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01 


THE  ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION 

NATURAL  AND  REVEALED 

TO  THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  COURSE 

OF  NATURE 


To  which  are  added  two  brief  Dif^ertations 

I.  OF  PERSONAL  IDENTITY 

II.  OF  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE 


THE 

ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION 

NATURAL  AND  REVEALED 
TO  THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  COURSE 

OF  NATURE 
BY    JOSEPH    BUTLER    LL.D. 

LORD  BISHOP  OF  DURHAM 

WITH  ANALYTICAL  PREFACE  AND  INDEX 
BY    THE   REV.    EDWARD    STEERE    LL.D. 


LONDON 
BELL  AND  DALDY  FLEET  STREET 


Ejus  {Analogice)  haec  vis  est,  ut  id  quod  dublum  est,  ad  ali- 
quid  simile  de  quo  non  quaeritur,  referat  j  ut  incerta  certis 
probet. — Slmnt,  Inst.  Orat.  L.  I.  c.  vi. 


CHISWICK  PRESS  :  —  PRINTED  BY  C.  WHITTINGHAM,  TOOKS   COURT, 
CHANCERY   LANE. 


INTRODUCTORY  PREFACE. 


HERE  is,  perhaps,  no  feeling  about 
Bishop  Butler's  Analogy  so  general  as 
the  convi(5lion  that  it  is  very  obscure 
and  difficult.  For  my  own  part,  I 
cannot  now  sympathize  with  that  idea  ; 
in  h6i,  I  know  few  authors  whose  style  and  matter 
seem  so  well  to  accord  with  one  another  as  do  Bishop 
Butler's.  It  was  not  so  with  me  always.  I  had 
once  to  get  up  his  three  first  sermons  for  a  Univer- 
sity examination.  I  remember  reading  on  with  a 
sort  of  dull  acquiescence  till  I  had  got  about  half 
way  through  them,  and  then  it  occurred  to  me  to 
wonder  what  all  I  had  been  reading  might  amount 
to,  and  I  found  myself  without  a  single  definite  idea. 
I  went  back  and  tried  to  pick  out  the  main  points  in 
the  argument,  and  I  certainly  then  thought  the 
writer's  style  was  cruelly  difficult  and  obscure.  But 
I  have  long  since  changed  my  opinion. 

In  truth,  the  greatest  beauty  of  an  author's  style 
consists  in  its  appropriatene{^  to  expreft  his  mean- 
ing. There  is  a  rough  likenef^  between  the  style  of 
the  Analogy  and  that  of  a  legal  document,  and  it 
goes  deeper  than  might  have  been  expe(fied  ; — 
for  what  makes  a  deed  obscure  to  the  uninitiated  ? 
Chiefly  the  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  framer  to  ex- 


«^-' 


vi  Introdudory  Preface. 

elude  all  ambiguity.  It  looks  like  irony,  but  it  is 
true,  that  no  written  thing,  when  examined,  is  clearer 
than  a  legal  document,  and  the  objec?!:, — the  attained 
objedl, — of  all  those  obscure  phrases  is  to  avoid  the 
pof^ibility  of  being  misunderstood.  Therefore  it  is 
that  the  more  one  examines  into  the  pof^ible  mean- 
ings of  what  seemed  clearer  exprefsions,  the  more 
we  shall  realize  and  admire  the  sound  judgment 
which  has  preferred  what  we,  at  first  sight,  thought 
ill-chosen  and  obscure.  Thus  it  is  that  careful  stu- 
dents of  Butler's  works  generally  come,  in  the  end, 
to  have  a  sort  of  relish  for  his  peculiar  style. 

It  is  small  comfort,  however,  to  a  weary  student 
to  be  told  that  what  wearies  him  is  a  beauty;  he 
will  be,  no  doubt,  better  pleased  to  have  his  labour 
lightened.  I  have,  therefore,  prepared  a  short  ab- 
stract of  the  line  of  argument  pursued  by  our  author, 
which  may  aisist  his  memory  in  retaining  the  main 
points  of  the  argument. 

The  two  great  principles  by  which  Butler  seems 
to  have  accounted  to  himself  for  the  existence  of 
evils  in  the  world,  are,  first,  that  the  government  of 

I  God  is  carried  on  by  general  laws,  which,  in  ex- 
ceptional cases,  seem  to  need  corredlion ;  and  then, 

I  that  man  is  guided  by  particular  affections  towards 
certain  obje(5ls  and  ends,  without  regard  to  the  mo- 
ral nature  of  the  means  used  to  obtain  them  ;  and, 
of  course,  if  men  transgref^,  they  encounter  the 
operation  of  those  other  general  laws  by  which  right 
is  rewarded  and  wrong  punished.  In  the  control  of 
these  particular  afFec^tions  lies  the  main  part  of  our 
probation.  We  are  never  impelled  by  our  nature  to 
seek  anything  intrinsically  bad,  for  its  own  sake,  and 
the  general  laws  which  govern  the  world  are  in 
themselves  good.  This  is  probably  as  near  an  ac- 
count of  the  mode  in  which  evil  exists  among  us, 


Introductory  Preface.  vii 

and  of  how  it  is  to  be  reconciled  with  God's  good- 
neft,  as  has  ever  yet  been  discovered. 

The  abstra(5l  question  is  not  here  formally  dis- 
cuf^ed,  but  it  is  shown  that,  after  all  pofsible  argu- 
ments have  been  considered,  there  is  a  practical 
matter-of-facft  testimony  to  the  moral  chara(9;er  of 
the  Author  of  nature  which  no  speculative  difficul- 
ties can  at  all  unsettle.  It  is  much  to  be  regretted 
that  the  arguments  of  the  Analogy  are  not  more  in- 
telligible and  interesting  to  those  who  need  to  be 
convinced  by  them ;  and  I  would  suggest  to  the 
reader  that  he  might  make  them  so,  if  he  colledled 
in  the  margin  of  his  copy  such  anecdotes,  proverbs, 
and  instances  as  may  occur  to  him,  embodying  the 
principles  of  condudl;  dryly  and  abstractedly  laid 
down  in  the  text ;  then,  in  preaching  or  speaking, 
these  illustrations  would  make  the  argument  much 
clearer  to  the  multitude  than  any  more  exa.6i  state- 
ments could  do.  I  shall  now  proceed  with  my  ac- 
count of  what  the  book  contains. 

The  Introdu(5Hon  opens  with  a  short  account  of 
the  nature  of  probable  evidence  as  distinguished 
from  demonstration.  It  is  shown  that  likenef^  to 
some  other  and  better-known  series  of  events  is  the 
material  ground  of  our  conclusions  in  reference  to 
matters  of  faSi — conclusions  upon  which  we  con- 
stantly and  fearleftly  a<Si.  It  is  proposed  to  show  that , 
the  doc^^^ines  of  Religion  have  such  a  similarity  to/ 1 
the  ordinary  course  of  events  in  everyday  life,  as  to' 
make  it  probable  that  the  laws  which  govern  them 
have  a  common  Author.  If  this  be  only  shown  to 
be  pojlible,  the  obje(5l  of  the  treatise  will  have  been 
obtained,  and  that  by  reasoning  resting  exclusively 
upon  fa6is,  and  therefore  irrefragable  so  long  as 
those  fa(9:s  remain  unchanged. 

It  is  ai^umed,  and  this  must  throughout  be  borne 


viii  Introdudory  Preface. 

in  mind,  that  there  is  some  regular  g^overnment  of 
the  universe, — that  the  world  is  not  a  chaos; — in- 
deed it  has  been  well  proved,  m  other  treatises,  that 
there  is  a  supreme  God.  It  is  not  proposed,  in  this 
work,  to  go  into  any  speculative  argument,  but  simply 
to  investigate  the  fa6ls  of  Nature  as  they  are,  and 
to  cojnpare  them  with  what  natural  and  revealed 
Religion  declare. 
\  <  Ch.  I.  The  first  thing  to  be  considered  is,  whether 
there  is  any  presumption  against  the  docftrine  of 
our  existence  in  a  future  life,  as  implied  in  both  na- 
tural  and  revealed  Religion.  But  first  we  must  in- 
quire what  there  is  to  live  in  a  future  state — what  it 
is  that  lives  now ;  in  other  words,  what  is  the  "  I," 
the  person  about  which  we  are  speaking  1  The  Dis- 
sertation on  Personal  Identity  comes  in  here,  in 
which  it  is  shown  not  to  consist  in  memory  or  con- 
sciousnel^,  but  in  that  which  pof^eftes  them, — a 
something  of_which  we  know  little  more  thanJ:hat 
it jnust_exist,  because  the  slightest  doubt  of  it  in- 
volves us  in  endlef^  pra(5lical  absurdities. 

To  return  to  the  question  about  a  future  life.  We 
have  ourselves  experienced  great  changes  in  form 
and  in  capacity.  We  see  many  such  going  on 
around  us,  especially  in  the  case  of  inse(5^s.  Con- 
tinuance is  expe(5led  on  the  ground  of  past  existence  : 
and  so  we  all  expedl  the  continuance  of  our  living 
powers  until  and  unlef^  they  end  in  death.  What 
is  death,  that  it  should  destroy  them  ]  There  does 
not  appear  to  be  any  reason  in  the  nature  of  things 
why  it  should,  and,  as  to  Analogy,  death  does  not 
destroy  our  material  substances ;  it  only  separates 
them;  but  the  individual  person,  being  mseparable, 
is  just  as  likely  to  continue  as  any  particular  atom 
of  matter  may  be.  It  is  evident  that  the  body  is  an 
instrument  of  the  person,  not  a  part  of  it ;  its  dif^o- 


Introdudory  Preface.  ix 

lution,  therefore,  may  leave  the  person  uninjured. 
The   case   of  brutes   is  not  analogous.     We   have 
powers  apparently  independent  of  our  bodily  senses  ; 
these  may  well  be  believed  to  continue  unimpaired 
by  the  sudden  change  called  death.     It  is  quite  pos- j 
sible  that  we  may  by  death  lose  hinderances  rather L 
than  capacities.     It  cannot,  therefore,  be  affirmed! 
that  it  is  impoftible  men  should  live  in  a  future  state  ;  | 
it  would  rather  be  in  accordance  with  the  Analogy 
of  Nature   that  they    should.     Thus  a  prospe^l  is 
opened  which  must  affe(5l  the  conduct  of  reason- 
able men. 

Ch.  II.  If  this  probability  of  a  future  life  should 
turn  out  a  truth,  can  we  be  sure  that  our  actions 
now  will  not  affe6i  our  happinei^  then  ?  How  is  it 
in  the  world  ?  As  a  matter  of  fa(5l,  our  condu(5l  does 
most  materially  affe^l  our  happinel^  afterwards. 
This  {a<Si  at  once  disposes  of  all  speculative  difficul- 
ties about  present  acftions  having  future  consequences, 
and,  besides^men  are  guided  in  their  a^lions  by  thd 
future  good  or  evil  consequences  of  them,  which  is; 
the  true  idea  of  being  governed  by  rewards  and  pu-' 
nishments.^  Especially  in  regard  to  evil  conse- 
quences.— They  follow  upon  carelef^  imprudent  ac- 
tions. They  are  sometimes  long  delayed,  and  often 
irreparable.  Frequently,  when  men  have  long 
seemed  to  escape,  they  come  suddenly  and  irresis- 
tibly, just  as  the  evil  consequences  of  impiety  are 
expe(5led  to  come  by  religious  persons.  What  mad- 
nei^,  then,  to  run  the  risk  of  all  this  misery,  which 
is  so  far  from  improbable,  that,  if  only  God  rules  the 
whole  universe  as  we  know  that  He  governs  the 
world,  the  punishment  of  some  men  is  morally  cer- 
tain ! 

Ch.  III.  But  will  these  rewards  and  punishments 
certainly  be  dispensed  on  moral  grounds,  as  Reli- 


X  Introdudory  Preface. 

gion  affirms  1  It  is  not  so  much  for  us  to  argue  about 
what  the  world  should  be,  according  to  our  notions  of 
God's  nature,  as  to  inquire  what  its  a(51:ual  course  is. 
Religion  does  not  affirm  that  what  we  see  is  perfect, 
but  much  ratherthat  it  is  as  yet  faulty  and  incomplete. 

The  Diftertation  on  Virtue  comes  in  here,  and 
shows  that  the  distinction  between  virtue  and  vice 
is  a  natural  one,  and  that  there  is  a  something  in 
man  which  connects  the  idea  of  punishment  with 
that  of  vice,  and  annexes  to  virtue  the  hope  of  re- 
ward and  favour. 

It  is  a  faiSi,  that  a  sense  of  satisfaction  does  gene- 
rally attend  virtue,  and  this  is  in  itself  a  reward. 
Certain  vices  are  naturally  punished  by  society,  as 
being  destructive  to  it,  and  virtue  is  never  punished 
as  such.  Wherever  harm  or  advantage  follows  an 
action,  not  as  being  an  action  merely,  but  as  having 
a  moral  chara(5ter,  virtue  is  always  rewarded  and  vice 
punished.  Consider  the  effe(5ts,  not  only  on  our  own 
peace  of  mind,  but  on  the  good  cr  ill  will  of  others, 
both  manifested  in  various  ways.  The  distribution 
of  pain  and  pleasure,  independently  of  moral  cha- 
racter, does  not  contradi(5t  this,  because  it  is  mani- 
festly not  the  moral  character  of  men  which  then 
produces  them.  There  is  an  analogy  between  the 
power  of  virtue  and  that  of  reason.  Reason  gives 
men  superiority  over  unreasoning  animals  ;  but  then 
reason  may,  for  a  time,  be  overborne,  and  the  very 
want  of  reason  sometimes  seems  to  add  to  the  force 
and  daring  of  brutes.  It  is  easy  to  conceive  cases 
analogous  to  the  present  prevalence  of  vice.  Then 
let  us  consider  what  would  be  the  effect  of  the  es- 
tablishment of  a  perfectly  virtuous  kingdom.  What 
we  know  of  the  government  of  the  world  shows  that 
its  Governor  is  not  indifferent  to  virtue  and  vice,  and 
that,  so  far  as  natural  tendencies  have  free  course, 


Introdudory  Preface.  xi 

vice  Is  punished  and  virtue  rewarded.  The  way  is 
thus  opened  for  the  ordinary  proofs  of  a  future  state 
of  retribution,  and  the  Analogy  of  Nature  shown  to 
be  on  its  side. 

€h.  IV.  Are  we,  then,  in  a  state  of  trial  for  some 
future  state  ]  Pleasure  and  pain  being  annexed  as 
consequences  to  our  a(5lions,  we  are,  in  facft,  each 
day  in  a  state  of  trial,  and  good  or  harm  results  to 
us  according  to  our  doings.  Habits  and  paf^ions 
mislead  us  in  regard  to  our  succeO?  in  the  world. 
Prudence  and  self-denial  are  necefkary  all  through 
life ;  and  men  are,  in  spite  of  experience,  volunta- 
rily extravagant  and  imprudent,  and  suffer  for  it  af- 
terwards. We  are,  no  doubt,  not  so  well  off  as  we 
might  be ;  but  our  own  interest  is  in  our  hands  to 
spoil  or  improve.  All  this  is  stric^ily  analogous  to 
what  Religion  tells  us  of  our  state  of  probation  for  a 
future  life,  and  our  conduct  under  it. 

Ch.  V.  It  may  be  beyond  our  faculties  to  ascer- 
tain how  we  came  to  be  placed  in  this  state  of  trial ; 
yet  we  may  see,  at  least,  one  natural  object  for  it — 
our  improvement  in  virtue  and  piety.  Every  crea- 
ture is  adapted  to  some  particular  state  of  life.  All 
that  we  are  acquainted  with  are  capable  of  becoming 
adapted  to  some  new  one.  We  see  this  in  the  ef- 
fe(5ls  of  pra(9:ice  and  custom  upon  ourselves.  Va- 
rious habits  of  mind  and  body  do  affe(5l  our  capabi- 
lities, and  may  change  our  moral  chara(51:er.  This 
capacity  for  improvement  it  lies  with  us  to  use. 
Children  are  gradually  educated  into  a  fit  state  for 
mature  life,  though  they,  in  many  things,  perceive 
it  as  little  as  we  do  that  w^e  are  being  educated  for 
a  future  state.  But  in  regard  to  moral  improvement, 
we  can  see  both  our  want  and  how  it  is  supplied. 
Habits  of  virtue  improve  our  characfter.  It  would  be 
so  with  even  perfe(5l  finite  beings ;  it  is  much  more 


xii  Introdudory  Preface. 

so  with  us.  The  difficuhies  we  meet  with  are  what 
strengthen  our  purposes  and  habits.  Though  but 
few  men  a(9:ually  improve,  they  are,  perhaps,  as 
many  in  proportion  as  the  well-formed  seeds  which 
grow  up  into  healthy  plants.  Our  tempers  may 
very  probably  be  improved  by  the  exercise  even  of 
virtues  which  we  may  not  need  hereafter  in  the  same 
form  ;  and  as  it  is  manifest  that  we  have  had  a  work 
to  do  in  fitting  ourselves  to  live  in  the  world,  can 
any  one  say  it  is  improbable  that  we  may  now  be 
fitting  or  unfitting  ourselves  for  some  other? 

The  world  is  a  theatre  of  action  in  regard  to  men  ; 
our  lives  may  be  so  in  regard  to  other  objec^ts. 

Ch.  VI.  We  have  hitherto  af^umed  the  world  to 
be  under  some  government,  and  it  may  be  suggested 
that,  if  that  government  be  by  natural  necef^ity 
merely,  what  we  have  said  of  moral  government  will 
fall  to  the  ground.  The  opinion  of  neceftity  is  a 
theory  only,  but  the  preceding  arguments  are  all 
drawn  from  fa(9:s,  and  must  remain  while  the  fa(5ls 
are  unchanged.  The  opinion  of  necef^ity  does  not 
exclude  deliberation,  choice,  and  a(9;ing  for  a  pur- 
pose in  men.  It  does  not  exclude  an  intelligent 
agent,  but  only  his  a(5i:ing  freely.  It  accounts,  by 
itself,  as  little  for  the  existence  of  a  universe  as  for 
that  of  a  house.  Suppose  a  child  educated  on  fa- 
talist principles,  it  could  not  live  in  the  world  with- 
out abandoning  them.  In  practical  matters  we  all 
disregard  this  opinion.  As  a  matter  of  fa(9;,  there 
is  such  a  thing  as  a  moral  characfter  in  men,  and 
they  are,  in  {'a6i,  governed  by  the  hope  and  fear  of 
rewards  and  punishments.  As  a  matter  of  fa(9:,  there- 
fore, the  Governor  of  the  universe  may  have  a  moral 
chara(5ler,  and  the  opinion  of  necefsity  must  either 
be  consistent  with  these  things,  as  fa<?is,  or  be 
abandoned.     The  external  evidence  of  Religion  also 


Introdu6!ory  Preface.  xiii 

rests  upon  fa^ls.  So  that  the  opinion  must  be  treated 
as  practically  false,  and,  even  if  it  were  true,  could 
not  be  inconsistent  with  Religion.  ^ 

Ch.  VII.  It  was  not  af^erted  that  Analogy  would 
give  a  strict  proof  of  Religion,  but  only  that  it  would 
prove  it  credible,  and  show  it  probably  true.  We 
know  that  the  natural  government  of  the  world  is  a 
scheme,  or  system,  of  which  we  see  but  a  small  part 
and  understand  but  a  little.  If  the  moral  govern- 
ment is  of  the  same  nature,  it  is  probable  that  we 
shall  understand  it  as  little.  Our  ignorance,  pro- 
bably, hides  from  us  the  solution  of  many  difficulties. 
Now  ignorance  is  no  answer,  unlef^  we  are  ignorant 
of  something  materially  concerned  in  our  estimate 
of  the  matter  in  question.  This  is  so  in  regard  to 
objec9;ions  against  the  moral  government  of  the 
world,  which  we  see  to  be  carried  on  by  good  ge- 
neral laws,  and  in  other  matters  we  daily  see  strange 
means  bringing  about  unexpec^led  results.  This  ig- 
norance is  not  of  equal  force  against  Religion,  be- 
cause our  proofs  have  rested  upon  facets,  which  we 
do  know,  while  the  objeclions  are  based  upon  as- 
sumptions, which  we  can  only  guef^  at.  Analogy 
shows  very  clearly  that  mere  ignorance  is  likely  to 
be  the  reason  why  we  cannot  answer  many  objec- 
tions. / 

The  Conclusion  of  the  first  Part  briefly  sums  up 
the  matters  discui^ed  and  the  conclusions  arrived  at, 
and  applies  them  as  incentives  to  a  virtuous  and  re- 
ligious life. 

Part  II.  In  the  first  Part  it  was  only  afsumed  that 
the  world  was  under  some  regular  government.  In 
the  second  Part  it  is  afsumed,  further,  that  there  are 
such  things  as  virtue  and  vice,  and  that  the  world, 
and  particularly  the  human  race,  is  under  the  go- 
vernment of  a  wise  and  good  God.     The  object:  of 


xiv  Introdudory  Preface. 

this  Part  is  to  show  that  the  dealings  of  God  with 
us,  in  respecl  of  Christianity,  are  analogous  to  those 
in  regard  of  natural  Religion,  and  therefore,  by  the 
arguments  of  the  first  Part,  and  sometimes  by  dire6l 
comparison,  analogous  to  those  in  regard  of  our  or- 
dinary temporal  interests. 

Ch.  I.  There  are  some  who  affe^i  to  think  any 
revelation  unnecef^ary.  But  it  is  manifest  that  there 
was  something  for  a  Revelation  to  effect,  and  that, 
if  one  has  been  really  made,  it  cannot  be  safely 
treated  as  of  no  importance.  Christianity  does,  in 
fa6i,  republish,  confirm,  and  provide  for  the  conti- 
nuous promulgation  of  the  do(A;rines  of  pure,  natural 
Religion.  It  also  declares  a  further  part  of  God's 
moral  government,  and  reveals  relations  and  duties 
hitherto  unperceived  by  us,  but  not  the  left  real  and 
of  natural  moral  obligation  when  declared, — espe- 
cially in  regard  to  the  Redeemer  and  the  San(9;ifier. 
The  bare  pojlibility  of  our  standing  in  such  rela- 
tions ought,  in  reason,  to  affeSi  our  practice.  The 
chapter  concludes  with  an  investigation  of  the  dif- 
ference between  moral  and  positive  precepts  and 
duties,  with  a  warning  not  to  prejudge  the  nature  of 
the  Revelation  to  be  expec^ted. 

Ch.  II.  It  is  said  to  be  unnatural  that  there  should 
be  a  miraculous  Revelation.  But  the  more  a  man 
knows,  the  more  he  feels  his  ignorance  and  how 
much  can  only  be  learnt  by  Revelation.  We  know 
not  how  far  Revelation  may  be  in  accordance  with 
that  general  course  of  Nature  in  regard  to  such 
things  of  which  we  can  only  know  this  one  instance. 
It  may  be  quite  natural  that  there  should  be  a  Re- 
velation at  the  creation  of  a  world,  and  history 
seems  to  point  to  one  in  regard  to  ourselves.  There 
is  a  presumption  against  everything  till  it  has  hap- 
pened.    We  know  not  but  that  there  might  be  na- 


Introdu£!ory  Preface.  xv 

tural  reasons  for  miracles.  We  do  know  that  there 
are  moral  ones,  and  there  are  things  commonly 
known,  which,  but  for  being  so,  would  have  seemed 
quite  as  incredible. 

Ch.  III.  Reason,  noble  as  it  is,  and  capable  of 
judging  of  the  evidence  of  Revelation  and  its  general 
character,  is  yet  no  competent  judge  of  the  details 
of  a  proved  Revelation  and  the  manner  in  which  it 
has  been  given.  Apply  it  to  the  details  of  the  or- 
dinary government  of  the  world,  and  it  will  prove 
itself  equally  incompetent ;  especially  consider  how 
men  are  taught  what  they  ordinarily  know.  We 
must  thoroughly  understand  God's  purposes  before 
we  can  judge  of  what  will  effect  them.  Compare 
human  instruction  with  Revelation,  and  the  use  and 
abuse  of  natural  powers  with  those  recorded  of  mi- 
raculous ones,  the  plainnef^  of  ordinary  duties,  and 
the  application  necei^ary  to  make  progrefs  in  know- 
ledge in  both  cases,  and  the  similar  hinderances  and 
ignorances.  Compare  the  existence  of  natural  and 
moral  diseases,  and  the  difficulties  in  discovering 
and  applying  their  remedies.  There  are  no  im- 
moral precepts  in  Scripture.  In  short,  objec9:ions 
against  Christianity  itself  are  generally  frivolous,  be- 
cause similar  ones  might  be  laid  against  the  ordi- 
nary course  of  Nature.  But  we  know  what  could 
have  been  expected  from  enthusiasm  and  political 
views,  and  it  goes  beyond  that. 

Ch.  IV.  Just  as  it  was  before  shown  that  the  mo- 
ral government  of  the  world  might  be  the  best  sys- 
tem pofsible,  and  not  appear  so  to  us,  the  same  may 
be  proved  of  Christianity.  It  is  evidently  a  vast 
^plan,  of  which  but  a  very  small  part  is  declared  to 
us.  The  fitnef^  of  particular  means  to  particular 
ends  we  are  very  bad  judges  of.  The  general  laws 
which  govern  it  we  can  only  perceive  by  some  in- 


xvi  Introdudory  Preface. 

dications,  as  we  can  in  Nature  reduce  but  a  part  of 
what  we  see  to  known  general  natural  laws.  Our 
redemption  was  certainly  worked  out  by  very  slow 
and  succeftive  means— so  is  the  bursting  of  a  flower. 
The  deliberation  with  which  natural  Providence 
works,  and  our  liability  to  mistake  the  tendency  of 
its  operations,  are  evident  in  everything  around  us. 
Ch.  V.  Men  obje(?l;  against  the  mediation  of 
Christ.  But  we  are  all  brought  into  the  world  and 
preserved  in  it  by  the  mediation  of  others.  The 
consequences  which  would  naturally  follow  upon  our 
follies  and  vices,  the  care  of  others  may  save  us 
from.  We  do  not  sufficiently  realize  the  present 
heinousnef^  and  disastrous  effedls  of  vice,  and  there- 
fore do  not  sufficiently  value  the  provisions  for  saving 
us  from  those  effects.  Reformation  does  not  save 
us  without  the  help  of  others,  and  it  is  to  be  re- 
membered that  Christianity  did  not  make  us  need 
salvation ;  it  only  declared  God's  goodnef^  towards 
us  in  respedl  of  it.  There  is  nothing  unnatural  in 
the  do(5lrine  of  our  being  in  a  fallen  state.  Christ 
is  declared  to  us  in  Scripture  as  Prophet,  Priest,  and 
King,  the  Vidlim  and  the  Offerer.  We  know  so 
little  about  the  future  punishment  of  sin,  that  we 
cannot  judge  of  the  expediency  or  usefulnef^  of  the 
means  taken  to  prevent  it.  It  is  said  to  be  contrary 
to  God's  nature  that  the  just  should  suffer  for  the 
unjust.  But  human  beings  often  undergo  great  la- 
bour, danger,  and  sufferings,  sometimes  death,  to 
deliver  their  fellow-creatures  from  the  consequences 
of  their  faults  and  mistakes ; — what  is  this  but  the 
vicarious  suffering  of  those  who  have  not  offended  ? 
It  is  the  highest  presumption,  and  contrary  to  all 
reason  and  analogy,  for  us  to  expecff  to  understand 
the  whole  of  the  Divine  condu^f.  Our  own  duty  is 
taught  us  clearly  ;  the  moment  we  go  beyond  that, 
we  grope  in  darknef^. 


IntroduSory  Preface.  xvii 

Ch.  VI.  Some  obje(5l  that  a  true  Revelation  would 
not  have  been  left  upon  evidence  capable  of  being 
doubted,  and  known  to  but  a  part  of  mankind.  But 
we  always  have  doubtful  evidence  to  a(5l  upon  in 
temporal  affairs,  and  no  two  men  have  exa6i\y  the 
same  advantages.  The  light  of  Revelation  has  been 
different  in  different  ages  and  to  different  individuals  ; 
but  we  must  remember  that  all  are  to  be  Judged  ac- 
cording to  what  they  had.  Why  were  different  kinds 
of  beings  created  ?  If  the  Revelation  came  alike  to 
all,  still  all  would  never  derive  the  same  benefit  from 
it.  But  this  doubtfulnel^  may  be  a  part  of  our  pro- 
bation. It  is  a  moral  fault  to  refuse  attention  and 
shut  our  eyes  to  doubtful  evidence.  Speculative  dif- 
ficulties may  be  no  more  to  be  complained  of  than 
any  other  temptations.  They  may  be  the  great 
temptations  of  some  men.  However,  men  are  often 
in  doubt  merely  through  some  evident  fault  of  their 
own.  There  seems  to  be  full  evidence  of  their  du- 
ties as  Christians  accef^ible  to  men  generally.  It 
can  be  no  excuse  for  negle(5ling  these,  that  they  may 
not  be  able  of  themselves,  at  once,  to  answer  all  the 
objections  cleverer  men  may  suggest.  Besides, 
God  does  not  desire  us  to  do  this  or  that  external 
thing,  but  to  cultivate  a  holy  and  virtuous  frame  of 
mind :  doubtful  evidence  will  suflfice  for  this.  Even 
a  sceptic  is  morally  bound  not  to  be  openly  profane. 

Ch.  VII.  The  evidence  of  Christianity  includes  a 
multitude  of  details,  making  up  together  one  great 
argument ;  so  does  the  evidence  on  which  we  be- 
lieve ordinary  fa(9;s.  The  miracles  recorded  in  Scrip- 
ture are  not  separable  from  the  other  fa.6is  of  the 
history.  All  stand  upon  the  same  historical  evidence, 
and  that  of  a  very  satisfactory  kind.  St.  Paul's 
Epistles,  by  themselves,  form  a  very  good  piece  of 
historical  evidence  for  Christianity  and  its  miracles. 
b 


xviii  Introdudory  Preface. 

Its  reception  on  the  ground  of  miracles  is  peculiar 
to  it.  The  fact  of  its  being  so  received,  and  under 
such  circumstances  as  it  was,  and  even  being  re- 
ceived at  all,  is  valid  historical  testimony  to  its  truth. 
The  suggestion  that  the  first  Christians  were  under 
the  influence  of  enthusiasm  does  not  destroy  this 
evidence  ;  nor  does  the  {a6i  that  men  have  been 
strangely  deluded  by  pretended  miracles.  There 
must  be  something  in  its  evidences,  or  these  sug- 
gestions would  never  have  been  made,  and  there  is 
no  counter-evidence  to  be  produced. 

As  to  the  evidence  from  prophecy,  the  obscurity 
of  one  part  does  not  refute  the  clearnels  of  another. 
The  fa(5l  that  prophecy  is  applicable  proves  the  pro- 
priety of  its  application.  The  individual  prophet  is 
not  the  true  author  of  his  prophecies ;  he  is  not, 
therefore,  any  perfe(5l  judge  of  their  application. 
The  whole  question  is,  are  they  applicable  to  Chris- 
tianity, or  no  } 

Upon  a  general  view  of  the  Bible  as  a  history, 
what  an  immense  scope  it  offers  for  criticism,  and 
how  many  openings  for  confutation,  yet  it  has  never, 
as  a  whole,  been  at  all  confuted. 

Suppose  a  person  to  have  picked  up  the  outlines 
of  the  prophecies  concerning  the  Jews  and  the  Mes- 
siah, and  their  alleged  fulfilment :  then  let  him  be 
told,  as  matters  beyond  dispute,  how  much  natural 
Religion  is  indebted  to  the  belief  in  this  Revelation  ; 
that  the  history  contained  in  it  is  confirmed  by  other 
records  and  documents ;  that  the  Jews  have  been 
and  are  what  they  are ;  that  a  person  did  certainly 
arise  among  them,  claiming  to  be  the  Meftiah,  and 
did  establish  a  Religion  which  was  received  on  the 
evidence  of  miracles,  and  does  row  prevail  through- 
out the  world,  the  state  of  which  seems  to  point  to 
the  fulfilment  of  other  prophecies  concerning  it ; — 


Introductory  Preface.  xix 

could  he  doubt  that  this  evidence  is  of  great  weight? 
There  undoubtedly  is  historical  evidence  for  miracles, 
and  there  are  many  instances  of  conformity  between 
the  prophecies  and  actual  events.  All  these  things, 
when  taken  together,  are  of  much  more  force  than 
when  taken  singly,  and  the  importance  of  the  sub- 
jecft  makes  it  our  duty  to  weigh  every  tittle  of  evi- 
dence the  more  carefully. 

Ch.  VIII.  It  is  pofsible  that  the  whole  course  of 
the  foregoing  argument  may  be  objected  to ;  and  to 
meet  this  it  is  desirable  to  remember,  i .  That  it  is 
unreasonable  to  allege  against  Revelation,  specially, 
what  is  equally  applicable  to  natural  Religion,  and 
still  more  whc.t  applies  as  well  to  ordinary  worldly 
prudence.  2.  That  we  have  no  right  to  complain 
that  Religion,  which  is  a  pra(9:ical  matter,  is  left 
doubtful,  if  it  is  not  more  so  than  other  pracftical 
matters  are.  3.  That  the  design  of  this  treatise  is 
not  to  prove  God's  goodnef^,  but  to  inquire  into 
man's  duty.  Objet^ions  to  the  doctrine  about  God 
are  only  considered  so  far  as  to  show  that  they  are 
not  conclusive,  and  that  the  things  obje(fted  to  are, 
as  matters  of  fa(5l,  made  probable  by  being  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  general  course  of  the  world.  4. 
That  there  is  nothing,  about  which  we  may  not  wish 
for  more  light.  5.  That  it  is  not  to  be  expe(fted 
that  any  argument  will  convince  every  one,  if,  as 
has  been  shown  to  be  probable,  the  necef^ity  of  at- 
tention, 8cc.  to  convicftion  forms  part  of  our  proba- 
tion. 6.  That  the  proofs  of  Religion,  from  the  prin- 
ciples of  liberty  and  moral  fitneft,  are  here  altogether 
paired  over,  because  the  aim  is  not  to  give  the  best, 
but  the  most  pra(5lical  proof,  and  one  involving  no 
disputed  principles.  The  whole  treatise  will  there- 
fore be  to  some  a  proof,  to  others  the  confirmation 
of  a  clearer  proof,  to  all  the  analogies  here  traced 


XX  Introdudory  Preface. 

will  be  of  use  in  support  of  the  fa(9;s  implied  in  Re- 
ligion. 

In  the  Conclusion  the  second  Part  is  recapitu- 
lated, and  the  pra(51ical  obligations  arising  from  the 
bare  pofsibility  of  the  truth  of  Christianity  are 
strongly  and  clearly  stated. 

The  specific  points  in  which  analogies  are  traced 
will  be  found  in  the  Index,  under  the  head  of  Ana- 
logy, and  the  principal  obje(5^ions  stated  in  the  text 
under  that  of  OhjeSiions  considered.  If  what  is  here 
done  to  his  hand  save  the  student  any  time  and 
trouble,  let  him  regard  that  gain  as  a  trust  to  be  laid 
out  in  the  further  prosecution  of  the  glorious  work 
of  theological  research,  the  noblest  occupation  that 
can  engage  the  mind  of  man.  May  he  find  as  much 
pleasure  therein  as  has  fallen  to  the  share  of  the 
unworthy  student  who  has  written  these  few  pages 
for  his  af^istance  I 

E.  S. 


[Original  Dedicatiori]. 
TO  THE  RIGHT  HONOURABLE 

CHARLES    LORD    TALBOT, 

BARON  OF  HENSOL, 
Lord  High  Chancellor  of  Great  Britain, 

The  following  Treatise  is,  with  all  respe(5l,  inscribed; 
in  acknowledgment  of  the  highest  obligations  to  the 
late  Lord  Bishop  of  Durham  and  to  himself, 

By  His  Lordship's 
most  dutiful, 

most  devoted, 

and  most  humble  servant, 
JOSEPH  BUTLER. 


ADVERTISEMENT. 


F  the  reader  should  meet  here  with 
any  thing,  which  he  had  not  before 
attended  to,  it  will  not  be  in  the  ob- 
servations upon  the  constitution  and 
course  of  Nature,  these  being  all  ob- 
vious ;  but  in  the  application  of  them :  In  which, 
though  there  is  nothing  but  what  appears  to  me  of 
some  real  weight,  and  therefore  of  great  importance  ; 
yet  he  will  observe  several  things,  which  will  ap- 
pear to  him  of  very  little,  if  he  can  think  things  to 
be  of  little  importance,  which  are  of  any  real  weight 
at  all,  upon  such  a  subjecl;  as  Religion.  However, 
the  proper  force  of  the  following  Treatise  lies  in  the 
whole  general  Analog^'  considered  together. 

It  is  come,  I  know  not  how,  to  be  taken  for 
granted,  by  many  persons,  that  Christianity  is  not 
so  much  as  a  subject  of  inquiry  ;  but  that  it  is,  now 
at  length,  discovered  to  be  fictitious.  And  accord- 
ingly they  treat  it,  as  if,  in  the  present  age,  this 
were  an  agreed  point,  among  all  people  of  discern- 
ment :  and  nothing  remained,  but  to  set  it  up  as  a 
principal  subje(5^  of  mirth  and  ridicule,  as  it  were  by 
way  of  reprisals,  for  its  having  so  long  interrupted 
the  pleasures  of  the  world.  On  the  contrary,  thus 
much,  at  least,  will  be  here  found,  not  taken  for 


xxiv  Advertisement. 

granted,  but  proved,  that  any  reasonable  man,  who 
will  thoroughly  consider  the  matter,  may  be  as 
much  aftured,  as  he  is  of  his  own  beingf,  that  it  is 
not,  however,  so  clear  a  case,  that  there  is  nothing 
in  it.  There  is,  I  think,  strong  evidence  of  its  truth  ! 
but  it  is  certain  no  one  can,  upon  principles  of  rea- 
son, be  satisfied  of  the  contrary.  And  the  prac^tical 
consequence  to  be  drawn  from  this  is  not  attended 
to  by  every  one  who  is  concerned  in  it. 

May,  1736. 


CONTENTS. 

Page 

Introductiok         .        .        .        .        .        .        .        I 

PART  I. 
Chap. 

I.  Of  a  Future  Life 12 

II.  Of  the  Government  of  God  by  Rewards  and  Pu- 

nishments ;  and  particularly  of  the  latter      .       32 

III.  Of  the  Moral  Government  of  God       ...       45 

IV.  Of  a  State  of  Probation,  as  implying  Trial,  Dif- 

ficulties, and  Danger  ....        72 

V.  Of  a  State  of  Probation,  as  intended  for  Moral 

Discipline  and  Improvement         ...       82 
VI.  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity,  considered  as  icflu- 

encing  Practice 109 

VII.  Of  the  Government  of  God,  considered  as  a 
Scheme  or  Constitution,  imperfectly  compre- 
hended       127 

Conclusion         .         .  .         .         .         .         .         .139 

PART  II. 
Chap. 

I.  Of  the  Importance  of  Christianity     .         .         .     147 

II.  Of  the  supposed  Presumption  against  a  Revela- 

tion, considered  as  miraculous     .         .         .167 

III.  Of  our  Incapacity  of  judging,  what  were  to  be  ex- 

pected in  a  Revelation  ;  and  the  Credibility, 
from  Analogy,  that  it  must  contain  things  ap- 
pearing liable  to  Objections  .         .         .     175 


xxvi  Contents. 


Page 
192 


IV.  Of  Christianity,  considered  as  a  Scheme  or  Con- 
stitution, imperfectly  comprehended 
V.  Of  the  particular  System  of  Christianity ;  the 
Appointment  of  a  Mediator,  and  the  Redemp- 
tion of  the  World  by  him    .         .         .         .201 
VI.  Of  the  Want  of  Universality  in  Eevelation  :  and 

of  the  supposed  Deficiency  in  the  Proof  of  it     222 
VII.  Of  the  particular  Evidence  for  Christianity        .     244 
VIII.  Of  the  Objections  which  may  be  made  against 
arguing  from  the  Analogy  of  Nature,  to  Re- 
ligion   285 

Conclusion 299 

DISSERTATION  I. 
Of  Personal  Identity 313 

DISSERTATION  II. 

Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue 321 

Analytical  Index 333 


Note  at  p.  31  refers  to  pages  168,  173,  177,  &c. 

34  „  131 

48  „  118 

72  „  118 

78  „  210 

118  „  326 

252  «  1,  244,  282,  &c. 


^^i^^ 


THE  ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION 

TO  THE  CONSTITUTION  AND 
COURSE  OF  NATURE 


^^^^^ 


INTRODUCTION. 


ROB  ABLE  Evidence  is  eftentially  dis- 
tinguishedfrom  demonstrative  by  this, 
that  it  admits  of  degrees  ;  and  of  all 
variety  of  them,  from  the  highest  mo- 
ral certainty,  to  the  very  lowest  pre- 
sumption. We  cannot  indeed  say  a  thing  is  proba- 
bly true  upon  one  very  slight  presumption  for  it ; 
becaufe,  as  there  maybe  probabilities  on  both  sides 
of  a  question,  there  may  be  some  against  it :  and 
though  there  be  not,  yet  a  slight  presumption  does 
not  beget  that  degree  of  convi(9;ion,  which  is  implied 
in  saying  a  thing  is  probably  true.  But  that  the 
slightest  pofsible  presumption  is  of  the  nature  of  a 
probability,  appears  from  hence  ;  that  such  low  pre- 
sumption often  repeated,  will  amount  even  to  moral 
certainty.  Thus  a  man's  having  observed  the  ebb 
and  flow  of  the  tide  to-day,  affords  some  sort  of  pre- 
sumption, though  the  lowest  imaginable,  that  it  may 
happen  again  to-morrow:  But  the  observation  of  this 
event  for  so  many  days,  and  months,  and  ages  to- 
gether, as  it  has  been  observed  by  mankind,  gives 
us  a  full  af^urance  that  it  will. 

That  which  chiefly  constitutes  Probability  is  ex- 


2  Introduction. 

pref^ed  in  the  word  Likely,  i.e.  like  some  truth,^  or 
true  event ;  like  it,  in  itself,  in  its  evidence,  in  some 
more  or  fewer  of  its  circumstances.  For  when  we 
determine  a  thing  to  be  probably  true,  suppose  that 
an  event  has  or  will  come  to  paf^,  it  is  from  the  mind's 
remarking  in  it  a  likenefs  to  some  other  event,  which 
we  have  observed  has  come  to  paf^.  And  this  obser- 
vation forms,  in  numberlef^  daily  instances,  a  pre- 
sumption, opinion,  or  full  convi(5lion,  that  such  event 
has  or  will  come  to  paft  ;  according  as  the  observation 
is,  that  the  like  event  has  sometimes,  most  commonly, 
or  always  so  far  as  our  observation  reaches,  come  to 
paft  at  like  distances  of  time,  or  place,  or  upon  like 
occasions.  Hence  arises  the  belief,  that  a  child,  if 
it  lives  twenty  years,  will  grow  up  to  the  stature  and 
strength  of  a  man ;  that  food  will  contribute  to  the 
preservation  of  its  life,  and  the  want  of  it  for  such  a 
number  of  days,  be  its  certain  destrudlion.  So  like- 
wise the  rule  and  measure  of  our  hopes  and  fears 
concerning  the  succeft  of  our  pursuits  ;  our  expecta- 
tions that  others  will  act  so  and  so  in  such  circum- 
stances; and  our  judgment  that  such  actions  proceed 
from  such  principles  ;  all  these  rely  upon  our  having 
observed  thelike  towhat we  hope,  fear,  expec^t,  judge ; 
I  say  upon  our  having  observed  the  like,  either  with 
respeift  to  others  or  ourselves.  And  thus,  whereas 
the  prince^  who  had  always  lived  in  a  warm  climate, 
naturally  concluded  in  the  way  of  Analogy,  that  there 
was  no  such  thing  as  water's  becoming  hard;  because 
he  had  always  observed  it  to  be  fluid  and  yielding : 
We  on  the  contrary,  from  Analogy  conclude,  that 
there  is  no  presumption  at  all  against  this :  that  it  is 


'  Verisimile. 

2  The  story  is  told  by  Mr.  Locke  in  the  Chapter  of  Proba- 
bility. 


Introduction.  3 

supposable,  there  may  be  frost  in  England  any  given 
day  in  January  next ;  probable  that  there  will  on 
some  day  of  the  month ;  and  that  there  is  a  moral 
certainty,  i.e.  ground  for  an  expectation  without  any 
doubt  of  it,  in  some  part  or  other  of  the  winter. 

Probable  Evidence,  in  its  very  nature,  affords  but 
an  imperfect  kind  of  information ;  and  is  to  be  con- 
sidered as  relative  only  to  beings  of  limited  capaci- 
ties. For  nothing  which  is  the  pofsibie  objecl  _of 
knowledg^e,  whether  past,  present,  or  futurgj^  canjbe 
proEable  to  an  infinite  intelligence;  since  it  cannot 
biif  Be  discerned  absotutely'as  it  is  in  itself,  certainly 
true,  or  certainly  false.  But  to  us,  probability  is  the 
very  guide  of  life. 

From  these  things  it  follows,  that  in  questions  of 
difficulty,  or  such  as  are  thought  so,  where  more  sa- 
tisfactory evidence  cannot  be  had,  or  is  not  seen;  if 
the  result  of  examination  be,  that  there  appears  upon 
the  whole,  any  the  lowest  presumption  on  one  side, 
and  none  on  the  other,  or  a  greater  presumption  on 
one  side,  though  in  the  lowest  degree  greater;  this 
determines  the  question,  even  in  matters  of  specu- 
lation ;  and  in  matters  of  practice,  will  lay  us  under 
an  absolute  and  formal  obligation,  in  point  of  pru- 
dence and  of  interest,  to  acl  upon  that  presumption 
or  low  probability,  though  it  be  so  low  as  to  leave  the 
mind  in  very  great  doubt  which  is  the  truth.  For 
surely  a  man  is  as  really  bound  in  prudence,  to  do 
w^hat  upon  the  whole  appears,  according  to  the  best 
of  his  judgment,  to  be  for  his  happinef^,  as  what 
he  certainly  knows  to  be  so.  Nay  further,  in  ques- 
tions of  great  consequence,  a  reasonable  man  will 
think  it  concerns  him  to  remark  lower  probabilities 
and  presumptions  than  these  ;  such  as  amount  to  no 
more  than  showing  one  side  of  a  question  to  be  as 
supposable  and  credible  as  the  other :  nay  such  as 


4  Introdudion. 

but  amount  to  much  left  even  than  this.  For  num- 
berleft  instances  might  be  mentioned  respecting  the 
common  pursuits  of  life,  where  a  man  would  be 
thought,  in  a  literal  sense,  distra(5led,  who  would 
not  a(?l;,  and  with  great  application  too,  not  only  upon 
an  even  chance,  but  upon  much  left,  and  v^here  the 
probability  or  chance  was  greatly  against  his  suc- 
ceeding.^ 

It  is  not  my  design  to  inquire  further  into  the  na- 
ture, the  foundation,  and  measure  of  probability ;  or 
whence  it  proceeds  that  Likenefs  should  beget  that 
presumption,  opinion,  and  full  convi6lion,  which  the 
human  mind  is  formed  to  receive  from  it,  and  which 
it  does  neceftarily  produce  in  every  one;  or  to  guard 
against  the  errors,  to  which  reasoning  from  Analogy 
is  liable.  This  belongs  to  the  subject  of  logic;  and 
is  a  part  of  that  subje6l  which  has  not  yet  been  tho- 
roughly considered.  Indeed  I  shall  not  take  upon 
me  to  say,  how  far  the  extent,  compaft,  and  force, 
of  analogical  reasoning,  can  be  reduced  to  general 
heads  and  rules ;  and  the  whole  be  formed  into  a 
system.  But  though  so  little  in  this  way  has  been 
attempted  by  those  who  have  treated  of  our  intellec- 
tual powers,  and  the  exercise  of  them  ;  this  does  not 
hinder  but  that  we  may  be,  as  we  unquestionably 
are,  aftured,  that  Analogy  is  of  weight,  in  various 
degrees,  towards  determining  our  judgment  and  our 
pra(9:ice.  Nor  does  it  in  any  wise  cease  to  be  of 
weight  in  those  cases,  because  persons,  either  given 
to  dispute,  or  who  require  things  to  be  stated  with 
greater  exac^tneft  than  our  faculties  appear  to  admit 
of  in  pra^lical  matters,  may  find  other  cases  in  which 
it  is  not  easy  to  say,  whether  it  be,  or  be  not,  of  any 
weight;  or  instances  of  seeming  Analogies,  which 
are  really  of  none.    It  is  enough  to  the  present  pur- 

3  See  Chap.  vi.  Part  ii. 


Introduflion.  5 

pose  to  observe,  that  this  general  way  of  arguing  is 
evidently  natural,  just  and  conclusive.  For  there  is 
no  man  can  make  a  question  but  that  the  sun  will 
rise  to-morrow  ;  and  be  seen,  where  it  is  seen  at  all, 
in  the  figure  of  a  circle,  and  not  in  that  of  a  square. 

Hence, namelyfrom  analogical  Reasoning,  Origen^ 
has  with  singular  sagacity  observed,  that  be  who  be- 
lieves the  Scripture  to  have  proceeded  from  him  who, 
is  the  Author  of  nature ^  may  well  expeSt  to  findtbe\ 
same  sort  of  difficulties  in  it,  as  are  found  in  the 
constitution  of  nature.  And  in  a  like  way  of  re- 
flec^tion  it  may  be  added,  that  he  who  denies  the 
Scripture  to  have  been  from.  God  upon  account  of 
these  difficulties,  may,  for  the  very  same  reason, 
deny  the  world  to  have  been  formed  by  him.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  there  be  an  Analogy  or  Likenef^ 
between  that  system  of  things  and  dispensation  of 
Providence,  which  Revelation  informs  us  of,  and  that 
system  of  things  and  dispensation  of  Providence, 
which  experience  together  with  reason  informs  us 
of,  i.  e.  the  known  course  of  nature  ;  this  is  a  pre- 
sumption, that  they  have  both  the  same  author  and 
cause  ;  at  least  so  far  as  to  answer  obje(9:ions  against 
the  former's  being  from  God,  drawn  from  anything 
which  is  analogical  or  similar  to  what  is  in  the  lat- 
ter, which  is  acknowledged  to  be  from  him :  for  an 
author  of  nature  is  here  supposed. 

