jeder Versuch darauf eine Antwort zu finden.
fuehrt ins Absurde." F. Jodl: Lehrbuch der Psyckologie. 1903. II.. 92 f.

*T. Ziehen: Introduction to Psychological Psychology, tr. 1893, 152.

350 SCHAUB

be necessary for us to glance only at the results that refer to the memory
image.

Experimental investigations of memory are practically confined to the
last fifteen years. Prior to this time we have only the introspective record
of Galton, who remarks that a remembered object is to him quite compara-
ble to the real object. "I feel as though I was dazzled when recalling the
sun to my mental vision."^ Other instances also are given in which the
memory image appeared to be as bright as the actual scene. The investi-
gation of mental imagery by Lay in 1 898^ rests on the questionary method,
and its results ought not to be accepted without careful criticism. We
find, however, a record of images of considerable intensity, though this
fails to measure up to the intensity of corresponding sensation. Meakin'
and Moore^ worked respectively on the mutual inhibition and on the control
of memory images. The former makes no mention of intensity, and Moore
tells us only that an image may be vivid for a period of five minutes. More
to our purpose are the experiments of Kuhlmann. In his first series, he
investigated the nature of imagery in the recall of a given material; he
directed his subjects to recall, aft'er a long interval, and to draw certain
meaningless visual forms.* Two types of images were found, the sponta-
neous and the slowly developing image, yet these in their completed state
differed not so much in intensity as in other attributes. Kuhlmann tells us
that "less intensity and vividness is among the least of the characteristics
in which the memory differed from its perceptive experience."^ In another
article this author states that, in the case of the spontaneous images, ' 'the
words would ring out clear and intense" and "the imagery then approached
the perceptive quality characteristic of all vivid recall."^ In a further
study, dealing with recognition, Kuhlmann says: "We have ceased to be
satisfied with the conception of memory as reproduced past experience, of
images as faint copies of original perception. We may regard this condi-
tion as a good index of the state of our progress."^ Gore, in an article
entitled "Image or Sensation," entirely rejects intensive difference between
images and sensations. "Could you rule out the ideational or perceptual
setting, your image would leave off being an image. It would become
sensational in quality and value."' H. B. Alexander has also touched
upon our problem, but gives us simply a record of personal observation
during several years. He finds that "with reference to vividness, three
grades of intensities are to be discriminated."^" His description of the three
classes, however, betrays a confusion between intensity and clearness. The
first, fleeting images of common thinking, are described as vague, fragile,
and ephemeral; the second as small and watery, but growing clearer and
assuming color under attention; the images of the third class are life-sized,
clear, and bright, with definite background. Memory images, he says,
are often more vivid than after-images or than dim perceptions. Slaughter"^
and Murray^2 barely mention the question of intensity, both laying em-
phasis upon the motor and kinaesthetic elements in reproduction.

iSir F. Galton: Inquiries into Human Faculty, 1883, 89 f.

2W. Lay: Mental Imagery, 1898.

^F. Meakin: Mutual Inhibition of Memory Images, Harv. Psych. Studies, I, 1903, 244.

*C. S. Moore: Control of the Memory Image, Harv. Psych. Studies, I, 1903, 282.

•^F. Kuhlmann: Analysis of the Memory Consciousness, Psych. Rev., XIII, 1906, 316.

« Op. cit., 342.

^F. Kuhlmann: On the Analysis of Auditory Memory Consciousness, Amer. Jour.
Psvch., XX., 1909. 200.

^F. Kuhlmann: Problems in Analysis of Memory Consciousness, J. of Phil., Psych.,
and Sci. Meth., IV, 1907, 1.

9 W. C. Gore: Image or Sensation? J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.. 1, 1904. 437-8.

i"H. B. Alexander: Some Observations on Visual Imagery, Psych. Rev., XI, 1904. 320.

^^ J. W. Slaughter: A Preliminary Study of the Behavior of Mental Images, Amer. Jour.
Psych., XIII, 1902.

'*E. Murray: Peripheral and Central Factors in Memory Images of VisucU Forms and
Color. Amer. Jour. Psych., XVII. 1906.

ON TH^ INTENSITY OF IMAGES 35 1

The studies of the memory image made by Bentley^ and Whipple,^ the
one dealing with vision and the other with audition, make no reference to
our problem, with the exception of Whipple's statement that the image,
when held, decreases rapidly in intensity. Kennedy gives a brief summary
of the results thus far obtained with regard to judgments of intensity in
paired memory images. "In the case of the intensity of sound we find
a decrease in the intensity of the memory image ; in the case of light, either
a decrease or increase of the intensity of the image according to the intensity
of the object itself ; and in the case of squares and of pressure, a quantitative
increase in the image. "^ The general light thrown upon our subject by the
above investigations, then, is merely an indication that introspection reveals
intensity as an attribute of images and that this intensity has various
degrees. The need for further and more definite study is apparent.

DiFFlCUIvTiES AND SOURCES OF ErROR

The study of imagery is subject to certain difficulties to
which we ought to pay regard at the outset. One of the great-
est of these, and one which occurs in the field of sensation as
well, though in a less serious form, is what is technically known
as the stimulus-error. It is the tendency to evaluate sensa-
tions and images in terms of the stimuli which produce them,
instead of in terms of the conscious experience itself; the
error of allowing a knowledge of the objective order of things
to bias introspection. Unless this error is avoided, results
become practically worthless. In our experiments, therefore,
we have attempted in various ways to eliminate it. The two
sounds whose images were to be compared were produced by
the same stimulus ; there was no difference in pitch or timbre,
but only in intensity. Thus, there is no reason why reference
to the stimulus should influence judgment. Moreover, the
actual stimulus was not seen by the observers; they saw
neither the force of the stroke upon the fork nor the distance
of the drop of the sound-pendulum. There were cases in
which one of our observers, especially, had visual images of
this distance; but this fact could not be regarded as evidence
of the stimulus-error, since her visual imagery was avowedly
based upon actually experienced (that is, heard) intensities,
and not upon a memory or perception of the distance of the
swinging pendulum. The danger of the stimulus-error was
further reduced by the fact that our observers were merely
instructed to compare memory images, and it was this com-
parison, and never that of the sensations, that received em-
phasis throughout the entire experiment. The judgments
of the observers were thus directed a step farther than sensa-
tion from the original stimulus. With these various precau-

1 1. M. Bentley: The Memory Imagery and its Qualitative Fidelity, Amer. Jour. Psych.,
XI, 1899.

^G. M. Whipple: An Analytic Study of the Memory Image and the Process of Judgment
in the Discrimination of Clangs and Tones, Amer. Jour. Psych., XII, 1900-01.

8 P. Kennedy: On the Experimental Investigation of Memory, Psych. Rev., V, 1898. 493.

352 SCHAUB

tions our results would seem to be practically, if not entirely,
free from stimulus-error.

More serious even than the danger just mentioned is that of
confusing intensity with clearness. With respect to this
Wundt cautions us as follows: "We must be especially care-
ful not to confuse the clearness of an idea with its intensity.
That is simply dependent upon the sensations which consti-
tute it. The intensity of perceptual ideas is determined by
the strength of the sense stimuli, that of memorial ideas by
other conditions which have nothing to do with ideational
clearness. At the same time, intensity usually promotes
clearness and distinctness."^ By clearness we mean that
sharpness or focal distinctness which depends upon, or is iden-
tical with, the degree of attention. "As applied to our ideas,
then," says Wundt, "clearness and distinctness denote prop-
erties which depend directly upon the activity of ideation."'
Intensity, in the psychological sense, is the strength or force
of a sensation or image in consciousness.' It is an attribute
of a sensation or image, and, if not absolutely, is at least rela-
tively independent of the attitude of the observer, even if
upon further investigation it should develop that attention
affects intensity.

Before taking up our experiments, therefore, it was neces-
sary by means of preliminary experiments so to familiarize
our observers with the introspective difference between clear-
ness and intensity that their reports should be free from any
confusion of the two. In these preliminary experiments, two
metronomes of different intensities were allowed to beat, and
the observers were instructed to perform aloud some task,
such as spelling, reciting, or adding, and to attend now to the
loud, now to the weak metronome, or else to their task. After
40 seconds they dictated their introspections. The results
of these experiments show that the observers were able to
hold the weak metronome at a maximal clearness for most of
the time, even in the face of the more intense metronome and
of the task that was being performed. When the weak metro-
nome was maximally clear, the task and the louder metronome
usually alternated in the background. The experiments were
then repeated, with the exception that the task was now per-
formed in terms of mental imagery. The observer was told
to attend to one of the metronomes while employing visual
imagery in counting, spelling, or reciting, having auditory
images of the chimes playing a familiar air, or kinaesthetic

^W. Wundt: Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology, tr. 1901, 247.
^Op. ciL, 246.

^See W. H. Sheldon: Definitions of Intensity, Jour, of Ph., Psy., and
Sci. Meth., I., 1904, 233-237.

ON THE INTENSITY OF IMAGES 353

images of lifting weights. After a brief practice in this, the
attention of the observers was directed to the task instead
of to the metronome. With Httle difficulty they were able
to get very clear images, while scarcely hearing at all either
the loud or the weak metronome. In the next and final group
of preliminary experiments only one metronome, loud or
weak, was sounded, the observer performing a task aloud and
getting an auditory image of the other metronome. At the
beginning of each experiment the metronome to be recalled in
image was sounded for an instant, and an interval was allowed
to intervene before the observers' recall. That all of our
observers found it possible, while performing mechanically
some task, to keep clear and focal the image of a weak metro-
nome and yet to be conscious that the real metronome beating
in the background was louder than the image, goes to show that
they had succeeded in sharply distinguishing intensity from
clearness. Entirely of their own accord the observers gave
many reports of "weak metronome clear, loud metronome
vague and dim." These results, added to the fact that all of
our observers were practised in introspection, seemed to
warrant us in proceeding to our specific study regarding the
intensity of images with the assurance that this would not
be confused with clearness.

ExPERiMENTAiy Procedure

Our experimental investigation of the problem of the inten-
sity of images was confined to the memory image, with the
exception of a few experiments involving the image of imagina-
tion. ^ The memory image has been variously defined. For
us, however, the term designates that experience which does
not come to us through external sense perception, yet repro-
duces this perception to consciousness with its specific tem-
poral reference in such a way as to be clothed with recogni-
tion. This, then, is the image whose intensity we endeavored
to investigate. The 'mental image' or general, timeless image
was left entirely out of account.^

Four observers took part in these experiments: Dr. Helen
M. Clarke (C), fellow in psychology; Dr. L. R. Geissler
(G), instructor; Mr. W. S. Foster (F), assistant; and Dr.
T. Okabe (O), scholar in psychology. AH of these observers
had had an exceptional amount of training and practice in

^For a discussion of the differences between images of memory and
of imagination, see C. W. Perky: Amer. Jour, of Psych., XXI., 1910,
422-452.

^See Bentley: The Memory Image and its Qualitative Fidelity, Amer.
Jour, of Psych., XI., 1899, 27 note; also Slaughter: A Preliminary Study
of the Behavior of Mental Images, Amer. Jour, of Psych., XIII., 1902, 526.

354 SCHAUB

introspection. Throughout the experiments they were kept
in ignorance of the purpose of our investigation. They were
asked merely to reproduce an experience in memory, and to
write their introspections upon the event. Since these intro-
spections were not guided by suggestions of any kind, there
were numerous instances in which no mention whatever was
made of intensity. The fact that many of the introspections
failed to speak of intensity, therefore, does not militate in
any way against our conclusions.

Our experiments fall into eight series as follows :

Series i. The purpose here was to find out in a prelimi-
nary way whether or not the observers spoke of intensity and,
if so, in what terms. The observer was seated with his back
to a table three meters distant. Upon this table stood a tun-
ing-fork on a resonance box. After giving a 'ready' signal, the
experimenter struck the fork with a felt hammer and allowed
it to sound for one second before damping. After an interval
of half a second the fork was struck again, the stroke being
either markedly louder or weaker than, or approximately equal
to, the first stroke. Again the fork was allowed to sound for one
second. The observer was told to wait until all memory
after-images had passed, and then to reproduce the whole
experience in memory. After every such experience he care-
fully recorded his introspections.

Series 2. In order to secure a greater uniformity of condi-
tions, it seemed wise to control the length of the interval be-
tween the stimulus and the image, and to secure a check upon
the nxemtal operations of the observer during this time. After
a number of trials with all of our observers, we decided upon
20 seconds as the shortest interval which might safely be
assumed to free the observer from the effects of memory after-
images. The above experiments were then repeated with the
following modifications: After giving the two sounds, a 20
second interval was allowed to pass. These intervals were
filled alternately by allowing the observer's attention to follow
its own capricious course and by directing it into certain
channels through the following means: noise, either voice or
metronome; tone, either tone variator or harmonical; or
vision, either colors or pictures. In this manner we attempted
to avoid the danger of having the image affected by special
or persistent characteristics of the experiences that might
fill up the interval before recall.

Series 3. Having tried the shortest possible interval after
the cessation of memory after-images, we next undertook a
brief series of experiments with a decidedly longer interval,
in order to see if the length of the interval had any effect upon
intensity. The method of Series 2 was repeated in all details,

ON THE INTENSITY OF IMAGES 355

except that the 20 second interval was lengthened to one
minute.

Series 4. Even at this point it was clear that our observers
ascribed intensity to the image, and that this imaginal inten-
sity had many different degrees. The question then arose in
how far these various degrees were comparable with those of
the sensational scale. In attempting the answer, we pro-
duced sensations both noticeably and just noticeably different^
in intensity, determining in each case, of course, just what this
difference should be. Some objective scale of stimulus inten-
sities thus became necessary. Instead of the tuning-fork,
therefore, we resorted to the sound-pendulum. Series of
four just noticeably different strokes — on the pendulum scale,
for instance, 20°, 32°, 40°, 55° — were given both ascending
and descending; also a series of three strokes noticeably dif-
ferent-^20°, 45°, 75° — in ascending and descending order;
and a series of two just noticeably different strokes — for in-
stance, 32°, 40° — ascending and descending. Bach of these six
stimulus series was repeated four times in all without definite
or consecutive order. At the fourth or final trial of each series
the stimulus was given while the observer had his memory
image, in order thus to get some control or check upon the ab-
solute intensity of the image. It seemed best in these experi-
ments to lengthen the interval between the stimulus and the
getting of memory images from 20 to 30 seconds, because
of the slightly longer duration of the memory after-images in
the case of the four-stroke series. From the three observers
who gave their results on auditory imagery we thus obtained
seventy-two introspections. G's auditory imagery having
shown itself to be very meagre, the above experiments were
carried out in his case with weights as stimuli instead of
sounds, the procedure in all other respects being analogous to
the above.

Series 5. In this series we again used noticeable and just
noticeable differences, but changed the preceding conditions
in the two following ways: (a) Only pairs of strokes were
used ; and (b) the interval preceding recall was now of various
lengths — not only 30 seconds as before, but also 60 and 120
seconds. As to the direction of the observer's attention
during the interval, the procedure of the former series was

^The 'just noticeable difference' of this paper is not the ordinary differ-
ential limen of the psychophysical methods, but a difference such as
would be recognized by the observer in at least 90 of 100 consecutive trials.
In other words, it is a Fechnerian just noticeable difference, the least differ-
ence that an observer can 'carry in his head,' the just noticeable difference
of Ebbinghaus' first form of the method of that name. This difference
was carefully determined, for each observer, at the beginning of our experi-
ments, and was tested, less accurately, at intervals during their progress.

356 SCHAUB

not changed. It should be mentioned that at various times
throughout the course of this series the stimulus was repeated
for the purpose of comparison with the observer's image.
For observer G the stimuli were again lifted weights.

Series 6. Observations were now made on images of imag-
ination instead of upon memory images. At the beginning
of every sitting the experimenter sounded on the pendulum
a stroke of moderate intensity, 40° on the scale. After this
sound, five minutes were allowed to pass in general conversa-
tion, and then the observer was asked to imagine, according
to the direction of the experimenter, certain pairs of strokes.
These pairs were both ascending and descending in order,
now noticeably different, now just noticeably diifferent in the
centre of the scale, now just noticeably at the loud end of the
scale, and now just noticeably different at the weak end. The
observer signalled the appearance of the image, and the experi-
menter immediately sounded two strokes such as the ob-
server had been told to imagine. The latter thereupon
reported how his images compared in intensity with the
strokes just sounded. In the cases of a failure of correspond-
ence, the experimenter continued giving other pairs of strokes
until the observer said "My images were like those." This
usually took only one or two trials — too few for the observer's
image to fade in the meantime. The method, though not free
from error, was accurate enough to show us the nature of just
noticeable differences and noticeable differences in the image,
as compared with those on the scale of sensory intensities.

Series y. A series of experiments was now performed in
order to investigate the minimal and maximal limits of imaginal
intensity. Both very loud and very weak sounds were given
on the gravity phonometer as well as on the sound-pendulum.
After a 30 second interval, the observer was asked to reproduce
the sound in image.

Series 8. In order to compare our results in the field of
auditory imagery with those which might be obtained in other
fields, we instituted a series of tests on brightnesses. The
brightness-discrimination box was used, an apparatus which
enables the observer to see simultaneously two brightnesses
side by side. The brightness of both openings, or of either
one singly, could be regulated at will and determined by a scale
on the box.^ The observer sat directly in front of the centre
of the box in a dark room and after a period of adaptation
two brightnesses, either noticeably or just noticeably different,
were shown. He then waited until all after-images had dis-

^For a fuller description of this apparatus, see G. M. Whipple: Man-
ual of Mental and Physical Tests, 1910, 163.

r ON THE INTENSITY OF IMAGKS 357

appeared, and recalled the experience in a memory image,
dictating his introspections to the experimenter.

The results of the above experiments seemed sufficient to
warrant conclusions regarding the intensity of auditory mem-
ory images, and to tell us something also regarding visual and
kinesthetic memory images.

RESUI.TS

I. Intensity, (a) Ascription of intensity to images

The first part of our problem was to determine whether or
not the image possessed intensity. For the answer to this
question we may simply turn to the introspections that were
given. As has been mentioned above, our observers were not
aware of the object or purpose of the experiments, — they did
not know that our concern was with intensity at all. Their
very frequent references to intensity, as an attribute of images,
are therefore the more significant since there was absolutely
no ground for supposing that they were reporting anything
other than that which introspection actually revealed to them.
Only a very few of the statements regarding this subject may
be quoted here. They are selected at random and may be
regarded as typical.

Series i. Observer C. ' 'Very clear auditory images, like the sensations in
pitch, intensity, and time-interval." "Purely auditory images like the
sensations in intensity." "Good images like the heard tones in pitch and
intensity." "Intensity of the images a little weaker than that of the sen-
sations."

Series J. Observer F. "I think the images are very accurate copies of the
sensations both as to quality and intensity." "Good images with intensi-
ties about like that of sensations." "The images were not quite so dear
as in sensation."

Series 6. Observer O. ' 'Images just exactly like sensations in loudness.
The sensations and images differ in quality so that unless there were an
element common to both I could not compare them without making an
arbitrary standard. I do not do this but compare them by their intensi-
ties ; therefore I know that intensity is the common element, although they
differ in every other way, force, liveliness, purity, etc." ' 'Got good images
but the first was a little too strong. The second was just like the sensa-
tion in intensity."

Series 4. Observer G (lifted weights). "In the image the second was
distinctly more intense." "Images like the sensations in intensity." ^

Series 2. Observer F. ' 'I think the images are very accurate copies of
the sensations as to intensity." "Intensities of images about correct."
"Loud image good and like the sensation in intensity, weak image not
clear this time and a little too loud."

Thus, our observers spontaneously attributed intensity to
the image, and this occurred in by far the greater number of our
experiments.

The question naturally arises, in this connection, whether
the images induced under experimental conditions are the
3— Journal

358

SCHAUB

same as "the normal waking images of every-day life."^ This
query occurred to Slaughter, and he tells us that it is impossible
to answer it. It is, however, merely the old question of the
value of experimental introspection, recurring in special form,
and as such is possible to answer. All of our observers re-
garded the images evoked in the laboratory as like their ordi-
nary images, with the possible exception of G. This observer
had very poor auditory images, and reported them as being
so weak as almost to lack intensity altogether, although, as he
said, his ordinary, normal auditory images, while they are usu-
ally vague, often have a marked degree of intensity. Such
statements did not occur in the case of our other observers, nor
with G in the field of kinsesthesis. It may be questioned
whether the meagre auditory images which G had in the
laboratory were really memory images at all, for he tells us
that in numerous cases "the images involve no reference to the
previous sensations; they occur as independent conscious
events."

(b) Varying degrees of imaginal intensity

The following results furnish the answer, in par£ at least,
to the second portion of our problem, the question. Can the
intensities of images be compared with sensational intensities,
and to what extent? The results of the different series, so far
as they bear upon the varying degrees of imaginal intensity,
may conveniently be thrown into the form of Tables. Con-

Tablb I

Series i: Tuning-fork struck at two noticeably different intensities;
no definite interval before recall.

Obs.

Exp'ts made

Absolute
imag. int.
mentioned

Imaginal •=

sensational

intensity

Both images
weaker

2nd im. weaker
or stronger
than first

cerning the judgments in this series (column 4) and in all
following series under the rubric 'both images weaker,' it is
important to mention that our observers also reported that
the difference in intensity between the images was the same as
the intensive difference between the sensations. Thus, C

^Cf. Slaughter: A Preliminary Study of the Behavior of Mental Images,
Amer. Jour. Psych., XVIII., 1902, 548.

ON THE INTENSITY O^ IMAGES

359

reports : "The auditory images were like the sounds in relative
intensity, but both images were a little less intense than the
corresponding sensations;" "both images weaker, but like
the sounds in difference of intensity." The following state-
ment of F is to the same effect : " Both images weaker than cor-
respondin-g sensations . . . intensive difference between images
like that between the sensations." O, indeed, gave two judg-
ments reporting the difference in intensity as greater in image
than in sensation. "The difference in loudness between the
two images seemed greater than in sensation, — it seemed too
great;" "the images were pure and simple and the difference
in loudness seemed too great."

The experiments with G are not recorded in the Tables
because his auditory imagery was, as a rule, too poor to admit
of full introspective accounts. We give three of his most defi-
nite introspections: "I get no intensive difference between
the images, although it was plain enough in the sensations;"
"there seemed to be no difference in intensity between the
images;" "the intensive difference between the two sensa-
tions was marked, but the only difference between the images
is a stronger breathing accompanying the image which cor-
responds to the louder sensations."

Tabls II
Series 2: Fork struck at two n. d. intensities; before recall a 20 sec.
interval either left for O to fill or filled by E with noise, tone,
or visual stimuli.

Obs.

Exp'ts
made

Absolute
imag. int.
mentioned

Im.=Tsens.
intensity

One im.
correct

Bothim.
weaker

Both dif-
ferent in int

The reports of columns 5, like the corresponding reports of
Series i, include also the judgments that the difference in
imaginal intensity was the same as that between the intensities
of the sensations. Besides the above, F and O reported four
and ten times respectively that the difference in the intensity
of the images was the same as the difference between the
sensations, without, however, making mention of absolute
intensity.

Nearly all of G's images came in kinaesthetic instead of in
auditory terms. As regards the direction of the observer's
attention during the interval, we find that, in all but two of
the cases in which the intensity of the images was like that of

36o

SCHAUB

the sensations, this occurred when O's attention was allowed
free play. The two exceptions were reported by O and oc-
curred when the interval was filled by E's reading nonsense
syllables.

Tabls III

Series j: Series 2 repeated with one minute interval before recall instead
of 20 sec. interval.

Obs.

Exp'ts made

Absolute
imag. int.
mentioned

Imag. = sens,
intensity

Oneim.
correct

Both images
weaker

C here reported two cases in which the difference between
the images was like that between the sensations, but she
failed to make any statement regarding their absolute in-
tensity. There is no evidence in the results of this series that
the filling of the interval affected the images, except O's state-
ment that his images are easier to get after an 'empty* interval,
i. e., an interval in which attention was allowed to follow its
own course. In two cases F mentions that his image seems
to be a 'general' image rather than a memory image, and in
his final introspection he states it as his belief that the same
thing was true in a number of cases. In this series of experi-
ments, G was able to report two cases in which imaginal
intensity was like that of sensation The results of this series,
it will be noticed, agree in general with those of the above
series.

Table IV

Series 4: Sound-pendulum; six series consisting of 2 j. n. d. strokes, 4 j. n

d. strokes, and 3 n. d. strokes, in ascending and descending orders.

Interval of 30 sec. (filled or empty) before recall.

Obs.

Exp'ts made

Absolute
imag. inten.
mentioned

Imaginal =

sensational

intensity

Both images
weaker

Besides the seven cases (in column 4) in which both images
were weaker but the intensive difference between them was
the same as that between the sensations, C reported two

ON run INTENSITY OF IMAGES

361

cases of correct difference without mentioning absolute inten-
sity. There seems to be no regularity as to which series
is most often reproduced correctly in image.

This set of experiments, however, brought out an interest-
ing fact in connection with images of noticeable and just
noticeable' differences. F reported four cases in which a just
noticeable difference was increased in image, and two in which
such a difference seemed to grow even smaller; in the case of
noticeable differences, three introspections tell us that the
difference is lessened in the image. The following record of
F's reports makes this point clear:

Stimulus 2 j. n. d. sounds. "1 think that the difference between the two
intensities in the image was greater than that between the two sensations;"
' 'the difference in the intensity of the two was greater in image than in
sensation;" "good auditory image of first sound with intensity like that of
sensation, but the second image had greater intensity than the second sen-
sation had." Stimulus 4J. n. d. sounds. "1 think the weakest image was
too strong and the strongest too weak." Stimulus j n. d. sounds. "There
was less difference of intensity in the series of images than in sensation;"
"loudest image not loud enough and weakest too loud;" "loudest image not
loud enough and weakest too strong."

Both F and C mentioned cases in which a j. n. d. was elimi-
nated and the two sounded equal in image :

F. Stimulus 2 j. n. d. sounds. "Images of equal intensity;" "sounds
alike in intensity in image."

C. Stimulus 2.j. n. d. sounds. "Auditory images of the same intensity;'
"both images were equally intense."

Table V

Series 5. Pairs of j. n. d. and n. d. strokes; interval of 30 sec, 60 sec,
or 120 sec (filled or empty) before recall.

Obs.

Exp'ts made

Absolute
imag. in ten.
mentioned

Imaginal

sensational
intensity

Both images
weaker

i(n.d. 60 sec)

(120 sec)
( 30 sec.)

(j. n. d. 30)
(j. n. d. 30)
^ (n. d.6osec.)
(n. d.6o sec.)

2 (60 sec)

(j. n. d. 30)
3 (j. n. d. 60)
(j. n. d. 120)

I (30 sec)

For the sake of uniformity in the Tables, we have arranged
the results of this series also with reference to absolute
intensity. The series was undertaken, however, primarily in
order to observe the effect of different time-intervals upon the
noticeable and just noticeable differences. Our results with
regard to this point follow.

362 SCHAUB

Just noticeable difference too great in image: C, i case (120 sec); F,
2 cases (120 sec); O, 3 cases (30 sec, 60 sec, 120 sec). Just noticeable
difference noticeable in image (images equal); C, i case (60 sec); O, 2 cases
(120 sec). Noticeable difference too small in image: C, i case (120 sec);
F, 2 cases (120 sec); O, 4 cases (30, 60, 120, 120 sec). Thirty-one tests
with lifted weights were made with G, with the following results : 5 mentions
made of absolute intensity; 3 cases in which a just noticeable difference
was too great in image (60 sec, 120 sec, 120 sec); 8 cases in which a
noticeable difference was too small in image (either 60 sec. or 120 sec).

The fact that in many cases the just noticeable differences
are greater and the noticeable differences less in the image
suggests Leuba's hypothesis with regard to the intensity of
the single image. "There seems to be a natural tendency
in us to shift the sensations held in memory towards the
middle of the scale of intensities. It might be conceived to
operate somewhat as follows. The image of a recent sensa-
tion tends to recall by association the united residual of all
past sensations of the same kind."^ As far as absolute inten-
sity goes, — and it is to this that the quotation refers, — we have
found in our experiments no traces of such a tendency. Our
results, however, show that at times the relative intensity or dif-
ference in intensity between two images does seem to approach
a mean, the just noticeable differences increasing, and the notice-
able differences decreasing, in imagery. A closer study of our
results shows that this change occurred almost entirely after the
long intervals. Thus we can regard it as one of the effects of
time upon the two images, rather than as a general character-
istic of all pairs of images. F reported that after the longer
intervals he was conscious of getting not a real memory image
but a sort of 'general' image, referring to no sensations in
particular. His reports in the case of the one minute interval
of Series 3 are in harmony with his observation in this series.
From his introspections we gather that this 'general' image,
probably the 'mental image' of psychologists, is usually of
moderate intensity. We quote one report: " Relaxation at
the tone which was of moderate intensity. I reproduced a
'general' experience and not the particular one this time. I
feel that this is what I have been doing usually after the long
interval."

Leuba's reference to the "residual of all past sensations"
indicates that he refers to this timeless mental image and not
to the specific memory image. We must not, however, be un-
derstood to mean that in every case in which our observers had
an increase in image of what was a small intensive difference
for sensation, or a decrease in image of the intensive difference
of a markedly large sensory* step, they did not get memory
images at all. In a number of such cases the introspections

^J. H. Leuba: A New Instrument for Weber's Law, Amer. Jour. Psych.,
v., 1892-93, 382 f.

ON run INTENSITY OF IMAGES 363

tell US that the one of the images was like the sensation in
intensity, while the other was either too weak or too strong as
the case might be; and this change in the one of the images
may be accounted for in numerous ways. We regard as
'general' or 'mental' images only those few in which the dif-
ference in intensity was changed by the weakening or strength-
ening of both th'e images, and the images were thus brought to
a moderate or medium degree of intensity. For our observers,
such images occurred relatively frequently when there was
an interval of one minute or more between the giving of the
sensation and its recall in image.

Series 6: Moderate stroke given ; pause of five minutes ; imaginary images

called up by O according to E's directions, either j. n. d. or n. d,,

ascending or descending, on loud, weak, or medium part of scale.

A Table here would only complicate matters, since we are
dealing with images of imagination, and also since the matter
of absolute intensity is a side-issue, the important thing being
the noticeable or just noticeable differences. We found,
however, that in numerous cases the observer's pair of images
corresponded exactly with the first pair of strokes later given
by the experimenter. Of these cases O reports four; F, six;
and C, six; with O the cases occurred with just noticeable
differences on the strong end of the scale; with F and C they
occurred with weak just noticeable differences, and a few with
noticeable differences. The introspections of our observers
corroborate the results which we tabulated in the course of the
series. O tells us: "It is much harder to get just noticeable
differences when both are weak;" "easiest to imagine strong
just noticeable differences." C: "Weak images are more
likely to be like the sounds than the strong ones are;" "very
hard and unpleasant to try to get strong images." F: "Weak
images are easier to get."

Further results regarding noticeable and just noticeable
differences are as follows: Out of sixteen tests, O reported
six cases in which that which he supposed to be a just noticeable
difference in his imaginative image proved, on comparison
with a just noticeable difference between sensations, to be
greater than this. Out of twelve tests, observer F reported
I case in which an imagined just noticeable difference proved
to be too great, and three cases where an imagined noticeable
difference proved to be too small, when compared with the
corresponding differences in sensation. Out of twenty tests,
C reported four cases of just noticeable difference too great,
and two of noticeable difference' too small, in the image of
imagination. This seems to indicate that, while we can image
in imagination both large and small intensive differences, there
is a slight tendency for these differences to approach a type or

364

SCHAUB

mean. In so far, then, their behavior resembles that of the
'mental image' mentioned above.

This result leads us to a series of experiments concerned with
the limits of the intensive scale in imagery.

Series 7: Loud or weak sounds given on sound-pendulum or gravity
phonometer ; O told to reproduce in imagery.

The results here merely show that for observers C and O there
were apparently no limits to the intensive scale of images.
There was no sensation, however weak or strong, of which they
were not able to get an adequately intensive men^ory image.
A few of the introspections follow.

O. Fall of I meter on phonometer. ' 'Intensity in the image, taken by itself,
could not be distinguished from that of the stimulus, — the only difference
was in thinness."

4° on sound-pendulum. "Good image just like sensation in loudness."

C. One meter on phonometer. "Image thin with less body than sensa-
tion, but intensity just the same."

80° on sound-pendulum.. "Got good image just like it." Stimulus was
repeated and C said, "yes, my image was just as intense as that sound."

4*^ on sound-pendulum. "Image just like that in intensity."

F could get very weak images, but he was unable to call to
mind any that were louder than a fall of 75° on the pendulum
or 85 cm. on the phonometer.

Series 8:

Table VI
Pairs of brightnesses;

recall in imagery.

Obs.

Exp'ts
made

Absolute
intensity
mentioned

Im.=sens.
intensity

Im. of dark
stimulus
too light

Im. of light
stimulus
too dark

Bothim.
too dark

There were two cases for each observer in which absolute
intensity was not mentioned, but the difference in intensity
between the images was reported as being like that between
the sensations. There were also five cases for O and one for F
where a small difference was imaged as greater, and one for O
and four for F where a large difference was imaged as smaller
than in sensation. C is of a markedly visual type, which
fact probably accounts for the large proportion of her accurate
images. In the field of vision, then, our results parallel those
obtained in audition and kinaesthesis.

2. Non-intensive Differences between Sensation and Image
In the comparison of images with sensations, several facts
of interest were brought out besides those immediately con-

ON THE INTENSITY OF IMAGES

365

nected with our main problem. The results above described
with reference to intensity show, as we have seen, that it is not
here that the distinguishing mark between images and sensa-
tions is to be found. For our observers, as we shall see, this
difference lay in other characters of the two experiences. They
all repeatedly emphasized the incompleteness^ of the image as
compared with sensation and found here the main point of
differentiation. Indirectly, then, we find in these statements
a verification of our conclusions.

The introspections regarding this point are so numerous
that only a few can here be given. They are chosen at random
from all the series.

F. * 'The images seem finer, less bulky and thick than the actual sounds;"
"the tones are as intense in image as in sensation but they lack 'volume,'
that is, concomitant muscular and organic sensations;" "the images are
abbreviated in some way, — they lack a fullness, vividness, aliveness, sharp-
ness, which the sensations have;" "usually concomitants such as sharp
clang or after tone and organic sensations are not reproduced in imagery;"
' 'hard to say how the images differed from the sensations, but I know they
lack certain qualities partly of sound and also perhaps of organic and,
muscular strains and attitudinal setting. 'Deadness' of sound is partly
lack of certain qualities, especially certain higher pitches;" "the visual
image is thin and threadlike as compared with the sensations. Images
are very instable and the main difference between them and sensation is
the fact that they are so abbreviated."

O. "Good images of correct intensity. With the sensations there are
kinaesthetic accompainments which are not present in the image;" "the
sensation is fuller and has an element of impressiveness that the image
lacks"; "the sensations are accompanied by kinaesthetic sensations and
also by noises and overtones, but none of these occur in the image, which
was purer and more simple than the sensation;" "images differ from sensa-
tions not in intensity but in fullness and kinaesthetic sensations accom-
panying them;" "the only element common to image and sensation is in-
tensity, they differ in every other way."

C. "Image less steady and impressive than sensation;" "got two images
exactly like the sensations in intensity, but they were more subjective and
did not give the kinaesthetic shock that accompanied the stimuli;"
"images thin and abbreviated but like the stimuli in intensity."

G. * 'The images differed from the sensations mostly in their accompany-
ing kinaesthetic sensations;" "I do not know what the difference between

'image and sensation is, or how I can tell which is which. The image has a
sort of 'Verschwommenheit,' is thin, diffuse, vaporous, and not as clear-
cut as the sensation. The difference is less a matter of degree than of
quahty;" "images are pure and there are no accompanying strains. The
concomitants such as pressure and strains are not reproduced in image, —
the images are isolated."

These and many other similar introspections made by
four observers, differing widely in imaginal type, indicate that
the difference between sensation and image is not one of
intensity.

^Cf. Kuhlmann: On the Analysis of Auditory Memory Consciousness,
jy Amer. Jour. Psych., XX., 1909, 214; E. Murray: Peripheral and Central
Factors in Memory Images of Visual Form and Color, Amer. Jour. Psych.,
XVII., 1906, 231.

366 SCHAUB

Another point upon which our introspections throw some
Hght is the time-relation in imagery. In by far the greater
number of introspections we find mention of the fact that the
time-relations of images exactly correspond to those of sen-
ations. There were, indeed, a few cases in which each indi-
vidual image lasted too long and the interval between them
was too short, and, conversely, a few in which the time interval
was appreciably lengthened. The latter, however, occurred
in the cases in which there was a long interval before recall and
in which, as is stated above, the images partook of the nature
of 'mental' rather than of memory images. On the basis of our
results, therefore, we are able to say that memory images
tend, in introspection, to reproduce exactly the time-relations
of the original sensational experience. The images, moreover,
always tended to become less accurate, both as to intensity and
as to temporal relation, when there were a number of repeti-
tions of the recall of the original sensation.

Of the many minor facts brought out by our experiments we
should, perhaps, mention also the important r61e that kinaes-
thesis plays in imagery. Others who have investigated audi-
tory imagery have noticed this same fact. Kuhlmann, for
example, tells us that in many cases "only one-fourth or
one-half of the sound was imaged in auditory terms. "^ While
our observers, as already stated, differentiated images from
sensations by the lack of certain kinaesthetic elements, never-
theless, in their descriptions of imagery, they reported the
presence of other kinaesthetic elements which were lacking
in sensation. They found all manner of throat strains and
organic attitudes that aided correct reproduction and carried
much of the 'meaning' of the image. The shock produced by
a stroke was not accompanied in the imagery by those starts
and strains characteristic of the sensation, but other bodily
tensions and kinaesthetic elements were substituted for them,
and gave meaning to the memory image. While pitch was
usually recalled in auditory terms, it was sometimes carried
in the memory images by throat settings of which there
was no trace in the sensation. Thus, corroborating the results
of Kuhlmann, our observers also reproduced the sound only
partially in auditory terms. In this fact there is a further
distinguishing mark of images, but a mark which, again, is
not intensive.

CONCIyUSION

The results of our experiments, then, as above described,
warrant the drawing of certain conclusions concerning the

^Kuhlmann: On the Analysis of Auditory Memory Consciousness,
Amer. Jour. Psych., XX., 1909, 214.

ON TH^ INTENSITY OF IMAGES

367

intensity of images. Our problem included the questions
whether intensity is an attribute of images and, if so, whether
there is a scale of imaginal intensity, and what the nature of
such a possible scale may be. The answer to the first of
these questions we have found in the introspections of our
observers. It appears beyond doubt that, at least under
ordinary laboratory conditions, images possess the attribute
of intensity. It is undoubtedly true that, oftentimes, the
image is to some extent weaker than the original sensation, but
it is far from true that this is always or necessarily the case.
The true memory image frequently reproduces very exactly
the sensational intensity, be it weak or strong; the intensity
of the image of imagination, though likely to be of a moderate
degree, may at times be very strong as well as very weak. The
'general' or 'mental' image, being a type-image referring not
to any particular sensation but to a number of past sensations
of varying degrees, is almost always of medium intensity.

The question regarding the nature of imaginal intensity
cannot be so briefly or so definitely answered. We have every
reason to believe that there are not two different kinds of
intensities, but that the intensive attribute is one and the same
whether it be that of sensation or of the image. In no case
did any of our observers note any difference in the nature of
imaginal and sensational intensities. But we need not rely
on negative evidence alone, for, as above quoted, there were
introspections which stated that intensity is the one element
common to image and sensation. The question that has at
times been raised, ''Could imaginal intensity, as such, replace
sensational intensity?" we are, therefore, inclined to answer
in the affirmative. One observer explicity stated that imagi-
nal intensity, taken by itself, is the same thing as sensational
intensity. Certain it is that none of our observers found any
difficulty in comparing the intensities of images and sensations.
As regards, more specifically, the scale of intensities, we
find that with the possible exception of the very loud end of the
scale the degrees of imaginal intensity correspond with those of
sensational intensity. About very weak sounds there is no
doubt, and it is certain, too, that some intense sounds can be
exactly reproduced in memory imagery. Whether, however,
we can thus image the loudest possible sound, or the brightest
possible light, or the heaviest possible weight, we have not
ascertained. With this exception all manner of intensive
differences, even those just noticeable in sensation, we have
found to be accurately reproduced in memory; indeed, with
le exception of very loud sounds in the case of observer F,
10 degree of intensity was given to our observers that was
lot correctly reproduced by them. From this it would

368 SCHAUB

appear that the intensive scales of sensations and images are
identical.

Incidental to the negative conclusion that the difference
between images and sensations is not one of intensity, we have
gained positive introspections as to the nature of this differ-
ence. Our observers regarded the incompleteness, thinness,
abbreviatedness of the image as its main point of differentia-
tion from sensation. Compared with the latter, the image
lacks a certain 'aliveness' or kinaesthetic complex, and it is
this which makes of it a very different thing. In so far, our
results confirm the views entertained by the second group of
writers to whom we referred in our historical note, — those,
namely, who regard imaginal as quite comparable with
sensational intensity, but maintain that the image differs
from sensation in texture or nature.

We ought perhaps also to refer briefly to two other points :
the influence of individual differences in imaginal type, and
the question of physiological substrate. As regards the former
we may remark that observer C, markedly visual in type, had
more good and accurately intensive visual images than any
of the other observers; G had almost no images except those
of kinaesthesis, and we find him hesitant about intensity until
he is tested with kinaesthetic images ; the other two observers,
individuals of mixed type, seemed to get all images with equal
ease. As regards physiological substrate, the question arises
what relation we must assume to exist between the cortical
centres of sensation and memory, such that a correspondence
in intensity may be rendered intelligible.

While our experiments point to certain positive conclusions
regarding imaginal intensity, we are well aware that, owing to
their limited scope and to the small number of our observers,
we are not justified in assuming a dogmatic attitude. The
intensity of images still remains a promising field for experi-
mental investigation, an especially interesting problem being
that of the upper limit of the intensive scale. In such an
investigation the stimulus-error would assume large propor-
tions; yet it might be overcome, we believe, by suitable
apparatus and by a method similar to that which we have
employed.

THE COLOR SENSATIONS OF THE PARTIALLY

COLOR-BLIND, A CRITICISM OF CURRENT

TEACHING

By SAMUEiy P. Hayes, Ph. D./ Mount Holyoke College

A. Introduction 369

B. Historical Cases of Monocular (Red-Green) Color-Blindness . 372

C. A new Case of Monocular Protanopia 377

1. Color Confusions 378

2. Color Discriminations 381

3. Color Equations 394

D. Conclusions . , 402

E. Bibliography 404

A. Introduction

Although the existence of color-blindness has been known
since 1777 (32, cj. 76), and although large numbers of cases
have been studied and described (19) during the century and
a quarter which has elapsed since that date, the general topic
of color-blindness is still in a state which many psychologists
consider to be most disgraceful to their science. One reason
for this backward condition is undoubtedly to be found in the
extreme complexity of the subject, and the enormous varia-
tion from case to case; but an even greater obstacle to the
progress of knowledge has been the almost universal practice
of studying and classifying cases under the domination of
some pre-conceived color-theory (36). Perhaps the most
notable example of this practice is to be found in the descrip-
tion of the sensations of the red-blind, which Helmholtz gives
in the first edition of his Optik.^ But even to-day, after
fifty additional years of extended observation and experi-
mentation upon color-defectives, many psychologists seem
disposed to discuss the topic in such a loose and superficial
fashion as will make it accord with the color theory which
they have espoused, rather than to work out a full and clear

^The writer wishes to express his gratitude to Professors E. B. Titchener
and J. W. Baird for much helpful criticism and suggestion.

^Helmholtz (18, p. 298) states that red, if seen at all, is seen as a weak
green; yellow, as a stronger, saturated green; green, as a whitish green;
blue and violet, as blue; and white as greenish blue. Holmgren (quoted
33» P- 29) describes the sensations of the green-blind and of the violet
blind, in the same fashion ; his procedure is essentially a logical process,
and his description is an inference as to how the defective retina must
see colors when its green-sensing or its violet-sensing fibres are lacking.

370 HAYES

statement of the facts thus far known, regardless of their
theoretical implications.

Ever since the work of Seebeck (69) , in the early part of the
nineteenth century, it has been customary to divide the par-
tially color-blinds into two or more classes, — the writers of
the Helmholtzian school tending to distinguish three groups,
while those who advocate a four color-element theory tend
to distinguish two. Seebeck regarded the shortening of the
spectrum, which he found in certain cases, as a fundamental
basis of differentiation; and, in present-day usage, the two
best established groups of partially color-blinds are those
which are distinguished by the different lengths of their
spectrums: Deuteranopes, whose color-system is reduced to
blue, yellow and grey, but who see color throughout the whole
length of the spectrum; and Protanopes, who likewise see
only blue, yellow and grey, but whose spectrum is shortened
at the red-end, and who show the Purkinje phenomenon in
ordinary light, i e., whose region of maximum brightness is
displaced from yellow toward blue (40). Authorities disagree
upon the question of the existence of a third group of partially
color-blinds — Tritanopes, whose color system is reduced to
red and green (40, 71, 74). All three groups are commonly
referred to as dichromates, because their color system is assumed
to be reduced to two colors.

Unfortunately this simple classification does not provide
for all the cases of color deficiency which have been discovered.
Seebeck (69, pp. 216 ff.) found mild cases of color deficiency
which he was loath to include in either class ; and ever since his
time, no wide survey of cases has failed to reveal a considerable
number of marginal forms which were neither normal nor
limited to a two-color spectrum. These cases were long
spoken of as "color- weak" or "incompletely color-blind,"
until Rayleigh's work (62) led to the conclusion that many of
them were unequally sensitive to red and to green. The
equation by which Rayleigh made this discovery, — the mix-
ture of red and green to match yellow, — is commonly spoken of
as the "Rayleigh equation." Ever since Konig's work (39) upon
defectives of this type, they have been known by the name
which he applied to them, — "anomalous trichromates," i. e.,
persons whose color-system includes all three of the funda-
mental colors of Helmholtz (red, green and violet), but whose
sensitiveness to red or green is abnormal. It is now custom-
ary (15, 37, 40, 42, 43, 52) to distinguish two groups of anomal-
ous trichromates, upon the analogy of the two groups of
dichromates, — the red-anomalous or protanomalous trichro-
mates, whose sensitiveness to red is below normal, and the
green-anomalous or deuteranomalous trichromates, whose

COLOR SENSATIONS OF THE PARTIALLY COLOR-BLIND 37 1

sensitiveness to green is below normal. Recent writers report
other peculiarities of this group, the most marked of which
is a heightened ♦sensitivity to contrast. Guttmann^ identifies
color-weakness with anomalous trichromacy, claiming that
the defect is a complex state involving seven inter-related
symptoms. Nagel insists that color- weakness is the wider
term, — that color-weakness may occur without the other
symptoms of anomalous trichromacy being present.

It has been the purpose of the writer to examine the evi-
dence upon which is based the assumption that the partially
color-blinds are dichromates, — see only blue and yellow, —
and to present a body of new experimental evidence upon the
question of the color sensations of col or- defectives.

A survey of the literature of color-blindness indicates that
we are indebted to Herschel (21) for the first suggestion of the
idea that the color-system of the color-blind is reduced to
blue and yellow; and that the general acceptance of this idea
is based upon the following lines of evidence (61): —

1. Testimony of the color-blinds themselves, and infer-
ence from color-confusions, from the naming of spectral colors
and the colors of objects.

2. Color equations in which the various colors have been
matched by mixtures of blue, yellow, black and white.

3. The study of acquired and temporary color defects.

4. The analogy of peripheral color-blindness.

5. The study of monocular cases of color-blindness. Of
these five sorts of evidence, the last is by far the most im-
portant, since its evidence is direct.

But it seems very clear to the writer that theory has, in many
cases, prejudiced the interpretation of the facts obtained from
all five sources, and that we have no right to conclude from
the evidence at hand that all typical cases of partial color-blind-
ness are dichromates. Almost every writer who has had any
wide experience with color defectives has seen mild cases of
color-blindness, ' ' incomplete " color-blindness, etc., in which the
subjects give evidence of seeing some kinds of red or green;
and the conviction seems to be growing common that dichro-
mates are the extreme and not the typical forms of partial
color-blindness, — that there are protanopes who see some
greens, deuteranopes who see some reds, etc.

In view of the great importance attaching to monocular
cases, it has seemed best to review all such cases available.
After this the experiments performed by the writer upon a
monocular protanope will be described; and the evidence
derived from this study will be compared with the results of

^For the discussion of this question by Guttmann and Nagel, see the
series of articles in the Zsch. f. Sinnesphysiol. 41-43.

372 HAYKS

similar experiments upon a number of color-blind subjects
whose defect extends to both eyes.

B. Historical Cases of Monocular (rbd-grebn) Color-
Blindness^

1. Woinow's case of green-blindness in one eye (iSyi)

The earliest case of monocular partial color-blindness
known to the writer is that reported by Dr. N. Woinow (78)
of Moscow in 1871. The patient, a woman 34 years old, was
tested with rotating discs and her case was diagnosed as green-
blindness. The following equations are reported: —
Left (normal) eye:

225 black 4-135 white = 135 red + 125 green -j- 100 violet
Right (color-blind) eye:

220 black +140 white =105 violet + 255 red

310 black -f 50 white = 30 violet -|- 330 green

Dr. Woinow evidently studied this case with the Helmholtz
three-color theory in mind; but his equations seem to indi-
cate that his patient was very deficient both in red and in
green vision. The case was not so simple as this, however.
The patient seems to have had an hysterical fear of reds, and
both eyes appeared to be somehow sensitive to this color. She
said she could not bear to look at red or orange, but that, if
she had to do so, "she felt better" with her right (color-blind)
eye closed. Moreover, she reported that when she looked
with her right eye alone, "everything was tinged with red."
Woinow concluded that she was color-blind to green only.
But in view of the complications involved, and the small
number of tests made, this case seems to have practically no
value as evidence of the actual color sensations of the color-
blind.

2, von HippeVs monocular partially color-blind subject (1880)
In the literature of the last thirty years, constant reference

is made to the case of monocular color-blindness which was
studied and described by von Hippel (28) in 1880. The
subject, a young man, came to von Hippel for spectacles to
correct double vision, and in von Hippel's exploration of the
subject's right visual field with a Forster perimeter, constant
confusions of red and green with yellow were noticed. Before
this the subject had known nothing of his color defect. Von
Hippel then made a long and careful series of experiments,
using a Hoffmann spectroscope, Radde's international color

I The monocular cases described by Niemetscheck (59), Hohngren (31),
Kirschmann (35) and Piper (60) are intentionally omitted because tliis
paper deals only with protanopia and deuteranopia.

COLOR SENSATIONS OI^ THE PARTIALLY COLOR-BLIND 373

charts, Holmgren's worsteds, Stilling's pseudo-isochromatische
Tafeln, contrast shadows and tissue contrast, color equations
with rotating discs. Dor's charts for the recognition of colors
at a distance of five meters, and von Hippel's photometer with
colored glasses. In all these experiments, the subject's left
eye seemed perfectly normal, while with his right eye he
made constant confusions of red and green with yellow, although
occasionally using the words "red" and "green" correctly.
In the experiments with the spectroscope, von Hippel reported
that when the whole spectrum was shown at once the subject
claimed to see red, yellow or greenish, and blue; but, when
only a narrow band was shown, the whole warm-end of the
spectrum was called yellow.

Von Hippel diagnosed his case as one of red-green blindness,
and there seems little ground for questioning his decision.
As he found no shortening of the spectrum, the subject was
probably a deuteranope.

Holmgren (30) studied the same case, and diagnosed it as
"a typical case of red-blindness," with shortened spectrum,
and the two fundamental colors which such a case should have,
according to the form of the Helmholtz theory presented in the
first edition of the Optik (18), — a greenish yellow, and a blue
tinged with violet.

Von Hippel (29) then made further experiments with the
spectroscope, and substantiated his claim that the subject's
spectrum was not shortened. He also carefully compared the
subject's judgments of color made with his normal and his
color-blind eye, and showed that he used ' 'blue" and "yellow"
for the same kinds of sensations in the two eyes. He added
a series of experiments with negative after-images, in which
the subject reported normal after-images for the left eye,
but for the right gave blue as the color of all after-images
from red, orange, yellow and green; yellow as the color of
after-images from blue and violet.

On the whole, there seems good evidence that this subject
saw only two colors (probably yellow and blue) ; and, as this
was the first monocular case pointing clearly towards dichro-
macy, one can easily understand its importance.

Holmgren claims to have seen another case of monocular
color-blindness in 1879, which, however, "unhappily became
useless through an accident" (31).

J. Stejffan'scaseof monocular color-blindness (i^, ^0,^3) (1881)
We get no clear light on our problem from this case. The
patient was a man sixty-two years old, who showed defective
color-vision in one eye after an attack of apoplexy. It is
interesting to note that although, the patient showed lowered

4 — JOURNAI,

374 HAYES

sensitivity for all colors, the only color he completely lost was
green; but considering our present uncertainty as to the rela-
tion of atypical acquired color-blindness to typical congenital
color-blindness, we have no right to reason from the one kind
to the other (38, 56, 71).

4. Kolbe's case of "monocular red-green weakness'' {1882)
Kolbe (37b) used many of the same tests as von Hippel; and

while this case does not show the grave color deficiency of von
Hippel' s case, repeated evidences of sub-normal color vision
were found. No neutral band in the spectrum was established.
But at 518 /x/x the subject said at one time that the color was
weaker than in the neighboring region; and at another time
he reported that from 508 to 520 was an uncertain color. In
the use of the Holmgren wools, the Stilling cards of 1879 and
Dor's charts, the subject showed himself below normal, but
considerably more color-capable than von Hippel's subject.
In a series of tests of color sensitivity, Kolbe's subject showed
decidedly high thresholds for both red and green. In the
experiments with contrast shadows and negative after-images,
this subject gave normal results for blue and yellow; but his
reactions with red and green were practically those of a color-
blind person.

From Kolbe's report, it would seem that this case might
well be diagnosed as a mild case of color-blindness, although
one hesitates to form such a conclusion without the use of
color-equations, and a repetition of the spectral experiments.

Kolbe refers to a monocular case of "red-green" blindness
described by Hermann (26a) in a pamphlet not accessible to
the present writer. This subject's spectrum was shortened at
the violet end, — the brightest region from 588 /a/a to 583 /a/a,
which appeared as a dull band, separating red, on the left,
from green, on the right. These details seem to point rather
to violet-\Ain6.n^ss.

5. SchufelVs case of monocular color-blindness (^7) {188 j)

Following are the observations made upon "a healthy
young man twenty-one years old" when tested with the
Holmgren wools: —

"With both eyes open, he succeeded, without trouble oi
hesitation, in picking out a series of purples and greens t<
match the test shade; but he exhibited a good deal of uncer-
tainty when called upon to do the same for the reds, the test
color being a bright red-lead shade. The worsteds beinj
again mixed up, he successfully chose the purple and greei
shades with either eye, one or the other being closed, and th<

COLOR SENSATIONS OF THE PARTIAI.I.Y COI.OR-BI.IND 375

reds with the right eye, the left one being closed. The worsteds
were mixed once more, and he was asked to close his right eye,
and to pick out the red shades. This he essayed to do by
first selecting a pale shade of brown, placing it on one side,
and with considerable hesitation of manner, he proceeded in
the same way until he had laid aside a full series of brown
shades from dark to light ochre. It was amusing to see his
confusion when I suddenly released his right eye, 'as the lids
were kept together with my finger, and quickly closing his
left, allowed him to see what he had done,"

This case adds very little to our knowledge. One would
hesitate to base any conclusions upon a preliminary test with
the Holmgren worsteds. The case is included in this paper
simply for completeness in reviewing the evidence.

6. A case of color-blindness limited to the nasal half of the left
retina, described by Hess in 18 go (27)

A young man, thirty-one years old, found he had difiiculty in
distinguishing colors and thought his difi&culty a matter of
recent origin. Upon examination, it was found that on the
nasal half of his left retina he was quite insensitive to red,
and had a decidedly lowered sensitivity for the other colors,
while on the other half of this retina, and on the whole of the
other retina his color- vision was normal. Colors were pre-
sented simultaneously to the right and to the left of a given
fixation-point; and he was asked to tell what colors he saw.
His replies were as follows:

Normal (temporal) half of left eye Color blind (nasal) half of left eye

Red appeared red "dirty dark yellow"

Orange " orange "dirty sulphur color"

Yellow " yellow "yellow"

Yellow-green, normal * ' weak yellowish grey ' '

Urgriin appeared " "greenish grey"

Blue " " "blue with violet tone"

Violet " " " less saturated violet than

that on temporal side' '

Purple " " " greyish violet "

Experiments with spectral lights gave similar results. It
seems plain that this subject thought he saw green with his
affected tract. In one place he especially said that "green
looked neither yellow nor blue; " and since his other eye seems
to have been completely normal, there is no apparent reason
why he should use the wrong name for what he called "green."
In spite of the fact that the patient thought he saw green,
Hess diagnosed the case as red-green blindness, explaining its

376 HAYES

presence by the assumption that the red-green substance,
posited by the Hering theory, was quite out of function. But
one feels loath to accept this conclusion. The fact that the
defect was limited to one half of one eye, and that the patient
thought his difi&culty a recent thing, would suggest that the
case was possibly of central origin and acquired. Hence,
whatever the results obtained by Hess, we ought not too
readily to accept them as representative of typical partial
color-blindness. And Guttmann (15, p. 280) has recently
suggested that, under similar tests, a red-anomalous trichro-
mate would have responded in much the same way, for, when
small areas outside the fovea are simultaneously stimulated,
the anomalous trichromate responds in much the same way
as a patient who is typically color-blind.

7. Hering's case of monocular partial color-blindness (25)

{1890)

In the same volume with the case just described, we find
an account of a series of experiments by Hering upon a patient
with partial color-blindness in one eye. The method of experi-
menting was practically the same : with a simple stereoscopic
device he presented patches of color to the two eyes simul-
taneously, and asked the subject to compare them, and report
what colors he saw with each eye. By means of mirrors,
Hering was able to change the brightness and saturation of
either color presented. Occasionally he tried, by increasing
or decreasing the illumination, to present to the normal eye
a color or a grey that should match the sensation experienced by
the affected eye; but he gives no numerical values, and hence
it is impossible to know exactly what his results mean, or to
compare them with the results obtained from other subjects.
To the affected eye, bluish red was reported to look "grey with
a reddish shimmer ; ' ' spectral red, ' ' dark yellowish grey ; ' ' orange,
yellow and yellowish green, "whitish yellow;" Urgran, "light
grey;" ultramarine blue, "whitish blue;" and violet, "dark
blue."

Upon the basis of these results, Hering diagnosed his case
as one of red-green blindness, with weakened sensitivity for
blue and yellow.

In a spectrum of moderate brightness, this patient reported
three colors; yellow, green and blue. When the brightness
was increased, only a " greenish shimmer " was mentioned,
though the normal eye saw a beautiful saturated green. The
spectrum was shortened at the red end, — the spectrum be-
ginning at wave-length 630 /w,/x for the affected eye, while the
normal eye saw color at 670 /m/x. From 630 /a/a inward, the

COI^OR SENSATIONS OP THK PARTIAL,I.Y COI.OR-BI.IND 377

patient saw only yellow with the affected eye, where red-
orange and orange were visible to the normal eye.

Looking through a telescope at the spectrum, the patient
described light of 630 /m/a as yellow-red, but still more yellow-
ish than it appeared to the normal eye; light of 600 /x/x she
described as orange; light of 570 fi/w, as cream colored. The
lights from 500-420 /ix/x she described, sometimes as grey, at
other times as greenish grey.

On the whole, Hering seems scarcely justified in calling
this a case of red-green blindness, for in one test or another
the subject correctly named both red and green. Guttmann
(15, p. 279) suggests that this case also closely resembles red-
anomalous trichromacy, and there is enough similarity to
prevent our complete acceptance of the case as evidence for the
claim that dichromates see only blue and yellow. Wundt (79,
p. 229, note) says of these cases reported by Hess and Hering,
"In these two cases we find complete red-blindness, while
the sensitivity for green as well as for the other colors is
merely lowered."

Of all the above cases, that of von Hippel alone furnishes
evidence for the claim that partially color-blinds are dichro-
mates. In Woinow's case, the results are complicated by the
patient's emotional reaction to red, which she was supposed
not to see; in Steffan's case there was probably some disturb-
ance in the cortex, and in Hess's case there would seem to
have been an acquired disorder of some kind; Hering' s sub-
ject seemed to recognize all the colors when they were intense
enough, and should perhaps be classed as a red-anomalous
trichromate; the preliminary test performed upon Schufelt's
case is suggestive but not conclusive. Von Hippel's subject
was probably a dichromate, and von Hippel's work furnishes
sufficient evidence that there can be clear-cut blue-yellow
vision. But when one considers the great variation among
color blind subjects which has constantly been noted by experi-
menters, one scarcely feels justified in jumping to the con-
clusion that all partially color-blind subjects see only blue
and yellow. On the whole there seems good ground for the
following confession of von Kries (40, p. 166): — "In general,
one may well admit that the factual basis for the oft-made
assertion that dichromates are blind to red and green but see
yellow and blue, is very insufficient. In reality this claim
is the result of theorizing, and its value is to be estimated
according to its harmony with theory."

C. A NSW CASK OF MONOCULAR PROtANOPIA

During some work with colors in the year 1907-08, Miss G.
S., a Senior in Mt. Holyoke College, made some remarks which

378 HAYES

indicated that her color vision was not normal. Preliminary
tests showed that she was quite unable to recognize reds with
her right eye, while no lack of ability with this or any other
color was shown when the left eye was tested.

She had studied psychology for two semesters before the
following experiments were begun, — one semester of intro-
ductory text-book work and one semester of elementary
laboratory work. She seemed to be an intelligent, carefiil
observer of the "objective type." The experiments described
below were performed in June,. 1908, October, 1908, and Novem-
ber, 1909. The subject was in good health at each of these
periods. In November, 1909, she was examined by a pro-
fessional oculist, who reported that the ophthalmoscope
showed nothing abnormal in either eye, but that she was slightly
myopic in her left eye, and had some weakness of vision in
the right eye which no lens seemed to correct. The subject
reports that her maternal grandfather was color-blind, but
she knows nothing about the details of his defect, and has
never heard of any other case of defective color vision in her
family.

I. Color confusions
a. Test with the Nagel cards (fifth edition)

With the left eye, the subject made no mistakes. With
the right eye, she could see no red on any cards, and selected
as grey A 9 (correct), and numbers A 3, 7 and 15 which have
upon them red or red and grey dots. As green she selected
the one green card A 5. In series B she thought the reds and
browns were black and grey, but correctly named the green
in B 3 and the yellow-green in B i.

In the Nagel test, then, the subject showed herself blind
to red, but made no mistakes in green. This is the more
remarkable, because many persons who, upon further exami-
nation, show only slight defects in color discrimination make
numerous confusions between green and grey.

b. Test with Bradley papers

Fifty pieces of Bradley paper, 3 cm. square, including all
the standard colors and many tints and shades, with similar
squares of the ten Bradley blacks, whites and greys, were
spread upon a table in a good light. The subject stood
before the table with her left eye covered. The test was
conducted in the same manner as the Holmgren worsted test,
the subject being given a sample and requested to select ten
or a dozen pieces of paper of the same color. She selected
green and yellow pieces to match the green sample (green
yellow shade 2) ; four reddish pieces, one light orange, and six

COLOR SENSATIONS OI? THB PARTIALITY COLOR-BUND 379

greys to match the rose sample (red tint 2) ; and nine light
and dark reds, four orange pieces and seven greys to match
the red sample (red tint i).

c. Tests with Holmgren worsteds^

Green A, presented to the right eye, was matched by worsteds
2, 4, 6, 8 and 12, all of which are green or yellowish green. 14,
16 and 18 looked like the sample to her, but darker. 10 and
20 seemed about the same in brightness as the sample, but
bluer.

Rose B, presented to the right eye, was matched by 28,
32, 34, 36, 38 and 40, all of which have red in them, by the
confusion colors 13, 15, 19, 33, 35, 37 and 39, all of which are
browns and far removed from the rose sample, and by the
confusion colors i and 3 which are faint greys with very little
color of any kind in them. The grey 5, the light blue 21, and
the bluish reds 22, 24, 26 and 30 were selected as like one sam-
ple, but "tending more or less toward blue." In these tests
we have a strong indication of red blindness.

Red C, presented to the right eye, was matched by 32, 34,
36 and 38, all of which are reds. 40 looked like the sample but
darker. In this test she made no color confusions.

In all of these tests, the subject refrained from holding the
sample close to each bunch as she examined it, but, glancing
at the sample and then at the other, decided by memory. In
most cases she decided quickly and easily.

d. Tests with dots of Hering papers on grey cards'^

In view of the fact that color-blindness has been reported
(51, 52, 57, 68) to be sometimes more extreme at the fovea
than elsewhere on the retina, a special series of experiments
was performed to decide the point in this case. Thirty-two
grey cards 8 cm. square were secured, and at the centre of each
was pasted a round dot of Hering paper 4 mm. in diameter, —
small enough so that when viewed directly at a distance of half
a meter, only the fovea would be stimulated. The cards were
spread out upon a table in a good light, and the subject, with
one eye closed, was asked to pick out all the cards having a
dot of the same color as one given as a sample. Hering
papers 1-12 were each represented by two cards (except red
no. 2 with which four cards were used), and upon 4 other
cards dots of Hering grey no. 8 were pasted.

'Forty skeins with metal tag attached. Supplied by Chicago Labora-
tory Supply & Scales Co.

^Rothe papers made under Hering's direction.

380 HAYES

With the right (color-bhnd) eye, Miss G. S. selected red and
grey to match the red sample; purple, violet and blue to
match the blue sample; green and yellow-green to match the
green sample; and orange and yellow to match the yellow
sample. There was no evidence that she was more color-
blind at the fovea. With the left eye all the colors were
correctly and exactly chosen and named.

e. Additional confusion tests

The subject stood before a window and looked skyward
through colored films and glasses. The right eye was tested
first. Blue, yellow and green were easily recognized; red
looked dark grey, and all mixed colors which contained red
lost their red element; blue-green looked greyish. With the
left eye all the colors were correctly named. When a film or
glass was moved over from the left to the right eye, the subject
said it always looked darker.

A rough test was made to determine whether the subject
used color associations in recognizing greens, etc. Seven
black and white reprints of famous pictures were colored
contrary to nature with crayons and water colors, — a face
was painted a strong green, a cow purple, a tree red, four
kittens were colored red, yellow, green and grey, a sky green,
etc. With her right (color-blind) eye, the subject detected
the trick in most cases, naming all the strong greens, yellows
and blues correctly. None of the reds appeared to her to
have color; and in those places where the green was weakened
by the black of the print underneath the thin paint she failed
to detect the green.

From these confusion tests one must conclude that this
protanope is unable, under ordinary conditions, to see red
as a color, but that under the same conditions she is repeatedly
able to recognize and correctly name various kinds of green, —
even such greens as those upon the Nagel cards. Now since
this subject seems to have perfectly normal color sensitiveness
with her left eye, we must assume that she knows what the
sensation of green is like, and when she correctly insists that
a certain color seen with her color-blind eye is green, we have
very strong evidence for the conviction that green (as a specific
color quality different from yellow and grey) is included in the
color system of her protanopic (right) eye. At the same time,
her occasional difficulty with greens gave evidence of a lowered
sensitiveness for that color, and seems entirely consistent with
the later discovery that there is a certain region in the neigh-
borhood of the blue-greens which this subject confused with
a light red.

COLOR SEJNSATIONS OF THE PARTIALLY COLOR-BLIND 38 1

2. Experiments in color discrimination
a. Determination of the color threshold with rotating discs^

Upon white discs with a radius of 95 mm. were pasted
circular rings of the four standard Hering colors 5 mm. in
width, at a distance of 60 mm. from the centre of the discs,
one color being pasted upon each disc. Upon a fifth disc a
strip of Bradley's neutral grey no. 2 was pasted, and this
disc and a pure white one were interwoven with the discs
bearing colors, and all mounted on the color-wheel together.

The subject was seated about one meter from the color-
wheel, with her back to the source of light, and her left eye
covered. The experimenter stood in front of the color- wheel
when it was not in motion, to conceal it from the subject, in
order that she might not know in advance what color was to be
given. The experimeter would then draw out one of the
colors or the grey, so that a small number of degrees were
exposed, set the mixer rotating and ask the subject to name the
colored ring. By varying the colors and the amount given,
and by occasionally introducing grey to make sure that the
subject was not merely guessing at the colors, a minimum
amount was at length determined upon as the least amount
of each color which the subject could correctly name. Fre-
quent rests were given. After completing the series with the
right eye, the experiments were repeated with the other eye.

Table I

Showing the Color Thresholds, as determined by means of rings of Hering paper
upon white discs. {The determinations are expressed in degrees.)

RED GREEN YELLOW BLUE

Miss G. S. Protanope Right Eye

Miss M. S. Deuteranope Right Bye

Left Eye
Miss H. B. Deuteranope Right Eye

Left Eye
Miss G. B. Deuteranope Right Eye

Left Bye
Miss B. C. Deuteranope Right Eye

Left Eye
Miss I. B. Deuteranope Left Bye
Average of 40 eyes, — 20 women who

made no mistakes with the Nagel test 21 22 25 21

^It is a matter of considerable regret that it was impossible to use spectral
lights for many of the experiments now to be reported upon. The recent
work of Nagel, von Kries and their pupils shows the great advantage of such
lights. But unfortunately the great cost of the apparatus necessary
renders it unattainable in a small College laboratory. Rivers found the
Lovibond Tintometer (44) very useftd for quantitative determinations of the
color sensitiveness of the natives of Torres Straits ; but this apparatus, with
a sufficiently large assortment of colored glasses, proved too expensive for

105

140

270

320

200

210

285

320

250

210

230

225

250

205

210

285

180

315

350

270

180

325

330

260

180

148

180

382 HAYBS

In the foregoing table the results obtained with Miss G. S.'s
right eye are compared with the results of similar tests upon
five deuteranopes, the last two of whom are mild cases; and
with the results of tests upon normal eyes. An "x" in the
table indicates that no color was recognized even when the
whole ring (360°) was exposed to view.

Slight differences in the color sensitivity of the two eyes
have been noted by many observers. Hence the eyes of all
the subjects mentioned in this paper were tested separately,
with the exception of the test with the Hegg sheet and the
experiments in contrast. When there was not time to test
both eyes, only the right was experimented upon, except in
the case of Miss I. B. whose left eye was found to be weaker in
color sensitivity than the right, and therefore more nearly
comparable with the other subjects.

The foregoing experiment is subject to criticism upon the
ground that the colors used were not the best ones for testing
the color sensitivity of the color-blind. In making an equa-
tion of red and green with color-blind observers, it is often
necessary to add blue to the red, or to the green, or to both these
colors, in order to make them both appear grey. A second
series of experiments was therefore performed using Hegg's
pigments^ instead of the Hering papers. Four discs 10 cm.
in diameter were cut from Hering' s grey paper number 14,
and upon these discs rings 5 mm. in width were painted with
Hegg's pigments, the rings being 60 mm. from the centre of
the discs, as in the earlier tests. No. 14 grey was selected
because that appeared to the writer and to two other normal
observers to be the nearest in brightness to the grey upon the
sheet of colors which is provided with the Hegg set.^ Before
the experiments upon the color threshold were begun, this
sheet of colors was presented to Miss G. S., with the request
that she name any colors she saw. Using her right eye, she at
once named the blue and the green, but she recognized neither
the red nor the yellow. The yellow she called grey, and said
it was lighter than the grey band in the middle of the sheet;
the red also seemed grey to her, but of the same brightness as
the central grey. With her left eye she named the four "in-
variable" colors correctly, although she was at first a little
uncertain about the yellow, and said it was a very poor yellow
at best.

Table II presents the results of the tests with Hegg's pig-
ments. The results with Miss G. S. are compared with those of

^Baird (4, p. 29) gives an account of the way in which these colors were
decided upon.

^Unfortunately no apparatus for the exact evaluation of brightness was
available in the laboratory.

COIvOR SENSATIONS OF THE PARTIALLY COLOR-BLIND 383

five deuteranopes. Miss G. B. was not tested with the Hegg
pigments, so the results of the Hegg test with another deuter-
anope, Mr. A. H. P., are substituted. The superiority of the
Hegg red and green for a threshold test with color-blind subjects
is clearly demonstrated. Evidently these colors approximate
the neutral bands of the partially color-blind. The high
thresholds for blue and yellow may possibly indicate a slightly
decreased sensitivity for these colors; but in view of the
difficulty which normal observers have in distinguishing them,
when mixed with a considerable amount of bluish grey, it is
perhaps unwise to come to such a conclusion as yet.

TABI.E II

Showing the Color Thresholds, as determined hy

means of the Hegg pigments

upon a grey background. {Results are expressed in degrees.)

RED

GREEN

YElvtOW

BLUE

Miss G. S. Protanope

Right Eye

100

Miss M. S. Deuteranope

Right Eye

240

1 10

Left Eye

250

270

Miss H. B. Deuteranope

Right Eye

240

Left Eye

240

Mr. A. H. P.Deuteranope

Right Eye

200

210

Miss E. C. Deuteranope

Right Eye

270

315

Left Eye

340

Miss I. B. Deuteranope

Right Eye

125

Left Eye

Average of 40 eyes, — 24 women who

made no mistakes with the Nagel test

57-1

74.6

98.8

71.6

For the general thesis of this paper, the most important
point in this table is this, that almost all of these color-blind
subjects recognized either red or green repeatedly, when a
considerable amount was given, and Miss G. S. was sure of
green at 75°, — about the average for normal observers.

The value of the Hegg pigments as confusion colors was

Nrther tested by showing the sheet of colors painted with the
^gg pigments to a considerable number of color-blind sub-
cts with the request that they name the colors. This sheet
easures 16 x 10 cm. Across the middle there is a band of
jutral grey 2.5 x 10 cm; on each side of this band are two
itches of color 5 x about 6.75 cm. in area, the red and the
green being on one side, the blue and the yellow on the other.
The following table, number III, shows how these colors were
named. Of course, this test is of secondary importance, since
a shrewd subject might readily assume that the four fundamen-
tal colors were displayed and then guess correctly which was
red and which was green. In general, however, the subjects
did not seem to think of this ; and as the table shows, the grey
band was several times reported to be colored.

384 HAYES

Table III

Showing the

names that were employed in describing the Hegg pigments

RED

GREEN

GREY

YEl^IvOW BLUB

Miss G. vS

Protanope Grey

Green

Grey

Grey Blue

Miss M. S.

Deuteranope Pink

Grey

Brown Blue

Miss E. C.

Deuteranope Pink

Grey

Grey Blue

Miss I. B.

Deuteranope Red

Green

Grey

Yellow Blue

Mr. A. H. P.

Deuteranope Grey

Grey

Grayish- Yellow Blue

Miss H. B.

Deuteranope Grey

Grey

Brown Blue

Mr. D. B. Y.

Deuteranope Grey

Reddish

L Grey

Grey Blue

Mr. M. H. H.

Deuteranope Grey

Green

Brown Blue

Mr.J.F.McD. Deuteranope Red(?)

Green

Pink

Yellow Blue

Mr. A. B. C.

Deuteranope Pink

Green

? Blue

Mr. C. R. B.

Deuteranope Red

Brown

Grey

Red or Brown Blue

h. Determination of the distance threshold for colors

Upon a sheet of Hering paper (no. 14 grey), four rows of
squares were painted with the Hegg pigments, — three hori-
zontal rows on the right half of the sheet, and one row at the
middle of the left half. The sizes and colors of these patches
were as follows:

15 mm. blue, green, red, yellow.
2.5 mm. green, red, yellow, blue. 5 mm. red, yellow, blue, green.

ID mm. green, blue, yellow, red.

The subject was stationed 14 meters from the card, with
her left eye covered. She was asked to tell whether she saw
any patches of color upon the grey sheet. As she could see
none at that distance, she was asked to advance slowly until
she could see some colored patch. At 3.5 meters she correctly
named the largest blue square; at 2, the largest green square;
and at 1.5, the largest yellow square. The smallest squares
were recognized at o. i m. She wholly failed to recognize the
red patches as colored.

Table IV.

Showing the distances at which small squares of colored paper were
correctly identified {monocular vision)

DISTANCES RIGHT EYE LEFT EYE

(expressed
in meters)
14 15 mm. Red

13
12
II 15 mm. Green called Green

or Blue
10
9

8.5

8 15 mm. Blue; 15 mm. Yellow

called White

COLOR SKNSATIONS OF THE PARTIALLY COLOR-BLIND 385

6.5

5.5
5

4.5

3-5

2.5

1-5
.5
.1

15 mm. Blue

15 mm. Green; 10 mm. Blue
15 mm. Yellow; 5 mm. Blue;
10 mm. Yellow; 10 mm. Green;
5 mm. Yellow; 5 mm. Green

2.5 mm Blue; 2.5 Green;
2.5 mm. Yellow

15 mm. Yellow; 10 mm. Red

15 mm. Green; 10 mm. Blue;
10 mm. Yellow called White
10 mm. Green

ID mm. Yellow

5 mm. Blue; 5 mm. Red
5 mm. Green

5 mm. Yellow; 2.5 mm. Red
2.5 mm. Blue; 2.5 nmi. Green
2.5 mm. Yellow

A comparison of these results with the results of similar
experiments upon twenty normal women and the six deuteran-
opes mentioned in Tables I and II shows that Miss G. S. occupies
a middle position between the two groups in her recognition
of green. Normal women recognize the largest green squares
at 9 meters, and the smallest at 1.5 m; Miss G. S. recognized
the largest green squares at 2 m. and the smallest at o.i m.
Three of the deuteranopes did not recognize the green squares
of any size at any distance; and the three who did recognize
them succeeded at about the same distance as Miss G. S.
When one remembers that this subject's visual acuity, in her
color-blind eye, is somewhat below normal, it is quite surprising
that she recognizes green so well. Possibly her inability to see
yellow or blue at a distance is to be explained in the same way,
although the deuteranopes also have considerable difficulty
with these colors, especially in their recognition of the small
squares. Miss G. S. did not appear to detect the red patches
at all. In the tests with her left eye. Miss G. S, compares
favorably with the normal women.

The experiments in color confusion showed very plainly
that with her right eye Miss G. S. is color-blind to all kinds of
reds tried, but that she fails to recognize green only when it is
weak or mixed with blue. The experiments upon the color
threshold and the distance threshold gave similar results. To
the Hering and the Hegg reds the subject is quite blind; to
both the Hering and the Hegg green, however, she seems to be
sensitive, failing to recognize them only when they are quite
reduced in saturation, or at a considerable distance from her
eye. Her color threshold for green is conspicuously lower
than that of the other color-blind subjects. It would seem
then that if the subject is blind to any kind of green, presented
in saturated form, it must be of a somewhat different tone

386 HAYES

from the Hering, Hegg, Holmgren, Nagel and Bradley greens.
In the color equations to be described later, the particular
green to which this subject is insensitive was determined.
But it is already pretty obvious that this subject's color
sensations are not limited to blue and yellow. If her two eyes
were defective, one might perhaps explain her recognition of
green from an employment of secondary criteria of some kind,
such as we have to assume (lo, 71) in subjects who repeatedly
recognize greens and reds in experiments with colored papers,
but are able to see only yellow and blue in the spectrum. But
since Miss G. S. sees the colors normally with her left eye, she
has a clear consciousness of green as a quality distinct from
yellow or grey; and when she uses the word "green " to describe
the sensations aroused by stimulation of her right (color-
blind) eye, we must assume that she sees green as green.

c. Campimetry experiments

Preliminary experiments were performed with Hering
papers. The standard red, yellow, green, and blue were placed
upon a color mixer one at a time, and rotated behind a grey
screen, through which a hole 15 mm. in diameter had been cut.
Upon the screen were pasted strips of millimeter paper, lead-
ing away from the hole in four directions. The subject fixed
her gaze upon a pencil point which was moved outward or
inward. The results showed coincidence of the green with
the yellow and blue zones, and relatively constricted color
areas in the right eye.

Further tests were made with the Hegg pigments by means
of a small perimeter. In these tests the stimuli were always
introduced first at the extreme periphery, and every precau-
tion was taken to prevent the subject from anticipating which
color was to be presented. The left eye showed the normal
color zones, and is quite comparable with the eyes of five nor-
mal women tested in the same way. The right eye again
showed coincidence of the green with the yellow and blue
zones, and constricted color areas. It is, of course, possible
that in the outer color zone this subject confused green with
yellow, though one would rather expect that this green would
there appear grey, as it does to normal eyes. The matter is
further complicated by the fact that the subject repeatedly
recognized it as green. Blue also was twice called "green."
The red disc was called "white" and seen far out beyond the
color zones. Yellow and green were called "white" on the
extreme periphery, but blue was twice seen first as "black."

COLOR SISNSATIONS OP THK PARTIAI,I,Y COI,OR-BI,IND 387

d. Contrast and Negative After-images

Ever since Stilling's suggestion, in the seventies, that con-
trast shadows might be successfully used for the diagnosis
of color-blindness, many experimenters have tested the ability
of the color-blind to obtain contrast colors (6, 15, 75) and
colored after-images.^ The writer has used various methods
with Miss G. S. and the other subjects, — contrast rings upon
rotating discs, tissue contrast (grey strip on a color, all covered
over with tissue paper), the Hering contrast box after Ragona
Scina's method, and negative after-images from colored patch-
es of Hering paper 9 cm. square, upon grey cards 40 x 50 cm.,
the after-images being projected upon grey cards with a
black fixation dot in the centre. The following Table shows
the results, i. e., the colors induced in the various experiments.

