Skip to main content

Full text of "A Monograph on Plebiscites: With a Collection of Official Documants"

See other formats


This is a digital copy of a book lhal w;ls preserved for general ions on library shelves before il was carefully scanned by Google as pari of a project 

to make the world's books discoverable online. 

Il has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one thai was never subject 

to copy right or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books 

are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often dillicull lo discover. 

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the 

publisher lo a library and linally lo you. 

Usage guidelines 

Google is proud lo partner with libraries lo digili/e public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the 
public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order lo keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to 
prevent abuse by commercial panics, including placing Icchnical restrictions on automated querying. 
We also ask that you: 

+ Make n on -commercial use of the files We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request thai you use these files for 
personal, non -commercial purposes. 

+ Refrain from automated querying Do not send automated queries of any sort lo Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine 
translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the 
use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help. 

+ Maintain attribution The Google "watermark" you see on each lile is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find 
additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it. 

+ Keep it legal Whatever your use. remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just 
because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other 

countries. Whether a book is slill in copyright varies from country lo country, and we can'l offer guidance on whether any specific use of 
any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner 
anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe. 

About Google Book Search 

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers 
discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through I lie lull lexl of 1 1 us book on I lie web 
al |_-.:. :.-.-:: / / books . qooqle . com/| 







Publications of the 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

Division of International Law 





With a Collection of Official Documents 





Director of the Division of International Law of the Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace 



AMERICAN BRANCH: 85 West 82nd Street 





Washington, d. C. 


- From time to time a plebiscitum has been held by the interested nations in 
order to ascertain the sentiment of a community in the matter of transfer of 
the allegiance of the inhabitants of a given territory which, by agreement of 
the nations involved, is to be ceded from one country to another. Within 
recent years the doctrine of plebiscites based more or less upon isolated prac- 
tice has found its way into treatises on international law. The treatment of 
the doctrine, however, has hitherto been fragmentary and the documents upon 
which the doctrine is based have not hitherto been assembled. 

In the belief that an exposition of the theory and practice of plebiscites as 
applied to States would not only be valuable historically but that it would be 
of service to publicists having to deal with such questions, Miss Sarah Wam- 
baugh has collected for the Division of International Law of the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, the documents relating to this subject 
and has prefixed to them a monograph in which she lays before the reader the 
result of her investigations in this interesting but hitherto unexplored domain. 

The importance and timeliness of this volume are very great. It is im- 
portant in that it is the first adequate treatment of the subject, laying before 
the reader, as it does, in the original language, and in English translation when- 
ever the original text is in a foreign tongue, documents relating to plebiscites 
which have never before been brought together and whose very existence has 
not been suspected even by persons interested in the subject. It is timely in 
that the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and 
Germany, signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919, provides for plebiscites to be 
held in many instances. 

In view of these facts, Miss Wambaugh's volume has a present interest not 
merely for the student of international law, but for the statesman, diplomat, 
and expert called upon to deal with plebiscites in the concrete cases provided 
for by the various treaties putting an end to the War of 1914. 

James Brown Scott, 
Director of the Division of International Law. 
Paris, France, 
July 15, 1919. 


Late in the autumn of 1917 I was asked by Dr. James Brown Scott, Director 
of the Division of International Law of the Carnegie Endowment for Inter- 
national Peace, to prepare a monograph, with a collection of documents, on 
the history of the doctrine of national self-determination in changes of sover- 
eignty. The present monograph was accordingly undertaken under his super- 

It had been hoped that the monograph could be published at an earlier date, 
but the study has proven to be a much heavier task than was expected. Re- 
search has disclosed many more instances of recourse to the doctrine than 
those which are enumerated in the treatises on international law or in the 
general histories, yet at the same time the collection of documents illustrating 
the various instances has proven to be unexpectedly copious. Careful intensive 
study of the history of each country treated has been necessary. Most of the 
cases have involved controversial questions, and thus a careful appreciation 
and statement of each side has been imperative. 

The monograph has been scrupulously limited to the doctrine with refer- 
ence to changes of sovereignty. Material regarding the numerous plebiscites 
to determine the form of government or the personality of the sovereign, 
such as the plebiscites of Napoleon III, Greece, Rumania, Belgium and Nor- 
way, has been excluded from consideration as such a study, although it might 
be of great interest, deals with a theme essentially different from that of 
separation, cession or annexation. 

There has been no attempt to present data on the many territorial ques- 
tions which have become acute since 1914, or of the several plebiscites which 
rumor has told us have taken place since then, nor did the author conceive 
it to be part of the scope of this study to present a plan for the settlement of 
such questions. 

Doubtless some cases which might be considered at first thought to be ger- 
mane to its purpose have been omitted. The self-determination of the United 
States was omitted deliberately for two reasons: one because our independ- 
ence was the result of a successful war and not of a resort to ballot, which 
came later; the other because, if it were put in its proper chronological posi- 
tion in the collection, it would make the doctrine appear to be derived from 
our revolution, which was not the fact. The American Revolution had more 
of a national than international aspect, so far as it affects this question. It 
made no change in the application of the theory of conquest or annexation, 


probably because these problems did not immediately confront the leaders, 
and in the later annexations of Louisiana and Florida the principle was not 
followed — a fact attributable, perhaps, to the sparsely populated condition 
of those territories. 

It may be thought that the case of the union of Wallachia and Moldavia 
into Rumania should have been omitted, and indeed the author is aware of 
having possibly stretched a point in including it as a change of sovereignty. 
The Principalities were, however, called sovereign States, although they were 
under Turkish suzerainty, and effected their union of two sovereignties into 
one by means of two appeals to popular vote. The case has been included 
because it presents the first, and so far the only, instance of an international 
commission to administer a vote. 

Of the cases included, those of the French Revolution and of Italy are 
instances of separation and integration. Savoy and Nice in 1860, the Danish 
West Indies in 1867, St. Bartholomew in 1877, and Tacna and Arica, still 
unsettled, are instances of cession which involve separation and integration. 
Moldavia and Wallachia are an instance of union or, perhaps, integration. 
Schleswig is an instance of division and cession, a project long discussed and 
still unfulfilled. The last case, that of Norway, is an instance of separation 
of a technically sovereign State from a technically voluntary union and there- 
fore presents a novel problem of change of sovereignty. 

The term plebiscite in its common meaning connotes universal male suffrage. 
In many of the cases included which obviously belong within a discussion of 
the doctrine of self-determination the vote was by a limited suffrage and was 
usually for delegates, instructed as a rule, to an assembly ad hoc. This is 
true of most of the votes of the French Revolution, of Moldavia and Walla- 
chia, the Italian votes of 1859 and that of the Ionian Islands. In the Italian 
votes of 1848, 1860, 1866 and 1870 a plebiscite in the accepted sense was used. 
The electorate included practically the whole male Italian population, whether 
literate or not. This was also true in Savoy and Nice, and in the votes of 
St. Bartholomew and the islands of St. Thomas and St. John. 

In all the cases where the original text of the documents has been avail- 
able it has been given. Extracts have been made where space could be econo- 
mized without sacrificing accuracy in presentation. The translations are, as 
far as possible, taken from well-known sources, such as the British Parlia- 
mentary Papers. Where there is no statement of the source of the trans- 
lation it has been made especially for this monograph. Care has been used 
in correcting these translations and in harmonizing the translation of corre- 
sponding words in different languages, but doubtless mistakes and inconsis- 
tencies occur. Owing to the numerous citations the title of each work is 
cited only in the first reference. In succeeding references it is referred to by 
the author's name only. In each case the full title will be found in the list 


of authorities. The legends, names of countries, places, rivers, etc., on the 
accompanying maps have been left in the language used on the original maps 
of which they are reproductions. 

I am most deeply indebted to the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace for making possible the publication of such an extensive work, and to 
the skillful advice of Dr. Scott in its original planning. 

The better to interpret the numerous problems presented, I have availed 
myself of the kindly assistance of many people — historians, international 
lawyers and diplomatists — to all of whom I also wish to express the warm- 
est gratitude. As for the invaluable aid and courteous assistance given by 
the several librarians to whom I have taken baffling questions, no acknowledg- 
ment would be adequate. 


Washington, D. C, 
March 6, 1919. 



Chronological List of Cases of Change of Sovereignty in which the Right to Self- 

Determination Has Been Recognized xxvii 

Bibliographical List of Principal Works Cited xxix 

A Study of the Theory and Practice of Plebiscites 

Historical Summary 1 

The Plebiscites of the French Revolution 

Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, 1791 33 

Savoy, 1792 41 

Nice, 1793 43 

The Belgian Communes, 1793 45 

The Rhine Valley, 1793 51 

The Republics of Mulhausen and Geneva, 1798 55 

The Period of 1848-1870 

The Italian Plebiscites of 1848 58 

The Italian National Assemblies of 1859 65 

The Italian Plebiscites of 1860-1870 72 

Tuscany and Emilia, 1860 72 

Savoy and Nice. 1860 75 

Sicily and Naples, 1860 89 

Umbria and the Marches, 1860 94 

Venetia, 1866 96 

Rome, 1870 98 

Moldavia and Wallachia, 1857 101 

The Ionian Islands, 1863 122 

The Schleswig Question, 1848— 132 

Maps : Copy of the German Map by F. H. I. Geerz Showing the Distribution of 

Languages in the Duchy of Schleswig, 1838 (opposite) 133 

Map Showing the Distribution of Languages in North and Central 

Schleswig, 1906 (opposite) 149 

The Islands of St. Thomas and St. John, West Indies, 1868 149 

The Period of 1871-1914 

Saint Bartholomew, West Indies, 1877 155 

The Tacna-Arica Question 1883— 156 

Map: Tacna and Arica (opposite) 156 

The Separation of Norway from Sweden, 1905 165 


Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, 1791 

Draft Decree of Charles Francoi* Bouche for " the Irrevocable Union of the Comtat 
Venaissin and of the City and State of Avignon to the County of Provence and by 
it to France," November 12, 1789 173 



Address of the Parishes of the Comtat Venaissin in Answer to the Motion of M. 
Bouchc, November 16, 1789 175 

The French Nation Renounces Conquest Decree Concerning the Right of Making 
Peace and War, May 22-27, 1790 7 177 

Formal Minute of the General Council of the Commune of the City of Avignon, 
June 12, 1790 . 178 

Address of the Representative Body of the Comtat Venaissin, June 22, 1790 . . . 182 

Address of the Deputation from the City of Avignon, Delivered before the National 
Assembly, June 26, 1790 184 

First Report of the French National Assembly on the Affair of Avignon, and Decree 
Adopted, August 27, 1790 185 

Decree of the National Assembly, November 20, 1790 187 

Second Report of the Committees on Avignon Regarding the Union of Avignon and 
the Comtat Venaissin with France, and Discussion by the Assembly, April 30-May 
4, 1791 188 

Draft Decree for the Union of Avignon Proposed by Menou in the Third Report 
of the Committees on Avignon, May 24, 1791 207 

Decree of the National Assembly Providing that Mediators shall be sent to 
Avignon, May 25, 1791 211 

Preliminaries of Peace and of Conciliation Agreed on and Signed by the Deputies 
of the Electoral Assembly of the Municipalities of Avignon and of Carpentras. and 
of the Army of Vaucluse, called the Army of Avignon, in the Presence of the 
Mediating Commissioners of France, Deputed by the King, June 14, 1791 . . . 212 

Letter of the Mediators to the President of the National Assembly at Bedarides . . 215 

Letter to the Communes, Sent by the President of the Assembly at the Request of 
the Mediators 215 

Formal Minute of the Communal Assembly of Seguret, August 11, 1791 .... 216 

Report of Le Scene des Maisons on his Mission as Mediator, September 10, 1791 . . 218 

Fourth Report of the Committees on Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, September 
12, 1791 227 

Formal Charges Brought Against the Mediators by Abbe Maury Before the National 
Assembly, and Replies of the Mediators, September 13, 1791 239 

Reply of Le Scene des Maisons 247 

Decree of the National Convention Uniting Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin to 
France, September 14, 1791 266 

Savoy and Nice, 1792^3 

Proclamation of General Montesquiou to the People of Savoy, September 21, 1792 . 269 

Letter of General Montesquiou to the Minister of War, and Discussion Regarding 
It in the French National Convention, September 28, 1792 270 

Proclamation of the Commissioners sent by the National Convention to the Army 
of the Alps, October 6, 1792 278 

Formal Minute pf the Vote of the Communal Assembly of Mouthiers, October 11, 
1792 281 

First Draft Decree Reported by the Diplomatic Committtee, Regarding the Con- 
duct to be Prescribed to the French Generals in Enemy Countries, October 24, 
1792 283 

Address of the Provisional Administrative Bodies of the City and County of Nice to 
the National Convention, and Action of the Convention, November 4, 1792 . . . 285 



Address of the "National Assembly of the Allobroges" Asking for the Union of 
the People of Savoy with the French Republic. Presented to the National Con- 
vention, November 21, 1792 289 

Extract from the Minute of the Second Session of the Assembly of the Deputies 
of the Communes of Savoy, October 22, 1792, the Year I of the Republic ... 290 

Decree of the French National Convention Uniting Savoy to France, November 27, 
1792 295 

Decree of Union with France passed by "the National Assembly of the Colons 
Marseillais" of Nice, January 4, 1793 296 

Decree of the National Convention Uniting the County of Nice to the Territory 
of the French Republic, January 31, 1793 301 

The Belgian Communes and the Rhine Valley, 1793 

Cambon Reports Regarding the Conduct to be Followed by the French Generals in 
the Countries Occupied by the Armies of the Republic, December 15, 1792 . . . 302 

Decree by which France Proclaims the Liberty and Sovereignty of all the Peoples to 
whom she has Carried or shall Carry her Arms, and Prescribes the Conduct of 
her Generals, December 15 and 17, 1792 306 

Form of Proclamation to be Made by the French Generals to the Peoples "Con- 
quered for Liberty" 310 

Protest of the Representative Assembly of Hainault Against the Decree of December 
15, Presented to the Convention, December 23 t 1792 311 

Protest of the Reoresentatives of the Sovereign People of the Country of Namur, 
December 30, 1792 312 

Second Decree Regarding the Conduct of the Generals in those Countries where 
the Armies of France have Entered or shall Enter, January 31, 1793 .... 314 

Decree Regarding the Union of the Principality of Monaco, of a Part of the Baili- 
wick of Schambourg, and other Neighboring Territories, February 14, 1793 . . 316 

Proclamation to the Belgian People by the Commissioners of the French National 
Convention, Delacroix, Gossuin and Merlin (de Douai), February 19, 1793 . . 318 

The Union of Brussels, Ghent and other Belgian Cities with France. Extracts from 
the Minutes of the National Convention, February 27-March 2, 1793 .... 322 

Letter of the Citizens Rewbel, Merlin (de Thionville) and Haussmann, Commissioners 
of the National Convention to Mayence, Announcing the Erection of a Revolution- 
ary Municipality. Read before the Convention, March 12, 1793 343 

Letter of General Dumouriez, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the North, to 
the National Convention, March 12, 1793 346 

Report made before the National Convention by Haussmann, Commissioner to the 
Armies of the Rhine, the Vosges, and the Moselle, March 30, 1793 349 

Address of the National Rheno-Germanic Convention to the French Republic, and 
Vote of Union by the National Convention of France, March 30, 1793 .... 354 

The Republics of Mulhausen and Geneva, 1798 

The Directory Delegates Jean Ulric Metzger as Commissioner to the Republic of 
Mulhausen with Regard to the Vote of Union, January 1, 1798 359 

Address of Citizen Metzger to the Burgomasters and Council of the Republic of 
Mulhausen, January 19, 1798 360 

Reply of the Magistracy, January 19, 1798 361 

Treaty of Union of the Republic of Mulhausen with the French Republic, January 
28, 1798 363 



Decree of the Directory Appointing Citizen Desportes Commissioner to the Republic 
of Geneva to Receive the Vote of Union, March 25, 1798 367 

Treaty of Union of the Republic of Geneva with the French Republic, April 26, 1798 . 368 

THE PERIOD OF 184&-1870 

Italian Plebiscites of 1848 


Proclamation of the Municipality of the City of Milan on Assuming Power, March 
20, 1848 370 

The Provisional Government Postpones all Discussion as to the Political Future 
of Lombardy, March 22, 1848 371 

Proclamation of King Carlo Alberto Promising a Free Vote, March 31, 1848 . . 371 

Confidential Communication to the Government of Lombardy Expressing the De- 
sire of Carlo Alberto for the Convocation of an Elective Assembly to Decide the 
Destinies of the Italian Provinces, March 31, 1848 373 

The Provisional Government Appoints a Commission to Draw up a Plan for 
the Convocation of a National Assembly, April 8, 1848 375 

The Provisional Government of Lombardy Proclaims a Plebiscite, May 12, 1848 . 376 

Statement by the Provisional Government of the Liberties which the Lombard People 
Now Possess, May 28, 1848 387 

Proclamation Announcing the Result of the Plebiscite, June 8, 1848 387 

Formal Presentation of the Vote of Union to King Carlo Alberto, June 11, 1848 . 391 

Reply of the King 392 

Address of the Women of Lombardy to the Women of the Sardinian States, July 
3, 1848 393 

Vote of the Snbalpine Parliament Accepting the Vote of Lombardy and the Provinces 
of Padua, Vicenza, Treviso and Rovigo, and Uniting these Provinces to Sardinia. 
Law of July 27, 1848 394 


The Provisional Government of the Republic of Venetia Announces that there will 
be a Single Constituent Assembly for the Liberated Provinces, March 24, 1848 . 395 

The Departmental Committees of Padua, Vicenza, Treviso and Rovigo Protest 
Against a Separate Republic and Announce that Voting for Union with Piedmont 
has Begun on the Venetian Mainland, May 31, 1848 396 

Reply of the Provisional Government, June 2, 1848 401 

Decree of the Provisional Government of the Venetian Republic Convoking a Rep- 
resentative Assembly, July 3, 1848 .402 

Vote of the Consulta of Venice, June 26, 1848 406 

Speech of Manin before the Representative Assembly, and Vote of the Assembly 
for the Union of Venice with Piedmont, July 4, 1848 406 

Vote of the Sardinian Parliament Accepting the Vote of the City and Province 
of Venice and Uniting them with the Sardinian States. Law of July 27, 1848 . . 409 

Parma and Piacenza 

The Council of Elders Appoints the Members of the Provisional Government, April 
11, 1848 410 

The Provisional Government of Parma Proclaims a Plebiscite on the Question of 
Union with Sardinia, May 8, 1848 411 



Formal Minute of the Result of the Plebiscite, May 26, 1848 413 

Law of the Sardinian Parliament Accepting the Votes of Parma and Guastalla and 
Uniting them with the Sardinian States. Law of June 16, 1848 417 

The Provisional Government of Piacenza Makes Public the Result of the Plebiscite, 
May 12, 1848 419 

Modena and Reggio 

The Municipality of Reggio Proclaims a Plebiscite on the Question of Union with 
Sardinia, May 3, 1848 424 

The Podesta Publishes the Electoral Arrangements, May 5, 1848 426 

The Municipality of Modena Proclaims a Plebiscite, May 10, 1848 428 

The Provisional Government of Modena, Reggio and Guastalla Embodies the Result 
of the Plebiscites in a Formal Act of Union with the Sardinian States, May 29, 
1848 432 

Formal Act Embodying the Results of the Plebiscite of Reggio, May 30, 1848 . . 436 

Vote of the Sardinian Parliament Accepting the Votes of Modena and Reggio and 
Uniting the Provinces to the Sardinian States. Law of June 13, 1848 439 

The Italian National Assemblies of 1859 

Preliminaries of Peace, Signed at Villafranca, July 11, 1859 441 

Statement by Lord John Russell of the Attitude of the British Government Re- 
garding the Preliminaries of Villafranca 442 

Decree of the Tuscan Government Reestablishing the Electoral Law of 1848 for the 
Purpose of Holding a General Election of an Assembly of Representatives Com- 
petent to Pass a Legitimate Vote as to the Definitive Fate of Tuscany, July 15, 1859 443 

Second Decree of the Tuscan Government Fixing Further Details of the Election, 
July 16, 1859 445 

Dispatches of Lord John Russell to the British Minister at Florence, Concerning 
the Tuscan Assembly 449 

Convocation of the Electoral Constituencies, July 29, 1859 450 

The Royal Commissioner Resigns His Functions to the Council of Ministers, 
August 1, 1859 450 

Ricasoli is Appointed President of the Council, August 1, 1859 452 

Decree Fixing Conditions of Eligibility of Deputies, August 2, 1859 453 

Proclamation of the Ministry Concerning the Approaching Elections, "August 4, 
1859 454 

Decree of Convocation of the Assembly, August 7, 1859 455 

Dispatch from Lord John Russell to the British Minister at Turin, August 10, 1859 456 

Dispatch from the British Minister at Florence to Lord John Russell Commenting 
on the Election, August 10, 1859 456 

Vote of the National Assembly of Tuscany Dethroning the House of Austro- 
Lorraine, August 16, 1859 457 

Vote of the National Assembly of Tuscany for Union with the Constitutional 
Kingdom of Victor Emmanuel, August 20, 1859 459 

Address of the Delegates of the Tuscan Assembly to the King of Sardinia, Pre- 
senting the Vote for Union, September 3, 1859 460 



Reply of the King 462 

The Provisional Government Announces that It Will Exercise Authority in the 
Name of Victor Emanuel, September 29, 1859 463 


Electoral Law for a National Assembly of the Provinces of Modena, July 29, 1859 . 464 

Convocation of the Electoral Colleges, August 5, 1859 474 

The National Assembly of the Provinces of Modena Dethrones the House of 
Hapsburg-Lorraine, August 20, 1859 474 

The National Assembly of the Provinces of Modena Decrees the Union of the 
Provinces with the Constitutional Monarchy of Sardinia, August 21, 1859 . . . 475 


Appeal for a Plebiscite, July 22, 1859 477 

The Sardinian Commissioner Retires from Office that the Vote may be Free, July 
28, 1859 478 

The Governing Council Announces that an Assembly will be Held, August 2, 1859 . 479 

Instructions in Regard to the Approaching Elections, August 8, 1859 480 

Circular Letter to the Officials of Romagna Emphasizing the Importance of the Ap- 
proaching Elections, August 22, 1859 481 

Convocation of the Electoral Constituencies of Romagna, August 24, 1859 . . . 485 

Convocation of the National Assembly of Romagna at Bologna, August 25, 1859 . 486 

Decree of the National Assembly of Romagna Deposing the Temporal Power, 
September 6, 1859 486 

Decree of the National Assembly of Romagna for Union with the Constitutional 
Kingdom of Sardinia, September 7, 1859 487 

Reply of King Victor Emanuel to the Delegates Presenting the Vote of the People 
of Romagna 488 

Parma and Piacenza, 1859 

The Sardinian Governor Resigns Power to Giuseppi Manfredi as Provisional Gov- 
ernor, August 8, 1859 489 

Convocation of the People of Parma in Popular Assemblies, for a Plebiscite, August 
8, 1859 , 491 

Convocation of the Electoral Constituencies for the Election of Deputies to a Rep- 
resentative Assembly, August 30, 1859 494 

Decree of the Representative Assembly of the States of Parma Dethroning the House 
of Bourbon, September 11, 1859 495 

Decree of the Same Assembly for Union with the Constitutional Kingdom of Sar- 
dinia, September 12, 1859 495 

Lombardy, 1859 

The Congregation and the Municipality of Milan Attest the Unanimous Desire of 
the Population to Renew the Pact of 1848, June 5, 1859 496 

The Communal Council of Milan Ratifies the Vote of the Municipal Congregation, 
June 6, 1859 497 

Proclamation of Victor Emanuel to the People of Lombardy, June 9, 1859 .... 498 



Italian Plebiscites of 1860-1870 

Tuscany and Emilia, 1860 

Dispatch of Lord John Russell to Earl Cowley, British Ambassador at Paris, 
Containing the British Proposal of the " Four Points," January 15, 1860 .... 499 

Dispatch of Lord John Russell to Sir James Hudson, British Minister at Turin, 
February 6, 1860 501 

Proposition Made by Thouvenel to Talleyrand for Transmission to the Sardinian 
Government, February 24, 1860 501 

Dispatch of Cavour to the Governors of Emilia and Tuscany, Concerning the 
Proposition made by the French Government, February 29, 1860 506 

Reply of Ricasoli, Governor of Tuscany, March 4, 1860 509 

Decree of the Tuscan Government Proclaiming a Plebiscite on the Question of 
Union with the Constitutional Kingdom of Victor Emanuel, March 1, 1860 . . 513 

Decree of the Government of Emilia Proclaiming a Plebiscite on the Question of 
Union with the Constitutional Kingdom of Victor Emanuel, March 1, 1860 . . 519 

Letter of Cavour to Villamarina, Minister of Sardinia at Naples, March, 1860 . . . 523 

Bon-Compagni Resigns the Office of Governor General, March 2, 1860 523 

Proclamation of the Tuscan Council of Ministers Regarding the Duty of the Tuscan 
People, March 5, 1860 525 

Rules for the Publication of the Results of the Plebiscite in Emilia, March 13, 
1860 529 

Proclamation of the Results of the Plebiscite in Tuscany, March 15, 1860 .... 529 
Proclamation of the Results of the Plebiscite in Emilia, March 15, 1860 .... 533 

Formal Presentation of the Results 'of the Plebiscite of Emilia to King Victor 
Emanuel II and His Reply 535 

Royal Decree Accepting the Popular Vote of Emilia and Uniting it to the Sardinian 
State, March 18, 1860 537 

Savoy and Nice, 1860 

Napoleon III Asserts the Claim of France to Savoy on the Opening of the Legislative 
Chambers, March 1, 1860 538 

Answer of Sardinia to France Agreeing to the Principle of Self-Determination, 
March 3, 1860 540 

Proclamation by the Governor of Annecy Announcing that there will be a Popular 
Vote, March 8, 1860 542 

Dispatch of the British Ambassador at Paris to Lord John Russell, March 9, 1860 . 544 

Proclamation by the Governor of Chambery, March 10, 1860 545 

Protest of the Swiss Government Against the Annexation of Savoy to France, March 
15, 1860 547 

Views of the French Government on the Swiss Protest, March 13, 1860 .... 548 

Swiss Protest to Sardinia, March 14, 1860 550 

Declaration Signed by Inhabitants of Northern Savoy, Asking for Union with 
Switzerland, March 16, 1860 552 

Address to Napoleon III by a Deputation from the Provincial and Municipal 
Councils of Savoy, Protesting Against the Separation of Chablais and Faucigny, 
March 21, 1860 554 



Address to Victor Emanuel by the Municipality of Nice, Protesting Against 
the Proposed Annexation, March 19, 1860 558 

Notes Exchanged Between Switzerland, France and Sardinia, March, 1860 ... 560 

Treaty Between France and Sardinia for the Union of Savoy and Nice with France, 
Signed at Turin, March 24, 1860 566 

Proclamation of Victor Emanuel to the Inhabitants of Savoy and Nice, April 1, 1860 . 569 

Speech of Victor Emanuel on Opening the Sardinian Parliament, April 2, 1860 . . 571 

Proclamation of the Provisional Governor of Savoy, April 4, 1860 572 

Proclamation of the Governor Regent of the City and County of Nice, April 5, 1860 . 574 

Address to the Sardinian Parliament by the Deputies Elected from Savoy to that 
Body, April 5, 1860 576 

Cavour Assures the Swiss Government that France will not take Possession until 
after the Plebiscite, April 6, 1860 578 

Proclamation of the Provisional Governor of the District of Nice, Fixing the Details 
of the Election, April 7, 1860 579 

Proclamation of the Syndic of the City of Nice, April 8, 1860 581 

Proclamation of the Syndic of the City of Nice, Regarding Registration, April 8, 
1860 583 

Proclamation of the Governor Regent of the Province of Chambery Regarding the 
Details of the Election, April 7, 1860 585 

Circular of Instructions Issued to the Syndics of Savoy by the Governor, April 9, 
1860 . . 587 

The Swiss Federal Council Renews Its Protest to the Powers, April 11, 1860 . . . 588 

Circulars Sent by the Intendant Regent of Faucigny to the Syndics, Communal 
Magistrates, Governors of Charitable Associations and Public Functionaries, April, 
1860 591 

The Vote of the County of Nice as Announced by the Court of Appeals, April 28, 
1860 595 

Result of the Plebiscite of Savoy as Proclaimed by the Municipal Junta of Chambery, 
April 29, 1860 597 

The Vote of Savoy by Districts and Communes, as Announced by the Court of 
Appeals, April 29, 1860 599 

Observations of the President of the Council of Ministers on Presenting to the 
Sardinian Chambers the Bill giving Execution to the Treaty of Turin, May 12, 1860 600 

Extract from Discussion Regarding the Votes of Savoy and Nice. Italian Chamber 
of Deputies, May 25, 1860 603 

Statement of the Position of Great Britain Regarding the Vote, May 15, 1860 . . 615 

Report Made to the Emperor by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Regarding 
the Treaty of Turin, June 11, 1860 617 

Senatus-Consulte uniting Savoy and the District of Nice to France, June 12, 1860 . 619 

Sicily and Naples, 1860 

Garibaldi Assumes the Dictatorship of Sicily, May 14, 1860 620 

The Sardinian Constitution is Proclaimed the Fundamental Law of Sicily, August 3, 
1860 621 

Cavour presents to Parliament a Bill for Annexation by Royal Decree of those 
Provinces of Central and Southern Italy in which there shall be a Direct Popular 
Vote for Union, October 2, 1860 623 



Convocation of the Popular Assemblies of the Neapolitan Provinces for the Plebis- 
cite, October 8, 1860 631 

Convocation of the Assembly of the Representatives of the Sicilian People, October 9, 
1860 634 

Convocation of the Popular Assemblies of Sicily for a Plebiscite on the Question 
of Union with Italy under Victor Emanuel, October 15, 1860 635 

Garibaldi Decrees the Union of the Two Sicilies with the Constitutional Kingdom 
of Victor Emanuel, October 15, 1860 637 

Proclamation of the Pro-Dictator of Sicily Urging a Vote for Union, October 15, 
1860 637 

Circular to the Governors of the Provinces Regarding the Plebiscite, October 16, 
1860 638 

Formal Minute of the Result of the Plebiscite of the Neapolitan Provinces as Pro- 
claimed by the Supreme Court, November 3, 1860 641 

Formal Minute of the Result of the Plebiscite in Sicily as Announced by the Supreme 
Court of Justice of Palermo, November 4, 1860 644 

Presentation of the Plebiscite of Naples to Victor Emanuel, November 7, 1860 . . 648 

Royal Proclamation Accepting the Vote of the Neapolitan and Sicilian Peoples, 
November 7, 1860 649 

Proclamation of Victor Emanuel to the People of Sicily on Entering Palermo, De- 
cember 1, 1860 650 

Formal Minute of the Acceptance of the Sicilian Plebiscite by King Victor Emanuel, 
December 2, 1860 651 

Royal Decree of Annexation of the Neapolitan Provinces to the Kingdom of Italy, 
December 17, 1860 654 

Umbria and the Marches, 1860 

Appointment of Lorenzo Valerio as Commissioner General Extraordinary for the 
Provinces of the Marches, September 12, 1860 655 

Appointment of Gioacchino Pepoli as Commissioner General for Umbria, Septem- 
ber 12, 1860 656 

Convocation of the Popular Assemblies of the Provinces of the Marches to Vote on 
the Question of Union with the Constitutional Kingdom of Italy, October 21, 1860 657 

Proclamation of the Royal Commissioner to the People of the Marches, October 21, 
1860 662 

Convocation of the Popular Assemblies of the Provinces of Umbria, October 21, 1860 . 665 

Formal Minute of the Result of the Plebiscite in the Provinces of the Marches, 
November 9, 1860 667 

Formal Minute of the Result of the Plebiscite in the Provinces of Umbria, Novem- 
ber 8 and 9, 1860 670 

Formal Act of Acceptance of the Plebiscite of the Marches and of Umbria, November 
22, 1860 672 

Royal Decree of Annexation of the Marches to the Italian State, December 17, 1860 . 677 

Venetia, 1866 

Convention Between Austria and France for the Cession of Venetia by Austria 
to France. Signed at Vienna, August 24, 1866 679 

Treaty of Peace Between Austria and Italy. Signed at Vienna, October 3, 1866 . . 681 



Report by the President of the Council to Victor Emanuel Recommending that a 
Plebiscite be Held in the Venetian Provinces, October 7, 1866 683 

Royal Decree Convoking the Popular Assemblies in the Venetian Provinces. 
Published October 19, 1866 686 

Formal Minute of the Delivery of Vcnetia to the Venetian Authorities by the 
French Commissioner. Signed at Venice, October 19, 1866 689 

Formal Minute of the Result of the Plebiscite of the Venetian and Mantuan Pro- 
vinces, October 27, 1866 694 

Royal Decree Uniting Venetia to the Kingdom of Italy, November 4, 1866 . . . .701 
Ratification of the Decree of Union, January 30, 1867 702 

Rome, 1870 

Proclamation of Cadorna After the Taking of Rome, September 20, 1870 .... 704 

Election of a Provisional Administrative Giunta by a Popular Assembly, September 
22 t 1870 705 

Cadorna appoints a Provisional Giunta, September 22, 1870 706 

Dispatches of Mr. Jervoise to Earl Granville, September 27 and 28, 1870 ... 707 

Proclamation of the Roman Giunta Fixing the Date and Form of the Plebiscite, 
September 29, 1870 708 

Rules of Procedure for the Plebiscite, September 29, 1870 709 

Authentic Copy of the Statement of the Votes Cast in the Leonine City, October 
2, 1870 713 

Formal Minute of the Result of the Plebiscite, October 6, 1870 715 

Formal Minute of the Presentation of the Plebiscite to King Victor Emanuel II, Oc- 
tober 9, 1870 720 

Royal Decree Incorporating the Roman Provinces in the Kingdom of Italy, October 
9, 1870 724 

Moldavia and Wallachia, 1857 

Conference of Vienna. — Extracts from Memorandum Communicated by the Pleni- 
potentiaries of Austria, France, and Great Britain, to Prince Gortshakoff, December 
Z8, 1854 726 

Development of the First Point of the Memorandum, March 15, 1855 .... 727 

Proposition of Prince Gortchakoff Advocating Consultation of the Principalities, 
March 17, 1855 728 

Development of the First Point of the Memorandum as Finally Adopted, March 
19, 1855 . . 730 

Congress of Paris. — Extracts from Protocols Nos. 1, 6, 8, and 22, February 25-April 
16, 1856 .732 

Treaty of Peace Between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia 
and the Ottoman Porte, Signed at Paris, March 30, 1856 741 

Instructions Issued by the Congress of Paris to the Special Commission for the 
Principalities, April 8, 1856 746 

Firman of Convocation of the Divans ad hoc of Wallachia and of Moldavia, 
Adopted January 13, 1857 749 

Manifesto of the Electoral Committee of Jassy, March 10/22, 1857 757 

Extracts from Protocols Nos. 1-6, 9, 11-14, 17, 19, 21, 22, 25 and 34 of the European 
Commission on the Reorganization of Moldavia and Wallachia, May 18 to 
December 28, 1857 760 

CONTENTS xxiii, 


Address of the Moldavian Patriots to the European Commission at Bucharest, 
Protesting Against the Electoral Lists Published by the Caimacam, June 8-20, 1857 . 802 

Memorandum Interpreting the Firman of Convocation of the Divans ad hoc, June 
11-17, 1857 808 

Form of Certificate of Election Prescribed by the Moldavian Government, June, 
13/24, 1857 814 

Identic Note Sent to the Porte by the Representatives of France, Prussia, Russia 
and Sardinia, June 25, 1857 814 

Protest and Resignation of Alexander Couza as Prefect of Galatz, June 24/July 

6, 1857 815 

Notes of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and Baron Prokesch-Osten to Reschid 
Pacha Opposing Adjournment of the Moldavian Elections, July 18, 1857 . . . 818 

Address of the Metropolitan of Moldavia to the European Commission at Bucharest, 
July 10/22, 1857 820 

Identic Note of Aali-Ghalib Pacha to the Representatives of France, Prussia, 
Russia and Sardinia^ July 30, 1857 820 

Decree of the Caimacam of Wallachia Regarding Registration, July 18/30, 1857 . 822 

Identic Note of Aali Pacha to the Representatives of France, Prussia, Russia and 
Sardinia, August 4, 1857 824 

Manifesto of the Central Committee of Bucharest (Wallachia), August 3/15, 1857 . 826 

Dispatches of Aali Pacha to the Caimacam of Moldavia, Ordering a New Election, 
August 24. 1857 828 

Vote of Union with Wallachia Passed by the Divan ad hoc of Moldavia, October 

7, 1857 830 

Vote of Union with Moldavia Passed by the Assembly ad hoc of Wallachia, Oc- 
tober 9, 1857 831 

Extracts from Report on the Reorganization of the Principalities of Moldavia and 
Wallachia. Addressed to the Congress of Paris by the European Commission, 
April 7, 1858 833 

Vote of Wallachia Electing Alexander John Couza Prince of Wallachia, January 
24, 1859 837 

Ionian Islands, 1863 

Vote of the Ionian Assembly for Union with Greece, January 27, 1859 .... 838 

Petition of the Ionian Assembly to the Queen, January 30, 1857 838 

Address of the Lord High Commissioner on Delivering the Reply of the Queen to 
the Petition of the Assembly, February, 1859 839 

Dispatch from Sir H. Storks, K.C.B., to the Right Hon. Sir E. B. Lytton, Bart, 
February 21, 1859 840 

Resolutions Presented to the Ionian Assembly, March, 1861 841 

Notification of Warning by the Lord High Commissioner to the Assembly, 
March 12, 1861 843 

Prorogation of the Assembly, March 12, 1861 844 

Dispatch of Earl Russell to the British Representatives at Foreign Courts Concern- 
ing Announcement that the Question of Union Shall Be Left to the Ionian 
Assembly, June 10, 1863 844 

Treaty Between Great Britain, France and Russia, on the One Part, and Denmark, 
on the Other Part, Relative to the Accession of Prince William of Denmark 
to the Throne of Greece, Signed at London, July 13, 1863 848 



Protocol of the Conference Held in London by Plenipotentiaries of Austria, France, 
Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, August 1, 1863 850 

Address of the Lord High Commissioner of the United States of the Ionian Islands, 
to the Legislative Assembly of the Said States, Convoked for the Purpose of 
Voting on the Question of Union 852 

Decree of the Ionian Assembly for Union with the Kingdom of Greece, September 
23, 1863 853 

Treaty Between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, Regarding the 
Union of the Ionian Islands to the Kingdom of Greece, Signed at London, 
November 14, 1863 854 

Treaty Between Great Britain, France and Russia on the One Part, and Greece on 
the Other Part, Respecting the Union of the Ionian Islands with the Kingdom of 
Greece, Signed at London, March 29, 1864 860 

The Schleswig Question, 1848 

Address of the Provisional Government of Schleswig-Holstein to the People of 
Denmark, Proposing a Vote of North Schleswig as to Union with Denmark or 
Germany, March 31, 1848 864 

Protest by the Provisional Government of Schleswig-Holstein Against the Proposal 
of a Separation of North Schleswig According to Nationality, Made to the 
Germanic Diet by the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs, May 17, 1848 . . 866 

Reply of the Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Provisional Government 
of the Duchies, May 19, 1848 870 

Reply of the Provisional Government to the Prussian Minister, May 22, 1848 . . 871 

Correspondence Between the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the 
Prussian Minister in London, Concerning the Prussian Proposal of a Division of 
Schleswig According to Nationality, May and June, 1848 874 

Extract from the' Discussion of the German National Assembly, Session of June 
9, 1848 879 

Dispatch of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French Plenipotentiary 
at London, March 20, 1864 883 

Protocols of Conferences Held at London Between Great Britain, Austria, Denmark, 
France, Germanic Confederation, Prussia, Russia, and Sweden and Norway, for 
the Reestablishment of Peace Between Austria, Prussia and Denmark, April 
25 to June 22, 1864 886 

Treaty of Peace Between Austria and Prussia on the One Part and Denmark on 
the Other Part, Signed at Vienna, October 30, 1864 933 

Treaty of Peace Between Prussia and Austria, Signed at Prague, August 23, 1866 . 935 

Prussian Note to Denmark Concerning a Plebiscite in North Schleswig, June 30, 
1867 937 

Treaty Between Austria-Hungary and Germany, Modifying Article V of the Treaty 
of Prague, Signed October 11, 1878 942 

The Islands of St. Thomas and St. John, West Indies, 1868 

Extracts from Correspondence Concerning the Proposed Cession of the Islands of 
St. Thomas and St. John by Denmark to the United States, July 17, 1866- 
October 24, 1867 945 

Mr. Seward to Mr. Raasloff, July 17, 1866 945 

Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward, May 17, 1867 945 

Mr. Seward to Mr. Yeaman, May 27, 1867 946 



Draft of the Treaty Accompanying the Above 947 

Mr. Yeaman to Count Frijs, May 28, 1867 948 

Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward, June 17, 1867 949 

Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward, July 12, 1867 951 

Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward, July 22, 1867 953 

Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward, August 17, 1867 955 

Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward, September 27, 1867 956 

Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward, October 1, 1867 956 

Inclosure: Mr. Raasloff to Mr. Yeaman, October 1, 1867 957 

Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward, October 3, 1867 957 

Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward, October 7, 1867 958 

Mr. Seward to Mr. Yeaman, October 24, 1867 959 

Uncompleted Treaty Between the United States of America and His Majesty the 
King of Denmark Concerning the Cession of the Islands of St. Thomas and St. 
John, Signed at Copenhagen on October 24, 1867 960 

Extracts from Correspondence Between Secretary Seward and the United States 
Agents in the Islands, October 26-December 4, 1867 962 

Mr. Seward to Reverend Charles Hawley, October 26, 1867 962 

Mr. Hawley to Mr. Seward, November 13, 1867 . .• 963 

Mr. Hawley to Mr. Seward, November 22, 1867 964 

Mr. Hawley to Mr. Seward, November 29, 1867 965 

Mr. Hawley to Mr. Seward, November 30, 1867 966 

Mr. Perkins to Mr. Seward, December 4, 1867 .... * 967 

Inclosure: Royal Proclamation to the Inhabitants of the Islands of St Thomas 
and St John, October 25, 1867 969 

Address of Merchants of St. Thomas to the Danish Commissioner 970 

Proposed Additional Articles to the Convention Between Denmark and the United 
States of America Made at Copenhagen on October 4, 1867 971 

Letter from Mr. Seward to Mr. Hawley, December 16, 1867 972 

The Result of the Election 

Extract from the St. Thomas Tidende, January 11, 1868 974 

Mr. Perkins to Mr. Seward, January 13, 1868 975 

THE PERIOD OF 1871-1914 

St. Bartholomew, West Indies, 1877 

Treaty Between France and Sweden for the Retrocession of the Island of St. Bar- 
tholomew by Sweden to France, Signed at Paris, August 10, 1877 977 

Protocol After the Plebiscite, Regarding the Details of the Delivery of the Island 

to France, October 31, 1877 978 

Statement of the Reasons for Support of the Bill Approving the Treaty, Presented 
to the French Chamber of Deputies by Duke Decazes, Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs, November 12, 1877 980 



The Tacna-Arica Question, 1883 — 

Extracts from the Correspondence Between the Secretary of State of the United 
States and the United States Minister Plenipotentiary to Chile, June 26, 1882- 
July 2, 1883 985 

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Logan, June 26, 1882 985 

Mr. Logan to Mr. Frelinghuysen, October 26, 1882 987 

Inclosure: Mr. Logan to Senor Aldunate, October 18, 1882 987 

Peace Protocol Between Novoa and Iglesias 991 

Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between Chile and Peru, Signed at Ancon, October 
20, 1883 992 

The Jimenez-Vial Solar Protocol, Signed January 26, 1894 995 

Uncompleted Secret Treaty Between Chile and Bolivia, Signed May 18, 1895 . . 997 

The Billinghurst-Latorre Protocol, Signed April 16, 1898 1000 

Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Commerce Between Bolivia and Chile, Signed 

at Santiago, October 20, 1904 1009 

Extracts from the Notes Exchanged Between the Chancelleries of Peru and of Chile, 

1905-1908 1012 

The Minister of Foreign Relations of Peru to the Minister of Foreign Relations 
of Chile, with Reference to the Treaty of Peace Between Chile and Bolivia, 
February 18, 1905 1012 

The Minister of Foreign Relations of Chile to the Minister of Foreign Relations 
of Peru, Proposing a Conference, March 15, 1905 1014 

The Minister of Foreign Relations of Peru to the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of Chile, Accepting the Proposal for a Conference, April 25, 1905 1021 

Confidential Communication from the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs to Sr. 
Seoane, Special Envoy of Peru, March 25, 1908 1025 

Reply of Sr. Seoane, May 8, 1908 1029 

Summary of the Chilean and Peruvian Proposals for the Holding of the Plebiscite, 

with Observations by the Peruvian Foreign Office, December 23, 1909 .... 1046 

Proposal Regarding the Plebiscite Made by the Peruvian Government November 

10, 1912 1049 

The Separation of Norway from Sweden, 1905 

Address to the King by the Riksdag Postponing Negotiations Regarding Separation 
Until After a Further Expression of the Desire of the Norwegian People, July 
28, 1905 1051 

Report to the Storting by the Norwegian Department of Justice Recommending a 
Plebiscite in Norway, Approved by Resolution of the Norwegian Government of 
the Same Date, July 27, 1905 1053 

Draft of Regulations for the Plebiscite Submitted with the Above Report .... 1057 

Circular of Instructions from the Department of Justice to the Registration Officers 

and Boards of Election, July 29, 1905 1060 

Circular of the Department of Ecclesiastical Affairs to the Clergy, July 29, 1905 . . 1069 

Report of the Norwegian Department of Justice Regarding the Plebiscite Held August 

13/21, 1905 1070 

Index 1075 

Chronological List of Cases of Change of Sovereignty in which the Right 

to Self-Determination Has Been Recognized 

Period of the French Revolution 

1791 Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin annexed to France after plebiscites 

1792 Savoy annexed to France after a plebiscite. 

1793 Nice annexed to France after a plebiscite. 

The Belgian Communes and Liege annexed to France after plebiscites. 
Communes of the Rhenish Palatinate and Alsace annexed to France after plebiscites. 
1798 The Republics of Mulhausen and Geneva annexed to France after votes of citizens. 

Period of 1848-1870 

1848 The Italian Plebiscites of 1848. Lombardy, Venetia, Parma, Modena, Piacenza, and 
Reggio annexed to the Kingdom of Sardinia after plebiscites. 

1848 The Schleswig Question. Proposals by Prussia and the Germanic Confederation for 
the division of Schleswig by a plebiscite in Northern Schleswig. 

1856 Reorganization of the Danubian Principalities. The Treaty of Paris established a 
European Commission to consult with Assemblies ad hoc in Moldavia and Wal- 
lachia. Signed April 27, 1856. 

1859 The Italian National Assemblies of 1859. Tuscany, Modena, Parma, Piacenza, and 


1860 The Italian Plebiscites of 1860. Tuscany, Emilia (Parma, Modena, Romagna), Naples, 

Sicily, the Marches, and Umbria annexed to the Kingdom of Sardinia after 

Savoy and Nice annexed to France after plebiscites. The Treaty of Turin, signed 
March 24, made the cession by Sardinia conditional on a consultation of the in- 

1864 The Ionian Islands ceded by Great Britain to Greece after a vote of the Legislative 
Assembly of the Islands, especially elected by qualified suffrage. The Protocol of 
London, signed August 1, and the Treaty of London, signed December 14, 1863, be- 
tween Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, stipulated for a vote 
of the Legislative Assembly of the Islands. 

1864 The Schleswig Question. Conferences of London for the settlement of the Danish 

1866 Venetia annexed to Italy after a plebiscite. 

1866 The Schleswig Question. The Treaty of Prague between Prussia and Austria, signed 

August 23, 1866, made the transfer of Northern Schleswig conditional on a free 
vote of the population. Abrogated by the Treaty of Vienna between Prussia and 
Austria, signed October 11, 1878. 

1867 The Danish West Indies. The uncompleted treaty between the United States and 

Denmark, signed October 24, for the purchase of the islands of St. Thomas and 
St. John (D. W. I.), contained a stipulation making the cession conditional on the 
consent of the population in the islands. The plebiscite was held in January, 1868. 

1870 The City and Provinces of Rome united to Italy after a plebiscite. 

Period of 1871-1914 

1877 St Bartholomew (W. I.) annexed to France after a plebiscite. The Treaty of Paris 
between Sweden and France made the cession conditional on the consent of the 
population. Signed August 10. 

1883 Tacna and Arica. The Treaty of Ancon between Chile and Peru provided for a 
plebiscite in Tacna and Arica (Peruvian provinces occupied by Chile) after ten 
years. Signed October 20. 

1905 The Separation of Norway from Sweden by a plebiscite in Norway. 

Bibliographical List of Principal Works Consulted 

Acta Sanctae Sedis in compendium opportune redacta et illustrata. Rome, 1870-71. Vol. 6. 

Acte si documente relative la istoria renascerei Romaniei. Edited by Dimitrie A. Sturdza 
and C. Colescu-Vartic. Bucharest, 1896. 9 vols. 

American Journal of International Law. New York, 1907-. 

Andre, J. F. Histoire de la resolution avignonnaise. Paris, 1844. 

Annuaire des deux tnondes. Histoire genirale des divers etats. Paris, 1851-1868. 14 vols. 

Arangio-Ruiz, Gaetano. Storia constituzionale del regno di Italia (1848-1898). Florence, 

Archives diplomatique s ; recueil de diplomatie, a" histoire et de droit international. Paris, 

Audinet, Eugene. La prescription acquisitive. Revue ginirale de droit international public. 
1896. Vol. 2, p. 313. 

Bancroft, Frederic. The Life of William H. Seward. New York, 1900. 2 vols. 

Barjavel, Casimir Francois Henri. Dictionnaire historique, biographique et bibliogra- 
phique du dipartement de Vaucluse, ou Recherches pour servir a V histoire scientiUque, 
littiraire et artistique, ainsi qu'd Vhistoire religieuse, civile et militaire, des villes et 
arrondissements d 'Avignon, de Carpentras, d'Apt et d'Orange. Carpentras, 1841. 2 

Barlow, Joel. A Letter to the People of Piedmont on the Advantages of the French Revolu- 
tion, in Political Writings. 2d ed. New York, 1796. 

Belaunde, Victor Andres. Nuestra cuestidn con Chile. Lima, 1919. 

Beauffort, Roger, Comte de. Histoire de Vinvasion des Etats PontiHcaux et du siige de 
Rome Par Varmie italienne en Septembre 1870. Paris, 1874. 

Bluntschli, Johann Kaspar. Le droit international codiHi. Translated by M. C. Lardy. 
Paris, 1870. 

Bonfils, Henri. Manuel de droit international public (droit des gens). Paris, 1894. 

Borgnet, Charles Joseph Adolphe. Histoire des Beiges a la fin du XVIII siicle. Brussels, 
1861-62. 2 vols. 

Bourgeois, J. V Annexion de la Savoie a la France. Revue genirale de droit international 
public. 1896. Vol. 3, p. 673. 

Bourgeois, Leon. Pour la sociiti des nations. Paris, 1910. 

Break sted, H. L. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway. London, 1905. 

Brennan, Rev. Richard. A Popular Life of Our Holy Father Pope Pius the Ninth. 4th 
ed. New York, 1877. 

Brissaud, Jean Baptiste. A History of French Public Law. Translation by James W. 
Garner. Boston, 1915. 

Bunsen, Christian Karl Josias, Freiherr von. Memoir on the Constitutional Rights of 
the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, presented to Viscount Palmerston by Chevalier 
Bunsen. 1848 . . . published with M. de Gruner*s essay on the Danish question, and all 
the official documents by Otto von Wenckstern. London, 1848. 

Cabouat, Jules. Des annexions de territoire et de leurs principales consequences. Paris, 


Cadorna, Raffaele. La liberazione di Roma neWanno 1870 ed il plebiscite. 2d ed. Turixr r 

Calvo, Carlos. Derecho international tedrico y pr&tico de Euro pa y America. 2 vols. 
Paris, 1868. 

. Le droit international thtorique et pratique; pricidi d'un expo si historique des 

progris de la science du droit des gens. 3d ed. Paris, 1868-81. 4 vols. 5th ed. Paris,. 
1896. 6 vols. 

The Cambridge Modern History; planned by the late Lord Acton. Cambridge ( England) r 
1902-. 14 vols. 

Charpenne, Pierre. Les grands ipisodes de la revolution dans Avignon et le Comtat. 
Avignon, 1901. 4 vols. 

Chiala, Luigi. Lettere edite ed inedite di Camillo Cavour, raccolte ed illustrate da Luigi 
Chiala. Turin, 1883-87. 6 vols. 

Chile. Ministerio de relaciones exteriores. Comunicaciones cambiadas entre las Cancil- 
lerias de Chile y el Peru y algunos antecedentes sobre la cuest'vdn de Tacna y Arica* 
1905-1910. 2d ed. Santiago de Chile, 1912. 

Memoria del Ministerio de relaciones exteriores, octubre de 1911-julio de 1914. Santiago de 
Chile, 1917. 

Couquet, Arthur Maxime. Les guerres de la revolution. Vol. 4. lemappes et la conquete 
de la Belgique, 1792-1793. Vol. 6. UExpidition de Custine. Vol 7. Mayence, 1792- 
1793. Paris, 1890. 

Clercq, Alexandre Jehan Henry de. Recueil des traitis de la France, publii sous les 
auspices du Ministkre des affaires Strangeres. Paris, 1864-. 

Collezione celerifera delle leggi, decreti, istrusioni e circolari . . . Turin, 1822-1913. 117 

Dame, Frederic. Histoire de la Roumanie contemporaine depuis favfriement des princes 
indigenes jusqu'a nos jours (1822-1900). Paris, 1900. 

Debidour, Antonin. Histoire diplomatique de VEurope depuis Vouverture du Congris ds 
Vienne jusqu'a la fermature du Congris de Berlin (1814-1878). Paris, 1891. 2 vols. 

La Defensa de Chile. Buenos Ayres, Argentina. The first issue is dated January 4, 1919. 

Delhaize, Jules. La domination francaise en Belgique a la fin du XVIII* et au commence- 
ment du XIX 9 Siicle. Brussels, 1908-12. 6 vols. 

Descamps, E. E. f and L. Renault. Recueil international des traitis du XX* siicle, contenant 
I* ensemble du droit conventional entre les Stats et les sentences arbitrates. j Paris, 

Despagnet, Frantz Clement Rene. Cours de droit international public. Paris, 1894. 
3rd ed., 1905. 4th ed., 1910. 

Despres, Clement. La question des Principautis Danubiennes. Perpignan, 1913. 

Deuxieme conference internationale de la paix — La Haye 15 juin-18 octobre 1907. Actes 
et documents. Ministere des affaires Hranghres. The Hague, 1907. 3 vols. 

Van Duerm, Charles. Vicissitudes Politique s du pouvoir temporel des popes de 1790 d nos 
jours. Lille, 1890. 

Duvergier, J. B. Collection complete des lois, dicrets, ordonnances, rtglemens et avis 
du Conseil d'Etat, publiee sur les editions officielles du Louvre. Paris, 1834-1904. 

Egana, Rafael. The Tacna and Arica question. Historical antecedents. Diplomatic action. 
Present state of the affair. Translated from the Spanish edition by Edwyn C Reed. 
Santiago de Chile, 1900. 

Erasmus Against War. Edited by J. W. Mackail. Boston, 1907. 

Fiore, Pasquale. Nouveau droit international public suivant les besoins de la civilisation 
mod erne. Translated by Pradier-Fodere, Paris, 1869. 2d. ed. translated by Charles 
Antoine, Paris, 1885. 


France. Annates du Sinat et de la Chambre des diputis. Session ordinaire de 1878. 

. Archives parlementaires de, 1787-1860. Recueil complex des debats Ugislatifs et 

politiques des chambre s francaises. ImprimS par ordre du Sinat, et de la Chambre des 
diputis. 1st scries, 1787-1799. 

. Gazette nationale ou le Moniteur universel. Paris, 1789-. (The present title is 

Journal officiel.) It is cited here as Moniteur universel. 

. Ministere des affaires Strangles, Documents diplomatiques, 1864. Affaires des duchis 

de TElbe, Annexion des lies Ioniennes a la Grdce. Paris, 1865. 

Fusinato. Guido. Le mutasioni territoriali, il loro fondamento giuridico e le loro conse- 
guense. Lanciano, 1885. 

Giacomexti, G. U Annexion de Nice. Revue des deux mondes, March, 1896. 

Giovagnoli, Raffaele. Le risorgimento italiano. Storia politico d' Italia, 1815-1848. Scritta 
da una societa di professori. Milan, 1897-. 

Gjerset, Knut. History of the Norwegian People. New York, 1915. 

Great Britain. British and Foreign State Papers. London, 1841-. 

. Parliamentary Papers. Accounts and Papers: 

Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Italy (part 2), January to 30 June, 1848; 1849 
[1108]. Vol. 57. 

Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Italy, July, 1859, to January, 1860; 1860 [2609]. 

Further correspondence (part 2), January to February, 1860; 1860 [2636]. Vol. 67. 

Further correspondence (part 3), February and March, 1860; 1860 [2638]. Vol. 67. 

Affairs of Italy, Savoy and Switzerland (part 6), March to June, 1860; 1860 12702]. 
Vol 67. 

Further correspondence (part 7), May to December, 1860; 1861 [2757], Vol. 67. 

Further correspondence (part 9), January and March, 1861; 1861 [2804]. Vol. 67. 

Mission of Rt. Hon. W. E. Gladstone to the Ionian Islands, 1858; 1861 [2891]. Vol. 67. 

Treaties, Conventions, etc.: Treaty between Her Majesty, the Emperor of the French, etc., 
1864 [3323]. Vol. 66. 

Treaty between Her Majesty, the Emperor of Austria, etc., 1864 [3247] Vol. 66. 

Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Rome, 1870-1871; 1871 [c. 247]. Vol. 72. 

Grivaz, Francisque. Le plebiscite d' annexion de 1860 en Savoie et dans le comti de Nice. 
Revue genirale de droit international public, 1896. Vol 3, p. 573. 

Grotius, Hugo. De jure belli ac pacts. Amsterdam, 1651. Translated by Whewell, Cam- 
bridge, 1853. 

Guggbnberger, A. A General History of the Christian Era. St. Louis, 1899. 

Guizot, Francois Pierre Guillaume. L'Histoire de France depuis Us temps les m plus 
recuUs jusqu'en 1789, racontie a mes petits enfants. Paris, 1878-79. 5 vols. 

Hall, William Edward. A Treatise on International Law. 4th ed. London, 1895. 

Hansard, Thomas Curzon. Parliamentary Debates. 3d series. London, 1830-1891. 356 

Hayes, Carlton J. H. A Political and Social History of Modern Europe. New York, 1916. 
2 vols. 

Heffter, August Wilhelm. Le droit international de VEurope. 4th ed. by F. Heinrich 
Geffcken. Berlin, 1883. 


Hkimweh, Jean (pseud.). Droit de conquete et de plebiscite. Paris, 1896. 

. Triple Alliance et Alsace-Lorraine. Paris, 1892. 

Holtzendorff, Franz von. Le principe des nationalites et la littirature italienne du droit 
des gens. Revue de droit international et de legislation comparte. 1870. Vol. 2, p. 92. 

d'Ideville, Henry. Les piimontais a Rome. Lettres recueillies et iditSes. Paris, 1874. 

Der Italienische Raubsug wider Rom im September 1870 von einem Augemeugen. 
Miinster, 1871. 

Italy. Camera dei deputati. Le Assembtee del risorgimento. Atti raccolti e publicati per 
deliberazione della Camera dei deputati. Rome, 1911. 15 vols. 

. Gazsetta UMciale del regno d'ltalia. Florence, 1870. The Gazzetta was published 

from Turin, in 1861. 

. Atti del Parlamento Italiano. Sessione del 1860. Discussioni della Camera dei 


. Direzione generale della statistica del Regno d'ltalia. Popolazione. Censimenti degli 

antichi stati Sardi. (1° gennaio, 1858) e censimenti di Lombardia, di Parma e di Modena 
( 1857-1858) . Turin, 1862. 3 vols. 

— — . Direzione generale della statistica. Statistica del Regno d'ltalia. Popolazione — 
Censimento generale (31 dicembre, 1861). Turin, 1864-66. 3 vols. 

. Direzione generale della statistica. Statistica del Regno d'ltalia. Popolazione — 

Censimento (31 dicembre, 1871). Rome 1874-76. 3 vols. 

de Jessen Franz (publie sous la direction de). Manuel historique de la question du Sles- 
vig. Documents, cartes, pieces justificative* et renseignements statistiques. Copenhagen, 

King, Bolton. A History of Italian Unity, being a political history of Italy from 1814 to 
1871. London, 1899. 2 vols. 

Kirkwall, Viscount. Four years in the Ionian Islands. Their political and social condi- 
tions. With a history of the British protectorate. London, 1864. 2 vols. 

Kluber, J. L. Droit des gens moderne de VEurope ... 2 ed. by M. A. Ott, Paris, 1874. 

La Gueronniere, Louis Etienne Arthur Dubreuil Helion, Vicomte de (ancien ambas- 
sadeur de France). Le droit public et VEurope moderne. Paris, 1876. 2 vols. 

Lawrence, William Beach. Commentaire sur les elements du droit international et sur 
Vhistoire des progrfo du droit des gens de Henry Wheaton. Leipsig, 1868. 2 vols. 

Lecomte, Ferdinand. L Italic en 1860. Paris, 1861. 

Lenormant, Francesco. L'Annessione delle isole Ionie al regno ellenico. Consider asioni 
storiche politiche. Venice, 1864. 

Levy, Armand. UEmpereur Napoleon III. et les principautds roumaines. Paris, 1858. 

Lieber, Francis. De la valeur des plebiscites dans le droit international. Revue de droit 
international et de legislation compare. Brussels, 1871. Vol. 3, p. 139. Miscellaneous 
Writings. Vol. III. 

MacCaffrey, Rev. James. History of the Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century. 2d 
ed. Dublin, 1910. 

Maguire, John Francis. Article in The Dublin Review, vol. 16 (new series), p. 32. Lon- 
don, 1836-1906. 138 vols. 

Martens, Fedor Fedorovich de. Traite de droit international. Paris, 1883-87. Translated 
from the Russian by Alfred Leo. 

Martens, Georg Friedrich von. Recueil des traites d'alliance, de paix, de treve . et 
plusieurs autres actes servant a la connaissance des relations etrangtres des puissances 
et etats de VEurope depuis 1761 jusqu'a present. . . . Gottingen, 1817-^35. 2d ed. 8 vols. 

. Nouveau recueil de traites d' alliance, de paix, de treve . . . et de plusieurs autres actes 

servant a la connaissance des relations etrangdres des puissances . . . de VEurope . . . 
depuis 1808 jusqu'a present.. .Gottingen, 1817-41. 16 vols. 


Martens, Georg Friedrich von. Nauveau recueil gintral de trait is, conventions et outre s 
transactions remarquables, servant a la connaissance des relations Strang h-es des puis- 
sances et itats dans leurs rapports mutuels. Compiled by Fredenc Murhard. Gottinizen. 
1843-75. 20 vols, in 22. * ^ 

Matter, Paul. Bismarck et son temps. Paris, 1906. 3 vols . 

Maurtua, Victor M. The Question of the Pacific. An English ed. . . . by F. A. Pezet. 
Philadelphia, 1901. 

Mhnoires et documents publics par la Soci6ti d'histoire et d'archiologie de Geneve. Series 
4. Geneva, 1915. 

Michon, Louis. Les traites international devant les chambres. Paris, 1901. 

Moore, John Bassett. A Digest of International Law. Washington, 1906. 8 vols. 

Morley, John. The Life of William Ewart Gladstone. London, 1903. 3 vols. 

Mulhouse. Musie historique. Bulletin. Mulhausen, 1876-. 

Nansen, Fridtjof. Norway and the Union with Sweden. London, 1905. 

Norway. Unionens Oplosning 1905. Officielle akstykker vedrorende unionens-krisen og 
Norgesg gjenreisning som helt suveraen stat, med latrige facsimiles og billeder. Edited 
by Jakob Vilhelm Heiberg. Christiania. 1906. 

Novikow, J. L' Alsace-Lorraine, obstacle a V expansion allemande. Paris, 1913. 

Nys, Ernest. Etudes de droit international et de droit politique. Brussels, 1896. 

Oliphant, Margaret Oliphant Wilson. Memoir of the Life of Laurence Oliphant and 
of Alice Oliphant, his Wife. New York, 1891. 2 vols. 

Ollevier, Emile. U Empire libiral; itudes, recits, souvenirs. Paris, 1895-1915. 17 vols. 

Oppenheim, Lassa Francis Lawrence. International Law: a treatise. London, 1905-06. 
2d ed. 2 vols. 

O'Reilly, Rev. Edmund J. The State of the Question as to the Pope's Temporal Power. 
The Month, July-December, 1871. Vol. 15. London. 

Padelletti, Guido. L Alsace et la Lorraine, et le droit des gens. Revue de droit inter- 
national et de legislation comparie. Brussels, 1871. Vol. 3, p. 464. 


Parton, James. The Danish Islands: Are we bound in honor to pay for themt Boston, 

Peru. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores del Peru. Circular sobre la cuestidn Tacna y 
Arica. Lima, 1901. 

Piiillimore, Sir Walter George Frank. Three Centuries of Treaties of Peace and their 
Teaching. London, 1917. 

Philupson, Coleman. Alsace Lorraine, Past, Present, and Future. London, 1918. 

. Termination of War and Treaties of Peace. New York, 1916. 

Pradier-Fodere, Paul Louis Ernest. L'AmSrique espagnole. Chronique des faits inter- 
nationdux. Revue de droit international et de ligislation comparie. 1897. Vol. 29, p. 

Traite de droit international public, europeen et amiricain, suivant les progr&s de la 

science et de la pratique contemporaines. 1885-1906. 8 vols. 

Pufendorf, Samuel, Freiherr von. De jure naturae et gentium. Amsterdam, 1698. Trans- 
lated by Basil Kennett London, 1729. 

Randolph, Carman Fitz. The Law and Policy of Annexation, with special reference to 
the Philippines, together with observations on the status of Cuba. New York, 1901. 

Ren an, Ernest. Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? Conference faite en Sorbonne, le 11 mars 1882. 
2d ed. Pans, 1882. 

Reid, Stuart J. Lord John Russell. London, 1895. 


Revue catholique des institutions et du droit par une sociiti de jurisconsultes et de publicistes. 
Grenoble, 1872. 82 vols. 

Revue de droit international et de legislation comparie. Brussels, 1869-. Quarterly, 1869-77; 
bi-monthly, 1878. 

Revue generate de droit international public: droit des pens — histoire diplomatique — droit 
penal — droit fiscal — droit administratis. Bi-monthly. Paris, 1894-. 

Riyier, Alphonse Pierre Octave. Principe s du droit des gens. Paris, 1896. 2 vols. 

Rouard de Card, Edgard. Les annexions et les plibiscites dans V histoire contemporame. 
Etudes de droit international. Paris, 1890. 

Roxburgh, Ronald F. International Conventions and Third States. London, 1917. 

Saint-Genis, Victor de. Histoire de Savoie d'apres les documents originaux depuis Us 
origines les plus recuUes jusqu'a V annexion. Chambery, 1869. 3 vols. 

Sampson, Don at. The Last Ten Years of the Temporal Power. From Men tana to the 
Porta Pia. American Quarterly Review. January-October, 1899. Vol. 24. 

Sorel, Albert. UEurope et la revolution francaise. Paris, 1889-1904. 7 vols. 

Soullier, Charles. Histoire de la revolution d' Avignon et du ComtS Venaissin en 1789 
et annies suivantes. Paris and Avignon, 1844. 2 vols. 

Stephens, H. Morse, A History of the French Revolution. New York, 1902. 3 vols. 

Sturdza, Alexandre A. C. La terre et la race roumaines. Paris, 1904. 

Sturdza, De metre A. Charles Ier roi de Roumanie. Chronique, actes, documents Bu- 
charest, 1899. 2 vols. 

Sumner, Charles. The Duel between France and Germany. Addresses on war, Boston, 

von Sybel, Heinrich. The Founding of the German Empire by William I, based chiefly 
upon Prussian state documents. Translated by Marshall Livingston Perrin and Gamaliel 
Bradford, Jr. New York, 1891. 5 vols. 

Thayer, William Roscoe. The Life and Times of Cavour. Boston, 1911. 2 vols. 

Thouvenel, L. Trois annies de la question d'orient, 1856-1859, d'apres les papiers vtfdits 
de M. Edouard Antoine Thouvenel. Paris, 1897. 

The Times. London. The publication began under the title Daily Universal Register, in 
1785, assuming its present title in 1788. 

Tkesal, J. V Annexion de la Savoie a la France, 1848 to I860. Paris, 1913. 

United States. Compilation of Reports of Senate Commitee on Foreign Relations, 1789- 
1901. Cited U. S. Senate Document No. 231. 56th Congress, 2d session. 

. Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 

with the annual message of the President. Washington, 1862-. Cited United States, 
Foreign Relations. 

de Vattel, Emmerich. Le droit des gens; ou Principes de la loi natureUe applique's a 
la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains. London, 1758. 

Wallon, Henri. Les reprisentants du peuple en mission et la justice rivolutionnaire dans 
les dipartements en Van II. 1793-1794. Paris, 1890. 5 vols. 

Walpole, Spencer. The Life of Lord John Russell. London, 1891. 2 vols. 

Westergaard, Waldemar. The Danish West Indies under Company Rule. 1671-1754. New 
York, 1917. 

White, Andrew Dickson. Seven Great Statesmen in the Warfare of Humanity with Un- 
reason. New York, 1912-. 

Woolsey, Theodore Dwight. Introduction to the Study of International Law, designed as 
an aid in teaching, and in historical studies. 2d ed. New York, 1864. 


XfcNOPOL, Alexandru D. Histoire des roumoines de la Dacie trajane depuis Us origin**, 
jusqu'a f union des principalis en 1859. Paris, 1896. 2 vols. 

Zanechelli, Domenico. Studi di storia costitusionale e politico del risorgimento italiano. 
Bologna, 1900. 

Zini, Luigi. Storia d* Italia dal 1850 al 1866, continuata da quella di Guise ppe La Farina. 
Milan, 1866-1869. 2 vols, in 4. 

Zobi, Antonio. Storia civile delta Toscana, 1737-1848. Florence, 1852. 5 vols. 

A Study of the Theory and Practice of 



Discussion of the doctrine of national self-determination falls naturally 
into three periods. At least this is true when the discussion, as in this vol- 
ume, deals exclusively with national self-determination as a factor in changes 
of sovereignty through separation, cession and annexation. 

The history of the doctrine properly begins with the French Revolution. 
Born of the political principles and practical problems of the Revolution, the 
doctrine was adopted as the guiding principle in foreign relations, was applied 
in good faith in the annexations of Avignon, Savoy, Nice, and used as a 
political subterfuge in the later annexations of the Belgian Communes and 
the Rhine Valley, only to be utterly destroyed by the growing ambition for 
conquest over a world of enemies. 

The next and most prosperous period of its history is from 1848 to 1870. 
Revived by the national aspirations for self-government in 1848; resorted 
to by the Italian patriots ; adopted as their own by Prussia and the Germanic 
Confederation as the solution for the Schleswig question; adopted by the 
Congress of Paris of 1856, it grew rapidly in prestige and by 1859 had en- 
listed the almost undeviating adherence of three of the four leading states- 
men of the time — Cavour, Russell and Napoleon — and the temporary sup- 
port of Bismarck. Recognized as the creative force of the new Italian king- 
dom; made the basis of the union of Tuscany, Emilia, Sicily, Naples, the 
Marches, and Umbria; repeated in the subsequent union of Venetia and 
Rome; stipulated in the treaty of Turin for the cession of Savoy; endorsed, 
though unsuccessfully, by the chief Powers at the Conference of London as 
the only solution for the Schleswig question; followed by Great Britain 
in her cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece; inserted in the treaty of Prague 
between Austria and Prussia — by 1866 the method of appeal to a vote of the 
inhabitants, either by plebiscite or by representative assemblies, especially 
elected, bade fair to establish itself as a custom amounting to law. Another 
philosophy was rising, however. The Prussian annexation of Schleswig in 
1867, without regard to the provisions of the treaty of Prague and the 
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 dealt the principle a blow which, the 
world being under German tutelage in matters of historical criticism and the 


philosophy of the State, was practically fatal. After 1870 it was given a 
nebulous continuance by the treaty of 1877 between France and Sweden for 
the cession of St. Bartholomew, and by the treaty of Ancon between Chile and 
Peru. The ascendancy of the doctrine of political opportunism, however, 
found accurate expression in the Congress of Berlin. A second Congress of 
Vienna, it was to have the same result, for the doctrine of national self- 
determination, abandoned by diplomats, was to have henceforth a place in 
the platform of every liberal or radical movement and with the outbreak of 
the war in 1914 was to become the symbol of regeneration for every subject 

The doctrine of national self-determination is based on and inseparable 
from that of popular sovereignty. Before the French Revolution sovereignty 
looked to the land, not to the inhabitants. Change of sovereignty through 
inheritance or marriage of the reigning prince, through barter or through 
conquest was the recognized and legitimate order. Title so acquired was ad- 
mittedly valid without appeal to the will of the inhabitants. 

To the philosophers of the French Revolution the right of conquest, rea- 
sonable adjunct as it was of the divine right of kings, was incompatible with 
the right of peoples to choose their own rulers. To assert that a conqueror 
could retain his domination over the inhabitants of a conquered territory 
against their will was to deny the doctrine of popular sovereignty and to 
change free men back to slaves. In order to harmonize external relations 
with the basic principles of the new order the doctrine of no annexation with- 
out consultation of the inhabitants was formulated, a doctrine new in the 
experience of Europe. Yet as no new doctrine of political philosophy springs 
full grown upon a startled world, but always, after the event, seeds of it 
may be found in the words of men of thought and may be discerned in events 
long antedating its period of maturity, so it is true in this instance that writers 
had indicated the principle, subjects had appealed to it, and a few astute rulers 
had made use of it before the final adoption as a national policy by leaders of 
the French Revolution. f 

Historians in discussing the origins of the doctrine refer 'to the case of 
the provinces ceded by Louis IX to Henry III of England in the thirteenth 
century, against which cession the nobles of the provinces in question protested 
as contrary to their rights, 1 and also to the refusal of the people of Guienne 
to be separated from the kingdom of England, notwithstanding the grant and 
donation of Richard the Second. 2 However significant these instances may be, 
there is far greater importance in the attack on title by conquest and the ridi- 

1 L. E. A. D. H. de la Gueronniere, Le droit public et VEurope moderne, vol. 1, p. 434. 

2 Samuel von Pufendorf , De jure naturae et gentium, lib. 3, pp. 809, 831, citing Froissard, 
1.4. Polyd. Virgil. Hist. Angl. 1.20. 


cule of historical arguments as claims to sovereignty over alien peoples, pub- 
lished by Erasmus in the Adagiorum Chiliades, is 1517. 1 Erasmus stated in 
precise language that authority over men and beasts is not of the same order, 
that all power and authority over people rests on their consent, and that title 
by conquest is a fallacy. In view of the great influence of Erasmus on con- 
temporary thought, and the immense popularity of his writings, 2 it is not 
surprising that the only two cases of deliberate appeal to the doctrine by rulers 
themselves which occur before the eighteenth century should follow shortly 
on his words. The first of these occurred in 1527, when Francis I of France, 
perceiving the political value of the principle, used it as a weapon of diplomacy 
by appealing to the estates of Burgundy in order to invalidate the cession of 
the duchy which he had just made to Charles V by the treaty of Madrid. 3 
The second resort to the principle was made by his successor, Henry II, who 
appears to have desired its sanction for annexing Toul, Metz and Verdun, 
and caused a vote of the people to be taken before annexation. Whether or 
not this vote was by universal suffrage, it would seem to be the only one at 
all approaching the character of a plebiscite occurring before the Revolution. 4 
The next century saw the beginning of the formulation of principles of in- 

x For an excellent . English translation, cf. J. W. Mackail (ed.), Erasmus, Against War, 
p. 50. 

2 The essay containing the passage cited was printed separately in April, 1517. Half 
the scholarly presses of Europe were soon employed in reprinting it Within ten years 
it had been reissued at Louvain, twice at Strasburg, twice at Mayence, at Leipsic, twice 
at Paris, twice at Cologne, at Antwerp and at Venice. German translations of it were pub- 
lished at Basel and at Strasburg in 1519 and 1520, and an English translation appeared in 
London in 1533. Mackail, p. xxiv. 

■The account given by Francois Guizot, in VHistoire de France, vol. 3, p. 96, is to the 
effect that Francis had no intention of carrying out the treaty which, he protested before 
signing, was void because wrung from him by force. Before executing the treaty he sum- 
moned the estates of Burgundy at Cognac. They formally repudiated the cession as con- 
trary, they said, to the laws of the kingdom and the rights of the king who could not 
alienate, on his own authority alone, any portion of his estate. Francis then called the 
envoys of Charles V to a solemn meeting of his council and court at Cognac, where the 
deputies from Burgundy repeated their protest, which Charles asserted was an insurmountable 
obstacle to the execution of the treaty. Cited also by Emmerich de Vattel, Le droit des gens, 
lib. 1, p. 263, and by de la GueWonnxkre, vol. 1, p. 432. 

Louis Miction in Les traitis internationaux devout les Chambres, p. 24, says that the clause 
in the treaty of Madrid reserving the approbation of the estates referred only to the estates 
of Burgundy and implied the consent of the representatives of the ceded district. If this 
were so, this treaty would be the first to contain such a clause. On examination of the 
treaty it appears, however, that the clause plainly refers to the States General of the kingdom 
and was meant as a legislative sanction only. 

4 The story runs that the bishop of Verdun said to his people " que le roi de France £tait 
venu comme liberateur, qu'il voulait traiter les bourgeois comme de bons Francais et que, 
bien eloigne d'user de mesures de rigueur, il en appelait au vote libre du peuple." Emile 
Ollivier, L'Empire libiral, vol. I, p. 165. Ollivier cites Janssen, Frankreichs Rheingeluste, 
p. 28. as his authority. 


ternational law. Grotius, writing in 1625, said, " In the alienation of a part 
of the sovereignty, it is also required that the part which is alienated consent 
to the act," * and Pufendorf wrote in 1672, " But in the alienation of a part 
of the kingdom, besides the king's consent, there is required not only the 
consent of the people which continues under the old king, but the consent of 
that part too, especially, whose alienation is at stake." 2 This view was echoed 
by Vattel in the eighteenth century. 3 The numerous transfers of territory 
made in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, were made with- 
out further concession to these teachings than that of a grant of the right 
of option. By this right the individual inhabitants of the ceded territory 
were allowed a definite period of time to choose between the two allegiances 
and to remove themselves and their property, should they choose to remain 
under the ceding State. 4 

This was the only alleviation of the ancient rule that the sovereignty of 
the conqueror extended to all inhabitants of a conquered country without re- 
gard to individual desires. Even the several partitions of Poland appear to 
have caused no comment on the score of disregard of the popular will. Con- 
quests by kings for their own aggrandisement, for economic markets, for stra- 
tegic values, proceeded with scarcely a challenge save as they disregarded 
treaty rights. 

The American Revolution had effected a lasting change in the relation of 
the citizen to the State. The French Revolution brought about far-reaching 
changes not only in the internal but also in the external relations of the State. 
The Revolution was almost immediately confronted with questions of the 
relations of States as to territorial matters. It was evident that the old 
principles of territorial cession which confounded the State with the prince 
were wholly unsuited to the new doctrine of popular sovereignty which, when 
established within the State, implied as a corollary that no change of sover- 
eignty was legal without the consent of the people concerned. To the leaders 
of the Revolution, devoted to abstract principles as guides for action, this 

1 " In partis alienatione aliud insuper requiritur, ut etiam pars de qua alienanda agitur con- 
sentiat." Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacts, lib. 2, cap. 6, sec. 5. The translation is by 

2 " Sed in alienatione partis praeter consensum regis requiritur non solum populi, qui 
sub pristino rege remanet, sed vel maxime consensus illius partis, de qua alienanda agitur." 
Pufendorf, bk. 8, ch. 5, § 9. The translation is by Basil Kennett. 

» Vattel, lib. 1, chap. 21, §§ 263-64. 

4 The first example of a clause of option in a treaty of cession given by Calvo is that 
in the treaty of Ryswick (1697), Article 17 of which reads "Qu'il soit permis a tous ceux 
des habitants de la ville de Strasbourg ou des dependences, de quelque condition qu'ils soient, 
qui voudront emigrer, de transferer leur domicile au lieu ou il leur plaira et d'y transporter 
leurs meubles, en franchise de tous droits, dans le delai d'une annee a partir de la ratification 
du traite de paix." A similar clause appears in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). Carlos Calvo, 
Le droit international thiorique et pratique (5th ed.), §641. 


admitted of no argument. Nor did they advance the doctrine through fear 
of aggression against France. The subsequent course of the Revolution, 
which was to terminate as it did in conquests more extended than any others 
of modern times, have made men cynical regarding the ideals with which it 
opened. The periods of a nation's history when the leaders sacrifice national 
material advantage to principle are rare. It is, however, a fact, and one 
to the eternal credit of the men who were so soon to abandon their own 
doctrines, or, rather, to distort them into their opposites for the sake of na- 
tional aggrandisement, that they were sufficiently loyal to their belief in the 
principle of self-determination to refrain for almost two years from an- 
nexing a small territory, an " enclave," of great strategic value — French in 
race, language and economic ties — from which came many voices imploring 
annexation as the only means to end a devastating civil war. The annexa- 
tion was finally granted, but only after the original votes of the communes 
had been repeated in a manner which to the Constituent Assembly at Paris 
appeared to be reasonably fair, free and significant of the popular will of the 
tiny States. 

Yet, although there is no doubt from the debates that the philosophers of 
the Revolution believed that the abstract principle was an essential of the 
universal justice which they were striving to establish, the doctrine had for 
them from the first its practical side. Fearful of European resentment at 
an ) r aggressive spirit in the revolutionary government, they at once saw that 
by insisting on no annexation without expression of popular will they were 
to some extent disarming criticism and distrust. 

The problem of foreign relations as a practical issue was presented to the 
Constituent Assembly in May, 1790, by a letter of the President of the As- 
sembly announcing that the armaments of England obliged France to look to 
her safety, and that the king had ordered an increase of fourteen ships. Be- 
fore discussing the issue of peace or war, the Constituent Assembly thought 
it necessary to seek for an abstract principle, to be placed in the new consti- 
tution, which should harmonize interest with justice, extend to the world 
the blessings of the new gospel and bring peace to Europe. The decree finally 
adopted on May 22 ended with an article definitely renouncing for the French 
nation all wars of conquest. 1 This renunciation of conquests is the key to 
the history of the doctrine during the Revolution. Convinced of the ethical 
and practical value of the renunciation, the Constituent Assembly made every 
effort to act in consistency with it, and when later events had led the French 

1 Documents, post, p. 177. The declaration was embodied in the Constitution of September 
3, 1791, under Title VI, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count de Montmorin, in a 
circular letter of September 19, wrote to the French representatives at foreign courts 
that the attention of all the European Powers should be directed to that part of the con- 
stitution. Ernest Nys, Etudes de droit international et de droit politique, p. 368. 


armies far beyond the borders of the Republic, the Convention in Paris still 
made vain efforts to keep its faith with principle by asserting that the wars 
were not for conquest, and that all peoples should be free to choose their own 

The first demand for annexation to revolutionary France was from Avignon 
and the Com tat Venaissin. In the heart of the Midi, Avignon and the 
Venaissin had for many hundreds of years been under the sovereignty of the 
Pope with occasional brief periods of French rule. The partisans of union 
in the Constituent Assembly pointed with some show of reason to the faulty 
title of the Pope and to the strategic value of Avignon, and were content to 
consider the first votes of the communes, cast during the Civil War, as suffi- 
cient. They had the Parisian crowd with them, but so devoted was the ma- 
jority of the Constituent Assembly to the principle of popular sovereignty 
and the recent pledge against conquest that for two years no measures looking 
to union could get a majority, in spite of the frequent appeals which came 
from the territory itself. In the Constituent Assembly the party for annexa- 
tion at any price advanced the flaws in the papal title. The majority, how- 
ever, looked on this argument as one of no value to the French claim which 
they based on the popular vote. This claim being in their eyes supreme, they 
regarded the historical argument for the French title as of use only in the 
eyes of a Europe which did not recognize popular sovereignty and whose 
sole concern was for treaties and public law. It was only after mediators 
had been dispatched to end the civil war which was consuming the territory 
and which had rent Provence and moved all France, and after these mediators 
had reported that the opposing forces had been pacified and a fair vote taken 
in the communes and ratified by the Assembly of elected delegates, that the 
Constituent Assembly finally voted the union. 1 

By both contemporary and later historians, doubt has been thrown on 
the fairness of the vote cast. Religious as well as political controversies were 
involved. On one side we find united in an effort to discredit the vote both 
the Catholic historians and those Protestants whose sympathy with liberal 
institutions had been alienated by the later excesses of the French Revolution. 
The conditions of the vote, the primitive methods of voting common to the 
time, 2 the presence of the French agents and armed troops, the fact that the 
civil war had been an especially vindictive one with numerous atrocities on 

1 In their characterization of the plebiscites of the revolution as mere comedies to cover 
conquest, some authors include that of Avignon. Cf. Frantz Despagnet, Droit international 
public, § 391, and Alphonse Rivier, Principes du droit des gens, vol. I, p. 208. Such a char- 
acterization does not appear, however, to be consistent with the actual nistory of the affair. 

2 Voting in the eighteenth century was customarily viva voce. The ballot, although in- 
troduced in some of the American States in 1775, was in reality a nineteenth century institu- 
tion. The Australian ballot was not introduced in England until 1872. 


both sides — these facts make it impossible to contend that the reproaches are 
not well founded, though it appears certain that they are exaggerated. As 
for the actual will of the majority having been ascertained, there can be no 
doubt. Even the most partisan historians admit that the majority were satis- 
fied and that the question of union soon ceased to be a vital one. 1 The im- 
portant aspect, however, is not so much whether the vote taken was actually 
fair, but whether the Constituent Assembly intended it to be fair and thought 
it so when it finally acted on it. As to this question, from a careful examina- 
tion of the many pages of debate there can be little doubt. 

This attitude of the Assembly was repeated even after the war against the 
Coalition had been undertaken and French forces were in Savoy and Nice. 
Both soldiers and politicians seemed determined to adhere to the fundamental 
principles on which the Revolution was based. The attitude of the Assembly 
concerning Savoy brought the highest praise from its American sympathizer, 
Joel Barlow. It was, he said, an instance forming an epoch in the history of 
Europe. " Here we see a sovereign people, uninfluenced by any fears, hopes, 
or connections from abroad, deliberating in the most solemn manner, whether 
they will extend their territorial boundaries by the admission of seven new 
provinces, inhabited by four hundred thousand freemen who had sent their 
deputies to solicit a union. To raise a question on a proposition of this kind 
is certainly a new thing in politics. Louis XIV would have carried on a 
war for half a century and sacrificed twice that number of his own subjects 
to have made such an acquisition for his dominions." 2 The elections of 
Savoy, though taken during the French occupation and under the auspices 
of the French Commissioners as well as the local authorities, are without 
reproach from historians. Those of Nice, perhaps more open to question, 
are equally accepted. 

The drama of the Revolution was, however, progressing swiftly. The 
war against Prussia and Austria was becoming the chief fact to which all 
theory must be subordinated. The French forces had not only entered Savoy 
and Nice, Custine was now advancing into German territory and Dumouriez 
into the Austrian Netherlands. 

It had been the consuming ambition of many kings of France, and par- 
ticularly of Louis XIV, to incorporate the Netherlands into their kingdom 
and thus regain the ancient boundaries of Charlemagne, but this national 
aspiration was now dormant. The idea of conquest was utterly foreign to 
the expedition in its initiation. The Constituent Assembly had declared the 

1 Soullier, Histoire de la revolution d f Avignon et du Comtat Venaissin en 1789 et 
anntes suivantes, vol. 2, p. 72 et scq. 

2 Joel Barlow, " A Letter to the People of Piedmont," in The Political Writings of Joel 
Barlow, p. 233. 


inviolability of popular sovereignty; the war was a defensive one from the 
point of view of the Legislative Assembly which had begun it and of the 
Convention which was carrying it on. Respect for popular sovereignty had 
been rewarded by the eager union of Savoy and Nice. Little doubting that 
other peoples would be equally eager to adopt revolutionary principles the 
French were at first content to repeat the policy with the Belgians. The Bel- 
gians, however, in their first elections under French occupation, showed an 
attachment to their old institutions. The growth of the scale of the war 
and the cost of the maintenance of troops on foreign soil were causing grave 
financial embarrassment to the Convention. Further funds were necessary. 
The Belgians showed a disposition to adopt neither revolutionary principles 
nor revolutionary money. In this juncture the temptation not to repudiate 
the principle of popular sovereignty but so to tamper with it that the result 
would be assured proved irresistible. The old argument of the natural limits 
revived and added its appeal. 

On December 15, 1792, Cambon, in charge of the financial policy of the 
Convention, presented a report for the Committees on Finance, Military Af- 
fairs and Diplomacy, regarding the conduct to be followed by the generals 
in the countries occupied by the armies of the Republic. On October 24 La- 
source had made a report and read a draft decree on this same subject which 
had not been acted upon. 1 The report of Cambon was far different from 
that of Lasource which had urged the Convention to decree that the generals 
should pay a most meticulous respect to the sovereignty of the invaded peo- 
ples. Totally abandoning this policy, the decree of Cambon suspended the 
existing governments, abolished taxes, limited the franchise to those in sym- 
pathy with the revolution and provided for two sets of agents to aid in the 
further manipulating of the vote. Thus the Convention, not daring to for- 
sake the principle of self-determination, perhaps not realizing that it was 
forsaking it, was guilty for the first time of the most drastic infringement 
of popular sovereignty. These conditions prescribed by the decree, even had 
they been unaccompanied by the improper acts of the French agents and the 
excesses of the sans-culottes would have served to discredit the votes of 
the Belgian communes. Had methods of coercion not been resorted to, the 
electoral qualifications alone would have served to disfranchise the opposition 
in each community. The stigma attaching to these votes attaches to all 
those cast after the decree. No vote, whether in Mayence, the Saar valley, 
or Monaco, should have been considered valid by the Convention. No vote 
was free, no vote was significant. Yet the Convention, deaf to warnings, 
steadfastly pursued its policy of annexations based on plebiscites without 

1 Documents, post, p. 283. 


any attempt to investigate the conditions of the vote. Two short years of 
war had served to change completely the attitude of France towards conquest. 

The Decree of December 15 marked a transition in the policy of the 
Convention. It is a turning point in the Revolution. Hitherto acts in- 
fringing on the sovereignty of foreign peoples, when committed by the gen- 
erals, had been disavowed by the Assembly at Paris. From now on these 
acts were authorized by the Convention itself. Political expediency had over- 
thrown the basic philosophy of the Revolution. Military necessity and the 
search for the sinews of war had turned the Revolution into paths which soon 
led them far from that renunciation of all conquest with which the Revolu- 
tion had started. The way was paved for Napoleon, and by the time of his 
advent and his triumph the campaign of forcing other people to be free had 
begun in earnest. Except for the treaties of union of the little republics of 
Miilhausen and of Geneva with France, in which the annexations are based 
on the votes of the inhabitants, we hear no further echo of the right of self- 

The Napoleonic era consigned the principle to oblivion, and the Congress 
of Vienna appeared to be its death-blow. Thanks to Talleyrand, Metternich 
and the other reactionaries, once more the ancient dynastic principle was re- 
stored, again the land was held to belong to the sovereign. Thus the struggle 
between principle and expediency ceased, for principle now coincided with the 
current conception of expediency. But the very disregard of national desires 
intensified the nationalistic spirit among the people so disposed of, 1 and the 
numerous subsequent outbreaks promised anything but permanence for the 
Vienna patchwork. 

Revolted by the excesses of the Revolution and exhausted by the Napo- 
leonic wars resulting from it, the world had become weary of the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty. -Any suggestion of doctrines reminiscent of the Rights 
of Man met with scorn from intellectuals and harsh repression from govern- 
ments. Such a condition of instability could not be permanent, however. 
The smouldering fires of nationalism which had been repressed in 1815, 
fanned by the rising wind of democracy, burst into flame in 1848. With 
the resurgence of the subject nationalities arose again, with greater virility, 
the twin principles of popular sovereignty and of national self-determination. 
The two places where the doctrine assumed importance were in the Italian 

1 The treaty of Kiel of January 14, 1814, by which Denmark ceded Norway to Sweden, 
was repudiated by the Norse on the ground that, while the Danish King might renounce 
his right to the Norwegian crown, it was contrary to international law to dispose of an 
entire kingdom without the consent of its people. The Norse thereupon attempted armed 
resistance, which was so far successful that the union was based not on the treaty but on 
the Act of Union of 1815, which declared Norway to be a free, independent, and indivisible 
kingdom. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 297. 


problem and the question of Schleswig-Holstein. In each case it was resorted 
to by a subject nationality in its effort to win freedom from reluctant rulers 
by establishing before Europe the justice of its claim. 

The method of founding the union of Italy on the voluntary wish of the 
people of each province which was expressed in a popular vote by manhood 
suffrage — the method followed in the union of each of the nine provinces, 
ending with that of Rome in 1870 — began with 1848. The choice of this 
method was doubtless due to the fact that there was no other way to estab- 
lish a title against the opposition of the various European courts, which could 
point to the treaties and the principle of legitimacy in support of the dis- 
possessed petty sovereigns and against union. The event proved the wisdom 
of the Italian statesmen who had chosen this method to defeat the attempted 
arrangements of the Holy Alliance, and the opposition of the northern Powers. 

The first plebiscite was held in Lombardy under the provisional government 
to determine whether or not there should be immediate union with Sardinia 
or whether the decision should be delayed. The vote was by manhood suffrage 
with no literacy qualification. Plebiscites followed in Parma, Modena and 
the cities of the Venetian mainland. In Venice itself the vote was by an 
elected assembly. The method of voting in the plebiscites was the primitive 
one of writing the name and vote in registers in the presence of election offi- 
cials, the chief of whom was the parish priest. In the case of Lombardy there 
were consequent accusations of fraud and intimidation, largely religious, and 
the republicans charged that the haste shown in holding the plebiscite was un- 
fair. There is, however, no serious assertion now that the result did not 
represent the popular will. 

The laws of the Sardinian Parliament uniting these States to the kingdom 
state that " in view of the popular vote of the inhabitants of Lombardy " 
[Modena, etc.] " the province is declared to be an integral part of the Sar- 
dinian Kingdom." The immediate results of the plebiscites of 1848 were 
short-lived and the union so decreed fell with the reverses attending the Pied- 
montese arms. The idea of popular consultation as a method of attaining 
union was not dead, however; it merely awaited a favorable opportunity to 
reassert itself, an opportunity which came with the aid of France in the war 
of 1859. 

The year 1848 not only saw the method of the plebiscite resorted to in Italy, 
but also advocated by Prussia and the Germanic Confederation as a means 
of settling the Schleswig question. The situation in Schleswig in 1848 was 
dramatic. Here two nationalist movements, the Danish and the German, each 
reaching out to" gather in all the people of common origin, came into conflict. 
In race the northern part of Schleswig was admittedly Danish, the southern 
part admittedly German. Holstein was wholly German and was a member 


of the Germanic Confederation. The Danish nationalists in Denmark, who 
were hoping to incorporate the whole of Schleswig, if not Holstein also, into 
the kingdom, were opposed by the revolutionary provisional government of 
the duchies, which wished both duchies to enter the Germanic Confederation. 
The provisional government, in its first manifesto, promised to the people 
of Northern Schleswig an opportunity to register their choice between the 
Confederation and Denmark. Relying on the aid of Prussia, however, this 
same government almost immediately repudiated the promise, but the polit- 
ical value of the doctrine was at once recognized by the Prussian Foreign 
Minister, von Arnim, as providing, if accepted by Denmark and the neutral 
Powers, a basis which would ipso facto give to Germany a valid claim to the 
German part of the duchies, as well as offering a hope that the people of 
North Schleswig might vote against separation from the rest of the duchy. 
On his suggestion the Confederation formally endorsed the proposal for a vote 
of the people of North Schleswig; and Bunsen, the Prussian Minister at Lon- 
don, urged it strongly on Lord Palmerston as one of the bases of mediation. 
Palmerston accepted the proposal of a division, but suggested that the line be 
drawn " with reference to known or ascertainable facts," to which Bunsen re- 
plied " Germany can not give up the principle declared on all occasions, that no 
separation of any part of Schleswig can ever be thought of, unless the popula- 
tion in the northern districts themselves declare, by an open and unbiased mani- 
festation of their intention to that effect, that they will be separated from 
the rest of the duchy." * The Prussian proposal was not accepted, however, 
and no further mention of the doctrine is found until the Crimean War pre- 
cipitated discussion of the Eastern Question. 

We now come to the period when the method of popular consultation en- 
joyed its greatest prestige. From 1855 to 1866 scarcely a year passed without 
some endorsement of the method. No matter what the attitude towards 
popular sovereignty at home, there was no one of the great Powers, not even 
Austria or Russia, which did not participate during those years in some form 
of appeal to national self-determination to settle the numerous European ter- 
ritorial questions. 

Considering how definite was the Russian opposition to all suggestions of 
popular sovereignty, it is strange to find Russia the first Power to propose 
the method for solving the question of the Danubian Principalities. Her 
purpose was to enable the Principalities to unite and so to form a bulwark 
against Turkey and Austria. Knowing that this was also the desire of the 
people of the two Principalities, in March, 1855, Gortchakoff proposed that 
in the memorandum drawn up at Vienna to serve as the preliminary basis for 

1 Bunsen to Palmerston, June 24, 1848, British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 40, p. 1321. 
Documents, post, p. 878. 


peace, there be inserted a clause providing for consulting the wishes of the 
Danubian Principalities themselves as to their reorganization. Napoleon was 
not only favorable to the union as in line with his own policy, but, having 
made popular appeal the basis of his own throne, was disposed to favor the 
introduction of the principle as a European custom. The Russian proposal 
was adopted, and in the ensuing Congress of Paris the details of this plan 
were elaborated by the French plenipotentiary, Bourqueney, were agreed to 
by Clarendon, Cowley, Cavour, Brunnow and their colleagues, by the Aus- 
trian Representatives and by Aali Pacha for Turkey, and were incorporated 
in the Treaty of Paris which was signed March 30, 1856. The treaty pro- 
vided that the settlement of the question of organization of the Principalities 
of Moldavia and Wallachia should be arrived at by means of an assembly 
or " divan ad hoc " elected in each principality under the joint supervision of 
the Porte and a European Commission. In this manner, by the initiation of 
Russia and the support of France, and without a dissenting voice in the 
Congress, international sanction was given to the method of direct consulta- 
tion concerning a question of internal order which, it was well known, would 
involve primarily the question of union of the two Principalities. 

The history of the deliberations of the European Commission and the 
forcing of a second vote in Moldavia by the concerted action of some of its 
members is of exceeding interest. Lack of harmony due to the conflicting 
policies of the various European courts towards the question of union some- 
what hampered its efficiency, yet in the end the work was well done and the 
popular will as clearly ascertained as was possible in view of the limited 
suffrage and the intricate method of indirect election which gave little indi- 
cation of the will of any but the landed proprietors. So strong, however, was 
the national feeling of the two Principalities that there appears to have been 
no disaffection regarding the result. 

The declaration for union made by the " divans '" was at first disregarded 
by the Congress at Paris, the diplomatic situation having changed, and a very 
qualified union was accorded. This arrangement was defeated by the strate- 
gem of the two " divans " which proceeded to elect one and the same man as 
Hospodar or ruler in both Principalities. The Powers thereupon granted 
a temporary union for the lifetime of the new Hospodar. Russia had been 
justified in her foresight. Although the losing Power in the Crimean War, 
she was enabled through appeal to the doctrine of self-determination to out- 
wit not only Turkey and Austria, but Great Britain as well, an outcome doubt- 
less aided by the Sepoy Rebellion and the British Liberals. 

The union of the Principalities was effected, for practical purposes, in 1859. 
In that same year the method of popular appeal in questions of sovereignty 
was again resorted to in Italy. The first suggestion of the method came 


from Napoleon. The Emperor, himself a carbonaro in his youth, was heir 
both to the revolutionary principles of 1848 and to the Napoleonic legend, 
which, so artfully fabricated at St. Helena, had by now convinced the nephew 
that the uncle had held nationality in special veneration. Spurred on by this 
idealism as well as by the historic French antagonism to Austrian control of 
the Italian Peninsula, Napoleon in 1859 had gone to the aid of the Italian 

By the Preliminaries of Villafranca, signed July 11, 1859, the war with 
Austria came to an untimely end with the freedom of Lombardy as the only 
fruit of the struggle. By the Preliminaries Austria ceded Lombardy to 
France with the understanding that it be handed over to Sardinia. Napo- 
leon endeavored to write into the agreement the phrase " according to the 
votes of the population. ,, * Francis Joseph, with characteristic fidelity to 
the Hapsburg theory of the State and, with the subtle instinct of a despotic 
sovereign, fully understanding the significance of the phrase, refused, saying 
that " he was unable to attach any importance to the will of the people," and 
Napoleon consented to renounce the proposed formula. 2 

Napoleon's devotion to Italian unity had been weakened by fear of oppo- 
sition at home, not only from the clericals but from those upholding the 
traditional French policy of a weak Germany and a weak Italy. The Pre- 
liminaries of Villafranca liberated Lombardy, but the Emperor had con- 
sented to abandon the other Italian peoples once more to their alien dukes, 
though without providing for the method of forcing their return on their 
unwilling subjects. The Italians were determined to thwart the provisions 
of Villafranca. Napoleon's support having been lost to them, the British 
Cabinet now came forward as their champion. With the support of Palmers- 
ton as Prime Minister and Russell as Foreign Secretary, the Italians of the 
duchies and of Romagna made a second attempt to overthrow the recurring 
principle of legitimacy and to settle the Italian question by popular consulta- 
tion, this time through assemblies especially elected and by a limited fran- 
chise. Russell, seeing in the method the only hope of a solution of the prob- 
lem which was threatening the peace of Europe, insisted on no disposal of 
the duchies before their unbiased opinion had been given. To this proposal 
the response of the Powers varied. Austria replied that while England looked 
to populations, Austria looked to governments and could not recognize in 
established monarchies the principle of popular elections, 8 a disapproval in 

1 Whether this was intended to refer to the vote of 1848 or to a future vote is obscure. The 
latter interpretation is the one generally given. 

2 Le Assemblee del risorgintento, vol. 1, p. cxxxvi; Guido Fusinato, i*e mutasioni territori- 
al!, p. 99. 

9 British Parliamentary Papers, Affairs of Italy [2636], pp. 19 and 34. 


which Prussia sincerely concurred. 1 Napoleon, however, unable to deny the 
force of a title based on popular vote, chose to hold the method and circum- 
stances of the vote indecisive and to base on that argument his continued 
opposition to a union. To meet this opposition, Russell proposed to Cavour 
that fresh assemblies be elected. Napoleon, helpless before this continued 
appeal to the principle on which his own throne rested, was forced to agree, 
but with the stipulation that the vote should be by plebiscite. To this Cavour 
and the Governors of Tuscany and Emilia eagerly assented, as making the 
result more incontestable, and Russell agreed on the ground that it was a 
question for each country to regulate for itself. Plebiscites were accord- 
ingly taken in Tuscany and Emilia. The importance attached by Cavour to 
the plebiscites and his confidence in the method may be gathered from a letter 
written by him on the day of the voting: " If, as I hope, this last proof is 
decisive," he wrote, " we shall have written a marvelous page in the history 
of Italy. Prussia and Russia, while disputing the juridical value of universal 
suffrage, can not cast a doubt upon, the immense value of the fact this day ac- 
complished. The dukes, the archdukes, the grand dukes, will be found buried 
under the pile of ballots deposited in the electoral urns of Tuscany and 
Emilia." 2 From this time on Cavour made the plebiscitary method the cor- 
nerstone of his policy, and the plebiscites of Sicily and Naples, Umbria and 
the Marches, followed swiftly and decisively. Cavour's choice of method 
has been justified. The political effectiveness of a title based on popular 
will, and its superiority over any based on treaty rights or inheritance, can 
never be more clearly shown than in the case of Italy. 

We now come to the plebiscites which in subsequent discussions of the 
method have been made the touchstone of its value. Napoleon had exacted 
the cession of Savoy and Nice as payment for his acquiescence in the annexa- 
tion of Tuscany and Emilia. Unable to refuse Napoleon's demand, Cavour 
wished to protect himself from attack by writing into the treaty a clause 
providing for consultation of the inhabitants. On this he insisted in spite 
of the reluctance of Napoleon who was becoming cool in his support of the 
method on account of the bad impression made on the Northern Powers by 
the events in Italy. 8 

1 The British representative at the Prussian Court wrote that Baron Schleinitz admitted 
that the method offered a practical solution in Central Italy but. "makes no concealment 
of his disapproval of the principle of appealing to the people of the Italian duchies . . . 
and I may add that Prussia would disapprove still more of the course about to be pursued if 
it were based on universal suffrage." British Parliamentary Papers, Affairs of Italy [2636], 
p. 36. 2 Documents, post, p. 523. 

8 Russia, of all the Powers, presented an attitude of acquiescence to the Savoy cession on 
condition that, whatever Piedmont did, France must not base her claim on a plebiscite. 
Cf. William R. Thayer, The Life and Times of Cavour, vol. 2, p. 211, quoting from Ollivier, 
pp. 399-401. 


It would be a courageous person who would venture to assert, considering 
the reputation of these plebiscites, that they were fair; and it would be a 
credulous person who could accept the mass of repeated assertions, unsup- 
ported by facts, without some scepticism. The primary error of later his- 
torians has been to confuse the two plebiscites and to treat them as one. 
Scanty as are the specific charges of any value against the vote of Nice, they 
must be considered far more weighty than those regarding the vote of Savoy 
which was admittedly French in race, in language and, at the time, in political 
sentiment. It is not necessary to account for the vote by moral pressure or 
the military force which, on examination, proves not to have been present. 
The recent events in Italy had caused in Savoy, French in culture, a fear 
of the predominance of the Italian element in the Sardinian monarchy which 
had suddenly become an Italian kingdom. To this fear was added dislike 
of the anti-clerical attitude of Cavour and the Italian liberals who had cap- 
tured the Sardinian parliament in the recent elections. Further, the intelli- 
gent French offers of commercial development, four years shorter military 
service, and the removal of custom barriers, must have been potent factors. 
European apprehension of Napoleon who thus regained the Swiss passes, 
the personal feeling of Garibaldi who never forgave the loss of Nice, his 
birthplace, and the disregard of Swiss claims to the neutralized portions of 
Savoy, were probably the cause of the exaggerated charges, and the charges 
were greatly aided by the amusing but frivolous attacks of Lawrence Oliphant 
who bestowed on propaganda and exhortation all the condemnation due to 
fraud and corruption. Although there is no doubt that the head officials used 
their position to urge union, some scepticism regarding the other points of criti- 
cism seems justified by the fact that in spite of an option clause in the 
treaty there appears to have been only a negligible emigration; that in 1870, 
when the two territories might have safely revolted from France, they were, 
on the contrary, devoted in their loyalty ; and that as far as can be discovered, 
there has not been an irredentist party in Savoy, Italy, or Nice. 

Although the governments of Austria, Russia, and Prussia were all abso- 
lutely opposed to the Italian independence which had just been erected through 
popular consultation and Great Britain was especially hostile to the cession 
of Savoy and Nice so accomplished, the principle was so firmly established 
by 1863 that it was again and even more definitely written into an interna- 
tional protocol signed by these four Powers which, by the Treaty of Paris, 
had been set up as guarantors of the Ionian Islands. This protocol was 
signed on August 1, 1863. In it the acquiescence of the protecting Powers is 
given to the expressed intention of Great Britain to allow the union of the 
Islands to Greece if the Ionian assembly should choose such union rather 
than the continuance of the British protectorate. The new assembly, spe- 


daily elected on the question, voted unanimously for union, and the desire 
was solemnly granted in another treaty between the same Powers on Novem- 
ber 14, and in a treaty with Greece as cosignatory on March 29, 1864. In 
all these treaties the vote of the islands is stated as the primary condition of 
the abrogation of the Vienna arrangement and the union with Greece. How- 
ever greatly the desire to balance the growing Slav strength to the north, or 
to reward the Greeks for their recent choice of a sovereign may have con- 
tributed to this act, until then unparalleled in history, the choice of method 
is undoubtedly due to the perception of its value by the British Cabinet, and 
especially by Lord John Russell. 

The most interesting international discussion of the method of the plebis- 
cite, and the one most significant to-day, is that by the eight Powers gathered 
in the Conference of London which met in the spring of 1864 with the object 
of converting the temporary cessation of hostilities between Denmark and 
the Germanic Powers into a permanent peace. The point at issue was again 
the disposition of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, a matter which had 
supposedly been settled, after 1848, by various treaties regarding ithe succession 
in the duchies. Denmark and the neutrals desired that these provisions be 
restored. Prussia, the Confederation and Austria were determined against 
it. Perceiving after a lengthy and futile discussion that restoration of the 
treaty provisions was hopeless, Earl Russell, as spokesman for the neutral 
powers, proposed that recognition be made of the national aspirations of the 
two races in Schleswig by a division of the duchy along a frontier which he 
indicated, no further disposition of the southern part or of Holstein to be 
made without the consent of the inhabitants " duly consulted.' ' To such a 
division Denmark and the Germanic Powers agreed in principle, but could 
reach no agreement on the line of demarcation, each proposing a line which 
would include many of the alien race, the German delegates claiming the 
whole of the mixed district and the Danish delegates claiming that and even 

The Germanic delegates, however, insisted on an unexpected development 
of the original proposal. It had been the British proposition that the vote 
should be taken only in those districts to be separated from the Danish crown, 
namely, in Holstein and the southern districts of Schleswig, in order to ascer- 
tain their wish as to their future ruler. Bismarck now resorted to a plan 
originally proposed to him by Napoleon * and instructed the Prussian pleni- 
potentiary to insist that the vote be taken also in the part of Schleswig to be 
separated from the rest of the duchies. " Guided by the conviction that 

1 Heinrich von Sybel, The Founding of the German Empire by William /, vol. 3, pp. 318 
and 341-351, gives extracts from the correspondence between Bismarck and Drouyn de Lhuys, 
the French Foreign Minister, on this subject 


the Conference should be aware of the wish of the people whose future they 
were deliberating," Count von Bernstorff, at the order of his government, 
asked " that the inhabitants of Schleswig should be consulted on the subject 
of the disposition to be adopted in their regard, and that the fate of these 
populations should not be decided without their wishes having been pre- 
viously consulted." * This plan of a vote in Northern Schleswig was not 
pleasing to Denmark as it offered an opportunity to the people to vote against 
their own ruler, nor was it pleasing to the neutral Powers to whom the 
preservation of the Danish monarchy was an essential to the Balance of 
Power. The Germanic delegates being insistent, however, the French pleni- 
potentiary, de la Tour d'Auvergne, then suggested a compromise. His plan 
was to limit the vote to the district bounded on the north by the line proposed 
by Prussia and on the south by the line insisted on by Denmark, the vote 
to be taken by communes under the eyes of delegates of the eight Powers, 
all military forces having been withdrawn. This, he said, presented a method 
" which would allow, in the definitive drawing of the frontier line, the giving 
of the most exact consideration possible to each nationality." 2 This solu- 
tion at once gained the support of the delegates of the Germanic Confedera- 
tion and Prussia, as well as those of all the other Powers excepting Russia 
and Austria who were still true to the principle of legitimacy of the Vienna 
Congress. The Russian representative, Brunnow, protested eloquently against 
the indignity of leaving to a vote of peasants a question which the diplomatists 
of Europe had been summoned to London to settle and said that he should 
be forsaking the principles which served to regulate the policy of the Em- 
peror were he to admit the appeal which the plenipotentiaries of Prussia pro- 
posed to make to the population of Schleswig. On the utter refusal of Den- 
mark to consider any other frontier than the one originally proposed by 
Russell the conference was forced to abandon the solution and, the period 
of the armistice having expired, the conference adjourned and the war went 
on to its conclusion so disastrous for Denmark. 