Forming  our  notions  of  the  constitution  and  gov- 
ernment of  the  world  upon  reasoning,  without  foun- 
dation for  the  principles  which  we  ai^ume,  whether 
from  the  attributes  of  God  or  anything  else;  is  build- 
ing a  world  upon  hypothesis,  like  Des  Cartes.  Form- 

*  Xp?)  ^I'tv  Toi  ji.  Tov  ctTTa?  irapadt^aixevov  tov  KTiaav- 
TOQ  TOV  Koayiov  tlvai  ravraQ  tolq  ypcKpdg  TrtirtXaQai,  on 
oaa  TTfpi  Ti]q  KTicreojQ  airavTa  ro'igt'tiTOvcn  tov  Trepi  avTrjg 
X670V,  Taiira  ku]  irtpi  Tuiv  ■ypa(pu>v. —  Philocal.  p.  23.  Ed. 
Cant. 


A 


^c 


6  Introdudion, 

ing  our  notions  upon  reasoning  from  principles  which 
are  certain,  but  applied  to  cases  to  which  we  have 
no  ground  to  apply  them,  (like  those  who  explain 
the  structure  of  the  human  body,  and  the  nature  of 
diseases  and  medicines  from  mere  mathematics 
without  sufficient  data;)  is  an  error  much  akin  to  the 
former:  since  what  is  aftumed  in  order  to  make  the 
reasoning  applicable,  is  hypothesis.  But  it  must  be 
allowed  just,  to  join  abstradl;  reasonings  with  the  ob- 
servation of  fa(fts,  and  argue  from  such  fac^s  as  are 
knov/n,  to  others  that  are  like  them;  from  that  part 
of  the  Divine  Government  over  intelligent  creatures 
which  comes  under  our  view,  to  that  larger  and  more 
general  government  over  them,  which  is  beyond  it; 
and  from  what  is  present,  to  colle(^,  what  is  likely, 
credible,  or  not  incredible,  will  be  hereafter. 

This  method  then  of  concluding  and  determining 
being  practical,  and  what,  if  we  will  a6l  at  all,  we 
cannot  but  act  upon  in  the  common  pursuits  of  life ; 
being  evidently  conclusive,  in  various  degrees,  pro- 
portionable to  the  degree  and  exac^nefs  of  the  whole 
Analogy  or  Likeneft;  and  having  so  great  authority 
for  its  introduction  into  the  subje(51  of  Religion,  even 
revealed  Religion  ;  my  design  is  to  apply  it  to  that 
subjeCl  in  general,  both  natural  and  revealed:  taking 
for  proved,  that  there  is  an  intelligent  Author  of  Na- 
ture, and  natural  Governor  of  the  world.  For  as 
there  is  no  presumption  against  this  prior  to  the  proof 
of  it:  so  it  has  been  often  proved  with  accumulated 
evidence  ;  from  this  argument  of  Analogy  and  final 
causes ;  from  abstract  reasonings ;  from  the  most 
ancient  tradition  and  testimony;  and  from  the  gene- 
ral consent  of  mankind.  Nor  does  it  appear,  so  far 
as  I  can  find,  to  be  denied,  by  the  generality  of  those 
who  profefs  themselves  dif^atisfied  with  the  Evidence 
of  Religion. 


Introdudion.  7 

As  there  are  some,  who,  instead  of  thus  attending 
to  what  is  in  fact  the  constitution  of  nature,  form  their 
notions  of  God's  government  upon  hypothesis :  so 
there  are  others,  who  indulge  themselves  in  vain  and 
idle  speculations,  how  the  world  might  pof^ibly  have 
been  framed  otherwise  than  it  is ;  and  upon  sup- 
position that  things  might,  in  imagining  that  they 
should,  have  been  disposed  and  carried  on  after  a  bet- 
ter model,  than  what  appears  in  the  present  disposi- 
tion and  condu(5l  of  them.  Suppose  now  a  person 
of  such  a  turn  of  mind,  to  go  on  with  his  reveries, 
till  he  had  at  length  fixed  upon  some  particular  plan  of 

nature,  as  appearing  to  him  the  best. One  shall 

scarce  be  thought  guilty  of  detraction  against  human 
understanding,  if  one  should  say,  even  beforehand, 
that  the  plan  which  this  speculative  person  would  fix 
upon,  though  he  were  the  wisest  of  the  sons  of  men, 
probably  would  not  be  the  very  best,  even  according 
to  his  own  notions  of  best ;  whether  he  thought  that  to 
be  so,  which  afforded  occasions  and  motives  for  the 
exercise  of  the  greatest  virtue,  or  which  was  produc- 
tive of  the  greatest  happinefs,  or  that  these  two  were 
necefsarily  connected,  and  run  up  into  one  and  the 
same  plan.  However,  it  may  not  be  amif^  once  for 
all  to  see,  what  would  be  the  amount  of  these  em- 
endations and  imaginary  improvements  upon  the 
system  of  nature,  or  how  far  they  would  mislead  us. 
And  it  seems  there  could  be  no  stopping,  till  we  came^ 
to  some  such  conclusions  as  these :  That  all  creature:^ 
should  at  first  be  made  as  perfect  and  as  happy  as 
they  were  capable  of  ever  being:  That  nothing,  to 
be  sure,  of  hazard  or  danger  should  be  put  upon  them 
to  do ;  some  indolent  persons  would  perhaps  think 
nothing  at  all :  Or  certainly,  that  effeclual  care  should 
be  taken,  that  they  should,  whether  necefsarily  or  not, 
yet  eventually  and  in  fa(5l,  aK\  ays  do  what  was  right 


8  Introdudion. 

and  most  conducive  to  happineft,  which  would  be 
thought  easy  for  infinite  power  to  effe6l ;  either  by 
not  giving  them  any  principles  which  would  endanger 
their  going  wrong  ;  or  by  laying  the  right  motive 
of  a(ftion  in  every  instance  before  their  minds  con- 
tinually in  so  strong  a  manner,  as  would  never  fail  of 
inducing  them  to  a6l  conformably  to  it :  And  that  the 
whole  method  of  government  by  punishments  should 
be  rejected,  as  absurd  ;  as  an  awkward  round-about 
method  of  carrying  things  on  ;  nay  as  contrary  to  a 

N principal  purpose,  for  which  it  would  be  supposed 
jcreatures  were  made,  namely  happineft. 

Now,  without  considering  what  is  to  be  said  in 
particular  to  the  several  parts  of  this  train  of  folly  and 
extravagance  ;  what  has  been  above  intimated  is  a 
full  dire(?i:  general  answer  to  it,  namely,  that  we  may 
see  beforehand  that  we  have  not  faculties  for  this  kind 
of  speculation.  For  though  it  be  admitted,  that  from 
the  first  Principles  ofour  nature,  we  unavoidably  judge 
or  determine  some  ends  to  be  absolutely  in  them- 
selves preferable  to  others,  and  that  the  ends  now 
mentioned,  or  if  they  run  up  into  one,  that  this  one 
is  absolutely  the  best;  and  consequently  that  we  must 
conclude  the  ultimate  end  designed,  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  nature  and  conduct  of  Providence,  is  the  most 
Virtue  and  Happinel^  pof^ible  :  yet  we  are  far  from 
being  able  to  judge,  what  particular  disposition  of 
things  would  be  most  friendly  and  aftistant  to  virtue ; 
or  what  means  might  be  absolutely  neceftary  to  pro- 
duce the  most  happineft  in  a  system  of  such  extent 
as  our  own  world  may  be,  taking  in  all  that  is  past 
and  to  come,  though  we  should  suppose  it  detached 
from  the  whole  of  things.  Indeed  we  are  so  far  from 
being  able  to  judge  of  this;  that  we  are  not  judges 
what  may  be  the  neceftary  means  of  raising  and  con- 
dueling  one  person  to  the  highest  perfection  and 


Introduction.  9 

happinef^  of  his  nature.  Nay  even  in  the  little  affairs 
of  the  present  life,  we  find  men  of  different  educa- 
tions and  ranks  are  not  competent  judges  of  the  con- 
duct of  each  other.  Our  whole  nature  leads  us  to 
ascribe  all  moral  perfection  to  God,  and  to  deny  all 
imperfection  of  him.  And  this  will  for  ever  be 
a  practical  proof  of  his  moral  charaCler,  to  such 
as  will  consider  what  apra(?tical  proof  is;  because  it 
is  the  voice  of  God  speaking  in  us.  And  from  hence 
we  conclude  that  virtue  must  be  the  happinel^,  and 
vice  the  misery,  of  every  creature  ;  and  that  regu- 
larity and  order  and  right  cannot  but  prevail  finally 
in  a  universe  under  his  government.  But  we  are  in 
no  sort  judges,  what  are  the  necei^ary  means  of  ac- 
complishing this  end. 

Let  us  then,  instead  of  that  idle  and  not  very 
innocent  employment  of  forming  imaginary  models 
of  a  world,  and  schemes  of  governing  it,  turn  our 
thoughts  to  what  we  experience  to  be  the  condu(5l  of 
nature  with  respeCl  to  intelligent  creatures ;  which 
may  be  resolved  into  general  laws  or  rules  of  admi- 
nistration, in  the  same  way  as  many  of  the  laws  of 
nature  respecting  inanimate  matter  may  be  collected 
from  experiments.  And  let  us  compare  the  known 
constitution  and  course  of  things,  with  what  is  said  to 
be  the  moral  system  of  nature  ;  the  acknowledged 
Dispensations  of  Providence,  or  that  government 
which  we  find  ourselves  under,  with  what  Religion 
teaches  us  to  believe  and  expeCf ;  and  see  whether 
they  are  not  analogous  and  of  a  piece.  And  upon 
such  a  comparison,  it  will  I  think  be  found,  that  they 
are  very  much  so  :  that  both  may  be  traced  up  to 
the  same  general  laws,  and  resolved  into  the  same 
principles  of  divine  conduct. 

The  Analogy  here  proposed  to  be  considered,  is 
of  pretty  large  extent,  and  consists  of  several  parts  ; 


10  Introduction. 

in  some,  more,  in  others,  left,  exact.  In  some  few 
instances  perhaps  it  may  amount  to  a  real  pra^lical 
proof;  in  others  not  so.  Yet  in  these  it  is  a  confir- 
mation of  what  is  proved  other  ways.  It  will  unde- 
niably shew,  what  too  many  want  to  have  shewn 
them,  that  the  system  of  Religion  both  natural  and 
revealed,  considered  only  as  a  system,  and  prior  to 
the  proof  of  it,  is  not  a  subject  of  ridicule,  unlefs  that 
of  nature  be  so  too.  And  it  will  afford  an  answer  to 
almost  all  objections  against  the  system  both  of  na- 
tural and  revealed  Religion ;  though  not  perhaps  an 
answer  in  so  great  a  degree,  yet  in  a  very  consider- 
able degree  an  answer,  to  the  obje(9;ions  against  the 
evidence  of  it :  For  obje(9;ions  against  a  proof,  and 
obje6^ions  against  what  is  said  to  be  proved,  the 
Reader  will  observe  are  different  things. 

Now  the  Divine  Government  of  the  world,  implied 
in  the  notion  of  Religion  in  general  and  of  Christi- 
anity, contains  in  it :  That  mankind  is  appointed  to 
live  in  a  future  state  :^  That  there,  every  one  shall 
be  rewarded  or  punished ;  ^  rewarded  or  punished 
respectively  for  all  that  behaviour  here,  which  we 
comprehend  under  the  words,  virtuous  or  vicious, 
morally  good  or  evil :  '^  That  our  present  life  is  a  pro- 
bation, a  state  of  trial,^  and  of  discipline,^  for  that  fu- 
ture one  ;  notwithstanding  the  objections  which  men 
may  fancy  they  have,  from  notions  of  necef^ity, 
against  there  being  any  such  moral  plan  as  this  at 
all;^"  and  whatever  objections  may  appear  to  lie 
against  the  wisdom  and  goodnef^  of  it,  as  it  stands 
so  imperfeClly  made  known  to  us  at  present  :^^  That 
this  world  being  in  a  state  of  apostacy  and  wicked- 
nef^,  and  consequently  of  ruin,  and  the  sense  both 
of  their  conditio^  and  duty  being  greatly  corrupted 
amongst  men,  this  gave  occasion  for  an  additional 

5  Ch.  i.  6  ch.  ii.  7  Ch.  iii.  8  ch.  iv. 

9  Ch.  V.  1°  Ch.  vi.  1'  Ch.  vii. 


Introduction.  1 1 

dispensation  of  Providence  ;  of  the  utmost  import- 
ance;'- proved  by  miracles  ;^-^  but  containing  in  it 
many  things  appearing  to  us  strange  and  not  to  have 
been  expected  ;^^  a  Dispensation  of  Providence,  which 
is  a  scheme  or  system  of  things  ;  ^^  carried  on  by  the 
Mediation  of  a  Divine  Person,  the  Mefsiah,  in  order 
to  the  recovery  of  the  world ;  '^  yet  not  revealed  to 
all  men,  nor  proved  with  the  strongest  pofsible  evi- 
dence to  all  those  to  whom  it  is  revealed ;  but  only 
to  such  a  part  of  mankind,  and  with  such  particular 
evidence  as  the  wisdom  of  God  thought  fit,^^  The 
design  then  of  the  following  Treatise  will  be  to  shew, 
that  the  several  parts  principally  objected  against  in 
this  moral  and  Christian  Dispensation,  including  its 
scheme,  its  publication,  and  the  proof  which  God  has 
afforded  us  of  its  truth  ;  that  the  particular  Parts 
principally  objecled  against  in  this  whole  Dispensa- 
tion, are  analogous  to  what  is  experienced  in  the  con- 
stitution and  course  of  nature,  or  Providence  ;  that 
the  chief  objections  themselves  which  are  alleged 
against  the  former,  are  no  other,  than  what  may  be 
alleged  with  like  justnefs  against  the  latter,  where 
they  are  found  in  faSi  to  be  inconclusive ;  and  that 
this  argument  from  Analogy  is  in  general,  unanswer- 
able, and  undoubtedly  of  weight  on  tbe  side  of  Re- 
ligion,''^ notv.'ithstanding  the  objections  which  may 
seem  to  lie  against  it,  and  the  real  ground  which 
there  may  be  for  difference  of  opinion,  as  to  the 
particular  degree  of  weight  which  is  to  be  laid  upon 
it.  This  is  a  general  Account  of  what  may  be  looked 
for  in  the  following  Treatise.  And  I  shall  begin  it 
with  that  which  is  the  foundation  of  all  our  hopes  and 
of  all  our  fears ;  all  our  hopes  and  fears,  which  are 
of  any  consideration  ;  I  mean  a  Future  Life. 

'2  Part.  11.  Ch.  i.       13  ch.  ii.  1^  Ch.  iii.       '^  Ch.  iv. 

»6  Ch.  V.  17  Ch.  vi.  vii.         18  Ch.  viii. 


THE  ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION  TO  THE 

CONSTITUTION  AND  COURSE 

OF  NATURE. 


PART  I.— Of  Natural  Religion. 
CHAP.  I.— Of  a  Future  Life. 

TRANGE  difficulties  have  been  raised 
by  some  concerning-  personal  identi- 
ty, or  the  samenef^  of  living  agents, 
implied  in  the  notion  of  our  existing 
now  and  hereafter,  or  in  any  two  suc- 
cefsive  moments ;  which  whoever  thinks  it  worth 
while,  may  se^  considered  in  the  first  Difsertation  at 
the  end  of  this  Treatise.  But  without  regard  to  any 
of  them  here,  let  us  consider  what  the  Analogy  of 
Nature,  and  the  several  changes  which  we  have  un- 
dergone, and  those  which  we  know  we  may  undergo 
without  being  destroyed,  suggest,  as  to  the  effect 
which  death  may,  or  may  not  have  upon  us ;  and 
whether  it  be  not  from  thence  probable,  that  we  may 
survive  this  change,  and  exist  in  a  future  state  of  life 
and  perception. 

I.  From  our  being  born  into  the  present  world  in 
the  helpleft  imperfect  state  of  infancy,  and  having 


Chap.  I.  Of  a  Future  Life.  13 

arrived  from  thence  to  mature  age,  we  find  it  to  be 
a  general  Law  of  Nature  in  our  own  species,  that  the 
same  creatures,  the  same  individuals,  should  exist  in 
degrees  of  life  and  perception,  with  capacities  of 
a(5lion,  of  enjoyment  and  suffering,  in  one  period  of 
their  being,  greatly  different  from  those  appointed 
them  in  another  period  of  it.  And  in  other  creatures 
the  same  law  holds.  For  the  difference  of  their  ca- 
pacities and  states  of  life  at  their  birth  (to  go  no 
higher)  and  in  maturity ;  the  change  of  worms  into 
flies,  and  the  vast  enlargement  of  their  locomotive 
powers  by  such  change  :  and  birds  and  insects  burst- 
ing the  shell  their  habitation,  and  by  this  means  en- 
tering into  a  new  world,  furnished  with  new  accom- 
modations for  them,  and  finding  a  new  sphere  of 
a(9;ion  af^igned  them;  these  are  Instances  of  this  ge- 
neral Law  of  Nature.  Thus  all  the  various  and  won- 
derful transformations  of  animals  are  to  be  taken  into 
consideration  here.  But  the  states  of  life  in  which 
we  ourselves  existed  formerly  in  the  womb  and  in 
our  infancy,  are  almost  as  different  from  our  present 
in  mature  age,  as  it  is  pof^ible  to  conceive  any  two 
states  or  degrees  of  life  can  be.  Therefore,  that  we 
are  to  exist  hereafter  in  a^state  a^  diifereflt  (sup- 
pose) from  our  present,  as  this  is  from  our  former, 
is  but  according  to  the  Analogy  of  Nature  ;  accord- 
ing to  a  natural  order  or  appointment  of  the  very 
same  kind,  with  what  we  have  already  experienced. 
IL  We  know  we  are  endued  with  capacities  of 
adlion,  of  happinei^  and  misery  :  for  we  are  con- 
scious of  a(5ling,  of  enjoying  pleasure  and  suffering 
pain.  Now  that  we  have  these  powers  and  capaci- 
ties before  death,  is  a  presumption  that  we  shall  re- 
tain them  through  and  after  death  ;  indeed  a  proba- 
bility of  it  abundantly  sufficient  to  a(5l  upon,  unlef^ 
there  be  some  positive  reason  to  think  that  death  is 


14  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  i. 

the  destruction  of  those  living  powers:  Because  there 
is  in  every  case  a  probability,  that  all  things  will  con- 
tinue as  we  experience  the}'  are,  in  all  respects,  ex- 
cept those  in  which  we  have  some  reason  to  think 
they  will  be  altered.  This  is  that  kind^  of  presump- 
tion or  probability  from  Analog}^,  exprefsed  in  the 
^^very  word  continuance,  which  seems  our  only  na- 
tural reason  for  believing  the  course  of  the  world  will 
continue  to-morrow,  as  it  has  done  so  far  as  our  ex- 
perience or  knowledge  of  history  can  carry  us  back. 
Nay  it  seems  our  only  reason  for  believing,  that  any 
one  substance  now  existing,  will  continue  to  exist  a 
moment  longer ;  the  self-existent  substance  only  ex- 
cepted. Thus  if  men  were  afsured  that  the  unknown 
.^vent,  death,  was  not  the  destruction  of  our  faculties 
of  perception  and  of  action,  there  would  be  no  appre- 
hension, that  any  other  power  or  event  unconne(fted 
with  this  of  death,  would  destroy  these  faculties  just 
at  the  instant  of  each  creature's  death  ;  and  there- 
fore no  doubt  but  that  they  would  remain  after  it : 
which  shows  the  high  probability  that  our  living 
powers  will  continue  after  death,  unlefs  there  be 
some  ground  to  think  that  death  is  their  destruction.^ 
For,  if  it  would  be  in  a  manner  certain  that  we  should 
survive  death,  provided  it  were  certain  that  death 
would  not  be  our  destruiftion,  it  must  be  highly  pro- 
bable we  shall  survive  it,  if  there  be  no  ground  to 
think  death  will  be  our  destru(51ion. 

'  I  say  kind  of  presumption  or  probability  ;  for  I  do  not  mean 
to  affirm  that  there  is  the  same  degree  of  convidlion,  that  our 
living  powers  will  continue  after  death,  as  there  is,  that  our 
substances  will. 

2  Dtstrucrion  of  U'ving  powers  is  a  manner  of  expreflion  un- 
avoidably ambiguous  ;  and  may  signify  either  the  destruBion  of 
a  U'ving  beings  so  as  that  the  same  U'ving  being  shaU  be  incapable 
of  e'ver  percei'ving  or  a&ing  again  at  all :  or  t/ie  destruBion  of 
those  means  and  instruments  by  nuhich  it  is  capable  of  its  present 


Chap.  1.  Of  a  Future  Life.  15 

Now  though  I  think  it  must  be  acknowledged,  that 
prior  to  the  natural  and  moral  proofs  of  a  future  life 
commonly  insisted  upon,  there  would  arise  a  general 
confused  suspicion,  that  in  the  great  shock  and  alte- 
ration which  we  shall  undergo  by  death,  we,  i.e.  our 
living  powers,  might  be  wholly  destroyed  ;  yet  even 
prior  to  those  proofs,  there  is  really  no  particular  dis- 
tinct; ground  or  reason  for  this  apprehension  at  all, 
so  far  as  I  can  find.  If  there  be,  it  must  arise  either 
from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  or  from  the  Analogy  of 
Nature. 

But  we  cannot  argue  from  the  reason  of  the  thing, 
that  death  is  the  destruction  of  living  agents,  because 
we  know  not  at  all  what  death  is  in  itself;  but  only 
some  of  its  efFe(9;s,  such  as  the  diftolution  of  flesh, 
skin,  and  bones.  And  these  effects  do  in  no  w  ise  ap- 
pear to  imply  the  destruction  of  a  living  agent.  And 
besides,  as  we  are  greatl}'^  in  the  dark,  upon  what  the 
exercise  of  our  living  powers  depends,  so  we  are 
wholly  ignorant  what  the  powers  themselves  depend 
upon ;  the  powers  themselves  as  distinguished,  not 
only  from  their  a(5lual  exercise,  but  also  from  the 
present  capacity  of  exercising  them  ;  and  as  opposed 
to  their  destru(5lion  :  For  sleep,  or  however  a  swoon, 
shews  us,  not  only  that  these  powers  exist  when  they 
are  not  exercised,  as  the  paf^ive  power  of  motion  does 
in  inanimate  matter  ;  but  shews  also  that  they  exist, 
when  there  is  no  present  capacity  of  exercising  them  : 

life,  of  its  present  state  of  perception  and  of  aFIicn.  It  is  here 
used  in  the  former  sense.  When  it  is  used  in  the  latter,  the 
t^^'ithtt  present  is  added.  The  lofs  of  a  man's  eye  is  a  destruc- 
tion of  living  powers  in  the  latter  sense.  But  we  have  no 
reason  to  think  the  destrudlion  of  living  powers,  in  the  former 
sense,  to  be  poflible.  We  have  no  more  reason  to  think  a 
being  endued  with  living  powers,  ever  loses  them  during  its 
whole  existence,  than  to  believe  that  a  stone  ever  acquires 
them. 


i6  Of  a  Future  Life.  Parti. 

or  that  the  capacities  of  exercising  them  for  the  pre- 
sent, as  well  as  the  a(fl;ual  exercise  of  them,  may  be 
suspended,  and  yet  the  powers  themselves  remain 
undestroyed.  Since  then  we  know  not  at  all  upon 
what  the  existence  of  our  living  powers  depends,  this 
shews  further,  there  can  no  probability  be  collecfted 
from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  that  death  will  be  their 
destru(51ion :  because  their  existence  may  depend, 
upon  somewhat  in  no  degree  aire<9:ed  by  death;  upon 
somewhat  quite  out  of  the  reach  of  this  king  of  ter- 
rors. So  that  there  is  nothing  more  certain,  than 
that  the  reason  of  Ihe  thing  shews  us  no  connexion 
between  death,  and  the  destru(5lion  of  living  argents. 
Nor  can  we  find  anything  throughout  the  whole 
Analogy  of  Nature  to  afford  us  even  the  slightest  pre- 
sumption, that  animals  ever  lose  their  living  powers  ; 
much  left,  if  it  were  poftible,  that  they  lose  them  by 
death  :  for  we  have  no  faculties  wherewith  to  trace 
any  beyond  or  through  it,  so  as  to  see  what  becomes 
of  them.  This  event  removes  them  from  our  view. 
It  destroys  the  sensible  proof,  which  we  had  before 
their  death,  of  their  being  poftefsed  of  living  pow- 
ers, but  does  not  appear  to  afford  the  least  reason-to 
believe  that  they  are,  then,  or  by  that  event,  deprived^ 
of  them. 

And  our  knowing,  that  they  were  pof^ef^ed  of 
these  powers,  up  to  the  very  period  to  which  we  have 
faculties  capable  of  tracing  them,  is  itself  a  probabi- 
lity of  their  retaining  them  beyond  it.  And  this  is 
confirmed,  and  a  sensible  credibility  is  given  to  it,  by 
observing  the  very  great  and  astonishing  changes 
which  we  have  experienced  ;  so  great,  that  our  ex- 
istence in  another  state  of  life,  of  perception  and  of 
a(?l;ion,  will  be  but  according  to  a  method  of  provi- 
dential condu6l,  the  like  to  which  has  been  already 
exercised  even  with  regard  to  ourselves  ;  according 


Chap.  I.  Of  a  Future  Life.  17 

to  a  course  of  nature,  the  like  to  which,  we  have  al- 
ready gone  through. 

However,  as  one  cannot  but  be  greatly  sensible, 
how  difficult  it  is  to  silence  imagination  enough  to 
make  the  voice  of  reason  even  distinctly  heard  in  this 
case  ;  as  we  are  accustomed,  from  our  youth  up,  to 
indulge  that  forward,  delusive  faculty,  ever  obtruding 
beyond  its  sphere  ;  of  some  afsistance  indeed  to  ap- 
prehension, but  the  author  of  all  error :  As  we  plainly 
lose  ourselves  in  gro{^  and  crude  conceptions  of 
things,  taking  for  granted  that  we  are  acquainted 
with,  what  indeed  we  are  wholly  ignorant  of;  it  may 
be  proper  to  consider  the  imaginary  presumptions,- 
that  death  will  be  our  destruction,  arising  from  these 
kinds  of  early  and  lasting  prejudices  ;  and  to  shew 
how  little  they  can  really  amount  to,  even  though  w^e 
cannot  wholly  divest  ourselves  of  them.     And, 

I.  All  presumption  of  death's  being  the  destru(?lion 
of  living  beings,  must  go  upon  supposition  that  they 
are  compounded ;  and  so,  discerptible.  But  since 
consciousnef^  is  a  single  and  indivisible  power,  it 
should  seem  that  the  subjecft  in  which  it  resides, 
must  be  so  too.  For  were  the  motion  of  any  par- 
ticle of  matter  absolutely  one  and  indivisible,  so  as 
that  it  should  imply  a  contradicftion  to  suppose  part 
of  this  motion  to  exist,  and  part  not  to  exist,  i.  e. 
part  of  this  matter  to  move,  and  part  to  be  at  rest ; 
then  its  power  of  motion  would  be  indivisible  ;  and 
so  also  would  the  subje6l  in  which  the  power  in- 
heres, namely  the  particle  of  matter  :  for  if  this  could 
be  divided  into  two,  one  part  might  be  moved  and 
the  other  at  rest,  which  is  contrary  to  the  suppo- 
sition.   In  like  manner  it  has  been  argued,'^  and,  for 


'  See  Dr.  Clarke's  Letter  to  Mr.  Dodivell,  and  the  defences 
of  it. 


1 8  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  I. 

anything  appearing  to  the  contrary,  justly,  that  since 
the  perception  or  consciousnefs,  which  we  have  of 
our  own  existence,  is  indivisible,  so  as  that  it  is  a 
contradidlion  to  suppose  one  part  of  it  should  be  here 
and  the  other  there  ;  the  perceptive  power,  or  the 
power  of  consciousneft,  is  indivisible  too :  and  con- 
sequently the  subje(5l  in,which  it  resides,  z.  e.  the 
conscious  being.  Now  upon  supposition  that  living 
agent  each  man  calls  himself,  is  thus  a  single  being, 
which  there  is  at  least  no  more  difficulty  in  conceiv- 
ing than  in  conceiving  it  to  be  a  compound,  and  of 
which  there  is  the  proof  now  mentioned ;  it  follows, 
that  our  organized  bodies  are  no  more  ourselves  or 
part  of  ourselves,  than  any  other  matter  around  us. 
And  it  is  as  easy  to  conceive,  how  matter,  which  is 
no  part  of  ourselves,  may  be  appropriated  to  us  in 
the  manner  which  our  present  bodies  are ;  as  how 
we  can  receive  imprefsions  from,  and  have  power 
over  any  matter.  It  is  as  easy  to  conceive,  that  we 
may  exist  out  of  bodies,  as  in  them :  that  we  might 
have  animated  bodies  of  any  other  organs  and  senses 
wholly  diiferent  from  these  now  given  us,  and  that 
we  may  hereafter  animate  these  same  or  new  bodies 
variously  modified  and  organized ;  as  to  conceive  how 
we  can  animate  such  bodies  as  our  present.  And 
lastly,  the  dif^olution  of  all  these  several  organized 
bodies,  supposing  ourselves  to  have  succefsively 
animated  them,  would  have  no  more  conceivable 
tendency  to  destroy  the  living  beings  ourselves,  or 
deprive  us  of  living  faculties,  the  faculties  of  per- 
ception and  of  a61ion,  than  the  diftolution  of  any 
foreign  matter,  which  we  are  capable  of  receiving 
imprefsions  from,  and  making  use  of  for  the  com- 
mon occasions  of  life. 

II.  The  simplicity  and  absolute  onenef^  of  a  living 
agent  cannot  indeed,  from  the  nature  of  the  thing, 


Chap.  I,  Of  a  Future  Life.  19 

be  properly  proved  by  experimental  observations. 
But  as  these  fall  in  with  the  supposition  of  its  unity, 
so  they  plainly  lead  us  to  conclude  certainly,  that  our  ' 
groft  organized  bodies,  with  which  we  perceive  the 
obje(5ls  of  sense,  and  with  which  we  a6l,  are  no  part 
of  ourselves ;  and  therefore  shew  us,  that  we  have  no 
reason  to  believe  .thejr  destrudlion  to  be  ours  :  even 
^^at^lout  determining  whether  our  livingsubstances  be 
material  or  immaterial.  For  we  see  by  experience, 
that  men  may  lose  their  limbs,  their  organs  of  sense, 
and  even  the  greatest  part  of  these  bodies,  and  yet 
remain  the  same  living  agents.  And  persons  can 
trace  up  the  existence  of  themselves  to  a  time,  when 
the  bulk  of  their  bodies  was  extremely  small,  in  com- 
parison of  what  it  is  in  mature  age  :  and  we  cannot 
but  think,  that  they  might  then  have  lost  a  consider- 
able part  of  that  small  body,  and  yet  have  remained 
the  same  living  agents  ;  as  they  may  now  lose  great 
part  of  their  present  body,  and  remain  so.  And  it 
is  certain,  that  the  bodies  of  all  animals  are  in  a  con- 
stant flux,  from  that  never-ceasing  attrition,  which 
there  is  in  every  part  of  them.  Now  things  of  this 
kind  unavoidably  teach  us  to  distinguish,  between 
these  living  agents  ourselves,  and  large  quantities  of 
matter,  in  which  we  are  very  nearly  interested  :  since 
these  may  be  alienated,  and  actually  are  in  a  daily 
course  of  succefsion,  and  changing  their  owners; 
whilst  we  are  afsured,  that  each  living  agent  remams 
one  and  the  same  permanent  being.^  And  this  ge- 
neral observation  leads  us  on  to  the  following  ones. 
First,  That  we  have  no  way  of  determining  by  ex- 
perience, what  is  the  certain  bulk  of  the  living  being 
each  man  calls  himself:  and  yet,  till  it  be  determined 
that  it  is  larger  in  bulk  than  the  solid  elementary 

*  See  DiJJertatkn  I. 


20  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  i. 

particles  of  matter,  which  there  is  no  ground  to  think 
any  natural  power  can  diftolve,  there  is  no  sort  of 
reason  to  think  death  to  be  the  difsolution  of  it,  of 
the  living  being,  even  though  it  should  not  be  abso- 
lutely indiscerptible. 

Secondly,  From  our  being  so  nearly  related  to  and 
interested  in  certain  systems  of  matter,  suppose  our 
flesh  and  bones,  and  afterwards  ceasing  to  be  at  all 
related  to  them,  the  living  agents  ourselves  remain- 
ing all  this  while  undestroyed  notwithstanding  such 
alienation  ;  and  consequently  these  systems  of  mat- 
ter not  being  ourselves :  it  follows  further,  that  we 
have  no  ground  to  conclude  any  other,  suppose  in- 
ternal systems  of  matter,  to  be  the  living  agents  our- 
selves ;  because  we  can  have  no  ground  to  conclude 
this,  but  from  our  relation  to  and  interest  in  such 
other  systems  of  matter :  and  therefore  we  can  have 
no  reason  to  conclude,  what  befalls  those  systems  of 
matter  at  death,  to  be  the  destru(5lion  of  the  living 
agents.  We  have  already  several  times  over  lost  a 
great  part  or  perhaps  the  whole  of  our  body,  accord- 
ing to  certain  common  established  Laws  of  Nature  ; 
3^et  we  remain  the  same  living  agents :  When  we 
shall  lose  as  great  a  part,  or  the  whole,  by  another 
common  established  Law  of  Nature,  death;  why  may 
we  not  also  remain  the  same?  That  the  alienation 
has  been  gradual  in  one  case,  and  in  the  other  will 
be  more  at  once,  does  not  prove  anything  to  the 
contrary.  We  have  pafted  undestroyed  through 
those  many  and  great  revolutions  of  matter,  so  pe- 
culiarly appropriated  to  us  ourselves  ;  why  should 
we  imagine  death  will  be  so  fatal  to  us  ]  Nor  can  it 
be  obje(?i:ed,  that  what  is  thus  alienated  or  lost,  is  no 
part  of  our  original  solid  body,  but  only  adventitious 
matter  ;  because  we  may  lose  entire  limbs,  which 
must  have  contained  many  solid  parts  and  veftels  of 


Chap.  I.  Of  a  Future  Life.  21 

the  original  body :  or  if  this  be  not  admitted,  we 
have  no  proof,  that  any  of  these  solid  parts  are  dis- 
solved or  alienated  by  death.  Though,  by  the  way, 
we  are  very  nearly  related  to  that  extraneous  or  ad- 
ventitious matter,  whilst  it  continues  united  to  and 
distending  the  several  parts  of  our  solid  body.  But 
after  all  ;  the  relation  a  person  bears  to  those  parts 
of  his  body,  to  which  he  is  the  most  nearly  related ; 
what  does  it  appear  to  amount  to  but  this,  that  the 
living  agent,  and  those  parts  of  the  body,  mutually 
affe(5l  each  other  \  And  the  same  thingr,  the  same 
thing  in  kind  though  not  in  degree,  may  be  said  of 
all  foreign  matter,  which  gives  us  ideas,  and  which 
we  have  any  power  over.  From  these  observations 
the  whole  ground  of  the  imagination  is  removed,  that 
the  difsolution  of  any  matter,  is  the  destruction  of 
a  living  agent,  from  the  interest  he  once  had  in  such 
matter. 

Thirdly,  If  we  consider  our  body  somewhat  more 
distinctly,  as  made  up  of  organs  and  instruments  of 
perception  and  of  motion,  it  will  bring  us  to  the  same 
conclusion.  Thus  the  common  optical  experiments 
shew,  and  even  the  observation  how  sight  is  afsisted 
by  glafses  shews,  that  we  see  with  our  eyes  in  the 
same  sense  as  we  see  with  glaives.  Nor  is  there 
any  reason  to  believe,  that  we  see  with  them  in  any 
other  sense  ;  any  other,  I  mean,  which  would  lead 
us  to  think  the  eye  itself  a  percipient.  The  like  is 
to  be  said  of  hearing :  and  our  feeling  distant  solid 
matter  by  means  of  somewhat  in  our  hand,  seems  an 
instance  of  the  like  kind,  as  to  the  subject  we  are 
considering.  All  these  are  instances  of  foreign  mat- 
ter, or  such  as  is  no  part  of  our  body,  being  instru- 
mental in  preparing  objects  for,  and  conveying  them 
to,  the  perceiving  power,  in  a  manner  similar  or  like 
to  the  manner,  in  which  our  organs  of  sense  prepare 


22  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  I. 

and  convey  them.  Both  are  in  a  like  way  instru- 
ments of  our  receiving  such  ideas  from  external  ob- 
je6ls,  as  the  Author  of  Nature  appointed  those  exter- 
nal obje(9:s  to  be  the  occasions  of  exciting  in  us. 
However,  glafses  are  evidently  instances^ of  this; 
namely  of  matter,  which  is  no  part  of  our  body,  pre- 
paring obje(?i:s  for  and  conveying  them  towards  the 
perceiving  power,  in  like  manner  as  our  bodily  or- 
gans do.  And  if  we  see  with  our  eyes  only  in  the 
same  manner  as  we  do  with  glaives,  the  like  may 
justly  be  concluded,  from  Analogy,  of  all  our  other 
senses.  It  is  not  intended,  by  anything  here  said, 
to  affirm,  that  the  whole  apparatus  of  vision,  or  of  per- 
ception by  any  other  of  our  senses,  can  be  traced, 
through  all  its  steps,  quite  up  to  the  living  power  of 
seeing,  or  perceiving:  But  that  so  far  as  it  can  be 
traced  by  experimental  observations,  so  far  it  ap- 
pears, that  our  organs  of  sense  prepare  and  convey 
on  obje(?i:s,  in  order  to  their  being  perceived,  in  like 
manner  as  foreign  matter  does,  without  affording  any 
shadow  of  appearance,  that  they  themselves  per- 
ceive. And  that  we  have  no  reason  to  think  our 
organs  of  sense  percipients,  is  confirmed  by  instances 
of  persons  losing  some  of  them,  the  living  beings 
themselves,  their  former  occupiers,  remaining  un- 
impaired. It  is  confirmed  also  by  the  experience  of 
dreams ;  by  which  we  find  we  are  at  present  pos- 
sef^ed  of  a  latent,  and,  what  would  otherwise  be,  an 
unimagined  unknown  power  of  perceiving  sensible 
obje<51s,  in  as  strong  and  lively  a  manner  without  our 
external  organs  of  sense  as  with  them. 

So  also  with  regard  to  our  power  of  moving,  or 
dire(5ling  motion  by  will  and  choice  :  upon  the  de- 
strudlion  of  a  limb,  this  a(5live  power  remains,  as  it 
evidently  seems,  unlef^ened  ;  so  as  that  the  living 
being,  who  has  suffered  this  loft,  would  be  capable  of 


Chap.  1.  Of  a  Future  Life.  23 

moving  as  before,  if  it  had  another  limb  to  move  v^^ith. 
It  can  walk  by  the  help  of  an  artificial  leg;  just  as  it 
can  make  use  of  a  pole  or  a  lever,  to  reach  towards 
itself  and  to  move  things,  beyond  the  length  and  the 
power  of  its  natural  arm:  And  this  last  it  does  in  the 
same  manner  as  it  reaches  and  moves,  with  its  na- 
tural arm,  things  nearer  and  of  lef^  weight.  Nor  is 
there  so  much  as  any  appearance  of  our  limbs  being 
endued  with  a  power  of  moving  or  direc^ting  them- 
selves ;  though  they  are  adapted,  like  the  several 
parts  of  a  machine,  to  be  the  instruments  of  motion 
to  each  other ;  and  some  parts  of  the  same  limb,  to 
be  instruments  of  motion  to  other  parts  of  it. 

Thus  a  man  determines  that  he  will  look  at  such 
an  obje(5l  through  a  microscope  ;  or  being  lame  sup- 
pose, that  he  will  walk  to  such  a  place  with  a  staff  a 
week  hence.  His  eyes  and  his  feet  no  more  deter- 
mine in  these  cases  than  the  microscope  and  the 
staff.  Nor  is  there  any  ground  to  think  they  any 
more  put  the  determination  in  pra(5lice ;  or  that  his 
eyes  are  the  seers  or  his  feet  the  movers,  in  any  other 
sense  than  as  the  microscope  and  the  staff  are.  Upon 
the  whole  then,  our  organs  of  sense  and  our  limbaj 
are  certainly  instruments,  which  the  living  persons! 
ourselves  make  use  of  to  perceive  and  move  with:\ 
There  is  not  any  probability  that  they  are  any  more  ; 
nor  consequently,  that  we  have  any  other  kind  of  re- 
lation to  them,  than  what  we  may  have  to  any  other 
foreign  matter  formed  into  instruments  of  perception 
and  motion,  suppose  into  a  microscope  or  a  staff;  (I 
say  any  other  kind  of  relation,  for  I  am  not  speaking 
of  the  degree  of  it)  nor  consequently  is  there  any 
probability,  that  the  alienation  or  dif^olution  of  these 
instruments  is  the  destruction  of  the  perceiving  and 
moving  agent. 
\      And  thus  our  finding,  that  the  dif^olution  of  mat-    [^ 


24  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  i. 

f  ter,  in  which  living-  beings  were  most  nearly  inte- 
!  rested,  is  not  their  diftolution  ;  and  that  the  destruc- 
;  tion  of  several  of  the  organs  and  instruments  of  per- 
ception and  of  motion  belonging  to  them,  is  not  their 
destruction  shews  demonstratively,  that  there  is  no 
ground  to  think  that  the  difsolution  of  any  other  mat- 
ter, or  destruction  of  any  other  organs  and  instru- 
ments, will  be  the  difsolution  or  destruction  of  living 
agents,  from  the  like  kind  of  relation.  And  we  have 
no  reason  to  think  we  stand  in  any  other  kind  of  rela- 
tion to  anything  which  we  find  difSolved  by  death. 

But  it  is  said  these  observations  are  equally  appli- 
cable to  brutes  :  and  it  is  thought  an  insuperable  dif- 
ficulty, that  they  should  be  immortal,  and  by  conse- 
quence capable  of  everlasting  happinefS.  Now  this 
manner  of  exprefSion  is  both  invidious  and  weak  :  but 
the  thing  intended  by  it,  is  really  no  difficulty  at  all, 
either  in  the  way  of  natural  or  moral  consideration. 
For  isf.  Suppose  the  invidious  thing, designed  in  such 
a  manner  of  expreftion,  were  really  implied,  as  it  is 
not  in  the  least,  in  the  natural  immortality  of  brutes  ; 
namely,  that  they  must  arrive  at  great  attainments, 
and  become  rational  and  moral  agents ;  even  this 
would  be  no  difficulty :  since  we  know  not  what  la- 
tent powers  and  capacities  they  may  be  endued  with. 
There  was  once,  prior  to  experience,  as  great  pre- 
sumption against  human  creatures,  as  there  is  against 
the  brute  creatures,  arriving  at  that  degree  of  under- 
standing, which  we  have  in  mature  age.  For  we  can 
trace  up  our  own  existence  to  the  same  original  with 
theirs.  And  we  find  it  to  be  a  general  Law  of  Na- 
ture, that  creatures  endued  with  capacities  of  virtue 
and  religion  should  be  placed  in  a  condition  of  being, 
in  which  they  are  altogether  without  the  use  of  them, 
for  a  considerable  length  of  their  duration  ;  as  in  in- 
fancy and  childhood.    And  great  part  of  the  human 


Chap,  I.  Of  a  Future  Life.  25 

species  go  out  of  the  present  world,  before  they  come 
to  the  exercise  of  these  capacities  in  any  degi^ee  at 
all.  But  then,  2dly.  The  natural  immortality  of  brutes 
does  not  in  the  least  imply  that  they  are  endued  with 
any  latent  capacities  of  a  rational  or  moral  nature. 
And  the  economy  of  the  universe  might  require,  that 
there  should  be  living  creatures  without  any  capaci- 
ties of  this  kind.  And  all  difficulties  as  to  the  man- 
ner how  they  are  to  be  disposed  of,  are  so  apparently 
and  wholly  founded  in  our  ignorance,  that  it  is  won- 
derful they  should  be  insisted  upon  by  any,  but  such 
as  are  weak  enough  to  think  they  are  acquainted  with 
the  whole  system  of  things.  There  is  then  absolutely 
nothing  at  all  in  this  objection,  which  is  so  rhetori- 
cally urged  against  the  greatest  part  of  the  natural 
proofs  or  presumptions  of  the  immortality  of  human 
minds :  I  say  the  greatest  part ;  for  it  is  lefs  appli- 
cable to  the  following  observation,  which  is  more  pe- 
culiar to  mankind : 

III.  That  as  it  is  evident  our  present  powers  and 
capacities  of  reason,  memory,  and  affection,  do  not 
depend  upon  our  groft  body  in  the  manner  in  which 
perception  by  our  organs  of  sense  does  ;  so  they  do 
not  appear  to  depend  upon  it  at  all  in  any  such  man- 
ner, as  to  give  ground  to  think  that  the  difsolution  of 
this  body  will  be^the^destru(51ion  of  these  our  j^resenf 
powers  of  refle<5lion,  as  it  will  of  our  powers  of  sen- 
sation; or  to  give  ground  to  conclude,  even  that  it 
wHTbe  so  much  as  a  suspension  of  the  former. 

Human  creatures  exist  at  present  in  two  states  of 
life  and  perception,  greatly  different  from  each  other; 
each  of  which  has  its  own  peculiar  laws,  and  its  own 
peculiar  enjoyments  and  sufferings.  When  any  of 
our  senses  are  affecled  or  appetites  gratified  with  the 
obje(?i:s  of  them,  we  maybe  said  to  exist  or  Hve  in  a 
stateof  sensatioiu  When  none  of  our  senses  are  af- 


26  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  i. 

fe(51ed  or  appetites  gratified,  and  yet  we  perceive  and 
reason  and  ac?!: ;  we  may  be  said  to  exist  or  live  in  a 
state  of  reflection.  Now  it  is  by  no  means  certain, 
that  anything  which  is  diftolved  by  death,  is  any  way 
neceftary  to  the  living  being  in  this  its  state  of  re- 
flection, after  ideas  are  gained.  For,  though  from 
our  present  constitution  and  condition  of  being,  our 
external  organs  of  sense  are  necef^ary  for  conveying 
in  ideas  to  our  reflecting  powers,  as  carriages  and 
levers  and  scaflblds  are  in  architecture  :  yet  when 
these  ideas  are  brought  in,  we  are  capable  of  refle(5t- 
ing  in  the  most  intense  degree,  and  of  enjoying  the 
greatest  pleasure  and  feeling  the  greatest  pain  by 
means  of  that  refleCtion,  without  any  aftistance  from 
our  senses :  and  without  any  at  all,  which  we  know 
of,  from  that  body  which  will  be  difsolved  by  death. 
It  does  not  appear  then,  that  the  relation  of  this  groft 
body  to  the  refleCting  being,  is,  in  any  degree,  neces- 
.  sary  to  thinking;  to  ourintelleCtual  enjoyments  or  suf- 
^y  ferings:  nor  consequently  that  the  difsolution  or  alie- 
nation of  the  former  by  death,  will  be  the  destruction 
of  those  present  powers,  which  render  us  capable  of 
this  state  of  reflection.  Further,  there  are  instances 
of  mortal  diseases,  which  do  not  at  all  affeCt  our  pre- 
sent intellectual  powers  ;  and  this  affords  a  presump- 
tion, that  those  diseases  will  not  destroy  these  pre- 
i  sent  powers.  Indeed,  from  the  observations  made 
above,^  it  appears,  that  there  is  no  presumption,  from 
their  mutually  affeCting  each  other,  that  the  diftolu- 
tion  of  the  body  is  the  destruction  of  the  living  agent. 
And  by  the  same  reasoning,  it  must  appear  too,  that 
there  is  no  presumption,  from  their  mutually  afleCt- 
ing  each  other,  that  the  diftolution  of  the  body  is  the 
destruction  of  our  present  reflecting  powers :  But 
instances  of  their  not  affeCting  each  other,  afford  a 

*  Pp.19,  20,  21. 


Chap.  I.  Of  a  Future  Life.  27 

presumption  of  the  contrary.  Instances  of  mortal 
diseases  not  impairing  our  present  reflecting  powers, 
evidently  turn  our  thoughts  even  from  imagining 
such  diseases  to  be  the  destruction  of  them.  Several 
things  indeed  greatly  affec^l  all  our  living  powers, 
and  at  length  suspend  the  exercise  of  them  ;  as  for 
instance  drowsinei^,  increasing  till  it  ends  in  sound 
sleep :  and  from  hence  we  might  have  imagined  it 
would  destroy  them,  till  we  found  by  experience  the 
weaknefs  of  this  way  of  judging.  But  in  the  diseases 
now  mentioned,  there  is  not  so  much  as  this  shadow 
of  probability,  to  lead  us  to  any  such  conclusion,  as 
to  the  reflecting  powers  which  we  have  at  present. 
For  in  those  diseases,  persons  the  moment  before 
death  appear  to  be  in  the  highest  vigour  of  life.  They 
discover  apprehension,  memory,  reason,  all  entire  ; 
with  the  utmost  force  of  aflection ;  sense  of  a  cha- 
racter, of  shame  and  honour ;  and  the  highest  men- 
tal enjoyments  and  sufferings,  even  to  the  last  gasp  ; 
and  these  surely  prove  even  greater  vigour  of  life 
than  bodily  strength  does.  Now  what  pretence  is 
there  for  thinking,  that  a  progref^ive  disease  when 
arrived  to  such  a  degree,  I  mean  that  degree  which 
is  mortal,  will  destroy  those  powers,  which  were  not 
impaired,  which  were  not  affe(?ted  by  it,  during  its 
whole  progrefs  quite  up  to  that  degree?  And  if 
death  by  diseases  of  this  kind,  is  not  the  destruction  of ! 
our  present  reflect:ing  powers,  it  will  scarce  be  thought 
that  death  by  any  other  means  is. 