Table V

Showing the color-names which were employed in describing the induction
effects in the contrast and after-image experiments

NEGATIVE

RINGS TISSUE

HERING BOX

AFTER-IMAGES

Miss G. S. Prot.

Blue Blue

Blue

Yellow Yellow

Yellow

Mr. J. W. P. Prot.

Blue and Yellow

Miss E. C. Deut.

None None

Blue and Yellow

Miss I. B. Deut.

Blue
Yellow

Miss H. B. Deut.

Blue
Yellow

Blue and Yellow

Mr.D.B.Y.Deut.

Blue and Yellow

Blue
Yellow

In general, these subjects seemed to be less sensitive to
contrast than normal observers. Occasionally a subject
would report a slight tinge of pink or green as an induced color,
but from the other experiments upon the same subjects it
seemed more likely that the words were used by chance, as
color names are so often used by such persons. Generally
blue was reported as the contrast color both for red and for
green, though often only a brightness contrast was noted.

e. Rapidity of color discrimination

Miss G. S., the monocular protanope, and four of the women
deuteranopes were tested for rapidity in sorting into 6 piles,
60 pieces of Milton Bradley paper 30 mm. square, mounted on
pieces of white cardboard 88 mm, square.^ All five subjects
sorted tints and shades of blue and yellow more rapidly than

^Von Hippel (29) and Guttmann (16) report blue and yellow after-
images from all colors.

^This test is modeled after that described by Henmon (20).

388 HAYES

tints and shades of red, orange-red and green. Miss G. S.
made the typical confusions with reds, putting them all in
one pile which she called "black;" but she correctly sorted and
named the greens, confusing only the darker shade of green
with the standard green. The other subjects, also, showed
considerable ability in recognizing and correctly sorting reds
and greens. Of course, it is possible that in all such cases the
color-blind is assisted by secondary criteria, and to make this
test of real value colors should be used which are nearer to the
reds and greens which the color-blind calls grey, such as the
Hegg pigments. But even then one should have a slightly
different set for protanopes and deuteranopes in order that the
reds and greens may appear to be greys of equal brightness.

/. Experiments with Spectral Lights
(i). With the Schmidt and Haensch direct-vision spectroscope

The subject was first asked to look through the spectro-
scope toward a cloudy sky, and read off in wave-lengths the
limits of all the colors she could see with her right eye. But
she was unable to do this, because the lenses provided with the
spectroscope were not suited to correct her visual defect.^

A collection of pieces of Hering paper 4 cm. square (in-
cluding 2 pieces of each of the 1 2 colored papers, and grays
I, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, and 50) was then spread out
upon a table; and, using only the right eye, the subject was
asked to select papers like those seen in the spectroscope and
arrange them in the same order.^ After looking into the
spectroscope several times, the following papers were chosen
and arranged in the order given: — 50 grey, 20 grey, 5 grey,
yellow 5, green-yellow 6, green-blue 8, blue 10 and violet 11.
From these results it seems highly probable that the red-end
of the spectrum is colorless and shortened, and that she may
have seen some green. Of course, there is the alternative
that she remembered that green comes between yellow and blue
in the spectrum ; but then we must admit that she sees green
in the colored papers.

When the papers were mixed up again, and the experiment
was repeated with the left eye only, she put two squares of
red 2, and one of yellow 5, in place of the greys at the red-end
of the series.

The Schmidt and Haensch spectroscope was found to be a
very convenient instrument for roughly determining whether
or not a subject's spectrum was shortened at the red-end.

* See test by optician mentioned above p. 378.

'In 1878 Magnus (45) recommended the matching of spectral colors with
Holmgren wools to avoid the use of color names.

COLOR SENSATIONS OF THE PARTIAI.I,Y COI.OR-BUND 389

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Journal — 5

390 HAYlBS

And while the subject was using the instrument, the experi-
menter asked what colors were visible. None of the subjects
claimed to see more than three colors, although several of them
recognized the instrument and knew what colors they ought
to see. No great importance is attached to the use of color
names in the following table, although several of the subjects
who claimed to see colors other than blue and yellow showed
a similar ability to distinguish these colors in other experiments.
Other experimenters (28) have noted the tendency of color-
blind subjects to see three colors when the whole spectrum is
shown at once ; and it was a matter for regret that our instru-
ment had not an attachment for exposing one color at a time.^
Table VI gives the results of these experiments.

(2) . Viewing a petroleum flame through a spectroscope

It was attempted to determine the length of Miss G. S.'s
spectrum by having the subject set the instrument in such a
position that all color appeared at the right of the vertical
line across the centre of the field of the spectroscope. The
setting of the instrument was read off in degrees. The instru-
ment was then adjusted until all color was at the left of the
vertical line. The following table shows the results obtained.

Table VII

Showing the Limits of Visibility in the Spectrum. {Results expressed in
terms of our scale readings.)

RED END VIOLET END

Miss G. S. Right Eye, Protanopic 285° 282° 9'

Left Eye, Normal 285° 40' 281° 28'

Miss M. S. Right Eye, Deuteranopic 285° 33' 281° 21'

MissL. D. Right Eye Normal 285° 40' 281° 40'

Mr. S. P. H. Right Eye Normal 285^26' 281° 25'

The typical shortening at the red end is plainly seen in
the case of Miss G. S.'s protanopic right eye; there would seem
to be a shortening at the violet end also.

( j) . Experiment with bisulphide of carbon prisms

A wide beam of light was sent from an electric lantern
through two slits and then through two bisulphide of carbon
prisms^ placed side by side in a darkened room. The two
spectra produced, were interrupted at two meters by a screen
in which two slits had been cut, so that on the next screen
beyond, two patches of colored light could be seen, each 6 cm.
high and i cm. wide. The prisms rested upon discs of card-

^Cohn (7, pp. 84 f.) describes such an instrument.

2Made by Wm. Gaertner & Co., Chicago, 111., Cat. No. L, 4025.

COLOR SENSATIONS O^ THE PARTIALLY COLOR-BLIND 39 1

board, which were held in place by thumb tacks pushed through
the centre of each. These discs could be rotated easily to
right or left ; and by this means the colors seen on the farthest
screen could be changed from red to violet. The movements
necessary to cause these changes in color were so slight
that the vividness of the colors was not materially affected;
and in the case of red, green, blue and violet, the colored
patch was approximately monochromatic. Yellow always
had a fringe of orange an one side, or of green on the other.

The subject was seated in front of the last screen, about
one meter from it, where she could not see any colors except
those shown in the two patches.

As a preliminary experiment, the subject was asked to close
her left eye, and name the colors shown her. Only one prism
was used in this experiment. This prism was turned so that
the extreme red appeared on the farther screen. The subject
reported no color, so the prism was very slowly rotated until
the subject said she saw "yellow." The colors then in the
patch were yellow and orange. The prism was then moved
slowly again ; and as soon as the yellow began to turn greenish,
the subject said she saw "green." She continued to report
green until that color was no longer visible to the experimenter,
and then she at once said she saw "blue," which she continued
to report well out into the violet. The subject was then asked
to rest her eyes, and the prism was turned back until the patch
was a strong pure red. The subject was now asked to tell
what she saw, and she replied that she saw a patch of "grey."

oc. Color comparison with two prisms

The subject turned away from the screen, and both prisms
were illuminated. The left prism was set so that it gave a
pure green patch, the right prism at the extreme red. The
subject was then asked to look at the screen with her right
eye only, and report what she saw. She replied that the left
patch was green and the right grey. She was then instructed
to watch the patches and tell when they looked just alike.
The right prism was then slowly turned, and not until both
patches were pure green did the subject judge them alike.
Evidently it was impossible to match spectral green with
spectral red or yellow of any kind.

The subject turned away from the screen again; the left
prism was now set at red, and the right at the extreme violet.
She reported that she saw grey at the left and faint blue at
the right. The right prism was slowly turned, with frequent
stops, but she was not satisfied with the match until this prism
also gave a pure red patch. In this test the attempt to match

392 HAYES

red with blue-green, green or yellow was unsuccessful. No
attempt was made to equate brightnesses; the subject insisted
throughout that there was a qualitative difference.

These experiments with spectral lights emphasize the same
fact that was indicated in the experiments with colored papers
and the Hegg pigments, — that the subject is blind to red, but
not blind to green.

p. Determination of the Color Threshold with Spectral Lights

Only one prism was illuminated, and an episkotister was
set up just beyond the screen with the slits in it. The prism
was turned to give pure green on the patch, the episkotister
set at 5° and rotated by means of an electric motor. The
subject was asked to look with her right (protanopic) eye at
the screen where the left colored patch had appeared in the
earlier experiments. She reported that she could see nothing.
She closed her eye and the episkotister was set at io°. The
subject now reported that she saw green, although there had
been no intimation on the part of the experimenter that green
would be the first color shown. The prism was moved back
and forth, but she could recognize no other color. The epis-
kotister was set at 8, 6 and 4 degrees in successive tests; but
below 10° the subject saw no color. At 6° she claimed she
saw a faint line of light when the prism was turned to green.

The episkotister was again set at 10°, and the prism moved
back and forth; green alone was recognized. At 15° no other
color was seen. The episkotister was opened 5° at a time,
in successive tests, and the prism turned through the series
of colors, with each new opening. At 30°, blue was recognized
and at 55°, yellow.

No definite attempt was made in these experiments to
attain dark adaptation in the right eye. There was consid-
erable light in that part of the room where the lantern was
stationed; and in most of the experiments the subject gazed
about freely during the intervals between tests. In this
particular series of tests, however, the subject was asked to
close her eye while the episkotister was being adjusted, so
that she might not see what changes were being made. The
conditions, then, were favorable for dark adaptation, and we
cannot say with certainty whether the extreme brightness of
the green was merely a manifestation of the Purkinje phenome-
non in dim light, or the displacement of the maximal bright-
ness which we would expect of a protanope even without dark
adaptation.

The experiment was repeated with the left eye only, and
all four colors, red, yellow, green and blue, were repeatedly
recognized and correctly named at 5° opening.

COLOR SENSATIONS OF THK PARTIALITY COLOR-BLIND 393

Of course these experiments with a home-made spectral
apparatus are open to the grave criticism that no provision
was made for determining objectively just what lights were
given to the subject, — instead of a statement of the exact wave
length of the patches of color exposed, the reader has only the
writer's assurance that red, green, etc., were given. But the
apparatus necessary to conduct this experiment objectively
was too expensive to be bought from the funds of a small
laboratory; and since the results of these rough tests are quite
in harmony with those obtained by the use of colored papers,
they certainly add considerable weight to the total mass of
evidence in favor of the view that this protanope is not blind
to green. It should also be said that repeated tests have
shown the experimenter's color sense to be perfectly normal,
so that there is no possibility that wrong colors were given by
mistake.

From the experiments thus far described, certain conclusions
regarding the color sensations of Miss G. S. seem amply
justified. There can be no doubt that her right eye is totally
insensitive to the quality red. She never used the word red
to describe any sensations obtained through her right eye,
in any of the experiments. It seems equally clear that her
right eye is not insensitive to the quality green. With scarcely
a single error, she repeatedly recognized green in the Nagel
cards, the Holmgren worsteds, the Milton Bradley and Hering
papers, in gelatine films, in prints painted with water colors,
in spectral lights, and in the Hegg pigments. And since
she is familiar with the quality green, through the use of her
normal left eye, we must grant that the sensation which she cor-
rectly names " green ", when her right (protanopic) eye is stimu-
lated, is probably the same sensation-quality which normal
persons describe by the use of the term "green." In other
words, her spectrum is not reduced to blue and yellow, although
in general she shows the ordinary characteristics of protanopia.
When the greens used are reduced in saturation or in bright-
ness, however, or when only a very small patch of color is
presented, Miss G. S. shows herself somewhat less sensitive
to green than normal persons. She shows a slightly sub-
normal sensitivity for blue and yellow also ; but these colors
are less affected than green.

It is considerably more difficult to decide whether the other
subjects see either red or green as normal persons do. There
is, of course, no doubt that color-blind subjects can distinguish
many reds and greens from each other and from yellows
and blues. Some of the subjects mentioned in this paper
showed a good deal of facility in distinguishing colors, so that
from day to day the writer hesitated whether or not to class

394 HAYES

them as color-blind. This decision was, however, somewhat
simplified by a change in mental state on the part of several
of the doubtful subjects. Misses H. E. and E. C, for instance,
long maintained that it was ridiculous to class them as color-
blinds, insisting that they could distinguish the reds and greens
one encounters in the daily use of colored objects, even though
they could not always correctly name the weak colors with
which they were tested in the laboratory ; but after a considera-
ble number of equations had been made, and the results
exhibited to them,^ these subjects took a more calm and object-
ive attitude in the matter, frankly giving themselves up to the
task of ascertaining just how much their color sense was affect-
ed, and even recounting instances in which their friends had
detected their errors in the naming of colors. In order to
eliminate the "secondary criteria" by which such subjects
are supposed to distinguish colors,^ as many as possible of these
subjects also were tested with spectral lights, using an arrange-
ment of apparatus similar to that used with Miss G. S. But a
lime light was substituted for electricity, the experiment was
performed in a dark room, and the carbon bisulphide prisms
were placed one above the other with a movable slit in front
of each to give the different colors. Three of the subjects,^
the protanope and two deuteranopes, reported only blue and
yellow; red, yellow and green all looked alike to them, but
no equation between red and blue-green could be made,
because the blue-green was reported to be whitish and lacking
in the yellowish tinge which they saw in the red. These
three subjects, however, are extreme cases of color-blindness.
Misses E. C. and I. B. insisted that they saw red as a color
distinct from yellow, and repeatedly recognized it. Miss I. B.,
whose color defect is the least marked of all the cases reported
in this paper, recognized green also with quite as much cer-
tainty as the extreme cases did blue and yellow. And since
these two subjects are the ones who have showed the greatest
keenness in distinguishing reds and greens in the other tests,
one must interpret this as another indication that only extreme
cases of partial color-blindness are limited to blue and yellow.

J. Color Equations
a. Equations with the Hering color sense apparatus^
This apparatus is so constructed that the subject, on looking

^Following Maxwell's suggestion (46, p. 287) thesubjects were occasionally
requested to look at their equations through a colored glass. The inequality
in the mixtures thus demonstrated helped greatly in inducing the objective
attitude.

^Differences in brightness, saturation, color associations, etc. 10 p. 210.

^Mr. J. W. P. (protanope), Mr. D. B. Y. (deuteranope), and Miss
H. B. (deuteranope).

*This instrument is described and figured by Hering (24).

COIvOR SENSATIONS OF THIS PARTIAI.I.Y COLOR-BUND 395

down a dark tube may see a disc one half of which is colored
by light filtered through one colored glass, the other half by a
mixture of lights transmitted through two glasses. The
intensity of the color presented is varied by the amount of
light reflected through the colored glasses from movable
reflectors, whose position is indicated upon a dial. It is thus
fairly easy to form color equations, such as red = green +
blue, etc. ; and to read off from the dial the amount of light
passing through each glass. When fully open the reflectors
register 120 units. The following table shows the result of the
experiments with this apparatus upon Miss G. S. and various
other subjects.

TABI.E VIII

•

Equations with the Hering Color Sense Apparatus.

(Results are expressed

degrees

, 120

being the

maximum

reading possible)

. GREEN :

= RED +

BIvUE

RED=GREEN + BLUE

Miss G. S.

Prot.

120

Mr. J. C. H.

Deut.

Miss M. S.

Deut.

120

Deut.

120

Miss H. E.

Deut.

120

Deut

120

Miss G. B.

Deut.

120

Deut.

120

Miss H. B.

Deut.

120

Mr. D. B. Y.

Deut.

120

Miss E. C.

Deut.

120

Deut.

120

Miss I. B.

Deut.

120

Miss L. W.

Deut.

120

Deut.

120

Mr. J. W. P.

Prot.

108

120

The wide variation in the results for different subjects can
probably be partly accounted for by differences in the amount
of sunlight on different days, or at different hours of the day.^
But the constant insistence of many subjects, besides the mo-
nocular protanope, that they saw red or green when more
than a certain amount of either color was used, gives added
evidence that many color-blind are not dichromates. Miss
G. S. was very sure she saw green when 50 was given alone,
or 70 mixed with blue.

The instrument would be greatly improved if four glasses
could be used at the same time, so that blue could be mixed

tboth with red and with green simultaneously. The subjects

^A series of experiments upon Miss H. E. (Deut.) extending over 5 days
in the spring of 1909 showed a variation of from 20 red on a bright day,
to 120 red on a dark day.

396 HAYES

were told that a colorless equation was to be made; and the
small amounts of red or green allowed when given alone may-
be attributed to the natural confusion of these colors with
yellow, and the insistence that the single glass should appear
colorless. A slight admixture of blue would obviate this diffi-
culty. But the small amount of red or green allowed by some
subjects, when mixed with a large amount of blue, remains as
evidence for the main thesis of this paper, — that red or green
sensations may be possible to the partially color-blind.

It seems quite likely that the neutral grey bands of differ-
ent deuteranopes may occupy slightly different regions of the
spectrum (40, p. 158). If this is the case, those whose bands
are most nearly represented by the particular red and green
glasses of the Hering apparatus would accept a much larger
amount of red or green when given alone in this instrument.

b. Equations obtained with rotating discs

Ever since Maxwell's work (46, 47) with rotating discs in
the fifties, it has been customary to make color equations
which shall indicate the extent of color confusion to which
color-blind subjects are liable, and to determine whether all
colors can be matched by the mixture of blue and yellow, black
and white.

(i). The Rayleigh equation

It is commonly asserted (41, 64) that all equations which
hold for normal observers will be found to hold also for the
partially color-blind. From a theoretical point of view, one
would expect that deuteranopes, at least, who are blind to
both red and green, would accept all normal equations; and
the writer found that all the deuteranopes tested with such
equations did accept them. But in protanopia, the shift of
maximum brightness might be expected to vitiate the equa-
tion somewhat. It was mainly to test the validity of this
assumption that Miss G. S. was tested with the equation red
-f green = yellow; but the unexpected result of the experi-
ment led to the testing of a number of the other subjects in the
same way.

The normal Rayleigh equation, — the equation accepted
on a bright day by a number of normal, trained observers,
from which 30 untrained observers varied by only about 10
degrees, — was presented to the subject. Miss G. S. found
the mixture much too green, and was not satisfied until the
green was reduced to 63°. All the other subjects accepted
not only the normal equation, but also wide variations from
it. The following table gives the normal equation with the

COLOR SENSATIONS 01^ THE PARTIALITY COLOR-BLIND 397

Hering papers, the equation formed for Miss G. S. and the
extreme amounts of red and green accepted by the other obser-
vers. The amounts of yellow, black and white are omitted,
as not pertinent to the question.

Tabls IX
Rayleigh equation of color-blind subjects

RHU + GREIBN == YBlylvOW + WHITE + BIvACK

278
290

Normal Equation

175

185

Miss G. S.

Prot.

297

Extremes

allowed by

other color

-blind

RED + GREEN

RED + G

REEN

Mr. J. W. P.

Prot.

300

360

Miss M. S.

Deut.

315

270

Miss H. E.

Deut.

225

135

250

Deut.

225

135

285

Miss E. C.

Deut.

182

178

295

Deut.

190

170

265

Miss I. B.

Deut.

192

168

160

2CO

Deut.

190

170

125

235

Miss L. W.

Deut.

190

170

160

200

Deut.

200

160

200

Miss H. B.

Deut.

190

170

130

230

Mr. D. B. Y

Deut.

300

360

Mr. A. H. P.

Deut.

178

182

310

The wide variation in the amounts of red and green accepted
in the Rayleigh equation by these subjects is in striking
contrast with the results obtained with Miss G. S. who would
not allow a variation of more than 5° in the green. In this
she resembles the anomalous trichromates discovered by the
use of this equation, as she does also in her sensitiveness to
green in the other experiments. But in view of the fact that,
unlike them, she is completely lacking in sensitivity to red, has
a neutral band in the blue-green {cf. the experiments with the
Plering color-sense apparatus p. 395), and appears to get no
contrast colors nor after-images from red or green, she would
seem to be more properly classed with the protanopes than
with the anomalous trichromates. Nagel (52) reports a
similar experience with the Rayleigh equation, in comparing
his own vision with that of two normal observers. Their
equation, made up of about 180° each of red and of green,
seemed very red to him, and had to be changed to between 140
and 150 red on a dark day, and to between 89 and 95 red on a
bright day. His variation was then hardly more than that
of Miss G. S.

It will also be noticed that some subjects show a much wider
variation than others. The subjects who vary between the
widest limits in this equation are the subjects who made the
worst confusions of colors in the other tests, and have therefore
been classed by the writer as extreme cases of color-blindness.

398 HAYES

The subjects whose Rayleigh equations did not exhibit such
wide variations are those who have shown such keen sensitivity
to reds and greens that it has often seemed absurd to class
them as color-bHnds in spite of the fact that they signally
fail in such tests as those of Nagel, Holmgren and Stilling, and
accept an equation in which a weak bluish red is matched with
a weak bluish green upon the color mixer. These cases re-
mind one of Holmgren's "incompletely color-blind" (31,
33, pp. 40-41); their acceptance of the normal Rayleigh
equation excludes them from the group of anomalous trichro-
mates.

All the subjects objected to wider extremes of red and green
by correctly naming red or green when either one was increased
beyond the limits finally decided upon; they insisted that the
mixture was different in quality from the dirty yellow with
which it was being matched, no matter how the yellow mix-
ture was varied. Now, since dichromates are supposed to see
red and green as yellow, it is difficult to imagine how they were
able to detect the reds and greens under the conditions, unless
we grant the possibility that they may have some sense of
red and green as a color quality distinct from yellow.

(2). The dichr ornate equation
The confusion of red with green has, from the beginning,
been regarded as one of the chief peculiarities of the color-
blind; but it was soon observed that, even in extreme cases
of color-blindness, the subject did not confuse all greens and
all reds. It is now well established that those reds and greens
which, like the physiological primaries, have a bluish tinge,
and are somewhat unsaturated, are most likely to be confused,
since they both appear colorless to the color-blind. In the
dichr omate equation, the attempt was made to make an
equation in which green was declared to be identical with
red, adding to both sides as little blue, black and white as
possible. The following table gives the results of these tests.

Table X

Dichromate equations

RED -f-BLUE -h WHITE-

=GREEN

-f- BLUE -|- BLACK -f- WHITE

Miss G. S. Prot.

R. 360

300

Mr. J. W. P. Prot.

R. 262

330

Miss M. S. Deut.

R. 230 55

360

Miss H. E. Deut.

R. 290

300

Miss G. B. Deut.

R. 210 50

100

270

Miss H.Y.B. Deut.

R. 210 45

105

280

Mr. A. H. P. Deut.

R. 300

220

140

Mr. D.B.Y. Deut.

R. 232 40

260

Miss E. C. Deut.

R. 100 73

187

107

200

Miss I. B. Deut.

L. 50 55

255

220

Miss L. W. Deut.

R. 50 200

198

COLOR SENSATIONS OF THE PARTIAI^LY COIyOR-BUND 399

The most striking point in this table is the very small
amount of green allowed by Miss G. S. When more was in-
troduced, she at once objected to it, insisting that the mixture
then had a greenish tinge. As the subjects were kept in
complete ignorance in regard to the changes made in these
equations, it is difficult to understand how she could repeatedly
make correct judgments, if she did not see green somewhat
as normal persons do.

The relatively small amounts of red and green allowed by the
last three subjects is also striking. When more red or green
was added, they were quite as sure of the change as was Miss
G. S. in the case of green; and no increase in the amount of
blue served to cancel the additional red or green, as one would
expect if red and green appear yellowish to these subjects.
To be sure, other tests have shown that these three subjects
are mild cases of color-blindness; but such cases are quite
valuable for the main contention of this paper, that people
properly classed as color-blinds have some sensations of red
and green.

( j) . Monocular comparison of colors

In order to test still further the claim that all colors per-
ceived by the color-blind can be matched by mixtures of blue
and yellow, and at the same time to obtain a full statement
of the appearance of the different colors, each of the Hering
papers was rotated before Miss G. S.'s protanopic right eye,
and matched by a mixture of colors rotated before her left
eye. Two color-mixers were set up and operated behind a
screen, and the subject looked through two blackened card-
board tubes 6 cm. in diameter and 55 cm. long. In this way
she saw only the standard papers with her right eye and only
the mixtures with her left. The results appear in the appen-
ded table.

Table XI
Showing how the Hering papers appear to a protanopic eye

BLUB

YELLOW-

BLUE-

WHITE

BLACK

YELLOW

GREEN

Red No. I

325

Red No. 2

340

Orange 3

170

115

Y-Orange 4

105

193

Yellow 5

175

135

Y-Green 6

271

Green 7

150

165

B-Green 8

130

Blue 10

Violet II

265

Purple 12

220

120

214

75
70

400 HAYES

In this experiment, the colors were presented to the right eye
in random order ; and in each equation, the attempt was made
to match the color presented to the right eye by a mixture
of black and white with yellow or blue. Green was introduced
only after every effort to make an equation without it had
failed, and green had been insisted upon by name. As the
table shows, there was no need of red to match red or orange.
This experiment then gives additional evidence in support
of our contention that this protanope perceives green but
not red.

A long series of color equations was formed for two deuter-
anopes. Misses M. S. and H. B-, in which the attempt was made
to match mixtures of red and yellow, red and blue, green and
yellow, and green and blue, by mixtures of blue and yellow
with black and white. In these tests, the equations were
formed by the use of large and small discs on a single color-
mixer, and the mixtures to be matched were given in irregular
order, a few at a time, through a period of three weeks. In
the case of Miss M. S. green was not distinguished at all;
but red was regularly distinguished from yellow and grey
mixtures whenever a large amount of red was used, even
though the red was mixed with considerable yellow or blue.
Miss H. K. recognized both red and green when presented in
large quantities.

In order to gather upon a single page a large part of the
evidence for the contention that partially color-blinds are not
dichromates, excepting in extreme forms of the defect, the
following table has been constructed. In the vertical column
are given the tests which seem of most importance for this
question, and which were used with a considerable number of
subjects. Under the initials of each subject, R. or G. is used
to indicate that the subject showed considerable ability in
recognizing red or green under the conditions of the various
experiments mentioned; "con." indicates that the subject
made the typical color-blind confusions, though occasionally
distinguishing red or green correctly. The proportion of
confusions to recognitions gives a fair idea of the degree of the
color-blindness in each of the subjects. Miss G. S., Prot.,
distinguished green in practically every test, and the other
women all recognized red or green (or both) repeatedly; the
three men appeared to use the color names capriciously,
although occasionally applying them correctly. They are
probably as insensitive to both red and green as Miss G. S. is
to red and Miss M. S. is to green.

The Stilling plates were not obtained until after the first four
women mentioned in this Table had left college. Thirteen
color-blind subjects have been tested with these plates, one

COLOR SENSATIONS OF THE PARTIALITY COLOR-BUND 401

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•C2 C

•5 ^ ^

^ i i|

f2i

■a 0

to* K

&i "^ ♦>-

CO -rS ^

p^ pfi

»i

§§§^

§0

1— 1

OCJOp^-

p^*

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p^'

d d d

(3c36

d . d d
Oq' 0 0

.d d

^p^ 5

pi.^ ^

^0 0

d d d d

d . .

0000
0000

opStf

;i ^ d d

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0000

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d d d d

0000

OOOO

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2- -s

S g
1 a

p. da

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■g

bO 'O

(L)

Cards

gren Worsteds
ig's Plates
g Color-Sense

Threshold (H
Sheet
roscope (Schm

1
1

ll-l

fegs

-M

rt 0 • -3 a>

0 <i> 0.

402 HAY^S

protanope, Mr. J. W. P., nine men and three women deuter-
anopes. All except two of these subjects read Plates 4 and 12
correctly, though according to Stilling (72, p. 11) deuteranopes
should read only 4 and 13-15, protanopes only 1,12, and 13-15.
Five of these deuteranopes read some figures in Plate i ; and
three read parts of 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. Mr. J. W. P. (Prot.), read
I, 12, 13-15; Miss E. C. was the only subject who had real
difficulty with 12. She read parts of Plates i, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and
8, and the whole of Plates 13-15.

D. CONCIvUSIONS

What, then, must be our conclusion regarding the color-
system of the partially color-blind? How many qualitatively
different sensations of color does he possess? From a study
of the literature, no less than from an experimental investi-
gation of numerous cases of defective color-vision, the writer
has been convinced that partial color-blindness is not identical
with dichromatism. The statement that sensations of blue
and of yellow alone are possible to the partially color-blind
cannot be reconciled with our findings. A brief review of the
evidence which has been brought forward in the literature,
in support of the contention that dichromatism is identical
with partial color-blindness, will make our position clearer.

I. Certain color-blinds, who have made a careful study
of their color-systems, have declared that they are limited to
sensations of blue and of yellow (Dalton, Pole). Opposed to
this is the testimony of five of our observers (Misses M. S.,
H. B., G. B., E. C, and I. B.) that red and green are specifically
different color qualities from yellow and grey.^ There are
doubtless cases of defective color vision where only sensations
of blue and of yellow are possible. Of our observers, Messrs.
J. W. P., D. B. Y., and A. H. P., probably belong to this
extreme type of defective, which is represented by Dalton and
Pole. But this conjecture does not justify the inference that
all partial color-blinds belong to the extreme type. The
evidence which has been presented in this paper supports the
contrary view, — that many intermediate or transitional stages
and degrees of abnormality may be found to exist between
dichromatism and normal col or- vision, — and that, moreover,
these intermediate forms need not be identical with anomalous
trichromatism.

^Nagel (52, p. 32) came to the conclusion that he, a deuteranope, saw red
as a specific sensation-quality when an extra-foveal region was adequately
stimulated; and Schumann (68) reports that he also, a deuteranope (?), can
see red as red, and can distinguish it from yellow. But Guttmann (15)
classes Schtunann as a green-anomalous trichromate.

COU)R SENSATIONS OF THE PARTIALITY COLOR-BUND 403

This view is further supported by the inferences which may-
be drawn from our findings regarding color confusions and color
naming. The repeated recognition of greens and of reds
throughout, and even under relatively unfavorable conditions,
furnishes a body of indirect evidence which cannot be ruled
out of court by assuming the participation of secondary criteria.

2. When reds and greens were presented under favorable
conditions of stimulation, many of our observers have wholly
failed to match them with mixtures of yellow, black and white.
When the conditions of stimulation are unfavorable, reds and
greens may be matched with such mixtures, or with each
other, if blue be added to one or to both. But when a con-
siderable amount of red or of green was employed, the red
or the green was seen in the mixture by all of our less pro-
nounced cases of color-blinds, and by certain of the extreme
cases, even when every precaution was taken to eliminate the
influence of ' chance ' and of ' guessing.' The evidence which is
furnished by our color equations, then, points to the existence
of specific sensations of red and of green in the color-systems
of the less pronounced cases of color-blindness.

3. This paper has included no data derived from an exami-
nation of acquired and temporary defects of color vision. In
the opinion of the writer, it is premature and unsafe to seek for
analogies between these atypical cases and cases of congenital
color-blindness, although Stilling (71) seems to advocate such a
procedure. The findings of other investigators, however,
(38) raise a significant question, whose ultimate solution prom-
ises to support the thesis of the present paper. If sensi-
tivity to green may lapse before sensitivity to red is lost, and
if transitional forms between trichromatism and dichromatism
occur in acquired color-blindness, what theoretical warrant
can there be for refusing to believe that an analogous series of
transitional forms occurs in congenital color-blindness? The
less pronounced cases which we have described would fit
into such a series.

4. Light is thrown upon the general problem of abnormal
color-systems by a consideration of the phenomena of indirect
vision. Recent explorations of the peripheral retina (4, pp.
53 f .) have yielded results which support the thesis of the pres-
ent paper, — that retinal function lapses, when it does lapse,
in a gradual and not in an abrupt fashion. "The whole
retinal surface, with the exception of the macula and the blind
spot, is endowed with a similar function, to the extent, at
least, that no region possesses a capacity which is wholly
lacking in any other region. The color sensitivity of the
periphery is unquestionably less acute than that of more
central areas ; and in consequence of this diminished sensitivity

404 HAYKS

a constant stimulus may arouse different sensations at different
regions. It cannot, however, be said that any part of the
normal retina, save the macula and the blind-spot, is wholly
or even partially color-blind. For the whole manifold of
sensation qualities which any region is capable of furnishing
may, under appropriate conditions of stimulation, be furnished
by every other region." (4, p. 65.)

5. Cases of monocular color-blindness constitute the crux
of the whole question. Our review of the monocular cases
which have been reported in the literature showed that,
with the exception of von Hippel's, they reveal nothing but
meagre experimentation, glaring contradiction, and theoretical
bias. A survey of Table XII (p. 401 of this paper) shows, in strik-
ing form, the trend of the evidence which has been obtained
from a study of Miss G. S. Green was recognized, and its
specific quality was insisted upon, in almost every Experiment
with spectral colors, as well as with pigments, — colored papers,
glasses, gelatines, etc. There can be no justification for the
statement that she sees only blue and yellow. Yet she is
clearly a protanope, and not an anomalous trichromats If
we grant that von Hippel's patient saw only blue and yellow,
must we not also grant that Miss G. S. sees green, blue and yel-
low? This assumption is supported by abundant indications
that many others of our color-blinds possess a similar sensi-
tivity to red or to green. ^

There seems, then, to be a large mass of evidence, direct
and indirect, which attests the presence of sensations of red
and green in the color systems of the partially color-blind.
The reader who still insists that partial color-blindness is
identical with dichromatism must find some means of explain-
ing away this mass of evidence. It seems much more reason-
able to admit that a strict classification of color defectives
is necessarily artificial; to assume the existence of slight
degrees of variation from normality, and numerous transitional
forms between normality and total color-blindness; and to
regard dichromacy as an extreme variation, and not as a
typical condition of the partially color-blind.

E. BiBUOGRAPHY
Selected bibliography of books and articles of importance in connection
with the particular problem of this paper. For more extended references
see Helmholz's Optik for the older literature, and the various periodical
indices for the newer writings.
I. Abney, W. deW. Colour Vision. New York. (No date.) The
Tyndall Lectures delivered at the Royal Institution in 1894.

^ Nagel (57) reported that among thirty dichromates, both protanopes
and deuteranopes, who were recently examined by him, none failed to
recognize various shades of red when a suflBiciently large area of the retina
was stimulated.

COLOR SENSATIONS OF THE PARTIALITY COLOR-BUND 405

2. Allen, Frank. Persistence of Vision in Color-blind Subjects. Phy

Rev., 1902, 15, 193-225.

3. Angier, Roswell p. Vergleichende Bestimmungen der Peripherie-

werte des trichromatischen und des deuteranopischen Auges.
Zsch. f. Psychol., 1904, 37, 401-413.

4. Baird, J. W. Color Sensitivity of the Peripheral Retina. Washing-

ton, Carnegie Institution, 1905.

5. Bi\iRD, J, W. The Problems of Color-blindness. Psychol. Bull.,

1908, 5, 294-300.

6. CoHN, H, Der Simultankontrast zur Diagnose der Farbenblindheit.

Centralhl. f. prakt. Augenheilk., 1878, 2, 35-36.

7. CoHN, H. Ueber Farbenblindheit. Centralbl. f. prakt. Augenheilk.,

1878, 2, 84-85, 264.

8. DoNDERS, F. C. Ueber Farbensysteme. Arch.f.Ophthalm. (Graefe),

1881, 27, I, 155-223.

9. DoNDERS, F. C. Noch einmal die Farbensysteme. Arch. f. Oph-

thalm. {Graefe), 1884, 30, I, 15-90.

10. Ebbinghaus, H. Grundziige der Psychologie. 2nd Ed. Leipzig, Veit,

1905, I, 209-212.

11. Edridge-GrEEn, F. W. Colour-Blindness and Colour-Perception.

2nd Ed. London, Kegan, Paul, Trench, Triibner & Co., 1909.

12. Favre, a. Resume des memoires sur le Daltonisme. 1877.

13. Guttmann, a. Untersuchungen am sogenannten Farbenschwachen.

Bericht d. I, Kong. f. Exp. Psy., 1904, 6-10.

14. Guttmann, A. Ein Fall von Griinblindheit (Deuteranopic) mit

ungewohnlichen Complicationen. Zsch. f. Sinnesphysiol., 1906,
4i» 45-56.

15. Guttmann, A. Untersuchungen iiber Farbenschwache. Zsch. f.

Sinnesphysiol., 1908, 42, 24-64, 250-270; 43, 146-162, 199-223,
255-298.

16. Guttmann, A. Anomale Nachbilder. Zsch. f. Psychol., 1910, 57,

271-292.

17. Helmholtz, H. von. On the Theory of Compound Colours. Phil.

Mag., 1852, (4) 4, 519-534-

18. Helmholtz, H. von. Handbuch der physiologischen Optik. Leipzig,

Voss. 1 856- 1 866.

19. Helmholtz, H. von. Handbuch der physiologischen Optik. 2nd

Ed. Leipzig, Voss. 1885- 1896.

20. Henmon, V. A. C. The Detection of Color-blindness. J. of Phil.,

Psychol, etc., 1906, 3, 341-344.

21. Henry, W. C. Memoirs of the Life and Scientific Researches of

John Dalton. 1854. Pages 25-26 give Herschel's letter to Dalton,
written in 1833.

22. Hering, E. Zur Lehre von Lichtsinne. Wien, Carl Gerold's Sohn,

1874. 2nd. Ed. 1878.

23. Hering, E. Zur Erklarung der Farbenblindheit aus der Theorie der

Gegenfarben. Lotos, N. F. 1880, i. Auch separat, Prag,i88o.

24. Hering, E. Zur Diagnostik der Farbenblindheit. Arch.f.Ophthalm.

{Graefe), 1890, 36, I, 217-233.

25. Hering, E. Die Untersuchung einseitiger Storungen des Farben-

sinnes mittelst binocularer Farbengleichungen. Arch. f. Ophthalm.

{Graefe), 1890, 36, III, 1-23.
a6. Herschel, J. F. W. Remarks on Colour Blindness. Phil. Mag.,

1859, (4) 19, 148-158.
26a . Hermann, G. Ein Beitrag zur Casuistikder Farbenblindheit, Inaug.

Diss. Dorpat, 1882.
27. Hess, C. Untersuchungen eines Falles von halbseitiger Farbensinn-

storung amlinken Auge. Arch.f. Ophthalm. {Graefe), 1890, 36, III,

24-36.

Journal— 6

4o6 HAYKS

28. HiPPEL, A. von. Bin Fall von einsei tiger, congenitaler Roth-Griin-

blindheit bei normalem Farbensinn des anderen Auges. Arch. f.
Ophthalm. (Graefe), 1880, 26, II, 176-186.

29. HiPPEL, A. von. Ueber einseitige Farbenblindheit. Arch. f. Oph-

thalm. (Graefe), 1881, 27, III, 47-55.

30. Holmgren, F. Ueber die subjective Farbenempfindimg der Farben-

blinden. Centralhl. /. d. med. Wiss. Berlin, 1880, No. 49, 898-900,
No. 50, 913-916.

31. Holmgren, F. How do the color-blind see the different colors?

London Roy. Soc. Proc, 1881, 31, 302-306.

32. HuDDART, J. An account of persons who could not distinguish colours.

Phil. Trans. 1777, 67, 260-265.
:i3. Jeffries, B. Joy. Color-blindness: its dangers and detection.
Boston, Houghton, Osgood & Co., 1879.

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RECENT FREUDIAN LITERATURE

By Rudolph Ach^r.

I. Freud, S. Eine Kindheitserinnerung des Leonardo da Vinci. Wien,
1910. 71 pp.

The one fundamental assumption of all practical experts in psychoanaly-
sis is that all psychic phenomena including dreams, gestures, automatisms
and reveries are governed by law and order, and have a causal sequence
which it is possible to discover if the proper data are at hand. Psycho-
analysts not only make this assumption theoretically but they proceed to lay
bare these laws and principles of psychic life in concrete cases by an exami-
nation and interpretation of the psychic manifestations. The materials
for psychoanalytical investigation are the facts of the life-history of the
individual, including, on the one hand, the environmental influences and,
on the other hand, the reactions of the individual to this environment.
Supported by his knowledge of the psychic mechanism, the psychoanalyst
attempts to grasp the dynamic factors of the individual's make-up, and to
discover the sources of the mental motive power, as well as its later trans-
formation and development. If the psychoanalysis is successful, the inner
characteristics of the individual personality resulting from inner energy
and outer influences are explained. While they deal largely with a class of
persons whose mental condition is pathological and who might be consid-
ered more or less abnormal, they strongly insist that the distinction between
normal and abnormal cannot be sharply drawn, and that the laws and
principles which they discover in the psychic life of their patients hold for
normal life also. Thus they proceed to apply the laws of psychic life,
which they have discovered, to an interpretation of the life and character
of historic personages, as well as to characters in drama and fiction. Their
aim is to lay bare the very inmost workings of the human soul by an inter-
pretation of its manifestations. This does not seem so hazardous in cases
where there are sufficient data at hand concerning the lives of the persons
under consideration. But they do not stop here. In cases where many
of the facts of the lives of noted characters are wanting and the data meagre
they attempt to fill out the gaps by making the known facts tell the full
story which they implicitly contain. A certain apparently insignificant
experience or impression of the person under consideration is made to
bristle with meaning and significance under the magic touch of the psycho-
analyst.

Perhaps the boldest of these attempts to give a new and fuller interpreta-
tion to a great historic character is that of Freud in his treatment of the
childhood memories of Leonardo da Vinci. Although Freud does not
claim absolute authenticity for his findings, he declares that they have a
reasonable degree of plausibility, and that they seem to him more satisfac-
tory than other attempts to account for this remarkable character. An
effort will be made in what follows to give a summary of the main points in
Freud's analysis of this man.

The significant facts of the life of da Vinci, so far as they are known, are
given by Freud and are somewhat as follows:

RSCeNT FREUDIAN LITERATURE 409

Bom in 1452, da Vinci was one of the foremost and most versatile char-
acters of the Italian Renaissance. He was not only a paramount painter;
he was also a noted and original scientist. In fact these two capacities were
never quite separated from each other, the spirit of investigation always
manifesting itself along with the artistic genius ; and, in the end, the former
almost wholly overshadowed the latter. He was not only great but well
balanced, being possessed of a keen intellect, a strong body, an admirable
address and a happy and lovable disposition. His scientific interests made
him a worthy forerunner of Bacon. He prosecuted all kinds of researches;
he dissected the bodies of horses and of men, built flying machines, studied
the nourishment of plants and their reactions to poisons. It is said that
at thirty he made this famous representation to the Duke of Milan: that
he understood instruments of war and implements of peace; that he could
construct bridges both light and strong; that he could cut off the water
from the trenches of a besieged fortress, make pontoons and scaling ladders,
and construct cannon which would be light and easy to transport, but
which would throw small stones like hail; that in times of peace he could
construct buildings both public and private, conduct water from place to
place, execute sculpture in marble, bronze or clay; and that in painting
he surpassed all of his contemporaries.

As has already been indicated, his scientific interests caused him to
devote less time to painting, often led him to abandon unfinished works,
and made him careless concerning the condition of his products. In these
respects he was peculiar. The slowness with which he worked was prover-
bial. He worked three years on the "Lord's Supper" in the cloister at
Santa Mariadelle Grazie at Milan, after the most painstaking prepara-
tory study. He would, at times, work from daylight until dark without
taking the brush from his hands. Then days would pass when nothing
was attempted other than an examination of the work and an inward test-
ing of it. He worked four years on the portrait of Monna Lisa, the wife
of Francesco del Giocondo, without finishing it.

The extraordinary number of preparatory sketches in his note book, and
the great number of notes which he made as to motive in his paintings
show that carelessness or unsteadiness had nothing to do with his attitude
toward his work. On the contrary, the very extent of his preparation and
the great amount of preliminary study made the wealth of possibilities so
great that definite decision was often difficult. This led to a sort of inhibi-
tion in the execution of his work. The slowness with which he worked was
a symptom of this inhibition and prophetic of his later turning away
from painting entirely. He was never aggressive, and always avoided
opposition and quarrels. He refused to eat meat because he thought it
not right to take the lives of animals. It gave him great pleasure to buy
birds in the market place and give them their freedom. He severely
arraigned war and bloodshed ; and he called man not king of the animal
world so much as the worst of wild beasts. But this feminine tenderness
of feeling did not prevent him from leading condemned criminals to their
execution in order that he might study their horrified facial expressions
and draw them in his note-book; neither did it prevent his drawing the
most horrible weapons, nor his entering the service of Cesare Borgia as
chief military engineer.

What is known about his sex life is limited, but significant. In a time
which saw boundless sensuality struggling with gloomy asceticism, da
Vinci was the embodiment of sexual indifference, — a thing which one would
scarcely expect to find in an artist who sets forth in his work the beauty of
woman. His writings, which deal not only with the most profound scien-
tific problems but also contain much varied and indifferent matter, are, as
a rule, free from erotic reference to a degree scarcely found in the literature
of our own day. In this respect he was in marked contrast with other

4IO ACHSR

great artists, who took peculiar pleasure in setting forth their fancy in
erotic and even obscene expressions.

There is no evidence that he ever loved a woman or had any spiritual
intimacy with one, such as Michel Angelo had with Vittoria Colonna.
There is good evidence that he had homosexual tendencies which were
however either sublimated or, in the main, successfully repressed.

This peculiarity of emotional and sexual life, in connection with his
double nature as artist and scientist, is, in the opinion of Freud, to be under-
stood in only one way. He subordinated all feeling and emotion to intel-
lectual pursuits. This idea is expressed by da Vinci himself, in his ' 'Trac-
tate on Painting," in which he defends himself against accusations of being
irreligious. He says these accusers may well hold their peace, for to know
and love the creator we must understand his works. Great love springs
from great knowledge of the loved one. This, as Freud points out, is not
true; for love is an emotion, and thought about an object tends to deaden
the emotion aroused by it. Da Vinci's idea was to withhold emotion and
make it subordinate to thought; and this he succeeded in doing. He
neither loved nor hated; was indifferent to good and bad; was always calm
and unperturbed, because he subordinated all else to the interests of thought.
He was, however, not apathetic. He did not dispense with the divine
spark that is either directly or indirectly the dynamic force of all human
activity; but he transformed it into the impulse to know. He devoted
himself to an investigation of natural phenomena, with a persistence and
steadiness that can come only from the enforcement of transformed feeling.
Only after the conquest of knowledge did he allow the inhibited feeling
to break forth as the stream that has driven the wheel, and is then allowed
to go on its way. He has been called the Italian Faust because of his insa-
tiable desire for scientific knowledge; but he was more akin to Spinoza in his
development. The significant thing about this programme was that in
trying to know before loving he made the latter impossible. In his efforts
to do so, emotion was largely swallowed up in the interests of intellectual
activity. This is the key that unlocks the mystery of da Vinci's hunger
for knowledge, and his apparent indifference to the emotional phases of life.

It is possible that he began his investigations in behalf of his own art
for the purpose of mastering the laws of light, color, shade and perspective,
in order to be true to nature. Then he was forced by the interests of the
painter to investigate the objects to be painted: the animals, the plants,
the proportions of the human body, the inner structure of all these, and the
functions which manifest themselves without and need to be consideredi
by the artist. But his scientific interests, thus begun in behalf of the ai
of painting, led him far away from the demands of his art, and finally^
impelled him to abandon it almost entirely in behalf of pure science.

Freud grants that any marked capacity in a character such as the scien-
tific spirit in da Vinci rests on special native endowment. But he hok
that such a strong bent of mind has very probably strengthened itself inj
early childhood through some external influence and that it originally]
attracted, to its use, energy from the sexual sphere. In this wa3^ it derives]
its strength partly from the sex field and acts as a substitute for it in late
life. Such a person would later take great delight in scientific investiga-j
tions at the expense of emotional life. This whole theor3'^ is based upoi
the assumption that the energy that is usually spent in the sphere of se
can be sublimated into non-sexual ends. That such contributions
made from the sex realm to other special spheres of activity is shown b]
daily observation. This process is unquestioned, Freud thinks, if durii
childhood this overpowering spirit of curiosity served sexual interests and!
if later, during mature life, there is a strong development of this same spirit j
of curiosity directed toward scientific ends accompanied by sexual indiffer-j
ence. Objection would generally be made to such a theory on the grounc
that young children have neither the spirit of investigation nor sexualj

RECENT FREUDIAN LITERATURE 4II

interests. But Freud holds that the curiosity of little children is abun-
dantly shown by their endless questioning. He thinks these questions are
circumlocutions, and that they have no end since the child wishes to ask
one question which it does not state. Psychoanalysis shows that all chil-
dren, but more especially the bright ones, pass through a period, beginning
with about the third year, which might be called the infantile sexual inves-
tigation period. This curiosity is usually awaked by some sexual im-
pression, such as the birth of a sister, or brother, by which the egoistic
interests are threatened. This curiosity has, for its object, the solution
of the problem as to where babies come from, just as if the child would
wish to prevent their coming. It has been found that the child does not
believe the stork story, and that from this date there arises a mental inde-
pendence because the child feels himself opposed by adults, and never again
pardons them for deceiving him about this matter. The child begins to
investigate in its own way, usually guesses the source to be the mother's
body; and from its own sexuality it gets impressions that help it work out
theories, about the source of babies as a result of eating, of being bom
through the alimentary tract, and may touch the role of the father which
appears to it as something malignant and forced. But owing to their own
very immaturity, they never reach a satisfactory solution, and finally
leave it in this unsolved condition. The failure of the first attempt at inde-
pendent investigation makes a profound impression, and affects the attitude
of mind in all later investigations in a somewhat similar way.

When this period of infantile sexual investigation ceases through sexual
repression, there may result any one of three possible conditions which
affect the future impulse to investigate, as a consequence of its early con-
nection with sexual interests. In the first type, the spirit of investigation
shares the fate of sexuality and is repressed; the desire for knowledge is
inhibited, and the free exercise of the intellect remains limited, especially
if later, during puberty, the powerful religious thought-inhibition is brought
into play. This is the type known as neurotic inhibition.

In the second type, the intellectual development is strong enough to
withstand the sexual repression, and is not repressed with it as in the first
type. Some time after the disappearance of the infantile sexual investi-
gation and when the intelligence is strengthened, it bids for its return to
help evade sex repression. This repressed sexual investigation energy
returns from the unconscious as imperative brooding (Griibelzwang) some-
what distorted and hampered but sufficiently powerful to sexualize the
thinking, and to color the intellectual operation with pleasure and anxiety
of the individual's own sexual processes. The investigation is turned
towards sexual activity, often almost exclusively; the feeling of success in
thought takes the place of actual sexual satisfaction; but the indefinite
character of the infantile investigation shows itself in the fact that the brood-
ing never finds its end, and the sought-for intellectual feeling accompanying
its solution moves further into the distance.

The third type is the rarest and most completely developed. The
sexual repression is present here, too, but it does not suceed in repressing a
part of the sex impulses into the unconscious. The Libido withdraws it-
self from the conditions of repression by being sublimated at once into a
thirst for knowledge which strengthens the already strong impulse to inves-
tigation. Here intellectual interests are powerfully reinforced by the
sublimated energy from the sex realm.

Now, when we consider the fact that in da Vinci the overpowering spirit
of investigation appeared in connection with a greatly diminished sex in-
stinct which was limited to ideal homosexuality, it seems very probable that
he was an excellent example of this third type. If we knew the details of
his early life, it would be possible to decide this point with certainty. But
very little is known about this stage of his life. It is known that he was
an illegitimate child, that his mother, Catarina by name, was a peasant

412 ACHER

girl and that his father, Sir Piero da Vinci, belonged to a considerably
higher stratum of society than his mother. When Leonardo was five years
of age he went to live with his father who had married another woman.
Here he remained until he went away to school.

Though the account of Leonardo's childhood is scant, there is one record
of his childhood memories that he himself made, which Freud thinks is
very significant to the psychoanalytical expert. It throws a flood of
light upon those childhood experiences which were important in determin-
ing his later life. It is from this record of his memories of childhood Uiat
Freud extracts, by means of the psychoanalytical method, the significant
facts in Leonardo's early life.

The reference to this memory of his childhood seems to have been
entirely incidental to the theme under discussion. In an article which deals
with the flight of the vulture, he turns from the main thought to what
appears to be the reason for his great interest in this bird. He says that
there comes to his mind what appears to be a very early memory. While
he was yet in the cradle a vulture flew down to him, opened his mouth with
its tail and pushed its tail against his lips many times. This is a strange
and improbable story and could not possibly have been a memory of a real
experience. It was a fancy of later life, projected into the time of his in-
fancy. This is frequently the case with so-called memories of childhood.
They are not recalled until childhood is past, and then they are modified
and falsified in the interests of later tendencies so that there is not much
to distinguish them from pure fancies. The individual is, in this respect,
much like the race. While the race is young and struggling for existence
with all manner of enemies there is no effort to record its history. But
later, when it grows powerful, and there is more time for meditation, the
desire for a past history arises. Then one employs all available material
such as tradition, sayings and proverbs, and weaves them into a story of
one's past in which one's present wishes and desires tend to fill in gaps,
distorting much of the evidence, and misinterpreting the rest. The result
is not history; neither is it pure fancy. It is a combination of the two. To
treat it as pure fancy would be to throw away valuable historical material.
It is the business of the historian to separate fact from fancy and interpret
both. Just so is it with the vulture story. What a person thinks he
remembers of his childhood experiences is very significant; as a rule, the
most telling evidences of his mental development are hidden in these sup-
posed early memories.

It is just here that the technical skill of the psychoanalist is needed to
follow out and interpret these alleged memories, and discover their hidden
meaning. It is in this way that an attempt is made to fill out the gaps in
Leonardo's early life through the analysis of the vulture story.

Similar material is found in dreams ; and it needs to be treated similarly.
The story is symbolic. It is erotic in its meaning and symbolizes fellatio.
Tail {coda) is a symbol of the male sex organ no less in Italian than in other
countries. The passive part of the subject in the story is significant. It
is similar to the dreams and fancies of homosexuals. The experience which
furnishes the material for this is nothing less than the infantile means of
securing its food from the mother's breast. This is why the story is pro-
jected back into Leonardo's infancy. Back of this fancy is hidden the
faint remembrance of his infantile food-getting. In his later life this
beautiful scene was often painted in the form of the infant Jesus and his
mother. This reminiscence was converted into a passive homosexual
fancy. But in the place of his mother was substituted a vulture. How
came this to pass?

In the holy picture-writing of the Egyptians, the mother is always rep-
resented by the picture of a vulture. The Egyptians also worshipped a
goddess called Mut, who was represented by a vulture-headed statue.
Perhaps the vulture was a symbol of motherhood because it was supposed

RECENT FREUDIAN UTERATURE 413

that there were only female birds of this species. The wind performed the
male function as they flew through the air. There is good evidence that
Leonardo was familiar with the fact that the Egyptians used the vulture
as a means to represent motherhood. He was a voluminous and omniv-
orous reader. Milan was the chief centre of books and libraries. The
church fathers often used this story to support the story of the conception
of the holy virgin.

Thus the origin of the vulture fancy of Leonardo might be conceived
somewhat as follows : As he may at some time have heard the story from a
church father, or read from a book of natural science that there were only
female vultures and that they reproduced themselves without the assist-
ance of males, there appeared faint echoes of a memory which took the
form of the story as he later recorded it, in which he unconsciously identified
himself with the vulture's offspring ; for he too had a mother but no father,
and with it there was associated in a manner as only such old impressions
can express themselves an echo of the pleasure which he enjoyed at his
mother's breast. Perhaps the idea of the virgin with her son led him to
value the fancy more than usual. He, in a measure, identified himself with
the Saviour. The substitution of the vulture for the mother indicates that
the child, being illegimate, missed the father. It is known that he spent
the few first few years alone with his mother. In this sense he was a vulture
child. This is the key to the memory of later years.

In the first few years of a child's life, experiences are so indelibly impressed
that they never again lose their meaning and effect in later life. If it is
true that the unintelligible childhood memories, and the later fancies built
upon these, portray the most important features in the mental unfolding
of an individual, then the fact that Leonardo spent the first few years of his
life with his mother alone must have had the most profound influence in
moulding his inner life. Under the influence of this constellation it could
not but happen that the child, who, in his first years, found a problem in
addition to that of other children, began to ponder with special interest
upon the riddle of the origin of children, and whether or not the father had
anything to do with it. He thus early became an investigator. Leon-
ardo himself seems later to have perceived some faint echo of the
connection between his childhood struggles and his later investigations,
for he is led to remark that it seemed to have been destined for him to
investigate the problem of the flight of the vulture since he was visited by
one while he was yet in his cradle.

As has been stated before, the vulture story symbolizes Leonardo's
homosexual tendencies. But since the vulture was considered the symbol
of the female why was she also given male attributes? It is well known
that many Egyptian goddesses, as well as those of Greek creation, were
composites of both male and female organs; and it is very probable that
Leonardo derived this knowledge from books. But how are we to account
for the fact that he accepted this notion and incorporated it in his so-called
memory of childhood?

To understand this we must consider the infantile sex theories which
young children create. There is a time in the child's early life when first
he begins to have his curiosity aroused concerning sex matters, when he
believes that everybody has organs similar to his own. The male child
thinks his own sex organs so interesting and important that he cannot
think of any one without one. He has great curiosity to see others. Later,
when he discovers that his conclusion was wrong and that the female is
different in structure, this curiosity gives way to disgust which at the time
of puberty may lead to psychic impotence and permanent homosexuality.

But the intensity with which the child works out this early sex theory
leaves permanent traces upon his mind. Certain foot fetishes seem to be
the outgrowth of a substitution of the foot, for this much-valued organ,
Freud points out that his notion of the child's interest in sex matters will

414 ACH^R

not receive much credence from those who hold to the modem attitude of
minimizing the elements of sex in life, and regarding it with shame and
disgust. He thinks that the great sexual interest which children manifest
has its analogue in primitive races. He holds that most primitive people
followed some form of phallic worship ; and that many gods arose from
this primitive worship through sublimation to higher non-sexual divinities.
The childish assumption that the mother has a male organ similar to his
own originated in the same way that the androgynous conception of the
goddesses of old originated. The old hermaphroditic goddesses were in
reality feminine figures with male sex organs attached just as the child
conceives the case to be. In this respect, the child recapitulates the race.
Thus the alleged memory of da Vinci concerning the vulture's tail had
its origin in his early life when he attributed to his mother a male organ
similar to his own. If this interpretation is correct, it furnishes further
evidence that his infantile curiosity was unusually active. Freud thinks
there was a causal relation between da Vinci's early sex theory and his
later homosexual tendency. This causal relation has been discovered many
times in the psychoanalysis of homosexual patients. In all these cases,
there occurred in early childhood a very intensive erotic attraction towards
the mother, due to over- tenderness of the mother, and perhaps strengthened
by the absence of the father. Later this attitude toward the mother is
repressed. The child identifies himself with the mother, takes his own
person as ideal, and chooses an object of love similar to his ideal, — and thus
becomes homosexual.

In reality he has gone back to auto-erotism, since the boys to whom he is
attracted are only memories of his own childish person which he loves as
his mother loved him in his infancy. He finds his object of love as did the
Greek Narcissus. Freud thinks that such homosexuals retain in the
unconscious a memory of their mother. Through the repression of the
love of mother, he conserves it in his unconscious, and remains true to her.
If he appears to seek boys upon whom to bestow his love, he is, in reality,
running away from those women who might make him untrue. Observa-
tion has also shown that those homosexuals who are apparently stimulated
only by males are, in reality, moved by the attraction which comes from a
woman. But they hasten to transfer the stimulus received from a woman
to a man; and therefore rehearse the same psychic mechanism that made
them homosexual in the first place. This may only produce one type of
homosexuals. Da Vinci's was of this type. Although he succeeded in
sublimating most of his sexual tendencies, yet it cannot be assumed that he
succeeded absolutely as this can never be attained. Other than mere
hints of erotic love must not then be expected in him. These were homosex-
ual. It is well known that he selected only beautiful boys for his school
and not promising ones. Other evidences are found in a record of some
purchases which he made for some of his students. He kept a note book in
which he used signs which only he understood. These records are few,
and apparently of little significance; but they mean much to the psy-
choanalyst.

The record shows a very exact account of a small outlay of money, as if
he were keeping the strictest account of household expenses. However
the expenditure of larger sums is not recorded, and there is no evidence
that he was a strict economist. One of these records is the purchase of a
new coat for one of his students; other similar records are found of the
purchase of wearing apparel for other students. Most biographers simply
regard this event as evidence of his foresight and goodness toward his
students. But this does not satisfactorily account for these records; we
must look for some affective motive that led him to make them. The cue
to this is found in another record, the motive of which is more certain and
evident. This other record consists of a statement of the funeral expenses
of his mother who died while visiting him at Milan. Da Vinci had succeeded

RECENT FR]eUDIAN UT^RATURK 415

in forcing his feelings under the yoke of investigation and thus inhibited
their free expression. But there were times when his repressed feeling
manifested itself by attaching itself to some apparently insignificant
object ; and the death of his once intensely loved mother was one of these
times. In this record we have the distorted expression of grief for the
mother. This is not a normal expression of feeling, but in so-called impera-
tive neurosis, this is a common phenomenon. In these cases we see intense
feeling, which has become unconscious through repression, attaching itself
to some trifling matter. The repressive factors have succeeded in diminish-
ing the expression of this feeling to such a degree that its intensity would
never be guessed were it not for certain evidences of an inner demand that
the apparently insignificant feeling be expressed. The recording of the
ftmeral expenses of his mother is just such a case of the disguised expression
of a strong though unconscious feeling towards his mother. The strong
repressive factors of his later life which repressed the infantile feeling would
not allow a more worthy memorial to be made; so there was a compromise
in the form of the record of funeral expenses. The same affective motive
was at the basis of the record of expenses for his students.

The vulture story has still other significance. The expression that the
tail pressed against his lips many times suggests the intensely erotic relation
between mother and child. It is not far-fetched to assume that the mother
planted numerous kisses upon his mouth. Thus the vulture fancy is a
synthesis from the memory of nursing at his mother's breast, and being
fondled and kissed over-much by her. The artist succeeded in uncon-
sciously expressing in his artistic work the elements that were perhaps his
strongest mental stimuli during early childhood. These elements are
contained in the remarkable, fascinating and enigmatical smile which he
has placed upon the face of his feminine characters in his paintings. It is
strictly characteristic of his work; and has been called Leonardesque.
In the strangely beautiful countenance of Monna Lisa it has affected visit-
ors most strikingly. Much has been written in explanation of it, and the
most varied interpretations given. He worked upon this portrait four
years, and left it unfinished. After this painting all his later feminine
characters wore this smile. The smile fascinated him no less than it has
those who contemplated it during the past four hundred years. Since he
first gave expression to this smile while painting a portrait, many critics
have assumed that this model must have possessed the smile. Freud
believes this is not the true explanation, and that she only awakened a
memory that had long slumbered in the unconscious. Its arousal so
fascinated him that he never again could free himself from its influence. It
was nothing less than the smile of his own mother, which he had forgotten,
but which was revived by the model. Chronologically, the next painting
was the holy Anna with Mary and the boy Jesus. Both these feminine
characters have the Leonardesque smile. This painting is a synthesis
of his childhood experiences. When he was five years of age he went to
live with his father; here he not only found another mother, but also a
grandmother who was very attentive to him. This suggested to him the
mother and the grandmother idea. But, in the picture, the grandmother
is yet young and with unfaded beauty. In reality, the boy has been given
two mothers, one reaching for him and the other in the back-ground. This
exactly embodies Leonardo's own childhood, for he had two mothers, —
his real mother a little older than his stepmother and a little farther away
from him, just as the grandmother is represented in the painting.

Another entry is found in the notebook concerning the death of his
father, which only the psychoanayst can interpret. The error is a repeti-
tion of the time of day when his father died. Ordinarily this might be
considered as a matter of inattention; but such is not the case. Such a
repetition is called perseveration. It is a key which shows an affective
coloring as a result of the momentary suspension of inhibition in which

41 6 ACHER

the strong, suppressed feeling attaches itself to an unimportant matter.
His father was a man of great strength, and became an important factor
in the psychosexual development of Leonardo, not only in a negative way
through his early absence, but, positively, in his later childhood.

Whoever as a child was attracted to his mother cannot but want to
place himself in his father's stead, and identify himself with him in his
fancy, and so lays the foundation for a later attempt to accomplish the
conquests which his father made. The father was a gentleman; and Leon-
ardo tried to be like him in this respect, although his means would not
always allow him to do so. Since an artist has the attitude of a father
towards his productions, da Vinci identified himself with his father here
also, because he was indifferent to the children of his brush just as his
father had been indifferent toward him.

But if his imitation of his father injured his artistic success, his father's
neglect made him a great scientist. The keenness and independence of his
later scientific investigations were due, in a measure, to his early sexual
investigation caused by his father's absence. It has been found by psycho-
analysts that the idea of and the belief in God is closely related to the father
complex; and that the personal God is psychologically nothing else than an
enlarged idea of father. The idea of nature is the embodiment of the mother
complex. Thus God and nature are grand sublimations of the father and
mother complexes. Da Vinci illustrates this tendency very well. He was
entirely free from religious dogma; and he worshipped nature. His close
study of natural phenomena enabled him to guess some of the most funda-
mental of later scientific discoveries. His was not a personal religion, but
a natural one. External authority in matters of religion had no significance
for him.

One great ambition of da Vinci's whole life was to build and to operate
a flying machine. He seems to have desired to do in this world what most
people of his time hoped to accomplish in the next. Why this interest in fly-
ing? Psychoanalysts have found that this wish is only a thinly veiled means
of expressing another wish. The stork story, the winged phallus of old
suggest the meaning of the wish. The most frequently used expression
for the sexual act is called vogeln. By Italians, the male organ is termed
vogel. {uccello). All of this suggests that the desire to fly does not mean any-
thing other than the desire to be able to carry on sexual activities. This is
an early infantile desire. It has been thought that children are satisfied by
the incidents of each moment. But the desire to be large like adults ever
haunts them, and determines most of their plays. If they learn that mature
people can do something in the sexual sphere, which they must wait to do,
they are consumed by the desire to do likewise, and dream of it in the form
of flying. Thus modern aviation has its infantile erotic roots. In da
Vinci's case both the suppressed wish and the symbolical embodiment were
doomed to failure.

This symbolism is scarcely intelligible unless one has followed the ex-
tensive literature on this subject, which has recently received so much
attention from the Freudians.

2. Pfister, Oskar. Die Frdmmigkeit des Graf en Ludwig von Zinzen-

dorf. Ein psychoanalytischer Beitrag zur Kenntnis der religiosen

Sublimierungsprozesse und zur Erkldrung des Pietismus. Zurich, 1910,

118 pp.

This psychoanalysis of the life of Count Zinzendorf shows, in yet another

instance, how closely sex and religion are united, and how inextricably they

become intertwined in the same individual. His whole religious life and

piety were dominated by his erotic life. His feeling towards Jesus was

plainly of a homosexual nature. God and the Holy Ghost, the other two

elements in the Trinity, were almost crowded off the stage, — so completely

did Jesus receive the religious devotion of this man.

RieCENT FREUDIAN UTKRATURE 417

Two factors were, in a measure, responsible for this strange co-mingling
of sex and religion in the life of Zinzendorf. The first of these was the
spirit of the times, which looked upon all pleasures as the work of the devil.
All Christians were called upon to wage warfare against this foe of man
and God. The "lusts of the flesh" were preeminently the most difficult
to conquer, and therefore received most attention. This severe repression
often led to surrogates where they were least expected. In the case of
Zinzendorf Jesus became this surrogate unconsciously.

The second factor was the early impressions received by Zinzendorf
from his mother and teachers. He was born in a rigidly pietistic family.
Spener, the father of Pietism, laid hands on him at four years of age for the
kingdom of Christ. His father, being tubercular, found compensation, in
the world of belief, for his earthly suffering; but he died a few months after
the count's birth. The latter was profoundly impressed by the story of his
father's love of Jesus as told him, over and over again, by his mother. Her
fondest hope was to have her son become a devoted follower of the mar-
tyred Jesus; and to this end she detailed with the greatest minuteness his
suffering and crucifixion. She dominated her son's early life to such an
extent that he always considered himself subject to his mother. This
attitude of the son towards the mother was erotic at first, but later Jesus
became the substitute. From early infancy he was refused worldly pleas-
ures. He could not and dared not be a child. Association with other
children was forbidden. Prayer to Jesus was the only form of pastime
which he was allowed to indulge in without restraint. Jesus thus became
a substitute for friends, companions, brothers, mother, and father. At
four years of age, he already learned that Jesus was our brother, that he had
died for us. He was deeply affected by this. The songs of Jesus' martyr-
dom pleased him early in life. Before six years of age he decided to live
for Jesus who had died for him; and at seven he had his first feeling of
how the wounds of Jesus felt, and he shed tears over it. He wrote a letter
to Jesus which he threw out of the window. The seeds of his later sadistic
and masochistic tendencies were here sown. He later preached what he
felt in these early years. Even his closest friends thought he went too far
in his love for Jesus. Their criticism, however, made him feel happy
because he was suffering for Jesus' sake. From the time he was eight years
old he never allowed himself to forget for a moment the wounds of Jesus.
He early developed a condition of anxiety which was plainly a result of sex
repression.

At ten years of age he went to live with Francke, the great teacher at
Halle. When his mother delivered him to his teacher, she reminded him
that her son had shown unmistakable signs of pride, which must be crushed.
This was successfully accomplished. In all this difficulty Jesus was the
youth's only friend and guide ; he acquired a real hunger for suffering. At
thirteen years of age, he wrote to Jesus thus: "Receive us into thy wounded
sides; from there we will fight the evil and conquer." At sixteen he wrote
that the devil could not harm him while he rested body and soul in the
wounds of Jesus. As a boy at school, he founded organizations and prayer
meetings. In all of these the suffering, wounds, and death of Jesus were
the only themes. The Lord's Supper with its revival of the memory of
Jesus' suffering would almost put him into an ecstasy.

At the University of Wittenberg, his pietistic tendencies were strength-
ened rather than dampened. Believing that his nature was essentially bad,
he became an ascetic; he prayed whole nights, and read the Bible, When
1 9 years old he said that if he could die he would look upon it as a wedding
joy. He wanted to come nearer to Jesus.

He felt it his duty to marry but could not persuade himself to love a
woman for fear of doing an injustice to Jesus. Four times he was about
to marry, but each time decided that his fiancee suited some one else better,
and surrendered her. Finally, however, he was persuaded by friends that

418 ACHER

a marriage would not interfere with his duty to Jesus. He married and had
twelve children, four of whom lived. He never cultivated domestic happi-
ness, and never manifested more than respect for his wife. He entered
the service of the state with tears because he felt this would do Jesus
little honor.

His homosexual attitude towards Jesus was manifested throughout his
life by the terms which he employed. He referred to Jesus as the bride-
groom of his soul; he prayed that strange love might be extinguished
from his soul and that he might be allowed to win his Saviour's love. He
preferred to consider his soul as the bride of Jesus, and used the most
extravagant terms in his praise of the bridegroom. He said it was Jesus'
own business if he kissed us after he had forgiven our sins. He also talked
of the embrace of Jesus. The manner by which Elisha called back to life
the woman's son who died had great fascination for him. He declared that
Jesus forgave sins in this identical way, and that the thrill which was felt
throughout the body and soul when this took place could only be compared
to the feeling of a wife when loved by her husband.

At the age of forty there seems to have been a new outbreak of his re-
pressed homosexual, sadistic and masochistic tendencies. The author thinks
this was due to the fact that the repression of his sex impulses was more
severely complete than before and therefore needed other means of expres-
sion. This led to a polymorphous perverse expression. At this time he also
came to rely more fully upon himself; and his authority in matters of
religious experience became greater. He trusted his own fancies and
sub-conscious manifestations more and more. As a result his natural
inclinations were given full sway and his unconscious impulses had full
expression.

Aside from the unmistakable homosexual manifestations, which now
became more outspoken, other perverse expressions were the following:
the tendency to necrophilism was clearly shown by his emotional excitement
in contemplating the dead body of Jesus, in partaking of the Lord's Supper,
and in advising the wife to place her arms about her dead husband's neck
for a stated period. The tendency to sadism is shown by his outspoken
pleasure in contemplating the wounds of Jesus. He prepared a wound
litany which the author pronounces as monstrous. Among other things
which are addressed in this litany are the scratches made by the crown of
thorns; the mouth with saliva dripping from it; the cheeks which were spat
upon; the exhausted eyes; the bloody foam; the sweat-covered hair, and
finally the wounds. The wounds became the only and highest good towards ^
which his whole life turned. The blood of Jesus, too, became a fetish with
the most extravagant sentiment woven about it. Its appeal to his sense
of taste, smell and sight is always evident. The sweat of Jesus, too, made
a peculiar appeal which could only feed his sadistic tendency. The wounds
in Jesus' sides were of greatest interest. They were called feminine
genitals, organs of birth, and sources of greatest pleasure. The author
quotes endless passages to show that the count 's thought and feelings were
strongly colored by his erotic life, when contemplating the details of the
crucifixion.

Zinzendorf introduced, as church ceremonies, footwashing, the brotherly
kiss, the night-watch, and the love-feast, — all of which the author thinks
sprang from his erotic needs. The same was true of his celebration of
other religious ceremonies, such as baptism, the Lord's Supper, confirma-
tion, funeral ceremonies, ascetic practices, mission-work, training of chil-
dren, and his founding of the United Brethren organization.

In all this manifestation of his erotic life there was left no room for the
ethical teachings of Jesus. They made no appeal to him because Jesus,
as the object of his erotic life, excluded all else.

Although there may have been a natural predisposition to begin with,
it is nevertheless true that in much of Count Zinzendorf' s later life we see i

RECENT FREUDIAN LlT^RATURB 419

the direct influence of his early impressions and teachings. They laid
well the foundation for just such a career as he led. The count perhaps
never suspected the nature of his piety, but recent studies in sexual abnor-
malities show very clearly that his attitude towards Jesus could be almost
exactly duplicated in the attitude of perverts towards the object of their
sexual desire.

The effort of his elders to have him concentrate his early attention upon
the martyred Jesus paved the way for his later libidinous attitude. The
fact that he did not know his father in childhood, except as his mother in-
formed him of his love for Jesus, accounts for the fact that he had no place
for God in his later religion. The great emphasis which his mother, early
in his life, placed upon Jesus, to the exclusion of relatives, friends and com-
panions, accounts in a large measure for the count's later lack of interest
in the social message of Jesus. The tears of joy of the seven-year-old over
the bloody Jesus on the cross may well have laid the foundation for his
adult sadistic tendency. His desire, at the beginning of puberty, to be
taken up into the wounds of Jesus later found satisfaction in his cult in-
volving the wounded sides of Jesus.

The author gives a wealth of quotations from Zinzendorf's works to
substantiate every point he makes ; but only the merest outline could here
be given. This psychoanalysis adds another valuable chapter to the
now rapidly growing literature which shows how large a part sex plays in
human life, and often in ways not usually suspected, so plastic is the sex
instinct.

3. Graf, Max. Richard Wagner im "Fliegenden Hollander." Ein Bei-
trag zur Psychologie des kiinstlerischen Schaffens. Leipzig, 191 1, 46 pp.

An effort is here made to explain the life and works of Richard Wagner
by showing how his early experiences influenced his later conduct, but
more especially his musical and dramatic productions. These early ex-
periences are conceived as resulting in dynamic factors which gave color
and direction to his whole later life.

The Flying Dutchman more than any of his other productions gives this
key to Wagner's personality and psychic peculiarities. It is the one pro-
duction in which the author reflects his life history, his inner conflicts, his
unconscious longings and wishes. When, as a young man, he first heard
the story or legend as told by the author, Heine, it fascinated him because
it contained something akin to his own inner struggles. Wagner's sea-
voyage to London and Paris, and his high hopes and crushing defeats at the
latter city, all tended to deepen his feeling of identity with the legendary
Flying Dutchman, and prepared him for the production of the opera by
that name. After he had written out a rough sketch of this opera, he
versified it in ten days and set it to music in seven weeks, — so completely
had both the music and verse taken form before he began to write it out.

He found it necessary to modify completely the motif of the romantic
operas of his time, in order to express himself. Before his modifications
were introduced, the three main characters in the opera were as follows:

A virtuous young woman and a worthy young man love each other de-
votedly. A demon with supernatural powers appears, and carries away
the maiden into captivity. But the power of the demon is only temporary,
because virtue must triumph in the end ; and so the maiden is subsequently
recovered by her lover.

Wagner retained the three characters but their relations are entirely
changed. Two persons are in love, as in the previous operas, and an unlucky,
demon-like man approaches as before; but now the maiden suddenly ex-
periences a complete change of heart, and receives him with open arms be-
cause she dreamed of his coming and his presence wakes her slumbering
love for him. By her devotion to the new-comer, she saves him from some

42 O ACHER

terrible doom. She willingly offers her life as a sacrifice to show her
fidelity; and by this act the spell, which held the unfortunate man
captive, is broken and his struggles are over.

This is the central motif of practically all of Wagner's works. This one
theme seems to have occupied him throughout his life. He could never
get away from it. He found it necessary to change somewhat the story
of the Flying Dutchman in order to express his own life by introducing the
character Brie, as the lover of his heroine, before the main character ap-
peared. But into the character of the Flying Dutchman himself, he seems
to have projected a complete embodiment of his own sufferings; and in
Senta he found his ideal of woman as she appeared in his dreams and visions,
when his innermost feelings determined their character. In fact, the
women of his artistic creation are all of one type. All have longings for
something more or less fantastic, something not to be found in their im-
mediate environment.

Thus in all of Wagner's productions, but more especially in the one here
under consideration, there seem to be evidences of the fact that his soul
experienced something which pressed for expression, either in imagination
or in life; a phantom, an idea, a dream fancy, an intensive wish, longed for
fulfillment if only in fancy. Odysseus and Columbus both made a strong
appeal to him ; but neither quite embodied his case and it was only when
he heard the story of the Flying Dutchman that he saw the reflection of his
own life. The fact that the hero could be saved only by the sacrifice of a
true woman seems to have been the feature of the story which touched
Wagner. At the age of twenty-three he was rather hastily married, but
after seven months his wife left him; and although there was latec a
reconciliation it never completely effaced the disharmony. They were
separated by a fancy or dream of his, in which he embodied the form of an
ideal, self-sacrificing, insightful woman, who would be faithful unto death,
and whose love would soften his troubles.

Why this conflict in Richard Wagner's life and in his artistic produc-
tions? The answer to this question is found in his early childhood experi-
ences. When he was six months old his father died. After six months of
widowhood, his mother married the painter and actor, Ludwig Geyer, who
had befriended the family after the death of her first husband. Geyer
seems to have made a profound impression upon young Wagner; for
the latter as a boy was fond of the belief that he might have been the son of
Geyer. This belief is not uncommon among boys. The wish is father
to the thought that they might be the son of some other more famous man,
king or even God, than their legal father. Goethe and Beethoven enter-
tained this idea in their youth. The same notion is also found in myth and
poetry. It gives the son a chance to choose his father. As a boy, Wagner
seems to have toyed with this idea that Geyer was his father. But the
very satisfaction which he derived from this possibility so impressed the
youth that he came to act as if the assumption were true. Even in his
later life, this attitude toward Geyer was not abandoned. He always
liked to have Geyer's portrait with him; he adorned his step-father's
grave; and referred to him often in letters, but never to his real father.
He even dressed himself as Geyer did, and wore the latter's cap and gown.
What is the motive of this fancy of Wagner's youth, and that of other boys?
The CEdipus complex is at the basis of this fancy. The child's attitude
towards the mother is more or less erotic, and is due to over-fondness of the
mother. This stimulates a rivalry with the father, whom the son would
like to equal, but to whom he is subordinate. Thus the father is the rival
and yet the ideal of the son. Although the fancy of having a different
father involves the infidelity of the mother, it is by this means that the
rival father is set aside. At the same time, the ideal qualities of the father
as conceived by the son are given to the God, king, or prince, whom his
fancy chooses as his father. The conflict between the love of the father

RECENT FREUDIAN I^ITERATURE 42 1

and the rivalry with him is settled by setting aside the rival father, and at
the same time giving his qualities to a new father.

This attitude of the son towards the mother may easily give rise to fancies
in which the infidelity of the mother plays a large r61e. The ambition of
the little CEdipus to equal his father extends to the latter's relation with his
mother. In normal children, and under normal conditions, this attitude
towards the mother is repressed, and dies out entirely. But if there is a nat-
ural precocity, or if the mother is unduly tender with the child, and caresses
him too much, the erotic impulses may become so strong that the fancies
of rivalry and infidelity become so established that they can never be
wholly overcome. Repression and suppression may remove them from
consciousness, but they enter the unconscious realm as active forces, and
constantly exert a determining influence on conduct.

This is just what seems to have been the case with Richard Wagner.
His father having died when he was six months of age, his mother lavished
her affection upon the little son to drown her grief; and from this he never
recovered. As a man, he was always hungering for love and honor. No
sacrifice of friends was too great, and no honor and praise from women
admirers was ever sufficient to satisfy him. His memory of his childhood
was unusually keen; and his childhood characteristics were remarkably
well retained. His hate and his love, his suffering and his ecstasy were
all very childlike.