The statement is sometimes made that the Conference of London repu- 
diated the method of the plebiscite. Such a conclusion might well be drawn 
from the adroit summing up of the discussion by the Russian plenipotentiary. 
Examination of the text of the protocols shows, however, that although Russia 
definitely repudiated any appeal to a vote, and Austria refused absolutely to 
support any vote except of the Estates, the plenipotentiaries of Denmark, 
Great Britain, France, Sweden, Prussia and the Germanic Confederation all 
accepted the general principle of a plebiscite, and that, although there was 
definite objection by Denmark and the neutrals to the Prussian proposal of 

1 Conference of London, Protocol No. 10, Documents, post, p. 913. 

2 Protocol No. 11, Documents, post, p. 928. 


taking a vote in the whole. of Northern Schleswig, the French solution of 
taking a vote in the disputed district and drawing a frontier line in accord- 
ance with it met with the unqualified approval of the representatives of all 
of the Powers except Denmark, Russia and Austria. 

In 1866 the Powers were once more met at Paris to discuss the question 
of the Danubian Principalities. Prince Couza, whose election in 1857 had 
secured the union of Moldavia and Wallachia, had been deposed by his own 
subjects. The vacancy in the office of Hospodar once more raised the ques- 
tion of union. Turkey and Austria were still opposed to it and Russia now 
shared their attitude. The Austrian and Russian plenipotentiaries, however, 
were both careful to base their arguments on the supposed desire of the 
Moldavians for separation. Both Brunnow for Russia and Metternich for 
Austria insisted that the people of Moldavia should be able to state their 
wishes under sure guarantees of liberty and independence. 1 Cowley, the 
British representative, said that his government had no preconceived opinion 
either for or against union, had no intention of imposing on the population an 
arrangement repugnant to them and left it to the wish of the populations. 
If the people, legally consulted, pronounced for the maintenance of union, the 
British government would not oppose it and would, in fact, support it with 
the Porte. In this Prussia agreed. France insisted that beyond question the 
people of the Principalities were still in favor of union; if further informa- 
tion was desired the joint assembly at Bucharest could be interrogated. This 
did not please either the Austrian or Russian delegates, who advocated a 
vote by separate assemblies in each Principality in order to obviate the danger 
of pressure on the Moldavian delegates. The question of a new election and 
of joint or separate assemblies was referred back to the home governments. 
The reply of the Russian government in the dispatch read by Brunnow is in- 
teresting. The Russian government replied that the chief requisite for a 
•decision was light. " This light," ran the dispatch, as read by Brunnow, " can 
be obtained only through a new resort to the vote of the two Principalities, 
surrounded by all the guarantees which could assure its sincerity." The 
Principalities had, however, not waited for the Powers to determine the 
question of an assembly. In the interval the provisional government of the 
Principalities had taken the matter into its own hands, had dissolved the 
Assembly and had convoked a new one. Against this action the Conference 
strongly protested, but ultimately allowed the vote for union cast by the 
assembly so elected and also granted the wish for a foreign prince, a desire 

1 Metternich declared " Son gouvernement desire dans tous les cas que les populations 
Moldaves puissent emettre leurs voeux sous certaines garanties de liberte et independence.'* 
Conference of Paris, 1866, Protocol No. 2, Martens, N. R. G., vol. 18 p. 175. 


which had been often expressed by the Principalities and which had finally- 
been put to a direct vote of the people by the provisional government. 

This same year of 1866 saw a second treaty of cession containing a stipu- 
lation for a plebiscite. The Treaty of Prague, signed on August 23, 1866, 
terminated the war between Prussia and Austria over the spoils which they 
had seized from Denmark in 1864. Article V contains the stipulation that 
Prussia shall incorporate the duchies only on condition that the populations 
of Northern Schleswig shall be ceded to Denmark if by a free vote they 
express such a wish. Contemporary observers and later historians agree in 
crediting the clause to the influence of Napoleon, who had acted as mediator. 
Whether or not this is the fact, it is obvious that the suggestion as to North- 
ern Schleswig was far from novel and had acquired its original prestige from 
Prussia. Parentage, however, did not prevent Prussia from at once uncondi- 
tionally annexing the duchies in toto on January 12, 1867, before any negotia- 
tions had been begun with Denmark. 

Bismarck had at first shown every intention of carrying out the plebiscite 
in Schleswig. On December 20, 1866, he had declared before the Prussian 
lower house that in his opinion a people unwillingly annexed could not be an 
element of strength and that the government could not refuse to redeem the 
pledge made in that treaty. 1 The yielding of Bismarck to pressure from the 
military party marks the maturing of another philosophy — the negative of 
that of popular sovereignty — the maturing, in fact, of a philosophy which 
had been developing across the Rhine, where a new nation was being erected, 
based on the principle not of consent, as in Italy, but of conquest. The na- 
tional democratic movement of 1848 having failed in Germany, thanks to the 
determination of Prussia to play a leading part in the new nation, German 
political philosophy had become enamored of another method, the method of 
blood and iron. Far different from the unification of Italy, which had been 
effected under the spirit of 1848, German unity represented a counter move- 
ment In her annexation of Hanover and Hesse in 1866, Prussia had shown 
no regard to the popular will. In 1867 she annexed Schleswig in spite of the 
conditional clause in the treaty. After 1867 and especially after 1870 any 
support of national self-determination constituted an indictment of the whole 
German political structure as well as of German action in Schleswig, a 
fact which German writers were not slow to discern. 

1 Emil Elberling, Portage du Slesvig, in Franz C. de Jessen, Manuel historique de la 
question du Slesvig, pp. 154 and 307; Fusinato, p. 103, quoting from Lawrence, pp. 80-82. 

Elberling in his chapter on the partition of Schleswig in de Jessen, p. 154, says that on 
October 13, 1864, Bismarck had declared that, in his opinion "si le Slesvig du Nord a un 
moment donne etait restitue" au Danemark, cet evenement ne serait pas un grand mal- 


The subsequent history of the doctrine becomes, after 1867, primarily one 
of discussion rather than of practice. There are, to be sure, a few scatter- 
ing examples of a resort to self-determination after the Treaty of Prague. 
Denmark, while still hopeful of arriving at an agreement with Prussia, in- 
sisted on a plebiscitary clause in the treaty of cession of the islands of St. 
Thomas and St. John to the United States, and the plebiscite was actually held 
in January, 1868. The Italian government insisted on a plebiscite being held 
in Venetia in 1866, and in Rome in 1870, before the annexation of these 
provihces to the kingdom. The treaty of cession signed by France and Swe- 
den in 1877 provided for a plebiscite in the island of St. Bartholomew. A 
clause stipulating for a plebiscite was incorporated in the Treaty of Ancon 
in 1883. But although all of these plebiscites, except that of the Treaty of 
Ancon, were duly carried out, nevertheless the cynical disregard of obligation 
under the Treaty of Prague shown by Prussia was a blow to the prestige of 
the principle, a blow the greater because of the growth of Germany as a 
world Power, and because of the growing custom of students of history and 
political philosophy to seek instruction in Germnn universities. The philo- 
sophic arguments there propounded were too valuable as support for the 
imperialistic and anti-democratic desires of individuals and groups in other 
countries not to gain eager credence. 

In attempts at settlement of questions of sovereignty and boundaries by 
the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878 and the Congress of Berlin in 1878 the 
doctrine and method were both ignored. The last case of successful appeal 
to the doctrine before the war of 1914 was that of Crete, which, after con- 
stant disregard by the Powers of its repeated vote for union with Greece, 
passed by each successive elective assembly, at last, in 1912, won their final 
consent to the ending of a situation grown untenable through continued dis- 
content and made acute through the threatened hostilities between Greece and 
Turkey. The doctrine had, however, been abandoned by statesmen as being 
inconsistent with the policy of Balance of Power. Diplomacy had returned to 
the methods of the Congress of Vienna. Once more, as after Vienna, the doc- 
trine was to find its support from the people whose national aspirations had 
been thwarted and from political students interested in perfecting tools suited 
to achieve the stability which had become more than ever essential to the 
delicate balance of the complex organization of society. 

The period of discussion of the position of the doctrine of self-determination 
in international law begins with the years following 1866. Liberal thought 
in Europe was insistent that the pledge of the Treaty of Prague be fulfilled. 
In one of the first issues of the newly instituted Revue de droit international 
at Brussels, the editor, Rolin-Jaequemyns, made a short but eloquent attack 


on the Prussian failure and insisted on both the legal and natural right of 
the people of Schleswig. 1 

To neutral thought there was no question of Prussia's obligation and 
the doctrine would in all probability have reasserted itself had it not been 
fatally weakened by the universal conviction that the moral guilt for the 
war of 1870 lay with France. In the opinion of the day, France, for pur- 
poses of conquest, had entered on an unjustified war of offense against a 
guileless Prussia. Such, thanks to the universal distrust of Napoleon III, 
was the sober judgment of neutrals at the time, a judgment not to be amended 
until the publication of the true story of the Ems dispatch. To the righteous 
anger of many of these liberals it appeared to be mere justice that France 
should herself suffer those pains of conquest which she had meant to inflict. 
In the treaty giving Alsace and Lorraine to Germany the clause giving to resi- 
dents of the ceded territories an option of retaining French citizenship, on con- 
dition of making their home in France, was thought sufficient concession to the 
rights of the inhabitants. 2 Rolin-Jaequemyns, who a few short months before 
had written that the people of Schleswig had the right inherent in all men 
not to be bartered about like beasts, now defended the right of the victor 
to extort territorial cession as a poena temere litigantis, and in this he re- 
flected the view of many whose resentment had utterly blinded them to the 
rights of the inhabitants themselves. 3 Yet as public opinion, still condemn- 
ing France, regained its balance sufficiently to regard the protests of the 
people of the conquered provinces, 4 there followed a wave of condemnation 
of such an infringement of a people's right to be consulted. The demand, 
voiced by Sumner in his address in Boston in October, 1870, 5 was so strong 

1 Revue de droit international et legislation comparie, vol. 2 (1870), p. 325. 

2 Article 2 of the Treaty of Frankfort, signed May 10, 1871, reads as follows: M Les 
snjets francais, originaires des territoires cedes, domicilies actuellement sur ces territoires, 
qui entendront conserver la nationality francaise, jouiront jusqu'au I er octobre 1872, et moyen- 
nant tine declaration prealable faite a l'autorite competente, de la faculte de transporter leur 
domicile en France et de s'y fixer, sans que ce droit puisse etre altere par les lois sur le 
service militaire, auquel cas la qualite de citoyen francais leur sera maintenue," A. J. H. and 
Jules de Clerq, Recueil des traitis de la France, vol. 10, p. 473. 

3 Revue de droit international et legislation comparie, 1870, vol. 2, p. 696, and 1871, vol. 3, 
p. 172, 

4 The elections for deputies held in the provinces on February 8, 1871, during the German 
occupation, had resulted in an almost unanimous vote against annexation. On February 
17 these deputies delivered to the National Assembly at Bordeaux a formal protest in the 
name of the people of Alsace-Lorraine. The protest was based, however, not on the right 
of self-determination but on the inviolability of national territory, the defense chosen by 
Thiers. "Une assemblee, meme issue du suffrage universel, ne pourrait invoquer sa sou- 
verainete, pour couvrir ou ratifier des exigences destructives de l'integrite nationale. Elle 
s'arrogerait un droit qui n'appartient meme pas au peuple reuni dans ses cornices/' Cole- 
man Phillipson, Alsace Lorraine, Past, Present, and Future, p. 99. 

8 Charles Sumner, "Duel between France and Germany," in Addresses on War. 


as to cause Francis Lieber, by birth a Prussian, and by nationality an Amer- 
ican, to publish in 1871 an essay on the value of plebiscites in international 
law, attacking both the principle itself and the cases where it had been in- 
voked. 1 Lieber's attack, coming, apparently, from a neutral source and 
from a writer of eminence, undoubtedly had tremendous effect in the con- 
flict between the two principles. His main theses, that the plebiscite was 
wrong in theory as subjecting the minority to the rule of a simple majority, 
and that in practice it had been used only after a fait accompli, are repeated 
and amplified by all the subsequent writers who oppose the doctrine. He 
silenced American protest by pointing out that the method had not been in- 
voked in any of the annexations of Texas, Florida, Louisiana or California, 
and he ended with a warning that the Americans had best concentrate on 
the Monroe Doctrine and leave European affairs alone. 

However powerful this argument may have been with Americans, French 
protests could not be so easily silenced. In pamphlets, journals and treatises 
the French writers stated the French case. The doctrine of self-determina- 
tion, they insisted, was one established by natural right and international 
usage, and though in origin a French doctrine, it had been adopted by the 
whole of Europe. The Germans answered with an amplification of Lieber's 
argument. The so-called principle was, they said, wrong in theory and 
valueless in practice, it contradicted the doctrine of the organic nature of 
the State, it would permit of secession and it would hamper a State in obtain- 
ing peace by denying the right of cession. Pointing with one accord to the 
plebiscite of Savoy and Nice as indicative of the evils attendant on the 
method, they all supported the doctrine of the individual option to emigrate, 
a doctrine of which wide use had already been made, as far preferable and 
a sufficient recognition of the rights of the inhabitants. 

The French view is advanced by Montluc in 1872, by Ott in 1874, by de la 
Gueronniere in 1876, by Cabouat in 1881, by Renan in 1882, by Rouard de 
Card in 1890, by Heimweh in 1892, and by Audinet in 1896. 2 In 1877 the 

1 " De la valeur des plebiscites dans le droit international," Revue de droit international 
et legislation comparfe, 1871, vol. 3, p. 139, reprinted in English in his collected works. Lieber 
was born in Berlin on March 18, 1800. 

2 L. A. de Montluc, "Le droit de conquete," Revue de droit international et legislation 
comparee, 1871, vol. 3, p. 531 ; M. A. Ott's edition of J. L. Kluber, Droit des gens moderne 
de VEurope, p. 366, note. 

" De nos jours, on s'est mis a consulter directement les habitants des provinces contraintes 
par les traites ou les lois de la guerre a changer de domination. On pent dire, en quelque 
sorte, que, si le plus fort conquiert encore des territoires, il ne conquiert plus de sujets." de 
la Gueronnidre, vol. 1, p. 432. 

Jules Cabouat, Des annexions de territoire, p. 129, " Une nation peut bien renoncer a son 
droit de souvrainete sur tel territoire, rompre le lien qui l'unit aux populations des pays 
cedes, mais il lui est impossible de les engager envers l'Etat annexant, par le seul effet de sa 


French Minister of Foreign Affairs in his address to the Chamber regarding 
the treaty of cession of St. Bartholomew had said, " The stipulation of a pleb- 
iscite, insisted on by Sweden, was too much in accord with the sentiments and 
with the rules of our public law of France, for any objection to be made to it." * 
Possibly the plebiscite held in St. Bartholomew and also the consulting of 
the chiefs of Tahiti regarding the treaty of cession of the island to France 
in 1880 2 has some relation to the French desire to establish the doctrine 
against the German claim to French territory, and is, in this way, similar 
to the Danish attempt in the West Indies. 

The case against plebiscites was argued with fervor by Holtzendorff, and, 
though less warmly, by Bluntschli, by Geffcken in a note to Heffter, by 
Stoerk and by an Italian, Padelletti. 3 There appears to have been no devia- 

Ernest Renan, Qu'est-ce-qu'une nation? p. 29. " Si des doutes s'elevent sur ses f rontieres, 
consultez les populations disputees. Elles ont bienle droit d'avoir un avis dans la question. 
Voila qui fera sourir les transcendants de la politique, ces infallibles qui passent leur vie 
a se tromper et qui, du haut de leurs principes superieurs, prennent en pitie notre terre-a- 
tcrre. 'Consulter les populations, fi done! Quelle naivete. Voila bien ces chetives idees 
franchises qui pretendent remplacer la diplomatic et la guerre par des moyens d'une sim- 
plicity enfantine.' — Attendons, messieurs; laissons passer le regne des transcendants; 
sachons subir le dedain des forts. Peut-etre, apres bien des tatonnements infructueux, 
reviendra-t-on a nos modestes solutions empiriques." The solution of a plebiscite in 
Alsace-Lorraine was urged as late as 1913 by J. Novikov in L' Alsace-Lorraine, obstacle a 
f expansion allemande. 

Edgard Rouard de Card, Etudes de droit international; J. Heimweh, Triple Alliance et 
Alsace-Lorraine; Eugene Audinet, "La prescription acquisitive," Revue generate de droit 
international public, 1896, vol. 3, p. 317. 

1 " Cette demande etait trop conforme a notre propre sentiment et aux regies de notre 
droit public pour que nous y fissions des objections." Decazes, " Statement of the Reasons 
for Support of the Bill Approving the Treaty of St Bartholomew," Documents, post, p. 980. 

2 De Clerq, vol. 12, pp. 571, 572 and 624. 

3 Fr. von Holtzendorff, " Le principe des nation a lites et la litterature italienne du droit des 
gens," Revue de droit international et legislation comparSe, vol. 2, 1870, p. 92. 

In 1869, Bluntschli in Le droit international codiUS, §§ 286 and 288, had written : 
44 La reconnaissance de la cession par les populations ne peut pas dtre passee sous silence et 
supprimee, car celles-ci ne sont pas une chose sans droits et sans volonte, dont on se transmet 
la propriete ; elles sont une partie essentielle, vivante, de l'etat et la resistance de la population 
rend impossible la prise de possession pacifique du pays. . . . Cette reconnaissance n'est pas 
necessaire pour soumettre le nouveau territoire et y organiser le pouvoir ; mais elle est indis- 
pensable pour conferer la sanction du droit au nouvel ordre de choses. Elle sert a constater 
que la nouvelle situation est necessaire et stable, e'est-a-dire qu'elle est legitime." In 1878, 
however, Bluntschli argued that although the express approval of the inhabitants was 
desirable, a recognition of necessity, manifested by passive obedience and abstention from 
resistance against the new government was sufficient (Das mode me volkerrecht der cwi- 
lisirten staaten, 3d ed. 1878, p. 286, cited by Fusinato, p. 139, note) and the same passage 
was added to his edition of the Droit international codifii of 1881, Fusinato, p. 138, quotes 
another passage of Bluntschli's written in 1875, in which . Bluntschli says that Hugo 
Grotius requires that, when a part of the territory must be alienated, not only the 
approval of the whole but also that of the inhabitants of the portion of territory in question ; 
"and rightly," comments Bluntschli, (to quote from the Italian) "because it is a question of 


tion in the attitude of support of popular appeal by the statesmen, 1 or the 
political writers of France until 1894 when support came to the German view 
from one of the chief French writers on international law, Bonfils, and, later, 
from Despagnet. 2 These opposed the doctrine of national self-determina- 
tion as contrary to the right of the body politic over any of its parts, as 
being dangerous to the State by implying the right of secession, and as en- 
trusting to the dangers of universal suffrage a question affecting future gen- 
erations. Of the other French writers Pradier-Fodere 3 mentions the doctrine 
as having been specially made use of in the second half of the nineteenth cen- 
tury. From a note in his translation of Fiore's Nouveau droit international 4 
and from the fact that he includes individual option under the head of popu- 
lar consultation, he may be fairly said to deny the doctrine any status in 
international law. Bourgeois, however, says that the doctrine is one which 
has intrenched itself in the European conscience. 5 

their entire political existence, and it is not possible that they can be sufficiently represented 
by the legislative powers of the whole state at a time when the latter are disposed to dis- 
member the community." Allgemeine Staatslehre, 5th ed. Stuttgart, 1878, pp. 280-281. Fusi- 
nato points out this inconsistency and makes the comment, " Evidently the fact of the cession 
of Alsace and Lorraine exercised an influence upon the scientific opinions of the eminent 

In Geffcken's edition of A. W. Heffter, Le Droit international de VEurope, p. 438, note 2 
(4th ed.), he says, "le plebiscite mis en scene plusieurs mois apres la prise de possession 
de la Savoie n'est qu'une simple comedie,"— to which Rouard de Card makes the comment, 
" Cest la une affirmation purement gratuite," op. cit. p. 73. 

Felix Stoerk, Option und Plebiscite bei Eroberungen und Gebietscessionem, reviewed in 
Revue de droit international et legislation cotnparee, vol. 13 (1881), p. 106; Guido Padelletti, 
" L'Alsace et la Lorraine et le droit des gens," Revue de droit international et legislation com- 
parte, 1871, vol. 3, p. 464. 

1 The following quotation from Thiers in an address to the corps Ugislatif on March 18, 
1867, is the sole example of French opposition to the doctrine before 1894 which the German 
writers have been able to present: "Le principe nouveau de consentement des popula- 
tions est un principe arbitraire, trds souvent mensonger, et qui n'est au fond qu'un principe 
de perturbation quand on veut Vappliquer aux nations!* Revue de droit international et 
legislation comparie, 1871, vol. 3, p. 174. 

2 "Un plebiscite ne peut etre que la ratification d'un fait deja realise et accompli. . . . Le 
systeme des plebiscites attribue aux habitants d'un pays des droits qu'ils n'ont pas et un pou- 
voir qu'ils ne sauraient exercer. ... La garantie reelle et vrai contre Talienation capricieuse 
d'une portion du territoire et de l'Etat cedant reside dans les libertes essentielles du regime 
representatif, dans la necessite d'obtenir des Chambres legislatives, auxquelles est delegue 
concurremment avec le pouvoir executif Texercice de la souverainete, l'approbation de tout 
traite comportant une alienation du territoire de TEtat." Henri Bonfils, Manuel de droit 
international public (1st ed.), §§ 567-571. 

Despagnet (3rd and 4th eds., Paris, 1905 and 1910), §396. The first edition appeared in 
1894. It makes no mention of the doctrine of national self-determination. 

* Pradier-Fodere, Traiti de droit international public europien et amSricain, 1906, vol. 2, 
p. 394 § 833. 

4 Pasquale Fiore, Nouveau droit international public suivant les besoins de la civilisation 
moderne, vol. 2, p. 6. Translation by Pradier-Fodere. 

5 " Le monde civilise n'admet plus que les destinees des hommes, qu'ils soient reunis ou 


Of writers on international law in other countries, the English writers, 
in treating of cession, for the most part ignore the doctrine of self-determina- 
tion. Hall states definitely that it has no standing in law; Oppenheim 
mentions it, but doubts if plebiscites will ever be made a rule of international 
law. 1 Phillimore appears to be kindly disposed to the doctrine of self- 
determination but prefers vote by assembly, as in the Ionian Islands, to a 
plebiscite. 2 Coleman Phillipson gives some account of the history of the 
doctrine, but dwells on its disadvantages. He cites from Lord Salisbury 
the accurate but misleading phrase that " the plebiscite is not among the 
traditions of this country." 8 Voting by manhood suffrage is indeed not 
among the traditions of Great Britain, but the principle of national self- 
determination owes much of its prestige to British statesmen. 

Although it is arguable that the historic attitude of the United States in 
refusing to recognize a new nation or government until the government, by a 
vote, if possible, demonstrates that it has the support of the majority, bears 
some relation to the doctrine of self-determination, Lieber is right in assert- 
ing that the United States has never required a vote in cases of cession. The 
negotiation of the treaty with Denmark in 1867, containing a stipulation for 
a plebiscite in the Danish Islands, can not be construed as an American 
recognition of the principle; it was due to the insistence of Denmark, and 
Seward was most reluctant, for diplomatic reasons, to allow the clause to 
remain. 4 Most American authorities omit any reference to the subject of 
popular appeal on questions of cession. William Beach Lawrence in 1868 
speaks of the principle as one constantly supported in recent times by France, 

isoles, puissent dependre de la volonte d'autrui. Et, autant que le sentiment du respect du a 
la signature des traites, celui du respect du au droit des peuples s'emparait d'une facon im- 
precise, mats certaine, de la conscience europeene." Leon Bourgeois, La socUti des nations, 
p. 12. 

1 W. E. Hall, International Law (4th ed.), § 9; Lawrence Oppenheim, International Law, 
vol. 1, § 219 (2d ed.). 

* Sir Robert Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, vol. 1, p. 585. 

8 Coleman Phillipson, Termination of War and Treaties of Peace, pp. 282-285. Hansard, 
Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. 345, p. 1311. 

4 To the suggestion made by Japan in 1897 that a plebiscite be held in the Hawaiian 
Islands, Secretary Sherman asserted the impropriety of appealing from the action of the 
government to die population, and that "in international comity and practice the will of a 
nation is ascertained through the established and recognized government, and it is only 
through it that the nation can speak" (Mr. Sherman, Sec. of State, to Mr. Toru Hoshi, 
Japanese Minister, August 14, 1897). John Bassett Moore, Digest of International Law, 
vol. 1, p. 274. 

The American Peace Commission at the conclusion of the Spanish War stated in their 
memorandum of October 27, 1898, that . . . "much less do the American Commissioners 
maintain that a nation cannot cede or relinquish sovereignty over a part of its territory 
without the consent of the inhabitants thereof . . ." (Senate Document 62, 55th Cong., 3d 
sess., pt. 2, pp. 100-107; Moore, vol. 1, p. 376). 


but as not being definitely established as a rule of international law. 1 Wool- 
sey, however, gives views as to alienation precisely like those of Grotius and 
Pufendorf. 2 

Calvo, the chief South American writer, may be quoted by both sides in 
the controversy. In 1880 he definitely states that it has become a rule of 
international law that to render cession valid the consent of the inhabitants 
is required. 3 In 1896 this is modified to a reference to option and plebis- 
cite as possible accompaniments of cession. 4 The question is far from aca- 
demic in South America where the chief question still at issue is the carrying 
out of the plebiscite stipulated by the treaty of Ancon in 1883. Alejandro 
Alvarez, a Chilean writer, repudiates the doctrine as useless in theory and 
in fact. The Chilean case involves a rather ingenuous argument which 
should be mentioned. It appears to be as follows. As every plebiscite 
which has ever been held on a question of cession has resulted for the affirma- 
tive, the signers of the treaty of Ancon intended the clause stipulating for a 
plebiscite to be the equivalent of a cession, or, in the Chilean phrase, a " simu- 
lated cession." The actual plebiscite is therefore unnecessary, and if held 
it should be under such conditions as to insure a vote for cession to Chile 
and to allow of no possibility of a vote for Peruvian sovereignty. 5 

The Italian writers give an even stronger support to the principle than 
do the French, a fact not surprising when one considers the history of Italy. 
Fiore, the chief Italian writer on international law, in the first edition of his 

1 William Beach Lawrence, Comtnentaire sur les fitments du droit international et sur 
I'histoire de progrds du droit des gens de Henry Wheaton, vol. 1, p. xviii. No reference to 
the doctrine is found in Lawrence, 1st edition of Wheaton of 1863. 

2 " A State's territorial right gives no power to the ruler to alienate a part of the territory 
in the way of barter or sale as was done in feudal times. In other words, the right is a* 
public or political and not a personal one. Nor in justice can the State itself alienate a por- 
tion of its territory without the consent of its inhabitants residing upon the same, and if in* 
treaties of cession this is done after conquest, it is only the acknowledgment of an unavoidable 
fact." T. D. Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of International Law (2nd ed.) f § 52. 

8 " Desormais, pour rendre definitifs et valides la cession, le transfert ou la vente d'un 
territoire, il faut que les habitants meme du pays appele a changer de nationality y donnent 
leur consentement expres ou tacite." Ca\vo (3d ed. 1880-81), §220. Calvo in his first edition 
published in Paris in 1868 had said " Necesitase hoy para que la cesion, trasferencia, enaje- 
nacion, etc. de un territorio perteneciento a un Estado sea valida, el consentimente espreso 6 
tacito de las personas que lo habiten." Derecho internacional tedrico y prdtico, vol. 1, § 131. 

4 Calvo, Droit international (5th ed.), § 266. 

8 "El con junto de consideraciones hasta aqui expuestas, demuestra de manera palmaria el 
derecho de Chile para sostener que las provincias de Tacna y Arica le ban sido cedidas por el 
pacto de Anc6n; que el plebiscito estipulado es de mera formula; y que por consiguiente, 
como todos los efectuados hasta el dia, debe celebrarse en condiciones que den un resultado 
favorable a la anexion." Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, Comunicaciones cam- 
biadas entre las Cane ill erias de Chile y el Peru y algunos antecedentes sobre la cuestidn de 
Tacna y Arica, 1905 to 1910 (2nd ed. 1912), p. 174 et seq. The writers on the Peruvian side, 
Belaunde and Wiesse, can not be quoted as their treatises are not available in this country. 


treatise on law as it is, makes an unqualified assertion that treaties of peace con- 
taining clauses of territorial cession, either of a state or a province, should not 
be valid without the consent of the part ceded. 1 In his second edition, how- 
ever, published, significantly enough, after 1871, while granting full value to 
an expression of the will of the people for the constitution of what he calls 
" legitimate aggregations " he does not hold as indispensable the consent of the 
inhabitants for the validity of treaties of territorial cession, although, he main- 
tains, without such consent, express or tacit, effective possession of the ceded 
territory can not take place. 2 Of the other authorities, Mamiani, Mancini, 
and Pierantoni all base the State on nationality and uphold the right of a na- 
tionality to form itself into a State. For all cessions of territory Mamiani 
and Pierantoni assert that it is of the greatest importance that the inhabitants 
should be consulted and should give their manifest and sincere assent. 3 Fusi- 
nato states definitely that the union of the Italian kingdom is based on self- 
determination by plebiscites. He upholds the juridical status of the doctrine 
and defends it against the various attacks of its opponents. His analysis of 
the arguments in opposition and in support of the doctrine is by far the most 
comprehensive in treatment of any which has been attempted. 

The arguments for and against the doctrine of national self-determination 
may be summarized as follows. The opponents of the doctrine agree that 

1 " Le second principe que nous etablissons est le suivant : les traites de paix qui entrainent 
la cession d'une partie d'un territoire national ou d'une province entiere ne peuvont etre 
valides sans le consentement special de la province qui doit passer sous la domination des 
vainquers." Fiore, Nouveau droit international Public. (1st ed.) Translated by Pradier- 
Fodere. Paris, 1869. Vol. 2, p. 6. The first edition was published in Italian in 1865. 

2 Ibid. (2d ed.) Translation by Charles Antoine, Paris, 1885, vol. 2, §§ 1081 to 1085. 

8 This summary of the views of Mancini, Mamiani and Pierantoni is taken from the article 
by Holtzendorff in the Revue de droit international et legislation comparie, 1870, vol. 2, p. 92, 
entitled " Le principe des nationalites et la litterature italienne du droit des gens/' and from 
Fusinato. The original works, which can not be obtained in the libraries at hand, are: 
Mamiani, DelV ottima congregazione uniana e del principio di nasionalita and Di nuovo 
dxritto pubblico Europe o, 1859; Pierantoni, Storia del diritto internasionale nel secolo XIX, 
p. 402 et seq. 

Besides those authors already cited, Fusinato, p. 136, mentions the following as in favor 
of the principle of the plebiscite in questions of cession : Bonghi, // Bismarkismo, in Nuova 
antologia, 1871, p. 257 et seq.; Palma, Del principio di nasionalita, p. 29, and Trattati e con- 
vensioni in vigor e fra il Regno d' Italia e i Governi esteri, part 1, introduction, p. 18; Brusa, 
in the introduction to his edition of Casanova, vol. 1, especially p. cccxlix et seq. 

Of foreign writers not already mentioned, he cites as in favor: C. von Rotteck, in Stoats- 
Lexicon of Rotteck und Welcker, neue Aufl. Altona 1845, vol. 1, s. v. Abtretung, p. 164 et 
seq.; Danewsky, L'equilibrio politico, la legittimitd e il principio delta nasionalita, 1882, (in 
Russian) ; a criticism of it appears in Annuaire de VInstitut de droit international (6th ed. 
1883), p. 314; and opposed: Lasson, Das Culturideal und der Krieg, Berlin, 1868, p. 52, 
and Princip und Zukunft des Volkerrechts, Berlin, 1871, p. 83; Selosse, Traiti de T annexion 
au territoire francais, Paris, 1880, p. 95; and F. de Martens, Traiti de droit international, 
(from the Russian), Paris, 1883, vol. 1, p. 469 et seq. It is interesting to find that the 
only German writers in the list in favor of the doctrine are those publishing before 1866. 


to legitimatize a title gained by conquest the express consent of the two con- 
tracting powers and the tacit assent of the inhabitants are sufficient. Against 
the method of the plebiscite they advance arguments attacking both the valid- 
ity of its underlying theory and the expediency of leaving to a vote by uni- 
versal suffrage a question of such importance as sovereignty. Their first 
argument is that the cession of sovereignty is outside the domain of inter- 
national law and is of merely political importance, concerning only the two 
States involved. This position appears to result from a failure to analyze 
the threefold aspect of a cession of sovereignty, namely, alienation, transfer 
and integration. It is true that these three phases are of unequal interest 
in international law. The first phase, alienation, corresponding to " divest- 
ing of title," is obviously a matter largely of constitutional law, but a matter 
certainly open to regulation by international law, as it involves national debt, 
police and, if done during war, questions of neutrality and blockade. The 
second stage, that of transfer, clearly concerns international law, for it has to 
do with the relations of two States at least. The third stage, that of integra- 
tion, is of a mixed character, concerning the municipal or constitutional law 
of the annexing State and, as it involves a question of title, concerning interna- 
tional law also. The subject of validity of title has long occupied the attention 
of writers on international law, for, as is well known, discussion of title by 
conquest, discovery, preemption, occupation and treaty occupy a place in the 
treatises, and the doctrines have broadened and developed to meet geograph- 
ical and political exigencies. 

The opponents next assert that the doctrine that a part of a State may 
resist a cession desired by the whole State is wholly subversive of the true 
doctrine of sovereignty, and that it defeats its own proposed object of secur- 
ing the rule of the majority, since it allows that will to be thwarted by a 
minority. 1 

Such a result, they say, is like allowing a tenant to decide whether he will 
pay rent to his landlord or to another. 2 They also point out that a use of 
self-determination might well obstruct peace, for it might happen that only by 
a cession could a defeated State negotiate peace, as in the case of France in 
1871. It might also defeat the ends of justice by preventing the victorious 
State, the victim of aggressive war, from enjoying the just fruits of victory. 8 
The supporters answer that the punishment of guilt for starting a war should 
be arranged by indemnities or payment by other means involving property 
loss only, but that it should not be made by means of change of sovereignty 
over people. They assert, moreover, that although a State may with right 

1 Cf. Lieber, also Bonfils (1st ed.), §571. 

*Fusitiato, p. 144, quotes Paul Laband, Das stoat srecht des Deutsche*, Reich, vol. 1, p. 184, 
to this effect. 

8 Geffcken, Heftier, p. 438. 


separate a part of itself for its own interest or safety, with that separation 
sovereignty ceases, the part so abandoned having the right to dispose of itself. 
The proposition that the right of transferees not exist, in which practically 
all the supporters of the doctrine agree, appears to be based on the presence 
of a latent sovereignty in each group, whether artificial or natural — a latent 
sovereignty which asserts itself when the former sovereignty ceases through 
separation. It is this conception of latent sovereignty as well as that of 
the right of a people to resist separation, which arouses that fear of secession 
which is so vividly felt by the opponents of the doctrine. 1 The supporters 
assert, however, that the right of secession is not an inevitable corollary, for 
to say that the people have the right to oppose separation or transfer is far 
from saying that they have the right to initiate it. Indeed on this point it 
might well be said that the right of successful secession is already recognized 
by international law, and that to introduce the requirement of a popular vote 
in such cases would be to cast on the party of secession the burden of proving 
the extent of its strength not only by force of arms but also by the ballot. 
It might well be that by such insistence secession would be discouraged and 
the State protected. 2 

The opponents' objection to the practical value of the plebiscite may be 
summarized under three heads. The first is the reluctance to allow the fate 
of the territory to be settled by a bare majority, swayed, in their apprehension, 
not by reason but by sentiment of a possibly evanescent sort. The answer 
is made that it is better to have the majority rule rather than the minority, 
and that the most important of all matters is precisely sentiment, which is 
the force most important to enlist for the purpose of stable order. 8 The second 
objection is that the plebiscite presents opportunity for pressure and fraud, ex- 
emplified particularly in Savoy and Nice. 4 The citation of the votes of Savoy 
and Nice against the doctrine is of no value according to Fusinato, who says 
that all the accusations brought, and fairly brought, against these plebiscites, 
especially on account of faulty execution, can not detract from the theoretical 
importance of the affirmation of the principle itself. 5 The third objection to 

1 Padelletti, Lieber, Bonfils, Rivier, Holtzendorff, Despagnet. 

2 In the case of the Southern Confederacy although no referendum was taken on the 
question of secession, except in Texas, especially elected State conventions in the States of 
the far south did indeed vote for secession, before the attack on Sumter. A vote from which 
a whole class is excluded, however, even if that class be unenfranchised slaves, cannot, by 
hypothesis, be considered as self-determination in the eyes of the twentieth century, what- 
ever standing it may have had in the nineteenth. It is noteworthy that it was only after the 
call for federal troops, after Sumter, that Virginia and the other border slave States changed 
their votes from union to secession. 

* Fusinato, p. 41. 

4 Lieber was perhaps the first writer on international law to attack the Savoy vote. His 
attack has been repeated by practically every writer in opposition. 

5 "Tutte le accuse di cui fu oggetto questo plebiscite, specialmente, come diremo, per i 


the plebiscites of the past is that they have merely been an unnecessary ratifi- 
cation of a fait accompli. As to this argument Fusinato adds that it has 
even here a juridical value by showing that the right was bound up with the 
force used, because to force was added the will of the people, and that by 
resort to the plebiscite all occasion for doubt, dispute or recrimination is re- 
moved and the State is given that formal juridical title which is invaluable. 1 
He points out that the practical objections raised are largely those always 
raised against universal suffrage, and that, with proper care, opportunities 
for fraud should be rendered negligible. 

To avoid the several dangers enumerated, the opponents of the doctrine 
assert that the rights of the individual are sufficiently safeguarded by the 
doctrine of individual option. To this Fusinato answers at length that how- 
ever relatively great may be the use made of option it always remains quite 
trivial as regards the mass of the inhabitants, for the great mass in its en- 
tirety, even after the exercise of individual option and the effective change 
of domicile by some, remains as it was before. Moreover, to say that the 
act of the man who remains inactive should be interpreted as an act of spon- 
taneous submission and of preference is often a sad irony. How little in- 
dividual option favors the liberty of the people, he continues, is shown easily 
by the fact that the most liberal treaties in regard to the right of option were 
precisely those that settled the partition of Poland. 2 He might have added 
that the option clause in the treaties of Prague and of Frankfort were far 
from sufficient. 

The war has rescued the principle of self-determination from its academic 
retirement. It comes to the fore again without the prestige of its past, for 
that has been forgotten with the passing of the generation of statesmen who 
supported it. Now, as then, it is turned to as a doctrine promising a prac- 
tical solution for those difficulties which were certainly not solved successfully 
by the ephemeral experiments made in the Congresses of Vienna and of 
Berlin and in the Treaty of Frankfort. One hears no longer that it is a 
doctrine which does not concern international law; for it grows obvious to 
the world that everything which concerns sovereignty concerns international 
law. The question whether or not the doctrine of self-determination has 
standing in international law has yielded to the question, of its fitness for 
the purposes of our generation. Thus to-day it becomes worth while to re- 
state the reasons which have been urged heretofore, and which will now 

vizii della sua esecuzione, non possono evidentemente togliere nulla alia importanza teorica 
dell' affermazione del principio in se medesimo." Fusinato, p. 104. 

1 " II valore giuridico della pacifica manifestazione nei plebisciti, la quale segue la violenza 
della rivoluzione, consiste appunto in questo, che essi purificano l'opera della forza, dimos- 
trando che con essa stava collegato il diritto, perocche ad essa si aggiungeva l'elemento della 
volnnta del popolo." Fusinato, p. 134. 

2 Fusinato, p. 156. 


inevitably be urged again in answer to its opponents. These reasons will now 

be summarized. 

Title rests for its final sanction on public opinion. History would seem 
to prove that, in questions of territorial sovereignty, public opinion bases its 
judgment on an unexpressed major premise, namely, that no title acquired 
either through treaty, conquest or occupation, or based on economic, racial 
or historical arguments, or arguments of military necessity, is valid, no mat- 
ter how many centuries it has run, unless it has behind it the consent of the 
majority of the inhabitants of the territory. Of this fact Ireland, Poland, 
Italy, Bohemia and Alsace-Lorraine are sufficient proof. 

The doctrine of national self-determination was born of the chief con- 
tribution of the eighteenth century to political thought, the assertion of the 
right of the individual to freedom from despotic control. It is an axiom 
of the twentieth century that the individual's right to self-government must 
yield to the welfare of society as a whole. One must, therefore, ask how 
far the doctrine is consistent with our present philosophy. It is often asked 
whether or not the national aspirations of one group should outweigh the 
economic desires of another, if it should appear that satisfaction of those 
desires is for the good of society. The answer is that the main requisite of 
society is order, to which validity of title and territorial sovereignty is 
essential. If this is so, then it appears that the interest of the world and 
that of the group are one, and that only by basing title on the principle of 
national self-determination can there be a presumption of stability for the 
State or for the world-wide society of States. 

The principle of national self-determination once accepted, there are prac- 
tical reasons why the plebiscite should be resorted to in order that the will 
of the majority may be ascertained in a definite statistical fashion. The 
purpose might be thought to be served either by mere imagination or by 
indirect consultation through an international commission collecting evidence 
of the desire of the inhabitants by a survey of history, literature, economic 
ties and interests, statistics as to race, language and religion, and by receiving 
deputations and petitions. Even were it possible by these means to hear 
from unorganized masses and interests, it can be easily shown that the cri- 
teria of racial and geographic determination are not sufficient guides for 
judgment regarding national sentiment. This was particularly true in Alsace- 
Lorraine in 1870, when many believers in determination through language 
and race thought that language and race required the return of the provinces 
to Germany; * and it is true to-day in the case of Schleswig. It is a method 
subjective, not objective, too likely to be based upon inadequate generaliza- 

1 The Germans adduced common origin of races, similarity of language and customs, 
geographical configuration and historical rights to support their conquest. Fusinato, p. 1. 


Further, even though the inadequate generalization may happen to reach 
the right result, there has been no proof that the result is right or desired. 
Inevitably there will be disaffection in the territory in question and in the 
State from which it is separated, or the State whose claim is not satisfied. 
The real problem is not only to ascertain the existence of a majority, but also 
to establish the incontrovertible fact of that majority in order to devitalize 
potential sources of agitation. 

Again, the advantage to be acquired by the annexing State through enlist- 
ing that loyalty to the State which is the normal psychological result of 
participation in the processes of selection is another consideration and a 
strong one. 1 

That these advantages will accrue from an actual vote, if charges of fraud 
are not too serious, is shown by the Italian votes of 1860, '66 and 70, which 
effectually silenced the claims of Austria, the petty princes, the republicans 
and the Pope. It is shown by the votes of Savoy and Nice themselves, for 
whatever the pressure, it was obvious that it could not account for the over- 
whelming majority cast for cession. The result of the votes made the pro- 
tests of Great Britain, Switzerland and the other Powers appear as weak 
as they were futile. It is significant, too, that a disaffected party has not 
survived in those territories or in Italy. Yet it may be asserted that in each 
case there were other factors which accounted for the permanence of the 
solution. This is undoubtedly true, but here is an instance where the cumu- 
lative force of the invariable condition of stability following the votes can 
not be ignored, and where, consequently, one can not fairly accuse the argu- 
ment of being an example of " post hoc, ergo propter hoc." 

Doubtless to be suited to the use of the twentieth century, the plebiscite 
must be modernized. The old methods of partisan administration would 
not satisfy the more sophisticated political standards of to-day. The plebis- 
cite must be under international and obviously impartial auspices. The accu- 
mulated political experience of a century of representative government must 
be applied to commissions which should oversee and police the registration, 
and guarantee the secrecy of the ballot. 

The real problems are, however, of a more general nature, and involve, 
among other questions, delimitation of the territory in which the vote shall be 
taken, electoral qualifications, and the drawing of the frontier line after the 
vote. It is obvious that a rigid plan to fit all cases is impossible. Special 
conditions necessitate special provisions. The conditions must be studied 
with infinite care, and the solutions must bear promise of justice to all parties, 
including both the majority and the minority. In cases of a mixed popula- 
tion and an indistinctly indicated frontier line, the international commis- 

Hlf. Fusinato, p. 135. 


sion will be forced to follow the proposal made by La Tour d'Auvergne in 
the Conference of London and draw a line based on the vote, in the way that 
shall most nearly satisfy the obvious desires of the inhabitants of the region. 
Here is the proper place for the clause of option, a place first accorded it in 
the Treaty of Mulhausen of 1798. It is properly a measure to protect the 
dissatisfied minority. 

The chief theoretical opposition to the doctrine comes now from the appre- 
hension that, once admitted, small units, even so small as cities, may demand 
self-determination. Although this difficulty has so far been an academic 
one it has now become one of importance. No rule is, of course, possible. 
The question is one primarily of proportion, of geographic position and 
economic relation ; in a word, it must be settled according to the specific case. 
No group, however small, should be without its day in court. The court 
should be an international commission to whose judgment the matter must 
be left. With the resources of customs zones and internationalization of 
rivers, ports and the like, the desires of the several parties in interest, even in 
the case of a single city, should be capable of being harmonized and the will 
of the majority satisfied. 

The chief practical opposition to the doctrine comes at present from those 
who fear, and with reason, that application in various regions where the 
conqueror has bent every effort to denationalize the people and has resorted 
to restrictions on language, to deportation and to massacre, would sanction 
the former conquest. It is obviously necessary that such methods should 
fail of their object and that their results should be neutralized. To arrive 
at a just solution in such a case is not easy. There are, however, means of 
solution which suggest themselves. It might be well to let only those vote 
who are native-born, or who were domiciled in the region before the conquest, 
and even to let those children of emigrants or optants vote who will give 
pledge to live in the territory if the vote goes in their favor. Finally, by 
letting the women vote, not only would there be a more comprehensive ex- 
pression of opinion but there would also be secured representation for the 
men who have been killed in war or have perished through deportation. 

Solution of these problems is not easy, nor should one attempt it without 
full knowledge both of the special cases at issue and of the problems, failures 
and successes of the past. 

Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, 1791 

In 1789 Avignon and the neighboring Comtat Venaissin were still a part 
of the patrimony of the Holy See, an alien dominion in the heart of France, 


an enclave, surrounded by the departments of Bouches-du-Rhone, Bases and 
Hautes Alpes, Drome and Gard, and itself encircling, or nearly so, the French 
communes of Suze and Mondragon and the tiny principality of Orange. The 
Papacy had acquired the two bits of territory by somewhat dubious title in 
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. After Avignon had ceased to be 
the papal residence both it and the Venaissin had been left in the hands of a 
vice-legate, under whom the two territories were separately administered. 

By 1789 the ninety-eight communes of the two territories contained over 
130,000 inhabitants. 1 The people were French in race and language, and 
enjoyed the privilege of regnicoles, sharing freely in the holding of offices 
under the French government. To France the inconvenience of this situa- 
tion was great, for the region was a refuge for fugitives from justice and a 
base for smugglers. History, too, had shown it to be of great strategical 
importance in case of invasion from Savoy or Lombardy. The Kings of 
France had always considered that as heirs to the Counts of Provence they 
had a claim to the territory. Before 1789 it had been occupied and annexed 
at various times during the quarrels with the Popes, but had always been 
restored, though the restoration had been accompanied by the statement that 
actual sovereignty lay with the crown and that the Pope held merely a mort- 
gage. The method by which the papal title had been acquired enabled those 
opposing it to question its validity. The Venaissin had been taken in 1274 
from Raymond of Toulouse by Philip the Hardy and given to Pope Gregory 
X in return for his aid against Raymond. Avignon had been sold to Clement 
VI in 1348 by Jeanne, Queen of Naples and Countess of Provence, in order, 
as the story runs, to gain absolution for the murder of her husband. It was 
further asserted that Jeanne was a minor at the time and that the property 
was entailed. 

For many years there had been in Avignon a party for annexation to 
France. The ties had been strengthened by the several annexations to the 
kingdom under Louis XIV. The silk manufacturers whose output supplied 
the chief industry of Avignon saw their rivals of Lyons far outstripping 
them, thanks to the customs barriers. The tobacco growers resented being 
deprived of the French market. 

On the breaking out of the revolution in France a similar one immediately 
engulfed the city of Avignon and spread from there to the Venaissin. Im- 
mediately three parties appeared, the moderes who wished to adopt the 
French Constitution but to continue under the sovereignty of the Pope, the 

1 The Abbe Maury stated the figures for Avignon to be 30,000 and for the Comtat 100,000. 
Archhres parlementaires, series 1, vol. 25, pp. 237 and 545. Menou gave the exact figures as 
152,919 in his final report, q.v. Documents, post, p. 232. 

In 1789 there were ninety churches, convents or religious establishments in Avignon 
alone. Soullier, vol. 1, p. 349, note 8. 


patriotes who wished both the French Constitution and union with France, 
and the aristocrates who were against the constitution and for the sover- 
eignty and unchanged administration of the Pope. To the patriotes be- 
longed a large part of the professional class who desired political reform, the 
majority of the merchants, who wished economic advantages, and the Jacobin 
element. To the aristocrates were joined the very numerous and power- 
ful clericals. Roughly speaking, of the ninety-eight communes, those of 
any size appear to have been for France, whereas the small communes of the 
upper Comtat and the rural districts, where there was great poverty, were 
for the Pope. The ensuing disturbances and civil wars were not wholly on 
political lines, however; excessive jealousy between the two chief towns, 
Avignon and Carpentras, and the complex local and personal rivalries con- 
fused the issues. Later a fourth party, for autonomy, developed, but was 
never of importance save in continuing disorder. 

The first proposition made in the French Assembly for the union of the 
territory with France came on November 12, 1789, from the neighboring 
French departments. It was based wholly on the claims of France to the 
territory and on an elaborate indictment of the papal title. No mention was 
made of the wish of the inhabitants. 1 Although there was no discussion in 
the Assembly, this proposal of union caused a protest by the parishes of the 
Comtat to the French Assembly. This protest avowed the greatest admira- 
tion for the principles of the Revolution, but emphasized that among them was 
the principle of self-determination, and stated the undying loyalty of the 
people of the Comtat to the Pope. 2 

On June 10, 1790, the aristocrates and patriotes became involved 
in a hot armed conflict. The " patriotes " defeated their opponents and drove 
off the papal legate. After several insurrections the liberals of Avignon had 
secured from the vice-legate a municipal government on the French pattern, 
and an elective assembly. At the call of the municipal officials the district 
assemblies now met, declared the Pope deposed and Avignon an independent 
State, and then voted for union with France. At the same time the States 
General of the Venaissin, which had just adopted the French Constitution, 
reiterated its desire for the continuance of papal sovereignty. 8 

A delegation from Avignon presented the vote and petition for union to 
the Constituent Assembly at Paris on June 26. This petition and succeed- 
ing ones were referred by the Constituent Assembly to a Committee on Avig- 
non to which were added later the Diplomatic Committee and the Committee 
on the Constitution. 4 The Committee reported on August 27 that the Pope's 

1 See Documents, post, p. 173. 

* Documents, post, p. 175. 

8 Documents, post, pp. 178, 182. 

4 The original committee was composed of Mirabeau (the elder), Barnave, Tronchet, 


title, though faulty, could not reasonably be contested, that no transfer of 
sovereignty should be made without the consent of the people involved, and 
that the vote of union, taken during disturbances and in the absence of the 
losing party, should not be considered as legal. 1 Although there was a spirited 
opposition in the Assembly the report was accepted. 

Civil war now broke out with intense passion. The Pope, who main- 
tained no force in the territory, asked the French Government to intervene. 
Debates on union once more occupied the Assembly, but in place of union, 
French troops were sent to protect French property and to restore law and 
order. 2 This force was of little avail and was withdrawn in the following 

During this period of civil war, from December, 1790, to April, 1791, 
votes in favor of union were taken by many of the communal assemblies of 
the territory. On April 30, 1791, delegates carrying what purported to be 
the formal minutes of these communal votes presented themselves to the 
Assembly at Paris. The matter was referred to the Committee on Avignon 
which, after examining the records, reported in favor of union on the ground 
that fifty-nine communes had actually voted for union, that all but one of 
the forty others had indicated a corresponding desire, and that, moreover, 
the papal title was faulty. 

There were three groups in the Assembly, those for union, whether the 
people of the territory wished it or not, the clericals who were absolutely 
against union, and the independent group who wished union but only if 
voted by the people of Avignon and the Comtat. The question of the 
freedom of the votes was at once raised from the floor. It was asserted 
that the evidence regarding them was insufficient. Robespierre and others 
defended the votes but the testimony of La Tour-Maubourg, the analysis 
of Clermont-Tonnerre and the arguments of various members of the As- 
sembly that the votes were taken in the midst of civil war and under intimi- 
dation by the revolutionists convinced the Assembly that the expression of 
the popular will was neither sufficiently clear, formal nor free to be adequate 
and the ensuing vote resulted in 487 to 316 against annexation. 8 A similar 
fate met the draft decree introduced by the committee on the following 
day providing for the annexation of Avignon alone. 4 

Charles de Lameth, De Meunier and Bouche. To these were added by decree of August 7, 
1790, Petion de Villeneuve, Cazales and Redon. Archives parliamentoires, series 1, vol. 
32, p. 547. 

1 Cf. Documents, post, p. 185, for report by Tronchet. 

2 Cf . Documents, post, 186, for decree. 

8 Extracts from the report and debate are given in Documents, post, p. 188. The deputies 
from the departments touching Avignon voted against the union in about the same proportion 
as the other deputies. 

4 Cf. Documents, post, p. 207. 


It was evident, however, to all parties that something must be done to 
curb the civil war whose violence was threatening the neighboring depart- 
ments. Petitions for intervention to prevent further bloodshed poured in 
from the region. After interminable discussion the Assembly finally adopted 
a compromise measure and on May 25 voted to send three commissioners as 
mediators to do all in their power to bring about a cessation of hostilities 
as a necessary preliminary to taking any further decision regarding the 
rights of France in the country. 1 

Le Scene des Maisons, Verninac-Saint-Maur and the Abbe Mulot were 
appointed mediators. These made their way at once to Orange where they 
conferred with deputies of the patriote army of Vaucluse, of the two 
municipal bodies of Avignon and Carpentras, and of one of the two rival rep- 
resentative assemblies of the territory. A treaty of peace was drawn up, 
called the " Preliminaries of Orange/' which provided that the two armies 
should be disbanded, order guaranteed by the mediators by means of French 
national guards and an electoral assembly held in a place not suspected of 
partisanship, where it should occupy itself with the decision as to the political 
state of the country. ' 

The Preliminaries were ratified by the French Assembly on July 4. After 
comparative order had been restored, the mediators requested the president of 
the national assembly of the two states to convoke the active citizens of the 
communes for the election of deputies to an electoral assembly, where they 
should draw up a statement of the communal votes on the question of union 
with the French Republic or continuance under papal rule. 

The various versions of the history of the voting in the communes and 
the conditions surrounding the votes may be gathered in detail from the re- 
ports of the mediators, the report of the Committees on Avignon, and the 
formal charges brought by Abbe Maury in the Assembly. 2 The election ma- 
chinery, though of the crudest, merely reflects the customary lack of political 
sophistication of the times. Minorities had little or no protection. The 
electors or " active citizens " were all those men, not domestic servants, of 
the age of 25 or over, who paid taxes amounting to about thirty cents an- 
nually. These were summoned by town crier or by placards on the day be- 
fore the meeting. The meeting took place in the chief church of the com- 
mune. After an address, the presiding officer, either the mayor or the eld- 
est citizen, put the question in his own words. Those of the electors who 
wished for union with France were told to remain in the body of the church 
and those wishing to remain under the Pope to pass into the chapel, or vice 
versa. Only one or two of the communes seem to have had more formal 

1 Cf. Documents, post, p. 211. 
2 Documents, post, pp. 239 et seq. 


proceedings or to have used a ballot. The communal assemblies met on 
different days during the period between July 7 and July 24. * At many of 
these assemblies the meeting was opened by one of the mediators with an 
address, setting forth the advantages of union. French troops were present, 
apparently at the desire of both parties and at the request of the communal 
authorities to prevent disturbance. 

The vote of Avignon was taken by districts. Its sincerity is the special 
object of attack. The first meetings of the districts were adjourned by the 
mediators on account of the turbulence of the electors. 2 At the final meet- 
ings, two days later, it is said that only the adherents of union dared attend. 
Owing to the small numbers of electors present at the second meeting, it was 
announced that those citizens who had been absent should go to the Hotel de 
Ville to put their signatures to the minute of the vote. No one dared refuse, 
say the opponents, who thus account, probably with reason, for the fact that 
at the end of three days the same act which had been drawn up in the almost 
deserted district assemblies was covered with signatures. The emigres pro- 
tested from their refuge across the river at Villeneuve that the vote had been 
taken while the active citizens were in exile. 8 

The delegates elected by each communal assembly met in a " national as- 
sembly " at B£darrides, proclaimed the independent state of " Vaucluse " and 
voted for incorporation with France. Three delegates from this assembly 
accompanied the mediators to Paris, to carry the vote to the Constituent 

The Committee on Avignon, to which the question was again referred, in 
an elaborate report declared that on examination of the votes it was convinced 
of their authenticity and of the freedom under which they were cast. The 
report stated that of the 98 communes, 71 had assembled and voted, 52 voting 
for France, 19 for the Pope. Of the 27 others, 17 had voted for France in the 
earlier votes of April and May and, being busy with the harvest, refused to 
assemble again. The committee counted these as still for union. Ten had 
abstained entirely from voting. Whether these should be counted for France 
or for the Pope, the Committee reported that the majority of communes were 
clearly for union. As for the majority of the population of 152,919 the Com- 
mittee estimated that the 52 communes voting for France contained 101,044. 
Even counting as now for the Pope all of the communes formerly voting for 

1 One commune met as late as August 11. 

2 The story was widely credited that at the first assembly the patriot es opened the 
tombs in the church where the assembly was meeting and threatened to throw the papists in 
and that the mediators contented themselves with merely closing the tombs and did not allow 
the Municipality to prosecute. This story is answered by Le Scene des Maisons in his 
answer to Maury's charges. Documents, post, p. 260. 

8 Pierre Charpenne, Les grands Spisodes de la revolution dans Avignon et le Comtat, vol. 
1, p. 204, points out that this protest bears no signatures. 


France, but later abstaining, as well as the 10 abstaining and the 19 actually 
voting for him, the inhabitants of the communes voting for the Pope num- 
bered only 51,87s. 1 

The vote, according to the report of the mediators, had been free and inde- 
pendent of. all pressure, which was proved, they said, by the fact that some of 
the communes, even though French garrisons were present, had voted for 
papal sovereignty. The Committee, therefore, considering that the independ- 
ence of the territory had been recognized by the Preliminaries of Orange and 
being of the opinion that union would be to the interest of France as well as 
that of Avignon and the Com tat and that the Powers would not object to a 
proceeding so founded on justice and reason, reported in favor of union, 
basing its final report on the communal vote of the territory. After a stormy 
debate the law of union was passed by the Assembly on September 14, 1791. 

The vote of Avignon and the Comtat is a matter of controversy to this 
day. Local and religious feeling, never more intense, have served to cloud 
the whole affair with recriminations which later historians have perpetuated 
without adequate consideration as to whether the charges are really meant 
as attacks on the votes themselves or concern other and separate local issues. 
The complexity of the rivalries of the region, which makes investigation at 
this distance of time most hazardous, appears in the fact that one of the 
chief complaints against the mediators, namely, that they recognized the Army 
of Vaucluse and the electoral assembly of Cavaillon, came from the munici- 
palities of Avignon and of Carpentras, both bodies having recently voted for 
union with France. 

The clerical party made the accusation that the revolution in the Comtat 
and Avignon was incited from France, that the mediators had shown par- 
tiality towards the " Army of Vaucluse " which was a self-confessed band 
of brigands, whose leader gloried in the name of " Coupe-tete ; " that they had 
shown unpardonable lack of judgment in having summoned the leaders of the 
band to a conference at Orange; that they had recognized the less legally 
constituted of the two rival assemblies, and that, by threats of withdrawal of 
the French forces, they had played upon the resulting fear of violence and 
thus forced the communes which were really papal in sentiment to vote for 
France. The French party in answer to this last pointed to the respectable 
number of communes which, although voting for the Pope, had incorporated in 
their minutes a vote of thanks to the mediators. 2 

1 The question of what percentage of the total population of Avignon and the Comtat 
were "active citizens" and what percentage of these voted can not be answered definitely. 
Menou in his report stated that the population of the city of Avignon was 24»000 and that 
there were four to five thousand active citizens. The proportion in the Venaissin must 
have been very much less than in Avignon owing to the great poverty of the rural districts. 

* See the Minutes of the Commune of Seguret, Documents, post, p. 216. The minutes of 
the Commune of Caderousse, after reciting that the active citizens met to the number of 308 


The clerical party was undoubtedly justified in some of its points. The 
mediators, though their work was done by intrigue rather than by force or 
threats, were certainly guilty of partiality. 1 The Minister of Justice, Duport, 
in a letter of August 14, although characterizing the attacks on the mediators 
as exaggerated, admitted that their own correspondence evinced too great 
a desire to effect the union and too little impartiality. 2 The Army of Vau- 
cluse certainly committed excesses under their eyes, and in fact later became 
so unruly that it opposed union and wished autonomy as the best way of 
postponing the return of law. The mediators, however, appear to have 
favored the army for its Jacobinism rather than its pro-French sentiments, 
for they supported it against partisans of union also. 

It is of some aid in unravelling the tangle of evidence to find that the 
solution of the question appears to have brought satisfaction, at least to 
the majority. The papal authorities admit that even the Comtadins who 
were most devoted to the Holy See had felt the need of union with France, 
and that the cleavage quickly ceased to be along the question of sovereignty 
and became one of class. In becoming French the Papal party became royal- 
ist. The line was still one of aristocrate and patriote? The violence 
which broke out again soon after the union did not extend to the Comtat, 
but was limited to Avignon and appears to have been due to local hatreds 
of incredible intensity and to delay in sending French troops and instituting 
French authority. 

By the Treaty of Tolentino, signed February 19, 1797, the Pope finally re- 
linquished all right to the cities and territories of Avignon and the Comtat 
Venaissin in favor of the French Republic. 4 No mention is made in the 
treaty of the vote of the people of the territory. 

in the parish church on July 24, continues, " They hasten to profit by the tranquillity promised 
by the return of peace, precious fruit of the wisdom and nobility of the French nation, and of 
the infinite care given by the mediators of France . . . and unanimously declare in the face of 
the universe in the manner ordered by the mayor, that their desire is to remain faithful to 
the Pope and the Holy See." Translation. For French text see Charpenne, vol. 1, p. 223. 
This is one of the communes which, Soullier says, the mediators were unable to master. 
Seguret, Grillon and Piolenc also gave thanks to the mediators in their formal minutes. 
The only minute containing any accusation against the mediators is that of the commune 
of Bollene which had voted for the Pope on July 7, 415 citizens being present. The minute 
recites that on August 10, Le Scene des Mai sons appeared with troops and ordered them 
to vote for union or to remove the French arms which they had displayed for protection. 
The citizens voted to ask the aid of the Department of Drome to induce the mediators to 
allow the arms to stay, and the vote for the Pope remained unchanged. Charpenne, vol. 1, 
p. 215, gives the text of this deliberation which is, however, unsigned. 

1 Soullier, vol. 1, p. 246. 

2 Charpenne, vol. 1, p. 237. 

8 " From now on we shall see only two parties, royalists and republicans. We were wholly 
French, and were arrived at a time when there was no more question of the court of Rome." 
Translated from Soullier, vol. 1, p. 73. 

*F. de Martens, Recueil de traitis (2nd ed.), vol. 5, p. 241. 

SAVOY, 1792 41 

Savoy, 1792 

At the outbreak of the Revolution in France the duchy of Savoy, which had 
once formed part of the empire of Charlemagne, was part of the kingdom 
of Sardinia, to which sovereignty it had passed through the intermediate 
hands to the Counts of Provence. The duchy held 58 communes, grouped 
in seven provinces. It had at five different times been part of the French 
kingdom. The people were French in language and sympathy, and the prin- 
ciples of the Revolution found ready converts among them. The Turin court, 
by offering asylum to the emigres and persecuting the patriotes of Savoy, 
alienated whatever loyalty might have remained. When, on September 19, 
1792, Montesquiou, General of the Army of the Midi, entered Savoy with 
twelve battalions, he was received with the utmost joy by the inhabitants. 
The Sardinian troops abandoned all the fortifications and retired before the 
French with scarcely a shot. On September 24 the gates of Chambery were 
thrown open by the Municipality and the keys presented to the General, the 
Syndic greeting him with the words " We are a people not conquered but 
delivered/ ' 

On September 24 Montesquiou sent a glowing description of his reception 
to Servan, Minister of War. 1 In speaking of the welcome of the people he 
says that he has already heard suggestion of erecting Savoy into a department 
of the Republic and asks guidance as to how to use his great influence. 
The question was debated in the Convention at Paris on the 28th. Grati- 
fied as the deputies were at the friendship for France which their armies 
were at that time finding not only in Savoy but also in the country about 
Mayence, the suggestion of annexing Savoy without consultation of the 
people was repudiated absolutely. Neither the arguments of Danton nor 
of Louvet de Couvrai urging the need of defraying the expenses of the 
war and of ensuring a free government to the newly delivered Savoyards 
availed. Discussion on the question was closed. 

Meanwhile the three commissioners who had already been sent by the Con- 
vention to keep watch over Montesquiou's devotion to revolutionary prin- 
ciples, had decided, on consultation with the clubs at Chambery, to put the 
question of union to a vote. On October 6 the commissioners issued a proc- 
lamation to the Savoyard people announcing to them that the imprescriptible 
sovereign rights of the people were restored to them, and that they should 
have a free choice as to their future status. Should the Savoyards choose to 
return to their former despots the way would be open, but their choice must 
be by the majority of the people in primary assemblies " which are the 

1 Documents, post, p. 270. 


only ones where the people can exercise sovereignty." * The established 
authorities were continued in office until successors had been chosen by the 

The communal elections were held on different days during the period 
before October 14. The procedure was similar to that of the assemblies of 
the Venaissin. 2 The suffrage was probably on the same basis as that in 
France, where the distinction between active and passive citizens had been 
abolished. The decree of August 11, 1792, had introduced universal suffrage 
for all those male citizens, save domestics and indigents, who were over 
twenty-one years of age and who had been domiciled in the commune for six 
months and had taken the civic t>ath. 3 

Although the simplicity of the methods used in the communal assemblies 
reflects that of the votes of Avignon, the historians make no charge of out- 
side influence or of intimidation by either party. Montesquiou had shown 
his good faith by withdrawing his forces from Chambery and taking up his 
headquarters <to the north at Carouge, near Geneva. 4 

On October 21 the deputies elected in the communes met in the Cathedral 
of Chambery. After their powers had been examined it was found that 
only three of the 658 communes of Savoy had failed to assemble. These were 
the three near the Italian border and still occupied by Sardinian troops. Of 
those assembling, 583 had voted for immediate union, 70 had given full 
powers to their deputies, one had voted for an independent republic and one 
had failed to indicate an opinion. 5 At the fourth session, on October 23, the 
deputies formed themselves into the " National Assembly of the Allobroges " 6 
and proclaimed the deposition of the House of Savoy. After abolishing 
feudal rights and privileges, tithes, torture, and the salt and tobacco tax, 
and decreeing the return to the nation of the possessions of the clergy while 
reserving the right of usufruct to the ecclesiastical holders of titles, the 
Assembly cast a solemn vote of union with France. 7 

The four delegates elected to carry the vote of union to the French Assem- 
bly appeared on November 21, with a copy of the formal minute of the 
Assembly containing the vote by provinces. 8 The address was received with 

1 Documents, post, p. 278. 

2 See Documents, post, p. 281. 

» J. B. Brissaud, A History of French Public Law, §§ 491-494. Translation by Garner. 

* Saint-Genis, Histoire de Savoie, vol. 3, p. 142. France was at the time contemplating an 
expedition against Geneva. 

5 Cf. Address of the National Assembly of the Allobroges to the National Assembly of 
France. Documents, post, p. 289. 

The Allobroges were a Celtic tribe which crossed the Alps with Hannibal and settled in 
what is now Dauphiny and Savoy. Traces of their language of Rhaeto-Romansch are stilt 
found in the Italian valleys of the Swiss Engadine. 

7 Saint-Genis, vol. 3, p. 147, gives an account of the proceedings. 

8 Documents, post, p. 289. 

NICE, 1793 43 

enthusiasm and referred to the Diplomatic Committee. On November 27, 
Gregoire presented the report of the committee and a draft decree of union. 
The reporter recites that it is plain that in Savoy as in France the people 
are sovereign. France has sworn no conquests, but has not sworn to repulse 
those peoples already united to it by common principles and interests who, 
by a free vote, beg for union. After an enumeration of the mutual benefits 
to be expected, the decree was submitted and adopted. The preamble, as in 
the decree of union of Avignon and the later decrees, bases the union on the 
vote of the people cast in primary assemblies. 1 

The administrative changes were accomplished without disturbance. The 
people welcomed the French regime, the young men enrolled in great num- 
bers in fat' Legion allobroge and formed battalions of volunteers. 2 The 
troubles which came later were a consequence of the development of the 
revolutionary legislation. The clergy, who had welcomed the French troops 
and had not raised a voice against the abolition of their privileges, were deeply 
resentful of the civic oath. The lively fear felt by the Savoyard peasant for 
the growing movement against religion, and his resentment against conscrip- 
tion were made use of by the emigres. There gradually arose a clearly sep- 
aratist royalist movement. This does not, however, appear to have been 
so much a movement back to Sardinia as away from the Revolution. 

Sardinia renounced all rights in Savoy and Nice by the Treaty of Paris 
of May 15, 1796. The second Treaty of Paris of May 30, 1814, divided 
Savoy, giving part to France and part to Piedmont. This division aroused 
unanimous protest in the duchy. The frontier of 1790 was restored by the 
Treaty of November 20, 1815, the French Constitution was taken away, and 
the exodus of Savoyard emigres to France began again. The sixth annexa- 
tion had lasted twenty-three years. 


Nice, 1793 

Nice, which had passed like a shuttle-cock back and forth from Sardinia 
to France since the Middle Ages, had been given, with its surrounding county, 
to Sardinia by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1748. 

As a part of the military expedition into Savoy, General Anselme, a lieu- 
tenant of Montesquiou, with 3,000 men, crossed the frontier into Nice. The 
entrance into the city was made without a shot, the emigres and the Sar- 
dinian troops fleeing as in Savoy. The Ni^ois, apparently as eager as the 
Savoyards for the termination of the Sardinian rule, received the French 
troops with rejoicing. Anselme, however, far from following Montesquiou's 

1 Documents, post, p. 295. 

* J. Tresal, V annexion de la Savoie a la France, p. xxxiii. 


policy of preserving the already existing municipal bodies set up new ones 
of his own choosing. On October 24, Lasource, reporting for the Diplomatic 
Committee on the letter of Montesquiou referred to it by the Assembly, 1 
objected that Anselme had appointed tribunals and administrative bodies — 
a right, according to the committee, not possessed by France and therefore 
incapable of transmission to her generals. 

On November 4, there was read in the Convention an official letter signed 
by the provisional administrative bodies of the city and county of Nice, ap- 
pointed by Anselme, stating that the citizens desired union with France. 2 The 
delegates carrying this were received with great enthusiasm, but a motion 
that the request of the citizens of Nice be acted on at once called forth a 
protest from Barere de Vieuzac who insisted on a free vote of the people 
in primary assemblies before any such action. The Convention thereupon 
closed the discussion, declaring that it could not deliberate upon the demand 
for union until the express wish of the people, freely uttered in primary 
assemblies, had been heard. 8 

The Ni9ois, accordingly, set about copying the procedure in Savoy and 
held elections for a " national convention." The primary assemblies were 
summoned by the mayor of the provisional government, in letters of convo- 
cation sent out on November 12, calling on the citizens to deliberate on the 
form of government suitable to a sovereign people for the securing of their 
liberty. 4 

The voting was by acclamation, as in Avignon and in Savoy. There were 
no votes against union from any assemblies as a whole, and few from indi- 
viduals. There appears to have been a second convocation on December 16, 
in order to elect deputies to the " National Assembly." 

On January 4, 1793, the delegates from the communes and the eight sec- 
tional assemblies of Nice, itself, constituted themselves as the " National 
Assembly of the Colons Marseillais." 5 After verification of powers and 
the taking of an oath of allegiance to the nation and to the principles of liberty 
and equality, a vote deposing the Sardinian King was passed, and two dele- 
gates were appointed, the same two who had already presented the address 
of the Municipality, to again present the wish of the people of Nice, now 
freely expressed in primary assemblies, for union with France. 6 

1 Cf . supra, p. 8. 

2 Documents, Post, p. 285. 

8 Cf . Documents, post, p. 285. 

* A note by the editors of the Archives parlementaires, series 1, vol. 56, p. 225, states 
that the summons was sent to only twenty communes, some having been inadvertently 
forgotten, some being still in the hands of Sardinia, but that the oversight was quickly re- 

5 Nice was founded some time before the Christian era, by the Phocaeans of Marseilles. 

6 Documents, post, p. 296. 


The decree of union was delayed by the absorbing question of the fate of 
Louis XVI and was not passed by the Convention until January 31. The 
decree recites that the Convention accepts the vote of the sovereign people of 
Nice, freely expressed in primary assemblies, and incorporates the county in 
the French Republic. 1 

The Belgian Communes, 1793 

In November, 1792, the desire of the National Convention to strike at the 
Coalition, and especially at Austria, at the weakest point, led to the dispatch 
of the Armee du Nord under Dumouriez into the Austrian Netherlands. By 
the victory of Jemappes, on November 6, the whole of the southern part of 
the country was opened to the advancing French army. 

Although the republican movement of 1789-90 had been short lived and 
Austrian rule had been quickly reestablished, hatred of the Austrians was 
strong and enthusiasm for revolutionary ideas still flourished. Dumouriez 
was welcomed with enthusiasm. Brussels hailed him as a liberator. Liege, 
the capital of the Walloon country, seemed intoxicated with joy. 

The Convention, in order to prevent any accusation of wishing to effect a 
political invasion, had recalled its envoys to the Department du Nord, who 
wished to follow the army into Belgium. Both generals and politicians re- 
jected all idea of territorial aggrandisement. Biron, Robespierre, Dumouriez, 
all were explicit as to the aim of the campaign. 2 

Like Montesquiou, Dumouriez, on entering Mons on November 8, had 
issued a proclamation calling on the people to assert their sovereignty and 
depose their despots, assuring them that the French Convention had no wish 
to interfere in the question of their future government. But the proclama- 
tion went further than that of Montesquiou. It insisted that, in order to 
treat with the French Republic, the existing authorities must be suspended 
and new administrations must be set up. These, to be sure, were to be 
freely chosen by popular election and the generals were instructed by Du- 
mouriez that they carried liberty to the people and should not seek to influ- 
ence them in the choice of the forms by which they wished to maintain it,* 
but Dumouriez had omitted to draw up provisions for the elections in detail 
and the principle of popular elections was differently applied in different 
places. In spite of the French agents, 4 however, the popular societies, and 

1 Documents, post, p. 301. 

2 Chuquet, Jemappes et la conquete de la Belgique, p. 179, C. J. A. Borgnet, Histoire des 
Beiges a la fin du xviii* si tele, vol. 2, p. 149. See particularly letter of Gensonne to Malou- 
Riga, Chuquet, p. 180. 

9 Chuquet, p. 181, et seq.; Borgnet, vol. 2, p. 70, et seq. 

4 Le Brun, the Minister of War, had, on Dumouriez* advice, appointed three French 


the exhortations made by Dumouriez in his addresses and proclamations, the 
elections for the popular assemblies went for the statistes or moderates 
who wished to restore the old constitution and the States General. Only 
in the province of Hainault and the cities of Brussels, Mons and Charleroi 
did the French party gain control, and there only, it was charged, by means 
of pressure and force. 

It had become apparent from the behavior of the French agents and army 
as well as from the debates in the Convention that the character of the 
expedition- was changing. The Convention was faced with the need for 
funds with which to carry on the war, and the wealth of the Belgians made 
an irresistible appeal, for the problem of how to support six hundred thou- 
sand troops in the campaign was a desperate one and served to weaken the 
scruples of many. 1 A further absorption of the assignors was imperative, 
and the hope that the Belgians would receive them voluntarily and at par 
had not been fulfilled. There arose a demand that the circulation should be 
forced. Dumouriez refused. The strength of the statistes in the elections 
gave rise to the argument that the Belgians must be saved from their lethargy 
and forced to be free. To reinforce these arguments the old one of the 
" natural limits " was resurrected. The Belgians were not slow to realize 
the trend. On December 4 a deputation representing the cities of Brussels, 
Mons and Tournai presented themselves to the Convention to thank the French 
nation for its aid and to beg that it would pledge itself never to sign a treaty 
not recognizing the independence of Belgium. They had been instructed to 
protest against the assignats, and to demand a pledge that there should be no 
effort towards union with France, but on the advice of Le Brun these pro- 
tests went unuttered. 

The fears of the Belgians were soon to be only too well justified by Cam- 
bon's decree of December 15. 2 This decree provided that, in the countries 
invaded by France, no one could vote or hold office who had not taken the 
oath of liberty and equality, and renounced in writing the privileges of 
which he had been possessed. All taxes were abolished, a measure crippling 
to the existing government. The decree further provided for two sets of 
agents to go into Belgium to assist in the establishment of " revolutionary 
power." A commission was to be sent to fraternize with the provisional 
administrative bodies which should be elected under the suffrage above de- 
scribed, and another group, called National Commissioners, were to advise 
with the generals and the provisional administrations as to the questions of 

agents, Bourdois, Metman and Chepy, to advise with Dumouriez and with the self-appointed 
Comiti revolutionnaire des Beiges et Li&gois. 

1 See the letter of Le Brun to the national commissioners, January 31, 1793. Ckuquet, p. 
195 ; also letter of Cambon, Borgnet, vol. 2, p. 197. 

2 Documents, post, p. 302. 


supplies for the armies. These provisional bodies were to resign their 
functions as soon as the people should have organized a free and popular 
government, but should they refuse the blessings of liberty and equality and 
recall their former princes, the decree further stated that the French nation 
would consider and treat them as an enemy. 

The decree prejudged the union. It at once called forth protests from 
the friendly provisional body of Brussels, from the governments of Hainault, 
Namur, Louvain, Malines, Tournai, Brussels, Ypres and Ghent. 1 The only 
cities where the decree did not bring forth official protests were Liege, Mons 
and Charleroi, and even in Liege there was indignation. The protests were 
vain. The necessity for the circulation of the assignats had deafened the 
ears of the devotees of popular sovereignty. Moreover, it was at the time 
when the trial of Louis XVI was about to begin and any other subject was 
of minor importance to the Convention and to Paris. 

Camus, Danton and Delacroix had been appointed on November 30 as 
commissioners to investigate a dispute between Servan and Dumouriez re- 
garding questions of military supplies. On their arrival in the Belgian 
country they started clubs everywhere to prepare the way for a revolutionary 
triumph in the elections. Dumouriez, believing that a free Belgian republic 
would be of far greater protection to France than an unwilling annexation, 
was sincere in his announcements that he wished to free and not conquer 
the country. The storm raised by the decree alarmed him, and it was only 
after threats from Delacroix that he consented to proclaim it. 2 

It was obvious to the Belgian patriots that the only hope of independence 
lay in a national assembly, but there was no common centre in the country, 
nor was there sufficient unanimity to make a national cooperation easy, and 
the decree of December 15 had deprived the administrative bodies of all 
resources by abolishing taxes. Liege, far more democratic than the rest 
and also much more naturally sympathetic with France, was not so out- 
raged at the decree nor was it anxious to join with the other more conserva- 
tive Belgian communities under a common government. Provincial senti- 
ment existed in most of the other cities also. The assemblies of Ghent and 
Ypres sent delegates to the Convention to beg for a national assembly. 
Their plea was supported by Dumouriez, but the revolutionary clubs of the 
Belgian cities, clubs largely composed of Frenchmen, sent their delegates to 
oppose the plan of an assembly and the Convention disregarded the Belgian 
plea. The only support came from Dumouriez, who saw in a national assem- 

1 Chuquet, p. 201. Cf. Documents, post, p. 311, for the protests of Namur and Hainault. 
The protest of the Representative Assembly of Hainault was endorsed by a vote of 207 to 2. 
Borgnet, vol. 2, pp. 106-115, gives a detailed account of the sentiment in the various parts 
of the country. 

2 It was not posted in Brussels until January 18. 


bly the only means of averting the storm. To further a national assembly 
he conceived the plan of holding primary assemblies, one for each two hun- 
dred families, each to choose two electors, those from each province to meet 
at a fixed place to elect members of the provincial assembly and deputies 
to a Belgian National Convention. 1 The conservatives were to be excluded 
by the requirement of the oath of liberty and equality. Having ordered the 
elections, Dumouriez left for Paris and the commissioners failed to carry 
out his instructions. The only place where primary assemblies were held 
according to Dumouriez' plan was Brussels. From the detailed account given 
by Borgnet of the elections held by the twenty-one sections of Brussels it is 
evident that party jealousies were far too extreme to permit any sacrifice for 
a national good. Only one section took the oath prescribed by Dumouriez. 
The others substituted another of different tenor. 2 All of the assemblies 
voted for the reestablishment of the governmental system of 1790, a vote 
which led to despotic measures from the commissioners who accused the 
elections of having lacked formality and refused to allow others to be 
held. 3 

The masters of the policy in Belgium were the commissioners of the Con- 
vention: Camus, Gossouin, Danton, Delacroix, Treihard, Merlin de Douai, 
and Robert. 4 These commissioners were to pass provisionally on all ques- 
tions as to procedure and to " fraternize " with the provisional administra- 
tions. To the military commanders was left decision as to time, place and 
manner of assembling and the issuing of the proclamations necessary to the 
carrying out of the decrees. 

Under the commissioners were the thirty national commissioners who had 
the duty of directing and giving tutelary supervision to the provisional ad- 
ministrations, to the circulation of the assignats and to all requisitions for 
military purposes. Misguided as was their policy, they appear to have been 
well-intentioned but stupid enthusiasts. Working with these officials were 
the clubs in Brussels, Malines, Louvain and Antwerp, where they had been 
holding meetings and voting for union for a month past, but these clubs 
were far from speaking for the country. The Societe populaire of Brussels 
in February numbered twelve Belgians, the rest of its members being mostly 
French. 5 In support of the decree of December 15 the club of Brussels had 

1 Borgnet, vol. 2, p. 119. 

2 " Nous jurons de maintenir la religion catholique, la liberte et l'egalite conformement 
a nos lois, et de reconnaitre la souverainete du peuple brabancon," from the formal minutes 
of the primary assemblies of Brussels, ibid., vol. 2, p. 121. 

8 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 123. 

4 Chaussard, one of the national commissioners to Brussels, quoted by Chuquet, p. 229, 
says they were " a kind of ambulatory dictation, invested with unlimited power, spreading re- 
ligious terror before them, and strong in a reputation for talent and eloquence." 

6 Chuquet, p. 215. 


ordered the formation of a legion of sans-culottes beiges et liegeois, and 
had started a reign of terror. 

The first vote of union with France came from the communes of the 
Pays de Liege, the heart of the Walloon country. Liege held a position 
entirely distinct from that of the rest of the Belgian cities. It had had 
no part in the confederated republic of 1789. Scornful of the conservative 
spirit and subservience to the church in the rest of Belgium, Liege wished 
union with France to escape a restoration of the Prince Bishop. 1 In race 
and political structure it had appeared to Dumouriez on his entrance as a 
second French nation, with the same republican ideas and energy. Confident 
of its support he had allowed the old municipal council, elected in 1790, to 
be restored, and to call a National Convention of Liegeois on a basis of 
universal suffrage. 

On December 23, 1792, the communes of the districts of Franchimont 2 
and* Stavello in the Pays de Liege met in primary assemblies, declared the 
right of popular sovereignty, abolished feudal rights and voted to form an 
indissoluble union with the French Republic. Three days later the members 
of the Congres franchimontois of 1790, with the other deputies, agreed to 
this vote in the name of the greater part of the country, reserving to their 
constituents the right of ratification. On January 7, the deputies of the 
greater part of the district met again to ratify the vote. This was all done 
with the approval of the commissioners. The primary assemblies of the 
commune of Liege were officially summoned on January 16 by the municipal 
council and met in sixty-one sections on January 20. The vote was not 
counted until the 28th. Out of 9,700 voting, 9,660 had voted for union and 
only forty against. In the majority of the sections the vote was by " secret 
ballot," so-called, in others it was by acclamation " preferring the more enthus- 
iastic method/' But whereas the vote of Franchimont had been unaccom- 
panied by any reservations, that of Liege carried stipulations regarding the 
national debt, indemnities and the assignats* The efforts of Dan ton to get the 
whole country incorporated when only the city had voted were unsuccessful. 
The Convention was still anxious to avoid all appearance of conquest, and re- 
fused to decree the union before the rest of the Pays de Liege had been heard 

The Convention was becoming impatient at the delay of Dumouriez in 
convoking the primary assemblies in the other Belgian communes. Accord- 

1 Chuquet, p. 223. 

2 Chuquet, p. 222, quotes the following from Merlin de Douai, " Ce que la France a ete 
pour le reste de l'Europe, le pays de Liege l'a ete pour la Belgique, et le pays de Franchimont 
pour celui de Liege." 

% Borgnet, vol. 2, pp. 196, 198, 200. Letter of Wattel, president of the municipality, to 
General Miranda. Archives Parlementaires, series 1, vol. 59. 


ingly, on January 31 another decree was passed, supplementing that of De- 
cember 15th and providing for its immediate execution, within fifteen days, 
under penalty of the Belgian people being considered enemies of the Re- 
public. 1 The limit appears to have been somewhat elastic for on February 
19th the commissioners issued to the Belgian people a proclamation com- 
posed of a preposterous mixture of biblical citations and exhortations urging 
a vote for union with the French Republic at the approaching elections. 2 

That the commissioners were relying on force rather than on the desire 
of the inhabitants to win a vote for union is undeniable. The evidence is 
overwhelming. Borgnet quotes Chaussard to the effect that the National 
Commissioners had met at Brussels on February 3 to decide the question 
u Shall Belgium be united to France? " The vote, with one abstention, was 
unanimously in favor of the union, and the discussion turned on the procedure 
to be employed. The ballot was rejected for the viva voce vote which " had 
the advantage of making known the individuals, of incalculable value under 
the circumstances." 3 

The commissioners were confirmed in their distrust of a free vote by the 
publication of the vote of the Pays de Liege on February 12. The country 
had, to be sure, given 19,401 votes for union out of 21,519 voting, but 14,103 
of these votes were for a union with conditions as to the assignees. 4 No 
pressure had been applied, and the vote was free, — the only free one in Bel- 
gium. But the conditions made it distasteful to the Convention, which de- 
layed the final vote of annexation, hoping for another and unreserved vote 
from Liege. This was delayed too long and could not be managed before 
the French evacuation. Liege was annexed on May 4 on the basis of the first 

The primary assemblies of Mons met on February 11, of Ghent on the 22d^ 
and of Brussels the 25th. This system of voting in different places on different 
days enabled the sans-culottes to carry their methods of terror from one city 
to the next. Everywhere force was displayed " to prevent disorder." 5 The 
reinforcements requested by the commissioners did not arrive, so the troops 
as well as the sans-culottes were moved from one town to another. The 
electoral machinery appears to have been quite as crude as that of Avignon 
and Savoy, yet whereas some semblance of order was observed in the pre- 
vious assemblies, in those of the Belgian communes no one asserts that there 
was the least suggestion of it. 

1 Documents, Post, p. 318. 

2 Cf. Documents, post, p. 318. 

* Borgnet, vol. 2, p. 181, quotation from Chaussard, Mtmoires historiques et politique s t 
$. 437. 

* Borgnet, p. 200, says 80,000 citizens abstained. 
« Chuquet, p. 244. 


The circumstances appear to have been the same throughout Belgium. 
Only a small number of citizens voted. The churches where the voting took 
place were surrounded or filled with soldiers. After an address by the French 
commissioners, often not understood, and a demonstration by the clubs, the 
vote was taken at once and by acclamation, or by passing to right or left, and 
a register opened for protests which no one dared to make. In the small 
towns where the commissioners lacked the support of the troops there appears 
to have been a lively resistance. 1 

Had the Convention desired to question the validity of the votes it had 
had ample warning and sufficient evidence in the formal minutes themselves 
to warrant it But such was the eagerness to consummate the union, that 
the testimony of the French agents was eagerly credited, and no investigation 
was attempted. As fast as the formal minutes were laid before the Assembly, 
it proceeded to annexation, in most cases on the very day or the day after, 
at times dispensing even with any report of the Diplomatic Committee. 

Owing to the military reverses of the French arms these unions were not 
carried out until 1795 when by a decree of October 1, the decrees of March 
2nd and 4th, and of May 8, 1793, were put in execution and the votes cast in 
1795 by the communes of Ypres, Grammont, and other parts of Flanders, of 
Brabant and of the former Austrian part of Gueldres, not included in the 
former decrees, were accepted. 2 

The Rhine Valley, 1793 

While the Belgian communes were being forced into a reluctant union, a 
similar activity was going on in the region to the south. On February 14 
the Convention in one decree proclaimed the annexation, based on the popular 
vote, of Monaco and of numerous small communes along the edge of the de- 
partments of the Moselle and Bas-Rhin. These were chiefly in the Saar val- 
ley, in the duchy of Deux Ponts, in the bailiwick of Harschkischen, belonging 
to the Princes of Nassau, as well as other communes belonging to other petty 
princes. 8 These votes had occurred after the region had been invaded and 
they were held under the conditions laid down by the decree of December 15. 
On March 14, Bergzabern and thirty-one neighboring communes were an- 
nexed. 4 The most important annexation was, however, that of the " Rheno- 
Germanic " people. 

1 Chuquet, p. 249, et seq. Sec Formal Minutes of the Assemblies of Brussels and Ghent, 
Documents, post, pp. 322 et seq. 

* Martens, Recueil des traitis (2d ed.), vol. 5, p. 186. 

* Documents, Post, p. 316. 

« Cf . Documents, post, p. 343, note. On March 20 the communes of Biding, Denting and 
the German part of Lelling-Empire were also annexed. 


The courts of the petty princes of the region between Bingen and Landau 
were partisans of the old regime in France, but the revolutionary principles 
had been joyfully received by the bourgeoisie. The lodges of Freemasons 
had long been working for the same ends and at once helped with the propa- 
ganda. 1 Custine's advance was unopposed. By October 20, 1792, the gates 
of Worms, Speier and Mayence had been opened to him from within. In 
Mayence and the regions near Alsace there was a particularly strong French 
movement composed of the intellectuals, the supporters of the Revolution, and 
the merchants tired of backward conditions and corrupt rule. 2 So long as 
Custine refrained from autocratic measures the expedition met with no oppo- 
sition. In the region occupied by the army, belonging to the Archbishop of 
Mayence, Custine at once assisted in the formation of clubs similar to those 
active in Belgium, and set up revolutionary governments without the formal- 
ity of a vote. The club at Mayence played a great part in the later events. 8 

The general administration named by Custine numbered ten members, six 
for Mayence, three for Worms and one for Speier. The Mayengais, fearful 
of the Prussian advance, received the proposal for union with France with 
coolness. The general administration determined to push the vote and to 
create a department of Bouches-du-Main. It was feared that the cities would 
be unfavorable, but they counted on the peasants to control the towns. Com- 
missions were sent to all the towns between Bingen and Landau to assemble 
all the inhabitants over twenty-one, except domestic servants, to read to them 
extracts from the constitution and to collect in a formal minute the names 
of all wishing the constitution. The minute stated that the electors desired 
to form one family with the French. 4 

Mayence voted on December 17 and 18, but few signatures were secured. 
The citizens had been summoned by corporations. The merchants asked for 
time, the tailors and cordonniers wished to be neutral. Although some out- 
lying localities voted for France the vote came to nothing. Custine refused 
to give importance to the vote. 

To carry out the decree of December 15, which the Convention had just 

1 H. M. Stephens, History of the French Revolution, vol. 2, p. 193, says, that it was on 
account of the repeated invitations to General Custine, himself a freemason, from the 
lodges of Western Germany, that he had made his bold advance. 

2 Chuquet, Mayence, p. 40. 

* Ibid., p. 46. The club of Mayence had five hundred members. Besides Bohmcr and 
Stamm, adherents of Custine, there were seven professors, the librarian of the University, 
Georges Forster, and his two assistants, two school teachers, eleven French teachers of lan- 
guages, three French residents of Mayence, eleven lawyers, officials of all kinds, clergy who 
had taken the oath, young men, students, literary men, merchants, craftsmen, propagandists 
brought by Custine and others. 

4 Ibid., pp. 56 and 58. He gives the list as Kastel, Nackenheim, Wollstein, Nieder-Olm and 
Klein Winternheim. • 


adopted, Haussmann, Reubell, Merlin, Simon and Gregoire were sent as com- 
missioners. They arrived in Mayence on January 31, 1793, and at once 
acted as if in a conquered country, making requisitions without payment. It 
was determined to force the circulation of die assignats, and for this annexa- 
tion was necessary. The decree of January 31 put the decree of December 
15 into immediate execution. 1 

In Belgium fear of the strong national feeling had caused the French to 
oppose a national convention. No such feeling existed in the Rhenish prov- 
inces, however, and a convention was determined on. The popular elections 
were fixed for Sunday, February 24, and the convocation of the National 
Rhenish Convention for March 10. Each commune was to elect at least one 
deputy, those of Worms and Speier to elect two each, and Mayence to elect 
six by districts. 2 Each deputy was to be uninstructed and left with full power 
to choose a government " suited to liberty and equality." 

The commissioners were determined that the vote should be one for union. 
Not only did they openly urge it, but they drew up a list of names of proved 
patriots whose choice was to be imposed on the electors. 3 The clubs insti- 
tuted a reign of terror and many fled from their menace. The commission- 
ers and other agents of Custine, by their oppressive and annoying attitude 
completed the alienation of popular sympathy. 4 

On February 18, Custine issued a decree convoking the peoples of the 
countries between Landau, the Moselle, and the Rhine, in primary assemblies. 
The nobles, the ecclesiastics, and the former officials were to declare in writing 
that they solemnly renounced their princes and their privileges and that they 
would be forever faithful to the principles of liberty and equality. Who- 
ever neglected or refused to make this declaration before the municipal body 
in his place of residence would be regarded as an enemy of the French Re- 
public and at once expelled from the country. 

The electoral provisions were drawn up by Forster who had replaced 
Gregoire on the commission. The assemblies were to meet on a Sunday, at 
8 in the morning after mass. Each assembly was first to name a president, 
three tellers and a secretary. The bureau constituted, they should then 
elect the mayor, the communal attorney, the municipal officers and lastly the 
deputy to represent them at the national convention at Mayence. The electors 
were to write the names of their candidates on a ballot, or, if illiterate, could 
tell the name to the tellers in the presence of a friend who could read. Each 
elector must be twenty-one and domiciled for at least twelve months past 
in the region between Landau and the Moselle. 

1 See supra, p. 46. 
*Chuquet, Mayence, p. 92. 
* Ibid. 
*Ibid„ p. 81. 


Opposition to this dictation of new administrative forms was at once obvi- 
ous. Attacks came from the clergy, the courts, and the corporations against 
thus forcing people to be free in forms prescribed. 1 Fearful of German 
vengeance and the loss of trade the citizens objected to the oath of adherence 
to revolutionary principles. Simon and Gregoire weakened as to the oath, 
but were persuaded by the other commissioners, Haussmann, Merlin, and Reu- 
bell who arrived at the moment The sans-culottes were now in the saddle. 
The commissioners openly threatened force against those protesting, impris- 
oned or expelled the old officeholders and ecclesiastics, and refused all appeal 
to the Convention at Paris. The leaders of the opposition were deported 
across the Rhine. 2 

The vote of Mayence was taken in six churches. It lasted from the morn- 
ing of the 24th to the evening of the 26th. About 300 electors presented 
themselves, and even the threats of the commissioners were unable to in- 
crease the number to over 345. The occasion called forth no enthusiasm. 
The only sound in the streets was that of the cavalry patrols. 

In only one commune, that of Nackenheim, was the vote spontaneous. 3 In 
most of the communes the priests had forbidden the proclamation to be read 
and told the peasants that the Revolution was a menace to the Church and the 
sacraments. Fear of a return of their former rulers also inhibited any desire 
to identify themselves with the French. The commissioners made use of 
armed escorts avowedly to aid the vote for France. 4 Many communes abso- 
lutely refused to take the oath. Mayence, Bingen, Worms and Speier pro- 
tested against it. The leaders of the opposition were deported, however, and 
the assemblies held. At the first assembly held at Worms only 20 attended. 
A second assembly was held between March 7 and 11, when 250 electors were 
present. 5 The vote of Speier was held on March 8, 9 and 10. In the two 
districts 342 electors presented themselves. 

The deputies thus elected were of course all friends of union with France 
as the commissioners had taken care they should be. They did not represent 
the whole of the conquered country for the communes of the Palatinate 
had obstinately refused to vote. 

The meeting of the convention was postponed for a week. It met on the 
17th and formed the Convention nationale des Allemands libres. Half 
were peasants, half intellectuals. Having gone through the necessary formal- 
ities, on March 18 they opened the discussion regarding the destiny of the 
country. A decree was at once adopted, declaring the country between Lan- 

1 Chuquet, Mayence, p. 97. 

* See the Report of the Commissioners, Documents, post, p. 349. 

* Chuquet, pp. 98, 100 and 101. 

4 Ibid., p. 104. Chuquet quotes Forster to this effect 

* Ibid., p. 108. 


dau and Bingen free from all political ties with the Emperor and Empire of 
Germany and from allegiance to their respective petty rulers, and proclaiming 
it to be an independent state, indivisible and founded on the principles of liberty 
and equality. 1 The convention having determined that it would come to no 
decision on any important measure without having first examined it in three 
successive sessions, the decree of union with France was postponed to the 21st, 
when it was voted on the motion of Forster. 

On March 30, Commissioner Haussmann reported to the Convention of 
France on the work of himself and his colleagues. 2 He incorporated an ac- 
count of the deportations of the bailiffs, priests and nobles who were attempt- 
ing to frustrate them. In the debate Cambon spoke of rumors of misconduct 
by the commissioners, which were rife in the Republic, and said that their 
report refuted these, but that it would be well that a more detailed report 
should be submitted in order that Europe might see for itself. On the asser- 
tion of Haussmann that he had not the necessary material at hand this sugges- 
tion was dropped and after the deputies of the National Rheno-Germanic Con- 
vention had delivered their address, the French Convention at once, without 
<lebate, adopted a decree to the effect that, in view of the decrees of the Na- 
tional Rheno-Germanic Convention for union with France, the communes 
-enumerated were made an integral part of the Republic. 

The Republics of Mulhausen and Geneva, 1798 

Mulhausen and the adjacent territory had for many years formed a self- 
governing state, at times in close alliance with or incorporated in the Swiss 
Confederation. The government of this community of 6,000 inhabitants, 
which included the communes of Ylzach and Modenheim, was composed of a 
<Jeneral Council and a Committee of Forty. Its commercial relations with 
France had been small but constant and its hatred of the Germanic Empire 
intensified its French sympathies. To protect itself from the Empire, it had, 
in 1777, concluded a defensive military alliance with both France and Switzer- 

In September 1797 the French Republic declared Mulhausen to be for- 
eign territory. This resulted in an appalling situation for the little state. 
All imports of food from France must pay heavy export duties and there 
was already great scarcity through failure of the crops. All exports to 
France must pay a heavy import duty and France was their best customer. 
The situation was intolerable. The state officials decided that the only solution 
-was union with France. 

1 Chuquet gives this decree in full, Mayence, p. 120. 

2 Documents, post, p. 343. 



When the news of this desire reached Paris, the Directory, on January 1, 
delegated Citizen Jean-Ulric Metzger, a member of the central administration 
of the department of the Upper Rhine, as commissioner to the Republic of 
Mulhausen, to confer with the magistrates and citizens as to conditions and 
stipulations of union, to receive their vote, and to draw up a treaty of union. 
On January 3, however, before the arrival of Metzger, the Burgomasters and 
Council had voted for union by a vote of 97 to 3, oh condition of exemption 
from conscription, then newly established, from requisitions, and from the 
general obligation of billeting troops until after the next general peace. On 
the next day, this vote was confirmed by the general assembly of burgesses 
meeting in the Church of Saint-fitienne. At this meeting 591 voted for 
union and 15 against it. This vote was communicated to Metzger and a new 
assembly of citizens named deputies to treat with him regarding the details 
of the union. 

The treaty of union of the Republic of Mulhausen with the French Repub- 
lic was signed on January 28. * By it the vote of the citizens of Mulhausen 
and the other communes was accepted, with the conditions stipulated, and 
contains a clause of option providing the period of a year, during which time 
the citizens of the territory were declared to be " French-born." Article 3 
those wishing to quit the territory might remove their possessions, and a 
further period of three years in which to sell their property and liquidate 
their debts. 

On March 10 the formal ceremony of annexation took place in Mulhausen, 
solemnized by the declaration that henceforth " the Republic of Mulhausen 
reposes on the bosom of the French Republic." There it remained until the 
passing of Alsace to Germany in 1871. 

By the union of Savoy with France in 1792, the Republic of Geneva be- 
came an enclave, surrounded by French departments which at once eagerly 
desired its incorporafion in the republic. There was also a group in Paris 
working for this union, in whose cause Desportes, the French minister resi-r 
dent at Geneva, was an active agent. 

In 1797 the economic measures which had brought such distress to Mul- 
hausen produced a corresponding result in Geneva, and other efforts were 
exerted by the French to bring home to the Genevois the desirability of union. 
There was trouble over contraband and a newspaper, I'Echo des Alpes was 
instituted at Carouge to further the cause of union. During the winter 
of black misery the propaganda resounded, the governing officers of the 
republic remaining unsuspicious of the plans of the French Directory. When, 
in March, Mulhausen ratified the treaty of union, word came from Paris to 
Desportes that the annexation which he was so diligently preparing would 

1 Documents, post, p. 363. 


be approved on condition that he should succeed in causing a request for it 
to come from the people of Geneva themselves. 1 

Hazarding an audacious bluff, Desportes called in the officials of the gov- 
ernment and announced to them that the union of their country with that 
of the French Republic had been decided on at Paris, and that all re- 
sistance would be useless and dangerous, as the French troops which were 
quartered in Switzerland had orders not to leave without completing this 
matter. This was communicated to the Administrative and Legislative 
Council, with the further proposal of Desportes that they appoint a special 
commission to which the sovereign powers of the General Council of Citizens 
should be delegated. This commission was appointed accordingly on March 
19. Desportes then announced to Talleyrand that . the commission would 
ask of the Directory the union of Geneva and its territory to the French Re- 
public, with the stipulation that its religious and commercial institutions 
should be conserved, and in return Desportes was provided with full powers 
to consult with the people and officials of the Genevese Republic regarding 
all those matters concerning the union and to receive their votes. 2 

The powers of the special commission on which Desportes was relying had 
expired before the treaty could be negotiated. On April 15, the General 
Council was convoked to renew them. The meeting took place in the Church 
of Saint-Pierre which was surrounded with a French guard of 1,600 foot 
and horse, with artillery, which had been requisitioned by Desportes. Under 
the menace of their bayonets, so the Genevois say, the citizens renewed the 
powers of the special commission and the commission voted most unwillingly 
for the treaty which terminated the existence of the Republic of Geneva. 

By the strategy of Desportes, the condition of a request from Geneva had 
been fulfilled. It was an easy matter to make France and Europe believe that 
the Genevois had voted for the union voluntarily, eagerly, and by a unanimous 
plebiscite. This was in fact the story as published in the Echo des Alpes* 

The treaty of union is similar to that of Mulhausen. By it France accepts 
the vote of the people of Geneva, giving the privilege of option to those 
desiring to leave the country. The clauses which differ are those permanently 
excluding by name three citizens of Geneva who had opposed the French 
effort's, and those protecting the precious metals used in the Geneva crafts 
and giving exceptional favor to the manufacture of chintz. The principal 
advantage offered to Geneva, as to Mulhausen, was the free disposal of the 
communal property. 

1 Societe d'Histoire et d'Archeologie de Geneve, MSmoires et documents publiis, series 
4, vol. 4, p. 178. 

2 Documents, post, p. 367. 

* " Le 26 germinal an VI de la Republique f rangaise, le peuple genevois reuni en Conseil 
general a vote a l'unanimit£, sa reunion a la Republique f rangaise," Mimoires et documents, 
p. 180, quoted from VEcho des Alpes. 


THE PERIOD OF 1848-1870 
The Italian Plebiscites of 1848 

In 1848 the spontaneous wave of nationalism and democracy, which began 
with the February revolution in Paris and swept rapidly over Europe, gave 
to the subject peoples of Italy not only the inspiration for another trial for 
freedom but the method of securing it. The founding of the Kingdom of 
Italy on the voluntary wish of the people of each province, expressed by a 
popular vote by universal manhood suffrage, dates from this year. Once 
adopted, the method was followed undeviatingly. From the first uprising 
in 1848 in Lombardy until the unification of Italy, in its present form, was 
completed by the annexation of Rome in 1870, the statesmen working for 
united Italy never for a moment based the union on any other title than that 
of self-determination, nor did they at any time rest content with the mere 
assertion of the popular will for union, however obvious that will may have 
been, but in each case held the plebiscite to be an essential part of the title. 
Lombardy, Venetia, Modena, and Parma, in 1848; Tuscany, Emilia, Sicily, 
Naples, the Marches, and Umbria in 1860; Venetia, again, in 1866; Rome in 
1870; each in turn was declared by Parliament, with a slightly different 
phraseology, to be an integral part of the Kingdom " in view of the result of 
the universal vote of the people of the province for union with the Constitu- 
tional Kingdom of Victor Emanuel II and his successors." 

The revolt in 1848 of the northern provinces against Austria began with 
the " Five Days of Milan," on March 18. On March 20 the municipality of 
Milan assumed authority and instituted a provisional government, which, on 
April 8, was extended to the whole of Lombardy. On March 23 Carlo Al- 
berto, King of Sardinia, 1 assumed the leadership of the revolt and declared 
war on Austria. The municipalities of Parma, Modena, and Reggio at once 
assumed power, as had already those of Venice and the cities of Venetia, and, 
except for Venice itself, set up provisional governments similar to that of 

The question of the political destiny of these provinces had already caused 
a sharp alignment of parties, especially in Lombardy and Venetia. There 
were two important parties and several minor ones. The radicals, the party 
of " Young Italy " under Mazzini, wanted a united Italy under a republican 
form of government and had made a beginning by declaring a Republic in 

1 Throughout this study of the Italian plebiscites the terms Sardinia, Savoy and Piedmont 
will be used interchangeably to denote the Kingdom of Sardinia whose reigning family 
was that of Savoy and whose capital was at Turin in the province of Piedmont. The 
kingdom of Sardinia was erected in 1718 when the Dukes of Savoy were compelled to 
accept Sardinia in exchange for Sicily. 


Venice. The conservatives were in two parties, one party wishing to form 
a part of a united kingdom of Northern Italy under the constitutional mon- 
archy of the House of Savoy, the other, the clerical conservatives, advocating 
union in a federation of independent States, under the presidency of the 
Pope. In some of the provinces there was a certain desire for autonomy. 
For the most part, these parties found their support in the cities; the coun- 
try people appear to have been comparatively indifferent both to the struggle 
against Austria and to the question of the political future. 

All parties had united to free Lombardy and Venetia from foreign rule 
on the agreement that the question of the political status should be postponed 
until after the war. Immediately upon its institution the provisional govern- 
ment of Milan had promised that the question should be postponed until all 
Italian territory should be free and should then be settled by a free popular 
vote. 1 This promise of a free vote was repeated by Carlo Alberto on March 
31. On the same day, word was sent from the King to the Milan govern- 
ment that recognition had been accorded it purely on its de facto standing 
and that as the question of the future should be settled by the people them- 
selves, the King was most desirous that a representative assembly for all 
. the insurgent provinces should be elected at once and on a very broad 
electoral basis, " in order that the decision may be really regarded as a most 
sincere expression of the common will." 2 

The pledge of delay had been made to please the republicans who hoped 
by this means to secure a republic which should include all of upper Italy. 
The party for union with Sardinia was, however, gaining in strength through 
the prestige of Carlo Alberto who, of all the princes of Italy, had granted a 
liberal constitution, and who had made himself the champion of the Italian 
cause. There was also the dire need for greater military effectiveness which 
could only be secured by combination. To end the uncertainty, the central 
provisional government of Lombardy, on April 8, appointed a commission to 
investigate the best method of convening the primary assemblies in order 
to obtain a representative assembly by popular vote and with the least pos- 
sible delay. As it was hoped that the resulting electoral arrangements could 
be used as a formula by the other states as well, if not for a joint constituent 
assembly, delegates were invited from the cities of Venetia, Parma, Modena, 
Reggio, and Piacenza, to join in the deliberations. The sessions of the com- 
mission lasted from April 11-28. Its report was in favor of a constituent 
assembly of delegates elected by the communes by universal manhood suffrage 
of all over twenty-one who had not been under judicial sentence. 3 

1 See Documents, post, p. 371. 

2 See Proclamation and Confidential Communication. Documents, post, pp. 371 and 373. 
8 The deliberations of the commission and the electoral law proposed by it are given in 

Le assemble e del risorgimento, vol. 1, pp. 133-196. 