It  is  obvious  that  this  general  observation  may  be 
carried  on  further :  and  there  appears  so  little  con- 
nection between  our  bodily  powers  of  sensation,  and 
our  present  powers  of  reflection,  that  there  is  no 
reason  to  conclude,  that  death,  which  destroys  the 
former,  does  so  much  as  suspend  the  exercise  of 
the  latter,  or  interrupt  our  continuing  to  exist  in  the 


28  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  I. 

like  state  of  refle(9;ion  which  we  do  now.  For  sus- 
pension of  reason,  memory,  and  the  affec^lions  which 
they  excite,  is  no  part  of  the  idea  of  death,  nor  is 
implied  in  our  notion  of  it.  And  our  daily  experi- 
I  encing  these  powers  to  be  exercised,  without  any 
aisistance,  that  we  know  of,  from  those  bodies,  which 
will  be  difsolved  by  death ;  and  our  finding  often, 
that  the  exercise  of  them  is  so  lively  to  the  last ; 
these  things  afford  a  sensible  apprehension,  that 
death  may  not  perhaps  be  so  much  as  a  discontinu- 
ance of  the  exercise  of  these  powers,  nor  of  the  en- 
joyments and  sufferings  which  it  implies^.  So  that 
our  posthumous  life,  whatever  there  may  be  in  it 
additional  to  our  present,  yet  may  not  be  entirely 
beginning  anew ;  but  going  on.  Death  may,  in  some 
sort,  and  in  some  respe(5ls,  answer  to  our  birth ;  which 
is  not  a  suspension  of  the  faculties  which  we  had  be- 
fore it,  or  a  total  change  of  the  state  of  life  in  which 
we  existed  when  in  the  womb  ;  but  a  continuation 
of  both,  with  such  and  such  great  alterations. 

Nay,  for  aught  we  know  of  ourselves,  of  our  pre- 
sent life  and  of  death  ;  death  may  immediately,  in 
the  natural  course  of  things,  put  us  into  a  higher  and 
more  enlarged  state  of  life,  as  our  birth  does' ;  a  state 

f       ^  There  are  three  distinft  questions,   relating   to  a  future 
I  Life,  here  considered  :  Whether  death  be  the   destruftion  of 
I  living  agents  j  If  not,  whether  it  be  the  destrudtion  of  their 
/  present  powers  of  refledlion,  as  it  certainly  is  the  destrudlion  of 
their  present  powers  of  sensation  5  And  if  not,  whether  it  be 
the  suspension,  or  discontinuance  of  the  exercise,  of  thefe  pre- 
sent refledling  powers.      Now  if  there  be  no  reason  to  believe 
the  last,  there  will  be,  if  that  were  pofiible,  lels  for  the  next, 
and  lefs  still  for  the  first. 

"^  This  according  to  Straho  was  the  opinion  of  the  Brach- 
mans,  vofx'iZ,Hv  iiiv  yap  h)  top  [xiv  tvOads  (3iov,  ojq  av 
aKjiyjv  Kvojxsvoiv  ih'ai'  top  Sk  t'oi-aror,  ysvfaii/  elg  rbv 
ovTMQ  jiiov,  Koi  rbv  ivdaifiova  toTq  (piKo(ro(pi](yaai.  Lib,  xv. 
p.  1039.  Ed.  Amst.  1707.     To  which  opinion  perhaps  AntO' 


Chap.  I.  Of  a  Future  Life.  29 

in  which  our  capacities,  and  sphere  of  perception  and 
of  aclion,  may  be  much  greater  than  at  present.  For 
as  our  relation  to  our  external  organs  of  sense,  ren- 
ders us  capable  of  existing  in  our  present  state  of 
sensation  ;  so  it  may  be  the  only  natural  hindrance 
to  our  existing,  immediately  and  of  course,  in  a 
higher  state  of  reflection.  The  truth  is,  reason  does 
not  at  all  shew  us  in  what  state  death  naturally 
leaves  us.  But  were  we  sure,  that  it  would  suspend 
all  our  perceptive  and  a(5live  powers  ;  yet  the  sus- 
pension of  a  power,  and  the  destruction  of  it,  are 
effecfts  so  totally  different  in  kind,  as  we  experience 
from  sleep  and  a  swoon,  that  we  cannot  in  any  wise 
argue  from  one  to  the  other  ;  or  conclude,  even  to 
the  lowest  degree  of  probability,  that  the  same  kind 
of  force  which  is  sufficient  to  suspend  our  faculties, 
though  it  be  increased  ever  so  much,  will  be  suffi- 
cient to  destroy  them. 

These  observations  together  may  be  sufficient  to 
shew,  how  little  presumption  there  is  that  death  is  the 
destru(5fion  of  human  creatures.  However  there  is 
the  shadow"  of  an  Analogy,  which  may  lead  us  to 
imagine  it  is ;  the  supposed  likenef^  which  is  ob- 
served between  the  decay  of  vegetables,  and  of  living 
creatures.  And  this  likenef^  is  indeed  sufficient  to 
afford  the  poets  very  apt  allusions  to  the  flowers  of 
the  field,  in  their  pi(5fures  of  the  frailty  of  our  pre- 
sent life.  But  in  reason,  the  Analogy  is  so  far  from 
holding,  that  there  appears  no  ground  even  for  the 
comparison,  as  to  the  present  question :  because  one 
of  the  two  subjects  compared,  is  wholly  void  of  that, 
which  is  the  princma^rud^chief  thing  in.the  other,  the 

ninus  may  allude  in  these  words,  mq  vvv  Trfpi/iiiveig,  ttots 
tfijSpvov  tK  TfJQ  yaarpbg  tT]q  yvvaiKOQ  aov  t^kXOi],  ovrujg 
tKCSx^'^^^'-  ''"'iv  iopav  iv  7]  TO  t\jv\a.piov  aov  tov  iXvrpov 
rovrov  eKTrtaarat.     Lib.  ix.  c.  3. 


30  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  i. 

power  of  perception  and  of  ac9:ion ;  and  which  is  the 
only  thing  we  are  inquiring  about  the  continuance  of. 
So  that  the  destruction  of  a  vegetable  is  an  event  not 
similar  or  analogous  to  the  destru(5lion  of  a  living 
agent. 

But  if,  as  was  above  intimated,  leaving  off  the  de- 
lusive custom  of  substituting  imagination  in  the  room 
of  experience,  we  would  confine  ourselves  to  what 
we  do  know  and  understand;  if  we  would  argue  only 
from  that,  and  from  that  form  our  expeClations ;  it 
would  appear  at  first  sight,  that  as  no  probability  of 
living  beings  ever  ceasing  to  be  so,  can  be  concluded 
from  the  reason  of  the  thing ;  so  none  can  be  col- 
leCled  from  the  Analogy  of  Nature;  because  we  can- 
not trace  any  living  beings  beyond  death.  But  as 
we  are  conscious,  that  we  are  endued  with  capaci- 
I  ties  of  perception  and  of  aclion,  and  are  living  per- 
I  sons  ;  what  we  are  to  go  upon  is,  that  we  shall  con- 
I  tinue  so,  till  we  foresee  some  accident  or  event, 
j  which  will  endanger  those  capacities,  or  be  likely  to 
destroy  us :  which  death  does  in  no  wise  appear  to  be. 
And  thus,  when  we  go  out  of  this  world,  we  may 
paf^  into  new  scenes,  and  a  new  state  of  life  and 
aClion,  just  as  naturally  as  we  came  into  the  present. 
And  this  new  state  may  naturally  be  a  social  one. 
And  the  advantages  of  it,  advantages  of  every  kind, 
may  naturally  be  bestowed,  according  to  some  fixed 
fil'eneral  laws  of  wisdom,  upon  every  one  in  propor- 
tion to  the  degrees  of  his  virtue.  And  though  the 
advantaeres  of  that  future  natural  state  should  not 
be  bestowed,  as  these  of  the  present  in  some  mea- 
sure are,  by  the  will  of  the  society  ;  but  entirely  by 
his  more  immediate  action,  upon  whom  the  whole 
frame  of  nature  depends :  yet  this  distribution  may 
be  just  as  natural,  as  their  being  distributed  here  by 
the  instrumentality  of  men.     And  indeed,  though 


Chap.  I.  Of  a  Future  Life.  31 

one  were  to  allow  any  confused  undermined  sense, 
which  people  please  to  put  upon  the  word  natural, 
it  would  be  a  shortneft  of  thought  scarce  credible, 
to  imagine,  that  no  system  or  course  of  things  can 
be  so,  but  only  what  we  see  at  present^ :  especially 
whilst  the  probability  of  a  Future  Life,  or  the  natural 
immortality  of  the  soul,  is  admitted  upon  the  evi- 
dence of  reason ;  because  this  is  really  both  admit- 
ting and  denying  at  once  a  state  of  being  different 
from  the  present  to  be  natural.  But  the  only  dis- 
tinct meaning  of  that  word  is  stated,  fixed,  or  settled: 
since  what  is  natural,  as  much  requires  and  pre- 
supposes an  intelligent  agent  to  render  it  so,  i.  e. 
to  effeSi  it  continually,  or  at  stated  times ;  as  what 
is  supernatural  or  miraculous  does  to  effect  it  for 
once.  And  from  hence  it  must  follow,  that  persons' 
notion  of  what  is  natural,  will  be  enlarged  in  pro- 
portion to  their  greater  knowledge  of  the  works  of 
God,  and  the  dispensations  of  his  Providence.  Nor 
is  there  any  absurdity  in  supposing,  that  there  may 
be  beings  in  the  universe,  whose  capacities,  and 
knowledge,  and  views,  may  be  so  extensive,  as  that 
the  whole  Christian  dispensation  may  to  them  appear 
natural,  i.  e.  analogous  or  conformable  to  God's 
dealings  with  other  parts  of  his  creation  ;  as  natu- 
ral as  the  visible  known  course  of  things  appears  to 
us.  For  there  seems  scarce  any  other  pofsible  sense 
to  be  put  upon  the  word,  but  that  only  in  which  it  is 
here  used ;  similar,  stated,  or  uniform. 

This  credibility  of  a  Future  Life,  which  has  been 
here  insisted  upon,  how  little  soever  it  may  satisfy 
our  curiosity,  seems  to  answer  all  the  purposes  of 
Religion,  in  like  manner  as  a  demonstrative  proof 
would.     Indeed  a  proof,  even  a  demonstrative  one, 

*  See  Part  ii.  Chap,  ii,  and  Part  ii.  Chap.  iv. 


32  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  i . 

of  a  Future  Life,  would  not  be  a  proof  of  Religion. 
For,  that  we  are  to  live  hereafter,  is  just  jas-J:£jCQ.n- 
cileable  with  the  scheme  of  athejsm,  and  as  well  to 
be  accounted  for  by  it,  as  that  we  are  now  alive,  is: 
and  therefore  nothing  can  be  more  absurd  than  to 
argue  from  that  scheme,  that  there  can  be  no  future 
state.  But  as  Religion  implies  a  future  state,  any 
presumption  against  such  a  state  is  a  presumption 
against  Religion.  And  the  foregoing  observations  re- 
move all  presumptions  of  that  sort,  and  prove,  to  a 
very  considerable  degree  of  probability,  one  funda- 
mental do(5lrine  of  Religion;  which,if  believed,  would 
greatly  open  and  dispose  the  mind  seriously  to  at- 
tend to  the  general  evidence  of  the  whole. 


CHAPTER  11.^ 

Of  the  Government  of  God  by  Rewards  and  Punish- 
ments ;  and  particularly  of  the  latter. 

r,HAT  which  makes  the  question  con- 
cerning a  Future  Life  to  be  of  so  great 
importance  to  us,  is  our  capacity  of 
happineftand  misery.  And  that  which 
makes  the  consideration  of  it  to  be  of 
so  great  importance  to  us,  is  the  supposition  of  our 
happineft  and  misery  hereafter  depending  upon  our 
a(9:ions  here.  Without  this,  indeed,  curiosity  could 
not  but  sometimes  bring  a  subject!,  in  which  we  may 
be  so  highly  interested,  to  our  thoughts;  especially 
upon  the  mortality  of  others,  or  the  near  prospe(5i: 
of  our  own.  But  reasonable  men  would  not  take  any 
farther  thought  about  hereafter,  than  what  should 
happen  thus  occasionally  to  rise  in  their  minds,  if  it 


Chap.  1.    Of  the  Government  of  God,  hz.    33 

were  certain,  that  our  future  interest  no  way  de- 
pended upon  our  present  behaviour :  Whereas  on 
the  contrary,  if  there  be  ground,  either  from  Analogy 
or  anything  else,  to  think  it  does;  then  there  is  rea- 
son also  for  the  most  a(fi;ive  thought  and  solicitude, 
to  secure  that  interest;  to  behave  so  as  that  we  may 
escape  that  misery,  and  obtain  that  happineft  in 
another  life,  which  we  not  only  suppose  ourselves 
capable  of,  but  which  we  apprehend  also  is  put  in  our 
own  power.  And  whether  there  be  ground  for  this 
last  apprehension,  certainly  would  deserve  to  be  most 
seriously  considered,  were  there  no  other  proof  of  a 
Future  Life  and  interest,  than  that  presumptive  one, 
which  the  foregoing  observations  amount  to. 

Now  in  the  present  state,  all  which  we  enjoy,  and 
a  great  part  of  what  we  suffer,  is  put  in  our  oven 
power.  For  pleasure  and  pain  are  the  consequences 
of  our  actions ;  and  we  are  endued  by  the  Author  of 
our  Nature  with  capacities  of  foreseeing  these  con- 
sequences. We  find  by  experience  he  does  not  so 
much  as  preserve  our  lives,  exclusively  of  our  own 
care  and  attention,  to  provide  ourselves  with,  and  to 
make  use  of,  that  sustenance,  by  which  he  has  ap- 
pointed our  lives  shall  be  preserved ;  and  without 
which,  he  has  appointed,  they  shall  not  be  preserved 
at  all.  And  in  general  we  foresee,  that  the  external 
things,  which  are  the  obje(51s  of  our  various  paf^ions, 
can  neither  be  obtained  nor  enjoyed,  without  exert- 
ing ourselves  in  such  and  such  manners  :  But  by  thus 
exerting  ourselves,  we  obtain  and  enjoy  these  obje(5ls, 
in  which  our  natural  good  consists  ;  or  by  this  means 
God  gives  us  the  pofsef^ion  and  enjoyment  of  them. 
I  know  not,  that  we  have  any  one  kind  or  degree  of 
enjoyment,  but  by  the  means  of  our  own  a<5lions. 
And  by  prudence  and  care,  we  may,  for  the  most 
part,  pafs  our  days  in  tolerable  ease  and  quiet :  Or 


34  Of  the  Government  of  God       Paj^t  l. 

on  the  contrary,  we  may  by  rashneft,  ungoverned 
pai^ion,  wilfulnef^,  or  even  by  negligence,  make  our- 
selves as  miserable  as  ever  we  please.  And  many 
do  please  to  make  themselves  extremely  miserable, 
i.  e.  to  do  what  they  know  beforehand  will  render 
them  so.  They  follow  those  ways,  the  fruit  of  which 
they  know,  by  instruction,  example,  experience,  will 
be  disgrace  and  poverty  and  sicknef^  and  untimely 
death.  This  every  one  observes  to  be  the  general 
Scourse  of  things  ;  though  it  is  to  be  allowed,  we  can- 
\\o\.  find  by  experience,  that  all  our  sufferings  are 
owing  to  our  own  follies. 

Why  the  Author  of  Nature  does  not  give  his  crea- 
tures promiscuously  such  and  such  perceptions,  with- 
out regard  to  their  behaviour ;  why  he  does  not  make 
them  happy  without  the  instrumentality  of  their  own 
actions,  and  prevent  their  bringing  any  sufferings 
upon  themselves  ;  is  another  matter.  Perhaps  there 
may  be  some  impoftibilities  in  the  nature  of  things, 
which  we  are  unacquainted  with.^  Or  left  happi- 
neft,  it  may  be,  would  upon  the  whole  be  produced 
by  such  a  method  of  conduct:,  than  is  by  the  present. 
Or  perhaps  Divine  Goodneft,  with  which,  if  I  mis- 
take not,  we  make  very  firee  in  our  speculations,  may 
not  be  a  bare  single  disposition  to  produce  happi- 
neft  ;  but  a  disposition  to  make  the  good,  the  faith- 
ful, the  honest  man  happy.  Perhaps  an  infinitely 
perfe(5l  Mind  may  be  pleased,  with  seeing  his  crea- 
tures behave  suitably  to  the  nature  which  he  has 
given  them ;  to  the  relations  which  he  has  placed 
them  in  to  each  other  ;  and  to  that,  which  they  stand 
in  to  Himself:  That  relation  to  himself,  which,  dur- 
ing their  existence,  is  even  neceftary,  and  which  is 
the  most  important  one  of  all :  perhaps,  1  say,  an  in- 

'  Chap.  vii.  p.  185,  &c. 


Chap.  2.     by  Rewards  and  Punishments.      35 

finitely  perfect  Mind  may  be  pleased  with  this  m»oral 
piety  of  moral  agents,  in  and  for  itself;  as  well  as 
upon  account  of  its  being  efsentially  conducive  to  the 
happinei^  of  his  creation.  Or  the  whole  end,  for 
which  God  made,  and  thus  governs  the  world,  may 
be  utterly  beyond  the  reach  of  our  faculties  :  There 
may  be  somewhat  in  it  as  impoftible  for  us  to  have 
any  conception  of,  as  for  a  blind  man  to  have  a  con- 
ception of  colours.  But  however  this  be,  it  is  cer- 
tain matter  of  universal  experience,  that  the  general 
method  of  Divine  Administration,  is,  forewarning  us, 
or  giving  us  capacities  to  foresee,  with  more  or  lef^ 
cleamefs,  that  if  we  a(?l:  so  and  so,  we  shall  have  such 
enjoyments,  if  so  and  so,  such  sufferings ;  and  giving 
us  those  enjoyments,  and  making  us  feel  those  suf- 
ferings, in  consequence  of  our  a(5lions. 

"  But  all  this  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  general  course 
of  nature."  True.  This  is  the  very  thing  which  I 
am  observing.  It  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  general 
course  of  nature :  i.  e.  not  surely  to  the  words  or 
ideas,  course  of  nature  ;  but  to  him  who  appointed 
it,  and  put  things  into  it :  Or  to  a  course  of  opera- 
tion, from  its  uniformity  or  constancy,  called  natu- 
ral p  and  which  necef^arily  implies  an  operating 
agent.  For  when  men  find  themselves  necefsitated 
to  confefs  an  Author  of  Nature,  or  that  God  is  the 
natural  Governor  of  the  world ;  they  must  not  deny 
this  again,  because  his  government  is  uniform :  They 
must  not  deny  that  he  does  all  things  at  all,  because 
he  does  them  constantly  ;  because  the  effects  of  his 
a(5ling  are  permanent,  whether  his  adling  be  so  or 
not ;  though  there  is  no  reason  to  think  it  is  not.  In 
short,  every  man,  in  everything  he  does,  naturally 
a<5ts  upon  the  forethought  and  apprehension  of  avoid- 

2  Pp.  43,  44. 


36  Of  the  Government  of  God      Parti, 

ing  evil  or  obtaining  good  :  And  if  the  natural  course 
of  things  be  the  appointment  of  God,  and  our  natural 
faculties  of  knowledge  and  experience,  are  given  us 
by  him  ;  then  the  good  and  bad  consequences  which 
follow  our  acTtions,  are  his  appointment,  and  our  fore- 
sight of  those  consequences,  is  a  warning  given  us  by 
him,  how  we  are  to  adl. 

"  Is  the  pleasure  then,  naturally  accompanying 
"  every  particular  gratification  of  pafsion,  intended, 
"  to  put  us  upon  gratifying  ourselves  in  every  such 
"  particular  instance,  and  as  a  reward  to  us  for  so 
"  doing?"  No  certainly.  Nor  is  it  to  be  said,  that 
our  eyes  were  naturally  intended  to  give  us  the  sight 
of  each  particular  object,  to  which  they  do  or  can 
extend;  objects  which  are  destru61ive  of  them,  or 
which,  for  any  other  reason,  it  may  become  us  to 
turn  our  eyes  from.  Yet  there  is  no  doubt,  but  that 
our  eyes  were  intended  for  us  to  see  with.  So 
either  is  there  any  doubt,  but  that  the  foreseen 
pleasures  and  pains  belonging  to  the  pafsions,  were 

I  intended,  in  general,  to  induce  mankind  to  a6l  in 
such  and  such  manners. 

Now  from  this  general  observation,  obvious  to 
every  one,  that  God  has  given  us  to  understand,  he 
has  appointed  satisfaction  and  delight  to  be  the  con- 
sequence of  our  acting  in  one  manner,  and  pain  and 
uneasinef^  of  our  ailing  in  another,  and  of  our  not 
a(5ling  at  all ;  and  that  we  find  the  consequences, 
which  we  were  beforehand  informed  of,  uniformly  to 
follow ;  we  may  learn,  that  we  are  at  present  actu- 
ally under  his  government  in  the  strictest  and  most 
proper  sense  ;  in  such  a  sense,  as  that  he  rewards 
and  punishes  us  for  our  actions.  An  Author  of  Na- 
ture being  supposed,  it  is  not  so  much  a  deduction 
of  reason,  as  a  matter  of  experience,  that  we  are  thus 
under  his  government ;  under  his  government,  in  the 


t 


Chap,  2.     by  Rewards  and  Punishments.      37 

same  sense,  as  we  are  under  the  government  of  civil 
magistrates.  Because  the  annexing  pleasure  to  some 
aclions,  and  pain  to  others,  in  our  power  to  do  or  for- 
bear, and  giving  notice  of  this  appointment  before- 
hand to  those  whom  it  concerns,  is  the  proper  for- 
mal notion  of  government.  Whether  the  pleasure 
or  pain  which  thus  follows  upon  our  behaviour,  be 
owing  to  the  Author  of  Nature's  ailing  upon  us  every 
moment  which  we  feel  it ;  or  to  his  having  at  once 
contrived  and  executed  his  own  part  in  the  plan  of 
the  world ;  makes  no  alteration  as  to  the  matter 
before  us.  For  if  civil  magistrates  could  make  the 
san(5lions  of  their  laws  take  place,  without  interpos- 
ing at  all,  after  they  had  passed  them ;  without  a 
trial  and  the  formalities  of  an  execution :  If  they  were 
able  to  make  their  laws  execute  themselves,  or  every 
offender  to  execute  them  upon  himself;  we  should 
be  just  in  the  same  sense  under  their  government 
then,  as  we  are  now,  but  in  a  much  higher  degree, 
and  more  perfe6f  mcinner.  Vain  is  the  ridicule,  with 
which,  one  foresees,  some  persons  will  divert  them- 
selves, upon  finding  leaser  pains  considered  as  in- 
stances of  Divine  punishment.  There  is  no  poftibi- 
lity  of  answering  or  evading  the  general  thing  here 
intended,  without  denying  all  final  causes.  For  final 
causes  being  admitted,  the  pleasures  and  pains  now 
mentioned  must  be  admitted  too  as  instances  of  them. 
And  if  they  are ;  if  God  annexes  delight  to  some 
a^fions,  and  uneasinefs  to  others,  with  an  apparent 
design  to  induce  us  to  a(5l  so  cind  so ;  then  he  not 
only  dispenses  happinei^  and  misery,  but  also  re- 
wards and  punishes  a(?tions.  If,  for  example,  the 
pain  which  we  feel,  upon  doing  what  tends  to  the  de- 
struction of  our  bodies,  suppose  upon  too  near  ap- 
proaches to  fire,  or  upon  wounding  ourselves,  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  Author  of  Nature  to  prevent  our  doing 


38  Of  the  Government  of  God      Part  i. 

what  thus  tends  to  our  destruction ;  this  is  altogether 
as  much  an  instance  of  his  punishing  our  actions,  and 
consequently  of  our  being  under  his  government,  as 
declaring  by  a  voice  from  heaven,  that  if  we  a(5led 
so,  he  would  infliift  such  pain  upon  us,  and  infli^ling 
it,  whether  it  be  greater  or  left. 

Thus  we  find,  that  the  true  notion  or  conception 
of  the  Author  of  Nature,  is  that  of  a  master  or  go- 
vernor, prior  to  the  consideration  of  his  moral  attri- 
butes. The  fa(9:  of  our  case,  which  we  find  by  ex- 
perience, is,  that  he  actually  exercises  dominion  or 
government  over  us  at  present,  by  rewarding  and 
punishing  us  for  our  actions,  in  as  stri(5l  and  proper 
a  sense  of  these  words,  and  even  in  the  same  sense, 
as  children,  servants,  subjects,  are  rewarded  and 
punished  by  those  who  govern  them. 

And  thus  the  whole  Analogy  of  Nature,  the  whole 
present  course  of  things,  most  fully  shews,  that  there 
is  nothing  incredible  in  the  general  do(9:rine  of  reli- 
gion ;  that  God  will  reward  and  punish  men  for  their 
a<5lions  hereafter :  nothing  incredible,  I  mean,  aris- 
ing out  of  the  notion  of  rewarding  and  punishing. 
For  the  whole  course  of  nature  is  a  present  instance 
of  his  exercising  that  government  over  us,  which  im- 
plies in  it  rewarding  and  punishing. 

I|UT  as  Divine  punishment  is  what  men 
chiefly  obj  e(?i:  against,  and  are  most  unwil- 
ling to  allow  ;  it  may  be  proper  to  men- 
tion some  circumstances  in  the  natural 
course  of  punishments  at  present,  which  are  analo- 
gous to  what  religion  teaches  us  concerning  a  future 
state  of  punishment :  Indeed  so  analogous,  that  as 
they  add  a  further  credibility  to  it,  so  they  cannot  but 
raise  a  most  serious  apprehension  of  it  in  those  who 
will  attend  to  them. 


Chap.  2.     by  Rewards  and  Punishments.      39 

It  has  been  now  observed,  that  such  and  such 
miseries  naturally  follow  such  and  such  a^lions  of 
imprudence  and  wilfulneft,  as  well  as  alliens  more 
commonly  and  more  distin(?i:ly  considered  as  vicious; 
and  that  these  consequences,  when  they  may  be  fore- 
seen, are  properly  natural  punishments  annexed  to 
such  a(5lions.  For  the  general  thing  here  insisted 
upon,  is,  not  that  we  see  a  great  deal  of  misery  in  the 
world,  but  a  great  deal  which  men  bring  upon  them- 
selves by  their  own  behaviour,  which  they  might 
have  foreseen  and  avoided.  Now  the  circumstances 
of  these  natural  punishments,  particularly  deserving 
our  attention,  are  such  as  these:  That  oftentimes 
they  follow,  or  are  inflicted  in  consequence  of  actions, 
which  procure  many  present  advantages,  and  are 
accompanied  with  much  present  pleasure :  for  in- 
stance, sickneft  and  untimely  death  is  the  conse- 
quence of  intemperance,  though  accompanied  with 
the  highest  mirth  and  jollity:  That  these  punish- 
ments are  often  much  greater  than  the  advantages 
or  pleasures  obtained  by  the  ac^tions,  of  which  they 
are  the  punishments  or  consequences :  That  though 
we  may  imagine  a  constitution  of  nature,  in  which 
these  natural  punishments,  which  are  in  fa6f  to  fol- 
low, would  follow,  immediately  upon  such  a(9;ions 
being  done,  or  very  soon  after;  we  find  on  the  con- 
trary in  our  world,  that  they  are  often  delayed  a  great 
while,  sometimes  even  till  long  after  the  a(flions  oc- 
casioning them  are  forgot;  so  that  the  constitution 
of  nature  is  such,  that  delay  of  punishment  is  no  sort 
nor  degree  of  presumption  of  final  impunity  :  That 
after  such  delay,  these  natural  punishments  or  mise- 
ries often  come,  not  by  degrees,  but  suddenly,  with 
violence,  and  at  once  ;  however,  the  chief  misery 
often  does :  That  as  certainty  of  such  distant  misery 
following"  such  actions,  is  never  afforded  persons; 


40  Of  the  Government  of  God      Parti. 

so  perhaps  during  the  a(5lions,  they  have  seldom  a 
distinct  full  expectation  of  its  following-"^:  And  many 
times  the  case  is  only  thus,  that  they  see  in  general, 
or  may  see,  the  credibility,  that  intemperance,  sup- 
pose, will  bring  after  it  diseases ;  civil  crimes,  civil 
punishments ;  when  yet  the  real  probability  often  is, 
that  they  shall  escape ;  but  things  notwithstanding 
take  their  destined  course,  and  the  misery  inevitably 
follows  at  its  appointed  time,  in  very  many  of  these 
cases.  Thus  also  though  youth  may  be  alleged  as 
an  excuse  for  rashneft  and  folly,  as  being  naturally 
thoughtlef^,  and  not  clearly  foreseeing  all  the  con- 
sequences of  being  untraceable  and  profligate  ;  this 
does  not  hinder,  but  that  these  consequences  follow, 
and  are  grievously  felt  throughout  the  whole  course 
of  mature  life.  Habits  contracted  even  in  that  age, 
are  often  utter  ruin :  and  men's  succef^  in  the  world, 
not  only  in  the  common  sense  of  worldly  succef^,  but 
their  real  happinefs  and  misery,  depends,  in  a  great 
degree,  and  in  various  ways,  upon  the  manner  in 
which  they  paft  their  youth  ;  which  consequences 
they  for  the  most  part  negledl  to  consider,  and  per- 
haps seldom  can  properly  be  said  to  believe,  before- 
hand. It  requires  also  to  be  mentioned,  that  in 
numberleft  cases,  the  natural  course  of  things  affords 
us  opportunities  for  procuring  advantages  to  our- 
selves at  certain  times,  which  we  cannot  procure 
when  we  will ;  nor  ever  recall  the  opportunities,  if 
we  have  negle(5led  them.  Indeed  the  general  course 
of  nature  is  an  example  of  this.  If,  during  the  op- 
portunity of  youth,  persons  are  indocile  and  self- 
willed;  they  inevitably  suffer  in  their  future  life,  for 
want  of  those  acquirements,  which  they  neglected 
the  natural  season  of  attaining.    If  the  husbandman 

3  See  Part  ii.  Chap.  vi. 


Chap.  2.     by  Rewards  and  Punishments.     41 

lets  his  seed-time  paf^  without  sowing,  the  whole 
year  is  lost  to  him  beyond  recovery.  In  like  man- 
ner, though  after  men  have  been  guilty  of  folly  and 
extravagance  up  to  a  certain  degree,  it  is  often  in 
their  power,  for  instance,  to  retrieve  their  affairs,  to 
recover  their  health  and  character ;  at  least  in  good 
measure  :  yet  real  reformation  is,  in  many  cases,  of 
no  avail  at  all  towards  preventing  the  miseries,  po- 
verty, sickneft,  infamy,  naturally  annexed  to  folly 
and  extravagance  exceeding  that  degree.  There  is 
a  certain  bound  to  imprudence  and  misbehaviour, 
which  being  transgrefsed,  there  remains  no  place  for 
repentance  in  the  natural  course  of  things.  It  is 
further  very  much  to  be  remarked,  that  negle(5ls 
from  inconsiderateneft,  want  of  attention"*,  not  look- 
ing about  us  to  see  what  we  have  to  do,  are  often 
attended  with  consequences  altogether  as  dreadful, 
as  any  active  misbehaviour,  from  the  most  extrava- 
gant paftion.  And  lastly,  civil  government  being 
natural,  the  punishments  of  it  are  so  too  :  And  some 
of  these  punishments  are  capital ;  as  the  effects  of 
a  difkolute  course  of  pleasure  are  often  mortal.  So 
that  many  natural  punishments  are  final^  to  him 
who  incurs  them,  if  considered  only  in  his  temporal 

*  Part  11.  Chap.  vi. 

*  The  general  consideration  of  a  future  state  of  punishment, 
most  evidently  belongs  to  the  subjedl  of  natural  religion.  But 
if  any  of  these  refiedlions  should  be  thought  to  relate  more 
peculiarly  to  this  dodrine  as  taught  in  Scripture  j  the  reader  is 
desired  to  observe,  that  Gentile  writers,  both  moralists  and 
poets,  speak  of  the  future  punishment  of  the  wicked,  both  as 
to  the  duration  and  degree  of  it,  in  a  like  manner  of  expreflion 
and  of  description,  as  the  Scripture  does.  So  that  all  which 
can  positively  be  aflerted  to  be  matter  of  mere  Revelation,  with 
regard  to  this  dodliine,  seems  to  be,  that  the  great  distindtlon 
between  the  righteous  and  the  wicked,  shall  be  made  at  the 
end  of  this  world  j  that  each  shall  then  receive  according  to  his 
deserts.     Reason  did,  as  it  well  might,  conclude  that  it  should. 


42  Of  the  Government  of  God       Part  i . 

capacity :  and  seem  infli(5led  by  natural  appointment, 
either  to  remove  the  offender  out  of  the  way  of  being 
further  mischievous;  or  as  an  example,  though  fre- 
quently a  disregarded  one,  to  those  who  are  left 
behind. 

These  things  are  not,  what  we  call  accidental,  or 
to  be  met  with  only  now  and  then;  but  they  are  things 
of  every  day's  experience :  They  proceed  from  general 
laws,  very  general  ones,  by  which  God  governs  the 
/  world,  in  the  natural  course  of  his  providence.  And 
■  they  are  so  analogous  to  what  Religion  teaches  us 
concerning  the  future  punishment  of  the  wicked,  so 
much  of  a  piece  with  it,  that  both  would  naturally  be 
expref^ed  in  the  very  same  words,  and  manner  of  de- 
scription. In  the  book  of  Proferfes^',  for  instance,  Wis- 
dom is  introduced,  as  frequenting  the  most  public 
places  of  resort,  and  as  reje(5ted  when  she  offers  her- 
self as  the  natural  appointed  guide  of  human  life. 
How  long,  speaking  to  those  who  are  pafsing  through 
it,  how  long,  ye  simple  ones,  will  ye  love  folly,  and 
the  scorners  delight  in  their  scorning,  and  fools  hate 
knowledge  ?  Turn  ye  at  my  reproof.  Behold  I  will 
pour  out  my  spirit  upon  you,  I  will  make  known 
my  words  unto  you.  But  upon  being  neglected. 
Because  I  have  called,andye  refused,  I  have  stretched 

finally  and  upon  the  whole,  be  well  with  the  righteous,  and  ill 
with  the  wicked  :  But  it  could  not  be  determined,  upon  any 
principles  of  reason,  whether  human  creatures  might  not  have 
been  appointed  to  pafs  through  other  states  of  life  and  being, 
before  that  distributive  justice  should  finally  and  eft'edlually 
take  place.  Revelation  teaches  us,  that  the  next  state  of 
things  after  the  prefent,  is  appointed  for  the  execution  of  this 
justice  ;  that  it  shall  be  no  longer  delayed  :  But  t/ie  mystery  of 
God,  the  great  mystery  of  his  suffering  vice  and  confusion  to 
prevail,  s/iail  then  be  fnhhed  ;  and  he  will  take  to  him  his  great 
poiver  andivill  reign,  by  rendering  to  every  one  according  to  his 
works. 
6  Chap.  i. 


Chap.  2.     by  Rewards  and  Punishments.      43 

out  my  hand,  and  no  man  regarded ;  hut  ye  have 
set  at  nought  all  my  counsel,  and  would  none  of  my 
reproof:  I  also  will  laugh  at  your  calamity,  I  will 
mock  when  your  fear  cometh ;  when  your  fear 
cometh  as  desolation,  and  your  destru6iion  cometh 
as  a  whirlwind  ;  when  distrefs  and  anguish  cometh 
upon  you.  Then  shall  they  call  upon  me,  hut  I  will 
not  answer  ;  they  shall  seek  me  early,  hut  they  shall 
not  find  me.  This  pafsage,  every  one  sees,  is  poeti- 
cal, and  some  parts  of  it  are  highly  figurative ;  but 
their  meaning  is  obvious.  And  the  thing  intended 
is  expref^ed  more  literally  in  the  following  words ; 
For  that  they  hated  knowledge,  and  did  not  choose  the 
fear  of  the  Lord — therefore  shall  they  eat  of  the  fruit 
of  their  own  way,  and  he  filled  with  their  own  de- 
vices. For  the  security  of  the  simple  shall  slay  them, 
and  the  prosperity  of  fools  shall  destroy  them.  And 
the  whole  paf^age  is  so  equally  applicable,  to  what 
we  experience  in  the  present  world,  concerning  the 
consequences  of  men's  actions,  and  to  what  Religion 
teaches  us  is  to  be  expelled  in  another,  that  it  may 
be  questioned  which  of  the  two  was  principally  in- 
tended. 

Indeed  when  one  has  been  recolle<?ling  the  proper 
proofs  of  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments, 
nothing  methinks  can  give  one  so  sensible  an  appre- 
hension of  the  latter,  or  representation  of  it  to  the 
mind  ;  as  observing,  that  after  the  many  disregarded 
checks,  admonitions,  and  warnings,  which  people  meet 
with  in  the  ways  of  vice  and  folly  and  extravagance  ; 
warnings  from  their  very  nature  ;  from  the  examples 
of  others ;  from  the  lefser  inconveniences  which  they 
bring  upon  themselves  ;  from  the  instructions  of  wise 
and  virtuous  men :  After  these  have  been  long  de- 
spised, scorned,  ridiculed  :  after  the  chief  bad  con- 
sequences, temporal  consequences,  of  their  follies, 


44  Of  the  Government  of  God       Parti. 

have  been  delayed  for  a  great  while  ;  at  length  they 
break  in  irresistibly,  like  an  armed  force :  Repentance 
is  too  late  to  relieve,  and  can  serve  only  to  aggra- 
vate, their  distreft :  the  case  is  become  desperate : 
and  poverty  and  sickneft,  remorse  and  anguish,  in- 
famy and  death,  the  effects  of  their  own  doings, 
overwhelm  them,  beyond  pofsibility  of  remedy  or 
escape.  This  is  an  account  of  what  is  in  fa(5l  the 
general  constitution  of  nature. 

It  is  not  in  any  sort  meant,  that  according  to  what 
appears  at  present  of  the  natural  course  of  things, 
men  are  always  uniformly  punished  in  proportion  to 
their  misbehaviour :  But  that  there  are  very  many 
instances  of  misbehaviour  punished  in  the  several 
ways  now  mentioned,  and  very  dreadful  instances 
too ;  sufficient  to  show  what  the  laws  of  the  universe 
may  admit ;  and,  if  thoroughly  considered,  sufficient 
fully  to  answer  all  obje(5lions  against  the  credibility 
of  a  future  state  of  punishments,  from  any  imagina- 
tions, that  the  frailty  of  our  nature  and  external  temp- 
tations, almost  annihilate  the  guilt  of  human  vices: 
as  well  as  objections  of  another  sort ;  from  neceftity ; 
from  suppositions,  that  the  will  of  an  infinite  Being 
cannot  be  contradi<5led,  or  that  he  must  be  incapable 
of  offence  and  provocation.^ 

Reflections  of  this  kind  are  not  without  their  ter- 
rors to  serious  persons,  the  most  free  from  enthu- 
siasm, and  of  the  greatest  strength  of  mind :  But  it 
is  fit  things  be  stated  and  considered  as  they  really 
are.  And  there  is,  in  the  present  age,  a  certain  fear- 
leftneft,  with  regard  to  what  may  be  hereafter  under 
the  government  of  God,  which,  nothing  but  an  uni- 
versally acknowledged  demonstration  on  the  side  of 
atheism,  can  justify;  and  which  makes  it  quite  ne- 

^  See  Chaps,  iv.  and  vi. 


Chap.  2.     by  Rewards  and  Punishments.      45 

cef^ary,  that  men  be  reminded,  and  if  pof^ible  made 
to  feel,  that  there  is  no  sort  of  ground  for  being  thus 
presumptuous,  even  upon  the  most  sceptical  prin- 
ciples. For  may  it  not  be  said  of  any  person  upon 
his  being  born  into  the  world,  he  may  behave  so,  as 
to  be  of  no  service  to  it,  but  by  being  made  an  ex- 
ample of  the  woeful  effec^ts  of  vice  and  folly  1  That 
he  may,  as  any  one  may,  if  he  will,  incur  an  infa- 
mous execution,  from  the  hands  of  civil  justice  ;  or 
in  some  other  course  of  extravagance  shorten  his 
days :  or  bring  upon  himself  infamy  and  diseases 
worse  than  death  \  So  that  it  had  been  better  for 
him,  even  with  regard  to  the  present  world,  that  he 
had  never  been  born.  And  is  there  any  pretence  of 
reason,  for  people  to  think  themselves  secure,  and 
talk  as  if  they  had  certain  proof,  that  let  them  ac^t  as 
licentiously  as  they  will,  there  can  be  nothing  ana- 
logous to  this,  with  regard  to  a  future  and  more  ge- 
neral interest,  under  the  providence  and  government 
of  the  same  God  \ 


CHAPTER  III. 

Of  the  Moral  Government  of  God. 

S  the  manifold  appearances  of  design 
and  of  final  causes,  in  the  constitution 
of  the  world,  prove  it  to  be  the  work 
of  an  intelligent  Mind  ;  so  the  parti- 
cular final  causes  of  pleasure  and  pain 
distributed  amongst  his  creatures,  prove  that  they  are 
under  his  government;  what  may  be  called  his  natu- 
ral government  of  creatures  endued  with  sense  and 
reason.    This,  however,  implies  somewhat  more  than 


46  Of  the  Moral  Part  i. 

seems  usually  attended  to,  when  we  speak  of  God's 
natural  government  of  the  world.  It  implies  govern- 
ment of  the  very  same  kind  with  that,  which  a  master 
exercises  over  his  servants,  or  a  civil  magistrate  over 
his  subjedls.  These  latter  instances  of  final  causes, 
as  really  prove  an  intelligent  Governor  of  the  world, 
in  the  sense  now  mentioned,  and  before^  distin(5lly 
treated  of;  as  any  other  instances  of  final  causes 
prove  an  intelligent  Maker  of  it. 

But  this  alone  does  not  appear  at  first  sight  to  de- 
termine anything  certainly,  concerning  the  moral 
chara(fi;er  of  the  Author  of  Nature,  considered  in  this 
relation  of  governor  ;  does  not  ascertain  his  govern- 
ment to  be  moral,  or  prOve  that  he  is  the  righteous 
judge  of  the  world.  Moral  government  consists,  not 
j  barely  in  rewarding  and  punishing  men  for  their 
a(9;ions,  which  the  most  tyrannical  person  may  do : 
but  in  rewarding  the  righteous  and  punishing  the 
wicked  ;  in  rendering  to  men  according  to  their  ac- 
tions, considered  as  good  or  evil.  And  the  perfec- 
tion of  moral  government  consists  in  doing  this,  with 
regard  to  all  intelligent  creatures,  in  an  exa(5l  pro- 
portion to  their  personal  merits  or  demerits. 

Some  men  seem  to  think  the  only  chara(5lerof  the 
Author  of  Nature  to  be  that  of  simple  absolute  bene- 
volence.    This  considered  as  a  principle  of  action, 
and  infinite  in  degree,  is  a  disposition  to  produce  the 
greatest  pofsible  happinef^,  without  regard  to  per- 
sons' behaviour,  otherwise  than  as  such  regard  would 
produce  higher  degrees  of  it.     And  supposing  this 
I  to  be  the  only  chara(?i:er  of  God,  veracity  and  justice 
i  in  him  would  be  nothing  but  benevolence  condu(51:ed 
'  by  wisdom.  Now  surely  this  ought  not  to  be  af^erted, 
unleft  it  can  be  proved ;  for  we  should  speak  with 

'  Chap.  ii. 


Chap.  2'         Government  of  God.  47 

cautious  reverence  upon  such  a  subject;.  And  whe- 
ther it  can  be  proved  or  no,  is  not  the  thing-  here  to 
be  inquired  into  ;  but  whether  in  the  constitution  and 
conducT;  of  the  world,  a  righteous  government  be  not 
discernibly  planned  out :  which  necefsarily  implies  a 
righteous  governor.  There  may  pofsibly  be  in  the 
creation  beings,  to  whom  the  Author  of  Nature  ma- 
nifests himself  under  this  most  amiable  of  all  charac- 
ters, this  of  infinite  absolute  benevolence ;  for  it  is 
the  most  amiable,  supposing  it  not,  as  perhaps  it  is 
not,  incompatible  with  justice:  but  he  manifests  him- 
self to  us  under  the  charad^er  of  a  righteous  gover- 
nor. He  may,  consistently  with  this,  be  simply  and 
absolutely  benevolent,  in  the  sense  now  explained : 
But  he  is,  for  he  has  given  us  a  proof  in  the  consti-f 
tution  and  conduct  of  the  world  that  he  is,  a  governor 
over  servants,  as  he  rewards  and  punishes  us  for  our 
actions.  And  in  the  constitution  and  conduct  of  it, 
he  may  also  have  given,  besides  the  reason  of  the 
thing,  and  the  natural  presages  of  conscience,  clear 
and  distincft  intimations,  that  his  government  is  right- 
eous or  moral :  clear  to  such  as  think  the  nature  of 
it  deserving  their  attention ;  and  yet  not  to  every 
carelefs  person,  who  casts  a  transient  reflection  upon 
the  subje(5l.^ 

But  it  is  particularly  to  be  observed,  that  the  Di- 

^  The  objeftions  against  Religion,  from  the  evidence  of  it 
not  being  universal,  nor  so  strong  as  might  polHbly  have  been, 
may  be  urged  against  natural  Religion,  as  well  as  against  re- 
vealed. And  therefore  the  consideration  of  them  belongs  to 
the  First  Part  of  this  Treatise,  as  well  as  the  Second.  But  as 
these  objedlions  are  chiefly  urged  against  revealed  Religion,  I 
chose  to  consider  them  in  the  Second  Part.  And  the  answer 
to  them  there,  chap,  vi.,  as  urged  against  Christianity,  being 
almost  equally  applicable  to  them  as  urged  against  the  Religion 
of  Nature  J  to  avoid  repetition,  the  reader  is  referred  to  that 
chapter. 


48  Of  the  Moral  Parti. 

vine  government,  which  we  experience  ourselves 
under  in  the  present  state,  taken  alone,  is  allowed  not 
to  be  the  perfe^lion  of  moral  government.  And  yet 
this  by  no  means  hinders,  but  that  there  may  be 
somewhat,  be  it  more  or  lef^,  truly  moral  in  it.  A 
righteous  government  may  plainly  appear  to  be  car-; 
ried  on  to  some  degree  :  enough  to  give  us  the  ap- 
prehension that  it  shall  be  completed,  or  carried  on 
to  that  degree  of  perfection  which  religion  teaches 
us  it  shall ;  but  which  cannot  appear,  till  much  more 
of  the  Divine  administration  be  seen,  than  can  in  the 
present  life.  And  the  design  of  this  chapter  is  to 
enquire,  how  far  this  is  the  case  :  how  far,  over  and 
above  the  m.oral  nature^  which  God  has  given  us,  and 
our  natural  notion  of  him  as  righteous  governor  of 
those  his  creatures,  to  whom  he  has  given  this  na- 
ture f  I  say  how  far  besides  this,  the  principles  and 
beginnings  of  a  moral  government  over  the  world 
may  be  discerned,  notwithstanding  and  amidst  all  the 
confusion  and  disorder  of  it. 

Now  one  might  mention  here,  what  has  been  often 
urged  with  great  force,  that,  in  general,  left  uneasi- 
neft  and  more  satisfacftion,  are  the  natural  conse- 
quences'^ of  a  virtuous  than  of  a  vicious  course  of  life, 
in  the  present  state,  as  an  instance  of  a  moral  go- 
vernment established  in  nature  ;  an  instance  of  it, 
colle6led  from  experience  and  present  matter  of  fa<51. 
But  it  must  be  owned  a  thing  of  difficulty  to  weigh  and 
balance  pleasures  and  uneasinefses,  each  amongst 
themselves,  and  also  against  each  other,  so  as  to 
make  an  estimate,  with  any  exa(9;neft,  of  the  over- 
plus of  happineft  on  the  side  of  virtue.  And  it  is 
not  impoftible,  that,  amidst  the  infinite  disorders  of 


'  DlJJertation  II.  ■*  Chap,  vi.  pp.  167,  &c. 

'  See  Lord  Shaftesbury's  Inquiry  concerning  Virtue,  Part  11. 