Thus the motif of the Flying Dutchman, and of some of the other of
Wagner's greatest works, springs from his childhood experiences and
fancies. The overfondness of the mother made such an impression upon
the child's mind that he was never afterwards entirely free from her person-
ality and characteristics. His heroines all embody the idealized qualities
which he conceived his mother to have possessed. When the Flying
Dutchman first saw Senta he said: "How strangely this maiden standing
before me seems to arise from long past memories!" This shows how
closely his mother's memory entered into his heroines. His fondness
for the fancy that Geyer might be his father sprang from the childish
wish that his mother had been unfaithful to his father for his sake. He
identified himself with Geyer, and remembered the latter because he
attributed to him what was in his own early childish fancy. This attitude
of rivalry left such a strong impression upon his psychic life that his
whole career was colored by it. It is just this relation of rivalry that
is manifested by nearly all of his heroes. They come, as a third party,
into the relations of two lovers, and successfully compete for the maiden's
love as did the Flying Dutchman. In the original story, this rivalry
was absent ; but Wagner created the character Eric as Senta's lover, prior
to the arrival of the Flying Dutchman, in order to embody the demands
of his life and to fulfill his own wishes. He looked upon his artistic pro-
ductions as a means of realizing his unfulfilled wishes, in actual life. He
said that if life itself were lived in its completeness there were no need of
art.

Although Wagner himself never guessed the source of these unfulfilled
wishes, psychoanalysis seems to make it clear that they sprang from his
childhood impressions; and that they were revived in his later life and ful-
filled in the heroes of his creation. They embodied what had always been
to him a fancy and a dream ; and the Flying Dutchman was par excellence
the expression of this dream.

An effort has been made to give a somewhat condensed resume of the
main facts and principles involved in each of foregoing articles. These
attempts at an intensive study of individual characters and personalities
are so thoroughly of the nature of pioneer work, and go so far beyond the
accepted standards of orthodox psychology in many of their explorations,
that it is difficult to attempt an evaluation. Perhaps it is not yet time

Journal— 7

422 ACHBR

to become too critical. It is in their effort to get at the dynamic factors of
psychic life that these studies are of immense importance. Whether one
accepts all their conclusions or not, they are still highly suggestive, if
not illuminating; and it does not seem too much to say that they are
prophetic of what the psychology of the future will largely concern itself
with. The emphasis placed on the evolutionary and genetic aspects of
psychic functioning cannot but meet the approval of all thorough-going
evolutionists. The effort to trace out the modification and sublimation of
the basic racial impulses into ever higher and more complex forms of which
all civilization is the expression is a stupendous programme, — but a most
fruitful one. One cannot but feel that these men are grappling with the
vital factors of mental life; and that, although their methods and conclusions
at times seem somewhat crude, they are opening rich mines of information
concerning psychic life, which are destined to make much of the present
introspective, laboratory psychology look pale and frothy if it is n't under-
mined entirely. The evidence which shows that consciousness is not to be
trusted in attempting to explain its own motives has already grown over-
whelming. The tremendous part played by unconscous complexes, in
the mental life of every normal person, cannot longer be doubted. In
the light of these facts it seems a little belated to continue the discussion
as to whether or not there is imageless thought.

It seems important, therefore, that this school of psychologists should
be given a full and free hearing. Nothing so tests one's open-mindedness,
and one's desire for more light, than such departures from the accepted
standards as the above studies are. The summary dismissal of the contri-
butions of the Freudian School as unscientific and without a basis of fact,
as some have a tendency to do, is simply a reflection of their own inability
to weigh principles in an unbiased fashion. Would it not be better to
adopt the same attitude towards these new contributions to psychology
that some denominations do towards repentant sinners; and put them on
probation for, say, a period of from five to ten years?

Coming now to closer quarters with these studies, an effort will be made
to point out a few of the common principles running through all of them.

Great emphasis is placed on sex in each of the studies, which is in har-
mony with one of the fundamental principles of the Freudian school. This,
in itself, is sufficient, in the eyes of many, to condemn it; although it is
safe to assume that not very many of those who criticise have clearly in
mind Freud's use of the term. He uses it in a very much larger sense
than current usage would warrant. He assumes that all evolutionary
variations and sublimations of the primitive impulse to procreate, in the
lower forms of life, can rightfully be designated sexual. In this he is
justified by Darwin's use of the term, as well as by all modem scientific
students of the subject. He accepts the dictum of the poet that hunger
and love rule the world; and he uses the terms sex and love synonymously.

The contention that the so-called partial sexual impulses manifest
themselves early in the infant's life, and virtually determine its later career,
is difficult to believe. While the above studies consider only the facts
as they actually occurred, and do not speculate as to what might. have
happened if conditions had been different, yet it does not seeem to do
violence to the spirit of these studies to say that, on their contention of the
great influence of the first years of infant life on the later career, Leonardo
da Vinci's life would have been completely changed if he had enjoyed the
presence of his father during the first four years of his life ; and that Wagner
received his lasting impressions by the time he was a year old.

In the case of Zinzendorf , the evidence of the effect of the early impressions
upon his later sex life is more convincing. The repression of practically
every form of play activity, and every other means of outlet for energy, and
the increasing emphasis upon the crucifixion of Jesus, with its tendency to
arouse strong emotions, were well fitted to give direction to his entire emo-

R^CBNT FREUDIAN LITERATURE 423

tional life. The religious care with which his mother fostered every incipi-
ent emotional attitude towards Jesus, even in his earliest years, could not
have been better planned to bring about his adult attitude.

The testimony which the Freudians marshal in support of the conten-
tion that infancy and childhood give evidence of sex manifestations is
being extended, from time to time, and is growing convincing. It is safe
to say that several chapters are yet to be written on the early sex life of
children, of which Freud has at least written the headings. That over-
much fondling, petting, and kissing tend to sensitize an infant to this form
of treatment, and make it sexually precocious, is now generally granted by
all close students of this phase of infant life. That this should leave per-
manent traces in the unconscious is easily possible. The following up of
early impressions, and the tracing of their influence upon later life is a
challenging problem, but one not yet fully developed. Freud has here
given direction to a line of investigation that is sure to yield an abundant
harvest.

So little is known about Leonardo da Vinci's early life that it seems a pity
that some other more familiar character was not chosen in preference to
him; and yet when one reads this classic analysis by that prince of psy-
choanalysts, one almost feels that, if more facts had been at hand, his almost
magic subtlety of analysis would have had less opportunity to reveal its
power and penetration. It is to be hoped that Freud will, in the near
future, psychoanalyze Goethe, Napoleon, Alexander the Great, or some
other great man, concerning whose life more facts are at hand.

One great contribution of the Freudian investigations to the knowledge
of sex is the demonstration that the energy expended in the satisfaction of
the sex impulse may be sublimated to higher mental activities. This prin-
ciple is illustrated most fully by the life of Leonardo da Vinci. In the case
of Wagner, it was not nearly so complete; while Count von Zinzendorf
offers a perhaps unique illustration of the pathological possibilities in this
respect. Instead of sublimating his sex impulse, he directed it towards
the physical Jesus almost in toto. It was simply the substitution of one
sex object for another, and the transfer of physical satisfaction to a satis-
faction due to the active use of the imagination.

This sublimation of sex energy into higher mental powers and capacities
is assumed by the Freudians to have been the very means of establishing
civilization. It was the long-circuiting of the sex impulse that produced
art, religion, poetry and scientific achievements. It is when sublimation
does not take place, and there is a successful effort to suppress the normal
physical expression of the sex impulse, that pathological mental symptoms
may begin to manifest themselves.

This whole problem of the sublimation of energy usually expended in the
sexual sphere to higher ends is of immense practical, as well as of moral and
hygienic, importance. The scientific study of this phase of life cannot be
too strongly commended. What the possibilities and limits of sublimation
are, is, of course, not yet clear; but here again the Freudians have begun a
line of investigation that promises to give a scientific basis for dealing with
this most perplexing and far-reaching of human problems. It might be
said, in passing, that it is this inclusive conception of sexuality that must
be adopted, if one is to follow the sublimation theory as worked out by the
Freudians.

The large place given to the unconscious, in these studies, seems to the
writer to be wholly justified, even if one is unable to accept all the com-
plicated mechanism and symbolism attributed to it. The Leonardesque
smile is most effectively accounted for from this point of view. The same
might be said about the peculiar characteristic of Wagner's musical and
dramatic productions, with their triangular complications, of which the
Flying Dutchman is perhaps the best type. In the case of Zinzendorf the
evidence of the effect of the early impressions upon his later life, through

424 ACHER

the mechanism of the unconscious, is so unmistakable that few are likely
to question it.

Another prominent characteristic of the Freudian theory of the uncon-
scious is that there is a positive tendency to suppress those elements of
childhood experience which do not conform to the moral standards of
adults, and that this suppression forces these memories into the uncon-
scious, where they have a positive influence in directing conduct. This
is so thoroughly established by the clinical experience of the psychoanalysts
that it is beyond the realm of controversy. And yet this point is frequently
objected to on the ground that the objecter does not find it so in his own case.
This kind of argument is about as effective as was that which attempted
to refute Berkeley's idealism by striking the earth with a cane. If a thing
is suppressed and forgotten the person who forgot it is certainly not in
a position to argue whether or not it has been forgotten. That the child,
in each of the above cases, should have suppressed his erotic attitude to-
wards his mother cannot be doubted in the light of the mass of clinical
evidence adduced by the psychoanalysts. Here, in the unconscious, it
still exerted a great influence upon the adult mind in all of these characters.

4. Freud, S. Die zukiinftigen Chancen der psychoanalytischen Therapie.
Zentralblatt fiir Psychoanalyse, 1 910, i . Jahrgang, Hef t 3^. pp. 1-9.

Freud wisely admits that psychoanalytical therapy has not yet com-
pletely won its battle, much as it has already accomplish ed in the treatment
of nervous diseases. He believes, however, that this method of treatment
has a bright future and he enumerates the sources from which it will
derive more strength as time goes on.

The first source from which strength will come will be a better under-
standing of the mechanism of the unconscious. This is necessary to a
correct diagnosis. Advances may be expected along the lines of a proper
interpretation of the symbolism of dreams, and of the unconscious. The
symbolism of dreams is a rich field, and needs yet to be fully developed
and explained.

Another source of strength will be a more thorough mastery of the tech-
nique of psychoanalysis. Two problems are involved here: the lessening
of the labors of the physician, and the discovery of a direct avenue to the
unconscious. Considerable change in the technique has developed since
the beginning of this method of treatment. Attention was at first directed
to an explanation of the symptoms; then to the discovery of the com-
plexes; and now attention is given to the forces of opposition. In
order to be successful in the technique, the physician must have examined
his own psychic life sufficiently to recognize symptoms in the patient.

An inevitable increase in authority and in prestige will constitute a third
source of strength. Heretofore, authority with its powerful ally, sugges-
tion, has been against the psychoanalyst. The very truths which psycho-
analysis discovers tend to be used as weapons against it. But truth must
ultimately prevail and Freud has faith that it will be so in the case of
psychoanalysis.

A fourth source of strength will come when the knowledge of the nature
of these psychoneuroses becomes generally known. These psychoneuroses
are due to the disguised compensatory satisfaction of an impulse, whose
existence is denied by the patient himself. Its very success depends upon
this distorted and unrecognized process. When the symptoms of these
neuroses become generally known, and the patient knows that his ail-
ment is generally understood, he will try to conceal this symptom and this
concealment will effect a cure. At one time, peasant maidens were fre-
quently afflicted with the delusion of being the holy virgin, for it received
some credence among the people. But now when such cases occur, people
feel that the girl is in need of medical treatment, and consequently such
delusions are rare. Just so will it be with the psychoneuroses.

RECENT FREUDIAN LITERATURE 425

Freud gives a word of warning against the invariable employment of
therapeutic and hygienic measures in all cases of psychoneuroses. He
thinks the psychoneurosis may at times be the mildest and best outlet of
an impulse that would lead to something worse if this means of expression
were cut off.

5. Freud, S. Ueher '-wilde' Psychoanalyse. Zentralblatt fiir Psychoan-
alyse. 1910. I Jahrgang, Heft 3. pp. 91-95.

This article is a protest against the use of psychoanalysis as a therapeutic
measure by those who show, by their application of it, that they have
mastered neither its scientific principles nor its technical details. The
paper was inspired by the complaint of a patient, who stated that she had
been given advice by a young physician which it was impossible to follow;
and that her feeling of anxiety became more intense after consulting this
physician. He had told her that her condition was due to unsatisfied
sexual needs, and that she should return to her divorced husband or secure
a lover.

Freud laments the fact that any one should do such violence to the
principles of psychoanalysis, when a study of the literature of the subject
would prevent any such unpardonable misapplication of its principles
and techinque.

The first blunder which this physician made was to narrow the term
sexual life to the merely somatic phases of the term, whereas psychoan-
alysis uses the term in a very much more inclusive way. This is justified
from the genetic point of view. All of the tender emotions are considered
to be a part of the sexual life which had their source in the primitive sexual
impulse, even though they inhibit the original sexual end or transform it
to non-sexual ends. Psycho-sexuality is preferred by psychoanalysts,
because it gives proper emphasis to the psychic factors. It is almost
synonymous with the term love. The author points out that there are
cases which show every indication of a lack of mental satisfaction, with all
its consequences, accompanying no lack of sexual indulgence in the somatic
sense of the term. These unsatisfied sexual strivings, which often create
a sort of substitute satisfaction that shows itself in nervous symptoms,
are helped very little by sexual indulgence. Freud emphasizes the fact
that those who limit the term sexuality to the merely somatic factors have
no right to apply the principles of psychoanalysis as therapeutic measures.
It deals with the etiological significance of sex, and must include all factors
however remote they may have come to be, through individual and racial
sublimation.

A second misconception of the above mentioned young physician was
the contention that want of sexual satisfaction is the cause of nervous
disorders. It is not the lack of satisfaction, but the conflict between the
hbidinous impulse and the effort to suppress it that causes the trouble.
Another error is to assume that all symptoms that indicate anxiety are
due to anxiety neuroses, and can be cured by somatic therapeutics. It
is necessary to know the symptoms which indicate anxiety neurosis, so as to
distinguish this form of nervous disorder from other pathological conditions
with anxiety as a symptom. No adequate therapeutic measures can be
applied without a clear grasp of this distinction, because their etiology is
different in each case, and the treatment must likewise be different.

The assumption that mere lack of knowledge of the cause of the symp-
toms does the injury, and that this information given to the patient can
effect a cure is as foolish, says Freud, as to assume that the menu card can
satisfy the appetite. It is not the ignorance, but the opposition which
causes this ignorance by suppressing and repressing the knowledge of the
facts, that produces the psychic disorder. It is the problem of therapeutics
to conquer this opposition, and to bring to the surface the facts in the case.

426 ACH^R

Mere telling would not suffice. The physician must prepare the patient
for the information, and must, at the same time, secure the patient's con-
fidence so that when the true state of affairs begins to dawn upon the pa-
tient's consciousness, he will believe it and trust the physician. This takes
infinite tact and patience; and it is difficult to acquire the requisite
technique. To avoid responsibility for the universal application of psy-
choanalysis, the leaders in this field have effected an international organi-
zation whose membership is limited to practitioners who are competent
to apply psychoanalytical principles. In this way, it is hoped that the
friends of psychoanalysis will be protected from the blunders of those who
would apply it without a mastery of its fundamental principles.

6. Freud, S. Die psychogene Sehstorung in psychoanalytischer Auffassung.
Arztliche Fortbilding. Jahrgang 1910, Nr. 9. pp. 1-7.

Freud is not satisfied with the explanation of the psychogenic visual
disturbances which is offered by the French school, of which Janet is the
chief exponent; and he offers a theory of his own, which he believes comes
much nearer to the facts. All psychopathologists have come to recognize
the unconscious as an ever present phenomenon in cases of hysteria. For
example, in the hysterically blind certain visual stimuli will awaken
strong emotions, even though the patient declares he sees nothing. These
people are blind only for consciousness. For the unconscious they can
see. It is such phenomena as these that force us to recognize a distinction
between the conscious and the unconscious.

Why this conscious blindness and the unconscious ability to see? The
French school answers with the statement that there is a tendency to
dissociation. Perhaps the idea of being blind acts as an auto-suggestion;
and the actual state of blindness follows. In this way, many unconscious
processes become separated from conscious processes. In all of this, there
is an innate, dispositional inability to synthetize experiences, due perhaps
to native weakness.

Freud holds that this is only substituting one riddle for another. He
points out that it is difficult to harmonize the following phases of Janet's
theory; the rise of an idea that acts as an auto-suggestion; his discrimi-
nation between conscious and unconscious mental processes; and the
assumption that there is a mental tendency to dissociation. All of these
are used by the French school in their effort to explain these cases.

Psychonalysis offers a more satisfactory explanation. It accepts the
ideas of the unconscious and of dissociation; but it considers them in a
different relation. It considers the psychic life as made up of dynamic
factors which enforce or inhibit one another. If a group of ideas is in the
unconscious, it does not assume a constitutional inability to synthetize
the various psychic elements as the basis of this dissociation. It considers
this group of ideas in the unconscious as having come in conflict with
another group of ideas, and as having been repressed by them into the
unconscious. It assumes that such repressions play an extraordinarily
important role in our mental life, and that disturbances may often arise
as a result of an unsuccessful effort to repress ideas. This gives rise to the
symptoms of hysteria.

When in psychogenic disturbances of sight, certain ideas connected with
sight are shut out from consciousness, psychoanalysis assumes that these
ideas came into opposition with other stronger ideas which forced them
into the unconscious by an act of repression. This latter group of ideas
may be termed the self group. Why this conflict between groups of
ideas? Here we must consider the significance of impulses for the rise
and decline of ideas. Every impulse tends to arouse and appropriate
to its use all those ideas which serve its ends. These impulses do not
always have the same ends; and conflict of interests is common. The
conflict of ideas, therefore, rests upon a conflict of impulses. There

RECENT FREUDIAN UTKRATURE 427

is an undoubted conflict between those impulses which have sexual
pleasures for their object and those others which tend to the preservation
of the individual. These latter might be called the self-preservation
impulses ; and they might correspond to the group of ideas whidi were men-
tioned above, and which are known as the self group. Freud accepts the
words of the poet that hunger and love rule the world; and holds that all
organic impulses which manifest themselves in the psychic life of the
individual could be classified under the terms hunger and love.

The sexual impulse has been followed from its first manifestations in
childhood to its mature development ; and it has been found to be made up
of a number of partial impulses, which arise from the stimulation of various
parts of the body. It has also been found that these isolated impulses
must undergo a complex development before they can be brought to serve
their final purpose of procreation. The application of psychology to the
study of cultural development shows that culture arises by means of the
sublimation, inhibition and repression of these isolated or partial impulses.
All disorders, known as neuroses, are traceable to the miscarriage of these
attempted transformations of the partial sexual impulses. The impulse
to self-preservation feels that it is threatened by the demands of the sexual
impulse, and protects itself through repressions, which do not always have
the desired result. These repressed impulses may establish a substitute
as a means of satisfaction ; and they will thus have an injurious effect upon
the mental integrity of the individual. In this way the symptoms known
as neuroses are built up.

From this point of view the neuroses are brought into vital relation with
the whole psychic life. Returning now to the special problem under consid-
eration, it must be granted that all organs and systems of the body may
serve both the sexual impulse, and the impulse to self-preservation. Sex-
ual pleasure is not limited to the genitals. The mouth serves for kissing,
as well as for eating. The eyes not only observe what is necessary for the
preservation of life, but also those features of an object that make it an
object of love. It is not easy to serve two masters. The more such an organ
with a double function serves the one impulse, the less it tends to serve
the other. This principle must lead to pathological consequences, when
the two fundamental impulses work at cross purposes, and the self pres-
ervation impulse represses any partial impulse that might serve the
sexual end. The application of this to visual disturbances can easily
be made. The partial sexual impulse connected with the eye might be
called sexual curiosity. If this impulse, on account of its undue service
in the interests of sexual pleasure, draws to itself the opposition of the self-
impulse, so that the ideas in which it expresses itself are repressed, and do
not come to consciousness, there is sure to be a disturbance in the relations
of vision to consciousness. The self has lost its domination over the eye,
which now gives itself over entirely to the service of the repressed sexual
impulse. It gives the impression of having gone too far in the repression
of the partial sexual impulse, in that the self now refuses to see at all,
since the sexual interests pressed forward so vigorously in sight. As a sort
of retaliation the repressed impulse claims the exclusive use of the eye;
and this is the price consciousness has to pay for the repression.

A similar case is that of the hand which becomes hysterically paralyzed
after it has attempted to carry out some sexual aggression, but is inhibited
from accomplishing its purpose, just as if it remained stubbornly by its
impulse to carry out the repressed innervation. In the beautiful legend
of Lady Godiva, all the townspeople hid themselves behind closed shutters
in order to lighten the task of this lady who was required to ride through
the streets naked in daylight. Any one who looked at the naked beauty
was punished by losing his eye-sight. This legend is one of many in which
the key to interpretation is found in neuroticism.

428 ACH^R

F'reud says the criticism that these pathological processes are explained
by purely psychological theory is unjust, since the emphasis in all of these
cases is placed upon the pathogenic role of sexuality, which is certainly
not exclusively psychic. Psychoanalysis never forgets that the psychic
factors rest on the organic, although its work only leads to the latter, and
it does not attempt an organic explanation. It is also ready to postulate
that not all functional disturbances of vision are of psychic origin. When
an organ which serves both kinds of impulses increases its erotic role, it is very
probable that this does not happen without a change of irritability and
innervation, which manifest themselves as disturbances of the function of
the organ in its service of the self. It is not improbable that there may be
toxic changes at the basis of a change of the organ's service from that of
self to that of sexual ends. The term neurotic disturbances covers dis-
orders of functional or physiological as well as of toxic origin.

7. FrBud, S. Ueher den Gegensinn der Urworte. Jahrbuch f iir psycho-
analytische und psychopathologische Forschungen. Band II. 1910.
pp. 179-184.

In this article Freud points out a striking parallel between certain
dream phenomena and certain ancient linguistic usages. He maintains
that, in dreams, the negative does not occur. Opposites are brought into
unity, or are presented as one, with peculiar predilection. Since in dreams
all desirable things are attained, because of the law of wish fulfilment,
there can be no opposite or opposing factor.

The dream intrepreters of old seem to have recognized the fact that in
a dream a thing can represent its opposite.

Freud says he reached an understanding of this peculiar dream phe-
nomenon of avoiding the negative and of presenting opposites with the
same word, on reading Abel's pamphlet. This author points out the great
age of the Egyptian language, and then shows that in this language there
are many words which possess two meanings, the one of which is the
direct opposite of the other. It will thus be seen that this familiar char-
acteristic of dreams is identical with that of the oldest of ancient languages.

The explanation which Abel offers for this characteristic of ancient lan-
guages is as follows: Our notions of things are a product of a process of
comparison. If it were always light, we could have no conception of dark-
ness. All things are thus relative to one other. Thus every conception
is, in a sense, a twin of its opposite; and, originally, the one could not be
thought of without the other. Thus, one word always brought to mind
both ideas; and the two ideas were expressed by the one word. It was
by a gradual process that each idea came to have a term of its own, and
could be thought of without its opposite. In writing, the ancient Egyp-
tians always used a determining picture before the word to designate the
meaning intended. Two words were subsequently evolved which sprang
from the same root with its double meaning. According to this writer,
the same characteristic is common to the Semitic and to various European
languages. In Latin, altus — means high, and deep; sacer, — holy, and
danmed. Some phonetic modification may be made as clamare, to cry
out — clam, quiet; siccus, dry — succus, soft. In German Boden means the
uppermost as well as the lowest in the house, even to-day. From bos
(schlecht) sprang bass which means good; in old Saxon bat, which means
good, as against the English, bad. In English, "to lock," as against the
German Liicke, a hole, illustrates the same phenomenon.

Another peculiarity of the Egyptian language is that the letters of a
word may be reversed and still represent the same thing. If bad were
Egyptian it might also be written dab. This also holds true of other lan-
guages. It is also a thing which children take a peculiar pleasure in doing.
In dreams, the material is often reversed to serve a definite end. Here,

RieC^NT FREUDIAN LITERATURE 429

however, it is not letters that are reversed, but ideas and images. Freud
thinks that this similarity between dreams and ancient languages justifies
the inference that dreams are regressive and archaic in character; and that,
to understand dreams, we must know more of the evolution of language
and speech.

8. Freud, S. Beitrdge zur Psychologie des Liebeslebens. Jarhbuch fiir
psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen. Band II.
1910. pp. 389-397-

Freud believes that poets have been entrusted too exclusively to tell us
about the psychology of love, and its various manifestations. Their aims
have never been to be true to the fact, for they always make full use of
poetic license in dealing with this theme.

Psychoanalysis gives special opportunity to obtain glimpses into the
love-life of patients, which one may also notice in daily life after one's atten-
tion has been called to it. Certain types are discovered on the basis of
object choice. The type here discussed is characterized by several con-
ditions which call forth the feeling.

The first condition is that of including an injured third party. Such
a man never loves a woman who is free or has no lover. Sometimes the
woman may even be ridiculed until she enters into the above-mentioned
relation, when she at once becomes the object of the most intense love.

The second condition of love is that the woman be not virtuous, or, at
least, not above si'spicion. This characteristic may vary from the flirt to
the genuinely polygamous coquette.

As the first condition gives opportunity for satisfying the malignant
feeling or impulse towards the man whose loved one is won away from
him, the second condition gives opportunity for the exercise of the feeling
of jealousy, which seems to be a necessary accompaniment of this type of
Igve. It is only then that the woman attains to full worth in the eyes of
the lover. Strangely enough, jealousy is never directed against the right-
ful possessor of the loved one, but against the new-comer, with whom the
woman might be brought into question. It is only during this triangular
relation that the love continues. This is an abnormal condition, be-
cause, in normal love, the moral integrity of the woman is a necessary
pre-condition. A peculiar trait of this type of lover is that he wants to
save his object of love from a career of vice. But a successful accomplish-
ment of this purpose does not intensify the love relationship; in fact,
failure to save her increases his love.

A psychoanalysis of these characters reveals the fact that there is
one determining cause for these various conditions of masculine love.
It springs from the infantile tenderness towards the mother, which has
become fixed. In normal love, there remain few traces of this early
attitude towards the mother. Occasionally they manifest themselves in
cases in which young men fall in love with older women. In the type
here under discussion, the object of love is a mother surrogate, because
the mother's influence cannot be cast off. This accounts for the fact
that the woman who attracts attention must be attached to a third
party. The child soon learns that the mother is united to the father; and
the latter becomes the injured third party. The intensity and fidelity of
the devotion of this type of lover is also an echo of the undivided love of
mother. The frequent change of the object of love also suggests that the
surrogate does not fully satisfy the unconscious demands of the individual.

How does this love for an unfaithful coquette spring from the mother-
constellation of the child, when the very term mother is the direct opposite
of prostitute in our adult conscious minds? The unconscious often con-
siders as one what consciousness separates into opposites. Here, again,
we must go back for an explanation to the time when the child obtains

430 ACHl^R

his first knowledge of the sexual relations of adults. This information often
comes in ways that destroy the child's faith in adults. He may even deny
that this relation between adults of the opposite sex applies to his own
parents. At about this time, he also learns that some women become
prostitutes; and that their conduct destroys people's respect for them.
When he learns that his mother is not different from other parents in sexual
matters, he cynically says that, after all, there is not such a great difference
between his mother and the prostitute, because both are guilty of the same
thing. This information awakes his memories of his infantile impres-
sions and wishes, which again become active. But the father stands be-
tween him and his desire. The CEdipus complex becomes active. He
therefore lives, in fancy, his wish fulfilment. The two motives of desire
and revenge are favorable to the fancy that the mother is untrue. The
lover with whom she is untrue is usually the idealized, mature self.

It is thus easy to see that this family romance leaves traces in the uncon-
scious ; and that this is why it is necessary for the woman to be a coquette
or a prostitute in order to arouse the passion of love in the adult. The
pubertal fancies persist in the unconscious, and demand satisfaction in
the reality of later life.

The desire to save the woman who is loved springs from the parent-com-
plex. When the son learns that he owes his life to his parents, he is seized
with a desire to repay them in some equally worthy way. His attitude
toward the father becomes more haughty and he fancies that he saves
him from some great danger. Toward his mother, his attitude is more
tender and worthy, and the notion of saving his mother is transformed,
in the unconscious, to a desire to present her with a child, — naturally a
child like himself. The mother has given the child his life, and he can
only give her another life, that of a child which resembles himself. In
this sense he identifies himself with his father, and wishes to become his
own father. Thus, the notion of saving the woman he loves really means
to bring a child to birth ; and the symbol must be interpreted just as in
dreams. The idea of danger is associated with the birth of the child. Freud
thinks the experience of being bom is a sort of type of all later danger
and anxiety, since it left an affective impression which developed into
anxiety.

9. Sadger, J. Aus dem Lieheslehen Nicolaus Lenaus. Schriften zur
angewandten Seelenkunde, 1909. Sechstes Heft. pp. 1-98.

This is a psychoanalytical study of the love between the poet Lenau
and Sophie, the wife of his friend Max Lowenthal. The writer points out
that in any such triangular relation, the situation is wholly in the hands
of the woman. Sophie Lowenthal was an intelligent woman, who married
at the urgent entreaties of her parents, and not because she loved her hus-
band. She felt he was not her equal. She had three children; and, at
twenty-six years of age, refused to have further sexual relations with her
husband. She was sexually anaesthetic, excepting that she loved to be
caressed and kissed. This she received from Lenau freely and almost
daily during their period of love. Her husband was assured that Lenau
would not go too far because of her peculiar condition. This is a
typical symptom of hysteria, in the case of women who have borne children.
Sophie had other symptoms of hysteria also.

The influence of her father dominated her entire life. He had the patri-
archal attitude and Sophie had more than a child's love for him. He
called the children together two or three times a week to tell them of nature
and of history, and to these recitals Sophie listened intently. From this
relation with her father, she acquired the longing to associate with famous
men.

It is well known that the first love of children is always the parent of the
opposite sex; and that later so-called first loves are simply the renewal of

RE)CE;nT FREUDIAN UT^RATURE 43 1

this earlier love in disguise. This was strikingly true in the case of Sophie.
The two men whom she really loved resembled her father in many ways.

The love of the child for its parent should not be confused with the con-
scious sexual love of later years. The tender love of Sophie for her father
is a universal phenomenon, and contained nothing but the purest sentiment.
He kissed her, embraced her, took her on his lap, carried her upon his arm,
and the like, as any father would do. However, it is nevertheless true
that this early experience sinks deeply into the child's very soul and often
determines its later love-choice. It is held by many writers that, in
cases where two persons fall in love at first sight, they resemble each
other. This is explained by the fact that the man selects a woman that
resembles his first love, i. e., his mother, whom he naturally resembles.
The same is true with the woman. Thus each resembles a parent of the
other which insures their resemblance to each other. The innocent love
between the child and parent, therefore, teaches the child to love, in later
fife, and determines the choice, all unconsciously.

This explains Sophie's attitude toward Lenau. He was a noted man
like her father, as she thought. She granted him everything which her
father granted her, in her childhood and refused other concessions because
she repressed these in her attitude toward her father. Sexually anaesthetic
women are often made so by the fact that they repress the incestuous feel-
ing toward the parent of the opposite sex at puberty, and continue in this
attitude toward the men of their choice throughout life.

Her piety also sprang from her love for her father, which shows that re-
ligion and love have the same foundation. God becomes the embodiment
of fatherly virtues. At fifteen, she placed all suffering upon the Lord who
cares for all as her father cared for his children. Her hope for another life
was due to her unsatisfied longings in this life. This played an important
role in her love for Kochil, her first lover, whom she surrendered at the re-
quest of her father. The only other man she ever loved was Lenau ; and
toward him she manifested the same attitude that she did towards her
father.

In Lenau's early life the (Edipus complex was unusually well developed;
and he never succeeded in getting away from his mother's influence. She
was intensely emotional and violently passionate. She threatened to take
her life, when her dear ones died, just as Lenau later threatened to do.
Her attitude toward her son, Lenau, was always characterized by the
strongest emotion and love. She saw his father's traits in her son, and
loved him the more for this because her husband died when Lenau was
five years old. She idolized him in the most extreme manner. At times
she was possessed with the idea that she might lose her son, or that some-
thing had happened to him when away from her. She frequently deserted
her second husband and children to follow him. She often prepared
special food for him, and served it while he was still in bed. His will was
always supreme. His mother sowed the seeds of megalomania in many
ways; and in adult life these childhood fancies and impressions dictated
his entire life. He felt that the world did not recognize his worth, and did
not reward him as he deserved. He tried to act the part of a nobleman
although his means did not allow it. He could not endure a joke at his
expense; and tolerated moods only in himself. He became desperate,
when fate did not always deal with him as his mother did. He became
intolerably indolent in adult life, because his bodily and mental wants as
a child had been so completely satisfied by his mother. He refused to
strive or plead for anything as a man because such a course had not been
necessary to secure what he wanted from his mother.

He could never love a woman unless the conditions were identical with
those of his early home life. He must be the centre of attraction, with no
rival in sight. He must be allowed to live the same life of indolence and
carelessness as when he was a boy; he must be allowed to come and go

432 ACHER

when he pleased, to talk or be silent as his mood dictated. Three families
catered to these caprices. The jfirst was that of his sister, Therese, who
was attached to him from childhood. She loved him more than her hus-
band and children; her attitude toward him was similar t^o that of his
mother. Emile Reinbeck also gave him the same attention, and he loved
her devotedly. But the woman who most nearly embodied his mother's
attitude toward him and whose intuition led her to adjust herself more
and more to this pattern of his mother was Sophie Lowenthal.

He even demanded good food from his feminine friends as his mother had
always catered to his appetite. He never went walking for his health,
never took a bath, never ventilated his room. His mother's influence was
evident even in such matters as his sleeping with the candle burning, and
his invariable habit of taking more personal effects (umbrellas, books,
canes) with him than he needed, whenever he travelled.

It is clear that through his mother's mistaken kindness, Lenau was
mightily influenced in large matters as in small, in youth as in later life,
in his character as in his bodily condition; and this gave direction to his
insanity. Every woman, whom the poet could love, must remind him
of his mother. In fact, in loving other women, he only loved his mother
in disguise.

He had sadistic, as well as homosexual, tendencies, which, however, did
not crop out until his insane period when his inhibitions were removed.

His love for his violin and guitar was distinctly erotic. Both these in-
struments have long been regarded as symbols of the feminine form, and
this was plainly the case with Lenau. This was more evident in his in-
sane period, when he adopted the same tender attitude toward his violin
that he had previously manifested toward the women of his love. He
would allow no one to touch it. Both homosexual as well as heterosexual
motives were associated with the violin. When he disliked his violin
teacher, he also discarded the instrument for the guitar. But when he
found a violin teacher whom he loved, his love for this instrument also re-
turned. At times he played his violin all night long; this long-continued
activity gave rise to a state of intense exaltation, but it was followed by a
reaction. At times, he played Beethoven with such vigor that drops of
perspiration appeared upon his face, and he became completely exhausted.
When he was intensely in love with a woman who responded to his love,
his interest in his violin decreased, but was again awakened when his love
grew cold.

There is evidence for a belief that he masturbated more or less. In
conversation he was pains-takingly careful not to allude to anything ques-
tionable, and he was mortally offended when others mentioned such sub-
jects to him. This phenomenon is frequently caused by a desire to com-
pensate for a secret vice. The healthy man does not take pleasure in
sensual conversation ; neither is he deeply affected by it.

His teacher, Kovesdy, stimulated his homosexual nature as his mother
did his heterosexual.

His love episode with Bertha left an indeUble impression upon him. Her
unfaithfulness to him caused him more pain and misery, in his later life,
that can fully be accounted for by the fact that he inherited a despondent
disposition. This suffering did not begin until after his mother's death.
It would seem that he, in some way, identified his mother with Bertha,
because in his childhood his mother was untrue to him in that she bore
children to his step-father. But more likely there was also an element of
self-condemnation in it, because he was untrue to his first love.

His fixed idea to come to America in spite of the protestations of friends
and relatives points to unconscious, repressed, erotic feelings. First of
all this idea sprang from his identifying himself with Kovesdy, who had
failed to carry out his plan of coming to America. Lenau thus wanted
to complete his friend's wish, and at the same time to regain his purity in

RECENT FREUDIAN LITERATURE 433

a strange land, in order thereby to become worthy of his mother again.
He carried out his idea faithfully while in America; but, after his return,
intense happiness alternated with deep melancholy. It was at this time
that Sophie Lowenthal began to exercise her influence over him. His
identification of Sophie with his mother was a very gradual process. She
first manifested great interest in his poetic works, which enabled her to
creep into his affections. Her indifference toward her husband led her
to value his attentions. His mother's recent death left a vacant place in
his affections which Sophie soon began to occupy, because of her tender-
ness to him. When he discovered her to be with child there returned the
old feeling which he had formerly experienced toward his mother when as
a child she became pregnant from his step-father. His love for Sophie
now became all the more intense.

From this time on, Sophie refused her husband marital intimacy, and
informed Lenau of the fact. This fulfilled a strong childhood wish in
reference to his mother and completed the identity of Sophie and his
mother.

A peculiar relation existed between his love and his piety. When in
love, he was very religious; when not in love, he was sceptical. At times
he almost identified God and Sophie. Both he and Sophie believed that,
in the hereafter, their fondest hopes and longings would be realized. He
pictured the hearafter thus: "My atmosphere will be your breath; my
light will be your eye; my drink will be your word; my blood, your kiss;
my bed, your heart; my place of abode, the kingdom of God with you,
dear Sophie!"

Sophie's hysteria demanded a lover who was satisfied with the satis-
faction of the impulse to contrectation without detumescence, to use Moll's
terminology. Both were saved from the evil consequences of unsatisfied
sexual excitement by a greater ailment. It was a case of a smaller evil
being swallowed up by a larger one. In her case, it was hysteria; in his
case, his serious afifliction which later culminated in insanity. Under
similar circumstances, a normal person would have been subject to anxiety
neuroses. Sophie's jealousy was in a measure due to this partial unsatis-
faction, as is the case with most women who are jealous.

There is little doubt that, if Lenau and Sophie had been free to marry,
they would never have lived together long. His inability to attach his
attention to any one thing for a long time, as well as her anaesthetic nature,
would have tended against this. It was only the thought of constant
danger of separation that bound them together. Lenau appreciated
this when he said that his misfortune was the greatest joy of his life. In
both cases, they obeyed the law of love, and ignored every other considera-
tion. At one time Caroline linger seemed about to supplant Sophie. Her
success was, at first, due to her motherly kindness to him, and her effort
to make him happy. But later, she began to ask favors herself instead of
giving them; and this was so different from his mother's attitude that he
soon cast her off. But the subtle influence of Sophie in' portraying her
lack of virtue and in pleading with him also had its effect. Here again his
despondency upon finding that Caroline was unworthy seems to have made
an impression somewhat akin to his Bertha experience, and it may be
explained in the same way.

His later life was filled with various premonitions of the final catastrophe
which culminated, in 1844, in insanity due to a syphilitic infection which
he had acquired some twelve years before. It is very likely that Sophie's
love and attention tended to cheer and sustain the poet in his last years of
affliction before the final breakdown.

10. FbrEnczi, S. Introjektion und Uebertragung. Jahrbuch fur Psycho-
analytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, 19 10. Band. I.
pp. 1-38.
This article is composed of two parts.

434 ACHER

I. Die Introjektion in der Neurose, and 2. Die Rolle der Uebertragung
bei der Hypnose und Suggestion.

The most prominent feature in the psychoanalytical treatment of hysteria
is the process known as transference {Uebertragung) of emotional activity
from some person previously known by the patient, to the physician.
However, this transference, or tendency to transference of emotion, is
not alone characteristic of the ^psychoanalytic treatment, but is mani-
fest at all times, and seems to be a fundamental attribute of this form of
the psychic mechanism. The apparently unmotived but extreme expres-
sion of love, hate, or sympathy of neurotics is the transference of feeling
from some long-forgotten psychic experience to the person under consider-
ation. In these cases, the unconscious complexes which are strongly toned
with feeling over-emphasize the emotion manifested towards the per-
son, by being brought into some kind of association with the idea of him.
This extreme manifestation of emotion has long been noticed in hysteri-
cals ; but it was regarded as a simulation of feeling, because there could be
discovered no adequate motive for the feeling. The feeling is, however,
genuine, and receives its motivation from the unconscious complexes which
remain in the background, but use this means of expressing the accumu-
lated emotion that has been waiting for an outlet. The discovery of this
mechanism is due to the investigations of Freud. The tendency of psycho-
neurotics to simulate, and the so-called "psychic infection" among hys-
tericals are not simple automatisms, but find their explanation in the
unconscious wishes and desires of the patients. Frequently, a patient
assumes the symptoms of another person, because he identifies himself with
that person, for one reason or another. Intense sympathy springs from
this same source. The impulsive acts of generosity and charity are, also,
reactions to these unconscious demands and may, in the last analysis, prove
to be egotistical.

The fact that movements of reform or movements of a humanita-
rian nature often secure recruits, in large measure, from neuropaths is
due to the transfer of interests from egotistic, self-condemned tendencies
of the unconscious, to subjects in which these interests can find expression
without repression and criticism or condemnation. The tendency of
hystericals to eat indigestible foods, their desire to eat at a strange table,
or to eat food of a peculiar form or consistency all point to a transfer of
interest from repressed, erotic tendencies, and reveal a state of unsatisfied
sexual impulses.

The business of the psychoanalyst is to provide a means by which the
emotion attached to a repressed complex may find expression, by being
transferred to some other object; and the physician usually becomes this
object. But this is only a temporary make-shift, and the real cure is
brought about by leading the patient to resurrect in consciousness the
source of his emotions in the repressed unconscious complexes.

The reason why the physician is so often the object toward which the
transference is made is that the CEdipus complex is almost invariably
present in the patient ; and the physician's fatherly care easily leads to the
same attitude towards him that was manifested toward the parent in child-
hood. Sometimes, a trivial factor may bring about the transference, such
as the color of the hair, the facial expression, a gesture, the manner of hold-
ing the cigarette or the pen, the identity of name with that of a friend of
the patient, etc. The sex of the physician is, of course, important. In
the case of female patients, this frequently suffices to attach this feeling
to a male physician. But the homosexual component, that Hes hidden in
every male, may lead male patients to make the transference.

This transfer of emotion from one object to another is a fundamental
characteristic of neuroticism; it explains conversion and substitution
as symptoms of hysteria. All neurotics suffer as a result of withdrawing
the libido from certain, previously pleasur ably- toned complexes of ideas.

RSCSNT FREUDIAN LITERATURE 435

If the withdrawal is not complete, the interest in that which was previously-
loved or hated is lessened. If it is more complete, the complex is wholly-
repressed and forgotten for consciousness. But it appears that the psychic
mechanism cannot endure the libido separated from its complex; it is,
therefore, transformed into anxiety. Psycho-neurotics have a similar
tendency to withdraw the psychic libido from certain complexes; and this
gives rise to a form of enduring unrest which the patient seeks to mitigate.
It may succeed, partially, in conversion, — which leads to hysteria, —
and in substitution, — which leads to anxiety neuroses. But this never
succeeds completely; and there always appears to be a portion of the im-
pulse which seems to seek satisfaction in the external world. This accounts
for the neurotic's tendency to transfer emotion from one object to another.

A comparison of neurotics with those who suffer from dementia praecox
and paranoia will throw light upon the former. In dementia praecox the
patient loses his interest in the external and becomes autoerotic. The
paranoiac projects all interests, which have become painful, into the ex-
ternal world. The psychoneurotic acts in a manner which is diametrically
opposite to paranoia. He takes up a great part of the external world
into the self, and uses it as a basis for unconscious fancy. It is a sort of
attenuation process by which the free, unsatisfied and not to be satisfied
unconscious wish stimuli are weakened. This process is called introjec-
tion as opposed to projection. The neurotic is constantly in search of
objects, with which he can identify himself and to which he can transfer
feelings, and which he introjects, or draws into the circle of his interests.
The illness is due to an enlargement of the self. Both projection and in-
trojection are extreme forms of psychic processes which are present in normal
life. In the child, everything is projected into the external world, and
in paranoia the same thing is true, in an effort to minimize the self. The
first love and hate are a transference of autoerotic pleasure and displeasure
to the object that arouses these feelings. Freud even goes so far as to say
that man's philosophy and religious metaphysics are only a projection of
his feeling stimuli into the outer world.

But introjection plays an equally great role. This is indicated by the
fact that so much of possible human experience is reflected in mythology.

The neurotic thus uses a normal mechanism when he attaches his feel-
ing to all possible objects which are not directly related to him, in order
to be able to leave in the unconscious the attachment to objects that are
closely related to him.

The difference between the normal and the abnormal is one of quantity.
The normal person transfers his affection upon much better grounds, and
does not dissipate his mental energy in such useless ways as the neurotic.
In the normal person the introjection is a much more conscious process,
while with the neurotic it is largely a matter of unconscious activity.

This transference of affects from the patient to the physician is at the
basis of all cures brought about by electro-, mechano-, hydro-therapy
and massage; as well as all other cures wrought by suggestion and hyp-
notism.

The second part of this article applies the principle of transference to
suggestion and hypnosis. The explanation of these phenomena, which
assumes that the implanting of the idea of sleep by the hypnotist leads to
dissociation, and that ideas presented to the subject will then easily have
the right of way over others, does not seem satisfactory. There are cer-
tainly deeper psychic forces at work, of which, as yet, no full account has
been taken. Evidence is accumulating daily, which points to the fact that
the main work in hypnosis and suggestion is done not by the hypnotist
but by the subject himself. The existence of auto-suggestion and auto-
hypnosis, on the one hand, and the work of the so-called "mediums," on
the other, argue that the function of the hypnotist is a subordinate one.
Psychoanalysis has shown that even in normal persons in the waking state.

436 ACHER

the conditions for dissociation are always highly favorable. It has also
shown, that in the course of the development of the civilized individual,
many impulses are repressed, and that these repressed impulses, with
their accompanying unsatisfied affects, are always ready to transfer them-
selves to persons and objects in the external world, and to bring the latter
unconsciously into touch with the self or to introject them. In hypnotism
and in suggestion, the role of the hypnotist reduces itself to an object to
which the unconscious transfers affects for its own relief.

The significant part which the parental complex plays in the life of
each individual is the basis for this transference of emotion in hypnotism
and in suggestion. The same complexes are brought into play in the nor-
mal individual that are active in psychoneuroses. The hypnotist may turn
toward himself certain complexes in the subject's unconscious mental life,
that are toned with fear, hate, anxiety, etc., because something about him
leads the subject to identify him with some person who has previously
aroused these same feelings. This usually goes back to childhood ex-
periences, that were repressed in later life.

It has been found that sympathy and respect greatly enhance the possi-
bility of suggestion and hypnotism. There is much evidence for believ-
ing that the unconscious affects play the principal role in both suggestion
and hypnotism ; and that these are, in the last analysis, feelings connected
with the sexual impulse, which are transferred from the child-parent com-
plex to the hypnotist-subject complex Everything points to the fact that,
at the basis of every feeling of sympathy, there is an unconscious sexual
element; and when two persons meet, the unconscious factors attempt
to make the transference. If the transference is successful, be it a purely
erotic feeling, or a sublimated one of respect, esteem, friendship, etc., there
springs up the feeling of sympathy between the two. If there is objection
to this transference on the part of the fore-conscious, other feelings spring
up which may lead to antipathy, disgust, etc. The question as to whether
any person can be hypnotized depends for its answer upon whether there
is a possibility of transference of the unconscious sexual attitude of the
subject to the hypnotist. This, in turn, is determined by the parent-com-
plex. The great variation in the proportion of hypnotizable persons, as
reported by various authorities, finds its explanation here. Some succeed
in only about fifty per cent, of their cases, others reach as high as ninety-
six per cent. An imposing-looking hypnotist is much more successful than
one of a different type. Long, black beard, great stature, heavy eye-
brows, penetrating eyes, forceful but trust-awakening countenance, self
confidence, good standing in the community, — all help. Commands given
with force and clearness, so that opposition seems impossible, are helpful.
Sometimes a surprise, a sudden and loud call, a bright object, a tense and
rigid expression of face, clenched fists, succeed when other means fail.

An entirely different method may be used. This requires a darkened
room, absolute quietness, friendly talking in a monotone, a mild melodious
voice, gentle stroking of the hair and forehead, etc.

These two methods might be considered as making use of anxiety and
fear, on the one hand, and of love, on the other. Experts adopt one or the
other of these methods, as the case requires. The one method involves
the attitude of the father toward his children; and the other that of the
mother. In each case the unconscious complexes which were established
in infancy are appealed to. These complexes were usually fixed by the
parents, in trying to induce sleep in the children. Even holding before the
eyes a bright object, or placing a ticking watch to the ear, both of which
methods are, at times, employed to induce hypnosis, are excellent means
of arousing childhood memories. This child-attitude, on the part of adults,
is not so foreign to maturity as might appear, because this attitude plays
a prominent part in our dreams.

RKC^NT FREUDIAN LITERATURE 437

Forgetting, in the sense of complete disappearance of all traces of a for-
mer experience, is as foreign to the facts, as the annihilation of energy or
matter is in the physical world. Psychic processes may be revived after
decades of oblivescence.

The unconscious, childhood memories tend to make the adult submis-
sive to those persons who resemble, in any way, his parents. There is rea-
son to believe that the hypnotic credulity and docility has its roots in the
masochistic compounds of the sexual impulse. Masochism is pleasurable
obedience which the child learns from its parents. The parental influence
often acts almost like a past hypnotic suggestion upon the later life of the
child. Both hypnotism and suggestion are due to the transference of the
repressed elements of the sexual impiilse from the subject to the hypnotist.
This is due to the child-parent complex which becomes active between
the subject and the hypnotist.

II. Jones, E. The Action of Suggestion in Psychotherapy. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology, Dec, 1910, Jan., 1911. pp. 217-254.

This discussion is based upon the conception of suggestion and hypno-
tism, as worked out by Ferenczi in " Introjektion und Uebertragung," and
since the main facts of this paper are summarized above it will not be
necessary to restate them here. Dr. Jones agrees fully with Ferenczi in
giving emotion a prominent place in making suggestion possible. This
is in harmony with the views of Bleuler and Lipps. "The peculiar rap-
port between the operator and the subject, so characteristic of the hyp-
notic state, is identical with that obtaining between physician and patient
in the spontaneous somnambulism of hysteria. " The basis of this rapport
is sexual attraction. In the majority of cases, it is unconscious, but not
in every case. This was foreshadowed long ago in the theories which
postulated a magnetic fluid, vital fluid, nervous fluid or an all-prevading
ether, and lastly a special psychical influence of the hypnotist. This
was supposed to be emitted from the eye, because the eye has been sym-
bolical of the male organ and its function.

Janet is quoted to show that hypnosis induces the following changes in
the subject: any fear of, or repugnance toward, hypnosis is replaced by a
passionate desire for its repetition, and the patient is excessively preoccu-
pied with the physician. At times a period of somnambulic passion lasts
until the next seance. Janet further writes: "What one most frequently
observes is a feeling of affection, which may become extremely intense.
The subject feels happy, when he sees his hypnotizer, when he speaks to
him; he experiences pleasure when he thinks of him; and consequently
soon comes to the point of feeling a strong love for him." Hystericals are
very jealous of the physician's attention and interest in them.

Dr. Jones believes that this attitude of ' 'warm affection, dread, jealousy,
veneration, exactingness " toward the physician is derived from the psy-
chosexual group of activities. Janet rejects this interpretation; but Jones
is convinced that Janet has not traced these conscious emotions to their
source; if he has done so, he could not fail to recognize their nature.

The relation of suggestion to psychoanalysis must first be pointed out,
before an evaluation of each of these methods of treating psychoneuroses
can be made. In both methods, there is a transference of psychosexual
affections from the patient to the physician ; but, where suggestion alone
is employed, the treatment stops here, while, in psychoanalysis, the pa-
tient is helped to trace his illness to its source; and liien "the wishes, desires,
etc., which had previously found unsatisfactory expression in the creation
of various symptoms, are now free to be applied, through the process of sub-
limation, to non-sexual social aims."

Treatment, by means of suggestion alone, really intensifies the trans-
erence. The result of this is that the patient never really is cured nor
Journal — 8

438 ACH^R

becomes independent of the physician. If one sympton is removed, another
takes its place; and chronic invahdism often results. Psychoanalysis
brings permanent relief wherever transference can first be brought about
by helping the patient to sublimate the psychosexual emotions to higher
ends.

12. Brill, A. A. A Contribution to the Psychopathology of Everyday Life.
Psychotherapy, Vol. Ill, No. i. pp. 5-20.

Dr. Brill is a disciple of Freud, and employs the terms unconscious, repres-
sion, and complex, in the Freudian sense. He conceives all hysterical symp-
toms to be the expression of a repressed wish, which is active in the uncon-
scious. Unconscious processes are defined as those processes which show
active manifestations, but of which the person concerned is not conscious
because of repression, due to conflicting impulses. This psychic mechanism
in hysteria, Dr. Brill conceives to be common, in a mild form, to all nor-
mal minds. This is manifested in dreams, and in everyday actions. The
tendency to forget, or crowd out of consciousness all thoughts of a disa-
greeable or painful nature, is at the basis of these everyday manifestations.
These thoughts are not really forgotten; they are repressed, and they re-
main in the unconscious as complexes. Here they lie dormant until some
experience or association taps their feeling content which is always strong.
There is always a resistance to their becoming conscious so that the indi-
vidual is never able to tell just what is actually taking place.

In everyday life these repressed complexes manifest themselves in ' 'lap-
ses of memory, in talking, writing, etc."

Familiar illustrations of this are the forgetting of the names of well
known persons, and the like. This is due to the fact that the name is asso-
ciated with some repressed complex, which prevents recall. Later, when
the association is broken the name may come freely.

A woman refers to one of her married friends, but by mistake uses her
maiden name instead of her husband's name. Psychoanalysis shows that
she does n't like her friend's husband, and wishes her friend had never
married him. In using her friend's maiden name, she fulfilled a wish and
revealed that the husband's name was repressed. She was, of course, un-
conscious of the motive for this.

A man is urged by his wife to attend a social function, which he does not
care for but agrees to attend. In dressing for the occasion he suddenly
finds the trunk containing his dress suit locked and the key lost. This
compels the sending of regrets. Next day the key is found in the trunk.
The husband declares he did not conceal the key intentionally. But the
motive is clear; it carried itself out when he was off his guard.

Many so-called meaningless, or automatic, indifferent or accidental
actions such as ' 'scribbling with one's lead pencil, jingling the coins in one's
pocket, kneading soft substances, etc., conceal sense and meaning for
which any other outlet is closed."

A maiden lady wears a wedding ring "because it was grandmother's."
A patient, who despairs of life, manifests special interest in Ibsen's ' 'When
the Dead Awaken." An embezzler is discovered in a distant city read-
ing the book, "Will I ever go back?"

Dr. Brill gives a wealth of illustrations to show that so-called meaning-
less actions are symbolical of a deeper meaning, and adds : ' 'These examples
show that there is nothing arbitrary or fortuitous in our actions, that, no
matter how we may try to conceal things, we always betray ourselves.
Our repressed thoughts forever strive to come to the surface; and just as
the insane realize their ideals in their insanities, we realize our wishes
through our dreams, and in the 'little ways' of everyday life."

If Dr. Brill's contention is true that the determining motives to conduct
are often, if not usually, below the threshold of consciousness, it has the
very greatest significance for the student of normal psychology. In fact.

RECENT FREUDIAN UTERATURE 439

it almost becomes revolutionary, and challenges the truthfulness of all so-
called introspection. If one cannot tell what motives lead to this or that
choice, action or even association, much of what has been accepted as
orthodox psychology must be radically revised. The validity of all ex-
perimental laboratory psychology that is based on introspection is thus
brought into question. It also plays havoc with the contention that con-
sciousness is the only legitimate field for the student of psychology. Dr.
Brill is, of course, not alone in his point of view. Evidence in support of
this view is being accumulated daily by the whole Freudian school.

The genetic psychologist, too, is taking this stand for reasons other than
those of the Freudian school. From an evolutional view-point, it is fully
justified. In fact, it forces itself upon any one who attempts to follow
up the evolutioti of psychic life from primitive forms of life, as leading
geneticists are pointing out.

13. Putnam, J. J. Personal Impressions of Sigmund Freud and his Work,
with Special Reference to his Recent Lectures at Clark University.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Dec, 1909, March, 1910. pp. 1-26,

Dr. Putnam laments the fact that the Freudian theories have been so
long neglected, and considers it to be ' 'a reflection on our energy and in-
telligence that we have not gained a closer knowledge of the claims and
merits of his doctrines." He also points out the peculiar prejudices and
misconceptions that are current concerning Freud's point of view, and
thinks that a better acquaintance with his work would remove much of
this unfavorable attitude. The emphasis which he places on "sexual
life in the etiology of psycho-neuroses" is largely responsible for this
prejudice.

This is itself in need of psychoanalysis. It supports Freud's conten-
tion that the motives which actuate conduct are usually below the level of
consciousness: and that the individual never gives the real reason for his
behavior or attitude of mind. "Motives are made up of 'attraction,' 'de-
sire' and 'acceptance,' on the one hand, and, on the other hand, of 'repulsion,'
'repression,' 'denial,' mixed in equal parts." The very intensity of the
opposition to Freud's theory indicates that it touches a tender spot, for
the opposition springs up even before the theory is tested.

A strong prejudice often involves the "half-felt but perhaps wholly
suppressed truth" of the matter under consideration, which cannot, at
present, be put to the test of reason.

Dr. Putnam's aim is to modify this prejudice, which he himself once
shared, by setting forth some of these Freudian principles in a manner best
calculated to remove misconceptions and invite unbiased consideration.
As far back as 1881, Freud and Breuer treated their first case of hysteria,
and revealed the germs of Freud's later theories. After a number of years
of study with Charcot in Paris, and with other psychiatrists, he continued
his treatment of cases of hysteria; and in all of these, he became convinced
that the childhood experiences played a very great r61e in producing the
later difficulties. The system of psycho-analysis was evolved; and it
was found that the emotions of childhood often cropped out in new forms,
in later life. Old and forgotten memories were revived; and it was dis-
covered that these were at the basis of the illness, and that when brought
up to the level of consciousness the patient recovered. This necessarily
gave rise to a new and larger view of the unconscious life than had hereto-
fore been held. The unconscious proved to be the "dwelling-place and
working place of emotions that we could not utilize in the personality
that we had shaped and rounded."

Dr. Putnam thinks that ' 'looked at broadly and as a whole' ' Freud's
main contribution has been this emphasis of the unconscious phase of life
as an active principle rather than the attempt to push forward the sexual

440 ACH^R

element in our experience. This latter factor is stressed by Freud, but
he is fully justified in his conclusions by the evidence bearing upon this
point which he secured from his patients. His critics seem to have lost
sight of everything else in their ' 'attack against the remarkable and truth-
seeking observations of a remarkable man. " A plea is made for open-
mindedness in considering this phase of Freud's theory, on the ground
that it is the first duty of any seeker after truth to hold his prejudices in
abeyance and examine the facts in an unbiased manner, even though the
subject be disagreeable. The attitude of many people towards the sub-
ject of sex is easily explained on Freud's theory of repression. This very
repression leads to a denial of its importance. Nevertheless the subject
has a "hold on us, or a right to demand our interest and attention," even
if "we would persuade ourselves that this was not the case." "This hold
upon our attention which we instinctively feel this subject has the right
to claim, even when we repudiate this right, constitutes one instance of
the 'desire' which is made to play such a large part in Freud's doctrines."

The repression of this instinctive desire may lead to one of three con-
sequences. The repression may be adequate, and the instinctive curiosity
may find an outlet in some other channel. The repression may go too
far, and produce an over-sensitive individual who is over-refined and over-
watchful of himself. Again, the repression may be unsuccessful and the
person is then in conflict with himself, and becomes hysterical, or falls a
prey to one of the phobias. The conflicting impulses in a human being are
so varied and complicated that we are never able to grasp them in their
completeness ; and perhaps every one could find in himself traces of what
would, in a larger scale, be regarded as criminal.

The struggles of the soul are immensely more complex than is generally
assumed. "Desire or craving furnishes the motive for many thoughts
and acts that seem actuated by sentiments of a diff'erent, and even of an
opposite, character." The fable of the sour grapes illustrates this.

When desire cannot be satisfied in one way, it is often satisfied in another.
This substitution of one situation for another is at the basis of the principle
of "conversion" in hysteria, by which the physical symptoms are pro-
duced. This principle of substitution is helped by the tendency to forget
the unpleasant experiences of life. This latter is a feature of every normal
life, although in hysteria it becomes exaggerated. It is due to repression
which is an active factor in mental life. In dream life these repressions
have a chance to express /themselves in a somewhat disturbed form, be-
cause they, like psychoses, are in a measure a compromise between con-
flicting motives.

Freud's therapeutic method is often criticised on the ground that it
brings to mind what was unwholesome in the individual's experience and
that this should be forgotten. However the best answer to this criticism
is that the psychoanalytic method of bringing to consciousness the for-
gotten memories actually brings peace, comfort and contentment to the
patient and that no other method of treatment can effect the same cure.

Freud lays much more stress upon early experiences and environment
in producing psycho-neuroses than upon hereditary and nervous insta-
bility. While heredity varies greatly in degree of soundness and vigor,
it is still the early experiences "which make us sick or well. " His theory,
therefore, tends to exalt early education as a hygienic measure in the
broadest sense of the term education.

In the final section of this article attention is given to the subject which
arouses more antagonism to Freud's theory than anything else: namely
his emphasis of sex as a causative factor in psycho-neuroses. However,
the fact that the unfavorable criticism is of the most contradictory sort
indicates that the critics have been moved by deep seated prejudice rather
than by cool consideration of the merits of his theory. In spite of the fact
' 'that this immense subject was daily and hourly thrusting itself upon our

RECENT FREUDIAN LITERATURE 441

notice whether as the cause of terrible suffering, of terrible crimes, of terri-
ble misunderstandings and misjudgments, and that it has played a huge
part in the history of religion and of civic progress, " there has been a ten-
dency to blind ourselves to the facts and to refuse to study the subject
scientifically.

One reason for this is that the term sexual is confused with the term
sensual. Hence to assume that sexual influence is basic for psychopathol-
ogy would be to charge every one so afflicted with immoral characteristics
according to this false view. Freud uses the term in a much more com-
prehensive sense and includes all emotions that have differentiated from
the primitive sex impulse. This includes all that has produced the high-
est and noblest in civilization. The experiences of infancy are causative
factors of later neuropathic states but cannot be considered sensual. All
students of the subject now agree that the term sex is much more compre-
hensive than has been customary to regard it and that the distinction be-
tween normal and abnormal is not to be too sharply drawn. Freud assumes
that civilization has been built up at the expense of sex interests and that
the sublimation and repression of the sexual energy is the means of attain-
ing a higher culture. It is in an effort to accomplish this end that repres-
sion sometimes goes too far in those persons who have a predisposition
to neuropathic states. Since much of this conflict takes place in the un-
conscious, and the symptoms of over repression are never traceable to
their source by the patient, unaided, there is after all no question of moral
responsibility. It is an unsuccessful struggle with factors that are clearly
beyond the reach of consciousness. The infantile experiences in the sex
realm may easily sow the seed of later troubles because the child gives
free and full expression to all impulses. In later life these impulses are
found to be out of harmony with civilized life and are repressed only to
retreat to the unconscious realm where they are still active. The adjust-
ment of the legitimate demands of the procreative instinct on the one hand
and the demands of civilization for repression and sublimation on the
other is the great problem of modern life. Tt is just here that the Freudian
investigations are most helpful, and Dr. Putnam believes that Freud and
his co-laborers have a distinct message for the present age in dealing with
this important and ever present problem.

Abraham Karl. Giovanni Segantini, ein psychoanalytischer Versuch. Schrif-
ten zur angewandten Seelenkunde, Elf tes Heft. Leipzig, 191 1. p. 65.

This is another contribution to the psychology of the artist. Giovanni
Segantini was a famous Italian painter of the last half of the ninteenth
century. His development, his outer and inner life, his artistic capacity
and his works were all unique, and challenge an explanation from the point
of view of individual psychology. This study applies the principles of
psychoanalysis to the life and works of Segantini. The unconscious mech-
anism of neurotics and artists is similar in many respects and the phy-
sician who is acquainted with the method of psychoanalysis of the former
has a peculiar advantage therefore in the study of the latter.

Segantini 's paintings are in a peculiar sense the expression of his inner
soul experiences. His theory of painting was that it should reveal and
express the deepest emotions of the artist rather than attempt a true re-
production of any external object or scene. Art, he says, shall glorify
work, love, mother, and death. These were the sources from which he
derived his inspiration. Although other artists have dwelt on these themes,
Segantini has given them a touch peculiar to himself and his genius is
limited to these subjects.

His lack of early education and his unwholesome environment did little
to exalt these themes. They therefore came largely from his own inner
tendencies. Psychoanalysis can throw much light upon the source of these
themes because it goes back to childhood and traces the beginnings of the
life impulses. Segantini himself thought that a true explanation of his

442 ACH^R

genius would have to go back to his earliest childhood and analyze all
sensations of the soul, even to their faintest beginnings. His mind was
free from the burden of traditional schooling and absorbed from his environ-
ment whatever it was fitted to assimilate.

The most profound single event of Segantini's early life was the death
of his mother, when he Was scarcely five years old. After that he lost the
influence of a home, was neglected by his father, and became more or less
of a wanderer. During all this time the early influence of his mother
made her the centre of his thought. In his autobiography he says that he
has a clear definite and accurate image of her. He says she was young, tall,
and beautiful and compares her to sunset in the spring. This lofty senti-
ment of love is the sublimated, infantile, erotic attitude toward her. The
neurotic and the artist both have abnormally strong impulses which are
greatly transformed through repression and sublimation. Both have a very
strong fancy. In the case of the neurotic the repressed fancies are converted
into symptoms of illness. In the artist they find partial expression in his
works. The other part is usually sublimated into some other form of
expression. In Segantini this last element was transformed into a com-
pensatory over-emphasis of and admiration for motherhood. This is
why Segantini embodied motherhood as the central theme of so many of
his paintings. The painting called "The Fruit of Love," was evolved in
his fancy by the transformation of a beautiful rose that came from heaven
into the form of a mother and child. Here the influence of his long de-
parted mother is seen. He often associated her beauty with that of a rose.

The infantile erotic attitude towards the mother often gives rise to
feelings of cruelty against the loved one. This is due to a sort of feeling
of revenge for supposed mistreatment. This manifests itself in desiring
the death of the loved one; or if death actually takes place in a sort of joy
that it occurred. Later when this feeling of cruelty is repressed and subli-
mated there arises in the mind of the neurotic a feeling of guilt even though
no good reason can be given for it. The dead one is glorified and an effort
is made to call him or her back to life in fancy.

That Segantini had this feeling of cruelty in childhood is shown by the
fact that when twelve j'^ears of age he derived real pleasure in trying to
paint the face of a dead child at its mother's request and worked for hours
at his task. In his later description of this mother, he spoke of her beauty
and used the same adjectives that he did in describing his own mother. It
was a case of transference of his feeling for his mother to this woman and
he thus undertook the task through his mother's unconscious influence.
In his effort to please this mother we see the beginning of the sublimation
of the feeling of cruelty to a desire to compensate for this feeling. This
is a frequent phenomenon in his later paintings. Thus death and mother-
hood came to occupy his attention during the first thirty years of his life,
and this points to his mother's early influence. He was twenty-two years
old before he became sufficiently free from her influence to fall in love.

The influence of Segantini's father is not noticeable because of his father's
treatment of him. In fact all traces of a father's influence such as conser-
vatism, obedience to authority, reverence for God, etc., are negative in the
character of Segantini. Home, mother, nature form a closely knit complex
in his life. When he lost his mother he lost home and the native scenery
that he loved.

In his adolescent years the repression of his sex impulse had a tendency
to make him melancholj'' and passive. He embodied this emotion and
passivity in the paintings of this time. Fancies of death also inspired many
of his works at this time.

Later, at about the age of thirty, this melancholy gave place to an
aggressive impulse to labor. He moved into the high Alps and there
studied the natural scenery as he had seen it in his childhood. Everything
seemed to inspire him to greater efforts. He was seized with an impulse

RECENT FREUDIAN LITERATURE 443

to work and seemed never to tire. The aggressive impulse was sublimated
into the impulse to work. Here he did his best work. All this time the
mother complex remained the same. It was at this time that he painted
the masterpiece called "The Two Mothers."

At this time he acquired a techinque of color analysis to a high degree
and used it very effectively in his paintings. This was a great triimiph.
It was, however, not so much a result of his artistic genius as it was a demand
of his soul in order to give adequate expression to his emotions. Light and
color were to him the source of the highest ecstasy. This was due to the
sublimation of that component of the sex impulse known as sex curiosity.

Later there was again a return of melancholy. At this time he painted
several works that are difficult to explain. One of these is "The Bad
Mothers." All products of the imagination according to Freud have a
manifest and a latent content. The manifest content is that which con-
sciousness is concerned with while the latent content escapes its notice
although it is the more significant. The latent content is the expression
of a suppressed impulse. This was the case with the mystical works of
Segantini above mentioned. Only the manifest content has received
attention by students of his works. Although he got his idea of the punish-
ment of bad mothers from Buddhistic mythology, this does not account for
his interest in the idea. Here again the unconscious motive springs from
the repressed infantile anger towards his mother for dividing her love with
his rival.

The idea of death seems to have had a peculiar fascination for him,
motivated many of his works, and at times there seem to have been uncon-
scious longings for death, which in the end helped disease hasten disinte-
gration. His early acquaintance with death in the loss ot his brother and
mother does not fully account for the dominance of this idea. We must
look deeper for the motive to this and it is found in the impulses of his
childhood. His sadistic impulses, his feeling of hate and his desire for
the death of a loved one had to be withdrawn from the objects against
whom they were directed as he grew older. They were partly transformed
to thoughts of his own death and partly sublimated into an impulse to
live. This conflict of conscious and unconscious impulses is the secret
of the tragedy which ended in his premature death.

TERMINOLOGY IN THE FIELD OF SENSATION.

There is at the present time a great deal of confusion in the scientific
terminology of sensory processes. In some cases several words have been
manufactured which are used to signify the same thing, and some of the
terms are quite indefensible. Acoumeter and audiometer are examples of
one such case. In other cases the same term has been used in entirely
different meanings. Perhaps the worst examples of this confusion are
the terms hemeralopsia and nyctalopsia, each of which is currently used to
signify both day-blindness and night-blindness. The unauthentic usage
of these words possibly results from an erroneous impression that the -al-
ls privative. A large list of illustrations might be given.

I suggest the following list of terms to cover a part of the field. Practi-
cally all are in use, with the exception of those included in 6, 7, and 8. In
these cases innovation is absolutely necessary, and the forms there given
are analogous to the forms under the other headings, and are from the
roots suggested by Professor C. W. E. Miller as the most logical. The
table is not complete, but the terms to cover the remainder of the field
should be constructed in accordance with the principles applied here, which
are drawn from the best present usage.

1. Taste geus(ia) a-, para-, hypo-, hyper-,; -imeter, -ic.

2. Smell osm(ia) an-, par-, hyp-, hyper-; -ometer, -etic.

3. Sight ops(ia) an-, par-, hyp-, hyper-; -imeter, -ic.

4. Hearing acu(sia) an-, par-, hyp-, hyper-,; -meter, -sic.

5. Touch (h)ap(hia) an-, par-, hyp-, hyper-; -tometer, -tic.

6. Warmth-sense thalpo(sia) a-, para-, hypo-, hyper-; -meter, -tic.

7. Cold-sense rhigo(sia) ar-, para-, hypo-, hyper-; -meter, -tic.

8. Tickle-sense gargal-esthe(sia) -an-, -par-, -hyp-, -hyper-; -tic.

9. Hair-sensibility tricho-esthe(sia) -an-, -par-, -hyp-, -hyper-; -siometer,

-tic, -sis.

10. Muscular-sense kinesthe(sia) a-, para-, hypo-, hjrper-; -siometer,

-tic

11. Body-sense coenesthe(sia) a-, para-, hypo-, hyper-; -tic, -sis.

12. Pain-sense alge (sia) an-, hyp-, hyper-; -simeter, -tic, -sis.

13. Vibration-sense palmesthe(sia) -an-, hypo-, hyper-; -tic.

The termination ia is of course used only with a prefix. It would be
perfectly legitimate to use the suffix is to indicate the sense itself, in all
cases (as is done in algesis, for example), as we are not bound strictly to
the Greek precedent; but as a matter of fact no one has ventured to do
this.

Special attention might be called to the use of acusic and opsic to des-
ignate the sensational facts; in place of optic and acoustic, which have
special significance. It is very desirable also that the special prefixes
chrom-, achrom-, monochrom-, dichrom-, etc. ; and hemian-, hemeral-, nyctal-,
and ambly- should be used with opsia, and not with opia, as the latter com-
bination is illogical, although it is found at present about as often as
is the other usage. In place of the color-prefixes indicated, chromat-,
achromat-, etc., are frequently used, but there seems to be no sufficient
reason for the -at-, and it should be dropped to bring these words into
harmony with others already established.

Ope is used as a combining form to indicate either the possessor of a
certain sort of eye {myope, emmetrope, etc.) or the subject of a certain form
of disorder of sensibility (amblyope, nyctalope, etc.). This usage is well
established and gives rise to no confusion.

The prefix dipl- is uniformly applied to opsia (although some authors
persist in writing diplopia !) and to acusia. It might legitimately be ap-
plied to aphia also. Ambly- has been applied to acusia in place of hypo,
but the usage does not seem commendable. Amblacusia might, however,
be logically applied to the lack of accuracy in pitch discrimination.

Knight Duni,ap.

The Johns Hopkins University.

BOOK REVIEWS

Das Geddchtnis im Lichte des Experiments. Von A. WrESCHNER. Zweite
vermehrte Auflage. Zurich, Art. Institute Fiissli, 1 910. pp.77.

Here, in the compass of exactly 70 pages, — less than half the space often
taken for a single article, — is a clear and well-proportioned account of
the experimental work on memory, from Ebbinghaus down to Katz and
Revesz. Professor Wreschner has earned the gratitude, not only of the
teachers for whom his work was originally intended, but of psychologists
as well. A translation would be useful.

The two-page bibliography is not wholly free from printer's errors, and,
curiously, omits the dates of many of the papers cited. S. Power

Observations d'un musicien americain. Par Louis Lombard. Traduit
par R. de Lagenardiere. Paris, L. Theuveny, 1905. pp. xxi., 198.
Mr, Lombard, the author of Observations of a Bachelor, and the founder
and sometime director of the Conservatory of Music at Utica, N. Y., has
here brought together a number of notes and addresses, dealing with
musical subjects. We have strictures on the songs, operatic performances,
composers and conservatories of America ; strictures also on the music and
dancing of modem Spain, and on the Japanese productions of western
music; a number of practical recommendations to students of music; and a
few theoretical discussions, — of the sense in which music may be termed a
universal language, of the adaptation of musical performances to the taste
of the people, of the social utility of art, and so forth. It is all readable
enough, and the practical advice is sensible; more cannot be said.

J. Field

La vie mentale de V adolescent et ses anomalies. Par A. LemaitrE. Saint-
Blaise, Foyer Solidariste, 1910. Pp. 240. Price fr. 3.
The work of M. Lemaitre, who is a professor in the College of Geneva,
is well known to students of applied psychology. In 1901 M. Lemaitre
published a work on colored hearing, the material for which he had gath-
ered among his pupils; and since the foundation of the Archives de Psycho-
logie in 1902, he has contributed to this journal a number of articles dealing
with the adolescent mind, and especially with what one may call its shadow
side. The present volume brings together, in convenient form, the sub-
stance of papers published by the author in the Archives, in Janet's Journal
and in the Rivista di Psicologia. The titles of the chapters are Adolescent
Thinking (students' views on class disciphne, on the ideal fellow-student,
on spending money), the More Common and the Rarer Forms of Synopsia
(three cases of an uncommon type are detailed). Internal Speech, the Forms
of Paramnesia, Mental Dissociation, Complex Hallucinations (two cases).
Multiple Personalities, Parapsychism (a name given to a transient state
of reverie, obsession, or what not, which results from a physiological crisis
and may help in the prognosis of a disease like tuberculosis or of the various
modes of psychasthenia). Bad Habits, and Adolescent Suicide. In an
epilogue, M. Lemaitre makes a plea for individual education. There is no
single type of the adolescent mind : ce type moyen est une pure convention,
qui ne correspond d, aucun sujet pris isolement; the mental life is in instable
equilibrium, and its oscillations are not only uneven but may also be so

446 BOOK R^VI^WS

brusque as to set up aberrant types of a permanent but wholly unexpected
kind. Education will, in the future, be of the individual sort; meantime,
the author recommends a system of compensations, whereby excellence in
certain studies shall be allowed to counterbalance deficiency in certain
others. Francis Jones

The Dawn of Character; X Study of Child Life. By E. E. R. Mumpord.
London, Longmans Green & Co., 1910. pp. xi., 225.

This is a very practical little book, written for the guidance of mothers,
aunts, nurses, governesses, — of all who, without special training, are called
upon to take care of young children. "My endeavor has been, "the
author tells us, ' 'to interpret the child's experiences from his own point of
view. Both in the earlier psychological chapters, in which I have tried to
trace his own development; and in the later chapters, concerned with his
development in relation to us and our attitude towards him; the aim has
been to see, as far as possible, with the child's eyes." The object is worthy,
and Mrs. Mumford, so far as the mere adult can judge, has attained a
very considerable measure of success.

After an introductory plea for the closer study of child life, we have seven
psychological chapters: on the contents and the growth of the child's
mind, on the growth of imagination, on the law and growth of habit, and on
the development and training of the will. For these chapters the writer
has had the advantage of the critical scrutiny of Professor Carveth Read.
There follow chapters on the place of punishment in education, on freedom
within the law, on childish curiosity, on the dawn of religion, on some dif-
ferent types of children, and on the child's point of view. There are few
references; the author acknowledges indebtedness especially to McCunn's
Making of Character, and to the teaching of Dr. Sophie Bryant and the
Rev. Stopford Brooke.

An Appendix, on the gaining of voluntary control in the functioning of
the bladder in infancy and childhood, closes the book which, unfortunately,
is not provided with an index. O. PerlER

Kleine Schriften. Von Wilhelm Wundt. Erster Band. Leipzig, W.
Engelmann, 1910. pp. viii., 640.

Every teacher of psychology has hoped that Wundt might, some day
or other, bring together his scattered psychological essays in book form.
The essays supplement the books, at many points; if they are less systematic,
they are also more human; and their full discussion of controverted issues
is often illuminating. It seems, now, that this hope is in a fair way of
being realised; we have the first volume of the Kleine Schriften — a truly
German misnomer ! — and though the present instalment is concerned with
philosophy, the next will in all probability be psychological.

Here are reprinted, in revised and extended form, the articles Ueher das
kosmologische Problem (1876), Kants kosmologische Antinomien und das
Problem des Unendlichen (1885), Was soil uns Kant nicht sein? Bemerk-
ungen zu Kants Philosophic (1892), Zur Geschichte und Theorie der ab^trakten
Begriffe; eine erkenntnistheoretische Betrachtung (1885), and Ueber naiven und
kritischen Realismus (1896). To these is added (1910) a very timely paper
on P sychologismus und Logizismus, which may be heartily recommended to
every serious student of psychology. From it he will learn that the experi-
mental method came in, not simply as an improvement upon, but also as a
protest against Selbstbeobachtung; he will see Brentano's work in historical
perspective, and will understand its enormous influence; he will grasp the
psychological significance of Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen; he will
discover, among many other interesting things, why the physiologist
Helmholtz went for his psychology to John Mill's Logic. No one but Wundt
could have given us this authoritative exposition. It is only to be regretted

BOOK REVIEWS 447

that he has not put it upon the market in separate form; experimental
psychologists will hardly be attracted by a large volume of philosophical
essays, B. B. TitchEnEr

Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico. Edited by F. W.
Hodge. Pt. 2. Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 1910. pp. iv.,
1221.
Antiquities of Central and Southeastern Missouri. By G. FowkE. Wash-
ington, Govt. Printing Office. 1910, pp. vii., 116.
Chippewa Music. By Frances Densmore. Washington, Govt. Print-
ing Office, 1 9 10. pp. xix,, 216.
The three works above mentioned are Bulletins 30, 37, and 45 of the
Bureau of American Ethnology, published by the Smithsonian Institution.
The first of them completes the very useful Handbook of American Indians,
covering the letters N to Z. Dr. Wissler contributes an article on
Psychology, the upshot of which is that we know practically nothing of the
subject, — surely a strong indictment against those directors of laboratories
who have Indian subjects within their reach; and Professor Boas writes,
with more to say, upon Religion. There are many other articles of psy-
chological interest in the volume.

The second Bulletin reports the results of mound-excavation in Missouri.
The burial vaults found are a new feature in American archaeology so far
as concerns the region east of the Rocky Mountains. At least two different
stages of culture are indicated; dates cannot be given, but the later stage
may perhaps be connected with the Siouian Indians.

The third item upon our list gives the transcription and analysis of nearly
two hundred Chippewa songs, collected in northern Minnesota. The
author finds that rhythm is the essential part of the songs; words, and
even the less important melodic progressions, may vary, but the rhythm is
constant. The songs are classified as harmonic and melodic: as harmonic,
if their accented tones follow the intervals of diatonic chords, as melodic,
if their contiguous accented tones have no apparent chord-relationship: of
180 songs, 41 are harmonic and 139 melodic. The work is well illustrated
with portraits, photographs of musical instruments, and cuts of the song-
pictures. J. Field

Examination [of Prof. William James's Psychology. By Ikbal Kishen
Sharga, Principal S. P. H. College, Srinagar, Kashmir. Allahabad,
Ram Narin Lai, 1910. pp. v., 118. Prince One Rupee.

When the incoming graduate student is asked what books he has read,
the first item on his list is likely to be James' Principles of Psychology.
And when he is asked, further, whether he understands and can reproduce
James' views, the reply is likely to be a cheerful affirmative. But if the
enquiring professor go on to ask for James' conception of the psychological
self, or for his view of the relation of mind to nervous system, or even
for his theory of emotion, the situation may take on an aspect the reverse
of cheerful; James' doctrine is not, after all, as clear-cut as it had ap-
peared; passages from the book that seem to speak definitely in a certain
sense may be met by passages that seem to speak, no less definitely, in
another.