The proposition of an assembly, while having the sanction of Carlo Al- 
berto, 1 involved a greater delay than his partisans in Lombardy could tol- 
erate. Petitions begging for an immediate popular vote were circulated. 
The citizens of Piacenza had already, on April 8, opened registers for 
a vote on the question of union and the cities of the Venetian mainland 
were begging Milan's aid in bringing pressure on the Venetian republic to 
vote for union. This impatience was reflected in Lombardy. It was argued 
that delay was inexpedient from a military viewpoint and that an assembly 
might enter into conflict with the Subalpine Parliament. The financial em- 
barrassment of the provisional government and its failure to supply the mili- 
tary cooperation that the people wanted undoubtedly increased the impa- 
tience at delay, as endangering the cause against Austria. The warmth of 
the discussion -and the pressure of the party for union finally persuaded the 
Lombard government to anticipate the holding of an assembly by taking a 
plebiscite on the question of whether there should be an immediate union 
with Sardinia or a delay of the decision. 

The decree fixing the details of the election was issued on May 12. 2 Ac- 
cording to this decree, the electorate was to be composed of all male citizens 
over twenty-one, whether literate or not. Registers were opened in each . 
commune from the date of the proclamation of the decree until May 29. In 
these the voters, in the presence of the parish priest, assisted by two election 
officials, were to indicate their choice of the two alternatives. Illiterates 
might make their mark. The soldiers with the army in the field were to 
vote at the headquarters of their corps, in the presence of their superior 

The Sardinian constitution of 1848 had established not manhood suffrage, 
but a suffrage based on property, business or professional standing. This 

1 Carlo Alberto was anxious to postpone the discussion of the future as he feared the 
diplomatic complications which would arise from fusion, and, on the other hand, was 
anxious to prevent a republic. 

2 Documents, post, p. 376. The idea of popular consultation to settle the question appears 
to have been proposed from various quarters. Viscount Ponsonby, writing from Vienna to 
Palmerston on May 12, 1848, transmits a draft of a proposition for a vote of the citizens 
of the Lombard- Venetian Kingdom as to whether they prefer to enter the projected Italian 
Confederation under the suzerainty of Austria, or whether they prefer absolute independence, 
some recompense to be made to Austria for the sacrifice of her rights. British Parliamentary 
Papers, Affairs of Italy, 1849, vol. 57 [1108], p. 444. The text of the proposal is in French/ 
The name of the author is omitted from the dispatch, and one would feel safe in assert- 
ing that he was not an Austrian were it not that there is a statement on good authority 
that in June, 1848, the Austrian government presented to Lamartine, the head of the French 
executive, a project of mediation which consisted in leaving to Lombardy and the duchies 
of Parma and Modena full power to dispose of their own destinies, Venetia to remain 
a part of the Austrian kingdom. Luigi Chiala, Lettere edite ed inedite di Camillo Cavour, 
vol. 4, p. 251. The choice of method was, however, apparently spontaneous with the insur- 
gent governments themselves, with the approval of Carlo Alberto. 



was displeasing to the liberals of Lombardy. The vote for union accordingly 
contained a stipulation that a constituent assembly for the whole Sardinian 
kingdom, including the states adhering to it, should be convoked by universal 
suffrage, to establish a new constitution for the monarchy. 

Except for a popular demonstration which occurred on May 27, to de- 
mand the safeguarding of the freedom of the press, the right of association, 
and a national guard, and a reiteration of the stipulation for universal suf- 
frage in the elections for the constituent assembly, all of which demands were 
agreed to by the government, the signing of the lists appears to have proceeded 
without disturbance. 1 The result was an overwhelming defeat of the party of 
delay, and a corresponding victory for the Sardinian union. Out of the 661,- 
226 qualified voters, 2 561,002 had voted for immediate union and only 681 for 
delay. 3 

The proportion of those voting to the number qualified is amazingly high. 
The overwhelming majority may be accounted for in part by the fact that 
the republicans were divided and irresolute, many of their leaders being away 
at the war and the mass hesitating to oppose any movement for unity. Then, 
too, the prestige of Savoy and the influence of the fusionists had increased 
enormously on the news of the victories of Goito and Peschiera. 

Before the lists were closed the republicans had brought charges of unfair 
action. On May 21 there appeared in the official newspaper of Milan, // 
22 Marzo, a letter signed by Mazzini and some twenty others, representing 
societies and newspapers, charging that the government was using indecorous 
haste in the hope of causing the triumph of one side, and protesting that the 
citizens were unprepared to decide such a momentous question without more 
information as to the vital issues, information which had been purposely 
withheld by the government. It was also impossible, they said, to ascertain 
the mature convictions of the people while the war was on. As to the method 
of voting by signing registers, they asserted that it was not only illegal but 
also contrary to the liberal program of the government itself, because it 

1 In one account there is found the assertion that the republicans attempted to overturn 
the government on the day that the polls were closed. Raffaele Giovagnoli, "Le risorgi- 
mcnto italiano," in Storia politico d* It alia, vol. 9, p. 820. 

1 These figures are from the report by the Minister of the Interior to the Subalpine Par- 
liament on June 15, 1848. Le assemble e del risorgimento, vol. 1, p. 209. He gives the 
population in Lombardy in 1848 as 2,667,337. 

8 In a dispatch of June 9, Abercromby, the British representative at Turin, gives the figures 
for the chief cities of Lombardy as follows (Parliamentary Papers [1108], p. 576) : 



VOTES foe 










prevented discussion, the inalienable right of the citizen, and substituted a 
mute bowing before power for the free expression of the real will of the 
people * which would have been secured by means of a constituent assembly. 
As to the petitions for holding the plebiscite, these, they said, were obtained 
by bribing the country people.. The conservatives, on the other hand, objected 
to the conditions contained in the vote, being opposed both to universal suffrage 
and to a constituent assembly. 

The fusionists were charged by the republicans with carrying on an un- 
scrupulous agitation. In order to neutralize the republican opposition, they 
said, royalist agents had been at work spreading the idea that the choice 
was limited in reality to the dilemma: Carlo Alberto or Austria. 2 The 
bishop had issued commands that the will of the government should be sup- 
ported and there were complaints that the peasants voted under the guid- 
ance of the priests. It was further asserted that foreigners voted, that the 
soldiers' votes were influenced by the presence of their officers, and that the 
condemned voted before the gallows. 3 

From the dispatches of Abercromby, the British representative at Turin, 
we get another contemporary view of events which makes no such charge of 
corruption or pressure. 4 La Farina, who was in Lombardy at the time of 
the vote, speaking of these accusations, says that anyone who, like him, saw 
Lombardy in those days, was persuaded that the majority of the people of 
Lombardy were for the cause which won. 5 King, in his history of the period, 
admits the truth of the charges, but says that, making every allowance for 
the unworthy acts of the one party and the disorganization of the other, the 
vote showed an overwhelming preponderance in favor of fusion. 6 

The suggestion that many republicans abstained is hardly supported by the 
percentage of the vote to the number qualified. Registration was not a volun- 
tary act. The names were placed on the registers by the election officials 
and we do not hear that they failed to enter the proper number of qualified 
votes. But, certainly, the method of voting by signing a register under 
the eyes of the priest offered every opportunity for pressure and coercion 

1 See Le assemble e del risorgimento, vol. 1, p. 200 for text. 

* Bolton King, History of Italian Unity, vol. 1, p. 243. 

8 Le assemblee del risorgimento, vol. 1, p. 96, quoting from Carlo Cattaneo. 

*Thc result was no surprise to him. In a letter to Palmerston dated from Turin, May 
14, enclosing a copy of the decree for the plebiscite, Abercromby says, "Thyere can be little 
doubt that a large majority will be found to have voted for immediate annexation." 
Parliamentary Papers [1108], p. 457. It should be said, however, that this is the opinion of 
a representative of a government in *favor of Italian unity and accredited to the Savoyard 

* Le assemblee del risorgimento, vol. 1, p. 96. 

6 King, loc. cit., adds that the dread of a socialist republic, sycophancy to a king and ambi- 
tion to see Milan once more the seat of a brilliant court also entered in. 


and to pretend that in the midst of agitation and war a vote can have the 
same regularity as at a time of public quiet, is to pretend the impossible. 
Yet though the charges of irregularity are numerous no one goes so far 
as to assert that the result was not satisfactory to the great majority of the 
people. The truth appears to be that the conservatives wished the fusion in 
order to avoid a socialist republic, and the mass of the republicans, impressed 
with the need of unity and reassured by the liberal institutions of Piedmont, 
were willing to sacrifice the republican form for the sake of union, provided 
it be under an absolutely democratic constitution. 1 

At a solemn meeting, in the presence of the archbishop and the civil and 
military officials, the provisional government announced the official figures. 
The result was hailed with joy by the populace. A few days later a solemn 
deputation presented the vote to Carlo Alberto, who received them, attended 
by the Duke of Genoa, the ministers of state and the officers of the army. 
He accepted the vote as a promise of unity and success in the struggle for 
Italian freedom. 2 It was unfortunate that the reds still cherished a feeling 
of having been betrayed by the hastening of the vote. Patriots though they 
were, the resulting jealousy and political dissension prevented the full sup- 
port which they might have given to the Sardinian campaign. 

On the outbreak of the revolt in Venice, on March 22, the provisional 
government had immediately proclaimed a republic, with Manin as president, 
and had summoned delegates to draw tip a constitution. Manin exerted 
every effort to carry out the republican plan of delay. The cities of the 
Venetian mainland, however, were unwilling to surrender their hope of a 
union of Venetia with Lombardy. They had joined in the commission to 
draw up a plan for an assembly; they now followed Lombardy's lead in 
opening registers for a popular vote. The cities of the Venetian mainland 
were incorporated in the Sardinian kingdom by the same decree which in- 
corporated Lombardy. Alarmed at the threatened isolation and made con- 
scious of the need of concerted action by the approach of the Austrian forces, 
Manin and the Venetian government on June 3 issued a decree convoking 
a representative assembly on the basis of universal suffrage. A later decree 
of the Consulta provided that the public should be given information as to 
the financial, military and commercial situation in order that their votes might 
be the more intelligent. 8 

The assembly met on July 3. On the following day, Manin in a noble 
and patriotic speech withdrew his opposition in face of the almost universal 


1 The women too, though not included in the plebiscite, did not remain silent as to their 
wishes. See "Address to the Women of the Sardinian States." Documents, post, p. 393. 
Unfortunately the number of signatures is not stated. 

2 For address of deputation and the answer of the king see Documents, post, pp. 391 and 392. 

•Documents, post, p. 406. 


sentiment for immediate union with Sardinia. 1 Union was promptly voted 
by 128 to 6 on the same conditions as those stipulated by Lombardy. 

Plebiscites had already been held in the duchies of Parma, Piacenza, Modena, 
and Guastalla, with overwhelming majorities for union. All these votes were 
by manhood suffrage for all over twenty-one with no literacy test In all 
of these plebiscites the lists were open over a considerable period of time, 
in one case for a period of three weeks. In each case the chief election official 
was the parish priest. In Parma the signing of the lists was to be in the 
presence of the mayor and the priest. In Reggio a special commission of 
eight and a subsidiary committee of twelve were appointed to collect the 
signatures, working in conjunction with the priest. In Modena a commis- 
sion of four was appointed to assist the priest. In Parma and Piacenza each 
voter was allowed to cast his vote for the solution most pleasing to him, and 
to surround it with any conditions desired. In Parma some voted for the 
former ruler, some for union with Tuscany, some for the Pontifical States. 
In Piacenza there was a similar scattering. In both, however, the great 
majority voted for Sardinia. This vote was in each case accompanied by 
a series of conditions relating to the future status of the chief city, the dis- 
posal of the state funds, protection for the university, and similar provisions. 

The percentage of the votes cast by those qualified was very high. In 
Reggio, out of 36,814 qualified voters, 29,851 voted for Sardinia alone. 2 In 
Piacenza out of a population of 206,566, there were 37,089 votes for Pied- 
mont, the scattering votes amounting to 496. The figures for Modena are 
n<5t given in the official report. The Sardinian Parliament incorporated each 
province with the same formula. 8 The union thus decreed was a short-lived 
one, however; the Austrian forces soon returned with the petty sovereigns 
in their train. The peace of 1849, based on the defeat of the Piedmontese 
forces at Novara and Custozza, returned Lombardy and Venetia to Austrian 
rule, 4 and restored the dukes to the throne from which their subjects had so 

1 The British Consul General at Venice in a dispatch of June 4 wrote to Viscount Palmers- 
ton : " There is no doubt that the majority of the inhabitants of Venice, comprising by far 
the greatest part of the upper and middle classes, and the whole of the marine, a very influen- 
tial body, are in favor of a junction with Piedmont, rather than a continuation of a Republican 
Government, even supposing the Venetian Republic could exist, confined as it would be to 
Venice and the islands of the Lagunes by the separation from it of the provinces of the 
mainland. Indeed, of the members of the existing Provisional Government, it is understood 
that the President, Signor Manin, is the only one who is desirous that the Republic, reduced 
to the dimensions above mentioned, should be carried on." . . . Parliamentary Papers [1108], 
p. 567. 

2 Other votes are not mentioned in the result. 

8 The decrees proclaiming the plebiscites, the formal statements of the results, and the laws 
of the Sardinian Parliament incorporating the duchies in the kingdom, basing the union on 
the plebiscites, will be found in Documents, post, pp. 411 to 441. 

4 After the withdrawal of Piedmont, the republic had been again set up in Venice, but the 
city was forced to capitulate shortly. 


formally banished them. Another decade was to pass before unity could 
be achieved. 

The Italian National Assemblies of 1859 

However permanent the Powers may have considered the restoration of 
the petty princes to their Italian thrones in 1849, it was obvious that the 
inhabitants of the duchies regarded the arrangement as purely temporary. 
By 1859, there was but one party in Northern Italy, that for union with 
Sardinia. Republican prestige had greatly increased after the defeat of Sar- 
dinia in 1849, only to fall again through the subsequent ill-conceived revolu- 
tionary attempts in Genoa, Milan and Leghorn. It was, too, becoming in- 
creasingly evident that union could come only by the aid of France and the 
complacency of Europe and that neither France nor Europe looked with 
favor on the proposal of a republic in the Italian peninsula. Thinking union 
more important than form, many of the republican leaders, among them 
Manin, and thousands of their followers, had gone over to the Sardinian party. 
La Farina, Manin and Pallavicino, three former republicans, founded the 
Societd nazionale with the motto " Unity, Independence and Victor Eman- 
uel," which made great headway, especially in the provinces under Austria. 
The party for federation under the Pope, the plan so eloquently urged by 
Gioberti, had long since been abandoned by its leader and was of small im- 
portance in Italy, though, having found a lodgment in the brain of Napo- 
leon, it was to cause endless difficulty. The Sardinian party had no rivals 
save in Tuscany, where there was a party for autonomy, of uncertain strength, 
and in Rome and Naples where the liberals still wished for constitutional 
government rather than for union. 

Napoleon's aid against Austria had been promised to Cavour at Plombieres 
in 1858. By the bargain made there, the Austrians were to be expelled, from 
the Alps to the Adriatic, Venetia and Lombardy were to be annexed to Sar- 
dinia, Central Italy was to form a separate kingdom under a Bonapartist 
prince, Naples was to be a third under Lucien Murat, and the whole was to 
form an Italian confederation under the presidency of the Pope. In return 
for this, Savoy and Nice, which had formed part of France after the plebis- 
cites in 1792, 1 and had been returned to Sardinia in 1815, were to be given 
back to France. 

The war which had been planned at Plombieres by Cavour and Napoleon 
broke out on April 29, 1859. The petty princes ruling over Tuscany, Parma, 
and Modena, and their dependencies, were completely under Austrian domi- 
nation. When the invitation of Sardinia to join in the war of liberation was 

i Cf. ante, pp. 41, 43. 


received, each in turn refused. The refusal was followed by a bloodless and 
orderly revolution in each duchy; the liberals rose, assumed power, and 
established a provisional government, which, in each province, announced the 
deposition of the reigning house. 1 Tuscany and the Romagna,* to which the 
union of 1848 had not extended, joined in the general revolt, proclaimed 
Victor Emanuel dictator, and sent envoys to Sardinia to offer allegiance. 
Lombardv, Parma and Modena, which had voted union in 1848, at once 
proclaimed the union to be again effective. Fearful of awakening the appre- 
hension of the Powers at this early date, Cavour, the King and the Emperor 
thought it impolitic to accept these offers. Yet, as unity of action was essen- 
tial for military success, a royal commissioner was appointed to each province 
to represent the King and the cause of Italian liberation, it being carefully 
stated that this was in no way to prejudice the question of union, a question 
which both Napoleon and Victor Emanuel had promised should be settled by 
a vote of the people themselves.* 

The events of the war need not be given here, nor .the many explanations 
of the unexpected peace concluded between Xapoleon and Francis Joseph at 
Yillafranca. By the agreement there drawn up Venecia was to remain 
with Austria, while Lombardy was ceded to Xapoleon, to be in turn ceded 
by him to Victor EmanueL It is said that Xapoleon made every effort to 
write into this article a stipulation of a vote of the Lombard people before 
the tinal cession. 4 Francis Joseph utterly refused to give recognition to 
such a revolutionarv doctrine. The onlv vote in 1859 in Lombardv was 
that of the municipal congregation of Milan renewing the compact of 1848, 
a vote ratified in turn by the communal council. 5 

The cession of Lombardy was the sole concession made at Villafranca to 
Italian national aspiration. Venetia was to be retained by Austria, the dukes 
were to be restored to Tuscany and Modena, and the papal legates to Romagna. 
Parma alone was left unmentioned. 

Xapoleon. on leaving Italy, had promised that there should be no armed 
in:erven::on to effect the restoration* and that votes legimatdy expressed 

• 7~"* r-vr-sacsa! cvvertaDent of FVrence was ayyointed fcy the mrsadpaHtr on April 27. 
5 TV Rorsagna was a put of the papal territory and was a »*imri by papal fc- 

* Xxrvieoc ee J~ae & after the hatt> of Majxcta* said. i= a prociaraatiom to the Italian 
t*v- .-'«. ~ I ie rc< eve* arrvese. ycc with a precvoaesved svssrcx to dispossess soreragns or to 
i— -> :^f -~? w-V.. ttt arrrr »C >csst hsrit m:th oc^jr two **-.:=***. K> ^t^t ycer eii-iks and to 
— .rrTar- rrtersfcrvcia! order; it iT» oppose no obstacle to tic free mm fi imiini of yoar 
kprssise desires." TrassittioeL For or^psal text see La%i Zri. 5>J^ia /7?aaw d*i r8*o 
aC :.<x\ ivt i part i icoesaeet »WR 

*C£ jw.v p. Lx 

* r\x . .uKitCK kv yev <#*5 and #C 

« T>rs <t~cuirve * act c oe t as =r < ^ sat £>e rV%:saanes. It was Ae resets of 
o.:Vnrarac excis 


should be carefully considered. 1 Deprived by Napoleon's defection of # the 
hope of success through force, the Italians were compelled to take the hint 
dropped by the Emperor and to rely on their own political resources. The 
problem was no longer one of how to win a majority to the cause of unity, 
but how to make the will of the majority triumph in the face of foreign 
opposition. The Powers were soon to gather at Zurich to complete the 
Preliminaries of Villafranca and the parcelling out of the Italians. To de- 
feat the ancient methods of diplomacy, the Italians determined to resort 
once more to the doctrine of national self-determination. Cavour resigned 
from the ministry the better to work for the union, which must be now done 
unofficially, and, on the insistence of Napoleon, the Sardinian commissioners 
were recalled. 

England and the English Cabinet, with Palmerston as Prime Minister, Lord 
John Russell as Foreign Secretary and Gladstone as Chancellor of the Ex- 
chequer, then took Napoleon's place as guardian of the Italian cause. Whereas 
Queen Victoria, the Prince Consort, and the Tories were consistently averse 
to the expulsion of Austria from the Italian peninsula, the Cabinet and the 
Liberals were the devoted friends of Italian freedom. Russell had indig- 
nantly opposed and repulsed the invitation to join in the two Emperors' plans. 
We are asked to propose a partition of the peoples of Italy," he exclaimed, 
as if we had the right to dispose of them." 2 In this attitude, policy har- 
monized with conviction. The Cabinet was determined on preserving the 
peace of Europe while Villafranca, by ignoring national aspirations, gave 
promise of future war. Such a war, moreover, would certainly result either 
in the end of the liberal movement in Italy or, equally fearful to believers 
in constitutional monarchy, it would end by setting up an Italian republic. 
The latter fear was one which Cavour found a most effective weapon. 

In support of the policy of the Cabinet Russell made direct appeal to the 
doctrine of self-determination. The Cabinet, said Russell, was wholly op- 
posed to the restoration of the dukes by force, which would be, in its opinion, 
im justifiable ; should such restoration be by the consent of the people, Great 
Britain would not object. The unbiased opinion of the people must, how- 
ever, be clearly ascertained, and to establish the wishes of Tuscany, Russell 
supported the holding of a national assembly, elected in a fair and orderly 
fashion. 5 

1 Documents, post, p. 444. Cf . also address of Ricasoli to the Tuscan Assembly at the 
opening session. Le assemblee del risorgimento, vol. 3, p. 660. To Cavour Napoleon had 
said that he would plead the people's cause before the European Congress and that, mean- 
while, they had simply to keep the tyrants from returning. Cavour to La Marmora, July 16, 
1859, Chiala, vol. 3, p. 111. To the representatives of Parma who waited on him in Paris 
after his return he said to tell the people that their armies would not force the issue, but 
that their votes would. Giacometti, La question italienne, p. 353. 

2 Stuart J. Reid, Lord John Russell, p. 304. 

• Russell, on July 19, wrote to Corbett, the British representative at Florence, who was 



Encouraged by Russell's support, the Tuscan ministry on July 15, imme- 
diately after Villafranca, and in order to attest their wishes before Europe, 
issued a decree convoking a representative assembly, competent to pass a 
legitimate vote as to the definitive fate of Tuscany. The decree was signed 
by both the Sardinian commissioner and the provisional government. In- 
stead of universal manhood suffrage, the decree provided for a qualified 
suffrage similar to that in Sardinia, based on a fairly low property, educa- 
tional or professional qualification. In Modena, Parma, Piacenza, and Ro- 
magna similar assemblies were convoked on the basis of adult literate male 
suffrage. The voting was not by signing a register, as in '48, but by secret 
ballots cast in primary assemblies. The election machinery was in the hands 
of the provisional governments, the details of registration to be administered 
by the mayors. The period for compiling the lists and for claims to be en- 
tered appears to have been somewhat short, — eight days for lists and three for 
claims after posting, with appeal from decisions to a higher court. 

In default of any definite information it is probable that the voting was 
by procedure similar to that established for electoral colleges by the Sar- 
dinian electoral law of March 17, 1848. By this law a card of identification 
was necessary for each voter to enter the voting place. A list of names of 
those qualified was posted in the hall, another copy was in the hands of the 
presiding officer. Each elector answering to his name, called from the list, 
received from the President a printed ballot on which he wrote his vote, or, if 
illiterate, got another man to write it. He then folded the ballot and gave it 
to the President who placed it in an " urn " or ballot-box. 

The British Foreign Office kept a close watch over the conditions sur- 
rounding the vote. In answer to reports from Corbett, British representa- 
tive at Florence, that oppressive measures were being used against partisans 
of the Grand Duke, 1 Russell instructed him to inform the provisional govern- 
ment that attempts to repress a free declaration of opinion in a matter of 
such vital interest to the government of the country would be unjust and illib- 
eral. On July 26 Corbett wrote that almost all who have the right to vote had 
registered, and that he had been assured by the government of a full and free 
expression of opinion. By a decree of July 29 the date ot the elections was 
fixed for August 7. On August 1 Boncompagni in order to disarm criti- 

endeavoring to discount the feeling for union in his dispatches to the Foreign Office, " It is 
much to be desired that a representative assembly should be convoked in Tuscany in order 
that the wishes of the people in favor of the autonomy of that country may be regularly and 
freely expressed." Documents, post, p. 449. See also Russell to Cowley (at Turin) July 25, 
Parliamentary Papers, Affairs of Italy, 1860, vol. 68 [2609], p. 20. 

1 Parliamentary Papers [2609], p. 28. Corbett also quotes one ot tne government as say- 
ing that it had been necessary to warn some of the ducal party who had shown a disposition 
towards disturbance. Jbtd., p. 44. 


cism, resigned office and retired from Tuscany, an act at which Russell ex- 
pressed the great satisfaction of the British Government as representing the 
intention of Sardinia to leave Tuscany wholly unfettered in her future choice. 1 
Ricasoli, a native of Tuscany, had been appointed by Boncompagni as 
President of the Council of Ministers. By a decree of August 2, Ricasoli 
ordered the president of each electoral college to inform the electors that 
the college was to elect a representative " for the sole purpose of express- 
ing the legitimate vote of the Tuscan people as to the definite fate of the coun- 
try." 2 The elections were held on August 7. No complete official figures 
of the result are available, but Corbett in a dispatch of August 10 8 gives the 
returns as follows : 

Those qualified Voted 

Florence 5,700 3,200 

Districts adjacent 1,000 890 

Priests in Florence 1,200 (almost all of whom were qualified.) . . 15 

According to Corbett probably three-fourths of the entire electorate went 
to the polls in spite of the efforts of the priests, who, though no longer election 
officials, made full use of their religious power to persuade them to abstain. 
This was more successful in the country districts than in the towns. The 
archbishop of Florence had shown his discountenance to the elections, 4 but 
this attitude was not universally followed, for in other districts four priests 
were themselves elected. The testimony of both Hudson from Turin, and 
Corbett from Florence, is to the effect that the elections were carried on 
throughout the country in the most orderly manner, and that the result was 
received with such lively enthusiasm as to indicate that the Grand Duke 
had few friends. The enthusiasm appeared to be from all classes, though, 
Corbett adds, had the vote been by universal suffrage the result might well 
have been different as the lower orders had taken little interest in politics, 
and, in the country places, where there was no dislike of the Grand Duke, the 
people might have been induced to give their votes for restoration. But, he 
concluded, such a result would have been wholly at variance with the desires 
of the upper and middle classes. The Grand Duke's cause had been de- 
stroyed for these by his presence with the Austrian forces at the battle of 
Solferino, and the common danger had awakened a community of feeling 
with Central Italy, the party of union with Piedmont in each province gain- 
ing courage from the strength of similar parties. 

Corbett adds that another reason for the apparent unanimity is that many 

* Parliamentary Papers [2609], pp. 33, 26 and 44. 
2 Documents, post, p. 453. 
•Parliamentary Papers [2609], p. 54. 


of the legitimists abstained from voting on the ground that the right of the 
Grand Duke to the throne could not be affected by the vote of a popular 
legislature. Groundless fear on the part of others kept them from the 
polls, or, if they voted, led them to do so against their convictions. But, he 
concludes, as far as can be ascertained the vote of union represented the 
desire of the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the Duchy. 1 
Even the officers of the Tuscan army appear to have been wholly against the 
restoration of the Grand Duke. 2 

In other duchies the Sardinian commissioners, on retiring, had been ap- 
pointed by the provisional governments as dictators or governors, and decrees 
convoking the primary assemblies had been at once issued. Everywhere per- 
fect order was enjoined in order that nothing should detract from the au- 
thoritative character of the vote and its effect on Europe. Throughout Italy 
the elections were orderly and decisive. While there were Sardinian troops 
in Modena, placed there by Boncompagni to maintain order, there were no 
charges of coercion or disorder. Everywhere the victory of the Sardinian 
party was unquestionable. 

In Tuscany the delegates, through birth, scientific, literary or industrial 
pursuits, were among the chief citizens of the province. 8 The Tuscan As- 
sembly thus elected considered itself a representative rather than a delibera- 
tive body, 4 the deputies having been elected on the platform of union. The 
assembly of 171 delegates met on August 11. After high mass in Santa 
Croce where divine inspiration was invoked for the deliberations of the 
assembly, the delegates marched to the Palazzo Vecchio where the Hall of the 
Cinque Cento had been prepared for their sittings. The crowds collected 
in the streets greeted them with wild enthusiasm as they passed, preceded by 
ministers of state, and followed by the Municipal officials of Florence. Bands 
played, cannon boomed. The session opened at 10 a. m. with an address 
read by Ricasoli as President of the Council of Ministers, explaining the 
political situation. The eldest member was elected president, the four young- 
est members were named secretaries 5 and the usual formalities of verifica^ 
tion of powers and adoption of rules were carried out. 

The method of voting was as follows. Each deputy was given two small 

1 The Grand Duke had abdicated in favor of his son on August 4, but it was too late to 
affect the result. 

2 Corbett forwarded a letter signed by them protesting against charges of attachment to 
the old dynasty. Parliamentary Papers [2609], p. 270. 

'Corbett to Russell, Parliamentary Papers [2609], p. 54. 

♦Their names are given in full in Le assemblee del risorgimento, vol. 5, p. 657, "To 
Florentines ever mindful of their glorious past, it seemed as if three centuries and a half had 
been bridged; for when the clerk read the rolls, name after name rang out of the men who 
had made Florence great." Thayer, vol. 2, p. 132. 

•Corbett to Russell, August 11, Parliamentary Papers [2609], p. 55. 


balls; one black, the other white. The black signified approval. As their 
names were called in alphabetical order, each deputy advanced to the urn, 
dropped in the ball representing his vote and dropped the discarded ball into 
another urn. The counting was done in public. 

On the fifth day of the session a resolution for the dethronement of the 
House of Lorraine was introduced and referred to all the committees into 
which the assembly was divided. Each committee named a representative to 
confer upon the resolution, which was adopted. The assembly, after a detailed 
indictment of the misrule of the dukes and a statement of the absolute in- 
compatibility of the Austrian House of Lorraine, and the Italian desires of 
Tuscany, unanimously decreed the Austro-Lorraine dynasty to be deposed, 
and declared that the dynasty could never be either recalled or received to 
reign again over Tuscany. 1 

At this same session of August 16 a resolution was introduced for the an- 
nexation of Tuscany to the Kingdom of Victor Emanuel II. It was reported 
on August 20, and was adopted without a dissenting voice. 2 In the duchies 
of Parma and Modena each assembly as it met passed similar decrees de- 
throning their dukes and asking for union with Sardinia. 

The attitude of Napoleon had not been changed by the vote. Unable to 
attack the principle of popular sovereignty, he alleged that the vote had been 
due to pressure from Sardinia, 8 to the momentary enthusiasm of the emotion 
accompanying war, and was not the cool expression of the popular will. 
He further asserted that there was ample reason to believe that Tuscany 
really wished independence, and that the vote had been due not to desire 
for union with Sardinia, but to fear of the return of Austrian domination. 
Although the British representatives in Italy refuted these allegations, 4 in 

1 Documents, post, p. 457. 

2 There were two abstentions, one being due to a desire for a Bonapartist kingdom. 

8 The ducal party asserted that the whole movement had been directed from Turin ; that 
Boncompagni, the Sardinian commissioner, although sent for purely military purposes, had 
at once become the chief figure in the provisional government, had fomented the revolt against 
the Grand Duke and had tried to win over the Tuscan troops to the Italian cause through 
gifts of money and free quarters. The initial revolt, however, appears to have been spon- 
taneous and Boncompagni, instead of falling in with the original purpose of Ricasoli to effect 
an immediate union with Sardinia, appears to have exerted every effort to force delay, a 
course in which he was supported by the Sardinian government, which on his inquiry, in- 
structed him that the initiative should not come from the Tuscan government when the royal 
commissioner was at its head. Le Assemblee del risorgimento, vol. 3, p. lxii. For a 
presentation of the other side, and especially the Sardinian plot in Parma, see Marquis of 
Normanby, A vindication of the Duke of Modena from the charges of Mr. Gladstone. Nor- 
manby was the British Minister at Florence. 

4 Russell on December 12 wrote to Hudson at Turin asking for the truth of the charges of 
terrorism and Sardinian agency in the duchies and Romagna, and for proofs, further than 
the recorded votes of the assemblies, of the satisfaction of the people and the tranquillity of 
the country {Parliamentary Papers [2609], p. 252). To this Hudson answered on December 


the face of Napoleon's opposition Victor Emanuel was forced to delay the 
union to an indefinite future. The provisional governments of the duchies 
endeavored to cement the union by forming a League of Central Italy 
composed of Parma, Modena, and Romagna, which were henceforth united 
under the name of Emilia and, by electing as regent a prince of Savoy, Eugene 
of Carignano. He, too, was forced to refuse by the opposition of Napoleon, 
who was still hoping for the establishment of the provisions of Villafranca, 
which had now been embodied in the Treaty of Zurich. 

The Italian Plebiscites of 1860-1870 
Tuscany and Emilia, 1860 

Napoleon was busily endeavoring to secure a European Congress to settle 
the question of the method of restoring the dukes and the Pope to their 
dominions. This did not satisfy the British Cabinet. As a solution of the 
difficulty presented by Napoleon's attitude, Lord John Russell, on January 
15, 1860, proposed that the matter be settled by another vote of the Italians 
themselves, and presented his proposal of the " Four Points " to the French 
Government. 1 By this plan Great Britain and France were to invite the King 
of Sardinia to agree not to send troops into Central Italy " until its several 
states and provinces hjtd, by a new vote of their assemblies, after a new 
election, solemnly declared their wishes as to their future destiny." Thus 
did Russell corner Napoleon who could do no less than accept the proposal 
with the reservation, however, that the vote should be by universal suffrage. 2 

The British proposal had left the matter of suffrage vague and Russell 
had recommended that the Government of Tuscany ascertain the views of 
France on the point 8 Russell made no objection to the French stipulation 
of universal suffrage but was content to leave it to the states themselves to 
decide, the matter of first importance being, to his mind, that the elections 
should be carried out under circumstances free from any reproach of intimi- 

25 that the imputation of terrorism by Sardinia was purely gratuitous .and imaginary, that the 
Tuscan vote had been clear and explicit, that the Piedmontese troops had been scrupulously 
recalled from the duchies and Romagna, and that the Piedmontese party had thereupon 
greatly increased. He attributed the vote for Sardinia directly to popular indignation at the 
terms of Villafranca. If all the supporters of annexation had been paid, Piedmont would 
now be insolvent, he added. Ibid,, p. 444. 

1 Documents, post, p. 499. 

2 Thou vend declared that the French Government could not divest itself of the moral 
responsibility arising from the treaty of Zurich unless the principle of universal suffrage, 
which constituted its own legitimacy became also the foundation of the new order of things 
in Italy. Annuaire des deux mondes, 1860, p. 103. 

8 Russell to Corbett, February 6, Parliamentary Papers, Affairs of Italy, 1860, vol. 67 
[2636], p. 36. 


dation or emotion. 1 Cavour, who had resumed office as Prime Minister of 
Sardinia, had been inclined towards an assembly elected by qualified fran- 
chise as in Sardinia, but at once perceived the value of basing the vote on 
the broadest sanction possible and gladly acquiesced in Napoleon's views. 2 
On February 24, he wrote to La Farina, his chief coadjutor in the work for 
annexation, recommending that he propose universal suffrage as his own idea, 
and "show at the same time that it would not have all the drawbacks 
generally feared." 8 

The chief objection to holding the new vote came from Ricasoli, the head 
of the Tuscan government. Ricasoli asserted that the first election had been 
legal and decisive. To hold another election would, in his opinion, serve to 
strengthen the argument against the former one. Russell answered with a 
warning that any reluctance would, on the contrary, amount to admission 
that the allegations against the first vote were true. 

While this discussion was going on, Napoleon, repenting of his assent, 
again proposed a plan of federation under the presidency of the Pope, the 
Grand Duke to be restored as ruler of Tuscany, Romagna to be a vicariat un- 
der Piedmont, and Austria to act as suzerain over Venetia. The French 
note ended with a veiled threat in case this arrangement was not adopted, a 
threat doubtless used to introduce a new mention of Savoy and Nice as com- 
pensation for such union as was granted by the scheme of federation. Cavour 
consented to communicate the proposition of the federation to the several 
States, but with the comment that although Sardinia would do its utmost 
to meet the views of Napoleon " it could not, even at the risk of being 
abandoned by France, deny the principle of popular will on which the Italian 
throne reposes." The people of Tuscany and of Emilia, into which the 
former duchies of Parma, Modena and Romagna had united, must decide 

1 Russell wrote to Hudson on February 6, M So far as Her Majesty's Government is con- 
cerned, our views would be satisfied if the actual law or practice of Tuscany, Modena, Parma 
and Romagna were observed. We have never adopted universal suffrage for ourselves . . . 
if that suffrage is proposed by France we should leave the different states and provinces to 
decide for themselves, both as to who should be electors and as to the mode of election. 
We have chiefly in view an election not carried by intimidation nor partaking of*the excite- 
ment of the first outburst of the national feeling for independence." Ibid., p. 36. 

2 On February 19 Cavour had written " We believe the better way of arriving at the true 
sentiment of the Tuscan people would be to convoke an assembly elected by classes which 
represent wealth, intelligence, and property. But if the Emperor is unwilling to recognize 
any authority save that of universal suffrage, we would also agree without hesitation, since, 
after all, we do not wish to have Tuscany united to us, if the majority of all classes, rich 
and poor, rural and urban, do not definitely wish it." Cavour to Arese. Translation. 
For original text see Chiala, vol. 3, p. 211. 

1 Translation. For original text see Zini, vol. 2, part 2, document no. 260. February 29, 
Cavour wrote to Nigra " they will, perhaps, adopt the means of universal and direct suffrage 
as the one of which the result may be least contested." Translation from Parliamentary 
Papers [2636], p. 31. 


for themselves; whatever their decision, Cavour promised, it should be re- 
spected. 1 

To block any further diplomatic manoeuvres of Napoleon, preparations for 
the vote were now hurried. The elections were called in both Tuscany and 
Emilia for March 11 and 12. The preamble of the Tuscan decree of convo- 
cation recites that although the Tuscan Assembly had, on August 20, voted 
unanimously for union, it was found expedient to consult the Tuscan people 
directly, with full legal forms, and in this way dissipate the doubt in Europe 
as to the complete freedom of the former vote and the firmness of the 
national will. Absolute manhood suffrage for all over twenty-one, whether 
literate or not, who were in enjoyment of civil rights and had resided in the 
commune for six months, was established. 

The voting, as in 1859, was to be by secret ballot, cast in the comisi. 2 
The polls were to be opened in the chief town of each district for the two 
days, from 8 a. m. to 6 p. m. The mayors and aldermen were put in charge 
of the drawing up of the electoral lists, which were to be based on the parish 
registers but were to include those non-Catholics who should go in person 
to register themselves. The voting was to be presided over by five common 
councillors, two of whom were always to be present. The formulas for the 
vote, to be written or printed on the ballots, were "Union with the Consti- 
tutional Monarchy of King Victor Emanuel " and " Separate Kingdom." 
There was only one ballot-box or " urn." The vote appears to have been 
meant to be secret, but it is probable that the voter had to select his ballot 
from one of two receptacles, as was the custom of the time, and thus the 
secrecy was somewhat impaired. Soldiers were to vote at their stations. 
The sealed ballot-boxes and formal minutes of the vote, drawn up by the 
election officials and transmitted through the several administrative officials 
to the Supreme Court of Cassation at Florence, were to be received by the 
court and the final vote announced in formal public session in the presence 
of the Ministry. 

The provisions in Emilia were practically identical. Farini had objected 
to submitting the alternative of a vicariat in Romagna to popular suffrage, 
on the ground that it was a question at the same time complicated and un- 
necessary, as nothing would induce the people of Romagna to vote for a 
return of the papal legates. 8 The formula of the question submitted in all 
parts of Emilia was the same as that used in Tuscany. 

On March 2, the day after the decree had been promulgated, Boncompagni, 
who had been acting as governor-general of Tuscany, again resigned office. 
There was, however, no doubt of the result. It was obvious that the vote 

1 Documents, post, p. 508. 

2 These appear to be the equivalent of our electoral districts. 
8 Zini, vol. 2, part 2, documents nos. 259 D and E. 

SAVOY AND NICE, 1860 75 

would be merely a reiteration of an unquestioned desire. In both provinces 
the balloting took place m perfect tranquillity. The votes of Tuscany were 
counted formally in public audience and the result embodied in a report signed 
by all the ministers and made public by the Supreme Court of Cassation; 
The court announced that of the 386,443 votes cast, there were 366,571 for 
union, 14,925 for a separate kingdom, and 4,949 were void. 1 In Emilia, 
where 89 per centum of those qualified had voted, the vote for union was 
even more decisive. 2 Rival dignity led the two deputations carrying the 
official result of the vote to present themselves to the King on different days. 
Farini led the deputation from Emilia. They were received by the King 
standing on the throne, surrounded by the nobles, the state councillors, the 
high officials of the crown and of the army, and the whole magistracy. The 
sumptuous ceremony was repeated for the Tuscan deputation. The votes 
were accepted and by two royal decrees, issued on the same day, the provinces 
were declared to be an integral part of the kingdom " in view of the result 
of the universal vote held in the province of Emilia (of Tuscany) the result 
of which was a general vote of the population to unite with our State." 

Savoy and Nice, 1860 

Having failed to free Venetia, Napoleon had been forced to relinquish his 
claim to Savoy and Nice. The refusal of the people to carry out the terms 
agreed on by the two Emperors at Villafranca, and the movement for 
union in Tuscany and Emilia, gave him an opportunity to exact the old prom- 
ise as the price of his acquiescence, on the ground that the two provinces 
were the equivalent of Venetia. Cavour was forced to yield the matter and 
the treaty of cession was signed at Turin on March 24. 3 

The treaty, however, did not provide for unconditional cession. Cavour 
had already comprehended the full value of the plebiscitary method of Na- 

1 Documents, post, p. 529. The population of Tuscany, according to the census of 1861, was 
1^26,334. Statistic a del Regno d' It alia, Popolazione, Censimento generate, vol. 1, p. xxii. 

The authenticity of the returns did not escape attack from the papal historians. De 
Bcauffbrt in L'Histoire de {invasion des Hats pontiUcaux, p. 396, quotes Curletti, a former 
secretary of Cavour and an official of the Piedmontese police at the time, as saying that in 
the Tuscan elections the officials, who had been carefully chosen for the purpose, had seen 
to it that affirmative votes were thrown into the urns to cover the abstentions, as well as 
a judicious number of negative votes in order to lend plausibility to the result. 

2 Documents, post, p. 533. The census of 1861 gives the population of Emilia by provinces. 
The population of Parma and Piacenza was 474,598, that of Modena, Reggio, and Massa was 
631,378, and that of Romagna 1,040,591. 

8 Documents, post, p. 566. There is no doubt that the idea of a cession of Savoy in return 
for foreign assistance was an old one. In 1883, it is said, the Mazzinian society of La Gio- 
vine Italia offered Savoy to France and the Sicilian ports to England in return for aid. 
Cf. Chiala, vol. 4, p. xii, note, who refers the assertion to C. Cantu, Croni-storia dell' inde- 
pendence italiona, vol. 3, p. 401. 


poleon. He had resorted to it to circumvent Napoleon in Italy. He now 
again invoked it to legitimate in the eyes of Europe, a transaction sure to be 
repugnant to it as well as to protect himself against the certain attack of Italian 
patriots against a cession of Sardinian soil. On Cavour's insistence, Article 1 
of the treaty provided that the annexation should be effected without any 
constraint of the wishes of the populations. 

As the ensuing plebiscites are at the same time the most familiar instances 
of a territorial cession subordinated to a popular vote, and the ones most 
bitterly attacked, it is advisable to give in some detail the previous history 
of the territories. 

The two territories being contiguous, and the cession having been provided 
for in the same treaty and under the same stipulations, the custom of con- 
sidering the two regions as identical and the plebiscites in them as one is 
perhaps natural. This collective treatment is, however, quite inaccurate. 
The two regions, different physically and racially, had had a widely differing 
history and, to contemporaries, the result of the votes which in the one in- 
stance aroused such widespread wonder and incredulity, in the other caused 
little surprise. 

Savoy, though in history as often a part of Piedmont as of France, lies 
on the western slopes of the Alps. It is a mountainous region, the valleys 
opening on France and Switzerland. The duchy was composed of two divi- 
sions, Chambery and Annecy. Each division had for s its capital a city of 
the same name. Of the three provinces of Annecy, two, Chablais and Fau- 
cigny, bordering on Lake Geneva, had been included in the neutrality of 
Switzerland when, in 1815, Savoy had been given back to Piedmont. 1 The 
chief commercial ties of these provinces were with Geneva, whereas the 
commercial ties of southern Savoy were with France. The people were 
French in race, however, as were those of the rest of the duchy. The devo- 
tion of the Savoyards to the church and its hierarchy was one of the chief 
characteristics of the duchy. It is said that there were more priests and 
monastic orders in Savoy than in the rest of Italy put together. 

Savoy was thus divided from Piedmont by language, customs and economic 

1 Whether this neutralization was in order to benefit Switzerland or Piedmont was in 
1860 a matter of bitter controversy. The British government supported the Swiss claim that 
the neutralization was to protect Switzerland only. The French and Italian view was that 
the neutralization was at the request of Sardinia, and as a recompense by the Powers for the 
session of a part of her territory to Geneva. The neutralization was desired because these 
two provinces were crossed by the Simplon and Great St. Bernard and had no means of 
military communication with Turin, which was thus without the means of defending from 
French aggression these two routes across her territory. By the provision of 1815 no armed 
troops of any Power were to be allowed to traverse the region. In case of Piedmont being 
involved in war, her troops were to withdraw and the Swiss troops were to police and 
defend the neutralized territory. 

SAVOY AND NICE, 1860 77 

interests, and by the intensity of its devotion to the church, but a more vital 
element of difference than race, religion or language, was the conviction of 
the Savoyards that they were governed according to the political exigencies 
of the cabinet at Turin, rather than according to their own desires, needs and 
traditions. 1 The Savoyards resented the fact that the administrative offi- 
cials were Piedmontese, no Savoyard being allowed to rise to positions of 
importance, and that almost one half of the taxes were spent outside of the 
duchy. The " question of Savoy " was agitated in contemporary discussion 
as that of " another Ireland." This feeling naturally strengthened the sym- 
pathy with France in whose history the people of Savoy had played their 
part. There had always been a dormant French party in Savoy. The 
nationalist movement of 1848 had galvanized it into activity. At that time, 
the liberals, however, had been quieted by the concession of French as the 
official language and the conservatives had been restrained by distrust of repub- 
lican France. The movement for annexation had again subsided until 1856, 
when events in France gave new life to the French party. The Savoyard 
conservatives were reassured by the change from republic to empire and had 
been estranged from Sardinia by Cavour's acts of 1850 when he caused the 
suppression of ecclesiastical privileges and closed the convents. 2 All the 
journals, democratic and conservative, supported the movement, as did the 
great colonies of Savoyard expatriates in Paris, Lyons and Marseilles. 

The events of 1859 by which Piedmont was expanded into the kingdom 
of Northern Italy intensified the feeling of isolation. Savoy, not being 
Italian, was reluctant to enter on a war for Italian nationality. 8 The conse* 
quence to Savoy was the subject of constant discussion. Even the addition 
of Lombardy alarmed them. In July, 1859, after Villafranca, a petition 
was drawn up and sent to Victor Emanuel asking what was to be the future 
of Savoy in this Italian national kingdom. 4 The address became the start- 
ing point for propaganda which was strenuously opposed by the Sardinian 

1 Saint Gents, vol. 3, p. 338 ; also TrSsal, p. 330. 

2 Francisque Grivaz, "Le plebiscite d'annexion de 1860 en Savoie et dans le comte de 
Nice," Revue generate de droit international public, vol. 3, p. 573. 

• On February 9, 1859, Marquis Leon Costa, a deputy from Savoy, speaking in the Sar- 
dinian Chamber had said : " Cette province sacrifie ses ressources pour annuler son influence 
deji si minime dans TEtat." TrSsal, p. 136, quoting from Atti del parlamento subalpino, vi* 
legis. 2nd session, p. 332. The Roman exile, Mamiani, said that Savoy felt abandoned as 
Ariadne on the cliffs of Naxos. Saint Genis, vol. 3, p. 339. 

* M Sire . . . les actes emanes de votre gouvernment, les bases de la paix qui a ete signee, 
proclament la fondation d'une nationality italienne, nettement dessinee par les Alpes ainsi que 
par le langage, les mceurs et la race de ceux qui doivent en f aire partie. — Ces designations, 
Sire, excluent la Savoie. La Savoie n'est pas italienne, elle ne peut pas Tetre, quel est done 
Tavenir qui lui est reservee?" Bourgeois, "L* Annexion de la Savoie a la France," Revue 
gSnSrale de droit international public, vol. 3, p. 680; TrSsal, p. 155; Saint Gents, p. 342. 


government. 1 To the alarm at the prospect of loss of political importance 
was added distrust of Cavour' s further policy towards the church. 2 

On the other hand the liberals, supporters of the French union in 1848 
were now in favor of union with Italy, which, under Cavour and the revolu- 
tionary leaders, was far more promising than the Empire with its cultivation 
of the clericals. 8 Stirred to action by the growing rumors of negotiations 
for cession, in the last month of 1859 the liberals organized. Their program 
was for a union with Switzerland, if union with Sardinia was impossible, or, 
if union yvith Switzerland could not be managed, then for an independent 
duchy under a liberal prince. They held a demonstration on January 29, 
1860, when a crowd numbering, according to the sympathies of the his- 
torian, from 400 to 3,000, 4 met at Chambery and swore allegiance to Victor 
Emanuel and to the union. 

Such appear to be the facts as to race, language and public opinion in 
Savoy at the opening of the year 1860. The city and county of Nice were 
in a far different situation. It had had a history as varied as that of any 
border city. In the early days it had been a free city and in alliance with 
the several Italian cities of its vicinity. Later, to escape the covetous hand 
of thq Counts of Provence it had placed itself under the protection of the 
Counts of Savoy. Except for the period of annexation to the first French 
Republic, 6 it had followed their fortunes and, with the setting up of the 
Kingdom of Sardinia under the Savoyard princes, Nice became part of that 
kingdom. Yet though its history had been varied there is little suggestion 
that Nice was anything but Italian and it is probably this fact which led 
Napoleon, in his first public intimation of the French claim to the two re- 
gions, to base it not on nationality, even though in Savoy he had a clean 
case, but on the claim of balance of power and natural limits. There is 
some mention of a French party in Nice, of which Cavour made the most in 
his defense, but it is not convincing. 

1 The clerical Courrier des Alpes was suspended for contending that as the people of 
Central Italy had voted for Piedmont, the Savoyards were entitled to vote on their own 
fate. Trtsal, p. 155. 

2 In the elections of 1857, Savoy with few exceptions had gone solidly clerical. Cavour, 
writing of his passage through Savoy on his way to Plombieres in 1858 says, " Nobody hissed 
me on the streets, I can't expect more." Translated from Chiala, vol. 6, p. 251, Cavour to 
Santa Rosa, July 13, 1858. 

8 The Savoyard liberals wrote lively brochures saying that France was not the France of 
1789, but the France of the Capucins and the Chouans, "Les interets de la liberte priment les 
interets de la nationality. Ubi libertas ibi patria." Saint Gents, vol. 3, p. 346. 

4 The Gazette de Savoie, anti-separatist, puts it at 3,000. Parliamentary Papers [2624], p. 
20. Grivaz credits this statement. Saint Genis puts the number at 400-500, p. 352; Tresal, 
p. 165, appears to credit the smaller figure. 

* Cf . ante, pp. 43-45. 

SAVOY AND NICE, 1860 79 

Although there had been persistent rumors as to a cession, the first public 
intimation of the claim of France was given by Napoleon in his address on 
the opening of the legislative chambers on March 1, I860. 1 The speech 
aroused the apprehension of Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and Austria. Ex- 
cept for France herself there was not a court in Europe which did not feel 
itself threatened by the transfer. Each feared that Napoleon was planning 
to follow the footsteps of his uncle. If claims to the slopes of the Alps 
were to be reasserted, why not also to Belgium and the Rhine? This fear 
was not lessened by the fact that the cession would give France control of 
the passes. 

Switzerland, already alarmed at the growth of the new Italian kingdom, 
was immediately concerned with the effect of the cession on the neutralized 
provinces. Napoleon had at first promised these provinces to Switzerland. 
At once there came from Savoy a vigorous protest against such dismember- 
ment, a protest carried to Napoleon by a delegation of fifty-five provincial 
and municipal councillors of Savoy. 2 This was made use of by Napoleon 
as an excuse to abandon the idea. Napoleon's change of policy was made 
the subject of many and repeated protests by the Swiss Government which 
thereupon insisted that the people of Northern Savoy be allowed to vote 
on the alternative of union with Switzerland. To support this demand, peti- 
tions with numerous signatures, whether real or false is contested, were 
drawn up in the ninety-nine communes of Faucigny and Chablais, asking for 
the opportunity to vote for such a union. 8 It is asserted that Cavour pro- 
moted the movement in order to alarm the party for unity and force a vote 
for France, rather than be disrupted. 4 

The Swiss movement was intimately bound up with the economic needs 
of the northern provinces which depended on freedom of trade with Geneva. 
France understood the importance of this question of a tariff and on March 
11, definitely promised that there should be instituted a trade zone with 

The Treaty of Turin was finally signed on March 24. The presence in 
the treaty of the clause conditioning the cession on the popular consent is 
usually credited to Napoleon; it is not strange considering his devotion to 

1 Cf. Documents, post, p. 538. From the correspondence between Russell and Cowley it is 
clear that England as well as the other European Powers had for months been fearful of 
such a claim. 

2 As these councils had just been renewed within three months, their attitude towards 
annexation to France should give some indication of public opinion. It must be remembered, 
however, that they had been elected not by manhood suffrage but on a tax-paying qualifica- 
tion of five francs annually in the rural communes and a proportionate rate in the towns. 

* Documents, post, p. 552. 
4 Saint Gents, p. 354. 


the principle. It appears, however, that in this instance Napoleon, though 
giving assurances to the Powers that no constraint would be used, 1 was 
actually opposed to the presence of the stipulation in the treaty. The reason 
for this, it has been suggested, was that Russia's acquiescence could be 
counted on only if there were no mention of a popular vote, and Napoleon 
needed Russia's support. 2 Certainly in the official announcement of the sign- 
ing of the treaty in the Moniteur no mention is made of the vote, nor is it 
referred to in the Senatus Consulte of Union. 8 It is apparent that this 
clause was inserted and insisted on by Cavour. 4 

The treaty had utterly disregarded the claims of the Swiss Government 
and of the inhabitants of Northern Savoy. There was to be no third alter- 
native to the vote for France or Sardinia. The only protection to Swiss 
interests was the clause perpetuating the neutrality of the Northern prov- 
inces. The only protection of the minority was the clause of option in Article 
6, by which those wishing to preserve Sardinian citizenship might have a 
year's time in which to remove themselves and their property to Sardinia. 

The treaty left the method of the vote to an agreement between the two 
sovereigns. Napoleon, yielding the point of popular consultation, next ap- 
pears to have made an effort to have the vote taken not by universal suffrage 
but by the provisional or municipal councils already in existence. This was 
likewise the desire of the leaders of the French party in Savoy. This is, at 
any rate, the statement of Grivaz who gives authority. 5 He adds that it was 
on the demand of the people themselves, presented to the Emperor on April 1, 
that the governments, with common accord, adopted universal suffrage. 
Cowley, however, writing to Russell from Paris on April 6, says that the 
Emperor had proposed universal suffrage to the King. 6 

1 In transmitting the speech of March 1 to the French representatives abroad, Thouvenel 
said, " I hasten to add that the government of the Emperor has no wish to hold the guaran- 
tees which it demands except with the free assent of the King of Sardinia and of the popu- 
lations. The cession, therefore, which will be made to it will remain exempt from all violence 
and from all constraint." From a translation in British Parliamentary Papers, Affairs of 
Italy, 1860, vol. 67 [2656], p. 5, March 13. 

2 Grivaz in Revue ginirale de droit international public, vol. 3, p. 579. 
8 Documents, post, p. 619. 

4 Cf. Cavour's speech in the Chamber of Deputies. Documents, post, p. 611. 

5 Grivaz, in Revue ginirale de droit international public, vol. 3, p. 578, cites the Journal 
dcs dSbats of March 16, 1860 and the Courrier des Alpes to further substantiate his state- 
ment. He repeats the following quotation taken from Chiala, vol. 4, p. Hi, from an inspired 
article in Le constitutional of March 30 regarding plebiscites : " un tel principe (la sou- 
verainete du peuple) pourrait devenir pour 1' Europe, par une fausse extension, la cause de 
troubles et de dangers incessants. Le suffrage universel peut s'appliquer seulement a Tint^- 
rieur du pays, mais non servir a modifier l'exercice de la souverainete dans les rapports avec 
Tetranger, ni pour un accroissement de territoire." 

6 Chiala, vol. 4, p. lxxx. Cavour to E. d'Azeglio, April 6, 1860. Ibid, vol. 3, p. 35. 
Thayer quotes Bianchi La politique du cotnte de Cavour, p. 342, " cependant nous avons pu, 

SAVOY AND NICE, 1860 81 

On March 25, were held the first parliamentary elections of the new king- 
dom of Italy. The citizens of Savoy and Nice voted for their deputies as 
if no treaty had been made. To the protest of the French government, 
Cavour answered that as the treaty had not been ratified the inhabitants were 
still subjects of the King. The elections in the rest of Italy gave added reason 
for the conservative and clerical Savoyards to wish for separation, whereas 
the radicals were shorn of their strength. The clericals were almost wiped 
out and the Cavour ministry endorsed by an overwhelming majority. Of 
the eighteen deputies elected in Savoy all but two were conservative annexa- 
tionists. 1 Of these two one had not declared himself and the other was hostile. 
It is improbable that the vote represented the work of a powerful organiza- 
tion, for the French party had not been organized, as is seen from their appeal 
to Napoleon to prevent this election because they had not had time to develop 
a propaganda. 2 All but two of the Savoyard deputies refrained from taking 
their seats in the Subalpine Parliament on the ground that as the vote on the 
cession had been decreed and as the French character, habits, language and 
commercial relations of Savoy left no doubt of the outcome, they thought it 
their duty to abstain from voting in the Italian Parliament until after the 
election. There are points to be observed, however, about this election. The 
suffrage was not universal but on a tax-paying qualification and there had 
been many abstentions due to failure to realize the significance of the vote. 
It is especially interesting, however, that Thonon, one of the chief communes 
of Chablais and near Geneva, had given a vote of 272 to 112 for the unionist 
candidate, and Bonneville had gone for annexation by 370 to 168. 3 

On April 1, Victor Emanuel absolved the inhabitants of Savoy and Nice 
from their allegiance, insisting, however, that the cession depended on their 
free consent. 4 The Piedmontese officials were recalled and replaced by na- 
tive Savoyards. This was to remove all suggestion of direct pressure by the 
Sardinian governors against annexation. The appearance of perfect neu- 
trality, however, was not attained as the appointments, save in rare instances, 
were of known leaders of the French party, whose names occur on the list of 
those who had been recommended to Napoleon by the Savoyard deputation 
in Paris as being friendly to the annexation. This was not true, however, 

non sans peine faire inserer les deux clauses de la sanction du Parlement et du vote des 


i Saint Gents, p. 360; Thayer, p. 214. It should perhaps be mentioned that Cavour had in 
February called to the Senate the chief pro-Sardinian delegate from Savoy, in order to give 
evidence of good faith to the Emperor. 

* Trisal, p. 251. 

» Only 390 had voted out of 857 registered, however. TrSsal, p. 255, gives the votes by 
electoral districts, of which there were twenty-two, and says that Chablais and Faucigny had 
been won by the French promise of a zone. 

*Cf. Documents, post, p. 569. 


of Lubonis the provisional governor appointed for the city and county of Nice, 
for his name is signed to the protest against the cession to France, addressed 
by the municipality of Nice to Victor Emanuel on March 21. The syndics 
of the communes who were appointed officers, and supposedly native Sa- 
voyards or NiQois, were not removed but were allowed to retain their offices. 
The communal councillors, who were to aid the syndics in carrying out the 
vote, were elected officers. They too were retained. 

Immediately on installation, the provisional governors proclaimed the 
plebiscite. The proclamation of Lubonis fixed the plebiscite for Nice and 
its district for April 15; that in Savoy was fixed for April 22. With the 
publication of these decrees the storm which Cavour had foreseen broke in 
the Sardinian Chamber. The difference in date and the haste in holding 
the vote in Nice were the chief bases of the attacks on the government. Gari- 
baldi in his famous interpellation, on April 12, after utterly repudiating the 
cession of his native city, bitterly criticized the unseemly haste which did 
indeed give a ridiculously brief period for the compilation of the lists, and 
urged delay; Mamiani offered a resolution providing for delay and also for 
a committee of inquiry to be sent by the Chamber to watch the conduct of 
the vote. These amendments were defeated, Cavour insisting that party feel- 
ing was running too high in Nice to make delay advisable, a defense in all 
probability not altogether disingenuous. The tone of Lubonis' proclamation 
was also savagely criticized in the Chamber, and the justice of the attack was 
admitted by the government. Certainly there could be no defense of its utter 
lack of neutrality. Every phrase had been framed with the purpose of in- 
sistence on the inevitable character of the cession and the desire of the King 
that it should be carried out. Lubonis had explicitly urged a vote of affirma- 
tion of the treaty. 1 Malaussena, the syndic of Nice, whose name, like that 
of Lubonis, had appeared on the protest of the 21st of March, in his mani- 
festo published on April 8, used language as unneutral and pro-annexation in 
tone as that of Lubonis. 

By the decrees of the governor and of the syndic the polls were to be opened 
in each commune of Nice and its district on Sunday, April 15 and on Monday 
the 16th, from nine to four. The vote was to be by written or printed ballots 
with the word " yes " or " no." All male citizens over twenty-one, belonging 
to Nice by birth or origin and living in the commune for the last six months, 
were given the right to vote. Latitude as to the period of domicile was 
allowed those away from the city but known to be Ni^ois and returning to 
vote. The compilation of the electoral lists was entrusted to a committee in 
each commune composed of the syndic and four municipal councillors. This 

1 See Proclamation of the Governor Regent of the City and County ox Nice. Documents, 
post, p. 574. 

SAVOY AND NICE, 1860 83 

committee was all-powerful. Not only were its decisions to be final, but the 
unusual provision was included that the committee should, without waiting 
for applications, transfer from the old lists the names of any who were 
known to have the right to the vote in this election, whereas others were to 
present themselves before the committee. This provision naturally gave 
rise to charges of partisanship which were probably well merited, for it was 
in this way made only too easy for the committee to inscribe French sympa- 
thizers without application and to insist that the anti-annexationists must 
register in person. 

The French government had sent a commissioner to Nice, as well as one 
to Savoy, to watch over the preliminary arrangements and to see that the 
interests of France were protected, a measure which though surely legitimate, 
has also been made a subject of reproach. 

The vote was held in Nice and the district on the days appointed. The 
official figures are 25,743 affirmative votes, 160 negative, and 30 void. The 
results were overwhelmingly for France. Even the soldier vote had gone 
for France by a large majority. 1 There is small wonder that there has been 
scepticism as to the returns, and, indeed, they must have been tampered with, 
if the assertion is correct that, in Levenzo, 74 more votes were cast than there 
were voters, an assertion made in the Italian Chamber on May 25 by Laurenti- 
Rabaudi, and not denied. The official returns naturally do not show this dis- 
crepancy. 2 This is the only specific accusation of the kind, however, nor is 
it necessary to consider it as proved, although Fusinato, in writing of the 
plebiscite, repeats the statement 'as to Levenzo and admits that the charges 
made by Laurenti-Rabaudi and the other opponents were for the most part 
true. But, he adds, on the other hand, it is necessary to agree that in the 
face of such a unanimity of votes it is not possible to admit that those illicit 
schemes alone were powerful. " If it were so," he says, " those populations 
were so utterly corrupted as to make us almost glad that they were torn away 
from our nation." 8 

The points made in defence of the vote of Nice by Cavour as President of 
the Council in his several speeches before the Sardinian parliament are of 
varying conclusiveness. 4 His picture of Nice as a French city he afterwards 
admitted to have been contrary to his own convictions. The impropriety of 
the acts of Lubonis he acknowledged from the first. The argument that what- 

1 The figures given out on April 28 gave 1200 for union and only 186 against. Documents, 
post, p. 597. According to the census of 1858 the total population of the city and county of 
Nice numbered 246,731. Of these 122,421 were male. Statistica del Regno d'ltalia, Popo- 
lazione, Censimento degli antichi stati Sardi, January 1, 1858. 

* Documents, post, p. 614 and table on pp. 423-5. 

9 Fusinato, p. 113. 

4 Documents, post, pp.435-443. 


ever pressure the civilians were under in Nice, the soldiers, who were not in one 
organization but were scattered throughout the Italian forces, had been under 
precisely the opposite influence, namely, that of their Italian companions, 
merely suggests that their officers had exercised pressure. The opportunity 
to lessen their term of service with the army from the eleven years required 
by Sardinia to the seven required by France, must, however, have played a 
great part in their decision. Aside from the vote of Levenzo the reproaches 
most often heard are that Lubonis and the bishop exerted all their eloquence, 
the bishop asserting that it was the will of God that they vote for union, 
and Lubonis insisting that it was also the desire of the King. With a loyal 
and Catholic community these arguments may have had great weight, but 
can scarcely be regarded as rendering a vote by secret ballot valueless. 
There is probability that the French offers of development of the city as a 
pleasure ground and the prospect of other benefits from annexation played 
their part — and a legitimate part. The assertion that there were French 
troops in the district at the time of the vote seems unfounded. In view of 
the apparent content of the population of Nice with their fate, and the 
scarcity of proof to support the assertions so hotly made, it is arguable that 
these have been exaggerated by the several Powers and parties whose inter- 
ests were involved and too easily credited by those who distrust universal 
suffrage and the doctrine of national self-determination. 

The vote of Savoy was held a week later than that of Nice. The provi- 
sional governor of Chambery, in a circular of rather more seemly unneutral- 
ity than those of Lubonis, had announced on April 7 that the polls of Savoy 
would be open on Sunday, the 22nd, from 8 a. m. to 7 p. m. for a vote on 
the question: "Does Savoy wish to be united to France?" The suffrage 
was given to all citizens over twenty-one, born in Savoy, or of Savoyard par- 
ents out of Savoy, who were in enjoyment of civil rights and had lived in 
the commune for over six months. 1 The registration lists based on the census 
and tax lists were to be drawn up by communal committees composed of the 
syndic and the four senior members of the giunta, and were to be posted by 
April 15, at latest. 2 On the 9th this proclamation was supplemented by one 
wholly unneutral in tone, addressed to the syndics of the district of Cham- 
bery, urging them to explain to their subordinates that the choice was 
no longer between France and Sardinia, but between France and an unknown 
fate. The Intendent Regent of Faucigny issued a similar circular pointing 
out that there was no question of union with Switzerland involved in this 
vote arid that a negative vote would not advance such a desire. The various 

1 Cf. Documents, post, p. 585. 

2 By a later proclamation, it was provided that agents should visit all houses of the com- 
mune in order to enter the names of all the inhabitants not on the census and tax lists. 

SAVOY AND NICE, 1860 85 

Sardinian officials still left in Savoy used their influence also for annexation, 
if one may judge by the action of Graglia, the royal commissioner of edu- 
cation, who wrote to the governor regent of Annecy begging him to instruct 
the people to give an enthusiastic endorsement to the union. 1 It is said that 
the circular issued by the governor of Annecy, in order to reconcile the electors 
of Chablais and Faucigny, permitted them to substitute France et zone 
for the simple affirmative. 2 Most of these circulars were intended to carry 
some suggestion that the vote was a mere form and the cession a foregone 
conclusion and yet they warned against staying from the polls on that account. 

The conservatives, through their deputation to Napoleon, had protested 
against a popular vote of any kind. When the proclamation reached them 
they were aghast at the news of the proposed adoption of manhood suffrage, 
and protested to Napoleon that they had not the time to work with the masses, 
that the syndics and the reds, who were well organized, would easily offset 
the new administration of Savoyard conservatives who would be without 
funds, arms, or time, and who lacked leaders of experience in directing propa- 
ganda. 3 They returned at once from Paris and set about forming committees 
throughout Savoy to prepare for the vote. On April 12 the central committees 
which they had formed at Chambery and Annecy sent circulars to all the 
syndics offering help in seconding the governor's efforts for a big vote for 
annexation and promised in particular to send French flags to all the com- 
munes where wanted, and urged union of all parties in support of annexation. 
Following this advice, in some places, notably in Tarentaise and Maurienne, 
the two parties fused and worked together for annexation. 4 Not all the 
radicals were willing to give up their desire for the liberal Italian rule, how- 
ever. The red newspaper, the Gazette de La Savoie, raged. 

The great doubt was as to Chablais and Faucigny. The conservatives said 
it was necessary to place these provinces in a position where material inter- 
ests would not be harmed by annexation to France. Though the Emperor 
had assured the Savoyard deputies that a zone would be granted, the Swiss 
agents were busily sowing doubts in the minds of the peasants as to the value 
of Napoleon's word, which was not yet embodied in official documents. In 
answer to the conservatives' plea to send an agent to counteract this, Napoleon 
sent Senator Laity to explain the French intentions as to the zone. He ar- 

1 Grivas, op. cit., p. 582, gives the text. 

*Tresol, p. 258. Grivaz makes the same statement giving the article. No text of the 
original can be found. The Circular of the Intendent Regent of Faucigny, q. v. in Docu- 
ments, post, p. 591, does not mention France et zone as a possible form of vote, though it 
gives assurance that the zone is included in the vote for France. This was unnecessary as 
the promise of the zone had been made previously to the vote. 

» Trisal, p. 251. 

* Ibid., p. 260. 


rived on April 4 and with his suite travelled through Savoy until April 28, 
giving particular attention to Chablais and Faucigny. Everywhere he was 
received with the greatest enthusiasm. 1 He was accompanied by a group 
of engineers to inspect the needs of the country, of which the Savoyard depu- 
tation to Paris had spoken, and to draw up projects on a grand scale for 
tunnelling the mountain passes as they had desired. This mission, with the 
many inducements which it offered for union with France, 2 went far to 
counteract the Swiss propaganda, in spite of the Swiss money which was 
reported to be plentiful in the northern provinces. 

The vote took place on the 22nd and 23rd of April. Contrary to the 
assertion commonly made, it appears that though French troops had been 
stationed in both Nice and Savoy, and had been constantly passing through 
on their way from Italy, where they had been kept some time after peace had 
been signed, the authorities had taken care to remove them before the vot- 
ing. 3 The vote is said to have taken place with enthusiasm. The electors 
of the country districts marched in procession, the syndic at the head, carry- 
ing French flags blessed by the priests, the procession beating drums and 
crying, " Vive la France. Vive VEmpereur" 4 In the towns they marched 
by trades and fraternities. The women, too, made known as well as they 
could, their desire for the union. Tresal, commenting on the accounts in 
the journals of the day, says it is obvious that the vote was a tremendous 
ovation for France and that it was a religious as well as a patriotic vote. 
The Swiss party in the northern provinces made no sign. At Bonneville, a 
centre of Swiss agitation, the vote was without disturbance and particularly 

On April 29 the Court of Appeal of Chambery, whose duty it was to verify 
the votes of the whole of Savoy and to add them together, published the 
official result of the vote. 5 130,533 had voted for union with France and 
only 235 against. 71 ballots were void. 6 The soldier vote, counted sep- 
arately, resulted in 6,033 votes for France, 282 against the change in sover- 
eignty and 34 void. 7 The anti-annexation party claimed that all abstentions 
should be counted as negative. It appears, however, that each commune kept 

i Trisal, p. 264. 

2 For the arguments used by the French mission, see Cavour's speech before the Sardinian 
Chamber. Documents, post, pp. 440 et seq. 

8 Saint Genis and Tresal agree than the Piedmontese soldiers were no longer in the coun- 
try, and the Savoyard militia were alone charged with the keeping of order. 

* Trisal, p. 274. 

B Documents, Post, pp. 427-8. 

•The total population of Savoy in 1858 was 543,098. Of these 265,775 were males. 
Statistic a del Regno a" Italia. 

7 Trtsal, p. 276. According to Saint Genis, this soldier vote was reported later and should 
be added to the official result. 

SAVOY AND NICE, 1860 87 

a careful list of the reasons for abstention, whether through illness, absence, 
or unwillingness to vote. 1 

There is no case of a plebiscite more energetically attacked by writers than 
these votes of Savoy and Nice. The main indictment advanced against the 
votes of Savoy and Nice is the same, namely, that the vote was a mere form, 
the cession having been already determined on and the treaty signed. Grivaz, 
one of those attacking it at length, says that to say the cession depended on 
the vote is ridiculous for the treaty was signed on March 24 and all the 
journals spoke of the cession as inevitable. Pradier-Fodere asks whether 
the two monarchs would have torn up the treaty had the vote been negative, 
and answers No. Stoerk says it is evident that the cession was not condi- 
tional on the plebiscite from the reasons given by the Emperor for the ces- 
sion, namely, that it was because of the necessity of safeguarding the frontiers 
and of maintaining equilibrium. 2 Grivaz insists that there must have been 
a party against annexation for the country was noted for its loyalty and 
there was at least a respectable minority in March. How could they have 
disappeared by April, unless it was because they felt the hopelessness of any 
opposition, and that the choice was between a France which wanted them, and 
a Piedmont which wanted them no longer? Grivaz asserts that Cavour did 
what he could politically to bring it about by both appointments and influence. 
Rouard de Card, Bourgeois, Tresal, Saint Genis and Heimweh all defend the 
vote of Savoy, the latter saying, however, that it is to no purpose to under- 
take a proof " which will not change the opinion of the gallophobes of the 
Triple Alliance." 

The arguments of the opposition are no doubt true in part. Certainly the 
officials had done all in their power to give an appearance of the inevitable 
to the cession. As for the treaty, it was especially provided that it should 
not be valid until ratified by parliament, and it was not ratified until after the 
vote. Napoleon, Victor Emanuel and Cavour all gave repeated assurances 
that they would abide by the plebiscite. What their course would actually 
have been had the vote been adverse is a matter for speculation, not decision. 

1 Saint Genis. p. 364, and Trisal, p. 276, put the voluntary abstentions at 647. Saint Genis 
gives the following analysis: 

4610 abstentions 
2709 absent 
1254 infirm or ill 


647 voluntary, 

out of which 157 were from one commune, half of which was in Switzerland. 

* Grivaz, Revue ginirale de droit international public, vol. 3, p. 445 ; Pradier-Fodiri, vol 
3. § 857 ; Felix Stoerk. p. 130. cited by Grivaz. 


It is possible that Cavour would have seized the opportunity to abandon the 
treaty. Certainly Napoleon, the champion of popular sovereignty, to which 
title he owed his throne, would have been in a position sufficiently embarrass- 
ing. It is noteworthy that the specific charges of pressure and cor- 
ruption which were so freely advanced in the Italian Chamber against the 
vote of Nice were not urged against the vote of Savoy. There was no charge 
of manipulation of the ballots nor of any pressure other than moral. Sur- 
prisingly enough, there was scarcely any attack on the proclamations issued 
in Savoy as unneutral nor emphasis on the undoubted activity of the priests 
for union. In the final debates of May 24-27 in the Chamber the fact of 
the French nationality of Savoy was admitted by Rattazzi and the other 
critics of the government, and opposition to the cession was based on wholly 
different grounds, namely, those of historical claims and strategic value. The 
most spirited attacks on the conduct of the vote are to be found in Laurence 
Oliphant's articles from Savoy to the London Times which was, of course, 
in sympathy with the British Government's opposition to the cession. OH- 
phant had gone to Savoy to revive the waning resistance to the cession and 
to prevent a vote for the " blackguard Emperor/' His evidence of lack of 
freedom of the vote in Savoy is largely frivolous, as examination of the 
Times articles shows, 1 nor are his generalities and inferences worth serious 

It is apparent from the almost unanimous character of the vote for France 
that something more than the exhortation and argument of the Savoyard 
officials would be necessary to account for it. With a secret ballot, corrup- 
tion, manipulation and imminent danger of general calamity would be neces- 
sary to provoke such a result against the popular inclination. Certainly 
there is no need of explaining the vote of Savoy by corruption, pressure or 
manipulation. The truth appears to be that in Savoy the already existing 

1 See the London Times, April 28, 1860. The most convincing argument made by 
Oliphant is that the officials not only posted their own proclamations urging union, but would 
not allow anti-union posters to be posted. He also charges that French agents were carry- 
ing on propaganda — which was to be expected and was, if not accompanied by threats or 
bribery, a legitimate activity — and that the zeal of the authorities in satisfying their curi- 
osity regarding the presence at the polls, without registration tickets, of two strange English- 
men, himself and his companion, showed that the vote was not free — a conclusion which is an 
apparent nonsequitur. He makes no suggestion of military coercion nor of direct bribery. 
Oliphant's efforts to stir up an opposition were hopeless, as he himself admitted. " There is 
not the slightest chance of a row," he wrote home, " the people are like sheep." It is evident 
that, apart from his opposition to Napoleon, he was not sorry to have a chance to ridicule the 
workings of universal suffrage. Oliphant had gone for adventure and "copy," as well 
as for a political purpose, and was determined to find it. " It is great fun to have another 
object than churches and picture-galleries," he wrote home. It is interesting to find that 
Garibaldi's interpellation of April 12 and the plan for breaking the ballot-boxes and forcing 
another election in Nice were attributed to him. Margaret O. W. Oliphant, Memoir of the 
Life of Laurence Oliphant and of Alice Oliphant, his Wife, vol. 1, p. 249 et seq. 


French party had been greatly strengthened by the events which occurred 
immediately before the plebiscite. Already smarting under consciousness of 
a different origin, resenting administration from Turin, the sudden accretion 
of millions of Italians which had come to Piedmont through the votes of 
Tuscany and Emilia made the Savoyards, never enthusiastic over the Italian 
war, fearful of being completely submerged in the new kingdom. The French 
promise of a zone and of capital to carry out the material developments which 
Savoy so sorely needed, and which have served to double her wealth, furnished 
the economic argument. To the strong Savoyard national pride, the fear of 
dismemberment of the northern provinces was sufficient of a patriotic argu- 
ment. Fear of Cavour's anti-clerical policy united the nobles, lawyers and 
priests, who, in that somewhat patriarchal society had great influence over 
the peasants. It is significant that although, ten years later, opportunity to 
escape from French allegiance presented itself with the Franco-Prussian war, 
there appears to have been no movement of such a nature. 

Sicily and Naples, 1860 

The republicans, the ground cut from under them in Northern and Central 
Italy by the votes of Tuscany and Emilia, had turned to the provinces of the 
Marches and Umbria which were still under papal rule, and to the kingdom 
of the two Sicilies, where the Bourbons still refused a constitution. In con- 
junction with local leaders Mazzini's agents, Rosalino Pilo and Francisco 
Crispi, had planned a revolution in Sicily which, early in April, had become 
an open revolt of such proportions as to induce Garibaldi to put himself 
at the head of the expedition in its aid. 

It is unnecessary to enter here on the tangled web of diplomacy which 
followed or on the picturesque adventure of Garibaldi's Thousand. On 
May 14, having landed at Marsala, Garibaldi, from Salemi, proclaimed him- 
self Dictator " on the invitation of noted citizens, and the deliberations of 
the free communes of the Island." 1 By the end of July the whole island, 
with the exception of Messina, was in his hands. 

There were four parties in Sicily, autonomists, republicans, Sardinians and 
Bourbon sympathizers. Desire for autonomy, which was largely desire for 
freedom from Neapolitan domination, was a political tradition. Illiteracy 
was high and, except for the brief period in 1848, Sicilians had had no expe- 
rience in self-government. 1 The strength of the new party for union with 
Sardinia was uncertain, though it was evident that it was fast increasing with 
the successes in northern Italy. The plan of the republicans was to delay 
the decision of the question of the political future of Sicily until Rome and 

1 Documents, post, p. 620. 


Naples were free. Though both Sardinians and republicans had supported 
the expedition, Garibaldi was a republican at heart, and the republicans looked 
on the expedition as their own. 

Cavour, through fear of a republic of southern Italy, as well as for diplo- 
matic reasons, was anxious for immediate annexation. For this purpose 
he wished a vote to be taken at once. Garibaldi opposed such action on the 
ground that it would interfere with the expedition to Naples. This division 
of counsel lasted through June, the republicans in their propaganda against 
union earnestly appealing to the ancient Sicilian love of autonomy. On June 
23 Garibaldi yielded so far as to publish an elaborate electoral law, establish- 
ing universal suffrage, excluding only religious orders, condemned criminals, 
and those under punishment for crime and misdemeanors, 1 and offering- 
alliance with Sardinia, a solution which appealed to France and Great Britain 
who both preferred the autonomy of Sicily to further union. 2 

Preparations for the Neapolitan expedition were now under way. On 
July 22, Garibaldi named Depretis, an agent of Cavour, as pro-dictator of 
Sicily, and as a final act caused the Sardinian constitution to be proclaimed on 
August 3. On August 20, Garibaldi landed on the mainland and began his 
triumphal march to Naples, which he entered on September 7. 

In Naples there had been far less desire for union with Sardinia than in 
Sicily 3 and the Bourbon placemen could be counted on to oppose it vigor- 
ously. The feeling for autonomy was strong and to this the republicans ad- 
dressed themselves. The diplomatic reasons for Cavour's desire for imme- 
diate annexation were increasing, while the republican policy of delay appeared 
to be gaining headway with Garibaldi's increasing successes. Efforts to fore- 
stall Garibaldi by a revolution in Naples were futile. The army and civilians 
were deserting the Bourbons in vast numbers, but the people were too ener- 
vated by Bourbon misrule to stir. Garibaldi's reception on entering Naples 
on September 7 was one of wild enthusiasm. Bourbons, republicans, na- 
tionalists, police, national guards and clericals, all joined in the demon- 
stration. The victories of the Piedmont troops over the papal forces and 
Garibaldi's triumphs over the Bourbons soon disposed of all resistance. 
Alarmed at the growth of republican prestige, Ricasoli and the other Sar- 
dinian leaders urged on Cavour immediate annexation by a declaration of 
parliament. Tempting as was this solution, Cavour refused to abandon his 
policy of basing the Sardinian title on a popular vote. 4 

1 Le assemblee del risorgimento, vol. 15, p. 1011, for text. 

2 England had, however, signified that she would abide by a popular vote in Naples as she 
had in Central Italy. Villamarina to Cavour, April 4, 1860, Chiala, vol. 4, p. cxxxv. 

8 Ibid., vol. 4, p. cxxxv, Villamarina to Cavour. 

4 It was proposed not only that parliament declare that all of Italy belonged to the king- 
dom but that parliament should surrender its power to the King who should be made a die- 


The situation was brought to a head by the increasing acuteness of the 
struggle in Sicily where Depretis, the pro-dictator, was working for a plebis- 
cite and Garibaldi opposing it. Depretis resigned and the struggle was 
taken by Cavour to Parliament where on October 2, after announcing the 
situation in Sicily and Naples and the revolt in Umbria and the Marches, 
he laid his policy of popular consultation before the Chamber and asked for a 
vote of confidence. 1 There could be no clearer statement of repudiation of 
title by conquest or devotion to the principle of self-determination than this 
made by Cavour. After protracted discussion the government's bill passed 
the Chamber by a vote of 296-6 and the Senate by a vote of 84-12, the oppo- 
sition being largely from the clericals, although this measure meant the anni- 
hilation of the revolution. 

On October 5th, Mordini, the new pro-dictator of Sicily, working with the 
autonomists, issued a decree convoking the electors not for a plebiscite but 
to choose delegates to a representative assembly, hoping by means of the 
delay consequent on this method to stave off annexation. The primary as- 
semblies were convoked for October 21. The attempt to interpose an assem- 
bly was repeated at Naples by Crispi, the leader of the republicans. Palla- 
vicino, the Neapolitan pro-dictator, was for a plebiscite, Garibaldi supported 
Crispi; Pallavicino resigned. The next morning the city was strewn with 
white slips marked " Yes " and memorials supporting Pallavicino were signed 
by citizens and National Guards. When Garibaldi saw the strength of the 
popular demand for a plebiscite he yielded. Almost simultaneously news 
was received of Cavour's victory in parliament. 

Pallavicino was restored to office and, on October 8, issued a decree call- 
ing the people of the continental provinces to meet in primary assemblies on 
October 21, the day already set for the elections in Sicily, in order to accept 
or reject the following " plebiscite " : " The people wish Italy, united and 
indivisible, with Victor Emanuel as Constitutional King, and his legitimate 
descendants." The qualifications for suffrage are the same as those of 
northern Italy, for here where the rate of illiteracy was far higher than in 
the north, it was even more essential to omit a literacy qualification if a real 
expression of the popular will was desired. The rate of illiteracy in Naples 
was, however, not so high as that in Sicily, where only one in ten could read 
and write. 

tator until all Italian questions were settled. To this Cavour answered that the sympathies of 
liberal Europe would be sacrificed as well as the legal liberty which he wished to be the 
inseparable companion of the independence of the nation. (Cavour to Salvagnoli, October 2, 
Chiala, vol. 4, p. 23.) "lama son of Liberty, and it is to her that I owe all that I am. If 
it be necessary to put a veil upon her statue, it will not be for me to do it," he wrote, and 
again, " The parliamentary road is longer, but it is more secure." (Cavour to the Countess 
Anastasia de Circourt, ibid., p. 25.) 
1 Documents, post, p. 623. 


Hoping to forestall a demand for a plebiscite in Sicily, Mordini, on October 
9, convoked the Sicilian Assembly for November 9, but Garibaldi, having 
yielded in Naples, abandoned the plan of the assembly in Sicily and caused 
a proclamation similar to the Neapolitan one to be issued there on October 
15. By this proclamation the assemblies already convoked for the 21st were 
to cast their votes, not for representatives as first planned, but directly on 
the question of union. 1 Then, unwilling that the royal title should be based 
wholly on a plebiscite and without formal recognition of his agency, Gari- 
baldi, on the same day, issued another decree announcing the union of the 
two Sicilies with the constitutional kingdom of Victor Emanuel. 2 

The votes were held in both Naples and Sicily on October 21. The result 
was overwhelmingly for Sardinia, although the conditions surrounding the 
vote of Naples and the continental provinces were attacked with bitterness 
by those opposed to the result, and to some extent with reason. The ques- 
tion of whether order or anarchy reigned in the city of Naples was a matter 
of controversy. Disorder and violence of party feeling were to be expected 
as a legacy from the Bourbon rule. Although the Sardinian troops did not 
enter Naples until October 29, and Victor Emanuel had, from Ancona prom- 
ised to defend the right of the people to legally and freely manifest their will, 
it was inevitable that the authenticity of the vote, taken as it was under Sar- 
dinian auspices, should be contested. In at least some of the country parts 
there appears to have been disorder. On October 27 Elliot reported a move- 
ment in favor of the Bourbons, about Isernia. It was supported chiefly 
by the peasants. Such attempts to restore the Bourbons were being ignored 
by the press and concealed by the authorities. 8 The republicans had been 
dealt a severe blow by Pallavicino who had suppressed the political clubs. 
Money and ships had been sent by Sardinia. It is asserted that the authori- 
ties clapped the reactionaries in prison, thus depriving the plebiscite of value. 
Intrigue was everywhere. The criminal classes were quick to make the most 
of the opportunity offered them by an interregnum and it was doubtless the 
desire to restore order and prosperity which won the support of the several 
parties to the cause of annexation. 4 

That there were suggestion and intimidation there is no doubt, and the 
method of voting whereby the elector must choose his ballot from one of the 

1 Documents, post, p. 635. 

* Ibid., post, p. 637. 

* Parliamentary Papers, Affairs of Italy, 1861, vol. 67 [2757], p. 134. 

♦Elliot, the British Minister at Naples, in a dispatch to Lord John Russell says that 
"many would wish autonomy if secure from the return of the Bourbons, but are obliged to 
vote in either the affirmative or the negative, and, to escape continued disorganization, many 
who are separatists at heart will give the affirmative vote." Parliamentary Papers [2757], 
p. 115. 


baskets under the public inspection doubtless aided in bringing pressure, 1 yet 
no coercion could account for the almost unanimous result. 2 The figures, as 
announced by the Supreme Court on November 3, were 1,302,064 votes for 
union and 10,312 against, which, according to figures forwarded to the British 
Foreign Office represented a vote of 19 per cent, of the population, a figure 
only slightly less than those of Tuscany and Emilia. 3 

The vote of the mainland provinces was presented by Pallavicino to Victor 
Emanuel, on his entrance into the city. He acknowledged it by a procla- 
mation to the Neapolitan and Sicilian peoples which read, " Universal suffrage 
has given me the sovereign power over these noble provinces, 4 and in the royal 
decree of annexation of December 17 the plebiscite was again referred to as the 
basis of title. 

The result of the plebiscite in Sicily was equally decisive, there having been 
432,053 yeas and 667 nays. 5 The result gave rise to far less discussion than 
did that of Naples, for Sicily had been much more evidently disposed to 
union, as Sardinian observers had agreed in April. 6 Here, too, desire for a 
stable order had won over the opponents. 

1 Elliott to Russell : " In fact, both the terms of the vote and the manner in which it is 
to be taken are well calculated to secure the largest possible majority for the annexation, but 
not so well fitted to ascertain the real wishes of the country." He admitted, however, that the 
annexionists were by far the strongest in numbers. Parliamentary Papers [2757], p. 115. 

2 Fusinato, p. 133, quotes Stoerk, p. 127, to the effect that 3,000 Neapolitan women pre- 
sented themselves at the polls to vote for union. There is no evidence that their vote was 

3 u According to an analysis published here of the votes upon different occasions in which 
appeal has been made to universal suffrage, the votes given have been in the following pro- 
portion to the population of the countries : — 

In France in 1848 2128 per cent 

u 1851 53.19 " " 

" 1852 23.25 " " 

Tuscany 21.17 " " 

Emilia ■. ;... 20.09 " " 

Naples 19.17 " " 

Though the numbers who have here taken part in the vote may be considered rather small, 
the proportion of affirmative to negative votes amounted to no less than 99.21 per cent., 
which is greater than in any preceding instance, except in the Emilia, where they amounted 
to 99.64 per cent, of the votes recorded. Elliott to Lord J. Russell, Naples, November 10, 
Parliamentary Papers [2757], p. 161. 

The population of the Neapolitan Provinces in 1861 was 6,787,289. Statistica del Regno 
d' Italia. 

* Documents, post, p. 649. 

8 The formal minute of the vote of Sicily recites that many votes were declared void, 
through improper phraseology, and that the votes of Ustica and Mandanici were thrown out 
because there the populace had voted "without regard to age or sex." Documents, post, 
p. 644. The population of Sicily in 1861 was 2,392,414. Statistica del Regno d' It alia. 

6 Chiala, vol. 4, p. cxxxv. 


The union, however, did not bring order at once either in Sicily or in 
Naples. After the union the autonomists, the reactionaries, and the republi- 
cans, the priests and the remnants of the Bourbon party in Sicily kept up a 
conflicting propaganda. Rivalry for political plums led to rivalry between 
the Mazzinians and the Garibaldians. 1 Brigandage flourished. Unification 
was difficult and the government had made itself unpopular. The climax was 
reached with the revolt of 1866 and the attack on Palermo. Since then there 
has been practically no separatist movement of any consequence. 

Umbria and the Marches, 1860 

The unrest in the southern part of the peninsula had spread into the 
Marches and Umbria. The papal troops were about to suppress it Cavour, 
alarmed at the republican direction of affairs in southern Italy, had adopted 
the policy of the military participation of Piedmont in the liberation of these 
States, forestalled the papal troops by sending a Piedmontese force to occupy 
the provinces and at the same time interpose a barrier between the " Red- 
shirts " and Rome. On September 1 1 the Piedmontese army crossed the fron- 
tier, on the 18th the papal forces were crushed at Castelfidardo and, with the 
fall of Ancona, on the 29th, the two provinces were in the hands of Victor 

Over each province the King had, on September 12, appointed a commis- 
sioner-general. 2 On October 21 each commissioner proclaimed a plebiscite 
for November 4 and 5 in his province, on the question of union with the 
constitutional monarchy of Victor Emanuel. 8 The provisions for the regis- 
tration and vote are almost identical in the two decrees. Manhood suffrage 
was established as in the other provinces, with the usual qualifications of six 
months' domicile and no judical inabilities. The commissioners made no 
pretense of neutrality, but in supplementary decrees urged the union with 
eloquence. But the union needed no urging, and although there were armed 
Sardinian forces throughout the provinces there is little doubt but that the 
vote was a sincere one. The result as proclaimed with great formality by 
the chief court of each province was, in the Marches 133,783 for, and 1,212 

1 Thayer, vol. 2, p. 434. The British minister at Naples wrote to Lord John Russell on 
November 16 that the measures incident to annexation were difficult to carry out owing not 
only to the great corruption of the country, but also to the fact that although the several 
parties had compromised on union with Sardinia in order to get rid of the Bourbons, there 
was no general desire for the success of the annexation and the paths were already diverging. 
He speaks of the humiliation of the autonomists at the provincial status of die country as a 
matter of some moment. Parliamentary Papers [2757], p. 177. 

2 Documents, post, pp. 655 and 656. 
s Documents, post, pp. 657 and 665. 


against annexation, and in Umbria, 97,040 for, and 380 against. 1 The votes 
were formally presented to the King in the same manner as those of Naples 
and Sicily and the provinces were incorporated in the kingdom with the same 

Cardinal Antonelli sought by energetic protests to awaken the Catholic 
countries in the interests of the Holy Father. In a letter of November 4, 
he said it was not a question of the conditions surrounding the vote, but the 
vote itself. He condemned the politics of Sardinia in seeking to introduce 
a principle eminently revolutionary and destructive of legitimate sovereigns. 2 
But much as this argument appealed to Austria and Prussia, it was of no avail 
against the overwhelming testimony of the vote itself. The protest of Lord 
John Russell was of another order. On October 27 he had won the adoration 
of the Italian patriots by defending, against the protests of Austria, France, 
Prussia and Russia, the action of Sardinia in support of the Sicilian and 
Umbrian expeditions, taking the ground that the people of the Roman and 
Neapolitan States were the best judges of their own interests. 8 He required, 
however, that that judgment should be clear and free from pressure. In a let- 
ter to Hudson on January 21, he says that the votes of Naples, Sicily, Umbria 
and the Marches, cast by universal suffrage, had no great value in the eyes 
of the British government, as they were nothing but a formality following 
upon acts of popular insurrection, or of successful invasion, and did not 
imply in themselves any independent exercise of the will of the nation in 
whose name they were given. He, however, waived further objections, should 
representatives of the several different Italian states convoked for February 18 
by a deliberate act constitute those States into one State. " When the 
formation of the State shall be announced to Her Majesty," he wrote, " it 
is to be hoped that the Government of the King will be prepared to show 
that the new monarchy has been erected in pursuance of the deliberate votes 
of the people in Italy and that it has all the attributes of a government pre- 
pared to maintain order within and relations of peace and friendship with- 
out." 4 

On February 18 the first Italian Parliament met in Turin, and, on February 
26 gave the sanction desired by Lord John Russell. Victor Emanuel was 
voted King of Italy by a vote of 129 to 2 in the Senate and 292 to 1 in the 

1 Documents, post, pp. 667 and 670. The population of the Marches in 1861 numbered 
883,073. That of Umbria was 513,019. Statistica del Regno d'ltalia. 

2 Archives diplomatique*, 1861, part 1, p. 93. 
• Parliamentary Papers [2757], p. 125. 

4 Ibid., Affairs of Italy, 1861, vol. 67 [2804], p. 1. Cavour in a letter to Azeglio at London 
from Turin, March 16, chose to construe this as a question of the principle of universal suf- 
frage and not of the conditions surrounding the vote. Ibid., p. 3. 


Chamber. The royal title was declared on March 17 to be " Victor Emanuel, 
King of Italy, by the Grace of God and the will of the nation." * 

The new kingdom was recognized by Great Britain within a fortnight and 
by France some three months later. The other Powers, though protesting 
the lack of validity of a sovereignty based on universal suffrage, could do no 
less than follow. 2 

Venetia, 1866 

Cavour died on June 6, 1861. By his statesmanship all of Italy had been 
united save Rome and Venetia: in the further movement towards Italian 
unity the policy he had made his own was undeviatingly followed. 

The foreign aid necessary to gain Venetia came in 1866, when Bismarck, 
in order to obtain Italy's support against Austria in the Schleswig-Holstein 
matter, promised Venetia ito the Italians. 3 On July 5, after the defeat of 
Koniggratz, Austria, accepting Napoleon's mediation, ceded Venetia to him 
with the understanding that it should be handed by him to Italy. Napoleon 
then induced Prussia, without consulting Italy, to sign a separate armistice 
with Austria. Italy was thus forced to sign one also, a bitter disappoint- 
ment, for it meant that Garibaldi must evacuate the Trentino. 

The treaty by which Austria ceded Venetia to France was signed on Au- 
gust 24. 4 It is said that Napoleon endeavored to insert a clause providing 
for a plebiscite to carry out the tacit understanding as to the making over of 
the kingdom to France, but that the Austrian Emperor again refused, as he 
had done in the case of Lombardy. Ricasoli, now Prime Minister of Italy, 
was bitterly opposed to accepting Venetia as a gift from France. Rather 
than suffer such a humiliation he preferred to continue the war. He was 
induced, however, to sign the armistice on the basis of uti possidetis, but in- 
sisted that France agree to the stipulation that Venetia should come to Italy 
without dishonorable conditions and after a plebiscite. This would enable 
Italy to base her claim on the will of the people, and not on the generosity of 
France. Napoleon, accordingly, promised to cede Venetia to Italy under 
the reservation of the " consent of the people duly consulted," a reservation 

1 Archives diplomatique s, 1861, part 2, p. 100. Le assemblee del risorgimento, vol. 1, pp. 

2 On the assumption by Victor Emanuel of the title of "King of Italy" in 1861, protests, 
reserving their rights, were issued by the Duke of Modena on March 30 from Vienna, by the 
Duchess Regent of Parma on April 10 from Switzerland, and by Francis II of the Two 
Sicilies on May 6 from Rome. Archives diplomatiques, 1861, part 1. 

8 The Trentino was refused as being comprised in the territory of the Germanic Confed- 
eration. It is said, however, that Bismarck made answer that what could be stipulated 
before war might become possible during or after it, and urgently suggested that the people 
should demand a plebiscite. Le assemblee del risorgimento, vol. 2, p. l f quoting from Genova 
di Revel, La Cessione del Veneto, p. 5. Revel was the Italian commissioner in Venetia. 

* Documents, post, p. 679. 

VENETIA, 1866 97 

which the Austrian Emperor, inconsistently enough, allowed to be mentioned 
in the preamble of the treaty of peace signed between Austria and Italy on 
October 3. 1 

On October 19, General Leboeuf, representing Napoleon, formally deliv- 
ered Venetia over to a commission representing the province. The delivery 
occurred at eight o'clock in the morning and under conditions which point 
to a desire on the part of the Emperor to prevent any public demonstration. 
Leboeuf, after a statement of the devotion of Napoleon to the right of self- 
determination, declared that Venetia was now mistress of her own destinies, 
in order that the people should freely express their wishes on the subject of 
the annexation of Venetia to the Kingdom of Italy. 

According to understanding the vote was to be taken under the direction 
of the Venetian municipal bodies without direction from the Italian govern- 
ment. On the same day of the delivery, however, a royal decree was promul- 
gated convoking the electoral assemblies and providing minute regulations 
for the conduct of the vote. 2 This appeared to be a denial of the agreement 
with France whereby the municipalities were to draw up their own regula- 
tions and accordingly called forth a protest from Leboeuf. The French 
were, however, satisfied by the explanation that the decree was unofficial 
in character and was meant rather to serve as a model which the municipalities 
might follow, than as a form imposed. The decree was, of course, followed 
minutely. There was no further interference by the Italian government 
The administration of the vote was in the hands of the municipal officials who 
were those elected in the previous May, while Venetia was still in Austrian 
hands. 8 The provisions of the decree are similar to those of the previous 

The plebiscite was held on October 21 and 22 without event. There was 
no doubt of the result. Out of the 647,315 voting, 69 voted " no " and 371 
votes were void. The result was such a foregone conclusion that the fact 
that the province had been erected into a military department a few days 
before the vote had no significance as affecting it. 

The result was published by the Court of Appeal sitting in special session 
in the Doges Palace, 4 and, on November 4, the votes were formally presented 
to the King at Turin by delegates from the municipalities. He received the 
delegates in state, accepted the votes, and by royal decree, " in view of the 
result of the vote of the citizens," incorporated the provinces of Venetia and 
Mantua in the Kingdom of Italy. 5 

1 Documents, post, p. 681. 

2 Documents, post, p. 686. 

8 Le Assemblee del risorgimento, vol. 2, p. li. 
♦Documents, post, p. 694. 
6 Documents, post, p. 701. 


Rome, 1870 

Another four years went by before Rome could be added to the Italian 
union. Guarded by French troops and protected by an agreement between 
Napoleon and Italy, the Temporal Power was secure for the time being. 
The opportunity came, however, with the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. 

The French troops were withdrawn in July. On September 11 General 
Cadorna in command of the Italian forces entered the papal territory with 
sixty thousand men and advanced without opposition to the walls of Rome. 
Here there was a show of resistance, the Pope wishing to appear to yield only 
to force. A breach having been made in the walls, he ordered the resistance 
to cease, and on September 20, Cadorna, followed by thousands of Roman 
exiles, marched into the city. 

Cadorna, on the day after his entrance, had issued a proclamation prom- 
ising that the question of future sovereignty should be decided by a free 
vote of the inhabitants of Rome and its provinces. The Italians, wishing to 
give every appearance of freedom, had ordered that in each province and 
commune giuntas should be erected, which should have charge of the admini- 
stration of the plebiscite. These giuntas were to be convoked by the military 
commanders placed over the provinces. The military officials were to merely 
lend their influence toward the establishment and prestige of the giuntas and 
to aid in giving them a common form. 1 There were in Rome three parties: 
those loyal to the papal government ; the republicans who were still mindful 
of their success under Mazzini and Garibaldi in 1848; and the party for 
union with the Kingdom of Italy. Immediately on Cadorna's entrance the 
republicans at once became active. On the next day a great assembly called 
by the republican leaders met in the Coliseum and elected a giunta of forty- 
two persons, which was superseded, however, by another and smaller one, 
appointed on the same day by Cadorna. Practically all of the eighteen names 
on Cadorna's giunta had been included in the forty-two selected by the republi- 
cans but the republican leaders had been omitted. 2 In spite of its origin this 
second giunta did not exhibit the quiescent obedience which was, perhaps, 
expected, but protested against both the administrative officials and the word- 
ing of the vote for the plebiscite which was sent from Florence. 3 The formula 
which had contained a guarantee of the independence of the Pope having been 
changed to that used in the other plebiscites, the vote, by a decree of September 
29, was fixed for October 2. 

1 RafFaele Cadorna, La liberasionc di Roma, p. 232. 

2 Documents, post, pp. 705 and 706. 

8 Dispatches of Mr. Jervoise to Earl Granville, Documents, p. 535. Florence was at that 
time the capital of Italy. 

ROME, 1870 99 

The vote was to be by universal suffrage. The list of accredited voters 
was to be furnished by the priests and by the presidencies of Rome. The 
further provisions of the decree are similar to those of the other plebiscites. 
It appears that the ballots were to be distributed before the voting, possibly 
to obviate the criticism brought against the vote of Naples and Sicily. 

The final registration was put in the hands of a special committee of 
twelve which was to appoint sub-committees to preside at the registration 
booths and there verify the claims of the registrants and furnish them with 
certificates as electors. Rome was divided into sections for both registration 
and vote. In the provinces the vote was taken in each communal headquar- 

There are two stories with reference to the vote of Rome. The Italian 
version is that the vote was a spontaneous expression of national enthusiasm. 
The Gaszetta ufficiale of Florence for October 3rd gives dispatches contain- 
ing accounts of the vote in the different towns. The lame and sick, it re- 
ported, were being carried to the voting places in Viterbo and Rome. The 
tradesmen and craftsmen were marching with bands and flags to the polls. 
In Labrica the polls opened at 9 o'clock. By 10 o'clock more than one-half 
of the population had voted. In Terracina the National Guard and all the 
city officials marched in a body in which the clergy were represented. The 
order was perfect, the enthusiasm indescribable. 1 Cadorna, writing from 
Rome on the day of the voting gives a description of the scene there. " It 
is the day of the plebiscite," he wrote. " It is an admirable spectacle. The 
people, marching in bodies, have passed under the balcony with flags flying, 
acclaiming the King of Italy the liberator of Rome, on their way to the 
Campidoglio to deposit their votes in the urn. I have exerted not the least 
pressure. It will be a solemn plebiscite." 2 

The papal story is, however, far different. According to this version the 
support of the Italian cause was due to Italian money which was plentiful, 
and to the presence of the troops, which the papal authorities accused of loot- 
ing and violence. Appearance of wide support was given by the numbers 
of returned emigres and men from all parts, who had poured into Rome with 
Cadorna. The Pope had issued an order prohibiting all Roman Catholics 
from taking part in the election on the ground that participation would seem 
to authorize the invaders to question the sovereign right of the Papacy. 8 To 

1 Gaszetta ufficiale del Regno d' Italia. 

2 Letter of Cadorna. Le assemble e del risorgimento, vol. 6, p. lxxxii. 

•Count de Beauffort Histoire de Vinvasion des £tats pontiUcaux. Rev. James Mac- 
Caffrey — History of the Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century, vol. 1, 2d ed., p. 432. 
A Guggenbcrger — A General History of the Christian Era, p 340. Donat Sampson — The 
Last Ten Years of the Temporal Power — American Catholic Quarterly Review, vol. xxiv, 
p. 170. As most of the Papal historians make this statement, it is doubtless accurate. 


balance the Catholic abstentions all absent Romans were summoned to return 
and the Italian authorities had forced the railways to give free transportation 
to any man presenting a certificate from a prefect attesting his status as a 
native of Rome. Countless Italians, born in all parts of the peninsula seized 
this opportunity for an excursion to the Eternal City, and only too easily se- 
cured registration cards with which they swelled the affirmative vote. 1 Con- 
trary to the decree, those who had been under judicial sentence for crime were 
also registered, 2 they assert, while those known to be against the union were 
omitted. 8 Even camp-followers were allowed to vote and whole companies 
of Italian soldiers, 4 as well as boys under age. 5 As electoral certificates 
bore no designations as to district, and need not be surrendered on casting a 
vote, with one such certificate a man might vote in as many districts as he 
pleased, and many strangers availed themselves of the opportunity. 6 To calm 
the fears of the timorous that a vote for union would cause the Powers, and 
especially Prussia, to look with disfavor on Italy, copies of a spurious letter- 
purporting to be from the King of Prussia to the Pope in which the King re- 
fused to aid in a protest against " his brother the King of Italy," were sold 
by thousands on the day of the election. Further propaganda of a nature most 
unfair to the papacy was carried on by means of posters which ridiculed the 
papal rule and misrepresented its policy. 7 Bribery and falsification of the 
returns is also charged. Had the plebiscite been honestly taken, however, 
the church would still have held it invalid on the ground that the people had 
no right to transfer their civil allegiance from the Pope. 8 

It had been intended not to attempt to take a vote in the Leonine City but 
to leave it to the Pope. At the earnest desire of some of the inhabitants, 
however, Cadorna assumed the responsibility of placing in a neighboring 
district an electoral urn for the votes of the city. 

The returns from the communes and the city of Rome were received by 
the giunta, verified, and proclaimed from the Capitoline stairs. In the whole 

They give no citations, however, and no trace of the document can be found in any of the 
usual collections. By the decree Non Expedit, of February 29, 1868, Pius had already for- 
bidden Catholics to participate in parliamentary elections under the Italian government. 

1 Der Italienische Raubsug, p. 207. De Beauffort, p. 392. Guggenberger, p. 340. Donat 
Sampson, op. cit, p. 170 

2 Der Italienische Raubsug, p. 206. 
8 De Beauffort, p. 392. 

4 Rev. Richard Brennan. Life of Pope Pius IX. 

5 Guggenberger, p. 340. 
• De Beauffort, p. 392. 

7 Letter of Cardinal Antonelli to the papal nuncios, November 8, 1870, Acta Sanctai 
Sedls, 1870-71, vol. 6, p. 216. Cf. also ibid., Appendix V, p. 251. 

8 The whole Papal side of the Roman Question was set forth in the Encyclical Letter of 
November 1, 1870, entitled Respicientes ea omnia. Acta Sane toe Sedis, vol. 6, pp. 136-145. 

The papal condemnation of transfer of allegiance had been repeatedly stated. Cf . espe- 


territory, it was announced, there had been 135,291 votes cast in favor of 
union and 1,507 against. 1 In Rome itself 68,466 had voted. Several of the 
commentators assert that it was a physical impossibility for so many votes 
to be cast in the time and with the facilities offered. 2 Owing to the papal 
interdiction, not a single negative vote had been cast in the Leonine City. 

The presentation to Victor Emanuel of this last and crowning act of union 
was made with great ceremony on October 9. The King, surrounded by 
the royal suite, the Ministry, both houses of parliament, and the high mili- 
tary officials received the delegates from the Roman giunta, and 'those from 
each of the provinces. The King accepted the votes, declaring that they 
completed Italian unity and reconsecrated the foundations of the national 
pact, 8 and a royal decree, confirmed later by parliament, incorporated Rome in 
the kingdom " in view of the result of the plebiscite by which the citizens of 
the Roman Provinces have declared for union with the Constitutional King- 
dom of Victor Emanuel II and his successors." 

Moldavia and Wallachia, 1857 

The year 1856 marks not only the end of the Crimean War but also an 
innovation in international diplomacy. For the first time in history an inter- 
national congress of great Powers, which had met to settle the future of a 
small, weak, and disunited people, postponed their action until they should 
have ascertained the desire of the people themselves, and, as a further inno- 
vation, they provided that this desire should be expressed by a vote taken 
under the supervision of an international commission. 

The two Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which now 
form the State of Rumania, although of the same racial texture, had from the 
beginning maintained a separate existence from each other, and had developed 
a separate history. In the Middle Ages the struggle for self-preservation 

cially the Encyclical of December 8, 1864. As for universal suffrage, Pius IX, in 1873, char- 
acterized it as " une plaie horrible qui afflige la societe humaine . . . une plaie destructive de 
l'ordre social et qui meriterait a juste titre d'etre appelee le mensonge universel" Cf. " Le 
suffrage universel juge par Pie IX," in the Revue catholique des institutions et du droit, 
1874, vol. 3, p. 66. The quotation is from a speech of Pius to the French pilgrims on May 5, 

1 Documents, post, p. 715. The population of the Roman provinces in 1871 was 836,704, 
of which number 267,467 were males over 21. It is stated by a Jesuit writer that four 
months later a formal petition was signed by 27,161 Romans, born or legally domiciled, male, 
of voting age, and enjoying civil rights, stating that they remained faithful to the over- 
turned government. Charles van Duerm, Vicissitudes politiques du pouvoir temporel des 
popes de 1790 a nos jours, p. 422. He cites La lettre du pope et I'ltalie oMcielle, 64. 

2 Cf. article by John Francis Maguire, Dublin Review, January, 1871, vol. 16 (new series), 
p. 32. 

8 Documents, post, p. 720, note. 


against the attacks of Turks, Hungarians, Poles, and Tartars had proved too 
great for the tiny Principalities. At last, in the 15th and 16th centuries, 
each, although Christian, had sought peace through the protection of Turkish 
suzerainty. In the Capitulations then entered on each had retained its auton- 
omy, which included the right to make treaties with foreign Powers. The 
constant turmoil and intrigue consequent on the political jealousy of the con- 
tending claimants to the thrones of the Principalities soon furnished Turkey 
with an excuse for substituting princes of her own choice as governors, and 
the autonomy of the Principalities gradually became a name only. 