Chap.  3.        Government  of  God.  49 

the  world,  there  may  be  exceptions  to  the  happi- 
neis  of  virtue  ;  even  with  regard  to  those  persons, 
whose  course  of  Hfe  from  their  youth  up,  has  been 
blamelef^  ;  and  more  with  regard  to  those,  who  have 
gone  on  for  some  time  in  the  ways  of  vice,  and  have 
afterwards  reformed.  For  suppose  an  instance  of 
the  latter  case  ;  a  person  with  his  paf^ions  inflamed, 
his  natural  faculty  of  self-government  impaired  by 
habits  of  indulgence,  and  with  all  his  vices  about  him, 
like  so  many  harpies,  craving  for  their  accustomed 
gratification:  who  can  say  how  long  it  might  be,  be- 
fore such  a  person  would  find  more  satisfa(5lion  in 
the  reasonableneft  and  present  good  consequences 
of  virtue,  than  difficulties  and  self-denial  in  the  re- 
straints of  it  ?  Experience  also  shews,  that  men  can, 
to  a  great  degree,  get  over  their  sense  of  shame,  so 
as  that  by  profefsing  themselves  to  be  without  prin- 
ciple, and  avowing  even  dire(51  villany,  they  can  sup- 
port themselves  against  the  infamy  of  it.  But  as  the 
ill  adiions  of  any  one  will  probably  be  more  talked 
of,  and  oftener  thrown  in  his  way,  upon  his  refor- 
mation ;  so  the  infamy  of  them  will  be  much  more 
felt,  after  the  natural  sense  of  virtue  and  of  honour 
is  recovered.  Uneasineftes  of  this  kind  ought  indeed 
to  be  put  to  the  account  of  former  vices  :  yet  it  will 
be  said,  they  are  in  part  the  consequences  of  refor- 
mation. Still  I  am  far  from  allowing  it  doubtful, 
whether  virtue,  upon  the  whole,  be  happier  than 
vice  in  the  present  world.  But  if  it  were,  yet  the 
beginnings  of  a  righteous  administration  may  beyond 
all  question  be  found  in  nature,  if  we  will  attentively 
inquire  after  them.     And, 

I.  In  whatever  manner  the  notion  of  God's  moral 
government  over  the  world  might  be  treated,  if  it 
did  not  appear  whether  he  were  in  a  proper  sense 
our  governor  at  all ;  yet  when  it  is  certain  matter  of 

E 


50  Of  the  Moral  Parti, 

experience,  that  he  does  manifest  himself  to  us  under 
the  chara(9;er  of  a  governor,  in  the  sense  explained;^ 
it  must  deserve  to  be  considered,  whether  there  be 
not  reason  to  apprehend,  that  he  may  be  a  righteous* 
or  moral  governor.  Since  it  appears  to  be  faifl,  that 
God  does  govern  mankind  by  the  method  of  rewards 
and  punishments,  according  to  some  settled  rules  of 
distribution;  it  is  surely  a  question  to  be  asked,  What 
presumption  is  there  against  his  finally  rewarding  and 
punishing  them,  according  to  this  particular  rule, 
namely,  as  they  a(9;  reasonably  or  unreasonably,  vir- 
tuously or  viciously  '\  Since  rendering  men  happy 
or  miserable  by  this  rule,  certainly  falls  in,  much 
more  falls  in,  with  our  natural  apprehensions  and 
sense  of  things,  than  doing  so  by  any  other  rule 
whatever:  Since  rewarding  and  punishing  a(5lions 
by  any  other  rule,  would  appear  much  harder  to  be 
accounted  for,  by  minds  formed  as  he  has  formed 
ours.  Be  the  evidence  of  Religion  then  more  or  lef^ 
clear,  the  expe(5lation  whi^h  Jt  raises  in^us,  that  the 
righteous  shall^  upon  the  whole,  be  happy,  and  the 
vdcked  miserable,  cannotjiowever  poftibly  be  con- 
sidered as  j^b^urd  or  chimerical ;  because  it  is  no 
more  than  an  expe(5lation,  that  a  method  of  govern- 
ment already  begun,  shall  be  carried  on,  the  method 
of  rewarding  and  punishing  alliens ;  and  shall  be 
carried  on  by  a  particular  rule,  which  unavoidably 
appears  to  us  at  first  sight  more  natural  than  any 
other,  the  rule  which  we  call  distributive  justice. 
Nor, 

II.  Ought  it  to  be  entirely  paired  over,  that  tran- 
quillity, satisfa(9;ion,  and  external  advantages,  being 
the  natural  consequences  of  prudent  management  of 
ourselves,  and  our  affairs ;  and  rashness,  profligate 

6  Chap.  ii. 


Chap.  2'        Government  of  God.  51 

neg-ligence,  and  wilful  folly,  bringing  after  them 
many  inconveniences  and  sufferings ;  these  afford 
instances  of  a  right  constitution  of  nature  :  as  the 
correc9;ion  of  children,  for  their  own  sakes,  and  by 
way  of  example,  when  they  run  into  danger  or  hurt 
themselves,  is  a  part  of  right  education.  And  thus, 
that  God  governs  the  world  by  general  fixed  laws, 
that  he  has  endued  us  with  capacities  of  reflecfiing 
upon  this  constitution  of  things,  and  foreseeing  the 
good  and  bad  consequences  of  our  behaviour;  plainly 
implies  some  sort  of  moral  government ;  since  from 
such  a  constitution  of  things  it  cannot  but  follow,  that 
prudence  and  imprudence,  which  are  of  the  nature 
of  virtue  and  vice,'  must  be,  as  they  are,  respectively 
rewarded  and  punished. 

III.  From  the  natural  course  of  things,  vicious 
actions  are,  to  a  great  degree,  actually  punished  as 
mischievous  to  society :  and  besides  punishment 
actually  infliCled  upon  this  account,  there  is  also  the 
fear  and  apprehension  of  it  in  those  persons,  whose 
crimes  have  rendered  them  obnoxious  to  it,  in  case 
of  a  discovery ;  this  state  of  fear  being  itself  often  a 
very  considerable  punishment.  The  natural  fear  and 
apprehension  of  it  too,  which  restrains  from  such 
crimes,  is  a  declaration  of  nature  against  them.  It 
is  necefsary  to  the  very  being  of  society,  that  vices 
destructive  of  it,  should  be  punished  as  being  so  ; 
the  vices  of  falsehood,  injustice,  cruelty :  which 
punishment  therefore  is  as  natural  as  society ;  and 
so  is  an  instance  of  a  kind  of  moral  government, 
naturally  established  and  aClually  taking  place.  And, 
since  the  certain  natural  course  of  things,  is  the  con- 
duCl  of  Providence  or  the  government  of  God, 
though  carried  on  by  the  instrumentality  of  men, 

7  See  Dlfiert.  II. 


52  Of  the  Moral  Parti. 

the  observation  here  made  amounts  to  this,  that 
mankind  find  themselves  placed  by  him  in  such 
circumstances,  as  that  they  are  unavoidably  ac- 
countable for  their  behaviour,  and  are  often  punished, 
and  sometimes  rewarded,  under  his  government,  in 
the  view  of  their  being  mischievous,  or  eminently 
beneficial  to  society. 

If  it  be  objeded  that  good  a(5^ions,  and  such  as 
are  beneficial  to  society,  are  often  punished,  as  in 
the  case  of  persecution  and  in  other  cases ;  and  that 
ill  and  mischievous  a^lions  are  often  rewarded :  it 
may  be  answered  distinctly;  first,  that  this  is  in  no 
sort  neceftary,  and  consequently  not  natural,  in  the 
sense  in  which  it  is  necef^ary,  and  therefore  natural, 
that  ill  or  mischievous  ac^tions  should  be  punished: 
And  in  the  next  place,  that  good  actions  are  never 
punished,  considered  as  beneficial  to  society,  nor  ill 
ac^tions  rewarded,  under  the  view  of  their  being 
hurtful  to  it.  So  that  it  stands  good,  without  any 
thing  on  the  side  of  vice  to  be  set  over  against  it, 
that  the  Author  of  Nature  has  as  truly  dire<5led,  that 
vicious  actions  considered  as  mischievous  to  society, 
should  be  punished,  and  put  mankind  under  a  neces- 
sity of  thus  punishing  them  ;  as  he  has  directed  and 
necelsitated  us  to  preserve  our  lives  by  food. 

IV.  In  the  natural  course  of  things,  virtue  as  such 
is  actually  rewarded,  and  vice  as  such  punished : 
which  seems  to  afford  an  instance^or  jexample,  not 
only  of  government,  but  of  morai_goyernment,  begun 
and  established;  moral  in  the  stri(5test  sense  ;  though 
not  in  that  perfe(?i:ion  of  degree  which  Religion 
teaches  us  to  expert.  In  order  to  see  this  more 
clearly,  we  must  distinguish  between  actions  them- 
selves, and  that  quality  ascribed  to  them,  which  we 
call  virtuous  or  vicious.  The  gratification  itself  of 
every  natural  pafsion,  must  be  attended  with  delight: 


Chap.  3.         Government  of  God.  53 

And  acquisitions  of  fortune,  however  made,  are  ac- 
quisitions of  the  means,  ormaterials,  of  enjoyment.  An 
action  then,  by  which  any  natural  pafsion  is  gratified 
or  fortune  acquired,  procures  delight  or  advantage  ; 
abstra<5led  from  all  consideration  of  the  morality  of 
such  a(5lion.  Consequently  the  pleasure  or  advan- 
tage in  this  case,  is  gained  by  the  action  itself,  not 
by  the  morality,  the  virtuousnei^  or  viciousnefs  of  it; 
though  it  be,  perhaps,  virtuous  or  vicious.  Thus,  to 
say  such  an  a<fl;ion  or  course  of  behaviour,  procured 
such  pleasure  or  advantage,  or  brought  on  such  in- 
convenience and  pain,  is  quite  a  different  thing  from 
saying,  that  such  good  or  bad  effecft  was  owing  to 
the  virtue  or  vice  of  such  action  or  behaviour.  In 
one  case,  an  acT:ion  abstracted  from  all  moral  con- 
sideration, produced  its  efFe(5l :  In  the  other  case, 
for  it  will  appear  that  there  are  such  cases,  the 
morality  of  the  action,  the  a(5lion  under  a  moral  con- 
sideration, i.  e.  the  virtuousnef^  or  viciousneft  of  it, 
produced  the  effect.  Now  I  say  virtue  as  such,  na- 
turally procures  considerable  advantages  to  the  vir- 
tuous, and  vice  as  such,  naturally  occasions  great 
inconvenience  and  even  misery  to  the  vicious,  in 
very  many  instances.  The  immediate  effe(?ts  of  virtue 
and  vice  upon  the  mind  and  temper,  are  to  be  men- 
tioned as  instances  of  it.  Vice  as  such  is  naturally 
attended  with  some  sort  of  uneasinef^,  and,  not  un- 
commonly, with  great  disturbance  and  apprehension. 
That  inward  feeling,  which,  respecting  lefser  mat- 
ters, and  in  familiar  speech,  we  call  being  vexed  with 
oneself,  and  in  matters  of  importance  and  in  more 
serious  language,  remorse ;  is  an  uneasinef^  natu- 
rally arising  from  an  aCtion  of  a  man's  own,  refle(5ted 
upon  by  himself  as  wrong,  unreasonable,  faulty,  i.  e. 
vicious  in  greater  or  lei^  degrees :  and  this  mani- 
festly is  a  different  feeling  from  that  uneasinef^  which 


54  Of  the  Moral  Part  I. 

arises  from  a  sense  of  mere  loft  or  harm.  What  is 
more  common,  than  to  hear  a  man  lamenting  an  ac- 
cident or  event,    and  adding but  however  he 

has  the  satisfa(5lion  that  he  cannot  blame  himself  for 
it;  or,  on  the  contrary,  that  he  has  the  uneasi- 
neft  of  being  sensible  it  was  his  own  doing?  Thus 
also  the  disturbance  and  fear,  which  often  follow 
upon  a  man's  having  done  an  injury,  arise  from  a 
sense  of  his  being  blameworthy  ;  otherwise  there 
would,  in  many  cases,  be  no  ground  of  disturbance, 
nor  any  reason  to  fear  resentment  or  shame.  On 
the  other  hand,  inward  security  and  peace,  and  a 
mind  open  to  the  several  gratifications  of  life,  are  the 
natural  attendants  of  innocence  and  virtue.  To 
which  must  be  added  the  complacency,  satisfaction, 
and  even  joy  of  heart,  which  accompany  the  exer- 
cise, the  real  exercise,  of  gratitude,  friendship,  be- 
nevolence. 

And  here,  I  think,  ought  to  be  mentioned,  the 
fears  of  future  punishment,  and  peaceful  hopes  of  a 
better  life,  in  those  who  fully  believe,  or  have  any 
serious  apprehension  of  Religion :  because  these 
hopes  and  fears  are  present  uneasineft  and  satis- 
faction to  the  mind  ;  and  cannot  be  got  rid  of  by 
great  part  of  the  world,  even  by  men  who  have 
thought  most  thoroughly  upon  that  subject;  of  Re- 
ligion. And  no  one  can  say,  how  considerable  this 
uneasineft  and  satisfaction  may  be,  or  what  upon  the 
whole  it  may  amount  to. 

In  the  next  place  comes  in  the  consideration,  that 
all  honest  and  good  men  are  disposed  to  befriend 
honest  good  men  as  such,  and  to  discountenance  the 
vicious  as  such,  and  do  so  in  some  degree;  indeed 
in  a  considerable  degree  :  from  which  favour  and 
discouragement  cannot  but  arise  considerable  ad- 
vantage and  inconvenience.     And  though  the  gene- 


Chap.  3.         Government  of  God.  55 

rality  of  the  world  have  little  regard  to  the  morality 
of  their  own  actions,  and  may  be  supposed  to  have 
lef^  to  that  of  others,  when  they  themselves  are  not 
concerned  ;  yet  let  any  one  be  known  to  be  a  man  of 
virtue,  somehow  or  other  he  will  be  favoured,  and 
good  offices  will  be  done  him,  from  regard  to  his 
chara<5ler  without  remote  views,  occasionally,  and  in 
some  low  degree,  I  think,  by  the  generality  of  the 
world,  as  it  happens  to  come  in  their  way.  Public 
honours  too  and  advantages  are  the  natural  conse- 
quences, are  sometimes  at  least  the  consequences  in 
fa(5l,  of  virtuous  ac^tions  ;  of  eminent  justice,  fidelity, 
charity,  love  to  our  country,  considered  in  the  view 
of  being  virtuous.  And  sometimes  even  death  itself, 
often  infamy  and  external  inconveniences,  are  the 
public  consequences  of  vice  as  vice.  For  instance, 
the  sense  which  mankind  have  of  tyranny,  injustice, 
oppre{^ion,  additional  to  the  mere  feeling  or  fear  of 
misery,  has  doubtleft  been  instrumental  in  bringing 
about  revolutions,  which  make  a  figure  even  in  the 
history  of  the  world.  For  it  is  plain,  men  resent 
injuries  as  implying  faultineft,  and  retaliate,  not 
merely  under  the  notion  of  having  received  harm, 
but  of  having  received  wrong;  and  they  have  this  re- 
sentment in  behalf  of  others,  as  well  as  of  themselves. 
So  likewise  even  the  generality  are,  in  some  degree, 
grateful  and  disposed  to  return  good  offices,  not 
merely  because  such  an  one  has  been  the  occasion  of 
good  to  them,  but  under  the  view,  that  such  good 
offices  implied  kind  intention  and  good  desert  in  the 
doer.  To  all  this  may  be  added  two  or  three  par- 
ticular things,  which  many  persons  will  think  frivo- 
lous ;  but  to  me  nothing  appears  so,  which  at  all 
comes  in  towards  determining  a  question  of  such 
importance,  as,  whether  there  be,  or  be  not,  a  moral 
institution    of  government,   in  the    stri(ftest    sense 


56  Of  the  Moral  Parti. 

moral,  visibly  established  and  begun  in  nature.  The 
particular  things  are  these  :  That  in  domestic  go- 
vernment, which  is  doubtlef^  natural,  children  and 
others  also  are  very  generally  punished  for  falsehood, 
and  injustice,  and  ill-behaviour,  as  such,  and  rewarded 
for  the  contrary ;  which  are  instances  where  veracity, 
cind  justice,  and  right  behaviour,  as  such,  are  natu- 
rally enforced  by  rewards  and  punishments,  whether 
more  or  left  considerable  in  degree  :  That,  though 
civil  government  be  supposed  to  take  cognizance  of 
a^lions  in  no  other  view  than  as  prejudicial  to  society, 
without  respe(51:  to  the  immorality  of  them ;  yet  as 
such  a(?i:ions  are  immoral,  so  the  sense  which  men 
have  of  the  immorality  of  them,  very  greatly  contri- 
butes, in  different  ways,  to  bring  offenders  to  justice: 
And  that  entire  absence  of  all  crime  and  guilt  in  the 
moral  sense,  when  plainly  appearing,  will  almost  of 
course  procure,  and  circumstances  of  aggravated 
guilt  prevent,  a  remifsion  of  the  penalties  annexed  to 
civil  crimes,  in  many  cases,  though  by  no  means  in  all. 
Upon  the  whole  then,  besides  the  good  and  bad 
effects  of  virtue  and  vice  upon  men's  own  minds, 
the  course  of  the  world  does,  in  some  measure,  turn 
upon  the  approbation  and  disapprobation  of  them  as 
such,  in  others.  The  sense  of  well  and  ill  doing, 
the  presages  of  conscience,  the  love  of  good  charac- 
ters and  dislike  of  bad  ones;  honour,  shame,  resent- 
ment, gratitude ;  all  these,  considered  in  themselves, 
and  in  their  effe(9:s,  do  afford  manifest  real  instances 
of  virtue  as  such  naturally  favoured,  and  of  vice  as 
such  discountenanced,  more  or  lef^,  in  the  daily 
course  of  human  life  ;  in  every  age,  in  every  re- 
lation, in  every  general  circumstance  of  it.  That 
God  has  given  us  a  moral  nature^,  may  most  justly 

8  See  Difsert.  II. 


Chap.  2,-         Government  of  God.  57 

be  urged  as  a  proof  of  our  being  under  his  moral  / , 
government :   But  that  he  has  placed  us  in  a  con- 
dition, which  gives  this  nature,  as  one  may  speak, 
scope  to  operate,  and  in  which  it  does  unavoidably  ^ 
operate  ;  i.  e.  influence  mankind  to  a(ft,  so  as  thus  to        « 
favour  and  reward  virtue,  and  discountenance  and 
punish   vice  ;    this  is  not  the  same,  but  a  further, 
additional  proof  of  his  moral  government :   for  it  is  an 
instance  of  it.    The  first  is  a  proof,  that  he  will  finally 
favour  and  support  virtue  eflfectually :   The  second  is 
an  example  of  his  favouring  and  supporting  it  at 
present,  in  some  degree. 

If  a  more  distinct  inquiry  be  made,  whence  it 
arises,  that  virtue  as  such  is  often  rewarded,  and  vice 
as  such  is  punished,  and  this  rule  never  inverted : 
it  will  be  found  to  proceed,  in  part,  immediately  from 
the  moral  nature  itself,  which  God  has  given  us ; 
and  also  in  part,  from  his  having  given  us,  together 
with  this  nature,  so  great  a  power  over  each  other's 
happinef^  and  misery.  For  first,  it  is  certain,  that 
peace  and  delight,  in  some  degree  and  upon  some 
occasions,  are  the  necefsary  and  present  effe(5ls 
of  virtuous  practice ;  effects  arising  immediately 
from  that  constitution  of  our  nature.  We  are  so 
made,  that  well-doing  as  such  gives  us  satisfaction, 
at  least,  in  some  instances ;  ill-doing  as  such,  in  7 
none.  And  secondly,  from  our  moral  nature,  joined 
with  God's  having  put  our  happinef^  and  misery  in 
many  respedls  in  each  other's  power,  it  cannot  but 
be,  that  vice  as  such,  some  kinds  and  instances  of  it 
at  least,  will  be  infamous,  and  men  will  be  disposed 
to  punish  it  as  in  itself  detestable  ;  and  the  villain 
will  by  no  means  be  able  always  to  avoid  feeling  that 
infamy,  any  more  than  he  will  be  able  to  escape  this 
further  punishment,  which  mankind  will  be  disposed 
to  infli^l  upon  him,  under  the  notion  of  his  deserving 


58  Of  the  Moral  Parti, 

it.  But  there  can  be  nothing  on  the  side  of  vice,  to 
answer  this;  because  there  is  nothing  in  the  human 
mind,  contradictory,  as  the  logicians  speak,  to  virtue. 
For  virtue  consists  in  a  regard  to  what  is  light  and 
reasonable,  as  being  so ;  in  a  regard  to  veracity, 
justice,  charity,  in  themselves :  and  there  is  surely 
no  such  thing,  as  a  like  natural  regard  to  falsehood, 
injustice,  cruelty.  If  it  be  thought,  that  there  are 
instances  of  an  approbation  of  vice,  as  such,  in  itself, 
and  for  its  own  sake,  (though  it  does  not  appear  to 
me,  that  there  is  any  such  thing  at  all ;  but  suppos- 
ing there  be,)  it  is  evidently  monstrous  :  as  much 
so,  as  the  most  acknowledged  perversion  of  any 
paftion  whatever.  Such  instances  of  perversion  then 
being  left  out,  as  merely  imaginary,  or,  however, 
unnatural,  it  must  follow,  from  the  frame  of  our 
nature,  and  from  our  condition,  in  the  respects  now 
described,  that  vice  cannot  at  all  be,  and  virtue  can- 
not but  be,  favoured  as  such  by  others,  upon  some 
occasions ;  and  happy  in  itself,  in  some  degree.  For 
what  is  here  insisted  upon,  is  not  the  degree  in  which 
virtue  and  vice  are  thus  distinguished,  but  only  the 
thing  itself,  that  they  are  so  in  some  degree  ;  though 
the  whole  good  and  bad  effeCl  of  virtue  and  vice  as 
such,  is  not  inconsiderable  in  degree.  But  that  they 
must  be  thus  distinguished  in  some  degree,  is  in  a 
manner  neceftary  :  It  is  matter  of  fac^  of  daily  ex- 
perience, even  in  the  greatest  confusion  of  human 
affairs. 

It  is  not  pretended,  but  that  in  the  natural  course 
of  things,  happineft  and  misery  appear  to  be  dis- 
tributed by  other  rules,  than  only  the  personal  merit 
and  demerit  of  characters.  They  may  sometimes  be 
distributed  by  way  of  mere  discipline.  There  may 
be  the  wisest  and  best  reasons,  why  the  world  should 
be  governed  by  general  laws,  from  whence  such 


Chap.  3.         Government  of  God.  59 

promiscuous  distribution  perhaps  must  follow;  and 
also  why  our  happinef^  and  misery  should  be  put  in 
each  other's  power,  in  the  degree  which  they  are. 
And  these  things,  as  in  general  they  contribute  to 
the  rewarding  virtue  and  punishing  vice,  as  such : 
so  they  often  contribute  also,  not  to  the  inversion  of 
this,  which  is  impoftible  ;  but  to  the  rendering  per- 
sons prosperous,  though  wicked;  afflicted,  though 
righteous ;  and  which  is  worse,  to  the  rewarding 
some  a6iions,  though  vicious  ;  and  punishing  other 
aSlions,  though  virtuous.  But  all  this  cannot  drown 
the  voice  of  nature  in  the  condu(?i:  of  Providence, 
plainly  declaring  itself  for  virtue,  by  way  of  distinc- 
tion from  vice,  and  preference  to  it.  For,  our  being 
so  constituted,  as  that  virtue  and  vice  are  thus  na- 
turally favoured  and  discountenanced,  rewarded  and 
punished  respe(9:ively  as  such,  is  an  intuitive  proof 
of  the  intent  of  nature,  that  it  should  be  so :  other- 
wise the  constitution  of  our  mind,  from  which  it  thus 
immediately  and  dire<flly  proceeds,  would  be  absurd. 
But  it  cannot  be  said,  because  virtuous  a(51ions  are 
sometimes  punished,  and  vicious  a(9:ions  rewarded, 
that  nature  intended  it.  For,  though  this  great 
disorder  is  brought  about,  as  all  acflions  are  done, 
by  means  of  some  natural  pafsion;  yet  this  may  be, 
as  it  undoubtedly  is,  brought  about  by  the  perver- 
sion of  such  paftion,  implanted  in  us  for  other, 
and  those  very  good  purposes.  And  indeed  these 
other  and  good  purposes,  even  of  every  pafsion,  may 
be  clearly  seen. 

We  have  then  a  declaration,  in  some  degree  of 
present  effecfl,  from  him  who  is  supreme  in  nature, 
which  side  he  is  of,  or  what  part  he  takes:  a  declara- 
tion for  virtue,  and  against  vice.  So  far  therefore 
as  a  man  is  true  to  virtue,  to  veracity  and  justice,  to 
equity  and  charity,  and  the  right  of  the  case,  in 


6o  Of  the  Moral  Parti. 

whatever  he  is  concerned ;  so  far  he  is  on  the  side 
of  the  Divine  administration,  and  co-operates  with 
it ;  and  from  hence,  to  such  a  man,  arises  naturally 
a  secret  satisfaction  and  sense  of  security,  and  im- 
plicit hope  of  somewhat  further.     And, 

V.  This  hope  is  confirmed  by  the  neceftary  ten- 
dencies of  virtue,  which,  though  not  of  present  ef- 
fe(ft,  yet  are  at  present  discernible  in  nature;  and 
so  afford  an  instance  of  somewhat  moral  in  the 
ef^ential  constitution  of  it.  There  is,  in  the  nature 
of  things,  a  tendency  in  virtue  and  vice  to  produce 
the  good  and  bad  effects  now  mentioned,  in  a  greater 
degree  than  they  do  in  fa6l  produce  them.  For 
instance ;  good  and  bad  men  would  be  much  more 
rewarded  and  punished  as  such,  were  it  not,  that 
justice  is  often  artificially  eluded,  that  chara61;ers 
are  not  known,  and  many,  who  would  thus  favour 
virtue  and  discourage  vice,  are  hindered  from  doing 
so  by  accidental  causes.  These  tendencies  of  virtue 
and  vice  are  obvious  with  regard  to  individuals. 
But  it  may  require  more  particularly  to  be  consi- 
dered, that  power  in  a  society,  by  being  under  the 
dire(?tion  of  virtue,  naturally  increases,  and  has  a 
necef^ary  tendency  to  prevail  over  opposite  power, 
not  under  the  direction  of  it ;  in  like  manner  as 
power,  by  being  under  the  dire<9;ion  of  reason,  in- 
creases, and  has  a  tendency  to  prevail  over  brute 
force.  There  are  several  brute  creatures  of  equal, 
and  several  of  superior  strength,  to  that  of  men  ;  and 
pof^ibly  the  sum  of  the  whole  strength  of  brutes, 
may  be  greater  than  that  of  mankind :  But  reason 
gives  us  the  advantage  and  superiority  over  them  ; 
and  thus  man  is  the  acknowledged  governing  animal 
upon  earth.  Nor  is  this  superiority  considered  by 
any  as  accidental ;  but  as  what  reason  has  a  tendency, 
in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  to  obtain.     And  yet  per- 


Chap.  2^.         Government  of  God.  6 1 

haps  difficulties  may  be  raised  about  the  meaning, 
as  well  as  the  truth,  of  the  af^ertion,  that  virtue  has 
the  like  tendency. 

To  obviate  these  difficulties,  let  us  see  more  dis- 
tin6lly,  how  the  case  stands  with  regard  to  reason ; 
which  is  so  readily  acknowledged  to  have  this  ad- 
vantageous tendency.  Suppose  then  two  or  three 
men,  of  the  best  and  most  improved  understanding, 
in  a  desolate  open  plain,  attacked  by  ten  times  the 
number  of  beasts  of  prey  :  Would  their  reason  se- 
cure them  the  vi(ftory  in  this  unequal  combat?  Power 
then,  though  joined  with  reason,  and  under  its  di- 
re(5lion,  cannot  be  expe(5led  to  prevail  over  opposite 
power,  though  merely  brutal,  unleft  the  one  bears 
some  proportion  to  the  other.  Again  :  put  the  ima- 
ginary case,  that  rational  and  irrational  creatures 
were  of  like  external  shape  and  manner :  it  is  certain, 
before  there  were  opportunities  for  the  first  to  dis- 
tinguish each  other,  to  separate  from  their  adver- 
saries, and  to  form  an  union  among  themselves, 
they  might  be  upon  a  level,  or  in  several  respe(5^s 
upon  great  disadvantage ;  though  united  they  might 
be  vastly  superior  :  Since  union  is  of  such  efficacy, 
that  ten  men  united,  might  be  able  to  accomplish, 
what  ten  thousand  of  the  same  natural  strength  and 
understanding  wholly  ununited,  could  not.  In  this 
case  then,  brute  force  might  more  than  maintain  its 
ground  against  reason,  for  want  of  union  among  the 
rational  creatures.  Or  suppose  a  number  of  men  to 
land  upon  an  island  inhabited  only  by  wild  beasts ; 
a  number  of  men,  who,  by  the  regulations  of  civil 
government,  the  inventions  of  art,  and  the  experi- 
ence of  some  years,  could  they  be  preserved  so  long, 
would  be  really  sufficient,  to  subdue  the  wild  beasts, 
and  to  preserve  themselves  in  security  from  them : 
Yet  a  conjuncflure  of  accidents  might  give  such  ad- 


62  Of  the  Moral  Part  i. 

vantage  to  the  irrational  animals,  as  that  they  might 
at  once  overpower,  and  even  extirpate,  the  whole 
species  of  rational  ones.  Length  of  time  then,  pro- 
per scope  and  opportunities,  for  reason  to  exert  it- 
self, may  be  absolutely  neceftary  to  its  prevailing 
over  brute  force.  Further  still :  there  are  many  in- 
stances of  brutes  succeeding  in  attempts,  which  they 
could  not  have  undertaken,  had  not  their  irrational 
nature  rendered  them  incapable  of  foreseeing  the 
danger  of  such  attempts,  or  the  fury  of  paftion  hin- 
dered their  attending  to  it;  and  there  are  instances 
of  reason  and  real  prudence  preventing  men's  under- 
taking what,  it  hath  appeared  afterwards,  they  might 
have  succeeded  in  by  a  lucky  rashneft.  And  in 
certain  conjunctures,  ignorance  and  folly,  weakneft 
and  discord,  may  have  their  advantages.  So  that 
rational  animals  have  not  neceftarily  the  superiority 
over  irrational  ones  :  but,  how  improbable  soever  it 
may  be,  it  is  evidently  pol^ible,  that,  in  some  globes, 
the  latter  may  be  superior.  And  were  the  former 
wholly  at  variance  and  disunited,  by  false  self-inte- 
rest and  envy,  by  treachery  and  injustice,  and  con- 
sequent rage  and  malice  against  each  other,  whilst 
the  latter  were  firmly  united  among  themselves  by 
instin(5l ;  this  might  greatly  contribute  to  the  intro- 
ducing such  an  inverted  order  of  things.  For  every 
one  would  consider  it  as  inverted :  Since  reason  has, 
in  the  nature  of  it,  a  tendency  to  prevail  over  brute 
force ;  notwithstanding  the  poftibility  it  may  not 
prevail,  and  the  necefsity,  which  there  is,  of  many 
concurring  circumstances  to  render  it  prevalent. 

Now  I  say,  virtue  in  a  society  has  a  like  tendency 
to  procure  superiority  and  additional  power:  whether 
this  power  be  considered  as  the  means  of  security 
from  opposite  power,  or  of  obtaining  other  advan- 
tages.   And  it  has  this  tendency,  by  rendering  pub- 


Chap.  3.         Government  of  God.  63 

lie  good,  an  object  and  end,  to  every  member  of 
the  society  ;  by  putting  every  one  upon  considera- 
tion and  diligence,  recolle^lion  and  self-government, 
both  in  order  to  see  what  is  the  most  effectual 
method,  and  also  in  order  to  perform  their  proper 
part,  for  obtaining  and  preserving  it ;  by  uniting  a 
society  within  itself,  and  so  increasing  its  strength  ; 
and,  which  is  particularly  to  be  mentioned,  uniting 
it  by  means  of  veracity  and  justice.  For  as  these 
last  are  principal  bonds  of  union,  so  benevolence  or 
public  spirit,  undire^led,  unrestrained  by  them,  is  no- 
body knows  what. 

And  suppose  the  invisible  world,  and  the  invisible 
dispensations  of  Providence,  to  be,  in  any  sort,  an- 
dogous  to  what  appears :  or  that  both  together 
make  up  one  uniform  scheme,  the  two  parts  of 
which,  the  part  which  we  see,  and  that  which  is  be- 
yond our  observation,  are  analogous  to  each  other : 
Then,  there  must  be  a  like  natural  tendency  in  the 
derived  power,  throughout  the  universe,  under  the 
dire(9:ion  of  virtue,  to  prevail  in  general  over  that, 
which  is  not  under  its  direcflion ;  as  there  is  in  rea- 
son, derived  reason  in  the  universe,  to  prevail  over 
brute  force.  But  then,  in  order  to  the  prevalence  of 
virtue,  or  that  it  may  a(5lually  produce,  what  it  has 
a  tendency  to  produce  ;  the  like  concurrences  are 
neceftary,  as  are,  to  the  prevalence  of  reason.  There 
must  be  some  proportion,  between  the  natural  power 
or  force  which  is,  and  that  which  is  not,  under  the 
dire(5lion  of  virtue  :  There  must  be  sufficient  length 
of  time;  for  the  complete  succei^  of  virtue,  as  of 
reason,  cannot,  from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  be 
otherwise  than  gradual :  There  must  be,  as  one  may 
speak,  a  fair  field  of  trial,  a  stage  large  and  extensive 
enough,  proper  occasions  and  opportunities,  for  the 
virtuous  to  join  together,  to  exert  themselves  against 


64  Of  the  Moral  Parti. 

lawlef^  force,  and  to  reap  the  fruit  of  their  united 
labours.  Now,  indeed,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  that  the  dis- 
proportion between  the  good  and  bad,  even  here  on 
earth,  is  not  so  great,  but  that  the  former  have  na- 
tural power  sufficient  to  their  prevailing  to  a  consi- 
derable degree,  if  circumstances  would  permit  this 
power  to  be  united.  For,  much  left,  very  much  lefs, 
power  under  the  direc^tion  of  virtue,  would  prevail 
over  much  greater  not  under  the  dire(5lion  of  it. 
However,  good  men  over  the  face  of  the  earth  can- 
not unite ;  as  for  other  reasons,  so  because  they 
cannot  be  sufficiently  ascertained  of  each  other's 
characters.  And  the  known  course  of  human  things, 
the  scene  we  are  now  pairing  through,  particularly 
the  shortneft  of  life,  denies  to  virtue  its  full  scope  in 
several  other  respects.  The  natural  tendency,  which 
we  have  been  considering,  though  real,  is  hindered 
from  being  carried  into  effeCl  in  the  present  state  : 
But  these  hinderances  may  be  removed  in  a  future 
one.  Virtue,  to  borrow  the  Christian  allusion,  is 
militant  here  ;  and  various  untoward  accidents  con- 
tribute to  its  being  often  overborne  :  But  it  may  com- 
bat with  greater  advantage  hereafter,  and  prevail 
completely,  and  enjoy  its  consequent  rewards,  in 
some  future  state.  Negle(5led  as  it  is,  perhaps  un- 
known, perhaps  despised  and  opprefted,  here;  there 
may  be  scenes  in  eternity,  lasting  enough,  and  in 
every  other  way  adapted,  to  afford  it  a  sufficient 
sphere  of  a6lion ;  and  a  sufficient  sphere  for  the 
natural  consequences  of  it  to  follow  in  h^.  If  the 
soul  be  naturally  immortal,  and  this  state  be  a  pro- 
greft  towards  a  future  one,  as  childhood  is  towards 
mature  age  ;  good  men  may  naturally  unite,  not 
only  amongst  themselves,  but  also  with  other  orders 
of  virtuous  creatures,  in  that  future  state.  For 
virtue,   from  the  very  nature  of  it,  is  a  principle 


Chap.  3.  Government  of  God.  65 

and  bond  of  union,  in  some  degree,  amongst  all  who 
are  endued  with  it,  and  known  to  each  other ;  so 
as  that  by  it,  a  good  man  cannot  but  recommend 
himself  to  the  favour  and  protection  of  all  virtuous 
beings,  throughout  the  whole  universe,  who  can  be 
acquainted  with  his  chara(5ler,  and  can  any  way  in- 
terpose in  his  behalf  in  any  part  of  his  duration.  And 
one  might  add,  that  suppose  all  this  advantageous 
tendency  of  virtue  to  become  effeCl,  amongst  one  or 
more  orders  of  creatures,  in  any  distant  scenes  and 
periods,  and  to  be  seen  by  any  orders  of  vicious 
creatures,  throughout  the  universal  Kingdom  of  God; 
this  happy  effect:  of  virtue  would  have  a  tendency,  by 
way  of  example,  and  poftibly  in  other  ways,  to  amend 
those  of  them  who  are  capable  of  amendment,  and 
being  recovered  to  a  just  sense  of  virtue.  If  our 
notions  of  the  plan  of  Providence  were  enlarged,  in 
any  sort  proportionable  to  what  late  discoveries  have 
enlarged  our  views  with  respedl  to  the  material 
world  ;  representations  of  this  kind  would  not  appear 
absurd  or  extravagant.  However  they  are  not  to  be 
taken,  as  intended  for  a  literal  delineation  of  what  is 
in  facft  the  particular  scheme  of  the  universe,  which 
cannot  be  known  without  revelation  :  for  suppositions 
are  not  to  be  looked  on  as  true,  because  not  incredible : 
But  they  are  mentioned  to  shew,  that  our  finding 
virtue  to  be  hindered  from  procuring  to  itself  such 
superiority  and  advantages,  is  no  objecftion  against 
its  having,  in  the  ef^ential  nature  of  the  thing,  a  ten- 
dency to  procure  them.  And  the  suppositions  now 
mentioned  do  plainly  shew  this  :  For  they  shew  that 
these  hinderances  are  so  far  from  being  necei^ary, 
that  we  ourselves  can  easily  conceive,  how  they  may 
be  removed  in  future  states,  and  full  scope  be  granted 
to  virtue.  And  all  these  advantageous  tendencies  of 
it,  are  to  be  considered  as  declarations  of  God  in  its 

F 


66  Of  the  Moral  Parti, 

favour.  This  however  is  taking  a  pretty  large  com- 
paft :  though  it  is  certain,  that,  as  the  material  world 
appears  to  be,  in  a  manner,  boundleft  and  immense  ; 
there  must  be  some  scheme  of  providence  vast  in 
proportion  to  it. 

But  let  us  return  to  the  earth  our  habitation;  and 
we  shall  see  this  happy  tendency  of  virtue,  by  im- 
agining an  instance  not  so  vast  and  remote :  by 
supposing  a  kingdom  or  society  of  men  upon  it,  per- 
fectly virtuous,  for  a  succef^ion  of  many  ages ;  to 
which,  if  you  please,]  may  be  given  a  situation  ad- 
vantageous for  universal  monarchy.  In  such  a  state, 
there  would  be  no  such  thing  as  faClion :  but  men 
of  the  greatest  capacity  would  of  course,  all  along, 
have  the  chief  direction  of  affairs  willingly  yielded 
to  them ;  and  they  would  share  it  among  themselves 
without  envy.  Each  of  these  would  have  the  part 
ai^igned  him,  to  which  his  genius  was  peculiarly 
adapted :  and  others,  who  had  not  any  distinguished 
genius,  would  be  safe,  and  think  themselves  very 
happy,  by  being  under  the  protedl:ion  and  guidance 
of  those  who  had.  Public  determinations  would 
really  be  the  result  of  the  united  wisdom  of  the 
community  :  and  they  would  faithfully  be  executed, 
by  the  united  strength  of  it.  Some  would  in  a  higher 
way  contribute,  but  all  would  in  some  way  con- 
tribute, to  the  public  prosperity :  and  in  it,  each 
would  enjoy  the  fruits  of  his  own  virtue.  And 
as  injustice,  whether  by  fraud  or  force,  would  be 
unknown  among  themselves  ;  so  they  would  be  suf- 
ficiently secured  from  it  in  their  neighbours.  For 
cunning  and  false  self-interest,  confederacies  in 
injustice,  ever  slight,  and  accompanied  with  fa(5lion 
and  intestine  treachery ;  these  on  one  hand  would 
be  found  mere  childish  folly  and  weakneft,  when  set 
in  opposition  against  wisdom,  public  spirit,  union 


Chap.  3.  Government  of  God.  67 

inviolable,  and  fidelity  on  the  other:  allowing  both 
a  sufficient  length  of  years  to  try  their  force.  Add 
the  general  influence,  which  such  a  kingdom  would 
have  over  the  face  of  the  earth,  by  way  of  example 
particularly,  and  the  reverence  which  would  be  paid 
it.  It  would  plainly  be  superior  to  all  others,  and  the 
world  must  gradually  come  under  its  empire :  not 
by  means  of  lawle{^  violence ;  but  partly  by  what 
must  be  allowed  to  be  just  conquest;  and  partly  by 
other  kingdoms  submitting  themselves  voluntarily 
to  it,  throughout  a  course  of  ages,  and  claiming  its 
prote(9;ion,  one  after  another,  in  succeftive exigencies. 
The  head  of  it  would  be  an  universal  monarch,  in 
another  sense  than  any  mortal  has  yet  been  ;  and 
the  eastern  style  would  be  literally  applicable  to  him, 
that  all  people,  nations,  and  languages  should  serve 
him.  And  though  indeed  our  knowledge  of  human 
nature,  and  the  whole  history  of  mankind,  shew  the 
impof^ibility,  without  some  miraculous  interposition, 
that  a  number  of  men.  here  on  earth,  should  unite 
in  one  society  or  government,  in  the  fear  of  God  and 
universal  pra6lice  of  virtue  :  and  that  such  a  govern- 
ment should  continue  so  united  for  a  succefsion  of 
ages :  yet  admitting  or  supposing  this,  the  effe(5l 
would  be  as  now  drawn  out.  And  thus,  for  instance, 
the  wonderful  power  and  prosperity  promised  to  the 
Jewish  nation  in  the  Scripture,  would  be,  in  a  great 
measure,  the  consequence  of  what  is  predicted  of 
them ;  that  the  people  should  he  all  righteous  and 
inherit  the  land  for  ever^ ;  were  we  to  understand 
the  latter  phrase  of  a  long  continuance  only,  suffi- 
cient to  give  things  time  to  work.  The  predictions 
of  this  kind,  for  there  are  many  of  them,  cannot  come 
to  pafs,  in  the  present  known  course  of  nature  ;  but 

9  Is.  Ix.  21. 


68  Of  the  Moral  Parti. 

suppose  them  come  to  paft,  and  then,  the  dominion 
and  pre-eminence  promised  must  naturally  follow, 
to  a  very  considerable  degree. 

Consider  now,  the  general  system  of  Religion : 
that  the  government  of  the  world  is  uniform,  and 
one,  and  moral ;  that  virtue  and  right  shall  finally 
have  the  advantage,  and  prevail  over  fraud  and  law- 
left  force,  over  the  deceits  as  well  as  the  violence 
of  wickedneft,  under  the  conduct  of  one  supreme 
governor  :  And  from  the  observations  above  made,  it 
will  appear,  that  God  has,  by  our  reason,  given  us 
to  see  a  peculiar  conne(5lion  in  the  several  parts  of 
this  scheme,  and  a  tendency  towards  the  completion 
of  it  arising  out  of  the  very  nature  of  virtue  :  which 
tendency  is  to  be  considered  as  somewhat  moral  in 
the  eftential  constitution  of  things.  If  any  one  should 
think  all  this  to  be  of  little  importance  ;  I  desire  him 
to  consider,  what  he  would  think,  if  vice  had,  es- 
sentially, and  in  its  nature,  these  advantageous  ten- 
dencies ;  or  if  virtue  had  eftentially  the  direct  con- 
trary ones. 

But  it  may  be  obje<?led,  that,  notwithstanding  all 
these  natural  effei^ls  and  these  natural  tendencies  of 
virtue  ;  yet  things  may  be  now  going  on  throughout 
the  universe,  and  may  go  on  hereafter,  in  the  same 
mixed  way  as  here  at  present  upon  earth :  virtue 
sometimes  prosperous,  sometimes  deprefted;  vice 
sometimes  punished,  sometimes  succeftful.  The 
answer  to  which  is,  that  it  is  not  the  purpose  of  this 
chapter,  nor  of  this  treatise,  properly  to  prove  God's 
perfe(5l  moral  government  over  the  world,  or  the  truth 
of  religion ;  but  to  observe  what  there  is  in  the  con- 
stitution and  course  of  nature,  to  confirm  the  proper 
proof  of  it,  supposed  to  be  known :  And  that  the 
weight  of  the  foregoing  observations  to  this  purpose, 
may  be  thus  distinctly  proved.     Pleasure  and  pain 


Chap.  3.  Government  of  God.  69 

are  indeed  to  a  certain  degree,  say  to  a  very  high 
degree,  distributed  amongst  us  without  any  apparent 
regard  to  the  merit  or  demerit  of  characfhers.  And 
were  there  nothing  else,  concerning  this  matter, 
discernible  in  the  constitution  and  course  of  Nature  ; 
there  would  be  no  ground  from  the  constitution  and 
course  of  Nature,  to  hope  or  to  fear,  that  men  would 
be  rewarded  or  punished  hereafter  according  to  their 
deserts :  which  how^ever,  it  is  to  be  remarked,  im- 
plies, that  even  then  there  would  be  no  ground  from 
appearances  to  think,  that  vice  upon  the  whole  would 
have  the  advantage,  rather  than  that  virtue  would. 
And  thus  the  proof  of  a  future  state  of  retribution, 
would  rest  upon  the  usual  known  arguments  for  it : 
which  are  I  think  plainly  unansw^erable  ;  and  would 
be  so,  though  there  were  no  additional  confirmation  of 
them  from  the  things  above  insisted  on.  But  these 
things  are  a  very  strong  confirmation  of  them.    For, 

First,  They  shew,  that  the  Author  of  nature  is  not 
indifferent  to  virtue  and  vice.  They  amount  to  a 
declaration  from  him,  determinate  and  not  to  be 
evaded,  in  favour  of  one,  and  against  the  other :  such 
a  declaration,  as  there  is  nothing  to  be  set  over  against 
or  answer,  on  the  part  of  vice.  So  that  were  a  man, 
laying  aside  the  properproof  of  Religion,  to  determine 
from  the  course  of  Nature  only,  whether  it  were  most 
probable,  that  the  righteous  or  the  wicked,  would 
have  the  advantage  in  a  future  life  ;  there  can  be  no 
doubt,  but  that  he  would  determine  the  probability 
to  be,  that  the  former  would.  The  course  of  Nature 
then,  in  the  view  of  it  now  given,  furnishes  us  with 
a  real  practical  proof  of  the  obligations  of  Religion. 

Secondly,  When,  conformably  to  what  Religion 
teaches  us,  God  shall  reward  and  punish  virtue  and 
vice  as  such,  so  as  that  every  one  shall,  upon  the 
whole,  have  his  deserts  ;  this  distributive  justice  will 


70  Of  the  Moral  Parti. 

\^  not  be  a  thing  different  in  kind,  but  only  in  degree, 
\  from  what  we  experience  in  his  present  government. 
It  will  be  that  in  effeSi,  toward  which  we  now  see  a 
tendency.  It  will  be  no  more  than  the  completion 
of  that  moral  government,  the  principles  and  begin- 
ning of  which,  have  been  shewn,  beyond  all  dispute, 
discernible  in  the  present  constitution  and  course  of 
Nature.     And  from  hence  it  follows. 

Thirdly,  That,  as  under  the  natural  government  of 

God,  our  experience  of  those  kinds  and  degrees  of 

•happineft  and  misery,  which  we  do  experience  atpre- 

I  sent,  gives  just  ground  to  hope  for  and  to  fear,  higher 

I  degrees,  and  other  kinds  of  both  in  a  future  state,  sup- 

I  posing  a  future  state  admitted :   so  under  his  moral 

'  government,  our  experience,  that  virtue  and  vice  are, 

in  the  manners  above-mentioned,  a(51:ually  rewarded 

J-  and  punished  at  present,  in  a  certain  degree,  gives 

1  just  ground  to  hope  and  to  fear,  that  they  may  be 

\  rewarded  and  punished  in  a  higher  degree  hereafter. 

1  It  is   acknowledged  indeed,  that  this  alone  is  not 

j  sufficient  ground  to  think,  that  they  aSiually  will  be 

\  rewarded  and  punished  in  a  higher  degree,  rather 

than  in  a  lower :    But  then. 

Lastly,  There  is  sufficient  ground  to  think  so,  from 
/  the  good  and  bad  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice.  For 
these  tendencies  are  ef^ential,  and  founded  in  the 
nature  of  things :  whereas  the  hinderances  to  their 
becoming  effedl:,  are,  in  numberleft  cases,  not  neces- 
sary, but  artificial  only.  Now  it  may  be  much  more 
strongly  argued,  that  these  tendencies,  as  well  as  the 
actual  rewards  and  punishments,  of  virtue  and  vice, 
which  arise  dire(ftly  out  of  the  nature  of  things,  will 
remain  hereafter,  than  that  the  accidental  hinderances 
of  them  will.  And  if  these  hinderances  do  not  re- 
main ;  those  rewards  and  punishments  cannot  but  be 
carried  on  much  further  towards  the  perfec^lion  of 


Chap.  2'         Government  of  God.  71 

moral  government :  i.  e.  the  tendencies  of  virtue  and 
vice  will  become  effe(ft :  But  when,  or  where,  or  in 
what  particular  way,  cannot  be  known  at  all,  but  by 
revelation. 

Upon  the  whole  :  There  is  a  kind  of  moral  govern- 
ment implied  in  God's  natural  government :^^  virtue 
and  vice  are  naturally  rewarded  and  punished  as  be- 
neficial and  mischievous  to  society  ;^^  and  rewarded 
and  punished  dire(flly  as  virtue  and  vice.^^  The 
notion  then  of  a  moral  scheme  of  government,  is  not 
fictitious,  but  natural ;  for  it  is  suggested  to  our 
thoughts  by  the  constitution  and  course  of  Nature: 
and  the  execution  of  this  scheme  is  actually  begun, 
in  the  instances  here  mentioned.  And  these  things 
are  to  be  considered,  as  a  declaration  of  the  Author 
of  nature,  for  virtue,  and  against  vice  :  They  give  a 
credibility  to  the  supposition  of  their  being  rewarded 
and  punished  hereafter  ;  and  also  ground  to  hope 
and  to  fear,  that  they  may  be  rewarded  and  punished 
in  higher  degrees  than  they  are  here.  And  all  this 
is  confirmed,  so  the  argument  for  Religion,  from  the 
constitution  and  course  of  Nature,  is  carried  on  far- 
ther, by  observing,  that  there  are  natural  tendencies, 
and,  in  innumerable  cases,  only  artificial  hinderances, 
to  this  moral  scheme's  being  carried  on  much  farther 
towards  perfe<5lion,  than  it  is  at  present.^^  The  no- 
tion then  of  a  moral  scheme  of  government,  much 
more  perfecl  than  what  is  seen,  is  not  a  fi(ftitious, 
but  a  natural  notion :  for  it  is  suggested  to  our 
thoughts,  by  the  ef^ential  tendencies  of  virtue  and 
vice.  And  these  tendencies  are  to  be  considered  as 
intimations,  as  implicit  promises  and  threatenings, 
from  the  Author  of  nature,  of  much  greater  rewards 
and  punishments  to  follow  virtue  and  vice,  than  do 

'Op.   51.  ''ibid.  I2p,  ^2,  &C.  13p.  6o^&C. 


72 


Moral  Government  of  God.      Parti 


at  present.  And  indeed,  every  natural  tendency, 
which  is  to  continue,  but  which  is  hindered  from  be- 
coming effecl  by  only  accidental  causes,  affords  a 
presumption,  that  such  tendency  will,  some  time 
or  other,  become  effe(5l :  a  presumption  in  degree 
proportionable  to  the  length  of  the  duration,  through 
which  such  tendency  will  continue.  And  from  these 
things  together,  arises  a  real  presumption,  that  the 
moral  scheme  of  government  established  in  nature, 
shall  be  carried  on  much  farther  towards  perfe(?iion 
hereafter  ;  and,  I  think,  a  presumption  that  it  will 
be  absolutely  completed.  But  from  these  things, 
joined  with  the  moral  nature  which  God  has  given 
us,  considered  as  given  us  by  him,  arises  a  practical 
proof ^^  that  it  will  be  completed:  a  proof  from  fadl ; 
and  therefore  a  distinct  one  from  that,  which  is 
deduced  from  the  eternal  and  unalterable  relations, 
the  fitnei^  and  unfitnef^  of  actions. 
\ 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Of  a  State  of  Probation,  as  implying  Trial,  Diffi- 
culties and  Danger. 