Some of these contradictions are real, some only apparent ; and none de-
tract from the greatness of James' achievement or offer a serious stumbling-
block to the trained reader, Nevertheless, it is just as well that they be
brought out into clear daylight; and the author of the work before us
has done psychology a service in publishing the results of a thorough com-
parative study of James' text. Unfortunately, perhaps, he has combined
the internal and the external methods of criticism; he is not content to
find James inconsistent, or to show reasons for the inconsistency, but he

448 BOOK REVIEWS

attacks, from the outside, some of the tendencies and principles of the
Jamesian psychology. The two aims are entirely legitimate; but they
are also distinct; and disagreement with a writer's general attitude may
easily lead you to overestimate his slips, and to find contradiction where
sympathy would have found only change of standpoint, or mere verbal
discrepancy. In some instances, our author seems to have fallen into
this trap ; in most, however, he has his finger on real weaknesses in James'
exposition.

The special points discussed are: the relation of brain to mind, the
doctrine of the externality of sensation, the doctrine of the indivisibility
of states of consciousness, the self as knower and as known, and James'
theories of conception, emotion and volition. S. Power

An Adventure. By 'EuzabETh Morison' and 'Frances Lamont.' London,
Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 191 1. pp. vii., 162.

The gist of the 'adventure' is this: On August 10, 1901, two English
ladies paid their first visit to the Petit Trianon at Versailles. It was, of
course, broad daylight; and the visitors, who were in good health, knew
practically nothing of the history of the place. They nevertheless saw
scenes and met persons of the time of the Revolution; 'Miss Morison' saw
the Queen herself. On Jan. 22, 1902, 'Miss Lamont' visited the place alone,
and had similar experiences. Subsequent visits, by both the narrators,
passed off normally.

Ch. i. of the present account details the events of the various visits,
the two authors writing independently; on the two critical occasions they
did not see alike at every point. Ch. ii. gives the results of research:
identification of the figures seen, the buildings and grounds passed and
traversed, the music heard, etc. Ch. iii. answers some of the questions
and meets some of the attempted explanations proposed to the writers by
sceptical friends. Ch. iv. seeks to account for the whole set of experi-
ences as the reproduction of a memory of Marie Antoinette's. On August
10, 1792, the royal family was penned up for many hours in the little
room opening into the Hall of the Assembly; the Queen, exhausted
and exasperated, sought a fleeting relief in recalling the simple pleasures and
the country freedom of the Petit Trianon; as her thoughts wandered,
incident after incident flashed upon her mind, — the incidents re-experienced
by the two ladies, more than a hundred years later.

The publishers guarantee "that the authors have put down what happened
to them as faithfully and accurately as was in their power;" the names
appended to the narrative are the only fictitious things in the book. Now
let conjecture do its work! J. Waterlow

The Concept of Method. By C. R. LomeR. Controversies over the Imita-
tion of Cicero as a Model for Style, and Some Phases of their Influence on
the Schools of the Renaissance. By I. Scott. Teachers College,
Columbia University, New York City, 19 10. Contributions to Educa-
tion, 34, 35, pp. 99; v., 145.
Dr. Lomer's object is ' 'to emphasise the strong necessity, in the edu-
cational theory of the present day, for an analysis of the process of experi-
ence itself, with a view to realising its organic character, to making apparent
its impUcations, and to maintaining its ultimate reality, in idea, as the
method of our existence." Educational theory has been largely occupied
either with the materials of education or, from a purely formal standpoint,
with special details of educational procedure. We have in fact, as the
terminal aspects in the educational process, the materials that are selected
as educationally valuable in the school course, and the child itself, with its
impulses, instincts, activities and energies. The problem is, then, to see
how these two elements are related in actual experience; to understand
education as a method of giving form to the experience of the child. From

BOOK REVIEWS 449

this point of view, the author first reviews some historical types of method
(the Greeks, Bacon, Descartes, Comenius, Kant), and then attempts con-
structive work on the function and interpretation of method (the idea of
development; the interpretation of experience; the function of method).
Unfortunately, his style is obscure, and the connection of his thought not
always apparent. As, however, he has read widely, and does not fear to
face ultimate problems, we may expect from him, later, a systematic, trea-
tise that will be better suited to the average reader.

Dr. Scott writes of Ciceronianism, in the sense of ' 'the trend of literary
opinion in regard to accepting Cicero as a model for imitation in composi-
tion," The work before us has an introductory chapter on the influence of
Cicero from his own time to that of Poggio and Valla (c. 1450), when
men of letters began a series of controversies over his merits as a model of
style ; chapters treating of these controversies ; and a study of the connec-
tion of the entire movement with the history of education. ' 'At the close
of the 1 6th century, the Renaissance spirit in general had furnished to
the schools, as the aim of education, the mastery of the Greek and Latin
languages; but the cult of the ultra- Ciceronians had wielded so great
influence that that aim, so far as Latin was concerned, had degenerated
into the purely imitative treatment of the authors studied, among whom
Cicero was given by far the greatest prominence. The dialectic of the
Middle Ages had been largely supplanted by rhetoric, and some effort had
been made to connect this study with life; but, on the whole, the reign of
form had been transferred from logic to rhetoric, and was fighting for pres-
tige there under the banner of New Learning." An appendix contains
translations of the controversial letters of Pico and Bembo, and of the Cice-
ronianus of Erasmus. W. Francis

Ueber die korperlichen Begleiterscheinungen psychischer Vorgdnge. O. Bumke^.
Wiesbaden, J. F. Bergmann, 1909. pp. 16. Price pf. 65.
A popular lecture delivered to the Naturforschende Gesellschaft of Frei-
burg. The writer first touches upon the pupillar reflex, and the expres-
sive changes of f pulse, respiration and volume; illustrations are given
from Lehmann. All these movements are expressive of feeling or emotion;
if they accompany attention or reflective thought, that is because all mental
processes whatsoever are attended by feeling. He then turns to Sommer's
tridimensional analysis of involuntary finger movements, which he uses
to explain certain card-tricks and phenomena of thought-reading. From
these it is natural to proceed to table-turning: the motor effect of a defi-
nitely directed expectation is illustrated by the pendulum experiment of
Bacon and Chevreul, by the mistakes of the self-conscious performer and
reciter, by the disasters of a first attempt at bicycle-riding; the surety of
movement when there is no interference by expectation is shown in the
trance- dancing of the well-known 'Madeleine.' Coming back to thought-
reading, Dr. Bumke then outlines the results of Lehmann and Hansen on the
unconscious whisper, and the story of the trick-horse Hans, with Pfungst's
related experiments. He is doubtful of the promise of Veraguth's psycho-
galvanic reflex; partly because, like the pupillar reflex, it shows only
one single form of reaction, without qualitative differentiation, partly
because it is too delicate a test of disturbance of mental equilibrium. Fi-
nally, he discusses Berger's observations of the exposed brain, in order to
gain light on the question whether the physical changes are co-ordinate
with or subordinate to the corresponding mental processes. The brain
changes precede the changes in other parts of the body, but are nevertheless
themselves of a secondary or subordinate kind ; the observations, therefore,
tell us nothing of the intimate nature of psychophysical parallelism.

The lecture thus covers a good deal of interesting ground, and the expo-
sition is in the main sound. There is some vacillation as to the mental
antecedents of involuntary movement; the general teaching appears to be

450 BOOK REVIEWS

that expressive movements are always expressive of feeling; but we are also
told that the mere idea {Idee) that a movement may occur suffices to set the
muscles in involuntary activity. The James-Lange theory of emotion is
dismissed with the remark that it was never demonstrable and to-day is
refuted : here the writer's logic seems to have gone astray, to say nothing
of his psychology. The concluding paragraphs, on Berger's results and
their connection with parallelsim, must have been unintelligible to the
majority of the audience as they will be unintelligible to most readers of the
lecture. Francis Jones

Sprache, Gesang und Korperhaltung: Handbuch zur Typenlehre Ruiz.
Von Dr. Ottmar Rutz. Miinchen, O. Beck. 191 1. pp. vi., 152.
With plates and tables. Price Mk. 2.80.

All amateur singers have observed that there are certain songs which,
though simple in composition and well within the compass of the voice, do
not 'suit.' It seems that professional singers have the same experience.
And about the year i860, the German professional singer Joseph Rutz
made the discovery that every song demands a very definite modality of
voice, can be sung adequately only in one particular way. At first, he
sought to find an explanation in the adjustment of larynx, mouth and throat ;
but repeated trial showed that the essential thing is the carriage of the body,
the attitude of the trunk. Joseph Rutz died in 1895, without having com-
mitted his results to paper ; but his wife and son — the son is the author of the
present book, and of a work entitled Neue Entdeckungen von der menschli-
chen Stimme, which appeared in 1908 — ^have worked further upon the
subject, and have reached conclusions of great scientific and practical im-
portance. Authorities of no less weight than Wundt and Sievers have
given the Typenlehre Rutz their approval, and have started enquiry into
the scientific aspects of the discovery.

Briefly stated, the thesis is this: that every mode of expression in tone
and word — music, poetry, prose, oratory, letter-writing — presupposes in
the individual a special bodily attitude, and can be reproduced only by
an individual to whom the attitude in question is either natural or by
practice familiar. Speech, song and the carriage of the body, are closely
interrelated, and are one and all related further to certain fundamental
tendencies of the life of mind, the temperamental tendencies that underlie
mood and the other forms of affective reaction. Not, of course, that the
principle of individuation must be pressed too far; the three great types
distinguished by the author are national or racial types, the Italian, the
German (which includes the English also), and the French; but these types
have sub-types or sub-forms, which may be variously combined, and which
may be differently displayed by a given individual at different times. It
is important to remark that the Rutz types are exclusively types of feeling,
not of character or of intelligence; if a man is able to shift from one type
to another, as Schumann shifts from his naturally German type to the
French in the Two Grenadiers, this is by virtue of a power of imitative or
empathic feeling.

The theory of the matter has been set forth in Dr. Rutz' earlier works,
in an article in Meumann's Arckiv, and elsewhere. The present book is
practical. It gives a list of the types, and of their sub-forms, with illustra-
tive plates, and draws up rules for the student. It also gives (pp. 60-144)
an alphabetical index of authors and musicians, classified by type. The
mastery of the directions for the carriage of the body is, at least in the rough,
by no means difficult, and the reader will be repaid if he spend a little time
upon them, and then test them by extracts from the writers quoted. There
can be no doubt that the Rutz types are real, and that the Rutz discovery is
destined to play a large part in the psychology of expression. Had Thorn-
dike taken these types into account, he could hardly have written so
strongly against the multiple-type theory as he has done in the new
edition of his Educational Psychology. A. Isaacson

BOOK REVIEWS 451

Leitfaden der experimentellen Psychopathologie. Vorlesungen gehalten
an der Universitat Leipzig von Privatdozent Dr. A GrEgor, Oberarzt
der psychiatrisch-neurologischen Klinik, Leipzig. Berlin, S. Karger.
1910. Pp. X., 222. Price Mk. 5.60.

In 1 900, Dr. Storring — at that time also a Privatdozent in the University
of Leipzig, but a Privatdozent of Philosophy — published a volume of Lec-
tures on Psychopathology, which has recently been translated into English.
This work naturally comes to mind, as one opens the present volume; but
a reading of Dr. Gregor's lectures shows that the intention of the authors
is entirely different. Storring, it will be remembered, aims to bring out
the significance of psychopathology for normal psychology, and outlines
the psychological principles of a theory of knowledge. Gregor avails
himself of the experimental method (we might say of Sommer's methods)
in psychopathology, in order to obtain results that shall be useful for treat-
ment, and in order, at the same time, to enhance the capacity of clinical
observation and of diagnosis (p. 13). The older work views psychopatholo-
gy from the standpoint of the psychologist; the newer views psychology
and psychological method from the standpoint of the psychiatrist. In a
certain broad sense, therefore, the two series of lectures are complementary,
though the lapse of time by which they are separated, and the differences
in the authors' training and attitude, make this relation partial and incom-
plete. At any rate, it is instructive to read the books together.

It may be said at once that Dr. Gregor is a worthy successor to Storring.
He is already favorably known by the experimental studies which, alone
or in collaboration, he has published since the year 1906, and in which
he has applied psychological methods to the study of such functions as the
appreciation of time, the apprehension of visual stimuli tachistoscopically ex-
posed, the range of memory, etc., in cases of mental disorder, and notably in
cases of what is called Korsakow's disease (a toxaemic neurosis, characterized
by defects of associative memory, confusion with a marked tendency to con-
fabulate and to indulge in pseudo-reminiscences, hallucinations and delu-
sions, a marked fluctuation of the affective life, and oftentimes disturbance
of function of peripheral nerves). The results of these studies, together
with those of other investigators, are here brought together in a systematic
way. An introductory lecture deals in general terms with the relation
between pychology and psychiatry. Then follow lectures on the psycho-
pathology of the time-sense, on reaction experiments, on visual perception
{Auffassung, in the sense of Kraepelin and Cron), association (2), memory
(2), the psychology of testimony (2), attention (2), the external volun-
tary action, the bodily expression of psychical states, the formal as-
pects of mental work, and tests of intelligence. In every instance the
technique and results of normal experiments are first set forth, and then
we have an account of method, as modified for application to the patient,
and of the results so far obtained. The exposition is clear, and the author
has a good knowledge of the normal work. In Lect. VI. he outlines his
positon to Freud's psychoanalytic method: the procedure is personal, and
the material not altogether objective; nevertheless, if used with caution,
psychoanalysis is a valuable instrument (p. 76). The view of attention
taken in Lect. XI. is that of Durr: the motor attitude of readiness for
stimuli is a concomitant phenomenon only; the essential thing in attention
is clear and definite apprehension of objects, vividness and compelling
character of conscious contents (p. 137).

The book has two external defects which call for notice. In the first
place there is no index. In the second, there is neither a paged table of
contents nor any sort of page heading ! The consequence is, that if one wants
to find, say, the experiments on testimony made with abnormal subjects,
one has first to look through the table of contents; there one discovers
that Lect. X. is the place required ; and then one has to turn the pages of

452 BOOK R^VIJeWS

the book at random, till one happens to strike the title Zehnte Vorlesung
on p. 123. Why the reader should be exposed to these indignities, only a
German publisher could explain. A useful bibliography (pp. 215-222)
is not mentioned in the table of contents. W. Asher

The Dweller on the Threshold, by Robert Hichens. New York, The Cen-
tury Co. 191 1, pp. 273. Price $1.10 net.

It is seldom that a psychologist is called upon to review the Latest Novel.
The present reviewer has read and enjoyed other works by Mr. Hidiens, —
The Garden of Allah, and Bella Donna; this newer work he has read with-
out enjoyment.

The story has to do principally with the Rector of a London parish and
his senior curate. At the beginning of their relationship, before the narra-
tive opens, these men stand in sharp contrast: the Rector is talented, am-
bitious, self-confident, the Curate is industrious, dutiful, humble-minded.
On the other hand, the Rector is troubled by sceptical doubts, and is be-
trayed by grossness of fibre into occasional lapses from right-doing, while
the Curate, amiable and easily led as he is, has at any rate the strength
that comes from an unshaken faith and personal purity of living. The
Rector now conceives the idea of using the Curate as a medium whereby
he may obtain communications from the spirit world; he thus satisfies
his lust of power, and at the same time hopes to settle his religious doubts.
The Curate, however, has to be inveigled into 'sitting'; and the Rector
gains his point by the lying assurance that the whole object of the proceed-
ings is to strengthen the Curate's will, to inspire him with something of the
mental power that he admittedly lacks and that he admires in his superior.
So the sittings begin. But the Rector fails after all, to 'entrance' his
weaker-minded colleague, — who, on his side, feels himself strengthened in
the manner promised. And so it presently comes to pass that the Curate
is the dominant and strong-willed, the Rector the dominated and suggesti-
ble member of the duo; the parts have been reversed or exchanged. But
here is the mysterious consequence: the Rector remains consciously what
he was, the Rector, only that he is now a weakling, aware of his weakness
and trending steadily down hill; the Curate, who has sucked the Rector's
strength from him, becomes a dual personality, in whom the original Rector
predominates and the Curate is entirely subordinate. In other words, the
Curate henceforth is the 'double' of the Rector, knows and feels himself
to be in the main identical with the Rector, while his own curate's nature
remains largely in abeyance, though it is not wholly lost; he therefore
watches the Rector, fears on his behalf, suffers with and for him, seeks to
guide or direct him, precisely as a man would act and suffer in his own
interest; and the Rector, harassed by this perpetual scrutiny, this ever-
present influence to which he must yield while he fails to understand it,
breaks down with a completeness that ends in death. The Curate, as the
watchful and critical double, is thus — as one may suppose — the 'dweller'
on the Rector's 'threshold.' The Rector's death dissolves the bond be-
tween the two men; the Curate reverts at once to his original, sequential
state; sincerely mourns the loss of his hero; has no memory of the insight
into the Rector's character and motives that he gained from the sittings;
and loses, once and for all, the foreign personality that had well nigh ousted
his proper nature.

That is the story. The remaining persons of the drama are a Professor
who, in the quest of scientific fact, devotes himself to psychical research,
and whose watchwords seem, hitherto, to have been telepathy and nervous
dyspepsia; a Gentleman of Independent Means, who is somewhat more
human than the Professor, but shows a like devotion, and has worked under
the Professor's direction; and the Rector's Wife, a lady whose fate it is
to worship at the shrine of masculine success, and who therefore, after an
interlude of keen dislike of the Curate, definitely transfers her admiration

BOOK Reviews 453

from her broken husband to his masterful coadjutor. The Professor is
wont to refer to this lady as the Link, though her connective office is not
clear; the confessions of the Rector to the Independent Gentleman, and
of the Curate to the Professor, make the story plain enough without her.

More interesting than the novel itself is the psychology of its author.
Why did he write it? To point the moral that, if we could but see our-
selves with a perfect vision, we should be horrified at the revelation? But
that is trite morality; and most readers, it may be assumed, will compare
themselves favorably with the Reverend Marcus Harding. To plead the
cause of psychical research, on the ground that there are more things in
heaven and earth than science dreams of? But an imaginative tale will
not convince any who are not convinced already. As a tour de force, to
prove that the modern novelist can make plausible use of the 'supernatural?'
Perhaps: the title seems to point to some such intention. But then —
plausibility is a relative matter, and the book should not be sent for review
to a psychologist. Wm. Krskinb

The Evolution of Mind. By Joseph McCabE. London, A. & C. Black.
New York, The Macmillan Co., 1910. pp. xvii., 287.

In this fluently — at times brilliantly — written essay, Mr. McCabe seeks
to solve the cosmic problem of the birth and development of mind. It
is usual, he tells us, to postulate two evolutionary series: the material,
where ' 'all varieties of energy and matter arise out of the abysmal womb
of ether," and the mental, which "set in when the earth reached a certain
stage of its development." Is this dualism tenable? When, and in what
form, did consciousness first appear? Can mind be brought into the cosmic
unity by tracing its gradual emergence from the etheric matrix? These
are the questions which the present work essays to answer.

All living matter, whether plant or animal, shows, when it has freedom
of movement, two properties which we may, if we will, term 'mental' or
'psychical:' namely, sensitiveness or irritability or responsiveness to
stimulation, and spontaneous or self-initiated movement. But sensi-
tiveness is also a widespread attribute of inorganic matter; and sponta-
neous movement always turns out, on careful scrutiny, to be a response to
environmental stimuli. Here, therefore, is no evidence of consciousness;
if we speak of 'mind' at all, we are stripping the word of the distinctive
significance that it has in our own experience. What we are looking
for is proof of consciousness.

But what, then, the reader may ask, is consciousness? "I make no
attempt to define consciousness," replies our author, "partly because it
defines itself more clearly than words can do, partly because all attempts
to define it have proved abortive." Nevertheless, he knows very well
what he is in search of. "The question to be answered is not, can we
find any actions in a lower animal which are consistent with a theory of
consciousness, but can we find any which are inconsistent with a purely
neural action. The question of consciousness does not arise till then."
"What I am chiefly seeking to determine is whether a new reality, or
agency, besides ether, intervenes at some point in the earth's story."
"The plain purpose I have in view is to see whether, and when, a new
reality, other than ether and its products or aspects, enters into the tissue
of our planetary life." And so he works up the scale of organic evolution,
and reaches one negative conclusion after another. "There is no proof
that consciousness had appeared before the Devonian period, or has since
developed in any of the modern representatives of Pre-Devonian animals."
' 'We have no clear or cogent indication of conscious states in the whole
invertebrate world, or in any type of animal that lived before the Permian
revolution in the earth's history," "We have not found a single pre-
Tertiary animal whose activities cannot be explained without an assump-

JOURNAL — 9

454 BOOK REVIEWS

tion of consciousness." The whole history so far is a history of the progress
of mechanism.

Of course it is! But then, so is the subsequent history, that of man in-
cluded. Mr. McCabe is the victim of a false antithesis. The opposite
of conscious is unconscious, — not mechanical or neural; the opposite of
reflex or automatic is complex or delayed, — not conscious. And this
criticism holds, on any definition of 'consciousness.' "Inferences from
external manifestations are precarious," says our author. One may reply
that, on his own principles, they are impossible; for external manifestations
can never give evidence of a new reality, different from ether; they must,
just because they are external, belong wholly and solely to the material
sphere. The most highly deliberative action of the civilized adult, no less
than the simplest tropism of the unicellular organism, must be explicable,
as an 'etheric' derivative, in physico-chemical terms. The logic of this
issue is so elementary, and the point has been so often made, that one
wonders to find Mr. McCabe the victim of the pitfall.

But now, for Mr. McCabe as for all of us, human consciousness is a
brute fact, and all the ether in the imiverse cannot away with it. What is
to be done? "I submit that the only way to come to any conclusion is to
compare the organ of consciousness in ourselves with the presumed organ"
in other creatures. The criterion, therefore, is to be external, after all!
The fishes have an archipallium; possibly then, a dull glow of conscious-
ness may accompany their activities; but its presence is disputable, and
its nature (if it is present) must be insubstantial. The part of the brain
which in higher animals is associated with consciousness is in the amphibia
and reptiles extremely small, and cannot with any confidence be regarded
as an index of consciousness. In the birds, the cerebral hemispheres have
at last gained conspicuously on the other parts of the brain ; here, according-
ly, we may assume some consciousness, though its degree must remain un-
known. Wherewith we pass to the mammals, and are on firmer ground.

And consciousness itself? ' 'It seems to me quite hopeless to speculate on
the origin of consciousness, so long as its organ is so wrapped in obscurity.
And precisely for the same reason I decline to see in it the emergence or
accession of a new reality, other than ether, or ether-compacted nerve.
Until we know the cortex sufiiciently well to say that its structure throws
no light on the nature of consciousness, the question must be left open.
At present, our knowledge of the cortex, the most transcendently important
thing that science approaches, is appallingly meagre." "It is the most
reprehensible dogmatism to say that consciousness may not have arisen in,
and be a function of it." ' 'Any further discussion of the point would take
us into metaphysical considerations." Apparently it would, — if we are
not in the realm of such considerations already.

Here the general argument ends. It is clear that Mr. McCabe is at
least under obligation to distinguish between the two current uses of
the term 'consciousness;' to say whether, for him, it means 'awareness' or
whether it is identical with 'mind' or 'mentality' at large. It is clear, too,
that he has not fully understood his authorities: he is not at home with
Wundt's theory of the instinct, or with Thomdike's doctrine of free ideas;
and, indeed, his conception of modem psychology seems to be that of an
objective body of arguments rather than that of a group of empirical and
subjectively verifiable observations. These, however, are minor points:
the great fault of the essay is the logical fallacy which we have noted above.

The two concluding chapters, on the Dawn of Humanity and the Ad-
vance of Mind in Civilization, presuppose the appearance of consciousness,
and need not be discussed. They, like all the book, are written with a
nerve and swing that fascinate the reader. Mr. McCabe has an unusually
wide range of knowledge, and a delightful style; it is a pity that his great
powers of popularization are not exercised by a more logical mind.

P. E. Winter

BOOK REVIEWS 455

Ueher den Traum: experimental-psychologische Untersuchungen. Von Dr.
J, MouRLY VoLD, well. Professor an der Universitat Kristiania.
Herausgegeben von O. Klemm, Privatdozent an der Universitat
Leipzig. Erster Band, Leipzig, J. A. Earth, 1910. Pp. xiii., 435.
With portrait of the author. Price Mk. 11.

John Mourly Void, professor of philosophy in the university of Chris-
tiania, died in 1907, at the age of fifty-seven. For twenty-five years,
Mourly Void had been engaged in the observation of dream phenomena;
some of his results are published in articles, in the Revue de I' Hypnotisme et
de la Psychologie, 1896, in the Zeitschrift fiir Psychiatrie, 1900, and especially
in the Zeitschrift jiir Psychologie, 1897. He left, at his death, besides a
large body of scattered notes, the manuscript (in German ) of a large work
on the experimental study of dreams ; the first volume of this work, edited
by Dr. Klemm, lies before us. Dr. Klemm has, no doubt, been well-
advised to print the manuscript as it stood; the author's German, though
not always idiomatic, is always intelligible ; and while the book might have
been very considerably condensed, the reader would have missed, in the
abbreviated form, a valuable lesson in scientific method. On the other
hand, the editor should, by all means, have supplied an index. It is true
that index-making is mechanical work; but then it is also mechanical
work of the expert kind ; and if an editor shrinks from it, he should decline
outright the editorial duties.

The book is, as we have said, a valuable lesson in scientific method.
The author takes us painfully and point by point through all the difficul-
ties of dream-observation ; shows us all the successive improvements in his
own manner of working; and discusses in all detail the interpretation of
dreams experimentally aroused or influenced. His method is, in every
sense, comparative: he compares the experimental dreams with dreams of
the preceding normal night; he gathers the dreams of a large number of
practised and unpractised observers, — of several hundred university
students and school teachers (both sexes); he has, to fall back upon, a
personal experience that is probably unequalled; he does not neglect the
comparison of the dream with the waking state. The first 58 pages, on
method, should be read by advanced students of psychology, whatever
their interest; only the specialist, we fear, will read critically through the
remainder of the book; more particularly now that Freud's interpretation
of the dream-consciousness has turned inquiry in a difi^erent direction.
Yet the remainder, though it fill nearly 400 octavo pages, is well worth
reading.

The experimental dreams here reported are but a fraction of the whole:
they are dreams whose peripheral motive consisted in a cutaneous-muscular
stimulation of the lower extremities, more especially of the ankles. The
first of the two principal chapters gives an account of experiments in
which a band is placed about the left ankle, and remains in position all
night; the resulting dreams are compared with those of the preceding
normal night. In other experiments, a band is tied around sole and in-
step, as well as about the ankle ; in yet others, the foot is encased in a sock.
Both types of experiments are, in one case, carried to the point of habitua-
tion. The second principal chapter gives an account of experiments in
which the two ankles are separately bound, either for the whole night or
for the evening only. In other experiments, the two ankles are not only
separately bound, but are also tied together by a third band. The result-
ing dreams are compared with those of the normal nights, and also with
those reported in the preceding chapter. A promised Appendix, on the
part played by the hip joint (p. 216), is not mentioned in the table of
contents and does not appear in the text.

The net result of the investigation can best be shown in the form of a
Table,

456 BOOK REVIEWS

I. Ideas of pressure and temperature are aroused only in slight measure.
II. Motor ideas are aroused most commonly.

1. a. Free active movements of high intensity are the specific
result of the stimulus, and outweigh in number all the other
motor ideas put together.

b. Parallel movements of the feet cannot with certainty be
brought into connection with the stimulus.

2. The same thing holds of inhibited movement.

3. Static conditions show a clear causal relation to the stimulus;
they are by no means intensive, yet stand in number next after
the free active movements.

4. Passive movements of the whole body cannot with certainty be

related to the stimulus.

5. Motor objects and

6. Abstract motives to movement are causally related to the
stimulus, though they are dream-factors that rarely appear in
isolation.

III. I. Ideas coincident in time with the experiment or with the dis-
cussion of it are aroused only in slight measure.
2. The unpleasurable common sensations cannot with certainty
be attributed to the operation of the stimulus alone; the free
active movements were accompanied by a pleasurable organic
complex.
This meagre statement of the outcome must here suffice. We may expect,
in the second volume, a full theoretical discussion of the dream-conscious-
ness; meanwhile, the remarks made on pp. 9 f., 416 ff., are significant.
The questionary used by the author is printed on pp. 31 ff. J. Field

Parenthood and Race Culture; An Outline of Eugenics. Caleb W. Saleeby.
Moffat, Yard and Company, New York, 1909. Pp. xv, 389.

This book lays claim to the distinction of being the first to survey the
whole field of eugenics. The author states in the preface that there is need
to-day of a "general introduction to eugenics which is at least responsible;"
and adds that he is "indebted to more than one pair of searching and illus-
trious eyes, .... for reading the proofs of this volume." The present dis-
cussion, it would seem, is a continuation of the author's previous campaign
of advocacy. Further, the book is to be regarded as an exposition, not as
a contribution of original material. Dr. Saleeby seeks to review and arrange
the results of Galton and of the other investigators; still, the author is
himself a man of opinions, and he devotes much space to his own particu-
lar crotchets. Unfortunately the book is swelled by some tiu-gid writing.
It stands in this regard in strong contrast with Galton's own condensed,
close-knit manner of utterance. Had the present volume been boiled down
to half its size, its effectiveness would have been doubled.

The contents are divided into two parts: "The Theory of Eugenics"
(Part I) and "The Practice of Eugenics" (Part II). Part II falls into
two complementary themes, "negative" and "positive" eugenics; — per-
haps "restrictive " and "constructive" would have been better terms. Nega-
tive eugenics, as the author defines it, seeks to discourage the parenthood
of the least desirable. Positive eugenics is the effort to encourage parent-
hood on the part of the most desirable.

Only one of his chief tasks does Dr. Saleeby perform with thoroughness.
That task is destructive. Errors and illusions are mercilessly slaughtered.
On page 28, the author sweeps the Nietzschean view of selection off the
boards. The superstition of maternal impressions is quashed on page 128.
Farther along Mr. Bernard Shaw's erratic proposals for a stud-farm to be
devoted to race-culture are dispatched. It is shown in Chapter X that
eugenics does not propose a destruction of the family; that it endorses,
indeed, exalts monogamy. And so throughout. The tone of the book is

BOOK Reviews 457

distinctly controversial. Unfortunately the author over-reaches himself.
He is too combative, lacking the calm temper of the scientist. He assumes
ignorance, misconception and indifference in his audience; and the conse-
quent attitude of defiance is at times unpleasant.

Eugenic endeavor, declares Dr. Saleeby, centres about "selection for
parenthood." Parenthood the unfit must be denied. The lowering of the
death-rate among infants (and adults as well) tends to keep alive until
the reproductive age many inherently weak constitutions which reduce
the average vitality of the stock; this fact emphasizes the need of man's
further interference with the processes of selection. *

The Chapters on "Heredity and Race Culture" and "Education and
Race Culture" define the relative importance of nature and nurture and
demonstrate the need of progressive improvement of the germ-plasm. The
section on "Lines of Eugenic Education" is excellent, although it should
be transposed to Part II of the book. In his discussion of terminology.
Dr. Saleeby appears to be trying to clear up his own ideas, and, on the whole,
he succeeds. Yet it is rather curious, after his demand that "conceptional "
be substituted for "congenital," to come across the word "congenital"
(p. 20I, near bottom) used in the very sense which the writer had before
violently repudiated.

The author's proposals are invariably mild. He desires no revolution
of moral or marital relations. Motherlove, he thinks, should have survival-
value in the minds of eugenists to the same degree as physique, ability and
character. "I confess myself opposed to the principle of bribing a woman
to become a mother, whether in the guise of State-aid or in the form of
eugenic premiums for maternity." Equally repugnant are the German
projects for a "eugenic" universal polygamy and polyandry (echoes of
Plato!) and Chesterton's definition of eugenics: "that people should be
forcibly married to each other by the police." Monogamic marriage has
survived and become dominant because of its supreme services to mother-
hood, and hence to the race. The conclusion is that the best form of sex-
relation secures the common parental care of the offspring; the support of
motherhood by fatherhood.

Society must prevent propagation of the criminal, the insane, the epi-
leptic, and the feeble-minded. Means to this end, however, the author
leaves undefined. Permanent detention is mentioned; surgery rejected.
Although Dr. Saleeby has enormous faith in the 'power of pubhc opinion,'
he puts little trust in the formal embodiment of it — legislation.

In general, it is true that acquired characters, or modifications, are not
inherited. A few virulent diseases and substances, however, sink deeply
enough into the bodily constitution to damage the germ-plasm. In such
cases the offspring suffer. The more common of these "racial poisons, "
as Dr. Saleeby names them, are alcohol, lead, narcotics and syphilis. The
discussion of racial poisons, though inexcusably prolix, constitutes one of
the most original contributions to eugenic literature in the book.

Nowhere does Dr. Saleeby speak out positively enough for constructive
eugenics. He says rather lukewarmly, "positive eugenics must largely
take the form, at present, of removing such disabilities as now weigh upon
the desirable members of the community, especially the more prudent
sort." Surely this is not the utterance of a soldier in the "moral crusade"
for children which Professor Karl Pearson emphasizes. In this connection
a line from Galton is apropos: "The possibility of improving the race or a
nation depends on the power of increasing the productivity of the best
stock. This is far more important than that of repressing the productivity
of the worst." The present book disagrees with Galton, not overtly but
implicitly.

Eugenics, for Dr. Saleeby, is the final arbiter of all disputes. He cares
not whether a "proposal is socialistic, individualistic, or anything else" so
long as it is eugenic. "When by means of eugenics we give education the

458 BOOK REVIEWS

right materials to work upon we shall have a Utopia, and as for forms of
government they may be left for fools to contest." Here we have the
ardor of the reformer, bordering on fanaticism ! Eugenics the only salva-
tion! This kind of enthusiasm seems to be responsible for many of the
faults of the book.

The volume is, without doubt, suitable for popular consumption. If
it is verbose, it is, in the main, clear. If it hammers and scolds, it meets
enough opposition and inertia to justify its censoriousness. If certain
details are questionable, the main outline is reliable. It will help, not
hurt, the eugenic propaganda. Nevertheless, it cannot be regarded as
a definitive exposition of eugenics as that science at present stands. It
should be superseded before long by a far abler treatise. C. R. Hugins.

Cornell University.

The Science of Poetry and the Philosophy of Language, by Hudson Maxim.
New York, Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1910. pp. XIII + 294.

The core of this book is that language both expresses and impresses
thought (p. 84). Thought may be so abstract that it cannot be expressed
except in the most literal way ; again, it can be figuratively expressed. The
latter gives poetry (Chap. Ill, IV). Poetry is non-emotional (Chap. Ill,
IV); it is also what separates man from the brute (Chap. II). Language
impresses thought, on the other hand, by the moving power of sound. Here
is the source of all emotion in letters (Chap. V). This power can be assigned
largely to the four properties of sound, each of which is connected
with a specific phase of emotion and is traced by analysis to a physiologi-
cal process (Chap. I, VI, VII) ; indeed, everything mental is physiological
(Chap. I). This impressiveness is given the name potentry (Chap. V), a
word that carries in its train a new nomenclature for all varieties of lin-
guistic arts, to a treatment of which later chapters are devoted. From the
tone of the whole book, one judges that science is the panacea for all
mysticism; those who see anything mysterious in poetry are belabored
right and left with much ridicule.

In its foundation principles the book is dogmatically materialistic. Surely
much may be said against consciousness being a physiological process
merely. And while it is true that "consciousness is the sense of awareness
of the other senses" (p. i), it is also aware of more than the psychical ele-
ments into which it can be resolved. This principle holds with the analy-
sis of all compounds; and the failure to see it gives a false tone to the
whole book. No one will deny that "there is a science of poetry" (p. 44),
but there is something in poetry which eludes us if we analyze it scientifi-
cally. Let men try to tell just what any familiar substance really is ; their
statements will be as mysterious as the definitions of poetry criticised by
Mr. Maxim from the standpoint of science. The quarrel then is not with
those who find a touch of mystery in poetry, but with those who, taking their
own restricted view of experience for the whole of it, refuse to countenance
the revelations of that experience from any other viewpoint. There has been
no "coalition against the scientific investigation of poetry" (p. 191). but
Mr. Maxim does not see the significance of admitting (p. 44) Coleridge's
claim, that poetry is the antithesis of science. For science seeks the
relations of experience apart from subjectivity, is objective; poetry —
an art — expresses experience linked with life, is subjective. One's attitude
to bread when he is hungry (p. 66) is quite different from his attitude of
curiosity as to the chemical constituents of bread; the latter gives us
science, is intellectual; the other gives us art, is emotional. Poetry is a
form of art. The fundamental unsoundness of the whole book then in its
treatment of poetry is evident in the statement that "as we go away from the
emotions and in the direction of thought at the expense of emotion ....
the more poetry we get" (p. 66) ; this is in the direction of science and gives
us, not poetry, but mathematics — the multiplication table. This antithe-

BOOK REVIEWS 459

sis of poetry and science gives to many of the statements about poetry
quoted in the book under review a relevancy not to be broken by the
cheap playing to gullibility that characterizes much of Mr. Maxim's
criticism of them. (See, for instance, Chapter IV, bottom of page 51.)
Poetry is not then the expression of mere ideas (p. 91). The use of trope
itself implies a heightened idea. The source of the moving power of any
poetry worth the name must lie primarily in a certain enthusiasm of the
personality. Remove this and poetry is gone. It was this ardor of life the
Greeks symbolized in Pegasus ; Mr. Maxim has tamed Pegasus, but he has
killed poetry.

The theory that language both expresses and impresses thought is not
after all so brand-new. Men in reality have taken this for granted. Every
idea has some feeling tone, — every sound some power to attract the hearer.
This is admitted (p. 80). Moreover, ideas assume naturally the form
best fitted both to express and impress themselves, giving us the poles of
science and art according as we emphasize intellect or personality. Looked
at from the standpoint of its impressiveness, language has long been known
as the pleasure-giving art of letters. In this pleasingness lies what Mr.
Maxim calls the impressive power of language, — "the conversion of energy
into pleasurable emotions, which serve to energize perceptions (p. 79)."
Where then is the need for coining the word potentry and all that rigmarole
of nomenclature that depends on it? Better to have called a much needed
attention to the practical value of art.

The valuable part of the book discusses this impressive power of language
(Chap. V, VII, VIII). The four properties of sound — loudness, duration,
pitch and timbre — are linked with specific phases of emotion; loudness and
duration with importance; pitch with intensity; and timbre with pleasure
and pain (Chap. VII). The theory is suggestive, but lacks — especially
that timbre expresses pleasure and pain — scientific confirmation. Spencer
is followed largely, but Chap. V links to his principle of economy the need
for added expenditure of energy in impressiveness of utterance. Spencer
says the vocal apparatus should be simple and do its work with the least
expenditure of energy. Maxim would say, Use economically as much
energy as you like, so long as it produces pleasurable emotions with the
thought conveyed. Both practice economy; Maxim does additional
business in another field. This is very important and valuable, but Mr.
Maxim does not see (i) that he is here in the province of art as opposed to
science, and (2) that the principle of economy is here applied only in
the very loosest way, if at all. Science looks at the apple and finds
economy. Think though of the blossoms that do not fructify. This,
too, is nature. What economy of energy is in the play of a healthy boy?
Or in his work either, if he enjoy it? Nature plays and works, better
plays in work. Art in literature corresponds to this play. In giving Mac-
beth six Imes to ask the doctor a question easily expressed in six words, the
artist reveals a healthy natural indifference to any law of mere parsimony
in speech. In the utterance of science there may be economy of energy;
a certain generosity characterizes the larger utterance of art.

Chap. VII also gives a theory of rhythm, which Spencer did not attempt.
Rhythm is the ebb and flow of nerve impulse according as muscles are
contracted or relaxed. "The beats of the verse are in harmony with the
beats of the nerve spasms which the nerve potential of passion tends to
induce" (p. 147). "Under emotion, then, vocal phenomena must necessa-
rily be rhythmical." The theory is not conclusive. No reason is given for
the fact that the tension and relaxation of muscles is regular in poetical
rhythm and irregular in that of prose. How account, moreover, for the
rhythm of the wheels on the rail joints to the unmoved passenger? The
theory also implies an unsatisfactory explanation of time. The feelings of
muscular contraction and relaxation are themselves in time: to conclude

460 BOOK REVIEWS

then that these are the data of our feeling of time seems to be begging the
question.

The book contributes nothing to the problem of the origin of language.
In taking the position that the use of trope and not articulate language
separates man from the animals (Chapter II), it seems to be using articulate
in the sense of uttered, spoken; but what men mean by articulate speech
when they deny it to animals is that orderly grouping of words correspond-
ing to ideas articulated logically so as to produce an intended end. It is
true animals do not use metaphor; it is almost equally evident they do
not form concepts, — the first requisite in reasoning. Nor is the discussion
of the development of speech in the race in the least fruitful. The develop-
ment of the child linguistically contributes little to our knowledge of that
general development; for there is no meaning to the babblings of an infant
until the mother has by gestures or in other ways aroused an association
in the child's mind between certain sounds and certain objects. The
statement, "Every mother in the world, of whatever race, can understand
the baby talk of any child of the race" (p. 20) is in its extravagance typical
of the book. Much less space, indeed, might have expressed all that is
valuable in it either as science or as poetry. Marlow A. Shaw.

State University of Iowa.

(i) Les degenerescences auditives. Par A. Marie. 1909. pp. iii.

(2) Reeducation physique et psychique. Par H. Lavrand. 1909. pp.123.

(3) Les f dies a eclipse. Par Lkgrain. 19 id. pp. 120.

(4), (5) Les rives et leur interpretation. Par P. Meunibr et R. MassElon.

1910. pp. 213.
(6) La suggestion et ses limites. Par BajEnopf et OssiPOPif. 191 1. pp.

119.
(7), (8) La psychologic de I'attention. Par N. Vaschide et R. MeuniKR.
1910. pp. 199.

These six volumes form nos. 12-19 of the Bibliotheque de Psychologic
experimentale et de Metapsychie, edited by Dr. Raymond Meunier and issued
by the Librairie Bloud et Cie of Paris.

(i) Dr. Marie, senior physician at the Asile de Villejuif, published in
1908 (as no, 3 of the present series) a little book entitled L' Audition morhide,
in which he briefly discussed the pathological physiology of hearing in
cases of mental and nervous disease. The work before us is concerned with
the principal anatomical anomalies of the peripheral or central auditory
apparatus. After a general introduction, treating of the diJBficulties of
diagnosis, the diagnostic value of symptoms, etc., the author takes up in
order, from without inwards, the various divisions of the auditory mech-
anism. To the chapter on the external and middle ear he contributes a
table of auricular measurements, with their craniological complements.
The chapter on the internal ear is sketchy; in particular, the problem of
heredity should have been approached in the light of the Mendelian hy-
pothesis. In the chapter on central lesion and cortical hearing, the author
quotes, apparently with approval, the opinion of Dr. P. Marie that isolated
sensory aphasia, and especially pure verbal deafness, does not occur. He
here describes a case (with autopsy) of dementia with motor verbal aphasia,
agraphia to dictation, and verbal deafness. A final chapter deals with
arrest of auditory development, physical and mental. Dr. Marie insists
strongly on the necessity of a precise diagnosis of the cause of deaf-mutism,
and pleads for systematic education of such patients as are educable. It
seems clear that the appeal to public sentiment made in this chapter was
the author's chief motive in writing the book.

(2) According to Dr. Lavrand, who is professor at Lille, mind and body
are not separate and separable phenomena, but constitute a 'substantial
unity' ; mind therefore acts upon body, body upon mind. There is, indeed,
a constant interaction among all organic functions, the conscious included;

BOOK R^VmWS 461

and since the symptoms of functional disturbance far outrun, in most cases,
the actual lesion of the organism, there is good hope of a successful re-
education. The model for this is, of course, given with the primary process,
that of education; the author accordingly outlines the genesis of ideas in
the child, the growth in complexity of bodily movements, and the co-
function of ideas and movements in what he calls psychomotor acts; he
finally formulates the end of education as the transformation of conscious
and attentively executed actions into subconscious or automatic activity.
Passing from theory to practice, he first takes up the question of mental
reeducation, i. e., of the effect of psychotherapeutics upon various forms of
mental disorder, from hysteria down to a practically normal psychasthenia.
Next follows a chapter on motor reeducation, — locomotor ataxia, paralysis,
tics, speech derangements, aphasia, deaf-mutism, — which contains much
empirical material, plainly of the writer's own observation. Dr. Lavrand
then proceeds to discuss sensory reeducation, with special reference to
Rousselot's method of treating deafness; organic reeducation, with refer-
ence to imaginary dyspepsia; respiratory reeducation, with reference to
the alleviation of asthma; and ends with a brief mention of circulatory
reeducation, and of the reeducation (or rather education) of the idiot
by Bourneville's method.

(3) The third volume on our list, from the pen of Dr. Legrain, senior
physician of the hospitals for the insane in the Department of Seine, is
mainly taken up with the symptomatology of what the author terms
eclipsed insanities. There is, says, Dr. Legrain, between the conscious
and the unconscious, a wide region of subconsciousness; it is manifest in
the phenomena of instinct and habit, and covers the whole field of the
forgotten. This subconsciousness is not inactive; it has its own life and
activity, even though it does not come to consciousness. Wherever, now,
there is mental disorder involving hallucinatory experiences, the contents
of the hallucination may disappear into the subconscious; the patient is
then not cured, though he is free of the obsessing ideas ; the hallucinations
are under eclipse, but may emerge again. (A second volume is to be de-
voted to this fact of resuscitation.) The impermanence of the cure is
favored by general mental weakness; and the condition of eclipse is evi-
denced by the fact that the hallucinations are accepted by the apparently
normal patient as real items of past experience. In conclusion, the author
recommends to experimental psychologists the study of the hallucinatory
idea, especially under the headings of strength and duration of impression.

(4), (5) The work of Drs. Meunier and Masselon, on dreams and their
interpretations, opens with a psychological analysis, couched in general
terms, of the nature and sources of the dream-consciousness. The writers
regard all dreams, except those that appear in the hypnagogic state just
before or after sleep, as in some measure pathological. They attach
special importance to dreams of coenaesthetic or organic origin, which
are of two kinds: in the one case, the organic derangement is clearly
localized, and the dream-images bear directly upon it; in the other, the
organic state is intellectualized by way of a diffuse emotion, and the dream-
images are emotively suggested. These dreams constitute "a veritable
microscope of sensibility; they throw into relief slight disturbances that
escape the notice of the waking consciousness." A review of drearns in
general pathology, in infections and intoxications, in neurotic conditions,
and in the various forms and stages of insanity — this review makes up the
body of the book — shows, in fact, that they may reveal a functional dis-
turbance which is not apparent in the waking life, and which may be the
indication either of some organic disease or of a hitherto latent mode of
mental disequilibration. Dreams are thus a touchstone of the stability
of the psychophysical organism. If they are ordinarily neglected, in prog-
nosis, this is only because they are considered too delicate and too variable
a reagent for the physician's purpose. In fact, however, there are certain

462 BOOK REVIEWS

characters that make them available. There is jSrst of all distress, especially
when intense (as terror) and sharply localized (as physical pain); this
may lead to the sleeper's actual arousal in the middle of the night; and
the arousal, if really due to the distress, is unquestionably a pathological
symptom. The homogeneity of the dream, shown perhaps in the recur-
rence of leading motives, is also evidence of the persistence of the causal
substrate. The stereotyped dream attests the presence of an identical
cause, organic or psychic, which exerts its influence at recurrent intervals
of time. (The writers emphasize the importance of this phenomenon of
stereotypism of dreams, and devote a special chapter to its consideration.)
The fact that a dream is remembered on waking is also significant. The
contents of the dream, finally, must always be taken into account. No
one of these characters, it is true, stamps the condition of the dreamer as
at all gravely pathological ; but each and all of them point to an anomaly,
to a nervous susceptibility, and so suggest a closer study of the patient's
bodily and mental state. In a word, dreams have a very real prognostic
value; but they are indicative only, and not demonstrative; and the indi-
cation should not be acted upon till it has been confirmed by other and more
technical methods of examination.

(6) Professor Bajenoff and Dr. Ossipoff, leading alienists of Moscow,
write upon the facts and theories of suggestion. The six chapters which
make up the book, entitled respectively the history of hypnosis and sugges-
tion, psychological automatism, hypnotism and suggestion, collective
suggestion, current theories of therapeutic theory, and the psychological
mechanism of suggestion, contain little more than a brief resume of the
work done and the views expressed by other investigators ; but the authors
command a clear and vivid style, and have the happy knack of literary
illustration, — as when they draw upon certain of Tolstoi's characters to
exemplify the procedure of psychotherapy. The central aim of the book
is the divorcement of suggestion from hypnosis. Suggestion is not the
essential characteristic of hypnosis; it may be exerted more effectually
in the waking state (p. ii). It is ordinarily supposed that the subject in
profound hypnosis is peculiarly liable to suggestion; "this opinion is ab-
solutely erroneous" (p. 36). Hypnotic suggestion has its definite limits
(pp. 39 ff., 114); while suggestibility itself is a psychophysiological phe-
nomenon of practically universal occurrence (pp. 58, 112). The mechanism
of suggestion is described, schematically, as ' 'the disaggregation of psychical
activity, the rupture of the normal co-ordination and subordination of the
elements of the mental life, and, as a result, the more or less complete
dissociation of the personality" (pp. 35, 113)-

(7), (8) The Psychology of Attention, written in collaboration with the
late Dr. Vaschide by Dr. R. Meunier, psychopathologist at the Asile de
Villejuif, is a companion volume to the Pathology 0} Attention (no. 5 of this
series) published by the same authors in 1908. It is not a text-book in
the psychology of attention; the writers' intention is at once narrower and
wider than that of the compiler; they present, first, a report of carefully
selected experimental data, and on the basis of this approved material they
rise to an inclusive theory of attention in dynamic terms. The first two
chapters discuss the technique of the study of attention and the results of
experimental investigation; the reader — unless he recall the contents of
the previous volume — will be surprised to find that the great bulk of the
space is given to the reaction experiment. However, the complete pro-
gramme of an experimental enquiry would cover, in the authors' judgment,
ten tests; those of cutaneous sensitivity, of muscular strength voluntarily
exerted, of speed of movement, of voluntary attention (canceUing letters,
discrimination of forms applied to wrist or palm, grasp of the sense of a
printed page by a rapid glance over it), of color- vision and extent of the
visual field, of audition and extent of the auditory field, of rapidity of
thought (reaction experiment in various forms), of memory of words and

BOOK REVIEWS 463

figures, of mental arithmetic, and of association of ideas. ' 'The examina-
tion of a subject by means of these ten experimental series will show that
it is possible to catch the attention at work, to seize its dynamic character.
And theoretical conceptions will in so far be modified" (p. 61). It seems
to the reviewer that some of the tests would require a great deal of psycho-
logical interpretation before they could be turned to account for the char-
acterization of attention; at all events, the writers do not justify their
statement. Chapter 3, on attention during sleep, reports an experimental
study (made by Vaschide) of the ability to wake at a set time in the morning.
Out of 40 chosen subjects, of different sex, age (20 to 76), occupation,
education and nationality, 33 proved available for the test. The tendency
was to wake too early; the amount of error, for 26 subjects, was in rough
average 21 minutes; the error might, however, be as great as an hour and
a half, and might reduce to 12 seconds. The chapter gives many interest-
ing facts, objective and introspective, but offers no connected theory of the
phenomenon. Ch. 4, on suggestibility and attention, reports Binet's ex-
periments on the suggestibility of school-children (lines, weights), and
concludes that, while there is no direct relation between suggestibihty and
attention, suggestibility may be considered as a state of emotive dis-
turbance, the first effect of which is a disturbance of attention. Ch. 5,
on hypnosis and attention, is mainly occupied with an account of Beaunis'
well-known experiments. No theory of hypnosis is at present possible;
it is, however, characterized rather by paraprosexia than by hyperprosexia,
— that is, if the reviewer understands these terms, rather by diversion of
attention than by extreme concentration of attention, — and by a high devel-
opment of the 'forces of automatic attention.' Ch. 6 reviews and criticises
the prevailing theories of attention, imder the rubrics peripheral, motor,
affective (Ribot, Bain), and sensory, voluntaristic, perceptive, central
(Marillier, Kreibig, Rageot, Nayrac). The authors conclude that attention
is intimately related to emotion ; that it is a phenomenon of central origin ;
and that it is essentially a dynamic function. "It is to the intellect what
reflex irritability is to the nervous system; it is not a state, but an act."
Let us hope that they find this conclusion satisfactory! —

As, now, we glance back over this series of books, we realize that, while
they leave much to be desired on the score of systematic presentation, they
are none the less readable and valuable, since every writer has some per-
sonal contribution to make to the existing stock of knowledge. A good
part of the contents strikes the reader as perfunctory; but there is always
some central chapter which brings new material or original ideas. Whether,
under these circumstances, it is worth while to publish books rather than
special articles is, perhaps, a question of taste; the reviewer, for his part,
would prefer to dispense with the second-hand discussions.

The proof-reading is usually poor. The punctuation is erratic; the
line-divisions show such monstrosities as ins-upportahle, o-hservation; and
names are massacred (Et. Slonon for E. E. Slosson, etc.).

James Field

The World of Dreams, by Havelock Ellis. Boston & New York,
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911. pp. xii., 288. Price $2.00 net.
There are at least four different ways, Mr. Ellis tells us, of writing a
book on dreams. There is the literary method, which may be dismissed at
once as wholly unscientific; there is the clinical method, followed for in-
stance by de Sanctis in his / Sogni; there is the experimental method, of
which Mourly Void has recently given us an excellent example; and there
is the introspective method, for a special form of which we are referred,
rather curiously, to Freud's Traumdeutung. However, we need not split
hairs about classification. The field of dreams is, in fact, the playground
of all sorts of psychological opinion ; the time has not yet come for anything
like a final synthesis; and so long as an author appeals to actual observa-

464 BOOK REVIEWS

tion, and so long as he takes up a definite position with regard to the phe-
nomena observed, we may be grateful for what he gives us. Mr. Ellis has
been noting down his dream-experiences for more than twenty years, and
in the present volume throws the outcome of his studies into popular form.
Let us see what his standpoint is.

Perhaps the first question that one asks of a writer upon dreams is that
of his attitude to the Subconscious. There is, indeed, no question upon
which the psychologists of this generation are more sharply divided ; there
is also no question which more imperatively demands a positive and clear-
cut reply; either one explains the conscious by a subconscious which is
still mental, or one draws the line of mind at the boundary of consciousness
itself. Mr. Ellis seeks the middle way, where the faring is least secure.
Consciousness is for him — as for the definers of the term in the Dictionary
of Philosophy and Psychology — 'the distinctive character of whatever may
be called mental life.' Subconscious is for the Dictionary 'not clearly
recognized in a present state of consciousness, yet entering into the devel-
opment of subsequent states of consciousness,' — a definition that is
obviously equivocal, and that is immediately particularized. Mr. Ellis
cites it without comment, adding only that subconscious states are 'slightly,
partially, or imperfectly conscious, ' and that "any objection to so precise
and convenient a term ( !) seems to belong to the sphere of personal idiosyn-
crasy" (p. 4). What then does the term precisely mean? Consciousness
covers, by definition, the whole of the mental life; is the subconscious not-
mental? No: it is slightly, partially mental, or imperfectly mental. But,
if it is the former, is the remaining 'part' of it material? Then, surely, our
author's objection to 'dispositions of brain cells' falls to the ground. Or,
if it is the latter, can Mr. Ellis explain how a phenomenon may show 'im-
perfectly' the distinctive character that makes it what it is?

A second question, of a more topical nature, that the modem reader asks
of a book on dreams is the question of the writer's attitude towards the psy-
choanalytic school. And here again Mr. Ellis strikes a middle path which,
to the reviewer, seems to lose itself in equivocation. "Freud's subtle
and searching analytic genius has greatly contributed to enlarge our
knowledge of this world of sleep. We may recognize the value of his con-
tribution to the psychology of dreams while refusing to accept a premature
and narrow generalization" (pp. 174 f.). But is not this an attempt to eat
one's cake and have it too? We are to accept all the Freudian analyses,
as holding for the dreams analyzed; but we are to reserve a large body of
unanalyzed dreams, as belonging to 'quite distinct' types. Mr. Ellis
disclaims in his Preface (p. vii.) any use of the psychoanalytic method;
how, therefore, does he know that the unanalyzed dreams would not have
submitted to a Freudian interpretation? And, in larger terms, how shall
one gain the right to declare a generalization premature and narrow, save
by producing negative instances within the imiverse of discourse to which
the generalization belongs? The reviewer, be it noted, is not here arguing
on behalf of Freud, as he was not arguing just now against any and every
doctrine of the Subconscious; he is urging, simply, that unclear definition
and dogmatic statement are out of place in science, however popular the
form in which the scientific presentation may be cast.

What is the mechanism of dreaming? Mr. Ellis' view is not easy to
expound: partly because his own exposition is spread serially over a number
of chapters, partly because he is by no means careful in expression. He
inclines strongly to the opinion that all dreams are peripherally initiated;
"we seem entitled to say that in all dreams there is probably a presentative
element," that every dream has "received an initial stimulus from some
external or, at all events, peripheral source" (pp. 72 f.). The dream-con-
sciousness is, therefore, always thrown into gear, so to say, by a peripheral
stimulus, external or organic. When the gearing has been effected, move-
ment may be kept up, even after the energy of the stimulus is exhausted,

BOOK REVIEWS 465

by an inherent tendency of images to assert themselves in consciousness.
A 'more or less spontaneous procession of images' is the elemental stuff
of dreams (pp. 24 f.). In the most elementary form of dreaming, in which
the peripheral element plays its largest part, we have a 'seemingly spon-
taneous,' 'mechanical flow of images, regulated by associations of resem-
blance' (p. 27). The stimulus, however, is never presented directly to
consciousness, as it would be in the waking life, but "serves to arouse old
memories and ideas which the dream consciousness accepts as a reasonable
explanation of it" (p. 73). This circumstance would appear to determine
the character of our dreams ; and the author admits that the dream-con-
sciousness may show "what we call a deliberate subconscious selection of
imagery," so that a 'real subconscious link' connects any two successive
images. Nevertheless, he insists that there may be sheer discontinuity;
"mental imagery is deeper and more elemental than any of the higher
psychic functions even when exerted subconsciously. Discontinuous images
may arise from a psychic basis deeper than choice, their appearance
being determined by their own dynamic condition at the moment." "If
we hold to the belief that dreaming is based on a fundamental and elemen-
tary tendency to the formation of continuous or discontinuous images,
which may or may not be controlled by psychic emotions and impulses,
we shall be delivered from many hazardous speculations" (p. 24).

The passages are not clear. If the occurrence of the initial stimulus is
universal, it is probably also necessary; yet, if images have a tendency to
spontaneous irruption into consciousness, there is no reason why a dream
should not be initiated at the centre; no reason, indeed, why we should
cease from dreaming at all. Contrariwise, if the images are held together
by associations of resemblance, then the initial stimulus, plus the law of
association of ideas, is adequate to the result; the spontaneity of the
images is illusory.

It seems that Mr. EUis has found certain dreams which suggest a sub-
conscious elaboration, and certain others which have a mechanical or
disconnected look; he has accordingly called in, as explanatory principles,
both the Subconscious and a dynamic Bereitschaft of images. His anti-
physiological bias, leading him to emphasize the Subconscious and the
Image as psychological terms, has then prevented the enquiry whether the
'dynamic condition' of the images is not an alternative to, or an equivalent
of, the hypothesis of the Subconscious, and has also encouraged him to
traverse the accepted doctrine of psychology that Bereitschaft is always
strictly conditioned. This, at any rate, is the interpretation which the
reviewer has put upon a puzzling subject.

The primary stimulus, we have learned, does not come to consciousness
in its own right, but arouses old memories and ideas. The arousal, how-
ever, is again not direct. The stimulus, if it appeal to one of the higher
senses, suggests motor activities which cannot be carried out; the excita-
tion, entering motor channels, is impeded, broken up, scattered; and
this process "is transmitted to the brain as a wave of emotion." If the
stimulus is internal, — alimentary, cardiac, respiratory, — then the organic
sensations which it sets up themselves constitute emotional excitement.
While, therefore, the elemental stuff of dreams is a procession of images,
"the fundamental source of our dream life may be said to be emotion"
(p. 107). How does the stimulus, after its emotive transformation, arouse a
dream? "The chief function of dreams is to supply adequate theories to
account for the magnified emotional impulses which are borne in on sleep-
ing consciousness. This is the key to imagination in dreams . . . Unable to
detect the origin" of the emotive waves, sleeping consciousness "invents an
explanation of them" (ibid.). This "craving for reasons is instinctive"
(p. 8); "every dream is the outcome of this strenuous, wide-ranging
instinct to reason" (p. 57); "all dreaming is a process of reasoning" (p. 56).
Reasoning, however, is a "synthesis of images suggested by resemblance

466 BOOK REVIEWS

and contiguity," and "the whole phenomenon of dreaming is really the
same process of image formation, based on resemblance and contiguity"
(p. 57). The possibility of subconscious elaboration is here given with the
instinct to explain. But will not the hand of the instinct be forced, so to
speak, time and again, by the inherent self-assertiveness of the images?

The reviewer has, perhaps, dwelt unduly upon obscurities which Mr.
Ellis will, doubtless, be able to clear up. At the same time, the obscurities
are here, a stumbling-block to the reader. And they appear again in
connection with another question. What do we mean when we ask whether
a particular conscious function or formation 'occurs' in dreaming? We
may mean: Does it operate or appear as it does in the waking life? Is
the mechanism of the dream consciousness, in its regard, to be considered as
normal? Or we may mean : Do we ever dream of it as operating or appear-
ing? Mr. Ellis is not careful to distinguish these two forms of the question.
When he declares, for instance, that the attention of dreams is for the most
part involuntary attention, he means, of course, that the general function
of attention in dreams is of the same kind as the function of involuntary
attention in waking; we are 'really' only involuntarily attentive, whatever
we may dream ourselves to be. Since, however, he has just described two
dreams in which the state of voluntary attention, as dream-phenomenon,
is well marked (a dream in which a particular kind of postage stamp is
looked for among the contents of a pocket-book, and a dream in which a
particular hat is sought in a row of hats of all shapes and sizes), it would
have been worth while to make the distinction explicit. Again, there is no
doubt that many persons have, not infrequently, the dream-experience
that they are dreaming. Mr. Ellis comments on the evidence as follows:
"I have never detected in my own dreams any recognition that they are
dreams. I may say, indeed, that I do not consider that such a thing is really
possible" (p. 65). Truly, it is not 'really' possible to 'recognize' in dreams
the dream-character of one's experience; for that, one must have waked.
But just as in the waking life one may say, on the ground of specific con-
scious experience, 'I was thinking. ' 'I was trying to remember, ' 'I must
have been dreaming, ' so may one dream, specifically, that one is thinking,
or trying to remember, or dreaming. To dream 'I am dreaming' is no more re-
markable than to dream 'I am looking for stamps in a pocket-book.' Indeed,
if the word 'occur' is taken in its second sense, there is no mode or item
of waking experience that may not occur in the dream-consciousness:
voluntary attention, deliberative thought, high resolve appear on equal
terms with involuntary attention, overwhelming emotion, or the dream-
state itself.

Mr. Ellis is not at his best in discussions of a technically psychological
sort. On the other hand, his wide reading and practised fluency of writing
stand him in good stead when he turns to special subjects. There is, e. g.,
an interesting chapter on Aviation in Dreams. Mr. Ellis rejects Stanley
Hall's theory of a hydro-psychosis, and explains the flying dream in the
orthodox way (though he achieved orthodoxy unawares, by his own obser-
vations) as reflecting the rise and fall of respiration. It is odd that he has
not thought of the possibility of a dendro-psychosis. If the falling dream
suggested to one of Mr. Hutchinson's correspondents {Dreams and their
Meanings, 1901, 108), the fear of falling from trees in sleep, the flying dream
suggests no less definitely the swing of our arboreal ancestor, Mowgli-like,
from tree to tree. This derivation would further account for the fact — a
difficulty to Mr. Ellis — that the dream of flying is usually agreeable, the
dream of falling usually disagreeable. The start from the sensations of
breathing is not hereby denied; but on the writer's own principles some
reason must be given for their imaginative dream-interpretation as the
movement of flight.

Another chapter, on Dreams of the Dead, is based upon a paper published
in the Psychological Review in 1895. At that date, Mr. Ellis could not.

BOOK REVIEWS 467

of course, have read Mr. Kipling's wonderful story of They; but it might
have been worth while, in the present recasting of his material, to raise
explicitly the question whether 'one never sees a dead person's face in
a dream.' The reviewer made some enquiry on this matter, in 1904, and
found (in accordance with his own experience) that the dead face not
uncommonly appears, as clearly and vividly as the face of a living person.
The chapter on Memory in Dreams contains a long excursus on false
recognition or paramnesia. The author believes that the necessary pre-
liminary to paramnesia is a general condition of temporary or chronic
nervous fatigue, though no sense of exhaustion need be felt. An externally
aroused perception begins, in this state, without sufficient strength to
afford the realization that it is beginning; it is brought down to a lower and
fainter stage, at which it is on a level with an internally aroused perception
or memory-image ; and when consciousness has become sufficiently devel-
oped to apprehend the nature of the perception, it also becomes aware that
the experience has been continuing for an indefinite time (pp. 251, 258).
"The mind has become flaccid and enfeebled; its loosened texture has, as
it were, abnormally enlarged the meshes in which sensations are caught
and sifted, so that they run through too easily. They are not properly
apperceived. To use a crude simile, it is as though we poured water into a
sieve. The impressions of the world which are actual sensations as they
strike the relaxed psychic meshwork are instantaneously passed through
to become memories, and we see them in both forms at the same moment,
and are unable to distinguish one from the other" (p. 259). The difficulty
in this hypothesis is that the 'actual present' reaches consciousness in the
'enfeebled shape' of a memory; for an enfeebled perception is not, ipso
facto, an image of memory. Mr. Ellis has spared no pains to acquaint
himself with previous attempts at explanation, but he has missed the
ingenious analysis offered by Linwiirzky in Meumann's Archiv.

Otto Perler

BOOK NOTES

Unsoundness of mind, by T. S. Clouston. London, Methuen & Co.,
1911. 361 p.
The author is of tJie conviction that unsoundness of mind is a topic that
urgently claims the attention not only of medical men but of intelligent
laymen ; this on account both of the vagueness and vastness of its problems
but also on account of the odium with which ignorance and prejudice have
surrounded it. Thus, medical specialists to-day owe a duty to the pubhc
as well as to the profession, and it is to discharge this duty that the author
writes this book into which he has put the results of a long life rich in
experience with the insane. He has taken the broadest view of the topic,
dealing with such themes as the hygiene of mind, education, the tragedy
of mental unsoundness, its relation to crime, borderland phenomena, etc.

The origin of life: being an account of experiments with certain super-heated
saline solutions in hermetically sealed vessels, by H. Charlton Bastian.
London, Watts & Co., 191 1. 76 p. (with ten plates).
This is a reproduction of an article lately submitted to the Royal Society
and which it did not consider suitable for acceptance. To this, the author
replies that very few believe that there was any non-natural cause of life.
Most think that there were certain conditions early in the history of the
earth that made abiogenesis possible. This work represents six recent
years of investigation upon the same subject which the author wrought on
in the years ending in 1872, under the title Heterogenesis or Archebiosis.
We are reminded that the same society turned down Joule's "The Mechani-
cal Equivalent of Heat," but published Tyndall's rather unsystematic
studies.

Famous impostors, by Bram Stoker. London, Sidgwick & Jackson, Ltd.,
1910. 349 p.
This book, with ten illustrations, briefly characterizes five pretenders,
three practitioners of magic, the Wandering Jew, John Law, six cases of
witchcraft, Tichbome claimant, women as men, ten hoaxes. Chevalier
d'Eon and the Bisley Boy. The tales are very crudely told, with very dis-
turbing affectation of scholarship. The only really valuable article is the
last one and the longest, on the Bisley Boy, where the author tries to
make out the case that Queen Elizabeth was practically sequestered from
her father and died at about the age of nine, while her keepers, fearing the
king's wrath, found the only possible substitute that would pass muster
for her in a boy nearby who assumed her role and lived it out through life.
He proved to be very able and remarkably adapted to his role, so
that, if this view were true. Queen Elizabeth was a man. His-her remark-
able and unreasonable devotion to the interests of two or three people,
otherwise unworthy, is explained by the fact that they alone knew her
secret which had to be guarded in every possible manner.

The nervous life, by G. E. Partridge. New York, Sturgis & Walton
Company, 1911. 216 p.
The author uses this term for two conditions: first, the nervous social
industrial life best typified by the stress and strife of the great cities; and
secondly, as expressed in the temperament in nervous individuals. Both
these elements of nervous life are on the increase and each produces the other.

BOOK NOTES 469

The problem is more pressing than ever before. After stating some bio-
logical laws and the need of self knowledge, the author discusses the prin-
ciples of control, the optimum life, food, skin, exercise, sleep, rest, work,
recreation, emotions, intellect, suggestion and mental healing.

Some mental processes of the rhesus monkey, by William T. Shepherd.
From the Psychological Laboratory of the George Washington Uni-
versity. The Psychological Monographs, Vol. XII, No. 5. Nov., 1910.
Whole No. 52. 61 p.
The author studied these monkeys with reference to the formation of
habits in releasing fastenings, in visual discrimination of brightness and
color, auditory of noise and pitch, inhibition of habits, imitation, ideation,
reasoning, adaptive intelligence and memory. He found that monkeys
discriminate brightness but take a long time to do so unless there is a direct
incentive to their work, but do so very readily if connected with objects
they are familiar with. So too with colors, if of their food. Habits are
rapidly formed if there is good inducement, and they inhibit former habits
easily. In this respect, they are superior to raccoons, dogs, cats, elephants,
otters, or any other animals yet tested. They have retentive number
memory. Their higher powers are rudimentary, but they have what may
be called practical ideas. Two learned by imitation, six did not appear to.
All seemed to reach a generalized mode of action in dealing with problems
without attaining true general notions. They have an adaptive intelli-
gence and lower forms of reason of a mental status inferior to true reason

The value and dignity of human life as shown in the striving and suffering
of the individual, by Charles Gray Shaw. Boston, Richard G.
Badger, 1 9 11 . 403 p .
This book is written with the conviction that a change is taking place
in our notion of human ideas and activities and, indeed, of the value of
life. It is dedicated to Professor Eucken who has the same conviction.
In the first part, entitled the problems of human life, the author discusses
the striving of humanity, the continuity of the former, the human world.
In part two, he takes up the naturalistic view of life, that of humanity and
sense in pleasure, desire, self, transmutation of naturalism and moralism,
eudemonism. The third part is characterized ethics of the life of humanity
and the will, conscience, rectitude, freedom, practical demands, rigorism,
destiny of man, etc. Part four is humanistic ethics, major and minor,
morality, category of virtue, virtue as an ethical sanction, human dignity
in the ethical category, the dignity of selfhood, the triumph of hvunanity
in major morals.

Three thousand years of mental healing, by George Barton CuTTEn. New
York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911. 318 p.
The writer has given us a rather hasty but interesting sketch of mental
healing from the very earliest civilization before Christianity down to
Schlatter, the Holy Ghost and Us, Dowie, Mrs. Eddy, and Emmanuelism.
with interesting chapters on relics and shrines, healers, talismans, amulets,
charms, royal touch, Mesmer and after, with eight interesting illustrations.
The book is popular and does not attempt to go into details of scholarship.
It is a little difficult to know just what the author aimed at. Perhaps it
was to show the community of all these different types of healing or to
show the persistence of the type down all the ages. This is, at any rate,
an impression the book gives us. The author does not attempt either
criticism or defence of the movement and indeed he has left us very im-
certain what his own attitude toward it is, unless the reader infers, as
perhaps he will inevitably do, that a writer who would spend so much time
upon such a topic must believe that there is something of great consequence
involved in his theme. The book is strangely pragmatic, non-committal ,
Journal — 10

470 BOOK NOTHS

attempting almost nothing in the way of psychological or philosophical
explanation. Perhaps the author intends fuller treatment later.

Die Mimik der Kinder beim kiinstlerischen Geniessen, von Rudolf SchulzE.
Leipzig, Voigtlander, 1906. 34 p.
The author showed a series of pictures of very diverse character to a
group of 12 girls, and a few seconds after the exposure of each picture photo-
graphed their faces in order to show the effect of the pictures. The charac-
ter of the pictures ranged all the way from very comic scenes to very serious
including the Crucifixion, and the faces of these girls are very expressive,
the picture and the expression being given on the same page and described.

The soul of the Indian; an interpretation, by Charles Alexander Eastman
(ChiyEsa). Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 191 1. 170 p.
This is one of the most charming and fascinating of books. The author,
in spite of the high civilization he has attained, has remained loyal to,
and sympathetic with, the faith of his people and give us a most interesting
account of how the great world looks to them. He treats the great mystery,
the family altar, ceremonial and symbolic worship, barbarism, the moral
code, the unwritten Scriptures, on the borderland of spirits. We have no
space here to do justice in a psychological journal to this work. It should
be in the hands of every one who has any interest in the Indian, and particu-
larly in the hands of those who have to deal with him ofl&cially.

Beitrag zur Aetiologie der Melancholie, by Emil Villiger. Basel, Schwei-
zer, 1898. 77 p. . ^

This thesis leads the author to conclude that melancholy is a psychosis
that may attack any age but is more common in men from 45 to 55 and in
women from 30 to 50. It is more common among women than men and
more among the unmarried than the married, more common among country
than city people. While there are many causes, heredity and the psycho-
pathic constitution are the chief. The psychic causes are shock and illness.

Affe und Mensch in ihrer hiologischen Eigenart, von Alexander Sokolow-
SKY. Leipzig, Theod. Thomas, 191 1. 147 p.
This work is by an assistant director of the Zoological Garden in Ham-
biu"g and contains a number of interesting characterizations. The first
part is devoted to apes, the last to primitive man, and a few, though it
must be admitted, rather superficial resemblances in the mode of life
between the two are pointed out.

Magical titbits, by Louis Hoffmann. N. Y., E. P. Button & Co., 191 1.
221 p.
The first part of this volume describes a few items of magic that are new,
and in the second part the author has put into more permanent shape a
number of ingenious inventions of his old friend Hartz which have hitherto
been accessible only in serial form.

The beginning of speech: a treatise on the uni-radical origin of Indo-European

words, by A. L. Snell. London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibrier &

Co., 1910. 267 p.

This work is the result of twenty-five years' study of some fifty langiiages,

chiefly Indo-European. It has involved not merely a study of lists of

words but a great deal of reading and note-taking. The author is evidently

not familiar with modem philology, and so apologizes for not quoting.

He found, as the book was going to press, that one or more of his important

conclusions had been anticipated by J. W. Donaldson's New Cratylus.

He holds that the number of simple, underived words in these languages

is small and that these consist of three letters and can be traced from one

language to another, not by permutation of initial consonants but by

BOOK NOTES 471

considerations of basal meaning; that each of these words is but one of a
vast number of modifications of one primal, photo-mimetic utterance. His
five laws are as follows. Monosyllabic words ending in 1, m, n, or r, were
once disyllabic and have been shortend by dropping an internal guttural
after its weakening to the aspirate. Words now beginning with 1, m, n, or
r, have lost initial wa, and so by the above law have retained no part of
the original word. Words now beginning with a vowel have lost a
consonant and those now ending with a vowel have lost an original final
guttural. Words now containing an internal n or m must, for philological
purposes, be written without these letters, which are merely nasal symbols
and no part of the original word.

The main thesis of this whole book is that each of these words is but one
of a vast number of modifications of one primal photo-mimetic utterance.
The original word from which all others have been derived must have been
something like vig, wag, jag, twav, jaw, and so on, 36 words which are
basal. These 36 he reduces to 6 and these 6 are all reduced by his laws to
waw, the primal, photo-mimetic utterance from which every word in all
the Indo-European languages has arisen. To the eye this word conveys
little, but when pronounced it is obviously the common cry of many birds
which the genius of primitive man transmuted into the foundation or
nucleus of human language. This is not humiliation for we are of lowly
origin.

Der Einfiuss psychischer Vorgdnge auf den Korper, inshesondere auf die

Blutverteilung, von Ernst WebER. Berlin, Julius Springer, 19 10.

426 p.
The writer discusses first the various physiological methods of register-
ing the accompaniments of psychic changes, especially the blood which
is without the brain and within it in men and animals. He takes up the
effect of the concepts of movement upon the distribution of blood in the
human body. He seeks to prove from experiments on animals the inde-
pendence of the brain in regulating its own blood supply. Oh this basis
he shows the changes of the volume of blood in the human brain in connec-
tion with different psychic processes, the reversal of the normal blood
distribution by physiological and pathological fatigue, the significance
of the variations of the blood distribution within the body under the
influence of psychic processes. The work closes with an excellent and
extended bibliography.
Bilderatlas zum ersten Bande der Grundzuge der Sprachpsychologie, von

Ottmar DiTTrich. Halle a. S., Max Meineyer, 1903. 95 p.
This atlas is by far the best now extant for the study of speech physiology
and defects. There are many very ingenious modes of representing the
various types of both normal and abnormal speech physiology which will
commend themselves to all who have to teach the subject.
Truth on trial: an exposition of the nature of truth. Preceded by a Critique

on Pragmatism and an Appreciation of its Leader, by PauIv Carus.

This work is dedicated to William James. It discusses Pragmatism,

the philosophy of personal equation, the rock of ages, the nature of truth,

with an appendix on Pragmatism.

Personality with special reference to super-personalities and the inter-personal

character of ideas, by PauIv Carus. Chicago, Open Court Publishing

Co., 191 1. 68 p.
This work first discusses the following topics : significance of personality,
the word persona and its history, problem of unity ideas, inter-personal
super-personalities, trinity conceptions, the super-personal God. These
titles will in general give sufficient intimation of the content of the book to
those who are familiar with the Monist.

472 BOOK NOTES

Technique de psychologie experimental e, par Ed. Toulouse et H. Pieron.
Paris, Octave Doin et Fils, 191 1. Tome premier, 303 p., et Tome
second, 288 p. (Encyclopedie scientifique.)
These two volumes constitute a very convenient manual for the labora-
tory student and practitioner. The authors have well availed themselves
of the work of their predecessors, Sanford and Titchener, although their
book, from the nature of a subject growing so fast, will not be considered
by all as up to date.

An introduction to experimental psychology, by Charles Myers. Cam-
bridge, The University Press. 191 1. 156 p.
This little primer of psychology discusses touch, temperature, pain,
color vision, the Miiller-Lyer illusion, memory, mental tests, and has a good
bibliography, index and a few colored plates.

Clever Hans, by Oskar Pfungst. With an introduction by Professor C.

Stumpf. Translated from the German by Carl L. Rahn. New York,

Henry Holt & Co., 191 1. 274 p.
Every one will thank the author of this volimie for bringing together
in the characteristic German and thorough way the whole story of the
rise and fall of this remarkable episode in the history of animal psychology.
The author himself examined the horse and reached his own conclusions
and describes in great detail how the trainer. Von Osten, directed his
actions unconsciously, and what was still more marvellous, how other people
did the same.

Experiments with drosophila ampelophila concerning evolution, by Frank
E. LuTz. Pub. by the Carnegie Institution of Washington, Washing-
ton, D. C, 191 1. 40 p.
These very interesting experimental studies lead the author to the con-
clusion that "there is no evidence that the constant disuse of wings during
forty generation has had any effect" in modifying the venation or other-
wise affecting the form of the wing of the sand fly.

Among friends. By S. McC. Crothers. Boston and New York, Houghton
Mifflin Co. 1910. pp. iii., 278. Price $1.25.
A collecton of nine essays, in which literary reminiscence is blended with
shrewd and kindly criticism of current social attitudes. "The Anglo-
American School of Polite Unlearning," "The Hundred Worst Books,"
"The Romance of Ethics," "The Merry Devil of Education." such titles
speak for themselves.

The Corsican: a diary of Napoleon's life in his own words. Compiled by
R. M. Johnston. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1910. pp. vi., 526. Price $1.75.
It was a happy idea which led Professor Johnston to bring together, in a
single volume, the recorded utterances of the great Napoleon. Conversa-
tions, letters, notes, proclamations are here arranged in chronological
order, with enough of explanatory comment to make the narrative continu-
ous for any reader who possesses an elementary knowledge of the period.
The whole forms a htmian document of extreme interest.

Publication of the Massachusetts General Hospital: Medical and Surgical

Papers. Boston, 19 10. 374 p.
The adolescent, by J. W. Slaughter. With an introduction by J. J.

Findlay. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 191 1. 100 p.

Introduction to philosphy, by Wh^liam Jerusalem. Authorized transla-
tion from the fourth edition by Charles F. Sanders. New York,
The Macmillian Co., 1910. 219 p.

BOOK NOTKS 473

Otto Weiningers Tod, von Hermann Swob oda. Vienna, Deuticke, 191 1.
100 p.

Pubertal und Auge, von Rudolf Schneider. Miinchen, Otto Gmelin,
1911. 17 p.

Festschrift zum sechzigsten Geburtstag Richard Her twigs. Jena, Gustav
Fischer, 19 10. 3 vols. (Arbeiten aus dem Gebiet der Zellenlehre
und Protozoenkunde.) 674, 624, 308 p.
The maturation of the egg of the mouse, by J. A. Lang and E. L. Mark.
Washington, Published by the Carnegie Institution of Washington,
191 1. 72 pages and 6 plates.
Das Wesen der Vernunft, von Adolf KELLER. Gross-Lichterfelde, J.