The growth of Turkish power in the Principalities had awakened the alarm 
of Russia, intent as she was on the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and 
the control of the Bosphorus. To counteract the growth in Turkish influence, 
she had put redoubled vigor into pushing her claim to the championship of all 
the Christians of the East, and with such success that the Russian protectorate 
over the Principalities had been formally recognized by the Porte in a series 
of conventions ending with the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. Turkish 
suzerainty, however, was still recognized by the payment of annual tribute 
and the right of investiture of the hospodars. 

The unity of the Rumanian race had been a favorite doctrine of the Mol- 
davian historians of the 18th century, but the movement had assumed no 
practical importance until the beginning of the 19th century, when the na- 
tionalist idea spread to the two Principalities from the Rumanians of Transyl- 
vania, who were held under Magyar and Hapsburg domination. Perpetua- 
tion of the separate existence of the Principalities had favored Turkish 
encroachment and had therefore been a cardinal tenet of the Turkish rule. 
Russia, willing to strengthen them against Turkey as well as hopeful of their 
eventually accepting a Russian prince, had shown sympathy with the unionist 
idea, and under the Russian protectorate the two Principalities had been given 
a joint administration. By the Treaty of Adrianople, it had been agreed that 
the internal constitution of the Principalities should be regulated by an or- 
ganic act, to be drawn up according to the wishes of divans of the notables of 
each territory. In the final act, drawn up under the tutelage of Russia, con- 
firmed by the Turkish and Russian governments and promulgated in 1834, 
were placed two articles expressing a desire for ultimate union. 1 This Or- 

1 Organic Act, Section 5, Auticle 425. — L'origine, la religion, les usages et la con- 
formite de langue des habitants dans les 2 Principautes, ainsi que le besoin mutuel, 
contiennent, des le principe, les elements d'une union intime qui a ete entravee et retardee 
par des circonstances fortuites et secondares. Les avantages et les consequences salu- 
taires resultant de la reunion de ces 2 peuples ne sauraient etre revoques en doute. Les 
elements de la fusion du peuple Moldo-Valaque sont deja poses dans ce reglement par 
Tuniformite des bases administratives des 2 pays. British and Foreign State Papers, 
vol. 32, 1843-1844, p. 786. 


ganic Act, although a conservative document perpetuating the feudal structure 
of society, nevertheless paved the way for union by establishing the same laws 
for the two Principalities and a further step was taken, when in the forties the 
tariff duties between the two were suppressed. The revolutionary movement 
of 1848, although its primary object in Moldavia and Wallachia was the over- 
throw of Russian influence rather than union, 1 nevertheless gave the unionist 
cause a great impetus through the resulting banishment of the political leaders 
who, in their exile in western Europe and particularly in Paris, came in touch 
with the new spirit of nationality aflame among the liberals and, in their turn, 
by painting the sufferings of the Rumanian people, supplied to the generous 
spirit of those liberals an object for their sympathy. The most influential of 
these disciples of the Rumanian patriots was Napoleon III, whose devotion 
to the principle of nationality was at once enlisted in the interest of this eastern 
outpost of the Latin race. 

Such was the situation in the Principalities when, in 1853, war broke out 
between Russia and Turkey. In the next year Great Britain and France made 
common cause with the Ottoman government and undertook the Crimean 
expedition. From the beginning the paramount aim of the allies was the 
abolition of the protectorate exercised by Russia over the three Principalities 
of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Serbia, and the substitution of the collective 
guarantee by all the Powers of the privileges of the Principalities, as well as 
the freedom of navigation of the Danube, the limitation of the Russian fleet 
on the Black Sea, and the cessation of the Russian pretensions over the other 
Christian subjects of the Porte. 

To these terms, embodied by Great Britain, France, and Austria in the 
notes of Vienna of August 8, 1854, the Russian government acceded, but with 
an interpretation so far from the intention of the allies as to necessitate a 
conference. In preparation for the conference, and in order to obviate any 
further misconceptions, the three Powers, on December 28, sent to Gortchakov, 
the Russian Minister at Vienna, a memorandum explaining and amplifying the 
meaning of the original note, and discussing separately the four points at 
issue. Regarding the Principalities, the memorandum stipulated that the 
Russian protectorate must cease and that the details of their future organiza- 
tion which was to be guaranteed by the Powers, should be arranged later and 
in such a manner as to give " full and entire satisfaction to the rights of the 
suzerain Power, to those of the Principalities, and to the general interests of 
Europe. 2 

It was obvious that the first question of organization to be settled was that 

1 A clause of the draft constitution of 1848 of Moldavia, however, expressed such a 

2 Documents, post, p. 727. 


of union. France made every effort to induce the conference to endorse it. 
Not only was Napoleon III devoted to the principles of nationality and self- 
determination, but the embarrassment which such a union would hold for 
Austria, by stimulating racial aspirations in Transylvania and Bukowina, 
would also harmonize with French policy. The opposition, however, was a 
strong one. To Turkey, union portended the eventual independence of the 
Principalities from the suzerain Power. To Austria, it promised not only 
another rising in Transylvania, but also meant the failure of her ambition to 
gain economic control over the full extent of the Danube. The British Cabinet 
supported Turkey and Austria. At the opening session the first point of the 
preliminary memorandum was so developed, on the initiative of Austria, as 
to leave the details of organization to the Porte, an arrangement which would 
ensure the separation of the two countries. 1 For the same reason that Turkey, 
Austria, and England opposed the union, however, Russia strongly favored 
it and, as it was obvious that the hope of direct endorsement by the conference 
was futile, the Russian plenipotentiaries chose an indirect but equally sure 
method. At the second session, Gortchakov answered the Austrian proposal 
by a counter proposition to the effect that the wishes of the two Principalities 
should be directly consulted through representative divans, pointing out that 
this procedure was the more suitable as the Organic Act of 1834, which would 
necessarily be the subject of discussion, had been drawn up in similar fashion. 2 
At the same time de Titoff, the second Russian plenipotentiary, presented a 
more formal proposal to the same effect, providing that the Porte should " in 
the first instance " consult the wishes of the country before determining the 
final provisions. In spite of the significance of the Russian proposal the 
opposition accepted it, and de TitofFs draft, with the omission of the words 
" in the first instance," was adopted by the conference with little debate. 8 At 
the sixth session the French plenipotentiary made a final effort to obtain a 
direct endorsement of the union, but discussion was prevented by the opposi- 
tion of the British delegates. The negotiations were wrecked on the remain- 
ing point of the memorandum, namely, the guarantee of the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire and the limitation of the Russian Black Sea fleet. The con- 
ference closed in June, and discussion was not reopened until, deprived of the 
support of Austrian neutrality, owing to the addition of Sardinia to the allies 
in 1855, Russia was forced, by the fall of Sebastopol, to capitulate. 

1 Documents, post, p. 728. 

2 Documents, post, p. 730. 

8 It is asserted by some historians that France desired union as a check to Russian 
expansion and that Russia was really against union and supporting it only in order to 
induce her enemies to defeat it. The action of the Russian delegates at Vienna would 
seem to prove the opposite. For the draft of de Titoff and the final action of the confer- 
ence, see Documents, post, pp. 728, 730. 


The Congress of Paris met on February 25, 1856, for the purpose of regis- 
tering the details of the peace already agreed on in principle in the Preliminary 
Draft 1 signed by France, Austria, Great Britain, Russia and Turkey on 
February 1. Walewski, French Minister of Foreign Affairs and the first 
plenipotentiary for France, presided. 2 The only lively debates were those 
regarding the frontier of Moldavia and its union with Wallachia. On the lat- 
ter question the diplomatic alignment was identical with that of 1855, with the 
exception that England now favored union. The preliminary draft, like the 
memorandum adopted at Vienna in 1855, had provided that the internal or- 
ganization of the Principalities should be in conformity with the needs and 
wishes of the population. 3 France made every effort to induce the Congress 
to endorse the union outright. At once, on the opening of the debate, 
Walewski pointed out that any question of organization necessarily involved 
the question of union, so greatly desired by the inhabitants, and his argument 
was heartily concurred in by Clarendon, 4 and by Brunnow. 4 It is an inter- 
esting commentary on the prestige which the principle of popular consent had 
acquired by 1856 to find that both Austria and Turkey, in opposing the union, 
made similar appeal to the wish of the people of the Principalities, Turkey 
insisting that the inhabitants did not at all desire the union, Austria pointing 
out that the people had not been consulted and asserting that, if they were, 
they would desire separation. In the face of the continued opposition of 
Austria and Turkey direct action on the question of union was again aban- 

The arguments of Austria, however, had pointed the way to a solution and 
indirect action was again resorted to. In the treaty draft, drawn up by 
Bourqueney, the second French plenipotentiary, and a committee composed of 
Count Buol and Aali Pacha, it was provided that, in regard to organization, the 
wishes of the populations should be ascertained on all questions of principle 
not yet settled. For this purpose the committee recommended that divans 
ad hoc should be summoned, at Jassy and at Bucharest, in such a manner as 
to guarantee a true representation of the wishes of the country, and that a 
European commission, composed of delegates of the Powers together with a 
Turkish commissioner, should meet at Constantinople, should there revise the 

1 Documents, post, p. 730. 

2 The second French representative was Bourqueney. Great Britain was represented 
by the Earl of Clarendon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and by Lord Cowley, 
Austria by Count Buol-Schauenstein, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Baron Hiibner, 
Russia by Count Orloff and Baron Brunnow, Sardinia by Cavour and the Marquis di 
Villamarina and Turkey by Aali Pacha and Mehemmed Djemil Bey. The Prussian dele- 
gation was headed by the Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manteuffel. 

* Documents, post, p. 733. 

<*For the passages referred to see Extracts from the Protocols, Documents, post, 
pp. 732, et seq. 


Organic Act, taking into consideration the wishes expressed by these divans, 
and should communicate the final result to the European conference. 

The report of the committee was received with favor by the Congress, with 
the sole amendment that the commission should merely recommend to a future 
conference of the Powers such details of revision in the Organic Act as it 
should deem advisable, rather than that it should itself revise them. With 
this change in the character of the proposed commission, the plan was adopted 
by the Congress and incorporated in the Treaty of Paris, 1 to which instrument 
the signature of Prussia, as well as of the six original Powers, was affixed. 

The Principalities had been under occupation by Austrian troops since 
1854. An immediate vote, during the occupation, offered to Austria and 
Turkey unlimited opportunity to swing the elections to their side. This was 
defeated by France, however, who insisted on the principle that foreign occu- 
pation was an insurmountable obstacle to the free expression of the wish of 
the people and that, in consequence, the vote should not be taken until the 
withdrawal of the Austrian forces. After a determined struggle Buol and 
Aali Pacha surrendered the point and it was agreed that the policing of the 
Principalities during the election should be in the hands of native troops. 

The Bourqueney committee had also been entrusted with the drafting of a 
set of instructions to the European Commission which had been established. 
These instructions emphasized the consultative and absolutely non-partisan 
character of the commission. The commissioners were to make an intensive 
study of all questions concerning finance, the church, the military system ; in 
brief, of all questions of administration save only those which had been set- 
tled by the treaty, namely, the inviolability of Turkish suzerainty and the 
cessation of the Russian protectorate. The subject of union was not spe- 
cifically mentioned. It was, however, sufficiently obvious that it would at 
once become the paramount question. According to the instructions the com- 
mission was to repair first to Constantinople, there to ascertain that the firman 
of convocation, which was to fix the electoral qualifications and the rules of 
procedure, had been issued by the Porte. From there they were to go to 
Bucharest, in order to put themselves in touch with the Divans, arriving there 
at the moment when the Austrian troops had been withdrawn. After the 
Divans had assembled, the presiding officers were to be invited to transmit the 
desires of these assemblies to the commission, which was empowered to ask of 
the Divans any additional information as to their wishes. At the termination 
of the sessions, the commission was to draw up a report, with such dissenting 
reports as should be necessary. 2 

The appointments to the European commission were Sir Henry Bulwer for 

1 Documents, post, p. 741. 

2 Documents, post, p. 746. 


England, Talleyrand for France, and one delegate each from the Austrian, 
Prussian, Russian, Turkish and Sardinian governments. Owing to difficulties 
in the execution of several points in the treaty regarding the new limits of 
Moldavia and an island at the mouth of the Danube, the Austrian occupation, 
which was to have ceased six months after the signing of peace, was prolonged 
to a year. The Commissioners were forced to remain in inactivity at Con- 
stantinople for some months until the evacuation should be completed, which 
was not accomplished until March 30, 1857. After more time, spent in visit- 
ing Jassy and in waiting for the arrival of the delayed members of the com- 
mission, they finally held their first session at Bucharest on May 18, 1857. * 

The firman convoking the Divans, which, by stipulation of the Congress, 
was to fix the rules of procedure of these assemblies, had already been drawn 
up by the Porte in conference with the ambassadors of the six Powers at Con- 
stantinople. As universal suffrage was unknown in the Principalities and was 
contrary also to the political principles of all the Powers except France, the 
Congress had stipulated in the instructions that there should be " an accurate 
representation of all classes of society." A careful consideration had there- 
fore to be given to the several classes in the territories. 

The population of the Principalities in 1857 was about five million, Wal- 
lachia having by far the larger nrmber of inhabitants. Their political and 
economic condition was still mediaeval. The Organic Act of 1834, although 
reaffirming the rights and privileges of the Principalities as a whole, had been 
far from a liberal instrument as regards internal matters. Among other 
abuses it had perpetuated the feudal privileges of the boyars and had left 
political power wholly in the hands of the great and lesser nobles and the 
clergy. Between these nobles and their peasant serfs there was, in the coun- 
try, no intermediate class. In the towns there were the trades-people, Ru- 
manian, Hungarian, Serb and Bulgar, who were organized in guilds. Com- 
merce was almost wholly under the control of Greeks, Armenians and Jews, 
who, thanks to Austrian protection, enjoyed advantages over their native 
competitors. Of the clergy there were two classes, the higher, composed of 
Greek monks, and the lower of ignorant peasants. The drawing up of the 
firman occasioned lengthy debate over the proper balancing of the several 
classes and the effort to strengthen the position of the native merchants. The 
final provisions represent primarily the labor and skill of Thouvenel. 2 The 

1 It appears from an article of April 17, 1857, in L'Gtoile du Danube that the gov- 
ernments of the Principalities offered to pay all the household expenses of the commis- 
sioners, an offer refused by the English and Russian members, and accepted only in part 
by the French. The Turkish commissioner took full advantage of it. Acte si documcnte 
relative la istoria renascerei Romaniei, Vol. 4, p. 76. 

* Thouvenel wrote on January 8, 1857, "Rediger une loi electorate pour un pays qui 
nous etait inconnu, ce n'etait pas chose facile, mais je crois tres sincerement que nous 


provision that debate in the Divans should be carried on separately by the 
delegates from each class sitting in Committee, was, however, a suggestion of 
the Porte which finally prevailed, although it was feared that the prestige of 
the Divans would be considerably diminished by each class reporting direct to 
the commission. The Porte had wished to add to the firman a program for 
discussion which should exclude all question of union, saying, at Austria's 
suggestion, that union would be an infraction not only of Turkish suzerainty, 
but also of the rights of the Principalities, as these included the right of 
separation. Such a program of discussion Thouvenel objected to, and its 
absence is due to his express protest. 1 

By the firman the number of deputies to the Wallachian Divan was fixed at 
112, the Moldavian at 84. In each Principality the election of deputies was 
to be by five classes, the deputies thus elected to sit in five committees, each 
committee to consider separately the questions of paramount importance to its 
class. The first class of electors was composed of the clergy. The superiors 
of convents and regular priests living in the capital of the diocese were to 
choose two deputies, while the lower clergy were to choose their delegates by 
indirect election, and the Metropolitan and the bishops of the country were to 
be members of the Divan ex officio. The second class was that of the great 
boyars and sons of boyars, of thirty years of age or over, owning cultivated 
land in excess of one hundred faltches, 2 or the equivalent in pogonesf and 
free from mortgage. These were to meet in the capital of each district and 
to* elect from their number two deputies owning three hundred faltches (or 
the equivalent in pogones). All proprietors of amounts of land from ten 
to ninety-nine faltches or their equivalent were to form the third class. 
These were to choose from among themselves five electors from each prefec- 
ture to meet in the capital of the district and there elect one deputy to the 
Divan. The fourth class, that of the peasant serfs of the rural communes, 
who had never before been represented, were to elect their deputies, one for 
each district, by means of two intermediary colleges. The fifth and last class 
was that of the inhabitants of the cities. These were divided into four groups, 
householders owning property of a certain value, 4 professional men, licensed 

nous sommes tires de ce probleme le moins mal possible. Ayant seul travaille a fond 
la question, je craignais un peu d'effaroucher les autres. J'at eu, au contraire, a me 
louer de tout le monde. Grace a Dieu, me voila delivre de cet ingrat travail, et si les 
Valaques ne se jettent pas dans les bras des Moldaves, ce ne sera pas ma faute! w L. Thou- 
venel, Trots annies de la question d'orient, d'aprds les papier s inidits de M. Gdouard 
Antoine Thouvenel, p. 66. 

1 Thouvenel to Walewski, Pera (Constantinople), January 4, 1857. Acte si documente, 
Vol. 3, pp. 1016-1023. 

*A Moldavian measurement, the equivalent of 14,320 square meters. 

3 A Wallachian measurement, about 4,990 square meters. 

4 20,000 piastres in the capital, 8,000 in the other cities. The Turkish piastre was 


merchants, and the provosts and delegates of the diverse guilds. These voted 
by indirect ballot for the delegates allotted to their city or town. In Wal- 
lachia the three largest cities had two deputies, the smaller towns one each. 1 
Thirty days were to be allowed for protests and complaints after the posting 
of the electoral lists, which were to be drawn up by the prefects. Protests 
were to be passed on by a committee composed of the prefect, the judges of 
the districts, and the municipal officials of the chief city. Any intervention 
of the authorities in the election was forbidden and no official was allowed to 
run for election without resigning office. It was further provided that the 
elections were not to be held until the arrival of the European Commission 
at Bucharest. 

According to the testimony of the French consuls at Jassy and Bucharest, 
the firman, although drawn up by outsiders, gave great satisfaction to all 
classes in the principalities. The only expressions of dissatisfaction came 
from some of the great boyars, who resented the humiliation of inclusion with 
the lesser proprietors and wished a much larger number of delegates, a plea 
in which Beclard, the French consul at Bucharest, felt no interest, both on 
account of its lack of reason, and because if there were any opponents of 
union they would be among the great nobles. 2 

Although any specific mention of the question of union as one of those to 
be settled had been omitted from the Treaty of Paris and from the instruc- 
tions to the commissioners, it had been well recognized that the subject could 
not be avoided in the elections. The matter was, indeed, brought up in the 
British House of Lords on February 7, soon after the firman was issued, by 
a question as to whether the matter of union was to be settled by the Divans or 
by the Powers. 8 To this Clarendon replied that the finnan put no bar on 
discussions of the question of union or of any other question arising from the 
Treaty of Paris, and was so far in faithful compliance with the intentions of 
the Congress of Paris which had declared, with the acquiescence of the Turk- 
worth a little more than 20 centimes. The piastre of each principality had slightly dif- 
ferent values. Thouvenel, p. 68, note. 

1 Documents, post, p. 749. The composition of the Wallachian Divan was as follows: 
of the 112 deputies, four, namely, the Metropolitan and the three bishops, were members 
ex officio, the higher clergy had six representatives, the large landed proprietors thirty- 
four, the smaller seventeen, the cities twenty-two, the rural communes seventeen. In the 
Moldavian Divan the eighty-four deputies were to be seven members of the higher 
clergy, twenty-eight representatives of the large proprietors, fourteen of the smaller 
ones, eighteen representatives of the cities, and fourteen of the rural communes. The 
Metropolitan of Jassy and the two bishops were members ex officio. Frtderic Dame, 
Histoire de la Roumanie, p. 102. 

* Thouvenel, p. 72. B&lard wrote that the ninety-five great boyars of Wallachia 
wanted twenty deputies out of the thirty-four allotted to the class as a whole, which 
numbered about 2,700. 

» Hansard (3d series), vol. 144, p. 331. The question was put by Lord Lyndhurst 


ish plenipotentiary, that the people of the Principalities should be free to dis- 
cuss any subject connected with the form of government to be adopted so long 
as Turkish suzerainty was not questioned. Further discussion by Parliament, 
Clarendon added, must be delayed until the Divans had been consulted, the 
report of the commission had been received, and the conference had met to 
consider it, for such had been the understanding of the Congress of Paris. 

Already during the discussions on the firman of convocation a lively cam- 
paign had been carried on in the Principalities. No sooner was the firman 
promulgated than the self -constituted " Electoral Committee " in Jassy, the 
chief city of Moldavia, issued a manifesto outlining its program, with union 
as the first article of its platform, and autonomy, a foreign prince, and a con- 
stitution the remaining ones. 1 In each district of Moldavia similar committees 
of union 2 were formed, which at once set about selecting their candidates for 
the Divan. With the leaders of the unionist party, Victor Place, the French 
consul at Jassy, was in close touch. Arriving in Jassy at the time when the 
struggle for union was first opening he had used all his influence in its favor, 
gaining the adherence of the Metropolitan and inducing the Hospodar to 
place unionist officials over each district with the purpose of arousing union 
sentiment. 8 

The Congress of Paris, in its anxiety fully to recognize the suzerain rights 
of the Sultan, had unwarily, and in spite of the efforts of Clarendon, left it 
absolutelv to the Porte to take such measures as should be suitable to insure a 
free vote. As the legal term of office of the hospodars was on the point of 
expiring, the Sultan chose to replace them by " caimacams " or regents, to 
whom he entrusted the formation of provisional governments. These men 
were carefully selected to promote Turkish interests. Over Wallachia he 
placed Prince Alexander Ghika, and over Moldavia, Balsche. Both of these 
were inacceptable to France, and Balsche particularly so, for he represented 
the influence of Austria. As an adverse vote from one Principality would 
be sufficient for their purpose, Turkey and Austria determined to concentrate 
even- effort on Moldavia, where, although the patriotic movement was older 
and stronger than in Wallachia, there was the hope that success might attend 
a propaganda which should emphasize the fact that, as the smaller and less 
populous province, Moldavia would be forced into an inferior position, and 
that its chief city. Jassy, would lose its rank as a capital. Austria had already 
used the opportunities afforded by her military occupation to stimulate this 
rivalry. Hoping to gain an adverse vote in Moldavia by making use of this 

1 Documents, post, p. 757. 

1 These organizations originally called themselves "clubs" but changed their name to 
"committees" as a result of criticism. 

* Alexandre Xenopol Histoir* dts Roumaims. vol. 2, p. 557. 


argument and of various means of manipulation, it was arranged that the vote 
there should precede that of Wallachia, and thereby exercise an unfavorable 
influence on the unionist sentiment of the latter. To further discourage the 
unionists of both countries, word was spread that France had abandoned their 
cause, an assertion promptly denied by an article in the Moniteur of Feb- 
ruary 5. 

Under the direction of Balsche the partisans of union were persecuted in 
innumerable ways. Accusations were trumped up and the courts packed 
against them, and in all questions pertaining to labor, taxes, debts and the like, 
the prefects, who were the arbiters, gave adverse judgment. 1 Balsche died 
suddenly, soon after the publication of the firman. His successor, Vogorides, 
like Balsche the choice of Austria as well as of Turkey, in spite of his formal 
oath to do nothing to interfere with the free vote of the people, at once set 
about carrying out his predecessor's policy of pressure. 2 New arguments 
against union were also advanced. The French Consul, Place, kept his chief 
fully informed of the repressive acts of the Caimacam, and received in reply 
repeated admonitions to bend every effort towards a free expression of Mol- 
davian opinion, 3 an end desirable in itself, but especially so as a means of modi- 
fying the opposition of Great Britain. 

The firman, drawn up at a distance, naturally contained numerous details 
admitting of doubt in interpretation. Hardly had the European Commission 
constituted itself at Bucharest before it had received from Prince Ghika, t 
Caimacam of Wallachia, questions which, he said, must be answered before the 
• electoral lists could be published. This was the cause of fresh difficulties. 
The commissioners asserted that the authors of the firman should be the only 
ones to interpret it. The question of which body should shoulder the task 
soon assumed the proportions of a European diplomatic conflict. To add to 
the complication, Vogorides had on the other hand no such hesitation but was 
proceeding to publish at once the Moldavian election lists which had been 
carefully revised to omit the partisans of union. This increased the tension 
among the Powers, those against union wishing to leave a free hand to 
Vogorides, who had prepared everything for an election corresponding to 
their wishes. 

The methods of Vogorides had been manifold and crude. Leaders of the 

1 Thouvenel, pp. 79-80. 

2 Vogorides was appointed Caimacam on March 7. Like Balsche he was not a native 
of the Principalities. Place reported to Thouvenel that Vogorides, who had been Minister 
of Finances under Balsche, had asked the support of France in his candidacy for the 
office of caimacam, saying that he was at heart a unionist. Thouvenel, p. 85. 

'Thouvenel to Walewski, March 2, 1857, Acte si documented vol. 3, p. 1172; Walewski 
to Place, March 19, 1857, ibid., vol. 4, p. 75. There are many other dispatches to the 
same effect 


unionists had been arrested and imprisoned, 1 officials who could not be de- 
pended on to work against union were deposed, judges were removed from 
office. 2 To strengthen his adherents, many promotions were made in the 
army and in the boyar class, an act expressly forbidden by the Organic Act. 
The public press was censored and some papers suspended. 8 The unionist 
committees were forbidden to meet and all public discussion was prohibited. 
These measures being apparently insufficient in the face of the popular will 
for union, the government officials had next turned their attention to the elec- 
toral lists. These were to have been published in each locality as soon as the 
prefect had drawn them up. The method adopted was to order that they 
should not be made public at once but that they should be sent by the prefects 
to Jassy, where they were carefully inspected and corrected to meet the gov- 
ernment's views. The prefects were instructed to aid the government in this 
work and care was taken in the election of prefects to insure the failure of 
any unionist candidate. The complete absence of statistics, of authentic meas- 
urements of the quantities of land, of certificates of birth and of nationality, 
and, above all, the provision in the firman that the holdings must be free of 
mortgage, made it easy for the government to reject in great numbers the 
demands for registration. Appeal lay, according to the firman, with a com- 
mittee composed of the prefect, two judges of the court, and two delegates of 
the municipal council. Although the latter were more independent, they were 
in the minority, as against the government commissioners. The appeals were 
for the most part returned unread. 4 From the figures given it appears that 
exclusion was practiced wholesale. Of the 2,000 large proprietors of Mol- 
davia the lists contained the names of only 350. Of the 20,000 or more 
.small proprietors only 2,264 were included. Among the municipal electors 
only eleven members of the liberal professions were entered. The complete 
lists comprised 4,658 electors of the higher classes in place of the 40,000 which 
should have been entered. Great boast was made of the 167,222 peasants 
registered, but in view of the manner in which they were to vote this amounted 
to nothing. 5 

1 Dispatch of Place, April 3, Acte si documente, vol 4, p. 222. Cf. also Gement 
Despres, La question des principalis danubiennes, p. 123, and Xinopol, voL 2, pp. 564, et seq. 

1 Protest of Constantin Stourdza, April 22, Acte si documente, vol. 4, p. 387. Stourdza 
also complained that he had been prevented from making a legal entry of the limits of 
his land on the ground that he was doing it in order to secure the right to vote for union. 

8 The chief unionist paper, L'Etoile du Danube, was published in Brussels. Austria 
came to the aid of Vogorides by prohibiting its carriage across her territory. The 
organ of the Moldavian government, the Gazeta Moldovei, opposed union energetically 
and freely. Xinopol, vol. 2, p. 563. 

4 Xinopol, vol. 2, pp. 567-jB. 

5 Xinopol, vol. 2, p. 569. In a protest addressed to the European Commission on 
June 20, signed by thousands of Moldavian patriots, it is charged regarding the clerical 
deputies that Vogorides had so arranged it that one electoral college, which had to elect 


In spite of assertions to the contrary by the Turkish Vizier, it is proven by 
numerous letters that Vogorides was merely carrying out the orders received 
from the Porte and that, in the large, if not in detail, his actions had the 
approval of Great Britain and the highest praise from Austria. 1 The appoint- 
ment of the Vizier himself had been at the instance of Lord Stratford de 
Redcliffe and Baron Prokesch von Osten, the Ministers of Great Britain and 
Austria, at Constantinople, and in their hands he was but a passive instru- 
ment. France, however, supported by Russia, Sardinia, and Prussia, was 
determined on a fight to the finish on the Moldavian elections. The unionists 
of the Principalities were equally determined. At each act of the govern- 
ment a cry of indignation went up, protests were at once sent to the French 
consul at Jassy, and to the members of the European Commission at Bucha- 
rest. In the end the ministers of the Powers friendly to the union offered 
such conclusive evidence that Vogorides was acting in a spirit directly con- 
trary to the Treaty of Paris, that their colleagues of Great Britain and 
Austria were forced to meet in conference to advise as to the most suitable 
means of recalling the Caiircacam of Moldavia to the execution of the firman. 
At this conference, held on May 30, 1857, it was agreed that the commission 
at Bucharest should interpret the firman in concert with the Caimacam of 
Wallachia, and that this interpretation should be sent to Vogorides, " in order 

two deputies, had only two electors; that any mortgage on land disqualified the owner, 
even though the land was worth the mortgage many times over; that members of the 
liberal professions were excluded illegally; that there were only 310 electors allowed for 
Jassy, out of 80,000 inhabitants, whereas there were 500 on the list for Houschi, which had 
only 8,000 inhabitants; that Galatz was forced to give up one of its two deputies and the 
vote was given to Fokshani, a town with a smaller number of inhabitants; and that some 
elections among peasants were held before the lists were published, by means of ballots 
on which the names of deputies were left blank. Documents, post, p. 802. For a summary 
of the different protests and petitions, Cf. Documents, post, pp. 781, 782. In Acte si docu- 
ment e, renascerei Romaniei there are" printed many more protests not given here. 

1 Cf. letter of Baron Prokesh-Osten to Vogorides, April 18, Acte si documente, vol. 4, 
p. 358. "J'ai suivi avec un vif interet et avec une satisfaction tou jours croissante l'acti- 
vite que votre Altesse n'a cesse de deployer dans un sens qui a du lui meriter la recon- 
naissance et les eloges de la Sublime Porte, et je me suis felicite dans la meme mesure, 
de la part que j'ai eu le bonheur de prendre au choix de sa personne pour le poste 
qu'elle remplit si dignement." Cf. also the confidential letter of A. Vogorides, Secretary 
to the Turkish Embassy in London to his brother, the Caimacam, on April 14, 1857, the 
French translation of which is as follows: . . . "Lord Palmerston est tout-a-fait contraire 
a l'union, il la considere comme subversive des droits et de la suprematie de notre Sou- 
erain, et, par consequent, des instructions analogues seront envoye's aujourd'hui a Sir 
Henri Bulwer . . . Ainsi que je vous l'ai dit prece'demment, il y a grande necessite que 
vous employiez a temps tous vos efforts pour que les Moldaves n'expriment point de 
voeux pour l'union et pour que vous vous rendiez ainsi digne de la bienveillance de la 
S. Porte et de l'appui de l'Angleterre et de l'Autriche. Puisque les trois Puissances sont 
deciders a empecher de toutes leur forces l'union, il ne faut guere vous inquieter de ce 
que veulent ou menacent de faire les Francais dont les journaux vous traitent de Grec 
" Acte si documente, vol. 4, pp. 328-9. 



that the firman should be followed as accurately as possible except in cases of 
conditions peculiar to Moldavia." 1 But Vogorides had already published 
the Moldavian electoral lists, with all the objectionable features which had 
raised such opposition. France and the three other Powers thereupon de- 
manded a delay of fifteen days in order that the lists might be revised accord- 
ing to the interpretation, and to this the Vizier, whose complicity was by now 
uncovered, had agreed, and the Council of Ministers had so decided when the 
ambassadors of Great Britain and Austria, using their influence over Rechid 
Pacha, induced the Grand Vizier to withdraw his promise on the ground that 
no such action could be taken without the unanimous consent of all the Powers. 
At the same time Redcliffe and Prokesch announced that they accepted any 
responsibility which might fall on the Porte, and the Caimacam of Moldavia 
proceeded with the elections. 

The elections in Moldavia were held on July 19. In spite of the careful 
preparation the majority of the electors chosen by the government so resented 
the manipulation of the lists that, as a protest, they abstained from voting. 
Of the 205 electors of the religious orders only 16 voted. Of the 465 large 
proprietors chosen by the government, only 214 voted. At Jassy, where only 
40 of the 700 great proprietors were registered, only 17 voted; at Bacau 17 
out of 57; at Soutchava, 17 out of 35. The delegates of the lower classes 
were nominated in large part by the government and the formal minutes were 
drawn up without consulting the electors. 2 Even in the polling places the 
abuses were continued, a group of electors at Jassy complaining that a self- 
appointed committee took possession of the ballots and wrote on it the name 
of the anti-unionist candidate while anyone who objected to this proceeding 
was ejected. 8 

What with these methods and with the abstention of such unionists as were 
registered, it is not surprising that the returns were against union, but the 
losing side refused to tolerate such a parody of a vote. France insisted that 
the elections be annulled. 4 Hoping to placate France, Rechid Pasha was sacri- 
ficed and a new ministry instituted. France, however, not content with a 
-mere change of ministry, repeated her demand. Russia, Sardinia, and Prussia 
joined France in an ultimatum. The Porte, which was still under the influ- 
ence of Redcliffe and Prokesch, answering evasively, France broke off diplo- 
matic relations with Turkey, on August 5, and Prussia, Sardinia, and Russia 
followed on the next day. 

1 Annuaire des deux mondes, vol. 7, 1856-57, p. 702. The text of this decision was 
not made public. The portion here given in quotations is translated from instructions 
given by Thouvenel to one of the French agents. 

* Annuaire, vol. 7, 1856-57, p. 708. Xinopol, vol. 2, p. 572. 

8 Cf. protest quoted in Annuaire des deux mondes, vol. 7, 1856-57, p. 707. 

4 For extracts from the diplomatic exchanges, see Documents. 


The situation was one of great gravity and another European war seemed 
possible. Neither France nor England, however, desired war, and Napoleon 
seized the occasion of a visit to the Queen at Osborne, on August 6, to effect 
a compromise. In return for his promise to refrain from insisting on an abso- 
lute union of the two Principalities, Great Britain gave consent to the annul- 
ment of the Moldavian elections. 1 With the defection of England, Turkey 
and Austria were forced to capitulate. New electoral lists were ordered in 
Moldavia, the elections were held once more, and diplomatic relations were 
restored. The crisis through which the Porte had passed having been suffi- 
ciently serious to make the avoidance of another more desirable than the defeat 
of union, Vogorides' first care in the second elections was to be as fair and 
impartial as possible. 2 

The drama which had been played on the international stage had been re- 
peated in petto in the sessions of the European Commission, where the dele- 
gates of France, Russia and Sardinia had been pitted against those of Great 
Britain, Austria and Turkey in the struggle over the Moldavian elections. 
As each question of procedure was brought up in the Commission the debate 
over the ruling reflected this partisan division, the pro-unionist group of dele- 
gates making a determined effort to force the Commission to be a supervisory 
body and the other group seeking to limit its powers in such a way that no 
response could be made to petitions and no word of censure could be passed. 
There were protracted debates over the actions of Vogorides ; the representa- 
tives of the Powers which were for union insisting that it was beneath the 
dignity of the Commission to treat with a divan which had been thus elected, 
while the British Commissioner, Bulwer, on the other hand, urged, in a 
lengthy defense, that the charges against Vogorides should be treated with 
patience and skepticism. 8 

The second Moldavian elections were held on September 10, and those in 
Wallachia on September 26. In both Principalities the victory for union was 
complete. The Moldavian Divan opened on October 4, and that of Wallachia 
on October 11. In Moldavia the Divan, after the usual formalities and a 
motion of gratitude to the Powers signatory to the Treaty of Paris, at once 
proceeded to formulate the general principles on which all reorganization 
must rest. These were a guarantee of the autonomy of the Principalities; 
union under one government ; a foreign prince, to be chosen from one of the 
reigning families of Europe ; and a single representative assembly for the two 

*Cf. Dcbidour, Histoire diplomatique de VEurope, vol. 2, p. 173. Debidour explains 
the concession on the part of England by the Sepoy Rebellion (May-July, 1857) which 
made it imperative to placate Russia, which was at Khiva, and France, which was in 
Hindustan. Cf. also, Dami, p. 104. 

* Xinopol, vol. 2 f pp. 574-5. 

• For the significant passages of the debates see Documents, post, pp. 760 et seq. 


Principalities. This platform was introduced in an eloquent address and 
seconded amidst the greatest enthusiasm. The only two members who were 
against union at once offered a counter motion. Although this had only two 
signatures and the rules of the assembly did not permit the reading of any 
motion unless it were supported by at least five members, the Divan, not wish- 
ing to cut off the adversaries of union, allowed the motion to be read. After 
a short discussion the vote was taken and of the eighty-three deputies voting, 
eighty-one were for union. The method of voting was open ; each deputy in 
turn advanced to the desk, stated his vote in a loud voice and signed his name 
to three identical ballots of which two, of parchment, were deposited by the 
archbishop in the State archives, while the third was appended to the minute 
of the deliberations. 

Having registered the vote for union, the Moldavian Divan then conformed 
with the firman by forming in committees of classes and there discussing the 
further details of the proposed reorganization. The Wallachian Divan was, 
however, far less subservient, perhaps because of the presence of a large num- 
ber of returned exiles of 1848. 1 It utterly refused to separate into class com- 
mittees and, after adopting, with only two dissenting votes, a platform similar 
to that of Moldavia, with union and a foreign prince the chief planks, it issued 
the pronouncement that further discussion of details would be inconvenient 
and impossible until the decision of the Powers on these points should be made 
known. In this attitude it persisted in spite of repeated requests from the 
European Commission to state its views on details of organization, 2 and on 
December 26 it accordingly adjourned until the following February. 

Foreseeing that if no official manipulation were allowed the verdict for 
union was inevitable, Turkey had anticipated the votes of the Divans by a 
formal communication to her representatives abroad, stating that quasi- 
revolutionary clubs had been organized in Wallachia and Moldavia which 
had intimidated the inhabitants, and that therefore, before the vote for union, 
she considered it to be her duty to declare frankly that, whatever the desire 
expressed by the Divans as to union, the Porte, relying on the provision of 
the Treaty of Paris, to the effect that the final arrangements should be deter- 
mined entirely by agreement between the Porte and the other Powers, felt 
absolutely obliged to maintain its former decision against union. To this 

1 These had returned, with the consent of the Porte, in time for the elections. It is 
probable that this permission was at the instance of Great Britain where the matter had 
been made the subject of a question in Parliament on March 18. 

2 The determination of the Wallachian Divan was strengthened by the certainty that 
there would be many differences of opinion on other questions, and that dissension might 
weaken the force of the vote for union in the eyes of the Powers. Xinopol, vol. 2, pp. 
576-7. This decision was borne out by the experience of the Moldavian Divan, where 
the several classes held far different views on many questions, and on some reached no 


protest Russia and Prussia replied that they would postpone their answer until 
they had heard the votes of the Divans and until the conference had met at 
Paris, and added that the character of the Divans was above reproach. After 
another protest the Porte ceased from further objections until the opening of 
the conference of ambassadors at Paris. 1 

In the sessions of the European Commission at Bucharest, there had been 
some criticisms by Austria and Turkey of the legality of the second elections 
in Moldavia ; little interest had, however, been excited, even Sir Henry Bulwer 
refusing to protest them, on the ground that one need not expect the millennium 
in such a backward region. The Russian Commissioner, anxious as he was to 
credit the votes for union, had been outraged at the prominence of the patriots 
of 1848 in the Wallachian assembly, at the refusal of the delegates to separate 
into classes, and at the institution of stenographic reports of debates, which 
were made public before copies could reach the commission. His protests, 
also, were without result. 

The Moldavian Divan had dissolved itself on January 2, 1858. Before the 
date for the Wallachian Divan to reassemble, both bodies were formally dis- 
solved by a firman of the Porte. It now remained for the European Com- 
mission to draw up its report to the Powers regarding the desires of the 
people's representatives. This had become a matter of great difficulty. The 
Divans had made union their first demand, but France, their chief supporter 
among the Powers, had pledged herself against it at Osborne, even before the 
votes were passed, and the several commissioners had received explicit orders 
from their governments not to discuss the question of union or of a foreign 
prince. On these points, therefore, the commission contented itself with 
simply transmitting the votes of the Divans, without recommendation. 2 The 
other problems of organization were exhaustively discussed in the report which 
was transmitted direct to the conference at Paris, without being made public. 

Whatever the agreement made between Napoleon and the Queen at Osborne, 
the British liberals were still hopeful of changing British policy in favor of 
acquiescence in the vote of the Principalities. A week before the conference 
of ambassadors was to meet at Paris, the question of the union was again 
brought up in Parliament, this time by Gladstone, who, supported by Lord 
John Russell, introduced a resolution calling on the House of Commons to 
reaffirm the policy regarding the Principalities which had been pursued by the 
Government in 1856, and to express the wish, in general terms, that due 
weight and consideration should be given to the wishes which their people 
had expressed through their representatives, elected in conformity with the 

lAnnuaire, vol. 8 (1857-58), pp. 683-4. 

2 See extracts from Reports on the Reorganization of the Principalities, Documents. 
post, p. 833. 


Treaty of Paris. 1 He held that the elections were conclusive in the fact that 
a great proportion of those qualified had voted, and with a unanimity remark- 
able in a vote taken by classes between which there existed questions of a most 
painful and difficult nature, offering every chance to foment dissension. To 
consult the people and then to refer the question of union to the commission- 
ers he characterized as a proceeding not only foolish, but dangerous. It was, 
he said, using his favorite simile, " like lighting a fire and stopping up the 
chimney," and he declared that he for one would be no party to trifling with 
the reasonable expectations of five millions of men, and concluded with the 
wise forecast that if the conference at Paris should decree against union the 
Principalities would thereby be pushed into the arms of Russia which was 
supporting it. The Government, in answer, attempted to interpret the vote 
of the Divans as one for union only in case a foreign prince should be accorded 
them. To this Lord Robert Cecil answered that in the preamble to the reso- 
lutions of the Divans it was clearly stated that the most important wish was 
for union, which showed the foreign prince to be a subsidiary desire. In 
spite of these efforts of Gladstone, Russell and Cecil, the government's policy 
remained unchanged. 

The conference for the reorganization of the Principalities met at Paris 
on May 22, 1858. France was represented by Count Walewski, England by 
Lord Cowley, Russia by Count Kissilef, Prussia by Count von Hatzfeld, 
Sardinia by the Marquis of Villamarina, and Turkey by Fuad Pacha, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of the Sultan. There was no attempt to question the 
authenticity of the votes of the divans. The plenipotentiaries of Russia, 
France, Prussia, and Sardinia all asserted their confidence in their validity, 
and Cowley agreed that there was no doubt but that the people had shown 
themselves for union. France made an initial effort to secure endorsement 
both for the union and for a foreign prince, but in the face of the continued 
opposition of England, Napoleon, his hands tied by the Osborne compromise, 
was forced to yield. The French plenipotentiary at the third session intro- 
duced a draft containing a qualified union and the draft was made the basis 
of the convention signed on August 19. The structure thus reared by the 
facile hand of diplomacy was a strange mixture of union and separation. 
The Principalities were, to be sure, henceforth to be called " united " but the 

1 . . . "The union is the wish of almost the entire population of the Principalities. 
That is a fact which bears greatly upon this question . . . although it is not conclusive on 
the question, yet I speak in the British House of Commons — I speak in that assembly 
to which, I will not say alone, but to which almost alone, every lover of liberty in the 
world has now to look for the vindication of his rights — and I implore the House of 
Commons to do full justice to the wishes, to the rights and interests of these peoples, if 
those interests be compatible with justice and the welfare of Europe." See Hansard, 
(3d series) 1858, vol. 150, pp. 46-80, for the speeches of Gladstone and Russell. 


words " of Moldavia and Wallachia " were to be added, in order to deprive 
the new denomination of significance. Each was to have a separate hospodar, 
a native of either Principality, who was to be elected for life, and each was 
to have a separate assembly. There was, on the other hand, to be a central 
commission and a high court of justice set up for the two Principalities for 
matters of common interest and the new organization was put under their 
safeguard. The militia bodies, too, were to have a common organization, 
and might be united for manoeuvres, yet they were to have separate flags. 1 
New assemblies were to be elected, each to vote for the new hospodar, and for 
this an electoral law was drawn up by the Powers. 2 Although vastly simpler 
and more liberal than the firman of 1857, this law perpetuated the voting by 
classes and the combination of a direct and indirect vote. 

While the Convention of August 19 did not fulfill the hopes of the Ru- 
manian patriots, it was nevertheless a long step towards union. Ingenuity 
soon contrived the next. The Convention had provided that citizens of either 
Moldavia or Wallachia should be eligible to the office of hospodar in either 
Principality. Explicit in all else, the Convention had not provided for any 
action in case the two assemblies should elect the same hospodar. This they 
at once proceeded to do, although, mindful of the other provisions of the 
Convention, they surrendered their desire for a foreign prince and elected a 

For the new elections the Conference at Paris had insisted that Vogorides 
and Ghrka be removed and replaced in each Principality by three members of 
the Ministry in power before 1857, but the turbulent relations and autocratic 
acts of these restored officials gave little evidence of their conception of the 
national situation. In the Moldavian assembly there were two rival candi- 
dates for the office of hpspodar, and into the ensuing bitter struggle the 
Turkish government entered with the hope of regaining by indirect methods 
what it had lost through the Convention of August 19. Fearing that dissen- 
sion would give aid and comfort to Turkey and Austria, the French and Rus- 
sian consuls urged the rival factions to unite on a new candidate. When the 
name of Alexander Couza, who, as prefect of Galatz, had refused to carry 
out Vogorides' orders for the first Moldavian election, was at last adopted 
by the national party, the partisans of the two other candidates gave way, 
and Couza was unanimously elected on January 9, 1859. 3 

The Wallachian assembly had been delayed by the struggle over the electoral 

1 When united for manoeuvres the two flags might each have a border of the same 

2 The text may be found in Annuaire, vol. 8, 1857-58, p. 931. 

■There were 49 delegates. Xinopol, vol. 2, pp. 580 et seq., gives a detailed account 
of the election. 


law, which the consuls had finally been forced to settle. When the assembly- 
met there was a three-cornered division between the partisans of two former 
hospodars and the party of union. A deadlock seemed certain when the 
newly named agent for Moldavia stopped at Bucharest on his way to Con- 
stantinople and advised that Wallachia also elect Couza, saying that he was the 
candidate supported by France, and that this was the indirect method chosen 
by Napoleon to impose the union on Europe. 1 This hint, together with the 
appearance of a crowd of townspeople to support it, brought forth from one 
of the members an eloquent appeal for harmony and for a vote for Couza 
as another vote for union, and Couza was unanimously elected. The op- 
ponents of the union, startled by the new turn of events, wanted the election 
annulled, but the enthusiasm of the country showed clearly that the vote, 
if annulled, would be repeated. The only alternative, that of intervention 
by some one of the Powers, was unacceptable to the others. Faced with the 
dilemma, Great Britain acknowledged the fait accompli. Austria was too 
much engaged with affairs in Italy to oppose it. The Sultan attempted to 
defeat the union by refusing investiture, but was finally prevailed upon by 
the five Powers, in conference at Constantinople, to give his consent. Forced 
to submit, he gave Couza two firmans of investiture, one for each Princi- 
pality, with the reservation that the union should be only during his occupation 
of the office and that thereafter the Convention of August 19 should be re- 
stored. 2 In 1861 a further step towards union was effected with the grant- 
ing of the privilege of a common assembly and ministry, again with the reser- 
vation that it should be temporary. These reservations were allowed to stand" 
but were not endorsed by the Powers, who expressly reserved their decision 
until the question should again arise. 

Couza did not have a peaceful reign. In his zeal for economic and political 
reform he contrived by successive measures and dictatorial methods to alienate 
the clergy, the nobles, and the peasantry. In February, 1866, he was forced 
to abdicate and the government at once issued a proclamation calling on the 
assembly already in session to elect a foreign prince. As the Porte had recog- 
nized a single hospodar for the Principalities only for the reign of Couza, and 
as the other Powers had reserved the right to consider the question when it 
should arise, the matter was again open and once more the Powers were 
summoned in conference at Paris to settle the question of the union of the 
two territories. It was obvious that the Rumanians were now determined 

1 DamS, p. 112, and Sturdza, La terre et la race roumdtnes, pp. 505-7. Xenopol makes 
no mention of Moldavian or French influence in the election, and credits it purely to the 
Wallachian assembly. 

2 Cf. Martens, N. R. G., vol. 17, pt 2, p. 82, for the protocols of the conference at 
Constantinople, and pp. 87-91 for the answer of the Foreign Offices of France, Russia,. 
Great Britain, Prussia, and Italy, to the reservation of the Porte. 


to have not only union but a foreign prince. In this latter desire they had 
always had but one strong supporter, France. Russia was now so alarmed 
by the prospect that she withdrew her support of the union. In discussing 
union the matter was once more placed on the basis of the popular will. Aus- 
tria and Russia, citing the recent upheaval regarding Couza as a proof of 
popular discontent with the existing order, now asserted that the desire of 
the people, especially in Moldavia, was for separation and, to ascertain this 
desire, they urged that the matter be again put to vote, under secure guaran- 
tees of liberty and independence. 1 France and Sardinia opposed a vote on 
the ground that the vote of 1857 had been decisive. Cowley stated that the 
British government had no preconceived opinion either for or against union, 
and left it wholly to the people, " on whom she had never had the intention 
of imposing a state of affairs repugnant to them." The majority of the Pow- 
ers favoring another vote, the French plenipotentiary proposed that to obviate 
delay it should be given by the joint assembly already gathered at Bucharest 
Russia argued that greater freedom would be assured if the Moldavian depu- 
ties should vote at Jassy. Russia, however, advocated a wholly fresh appeal 
to the people, and was supported in this by Prussia and by Great Britain, 
Cowley saying that he could not understand why there should be any hesita- 
tion in consulting the populations. The method of taking the vote, whether 
by one or two assemblies, and by new elections or not, was finally referred to 
the home governments. Without waiting for the decision of the Powers, 
however, the Provisional Government of the Principalities settled the question 
by dissolving the assembly already in session and convoking a new one, and 
by holding a plebiscite which elected the Count of Flanders. 2 This action 
brought forth bitter denunciation from the conference. The consuls in the 
Principalities were notified by telegraph to inform the Provisional Govern- 
ment that a foreign prince was impossible, that as to union if the Moldavian 
delegates to the new assembly requested it, they should be allowed to vote 
separately on the matter, and that, if their vote should be adverse, the union 
would be dissolved. The consuls were to exercise a joint supervision over the 

Judging the diplomatic situation to be inauspicious, the Count of Flanders 
had refused his election, but the Provisional Government had not exhausted 
its resources. On May 17, the President read to the Conference another 
dispatch from the government at Bucharest announcing a second plebiscite 
by which Prince Charles Louis of Hohenzollern Sigmaringen had been elected, 
by 685,969 votes to 224. The Rumanian agents at London and Paris had 

1 The protocols of this Conference may be found in Martens, N. R. G., vol. 18, pp. 
166 et seq. 

2 Universal manhood suffrage had been one of the reforms instituted by Couza. 


already ascertained that Prince Charles would be acceptable to both Great 
Britain and France. 1 Needless to say he had also the support of Prussia. 
Although none of this support was voiced in the Conference, Austria and 
Turkey, perceiving further opposition to the union to be useless, accepted it, 
and, after a long and futile discussion, yielded also on the question of the 
foreign prince. On October 23, 1866, Prince Charles I was invested as 
hereditary prince over the United Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, 
which henceforth assumed for themselves the name of Rumania, although the 
name did not receive diplomatic recognition until the Principalities had gained 
their independence after the Russo-Turkish war in 1877, and it was not 
until May 22, 1881, that the coronation of Charles as King of Rumania took 
place at Bucharest. 

The Ionian Islands, 1863 

The year 1863 was marked by an event unique in the annals of European 
diplomacy. A great empire, coveting maritime and commercial supremacy 
in the East, voluntarily relinquished a most commanding position, held there 
by undisputed right of treaty, and ceded to another nation what was thought 
to be one of the strongest fortresses in the world ; 2 and the cession is still 
more noteworthy for the fact that it was made under the stipulation that the 
people themselves should, through their elected assembly, sanction the act. 
However accurately the cynical may attribute this act to complex diplomatic 
causes, it remains the highwater mark of the liberal era of Great Britain's 
foreign policy. 

Before the British Protectorate, which was instituted in the general re- 
arrangement of Europe in 1815, the seven Ionian Islands, Corfu, Cephalonia, 
Ithaca, Santa Maura (Leucas), Zante, Cerigo and Paxo, scattered along the 
coast of Greece from Epirus to the extreme south of the Morea, had known 
many masters. For four centuries they had been under the harsh dominion 
of the Venetian Republic, when, in 1797, the overflowing current of the French 
Revolution caught up the Islands and carried them rapidly through kaleido- 
scopic changes of sovereignty ; first the Directory, by the Treaty of Campo- 
Formio in 1797 ; then a joint Russo-Turkish protectorate, under whose loosen- 
ing grasp the Islands managed to obtain recognition as the Septinsular 
Republic, in the Treaty of Amiens in 1802 ; then, by the Treaty of Tilsit in 
1809, back to Napoleon, under whom they remained for the brief period 
before they were seized by the British during the operations of the war and 

1 Sturdza, Charles I, roi de Roumanie, vol. 1, p. 46. 

2 George William Hamilton Fitzmaurice, Viscount Kirkwall (sixth Earl of Orkney), 
Four Years in the Ionian Islands — Kirkwall, writing in 1864, says that Corfu is still un- 
rivalled as the strongest and most valuable of eastern fortresses — vol. 1, p. 48. 


put under a British administration. 1 Their fate for the next fifty years was 
at last settled by the Treaty of Paris, signed on November 5, 1815. 

By the Treaty of Paris, Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia again 
recognized the Islands as a republic under the name of the " United States 
of the Ionian Islands," and declared them to be a single, free, and independent 
State. In order to keep them out of more dubious hands, however, and to 
remove them from the international chess table, they were placed under the 
immediate and exclusive protection of Great Britain. The " mandatory/' 
anticipating from the charge a thankless burden, gave reluctant acceptance, 
so the historians say ; 2 yet the strategic position of the Islands must needs 
have been of the first importance to a World Power, and the right to occupy 
forts and territories was expressly given by Article 5. Nor was the inde- 
pendence of the Islands so apparent at the end of the treaty as at the begin- 
ning, for the power of the new State to regulate its internal organization was 
to be " with the approval of the protecting Power " 3 which was " to dedicate 
its particular solicitude to the legislation and general administration of the 
State," and to appoint a resident Lord High Commissioner invested with 
authority sufficient for the purpose. To this Lord High Commissioner were 
given practically unlimited powers regarding the convocation and direction 
of the assembly, and the Constitution of 1817, by the simple device of enabling 
the government to nominate the delegates to the Assembly and depriving the 
Assembly of power over supplies or ministers, enabled the Lord High Com- 
missioner to do whatever he pleased. 4 

With such a despotic system, established by an alien ruler, it is surprising 
that, in spite of the resurgence of Greek nationalism on the mainland in 1821 
and the success of the Greek War of Independence which culminated in the 
acknowledgment of the independence of the Greek kingdom in 1832, there 
should have been, until 1840, only a small party in the Islands actively against 
the British protectorate, and scarcely any movement to join in the new Greek 
kingdom. This was probably due not only to the unpopularity of Otto, the 
Bavarian king of Greece, but to the economic conditions in the Islands, which 
emphasized the lack of racial solidarity; for, although the lower classes were 
overwhelmingly Greek in race and language, the aristocracy, especially in 
Corfu, was largely Italian, and appears to have cared more for the perpetua- 
tion of its control over the peasantry, so recently serfs, than for self-govern- 
ment. Moreover, the protecting Power, by its appointment of vast numbers 

1 Corfu did not surrender until 1814. 

2 Ci. Dispatch of Earl Russell to the British Representatives. Documents, post, p. 844, 
for an explanation of the choice of Great Britain as protector. 

8 Article 3. State Papers, vol. 3, pp. 250 et seq. 

4 Cf. John Morley, Life of William Ewart Gladstone, vol. 1, p. 598. 


of native officials as well as by its conservative constitution, had tied the aris- 
tocracy to its interests. The smouldering hatred of the Protectorate, how- 
ever, always strong with the peasantry and the small tradesmen, was at last 
linked with the new spirit of nationalism kindled by the Greek revolution of 
1843, and when, in 1844, there arose in the Islands a party with union with 
Greece as its platform, it rapidly swept all before it. 

Alarmed at the growth of this party, as well as at the spread of the revolu- 
tionary fever of 1848, the Lord High Commissioner, left free by the custom 
of the Foreign Office to institute his own policy, attempted to forestall unrest 
in the Islands by granting freedom of the press and a more liberal constitu- 
tion. The size of the Assembly was increased and the election of its members 
was made free from government control ; the ballot was restored and the 
electorate trebled, and eventually quadrupled, by reducing the requisite quali- 
fications. But, while the press and parliament were thus liberated, the execu- 
tive power was fixed more firmly than ever in the hands of the Lord High 
Commissioner. 1 The Assembly was still unable to stop supplies or eject min- 
isters. Its only means of protest was to vote against the introduction of any 
government measure whatsoever, and this, with the passing of resolutions for 
the union with Greece, became the principal occupation of the Ionian Assem- 
bly. 2 

The electoral reforms of 1849 seem to have completely destroyed the gov- 
ernment's control over the Assembly, by placing the new Assembly in the 
hands of the Unionists. The several complaints against the Protectorate now 
all became vocal. It had been a cause of irritation that, in spite of early 
pledges, Italian and not Greek had been retained as the official language, and 
that even now, when Greek had gained official status, not one of the " Resi- 
dents " sent out from England to rule the several islands could speak a word 
of it. Taxation was neither uniform nor wise. 8 The Assembly, deprived 
of all constitutional means by which to express their many grudges, adopted 
the " insolent practice " of admitting a priest to purify the assembly hall after 
the departure of the Lord High Commissioner. With such an inauspicious 
beginning, it is not surprising to find the succeeding Commissioners frequently 
proroguing the body to stop its " treasonable " motions. More than that, 
in spite of the alleged freedom of the press, they imprisoned some of the 

1 Kirkwall, vol. 1, p. 175. 

2 This attempt to combine repression and constitutional reform again incurred Glad- 
stone's satirical metaphor of lighting the fire and stopping up the chimney, which he had 
applied to British policy in the Principalities. Morley, vol. 1, p. 598, imputes the author- 
ship of the simile to Charles Buller. 

8 Kirkwall, vol. 2, p. 296. Viscount Kirkwall had been a member of the staff of Sir 
Henry Ward, Seventh Lord High Commissioner. He remained in the islands until after 
the vote for union with Greece. 


editors of the Island newspapers, which were all unionist, thus increasing dis- 
content. The faults of the system, unworkable enough at best, were clearly 
shown in an agrarian rising in Cephalonia, when the atrocities on both sides 
called forth from England's enemies taunts as to the English charges against 
Bourbon rule in Naples. 1 

Liberal thought in England, with its admirable and unrivalled ability to 
see the mote in its own eye as well as the beam in the eye of another, had long 
before this become alive to the injustice of the arrangement, if not to the 
national aspirations of the Ionians. It now demanded a cessation of the 
scandal and a special mission was dispatched to the Islands in 1859. The 
mission was headed by Gladstone, " whose renown as a Homeric scholar " 
would " justly commend him to the sympathies of an Hellenic race." 2 

On November 24, 1858, Gladstone arrived at Corfu. His coming had 
created a sensation in the Islands and had greatly excited the hopes of the 
Unionists. Although, soon after landing, he took care to inform the island- 
ers that he had not come to effect any change in the terms of the Treaty of 
Paris, nevertheless, the people were convinced that he had come to aid the 
union, and everywhere on his pilgrimage through the Islands he was met with 
the cries of " Union with Greece " and " Down with the Protectorate." Yet, 
as the Ionian gentlemen, noted for their politeness, and the officials, alarmed 
at such contretemps, disowned these proceedings, he seems to have believed 
that the cries represented only a small minority. 8 He! proceeded to state ex- 
plicitly that there was no thought of union, and, at his request, the shouting 
ceased, but the feeling remained. It had, indeed, gained added intensity from 
a dispatch of the resident Lord High Commissioner, Sir John Young, in which 
he had recommended that Corfu and Paxo, with the consent of their inhab- 
itants (which he declared to be probable), should be constituted British col- 
onies. This had been stolen from the Foreign Office and made public a short 
time before Gladstone's arrival. It was in fact the opinion of the British 
officials in the Islands that the only alternative to making Corfu a British 
colony was a cession of the Islands to Greece. 4 Gladstone was determined 
against either alternative, yet he clearly perceived many faults in the existing 
system. He found that the British severities in Cephalonia, the contempt 
frequently shown for the religion of the people, and the lack of understand- 
ing shown by the British press, which called the Ionians brigands, pirates and 

1 It was the opinion in southern Europe that British rule in the islands was on a level 
with Austrian rule at Venice and the rule of the Cardinals in the Pontifical States. 
M or ley, vol. 1, p. 616. 

'From the dispatch of .the Colonial Minister, November 1st, 1858. Kirkwall, vol. 1, 
p. 216. 

« Ibid., pp. 221-2. 

*Ibid., p. 229. 


barbarians, as well as the lack of tact on the part of the Lord High Commis- 
sioner, had greatly embittered the inhabitants. 1 He saw that the existing 
system was bad for both parties, yet, considering that union would be dis- 
advantageous for the Ionians themselves, he hoped that the Protectorate 
could be maintained, and that the desire for union could be cured by a grant 
of reforms. 

On January 18, Gladstone was made resident Lord High Commissioner of 
the Ionian Islands, which he accepted as a temporary post. On the day on 
which he assumed office the Assembly met in extraordinary session to hear 
the proposed reforms. To his message announcing his appointment and its 
object, the Assembly returned no answer save a veiled attack on the govern- 
ment which culminated two days later in a vote proclaiming that " the sole 
and unanimous will (Bikqm)* of the Ionian people has been and is, the union 
of the Seven Islands with Greece." A committee of eleven was appointed 
" to submit to the Chamber its opinion on the ulterior measures suitable to the 
proclamation of the union this day adopted by the Assembly." 8 On the fol- 
lowing day Mr. Gladstone sent a message to the Chamber pointing out the 
unconstitutional nature of its proceedings and advising that the committee 
of eleven should rather be employed to draw up a petition to the Queen, in 
accordance with the Constitution. After some opposition by the radical lead- 
ers, this advice was adopted by a great majority, all save a few radicals join- 
ing in it. The enemies of union hoped that in this way the question would 
be closed. The petition was adopted on January 30 and telegraphed to Eng- 
land by Mr. Gladstone on the following day. 3 At the same time he sent in 
his resignation. 

The suggestion of relinquishing the strategic fortress of Corfu excited 
warm opposition in Great Britain. As Lytton had impressed on Gladstone, 
neither the British public nor its Parliament likes any policy that " gives any- 
thing up," 4 nor is their attitude unique. On February 2 the Colonial Min- 
ister telegraphed the Queen's reply, which was a most unequivocal negative. 5 

The question of union being disposed of, Mr. Gladstone now introduced his 
bill of reforms, but nationality, not liberty, was the consuming passion of 
the Ionians and no other boon would suffice. Nor was the upper class in 
sympathy with the reforms, preferring that the Protectorate should retain its 
power. The Assembly, fearing that any other action on its part would 

1 Cf. Morley, vol 1, p. 603. 

2 Gladstone sent back to the Foreign Office a scholarly discussion of whether this word 
meant "will" or "wish," a meticulous attention to detail which, in view of the evident 
intent of the voters, has caused some hilarity among the commentators. 

8 Documents, post, p. 838. 

4 Morley, vol. 1, p. 615. 

5 Documents, post, p. 841. 


weaken the effect of its vote for union, declared with only one dissenting vote 
that the reforms were inadmissible. On February 19, Mr. Gladstone departed, 
still devoted to the cause of reform in the British administration of the 
islands, but as little bitten by his experience here as in Italy with any en- 
thusiasm for national aspirations. 

On the day before Gladstone's departure the committee of eleven had re- 
ported that the Queen's reply did not close the question of union. With this 
situation the new Commissioner, Sir Henry Storks, had to deal, which he did 
by declaring the Assembly prorogued. 

The Italian war had created throughout Europe an agitation regarding na- 
tionality. To this the Ionians were acutely alive, and were not slow to point 
out the significance of the doctrine that each people is the only true judge 
of who should rule them, which had been expressed, in the Italian case, by 
Lord John Russell, now British Foreign Secretary. 1 The Assembly of 1861, 
encouraged by Italian success to follow Italian tactics, adopted two resolutions 
drawn up by the radical leaders of the Unionists; the one addressed to " the 
People, Governments, and Philanthropists of Christian Europe," attacking the 
despotic nature of the Government; the other proposing that the matter be left 
to a vote of the people by universal suffrage. 2 The Commissioner warned the 
Assembly that any discussion of these documents would be unconstitutional, 
and on its determination to proceed, prorogued it for six months. 

In spite of the position now occupied by Great Britain in the Islands, the 
British Cabinet still persisted in opposing any change in the Treaty of Paris. 
On April 22, 1861, the Colonial Minister declared in the House of Lords that 
the Government was determined to maintain the Protectorate and on May 7, 
Gladstone, now Chancellor of the Exchequer, denounced the cession as noth- 
ing less than a crime against the safety of Europe. 3 When the twelfth Ionian 
Parliament opened on March 1, 1862, and in its animosity against the Govern- 
ment drew up a protest accusing it of various breaches of the Treaty of 
Paris, it, too, was prorogued. Matters had come to a patent deadlock. A 
new factor was introduced, however, in the summer of 1862, by the expulsion 
of King Otto from the throne of Greece. The filling of the vacant throne 
was an absorbing question for the three Powers, Great Britain, France, and 
Russia, who were guarantors of the kingdom by the treaty of 1832. On the 
deposition of King Otto the revolutionary government had offered the throne 
to a cousin of the Czar, who refused. The mass of the people, however, were 

1 Signor Dandolo, a leading Ionian, had in fact published a letter to Russell calling 
on him to carry out in the Islands the policy he had outlined in his famous dispatch' to 
Hudson at Turin, dated October 27, 1860. 

2 Documents, post, pp. 841 et seq. 
• Kirkwall, vol. 1, p. 267. 


determined to have Prince Alfred of England and the crown was offered to 
him in October. By an agreement established between the three Powers it 
had been settled that no member of their reigning families might occupy the 
Greek throne, and upon the deposition of King Otto, England had at once 
proposed to the other Powers that this principle be reaffirmed. The other 
Cabinets, so long as there appeared to be a chance of the choice falling on a 
prince of their respective nationalities, were eager to uphold the right of the 
people to make their own choice. When, however, they saw that the choice 
was likely to fall on Prince Alfred of England, the Powers agreed to the 
British proposal and signed a convention to that effect on December 4, 1862. * 

The Greeks refused to accept Prince Alfred's refusal and proceeded to 
elect him by a plebiscite. Before his election, 2 however, the British Cabinet, 
whether anxious to carve a way out of a position untenable in the face of 
the continued opposition of the islanders, or eager to strengthen the Greek 
kingdom as a counter balance to the growing Slav power, had, on December 
8, 1862, adopted a resolution to surrender the Protectorate. 8 This resolution 
which, in view of the event, presumably contained the provision that it should 
be subject to the vote of the Ionian Assembly, was forwarded to the Provi- 
sional Government with the stipulations that if a suitable person were chosen 
as king, if the constitutional form of government were preserved, and if all 
attempt at aggression against Turkey were abandoned, the Ionian Islands 
would be ceded to Greece. 4 

The choice of Prince Alfred being out of the question, Prince George of 
Denmark, whom the British desired as a substitute, was elected by the Greek 
Assembly on March 3, 1863, and in the treaty of July 13 between Great Brit- 
ain, France, Russia, and Denmark establishing the Danish prince as king of 
Greece Great Britain pledged herself to add the Ionian Islands to the realm 
of the new King " when such union shall have been found to be in accord- 
ance with the wishes of the Ionian Parliament and shall have obtained the 
assent of the Courts of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia." 5 By a con- 

1 Cambridge Modern History, vol. 11, p. 641. 

2 The plebiscite was held apparently in the second week of December. The result of 
the election was published at Athens on December 22 (N. S.). The Times (London), De- 
cember 25, 1862. 

*Morley, vol. 1, p. 620, note, "Dec. 8, 1862.— Cabinet Resolution to surrender the 
Ionian protectorate. Only Lord W(estbury) opposing." The Cambridge Modern History, 
vol. 11, p. 641, attributes the British cession to gratitude for the choice of an English 
prince. According to a dispatch of Drouyn dc Lhuys, of November 17, 1863, the cession 
was made a condition by Denmark of the acceptance of Prince George of the throne of 
Greece, and France had encouraged the plan. France, Affaires i tr anger es: Documents 
diplomatiques, 1864. Annexion des ties ioniennes a la Grice, p. 75. 

* Cambridge Modern History, op. cit. and loc. cit 

8 Documents, post, p. 848, Article 4. 


vention of August 1, these Courts, which had been signatories to the Treaty 
of Paris, agreed that when they should obtain certain knowledge of the 
assent of the Assembly, they were ready to come to an agreement with Great 
Britain with regard to the final terms of the treaty. 1 By this convention the 
consultation of the representatives of the Islands was reserved to the British 

In accordance with these international agreements the Lord High Com- 
missioner convoked a new Ionian Parliament to vote on the question of union 
with Greece. The electoral qualifications for the new parliament were those 
of the electoral law of 1849. 2 By this it had been provided that the electors 
must be citizens, either native or naturalized, Christians, of 21 years of age, 
and literate. Further than this, the electors must own property, or if not, 
must fulfill other requirements of education, or of business or official stand- 
ing. Those voting on a property qualification must own property worth 
three thousand dollars, if domiciled in a town, or of one thousand eight hun- 
dred dollars, if in the country. These amounts applied to the larger islands 
of Corfu, Cephalonia and Zante. In the smaller island of Santa Maura the 
requirement was one thousand five hundred dollars in towns and seven hun- 
dred and fifty dollars in the rural parts; in Ithaca, Cerigo, and Paxo the 
requirement was less. Sons living in their father's households and owning 
sufficient property might vote, as well as brothers living together, if together 
they should possess the requisite amount of property. If the elector claimed 
a vote on the basis of education, he must hold a degree or certificate in science 
obtained in the Ionian or foreign universities, or be a practicing advocate or 
attorney, or a physician, surgeon, or apothecary, or a professor or tutor in 
science, literature, or the fine arts, or a master in the Ionian College or in a 
secondary school. The vote was also given to officials in the public employ- 
ment who were in receipt of a salary or life pension equivalent to the prop- 
erty qualification, and also to retail merchants if the returns on their capital 
were equivalent to the value of the property qualifications. The master or 
owner of a ship and the head of any manufacturing establishment might also 
vote. The usual proviso was added excluding all those who had been de- 
clared guilty of offences, other than political, unless their civil rights had been 
restored. The population of the islands was in 1862 a little under two hun- 
dred and fifty thousand; these qualifications yielded thirteen thousand four 
hundred and nineteen qualified electors. 3 To be eligible for parliament the 
candidate must be over thirty, and own property of twice the value of that 
of an elector, or possess other qualifications corresponding to those for an 

1 Documents, post, p. 850. 

2 Parliamentary Papers, Colonies, 1850, vol. 36 [1276], p. 72. 

» Kirkwall, vol. 1, p. 174. 


elector. The number of delegates allotted to Corfu, Cephalonia, and Zante, 
was ten each. Santa Maura was given six, and Ithaca, Cerigo and Paxo, two 
each, making forty-two in all. 

The vote was held in the chief town of each district. The polls were open 
from seven a. m. to five p. m. on two successive days. At a public meeting 
some days previous to the election the candidates were nominated and the 
election officials elected. Voting at the election was by secret ballot. The 
method followed was novel; a ballot box with two compartments was pro- 
vided for each candidate's name, one compartment, painted white, to receive 
the affirmative vote, one green, to receive the negative. The count was to be 
made by local native officials who for the most part were elective. 

It appears that British opinion had failed to credit with sincerity the votes 
of the former delegates for union, arguing from the well-known Ionian love 
of office that in view of the fact that union would surely mean a reduction in 
the number of offices, the deputies were voting for it only while it was un- 
attainable, and as a means of earning their constituents' support The Brit- 
ish officials had also firmly believed that the landed class would, if it came 
to a vote, prefer the sure protection of Great Britain with its conservative 
franchise to the doubtful protection of the weak Greek kingdom which had 
universal suffrage. This false impression had been aided by several peti- 
tions which had been presented, begging for incorporation as a British Crown 
colony. However widespread these views may have been among the British 
officials, and they were certainly held by the Commissioner, Sir Henry Storks, 
and by Gladstone, 1 they proved to be unfounded. There was scarcely a dis- 
senting voice in the vote for union. 

The Parliament opened on October 1, 1863. On the 3rd, it was addressed 
by the Commissioner, who stated that they had been convoked to inform him 
whether or not it was the desire of the people by whom they had been chosen 
that the Protectorate of Her British Majesty should cease and that the Ionian 
States should form henceforth a part of the Kingdom of Greece. In the 
same address he enumerated the conditions stipulated by the British Govern- 
ment, the important one being that of an obligation to make an annual pay- 
ment of £10,000 to the Civil List of the Greek King. Should the vote be 
in favor of the union, he continued, the Queen would then invite the Powers 
which were parties to the treaty of 1815 to revise that treaty, in conjunction 
with France, which had been a party to the treaties respecting Greece, to make 
" such arrangements as should tend to the future welfare of the Islands and 
the permanent interests of Europe. 2 On October 5 the Parliament, with 

* Kirkwall, vol. 1, pp. 233, 284. 
2 Documents, post, p. 852. 


only three dissenting votes, 1 proceeded to vote a formal decree of union with 
the kingdom of Greece. 2 Regarding the conditions laid down by the Com- 
missioner, the Assembly reserved to itself the right to declare its decisions, 
as soon as it should have been informed concerning the matters vaguely re- 
ferred to by the Commissioner as " arrangements for the welfare of the States 
and the interests of Europe." As for the guarantee of an annual payment of 
£10,000 to the King's civil list, the Assembly made no answer whatever. The 
temper of the deputies was opposed to considering it as a compulsory meas- 
ure. No action having been taken, the Commissioner, on the 13th, again 
called their attention to the subject, to which the Assembly answered with a 
request to modify the conditions. 8 The Assembly was finally forbidden to 
discuss the matter further and on October 21 it was prorogued, never to 
reassemble. 4 » 

The "arrangements for the welfare of the States and the interests of 
Europe " proved to be as displeasing to the islanders as was the guarantee of 
the civil list. The Powers had come to a secret understanding, on the de- 
mand of Great Britain, Austria and Turkey, that the cession should be accom- 
panied by the razing of the fortifications of Corfu and the neutralization of 
the islands. 5 These conditions had not been mentioned by the Commissioner 
and when they were published in the British press they raised a fury of pro- 
test in the Islands, but, as in the case of the civil list, they were insisted on by 
the Powers. 

The wish of the Ionian Assembly having been duly expressed on the ques- 
tion of union, and the British government having made the vote known to 
the guaranteeing Powers, the plenipotentiaries of Austria, France, Great 
Britain, Prussia and Russia met at London to take the next step. On Novem- 
ber 14 they signed a treaty to the effect that, the condition of the vote laid 
down in the Convention of August 1 having been fulfilled, the Powers signa- 
tory to the treaty of 1815 now formally accorded their assent to the renuncia- 
tion of the Protectorate by Britain, and to the union of the Islands with the 
Hellenic kingdom. The obnoxious clauses of neutrality and the razing of 

1 Kirkwall, vol. 1, p. 284. On p. 262 of vol. 2, Kirkwall says that the vote was 

2 Documents, post, p. 853. 

8 There were three dissenting from this vote on the ground that all the conditions of 
union might he confided to the generosity of Great Britain. Possibly this accounts for 
the inconsistency in KSrkwall noted above. 

* The treaty of March 29, 1864, recites in Article 5 that the Assembly on October 7/19, 
1863, voted that the annual payment be made. — Kirkwall characterizes the demand as 
indefensible, as there was no reason to assign the King a special revenue from the Islands. 
It was later abandoned. 

5 France, Affaires Hranghres: Documents diplomatiques, 1864, p. 75. Kirkwall says 
that the condition was insisted on by Austria against the wish of Great Britain. 


the fortress were included in the treaty. On March 29, 1864, a final treaty 
between Great Britain, France, Russia, and Greece, again referring to the 
vote of the Assembly as the condition which had been stipulated and fulfilled, 
legalized the cession and the termination of the British Protectorate was 
finally proclaimed by the Lord High Commissioner on May 28, 1864. 

The Schleswig Question, 1848 — 

The most widely known instance of a treaty clause providing for a plebis- 
cite concerning a question of sovereignty is that of Article 5 of the treaty 
signed at Prague in 1866, whereby Austria and Prussia agreed as to the dis- 
position of the Danish duchies. However, the suggestion of a plebiscite in 
Northern Schleswig does not begin with the Treaty of Prague, but dates 
from the struggle in the duchies between the German and Danish nationalist 
movements of 1848. 

The fortunes of the two feudal duchies of Schleswig and Holstein had for 
many years been identified with those of the Kingdom of Denmark, although 
their union with the kingdom was purely a personal one under the Danish 
King, who had inherited the titles of Duke of Holstein and Duke of Schles- 
wig. In spite of this ancient union, and of the fact that the two duchies 
had been for centuries closely allied or dynastically united with each other, 
they were of different racial texture. Holstein was wholly German in popu- 
lation and had been made a member of the Germanic Confederation in 1815. 
Except for the west coast and the North Sea islands, Frisian from time im- 
memorial, Schleswig was originally Danish down to the river Eider, which 
was the historical frontier of Denmark. In the Middle Ages, however, it 
had received a large influx of settlers from Holstein, as may still be seen 
from the German place names along the Eider and through the south of 
Schleswig. During the close union of the two duchies this northward move- 
ment of German settlers continued and South Schleswig proper (bounded by 
the Schley-Dannevirke-Husum line to the north), eventually became solidly 
German in language and sympathies. This line of Schley-Husum at the end 
of the 18th century formed the frontier for race and language. During the 
19th century, however, the German language, aided by Government pressure, 
by the influence of the Church, and later by a popular movement, penetrated 
further north, and by 1848 the linguistic frontier corresponded roughly to the 
line of Flensburg-Tondern. 1 This was only a very rough approximation, 
however, for throughout central Schleswig there were regions where some- 
times the one race and sometimes the other were settled in solid blocks, and, 

1 Emil Elberling, " Partage du Slesvig " in Manuel historique de la question du Slesvig. 
Edited by Franz de Jessen, p. 139. 

From Frani de Manutl Hiuorique de la Que: 

n« cyatst 


in some places, where the two groups were mingled in the same parish. 
These so-called " mixed districts "of Schleswig contained the city of Tondern 
and forty-nine country parishes of the departments of Flensburg, Tondern, 
Husum and Gottorp. In eighteen of these parishes, in the centre of the 
region, Danish was used exclusively in ordinary speech, and there were eight 
parishes where German was the common medium. 1 The region properly re- 
ferred to as mixed contained 23 parishes, chiefly in Anglia, and 29,879 in- 
habitants. 2 The total population of the jduchy, according to tjie census of 
1855, was 395,860. That of Holstein was about 500,000. Their combined 
area was approximately 700 square miles. Linked to the fate of the two 
duchies was that of the former Prussian Duchy of Lauenburg, lying along 
the Elbe to the southeast of Holstein, and given to the Danish King in 1815. 

Although both Schleswig and Holstein had for many years been ruled by 
kings of Denmark, the law of succession in the kingdom and in the duchies 
was different, the kingdom being heritable in the female line, and the Salic 
law still being in force in the duchies. The imminent danger of the failure 
of the male line, which was the only common heir, had given rise in Den- 
mark to an agitation to induce the king to change the law of succession in the 
two duchies, and to make them an integral part of the kingdom of Denmark. 
Christian VIII had accordingly, by a rescript of July 8, 1846, arbitrarily 
decreed the continuance of the union of the duchies with Denmark in spite of 
the different laws of inheritance in the two states. These efforts had called 
forth such violent protests 8 from the Estates of the duchies, that the matter 
had been left in abeyance. Christian soon died. His successor, Frederick 
VII, was forced by a revolutionary movement in Copenhagen to issue a 
rescript on January 28, 1848, announcing that there would be a single con- 
stitution for the three units, Holstein, Schleswig, and Denmark, leaving to 
the duchies autonomy in local matters, but providing for common estates. 
This supreme effort of the Danish party of expansion occurred at the very 
moment when the new German nationalist spirit was eager to unite under 
the Germanic Confederation all territories inhabited by the German race. 
And as the Danish nationalist party had not been content to incorporate only 

1 The German contention was that the Danes in North Schleswig were peasants, whereas 
the men of property were for the most part German. However true this may have been 
in 1848, it is obvious from the map on opposite page that the situation had changed radi- 
cally by 1906. 

2 This account is taken from P. K. Lauridsen : " La situation des langues en Slesvig," 
in Manuel historique, pp. 114-18 and 122. See map on opposite page. 

8 See State Papers, vol. 40, p. 1253, for protest of the Estates of Holstein against the 
vote of the Roeskild Assembly in Denmark for uniting the two duchies to Denmark. The 
union was strongly opposed by Duke Frederick of Augustenburg who had strong claims 
to the duchies, but none to Denmark. 


Danes in the Danish kingdom, so the German nationalists coveted the incor- 
poration of the whole of Schleswig, as well as of Holstein, in the Confedera- 
tion, and to do this made use of the argument of the indissoluble union of 
the duchies. 1 The estates of the duchies, in warm sympathy with the Ger- 
manic movement, answered the royal rescript with a demand for the incor- 
poration of Schleswig under the sovereignty of the Danish king, as a state 
in the Germanic Confederation. This they said was the only means of safety 
against the Danish imperialists. Their demand was carried to Copenhagen 
in March, by the delegates to the constituent assembly who, true to their 
instructions, laid before the Danish Government the demand for incorpora- 

It is in these discussions at Copenhagen that we hear the first suggestion 
of a division of Northern Schleswig by a plebiscite. The plan, which re- 
quired leaving to the vote of the inhabitants, taken by parishes, the question 
of incorporation in Denmark or in the Confederation, appears to have been 
proposed by two of the German delegates from the duchies, Clausen and 
Olshausen, to the Danish Minister, Lehmann. How much support it actually 
received from the Danish government is uncertain. Certainly it received no 
official assent, although there appears to have been some hope of this for a 
short time in March. 2 The King, however, although yielding a separate con- 
stitution for Holstein, answered the demand of the duchies not only by re- 
fusing the incorporation of Schleswig in the Confederation but by incorporat- 
ing it as an integral part of the Kingdom of Denmark. 

Without waiting for the king to reply to their demands, the duchies had 
broken into open insurrection. On March 24, a provisional government had 
been erected at Kiel, which, proclaiming that the duke was no longer free 
but under the influence of the Eider Danes, called its supporters to rally with 
their arms, " to preserve their German land from being absorbed." A week 
later, on March 31, the Provisional Government issued from Rendsburg a 
proclamation to the Danish people, promising that the people of North 
Schleswig should freely declare whether they desired to be a province of the 
kingdom of Denmark or to follow the German nation, although, " so long 

1 The view of the German inhabitants of the duchies and that of many of the Danish 
inhabitants was that this union was a constitutional right and could not be taken from 
them. The Danish view was that it was a visionary affair, belief in which was of modern 
origin, due largely to the propaganda of various German professors at Kiel. Elberling in 
Manuel historique, p. 159. The right to union had, however, been formally recognized in 
various royal rescripts of the Danish crown and had an undeniable historical basis. 

8 Sten Bille, the Danish admiral who carried the delegates back to Kiel recounts in 
Bidrag Til Martsdagenes Historie, Hist. Tidsskrift, R. VI, p. 413, that one of the delegates 
showed to him a map and drew a line across it nearly as high as Flensburg, saying that 
they might have supported that line as a basis for such a solution, but that the Danish 
ministers had refused it. Manuel historique, p. 137. 


as the male line rules in Denmark they offer to the Danes an honorable alli- 
ance and a common sovereign." x 

Danish troops were at once dispatched to Schleswig. The revolt in the 
duchies had occurred at the time when the revolution in Berlin was at its 
height. The Prussian Government, seeing the popularity of a movement in 
harmony with the growing nationalist sentiment, made the marching of Dan- 
ish troops into Schleswig the excuse for dispatching Prussian troops into 
Holstein. This action was endorsed by the Germanic Diet at Frankfort, 
which, on April 4, formally declared that the Federal German State of Hol- 
stein was in danger of being attacked and that the Prussian action was 
approved. The Diet in the same proclamation offered mediation based on 
recognition of the independence of the two duchies and their right to indis- 
soluble union. Great Britain who, with Russia, had guaranteed the posses- 
sion of Schleswig to the Crown of Denmark in 1721, looked with great dis- 
favor on the action of Prussia, and threatened to send her fleet to preserve the 
status quo. Russia, France and Sweden also opposed Prussia and the Con- 
federation. The latter refusing to withdraw its troops, mediation was of- 
fered by Great Britain and Russia, and accepted by Prussia and the Diet. 

The proposal for a vote in North Schleswig had been quickly adopted by 
von Arnim, the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs. With Great Britain 
giving full support to the Danish cause and the other Powers ranged beside 
her, it was plain that Germany would not be allowed to absorb the whole 
of Schleswig : von Arnim saw in the proposal of a vote in North Schleswig 
a method by which, by adhering to the principle of nationality and thus sacri- 
ficing a part of Schleswig, the remainder of the duchy, as well as all of Hol- 
stein, could be claimed by the Confederation by an unquestionable title. He 
accordingly informed the Diet and the British Cabinet that Prussia would 
agree to a plan of armistice if there were included in the principles of peace 
not only a recognition of the indissoluble union and independence of the 
duchies, and inheritance through the male line only, but also the division of 
Northern Schleswig according to nationality as established by a vote. 2 Al- 
though the Provisional Government had itself been the author of this last 
point of the vote, and it had gained wide support in the duchies, 8 the coming 

1 Documents, post, p. 864. 

*Elberling says that von Arnim hoped that a vote would give Germany the line of 
Apenrade-Tondern although he knew the linguistic frontier to be approximately Flensburg- 
Tondern. Manual historique, pp. 139, 152. 

8 In the debate on April 3d in the common assembly of the duchies at Rendsburg, three 
of the chief delegates declared that no obstacle would be t>ut in the way of the people of 
Northern Schleswig if they should evince a desire for Denmark, "for the happiness of 
a people can not be effected in spite of themselves." The Prussian Major Wildenbruch, 
who had been sent by his government to conduct negotiations with the Danish authorities 
after the battle of Schleswig (early in April) had found that in Rendsburg opinion was 


of aid from both Prussia and the Confederation had raised hopes of gaining* 
the whole of Schleswig, and the same Provisional Government now vehemently 
objected to a vote on the ground that " the sacrifices of the sanguinary strug- 
gle which had occurred since its proposal would not justify it, for simple 
considerations of equity, in adhering to a principle which would infringe on 
higher interests and national rights " ; * a curiously naive statement of a 
familiar argument. A spirited correspondence followed, von Arnim replying 
flatly that Prussia's influence was to be had only for an object possible of 
attainment, and that for this the vote was a necessity, 2 and the Provisional 
Government countering with the objection that no true frontier could be 
arrived at by a division, owing to the mixture of languages and social condi- 
tions, for even in Northern Schleswig it pointed out that although the peas- 
ants were undeniably Danish, the landed proprietors were German; further- 
more, it would be abandoning the excellent ports of Apenrade and Flensburg r 
which were mostly German. 8 Von Arnim persisted, answering these argu- 
ments with the practical one that any departure from the status quo ante 
would require a " compensation," and that a vote would supply an argument 
for division which might be justified before the European Powers and con- 
sented to by Denmark. 

In spite of the fact that the Provisional Government had instructed their 
representatives at both London and Frankfort to oppose the division, the 
Diet, at the instance of von Arnim, resolved on May 30 to adhere in toto to 
the Prussian propositions for an armistice and peace preliminaries, emphasiz- 
ing in its turn the stipulation that no part of the duchy of Schleswig could be 
detached except by the free consent of the population. 4 No special protection 
was demanded for the German minority. 

Meanwhile, Bunsen, the Prussian Minister at London, had proposed the 
Prussian bases for an armistice to Palmerston on May 18. Palmerston, in 
his capacity as mediator, replied that he would recommend them to the Danish 
Government. With regard to drawing the line of separation through the 
mixed districts, Pfetlmerston, however, suggested that "instead of going 
through the difficult process of a detailed appeal to all the inhabitants of each 
district, the line be drawn according to ascertainable statistical facts." 5 He 

unanimous that in case of a separation it should be done by vote and that a line to the 
north of Flensburg and Tondern, leaving to Denmark the islands of Als and Mro would 
form a frontier satisfactory to the Provisional Government Elberling, in Manuel his* 
torique, pp. 137-8. 

1 Documents, post, p. 866. 

2 Documents, post, p. 870. 
8 Documents, post, p. 871. 

4 Martens, JV. R. G., vol. 12, p. 290, note. Elberling, in Manuel historique, p. 139. 

5 Documents, post, p. 874. 


submitted the plan of a partition to Denmark but it again found enemies 
among the Danish statesmen. The Danish Government replied to Palmerston 
that a separation would divide communes and even families and that the 
greater part of the population would prefer annexation to either Denmark or 
Germany. 1 In spite of Palmerston's advice, Denmark refused to accept any 
division, and insisted upon counter proposals which provided for the complete 
evacuation of Schleswig, the Provisional Government to continue to admin- 
ister the duchies until the final settlement of the question. Bunsen, however, 
clung to the vote, and replied to Palmerston with a plan, available under the 
Danish proposal, for securing a free and unbiased opinion of the political 
opinions of the inhabitants as to incorporation with Denmark. 2 By this each 
of the two belligerents, Germany and Denmark, were to send commissioners, 
and England, as mediating Power, was to send a third, the three to oversee 
the vote which was to be administered by the Provisional Government, the 
representatives of the mediating Power to act as umpire. 

During the negotiations the matter came up for debate in the German 
National Assembly at Frankfort on June 9, on the presentation of a report 
of the Committee on International Questions. 8 In the debate the Austrian 
President of the Germanic Diet endorsed the proposed division by vote, though 
he felt confident that the vote would be against any division, an opinion which 
must have been confirmed by the speech of the two delegates from North 

On June 23 Palmerston, still omitting the suggestion of a vote, submitted 
to the Danish and Prussian Ministers in London a plan for an armistice which 
contained two alternatives as to the disposition of Schleswig; the first, that 
it should be divided according to nationality, the northern part to be incor- 
porated in Denmark and the southern in Germany ; the second, that it be kept 
intact and be administered by a joint administrator for Schleswig and Hol- 
stein. To this Bunsen replied flatly on June 24, " that Germany can not give 
up the principle, adhered to on ajl occasions, that no separation of any part 
of Schleswig can ever be thought of, unless the population in the northern 
districts themselves declare, by an open and unbiased manifestation of their 
intention to that effect, that they wish to be separated from the rest of the 
duchy." 4 

1 EIbcrling in Manuel historique, p. 140. 

2 Documents, post, p. 875. Elberling, p. 139, says that Bunsen, who was more sympa- 
thetic with the Provisional Government of the duchies than was his Government, urged 
on Palmerston that North Schleswig should form, after the division, a separate duchy, inde- 
pendent like the rest of Schleswig, and that the German minority should be protected. 
Manuel historique, p. 139. 

'Documents, post, p. 879. 

* Documents, post, pp. 876, 878. 


Although acceptance of a division according to nationality afforded an 
opportunity for Denmark to gain the Danish part of Schleswig irrevocably, 
the Danish Government continued to refuse to recognize the new doctrine of 
nationality and rested its case on treaties and historic right. 1 Among the 
Schleswig refugees at Copenhagen, there was also great unwillingness to 
accept the idea of a division. Even the distinctly Danish people of North 
Schleswig went so far as to threaten that they would choose annexation with 
the rest of Schleswig to Germany, rather than a divided Schleswig, 2 and pro- 
tests and petitions were drawn up to this effect. There were, however, a 
few Danish individuals who favored the plan. A quantity of pamphlets ap- 
peared supporting the two parties, the party of nationality and the party of 
the indivisible monarchy; those for a division placing their emphasis on 
division according to the linguistic frontier rather than by a vote, as the 
means of settling the problem. 3 The Danish government, however, refused 
to discuss the point and would treat only regarding a suspension of arms and 
the provisional administration of the duchies. Prussia, although propelled by 
the clamorous desire of the German nationalists, dared not persist in the face 
of the threatening attitude of the European Powers. In an armistice signed 
on August 26 at Malmoe, she yielded practically all the Danish demands, and, 
although hostilities soon began again, the war ended with the status quo ante. 

Although peace was effected in 1849 it was sufficiently apparent that it 
would be only temporary and there was constant effort on the part of Euro- 
pean diplomacy during the succeeding years to effect a permanent solution. 
The chief effort was directed towards settling the dynastic quarrel ; the idea 
of a division as a compromise was, however, not forgotten. Palmerston con- 
tinued to urge it. The only agreement reached, however, was that by a con- 
ference of the Great Powers at London in 1852 which attempted to adjust the 
issues at stake by buying off the claims of the Duke of Augustenburg, and by 
confirming to the Danish King the succession in the duchies, while providing 
that the union between them and Denmark should be purely personal. 

1 To its representatives abroad Denmark admitted that it might accept the line Schley- 
Husum, leaving the city of Schleswig to Germany. 

2 In support of this statement Elberling gives several names and cites the Dagbladet 
of May 10, 1848. 

8 Elberling mentions especially Le partage du Slesvig by H. E. Schack and a pamphlet 
entitled La question Slesvig oise by H. A. Raaslof, (Minister for Schleswig, 1854-56, and 
for Holstein, 1860-61), published in November, 1848, under the signature of " Theophilus," 
in which he advocated consideration of the wishes of the people of the south of Schleswig 
as well as those of the north. He advocated a division along the Dannevirke, but without 
annexation of the northern part to Denmark, and hoped for a solution by a special 
assembly of representatives not only from Schleswig, Denmark, and Holstein, but also 
from Sweden and Norway and Germany. He was the first to see it as a Scandanavian 
as well as a German question. 


The prestige given to the principle of nationality by the Italian war of 
1859 once more brought the proposal of a partition of Schleswig into diplo- 
matic notice. Schleinitz, Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared in 
August and again in October, 1859, — that is, after the war in Italy, — and 
again in May, 1861, that division was the only solution capable of satisfying 
all parties. The Cologne Zeittmg, the Hamburg Nachrichten and the London 
Morning Post all supported it, 1 and Bismarck, on his entrance into the Prus- 
sian government (September, 1862) spoke in favor of this partition to Lord 
Russell. 2 The idea of a division had, however, been abandoned by the neu- 
trals, owing in part to the great desire of Austria to keep the Danish mon- 
archv intact. 

Counting on the continued support of the Powers, the Danish government 
had persisted in the hope of retaining not only the whole of Schleswig, but 
Holstein as well, and had prevented any support of a division by keeping the 
people in ignorance of the growing storm. So unconscious, indeed, was the 
Danish Government of its predicament, that, in 1863, at the very moment when 
the three forces, the dynastic ambitions of the House of Augustenburg, the 
theory of the political unity of Schleswig and Holstein, and the exalted na- 
tional sentiment of the German people, fusing in the able hands of Bismarck 
and gathering momentum from the growing belief in the national right of 
people to dispose of themselves, were threatening Denmark and her ancient 
rights based on treaties and inheritance, Christian IX, propelled by an over- 
whelming enthusiasm on the part of his Danish subjects, signed a constitu- 
tion which, contrary to the London agreement, unified the political institu- 
tions of Denmark and the duchies. The German answer was an opposing 
wave of national patriotism from the people of Austria and Prussia, the two 
governments vieing with each other as leaders in the national cause. Chris- 
tian IX on his side refused to yield. 

In 1864 when the storm broke, the European situation, which had made 
it to the interest of the Powers to protect Denmark in 1848, had changed. 
France was disposed to be friendly to Prussia at the moment. 8 Rnssia and 
Great Britain were the only ones still concerned in preserving the monarchy 
but neither now felt it worth a show of force. On February 1, 1864, the 
Austrian and Prussian forces crossed the Eider into Schleswig, ostensibly to 
take possession of the duchy as a guarantee of the execution of certain under- 
takings made by the Danish government in 1852 and since repudiated. After 
a courageous but hopeless struggle the Danish troops were forced back into 

1 Elbcrling, Manuel historique, p. 150. The reference to the Morning Post is to the 
issue of March 26, 1861. 

2/Wd., p. 151. 

8 It is said that Napoleon was supporting Augustenburg on the theory that he repre- 
sented the principle of nationality. 


Denmark. But although the whole of the continental part of the kingdom 
was evidently soon to be at the mercy of the Allies, Denmark was maintaining 
an effective blockade against Germany which was a sufficient embarrassment 
to induce them to accept the mediation of the Powers. On the invitation of 
the British Government, plenipotentiaries of Austria, Denmark, France, the 
Germanic Confederation, Prussia, Russia, and Sweden and Norway, met in 
conference on April 25, with the object of agreeing on a plan for peace be- 
tween Denmark and Germany. 

Even before the plenipotentiaries had gathered, it was obvious to those 
acquainted with the attitude of the German States that there was little hope 
of an agreement on the lines of the arrangement made at London in 1852. 
Napoleon, seeing this, and anxious that before the Conference met some pos- 
sible way out of the dilemma might be in readiness, revived the plan of a 
solution by a vote of the inhabitants. On March 20, Drouyn de Lhuys, Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs, sent a dispatch both to London and to the German 
Courts in which he proposed that if the London agreement failed of accept- 
ance the settlement of the question should be left to a vote of the inhabitants 
of the duchy. 1 Whether or not this was with the prime intention of annoy- 
ing Austria, as is asserted by von Sybel, 2 Rechberg at once declared that 
Austria would never countenance such a revolutionary proceeding. The Ber- 
lin authorities, however, although quite as little inclined as Austria to abet 
Napoleon in his method of founding States and Governments on plebiscites, 
was more anxious to propitiate their powerful neighbor and declared a friendly 
willingness to discuss the matter. Bismarck professed a corresponding 
solicitude for the will of the inhabitants, who, he said with some irony, had 
been bartered at the mercy of third parties by former congresses, including 
that of London of 1852. Yet, he added, although an important point, it was 
not the only one demanding attention : existing rights, treaties, and the con- 
venience of all parties must be considered. 8 To avoid definite commitment 
he endeavored to turn the discussions to the project of the Kiel Canal in 
which Napoleon was interested. Drouyn de Lhuys, in order to make the 
proposal more palatable, explained that France attached no special importance 
to the question whether the will of the people of Schleswig-Holstein was to 
be expressed by a plebiscite or by a vote of the Estates, but added that during 
the vote the troops of both of the contending parties should be removed from 
the country, a development which met with the decided disapproval of von 
Goltz, the Prussian ambassador at Paris. 

1 Documents, post, p. 883. 

*Heinrich von Sybel, The Founding of the German Empire, vol. 3, p. 341. 

• Von Sybel, pp. 341-3. Von Sybel, as is well known, had access to unpublished official 



Pursuing the matter, Drouyn de Lhuys, on April 9, made a definite state- 
ment to the Prussian ambassador that the Emperor was in favor of a com- 
plete cession of Holstein and of that part of Schleswig lying south of the 
proposed canal, 1 the people to be consulted, either through a plebiscite or a 
vote of the Estates. If the people wished to form an independent state under 
the Augustenburg prince, France would raise no objections, although she 
could only regret the founding of another small state. If, however, the vote 
should be in favor of uniting with Prussia, Napoleon would, in the confer- 
ence, make their cause his own. Drouyn de Lhuys showed further how few 
objections could be raised against such a system ; the inherent grandeur of 
the idea, he said, must meet with irresistible success in the Conference. 2 To 
this Bismarck sent an answer on April 14 that the King had expressed his 
concurrence with the general plan of division proposed by France, although 
he must insist on more favorable conditions for the German element in the 
duchies and, more especially, a more northerly situation for the canal or for 
the frontier, although, if the alternative of annexation to Prussia, proposed 
by Drouyn de Lhuys, should be decided on, this demand would be more 
moderate. As to a vote, he wrote : 

Prussia will at all stages of the conference certainly insist upon consulting 
the will of the inhabitants, about which we are negotiating with Vienna, and 
upon the proposal of a canal, although Russia will not listen to it. Yet it will 
not be advisable to call upon the people to cast their votes at the very outset. 
If the vote should be taken now, it would be in favor of Augustenburg, but 
against any division of Schleswig, and, consequently, not in accordance with 
Napoleon's wishes. 

Prussia therefore intends to bring forward at first in the conference the 
demands made hitherto : personal union with Denmark, admission of Schles- 
wig into the Germanic Confederation, and elevation of Rendsburg to the rank 
of a Confederate fortress, and of Kiel to a Confederate port. Denmark will 
surely reject these demands, and prefer rather the cession of Holstein and of 
a part of Schleswig. Then the people will see that there must be a division in 
any case, and they will make up their minds to it. 

The same is true of the question, to whom the territory which is ceded 
shall belong? Prussia, of course, would prefer the plan of annexation; but 
the people will not vote for that, until the other plan has proved itself to be 
hopeless, and the matter is reduced to the simple question: Prussian or 
Danish ? Moreover, the postponement of the decision, so long as the occu- 
pation of the country continues, would not be prejudicial to Prussian 
interests. 8 

1 On April 19 Napoleon signified his assent to the line Schley-Husum, a line at that 
time thought of for the canal, or any other provided Prussia gained the consent of the 
people to it Von Sybel, vol. 3, p. 351. 

•This summary of the Conference of April 9 (between de Lhuys and von Goltz) is 
quoted from von Sybel, p. 345. 

8 Ibid., pp. 349-50. 


Meanwhile the time for the opening of the Conference had arrived and 
the plenipotentiaries had gathered in London. A suspension of hostilities 
was the first subject of debate. After a long discussion of terms, a four 
weeks' armistice was finally agreed on. In conformity with the Prussian 
plan, the suggestion of a division was not at once brought forward. The 
month went by before any hope of agreement was reached. The plenipo- 
tentiaries of Great Britain and France supported the Danish insistence on the 
rights of inheritance of King Christian IX over all the countries of the Dan- 
ish monarchy as provided in the Treaty of London of 1852, whereas the 
Germanic Confederation, which had not been represented at the signing of 
the treaty of 1852, refused to consider itself bound by it, and, supported by 
Austria and Prussia, insisted on the complete independence of the duchies as 
the first essential of peace. On May 28 matters were brought to a head 
by a motion which was introduced by the plenipotentiaries of the German 
Powers, calling for the establishment of Schleswig-Holstein as an independ- 
ent State under the sovereignty of the hereditary Prince of Augustenburg. 1 

Before this attitude of the Germanic Powers the neutrals were helpless un- 
less they wished to come to Denmark's aid openly. As Bismarck had fore- 
seen, division was the only alternative. Perceiving this the Earl of Clarendoa 
abandoning all hope of agreement on the lines of the convention of 1852, 
had, in consultation with the neutrals, drawn up a new proposition to respect 
the national aspirations of both races by giving to Germany Holstein and 
southeastern Schleswig, from the mouth of the Schley to the rampart of the 
Dannevirke, and by allowing the rest of Schleswig to be incorporated in Den- 
mark. This gift of the mixed districts to Denmark was defended by the 
French representative on the ground that as there was bound to be dissatis- 
faction among the inhabitants, no matter to whom they were given, the 
region should go to the weaker power. The plan further stipulated that the 
future sovereignty of the Duchies of Holstein and of Lauenburg, as well 
as the southern part of Schleswig, was not to be fixed without their consent. 
Following an arrangement with the German delegates, this plan was pro- 
posed on May 28, by Clarendon, immediately after the German motion. 

The new proposal at first gave promise of success. The German and Dan- 
ish plenipotentiaries, after some debate, accepted in principle the propositions 
both of division and of appeal to the vote of the people of the southern 
territory. It remained to agree on the line south of which the vote was to 
be taken. England had proposed the line of Schley-Husum ; Prussia pro- 
posed a line far to the north, namely, the line of Apenrade-Tondern, which 
Count von Arnim had had in mind in 1848. 2 The Prussian plenipotentiary 

1 For the significant passage in the protocols, see Documents, post, pp. 886 et seq. 

2 Elberling in Manuel historique, p. 171, says that it is easy to understand that Germany 


later let it be hoped that his government would consent to the line of Flensburg- 
Tondern, 1 a line which accorded somewhat better with the linguistic fron- 
tier. Denmark, relying on the support of the British public, held to the lines 
Schley-Husum or, preferably, Eckernforde-Friederichstadt. Bismarck had 
been waiting for the Conference to reject the Augustenburg motion, before 
making his proposal of a vote of the populations, the idea originally intro- 
duced by the French. 2 Accordingly, at this point the plenipotentiaries of the 
Germanic Confederation announced that the principle of consultation of the 
inhabitants should be extended to any territory separated from Schleswig as 
well as applied to any separated from Denmark; in other words that there 
should be a vote taken in the north as well as in the south of Schleswig. This 
application of the principle of popular consultation raised a storm of objec- 
tion in the Conference on the ground of the impropriety of consulting subjects 
as to whether they would remain under their rjghtful king. Denmark re- 
fused absolutely. Great Britain, Sweden, and Russia supported her, 3 as well 
as France, who was determined to adhere to the neutrals' proposal of May 
28. Seeing that her proposition was useless, Prussia then mentioned the pos- 
sibility of limiting the vote to the mixed districts, in order to draw a line of 
frontier, and the suggestion was endorsed by the Germanic Confederation. 

Throughout the discussion Austria, though supporting the plan of division, 
had consistently objected to any popular consultation. Russia, also seeing in 
any European endorsement of such a method a threat against absolutism, had 
made even more earnest protests. At this point, and before any discussion 
on the new German proposal was possible, Brunnow, the Russian plenipo- 

could not support the British line, as it gave her only a small part of the territory in 
question, and left to Denmark precisely the region where the antagonism of nationality 
was strongest, namely the peninsula of Angel, which was half Germanized and wholly 
German in sentiment. 

1 Elberling cites a letter of Geffcken of June 4, containing a statement by Bismarck 
himself to M. Jules Hansen, a Dane, some months later, as proof that the Prussian gov- 
ernment would have accepted the line. Bismarck said that Prussia might even have con- 
sented to a line from Gj citing to Bredsted. Manuel historique, p. 152. 

2 Von Sybel Implies that Bismarck had abandoned the idea and returned to it, "un- 
willing to lose the opportunity of employing practical means on account of theoretical 
scruples." On May 21, Bismarck, with the approval of the King, had written to Werther, 
" After putting aside the consideration of Christian IX, the claims of Augustenburg are 
doubtless the ones that could under the present conditions be most easily realized, and 
with the least danger of European complications. There would be nothing to fear in the 
way of opposition from the Duchies themselves; and any tendency towards suffrage um- 
vcrsel could also be avoided. We are therefore not disinclined to favor this solution of 
the problem, if we may hope for the cooperation of the Imperial Government." Von 
Sybel, vol. 3, p. 372. 

8 Von Sybel, vol. 3, p. 399, says that the opposition of the Danes and their friends 
was due to a fear that an official inquiry into sentiment in North Schleswig would seriously 
injure the Danish cause. 


tentiary, read a summary of the debate in which he stated that the method 
of solution indicated by the Court of Prussia had not gained the support of 
the Conference. This statement, sufficiently inaccurate at its best, when 
taken apart from the detailed debate preceding and following, is absolutely 
misleading: yet it is repeated in the final summary of the Conference, printed 
at the end of the protocols, and is undoubtedly the cause of the commonly 
repeated but erroneous statement that the London Conference repudiated the 
method of a plebiscite. Far from that being true, the same suggestion of a 
plebiscite in the mixed districts, brought forward almost immediately after 
by France, as we shall see, was endorsed by all the other Powers save Russia 
and Austria, and would doubtless have been adopted had there been the neces- 
sary agreement as to delimitation of the territory in which the vote should 
be taken. 

After Brunnow's summaty was read, Russell introduced a new proposal, 
namely, that the question of the line be submitted to arbitration, the award to 
be final. This failing to gain the support of either the Danish or German 
plenipotentiaries, de la Tour d'Auvergne, in accordance with his instructions 
of June 11, from Drouyn de Lhuys, as to his course in case agreement on the 
boundary could not be reached by other means, 1 then proposed that a vote 
be taken by communes in the district bounded on the north by the line 
suggested by the German plenipotentiaries and on the south by the line in- 
sisted on by the Danish plenipotentiary. His plan included the details that all 
military force be removed from the region prior to the balloting and all pos- 
sible pressure guarded against, and that each Power should send a delegate 
to bear witness to the authenticity of the vote. To this the plenipotentiaries 
of Prussia and the Germanic Confederation agreed, ad referendum, and those 
of Great Britain approved it, subject to the Danish King's decision. The 
Danish plenipotentiaries, however, refused to accept it, even ad referendum 
and, the truce having come to an end, the Conference broke up on June 22. 
The summary drawn up by the British plenipotentiaries and annexed to the 
protocols shows that this inability to reach an agreement on a delimitation of 
territory for the vote, rather than on a vote itself, was the cause of the futility 
of the London Conference. 2 

The truce ended on June 25. The German troops soon forced the Danes 
to make a peace far more disastrous than any discussed in the Conference of 
London. Not even the northermost part of Schleswig was left to them. By 
the terms of peace drawn up on August 1, and signed on October 30, 1864, 
the King of Denmark renounced all his rights over the duchies of Schleswig- 
Holstein and Lauenburg in favor of the King of Prussia and the Emperor of 

1 France, Affaires itrang&res: Documents diplomatique s, 1864, p. 25. 

2 Documents, post, p. 932. 


Austria, and undertook to recognize any dispositions which the said monarchs 
should make in regard to them. 1 The treaty itself indicated the line of fron- 
tier and instituted an international commission to complete the line on the 
spot, without any suggestion that any part of it should be determined by a 
vote of the people. The only provision for the expression of a desire on the 
part of the inhabitants was in the six years' option clause contained in Article 
XIX, which gave a period of six years to Danish subjects domiciled in the 
ceded territories in which to exercise the right of choosing Danish nationality 
and of transferring themselves, their families, and their personal property 
to Denmark, while keeping their landed property in the duchies. The Danes 
were at last convinced by the peace that the division by nationality was the 
only solution and bitterly regretted their refusal to cooperate in it. 2 

Prussia and Austria first essayed to administer the duchies in common, an 
arrangement which, as Bismarck had planned, led to endless altercation. The 
compromise attempted through the Gastein Convention, which gave the ad- 
ministration of Schleswig to Prussia and of Holstein to Austria, served, 
through the oppressive Prussian rule over the Danes of North Schleswig, to 
intensify their longing for separation and for a union with Denmark. In 
this they continued to have the support of Napoleon, and to his representa- 
tions Bismarck, whether or not in sympathy, never gave a decisive negative. 
The Prussian King, however, was determined against any division. 