HE  general  doc^trine  of  Religion,  that 
our  present  life  is  a  state  of  probation 
for  a  future  one,  comprehends  under  it 
several  particular  things,  distincl  from 
each  other.  But  the  first,  and  most 
common  meaning  of  it,  seems  to  be,  that  our  future 
interest  is  now  depending,  and  depending  upon  our- 


**  See  this  proof  drawn  out  briefly,  ch. 


Chap.  4.         Of  a  State  of  Trial.  73 

selves  ;  that  we  have  scope  and  opportunities  here, 
for  that  good  and  bad  behaviour,  which  God  will  re- 
ward and  punish  hereafter ;  together  with  tempta- 
tions to  one,  as  well  as  inducements  of  reason  to  the 
other.  And  this  is,  in  great  measure,  the  same  with 
saying,  that  we  are  under  the  moral  government  of 
God,  and  to  give  an  account  of  our  ac^tions  to  him. 
For  the  notion  of  a  future  account  and  general 
righteous  judgment,  implies  some  sort  of  tempta- 
tions to  what  is  wrong :  otherwise  there  would  be  no 
moral  pof^ibility  of  doing  wrong,  nor  ground  for 
judgment,  or  discrimination.  But  there  is  this  dif- 
ference, that  the  word  probation  is  more  distinctly 
and  particularly  exprefsive  of  allurements  to  wrong, 
or  difficulties  in  adhering  uniformly  to  what  is  right, 
and  of  the  danger  of  miscarrying  by  such  temp- 
tations, than  the  words  moral  government.  A  state 
of  probation  then,  as  thus  particularly  implying  in  it 
trial,  difficulties  and  danger,  may  require  to  be  con- 
sidered distin(?i:ly  by  itself. 

And  as  the  moral  government  of  God,  which  Re- 
ligion teaches  us,  implies,  that  we  are  in  a  state  of 
trial  with  regard  to  a  future  world  :  so  also  his  natural 
government  over  us,  implies  that  we  are  in  a  state 
of  trial,  in  the  like  sense,  with  regard  to  the  present 
world.  Natural  government  by  rewards  and  punish- 
ments, as  much  implies  natural  trial,  as  moral 
government  does  moral  trial.  The  natural  govern- 
ment of  God  here  meant,^  consists  in  his  annexing 
pleasure  to  some  actions,  and  pain  to  others,  which 
are  in  our  power  to  do  or  forbear,  and  in  giving  us 
notice  of  such  appointment  beforehand.  This  ne- 
cefsarily  implies,  that  he  has  made  our  happinel^ 
and  misery,  or  our  interest,  to  depend  in  part  upon 

»  Chap.  ii. 


74  Of  a  State  of  Trial.  Part  i . 

ourselves.  And  so  far  as  men  have  temptations  to 
any  course  of  a(ftion,  which  will  probably  occasion 
them  greater  temporal  inconvenience  and  uneasineft, 
than  satisfaction ;  so  far  their  temporal  interest  is  in 
danger  from  themselves,  or  they  are  in  a  state  of 
trial  with  respe(5l  to  it.  Now  people  often  blame 
others,  and  even  themselves,  for  their  miscondu6l 
in  their  temporal  concerns.  And  we  find  many  are 
greatly  wanting  to  themselves,  and  mifs  of  that  natu- 
ral happinef^,  which  they  might  have  obtained  in  the 
present  life  :  perhaps  every  one  does  in  some  degree. 
But  many  run  themselves  into  great  inconvenience, 
and  into  extreme  distref^  and  misery :  not  through 
incapacity  of  knowing  better,  and  doing  better  for 
themselves,  which  would  be  nothing  to  the  present 
purpose  ;  but  through  their  own  fault.  And  these 
things  necef^arily  imply  temptation,  and  danger  of 
miscarny'ing,  in  a  greater  or  lel^  degree,  with  respedl 
to  our  worldly  interest  or  happineft.  Every  one  too, 
without  having  Religion  in  his  thoughts, speaks  of  the 
hazards  which  young  people  run,  upon  their  setting 
out  in  the  world :  hazards  from  other  causes,  than 
merely  their  ignorance,  and  unavoidable  accidents. 
And  some  courses  of  vice,  at  least,  being  contrary  to 
men's  worldly  interest  or  good  ;  temptations  to  these, 
must  at  the  same  time  be  temptations  to  forego  our 
present,  and  our  future  interest.  Thus  in  our  natural 
for  temporal  capacity,  we  are  in  a  state  of  trial,  i.  e.  of 
difficulty  and  danger,  analogous,  or  like  to  our  moral 
^and  religious  trial. 

This  wall  more  distinClly  appear  to  any  one,  who 
thinks  it  worth  while,  more  distinc^ily,  to  consider, 
what  it  is  which  constitutes  our  trial  in  both  capaci- 
ties, and  to  observe,  how  mankind  behave  under  it. 

And  that  which  constitutes  this  our  trial,  in  both 
these  capacities,  must  be  somewhat  either  in  our  ex- 


Chap.  4-'         Of  a  State  of  Trial.  75 

temal  circumstances,  or  in  our  nature.  For,  on  the 
one  hand,  persons  may  be  betrayed  into  wrong  be- 
haviour upon  surprise,  or  overcome  upon  any  other 
very  singular  and  extraordinary  external  occasions ; 
who  would,  otherwise,  have  preserved  their  cha- 
racfter  of  prudence  and  of  virtue  :  in  which  cases, 
every  one,  in  speaking  of  the  wrong  behaviour  of 
these  persons,  would  impute  it  to  such  particular  ex- 
ternal circumstances.  And  on  the  other  hand,  men 
who  have  contra(9;ed  habits  of  vice  and  folly  of  any 
kind,  or  have  some  particular  paf^ions  in  exceft,  will 
seek  opportunities,  and,  as  it  were,  go  out  of  their 
way,  to  gratify  themselves  in  these  respec^ts,  at  the 
expense  of  their  wisdom  and  their  virtue  ;  led  to  it, 
as  every  one  would  say,  not  by  external  temptations, 
but  by  such  habits  and  pafsions.  And  the  account 
of  this  last  case  is,  that  particular  pafsions  are  no 
more  coincident  with  prudence,  or  that  reasonable 
self-love,  the  end  of  which  is  our  worldly  interest, 
than  they  are  with  the  principle  of  virtue  and  re- 
ligion ;  but  often  draw  contrary  ways  to  one,  as 
well  as  to  the  other :  and  so  such  particular  pafsions 
are  as  much  temptations,  to  a6i  imprudently  with 
regard  to  our  worldly  interest,  as  to  a6{  viciously.^ 
However,  as  when  we  say,  men  are  misled  by  ex- 
ternal circumstances  of  temptation;  it  cannot  but 
be  understood,  that  there  is  somewhat  within  them- 
selves, to  render  those  circumstances  temptations, 
or  to  render  them  susceptible  of  imprei^ions  from 
them  :  So  when  we  say,  they  are  misled  by  pafsions; 
it  is  always  supposed,  that  there  are  occasions,  cir- 
cumstances, and  obje(5^s,  exciting  these  pafsions,  and 
affording  means  for  gratifying  them.    And  therefore, 

'  See  Sermons  preached  at  the  Rolls,  1726.    zd,  Ed.  p.  205, 
&c.     Pref.  p.  25,  &c,     Serm.  p.  21,  &c. 


76  Of  a  State  of  Trial.  Part  i. 

temptations  from  within,  and  from  without,  coincide, 
Jind  mutually  imply  each  other.  Now  the  several 
external  obje(5ls  of  the  appetites,  paf^ions,  and  affec- 
tions, being  present  to  the  senses,  or  offering  them- 
selves to  the  mind,  and  so  exciting  emotions  suitable 
to  their  nature  ;  not  only  in  cases  where  they  can 
be  gratified  consistently  with  innocence  and  pru- 
dence, but  also  in  cases  where  they  cannot,  and  yet 
can  be  gratified  imprudently  and  viciously :  this  as 
really  puts  them  in  danger  of  voluntarily  foregoing 
their  present  interest  or  good,  as  their  future  ;  and  as 
really  renders  self-denial  necef^ary  to  secure  one,  as 
i  the  other :  i.  e.  We  are  in  a  like  state  of  trial  with 
I  respe6l  to  both,  by  the  very  same  paf^ions,  excited 
by  the  very  same  means.  Thus  mankind  having  a 
temporal  interest  depending  upon  themselves,  and 
a  prudent  course  of  behaviour  being  necef^ary  to 
secure  it ;  paf^ions  inordinately  excited,  whether  by 
means  of  example,  or  by  any  other  external  circum- 
stance, towards  such  objecfts,  at  such  times,  or  in 
such  degrees,  as  that  they  cannot  be  gratified  con- 
sistently with  worldly  prudence  ;  are  temptations, 
dangerous,  and  too  often  succef^ful  temptations,  to 
forego  a  greater  temporal  good  for  a  lef^  ;  i.  e.  to 
forego  what  is,  upon  the  whole,  our  temporal  inter- 
est, for  the  sake  of  a  present  gratification.  This  is 
a  description  of  our  state  of  trial  in  our  temporal 
capacity.  Substitute  now  the  word  future  for  tem- 
poral, and  virtue  for  prudence  ;  and  it  will  be  just 
as  proper  a  description  of  our  state  of  trial  in  our 
religious  capacity :  so  analogous  are  they  to  each 
other. 

If,  from  consideration  of  this  our  like  state  of  trial 
in  both  capacities,  we  go  on  to  observe  farther,  how 
mankind  behave  under  it ;  we  shall  find  there  are 
some,  who  have  so  little  sense  of  it,  that  they  scarce 


Chap.  4-'         Of  a  State  of  Trial.  77 

look  beyond  the  pacing  day  :  They  are  so  taken  up 
with  present  gratifications,  as  to  have,  in  a  manner, 
no  feeling  of  consequences,  no  regard  to  their  future 
ease  or  fortune  in  this  life  ;  any  more  than  to  their 
happinef^  in  another.  Some  appear  to  be  blinded 
and  deceived  by  inordinate  paf^ion,  in  their  worldly 
concerns,  as  much  as  in  religion.  Others  are,  not 
deceived,  but,  as  it  were,  forcibly  carried  away  by 
the  like  pal^ions,  against  their  better  judgment,  and 
feeble  resolutions  too  of  a(51;ing  better.  And  there 
are  men,  and  truly  they  are  not  a  few,  who  shame - 
leftly  avow,  not  their  interest,  but  their  mere  will 
and  pleasure,  to  be  their  law  of  life  :  and  who,  in 
open  defiance  of  everything  that  is  reasonable,  will 
go  on  in  a  course  of  vicious  extravagance,  foresee- 
ing, with  no  remorse  and  little  fear,  that  it  will  be 
their  temporal  ruin ;  and  some  of  them,  under  the 
apprehension  of  the  consequences  of  wickednef^  in 
another  state.  And  to  speak  in  the  most  moderate 
way,  human  creatures  are  not  only  continually  liable 
to  go  wrong  voluntarily,  but  we  see  likewise  that  they 
often  a(5lually  do  so,  with  respedl:  to  their  temporal 
interests,  as  well  as  with  respe^l  to  Religion, 

Thus  our  difficulties  and  dangers,  or  our  trials,  in 
our  temporal  and  our  religious  capacity,  as  they 
proceed  from  the  same  causes,  and  have  the  same 
effeSi  upon  men  s  behaviour,  are  evidently  analogous, 
and  of  the  same  kind. 

It  may  be  added,  that  as  the  difficulties  and 
dangers  of  miscarrying  in  our  religious  state  of  trial, 
are  greatly  increased,  and  one  is  ready  to  think, 
in  a  manner  wholly  made,  by  the  ill  behaviour  of 
others ;  by  a  wrong  education,  wrong  in  a  moral 
sense,  sometimes  positively  vicious ;  by  general  bad 
example  ;  by  the  dishonest  artifices,  which  are  got 
into  businef^  of  all  kinds  ;  and,  in  very  many  parts  of 


78  Of  a  State  of  Trial.  Part  i. 

the  world,  by  religion's  being  corrupted  into  super- 
stitions, which  indulge  men  in  their  vices :  So  in 
Hke  manner,  the  difficulties  of  condudliing  ourselves 
prudently  in  respe(5l  to  our  present  interest,  and  our 
danger  of  being  led  aside  from  pursuing  it,  are 
greatly  increased,  by  a  foolish  education  ;  and,  after 
we  come  to  mature  age,  by  the  extravagance  and 
careleftneft  of  others,  whom  we  have  intercourse 
with  ;  and  by  mistaken  notions,  very  generally  pre- 
valent, and  taken  up  for  common  opinion,  concerning 
temporal  happineft,  and  wherein  it  consists.  And 
persons,  by  their  own  negligence  and  folly  in  their 
temporal  affairs,  no  le(^  than  by  a  course  of  vice, 
bring  themselves  into  new  difficulties ;  and,  by  habits 
of  indulgence,  become  left  qualified  to  go  through 
them :  And  one  irregularity  after  another,  embar- 
raf^es  things  to  such  a  degree,  that  they  know  not 
where  about  they  are  ;  and  often  makes  the  path  of 
conduct  so  intricate  and  perplexed,  that  it  is  difficult 
to  trace  it  out ;  difficult  even  to  determine  what  is 
the  prudent  or  the  moral  part.  Thus,  for  instance, 
wrong  behaviour  in  one  stage  of  life,  youth  ;  wrong, 
I  mean,  considering  ourselves  only  in  our  temporal 
capacity,  without  taking  in  Religion  ;  this,  in  several 
ways,  increases  the  difficulties  of  right  behaviour  in 
mature  age ;  i.  e.  puts  us  into  a  more  disadvan- 
tageous state  of  trial  in  our  temporal  capacity. 

We  are  an  inferior  part  of  the  creation  of  God. 
There  are  natural  appearances  of  our  being  in  a  state 
of  degradation. 3  And  we  certainly  are  in  a  con- 
dition, which  does  not  seem,  by  any  means,  the  most 
advantageous  we  could  imagine  or  desire,  either  in 
our  natural  or  moral  capacity,  for  securing  either  our 
present  or  future  interest.    However,  this  condition, 

^  Part  II.  Chap.  v. 


Chap.  4.         Of  a  State  of  Trial.  79 

low  and  careful  and  uncertain  as  it  is,  does  not  afford 
any  just  ground  of  complaint.  For,  as  men  may 
manage  their  temporal  affairs  with  prudence,  and 
so  paf^  their  days  here  on  earth  in  tolerable  ease  and 
satisfatflion,  by  a  moderate  degree  of  care:  so  like- 
wise with  regard  to  Religion,  there  is  no  more  re- 
quired than  what  they  are  well  able  to  do,  and  what 
they  must  be  greatly  wanting  to  themselves,  if  they 
neglect.  And  for  persons  to  have  that  put  upon 
them,  which  they  are  well  able  to  go  through,  and 
no  more,  we  naturally  consider  as  an  equitable  thing ; 
supposing  it  done  by  proper  authority.  Nor  have 
we  any  more  reason  to  complain  of  it,  with  regard 
to  the  Author  of  nature,  than  of  his  not  having  given 
us  other  advantages,  belonging  to  other  orders  of 
creatures. 

But  the  thing  here  insisted  upon  is,  that  the  state 
of  trial  which  Religion  teaches  us  we  are  in,  is  ren- 
dered credible,  by  its  being  throughout  uniform  and 
of  a  piece  with  the  general  condudl  of  Providence 
towards  us,  in  all  other  respecfls  within  the  compaf^ 
of  our  knowledge.  Indeed  if  mankind,  considered 
in  their  natural  capacity,  as  inhabitants  of  this  world 
only,  found  themselves,  from  their  birth  to  their 
death,  in  a  settled  state  of  security  and  happinef^, 
without  any  solicitude  or  thought  of  their  own :  or  if 
they  were  in  no  danger  of  being  brought  into  in- 
conveniences and  distref^,  by  carelef^nef^,  or  the 
folly  of  pafsion,  through  bad  example,  the  treachery 
of  others,  or  the  deceitful  appearances  of  things  : 
Were  this  our  natural  condition  ;  then  it  might  seem 
strange,  and  be  some  presumption  against  the  truth 
of  religion,  that  it  represents  our  future  and  more 
general  interest,  as  not  secure  of  course,  but  as  de- 
pending upon  our  behaviour,  and  requiring  recol- 
le(5lion  and  self-government  to  obtain  it.   For  it  might 


8o  Of  a  State  of  Trial.  Part  i . 

be  alleged,  "  What  you  say  is  our  condition  in  one 
"  respe(?l;,  is  not  in  any  wise  of  a  sort  with  what  we 
"  find,  by  experience,  our  condition  is  in  another. 
"  Our  whole  present  interest  is  secured  to  our  hands, 
"  without  any  solicitude  of  ours ;  and  why  should 
"•  not  our  future  interest,  if  we  have  any  such,  be 
"  so  too  ?"  ^But  since,  on  the  contrary,  thought  and 
consideration,  the  voluntary  denying  ourselves  many 
things  which  we  desire,  and  a  course  of  behaviour,  far 
from  being  always  agreeable  to  us  ;  are  absolutely 
neceftary  to  our  acting  even  a  common  decent,  and 
common  prudent  part,  so  as  to  paft  with  any  satis- 
faction through  the  present  world,  and  be  received 
upon  any  tolerable  good  terms  in  it :  since  this  is 
the  case,  all  presumption  against  self-denial  and 
attention  being  neceftary  to  secure  our  higher  in- 
terest, is  removed.  Had  we  not  experience,  it  might, 
perhaps  speciously,  be  urged,  that  it  is  improbable 
anything  of  hazard  and  danger  should  be  put  upon 
us  by  an  Infinite  Being  ;  when  everything  which  is 
hazard  and  danger  in  our  manner  of  conception,  and 
will  end  in  error,  confusion,  and  misery,  is  now 
already  certain  in  his  foreknowledge.  And  indeed, 
why  anything  of  hazard  and  danger  should  be  put 
upon  such  frail  creatures  as  we  are,  may  well  be 
thought  a  difficulty  in  speculation ;  and  cannot  but 
be  so,  till  we  know  the  whole,  or,  however,  much 
more  of  the  case.  But  still  the  constitution  of  nature 
is  as  it  is.  Our  happineft  and  misery  are  trusted  to 
our  conduct,  and  made  to  depend  upon  it.  Some- 
what, and,  in  many  circumstances,  a  great  deal  too, 
is  put  upon  us,  either  to  do,  or  to  suffer,  as  we  choose. 
And  all  the  various  miseries  of  life,  which  people 
bring  upon  themselves  by  negligence  and  folly,  and 
might  have  avoided  by  proper  care,  are  instances  of 
this :  Which  miseries  are  beforehand,  just  as  contin- 


Chap.  4.         Of  a  State  of  Trial.  8 1 

gent  and  undetermined  as  their  conduct:,  and  left  to 
be  determined  by  it. 

These  observations  are  an  answer  to  the  objeclions 
against  the  credibility  of  a  state  of  trial,  as  implying 
temptations,  and  real  danger  of  miscarrying  with 
regard  to  our  general  interest,  under  the  moral 
government  of  God  :  and  they  shew,  that,  if  we  are 
at  all  to  be  considered  in  such  a  capacity,  and  as 
having  such  an  interest ;  the  general  analogy  of 
Providence  must  lead  us  to  apprehend  ourselves  in 
danger  of  miscarrying,  in  different  degrees,  as  to  this 
interest,  by  our  negle(5^ing  to  adl  the  proper  part 
belonging  to  us  in  that  capacity.  For  we  have  a 
present  interest,  under  the  government  of  God  which 
we  experience  here  upon  earth.  And  this  interest, 
as  it  is  not  forced  upon  us,  so  neither  is  it  offered  to 
our  acceptance,  but  to  our  acquisition ;  in  such  sort, 
as  that  we  are  in  danger  of  miffing  it,  by  means  of 
temptations  to  negle(5l,  or  a(5l  contrary  to  it;  and 
without  attention  and  self-denial,  must  and  do  mif^ 
of  it.  It  is  then  perfe(5lly  credible,  that  this  may 
be  our  case,  with  respect  to  that  chief  and  final  good, 
which  Religion  proposes  to  us. 


82  Of  a  State  of  Part  i. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Of  a  State  of  Probation,  as  intended  for  moral 
Discipline  and  Improvement. 

ROM  the  consideration  of  our  being  in 
a  probation-state,  of  so  much  difficulty 
and  hazard,  naturally  arises  the  ques- 
tion, how  we  came  to  be  placed  in  it. 
But  such  a  general  inquiry  as  this, 
would  be  found  involved  in  insuperable  difficulties. 
For,  though  some  of  these  difficulties  would  be  les- 
sened by  observing,  that  all  wickedneft  is  voluntary, 
as  is  implied  in  its  very  notion ;  and  that  many  of 
the  miseries  of  life  have  apparent  good  effec^ts :  yet, 
when  we  consider  other  circumstances  belonging  to 
both,  and  what  must  be  the  consequence  of  the 
former  in  a  life  to  come ;  it  cannot  but  be  acknow- 
ledged plain  folly  and  presumption,  to  pretend  to 
give  an  account  of  the  whole  reasons  of  this  matter : 
the  whole  reasons  of  our  being  allotted  a  condition, 
out  of  which  so  much  wickedneft  and  misery,  so 
circumstanced,  would  in  fa^i  arise.  Whether  it  be 
not  beyond  our  faculties,  not  only  to  find  out,  but 
even  to  understand,  the  whole  account  of  this ;  or, 
though  we  should  be  supposed  capable  of  under- 
standing it,  yet,  whether  it  would  be  of  service  or 
prejudice  to  us  to  be  informed  of  it ;  is  impoftible  to 
say.  But  as  our  present  condition  can  in  no  wise  be 
shewnlnconsistent  with  the  perfe(5l  moral  govern- 
ment of  God  :  so  Religion  teaches  us  we  were  placed 
in  it,  that  we  might  qualify  ourselves,  by  the  prac- 


Chap.  5.  Moral  Discipline.  83 

tice  of  virtue,  for  another  state  which  is  to  follow 
it.     And  this,  though  but  a  partial  answer,  a  very 
partial  one  indeed,  to  the  inquiry  now  mentioned ; 
yet,  is  a  more  satisfacftory  answer  to  another,  which 
is  of  real,  and  of  the  utmost  importance  to  us  to  have 
answered :  the  inquiry,  What  is  our  busineft  hereT", 
The  known  end  then,  why  we  are  placed  in  a  state  1 
of  so  much  affli6lion,  hazard,  and  difficulty,  is,  our    / 
improvement  in  virtue  and  piety,  as  the  requisite  ,  / 
qualification  for  a  future  state  of  security  and  hap- 
pinei^.  — 

Now  the  beginning  of  life,  considered  as  an 
education  for  mature  age  in  the  present  world,  ap- 
pears plainly,  at  first  sight,  analogous  to  this  our 
trial  for  a  future  one  :  the  former  being  in  our  tem- 
poral capacity,  what  the  latter  is  in  our  religious 
capacity.  But  some  observations  common  to  both 
of  them,  and  a  more  distin6l  consideration  of  each, 
will  more  distin(51;ly  shew  the  extent  and  force  of  the 
analogy  between  them ;  and  the  credibility,  which 
arises  from  hence,  as  well  as  from  the  nature  of  the 
thing,  that  th^4)r£s.Q^ntJ[ife  was  intended  Jo  be  a  state 
of  discipline  for  a  future  one. 

I.  Every  species  of  creatures  is,  we  see,  designed 
for  a  particular  way  of  life ;  to  which,  the  nature, 
the  capacities,  temper,  and  qualifications,  of  each 
species,  are  as  neceftary,  as  their  external  circum- 
stances. Both  come  into  the  notion  of  such  state, 
or  particular  way  of  life,  and  are  constituent  parts  of 
it.  Change  a  man's  capacities  or  chara6ler  to  the 
degree,  in  wTuch  it  is  conceivable  they  may  be 
changed ;  and  he  would  be  altogether  incapable  of 
a  human  course  of  life,  and  human  happineft :  as 
incapable,  as  if,  his  nature  continuing  unchanged,  he 
were  placed  in  a  world,  where  he  had  no  sphere  of 
a61;ion,  nor  any  obje^ls  to  answer  his  appetites,  pas- 


84  Of  a  State  of  Parti. 

sions,  and  affe(5lions  of  any  sort.  One  thing  is  set 
over  against  another,  as  an  ancient  writer  expreftes 
it.  Our  nature  corresponds  to  our  external  condition. 
Without  this  correspondence,  there  would  be  no  pos- 
sibility of  any  such  thing  as  human  life  and  human 
happineft  :  which  life  and  happineft  are,  therefore,  a 
result  from  our  nature  and  condition  jointly  :  mean- 
ing by  human  life,  not  living  in  the  literal  sense,  but 
the  whole  complex  notion  commonly  understood  by 
those  words.  So  that,  without  determining  what 
will  be  the  employment  and  happineft,  the  particular 
life  of  good  men  hereafter ;  there  must  be  some  de- 
terminate capacities,  some  neceftary  chara(?i:er  and 
qualifications,  without  which  persons  cannot  but  be 
utterly  incapable  of  it :  in  like  manner,  as  there  must 
be  some,  without  which  men  would  be  incapable  of 
their  present  state  of  life.     Now, 

II.  The  constitution  of  human  creatures,  and  in- 
deed of  all  creatures  which  come  under  our  notice, 
is  such,  as  that  they  are  capable  of  naturally  be- 
coming qualified  for  states  of  life,  for  which  they  were 
once  wholly  unqualified.  In  imagination  we  may 
indeed  conceive  of  creatures,  as  incapable  of  having 
any  of  their  faculties  naturally  enlarged,  or  as  being 
unable  naturally  to  acquire  any  new  qualifications : 
But  the  faculties  of  every  species  known  to  us,  are 
made  for  enlargement;  for  acquirements  of  expe- 
rience and  habits.  We  find  ourselves  in  particular 
indued  with  capacities,  not  only  of  perceiving  ideas, 
and  of  knowledge  or  perceiving  truth,  but  also  of 
storing  up  our  ideas  and  knowledge  by  memory. 
We  are  capable,  not  only  of  a(5ling,  and  of  having 
different  momentary  impref^ions  made  upon  us ;  but 
of  getting  a  new  facility  in  any  kind  of  a(5lion,  and 
of  settled  alterations  in  our  temper  or  character. 
The  power  of  the  two  last  is  the  power  of  habits. 


Chap.  5.  Moral  Discipline.  85 

But  neither  the  perception  of  ideas,  nor  knowledge 
of  any  sort,  are  habits  ;  though  absolutely  necef^ary 
to  the  forming  of  them.  However,  apprehension, 
reason,  memory,  which  are  the  capacities  of  acquir- 
ing knowledge,  are  greatly  improved  by  exercise. 
Whether  the  word  habit  is  applicable  to  all  these 
improvements,  and  in  particular  how  far  the  powers 
of  memory  and  of  habits  may  be  powers  of  the  same 
nature,  I  shall  not  inquire.  But  that  perceptions 
come  into  our  minds  readily  and  of  course,  by  means 
of  their  having  been  there  before,  seems  a  thing  of 
the  same  sort,  as  readinef^  in  any  particular  kind  of 
action,  proceeding  from  being  accustomed  to  it. 
And  aptneft  to  recolledl;  practical  observations  of 
service  in  our  condu6l,  is  plainly  habit  in  many  cases. 
There  are  habits  of  perception,  and  habits  of  adlion. 
An  instance  of  the  former,  is  our  constant  and  even 
involuntary  readineft,  in  correcting  the  imprefsions 
of  our  sight  concerning  magnitudes  and  distances,  so 
as  to  substitute  judgment  in  the  room  of  sensation 
imperceptibly  to  ourselves.  And  it  seems  as  if  all 
other  afsociations  of  ideas  not  naturally  connected, 
might  be  called  paftive  habits ;  as  properly  as  our 
readineft  in  understanding  languages,  upon  sight  or 
hearing  of  words.  And  our  readinefs  in  speaking 
and  writing  them  is  an  instance  of  the  latter,  of  active 
habits.  For  distinc^nef^,  we  may  consider  habits, 
as  belonging  to  the  body,  or  the  mind:  and  the 
latter  will  be  explained  by  the  former.  Under  the 
former  are  comprehended  all  bodily  a(5livities  or 
motions  whether  graceful  or  unbecoming,  which  are 
owing  to  use  :  under  the  latter,  general  habits  of  life 
and  conduct;  such  as  those  of  obedience  and  sub- 
mifsion  to  authority,  or  to  any  particular  person ; 
those  of  veracity,  justice,  and  charity;  those  of  at- 
tention, industry,  self-government,  envy,  revenge. 


86  Ofa  State  of  Parti. 

And  habits  of  this  latter  kind  seem  produced  by 
repeated  a(fl;s,  as  well  as  the  former.  And  in  like 
j  manner  as  habits  belonging  to  the  body  are  produced 
1  by  external  ac^ts  :  so  habits  of  the  mind  are  produced 
',  by  the  exertion  of  inward  practical  principles,  i.  e. 
\  by  carrying  them  into  a6i,  or  a(5ling  upon  them  ;  the 
principles  of  obedience,  of  veracity,  justice,  and 
charity.  Nor  can  those  habits  be  formed  by  any 
external  course  of  allien,  otherwise  than  as  it  pro- 
ceeds from  these  principles  :  because  it  is  only  these 
inward  principles  exerted,  which  are  strictly  ac^ts  of 
obedience,  of  veracity,  of  justice,  and  of  charity.  So 
likewise  habits  of  attention,  industry,  self-govern- 
ment, are  in  the  same  manner  acquired  by  exercise  ; 
and  habits  of  envy  and  revenge  by  indulgence, 
whether  in  outward  d.6i,  or  in  thought  and  intention, 
i.e.  inward  a6l:  for  such  intention  is  an  a(5l.  Reso- 
lutions also  to  do  well,  are  properly  a.6is.  And 
endeavouring  to  enforce  upon  our  own  minds,  a 
practical  sense  of  virtue,  or  to  beget  in  others  that 
pra6lical  sense  of  it,  which  a  man  really  has  himself, 
is  a  virtuous  a6i.  All  these,  therefore,  may  and  will 
contribute  towards  forming  good  habits.  But  going 
over  the  theory  of  virtue  in  one's  thoughts,  talking 
well,  and  drawing  fine  pi(5lures,  of  it ;  this  is  so  far 
from  neceftarily  or  certainly  conducing  to  form  an 
habit  of  it,  in  him  who  thus  employs  himself;  that 
it  may  harden  the  mind  in  a  contrary  course,  and 
render  it  gradually  more  insensible,  i.  e.  form  an  habit 
of  insensibility,  to  all  moral  considerations.  For, 
from  our  very  faculty  of  habits,  paftive  impreftions, 
by  being  repeated,  grow  weaker.  Thoughts,  by 
often  paf^ing  through  the  mind,  are  felt  lei^  sensibly  : 
Being  accustomed  to  danger,  begets  intrepidity,  i.  e. 
lef^ens  fear ;  to  distreft,  leftens  the  pai^ion  of  pity  ; 
to  instances  of  others'  mortality,  leftens  the  sensible 


Chap.  5.  Moral  Discipline.  87 

apprehension  of  our  own.  And  from  these  two  ob- 
servations together  ;  that  practical  habits  are  formed 
and  strengthened  by  repeated  a6ls,  and  that  paftive 
impref^ions  grow  weaker  by  being  repeated  upon 
us ;  it  must  follow,  that  a(51ive  habits  may  be  gra- 
dually forming  and  strengthening,  by  a  course  of 
adling  upon  such  and  such  motives  and  excitements, 
whilst  these  motives  and  excitements  themselves 
are,  by  proportionable  degrees,  growing  lef^  sen- 
sible, i.  e.  are  continually  left  and  left  sensibly  felt, 
even  as  the  active  habits  strengthen.  And  experience 
confirms  this :  For  a(51ive  principles,  at  the  very  time 
that  they  are  left  lively  in  perception  than  they  were, 
are  found  to  be,  somehow,  vv^rought  more  thoroughly 
into  the  temper  and  chara6ler,  and  become  more 
effecftual  in  influencing  our  pra6lice.  The  three 
things  just  mentioned  may  afford  instances  of  it. 
Perception  of  danger,  is  a  natural  excitement  of 
paftive  fear,  and  active  caution :  And  by  being 
inured  to  danger,  habits  of  the  latter  are  gradually 
wrought,  at  the  same  time  that  the  former  gradually 
leftens.  Perception  of  distreft  in  others,  is  a  na- 
tural excitement,  paftively  to  pity,  and  acftively  to 
relieve  it :  But  let  a  man  set  himself  to  attend  to, 
inquire  out,  and  relieve  distrefted  persons,  and  he 
cannot  but  grow  left  and  left  sensibly  affe(5led  with 
the  various  miseries  of  life,  with  which  he  must 
become  acquainted;  when  yet,  at  the  same  time, 
benevolence,  considered  not  as  a  paftion,  but  as  a 
pracftical  principle  of  a(9:ion,  will  strengthen  :  and 
whilst  he  paftively  compaftionates  the  distrefted  left, 
he  will  acquire  a  greater  aptitude  actively  to  aftist 
and  befriend  them.  So  also  at  the  same  time  that 
the  daily  instances  of  men's  dying  around  us,  give  us 
daily  a  left  sensible  paftive  feeling  or  apprehension 
of  our  own  mortality,  such  instances  greatly  con- 


88  Ofa  State  of  Parti. 

tribute  to  the  strengthening  a  pra(51ical  regard  to  it 
in  serious  men ;  i.  e.  to  forming  an  habit  of  adling 
with  a  constant  view  to  it.  And  this  seems  again 
further  to  shew,  that  paftive  impreftions  made  upon 
our  minds  by  admonition,  experience,  example, 
though  they  may  have  a  remote  efficacy,  and  a  very 
great  one,  towards  forming  a(51ive  habits,  yet,  can 
have  this  efficacy  no  otherwise  than  by  inducing  us 
to  such  a  course  of  ac^tion :  and  that  it  is,  not  being 
affedled  so  and  so,  but  ac^ting,  which  forms  those 
habits :  Only  it  must  be  always  remembered,  that 
real  endeavours  to  enforce  good  imprel^ions  upon 
ourselves,  are  a  species  of  virtuous  action.  Nor  do 
we  know  how  far  it  is  poi^ible,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
that  effe(5ts  should  be  wrought  in  us  at  once,  equiva- 
lent to  habits,  i.  e.  what  is  wrought  by  use  and  ex- 
ercise. However,  the  thing  insisted  upon  is,  not 
what  may  be  poftible,  but  what  is  in  fa(ft  the  appoint- 
ment of  Nature  :  which  is,  that  active  habits  are  to 
be  formed  by  exercise.  Their  progreft  may  be  so 
gradual,  as  to  be  imperceptible  of  its  steps  :  It  may 
be  hard  to  explain  the  faculty,  by  which  we  are 
capable  of  habits,  throughout  its  several  parts  ;  and 
to  trace  it  up  to  its  original,  so  as  to  distinguish  it 
from  all  others  in  our  mind  :  And  it  seems  as  if  con- 
trary effec^ls  were  to  be  ascribed  to  it.  But  the  thing 
in  general,  that  our  nature  is  formed  to  yield,  in 
some  such  manner  as  this,  to  use  and  exercise,  is 
matter  of  certain  experience. 

Thus,  by  accustoming  ourselves  to  any  course  of 
a(9:ion,  we  get  an  aptnef^  to  go  on,  a  facility,  readi- 
nei^,  and  often  pleasure,  in  it.  The  inclinations  which 
rendered  us  averse  to  it  grow  weaker :  the  difficul- 
ties in  it,  not  only  the  imaginary  but  the  real  ones, 
leften  :  the  reasons  for  it,  offer  themselves  of  course 
to  our  thoughts  upon  all  occasions :  and  the   least 


Chap,  5.  Moral  Discipline.  89 

glimpse  of  them  is  sufficient  to  make  us  go  on,  in  a 
course  of  adlion,  to  which  we  have  been  accustomed. 
And  practical  principles  appear  to  grow  stronger, 
absolutely  in  themselves,  by  exercise  ;  as  well  as 
relatively,  with  regard  to  contrary  principles ;  which, 
by  being  accustomed  to  submit,  do  so  habitually,  and 
of  course.  And  thus  a  new  character,  in  several 
respe(?is,  may  be  formed;  and  many  habitudes  of 
life,  not  given  by  nature,  but  which  nature  directs 
us  to  acquire. 

III.  Indeed  we  may  be  allured,  that  we  should 
never  have  had  these  capacities  of  improving  by 
experience,  acquired  knowledge,  and  habits,  had 
they  not  been  neceftary,  aod  intended  to  be  made 
use  of.  And  accordingly  we  find  them  so  necef^ary, 
and  so  much  intended,  that  without  them  we  should 
be  utterly  incapable  of  that,  which  was  the  end  for 
which  we  were  made,  considered  in  our  temporal 
capacity  only :  the  employments  and  satisfactions  of 
our  mature  state  of  life. 

Nature  does  in  no  wise  qualify  us  wholly,  much 
left  at  once,  for  this  mature  state  of  life.  Even 
maturity  of  uriderstandin^  and  bpdily^  stxength,  are 
not  only  arrived  togradually,  but  are  also  very  much 
owing  to  the  continued  exercise  of  our  powers  of 
body  and  mind,  from  infancy.  But  if  we  suppose  a 
person  brought  into  the  world  with  both  these  in 
maturity,  as  far  as  this  is  conceivable;  he  would 
plainly  at  first  be  as  unqualified  for  the  human  life 
of  mature  age,  as  an  idiot.  He  would  be  in  a  man- 
ner distra(5led,  with  astonishment,  and  apprehension, 
and  curiosity,  and  suspense  :  Nor  can  one  gueft, 
how  long  it  would  be,  before  he  would  be  familiar- 
ized to  himself  and  the  objects  about  him  enough, 
even  to  set  himself  to  anything.  It  may  be  ques- 
tioned too,  whether  the  natural  information  of  his 


90  Of  a  State  of  Part  i. 

sight  and  hearing,  would  be  of  any  manner  of  use 
at  all  to  him  in  adling,  before  experience.     And  it 
seems,  that  men  would  be  strangely  headstrong  and 
self-willed,  and  disposed  to  exert  themselves  with  an 
impetuosity,  which  would  render  society  insupport- 
able, and  the  living  in  it  impracticable ;  were  it  not 
for  some  acquired  moderation  and  self-government, 
some   aptitude  and  readinef^  in  restraining  them- 
selves, and  concealing  their  sense  of  things.     Want 
of  everything  of  this  kind  which  is  learnt,  would 
render  a  man  as  incapable   of  society,  as  want  of 
language  would:  or  as  his  natural  ignorance  of  any 
of  the  particular  employments  of  life,  would  render 
him  incapable  of  providing  himself  with  the  com- 
mon conveniences,  or  supplying  the  necef^ary  wants 
of  it.    In  these  respe61:s,  and  probably  in  many  more, 
of  which  we  have  no  particular  notion,  mankind  is 
left,  by  nature,  an  unformed,  unfinished  creature  ; 
utterly  deficient  and  unqualified,  before  the  acquire- 
ment of  knowledge,  experience,  and  habits,  for  that 
mature  state  of  life,  which  was  the  end  of  his  crea- 
tion, considering  him  as  related  only  to  this  world. 
But  then,  as  Nature  has  endued  us  with  a  power 
of  supplying  those  deficiencies,  by  acquired  know- 
ledge, experience,  and  habits :   so  likewise  we  are 
placed  in  a  condition,    in  infancy,   childhood,  and 
youth,  fitted  for  it;  fitted  for  our  acquiring  those 
qualifications  of  all  sorts,  which  we  stand  in  need  of 
in  mature  age.     Hence   children,  from  their  very 
birth,  are  daily  growing  acquainted  with  the  objec^ts 
about  them,  with  the  scene  in  which  they  are  placed, 
and  to  have  a  future  part ;    and  learning  somewhat 
or  other,  neceftary  to  the  performance  of  it.     The 
subordinations,  to  which  they  are    accustomed  in 
domestic  life,  teach  them  self-government  in  com- 
mon behaviour  abroad,  and  prepare  them  for  sub- 


Chap.  ^.  Moral  Discipline.  91 

je(5lion  and  obedience  to  civil  autliority.  WTiat  paftes 
before  their  eyes,  and  daily  happens  to  them,  gives 
them  experience,  caution  against  treachery  and  de- 
ceit, together  with  numberleft  little  rules  of  a<Si\on 
and  condu(5l,  which  we  could  not  live  without ;  and 
which  are  learnt  so  insensibly  and  so  perfe(5lly,  as  to 
be  mistaken  perhaps  for  instin^l :  though  they  are 
the  effecft  of  long  experience  and  exercise ;  as  much 
so  as  language,  or  knowledge  in  particular  busineft, 
or  the  qualifications  and  behaviour  belonging  to  the 
several  ranks  and  profeftions.  Thus  the  beginning^ 
of  our  days  is  adapted  to  be,  and  is,  a  state  of 
education  in  the  theory  and  practice  of  mature  life. 
We  are  much  agisted  in  it  by  example,  instruction, 
and  the  care  of  others ;  but  a  great  deal  is  left  to 
ourselves  to  do.  And  of  this,  as  part  is  done  easify 
and  of  course  ;  so  part  requires  diligence  and  care, 
the  voluntary  foregoing  many  things  which  we  de- 
sire, and  setting  ourselves  to  what  we  should  have 
no  inclination  to,  but  for  the  neceftity  or  expedience 
of  it.  For,  that  labour  and  industry,  which  the 
station  of  so  many  absolutely  requires,  they  would 
be  greatly  unqualified  for,  in  maturity ;  as  those  in 
other  stations  would  be,  for  any  other  sorts  of  appli- 
cation ;  if  both  were  not  accustomed  to  them  in  their 
youth.  And  according  as  persons  behave  them- 
selves, in  the  general  education  which  all  go  through, 
and  in  the  particular  ones  adapted  to  particular  em- 
ployments ;  their  chara(fi:er  is  formed,  and  made 
appear  ;  they  recommend  themselves  more  or  left; 
and  are  capable  of,  and  placed  in,  different  stations 
in  the  society  of  mankind. 

The  former  part  of  life  then,  is  to  be  considered  f 
as  an  important  opportunity,  which  Nature  puts  into ; 
our  hands  ;  and  which,  when  lost,  is  not  to  be  re-  \ 
covered.     And    our   being   placed    in   a    state    of 


92  Of  a  State  of  Part  i. 

discipline  throughout  this  life,  for  another  world,  is 
a  providential  disposition  of  things,  exa(5lly  of  the 
same  kind,  as  our  being  placed  in  a  state  of  disci- 
pline during  childhood,  for  mature  age.  Our  con- 
dition in  both  respe^ls  is  uniform  and  of  a  piece, 
and  comprehended  under  one  and  the  same  general 
law  of  Nature. 

And  if  we  were  not  able  at  all  to  discern,  how  or 

\  in  what  way  the  present  life  could  be  our  prepara- 
tion for  another  ;  this  would  be  no  objection  against 
the  credibility  of  its  being  so.  For  we  do  not  discern, 
how  food  and  sleep  contribute  to  the  growth  of  the 
body  :  nor  could  have  any  thought  that  they  would, 
before  we  had  experience.  Nor  do  children  at  all 
think,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  sports  and  exercises, 
to  which  they  are  so  much  addicfled,  contribute  to 
their  health  and  growth  ;  nor  on  the  other  hand,  of 
the  neceftity  which  there  is  for  their  being  restrained 
in  them :  Nor  are  they  capable  of  understanding  the 
use  of  many  parts  of  discipline,  which  neverthelef^ 
they  must  be  made  to  go  through,  in  order  to  qualify 
them  for  the  busineft  of  mature  age.  Were  we  not 
able  then  to  discover,  in  what  respects  the  present 
life  could  form  us  for  a  future  one  :  yet  nothing 
would  be  more  supposable  than  that  it  might,  in 

^^  some  respects  or  other,  from  the  general  analogy  of 
Providence.  And  this,  for  aught  I  see,  might 
reasonably  be  said,  even  though  we  should  not  take 
in  the  consideration  of  God's  moral  government 
over  the  world.     But, 

IV.  Take  in  this  consideration,  and  consequently, 
that  the  charadler  of  virtue  and  piety  is  a  necef^ary 
qualification  for  the  future  state ;  and  then  we  may 
distinctly  see,  how,  and  in  what  respe(9:s  the  present 
life  may  be  a  preparation  for  it :  since  we  want,  and 
are  capable  of,  improvement  in  that  charaSier,  by 


Chap.  5.  Moral  Discipline.  93 

moral  and  religious  habits  ;  and  the  present  life  is 
Jit  to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  such  improvement  : 
In  like  manner  as  we  have  already  observed,  how, 
and  in  what  respe6ls,  infancy,  childhood,  and  youth, 
are  a  neceftary  preparation,  and  a  natural  state  of 
discipline,  for  mature  age. 

Nothing  which  we  at  present  see,  would  lead  us 
to  the  thought  of  a  solitary  ina(5live  state  hereafter : 
but,  if  we  judge  at  all  from  the  analogy  of  Nature, 
we  must  suppose,  according  to  the  Scripture  account 
of  it,  that  it  will  be  a  community.  And  there  is  no 
shadow  of  anything  unreasonable  in  conceiving, 
though  there  be  no  analogy  for  it,  that  this  com- 
munity will  be,  as  the  Scripture  represents  it,  under 
the  more  immediate,  or,  if  such  an  expreftion  may 
be  used,  the  more  sensible  government  of  God.  Nor 
is  our  ignorance,  what  will  be  the  employments  of 
this  happy  community,  nor  our  consequent  igno- 
rance, what  particular  scope  or  occasion  there  will 
be  for  the  exercise  of  veracity,  justice,  and  charity, 
amongst  the  members  of  it  with  regard  to  each  other ; 
any  proof,  that  there  will  be  no  sphere  of  exercise 
for  those  virtues.  Much  left,  if  that  were  poftible, 
is  our  ignorance  any  proof,  that  there  will  be  no 
occasion  for  that  frame  of  mind,  or  chara(9:er,  which 
is  formed  by  the  daily  prac^lice  of  those  particular 
virtues  here,  and  which  is  a  result  from  it.  This  at 
least  must  be  owned  in  general,  that,  as  the  govern- 
ment established  in  the  universe  is  moral,  the  cha- 
racter of  virtue  and  piety  must,  in  some  way  or  other, 
be  the  condition  of  our  happineft,  or  the  qualifica- 
tion for  it. 

Now  from  what  is  above  observed,  concerning  our 
natural  power  of  habits,  it  is  easy  to  see,  that  we 
are  capable  of  moral  improvement  by  discipline. 
And  how  greatly  we  want  it,  need  not  be  proved  to 


94  Ofa  State  of  Parti. 

any  one  who  is  acquainted  with  the  great  wickedneft 
of  mankind ;  or  even  with  those  imperfections,  which 
the  best  are  conscious  of  But  it  is  not  perhaps 
distinctly  attended  to  by  every  one,  that  the  occasion 
which  human  creatures  have  for  discipHne,  to  im- 
prove in  them  this  charaCler  of  virtue  and  piety,  is 
to  be  traced  up  higher  than  to  exceft  in  the  paftions, 
by  indulgence  and  habits  of  vice.  Mankind,  and 
perhaps  all  finite  creatures,  from  the  very  constitu- 
tion of  their  nature,  before  habits  of  virtue,  are  de- 
ficient, and  in  danger  of  deviating  from  what  is  right : 
and  therefore  stand  in  need  of  virtuous  habits,  for  a 
security  against  this  danger.  For,  together  with  the 
general  principle  of  moral  understanding,  we  have 
in  our  inward  frame  various  aifeClions  towards  par- 
ticular external  obje(5ls.  These  affeClions  are  na- 
turally, and  of  right,  subjeCl  to  the  government  of 
the  moral  principle,  as  to  the  occasions  upon  which 
they  may  be  gratified ;  as  to  the  times,  degrees,  and 
manner,  in  which  the  objeCIs  of  them  may  be  pur- 
sued :  But  then  the  principle  of  virtue  can  neither 
excite  them,  nor  prevent  their  being  excited.  On 
the  contrary,  they  are  naturally  felt,  when  the  ob- 
jeCls  of  them  are  present  to  the  mind,  not  only  before 
all  consideration,  whether  they  can  be  obtained  by 
lawful  means,  but  after  it  is  found  they  cannot.  For 
the  natural  objeCls  of  affection  continue  so;  the 
neceftaries,  conveniences,  and  pleasures  of  life,  re- 
main naturally  desirable ;  though  they  cannot  be 
obtained  innocently  :  nay,  though  they  cannot  pofti- 
bly  be  obtained  at  all.  And  when  the  objects  of  any 
affeClion  whatever  cannot  be  obtained  without  unlaw- 
ful means ;  but  may  be  obtained  by  them :  such  af- 
feClion,  though  its  being  excited,  and  its  continuing 
some  time  in  the  mind,  be  as  innocent  as  it  is  natural 
and  necef^ary ;  yet  cannot  but  be  conceived  to  have 


Chap.  5.  Moral  Discipline.  95 

a  tendency  to  incline  persons  to  venture  upon  such 
unlawful  means  :  and  therefore  must  be  conceived  as 
putting  them  in  some  danger  of  it.  Now  what  is 
the  general  security  against  this  danger,  against 
their  actually  deviating  from  right '?  As  the  danger 
is,  so  also  must  the  security  be,  from  within :  from 
the  practical  principle  of  virtue.^  And  the  strength- 
ening or  improving  this  principle,  considered  as 
practical,  or  as  a  principle  of  a(ftion,  will  lef^en  the 
danger,  or  increase  the  security  against  it.  And 
this  moral  principle  is  capable  of  improvement,  by 
proper  discipline  and  exercise  :  by  recollecting  the 
practical  impreftions  which  example  and  experience 
have  made  upon  us  :  and, instead  of  follow^ing  humour 
and  mere  inclination,  by  continually  attending  to  the 
equity  and  right  of  the  case,  in  whatever  we  are  en- 
gaged, be  it  in  greater  or  left  matters ;  and  accus- 
toming ourselves  always  to  a(51;  upon  it ;  as  being 
itself  the  just  and  natural  motive  of  a6lion  :  and  as 
this  moral   course  of  behaviour,  must  neceftarily, 

'  It  may  be  thought,  that  sense  of  interest  would  as  effedlu- 
ally  restrain  creatures  from  doing  wrong.      But  if  by  a  sense  of 
interest  is  meant  a  speculative  convidtion  or  belief,  that  such  and, 
such  indulgence  would  occasion  them  greater  uneasinefs,  upon  . 
the  whole,  than  satisfadtion  j  it  is  contrary  to  present  experience  ! 
to  say,  that  this  sense  of  interest  is  sulficient  to  restrain  them  ! 
from  thus  indulging  themselves.      And  if  by  a  sense  of  interest  is'\ 
meant,  a  practical  regard  to  what  is  upon  the  whole  our  happi-  ] 
nefs  :  this  is  not  only  coincident  with  the  principle  of  virtue  os-^ 
moral  reftitude,  but  is  a  part  of  the  idea  itself.     And  it  is  evi- 
dent this  reasonable  self-love  wants  to  be  improved,  as  really  as 
any  principle  in  our  nature.     For  we  daily  see  it  overmatched, 
not  only  by  the  more  boisterous  pafsions,  but  by  curiosity,  fhame, 
love  of  imitation,  by  anything,  even  indolence  :  efpecially  if  the 
interest,  the  temporal  interest,  fuppofe,  which  is  the  end  of  such 
self-love,  be  at  a  distance.     So  greatly  are  profligate  men  mis- 
taken, when  they  affirm  they  are  wholly  governed  by  interest- 
ednefs  and  felf-love.     And  fo  little  caule  is  there  for  moralists 
to  disclaim  this  principle.     See  pp.  75,  76. 