Univerdorben & Co., 191 1. 12 p.
L'analyse physiologique de la perception, par Edouard Abramowski.
Paris, Bloud & Cie, 1911. 121 p. (Collection de psychologie experi-
mentale et de Metaphyschie, Directeur Raymond Meunier.)
Kliene Schriften, von Wilhelm Wundt. Leipzig, Wilhelm Engelmann,

191 1. 496 p. (ZweiterBd.)
Creative evolution, by Henri Bergson. Translation by Arthur Mitchell.

New York, Henry Holt & Co., 191 1. 407 p.
Die Methode der historisch-volkerpsychologischen Begriffsanalyse, von Abra-
ham ScHLESiNGER. Sonderabdruck aus Archiv fiir die gesamte
Psychologie, XX Bd, 2 Heft. Leipzig, Wilhelm Englemann, 191 1.
pp. 150-185.
The place of movement in consciousness, by W. B. Pillsbury. Reprinted
from the Psychological Review, March. 191 1. Vol. XVIII, pp. 83-99.
Psychotherapy from a psychological standpoint, by David S. Booth. Re-
printed from The Alienist and Neurologist, February, 191 1. Vol.
XXXII, No. I, 24 p.
Notebook of American Indian languages, by Franz Boas. Washington,
Government Printing Office, 191 1. 1069 p. (»Smithsonian Insti-
tution. Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin 40,)
Psychic phenomena, science and immortality, by Henry Frank. Boston,
Sherman, French & Co., 191 1. 556 p.
In the first book, the author deals with psychic phenomena and has
much to tell us concerning the soul's secret scroll, sub-conscious mind,
correspondence, superphysical senses. Sir William Crookes, the sleepless
self, spirit forms and materializations. The second book is entitled scien-
tific interpretation. Here he deals with ultimate matter and vital energy,
occult forces, the subtle seat of human intelligence, biology of the soul,
its body, radio-activity, telepathy and substantiality of thought. The
third book deals with problems of immortality. He deems that the studies
which he enumerates demonstrate beyond all question the survival of the
soul after death.

Influencing men in business, by Walter Dill Scott. New York, The
Ronald Press Co., 191 1. 168 p.
This book assumes that we can increase our ability to influence men by
mastering a few simple laws for influencing their minds. To find these,
he analyzes deliberation and suggestion and tells how to decide questions
and reach conclusions, when to use arguments and when suggestion, and
how to make both effective.

Precis d' auto-suggestion volontaire, par G:^raud Bonnet. Paris, Jules
Roussett, 191 1. 297 p.
After preliminary explanations, the author discusses hypnotism and

474 BOOK NOTES

auto-suggestion, the education of the will, the influence of the self, con-
centration of thought and personal power.

Les syncinesies, par G. Strouhlin. Paris, G. Steinheil, 191 1. 147 p.

In the first, clinical part, the author discusses movements associated
with normal states, those with motor debility, those with volitive syncin-
esias, those with hemiplegia, and then gives us his scheme of diagnosis.
In the second, physiological part, he follows the same fourfold division of
his material and gives a few general conclusions.

Das kranke Geddchtnis, von Paul Ranschburg. Leipzig, Johann Ambro-
sius Barth, 191 1. 138 p. Mit 6 Kurven und 27 Abbildungen im Text.
This work is divided into two parts. The first is the result of experi-
mental psychopathology in the study of memory. First the retrospective,
and then the anterograde direction of memory is considered. The second
part describes the ways of experimental investigation in the pathology of
memory, how to investigate recognition, reproductive activity and those of
investigating morbid memories by means of special apparatus. The work
has many cuts and contains an excellent bibliography.

The psychology 0} education, by J. Welton. London, Macmillan & Co.,
1911. 507 p.
The chapters are as follows : the relations between education and psy-
chology, the study of mental life, bodily endowment, general mental endow-
ment, variations in mental endowment, nature of experience, development
of interests, direction of activity, learning by direct experience, learning
through communicated experience, critical thought, ideals, character.

Scientific method in animal psychology, by Robert M. Yerkes. 13 p.
Kxtrait des Comptes rendus du VI^ Congres international de Psy-
chologic. (Geneve 1909. Pages 808-819).

The psychological aspects of illuminating engineering, by Robert M. Yerkbs.
(A lecture delivered at the Johns Hopkins University, October-
November, 1910.) pp. 575-604.

Do kittens instinctively kill mice? by Robert M. Yerkes and DaniEi<
Bloomfield. Reprinted from the Psychological Bulletin, August,
1910. Vol. VII, pp. 253-263.

Psychology in its relations to biology, by Robert M. Yerkes. Reprinted
from The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods,
Vol. VII, No. 5, March 3, 1910. pp. 1 13-124.

The method of Pawlow in animal psychology, by Robert M. Yerkes and
Sergius Morgulis. Psychological Biilletin, Vol. 6, No. 8, August
15, 1909- pp. 257-273.

Modifiahility of behavior in its relations to the age and sex of the dancing
mouse, by Robert M. Yerkes. Reprinted from The Journal of
Comparative Neurology and Psychology, Vol. XIX, No. 3, June, 1909.
pp. 237-271.

Die Spuren interessebetonter Erlebnisse und ihre Symptome, von Otto
LiPMANN. Leipzig, Johann Ambrosius Barth, 191 1. 96 p. (Beihefte
ziu- Zeitschrift fiir angewandte Psychologic und psychologische
Sammelforschrung., hrsg. von William Stem und Otto Lipmann. i)

Untersuchungen iiber Geschlechts-, Alter s-und Begabungs-Unterschiede bei
Schiilern, von Jonas Cohn und Julius Dieffenbacher. Leipzig,
Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1911. 213 S. und drei Tafeln. (Beihefte
zur Zeitschrift fiir angewandte Psychologic und psychologische
Sammelforschung, hrsg von William Stern und Otto Lipmann. 2)

DR. EDMUND MONTGOMERY

The following note by Mr. B. F. Underwood, of the Quincy, 111., Journal,
refers to a writer whose work is familiar to many of our readers. —

At Hempstead, Texas, died a few days ago Dr. Edmund Montgomery.
Probably there was some mention of his death in the local papers of the
community, in which he was a well-known citizen; but the writer of this
article has seen no reference to the event in any Journal. Yet Dr. Mont-
gomery was the author of original scientific and philosophical works, —
some of them written in English, others in German, — which are in all the
great libraries of the world. In his fields of thought he had an interna-
tional reputation. He wrote on "Theories of Knowledge," "Our Ideas
of Time and Space," "TheFormation of So-Called Cells," "Vital Organiza-
tion," "The Unity of the Organic Individual," "The Dual Aspect of Our
Nature," "Protoplasm of the Muscles," "Transcendentalism," "Vital
Motility," etc.

Dr. Montgomery was for years a contributor to Mind, the Popular Science
Monthly, and the Boston Index, besides other journals in this country.

Dr. Montgomery was born in Edinburgh, Scotland, in 1835, of Scotch
parents. He was taken to Paris in care of a French nurse so early that the
first language he learned to speak was French. At nine he was taken to
Frankfort, Germany, where, educated in German, he began early the study
of the natural sciences and philosophy.

He was acquainted with Feuerbach ; and at Heidelberg he attended the
lectures of Moleschott and Kuno Fischer. He used to see Schopenhauer,
with his poodle, daily, and was much interested in the philosopher of pes-
simism. At Bonn he attended Helmholtz's famous lectures on the "Phy-
siology of the Senses." He studied at German universities — Heidelberg,
Berlin, Bonn, Wiirzburg (where he received the M. D. degree), Prague and
Vienna. He wrote in German a reply to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason,"
at Munich in 1871. From i860 to 1863 he was lecturer on Physiology
in St. Thomas, Hospital, London, where the effects of a dissecting wound put
an end to his work in that institution, where he used to meet and converse
with Darwin.

For six years he practised medicine at Madeira, Men tone, and Rome;
and in 1869, with a competence, he retired to give his whole attention to
science.

In 1 87 1 he went to Texas and bought the Liendo plantation, paying
for it $40,000. In a letter to the writer he wrote: "The first seven years
here in the South were devoted to laborious biological research; no writing
at all."

Dr. Montgomery's wife was Elizabeth Ney, a grandniece of Marshal
Ney of France. She acquired a reputation as an artist, and designed and
executed some of the finest pieces of sculpture in the state capital at
Austin.

Late in the eighties Dr. Montgomery, by request, sent a paper to be
read before the "Concord School of Philosophy," whose programme that
season included lectures by Dr. W. R. Alger and Dr. W. T. Harris, whose
terminology caused no little merriment among those unacquainted with
scientific and philosophic thought. In the Boston Record from some bright
reporter appeared the following, indicating the impression Dr. Mont-
gomery's paper had produced among those not so much interesetd in the
thought as they were confounded by the language :

476 DR. EDMUND MONTGOMERY

"A Texan has floored the Concord crowd.
Sing high, and sing ho! for the great Southwest;

He sent 'em a paper to read aloud.

And 't was done up in style by one of their best.

"The Texan, he loaded his biggest gun

With all the wise words he ever had seen,
And he fired at long range with death-grim fun.

And slew all the sages with his machine.

"He muddled the muddlers with brain-cracking lore.
He went in so deep that his followers were drowned,

But he swam out himself to the telluric shore,
And crowed in his glee o'er the earthlings around.

V Envoy

"Oh Plato, dear Plato, come back from the past!

And we '11 forgive all that you ever did to vex us.
If you '11 only arrange for a colony vast.

And whisk these philosophers all off to Texas."

In scientific and philosophical circles the paper attracted wide attention,
and is included among his published writings. Dr. Montgomery was in
personal appearance as handsome and impressive and in manners as courtly
and courteous as he was intellectually brilliant.

JfT)

THE AMERICAN

Journal of Psychology

Founded by G. Stani^ey Hai.Iv in 1887
Voi,. XXII. OCTOBER, 1911 No. 4

THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE^
By Ernest Jones, M. D. (London), University of Toronto

CONTENTS

I. Introduction. Psychical determinism 477

II. Forgetting. Errors in memory . . . 479

III. Lapsus linguae 492

IV. Lapsus calami 498

V. Misprints 503

VI. False visual recognition S04

VII. Mislaying of objects 506

VIII. Erroneously carried out actions 508

IX. S5anptomatic acts 510

X. General observations 515

(i) Warrant for interpretations 515

(2) Bearing on psycho-analytic method of treatment . 520

(3) Relation to health and disease 521

(4) Determinism and free will 521

(5) Social significance 522

XI. Summary 526

I. Introduction
- Under this title Freud has written an interesting volume^
dealing with a number of mental processes that previously
had received little or no attention from psychologists. The
material of this kind that lends itself to study, like that of
dreams, is very extensive, and is accessible to every one; it
is, therefore, of importance to those who wish to test Freud's
general psychological conclusions, and who have not the
opportunity of investigating the more obscure problems of
the psycho-neuroses. Freud's study of the mental processes
in question is of especial interest as showing that mechanisms
similar to those observable in the abnormal also occur in the

^Elaborated from an address delivered before the Detroit Academy
of Medicine, May 1 6th, 1 9 1 1 .

'Freud, S.: Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens. Dritte Auflage, 19 10.

478 jONies

normal; indeed from a psychological point of view these pro-
cesses may be termed symptoms, although they occur in per-
fect health. They may be further likened to neurotic symp-
toms in that they represent flaws in the normal functioning
of the mind.

Freud's principal thesis in this connection may be thus
stated: Certain inadequacies of our mental functioning,
and certain apparently purposeless performances, can be
shown by means of psycho-analysis to have been determined
by motives of which we were not at the time aware. The
occurrences in question have the following characteristics in
common : They belong to what may be called normal behavior.
They are only temporary disturbances of a function which
at another moment would be correctly performed. Their
incorrectness is at once recognized as soon as attention is
drawn to them. We can trace no motive for them at first,
but always attribute them to "inattention," to "chance,"
and so on.

It will be seen from this that, according to Freud, our mental
processes are more rigorously determined than is commonly
believed, and that many of them generally thought to be
causeless have in fact a very precise and definable cause^
The same remark applies to many mental processes where we
believe we have a perfectly free choice. A typical instance
of this is afforded by the child game "think of a number."
Whereas at first sight it would appear that we are free to
choose any possible number, careful analysis shows, as was
first pointed out by Adler^ a few years ago, that the number
actually chosen is always connected with some mental process
of considerable personal significance, though this may never
have been realized by the subject, and that the choice has been
determined by definite preceding mental constellations. I
may relate an example of this, obtained from an unbelieving
acquaintance. He produced the number 986, and defied me
to connect it with anything of especial interest in his mind.
Using the free-association method he first recalled a memory,
which had not previously been present to him, and which was
to the following effect. Six years ago, on the hottest day he
could remember, he had seen a joke in an evening newspaper,
which stated that the thermometer had stood at 986 deg. F.,
evidently an exaggeration of 98.6 deg. F. We were at the
time seated in front of a very hot fire, from which he had just
drawn back, and he remarked, probably quite correctly, that
the heat had aroused this dormant memory. However, I

1 Alfred Adler: Drei Psycho- Analysen von Zahleneinf alien und ob-
sedierenden Zahlen. Psychiatr-Neurol. Woch. 1905. Jahrg. VII. S. 263.

THE PSYCHOPATHOIyOGY OF EVERYDAY UFE 479

was curious to know why this memory had persisted with such
vividness as to be so readily brought out, for with most people
it surely would have been forgotten beyond recall, unless it
had become associated with some other mental experience of
more significance. He told me that on reading the joke he had
laughed uproariously, and that on many subsequent occasions
he had recalled it with great relish. As the joke was obviously
of an exceedingly tenuous nature, this strengthened my ex-
pectation that more lay behind. His next thought was the
general reflection that the conception of heat had always
greatly impressed him, that heat was the most important
thing in the universe, the source of all life, and so on. This
remarkable attitude of a quite prosaic young man certainly
needed some explanation, so I asked him to continue his free
associations. The next thought was of a factory stack which
he could see from his bedroom window. He often stood of an
evening watching the flame and smoke issuing out of it, and
reflecting on this deplorable waste of energy. Heat, flame,
the source of life, the waste of vital energy issuing from an
upright, hollow tube — it was not hard to divine from such
associations that the ideas of heat and fire were unconsciously
linked in his mind with the idea of love, as is so frequent in
symbolic thinking, and that there was a strong masturbation
complex present, a conclusion that he presently confirmed.
His choice of the number was therefore far from being a free
one, being in fact related to a very significant personal con-
stellation.

II. Forgetting

One of Freud's most notable contributions to psychology,
and a conception fundamental in his study of the present
group of mental processes, was his discovery that, in addition
to the other causes of forgetting, *' repression" (Verdrdngung)
plays a most important part. Others before Freud had realized
the existence of this, but it was reserved for him to demon-
strate the extent to which it is operative in both normal and
abnormal mental life.

Freud regards repression as a biological defence-mechanism,
the function of which is to guard the mind from painful ex-
periences. He holds that there is in the mind of every one a
tendency to forget the things that the person does not like to
be reminded of, in other words, painful or disagreeable memo-
ries. It is true that we often remember against our will
matters that we would rather forget, but there are two expla-
nations for this. In the first place, such disagreeable haunting
memories are frequently themselves only the replacements

480 JONISS

of buried and still more disagreeable ones, with which they
are associated, an occurrence allied to that concerned in the
genesis of true obsessions. In the second place, the capacity
to forget painful experiences is only of a certain strength,
which differs greatly in different people, and is not always suc-
cessful in achieving its aim. It is but rarely that one can for-
get the death of a dear relative, however desirable that might
be, for the associative links to other conscious memories are
too well formed. In such cases, what happens is that trivial
memories, which by association might serve unnecessarily
to remind us of the painful event, are apt to get forgotten,
the name of the medical attendant, details as to the fatal
malady, and so on; the tide of amnesia covers the base of the
hill, but cannot reach the summit. By this means an economy
is effected in the number of times that the painful memory is
recalled to consciousness. Further, it must be remarked that,
for reasons which cannot here be gone into, repression acts
much more extensively in causing forgetfulness of in-
ternal, extremely intimate, and personal, mental processes
than of what may be called external memories, known to
the world, such as failure, grief, and so on. As is well known,
Freud has applied his conception of repression to a number of
other fields, notably to the explanation of infantile and hys-
terical amnesias,^ which do not here concern us.

A good instance of the recognition of the part played in
everyday life by repression has been furnished by Darwin, in
a passage that does equal credit to his scientific honesty and
his psychological acumen.^ He writes, in his autobiography:
"I had, during many years, followed a golden rule, namely,
that whenever a published fact, a new observation or thought
came across me, which was opposed to my general results, to
make a memorandum of it without fail and at once; for I
had found by experience that such facts and thoughts were
far more apt to escape from the memory than favourable
ones." Pick^ quotes a number of authors who more or less
clearly recognize that a defensive striving against painful
memories can lead to their becoming forgotten, but, as Freud
remarks, no one has so exhaustively and at the same time so
incisively described both the process itself and the psychologi-
cal basis of it as has Nietzche in his Jenseits von Gut und
Bose; "Das habe ich getan, sagt mein Gedachtnis. Das

iFreud: Selected Papers on Hysteria, and Three Contributions to
Sexual Theory. Transl. by A. A. Brill.

^lytfe of Charles Darwin. Ed. by Francis Darwin. 1902. p. 42.

'Pick : Zur Psychologic des Vergessen bei Geistes- und Nervenkranken.
Arch. f. Kriminal-Anthropologie u. Kriminalistik. 1905. Bd. XVIII
S. 251.

THE PSYCH OP ATHOLOGY O^ EVERYDAY LIFE 48 1

kann ich nicht getan haben, sagt mein Stolz und bleibt uner-
bittlich. Endlich — gibt das Cedachtnis nach."

The class of forgotten thoughts in everyday life to which
this mechanism applies is of course that where the other
causes of forgetting do not provide adequate explanations;
in other words, it principally concerns matters that we should
normally expect to remember. For instance, one would ex-
pect some hidden reason in the case of the name of a near
relative or friend being forgotten much more readily than in
the case of a casual acquaintance. The examples of the
mechanism may conveniently be divided into two groups:
(i) forgetting to carry out some intended purpose (Vergessen
von Vorsatzen), and (2) forgetting a given memory.

(i) Forgetting to carry out an intention

A field in which some counter-will frequently leads to for-
getting is that regarding the making or keeping of appoint-
ments. A man unwillingly feels that he should invite a
given acquaintance to a social function he is giving in the near
future. He says to him, "You will be sure to come, won't
you. I am not absolutely certain of the date at this moment,
but I will send you a written invitation and let you know."
He forgets, until it is too late, and his excessive self-reproach
betrays his unconscious culpability and shows that the for-
getting was not altogether an accident. Maeder^ relates the
case of a lady who forgot to keep her appointment with the
dressmaker to try on her bridal gown the day before the wed-
ding, recollecting it only at eight in the evening. One must
suppose that her whole heart was not in the marriage, and in
fact she has since been divorced. In my own life I have
noted numerous instances of a purposeful forgetting of ap-
pointments, particularly with patients. If a given patient
is very tedious and uninteresting, I am very apt to forget that
I have to see him at a certain hour, and if a doctor telephones
to ask me whether I can see an interesting case at that hour,
I am more likely than not to tell him that I shall be free then.
Indeed I can recall several annoying quandaries that this habit
has led me into. One is perhaps worth repeating, as showing
how complete can be the divorce between two memories when
an Unlust motive is in action. Some years ago, when in a
junior position at a certain hospital, I was asked by my chief
to see his out-patients on Friday, as he wished to attend an
important luncheon at the time. It was an exceptional
request, for the rule was that approbation of the committee
had to be obtained before a substitute was allowed to act,

^Maeder: Contributions k la psychopathologie de la vie quotidienne.
Arch, de Psychol. 1907. t. VI. p. 150.

482 JONES

and I gladly consented, quite forgetting that I already had
at the same time an appointment which I was very desirous
of keeping, and which would have been particularly incon-
venient to postpone. On several occasions during the week,
while going over my future engagements, I thought of both
these, but never together; the thought would come, "let me
see, at one on Friday I have to be at such-and-such a place,"
and a few hours later a similar thought would come concern-
ing the other place. The two intentions, both of which I
was anxious not to forget, were kept distinct from each other,
as if in water-tight compartments. When the time came I
forgot the hospital appointment, and to my intense chagrin
heard that my chief was very annoyed about being called
away from his luncheon on account of my apparent unpardon-
able remissness. At the present time my memory chiefly
fails in this respect in regard to visiting patients in nursing-
homes, a duty I find irksome on account of the time consumed.
Often when I am busy I conveniently forget, and recently I
left a patient without her daily visit for nearly a week. The
self-reproach one feels on recollecting the forgotten duty on
these and similar occasions is indicative of the true significance
of the occurrence. This significance is intuitively realized
in the case of lovers. A man who has failed to appear at a
rendezvous will seek in vain to be forgiven on the plea that he
had forgotten about it, will indeed with this plea only increase
the lady's resentment. Even if he falls back on the customary
psychological explanations, and describes how urgent business
had filled his mind, he will only get as reply, "How curious
that such things didn't happen last year; it only means that
you think less of me." Similarly, when a man begins to be
forgetful about paying accustomed attentions to his wife,
overlooks her birthday, and so on, she correctly interprets
it as a sign of a change in their relations.

Another field where forgetting occurs to an untoward extent
is in giving, a fact that indicates a more wide-spread objection
to giving than is agreeable to our altruistic conceptions. Most
of those who have filled secretarial positions have been aston-
ished to find the difficulty there is in collecting subscriptions
as they fall due, and the ease with which people with other-
wise good memories "overlook" such matters. It is far
from rare for them even to falsify their memory, and to assert
firmly that they have already paid. A few, dimly conscious
of their weakness, compensate for it by forming the habit
of promptly paying every bill as soon as it arrives. In general,
however, there is a striking difference between the ease with
which one remembers to send to the bank incoming cheques,
and that with which one forgets to pay incoming bills. The

THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY I.IFE 483

same tendency is the explanation of the constant "forgetting"
to return borrowed books that seems to afflict so many people,
a habit which must have distressed most people who have a
good library. This observation will be confirmed by any one
who has tried to establish a permanent library in an insti-
tution where many coming and going students have ready
access to it.

Almost as common is the habit of forgetting to post letters.
Here, also, unconscious motives can sometimes be detected
in individual instances. Sometimes one leaves a letter on
one's desk for several days, forgetting each time to take it
with one; in such cases it may be reckoned on that there is
some secret opposition to sending the given letter. In one
instance of the kind I ultimately posted the letter, but forgot
to address the envelope. It was returned to me through the
dead letter office, I addressed it, and again posted it, but
this time without a stamp. I was then forced to recognize
that there was in me an unconscious opposition to the sending
of the letter, one of which I had previously been unaware,
but which manifested itself in external inhibitions. One does
not forget to post a letter that one's mind is in full har-
mony about sending; for instance, a love letter. One is more
apt to forget to send a letter containing a cheque than one
containing an account. Often the resistance is of a general
order. Thus a busy man forgets to post letters entrusted
to him — to his slight annoyance — by his wife, just as he may
"forget" to carry out her shopping orders. Inhibitions of
this kind sometimes betray a veiled antagonism towards the
person whose behests we forget to fulfil. They constitute
a way of depreciating the importance of the other person for
ourselves, and when pronounced in general they indicate a
lack of consideration for others, based on an excessive self-
absorption or abnormally high self-estimation.

In examples similar to these preceding the counter-impulse
that inhibits the memory is as a rule directed immediately
against the conscious intention. In a more complicated
series of cases, which the Germans term Fehlleistungen, it is
directed against some other mental process, which, however,
stands in associative relation to it; this mental process is,
so to speak, symbolized in the conscious intention. The
following are two examples of the kind. Maeder^ relates the
case of a hospital interne who had an important business ap-
pointment in the town, but who was not allowed to leave the
hospital until his chief, who was out for the evening, returned.
He decided to leave his post, nevertheless, and on getting

^Maeder: Une voie nouvelle en psychologic; Freud et son ecole.
Coenobium. Gennaio 1909. Anno. III. p. 100.

484 JONSS

back late in the evening, was astonished to find he had left
the light burning in his room, a thing he had never done before
during his two years of service. He at once perceived the
reason for his omission; his chief always passed by the win-
dow on his way to his own house, would see the light burning
and conclude that the assistant was at home. The cause
for the inhibition having passed, the subject readily appre-
ciated it. A patient of mine on a number of occasions made
the remarkable omission of forgetting to shave the right
side of his face. It was always the same side, and it was the
one that was turned towards me during the treatment. Analy-
sis of the occurrence showed that it was determined by a num-
ber of unconscious processes, of which the following was one.
The idea of hair was connected with various sexual ideas,
and the non-shaving of the side turned to me symbolized a
disinclination to lay bare his sexual life, the occurrence always
synchronizing in fact with an outburst of resistance against
the treatment.

2. Forgetting a given memory

We are concerned only with striking lapses in memory,
namely, regarding matters that as a rule we can easily recall.
An instance, which is hard to credit, though I can vouch for
the accuracy of it, was related to me by a medical friend.
His wife was seriously ill with some obscure abdominal malady,
and, while anxiously pondering over the possible nature of
it, he remarked to her, "It is comforting to think that there
has been no tuberculosis in your family." She turned to him
very astonished, and said "Have you forgotten that my
mother died of tuberculosis, and that my sister recovered
from it only after having been given up by the doctors?"
His anxiety lest the obscure symptoms should prove to be
tubercular had made him forget a piece of knowledge that
was thoroughly familiar to him. Those accustomed to
psycho-analysis will surmise that there is more to be said
about the matter, but the example will serve to illustrate the
influence affective processes have in connection with for-
getting.

It is with proper names that one observes the most striking
instances of this process. In the majority of cases the counter-
will that prevents a familiar name from being recalled is
directed against some mental process that is associated with
the one to be recalled, rather than against this itself. On
account of some disagreeable experience we would rather not
recall a given name; we may actually succeed in forgetting
it, but more often the tendency is shown indirectly in our
being unable to recall other names resembling it and which

THE PSYCHO PATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY UFE 485

might bring the undesired one to our mind. In other words,
we have to think of the undesired name at times, but we
guard ourselves against doing so more often than is necessary.
A hospital interne got to know a nurse, whom he of course
addressed by her surname, and in his work saw her daily for
about a year. They later got more intimate and he now
experienced great difficulty in recalling her surname so as to
address envelopes to her. On one occasion he was unable to
write to her for three weeks ; recourse to her letters was of no
use, for she always signed only her Christian name in them.
Investigation of the matter brought to light the fact that her
Christian name was the same as that of a girl he had pre-
viously jilted, and also of another girl he had been passionately
in love with throughout his boyhood. This name he could
not forget. What had happened was that he had successively
transferred his affections from one girl to the other, the three
being unconsciously identified in his mind. He was thus
always true to his love, and did not wish to recall any fact, such
as the different surname, that would tend to remind him of his
faithlessness. The surnames in no way resembled one another.
BrilP relates the following example from his own ex-
perience. When working at Zurich he wished to recall the
name of an old patient of his, on whose case he had specially
worked for some months, but was totally unable to do so.
He had painstakingly prepared an account of the case for
publication, but at the last moment his chief intervened, and
decided to report it before a local society. He was unex-
pectedly prevented from doing so, and Brill was sent to read
the paper at the meeting, this being credited to the chief.
In trying to recall his patient's name, the name of another
patient, Appenzeller, who was suffering from the same disease,
persistently presented itself. In the psycho-analysis under-
taken one apparently irrelevant memory kept recurring over
and over again. This was an actual scene, in which the chief
in question had aimed with a shot-gun at a rabbit, and had
missed, to the amusement of Brill and the bystanders. The
sought for name ultimately flashed up — Lapin (rabbit), the
patient being a French- Canadian. The example is instructive
in illustrating the associative replacement-formations that
come to the mind instead of the proper memory. The sound
of the first part of Appenzeller' s name resembles the French
pronunciation of Lapin, and the scene that kept recurring,
the failure of the chief to bag the rabbit, symbolized the whole
incident that was the cause of the inhibition.

*A. A. Brill: A Contribution to the Psychopathology of Everyday Life.
Psychotherapy, 1909. p. 9.

486 JONES

The following instance is rather more complex, but shows
how fine are the threads connecting unconscious mental pro-
cesses. A lady was unable to recall the Christian name of
a near friend. The full name was Isabell Brown, but she
could only recall the surname; instead of the other the name
Isidore presented itself, to be at once rejected as incorrect.
Thus the failure in memory consisted only in the replacement
of the syllable Bell by Dore. I asked her to associate to the
word Brown, and the two names Owlie and Leen at once
came to her mind. It will be noticed that the first two letters
of the first word and the last one of the second word are con-
tained in Brown; the only foreign ones in each case form the
syllable **ly" in pronunciation, a fact to be borne in mind.
The two words were pet names of two common friends, who
used to live together with the subject, and it was in their
company that she used to see Miss Brown. Concerning the
first one she said that she was at present pregnant for the
first time, and that she was anxious as to the outcome, be-
cause certain characteristics in her figure had led her to sus-
pect that pelvic narrowing might give rise to difficulties in
the confinement. She also mentioned another friend, Dora
D., who had similar characteristics, and Isadora D., a famous
dancer, whom she knew personally, and whose perfect figure
she greatly admired. The name Isidore, which it will be
remembered was the replacement-memory, reminded her of
the poem by Edgar Allan Poe, Beautiful Isidore Lee (ly).
I told her that the correct name of the poem was Beautiful
Annabel Lee; some inhibition was therefore acting against
the syllables Anna and Bell. Thought of the name Annabel
brought to her mind the name of Owlie's sister Annie Sybil,
which is a sound-contraction of Anna Isabell, and at once
Miss Brown's proper name Isabell, which I personally did
not know, came to her mind. The subject had recently had
a painful quarrel with Annie Sybil, in which also the latter' s
sister had unfortunately become involved; she had always
thought it a pity that the sister she disliked had a better
figure, and was more suited for matrimony, than the one
she was so fond of. There were thus two painful thoughts
at the bottom of the amnesia, one the anxiety about Owlie's
confinement, and the other that in this respect the disliked
sister was more favorably situated.

The names first recalled by the subject, namely, Isidore
Brown, one incorrect, the other correct, were both directly
associated to the syllable "ly. " The suppressed syllable
was "Bell." In view of the fact that the word "belly" sum-
marized the whole situation, it is difficult to avoid the in-
ference that the amnesia for the syllable "Bell" had thus

THE PSYCHOPATH OI.OGY OP EVERYDAY UPE 487

proceeded: One must suppose that the thought of Miss
Isabell Brown had unconsciously reminded the patient of
their common friend and her sister; the diphthong in the
surname further is identical with that in the former's name,
Owlie, and the Christian name resembles the second part of
the latter's name, Annie Sybil. The first part of the latter
name, Annie, reminded her of "Beautiful Annabel Lee,"
making the word "belly" which symbolized the painful
thoughts in question. These thoughts nevertheless came
to expression in the false replacement-memory. First the
accent was shifted from the first syllable, "bell," of the
objectionable word to the second, "ly," which was also the
second syllable of Owlie's name. This, however, was un-
suitable for forming a name by being added to the remembered
part "Isi," so that a further shifting took place in which it
was replaced by "dore." Dora was the name of a friend
with similar characteristics to Owlie's, but in combination
with "Isi" it was the name of another person, Isadora D., who
was strikingly free from them. The subject, therefore, invests
her friend with the beautiful and healthy attributes of the
famous dancer. One might even go farther and surmise that
the reason why Dore had appeared rather than Dora was be-
cause the word "door," which is constantly used symbolically
for any exit (for instance, of the body, as in the Song of Songs)
was better adapted to symbolize the suppressed complex than
the word Dora is. To many readers this reconstruction will
probably appear as too fine-spun. In my opinion, however,
they underestimate the combination of delicacy and rigor
with which unconscious and foreconscious processes are deter-
mined, a conclusion which can readily be confirmed by a pains-
taking study of similar material.^

A simple illustration of the way in which a strong affect
will cleave to a name, and be transferred to any other person
bearing the same or similar name, is afforded by Shakspere
in Julius Caesar (Act. Ill Sc. 3):

First Citizen. Your name, sir, truly.

Cinna. Truly, my name is Cinna.

First Citizen. Tear him in pieces, he 's a conspirator.

Cinna. I am Cinna the poet; I am not Cinna the conspi-
\^ rator.

Second Citizen. It is no matter; his name's Cinna; pluck
but his name out of his heart, and turn him going.

A field in which significance is apt to be intuitively attribu-
ted to the forgetting of names, is that where our own are for-

^In the Zentralbl. f. Psychoanalyse, Jahrg. i. Heft 9, this analysis is
carried to a farther stage.

488 JONES

gotten. Few people can avoid feeling a twinge of resentment
when they find that their name has been forgotten, particu-
larly if it is by some one with whom they had hoped or ex-
pected it would be remembered. They instinctively realize
that if they had made a greater impression on the person's
mind he would certainly have remembered them again, for
the name is an integral part of the personality. Similarly,
few things are more flattering to most people than to find
themselves addressed by name by a great personage where
they could hardly have anticipated it. Napoleon, like most
leaders of men, was a master of this art. In the midst of the
disastrous Campaign of France, in 1814, he gave an amazing
proof of his memory in this direction. When in a town near
Craonne he recollected that he had met the mayor, De Bussy,
over twenty years ago in the La Fere regiment ; the delighted
De Bussy at once threw himself into his service with extra-
ordinary zeal. Conversely there is no surer way of affronting
some one than by pretending to forget his name; the insinua-
tion is thus conveyed that the person is so unimportant in our
eyes that we cannot be bothered to remember his name.
This device is often exploited in literature. In Turgenev's
Smoke (p. 255) the following passage occurs. " 'So you still
find Baden entertaining, M'sieu — Litvinov.* Ratmirov al-
ways uttered Litvinov's surname with hesitation, every time,
as though he had forgotten it, and could not at once recall it.
In this way, as well as by the lofty flourish of his hat in salut-
ing him, he meant to insult his pride." The same author in
his Fathers and Children (p. 107) writes, "The Governor
invited Kirsanov and Bazarov to his ball, and within a few
minutes invited them a second time, regarding them as
brothers, and calling them Kisarov." Here the forgetting that
he had spoken to them, the mistake in the names, and the
inability to distinguish between the two young men, con-
stitute a culmination of disparagement.^ Falsification of a
name has the same significance as forgetting it; it is only a
step towards complete amnesia. The word-contamination
in this instance shows a striking psychological intuition of
the process termed by Freud "identification;" it indicated
that in the Governor's eyes the characteristics of the young
men were so little marked, and the men so unimportant, that
he did not think it worth while to make the effort of differ-
entiating one from the other. Sensitiveness about the correct

iln literature disparagement is often indicated by the forgetting of other
matters besides names. Thus in Bernard Shaw's "Caesar and Cleopatra,"
Caesar's indifference to Cleopatra is depicted by his being vexed, on leaving
Egypt, at having forgotten something he has to do; finally he recollects
what it is — to say Good-bye to Cleopatra.

THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE 489

Spelling of one's name is extremely frequent; we all know the
profound difference that members of Scottish clans see between
Mc and Mac, and a practical psychologist realizes the impor-
tance of being sound on the matter every time he writes such
a name. I had thought personally that I was free from such
sensitiveness until a little occurrence some time ago taught
me the contrary. An article of mine had been published in a
German journal; only my surname was printed, with the letters
M. D. (which are not used prof essionally in Germany) attached,
as if they were the initials. The same morning I had occa-
sion to fill up a lunacy certificate, and was surprised at the
secretary laughing when I handed it in; I had signed it with
my Christian name only, thus compensating for the omission
in the article. This sensitiveness has sometimes deeper
roots than mere personal self-esteem; Stekel^ has traced it to
infantile complexes relating to the giver of the name — the
father.

The following two instances in my own experience are
similar to those quoted from Turgenev. The first relates to
Mr. Mayo Robson, the eminent gastro-intestinal surgeon,
after whom was named a bobbin he had invented for the oper-
ation of entero-anastomosis. Another surgeon, almost equally
eminent in the same field of work, and living in the same town,
remarked one day in a lofty and contemptuous manner,
"This patient had previously been unsuccessfully operated
on by a man called Rayo Bobson, or Bayo Dobson, or some
such name." His motive was evident, and, of course, quite
conscious. In the second instance the mistake in the name
was quite unconsciously made as the result of a falsification
of memory, but the significance was very similar. It was at
a university graduation ceremony, where a number of visitors
were present arrayed in multi-colored and imposing robes.
Those so attired formed a procession in double file. A friend
of mine, a foreigner, remarked as Professor Titchener passed,
"Let me see, who is that? Is n't it Kitchener?" Many would
be inclined to see no significance in the mistake, although
my friend knew the names of Lord Kitchener and Professor
Titchener fairly well. I have, however, to add these two
additional facts. A few minutes before, while talking about
experimental psychologists in general, he allowed himself
to make the scurrilous remark that in his opinon they
should be called the pantry-cooks of psychology on account

/Stekel: Warum sie den eigenen Namen hassen. Zentralbl. f. Psy-
choanalyse, Jahrg. I, Heft 3, S. 109. See also his article, Die Verpflichtung
des Namens. Zeitschr. f. Psychother. u. med. Psychol. Feb., 191 1. Bd. III.
S. 110.

490 JONISS

of their menial field of work; the passage from "cook" to
"kitchen" is obvious. Secondly he had also commented on
the martial appearance of this dazzling procession, and I can
readily imagine his being especially struck by Professor Titch-
ener's soldierly bearing. It is difficult to avoid the inference
that these two trends of thought, present in his mind so re-
cently, played their part in the falsification of the name, which
thus betrayed his private opinion of the field of work in which
Professor Titchener^ is so eminent.

Many people have a strikingly bad memory for names, even
when their memory is otherwise good. This is generally
explained by saying that proper names are among the latest
acquired knowledge, so that our memory of them is especially
fragile ; in accordance with the law of dissolution these memo-
ries are among the first to be lost, a process that constitutes
one of the most characteristic signs of approaching senility.
This explanation is difficult to harmonize with two facts,
first that in many cases the memory is weak in this connection
when it is notably good in regard to other more complex and
later acquired matters, such as scientific formulae, and so on,
and secondly that the characteristic in question is much more
pronounced with some people than with others. When the
opportunity of making a psycho-analysis with some one of
this type presents itself two other matters are brought to light
with considerable constancy, namely, that for various reasons
the person's own name has acquired an unusual psychical
significance, so that it becomes invested with the feeling-tone
of the whole personality, and that there is a strong ego-com-
plex present. It would seem, therefore, that the general
inability to bear other people's names in mind is an expression
of an excessively high estimation of the importance of one's
own name and of oneself in general, with a corresponding
indifference to or depreciation of other people. In my own
experience I have most often found this characteristic with peo-
ple having either an extremely common or an extremely rare
name, both contingencies leading to undue sensitiveness in
the matter, but I cannot put this forward as being a general
rule. It further seems to me probable that the increasing
difficulty of retaining names that is such a frequent accom-
paniment of advancing years, may in part at least b*e attributed
to the growing self-esteem brought by success and by cessation
from the turmoils and conflicts of youth.

^I trust that Mr. Robson and Professor Titchener will pardon my sacri-
ficing the personal privacy of their names in the cause of science. I have
purposely selected, from a large number of similar instances, two in which
the contrast between a rare individual disparagement and an otherwise
universal respect is especially striking.

THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY I.IFE 49 1

Falsification of memory, as was indicated above, is closely
related to forgetting, and is influenced by the same motive.
A common instance is the mistakes made with regard to the
day of the week. Some one who is eagerly anticipating an
event at the end of the week is very apt to think it is Wednes-
day when it is only Tuesday, and so on; their impatience at
the slowness with which the week is passing manifests itself
as an error — in the desired direction — as to the present date.

Other mental operations, besides recollecting, may be
falsified in the same way, a process designated by Freud as
an " Irrtum.'' Several examples related elsewhere in this
paper might be classified in this group, so that one here will
suffice. I was buying some flowers, and put two dollars, the
exact price of them, on the counter. While they were being
got ready, I changed my mind about one bunch, and told the
woman serving me to leave it out; it should be said that
she was the owner of the shop. On taking the money a few
moments later she said, ' * that bunch cost forty cents, so that
will make two dollars forty." Her wish that I were making
the order larger instead of smaller was probably concerned
in the mistake.

A few concluding remarks may be added on this mechanism
of forgetting. The main points may be summarized in the
statements that forgetting is often determined by a painful
mental process (Unlust) of which the subject is unaware,
either at the time only or permanently; that this inhibiting
mental process may be a counter-will to recollecting the
matter in question or may be associated to this in a more com-
plex way; and that a false memory presenting itself in the
place of the true is a symbolic substitute of this, standing
in associative connection with it. Two general considera-
tions indicate that acts of forgetting, of the type illustrated
above, are not, as is commonly supposed, accidental or due to
chance. First is the fact that the same one tends to be re-
peated. If we forget to carry out a given intention, or are
unable to recall a given name, the failure is apt to recur, thus
suggesting that it has a specific cause. Secondly is the fact
that in at least two spheres of life it is universally recognized
that remembering is under control of the will, so that a failure
to remember is regarded as synonymous with a not wanting
to remember. Freud^ writes: " Frauendienst wie Militar-
dienst erheben den Anspruch, dass alles zu ihnen Gehorige dem
Vergessen entriickt sein miisse, und erwecken so die Meinung,
Vergessen sei zulassig bei unwichtigen Dingen, wahrend es bei
wichtigen Dingen ein Anzeichen davon sei, dass man sie wie

^Freud: Op. cit., S. 83.

492 JONES

unwichtige behandeln wolle, ihnen also die Wichtigkeit ab-
spreche." A soldier who forgets to perform a given duty is
punished regardless of the excuse. He is not allowed to forget,
and whether his not wanting to perform the duty is openly
expressed, or indirectly, as by his forgetting, is considered by
his officer as comparatively irrelevant. The standard set by
women is equally severe; a lover who forgets his lady's wishes
is treated as though he openly declared them unimportant.

III. Lapsus Lingu.^

The everyday occurrence of the defect in psycho-physical
functioning popularly known as a slip of the tongue has not
received much attention from psychologists. The attempts
made, by Meringer and Mayer and others, to explain on pho-
netic grounds the particular mistake made have signally
failed, for on the one hand many cases are to be observed where
no phonetic factors are in operation, and on the other hand
careful study shows that such factors are at the most accessory
or adjuvant in nature, and are never the essential cause.

According to Freud the word said in mistake is a manifes-
tation of a second suppressed thought, and thus arises outside
the train of thought that the speaker is intending to express.
It may be a word, or phrase, entirely foreign to this train of
thought, being taken in its entirety from the outlying thought,
or it may be a compromise-formation, in which both come to
expression. In the latter case the false word may be a neolo-
gism ; a common example of this is where a speaker, intending
to use the word "aggravating," says " How very aggravoking,"
the word "provoking" having intruded itself; many mal-
apropisms are formed in this way, being the result of uncer-
tainty as to which is the most appropriate word.

The secondary thought that thus obstrudes itself on the in-
tended speech may, like the motives of repressive forgetting,
be of two kinds: (i) a general counter-impulse (Gegenwillen)
directed immediately against the speech, or (2) another
thought accidentally aroused by it. In the latter case it can
represent either a continuation of a theme previously in the
speaker's mind, or a thought aroused, through a superficial
association, by the theme that is intended to be spoken; even
when it represents a continuation of a previous theme it will
generally, if not always, be found that there is some association
between this and the theme of the speech. It will readily be
understood that in many cases the disturbing thought is not
evident, but can be revealed only by investigation, sometimes
a searching psycho-analysis being necessary.

THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE 493

Cases where the disturbing thought is a direct counter-
impulse are usually easy to interpret. One instance will
suffice. A President of the Austrian Reichstag finished his
introductory remarks by declaring the session closed, instead
of opened; as the particular session promised nothing but
fruitless wrangles, one can sympathize with his wish that it
were already at an end.

Some cases where the disturbing thought is nearly related
to the intended theme are equally simple. A French gov-
erness in Dr. Stekel's family^ asked his wife that she might re-
tain her testimonials, saying: "Je cherche encore pour les
apres-midis, pardon, pour les avant-midis." The slip betrayed
her feeling of dissatisfaction with th^ afternoon engagement,
and her intention to look for another situation for the after-
noons as well as the mornings, an intention she proceeded to
carry out.

A friend of mine was driving his motor-car slowly and cau-
tiously one day, when a cyclist, who was riding with his head
down, furiously, and on the wrong side of the street, ran into
him and damaged his bicycle. He sent in a bill for $50.00,
and, as my friend refused to pay, he sued him in court. When
I enquired as to the result of the action my friend said, "the
judge reprimanded the prisoner for careless riding." I
corrected him, "You mean the plaintiff, not the prisoner."
"Well," he replied, "I think the fellow should have been
arrested for furious riding."

A lady when speaking of Bernard Shaw's works said to me,
"I think very highly of all my writings," instead of "all his
writings." She was an amateur writer of short stories.

An unmarried man, a patient, remarked, "my father was
devoted to my wife." He meant, of course, either ' ' his wife ' ' or
"my mother." This is a typical instance of a lapsus that would
pass as being entirely accidental and devoid of significance.
I must add, however, that one of the main causes of the
patient's neurosis was an unconscious incestuous attachment
to his mother, so that his unsuppressed thoughts on the sub-
ject of the remark would run in full, "My attitude towards
my mother is the same as that of my father." No alteration
is too slight to have a meaning. The instance narrated above,
in which the first letter only of Titchener's name was replaced
by a K,2 belongs to the subject of lapsus linguae equally as much
as to that of forgetting.

^Related by Freud. Op. cit. S. 48.

2This replacing of the initial letter of a word by that of another word,
typically from the same sentence, is known in Oxford as a Spoonerism,
on accoimt of a distinguished professor who had the habit of committing
the particular slip.

JOURNAI, — 2

494 JONES

Such self -betrayals as those just related sometimes afford
valuable insight into character and motive. I was present
at the International Congress in Amsterdam when the fol-
lowing curious episode occurred. There was a heated dis-
cussion regarding Freud's theory of hysteria. One of the most
violent opponents, who is noted as having worked long and
fruitlessly on the subject of hysteria, was grudgingly admitting
the value of the earlier work of Breuer and Freud — the con-
clusions of which he had himself discovered to be true — as
a prelude to a vehement denunciation of the dangerous ten-
dencies of Freud's later work. During his speech he twice
said, "Breuer and ich haben bekanntlich nachgewiesen," thus
replacing Freud's name by his own, and revealing his envy
of Freud's originality.

The following example is more complicated. In talking
of the financial standards so prevalent in modern civilization
I said, "In yesterday's newspaper there were the headings 'Ten
million dollar fire in Halifax; six lives lost.'" It was at
once pointed out to me that I had said Halifax instead of
Bangor, Maine. Analysis brought the following free asso-
ciations. Until a few years ago I was disgracefully ignorant
of the existence of Bangor, Maine, and I remember in college
days being puzzled by the reference to Maine in the well-
known student song "Riding down from Bangor," as in my
ignorance I supposed that this related to Bangor, the univer-
sity town of Carnarvonshire, Wales. The name Bangor
essentially stands in my mind for the original Bangor. It
brought up a memory of the recent controversy as to whether
the new National Welsh Library should be established at
Bangor, at Swansea (my home), or at Cardiff (the university
town where I studied). This reminded me of interests I
have in the contents of this library, in Celtic mythology,
which naturally carried me to the valuable library of mytho-
logical books that I possess myself. Then I remembered that
what had especially struck me in reading about the recent
fire was the fact that a valuable collection of books had been
destroyed in it, and that this had made me enter a note not
to forget to renew my fire insurance, which had recently lapsed,
before leaving in the coming week for a fortnight's visit to
the United States.

The meaning of my lapsus is beginning to emerge. A
library fire at Bangor was too near home for my peace of mind,
and my unconscious had consolingly relegated it to some
other spot. The next problem is to discover the motive for
the replacement of Bangor by Halifax, a process that was
greatly "over-determined." Maine is from its geographical
position closely associated in my mind with the Maritime

THS PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY I.IFE 495

Provinces of Canada, and only on the preceding day a Cana-
dian had been demonstrating to me on a map, for the
nth time, how Maine should rightfully have formed part of
these Provinces. Still that does not explain why I selected
Halifax rather than St. John, the other town I know the name
of in the Maritime Provinces. One reason doubtless was the
fact that at the time I was treating a patient from Halifax,
Nova Scotia, who had recently been telling me that the houses
there were mostly built of wood, and therefore were exposed
to the danger of fire. The name Halifax, however, is better
known to me as an English euphemisim for Hell, as in the ex-
pression, "Go to Hal-ifax." This called up the memory of
half-forgotten childhood fears, for, like most Welsh children,
I was carefully nurtured with a proper dread of what was
called "the burning fire;" as I grew up I was comforted to
learn the groundlessness of this particular dread. My slip of
the tongue, therefore, registered my desire that any library
fire should be in some other place than in my home, and if
possible in a non-existent locality.^

An example, for which I am indebted to Dr. A. A. Brill,
is peculiar in that the slip of the tongue represented a resolu-
tion in opposition to the conscious intention. A man, who
on account of homosexual practices was in constant fear of
coming into conflict with the law, invited two lady friends to
spend an evening at the theatre. They expressed a wish to
see a play called "Alias Jimmy Valentine," which deals
largely with convicts and prisons. He was far from comfort-
able at the idea of spending an evening with such thoughts,
but could not well avoid it. On getting into the cab to drive
to the theatre, however, he accidentally gave the driver the
name of another theatre, and did not notice the mistake until
they arrived there, when it was too late to rectify it. At
this theatre the play was about the cleverness with which a
daughter outwitted her selfish old father. It was not without
significance that the subject's attitude towards his own father
was one of pronounced hostility, so that his slip of the tongue
had the effect of exchanging an evening with a painful topic
for one with a topic that he greatly enjoyed.

Several non-scientific writers before Freud had noted the
psychological significance of accidental slips of the tongue.
Freud^ quotes examples of this from, for instance, Brantome
and Wallenstein. Shakspere himself furnishes a beautiful
one in the Merchant of Venice (Act. Ill Sc. 2). It occurs in
the scene where Portia is expressing her anxiety lest the fa-

^This analysis led further into previously unconscious thoughts, which
are too intimate for me to describe here.
2Freud: Op. ciL, S. 50, 58.

496 JONKS

vored suitor should fare as badly as the distasteful ones in
the hazard set for them by her father. She wants to tell
Bassanio that in the event of his failure she would nevertheless
belong to him, but is prevented by her promise to her father.
In this mental discord she speaks: —

There is something tells me (but it is not love),
I would not lose you; and you know yourself
Hate counsels not in such a quality.
But lest you should not understand me well,
(And yet a maiden hath no tongue but thought)
I would detain you here a month or two,
Before you venture for me. I could teach you
How to choose right, but then I am forsworn;
So will I never be; so may you miss me;
But if you do, you '11 make me wish a sin.
That I had been forsworn. Beshrew your eyes.
They have o'erlooked me, and divided me:
One half of me is yours, the other half yours, —
Mine own, I would say; but if mine, then yours,
And so all yours.

Rank^ comments on this passage: "Gerade das, was sie
ihm also bloss leise andeuten mochte, weil sie es eigentlich
ihm iiberhaupt verschweigen sollte, dass sie namlich schon
vor der Wahl ganz die seine sei und ihn liebe, das lasst der
Dichter mit bewundernswertem psychologischem Feingefiihl
in dem Versprechen sich offen durchdrangen und weiss durch
diesen Kunstgriff die unertragliche Ungewissheit des Liebenden
sowie die gleichgestimmte Spannung des Zuhorers iiber den
Ausgang der Wahl zu beruhigen. "

Our greatest novelist, George Meredith, in his masterpiece.
The Egoist, shows an even finer understanding of the mech-
anism. The plot of the novel is, shortly, as follows : Sir Wil-
loughby Patterne, an aristocrat greatly admired by his circle,
becomes engaged to a Miss Constantia Durham. She dis-
covers in him an intense egoism, which he skilfully conceals
from the world, and, to escape the marriage, she elopes with
a Captain Oxford. Some years later Patterne becomes en-
gaged to a Miss Clara Middleton, and most of the book is
taken up with a detailed description of the conflict that arises
in her mind on also discovering his egoism. External circum-
stances, and her conception of honor, hold her to her pledge,
while he becomes more and more distasteful in her eyes. She
partly confides in his cousin and secretary, Vernon Whitford,
the man whom she ultimately marries, but, from a mixture
of motives, he stands aloof.

^Otto Rank: Zentralbl. f. Psychoanalyse. Heft 3, S. 110.

THE PSYCHOPATHOI^OGY OP EVERYDAY UPE 497

In a soliloquy Clara speaks as follows: "If some noble
gentleman could see me as I am and not disdain to aid me!
Oh! to be caught out of this prison of thorns and brambles.
I cannot tear my own way out. I am a coward. A beckon-
ing of a finger would change me, I believe. I could fly bleed-
ing and through hootings to a comrade. . . . Constantia met
a soldier. Perhaps she prayed and her prayer was answered.
She did ill. But, oh, how I love her for it. His name was
Harry Oxford. . . . She did not waver, she cut the links,
she signed herself over. O brave girl, what do you think of
me? But I have no Harry Whitford, I am alone" ....
"the sudden consciousness that she had put another name
for Oxford, struck her a buiffet, drowning her in crimson."

The fact that both men's names end in "ford" evidently
renders the confounding of them more easy, and would by
many be regarded as an adequate cause for this, but the
real underlying motive for it is plainly indicated by the author.
In another passage the same lapsus occurs, and is followed
by the hesitation and change of subject that one is familiar
with in psycho-analysis when a half- conscious complex is
touched. Sir Willoughby patronizingly says of Whitford:
"False alarm. The resolution to do anything unaccustomed
is quite beyond poor old Vernon." Clara replies: "But if
Mr. Oxford — Whitford . . . your swans coming sailing up
the lake, how beautiful they look when they are indignant.^
I was going to ask you, surely men witnessing a marked ad-
miration for some one else will naturally be discouraged?"
"Sir Willoughby stiffened with sudden enlightenment."

In still another passage Clara by another lapsus betrays
her secret wish that she was on a more intimate footing with
Vernon Whitford. Speaking to a boy friend she says: "Tell
Mr. Vernon— tell Mr. Whitford."

In relation to these two literary passages I made a personal
slip of the tongue that illustrates the probity of the uncon-
scious mind as contrasted with the duplicity of the conscious
one. Expounding the subject of lapsus linguae to some one
I said that I had come across two interesting literary examples,
in Meredith's Egoist and in Shakspere's Love's Labour Lost;
when detailing the second I noticed that I had named the
wrong play. Analysis of the mistake brought the following
memories. On the preceding day, while talking of the sources
of Shakspere's plots, I had made the remark that the only
one he had not taken from previous authors was that con-

^The nature of the change of the subject here accurately betrays the con-
tent of the imderlying affect, indignation at Patteme's disparagement of
Whitford, just as a mediate association reaction indicates the nature of
the complex stimulated.

498 JONES

tained in Love's Labour Lost. Some six months before,
Professor Freud had told me that he had heard from Dr.
Otto Rank that there was in the Merchant of Venice an ex-
ample of lapsus linguae attributed to the disturbing influence
of a suppressed thought, but he could not tell me where it oc-
curred. On looking back I realize that I felt just a touch of
pique, though I did not pay any attention to it at the time, at
not having observed it myself, and took the first opportunity to
re-read the play, when of course I came across the example.
The one in the Egoist I had really observed myself. My
statement that I had discovered the two examples in question
was therefore only three parts true. The fact, which I had
suppressed,^ that Dr. Rank deserved some credit, leaked
through to external expression in my error of naming the
wrong play, substituting Shakspere's only original one. An in-
teresting feature of the example is the fact that a few minutes
before I had been relating how a man not over-scrupulous in the
matter of priority had betrayed his dishonesty in a treacherous
slip of the tongue. No doubt deeper factors than interest in
scientific priority were also operative in my own case, such
as rivalry and an "English" complex, both of which are
matters that play a very subordinate part in my conscious
mental life.

IV. Lapsus Calami

The introductory remarks made on the subject of slips of
the tongue apply almost literally to slips of the pen. One
principal difference is that the delay interposed by the mechan-
ical acts of writing enables disturbances of co-ordination to
occur with especial readiness, as can be illustrated by a glance
over any author's manuscript. The necessity for numerous
corrections indicates that, whether owing to the intricacy
of the subject-matter or to a lack of clearness in the author's
mind, a harmonious flow is far from being attained. General
perplexities mirror themselves in half-conscious hesitations
as to the choice of individual words. Thus, a correspondent,
who could n't decide as to the advisability of a given proposal,
wrote to me that it might turn out to be "umpracticle,"
evidently a contamination of "impracticable" and "unprac-
tical."

A field of frequent errors is that of dates. Many people
continue to write the date of the previous year throughout
a great part of January. Not all such mistakes are due to
the fixation of habit, as is readily assumed ; sometimes they sig-
nify a disinclination to accept the fact that yet another by-gone

^Naturally I excused this to myself on the ground that pedantic ac-
curacy is uncalled for in conversation; but the facts remain.

TH:e PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY UFE 499

year has brought them nearer to old age, a reflection that is apt
to be prevalent at the turn of the year. Regrets that such and
such a date is already past, or impatience that it has not yet
arrived, are common motives of such unconscious mistakes.
A student dated a letter to me April 11, 191 1, instead of April
22. An examination was due in the first week of May for
which he was very unprepared, and I attributed his slip to
the wish that there was twice as much time ahead of him in
which to get ready. That the date he actually wrote was the
1 1 th was no doubt influenced by the presence of these ciphers
at the end of 191 1, but it is to be noted even in this connection
that his mistake consisting in writing them earlier than he
should, i. e., in putting the date earlier. As with the phonetic
factors entering into slips of the tongue, the fact that the
part wrongly written occurs elsewhere in the same line only
predisposes to the mistake; such factors do not cause the
mistake, they only make it easier to assume that particular
form.

For the following example I am indebted to Dr. A. A. Brill.
A patient wrote to him on the subject of his sufferings, which
he tried to attribute to worry about his financial affairs in-
duced by a cotton crisis : " my trouble is all due to that damned
frigid wave;^ there isn't even any seed." What he really
wrote, however, was not "wave" but "wife." In the bottom
of his heart he cherished half-avowed reproaches against his
wife, on account of her sexual anaesthesia and childlessness,
and he dimly realized, with right, that his life of enforced
abstinence played an important part in the genesis of his
symptoms.

As with slips of the tongue, no mistake is too slight to be
significant. The following four are instances, selected from
a considerable number of similar ones, in which it consisted
only in the replacement of one letter by another.

A correspondent of mine had published a scientific paper
on a sexual subject, and was writing to me about a virulent
criticism of it that had appeared; the critic had used such
passionately denunciatory language as to make it evident
that the topic of the paper had aroused some strong personal
complex. My correspondent's first sentence was "Have
you seen X's satyrical criticism of my paper.'*", plainly in-
dicating by his unconscious substitution of "y" for "i" his
estimate of the nature of the criticism.

Some two years ago I was writing to an old friend, whom I
had always called by his surname. On account of family
ties it became more appropriate to address him by his Christian

* Meaning in the money-market.

500 JONES

name, and, after a momentary embarrassment natural under
the circumstances, I took up my pen and began, "Dear
Fred." To my amazement, however, I saw that I had sHpped
in a "u" before the final letter of the name. This may seem
a very trivial mistake, and due to the similarity of the two
words, but a psycho-analytic conscience tends to be more
unsparing in the criticism of its owner, as it is more sparing
in that of others. Two memories at once rushed to my mind.
One was of a dream I had had two years before, at a time
when I was debating with myself whether it would be politic
openly to defend the Freudian principles, the truth of which
my experience had made me accept. In the dream I was in
a swiftly-moving motor-omnibus, the driver of which was a
composite figure (Sammelperson) ,^ bearing mostly the linea-
ments of my friend. An angry crowd surrounded us, and
threatened the driver for "going so fast." It became necessa-
ry for me to decide whether to stand aloof or to side with the
driver, and I did the latter. I need not give the other details
of the dream, but the analysis showed it to be a presentation
of my waking dilemma, the driver being a replacement-figure
for Professor Freud. I had recently been taken for a long
motor ride by my friend, who by the way has a German sur-
name, and though at first I had qualms as to the recklessness
of his driving I soon perceived, to my relief, that this was only
apparent and that he was really an exceedingly skilful and
reliable driver. Before the incident of the lapsus calami,
therefore, he had long been unconsciously associated in my
mind with Professor Freud. The second memory was of a
letter I had recently written to a Canadian Professor of a
subject allied to my own. On coming to Canada I had felt
very awkward and constrained at the American custom of
formally prefacing a man's title to his name when addressing
him, and it was a long time before I got accustomed to being
spoken to by both younger and older colleagues as Dr. Jones
or as Doctor. It embarrassed me to have to speak to even
fairly intimate friends in this way, and in the case of the gentle-
man in question I frankly told him, in the letter referred to
above, that my English prejudices would not let me do it with
any degree of comfort. As he was some fifteen years older
than myself I wondered afterwards whether he might resent
a younger man taking the initiative of addressing him simply
by his surname. The slip of the pen now began to take on
a different aspect, and I was obliged to recognize in it the
manifestation of a snobbish wish that I was on sufficiently
close personal terms with Professor Freud to allow such a

^SeeAmer. Journ. of Psychol., April, 1910, p. 287.

THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE 50I

familiar mode of address. I feel certain that no thought of
the kind had ever entered my consciousness, to which it is
quite strange, though my intense reaction of shame con-
vinced me of the reality of its existence. The circumstances
of the slip of the pen were extraordinarily favorable to its
occurrence, the similarity in the names, the previous identi-
fication of the men, the occasion of the letter following so
soon after the other one, and so on. If it were not for this,
I hardly think that such a deeply repressed wish could have
come to expression, at least not so flagrantly.

I am indebted to Dr. A. A. Brill for the following personal
example. Although by custom a strict teetotaler, he yielded
to a friend's importunity one evening, in order to avoid offend-
ing him, and took a little wine. During the next morning an
exacerbation of an eye-strain headache gave him cause to re-
gret this slight indulgence, and his reflections on the subject
found expression in the following slip of the pen. Having
occasion to write the name of a girl mentioned by a patient
he wrote not Ethel but Ethyl. ^ It happened that the girl
in question was rather too fond of drink, and in Dr. Brill's^
mood at the time this characteristic of hers stood out with
conspicuous significance.

Some three years ago I was writing to a friend in England,
and gave the letter to a member of my family to post. For-
tunately she noticed I had made a mistake in the address,
having written as the street number 19 instead of 55. The
two numbers do not even resemble each other, so that the
customary explanations are here more than ever in default.
I will relate a few of the associations as they occurred. The
name of the street, Gordon St., brought "Gordon Highlanders —
the Highlands — the thought that my friend is an ardent mount-
aineer— the thought that Professor Freud is very fond of the
mountains — Berg (=Mountain) — Berggasse, the street in
Vienna in which Professor Freud lives, — the number of his
house, 19." The friend's name, Morris brought "morris —
dancers — maypole — phallus — sex — Professor Freud's works on
sexual subjects." In desperation I started again with Gordon,
which now brought "the regiment called the Gay Gordons —
gay women (the London euphemism for prostitutes) — the

^Ethyl alcohol is of course the chemical name for ordinary alcohol.

^In writing my manuscript I made the slip of replacing the word Brill
by that of Bree, the name of another medical friend. The mistake is
evidently a contamination derived from the word-picture of * 'Brill on the
spree," and is determined by the memory of tenuous jests relating to Berlin
on the (river) Spree; both the vowel and the consonants of Brill are con-
tained in the word Berlin. It is only right to add, however, that the
thoughts of both Dr. Brill and Dr. Bree are intimately connected in my
mind with Berlin in ways that discretion prevents me from describing.

502 JONES

German equivalent, Freudenmadchen — a cheap joke I had
heard in Germany in this connection on Professor Freud's
name;" as a matter of fact I had on the previous evening read a
passage in his Traumdeutung where he refers to jokes on names.
Turn which way I would I arrived at the same end-point, and I
began to suspect that this was not chance. It might be said
that for some reason or other, whether from the number
coinciding with that in the Berggasse or what not, thoughts
relating to Professor Freud were at the time occupying my
mind to the exclusion of all else, in reply to which I have to
say that I do not find this so in other analyses, and that in my
experience, whenever free, unforced associations constantly
lead in the same direction there is some good reason for it;
in such cases there is invariably some essential, significant
connection between the starting-point and the end reached.
Further, the more far-fetched and strained the associations
appear, as in this example, in other words the more superficial
they are, the more important is the underlying essential
connection found to be. This conclusion, clearly demon-
strated in Jung's experimental work, was fully confirmed in
the present instance. Although I could see no possible con-
nection between my friend and Professor Freud, of whom
he knew nothing, I was led to investigate the contents of the
letter I had sent him. To my amazement I found that
the main feature of it could be applied to Professor Freud
in the same sense, and that I must unknowingly have
harbored a wish to send it to him ; in the slip in writing
I had expressed my unconscious wish to send the letter to
another man by addressing the envelope partly to him and
partly to the one I consciously intended it to go to. There
can be no question as to the intense personal significance of the
complex covered by the superficial associations of the analysis,
for wild horses would not tear from me the contents of that
letter.

Mistakes in addressing envelopes, as in the example just
mentioned, are generally manifestations of some disturbing
thought that the writer does not mean to express. • A young
lady was secretly engaged to a medical man, whom we will
call Arthur X. She addressed a letter one day not to Dr.
Arthur X., but to Dear Arthur X, thus expressing her desire
to let all the world know of their relationship.

Not long ago I was treating a case of exceptional interest in
a patient who lived some sixty miles from Toronto. On
account of the distance the patient, who could not leave his
work, was able to visit me only twice a week. I found it im-
possible to treat him on these conditions, and wrote to tell
him so. Instead of writing the name of his town on the

THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE 503

envelope, however, I wrote Toronto, displaying my wish
that he were more conveniently situated.

V. Misprints

Misprints may of course arise from errors made by the
writer, the editor, the proof-reader, or the printer. From
time to time the press records amusing instances of a dis-
agreeable truth unintentionally leaking out in the form of a
misprint; in Freud's book several examples of this are related.^
Unlike the other kinds of failure under discussion one
here is rarely in a position to obtain an objective verification
of a given interpretation, but sometimes this in itself reaches
a high grade of probability. At all events general principles
indicate that the mistake made must be determined by per-
sonal constellations of whoever made it, and cannot be al-
together accidental.

In a recent number of the Zentralblatt fiir Psycho-analyse^
the title of a book of Gross' is wrongly given as " Das Freud'-
sche Ideogenitatsmonument" instead of Ideogenitatsmoment.
As both the writer of the article, and the editorial staff (Drs.
Adler and Stekel) regard the conception as a monumental one,
it is possible that the overlooking of the mistake is to be corre-
lated with this fact.

In a paper of my own on nightmare I wrote the sentence,
"The association in general between the sex instinct and the
emotions of fear and dread is a very intimate one." This
was correctly rendered in the proof, but on the second occasion
of reading it the proof-reader was shocked to think that I
could make such an obviously outrageous mistake, and altered
the word ''intimate" to "distant," in which form it appeared
in print.

In a broschure of mine that appeared as a German transla-
tion a mistake was made of a less unfortunate kind. One
of my main theses was that the conception of Hamlet rep-
resented a projection of the most intimate part of Shakspere's
personality, and so thoroughly did the translator absorb my
view of the identity of the two that, when he came to a passage
on the death of Shakspere's father, he substituted the name
Hamlet for Shakspere and rendered the passage as referring
to "the death of Hamlet's father in 1601." The substitution
was overlooked in the proof by two other readers thoroughly
familiar with the subject.

In the notorious Wicked Bible, issued in 1631, the word
"not" was omitted from the Seventh Commandment, so

^S. 66, etc.

2Jahrg. 5, Heft. 16, S. 197.

504 JONES

that this read, **Thou shalt commit adultery." The possi-
bihty is not to be excluded that the editor had a personal
interest in the subject of the commandment. At all events
he was heavily fined, it being empirically recognized that
whether his purpose was conscious or unconscious he was
equally responsible for it, and that he had no right, even "ac-
cidentally," to impute such commandments to Jahve.

Type- writing, being a form of writing, is subject to the same
influence as this. Mistakes made may be due to either a
** Verschreiben" or a " Verlesen," in any case being determined
by the previous mental constellations of the typist. Thus
my typist, having worked long in a lawyer's office, is fond of
replacing "illogical" by "illegal," and, being of a very proper
turn of mind, makes such mistakes as changing "a vulgar
word" to "a regular word." I have found that distinctness
of calligraphy is powerless to prevent such mistakes.

One practical aspect of this matter is generally recognized,
namely, that accuracy in correcting proofs can be attained
only by getting some one else to do it for one. A mistake
once made in the manuscript, and then copied, is very apt to
get overlooked by the person who made it. The affective
blindness that enabled him to make the mistake, or, more
strictly, that enabled an unconscious impulse to come to
expression, will very Hkely continue its action by preventing
him from recognizing it.

VI. False Visual Recognition

In visual perception the same mistakes of affective origin
that were discussed in connection with memory are frequently
to be observed, and here also they are of two kinds, a failure
to see something that for various reasons we do not want to
see, and a falsification of perception in the light of personal
complexes. Examples of the former kind are very common
in connection with reading the newspaper. Thus, just when
a relative was crossing the Atlantic last year, I saw in the news-
headings that a serious accident had happened to a liner,
but I had the greatest difficulty in finding the account of it
in the paper, overlooking it again and again.

False perceptions perhaps consist most often in catching
sight of one's name where it really does n't occur. As a rule
the word that has attracted one's attention is very similar to
one's name, containing perhaps the same letters differently ar-
ranged. Professor Bleuler^ relates an example where this
was not so, and where, therefore, the essential cause of the
mistake must have been of a greater affective intensity; the

^Bleuler: Afifektivitat, Suggestibilitat, Paranoia, 1906, S. 121.

THK PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY UFE 505

word was really "Blutkorperchen," only the first two letters
being common to the two words. He explained it thus:
"In diesem Falle Hess sich aber der Beziehungswahn und
die Illusion sehr leicht begriinden: Was ich gerade las,
war das Ende einer Bemerkung liber eine Art schlechten Stiles
von wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten, von der ich mich nicht frei
fiihlte."

Freud^ quotes an example from Lichtenberg: "He always
mistook "angenomnen" for "Agamemnon," so thoroughly
had he read his Homer." In searching an American news-
paper for English political news at the time of the Navy scare,
my attention was caught by the heading "German danger;"
on looking nearer I saw that it was "General danger."

Similar observations can be made in regard to the percep-
tion of other objects than written matter, and especially with
the recognizing of other people. False recognition is quite
commonly due to a pervading desire to meet the person in
question; a lover who has a rendezvous with his mistress
fancies he sees her coming many times over, when really the
women he mistakes for her bear only the faintest resem-
blance to her.

The failure to greet a friend or acquaintance in the street
is not always due to not seeing them, and one knows how
gradual are the shades between a direct "cut," where one
person consciously pretends he does not see the other, and a
not seeing that is due to a not wanting to see.^ Women in-
tuitively feel that the difference between the two is unim-
portant, and are as much offended by the one as by the other;
some one who thinks highly of them has no right not to see
them when they pass.

A striking instance of this affective blindness occurred to
me not long ago. It is part of my routine duty to check the
invoices for laboratory apparatus as they come in, and hand
them over to the assistant superintendent to see that they
get paid. On one occasion I had neglected to do this until
a small number collected. I then went through them, and
took them with me into the assistant superintendent's office.
I was very pressed for time, and hoped he would n't be there
so that I could simply deposit them on his desk; especially
so, as there was a small error in one of them that I had to
point out to him, and I realized that his over-conscientious-
ness would mean a tedious investigation of the error. I
felt, however, that I ought to try to find him, and explain

ipreud: Op. cit. S. 64.

^One might invert the familiar proverb and say: "What the heart
doesn't grieve over, the eye doesn't see."

5o6 JONES

the point to him. On going into his office I saw several men
there, went up to one of them who had his back to me, and
said, "Do you know where Dr. X. is?** To my astonishment
he repHed, "Why, I am Dr. X." My not recognizing him was
faciHtated by the fact of his having an unfamihar hat on,
but the actual cause of it I knew well enough.

The phenomenon of "fausse reconnaissance," or "d^ja vu,"
which has perplexed so many psychologists, is closely allied
to the same category. Freud has finally solved this riddle,^
but as the explanation of it is of a more complex order than
with the other occurrences under consideration, I shall not
go into it here.

VII. Mislaying of Objects

It is probable that objects are never accidentally mislaid.
The underlying motive manifests itself in two ways, in the
act of mislaying the object, and in the subsequent amnesia;
in other words a "Verlegen" is a composite of a ** Vergreifen"
and a "Vergessen," the latter being the main feature. As
before, the motive may be a counter-impulse directed against
the use of the object, or against an idea associated with the
use of it. Instances of both will be given, first of the former.

We are all more apt to mislay bills rather than cheques,
and in general objects that we don't want to see rather than
those we do. Apparent exceptions to this rule, such as the
mislaying of valuable objects, come under the second category,
where our objection is not to the thing itself, but to what it
can remind us of.

A common experience, which has often occurred to me per-
sonally, is the following: Whenever I suffer from the effects
of over-smoking, I notice that it is much harder to find my
pipe; it has got put behind ornaments or books, and in all
sorts of unusual places that it normally does not occupy.

A patient of mine was recently very put out at having
lost an important bunch of keys. He told me that he urgently
wanted them .that afternoon to open the lock of a minute
book at a meeting with his auditor and solicitor. I en-
quired ae to the purpose of the meeting. It appeared that an
important resolution had been passed at an annual directors'
meeting, and that he had omitted to enter it in the minute
book. He was the managing director, and it became a ques-
tion legally whether a certain action could be taken without
the formal consent of the other directors, or whether possibly
the minute could be subsequently added by private arrange-
ment with them. At all events it was an annoying situation,

»Freud: Op. cit. S. 139.

THH PSYCHOPATHOIyOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE 507

and I felt sure that his dishke of having to face it was connected
with the loss of the key. Further enquiry showed that he
had used the keys only once that morning, to open his office
desk; after doing this it was his custom immediately to re-
place them in his pocket, the desk being provided with an
automatic closing lock. He had missed the keys as soon as
he got into the street car to come to see me, and had telephoned
a message for a clerk to search the short distance between
his private office and the car line. The surmise was near that
he must have flung the bunch into his desk behind some papers,
later closing it in the usual way; on telephoning to have the
desk forcibly opened, this was found to be correct.

The following example is a little more complicated. A lady
had lost the key of a box containing phonograph records,
and had thoroughly ransacked her rooms for it many times
during six weeks, but all in vain. The records belonged to
a correspondence college, and were a means of learning French
pronunciation. They had been put away early in the summer,
and now, in the autumn, she wanted them for the purpose of
renewing her French studies. Her whole heart was not in
these, however, for it happened that she was fond of singing
and hoped to get accepted in an orchestral choir, the rehearsals
of which would leave her no time for other studies. As time
went on she despaired more and more of being accepted, and
fell back on the French as the next best way of occupying
her winter evenings. Soon after her definite rejection by
the choir she discovered the lost key, which had been carefully
stowed away in the corner of an attic. She recollected lock-
ing the box in the early summer, and thinking that she would
not need it again for a long time, but had no memory of putting
the key away. She was extremely proud of her voice, and
had built on "her application being successful. Taking up
the French studies connoted failure of her hopes. Her in-
ability to find the key thus symbolized her lothness to be-
lieve that her vocal reputation would be slighted.

To lose or misplace a present, especially if it happens more
than once, is not generally considered a compliment to the
giver, and with right, for it often is an unconscious expression
of disdain, disregard, or indifference. When a wife repeatedly
loses her wedding ring during the honeymoon, it does not
augur well for the future happiness of the marriage. Freud
relates an example of misplacing where the motive was of this
kind, and which, like the last mentioned example, is interest-
ing in regard to the circumstances under which the object was
again found. It concerned a married couple who lived rather
aloof lives from each other, any marks of tenderness being of a
distinctly lukewarm nature; the fault, according to the

508 JONES

husband, lay in the emotional apathy of his wife. One day
she made him a present of a book that would interest him. He
thanked her for the attention, promised to read it, put it aside,
and could n't find it again. In the next six months he made
several vain attempts to find it. At the end of this time his
mother, to whom he was devoted, got seriously ill, and was
very tenderly nursed by his wife. His affection for his wife
rapidly increased, and one evening, coming home from the'
sick bed with his heart filled with gratitude towards her, he
went to his desk and, without any conscious purpose, un-
hesitatingly opened a drawer and took out the lost book.

Leaving things behind one is a common type of mislaying.
To do so in the street or in a public conveyance has a very
different significance from doing so in the house of a friend.
In the latter case it often expresses the person's attachment,
and the difficulty he has in tearing himself away. One
can almost measure the success with which a physician is
practising psychotherapy, for instance, by the size of the
collection of umbrellas, handkerchiefs, purses, and so on, that
he could make in a month.

VIII. Erroneously Carried Out Actions

A secondary suppressed tendency may manifest itself in
the disturbance not only of writing, but also of any other
conscious motor act, an occurrence Freud terms a " Vergreifen."
The intended action is not carried out, or only incorrectly,
being entirely or partly replaced by an action corresponding
with the suppressed impulse that breaks through. As in the
former cases this secondary tendency is associated, either
directly or indirectly, with the conscious intention, and the
faulty action is customarily explained as being due to "chance,"
* ' accident, " or * * carelessness . ' '

A trite example will perhaps best illustrate the type of
occurrence. On starting to open a fresh tin of tobacco I
economically reflected that I should first finish the rather dry
remains of the previous one. A few minutes later, however,
while engrossed in reading, I wanted to refill my pipe, and to
my surprise detected myself in the act of opening the new tin,
although I had pushed it farther away from me than the other.
My checked wish to enjoy the fresh tobacco had taken advant-
age of my distraction, and so interfered with my conscious
intention of filling the pipe from the old tin.

An equally simple example is the following. It is my
custom to put scientific journals, as they arrive, on a stool in
the corner of my study. On reading them I write on the back
the page number of any articles I wish to enter in my refer-

THE PSYCHOPATHOIvOGY OI^ EVERYDAY LIFE 509

ence books; the journals not so marked are put on top of the
files, to be bound at the end of the year, while the others are
placed on a pile at one side of my desk. Once a week or so I
go through this pile and enter the references, but, whenever
I have neglected this for so long that the pile begins to assume
formidable dimensions, I find I have a pronounced tendency
to put no more there, and to put on the files any fresh journal
I read, whether it has articles that should be entered or not.
The motive is obvious, to save myself the trouble of having
to enter more than I already have to.

A lady went to post some letters which had come for her
brother, and which had to be re-addressed and forwarded on
account of his absence. When she got home she found the
letters still in her hand-bag, but realized that she had posted
two letters addressed to herself, which she had opened that
morning; they duly arrived on the next day. At the time
another younger brother was at home seriously ill with typhoid
fever, and she had just written to the elder brother begging
him to come home as soon as possible. She knew, however,
that on account of urgent business he would not be able to
leave immediately, but her posting letters addressed to the
home under the impression that she was sending them to
her brother, indicated her keen anxiety that he was already
there.

A patient came up from the country to get advice about
various obsessing ideas that greatly distressed him. He had
been recommended to consult two physicians, another one
and myself. The other physician told him * 'not to think
about the ideas," and advised him to take a course of physical
exercise at a special gymnasium that he kept for the purpose.
I of course advised psycho-analytic treatment, which has
since cured him. He promised us both that he would think
the matter over, and let us know what he decided. That
night, on getting home, he wrote to each of us, to the other
physician that he could n't yet make up his mind, and to me
that he would like to make an appointment to begin the treat-
ment as soon as possible. He put the letters into the wrong
envelopes. During the subsequent psycho-analysis it be-
came evident that this "accidental" mistake was unconscious-
ly determined by the spiteful desire to let both the other
physician and myself know what his opinion was of the
former's advice.

The use of keys is a fertile source of occurrences of this kind,
of which two examples may be given. If I am disturbed in the
midst of some engrossing work at home by having to go to the
hospital to carry out some routine work, I am very apt to find
myself trying to open the door of my laboratory there with

Journal— 3

5IO JONES

the key of my desk at home, although the two keys are quite
unHke each other. The mistake unconsciously demonstrates
where I would rather be at the moment.

Some years ago I was acting in a subordinate position at a
certain institution, the front door of which was kept locked,
so that it was necessary to ring for admission. On several
occasions I found myself making serious attempts to open the
door with my house key. Bach one of the permanent visiting
staff, of which I aspired to be a member, was provided with a
key, to avoid the trouble of having to wait at the door. My
mistakes thus expressed my desire to be on a similar footing,
and to be quite "at home" there.

Two other everyday sets of occurrences may briefly be
mentioned where unconscious disturbances of otherwise in-
tended actions are very frequent. The one is the matter of
paying out money, and particularly of giving change. It
would be an interesting experiment to establish statistically
the percentage of such mistakes that are in favor of the
person making them, in comparison with that of the opposite
sort.

The second is the sphere of domestic breakages. It can
be observed that after a servant has been reprimanded, es-
pecially when the reprimand is more than usually unjust in
her eyes, is a favorite time for crockery to * ' come to pieces in
her hand." Careless breakage of valuable china, an event that
often perplexes the owner as much as it incenses her, may be
the product of a number of factors in the mind of the trans-
gressor, class envy of valuable property, ignorant lack of
appreciation for objects of art, resentment at having to devote
so much labor to the care of what appear to be senseless
objects of enthusiasm, personal hostility towards the owner,
and so on.