Two years after the joint conquest of the duchies, a short war broke out 
between the conquerors. 3 As a result, by the Preliminaries signed at Nikols- 
burg in July, 1866, and embodied in the Treaty of Prague, signed on August 
23d, Austria ceded to Prussia all the rights acquired over the duchies of 
Holstein and Schleswig, with the condition that the population of the north- 
ern districts of Schleswig "should be ceded to Denmark if, by a free vote, they 
should express a wish to be so united. 4 

It is said that this clause is due to a hope entertained by Prussia that by 
surrendering North Schleswig she would gain the acquiescence of France in 
the reorganization of Germany. The project of the Kiel Canal was un- 
affected by the matter for its proposed course lay far to the south of the mixed 
districts and well within the German-speaking territory. Bismarck appears 
to have accepted the clause in good faith, 5 and in the beginning certainly de- 

1 Documents, post, p. 933. 

2 Elberling, " La paix de Prague 1866," in Manuel historique, p. 299. 

8 It seems unnecessary here to go into the intricate claims and counterclaims of the 
various princes, supported by Prussia and Austria in their efforts to gain exclusive control 
of the duchies, nor the relation of the Seven Weeks' War to Bismarck's policy of German 

♦Documents, post, p. 935. See Article 5. 

8 Elberling credits Bismarck with "just and benevolent intentions." Manuel historique ,> 
p. 307. 


fended it in the Reichstag. But, however honest his intentions, he would not 
risk a struggle with the King and the military party for the sake of fulfilling 
the treaty provision and, without waiting for the promised plebiscite, the 
duchies in their entirety were formally united to Prussia by an act of incor- 
poration on January 12, 1867. 

Notwithstanding the annexation, however, negotiations were entered into 
by Prussia and Denmark at Copenhagen on May 7, 1867, regarding the con- 
ditions of the proposed plebiscite. The proceedings of the conference are 
not published, but the outline may be gathered from various sources of in- 
formation. It appears that Prussia proposed, as primary conditions, special 
guarantees of a drastic nature regarding the legal status of Germans and the 
German language in the part of Schleswig which might be retroceded. 1 These 
conditions were so severe as to give the Danes the impression that Prussia did 
not wish to reach an agreement, and to stimulate the fear that the granting of 
the guarantees would lead to intrusion by Germany in Danish affairs. 2 Prus- 
sia, refusing to modify her demands, the negotiations, in spite of the efforts 
of the French government to laid in effecting a settlement, were broken off, 
and, after a few months- : of continued discussion in Berlin, in which the 
Prussian demands were still insisted upon, the matter dropped: 

Of the 150,000 people of North Schleswig, about 50,000, taking advantage 
of the option clause in the Treaty of Vienna of 1864, had chosen to remain 
under Denmark and, on the signing of the Treaty of Prague, had migrated 
across the frontier pending the plebiscite. These, seeing no prospect of a 
plebiscite, now returned to Schleswig where, owing to their having lost their 
Danish citizenship and not being allowed by the Prussians — as a punish- 
ment — to acquire Prussian citizenship, they became in their unprotected 
state the special object of persecution in the Prussian efforts to Germanize 
the country. The plight of these optants served at least to fix European 
attention on the failure of Prussia to live up to her obligations under the 
Treaty of Prague and started a discussion as to whether either Denmark or 
the people of Schleswig had not by the treaty acquired a legal right to claim 
its performance. The existence of such a right was denied categorically 
by Bismarck in the Constituent Assembly of 1867, 8 to which the people of 

1 Documents, post, p. 937. 

2 The Haandbog i det Nordslevigske sporgsmaals historie, Copenhagen, 1901, says that 
the Austrian government did not conceal its opinion that Prussia's conditions were 
unreasonable. Further information may be found in the dispatches of George H. Yeaman, 
United States Minister to Denmark, to Secretary Seward regarding the negotiations. 
United States, Foreign Relations, 1867, vol. 1, pp. 660 et seq. 

•Frederic Thudicum, Verfassungsrecht des norddeutschen Bundes und des deutschen 
Zollvereins, reviewed by Rolin-Jaequemyns, Revue de droit international et de legislation 
com parte, 1870, vol. 2, p. 72L 


North Schleswig had sent a deputy to protest against the incorporation of the 
territory in the Confederation and to claim their right to a popular vote. 1 
Bismarck replied with the denial of the existence of any right, legal or moral, 
which could be claimed by the people of North Schleswig. 

The dispute has raised the subsidiary question of who was the intended 
beneficiary, Denmark, the people of Schleswig, or Napoleon, and, if it was 
the people of Schleswig, whether a group of individuals not a State can acquire 
rights under a treaty. 2 

After the fate of Alsace and Lorraine in 1870, there was little hope of 
inducing Prussia to hold a plebiscite in Schleswig. Nevertheless, the abro- 
gation of the plebiscitary clause in the Treaty of Prague was made by Prussia 
the condition of the Austro-Prussian alliance and, accordingly, by the Treaty 
of Vienna of October 11, 1878, the Emperor of Austria formally released 
the King of Prussia from the obligations under Article 5 ostensibly " in con- 
sideration of the difficulties presented in the carrying out of the principles' 
there laid down." 3 

In spite of the large emigrations to Denmark and of the constant attempts j 
to Germanize those who remained, for German rule here as in Alsace has been 
far from affording the protection to the racial minority which she herself 
demanded in 1867, the population of South Jutland is still preponderately 
anti-German in sentiment. The case of North Schleswig is still a live issue 
but there is at last a hope that the question which has agitated Europe for 
seventy years is about to be settled. 

During the half century that Denmark has been deprived of Schleswig and 
Holstein, she has learned the value of the doctrine of self-determination. 
She no longer demands the return of the German populations of the duchies. 
On the contrary she has definitely refused to accept any part, even of Schles- 
wig, whose inhabitants do not wish to join the kingdom of Denmark, and, in 
accordance with both the resolution of the Rigsdag of October 3, 1918, and 
with the desire of the people of North Schleswig, as expressed in the Apen- 
rade resolution of the Schleswig Electoral Society, of November 17, 1918, the 
Danish Government has asked that a plebiscite be held to settle the future dis- 
position of the regions in question. 4 

1 Paul Matter, Bismarck et son temps, vol. 2, p. 576. 

*Cf. Ronald F. Roxburgh, International Conventions and Third States, p. 42. Rox- 
burgh cites Holtzendorff, Revue de droit international et de legislation compar&e, vol 10, 
p. 580. Oppenheim, International Law (2d ed.), vol. 1, p. 364. Rivier, Principes du droit 
des gens (2d ed.) t vol. 2, p. 63. Bonfils, Manuel de droit international public (6th ed.) 
§ 850. Pradier-Fodere, Traiti de droit international public, vol. 2, p. 813, § 1129. Cf., on 
the other side, Rolin-Jaequemyns, op. cit., p. 325, and pp. 723-24, and Fusinato, p. 101. 

'Documents, post, p. 942. 

4 The Danish Government has stated its support of a policy of self-determination in 


The situation in Schleswig serves to illustrate how, in order to effect a 
permanent settlement satisfactory to all parties, a plebiscite is indeed essen- 
tial, for the drawing of the boundary line according to statistics of race and 
language, a method seldom satisfactory if what is wanted is to fulfill popular 

the following official communication, made public by the Ritzau Press Bureau on Janu- 
ary 25, 1919. 

The North Schleswig question is for Denmark an exclusively national question. The 
Danish nation hopes and longs for the return to the kingdom of Denmark of all who 
speak and feel Danish, but we have no interest in the question beyond that of nationality. 
Denmark's strength as a State would not be increased by the possession of a greater 
part of Schleswig than that in which the people really desire to be united with us; such 
possession would only create great political and administrative difficulties. 

All the parties of the Rigsdag, and through them an overwhelming majority of the 
Danish people, have declared, in the Rigsdag resolution of October 3, in favor of a solu- 
tion along purely national lines as the only one that accords with the desires, sentiments, 
and interests of the Danish people. This is exactly the same viewpoint as that of the 
Danes in North Schleswig, as expressed in the resolution passed by the North Schleswig 
Electoral Society at its meeting in Aabenraa, November 17. 

We are therefore bringing before the Peace Conference the demand formulated by the 
people of North Schleswig for a solution of the problem on the basis of the self-deter- 
mination of nations by means of a popular vote. This Government agrees with the Danes 
in North Schleswig that a plebiscite would form the surest foundation for our reunion 
in the future. In accordance with Article 1 of the Aabenraa resolution, this Government 
believes that the correct procedure will be to have " North Schleswig regarded as a unit, 
so that the inhabitants by voting yes or no may indicate whether or not they wish to be 
reunited with Denmark." 

The unquestionably Danish part of Schleswig is described in Article 2 of the Aabenraa 
resolutions as follows : " North Schleswig is that part of the Duchy of Schleswig bounded 
by a line running from the southern point of Als, through Flensborg Fjord to the Kob- 
bermolle Bay and along the Krusaa south of Froslev, so that Padoberg will be the boundary 
station, then following the waterways between Slogs and Kaer herred, Skelbaek, Sondenaa, 
and Hvidaa, to the point where Hvidaa turns to the north, when the line runs straight 
out to the Western Sea and thence out to the northern point of Sild." 

In central Schleswig, on the other hand, a fair determination can be arrived at only by 
voting in districts, as indicated in the Aabenraa resolution. If any hindrance should arise 
to prevent a plebiscite of the Danes in North Schleswig — which the Government has no 
reason to apprehend — then the line indicated in Article 2 of the Aabenraa resolution must 
be made the basis of the regulation, since there is no doubt but that the population north 
of this line can with safety be added to Denmark even without a vote. 

The Aabenraa resolution, Article 5, declares that, as a matter of course, any districts 
south of the line that express a desire for it should have a right to vote separately on 
whether or not they wish to return to Denmark. In case anything should prevent a 
plebiscite of these people also — which the Government has no reason to apprehend — it 
would still be possible to receive back individual parishes which have an unquestionably 
Danish-speaking majority, in accordance with the petition signed by 876 men and women 
over twenty years of age in this district and sent in to this Government. There are, 
however, some communes from which no petition has been received. 

In the case of Flensborg and its immediate vicinity conditions are very different. 
We can not consent to have these districts reunited with Denmark unless the inhabitants 
express a desire for it through a free vote, since without a doubt the majority of the 
people there are Germans. The petition from Flensborg is signed by 3,401 men and 
women over twenty years, whereas the total population of that age must be estimated as 




i » 

»-». » 



desires, would be most inaccurate here. Even the Danish authorities agree 
that although statistics yield a sufficiently definite language frontier, which 
would leave to the south a large Danish minority in only one place, namely, 
Flensburg, yet, in the triangle between this line, which juts down southwest 
of Flensburg, and a line drawn, roughly, westward from the city, the popu- 
lation, though Danish in language, is only exceptionally so in sentiment. 1 
Nor can credence be given to an interpretation of votes in recent elections 
under German rule, for in this region of sparsely populated moorland many 
of the people of Danish language and sympathies have bowed before the 
storm. There is this further objection that a division according to statistics 
would disregard the historic desire for unity in the smaller group, a desire 
which led the refugees in Copenhagen in 1848 to protest that they preferred 
unity under Germany rather than division. This objection has an historic 
claim to consideration although it is possible that the events of the past 
seventy years have rendered its importance merely academic. 

The Islands of St. Thomas and St. John, West Indies, 1868 

The first plebiscite regarding a cession of sovereignty ever held in the 
western hemisphere is that which was held in the islands of St. Thomas and 
St. John, in January, 1868, on the question of their cession by Denmark to 
the United States. It is a matter of some interest that both the vote and the 
insertion of the clause referring to it in the treaty between the two Powers, 

40,000. This Government is taking steps to have the Peace Conference guarantee the 
freedom of the plebiscite in accordance with the desires of the Danish North Schleswigers 
as expressed by the second Aabenraa resolution of December 30, 1918. Translation. From 
The Nation, April 5, 1919. 

1 This statement is taken from the article by H. V. Clausen, "La situation des langues 
en Nord-Slesvig apres 1864/' in Manuel historique, p. 341. See map on opposite page, 
which is a copy of that accompanying the article. According to the author's comment, 
the colored part represents all of that part of Schleswig in which Danish is spoken by 
the majority of the families owning land. To the south of this region there is only one 
place, namely Flensburg, where there is any considerable Danish speaking minority, the 
number there being about 4,000. The figures given on the map are of two kinds. In 
North Schleswig these figures are in three sets (see note 1 on map). In the middle portion 
of Schleswig, where the Danish language is still dominant, namely, that part contained 
in the triangle bounded on the east by the peninsula of Anglia and on the west by the 
Frisian territory, there is only one numeral under each commune (see note 2 on map). 
This difference in the method of evaluation is caused by the difference in the sources 
from which the statistics are compiled. In middle Schleswig, where the people, "although 
Danish in language, are only exceptionally so in sentiment," the statistics are based on 
German works and, in particular, on the work of Adler, Die VolkssPrach in dent Herzog- 
thum Schleswig seit 1864. In the north, where it was possible for the Danes themselves 
to take the statistics in each commune, the figures are more complete and more accurate, 
except for the cities of Haderslav, Apenrade, Sonderburg and Tondern, where only an 
approximate result could be secured. 


were directly due to the presence of Article 5 in the Treaty of Prague of 1866. 
Owing to the fact that the treaty with Denmark was never ratified by the 
United States and that thus the cession was never completed, the circum- 
stances of the affair have been largely forgotten. 

During the American Civil War the Government of the United States had 
felt the need of a coaling station in the West Indies for which the three small 
Danish islands of St. Croix, St. Thomas and St. John, the last two with 
excellent harbors, were well suited. The islands had no great area or popu- 
lation, St. Thomas being 12 miles long and 3 wide, with about 13,000 inhab- 
itants, St. Croix, the largest one, being twice as large in area and population, 
and St. John being about the same area as St. Thomas but with a much smaller 
number of inhabitants. The people of the islands were largely negroes who 
had been freed but not enfranchised, and, although Danish subjects, the lan- 
guage in common use was English. According to a Danish estimate made 
at the time there were in the three islands, even including the military force 
and the government employees, only about 200 people whose mother tongue 
was Danish. 1 

In pursuance of his policy of territorial expansion, and while the need of a 
coaling station in the Caribbean was still a matter of public concern, Secre- 
tary Seward on July 17, 1866, intimated to General Raaslof, the Danish Min- 
ister at Washington, that the United States would be willing to pay five 
million dollars for the three islands, 2 which were not only a source of debt 
rather than of revenue to Denmark but were of little use to her in any other 
respect. Her treasury, too, had been depleted by the recent disastrous war 
with Prussia and Austria. Yet, coming as it did so soon after the loss of 
Schleswig and Holstein, the proposal of a further reduction of her territory 
did not appeal to Denmark. Fear of opposition from Great Britain and, 
more especially, France, also deterred her from accepting the American offer. 
Although certain informal conversations took place regarding the matter, it 
was not until May 17 of the following year that the official Danish reply was 
delivered to Mr. Yeaman, the American Minister at Copenhagen. The an- 
swer was a counter proposition. Denmark would sell the smaller islands for 
ten million and St. Croix for five, if the consent of France, which was neces- 
sary for the transfer of the latter, could be obtained, 3 but for any cession 

1 Faderlandet, Copenhagen, Aug. 29, 1867; United States, Compilation of Reports of 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Sen. Doc. No. 231, pt. 8, 56th Cong., 2d sess.), 
p. 186. 

2 Documents, post, p. 945. The sum fixed was that suggested by General Delafield as a 
most generous compensation in his report to Mr. Seward on July 9, 1866, regarding the 
value of the islands. U. S. Sen. Doc. No. 231, pt 8, 56th Cong. 2d sess., p. 178. 

8 The question raised as to the cession of St. Croix grew out of the provisions of 
Article 5 of the convention signed at Copenhagen June 15, 1733, by which France ceded 
the island to the Danish West India Company. The article provided that the Danish 


whatever, not only was the sanction of the Rigsdag required by the constitu- 
tion but the Danish Government would also insist on the consent of the people 
of the islands as well. 1 

To this Seward sent an answer on May 27 that the United States must 
have all the islands and at a price not exceeding seven and one-half million 
and that a plebiscite would be wholly unnecessary in view of the inclusion of 
a two year option clause in the treaty draft which he was forwarding. 2 On 
the receipt of a telegram from Washington, Yeaman submitted, on May 28, 
to Count Frijs, the Danish Foreign Minister, the terms proposed by Mr. 
Seward, with the condition that the treaty must be ratified by Denmark be- 
fore August 4th or the negotiations would be considered at an end. 

Mr. Seward had expressly withheld his consent that the ratification of the 
treaty should await or depend upon a vote of the people of the islands. The 
exact source of this objection of Mr. Seward's to a vote in the islands is not 
clear. There are three explanations, first, that he feared that the influence 
of Great Britain, France, and Spain would be excited to cause an adverse 
vote; secondly, that if the islanders were allowed to vote on the question they 
would then demand statehood ; third, that haste was imperative owing to the 
early adjournment of Congress. 3 Whatever the ; cause of his objection he 
adhered to it for many months, after all the other difficulties of price and 
time of ratification were removed. The Danish Cabinet, on their side, was 
equally insistent that a vote was "imperative. For this they gave two reasons, 
as stated by Yeaman in his dispatch of June 17. The first was that the mod- 
ern custom of Europe upon the subject was so uniform as to amount to a 
rule of public law, and that any departure from k would cause comment and 
discontent, and, the second, that Denmark, especially, could not afford to dis- 
regard the rule as she would thereby infinitely weaken her claim to a plebiscite 
in Northern Schleswig. To Yeaman's arguments that the plebiscite would 
offer opportunity for intrigue from without as well as tend to weaken the 
authority of the State over the subject, the Danish Cabinet, though doubtless 
sympathetic, again dwelt on the Schleswig situation, whose force as an argu- 
ment Yeaman was compelled to admit. 

On June 17, Yeaman had forwarded Denmark's proposal to sell the two 
islands of St. Thomas and St. John for seven and a half million dollars, and 

West India Company should engage and obligate itself in a formal and authentic manner, 
neither to sell nor to cede the island on any. terms to any other nation without the ap- 
proval and consent of the King of France. See John Bassett Moore, Digest of Interna- 
tional Law, vol 1, p. 603, note a. 

1 Documents, post, p. 946. 

1 Documents, post, p. 948. Article 3. 

* Cf. Frederic Bancroft, Life of William H. Seward, vol. 2, p. 483, and Waldemar 
Westergaard, The Danish West Indies, p. 259. 


to make St. Croix the subject of separate negotiations. Seward, early in 
July, cabled to close with the offer, but with no indication that he yielded on 
the matter of the vote. Finding the Danes still insistent on the vote, Yeaman 
cabled for instructions and received the answer " Do not agree to submit the 
question." Congress being about to adjourn, the immediate need for haste 
would appear to have passed, but there was another reason which still made 
Seward insistent against delay. The return of peace had gradually elimi- 
nated the importance of a coaling station in the West Indies from the public 
mind whose demand for expansion had been gratified by the acquisition of 
Alaska. For these reasons the negotiations for St. Croix were eventually 

Despite the diplomatic concern of the Danish Government not only that the 
vote should be held but that it should be stipulated in the treaty, Count Frijs, 
in order to meet Mr. Seward's objection, after the other points of difference 
had been disposed of, on August 17 signified his willingness to yield the de- 
mand for a conditional clause in the treaty, if, instead, there should be in- 
serted an allusion to the intention of the Danish Government to take the 
vote. This Yeaman refused at first, but finally took ad referendum, and, on 
September 27, forwarded the text of the clause as drawn up by the Danish 
negotiators. Convinced at last by the repeated advices of his Minister that 
Denmark would not yield and that if there were no vote there would be no 
cession, Seward, early in October, yielded to the Danish insistence for a plebis- 
cite so far as to cable the withdrawal of his objection to the vote, if the con- 
dition of the vote were not mentioned in the treaty. 1 In yielding this Seward 
was doubtless influenced by Yeaman's account of sentiment in the islands, the 
word received in Copenhagen being that the people were well disposed for 
union and would give it a good majority, and by the warning that, news of 
the negotiations having leaked out, France was already protesting and similar 
protests were expected from Great Britain. 2 On receipt of Seward's tele- 
gram Yeaman informed Count Frijs that a clause would be inserted simply 
stating the fact that the King would afford the people an opportunity of 
freely expressing their approbation of the cession. 

The treaty draft was signed at Copenhagen on October 24. Article 1 con- 
tained the clause that the King of Denmark would not exercise any constraint 
over the people and would, therefore, as soon as practicable, give them an 
opportunity to express freely their wishes in regard to the cession. In addi- 
tion to this the option clause was retained. 8 

It now remained to take the vote. On October 1, before the treaty had 

1 Documents, post, p. 959. 

2 Documents, post, p. 959. 
8 Documents, post, p. 960. 


been signed, General Raasloff, now the Danish Prime Minister, had suggested 
to Mr. Yeaman that as an agreement seemed probable, the American Govern- 
ment should send to the islands both ships of war and agents, " properly pro- 
vided with instructions and all that may be useful to assist the Danish com- 
missioner in his work and to do whatever else circumstances may require." x 
Rear Admiral Palmer was accordingly ordered to St. Thomas with the Sus- 
quehannah, and the Reverend Charles Hawley of Auburn, New York, was 
appointed by Secretary Seward to act as confidential representative to help 
secure a favorable decision. His instructions were to present to the inhabit- 
ants the advantages of the change of sovereignty, and, especially, the great 
market that they would gain for their products as well as the further prosperity 
which would result from the proposed naval station. In all things, however, 
he was to cooperate with the Danish commissioner, deferring to his judgment. 
Hawley, accompanied by two assistants, arrived at the islands on Novem- 
ber 12. The Danish Commissioner arrived some ten days later, and at once 
invited the American agents to confer with the Danish officials. The Danish 
government was as eager for a favorable vote as was the American govern- 
ment. Chamberlain Carstensen, the Danish commissioner, was frankly un- 
willing to order an election until reasonably assured that the vote would be 
favorable. The agents of both governments were convinced that the mass of 
the inhabitants were for the cession, but that the mercantile interests of St. 
Thomas would be a unit against it unless they should receive some assurance 
from the United States that the status of St. Thomas as a free port would be 
preserved, at least for a certain period, and thus the trade with the other 
islands, which was the chief source of their income, remain unhampered. This 
demand of the merchants was presented to the American representatives at a 
formal conference convened by the Governor at the request of the Danish Com- 
missioner. It was a demand to which the American agents could only answer 
that it was a matter for Congressional action, but that no doubt such action 
would be generous. The Danish Commissioner, however, was unwilling to 
chance a vote on such a vague declaration and decided to take advantage of 
the disorganization due to a recent great earthquake and tidal wave, and to go 
himself to Washington hoping to obtain some more definite promise which 
would insure a favorable vote. Hawley went with him on the journey. Be- 
fore their departure the royal proclamation of the King of Denmark was read, 
acquainting the islanders with the provisions of the treaty. Dissatisfied with 
its contents the merchants of St. Thomas at once forwarded to the Commis- 
sioner a set of additional articles containing the stipulations as to trade and 
other matters which they desired. 2 The memorial and articles were duly laid 

1 Documents, post, p. 957. 

2 Documents, post, p. 971. 


before the President at Washington, and Seward replied that no further 
negotiation could be entered upon either with the Danish Commissioner or the 
local authorities. This reply was addressed to Hawley and at the same time 
his mission was terminated, the Danish Commissioner having informed the 
Secretary that the prospect for a favorable vote was good and that no further 
action from Mr. Hawley was necessary. 

On Carstensen's return to St. Thomas on January 1, he at once announced 
that the vote would be held on the ninth. On the fourth the citizens who had 
drawn up the memorial were invited to Government House to hear the result 
of his visit to Washington. The Commissioner confined himself to the state- 
ment that " the inhabitants of St. Thomas, by annexation .to the United States, 
will secure rights superior even to those which they have so long enjoyed," and 
after warning them that if the United States should buy a naval base from 
some other Power in the West Indies their prosperity would be seriously im- 
paired, he urged on them that while opposition to annexation might prejudice 
the future commercial position of the port, a great majority for the transfer 
would react favorably. 

The qualifications for the franchise had been discussed by Yeaman and the 
Danish Cabinet as far back as July 12 of the previous year. 1 Yeaman had 
told Seward that he would insist that all foreigners domiciled in the island 
merely for business purposes should be excluded, and that all native born sub- 
jects of Denmark, white or black, should vote : — this not only because the 
vote of the colored people would probably make a favorable result more cer- 
tain, but also because it would better comport with their future position as 
United States citizens. Although manhood suffrage was an innovation in 
the jslands, such were the final provisions. 2 

The polls were opened on Thursday, January 9, at 8 o'clock, under the 
supervision of a committee of five, whose chairman was a judge, and in the 
presence of the Danish Commissioner and two other royal officials. The 
ballots were of two colors, thus preventing any secrecy. Indeed, the local 
paper gives the name and vote of the first man to drop his ballot in the urn. 
Either the cession was really desired or the people had taken the Commis- 
sioner's words to heart, for the result was 1,039 votes for cession and only 
twenty-two against it. In St. John the vote was 205 in favor and none in 
opposition. As Yeaman had anticipated, the colored vote, enfranchised for 
this occasion, was wholly in favor of the cession. 8 

The treaty was immediately ratified by the Rigsdag and signed by the King. 
Action was never obtained in the United States Senate, however. In the 

1 Documents, post, p. 951. 

2 See Extract from St. Thomas Tidende, Documents, post, j>. 974* 
8 Documents, post, p. 975. 


Foreign Affairs Committee the treaty had no champion and in Sumner, the 
chairman of the Committee, it had a strong opponent. Nor was there any 
considerable public sentiment in its favor. The treaty was laid on the table 
until, in 1870, the Committee reported unanimously against it and it was 
allowed to lapse. A second treaty, drawn up in 1901, failed of ratification by 
the Landsthing. This treaty contained no mention of a vote, nor did the 
final treaty, ratified in 1917, by which the islands, now including St. Croix, 
were finally ceded to the United States in consideration of a payment of 
twenty-five million dollars. Before the ratification of this last treaty, in re- 
sponse to a popular demand, a plebiscite was held in Denmark on the subject 
of the cession, 1 but, contrary to the current impression, no official vote was 
held in the islands. There were several mass meetings held and informal 
votes taken which, though naturally inconclusive, appear to indicate an over- 
whelming sentiment for the cession, but the only formal expression of opinion 
came from the island legislatures, which had voted overwhelmingly for the 
cession and had sent delegates to Copenhagen to press the matter. 

THE PERIOD OF 1871—1914 
St. Bartholomew, West Indies, 1877 

The island of St. Bartholomew, in the West Indies, after having been under 
French sovereignty for over a century and a half, had been given to Sweden 
in 1784 in return for the economic advantages about to accrue to France 
from the establishment at Gothenburg of a warehouse for French merchan- 
dise. The island, which measured twenty-five kilometers in circumference 
and had a population of about 2400 inhabitants, proved to be of little use and 
considerable burden to Sweden, who had no other possessions in the neighbor- 
hood. Accordingly, the Swedish Cabinet, in 1877, offered to cede the island 
back to France, to which Power, with colonial possessions already in the 
immediate vicinity, it would be of considerable value. On August 10, 1877, 
the treaty was signed by the two Governments. 2 By Article I, the cession was 
made conditional on the consent of the population of St. Bartholomew. The 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, on presenting the reasons for the treaty 
to the Chamber, on November 12, attributed the initiation of this condition to 
the Swedish Government. It was, he said, however, a demand " too much in 

1 The new Danish constitution had doubled the electorate by enfranchising women and 
domestic servants, and reducing the age requirement for electors. Owing to this there 
arose a sentiment that the old Parliament was not competent to pass on the question. 

2 Documents, post, p. 977. 


conformity with our sentiment and with the rules of our public law for us to 
make any objections." Such, indeed, may have been its parentage, and yet 
the thought suggests itself that the vote of 1878 in St. Bartholomew, like the 
vote of 1868, in the Danish Islands, probably signifies the desire of a Power, 
recently bereft of its territory by Prussian aggression, to point out the weak- 
ness of the victor's title by insisting upon the validity of the principle of self- 
determination in international law. 

It had been agreed that while the terms of the protocol which was to settle 
the several details of the transfer were being discussed the vote should be 
taken. This was done under universal manhood suffrage of the Swedish citi- 
zens of the island. 1 Although they had been under Swedish sovereignty for 
a century, there had been practically no colonization and the people had re- 
tained.their French customs and language. The result of the plebiscite, which 
gave three hundred and fifty votes for union and only one against, occasioned 
no surprise. 2 The protocol, which was not concluded until after the plebiscite, 
contained a generous provision allowing those wishing to retain their Swedish 
citizenship to do so without leaving the island, unless they should become a 
menace to public order. 

On January 22, 1878, the resolution approving the treaty was adopted by 
the French Chamber of Deputies. Deputy Lacascade in seconding it referred 
to the original autocratic cession to Sweden with the comment, " today, thank 
God, public European law is greatly changed in this respect ; the retrocession 
. . . has not been submitted to you until after a solemn and free vote, a real 
plebiscite of the inhabitants." Another deputy, from his place, added, " We 
shall vote for it the more willingly as it recognizes the right of plebiscite in its 
full extent," 8 and with a vote of 425 to 8, the Chamber adopted the resolution. 

The Tacna-Arica Question, 1883 — 

The Tacna-Arica question dates from the War of the Pacific, which began 
in 1879, between Chile on the one part, and Bolivia and Peru on the other, 
and was terminated by the Treaty of Ancon, in 1883. 

During the war Chile had occupied not only all the Bolivian littoral, but also 
the three southern Peruvian littoral provinces of Tarapaca, rich in nitrates 

1 Victor M. Maurtua, The Question of the Pacific, translated by F. A. Pezet, p. 242, 
quotes extracts from correspondence between the Swedish and French Governments, 
showing that the latter had raised the question whether foreign residents might vote and 
that the Swedish Government had answered unequivocally in the negative. 

2 The table given in Documents, post, p. 983, note, gives the number of males over 
15 years of age as 617. 

3 Translation from Annales du Sinat et de la Chatnbre des Diputis, Session ordinaire 
de 1878, vol. 1, p. 151. 











de 1878, vol. 1, p. 151. 


and guano, and the source of most of the revenue of Peru, and Tacna and 
Arica, which contained the important port of Arica. By the Treaty of Ancon, 
Peru ceded Tarapaca outright to Chile. She did not, however, cede the 
provinces of Tacna and Arica, but agreed that they should remain in the pos- 
session of Chile, and subject to Chilian laws and authority for ten years; at 
the expiration of this term a plebiscite was to decide whether or not the prov- 
inces should " remain finally under the dominion and sovereignty of Chile, or 
continue to form a part of Peruvian territory/' The details of the plebiscite 
as well as of the payment of the ten million dollars which the winner was to 
make over to the loser, were to be established by a special protocol. 1 

As the subsequent controversy turns on the significance and interpretation 
of this article, it is interesting to trace its origin. Whoever had been the 
aggressor in the war, — and it is a point still in dispute, — it soon became 
evident that Chile would be the victor. In order to prevent an unnecessary 
prolongation of hostilities, President Hayes offered the mediation of the 
United States which was accepted in October, 1880, and the negotiations were 
held on board the U. S. S. Lackawanna. The mediation was unsuccessful. 
Chile, already in occupation of Tarapaca, Tacna, and Arica, insisted on abso- 
lute cession of the first province, and occupation of the others until peace 
should be signed, as security for indemnity, and Peru absolutely refused these 
conditions or any cession of territory whatever. When hostilities were re- 
sumed, Chile occupied Peru, arrested Calderon, the President, for alleged 
efforts to revive Peruvian resistance, and exiled him to Chile. President 
Arthur thereupon renewed the efforts of the United States to bring about an 
agreement. The Blaine-Trescot Mission was instructed to exert its efforts 
to induce Peru to concede a suitable monetary indemnity and to persuade 
Chile to be content with this and to relinquish her claim to any cession of 
territory. This effort at mediation being also unsuccessful, in June, 1883, a 
third attempt was made to end hostilities and the United States Ministers at 
Lima and at Santiago were instructed by Secretary Frelinghuysen 2 to save to 
Peru as much of her three provinces under occupation as was possible in the 
treaty of peace. 3 

Mr. Logan, United States Minister to Chile, proceeded accordingly to open 
negotiations with Senor Aldunate, Chilean Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 
and with the captive Peruvian President, Calderon. Logan submitted vari- 
ous formal propositions, some of his own devising, to both parties. Of these 
propositions, which included arbitration, limited occupation, sale, and division 
of the two provinces, one, which was of Chilean origin and which was put into 

1 Treaty of Ancon, Article 3, Documents, post, p. 992. 

2 Secretary of State under President Arthur. 

* Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Logan, June 26, 1882, Documents, post, p. 985. 


formal shape by Logan, was in essence that adopted in the Treaty of Ancon, 
with the difference that the military occupation of Chile was to be for a five, 
and not a ten year period. This proposition, as well as the others, was 
refused by Calderon. Chile, finding it impossible to make an agreement with 
Calderon, then conceived the plan of supporting for the office of President of 
Peru, the Peruvian General Iglesias, who had a considerable backing in Peru 
from those who desired peace. Before supplying him with arms, however, 1 
the Chilean Government secured an agreement from him as to Tacna and 
Arica, on the lines of the one submitted by Logan to Calderon and which is 
substantially the same as that embodied later in the Treaty of Ancon. 2 

Iglesias formed his government in August, 1883, and it having been duly 
recognized by Chile, the Treaty of Ancon was signed at Lima on October 20, 
1883, and ratifications were exchanged on March 28, 1884. From Bolivia, 
Chile obtained a truce agreement giving indefinite occupation of the Bolivian 
littoral, 8 and thus acquired possession of a continuous coast line to the north- 
ern boundary of Arica. 

The Treaty of Ancon, in stipulating a plebiscite at the end of the ten-year 
period, had stated that a special protocol should establish the form in which 
the plebiscite should take place and the conditions and periods of payment of 
the ten million dollars which was to be paid by the country remaining in pos- 
session of Tacna and Arica. The plebiscitary clause in the Treaty of Ancon 
was certainly not due to the idea that there was any appreciable desire for 
annexation latent in the inhabitants at that time. The provinces had never 
been Chilean, nor were the Chilean immigrants, though numerous, in sufficient 
numbers to suggest a close vote. The census of 1876, the last official census 
previous to the war, puts the Peruvian population at 17,013 while the Chilean 
residents numbered 9,664. 4 The first negotiations, after the treaty was 
signed, were occupied with the Peruvian offer to hypothecate the Chilean 
claims by means of the customs receipts of the port of Arica. Chile, on the 
ground that she was unwilling to surrender her expectation of possession of 
the provinces, refused this. 5 Thereupon a series of conferences, known as 
the Jimenez- Vial Solar negotiations, followed, for the drawing up of the spe- 

i Letter of the United States Minister to Peru, to Mr. Frelinghuysen, October 3. 1882. 
United States Foreign Relations, 1883, p. 720. 

2 Documents, post, p. 991. 

8 The treaty of truce with Bolivia was signed on April 4, 1884. State Papers, vol. 75, 
p. 367. The treaty of peace giving permanent possession, was signed May 18, 1895. Ibid., 

vol. 88, p. 755. 

4 Victor Maurtua, The Question of the Pacific, English edition by F. A. Pezet, p. 148. 

8 For the negotiations from 1892-1900, see Ministerio de relaciones exteriores del Peru 
— Circular sobre la cuesHdn Tacna y Arica, also Egana, The Tacna and Arica Question, 
pp. 82 et seq., and Maurtua, pp. 170 et seq., and Victor Andres Belaunde, Nuestra cuestion 
con Chile. 


cial protocol. The question of the auspices under which the plebiscite should 
be held was the first to arise. Peru claimed that the treaty was so worded as 
to indicate that Chile's title to occupation should expire ten years from the date 
of ratification, that the provinces should then return to the authority of Peru 
as the legitimate sovereignty, and that the plebiscite should then be held under 
Peruvian auspices. Chile, denying the propriety of this interpretation of the 
treaty, insisted that, according to its tenms, her occupation was to cease only 
after an unfavorable vote, held under her own auspices. As a compromise, 
Peru offered to allow the plebiscite to be held under the auspices of a neutral 
power. This Chile refused. 1 Peru has continued since this date to propose 
neutral auspices as a solution and Chile has held consistently to her first 

The determination of the proper electoral qualifications was from the first 
another difficulty. Peru had asserted that only those Peruvians born or domi- 
ciled in the provinces should vote in the plebiscite. Chile claimed that not only 
should all Chilean as well as Peruvian residents be allowed to vote, but also all 
resident foreigners. As no agreement could be reached the Peruvian Foreign 
Minister proposed that the provinces be divided into zones, each country to 
establish the electoral qualifications for its respective zone. 2 This plan fail- 
ing, he proposed arbitration on the question of electoral qualifications, as well 
as of the auspices under which the vote was to be taken, but without success. 
The Jimenez- Vial Solar protocol was finally signed, to the indefinite purport 
that the plebiscite should be held under those conditions of reciprocity which 
both governments should deem necessary in order to obtain an honest election, 
the payment of the indemnity to be by public bonds. 3 Whichever country 
should lose the plebiscite should have the right to rectify its frontier by ad- 
vancing to a certain point. By the time the protocol had been signed, however, 
the Chilean administration had changed, and the protocol was not ratified. 
The Peruvian proposal made on February 23, 1894, in elaboration of the 
protocol and providing that the election be under a mixed commission of one 
Chilean, one Peruvian, and a third member appointed by a friendly Power, and 
that all Peruvians and Chileans over 21 or married, and actually resident in 
the provinces, should vote, did not meet with Chile's favor. Chile particularly 
objected to the proposed exclusion from voting of all armed forces and public 
officials, and to the requirement of a two years' residence, as practically ex- 
cluding all Chileans. The ten-year period provided in the treaty had now 

1 Eg an a, p. 85 ; Maurtua, p. 181. 

2 Pradier-Fodere, article in Revue de droit international et de legislation comparie, 
vol. 29, 1897, p. 660. Maurtua, p. 182, says that the proposal came first from Chile and 
that the Peruvian Congress repudiated it. 

8 Documents, post, p. 995. 


expired. After various new proposals to divide the territory into zones, Chile 
at this point in the negotiations adopted the policy of insisting upon an agree- 
ment as to the method and guarantee of payment of the indemnity of ten 
millions as one on which decision was essential before the actual conditions of 
the plebiscite should be determined. There followed lengthy negotiations on 
the subject of guarantees, Chile professing a fear that Peru would be unable 
to pay the indemnity should the vote be in her favor — a fear somewhat justi- 
fied by the financial condition of Peru and by the fact that Chile had already 
deprived Peru of her richest province, Tarapaca, by the Treaty of Ancon — 
and proposing that the money should be paid practically immediately on the 
taking of the vote. Peru argued that as Chile was already in possession of 
the two provinces she held sufficient guarantee. This Chile declared to be 
unacceptable; nor did the further Peruvian proposal of guarantee by a lien 
on the salt monopoly satisfy her. The question of whether or not the district 
of Tarata was properly included in the province of Tacna further complicated 
the affair. Meanwhile, a secret treaty delimiting frontiers had been negoti- 
ated between Chile and Bolivia. A storm of protest was aroused in Peru 
when the terms became known, and Peru learned that Chile in return for a 
promise of five million dollars had ceded Tacna-Arica to Bolivia in case the 
plebiscite should be favorable, and had promised to do all in her power, either 
separately or together with Bolivia, to obtain final possession. Further, she 
had promised outright to Bolivia a part of the disputed territory, the Cove of 
Vitor, whether or not the plebiscite should be favorable. 1 Although the 
treaty failed of ratification, its negotiation throws an interesting light on 
Chilean diplomacy. 

In the negotiations from 1895 to 1898 the Chilean Minister successively 
proposed three solutions: the first, that Chile should buy the provinces out- 
right; the second, that Peru should take Tacna, and Chile, Arica, without 
indemnity ; and, lastly, that each country should advance its frontier, Peru to 
Chero, and Chile to Vitor, the plebiscite to be held in the intermediate area. 
The Peruvian government refused each offer in turn, and insisted on abiding 
by the treaty stipulations. In consequence of the Peruvian stand, discussion 
again centered on the bases of the plebiscite, and it was resolved that these 
should be studied in the following order: electoral qualifications; open or 
secret ballot; auspices; and the conditions and guarantee of the indemnity. 
Chile insisted that all inhabitants, irrespective of nationality, should vote and 
that the ballot should be secret. Peru contended that only natives born in the 
territory or resident there should be given the ballot and that the vote should 
be open. No agreement could be reached on these points and in the conven- 

1 Documents, post, p. 997. 


tion, called the " Billinghurst-Latorre Protocol," which was finally signed, the 
questions of electoral qualifications and the secret ballot were submitted to the 
arbitrament of Spain. The protocol, however, determined outright that the 
auspices should be a directive committee of three, one representing Peru, one 
Chile, and the third member representing Spain. The details of the election 
machinery and the condition of the payment of the indemnity were also set- 
tled. 1 This protocol, formally signed by the two plenipotentiaries, was sub- 
mitted to their respective governments. It was ratified by the Peruvian Con- 
gress, in which any opposition was silenced by the argument that the Schleswig 
fiasco must not be repeated; and it was also ratified by the Chilean Senate, 
which was then apprehensive of war with Argentina, but the Chilean Chamber, 
after having approved it in principle, withheld its sanction on finding the 
differences with Argentina settled, and, in 1901, returned the protocol with a 
recommendation that the points there left to an arbitrator be settled directly 
by the two governments and that new diplomatic proceedings be undertaken 
for the fulfilment of the third clause of the Treaty of Ancon. 2 

From this time the Chilianizing of the two provinces, which had been going 
on for years, appears to have become an active policy. The schools, to which 
the Peruvian Government had continued its support, were closed, teaching of 
Peruvian history was forbidden, the pulpit and press were gagged, Peruvian 
laborers were boycotted and there was constant interference in commercial 
matters. 8 Finally, in 1901, diplomatic relations were broken by Peru, who 
recalled her minister and addressed to the foreign chancellories a note placing 
on Chile the burden of failure to fulfill her treaty obligations. 4 Relations 
were resumed shortly, but the exchange of notes of 1905 and 1908 were as 
futile as ever, for the question of auspices and electoral qualifications were 
still insoluble. Chile continued to insist that the plebiscite should be held under 
her own authority, with the aid of Peruvian commissioners, and that all in- 
habitants who had lived in the provinces for a certain time, whether citizens 
or not, should vote. Not only were these conditions still unsatisfactory to 
Peru, but a fresh grievance was presented by the new boundary treaty between 
Chile and Bolivia, signed on September 23, 1902, which, in defining the 
Ixnindary line between the two countries, treated Tacna and Arica as an 
integral part of Chile, and which further provided for the construction of a 

1 Documents, post, p. 1000. 

2 Maurtuo, p. 278. 

8 Ibid., p. 250. It is said that this persecution has resulted in the emigration of some 
18,000 families to Peru. 

4 Cf. the circular note to the Peruvian representatives in foreign countries, published 
m English in pamphlet form by the Peruvian Department of Foreign Affairs, November 
3. 1900. 


railway from Arica to La Paz. Against these acts of sovereignty the Peru- 
vian Government protested on the ground that Chile was not the sovereign 
but merely the occupant of the. two provinces. 1 To this Chile answered that 
Article 3 of the Treaty of Ancon, ceded to Chile free and absolute sover- 
eignty over the provinces, without any limitation save that of the period of 
duration. Peru replied by referring to the Bolivian recognition of her rights 
over Tacna and Arica in the boundary treaty between Peru and Bolivia, of 
September, 1902. 2 

Aside from the exchange of views regarding the Peruvian protest, the 
negotiations of 1905 and 1908 were concerned with attempts by Chile to sub- 
stitute a commercial agreement for the vote, and, this failing, a proposal for 
an increased indemnity to be paid by the winner of the plebiscite. There 
was also a detailed discussion of the position of the two countries on the 
matter of auspices and electoral qualifications. 

It is at this period that we find for the first time the argument since be- 
come the fundamental one of the Chilean case; namely, that of simulated 
cession. This ingenious and interesting argument is to the effect that, as in 
all the historical cases of plebiscites the vote has gone for the annexing Power, 
the stipulation for a plebiscite in the Treaty of Ancon was understood by both 
parties to be merely a cloak for a definite cession and that therefore the plebis- 
cite should either not be held or, if held, should be surrounded by such condi- 
tions that the vote would surely go for Chile as the annexing Power. 3 To 
support this argument two cases are cited, those of Savoy and Schleswig : It 
is scarcely surprising that Peru objects to the attempt to draw analogies from 
cases differing so widely from the one under discussion. The argument of the 
simulated cession would, to an American, appear to be thrown out by the fact 
that the American Minister to Chile was so intimately concerned in its incipi- 
ency and, indeed, there can be quoted contemporary statements of- both Novoa 
and Aldunate to the purport that the proposal was genuine. 4 Chile showed 
further ingenuity in the argument which she advanced for allowing 

1 For the negotiations from 1906 to 1908, see Documents, post, pp. 1012 e t seq. 

2 Descamps, E. E. and L. Renault, Recueil international des trait is du XX me Sidcle, 
p. 426; translation in American Journal of International Law, Supplement, vol. 3. p. 381. 

3 See Note of the Chilean Minister, March 15, 1905, Documents, post, p. 1014. Cf. 
also, Observaciones & la nota del Excmo. Sr. Seoane, de 8 de Mayo de 1908, por el Consultor 
Letrado del Ministerio de Relaciones Exterior es de Chile, senor Alejandro Alvarez, Chile, 
Ministerio de relaciones exteriores, Comunicaciones cambiadas entre las Concillerias de Chile 
y el Peru y algunos antecedentes sobre la cuestidn de Tacna y Arica, 1905-1910, commonly 
called the Rose Book of Chile, 2d ed., Santiago de Chile, 1912. 

4 Cf. Belaunde, pp. 96-103. The statement by Novoa is quoted from a work by Sr. 
Larrabure, at one time vice-president of Peru. Those from Aldunate are from Memoria 
de R.R. E.E. de Chile, 1883, pp. 78-91. 


foreign citizens to vote in which she declared that an international plebiscite 
is different from an election concerned only with domestic affairs, and that 
therefore the customary rules should not apply. Resident foreigners not only 
have an interest in the questions of sovereignty, runs the Chilean reasoning, 
but, as neutrals, their vote would correspond to the service of a third person in 
arbitral procedure. For this position Chile is forced to acknowledge that she 
abandons all precedent and bases her claim on considerations of equity in- 
stead. As it is well known that the foreign residents would vote to continue 
the Chilean rule, Peru is not inclined to acknowledge the equity of the basis. 

The next exchange of proposals for a protocol occurred in 1909-10. In 
these Chile still insisted on the propriety of allowing all foreigners, as well as 
Chileans and Peruvians to vote, 1 demanding only the qualifications of literacy, 
and a residence of six months. Although conceding a mixed board, of one 
Chilean, one Peruvian and one representative of the foreign residents, to ad- 
minister the plebiscite, she insisted that the chairman of this, as well as of all 
subordinate committees, should be the Chilean member. In all other matters 
Chile suggested that the provisions of the Billinghurst-Latorre Protocol 
should be followed. Peru answered by requiring that the right to vote be 
limited to Peruvians and Chileans of 21 years of age, who had been born in 
Tacna-Arica, or had resided in the territory since July 1, 1907, and who should 
be present and registered at the time of the vote, 1 public employees and mem- 
bers of the army or police alone to be excluded. As for the literacy test, 
although Peru has such a test in her own elections, she has always insisted 
that in questions of so fundamental a nature as that of change of sovereignty 
only universal manhood suffrage is suitable. 8 With regard to the electoral 
board, Peru insisted that the presidency should belong to a neutral member, 
appointed by a friendly Power. She further proposed arbitration on any 
disputed points. Chile answered the Peruvian proposals by a note of March 
3, 1910, making only very minor concessions, and refusing arbitration. Twice 
Chile has arbitrated boundary disputes with Argentina. She has consistently 

1 No statistics are available regarding the different groups in the disputed provinces 
as the Chilean census omits to give any figures for them as distinguished from the rest 
of the country. The total population is probably now between ten and thirteen thousand. 

2 Under both the Peruvian and the Chilean law the qualifications for the electorate are 
citizenship, literacy and attainment of the age of 21. In Chile domestic servants are dis- 
qualified. Chile requires a year's residence before naturalization. Peru requires a still 
shorter period. 

8 Further, since the closing of the Peruvian schools by the Chilean authorities, in 1901, 
the Peruvian inhabitants of the provinces have been under great disabilities in getting a 
schooling for their children, which should not at the same time destroy their Peruvian 
patriotism, a matter which, in view of the future plebiscite, was one of importance to the 
Peruvian inhabitants. 


refused to arbitrate that with Peru, and, no doubt with it in mind, has made a 
point of abstaining from accepting, at least without a reservation, any and all 
proposals for compulsory arbitration of any such questions, both at The Hague 
and at the Pan American Conferences. 1 

In protest against the treatment of the Peruvian inhabitants of Tacna and 
Arica, and especially the expulsion of the parish priests who, in spite of Chilean 
arguments directed to the Holy See, were still under the ecclesiastical juris- 
diction of the Bishop of Arequipa, diplomatic relations were again broken by 
Peru, in March, 1910. In 1912 President Billinghurst, soon after his instal- 
lation as President of Peru, opened the question once more. In accordance, 
it is said, with a previous agreement with the Chilean Government, a telegram 
was sent to the Chilean Government by Wenceslao Valera, Minister of For- 
eign Relations for Peru, proposing that the plebiscite be held in 1933, that the 
suffrage should be limited to natives of the provinces and to Peruvians and 
Chileans who should have enjoyed three years' residence, that a literacy quali- 
fication should be included, and that the presiding officer of the directing com- 
mission should be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Chile. 2 Chile 
at once accepted the proposal, which is referred to as the Valera-Huneesis 
agreement, but although the negotiations were secret, it became known in 
Peru that exchanges surrendering two of the cardinal points of the Peruvian 
contention were under way and indignation on this score served to increase 
the popular discontent with the Billinghurst government and was a contribu- 
tory cause of the revolution which followed. Relations between the two 
countries have never been resumed, nor have further exchanges of an official 
nature occurred. As a result of demonstrations in Iquique immediately after 
the armistice in the European war, even consular relations have been broken 
off. The situation is now further complicated by the renewed exodus of 

1 In accepting Article 39 of the Hague Convention of 1907 for the pacific settlement of 
international disputes, the Chilean representative carefully excepted all questions of origin 
previous to the signing of the Convention. "La Delegation du Chili desire faire la 
declaration suivante au nom de son Gouvernement a propos de cet article. Notre Delega- 
tion au moment de signer la Convention de 1899 pour le reglement pacifique des conflits 
internationaux l'a fait sous la reserve que l'adhesion de son Gouvernement en ce que 
concernait 1'article 17 ne comprendrait pas les litiges ou questions anterieures a la celebra- 
tion de la Convention.— La Delegation du Chili croit de son devoir rcnouveler aujourd'hui 
a propos de la meme disposition la reserve qu'elle a deja faite auparavant, quoiqu'il ne 
soit pas strictement necessaire en vue du caractere meme de la disposition." — Declaration, 
Deuxi&me conference Internationale de la paix, La Haye, 15 juin~i8 octobre, 1907, Actes 
et documents, vol. 2, p. 121. 

Article 39 of the Hague Convention of 1907 for the pacific settlement of international 
disputes, reads as follows: "La convention d'arbitrage est conclue pour des contestations 
deja nees ou pour des contestations eventuelles. — Eile peut concerner tout litige ou seule- 
ment les litiges d'une categorie determined 

2 Documents, post, p. 1049. 


Peruvians from Tacna and Arica and by the effort of Bolivia to gain an outlet 
to the sea by securing the two provinces, an arrangement which certain Chilean 
groups regard with favor, but which is displeasing to Peru. 

The Separation of Norway from Sweden, 1905. 

The union of Norway and Sweden, which was established by the Act of 
Union of August 6, 1815, and was maintained until 1905, was a voluntary 
personal union of two separate and equal kingdoms under one sovereign. 1 
The voluntary nature of the union was emphasized by the preamble of the 
Act of Union, entered into by the parliaments of the respective kingdoms, 
which declared that the union had been effected not by force of arms but by a 
free and voluntary resolution which could not and ought not to be maintained 
except by a mutual recognition of the legitimate rights of the peoples, for the 
support of the common throne. The equality established by the act was, how- 
ever, perfect in theory only. Although each kingdom had its own parliament, 
army, navy, and customs system, a separate commercial flag, and, to a certain 
extent made separate treaties, 1 the foreign relations of the two kingdoms and 
the diplomatic and consular services were in the hands of Sweden. 

Of the several important questions regarding the mutual relations of the two 
kingdoms which arose in the succeeding years, the most important was that of 
the consular service. The demand for a separate consular service was raised 
in Norway in 1892. The two kingdoms, which were in many ways commer- 
cial rivals, had different commercial systems, Sweden having protection and 
Norway approximately free trade. In some places where consuls were main- 
tained, Norway had no interests whatever. The injustice of this was aggra- 
vated for Norway by the fact that Norway paid 41% per cent of the expenses 
of the service. The matter was the subject of incessant negotiation between 
1892 and 1905. Several joint committees were appointed to consider a solu- 
tion, but whatever agreements were reached by them were opposed by the 
Swedish Ministry. The Norwegians had in 1815 desired independence, and 
it was not surprising that talk of separation should revive. From the begin- 
ning of its formation, in 1869, the Great National Party of the Norwegian 
Left had held dissolution as its cardinal tenet. The Conservatives still upheld 
the union, but the obstinate stand of the Swedish Government was gradually 
alienating their support. 

x "Le Royaume de Norvege formera un Royaume libre, independant, indivisible et 
inalienable, reuni avec la Suede sous un meme Roi." Act of Union, August 6, 1815, Article 
I. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 5, p. 1049. The Union was based on this act 
and not on the Treaty of Kiel of 1814. 

2 The United States in 1893 signed separate extradition treaties with Norway and 
Sweden, the one with Sweden signed January 14 and with Norway, June 7. 


The consular question finally reached a crisis in 1905. Both houses of the 
Norwegian Storting had in May passed a law providing for a separate con- 
sular service, hoping that the King would give his consent to the unanimous 
wish of the Norwegian people. This the King refused. The Norwegian 
Ministry thereupon resigned, and no one of the political leaders could be 
prevailed upon to form a new one. On June 7 the Storting was assembled 
to take action. The Prime Minister informed the Storting that all the mem- 
bers of the Government had resigned, that the King had refused to accept the 
resignations, and that as an alternative government could not be formed the 
royal power had ceased to function and the union was therefore dissolved. 
The Storting at once adopted this resolution, conferring on the Ministry the 
power hitherto belonging to the King, and voted an address to the King set- 
ting forth the reasons for the dissolution and asking permission to elect a 
prince of the House of Bernadotte as King of Norway. 

Sweden had to face a grave problem in her answer to this decisive action. 
The Swedish nobility was strong, jealous of Swedish honor and proud of 
Sweden's former greatness. Sweden was twice as populous as Norway. As 
was naturally to be expected, a Swedish war party was at once formed. The 
situation was, however, most unfavorable to war, even in the eyes of the 
militarists. Norway, though small, was well prepared, while not only was 
the Swedish military organization in a transition state but there was the ever 
present fear of Russian aggression in case Sweden should turn her back on 
her eastern frontier. Aside from the influence of these negative forces in 
Sweden, the King of Sweden, Oscar II, was a sincere friend of peace, and the 
lower classes in Sweden were against resorting to arms. The laborers, so- 
cialists and the influential leaders of the international peace movement spoke 
with earnestness in behalf of a friendly settlement of the Norwegian question, 
and their influence was felt in the subsequent action of the Swedish Govern- 
ment. 1 

The Resolution of the Storting had at once evoked a protest from the 
Swedish Government against such an arbitrary dissolution and a special ses- 
sion of the Swedish Riksdag had been summoned to consider the matter. The 
desire of the Government for a peaceful settlement was set forth in the speech 
of the Swedish Secretary of State before the Council on June 19. Sweden, 
he said, would no doubt be legally justified in maintaining its position which 
was founded on contract, and in using force to perpetuate it ; such a proceeding 
would, indeed, be natural in view of the precipitate action of Norway; yet 
such action would be inconsistent with the true interests of Sweden, for the 

1 Gjerset gives a detailed account of the May Day demonstrations for "Justice for 
Norway" and the speeches of the Swedish statesmen and leaders of the peace movement, 
K. Gjerset, History of the Norwegian People, pp. 579 et seq. 


great advantages which the union had held for the two countries could only 
be enjoyed provided their mutual relations were cordial, and certainly could 
not be retained by a union based on force, which would create such ill-feeling 
that it would constitute a source of weakness rather than of strength. The 
dissolution must be legal, however, and in order to settle the most vital ques- 
tions concerned in the future relations of the two countries, the Riksdag should 
be asked to empower the Government to negotiate with the Storting. 

The Riksdag, to which this proposal was submitted on June 21, at once re- 
ferred the matter to a special committee, which after a month's discussion, 
reported on July 25. The substance of the report and the resolution taken by 
the Riksdag are contained in the Address to the King of July 28. Following 
the report of the committee the Riksdag took the position that in a matter of 
such consequence as the dissolution of the union a surer expression of the will 
of the Norwegian people should be obtained. It granted the authorization re- 
quested, but on condition that the negotiations should be subsequent to a vote 
of the people of Norway, either for a new Storting to decide the matter, or by 
a direct plebiscite. Should such a vote result in favor of dissolution, the 
R iksdag would agree to it, on condition that agreements regarding the arbitra- 
tion of future disputes, a neutral zone between the two countries, pasturage for 
the Nomadic Swedish Lapps, commerce in transit and common waterways 
were made in a manner satisfactory to Sweden's interests. 1 Although formal 
approval was not given to this decision of the Riksdag until August 8, this 
resolution was at once telegraphed to the Storting by command of the King. 

On July 27, two days after the committee's report to the Riksdag and the 
day before the address referred to above, the Norwegian Department of Jus- 
tice had reported to the Storting that as outside of Norway there appeared to 
be a doubt of the strength of the popular desire for dissolution, a doubt 
expressed in the committee report to the Riksdag, it was of the utmost im- 
portance that a plebiscite should be held, not so much to ascertain the wish of 
the people, for that was sufficiently clear, but to dissipate the doubts of out- 

The resolution and draft regulations for the plebiscite, proposed by the 
Department, were adopted by the Storting on July 28. 2 The Department's 
recommendation may be summarized as follows : The elections were to take 
place throughout the Kingdom on Sunday, August 13, at 1 p. m. The elec- 
toral qualifications fixed on the last election of the Storting were to be fol- 
lowed except with certain modifications, — chiefly calculated to allow those 
to vote who had attained their majority or completed the necessary period of 
domicile since the last election. 8 In view of the shortness of the time certain 

1 Documents, post, p. 1051. 

2 Documents, post, pp. 1053 et seq. 

8 The electoral qualifications in Norway in 1905 allowed all male citizens over 25 to 


special provisions were made. Anyone entitled to vote at the last Storting 
election who had subsequently changed his domicile was allowed to vote in his 
former electoral district under the regulations concerning absentee voting, and 
leniency as to a reasonable excuse for being absent was to be practiced. The 
ballots were to contain merely the word " yes " or " no " and were not to be 
signed. These regulations were supplemented by a circular of instructions 
from the Department of Justice giving full directions regarding the composi- 
tion and functions of election boards and the like. 1 If the voting could not be 
finished on August 13, it was to be continued the next day. A special cir- 
cular by the Department of Ecclesiastical Affairs to the clergy instructed them 
to hold short services at the polling places if the polls should be so far distant 
from the church as to make attendance at service interfere with the partici- 
pation in the ref ereundum. 2 

, All parties in Norway united in support of the dissolution; Liberals, Con- 
servatives, Moderates, the Labor Party, the women, the Swedes resident in 
Norway, all issued appeals to the electorate in its favor. The vote for dis- 
solution was overwhelming. Of the 371,911 votes cast, the Department of 
Justice reported that 368,208 were affirmative and 184 negative. In spite of 
the short notice, 85.4% of those qualified had voted. 8 

The Storting, on receipt of the official result of the vote, thereupon extended 
a formal request to the Swedish Government to cooperate in the dissolution of 
the union by entering into formal negotiations for the purpose of arriving at 
an agreement on the questions raised by the dissolution. The request was at 
once agreed to and each country appointed a committee for the purpose, which 
met at Karlstad in Sweden, from August 31 to September 23. During their 
sessions great anxiety was f ek throughout Europe over the outcome and each 
of the two Governments stationed troops at the border. The Swedish propo- 
sition called for submission to the Hague Tribunal of any dispute not involv- 
ing the independence, integrity, or vital interest of the two countries, and a 
neutral zone within which the fortresses were to be razed. The conditions of 
the neutral zone and the razing of the fortresses created ill-will in Norway, 
where they were thought humiliating. They were ultimately accepted by 
Norway, however, on the concession by Sweden that two historic fortresses 
should be allowed to remain. On October 16, the Riksdag approved a gov- 

vote, who were not disqualified through indictment for crime or bankruptcy. Women were 
not given the vote until 1907. 

1 Documents, post, p. 1060. 

2 Documents, post, p. 1069. 

8 Documents, post, p. 1070. It is interesting to compare these figures with those of the 
plebiscite on the question of Prince Charles of Denmark as King, which was held a few 
months later. In this only 328,827 voted and, although the vote was decisive, there was a 
far greater negative vote. The figures are 259,563 for, and 69,264 against Braekstad, 
Encyclopedia Britannka. 


eminent resolution to annul the Act of Union, to date from the day when the 
Karlstad agreements should have been formally signed by the two countries, 
and authorized the King to declare the union dissolved, and, the agreements 
having been signed on the 26th, on October 27, King Oscar issued a proclama- 
tion to the Norwegian people announcing his abdication as King of Norway. 



The Period of the French Revolution 


Draft Decree of Charles Francois Bouche for " the Irrevocable Union of the 
Cotntat Venaissin and of the City and State of Avignon to the County of 
Provence and by it to France/' November 12, 1789. 1 

L' Assemblee nationale, institute des 
titres et droits que le comte de Pro- 
vence a sur le comte Venaissin, sur les 
ville et Etat d'Avignon, et que, par 
le comte de Provence, les rois de 
France ont sur ces pays ; tenant pour 
maxime fondamentale que les do- 
maines de la couronne sont inalie- 
nables, a moins que la nation n'accede 
ou n'approuve leur alienation; que 
les peuples, provinces et villes ne peu- 
vent etre echanges, cedes ou vendus 
sans leur consentement ; s'etant con- 
vaincue que la nation provengale n'a 
approuve, dans aucun temps, Taliena- 
tion illegale et faite d non domino du 
comte Venaissin, des ville et Etat 
d'Avignon, parties integrantes de la 
souverainete de Provence; voyant 
d'ailleurs dans les annales fran^aises 
les reclamations que plusieurs mo- 
narques ont faites pour etre remis 
en possession de ces pays possedes par 
les papes, sans titre valable et legi- 
time, a declare et arrete : 

The National Assembly, informed 
as to the titles and rights which the 
County of Provence enjoys over the 
Comtat Venaissin and over the City 
and State of Avignon, and which, 
through the County of Provence, the 
Kings of France enjoy over these ter- 
ritories; holding it as a fundamental 
maxim that the domain of the crown 
is inalienable, unless the nation assents 
to or approves of such alienation; that 
peoples, provinces and cities can not be 
exchanged, ceded or sold without their 
consent ; convinced that the Provencal 
nation has not at any time approved of 
the illegal alienation of the Comtat 
Venaissin made non domino, of the 
City and State of Avignon, integral 
parts of the sovereignty of Provence ; 
in view, moreover, of the claims 
which several monarchs have made in 
the annals of France for the posses- 
sion of these countries, held by the 
Pope without good and legal title, has 
declared and determined : 

1 Archives Parlementaires, 1st series, vol. 10, pp. 4 and 213. 



1° Que le Roi sera prie par T As- 
semble nationale, representee par son 
president et six de ses membres qui 
lui seront deputes a cet effet, de don- 
ner des ordres a son ambassadeur a 
Rome, pour reclamer, sur-le-champ, 
le comte Venaissin, les ville et Etat 
d' Avignon, et en obtenir la restitution, 
a l'aimable, dans quinze jours, au plus 
tard, a compter du jour de la recep- 
tion des ordres de Sa Majeste. 

2° Que si Sa Saintete se refuse a 
faire cette restitution sous Toff re d'in- 
demnite, s'il y a lieu, laquelle ne 
pourra exceder la somme d'un million 
de livres, monnaie de France, Sa Ma- 
jeste sera priee de prendre d'abord 
apres Texpiration des susdits quinze 
jours possession a main armee du 
comte Venaissin, des ville et Etat 
d' Avignon, et d'y etablir le regime 
politique, civil, ecclesiastique et mili- 
taire qui va etre eta,bli dans tout le 
reste de la France. 

3° Qu'au moyen de ce, le comte 
Venaissin, les ville et Etat d' Avignon, 
avec tous leurs droits, appartenances 
et dependances, seront irrevocable- 
ment et resteront a jamais reunis au 
comte de Provence, et par lui a la 
France ; 

4° Que cependant, et jusqu'a ce que 
la restitution du comte Venaissin, des 
ville et Etat d' Avignon, soit accordee 
et la reunion achevee, tous les pri- 
vileges dont les habitants desdits comte 
et Etat jouissent en France, toutes 
les pensions, tous les dons, traite- 
ments, gratifications et emoluments, 

1. That the King shall be requested 
by the National Assembly, represented 
by its president and six of its mem- 
bers, who shall be appointed for the 
purpose, to instruct his ambassador at 
Rome to at once enter a claim for the 
Comtat Venaissin and the City and 
State of Avignon, and to obtain ami- 
cable restitution of them, within fif- 
teen days at latest, dating from the 
date of reception of His Majesty's 

2. That if His Holiness should re- 
fuse to make this restitution in return 
for an indemnity, should there be oc- 
casion for it, which shall not exceed 
the sum of a million livres, in French 
money, His Majesty shall be re- 
quested, on the expiration of the 
aforesaid fifteen days, to take imme- 
diate forcible possession of the Com- 
tat Venaissin and the City and State 
of Avignon, and to establish there the 
political, civil, ecclesiastical and mili- 
tary regime which is to be established 
throughout the rest of France. 

3. That by this means, the Comtat 
Venaissin, and the City and State of 
Avignon, with all their rights, appur- 
tenances and dependencies, shall be ir- 
revocably and forever united to the 
County of Provence, and through it 
to France. 

4. That meanwhile and until the 
restitution of the Comtat Venaissin, 
and of the City and State of Avignon 
shall be made and the union effected, 
all the privileges which the inhabitants 
of the said Comtat and State enjoy in 
France, all thct pensions, all the dona- 
tions, salaries, gratuities and emolu- 



les concernant, de quelque nature 
qu'ils soient, toutes les places et (lig- 
nites, tous les emplois, grades dont 
les Comtadins et les Avignonais sont 
revetus dans les villes, corps, corpo- 
rations et chapitres de la France, sont 
suspendus; les revenus des benefices 
qu'ils possedent en France seront ar- 
retes ; 

5° L' Assemblee nationale se reserve 
de modifier, etendre, ou revoquer les 
dispositifs contenus dans Tarticle ci- 
dessus, s'il y a lieu, et suivant l'exi- 
gence des cas. 1 

ments attached thereto, of whatever 
nature they may be, all the positions 
and dignities, all the employments and 
ranks held by the Comtadins and 
Avignonais in the towns, bodies, cor- 
porations and chapters of France, are 
suspended, and the revenue of the ben- 
benefices which they possess in France 
shall be stopped. 

5. The National Assembly reserves 
the right to modify, extend or revoke 
the provisions contained in the above 
article, if it should be expedient, ac- 
cording to the exigencies of the case. 

Address of the Parishes of the Comtat Venaissin in Answer to the Motion of 

M. Bouche, November 16, 1789 2 


In formes de ladite motion pour le 
reclamer, le Comtat Venaissin, croy- 
ant edifier cette respectable assemblee, 
et donner un temoignage authentique 
envers leur auguste souverain; con- 
siderant, que le seul fondement legi- 
time de toute acquisition et revendi- 
cation de la souverainete est le 
consentement libre du peuple, et que 
sa volonte doit etre manifestee avant 
qu'il passe sous aucune autre domina- 
tion; considerant encore qu'un peu- 
ple, cede par un acte ou il ne serai t pas 
intervenu, se regarderait comme aban- 
donne, et ensuite maitre de disposer 
de lui-meme, des hommes ne pouvant 
etre trafiques comme de simples pro- 


*-; Informed of the said motion pur- 
porting to annex the Comtat Venais- 
sin to France, the parishes of the said 
Comtat, for the edification of this 
honorable assembly and as a formal 
testimony to their august sovereign, 
declare that: considering that any 
claim or assumption of sovereignty 
can be lawfully founded only on the 
free consent of the people and that the 
expression of their will must precede 
any change of government ; consider- 
ing, moreover, that a people handed 
over by proceedings in which it has 
had no part would consider itself 
abandoned and thenceforth master of 
its own fate, for men can not be 

1 The Assembly ordered the printing of this draft decree but took no further action. 

2 As read to the National Assembly by the Abb6 Maury, in the session of April 30, 1791, 
Arch, pari, 1st series, vol. 25, p. 468. 



prietes mobilieres et territoriales ; en- 
fin, persuades qu'une reclamation se- 
rait d'un exemple funeste, puisqu'au 
mepris des traites les plus solennels, 
elle n'etablirait pour toute regie que 
celle de la force et de la violence, et 
exposerait la nation qui l'aurait teme- 
rairement adoptee, a se voir depouillee, 
par la meme voie, des meilleures por- 
tions de son empire; ils regardent la 
motion de M. Bouche comme attenta- 
toire au droit des gens et contraire 
aux principes de TAssemblee dont il 
est membre : ils declarent, en presence 
de l'Etre supreme, que rien ne saurait 
les delier jamais du serment de fide- 
lite a Tegard de leur legitime souve- 
rain, fidelite d'autant plus inalterable, 
qu'elle repose sur des bases assurees, 
la moderation et la generosite avec 
lesquelles ils sont gouvernes depuis 
plus de cinq siecles, et sur le main- 
tien de leurs privileges et immunites. 
Ils protestent, a la face de Tunivers, 
contre tous traites faits a leur insu et 
sans leur intervention directe et no- 
toire, et ou Ton disposerait d'eux sans 
un consentement prealable, et sans une 
ratification subsequente. 

Au surplus, les citoyens assembles 
ne pouvant en ce moment reunir le 
voeu general, et ne voulant pas se 
contenter d'un voeu partiel dans une 
affaire d'une aussi grande importance, 
ont arrete que la presente delibera- 
tion sera imprimee et adressee a toutes 
les communautes de cette province, en 
les invitant a la faire ratifier par le 
Corps legislatif, et a faire parvenir 
au plus tot un extrait conforme de 
leurs deliberations. 

bought and sold like mere lands and 
chattels ; persuaded, in short, that such 
a claim would constitute a fatal prece- 
dent, since, in violation of the most 
solemn treaties, it would set up the 
law of might and force and expose 
the nation using it to spoliation of its 
fairest provinces by the same meth- 
ods ; they, the parishes of the Com tat 
Venaissin, regard M. Bouche's motion 
as contrary to the law of nations and 
to the principles of the Assembly of 
which he is a member. They declare 
in the presence of the Supreme Being 
that nothing can absolve them from 
their oath of loyalty to their lawful 
sovereign, a loyalty the more unalter- 
able in that it is assured by the mod- 
eration and liberality with which they 
have been governed for more than five 
centuries and by the preservation 
of their privileges and immunities. 
They protest before the universe 
against all treaties made without their 
knowledge and their direct, public par- 
ticipation, purporting to dispose of 
them without their previous consent 
or subsequent ratification. 

Moreover, the citizens here assem- 
bled, unable at this time to secure a 
general consensus of opinion, and not 
satisfied with a partial vote in a mat- 
ter of such great importance, have de 
cided that these resolutions shall be 
printed and sent to all the communes 
of this province with a request that 
they have the same ratified by the 
legislature and that they send back as 
soon as possible a copy of their reso- 



The French Nation Renounces Conquest. Decree Concerning the Right of 

Making Peace and War. May 22-27, 1790 l 

Art. 1" Le droit de la paix et de 
la guerre appartient a la nation. 

La guerre ne pourra etre decidee 
que par un decret du Corps Legislatif , 
qui sera rendu sur la proposition f or- 
melle et necessaire du Roi, et ensuite 
sanctionne par Sa Majeste. 

2. Le soin de veiller a la surete ex- 
terieure du royaume, de maintenir ses 
droits et ses possessions, est delegue 
au Roi par la constitution de TEtat; 
ainsi, lui seul peut entretenir des re- 
lations politiques au dehors, conduire 
les negotiations, en choisir les agens, 
faire les preparatifs de guerre propor- 
tionnes a ceux des Etats Voisins, dis- 
tribuer les forces de terre et de mer, 
ainsi qu'il le jugera convenable, et en 
regler la direction en cas de guerre. 

3. Dans le cas d'hostilites immi- 
nentes ou commencees, d'un allie a 
soutenir, d'un droit a conserver par la 
force des armes, le pouvoir executif 
sera tenu d'en donner, sans aucun 
delai, la notification au Corps-Legis- 
latif, d'en faire connaitre les causes 
et les motifs; et si le Corps-Legislatif 
est en vacance, il se rassamblera sur- 

4. Sur cette notification, si le Corps- 
Legislatif juge que les hostilites com- 
mencees soient une agression cou- 
pable de la part des ministres ou de 
quelque autre agent du pouvoir execu- 
tif Tauteur de cette agression sera 

1 Duvergier, Collection Compute des Lois, 

Article 1. The right of making 
peace and war belongs to the nation. 

War may not be determined on ex- 
cept by a decree of the legislative 
body, which shall only be rendered 
on the formal proposition of the King, 
and afterwards sanctioned by His 

2. The duty of watching over the 
external safety of the kingdom and 
of maintaining its rights and its pos- 
sessions is delegated to the King by 
the constitution of the State ; thus he 
alone may hold political relations 
with foreign states, conduct negotia- 
tions, choose agents, make prepara- 
tions for war in proportion to those 
of neighboring states, make such dis- 
tribution of the forces on sea and on 
land as he shall consider suitable, and 
control their direction in case of war. 

3. In case of hostilities being immi- 
nent or already begun, of an ally to 
uphold or a right to be maintained by 
force of arms, the executive must 
give notification to the legislative body 
without delay, and must acquaint it 
with the causes and the reasons; and 
if this legislative body is not in ses- 
sion, it shall reassemble immediately. 

4. On receipt of this notification, 
if the legislative body is of the opin- 
ion that the hostilities already begun 
are a culpable aggression on the part 
of the ministers or of any other 
agent of the executive, the author of 

vol.1, p. 191. 



poursuivi comme criminel de lese- 
nation; TAssemblee nationale decla- 
rant a cet effet que la nation f rangaise 
renonce a entreprendre aucune guerre 
dans la vue de f aire des conquetes, et 
qu'elle n'emploiera jamais ses forces 
contre la liberte d'aucun peuple. 1 

5. Sur la meme notification, si le 
Corps-Legislatif decide que la guerre 
ne doit pas etre faite, le pouvoir 
executif sera tenu de prendre sur-le- 
champ des mesures pour faire cesser 
ou prevenir toutes hostilites, les mi- 
nistres demeurant responsable des de- 

6. Toute declaration de guerre sera 
faite en ces termes: De la part du 
Roi des Franqais, au nom de la na- 

this aggression shall be prosecuted for 
the crime of an affront against the 
nation; the National Assembly mak- 
ing a declaration to the effect that the 
French nation renounces the under- 
taking of any war for the purpose of 
conquest, and that it will never em- 
ploy its forces against the liberty of 
any people. 

5. If on the same notification, the 
legislative body decides that the war 
ought not to be waged, the executive 
shall be obliged to take immediate 
measures to stop or to prevent all hos- 
tilities, the ministers remaining re- 
sponsible for any delays. 

6. All declarations of war shall be 
made in this form: On the part of 
the King of the French, in the name 
of the nation. 

Formal Minute of the General Council of the Commune of the City of Avignon. 

June 12, 1790 2 

L'an mil sept cent quatre-vingt-dix 
et le douzieme jour du mois de juin, 
le conseil general de la commune 
etant assemble dans la salle du con- 
seil, apres due convocation, M. Lami, 
officier municipal, presidant le conseil 

In the year 1790 and on the 12th 
day of the month of June the General 
Council of the Commune being assem- 
bled in the council hall, after due con- 
vocation, M. Lami, municipal official, 
President of the Council in the ab- 

i Cf. Constitution of September 3-14, 1791 : Duvergier, Collection, vol. 3, p. 254. Titre 
VI. Des rapports de la nation francaise avec les nations Strangles La nation fran- 
chise renonce a entreprendre aucune guerre dans la vue de faire des conquetes, et n'emploiera 
jamais ses forces contre la libert* d'aucun peuple. (Translation), Title VI. The Relations 
of the French Nation with Foreign Nations. The French nation renounces the undertaking 
of any war for the purpose of conquests, and will never employ its forces against the liberty 

of any people. 
* Soullier, Histoire de la Revolution d'Avignon, vol. 1, p; 316, note 6. 



en l'absence de M. Blanc et de M. le 
maire, M. Peyre, autre officier munici- 
pal, a expose que dans le temps que la 
municipality et le comite des re- 
cherches s'occupent a suivre les traces 
des noirs complots, dont les suites 
desastreuses ont ete fatales a nombre 
infini de citoyens dans la journee du 
10 courant, comme il se verra par le 
verbal qui se dresse a mesure qu'on 
parvient a decouvrir les crimes mul- 
tiplies de cette malheureuse journee. 
Plusieurs personnes, inculpees d'etre 
chefs ou fauteurs de ces crimes 
atroces, ont ete arretees a la clameur 
publique, et deja meme le peuple 
justement indigne contre celles d'entre 
ces personnes qu'il croyait les plus 
coupables, a exige et commande leur 
supplice et s'obstine d'autant plus a 
faire continuer l'execution des autres 
personnes arretees, qu'il s'imagine ne 
pouvoir obtenir justice dans l'etat 
d'anarchie ou la negligence, et peut- 
etre meme la connivence du gouverne- 
ment nous laisse depuis plusieurs 
mois. Que pour mettre ce peuple plus 
a portee d'obtenir cette justice par des 
voies regulieres, la municipality a pris 
le parti de convoqutfr une assemblee 
generate des citoyens par districts, 
dont les deliberations ont ete mises sur 
le bureau par MM. les presidens de 
chacun d'iceux, et a requis etre fait 
lecture desdites deliberations; ce qui 
ayant ete fait par nous notaire, secre- 
taire-greffier de la commune soussigne, 
il a ete reconnu qu'il a ete delibere 
a l'unanimite, dans chacun des dis- 
tricts, que la nation avignonnaise et 
les Comtadins sont libres, souverains 

sence of M. Blanc and of the Mayor, 
M. Peyre, another municipal official, 
has stated that during the time de- 
voted by the Municipality and the 
committee of investigation to the fol- 
lowing of the clues of black conspir- 
acies, whose disastrous effects have 
been fatal to countless citizens during 
the 10th day of this month, as is evi- 
dent from the report to be drawn up 
after the discovery of the multitude 
of crimes of that unhappy day. Sev- 
eral persons, accused of being lead- 
ers or abettors in those atrocious 
crimes, have been arrested in re- 
sponse to the public clamor; and al- 
ready the people, justly indignant 
against those amongst the number 
who are considered the most guilty, 
have required and commanded their 
punishment and are the more deter- 
mined to cause the execution of the 
other persons arrested to be continued, 
because they imagine that justice can 
not be obtained during the state of an- 
archy in which the negligence and per- 
haps even the connivance of the gov- 
ernment has allowed us to remain for 
some months past. That to put the 
people more in the way of obtaining 
this justice by regular methods, the 
Municipality has convoked a general 
assembly of citizens by districts, 
whose deliberations have been placed 
on the bureau by the president of each 
district. The Municipality has re- 
quired that the said deliberations be 
read; this having been done by our 
notary, recording secretary of the 
commune, whose signature is below, 
it has been recognized that it has been 



et independans ; qu'en consequences la 
ville d'Avignon et ses dependances 
qui n'ont pu etre separees de la na- 
tion fran^aise, y seront reunies. A 
Peffet de quoi, M. le Maire et officiers 
municipaux sont requis de faire ar- 
borer sur le champ les armes de 
France, en faisant deplacer prealable- 
ment celles du St-Siege, avec le re- 
spect du a sa Saintete, comme chef 
visible de l'Eglise; de charger MM. 
Peyre et Duprat, le premier, avocat; 
le second, negotiant, officiers munici- 
paux deja nommes par la precedence 
deliberation du Conseil general de la 
commune, de se transporter conjointe- 
ment avec M. Tissot aussi avocat, pro- 
cureur de la commune, et nous greffier 
secretaire d'icelle, sans retard a Paris, 
pour faire aupres de I'auguste assem- 
ble nationale et du Roi des f ran$ais, 
toutes les demarches necessaires, a 
l'effet d'obtenir Tacceptation de cette 
reunion, et traiter tout ce qui con- 
cerne les interets de notre ville; sur 
quoi ledit sieur Tissot, procureur de 
la commune a requis, qu'attendu que 
cette deliberation est unanime, elle 
f ut mise a execution sur le champ ; et 
en consequence les armes de France 
ayant ete placees sous un dais, le Con- 
seil general precede d'un detachement 
des gardes avignonaises et des grena- 
diers, de la garnison de cette ville, et 
de la musique militaire, a accompagne 
le susdit dais, suivi d'un autre detache- 
ment, s'est rendu au palais, ou lesdites 
armes ont ete arborees sur la pre- 
miere porte d'entree, et en meme temps 
celles du St-Siege ont ete enlevees res- 

deliberated unanimously by each of 
the districts that the Avignonais na- 
tion and the Comtadins are free, sov- 
ereign and independent; that, in con- 
sequence, the City of Avignon and its 
dependencies which could not be sepa- 
rated from the French nation, are 
united to it. By reason of which the 
mayor and the municipal officials are 
required to at once display the arms 
of France, first displacing those of the 
Holy See with the respect due to His 
Holiness, as visible head of the 
Church; and to instruct MM. Peyre 
and Duprat, the former a lawyer, the 
latter a merchant, municipal officials 
already appointed by the preceding 
deliberation of the Communal Coun- 
cil, to repair to Paris at once and with- 
out delay in company with M. Tissot, 
likewise a lawyer, and communal 
attorney and recording secretary of 
this body, to take all measures before 
the august National Assembly of the 
King of the French, which may be 
necessary in order to obtain the accep- 
tation of the union, and to negotiate 
regarding everything which concerns 
the interests of our City ; on which the 
Sieur Tissot, communal attorney, has 
required that in view of the unanimity 
of this deliberation it should be at 
once put in execution; and in conse- 
quence the arms of France were placed 
under a canopy and the general coun- 
cil, preceded by detachments of Avig- 
nonais guards and grenadiers of the 
garrison of this city, and of the mili- 
tary band, accompanied the aforesaid 
canopy, and followed by another de- 



pectueusement, placees sous le meme 
dais, et accompagnees par le meme 
cortege a la maison commune, ou 
elles ont ete deposees dans un endroit 
decent; et pour Tentiere execution 
desdites deliberations, le conseil a au- 
torise le bureau de regie a fournir des 
mandats sur le tresorier de la com- 
mune pour la depense de la susdite 
deputation pour la somme de quinze 
cents livres, et une lettre de credit sur 
Paris jusqu'a concurrence de la 
somme de deux mille livres, sauf a 
regler ensuite les frais de cette depu- 
tation. Delibere de plus, que les 
deputes partiront dans le jour, qu'ex- 
trait de la presente deliberation et 
celles des districts leur seront delivres 
pour faire constater de leur mandat, 
qu'il sera envoye un courrier extra- 
ordinaire a M. le president de l'as- 
semblee nationale, avec une adresse 
pour le prevenir de cette deputation. 
L'assemblee chargeant lesdits sieurs 
deputes de presenter a Tauguste as- 
semble nationale Thommage de son 
respect, de son admiration et de sa 
soumission sans bornes a ses decrets, 
et Tassurance de la fidelite des Avi- 
gnonais a la nation, a la loi et au roi, 
et attendu que nousdit secretaire-gref- 
fier sommes oblige de nous absenter 
pour cette deputation, avons, du con- 
sentement du Conseil general, nomme 
et choisi pour pro-secretaire-greffier 
M. Namur, notable, qui a bien voulu 
accepter ladite charge, et a prete le ser- 
ment requis. De quoi et de tout ce 
que dessus, ledit sieur procureur de la 
commune a requis acte, et se sont, les- 

tachment, repaired to the palace, where 
the said arms were displayed on the 
first entrance gate, and at the same 
time those of the Holy See were re- 
spectfully removed, placed under the 
same canopy and, accompanied by .the 
same procession, were carried to the 
communal hall, where they were de- 
posited in a proper place ; and for the 
complete execution of the said delib- 
eration the Council has authorized the 
administrative officer to furnish requi- 
sitions on the communal treasury for 
the expenses of the aforesaid deputa- 
tion, to the sum of fifteen hundred 
livres, and a letter of credit on Paris 
up to the limit of the sum of two thou- 
sand livres, postponing the fixing of 
the expenses of this deputation. It is 
further deliberated that the deputies 
shall depart during the day, that a copy 
of the present deliberation and those 
of the district shall be given to them in 
order to bear witness to their mandate, 
that a special messenger shall be sent 
to the president of the National As- 
sembly with an address to inform them 
beforehand of the deputation's arrival. 
The assembly instructs the said dep- 
uties to present to the august National 
Assembly the homage of its respect, 
its admiration and its unlimited sub- 
mission to its decrees, and the assur- 
ance of the fidelity of the Avignonais 
to the nation, to the law and to the 
King, and in view of the fact that we, 
the undersigned recording-secretary, 
are obliged to be absent with this depu- 
tation, we have, with the consent of 
the general council, named and chosen 



dits sieurs assembles, soussignes a 
l'original, etc. 

Collationne, Signe; Namur, pro- 

for recording secretary, M. Namur, 
a leading citizen, who has been good 
enough to accept the office aforesaid, 
and has taken the required oath. The 
said attorney for the communal attor- 
ney has required a formal act of this 
and of all the above, and the said gen- 
tlemen being assembled, have signed 
the original, etc. 

Collated and signed; Namur, Act- 
ing Recording Secretary. 

Address of the Representative Body of the Comtat Venaissin. June 22, 1790 * 



Cest par Torgane de ses deputes 
librement elus, et constitues depuis 
peu de jours en Assemblee represen- 
tative, que le comte Venaissin vient 
porter a l'auguste Assemblee nationale 
de France ce tribut unanime. 

To the National Assembly 

Gentlemen : 

By the voice of its deputies, freely 
elected and constituted, a few days 
since, as a representative assembly, 
the Comtat Venaissin comes to bring 
to the august National Assembly of 
France this unanimous tribute. 

Oui, Messieurs, l'adoption des lois 
fran^aises, d'ou va dependre une 
partie de notre bonheur, ne saurait 
neansmoins porter la moindre atteinte 
au respect et a la fidelite inviolable que 
nous conserverons jusqu'au dernier 
soupir a notre bienfaisant monarque. 
Attaches a son gouvernement par des 
liens que nos coeurs rendront toujours 
indissolubles, rien ne saurait alterer 
nos sentiments pour sa personne 
sacree: ils reposent sur des bases in- 
ebranlables, notre consentement libre, 
la moderation et la generosite de nos 

1 Arc h. pari, 1st series, vol. 16, p. 405. 

Yes, gentlemen, the adoption of 
French laws, on which will depend a 
part of our happiness, will neverthe- 
less be unable to do the slightest in- 
jury to the inviolable respect and fidel- 
ity towards our beneficent monarch 
which we shall preserve to our last 
breath. Attached to his government 
by ties which our hearts will make for- 
ever indissoluble, nothing would be 
capable of altering our feelings for his 
sacred person ; they rest upon immov- 
able bases, our free consent, the mod- 
eration and generosity of our princes, 



princes, et l'amour qui est le juste prix 
d'un si grand bienfait. Rien ne sau- 
rait nous delier du serment que nous 
avons si souvent repete de vouloir 
vivre et mourir sous son empire. Ser- 
ment que nous venons de renouveler 
d'une maniere encore plus authentique, 
puisqu'il est emane du voeu unanime 
de nos commettants, exprime dans nos 
mandats; serment, enfin, que nous 
venons de lui offrir, comme les pre- 
mices de nos travaux, comme Telement 
necessaire de notre bonheur. Qu'il 
soit connu de Tunivers entier, ce ser- 
ment auguste ! 

■ • • » • 

Qu'il est consolant pour nous, qu'il 
est glorieux pour vous, Messieurs, 
de songer qu'en invoquant les prin- 
cipes eternels de la verite et de la 
justice, nous ne repetons que vos pro- 
pres principes, nous n'invoquons que 
vos propres decrets ! . . . 

Quelle crainte pourrait desormais 
inspirer une nation puissante, a la 
verite, mais qui vient de declarer 
solennellement qu'elle renonce a toute 
espece de conquete et qu'elle n'em- 
ploiera jamais ses forces contre la 
liberte d'aucun peuple? Ah plutot! 
quelle confiance sans reserve et sans 
borne ne doit-elle pas attendre, nous 
ne dirons pas d'un peuple qu'elle pro- 
tege et qu'elle vivifie dans son sein, 
mais de tous les habitants de Tunivers, 
de tous les vrais amis du bonheur et 
de la liberte des hommes ? . . . 

De G£rende, president. 

Raphel, Martinet, secretaires. 

and the love which is the just price of 
such a great benefit. Nothing would 
be capable of freeing us from the oath 
we have so often repeated of wishing 
to live and die under his rule. An 
oath which we have just renewed in a 
still more authentic manner, since it 
emanated from the unanimous vote of 
our constituents, expressed in our 
commissions ; an oath, finally, that we 
have offered him, as the first fruits 
of our labors, as the necessary element 
of our good fortune. Let this august 
oath be known to the whole world! 

How consolatory it is for us, how 
glorious for you, gentlemen, to think 
that in invoking the eternal principles 
of truth and justice, we are but repeat- 
ing your own principles, we are but 
invoking your own decrees! . . . 

What fear could a nation inspire 
henceforth, which, though in truth 
powerful, has just declared solemnly 
that she renounces all kinds of con- 
quest and that she will never use her 
forces against the liberty of any peo- 
ple? Ah! rather, what confidence 
without reserve and without limit 
should she not expect, we will not say 
from a people she protects and nour- 
ishes in her bosom, but from all the 
inhabitants of the world, from all the 
true friends of the happiness and the 
liberty of men ? . . . 

De GfeRENDE, President. 

Raphel, Martinet, Secretaries. 



Address of the Deputation from the City of Avignon, Delivered before the 

National Assembly. June 26, 1790 x 

Deputes par un peuple libre, in- 
dependant et souverain, ce n'est pas 
en vain que nous venons jurer une 
fidelite inviolable a la nation fran- 
gaise. . . . Place au milieu de la 
France, ayant les memes moeurs, le 
meme langage, nous avons voulu avoir 
les memes lois. ... A peine avez- 
vous declare que tous les hommes sont 
libres, que nous avons voulu l'etre. 
Nos municipalites se sont organisees 
d'apres les lois etablies par vos decrets, 
et nous etions deja constitues lorsque 
des brefs incendiaires et tyranniques, 
lances par le Vatican, sont venus 
frapper d'anatheme la Constitution 
fran^aise 2 . . . (L'orateur fait le 
tableau des dispositions preparees 
sourdement a Avignon pour tenter une 
con t re-re volution en France). . . . 

Des hommes armes parurent tout 
a coup au milieu de la ville; bientot, 
presses de toutes parts, ils abandon- 
nerent le champ de bataille. Le sang 
pur des citoyens patriotes fut con- 
fondu avec celui des assassins qu'on 
avait suscites contre nous. Nos al- 
lies volerent enfin a notre secours ; et 
... ils sont parvenus ... a nous 
rendre la paix. Le lendemain de ces 
scenes de sang et de carnage, les cito- 
yens actifs de tous les districts de la 
ville d'Avignon s'assemblerent legale- 
ment. Cest dans cette assembled que 
le peuple, considerant qu'il ne pouvait 

Deputed by a free, independent and 
sovereign people, it is not in vain that 
we have come here to swear inviolable 
fidelity to the French nation. . . . 
Placed in the center of France, with 
the same customs, the same language, 
we have wished to have the same 
laws. . . . Hardly had you declared 
that all men are free than we de- 
sired freedom. Our municipalities 
are organized according to the laws 
established by your decrees and they 
were already constituted when the 
incendiary and tyrannical letters 
launched by the Vatican arrived to 
hurl anathema against the French 
Constitution. . . . (The orator here 
describes the secret arrangements pre- 
pared at Avignon to bring about a 
counter-revolution in France.) . . . 

Armed men appeared suddenly in 
the centre of the town; soon, hard 
pressed on all sides, they abandoned 
the field of battle. The pure blood of 
the citizen patriots was mingled with 
that of the assassins who had been 
stirred up against us. Our allies 
finally hastened to our aid; and . . . 
they succeeded ... in restoring 
peace. The day after these scenes of 
blood and carnage, the active citizens 
of all the districts of the town of 
Avignon assembled in legal course. 
It was in this assembly that the peo- 
ple, considering that they could be 

1 Arch. pari, 1st series, vol. 16, p. 476-7. A letter from the municipal officials of 
Avignon as to the vote of the city was read to the Assembly by Camus on June 17 {ibid., 
p. 250) and one telling of similar votes in the districts by Bouche, June 19 (ibid., p. 369). 

2 Omitted in the original. 



etre heureux et libre que par la Con- 
stitution fran^aise, declara qu'il se 
reunissait a la France, qu'il supprimait 
les armes du pape, qu'il y substituait 
celles du roi de France, et qu'il depu- 
tait vers lui pour lui temoigner le re- 
spect et la fidelite que lui vouaient les 
Avignonnais. Vous connaissez nos 
droits : les deliberations de tout le peu- 
ple avignonnais. Vous connaissez 
nos motifs: notre roi veut etre des- 
pote, et nous ne voulons plus etre es- 
claves. La France est libre ; nous ne 
pouvons le devenir que par elle, et nous 
nous jetons dans ses bras. (Des ap- 
plaudissetnents reiteres interrompent 
Vorateur.) Vous accepterez sans 
doute un peuple qui vous appartenait 
autrefois, un peuple enfin qui a verse 
son sang pour le maintien de vos de- 
crets. Nous remettons sur le bureau 
les deliberations de la ville et de l'Etat 

happy and free only by means of the 
French Constitution, declared that they 
were united to France, that the papal 
arms were suppressed and those of 
the King of France substituted, and 
that a deputation should be sent to him 
to testify to the respect and fidelity 
sworn to him by the people of Avig- 
non. You are acquainted with our 
rights : the deliberation of all the peo- 
ple of Avignon. You are acquainted 
with our motives ; our King wishes to 
be a despot, and we wish to be slaves 
no longer. France is free; we can 
become so only through her, and 
we throw ourselves into her arms. 
(Repeated applause interrupts the 
speaker.) You will surely accept a 
people who formerly belonged to you, 
a people who have now poured out 
their blood to maintain your decrees. 
We place on the bureau the delib- 
erations of the City and State of 

First Report of the French National Assembly on the Affair of Avignon, and 

Decree Adopted, August 27, 1790 * 

M. Tronchet, rapporteur. . . . 

Les citoyens ont ete egorges par 
leurs concitoyens. Cest au- milieu de 
ces horreurs que la ville d'Avignon a 
declare son independance et a de- 
mande sa reunion a TEmpire fran^ais. 
Est-ce done parmi des violences et 
dans le moment ou une foule de f ugi- 
tifs ont abandonne leur ville malheu- 
reuse, que Ton a pu recueillir un voeu 
libre et suffisant? . . . Je ne pense 

Tronchet, reporter. . . . 

The citizens had been slaughtered 
by their fellow citizens. It was in the 
midst of these horrors that the City 
of Avignon declared its independence 
and asked for union with the French 
Empire. Is it amid such scenes of 
violence and at the moment when a 
crowd of fugitives have abandoned 
their unhappy city that a free and 
satisfactory vote can be taken? . . . 

1 Arch, pari, 1st series, vol. 18, pp. 369-^379. 



pas que l'Assemblee nationale puisse 
ordonner la reunion de cette province 
a la France. . . . Avignon est une 
province des Etats du pape, qui ne 
peut se detacher du surplus des sujets 
de cette puissance sans l'aveu de tous 
les autres citoyens qui composent avec 
elle cette association. Cette reunion 
ne doit pas s'operer que par un traite 
entre le pape et la France sous le con- 
sentement des Comtadins. Sans cela, 
ce serait une conquete interdite par les 
principes meme de votre Constitution. 
. . . Voici en consequence le pro jet 
de decret que j'ai Thonneur de vous 
presenter : 

L'Assemblee nationale, apres avoir 
entendu le rapport de ses commis- 
saires, a decrete et decrete : 

1°. Qu'en execution du decret du 
17 juin, son president se retirera par 
devers le roi, a l'effet de lui commu- 
niquer les nouvelles pieces et instruc- 
tions relatives a la petition des Avig- 
nonnais, ainsi que les pieces et instruc- 
tions relatives a l'etat actuel du com- 
tat Venaissin, pour etre, par Sa Ma- 
jeste, propose, et par TAssemblee na- 
tionale decrete ce qu'il appartiendra ; 
et que cependant le roi sera supplie de 
faire placer dans les environs d'Avi- 
gnon et du comtat les troupes de ligne 
qu'il croira convenables, eu egard aux 
circonstances ; 

I do not think that the National As- 
sembly can order the union of this 
province to France. . . . Avignon is 
a province of the Papal States, and 
can not separate itself from the re- 
mainder of the subjects of that Power 
without the consent of all the other 
citizens who with it compose this 
association. This union ought not 
to be consummated except by a treaty 
between the Pope and France, with 
the consent of the people of the 
Comtat. Without this it would be 
conquest, which is forbidden by the 
very principles of your constitution. 
. . . Here, consequently, is the draft 
decree which I have the honor to pre- 
sent to you : 

The National Assembly, having 
heard the report of its commissioners, 
has decreed and decrees : 

1. That in execution of the decree 
of June 17, its president shall repair 
before the King in order to communi- 
cate to him the new documents and 
instructions relating to the petition of 
the people of Avignon as well as those 
documents and instructions relating 
to the present state of the Comtat Ve- 
naissin, that that which pertains to 
the matter may be proposed by His 
Majesty, and decreed by the National 
Assembly; and that, meanwhile, the 
King shall be requested to cause to 
be placed in the environs of Avignon 
and of the Comtat such troops of the 
line as he shall deem advisable in view 
of the circumstances; 

4°. L'Assemblee nationale charge 
son president de faire remettre inces- 

4. The National Assembly in- 
structs its President to send a copy of 



samment une expedition du present de- 
cret, tant aux officiers municipaux 
d'Orange qu'aux deputes de la ville 
d' Avignon. Elle charge en outre son 
president d'ecrire au peuple avignon- 
nais, pour lui temoigner la profonde 
douleur dont elle a ete affectee a la 
vue des malheurs qui ont accompagne 
les evenements arrives a Avignon, et 
Tinviter a employer les moyens les 
plus efficaces pour effacer jusqu'au 
souvenir de ces malheurs, et pour re- 
tablir entre tous les citoyens la Con- 
corde que leur interet mutuel leur 


• • • ■ ■ 

L'Assemblee, apres quelques nou- 
velles observations, rend le decret 
suivant : 

" L'Assemblee nationale, apres 
avoir entendu le rapport de ses com- 
missaires sur Taffaire d' Avignon, 

" Decrete que les citoyens d* Avig- 
non, detenus depuis le 12 juin dans 
les prisons d'Orange, seront provi- 
soirement elargis, a la charge de tenir 
la ville d'Orange pour prison, ou ils 
resteront sous la sauvegarde de la na- 
tion fran^aise, et ou il sera pourvu a 
la subsistance des ouvriers qui se trou- 
vent parmi eux. 

"Ajourne, au surplus, le reste du 
projet de decret qui lui a ete propose 
par ses commissaires. ,, 

this decree without delay to the mu- 
nicipal officers of Orange as well as to 
the deputies of the City of Avignon. 
It further instructs its President to 
write to the people of Avignon in 
order to testify to them the profound 
sorrow which it experiences in view 
of the misfortunes which have accom- 
panied the events which have taken 
place in Avignon, and to invite them 
to employ the most efficacious means 
whereby to efface the very memory of 
those misfortunes, and to establish 
that harmony between all the citizens 

which their mutual interest enjoins. 

• • • . • 

The Assembly, after several new 
observations, passed the following de- 

" The National Assembly, having 
heard the report of its commissioners 
on the affair of Avignon, 

" Decrees that the citizens of Avig- 
non detained since June 12 in the 
prisons of Orange, shall be set free 
provisionally, on condition of keeping 
to the city of Orange as their prison, 
where they shall remain under the pro- 
tection of the French nation, and 
where there shall be provision for sub- 
sistence of the workmen among them. 

" The remainder of the draft decree 
proposed by its committee is ad- 
journed/ ' 

Decree of the National Assembly, November 20, 1790 * 

L'Assemblee nationale, apres avoir The National Assembly, having 
entendu son comite diplomatique, heard its Diplomatic Committee, ad- 

1 Arch pari, vol. 20, p. 580. This decree was proposed by Mirabeau, not as the official 



ajourne la deliberation sur la peti- 
tion du peuple avignonais, et de- 
crete que le roi sera prie de faire 
passer incessamment des troupes 
fran^aises a Avignon, pour y pro- 
teger, sous ses ordres, les etablisse- 
ments fran£ais, et pour y maintenir, 
de concert avec les officiers munici- 
paux, la paix et la tranquillite pu- 
blique ; 

journs deliberation on the petition of 
the people of Avignon, and decrees 
that the King be requested to send 
French troops to Avignon without 
•delay, to there protect under his or- 
ders, the French establishments, and 
in concert with the municipal officers 
to there maintain the public peace. 1 

Second Report of the Committees on Avignon Regarding the Union of Avig- 
non and the Comtat Venaissin with France, and Discussion by the Assembly. 
April 30-May 4, 1791 1 

M. de Menou, au nom des comitis 
diplomatique et d* Avignon. 

Messieurs, je viens, au nom des 
comites diplomatique et d' Avignon, 

M. de Menou, in the name of the 
Committees on Diplomacy and on 

Gentlemen, I come, in the name of 
the Committees on Diplomacy and on 

proposition of the Committee on Avignon but as representing the opinion of the Committee. 

Decrees had been proposed on the 16th and the 18th by Petion and Robespierre respect- 
ively, but not voted on. They were as follows : 

Draft Decree proposed by Petion, November 16, 1790 (ibid., vol. 20, p. 481). 

" L'Assemblee nationale declare que la ville d* Avignon et son territoire font partie de 
l'Empire francais. Elle prie de roi de negocier avec la cour de Rome sur les indemnites qui 
pourraient lui etre dues, pour ensuite les articles ainsi negocies etre fournis a son examen, 
admis, modifies ou rejetes par elle. Elle le prie, en outre, d'envoyer a Avignon une quantite 
de troupes de ligne franchises suffisante pour prevenir les troubles et maintenir la paix." 


u The National Assembly declares that the City of Avignon and its territory form a part 
of the French Empire. It requests the King to negotiate with the Court of Rome as to 
whatever indemnities may be due it, and that the resulting articles of this negotiation be 
furnished to it for examination, to be accepted, amended or rejected by it It further re- 
quests the King to send to Avignon sufficient numbers of French troops of the line, to 
prevent trouble and maintain peace." 

Draft Decree proposed by Robespierre, November 18, 1790 (ibid., vol. 20, p. 530). 

"L'Assemblee nationale declare que la ville d' Avignon et son territorie font partie de 
TEmpire francais, ordonne que tous ses decrets y seront aussitot envoyes pour y etre exe- 
cutes comme dans le reste de la France." 


" The National Assembly declares that the city of Avignon and its territory form a part 
of the French Empire, and orders that all its decrees shall be sent there at once to be exe- 
cuted as in the rest of France." 
1 Arch. pari, 1st series, vol. 25, p. 452 et seq. 



soumettre de nouveau a votre delibera- 
tion une question sur laquelle il est 
temps enfin de prononcer definitive- 
ment, si vous voulez prevenir la de- 
struction de 150,000 individus livres 
a toutes les horreurs d'une guerre 
civile alimentee par les passions les 
plus violentes. 

L'etat d'Avignon et le Comtat Ve- 
naissin seront-ils reunis a la France? 
Telle est la question sur laquelle vous 
avez a deliberer. 

Cette question se subdivise en plu- 
sieurs parties. 

Avignon, to again submit to your 
consideration a question which must 
be finally decided if you wish to pre- 
vent the destruction of 150,000 indi- 
viduals, given over to all the horrors 
of a civil war fostered by the most 
violent passions. 

Shall the State of Avignon and the 
Comtat Venaissin be united to 
France? That is the question you 
have to consider. 

The question may be divided into 
several parts. 

Quinziime et Derniire Question 

Le v<ru des Avignonais et des Com- 
tadins est-il stdHsamment exprimc? 

Plusieurs actes des plus authen- 
tiques, passes depuis le mois de mai 
de Tannee derniere, jusqu'aujour- 
d'hui, prouvent evidemment le voeu 
des Avignonais pour se reunir a la 

L'un en date du 14 juin 1790 est la 
deliberation des 9 districts d'Avignon 
et dependances, votant formellement 
la reunion a la France. . . . 

II resulte de tout ce que je viens 
d'avoir Thonneur de vous dire, Mes- 
sieurs, 1° que 59 communautes du 
Comtat ont pris, depuis le mois de 
juin 1790 jusqu'au mois de fevrier 
1791, des deliberations authentiques 
pour se reunir a la France ; 

2° Que depuis le 14 Janvier 
jusqu'au 20 du meme mois, toutes les 

Fifteenth and Last Question 

Is the vote of the people of Avig- 
non and of the Comtat sufficiently ex- 

Several most authentic acts occur- 
ring since the month of May of last 
year, up to the present day, prove 
clearly the desire of the people of 
Avignon to unite themselves to 

One, under date of June 14, 1790, 
is the decision of nine districts of 
Avignon and its dependencies, voting 
formally for union with France. . . . 

It follows from all that I have just 
had the honor to say to you, gentle- 
men, (1) that fifty-nine communities 
of the Comtat have, since the month of 
June, 1790, and up to the month of 
February, 1791, made authenticated 
decisions to unite themselves with 
France ; 

2. That from the 14th of Jan- 
uary to the 20th of the same month, 



communes du Comtat, excepte Val- 
reas, ont, a Texemple de Carpentras, 
arbore les armes de France, et mani- 
festo leur voeu pour la reunion ; 

4° Qu'il n'existe aucun acte portant 
revocation des deliberations des 59 
communes citees ci-dessus, ou ema- 
nant des 39 autres, pour mani fester 
un vceu contraire a la reunion; d'ou 
je conclus avec tous les departements 
envirorftiants, que le vceu de la ma- 
jorite des habitants du Comtat est en 
faveur de la reunion. 

Resume General 

J'ai prouve qu'avant les annees 
1229, 1274 et 1348, Avignon et le 
Comtat Venaissin avaient toujours 
fait, quoique separes entre eux, par- 
tie integrante du Comte de Provence ; 

Qu'en 1229, de l'aveu meme du pape 
Gregoire IX, le Comtat ne lui avait 
ete cede qu'a titre de depot ; 

Qu'en 1235, ce comte avait ete res- 
titue au comte de Toulouse ; 

Qu'en 1274, Philippe le Hardi, 
auquel il n'appartenait pas, n'avait pu 
le ceder legitimement au pape Gre- 
goife X ; 

Qu'en 1125, 1308 et 1343, ces deux 
etats avaient et6 greves de substitu- 
tions, avec defense expresse d'aliener ; 

Que, d'apres ces substitutions et ces 
defenses d'aliener, et a defaut de ma- 
jorite, Jeanne n'avait pu vendre Avig- 
non ien 1348; 

Que, en consequence, la vente . ou 

all the communes of the Comtat, ex- 
cept Valreas, have, following the ex- 
ample of Carpentras, raised the arms 
of France and manifested their desire 

for the union ; 

• • • > • 

4. That there exists no act ex- 
pressing a revocation of the decisions 
of the fifty-nine communes above 
cited, or emanating from the thirty- 
nine others, to show a desire contrary 
to union ; from which I conclude, with 
all the neighboring departments, that 
the vote of the majority of the inhab- 
itants of the Comtat is in favor of the 

General Summary 

I have proved that before the years 
1229, 1274, and 1348, Avignon and 
the Comtat Venaissin, although sepa- 
rate from each other, formed an in- 
tegral part of the County of Provence ; 

That in 1229 Pope Gregory IX 
himself admitted that the Comtat had 
been ceded to him only in trust ; 

That, in 1235 this County was re- 
stored to the County of Toulouse ; 

That, in 1274 Philip the Bold, to 
whom it did not belong, did not have 
the right to cede it to Pope Gregory 

That, in 1125, 1308 and 1343, those 
two states were encumbered with en- 
tails with express prohibition against 
alienation ; 

That, on account of the entails and 
prohibition against alienation, and be- 
cause she was not of age, Joan had 
no power to sell Avignori in 1348; 

That, consequently, the sale or ab- 



cession absolue de ces deux Etats etait 
de toute nullite et ne pouvait tout au 
plus etre consideree que comme un 
simple engagement; 

Que, en vertu du droit d'heredite, 
les rois de Naples, comtes de Pro- 
vence, ont continue d'etre les vrais 
proprietaires de ces deux etats; 

Qu'en vertu du testament de 
Charles IV, dernier comte de Pro- 
vence, Louis XI, roi de France, ses 
successeurs et aujourd'hui la nation 
fran^aise sont devenus les legitimes 
proprietaires d' Avignon et du Comtat 
Venaissin, domaines inalienables de- 
pendant de la Provence; 

Que la possession des papes n'a 
jamais ete paisible et que tous ceux 
qui ont eu droit a la chose ont fait 
des actes soit conservatoires, soit 
revocatoires ; 

Que meme quelques-uns d'entre eux 
ont joui de toute la plenitude de leurs 
droits en prenant possession de ces 
deux pays. 