96  Ofa  State  of  Parti, 

under  divine  government,  be  our  final  interest.  Thus 
the  principle  of  virtue,  improved  into  an  habit,  of 
which  improvement  we  are  thus  capable,  will  plainly 
be,  in  proportion  to  the  strength  of  it,  a  security 
against  the  danger  which  finite  creatures  are  in,  from 
the  very  nature  ofpropension,  or  particular  affe6lions. 
This  way  of  putting  the  matter,  supposes  particular 
affe^lions  to  remain  in  a  future  state ;  which  it  is 
scarce  pofsible  to  avoid  supposing.  And  if  they  do  ; 
we  clearly  see,  that  acquired  habits  of  virtue  and 
self-government  may  be  neceftary  for  the  regulation 
of  them.  However,  though  we  were  not  distinctly 
to  take  in  this  supposition,  but  to  speak  only  in  ge- 
neral ;  the  thing  really  comes  to  the  same.  For 
habits  of  virtue,  thus  acquired  by  discipline,  are  im- 
provement in  virtue :  and  improvement  in  virtue, 
must  be  advancement  in  happineft,  if  the  govern- 
ment of  the  universe  be  moral. 

From  these  things  we  may  observe,  and  it  will 
farther  shew  this  our  natural  and  original  need  of 
being  improved  by  discipline,  how^  it  comes  to  paft, 
that  creatures  made  upright  fall ;  and  that  those  who 
preserve  their  uprightneft,  by  so  doing,  raise  them- 
selves to  a  more  secure  state  of  virtue.  To  say  that 
the  former  is  accounted  for  by  the  nature  of  liberty, 
is  to  say  no  more,  than  that  an  event's  ac^tually  hap- 
pening is  accounted  for  by  a  mere  poftibility  of  its 
happening.  But  it  seems  distindlly  conceivable  from  . 
the  very  nature  of  particular  affe(5lions  or  propen- 
sions.  For,  suppose  creatures  intended  for  such  a 
particular  state  of  life,  for  which  such  propensions 
were  neceftary :  suppose  them  endued  with  such 
propensions,  together  with  moral  understanding,  as 
well  including  a  pra61ical  sense  of  virtue,  as  a  spe- 
culative perception  of  it ;  and  that  all  these  several 
principles,  both  natural  and  moral,  forming  an  in- 


Chap.  5.  Moral  Discipline.  97 

ward  constitution  of  mind,  were  in  the  most  exacft 
proportion  pof^ible  ;  i.e.  in  a  proportion  the  most 
exactly  adapted  to  their  intended  state  of  life  :  Such 
creatures  would  be  made  upright,  or  finitely  perfe^l. 
Now  particular  propensions,  from  their  very  nature, 
must  be  felt,  the  obje(5ls  of  them  being  present ; 
though  they  cannot  be  gratified  at  all,  or  not  with 
the  allowance  of  the  moral  principle.  But  if  they 
can  be  gratified  without  its  allowance,  or  by  contra- 
dialing  it ;  then  they  must  be  conceived  to  have 
some  tendency,  in  how  low  a  degree  soever,  yet 
some  tendency,  to  induce  persons  to  such  forbidden 
gratification.  This  tendency,  in  some  one  particular 
propension,  may  be  increased,  by  the  greater  fi-e- 
quency  of  occasions  naturally  exciting  it,  than  of 
occasions  exciting  others.  The  least  voluntary  in- 
dulgence in  forbidden  circumstances,  though  but  in 
thought,  will  increase  this  wrong  tendency ;  and  may 
increase  it  further,  till,  peculiar  conjunctures  perhaps 
conspiring,  it  becomes  effect ;  and  danger  of  devi- 
ating from  right,  ends  in  a(9;ual  deviation  from  it :  a 
danger  neceftarily  arising  from  the  very  nature  of 
propension ;  and  which  therefore  could  not  have 
been  prevented,  though  it  might  have  been  escaped, 
or  got  innocently  through.  The  case  would  be,  as 
if  we  were  to  suppose  a  straight  path  marked  out 
for  a  person,  in  which  such  a  degree  of  attention 
would  keep  him  steady :  but  if  he  would  not  attend 
in  this  degree,  any  one  of  a  thousand  objects,  catch- 
ing his  eye,  might  lead  him  out  of  it.  Now  it  is  im- 
po(^ible  to  say,  how  much,  even  the  first  full  overt 
a6l  of  irregularity,  might  disorder  the  inward  con- 
stitution ;  unsettle  the  adjustments,  and  alter  the 
proportions,  which  formed  it,  and  in  which  the  up- 
rightnef^  of  its  make  consisted :  But  repetition  of 
irregularities  would  produce  habits.  And  thus  the 
H 


98  ,    Of  a  State  of  Part  i. 

constitution  would  be  spoiled ;  and  creatures  made 
upright,  become  corrupt  and  depraved  in  their  settled 
character,  proportionably  to  their  repeated  irregula- 
rities in  occasional  a(fts.  But  on  the  contrary,  these 
creatures  might  have  improved  and  raised  them- 
selves, to  an  higher  and  more  secure  state  of  virtue, 
by  the  contrary  behaviour :  by  steadily  following  the 
moral  principle,  supposed  to  be  one  part  of  their 
nature  ;  and  thus  withstanding  that  unavoidable  dan- 
ger of  defe(5lion,  which  neceftarily  arose  from  pro- 
pension,  the  other  part  of  it.  For,  by  thus  preserv- 
ing their  integrity  for  some  time,  their  danger  would 
leflen ;  since  propensions  by  being  inured  to  submit, 
would  do  it  more  easily  and  of  course  :  and  their 
security  against  this  leftening  danger  would  increase; 
since  the  moral  principle  would  gain  additional 
strength  by  exercise  :  both  which  things  are  implied 
in  the  notion  of  virtuous  habits.  Thus  then  vicious 
indulgence,  is  not  only  criminal  in  itself,  but  also 
depraves  the  inward  constitution  and  characfter.  And 
virtuous  self-government,  is  not  only  right  in  itself, 
but  also  improves  the  inward  constitution  or  cha- 
racter :  and  may  improve  it  to  such  a  degree,  that 
though  we  should  suppose  it  impoftible,  for  parti- 
cular affections  to  be  absolutely  coincident  with  the 
moral  principle  ;  and  consequently  should  allow,  that 
such  creatures  as  have  been  above  supposed,  would 
for  ever  remain  defe(5tible  ;  yet  their  danger  of  ac- 
tually deviating  from  right,  may  be  almost  infinitely 
leftened,  and  they  fully  fortified  against  what  re- 
mains of  it :  if  that  may  be  called  danger,  against 
which,  there  is  an  adequate  effe(5lual  security.  But 
still  this  their  higher  perfection  may  continue  to 
consist  in  habits  of  virtue  formed  in  a  state  of  disci- 
pline, and  this  their  more  complete  security  remain 
to  proceed  from  them.     And  thus  it  is  plainly  con- 


Chap.  5.  Moral  Discipline.  99 

ceivable,  that  creatures  without  blemish,  as  they 
came  out  of  the  hands  of  God,  may  be  in  danger  of 
going  wrong ;  and  so  may  stand  in  need  of  the  se- 
curity of  virtuous  habits,  additional  to  the  moral 
principle  wrought  into  their  natures  by  Him.  That 
which  is  the  ground  of  their  danger,  or  their  want 
of  security,  may  be  considered  as  a  deficiency  in 
them,  to  which  virtuous  habits  are  the  natural  sup- 
ply. And  as  they  are  naturally  capable  of  being 
raised  and  improved  by  discipline,  it  may  be  a  thing 
fit  and  requisite,  that  they  should  be  placed  in  cir- 
cumst£inces  with  an  eye  to  it :  in  circumstances 
peculiarly  fitted  to  be,  to  them,  a  state  of  discipline 
for  their  improvement  in  virtue. 

But  how  much  more  strongly  must  this  hold  with 
respe(5l  to  those,  who  have  corrupted  their  natures, 
are  fallen  from  their  original  re(5litude,  and  whose 
paftions  are  become  excef^ive  by  repeated  violations 
of  their  inward  constitution  ?  upright  creatures  may 
want  to  be  improved :  depraved  creatures  want  to 
be  renewed.  Education  and  discipline,  which  may 
be  in  all  degrees  and  sorts  of  gentleneft  and  of  se- 
verity, is  expedient  for  those  :  but  must  be  absolutely 
neceftary  for  these.  For  these,  discipline  of  the  severer 
sort  too,  and  in  the  higher  degrees  of  it,  must  be 
neceftary,  in  order  to  wear  out  vicious  habits ;  to 
recover  their  primitive  strength  of  self-government, 
which  indulgence  must  have  weakened;  to  repair,  as 
well  as  raise  into  an  habit,  the  moral  principle,  in 
order  to  their  arriving  at  a  secure  state  of  virtuous 
happineft. 

Now  whoever  will  consider  the  thing,  may  clearly 
see,  that  the  present  world  is  peculiarly  jit  to  be  a 
state  of  discipline  for  this  purpose,  to  such  as  will 
set  themselves  to  mend  and  improve.  For,  the 
various  temptations  with  which  we  are  surrounded ; 


100  Ofa  State  of  Parti. 

our  experience  of  the  deceits  of  wickedneft ;  having 
been  in  many  instances  led  wrong  ourselves ;  the 
great  viciousnef^  of  the  world  ;  the  infinite  disorders 
consequent  upon  it;  our  being  made  acquainted 
with  pain  and  sorrow,  either  from  our  own  feeling 
of  it,  or  from  the  sight  of  it  in  others ;  these  things, 
though  some  of  them  may  indeed  produce  wrong 
effects  upon  our  minds,  yet  when  duly  refle(9:ed 
upon,  have,  all  of  them,  a  direc?!:  tendency  to  bring 
us  to  a  settled  moderation  and  reasonableneft  of 
temper :  the  contrary  both  to  thoughtleft  levity,  and 
also  to  that  unrestrained  self-will,  and  violent  bent 
to  follow  present  inclination,  which  may  be  observed 
in  undisciplined  minds.  Such  experience,  as  the 
present  state  affords,  of  the  frailty  of  our  nature  ;  of 
the  boundlef^  extravagance  of  ungovemed  paftion  ; 
of  the  power  which  an  Infinite  Being  has  over  us, 
by  the  various  capacities  of  misery  which  He  has 
given  us ;  in  short,  that  kind  and  degree  of  experi- 
ence, which  the  present  state  affords  us,  that  the 
constitution  of  Nature  is  such  as  to  admit  the  pof^i- 
bility,  the  danger,  and  the  a(5lual  event,  of  creatures 
losing  their  innocence  and  happinef^,  and  becoming 
vicious  and  wretched  ;  hath  a  tendency  to  give  us  a 
practical  sense  of  things,  very  different  from  a  mere 
speculative  knowledge,  that  we  are  liable  to  vice, 
and  capable  of  misery.  And  who  knows,  whether 
the  security  of  creatures  in  the  highest  and  most 
settled  state  of  perfe(51:ion,  may  not  in  part  arise, 
from  their  having  had  such  a  sense  of  things  as  this, 
formed,  and  habitually  fixed  within  them,  in  some 
state  of  probation.  And  paf^ing  through  the  present 
world  with  that  moral  attention,  which  is  necef^ary 
to  the  ailing  a  right  part  in  it,  may  leave  everlasting 
impref^ions  of  this  sort  upon  our  minds.  But  to  be 
a  little  more  distin<5l :  allurements  to  what  is  wrong  ; 


Chap.  5.  Moral  Discipline.  10 1 

difficulties  in  the  discharge  of  our  duty ;  our  not 
being  able  to  act  an  uniform  right  part  without  some 
thought  and  care;  and  the  opportunities  which  we 
have,  or  imagine  we  have,  of  avoiding  what  we 
dislike,  or  obtaining  what  we  desire,  by  unlawful 
means,  when  we  either  cannot  do  it  at  all,  or  at 
least  not  so  easily,  by  lawful  ones ;  These  things, 
I.  e.  the  snares  and  temptations  of  vice,  are  what 
render  the  present  world  peculiarly  fit  to  be  a  state 
of  discipline,  to  those  who  will  preserve  their  in- 
tegrity :  because  they  render  being  upon  our  guard, 
resolution,  and  the  denial  of  our  paftions,  neceftary 
in  order  to  that  endV  And  the  exercise  of  such 
particular  recollection,  intention  of  mind,  and  self- 
government,  in  the  pracftice  of  virtue,  has,  from  the 
make  of  our  nature,  a  peculiar  tendency  to  form 
habits  of  virtue  ;  as  implying,  not  only  a  real,  but  also 
a  more  continued,  and  a  more  intense  exercise 
of  the  virtuous  principle ;  or  a  more  constant  and 
a  stronger  effort  of  virtue  exerted  into  a6i.  Thus 
suppose  a  person  to  know  himself  to  be  in  particu- 
lar danger,  for  some  time,  of  doing  anything  wrong, 
which  yet  he  fully  resolves  not  to  do :  Continued 
recolle^lion,  and  keeping  upon  his  guard,  in  order 
to  make  good  his  resolution,  is  a  continued  exerting 
of  that  a<5l  of  virtue  in  a  high  degree,  which  need 
have  been,  and  perhaps  would  have  been,  only  in- 
stantaneous and  weak,  had  the  temptation  been  so. 
It  is  indeed  ridiculous  to  aftert,  that  self-denial  is 
ei^ential  to  virtue  and  piety :  But  it  would  have  been 
nearer  the  truth,  though  not  stridlly  the  truth  itself, 
to  have  said,  that  it  is  ef^ential  to  discipline  and 
improvement.  For  though  a<5lions  materially  vir- 
tuous, which  have  no  sort  of  difficulty,  but  are  per- 
fe(5lly  agreeable  to  our  particular  inclinations,  may 
pof^ibly  be  done  only  from  these  particular  incli- 


ioi  Of  a  State  of  Parti. 

nations,  and  so  may  not  be  any  exercise  of  the 
principle  of  virtue,  i.  e.  not  be  virtuous  actions  at  all; 
yet  on  the  contrary,  they  may  be  an  exercise  of  that 
principle  :  and  when  they  are,  they  have  a  tendency 
to  form  and  fix  the  habit  of  virtue.  But  when  the 
.  exercise  of  the  virtuous  principle  is  more  continued, 
X^  oftener  repeated,  and  more  intense ;  as  it  must  be 
in  circumstances  of  danger,  temptation  and  difficulty, 
of  any  kind  and  in  any  degree  ;  this  tendency  is  in- 
creased proportionably,  and  a  more  confirmed  habit 
is  the  consequence. 

This  undoubtedly  holds  to  a  certain  length  ;  but 
how  far  it  may  hold,  I  know  not.  Neither  our  intel- 
lectual powers,  nor  our  bodily  strength,  can  be  im- 
proved beyond  such  a  degree  :  and  both  may  be 
over-wrought.  Pofsibly  there  may  be  somewhat 
analogous  to  this,  with  respect  to  the  moral  charac- 
ter ;  which  is  scarce  worth  considering.  And  I 
mention  it  only,  lest  it  should  come  into  some  per- 
sons' thoughts,  not  as  an  exception  to  the  foregoing 
observations,  which  perhaps  it  is  ;  but  as  a  confu- 
tation of  them,  which  it  is  not.  And  there  may  be 
several  other  exceptions.  Observations  of  this  kind 
cannot  be  supposed  to  hold  minutely,  and  in  every 
case.  It  is  enough  that  they  hold  in  general.  And 
these  plainly  hold  so  far,  as  that  from  them  may  be 
seen  distin(5lly,  which  is  all  that  is  intended  by  them, 
^^  that  the  present  world  is  peculiarly  Jit  to  be  a  state 
/  of  discipline,  for  our  improvement  in  virtue  and 
piety :  in  the  same  sense  as  some  sciences,  by  re- 
quiring and  engaging  the  attention,  not  to  be  sure 
of  such  persons  as  will  not,  but  of  such  as  will,  set 
themselves  to  them  ;  are  fit  to  form  the  mind  to 
habits  of  attention. 

Indeed  the  present  state  is  so  far  from  proving, 
in  event,  a  discipline  of  virtue  to  the  generality  of 


Chap.  5.  Moral  Discipline.  103 

men,  that,  on  the  contrary,  they  seem  to  make  it  a 
discipline  of  vice.  And  the  viciousneft  of  the  world 
is,  in  different  ways,  the  great  temptation,  which 
renders  it  a  state  of  virtuous  discipline,  in  the  degree 
it  is,  to  good  men.  The  whole  end,  and  the  whole 
occasion,  of  mankind's  being  placed  in  such  a  state 
as  the  present,  is  not  pretended  to  be  accounted  for. 
That  which  appears  amidst  the  general  corruption, 
is,  that  there  are  some  persons,  who,  having  within 
them  the  principle  of  amendment  and  recovery, 
attend  to  and  follow  the  notices  of  virtue  and  religion, 
be  they  more  clear  or  more  obscure,  which  are 
afforded  them  ;  and  that  the  present  world  is,  not 
only  an  exercise  of  virtue  in  these  persons,  but  an 
exercise  of  it  in  ways  and  degrees,  peculiarly  apt  to 
improve  it :  apt  to  improve  it,  in  some  respe(?l;s,  even 
beyond  what  would  be,  by  the  exercise  of  it  required 
in  a  perfe(9:ly  virtuous  society,  or  in  a  society  of 
equally  imperfe(5l  virtue  with  themselves.  But  that 
the  present  world  does  not  a6lually  become  a  state 
of  moral  discipline  to  many,  even  to  the  generality, 
i.  e.  that  they  do  not  improve  or  grow  better  in  it,\ 
cannot  be  urged  as  a  proof,  that  it  was  not  intended  ' 
for  moral  discipline,  by  any  who  at  all  observe  the 
Analogy  of  Nature.  For,  of  the  numerous  seeds  of 
vegetables  and  bodies  of  animals,  which  are  adapted 
and  put  in  the  way,  to  improve  to  such  a  point  or 
state  of  natural  maturity  and  perfedlion,  we  do  not 
see  perhaps  that  one  in  a  million  a(9:ually  does.  Far 
the  greatest  part  of  them  decay  before  they  are  im- 
proved to  it;  and  appear  to  be  absolutely  destroyed. 
Yet  no  one,  who  does  not  deny  all  final  causes,  will 
deny,  that  those  seeds  and  bodies,  which  do  attain 
to  that  point  of  maturity  and  perfe(9:ion,  answer  the 
end  for  which  they  were  really  designed  by  Nature ; 
and  therefore  that  Nature  designed  them  for  such 


104  Of  a  State  of  Part  i. 

perfe(9:ion.  And  I  cannot  forbear  adding,  though  it 
is  not  to  the  present  purpose,  that  the  appearance 
of  such  an  amazing  waste  in  Nature,  with  respe(?i:  to 
these  seeds  and  bodies,  by  foreign  causes,  is  to  us 
as  unaccountable,  as,  what  is  much  more  terrible, 
the  present  and  future  ruin  of  so  many  moral  agents 
by  themselves,  i.  e.  by  vice. 

Against  this  whole  notion  of  moral  discipline,  it 
may  be  obje(?ted,  in  another  way  ;  that  so  far  as  a 
course  of  behaviour,  materially  virtuous,  proceeds 
'^  from  hope  and  fear,  so  far  it  is  only  a  discipline  and 
strengthening  of  self-love.  But  doing  what  God 
commands,  because  he  commands  it,  is  obedience, 
though  it  proceeds  from  hope  or  fear.  And  a  course 
of  such  obedience  will  form  habits  of  it.  And  a  con- 
stant regard  to  veracity,  justice  and  charity,  may 
form  distin(?l;  habits  of  these  particular  virtues ;  and 
will  certainly  form  habits  of  self-government,  and  of 
denying  our  inclinations,  whenever  veracity,  justice 
or  charity  require  it.  Nor  is  there  any  foundation 
for  this  great  nicety,  with  which  some  affect  to  dis- 
tinguish in  this  case,  in  order  to  depreciate  all  re- 
ligion proceeding  from  hope  of  fear.  For,  veracity, 
justice  and  charity,  regard  to  God's  authority,  and 
to  our  own  chief  interest,  are  not  only  all  three  co- 
incident:  but  each  of  them  is,  in  itself,  a  just  and 
natural  motive  or  principle  of  action.  And  he  who 
begins  a  good  life  from  any  one  of  them,  and  per- 
severes in  it,  as  he  is  already  in  some  degree,  so  he 
cannot  fail  of  becoming  more  and  more,  of  that 
charadler,  which  is  correspondent  to  the  constitution 
of  Nature  as  moral ;  and  to  the  relation,  which  God 
stands  in  to  us  as  moral  Governor  of  it :  nor  conse- 
quently can  he  fail  of  obtaining  that  happineft,  which 
this  constitution  and  relation  neceftarily  suppose 
conne^led  with  that  chara(^er. 


Chap.  5.  Moral  Discipline.  105 

These  several  observations,  concerning  the  a(9;ive 
principle  of  virtue  and  obedience  to  God's  commands, 
are  applicable  to  paftive  submii^ion  or  resignation 
to  his  will :  which  is  another  ei^ential  part  of  a  right 
chara(9:er,  conne(5led  with  the  former,  and  very  much 
in  our  power  to  form  ourselves  to.  It  may  be  im- 
agined, that  nothing  but  afflictions  can  give  occasion 
for,  or  require  this  virtue ;  that  it  can  have  no  respe(?l 
to,  nor  be  any  way  neceftary  to  qualify  for,  a  state 
of  perfect;  happineft  :  But  it  is  not  experience  which 
can  make  us  think  thus.  Prosperity  itself,  whilst 
anything  supposed  desirable  is  not  ours,  begets  ex- 
travagant and  unbounded  thoughts.  Imagination 
is  altogether  as  much  a  source  of  discontent,  as  any- 
thing in  our  external  condition.  It  is  indeed  true, 
that  there  can  be  no  scope  for  patience,  when  sor- 
row shall  be  no  more :  but  there  may  be  need  of  a 
temper  of  mind,  which  shall  have  been  formed  by 
patience.  For,  though  self-love,  considered  merely 
as  an  a(5live  principle  leading  us  to  pursue  our  chief 
interest,  cannot  but  be  uniformly  coincident  with  the 
principle  of  obedience  to^  God's  commands,  our  in- 
terest being  rightly  understood ;  because  this  obe- 
dience, and  the  pursuit  of  our  own  chief  interest, 
must  be  in  every  case  one  and  the  same  thing :  yet 
it  may  be  questioned,  whether  self-love,  considered 
merely  as  the  desire  of  our  own  interest  or  happi- 
nef^,  can,  from  its  nature,  be  thus  absolutely  and 
uniformly  coincident  with  the  will  of  God  ;  any  more 
than  particular  affe(51;ions  can^:  coincident  in  such 
sort,  as  not  to  be  liable  to  be  excited  upon  occasions 
and  in  degrees,  impof^ible  to  be  gratified  consistently 
with  the  constitution  of  things,  or  the  divine  ap- 
pointments.   So  that  habits  of  resignation  may,  upon 


io6  Of  a  State  of  Parti, 

this  account,  be  requisite  for  all  creatures  ;  habits, 
I  say  ;  which  signify  what  is  formed  by  use.  How- 
ever, in  general  it  is  obvious,  that  both  self-love  and 
particular  affecflions  in  human  creatures,  considered 
only  as  paftive  feelings,  distort  and  rend  the  mind ; 
and  therefore  stand  in  need  of  discipline.  Now  denial 
of  those  particular  affe<9:ions,  in  a  course  of  active 
virtue  and  obedience  to  God's  will,  has  a  tendency 
to  moderate  them  ;  and  seems  also  to  have  a  ten- 
dency to  habituate  the  mind,  to  be  easy  and  satis- 
fied with  that  degree  of  happinei^  which  is  allotted 
us,  i.  e.  to  moderate  self-love.  But  the  proper 
discipline  for  resignation,  is  afflidlion.  For  a  right 
behaviour  under  that  trial ;  recolleding  ourselves  so 
as  to  consider  it  in  the  view,in  which  Religion  teaches 
us  to  consider  it,  as  from  the  hand  of  God  ;  receiving 
it  as  what  he  appoints,  or  thinks  proper  to  permit, 
in  his  world  and  under  his  government ;  this  will 
habituate  the  mind  to  a  dutiful  submiftion.  And 
such  submiftion,  together  with  the  a(5live  principle 
of  obedience,  make  up  the  temper  and  chara<5ler  in 
us,  which  answers  to  his  sovereignty ;  and  which 
absolutely  belongs  to  the  condition  of  our  being,  as 
dependent  creatures.  Nor  can  it  be  said,  that  this 
is  only  breaking  the  mind  to  a  submiftion  to  mere 
power ;  for  mere  power  may  be  accidental,  and 
precarious,  and  usurped  :  But  it  is  forming  within 
ourselves  the  temper  of  resignation  to  his  rightful 
authority,  who  is,  by  nature,  supreme  over  all. 

Upon  the  whole :  such  a  chara(^er,  and  such 
qualifications,  are  neceftaryfor  a  mature  state  of  life 
in  the  present  world,  as  Nature  alone  does  in  no  wise 
bestow ;  but  has  put  it  upon  us,  in  great  part,  to 
acquire,  in  our  progref^  from  one  stage  of  life  to 
another,  from  childhood  to  mature  age  :  put  it  upon 
us  to  acquire  them,  by  giving  us  capacities  of  doing 


Chap.  5.  Moral  Discipline.  107 

it,  and  by  placing  us,  in  the  beginning  of  life,  in  a 
condition  fit  for  it.  And  this  is  a  general  Analogy 
to  our  condition  in  the  present  world,  as  in  a  state 
of  moral  discipline  for  another.  It  is  in  vain  then  to 
object  against  the  credibility  of  the  present  life's  being 
intended  for  this  purpose,  that  all  the  trouble  and 
the  danger,  unavoidably  accompanying  such  disci- 
pline, might  have  been  saved  us,  by  our  being  made 
at  once  the  creatures  and  the  chara(fi:ers,  which  we 
were  to  be.  For  we  experience,  that  what  we  were 
to  be,  was  to  be  the  effecft  o{what  we  would  do:  and 
that  the  general  condu(5l  of  Nature  is,  not  to  save  us 
trouble  or  danger,  but  to  make  us  capable  of  going 
through  them,  and  to  put  it  upon  us  to  do  so.  Ac- 
quirements of  our  own,  experience  and  habits,  are 
the  natural  supply  to  our  deficiencies,  and  security 
against  our  dangers :  since  it  is  as  plainly  natural  to  set 
ourselves  to  acquire  the  qualifications,  as  the  external 
things,  which  we  stand  in  need  of.  In  particular,  it 
is  as  plainly  a  general  law  of  Nature,  that  we  should, 
with  regard  to  our  temporal  interest,  form  and  cul- 
tivate practical  principles  within  us,  by  attention,  use 
and  discipline,  as  anything  whatever  is  a  natural  law; 
chiefly  in  the  beginning  of  life,  but  also  throughout 
the  whole  course  of  it.  And  the  alternative  is  left 
to  our  choice :  either  to  improve  ourselves,  and  better 
our  condition:  or,  in  default  of  such  improvement, 
to  remain  deficient  and  wretched.  It  is  therefore 
perfectly  credible,  from  the  Analogy  of  Nature,  that 
the  same  may  be  our  case,  with  respe(?i:  to  the  hap- 
pinei^  of  a  future  state,  and  the  qualifications  ne- 
cef^ary  for  it. 

There  is  a  third  thing,  which  may  seem  implied 
in  the  present  world's  being  a  state  of  probation  ;  that 
it  is  a  theatre  of  action,  for  the  manifestation  of 
persons'  characflers,  with  respe(9:  to  a  future  one  : 


io8     Of  a  State  of  Moral  Discipline.  Part  i. 

not  to  be  sure  to  an  All -knowing  Being,  but  to  his 
creation  or  part  of  it.  This  may,  perhaps,  be  only 
a  consequence  of  our  being  in  a  state  of  probation 
in  the  other  senses.  However,  it  is  not  impof^ible, 
that  men's  shewing  and  making  manifest,  what  is  in 
their  heart,  what  their  real  character  is,  may  have 
respe(5l  to  a  future  life,  in  ways  and  manners  which 
we  are  not  acquainted  with :  particularly  it  may  be 
a  means,  for  the  Author  of  nature  does  not  appear 
to  do  anything  without  means,  of  their  being  dis- 
posed of  suitably  to  their  chara(5lers ;  and  of  its  being 
known  to  the  creation,  by  way  of  example,  that  they 
are  thus  disposed  of  But  not  to  enter  upon  any 
conjedlural  account  of  this  ;  one  may  just  mention, 
that  the  manifestation  of  persons'  chara(5lers,  contri- 
butes very  much,  in  various  ways,  to  the  carrying 
on  a  great  part  of  that  general  course  of  Nature,  re- 
specfiing  mankind,  which  comes  under  our  observa- 
tion at  present.  I  shall  only  add,  that  probation,  in 
both  these  senses,  as  well  as  in  that  treated  of  in  the 
foregoing  chapter,  is  implied  in  moral  government : 
since  by  persons'  behaviour  under  it,  their  charac- 
ters cannot  but  be  manifested,  and  if  they  behave 
well,  improved. 


Chap.  6.       Opinion  of  Ncccjsity,  &c.  109 


CHAPTER   VI. 

Of  the  Opinion  of  Necefiity,  considered  as 
influencing  Pra6iice. 


HROUGHOUT  the  foregoing  treatise 
it  appears,  that  the  condition  of  man- 
kind, considered  as  inhabitants  of  this 
world  only,  and  under  the  govern- 
ment of  God  which  we  experience ; 
is  greatly  analogous  to  our  condition,  as  designed 
for  another  world,  or  under  that  farther  government, 
which  Religion  teaches  us.  If  therefore  any  af^ert, 
as  a  fatalist  must,  that  the  opinion  of  universal  ne- 
ceftity  is  reconcileable  with  the  former ;  there  im- 
mediately arises  a  question  in  the  way  of  analogy, 
whether  he  must  not  also  own  it  to  be  reconcileable 
with  the  latter,  i.  e.  with  the  system  of  Religion 
itself,  and  the  proof  of  it.  The  reader  then  will 
observe,  that  the  question  now  before  us  is  not  ab- 
solute, Whether  the  opinion  of  fate  be  reconcileable 
with  Religion;  but  hypothetical.  Whether,  upon  sup- 
position of  its  being  reconcileable  with  the  constitu- 
tion of  Nature,  it  be  not  reconcileable  with  Religion 
also  :  Or,  what  pretence  a  fatalist,  not  other  persons, 
but  a  fatalist,  has  to  conclude  from  his  opinion,  that 
there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  Religion.  And  as  the 
puzzle  and  obscurity,  which  must  unavoidably  arise 
from  arguing  upon  so  absurd  a  supposition  as  that 
of  universal  neceftity,  will,  I  fear,  easily  be  seen  ;  it 
will,  I  hope,  as  easily  be  excused. 


no        Of  the  opinion  of  Neccjsity,     Parti. 

But  since  it  has  been  all  along  taken  for  granted, 
as  a  thing  proved,  that  there  is  an  intelligent  Author 
of  nature,  or  natural  Governor  of  the  world ;  and 
since  an  obje(5lion  may  be  made  against  the  proof  of 
this,  from  the  opinion  of  universal  neceftity,  as  it  may 
be  supposed,  that  such  necef^ity  will  itself  account 
for  the  origin  and  preservation  of  all  things :  it  is 
requisite,  that  this  objet^tion  be  distinctly  answered; 
or  that  it  be  shewn,  that  a  fatality,  supposed  con- 
sistent with  what  we  certainly  experience,  does  not 
destroy  the  proof  of  an  intelligent  Author  and  Gover- 
nor of  nature ;  before  we  proceed  to  consider, 
whether  it  destroys  the  proof  of  a  moral  Governor 
of  it  or  of  our  being  in  a  state  of  Religion. 

Now,  when  it  is  said  by  a  fatalist,  that  the  whole 
constitution  of  Nature,  and  the  a(?l:ions  of  men,  that 
everything,  and  every  mode  and  circumstance  of 
everything,  is  neceftary  and  could  not  poftibly  have 
been  otherwise  ;  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  this  ne- 
cei^ity  does  not  exclude  deliberation,  choice,  pre- 
ference, and  a(?t;ing  from  certain  principles,  and  to 
certain  ends :  because  all  this  is  matter  of  undoubted 
experience,  acknowledged  by  all,  and  what  every 
man  may,  every  moment,  be  conscious  of  And  from 
hence  it  follows,  that  necef^ity,  alone  and  of  itself,  is 
in  no  sort  an  account  of  the  constitution  of  Nature, 
and  how  things  came  to  he  and  to  continue  as  they 
are;  but  only  an  account  of  this  circumstance,  relat- 
ing to  their  origin  and  continuance,  that  they  could 
not  have  been  otherwise,  than  they  are  and  have 
been.  The  aftertion  that  everything  is  by  neceftity  of 
Nature,  is  not  an  answer  to  the  question ;  Whether 
the  world  came  into  being  as  it  is,  by  an  intelligent 
agent  forming  it  thus,  or  not :  But  to  quite  another 
question ;  Whether  it  came  into  being  as  it  is,  in 
that  way  and  manner  which  we  call  necejlarily,  or  in 


Chap.6.  Considered  as  influencing  Pradice.  Ill 

that  way  and  manner  which  we  caW  freely.  For  sup- 
pose farther,  that  one  who  was  a  fatalist,  and  one 
who  kept  to  his  natural  sense  of  things,  and  be- 
lieved himself  a  free  agent,  were  disputing  together, 
and  vindicating  their  respedlive  opinions  ;  and  they 
should  happen  to  instance  in  a  house  ;  they  would 
agree,  that  it  w^as  built  by  an  architecfi:.  Their  dif- 
ference concerning  neceftity  and  freedom,  would 
occasion  no  difference  of  judgment  concerning  this  ; 
but  only  concerning  another  matter ;  whether  the 
architect  built  it  necei^arily  or  freely.  Suppose  then 
they  should  proceed  to  inquire  concerning  the  con- 
stitution of  Nature  :  in  a  lax  way  of  speaking,  one 
of  them  might  say,  it  was  by  neceftity  ;  and  the 
other  by  freedom :  But  if  they  had  any  meaning 
to  their  words,  as  the  latter  must  mean  a  free  agent, 
so  the  former  must  at  length  be  reduced  to  mean  an 
agent,  whether  he  would  say  one  or  more,  ailing 
by  neceftity :  for  abstracfl:  notions  can  do  nothing. 
Indeed  we  ascribe  to  God  a  necefsary  existence, 
uncaused  by  any  agent.  For  we  find  within  our- 
selves the  idea  of  infinity,  i.  e.  immensity  and  eter- 
nity, impof^ible,  even  in  imagination,  to  be  removed 
out  of  being.  We  seem  to  discern  intuitively,  that 
there  must,  and  cannot  but  be  somewhat,  external 
to  ourselves,  answering  this  idea,  or  the  archetype 
of  it.  And  from  hence  (for  this  abstract,  as  much 
as  any  other,  implies  a  concrete)  we  conclude,  that 
there  is  and  cannot  but  be,  an  infinite,  and  immense 
Eternal  Being  existing,  prior  to  all  design  contri- 
buting to  his  existence,  and  exclusive  of  it.  And 
from  the  scantinef^  of  language,  a  manner  of  speak- 
ing has  been  introduced  ;  that  necef^ity  is  the  foun- 
dation, the  reason,  the  account  of  the  existence  of 
God.  But  it  is  not  alleged,  nor  can  it  be  at  all  in- 
tended, that  everything  exists  as  it  does,  by  this  kind 


112      Of  the  Opinion  of  Necejsity,      Parti. 

of  neceftity  ;  a  neceftity  antecedent  in  Nature  to  de- 
sign :  it  cannot,  I  say,  be  meant  that  everything  ex- 
ists as  it  does,  by  this  kind  of  necef^ity,  upon  several 
accounts  \  and  particularly  because  it  is  admitted, 
that  design,  in  the  a(?lions  of  men,  contributes  to 
many  alterations  in  Nature.  For  if  any  deny  this, 
I  shall  not  pretend  to  reason  with  them. 

From  these  things  it  follows ;  First,  That  when 
a  fatalist  afterts,  that  everything  is  hy  necejlity,  he 
must  mean,  by  an  agent  a6iing  necejlarity ;  he  must 
I  say  mean  this,  for  I  am  very  sensible,  he  would 
not  choose  to  mean  it :  And  secondly,  That  the  ne- 
ceftity,  by  which  such  an  agent  is  supposed  to  ac^, 
does  not  exclude  intelligence  and  design.  So  that, 
were  the  system  of  fatality  admitted  ;  it  would  just 
as  much  account  for  the  formation  of  the  world,  as 
the  structure  of  an  house,  and  no  more.  Neceftity 
as  much  requires  and  supposes  a  neceftary  agent, 
as  freedom  requires  and  supposes  a  free  agent,  to 
be  the  former  of  the  world.  And  the  appearances 
of  design  and  of  final  causes  in  the  constitution  of 
Nature,  as  really  prove  this  a(5ling  agent,  to  be  an 
intelligent  designer,  or  to  3i6i  from  choice ;  upon 
the  scheme  of  neceftity,  supposed  poftible,  as  upon 
that  of  freedom. 

It  appearing  thus,  that  the  notion  of  necef^ity  does 
not  destroy  the  proof  that  there  is  an  intelligent 
Author  of  nature  and  natural  Governor  of  the  world; 
the  present  question,  which  the  analogy  before  men- 
tioned' suggests,  and  which,  I  think  it  will  answer, 
is  this :  Whether  the  opinion  of  necel^ity,  supposed 
consistent  with  pof^ibility,  with  the  constitution  of 
the  world,  and  the  natural  government  which  we 
experience  exercised  over  it ;  destroys  all  reasonable 

'  p.  109. 


Chap.  6.  Considered  as  influencing  Pra6!ice.  113 

ground  of  belief,  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  Religion: 
or  wliether  that  opinion  be  reconcileable  with  Re- 
ligion ;  with  the  system,  and  the  proof  of  it. 

Suppose  then  a  fatalist  to  educate  any  one,  from 
his  youth  up,  in  his  own  principles ;  that  the  child 
should  reason  upon  them,  and  conclude,  that  since 
he  cannot  pof^ibly  behave  otherwise  than  he  does, 
he  is  not  a  subject  of  blame  or  commendation,  nor 
can  deserve  to  be  rewarded  or  punished :  Imagine 
him  to  eradicate  the  very  perceptions  of  blame  and 
commendation  out  of  his  mind,  by  means  of  this 
system  ;  to  form  his  temper,  and  chara(5ler,  and 
behaviour  to  it ;  and  from  it  to  judge  of  the  treatment 
he  w^as  to  expedl,  say,  from  reasonable  men,  upon 
his  coming  abroad  into  the  world  :  as  the  fatalist 
judges  from  this  system,  what  he  is  to  expe(5l  from 
the  Author  of  nature,  and  with  regard  to  a  future 
state.  I  cannot  forbear  stopping  here  to  ask,  whether 
any  one  of  common  sense  w^ould  think  fit,  that  a 
child  should  be  put  upon  these  speculations,  and 
be  left  to  apply  them  to  practice.  And  a  man  has 
little  pretence  to  reason,  who  is  not  sensible,  that  we 
are  all  children  in  speculations  of  this  kind.  How^- 
ever,  the  child  would  doubtleft  be  highly  delighted 
to  find  himself  freed  from  the  restraints  of  fear  and 
shame,  with  which  his  play-fellows  were  fettered 
and  embarrafsed ;  and  highly  conceited  in  his  su- 
perior know^ledge,  so  far  beyond  his  years.  But 
conceit  and  vanity  would  be  the  least  bad  part  of  the 
influence,  which  these  principles  must  have,  when 
thus  reasoned  and  acted  upon,  during  the  course  of 
his  education.  He  must  either  be  allowed  to  go  on 
and  be  the  plague  of  all  about  him,  and  himself  too, 
even  to  his  own  destru(9:ion :  or  else  correction 
must  be  continually  made  use  of,  to  supply  the  want 
of  those  natural  perceptions  of  blame  and  commen- 
I 


114       Of  the  Opinion  of  Necejsity,     Parti, 

dation,  which  we  have   supposed  to  be  removed  ; 
and  to  give  him   a  pra(5lical  impreftion,  of  what  he 
had  reasoned  himself  out  of  the  belief  of,  that  he 
was  in  fa(5l  an  accountable  child,  and  to  be  punished 
for  doing  what  he  was  forbid.    It  is  therefore  in  re- 
ality impoftible,  but  that  the   correction  which  he 
must  meet  with,  in  the  course  of  his  education,  must 
convince  him,  that  if  the  scheme  he  was  instru6led 
in  were  not  false  ;    yet  that  he  reasoned  inconclu- 
sively upon  it,  and  somehow  or  other  misapplied  it 
to  practice  and  common  life  :   As  what  the  fatalist 
experiences  of  the  condu61:  of  Providence  at  present, 
ought  in  all  reason  to  convince  him,  that  this  scheme 
is  misapplied,  when  applied  to  the  subject  of  ReH- 
gion.^     But  supposing  the  child's  temper  could  re- 
main still  formed  to  the  system,  and  his  expe(5lation 
of  the  treatment  he  was  to  have  in  the  world  be 
regulated  by  it ;  so  as  to  expecft  that  no  reasonable 
man  would  blame  or  punish  him,  for  anything  which 
he  should  do,  because  he  could  not  help  doing  it : 
Upon  this  supposition,  it  is  manifest  he  would,  upon 
his  coming  abroad  into  the  world,  be  insupportable 
to  society,  and  the  treatment  which  he  would  receive 
from  it,  would  render  it  so  to  him  ;   and  he  could  not 
fail  of  doing  somewhat,  very  soon,  for  which  he  would 
be  delivered  over  into  the  hands  of  civil  justice.     And 
thus,  in  the  end,  he  would  be  convinced  of  the  ob- 
ligations he  was  under  to  his  wise  instructor.     Or 
suppose  this  scheme  of  fatality,  in  any  other  way, 
applied  to  pra(5tice,  such  practical  application  of  it, 
will  be  found  equally  absurd ;    equally  fallacious  in 
a  practical  sense  :    For   instance,  that  if  a  man  be 
destined  to   live   such  a  time,  he  shall   live  to  it, 
though  he  take  no  care  of  his  own  preservation ;  or 

2  P.  125. 


Chap.  6.  Considered  as  influencing  Pradice.  115 

if  he  be  destined  to  die  before  that  time,  no  care  can 
prevent  it :  therefore  all  care  about  preserving  one's 
life  is  to  be  negle(5led :  which  is  the  fallacy  instanced 
in  by  the  ancients.  But  now  on  the  contrary,  none 
of  these  pra(5lical  absurdities  can  be  drawn,  from 
reasoning  upon  the  supposition,  that  we  are  free  ; 
but  all  such  reasoning  with  regard  to  the  common 
affairs  of  life,  is  justified  by  experience.  And  there-^ 
fore,  though  it  were  admitted  that  this  opinion  of 
necef^ity  were  speculatively  true  ;  yet,  with  regard 
to  pra(5fi<±,  it  is  as  if  it  were  false,  so  far  as  our  ex- 
perience reaches ;  that  is,  to  the  whole  of  our  pre- 
sent life.  For,  the  constitution  of  the  present  world, 
and  the  condition  in  which  we  are  actually  placed, 
is,  as  if  we  were  free.  And  it  may  perhaps  justly 
be  concluded,  that  since  the  whole  procef^  of  action, 
through  every  step  of  it,  suspense,  deliberation,  in- 
clining one  way,  determining,  and  at  last  doing  as 
we  determine,  is  as  if  we  were  free,  therefore  we 
are  so.  But  the  thing  here  insisted  upon  is,  that 
under  the  present  natural  government  of  the  world, 
we  find  we  are  treated  and  dealt  with,  as  if  we 
were  free,  prior  to  all  consideration  whether  we 
are  or  not.  Were  this  opinion  therefore  of  necef^ity 
admitted  to  be  ever  so  true  ;  yet  such  is  in  facl:  our' 
condition  and  the  natural  course  of  things,  that 
whenever  we  apply  it  to  life  and  pra(9:ice,  this  ap- 
plication of  it,  always  misleads  us,  and  cannot  but 
mislead  us,  in  a  most  dreadful  manner,  with  regard 
to  our  present  interest.  And  how  can  people  think 
themselves  so  very  secure  then,  that  the  same  ap- 
plication of  the  same  opinion  may  not  mislead  them 
also,  in  some  analogous  manner,  with  respe(5t  to  a 
future,  a  more  general  and  more  important  interest? 
For,  Rehgion  being  a  practical  subje(9;;  and  the 
Analogy  of  Nature  shewing  us,  that  we  have  not 


Ii6       Of  the  Opinion  of  Necejsity,     Parti, 

faculties  to  apply  this  opinion,  were  it  a  true  one,  to 
.pracftical  subjects  ;  whenever  we  do  apply  it  to  the 
subject  of  Religion,  and  thence  conclude,  that  we 
are  free  from  its  obligations,  it  is  plain  this  conclusion 
bannot  be  depended  upon.  There  will  still  remain 
just  reason  to  think,  whatever  appearances  are,  that 
we  deceive  ourselves ;  in  somewhat  of  a  like  man- 
ner, as  when  people  fancy  they  can  draw  contra- 
dictory conclusions  from  the  idea  of  infinity. 

From  these  things  together,  the  attentive  reader 
will  see  it  follows,  that  if  upon  supposition  of  freedom 
the  evidence  of  Religion  be  conclusive,  it  remains  so, 
upon  supposition  of  necei^ity ;  because  the  notion  of 
neceftity  is  not  applicable  to  pracflical  subje(5ls  -.i.e. 
with  respe(5l  to  them,  is  as  if  it  were  not  true.  Nor 
does  this  contain  any  refle(9:ion  upon  reason ;  but 
only  upon  what  is  unreasonable.  For  to  pretend  to 
act  upon  reason,  in  opposition  to  pra(?i:ical  principles, 
which  the  Author  of  our  nature  gave  us  to  a6l  upon ; 
and  to  pretend  to  apply  our  reason  to  subjects,  with 
regard  to  which,  our  own  short  views,  and  even  our 
experience,  will  shew  us,  it  cannot  be  depended  upon ; 
and  such,  at  best,  the  subje(?l;  of  necefkity  must  be  ; 
this  is  vanity,  conceit,  and  unreasonableneft. 

But  this  is  not  all.  For  we  find  within  ourselves 
a  will,  and  are  conscious  of  a  chara(51er.  Now  if  this, 
in  us,  be  reconcileable  with  fate,  it  is  reconcileable 
with  it,  in  the  Author  of  nature.  And  besides,  na- 
tural government  and  final  causes,  imply  a  character 
and  a  will  in  the  Governor  and  Designer ;  ^  a  will  con- 
cerning the  creatures  whom  he  governs.  The  Au- 
thor of  nature  then  being  certainly  by  some  cha- 

^  By  iv'dl  and  charaBer  is  meant  that,  which,  in  fpeaking  of 
men,  we  should  exprefs,  not  only  by  these  words,  but  also  by 
the  words,  temper^  taste,  dispositions,  pra6iical principles,  that  ivhole 
frame  ofmind,from'whence  ine  a£i  in  one  manner  rather  than  another. 


Chap,6.  Considered  as  influencing  Practice.  117 

ra(?l;er  or  other,  notwithstanding  neceftity  ;  it  is  evi- 
dent this  nece{^ity  is  as  reconcileable  with  the  parti- 
cular chara(?ter  of  benevolence,  veracity,  and  justice 
in  him,  which  attributes  are  the  foundation  of  Reli- 
gion, as  with  any  other  charac^ter  :  since  we  find  this 
necef^ity  no  more  hinders  men  from  being  benevo- 
lent, than  cruel ;  true,  than  faithleft ;  just,  than  un- 
just ;  or  if  the  fatalist  pleases,  what  we  call  unjust. 
For  it  is  said  indeed,  that  what,  upon  supposition  of 
freedom,  w^ould  be  just  punishment ;  upon  supposi- 
tion of  necefsity,  becomes  manifestly  unjust :  because 
it  is  punishment  inflidled  for  doing  that,  which  per- 
sons could  not  avoid  doing.  As  if  the  necef^ity,  which 
is  supposed  to  destroy  the  injustice  of  murder,  for 
instance,  would  not  also  destroy  the  injustice  of  pun- 
ishing it.  However,  as  little  to  the  purpose  as  this 
objection  is  in  itself,  it  is  very  much  to  the  purpose 
to  observe  from  it,  how  the  notions  of  justice  and  in- 
justice remain,  even  whilst  we  endeavour  to  suppose 
them  removed  ;  how  they  force  themselves  upon  the 
mind,  even  whilst  we  are  making  suppositions  de- 
stru(5tive  of  them:  For  there  is  not,  perhaps,  a  man 
in  the  world,  but  would  be  ready  to  make  this  objec- 
tion at  first  thought. 