IX. Symptomatic Acts

Under the name of " Symptomhandlungen " Freud dis-
cusses a series of unconsciously performed actions that differ
from the last-mentioned ones in being independent activities,
and not grafted on to another conscious one. They are done
"without thinking" or "by chance," and no significance is
seen in them. Analysis of them, however, shows that they
are the symbolic expression of some suppressed tendency,
usually a wish. In many instances the action is a complicated
one, and performed on only one occasion; in others it is a
constant habit that often is characteristic of the person.
The mannerisms of dress, of fingering the moustache or
elothes-buttons, the playing with coins in the pocket, and so

TH^ PSYCHOPATHOI.OGY OF EVERYDAY UFE 511

on, are examples of this kind; they all have their logical
meaning, though this needs to be read before becoming evident.

Different ways of occupying the hands often betray thoughts
that the person does not wish to express or even does not
know of. It is related of Eleonora Duse that in a divorce
play, while in a soliloquy following a wrangle with the hus-
band, she kept playing with her wedding-ring, taking it off,
replacing it, and finally taking it off again; she is now ready
for the seducer. The action illustrates the profundity of the
great actress' character studies.

Maeder^ tells the following story of a Zurich colleague who
had a free day and was hesitating between making an agree-
able holiday of it and paying a distasteful duty call on some
people in Lucerne. He ultimately decided on the latter, and
dolefully set out. Half way to Lucerne he had to change
trains; he did this mechanically, and settled down in the
other train to continue his reading of the morning papers.
When the ticket collector came round he discovered that he
had taken a train back to Zurich. His wish to spend the day
there and not in Lucerne had proved too strong for his good
intentions.

In most of the examples previously mentioned in this paper,
and of those encountered in real life, it is possible to discover
a motive for the given occurrence that logically accounts for
this, but which does not lie particularly deep in the person's
mind. In other words, it is, in Freud's language, fore-con-
scious,2 and the subject has no particular difficulty in recogniz-
ing it as an integral part of his personality. The problem,
however, is far from exhausted at this point. It is next
necessary to discover the origin of the motive or tendency in
question, or to explain why it needs to be expressed at all.
In this investigation one reaches the realm of the unconscious
proper, and here it often turns out that the error which is
being analyzed has a deeper meaning, that it symbolizes more
than the fore-conscious motive, and expresses tendencies of
much greater personal significance; this may be the case,
however trivial the error in itself. In some of the preceding
examples the fore-conscious motive disclosed appears trite,
and it seems unlikely that such a trifling matter should need
a complicated psychological mechanism to manifest itself.
In the cases of this kind that I have had the opportunity of
submitting to a detailed psycho-analysis, I have found that
the unconscious associations often shed an unexpectedly

^Maeder: Nouvelles contributions a la psychopathologie de la vie
quotidienne. Arch, de Psychol., 1908. VII, p. 296.

^For the explanation of this and allied terms see Psychol. Bull., April,
1910. p. III.

5 1 2 JONES

instructive light on the full meaning of the occurrence. Un-
fortunately, however, the motives thus reached are usually of
so intimate a nature that discretion forbids the publishing of
them.

In still other cases no fore-conscious motive can be dis-
cerned, and the error appears to be quite meaningless until
the truly unconscious sources are reached. In the following
example^ the fore-conscious motive was not discovered until
the resistance to the unconscious sources of it were broken
down. It is further peculiarly instructive in illustrating
what important and fundamental traits of character may be
revealed by the analysis of an absolutely trivial occurrence.

A doctor on re-arranging his furniture in a new house came
across an old-fashioned, straight, wooden stethoscope, and
after pausing to decide where he should put it, was impelled to
place it on the side of his writing-desk in such a position that
it stood exactly between his chair and the one reserved for his
patients. The act in itself was certainly odd, for in the first
place the straight stethoscope served no purpose, as he invari-
ably used a binaural one; and in the second place all his
medical apparatus and instruments were kept put away in
drawers, with the sole exception of this one. However, he
gave no thought at all to the matter until one day it was
brought to his notice by a patient, who had never seen a
wooden stethoscope, asking him what it was. On being told,
she asked why he kept it just there; he answered in an off-
hand way that that place was as good as any other. This
started him thinking, however, and he wondered whether
there had been any unconscious motive in his action.
Being interested in the psycho-analytic method he asked me
to investigate the matter.

The first memory that occurred to him was the fact that
when a medical student he had been struck by the habit his
hospital interne had of always carrying in his hand a wooden
stethoscope on his ward visits, although he never used it.
He greatly admired this interne, and was much attached to
him. Later on, when he himself became an interne, he con-
tracted the same habit, and would feel very uncomfortable
if by mistake he left his room without having the instrument
to swing in his hand. The aimlessness of the habit was shown
not only by the fact that the only stethoscope he ever used was
a binaural one, which he carried in his pocket, but also in that
it was continued when he was a surgical interne and never
needed any stethoscope at all.

^In the Zentralb. f. Psychoanalyse, Jahrg. i, S. 96, I have published a
fuller account of this example.

THE PSYCHO PATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE 513

From this it was evident that the idea of the instrument in
question had in some way or other become invested with a
greater psychical significance than normally belongs to it, in
other words, that to the subject it stood for more than it does
with other people. The idea must have got unconsciously
associated with some other one, which it symbolized, and from
which it derived its additional fulness of meaning. I will
forestall the rest of the analysis by saying what this secondary
idea was, namely a phallic one ; the way in which this curious
association had been formed will presently be related. The
discomfort he experienced in hospital on missing the instru-
ment, and the reUef and reassurance the presence of it gave
him, was related to what is known as a "castration-complex;"
namely, a childhood fear, often continued in a disguised form
into adult life, lest a private part of his body should be taken
away from him, just as playthings so often were; the fear was
due to paternal threats that it would be cut off if he were not
a good boy, particularly in a certain direction. This is a very
common complex, and accounts for a great deal of general
nervousness, and lack of confidence, in later years.

Then came a number of childhood memories relating to his
family doctor. He had been strongly attached to this doctor
as a child, and during the analysis long buried memories were
recovered of a double phantasy^ he had in his fourth year
concerning the birth of a younger sister, namely that she was
the child (i) of himself and his mother, the father being rele-
gated to the background, and (2) of the doctor and himself;
in this he thus played both a masculine and feminine part. At
the time, when his curiosity was being aroused by the event,
he could not help noticing the prominent share taken by the
doctor in the proceedings, and the subordinate position occu-
pied by the father ; the significance of this for later life will
presently be pointed out.

The stethoscope association was formed through many
connections. In the first place, the physical appearance of
the instrument, a straight, rigid, hollow tube, having a small
bulbous summit at one extremity, and a broad base at the
other, and the fact of its being the essential part of the medical
paraphernalia, the instrument with which the doctor performed
his magical and interesting feats, were matters that attracted
his boyish attention. He had had his chest repeatedly ex-
amined by the doctor at the age of six, and distinctly recollect-
ed the voluptuous sensation of feeling the latter' s head near
him pressing the wooden stethoscope into his chest, and of the

^Psycho-analytic research, with the penetration of infantile amnesia*
has shown that this apparent precocity is a less abnormal occurrence than
was previously supposed.

514 • JONES

rhythmic to-and-fro respiratory movement. He had been
struck by the doctor's habit of carrying his stethoscope inside
his hat; he found it interesting that the doctor should carry
his chief instrument concealed about his person, always handy
when he went to see patients, and that he only had to take off
his hat {i. e. a part of his clothing) and "pull it out." At
the age of eight he was impressed by being told by an older
boy that it was the doctor's custom to get into bed with his
women patients. It is certain that the doctor, who was
young and handsome, was extremely popular among the
women of the neighborhood, including the subject's own
mother. The doctor and his "instrument" were therefore
the objects of great interest throughout his boyhood.

It is probable that, as in many other cases, unconscious
identification with the family doctor had been a main motive
in determining the subject's choice of profession. It was here
doubly conditioned, (i) by the superiority of the doctor on
certain interesting occasions to the father, of whom the subject
was very jealous, and (2) by the doctor's knowledge of for-
bidden topics^ and his opportunities for illicit indulgence. The
subject admitted that he had on several occasions experienced
erotic temptations in regard to his women patients; he had
twice fallen in love with one, and finally had married one.

The next memory was of a dream, which I have published
elsewhere,^ plainly of a homosexual-masochistic nature; in it
a man, who proved to be a replacement-figure of the family
doctor, attacked the subject with a "sword." The idea of a
sword, as is so frequently the case in dreams, represented
the same idea that was mentioned above to be associated with
that of a wooden stethoscope. The thought of a sword re-
minded the subject of the passage in the Nibelung Saga where
Sigurd sleeps with his naked sword (Gram) between him and
Brunhilda, an incident that had always greatly struck his
imagination.

The meaning of the symptomatic act now at last became
clear. The subject had placed his wooden stethescope between
him and his patients, just as Sigurd had placed his sword (an
equivalent symbol) between him and the maiden he was not
to touch. The act was a compromise-formation; it served
both to gratify in his imagination the repressed wish to enter
into nearer relations with an attractive patient (interposition
of phallus), and at the same time to remind him that this wish
was not to become a reality (interposition of sword). It was,
so to speak, a charm against yielding to temptation.

^The term "medical questions" is a common periphrasis for "sexual
questions."

^Amer. Journal oj Psychol., April, 1910, p. 301.

THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY UFE 5^5

X. Generai. Observations
( j) Warrant for Interpretations

The first criticism of the theses here maintained that nat-
urally presents itself is the question as to the reliability of the
individual interpretations. It is not likely that any one will
reject them all as improbable, but, particularly with the more
complex analyses, doubt must arise concerning the trust-
worthiness of the results. This is especially so in regard to the
personal, subjective factor in the interpretations, although as
a matter of fact the very constancy of the way in which similar
conclusions are reached by different observers indicates that
this factor is less potent than might be imagined. Experience
shows that, when attention is carefully directed to the objective
aspects of the analysis, the importance of the personal factor,
which from the unavoidable nature of the circumstances can
never be entirely eliminated, can be reduced to a degree where
it is practically negligible. In most scientific work the per-
sonal factor has to be reckoned with, but appreciation of the
way in which it acts, especially when this is based on psycho-
logical knowledge, as a rule enables it to be excluded to such
an extent as not to interfere with conclusions being formulated
that are valid enough to stand the objective test of verifiability.
It is contended that this statement applies unrestrictedly to
psycho-analytic interpretations. It is, of course, to be conce-
ded that the probable accuracy of these interpretations varies
considerably in different instances, as conclusions do else-
where in science. Thus, in a chemical analysis, the conclu-
sion as to whether a given substance is present or not varies
in probability according to the quality and amount of evi-
dence obtainable; in some cases the confirmatory tests are
so unequivocal that the final decision is a practically certain
one, in others it is very probable, in still others it is only a
plausible possibility, and so on.

The view that the psycho-analytic interpretations of the
class of occurrences under discussion are reliable is based on,
among others, the following considerations:

(a) The psychological correctness of the principles of the
free association method. This is too complex a matter to be
gone into here, and I will only refer the reader to Jung's well-
known works^ on the subject.

(b) The constancy of the findings by different observers,
and the harmony of the conclusions with those reached in the
study of other fields, e. g., dreams, psycho-neuroses, mythology,
etc. It is extremely unlikely that this is due to coincidence,

ijung: Diagnostische Assoziationsstudien. Bd. /, 1906, Bd. //, 19 10.

5i6 JON^S

and still more so that it is due to identical prejudices on the
part of the different workers, for in the first place this would
be postulating a very remarkable uniformity in their individual
mental constellations, and in the second place psycho-analytic
research brings with it an eradication of personal prejudice,
and an appreciation of personal complexes, that is rarely
attained elsewhere in the same degree.

(c) The increased intelligibility of the processes in question.
An occurrence that previously was obscure and meaningless
now becomes throughout comprehensible, and an integral part
of the rest of the person's mental operations. It is seen to
be merely an irregular manifestation of a logical tendency that
is an essential constituent of the personality, the unusual
features having certain definite reasons for their occurrence.
Moreover, the discovery of the underlying motive, and its
connection with the manifestation being analyzed, is a matter
that commonly lends itself to external verification. When,
in an analysis, one traces a given error in mental functioning,
such as a lapsus linguae, to a thought that the person was
desirous of keeping back, it is usually easy to confirm the
truth of the conclusion. Very significant in this connection
is the unmistakable evidence of the resulting affect in the
person, which accurately corresponds with that characteristic
of the revealed mental process. Often this is so pronounced
that it is quite impossible to doubt the truth of the interpreta-
tion made ; this especially is a matter where personal experi-
ence is more convincing than any possible amount of discussion.

(d) The fact that in many fields the principles in question
are generally recognized to be valid. Freud's study is only a
detailed working-out of laws that were already known to hold
true over a limited area. When a man is hurt at finding his
name unfortunately forgotten, or at unexpectedly being
passed by unrecognized in the street ; when a lady is offended
by some one who professes regard for her forgetting to carry
out her behests or to keep a rendezvous, they are displaying
an affect that accords perfectly with the inferences of the
psycho-analyst, and with no others. In this correct intuition
of mankind lies already the essential nucleus of the conclusions
maintained by Freud.

Indeed it is quite impossible to go through life without
constantly making interpretations of just this kind, though
usually they are simpler and more evident than those needing
a special psycho-analysis. Observation of a very few jokes
is sufficient to illustrate this, and we ' ' read between the lines ' '
of the people we have to do with, doubting the scientific justi-
fication of our right to do so as little as we do in the interpreta-

THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OK EVERYDAY LII^E 517

tions of jokes. ^ This holds in the most manifold fields of
mental activity. Three examples may be quoted, of a kind
that could be multiplied indefinitely. With Mr. E. R.
Bennett's play "The Servant in the House," no one can wit-
ness it intelligently and doubt that the Hindoo servant, who
is the principal character, is a presentation of Jesus Christ, or
that his name "Manson" is a disguised form of the title
"Son of Man." Yet we should find it difficult to "prove"
this to a carping critic who is bent on avoiding the obvious
inference, and still more to "prove" our assumption that the
disguise was the product of definite motives in the author's
mind. In Mr. Bernard Shaw's play "Press Cuttings" one
of the characters, the Prime Minister of England, is called
" Balsquith." When one infers that he compounded the word
from the names of two Prime Ministers, Balfour and Asquith,
the critic may accuse us of reading into Mr. Shaw's mind views
of our own that never existed there.^ In Shelley's "(Edipus
Tyrannus" what right have we to assume that in his ridicule
of the Ionian Minotaur^ the author was satirizing the English-
man of his time? Our answer in all these cases is the same,
namely, that we feel justified in making the inferences in
question because they make something intelligible that other-
wise would have no meaning. This answer is perfectly correct,
for in the last analysis the justification of every scientific
generalization is that it enables us to comprehend something
that is otherwise obscure, namely, the relations between
apparently dissimilar phenomena.

To this it may be said that in such cases as those just men-
tioned a logical meaning is given to something that from pre-
vious experience we have every reason to expect has one, but
that the point in dispute about the * 'psychopathological "
occurrences of everyday life is whether they have such a
meaning or not. Here a priori argument can take us no
farther, and the question can only be referred for solution to
actual investigation, a matter usually considered unnecessary,
on the pure assumption that the occurrences have no logical
meaning. Freud's scepticism made him challenge the neces-
sity of this assumption, and prefer to leave the question open

*In "Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten " Freud has made
a detailed study of this subject. As with the occurrences studied in the
present paper, he has shown that the insight consciously obtained is often
only a partial one, and that the true significance is often related to uncon-
scious sources.

'The royal censor refused to let the play be acted until the name was
replaced by one less open to this personal interpretation, namely, Johnson;
the name of the commander in chief, Mitchener(from Milner and Kitchener),
had to be altered to Bones.

3:= John Bull.

5i8 JONES

until it was investigated. On doing so he found as a matter of
experience two things, namely, that the realm of psychical
determinism is more extensive than is generally supposed, and
that awareness of a motive at a given moment is not a neces-
sary accompaniment of the external manifestation of this.

Freud further came to the conclusion that there was a
definite cause for the popular belief that so many blunders in
our mental functioning are meaningless. He holds that this
belief is due to the same cause as the blunders themselves,
namely, to repression. Various repressed thoughts are in
every one of us constantly coming to expression in the shape
of " meaningless " blunders, the significance of which necessa-
rily escapes us. Being thus accustomed to the occurrence of
such matters in ourselves we naturally attach no significance
to them in others; we "explain" these as we do our own, or
accept the "explanations" proffered just as we expect others
to accept the "explanations" of our own blunders.

As to these explanations little more need be added. Where
the factors they have recourse to are operative at all, they act
only as predisposing conditions, not as the true cause. Freud^
gives the following apposite illustration of the actual state of
affairs. "Suppose I have been so incautious as to go for a
stroll in a lonely part of the town, where I am attacked and
robbed of my watch and money. At the next police station
I give information with the words : I have been in this and
that street, where loneliness and darkness stole my watch and
money. Although in these words I should have said nothing
that was not correct, still from the wording of my information
I run the danger of being thought not quite right in the head.
The state of affairs can correctly be described only thus, that
favored by the loneliness of the spot, and unrecognizable
through the protection of the darkness, a thief has robbed me
of my valuables. Now, the state of affairs in the forgetting
of a name need not be otherwise; favored by fatigue, circula-
tory disturbances and poisoning, some unknown psychical
agent robs me of the proper names that belong to my memory,
the same agent that on other occasions can bring about the
same failure of memory, during perfect health and capacity."
Similarly such a mistake as a slip of the tongue is often attrib-
uted by psychologists (e. g. Wundt) to a momentary in-
attentiveness. It is certainly a question of conscious
attention, but Freud^ has pointed out that the defect is more
accurately described as a disturbance of attention than as a
diminution, the true cause being the disturbing influence of a

^Freud: Zur Psychopathologie. S. 22.
^Freud: Op. cit. S. 68.

THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE 519

second train of thought. The same remarks apply to all the
other explanations urged. Several examples were given above
in which names and other words differing by only one letter
were confounded or interchanged, and evidence was brought
forward to show that this external association was merely a
predisposing circumstance, and not the actual cause of the
mistake. Many such circumstances favor the occurrence of a
blunder, that is, they permit a repressed thought to slip partly
through. Alcoholic intoxication is notoriously one. Emo-
tional excitement is another. Many blunders, forgettings,
and other oversights, are attributed to the confusion of hurry.
Thus, for instance, I have noticed that the using of the wrong
key, in the examples quoted above, most often occurred when
I was in a great hurry (the same was true of the not recogni-
zing the assistant superintendent in his office), but if haste
were the true cause it would be curious that it should bring
about a blunder of a kind that defeats its own object; strictly
speaking it is the emotional confusion or excitement engendered
by hurry that permits a second repressed impulse to manifest
itself in what externally appears as a blunder.

As has been remarked above, there are certain occasions
in everyday life when the normal person divines the motiva-
tion of unintentional errors, though these are rare in comparison
with the occasions on which it escapes him. Freud^ has
pointed out that there are two other groups of processes in
which an unconscious, and therefore distorted, knowledge of
this motivation is manifested, namely in paranoia and in
superstitions. In both these the subject reads a meaning into
external happenings that have no such psychical meaning, and,
in a very interesting discussion of the subject, Freud produces
reasons to believe that this erroneous functioning is due to a
projection to the outside of motives that exist in the subject's
mind and are full of meaning there, but which he does not
directly perceive.

A little may be said on a feature of some of the analyses
quoted that may strike the reader as odd, namely, the remark-
able play on words that is so often found. Whoever is sur-
prised at this needs to be reminded of the almost boundless
extent to which the same feature occurs in other fields of mental
activity, in wit, dreams, insanity, and so on. Even in the
serious affairs of everyday life it is far from unusual. Thus,
to cite a few business announcements, we see the National
Drug Company using as its trade motto " Nadru," the National
Liquorice Company (N. L. Co.) that of "Enelco," we find
the Levy Jewellery Company reversing its first name into the

^Freud: Op. cit. S. 131 et seq.

520 JONES

more pretentious one of Yvel, and advertisements of " Uneeda"
biscuits and " Phiteezi" boots are familiar to every one. This
tendency to play on words, and to produce a more useful or
pleasing result (mirror-writing, ciphers, and rhyming slang^
also belong here), is evidently dictated by the same Unlust
motives — to avoid banal or otherwise unattractive words —
that so much stress has been laid on above. It is one that has
far-reaching roots in early childhood life. In fore-conscious
and unconscious mental activities this play on words — clang
associations — is much more extensive than in consciousness,
and serves for the transference of a given affect from one mode
of expression to a more suitable and convenient one.

(2) Bearing on psycho-analytic method oj treatment

Three brief remarks may be made on this matter. In
the first place, investigation of the errors and slips of everyday
life is perhaps the best mode of approach to the study of
psycho-analysis, and affords a convenient preliminary to the
more difficult, and more important, subject of dreams. The
greatest value is to be attached to self-analysis, a fact to
which attention cannot too often be called. In the second
place, analysis of the occurrences in question is of great service
in the treatment of neurotic patients. Their behavior in
this respect needs to be closely observed, and frequently a
quite trivial occurrence will, when investigated, provide clues
to the elucidation of the main problems. Thirdly, considera-
tion of the mechanism of these erroneous functionings makes
it easy to understand the way in which psycho-analysis brings
about its therapeutic effects. Both the errors and neurotic
symptoms are the manifestations of dissociated conative
trends which are weaker than the rest of the personality
opposed to them, are consequently repressed, and can come
to expression only in indirect ways and only under certain
circumstances. An essential condition for this is non-aware-
ness of the process. Psycho-analysis by directing the disso-
ciated trend into consciousness abolishes this condition,
and therefore brings the trend under the control of the con-
scious inhibiting forces. Conscious control is substituted for
automatic expression, the significance of which was not real-
ized. These considerations may be illustrated by the tritest
of the examples given above, namely, my opening of a fresh

^The following are instances from the Cockney type of this. "Aristotle"
=bottle. "Cain and Abel' '=table. "Harry Nichols "=pickles. Mediate
forms are: "Christmas" (card)=guard : "Bull" (and cow)=row:
"Malcolm" (Scott)=hot; "Stockton " (on-Tees)=cheese : "Rosie" (Loader)
=soda, and so on.

THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY UPE 52 1

tobacco tin although I wished first to finish the old one. Here
it is quite obvious that the rule just stated holds, that an
essential condition of the erroneous functioning is non-aware-
ness of the significance of the process; I knew that I was
reaching for tobacco, but did n't notice which tin it was. The
moment I realized the situation I of course checked the error,
and controlled the wish that was taking advantage of my
absent-mindedness to come to expression. On a larger scale
the same is true of neurotic symptoms; realization of their
significance checks the morbid expression of the underlying
impulse. The cardinal proposition is, that consciousness of an
aberrant impulse means increased control of it.

(3) Relation to health and disease

This matter should be fairly evident from the preceding
considerations, so that the two corollaries that follow in this
respect need only to be stated. The first is that from a psy-
chological point of view perfect mental normality does not
exist. In other words, every one shows numerous defects in
mental functioning that are manifestations of dissociated,
repressed, psychical material, and which are brought about
by the same psychological mechanisms as those operative in
the case of the psycho-neuroses. A further matter not brought
out in the preceding study is that this material is ultimately of
the same nature as that from which neuroses are produced.
The second corollary is that the border-line between mental
health and disease is much less sharp even than is generally
supposed. The distinction between the two is really a social
one, rather than a psychopathological one, just as the dis-
tinction between sanity and insanity is primarily a legal one.
When the erroneous mental functioning happens to carry with
it a social incapacity or disability the condition is called a
neurosis, and when it does not it is called absent-mindedness,
eccentricity, personal mannerism, and so on. Further reflec-
tions on the significance of these conclusions will here be
omitted, as they are not relevant to the main purpose of the
paper.

(4) Determinism and Free WilV-

One of the psychological arguments against the belief in a
complete mental determinism is the intense feeling of con-
viction that we have a perfectly free choice in the performance
of many acts. This feeling of conviction must be justified
by something, but at the same time it is entirely compatible
with a complete determinism. It is curious that it is not

^This section is largely paraphrased from Freud, Op. cit. S. 130.

522 JONES

often prominent with important and weighty decisions; on
these occasions one has much more the feeUng of being irresis-
tibly impelled in a given direction (compare Luther's "Hier
stehe ich, ich kann nicht anders"). On the contrary it is with
trivial and indifferent resolutions that one is sure that one
could just as well have acted otherwise, that one has acted
from non- motived free will. From the psycho-analytic point
of view the right of this feeling of conviction is not contested.
It only means that the person is not aware of any conscious
motive. When, however, conscious motivation is distin-
guished from unconscious motivation, this feeling of conviction
teaches us that the former does not extend over all our motor
resolutions. What is left free from the one side receives its
motive from the other, from the unconscious, and so the
psychical determinism is flawlessly carried through. A knowl-
edge of unconscious motivation is indispensable even for
philosophical discussion of determinism.

(5) Social Significance

It would be interesting to speculate as to the result of a
general knowledge of the unconscious motives that underlie
the failures of mental functioning in everyday life, but it is
perhaps more profitable to review some of the present results
of ignorance of them.

One of these is that both intellectual and moral dishonesty
is facilitated to an extraordinary extent. There is no doubt
that dishonesty of which the subject is not conscious is much
commoner than deliberate dishonesty, a fact of considerable
importance in, for jnstance, juristic matters. The hysteric
who cannot move her leg because unconsciously she wishes
it to be paralyzed, the tourist who oversees a prohibiting
notice because he finds such things annoying, and the impecu-
nious man who forgets to pay a bill because he does n't want
to, are all instances of this. At the same time the line between
these two types of dishonesty is nowhere a sharp one, and in
many cases one can only conclude that the subject could with
a very little effort recognize the suppressed motive, which is
more than half conscious. In psycho-analytic treatment this
is constantly to be observed ; the following slight example of it
may be quoted. A young woman told me of a certain experi-
ence she had had in her childhood in company with a boy.
I had every reason to believe that this was far from being an
isolated one, and asked her whether it had occurred with
any one else. She said, " Not that I can remember." Notic-
ing the wording of her answer and a certain expression in her
face, I asked," What about the times that you can't remember?"

THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY UFE 523

She exclaimed "Oh, shucks," and in such a disconcerted tone
that I was sure my surmise had been well-founded. She then
made the remark, "Well, I really had forgotten the other
times till this minute," the truth of which was probably only
partial. The incident made me think of Nietzsche's epigram:
" One may indeed lie with the mouth, but with the accompany-
ing grimace one nevertheless tells the truth." Half -amnesias
of this kind are extremely common in daily life.

In spite of the constant endeavor to keep back disagreeable
or unacceptable thoughts, these very thoughts betray them-
selves in blunders of the type under discussion. By the
world this self -betrayal is passed by unnoticed, but it does not
escape any one who has made a study of unconscious function-
ing. Freud^ in no way exaggerates when he says: "He who
has eyes to see, and ears to hear, becomes convinced that
mortals can hide no secret. Whoever is silent with the lips,
tattles with the finger-tips; betrayal oozes out of every pore."
Morevoer, even with a direct lie, careful observation of the
undue emphasis here and the distortion there will usually
disclose what the person is trying to conceal, for the lie is a
creation of the same mind that at the moment is cognizant
of the truth. It is very rare, especially on emotional occa-
sions, for self-control to be so complete as to inhibit all uncon-
scious manifestations, which to an attentive observer will
indicate the truth. Strictly speaking, one cannot lie to another,
only to oneself, and skilled introspection makes even this
increasingly difficult.

An important consequence of this is that every one is apt
to know more about the inner motives of those near to him
than they themselves know, inasmuch as every one is continu-
ally performing at all events some simple kind of psychical
analysis on those around him. This is a fertile source of
misunderstandings and friction,^ especially in family and mar-
ried life where contact is much nearer. One person intuitively
recognizes an intention or tendency in the other that the
latter refuses to admit even to himself. When the unavoidable
inferences are presented to him, he is indignant, rebuts them
as being groundless, and complains that he is misunderstood.
Strictly speaking, such misunderstanding is' really a too fine
understanding. The more nervous two people are, the more
often do they give rise to schisms, the reasons for which are as
categorically denied by the one as they are obvious to the
other. This is the punishment for the inner improbity, that,
under the pretext of forgetting, absent-mindedness, and so on,

^Freud: Sammlung kleiner Schriften. Zweite Folge. S. 69.
^Freud. Zur Psychopathologie, S. 114.

524 JONES

people allow tendencies to come to expression which they
would do better to admit to themselves and others, unless
they can control them.

Most important, however, is the extension of these princi-
ples to the sphere of human judgment, for it is probable that
repressed complexes play as prominent a part in distortion
here as they do in the minor errors of memory mentioned
above. On a large scale this is shown in two ways, in the
minimum of evidence often necessary to secure the acceptance
of an idea that is in harmony with existing mental constella-
tions, or to reject one that is incompatible with these. In
both cases it is often affective influences rather than intellectual
operations that decide the question. The same evidence is
construed quite differently when viewed in the light of one
affective constellation from the way it is when viewed in the
light of another. Further, when the general attitude towards
a question changes in the course of time, this is often due at
least as much to modification of the prevailing affective influ-
ences as to the accumulation of external evidence ; for instance,
the average man of to-day does not hesitate to reject the same
evidence of witchcraft that was so convincing to the man of
three centuries ago, though he usually knows no more about
the true explanation of it than the latter did.

Ignorance of the importance of affective factors in this
respect, combined with the ineradicable popular belief in the
rationality of the individual mind, has the interesting result
that strong differences of opinion are attributed by each side
to a defect in reasoning capacity on the part of the other. In
an exposition of this matter Trotter^ writes: "The religious
man accuses the atheist of being shallow and irrational, and is
met with a similar reply; to the Conservative, the amazing
thing about the Liberal is his incapacity to see reason and ac-
cept the only possible solution of public problems. Examination
reveals the fact that the differences are not due to the commis-
sion of the mere mechanical fallacies of logic, since these are
easily avoided, even by the politician, and since there is no
reason to suppose that one party in such controversies is less
logical than the other. The difference is due rather to the
fundamental assumptions of the antagonists being hostile,
and these assumptions are derived from herd suggestion."

There is a certain amount of truth in this imputation of
stupidity to the person on the opposite side, for in his blind
refusal to appreciate or even to perceive the evidence adduced
by his opponent he may give an unavoidable appearance of

^Wilfred Trotter: Herd Instinct and its Bearing on the Psychology of
Civilised Man. Sociological Review, July, 1908. (P. 19 of reprint.)

THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY UFE 525

marked stupidity. A further reason for this is that some one
under the sway of strongly affective influences thinks not only
that any one differing from him must be deficient in reasoning
power, but also that the views of the latter are themselves
stupid. In attempting to controvert these, therefore, he uncon-
sciously distorts them until they really are foolish, and he then
finds it easy to demolish them. Any man of the period who
read only the account of Darwin's views that was promulgated
by his theological and scientific opponents must have wondered
why it was worth while to attack such obvious nonsense, while
our wonder, on the other hand, is that reputable and other-
wise intelligent men could have managed so to pervert and
misunderstand statements that to us are lucidity itself. Simi-
larly at the present time if some of the remarkable accounts
of Freud's views that are given by his opponents represented
anything like what he really holds, the fact would need much
explanation that so many scientific men can accept them and
yet remain sane.

Yet this astonishing stupidity in apprehending the argu-
ments of opponents, and in defending preconceived views, is
only apparent. The men who so grossly misinterpreted
Darwin were often men of the highest intellectual power, and
the same is true of many of Freud's opponents; similarly no
one can read closely the Malleus Maleficarum without admira-
tion for the amazing intellectual ingenuity with which the
most fantastic propositions are there defended. The process
is one that psychiatrists call "emotional stupidity," a symp-
tom seen in patients who have no real defect of reasoning
power, but who through various affective influences are in a
condition that at first sight gives rise to a strong suspicion of
some organic defect of the brain.

On observing the general attitude towards people whose
"emotional stupidity" has in the course of time become
apparent, two things are noticeable. In the first place, as
was remarked above, the fault is attributed much more to
intellectual inferiority than to the more important affective
causes. Hence the present day supercilious pity for the
scholastics of the "dark ages, " an attitude considerably modi-
fied by an objective comparison of the reasoning powers
characteristic of the two civilizations. In the second place, far
greater leniency is shown towards a stupidity that expressed
itself in the form of blind adherence to accepted errors, than
that which expressed itself in the form of blind rejection of a
novel truth; in other words, credulousness is always more
harshly judged than incredulousness, though they are both
merely different aspects of the same fundamental failing,

Journal — 4

526 JONES

namely, lack of true scepticism. Yet the one is hardly more
characteristic of human weakness than the other — as Nietzsche
put it: "Mankind has a bad ear for new music" — and it
would be hard to convince a student of human progress that
the first manifestation has a greater retarding influence on
this than the second. In any case these considerations go to
show the fallacy of the popular belief that the will is the servant
of reason, the truth being that reason has always been, and
probably always must be, only the handmaid of the will.

XI. Summary

Only a small part of the subject matter dealt with by Freud
has been covered in the present paper. Those interested are
referred to his book for richer and more numerous examples,
and for the lucid and penetrating discussion there given of the
theoretical aspects of the subject. It is perhaps desirable,
however, to summarize here the main conclusions on the
topics discussed above.

The occurrences that form the subject-matter of this study,
the general characteristics of which were defined in the
introductory section,^ may be divided into motor and sensory.^
The defects of the former class that enter into consideration
are two, (i) the erroneous carrying out of an intended purpose
(slips of the tongue and pen, erroneously carried out actions),
and (2) the carrying out of an unintended purpose (symp-
tomatic acts) . The defects of the latter class are also two, ( i )
simple failure of perception (forgetting, not seeing), and (2)
erroneous perception (false recollection, false visual perception) .
In each class the distinction between the two kinds of defects
is not sharp; thus in the latter one, for instance, a failure to
remember is always accompanied by an over-prominent
remembrance of some associated memory, a false recollection.
Further, the distinction between the two classes themselves
is not a sharp one, both motor and sensory processes playing
a part in many instances; thus in the mislaying of objects,
the object is first misplaced, and then the memory of the act
is forgotten.

Common to all forms is the fact that the subject, and most
observers, either give an obviously inadequate explanation
of the particular occurrence, such as that it was due to "inat-
tention," "absent-mindedness," "chance," and so on, or

iln Germany the cironeousness of the process is conveniently indicated
by the preface "ver"; thus, verdnicken, vergessen, vergreifen, verlegen, ver-
lesen, verschreiben, versehen, versprechen, etc.

'This term is here used in its neuro-biological sense, and hence includes
perceptive and apperceptive processes.

TH^ PSYCHOPATHOI^OGY OF EVERYDAY UFE 527

frankly maintain that it has no explanation at all. On the
contrary psycho-analysis shows that there is not only a defi-
nite psychical cause for the occurrence, but that this has
always a logical meaning, and may strictly be called a motive.
This motive is some secondary tendency or train of thought,
of which the subject is not aware at the time. Usually it is
fore-conscious, or, in popular language, unconscious; in
many cases it is unconscious in the strict sense, and is then
correspondingly more difficult to reveal. In most cases there
are both a fore-conscious and unconscious motive, which are
associated with each other. The motive is repressed by the
subject, the repression being a defence-mechanism that sub-
serves the function of keeping from consciousness undesirable
or painful thoughts. The motive may be one of two kinds:
either it is a counter-impulse {Gegenwillen) directed immediately
against the mental operation that is intended, or it is an
impulse directed against some mental tendency that stands
in associative connection with this operation; that is to say,
the association between the two mental processes may be
either intrinsic or extrinsic. As a result of the repression any
direct manifestation of the tendency is inhibited, and it can
come to expression only as a parasitic process engrafted on
another, conscious one. The disturbance thus caused con-
stitutes a temporary failure or error of normal mental func-
tioning.

This error can psychologically be compared with a psycho-
neurotic symptom, the mechanisms by which the two are
brought about are almost the same, and the psychical material
that is the source of them is closely similar in the two cases.
It is maintained that appreciation of the significance of these
everyday errors is important for both the practice and theory
of psychology; this is especially so in the contribution it
furnishes to the problem of psychical determinism, and in the
understanding it gives to the deeper, non-conscious motives
of conduct. It further throws a valuable light on certain
social problems, notably the question of mutual misunder-
standings in everyday life, and on the importance of aJBFect-
ive influences in forming decisions and judgments.

A CASE OF COLORED GUSTATION

By JuNB E. Downey, University of Wyoming

Cases of colored gustation have been described in less detail
than the more common instances of colored audition. The
relative infrequency with which colored tastes and colored
odors have been reported has been explained from the fact
that taste and odor are so bound up with the perception of
a colored body that one's attention is attracted away from the
photism even when it is attracted to the color of the object.
The photisms are said to be most readily perceived in cases
where an odor or a taste from an unknown source suddenly
attracts the attention. In the present instance there has
been no difficulty in perceiving the taste-color, because the
latter is very brilliant, and it frequently persists more than
ten minutes. Moreover, the taste-color is quite as intensive
and quite as fully saturated as are the colors of objects; it
can therefore be maintained without difficulty in the presence
of the latter.

The young man (5.), who reports the present case, is a
senior in college, has had some practice in psychological ex-
perimentation, and is an excellent observer. He has been
under observation a year. So far as he can remember, he
has always experienced tastes as colored. He reports that,
as children, he and his sister employed color-names in describ-
ing their tastes. His taste-colors are located in the mouth;
and they are intensified by closing his eyes. He recalls an
illness during which his tastes were especially highly colored.
In eating his meals, he ignores the induced colors; and,
indeed, one color is frequently cancelled by another, during
the act of eating. When the induced taste-color does not
correspond with the^actual color of the food, a most disagreea-
ble experience results. For instance, brown and yellow
mints are extremely distasteful, because of conflict of these
colors with the green taste-color which is common to all
mints. In general, pink and lavender tastes are agreeable;
reds and browns are disagreeable. Blue tastes are never
experienced. S. reports that colors suggest tactual experi-
ences, and that tactual impressions suggest color.

In our investigation of the case, the following questions
were kept in mind throughout: i. Does S. possess a normal

A CASE OF COLORED GUSTATION 529

sensitivity to taste? 2. Are the color- tones of his tastes uni-
formly determined by any particular factor in the gustatory
complex? 3. Is the induced color sensational or imaginal?
4. Are his associations of touch and color comparable with
his associations of taste and color? 5. Is there a correspon-
dence between the feeling-tone of taste and that of its atten-
dant color?

I. Does our Subject Possess a Normai, Gustatory
Sensitivity?

In our determination of the. limens both for the presence
and for the recognition of taste sensation, the method em-
ployed by Miss Thompson^ was followed precisely, in order
that our results might be comparable with hers. 5.'s limens
of presence were as follows, — all solutions being prepared with
distilled water, and each limen being regarded as established
only when three out of four judgments were correct: Sweet,
.0005 per cent, saccharin; salt, .04 per cent, pure sodium
chloride; sour, .003 per cent, sulphuric acid; bitter, .00008
per cent, sulphate of quinine. A reference to Miss Thomp-
son's curves shows that five of her twenty-five male subjects
gave a limen for sweet as low as that of the present subject;
four of her subjects gave a. limen for salt as low as S., and two
subjects a lower limen. Seven gave the same limen for sour,
and four subjects gave a lower limen. Miss Thompson reports
no subject whose limen for the presence of bitter was as low
as that obtained for S.

In our investigation of the limens of recognition it was
found that S. showed great facility in describing the tactual
accompaniments of the four taste qualities. His judgments
of the taste qualities were usually indirect inferences which
were based upon the local tactual or color accompaniments.
He described salt, sweet, sour and bitter as merely 'feels ' upon
the tongue. He insisted that a lump of sugar had no taste;
and he remarked casually that rock-candy was salt. None
the less, his gustatory sensitivity appeared normal, or supra-
normal.

The limen for the recognition of sweet was .0005 per cent,
saccharin, — a lower limen than Miss Thompson obtained
for any of her male subjects. Discrimination both of this
taste quality and of its relative intensity was due to the pres-
ence of the concomitant black, which was present even with
the weakest solution which we employed. The 'feel' of sweet
was usually located at the tip of the tongue.

^H. B. Thompson: Psychological Norms in Men and Women. University
of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy, IV. i. 1903, 50 f.

530 DOWNEY

The limen for the recognition of salt was about average, —
.II per cent, sodium chloride. Four of Miss Thompson's
subjects gave the same, and ten gave a lower limen. Color
rarely appeared with this solution; when it did appear it was
slate or dirty white. The discrimination of salt from sweet
revealed the following characteristics: It was differently
localized; it failed to persist; it had no color. The judgments
were given slowly, and with clear consciousness of the founda-
tion upon which they were based.

The limen for recognition of sour was also average, or
somewhat high, — .007 per cent, sulphuric acid, a limen which
Miss Thompson found for twelve of her subjects, while seven
of her subjects gave a lower limen. Color entered the ex-
perience, but without much uniformity, — brown, red and green
being reported. The distinctive tactual component was its
puckering character.

The limen for recognition of bitter was low. At the point
where discrimination began, — .0003 per cent, sulphate of
quinine, — a dull orange-red entered the experience, and be-
came more pronounced as the solutions increased in intensity.
The tactual component was a roughness. S. remarked that
the solution tasted exactly like a mixture of red pepper and
water. Only one of Miss Thompson's male subjects gave the
same limen as S., and only two gave a lower limen. It seems
to be significant that the two solutions which gave the lowest
limens for recognition, — the sweet and the bitter, — are just
those taste qualities which are most unambiguously colored.

Individual papillae were stimulated by means of strong
solutions of the four sapid substances, and it was found that
the color component did not occur with minutely circum-
scribed stimulation. Here as before, discrimination proved
to be a product of tactual differentiae, excepting in the case
of bitter. The rough effect which was noticeable in the case
of bitter with extensive stimulation was lacking in the papillary
test. 5. identified bitter by successively eliminating the other
three taste qualities. He also reported an inter mi ttence or
'beating' of sensation, which facilitated his identification;
the identification was made very slowly but with considerable
accuracy. When, on withdrawing the tongue, the solution
spread over the lingual surface, the familiar orange-red ap-
peared. In not a single instance did 5. detect the purely
bitter quality of the solution, — a two per cent, solution of hy-
drochlorate of quinine.

Although our tests suggest the inference that S. 's sense of
taste may be defective, they do no more than suggest it. A
crucial test would involve a separation of tactual and gustatory

A CASE OF COI.OR:eD GUSTATION 53 1

qualities, — a separation which, indeed, we attempted but
without success.

The most convincing evidence of a defective gustatory
sensitivity is furnished by S.'s insistence that solutions of
cayenne pepper and of quinine taste exactly alike. He was,
indeed, unable to distinguish between strong solutions of
red pepper and of quinine, because both produced the same
'feel' upon the tongue, and both were accompanied by the
same color. After rubbing his forehead with capsicum
vaseline, S. reported a 'smart' or 'burn,' which, although not
accompanied by color, gave 'the same tactual feeling as the
taste of bitter. ' It would seem that, for 5., bitter is simply a
rough, burning sensation. He does not find the taste of
quinine unduly disagreeable; and he shows none of the
ordinary reactions to an intensive bitter. He is, moreover,
unable to understand how bitter, as he employs the term, is,
in the slightest degree, characteristic of the taste of unsweet-
ened chocolate or of ground coffee, both of which gave the
color brown. All spices, on the other hand, induced red or
reddish brown colors, similar to the color of pepper. His
recognition of spices was slow. Cinnamon and mustard were
named, but without any high degree of confidence; and
ginger was stated to be either cinnamon or pepper. It is
a significant fact that the taste of bitter, which furnished the
best evidence of a gustatory defect, was also the taste which
was most uniformly and most unambiguously accompanied
by color.

As already stated, S. describes sugar as a 'feel.' He sugars
his food in order to make the taste milder; and he is accus-
tomed to put a pinch of salt into chocolate in order to change
its 'feel'. When a drop of peppermint, or of lemon juice was
added to salt, S. identified the salt very slowly, and even
confused it with sugar.

His recognition of tastes was often retarded to a remarkable
degree. In one instance, strong essence of peppermint was
not identified until after three minutes. In repeated ex-
periments with anise, which is attended by a brilliant black
color, it was found that this color appeared in time to serve
as a mark of identification. Sarsaparilla syrup, which like-
wise induced black, was also identified as anise. Listerine
was at first called camphor and alum; and, after four tests in
which its name was furnished to S., he still failed to recog-
nize it.

The question naturally arises as to whether 5.'s olfactory
sense is normal. A test with the olfactometer showed that it is.
It is possible that the recognition of strongly odoriferous
substances was, at times, retarded by the brilliant taste-colors,

532 DOWNEY

which may have served to distract attention. It was found,
however, that odors are not colored for S. save in rare instances.
In the few positive cases which we discovered during the
course of the investigation, a distinct taste was found to be
induced by the olfactory stimulation.

2. Is THE Color-tone of Tastes Uniformly Determined

BY any Particular Component in the

Gustatory Complex?

Here the writer recognized the possibility that odor was the
factor which determined the color-tone of the taste; and this
possibility was carefully tested. Solutions including syrups
of orange, lemon, cherry, pineapple, the essences of wintergreen,
anise, and bitter almonds together with lime-juice and alum
were employed. 5. plugged his nostrils and the central
region of the tongue was painted lightly with the solution,
S. immediately recording his experience without withdrawing
his tongue. The sides and tip of the lingual surface were then
painted, and records were made as before. Then a few drops
of the solution were placed upon the tongue and allowed to
spread, and to be swallowed. And finally the nostrils were
unplugged, and a few drops of the solution were taken and
immediately swallowed. The results of these experiments
were clear-cut and definite. Excepting in the case of the
intensely sweet solutions, color entered the complex only
when the solution spread over the surface of the tongue.
This color became more intensive and more persistent when,
on the nostrils being unplugged, the olfactory component
was added to the gustatory complex.

The author was tempted to conclude that the presence of
color in the complex was largely due to the olfactory com-
ponent. But this conclusion is not in accord with the fact
that odorless tastes, — those from our sweet, sour and bitter
solutions aroused colors; and with the additional fact that
odors themselves were uncolored, save in rare instances. On
the other hand, the fact that the taste-colors were frequently
intensified by unplugging the nostrils, and the fact that in-
tensive colors were more frequently present when the sub-
stances were more strongly flavored, suggest the influence of
odor as an inducer of color. The presence of odor and of
extensive stimulation certainly increases the vividness and
the persistence of the taste-colors.

The writer is convinced that a thoroughgoing analysis
would reveal the existence of a constant and uniform principle
which determines the color tones of various tastes. It must
be confessed, however, that certain facts still remain unac-
counted for, even after extensive experimentation. A cata-

A CASE OF COLORED GUSTATION 533

logue of the colors which are induced by various stimulations
shows that it is impossible to classify them upon the basis
of the olfactory component ; it is possible, however, to a certain
extent, to classify them upon the basis of the four taste
qualities. It must be borne in mind that, for S., the chief
characteristic of a taste is frequently its tactual, and particu-
larly its pungent or cooling effect. And this peculiarity must
be reckoned with in any attempted classification of tastes.
But so distinct are the complexes experienced that any en-
deavor to classify the very individual gustatory fusions under
four heads must appear to be forced. With these reservations
in mind, however, we shall attempt the classification.

Strong solutions of sugar and weak solutions of saccharin
were found to give black, although, strangely enough, neither
granulated nor lump sugar gave a colored taste. The latter,
in fact, were not found to be intensively sweet, although they
produced a distinct tactual sensation. Anise, cherry syrup
and sarsaparilla syrup were described as sweet, and induced
black, — that of anise being very brilliant. Tar-water also
gave a black taste; but S. was uncertain whether, in this
case, he actually experienced a true synaesthesia. The in-
duced black seemed to him to be imaginal rather than sen-
sational.

Quinine solutions, both strong and weak, gave a dull
orange-red taste, — an orange-red which re- appeared in the
taste of red-pepper, essence of bitter almonds, and alum. A
modified red was induced by lime juice, peach flavor, pine-
apple syrup, and various spices. As previously mentioned, the
burn or sting of the sensation was a prominent part of such
tastes.

Saturated salt solution was found to giv& a crystal-clear
experience. Moreover, it was found that a salt solution
would remove mouth-colors which were already present, — a
discovery which proved to be most valuable in experimenta-
tion, since the long persistence of the taste-colors made ex-
perimentation an exceedingly slow and laborious process.
Listerine was the only other solution found to have this effect.

The results obtained from sour were less clear-cut than those
from other taste-qualities. Green is, perhaps, the color of
purely sour solutions. An occasional flash of green appeared
in the test with minimal solutions. Eight per cent, tartaric
acid was used as a strong solution, and this also gave, at times,
a flash of green. It was noticeable that even this strong sour
solution was sometimes confused with bitter. An attempt
was made to provide tastes that S. would find very sour.
This proved to be difficult. A lemon juice that the experi-

534 DOWNEY

menter found excessively sour seemed to S. to be only moder-
ately so. This lemon juice was found to give, however, a
flash of green, a green which was more certainly induced when
the lemon juice was cooled. A sour, lemon-pineapple sherbet
was reported as very green, a green which persisted. In
the laboratory tests, peppermint was the only solution that
gave uniformly a persistent and vivid green. It would seem
from these facts that a cooling-effect is essential to green
tastes. It is, moreover, not without interest that S. classi-
fies peppermint as a sour taste.

Usually, in the tests in which green appeared, it was very
unstable, alternating with the color pink or red. Such alter-
nation was observed for orange syrup, peach syrup and, above
all, for wintergreen. Wintergreen, in fact, gave the most
interesting results. The taste-color of wintergreen was a
brilliant pink, which, however, was preceded by green or
alternated with green. Usually the green persisted only a
few seconds, while the pink lasted many minutes. When,
however, the wintergreen solution was cooled, it gave a green
that persisted nearly two minutes before changing to pink,
while the same solution when warmed, gave a deeper pink
than usual, and no green.

The alternation of green with pink raises an interesting
question, as to the possibility of obtaining after-image effects
from colored tastes. In support of the affirmative answer to
this question, are two other casual observations. Once a
black taste became white; and 5. reported a grape- juice punch
that in course of eating changed from a purple to a yellow
taste. On the other hand, on this assumption, it is diflficult
to understand why the vivid green of peppermint, which at
times persisted many minutes, should fail to give an after-
image. In any case, we are left with pink as an unexplained
color.

Tests of the effect of mixing the standard solutions, and
the effect of successive applications of such solutions, were
next planned. The mixed solutions gave the following re-
sults: Salt and sweet produced a sweet taste without color;
salt and tartaric acid tasted salt and bitter and induced
dark orange; salt and quinine gave a bitter taste and a
faint suggestion of red; tartaric acid and sweet gave, upon
one occasion, a sour-sweet taste, and a pink color; a second
time, a sour taste with a flash of green; tartaric acid and
quinine produced a bitter taste and a reddish color, which was
less pronounced than usual; quinine and sugar solution
tasted sweet, although the combination was very bitter for
the experimenter, and produced a "queer hollow black"
which vanished as soon as the solution was swallowed.

A CASE OP COLORED GUSTATION 535

Application of the standard solutions in pairs was next
attempted, each pair being utilized twice, and the order of
application varied. The results, on the application of the
second solution, were as follows: Salt-sweet, no taste, no
color; sweet-salt, no taste, no color; salt- tartaric acid, bit-
ing effect of salt intensified, no color; tartaric acid-salt,
salty taste, no color; salt-quinine, neutralized taste, red color
as soon as salt effect wears off; quinine-salt, second taste
clears up the first, then orange-red returns; tartaric acid-
sweet, neutral taste, no color; sweet-tartaric acid, sweet then
sour taste, green with sour taste; tartaric acid — quinine,
taste not recorded, color red, a different red from that pro-
duced by pure taste of bitter; quinine-tartaric acid, taste not
recorded, orange-red of bitter taste brightened by sour stimu-
lation ; quinine-sugar, taste unrecorded, orange-red unchanged ;
sugar-quinine, bitter taste prevailed, red darker than bitter-
red.

One seems justified in concluding that salt "clears up" the
colors induced by the other solutions, but that this "clearing-
up" is least stable in the case of bitter. Sour is found to
modify the orange-red of bitter, and to neutralize sweet, once
giving pink, in this combination; bitter and sweet appear,
at times, to give a color intermediate between the colors of
the pure solutions.

It seemed possible that pink represented a sour- sweet taste,
lycmon juice was accordingly sweetened in the hope of pro-
ducing a pink taste. One attempt was successful; but a
second attempt gave yellow instead. It is very difficult to
make the sweet in a mixture perceptible for 5. Peppermint
essence was dropped on sugar; but the sugar was "not even
tasted" and the green taste remained unchanged. If, in
fact, pink be a sour-sweet taste, the color is certainly not a
mixture of the colors obtained from piure sour and a saturated
sugar solution.

The pink of wintergreen unites with the golden color induced
by a lime wafer, to produce a rose-color, unlike the usual
pink of wintergreen. If anise be taken while the wintergreen
pink is still bright, there is a change to brilliant black. This
black persists for a short time only; and a dirty pink results,
which, in time, clears up, and gives a light pink which lasts
several minutes.

The only other color that remains unaccounted for is yellow,
with its variants, — tan and brown. This color was obtained
from the following solutions: sweetened lemon juice, yellow
(once); peppermint on salt, yellow (tried once); vanilla, tan
or brown (constant); lime juice, yellow (once, alternating
with red) ; lime candy wafer, golden (constant) ; lemon candy

536 DOWNEY

wafer, yellow and brown (tried once) ; lemon essence diluted,
yellowish brown mixed with green; sassafras candy wafer,
pink shot with yellow light (tried once); hot oil of cloves
diluted, tannish brown (tried once); same solution on salt,
flash of brown (tried once) ; chocolate and coffee, dark brown
(constant); nuts of various kinds, — brown, minced English
walnuts giving the lightest color. Once, while the green taste
of peppermint was still vivid, wintergreen was given. This
stimulation resulted in a bright and pronounced pink, which
changed finally to tan.

It is perhaps unnecessary to state that all tests were tried
without 5.'s knowledge of the stimulus to be given and that
his eyes were usually closed, during the test.

3. Is THE Induced C01.OR Sensationai. or Imaginal?

That the color element in the tastes under consideration was
sensational in value seems to us to be proved by its constancy
in tone for a given taste, as shown by tests at widely separated
intervals ; by its persistence ; by its localization in the mouth ;
and by the fact that results were novel and unanticipated by
S., who was curious as to what might come, and reported
results as in a sensation test. Several of the solutions were
new to him, as, for instance, anise ; but these new gustatory ex-
periences yielded as constant colors as did the familiar tastes.
It was noticeable that the color was usually named before a
taste was recognized; in fact, S. frequently relies upon color
as an aid in recognition. These taste-colors were not influ-
enced by suggestion, as was shown by tests. Moreover,
when colored candy wafers were used, and the eyes kept open,
the color experienced was not affected by the objective color.

S. found difficulty in describing the taste-colors. For in-
stance, he reported that the beautiful glazed black of anise,
had never been experienced in any other connection. S.
insisted that color is an integral part of the taste-fusion, and
reported that wintergreen changed perceptibly in taste when it
shifted from green to pink.

That the colors were not called up voluntarily is shown by
the fact that, when asked to give from memory the color of
a particular taste, S. frequently made mistakes, even in the
case of solutions that gave perfectly uniform results during
experimentation. Furthermore, S. showed very little capacity
in voluntary visualization of colors, and was unable to pro-
ject these colors.

6". also showed little capacity in the voluntary projection of
a taste-color to an external surface. Twice, however, the
surface upon which he was gazing became, to his surprise, a

A CASK OF COIvORKD GUSTATION 537

brilliant pink, the color of the wintergreen which he was
tasting. Both of these occurrences were spontaneous and
unexpected. Attempts to throw the mouth-color upon a
colored surface, in order to test the effect of such super-
position, met with little success. In general, when instructed
to gaze steadfastly at a colored surface while experiencing
a taste-color, S. reported most disagreeable tension with
dizziness. The mouth-color was fully as vivid as the objec-
tive color, but was differently localized.

The following were among the tests which we attempted.
Strong essence of wintergreen was given, and pink color ob-
tained in mouth ; disc of spectral green placed before 5. ; no
fusion. Attempt made to throw green peppermint taste-
color upon rose paper; unsuccessful. 5. unable to keep at-
tention off mouth-color even when so instructed; rose finally
fixated for 45 sec; eyes then closed; 5". got gray in front of
eyes, and green in mouth; then a rose-red image came, and
seemed to fuse with green; green returned. Attempt made
to throw the brown obtained from cinnamon candy wafer
upon dark blue paper; no fusion; intermittent attention;
blue caused confusion and dizziness; blue did not banish
brown which became darker. Orange-red pepper taste ob-
tained and dark green paper used to stimulate eyes ; attention
fluctuates; no fusion. After-images were also obtained before
giving a taste-stimulation and an attempt made to fuse these
colors with those induced by taste, but without success. The
eyes were fatigued for a certain color without any perceptible
effect upon a mouth-color of the same general tone. Thus,
fatiguing for black had apparently no effect upon the black
taste of anise; and fatiguing for green had no effect upon the
green peppermint taste. While maintaining green in the mouth,
S. could get an after-image from spectral green without
interference of colors. It has already been mentioned that
peppermint green can be maintained as long as seven minutes,
without failure of the color through fatigue.

4. Ark thk Associations of Touch and Color Compar-

ABLK WITH THK ASSOCIATIONS OF TaSTK AND COLOR?

Our experimental results lead us to answer this question
in the negative. Color calls up tactual experiences much more
consistently and much more frequently than touch evokes
color. In an investigation of the latter situation, it was
found that certain tactual experiences frequently suggested
color, but that these colors were only rarely sensational in
value, and were not uniform in tone. Occasionally there were
instances of true synaesthesia; but there was no evidence of

538 DOWNEY

a systematic case. On the other hand, colors do, apparently,
call up true tactual sensations. 5. named the ** tactual feel"
of every color in the Bradley chart of spectrum scales, — a test
which left his hand itching and in a disagreeable condition.
Nevertheless, it is very difficult to determine in how far these
tactual experiences were anything more than the usual secon-
dary accompaniment to visual perception. With his eyes
closed, 5. was frequently unable to confirm, by stroking the
material, the tactual impression which he received from the
visual stimulation. On the whole, however, it was evident that
S. obtained unusually acute suggestions of tactual texture from
visual texture. It is obvious that a satisfactory explanation
of synsesthesia must await a more complete understanding of
the secondary element in perception. In the meanwhile,
border-line cases deserve more careful examination than they
have received.

It is not without interest that 5.'s preferred form of atten-
tion is auditory. He is very musical, and has an excellent
command of auditory imagery. Colored audition seems to
him to be forced and extraordinary. Yet, during a recent
test, on the imagery aroused by poetic fragments, he has twice
reported changing an auditory suggestion into a play of
imaginal colors.

5. Is THERE A Correspondence Between the Feeung

Tone of each Taste and the Feeung Tone of its

Induced Color?

It has been suggested that synaesthetic experiences involve
associations through emotional similarity. The suggestion
has, perhaps, been couched in too general terms to deserve
detailed consideration. Our conclusion, after a careful obser-
vation of 5. for a year, is that his experiences of taste-color
are, on the whole, indifferent to him, and that there has been
no aesthetic organization of tastes on a color basis, as has been
suggested to be a possibility in such cases. Violets and blues,
which were found by the method of paired comparison to be
►S.'s preferred colors, play no part in these experiences. The
judgment 'agreeable' or 'disagreeable' is, apparently, given
on the basis of the whole gustatory experience of which color
constitutes an essential part. In at least one case, however,
the taste of lime candy, S. spoke of the color, golden, as being
very "pretty," while the taste was not "particularly agreea-
ble." There was frequent disagreement between the affec-
tive tone of the color and of its tactual accompaniment. Thus,
green has an agreeable "feel," but is not an agreeable color.
Violet-blues are agreeable in color, but not particularly so in

A CASE OF COI.ORED GUSTATION 539

"feel." Blue-greens give a "perfectly awful feeling, like
running the hand over sand-paper; disagreeable to both
sight and touch." The double arousal of sense-qualities, in
the manner under discussion, is not without interest in the
investigation of feeling- tone. It would seem to afford an
especially good opportunity for the investigation of mixed
feelings. Our observations on this latter point were too
meagre to lead to any definite conclusion, except the unlike-
lihood of the synaesthetic experiences, in the present case,
being explicable upon an affective basis.

In conclusion, the following facts, as deduced from the
present study, are important in a theoretical consideration
of synsesthesia :

1. The synaesthetic factor is sensational in value, as has
been demonstrated in many other cases.

2. The color hallucination may be induced by the minimal
sensory intensity of the primary component of the gusta-
tory fusion. Other reported cases have also shown sensory
defects of the primary sense-organ. Thus Pierce reports de-
fective hearing in connection with gustatory audition. On
the other hand, the literature of the subject frequently states
that, in particular instances, no sensory defects were found.
The reliance, in the majority of the cases reported, upon a
descriptive rather than upon an analytical method may induce
hesitation in accepting the evidence upon this point.

3. In the case of colored tastes or odors, color may enter
the perceptual fusion from experience of the source of taste as
colored. The color of the object is an important component
of the usual gustatory or olfactory perception. It is easily
comprehensible that the odor of violets should be blue in tone,
in a given instance; and that, too, without rejecting the syn-
aesthetic element as a sensational part of the perceptual fusion,
and interpreting it, instead, as an artificial association. Re-
duce the intensity of a primary element in a perceptual fusion,
and its place may be taken by a normally secondary factor.
Thus, we can understand why for S. red pepper should taste
dull red, and why possibly sweet tastes are black, if, as S.
is inclined to believe, burnt sugar figured in a vivid experience
of childhood. It is, however, difficult to understand how,
in colored audition, tonal vision, or gustatory audition, the
synaesthetic factor is involved in perceptual experience. In
my opinion, we shall not understand synaesthesia until we
have made a more thoroughgoing analysis of perception.

A NOTE OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF

By E- B. TiTCHENER

It happens that a number of graduates, in the department
of psychology at Cornell University, have received, during the
past few years, an unusually thorough training in ' systematic
experimental introspection.' Many thousands of observations
have been taken, under controlled conditions, of such con-
sciousnesses as understanding, recognition, relation, expecta-
tion, belief; the classical experiments on the thought-processes
have been repeated and, in some cases, varied ; different kinds
of imagery have been studied and their temporal courses
traced. Here, then, is a group of observers who seem to be
especially well qualified to report upon the nature and appear-
ance of the self-consciousness, — about which, as it is hardly
necessary to say, psychologists are very far from agreement.

The reports were obtained as answers to questions which
were laid, one at a time, before the individual observers. The
method is crude, and I should be the last to claim anything
like finality for the results. For one thing, the reports are
necessarily partial and imperfect; a complete account of the
psychological self, and of the conditions of its appearance,
would need to be pieced out from observations taken over an
extended period of time. For another thing, the bare state-
ment, even of a highly trained observer, that this or that mode
of experience is habitual with him, or that this or the other
form of experience is unknown, cannot be accepted as of equal
value with the — often unconscious — self-revelation of an ex-
perimental record.^ As regards the first point, however, I
am satisfied if the reports are correct so far as they go ; and,
as regards the second, I rely upon the nature of the questions
themselves and upon the way in which the enquiry was con-
ducted. The questions were of a large and simple kind, and,
after the first sets of answers had been received, were again
laid before the observers, who were instructed to note at their
leisure the facts appearing in daily life and in the course of
laboratory work, and to hand in another set, of corrected
answers, if they found correction to be necessary.

^Cf. G. E. MuUer, Zur Analyse der Gedachtnistatigkeit imd des Vorstel-
lungsverlaufes, 191 1, 143 ff.

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SElvF 54 1

The first question raises the point of the continuity or inter-
mittence of the self -experience. In my own case, "the con-
scious self, while it can always be constructed by a voluntary
effort, is of comparatively rare occurrence."^ Wundt writes
to the same effect: "Psychologically regarded, it is in normal
circumstances the ordinary state of affairs that objects are
given simply as objects, without there being any thought
whatever of the ideating and sensing subject. . . [The
expression] ' f orgetf ulness of self ... is misleading, in so
far as it is prompted by the tendency to consider reference
to the subject as the normal . . . state of affairs. "^ And
Mach, in his polemic against the ego, reminds us that not only
in sleep, but also "when we are absorbed in contemplation or
thought, in the very happiest moments of our lives, the self
may be partly or wholly lost( fehlen kann).''^ On the other
side, we read in Calkins that "I am always, inattentively or
attentively, conscious of the private, personal object, myself,
whatever the other objects of my consciousness;"^ and James,
speaking of the ' material ' self, remarks that "we feel the whole
cubic mass of our body all the while, it gives us an unceasing
sense of personal existence."^

The second and third questions deal with the mode of
appearance of the self in consciousness, and of the conditions
under which it appears. It seems, if we consult the current
works upon psychology, that there are three principal ways
in which the self may become conscious, (i) There may be a
certain class of mental processes which, apart from any deter-
mination of present consciousness, carries the self-meaning.
For Lipps, e. g., all conscious experiences fall into the one or
the other of two great groups, conscious contents and self-
experiences ; and the self-experiences are ' feelings in the wider
sense of the term.'^ These 'subjective' experiences always
appear together with the 'objective'; "I always feel myself
somehow."^ (2) The self -experience may proceed from a

^Text-book of Psychology, 19 10, 544 f.

^W. Wundt, Ueber naiven und kritischen Realismus, Phil. Stud., xii.,
1896, 342 f. ; Kleine Schriften, i., 1910, 291 f.

^E. Mach, Beitrage zur Analyse der Empfindungen, 1886, 18 n; Die
Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhaltniss des Physischen zum
Psychischen, 1900, 17.

^M. W. Calkins, First Book in Psychology, 19 10, 4.

^W. James, Principles of Psychology, i., 1890, 333. I may here remark
that the quotations made in this Note are illustrative only; I do not attempt
either to furnish a complete list of authorities or adequately to characterise
the positions of the authors cited.

*T. Lipps, Leitfaden der Psychologic, 1906, 3 f., 281; cf. G. Kafka, Ver-
such einer kritischen Darstellung der neueren Anschauungen uber das
Ichproblem, in Arch. f. d. ges. Psych., xix., 1910, 116 fif.

'T. Lipps, Das Selbstbewusstsein ; Empfindimg und Gefuhl, 1901, 13.

Journal— 5

542 TITCHENSR

determination; and may then be either expHcit or implicit.^
When it is explicit, the self-meaning is carried by a character-
istic group of conscious processes which is, so to say, set apart
for this special office; for Wundt, e. g., the self -experience
consists "in essentials of a total feeling, whose predominating
elements are the apperceptive feelings, and whose secondary
and more variable constituents are other feelings and sensa-
tions connected with" the vital functions, the movements of
the limbs, the condition of the internal organs. ^ Where it is
implicit, we have — under the determination — a certain
arrangement and temporal course of processes which, other-
wise determined, would lack the special self -reference. Here
we may, perhaps (for I am not sure of the instance), mention
James' reduction of the spiritual, central or active self to
kinaesthetic sensations in head, throat, and respiratory mech-
anism.^ (3) Finally, conscious selfhood may inhere in the
whole of conscious experience, e. g. as the character of 'warmth
and intimacy' which, according to James, distinguishes all of
*my' ideas from the ideas that I ascribe to any 'you'.'*

So much may suffice by way of introduction ; I turn now to
the reports. The letters A, B, etc., denote the observers;
their present status, as student or teacher of psychology, is
indicated by s or t; and sex is shown by the letter m or f.
Further reports, from present members of my graduate semin-
ary,— students trained in introspection, but not trained so
widely or for so long a period as the members of the other
group, — are distinguished by the use of italicised capitals,
^,^,etc. Corrected reports are placed within square brackets.

Question I. " ' I am always, inattentively or attentively,
conscious of myself ^ whatever the other objects of my conscious-
ness.' Is this statement true, as a matter of experience, (a) in
everyday life, {h) in the introspective exercises of the labora-
tory?"

Asf. (a) No. {b) No. The statement is true as a rule at the beginning
of an experiment (when I am 0), before I have become used to the demands
of E. It holds only occasionally after I have become practised and have
forgotten that I am under £*s observation.

Btm. (a) No. In seeing a play, I am often another person, portrayed
by the actor, and do not realise that I am a spectator until my neighbor
speaks. So also when I am absorbed in a book, {b) No. I do not realise often
that there is any I which perceives the stimuli. I should say that the

^Cf. the analysis of Belief offered by T. Okabe, this Journal, xxi., 594.

2W. Wundt, Grundziige der physiologischen Psychologic, iii., 191 1, 353 ff.

^W. James, Principles of Psychology, i., 1890, 301; Does 'Consciousness'
exist? in Journ. Phil. Psych. Sci. Meth., i., 1904, 491.

^Principles of Psychology, i., 1890, 330 fif. The precise nature of the
'warmth' (cf. p. 333) does not here concern us; nor does the question of its
recognition or realisation (apparently answered by James in the doctrine
that the experience of 'mine' is genetically prior to the experience of 'me') .

TH^ CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF 543

consciousness of self is no more frequent than the 'feeling of familiarity.'
I take myself for granted, very much as I take familiarity for granted
in 'immediate apprehension.'

[(a) No. Only occasionally do I realise that there is any I which is
standing over against objects or situations. I do become self-conscious,
most strongly, in just those situations which seem to demand that I appear
not to be self-conscious ; when I know myself to be watched, when there is de-
manded the making or keeping of some motor adjustment (bodily move-
ment, verbal reply). In such cases there are usually the situation (external
perception of place and people and so on) and beside it the I (kinaesthetic
sensations in upper chest and arms, and organic sensations) and my emo-
tive reaction (pleasantness or unpleasantness, with abdominal organic
sensations). This analysis (which I believe to be typical) is mainly from
an actual experience yesterday, (b) No; even less than in everyday life.
The very instruction from E leaves no chance for one to get self-conscious.
The things to be watched are sensations and images and so on, and one
watches them just exactly as one watches a thermometer rise. The more
careful and strenuous the observation, the less chance does there seem to be
for the realisation of anything else than the thing observed.]

Ctm. (a) Not in my case; I am only very rarely 'conscious of myself.*
By 'myself I mean not only the sum total of organic and kinaesthetic sen-
sations representing my body and its movements, but also 'unified experi-
ence' vaguely and verbally referred to as 'my ' experience. Very often my
experiences, simultaneous or immediately successive, are not 'unified,*
not referred to a single and identical agent, but they run side by side.
(b) Not in my case, if the introspection is what I call successful, that is,
if I did not catch myself introspecting. It is true that in introspective
exercises I notice much more easily kinaesthetic and organic processes,
also more verbal imagery, than in everyday life, because of their greater
clearness and reproducibility. I become 'self-conscious,' however, only
if their intensity rises above the normal degree, and that is very rarely.
The matter of 'unified experience' has never come up in my introspections,
as far as I can remember.

Dsf . (a) No. I am usually inattentively, and at times very attentively,
conscious of myself, but there occur fairly numerous instances when I
am not self-conscious at all. These periods when I am not conscious of
self are of comparatively short duration (usually when I am deeply inter-
ested in a book, in listening to music, studying a picture, etc.), and often —
but not always — returning self-consciousness leaves me with a feeling of
surprise, (b) The mere fact of being an observer in a laboratory exercise
seems to imply self -consciousness. I think that I am always somewhat
conscious of myself when busied in this way. Yet even in the laboratory
there are times when self-consciousness is decidedly marginal. These
times are usually during the experiment itself, when perhaps attention is
fixed upon some external stimulus; but the vague feeling that I am soon
to answer the question 'what was my experience' is always faintly present.
[This observer had no opportunity to correct her first answers.]

Etf . (a) I should say almost always. Occasionally I become so absorbed
in a book or task or train of thought that, when interruption comes, I
feel almost as I do when I have waked from sleep, and the immediate past
seems almost blank, and cut off from the rest of my experience. I believe
that consciousness of self is at a minimum if not wholly lacking at such
times, (b) Yes, I believe so. I tend to visualise anything that I am
thinking about, and so in writing introspections: the mental facts or
processes that I try to describe are placed in a large dark vagueness which
represents my own mind. This is situated at about the level of my head,
but is much larger. Again, the effort of introspection is usually accom-
panied by wrinkling of forehead, drawing of eyes, and vague feeling of
tension in head. These things constitute in part what I mean by conscious-

544 TITCHENER

ness of self in the present case. I never forget that I am looking in, and
this realisation is so strong sometimes as to amount to sensations from eyes
as if turning inward. [This observer had no opportunity to correct her
first answers.]

Ftm. (a) No. (b) I have never worked under the Aufgabe of this
question ; but my impression is that 'consciousness of myself is occasional,
except in the early stages of practice.

Am. (a) Yes. I am seldom attentively conscious of myself. There
seems, however, to be always in my consciousness the obsciu-e groundwork
of pressures, strains and organic sensations which, become clearer and sup-
plemented by visual images, make up my attentive consciousness of self.
(b) Yes. The laboratory experience does not seem to differ from the every-
day experience, [(a) No. Observation since my first report leads me to
reverse my opinion. I am now confident that I am not always conscious
of myself. Self -consciousness carried kinaesthetically with possible visual
images occurs comparatively seldom. Only when there is some special
experience calling attention to myself, either directly as my physical self
or indirectly as in a difl&cult or baffling action or problem (which nearly
always calls up the kinaesthetic self), do I have this self -consciousness .
The experience may be clear, as when accompanied by visual images of self
or in the strong kinaesthetic self of an unusually difficult situation; or it
may be unclear, as in vague kinaesthetic feelings of effort. Consciousness
is, however, made up most of the time by mixed perceptional and ideational
contents without reference to the experiencing self, (b) I have not observed
any difference in the consciousness of self under laboratory conditions
from that of everyday experience. Even introspection in the laboratory
does not involve a constant reference to the introspecting self, although
this reference is very frequently present, and often very clear.]

J5m. (a), (b) No.

a. (a), (6) No.

Dm. (a), (b) There are certain sensations which characterise my ali-
mentary canal; others my arms, face, legs, etc.; varying, to be sure, with
my activity, but nevertheless for any given activity possessing a fair con-
stancy. There are thus a large number of groups of sensations which are
frequently present in the various parts of my body; and when some such
groups are present (which is practically always) there is consciousness of
self; that is, these sensations, by virtue of their habitual attendance upon
my activities, possess logical reference to self.

In addition, my ways of thinking and acting — in so far as they are con-
scious— bear my stamp ; the feeling of them is characteristic. Hence when
under an Aufgabe or in a particular situation I speak of them, I naturally
use the term / think or / act, just as I say / feel, when speaking of the
somatic sensations.

But when I do thus make specific use of the idea of self ; when I do thus
have some psychic term (e. g., the kinaesthetic and verbal image /) which
specifically designates the I-ness; then I have no longer mere sensations,
images, etc., with their vague reference to self, but now an actual perception.
This perception may have various degrees of clearness. It waxes and wanes
and revives again. It comes most close to being lost altogether when I
become completely engrossed — 'lose myself — in a task. Then, if only
for a very brief time, I become objective. It is especially frequent in
occurrence with images of future activity.

[Yes. By 'myself I mean: This centre of material, psychical, social,
etc. relations. By being conscious of myself I mean that states or processes
of consciousness are present such that they carry a reference to sdf . Em-
pirically one finds ^at the self which one means is seldom totally the same
in any two cases; it is myself in this or that particular situation that is
referred to. Empirically one finds also that the psychical phenomena which
carry these references are varied, and seldom totally the same. One does

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF 545

not find, that is, that any particular set of constant psychical factors
(such as sensations of respiration) is the exclusive or predominant vehicle.

On the other hand, generally speaking, continually recurring psychical
phenomena (at least, those of somatic character) do seem to me at this
writing to be the vehicle of self-reference. There seems to be something
of self-reference in the very feeling of moving my eyes, uttering a word,
or moving or resting a limb; and this quite apart from any specially set
Aufgabe. However, I am quite doubtful as to whether or not familiar
sights, sounds and touches do ipso facto refer to self.

I should be inclined to distinguish between sensations of self and per-
ceptions of self. Of the former sort were the tonic sensations in the right
leg which were present five minutes ago. These bore a reference (even
though vague and almost formless) to myself; they referred not at all to
the red house across the valley (which I was not thinking of).

There are degrees of clearness or intensity of perceptions of self, and
there are different kinds of perception, as above indicated.]

Em., (a) No. When I am alone, when I am engrossed in work, when a
problem has presented itself, I am not conscious of myself at all. It is only
when the environment is new and unfamiliar, or when I am in personal
conversation with someone else, or when other individuals suggest the
visualisation of myself among them, that I am conscious of myself. Strong
kinaesthesis, and especially organic movements, emphasise self- conscious-
ness, (b) I am strongly conscious of myself, especially at the beginning of
an experiment, because I feel that the situation is new, E converses with me,
and I visualise myself, I feel that the reports are of processes peculiarly
my own. Kinaesthesis comes out strongly, and this emphasises conscious-
ness of self.

[(a) No. My consciousness of self depends decidedly upon 'the other
objects of my consciousness.' I should lay less stress on the situation
(mentioned in my first answer) in which I am thrown into a new environ-
ment as the occasion of self-consciousness, since I find that even here I am
very little self-conscious. As a rule, however, when kinaesthesis and par-
ticularly organic sensations are strong, or when I see or hear a reference
to myself, then I am conscious of self. (6) No, not often. Here again
when reference is made to my experiences, my introspections, my sensations,
etc., I may sometimes get a momentary consciousness of self, mainly in
visual terms (as one sitting before an experimenter). Seldom, and only
in the most trying and unusual circumstances, am I continuously aware of
myself for any length of time, here as elsewhere.]

Fi. (a) No. I often lose all consciousness of myself; not, however, for
a long period. An uncomfortable position, some distraction of attention
occurs, and I am suddenly aware of myself in all sorts of organic sensations.
On some days this awareness is more apparent, more frequent than on
other days. With certain persons consciousness of myself is invariably
present. [Further observation shows that the frequency of self -awareness
is dependent upon my physical condition.] (b) Yes. The very fact that
introspections are to be given makes me aware of myself. I am then
conscious of organic sensations of which, ordinarily, I am totally unaware.
[The self is usually in the background; yet I am conscious of organic
sensations, of changes of mental attitude, of effort, which generally persist
during the entire introspective period.]

Gi. (a), (b) No.

Question II. The second question called for a description of
the self-consciousness, which should be made "as definite as
possible. Is the consciousness of self explicit {e. g., visual
image, organic sensations) or implicit (intrinsic to the nature
of consciousness, inherent in the course of consciousness)?

546 TITCHENIBR

Can you bring out the character of the self-consciousness by
comparing or contrasting it with other phases of a total con-
sciousness?"

The replies should fall into three natural groups: (i) the
reports of those who answer I. (a) in the affirmative, and
thus assert that they are always self-conscious; (2) the reports
of those who answer I. (a) in the negative, but I. (b) in the
affirmative, and thus assert that the introspective attitude
always implies self-consciousness; and (3) the reports of those
who answer both members of Question I. in the negative.
In fact, the replies are not all as clean-cut as this grouping
demands, and we must therefore be content, under the first
two headings, with a classification a potiori.

(i) Etf. ( "I should say almost always.") I have already described my
self -consciousness during introspection. It is hard to describe that which
is present in everyday life because, when I attempt to do so, it is this
introspective self-consciousness which is present. I believe that the more
natural kind is somewhat different on different occasions. It often involves
organic sensations, and feelings of bodily position and of comfort and dis-
comfort. In the presence of other people it is often connected in some way
with their approval or disapproval ; and almost always, whether I am alone
or not, there is a strong sense of my own approval or disapproval. In
other words, it is affectively toned.

Dm. (Occasionally 'loses himself.*) I have virtually already answered
this question. I find my self -consciousness in groups of psychic entities
which habitually reocciu-. When my sensations, feelings, images and
activities are changed, and somewhat new ones take their place, I have
less feeling of self. If they were in continual change and did not character-
istically reoccur, I deduce that I should be without the self-consciousness
I now have.

I have not said that the consciousness of self is a 'phase of a total con-
sciousness'. Rather the self is a thing meant, a complex logical entity,
which in the past has lived in X, is now studying psychology, etc. But
that logical entity is represented in the total consciousness of almost any
moment in that way which I have already mentioned, viz., the habitual
attendance of certain psychic groups. Other designatory terms, so to call
them, are visual images of myself in a particular situation, also auditory
images of my voice and of voices speaking to me, and again various combina-
tions of these with kinaesthetic images of activity.

(2) Dsf. (Self -consciousness sometimes decidedly marginal.) The
consciousness of self is not comparable with the consciousness of external
objects. It is not explicit in the sense of coming as visual imagery or
organic sensations. It is rather an inherent feeling or knowledge or atti-
tude that tells me that I am that which has images and sensations. Not a
consciousness of my physical self as the object of experience, but an under-
lying imique knowledge of myself as the experiencing subject. I cannot
seem to be able to get at it or to analyse it further in introspection. Often
it is intense, but often it is merely the background of experience.

Fi. (No qualification.) Sometimes the self appears as a visual image,
as if it were a thing apart and separate. The self to which I refer in my
answer is, however, an intangible something, forming a sort of background,
in which (as I have said) I can distinguish organic sensations.

(3) Asf. Occasioiially in the form of an indefinite visual image (this
is often implied by a vague kinaesthetic complex); sometimes I have also

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OJf SELI^ 547

vague visual images (or kinaesthetic substitutes for them) of other people.
Usually via organic sensations, nausea, tightening of diaphragm, changes
in respiratory sensations; frequently accompanied by a slight watering of
the eyes (this almost invariably occurs when I am 'touched').

Btm. Self-consciousness appears usually in the form of kinaesthetic
sensations from the lower trunk or from parts of the body in strained posi-
tions. Sometimes in visual images.