J'ai egalement prouve qu'en sup- 
posant que les Avignonais et les Com- 
tadins etaient autrefois deux peuples 
libres et independants, ils ont neees- 
sairement conserve ce caractere de 
liberte et d'independance ; 

Que si, de leur pleine et entiere vo- 
lonte, ils se sont autrefois soumis au 
gouvernement du pape, ils ont le droit 
d'en changer aujourd'hui et> .con- 
sequemment, celui de se reunir a la 
nation fran^aise, s'ils y trouvent leur 
. Qu'il est de Tinteret de la France* 
soit d'ordonner cette reunion, e;i vertu 
de son droit, soit de Taccepter en vertu 

solute conveyance of those two "states 
was null and void or could, at most, 
be regarded only as creating a trust; 

That, by right of inheritance, the 
Kings of Naples, Counts of Provence, 
have continued to be the rightful own- 
ers of those two States ; 

That, by the last will and testament 
of Charles IV, last Count of Pro- 
vence, Louis XI, King of France, his 
successors, and to-day the French na- 
tion, have become the lawful owners 
of Avignon and of the Comtat Venais- 
sin, inalienable estates appurtenant to 
Provence ; 

That the Popes have never had 
peaceful possession and that all those 
who had any rights in the premises 
have executed deeds either of entail or 

That some of the claimants even 
took possession of the two countries 
and enjoyed the full use of their 

I have likewise proved that the 
Avignonais and the Comtadins, as- 
suming them to have been formerly 
two free and independent peoples, 
must have preserved their liberty and 

That, if formerly they freely sub- 
mitted to the papal government, they 
have to-day the right to change their 
government, and, consequently, the 
right to join the French nation, if 
they consider such a change to their 
advantage ; 

That it is to the interest of France 
either to order this union as of its own 
right, <or to accept it as based on the 



de celui des Avignonais et Comtadins; 

Qu'il serait egalement desavanta- 
geux pour la France et pour les Com- 
tadins et Avignonais, que cette re- 
union n'eut pas lieu ; que cette mesure 
ne peut raisonnablement causer ni in- 
quietude ni jalousie, aux peuples et 
princes etrangers. 

J'ai egalement prouve que, en or- 
donnant cette reunion, la France ne 
contrevenait a aucun de ses decrets ; 

Que le voeu des Comtadins et Avi- 
gnonais etait suffisamment exprime. 

Je conclus, en consequence, a la re- 
union d' Avignon et du Comtat Ve- 
naissin a TEmpire fra^ais. (Ap- 
plaudissements & gauche.) 

Voici le pro jet de decret que je suis 
charge de vous presenter: 

" L'Assemblee nationale, apres 
avoir entendu le rapport de ses comites 
diplomatique et d' Avignon decrete ce 
qui suit: 

"1° Le Comtat Venaissin et la ville 
d' Avignon, avec leurs territoires et de- 
pendances, font parties integrantes de 
l'Empire fran^ais. 

" 2° Le roi sera prie de nommer 
le plus promptement possible, 3 com- 
missaires charges de se rendre a Avig- 
non et dans le Comtat Venaissin, avec 
pleins pouvoirs pour consommer la 
reunion, faire cesser toutes voies de 
fait et hostilites, requerir, s'U est be- 
soin, les troupes de ligne et gardes 
nationales des departements environ- 
nants, afin d'y retablir le bon ordre et 
la tranquillite. 

" Le roi est prie de faire negocier 

rights of the Avignonais and Com- 
tadins ; 

That it would be equally disadvan- 
tageous for France and for the Com- 
tadins and Avignonais if this union 
did not take place ; that this measure 
can not reasonably cause either anx- 
iety or jealousy to foreign peoples or 

I have likewise proved that by or- 
dering this union France would not in- 
fringe on any of its own decrees; 

That the wish of the Comtadins and 
Avignonais has been sufficiently ex- 

I conclude, therefore, that Avignon 
and the Comtat Venaissin should be 
united to the French Empire. (Ap- 
plause on the left. ) 

Here is the draft decree which I am 
instructed to present to you : 

" The National Assembly, its com- 
mittees on Diplomacy and on Avig- 
non having been heard, decrees as 
follows : 

" 1. The Comtat Venaissin and the 
City of Avignon, with their territories 
and dependencies, constitute integral 
parts of the French Empire. 

" 2. The king shall be requested to 
name, as promptly as possible, three 
commissioners who shall be instructed 
to go to Avignon and the Comtat 
Venaissin with full power to consum- 
mate the union, to stop all acts of vio- 
lence and hostility, to requisition, if 
necessary, the troops of the line and 
the National Guard of the surround- 
ing departments in order to restore 
quiet and good order. 

" The king is requested to enter into 



avec la cour de Rome sur les indem- 
nites et remboursements qui pourront 
lui etre legitimement dus. 

" 3° Le President presentera dans 
le jour le present decret a Tacceptation 
et sanction du roi. 

" L'Assemblee nationale charge ses 
comites de Constitution, diplomatique 
et d'Avignon, de lui presenter inces- 
samment et d'apres le compte qui sera 
rendu par les commissaires du roi, un 
projet de decret sur les moyens ulte- 
rieurs d'execution pour effectuer Tin- 
corporation de la ville d'Avignon et 
du Comtat Venaissin a TEmpire f ran- 


• • • • • 

M. l'Abbe Maury. . . . Apres que 
M. le rapporteur vous a demande 
plusieurs delais pour faire son rap- 
port, penseriez-vous qu'il y eut de Tin- 
discretion a vous demander que le 
rapport fut ajourne? ( Murmur es a 
gauche.) ... Si vous voulez ac- 
corder aux defenseurs des droits du 
pape le delai necessaire, vous pouvez 
declarer provisoirement que vous 
prenez Avignon et le Comtat Venais- 
sin sous votre protection speciale que 
vous y defendez tout acte d'hostilite. 
Quelle que doive etre votre delibera- 
tion, quand le decret de reunion de- 
vrait etre prononce dans cette seance, 
il n'y aurait toujours rien de plus ur- 
gent que de faire cesser les hostilites, 
et le decret que j'ose attendre de votre 
humanite aurait toujours d'heureux 
effet. . . . 

Je demande de plus que TAssemblee, 
instruite des troubles qui interessent 

negotiations with the Court of Rome 
regarding the indemnities and reim- 
bursements that may be lawfully 
due it. 

" 3. The President shall, this same 
day, present the present decree to the 
King for acceptance and approval. 

" The National Assembly instructs 
its Committees on the Constitution, on 
Diplomacy, and on Avignon forth- 
with to lay before it, in accordance 
with a report to be made by the royal 
commissioners, a draft decree as to 
further means of effectuating the in- 
corporation of the City of Avignon 
and of the Comtat Venaissin into the 
French Empire." 

• • • • • 

M. l'Abb£ Maury. . . . Since the 
chairman has requested several delays 
in order to make his report, would you 
think it indiscreet to ask that action 
thereon be adjourned? {Murmurs 
on the Left.) ... If you wish to 
grant the necessary delay to the de- 
fenders of the papal rights you can 
declare provisionally that you take 
Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin 
under your special protection and 
that you prohibit all hostile acts 
therein. Whatever decision you may 
come to, and although the decree of 
union should be passed in this session, 
the most urgent thing would still be 
to bring about a cessation of hostili- 
ties, and the decree I dare expect of 
your humanity would in any case have 
a happy effect. . . . 

I ask that the Assembly, already 
informed of the disturbances, which 



d'autant plus sa solicitude, qu'elle a 
appris que c'etait au nom de la France 
qu'on tentait de faire des conquetes, 
declare qu'elle prend sous sa protec- 
tion speciale la ville d* Avignon et 
toutes les communes du Comtat, et 
qu'elle defend provisoirement toute 
espece d'hostilite. 

Un membre a gauche: Et de quel 
droit ? 

M. l'Abbe Maury. En vertu du 
droit sacre que lui donnent les peti- 
tions de la ville d* Avignon et du Com- 
tat, qui ont reclame son intervention 
et sa protection. 

• • • • • 

M. de Clermont-Tonnerre. . . . 
J'appuie . . . Tajournement jusqu'au 
delai demande par M. Tabbe Maury; 
et je demande en outre, que M. de la 
Tour-Maubourg, qui connait mieux 
que noUs Tetat des choses, puisqu'il a 
fait le voyage d* Avignon en qualite 
de colonel du regiment de Soissonais, 
veuille bien nous indiquer les moyens 
qui lui paraissent les plus propres a 
retablir le calme dans Avignon, et tout 
particulierement les moyens de retirer 
du Comtat les deserteurs f ran^ais qui 
font toute la force de cette armee pre- 
tendue patriotique a laquelle ils se sont 

M. Robespierre. Les horreurs qui 
ont desole le Comtat sont un pressant 
motif de hater notre deliberation et 
non de Tentraver et de la retarder par 
des discussions inutiles ou des ta- 
bleaux exageres de la situation des 

bespeak its care all the more because, 
as it has learned, conquests have been 
attempted in the name of France, 
that the Assembly take the City of 
Avignon and all the communes of the 
Comtat under its special protection 
and prohibit provisionally all manner 
of hostilities. 

A member on the Left. And by 
what right? 

M. l'Abb£ Maury. By the sacred 
right conferred by the petitions of the 
City of Avignon and of the Comtat 
which have invoked the intervention 
and protection of this body. 

• • • • • 

M. de Clermont-Tonnerre. . . . 
I . . . support a postponement for 
the length of time asked for by M. 
the Abbe Maury; and I further ask 
that M. de La Tour-Maubourg, who 
knows the state of things better than 
we, since he has made the journey to 
Avignon in the capacity of colonel of 
the Soisson regiment, will please indi- 
cate to us the means that seem to him 
most suitable to reestablish quiet in 
Avignon, and more particularly the 
means to draw from the Comtat the 
French deserters who form the main 
force of this pretended patriotic army 
to which they are attached. 

M. Robespierre. The horrors 
that have desolated the Comtat make 
a pressing reason to hurry our delib- 
eration and not to hinder and retard 
it by useless discussions or exagger- 
ated pictures of the situation of the 
people of the Comtat. 

L'envoi d'une force quelconque To send any force whatever into the 



dans le Comtat, sans la declaration de 
reunion a la France, serait une viola- 
tion manifeste du territoire etranger. 
Si nous n'avons aucun droit sur ce 
pays, nous ne pouvons y envoyer 
d'armee sans etre des oppresseurs. Si 
nous avons des droits, il faut le de- 
clarer et agir sans delai. D'ailleurs 
les mesures provisoires ne pourraient 
avoir que de funestes effets. Ne 
pourrait-on pas croire que vos troupes 
ne seraient venues que pour en im- 
poser aux partis victorieux; et si le 
chef de ces troupes avait adopte des 
principes contraires a ce parti, ne 
pourrait-on pas soup£onner, que le 
chef et Tarmee seraient venues pour 
proteger ce qu'on appelle le parti aris- 
tocratique, qui est le parti vaincu. 

Je demande, en consequence; que 
Tajournement soit rejete et que la dis- 
cussion commence sur le fond du pro- 
jet de deeret. 

Comtat, without a declaration of 
union with France, would be a mani- 
fest violation of foreign territory. If 
we have no rights over this country, 
we can not send an army there with- 
out being oppressors. If we have 
rights, we must declare it and act 
without delay. Moreover the provi- 
sional measures could only have un- 
fortunate effects. Might they not be- 
lieve that your troops had come only 
to overawe the victorious parties ; and 
if the leader of these troops had 
adopted any principles contrary to 
this party, might they not suspect that 
the leader and the army had come to 
protect what is called the aristocratic 
party, which is the conquered party. 

I ask, consequently, that the post- 
ponement be rejected and that the dis- 
cussion begin on the subject of the 
draft decree. 

M. Malouet. 1 Tout le systeme du 
comite, les moyens, les raisonnements, 
les conclusions du rapport portent 
cumulativement sur des principes en- 
tre lesquels il faut opter; car ils se 
detruisent Tun l'autre. Ces deux 
principes sont le droit de propriete et 
de souverainete du territoire qu'on at- 
tribue par transmission et heredite au 
roi des Fran£ais, et point au pape, 
reduit a la condition de simple en- 
gagiste. Cette partie du rapport est 
la plus enrichie de faits, de citations, 
de monuments htetoriques, dont la 
diversite se prete a tous les systemes, 
a toutes les pretentions; car vous 

1 Session of May 2, p. 496. 

M. Malouet. The whole scheme 
of the committee, the methods, the 
reasoning, the conclusions of the re- 
port rest cumulatively upon principles 
between which one must choose; for 
they mutually destroy one another. 
These two principles are the right of 
property and of sovereignty in the ter- 
ritory which is attributed by trans- 
mission and heredity to the King of 
the French, and not at all to the Pope, 
who is reduced to the condition of a 
mere tenant. This part of the report 
is the richest in facts, citations, his- 
toric records, the diversity of which 
lends itself to all schemes, to all pre- 



noubliez point, Messieurs, que c'est 
aussi sur des monuments historiques 
que les cours de Vienne, de Peters- 
bourg et de Berlin se sont partage la 

Le second principe auxiliaire du 
comite et de M. le rapporteur est le 
droit qu'a chaque peuple de se declarer 
libre, independant de la domination du 
prince auquel il a obei jusqu'au mo- 
ment ou il lui plait de changer la forme 
de son gouvernement. Je ne m'at- 
tache qu'a ces deux divisions princi- 
pales dont les 15 articles en question 
sont des subdivisions. 

Avant de passer outre, je demande 
a M. le rapporteur : dans quel systeme 
raisonnez-vous ? 

tentions; for do not forget, gentle- 
men, that it is also on historical rec- 
ords that the courts of Vienna, Peters- 
burg and Berlin divided Poland among 

The second auxiliary principle of 
the committee and of the reporter is 
the right every people possesses of de- 
claring itself free and independent of 
the domination of the prince whom it 
has obeyed up to the moment that it 
pleases to change the form of its gov- 
ernment. I will only apply myself to 
these two principal divisions of which 
the fifteen articles in question are sub- 

Before proceeding, I ask the re- 
porter: on what system do you rea- 

Une nation qui se ressaisit de la 
souverainete de son territoire n'a pas 
besoin de chartes et de monuments 
historiques; sa volonte et sa force, 
voila la mesure de ses pouvoirs ; celle 
de ses droits ne peut etre que la jus- 
tice et Tinteret de tous. II n'en est 
pas de meme d'un prince qui exerce 
la souverainete; il lui faut ou une 
delegation speciale du peuple qui lui 
obeit, ou un titre successif reconnu 
par ses sujets et par les autres souve- 
rains. Voila ses droits a une exist- 
ence tranquille et leur condition es- 
sentielle est d'etre incommunicable a 
aucun autre prince, a aucune societe 
politique, autrement que par les memes 
principes qui les constituent. 

Brulons done les publicistes qui 
pourraient defendre le pape et non le 
systeme du comite et arrivons aux 

A nation which takes back to itself 
the sovereignty of its territory has no 
need of charters and historical rec- 
ords; its will and its force, those are 
the measure of its powers ; that of its 
rights can only be justice and the in- 
terest of all. It is not the same with 
a prince who exercises sovereignty; 
he must have either a special delega- 
tion of it from the people who obey 
him, or a title of succession recog- 
nized by his subjects and by other sov- 
ereigns. These are his rights to a 
quiet life and their essential condition 
is that they are incommunicable to 
any other prince, to any other political 
society, otherwise than on the same 
principles which constitute them. 

Therefore let us burn the publicists 
who would defend the Pope and not 
the system of the committee and let 



droits de rhomme, aux droits des peu- 
ples qui forment le second moyen de 
M. le rapporteur. 

• • • • • 

Je dirai done comme vous: tout 
peuple rassamble a le droit de se de- 
clarer libre, independant, et de changer 
son gouvernement avec cette condi- 
tion prealable que la volonte de tous 
sera librement manifestee par des 
formes legales et solennelles. Est-ce 
la le caractere du vceu des Avigno- 
nais et Comtadins, demandant leur re- 
union a la France? 

Au lieu de la voix majestueuse d'un 
peuple deliberant, je ne distingue que 
celle des brigands et des bourreaux, 
les cris des assassins, les gemissements • 
des victimes, les plaintes des fugitifs; 
voila ce que j'entends depuis la pre- 
miere epoque de Tinsurrection. 
Avant cette epoque, vous avez pu con- 
naitre la volonte generate; elle s'est 
librement et unanimement manifestee. 
Les habitants d* Avignon et du Com- 
tat savaient alors qu'un parti puissant 
en France protegerait leur reunion, 
que des membres de cette Assemblee 
la sollicitaient; mais aucune force 
armee, aucune faction ne les mena^ait 
encore: ils pouvaient done librement 
s'expliquer. . . . Cest dans de telles 
circonstances que les habitants, que les 
communes ont vote unanimement le 
renouvellement de leur serment de 
fidelite au pape et a son gouverne- 

us come to the rights of man, to the 
rights of peoples which forms the sec- 
ond method of the reporter. 

• • . . . 

I will say then as you do : every as- 
sembled people has the right to declare 
itself free, independent, and to change 
its government, with this preliminary 
condition that the will of all shall be 
freely shown by legal and solemn 
forms. Is this the character of the 
vote of the people of Avignon and of 
the Comtat asking union with France ? 

In place of the majestic voice of a 
deliberating people, I distinguish only 
that of brigands and butchers, the 
cries of assassins, the groans of vic- 
tims, the complaints of fugitives ; that 
is what I hear from the first period of 
the insurrection. Before that period, 
you have been able to learn the general 
will; it was freely and unanimously 
shown. The inhabitants of Avignon 
and the Comtat knew then that a pow- 
erful party in France would protect 
their union, that members of this As- 
sembly were asking for it; but no 
armed force, no faction yet menaced 
them; therefore they could express 
themselves freely. ... It was under 
such circumstances that the inhabi- 
tants, the communes, voted unani- 
mously the renewal of their oath of 
fidelity to the Pope and his govern- 

Je dis que Tepoque de cette delibera- 
tion est la seule epoque <de la liberte 
pour le Comtat, pour la ville d'Avig- 

I say that the epoch of this decision 
is the only epoch of liberty for the 
Comtat, for the City of Avignon ; at 



non ; dans ce temps-la, les officiers mu- 
nicipaux etaient nommes au scrutin, 
dans ce temps-la, toutes les idees nou- 
velles, toutes les circonstances environ- 
nantes favorisaient la plus libre emis- 
sion du voeu des Comtadins et des 
Avignonais; dans cet etat ils avaient 
juge de leur interet, de la convenance 
meme de renoncer a leur prince; ils 
avaient la certitude d'etre fortement 
proteges ; dans ce temps-la ils ne Tont 
pas fait, et depuis ce temps-la ils n'ont 
pas eu une seule epoque, un seul in- 
stant de liberte d'opinion, de securite 
dans leurs personnes, et dans leurs 


• • • • • 

M. Robespierre. En nous parlant 
du proces-verbal qui constate le voeu 
des Avignonais, M. l'abbe Maury au- 
rait du ajouter que c'etait le resultat 
d'une deliberation des anciennes com- 
munautes du Comtat, qui, loin d'etre 
Texpression du peuple, n'etait que 
celle des anciens officiers municipaux 
maitrises par Tinfluence du pape. La, 
comme en France, il y avait un parti 
contre le vceu du peuple; la noblesse 
et le clerge se sont armes, on en est 
venu aux mains; le parti populaire a 
vaincu la ligue des aristocrates. . . . 

II n'y a pas de difficulty d'abord sur 
ce voeu, ou il est prouve que, par les 
faits historiques qui vous ont ete de- 
veloppes, le peuple avignonais f ormait 
un Etat separe de l'Etat Venaissin. II 
est done evident qu'il a eu le droit de 
demander seul la reunion a la France. 

that time the municipal officers were 
nominated by ballot, at that time all 
the new ideas, all the surrounding cir- 
cumstances favored the freest expres- 
sion of the vote of the people of the 
Comtat and of Avignon ; in that con- 
dition they judged of their interest, 
even of the propriety of renouncing 
their prince ; they had the certainty of 
being strongly protected ; at that time 
they did not do it, and since that time 
they have not had a single period, a 
single instant of liberty of opinion, of 
security for their persons and for their 

M. Robespierre. In telling us of 
the official report proving the vote of 
the people of Avignon, M. l'Abbe 
Maury should have added that it was 
the result of a decision of the old com- 
munities of the Comtat, which, far 
from being the expression of the peo- 
ple, was only that of old municipal of- 
ficers dominated by the influence of 
the Pope. There, as in France, there 
was a party opposed to the wish of 
the people ; the nobility and the clergy 
armed themselves, they came to 
blows; the popular party conquered 
the league of aristocrats. . . . 

There is, in the first place, no diffi- 
culty regarding this vote when it is 
proved, by the historical facts which 
have been shown you, that the people 
of Avignon formed a separate State 
from the Venaissin State. It is there- 
fore evident that they had the right to 
ask by themselves for union with 



Passons au Comtat. Nous avons 
encore la majorite du Comtat, ma- 
jorite incontestable, si on veut ecouter 
la verite, et ne point poursuivre le sys- 
teme d'embarrasser l'Assemblee na- 
tionale par des doutes que les faits 
ont dementis. M. le rapporteur vous 
a atteste qu'il etait porteur des decla- 
rations de 51 communautes du Com- 
tat qui demandent formellement leur 
reunion a la France. Ces 51 com- 
munautes f orment evidemment la ma- 
jorite sur 95 : aucun de nous ne peut 
douter du voeu des Comtadins. Si 
vous reunissez le Comtat avec Avig- 
non, pouvez-vous desirer une majorite 
plus complete ? 

M. de La Tour-Maubourg. . . . 

Puisque je suis provoque a enoncer 
ici mon opinion, je dirai, d'apres ce 
que j'ai entendu dire sur les droits 
positifs de la nation franqaise et du 
pape, qu'il ne me reste aucun doute 
que nous avons plus de droit que le 
pape a la souverainete d' Avignon. 
(Apploudissements. ) 

II me reste a parler de la seconde 
question : le vceu du peuple avignonais 
et du peuple comtadin est-il bien con- 
state et suffisamment exprime? Je 
m'exprimerai a cet egard avec la meme 

Depuis que je suis revenu d* Avig- 
non, je n'en ai requ que des lettres 
anonymes que j'ai eu soin de remettre 
au comite diplomatique, et auxquelles 
il n a sans doute pas eu plus d'egard 
que de raison. 

Mais, quand j'etais a Avignon, il 
est certain que le vceu de quelques 
communes du Comtat a ete force; 

Let us pass to the Comtat. We 
still have the majority in the Comtat, 
an undeniable majority, if we will 
listen to the truth, and not follow the 
method of embarrassing the National 
Assembly by doubts which the facts 
belie. The gentleman who made the 
report has testified that he was the 
bearer of the decisions of fifty-one 
communities of the Comtat who for- 
mally ask their union with France. 
These fifty-one communities evidently 
form the majority out of ninety-five ; 
not one of us can doubt the vote of 
the people of the Comtat. If you 
join the Comtat to Avignon, can you 
want a majority more complete? 

M. de La Tour-Maubourg. . . . 

Since I am challenged to announce 
my opinion here, I will say, that after 
what I have heard said concerning the 
positive rights of the French nation 
and of the Pope, that I have no 
longer the slightest doubt that we have 
more right than the Pope to the sov- 
ereignty of Avignon. {Applause.) 

It remains to speak of the second 
question : is the vote of the people of 
Avignon and of the people of the 
Comtat fully verified and sufficiently 
expressed? I will express myself in 
this respect with the same frankness. 

Since I returned from Avignon, I 
have received from there only anony- 
mous letters which I have taken care 
to send to the Diplomaic Committee, 
and for which no doubt it has had no 
more respect than was proper. 

But when I was in Avignon, it is a 
fact that the vote of some communes 
of the Comtat was forced ; I have seen 



j'ai vu que ceux qui voulaient la re- 
union arrachaient les vceux de ceux 
qui ne la voulaient pas, en y emplo- 
yant la force et les armes: on s'est 
servi pour cela des deserteurs des reg- 
iments de Soissonais et de quelques 
dragons de Penthievre. De tels suf- 
frages ne sont certainement ni libres 
ni valides. 

Je ne sais si, depuis mon depart, on 
a pris des voies plus legales. 

D'apres cela, ce que je croirais qu'il 
y aurait a faire, ce serait d'abord d'y 
envoyer des troupes suffisantes pour 
retablir Tordre et ensuite de mettre le 
peuple a meme de pouvoir mani fester 
son vceu, quelqu'il soit, d'une fa^on 
plus libre et plus legale que la pre- 
miere fois. (Murmures.) 

M. de Clermont-Tonnerre. 
Pour prendre enfin une resolution de- 
finitive sur la proposition de reunir a 
la France Avignon et le Comtat Ve- 
naissin, il suffit de se reduire a 2 

La France a-t-elle un droit positif 
sur Avignon et le Comtat Venaissin ? 

Avignon et le Comtat Venaissin 
ont-ils librement et formellement emis 
le vceu de se reunir a la France? 

Je ne m'appesantirai pas sur la pre- 
miere de ces 2 questions : * . . . 

. . . Je rappelle le principe du par- 
lement de Provence ; le voici : Sans 
prejudice des droits du roi de la cou- 
ronne, comme etant imprescriptibles 
et inalienables. (Applaudissements & 

those who wished the union seize the 
votes of those who did not wish it, by 
using force and arms: for that pur- 
pose they made use of the deserters 
from the regiments of Soissons and of 
some dragoons of Penthievre. Such 
votes are certainly neither free nor 

I do not know whether, since my 
departure, they have used more legal 

Considering this, what I should 
think ought to be done, would be first 
to send there sufficient troops to re- 
establish order and then to put the 
people again in the way of manifest- 
ing their wish, whatever it might be, 
in a manner more free and more legal 
than the first time. (Murmurs.) 

M. de Clermont-Tonnerre. To 
take finally a definite resolution upon 
the proposition to unite Avignon and 
the Comtat Venaissin with France, it 
is enough to reduce it to two points. 

Has France a positive right over 
Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin? 

Have Avignon and the Comtat Ve- 
naissin freely and formally cast their 
vote to unite themselves with France ? 

I shall not dwell upon the first of 
these two questions. 1 . . . 

... I recall the principle of the 
parliament of Provence; it is this: 
Without prejudice to the rights of the 
King and of the Crown, as being im- 
prescriptible and inalienable. (Ap- 

1 There follows an examination of the validity of the historical claims of France to 
the territory. 



gauche. ) . . . Mais, Messieurs, si, au 
milieu des principes politiques que 
vous professez, il etait encore permis 
d'invoquer celui dont je parle, vous 
auriez fait la plus illusoire des decla- 
rations quand vous vous etes interdit 
les conquetes; une rentree de domaine 
n'est pas une conquete, et toute aliena- 
tion de domaine etant imprescriptible, 
vous auriez possibility tou jours en 
de$a de votre declaration, mais fort 
au dela de vos f rontieres actuelles, de 
revendiquer successivement les do- 
maines qui ont incontestablement ap- 
partenu a Charlemagne, et le tout sans 
autre intention que celle indiquee par 
M. le rapporteur, de consulter pour 
Tepoque des reprises, le plus ou moins 
de force, des puissances qui en se- 
raient en possession. On sent l'ab- 
surdite de la consequence; cependant 
j'ai raisonne juste; c'etait done dans 
le principe que se trouvait l'absurdite. 
Cest ce principe qui peut seul servir 
d'appui aux droits plus qu'equivoques 
que nous pourrions pretendre sur 
Avignon. II faut done renoncer a ce 
droit, il faut renoncer a ces arguties 
diplomatiques, il faut renoncer a la 
reunion d' Avignon, si le vceu du peu- 
ple bien librement, bien clairement ex- 
prime, ne nous donne pas un meilleur 
droit. M. le rapporteur nous a suc- 
cinctement rendu compte du vceu des 
communes comtadins ; il nous a dit que 
sur 95 communes, nous avions le vceu 
de reunion de 51; la majorite est de 
7, ce resultat est mot a mot celui 
qu'ont presente MM. Tissot et Pallin, 
deputes d' Avignon. Ce sont les bases 

plause on the Left ) . . . but, gentle- 
men, if notwithstanding the political 
principles that you profess, it were still 
permitted to invoke the one of which 
I am speaking, you would have made 
the most illusory of declarations when 
you forbade yourselves conquest; re- 
entry into a domain is not conquest, 
and all alienation of domain being im- 
prescriptible, you would have had the 
possibility always on this side of your 
declaration, and far on the other side 
of your actual frontiers, of claiming 
successively the domains that incon- 
testably belonged to Charlemagne, and 
all this without any other intention 
than that indicated by the gentleman 
who made the report, of considering, 
at the time of taking them back, the 
greater or less force of the powers 
that might be in possession. You see 
the absurdity of the conclusion; nev- 
ertheless, I have reasoned correctly; 
it was therefore in the principle that 
the absurdity was found. It is this 
principle alone that can serve as a 
support to the more than equivocal 
rights that we could assume concern- 
ing Avignon. Therefore we must re- 
nounce this right, we must renounce 
these diplomatic quibbles, we must re- 
nounce the union of Avignon, if the 
vote of the people quite freely, quite 
clearly expressed, does not give us a 
better right. The reporter has given 
us a succinct account of the vote of the 
communes of the Comtat ; he has told 
us that out of ninety-five communes, 
we had the vote of union of fifty-one; 
the majority is seven, and this result 



de ce calcul que je me suis permis 
cTexaminer, et je vais vous soumettre 
mes resultats. 

Avant d'entrer dans les details, je 
me borne a definir ce que j'appelle un 
veritable vceu. Ce vceu doit avoir 
trois caracteres: II doit etre libre; 
il doit etre clairement enonce; il doit 
etre legalement constate. Ces trois 
clauses sont rigoureusement neces- 
saires. Un vceu non libre est nul; 
un vceu con^u en termes ambigus est 
inadmissible; un vceu non constate 
n'est pas un vceu. Cest a cette triple 
epreuve que je vais soumettre ce qu'on 
appelle le voeu de la majorite des com- 
munes du Comtat Venaissin. 

Je commencerai par les trois com- 
munes dont le vceu m'a paru etre le 
moins attaquable. 1 

• • • • • 

J'ai parcouru, Messieurs, toutes les 
pieces qui pouvaient vous eclairer sur 
le vceu des communes du Comtat Ve- 
naissin; trois m'ont paru en avoir 
emis un que je ne veux pas con tester. 

7 n'en ont evidemment emis aucun. 

35 m'ont fourni des objections qui 
me paraissent attaquer fortement la 
legalite de leur vceu. 

En effet, les caracteres de la ter- 
reur ne peuvent pas se meconnaitre. 
Cest le 10 Janvier que Cavaillon est 
devaste par les Avignonais; c'est du 
10 au 30, c'est dans les 20 jours sui- 

1 The detailed examination of the votes of 

is word for word that which was 
presented by MM. Tissot and Pallin, 
deputies of Avignon. These are the 
bases of the calculation that I have 
allowed myself to examine, and I am 
going to submit to you my results. 

Before entering into details, I will 
confine myself to defining what I call 
a true vote. This vote should have 
three characteristics: It must be 
free ; it must be clearly stated ; it must 
be legally verified. These three pro- 
visos are strictly necessary. A vote 
not free is void; a vote expressed in 
ambiguous terms is inadmissible; a 
vote not verified is not a vote. To 
this triple proof I am going to submit 
what is called the vote of the majority 
of the communes of the Comtat Ve- 

I shall begin with the three com- 
munes whose vote appeared to me the 

least questionable. 1 

• . . . . 

I have looked over, gentlemen, all 
the papers which could enlighten you 
concerning the vote of the communes 
of the Comtat Venaissin; three seem 
to me to have given one that I do not 
want to contest. 

Seven have evidently given none 

Thirty-five have furnished objec- 
tions which seem to me to attack 
strongly the legality of their vote. 

In fact the characteristics of terror 
can not be mistaken. It was the 10th 
of January when Cavaillon was devas- 
tated by the people of Avignon ; it 
was from the 10th to the 30th, that is, 

the individual communes is omitted. 



vants que les 35 deliberations sont 
prises ; elles sont f ondees sur la neces- 
sity le salut du peuple, et Tempire des 
circonstances. On y allegue l'aban- 
don du pape, et cet abandon meme 
n'est pas exact*. Le pape a, par une 
lettre du 6 octobre 1790, reclame les 
bons offices et la protection de Ja 
France pour retablir la paix et l'ordre 
dans ce malheureux pays. Je sais 
qu'une demande de secours n'est pas 
un secours effectif ; mais peut-etre est- 
il permis de dire ici qii'un prince 
faible, qui met ses sujets sous la pro- 
tection du roi des Franqais, peut 
croire ne les avoir pas abandonnes. 

II y a loin, Messieurs, du resultat 
de Texamen que je vous ai soumis a 
celui que vous presentait M. le rap- 
porteur. II vous annonqait 51 com- 
munes ayant forme un voeu formel 
de reunion; et, en compulsant les 
pieces, je n'en trouve que 44 dont il 
existe des deliberations quelconques. 
Sur ce nombre, j'en retranche 7 par 
des raisons qu'il est impossible d'at- 
taquer ; et sur les 37 restantes, il n'en 
est que 3 qui presentent l'apparence 
d'un consentement, les autres sont 
vicies de toute part; aucune n'est en 
meme temps libre, positive et con- 
statee. Ici le nombre des votants est 
omis, la c'est un simple certificat sans 
forme legale ; dans quelques pieces, ce 
sont des ratures coupables qui al- 
terent leur sens; souvent, ce sont de 
simples copies envoyees par les Avig- 
nonais qui disent avoir les minutes, 
circonstance qui les annule toutes ; car 

in the twenty days following, that the 
thirty-five decisions were taken; they 
are based on necessity, the welfare of 
the people, and the force of circum- 
stances. The abandonment of the 
Pope is alleged therein and even this 
abandonment is not exact. The Pope 
by a letter of October 6, 1790, called 
for the good offices and the protection 
of France to reestablish peace and or- 
der in that unhappy country. I know 
that a request for help is not an effec- 
tive succor ; but perhaps it is permis- 
sible to say here that a feeble prince 
who puts his subjects under the pro- 
tection of the King of the French, 
may believe that he has not abandoned 

There is a great distance, gentle- 
men, between the result of the exami- 
nation I have submitted to you and 
that presented to you by the gentle- 
man who made the report. He an- 
nounced to you that fifty-one com- 
munes had made a formal vote of 
union; and, by forcing the records, I 
found only forty- four of them in 
which any decisions whatever exist. 
Out of this number I take seven for 
reasons which it is impossible to at- 
tack; and out of the thirty-seven re-' 
maining, there are but three of them 
which present the appearance of an 
acquiescence, the others are entirely 
vitiated; not one is at the same time 
free, positive and verified. Here the 
number of voters is omitted, there it 
is simply a certificate without legal, 
form, in some papers there are cul- 
pable erasures that alter their sense; 
often they are simple copies sent by 



une piece qui n'est fournie et cer- 
tifiee que par la partie adverse ne f ut 
jamais une piece probante. . . . 

Je conclus a ce que la reunion ne 
soit pas decretee ; mais, f rappe comme 
tous les membres de cette Assemblee, 
des dangers affreux auxquels sont ex- 
poses les citoyens de cette contree si 
heureuse il y a deux ans, je desire que 
vous y portiez la paix ; je soutiens que 
vous le pouvez dans tous les systemes 
et dans toutes les hypotheses. 

En droit positif, vous etes requis 
par le prince, sa requisition est du 
mois d'octobre dernier; en droit na- 
turel, vous Tetes par les malheureux 
Comtadins, dont tous les pretendus 
vceux de reunion se reduisent a ce 
seul cri: Sauvez-nous, car on nous 
egorge. Je crois que les Avignonais 
eux-memes vous sauront gre de leur 
epargner des crimes ; je ne croirai pas 
qu'ils pretendent vous resister, quoi- 
qu'un honorable membre nous ait an- 
nonce dans la seance d'avant-hier et 
leur resistance future, et meme la des- 
obeissance des departements qu'il croit 
attaches a leur cause. 

the people of Avignon who say that 
they have the minutes, a fact that an- 
nuls them all; for a paper which is 
furnished and certified only by the ad- 
verse party never was a probatory 
document. . . . 

I conclude that the union should not 
be decreed; but being struck, like all 
the members of this Assembly, by the 
frightful dangers to which are ex- 
posed the citizens of this country so 
happy two years ago, I want you to 
introduce peace there ; I maintain that 
you can do it on all grounds and on 
all hypotheses. 

By positive right, you are called 
upon by the prince, his requisition is 
of the month of October last ; by nat- 
ural right, you are also called upon by 
the unhappy people of the Com tat, all 
of whose pretended votes of union re- 
duce themselves to the sole cry : Save 
us for we are being slaughtered. I 
believe that the people of Avignon 
themselves will thank you to spare 
them crimes; I will not believe that 
they may try to resist you, although 
an honorable member announced to us 
at the session of day before yesterday, 
both their future resistance and even 
the disobedience of the departments 
that he thinks attached to their cause. 

Je crois que les commissaires qu'il 
f aut envoyer dans le Comtat et a Avig- 
non doivent etre provisoirement re- 
vetu de grands pouvoirs, il faut que 
les forces soient assez considerables 
pour que 1* impossibility de la resist- 
ance ramene surement le calme; il 
faut que toutes les autorites usurpa- 

I think that the commissioners 
whom it is necessary to send into the 
Comtat and to Avignon must be provi- 
sionally clothed with great powers, it 
is necessary that the forces be rather 
large so that the impossibility of re- 
sistance may surely bring about tran- 
quillity; it is necessary that all the 



trices disparaissent devant les com- 
missaires que vous enverrez; il faut 
que, apres ces preliminaires, le vceu 
du peuple puisse etre emis avec tran- 
quillite, et c'est alors que vous jugerez 
si ce vceu peut devenir pour vous 
l'objet d'une deliberation. 

usurping authorities should disappear 
before the commissioners whom you 
shall send.; it is necessary that, after 
these preliminaries, the vote of the 
people be cast in tranquillity, and then 
you will judge whether this vote may 
become the subject of your delibera- 

M. du Chatelet. 1 . . . J'avais 
pense et je pense encore que la nation 
a le droit et meme le devoir d'employer 
tous les moyens qui sont en sa puis- 
sance pour mettre un terme aux hor- 
reurs qui desolent depuis trop long- 
temps un petit Etat environne de 
toutes parts de departements f ran^ais ; 
comme tout individu a le droit et 
meme le devoir d'user de toutes ses 
facultes pour eteindre le feu qui em- 
braserait la maison qui touche a la 
sienne. . . . 

Quant au voeu du peuple avigno- 
nais, je ne l'ai jamais regarde ni 
comme assez gen£ralement ni surtout 
comme assez librement prononce, et 
il m'a paru que cette verite vous avait 
ete demontree dans tous ses details 
hier jusqu'a Tevidence. 

Que votre humanite done, que votre 
interet meme retablisse promptement 
Tordre et le calme dans le Comtat; 
eteignez-y les flambeaux de la dis- 
corde; qu'il n'y ait plus dans ce mal- 
heureux pays ni cruautes, ni victimes ; 
que les peuples du Comtat et d' Avig- 
non se rassemblent ensuite librement, 
paisiblement, legalement sous votre 
protection tutelaire et vous obtiendrez 
certainement par la reconnaissance ce 

1 Session of May 3. 

M. du Chatelet. ... I had 
thought and I still think that the na- 
tion has the right and even the duty 
of using all the means in its power to 
put an end to the horrors which have 
so long desolated a little State sur- 
rounded on all sides by French de- 
partments ; as every individual has the 
right and even the duty of using all 
his powers to put out the fire that 
would consume the house touching his 
own. . . . 

As to the vote of the people of 
Avignon, I never regarded it as cast 
generally enough, or even freely 
enough, and it seemed to me that this 
fact had been demonstrated to you 
yesterday in all its details, even to the 

Therefore let your humanity, let 
your interest, even, reestablish 
promptly order and calm in the Com- 
tat; put out the torches of discord 
there; let there be no longer cruelty 
nor victims in that unhappy country ; 
let the peoples of the Comtat and of 
Avignon then come together freely, 
peaceably, legally under your tutelary 
protection and you will certainly ob- 
tain through gratitude what it would 



qu'il serait indigne de vous de devoir 
a la crainte ou a Tabus de la puissance. 

• • • • • 

M. Petion de Villeneuve. . . . 
Je dis, Messieurs, que les deliberations 
qui ont ete invoquees sont celles qui 
ne peuvent pas etre admises, et que ces 
deliberations dont votre comite vous 
a parle, ren ferment un voeu libre, un 
voeu volontaire, un voeu parfaitement 
exprime, et j'espere vous le demon trer. 
(Riresa droite.) 

Je dis qu'il n'y a pas une commune 
dans le Comtat qui ne desire la re- 
union avec la France ; il n'est pas une 
commune, Messieurs, qui n'ait arbore 
les armes de la France. Quelle est la 
difficulte qui survient aujourd'hui en- 
tre les Comtadins et les Avignonais? 
Croyez-vous que ce soit pour la re- 
union a la France ? Non ; les troubles 
viennent principalement d'une jalousie 
entre Avignon et Carpentras, suscitee 
par les ennemis du bien public precise- 

ment pour empecher la reunion. 1 

• • * « • 

L'Assemblee decrete qu'il ne sera 
plus entendu personne. 2 (Applaudis- 
sements dans les tribunes.) 

Le President. Au nom de 1' As- 
semble je declare aux tribunes et aux 
galeries que je ferai sortir le cote qui 
le premier donnera le moindre signe 

II va etre procede a Tappel nominal. 

be unworthy of you to owe to fear or 
to the abuse of power. 

• • • • • 

M. PfeTioN de Villeneuve. . . . 
I say, gentlemen, that the decisions 
that have been invoked are those that 
can not be admitted, and that the deci- 
sions of which your committee has 
told you, comprise a free vote, a vol- 
untary vote, a vote properly ex- 
pressed, and I hope to prove it to you. 
(Laughter on the Right.) 

I say that there is not a commune in 
the Comtat that does not desire union 
with France ; there is not a commune, 
gentlemen, that has not set up the 
arms of France. What is the diffi- 
culty arising today between the people 
of the Comtat and those of Avignon? 
Do you think it is on account of the 
union with France ? No ; the troubles 
come chiefly from a jealousy between 
Avignon and Carpentras, created by 
the enemies of the public good pre- 
cisely in order to prevent the union. 

• • • • • 

The Assembly decrees that no more 
speakers shall be heard. (Applause 
in the galleries.) 

The President. In the name of 
the Assembly I announce to the trib- 
unes and the galleries that I will have 
ejected the side that first gives the 
slightest sign of applause. 

The roll call will be proceeded with. 

Voici le resultat de l'appel nominal This is the result of the roll call on 

1 The debate, frequently interrupted by disorder, occupied the remainder of the session, 
the leading exponents of the two extreme views being the Abb6 Maury and Bouche. On 
May 4 the debate was resumed with the same heat. 

2 Session of May 4. 



sur le premier article du pro jet de de- 
cret du comite portant reunion d* Avig- 
non et du Comtat Venaissin a la 

Le nombre des votants a ete de 870 ; 

316 ont vote oui. 

487 ont vote non. 

67 n'on pas donne de voix. 

En consequence, TAssemblee ra- 
tionale a re j ete le premier article du 

*. * 


the first article of the draft decree of 
the Committee on Union of Avignon 
and the Comtat Venaissin with 

The number voting was 870 ; 

316 voted yes. 

487 voted no. 

67 gave no vote. 

Consequently the National Assem- 
bly has rejected the first article of the 

Draft Decree for the Union of Avignon Proposed by Menou in the Third Re- 
port of the Committees on Avignon. May 24, 1791 2 

M. de Menou, rapporteur. . . . Je 
ne parlerai pas du premier vceu forme 
par les Avignonais, dans le mois de 
juin 1790, puisqu'on m'objecte qu'il 
fut emis au milieu du tumulte, du de- 
sordre et du massacre de plusieurs 

Je passe aux actions subsequents. 
Tous ren ferment le vceu le plus so- 
lennel, le plus libre, le plus legal de se 
reunir a la France. 

Le premier est un serment prete sur 

M. de Menou, reporter. ... I 
shall not speak of the first wish of the 
Avignon people, in June, 1790, since it 
is objected that it was uttered in the 
midst of tumult, of disorder and of 
the massacre of several citizens. 

I pass to subsequent acts. All con- 
tain the most solemn, most free and 
most legal wish to be united to France. 

The first is an oath of allegiance to 

1 M. Petion de Villenetjve, speaking in the Session of May 4, said : ". . . Three opin- 
ions yesterday divided the Assembly. Some did "not wish for union ; others wished for 
union at the present time, and still others wished for union, but at a more distant time. 
Now, gentlemen, there were therefore two parties that desired union, but one of which 
wanted immediate union and the other wanted union at a more distant time, and the fact 
can still less be denied that those very persons who, on the question, declared either that they 
had no voice, or that they were for the negative, expressed themselves in the clearest and 
most precise manner in this tribune. 

They had said: The vote of the people of Avignon and of the Comtat does not seem 
to us a vote expressed in a manner sufficiently free and voluntary {Murmurs from the 
Right), and that is why we do not ask immediate union ; but these members who did not wart 
present union, far from saying that they did not wish for union, on the contrary thought 
and said clearly that, if the vote seemed free, seemed voluntary, taken in moments of tran- 
quillity, far from opposing the union, they would themselves ask for it." 

2 Arch. Pari., 1st series, vol. 26, p. 362. 



la roche du Don par toutes les gardes 
nationales d'Avignon, et de son terri- 
toire, a la Constitution f ran^aise, a la 
nation, a la loi et au roi ; il est en date 
du 14 juillet, jour de la federation 
generale de TEmpire frangais. II 
fut prete en presence de plusieurs de- 
tachements de gardes nationales des 
villes fran9aises voisines d'Avignon. 
Le deuxieme est une lettre ecrite par 
la municipality d' Avignon a r Assem- 
ble nationale, au nom des habitants 
de cette ville, pour demander la re- 
union. Elle est du 13 aout 1790. 

Le troisieme est un nouveau ser- 
ment des gardes nationales avigno- 
naises. . . . 

Le quatrieme est Tadhesion au ser- 
ment precedent donne par les habi- 
tants de Morieresbourg dependant 
d* Avignon, en date du 6 septembre. 

Le cinquieme est un voeu forme par 
les 9 sections ou districts composant 
1'assemblee generale des citoyens ac- 
tifs d' Avignon pour se reunir a la 
France, et s'incorporer au departe- 
ment des Bouches-du-Rhone, en date 
du 6 octobre 1790. 

Le sixieme est un voeu forme par 
les 9 districts ou sections composant 
l'assemblee generale des citoyens ac- 
tifs d' Avignon, pour se reunir a la 
France, et envoi de cette deliberation 
a tous les departements du royaume, 
en date du 26 octobre 1790 : a cet acte 
est jointe une lettre d'envoi a TAssem- 
blee nationale. 

Le septieme est un voeu forme par 
les citoyens actifs d' Avignon, pour se 
reunir a la France. II a ete transmis 

the French constitution, nation, law 
and King, taken on the Roche du Don 
by all the National Guards of Avig- 
non, and of its territory; it is of the 
date of July 14, the day of the general 
federation of the French Empire. It 
was taken in the presence of several 
detachments of the National Guards 
of the French towns, neighbors of 
Avignon. The second is a letter 
written by the Municipality of Avig- 
non to the National Assembly in the 
name of the inhabitants of that town, 
to ask for union. It is dated August 
13, 1790. 

The third is a new oath of the Na- 
tional Guards of Avignon. . . . 

The fourth is the adhesion to the 
preceding oath given by the inhabit- 
ants of Morieresbourg, a dependency 
of Avignon, dated September 6. 

The fifth is a wish formed by the 
nine sections or districts composing 
the general assembly of active citi- 
zens of Avignon to be united to 
France, and to incorporate themselves 
in the Department of the Bouches-du- 
Rhone, dated October 6, 1790. 

The sixth is a wish formed by the 
nine districts or sections composing 
the general assembly of active citizens 
of Avignon to be united to France, 
and the dispatch of this deliberation 
to all the departments of the king- 
dom, dated October 26, 1790; to this 
act is joined a letter of despatch to the 
National Assembly. 

The seventh is a wish formed bv 
the active citizens of Avignon to be 
united to France. It was transmitted 



a l'Assemblee nationale, par MM. les 
commissaires du roi, envoyes dans le 
departement du Gard; a cet acte est 
jointe une lettre des commissaires qui 
constate le voeu des Avignonais; cet 
acte est du 15 mars 1791. 

Le huitieme est une lettre des elec- 
teurs de Tassemblee electorate de Vau- 
cluse, seante a Avignon, a l'Assemblee 
nationale, pour demander la reunion, 
en date du 18 mars 1791 ; cette lettre 
est revetue des signatures de tous les 

Le neuvieme est une lettre de la 
municipalite d'Avignon a l'Assemblee 
nationale ecrite au nom du peuple 
avignonais, et datee du 16 mai 1791 ; 
elle demande la reunion par les motifs 
les plus pressants, et a ete lue hier ma- 
tin a l'Assemblee nationale; elle est 
accompagnee d'une lettre au presi- 
dent de l'Assemblee nationale, en date 
du 17 mai. 

Je pense, Messieurs, que les diffe- 
rents actes dont je viens de vous ren- 
dre compte, vous paraitront suffisants 
pour constater, de la maniere la plus 
evidente, le vceu libre, solennel et 
f ormel des Avignonais. On ne pourra 
pas alleguer que ce voeu ait ete emis au 
milieu des troubles: car j'ai entiere- 
ment ecarte tous les actes qui ont eu 
lieu dans le mois de juin, quoique 
plusieurs d'entre eux soient revetus 
des formes les plus authentiques et les 
plus legates. Tous les troubles etaient 
cesses a Avignon a la fin de ce mois, 
et je n'ai fait mention des actes qu'a 
commencer du 14 juillet, epoque a 
laquelle on avait admis ici a la grande 

to the National Assembly by the com- 
missioners of the King, sent into the 
Department of Gard; to this act is 
joined a letter of the commissioners 
who confirm the wish of the people of 
Avignon; this act is dated March 15, 

The eighth is a letter of the electors 
of the Electoral Assembly of Vau- 
cluse, sitting at Avignon, to the Na- 
tional Assembly, to ask for union, 
dated March 18, 1791; this letter is 
furnished with the signatures of all 
the electors. 

The ninth is a letter of the Munici- 
pality of Avignon to the National As- 
sembly, written in the name of the 
people of Avignon and dated the 16 
of May, 1791 ; it asks the union for 
the most pressing reasons, and it was 
read yesterday morning to the Na- 
tional Assembly ; it is accompanied by 
a letter to the President of the Na- 
tional Assembly, dated May 17. 

I think, gentlemen, that the differ- 
ent acts of which I have just given 
you an account will appear to you 
sufficient to prove, in the most evident 
manner, the free, solemn and formal 
wish of the people of Avignon. No 
one can allege that this wish has been 
expressed in the midst of disturb- 
ances: for I have entirely set aside 
all the acts which took place in the 
month of June, although several 
among them may have been clothed in 
the most authentic and legal forms. 
All the disturbances had ceased at 
Avignon at the end of this month, and 
I have mentioned only the acts com?- 
mencing from the 14th of July, the 



federation une deputation des gardes 
nationales avignonaises : je dois ob- 
server aussi que la population d* Avig- 
non, n'etant que de 24,000 ames, ne 
donne qu'environ 4 a 5,000 citoyens 
actifs. Le voeu des Avignonais est 
encore constate par une infinite d'actes 
qui vous ont ete envoyes, des departe- 
ments et districts voisins : Orange, Va- 
lence, Aix, Nions, Chateau-renard, 
Nimes, Marseille, Aries, Courtheson, 
Tarascon, etc., etc., n'ont cesse 
d'ecrire a TAssemblee nationale pour 
Tengager a prononcer sur la petition 
des Avignonais, et Tavertir du danger 
qu'il y aurait a rejeter leur voeu. 

J'ai en consequence, Thonneur de 
vous proposer le projet de decret sui- 
vant, au nom des comites diploma- 
tique, de Constitution et d'Avignon: 

" L'Assemblee nationale, apres 
avoir entendu le rapport de ses comites 
de Constitution, diplomatique et 
d' Avignon, relativement aux droits de 
la France sur TEtat d* Avignon et son 
territoire, ainsi qu'au voeu libre, legal 
et solennel des Avignonais pour se 
reunir a T Empire f ran^ais, decrete : 

u 1°. Qu'elle admet et incorpore les 
Avignonais dans la nation fran^aise, 
dont ils feront desormais partie in- 
tegrante, leur accordant tous les droits 
et avantages de sa Constitution ; 

epoch at which a deputation of Na- 
tional Guards of Avignon were ad- 
mitted here to the great federation : I 
must also observe that the population 
of Avignon, being only 24,000 souls, 
gives only about four to five thou- 
sand active citizens. The wish of the 
people of Avignon is further proved 
by an infinity of acts which have been 
sent to you from the neighboring de- 
partments and districts: Orange, Va- 
lence, Aix, Nions, Chateau-renard, 
Nimes, Marseilles, Aries, Courtheson, 
Tarascon, etc., etc., have not ceased 
to write to the National Assembly to 
urge it to pronounce upon the petition 
of the people of Avignon, and to ap- 
prise it of the danger there would be 
in rejecting their wish. 

• • • • • 

I have consequently the honor of 
proposing to you the following draft 
decree, in the name of the Diplomatic 
Committee, and the Committees on 
the Constitution and on Avignon : 

"The National Assembly, having 
heard the report of its Committee on 
the Constitution, its Diplomatic Com- 
mittee, and its Committee on Avig- 
non regarding the rights of France 
over the State of Avignon and its ter- 
ritory, as well as the free, legal and 
solemn wish of the people of Avignon 
to be united to the French Empire, 
decrees : 

" 1 . That it admits and incorporates 
the people of Avignon in the French 
nation, of which it shall henceforth 
form an integral part, granting to 
them all the rights and advantages of 
its constitution ; 



" 2°. Que le roi sera prie de donner 
au ministre des affaires etrangeres, 
tous les ordres necessaires pour nego- 
cier, avec le pape, les indemnites qui 
pourraient lui etre dues; 

"3°. Le roi sera egalement prie 
d'ordonner aux citoyens dudit Etat 
et territoire d' Avignon, de cesser tout 
acte d'hostilite contre les habitants du 
Comtat Venaissin, avec lesquels la na- 
tion f ran^aise veut vivre en bonne in- 
telligence : x . . ." 

" 2. That the King be requested to 
give to the Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs all the orders necessary to nego- 
tiate with the Pope whatever indemni- 
ties may be due him ; 

" 3. The King shall also be re- 
quested to order the citizens of the 
said State and territory of Avignon, 
to cease from all acts of hostilitv 
against the inhabitants of the Comtat 
Venaissin, with whom the French na- 
tion desires to live in amity. . . ." 

Decree of the National Assembly Providing that Mediators shall be sent to 

Avignon. May 25, 1791 2 

L'Assemblee nationale decrete que 
le president se retirera par devers le 
roi, pour le prier: 

1°. D'envoyer des mediateurs qui 
interposent les bons offices de la 
France entre les Avignonais et les 
Comtadins et f assent tous leurs efforts 
pour les amener a la cessation de toute 
hostilite, comme un provisoire neces- 
saire avant de prendre aucun parti 
ulterieur relativement aux droits de 
la France sur ces pays ; 

2° D'employer les forces qui sont 
en son pouvoir, pour empecher que 
les troupes qui se font la guerre dans 
le Comtat Venaissin, ne fassent au- 
cune irruption sur le territoire de 
France ; 

3° De reclamer tous les Fran^ais 
qui ont pris parti dans Tune ou Tautre 

The National Assembly decrees 
that the President shall repair before 
the King to request him : 

1. To send mediators who shall in- 
terpose the good offices of France be- 
tween the people of Avignon and 
those of the Comtat and shall exert 
all their efforts to induce them to stop 
hostilities as a provision* necessary be- 
fore taking any further decision re- 
garding the rights of France over the 
country ; 

2. To employ all the forces in their 
power to prevent the troops making 
war in the Comtat Venaissin from 
any irruption into French territory ; 

3. To recall all the Frenchmen who 
have taken a part in either the one or 

1 The first two articles were voted on separately and lost by 394 votes against 374 ; Arch. 
Pari., 1st series, vol. 26, p. 382. 

2 Arch. Pari, 1st series, vol. 26, p. 461. 



des deux armees, et de faire a cet ef- 
fet une proclamation qui fixe un delai 
et assure une armistie [sic] aux mili- 
taires fransais qui rentreront dans le 
delai prescrit, et qui declare deserteurs 
a Tetranger ceux qui ne rentreraient 

4° De faire poursuivre et punir 
comme embaucheur tout homme qui 
ferait en France des recrues, soit pour 
un parti, soit pour l'autre. 

the other of the two armies, and to 
make a declaration to this effect which 
shall fix a term and assure an am- 
nesty to the French soldiers who shall 
return within the period prescribed, 
and which shall declare as deserters 
to a foreign Power those who do not 
return ; 

4. To pursue and punish as a re- 
cruiting officer any man who in 
France recruits for either the one 
party or the other. 

Preliminaries of Peace and of Conciliation Agreed on and Signed by the Depu- 
ties of the Electoral Assembly of the Municipalities of Avignon and of 
Carpentras, and of the Army of Vaucluse, called the Army of Avignon, in 
the Presence of the Mediating Commissioners of France, Deputed by the 
King. June 14, 1791 x 

Cejourd'hui, 14 juin 1791, MM. 
les deputes de Tassemblee electorate 
des municipality d' Avignon et de Car- 
pentras et de Tarmee de Vaucluse, 
etant reunis en presence de MM. les 
mediateurs de la France, sont con- 
venus de ce qui suit et en ont pris 
l'engagement formel pour ce qui con- 
cerne leur commettants respectifs, en- 
vers MM. les mediateurs de la France : 

Art. 1". Chaque deputation s'en- 
gage a suspendre des a present toutes 
hostilites, a licencier toutes les troupes 
armees pour la guerre, a retablir et 
proteger la liberte et la surete des 
campagnes et la recolte des moissons. 


Art. 2. II est convenu entre les 
deux parties contractantes que Tas- 

1 Arch. Pari., 1st series, vol. 27, p. 708. 

To-day, June 14, 1791, the deputies 
of the Electoral Assembly of the Mu- 
nicipalities of Avignon and et -Car- 
pentras and of the Army of Vaucluse 
having met in the presence of the Me- 
diators of France, have agreed on the 
following, and have made a formal 
engagement with the Mediators of 
France as to that which concerns their 
respective constituents. 

Article 1. Each deputation un- 
dertakes to suspend all hostilities from 
this time on, to disband all forces 
armed for purposes of war, to estab- 
lish and to protect the liberty and the 
safety of the countryside and the 
gathering of the harvests. 

Art. 2. It is agreed between the 
contracting parties that the Electoral 



semblee electorate se reunira dans un 
lieu qui ne soit soup<jonne d'aucune 
influence de parti, le plus propre a la 
liberte des suffrages, et qui sera choisi 
par MM. les mediateurs. 

Art. 3. Pour hater le succes des 
intentions bienfaisantes de 1' Assem- 
ble nationale de France, les deputes 
de Tassemblee electorale arretent 
qu'elle ne s'occupera que des objets 
relatifs a la mediation pendant toute 
sa duree. 

Art. 4. II a ete arrete par toutes 
les parties que, pendant tout le temps 
que Tassemblee electorale s'occupera 
de la decision de Tetat politique du 
pays, tous les corps administratifs 
seront circonscrits dans les droits qui 
sont de leur essence et qu'ils ne s'attri- 
bueront aucun de ceux qui appartien- 
nent aux corps administratifs de la na- 

Art. 5. Pour assurer Texecution 
des presents preliminaires, pour ren- 
dre a ceux qui auraient pu etre in- 
timides par la force, leur liberte en- 
tiere et absolue, enfin pour prevenir 
le desordre de ceux qui, apres le li- 
cenciement des armees, pourraient se 
repandre dans les campagnes et y 
exercer des vexations, MM. les de- 
putes de Tassemblee electorale, des 
municipality d* Avignon et de Carpen- 
tras et de Tarmee de Vaucluse de- 
mandent unanimement a MM. les 
mediateurs de la France : 

1°. De se porter pour garants en- 
vers et contre chacun des contrac- 
tants, comme aussi contre toute asso- 

Assembly shall meet in a place which 
shall not be suspected of any party 
influence, and shall be the one most 
compatible with a free vote, and 
which shall be chosen by the medi- 

Art. 3. In order to hasten the 
success of the beneficent intentions of 
the National Assembly of France, the 
deputies of the Electoral Assembly 
decree that the Assembly shall occupy 
itself throughout its duration solely 
with subjects relative to the media- 

Art. 4. It has been resolved by 
all parties that, during the whole time 
that the Electoral Assembly shall oc- 
cupy itself with the decision of the 
political state of the country, all the 
administrative bodies shall be limited 
to the rights which are of their es- 
sence and that they shall assume none 
of those which pertain to the admin- 
istrative body of the nation. 

Art. 5. In order to assure the ex- 
ecution of the present Preliminaries, 
to restore to those who may have 
been intimidated by force, their entire 
and absolute liberty, and, finally, to 
prevent disorders by those who, after 
the disbanding of the armies, might 
spread themselves throughout the 
countryside and there cause trouble, 
the deputies of the Electoral Assem- 
bly, of the Municipalities of Avignon 
and of Carpentras, and of the Army 
of Vaucluse unanimously request the 
Mediators of France : 

1. To hold themselves as guar- 
antors towards and against each of 
the contracting parties, as also against 



ciation et attroupements faits dans 
les deux Etats pour s'opposer a l'ordre 
public et a l'execution des engage- 
ments ci-dessus mentionnes; 

2° De placer, dans les 2 villages 
d' Avignon et de Carpentras et dans 
tout autre lieu ou besoin serait, des 
troupes f ran^aises pour prevenir tous 
les maux prevus dans le present ar- 
ticle, bien entendu que les armees ne 
seront licenciees qu'apres que Ton aura 
pris lesdites suretes pour retablir Tor- 

Art. 6. II a ete convenu, entre 
toutes les parties, que les presents pre- 
liminaires seraient envoyes a toutes 
les communes de TEtat d' Avignon et 
Comtat Venaissin, a Teffet par elles 
d'envoyer chacune un depute muni de 
pouvoirs suffisants pour contracter et 
souscrire ce present engagement. 

Art. 7. II a ete arrete enfin que 
tous les prisonniers respectivement 
faits seront rendus sans ran^on et a 
Tinstant du licenciement des armees. 

Les presents preliminaires ont ete 
arretes et signes, pour etre executes 
aussitot apres la ratification respec- 
tive des commettants de chacune des 
deputations, en presence de MM. les 
mediateurs de France, deputes par le 
roi, lesquels ont signe avec les con- 
tractants, comme temoins et garants 
des presentes. 

Fait a Orange, les jour, mois et an 
que dessus. 

(Suivent les signatures.) 1 

all associations and mobs organized in 
the two States to oppose public order 
and the execution of the engagements 
above mentioned. 

2. To place French troops in the 
two cities of Avignon and Carpentras, 
and in all other places where there 
may be need, in order to prevent the 
ills anticipated in the present article, 
it being understood that the armies 
shall not be disbanded until after the 
aforesaid measures to restore order 
shall have been taken. 

Art. 6. It has been agreed be- 
tween all the parties that the present 
Preliminaries shall be sent to all the 
communes of the States of Avignon 
and of the Comtat Venaissin, in order 
that each shall send a deputy provided 
with sufficient power to contract and 
subscribe to the present engagement. 

Art. 7. It has been agreed, lastly, 
that all the prisoners taken by each 
party respectively, shall be set free 
without ransom and at the time of the 
disbanding of the armies. 

The present Preliminaries have been 
agreed on and signed, to be exe- 
cuted immediately on their ratification 
by the constituents of each of the dep- 
utations, in presence of the Medi- 
ators of France, deputed by the King, 
who have signed with the contracting 
parties, as witnesses and guarantors 
of these presents. 

Done at Orange, on the day, month, 
and year as above. 

(The signatures follow.) 

1 These Preliminaries were presented to the Assembly on July 4. A decree was at once 
adopted approving the conduct of the Commissioners sent as pacificators to Avignon, and 
authorizing them to take any measures they might think proper to assure the execution of 
the Preliminaries of Peace. — Arch, pari, vol. 27, 1st series, p. 709. 



Letter of the Mediators to the President of the National Assembly at 

Bedarides 1 

La paix, arretee dans les pre- 
liminaires de paix, Monsieur, a eu 
son effet L'armee de Vaucluse a ete 
licenciee, et deja Avignon et plusieurs 
grandes communes du Comtat se sont 
empressees d'emettre un voeu sur leur 
sort politique. Une paix durable ne 
peut s'etablir, la prosperite publique 
ne peut renaitre que par la reunion des 
opinions et des voeux sur cet objet 
important. Veuillez done, Monsieur, 
adresser a toutes les communes la let- 
tre ci-jointe; leur annoncer que, con- 
formement aux preliminaires de paix, 
TAssemblee electorate va se reunir a 
Bedarides, lieu que nous avons in- 
dique, et qu'il est instant qu'elles s'em- 
pressent d'y envoyer leurs deputes, 
afin de depouiller les proces-verbaux 
d'emission des voeux et de constater 
la majorite. 

The peace agreed upon in the Pre- 
liminaries of Peace, Sir, has had re- 
sults. The Army of Vaucluse has 
been disbanded, and already Avignon 
and several of the large communes of 
the Comtat have made haste to express 
a wish as to their political future. A 
durable peace can not be established, 
public prosperity can not be restored, 
save by unanimity of opinion and de- 
sire as to this important subject. Be 
so good then, Sir, as to send the en- 
closed letter to all the communes, to 
announce to them that, in conformity 
with the Preliminaries of Peace, the 
Electoral Assembly will shortly meet 
at Bedarides, the place indicated by 
us, and that it is of immediate impor- 
tance that they should make haste to 
send their deputies there, in order to 
abstract from the minutes the state- 
ments of the wishes expressed and to 
ascertain the majority. 

Letter to the Communes, Sent by the President of the Assembly at the Request 

of the Mediators 2 

Je vous envoie, Messieurs, une 
copie certifiee de la lettre qui m'a ete 
adressee par MM. les Mediateurs de 
la France. L'Assemblee electorate, 
qui va se reunir a Bedarides, verra 
avec satisfaction tout ce que vos con- 

I am sending you, Sir, a certified 
copy of the letter which has been sent 
to me by the Mediators of France. 
The Electoral Assembly, which is 
about to meet at Bedarides, will look 
with approval on all that your fellow 

1 Charpenne, Les Grands Episodes de la Revolution dans Avignon et le Comtat, vol. 1, 
p. 239. No date or signature is given. 

s Charpenne, Les Grands Episodes de la Revolution, vol. 1, p. 240. No date is given. 



citoyens f eront pour concourir au suc- 
ces de leurs vues bienfaisantes. Je 
vous salue cordialement. — Duprat, 
president; Vaton, secretaire; Ru- 
chon, secretaire. 

Nous vous prevenons, Messieurs, 
que, conformement aux preliminaires 
de paix ratifies par la majorite des 
communes et garantis par la France, 
en vertu du decret de TAssemblee na- 
tionale du 4 juillet, present mois, il 
est instant que vous envoyiez des 
deputes a TAssemblee electorate qui 
s'assemblera jeudi 21 juillet, present 
mois, au lieu de Bedarides que nous 
avons designe. Elle sera le point cen- 
tral ou le proces-verbal d'emission des 
vceux sur Tetat politique du pays sera 
dresse, a Teffet de constater sous nos 
yeux la majorite des suffrages. 

citizens may do to promote the suc- 
cess of their benevolent intentions. I 
greet you cordially, — Duprat, Presi- 
dent; Vaton, Secretary; Ruchon, 

We hereby inform you, Sir, that in 
conformity with the Preliminaries of 
Peace, ratified by a majority of the 
communes and guaranteed by France, 
by virtue of the decree of the National 
Assembly of July 4 of the present 
month, it is of immediate importance 
that you send deputies to the Elec- 
toral Assembly, which will assemble 
on Thursday, July 21 of the present 
month, at the place of Bedarides, des- 
ignated by us. This will be the cen- 
tral point where the official statement 
of the wishes expressed as to the po- 
litical state of the country shall be 
drawn up, for the purpose of ascer- 
taining in our presence, the majority 
of the votes. 

Formal Minute of the Communal Assembly of Seguret August 11, 1791 * 

La municipality ayant convoque 
la veille par cris publics tous les cito- 
yens actifs, ils s'assemblerent au nom- 
bre de cent trois, le 11 aout 1791. 
Apres que le Procureur de la com- 
mune leur eut fait part du discours 
a lui tenu par Tun des Mediateurs, 
relativement a remission de leur voeu, 
tous les assembles prirent a Tunani- 
mite la deliberation suivante: 1° de 
voter des remerciements a la genereuse 
nation des Frangais, qui, instruite et 

The Municipality having the day 
before, by public crier, convoked the 
active citizens, they assembled to the 
number of three hundred, on August 
11, 1791. After the Procurer of the 
Commune had reported to them the 
discourse made to him by one of the 
Mediators, regarding the emission of 
their vote, all those assembled unani- 
mously adopted the following delib- 
erations: 1. to vote their thanks to 
the generous French nation, which, in- 

1 Charpenne, Les Grands Episodes de la Revolution, vol. 3, p. 224. 



touchee de Tanarchie et des horreurs 
qui desolent notre province, a daigne, 
dans Timmensite de ses travaux, s'oc- 
cuper de nous, compatir a nos mal- 
heurs et nous envoyer des Mediateurs, 
qui fideles a la mission la plus auguste, 
ont mis en usage tous les moyens pour 
ramener parmi nous la paix et la 
surete ; 2° de renouveler le serment de 
fidelite au Saint-Siege, dans la per- 
sonne de Pie VI, souverain Pontife, 
qui, nous rappelant par la sagesse de 
son gouvernement et la tendresse de 
son coeur paternel tous les bienfaits 
dont ses predecesseurs ont toujours 
comble cette province, nous a tou- 
jours traites en enfants cheris plutot 
qu'en sujets; 3° de revoquer et re- 
garder comme de nullite toutes les 
deliberations que la crainte et la ter- 
reur ont pu leur arracher jusqu'a ce 
jour et pourraient leur commander a 
Tavenir, protestant vouloir vivre et 
mourir sujets de N.-S. Pere le Pape, 
et disciples de la religion catholique 
apostolique et romaine, dont il est le 
chef comme vicaire de Jesus-Christ et 
successeur de Saint-Pierre. 

Ainsi propose, conclu et delibere. — 
Extrait du registre de la commune de 
ce lieu de Seguret, tire mot & mot. 

David, maire; 

Biscarrat, secretaire-grefHer. 

formed of and touched by the anarchy 
and the horrors which are desolating 
our province, has deigned in the im- 
mensity of its labors, to occupy itself 
with us, to pity our misfortunes and 
to send to us the Mediators, who, 
faithful to their most august mission, 
have made use of every means to re- 
store peace and safety among us; 2. 
to renew the oath of fidelity to the 
Holy See in the person of Pius VI. 
Sovereign Pontiff, who, recalling to 
us by the wisdom of his government 
and the tenderness of his paternal 
heart, all the benefits with which his 
predecessors have always over- 
whelmed this province, and have al- 
ways treated us as beloved children 
rather than as subjects; 3. to revoke 
and to regard as null all deliberations 
which fear and terror have been able 
to wrest from them up to this time 
and might be able to dictate to them 
in the future, protesting that they 
wish to live and to die subjects of 
our Holy Father the Pope, and dis- 
ciples of the catholic apostolic and 
Roman religion, of which he is the 
head as Vicar of Jesus Christ and suc- 
cessor of Saint Peter. 

Proposed, concluded and deliber- 
ated as above. Extract from the reg- 
ister of the commune of this Toivn of 
Seguret, copied verbatim. 
David, Mayor; 
Biscarrat, Recording-Secretary. 



Report of Le Seine des Maisons on his Mission as Mediator. September 

10, 1791 * 


Deputes par le roi, vers les peuples 
d'Avignon et du Comtat, en execu- 
tion de vos lois des 24 mai et 4 juillet 
dernier, nous allons mettre sous vos 
yeux ce qui seul est digne de vous: 
la verite attestee par le devoir et par 


As deputies from the King to the 
people of Avignon and the Comtat, in 
execution of your laws of May 24 and 
July 4 last, we are going to submit to 
you what alone is worthy of you : the 
truth attested by duty and by honor. 

La revolution operee dans Avignon 
et dans le Comtat Venaissin fut une 
suite naturelle, inevitable, de celle ar- 
rivee en France; ou plutot elle fut la 
meme, puisque, de tout temps, la na- 
ture, les liaisons du sang, les habitudes 
et la politique, qui n'est constamment 
dirigee que par la loi imperieuse des 
besoins mutuels, avaient fait de ces 
deux petites peuplades des portions de 
la grande famille dans le sein de la- 
quelle elles etaient enclavees. 2 

• • • ■ • 

Tel etait le sort des Etats d'Avignon 
et du Comtat, lorsque TAssemblee na- 
tional s'en occupa au mois de mai, 
lorsque son humanite autant que sa 
justice decreterent d'y etablir la paix 
avant de prendre un parti ulterieur au 
sujet de ses droits sur ce pays; telle 
etait enfin la tache a remplir par les 
mediateurs, et envoyes par le roi pour 
remplir ces vues. 

The revolution carried on in Avig- 
non and the Comtat Venaissin was the 
natural and inevitable result of that 
which took place in France ; or rather 
it was the same, since, in every age, 
nature, ties of blood, habits, and poli- 
tics, which are continuously guided by 
the imperious law of mutual needs, 
have made these tiny groups but parts 
of the great human family in the 
midst of which they were placed. 

Such was the condition of the 
States of Avignon and of the Com- 
tat, when the National Assembly gave 
its attention to them in the month of 
May, and humanity as much as jus- 
tice decreed that peace should be estab- 
lished there before any additional 
steps were taken in regard to its rights 
over the country; such was in short 
the task to be fulfilled by the Medi- 
ators sent by the King to carry out 
these views. 

1 Arch, pari, 1st series, vol. 30, p. 438 et seq. The Report of Verninac Saint-Maur is not 
given here as it relates only to events after the vote was taken. See below p. 87. 

2 The omitted paragraph recalls the events in Avignon and the Comtat before the arrival 
of the Mediators. 



Les mediateurs s'arreterent a 
Orange: ils crurent qu'il etait sage 
d'eviter une nouvelle rivalite entre 
Avignon et Carpentras, puisqu'il etait 
impossible de se rendre dans les deux 
villes en meme temps. Ils crurent 
qu'il importait de connaitre les dis- 
positions et les pretentions de tous, 
avant de s'exposer dans un pays ou 
rien alors n'etait respecte; ils crurent 
qu'il importait d'amortir ce premier 
choc des passions opposees, et de re- 
unir des hommes ennemis pour'dis- 
cuter en leur presence, et atteindre en- 
suite le but de leur mission. Inex- 
perience confirma la justesse de leurs 
vues, Hs obtinrent bien plus de sacri- 
fices qu'ils n'en auraient obtenu au- 
trement; chacun desirait la paix, et 
elle n'etait offerte qu'aux pretentions 
raisonnables et au silence des pas- 

Cependant, d'un cote, le territoire 
de France venait d'etre viole a Gigon- 
das par des assassinats commis par des 
gens de Tarmee du Haut-Comtat; de 
Tautre, les rassamblements se conti- 
nuaient, et il etait a craindre qu'en li- 
cenciant Tarmee avignonaise, celle qui 
se formait et qui paraissait conside- 
rable, qui semblait avoir des liaisons 
tres-etendues, ne causat de plus grands 
desordres encore; deja les chefs exi- 
geaient, a Tinstar de ceux d' Avignon, 
des contributions forcees, et ils trou- 
vaient bon pour eux ce qu'ils condam- 
naient en autrui. 

II fallut retarder le licenciement de 
Tarmee d* Avignon jusqu'a ce qu'il fut 
constant que les rassemblements se 

The Mediators stopped at Orange : 
they believed that it was wise to avoid 
any additional rivalry between Avig- 
non and Carpentras, since it was im- 
possible to be in both towns at the 
same time. They believed that it be- 
hooved them to know the designs and 
claims of all, before appearing in a 
country where nothing was then re- 
spected ; they believed that it behooved 
them to soften the first shock of op- 
posing passions, and to bring hostile 
factions together in their presence for 
the purpose of discussion, and thus to 
attain the object of their mission. 
Experience proved the justice of their 
theories; they obtained many more 
sacrifices than they would have ob- 
tained otherwise; each desired peace, 
but this was rendered possible only by 
calmness and reasonable claims. 

In the meantime, on one side, the 
territory of France was violated at 
Gigondas by murders committed by 
men of the army of the Haut-Comtat ; 
on the other, crowds continued to con- 
gregate, and it was to be feared that 
in disbanding the army of Avignon, 
the one which was in training, and 
which seemed considerable and with 
extensive connections, might cause 
still greater disorders; already the 
leaders were demanding forced contri- 
butions, after the fashion of those of 
Avignon, and they thought things 
right for them which they condemned 
in another. 

It was necessary to delay the dis- 
banding of the army of Avignon un- 
til it was certain that the crowds had 



dissipassent, et que des preliminaires 
de paix, signes de toutes les parties, 
assurassent la tranquillite publique. 

Au nombre des contractants etaient 
les deputes de cette assemblee elec- 
torale reconnue par les uns, repoussee 
par les autres, et assez generalement 
hale, puisque rarmee etait a ses or- 
dres et qu'elle portait Todieux de 
toutes les vexations. L/admettre nous 
parut en principe, puisqu'elle nous 
presentait 68 proces-verbaux sur 84, 
en vertu desquels elle existait ; puisque 
appeler une nouvelle deputation, un 
nouveau corps deliberant, c'etait op- 
poser puissance a puissance, doubler 
les embarras et creer un nouvel ob- 
stacle? a notre mission. Mais il f allait 
en meme temps tranquilliser les com- 
munes qui la craignaient, qui ne vou- 
laient point du tout la reconnaitre; 
il fallait ramener celles qui avaient 
rappele leurs electeurs, celles qui ne 
voulaient pas en entendre prononcer 
le nom. II fallait enfin obtenir la vo- 
lonte et la parole de toutes les com- 
munes de mettre bas les armes. 

Nous trouvames ce point commun 
de la reunion des principes avec tous 
les interets, dans le troisieme article 
des preliminaires. V Assemblee elec- 
toral devait etre reconnue par tous, 
mais a Teffet d'etre seulement le noeud 
commun des interets de tous. Pour 
oter toute crainte de ses entreprises ou 
de ses operations politiques, elle con- 
sentait elle-meme a etre paralysee pour 
tout autre objet, et a n'avoir d'autre 
fonction que de recevoir, recueillir et 
constater les voeux des communes sur 

dispersed, and that the Preliminaries 
of Peace, signed by all parties, would 
assure public tranquillity. 

Among the contracting parties were 
the deputies of that Electoral Assem- 
bly which was recognized by some, re- 
jected by others, and rather generally 
hated, since the army was under its 
orders and it bore the blame of all its 
misdeeds. To recognize it appeared 
to us necessary, since it presented to 
us sixty-eight formal minutes out of 
eighty-four, in virtue of which it ex- 
isted, since to summon new deputies, a 
new deliberative body, would be but to 
oppose power to power, to double the 
embarrassment and to create a new 
obstacle to our mission. But it was 
necessary at the same time to quiet the 
communes which feared it, which 
strongly opposed recognizing it; it 
was necessary to bring around those 
which had recalled their electors, 
which could not bear to hear its name 
mentioned. Moreover, it was neces- 
sary to obtain both the desire and the 
promise of all the communes to lay 
down their arms. 

We found this common point of 
union of principles and interests, in 
the third article of the Preliminaries. 
The Electoral Assembly should be 
recognized by all, but only as a 
common link in the interests of all. 
In order to remove all fear of its ac- 
tions and political operations, it con- 
sented of its own free will to be in- 
active in every other respect, and to 
have no other function than that of 
receiving, collecting and reporting 
the votes of the communes on their 



leur sort politique ; car ces peuples sen- 
taient fort bien que poser les armes 
n'etait pas bannir Tanarchie d'un pays 
ou chaque commune formait une es- 
pece de petite republique, ou il n'exis- 
tait aucun gouvernement, aucun or- 
dre judiciaire; ils sentaient fort bien 
qu'il etait important pour eux de 
presser le moment de determiner leur 
sort politique, et que tous les moyens 
qui pouvaient y concourir devaient 
etre saisis par eux avec avidite. Si 
TAssemblee nationale s'etait contentee 
de dire : retablir la paix avant de sta- 
tuer sur ses droits; pour eux qui 
n'apercevaient de bonheur que dans 
la realisation de ces droits, qui deja 
avaient presente 68 deliberations sur 
84, qui demandaient la reunion, qui 
avaient vu ce voeu ajourne, et a qui 
on avait reproche qu'ils ne Tavaient 
pas emis librement; pour eux, dis-je, 
la chose la plus instante, la plus im- 
portante etait d'employer les premiers 
moments d'une paix garantie par la 
France, pour emettre de nouveau, et 
a l'abri de tout reproche, un voeu du- 
quel ils faisaient dependre leur bon- 

Telle fut la matiere et l'objet des 
articles 3 et 4 des preliminaires de 

Ces preliminaires de paix furent 
adoptes par l'Assemblee nationale; 
vous en fites, Messieurs, la loi du 4 
juillet, et vous daignates en approu- 
vant les mesures et la conduite des me- 
diateurs, donner a leurs travaux la 
plus flatteuse recompense, a leur zele 
le plus puissant aiguillon. 

Notre premiere entree dans le pays 

political future; for the people saw 
clearly that laying down arms was 
not banishing anarchy from a 
country where each commune 
formed a kind of tiny republic, 
where existed neither government 
nor courts; they knew well that it 
was important for them to hasten 
the time of decision in regard to their 
political Ifuture, and that all means 
which could contribute to it should 
be seized with avidity. If the Na- 
tional Assetnbly had been content to 
say: reestablish peace before com- 
ing to a decision in regard to their 
political rights; for those who saw 
happiness only in the realization of 
these rights, who had already pre- 
sented sixty-eight deliberations out of 
eighty-four, demanding union, who 
had seen this wish put aside, who 
had borne the reproach that it had 
not been freely expressed; for them, 
I say, the most urgent, and important 
thing was to employ the first moments 
of a peace guaranteed by France, in 
order to express again, guarded from 
all reproach, the wish upon which de- 
pended their happiness. 

Such was the matter and the object 
of Articles 3 and 4 of the Prelimin- 
aries of Peace. 

These Preliminaries of Peace were 
adopted by the National Assembly; 
you made of them, Gentlemen, the 
law of July 4, and you deigned, in 
approving the measures and the con- 
duct of the Mediators, to give the 
most flattering reward to their work, 
the most powerful spur to their zeal. 

The first entry in the country was 



fut la plus douce des jouissances; des 
champs couverts de riches moissons 
attendaient les bras du cultivateur; 
abandonnes depuis longtemps, ils vi- 
rent reparaitre les mains qui les 
avaient fertilises, et de tous cotes nous 
recueillions pour vous les actions de 
graces et les benedictions d'un peuple 
a qui vbus rendiez le bonheur. 

Cependant les rassemblements dc 
Brantes, du Liberon et de Lagnes 
venaient etre dissipes par nos soins et 
notre fermete, Tarmee d' Avignon 
venait d'etre licenciee; et afin de pre- 
venir tout trouble, et sur la demande 
des municipality, conformement a 
la garantie de la loi du 4 juillet, nous 
avions fait marcher a Avignon 2 ba- 
taillons du ci-devant regiment de la 
Fere, un de Somnemberg et 2 esca- 
drons de hussards; nous avions fait 
marcher a Carpentras un bataillon du 
ci-devant regiment de Soissonais, un 
escadron de dragons et une compagnie 
d'artillerie ; c'etait tout ce qu'il nous 
avait ete possible d'obtenir, quoique 
infiniment au-dessous de ce qui etait 
necessaire pour maintenir la paix dans 
un pays de haines si inveterees, si mul- 

Toutefois, l'armee rentra dans 
Avignon: cette armee a laquelle les 
calamites peut-etre inevitables qu'elle 
avait produites; les haines de la mu- 
nicipality et les calomnies qui en 
avaient ete la suite, avaient attache la 
designation odieuse de brigands. 
Elle etait composee de la garde soldee 
avignonaise, d'un fort detachement de 
la garde nationale, et de 180 deser- 
teurs f ran^ais, a peu pres : elle montait 

the most delightful of pleasures; 
fields covered with rich harvests 
awaited the arms of the farmers; 
abandoned for a long time, they saw 
again the hands which had enriched 
them, and on all sides we received 
for you the thanks and the blessing 
of a people to whom you had re- 
stored happiness. 

In the meantime, the gatherings of 
Brantes, of the Liberon and of 
Lagnes had been dispersed by our 
care and our firmness, the army of 
Avignon had been disbanded; and in 
order to prevent all trouble, and upon 
the request of the Municipality, in 
conformity with the guarantee of the 
law of July 4, we ordered to Avignon 
two battalions of the former regi- 
ment of la Fere, one of Somnemberg, 
and two squadrons of huzzars; we 
ordered to Carpentras a battalion of 
the former regiment of Soissonais, a 
squadron of dragoons and a com- 
pany of artillery; this was all that 
it was possible for us to obtain, 
though infinitely below what was req- 
uisite in order to maintain peace in 
a country of such numerous and in- 
veterate hatreds. 

Nevertheless, the army entered 
Avignon; this army to which the 
calamities, perhaps inevitable, which 
it had occasioned, the antagonism of 
the Municipality and the calumnies 
which had thereby resulted, had at- 
tached the odious name of " brig- 
ands." It was composed of the paid 
guard of Avignon, of a strong detach- 
ment of the National Guard, and of 
about one hundred and eighty French 



a plus de 3,000 hommes. Apres avoir 
remis leurs canons, la plupart des de- 
tachements se retirerent tranquille- 
ment dans leurs communes. Nous 
proclamames Tamnistie, et nous fimes 
partir les deserteurs. Nous n'avions 
alors qu'a nous louer des chefs de 
Tarmee et de Tassemblee electorate; 
ils se conformaient strictement a la 
loi, et l'ordre regnait dans Avignon. 

Mais les haines etaient encore trop 
fraiches, les ressentiments trop actifs 
pour obtenir une tranquillite absolue. 
Caron avait ete une des villes mal- 
heureuses qui, flottant dans ses opin- 
ions, avait fourni des detachements 
aux deux armees ennemis. Nous 
avions prevu cet inconvenient, et pour 
eviter l'effet de ces haines, nous avions 
ecrit au commandant de Soissonais de 
proteger sa rentree par un detache- 
ment des troupes de ligne. En ar- 
rivant a Carpentras, ceux de Caron 
f urent attaques par le peuple ; un d'eux 
fut massacre malgre les efforts de nos 
troupes; M. Desperon sauva le reste. 

II les fit conduire a Caron par 60 
hommes de ligne et remettre sous la 
protection d'une compagnie d'artil- 
lerie. Le peuple, excite par uri 
nomme Clement, commandant de 
Brantes, et ancien deserteur fran^ais, 
dit-on, fut bientot en insurrection. 
On arrache 11 de ces malheureux du 
chateau ou on les avait deposes, et 
sous les yeux du detachement fran- 
^ais ; les officiers municipaux se 
cachent ou ne paraissent pas. Sem- 

deserters: it comprised more than 
3,000 men. After having given up 
their guns, the greater part of the de- 
tachments retired tranquilly to their 
communes. We proclaimed an 
armistice, and we ordered off the de- 
serters. We had at that time noth- 
ing but praise for the leaders of the 
army and of the Electoral Assembly; 
they conformed strictly to the law, 
and order reigned in Avignon. 

But hatred was too fresh and 
resentment too active to obtain abso- 
lute tranquillity. Caron had been 
one of the unhappy towns which, 
wavering in its opinions, had fur- 
nished detachments to the two hostile 
armies. We had foreseen this diffi- 
culty, and in order to prevent the ef- 
fect of these antagonisms, we had 
written to the commanding officer of 
the Soissonais to protect his return 
by a detachment of troops of the 
line. On arriving at Carpentras, the 
soldiers of Caron were attacked by 
the people; one of them was 
murdered notwithstanding the ef- 
forts of the troops; M. Desperon 
saved the rest. 

He had them conducted to Caron 
by sixty men of the line and placed 
under the protection of a company 
of artillery. The people, aroused by 
one named Clement, Commandant of 
Brantes, and said to be a former 
French deserter, were soon in in- 
surrection. They dragged eleven of 
these unfortunates from the chateau 
where they had been lodged, and 
under the eyes of the French detach- 
ment; the municipal authorities 



blables aux cannibales, on les traine 
hors des murs, on leur donne un con- 
fesseur, et la on les assassine tous a 
coups de fusil: entre eux etait un 

On dit, et on aura peine a le croire, 
mais, a la honte de l'humanite, le fait 
est certain, je l'ai verifie; cet atroce 
Clement for^ait les peres et meres de 
ces malheureuses victimes a aller as- 
sister a cet affreux assassinat. 

Des que la nouvelle nous parvint, 
nous courumes en arreter les suites; 
mais, a l'instant, il f allut se multiplier ; 
le complot paraissait forme d'assas- 
siner tous les detachements de l'armee 
avignonaise a leur rentree paisible 
dans leurs foyers: cela arrivait dans 
les communes ou il y avait eu le plus 
de division. L'humanite nous donna 
des ailes : nous nous trouvames a Pio- 
lene, a Lisle et dans d'autres com- 
munes a Tinstant ou les sacrifices hu- 
mains allaient commencer; et a force 
de soin, de prieres, de raisons et de 
menaces, nous parvinmes a retablir 
le calme. 

L'experience prouva bien alors com- 
bien nos reclamations etaient justes, 
et combien nos forces etaient insuffi- 
santes. D'apres Timpossibilite d'avoir 
des troupes de ligne, et les refus que 
nous eprouvions, nous criimes devoir 
employer les moyens que nous four- 
nissait la loi du 4 juillet, et demander, 
en consequence, des gardes nationales. 
Nous criimes qu'il serait plus aise 
d'obtenir 15 ou 1,800 gardes nation- 
aux qui nous promettaient des res- 

either hid themselves or did not ap- 
pear. Like cannibals, they dragged 
them outside the walls, gave them a 
confessor, and there they shot them. 
Among them was an elector. 

They say, and one will have diffi- 
culty in believing it, but to the shame 
of humanity, it is a fact, I have veri- 
fied it, this atrocious Clement forced 
the fathers and mothers of these un- 
happy victims to witness their 
murder. ( Movement. ) 

As soon as the news reached us, 
we hastened to prevent the conse- 
quences; but at that moment it was 
necessary to multiply oneself; the 
plot appeared to be formed to 
murder all the detachment of the 
army of Avignon on their peaceable 
return to their firesides: this was in 
the communes in which dissensions 
had been greatest. Humanity gave 
us wings: we arrived at Piolene, at 
Lisle and at other communes at the 
very moment that the human sacri- 
fices were to begin; and by our care, 
our prayers, reasoning, and men- 
ances, we succeeded in reestablishing 

Experience proved clearly at that 
time that our claims were just and 
our forces insufficient. From the 
impossibility of getting troops of the 
line, and the refusal which we re- 
ceived, we believed that we should 
make use of the means which the law 
of July 4 furnished us, and demand, 
in consequence, the National Guard. 
We believed it would be easy to ob- 
tain 1500 or 1800 National Guards 
who would be sufficient to con- 



sources suffisantes pour consolider 
cette paix que la loi nous chargeait 
d'etablir, et que d'ailleurs, 1,500 
gardes nationaux, pris dans les 3 de- 
partements environnants, ne pour- 
raient pas les affaiblir. 

Nous en obtinmes, non sans beau- 
coup d'embarras et de nombreux re- 
fus. Des que nous pumes en placer 
dans divers points du Comtat, de 
maniere a prevenir les assassinats, 
nous crumes qu'il etait important d'in- 
spirer la confiance a tous les partis, 
de fournir a tous les emigrants les 
moyens de rentrer dans leurs foyers. 
Nous adressames, a cet effet, aux 
commandants divers, une instruction, 
dans laquelle nous recommandions la 
plus grande impartiality protection et 
surete pour tous. Nous fimes ren- 
dre la liberte a des prisonniers chers 
a tous les partis, et notamment a 
MM. de Sainte-Croix, impliques dans 
l'affaire du malheureux La Vilasse, 
maire de Vaison. La confiance et 
l'ordre se retablirent en effet ; tous les 
emigrants rentrerent ou purent ren- 
trer dans le Comtat. 

Ce fut apres ces mesures que l'as- 
semblee electorate engagea les com- 
munes a s'assembler, et a emettre, con- 
formement aux preliminaires de paix, 
un vceu sur leur sort politique, qui 
put etre presente par elle a l'Assem- 
blee nationale lorsqu'elle prendrait un 
parti ulterieur sur ses droits sur les 
deux Etats d* Avignon et du Comtat. 

A cette epoque, les membres de la 
mediation furent appeles, par les cir- 

solidate this peace which the law 
charged us to establish, and that 
moreover, 1500 National Guards 
taken in the neighboring departments, 
could not weaken them. 

We obtained them, not without a 
good deal of embarrassment and 
numerous refusals. As soon as we 
were able to place them at different 
points in the Comtat, in order to pre- 
vent the assassinations, we believed 
it was important to inspire confidence 
in all parties, and to furnish to the 
emigrants the means to return to their 
homes. We forwarded, to the vari- 
ous commanding officers, instructions 
to this effect, recommending the 
greatest impartiality, protection and 
security for all. We ordered the 
liberation of prisoners dear to all 
parties, and especially MM. de 
Sainte-Croix, implicated in the af- 
fair of the unfortunate La Vilasse, 
mayor of Vaison. Confidence and 
order were in fact reestablished; all 
the emigrants returned, or were able 
to return to the Comtat. 

It was after these measures that 
the Electoral Assembly invited the 
communes to assemble, and to de- 
clare, in conformity to the peace 
preliminaries, their wishes in regard 
to their political future, in order that 
they might present them to the Na- 
tional Assembly when additional ac- 
tion would be taken in regard to its 
rights in the two States of Avignon 
and the Comtat. 

At this time the Mediators were 
called by circumstances to different 



Constances, a des occupations differ- 
entes. Avignon etait devenu le cen- 
tre des affaires, et Tun de nous dut y 
rester; il fallait qu'un'autre surveillat 
les operations de Tassemblee electorate, 
pour la contenir dans les bornes qui 
lui etaient prescrites par le traite, et 
qu'il se tint a Sorgues, pres d'Avig- 
non, pour cet objet. Le maintien de 
la paix dans le Comtat, la demande 
et les sollicitations des communes, qui 
se plaignaient de la preference ac- 
cordee a Avignon, firent juger qu'il 
etait important que Tun de nous se 
rendit a leurs desirs, et dissipat les 
calomnies que les ennemis du bien pu- 
blic et les ecrivains qui leur sont ven- 
dus ne cessaient de repandre. Je fus 
charge de cette mission, et je declare 
a Tauguste Assemblee qui m'entend, 
que si toutes les communes du Comtat 
n'ont pas alors joui de la paix la plus 
parfaite, les individus de la surete la 
plus entiere, les communes de la lib- 
erte de suffrages la plus absolue, la 
plus independante, moi seul j'en suis 
et m'en rends responsable. Deja 
grand nombre avaient emis leur vceu 
lorsque je me suis presente chez elles : 
7 Tont emis en ma presence. A Val- 
reas, par exemple, chef-lieu du parti 
qui tient au pape, Tassemblee s'est 
tenue en presence de 150 gardes na- 
tionaux, demandes par une partie de 
la municipalite, sous mes yeux et ceux 
des hussards qui m'accompaghaient. 
J'ai fourni une garde pour la police 
et la surete de Tassemblee, sur la de- 
mande faite par la municipalite, et 
Tassemblee a vote pour la cour de 
Rome. A Piolene, a Serignan, a Vil- 

occupations. Avignon had become 
the center of affairs, and one of us 
must stay there ; it was necessary for 
another to watch the conduct of the 
Electoral Assembly in order to keep 
it within the limits prescribed by the 
treaty, and to establish himself at 
Sorgues, near Avignon, for this pur- 
pose. The maintenance of peace in 
the Comtat and the prayers and 
solicitations of the communes, which 
complained of the preference ac- 
corded to Avignon, led us to believe 
that it was important for one of us 
to yield to their desires, and dissipate 
the slanders which the enemies of 
public security and the writers hired 
by them did not cease to spread. I 
was charged with this mission, and 
I declare to the august Assembly 
which now hears me, that if all the 
communes of the Comtat did not at 
that time enjoy the most perfect 
peace, and individuals the most per- 
fect security, and communes the 
most absolute, free and independent 
liberty of suffrage, I alone am respon- 
sible. Many already had declared 
their wishes when I went among 
them: seven did so in my presence. 
At Valreas, for instance, the strong- 
hold of the party of the Pope, the 
assembly was held in the presence of 
one hundred and fifty national guards, 
asked for by a part of the Municipal- 
ity, under my eyes, and those of the 
hussars who accompanied me. I fur- 
nished a guard for the police and the 
security of the assembly, by request 
from the Municipality, and the assem- 
bly voted for the Court of Rome. At 



ledieu, etc., il est arrive la meme chose, 
et les vceux ont ete pour la cour de 

II est done impossible de revoquer 
en doute la liberte qui a preside aux 
vceux emis; partout j'ai preche l'u- 
nion, la paix, la Concorde et la liberte 
des opinions ; partout je les ai etablies, 
et j'en appelle sur la verite de ces 
faits, non pas aux 60 communes qui 
veulent etre f ran^aises, mais aux chefs 
de celles qui ont vote en sens con- 
traire, que ma conduite a forces a 
Testime et qui m'en ont donne des 
preuves non equivoques, et que je pro- 
duirai a TAssemblee si elle Tordonne. 

Piolene, at Serignan, at Villedieu, etc., 
the same thing happened and the vote 
was for the Court of Rome. 

It is, then, impossible to call in 
question the freedom amid which the 
votes were cast; everywhere I 
preached union, peace, concord and 
liberty of opinion; everywhere I 
established them, and as to the truth 
of these facts I appeal, not only to 
the sixty communes which wish to 
be French, but to the heads of those 
which have voted to the contrary, 
from whom my conduct has called 
forth esteem of which I have received 
far from doubtful proof, which I will 
produce if the Assembly orders it. 

Fourth Report of the Committees on Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, 

September 12, 1791 1 

M. de Menou, rapporteur. J'ob- 
serve a l'Assemblee que j'ai la les 
pieces probantes de tous les faits que 
je vais annoncer. 

Messieurs, les comites que, pour la 
4* fois, vous avez charges de vous 
rendre compte de l'affaire des Etats 
reunis d'Avignon et du Comtat Ve- 
naissin, vont avofc Thonneur de vous 
rendre compte avec exactitude et im- 
partiality de la situation actuelle de 
ces deux malheureux pays, qui places 
presque au centre de TEmpire fran- 
^ais et sous le climat le plus heureux, 
sont depuis longtemps livres a tous 

M. de Menou, reporter. I notify 
the Assembly that I have here the con- 
vincing proofs of all the facts which I 
am about to state. 

Gentlemen, the committees which, 
for the fourth time, you have 
charged to render an account to you 
of the affair concerning the united 
states of Avignon and the Comtat 
Venaissin, will have the honor of re- 
porting to you with exactness and 
impartiality the actual condition of 
those two unfortunate countries, 
which, situated nearly in the centre 
of the French dominions, and blessed 

1 Arc h. pari, 1st series, vol. 30, p. 579. 



les desordres de la licence et de Tan- 

Vos comites n'ont pas cru devoir 
traiter de nouveau la question des 
droits de la France sur les Etats 
d' Avignon et du Comtat venaissin; 
elle a ete debattue et discutee, a dif- 
ferentes epoques, dans 22 seances de 
cette Assemblee; le pour et le contre 
vous sont suffisamment connus; et 
chacun peut s'etre forme une opinion 
juste et saine de nos droits sur ces 2 
Etats ; droits qui ont ete f ormellement 
reserves par 1' Assemblee nationale, 
dans Tarticle premier de son decret du 
25 mai, qui ordonne Tenvoi des com- 
missaires mediateurs. 

with the best of climates, have for 
a long time been given over to all 
the disorders of license and anarchy. 

a • . . • 

Your committees did not deem it 
necessary to deal again with the 
question of the rights of France over 
the States of Avignon and the 
Comtat Venaissin; it has been de- 
bated and discussed at different times 
during twenty-two sittings of this 
Assembly; you are sufficienly fa- 
miliar with the pros and cons, and 
each one of you has been able to form 
a just and sane opinion of our rights 
over these two states; rights which 
were formally reserved by the Na- 
tional Assembly in the first article 
of its decree of May 25, which directs 
the sending of a commission of 

L' Assemblee nationale, apres une 
discussion qui dura plusieurs jours, 
ne croyant pas que le voeu de reunion, 
presente par les Avignonais et les 
Comtadins, fut assez solennellement, 
assez librement et assez legalement 
emis, pour etre accepte par elle, se de- 
termina par un decret du 25 mai a 
envoyer des commissaires mediateurs, 
avec mission de retablir l'ordre et la 
tranquillite parmi ces 2 peuples, et d'y 
faire cesser toute hostilite, comme un 
prealable necessaire avant de pren- 
dre aucun parti ulterieur relativement 
aux droits de la France sur ce pays. 

Dans les 4 articles de ce decret, il 
n'est nulle part mention du pape, ni 
de la cour de Rome. 

U Assemblee nationale, en y reser- 

The National Assembly, after a 
discussion lasting several days, not 
considering that the vote of union 
presented by the citizens of Avignon 
and the Comtat had been cast in a 
manner sufficiently formal, free or 
legal to be accepted by it, decided, 
through a decree of May 25, to send 
a commission of mediation, whose 
mission would be to reestablish order 
and quiet among these two peoples, 
and to stop all hostilities, as a neces- 
sary preliminary to any further ac- 
tion relative to the rights of France 
over the country. 

In the four articles of this decree, 
there is no mention of the Pope or of 
the Court of Rome. 

The National Assembly, while re- 



vant les droits de la France, reconnait 
cependant implicitement rindepend- 
ance des Avignonais et des Comtadins, 
puisqu'elle envoie des mediateurs pour 
interposer leurs bons offices entre 2 
peuples qui se font la guerre. 

Les mediateurs partent et arrivent 
dans les pays belligerants ; leur pre- 
mier soin est de concilier les 2 peu- 
ples : le 19 juin des deputes de toutes 
les parties interessees se rassemblent 
a Orange, et signent, en presence des 
mediateurs de la France et sous leur 
garantie provisoire, des preliminaires 
de paix contenant 7 articles ; dans au- 
cun de ces articles, il n'est question du 
pape ni de la cour de Rome. Les 
Comtadins et les Avignonais stipu- 
lent comme peuples independants et 
souverains; Particle 4 est surtout re- 
marquable ; il consacre le principe que 
la souverainete sera exercee exclusive- 
ment par le corps representatif de la 
nation, et ce corps representatif est 
Tassemblee electorate qui doit etre 
composee des deputes des communes. 

Ces preliminaires de paix sont en- 
voyes par les mediateurs a TAssemblee 
nationale et au roi, et le 4 juillet TAs- 
semblee nationale rend un decret so- 
lennel par lequel: 1° elle approuve la 
conduite des commissaires mediateurs 
envers les differents partis bellige- 
rants ; 

2° Par lequel elle confirme la garan- 
tie donnee par les 3 commissaires me- 
diateurs pour Texecution des articles 
et preliminaires de paix arretes et 
signes a Orange. 

serving in this decree the rights of 
France, recognizes implicitly, how- 
ever, the independence of Avignon 
and the Comtat, by sending medi- 
ators to offer their services to two 
warring peoples. 

The Mediators having arrived in 
the belligerent countries; their first 
care was to conciliate the two 
peoples. On June 19 deputies from 
all the interested parties assembled 
at Orange, and, in the presence of 
the French Mediators and under their 
provisional guarantee, signed the 
Preliminaries of Peace containing 
seven articles. In none of these 
articles is there question of the Pope 
or of the Court of Rome. The 
Comtat and Avignon made their 
stipulations as independent and 
sovereign peoples. Article 4 is espe- 
cially noteworthy: it sanctions the 
principle that sovereignty will be 
exercised exclusively by the repre- 
sentative body of the nation, and this 
representative body is the Electoral 
Assembly, which must be composed 
of the deputies from the communes. 

These Preliminaries of Peace were 
sent by the Mediators to the National 
Assembly and to the King, and on 
July 4 the National Assembly issued 
a solemn decree, which first approved 
the conduct of the commission of me- 
diation towards the various belliger- 
ent parties; 

2. Confirmed the guarantee given 
by the three commissioners for the 
execution of the articles and Prelim- 
inaries drawn up and signed at 



Dans ce decret, nulle mention du 
pape, ni de la cour de Rome. L'As- 
semblee nationale reconnait claire- 
ment Tindependance et la souve- 
rainete des Avignonais et des Comta- 
dins, puisqu'elle garantit un traite 
passe entre deux peuples qui ont 
stipule en leur propre et prive nom, 
et en vertu de leur independance et 
de leur souverainete. Si TAssemblee 
nationale n'eut pas reconnu cette in- 
dependance, eut-elle, sans Interven- 
tion du pape, sans son agrement, sans 
qu'il fut appele comme partie inte- 
ressee, garanti le traite passe entre les 
Comtadins et les Avignonais? II est 
done evident, et e'est un point con- 
venu, et qu'on ne peut contester, si on 
est de bonne foi, que ces deux peuples 
sont reconnus libres et independants 
par la France, et qu'ils ont pu et du 
emettre leur voeu sur l'etat politique 
de leur pays. 

Ce voeu a-t-il eti libre, a-t-il ete so- 
lennel, a-t4l ete legal? 

D'apres les preliminaires de paix 
arretes a Orange et garantis par 1' As- 
semble nationale, les mediateurs 
ecrivent au president de Tassemblee 
electorate, qui, conformement a l'ar- 
ticle 2 du traite de paix, tenait ses 
seances a Bedarrides, lieu qui n'etait 
soup^onne d'aucune influence de parti, 
lui ecrivent, dis-je, pour le prier de 
faire passer a toutes les communes 
des deux Etats une lettre par laquelle 
elles etaient invitees a se reunir pour 
emettre leur voeu sur Tetat politique 
du pays. 

In this decree, no mention of the 
Pope or of the Court of Rome. The 
National Assembly clearly recognized 
the independence and the sovereignty 
of Avignon and the Comtat, by guar- 
anteeing a treaty between two peoples 
who made their stipulations in their 
own name and by virtue of their inde- 
pendence and of their sovereignty. 
If the National Assembly had not 
recognized this independence, would 
it have guaranteed the treaty between 
the Comtat and Avignon without the 
intervention of the Pope, without his 
agreement andi without his having 
been named as an interested party? 
It is therefore evident, and it is an 
agreed and incontestable fact to those 
cf good faith, that these two peoples 
are recognized by France to be free 
and independent, and that they could 
and should express their vote on the 
political status of their country. 

Was this vote free, zvas it solemn, 
was it legal? 

According to the Preliminaries of 
Peace drawn up at Orange and 
guaranteed by the National As- 
sembly, the Mediators wrote to the 
president of the Electoral Assembly, 
which conformably to Article 2 of 
the treaty of peace, held its meetings 
at Bedarrides, a place which was 
thought to be free from all party in- 
fluence; wrote to him, I say, to ask 
him to transmit a letter to all the 
communes of the two states, inviting 
them to assemble and to cast a vote 
on the political condition of the 



De 98 communautes qui forment 
les deux Etats reunis, 71 se sont ras- 
semblees et ont emis leur voeu. 52 
ont demande leur reunion a la France, 
19 ont vote pour le pape; des 27 au- 
tres, 17 qui avaient vote pour la 
France dans les mois d'avril et de 
mai, et qui sont formees par les ha- 
bitants les plus laborieux qui se trou- 
vaient dans ce moment occupes aux 
recoltes et travaux de la campagne, 17, 
dis-je, n'ont point emis de nouveau 
vceu; mais il est a remarquer qu' elles 
avaient precedemment, et a plusieurs 
reprises, delibere leur reunion a la 
France. Ainsi n'ayant pas forme de 
voeu contraire, dans un moment ou il 
etait essentiel pour elles de le mani- 
fester, si elles avaient change d'opi- 
nion, leur silence doit etre considere 
comme une confirmation de leur prece- 
dente deliberation. 

10 n'ont point emis de voeu ni pour 
la France, ni pour le pape, et semblent 
attendre le denouement de Taffaire. 
Mais, quand meme on n'admettrait 
pas cette opinion et qu'on s'en tien- 
drait a ne considerer que les 52 com- 
munautes qui ont vote pour la France, 
elles forment la majorite en nombre de 
communes et en population. En nom- 
bre de communes ; car de 98 otez 52, 
restent 46 ; ce qui donne 6 communes 
de plus pour la France. Et j'ai Thon- 
neur de vous faire remarquer, Mes- 
sieurs, que ce calcul est le plus favor- 
able pour la cour de Rome. Car, 
dans cette hypothese, je suppose que 
les 46 communes ont vote pour le 
pape. Et cependant, il est certain que 
19 seulement ont delibere pour con- 

Of the ninety-eight comunities, 
which form the two united states, 
seventy-one assembled and voted. 
Fifty-two asked to be united to 
France, nineteen voted for the Pope. 
Of the twenty-seven others, seven- 
teen who had voted for France dur- 
ing the months of April and May, 
and who comprised the most hard 
working of the inhabitants engaged 
at this time in harvesting and farm 
work, seventeen, I say, did not cast 
a new vote ; but it was to be remarked 
that they had ^previously repeatedly 
decided for union with France. 
Therefore, not having cast a con- 
trary vote at a time when it was es- 
sential for them to mention it, if they 
had changed their opinion, their 
silence must be considered as a con- 
firmation of their previous decision. 

Ten did not vote either for France 
or for the Pope, and seem to be await- 
ing the outcome of the affair. But, 
even should one not admit this 
opinion and should one consider only 
the fifty-two communities who voted 
for France, they still form the 
majority in number of communes 
and in population ; for, subtract fifty- 
two from ninety-eight and forty-six 
remains, which gives six more com- 
munes to France. And I have the 
honor, gentlemen, of calling your at- 
tention to the fact that this calculation 
is most favorable to the Court of 
Rome. For, in this hypothesis, I in- 
fer that forty-six communes voted 
for the Pope and yet it is certain that 
only nineteen decided to preserve the 



server Tancien regime; que 17 qui 
avaient precedemment vote pour la 
France, n'ont point emis de nouveau 
voeu, et que 10 n'en ont jamais emis; 
done il n'y a veritablement que le 
voeu de 19 communes qui puisse ba- 
lancer celui des 52 qui ont vote pour 
la France, ce qui etablit en faveur de 
la reunion une difference de 33 com- 

Quant a la population, la totalite 
do celle des deux Etats reunis est de 
152,919 ames; et celle des 52 com- 
munautes qui ont vote pour la France 
de 101,046. Dans le calcul le plus 
favorable au pape, e'est-a-dire, en sup- 
posant que 46 communes ont vote en 
sa faveur, il aurait pour lui 51,873 
habitants. La France en a eu 101,- 
046; difference en faveur de la 
France, 24,586; car la majorite dans 
152,919 est formee par 76,460; et 
101,046 ont vote pour la France. 

Mais, en retablissant le calcul tel 
qu'il doit etre, e'est-a-dire en se rap- 
pelant qu'il n'y a veritablement que 
19 communes qui aient vote pour le 
pape, la majorite devient bien plus 
forte encore en faveur de la France. 