But  though  it  is  most  evident,  that  universal  ne- 
ceftity,  if  it  be  reconcileable  with  anything,  is  re- 
concileable with  that  chara(5ler  in  the  Author  of  na- 
ture, which  is  the  foundation  of  Religion  ;  ''  Yet,  does 
"  it  not  plainly  destroy  the  proof,  that  he  is  of  that 
"  charadier,  and  consequently  the  proof  of  Religion?" 
By  no  means.  For  we  find,  that  happineft  and  mi- 
sery are  not  our  fate,  in  any  such  sense  as  not  to  be 
the  consequences  of  our  behaviour  ;  but  that  they  are 
the  consequences  of  it.'*  We  find  God  exercises  the 
same  kind  of  government  over  us,  with  that,  which 

<  Ch.  ii. 


Ii8  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necefsity,    Part  i. 

a  father  exercises  over  his  children,  and  a  civil  ma- 
gistrate over  his  subje^ls.  Now,  whatever  becomes 
of  abstracft  questions  concerning  liberty  and  neceftity, 
it  evidently  appears  to  us,  that  veracity  and  justice 
must  be  the  natural  rule  and  measure  of  exercising 
this  authority  or  government,  to  a  Being,  who  can 
have  no  competitions,  or  interfering  of  interests,  with 
his  creatures  and  his  subje(51:s. 

But  as  the  do6lrine  of  liberty,  though  we  experi- 
ence its  truth,  may  be  perplexed  with  difficulties, 
which  run  up  into  the  most  abstruse  of  all  specula- 
tions ;  and  as  the  opinion  of  necefsity  seems  to  be  the 
very  basis,  upon  which  infidelity  grounds  itself;  it 
may  be  of  some  use  to  offer  a  more  particular  proof 
of  the  obligations  of  Religion,  which  may  distin(9:ly 
be  shewn  not  to  be  destroyed  by  this  opinion. 

The  proof  from  final  causes  of  an  intelligent  Author 
of  nature,  is  not  affec^ted  by  the  opinion  of  necefsity  ; 
supposing  necefsity  a  thing  poftible  in  itself,  and  re- 
concileable  with  the  constitution  of  things.^  And  it 
is  a  matter  of  fa(5l,  independent  on  this  or  any  other 
speculation,  that  he  governs  the  world  by  the  method 
of  rewards  and  punishments  :^  and  also  that  he  hath 
given  us  a  moral  faculty,  by  which  we  distinguish 
between  a(5lions,  and  approve  some  as  virtuous  and 
of  good-desert,  and  disapprove  others  as  vicious  and 
of  ill-desert.'  Now  this  moral  discernment  implies, 
m  the  notion  of  it,  a  rule  of  a(51ion,  and  a  rule  of  a 
very  peculiar  kind ;  for  it  carries  in  it  authority  and 
a  right  of  direction  ;  authority  in  such  a  sense,  as 
that  we  cannot  depart  from  it  without  being  self-con- 
demned.® And  that  the  di<5lates  of  this  moral  faculty, 
which  are  by  nature  a  rule  to  us,  are  moreover  the 
laws  of  God,  laws  in  a  sense  including  san(5lions  ;  may 

5  Pp.  no,  &c.  ^  Ch.  ii.  7  Difsert.  II. 

*  Seim.  2.  at  the  Rolls. 


Chap.6.  Considered  as  influencing  Pradice.  119 

be  thus  proved.  Consciousneft  of  a  rule  or  guide  of 
a(51ion,  in  creatures  who  are  capable  of  considering 
it  as  given  them  by  their  Maker,  not  only  raises  im- 
mediately a  sense  of  duty,  but  also  a  sense  of  secu- 
rity in  following  it,  and  of  danger  in  deviating  from 
it.  A  dire(9;ion  of  the  Author  of  nature,  given  to 
creatures  capable  of  looking  upon  it  as  such,  is  plainly 
a  command  from  him :  and  a  command  from  him 
nece{sarily  includes  in  it,  at  least,  an  implicit  promise 
in  case  of  obedience,  or  threatening  in  case  of  dis- 
obedience. But  then  the  sense  or  perception  of  good 
and  ill  desert,^  which  is  contained  in  the  moral  dis- 
cernment, renders  the  san(9;ion  explicit,  and  makes 
it  appear,  as  one  may  say,  exprefsed.  For  since  his 
method  of  government  is  to  reward  and  punish  ac- 
tions, his  having  annexed  to  some  adlions  an  inse- 
parable sense  of  good  desert,  and  to  others  of  ill,  this 
surely  amounts  to  declaring,  upon  whom  his  pun- 
ishments shall  be  inflicted,  and  his  rewards  be  be- 
stowed. For  he  must  have  given  us  this  discernment 
and  sense  of  things,  as  a  presentiment  of  what  is  to 
be  hereafter  :  that  is,  by  way  of  information  before- 
hand, what  we  are  finally  to  expect  in  his  world. 
There  is  then  most  evident  ground  to  think,  that  the 
government  of  God,  upon  the  whole,  will  be  found  to 
correspond  to  the  nature  which  he  has  given  us :  and 
that  in  the  upshot  and  if^ue  of  things,  happineft  and 
misery  shall,  in  fa6i  and  event,  be  made  to  follow  vir- 
tue and  vice  respe^lively  ;  as  he  has  already,  in  so 
peculiar  a  manner,  aftociated  the  ideas  of  them  in 
our  minds.  And  from  hence  might  easily  be  deduced 
the  obligations  of  religious  worship,  were  it  only  to 
be  considered  as  a  means  of  preserving  upon  our 
minds  a  sense  of  this  moral  government  of  God,  and 

"  Difsert.  II. 


120         Of  the  Opinion  of  Necefsity,    Parti, 

securing  our  obedience  to  it :  which  yet  is  an  ex- 
tremely imperfect  view  of  that  most  important  duty. 
Now  I  say,  no  objec^tion  from  neceftity  can  lie 
against  this  general  proof  of  Religion.  None  against 
the  proposition  reasoned  upon,  that  we  have  such  a 
moral  faculty  and  discernment;  because  this  is  a 
mere  matter  of  facft,  a  thing  of  experience,  that  hu- 
man kind  is  thus  constituted  :  None  against  the  con- 
clusion ;  because  it  is  immediate  and  wholly  from  this 
fa6l.  For  the  conclusion,  that  God  will  finally  reward 
the  righteous  and  punish  the  wicked,  is  not  here 
drawn,  from  its  appearing  to  us  fit,^*^  that  He  should; 
but  from  its  appearing,  that  he  has  told  us,  He  will. 
And  this  he  hath  certainly  told  us,  in  the  promise 
and  threatening,  which  it  hath  been  observed  the 
notion  of  a  command  implies,  and  the  sense  of  good 
and  ill  desert  which  he  has  given  us,  more  distinctly 
expreftes.  And  this  reasoning  from  fa(5l  is  confirmed, 
and  in  some  degree  even  verified,  by  other  fadls  ;  by 
the  natural  tendencies  of  virtue  and  of  vice  ;^^  and 

'"  However,  I  am  far  from  intending  to  deny,  that  the  will  of 
God  is  determined,  by  what  is  fit,  by  the  ri^ht  and  reason  of  the 
case  ;  though  one  chooses  to  decline  matters  of  such  abstract 
speculation,  and  to  speak  with  caution  when  one  does  speak  of 
them.  But  if  it  be  intelligible  to  say,  that  it  is  Jit  and  reasonable 
for  every  one  to  consult  his  o%vn  happinejs^  then,Jitnefs  ofa^ion,  or  the 
right  and  reason  of  the  case,  is  an  intelligible  manner  of  speaking. 
And  it  seems  as  inconceivable,  to  suppose  God  to  approve  one 
course  of  aftion,  or  one  end,  preferably  to  another,  which  yet 
his  adling  at  all  from  design  implies  that  he  does,  without  sup- 
posing somewhat  prior  in  that  end,  to  be  the  ground  of  the  pre- 
ference J  as  to  suppose  him  to  discern  an  abstract  proposition  to 
be  true,  without  supposing  somewhat  prior  in  it,  to  be  the  ground 
of  the  discernment.  It  doth  not  therefore  appear,  that  moral 
right  is  any  more  relative  to  perception,  than  abstrad:  truth  is : 
orthatitisanymore  improper,  to  speak  of  the  firnefsand  rightnefs 
of  anions  and  ends,  as  founded  in  the  nature  of  things,  than  to 
speak  of  abstract  truth,  as  thus  founded. 

»>   P.  60. 


Chap. 6.  Considered  as  influencing  Pra6!ice.  I2i 

by  this,  that  God,  in  the  natural  course  of  his  Pro- 
vidence, punishes  vicious  a(5lions  as  mischievous  to 
society  ;  and  also  vicious  a(5lions  as  such  in  the  stri(?i:- 
est  sense. ^■-  So  that  the  general  proof  of  Religion  is 
unanswerably  real,  even  upon  the  wild  supposition 
which  we  are  arguing  upon. 

It  must  likewise  be  observed  farther,  that  natural 
Religion  hath,  besides  this,  an  £X££i2aaL,!LYidepce  ; 
which  the  doctrine  of  necefsity,  if  it  could  be  true, 
would  not  affe(5l.  For  suppose  a  person,  by  the  ob- 
servations and  reasoning  above,  or  by  any  other,  con- 
vinced of  the  truth  of  Religion  ;  that  there  is  a  God, 
who  made  the  world,  who  is  the  moral  Governor  and 
Judge  of  mankind,  and  will  upon  the  whole  deal  with 
every  one  according  to  his  works :  I  say,  suppose  a 
person  convinced  of  this  by  reason;  but  to  know 
nothing  at  all  of  antiquity,  or  the  present  state  of 
mankind :  it  would  be  natural  for  such  an  one  to  be 
inquisitive,  what  was  the  history  of  this  system  of 
dodfrine  ;  at  what  time,  and  in  what  manner,  it  came 
first  into  the  world  ;  and  whether  it  were  believed  by 
any  considerable  part  of  it.  And  were  he  upon  in- 
quiry to  find,  that  a  particular  person,  in  a  late  age, 
first  of  all  proposed  it,  as  a  deduc^tion  of  reason,  and 
that  mankind  were  before  wholly  ignorant  of  it :  then, 
though  its  evidence  from  reason  would  remain,  there 
would  be  no  additional  probability  of  its  truth,  from 
the  account  of  its  discovery.  But  instead  of  this 
being  the  facl  of  the  case,  on  the  contrary,  he  would 
find,  what  could  not  but  afford  him  a  very  strong 
confirmation  of  its  truth  :  First, That  somewhat  of  this/ 
system,  with  more  or  fewer  additions  and  alterations/ 
hath  been  profefted  in  all  ages  and  countries,  of 
which  we  have  any  certain  information  relating  tp 

'2  Pp.  51,  Sec. 


\ 


122         Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity,    Part  i. 

this  matter.  Secondly,  That  it  is  certain  historical 
fac^,  so  far  as  we  can  trace  things  up,  that  this  whole 
system  of  belief,  that  there  is  one  God,  the  Creator 
and  moral  Governor  of  the  world,  and  that  mankind 
is  in  a  state  of  Religion,  was  received  in  the  first  ages. 
And  thirdly,  That  as  there  is  no  hint  or  intimation  in 
history,  that  this  system  was  first  reasoned  out ;  so 
there  is  no  expref^  historical  or  traditional  evidence, 
as  ancient  as  history,  that  it  was  taught  first  by  Re- 
velation. Now  these  things  must  be  allowed  to  be 
of  great  weight.  The  first  of  them,  general  consent, 
shews  the  system  to  be  conformable  to  the  common 
sense  of  mankind.  The  second,  namely,  that  Reli- 
gion was  believed  in  the  first  ages  of  the  world,  es- 
pecially as  it  does  not  appear  that  there  were  then 
any  superstitious  or  false  additions  to  it,  cannot  but 
be  a  farther  confirmation  of  its  truth.  For  it  is  a 
proof  of  this  alternative :  either  that  it  came  into  the 
world  by  Revelation  ;  or  that  it  is  natural,  obvious, 
and  forces  itself  upon  the  mind.  The  former  of  these 
is  the  conclusion  of  learned  men.  And  whoever  will 
consider,  how  unapt  for  speculation  rude  and  uncul- 
tivated minds  are,  will,  perhaps  from  hence  alone,  be 
strongly  inclined  to  believe  it  the  truth.  And  as  it 
is  shewn  in  the  second  part^^  of  this  treatise,  that 
there  is  nothing  of  such  peculiar  presumption  against 
a  Revelation  in  the  beginning  of  the  world,  as  there 
is  supposed  to  be  against  subsequent  ones  :  a  sceptic 
could  not,  I  think,  give  any  account,  which  would 
appear  more  probable  even  to  himself,  of  the  early 
pretences  to  Revelation ;  than  by  supposing  some 
real  original  one,  from  whence  they  were  copied. 
And  the  third  thing  abovementioned,  that  there  is 
exprei^  historical  or  traditional  evidence  as  ancient 

13  Chap.  ii. 


Chap.  6.  Considered  as  influencing  Pradice.  123 

as  history,  of  the  system  of  Religion  being  taught 
mankind  by  Revelation  ;  this  must  be  admitted  as 
some  degree  of  real  proof,  that  it  was  so  taught. 
For  why  should  not  the  most  ancient  tradition  be 
admitted,  as  some  additional  proof  of  a  faSi,  against 
which  there  is  no  presumption  ?  And  this  proof  is 
mentioned  here,  because  it  has  its  weight  to  shev/, 
that  Religion  came  into  the  world  by  Revelation,  prior 
to  all  consideration  of  the  proper  authority  of  any 
book  supposed  to  contain  it :  and  even  prior  to  all 
consideration,  whether  the  Revelation  itself  be  un- 
corruptly  handed  down  and  related,  or  mixed  and 
darkened  with  fables.  Thus  the  historical  account, 
which  we  have,  of  the  origin  of  Religion,  taking  in 
all  circumstances,  is  a  real  confirmation  of  its  truth, 
no  way  affecfted  by  the  opinion  of  necef^ity.  And 
the  external  evidence,  even  of  natural  Religion,  is  by 
no  means  inconsiderable. 

But  it  is  carefully  to  be  observed,  and  ought  to  be 
recollected  after  all  proofs  of  virtue  and  Religion, 
which  are  only  general ;  that  as  speculative  reason 
may  be  negle6led,  prejudiced,  and  deceived  :  so  also 
may  our  moral  understanding  be  impaired  and  per- 
verted, and  the  dictates  of  it  not  impartially  attended 
to.  This  indeed  proves  nothing  against  the  reality 
of  our  speculative  or  pra^lical  faculties  of  perception ; 
against  their  being  intended  by  Nature,  to  inform  us 
in  the  theory  of  things,  and  instruct  us  how  we  are 
to  behave,  and  what  we  are  to  expec^t  in  consequence 
of  our  behaviour.  Yet  our  liableneft,  in  the  degree 
we  are  liable,  to  prejudice  and  perversion,  is  a  most 
serious  admonition  to  us  to  be  upon  our  guard,  with 
respe6l  to  what  is  of  such  consequence,  as  our  de- 
terminations concerning  virtue  and  Religion:  And  par- 
ticularly not  to  take  custom,  and  fashion,  and  slight 
notions  of  honour,  or  imaginations  of  present  ease, 


124        Of  the  Opinion  of  Necefsity,     Parti, 

use  and  convenience  to  mankind,  for  the  only  moral 
rule.i* 

The  foregoing  observations,  drawn  from  the  na- 
ture of  the  thing,  and  the  history  of  Religion,  amount, 
when  taken  together,  to  a  real  prac^hcal  proof  of  it, 
not  to  be  confuted  :  Such  a  proof  as,  considering  the 
infinite  importance  of  the  thing,  I  apprehend,  would 
be  admitted  fully  sufficient,  in  reason,  to  influence 
the  actions  of  men,  who  a(5l  upon  thought  and  re- 
fle(51ion ;  if  it  were  admitted,  that  there  is  no  proof 
of  the  contrary.  But  it  may  be  said  :  "  There  are 
"  many  probabilities,  which  cannot  indeed  be  con- 
"  futed,  i.  e.  shewn  to  be  no  probabilities,  and  yet  may 
"  be  overbalanced,  by  greater  probabilities  on  the 
"  other  side  ;  much  more  by  demonstration.  And 
"  there  is  no  occasion  to  obje^l  against  particular  ar- 
*'  guments  alleged  for  an  opinion,  when  the  opinion 
"  itself  may  be  clearly  shewn  to  be  false,  without 
"  meddling  with  such  arguments  at  all,  but  leaving 
*' them  just  as  they  are.^^  Now  the  method  of  go- 
"  vernment  by  rewards  and  punishments,  and  espe- 
''  cially  rewarding  and  punishing  good  and  ill  desert 
''  as  such  respe^lively,  must  go  upon  supposition, 
"  that  we  are  free  and  not  neceftary  agents.  And  it 
''  is  incredible,  that  the  Author  of  nature  should 
'^  govern  us  upon  a  supposition  as  true,  which  he 
'*  knows  to  be  false :  and  therefore  absurd  to  think, 
"  he  will  reward  or  punish  us  for  our  actions  here- 
"  after,  especially  that  he  will  do  it  under  the  notion, 
"  that  they  are  of  good  or  ill  desert."  Here  then 
the  matter  is  brought  to  a  point.  And  the  answer 
to  all  this  is  full,  and  not  to  be  evaded :  that  the  whole 
constitution  and  course  of  things,  the  whole  Analogy 
of  Providence,  shews  beyond  pol^ibility  of  doubt,  that 

»4  Difsert.  II.  '5  Pp.  I,  9. 


Chap.  6.  Considered  as  influencing  Pradice.  125 

the  conclusion  from  this  reasoning  is  false  ;  wherever 
the  fallacy  lies.  The  doctrine  of  freedom  indeed 
clearly  shews  where  :  in  supposing  ourselves  neces- 
sary, when  in  truth  we  are  free  agents.  But  upon 
the  supposition  of  necef^ity,  the  fallacy  lies  in  taking 
for  granted,  that  it  is  incredible  necef^ary  agents 
should  be  rewarded  and  punished.  But  that,  some- 
how or  other,  the  conclusion  now  mentioned  is  false, 
is  most  certain.  For  it  is  fa6i,  that  God  does  go- 1 
vern  even  brute  creatures  by  the  method  of  rewards 
and  punishments,  in  the  natural  course  of  things.  I 
And  men  are  rewarded  and  punished  for  their  aclions, 
punished  for  actions  mischievous  to  society  as  being 
so,  punished  for  vicious  actions  as  such  ;  by  the  na- 
tural instrumentality  of  each  other,  under  the  present 
condu(5l  of  Providence.  Nay  even  the  affe(5tion  of 
gratitude,  and  the  pafsion  of  resentment,  and  the  re- 
wards and  punishments  following  from  them,  which 
in  general  are  to  be  considered  as  natural,  i.e.  from 
the  Author  of  nature ;  these  rewards  and  punish- 
ments, beingnaturally^^  annexed  to  a(5lions  considered 
as  implying  good  intention  and  good  desert,  ill  in- 
tention and  ill  desert ;  these  natural  rewards  and 
punishments,  I  say,  are  as  much  a  contradiction  to 
the  conclusion  above,  and  shew  its  falsehood,  as  a 
more  exaSi  and  complete  rewarding  and  punishing 
of  good  and  ill  desert  as  such.  So  that  if  it  be  in- 
credible, that  necefsary  agents  should  be  thus  re- 
warded and  punished ;  then,  men  are  not  neceftary 
but  free  :  since  it  is  matter  of  fa6i,  that  they  are  thus 
rewarded  and  punished.  But  if,  on  the  contrary, 
which  is  the  supposition  we  have  been  arguing  upon, 
it  be  insisted,  that  men  are  necei^ary  agents  ;  then, 
there  is  nothing  incredible  in  the  farther  supposition 

'6  Serm.  8th,  at  the  Rolls. 


126  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necefsity,  &c.  Part  i. 

of  neceftary  agents  being-  thus  rewarded  and  pun- 
ished :   since  we  ourselves  are  thus  dealt  with. 

From  the  whole  therefore  it  must  follow,  that  a 
necefsity  supposed  poftible,  and  reconcileable  with 
the  constitution  of  things,  does  in  no  sort  prove  that 
the  Author  of  nature  will  not,  nor  destroy  the  proof 
that  he  will,  finally  and  upon  the  whole,  in  his  eternal 
government,  render  his  creatures  happy  or  miserable, 
by  some  means  or  other,  as  they  behave  well  or  ill. 
Or,  to  expreft  this  conclusion  in  words  conformable 
to  the  title  of  the  chapter,  the  Analogy  of  Nature 
shews  us,  that  the  opinion  of  necefsity,  considered  as 
pra^lical,  is  false.  And  if  neceftity,  upon  the  sup- 
position abovementioned,  doth  not  destroy  the  proof 
of  natural  Religion,  it  evidently  makes  no  alteration 
in  the  proof  of  revealed. 

From  these  things  likewise  we  may  learn,  in  what 
sense  to  understand  that  general  aftertion,  that  the 
opinion  of  necefsity  is  eftentially  destru6live  of  all 
Religion.  First  in  a  pra(9:ical  sense  ;  that  by  this  no- 
tion, atheistical  men  pretend  to  satisfy  and  encourage , 
themselves  in  vice,  and  justify  to  others  their  disre- 
gard to  all  Religion.  And  secondly,  in  the  stri(51est 
sense  ;  that  it  is  a  contradiction  to  the  whole  consti- 
tution of  Nature,  and  to  what  we  may  every  moment 
experience  in  ourselves,  and  so  overturns  everything. 
But  by  no  means  is  this  a{^ertion  to  be  understood, 
as  if  necefsity,  supposing  it  could  pofsibly  be  recon- 
ciled with  the  constitution  of  things  and  with  what 
we  experience,  were  not  also  reconcileable  with  Re- 
ligion :  for  upon  this  supposition,  it  demonstrably  is 
so. 


Chap.  7.  Of  the  Government  of  God,  &c.    127 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Of  the  Government  of  God,  considered  as  a  Scheme 
or  Constitution,  imperfe6ily  comprehended. 


HOUGH  it  be,  as  it  cannot  but  be,  ac- 
knowledged, that  the  Analogy  of  Na- 
ture gives  a  strong  credibility  to  the 
general  do(5lrine  of  Religion,  and  to 
the  several  particular  things  contained 
in  it,  considered  as  so  many  matters  of  fa6l ;  and 
likev^ase  that  it  shews  this  credibility  not  to  be  de- 
stroyed by  any  notions  of  necefsity  :  yet  still,  objec- 
tions may  be  insisted  upon,  against  the  wisdom, 
equity  and  goodneft  of  the  Divine  government  im- 
plied in  the  notion  of  Religion,  and  against  the  method 
by  which  this  government  is  conducted ;  to  which 
obje(5lions  Analogy  can  be  no  dire6l  answer.  For  the 
credibility,  or  the  certain  truth,  of  a  matter  of  facl, 
does  not  immediately  prove  anything  concerning  the 
wisdom  or  goodnefl  of  it :  and  Analogy  can  do  no 
more,  immediately  or  dire611y,  than  shew  such  and 
such  things  to  be  true  or  credible,  considered  only 
as  matters  of  fa6l.  But  still,  if,  upon  supposition  of 
a  moral  constitution  of  Nature  and  a  moral  govern- 
ment over  it.  Analogy  suggests  and  makes  it  credible, 
that  this  government  must  be  a  scheme,  system,  or 
constitution  of  government,  as  distinguished  from  a 
number  of  single  unconne(?l:ed  acts  of  distributive  jus- 
tice and  goodnefs ;  and  likewise,  that  it  must  be  a 
scheme,  so  imperfec'lly  comprehended,  and  of  such  a 
sort  in  other  respects,  as  to  afford  a  dire(?t  general 
answer  to  all  objections  against  the  justice  and  good- 


128  The  Government  of  God,      Part  i. 

neft  of  it :  then  Analogy  is,  remotely,  of  great  service 
in  answering  those  obje^lions ;  both  by  suggesting 
the  answer,  and  shewing  it  to  be  a  credible  one. 
Now  this,  upon  inquiry,  will  be  found  to  be  the 
-^-^  case.  For,^r5^,  upon  supposition  that  God  exercises 
a  moral  government  over  the  world,  the  Analogy  of 
his  natural  government  suggests  and  makes  it  cre- 
dible, that  his  moral  government  must  be  a  scheme, 
quite  beyond  our  comprehension  :Nand  this  affords 
a  general  answer  to  all  objections  against  the  justice 
and  goodneft  of  it.  And,  secondly,  a  more  distin(5l 
observation  of  some  particular  things  contained  in 
God's  scheme  of  natural  government,  the  like  things 
being  supposed,  by  Analogy,  to  be  contained  in  his 
moral  government,  will  farther  shew,  how  little  weight 
is  to  be  laid  upon  these  obje(9:ions. 

I.  Upon  supposition  that  God  exercises  a  moral 
government  over  the  world,  the  Analogy  of  his  na- 
tural government  suggests  and  makes  it  credible, 
that  his  moral  government  must  be  a  scheme,  quite 
beyond  our  comprehension :  And  this  affords  a  ge- 
neral answer  to  all  obje(?l:ions  against  the  justice  and 
goodnef^  of  it.  Itjsjnost  obvious^Analogy  renders 
it  highly  credible,  that  upon  supposition  of  a  moral 
government,  it  must  be  a  scheme  ;  for  the  world  and 
the  whole  natural  government  of  it,  appears  to  be  so : 
to  be  a  scheme,  system  or  constitution,  whose  parts 
correspond  to  each  other,  and  to  a  whole  ;  as  really 
as  any  work  of  art,  or  as  any  particular  model  of  a 
civil  constitution  and  government.  In  this  great 
scheme  of  the  natural  world,  individuals-have  various 
peculiar  relationsjto  other  individuals  of  their  ov/n 
species.  And  whole  species  are,  we  find,  variously 
related  to  other  species,  upon  this  earth.  Nor  do 
we  know,  how  much  farther  these  kinds  of  relations 
may  extend.     And,  as  there  is  not  any  acftion  or  na- 


Chap.  7.    A  Scheme  Incomprehensible.         129 

tural  event,  which  we  are  acquainted  with,  so  single 
and  unconnected,  as  not  to  have  a  respec^t  to  some 
other  a(9:ions  and  events  :  so  pofsibly  each  of  them, 
when  it  has  not  an  immediate,  may  yet  have  a  re- 
mote, natural  relation  to  other  actions  and^  events, 
much  beyond  the  compaf^  of  this  present  world. 
There  seems  indeed  nothing,  from  whence  we  can 
so  much  as  make  a  conjecture,  whether  all  creatures, 
a(5lions  and  events,  throughout  the  whole  of  Nature, 
have  relations  to  each  other.  But,  as  it  is  obvious, 
that  all  events  have  future  unknown  consequences ; 
so,  if  we  trace  any,  as  far  as  we  can  go,  into  what  is 
connected  with  it ;  we  shall  find,  that  if  such  event 
were  not  connected  with  somewhat  farther  in  Nature 
unknown  to  us,  somewhat  both  past  and  present,  such 
event  could  not  pofsibly  have  been  at  all.  Nor  can 
we  give  the  whole  account  of  any  one  thing  what- 
ever :  of  all  its  causes,  ends,  and  necefsary  adjun(5ls ; 
those  adjuncts,  I  mean,  without  which  it  could  not 
have  been.  By  this  most  astonishing  connexion, 
these  reciprocal  correspondencies  and  mutual  rela- 
tions, everything  which  we  see  in  the  course  of  Na- 
ture, is  a(5tually  brought  about.  And  things  seem- 
ingly the  most  insignificant  imaginable,  are  perpe- 
tually observed  to  be  neceftary  conditions  to  other 
things  of  the  greatest  importance  :  so  that  any  one 
thing  whatever  may,  for  aught  we  know  to  the  con- 
trary, be  a  neceftary  condition  to  any  other.  The 
natural  world  then,  ancLjaatural  government  ^  it,, 
being  such  an  incomprehensible  scheme  ;so_mcom- 
prehensible,  that  a  man  must,  really  in  the  literal 
sense,  knov/  nothing  at  all,  who  is  not  sensible  of  his 
ignorance  in  it:  this  immediately  suggests^^nd 
strongly  shews  the  credibility,  that  tHe^nioral  world 
and  government  of  it  may  be  so  too^  Indeed  the 
natural  and  moral  constitution  and  government  of  the 

K 


130  The  Government  of  God,      Part  i. 

world  are  so  conne(9:ed,  as  to  make  up  together  but 
ofiF  scheme  :.and  it  is  hig^hly  probable^hat  the  first 
is  formed  and  carried-on  merely  in  subserviency^^to 
the  latter ;  ks  the  vegetable  world  is  for  the  animal, 
and  organized~Bodies  for  minds.  ■  But  the  thing  in- 
tended here,  is,  without  inquiring  how  far  the  admi- 
nistration of  the  natural  world  is  subordinate  to  that 
of  the  moral,  only  to  observe  the  credibility,  that  one 
should  be  analo^;ous_pr^milar  to  the  other :  that 
therefore  every  aiR  of  Divine  justice  and  goodnef^, 
may  be  supposed  to  look  much  beyond  itself,  and  its 
immediate  obje(5l ;  may  have  some  reference  to  other 
parts  of  God's  moral_axiministm^^^  and  to  a  general 
moral  plan  :  and  that  every  circumstance  of  this  his 
moral  government,  may  be  adjusted  beforehand  with 
a  view  to  the  whole  of  it.  Thus  for  example  :  the 
determined  lengthoftime,  and  the  degrees  and  ways, 
in  which^virtue  is  to  remain  in  a  state  of  warfare  and 
discipline,  and  in  vvTiich  wickedneft  is  permitted  to 
have  its  progreft ;  the  times  appointed  for  the  exe- 
cution of  justice;  the  appointed  instruments  of  it ; 
the  kinds  of  rewards  and  punishments,  and  the  man- 
ners of  their  distribution  ;  all  particular  instances  of 
Divine  justice  and  goodneft,  and  every  circumstance 
of  them,  may  have  such  respects  to  each  other,  as 
to  make  up  altogether  a  whole,  connected  and  re- 
lated in  all  its  parts :  a  scheme  or  system,  which  is 
as  properly  one  as  the  natural  world  is,  and  of  the 
like  kind.  And  supposing  this  to  be  the  case  ;  it  is 
most  evident,  that  we  are  not  competent  judges  of 
this  scheme,  from  the  small  parts  of  it,  which  come 
within  our  view  in  the  present  life  :  and  therefore  no 
objections  against  any  of  these  parts,  can  be  insisted 
upon  by  reasonable  men. 

This  our  ignorance,  and  the  consequence  here 
drawn  from  it,  are  universally  acknowledged,  upon 


Chap.  7.    A  Scheme  Incomprehensible.         131 

other  occasions  ;  and,  though  scarce  denied,  yet  are 
universally  forgot_,  when  jiersons.come^to  argue 
against  Religion.  And  it  is  not  perhaps  easy,  even 
for  the  most  reasonable  men,  always  to  bear  in  mind 
the  degree  of  our  i^orance,  and  make  due  allow- 
ances for  it.  Upon  tEese~accouhts,  it  may  not  be 
uselei^  to  go  on  a  little  farther,  in  order  to  shew  more 
distin6lly,  how  just  an  answer  our  ignorance  is,  to  ia...,.., 
objections  against  the  scheme  of  Providence..  Sup- 
pose  then  a  person  boldly  to  af^ert,  that  the  things 
complained  of,  the  origin  and  continuance  of  evil, 
might  easily  have  been  prevented  by  repeated  inter- 
positions;^ interpositions  so  guarded  and  circum-  <^  -— ^- 
stanced,  as  would  preclude  all  mischief  arising  from 
them :  Or,  if  this  were  impracticable,  that  a  scheme 
of  government  is  itself  an  imperfection ;  since  more 
good  might  have  been  produced,  without  any  scheme, 
system,  or  constitution  at  all,  by  continued  single  — 
unrelated  aCtsof  distributive  justice  and  goodnei^  ;j 
because  these  v^ould  have  occasioned  no  irregula- 
rities. And  farther  than  this,  it  is  presumed,  the 
obje(5tions  will  not  be  carried.  Yet  the  answer  is 
obvious  :  that  were  these  aftertions  true,  still  the  ob- 
servations above,  concerning  our  ignorance  in  the 
scheme  of  Divine  government,  and  the  consequence 
drawn  from  it,  would  hold,  in  great  measure  ;  enough 
to  vindicate  Religion,  against  all  objections  from  the 
disorders  of  the  present  state.  Were  these  af^er- 
tions  true,  yet  the  government  of  the  world  might 
be  just  and  good  notwithstanding ;  for,  at  the  most, 
they_vvould^mfej^nothir^  more  than  that  it  rnight 
have  been  better.  But  indeei3~they  are  mere  arbi- 
trary ai^ertions  :  no  man  being  sufficiently  acquainted 
with  the  poftibilities  of  things,  to  bring  any  proof  of 

'  Pp.  i35>  136. 


132  The  Government  of  God,      Parti. 

them,  to  the  lowest  degree  of  probability^  For  how- 
ever pof|ible  what  is  a{^erted  may  seem ;  yet  many 
instanceTmay  be  alleged,  in  things  much  lef^  out  of 
our  reach,  of  suppositions  absolutely  impoftible,  and 
reducible  to  the  most  palpable  self-contradicftions, 
which,  not  every  one  by  any  means  would  perceive 
to  be  such,  nor  perhaps  any  one  at  first  sight  suspedt. 
From  these  things,  it  is  easy  to  see  distin(5lly,  how 
our  ignorance,  as  it  is  the  common,  is  really  a  satis- 
factory answer  to  all  objedlions  against  the  justice 
and  goodneft  of  Providence.  If  a  man  contemplat- 
ing any  one  providential  dispensation,  which  had  no 
relation  to  any  others,  should  object;,  that  he  dis- 
cerned in  it  a  disregard  to  justice,  or  a  deficiency  of 
goodneft ;  Nothing  would  be  lef^  an  answer  to  such 
obje(9;ion,  than  our  ignorance  in  other  parts  of  Pro- 
vidence, or  in  the  poftibilities  of  things,  no  way  re- 
lated to  what  he  was  contemplating.  But  when  we 
know  not,  but  the  parts  objecfled  against  may  be 
relative  to  other  parts  unknown  to  us  ;  and  when  we 
are  unacquainted  with  what  is,  in  the  nature  of  the 
thing,  pra(5licable  in  the  case  before  us ;  then  our 
ignorance  is  a  satisfactory  answer :  Because,  some 
unknown  relation,  or  some  unknown  impof^ibility, 
may  render  what  is  objected  against,  just  and  good; 
nay  good  in  the  highest  prac^ticable  degree. 

II.  And  how  little  weight  is  to  be  laid  upon  such 
obje(9;ions,  will  farther  appear,  by  a  more  distin^l 
observation  of  some  particular  things  contained  in 
the  natural  government  of  God,  the  like  to  which 
may  be  supposed,  from  Analogy,  to  be  contained  in 
his  moral  government. 

First,  As  in  the  scheme  of  the  natural  world,  no 
ends  appear  to  be  accomplished  without  means :  so 
we  find  that  means  very  undesirable,  often  conduce 
to  bring  about  ends  in  such  a  measure  desirable,  as 


Chap.  7.    A  Scheme  Incomprehensible.        133 

greatly  to  overbalance  the  disagreeableneft  of  the 
means.  And  in  cases  where  such  means  are  con- 
ducive to  such  ends,  it  is  not  reason,  but  experience, 
which  shews  us,  that  they  are  thus  conducive.  Ex- 
perience also  shews  many  means  to  be  conducive 
and  neceftary  to  accomplish  ends,  which  means, 
before  experience,  we  should  have  thought,  would 
have  had  even  a  contrary  tendency.  Now  from  these 
observations  relating  to  the  natural  scheme  of  the 
world,  the  moral  being  supposed  analogous  to  it, 
arises  a  great  credibility,  that  the  putting  our  misery 
in  each  other's  power  to  the  degree  it  is,  and  making 
men  liable  to  vice  to  the  degree  we  are  ;  and  in 
general,  that  those  things,  which  are  objected  against 
the  moral  scheme  of  Providence,  may  be,  upon  the 
whole,  friendly  and  aftistant  to  virtue,  and  produc- 
tive of  an  over-balance  of  happineft  :  i.  e.  the  things 
objected  against,  may  be  means,  by  which  an  over- 
balance of  good  will,  in  the  end,  be  found  produced. 
And  from  the  same  observations,  it  appears  to  be  no 
presumption  against  this,  that  we  do  not,  if  indeed 
we  do  not,  see  those  means  to  have  any  such  ten- 
dency ;  or  that  they  seem  to  us  to  have  a  contrary 
one.  Thus  those  things,  which  we  call  irregularities, 
may  not  be  so  at  all :  because  they  may  be  means 
of  accomplishing  wise  and  good  ends  more  consider- 
able. And  it  may  be  added,  as  above,^  that  they 
may  also  be  the  only  means,  by  which  these  wise  and 
good  ends  are  capable  of  being  accomplished. 

After  these  observations  it  may  be  proper  to  add, 
in  order  to  obviate  an  absurd  and  wicked  conclusion 
from  any  of  them,  that  though  the  constitution  of  our 
nature  from  whence  we  are  capable  of  vice  and  mi- 
sery, may,  as  it  undoubtedly  does,  contribute  to  the 

2  P.  132. 


134  The  Government  of  God,      Part  i. 

perfecftion  and  happinef^  of  the  world ;  and  though 
the  actual  permiision  of  evil  may  be  beneficial  to  it : 
(i.  e.  it  would  have  been  more  mischievous,  not  that 
a  wicked  person  had  himself  abstained  fi"om  his  own 
wickednefk,  but  that  any  one  had  forcibly  prevented 
it,  than  that  it  was  permitted  :)  Yet  notwithstanding, 
it  might  have  been  much  better  for  the  world,  if  this 
very  evil  had  never  been  done.  Nay,  it  is  most 
clearly  conceivable,  that  the  very  commiftion  of 
wickedneft  may  be  beneficial  to  the  world,  and  yet, 
that  it  would  be  infinitely  more  beneficial  for  men  to 
refrain  from  it.  For  thus,  in  the  wise  and  good  con- 
stitution of  the  natural  world,  there  are  disorders 
which  bring  their  own  cures ;  diseases,  which  are 
themselves  remedies.  Many  a  man  would  have  died, 
had  it  not  been  for  the  gout  or  a  fever ;  yet  it  would 
be  thought  madneft  to  afkert,  that  sicknef^  is  a  better 
or  more  perfe(5l  state  than  health  ;  though  the  like, 
with  regard  to  the  moral  world,  has  been  averted. 
But, 

Secondly,  The  natural  government  of  the  world  is 
carried  on  by  general  laws.  For  this  there  may  be 
wise  and  good  reasons :  the  wisest  and  best,  for  aught 
we  know  to  the  contrary.  And  that  there  are  such 
reasons,  is  suggested  to  our  thoughts,  by  the  Ana- 
logy of  Nature  ;  by  our  being  made  to  experience 
good  ends  to  be  accomplished,  as  indeed  all  the  good 
which  we  enjoy  is  accomplished,  by  this  means,  that 
the  laws,  by  which  the  world  is  governed,  are  ge- 
neral. For  we  have  scarce  any  kind  of  enjoyments, 
but  what  we  are,  in  some  way  or  other,  instrumental 
in  procuring  ourselves,  by  acting  in  a  manner  which 
we  foresee  likely  to  procure  them  :  Now  this  fore- 
sight could  not  be  at  all,  were  not  the  government 
of  the  world  carried  on  by  general  laws.  And  though, 
for  aught  we  know  to  the  contrary,  every  single  case 


Chap.  7.    A  Scheme  Incomprehensible.        135 

may  be,  at  length,  found  to  have  been  provided  for 
even  by  these :  yet  to  prevent  all  irregularities,  or 
remedy  them  as  they  arise,  by  the  wisest  and  best 
general  laws,  may  be  impofsible  in  the  nature  of 
things ;  as  we  see  it  is  absolutely  impofsible  in  civil 
government.  But  then  we  are  ready  to  think,  that, 
the  constitution  of  Nature  remaining  as  it  is,  and  the 
course  of  things  being  permitted  to  go  on,  in  other 
respecfts,  as  it  does,  there  might  be  interpositions  to 
prevent  irregularities ;  though  they  could  not  have 
been  prevented  or  remedied  by  any  general  laws. 
And  there  would  indeed  be  reason  to  wish,  which, 
by  the  way,  is  very  different  from  a  right  to  claim, 
that  all  irregularities  were  prevented  or  remedied  by 
present  interpositions,  if  these  interpositions  would 
have  no  other  effe(5f;  than  this.  But  it  is  plain  they 
would  have  some  visible  and  immediate  bad  effec^ts  : 
for  instance,  they  would  encourage  idlenefs  and  neg- 
ligence ;  and  they  would  render  doubtful  the  na- 
tural rule  of  life,  which  is  ascertained  by  this  very 
thing,  that  the  course  of  the  world  is  carried  on  by 
general  laws.  And  farther,  it  is  certain  they  would 
have  distant  effe(5ls,  and  very  great  ones  too  ;  by 
means ofthe  wonderful  connedlions  before  mentioned.^ 
So  that  we  cannot  so  much  as  guefk,  what  would  be 
the  whole  result  of  the  interpositions  desired.  It 
may  be  said,  any  bad  result  might  be  prevented  by 
farther  interpositions,  whenever  there  was  occasion 
for  them  :  But  this  again  is  talking  quite  at  random, 
and  in  the  dark.^  Upon  the  whole  then,  we  see  wise 
reasons,  why  the  course  of  the  world  should  be 
carried  on  by  general  laws,  and  good  ends  accom- 
plished by  this  means:  And,  for  aught  we  know, 
there  may  be  the  wisest  reasons  for  it,  and  the  best 

^  Pp.  128,  Scz.  •»  Pp.  131,  132. 


136  The  Government  of  God,      Pari  1. 

ends  accomplished  by  it.  We  have  no  ground  to 
believe,  that  all  irregularities  could  be  remedied  as 
they  arise,  or  could  have  been  precluded,  by  general 
laws.  We  find  that  interpositions  would  produce 
evil,  and  prevent  good :  And,  for  aught  we  know, 
they  would  produce  greater  evil  than  they  would 
prevent ;  and  prevent  greater  good  than  they  would 
produce.  And  if  this  be  the  case,  then  the  not  in- 
terposing is  so  far  from  being  a  ground  of  complaint, 
that  it  is  an  instance  of  goodnei^.  This  is  intelligible 
and  sufficient :  and  going  farther,  seems  beyond  the 
utmost  reach  of  our  faculties. 

But  it  may  be  said,  that  "  after  all,  these  supposed 
"  impof^ibilities  and  relations  are  what  we  are  unac- 
"  quainted  with  ;  and  we  must  judge  of  Religion,  as 
*'  of  other  things,  by  what  we  do  know,  and  look 
"  upon  the  rest  as  nothing :  Or  however,  that  the 
"  answers  here  given  to  what  is  objecfled  against  Re- 
"  ligion,  may  equally  be  made  use  of  to  invalidate 
"  the  proof  of  it ;  since  their  streft  lies  so  very  much 
*'  upon  our  ignorance."     But, 

Firsty  Though  total  ignorance  in  any  matter,  does 
indeed  equally  destroy,  or  rather  preclude,  all  proof 
concerning  it,  and  obje(9;ions  against  it :  yet  partial 
ignorance  does  not.  For  we  may  in  any  degree,  be 
convinced,  that  a  person  is  of  such  a  character,  and 
consequently  will  pursue  such  ends  ;  though  we  are 
greatly  ignorant,  what  is  the  proper  way  of  a(9:ing, 
in  order,  the  most  effe(51:ually,  to  obtain  those  ends : 
And  in  this  case,  objedlions  against  his  manner  of 
a6ling,  as  seemingly  not  conducive  to  obtain  them, 
might  be  answered  by  our  ignorance ;  though  the 
proof  that  such  ends  were  intended,  might  not  at  all 
be  invalidated  by  it.  Thus,  the  proof  of  Religion  is 
a  proof  of  the  moral  character  of  God,  and  conse- 
quently that  his  government  is  moral,  and  that  every 


Chap.  7.    A  Scheme  Incomprehensible.        137 

one  upon  the  whole  shall  receive  according  to  his 
deserts  ;  a  proof  that  this  is  the  designed  end  of  his 
government.  But  we  are  not  competent  judges, 
what  is  the  proper  way  of  a(5ling,  in  order  the  most 
effectually  to  accomplish  this  end.^  Therefore  our 
ignorance  is  an  answer  to  objecftions  against  the  con- 
du6l  of  Providence,  in  permitting  irregularities,  as 
seeming  contradictory  to  this  end.  Now,  since  it  is 
so  obvious,  that  our  ignorance  may  be  a  satisfa(5lory 
answer  to  objections  against  a  thing,  and  yet  not 
affeCl  the  proof  of  it ;  till  it  can  be  shewn,  it  is  fri- 
volous to  aftert,  that  our  ignorance  invalidates  the 
proof  of  Religion,  as  it  does  the  objections  against  it. 
Secondly,  Suppose  unknown  impoftibilities,  and 
unknown  relations,  might  justly  be  urged  to  invali- 
date the  proof  of  Religion,  as  well  as  to  answer  ob- 
jections against  it:  And  that  in  consequence  of  this, 
the  proof  of  it  were  doubtful.  Yet  still,  let  the  as- 
sertion be  despised,  or  let  it  be  ridiculed,  it  is  unde- 
niably true,  that  moral  obligations  would  remain 
certain,  though  it  were  not  certain  what  would,  upon 
the  whole,  be  the  consequences  of  observing  or  vio- 
lating them.  For,  these  obligations  arise  immedi- 
ately and  neceftarily  from  the  judgment  of  our  own 
mind,  unleft  perverted,  which  we  cannot  violate  with- 
out being  self-condemned.  And  they  would  be  cer- 
tain too,  from  considerations  of  interest.  For  though 
it  were  doubtful,  what  will  be  the  future  consequences 
of  virtue  and  vice  ;  yet  it  is,  however,  credible,  that 
they  may  have  those  consequences,  which  Religion 
teaches  us  they  will :  And  this  credibility  is  a  certain® 
obligation  in  point  of  prudence,  to  abstain  from  all 
wickedneft,  and  to  live  in  the  conscientious  praCtice 
of  all  that  is  good.     But, 

5  Pp.  8,  9.  ^  P.  3.  and  Part  II.  ch.  vi. 


138  The  Government  of  God,     Parti. 

Thirdly,  The  answers  above  given  to  the  objec- 
tions against  Religion,  cannot  equally  be  made  use 
of  to  invalidate  the  proof  of  it.  For,  upon  supposi- 
tion that  God  exercises  a  moral  government  over  the 
world.  Analogy  does  most  strongly  lead  us  to  con- 
clude, that  this  moral  government  must  be  a  scheme, 
or  constitution,  beyond  our  comprehension.  And  a 
thousand  particular  Analogies  shew  us,  that  parts  of 
such  a  scheme,  from  their  relation  to  other  parts, 
may  conduce  to  accomplish  ends,  which  we  should 
have  thought,  they  had  no  tendency  at  all  to  accom- 
plish :  nay  ends,  which  before  experience,  we  should 
have  thought  such  parts  were  contradictory  to,  and 
had  a  tendency  to  prevent.  And  therefore  all  these 
Analogies  shew,  that  the  way  of  arguing  made  use 
of  in  obje(51ing  against  Religion,  is  delusive :  because 
they  shew  it  is  not  at  all  incredible,  that,  could  we 
comprehend  the  whole,  we  should  find  the  permis- 
sion of  the  disorders  objected  against,  to  be  consist- 
ent with  justice  and  goodneft ;  and  even  to  be  in- 
stances of  them.  Now  this  is  not  applicable  to  the 
proof  of  Religion,  as  it  is  to  the  objections  against  it ;' 
and  therefore  cannot  invalidate  that  proof,  as  it  does 
these  obje(5lions. 

Lastly,  From  the  observation  now  made,  it  is  easy 
to  see,  that  the  answers  above  given  to  the  objections 
against  Providence,  though,  in  a  general  way  of 
speaking,  they  may  be  said  to  be  taken  from  our 
ignorance  ;  yet  are  by  no  means  taken  merely  from 
that,  but  from  somewhat  which  Analogy  shews  us 
concerning  it.  For  Analogy  shews  us  positively, 
that  our  ignorance  in  the  pof^ibilities  of  things,  and 
the  various  relations  in  Nature,  renders  us  incom- 
petent judges,  and  leads  us  to  false  conclusions,  in 

"'  Serm.  at  the  Rolh,  p.  312,  2nd  edit. 


Chap.  7.    A  Scheme  Incomprehensible.        139 

cases  similar  to  this,  in  which  we  pretend  to  judge 
and  to  obje(5l.  So  that  the  things  above  insisted  upon, 
are  not  mere  suppositions  of  unknown  impofsibilities 
and  relations  :  but  they  are  suggested  to  our  thoughts, 
and  even  forced  upon  the  observation  of  serious  men, 
and  rendered  credible  too,  by  the  Analogy  of  Nature. 
And  therefore,  to  take  these  things  into  the  account, 
is  to  judge  by  experience  and  what  we  do  know  :  and 
it  is  not  judging  so,  to  take  no  notice  of  them. 


CONCLUSION. 