Ctm. My self -consciousness is usually intensely organic, a 'sinking of
the stomach,* a blushing and flushing of the face, hot and uncomfortable;
I am conscious of the position of my body, and especially of the movements
of my limbs, through intensely unpleasant kinaesthetic and cutaneous
sensations, of great variety and disconnectedness. If I am standing, the
weight of the body is awkwardly shifted from one foot to the other, and
one or both hands are put under the coat at the hips, thumbs pointing
backwards. All these processes have a fair degree of clearness, with one
or another now and then shooting to the extreme focus of attention, ousting
momentarily some intellectual process which happens to be running its
course in the meanwhile.

Ftm. Chiefly organic sensation. At times, a vague visual image (as
if I stood before myself and saw my own face) . At times, the Bewusstseins-
lage of responsibility. [I find that my self-consciousness is usually emo-
tional.]

Ara. My self -consciousness is definitely explicit. In its clearest form
it consists of organic sensations (of a kind of 'nervous strain' quality) in the
body, especially in the chest; and, when connected with my 'willing self'
or my 'thinking self,' of deep strain sensations in the head. There are
sometimes also vague strain sensations in the limbs; these are stronger
when self-consciousness means my 'willing self.' Besides the dear sensa-
tions in self-consciousness, there are always poorly defined visual images,
such as translucent rays being projected from the region of my chest where
the organic sensations are strongest, and meaning 'I am the centre of this
experience.'

The self-conscious experience seems more often to be a part of other
experiences than a thing of itself. It colors the meaning of the others.
In itself it resembles the experience of effort, but differs slightly in meaning
and in its persistence.

Bm. It seems to me that all sorts of sensations and feelings may refer
to that which experiences, to that which owns and appropriates the experi-
ence. I cannot now be more explicit. [Further observation shows me
that the self-meaning is most commonly carried by organic sensations, or
by visual memory-images of my body doing something; but it is also carried
by other sensations and images. The verbal ideas I and my may or may not
appear. The complex is affectively toned; there is a feeling of warmth or
familiarity. I have noticed that the consciousness of self is clearer during
inhalation. The experience with me is rare.]

a. Chiefly organic sensations ; a visual image may be present too .
The consciousness is explicit.

Em.. Self-consciousness is partly explicit, manifest in a visual image of
myself, organic sensations and kinaesthesis, and in part implicit, as when
I recognise my introspections as material peculiarly my own, which E
could not directly know. When I am conducting a piece of work, I am
never conscious of myself as master of my hands and muscles, brain, etc.
The visual image of the work as it is completed is almost continually before
me as an end, — of course, with many interruptions; I mean the visual
image is the majority factor. It is only when the work, problem or experi-
ment, has been completed that I say 'I have done that.' If, however,
a hitch comes (new situation), I may again be enormously aware of myself,
as before the problem was begun. The consciousness of self is partly a

548 TITCHENER

visual image of myself at present, plus a vague memory image or images
(whether visual or not I do not know) of big experiences in the past.
Gi. For the most part, verbal imagery and organic sensations.

Question III. The third question, addressed only to those
who had answered I. (a) in the negative, points out that this
answer "implies that self-consciousness is intermittent.
Under what circumstances, then, is it likely to appear?"

Asf . Whenever I know that other people are observing my physical or
psychophysical self, i. e., when I see their eyes fixed on me, or when I think
of other people's opinion of me; when I am emotionally stirred up; in
comparing my physical or mental characteristics with those of others, or
with those of myself at some other time; always when something occurs
which, as I say, 'touches' me, rather unexpectedly, e. g.,z. word of commen-
dation or reproof from another person; when another person refers to a
characteristic which he designates as mine ; when I am very elated, fatigued,
sick; when I am wearing new or ill-fitting clothes; when sitting for a
photograph. In general, when I am in an unusual situation.

Btm. Particularly when a new situation is to be met, when there is
necessity for making or keeping a new or not entirely familiar bodily
adjustment; or when the adjustment was unsuitable. Often also as a
bodily reaction to a situation involving other persons.

Ctm. Most strongly immediately before appearing in public or before
some personage of importance; when I hear somebody speaking about me,
or read my name in print as mentioned by somebody else; when I open a
telegram; in the course of talking, when a familiar word has slipped my
memory, or when I get tangled up in an argument. [You have called my
attention to the fact that my answers seem to make self-consciousness
mainly an unpleasant experience. It is, however, true (I have verified
the point by recent observations) that my states of self -consciousness are
almost invariably unpleasant. There is sometimes a 'glow' of self-con-
sciousness, which is pleasurable, after praise, recognition, etc., but this
is not marked, and in any case is soon replaced by indifference or (if the
self-consciousness continues) by an unpleasant, often a strongly unpleasant
mood of self-criticism. I am myself a little surprised at the constancy of
the unpleasantness, now that I have definitely realised it, since I am by
no means of a pessimistic temperament.]

Dsf. Self -consciousness appears usually under some of the following
circumstances: in cases of physical pain (organic discomfort), nervous
condition, tiredness, when one has made a blunder and feels foolish or has
done something one regrets, in a feeling of uselessness or inability to do
what is expected of one (by self or others), in vanity or jealousy, in fear,
whenever as a rule one thinks of oneself in relation to other persons or
during purposeful introspection. There are other circumstances in which
self-consciousness appears, and often it is present all the time.

Ftm. I think in the early stages of laboratory practice. Also, I suspect ,
in observations that involve perception of body {e. g., compass points on
skin) and in those that involve extreme capacity of a mental function
{e. g., memorial learning).

Ara.. [I am apt to experience consciousness of self under the following
situations, (i) In many situations of shame. Often, though not always,
when I am undressed in the presence of strangers; also when I am in an
embarrassing position, especially when I have done something physically
awkward or have discovered something wrong with my clothing. In the
last case one of the most prominent factors in the self -consciousness is a
strong tactual perception [or image?] directly under the part of my dress
affected. I am also generally conscious of self when I am ashamed or
belittled morally or intellectually, as when I am surprised in doing some-

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SEI.F

549

thing of which I am ashamed, when I realise that I am acting hypocritically ,
and especially when I am violently accused, whether rightly or wrongly ;
also sometimes when I am badly defeated in an argument. I experience
self -consciousness in this last situation chiefly as a feeling of mental isola-
tion. I get exactly the same consciousness when I realise that I can know
directly no one but myself and that I am separated from all others by
mediating sensations. (2) In many situations of elation. I am conscious
of self when I have a strong feeling of exaltation, as after an intellectual
victory, after being paid a compliment, or some other success. This is a
definite complex of strong organic sensations in the chest, — which does not
always occur even in these situations. It used to be most definite in relig-
ious fervor. It now occurs most often in the enthusiasm of a new idea;
in enthusiasm there is a set of intoxicating muscular and organic sensations,
a large part of which I should interpret as consciousness of self. (3) In
many situations of mental effort. The strains that go to make up the feeling
of mental effort are in many cases identical with self -consciousness. They
are most prominent in this way in the feeling of resolve or determination,
especially in repeated resolve that cannot have any immediate motor
result. Another striking instance is in stage-fright, where in place of the
imaged speech consciousness is largely filled with strains and organic
sensations meaning self.]

Bra. When thinking of nearest and dearest relations and friends; but
not always. When thinking about what I ought to do in a given case;
sometimes, but not always. Sometimes when praised or blamed. Espe-
cially when alone after having left home with people sorry to see me leave,
etc.

Cf. It is likely to appear in one's social relations, in some emotional
states and religious experiences, rather than when one is absorbed in a
given task.

Em.. I have already answeried this question, under II.

Fi. I have already answered this question. When attention is delib-
erately turned upon the self, as in observations in laboratory. Under the
other circumstances mentioned.

Gf. The consciousness of self appears under unusual circumstances.
When I set myself the task of introspecting, or when I am conscious of
being alone, or when I feel myself under strict observation : these are some
of the circumstances under which self-consciousness appears.

The replies do not, by any means, stand upon the same
psychological level. They show clear differences of intro-
spective ability. They show, also, differences of attitude, of
training, of point of view. They show, I am afraid, different
degrees of interest in the subject; there are answers, of a
partial and tentative sort, which have not been supplemented
or corrected. Can any conclusions be drawn from such
material?

Question I. asks whether self -consciousness is persistent or
intermittent . I group the replies under the rubric of sex, and
also under that of introspective experience (m, f , for the senior
and m, /, for the junior group of observers) ; I add a q, in cases
in which the reply was qualified.

Total

(i) Persistent throughout the waking hfe

(2) Persistent during introspection

(3) Intermittent

I, iq

550 TITCHENER

Here ii out of 13 observers (7 men and 6 women) deny the
persistence of self-consciousness throughout the waking hfe,
and 9 out of 13 deny its persistence during introspective as
well as during everyday experience. The 1 1 include 5 seniors
and 6 juniors; the 9 include 4 seniors and 5 juniors. The 11
include 6 men and 5 women; the 9 include 6 men and 3 women.

Even the two observers who affirm the continuity of self-
consciousness qualify their answers: the testimony to inter-
mi ttence is therefore stronger than I have made it. And I do
not hesitate to draw the conclusion that self-consciousness is,
in many cases, an intermittent and even a rare experience. It
may, of course, be maintained, in spite of what I have said
above, that the method is altogether worthless; or it may be
objected that the results are due to 'laboratory atmosphere.'
But, at the worst, it is not likely that the text-book statements
of the persistence and continuity of self-consciousness rest
upon any better method; and the argument from suggestion,
in a matter like this, becomes a little ridiculous. Graduate
students are not simple sheep.

If this conclusion is accepted, it remains to account for the positive
replies of the four observers in the first and second horizontal lines of the
Table. It is possible that the four are mistaken. The two senior women
of column f had no opportunity to revise their answers; and another obser-
ver, as we have seen (p. 544), changes on revision from Yes to No. Con-
trariwise, the m of these two lines does not change. It is possible, again,
that the two groups of observers, the four and the nine, may have under-
stood the question differently, and are therefore talking of different things.
But it is not easy to make this possibility concrete, to use it as a ground of
explanation; it is at the best a possibility, and by no means a probability;
and the fact of change from Yes to No again tells against it. So I incline
to the hypothesis of individual difference. The tendency to conscious self-
hood is, I believe, one of those "tendencies which represent total directive
pressures laid upon the organism, more strongly upon some individuals
and more weakly upon others, but in some measure upon all ; and which are
realised or expressed on very various occasions, and with very varying
accompaniment of consciousness" (Text-book of Psychology, 19 10, 464,

544).

The persistence of self-consciousness need not — if our results are to be
trusted — betray itself in the intercourse of everyday life. Four observers,
two men and two women, were asked to name the man and the woman to
whom they would most confidently attribute such persistence. All four
mentioned the m, no one mentioned the f, of the first horizontal line of the
Table. Reference to the repUes of Etf and Dm will show that the self-
consciousness takes on very different forms in the two cases.

I had thought that the women might prove to be more persistently self-
conscious than the men. The question must, however, be left open, not
only because our observers are few, but, in particular, because the women of
column f had no opportunity to revise their answers.

Question II. asks for a description of the self -consciousness.
Under this heading, the following general results may be
noted, (i) There is no evidence of a special class of 'subject-
ive' processes (Lipps). (2) With one possible exception, all

THK CONSCIOUSNieSS OF SELF 551

the reports fall under the rubric of determination. We find
reference to an implicit self-consciousness in C's 'unified
experience,* in D's mention of *my ways of thinking and
acting,' and in statements {B, D, for example) of the variable
contents of the self-conscious experience. We find self-
consciousness explicit in E's 'large dark vagueness which
represents my own mind,' in ^'s 'translucent rays projected
from the chest,' — probably, indeed, in all the cases of visual
imagery, as well as in many organic complexes (A, C). For
the most part, however, no hard and fast line of distinction
can be drawn between the explicit and the implicit conscious-
nesses. (3) A possible instance of continuous and all-perva-
sive conscious selfhood is furnished by the observer D.

I do not think it wise to press the data further. I add only a rough list
of the constituents of the self-consciousness, in the order of frequency of
mention :

Organic complexes 12

Visual imagery lo

Affective processes 8 (implied in 4 other cases)

Kinaesthetic complexes 8 (probably, in other cases,

merged in organic)
Conscious attitudes 4

Verbal-auditory images 4

Cutaneous sensations 2

The attitudes are those of responsibility (F), recognition of ownership of
introspections (£), ownership of experience (D), and activity in back-
ground of consciousness (F).

Question III. asks for the circumstances under which self-
consciousness is likely to appear. Here the one outstanding
result is that the experience of self is preponderantly a social
matter. Of the 11 observers who replied to the question,
10 (A, B, C, D, ^, B, C, E, F, G) refer to some situation which
involves the ascription of selfhood by others, or implies per-
sonal relations to others.

It seems, then, that the 'material self and the 'spiritual self are, for
observers of our sort, subordinate to the 'social self;' that the realisation of
the self occurs, usually, under a consciously social determination. Here
of course, is nothing new. But it is reassuring, in view of the testimony
to intermittence, to find that the fact appears thus plainly.

Next in order comes the unusual or novel situation (A, B, C, E [with
qualification], G).

I conclude, therefore, that it is not permissible to define
psychology as "the science of the self as conscious."^ This
definition was, in fact, rejected by one and all of our thirteen
observers. 2 Self-consciousness appears, in many cases, as an

*M. W. Calkins, A First Book in Psychology, 1910, i.

*By twelve, for empirical reasons; by the thirteenth, for reasons that are
mainly theoretical. "No. For suppose that there were periods in the
consciousness of any individual which were without reference to self:

552 TITCHEN^R

intermittent mode of conscious experience. Like other con-
scious attitudes, it takes shape, explicitly or implicitly, under
determination. And so far as our results go, the determin-
ation is usually social in character.

then such periods of consciousness would not be subject-matter for psy-
chology. Whether such periods exist is a matter for psychology to investi-
gate ; it may not assume their absence beforehand. Or suppose that there
were phases of consciousness which in no measure had reference to self, — as
indeed there seem to be: then such phases would be barred from the study
of psychology."

ON MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING'

By Edmund Jacobson

CONTENTS

PAGB

§1. Introduction . . * 553

I2. The Perception of Letters 557

§3. The Understanding of Words 562

14. The Understanding of Sentences 569

15. In Reply to Criticism 594

§ I. Introduction.

We give, in the following pages, the results of experiments
on the perception of single letters, the understanding of words,
and the understanding of sentences. The experiments were
performed by what is known as Binet's method, or the Wurz-
burg method, or the method of examination: the stimulus,
written or printed, was laid before the observer, who upon
signal opened his eyes, fixated the paper before him, and after
performance of the assigned task gave a report of his experi-
ence. The observers were Miss L. M. Day (assistant in
psychology), Mr. W. S. Foster (assistant) and Dr. L. R.
Geissler (instructor in psychology) ; all three had had thorough
introspective training. In the experiments of §§ 2, 3, the
writer also served as observer.

The method of examination is, without question, merely
the first beginnings of an experimental method. Okabe
and Clarke, in work published from this laboratory, ^ have
proposed to supplement it by the method of confrontation.
We ourselves, at one point or another in the course of the
present experiments, introduced three novel features, (i)
In the experiments of §§ 2 and 4 the observer was instructed
to give his account of conscious events in their strict temporal
order. Spontaneous reference to this order is customarily
made, in most extended reports by the method of examina-

^From the psychological laboratory of Cornell University.

2This Journal, xxi., Oct. 1910 and xxii., April 191 1. Ogden curiously
regards the addition as worthless, because alterations were not suggested
{Psych. Bulletin, viii., 191 1, 194); it seems to us that confirmation is as
valuable as correction. Ogden's suggestion that the confrontation was
"quite a perfunctory affair" is both gratuitous and incorrect.

554 JACOBSON

tion, through such terms as then, after that, etc. We thought
it worth while specifically to give the temporal instruction :
partly in order to increase the fullness of the reports, partly
in order to attain as great an accuracy in the reproduction
of the experience as the circumstances of the experiments
permitted. As regards the latter point, we found that con-
siderable training was required before the observers indicated
the temporal position of every reported event; and we are
thus forced to the conclusion that the sequences and coin-
cidences noted by previous writers have a certain inadequacy.
As regards the former point, we found that the temporal
arrangement was of material aid in the correlation of 'pro-
cess' and 'meaning,' — phases of the reports which will be
explained under (2) below. The actual instruction was to
give as precise and minute an account as possible of every-
thing that occurred in consciousness, in temporal order, making
liberal use of such terms as next, then, simultaneous with,
and overlapping. When the report failed to specify the tem-
poral position of an event, a question was usually asked;
but the necessity of such questions diminishes with practice.
The experimenter, who took down the observer's dictation,
began a new paragraph whenever next, then, after that, or any
term definitely denoting succession was employed: so that
the events of a quoted paragraph are to be considered either
as simultaneous or as belonging to a single (though extended)
conscious present. But it should be noted that the break of
consciousness between paragraphs is relative only; neither
'process' nor 'meaning' terminates abruptly, in order directly
to give place to a successor ; and the observers were asked
expressly to declare when an event of one paragraph lasted
over into the next.

(2) The observer in these §§ 2 and 4 was also instructed
to place everything, except the direct description of conscious
processes, in parenthesis. Previous students of the thought-
processes have distinguished between description proper
{Beschreibung) and a mode of report that is variously named
Kundgabe or sprachlicher Ausdruck or the objective reference
involved in the stimulus-error. We do not here enter upon
the question whether these three terms cover precisely the
same material and designate precisely the same attitude on
the part of the observer; nor do we now identify our owti
reports of 'meaning' with any one of them; it is enough for the
present if intimation, linguistic expression, objective reference
and report of meaning be regarded as four species of the same
genus. What we desired was that attributive description
of conscious processes should be marked off, by the observers
themselves, from whatever else might enter into the reports;

ON MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING 555

and we accordingly required them to put direct description
of conscious processes outside of parentheses, and statements
concerning meanings, objects, stimuli and physiological oc-
currences inside. The procedure was justified by the results:
for though failure to specify now a meaning and now a pro-
cess was at first not infrequent, it grew less and less common
with practice, until the twofold report became characteristic
of the experiments. It is, of course, out of the question that
the observer should on every occasion specify the attri-
butes of every process and the details of every meaning:
where analysis is not imperative, e. g., it is sufificient to report
'perception of signal', 'sensations from eye-movement', or
'sensations from the stimulus'. But it is necessary that the
observer be trained to distinguish such references to meaning
or to the physiological source of his experiences or to the stim-
ulus from description of the concomitant conscious processes;
since the perception of a given object or of the same phy-
siological occurrence or of an identical stimulus may, under
different conditions, be accompanied by different conscious
processes, and what the latter are often needs to be investi-
gated. Moreover, the object of perception is not to be con-
fused with the presented stimulus ; if the experimenter desires to
know what the observer is perceiving, at a particular moment,
he must obtain special reports on the matter from the ob-
server; he cannot assume that the stimulus is perceived as
he himself perceives it. — By the use of parentheses we secured
in any given experiment a fuller description of processes,
where the observer had a tendency to report in meanings,
and a fuller statement of meanings, where the observer
tended to report solely in terms of processes.^

(3) In the experiments of § 3, and to a slight degree in
those of § 2, we availed ourselves of a special mode of repe-
tition. If the observer had failed adequately to analyse some
complex experience, or if we wished him to verify an analysis
already given, or to answer some question after the event, we
restored the original conditions of the observation and in-
structed the observer to 'get back the original complex'. We
found that it was often possible, in this way, to reinstate the
former experience, — so far, at any rate, as that the observer

^It should be said that, while F and J tended, after practice, to make
their reports of meanings as full and detailed as their reports of processes,
D and G (owing, as was later discovered, to a partial misunderstanding
of the instructions given) sometimes reported meanings with less complete-
ness. In these cases the experimenter usually had recourse to questions.

The marks of parenthesis were, as a rule, either entered by the observers
themselves upon the dictated report, or inserted by the experimenter with
the approval of the observer. The reports quoted in the present paper
have been submitted to their authors and approved.

556 JACOBSON

recognised the present complex as a revival of the old. Some-
times the experiment failed; and it speaks for the reliability
of the observers that they did not hesitate to report failures.
Sometimes specific differences were realised between the
second and the first experiences. Complete success, under
the limitations of the method, was usual with D, G and J;
less frequent with F.^

(i) The method of examination furnishes two kinds of report: the
'selective', in which the observer gives special attention to certain features
of his experience, and the 'complete', in which he seeks to reproduce the
experience as a whole. Since we were unable to say beforehand what was
relevant and what irrelevant to our problems, we asked only for the com-
plete account.

By putting questions to the observer, it is often possible to gain informa-
tion as to matters omitted from the report; and, what is more important,
the bringing of the observer's attention to these omissions leads to their
avoidance in future. Owing to the danger of undesirable suggestion, very
great care is needed in framing the questions; and a careful record of
question and answer must always be kept. Our object in the work of
§§2 and 4 was to drop them entirely, as soon as the reports became
spontaneously complete. During the stage of training, however, the
observers were frequently requested by the experimenter to supplement a
process-report by naming the meaning, or conversely to supplement a
meaning-report by an analysis of processes. After some practice, the re-
course to parentheses became familiar: though it should be added that no
observer was wholly consistent in their use, or entirely regular in paralleling
process and meaning.

(2) We cannot insist too strongly upon the necessity of repeated in-
struction; the task set is so difficult that even the most reliable and most
willing observers tend to omissions. A meaning may be stated, while the
corresponding process is in whole or part omitted: thus, an observer re-
ports "general notion of a discussion in that book about the psychology
of genetics," and a question is needed to bring out the fact that the 'general
notion' was carried in kinaesthetic and verbal terms. Or a process may be
described, while the corresponding meaning is in whole or part omitted:
thus, an observer reports "sensations of slight strain in chest, as breath
was held for a moment; sinking in abdomen; other sensations of touch
from clothes; other organic sensations not so clear in consciousness,"
without giving any indication of the meaning of the attitude. There is
often failure, even after practice, to report the time of an occturence, to
state fully the object of perception, to give the stages in the development
of a meaning, to rehearse the conscious processes present. The observer
must therefore be keyed up to his task by insistent repetition of the in-
struction.

(3) We do not here enter upon the question — which indeed is a ques-
tion rather for epistemology than for psychology — how it is possible to
give two parallel accoimts, in terms of process and in terms of meaning, of

^This method of repetition was introduced in order that we might deter-
mine whether the method of examination satisJSed Wundt's requirement of
"Wiederholung bei gleichem beobachteten Inhalt" (Psych. Studien, iii.,
1907, 332 f.). The results are encouraging; though we offer them only as
a first contribution to the settlement of the question.

It is perhaps needless to add that recognition is not conditioned upon
possibility of description; we often recognise, quite definitely, something
that we are entirely unable to describe.

ON MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING 557

one and the same total experience. The possibiUty has been taken for
granted by previous investigators (Biihler, Diirr, von Aster), and we sim-
ply follow in their footsteps. It should, however, be said expressly that
the shift of attitude, from process to meaning or conversely, presented —
after preliminary training — no insuperable difficulty to the observer. If
a process or a meaning stood alone in the report, the failure was due to in-
advertence. All the observers found that duplicate accounts were possible,
that processes could be summed up in a meaning, and that meanings could
be paralleled by processes. We may add that the word 'process' was
chosen, not as the equivalent by definition of sensations, images and
feelings, but in order to leave room for any other conscious form (e. g., an
imageless thought) that might be discovered.

(4) We append a full report on the experience of understanding a
sentence. The observer was instructed to open his eyes upon signal, to
look at the paper, to get the meaning of the sentence written upon it, and
then to close his eyes and dictate his report. The notes which follow the
quotation call attention to the details of the method.

Observer F. Stimulus sentence: She came in secretly. Time: 1.25 sec.
"Purple (from written words) ^ clear. White (from paper) ^ and black
(from cardboard)^ in background, and these were [comparatively ]2 unclear.
Simultaneous with the visual clearness, kinaesthetic-auditory images (cor-
responding to the words) ; weak intensity, more as if whispered than as if
said in ordinary voice; i. e., lacked deeper tones; and slightly faster than
I should ordinarily say them. (The words did not come singly, but the
sentence as a whole made a single impression on me; e. g., the period
at the end was a part of the total impression. [All this wasl^ Perception of
sentence as visual and kinaesthetic-auditory impression.)'

"Then vague visual and kinaesthetic image (of Miss X. coming in a
stealthy position, on tip-toe with legs bent, through the door into the
Audition Room from the Haptics Room)S i. e., blue visual image (upper
left part of skirt)* and very vague, featureless image, flesh-colored (of
left side of face).'* The image (was projected straight ahead of me, to the
position in which the door actually is).^ Kinaesthetic images in own right
upper leg^ (which was directly opposite in position to the image, as if my
own leg was bent); also kinaesthetic images or sensations in muscles,
probably intercostals, of right side (such as I get when standing and bend-
ing right leg). (The sentence meant: Miss X. came in over there, through
the door, secretly.)^

"In the fore-period (I told myself: Get the meaning, and set myself
muscularly to work hard)."^
Notes. —

^Reference to stimulus.

^Insertions by the experimenter, for the sake of clearness.

^Statement of object of perception: a sentence which, as yet, was
meaningless.

^Statement of object of image.

^O fails to say what processes carried this projection.

®By agreement, the reference of a process to the body was not included
in parentheses.

'Completion of understanding ; meaning of sentence has been specialised.

*The contents of the fore-period were here not under analysis.

§ 2. The Perception of Letters

Our problem, in this group of experiments, was to determine
what precisely occurs in consciousness when there is 'percep-
tion' of a single letter. The method has been described.

Journal— 6

558 JACOBSON

The stimulus was a letter written in long-hand ; the time of
exposure was left to the decision of the observer, the instruc-
tion being that he should close his eyes as soon as he had
experienced as much as he could report with accuracy and
completeness. Usually, the time of observation was i to 3
sec.

The processes involved in perception. — For the most part,
the visual sensations aroused by the stimulus are not sufiScient,
of themselves, to constitute a perception of the particular
letter; some additional process or processes must supervene.
Since the office of these additional processes is to designate
the object of perception, we shall call them, in brief, 'designa-
tory processes*. They generally consist of kinaesthetic or
auditory sensations or images as of pronouncing or hearing
the letter, or of a combination of the two. The following
Table summarises the results.

Total number

Associative processes

Observer

of perceptions

D. P. reported

reported without

of letter

perception

(i) If the D. P. are absent, there is usually no perception of the letter.
Two instances are appended.

Observer D. Stimulus Y. — . . . Then sensations in throat (of repeated
contraction and relaxation) accompanied by faint auditory images (of the
sound). In the course of this, the perception (of Y) faded away, and
attention during this time was on the kinaesthetic sensations and on the
idea (that I must not utter the word).

Then (was aware that eyes, which had not been carefully fixating, were
now doing it). Strain sensations in muscles around sides of eyes.

Then sensations (of eye-movement) and awareness (that I was follow-
ing the Y around; and while doing this it was not Y for me hut just a line
gure).

Observer F. Stimulus Z. — When first opened eyes, the black white and
grayish sensations became clear (the stimuli being the paper, ink, letter
and black background). The extent of the visual field was [0 indicates a
rough circular outline on the table]. This state was of short duration.
(All this was perception of [some] letter on white paper on black ground.)

Later came the auditory image Z and with it the perception (of Z).
[All that was at first perceived, as the observer specified on question, was
letter in general.] *

(2) In order to test the above result, the observer was sometimes in-
structed (oftenest in the case of J) to wait till a time arrived when there
were present in consciousness no kinaesthetic or auditory images or sensa-
tions as of uttering or hearing the letter, and to begin the report from that
time. Two instances may be given.

^In two cases from J, in which the kinaesthetic-auditory image as of
utterance of the letter was probably or certainly lacking, the D. P. were
given in the form of images of incipient right-hand movements, as for the
writing of the letter. These cases are not included in the Table. On the
other hand, the Table contains 7 'repetition' experiments, 4 from F and 3
from J: cf. (5) below.

ON MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING 559

Observer G. Letter G. — Strong strain sensations (from fixation of
thickest part of the letter), with great clearness of blue localised to the
upper right half, and with special clearness of its extent and form. Much
less clear were the other blues of certain extent and form interrupted here
and there by white (as if the letter was incomplete, or as if there were
breaks in the line.) These other blues were blurred in outline and indefinite
in shape and direction They were simply there, (without seeming to be-
long together, — which is now carried into this previous experience) ; [The
observer means that the incoherence was present in the original experience,
but that he was not aware of it as such ; he now notices it, as he frames his
report.] (this I call blank empty staring at the stimulus) ; accompanied
intermittently by temperature and pressm-e and auditory sensations (of
expiration) alternately with warm and pressure sensations (of tip of tongue
against upper teeth) and by vague white somewhere surrounding the blues.
These blues were constant. This whole experience is not a perception
( of the letter G ), but merely a conglomeration or concurrence of certain
sensations. No conscious tendency was present to articulate.

Observer J. Letter W. — There were the black and white sensations,
but I can scarcely say that at any time there was perception (of any figure
or indeed of anything at all), despite the fact that the visual sensations were
clear and intense. The best I can say is, that these visual sensations,
along with a vague complex of background processes — (those resulting
from position of body, eyes, and possibly also from gastro-intestinal
organs) — made up a general attitude of staring, which, however, involved
no perception at the time, (though it would be correct afterwards to say I
perceive, from memory, that there was a figure of such and such a type). —

From these and similar reports it would follow that sensations may
appear in consciousness as such, without necessarily forming part of a
particular perception.

(3) It may not be superfluous to state that the D. P. appear in other
perceptions than those of letters. Here are three instances :

Observer G. Letter Y. — ^Visual perception, clear (of first part of
letter), with slight kincBsthetic sensations (of fixating that part) and other
slight visual sensations (of rest of white field).

Observer J. Letter B. — [Next] a period (when the eye changingly
rested on certain parts of the upper strokes of the letter) and there was
simultaneous kincesthetic-auditory verbal imagery 'thin' (meaning the lines
were thin, and thus constituting a perception that they were so). This
perception may have had other components, but certainly those men-
tioned were the only prominent ones.

Observer F. Letter Z. — Then attention (caught by pendulum swinging) .
That is, sensations (from pendulum bob seen in indirect vision) were clear,
and there were kincBsthetic images in neck (as if to swing head with the bob).

A rivalry of perceptions from the same stimulus may show itself in al-
ternation of the D. P. An illustration follows:

Observer J. Letter C. — There was a fluctuation, a struggle of perceptions
in successive order. Predominant was a perception (of an apple. Visual
fixation was on left side of base of stem of apple). There is no visual
image (of an apple), but verbal-motor incipient utterance 'apple' occurred.
(When the letter C was perceived, the visual fixation was not as just de-
scribed), and there was no verbal image 'apple'. At times during the per-
ception (of C there was incipient motor innervation of the index finger of
the right hand to follow the curve of C; at times also to continue the
movement in the form of an .4 ) ; and simultaneous with this was a visual
image with very faint, hazy and shadowy outlines. I do not reniember
whether verbal images were or were not present simultaneously with the
perception (of the letter).
I (4) Sometimes the observer fails to report the presence of D. P., and

! a question is needed to bri&g them to light. Thus in one case the observer

560 JACOB SON

reports 'attention attracted to the horizontal line,' and only in reply to
question by the experimenter is it added that there were simultaneous
kinaesthetic sensations from eye-movement, — though these obviously
played the part of D. P. in the perception.^

We have said that, if the D. P. are absent, there is 'usually' no percep-
tion of the letter. The rule has possible exceptions. Especially during
the earlier observations, J was often in doubt whether there was a per-
ception of the letter at times when the contents of consciousness were pre-
dominantly visual. Thus, with stimulus G, he reports "a period during
which the visual sensations alone were prominent, with simultaneous
pain and pressure sensations about eyelids and probably in other muscles
of eyes. During this period there was no well-defined well-developed per-
ception of G; at most there was a hazy and ill-defined perception; but I
cannot say with surety whether there was this or none at all."

(5) The Table mentions five cases in which no perception occurs,
notwithstanding the presence of associated processes. In three of these,
the first, third, and fifth of those quoted below, this failure seems to be
due to the absence of clear visual sensations from the stimulus; the fourth
may have a like cause, since G, in mentioning vague visual sensations in
the fifth, says that perhaps the fourth case was similar; but for the second
case we have no explanation farther than that suggested in the report it-
self.

Observer D. Letter B. — Then sensations in larynx, repeatedly inrhythm.
At the same time there was no visual perception (of letter B), — only
vague indistinct sensations {of blackness and whiteness), of long duration.

Observer J. Letter M. Time, 20 sec. Instruction: Repeat to get
back the visual sensations as they occur when perception of M is absent.
[A previous regular report, as well as repetitions of this occurrence with the
letter, had been made.] — I am unable to report according to temporal order
this time. (The eyes kept running over the stimulus and there was con-
tinual tendency periodically to utter M.) At most of these times there
was perception (of M), but there were other times when this imaginal
utterance was present simultaneously with visual sensations from the stimu-
lus, yet no visual perception (of M). This was succeeded by a period in
which, with the same kind of imaginal utterance, there was again visual
perception (of M). It was apparent that there was some difference in the
visual sensations or in the concomitant kinaesthesis, i. e. images (of eye-
movement or head-movement). But the difference was delicate and
hard qualitatively to describe.

Observer J. Same letter. Instruction: Repeat and imaginally utter
Jlf periodically. Time, 3 sec. — (The periodic utterance occurred.) lam
not sure but that the visual sensations were attentionally clearer between
utterances than at the points of utterance. But it was apparent that the
strong perception (of M) that usually attends such utterance was absent.

Observer G. Letter Y. — .... Next clear verbal kinaesthetic-auditory
complex (whispering Y) with faint kinaesthetic sensations (from eye-move-
ment over the whole letter successively in the order of writing it). (All
of this is perception of the letter.)

(Next repeated whispering) with kinaesthetic sensations (from eyes
moving backwards over whole letter) ; same kinaesthetic-tactual-tempera-
ture [complex] (from exhaled breath) vaguely present. (This repetition
is not a perception, — but merely a concurrence of these mental processes.
I am unable to say what exactly is the difference in consciousness [between

iThe stimulus in this case was a geometrical figure. With the letters,
and indeed with any form of frequently recurring stimulus, such cases be-
come, in our experience, rare. It should, however, be added that the
D. P. are by no means always obvious; sometimes both skill and practice
are required for their detection.

ON MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING 56 1

the perception and non-perception as they occurred above]. Am doubtful
as to whether there was any conscious difference, unless the first repetition
was accompanied by a vague, feeling of familiarity — slightly pleasant,
while the later repetitions were indifferent, and, so to say, automatically
continued.)

Observer G. Same letter. Instruction: Repeat the mental situation
[as above]. — .... Next (whispering) complex becomes still less clear.
Vague visual sensations, black and white, without any connection between
them in consciousness, — no consciousness of their form or extent. Drowsy
sensations practically indifferent. (All this is not perception of Y.) This
description of the non-perception of Y differs from the original non-percep-
tion [i. e. that described in G's report above] in point of the drowsy sensa-
tions and the vague visual sensations, — both of which may have been
previously present, but which were not reported.

Perception as meaning. — We turn now to the 'meanings' that
appear parenthesized in the reports of our observers. The
main point to note is that the precise statement of meanings is
by no means easy. Just as processes flit by on the passing
instant, so do meanings change and elude the observer; and
the skill in expression of meaning acquired in daily life is
comparatively rough and superficial. This fact may be illus-
trated in two ways.

First, it is often not enough to record simply that 'the per-
ception of the letter' occurred ; what is perceived is frequently
— perhaps always — something more complex. We gave to
F the special instruction that he should state, precisely, what
he perceived; and the result justified the specialisation of
method. For example :

Letter Z. — (As soon as I opened eyes) perception {of Z placed on white
paper in a particular direction from left upper corner of paper). This was
clear visual sensations (from black Z and white paper), also sensations
(from upper left-hand comer of paper). The attribute of extent [form
and position] of this corner and the visual sensations (from Z) were
clearer than the sensations (from the white paper), v/hich in turn were
perhaps clearer than those (from the black background). Simulta-
neous or immediately after and forming a part of this perception, abbre-
viated auditory image Z. ( (I notice now, in reporting, that this image was
purely sibilant.)) There were also vague kinaesthetic images or sensations
in throat and lips, those in lips being the more noticeable.

Letter D. — (Soon as opened eyes) gray and white clear (from paper and
ink). Simultaneous auditory image D. These visual sensations were
clear only for a brief time, about one- tenth of the whole period. The
auditory image was of higher pitch and less intensity than it would be
from spoken D. Its other attributes, clearness and duration, were the
same as if I had uttered D. (There was perception of D on white paper.)

Secondly, the stimulus frequently arouses other perceptions
than those of the particular letter, and the object of these
perceptions needs careful statement. Examples may be
found in reports already quoted; we add one further instance:

Observer D. Letter A. — Kinaesthetic sensations retreat to margin of
consciousness; become non-focal, non-clear; simultaneous visual percep-
tion {of a dark line of the shape A on a white ground; it was not perception of

562 JACOBSON

A). Sensations of eye-movement, plus an awareness (of the same along
the figure, thus) [observer indicates the direction, which is that taken by
the pen in writing the letter], plus kinaesthetic sensations especially in the
neck, but not definitely localised and not distinct.

Summary. — The perception of a. particular letter usually
depends upon the arousal of contextual associates, which we
have termed 'designatory processes'. The direct visual
apprehension of the stimulus, i. e. the presence merely of
ordered visual sensations, does not suffice as a rule, under
the conditions of our experiments, for the perception of the
letter.

These designatory processes may characterise other per-
ceptions, as well as the perception of a letter.

From knowledge of the stimulus, the experimenter cannot
determine the nature of the perception at a given instant;
a report of the precise object of perception must be obtained
from the observer.

Variation of the object of perception, with a given stimulus,
is accompanied — again, under the conditions of our ex-
periments— by variation of the concomitant or underlying
'processes' ; this variation may usually be traced both in the
designatory processes and in the processes which subserve
accommodation of attention.

§ 3. Th^ Meaning of Words

The experiments now to be reported were the first made in
the present investigation; the method was tentative, and the
observers were comparatively unpractised for the problem
in hand. The usual method of procedure was as follows:
A written word was laid before the observer for a period of
I min. He was instructed to fixate the word, to utter it with
quick repetition, and to get its meaning. The concluding
10 sec. were marked off by signals; and the observer's task
was to report what occurred in consciousness during this
particular interval.

Our aim in adopting this method was to secure frequent appearances
and disappearances of the verbal meaning, and so to provide repeated
opportunities for its analysis. The method was fairly successful, though
the period of 10 sec. proved to be too long for a complete report; thie ex-
perimenter was therefore obliged in many cases to have recourse to ques-
tions— made as little suggestive as possible — in order to secure omitted in-
formation and, less frequently, in order to verify the absence of an unreported
item.

The special form of the method which involved repetition has been de-
scribed above, p. 555. Another variation was sometimes introduced, by
which a feature of the original report was eliminated, and the consequence
of this elimination noted. Thus, with the word silently G reports the pres-
ence of kinaesthetic- verbal images 'still' and 'silently means ruhig'; these
images carry the meaning of the stimulus- word. He is thereupon in-

ON MEANING AND UNDEJRSTANDING 563

structed to fixate the word and to articulate, as before, but not to permit
the rise of such verbal associations. The report of the changed situation
reads: 'No meaning to the word. Just sounds and just sensations from
articulation.'

The repetition and prolonged fixation of the stimulus-word had the
effect, as we expected, of intermittently destroying associations. But
they led also, in some cases, to the disintegration of the perception itself.
Special parts of the word might stand out and be perceived in place of the
whole. Thus, a kinaesthetic or auditory or combined image of one of the
letters arises, accompanied by visual fixation of that letter, and perhaps
leaving the rest of the word visually (peripherally) obscure: then there is
perception of the single letter rather than of the whole word, despite
the fact that the word is being uttered. Our records suggest, though they
do not prove, that so long as there are visual sensations from the whole
of the word, with simultaneous enunciation of it, the perception remains.
—Cf. E. Severance and M. F. Washburn, this Journal, xviii., 1907, 182 ff.

No definition of 'meaning* was furnished by the experi-
menter. F at first showed occasional uncertainty as to what
constituted meaning; and D for some time showed occasional
doubt and inconsistency. Eventually, however, the reports
of all four observers became practically uniform. It is need-
less to say that no observer was informed of the results ob-
tained from the others, and that all were cautioned not to
discuss the experiments outside of the laboratory. Illustra-
tions of what were called 'meanings' follow.

Observer D, Stimulus bloody. [The word has been articulated and
fixated for the previous 50 sec, and these activities are continued during the
final 10 sec] After the signal I said to myself, Must get meaning again;
and then said. Must the blood be running? — accompanied by a visual
image of an animal of indefinite shape with a flowing wound : Or may it
be dry? — now with a visual image of same animal, but I was looking at
the edges of the wound where there was coagulation. Visual image of some
animal on table, and of Mr. X saying: So-and-so is fond of seeing blood
run. Then lost meaning.

Observer D. Stimulus secretly. [Conditions as above.] Just after
the signal I tried voluntarily to get back to what I had before, when I had
the bodily attitude of hiding or concealing. [Later] a visual image of a
girl whispering to me disappeared suddenly, and I was left just saying the
word.

[In order to give opportunity for the analysis of this imaginal bodily
attitude two repetitions (p. 555) were made. Both were successful; in
the first repetition the attitude was declared more distinct than in the ori-
ginal experience. The reports, supplemented by questions, brought out
the fact that the attitude was wholly kinaesthetic; the observer was crouch-
ing, and concealing an object in front of her with body and hands; she
was aware of people behind her, who, however, were not given in visual
images, but were implied by the nature of the attitude.]

Observer F. Stimulus face. [Conditions as above.] When signal
came was saying to myself: Wonder whether he wants me to get a noun or
a verb. Then pulled myself together [observer indicates retractive move-
ment of arms and inward movement of chest, with forward tension of
shoulders and head leaning forward]. Now with attention to sound of
voice it was as if I were telling myself to face something. All strains
seemed to drag me to the front, and I said: Verb, — ^with accompanying
auditory image. Then vague visual image of experimenter's face, and

564 JACOBSON

then of my own. . . , [The attitude here carried the verbal meaning, the
visual images the substantive meaning.]

Observer F. Stimulus to. [Conditions as above.] Visual image of a
clothed right arm reaching out to the storm-door at the front of this build-
ing. While this image lasted, attention was on sound of voice; and then
the arm reached to the door, but did not open it. This recurred once or
twice, except that attention was no longer on the voice. Then I thought
I ought to get some other meaning. Then verbal-auditory image to him,
with kinaesthetic image of moving left hand, which was held forward, from
left to right. [During the entire period the observer had nodded his head
vigorously with each enunciation; and questions bring out the fact that
this gesture means for him the instruction: Get that meaning!]

Observer G. Stimulus to. [Conditions as above. Two meanings are
given below; the rest of the report, containing two other meanings, is
omitted.] Strong kinaesthetic tendency to move to right in the direction
of the end-stroke of the letter o. The to meant a direction, a going some-
where, similar to that given by a guide-post, and there was a sense of being
at a loss. . . . Then the numerical meaning, in the form of putting two fingers
on the table.

[Instruction: Repeat, and get back the first meaning. — I do not know
whether it came as completely as before. There was a tendency to move
eyes and body to the right, and to pronounce the word briefly as if saying :
To — some place. There was no more of the Bewusstheit of direction than
this. There was strong fixation of the last part of the word.]

Observer G. Stimulus cutting. [Conditions as above.] Meaning
present as a faint visual image of a knife-blade and a kinaesthetic tendency
to press it down. [Where was that tendency?] In the first three fingers
of right hand ; it was accompanied by movement of eyes to the place on the
right.

Observer J. Stimulus botany. [Conditions as above.] . . . Remembrance
that must concentrate on meaning. [Not analysed.] Then visual image
of green plants and a recently seen hot-house. This disappeared, leaving
only the sounds from enunciation. Later an attempt again to follow the
instructions [not analysed] was followed by the motor expression 'study
of plants' and still later by 'study of plants and flowers,' and these phrases
were frequently repeated, notwithstanding the simultaneous enunciation
of 'botany'.

The meaning of the stimulus- words were thus carried by vis-
ual, auditory and kinaesthetic processes; or, to speak more
precisely, the meanings which these processes bore were the
meanings of the stimulus-words, in so far as the latter were
consciously realised. If we may use the term 'association' in
the widest sense, to denote peripheral-kina^sthetic as well as
imaginal processes, we may say that the meanings were given
in the shape of associations to the words. But the associa-
tions to a given word do not remain constant : thus, the visual
image of plants and a hot-house, associated to the word botany,
gives way a moment later to the verbal-motor 'study of
plants'. It seems to follow that the meanings of the words,
so far as they are conscious, vary as the associations vary. The
logical meaning of a word, as expressed in a formal definition,
does not change ; but what we are studying is not this perfect
logical meaning, but rather the phases of meaning or the part-

ON MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING 565

meanings carried by certain transient processes; and as thus
understood the meaning must be said to vary.

If the associations are absent, meaning is also reported as
lacking. Here are some examples :

Observer G. Stimulus loud. — The first impression was of an Aufgabe
given me by the word, and I started to speak loudly. After several repeti-
tions this Aufgabe came again, but then gradually became unconscious, and
there was mere mechanical pronunciation. Then verbal image laut, lead-
ing to stronger accent on the d during enunciation. With a new inhalation
the same Aufgabe returned, and there was greater muscular effort in articu-
lation for the next few pronunciations.

[Instruction: Repeat, without getting this Aufgabe association or other
similar ones; but try to get what you can of the meaning, and then
report. — Practically nothing under these conditions besides the visual
and kinaesthetic perceptions, the latter being especially clear. The word
has an empty look; I don't know how to describe it.]

For another like case with G., see pp. 562 f.

Observer D. Stimulus kill. — The first signal suppressed a coming visual
image of an object floating on the water, a clipping from a newspaper, etc.
[Then] visual image of the physiological laboratory and of a pithed frog,
with appropriate tactual and organic sensations. Visual image of the
operating room and of an animal I had killed through over-etherization.
Then [other similar images].

[Instruction: Repeat, and get none of these associations, and then de-
scribe.— I got a few motor-auditory verbal images, — 'to murder', and
'to destroy life'. There were vague sensations from bodily position, and
a strain to get something else besides these images. [What?] Tension in
my head, and a slight tendency to scowl.

Instruction: Repeat, and do not get these verbal images. — The word
is quite lifeless and meaningless. [The observer adds incidentally that
this meaninglessness had its organic side — weak breathing, a let-go feel-
ing, a depression.] ]

Observer J, Stimulus piano. — . . . Then the writing was no longer in
consciousness as a word, but rather as a collection of curved lines.

[Instruction: Repeat, to see what is in consciousness when only these
lines are present. — I fixated one letter after another, each time pronounc-
ing the whole word. The other letters were all in consciousness, but not
so clear; nevertheless the word was present as 'a whole. But at times,
when fixation was on the a or the n, there occurred slight optical divergence,
and the whole word became slightly [peripherally] unclear. This was con-
tinued until there was no consciousness of any of the individual letters
seen as such, but only a consciousness of wavy blue lines with a tendency
to follow them with the eyes and with the right hand from left to right and
back again. But in this the lower parts of the o and a were omitted.
[Apparently here also there are no associations to the word as such, and
it is meaningless.] ]

We did not find a characteristic variation of associations
with the different parts of speech. Those which stood for
the meanings of prepositions, e. g., were not invariably motor
tensions or impulses.^ On the whole, kinaesthesis was more
prominent with prepositions than with nouns like 'piano' and
'dog'; but visual and auditory processes were also involved
in the meanings. Here are instances of various kinds:

^Cf. B. H. Rowland: The Psychological Experiences connected with the
Different Parts of Speech, Psych. Rev. Mon. Suppl. 32, 1907, 25.

566 JACOBSON

With F, stimulus to, the report cited on p. 564 shows that the preposi-
tional meaning is at first carried purely in visual and auditory terms.
Again, with stimulus for, a report runs: Auditory 'for me', with visual
image of me written on the paper. Slight tendency to lean forward;
rather pleasant. Auditory image: What for? with accent on the for. The
for became very clear.

Again, vision may be mixed with kinaesthesis. Observer D. Stimulus
upon. — In the fore-period I had visual-kinaesthetic images of myself
standing on a pile of wood. And I had various objects given more kinaes-
thetically than visually, — usually adjusting body for looking from one to
another.

Similarly, the meaning of adverbs may be given visually, auditorily
or kinaesthetically. Observer F. Stimulus heavily. — Visual image of gray
cube of iron several times falling on floor of the Audition Room. An im-
clear auditory image of the noise. Strains in ear-drum. Organic sensa-
tions in abdomen such as are involved in hearing a weight dropped, and
such images as one would get from a jar of the building. Whole experi-
ence repeated a number of times, not quite as fast as I uttered the word.
Tendency to nod head sjmchronously with utterance: meant 'heavily'.

It would be tedious to illustrate this point with reference
to adjectives, substantives and verbs; let it suffice to say that
with these as with the other parts of speech, as classes, there
appeared no characteristic differentice of associations.^ —

There were associations reported which were not called
'meanings'. Thus, G reports with stimulus cunning:

Certain verbal processes which I should call meanings, and certain
others which I should not. Belonging to the last class was 'Cunningham, '
formed by adding 'ham' to what was being said aloud. Then visual
image of a ham. Then verbal question: What is cunning? followed by
verbal image wise. Verbal question: What else? then vague complex of
the difficulty I should have in writing a definition of cunning. I cannot
analyse this, but it included frowning and strains in neck.

What, now, is the difference between these two kinds of
associates, — those that carry the meaning of the stimulus-
word and those that do not? The question may be answered
from two points of view. If we regard the associates as 'pro-
cesses', in the sense of § 2, then we must reply that the mean-
ing-associates proceed from the instruction given, while the
not- meaning-associates are external to the instruction; the
former indicate the activity of a particular determining ten-
dency, the latter indicate the activity of reproductive ten-
dencies not connected with this determination. If, on the
other hand, we regard the associates as themselves 'mean-
ings', again in the sense of § 2, then we must reply that the
associates which carry the meaning of the stimulus- word are,
as independent part-meanings, logically relevant to the total
word-meaning, while the associates which do not carry the
meaning of the word are as independent part-meanings

^Thus, we found nothing that could warrant such a generalisation as
Rowland makes in the case of adverbs: op. cit., 27 ff.

ON MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING 567

logically irrelevant to the total word-meaning. Both of these
replies, however, require qualifying comment. First, the
observer is not (at least, in our experiments was not) aware
of any introspective difference between the processes associated
under the instruction, and the external associates, — between
the processes which carried the word-meaning and the pro-
cesses which were outside of that meaning. There is no
modal or qualitative difference; there is no special 'feel'
of 'belonging' to the instruction, or to the situation in-
duced by it^; simply, the observer is able, on question, to
point to certain associated processes as carrying the mean-
ing of the word and to certain other processes as not involved
in the word-meaning. Secondly, the independent part-mean-
ings borne by the associates are not necessarily their obvious
or face-meanings ; the test of logical relevancy or irrelevancy
cannot, any more than the test of procession from the instruc-
tion, be applied by the experimenter on behalf of the observer;
some ingrained habit of the observer in regard to reproductive
tendency, or the disposition into which he is brought by the
present situation, may give all manner of warps and twists to
the part-meanings carried by the associates as such; con-
stituent processes, which appeal to the experimenter as vehicles
of a definite part-meaning, may prove to be extrinsic to mean-
ing, may (in popular phrase) be 'ignored' by the observer;
and constituent processes which appeal to the experimenter
as casual may turn out to be, for the part-meaning, essential.
In every case, then, we are forced back upon the distinctions
drawn by the observer; there is no criterion, whether psy-
chological or logical, which can be applied by the experimenter
in default of the observer's specific statement.

If we seek to analyse the instance given above (Observer G, Stimulus
cunning), we reach the following general result. First, to take the asso-
ciates as processes : we have the utterance of cunning arousing, by mechan-
ical sound-association outside of the instruction, the familiar name Cun-
ningham (the name of a friend and colleague) ; and we have then the added
member -ham (the observer himself notes the 'addition' of this member)
arousing, still outside of the instruction, the image of a ham. Thereupon
the observer harks back to his instruction: and his return is effected,
typically, in verbal imagery. 'What is cunning?' he asks, in internal
speech, and the verbal image wise appears, issuing from the instruction
'Get the meaning.' The processes Cunningham and ham do not aid in
carrying the meaning of the stimulus- word; the process wise does so aid.

Secondly, to take the associates as meanings: Cunningham a.nd ham
have their own independent meanings, irrelevant to the meaning of the
stimulus-word cunning; they form separate constellations, outside of the

^It should be said that the observers were not specially questioned upon
this point. As the reports stand, however, there is no indication of
any 'feeling' of direction or of guidance or of any regional consciousness.
The instruction itself was carried in the usual and typical ways; we do not
think it necessary to give illustrations.

568 JACOBSON

instruction. Wise, on the contrary, has a fringe of meaning of its own,
which is logically relevant to the meaning of cunning.

We have chosen this instance for analysis, because it is unusually simple;
because in it the experimenter can, to some extent, put himself in the ob-
server's place, and see the 'reason ' for the admission of some associates to
the rank of vehicles of word-meaning, and for the rejection of others. But
the simplicity of the instance is quite unusual; and, for that matter, we
have no doubt that our analysis, undertaken after the event and on general
psychological principles only, is far from complete.

Although the observer was able, v^ithout hesitation, to make
the distinction between meaning-associates and associates
that had no share in the meaning of the stimulus-word, the
relation of the meaning-associates to the word-perception was
never reported as a specific and characteristic conscious
reference. Special questions were therefore asked, in order
to determine whether such a specific reference came to con-
sciousness.

Observer G. Stimulus cutting. [Question, following report on p. 564:
What was the connection in consciousness?] Simply simultaneity. There
was no apperception of their belonging together ; in fact they did not occur
at the same place, as the kinaesthetic motor tendency was in the right hand
and the faint visual image was here [indicating a certain place on the
table toward which the eye moved and where the imaged hand had not been].
[Was there any conscious connection between the visual image and the
word, i. e., the sound and sight of it?] No.

Observer G. Stimulus Roosevelt. . . . Vague visual image, a circle with
three lines in it. [What connection had the circle with Roosevelt?] That
is the visual image I have from caricatures of Roosevelt, the circle meaning
his head, the lines his teeth, [What connection was there consciously
between the circle and Roosevelt?] I don't know what you mean by
connection; the only connection I see is that they came simultaneously or
successively.

Observer D. Stimulus face. The observer reports visual image of a
mask and slight eye and head movements as if to look at it. [What was
the conscious relation of that mask to the visual-auditory-kinsesthetic
impressions from the word?] It did not have any; I did not consciously
refer it to what I was seeing at all.

Observer J. Stimulus was a proper name, and verbal imagery 'the ex-
perimental psychologist' had been reported. Observer adds: I cannot
answer the question whether there was any conscious connection between
the sensations from enunciation and this verbal image. The question
seems strange.

[Instruction was given to repeat.] The images came as before, but
more vaguely. ... I found a certain conscious spatial relationship, namely,
the visual image appeared close to the word seen; but I was not able to
ascertain whether there were other conscious relationships.

We are thus led to the conclusion, indicated in a previous
paragraph, that the conscious 'meanings' brought out in these
experiments are not the perfect and static logical meanings of
definition, but rather partial meanings, particular exemplifi-
cations, or what not, touched off under the given instruction
by the habit or the momentary disposition of the observer.
Logically, the representation of meaning is inadequate; psy-

ON MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING 569

chologicaliy, it is adequate to the demands of the occasion.
We may add that, especially at the beginning of the work,
the observers often showed a tendency to verbalise a defini-
tion of the stimulus-word, and thus to meet the situation with
logical as well as with psychological adequacy.^

§ 4. The Understanding of Sentences

In this part of our study, the stimuli were simple sentences,
type-written. These were laid before the observer, who was
instructed to open his eyes upon a signal; to read and under-
stand the sentence before him; and then to close his eyes and
recount his experience.

We shall outline the results from each one of the observers.

Observer D. Stimulus Her dress was white. Time 2.5 sec. — (After the
ready signal) sensations of kinaesthesis and strain in head and neck region.
Simultaneous awareness (of the Aufgabe, and determination to get full
meaning); a special set of strain and other organic sensations belongs to
this.

(Then signal Now, and opened eyes.) Kor a moment dazed feeling and
blurry sensations (from incomplete fixation) of light on dark.

Then a kinaesthetic dart or snap in head and (sentence) was visually
clear. [Later question: Describe this dart or snap. 'In top of head and
around eyes'. In scalp? 'No; inside head'.]

Then vague kinaesthetic sensations in throat and indefinite auditory
images (accompanied by automatic reading of sentence).

Then mixed-up feeling, unpleasant; sensations of nausea and (of
inhibited breathing), (all this meaning: I don't know what I am to do).
The whole field of vision was obscure.

Then (rapid eye-movement); quite definite kinaesthetic sensations,
but hard to describe. Mixed-up feeling continues.

Then visual image (of myself in a particular white dress). Image was
very small and very indistinct, and the kinaesthetic accompaniments were
more prominent than the visual. (Definitely localised to the left.)

Then feeling of doubt ; (again rapid eye-movement) ; muddle of organic
sensations and unpleasantness. (Signifying: Is this the meaning?)

Then feeling of relief; (general relaxation); totally different set of or-
ganic sensations from above. Pleasant. Kinaesthetic sensations in throat
(meant assurance that I had the meaning).

This report is typical, in so far that D always records the
automatic reading before she gets the meaning of the sentence.
It is typical of about one-half of her reports, in that it shows
her doubt whether she shall identify the associated ideas,
aroused by the stimulus, with its meaning. It is apparent

^Since the experiments here reported were concluded, the writer has
found that, if he reads any particular word upon a printed sheet (looks
at the word, and gets a kinaesthetic-auditory repetition of it), there is
usually attached to it a thin coat of meaning which distinguishes it from
other words similarly read, though there is a total absence of recognisable
associations. Save for two or three possible instances, whose interpreta-
tion is not clear, such direct or incorporated meaning did not appear in the
experiments of this Section. On the general question, see Titchener,
Thought-processes, 1909, 177.

570 JACOB SON

that she finally does thus identify, after finding that nothing
else occurs which can be termed meaning. The following
excerpts from other reports illustrate this point :

D. It is very warm in this room. Kinaesthetic sensations in throat
plus auditory images (of words). (Read the line.)

Then a curious feeling, largely organic sensations of general laziness,
pleasant warmth, drowsiness, and kinaesthetic sensations (chiefly of eye-
movement and strains in head that meant my Office, where I had ten
minutes ago been very warm). [The observer reports that here was the
meaning of the stimulus sentence.]

D. Let him bring a glass of water. . . . Then feeling (of relief), that is,
mild pleasantness and less strain in head and different organic sensations in
region of diaphragm. Verbal kinaesthetic idea (meaning I don't have to
do or say anything to get the meaning; I just know I understand it). At
same time there was some kinaesthesis (from eye-movement?) (that con-
stituted meaning of sentence).

Then and slightly overlapping the above, very vague schematic visual
image (of some man in tha laboratory, I don't know who, standing at sink
and holding a glass before the running water). All this was just in grays.

Then verbal kinaesthetic idea (Perhaps this has something to do with the
meaning).

D. She came in secretly. . . . Then slight kinaesthesis (from automatic
reading of the sentence). At last word kinaesthesis (accompanied by
sudden eye-movement or Winking). (After this did not fixate paper.)
[Later question: Was the meaning of the sentence present here? 'No.'
Did you perceive the words or sentence? 'Yes; but secretly is the only
word I perceived very clearly.']

Then a visual image, vague and schematic (of a girl who was some-
times myself and sometimes Miss X walking on tiptoe into my Office).
At the same time organic and kinaesthetic sensations (as if I were going
through that performance), namely, respiratory sensations (from repressed
breathing), general kinaesthesis (from slight tremor of whole body), ar-
ticulatory sensations, kinaesthetic sensations (from walking on tiptoe),
and contact sensations in arms and hand (from touching sides of doorway
as I entered). All this organic and kinaesthetic complex was the clearest
thing in consciousness. There were quick alternations of pleasant and
unpleasant feelings accompanied by kinaesthesis which I can't analyse now,
though it was definite at the time.

Then feeling (of assurance) in terms of respiratory sensations (from
rather deep and free breathing), and a certain kinaesthetic complex (from
eye-movement, meaning that this attitude of walking in secretly conveyed
the meaning of the sentence.)

Next we give a sample of G's reports. It will be seen that
there is a very full description of processes. The reader is
requested to attempt, as he goes through the report, definitely
to decide at what point, if at all, the meaning of the sentence
was realised.

Observer G. Stimulus Did you see him kill the man ? Time 3 sec. —
Auditory perception (of word Ready). Simultaneous unpleasant strain
and tactual sensations (from hands on face and general position).

Then a pinkish grayish limitless visual perception (of the field of the
closed eyelids) accompanied by vague kinaesthetic strain in region of eyes
and in eyes.

Then auditory perception (of Now). Faint verbal idea (meaning What
a difference in intensity between the Now and the Ready) ! The opening

ON MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING 57 1

of the eyes is accompanied by a succession of blurs, partly gradual, partly
sudden, with vague strains from the front part of the eyes themselves. At
the same time recognition (of the white strip) with indefinite indistinct out-
Hnes, and with similarly indefinite blue sensations strung along a horizontal
line in center of the white area.

Then faint strains (from fixation of blue complex) accompanied by
verbal ideas of articulation.

Then (new fixation) and repetition of these ideas. Background of
consciousness almost zero.

After the perception (of the last word) a sudden rise of all sorts of or-
ganic, kinaesthetic and tactual sensations localised in abdominal region,
mouth region, elbow, and facial areas touched by hand, together with a
new visual perception. [Later question: Of what? 'Of objects on table,
eyes being open'.]

Followed by verbal idea (What is it?)

Then a general, organic and respiratory, conscious attitude (of relief).
(No meaning all the way through.)

It is certain, if we may trust our own experience, that the
reader who tried to discover the point at which a meaning
might have been realised failed in the attempt; and the
failure emphasizes the difference that we have drawn between
report of 'meanings' and report of 'processes'. Or, to put the
matter differently: If the observer had omitted the informa-
tion *No meaning', and had challenged the experimenter or any
one else to state when (if at all) the meaning of the sentence
was realised, and what this particular meaning was, the per-
son thus challenged would have found it impossible to infer
the meaning from the description given of the corresponding
processes. Information about meanings as well as descrip-
tion of processes — we have made the point before, and we
shall recur to it again — must come always from the observer
himself. —

There are five other cases in which no meaning is reached.
Sometimes meaningless reading is followed by the meaning.
Thus:

Observer G. Stimulus The iron cube fell heavily on the floor. Time
4.5 sec. — Visual perception (of words) accompanied by imaginal and
articulatory processes (of reading). The first perception (of the third
word) was vague; (in fact, it was not a word but a blot). It became a
word as soon as certain parts (of the blot) stood out more clearly and were
verbalised. (The rest of the sentence was first perceived as meaningless
words, tiien re-read) with strong motor tendencies around the eyes (mean-
ing attempt to see an iron cube fall down from the table.) The perception
(of the word Floor) was accompanied by a faint auditory image (meaning
a very loud sound). (Then closed eyes.)

In yet other cases the meaning comes simultaneously with
the perception of the words, and is carried by non-verbal
images or sensations. We may therefore say that (save for
one instance, which resembles the three peculiar reports of F
to be discussed below) the reports of G are like those of D ;
the perception of the words, that is, visual sensations accom-

572 JACOBSON

panied by designatory processes, does not necessarily involve
awareness of the meaning of the sentence, which either ( i ) comes
in terms of non-verbal images or sensations, appearing simul-
taneously or later, or (2) does not come at all.

The reports of F show two types: in the one, perception
of the words or of the sentence precedes the meaning, which
finally appears in terms of non-verbal images or sensations;
in the other, these meaning-associates occur simultaneously
with the perception. There are, however, three reports which
stand by themselves. We give two of them, in part:

F. It is very warm in this room. 2 sec. — Purple sensations (from words)
clear. White sensation (from paper) and black (from background) in
background of consciousness. Also very weak strain sensations in chest,
in background, which remained comparatively constant in intensity
while I was reading. Simultaneously with the reading, auditory images
(of the words). (Strain sensations mean: I am under Aufgabe to read
and interpret and not to waste too much time. Visual sensations plus
auditory images carried in themselves the meaning of the sentence.)

F. The affair was bewildering, i sec. — White and black sensations
(from paper and background) in background of consciousness. Simulta-
neous with the visual clearing of each word, auditory images. (The mean-
ing of the sentence was in the auditory images and visual sensations
themselves. No other context to carry the meaning tJmt I can find.)

If we may assume that F has not overlooked something,
we have the result (confirmed by a single case from G) that
the visual and auditory images and sensations from reading
might be the sole processes present in consciousness, while yet
the sentence had meaning.^

We turn now from 'processes' to 'meanings'. And we note
that it is not enough for the observer to make the bare state-
ment that he did, or did not, understand the sentence. For
oftentimes, at the moment of understanding, the sentence
has a special or peculiar meaning.

An illustration has been given in the report on p. 557. Another follows.

F. His face was very serious. . . . (Read the sentence over again), that is,
visual sensations and auditory images as before, except at a slower speed.
Accompanied by kinaesthetic sensations in face (from frowning) and, I
think, sensations or images from (slight nods of head towards the words,
for emphasis). (Determined effort to see what the sentence meant.
Meaning clear this time.) [Question: What was that meaning? The
answer came with conviction and immediately.] {My face is very serious.)

^Cf. p. 569. The writer finds that he can converse or think in words
or in incipient verbal articulations, with the meaning present, while for
considerable periods of time he can discern no vestige of sensations or
images other than those from the words themselves. There are, in the
background, sensations due to bodily position and to general set; but
while it is introspectively clear that these play an important part in the
whole experience, they do not seem to vary correspondingly with the verbal
meanings, as the conversation proceeds or the thought goes on.

Our results do not tell us what is the difference, if any, between the
processes occurring in these cases and in those of meaningless reading of
the sentence.

ON MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING 573

So in the case of G: two reports obtained from the same sentence Her

dress was white show that on the one occasion her referred to a particular
person, on the other to nobody in particular.

The Single Word and the Word in Context. — Every sentence employed
as stimulus in these experiments contained, in a prominent place, one of
the words that had been employed singly in the experiments of § 3.
Several months intervened between the two sets of experiments; and we
have no reason to suppose that the repetition was remarked by any of
our observers. Our object was to compare the meaning of a word presented
singly with the meaning of the same word given in a verbal context. The
conditions of the two sets of experiments were by no means parallel;
still, certain results appear to be trustworthy.

There are a few cases in which the associates of the single word recur
(usually with some alteration of form) in the cluster of associates aroused
by the sentence. Thus, in both experiments a proper name calls up, for
one observer, a visual image of the same person; 'process' and 'meaning'
are identical in the two reports. In another instance, the word face has
the same reported meaning under both conditions, though the 'process'
appears in the one experiment as a visual image, in the other as a kinaes-
thetic complex.

In the great majority of cases, however, the associations traceable to
the word in context are not those previously aroused by it in isolation.
This result harmonises with the statement made on p. 564 regarding the
variable character of meaningful associations. The word-in-sentence is
not a separate stimulus, but merely a constituent of a total stimulus, which
is the sentence; as constituent of the total stimulus it may, of course, set
up determining tendencies in the sense of its own meaning; but this
meaning is now only a phase of the total meaning of the sentence,
a meaning of incorporation or of implication; and it is therefore impossible
to predict, from the report on the single word, how the meaning of the
word-in-sentence shall appear in consciousness. G reports, with the
stimulus heavily, 'Meaning was mostly kinaesthetic, and secondarily or-
ganic' With the stimulus-sentence The iron cube fell heavily on the floor,
this mode of meaning has lapsed; the effect of the word heavily shows only
in the 'faint auditory image (meaning a very loud sound'). We may refer
also to the reports of D on secretly and She came in secretly (pp. 563, 570),
which illustrate the same point. The difference was especially marked
in the case of prepositions: taken alone, these words tended to form a
context of their own, verbal or attitudinal (by gesture) ; occurring in a
sentence, they simply colored the meaning of the total stimulus. — Cf.
the remarks of H. M. Clarke, this Journal, xxii., 1911, 236 ff.

Summary, i. The meaning of a sentence is often entirely-
lacking at the first reading, i. e. the initial perception of it,
and appears later, borne by processes representative of its
content or of some response to that content made by the
observer.

2. Sometimes these representative processes come with the
initial perception, and the sentence at once has meaning;
sometimes they seem to be absent, while the meaning neverthe-
less arises.

3. The same stimulus-sentence may give rise to different
meanings for the same observer, so that it is not enough for
him to say that he understood it ; he must be asked to specify
precisely what he understood.

Journal — 7

574 jacobson

§ 5. In Repi^y to Criticism.

The discussion of Imageless Thought has led, time and again,
to personal exchanges of regrettable warmth. Yet the issue
is, after all, an issue of fact ; it is the observations that coimt,
and not the thrusts of controversy. When, for instance,
Dr. Watt suggests that an observation made in the Wiirzburg
laboratory is eo ipso more dependable than an observation
taken in the Cornell laboratory ;^ when, forgetting the genesis of
his own Theory of Thinking, he belittles the work of graduate
students ;2 when Professor Ogden charges that Okabe's analyses
of Belief ' ' would apply equally well to a description of the
aesthetic attitude, the ethical attitude, the consciousness of
understanding, or indeed any other of the higher apperceptive
states of mind;"^ when he remarks that Clarke's conscious
attitudes are "unblushingly" analysed into sensory and im-
aginal components;* when he declares that the method of
confrontation is "quite a perfunctory affair" and leads to an
"equivocal result;"^ when he cleverly dubs the sensation-
alistic school 'the opposition', and thus puts the champions of
imageless contents into the secure position of governmental
orthodoxy:^ — in all these, and in many similar instances, the
polemics simply mean "I refuse to accept your results." Or
perhaps, since the phrases are polemical, they may carry the
further meaning, "although I can't explain them away;"
for emotion is likely to appear when argument has broken
down.

Let these things pass, then, and let us come to close quarters
with Professor Ogden's criticism. This is, in a nutshell, that
Cornell observers have been predisposed against "the discovery
of meanings in experience", and have therefore confined their
introspections to the "known mental categories of sensation,
image and feeling in which [they] have been schooled." The
best reply to the first of these statements is the fact of the
present paper. Professor Ogden's critique appeared on June
15, 1911; and, by that date, the experiments by our 'method
of parentheses' had been concluded. It is true that previous
Cornell experimenters have intentionally neglected meanings,
in the sense of this term used in the present paper. But, so far
from having a predisposition against meanings, we have in
the present work made a systematic attempt to cultivate
reports about them. And we reach a result which does not

*Mind, XX., 191 1, 403.

^Ihid., 403 f.

'Psychol. Bulletin, viii., 191 1, 194.

*Ihid.

Hbid.

Ubid., 186 f.

ON MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING 575

accord with Professor Ogden's views: we find that wherever
there is meaning there are also processes, and we find that the
correlated meanings and processes are two renderings, from
different points of view, of one and the same experience.

We have already stated that it is frequently no easy matter to give a
detailed account both of attributes of process and of shades of meaning,
the beginner who is set for the report of meanings will be likely to over-
look the corresponding processes, and conversely, just as, if he is set for
the report of the quality of a sensation, he will be likely to overlook the
correlated sensory intensity, and conversely. To be sure, after considera-
ble practice it becomes tolerably easy to report the principal features of
the double task, but even then omissions sometimes occur.

But it must be remembered that the danger of defect is two-sided; it
inheres in either mode of predisposition. When Professor Ogden writes:
"It is precisely in the brief moments of active thinking that the thought-
factor is most apparent" {op. cit., 187), he lays himself open to the very
objection that he is urging against his opponents. If by the thought-
factor is meant the meaning, the topic or object of thought, that must, in
the very nature of things, be most apparent under the conditions of quick
active thinking; and, again in the nature of things, the corresponding
processes must, under such circumstances, be least apparent; the observer
is set for meaning, — and even if the instruction is changed, and he is later
set for the reporting of processes, the brevity of the experience will work
against him. But there is absolutely nothing in the case to compel our
belief that meaning without process exhausts the experience, that process is
altogether absent.

A like reply might be made to the complaint of Professor Ogden's col-
league {op. cit., 193). If the relatively untrained observers gave plentiful
meanings in their original reports, and failed to specify processes, that is
because they had not been taught to distinguish between process and mean-
ing and to report on the former as well as on the latter. If the trained
observers of the later work gave nothing but sensations and images and
feelings, that is because they had been taught to observe processes, and
the experimenter did not demand of them the statement of meanings. Our
experience shows conclusively that observers who have had a long training
in process-report are able, after training, to parallel the processes by
meanings.

And the same reply, once more, invalidates Professor Ogden's dis-
covery of imageless thought in the quoted report of our observer F {op. cit.,
195). "Red : blue :: green : yellow. I started to say this automati-
cally. Then I repeated the stimulus and said 'intermediate' verbally.
Some kind of consciousness that meant 'principal colors.' I did not say
'principal'." Rewritten in terms of our method of parentheses, the last
sentences would be: "Some kind of consciousness (that meant principal
colors.) I did not say principal". F found a meaning present, the mean-
ing of principal colors; and he found also a corresponding process, about
which, however, he could say nothing more than that it was not a kinaes-
thetic-auditory verbal image.

As to the second member of Professor Ogden's criticism,
that Cornell observers have confined their reports to the de-
scription of sensations, images, feelings, and like familiar modes,
and have failed to find a new process (if we use this term again
in our present sense), — we must admit the fact. But Professor
Ogden has, nevertheless, confused the deed of this non-dis-
covery with the will. The observers did not, it is true,

576 JACOBSON

report on 'meanings' as well as on 'processes,* in the sense of
the present study; for this is, we believe, the first instance of
the intentional and systematic assignment of the double task
in any laboratory. They did, however, have the Aufgabe to
report all the processes that were present in their experiences.
Thus, Okabe writes: ''No hint was given that certain processes
were wanted or expected by the experimenter, and no limit was
set to the observer's vocabulary.'' " It seems especially important
to note that G finds no trace of imageless contents, since he
is precisely of what has been described as the imageless type."^
Can the critic have overlooked these and similar passages?
The aim of Clarke's study of Conscious Attitudes was to
"bring these experiences to the test of introspective observa-
tion, and thus to discover whether or not they are analy sable."
"The introspections of any one observer show different stages
of clearness and intensity of imagery, which allow us to connect,
by a graded series of intermediate steps, a complex of vivid and
explicit imagery with a vague and condensed consciousness
which we suppose to represent what is called 'imageless
thought '."2 Has the critic again read a little hastily? —
Let us make the rejoinder concrete. Suppose that you are
told : * ' Here is a pile of coins, of various denominations, some
of which are American, some English, some French. Sort
the coins out, both by country and by denomination. We
are informed that there are also German coins in the pile.
Keep an eye especially keenly on this possibility." You sort,
and you find nothing but American, EngUsh and French
pieces. And your conclusion is summarily rejected, on the
ground that you have had special training in the identification and
discrimination of American, English and French money!

A final word on Biihler and his thought-elements. "I
was fortunate enough,"says Biihler, "to find two experienced
psychologists who put themselves at my disposal for the ex-
periments. . . In the present paper. . . I shall refer always
and only to the observations of Kiilpe and Diirr. . . The
experimenter must feel himself into the position of his obser-
vers, must experience with them, if he is properly to understand
them; he must be able to go into their peculiarities, and to
speak with them in their own language."^ Biihler, then,
sought to feel himself into the position of his two observers;
and, as regards the one of them, Diirr, the attempt — as Diirr
has himself written — was unsuccessful. Biihler's thought-
element rests, therefore, upon his interpretation of Kiilpe's
reports. And Professor Ogden now tells us that it occurred

^This Journal, xxi., 1910, 563, 567, 593.

2This Journal, xxii., 191 1, 215, 248.

^Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., ix., 1907, 306, 309.

ON MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING 577

to Kiilpe, while lecturing on Leibniz, "that the monads were
not 'concepts' but thoughts;'* here, still according to Professor
Ogden, is Kiilpe's first idea "regarding the character of thought
as a distinct mental element."^ But was not Kiilpe, then, —
to borrow a word of Professor Ogden 's — predisposed to the
discovery of the thought-element?

We greatly regret that we have been unable to compare
our results, in detail, with those of former workers in the
same field. Limits of space forbid; as they forbid, also, a
further exploitation, at this time, of our observers' reports.

^Op. cit., 185.

MINOR STUDIES FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL

LABORATORY OF VASSAR COLLEGE
XVI. Thh Effect of Area on the Pleasantness of Colors

By Dorothy Clark, Mary S. Goodell, and M. F. Washburn

The arrangement of apparatus in the experiments to be described was
as follows. Two sets of colored paper squares were provided, one set
being 5 cm. a side, the other 25 cm. a side. The small squares were pasted,
the large ones fastened with small wire clips, to cardboard squares of
the same size as the paper, in order to give them stiffness. The colors
used were from the Bradley series and comprised the following: saturated
violet, blue, green, yellow, orange, and red, with the lighter tint and the
darker shade of each. For every color there were two squares, a larger
and a smaller one. In performing an experiment one of the colored squares
was suspended by means of wire so that it was seen against a background
of the gray laboratory wall about a meter and a half away, and the observer
sat at a distance of one and a half meters from the square, which was hung
at about the level of her eyes. This arrangement was suggested by Dr.
E. Murray as being likely, by rendering the background indefinite, to
lessen its influence. The observer at a signal looked at the colored square
for ten seconds and recorded her judgment of its pleasantness or unpleasant-
ness in numerical terms, using the numbers i to 7 to indicate the following
affective grades: very unpleasant, moderately unpleasant, slightly un-
pleasant, indifferent, slightly pleasant, moderately pleasant, very pleasant.
The colors were shown in irregular order, which was, however, kept constant
for all observers. A large and a small square of the same color were never
shown in immediate succession, as our object was to obtain independent
judgments of the affective value of each square, not comparisons of one with
another. Nearly all of the observations were taken upon bright days.
The observers were twenty-three in number, all women and all but three
college students.

The results were treated in two ways. First, the number of observers
who assigned a higher affective value to the larger area of each color was
counted and compared with the number of those who assigned a lower value
to the larger area. This method took no account of the degree of the pref-
erence, that is, of how much greater, numerically expressed, the observer's
estimate was of the pleasantness of one area as compared with that of the
other. The following conclusions were drawn from this method of con-
sidering the results. Among saturated colors, red was the only one which
the majority of the observers preferred in large rather than in small area.
All the others were preferred by more observers in the smaller area, though
the majority in the cases of yellow and violet was slight. In the case of
all of the tints, a slight majority preferred the larger area. In the case of
all the shades the larger area was preferred, though the majority was small
for green and violet.

Secondly, the numerical values assigned by all the observers to the large
area of a color were added, and divided by the sum of the nimierical values
assigned by all the observers to the small area of the same color. This
proceeding gave the ratio of the total affective values of the two areas of a
given color. The following facts resulted from a study of the figures thus

MINOR STUDIES 579

obtained. In saturated colors, the smaller area is pleasanter except in the
case of saturated red, where the larger area is pleasanter. All the tints
showed slightly higher affective values for the larger areas. In the case
of the shades there was a more marked preference for the larger areas
except in the case of green.

We may conclude, then, that under the experimental conditions described
(i) saturated colors are preferred in smaller area, with the exception of saturated
red, which is preferred in larger area; (2) the larger area of tints is slightly
preferred; and (3) the larger area of shades is preferred, the preference being
least in the cases of green and violet.

There was no correspondence between the absolute affective value of
a color and the preference for it in larger or smaller area. It may be noted
that in this study as in the preceding ones, the highest absolute affective
value was that of the blue tint and the next highest that of saturated red,
also that yellow and orange had the lowest affective values among saturated
colors, tints, and shades alike. Twelve of the twenty-three observers in
this study were also observers in the study on An Effect of Fatigue on Judg-
ments of the Affective Value of Colors.

XVII. Fluctuations in the Affective Value of Colors During
Fixation for One Minute.

By Dorothy Crawford and M. F. Washburn

The materials used in this experiment consisted of pieces of the Bradley
colored papers, 2.9 cm. square. This size was used in the present study, as in
some of our other studies on the affective value of colors, for the reason that
it can be conveniently cut from the sample books issued by the Bradley
Company. Eighteen colors were used: saturated violet, blue, green,
yellow, orange, and red, and the lightest tint and darkest shade of each.
Each piece of paper was laid on a white ground before the observer, who
was asked to express her judgment as to its pleasantness or unpleasantness
by using one of the numbers from one to seven, in the ordinary way. The
observer was further asked to look steadily at the color for an interval of
one minute, measured by the experimenter, and to report by means of the
appropriate numbers any changes in the affective value of the color. At
the end of the period of fixation she was asked to give the reasons for the
changes which had occurred. The same proceeding was repeated for each
of the eighteen colors, in random order. Fourteen observers worked on
the problem; all, as usual, women, and nearly all students. Eight of the
observers had had practice in introspection. Several of them made the
experiment more than once, at considerable intervals, so that the total
number of experiments performed was twenty-seven.

For most of the observers some fluctuation did occur during the one
minute period: the number of colors with which no fluctuation took place
varied from fourteen, out of the eighteen, to none, and averaged between
four and five. Our principal interest was in the causes which produced the
changes in affective value. These changes may be roughly divided into
two groups: alterations due to changes in the color itself, and alterations due
to purely mental causes.