Car, ces 19 communes ne compre- 
nant que 30,667 individus, il en re- 
sulte en faveur de la France une dif- 
ference de 70,379 habitants. Si a ce 
nombre on ajoute celui des individus 
formant la population des 17 com- 
munes qui, ayant emis en avril et mai 
leur voeu en faveur de la France, n'en 
ont emis de nouveau en faveur du 
pape, la majorite deviendra encore 
bien plus considerable ; car cette popu- 

old order of government; that seven- 
teen who had previously voted for 
France did not cast a new vote and 
that ten did not vote at all. There- 
fore there is really only the vote of 
the nineteen communes to counter- 
balance that of the fi-fty-two who 
voted for France, which establishes 
a difference of thirty-three com- 
munes in favor of the union. 

As to the population: the total 
number for the combined states is 
152,919 souls, and for the fifty-two 
communities who voted for France 
101,046. In the calculation most 
favorable to the Pope, that is to say, 
supposing that the forty-six com- 
munes voted in his favor, he would 
have on his side 51,873 inhabitants. 
France had 101,046, a difference of 
24,586 in favor of France; for the 
majority of 152,919 is formed by 
76,460, and 101,046 voted for 

But, making the calculation as it 
should be made, that is to say, re- 
membering that ther^ were really 
only nineteen communes who voted 
for the Pope, the majority in favor 
of France becomes still greater. 

These nineteen communes com- 
prising only 30,667 individuals, the 
resulting difference in favor of 
France amounts to 70,379 inhabit- 
ants. If to this number is added 
that of the individuals forming the 
population of seventeen communes, 
who, having voted in favor of 
France during April and May, did 
not vote again in favor of the Pope, 
the majority will be considerably in- 



lation s'eleve a 15,677 individus qui, 
reunis aux 101,046 qui ont vote pour 
la France dans les 52 communes, for- 
ment un total de 116,723 habitants, 
tandis qu'il h'y en a pour le pape que 
30,667 ; plus, dans le nombre de ceux 
qui ont vote pour le pape, il s'est 
trouve une minorite assez consider- 
able qui a vote pour la France ; entre 
autres a Valreas, a Buisson, a Ville et 
a Piolene. Ce sont les deliberations 
elles-memes qui en font foi; a quel- 
ques-unes, sont annexees des protes- 

Le vceu de toutes les communes a 
ete parfaitement libre. Car sous les 
yeux des mediateurs de la France, en 
presence des troupes de ligne et des 
gardes nationales f ranqaises, plusieurs 
communautes ont vote pour le pape; 
et leurs deliberations portent des re- 
merciements aux mediateurs pour 
avoir assure la liberte des opinions, la 
surete des personnes et des pro- 

Parmi les 19 communes qui ont 
vote pour le pape, 11 avaient garni- 
son franqaise qu'elles avaient de- 
mandee pour assurer leur liberte phy- 
sique et morale ; il est done impossiblt 
de dire, a moins qu'on ne soit de la 
plus mauvaise foi, que leurs delibera- 
tions n'ont pas ete libres. Une d'entre 
elles, Bolline, ayant, depuis remission 
de son vceu pour le pape, reflechi que 
son interet demandait sa reunion a la 
France, a ecrit a Tun des mediateurs 
pour demander a se rassembler de 
nouveau. II a repondu, avec la dig- 
nite qui convenait a sa mission, que le 
voeu ayant ete emis legalement en fa- 

creased; for this population amounts 
to 15,677 individuals, which, added, 
to the 101,046 who voted for France 
in the fifty-two communes, makes a 
total of 116,723 inhabitants, whereas 
for the Pope there were only 30,667. 
Moreover, in the number of those 
voting for the Pope, there was a 
fairly considerable minority who 
voted for France; among other 
places at Valreas. Buisson. Ville and 
Piolene. The resolutions themselves 
prove this; to some of them declara- 
tions are attached. 

The vote of all the communes was 
entirely free. For, under the eyes 
of the French Mediators, of the 
regular troops and of the French Na- 
tional Guards, several communities 
voted for the Pope, and their resolu- 
tions convey their thanks to the 
mediators, for having secured to 
them freedom of opinion and safety 
of person and of property. 

Among the nineteen communes 
which voted for the Pope, eleven had 
French garrisons, for which they had 
asked, in order to secure physical and 
moral freedom. It is, therefore, 
impossible to state, unless one does 
so in bad faith, that their deliberations 
were not free. One among them, 
Bollbte, after having voted for the 
Pope on second thought decided that 
its interest demanded its union with 
France, and wrote to one of the 
Mediators asking to assemble again. 
He replied, with the dignity becom- 
ing to his mission, that the vote hav- 
ing been legally cast in favor of the 



veur du pape, il ne permettrait qu'on 
ne variait pas ainsi dans un si court es- 
pace de temps ; et que ce qui avait ete 
fait l'etait dument et legalement. 
Qu'on ose dire actuellement que la 
liberte des suffrages n'a pas ete en- 
tiere et que les mediateurs ont cherche 
a accaparer les opinions. Dans quel- 
ques-unes des communes qui ont vote 
pour la France, des individus ont vote 
librement pour le pape, et leur opinion 
est inseree dans les deliberations, telles 
qu'a Aubignan, a Bedarrides ou sie- 
geait Tassemblee electorate, a Crestets 
a Entrechaux, a Lille, a Lillia, a la 
Roque-sur-Pernes, au Thor et a Vai- 

II est encore a remarquer que, dans 
les 52 communes qui ont vote pour la 
France, 9 seulement avaient garnison 
fran$aise, et que, comme je l'ai deja 
dit, sur 19 qui ont vote pour le pape, 
11 avaient garnison fran^aise, et per- 
sonne n'ignore que les gardes natio- 
nals des departements voisins du 
Comtat desirent vivement la reunion ; 
done les mediateurs ont employe tous 
leurs moyens pour assurer la liberte 
des opinions et y sont parvenus. 
Done remission des voeux en faveur 
de la France a ete libre et spontanee. 

Le voeu a ete solennel ; car partout 
il a ete emis apres une convocation 
faite a son de trompe ou de tambour, 
et apres des affiches prealablement ap- 
posees ; les rassamblements ont eu lieu 
dans les eglises, en plein jour et avec 
l'appareil qu'exigeait une affaire aussi 

Le vceu a ete legal; car il a ete 

Pope, he would not allow them to 
change it in so short a space of time, 
and that what was done had been 
done duly and legally. No one 
could dare now to say that suffrage 
was not entirely free and that the 
Mediators sought to influence opin- 
ion. In some of the communes 
which voted for France, some in- 
dividuals freely voted for the Pope, 
and their opinion is inserted in their 
resolutions, as at Aubignan, at Bedar- 
rides, where the Electoral Assembly 
was sitting, at Crestets, at Entre- 
chaux, at Lille, Lillia, Roque-sur- 
Pernes, Thor and Vaison. 

It is also worth remarking that in 
the fifty-two communes which voted 
for France, only nine had French 
garrisons, and, as I previously said, 
of the nineteen which voted for the 
Pope, eleven had French garrisons, 
and no one is igorant of the fact that 
the National Guards of the neighbor- 
ing departments to the Comtat 
eagerly desired union. Therefore, 
the Mediators employed every means 
to secure liberty of opinions and suc- 
ceeded in their endeavors. Therefore 
the voting in favor of France was free 
and spontaneous. 

The vote was solemn, for every- 
where it was cast after a summons 
by trumpet and drum, and after 
preliminary placards had been 
posted. The assemblies took place 
in the churches, in broad daylight 
and with all the solemnity demanded 
by so important an occasion. 
- The vote was legal, for it followed 



la suite du traite de paix signe a 
Orange et garanti par TAssemblee na- 
tionale; l'ordre de convocation a ete 
donne par l'assemble electorale d'apres 
Tinvitation des mediateurs; toutes les 
formalites ont ete remplies dans les 
assemblies, car on y a procede a la 
nomination d'un president, d'un se- 
cretaire et de trois scrutateurs, apres 
s'etre prealablement assembles sous la 
presidence du plus ancien d age, ainsi 
que le prescrivent les decrets de l'as- 
semblee nationale ; on y a nomme, en- 
suite des deputes pour porter les voeux 
a Tassemblee electorale qui, apres le 
recensement des deliberations, a con- 
state la majorite, et a emis elle-meme 
son vceu en faveur de la reunion, ainsi 
que le portent formellement les pou- 
voirs donnes a MM. les deputes de 
cette assemblee pour se rendre a TAs- 
semblee nationale de France. Vos 
comites ont done conclu que le vote 
des communes etait libre, solennel et 

Est-il de Vinteret de la France d' ac- 
cepter la reunion? 

Vos comites vous ont observe, Mes- 
sieurs, que l'independance des Avig- 
nonais et des Comtadins avait ete in- 
contestablement reconnue par 1' As- 
semble nationale dans les decrets des 
25 mai et 4 juillet ; qu'en consequence, 
ces peuples avaient le droit de voter 
sur leur etat politique; que leurs de- 
liberations avaient ete prises avec 
cette liberte de suffrage et d'opinions, 
qui seule peut en caracteriser la le- 
galite. II s'agit de savoir si la 
France a interet d'accepter la reunion 

the treaty of peace signed at Orange 
and guaranteed by the National As- 
sembly. The order of convocation 
was given by the Electoral Assembly 
according to the invitation of the 
mediators. All the formalities were 
complied with in the assemblies, for 
they proceeded to the nomination of 
a president, of a secretary and of 
three scrutators, after having previ- 
ously assembled under the presi- 
dency of the oldest in age, as pre- 
scribed by the dejerees of the National 
Assembly. They then nominated 
deputies to carry the votes to the 
Electoral Assembly, which, after 
verifying the returns, announced the 
majority and cast their own vote in 
favor of union, according to the for- 
mal powers given to the deputies of 
this Assembly to be carried to the 
National Assembly of France. Your 
committees, therefore, agreed that the 
vote of the communes was free, sol- 
emn and legal. 

Is it to the interest of France to 
accept the union? 

Your committees have remarked 
to you, Gentlemen, that the independ- 
ence of Avignon and the Comtat was 
incontestably recognized by the Na- 
tional Assembly in the decrees of 
May 25 and July 4, that in conse- 
quence these peoples had the right to 
vote on their political status; that 
their resolutions were taken with that 
liberty of suffrage and of opinion, 
which alone characterize legality. 
It is necessary to know whether it is 
to the interest of France to accept the 



demandee par la majorite des Avig- 
nonais et des Comtadins reunis. 

Cette question a deja ete agitee et 
discutee profondement dans diverses 
seances de l'Assemblee nationale. 

La majorite des deputes des de- 
partements voisins desire cette re- 
union. . . . 

L'interet de nos manufactures exi- 
gerait qu'on entourat de barrieres 
Avignon et le Comtat; et comment 
pourrait-on y parvenir sans des frais 

union asked by the majority of the 
united people of Avignon and of the 

This question has already been 
agitated and exhaustively discussed 
in various sittings- of the National 

The majority of the deputies from 
the neighboring departments desire 
this union. . . . 

The interest of our manufactures 
would exact the erection of barriers 
around Avignon and the Comtat and 
how could this be done without im- 
mense expense? 

Avignon, par sa situation, est un des 
boulevards de la France, du cote des 
montagnes qui lient le Dauphine et la 
Provence aux Etats du roi de Sar- 
daigne ; et il est assez aise de penetrer 
jusqu'a cette ville par les gorges de ces 
montagnes ; il est done de l'interet de 
la France d'occuper un poste aussi 
important; il est done de son interet 
d'accepter la reunion des 2 Etats. 

Avignon, by its situation, is a bul- 
wark of France on the side of the 
mountains which connect the 
Dauphine and Provence with the 
dominions of the King of Sardinia, 
and it is easy enough to penetrate 
as far as the city by way - of the 
mountain gorges. It is therefore to 
the interest of France to occupy so 
important a post and to accept the 
union of the two states. 

Les nations Strangles verront-elles Will the foreign nations be will- 
d'un ail tranquille cette reunion? ing to accept this union? 

Cette question a deja ete tres lon- 
guement discutee. 

Les gens de bonne foi peuvent-ils 
croire que ce sera le pretexte dont 
les puissances etrangeres se serviront 
pour nous attaquer, si jamais elles en 
viennent a cette extremite, ce que moi, 
particulierement, je ne crois pas? 
Depuis 2 ans elles ont trouve des cir- 

This question has already been dis- 
cussed at great length. 

Is it possible for people of good 
faith to believe that it will constitute 
a pretext, of which the foreign 
Powers will make use to attack us, 
should such an extremity ever arise, 
which I, for one, do not believe? 
For two years they have found cir- 



Constances bien plus favorables pour 
nous faire la guerre; en ont-elles 
profite? Non: 1° parce qu'elles con- 
naissent notre energie, et notre amour 
indestructible pour la liberte. 

• a • • • 

Tous les etrangers connaissent aussi 
bien que nous nos droits sur ces pays ; 
ils savent bien que dans les circon- 
stances actuelles Avignon et le Com- 
tat ne peuvent exister sans s'incor- 
porer a la France ; ils savent bien que 
notre puissance n'en sera pas aug- 
mentee, et que, tout au plus, cette re- 
union ne servira qu'a diminuer quel- 
ques genes commerciales. Personne 
n'a jamais ignore que, tot ou tard, 
Avignon et le Comtat devaient rentrer 
sous notre domination. Si Avignon 
et le Comtat existaient au milieu de 
l'Espagne, de TAngleterre, de la 
Suede, de la Prusse ou des Etats 
hereditaires de TEmpereur, trou- 
verions-nous mauvais que les princes 
qui gouvernent ces pays, con fondant 
leurs droits avec les voeux du peuple, 
cherchassent a les reunir a leurs au- 
tres domaines? Non, sans doute; eh 
bien! croyoiis, sans chercher a nous 
faire des monstres pour les combattre, 
que la raison n'est pas encore totale- 
ment bannie des cabinets de TEurope ; 
et que si les puissances etrangeres veu- 
lent nous attaquer, ce ne sera pas pour 
le futile pretexte de la reunion d* Avig- 
non. D'ailleurs, je maintiens que la 
reunion nous met en meilleure posi- 
tion. Car, comme je Tai dit, en sup- 
posant la guerre, nous aurons de 
moins a combattre des ennemis inte- 

cumstances much more favorable to 

war; did they profit by them? No. 

First, because they know our energy 

and our indestructible love of 


• . • . . 

Every foreigner is as familiar as 
ourselves with our rights over these 
countries; they knew very well that 
under the actual conditions Avignon 
and the Comtat can not exist without 
being incorporated with France ; they 
know that our power will not be in- 
creased thereby, and, that at the 
most, this union will only serve to 
diminish a few commercial incon- 
veniences. No one has ever been 
ignorant of the fact that sooner or 
later Avignon and the Comtat would 
have to come once more under our 
control. If Avignon and the Com- 
tat existed in the midst of Spain, 
England, Sweden, Prussia, or the 
hereditary estates of the Emperor, 
would we consider it wrong if the 
princes governing these countries, 
blending their rights with the votes 
of the people, should seek to unite 
them to their other dominions? Un- 
doubtedly no. Very well, then let 
us believe, without trying to make 
for ourselves monsters to be fought, 
that common sense has not yet been 
entirely banished from the cabinets 
of Europe and that, if the foreign 
Powers wish to attack us, it will not 
be for the futile pretext of the union 
of Avignon. Besides, I maintain, 
that the union places us in a better 
position; for, as I have already said, 



rieurs, beaucoup plus dangereux que 
les exterieurs. 

supposing we were to have war, we 
would not have to fight domestic 
enemies, who are much more danger- 
ous than those outside. 

Est-il de Vinteret des deux Etats Is it to the interest of the two states 
d'etre reunis & la France ? to be united to France? 

J'en appelle: 1° a leurs delibera- 
tions; 2° a l'etat affreux ou nous les 
reduisons, si la reunion n'a pas lieu. 

J'ai prouve que ce voeu avait ete 
emis avec toute la liberte et la solen- 
nite qui en assurent la legalite; 

Que la majorite des communes et 
des individus avait vote pour se reunir 
a la France ; 

Que Tinteret bien entendu de la na- 
tion f rangaise etait d'accepter cette re- 
union ; 

Que la crainte que cette reunion ne 
servit de pretexte aux puissances 
etrangeres pour nous attaquer, etait 
vaine, illusoire et indigne de r Assem- 
ble nationale; 

Que Tinteret des Avignonais et des 
Comtadins etait que cette reunion 
s'operat ; 

Que la mesure du sequestre etait 
in juste et dangereuse pour la France ; 

Que Thumanite et I'honneur na- 
tional exigeaient qu'on ne rejetat pas 
le voeu des Avignonais et des Comta- 

Qu'enfin le refus de ce voeu replon- 
gerait ces deux peuples dans toutes 
les horreurs de la guerre civile et de 
l'anarchie ; 

I call attention, first, to their de- 
liberations; second, to the frightful 
condition to which we will reduce 
them, if the union does not take 
place. . . . 

I have proven that this vote was 
cast with all the liberty and solemnity 
which insure its legality ; 

That the majority of the com- 
munes and of the individuals voted 
to be united to France; 

That it is clearly to the interest of 
the French nation to accept this 
union ; 

That the fear that this union 
would serve as pretext to the foreign 
Powers to attack us, is vain, illusory 
and unworthy of the National As- 
sembly ; 

That it is to the interest of 
Avignon and the Comtat that this 
union should be accomplished; 

That the measure of sequestration 
was unjust and dangerous for 
France ; 

That humanity and national honor 
demand that the vote of Avignon 
and the Comtat should not be re- 
jected ; 

And lastly that the refusal of this 
vote would again plunge these two 
peoples into all the horrors of civil 
war and anarchy. 



Vos comites, determines par toutes 
ces considerations, ont ete d'avis 
d'accepter la reunion; et c'est en leur 
nom que j'ai Thonneur de vous pro- 
poser le decret suivant : 1 

Your committees, decided by all 
these considerations, are of the 
opinion that the union should be 
accepted, and it is in their name that 
I have the honor to propose to you 
the following decree. 

Formal Charges Brought Against the Mediators by Abbe Maury, before the 
National Assembly, and Replies of the Mediators, September 13, 1791 2 

M. l'Abb£ Maury. . . . Messieurs, 
void une accusation dont je vais don- 
ner lecture a TAssemblee ; elle est ecrite 
et signee de ma main. Je la deposerai 
ensuite dans le bureau, esperant de la 
justice de l'Assemblee qu'elle sera as- 
sez frappee de l'importance de cette 
accusation pour sentir toute la neces- 
sity de punir les mediateurs, s'ils sont 
coupables, ou la necessite non moins 
sacree de les justifier s'ils sont inno- 

Voici, Messieurs, mon acte d'accu- 
sation : 

" L'Assemblee nationale s'etant re- 
serve les fonctions de grand jure pour 
decider s'il y a lieu a accusation contre 
les agents du gouvernement, je lui 
denonce MM. Le Scene des Maisons, 
Verninac Saint-Maur et Mulot, com- 
missaires mediateurs charges de re- 
tablir le bon ordre et la tranquillite 
dans Avignon et le Comtat. Je de- 
mande a etre autorise a les poursuivre 
devant le tribunal provisoire de la 
haute cour nationale seant a Orleans, 
comme s'etant rendus coupables de la 

M. l'Abb£ Maury. . . . Gentle- 
men, here is an accusation which I will 
read to the Assembly; it is written 
and signed by my hand. I will then 
deposit it on the bureau, hoping that 
the justice of the Assembly will be 
sufficiently struck with the import- 
ance of this accusation to feel the ab- 
solute necessity of punishing the me- 
diators, if they are guilty, or the 
necessity no less sacred of justify- 
ing them, if they are innocent. 

Here, Gentlemen, is my accusa- 

" The National Assembly having 
reserved to itself the functions of a 
grand jury to decide if there is cause 
for accusation against agents of the 
Government, I wish to denounce to 
it MM. Le Scene des Maisons, Ver- 
ninac Saint-Maur and Mulot, Com- 
missioners of Mediation, charged 
with the reestablishment of good 
order and quiet in Avignon and 
the Comtat. I ask to be author- 
ized to prosecute them before the 
provisional tribunal of the High Na- 

1 See the Decree of Union, p. 94 ; the texts are identical. 

2 Arch, pari, 1st series, vol. 30, p. 611. 



partialite la plus revoltante, des abus 
d'autorite les plus iniques, de la pro- 
tection la plus scandaleuse donnee aux 
brigands; enfin, comme ayant con- 
trarie le but de leur mission, sans 
avoir jamais voulu en remplir le veri- 
table objet. - 

" En consequence, je les accuse, sur 
ma responsabilite, d'avoir vecu, des 
leur arrivee a Orange, dans la plus 
grande intimite avec les chefs des bri- 
gands de Vaucluse; de les avoir fait 
figurer, avec les parties contractantes, 
comme chefs de Tarmee de Vaucluse, 
comme parties contractantes avec les 
communes d' Avignon et de Carpen- 
tras; d'en avoir fait leurs conseillers 
et leurs convives. Je les accuse de 
n'avoir desarme que les seuls citoyens 
du Comtat, apres une proclamation qui 
enjoignait aux deux partis de poser 
les armes ; d'avoir laisse entrer Tarmee 
des brigands a Avignon, ou elle a 
commis toutes sortes de crimes, ou ils 
dominent en souverains et ou ils se 
sont empares recemment du palais et 
de Tarsenal ; d'avoir repondu aux cito- 
yens qui se plaignaient de cette par- 
tialite, que les armes etaient bien 
placees entre les mains de ces gens-la 
et non dans les siennes, dirent-ils au 
sieur Vince, procureur de la commune 
d'Avignon, et d'avoir ordonne formel- 
lement que les brigands seraient 

" Je les accuse d'avoir place, d'abord 

tional Court sitting at Orleans, as 
having been guilty of the most re- 
volting partiality, of the most in- 
iquitous abuse of authority, of most 
scandalous protection given to brig- 
ands: finally, of having acted con- 
trary *to the -object of their mission, 
without ever having desired to ac- 
complish its real object. 

" In consequence, I accuse them, 
on my responsibility, of having lived, 
from the moment of their arrival at 
Orange, in the greatest intimacy 
with the chiefs of the brigands of 
Vaucluse; of having made them fig- 
ure, with the contracting parties, as 
chiefs of the army of Vaucluse, as 
contracting parties with the com- 
munes of Avignon and of Carpentras; 
of having made them their councillors 
and guests. I accuse them of dis- 
arming only the citizens of the Com- 
tat, after a proclamation which en- 
joined on both parties to lay down 
their arms; of having permitted the 
army of the brigands to enter Avig- 
non, where they committed all sorts 
of crimes, where they rule as sover- 
eigns and where they have recently 
taken possession of the palace and of 
the arsenal; of having replied to the 
citizens who complained of this par- 
tiality that the arms were better 
placed in the hands of those people 
than in their own, as they remarked 
to the Sieur Vince, Procurator of the 
Commune of Avignon ; and of having 
formally ordered the arming of the 

" I accuse them of having placed, 



sans autorite, des garnisons de troupes 
de ligne dans la commune du Comtat, 
et d'avoir ensuite renvoye ces troupes 
de ligne qui refusaient de seconder 
leur despotisme pour y substituer des 
gardes nationales de France dans le 
moment de la revoke; d'avoir tire ces 
gardes nationales des villes de Nimes 
et de Marseille, de les avoir envoyees 
dans les communes les plus paisibles 
du Comtat ou rien ne sollicitait leur 
assistance, et specialement dans les 
communes qui avaient manifeste leur 
fidelite au pays, quoique ces com- 
munes ne cessaient de demander aux 
commissaires l'eloignement de troupes 
inutiles et souvent tres onereuses aux 
communautes; d'avoir ordonne sans 
aucune autorisation aux districts voi- 
sins de payer les soldes de ces gardes 
nationales qu'ils employaient sans 
necessite, et d'avoir merite par la les 
arretes de defense des departements 
du Gard et des Bouches-au-Rhone qui 
ont appele leurs detachements et qui 
ont denonce lesdits mediateurs a 1'As- 
semblee nationale et au ministre de 
l'interieur, en les accusant formelle- 
ment de servir la mesintelligence entre 
les corps administratifs, en demandant 
a l'Assemblee nationale qu'elle mit un 
frein a Tabus de leur autorite; enfin 
en remerciant les directoires de dis- 
tricts de s'etre tenus en garde contre 
leurs insinuations. Je les accuse 
d'avoir refuse, sur la demande ex- 
presse de la municipality d' Avignon, 
de faire desarmer les brigands, de les 
avoir fait entrer au contraire en tri- 
omphe dans cette ville, tambour bat- 

at first without authority, garrisons 
of troops of the line in the commune 
of the Comtat, and of having later 
dismissed these troops of the line, 
who refused to second their despot- 
ism, in order to substitute National 
Guards of France at the time of the 
revolt; of having drawn these Na- 
tional Guards from the cities of 
Nimes and Marseilles ; of having sent 
them to the most peaceful communes 
of the Comtat, where their assistance 
was not needed, and especially to the 
communes which had manifested 
their loyalty to the country, although 
these communes incessantly requested 
the commissioners to remove these 
troops, who were useless and often 
very burdensome to the communities ; 
of having ordered, without authority, 
that the neighboring districts should 
pay these National Guards, whom 
they were employing without neces- 
sity, and of having deserved thereby 
the resolutions of condemnation of 
the Departments of the Gard and of 
the Bouches-au-Rhone which called 
in their detachments and denounced 
the said mediators to the National 
Assembly and to the Minister of the 
Interior, by formally accusing them 
of having created misunderstanding 
between the administrative bodies, 
and by demanding that the National 
Assembly put a curb on the abuse of 
their authority; finally by thanking 
the directories of the district for hav- 
ing been on guard against their in- 
sinuations. I accuse them of having 
refused the express request of the 



tant, meche allumee, portant en forme 
de cocarde une carte sur laquelle on 
lisait ces mots imprimes : ' Braves 
brigands de Tarmee du departement 
de Vaucluse/ et de les avoir compli- 
mentes aux portes de la ville en pres- 
ence des troupes de ligne; d'avoir 
ecrit une lettre imprimee dans laquelle 
ils mandent a 1'officier general qui 
commande en Provence que ces bri- 
gands meritent estime et considera- 
tion, d'avoir fait rendre aux brigands, 
dans la ville de ITsle, les armes qu'on 
leur avait otees. 

"Je les accuse d'avoir preside (le 
sieur Verninac-Saint-Maur) au club 
d' Avignon, le jour qu'on fit la mo- 
tion et qu'on y decida formellement 
d'aneantir les procedures criminelles 
instruites a Avignon contre les chefs 
de brigands, de forcer la municipalite 
a les reconnaitre pour bons patriotes 
et de proteger specialement Tun d'eux, 
le sieur Toureal. Le meme sieur 
Verninac-Saint-Maur, oubliant son 
caractere de mediateur, a ete presi- 
dent de la Societe des amis de la Con- 
stitution d' Avignon ; il a ecrit, en cette 
qualite, des lettres dans lesquelles il 
fait Teloge des brigands, en assurant 
que personne n'ose les accuser, tandis 
que la procedure instruite contre eux 
a ete aneantie et qu'ils se sont venges 
des officiers municipaux d' Avignon, 
leurs denonciateurs, en les renfermant 

Municipality of Avignon to disarm 
the brigands ; of having caused these, 
on the contrary, to enter the city in 
triumph, drums beating, torches 
lighted and wearing in the form of a 
cockade a card, on which could be 
read these printed words : ' Brave 
brigands of the army of the depart- 
ment of Vaucluse ; ' and of having 
complimented them at the gates of 
the city, in the presence of the troops 
of the line; of having written a 
printed letter, in which they informed 
the general officer commanding in 
Provence that these brigands de- 
served esteem and consideration; of 
having caused to be returned to the 
brigands the arms which had been 
taken from them, in the City of Isle. 
" I accuse them of having presided 
(the Sieur Verninac Saint-Maur) at 
the Club of Avignon, on the day that 
the motion was made and it was 
formally decided to annul the crim- 
inal procedures instituted in Avignon 
against the brigand chiefs, and to 
force the Municipality to recognize 
them as good patriots and to especially 
protect one of them, Sieur Toureal. 
The same Sieur Verninac Saint-Maur, 
forgetting his character of mediator, 
was president of a Society of the 
Friends of the; Constitution of Avig- 
non; in this capacity he wrote let- 
ters, in which he praised the brigands, 
giving assurance that no one dare ac- 
cuse them, the proceedings instituted 
against them having been annulled, 
and stating that they had avenged 
themselves against the municipal offi- 



dans un cachot, ou ils sont encore au- 
jourd'hui a la merci des brigands. 

u Je les accuse d'avoir dit publique- 
ment a Villeneuve, aux emigrants 
d' Avignon, qu'ils ne leur promettaient 
surete dans la ville d'Avignon qu'a 
condition qu'ils ne voteraient point 
pour le pape; de s'etre oppose a la 
confection d'un proces-verbal qui de- 
vait constater les violences des bri- 
gands pour forcer les Avignonais de 
voter pour leur reunion a la France. 

" Je les accuse d'avoir parcouru tout 
le Comtat sans aucune mission, sans 
aucun ordre de TAssemblee rationale, 
ni du roi, pour sollicker le voeu de 
reunion a la France; d'avoir change, 
de leur seul autorite, le jour fixe pour 
les assemblies primaires, lorsqu'ils ne 
trouvaient pas les esprits disposes a 
seconder leurs vues; d'avoir annonce 
aux habitants les plus affreux de- 
sordres, s'ils refusaient de s'incorporer 
a Tempire f ranqais ; de leur avoir ex- 
pose les maximes les plus seditieuses ; 
d'avoir appele publiquement le pape 
un despote {Rites) dans un pays ou 
Ton benit depuis plus de 6 ans la 
douceur de son gouvernement pater- 
nel, et d'avoir ordonne aux communes 
qui restaient a leur souverain, de re- 
tirer des portes de leur cite les armes 
de France qu'on y avait placees avec 
honneur, pour intimider les citoyens. 

cers of Avignon, their accusers, by 
shutting them up in a dungeon, where 
they remain to this day, at the mercy 
of the brigands. 

" I accuse them of having publicly 
said to the emigrants of Avignon at 
Villeneuve, that they would promise 
them safety in the city of Avignon 
only on condition that they would not 
vote for the Pope; of having been 
opposed to the drawing up of an offi- 
cial report which was to prove the 
violent acts of the brigands, in order 
to force the people of Avignon to vote 
for union with France. 

" I accuse them of having traversed 
the whole of the Comtat without any 
mission whatever, with no order of 
any kind from the National Assembly 
nor from the King, in order to solicit 
the vote for union with France; of 
having changed, on their own au- 
thority, the day fixed for the primary 
assemblies, when they did not find the 
people disposed to second their views ; 
of having threatened the inhabitants 
with the most frightful disorders, if 
they refused to be incorporated in the 
French Empire; of having placed be- 
form them most seditious maxims; 
of having publicly called the Pope a 
despot {laughter) in a country, 
where for more than six years they 
have blessed the sweetness of his 
paternal government, and of having 
ordered the communes who were still 
left to their sovereign to remove from 
the gates of their city the arms of 
France which they had placed there 
in honor, so as to intimidate the 



"Je les accuse d'avoir fait entrer 
dans la municipality d'Avignon, les 
chefs des brigands qui demandaient, 
a main armee, une solde de 40 sous 
par jour ou une gratification, et 
d'avoir fait emprisonner, de leur au- 
torite privee, des citoyens avignonais 
sans aucune autorite que leur volonte 
supreme; d'avoir reintegre le sieur 
Raphel, juge d'Avignon, revoque par 
les sections de ses fonctions depuis 
qu'il s'etait mis a la suite de l'armee 
des brigands pour y juger, disait-il, 
les crimes de lese-nation; d'avoir 
rendu une proclamation pour ordonner 
aux officiers ministeriels de recon- 
naitre le sieur Raphel pour juge et 
pour declarer, en veritables souverains, 
que ses jugements et leur execution 
seraient proteges par toute la force 
publique; je les accuse d'y avoir 
reconnu, sans raison, la souverainete 
de l'assemblee electorale et de lui avoir 
adresse un discours qui legitime toutes 
les vexations dont les habitants du 
Comtat sont les victimes. 

"La premiere motion de cette as- 
semble, haranguee par le sieur Verni- 
nac-Saint-Maur, eut pour objet la 
nomination de M. Le Victorin Mulot, 
mediateur, a l'eveche du departement 
Cette seance se termina par une rixe 
qui s'eleva entre les electeurs; M. 
Mulot ne fut point elu pour occuper 
un siege qui n'etait point vacant, et 
l'assemblee electorate vient de rendre 
un arrete contre lui en le denon$ant 
a l'Assemblee nationale; il est sorti 

" I accuse them of having caused 
the entry into the municipality of 
Avignon of the brigand chiefs, who 
demanded, arms in hand, pay of 
forty sous per day or a gratuity ; and 
of having, on their private authority, 
imprisoned some citizens of Avig- 
non, without any other authority 
than their own supreme will; of hav- 
ing reinstated, the Sieur Raphel, 
Judge of Avignon, recalled by the 
sections after he had placed himself 
among the followers of the army of 
the brigands, to judge, as he said, the 
crimes of high treason; of having is- 
sued a proclamation ordering the 
ministerial officers to recognize the 
Sieur Raphel as judge and declaring, 
as veritable sovereigns, that his judg- 
ments and their execution would be 
protected by all the public force. I 
accuse them of having recognized 
therein, without reason, the sover- 
eignty of the Electoral Assembly and 
of having addressed a discourse to it 
justifying all the annoyances of 
which the inhabitants of the Comtat 
have been victims. 

" The first motion of this assembly, 
addressed by the Sieur Verninac 
Saint-Maur, had for object the nom- 
ination of M. Le Victorin Mulot, 
mediator, to the bishopric of the de- 
partment. This session ended in an 
altercation, which arose between the 
electors ; M. Mulot was not elected to 
occupy a see which was not vacant, 
and the Electoral Assembly have 
rendered a decision against him, while 
denouncing him to the National As- 



du Comtat pour se ref ugier en France, 
dans la ville. de Courtaison. 

"Je les accuse d'avoir ete specta- 
teurs tranquilles des plus grandes des- 
ordres, de Fanarchie, des assassinats 
continuels, et d'avoir fait des orgies 
continuelles avec les chefs des bri- 
gands qui se sont rendus maitres de 
la ville d' Avignon en leur presence, 
sans qu'ils se soient opposes a cette in- 
vasion, ni aux vexations inouies qui 
en ont ete la suite, les faits, que je 
m'engage a prouver legalement, an- 
noncent une collusion et une com- 
plicity qu'il est de 1'honneur de la jus- 
tice de la France de punir exemplaire- 

"J'accuse les mediateurs de tous 
ces delits. 

" Je les accuse de tous les desastres 
actuels du Comtat qu'ils auraient pu 

" Je les accuse enfin de n'avoir pas 
voulu remplir leur mission, d'avoir 
fait le contraire de ce que TAssemblee 
nationale leur avait ordonne, et je me 
reserve d'articuler contre eux plusieurs 
autres accusations majeures lorsqu'il 
me sera permis de les traduire au tri- 
bunal de la haute cour nationale, me 
soumettant a toute reparation civile 
et tous depens, dommages et interets. 
(Rires et murmures.) . . . 

" Et a tous depens, dommages et 
interets, si je ne justifie pas devant 
les ministres de la loi des faits que je 
denonce et de ceux que je me reserve 
de denoncer a la justice pour prouver 

sembly ; he left the Comtat in order to 
take refuge in France, in the city of 

" I accuse them of having been 
quiet spectators of the greatest dis- 
orders, of anarchy, of continual as- 
sassinations, and of having had con- 
tinual orgies with the brigand chiefs, 
who, in their presence, made them- 
selves masters of the City of Avig- 
non, without any opposition on their 
part to this invasion, or to the untold 
annoyances which followed. The 
facts, which I undertake to prove 
legally, proclaim a collusion and a 
complicity which, the honour and jus- 
tice of France demand shall be exem- 
plarily punished. 

" I accuse the Mediators of all these 

" I accuse them of all the present 
disasters in the Comtat, which they 
could have prevented. 

" I accuse them, finally, of not hav- 
ing wished to fulfill their mission, of 
having done the contrary of that 
which the National Assembly had or- 
dered, and I reserve to myself the 
right to formulate against them sev- 
eral other major accusations, when I 
am permitted to indict them before the 
tribunal of the High National Court, 
taking upon myself all compensations, 
and all expenses, damages and inter- 
est. (Laughter and murmurs.) . . . 

" And to all expenses, damages 
and interest, if I do not justify be- 
fore the ministers of justice the facts 
which I denounce and those which 
I reserve to denounce to justice, to 



que les mediateurs n'on pas ete les 
agents de la France, mais qu'ils se 
sont conduits comme les agents d'une 
armee de brigands et d'une assemblee 
d'administrateurs intrus sur lesquels 
ils n'avaient aucun pouvoir, apres 
avoir favorise jusqu'au scandale leurs 
entreprises et leurs attentats. 


" A Paris, le 13 septembre 1791. 
Et j'ai signe. 

En mettant cet acte d'accusation sur 
le bureau, je demande main tenant a 
T Assemblee, et je la supplie de vou- 
loir bien accueillir, par un decret, ce 
que j'ai Thonneur de lui demander 
sur ma responsabilite. (Exclama- 
tions & gauche.) 

Je vous prie de considerer que l'ac- 
cusation que vous venez d'entendre 
est appuyee sur les titres les plus im- 
posants et les plus respectables, sur les 
denonciations des departements, sur 
des lettres ecrites de la main des com- 
missaires eux-memes; enfin, sur des 
preuves par ecrit de tous les faits que 
j'ai annonces, sur des faits de noto- 
riete publique. Je consens a ce que 
les mediateurs prennent la parole, et 
je les somme de repondre, article par 
article, et par des faits, a mes chefs 
d'accusation ; tout le reste ne serait 
que de vaines declamations ; il ne f aut 
qu'il viennent me produire des lettres 
mendiees ou ecrites par des habitants 
du Comtat. 

Un membre: Quelles sont les 
votres ? 

M. l'Abb£ Maury. D'apres ces 
faits, vous voyez que le rapport 

prove that the Mediators were not 
agents of France, but that they con- 
ducted themselves as agents of an 
army of brigands and of an assembly 
of intrusive administrators, over 
which they had no power, but whom 
they favoured to the extent of scan- 
dal in all their enterprises and under- 

" Paris, September 13, 1791." 

And I have signed this. 

• • • • • 

In placing this accusation on the 
table, I now ask the Assembly, and 
I beg them to receive with a decree, 
that which I have the honour of ask- 
ing on my own responsibility. (Ex- 
clamations on the Left.) 

I beg you to consider that the accu- 
sation to which you have just lis- 
tened, is based on claims the most im- 
posing and the most respectable, on 
the denunciations of the departments, 
on letters written by the hand of the 
commissioners themselves; finally, on 
the written proofs of all the facts I 
have stated, on facts of public notori- 
ety. I am willing that the Mediators 
should speak for themselves and I 
summon them to answer, article by 
article, and by facts, my accusations; 
anything else would be merely vain 
declamations; they must not produce 
letters begged for or written by in- 
habitants of the Comtat. 

A member. Which are yours? 

M. l'Abbe Maury. According to 
these facts, you can see that the Avig- 



<T Avignon, fonde sur des proces-ver- 
baux qui sont Touvrage de ces media- 
teurs, ne peut plus etre discute. 
(Rires et murtnures.) J'ose dire a 
TAssemblee que je ne redoute point 
cette discussion, et que j'espere de 
trouver dans les actes memes qu'on 
nous presente comme la preuve du 
voeu de la reunion, les moyens d'en 
prouver la nullite. 

non statement, founded on official 
reports which are the work of these 
mediators, can no longer be discussed. 
( Laughter and murmurs. ) I dare to 
say to the Assembly that I do not 
fear this discussion, and I hope to find 
in the very acts, which are presented 
to us as proof of the vote of Union, 
the means of proving its nullity. 

Reply of Le Seine des Maisons 

Charges des pouvoirs de TAssem- 
blee nationale, honores de la confiance 
du pouvoir executif, nous n'avons eu 
d'autres instructions que vos propres 
lois ; e'est la que nous avons appris nos 

Arrives a Orange, nous avons fait 
ce que le devoir nous dictait. Nous 
voyions devant nous un pays, qui, 
depuis 6 mois, etait le theatre de 
toutes les horreurs de la guerre civile ; 
nous nous sommes arretes a Orange, 
et, j'ai deja eu Thonneur de le dire a 
TAssemblee, nous nous y sommes ar- 
retes parce qu'il etait important de 
voir les chefs de tous les corps armes, 
toutes les autorites alors reconnues, 
et qu'il fallait etablir la paix pour 
remplir vos volontes. 

M. Tabbe Maury nous a reproche 
d'avoir admis a ces conferences les 
deputes de Tassemblee representative 
du pays, munis de 68 proces-verbaux 
qui les avaient etablis. Cette assem- 
ble avait a ses ordres l'armee dite de 
Vaucluse, qui etait un des partis prin- 
cipaux entre tous les partis interesses. 

Charged with the powers of the 
National Assembly, honoured with the 
confidence of the executive power, 
we had no other instructions than 
your own laws; it is there that we 
learned our duties. 

Arrived at Orange, we did what 
duty dictated. We saw before us a 
country, which, for six months, had 
been the theatre of all the horrors of 
a civil war; we stopped at Orange, 
and I have already had the honor o.f 
stating to the Assembly that we 
stopped there because it was import- 
ant for us to see the chiefs of all the 
army corps, of all the then recognized 
authorities, and because it was neces- 
sary to establish peace in order to 
accomplish your wishes. 

M. TAbbe Maury has reproached 
us for having admitted to .these 
conferences deputies from the repre- 
sentative assembly of the country, 
armed with sixty-eight formal min- 
utes by which they had been accred- 
ited. This assembly had under its 
orders the so-called army of Vau- 



Avec qui devions-nous done traiter 
pour executer vos lois; si nous n'ap- 
pelions pas les corps reconnus aux- 
quels Tarmee obeissait? II ne nous 
appartenait pas d'entrer dans toutes 
les injures, dans toutes les oppositions 
des divers partis; il ne nous apparte- 
nait pas, comme a M. Maury, de trai- 
ter ces gens de brigands. Nous al- 
lions mettre la paix parmi eux. Notre 
devoir etait de les entendre et de les 
admettre au traite puisque d'eux en 
partie dependait cette paix que vous 
nous aviez charge d'etablir. (Ap- 
plaudissements & gauche.) . . . 

Le 14 juillet, nous signames le pacte 
en vertu duquel chaque parti prenait 
Tengagement de mettre bas les armes 
et de remplir votre loi de licenciement. 
— Licencier une armee n'est pas des- 
armer un pays. Votre loi nous ordon- 
nait de licencier deux armees qui se 
battaient, qui repandaient le trouble 
dans leur pays. Nous appartenait-il 
d'interpreter vos lois? Non. Notre 
devoir etait de les executer. Nous li- 
cenciames les armees, mais nous 
n'otames pas les armes des individus 
qui, retournant paisiblement dans 
leurs communes, dans leurs families, 
en avaient encore besoin dans les pre- 
miers moments d'agitation; et This- 
toire de Caromb ne vous Ta que trop 

M. Tabbe Maury vous a dit, Mes- 
sieurs, que, si nous nations pas ar- 
rives, si nous avions retarde quelques 
jours, la paix se serait retablie dans 
le Comtat. Quelle etait ce pays? 
Cetait le pays de la mort, la paix des 

cluse, which was one of the principal 
parties among all the interested fac- 
tions. With whom could we treat in 
order to execute your orders, if we 
did not summon the recognized bodies 
which the army obeyed? It was not 
our place to enter into all the wrongs, 
into all the disputes of the different 
parties; it was not our place, like M. 
Maury, to treat these people as 
brigands. We were to bring them 
peace. Our duty was to hear them, 
to admit them to treaty, because on 
them partly depended that peace 
which you had charged us to estab- 
lish. (Applause on the Left.) . . . 

On July 14 we signed the pact by 
virtue of which each party agreed to 
lay down their arms and to carry out 
your order to disband. Disbanding 
an army is not disarming a country. 
Your order directed us to disband two 
fighting armies, which were spread- 
ing trouble in their country. Was it 
our business to interpret your orders? 
No. Our duty was to carry them 
out. We disbanded the armies, but 
we did not take away the arms of in- 
dividuals, who, returning peacefully 
to their communes, to their families, 
still needed them in these first mo- 
ments of agitation, which the history 
of Caromb has amply proved to you. 

M. l'Abbe Maury has told you, 
gentlemen, that had we not arrived, 
had we delayed for a few days, peace 
would have been established in the 
Comtat. What was this country? 
It was the country of death, the peace 



tombeaux; c'etaient 12,000 hommes 
qui en auraient egorge 3,000 ren- 
fermes dans la ville de Carpentras; 
qui, de la, promenaient la destruction 
et la mort dans la ville d' Avignon. 
Voila la paix de M. TAbbe Maury. 
( Vifs applaudissements d gauche.) 

• • • • • 

Vous vous rappelez, sans doute, la 
malheureuse histoire de Caromb. 1 . . . 
Nous avons desarme les auteurs de ces 
crimes: nous leur avons ote leurs 
armes, comme on arrache les dents 
aux betes feroces et comme on devrait 
arracher la langue aux calomniateurs. 
( Vifs applaudissements d gauche. ) 

Je le demande a TAssemblee: Si 
nous avions desarme ce pays, si, contre 
les pouvoirs qui nous etaient confies 
par notre mission, nous avions arrache 
les armes a toutes les communes, a 
toutes les gardes nationales, que ne 
dirait pas alors M. Tabbe Maury? 
Cest alors qu'il aurait pu nous dire: 
vous avez viole les lois, vous avez 
meme abuse de votre pouvoir. Vous 
apportez des voeux a TAssemblee na- 
tionale, et quels sont ces voeux? 
Quelle valeur ont-ils, lorsque vous 
avez commence par arracher les armes 
aux habitants du Comtat, et que, dans 
la crainte, ils ont ete forces en votre 
presence, de faire ce que vous avez 
ordonne. Alors il y aurait lieu de 
nous inculper. Mais, lorsque nous 
avons ete obei a Tesprit de la loi, je 
crois que la seule chose que M. Tabbe 
Maury regrette, c'est que nous n'eus- 
sions pas fait la chose meme dont il 
nous accuse. (Applaudissements A 
gauche.) . . . 

1 See the Report of Le Scene des Maisons, 

of the tomb; it was 12,000 men who 
would have strangled 3,000 shut up 
in the city of Carpentras; who from 
there would have carried death and 
destruction to the city of Avignon. 
That is the peace of M. TAbbe Maury. 
(Lively applause on the Left.) 

• • • • • 

You no doubt remember the un- 
happy history of Caromb. . . . We 
have disarmed the authors of these 
crimes; we have taken away their 
arms, as one pulls the teeth of savage 
beasts and as one should tear out the 
tongue of calumniators. (Lively ap- 
plause from the Left.) 

I ask the Assembly, if we had dis- 
armed this country, if, contrary to 
the powers confided to us by our mis- 
sion, we had seized the arms of all 
the communes of all the National 
Guards, what would M. TAbbe 
Maury have said then? He could 
then have said: you have violated 
the laws, you have even abused your 
power. You have brought votes to 
the National Assembly, but what are 
these votes ? Of what value are they, 
when you began by seizing the arms 
of the inhabitants of the Comtat, who 
then, in fear, were forced in your 
presence to do what you had ordered. 
There would then have been reason to 
accuse us. But, as we were obeyed 
in the spirit of the law, I believe that 
the only regret of M. TAbbe Maury, 
is that we did not do the very thing of 
which he accuses us. (Applause 
from the Left.) 

p. 46. 



Des crimes et des vengeances pre- 
medites se commettaient partout. 
Cest pour en empecher l'effet que nous, 
volames dans toutes les communes du 
Comtat; que nous allames a Piolene, 
ou deja une maison, renfermant plu- 
sieurs citoyens, etait assiegee par cinq 
ou six cents hommes ; que nous allames 
a Tlsle, ou la meme chose arrivait et 
ou deja Ton se fusillait par les fene- 
tres. Cest pour cela que nous fumes 
obliges de demander les forces que M. 
1'abbe Maury nous reproche d'avoir 

D'apres Texperience des crimes 
commis, pour eviter ceux qui se pre- 
paraient encore, nous fumes obliges 
d'?ppeler les gardes nationales, comme 
la loi nous y obligeait. La loi du 14 
juillet, qui portait la garantie de la 
France pour la surete des personnes et 
des proprietes, nous autorisait k ap- 
peler les gardes nationales, nous les 
appelames parce que les troupes de 
ligne etaient en trop petit nombre dans 
les departements voisins, parce que 
les commandants de ces corps nous 
repondaient qu'ils ne pouvaient nous 
en fournir, et a cet instant meme, le 
regiment ci-devant de la Fere, que 
nous eussions pu en partie requerir, 
avait re^u du ministre Tordre de par- 
tir pour la Corse. Nous etions done 
forces d'appeler les gardes nationales ; 
et, Messieurs, en appelant des gardes 
nationales fransaises, devions-nous 
nous attendre que Ton nous en ferait 
un crime dans l'Assemblee? Qui 
devions-nous croire, qui etablirait 
mieux la paix parmi les habitants du 

Crimes and premeditated vengeance 
were committed everywhere. It was 
to destroy their effect that we hurried 
to all the communes of the Comtat; 
that we went to Piolene, where one 
house, in which several citizens had 
shut themselves up, was being be- 
sieged by five or six hundred men; 
that we went to Isle, where the same 
thing was happening and where they 
were shooting each other from the 
windows. It was on this account 
that we were obliged to ask for 
troops, which M. TAbbe Maury re- 
proaches us for having called for. 

Having had experience of the 
crimes committed, and in order to 
prevent those in contemplation, we 
were obliged to call the National 
Guards, as the law required. The 
law of July 14, which carried with it 
the guarantee of France for the safety 
of persons and properties, authorized 
us to call the National Guards; we 
called them because the troops of the 
line were too few in number in the 
neighboring departments, because the 
commanding officers of these troops 
replied to us that they could not fur- 
nish us men, and because at this very 
time the former la Fere regiment, a 
part of which we might have been able 
to requisition, had received orders 
from the minister to leave for Corsica. 
We were therefore forced to call the 
National Guards; and, gentlemen, 
were we to expect that our calling 
the National Guards would be called 
a crime in the National Assembly? 
Were we not to think that a citizen 
guard would be most certain to estab- 



Comtat, si ce n'est une garde cito- 
yenne? Qui devions-nous croire, qui 
se preterait plutot aux voeux de paci- 
fication, a tous les moyens de con- 
ciliation que nous voulions employer? 
Devions-nous attendre que M. Tabbe 
Maury nous reprochat comme un 
crime d'avoir appele les gardes na- 

J'entends dire aupres de moi que 
c'est un crime, si c'est sans necessite. 
Je repondrai que Tinsurrection par- 
tielle d* Avignon, qui n'avait rien de 
commun avec le Comtat, n'a eu lieu 
que parce qu'il n'y avait pas de gar- 
nison, parce que nous etions sans 
force, parce qu'alors beaucoup de gens 
qui avaient des interets particuliers a 
discuter avec les corps administratifs 
qui commandaient dans Avignon, des 
gens qui ne voyaient pas dans nos 
mains les moyens de les tenir a Tordre, 
s'abandonnerent a cette effervescence 
dont Toulon donnait alors un exem- 

Et qu'on ne croie pas que le nombre 
de ces gardes nationales fut tres 
grand! II n'y a jamais eu dans le 
Comtat et dans Tetat d' Avignon, dans 
80 et quelques communes dont la plu- 
part sont des grandes villes, il n'y a 
jamais eu plus de 1,600 hommes tires 
de 3 departements differents. Ainsi 
TAssemblee verra que nous avons ete 
tres a 1'epargne pour appeler des 
gardes nationales, que leur appel a ete 
le fruit d'un travail et d'un calcul re- 
flechi qui pla^ait un corps de 100 a 150 
hommes, de maniere a proteger 5, 6, 
7 et meme 8 communes. Nous avons 

lish peace among the inhabitants of 
the Comtat ? Were we not to believe 
that they would lend themselves more 
readily to the desire for pacification 
and to all the means of conciliation 
which we would wish to employ? 
Were we to expect that M. l'Abbe 
Maury would reproach us for having 
committed a crime in calling the Na- 
tional Guards? 

I hear it said near me that it is a 
crime if unnecessary. I will reply 
that the partial insurrection of Avig- 
non, which had nothing in common 
with the Comtat, took place only be- 
cause there was no garrison, because 
we were without forces, and because 
a great many people who had par- 
ticular interests to discuss with the 
administrative body which com- 
manded in Avignon, seeing in our 
hands no means of keeping them in 
order, abandoned themselves to that 
exuberance of which Toulon was then 
giving the example. 

And do not think that the number 
of these National Guards was very 
great. There never were more than 
1600 men, drawn from three differ- 
ent departments, in the Comtat and in 
the state of Avignon : eighty odd com- 
munes, most of which are large cities. 
Therefore the Assembly will see that 
we were very sparing in our call for 
National Guards ; that their summons 
was the result of labor and a thought- 
out calculation, which placed a body 
of one hundred to one hundred and 
fifty men in such a manner as to pro- 
tect five, six, seven, and even eight 



done ete tres a Tepargne, et nous 
n'avons appele que ce qu'une neces- 
sity indispensable nous prescrivait 
d'appeler. Et quand les avons-nous 
appelees? A Tinstant ou les crimes 
que je vous ai annonces nous don- 
naient la plus vive inquietude, ou 
les debris de cette armee qui, selon 
Tabbe Maury, devait ramener la paix, 
ou les debris de cette armee qu'on nous 
accuse d'avoir forcee a mettre bas les 
armes, s'etaient repartis dans plusieurs 
communes et y avaient complote l'as- 
sassinat de leurs freres et de leurs con- 
citoyens. Au moyen de l'emploi des 
gardes nationales, la paix s'est retablie 
dans le Comtat. 

. . . Je prouverai a M. Tabbe 
Maury lui-meme, qui sa patrie de Val- 
reas, ou il vous a dit que 150 gardes 
nationaux avaient ete envoyes sans 
qu'on sache pourquoi, avait demande 
cette troupe, sur la requisition des of- 
ficiers municipaux. 

Avant que j'abandonne la question 
relative aux gardes nationales il est 
important que je vous mette sous les 
yeux jusqu'a quel degre, la calomnie 
p<-ut empoisonner une bonne action. 
On vous a dit, je suis fache de le re- 
peter, que M. Tabbe Mulot a emprunte 
3,600 livres a Avignon. Vous con- 
naissez, Messieurs, la lenteur avec la- 
quelle on paye les gardes nationales 
employes dans le Comtat; ils ne re- 
^oivent point d'argent, ils nous en de- 
mandaient ; mais la loi qui nous avait 
donne le moyen d'appeler les gardes 

communes. We were therefore very 
sparing and we called only those 
which an immediate necessity obliged 
us to call. And when did we call 
them? At the moment when the 
crimes I have spoken of were causing 
us the greatest anxiety, when the 
remnants of the army, which, accord- 
ing to TAbbe Maury was to establish 
peace, when the remnants of this 
army, which we were accused of hav- 
ing forced to lay down their arms, had 
separated and gone into several com- 
munes, where they plotted the murder 
of their brothers and fellow citizens. 
By means of the use of the National 
Guards peace was reestablished in the 

... I will prove to M. TAbbe 
Maury himself, that his home town 
of Valreas, to which, according to his 
statement to you, one hundred and 
fifty National Guards had been sent 
with no apparent reason, had asked 
for these troops on the requisition of 
the municipal officers. 

• • • • • 

Before leaving the subject of the 
National Guards it is important that I 
should call to your attention to what 
degree calumny can poison a good 
action. You have been told, I regret 
to be obliged to repeat it, that M. 
TAbbe Mulot borrowed 3,600 livres 
from Avignon. You are aware, Gen- 
tlemen, of the slowness with which 
the National Guards employed in the 
Comtat are paid. They had received 
no money and asked us for some ; but 
the law which permitted us to call 
the National Guards, did not give us 



nationales, ne nous avait donne aucun 
moyen pour les payer; nous emprun- 
tames sur notre propre responsabilite 
jusqu'a 7,200 livres pour payer les 
gardes nationales dont les besoins 
etaient urgents, dont quelques-uns re- 
tournaient dans leur pays, et voila, 
Messieurs, la chose dont on nous a 
fait un crime ! C'est de notre devoue- 
ment ; c'est de l'emploi de nos propres 
moyens pour venir au secours des 
gardes nationales, qu'on nous fait ici 

un chef d'accusation. 

■ . • • • 

Les chefs de Tarmee, lorsqu'ils eu- 
rcnt ramene les gardes nationales dans 
Avignon, et les 40 pieces de canon 
qu'ils en avaient extraites, les chefs 
de l'armee imaginerent peut-etre, 
comme l'avait jadis fait la Hollande, 
dans la Revolution qui donna la liberte 
a ce pays, qu'en mettant la designation 
de braves brigands sur eux-memes, ils 
feraient tomber l'opinion (Murmur es 
et tires a droite) ; comme en Flandre 
jadis des hommes combattant dans la 
meme disposition, auxquels on avait 
donne la designation de gueux, pour 
faire tomber cette designation a ceux 
qui portaient sur leur habit une ecuelle. 
Avertis que les soldats portaient cette 
designation, nous nous rendimes hors 
de la ville, et nous exigeames de 
Tarmee de la faire tomber. U n'en- 
tra personne dans la ville, portant 
cette designation; et voila ce que M. 
1'abbe Maury appelle aller compli- 
menter l'armee. (Applaudissements 

A gauche. ) 

La designation de brigands, 
j'adopte celle-la parce que la personne 

the means of paying them; we bor- 
rowed on our own responsibility a 
sum amounting to 7,200 livres in 
order to pay the National Guards 
whose need was urgent, as some of 
them were returning to their own 
country ; and this, Gentlemen, is what 
has been constituted a crime on our 
part! It is of our devotion to duty, 
it is of our employing our own means 
in order to come to the assistance of 
the National Guards, that a cause of 
accusation has here been made. 

• • • • • 

The army chiefs, after bringing 
back the National Guards to Avig- 
non and the forty cannon which they 
had taken away, imagined perhaps, 
as Holland did during the revolution 
which gave that country its liberty, 
that in calling themselves brave brig- 
ands, they would put an end to this 
opinion, (murmurs and laughter from 
the right) as in Flanders of yore, 
when men fought for the same ideas, 
the designation of beggar was given 
in order to put an end to this name 
given to those who wore a porringer 
on their clothes. Notified that the 
soldiers carried this designation, we 
went outside of the city, and we de- 
manded that they drop it. No one 
entered the city wearing this sign; 
and that is what M. l'Abbe Maury 
calls complimenting the army. (Ap- 
plause on the left.) 

The designation of brigands, 1 
adopt this one because our accuser is 



qui nous accuse est du parti contraire, 
la designation de brigands devenait 
done pour nous un devoir, une obliga- 
tion stricte de chercher, autant qu'il 
etait en nous, a la faire tomber et em- 
pecher ses mauvais eff ets qui pouvaient 
perpetuer la guerre civile. Les chefs 
de Tarmee fran^aise craignant eux- 
memes que cette opinion ne se pro- 
longed, nous inviterent a leur ecrire 
une lettre qui etait une sorte de con- 
ciliation entre tous les partis. 

C'etait a cette epoque meme, ou Ton 
venait de commettre des assassinats, 
ou il restait encore dans Avignon quel- 
ques detachements qui n'avaient pas 
regagnes leur pays: il etait done im- 
portant de precher la paix a Avignon, 
de precher a tous l'abandon de ces 
designations de parti; et cette lettre, 
dont M. l'abbe Maury vous a cite une 
phrase comme un chef d'accusation, 
j'aurai Thonneur de la mettre en origi- 
nal sous les yeux de TAssemblee. 
Vous jugerez si Tesprit de la media- 
tion n'etait pas conforme a la mis- 
sion, qui la chargeait d'etablir la paix 
dans le pays, et de prevenir les dissen- 
sions civiles. Voici cette lettre : 

" La mission dont nous sommes 
charges, Monsieur le General, est telle- 
ment hors les mesures ordinaires aux 
troupes de ligne, que nous avons cru 
necessaire de vous faire cette lettre 
pour etre communiquee a MM. les 
officiers de Tarmee, afin que tous 
concourent au succes de notre negocia- 
tion. L'Assemblee nationale et le roi 
ont voulu retablir la paix dans une 

of the opposite party, this designa- 
tion of brigands made it our duty, a 
strict obligation on us, to seek, as far 
as it lay in our power, to have it 
dropped and to prevent any bad ef- 
fects which might perpetuate civil 
war. The French armv chiefs them- 
selves, fearing that this feeling of 
hatred would be prolonged, invited 
us to write them a letter, which was 
a sort of conciliation between all par- 

This was at a time when several 
murders had been committed and 
when some detachments which had 
not yet returned to their own country 
were still in Avignon. It was there- 
fore important to preach peace in 
Avignon; to preach the abandoning 
of all these party designations; and 
this letter, of which M. PAbbe Maury 
quoted to you one sentence as cause 
of accusation, I shall have the honor 
of placing in its original form before 
the eyes of the Assembly. You will 
judge if the spirit of the mediation 
was not in conformity with the mis- 
sion, which charged them with the es- 
tablishment of peace, and the preven- 
tion of civil dissensions. This is the 
letter : 

" The mission with which we are 
charged, General, is so entirely for- 
eign to the measures ordinarily 
adopted by the troops of the line, that 
we have thought it necessary to write 
you this letter to be communicated to 
the officers of the army, in order that 
all may cooperate in the success of 
our negotiations. The National As- 
sembly and the King have wished to 



contree ou la nation a laisse ses droits 
indecis jusqu'au retablissement de 
cette paix. II est done indispensable, 
pour obtenir cet effet que les troupes 
f ran<jaises charges du maintien de l'or- 
dre accordent a tous surete des per- 
sonnes et des proprietes, qu'elles evi- 
tent avec scrupule aucun acte qui 
adopte partialite et predilection pour 
aucun parti. On doit protection a 
ceux qu'on appelle emigrants, mais il 
Taut bien se garder de leur donner a 
leur retour lair du triomphe, puisque 
ceux qui sont assez faibles pour aban- 
donner la chose publique en danger 
n'ont point le droit de reparaitre avec 
un orgueil insultant parmi les cito- 
yens qui l'ont defendue. II ne faut 
pas non plus que ceux qui ont com- 
battu pour leur patrie en abusent pour 
vexer ceux qui ont droit a la protec- 
tion de la loi; cependant, il ne faut 
pas oublier que ceux qui reviennent 
de Tarmee de Monteux sont des cito- 
yens qui ont tout sacrifie a la liberte, 
et qui meritent Testime et la considera- 
tion. (Exclamations a droit e.) 

" On doit surtout eviter les desig- 
nations de parti tou jours odieuses, 
mais moins pardonnables encore, 
quand elles tombent sur ceux qui ont 
eu le courage de verser leur sang pour 
maintenir leur liberte. Protection a 
tous, conduite egale envers tous, et 
aucune distinction de personnes ; telles 
sont les mesures exigees par la media- 
tion des officiers et soldats fran<jais, 

establish peace in a country in which 
the nation has left her rights unde- 
termined until the reestablishment of 
such peace. It is therefore indis- 
pensable, in order to obtain this re- 
sult, that the French troops charged 
with the maintenance of order, should 
grant to all assurance of the safety of 
person and of property, that they 
should scrupulously avoid any act 
which might show partiality or favor- 
itism towards any one party. Protec- 
tion is due to those who are called 
emigrants, but care must be taken 
that their return be not given the sem- 
blance of triumph, for those who are 
weak enough to abandon the public 
cause in the moment of danger have 
no right to reappear with insulting 
pride among the citizens who de- 
fended it. It is not right, either, that 
those who fought for their country 
should abuse this privilege by molest- 
ing those who are entitled to the pro- 
tection of the law; however, it must 
not be forgotten that those who re- 
turn from the army of Monteux are 
citizens who have sacrificed every- 
thing to liberty, and who deserve es- 
teem and consideration. (Exclama- 
tions from the Right.) 

" One should above all avoid party 
designations, always odious, but less 
pardonable when applied to those 
who had the courage to shed their 
blood in the defence of their liberty. 
Protection to all, equal treatment to 
all, without distinction of persons; 
these are the measures exacted by 
the mediation of French officers and 
soldiers, besides those ordered bv law, 



outre celles que la loi commande et 
qui sont la responsabilite individuelle 
de tous les officiers employes dans 
Avignon et le Comtat. Nous connais- 
sons en general votre patriotisme, et 
celui des troupes de ligne; nous ne 
doutons point de l'empressement a 
remplir nos vues ; mais il etait de notre 
devoir de dissiper les troubles repan- 
dus par les prejuges des deux partis, 
et qui pourraient les induire en er- 

Voila la lettre qui forma un chef 
d'accusation ! (Applaudissements d 
gauche. ) 

M. l'abbe Maury nous a reproche la 
phrase ou nous disions que ceux qui 
s'etaient battus pour leur liberte meri- 
taient estime et consideration. Mais 
quelle etait notre position? D'un 
cote une armee qui avait laisse apres 
elle toutes les traces de la guerre 
civile ; de Tautre cote un parti qui as- 
sassinait de la maniere la plus atroce 
ceux qui rentraient dans leurs foyers. 
Je vous le demande, ne devions-nous 
pas nous jeter au milieu de ces hom- 
ines tous criminels, et leur commander 
de ne plus employer des designations 
qui ne nous promettaient que de nou- 
veaux crimes, de nouveaux assassi- 

Le chef d'accusation qui porte sur 
TAssemblee electorate, et son admis- 
sion au traite de paix, je n'y repon- 
drai pas. La loi du 4 juillet me le de- 
fend, car il ne m'est pas permis de 
commenter vos lois. (Applaudisse- 
ments dans les tribunes.) 

and which are the personal responsi- 
bility of all the officers employed in 
Avignon and the Comtat. We are 
aware in general of your patriotism, 
and of that of the troops of the line; 
we do not doubt your eagerness to 
carry out our views ; but it is our duty 
to dissipate the disturbances spread 
by the prejudices of both parties, 
which might have led them into 



This is the letter which formed a 
basis o f accusation ! ( Applause from 
the Left. ) 

M. l'Abbe Maury has reproached 
us with the sentence in which we said 
that those who had fought for their 
liberty deserved esteem and consider- 
ation. But what was our position? 
On one side an army which had left 
behind it all the marks of civil war; 
on the other a party which murdered 
in the most atrocious manner those 
who returned to their homes. I ask 
you, was it not our duty to throw our- 
selves into the midst of these men, all 
criminal, and to command them to 
refrain from using designations 
which could only cause more crimes, 
fresh murders? 

The accusation relative to the 
Electoral Assembly and its admis- 
sion to the treaty of peace, I will not 
answer. The law of July 4 forbids 
it, for I am not permitted to comment 
on your laws. (Applause in the gal- 
leries. ) 

M. l'abbe Maury a pretendu que la M. TAbbe Maury has claimed that 



mediation avait autorise r Assemblee 
electorate a lever des impots ; il a pre- 
tendu qu'elle avait autorise cette meme 
assemblee a s'emparer des biens eccle- 
siastiques. L' Assemblee electorate n'a 
pas, a ma connaissance, re^u aucune 
reclamation, pour avoir leve des im- 
pots ; elle n'a point, a ma connaissance, 
sequestre ou fait aucune espece d'actes 
envers les biens ecclesiastiques. 

• • • • • 

II est bien vrai que 1' Assemblee re- 
presentative d'un peuple qui avait de- 
clare son independence depuis pres 
d'un an, que cette Assemblee represen- 
tative, en vertu des premiers actes de 
laquelle les peuples avaient cesse de 
payer les dimes et s'etaient con formes 
en tout aux decrets de 1' Assemblee na- 
tionale, que cette Assemblee, dis-je, 
avait sequestre beaucoup de biens ec- 
clesiastiques, si ce n'est meme la to- 
talite. Je crois que tout etait seques- 
tre a Tarrivee de la mediation. . . . 

Je vous ai demontre que les allega- 
tions au sujet des troubles du Comtat 
n'etaient point vraies. Je vous prou- 
verai, de la maniere la plus convain- 
cante, que les emigrants sont restes 
dans le Comtat ; qu'il y avait a Orange 
plusieurs families du Comtat que des 
terreurs, peut-etre exageres, peut-etre 
reelles, avaient force de s'expatrier, 
je les ai fait rentrer dans le Comtat. 
II est un des membres de cette Assem- 
blee, qui tient a ces families, et qui 
peut dire qu'elles sont rentrees et de- 
meurent tranquillement, paisiblement 
dans Malaucene. 

the mediation authorized the Elec- 
toral Assembly to levy taxes; he has 
claimed that it authorized this same 
assembly to seize ' all ecclesiastical 
goods. The Electoral Assembly has 
not, to my knowledge, received any 
complaint for having levied taxes; 
it has not, to my knowledge, seques- 
trated or committed any act to the 
prejudice of ecclesiastical property. 

• • • • • 

It is very true that the representa- 
tive assembly of a people who had 
declared their independence nearly a 
year before, that this representative 
assembly, in virtue of the first acts by 
which the people had ceased to pay 
tithes and had conformed in every- 
thing to the decrees of the National 
Assembly, that this assembly, I say, 
had sequestrated a good deal if not 
all ecclesiastical property. I believe 
everything was sequestrated at the 
time of the arrival of the media- 
tion. . . . 

I have demonstrated to you that 
the allegations concerning the dis- 
turbances in the Comtat were not 
true. I will prove to you, in the most 
convincing manner, that all the emi- 
grants remained in the Comtat; that 
there were in Orange several families 
of the Comtat, whom terrors, per- 
haps imagined, perhaps real, had 
forced to expatriate themselves. I 
made them return to the Comtat. 
There is a member of this Assembly, 
who is connected with these families, 
and who can state that they returned 
and are living quietly and peacefully 
at Malaucene. 



II n'est done pas vrai qu'il y ait des 
troubles dins le Comtat ; il n'est done 
pas vrai que les emigrants n'y aient 
pas joui de la liberte. II est arrive 
precisement le contraire, e'est que les 
emigrants, rentres en grande force, ont 
maitraite, chasse, notamment a Malau- 
cene, ceux que Ton appelait patriotes. 
Cest au milieu de cette paix que les 
communes se sont assemblies pour de- 
liberer sur leur sort politique. Deja 
ces deliberations avaient eu lieu au 2 
fevrier de cette annee. On avait mis 
sous vos yeux remission de ces voeux ; 
on avait allegue, comme aujourd'hui, 
que la liberte n'y n'avait pas preside, et 
ces vceux avaient ete rejetes. Quel 
etait Tobjet principal de tous ceux qui 
contractaient avec nous a Orange? 
C'etait d'obtenir les moyens de retablir 
l'ordre dans leur pays, dans un pays 
qui avait declare son independence, 
qui avait adopte la Constitution fran- 
<jaise; un pays qui avait deja mis en 
vigueur un grand nombre de vos de- 
crets, et surtout Torganisation munici- 
pale qui existe dans toutes les villes, 
meme a Valreas. 

Ainsi done, ce peuple n'apercevait 
de terme a son anarchie, de fin a ses 
malheurs, que dans la prononciation 
de la decision de ses droits politiques. 
II en etait si convaincu que, dans les 
preliminaires de paix, il exigea qu'un 
article porterait qu'on s'occuperait du 
sort politique du pays a l'instant 
meme. Ainsi done, on s'est occupe, 
non pas a l'instant meme, parce que 
les troubles de Caromb, parce que les 
assassinats exigeant qu'on retablit la 
tranquillite, que Ton put voter a Tom- 

It is therefore not true that there 
are disturbances in the Comtat; it is 
therefore not true that the emigrants 
were not granted liberty. Precisely 
the contrary took place, for, the emi- 
grants, returning in great force, mal- 
treated and drove out those who were 
called patriots, notably at Malaucene. 
It is in the midst of this peace that 
the communes assembled to deliberate 
on their political state. These de- 
liberations had already taken place 
en February 2 of this year. The 
votes cast were placed before you; 
it was alleged, as to-day, that the vote 
was not free, and the votes were re- 
jected. What was the principle ob- 
ject of all those who were contract- 
ing with us at Orange? It was to 
obtain the means of reestablishing 
order in their country, in a country 
which had declared its independence, 
which had adopted the French con- 
stitution ; a country which had already 
put into effect a great number of your 
decrees, especially the municipal or- 
ganization which exists in all the 
cities, even at Valreas. 

Therefore, this people could not see 
any termination to its anarchy, any 
end to its misfortune, except in the 
pronouncement of the decision on its 
political rights. It was so convinced 
of this, that in the Preliminaries of 
Peace, it demanded that one article 
should provide that the consideration 
of the political fate of the country 
should be taken up at once. The 
matter was taken up, but not imme- 
diately, because the disturbances at 
Caromb, and the murders, demand- 



bre de la surete personnelle, f orcerent 
TAssemblee electorate a demander 
remission de ce voeu un peu plus tard. 
L'emission de ce voeu s'est faite dans 
la plus grande tranquillite ; et en vain 
on voudrait vous rappeler ici l'insur- 
rection d' Avignon, qui n'a eu lieu que 
6 semaines apres remission de ces 

L'insurrection d' Avignon, il est bon 
de le repeter, est une insurrection par- 
tielle qui est arrivee dans une ville, a 
raison d'une rivalite entre deux partis 
qui cherchaient a dominer mutuelle- 
ment. Cette insurrection n'avait au- 
cun rapport avec le Comtat, n'a pas 
meme effleure la tranquillite de Mo- 
rieres et des petites communes qui ap- 
partiennent a l'Etat d' Avignon et qui 
Tentourent; cette insurrection n'a eu 
aucune espece d'effet sur les vceux 
qui vous ont ete presentes, puisqu'elle 
etait posterieure de 6 semaines a 
remission de ces vceux; cette insur- 
rection ne peut pas etre a la charge des 

Nous avons, dit M. l'abbe Maury, 
fait rentrer les brigands dans leurs 
foyers. Mais je demande a M. l'abbe 
Maury comment les citoyens ne de- 
vaient pas rentrer dans leurs habita- 
tions, comment les gardes ne devaient 
pas retourner chez leurs femmes, ne 
pouvaient pas retourner dans une ville 
dont ils sont citoyens, dont ils sont la 
population? Ils sont entres dans 
Avignon, parce qu' Avignon etait leur 
demeure, leur domicile, leur posses- 
sion. II etait impossible, je crois, a 
la mediation, de chasser la population 

ing that quiet be restored in order to 
be able to vote under the assurance of 
personal safety, forced the Electoral 
Assembly to ask for the casting of 
this vote a little later. The casting 
of this vote took place in the greatest 
quiet; and it is vain to try to remind 
you here of the insurrection at Avig- 
non, which only took place six weeks 
after these votes had been cast. 

The insurrection of Avignon, it is 
well to repeat, was a partial insur- 
rection, which took place in a city, 
and was caused by the rivalry be- 
tween two parties who mutually 
sought to dominate. This insurrec- 
tion had no connection with the Com- 
tat, did not even ruffle the tranquillity 
of Morieres and of the small com- 
munes which belong to the State of 
Avignon and which surround it; this 
insurrection had no effect whatever 
on the votes which were presented to 
you, as it took place six weeks after 
the casting of these votes. The 
mediators can not be charged with 
this insurrection. 

According to M. l'Abbe Maury, 
we made the brigands return to their 
homes. But I ask M. l'Abbe Maury 
why should the citizens not return to 
their habitations, why should the 
guards not return to their wives, why 
should they not return to a city of 
which they were the citizens, of which 
they formed the population? They 
entered Avignon because Avignon 
was their home, their domicile, their 
possession. It was impossible to the 
mediation, I think, to drive out the 
population of Avignon in order to 



cT Avignon pour plaire au Haut-Com- 
tat. (Applaudissernents & gauche.) 

On a articule que, lors de remis- 
sion du voeu d' Avignon, on avait 
ouvert des tombeaux dans une eglise. 
Le fait est absolument faux. Lors de 
remission du voeu d' Avignon, il n'y 
a eu ni tombeaux ouverts, ni querelles, 
ni diffamations. La gazette de Ville- 
neuve-les-Avignon, cette gazette qui 
est payee par le parti de contre-revolu- 
tionnaires qui s'y sont refugies, cette 
gazette qui a fourni a M. Maury la 
plupart des faits qu'il a articules, 
parce qu'en effet ils y sont consignes 
depuis 3 semaines, cette gazette, dis-je, 
a transports, a cette epoque, une anec- 
dote qui est arrivee lorsque la garde 
nationale d' Avignon, 6 semaines au- 
paravant formait son etat-major dans 
une eglise appelee des Cannes, si je ne 
me trompe. Une rivalite d'entree dans 
l'etat-major avait occasione quelques 
rixes. On a pretendu que quelqu'un 
avait remue une tombe ; nous en avons 
ete avertis, et a Tinstant nous avons 
fait annuler les deliberations: nous 
avons denonce le fait k la municipality 
et Tassemblee qui avait ete tenue a ete 
recommencee; voila le fait qu'on de- 
nature et que je certifie comme veri- 
table, pour en avoir pris moi-meme la 
connaissance la plus exacte, et je defie 
M. Maury de dire le contraire. 

Je denie encore de la maniere la plus 
formelle le fait egalement pris dans la 
gazette de Villeneuve-les-Avignon, 
que, lorsque j'ai ete dans cet endroit, 

please the Haut-Comtat. (Applause 
on the Left.) 

It has been said that at the time of 
the casting of the vote at Avignon, 
the tombs were opened in one of the 
churches. This is absolutely false. 
At the time of the casting of the vote 
at Avignon there were no tombs 
opened, no quarrels and no desecra- 
tions. The gazette of Villeneuve- 
les-Avignon, the gazette which is 
paid by the party of anti-revolution- 
aries who took refuge there, this 
gazette which furnished M. Maury 
with most of the facts he set forth, 
because, for a fact, they have been 
published in it for three weeks past, 
this gazette, I say, published at this 
time an anecdote of an occurrence 
which took place six weeks before 
when the National Guard of Avignon 
established its staff office in a church 
called the Carmelites, if I am not mis- 
taken. A rivalry for position on the 
staff occasioned some altercations. 
It was claimed that some one moved a 
tomb; we were notified, we immedi- 
ately annulled the deliberations; we 
denounced the fact to the Municipal- 
ity, and the assembly which was being 
held was begun again ; this is the fact 
which was distorted, but which I cer- 
tify as being true, for I personally 
looked into the matter very carefully 
and I defy M. Maury to contradict 

I deny also, in the most formal 
manner, the fact likewise taken up by 
the gazette of Villeneuve-les-Avignon, 
that when I was at that place I was 



j'aie ete assez en demence pour meper- 
mettre de dire a aucun homme que les 
emigrants pouvaient revenir a Avig- 
non, a condition qu'ils ne voteraient 
pas pour le pape. J'espere qu'on 
n'imaginerait pas un homme choisi 
pour ^execution de la loi assez fou 
pour tenir un pareil langage. 

Le fait est que je passai a Ville- 
neuve-les-Avignon par curiosite; que 
la je trouvai 3 ou 400 emigrants que 
la curiosite attirait sur le rivage. . . . 
Je leur avais dit : Retournez a Avig- 
non; vous y jouirez comme les ha- 
bitants de la garantie promise par la 
loi et de la protection de la mediation ; 
mais si vous voulez y retourner pour 
y exciter du trouble, gardez-vous bien 
de le faire, car nous ne le permettons 
a aucun parti. (Applaudissements.) 

ever so demented as to say to any one 
that the emigrants could return to 
Avignon on condition that they did 
not vote for the Pope. I hope that 
no one will imagine that a man chosen 
to execute the law could be mad 
enough to be guilty of such language. 

The fact is that I was pass- 
ing through Villeneuve-les-Avignon 
through curiosity; that there I found 
three or four hundred emigrants 
whom curiosity had drawn to the 
banks of the river. ... I said to 
them : " Return to Avignon ; like the 
inhabitants you will possess the guar- 
antee promised by law and the protec- 
tion of the mediation ; but if you wish 
to return in order to stir up trouble, 
take care not to do it, for we will 
not permit that to any party." (Ap- 
plause. ) 

J'ai ete a Bolem, et la il est bien 
etonnant que M. Tabbe tylaury pre- 
tende que j'aie pu y avoir quelque in- 
fluence sur le voeu du peuple. II 
etait emis il y a 17 jours; on me pre- 
sente ce vceu; on me presente la de- 
liberation de la commune. Je dis k 
la municipality qu'elle avait fort bien 
fait, mais en lisant le proces-verbal, 
j'y trouvais une protestation qui sup- 
posait que Ton pouvait employer la 
force pour le faire changer. 

J'observai a la municipality que, si 
elle avait eu le droit demettre son 
vceu, il etait peut-etre peu decent 
d'avoir exprime qu'on avait eu le 

I have been to Bolem, and it is very 
surprising that M. l'Abbe Maury 
should claim that I could in any way 
influence the vote of the people. It 
had been cast seventeen days before; 
the vote was presented to me; they 
presented me the deliberation of the 
commune. I told the Municipality 
that they had done very well, but on 
reading the formal minute, I found 
in it a declaration which suggested 
that force could be used in order to 
change it. 

I observed to the Municipality, that 
if it had the right to cast its vote, it 
was perhaps scarcely decent to have 
expressed a suspicion that the media- 



soup^on que la mediation pouvait la 
forcer a changer son opinion; je lui 
dis que je croyais cela peu necessaire, 
que cet article n'etait pas agreable a 
la mediation qui montrait une impar- 
tiality aussi decidee, une protection et 
une garantie aussi fortes. Les armes 
de France etaient sur les portes de 
Bolem; je dis a la municipalite . que, 
quand les gardes nationales qu'ils 
avaient appelees, pour leur surete, 
seraient retirees, il etait possible que 
les armes de France fussent, par quel- 
que circonstance, insultees; que je 
croyais qu'il etait plus sage et mieux 
de les oter. 

Un dernier chef est d'avoir reinte- 
gre M. Raphel, juge d'Avignon. M. 
Raphel a ete nomme juge d' Avignon 
par la commune. Dans le temps des 
troubles, la commune chargea la mu- 
nicipalite de choisir un autre juge. 
M. Raphel, revenu apres une absence 
de 2 mois, demanda a rentrer dans ses 
fonctions, qu'il n'avait jamais cesse 
d'exercer, en vertu de sa nomination 
et en vertu de la loi, qui veut qu'un 
juge ne puisse etre destitue que par 
un jugement. M. Raphel s'adressa a 
nous, et nous a la municipalite. Nous 
nous trouvions charges envers M. Ra- 
phel d'une sorte de responsabilite, 
puisque nous etions les garants de la 
propriete des personnes. La munici- 
palite retablit M. Raphel, et alors 
comme nous seuls avions sur les es- 
prits une preponderance d'opinion, 
qui prevenait les troubles, nous de- 
clarames qu'en vertu du retablisse- 
ment de M. Raphel, la force publique 
preterait assistance a ses jugements, 

tion could force it to change its opin- 
ion ; I said that I thought this hardly 
necessary, that this article was not 
pleasing to the mediation, which 
showed decided impartiality, and a 
protection and guarantee equally 
strong. The arms of France were 
over the gates of Bolem; I told the 
Municipality that when the National 
Guards, which they had summoned 
for their safety, were withdrawn, it 
was possible that the arms of France 
might meet with some insult and that 
I thought it wiser and better to take 
them down. 

One more accusation is the rein- 
statement of M. Raphel, Judge of 
Avignon. M. Raphel was nominated 
as Judge of Avignon by the commune. 
During the time of the disturbances, 
the commune directed the Municipal- 
ity to choose another judge. M. 
Raphel on his return after an absence 
of two months asked to be permitted 
to take up his duties, which he had 
never ceased to perform, by virtue of 
his nomination and by virtue of the 
law, which directs that a judge can 
only be removed from office by a 
judgment against him. M. Raphel 
turned to us, and we turned to the 
Municipality. We found ourselves 
charged with a sort of responsibility 
towards M. Raphel, as we were guar- 
antors of the safety of persons. The 
Municipality reinstated M. Raphel, 
and then, as we alone had the pre- 
ponderance of opinion over the minds 
of the people, and foresaw disturb- 
ances, we declared that by virtue of 



et je crois que nous etions dans les 
termes precis de la loi. 

the reinstatement of M. Raphel, the 
public forces would lend assistance to 
his judgments, and I believe that we 
acted according to the exact terms of 
the law. 

D'apres le compte viens de 
vous rendre, Messieurs, vous avez vu 
que la mediation a fait cesser toutes 
les hostilites entre les peuples d' Avig- 
non et du Comtat ; vous avez vu qu'elle 
a retabli partout la paix, qu'elle a fait 
rentrer dans les communes du Comtat 
les emigrants que les troubles, les 
craintes ou les vexations en avaient 
bannis. Elle a done rempli litterale- 
ment le but que TAssemblee nationale 
s'etait propose dans son decret du 25 
mai. Conformement aux prelimi- 
naires de paix les communes se sont 
expliquees au sein de la tranquillite et 
de la paix. UAssemblee electorate a 
recueilli leurs vceux, et les a deposes 
devant vous. La mediation a done 
rempli encore le but de la loi du 4 
juillet, dont Texecution lui etait con- 

Une inculpation porte particuliere- 
ment sur M. Verninac, mon collegue. 
II va, si TAssemblee le permet, y 
repondre lui-meme. (Applaudisse- 
ments. ) 

According to the report I have 
rendered you, Gentlemen, you have 
seen that the mediation has caused the 
cessation of all hostilities between the 
people of Avignon and the Comtat; 
you have seen that it established peace 
everywhere, that it caused to return to 
the communes of the Comtat the emi- 
grants, whom disturbances, fear and 
molestations had banished. It there- 
fore accomplished literally the aim 
which the National Assembly had 
proposed in its decree of May 25. 
Conformably to the Preliminaries of 
Peace, the communes made their dec- 
larations in the midst of tranquillity 
and peace. The Electoral Assembly 
received their votes, and placed them 
before you. The mediation has 
therefore accomplished the object of 
the law of July 4, the execution of 
which had been confided to it. 

One accusation deals particularly 
with M. Verninac, my colleague. 
With the permission of the Assembly, 
he will reply for himself. (Ap- 
plause. ) 

Reply of Verninac Saint-Maur 

Parmi la foule des assertions 
enoncees hier par M. Tabbe Maury, 
avec une merveilleuse assurance et 
que j'appellerai du nom bien mitige 

Among the number of assertions 
made here yesterday by M. TAbbe 
Maury, with a marvellous assurance 
and what I will call by the much 



cTinexactitudes, parce que je veux 
donner a TAssemblee une haute 
preuve de mon pro fond respect, il 
en est une qui n'est pas denuee de 
verite. M. l'abbe Maury a dit que 
j'avais accepte la presidence des Amis 
de la Constitution fran^aise a Avig- 
non. Je le confesse, Messieurs, et s'il 
est vrai que cette condescendance de 
ma part ait contrarie mon caractere, 
si cette condescendance est un tort, je 
m'empresse de faire la part de la mal- 
veillance, en m'en avouant coupable. 
Ce tort, si e'en est un, n'est cependant 
pas inattenuable ; . . . 

Je commencerai par vous instruire 
d'un fait essentiel: e'est que la Con- 
stitution fran^aise, e'est que vos de- 
crets regissent depuis longtemps les 
deux Etats d' Avignon et du Comtat 
Venaissin. Tout ce que Tanarchie a 
pu permettre d'y former d'etablisse- 
ments politiques, est organise suivant 
vos lois; et si M. l'abbe Maury m'ac- 
cusait d'inexactitude, j'en appellerai a 
lui-meme. II vous a dit hier, Mes- 
sieurs, que la municipality de Bolem 
etait allee en echarpe au-devant de 
mon collegue. Oui, Messieurs, e'est 
une verite de fait que les deux Etats 
d' Avignon et du Comtat se gouver- 
nent par les lois que vous avez f aites ; 
et il n'est cependant la patrie de M. 
l'abbe Maury, qui n'ait une administra- 
tion municipale, institue suivant vos 

. . . Messieurs, n'eut-il pas ete sur- 
prenant qu'il y eut eu dans Avignon 

mitigated name of inaccuracies, be- 
cause I wish to give to the Assembly 
a high proof of my profound re- 
spect, there is one which is not de- 
nuded of truth. M. l'Abbe Maury 
said that I had accepted the presi- 
dency of the " Friends of the French 
Constitution of Avignon." I con- 
fess it, gentlemen, and if it is true 
that this condescension on my part is 
contrary to my character, and if this 
condescension is wrong, then I hasten 
to yield to malevolence in acknowl- 
edging my guilt. This wrong, if it 
is one, is however not without exten- 
uating circumstances ; . . . 

I will begin by explaining to you 
one essential fact: which is that the 
French constitution and your decrees 
have ruled for a long time over the 
two States of Avignon and the Com- 
tat Venaissin. All that anarchy 
could permit in the forming of polit- 
ical establishments are organized ac- 
cording to your laws; and if M. 
l'Abbe Maury accuses me of inac- 
curacy, I will appeal to himself. He 
told you yesterday, Gentlemen, that 
the Municipality of Bolem, wearing 
their scarves, had gone to meet my 
colleague. Yes, Gentlemen, it is a 
veritable fact that the two States of 
Avignon and of the Comtat are gov- 
erned by laws which you have made, 
and even the home of M. l'Abbe 
Maury has a municipal administra- 
tion, instituted according to your de- 

. . . Gentlemen, would it not have 
been surprising, that in Avignon there 



une societe vouee au sacerdoce des lois 
f rangaises, et que des Fran^ais eussent 

dedaigne d'y paraitre. 

• • • • • 

Par une suite de troubles qui a- 
vaient tourmente la ville d'Avignon, et 
durant que 1'armee etait en campagne, 
la Societe des Amis de la Constitution 
avait raye de ses registres plusieurs de 
ses societaires. Au retour de Tarmee 
apres le licenciement, ces societaires 
demanderent a etre reintegres ; et nul 
ne paraissant pour soutenir les incul- 
pations qui avaient ete faites, on les 
biffa sur les registres, et Ton y retablit 
les noms qui en avaient ete effaces. 

Mais le rapprochement des esprits 
n'ayant pu s'operer comme celui des 
personnes, et la societe etant devenue 
tres tumultuaire, les deux partis pen- 
serent que le moyen d'y retablir le bon 
ordre, et de fondre ensemble les dif- 
ferentes passions, etait de nommer a 
la presidence une personne qui, par le 
respect du a son caractere, imposat 
silence aux ressentiments divers, les 
accoutumat ainsi a se voir de pres, et 
achevat insensiblement Tceuvre de la 

Ce f ut dans ces circonstances que je 
fus invite a presider la Societe des 
Amis de la Constitution dans Avig- 
non ; ce f ut dans des vues de paix que 
j'acceptai cette place, . . . 

should be a society devoted to the cult 
of the French laws, and that French- 
men had disdained to be present? 

« « « • k 

In consequence of the disturbances 
which had tormented the City of 
Avignon and while the army was in 
the field, the Society of the Friends 
of the Constitution had erased from 
its register several of its members. 
On the return of the army after its 
disbanding, these members asked to 
be reinstated, and no one appearing to 
sustain the charges which had been 
preferred, the records were cancelled, 
and the names which had been erased 
were restored. 

But minds not having been able to 
come together as did the individuals, 
and the society having become very 
tumultuous, the two parties thought 
that the best means of restoring order 
and of harmonizing the contending 
factions would be to nominate for the 
presidency a person who, by the re- 
spect due his position, could impose 
silence on the various factions, could 
accustom them to get into contact, and 
imperceptibly to effect a reconcilia- 

It was under these conditions that 
I was invited to preside over the So- 
ciety of the Constitution at Avignon ; 
it was in the interest of peace that I 
accepted the position, . . . 



Decree of the National Convention Uniting Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin 

to France. September 14, 1791 x 

L'Assemblee nationale, apres avoir 
entendu le rapport de ses comites dip- 
lomatiques et d' Avignon ; 

Considerant que, conformement aux 
preliminaires de paix arretes et signes 
a Orange le 15 juin de cette annee, 
par les deputes de Tassemblee elec- 
torale des deux etats reunis, des mu- 
nicipalites d' Avignon et de Carpen- 
tras, et de 1'armee de Vaucluse, en 
presence et sous la garantie provisoire 
des mediateurs de la France envoyes 
par le Roi, garantie que TAssemblee 
nationale a confirmee par son decret 
du 4 juillet dernier, les communes des 
deux etats reunis d' Avignon et Com- 
tat Venaissin se sont formees en as- 
semblies primaires, pour deliberer sur 
l'etat politique de leur pays ; 

Considerant que la majorite des 
communes et des citoyens a emis libre- 
ment et solennellement son vceu pour 
la reunion d' Avignon et du Comtat 
Venaissin a TEmpire f ran^ais ; 

Considerant que, par un decret du 
25 mai dernier, les droits de la France 
sur Avignon et le Comtat Venaissin 
ont ete f ormellement reserves ; 

L'Assemblee nationale declare qu'en 
vertu des droits de la France sur les 
etats reunis d' Avignon et du Comtat 
Venaissin, et que, conformement au 

1 Duvcrgicr, Collections, vol. 3, p. 267. 

The National Assembly, having 
heard the report of its Diplomatic 
Committee and its Committee on 
Avignon ; 

Considering that, according to the 
Preliminaries of Peace agreed on and 
signed at Orange on June 15 of this 
year, by the deputies of the joint Elec- 
toral Assembly of the two States, of 
the Municipalities of Avignon and of 
Carpentras and of the army of Vau- 
cluse, in the presence and under tht 
provisional guarantee of the MediaA 
tors of France sent by the King, a 
guarantee which the National Assem- 
bly has confirmed by its decree of 
July 4 last, the communes of the two 
united States of Avignon and the 
Comtat Venaissin have formed them- 
selves into primary assemblies, for the 
purpose of deliberating regarding the 
political status of their country; 

Considering that the majority of 
the communes and of the citizens has 
freely and solemnly expressed its de- 
sire for the union of Avignon and the 
Comtat Venaissin with the French 
Empire ; 

Considering that, by a decree of 
May 25 last, the rights of France over 
Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin 
have been formally reserved ; 

The National Assembly declares 
that by virtue of the rights of France 
over the united States of Avignon 
and the Comtat Venaissin, and in ac- 



vceu librement et solennellement emis 
par la majorite des communes et des 
citoyens de ces deux pays pour etre 
incorpores a la France, lesdits deux 
etats reunis d' Avignon et du Comtat 
Venaissin font, des ce moment, partie 
integrante de l'Empire fran<jais; 

L'Assemblee nationale decrete que 
le Roi sera prie de nommer des com- 
missaires qui se rendront incessament 
a Avignon et dans le Comtat Venais- 
sin, pour faciliter Incorporation de 
ces deux pays a l'Empire f ran<jais ; 

L'Assemblee nationale decrete que, 
des ce moment, toutes voies de fait, 
tous actes d'hostilites, sont expresse- 
ment defendus aux differens partis qui 
peuvent exister dans ces deux pays. 
Les commissaires envoyes par le Roi 
veilleront a l'execution la plus exacte 
des lois; ils pourront requerir, avec 
les formes accoutumees, les troupes 
de ligne et gardes nationales, pour le 
retablissement et le maintien de l'or- 
dre public et de la paix. 

L'Assemblee nationale decrete que 
le Roi sera prie de faire ouvrir des 
negotiations avec la cour de Rome, 
pour traiter des indemnites et dedom- 
magements qui pourraient lui etre le- 
i;itimement dus. 

L'Assemblee nationale charge ses 
comites de constitution, diplomatique 
et d' Avignon, de lui presenter inces- 
samment un projet de decret sur l'etab- 
lissement provisoire des autorites 
civiles, judiciaires et administratives 

cordance with the vote freely and 
solemnly expressed by the majority 
of the communes and of the citizens 
of these two countries for incorpora- 
tion with France, the said United 
States of Avignon and the Comtat 
Venaissin form, from this time on, 
an integral part of the French Em- 

The National Assembly decrees 
that the King shall be requested to 
name commissioners who shall re- 
pair to Avignon and the Comtat Ven- 
aissin, without delay, in order to 
facilitate the incorporation of these 
two countries in the French Empire; 

The National Assembly decrees 
that, from this time on, all acts of 
violence and all hostile acts are ex- 
pressly forbidden to the different 
parties which may exist in these two 
countries. The commissioners sent 
by the King shall see to the careful 
execution of the laws; they may, by 
means of the accustomed forms, call 
for the aid of the troops of the line 
and the National Guard, in order to 
restore and maintain public order and 

The National Assembly decrees 
that the King shall be requested to 
open negotiations with the Court of 
Rome concerning such indemnities 
and damages as may be legitimately 
due it. 

The National Assembly charges its 
Committees on the Constitution and 
on Avignon, and its Diplomatic Com- 
mittee, to present at once a- draft de- 
cree for the provisional setting up of 
civil, judicial and administrative au- 


qui regiront les deux pays reunis thorities, which shall exercise power 
d' Avignon et du Comtat Venaissin, in the two united countries of Avig- 
jusqu'a leur organisation definitive. non and the Comtat Venaissin, until 

the time of their final organization. 


Proclamation of General Montesquiou to the People of Savoy. September 

21, 1792 * 

Au camp de Barraux, 
le2l septembre. 

Au nom de la nation fran^aise, 
liberte, egalite. 

Le general de l'armee fran^aise, 
obeissant a la volonte souveraine de 
la nation, charge par elle de venger les 
injures que le roi de Sardaigne, au 
mepris des traites, a f aites a la France 
dans la personne de ses ambassadeurs, 
et les mauvais traitements qu'il a per- 
mis que des citoyens franqais eprou- 
vassent dans ses Etats, veut f aire con- 
naitre a l'Europe, et particulierement 
aux peuples de la domination sarde, les 
justes motifs qui ont determine la na- 
tion fran$aise a agir envers le roi 
comme envers un violateur de la foi 
publique et du droit des gens. 

In the Field at Barraux, 

September 21. 

In the name of the French nation, 
Liberty, Equality. 

The General in command of the 
French army, in obedience to the sov- 
ereign will of the nation, charged by 
it with the avenging of the injuries 
which the King of Sardinia, in despite 
of treaties, has done to France in the 
person of her Ambassador, and the 
evil treatment which he has allowed 
the French citizens to suffer in his 
States, desires to acquaint Europe, and 
particularly the peoples under Sar- 
dinian domination, with the just rea- 
sons which have determined the 
French nation to take action against 
the King as against a violator of pub- 
lic faith and of international law. 

Separez-vous de vos tyrans ; ce sont 
eux seuls que nous venons combattre. 
La chaumiere du pauvre sera l'asile de 
la paix, nous y verserons des consola- 
tions. L'armee fran^aise ne vient 
point devaster vos campagnes. Ce 
que ses besoins exigeront, le general 
vous le demandera avec corifiance; ce 
sera toujours l'argent a la main qu'il 
recevra votre secours. En respectant 

1 Arch, pari, 1st series, vol. 52, p. 295. 

Separate from your tyrants; it is 
they alone we are come to battle with. 
The poor man's cottage shall be the 
refuge of peace, we shall there pour 
forth consolation. The French army 
does not come to lay waste your fields. 
What our needs require the General 
will ask for confidently; he will ever 
receive your aid with money in hand. 
As for your persons, your homes, 




vos personnes, vos demeures, vos pro- 
prieties, en vous offrant son amitie, le 
peuple fran^ais veut vous faire par- 
tager avec lui le bien le plus cher a 
l'homme, celui dont Tespoir ou le desir 
ne meurt jamais, meme dans le coeur 
de Tesclave, la liberte. Puissiez-vous 
en jouir sans sa protection ! Ce sera 
le succes le plus glorieux pour nos 

Signe : Le general. 


your property, in offering you its 
friendship the French people wish 
you to share with it the blessing dear- 
est to mankind, Liberty, for which 
hope and longing never die, even in 
the heart of the slave. May you en- 
joy this without its protection ! That 
would form the most glorious success 
of our armies. 

(Signed), General in Command, 


Letter of Getieral Montesquiou to the Minister of War, and Discussion Re- 
garding it in the French National Convention. September 28, 1792 * 

Chambery, le 25 septembre, Van IV* 
de la liberte et le V T de Vegalite. 
J'avais eu l'honneur de vous man- 
der, Monsieur, que ma premiere lettre 
serait datee de Chambery ; vous voyez 
que je vous tiens parole. Tout a fui 
depuis les bords du lac de Geneve jus- 
qu'a ceux de ITsere; et des deputa- 
tions de toutes les villes de Savoie 
m'arrivent successivement pour ren- 
dre hommage a la nation f ran$aise, et 
pour implorer sa protection. La fuite 
n'a ete que trop rapide, puisqu'il m'est 
impossible d'atteindre les ennemis; 
mais, si je n'ai qu'un faible espoir de 
les faire prisonniers, j'en suis de- 
dommage par des captures plus utiles 
que je dois a la precipitation de leur 
fuite. Je joins ici un etat succinct 
des provisions, des munitions, etc. . . . 
La marche de mon armee est un 
triomphe; le peuple des campagnes, 

1 Arch, pari, 1st series, vol. 52, p. 188. 

Chambery, September 25, Year IV 
of Liberty and I of Equality. 
I have had the honor of informing 
you, Sir, that my first letter would be 
dated from Chambery; you see that 
I keep my word. All have fled, from 
the borders of Lake Geneva to those 
of the Isere ; and deputations from all 
the towns of Savoy are arriving in 
turn before me, to do homage to the 
French nation, and to implore its pro- 
tection. The flight has been only too 
rapid, since it is impossible for me 
to reach the enemy; but if I have only 
a slight hope of taking them prisoner, 
I am compensated by more useful cap- 
tures which I owe to the precipitation 
of their flight. I give here a detailed 
statement of the provisions, muni- 
tions, etc. . . . 

My army marches in triumph; the 
country people and those of the towns 



celui des villes accourent au-devant de 
nous; la cocarde tricolore est arboree 
partout ; les applaudissements, les cris 
de joie accompagnent tous nos pas. 
Une deputation de Chambery m'est 
venue trouver avant-hier au chateau 
des Marches; hier matin, j'en suis 
parti avec 100 chevaux, 8 compagnies 
de grenadiers et 4 pieces de canon 
pour me rendre dans cette ville. La 
municipalite m'attendait a la porte, en 
habit de ceremonie, pour m'en re- 
mettre les clefs. Le chef de la munici- 
palite m'a exprime les sentiments de 
respect et d'attachement du peuple de 
Savoie pour la nation fran^aise; et, 
au nom de cette nation genereuse, j'ai 
promis protection, paix et liberte au 
peuple de Savoie. Je me suis rendu a 
la maison commune; j'y ai regu les 
hommages que les citoyens s'empres- 
saient de rendre a la nation, et toute la 
troupe a ete invitee a un grand festin 
qui lui etait prepare. 

Aujourd'hui Tarbre de la liberte 
sera plante en grande ceremonie sur 
la place principale de la ville. 

II me parait que les esprits sont 
disposes a une Revolution semblable 
a la notre: j'ai deja entendu de pro- 
poser a la France un 84* departement, 
ou au moins une Republique sous sa 
protection. II est a desirer que je 
connaisse le vceu du gouvernement, 
car je crois que je serai a portee d'in- 
fluer sur les partis que Ton prendra. 
. . . JTai dit d'ailleurs, que la nation 
laissait libre cours aux lois du pays, 
jusqu'a ce que la nation savoisienne 

run to meet us ; the tricolor cockade is 
everywhere displayed ; our progress is 
accompanied by applause and cries of 
joy. Day before yesterday a deputa- 
tion from Chambery came to seek 
me at the Chateau des Marches ; yes- 
terday morning I departed from it 
for that town with one hundred 
horses, eight companies of grenadiers 
and four pieces of canon. The 
Municipality awaited me at the gate, 
in ceremonial robes, to give me the 
keys. The head of the Municipality 
expressed to me the sentiments of 
respect and of attachment of the peo- 
ple of Savoy for the French nation; 
and, in the name of this generous na- 
tion I promised protection, peace and 
liberty to the people of Savoy. I re- 
paired to the communal hall; I there 
received the homage which the citi- 
zens hastened to render to the nation, 
and the whole troop was invited to a 
great festival which had been pre- 
pared for it. 

• • • • • 

To-day the Tree of Liberty is to be 
planted with great jceremony in the 
principal square of the town. 

It appears to me that the mind of 
the people here is disposed to a revo- 
lution such as ours; I have already 
heard made the suggestion of propos- 
ing to France an eighty- fourth depart- 
ment, or at least a republic under its 
protection. It is desirable that I 
should know the wish of the Govern- 
ment, for I believe that I shall be in a 
position to influence the decisions to 
be made. ... I have said besides 
that the nation was giving free play 



les ait librement changees. Je vous 
prie de me mander si je dois tenir un 
autre langage; jusqu-la je n'interrom- 
prai point les lois ordinaires, ni les 
fonctions des magistrats. 

Peut-etre faudrait-il, pour rem- 
placer l'auiorite administrative de Tan- 
cien gouvernement, tant qu'il ne sera 
pas change, nommer un gouverneur 
general de cette province. Je ne peux 
y exercer que Tautorite militaire, "et 
c'est user du droit de conquete. Je 
laisse cet examen a votre sagesse. 

Je desire, Monsieur, que ma con- 
duite ait l'approbation de TAssem- 
blee nationale et la votre. . . . 

Le General de I'armee du Midi, 1 
Signe : Montesquiou. 

Bancal. . . . Je rappellerai a la 
Convention que l'Assemblee consti- 
tuante, en consacrant par un decret 
solennel qu'elle renoncait a Tambition 
des conquetes, a^ rendu le plus grand 
hommage a la liberte des peuples. 
Fidele a ce principe sacre, la Conven- 
tion doit rejeter la proposition qui lui 
est faite d'eriger un 84 e departement 
la partie de la Savoie qui manifeste 
son amour pour la liberte en s'ar- 
rachant au joug du despotisme (Mur- 
mures) et laisser ce pays libre de se 
donner un gouvernement particulier. 

1 Copie de la proclamation faite par le gSniral de Varmie du Midi, et aMchie par son 
ordre dans la Savoie. 

" Au nom de la nation £ rangaise, guerre aux despotes, paix et liberte aux peuples ! 

" Le GinSral de Yarmee du Midi, 

Signe : Montesquiou." 

to the laws of the country, until the 
Savoyard nation should have freely 
changed them. I beg you to write me 
whether I should use other language ; 
until then I shall interfere neither with 
the ordinary laws nor with the func- 
tions of the magistrates. 

Perhaps it may be necessary, in or- 
der to replace the administrative au- 
thority of the former Government, in 
so far as it is not changed, to name a 
governor general of this Province. I 
can exercise only military authority 
here, and that would be to make use 
of the right of conquest. I leave this 
question to your wisdom. 

I desire, Sir, that my conduct 
should have the approval of the Na- 
tional Assembly and yours also. . . . 

The General of the Army of the 

( Signed ) Montesquiou. 


Bancal. ... I shall recall to the 
Convention that the Constituent As- 
sembly, in consecrating by a solemn 
decree its renunciation of conquest, 
has rendered the greatest homage to 
the liberty of peoples. Faithful to 
this sacred principle, this Convention 
must reject the proposition made to it 
to erect, as Department 84, the part of 
Savoy which manifests its love for 
liberty by tearing itself from the des- 
pot's yoke {murmurs) and must leave 
this country free to give to itself its 
own government. 




Je ne suis d'avis de ceux qui pen- 
sent que, pour qu'un peuple soit heu- 
reux, il faut qu'il possede une grande 
etendue de territoire. La France est 
a$sez vaste, et je crois que vous devez 
manifester l'intention de renoncer a 
tout desir d'agrandissement. Ce de- 
cret ne peut qu'etre agreable. (Mur- 
mnres.) Je demande le renvoi de la 
proposition du general Montesquiou 
au comite diplomatique. 

Lacroix. Et moi, je demande la 
question prealable, sur le renvoi au 
comite. Vous entrez en Savoie pour 
donner a ce peuple la liberte, et non 
pour le conquerir. Mais au moins 
faut-il que quelque avantage vous in- 
demnise des f rais de la guerre, et que 
la propagation des principes de la lib- 
erte soit sure et stable ; car si a la paix 
vous rendiez ces pays aux despotes qui 
les avaient asservis, quels seraient les 
hommes qui oseraient se reunir a vous, 
et qui le pourraient sans danger! 
Vous ne trouveriez pas un ami, cha- 
cun serait retenu par la crainte de ren- 
trer bientot sous la domination du 

I am not of the opinion of those 
who think that for a people to be 
happy, it must possess a great extent 
of territory. France is sufficiently 
large, and I believe that you should 
make plain the intention of renounc- 
ing all desire for aggrandisement. 
This decree cannot fail to be pleasing. 
(Murmurs. ) I ask that the proposi- 
tion of General Montesquiou be re- 
ferred to the Diplomatic Committee. 

Lacroix. And I, I move the pre- 
vious question, as to referring it to 
the committee. You enter Savoy to 
give this people liberty, not to con- 
quer it. But it is necessary that at 
least some advantage should indem- 
nify you for the costs of the war, and 
that the spread of principles of liberty 
should be sure and firm ; for, if at the 
peace you give over this country to 
the despots who have enslaved it, 
what would become of the men who 
dared join you, and who should be 
able to do so without danger! You 
would not find a friend, every man 
would be held back by the fear of 
soon finding himself again under the 
domination of the tyrant. 

Leonard Bourdon. Je demande 
Timpression de la lettre de Montes- 
quiou et je propose d'attendre, pour 
prendre une determination quelcon- 
que, que la Convention soit informee 
des dispositions du peuple de Savoie. 

Camille Desmouuns. L* Assem- 
ble constituante a consacre ce grand 
principe que tout peuple a le droit de se 
donner le gouvernement qui lui plait. 
La Convention nationale ne doit pas 

Leonard Bourdon. I request the 
printing of the letter of General Mon- 
tesquiou and propose delay, before ar- 
riving at any decision, until the Con- 
vention is informed as to the attitude 
of the people of Savoy. 

Camille Desmoulins. The Con- 
stituent Assembly has consecrated the 
great principle that every people has 
the right to give itself the government 
which pleases it. The National Con- 



restreindre la souverainete des peu- 
ples; die doit laisser le peuple savoi- 
sien libre de se choisir le gouverne- 
ment qui lui convient. Et, & cet 
egard, je rappellerai un trait fameux 
dans les fastes de Thistoire. Rappe- 
lez-vous, Messieurs, lorsque la ligne 
des Acheens f ut vaincue, que le peuple 
romain reconnut pour la premiere fois 
le droit incontestable des peuples . . . 
Le Senat romain convoque toute la 
Grece et declara a ses habitants qu'ils 
avaient le droit d'adopter telle forme 
de gouvernement a laquelle ils don- 
neraient la preference. 

Craignons de ressembler aux rois en 
enchainant la Savoie a la Republique. 
Invitons-la a s'assembler, sous notre 
protection et a prononcer sa destinee 

vention should not fetter the sover- 
eignty of the people; it should leave 
the Savoyard people free to choose 
the government which it wishes. 
And on this point I recall an act 
famous in the annals of history. Do 
you recall, Gentlemen, when the 
Achaean League was conquered, that 
the Roman people for the first time 
recognized the incontestable rights of 
peoples. . . . The Roman Senate con- 
voked the whole of Greece and de- 
clared to the inhabitants that they had 
the right to adopt such form of gov- 
ernment as they preferred. 

Beware of resembling kings in en- 
chaining Savoy to the Republic. Let 
us invite them to assemble, under our 
protection, and to determine their po- 
litical future. 

Louvet de Couvrai. . . . Certes, 
Frangais, il 'ne peut entrer dans la 
tete d'aucun membre de cette As- 
semble, qu'en penetrant dans la Sa- 
voie vous ayez voulu ne soulever 
qu'un moment les chaines du peuple 
qui Thabite, pour ensuite les laisser re- 
tomber sur lui avec plus de pesanteur. 
. . . Comment pourriez-vous, sans 
porter atteinte a leurs droits les plus 
sacres, les forcer a recevoir de vous la 
Constitution que vous allez vous don- 
ner, et qui peut-etre ne leur convien- 
drait pas? Et d'ailleurs, Franqais, 
considerez que ce qui est essentielle- 
ment juste, est aussi presque tou jours 
essentiellement politique. Je main- 
tiens, par exemple, que dans le Bra- 
bant, ou vous allez entrer, vous vous 

Louvet de Couvrai. ... It is 
certain, Frenchmen, that it can en- 
ter the mind of no member of the 
Assembly that in penetrating into 
Savoy you have wished to raise the 
chains from the people for a moment 
only, to let them fall back on them 
with the more weight. . . . How, with- 
out infringing on their most sacred 
rights, could you force them to receive 
from you the constitution which you 
are about to give yourselves, and 
which, perhaps, would not suit them ? 
And moreover, Frenchmen, consider 
that what is essentially just is almost 
always essentially expedient. I main- 
tain, for example, that in Brabant, 
which you are about to enter, you 
would make for yourselves many 



feriez beaucoup d'ennemis, si vous 
annonciez le dessein de donner a ses 
habitants toutes vos lois, dont quel- 
ques-unes leur seraient longtemps en- 
core, et jusqu'a ce qu'ils soient plus 
eclaires, tres desagreables. Je main- 
tiens, au contraire, que le meilleur 
moyen de vous faire de nombreux 
allies dans tous les pays que vous allez 
conquerir sur la tyrannie des despotes, 
c'est de declarer que vous apportez aux 
peuples, non pas soumis, mais delivres 
(Applaudissements) une liberte tout 
entiere (Applaudissements) ; que vous 
ne leur contesterez pas le droit de se 
gouverner, et de ne se gouverner que 
par des lois qu'eux-memes ils se seront 
donnees ; qu'enfin, vous vous bornerez 
a reconnaitre leur independance abso- 
lue, que vous garantirez contre tous, 
et de toute la force de vos armes. 
(Vifs applaudissements,) 

Lacroix. Qui paiera les frais de 
la guerre? 

Louvet de Couvrai. Les frais de 
la guerre ! Vous en trouverez Tample 
dedommagement dans la jouissance 
de votre liberte, pour toujours assuree, 
dans le spectacle du bonheur des peu- 
ples que vous aurez affranchis. . . . 

Fran^ais, je demande que pour la 
joie des peuples auxquels il sera des 
lors demontre que vous voulez en effet 
leur apporter la liberte, mais une vraie 
liberte, mais la leur, et non la votre; 
que pour le desespoir des tyrans qui 
ne pourront vous calomnier en vous 
supposant devant TEurope Tambition 
des conquetes, je demande que tout a 
ftieure vous proclamiez, a la face de 
Tunivers, ce decret solennel qu'a Tin- 

enemies if you should announce the 
intention of giving to the inhabitants 
all your laws, many of which would be 
very disagreeable to them until they 
are more enlightened. I maintain, on 
the contrary, that the better way of 
making numerous allies for yourselves 
in all the countries which you are go- 
ing to wrest from the tyranny of des- 
pots, is to declare that you are bring- 
ing to the people, not conquered but 
delivered, (applause) a liberty which 
is complete (applause) ; that you do 
not contest their right to govern them- 
selves and to govern themselves by 
those laws only which they shall have 
given to themselves ; that, finally, you 
will limit yourself to recognizing their 
absolute independence, which you will 
guarantee against everyone with all 
the force of your arms. (Loud ap- 

Lacroix. Who will pay the cost 
of the war? 

Louvet de Couvrai. The cost of 
the war! You will find ample in- 
demnity in the enjoyment of your lib- 
erty assured forever, in the spectacle 
of the happiness of the people whom 
you will have enfranchised. . . . 

Frenchmen, I ask that for the joy 
of the people to whom it shall be 
henceforth shown, that you wish truly 
to bring liberty — a real liberty, their 
own and not yours — that for the de- 
spair of the tyrants who will not be 
able to slander you by imputing to you 
before Europe, the ambition for con- 
quest, I ask that you at once proclaim 
before the universe this solemn decree, 
that at the instant when, defied by 



stant ou, defies par quelque roi, vous 
serez entres sur son territoire, et que 
vous y aurez brise les fers de ses ci- 
devant sujets, vous rendrez au peuple 
affranchi le droit de s'assembler, pour 
se donner lui-meme les lois qu'il ju- 
gera necessaires a son bonheur, et 
qu'aussitot vous, Franqais, vous ga- 
rantirez son independance par toute la 
puissance de vos armes. (Vifs ap- 
plaudissements. ) 

Lasource. Plus on parlera sur ce 
principe, plus on fera sentir la neces- 
sity d'y admettre des modifications et, 
par consequent, de renvoyer la ques- 
tion a Texamen d'un comite. Le cito- 
yen Louvet a conf ondu ici deux choses 
tres distinctes: le principe general et 
la demande que vous fait Montes- 
quiou de lui donner un plan de con- 
duite pour la circonstance particuliere 
ou il se trouve. 

Sans doute, nous ne devons porter 
atteinte a la liberte d'aucun peuple, 
mais la nation franqaise a deja fait la 
declaration solennelle de ce principe; 
il ne s'agit maintenant que de son ap- 
plication. Or, nous n'avons point a 
decider ce que la Convention jugera 
convenable a Tegard du peuple de Sa- 
voie, dont les regards se sont tournes 
vers la liberte. Cette question meri- 
tera une discussion particuliere et je 
demande le renvoi au comite diplo- 

Mais il est necessaire que la Con- 
vention determine ce que le pouvoir 
executif et le general Montesquiou 
peuvent faire dans la circonstance ac- 
tuelle. Je demande d'abord Timpres- 

some king, you shall have entered his 
territory and shall there have broken 
the fetters of his former subjects, you 
will return to the enfranchised people 
the right to assemble in order to give 
themselves the laws which they shall 
deem necessary for their welfare, and 
that immediately, Frenchmen, you will 
guarantee their independence by all 
the power of your arms. (Lively ap- 
plause, ) 

Lasource. The more this princi- 
ple is spoken of, the more we are 
made to feel the necessity of admit- 
ting modifications and consequently 
of referring the question to the ex- 
amination of a committee. Citizen 
Louvet has here confused two very 
distinct matters : the general principle, 
and the request which Montesquiou 
has made to you to give him a plan 
of conduct for the particular circum- 
stance in which he finds himself. 

Doubtless we should not infringe 
on the liberty of any people, but the 
French nation has already made a 
solemn declaration of this principle; 
it is now a question only of its appli- 
cation. But it is not for us to decide 
as to what the Convention will judge 
suitable regarding the people of Sa- 
voy, whose eyes are turned towards 
liberty. This question deserves a 
special discussion and I ask that it be 
referred to the Diplomatic Commit- 

But it is necessary that the Con- 
vention shall decide what the execu- 
tive power and General Montesquiou 
can do under the present circum- 
stances. I ask first that the letter be 



sion de la lettre, renvoi aux departe- 
ments et le renvoi au comite diplo- 
matique, pour vous presenter, sur ce 
dernier objet, ce qui sera necessaire. 

Danton. Quoique je reconnaisse 
le principe par lequel tous les peuples 
ont le droit de choisir le gouvernement 
qui leur est propre, je ne suis pas de 
l'avis de f antepreopinant par rapport 
aux consequences qu'il en a tirees et 
j'appuie la proposition de renvoi au 
comite avec d'autant plus de raison 
que le principe qu'on vient d'enoncer 
parait peut-etre susceptible de quel- 
que restriction. 

En meme temps que nous devons 
donner aux peuples voisins la liberte, 
je declare que nous avons le droit de 
leur dire: "Vous n'aurez plus de 
rois; (Mouvements divers) car tant 
que vous serez entoures de tyrans, leur 
coalition pourra mettre votre propre 
liberte en danger." Les Fran$ais ne 
doivent done pas souffrir que les peu- 
ples qui aspireront a la liberte, se don- 
nent neanmoins un gouvernement con- 
traire a leurs interets et, qu'en se cre- 
ant des rois, ils nous fournissent sans 
cesse de nouveaux tyrans a combat- 
tre. (Murmurs.) En nous depu- 
tant ici, la nation franqaise a cree un 
grand comite d'insurrection generate 
des peuples contre tous les rois de 
Tunivers. (Applaudissements dans 
les tribunes.) 

Remplissons notre mission, muris- 
sons le principe et ne precipitons pas 
nos decisions. En un mot, je de- 

printed, sent to the departments and 
referred back to the Diplomatic Com- 
mittee which shall report to you as 
to what will be necessary regarding 
the last point. 

Danton. Although I recognize 
the principle according to which all 
peoples have the right to choose the 
government most suitable to them, I 
am not of the opinion of the speaker 
before the last regarding the conclu- 
sions which he has drawn from it and 
I support the proposition to refer it 
to the committee all the more because 
the principle which has been enun- 
ciated appears to be possibly suscep- 
tible of some restrictions. 

I declare that although we should 
give liberty to neighboring peoples, 
we have the right to say to them: 
" You shall have no more kings, 
(sensation) for so long as you are 
surrounded by tyrants, their coalition 
may place your own liberty in dan- 
ger." The French people should not 
suffer the peoples who aspire to 
liberty to give themselves, neverthe- 
less, a government contrary to their 
interests, and in creating kings for 
themselves to furnish themselves 
ceaselessly with new tyrants to strug- 
gle against. (Murmurs.) In send- 
ing us here as their deputies, the 
French nation has created a great 
committee of general insurrection of 
the peoples against all the kings of the 
universe. (Applause in the gal- 
leries. ) 

Let us fulfil our mission, let us al- 
low the principle to mature and let us 
not rush into decisions. In a word. 



mande qu'en appelant les peuples a la 
conquete de la liberte, la Convention 
leur propose tous les moyens de re- 
pousser la tyrannie sous quelque forme 
qu'elle se presente et c'est pourquoi 
j'appuie le renvoi au comite diplo- 
matique. ( Applaudissctnents. ) 

Plusieurs membres: La discussion 
f ermee ! 

(La Convention ferme la discus- 
sion, decrete Timpression et Tenvoi 
aux departements et aux armees de 
la lettre du general Montesquiou et 
des pieces qui Taccompagnent, enfin 
renvoie les pieces au comite diplo- 
matique, en chargeant ce comite de 
lui faire incessamment un rapport sur 
la maniere dont le general Montes- 
quiou doit se conduire en Savoie.) 

I propose that in calling the peoples to 
the conquest of liberty, the Conven- 
tion shall propose to them every 
means of repulsing tyranny, under 
whatever form it may present itself, 
and that is why I support the motion 
to refer the matter to the Diplomatic 
Committee. {Applause. ) 

Several Members: Close the dis- 
cussion ! 

(The Convention closes the discus- 
sion, decrees that the letter of General 
Montesquiou and the documents ac- 
companying it be printed and sent to 
the departments and to the armies, 
and that the documents be then sent 
back to the Diplomatic Committee; 
instructing the committee to report to 
it at once regarding the manner in 
which General Montesquiou should 
conduct himself in Savoy.) 

Proclamation of the Commissioners sent by the National Convention to th& 

Army of the Alps. October 6, 1792 * 

A Chambery, le 6 octobre 1792, Van Chambery, October 6th, 1792, Year I 
V r de la Republique franqaise. of the French Republic. 

Les commissaires de la Convention 
nationale de France, au peuple sa- 
Freres et amis, 

Vous avez vu, par le manifeste du 
general Montesquiou, les justes motifs 
de la Republique franqaise pour re- 
pousser loin de ses f rontieres les satel- 
lites du despots de Turin. Le sol que 
vous habitez, esclave il y a huit jours, 
est libre aujourd'hui ; et depuis le lac 

1 Arch, pari., 1st series, vol. 52, p. 468. 

The Commissioners of the National 
Convention of France to the Sa- 
voyard People. 
Brothers and Friends: 

You have seen, by the manifesto 
of General Montesquiou, the just mo- 
tives of the French Republic for push- 
ing the despots of Turin far back 
from their frontiers. The soil which 
you inhabit, a week ago enslaved, is 
today free: and from the Lake of 



de Geneve jusqu'au Mont-Cenis, les 
Piemontais ont disparu. 

Vous avez recouvre vos droits, 
ces droits imprescriptibles des peu- 
ples qui, seuls, sont souverains. 
U unique prix que la France attend 
des sacrifices qu'elle a faits pour vous 
les obtenir, c'est de vous en voir jouir 
dans toute leur plenitude ; c'est de vous 
voir employer les moyens de les con- 

Les generaux fran£ais, pour vous 
garantir des desordres que pouvaient 
exciter quelques malveillants, ont 
sagement decide que les autorites eta- 
blies continueraient l'exercice de leurs 
fonctions jusqu'a ce qu'elles fussent 
remplacees par des autorites legitimes, 
celles qui emanent directement du 
choix et de la volonte du peuple. 

Sortez done de votre lethargie; 
vous ne devez aux Fran^ais que de 
l'estime et de la reconnaissance; vous 
n avez plus a redouter les Piemontais ; 
et pendant que nos armees veilleront 
a votre surete, occupez-vous d'assurer 
votre liberte. 

Si vous voulez rester sous le joug 
de vos anciens prejuges, vous etes les 
maitres; les Fran^ais, en vous plai- 
gnant, respecteront jusqu'a votre aveu- 
glement, et ne s'occuperont que de leur 
propre surete. Si vous voulez un 
gouvernement libre, fonde sur l'ega- 
lite des droits de tous les citoyens sans 
distinction, nous vous jurons, au nom 
de la nation f ran<jaise, paix et alliance 

Mais, quelle que soit votre vo- 

Geneva as far as the Mont-Cenis, the 
Piedmont troops have vanished. 

You have Recovered your rights, 
those imprescriptible rights of the 
peoples, who alone are sovereign. 
The sole price which France expects 
from the sacrifices which she has 
made to obtain these rights for you, 
is to see you in the enjoyment of them 
in all their amplitude ; it is to see you 
employing the means to preserve 

The generous French people, in 
order to guarantee you from the dis- 
orders which might be excited by 
some evil doers, have wisely decided 
that the established authorities should 
continue to exercise their functions 
until they are replaced by the legiti- 
mate authorities, namely those ema- 
nating directly from the choice and 
the will of the people. 

Awake from your lethargy; you 
owe to France only esteem and grati- 
tude ; you have nothing more to fear 
from the Piedmont troops ; and while 
our arms are keeping watch over your 
safety, occupy yourselves with ren- 
dering your liberty secure. 

If you wish to remain under the 
yoke of your former prejudices, you 
are the masters ; the French, while de- 
ploring, will respect even your blind- 
ness, and will occupy themselves only 
with their own safety. If you wish 
a free government, founded on 
equality of rights of all citizens, with- 
out distinction, we shall swear to you, 
in the name of the French nation, 
peace and eternal alliance. 

But, whatever your will may be. 



lonte, nous ne pouvons la reconnaitre 
que dans le peuple assemble, en pre- 
nant son voeu a la majorite. 

Des republicans tels que nous, ne 
s'enorgueillissent que du bien qu'ils 
font: fiers du succes de nos armes, 
nous pourrions vous donner des or- 
dres; mais la Republique franqaise a 
efface de ses annates les mots de roi, 
de maitre et de sujets; elle ne voit que 
des f reres dans les peuples qui ont des 
rapports avec elle, et nous ne vous 
donnerons, en son nom, que des con- 

Les assemblies primaires sont les 
seules ou le peuple puisse exercer sa 

Nous exhortons done les Savoi- 
siens Hbres, aujourd'hui sous l'egide 
des armes f rangaises, a se reunir pai- 
siblement et sans armes, dans chaque 
commune, a 1'effet de nommer un de- 
pute charge d'exprimer leur vceu dans 
une assemblee generate pour Torgani- 
sation d'un nouveau gouvernement. 

Pour que la paix regne, et que la 
raison triomphe de tous les interets 
personnels, nous transcrivons ici rim- 
mortelle declaration des droits, base 
du gouvernement dont les Frangais 
vont donner le modele a T Europe, et 
successivement au monde entier. 

Peuple savoisien, etudiez les prin- 
cipes immuables, et vous verrez que 
ces pretendus factieux qui ont abattu 
tous les prejuges, triomphe de toutes 
les conspirations, et brave la fureur de 
tous les partis, pour dissiper les er- 
reurs de tant de siecles, et ramener 
leurs concitoyens aux bases de la jus- 

we can recognize it only in the people 
assembled, casting its vote by ma- 

Republicans such as we pride 
themselves only on the good which 
they do; proud of the success of our 
arms, we might give you orders; but 
the French Republic has effaced from 
its annals the words ' king,' ' master ' 
and ' subjects ' ; it sees only brothers 
in the peoples who have relations with 
them, and, in its name, we give you 
counsel only. 

The primary assemblies are the 
only ones in which the people can 
exercise their sovereignty. 

We, therefore, exhort the free 
Savoyards, to-day under the aegis of 
French arms, to meet peaceably and 
unarmed in each commune, in order 
to name a deputy charged with the 
expression of their wish, in a general 
assembly, for the organization of a 
new government. 

In order that peace may reign, 
and that reason may triumph over 
all personal interests, we here tran- 
scribe the immortal Declaration of 
Rights, the basis of government 
which the French people wish to give 
as a model to Europe and, in turn, 
to the entire world. 

People of Savoy, study the im- 
mutable principles, and you will see 
that these alleged factious ones who 
have fought against all prejudice, 
triumphed over all conspiracies, and 
braved the fury of all parties, in order 
to dissipate the errors of so many 
centuries, and to lead their fellow 



tice eternelle, ne sont pas des brigands, 
comme vous Tavaient insinue nos me- 
prisables fugitifs; mais des homines 
qui se sont eleves a la hauteur de leur 
dignite, et qui meritent autant votre 
estime que votre confiance. 

Signe: Dubois-Crance — Gas- 



citizens to the bases of eternal justice, 
are not brigands, as has been insinu- 
ated in your ear by our contemptible 
fugitives, but men, who are elevated 
in the pride of their dignity and who 
merit your esteem and confidence. 
( Signed) Dubois-Cranc^ — Gas- 


Formal Minute of the Vote of the Communal Assembly of Mouthiers. Octo- 
ber 11,1792 * 

L'an 1792, le onze d'octobre, Tan 
IV de la Liberte et le F r de 1'Egalite, 
sur les dix heures du matin, a Mou- 
tiers dans l'eglise metropolitaine de 
Saint-Pierre, la Nation fran^aise 
venant d'occuper par la force des 
armes tout le territoire du duche de 
Savoie, et cette meme Nation invitant 
a forme de manifeste de Messieurs les 
deputes de la Convention Nationale du 
6 du courant, que chaque commu- 
naute forme des assembles primaires 
pour l'election d'un depute charge 
d'exprimer son vceu dans une assem- 
ble generate de toutes les communes 
pour Torganisation d'un nouveau 
gouvernement, vu que Tancien doit 
cesser, la communaute de Moutiers 
riere (sic) laquelle ledit manifeste a 
ete lu, publie et affiche aux lieux et a 
la maniere accoutumee en ayant oui la 
lecture et ayant considere qu'il est ur- 
gent de prendre des determinations qui 
previendront les effets funestes de 

In the year 1792, on the eleventh 
day of October, the Fourth Year of 
Liberty and the First of Equality, at 
six o'clock in the morning at 
Mouthiers, in the church of Saint- 
Pierre, the French nation having oc- 
cupied by force of arms all the ter- 
ritory of the Duchy of Savoy, and 
this same nation, by a manifesto of 
the deputies of the National Con- 
vention of the 6th of the current 
month, having invited each com- 
munity to form in primary assembly 
to elect a deputy, charged with the 
function of expressing its wish in a 
general assembly of all the communes, 
in order to organize a new govern- 
ment, as the former one must cease: 
the Commune of Mouthiers, in whose 
presence the said manifesto has been 
read, published and posted in the ac- 
customed places and manner, having 
heard it read and having decided that 
there is urgent need to arrive at a de- 

1 St. G6nis, Histoire de Savoie, vol. 3, p. 537. Taken from Archives Municipals de la ville 
de Mo&tiers, Registre des deliberations No. VII (de 1792 a 1'an IV), folio 2. 



Tanarchie et dissiperont la perplexite 
ou sont les citoyens, a fait avertir par 
le son de la cloche, tant hier que ce 
matin, et par les avis qu'elle a fait 
communiquer, qu'aujourd'hui il y au- 
rait une assemblee generale de tous les 
habitants de cette communaute, et le 
peuple se trouvant en consequence 
reunie dans l'eglise metropolitaine de 
Saint-Pierre, lieu fixe pour cet effet, 
et en nombre excedent les deux tiers 
ainsi qu'il l'a afferme, il a ete de nou- 
veau fait lecture du manifeste et tous 
ont convenu que les circonstances 
exigent imperieusement une assemblee 
generale des communes de la Savoie, 
et ils ont ensuite delibere par acclama- 
tion que, eu egard au trop grand nom- 
bre de citoyens assembles, la delibera- 
tion se fera aussi par acclamation, 
qu'elle n'exigera d'autres signatures 
que celles des maires, du secretaire de 
la municipality et des deux secretaires 
ad joints. . . . Et, sur la proposition 
sur le choix du gouvernement, tous les 
citoyens assembles ont unanimement 
delibere et par acclamation qu'ils de- 
siroient former partie integrante de 
TEmpire fran^ais avec lequel ils vou- 
loient etre toujours unis, et s'etant 
determines a elire un representant, les 
citoyens assembles ont depute par ac- 
clamation et unanimement M. Joseph 
Abondance, medecin, et en cas qu'il 
soit empesche ils ont depute M. Mi- 
chel Gumery et, a son defaut M. 
Benoit Fontanel, tous deux hommes 
de loy. 

cision in order to prevent the fatal 
effects of anarchy and to dissipate the 
perplexity of the citizens, has given 
notice both yesterday and this morn- 
ing by means of a bell, and by the 
announcements which have been 
made, that to-day there would be a 
general assembly of all the inhabit- 
ants of this community; and the 
people finding themselves, conse- 
quently, assembled in the church of 
Saint-Pierre, the place appointed for 
this purpose, and exceeding in num- 
ber the two-thirds, as has been stated, 
the manifesto was again read and 
all agreed that the circumstances 
imperatively called for a general as- 
sembly of the communes of Savoy, 
and they have thereupon deliberated 
by acclamation that, by reason of the 
too great number of citizens as- 
sembled, the deliberation shall be also 
by acclamation, that no other signa- 
tures are needed than those of the 
Mayors, the Secretary of the Munici- 
pality and the two Assistant-secre- 
taries. . . . And, regarding the ques- 
tion as to the choice of government, 
all the citizens assembled decided 
unanimously and by acclamation that 
they desired to form an integral part 
of the French Empire with which 
they wished to be forever united, and 
having decided to elect a representa- 
tive, the assembled citizens elected M. 
Joseph Abondance, physician, unani- 
mously and by acclamation, and in 
case he should be prevented from act- 
ing, they elected M. Michel Gumery, 
and, as his subsitute, M. Benoit Fon- 
tanel, both lawyers. 



Lesdits citoyens donnent pouvoir 
par le present aux-dits deputes et sup- 
pleants de se rendre a Chambery le 21 
du courant pour assister a l'assemblee 
generate des communes qui s'y tien- 
dra dans Teglise paroissiale y deliberer 
sur ce qu'il convient de faire dans les 
circonstances sur la forme du Gou- 
vernement qu'il convient a la Nation 
de choisir et d'adopter en leur nom; 
enfin pour y discuter sur les interets 
de la patrie et prendre toutes les pre- 
cautions convenables pour la surete 
et tranquillite des citoyens et la con- 
servation de leurs proprietes. 

Lesdits deputes auront, ainsi qu'on 
leur con fere par le present, un pou- 
voir illimite pour la decision de tous 
les cas que les circonstances feront 
naitre sauf pour celui d'unir a TEm- 
pire f ran£ais tel qu'il a ete delibere cy- 
devant La presente deliberation a 
ete lue dans son entier a tous les cito- 
yens qui Tont de nouveau approuvee 
par acclamation dans tout son con- 
tenu, &c. . . . Signe: les syndics 


The said citizens by these presents 
empower the said deputies and sub- 
stitutes to repair to Chambery on the 
21st of the current month and to take 
part in the general assembly of the 
communes, which is to be held in the 
parish church to deliberate concerning 
what should be done under the cir- 
cumstances regarding the form of 
government which it may please the 
nation to choose and to adopt in their 
name ; and finally to discuss the inter- 
ests of the country and to take all suit- 
able precautions for the safety and 
tranquillity of the citizens and the 
preservation of their property. 

The said deputies are also endowed 
by those present with unlimited power 
for the decision of all questions which 
may arise except that of union with 
the French Empire, as has been de- 
liberated above. The present delib- 
eration has been read in its entirety 
to all the citizens, who have again, by 
acclamation, approved it in all its con- 
tents. . . . (Signed) Duplan, Be- 
rard, &c, &c, Syndics. 

First Draft Decree Reported by the Diplomatic Committee, Regarding the 
Conduct to be Prescribed to the French Generals in Enemy Countries. 
October 24, 1792 1 

La Convention nationale, apres 
avoir entendu le rapport de son comite 
diplomatique, preseverant dans la re- 
nonciation aux conquetes, consacree 

The National Convention, having 
heard the report of its Diplomatic 
Committee, persevering in the renun- 
ciation of conquests, which has been 

1 Arch. pari, vol. 52, p. 651, et seq. Consideration of this draft was adjourned, and the 
decree adopted on December 15 was substituted. See post, page 306. 



par la nation frangaise; invariable- 
ment decidee a ne jamais meconnaitre 
le principe eternel et sacre de la sou- 
verainete des peuples ; jalouse de dis- 
siper toutes les inquietudes que la 
presence des armees frangaises pour- 
rait faire concevoir; considerant la 
necessite de prescrire aux generaux 
des regies de conduite qui previennent 
toute atteinte a la liberte des peuples 
chez lesquels ils ont porte ou porte- 
ront a Tavenir les armes de la Re- 
publique, decrete ce qui suit : 

Art. 1". Dans tous les pays ou 
penetreront les armees frangaises, les 
generaux feront respecter la surete 
des personnes et des proprietes, et l'in- 
dependance des opinions. 

Art. 2. Les generaux frangais 
pourront adresser aux peuples dont ils 
occuperont le territoire, les proclama- 
tions, instructions et invitations neces- 
saires pour les porter a se dormer un 
gouvernement libre ; mais ils ne pour- 
ront, ni les inviter a adopter les lois 
frangaises, ni leur proposer telle autre 
forme de gouvernement. 

Art. 3. La Convention nationale 
defend expressement aux generaux de 
la Republique de prendre possession 
d'aucun territoire au nom de la na- 
tion frangaise. 

Art. 4. En entrant en pays en- 
nemi, les generaux feront proclamer, 
au nom de la nation frangaise, que le 
pays est aff ranchi de la domination de 
son ci-devant souverain, et libre de se 
donner, sous la protection des armes 
de la Republique, telle organisation 

consecrated by the French nation ; de- 
cided without exception to never dis- 
own the eternal and sacred principle 
of the sovereignty of the peoples; 
zealous of dissipating all the alarm 
to which the presence of the French 
arms might give rise; in view of the 
necessity of prescribing to the generals 
rules of conduct which should provide 
against any infringement on the 
liberty of the peoples to whom they 
have carried, or shall in the future 
carry, the arms of the Republic, de- 
crees the following: 

Article 1. In all the countries 
where the French armies shall pene- 
trate, the generals shall cause the 
safety of persons and -of property 
and the independence of opinions to 
be respected. 

Art. 2. The French generals may 
address to the people whose territory 
they shall occupy, such proclamations, 
instructions and invitations as are 
necessary to lead them to give them- 
selves a free government; but they 
shall neither invite them to adopt 
French laws nor propose to them any 
other form of government. 

Art. 3. The National Convention 
expressly forbids the generals of the 
Republic to take possession of any 
territory in the name of the French 

Art. 4. On entering enemy terri- 
tory, the generals shall proclaim in 
the name of the French nation, that 
the country is liberated from the 
dominion of its former sovereign, 
and free to give itself, under the pro- 
tection of the armies of the Republic, 



provisoire, et telle forme de gouverne- 
ment qu'il lui plaira d'adopter. 

Art. 5. Les generaux fran^ais 
actuellement en pays ennemi feront 
f aire la meme proclamation. 

Art. 6. Le comite diplomatique 
presentera incessamment un pro jet 
d'adresse aux peuples, sur Texercice 
de leur souverainete. Les generaux 
seront tenus de la faire promulguer 
dans tous les pays ou ils entreront. 

such provisional organization and 
such form of government as it shall 
be pleased to adopt. 

Art. 5. The French generals at 
present in enemy territory shall make 
the same proclamation. 

Art 6. The Diplomatic Commit- 
tee shall without delay present a pro- 
posal for an address to the peoples, 
on the exercise of their sovereignty. 
The generals shall be obliged to 
promulgate this in all the countries 
which they may enter. 

Address of the Provisional Administrative Bodies of the City and County of 
Nice to the National Convention, and Action of the Convention. November 
4, 1792 x 

Adresse a la Convention nationals 
Seance du 21 octobre 1792, 7 heures 
du soir, Pan 1" de la Republique 


Les corps administratifs provi- 
soires de la ville et ci-devant comte de 
Nice, en permanence, reunis a la mai- 
son commune, considerant que le plus 
precieux bien pour Thomme est de 
vivre libre, offrent a la Republique 
fran^aise Thommage pur de leur re- 
connaissance a cause de leur affran- 
chissement. Depuis Tarrivee des 
Fran^ais dans leur pays, le drapeau 
de la liberte decore toutes les places 
publiques. Avant le 29 septembre, 
cette liberte etait concentree dans 

1 Arch. pari, 1st series, vol. 53, p. 146. 

Address to the National Convention, 
Session of October 21, 1792, at 7 
p. m., Year I of the French Re- 

Legislators : 

The Provisional Administrative 
Bodies of the City and the former 
County of Nice, in session at the 
communal hall, considering that the 
most precious possession of mankind 
is to live free, offer to the French Re- 
public the pure homage of their 
gratitude for their deliverance. Since 
the arrival of the French in their 
country, the flag of liberty decorates 
all public places. Before September 
29, this liberty was concentrated in 
their hearts; they are aware of its 



leurs coeurs ; ils en sentent tout le prix. 
Delivres du tyran qu'ils abhorrent, 
ils vous jurent, Fran9ais, qu'eleves par 
vos soins a toute la dignite d'hommes, 
ils sauront soutenir les droits impre- 
scriptibles de la nature et s'ensevelir 
sous les cendres et les ruines de leur 
pays, plutot que de cesser d'etres li- 

Nous avons jure de vivre libres 
ou de mourir; nous attendons de vous 
la vie ou la mort; hatez-vous de pro- 
noncer notre aggregation a la Repub- 
lique f ran£aise ; nous vous disons ayec 
cette franchise qui convient a un peu- 
ple libre, que si notre priere d'etre 
Fran<jais n'etait pas accueillie, nous 
ne transigerions jamais avec nos per- 
secuteurs, et nous embraserions plu- 
tot toutes nos possessions dans cette 
terre de proscription, pour aller vivre 
dans la terre de la liberte que vous 

Nous deputons vers vous deux 
citoyens recommendables par leur pa- 
triotisme, ils vous exprimeront avec 
quelle impatience les citoyens de cette 
importante contree attendent la nou- 
velle de leur adoption a leur primitive 
patrie, la Republique frangaise, dont 
ils n'auraient jamais du etre separes. 

Signe: Paul Barras, president; 
Louis Salvy, Cauvin, Chabaud, 
Leclerc, Giacobi, maire; Mouquin, 
Defly, Levi Faini, Heraud, Veil- 
lon, Andre, Farandy, Jean-Bap- 
tiste Grosson, Louis Saint-Pierre, 
David Moise, Andre Gastaud, 
Dominique Blanqui, Pierre-Ho- 

value. Delivered from the tyrant 
whom they abhor, they swear to you, 
Frenchmen, that, elevated by you to 
the dignity of manhood, they will 
know how to preserve the impre- 
scriptible rights of nature and to 
perish under the ashes and ruins of 
their country sooner than cease to be 

We have sworn to live free or to 
die; we await from you the verdict 
of life or death; make haste to 
pronounce our union with the French 
Republic; we say to you with that 
frankness which becomes a free 
people, that if our prayer to be French 
is not accepted, we shall never 
compromise with our persecutors, 
that sooner than that we would burn 
all our possessions in this land of 
proscription, in order to go to live 
free in the land of liberty which you 

We send to you, as deputies, two 
citizens eminent for their patriotism. 
They will describe to you with what 
impatience the citizens of this im- 
portant country await the tidings of 
their adoption by their original 
mother country, the French Republic, 
from which they should never have 
been separated. 

(Signed) Paul Barras, Presi- 
dent; Louis Salvy, Cauvin, Cha- 
baud, Leclerc, Giacobi, Mayor; 
Mouquin, Defly, Levi the elder; 
Heraud, Veillon, Andr£, Farandy, 
Jean-Baptiste Grosson, Louis 
Saint-Pierre, David Moise, Andr£ 
Gastaud, Dominique Blanqui, 




Bernadin Clevecy, Asda, Jaume, 
procureur de la commune. 

David. Je demande qu'au nom de 
la nation fran<jaise le president de la 
Convention donne le baiser fraternel 
aux deux deputes citoyens de Nice. 

(La Convention decrete cette mo- 
tion au milieu des applaudissements 
qui se prolongent pendant tout le 
temps de l'execution du decret.) 

(Les deux deputes prennent ensuite 
place a cote du president.) 

(La Convention decrete alors qu'il 
sera fait mention de tous ces f aits dans 
son proces-verbal dont expedition sera 
envoyee aux citoyens des villes et 
comte de Nice. Elle ordonne, en ou- 
tre, que Tadresse des citoyens de Nice 
et la reponse de son president seront 
imprimees et envoyees aux 83 de- 
partements et aux armees. ) 

Lequinio. Je demande qu'il soit 
fait droit a Tinstant au voeu des cito- 
yens de Nice. 

Barere de Vieuzac. J'applaudis 
avec un vif interet a la reception fra- 
ternelle des deputes du ci-devant 
comte de Nice, et j'ai partage votre 
empressement a accueillir leur de- 
mande en reunion a la Republique 
fran^aise. Mais il est une observa- 
tion que je crois digne de votre re- 
spect pour la souverainete des peuples ; 
c'est qu'avant de s'occuper de Tacces- 
sion, de la reunion d'un peuple a un 
autre, il est essentiel, il est necessaire 

Pierre-Honore: Roassal, Victor 
tlranty, bernardin clevecy, 
Asda, Jaume, Procurator of the 

. • . . . 

David. I move that, in the name 
of the nation, the president of the 
Convention give a fraternal kiss to 
the two citizen deputies from Nice. 

(The Convention decrees this mo- 
tion in the midst of applause which is 
prolonged during the entire time of 
the carrying out of the decree.) 

(The two deputies thereupon take 
their places by the side of the presi- 
dent. ) 

(The Convention then decrees that 
all these acts shall be mentioned in the 
formal minute, a copy of which shall 
be sent to the citizens of the town and 
county of Nice. It further orders 
that the address of the citizens of 
Nice and the reply of its president 
shall be printed and sent to the eighty- 
three departments and to the armies.) 

Lequinio. I move that the wish 
of the citizens of Nice be acted upon 
at once. 

Barere de Vieuzac. I applauded 
with lively interest the fraternal re- 
ception of the deputies of the former 
county of Nice, and I shared your 
eagerness to take up their request for 
union with the French Republic. 
But there is one observation which 
T think worthy of your respect for the 
sovereignty of peoples; it is that, 
before concerning ourselves with the 
accession, with the union of one 
people with another, it is essential,. 



d'avoir son voeu expressement et 
librement emis. Or, ce qu'on a lua 
cette tribune, n'est que le voeu des 
deputes des administrations provi- 
soires de ce pays. Mais, d'apres 
vous-memes, les administrateurs ne 
sont pas des representants, et ne peu- 
vent pas emettre le voeu des adminis- 
tres. Sans doute les citoyens du pays 
de Nice sont dignes de la liberte, 
puisqu'ils abhorrent comme nous la 
noblesse et la royaute. Ainsi, avant 
de deliberer sur la reunion, que le 
peuple prononce, que le souverain 
emette son voeu ; et le souverain n'est 
que dans les assemblees primaires, il 
n'est que la. . . . 

Je demande, en consequence, que 
la Convention nationale declare qu'elle 
ne peut deliberer sur la reunion de- 
mandee par les deputes des adminis- 
trations provisoires du ci-devant 
comte de Nice, qu'apres avoir connu 
le voeu expres du peuple. 

Delacroix. J'appuie la proposi- 
tion de Barere, mais en attendant je 
demande le renvoi de l'adresse au 
Comite diplomatique. 

(La Convention ferme la discus- 
sion et declare qu'elle ne peut deliberer 
sur la demande en reunion presentee 
par les deputes des administrations 
provisoires du ci-devant comte de 
Nice, qu'apres avoir connu le voeu 
expres du peuple, emis librement dans 
les assemblees primaires. Elle ren- 
voie, en attendant, l'adresse au Comite 

it is necessary, to have their expressed 
and freely uttered wish. Now what 
has been read at this tribune is only 
the desire of the deputies of the 
provisional administrative bodies of 
that country. But, according to you 
yourselves, administrators are not 
representatives and cannot utter the 
wishes of those for whom they ad- 
ministrate. Doubtless the citizens of 
the country of Nice are worthy of 
liberty, since they, like us, abhor 
nobility and royalty. So, before de- 
liberating upon the union, let the 
people pronounce, let the sovereign 
express his wish; and the sovereign 
dwells only in the primary assemblies, 
he is there only. . . . 

I demand, consequently, that the 
National Convention declare that it 
can deliberate upon the union asked 
by the deputies of the former county 
of Nice only after having learned the 
express wish of the people. 

Delacroix. I support the propo- 
sition of Barere, but in the meantime 
I move that the address be sent to the 
Diplomatic Committee. 

(The Convention closes the discus- 
sion and declares that it can not de- 
liberate upon the demand for union 
presented by the deputies of the 
provisional administrations of the 
former county of Nice, except after 
learning the express wish of the 
people, freely uttered in primary as- 
semblies. In the meantime, the ad- 
dress is referred to the Diplomatic 




Address of the " National Assembly of the Allobroges " Asking for the Union 
of the People of Savoy with the French Republic. Presented to the Na- 
tional Convention, November 21, 1792 * 

Les citoyens Doppet, Favre, Des- 
saix et Villar, deputes du peuple Sa- 
voisien, se presentent a la barre. . . . 

Le citoyen Doppet, lieutenant- 
colonel de la Legion allobroge et ora- 
tcur de la deputation, s'exprime ainsi : 

Representants de la Republique 
fran£aise, nous avons ete charges par 
TAssemblee nationale des Allobroges 
d'apporter le voeu de tous les Savoi- 
siens a la Convention nationale de 
France. Nous avons ete en meme 
temps charges par tous nos commet- 
tants de vous exprimer les sentiments 
de reconnaissance dont ils sont pene- 
tres envers la nation fran£aise, pour 
le bienfait, ou plutot (car c'est un 
bienfait au-dessus de tous les autres) 
pour la liberte qu'elle leur a apportee. 
Des que nous avons pu emettre notre 
vceu, nous avons renverse d'un seul 
coup le despotisme royal et la domina- 
tion ultramontaine. Le peuple savoi- 
sien a exerce spontanement son droit 
de souverainete. Des que les troupes 
frangaises se furent retirees pour se 
porter vers Geneve, on convoqua une 
assemblee generate du peuple. Toutes 
les communes, au nombre de 655, 
furent spontanement assemblies. 
Elles emirent d'abord leur vceu pour 
la reunion a la France; mais outre 
cela, elles nommerent chacune un 
depute pour se rendre a Tassemblee 

1 Arch, pari, 1st series, vol. 53, p. 506. 

Citizens Doppet, Favre, Dessaix 
and Villar, deputies of the Savoyard 
people, present themselves at the 
bar. . . . 

Citizen Doppet, Lieutenant-Colonel 
of the Legion of the Allobroges and 
spokesman for the deputation, ex* 
presses himself as follows: 

Representatives of the French 
Republic, we have been charged by 
the National Assembly of the Allo- 
broges with the duty of carrying the 
vote of all the Savoyard people to the 
National Convention of France. We 
have at the same time been instructed 
by all our constituents to express to 
you the sentiments of gratitude which 
they feel towards the French nation, 
for the benefit, or rather (for it is a 
benefit above all others) for the lib- 
erty which it has brought to them. 
Since giving expression to our wish, 
we have with one stroke overthrown 
royal despotism and ultramontane 
domination. The people of Savoy 
have spontaneously exercised their 
right of sovereignty. As soon as the 
French troops had retired towards 
Geneva, a general popular assembly 
was convoked. All the communes, to 
the number of 655, were assembled 
spontaneously. They first expressed 
their wish for union with France ; fur- 
thermore, each of them elected a dep- 
uty to repair to the General Assembly, 
which was to meet at Chambery on the 



generate, qui eut lieu a Chambery, le 
21 octobre dernier. Dans la pre- 
miere seance de cette assemblee ge- 
nerate des deputes du peuple savoisien, 
on verifia les pouvoirs qu'ils avaient 
regus de leurs communes respectives. 
Voici le proces-verbal de la seconde 
seance, qui fait connaitre quel est le 
voeu de toutes les communes des Allo- 

21st of October last. At the first ses- 
sion of this assembly of the deputies 
of the Savoyard people, the powers 
which they had received from their 
respective communes were verified. 
Here is the formal minute of the sec- 
ond session, which will make known 
what is the wish of all the communes 
of the Allobroges. 

Extract from the Minute of the Second Session of the Assembly of the 
Deputies of the Communes of Savoy, October 22, 1792, the Year I of the 

Seance ouverte a 9 heures du matin. The session was opened at 9 a. m. 

Eustache Monachon, president 
d'age, occupe le fauteuil. 

La seance a ete ouverte par la 
lecture du proces-verbal de la prece- 
dente. On a fait successivement a la 
tribune lecture des rapports des com- 
missaires de chaque bureau sur la 
verification des pouvoirs a laquelle ils 
avaient procede la veille. 

De ces divers rapports, il resulte 
que, dans la province de Carouge, 
composee de 64 communes, 42 ont 
vote pour la reunion a la Republique 
fran^aise dans les pouvoirs qu'elles 
ont remis a leurs deputes; que 21 ont 
donne des pouvoirs illimites a leurs 
deputes, et qu'une seule n'a pas fait 
connaitre ses sentiments. Toutes les 
communes de la province de Chablais, 
au nombre de 95, ont unanimement 
manifeste, dans les pouvoirs remis a 
leurs deputes, leurs desirs d'etre re- 

Eustache Monachon, president 
by virtue of seniority, occupies the 

The session is opened with the read- 
ing of the formal minutes of the pre- 
vious session. The reports of the 
commissioners of each committee on 
the verification of powers, which has 
been begun the day before, are read 
in turn from the tribune. 

From these several reports it re- 
sults that, in the Province of Car- 
rouge, composed of sixty-four com- 
munes, forty-two have voted for 
union with the French Republic in 
the powers which they have given 
to their deputies; twenty-one have 
given to their deputies unlimited 
powers, and one only has failed to 
make known its sentiments. All the 
communes of the Province of Chab- 
lais, to the number of ninety-five, 
have unanimously shown, in the pow- 



unies a la nation frangaise; la ma- 
jor ite de ces deputes avaient des pou- 
voirs illimites. Celles de la province 
de Faucigny, au nombre de 79, ont 
toutes, dans leurs pouvoirs, emis le 
voeu d'etre reunies a la nation fran- 
gaise, pour en faire partie integrante. 
Les 116 communes de la province du 
Genevois ont toutes charge leurs 
deputes de demander Incorporation 
a la nation frangaise; la tres grande 
major ite a donne a ses deputes le pou- 
voir de representee deliberer et ar- 
reter tout ce qui serait utile pour le 
bien public et pour Tetablissement de 
la liberte et de l'egalite savoisienne. 
Les communes de la province de Mau- 
rienne qui sont au nombre de 65, ont 
toutes manifeste, dans leurs pou- 
voirs donnes a leurs deputes, leurs 
desirs d'etre reunies a la Republique 
frangaise, sauf celles de Lansvillard, 
Bessan et Bonneval, qui n'ont pu 
faire connaitre leurs vceux, lors des 
assemblies des communes, parce que 
leur territoire etait encore occupe par 
des soldats piemontais. Des 204 
communes qui composent la province 
de Savoie, une seule a emis son vceu 
pour former une republique particu- 
liere ; les autres ont exprime leur vceu 
de reunion a TEmpire frangais. Des 
62 communes formant la province de 
Tarentaise, treize ont vote pour Tin- 
corporation a la Republique frangaise ; 
les autres avaient toutes donne, par 
leurs mandats a leurs deputes, le pou- 
voir de choisir et adopter pour elles 
le gouvernement que Tassemblee des 
deputes jugerait le plus convenable a 
la nation savoisienne. 

ers given to their deputies, their 
desire to be united to the French na- 
tion; the majority of these deputies 
had unlimited powers. Those of the 
Province of Faucigny, to the number 
of seventy-nine, have all expressed in 
their powers the wish to be united to 
the French nation, in order to form 
an integral part of it. The 116 
communes of the Province of 
Gqnevois have all instructed their 
deputies to ask for incorporation in 
the French nation ; the great majority 
have given their deputies the power 
of representation, deliberation and 
decision as to all matters for promot- 
ing the public welfare and the estab- 
lishment of liberty and equality in 
Savoy. The communes of the 
Province of Maurienne, which num- 
ber sixty-five, have all, in the powers 
given to their deputies, manifested 
their desire to be united with the 
French Republic, with the exception 
of those of Lansvillard, Bessan and 
Bonneval, which were not able to 
make their wishes known, at the time 
of the communal assemblies, because 
their territory was still occupied by 
Piedmontese soldiers. Of the 204 
communes of which the Province 
of Savoy is composed, one only has 
expressed a wish to form an inde- 
pendent republic; the others have ex- 
pressed their wish for union with 
the French Empire. Of the sixty- 
two communes forming the Province 
of Tarentaise, thirteep have voted for 
incorporation with the French Re- 
public, the others had all, in the man- 
dates to their deputies, given them the 



La lecture de ces rapports a ete 
souvent interrompue par les applaudis- 
sements de Tassemblee et des tribunes ; 
ils ont ete deposes sur le bureau. II 
a ete arrete que les pouvoirs que 
chaque depute avait requs de sa com- 
mune, y seraient egalement deposes 
pour etre conserves dans les Archives, 
et servir eternellement de preuve de 
l'attachement du peuple savoisien au 
gouvernement republicain des Fran- 

Nous, president et secretaires, de- 
clarons le present extrait conforme a 

Signe: J. Decret, president; F. 
Chastel, F. Favre, Gumery, Hac- 
quier, secretaires. 

En attendant que la Convention na- 
tionale de France eut prononce sur 
notre demande, TAssemblee nationale 
crut qu'il etait important d'exercer 
promptement la souverainete du peu- 
ple savoisien. Son premier decret f ut 
l'alxriition de la royaute. Elle pro- 
testa contre les soi-disant droits de la 
ci-devant maison de Savoie; elle an- 
nula tous ceux qu'elle pouvait encore 
reclamer; ensuite elle decreta une 
adresse a la Convention nationale de 
France, dans laquelle sont exprimes 
les sentiments de tous les Allobroges. 
Legislateurs, on va vous en donner 

power to choose, and by their own ac- 
tion to adopt whatever form of gov- 
ernment the Assembly of Deputies 
should consider to be the most suited 
to the Savoyard nation. 

The reading of these; reports was 
often interrupted by the applause of 
the Assembly and of the galleries; 
they were placed on the table. It 
was determined that the powers re- 
ceived by each deputy from his com- 
mune should be likewise deposited, to 
be preserved in the archives and to 
serve as a perpetual proof of the at- 
tachment of the Savoyard people fc> 
the republican Government of France. 

We, the President and Secretaries, 
declare that the present extract is an 
accurate copy of the original. 

(Signed) J. Decret, President; 
F. Chastel, F. Favre, Gumery, 
Hacquier, Secretaries. 

In waiting for the National Con- 
vention of France to pronounce on 
our request, the National Assembly 
believed that it was important to 
exercise promptly the sovereignty of 
the Savoyard people. Its first de- 
cree was the abolition of royalty. It 
protested against all the pretended 
rights of the former House of Savoy; 
it annulled all those which could still 
be claimed; it thereupon decreed an 
address to the National Convention 
of France, in which are expressed the 
sentiments of all the Allobroges. 
Legislators, this will now be read to 



Libert^, Egalit£ 

L f assemblee nationale des Allobroges, 
a la Convention nationale de 

" Legislateurs, le soleil bienfaisant 
de la Liberte vient enfin, par ses 
douces influences, de dissiper les 
nuages epais de la tyrannie et du des- 
potisme qui infestaient notre atmo- 
sphere : nos tyrans, aussi laches qu'ils 
ont ete cruels, n'ont pu soutenir Ins- 
pect redoutable du drapeau tricolore ; 
ils ont fui, et pour jamais ont delivre 
de leur odieuse presence une terre trop 
longtemps abreuvee des maux emanes 
d'un sceptre de fer. Les Savoisiens, 
penetres de la reconnaissance la plus 
vive, prient Tauguste Assemblee d'en 
recevoir les temoignages; nos hom- 
mages, legislateurs, ne sont pas dictes 
par ces organes corrompus de Tancien 
regime : ce sont des hommes libres qui 
vous les presentent et qui sentent toute 
la dignite de leur nouvelle existence. 

Liberty, Equality 

The National Assembly of the Alio- 
broges, to the National Convention 
of France. 

" Legislators : the beneficent sun of 
liberty, has at last, by its gentle in- 
fluence, succeeded in dispersing the 
thick mists of tyranny and despotism, 
which infested our atmosphere: our 
tyrants, as cowardly as they have been 
cruel, have not been able to bear the 
redoubtable sight of the tricolor flag; 
they have fled, and have forever de- 
livered from their odious presence a 
land too long overwhelmed with evils 
arising from an iron sceptre. The 
Savoyards, filled with the deepest 
gratitude, request the august Assem- 
bly to receive the proofs thereof ; our 
homage, Legislators, is not dictated 
by those corrupt organs of the old 
regime: these are free men who pre- 
sent homage to you, and who feel all 
the dignity of their new existence. 

" Vous nous avez laisses les maitres 
de nous donner des lois, nous avons 
agi. La nation savoisienne, apres 
avoir declare la decheance de Victor- 
Amedee et de sa posterite, la proscrip- 
tion eternelle des despotes couronnes, 
s'est declaree libre et souveraine. 
Cest du sein de cette Assemblee qu'est 
emis le vceu unanime d'etre reunis a 
la Republique fran^aise, non par une 
simple alliance, mais par une union in- 
dissoluble, en formant partie inte- 
grante de T Empire fran^ais. 

" You have made us masters over 
our own lawmaking, we have acted. 
The Savoyard nation, having de- 
clared the deposition of Victor 
Amadeus and his descendants, and 
the perpetual proscription of crowned 
despots, has declared itself free and 
sovereign. It is from the bosom of 
this Assembly that the unanimous 
wish has been expressed to be united 
with the French Republic, not by a 
simple alliance, but by an indissoluble 
union, forming an integral part of the 
French Empire. 



" Legislateurs, ce n'est point une 
Assemblee d'esclaves tremblants a 
Taspect des fers qu'ils viennent de 
quitter, qui vous supplient de la pren- 
dre sous votre protection: c'est un 
souverain, admirateur de votre gloire, 
demandant a en f aire reflechir sur lui 
qnelques rayons. . . . 

" Fait a 1' Assemblee nationale des 
Allobroges, seante a Chambery, le 27 
octobre, Tan 1" de la Republique. 

" Signe: Doppet, vice-president; 
Favre, secretaire; Villar, membre 
du comite de redaction/' 

Villar. Citoyens, nous allons 
maintenant vous faire connaitre nos 
pouvoirs. Les void : 


" L' Assemblee nationale des Allo- 
broges donne pouvoir aux citoyens 
Doppet, Favre, Dessaix et Villar, 
qu'elle a deputes aupres de la Conven- 
tion nationale des Fran^ais, et aux 
citoyens Gumery, Bard et Balmain, 
leurs suppleants, en cas d'empeche- 
ment, de lui presenter Tadresse qui 
lui sera remise et de lui enoncer le 
voeu qu'a forme la nation qu'elle rep- 
resente d'etre unie a la Republique 
fran£aise et d'en former partie inte- 
grante. Elle charge expressement les 
deputes de soliciter l'acte solennel 
d'adhesion de la Convention nationale 
des Fran^ais a Incorporation de- 
mandee et de faire part a la commis- 
sion provisoi re d'administration de 
Texecution de leur mission et des re- 
ponses qui leur seront faites et d'en- 

" Legislators, it is not an Assembly 
of slaves trembling at the sight of the 
fetters which they have just dis- 
carded, who beg you to take them 
under your protection: it is a 
sovereign admiring your glory and 
asking to have some rays of that 
glory reflected on himself. . . . 

" Done in the National Assembly of 
the Allobroges, in session at Cham- 
bery, October 27, the Year I of the 

" (Signed) Doppet, Vice-Presi- 
dent; Favre, Secretary; Villar, 
Member of the editorial committee/' 

Villar. Citizens, we shall now 
acquaint you with our powers. They 
are these: 


"The National Assembly of the 
Allobroges empowers Citizens Dop- 
pet, Favre, Dessaix, and Villar, de- 
puted by it to the National Conven- 
tion of France, and Citizens Gumery, 
Bard and Balmain, their substitutes in 
case of inability to serve, to present 
to the Convention the address which 
shall be transmitted to it and to an- 
nounce to it the desire felt by the na- 
tion for which the Assembly speaks to 
unite with the French nation and to 
form an integral part of it. The As- 
sembly expressly instructs the depu- 
ties to beg from the National Conven- 
tion of the French people its solemn 
adhesion to the incorporation re- 
quested, and to inform the Provisional 
Administrative Commission of the 
execution of their mission and of the 



tretenir avec elle une correspondance 
exacte : le tout en conf ormite des de- 
terminations prises dans les seconde 
et derniere seances de TAssemblee na- 
tionale des 22 et 29 octobre dont les 
extraits des proces-verbaux seront 
joints au present, signes par le presi- 
dent et les secretaires. 

" Fait a I'Assemblee nationale des 
Allobroges, seante a Chambery, le 29 
octobre 1792, Tan 1" de la Repub- 

" Signe: J. Decret, president; 
Chastel, Gumery, F. Favre, Hac- 
quier, secretaires." 

responses which shall be made to them, 
and to carry on a detailed correspond- 
ence with it : all of this in conformity 
with the decisions made at the second 
and last session of the National As- 
sembly of the 22d and 29th of Octo- 
ber, of which extracts from the formal 
minutes, signed by the President and 
the secretaries, shall be annexed to the 
present document. 

" Done in the National Assembly of 
the Allobroges, in session at Cham- 
bery, October 29, 1792, the Year I 
of the Republic. 

"(Signed) J. Decret, President; 
Chastel, Gumery, F. Favre, Hac- 
quier, Secretaries." 

Decree of the French National Convention Uniting Savoy to France. 

November 27, 1792 x 

La Convention nationale, apres 
avoir entendu le rapport de ses comites 
de constitution et diplomatique, et 
avoir reconnu que le voeu libre et uni- 
versel du peuple souverain de la Sa- 
voie, emis dans les assemblies des 
communes, est de s'incorporer a la 
Republique f ran<jaise ; considerant que 
la nature, les rapports et les interets 
respectifs rendent cette union avan- 
tageuse aux deux peuples, declare 
qu'elle accepte la reunion proposee, et 
que, des ce moment, la Savoie fait 
partie integrante de la Republique 

Art. 1". La Convention nationale 
decrete que la Savoie formera pro- 

1 Duvergier, Collections, vol. 5, p. 59. 

The National Convention, having 
heard the report of its Diplomatic 
Committee and the Committee on the 
Constitution, and having recognized 
that the free and universal wish of the 
sovereign people of Savoy, expressed 
in communal assemblies, is for incor- 
poration in the French Republic, and 
considering that nature as well as 
their relations and respective interests 
render this union advantageous to the 
two peoples, declares that it accepts 
the union proposed and that, from 
this moment, Savoy forms an integral 
part of the French Republic. 

Article 1. The National Conven- 
tion decrees that Savoy shall form, 



visoirement un quatre-vingt-quatrieme 
departement, sous le nom de departe- 
ment du Mont-Blanc. 

2. Les assemblies primaires et 
electorates se formeront incessament, 
suivant la forme des lois etablies, pour 
nommer leurs deputes a la Conven- 
tion nationale. 

3. Ce departement aura provisoire- 
ment une representation de dix depu- 
tes a la Convention nationale. 

4. II sera envoye, dans le departe- 
ment du Mont-Blanc, quatre commis- 
saires pris dans le sein de la Conven- 
tion nationale, pour proceder a la 
division provisoire et a Torganisation 
de ce departement en districts et en 
cantons. Ces commissaires seront 
nommes par la voie du scrutin. 1 

provisionally, an eighty-fourth de- 
partment, under the name of the De- 
partment of Mont-Blanc. 

2. The primary and electoral as- 
semblies shall at once convene, ac- 
cording to the manner provided by 
law, in order to elect their deputies 
to the National Convention. 

3. This department shall have a 
provisional representation of ten dep- 
uties to the National Convention. 

4. Four Commissioners, who shall 
be chosen from the members of 
the National Convention, shall be sent 
to the Department of Mont Blanc, to 
proceed to the provisional division 
and to the organization of this de- 
partment into districts and cantons. 
These commissioners shall be elected 
by ballot. 

Decree of Union with France passed by " the National Assembly of the 

Colons Marseillais " of Nice. January 4, 1 793 2 

Liberty, Egalit£ 

Decret de la Convention nationale des 
colons marseillais, du 4 Janvier 
1793, Van II de la Republique fran- 

L'Assemblee composee des repre- 
sentants des huit sections de la ville 
et territoire de Nice, et des communes 
de Saint-Agnes, Escarene, Aspro- 
mont, Roquette et Saint-Martin, Con- 
tes, Chateau-neuf, Tourrettes, Roque- 

Liberty, Equality 

Decree of the National Convention 
of the Colonists of Marseilles, Jan- 
uary 4, 1793, the year II of the 
French Republic. 

The Assembly, composed of the 
representatives of the eight districts of 
the city and territory of Nice, and of 
the Communes of Saint-Agnes, Esca- 
rene, Aspromont, Roquette and Saint- 
Martin, Contes, Chateau-neuf, Tour- 

1 Articles 5, 6 and 7 are omitted. They deal with questions of the customs, boundaries, etc. 

2 Arch, pari, 1st series, vol. 57, p. 61. This decree was read before the Convention on 
January 15. 



Esteron a gauche de la riviere, Ville- 
franche, Peillon, Saint-Andre, Bou- 
son, Saint-Antonin, Eza, Gillette, Gor- 
bio, Falicon, Toet, Levens, etc., apres 
avoir entendu la lecture des proces- 
verbaux de leurs respectives sections 
et communes, qui constatent Telection 
libre et legale des susdits membres, et 
Tautorite et les pouvoirs amples et 
illimites, qui leur ont ete transmis et 
apres avoir prete successivement le 
serment d'etre fidele a la nation, de 
maintenir la liberte et Tegalite, et de 
mourir en les defendant, se rappelant 
avec indignation les injustes provoca- 
tions du ci-devant despote, connu sous 
les nom de roi de Sardaigne, et de 
ses satellites, faites a la nation fran- 
^aise qui s'etait declaree amie de 
rhomme; se rappelant avec douleur 
les vexations inquisitoriales, senatori- 
ales, prefectorales, militaires et arbi- 
traires exercees envers le peuple ni^ois 
qu'elle represente; se rappelant en ou- 
tre toutes les tyrannies, usurpations 
et injustices faites a ce meme peuple, 
tant par le susdit despote, que par tous 
ses adherents, qu'il salariait de la 
sueur du pauvre; se rappelant encore 
les inhumanites commises envers tous 
ceux qui n'avaient pas achete des ti- 
tres, et de Tinsolence insupportable 
des ci-devant nobles, qu'il n'a jamais 
cherche de reprimer, meme apres que 
les principes de liberte et d'egalite ont 
ete propages par la nation frangaise; 
et se rappelant enfin la lachete avec 
laquelle il a abandonne a la plus af- 
freuse anarchie un peuple, auquel il 
avait promis la conservation des pro- 
prietes et la surete des personnes; 

rettes, Roque-Esteron on the left 
bank of the river, Ville- tranche, 
Peillon, Saint-Andre, Bouson, Saint- 
Antonin, Eza, Gillette, Gorbio, Fal- 
cion, Toet, Levens, etc., after hav- 
ing heard the reading of the formal 
minutes of their respective districts 
and communes, which attest the free 
and legal election of the members 
aforesaid, and the authority and full 
and unlimited powers which have 
been bestowed on them, having taken, 
each in turn, the oath to be faithful 
to the nation and to the maintainance 
of liberty and equality, and to die in 
defending them ; recalling with indig- 
nation the unjust provocations which 
the former despot, known under the 
title of King of Sardinia, and his sat- 
ellites have offered to the French na- 
tion which had declared itself the 
Friend of Man ; recalling with sorrow 
the inquisitorial, senatorial, prefec- 
torial, military and arbitrary annoy- 
ances against the people of Nice 
whom the Assembly represents; re- 
calling moreover, all the tyrannies, 
usurpations and injustices done to 
this same people, both by the despot 
aforesaid and by all his adherents 
whom he paid from the sweat of the 
poor ; recalling the inhuman acts com- 
mitted against all those who have not 
bought titles, and the unbearable 
insolence of the former nobles, whom 
he never sought to repress, even 
after the principles of liberty and 
equality were proclaimed by the 
French nation; and recalling, finally, 
the cowardliness with which he 
abandoned to the most frightful 



apres avoir mis tout en usage pour lui 
inspirer de Inversion et une haine im- 
placable contre les Fran^ais qui 
s'etaient declares libres, et avoir use 
de tous les moyens pour le compro- 
mettre, et Texposer a leur vengeance, 
declare unanimement, au nom du meme 
peuple nicjois qu'elle represente, la de- 
cheance perpetuelle du ci-devant comte 
de Nice, Victor-Amedee troisieme, 
soi-disant roi de Sardaigne, et de toute 
sa descendance, et prete le serment so- 
lennel de ne plus reconnaitre a Tavenir 
d'autre autorite que celle du peuple, 
ou librement emanee de lui-meme; 
comme le seul souverain legitime, de- 
cretant en meme temps Tabolition de 
tous les titres, privileges et preroga- 
tives quelconques, comme contraires 
a l'egalite de Thomme, ces distinc- 
tions n'ayant ete creees que par le des- 
potisme et Taristocratie proscrits par 
les droits imprescriptibles et inalien- 
ables de l'homme, desquels elle declare 
ne pouvoir point s'ecarter sans com- 
mettre la plus noire des injustices, et 
sans s'arroger une autorite qu'elle ne 
peut acquerir en aucune maniere. 

L'Assemblee penetree d'autre part 
d'admiration et de reconnaissance en- 
vers la nation fran^aise, franche et 
genereuse, qui a retabli le peuple ni<jois 
dans tous ses droits; considerant que 
ce meme peuple est libre, independant, 
et dont la souverainete doit etre rep- 
resentee par les membres, auxquels il 

anarchy a people to whom he had 
promised the preservation of property 
and the protection of persons, after 
having done everything to inspire in 
them implacable aversion and hatred 
against the French who had declared 
themselves free, and having employed 
every means to compromise the peo- 
ple and to expose them to their ven- 
geance, declares unanimously, in the 
name of these people of Nice whom 
it represents, the perpetual deposition 
of the former Count of Nice, Victor 
Amadeus III, so-called King of Sar- 
dinia, and of all his descendants, and 
takes a solemn oath never to recog- 
nize any other authority in future 
than that of the people, or such au- 
thority as has been freely delegated 
by them, decreeing at the same time, 
in its capacity as sole legitimate sov- 
ereign, the abolition of all titles, priv- 
ileges and prerogatives whatsoever, as 
being contrary to the equality of man, 
these distinctions having been created 
only by despotism and by the aristoc- 
racy prescribed by the imprescriptible 
and inalienable rights of man, which 
the Assembly declares can never be 
discarded without committing the 
blackest of injustices, and without as- 
suming an authority which it can not 
acquire in any way whatever. 

The Assembly, actuated on the 
other hand by admiration and grati- 
tude for the frank and generous 
French nation, which has restored the 
people of Nice to all their rights, con- 
sidering that this same people is free 
and independent and that its sover- 
eignty should be represented by those 



a donne toute sa confiance, et ses pou- 
voirs, declare s'etre constitute en Con- 
vention nationale des colons marseil- 
lais, pour rappeler a tous les peuples 
l'origine de celui qu'elle represente, et 
a l'effet de traiter par elle-meme, ou 
par les deputes, que la grande ma- 
jorite du peuple a nomme, la reunion 
de la ville de Nice, et le ci-devant 
comte a la Republique f rangaise avec 
la Convention nationale, au cas que la 
demande qui lui sera faite de cette 
reunion par les susdits deputes, deja 
munis du voeu du peuple, soit recon- 
nue insuffisante; et pour pourvoir a 
toutes les places d'administration, 
juges du tribunal et autres, et faire 
generalement tout ce que le peuple 
reuni aurait droit de faire lui-meme. 

Ladite Convention nationale des 
colons marseillais decrete, en conse- 
quence avoir charge comme elle 
charge expressement les citoyens Blan- 
qui et Veillon, deputes aupres de la- 
dite Convention nationale de France, 
premierement par les corps adminis- 
tratifs reunis provisoires de la ville 
et ci-devant comte de Nice, et succes- 
sivement par la tres grande majorite 
des communes, pour presenter, au nom 
du peuple ni<jois ou des colons mar- 
seillais, le voeu librement emis par le 
meme peuple dans ses assemblies pri- 
maires, et que l'assemblee et ses rep- 
resentants vient de confirmer, leu'r 
donnant a ces deputes tout pouvoir 
et autorite necessaires pour sollicker 
aupres de ladite Convention nationale 

members to whom it has given its 
confidence and its powers, declares it- 
self to be constituted as the National 
Convention of the Colonists of Mar- 
seilles in order to recall to all peoples 
the origin of the people it represents ; 
and for the purpose of treating with 
the National Convention either for 
itself or by the deputies named by the 
great majority of the people, regard- 
ing the union of the City of Nice and 
the former County to the French Re- 
public, if the request which it has 
made for this union, through the 
aforesaid deputies, already provided 
with proof of the wish of the people, 
is considered to be insufficient ; and in 
order to provide for all offices of ad- 
ministration, judges of courts and 
others, and, in general, to do all that 
a people assembled would have the 
right to do for itself. 

The said National Convention of 
the Colonists of Marseilles decrees, in 
consequence, that it has appointed and 
expressly appoints the citizens Blan- 
qui and Veillon, delegated to the said 
National Convention of France, first- 
ly by the assembled Provisional Ad- 
ministrative Bodies of the City and 
former County of Nice, and later by 
the great majority of the communes, 
to present, in the name of the people 
of Nice or of the Colonists of Mar- 
seilles, the wish freely expressed by 
that same people in its primary assem- 
blies, and which has just been con- 
firmed by the assembly and its repre- 
sentatives, giving to those deputies all 
power and authority necessary to 
solicit from the said National Con- 



fagrement de ce voeu, et obtenir d'elle 
la reunion si desiree a la Republique 
frangaise, pour laquelle le peuple 
ni<jois ne cesse de soupirer. 

L'Assemblee decrete, en outre, 
que Textrait de la presente delibera- 
tion sera envoye auxdits deputes, et 
qu'elle sera incessamment imprimee 
pour qu'un exemplaire soit egalement 
envoye dans toutes les communes du 
peuple des colons marseillais, aux Al- 
lobroges nos f reres, aux Beiges, dans 
toutes les places ou la nation fran- 
gaise a porte ses armes, dans les villes 
et villages du Piemont, et de la Sar- 
daigne pour leur inspirer le desir de 
suivre Texemple des Allobroges, et le 
notre, et finalement un autre exem- 
plaire au despote turinois pour Tas- 
surer des dispositions que Ton prend 
pour le detroner. 

A Nice, et dans la salle des seances 
de ladite Convention nationale des 
colons marseillais, le quatre Janvier 
mil sept cent quatre-vingt-treize, Tan 
second de la Republique frangaise. 

Signe: Louis Villiers, presi- 
dente; Clerici, secretaire; Gastaud, 

Collationne avec ('original, 
Pour T Assemblee : 
Gastaud, secretaire. 

vention the granting of this wish, and 
to obtain from it the union with the 
French Republic, so deeply desired 
and for which the people of Nice do 
not cease to long. 

The Assembly decrees, moreover, 
that the copy of the present delibera- 
tion shall be sent to the said deputies, 
and that it shall be printed immedi- 
ately in order that copies may also be 
sent to all the communes of the people 
of the Colonists of Marseilles, to our 
brothers the Allobroges, to the Bel- 
gians, in all places where the French 
nation has carried its arms, in the 
towns and villages of Piedmont, and 
of Sardinia in order to inspire in them 
the desire to follow the example of the 
Allobroges and ours, and, finally, an- 
other copy shall be sent to the Turin 
despot to acquaint him with the meas- 
ures taken to dethrone him. 

Done at Nice, in the meeting hall 
of the said National Convention of 
the Colonists of Marseilles, January 
fourth, seventeen hundred and ninety 
three, the second year of the French 

(Signed) Louis Villiers, Presi- 
dent; Clerici, Secretary; Gastaud, 

(Compared with the original,) 
For the Assembly: 
Gastaud, Secretary. 



Decree of the National Convention Uniting the County of Nice to the Terri- 
tory of the French Republic. January 31, 1793 * 

La Convention nationale declare, 
au nom du peuple f ran^ais, qu'elle ac- 
cepte le voeu librement emis par le 
peuple souverain du ci-devant comte 
de Nice dans ses assemblies primaires, 
et decrete, en consequence, que le ci- 
devant comte de Nice fait partie in- 
tegrante de la Republique franQaise; 

Ordonne que le conseil executif pro- 
visoire prendra sur-le-champ les me- 
sures necessaires pour faire trans- 
porter les bureaux de douanes aux 
points limitrophes du territoire 
etranger ; 

Charge son comite de division de 
lui faire incessamment un rapport sur 
le mode d'organisation generate du ci- 
devant comte de Nice. 

The National Convention declares, 
in the name of the French people, 
that it accepts the vote of the sover- 
eign people of the former County of 
Nice, freely expressed in primary as- 
semblies, and decrees, in consequence, 
that the former County of Nice forms 
an integral part of the French Repub- 

Orders that the Provisional Execu- 
tive Council shall take immediatelv the 
necessary measures to cause the cus- 
toms houses to be moved to points on 
the frontiers of foreign countries: 

Charges its Committee of Division 
to make an immediate report regard- 
ing the mode of general organization 
of the former County of Nice. 

1 Duvcrgicr, Collection, vol. 5, p. 130. Arch, pari., 1st series, vol. 58, p. 102. 


Cambon Reports Regarding the Conduct to be Followed by the French Gen- 
erals in the Countries Occupied by the Armies of the Republic. December 
15, 1792 1 

Cambon, au nom des Comites des 
finances, militaire et diplomatique. 
Vous avez charge trois de vos Comites 
de l'examen de plusieurs lettres des 
generaux commandant les armees 
qui sont actuellement sur territoire 


• * • • • 

Dumourier, en entrant dans la Bel- 
gique, a annonce de grands principes 
de philosophic; mais il s'est borne a 
faire des adresses au peuple. II a 
jusqu'ici tout respecte, nobles, priv- 
ileges, corvees, feodalite, &c. tout est 
encore sur pied; . . . 

Le general a cm, d'apres les in- 
structions du conseil executif, devoir 
respecter sa souverainete et son inde- 
pendance, ne pas lui imposer de con- 
tributions extraordinaires ; lorsque ses 
convois passent a quelques barrieres 
ou peages, ils y paient les droits ordi- 
naires. II a cru ne devoir pas meme 
forcer les habitans a fournir des ma- 
gasins et des approvisionnemens a nos 
armees. Ces principes philosophiques 
sont les notres ; mais nous ne voulons 
pas, nous ne devons pas respecter les 
usurpateurs. Tous ceux qui jouis- 

i Moniteur Universel, No. 353, December 18, 

Cambon, in the name of the Com- 
mittee on Finances, Military and 
Diplomatic Committees. You have 
charged three of your committees 
with the examination of many letters 
from the generals commanding the 

armies now on foreign territory. 

• • . . * 

Dumourier, on entering Belgium, 
announced great philosophic prin- 
ciples; but he confined himself to 
making addresses to the people. Up 
to the present time, he has respected 
everything; nobles, privileges, forced 
labor, feudalism, &c, everything is 
still running; . . . 

The General believed that, follow- 
ing the instructions of the executive 
council, he must respect its sov- 
ereignty and independence and not 
impose on it any extraordinary 
contributions; when its convoys 
pass through any barriers or toll- 
gates they pay the ordinary taxes. 
He thought that he must not even 
force the inhabitants to furnish stores 
and provisions to our armies. These 
philosophical principles are our own; 
but we do not wish, we ought not, 
to respect usurpers. All those who 



sent d'immunites et de privileges, sont 
nos ennemis, il faut les detruire; au- 
trement, notre propre liberte serait en 
peril. Ce n'est pas aux rois seuls que 
nous avons a f aire la guerre ; car s'ils 
etaient isoles, ce ne serait que dix ou 
douze tetes a faire tomber. Nous 
avons a combattre tous leurs com- 
plices, les castes privilegiees, qui, sous 
le nom des rois, rongent les peuples, 
et les oppriment depuis plusieurs 

Vos Comites se sont done dit : 
Tout ce qui dans les pays ou vous 
portez les armes, existe en vertu de 
la tyrannie et du despotisme, est usur- 
pation: car les rois n'avaient pas le 
droit d'etablir des privileges en f aveur 
du petit nombre, au detriment du plus 
grand. . . . 

II faut done que nous nous declari- 
ons pouvoir revolutionnaire dans les 
pays ou nous entrons. (On applaudit.) 
. . . L'aristocratie gouverne partout; 
il faut done detruire toutes les 
autorites existantes. ... II faut que 
le systeme populaire s'etablisse, que 
toutes les autorites soient renouve- 
lees, ou vous n'aurez que des ennemis 
a la tete des affaires. Vous ne pouvez 
done donner la liberte a un pays, vous 
ne pouvez y rester en surete, si les 
anciens magistrats conservent leurs 
pouvoirs; il faut absolument que les 
Sans-Culottes participent a Tadminis- 
tration. (De nombreux applaudisse- 
ments s'elivent dans Vassemblee et 
dans les tribunes,) . . . 

En entrant dans un pays, quel doit 
etre notre premier soin ? e'est de pren- 
dre pour gage des frais de la guerre 

are enjoying immunities or privileges 
are our enemies, they must be de- 
stroyed; otherwise our own liberty 
would be in peril. It is not upon 
kings alone that we have to make 
war; for if they were isolated, there 
would be but ten or a dozen heads 
to cut off. We have to fight all their 
accomplices, the privileged castes, 
who in the name of the kings, devour 
the people, and oppress them for 
many centuries past. 

Your committees, therefore, said to 
themselves : All that exists by virtue 
of tyranny and despotism in the 
countries where you carry your arms, 
is usurpation ; for kings have no right 
to establish privileges in favor of the 
few to the detriment of the larger 
number. . . . 

It is therefore necessary that we 
declare the revolutionary power in the 
countries we enter. (Applause.) 
. . . Aristocracy is governing every- 
where ; therefore all existing authori- 
ties must be destroyed. . . . The 
popular rule must be established, all 
authorities must be renewed, or you 
will have only enemies at the head of 
affairs. You can not then give lib- 
erty to a country, you can not stay in 
it with safety, if the old magistrates 
keep their powers; it is absolutely 
necessary that the Sans-Culottes 
participate in the administration. 
(Great applause in the Assembly and 
in the galleries. ) . . . 

In entering into a country, what 
should be our first care? to take the 
possessions of our enemies as a 



les biejns de nos ennemis ; il f aut done 
mettre sous la sauvegarde de la Na- 
tion les biens meubles et immeubles 
appartenant au fisc, aux princes, a 
leurs fauteurs, adherens, participes, a 
leurs satellites volontaires, a tous les 
complices de la tyrannic (On ap- 
plaudit.) Et pour qu'on ne se me- 
prenne pas sur les intentions pures et 
franches de la Republique frangaise, 
vos Comites ne vous proposent pas de 
nommer des administrateurs particu- 
liers pour l'administration et la regie 
de ces biens ; mais d'en confier le soin 
a ceux qui seront nommes par le peu- 
ple. Nous ne prenons rien, nous con- 
servons tout pour les frais de la 

Vous sentez qu'en accordant cette 
confiance aux administrateurs provi- 
soires, vous aurez alors le droit d'en 
exclure tous les ennemis de la Repub- 
lique qui tenteraient de s'y intro- 
duce. . . . 

Ces precautions prises, vos Comites 
ont pense qu'il ne fallait pas encore 
abandonner un peuple peu accoutume 
a la Liberte absolument a lui-meme; 
qu'il fallait l'aider'de nos conseils, 
fraterniser avec lui; en consequence 
que des que les administrations pro- 
visoires seraient nominees, la Conven- 
tion devait leur envoyer des commis- 
saires tires de son sein, pour entretenir 
avec elles des rapports de fraternite. 
Cette mesure n'est pas meme suffi- 
sante. Les representans du peuple 
sont inviolables ; ils ne doivent jamais 
executer. II faudra done nommer 

guarantee for the expenses of the 
war ; therefore it is necessary to place 
in the custody of the nation the per- 
sonal and landed property belong- 
ing to the public treasury, to princes, 
to their followers, adherents, and 
partisans, to their voluntary satellites, 
to all the accomplices of tyranny. 
(Applause.) And in order that 
there shall be no misunderstanding 
about the pure and honest intentions 
of the French Republic, your com- 
mittees do not propose to you to name 
special administrators for the man- 
agement and control of these posses- 
sions ; but to confide the care of them 
to those who shall be named by the 
people. We take nothing, we keep 
everything for the expenses of the 

•You. see that in granting this con- 
fidence to the provisional admin- 
istrators, you will then have the right 
to exclude all enemies of the Republic 
who might attempt to introduce them- 
selves there. . . . 

These precautions taken, your com- 
mittees thought that a people little ac- 
customed to liberty should not yet be 
entirely abandoned to itself; that it 
was necessary to help it by our coun- 
sel, to fraternize with it ; consequently, 
that as soon as the provisional ad- 
ministrators should be named, the 
Convention ought to send to them 
commissioners chosen from its own 
body, to form with them fraternal re- 
lations. This measure, even, is not 
enough. The representatives of the 
people are inviolate : they must never 
be executive. It is therefore neces- 


aussi des executeurs. Vos Comites 
ont done pense que le conseil executif 
devait envoyer de son cote des com- 
missaires nationaux qui se concerte- 
ront avec les administrations provi- 
soires pour la defense du pays nou- 
vellement affranchi, pour assurer les 
approvisionnemens et la subsistance 
de nos armees, et enfin se concerter 
sur les moyens qu'il y aura a prendre 
pour payer les depenses que nous au- 
rons f aites ou que nous ferons sur leur 

Vous devez penser qu'au moyen de 
la suppression des contributions an- 
ciennes, les peuples affranchis n'auront 
point de revenus; ils auront recours 
a vous, et le Comite des finances croit 
qu'il est necessaire d'ouvrir le tresor 
public a tous les peuples qui voudront 
etre libres. Quels sont nos tresors? 
Ce sont nos biens territoriaux, que 
nous avons realises en assignats. 
Consequemment, en entrant dans un 
pays, en supprimant ses contributions, 
et lui offrant une partie de nos tresors 
pour raider a reconquerir sa liberte, 
nous lui offrirons notre monnaie revo- 
lutionnaire. (On applaudit.) Cette 
monnaie deviendra la sienne; nous 
n'aurons pas besoin alors d'acheter a 
grands frais du numeraire, pour trou- 
ver, dans le pays meme, des habille- 
mens et des vivres; un meme interet 
reunira les deux peuples pour com- 
battre la tyrannic Des lors nous 
augmenterons notre propre puissance, 
puisque nous aurons un moyen d'ecou- 
lement pour diminuer la masse des 
assignats circulante en France, et que 
Thypotheque que fourniront les biens 

sary to name executors also. Your 
committees, therefore, thought that 
the Executive Council should on its 
part send natiorial commissioners 
who would arrange with the provi- 
sional administrators for the defence 
of the newly enfranchised country, 
for the assurance of supplies and sub- 
sistence for our armies, and finally 
to concert measures that will have 
to be taken for paying the expenses 
that we shall have incurred or that 
we will incur on their territory. 

You must reflect that because of 
the suppression of the former taxes 
the enfranchised peoples will have no 
revenues; they will have recourse to 
you, and the Committee on Finances 
thinks it is necessary to open the 
public treasury to all peoples who 
wish to be free. What are our re- 
sources? They are our territorial 
possessions, which we have realized in 
assignats. Consequently, in entering 
into a country, in suppressing its 
taxes, and offering to it a part of our 
resources to aid it in reconquering its 
liberty, we are offering it our revolu- 
tionary money. (Applause.) This 
money will become its own; we shall 
not then have need to buy at great 
expense of cash, in order to find 
clothing and food in the country it- 
self ; a common interest will unite the 
two peoples to fight tyranny. From 
that moment we shall increase our 
own power, since we shall have a 
channel to diminish the mass of as- 
signats circulating in France, and the 
mortgage furnished by the property 
placed in the custody of the Republic 



mis sous la sauvegarde de la Repub- 
lique augmentera le credit de ces 
memes assignats. 

will increase the credit of these same 

Decree by which France Proclaims the Liberty and Sovereignty of all the Peo- 
ples to whom she has Carried or shall Carry her Arms, and Prescribes the 
Conduct of her Generals. December 15 and 17, 1792 x 

La Convention nationale, apres 
avoir entendu le rapport de ses comites 
des finances, de la guerre et diploma- 
tique reunis; fidele aux principes de 
la souverainete du peuple, qui ne lui 
permet pas de reconnaitre aucune des 
institutions qui y portent atteinte, et 
voulant fixer les regies a suivre par 
les generaux des armees de la Repub- 
lique dans les pays ou ils porteront les 
armes, decrete : 

Art. 1". Dans les pays qui sont ou 
seront occupes par les armees de la 
Republique, les generaux proclame- 
ront sur-le-champ, au nom dfe la nation 
fran<jaise, la souverainete du peuple, 
la suppression de toutes les autorites 
etablies, des impots ou contributions 
existans, Tabolition de la dime, de la 
feodalite, des droits seigneuriaux, tant 
f eodaux que censuels, fixes ou casuels, 
des banalites, de la servitude reelle 
et personelle, des privileges de chasse 
et de peche, des corvees, de la noblesse, 
et generalement de tous les privileges. 

2. Ils annonceront au peuple qu'ils 
lui apportent paix, secours, fraternite, 

1 Duvcrgicr, Collection, vol. 5, p. 82. 

The National Convention, having 
heard, the joint report of its Com- 
mittees of Finance, War and Diplo- 
macy; faithful to the principles of 
popular sovereignty, which do not 
permit it to recognize any of the 
institutions which threaten these prin- 
ciples, and desiring to fix the rules to 
be followed by the generals of the 
armies of the Republic in the 
countries where they shall carry its 
arms, decrees: 

Article 1. In the countries which 
are or shall be occupied by the 
armies of the Republic, the generals 
shall immediately proclaim, in the 
name of the French nation, the 
sovereignty of the people, the sup- 
pression of all established authority, 
existing imposts or taxes, the aboli- 
tion of the tithes, of feudal tenure, of 
seigniorial rights, both feudal tax and 
poll tax, fixed or unfixed, of socage 
payments, of real and personal servi- 
tude, of the privileges of hunting and 
fishing, of statute-labor, of nobility, 
and of all privileges in general. 

2. They shall announce to the peo- 
ple that they bring to them peace, sue- 


liberte et egalite, et ils le convoqueront 
de suite en assemblies primaires ou 
communales, pour creer et organiser 
une administration et une justice pro- 
visoire; ils veilleront a la surete des 
personnes et des proprietes ; ils f eront 
imprimer en langue ou idiome du pays, 
afficher et executer sans delai, dans 
chaque commune, le present decret et 
la proclamation y annexee. 

3. Tous les agens et officiers civils 
ou militaire de Tancien gouvernement, 
ainsi que les individus ci-devant re- 
putes nobles, ou membres de quelques 
corporations ci-devant privilegies, 
seront, pour cette fois seulement, in- 
admissibles a voter dans les assem- 
blies primaires ou communales, et ne 
pourront etre elus aux places d'admi- 
nistration ou du pouvoir judiciaire 
provisoire. 1 

4. Les generaux mettront de suite 
sous la sauvegarde et protection de la 

cor, fraternity, liberty, and equality, 
and they shall at once convoke them 
in primary or communal assemblies, to 
create and organize a provisional ad- 
ministrative and judicial system; they 
shall care for the safety of persons 
and of property; they shall cause the 
present decree and the proclamation 
annexed to be printed in the language 
or the idiom of the country, and to be 
posted and put in execution without 
delay in each commune. 

3. All the agents and officers, 
civil or military, of the former gov- 
ernment, as well as the individuals 
formerly considered noble, or mem- 
bers of any corporations hitherto 
privileged shall be, for the time only, 
excluded from voting in the primary 
or communal assemblies, and mav not 
be elected to office in the provisional 
administration or in the provisional 
judicial bodies. 1 

4. The generals shall at once place 
under the care and protection of 

1 Repealed by the Law of December 22, 1792, — " La Convention nationale rapporte Tart. 3 de 
son decret des 15 et 17 decembre courant, concu en ces termes : ' Tous les agens et officiers 
civils ou militaires de l'ancien gouvernement, ainsi que les individus ci-devant privilegies, 
seront, pour cette fois seulement, inadmissibles a voter dans les assemblies primaires ou 
communales, et ne pourront etre elus aux places d'administration et de pouvoir judiciaire 
provisoire'; et elle decrete que nul ne pourra etre admis a voter dans les assemblies pri- 
maires et communales, et ne pourra etre nomine administrates ou juge provisoire, sans avoir 
prete le serment a la liberte et a regalite, et sans avoir renonce par ecrit aux privileges et 
prerogatives dont Tabolition a e"te" prononcee par le decret des 15 et 17, et dont il pourrait 
avoir joui"; 

(Translation) : "The National Convention repeals Article 3 of its decree of December 15 
and 17, which reads as follows: 'All the agents and officers, civil or military, of the former 
government, as well as the individuals formerly privileged, shall be, for this time only, ex- 
cluded from voting in the primary or communal assemblies and may not be elected to office 
in the provisional administration or in the provisional judicial bodies/ and decrees that no one 
shall be allowed to vote in the primary and communal assemblies, nor nominated as adminis- 
trator or provisional judge, without having taken the oath of liberty and equality, and without 
having renounced in writing those privileges and prerogatives whose abolition was pro- 
nounced by the Decree of the 15 and 17, and which they may have enjoyed." . . . (This was 
the provision as originally proposed by Cambon.) 



Republique fran<jaise tous les biens 
meubles et immeubles appartenant au 
fisc, au prince, a ses fauteurs, ad- 
herens et satellites volontaires, aux 
etablissements publics, aux corps et 
communautes laiques et ecclesias- 
tiques ; ils en f eront dresser sans delai 
un etat detaille, qu'ils enverront au 
conseil executif, et prendront toutes 
les mesures qui sont en leur pouvoir, 
afin que ces proprietes soient re- 

L'administration provisoire, nom- 
inee par le peuple, sera chargee de la 
surveillance et regie des objets mis 
sous la sauvegarde et protection de 
la Republique frangaise; elle veillera 
a la surete des personnes et des pro- 
prietes; elle fera executer les lois en 
vigueur relatives au jugement des 
proces civils et criminels, a la police 
et a la surete publique; elle sera 
chargee de regler et f aire payer les 
depenses locales et celles qui seront 
necessaires pour la defense commune; 
elle pourra etablir des contributions, 
pourvu toutefois qu'elles ne soient pas 
supportees par la partie indigente et 
laborieuse du peuple. 

6. Des que Tadministration provi- 
soire sera organisee, la Convention ra- 
tionale nommera des commissaires 
pris dans son sein pour aller frater- 
niser avec elle. 

7. Le conseil executif nommera 
aussi des commissaires nationaux, qui 
se rendront de suite sur les lieux 
pour se concerter avec les generaux 
et Tadministration provisoire nommee 
par le peuple, sur les mesures a pren- 

the French Republic all the real 
and personal property belonging to 
the treasury, the prince, his agents, 
adherents and voluntary satellites, 
to the public establishments, to the 
bodies and communities, lay and 
ecclesiastical; they shall cause to be 
drawn up without delay a detailed 
statement of these, which they shall 
send to the Executive Council, and 
shall take all measures within their 
power to cause these properties to be 

The provisional administration, 
named by the people, shall be charged 
with the oversight and the administra- 
tion of the objects put under the care 
and protection of the French Repub- 
lic; it shall see to the safety of per- 
sons and property; it shall enforce the 
execution of the laws in force relat- 
ing to civil and criminal trials, to po- 
lice and public security; it shall be 
charged with the duty of regulating 
and causing to be paid the local ex- 
penses and those which shall be neces- 
sary for the common defence; it may 
establish taxes, provided, however, 
that they shall not be borne by the 
indigent and laboring class. 

6. As soon as the provisional ad- 
ministration shall be organized the 
National Convention shall name com- 
missioners, from its own number, to 
fraternise with it 

7. The Executive Council shall 
also name national commissioners, 
who shall at once repair to the spot 
to advise with the generals and the 
provisional administration named by 
the people, as to the measures to be 


dre pour la defense commune, et sur 
les moyens employes pour se procurer 
les habillements et subsistances neces- 
saires aux armees, et pour acquitter 
les depenses qu'elles ont faites et 
feront pendant leur sejour sur son 

8. Les commissaires nationaux 
nominees par le conseil executif lui 
rendront compte, tous les quinze jours, 
de leurs operations. Le conseil exe- 
cutif les approuvera, modifiera ou re- 
jettera, et il en rendra compte de suite 
a la Convention. 

9. L'administration provisoire nom- 
inee par le peuple et les fonctions 
des commissaires nationaux cesseront 
aussitot que les habitans, apres avoir 
declare la souverainete et Tindepen- 
dance du peuple, la liberte et Tegalite, 
auront organise une forme de gou- 
vernement libre et populaire. 

10. II sera fait etat des depenses 
que la Republique franchise aura 
faites pour la defense commune, et 
des sommes qu'elle pourra avoir 
re£ues, et la nation f rangaise prendra 
avec le gouvernement qui sera etabli 
des arrangemens pour ce qui pourra 
etre du ; et, au cas ou Tinteret commun 
exigerait que les troupes de la Re- 
publique restassent encore a cette 
epoque sur le territoire etranger, elle 
prendra les mesures convenables pour 
les faire subsister. 

11. La nation fran^aise declare 
qu'elle traitera comme ennemi le peu- 
ple qui, refusant la liberte et Tegalite, 

taken for the common defence and as 
to the means to be employed to pro- 
cure the clothing and subsistence nec- 
essary for armies, and to provide pay- 
ment for the expenses which they 
have incurred and shall incur during 
their sojourn in the territory. 

8. The national commissioner 
named by the Executive Council shall 
render it an account of their opera- 
tions, every fifteen days. The Execu- 
tive Council shall approve, modify or 
reject them, and it shall report the 
result to the convention. 

9. The provisional administration 
named by the people and the offices of 
national commissioner shall cease as 
soon as the inhabitants, after having 
declared the sovereignty and inde- 
pendence of the people, and their 
liberty and equality, shall have organ- 
ized a free and popular form of gov- 

10. A statement shall be made of 
the expenses which the French Re- 
public shall have incurred for the 
common defense and the service 
which it may have received, and the 
French nation shall agree with the 
government which shall be established 
as to the arrangements for paying the 
amount which may be due; and, in 
case the common interest should de- 
mand that the troops of the Republic 
should remain yet longer in the for- 
eign territory, it shall take suitable 
measures for the provision for their 

11. The French Nation declares 
that it will treat as an enemy the peo- 
ple who, refusing liberty and equality 



ou y renon^ant, voudrait conserver, 
rappeler ou traiter avec le prince et 
les castes privilegiees ; elle promet et 
s'engage de ne souscrire aucun traite, 
et de ne poser les armes qu'apres l'af- 
fermissement de la souverainete et de 
Tindependance du peuple sur le terri- 
toire duquel les troupes de la Re- 
publique sont entrees, qui aura adopte 
les principes de l'egalite, et etabli un 
gouvernement libre et populaire. 

12. Le conseil executif enverra le 
present decret par des courriers ex- 
traordinaires a tous les generaux, et 
prendra les mesures necessaires pour 
en assurer Texecution. 

or renouncing it, should wish to pre- 
serve, recall or treat with the prince 
and the privileged classes ; it promises 
and engages not to sign any treaty, 
nor to lay down its arms until after 
the consolidation of the sovereignty 
and independence of the people into 
whose territory the troops of the Re- 
public have entered, who shall have 
adopted the principles of equality and 
have established a free and popular 

12. The Executive Council shall 
forward the present decree by special 
messengers to all the generals, and 
shall take those measures necessary to 
assure its execution. 

Form of Proclamation to be Made by the French Generals to the Peoples 

" Conquered for Liberty " 

Le peuple Francais au peu- 

PLE. ... 

Freres et amis, nous avons conquis 
la liberte, et nous la maintiendrons. 
Nous offrons de vous faire jouir de 
ce bien inestimable qui nous a tou- 
jours appartenu, et que nos oppres- 
seurs n'ont pu nous ravir sans crime. 

Nous avons chasse vos tyrans; 
montrez-vous hommes libres, et nous 
vous garantirons de leur vengeance, 
de leurs projets et de leur retour. 

Des ce moment, la nation f ran^aise 
proclame la souverainete du peuple, 
la suppression de toutes les autorites 
civiles et militaires qui vous ont gou- 

The French People to the 
People of : . . . 

Friends and Brothers, we have con- 
quered liberty, and we shall maintain 
it. We offer to you the enjoyment 
of this inestimable benefit which has 
always been our right, and of which 
our oppressors have not been able to 
deprive us except by crime. 

We have chased away your 
tyrants; show yourselves to be free 
men, and we will guarantee you from 
their vengeance, their projects and 
their return. 

From this moment the French na- 
tion proclaims the sovereignty of the 
people, the suppression of all the civil 
and military authorities which have 


vernes jusqu'a ce jour, et de tous les 
impots que vous supportez, sous quel- 
que forme qu'ils existent; Tabolition 
de la dime, de la feodalite, des droits 
seigneuriaux, tant feodaux que cen- 
suels, fixes ou casuels, des banalites, 
de la servitude reelle et personnelle, 
des privileges de chasse et de peche, 
des corvees de la gabelle, des peages, 
des octrois, et generalement de toute 
espece de contributions dont vous avez 
ete charges par vos usurpateurs; elle 
proclame aussi l'abolition parmi vous 
de toute corporation nobiliaire, sacer- 
dotale et autres, de toutes les prero- 
gatives et privileges contraires a 
Tegalite. Vous etes des ce moment, 
freres et amis, tous citoyens, tous 
egaux en droits, et tous appeles egale- 
ment a gouverner, a servir et def endre 
votre patrie. 

Formez-vous sur-le-champ en as- 
semblies primaires ou de communes, 
hatez-vous d'etablir vos administra- 
tions et justices provisoires, en se con- 
formant aux dispositions de Tarticle 
3 du decret ci-dessus. Les agens de 
la Republique frangaise se concerter- 
ont avec vous pour assurer votre bon- 
heur et la fraternite qui doit exister 
desormais entre nous. 

governed you until to-day, and all the 
imposts which you support, under 
whatever form they may exist; the 
abolition of the tithe, the feudal ten- 
ure, seigniorial rights, both feudal tax 
and poll tax, socage payments, real 
and personal servitudes, the privileges 
of hunting and fishing, statute labor 
and the salt tax, tolls, town dues, and 
in general all kinds of taxes imposed 
on you by your usurpers ; it proclaims 
also the abolition among you of all 
noble bodies, priestly or otherwise, of 
all prerogatives and privileges con- 
trary to equality. You are from this 
moment friends and brothers, all citi- 
zens, all equal in rights, and all called 
equally to govern, to serve and to de- 
fend your country. 

Form yourselves at once in primary 
or communal assemblies, make haste 
to establish your provisional admin- 
istrations and judicial systems, con- 
forming them to the provisions of 
Article 3 of the above decree. The 
agents of the French Republic will 
advise with you in order to assure 
your welfare and the fraternity which 
should exist henceforth among you. 

Protest of the Representative Assembly of Hainault against the Decree of 
December 15. Presented to the Convention, December 23, 1792 * 

Representants de la nation fran- Representatives of the French Na- 
gaise, nous le disons avec orgueil, avec tfon, we say it with pride, with confi- 
confiance, le peuple belgique est mur dence, the Belgian people are ripe for 

1 Procds-verbaux des reprisentants du peuples souverain de Hainaut, n° 31, du 21 decern- 
bre 1792. Borgnet, Histoire des Beiges, vol. 2, p. 108. 



a la liberte. . . . Cependant une na- 
tion libre, une nation qui a consacre 
en Europe les principes sacres de la 
liberte, qui professe qu'elle la respec- 
tera, qu'elle la protegera, qu'elle la 
propagera chez tous les peuples, en en- 
leverait aux Beiges, en ce moment, 
Texercice precieux; elle l'usurperait, 
ou plutot elle le deleguerait par le droit 
de conquete a quelques individus, car 
comment appeler autrement ce pouvoir 
revolutionnaire etranger qu'elle nous 
annonce? II sera a nos yeux,'il sera 
aux yeux de T Europe entiere, le pou- 
voir de la force. . . . Genereux Fran- 
$ais, nation fiere et juste, rappelez 
votre decret du 15 decembre, ou vous 
nous parlez en vainqueurs, en maitres, 
en souverains, lorsque de vous-memes 
vous decretez la cessation des impots 
et de nos revenus publics; que vous 
mettez sous votre main et que vous 
ordonnez la regie de nos biens na- 
tionaux; que vous prononcez, autre- 
ment que par notre organe, Textinc- 
tion de nos agregations ou corpora- 
tions politiques; que vous prescrivez 
meme la confiscation des proprietes 
particulieres, ce que nos anciens des- 
potes n'osaient pas faire, lorsqu'ils 
nous declaraient rebelles, et qu'ils 
rious traitaient en rebelles. 

liberty. . . . But a free nation, a na- 
tion which has consecrated in Europe 
the sacred principles of liberty, which 
professes to respect it, and to pro- 
tect it and to spread it among all 
nations, would at this moment be de- 
priving the Belgian people of its pre- 
cious exercise ; it would be usurping it, 
or rather be delegating it by right of 
conquest to certain individuals, for 
how otherwise can one describe this 
" revolutionary power" which has 
been proclaimed to us? It will be to 
our eyes and to the eyes of all Europe, 
the right of force. . . . Generous 
Frenchmen, nation proud and just, 
repeal your decree of December 15, 
where you speak as conquerors, mas- 
ters, sovereigns, where you yourselves 
decree the abolition of taxes and pub- 
lic revenues ; by which you put under 
your hand and decree the regulation 
of our national property, by which 
you pronounce, otherwise than 
through us, the extinction of our as- 
sociations and political bodies; by 
which you even prescribe the confis- 
cation of private property, which our 
former despots did not dare to do, 
when they were declaring us to be 
rebels and treating us as such. 

Protest of the Representatives of the Sovereign People of the Country of 

Namur, December 30, 1792 * 

La calomnie seule, peut avoir ar- Calumny alone, . . . could have 
rache aux oracles de la loi, aux pro- obtained from the oracles of law, the 

1 Procis-verbaux des stances des reprdsentants provisoires du peuple souverain du pays 
de Namur, n° 25, du 30 decembre 1792. Borgnet, Histoire des Beiges, vol. 2, p. 109. 


tec.ears des opprimes, aux res- 
taurateurs des droits de l'homme, ce 
decret terrible pour nous. . . . Vos 
generaux, en entrant dans chacune des 
provinces belgiques, ont rendu hom- 
mage a cet enthousiasme des ames 
beiges; partout ils ont vu, ils ont 
reconnu, ils ont applaudi Tivresse de la 
joie repandue sur tous les fronts ; par- 
tout un peuple nombreux s'offrait sur 
leur passage, les comblait de felicita- 
tions, et ne cessait de temoigner tour 
a tour sa reconnaissance a ses libera- 
teurs, et son attachement a la liberte 
et a Tegalite. Ces voeux pour la 
liberte et Tegalite s'etaient deja an- 
nonces d'une maniere non equivoque 
dans le temps meme ou, gemissant en- 
core sous le fer du despotisme, nous 
osions a peine lever les yeux vers le 
soleil qui avait fait eclore chez nous 
ces deux dons inappreciables. Tel est 
ce peuple, tels sont ses sentiments in- 
times, et c'est cette nation que Ton 
ose traduire, a la face de PEurope, 
dans le sanctuaire d'ou emanent les 
oracles de la liberte et de Tegalite, 
comme susceptible de sacrifier au des- 
potisme le bien qui faisait depuis si 
longtemps le seul objet de ses brulants 
desirs. . . . Ce n'est pas, legislateurs, 
que votre decret ne contienne des vues 
sublimes, emanees de votre sagesse : 
nous sentons la hauteur des principes 
que vous y consacrez, mais apres tout 
il est injonctif; nous ne pourrons 
jamais vous dire : Ce sont nos vues, 
ce sont nos principes ; vous nous prive- 
riez de la jouissance du caractere le 
plus sacre de la souverainete et de la 
liberte, celui de n'obeir qu'a elle-meme, 

protectors of the oppressed, the re- 
storers of the rights of man, this de- 
cree so terrible for us. . . . Your 
generals on entering each Belgian 
province have done homage to the 
enthusiasm of the Belgian spirit; 
everywhere they have seen, recog- 
nized, applauded the intoxication of 
joy shown by everyone; everywhere 
crowds greeted them on their way, 
overwhelmed them with felicitations, 
and did not cease to bear witness 
to their gratitude to their deliverers, 
and their attachment to liberty and 
equality. These wishes for liberty 
and equality had been already an- 
nounced in an unequivocal manner 
at the time when, still groaning under 
the yoke of despotism, we scarcely 
dared raise our eyes to the sun which 
had caused these inestimable gifts to 
be showered on us. These are the 
people, these are the innermost senti- 
ments, and this the nation which, in 
the sanctuary whence come the 
oracles of liberty and of equality, one 
dares traduce before Europe as ca- 
pable of sacrificing to despotism the 
good which had for so long been the 
sole object of their ardent desire! 
... It is not, legislators, that your 
decree does not contain sublime ideas, 
results of your wisdom; we appreci- 
ate the loftiness of the principles 
which you there consecrate, but after 
all it is imperative; we can never say 
to you: "These are our opinions, 
these are our principles. ,, You would 
deprive us of the enjoyment of the 
most sacred attribute of sovereignty 
and liberty, that of obeying it alone, 



celui de ne suivre que sa propre im- 
pulsion et de se devoir sa felicite et 
sa gloire. Vous futes, vous etes ja- 
loux de la votre, laissez-nous done 
cherir aussi le bienfait que nous vous 
devons. . . . 

of following its own impulse, and 
of owing to itself its happiness and 
its glory. You would be, you are 
jealous of your own, let us then also 
preserve the benefits which we owe 
to you. 

Second Decree Regarding the Conduct of the Generals in those Countries 
where the Armies of France have Entered or shall Enter. January 31, 
1793 1 

La Convention nationale, informee 
que, dans quelques-uns des pays ac- 
tuellement occupes par les armees de 
la Republique, Texecution des decrets 
des 15, 17 et 22 decembre dernier a 
ete arrete, en tout ou en partie, par les 
ennemis du peuple coalises contre sa 
souverainete, decrete ce qui suit : 

Art. l* r . Les decrets des 15, 17 et 
22 decembre seront executes dans tous 
les lieux ou les armees de la Repub- 
lique sont entrees ou entreront a 

2. Les generaux des armees de la 
Republique prendront toutes les me- 
sures necessaires pour la tenue des 
assemblies primaires ou communales, 
aux termes desdits decrets. Les com- 
missaires envoyes par la Convention 
nationale pour fraterniser avec ces 
peuples pourront decider provisoire- 
ment toutes les questions qui s'eleve- 
ront relativement a la forme et aux 
operations des assemblies, meme en 
cas de reclamation sur la validite des 
elections. lis veilleront particuliere- 

1 Duvergier, Collection, vol. 5, p. 130. 

The National Convention, in- 
formed that, in some of the countries 
at present occupied by the armies of 
the Republic, the execution of the 
decrees of the 15, 17 and 22 of last 
December has been arrested, in whole 
cr in part, by the enemies of the peo- 
ple, joined together against their sov- 
ereignty, decrees as follows: 

Article 1. The decrees of De- 
cember 15, 17 and 22 shall be ex- 
ecuted in all the places where the 
armies of the Republic have entered 
or shall enter in the future. 

2. The generals of the armies of 
the Republic shall take all the meas- 
ures necessary for the holding of pri- 
mary or communal assemblies, accord- 
ing to the terms of the said decrees. 
The commissioners sent by the Na- 
tional Convention to fraternize with 
these people may decide provisionally 
all the questions which arise relating 
to the form and operations of the as- 
semblies, even in case of protests 
against the validity of elections. 
They shall exercise special care over 


ment sur tout ce qui pourra assurer la 
liberte des assemblies et des suffrages. 

3. Les peuples reunis en assemblies 
primaires ou communales sont invites 
a emettre leur voeu sur la forme du 
gouvernement qu'ils voudront adopter. 

4. Les peuples des villes et terri- 
toires qui ne se seraient pas assem- 
bles dans la quinzaine au plus tard 
apres la promulgation tant des decrets 
des 15, 17 et 22 decembre dernier, si 
elle n'a pas ete faite, que du present 
decret, seront declares ne vouloir etre 
amis du peuple fran£ais. La Repu- 
blique les traitera comme les peuples 
qui refusent d'adopter ou se donner 
un gouvernement fonde sur la liberte 
et Tegalite. 

5. Les trois commissaires de la 
Convention nationale dans la Bel- 
gique, le Hainaut, le pays de Liege 
et les pays voisins, qui sont venus 
rendre compte de leurs operations a 
la Convention, se reuniront a leurs 
collegues, et partiront, savoir: Dan- 
ton et Lacroix, immediatement apres 
le present decret ; Camus, dans la hui- 
taine au plus tard. lis pourront agir 
conjointement ou separement, pourvu 
neanmoins qu'ils soient reunis au 
nombre de deux, et a la charge de 
donner connaissance, dans les vingt- 
quatre heures, de toutes leurs opera- 
tions a la Convention. 

all that may insure the freedom of 
the assemblies and of the votes. 

3. The peoples, convened in pri- 
mary or communal assemblies, are 
invited to express their wish as to the 
form of government which they wish 
to adopt. 

4. The people of the. towns and 
territories who shall not have assem- 
bled within fifteen days, at the lat- 
est, after the promulgation of the de- 
crees of December 15, 17 and 22, if 
such promulgation has not already 
been made, shall be declared to be not 
desirous of being friends with the 
French people. The Republic shall 
treat them as peoples who refuse to 
adopt or give themselves a govern- 
ment founded on liberty and equality. 

5. The three commissioners of the 
National Convention in Belgium, 
Hainaut, the country of Liege and 
the neighboring countries, who have 
come to render- an account of their 
operations to the Convention, shall 
join their colleagues, and shall de- 
part as follows: Danton and La- 
croix, immediately after the present 
decree, Camus in a week, at latest. 
They may act together or separately, 
provided, however, that they shall be 
in groups of two, and under the obli- 
gation to render an account of all 
their actions to the Convention, every 
twenty-four hours. 



Decree Regarding the Union of the Principality of Monaco, of a Part of the 
Bailiwick of Schambourg, and other Neighboring Territories. February 
14, 1793 1 

La Convention nationale, constante 
dans les principes qu'elle a consacres 
par ses decrets des 19 novembre 
et 15 decembre derniers, confirmant 
les resolutions qu'ils annoncent, 
d'aider et secourir tous les peuples 
qui voudront conquerir leur liberte; 
sur le voeu libre et formel qui lui a 
ete adresse par plusieurs communes 
etrangeres, circonvoisines ou en- 
clavees, reunies en assemblies pri- 
maires, faisant usage de leur droit in- 
alienable de souverainete a Teffet 
d'etre reunies a la France comme 
parties integrantes de la Republique; 
apres avoir entendu le rapport de son 
comite diplomatique, declare, au nom 
du peuple fran9ais, qu'elle accepte ce 
voeu, et en consequence decrete ce qui 
suit : 

Art. l* r . La ci-devant principaute 
de Monaco est reunie au territoire de 
la Republique frangaise, et fait partie 
du departement des Alpes-Mari times. 

Art. 2. La partie inferieure du 
bailliage de Schambourg, dite le Bas- 
Office, est reunie au territoire de la 
Republique, et fait partie du departe- 
ment de la Moselle. 

Art. 3. Les communes du pays 
de Saarwerden et de Harshkerich, 
ainsi que celles d'Asweiller, sont re- 
unies au territoire de la Republique, et 

1 Arch, pari., 1st series, vol. 58, p. 550. 

The National Convention, firm in 
the principles it has sanctioned by its 
decrees of the 19th of November and 
the 15th of December last, confirm- 
ing the resolutions that they announce 
of aiding and succoring all peoples 
who may wish to conquer their own 
liberty ; upon the free and formal vote 
addressed to it by several foreign, 
neighboring or enclosed communes 
gathered in primary assemblies, and 
making use of their inalienable right 
of sovereignty for the purpose of be- 
ing united to France as integral parts 
of the Republic; after having heard 
the report of its diplomatic commit- 
tee, declares, in the name of the 
French people, that it accepts this 
vote, and consequently decrees as fol- 
lows : 

Article 1. The former princi- 
pality of Monaco is united to the ter- 
ritory of the French Republic, and 
makes a part of the department of the 
Maritime Alps. 

Art. 2. The lower part of the 
bailiwick of Schambourg, called the 
Bas-Office, is united to the territory