Under the first head, two obvious factors suggest themselves : adaptation
and the presence of a negative after-image, due to shifting of fixation, in
the neighborhood of the color. The effects of adaptation were variously
described as 'fading,' 'dulling,' 'getting dirty,' 'getting darker.' The most
important purely mental cause for change in the pleasantness or unpleasant-
ness of a color lay in the occurrence of associated ideas. These were most
frequently of definite things, such as violets or wall-paper; sometimes of

580 CRAWFORD AND WASHBNRN

touch experiences, indicated by the words 'velvety,' 'soft,' Other mental
causes of change concerned the affective process itself : they were expressed
by 'getting used to it,' or 'getting tired of it.' Both of these last comments
were surprisingly rare; getting used to the color was mentioned only six
times as a cause of increased pleasantness, and getting tired of a color was
twenty-two times given as a cause of increased unpleasantness. This is
in comparison with one hundred and twenty-seven cases where change
was due to the occiu'rence of an association.

When the number of cases of change due to each of these two principal
classes of causes was counted up for each of the eighteen colors, it was
found that changes caused by alteration in the actual appearance of the color
were decidedly more numerous in the case of the saturated colors (133) than in
that of the shades (93) or tints (70). The principal reason for this difference
seemed to be the greater frequency with which an after-image was noticed
in the case of the saturated colors (thirty- three times, as compared with three
times for the tints and six times for the shades). The process of adapta-
tion was about equally influential upon the three classes of colors. Be-
sides adaptation and the negative after-image, our observers occasionally
reported other changes in the appearance of the colors, such as alteration
in the color- tone, orange getting pinker, green shade growing less yellow,
and so on, which could not with certainty be ascribed to adaptation. Once
in a while an observer would report that a color grew brighter as it was
looked at : it is possible that this was due to renewed fixation after having
shifted the eyes.

On the other hand, changes due to purely mental causes were most frequent
in the case of tints (70); shades came next (59), and saturated colors last (55).
This difference was in large measure due to the fact that associations oc-
casioned a greater number of changes in affective value in the case of tints
(47) than in the case of shades (39) or saturated colors (31). Saturated
colors occur with less frequency in nature than unsaturated colors, and
this fact would naturally make them poorer in associations: why tints
should be superior to shades in associative power is not clear. The oc-
currence of an associated idea, when it produces a change in the pleasant-
ness or unpleasantness of a color, is equivalent, of course, to a change in
the source of the afi"ection, just as truly as when the color itself changes
under the influence of adaptation. But when an observer reports that she
has grown 'used to,' or 'tired of a color, these terms probably refer to a
dulling of the affective process itself, apart from an alteration in its source.
We have already noted that, in the comparatively short interval which we
used, such changes were rare. This result was in part due, no doubt, to
the fact that the conditions of the experiment set the mind of the observer
towards finding some affective value, pleasant or unpleasant, in the colors,
and growing used to and tired of a color are processes leading to the dis-
appearance of affective value. The six cases of 'getting used' to a color
were equally divided among shades, tints, and saturated colors. The
shades gave the most instances of lowered affective value through getting tired of
the color (11); the saturated colors came next (8), and the tints last (3). Very
likely the tendency to get tired of shades is due to their being some;what
depressing. Getting used to and tired of colors may be called processes
of affective adaptation. In addition to them, certain changes were re-
ported which seemed to refer to the affective process itself rather than to
its cause, but which were too indefinite to be classified; such, for instance,
as 'growing depressing,' 'growing insipid.'

A further question which suggests itself is whether the above-mentioned
causes of change in the affective value of colors were causes of increased
or diminished pleasantness. This question is not a simple one. If we
find, for instance, that a given cause such as adaptation produces in a
given color more changes in the direction of increased affective value than
in that of diminished affective value, we must bear in mind that a color

MINOR STUDIES 58 1

which started at the beginning of the one-minute interval with the max-
imum affective value, 7, would have no chance of increasing, while one
which started at i would have no chance of decreasing. On the other
hand, by far the greatest number of changes in affective value that occurred
under the conditions of this experiment were changes of one place only
in the scale. Therefore if the initial value of a color were anything but 7
or I, the chances were about equal for a rise or a fall. It ought to be
sufficient, then, to correct our comparison of the number of rises in affec-
tive value produced by a given cause for a given color with the munber of
falls, by taking account merely of the number of maximum and minimum
judgments of initial affective value made for that color.

Adaptation and association were the only causes of change that occurred
with sufficient frequency to make this calculation worth while. Its re-
sults were as follows:

Saturated violet had 7 for its initial value once, and i not at all. It had
therefore a very slightly greater chance for decrease than for increase.
There were six cases where associations produced an increase and two
cases where they produced a decrease. Associations then, on the whole,
exerted a favorable influence. There were seven cases where adaptation
produced increase and three where it produced decrease: the influence of
adaptation, then, is also favorable to this color.

Saturated blue had 7 once for its initial value and i three times. It had
therefore more chance to increase than to diminish. Associations pro-
duced three increases and no decreases ; hence they had no demonstrable
influence. Adaptation on the other hand produced sixteen increases to
one decrease, and undoubtedly had a favorable influence on the pleasant-
ness of this color.

Saturated green as regards initial values was exactly like satiu-ated blue.
Associations had almost no influence upon it, occurring only twice as a
cause of increase and not at all as a cause of decrease. Adaptation was
favorable, with nine cases of increase to two of decrease, but its effect was
not very marked.

Saturated yellow never had 7 for its initial value, while it had i three
times; its chance for increase was therefore greater than that of blue and
green. The effect of association was on the whole favorable; there were
six increases and no decreases. The effect of adaptation was rather un-
favorable : four increases to an equal number of decreases.

Saturated orange never had 7 for initial value, and had i five times. It
had therefore decidedly more chance for increase than for diminution. As-
sociations had little effect, the proportion of increase to decrease being five
to two. Adaptation was also of small influence, the proportion being
seven to four.

Saturated red never had i for an initial value, and had 7 seven times.
Thus it had much more chance to diminish than to rise in affective value.
On the whole the influence of association on this color must be considered
favorable, for there were two increases and only three decreases, despite
the greater likelihood of the latter. Adaptation on the other hand did
saturated red no good; there were ten cases where it brought about a fall,
and four where it brought about a rise.

Violet shade, having 7 and i for initial values once each, had balanced
chances. The influence of association was then wholly favorable, the
ratio of rises to falls being five to nothing. Adaptation was nearly as
often unfavorable as favorable (six to eight).

Blue shade had decidedly more chance for fall than rise, 7 occurring ten
times as initial value and i once. The influence of associations was
negligible, as they produced change in two instances only. The effect of
adaptation must be considered favorable, as there was an equal number,
five each, of rises and falls assigned to it.

Green shade had equal chances for rise and fall, as neither of the extreme
numbers was ever assigned to it at the outset. Associations were dis-

582 CRAWFORD AND WASHBURN

tinctly favorable to it, the ratio of rise to fall being six to one. Adaptation
on the other hand had an unfavorable effect nearly as often as a favorable
one (five to six).

Yellow shade had greatly more chance for increase than for decrease, i
occurring twelve times as initial value and 7 not at all. The influence of
associations was then but slightly favorable, the ratio of rise to fall being
five to one. Adaptation seemed to have a somewhat unfavorable effect,
causing four decreases to seven increases.

Orange shade had equal chances for increase and decrease, neither ex-
treme occurring as its initial value. Associations were distinctly favorable
to it, in the proportion of ten to three. Adaptation was a little more
favorable than unfavorable (seven to five).

Red shade had more chance of decrease than of increase, as 7 was assigned
to it four times at the outset and i never. The influence of association
must then be reckoned as decidedly favorable, since it produced six rises
and no falls. Adaptation on the other hand was perhaps a little more
unfavorable than favorable in its influence, producing eight falls to four
rises.

Violet tint had 7 for its initial value nine times and i not at all ; it was
therefore much more likely to fall than to rise. Association thus must have
had a distinctly favorable influence to produce six increases and no de-
crease. Adaptation on the other hand had little if any effect, the propor-
tion of falls to rises being two to ten.

Blue tint had somewhat more chance of decrease than increase, 7 occurring
twice and i not at all as its initial value. The effect of associations was
favorable, though not so markedly as with violet tint, the ratio of rise to
fall being seven to two. Adaptation was unfavorable, causing nine de-
creases to four increases. Green tint had 7 six times and i once for initial
value, and so was more likely to fall than to rise. Associations were
favorable, producing five rises to one fall. Adaptation was distinctly
unfavorable, causing thirteen falls to two rises.

Yellow tint had equal chances, 7 occm-ring twice and i twice. Associa-
tion produced less effect upon this tint than upon any of the other tints,
but such effect as existed was mostly favorable (five to one). Adaptation
was equally unfavorable, producing one rise and five falls.

Orange tint had more chance of fall than of rise, 7 occurring five times and
I once. The effect of association was on the whole favorable, producing
eight rises and five falls. Adaptation had little effect, but that little was
probably favorable, there being three increases to four decreases.

Red tint had nearly equal chances, leaning slightly towards fall, with
two cases of 7 and one of i . Associations were favorable to it, in the pro-
portion of seven to one, but the effects of adaptation were balanced, eight
to seven.

These results may be simimarized in the following statements. For
saturated colors, associations have little influence, but what they have is pre-
dominantly favorable. Adaptation is favorable to violet, blue, and green,
rather unfavorable to yellow and red, and without definite effect on the affective
value of orange. The colors of the warm end of the spectrum our observers
seem to have liked quite as well in their original saturation as in the duller
tones produced by adaptation. In the case of shades, association produced
a favorable effect upon violet, green, orange, and red; little effect of any ;. ind
upon blue, and nearly as much unfavorable as favorable effect upon yellow.
The effects of adaptation were on the whole as often unfavorable as favorable
to the shades. Associations are favorable to tints without exception, and
adaptation was on the whole unfavorable. Broadly speaking, the tendency
of associated ideas is to raise the pleasantness of a color, and the tendency of
adaptation is to lower it rather than raise it.

With two exceptions, in every case where an after-image was noticed,
it diminished the pleasantness of the color.

IMITATION IN RACCOONS

By W. T. Shepherd, Ph. D., The George Washington University

This paper is, in certain respects, supplementary to work which has
already been published by Cole,^ and by the present writer.^ The same
four raccoons which served as subjects in those earlier investigations were
employed in the present study. At the time when these later experiments
were undertaken, the animals were seven months old. They had all been
trained, for a period of nearly three months, in 'puzzle-box' and other
tests; but, with the exception of one individual, they had had no experience
with experiments similar to those which were here undertaken.

For the purposes of comparative psychology, three sorts of imitation may
be distinguished. Instinctive imitation is illustrated in the reaction of the
chick which pecks at an object on seeing another chick do so. Gregarious
imitation is exemplified by the stampede of the herd when one of its num-
ber becomes alarmed and flees. When a monkey sees one of its fellows
obtain food by pressing a lever and releasing a door, and himself proceeds
to an intelligent performance of the same act, we have a case of inferential
imitation. The present study is concerned with an investigation of this
higher, or inferential type of imitation.

Our apparatus consisted of an inclined plane of poultry netting, 1,5 m.
long by 25 cm, wide; it was supported at one end upon a box, in such
fashion that it extended in a slightly upward and diagonal direction across
a corner of the room to a platform, which was 30 cm. wide and 50 cm. long.
The platform was 90 cm. high ; and the other end of the inclined plane was
65 cm. above the floor. At the lower end of the plane, stood a box-step,
32 cm. high, by means of which the raccoons could easily climb upon the
plane.

At a given signal, the raccoon went up the step and along the plane to the
platform, where he was fed. The experimenter stood at a distance of about
a meter from the plane. In earlier experiments, one of the raccoons (Jim)
had learned to go up to the platform to be fed. He now served as imitatee,
while the other three animals were employed as possible imitators of his
acts. The procedure consisted in releasing the imitator in the room where
he was able to make several observations of Jim's performance of the
act of climbing and obtaining food. Immediately afterwards, the imitator
was given an opportunity to perform the act alone. We kept a record of the
number of times that he clearly saw the act performed, of the number of
times he probably saw it, of any apparent tendency to imitate, and of all
other significant facts.

Tom. First day. Tom was present in the room while Jim went through
twenty-one repetitions of the act of going up the step, and along the plane
to the platform and receiving food. Tom apparently^ saw seven of the
twenty-one repetitions of the act; and he probably saw the act in five
other repetitions. Then Tom was placed in the room alone, in order that

*L. W. Cole: Concerning the Intelligence of Raccoons, Jour. Comp. Neur. and Psychol.,
XVII, 1907, 211-261.

^W. T. Shepherd: The Discrimination of Articulate Sounds by Raccoons. Atner. Jour.
Psychol., XXII, 19H, 116-119.

'^This qualification is necessary because it is diflScult to be entirely sure that one s
has really seen the action of another.

584 SHEPHERD

he might imitate Jim's reaction under similar conditions. He failed to
accomplish it during a period which lasted one minute and twenty seconds
Second day. (Six days after the first trial.) Tom saw Jim perform the
act three times ; and he probably saw the reaction five times in all. When
tested alone for a period of ten minutes, he failed to repeat the act, — indeed
he showed no indication of any tendency to imitate Jim's reaction. Third
day. (One day after the preceding trial.) Jim's reaction was seen four
times, and probably was seen nine times, in all. When tested alone, Tom
gave no indication of any tendency to imitate, and had not accomplished the
act at the end of ten minutes. In three of Jim's repetitions, however,
after the imitatee had performed the act and was eating his food, or had
just eaten it on the platform, Tom went up also and sniffed about on the
platform.

Dolly. First day. Dolly was in the room while Jim went through the
act fifteen times. She saw four of his reactions, and probably saw eight
more. When tested alone, she showed no tendency to imitate, and had not
accomplished the act at the end of ten minutes. Second day. (Seven days
later.) She saw Jim's reaction eleven times, and probably saw it three
times more. During his tenth reaction, she went up the plane and to the
platform, where she sniffed about. During the subsequent test of her
imitation, she climbed upon the experimenter for food, and rambled
casually about the room. She then went up the step to the plane, and
down again, and again wandered about the room.

Jack. First day. Jack saw six of Jim's twenty-one reactions, and
probably saw seven more. During Jim's eighth reaction, Jack went up the
step, and crossed the plane to the platform, where, if one may judge from
his actions, he seemed to expect to be fed. But when tested alone immedi-
ately afterwards he wholly failed. In no way did he indicate any tendency
to imitate Jim's reaction. Second day. (Five days later.) Jack saw seven
of Jim's reactions, and probably saw four others. During the progress of
Jim's fifteenth reaction. Jack went up the step and partially up the plane to
a coat which hung upon the wall near-by. Jim had aheady gone to the
platform. Jack did not appear, however, to expect food. In the first
trial where Jack was tested alone, after the usual signal had been given,
he played about the room, went to the window and to various boxes in the
room; he finally ascended the step and the plane to the platform and was
fed there. His time for this trial was two minutes and fifteen seconds.
When the signal was given for the second trial, he went up on a box at the
other side of the room, and looked at the experimenter for food, — as it
appeared. Finally, he went to the platform and was fed. In the third
trial, his behavior was similar to that in the second trial. He went up to
the platform in twelve and a half seconds. In the fourth trial, he did the
act in twenty seconds, first going part way up the plane and looking toward
the experimenter. In the fifth to the eighth trials, his behavior was similar
to that during the fourth trial ; his times for the accomplishment of the
act during these trials were thirty-seven, twenty-five, thirty-two, and
thirteen seconds respectively. In the ninth trial he reacted correctly in
eleven seconds; and in the tenth, in thirteen seconds. In both of these
latter trials he made but a brief stop during the act of ascending the plane.

The results of these experiments may be regarded as wholly negative.
When tested alone, after seeing Jim's reactions, neither Tom nor Dolly
made any attempt to imitate the act which they had just seen. It is true
that they went up the step or up the plane during the process of Jim's
reaction; and Tom's behaviour on the third day, — when on three occasions
he went up on the platform where Jim was eating, — seems to be imitative.
But if the raccoons perceived the results of Jim's reactions, it is diflScult
to understand why they did not themselves react to that intelligent percep-
tion of the results of Jim's actions, when tested for a period of ten minutes
immediately afterwards. It seems probable that some mental process

IMITATION IN RACCOONS 585

of no higher order than 'instinctive' imitation is sufficient to account for
these reactions.

Jack's reactions appear to be somewhat more doubtful. But when we
consider all of the evidence, and especially when we note his hesitating
behavior on the second day — where he apparently had formed, or almost
formed, the appropriate associations, — it would appear that we may attrib-
ute his learning to the humbler procedure of 'trial and error,' and not to an
'inferential' imitation of Jim's reactions.

We conclude, therefore, that these brief experiments have failed to show
that 'inferential' imitation (involving ideation) is a part of the mental
equipment of the raccoon. And it may be recalled that another investi-
gation of imitation, in which we employed the same animal,^ yielded wholly
negative results. Davis's^ interesting observations of the raccoon likewise
failed to reveal the presence of the higher form of imitation.

iL. W. Cole: Op. cit. pp. 232-235.

2H. B. Davis: Tlie Raccoon: A Study in Animal Intelligence. Amer. Jour. Psychol.,
XVIII, 1908, 447-489.

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE SCIENTIFIC WRITINGS
OF WILHELM WUNDT

By E. B. TiTCHENER ^nd L. R. Geissler

{Third supplementary list)

1861

(7) Der Blick. Eine physiognomische Studie. K. Gutzkow's Unter-
haltungen am hauslichen Herd, dritte Folge, i., 1028-1033.

1862

(11) Der Mund. Physiognomische Studie. K. Gutzkow's Unter-
haltungen am hauslichen Herd, dritte Folge, ii., 505-510.

(12) Die Zeit. K. Gutzkow's Unterhaltungen am hauslichen Herd,
dritte Folge, ii., 590-593-

1898
(5) Leerboek der zielkunde. Bew, naar den 2en druk van [W. Wundt's]
Grundriss der Psychologic door M. H. Lem. Large 8vo. Amsterdam,
A. Versluys. pp. 300.

1906

(8) Ipnotismo e suggestions: studio critico. Traduzione autorizzata
dair autore del dott. Leonardo Tucci. 16 mo. Palermo, R. Sandron
(F. Ando). pp. 174.

1910

(5) Elementi di psicologia. Nuova traduzione italiana. 8vo. Pian-
cenza, Societi editrice libraria Pontremolese (Rocca S. Casciano, L.
Cappelli). pp. 363.

(6) Volkerpsychologie. Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungesetze
von Sprache, Mythus und Sitte. Vol. iv. Mythus und Religion, erster
Teil. Zweite, neu bearbeitete Auflage. With 8 illustrations. Large 8vo.
Leipzig, W. Engelmann. pp. xii., 587. [For the new arrangement of
this work, see 1908 (4).]

(7) Kleine Schriften. Vol. i. Large 8vo. Leipzig, W. Engelmann.
pp. viii., 640. (Philosophical essays. Ueber das kosmologische Problem
[revision of 1877 (2) ]; Kants kosmologische Antinomien und das Problem
des Unendlichen [revision of 1885 (3) ]; Was soil uns Kant nicht sein?
[revision of 1891 (7) ]; Zur Geschichte und Theorie der abstrakten BegrifiFe
[revision of 1884 (3) ]; Ueber naiven und kritischen ReaHsmus [revision of
1896 (3), (4); 1897 (6)]; Psychologismus und Logizismus [new; pp.
511-634]).

1911

(i) Grundziige der physiologischen Psychologie. Sechste, umgearbeitete
Auflage. Vol. iii., with 71 illustrations and indices. Large 8vo. Leipzig,
W. Engelmann. pp. xi., 810.

(2) Grundriss der Psychologie. Zehnte, verbesserte Auflage. With
23 illustrations. Large 8vo. Leipzig, W. Engelmann. pp. xvi., 414.

WRITINGS OF WII^HBlyM WUNDT 587

(3) Vorlesungen uber die Menschen- und Tierseele. Fiinfte Auflage.
With 53 illustrations. Large 8vo. Hamburg and Leipzig, L. Voss.
pp. xii., 558.

(4) Kleine Schriften. Vol. ii. Large Svo. Leipzig, W. Engelraann.
pp. vii., 496. (Psychological essays. Ueber psychische Kausalitat
[revision of 1894 (2)]; Die Definition der Psychologie [revision of 1895 (i)];
Ueber psychologische Methoden [revision of 1891 (3), 1899 (i), 1907 (3),
1909 (i), 1904 (2)]; Zur Lehre von den Gemiitsbewegungen [revision of
1 89 1 (i)]; Hypnotismus und Suggestion [revision of 1892 (2), (3)]).

(5) Prohlemeder Volkerpsychologie. Large 8vo. Leipzig, E. Wiegandt.
pp. vii,, 120.

(6) Hypnotismus und Suggestion. Zweite, durchgesehene Auflage.
From Kleine Schriften, ii.] Large Svo. Leipzig, W. Engelmann. pp. 69.

BOOK REVIEWS

Introduction to philosophy, by W. Jerusalem, translated by C. F. Sanders.
New York, The Macmillan Company, 1910. pp. VIII, 319.

An excellent compendium of the philosophical schools and theories,
objective and impartial, yet with a clear platform of its own, is here made
more accessible to American students. For completeness in historical
orientation of the theories, and in exposition of their recent developments,
we hardly know a better book. Its standpoint is empirical, practical,
social, and devoted to common-sense. Judged as a text for beginners in
this country, it seems to presuppose a more thorough general preparation
and more mature habits of thought than one ordinarily finds in the Ameri-
can student; its greatest utility here would perhaps lie in its compendious
character. For graduate students wishing a summary view it should be
invaluable. Every problem is historically grounded, and the bibliographies
are carefully prepared and well-balanced.

Jerusalem's philosophy "is characterized by the empirical view-point,
the genetic method, and the biological and social method of interpreting
the human mind" (p. vi). It is "rather close to pragmatism in epistem-
ology," but gives "a further development of the pragmatic concept of truth "
(p. vi). The following are typical phrases: "the airy realm of the tran-
scendental," "come down to the level of reality," "understand life itself,"
"define its ideal and destiny" (p. vii). Philosophy is defined as "world
theory, "which is "obliged to keep in close touch with science," and "to con-
struct the fragments, beyond which scientific investigation can never attain,
into consistent, articulated system " (p. 2). Emotional and practical motives
also play a part. Philosophy "should teach us to regard the world and
life from nobler view-points "(p. 3). In its unity and in its study of the
methods by which unity is gained, lies the distinction between philosophy
and science (p. 14). Thus "the investigation of the foundations of knowl-
edge" is philosophy's "most important task" (p. 15). But its field is very
broad. It includes psychology and logic as Propaedeutik, epistemology,
metaphysics, aesthetics, and ethics (including sociology), — all of which are
to be studied historically as well as systematically.

The second division of the book, which deals with psychology and logic,
limits itself mainly to the defining of the subject-matter of these two
sciences. Psychology studies processes, not states; knows nothing of
substance (soul); and is independent of metaphysics (p. 26), although
contributory to the problem of knowledge, and to other problems (p. 40).
The sections on logic, comprising the theory of judgment, are rather ad-
vanced reading, but they constitute an admirable summary.

The third division, "Criticism of Knowledge and Epistemology," traces
the theories historically from naive realism through Kantianism and ideal-
ism to the author's view, critical realism. Idealism, he finds, fails to account
for social agreement; and since a universal consciousness is "psychologi-
cally practically inconceivable" (p. 82), critical realism alone remains.
The discussion of epistemology includes sensualism, intellectualism (ra-
tionalism), mysticism and pragmatism. The author identifies modem
mysticism (wrongly, in the opinion of the reviewer) with spiritism; and in
his criticism of pragmatism, he seems to overlook its chief difiiculty, i. e.,
its failure to account for the need of knowledge for its own sake, apart
from further consequences. The governing category of knowledge he

BOOK REVIEWS 589

finds genetically to be "fundamental apperception," which seems to be
Kant's "transcendental unity" with a psychological body (p. 108). This,
as well as the more particular categories, is evolved by natural selection,
in accordance with the pragmatic principle of useful adaptation to environ-
ment (p. III). Abstract reasoning is the best substitute we can find, in the
absence of concrete verifiability; this furnishes the origin of the apparent
independence of logic (pp. 1 18-120). There is really no a priori knowledge
(p. 123). On the whole, the discussion, although difficult for a beginner,
is a masterpiece of logical arrangement and clearness.

The fourth division, "Metaphysics or Ontology," first discusses the
ontological problem. Monism is either materialism, spiritualism (panpsy-
chism), monism of being (Haeckel) or of becoming (Mach, Avenarius).
The author doubts the conservation of energy in psychical process, and
inclines to accept Wundt's "creative synthesis" (p. 147). Panpsychism
is condemned (unfairly, we believe) as not accounting for the physical.
The author is a dualist and an interactionist; he regards will as the type of
causation (p. 181). Pluralism is less completely discussed than other
topics, inasmuch as radical empiricism does not seem to be understood.
Its attempt to defend plurality from the point of view of immediacy is not
mentioned (p. 184). In his discussion of the cosmological problem the
author follows Paulsen, in the main.

The fifth division treats of .Esthetics; and the sixth, of Ethics and
Sociology. In the opinion of the author, indeed, ethics is sociology. Its
subject-matter is not "deportment," but "volition" (p. 241), "the evalua-
tion of an act in its social significance" (p. 265). Strangely enough, he
brings the problem of freedom under ethics, rather than under metaphysics.
He upholds psychological freedom, or the "absence of the feeling of external
or internal constraint;" but denies metaphysical freedom, or the view that
acts are "outside the law of causality" (p. 256). As to sociology, so much
does he value it that he says "the sociology of the future ....
might well become the foundation of all philosophy" (p. 285).

From the "Concluding Reflections" many quotations might be cited
to confirm our general estimate of the author's position. "Philosophy
must return to the theory .... of sound common-sense" (p.
293). "The ultimate object of knowledge is, after all, the preservation and
improvement of life" (p. 300). Intellectualistic idealism is "an hyper-
trophy of the cognitive impulse" (p. 300). The universe is a vast will
(pp. 306-307) ; and "the investigation of the laws of this divine will furnishes
the sublime problem of all science" (p. 307). Is not this panpsychism?
Or at least, is it not just a little above common-sense?

But, all criticisms apart, the book is a remarkable, and on the whole, a
very just summary of philosophy. One finds it impossible, in a short
review, to do justice to its historical perspective, and its logical arrange-
ment of the problems. May it meet with the hearty welcome which it
deserves. W. H. Sheldon.

Dartmouth College,

The Process of Abstraction: An Experimental Study, by Thomas Vernbr

MooRB. University of California Publications in Psychology, i, 2,

1910, pp. 73-197.

Following in the wake of the Wurzburg school which has tried, during

the past ten years, to study experimentally the higher thought processes,

Moore attempts to determine experimentally the mental processes involved

in the process of abstraction, or the formation of our general ideas. He

seeks to discover how general ideas form and develop, and what mental

processes are involved in their formation.

His method consisted in presenting to his subjects, a series of groups of
geometrical figures so drawn and arranged that a common element con-
stantly recurred in each group, while the other figures in the group were con-
JOURNAL — 8

590 BOOK REVIEWS

stantly varied. As soon as the subject felt sure that the same figure had
occurred more than once, he stopped the exposure-apparatus; he then
described his state of mind during the experiment stating, especially, what
it was that he first noticed in isolating and perceiving the common element.

It was found that the groups of figures thus exposed constituted some-
thing of a unit which underwent rather definite changes as the common
element became isolated and perceived. That is to say, the elements of
these groups had a different mental value after the common element had
been perceived from what they had before. This made it possible to study
the process of abstraction genetically. Four stages or steps in the process of
abstraction were ascertained: (i) The breaking up of the groups of figures
and the selection of the common element. (2) The process of perceiving
or apprehending this common element. (3) Holding this common element
in immediate memory, until (4) it was recognized as having occurred before .
Each of these stages was made the subject of special observation, with a
view to determining the mental processes involved.

On the first point, the breaking up of the group, and the isolation of the
common element, nothing new was determined. Moore simply says that
the selection of the common element depended upon the degree to which
the repeated figure attracted the observer's attention. This step seems not
to have been worked out in detail. No psychological history of the mental
process actually employed in selecting the common element was obtained;
but it was determined that, when the group was finally broken up, the
common element always became accentuated at the expense of the surround-
ing elements, which seemed to be positively cast aside and swept more or
less completely from the field of consciousness.

The second step, the perception the common element, was initiated by
this breaking up of the group. The sensations aroused by the recurrent
figure were attended to. This, at once, instituted a process of appercep-
tion or mental assimilation, by means of which the sensations were related
or joined to one or more appropriate categories. A general idea that some
kind of a figure (roundish, open, pointed, etc.) had been repeated, was the
result; but no definite information about the shape or nature of this figure
could be given. The figure was clearly apprehended but not in represen-
tative terms. "Mental images formed no essential part in this first appre-
hension of the figure." There was not even a more or less specialized
general concept of the form of the figure perceived. After the knowledge
that some kind of figure had been repeated, the memory of this fact usually
lingered in consciousness until a clearer idea of the figure was formed. But
this second idea of the common element might still be expressed in perfectly
general and non-representative terms. It was only rarely represented
in consciousness in imaginal terms, or accompanied by feelings of pleasant-
ness or unpleasantness, strain, and the like. The third step in the percep-
tion of the common element was the acquisition of a correct idea of the
figure and a clear knowledge of its shape ; this stage was attended by doubt
or error as to the orientation of the figure in the group. The fourth and
last step in the perception of the common element involved forming a
correct idea of the figure and its shape, with a true knowledge of its orienta-
tion in the group. It is, therefore, clear that the perception of the common
element in abstraction proceeded from that which was general and vague
and imageless to that which was particular and definite and clear. Mental
images belonged only to the later and more unessential stages of the per-
ception of the common figure.

After the common element had been isolated and perceived, it had to be
held in immediate memory until it could be certainly recognized as having
been seen before. This memorial process was investigated, and three
factors were found to affect the memorial permanency of the common
element: (i) The method of memorial visualization, motorization, asso-
ciation, analysis, etc. (2) The appearance and noting of impressions

BOOK R^vmWS 591

between the time when the common element was first noticed, and its final
perception and recognition. (3) The focality of the common element, when
perceived. The most economic method of memorizing the common ele-
ment, and the method most often used, was that of association and analysis.
Analyzing the vague idea of the figure "to see what it was made up of, what
it resembled, its possible use," etc., was found to be the most effective
method of fixing it. This mental analysis, while never put into actual words
or representative terms, was found to have a greater effect for memorial
permanency than the combined effects of any visual and motor imagery
employed by the subjects. "Subjects often remarked that figures were
remembered in this way when they were attempting to memorize them by
visualization." But the method of memorizing is not the only element that
influenced the memorial permanency of the common element. Succeeding
impressions had a positive tendency to impair the subject's memory for the
common element. In every case, the perception of new figures tended to
obliterate from memory the figure already perceived. Then, too, the
farther the figure was from the focal point of vision when perceived, the
less accurately could it be held and reproduced.

The last stage in the process of abstraction, — the recognition of the com-
mon element, or the knowledge that the figure had been seen before, — was an
entirely different mental process from the selection, perception or retention
of this common element. It often occurred that the figure which the sub-
jects had in mind for some time was later recognized as the common ele-
ment, "Certainty that the figure apprehended had been seen before was
what was dawning upon the subject during the interval when his mind was
thus being fully made up." In the development of this recognitive certainty
there was (i) an intimation or feeling of weak probability that a figure had
been seen before; (2) a stage of actual probability that a common element
was present; (3) a final stage of certainty. While the process of recognizing
was thus distinct from the process of perceiving the common element, it
must not be inferred that the process of perception was regularly completed
before the process of recognition began. "What actually happened was that
almost any degree or certainty of recognition might co-exist with any degree
of the perfection of perception." There might be (i) an intimation of a
common element, without any knowledge of its form; (2) probability that
a common element was present, but an imperfect idea of its form; (3)
probability that a common element was present, and a true idea of its form;
(4) certainty that a common element was present, but an imperfect idea
of its form; (5) certainty that a figure was repeated without any knowledge
of its form. These results were obtained by stopping the apparatus, during
some of the experiments before absolute certainty had developed. In this
way, cross-section analyses of the recognitive consciousness were obtained
which showed the process at all stages of its development. The subjects
were also shown discs without a common element, and discs containing more
than one common element, to insure accurate observation. Certain
recognition, is, therefore, not dependent upon perfect perception; neither
is it dependent upon a comparison of mental images. It often took place
without the formation of any mental image of the thing that was recog-
nized. "A person might be certain that a figure was repeated, and have a
perfect image of the figure, or an imperfect image, or no image at all." "A
comparison of mental images is not the normal method of recognition."

In this process of recognition, an element of certainty or uncertainty was
always involved. This imphed assent or doubt, and, consequently, an
actual or suspended judgment. The final question, therefore, is to determine
the psychological basis of this recognitive judgment. How was this
judgment or feeling of certainty arrived at in the experiment? Moore's
answer to this question is theoretical. The actual development of this
feeling of certainty was not determined; but "recognition took place not
only when there was no revived mental image of the past perception, but

592 BOOK EEVIKWS

when the present perception itself was too imperfect to leave any trace of
mental imagery on the mind" (p. 173).

The real basis of this recognitive certainty, "was the series of associated
concepts or appropriate mental categories which the sensations of the
common element aroused." "The subject's first idea of the common
element was made up of the sensations from the repeating figure plus the
concepts or mental categories which these recalled. These two processes
fused and formed a new psychical product, — the subject's first apprehen-
sion or idea of the common figure. When the common element was seen
again, a new percept was formed and assimilated to the old." Just how
this occurred Moore does not say. "The old series of associated concepts
readily falls in with the new, and gives rise to the feeling of familiarity and
certainty." How or why, Moore does not determine. "The new concepts
thus formed readily fit in with the old. There is nothing to jar the process
of their assimilation, but often a re-enforcement of at least some members
of the associated train of concepts." The figure's series of associated
concepts, therefore, not only formed the chief factor in perception, and the
factor by means of which the subjects recalled the figures, but also the factor
that enabled them to recognize the figure as having occurred before (p.
175). These mental categories or concepts were also the final product of
the whole process of abstraction.

Two things were determined about this final product of abstraction or
learning: (i) That the mental categories and concepts formed in the process
of this experiment were the result of the subject's experience with the
repeating figures of the groups. All other categories and concepts possessed
by the individual are products of the individual's past experience in the
process of learning. (2) These mental categories or concepts represent
compound psychic processes which are separate and distinct from mental
images and feelings, — a result supported by the author's careful summary
of related studies in the psychology of thought with which his study begins.

The character and nature of these concepts was not determined or
described; and the reader seeks in vain for a more detailed psychological
history of the formation and development of the particular concepts formed
in the course of the experiment. One is curious to know the nature and
origin of the imageless mental contents arrived at; and how these actually
operated in the process of forming other mental categories and concepts.
The reviewer feels that a more detailed psychological history of the forma-
tion and development of the particular concepts formed in the cotu-se of the
experiment would have told us much about the nature and origin of these
imageless processes. The author should have told us exactly how the
common element was perceived ; he should have determined, by controlled
and repeated observations, exactly how the feeling of recognitive certainty
was acquired, how the common element was actually selected, etc., — a very
difficult but not impossible task which must be squarely met if we are to
obtain the psychological facts. What, to the reviewer, seems to be needed
most in all such studies as this is a complete psychological history of the
processes studied. We should be supplied with enough accurate, cross-
section analyses of the mental processes involved to enable us to trace,
with assurance, the whole course of their development. This is a method
and point of view, which is not clearly apprehended in the present study.
In fact, the reviewer feels that the author is at times describing logical
deductions instead of psychological facts; that he is trying to tell how he
thought certain processes worked instead of giving us actual verified
observations from his subjects. Nevertheless, Moore has done a careful
and important piece of work. His study is, without doubt, the best in
the field, for it not only makes an important contribution to the ever-
growing psychology of the higher thought processes, but it also raises an
array of definite problems for future work, some of which I have tried to
indicate in this review. W. F. Book.

University of Montana.

BOOK REVIEWS 593

Technique de psychologie experimentale de Toulouse, Vaschide et Pieron.
Par E. Toulouse et H. Pie;ron. Paris, O. Doin et Fils, 191 1. Two
vols. pp. 303, 288.

This is the second edition, carefully revised and largely extended, of
a one- volume work published by Toulouse, Vaschide and Pieron in 1904.
In its original form, the Technique was practically a manual of mental
tests, the sublimated result of ten years of teaching and investigation;
it grew out of Toulouse's study of Zola (1896), where the need for precise
methods was keenly felt. The authors accordingly made a clean sweep
of experimental tradition, and started out to devise, on their own behalf,
rules for the examen des sujets (see this Journal, xvi., 1905, 139).
The new two- volume work has a wider scope; "it allows a very large place
to the methods customarily employed in the various laboratories of France,
Germany, England and the United States of America;" it devotes a chapter
to the doctrine of averages and the formulae of correlation; it pays special
attention to the 'higher processes;' it describes new experiments (especially
in the domain of visual perception) and new apparatus; finally, it omits
the theoretical framework of the earlier exposition, and so gains space
for maxims of actual laboratory practice.

Nevertheless, the reader who turns to the book with the expectation
of finding in it a monographic review of the methods of experimental psy-
chology will be sadly disappointed. There is not a single reference that
extends beyond the bare name of a writer, and the bibliographical index
contains only four works, the manuals of Jud#, Myers, Sanford and Titch-
ener. There is no discussion of method proper: the methods of experi-
mental psychology "are implied in our technique, but the man of science
uses methods, and it is the philosopher who reflects upon them after the
event and appraises or judges them; so that this is not our business."
Unfortunately, the methods implied in the technique are of an empirical
and proximate kind; the trail of the mental test is still apparent. How-
ever, the value of the book, at any rate to the American psychologist, is
found precisely in its limitations. It has the qualities of its defects: it
shows us what a course in experimental psychology becomes when the
primary interest of the instructors is in individual psychology, and when
the practical application of laboratory results is a constant motive in
the shaping of the experiments.

As a paradigm of the writers' treatment we may take the first section
of the work, the seven and a half pages allotted to Sensations of Pressure.
The student is warned, at the outset, that the experiment is concerned,
not with the limen of duality, but with the single sensation of contact;
nothing is said of the nature of the sensation, A brief account is given (with
figure) of von Frey's hair sesthesiometer. Then follows a longer account
(with figure) of the haphiaesthesiometric needle-points of Toulouse and
Vaschide; von Frey's formula for tension values is stated in a foot-note.
Beaunis' aesthesiometric needle-point is figured and described, at the ex-
pense of a page and a half, although it is difficult of manipulation, too
heavy for the lower limens, and 'has hardly ever been employed.' So
we come to the paragraphs headed Technique. A circle of at most 2 mm.
in diameter is marked with a rubber stamp on the front surface of the
observer's wrist, where there is no hair. The observer's eyes are blind-
folded, and his hand placed in a fixed position on a felt-covered table.
He is instructed that he will be touched from time to time on the back ( !)
of the wrist, and that he is to say Yes whenever he feels the pressure. Rate,
order of touches and blank experiments, ready-signal, form of enquiry for
the experimenter, are all prescribed. 'The series is ascending, from light
to heavy; when the observer says Yes, the point evoking this response is
to be used in a special series, consisting about one-half of actual touches and
one-half of blanks; if the reply is always correct, the next lighter point is
taken. Thus one obtains either the limen of certainty or a lower limen of

594 BOOK REvmws

arbitrary value (touch sensed in three-quarters or less of the cases). Pauses
must be made, in order to the avoidance of fatigue. Preliminary experi-
ments are required, that the observer may understand the problem. The
point must be applied slowly and in a strictly vertical position; it must
remain on the skin for a constant period of time. All points must be
kept, during the experiment, in a dry-chamber of 38** temperature. — Here
is no lack of details; and yet the account of the experiment leaves much
to be desired. At what place within the circle of 2 mm. diameter is the
point of yV ini^- diameter to be set down; always at the same spot or
indifferently at any place within the circle? How is the hand of the obser-
ver to be 'immobilised' upon the felt-covered table? Even if the method
employed — an ascending series, interrupted by blank experiments — does
not call for explanation and justification, why is not a descending series
taken, and the two results averaged (this procedure has been recommended
in the Introduction, p. 23)? What meaning will the student attach to the
technical term seuil, when its value may be correspond to 100% of right
cases, to 75%, to 'a lesser number,' or (p. 20) to four successive right
answers? Are the limens obtained by the various members of the class
to be averaged, whether or not they chance to be derived from pressure-
spots? These and similar questions must be answered, if the experiment
is to be taken in psychological earnest.

Finally, what of the instrument used? The hair aesthesiometer is re-
jected, partly on account of the hygroscopic properties of the hair, partly
on account of the variation (presumably as the result of bending) of its
stimulus-value. We have, instead, the haphiaesthesiometric needle-
points of tempered steel. We are warned, however, that the manipulation
of these points is by no means easy. The holder is small, oftentimes very
small; too sudden an application brings the head of the needle against
the roof -plate of the holder; an application in any but an exactly vertical
position means friction of the needle in the guide, so that the experimenter
must rest his elbows solidly on the table, fixate the head of the needle, and
follow its course from various points of view; the points must be kept
in the dry-chamber, at a certain temperature, or a temperature sensation
will precede or accompany the sensation of contact ; and the heavier points
(this caution would hardly have been given had not experience proved it
necessary) are liable to rust. The reviewer has had no experience with
the haphiaesthesiometer, but on general principles he must believe that the
use of the points calls for the constant supervision of the instructor, and in
particular that the error arising from friction is serious. If the authors
are absolutely determined against the introduction into the laboratory of
'capillary organic matter,' and if the experiment requires stimulus-points
of minimal diameter, it would seem better to have recourse to Thunberg's
standardized glass 'hairs.'

All these criticisms carry a single moral: that the experiment of ex-
perimental psychology is one thing, and the mental test another. In
psychophysics the limen must be rigorously defined; for test purposes,
an arbitrary limen may be set up, to meet the special conditions of the
tests. In the psychological laboratory, the choice of method and appara-
tus is determined by scientific reasons and by these alone; in the case. of
mental tests, it is influenced by other considerations, — simplicity, ease of
manipulation, portability, quickness of application and of calculation.
It seems that in this first experiment, on pressure, the authors of the work
under review have fallen between the two stools: their method is unduly
rough, and their instruments are too delicate for any but the most skilled
and careful use.

The reviewer, however, wishes to bring out the qualities of the two
volumes; and this end can, perhaps, best be accomplished by way of a com-
plete synopsis of their contents. Pt. I. discusses the measurement of the
elementary phenomena of sense. Ch. i., on the measurement of cutaneous

BOOK RBvmws 595

sensations, opens with (i) the experiment on sensations of pressure which
has just been described. Sensations of temperature (2) are measured by
means of a thermoaesthesiometer, which deposits on the skin drops of
warmed or cooled water. Kiesow's cone is figured. Sensations of pain
(3) are obtained by the compression, in a pincers-Hke algoaesthesiometer,
of a fold of the skin; the direct-pressure instruments of Macdonald and
Cheron are figured. Sections follow on (4) the electrical sensations (!)
produced by faradisation of the skin, and (5) miscellaneous cutaneous
sensations, — caustic sensations, due to the application of caustic potash
in various strengths of solution; sensations of traction; pilary sensations;
sensations of tickling. Finally, directions are given for the determination
(6) of the duration of cutaneous sensations (method of intermittent stimuli).
Ch. ii., on the measurement of the subcutaneous sensations, is devoted to
(i) sensations of vibration, evoked by the tuning fork, and (2) kinsesthetic
or, as the authors prefer to call them, kinesic sensations. The latter are
of three kinds: sensations of muscular effort (myoaesthesiometer: a set
of holders and weights), static sensations (schesiaesthesiometer : an adjust-
able support for the hand, whereby positions of the arm may be varied and
reinstated), and dynamic sensations of passive and active movement
(schesiaesthesiometer, moving car; boards with grooved patterns, moving
car). Ch. iii. brings us to the measurement of sensations of taste and
smell. The instruments recommended are the gueusiaesthesiometer
(geusiaesthesiometer?), a set of flasks containing standard solutions, with
droppers inserted in the corks, and the osmiaesthesionieter, a set of wide-
mouthed bottles containing 34 aqueous solutions of camphor, of known
degrees of concentration, 10 typical scents (for recognition), and 5 strengths
each of liquid ammonia and of aqueous sulphuric ether (for testing the
tactual sensitivity of the mucosa). Ch. iv. deals with the measurement of
visual sensations. Two experiments fall under the heading (i) sensations
of light. The minimum perceptihile is determined by an instrument con-
structed on the principle of Charpentier's photoptometer; the source of
light is controlled by the Blondel-Broca photometer. Bouguer's and
Biondel's diaphragms are figured. The differential limen is determined
either by a differential photoaesthesiometer built on the same principle
(rays from a single source are directed by two total-reflection prisms upon
diffusing screens, which are viewed through tubes containing a diaphragm)
or by rotating discs. (2) Sensations of color have four experiments. For
the absolute limen of color, and for the differential limen of chroma ('color
intensity'), the authors recommend a chromatoassthesiometer, made up
of colored solutions in rectangular glass vessels; directions are given for
the preparation of the solutions. The extreme limits of color sensitivity
are fixed by reference to a spectrum. The differential limen of hue is
spectrometrically determined. The equation of tint, in the determination
of the differential limen of chroma, — a precaution neglected in the initial
experiment, — may be effected, though only at the cost of much labor, by
suitable combinations of the colored solutions; it is better, therefore, to
have recourse to rotating discs ; these then permit also of the determination
of the absolute color limen, under the same conditions ; they permit, further,
by the addition of increments of black or white, of the determination of the
differential limen of nuance {nuances claires and nuances foncces, that is,
changes of tint involving at the same time changes of chroma. Nothing
is said of the equation of tint and chroma as a preliminary to the finding
of the differential limen of hue.) (3) Visual acuity is measured by a set of
optotypes, resembling those of Sulzer, (4) and the extent of the field of
vision by Polack's perimeter, (5) The duration of visual sensations
(method of intermittence) may be ascertained either by rotating discs
(Pierre Janet's arrangement, with regulator and counter) or by Michotte 's
tachistoscope. Ch. v. deals with the measurement of auditory sensations,
(i) The acousiaesthesiometer (drops of water fall upon a sloping plate of

59^ BOOK REVIEWS

aluminium which gives the a of 217.5 vs.: apparently, the authors count
in complete vibrations) takes the place of the more familiar acoumeters.
(2) The lower limit of pitch is found by the siren; the upper limit by
Koenig's cylinders or the Galton whistle; the differential limen by forks
of variable pitch. (3) The temporal limen of tone is also found by the
siren; the duration of tonal sensation by means of Sanford's pendulum
and tuning fork. Ch. vi. describes the measurement of the labyrinthine
sensations, (i) Sensations of rotation require a turn-table, (2) sensations
of translation a car running upon rails.

Pt. II. discusses the measurement of the complex phenomena of sense.
Ch. i., on the measurement of the perceptions connected with cutaneous
sensations, opens with experiments on (i) the cutaneous space-sense.
Here we have four main experiments, the first of which, on the differen-
tiation of contacts, has three subdivisions: the distinction of simultaneous
contacts (haphiaesthesiometric compasses of the writers, and of Michotte),
the spatial distinction of successive contacts, and the spatial discrimination
of two points, the one of which is fixed, while the other is moved away from
it at an uniform rate (Michotte). Then follow experiments on the localisa-
tion of a contact, absolute or relative; on the various movement limens
(kinesimeter with horse-hair stimulator) ; and on the cutaneous perception
of form (stereoaesthesiometer). (2) The stereognostic perception of form
is determined by means of a series of copper balls varying from sphere to
ovoid; the forms are rolled between thumb and finger tips (dynamic
stereoaesthesiometer). (3) The perception of the position and movement
of the body is effected by a vertical tilt-board (somatic perception of the
vertical) and an adjustable swing (perception of displacement in the ver-
tical direction). (4) The concluding experiment measures the illusion,
with passive pressure, of open and filled space. Ch. ii. takes up the per-
ceptions connected with associated visual sensations, (i) The percep-
tion of depth is studied by means of luminous points in a dark room. (2)
Five experiments are grouped under the heading of perception of magnitude :
the discrimination of the lengths of horizontal and vertical lines; of the
relative position of two points within a circle (the one point is fixed, the
other is radially and angularly variable) ; of angles of different magnitudes ;
and of the areas of circles and squares. (3) The perception of form may
be measured either by the solid forms of the stereoaesthesiometer, or by
way of series of plane figures, in which the circle changes to the ellipse or the
square to the oblong. (4) The movement limens are determined by the
aid of luminous points in a dark room. (5) A few typical phenomena of
stereoscopic vision are observed, with and without the Brewster prisms.
(6) The time of perception is roughly measured by a simple form of tach-
istoscope (photographic shutter). The concluding experiments are
devoted (7) to some typical geometrical illusions (length of lines, magni-
tude of areas, direction of lines) and (8) to the size- weight illusion. Ch.
iii., on the measurement of perceptions connected with associated auditory
sensations, comprises a single experiment, on the localisation of sound (the
acousiaesthesiometer is employed). Ch. iv. describes two experiments
on the measurement of perceptions connected with associated sensations
of diverse modalities, (i) The sense of time requires somewhat elaborate
apparatus: the authors describe a new-pattern electric chronoscope (vol.
ii., p. 31), fitted with Pieron's interrupter. Short, moderate and long
times (e. g., times of 150, 600 and 2,400 cr) are Hmited by impressions of
light (Pliicker's tube) or sound (bell). (2) The sense of rhythm is studied
by means of notched discs actuating an electric interrupter. Ch. v. brings
us to the measurement of sensory attention, (i) The difference between
surprised, reflex and voluntary attention is measured by the brief exposure,
in a dark room, of a series of objects presented for recognition, — without
signal, with a flash of light given 0.02 sec. before illumination, and with a
preparatory 'Attention!' (2) The reinforcement of sensory intensity is

BOOK REVIEWS 597

shown by the lowering of the differential limen (Michotte's movement-
limen, determined as in ch. i., compared with the same limen under simple
distraction), by sustained precision of perception with monotonous repeti-
tion of stimuli (special form of the cancellation test), and by the fluctua-
tion of a liminal stimulus (acousiaesthesiometer). (3) The acceleration
of mental processes in attention is proved by experiment (i) as just
described, and by change in the duration of simple and choice reactions.
(4) The fluctuations of attention are indicated by the mean variation of
the reaction times. Ch. vi., on the measurement of sensory affectivity,
recommends experiments by the serial method or the method of paired
comparison on colors and tones, taken singly or in groups of simultaneous
or successive terms.

Pt. III. discusses the measurement of phenomena of objectification .
A subjective experience may be objectified in two ways: by stimulating
to a motor reaction, which produces consequences in the external world,
and by arousing an affirmation of external existence. The second or
affirmative mode of objectification is treated in ch. i. (i) Assurance of testi-
mony is measured by the familiar test-picture and questionary. (2) Suggesti-
bility is measured, in the same experiment, by the addition of suggestive
questions, and (on its sensory side) by the subjects' liability to an illusion
of warmth. Ch. ii., on the motor mode of objectification, opens (i) with
an account of the apparatus required for the reaction experiment; we
have already noticed the new electric chronoscope, run by a 50 or 100 vs.
electric fork; the authors' complete set of instruments for visual, auditory
and cutaneous reactions is shown on p. 39. (2) Rate of voluntary move-
ment is measured by a simple tapping test and by a sorting test. (3)
Accuracy of movement is measured, most simply, by a tracing test; with
sensory-motor adaptation, by an aiming test; symmetrically by rectilineal
arm-movements across a vertical surface. (4) Motor fatigue and the
fluctuation of voluntary effort are studied by the dynamograph or ergo-
graph. (5) Motor suggestibility is measured by Binet's belted wheels;
tendency to involuntary movement by one or other of the familiar in-
struments: the observer is instructed to inhibit all movement when a
certain word appears in a list read out to him, and the instruction has a
positively suggestive effect. (6) The limits of voluntary movement are
determined by instruction to move the nostrils, ears, etc., and by experi-
ments in free stereoscopy. (7) Motor inhibition is approached by way
of the reflex wink and the knee-jerk; the authors figure a special reflex-
ometer for the measurement of the patellar reflex.

Pt. IV. discusses the measurement of intellectual phenomena; ch. i. is
devoted to memory, (i) The memory of elementary perceptions may be
determined by the method of recognition, with all forms of sensory tech-
nique; a uniform interval of i min. is prescribed, (2) Special tests are
outlined for the memory of complex perceptions: kinesic memory is in-
vestigated by means of tracing-forms; auditory memory by musical tones,
triads, arpeggios, and melodic fragments (the material used is given in an
appendix); visual memory by combinations of curved and straight lines,
by pictures of simple objects, and (as memory of attitude and expression)
by observation of an artist's lay-figure. This last test seems to the writer
to be worthy of introduction into American laboratories. Memory of
physiognomy and of complex scenes is tested by means of paired pictures,
the members of the pair differing in slight details; the use of picture
post-cards is recommended. Five experiments are described under the
heading (3) verbal and intellectual memory. A preliminary section deals
with the manner of presentation of the material ; a simple exposure-screen,
with two openings for alternate use, is figured. The experiments — or
rather tests — are concerned with the memory of letters and figures, of
words and syllables, of phrases, and of ideas (meanings), and with types of
memory; samples of material are given in an appendix. The tests present

598 BOOK REVIEWS

nothing new; and we therefore pass to (4) the tests of acquisition. These
are merely outlined, under the headings: time of learning (nonsense
syllables), economy of learning (optimal interval; partial vs. global learn-
ing), the influence of fatigue, the mutual influence of the perceptual ele-
ments (series of words with first or last syllable identical, etc.), and motor
apprenticeship (typewriting with change of keys). (5) The phenomena
of forgetting are examined in two ways: by increase of the interval elaps-
ing between impression and recall, and by counting the repetitions neces-
sary for the rememorising of a forgotten syllabic series. (6) A final experi-
ment is devoted to the phenomena of localisation, i. e., the reproductiqn
of a presented temporal or spatial order. Ch. ii. deals with the measure-
ment of the phenomena of association. Here we have (i) experiments on
free association; rate is measured by the reaction time of the single
association, wealth of ideas by the number of associations effected in a
given time; the forms of connection may be classified as intellectual,
verbal, and accidental. (2) Constrained association may be simply studied
in the same two ways; a special experiment is devoted to abstraction
(superordination). Imagination is also brought under this rubric: an
elementary test consists in the presentation of words (visual or auditory)
for reproduction in the reverse (literal or syllabic) order; complex tests
are the building up of a sentence from a word, or of a narrative from a phrase,
and the description of a picture. Ch. iii. advances to the measurement of
logical phenomena, (i) Understanding is tested by the time required
for the solution of a very simple geometrical problem. (2) Judgment is
tested, ingeniously, by the presentation to the subject of sentences or
pictures, some of which are reasonable and others absurd; the element of
improbability is to be indicated. (3) Reasoning is tested by the characteri-
sation of completed syllogisms as correct or incorrect, and by the drawing
of a conclusion from presented premises. (4) Ingenuity is tested by a
puzzle (arrangement of blocks).

Pt. V. is entitled "Determination of the Individual S5mthesis." Ch.
i., written in collaboration with Dr. M. Mignard, treats of voluntary con-
trol, i. e., of the synthesis and direction, in the concrete case, of the ele-
mentary functions already measured. The apparatus used for the reaction
experiment is employed to determine starting- times (action), stopping-
times (inhibition) and times of change (decision); the actions called for
are simple, — tapping, continuous addition or subtraction, etc. Mental
stability is tested by the performance of experiments under various forms
of distraction. Finally, the extent of the field of attention is measured by
the assignment of a twofold instruction (alternate types of constrained
association; addition and counting metronome beats), and the comparison
of the results with those of the corresponding regular experiments. Ch.
ii. discusses functional correlations and the comparison of individuals.
It is impossible, if we start out with the tests, to reach a general measure
of character or ability, or to determine the aptitude of the subjects for
special vocations. On the other hand, we may start out with subjects of
known ability or disability, and by examining them may be able to establish
a norm of test-performance; or with any selected group of individuals,
whom we may rank in the order of their standing under some particular
test. These partial comparisons involve a comprehension of the nature
of averages, deviations, and formulas of correlation, to which accordingly
the main body of the chapter is devoted. Ch. iii. then takes up the role
of observation in the determination of individual type. The peculiarly
social side of human nature is beyond the reach of experiment; we cannot
study our fellow-men as we can study animals, under the all-inclusive
rubric of behavior. Even if we have at our disposal the backward forms
of civilised mentality, or specimens of the backward races, a measurement
of total human capacity is beyond our reach; subjective estimation must
still play a part. Indeed, a field will always remain, in psychology, for

BOOK RKVI^WS

599

observation: individual acquisition, the intellectual sentiments, automatic
and affective tendencies, the forms and degrees of self-control, — topics of
this kind can be approached only by the observational method, which
"deserves a kind of technique of its own." Whether the authors intend
to write this supplementary manual, as Dr. Hallion has undertaken to
write upon physiological psychology, we are not informed; but the book
is advertised to appear in the series. B. B. T.

BOOK NOTES

Zur Analyse der Geddchtnistdtigkeit und des Vorstellungsverlaufes, von
G. E. MU1.LER. I Teil. Leipzig, Johann Ambrosius Barth, 191 1.
403 p. I. Abteilung, Zeitsch. f. Psychologic, hrsg. von F. Schumann
Brg.-Bd. 5.
This work is divided into four parts, i. A general introduction, state-
ment of problems, discussion of types and their mixtures, etc. 2. Self
perception, especially in experiments on memory; here are included the
discussion of subjective and objective observation, the psychic process
in the description of an outer object, the operation of self -observation in its
various forms, methods of reminiscence, etc. 3. This part treats of the
investigation of prominent events of memory. Here we have accounts of
Riickel's number, sense and other tests. 4. The fourth division treats of the
complexes built during the process of learning.

Les localisations cerehrales. Esquisse medicale et psychologique, par Jean
Ferrand. Paris, Jules Rousset, 191 1. 87 p.
This writer concludes that the point of departure of writers of researches
on cerebral localizations is false. Upon certain erroneous facts has been
built a wrong psychic doctrine destined to give intelligence a material
explanation. Certain clinical, anatomical and physiological facts have
been used to serve a philosophic cause; and this has been allowed to go on
on account of the preoccupations of metaphysicians. One result is the
condemnation of the theory of images and the magnification of association-
ism, which seems now to have triumphed over the old philosophical spirit-
ualism.

The function of suspense in the catharsis, by W. D. Moriarty. Ann
Arbor, Mich., George Wahr, 191 1. 61 p.
The author thinks he can do justice to this subject by refraining from
such questions as the history of the Aristotelian catharsis and competing
theories and confining himself to discussing the function of suspense in
general, then in the drama, and third, in the catharsis. Starting, then,
from the drama, the author, we may say, cuts loose from Aristotle. The
author does not deem it necessary to define exactly beforehand the meaning
of suspense, any more than critics agree upon what catharsis itself is. In
the higher psychocrasis the author distinguishes the functions of entangle-
ment and disentanglement and denouement; and in the last part, on the
nature and scope of the catharsis, he tells us of its surface theories, its
deeper basis, the reasons for diverse views, and its true scope.

La theorie du rythme et le rythme du fran^ais declame, par Eugene Landray.
Paris, Librairie Honore Champion, 191 1. 427 p.
This comprehensive work is divided into three parts, the first on the
theory of rhythm, its relations to movement, perception, art and discourse.
The second part treats of rhythm in French contemporaneous declamation,
deals with energy , duration, accent, pauses, rhythmic divisions, syllabiza-
tion, verse scansion, metre. The third part is devoted to examples of
declamation, for instance in comedy, Mounet-Sully, the poets, Italian
verse, nuance of duration in music, etc.

BOOK NOTKS • 6oi

Experimental studies of rhythm and time, by J. E. Wallace Wallin. Re-
printed from the Psychological Review, March, 191 1. Vol. 18, p.
100-131.
This investigation leads the author to the following conclusions, i.
The different thresholds for time are invariably smaller than the first
rhythm limen although the difference is not large. 2. The different thresh-
olds are relatively smaller for the longer intervals. 3. If we compare the
two methods, using the same pattern, it appears that the threshold for the
continuous method is slightly smaller. 4. As to patterns, the limens are
smdler for the trochaic than for the iambic type of measure. 5. As to the
size of the time limens, the smallest relatively to the interval length is 4.5%.

The essentials of mental measurement, by Willlam Brown. Cambridge,
University Press, 1911. i54P-
This work is written for the professed psychologists who are interested
in quantitative methods and in biometric methods of correlation. The
correlation theory ought to interest educational psychologists. In the
first part, on psychophysics, the author discusses mental measurements and
psychophysical methods, and in the second part, on psychophysical methods,
its mathematical theory, its history, its experimental results and its signifi-
cance in psychology. In an appendix he discusses the theories of Fechner,
Miiller and Urban, with correlation table, etc., with an excellent bibliog-
raphy. The work is to quite an extent mathematical.

An introductory psychology, with some educational applications, by Mel-
bourne Stuart Read. Boston, Ginn & Co., 191 1. 309 p.
This writer holds that the main truths of psychology can be presented
in simple, straightforward, interesting fashion such as he here attempts.
He strives especially to avoid technicalities that would tend to repel rather
than attract, and give the impression that the topics are abstruse and far
away instead of being closest of all. The author attempts nothing original
but merely seeks to make selections, to emphasize, etc. On this principle,
he first discusses consciousness and then the nervous system, attention,
instinct, impulse, habit, the senses, apperception, feeling, interest, associa-
tion, memory, imagination, concept, emotion, sentiment and will.

The essentials of psychology, by W. B. Pillsbury. New York, the Mac-
millan Company, 191 1. 362 p.
The author attempts here to present the accepted facts of psychology,
emphasis being placed upon fact rather than theory. Where theories
conflict the better one has been chosen and the others merely neglected.
His point of view is functional with attention to what mind does rather
than what it is. He stresses the outer manifestations of consciousness, and
yet uses the results of structural psychology, making large use of the
hypothesis of the synapse. Thus he treats first of the nervous system and
neural action in relation to consciousness and behavior, and then discusses
sensation, selection and control, attention, retention and association, apper-
ception, memory and magination, reasoning, instinct, feelings, the emotions,
action and will, work, fatigue and sleep, interrelation of mental functions,
and finally the cell.

Introduction to psychology, by Robert M. Yerkes. New York, Henry
Holt & Co., 191 1. 427 p.
The author regards psychology as a description of consciousness, and
so after an introductory chapter discusses this topic in various aspects, e. g.,
concrete experiences or varieties of consciousness, analysis and the problem
of psychological elements, syntheses and complex experiences, sensations as
elements of consciousness and their properties, psychic complexes of apper-
ception, feeling, memory and imagination. The next part discusses psy-

6o2 BOOK NOTKS

chology as the history of consciousness or genetic description in the individ-
ual and in the race. This subject is despatched in short metre and the
author does but very slight justice to it. The next part treats psychology
as generalizations dealing with observations, laws, principles, as found in
apperception, association, affection and memory. The next part is psy-
chology as explanation and correlation, physical and psychic, bodily and
mental processes, behavior and consciousness, while the last part deals
with the control of the mental life, education, eugenics, etc.

Some neglected factors in evolution; an essay in constructive biology. By
Henry M. Bernard. Edited by Matilda Bernard. New York, G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 191 1. 489 p.
This book contains the mature results of twenty years of biological
research to which the author brought a mind trained by mathematical and
philosophical studies. In 1889, under Haeckel at Jena, he took up the
problem of the origin of the Crustacea. He later became greatly interested
in entoptic phenomena and made a comparative study of vertebrate retinas
which he thought did not consist of cells, as is usually stated, but a network
of nodes which are formed by nuclei. This led him to doubt that the cell is,
after all, the unit of structure of all tissue ; he felt that it needed explanation.
He finally reached the conclusion that in all living organisms there is a
"protomitomic network." There must be more than one unit of structure.
Periodicity and rhythm interested him also.

Medical revolution, by Sydney W. Macilwaine. London, P. S. King
& Son, 191 1. 162 p.
This author pleads for a national preservation of health based on the
natural interpretation of disease. He has lately retired from a long experi-
ence and puts his criticisms of the present practice of medicine in a plain,
simple way in the form of an appeal to the people. His conception is
based on Darwinism. All depends on the conception of disease, whether
it is only negatively a deficiency of health or a symptom group with a
special causation as in specific diseases. Diseases are of two kinds: those
arising from the environment, extrinsic, and these may be of three kinds
— parasitism, poisoning and traumatism; and the second class rising from
the patient's constitution. These are intrinsic and fall into five groups —
incomplete development, constitutional defect, overwork, deficient work,
wear and tear. Now to diagnose is to determine which series the disease
belongs to. Merely to determine the symptom group is not to find the
cause. Specialism must disappear and the hospital system must be re-
formed.

La pensee contemporaine: les grands problemes. Par Paui* Gaui^TiER.
Paris, Hachette et Cie, 191 1. 312 p.
The great problems here discussed are convention in the sciences, the
reality of the sensible world, the inner life, the originality of sentiment,
the reign of liberty, the beauty of art, the virtue of morals, social reform,
political necessity, the end of monism, the future of pluralism, and the
value of action. These he deems the chief problems of our day in both the
theoretical and the practical field. He strives to be at once ideaUstic and
practical.

L'annee psychologique, publiee par AjuFrED BinET. 17th year. Paris,
Masson et Cie, 191 1. 498 p.
In this volume the bibliographical analyses include pages 389 to 496 and
follow the usual rubrics; all the rest of the volume is taken up with original
memoirs. In one Binet discusses what is an emotion and what is an in-
tellectual act; Cruchet, the psycho-physoliogical development of the infant
from birth to two years. There are articles on special methods in psychol-

BOOK NOTES 603

ogy; the relation of the school and society; psycho-physiology and mystic
states; new studies on the measure of intellectual level of school children;
psychic functions in mental diseases; morbid altruism; the delirium of
interpretation and systematized delusions; definition of alienation; mental
confusion; parallels in the classification of alienists.

Puhertdt und Sexualitdt; Untersuchungen zur Psychologie des EntwicklungS'
alters, von August Kohl. Wurzburg Curt Kabitzsch, 191 1. 82 p.
The author first discusses the time of unconscious sexuality or of ignorance
as to the nature of these phenomena, which he describes as a period of
longing, yearning, vague and indefinite as is its nature. In the second
chapter he characterizes the pubertal development of the young man and
devotes another chapter to the young woman. The best trait of the book
is the description of the mental characteristics of the dim and vague mental
trance of this period of life.

Die Traumdeutung, von Sigm. Freud. 3d. enl. ed. Leipzig, Franz Deu-
ticke, 191 1. 418 p.
Although nine years elapsed between the first and the second, only a little
more than one year passed between the second and the third editions of
this work. In this new edition, the writer has taken note of his coadjutors,
particularly Steckel and Otto Ranck, who have co-operated with him in
making additions and particularly the new citations of literature.

Recherches sur les sensations de rotation, par B. Bourdon. Rennes, Oberthur,
191 1. 46 p. (Extrait du Bulletin de la Societe scientifique et medi-
cale de r Quest, t. XX, no. i, 1911.)

II subcosciente, da Roberto Assagiou. Firenze, Biblioteca Filosofica
1911. 30 p.

Un nouvel accoumetre, par B. Bourdon. Extrait du Bulletin de la Societ6
scientifique et medicale de I'Ouest, 4^ trimestre 1910. 6 p.

L'anima. Firenzi, Anno i, Numero 2, Febbraio 191 1. pp 35-62.

Psychologische Studien, hrsg von Wilhelm Wundt. Leipzig, Wilhelm
Engelmann, 191 1 . 140 p. (Neue Folge der ^hilosophischen Studien.)
VII. Hefte I und 2.

Trasformazione e suhlimazione delle energie sessuali, da R. Assagioli.
Bologna, Emiliano, 191 1. 11 p. (Estratto dalla Rivistadi Psicologia
Applicata, pubblicata e diretta da G. C. Ferrari. Maggio-Giugno
191 1, Anno VII, N. 3.)

Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research. August, 191 1. p. 364-
476. Printed for the Society by Robert Maclehose & Co., Limited,
Glasgow, University Press.

Proceedings of the American Medico-Psychological Association at the 66th
annual meeting, held in Washington, D. C, May 3-6, 1910. Published
by the Medico-Psychological Association, 1910. 514 p.

On certain electrical processes in the human body and their relation to emotional
reactions, by Frederick Lyman Wells and Alexander Forbes.
Archives of Psychology, No. 16, March, 191 1. New York, Science
Press. 39 p.

Suhakute Raucher paranoia und einige andere Fdlle von diffusem Beachtungs-
wahn aus dem Gefiihle suhjektiver Unruhe oder unbestimmter Angst
{drohenden Unheils), unbestimmter Erwartung, und aus dem Gefiihle
allegmein erhohter Importanz der Eindrucke, von Max Lowy. Zeit-
schrift fiir die gesamte Neurologic und Psychiatric, 19 10. Band 5,
Heft 4. p. 605-632.

604 BOOK NOTES

Stereotype " pseudokatatone" Bewegungen bei leichtester Bewusstseinsstdrung
(im "hysterischen" Ausnahmszustande), von Max Lowy. Zeitschrift
fiir die gesamte Neurolgie und Psychiatric. 19 lo. Band i, Heft 3,
p. 330-340.

Indian languages of Mexico and Central America and their geographical
distribution, by Cyrus Thomas, assisted by John R. Swanton.
Accompanied by a linguistic map. Gov't printing office, 1 9 1 1 . 1 08 p .
Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 44.

Antiquities of the Mesa Verde National Park, Cliff Palace, by jEssiB Walter
Fewkes. Gov't printing office, 191 1. 82 p. Smithsonian Institu-
tion, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 51.

Indian tribes of the lower Mississippi valley and adjacent coast of the gulf of
Mexico, by John R. Swanton. Gov't printing office, 191 1. 387 p.
Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 43.

Preliminary report on a visit to the Navaho national monument, Arizona,
by Jesse Walter Fewkes. Gov't printing office, 191 1. 35 p.
Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 50.

BERLIN RESEARCH FELLOWSHIP

It is perhaps not generally known that the Sarah Berliner Research
Fellowship for Women (an annual fellowship of $1,000 "open to women
holding the degree of doctorate of philosophy or to those similarly equipped,"
and "available for study and research in physics, chemistry or biology"),
and the biennial prize of $1,000 offered by the Naples Table Association
"for the best thesis written by a woman, on a scientific subject, embodying
new observations and new conclusions based on an independent laboratory
research in biological, chemical or physical science" are open to workers
in psychology. Applications for the exact conditions should be made to
Mrs. C. L. Franklin, Chairman of the Sarah Berliner Committee, 527
Cathedral Parkway, New York, or to Dr. Jane Welch, Baltimore, Md.,
of the Naples Table Association.

SUBJECT INDEX

Abnormal psychology, 323; 408; 460; abnormalities of adolescence, 445;
apraxia, 65; drowsiness, 99; experimental psychopathology, 460;
psychopathology of every day life, 477.

Abstraction, 589.

Adolescence, mental abnormalities of, 445.

^Esthetics, 137.

Affection: affective tendencies, 311; affective value of colors, 112; 114;
fluctuations in affection, 579; affective influence of area of stimulus,
578; affective influence of fatigue, 112.

Anaesthetics, 333.

Animal psychology. See comparative psychology.

Annee psychologique, 316.

Anthropology, 317; 447; linguistic stocks, 120; linguistic types, 120.

Area of stimulus, thermal, 325; affective, 578.

Association : effect of practice, i ,

Attention, 462.

Attitudes of consciousness, 214.

Auditory localization, 250.

Body and mind, 449.

Book notes; 132; 319; 468; 600.

Child study, 125; 446; reasoning in children, 133.

Color-blindness, 369.

Comedy: the aesthetic principle in, 139.

Comparative psychology: auditory discrimination in raccoons, 116; imi-
tation in raccoons 583; instinct, 131; mental evolution, 453.

Consciousness, and learning, 158; anaesthetics, 333; conscious attitudes,
214; consciousness of self, 540.

Correlation in psychology, 129.

Craniometry, 317. *"

Dreams, 124; 127; 455; 460; 463.

Drowsiness, 99.

Emotion, 311; 317.

Eugenics, 456.

Evolution, 304; 453.

Fatigue and affective judgments, 112; products of fatigue, 126.

Freudian literature, 408.

Gustation, 528.

Hypnotism and suggestion, 126; 134; 462.

Images, intensity of, 346.

Imagination, 127.

Imitation in raccoons, 583.

Instinct, 131.

6o6 SUBJECT INDEX

James's psychology, 447.

Learning, 158.

Meaning, 553.

Memory, 445.

Mental measurement, 94; 298; 307.

Miscellaneous: American music, 445; Annee psychologique, 316; craniome-
try, 317; James's psychology, 447; Palladino, 125; sense-organs of
plants, 127.

Montgomery, Edmund, 475.

Philosophy: dogmatism and evolution, 304; history of philosophy, 125;
introduction to philosophy, 588; metaphysics of a naturalist, 124; ^
phenomenology of mind, 309.

Physical factors affecting reaction time, 86.

Practice effects in free association, i.

Psychometry, 94; 298.

Psychopathology of apraxia, 65; of everyday life, 477.

Reaction time, 86; reaction key, 86.

Self, consciousness of, 541.

Spatial perception, auditory, 250.

Spiritism, 122; 323.

Synaesthesia, 528.

Thermal sensitivity, 325.

Terminology, 444.

Tests, mental and physical, 129; 307,

Text-books of psychology: Calkins, 127; Pillsbury, 601; Read, 601; ::

Thorndike, 128; Titchener, 313; Toulouse and Pieron, 593; Yerkes, \

601.

Understanding, conscious concomitants of, 14; meaning and under-
standing, 553.

Wundt, Kleine Schriften, 446; bibliography, 586.

NAMES OF AUTHORS

(The names of those who have contributed original matter are printed

in SMAIvL CAPITALS.)

Abramowski, Edouard 473
AcHKR, Rudolph 408
Aitken, H. F. 136
Angell, Frank 86
AsHER, W. 451
Assagioli, Roberto 603

Baillie, J. B. 132, 309
Baird, J. W. 131
Bajenoff, — 460
Balfour, Arthur James 134
Barnholt, Sarah E. 325
Bastian, H. Charlton 468
Benedict, Francis G. 127
Bentley, Madison 325
Bergson, Henri 473
Bemaldo de Quiros, C. 322
Bernard, Henry M. 602
Bernard, Matilda 602
Binet, Alfred 125, 316, 602
Bloomfield, Daniel 474
Boas, Franz 473
Bode, B. H. 304
Bonnet, Geraud 473
Bonser, Frederick G. 133
Book, W. F. 319, 589
Booth, David S. 473
Bourdon, B. 603
Brown, Warner 134
Brown, William 129, 601
Bruce, Alexander 319
Bumke, O. 449

Calkins, Mary Whiton 127

Carpenter, Thome M. 127

Cams, Paul 319, 471

Castella, G. 319

Cellerier, Lucien 136

Cesaresco, Eugenio Martinengo 133

Chamberlain, Alexander F. 120,

317
Citron, Julius 136
Clark, Dorothy 578
Clarke, Helen Maud 214
Cline, M. 135
Clouston, T. S. 468
Cohn, Jonas 474

Collins, Ruth 250
Cook, Helen Dodd 135
CoRiAT, Isador H. 65
Crawford, Dorothy 579
Crothers, S. McC. 472
Cushman, Herbert Ernest 125
Cutten, George Barton 469

Dearborn, George V. N. 321
Densmore, Frances 447
Des Bancels, Larguier 316
Dieffenbacher, Julius 474
Dittrich, Ottmar 471
Doncaster, L. 320
Downey, June E. 133, 528
Dubois, J. 311
Dunlap, Knight 444

Eastman, Charles Alexander 470
Ellis, Havelock 322, 463
Erskine, William 452

Ferrand, Jean 600

Ferree, C. E. 250

Fewkes, Jesse Walter 604

Field, James 445, 447, 455, 460

Finck, Franz Nikolaus 120, 136

Findlay, J. J. 472

Fite, Warner 321

Forbes, Alexander 603

Foster, W. S. 124, 316

Fowke, G. 447

Francis, W. 448

Frank, Henry 473

Frank, L. 136

Freud, Sigmund 135, 603

Gatewood, L. C. 136
Gaultier, Paul 602
Gaupp, Robert 125
Geissler, Iv. R. 586
GooDELL, Mary S. 578
Graf, Max 320
Gregor, Adalbert 135, 451

Haberlandt, G. 127
Hahne, Hans 320

6o8

NAMES OF AUTHORS

Hall, G. Stanley 122
Hart, Bernard 319
Hayes, Samuel P. 369
Hegel, G. W. F. 132, 309
Heitmann, Henry 309
Herbert, S. 319
Herrick, C. L. 124, 135
Hichens, Robert 452
Hirschfeld, Magnus 135
Hodge, F. W. 447
Hoflfman, Louis 470
HOLLING WORTH, H. L. 99, 133
HUGINS, C. R. 456

Isaacson, A. 450

Jacobson, Edmund 333, 553
Janet, Pierre 319, 321
J astro w, Joseph 122, 126, 319
Jerusalem, William 322, 472, 588
Johnston, R. M. 472
Jones, Ernest 477
Jones, Francis 445, 449
Judd, C. H. 135

Kakise, Hikozo 14
KAI.LEN, Horace M. 137
Karishka, Paul 128
Keller. Adolf 473
Kent, Grace Helen 320
Kohl, August 603
Krebs, Stanley Le Fevre 125
Krueger, Felix 135

Lagenardi^re, R. de 445

Laguna, Grace Andrus De 133, 304

Laguna, Theodore De 133, 304

Lamont, Frances 448

Landray, Eugene 600

Lang, J. A. 473

Lankester, Edwin Ray 134

Lavrand, H. 460

Legrain, — 136, 460

Lemaitre, A, 445

Lipmann, Otto 474

Lombard, Louis 445

Lomer, C. R. 448

Lomer, Gerhard R. 319

Lowy, Max 136, 603, 604

Lutz, Frank E. 472

Macilwaine, Sydney W. 602
Marie, A. 136, 460
Mark, E. L. 473
Masselon, Rene 124, 460
Maxim, Hudson 133, 458
McCabe, Joseph 320, 453
Meunier, Paul 124, 460
Meunier, Raymond 136, 460

Mitchell, Arthur 473
Moll, Albert 320
Moore, Thomas Vemer 589
Morgulis, Sergius 474
Moriarty, W. D. 600
Morison, Elizabeth 448
Morosoef, N. A. 135
Miiller, G. E. 600
Mumford, E. E. R. 446
Miinsterberg, Hugo 319
Myers, Charles 472

Nicholson, Anne M. 126
NoRRis, Ethel L. 112

Oppenheim, H. 319
Ordahl, Louise Ellison 158
/3sbom, Albert S. 322
Osborn, Henry Fairfield 32 1
Ossipoff, — 460

Partridge, G. E. 468
Pelletier, M. 134
Perler, Otto 446, 463
Peterson, Harvey Andrew 319
Pfister, Oskar 134
Pfungst, Oskar 472
Pieron, H. 472, 593
Pikler, Julius 136
Pillsbury, W. B. 473, 601
Potts, W. A. 321
Power, S. 445, 447
Prince, Morton 135, 319
Pringsheim, Hans 135

Rahn, Carl L. 472
Ranschburg, Paul 474
Read, Melbourne Stuart 601
Rehmke, Johannes 319
Ribbert, Hugo 135
Ribot, Theodule 319
Rignano, E. 311
Rosanoff, A. J. 320
Ruge, Arnold 323
Rutz, Ottmar 450

Safford, F. H. 94

Saleeby, Caleb W. 456

Salvio, Alfonso de 322

Sanders, Charles F. 322, 472, 588

Schaub, Alma de VriES 346

Schlesinger, Abraham 135, 473

Schneider, Rudolf 473

Schoppa, A. 127

Schulze, Rudolf 470

Scott, I. 448

Scott, Walter Dill 473

Sergi, Sergio 317

Sharga, Ikbal Kishen 447

NAMES OF AUTHORS

609

Shaw, Charles Gray 469
Shaw, Marino w A. 458
Sheldon, W. H. 588
Shepherd, William T. 116, 469,

583
Shuttleworth, G. E. 321
Sidis, Boris 135
Simon, Th. 316
Slaughter, J. W. 472
Smith, Theodate L. 124, 311
Snell, A. L. 470
Snowden, James H. 128
Sokolowsky, Alexander 470
Stoker, Bram 468
Stroehlin, G. 474
Stumpf, C. 472
Stumpf, E. J. G. 127
Swanton, John R. 604
Swoboda, Hermann 473

Talmey, Max 132
Tanner, Amy E. 122
Thomas, Cyrus 604
Thorndike, E. L. 128, 307
TiTCHENER, Edward Bradford

126, 313, 446, 540, 586, 593
Toulouse, Ed. 472, 593
Trine, Ralph Waldo 136
Twiss, Alice G. 112

Uexkiill, J. von 319
Urban, F. M. 129, 298

Vaschide, N. 136, 460
Vaux, Carra de 319
Vecchio, Giorgio del 317
Villiger, Emil 470
Violett, Marcel 323
Voigtlander, Else 320
Void, J. Mourly 133. 455

Walker, Charles Edward 320

Wallin, J. E. Wallace 601

Washburn, M. F. 112, 114, 578, 579

Waterlow, J. 448

Watson, John B, 313

Weber, Ernst 471

Weichardt, Wolfgang 126

Wells, Frederic Lyman i, 603

Welton, J. 474

Westell, W. Percival 321

Whipple, Guy Montrose 132, 307

White, William A. 134

Wingfield, H. E. 126

Winslow, ly. Forbes 134

Winter, P. E. 453

Wreschner, A. 445

Wundt, W. 135, 446, 473, 603

Yerkes, Robert M. 474, 601
Ziegler, Heinrich Ernst 131, 135

BlNOiw^ ^^'^ ^^^

V.22

American journal of
psychology

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