HE  observations  of  the  last  chapter, 
lead  us  to  consider  this  little  scene 
of  human  life,  in  which  we  are  so  bu- 
sily engaged,  as  having  a  reference, 

of  some   sort  or   other,   to  a   much 

larger  plan  of  things.  Whether  we  are,  any  way, 
related  to  the  more  distant  parts  of  the  boundleft 
universe,  into  which  we  are  brought,  is  altogether 
uncertain.  But  it  is  evident,  that  the  course  of  things, 
which  comes  within  our  view,  is  connected  with 
somewhat  past,  present,  and  future,  beyond  it.^  So 
that  we  are  placed,  as  one  may  speak,  in  the  middle 
of  a  scheme,  not  a  fixed  but  a  progref^ive  one,  every 
way  incomprehensible  :  incomprehensible,  in  a  man- 
ner equally,  with  respect  to  what  has  been,  what 
now  is,  and  what  shall  be  hereafter.  And  this  scheme 
cannot  but  contain  in  it  somewhat,  as  wonderful,  and 
as  much  beyond  our  thought  and  conception,-  as 
anything  in  that  of  Religion.     For,  will  any  man  in 


Pp. 


&c. 


See  Part  II.  ch. 


140  Conclusion.  Part  i. 

his  senses  say,  that  it  is  left  difficult  to  conceive,  how 
the  world  came  to  be  and  to  continue  as  it  is,  with- 
out, than  with,  an  intelligent  Author  and  Governor 
of  it  ?  Or,  admitting  an  intelligent  Governor  of  it, 
that  there  is  some  other  rule  of  government,  more 
natural,  and  of  easier  conception,  than  that,  which 
we  call  moral  'I  Indeed,  without  an  intelligent  Author 
and  Governor  of  nature,  no  account  at  all  can  be 
given,  how  this  universe,  or  the  part  of  it  particu- 
larly in  which  we  are  concerned,  came  to  be,  and 
the  course  of  it  to  be  carried  on,  as  it  is :  Nor  any, 
of  its  general  end  and  design,  without  a  moral  Go- 
vernor of  it.  That  there  is  an  intelligent  Author  of 
nature,  and  natural  Governor  of  the  world,  is  a  prin- 
ciple gone  upon  in  the  foregoing  treatise,  as  proved, 
and  generally  known  and  confefted  to  be  proved. 
And  the  very  notion  of  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature, 
proved  by  particular  final  causes,  implies  a  will  and 
a  chara(9:er.'^  Now,  as  our  whole  nature,  the  nature 
which  he  has  given  us,  leads  us  to  conclude  his  will 
and  character  to  be  moral,  just,  and  good :  so  we 
can  scarce  in  imagination  conceive,  what  it  can  be 
otherwise.  However,  in  consequence  of  this  his  will 
and  characfter,  whatever  it  be,  he  formed  the  universe 
as  it  is,  and  carries  on  the  course  of  it  as  he  does, 
rather  than  in  any  other  manner ;  and  has  aligned 
to  us,  and  to  all  living  creatures,  a  part  and  a  lot  in 
it.  Irrational  creatures  a6l  this  their  part,  and  enjoy 
and  undergo  the  pleasures  and  the  pains  allotted 
them,  without  any  refledlion.  But  one  would  think 
it  impoftible,  that  creatures  endued  with  reason  could 
avoid  reflecting  sometimes  upon  all  this  :  reflecting, 
if  not  from  whence  we  came,  yet,  at  least,  whither 
we  are  going ;  and  what  the  mysterious  scheme,  in 

»  P.  116. 


Part  I.  Conclusion.  141 

the  midst  of  which  we  find  ourselves,  will,  at  length, 
come  out,  and  produce :  a  scheme  in  which  it  is 
certain  we  are  highly  interested,  and  in  which  we 
may  be  interested  even  beyond  conception.  For 
many  things  prove  it  palpably  absurd  to  conclude, 
that  we  shall  cease  to  be,  at  death.  Particular  Ana- 
logies do  most  sensibly  shew  us,  that  there  is  nothing 
to  be  thought  strange,  in  our  being  to  exist  in  ano- 
ther state  of  life.  And  that  we  are  now  living  beings, 
affords  a  strong  probability,  that  we  shall  continue 
so  ;  unlefs  there  be  some  positive  ground,  and  there 
is  none  from  Reason  or  Analogy,  to  think  death  will 
destroy  us.  Were  a  persuasion  of  this  kind  ever  so 
well  grounded,  there  would,  surely,  be  little  reason 
to  take  pleasure  in  it.  But  indeed  it  can  have  no 
other  ground,  than  some  such  imagination,  as  that 
of  our  grof^  bodies  being  ourselves :  which  is  con- 
trary to  experience.  Experience  too  most  clearly 
shews  us  the  folly  of  concluding,  from  the  body  and  the 
living  agent  affedling  each  other  mutually,  that  the 
dif^olution  of  the  former  is  the  destruction  of  the 
latter.  And  there  are  remarkable  instances  of  their 
not  affe(9:ing  each  other,  which  lead  us  to  a  contrary 
conclusion.  The  supposition  then,  which  in  all  rea- 
son we  are  to  go  upon,  is,  that  our  living  nature  will 
continue  after  death.  And  it  is  infinitely  unreason- 
able to  form  an  institution  of  life,  or  to  a(5l,  upon 
any  other  supposition.  Now  all  expecftation  of  im- 
mortality, whether  more  or  left  certain,  opens  an 
unbounded  prospect  to  our  hopes  and  our  fears: 
since  we  see  the  constitution  of  Nature  is  such,  as 
to  admit  of  misery  as  well  as  to  be  produ(9:ive  of 
happineft,  and  experience  ourselves  to  partake  of 
both  in  some  degree  ;  and  since  we  cannot  but  know, 
what  higher  degrees  of  both  we  are  capable  of.  And 
there  is  no  presumption  against  believing  farther, 


142  Conclusion.  Part  i. 

that  our  future  interest  depends  upon  our  present 
behaviour :  For  we  see  our  present  interest  doth ; 
and  that  the  happinei^  and  misery,  which  are  natu- 
rally annexed  to  our  ac^lions,  very  frequently  do  not 
follow,  till  long  after  the  actions  are  done,  to  which 
they  are  respe61:ively  annexed.  So  that  were  spe- 
culation to  leave  us  uncertain,  whether  it  were  likely, 
that  the  Author  of  nature,  in  giving  happineft  and 
misery  to  his  creatures,  hath  regard  to  their  a(5lions 
or  not :  yet,  since  we  find  by  experience,  that  he 
hath  such  regard,  the  whole  sense  of  things  which 
he  has  given  us,  plainly  leads  us,  at  once  and  with- 
out any  elaborate  inquiries,  to  think,  that  it  may,  in- 
deed must,  be  to  good  a(51ions  chiefly  that  he  hath 
annexed  happineft,  and  to  bad  actions  misery  ;  or 
that  he  will,  upon  the  whole,  reward  those  who  do 
well,  and  punish  those  who  do  evil.  To  confirm  this 
from  the  constitution  of  the  world,  it  has  been  ob- 
served ;  that  some  sort  of  moral  government  is  ne- 
cef^arily  implied  in  that  natural  government  of  God, 
which  we  experience  ourselves  under  :  that  good  and 
bad  a(9;ions,  at  present,  are  naturally  rewarded  and 
punished,  not  only  as  beneficial  and  mischievous  to 
society :  but  also  as  virtuous  and  vicious :  and  that 
there  is,  in  the  very  nature  of  the  thing,  a  tendency 
to  their  being  rewarded  and  punished  in  a  much 
higher  degree,  than  they  are  at  present.  And  though 
this  higher  degree  of  distributive  justice,  which  Na- 
ture thus  points  out  and  leads  towards,  is  prevented 
for  a  time  from  taking  place  :  it  is  by  obstacles, 
which  the  state  of  this  world  unhappily  throws  in  its 
way,  and  which  therefore  are  in  their  nature  tem- 
porary. Now,  as  these  things  in  the  natural  condu(ft 
of  Providence,  are  observable  on  the  side  of  virtue  ; 
so  there  is  nothing  to  be  set  against  them,  on  the 
side  of  vice.     A  moral  scheme  of  government  then, 


Part  I.  Conclusion.  143 

is  visibly  established,  and,  in  some  degree,  carried 
into  execution :  And  this,  together  with  the  eftential 
tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice  duly  considered,  natu- 
rally raise  in  us  an  apprehension,  that  it  will  be  car- 
ried on  farther  towards  perfe(5lion,  in  a  future  state, 
and  that  every  one  shall  there  receive  according  to 
his  deserts.  And  if  this  be  so,  then  our  future  and 
general  interest,  under  the  moral  government  of  God, 
is  appointed  to  depend  upon  our  behaviour ;  not- 
withstanding the  difficulty,  which  this  may  occasion, 
of  securing  it,  and  the  danger  of  losing  it :  just  in 
the  same  manner  as  our  temporal  interest,  under  his 
natural  government,  is  appointed  to  depend  upon  our 
behaviour;  notwithstanding  the  like  difficulty  and 
danger.  For,  from  our  original  constitution  and  that 
of  the  world  which  we  inhabit,  we  are  naturally 
trusted  with  ourselves;  with  our  own  condu(fl:  and 
our  ow^n  interest.  And  from  the  same  constitution 
of  Nature,  especially  joined  with  that  course  of  things 
which  is  owing  to  men,  we  have  temptations  to  be 
unfaithful  in  this  trust ;  to  forfeit  this  interest,  to  neg- 
lect!: it,  and  run  ourselves  into  misery  and  ruin. 
From  these  temptations  arise,  the  difficulties  of  be- 
having so  as  to  secure  our  temporal  interest,  and  the 
hazard  of  behaving  so  as  to  miscarry  in  it.  There 
is  therefore  nothing  incredible  in  supposing,  there 
may  be  the  like  difficulty  and  hazard  with  regard  to 
that  chief  and  final  good,  which  Religion  lays  before 
us.  Indeed  the  whole  account,  how^  it  came  to  paf^, 
that  we  w^ere  placed  in  such  a  condition  as  this  ; 
must  be  beyond  our  comprehension.  But  it  is  in 
part  accounted  for  by  what  Religion  teaches  us,  that 
the  chara(fler  of  virtue  and  piety  must  be  a  neceftary 
qualification  for  a  future  state  of  security  and  hap- 
pineft,  under  the  moral  government  of  God  ;  in  like 
manner,  as  some  certain  qualifications  or  other  are 


144  Conclusion.  Part  i. 

neceftary  for  every  particular  condition  of  life,  under 
his  natural  government :  And  that  the  present  state 
was  intended  to  be  a  school  of  discipline,  for  im- 
proving in  ourselves  that  chara(5ler.  Now  this  in- 
tention of  Nature  is  rendered  highly  credible  by  ob- 
serving ;  that  we  are  plainly  made  for  improvement 
of  all  kinds  :  that  it  is  a  general  appointment  of  Pro- 
vidence, that  we  cultivate  pra(?i:ical  principles,  and 
form  within  ourselves  habits  of  a(51ion,  in  order  to 
become  fit  for,  what  we  were  wholly  unfit  for  before  : 
that  in  particular,  childhood  and  youth  is  naturally 
appointed  to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  mature  age  : 
and  that  the  present  world  is  peculiarly  fitted  for  a 
state  of  moral  discipline.  And,  whereas  objecftions 
are  urged  against  the  whole  notion  of  moral  govern- 
ment and  a  probation-state,  from  the  opinion  of  ne- 
cef^ity ;  it  has  been  shewn,  that  God  has  given  us 
the  evidence,  as  it  were,  of  experience,  that  all  ob- 
jections against  Religion,  on  this  head,  are  vain  and 
delusive.  He  has  also,  in  his  natural  government, 
suggested  an  answer  to  all  our  short-sighted  objec- 
tions, against  the  equity  and  goodneft  of  his  moral 
government :  And  in  general  he  has  exemplified  to 
us  the  latter  by  the  former. 

These  things,  which,  it  is  to  be  remembered,  are 
matters  of  fact,  ought,  in  all  common  sense,  to 
awaken  mankind ;  to  induce  them  to  consider  in  ear- 
nest their  condition,  and  what  they  have  to  do.  It 
is  absurd,  absurd  to  the  degree  of  being  ridiculous, 
if  the  subjeCl  were  not  of  so  serious  a  kind,  for  men 
to  think  themselves  secure  in  a  vicious  life  ;  or  even 
in  that  immoral  thoughtleftneft,  which  far  the  great- 
est part  of  them  are  fallen  into.  And  the  credibility 
of  Religion  arising  from  experience  and  fa(9:s  here 
considered,  is  fully  sufficient,  in  reason,  to  engage 
them  to  live  in  the  general  practice  of  all  virtue  and 


Part  I.  Conclusion.  145 

piety ;  under  the  serious  apprehension,  though  it 
should  be  mixed  with  some  doubt,^  of  a  righteous 
administration  established  in  Nature,  and  a  future 
judgment  in  consequence  of  it :  Especially  when  we 
consider,  how  very  questionable  it  is,  whether  any- 
thing at  all  can  be  gained  by  vice;^  how  unques- 
tionably little,  as  well  as  precarious,  the  pleasures 
and  profits  of  it  are  at  the  best ;  and  how  soon  they 
must  be  parted  with  at  the  longest.  For,  in  the  de- 
liberations of  reason,  concerning  what  we  are  to 
pursue,  and  what  to  avoid,  as  temptations  to  anything 
from  mere  paf^ion,  are  supposed  out  of  the  case  : 
So  inducements  to  vice,  from  cool  expectations  of 
pleasure  and  interest  so  small  and  uncertain  and 
short,  are  really  so  insignificant,  as,  in  the  view  of 
reason,  to  be  almost  nothing  in  themselves :  And  in 
comparison  with  the  importance  of  Religion,  they 
quite  disappear  and  are  lost.  Mere  paf^ion  indeed 
may  be  alleged,  though  not  as  a  reason,  yet  as  an 
excuse,  for  a  vicious  course  of  life.  And  how  sorry 
an  excuse  it  is,  will  be  manifest  by  observing,  that 
we  are  placed  in  a  condition,  in  which  we  are  un- 
avoidably inured  to  govern  our  paf^ions,  by  being 
necef^itated  to  govern  them  ;  and  to  lay  ourselves 
under  the  same  kind  of  restraints,  and  as  great  ones 
too,  from  temporal  regards,  as  virtue  and  piety,  in 
the  ordinary  course  of  things,  require.  The  plea  of 
ungovernable  paf^ion  then,  on  the  side  of  vice,  is  the 
poorest  of  all  things :  for  it  is  no  reason,  and  but  a 
poor  excuse.  But  the  proper  motives  to  Religion, 
are  the  proper  proofs  of  it,  from  our  moral  nature, 
from  the  presages  of  conscience,  and  our  natural 
apprehension  of  God  under  the  characfter  of  a  righte- 
ous Governor  and  Judge  ;  a  nature  and  conscience 

*  Part  II.  ch.  vi.  5  p^  ^g 


146  Coiiclusion.  Part  i. 

and  apprehension  given  us  by  him :  and  from  the 
confirmation  of  the  dictates  of  reason,  by  life  and 
immortality  brought  to  light  by  the  Gospel ;  and  the 
wrath  of  God  revealed  from  Heaven,  against  all  un- 
godlinefs  and  unrighteousnefi  of  men. 


The  End  of  the  First  Part. 


THE  ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION  TO  THE 

CONSTITUTION  AND  COURSE 

OF  NATURE. 


PART  II. — Of  Revealed  Religion. 
CHAP.  I. — Of  the  Importance  of  Christianity. 

OME  persons,  upon  pretence  of  the 
sufficiency  of  the  light  of  Nature, 
avowedly  reject  all  Revelation,  as,  in 
its  very  notion,  incredible,  and  what 
miist  be  ficT:itious.  And  indeed  it  is 
certain,  no  Revelation  would  have  been  given,  had 
the  light  of  Nature  been  sufficient  in  such  a  sense, 
as  to  render  one  not  wanting  and  useleft.  But  no 
man,  in  seriousneft  and  simplicity  of  mind,  can  pos- 
sibly think  it  so,  who  considers  the  state  of  Religion 
in  the  heathen  world,  before  Revelation,  and  its  pre- 
sent state  in  those  places  which  have  borrowed  no 
light  from  it :  particularly,  the  doubtfulneft  of  some 
of  the  greatest  men,  concerning  things  of  the  utmost 
importance,  as  well  as  the  natural  inattention  and 
ignorance  of  mankind  in  general.  It  is  impof^ible  to 
say,  who  would  have  been  able  to  have  reasoned  out 
that  whole  system,  which  we  call  natural  Religion, 


148  Of  the  Importance  Part  2. 

in  its  genuine  simplicity,  clear  of  superstition :  but 
there  is  certainly  no  ground  to  affirm,  that  the  ge- 
nerality could.  If  they  could,  there  is  no  sort  of 
probability,  that  they  would.  Admitting  there  were, 
they  would  highly  want  a  standing  admonition,  to 
remind  them  of  it,  and  inculcate  it  upon  them.  And 
farther  still,  were  they  as  much  disposed  to  attend 
to  Religion,  as  the  better  sort  of  men  are  :  yet  even 
upon  this  supposition,  there  would  be  various  occa- 
sions for  supernatural  instru(5lion  and  aftistance,  and 
the  greatest  advantages  might  be  afforded  by  them. 
So  that  to  say.  Revelation  is  a  thing  superfluous, 
what  there  was  no  need  of,  and  what  can  be  of  no 
service ;  is,  I  think,  to  talk  quite  wildly  and  at  ran- 
dom. Nor  would  it  be  more  extravagant  to  affirm, 
that  mankind  is  so  entirely  at  ease  in  the  present 
state,  and  life  so  completely  happy ;  that  it  is  a  con- 
tradi(5lion  to  suppose  our  condition  capable  of  being, 
in  any  respe61:,  better. 

There  are  other  persons,  not  to  be  ranked  with 
these,  who  seem  to  be  getting  into  a  way  of  neglecft- 
ing,  and,  as  it  were,  overlooking  Revelation,  as  of 
small  importance,  provided  natural  Religion  be  kept 
to.  With  little  regard,  either  to  the  evidence  of  the 
former,  or  to  the  objec^tions  against  it,  and  even  upon 
supposition  of  its  truth  ;  "  the  only  design  of  it,"  say 
they,  "  must  be,  to  establish  a  belief  of  the  moral 
"  system  of  Nature,  and  to  enforce  the  pra^lice  of 
"  natural  piety  and  virtue.  The  belief  and  practice 
"  of  these  things  were,  perhaps,  much  promoted  by 
*'  the  first  publication  of  Christianity :  But  whether 
"  they  are  believed  and  pra(9:ised,  upon  the  evidence 
"  and  motives  of  Nature  or  of  Revelation,  is  no  great 
"matter."^     This  way  of  considering  Revelation, 

'  Invenis  multos propterea  nolle  fieri  Christianos,  quia 

quasi  sufficiunt  sibi  de  bona  vita  sua.     Bene  vivere  opus  est,  ait. 


Chap.  1.  of  Christianity.  149 

though  it  is  not  the  same  with  the  former,  yet  bor- 
ders nearly  upon  it,  and  very  much,  at  length,  runs  up 
into  it :  and  requires  to  be  particularly  considered, 
with  regard  to  the  persons,  who  seem  to  be  getting 
into  this  way.  The  consideration  of  it  will  likewise 
farther  shew  the  extravagance  of  the  former  opinion, 
and  the  truth  of  the  observations  in  answer  to  it,  just 
mentioned.  And  an  inquiry  into  the  importance  of 
Christianity,  cannot  be  an  improper  introduction  to 
a  treatise  concerning  the  credibility  of  it. 

Now  if  God  has  given  a  Revelation  to  mankind, 
and  commanded  those  things,  which  are  commanded 
in  Christianity ;  it  is  evident,  at  first  sight,  that  it 
cannot  in  any  wise  be  an  indifferent  matter,  whether 
we  obey  or  disobey  those  commands :  unlef^  we  are 
certainly  aftured,  that  we  know  all  the  reasons  for 
them,  and  that  all  those  reasons  are  now  ceased, 
with  regard  to  mankind  in  general,  or  to  ourselves 
in  particular.  And  it  is  absolutely  impofsible,  we 
can  be  ai^ured  of  this.  For  our  ignorance  of  these 
reasons  proves  nothing  in  the  case  :  since  the  whole 
Analogy  of  Nature  shews,  what  is  indeed  in  itself 
evident,  that  there  may  be  infinite  reasons  for  things, 
with  which  we  are  not  acquainted. 

But  the  importance  of  Christianity  will  more  dis- 
tin(9;ly  appear,  by  considering  it  more  distindlly : 
First,  as  a  republication,  and  external  institution,  of 
natural  or  ef^ential  Religion,  adapted  to  the  present 
circumstances  of  mankind,  and  intended  to  promote 
natural  piety  and  virtue :    And  secondly,  as  contain- 

Qt£id  mihi  praecepturus  est  Christus  ?  Ut  bene  vivam  ?  Jam  bene 
vivo.  Quid  mihi  necefsarius  est  Christus  ?  Nullum  homicidium, 
nullum  furtum,  nullam  rapinam  facio,  res  alienas  non  concupisco, 
nullo  adulterio  contaminor.  Nam  inveniatur  in  vita  mea  aliquid 
quod  reprehenditur,  et  qui  reprehenderit  faciat  Christianum. — 
yiug.  in  Psal.  xxxi. 


150  Of  the  Importance  Part  2. 

ing  an  account  of  a  dispensation  of  things,  not  dis- 
coverable by  Reason,  in  consequence  of  which,  se- 
veral distinct  precepts  are  enjoined  us.  For  though 
natural  Religion  is  the  foundation  and  principal  part 
of  Christianity,  it  is  not  in  any  sense  the  whole  of  it. 

I.  Christianity  is  a  republication  of  natural  Reli- 
gion. It  instru(5ls  mankind  in  the  moral  system  of 
the  world :  that  it  is  the  work  of  an  infinitely  perfect 
Being,  and  under  his  government ;  that  virtue  is  his 
law  ;  and  that  he  will  finally  judge  mankind  in  righte- 
ousnef^,  and  render  to  all  according  to  their  works, 
in  a  future  state.  And,  which  is  very  material,  it 
teaches  natural  Religion,  in  its  genuine  simplicity ; 
free  from  those  superstitions,  with  which  it  was  to- 
tally corrupted,  and  under  which  it  was  in  a  manner 
lost. 

Revelation  is  farther,  an  authoritative  publication 
of  natural  Religion,  and  so  affords  the  evidence  of 
testimony  for  the  truth  of  it.  Indeed  the  miracles 
and  prophecies  recorded  in  Scripture,  were  intended 
to  prove  a  particular  dispensation  of  Providence,  the 
redemption  of  the  world  by  the  Mef^iah :  But  this 
does  not  hinder,  but  that  they  may  also  prove  God's 
general  Providence  over  the  world,  as  our  moral 
Governor  and  Judge.  And  they  evidently  do  prove 
it ;  because  this  chara(5ter  of  the  Author  of  nature, 
is  necefsarily  connected  with  and  implied  in  that 
particular  revealed  dispensation  of  things  :  It  is  like- 
wise continually  taught  exprefsly,  and  insisted  upon, 
by  those  persons,  who  wrought  the  miracles  and 
delivered  the  prophecies.  So  that  indeed  natural 
Religion  seems  as  much  proved  by  the  Scripture  Re- 
velation, as  it  would  have  been,  had  the  design  of 
Revelation  been  nothing  else  than  to  prove  it. 
/  But  it  may  pof^ibly  be  disputed,  how  far  miracles 
can  prove  natural  Religion ;  and  notable  objections 


Chap.  I.  of  Christianity.  151 

may  be  urged  against  this  proof  of  it,  considered  as 
a  matter  of  speculation :  But  considered  as  a  prac- 
tical thing,  there  can  be  none.  For  suppose  a  per- 
son *to  teach  natural  Religion  to  a  nation,  who  had 
lived  in  total  ignorance  or  forgetfulnef^  of  it ;  and 
to  declare  he  was  commii^ioned  by  God  so  to  do : 
Suppose  him,  in  proof  of  his  commii^ion,  to  foretel 
things  future,  which  no  human  foresight  could  have 
guef^ed  at ;  to  divide  the  sea  with  a  word  ;  feed  great 
multitudes  with  bread  from  Heaven  ;  cure  all  man- 
ner of  diseases  ;  and  raise  the  dead,  even  himself,  to 
life  :  Would  not  this  give  additional  credibility  to  his 
teaching,  a  credibility  beyond  what  that  of  a  com- 
mon man  would  have  ;  and  be  an  authoritative  pub- 
lication of  the  Law  of  Nature,  i.  e.  a  new  proof  of  it  *? 
It  would  be  a  practical  one,  of  the  strongest  kind, 
perhaps,  which  human  creatures  are  capable  of 
having  given  them.  The  law  of  Moses  then,  and 
the  Gospel  of  Christ,  are  authoritative  publications 
of  the  Religion  of  Nature :  They  afford  a  proof  of 
God's  general  Providence,  as  moral  Governor  of  the 
world ;  as  well  as  of  his  particular  dispensations  of 
Providence  towards  sinful  creatures,  revealed  in  the 
Law  and  the  Gospel.  As  they  are  the  only  evidence 
of  the  latter  ;  so  they  are  an  additional  evidence  of  the 
former. 

To  shew  this  further,  let  us  suppose  a  man  of  the 
greatest  and  most  improved  capacity,  who  had  never 
heard  of  Revelation,  convinced  upon  the  whole,  not- 
withstanding the  disorders  of  the  world,  that  it  was 
under  the  direction  and  moral  government  of  an  in- 
finitely perfe(51  Being;  but  ready  to  question,  whether 
he  were  not  got  beyond  the  reach  of  his  faculties : 
Suppose  him  brought,  by  this  suspicion,  into  great 
danger  of  being  carried  away  by  the  universal  bad 
example  of  almost  every  one  around  him,  who  ap- 


152  Of  the  Importance  Part  2. 

peared  to  have  no  sense,  no  pra(5lical  sense  at  least, 
of  these  things  :  And  this,  perhaps,  would  be  as  ad- 
vantageous a  situation  with  regard  to  Religion,  as 
Nature  alone  ever  placed  any  man  in.  What  a  con- 
firmation now  must  it  be  to  such  a  person,  all  at  once, 
to  find,  that  this  moral  system  of  things  was  revealed 
to  mankind,  in  the  name  of  that  infinite  Being,  whom 
he  had  from  principles  of  Reason  believed  in ;  and 
that  the  publishers  of  the  Revelation  proved  their 
commif^ion  from  him,  by  making  it  appear,  that  he 
had  intrusted  them  with  a  power  of  suspending  and 
changing  the  general  laws  of  Nature. 

Nor  must  it  by  any  means  be  omitted,  for  it  is  a 
thing  of  the  utmost  importance,  that  life  and  im- 
mortality are  eminently  brought  to  light  by  the  Gos- 
pel. The  great  do(?l:rines  of  a  future  state,  the  danger 
of  a  course  of  wickedneft,  and  the  efficacy  of  Re- 
pentance, are  not  only  confirmed  in  the  Gospel,  but 
are  taught,  especially  the  last  is,  with  a  degree  of 
light,  to  which  that  of  Nature  is  but  darknefs. 

Farther:  As  Christianity  served  these  ends  and 
purposes,  when  it  was  first  published,  by  the  mira- 
culous publication  itself;  so  it  was  intended  to  serve 
the  same  purposes,  in  future  ages,  by  means  of  the 
settlement  of  a  visible  Church  :  of  a  society,  distin- 
guished from  common  ones,  and  from  the  rest  of  the 
world,  by  peculiar  religious  institutions ;  by  an  insti- 
tuted method  of  instruction,  and  an  instituted  form 
of  external  Religion.  Miraculous  powers  were  given 
to  the  first  preachers  of  Christianity,  in  order  to  their 
introducing  it  into  the  world  :  A  visible  Church  was 
established,  in  order  to  continue  it,  and  carry  it  on 
succef^ively  throughout  all  ages.  Had  Moses  and 
the  Prophets,  Christ  and  his  Apostles,  only  taught, 
and  by  miracles  proved.  Religion  to  their  cotempo- 
raries ;  the  benefits  of  their  instru(5lions  would  have 


Chap.  I.  of  Christianity.  153 

reached  but  to  a  small  part  of  mankind.  Christianity 
must  have  been,  in  a  great  degree,  sunk  and  forgot 
in  a  very  few  ages.  To  prevent  this,  appears  to  have 
been  one  reason,  why  a  visible  Church  was  instituted  : 
to  be,  like  a  city  upon  a  hill,  a  standing  memorial  to 
the  world  of  the  duty  which  we  owe  our  Maker :  to 
call  men  continually,  both  by  example  and  instruc- 
tion, to  attend  to  it ;  and  by  the  form  of  Religion 
ever  before  their  eyes,  remind  them  of  the  reality  : 
to  be  the  repository  of  the  oracles  of  God  :  to  hold 
up  the  light  of  Revelation  in  aid  to  that  of  Nature, 
and  propagate  it  throughout  all  generations  to  the 
end  of  the  world the  light  of  Revelation,  consi- 
dered here  in  no  other  view,  than  as  designed  to 
enforce  natural  Religion.  And  in  proportion  as  Chris- 
tianity is  profel^ed  and  taught  in  the  world,  Religion, 
natural  or  efsential  Religion,  is  thus  distin(fHy  and 
advantageously  laid  before  mankind ;  and  brought 
again  and  again  to  their  thoughts,  as  a  matter  of  in- 
finite importance.  A  visible  Church  has  also  a  farther 
tendency  to  promote  natural  Religion,  as  being  an 
instituted  method  of  education,  originally  intended 
to  be  of  more  peculiar  advantage  to  those  who  would 
conform  to  it.  For  one  end  of  the  institution  was, 
that  by  admonition  and  reproof,  as  well  as  instruc- 
tion ;  by  a  general  regular  discipline,  and  public  ex- 
ercises of  Religion  ;  the  body  of  Christ,  as  the  Scrip- 
ture speaks,  should  be  edified,  i.e.  trained  up  in  piety 
and  virtue,  for  a  higher  and  better  state.  This  set- 
tlement then  appearing  thus  beneficial ;  tending  in 
the  nature  of  the  thing  to  answer,  and  in  some  de- 
gree a(5lually  answering,  those  ends ;  it  is  to  be  re- 
membered, that  the  very  notion  of  it  implies  positive 
institutions:  for  the  visibility  of  the  Church  consists 
in  them.  Take  away  everything  of  this  kind,  and 
you  lose  the  very  notion  itself.    So  that  if  the  things 


154  Of  the  Importance  Part  2. 

now  mentioned  are  advantages,  the  reason  and  im- 
portance of  positive  institutions  in  general,  is  most 
obvious  ;  since  without  them,  these  advantages  could 
not  be  secured  to  the  world.  And  it  is  mere  idle 
wantonnef^,  to  insist  upon  knowing  the  reasons,  why 
such  particular  ones  were  fixed  upon,  rather  than 
others. 

The  benefit  arising  from  this  supernatural  ai^ist- 
ance,  which  Christianity  affords  to  natural  Religion, 
is  what  some  persons  are  very  slow  in  apprehending. 
And  yet  it  is  a  thing  distinct  in  itself,  and  a  very 
plain  obvious  one.  For  will  any  in  good  earnest 
really  say,  that  the  bulk  of  mankind  in  the  heathen 
world,  were  in  as  advantageous  a  situation,  with  re- 
gard to  natural  Religion,  as  they  are  now  amongst 
us  :  That  it  was  laid  before  them,  and  enforced  upon 
them,  in  a  manner  as  distin^l,  and  as  much  tending 
to  influence  their  practice  ? 

The  objections  against  all  this,  from  the  perversion 
of  Christianity,  and  from  the  supposition  of  its  having 
had  but  little  good  influence,  however  innocently 
they  may  be  proposed,  yet  cannot  be  insisted  upon 
as  conclusive,  upon  any  principles,  but  such  as  lead 
to  downright  Atheism :  Because  the  manifestation 
of  the  Law  of  Nature  by  Reason,  which,  upon  all 
principles  of  Theism,  must  have  been  from  God,  has 
been  perverted  and  rendered  inefle^lual  in  the  same 
manner.  It  may  indeed,  I  think,  truly  be  said,  that 
the  good  effecfts  of  Christianity  have  not  been  small : 
nor  its  supposed  ill  efle(51s,  any  effed^s  at  all  of  it, 
properly  speaking.  Perhaps  too  the  things  them- 
selves done,  have  been  aggravated:  And  if  not, 
Christianity  hath  been  often  only  a  pretence  :  And  the 
same  evils  in  the  main  would  have  been  done,  upon 
some  other  pretence.  However,  great  and  shocking 
as  the  corruptions  and  abuses  of  it  have  really  been, 


Chap.  1.  of  Christianity.  155 

they  cannot  be  insisted  upon  as  arguments  against 
it,  upon  principles  of  Theism.  For  one  cannot  pro- 
ceed one  step  in  reasomng  upon  natural  Religion, 
any  more  than  upon  Christianity,  without  laying  it 
down  as  a  first  principle,  that  the  dispensations  of 
Providence  are  not  to  be  judged  of,  by  their  perver- 
sions, but  by  their  genuine  tendencies :  not  by  what 
they  do  actually  seem  to  effect:,  but  by  what  they 
would  effedl  if  mankind  did  their  part ;  That  part 
which  is  justly  put  and  left  upon  them.  It  is  alto- 
gether as  much  the  language  of  one,  as  of  the  other ; 
He  that  is  unjust,  let  him  be  unjust  still :  and  he  that 
is  holy,  let  him  he  holy  still.-  The  light  of  Reason 
does  not,  any  more  than  that  of  Revelation,  force 
men  to  submit  to  its  authority :  Both  admonish  them 
of  what  they  ought  to  do  and  avoid,  together  with 
the  consequences  of  each  ;  and  after  this,  leave  them 
at  full  liberty  to  act  just  as  they  please,  till  the  ap- 
pointed time  of  judgment.  Every  moment's  ex- 
perience shews,  that  this  is  God's  general  rule  of 
government. 

To  return  then :  Christianity  being  a  promulga- 
tion of  the  Law  of  Nature  ;  being  moreover  an  au- 
thoritative promulgation  of  it ;  with  new  light,  and 
other  circumstances  of  peculiar  advantage,  adapted 
to  the  wants  of  mankind ;  these  things  fully  shew  its 
importance.  And  it  is  to  be  observed  farther,  that, 
as  the  nature  of  the  case  requires,  so  all  Christians 
are  commanded  to  contribute,  by  their  profef^ion  of 
Christianity,  to  preserve  it  in  the  world,  and  render 
it  such  a  promulgation  and  enforcement  of  Religion. 
For  it  is  the  very  scheme  of  the  Gospel,  that  each 
Christian  should,  in  his  degree,  contribute  towards 
continuing  and  carrying  it  on :  all  by  uniting  in  the 


156  Of  the  Importance  Part  2. 

public  profef^ion  and  external  pra(9;ice  of  Christi- 
anity ;  some  by  instructing-,  by  having  the  oversight 
and  taking  care  of  this  religious  community,  the 
Church  of  God.  Now  this  farther  shews  the  im- 
portance of  Christianity ;  and,  which  is  what  I  chiefly 
intend,  its  importance  in  a  pra(5lical  sense :  or  the 
high  obligations  we  are  under,  to  take  it  into  our 
most  serious  consideration;  and  the  danger  there 
must  neceftarily  be,  not  only  in  treating  it  despite- 
fully,  which  I  am  not  now  speaking  of,  but  in  disre- 
garding and  neglecting  it.  For  this  is  neglecting  to 
do  what  is  expreftly  enjoined  us,  for  continuing  those 
benefits  to  the  world,  and  transmitting  them  down 
to  future  times.  And  all  this  holds,  even  though  the 
only  thing  to  be  considered  in  Christianity,  were  its 
subserviency  to  natural  Religion.     But, 

II.  Christianity  is  to  be  considered  in  a  further 
view :  as  containing  an  account  of  a  dispensation  of 
things,  not  at  all  discoverable  by  Reason,  in  conse- 
quence of  which  several  distinCl  precepts  are  enjoined 
us.  Christianity  is  not  only  an  external  institution 
of  natural  Religion,  and  a  new  promulgation  of  God's 
general  Providence,  as  righteous  Governor  and  Judge 
of  the  world ;  but  it  contains  also  a  Revelation  of  a 
particular  dispensation  of  Providence,  carrying  on 
by  his  Son  and  Spirit,  for  the  recovery  and  salvation 
of  mankind,  who  are  represented,  in  Scripture,  to  be 
in  a  state  of  ruin.  And  in  consequence  of  this  Re- 
velation being  made,  we  are  commanded  to  be  bap- 
tized, not  only  in  the  name  of  the  Father,  but  also,  of 
the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost :  and  other  obliga- 
tions of  duty,  unknown  before,  to  the  Son  and  the 
Holy  Ghost,  are  revealed.  Now  the  importance  of 
these  duties  may  be  judged  of,  by  observing  that  they 
arise,  not  from  positive  command  merely ;  but  also 
from  the  offices,  which  appear,  from  Scripture,  to 


Chap,  I.  of  Christianity.  157 

belong  to  those  Divine  Persons  in  the  Gospel  dis- 
pensation ;  or  from  the  relations,  which,  we  are  there 
informed,  they  stand  in  to  us.  By  Reason  is  re- 
vealed the  relation,  which  God  the  Father  stands  in 
to  us.  Hence  arises  the  obligation  of  duty,  which 
we  are  under  to  him.  In  Scripture  are  revealed  the 
relations,  which  the  Son  and  Holy  Spirit  stand  in  to 
us.  Hence  arise  the  obligations  of  duty,  which  we 
are  under  to  them.  The  truth  of  the  case,  as  one 
may  speak,  in  each  of  these  three  respe(5ls  being 
admitted :  that  God  is  the  Governor  of  the  world, 
upon  the  evidence  of  Reason ;  that  Christ  is  the  Me- 
diator between  God  and  man,  and  the  Holy  Ghost 
our  Guide  and  Sanclifier,  upon  the  evidence  of  Re- 
velation :  the  truth  of  the  case,  I  say,  in  each  of  these 
respe<5ls  being  admitted ;  it  is  no  more  a  question, 
why  it  should  be  commanded,  that  we  be  baptized 
in  the  name  of  the  Son  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  than 
that  we  be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Father.  This 
matter  seems  to  require  to  be  more  fully  stated.'^ 

Let  it  be  remembered  then,  that  Religion  comes 
under  the  twofold  consideration  of  internal  and  ex- 
ternal :  for  the  latter  is  as  real  a  part  of  Religion,  of 
true  Religion,  as  the  former.  Now  when  Religion 
is  considered  under  the  first  notion,  as  an  inward 
principle,  to  be  exerted  in  such  and  such  inward  a<5ls 
of  the  mind  and  heart ;  the  eftence  of  natural  Reli- 
gion may  be  said  to  consist  in  religious  regards  to 
God  the  Father  Almighty:  and  the  ei^ence  of  re- 
vealed Religion,  as  distinguished  from  natural,  to 
consist  in  religious  regards  to  the  Son,  and  to  the 
Holy  Ghost.  And  the  obligation  we  are  under,  of 
paying  these  religious  regards  to  each  of  these  Di- 

^  See,  the  nature,  obligation,  and  efficacy,  of  the  Christian 
Sacraments,  &c.  and  Colliber  of  Revealed  Religion,  as  there 
quoted. 


158  Of  the  Importance  Part  2. 

vine  Persons  respec^iively,  arises  from  the  respective 
relations,  which  they  each  stand  in  to  us.  How  these 
relations  are  made  known,  whether  by  Reason  or 
Revelation,  makes  no  alteration  in  the  case  :  because 
the  duties  arise  out  of  the  relations  themselves,  not 
out  of  the  manner  in  which  we  are  informed  of  them. 
The  Son  and  Spirit  have  each  his  proper  office,  in 
that  great  dispensation  of  Providence,  the  redemp- 
tion of  the  world :  the  one  our  Mediator,  the  other 
our  Sandlifier.  Does  not  then  the  duty  of  religious 
regards  to  both  these  Divine  Persons,  as  immediately 
arise,  to  the  view  of  Reason,  out  of  the  very  nature 
of  these  offices  and  relations ;  as  the  inward  good- 
will and  kind  intention,  which  we  owe  to  our  fellow- 
creatures,  arise  out  of  the  common  relations  be- 
tween us  and  them  1  But  it  will  be  asked,  "  What 
"  are  the  inward  religious  regards,  appearing  thus 
*'  obviously  due  to  the  Son  and  Holy  Spirit ;  as  arising, 
"  not  merely  from  command  in  Scripture,  but  from 
"  the  very  nature  of  the  revealed  relations,  which 
"  they  stand  in  to  us  ?"  I  answer,  the  religious  re- 
gards of  reverence,  honour,  love,  trust,  gratitude, 
fear,  hope.  In  what  external  manner,  this  inward 
worship  is  to  be  exprefted,  is  a  matter  of  pure  re- 
vealed command ;  as  perhaps  the  external  manner, 
in  which  God  the  Father  is  to  be  worshipped,  may 
be  more  so,  than  we  are  ready  to  think :  But  the 
worship,  the  internal  worship  itself,  to  the  Son  and 
Holy  Ghost,  is  no  farther  matter  of  pure  revealed 
command,  than  as  the  relations  they  stand  in  to  us 
are  matter  of  pure  Revelation  :  for  the  relations  being 
known,  the  obligations  to  such  internal  worship  are 
obligations  of  Reason,  arising  out  of  those  relations 
themselves.  In  short,  the  history  of  the  Gospel  as 
immediately  shews  us  the  reason  of  these  obligations, 
as  it  shews  us  the  meaning  of  the  words,  Son  and 
Holy  Ghost. 


Chap.  I.  of  Christianity.  159 

If  this  account  of  the  Christian  Religion  be  just ; 
those  persons  who  can  speak  lightly  of  it,  as  of  little 
consequence,  provided  natural  Religion  be  kept  to, 
plainly  forget,  that  Christianity,  even  what  is  pecu- 
liarly so  called,  as  distinguished  from  natural  Reli- 
gion, has  yet  somewhat  very  important,  even  of  a 
moral  nature.  For  the  office  of  our  Lord  being 
made  known,  and  the  relation  he  stands  in  to  us,  the 
obligation  of  religious  regards  to  him,  is  plainly 
moral ;  as  much  as  charity  to  mankind  is  ;  since  this 
obligation  arises,  before  external  command,  imme- 
diately out  of  that  his  office  and  relation  itself  Those 
persons  appear  to  forget,  that  Revelation  is  to  be 
considered,  as  informing  us  of  somewhat  new,  in  the 
state  of  mankind,  and  in  the  government  of  the 
world  :  as  acquainting  us  with  some '  relations  we 
stand  in,  which  could  not  otherwise  have  been  known. 
And  these  relations  being  real,  (though  before  Re- 
velation we  could  be  under  no  obligations  from  them, 
yet  upon  their  being  revealed,)  there  is  no  reason 
to  think,  but  that  neglecft  of  behaving  suitably  to 
them,  will  be  attended  with  the  same  kind  of  conse- 
quences under  God's  government ;  as  negleci:ing  to 
behave  suitably  to  any  other  relations  made  known 
to  us  by  Reason.  And  ignorance,  whether  unavoid- 
able or  voluntary ;  so  far  as  we  can  poftibly  see,  will, 
just  as  much,  and  just  as  little,  excuse  in  one  case  as 
in  the  other  :  the  ignorance  being  supposed  equally 
unavoidable,  or  equally  voluntary,  in  both  cases. 

If  therefore  Christ  be  indeed  the  Mediator  be- 
tween God  and  man,  i.  e.  if  Christianity  be  true  ;  if 
he  be  indeed  our  Lord,  our  Saviour,  and  our  God ; 
no  one  can  say,  what  may  follow,  not  only  the  ob- 
stinate, but  the  careleft  disregard  to  him,  in  those 
high  relations.  Nay  no  one  can  say,  what  may  fol- 
low such  disregard,  even  in  the  way  of  natural  con- 


l6o  Of  the  Importance  Part  2. 

sequence.^  For,  as  the  natural  consequences  of  vice 
in  this  life,  are  doubtlef^  to  be  considered,  as  judicial 
punishments  infli(5led  by  God  ;  so  likewise,  for  aught 
we  know,  the  judicial  punishments  of  the  future  life 
may  be,  in  a  like  way  or  a  like  sense,  the  natural 
consequence  of  vice :  ^  of  men's  violating  or  disre- 
garding the  relations,  which  God  has  placed  them 
in  here,  and  made  known  to  them. 

Again :  If  mankind  are  corrupted  and  depraved 
in  their  moral  charac^ter,  and  so  are  unfit  for  that 
state,  which  Christ  is  gone  to  prepare  for  his  dis- 
ciples ;  and  if  the  aftistance  of  God's  Spirit  be  ne- 
ceftary  to  renew  their  nature,  in  the  degree  requi- 
site to  their  being  qualified  for  that  state  ;  all  which 
is  implied  in  the  exprei^,  though  figurative  declara- 
tion. Except  a  man  be  born  of  the  Spirit,  he  cannot 
enter  into  the  kingdom  of  God :^  Supposing  this,  is 
it  pofsible  any  serious  person  can  think  it  a  slight 
matter,  whether  or  no  he  makes  use  of  the  means, 
expref^ly  commanded  by  God,  for  obtaining  this  Di- 
vine aftistance  f  Especially  since  the  whole  Analogy 
of  Nature  shews,  that  we  are  not  to  expect  any  be- 
nefits, without  making  use  of  the  appointed  means 
for  obtaining  or  enjoying  them.  Now  Reason  shews 
us  nothing,  of  the  particular  immediate  means  of 
obtaining,  either  temporal  or  spiritual  benefits.  This 
therefore  we  must  learn,  either  from  experience  or 
Revelation.  And  experience,  the  present  case  does 
not  admit  of. 

The  conclusion  from  all  this  evidently  is ;  that, 
Christianity  being  supposed  either  true  or  credible, 
it  is  unspeakable  irreverence,  and  really  the  most 
presumptuous  rashnef^,  to  treat  it  as  a  light  matter. 
It  can  never  justly  be  esteemed  of  little  consequence, 

*  Pp.  30,  31.  ^  Ch.  V.  ^  John  iii.  5. 


Chap.  I.  of  Christianity.  l6l 

till  it  be  positively  supposed  false.  Nor  do  I  know 
a  higher  and  more  important  obligation  which  we 
are  under,  than  that,  of  examining  most  seriously 
into  the  evidence  of  it,  supposing  its  credibility ;  and 
of  embracing  it,  upon  supposition  of  its  truth. 

The  two  following  dedu(5lions  may  be  proper  to 
be  added,  in  order  to  illustrate  the  foregoing  obser- 
vations, and  to  prevent  their  being  mistaken. 

First,  Hence  we  may  clearly  see,  where  lies  the 
distindl;ion  between  what  is  positive  and  what  is  moral 
in  Religion.  Moral  precepts  are  precepts,  the  rea- 
sons of  which  we  see  :  Positive  precepts  are  precepts, 
the  reasons  of  which  we  do  not  see.''  Moral  duties 
arise  out  of  the  nature  of  the  case  itself,  prior  to  ex- 
ternal command.  Positive  duties  do  not  arise  out  of 
the  nature  of  the  case  ;  but  from  external  command  : 
Nor  would  they  be  duties  at  all,  were  it  not  for  such 
command,  received  from  him  whose  creatures  and 
subjects  we  are.  But  the  manner  in  which  the  na- 
ture of  the  case,  or  the  fa(5l  of  the  relation,  is  made 
known,  this  doth  not  denominate  any  duty  either 
positive  or  moral.  That  we  be  baptized  in  the  name 
of  the  Father,  is  as  much  a  positive  duty,  as  that  we 
be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Son;  because  both 
arise  equally  from  revealed  command :  though  the 
relation  which  we  stand  in  to  God  the  Father,  is 
made  known  to  us  by  Reason  ;  the  relation  we  stand 
in  to  Christ,  by  Revelation  only.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  dispensation  of  the  Gospel  admitted,  gratitude 

'  This  is  the  distinftion  between  moral  and  positive  precepts, 
considered  respeftiveljr  as  such.  But  yet,  since  the  latter  have 
somewhat  of  a  moral  nature,  we  may  see  the  reason  of  them, 
considered  in  this  view.  Moral  and  positive  precepts  are,  in 
some  respefts  alike,  in  other  respedls  different.  So  far  as  they 
are  like,  we  discern  the  reasons  of  both  :  So  far  as  they  are  dif- 
ferent, we  discern  the  reasons  of  the  former,  but  not  of  the 
latter.  See  pp.  152,  &c.  and  p.  162. 
M 


i62  Of  the  Importance  Parti, 

as  immediately  becomes  due  to  Christ,  from  his  being 
the  voluntary  Minister  of  this  dispensation  ;  as  it  is 
due  to  God  the  Father,  from  his  being  the  Fountain 
of  all  good :  though  the  first  is  made  known  to  us, 
by  Revelation  only  ;  the  second,  by  Reason.  Hence 
also  we  may  see,  and,  for  distindlneft  sake,  it  may 
be  worth  mentioning,  that  positive  institutions  eome 
under  a  twofold  consideration.  They  are  either  in- 
stitutions founded  on  natural  Religion,  as  baptism  in 
the  name  of  the  Father ;  though  this  has  also  a  par- 
ticular reference  to  the  Gospel -dispensation,  for  it  is 
in  the  name  of  God,  as  the  Father  of  our  Lord  Jesus 
Christ :  Or  they  are  external  institutions  founded  on 
revealed  Religion ;  as  baptism  in  the  name  of  the 
Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost. 

Secondly,  From  the  distindlion  between  what  is 
moral  and  what  is  positive  in  Religion,  appears  the 
ground  of  that  peculiar  preference,  which  the  Scrip- 
ture teaches  us  to  be  due  to  the  former. 

The  reason  of  positive  institutions  in  general,  is 
very  obvious  :  though  we  should  not  see  the  reason, 
why  such  particular  ones  are  pitched  upon,  rather 
than  others.  Whoever  therefore,  instead  of  cavilling 
at  words,  will  attend  to  the  thing  itself,  may  clearly 
see,  that  positive  institutions  in  general,  as  distin- 
guished from  this  or  that  particular  one,  have  the 
nature  of  moral  commands :  since  the  reasons  of 
them  appear.  Thus,  for  instance,  the  external  wor- 
ship of  God  is  a  moral  duty,  though  no  particular 
mode  of  it  be  so.  Care  then  is  to  be  taken,  when  a 
comparison  is  made  between  positive  and  moral  du- 
ties, that  they  be  compared,  no  farther  than  as  they 
are  different :  no  farther  than  as  the  former  are  po- 
sitive, or  arise  out  of  mere  external  command,  the 
reasons  of  which  we  are  not  acquainted  with ;  and 
as  the  latter  are  moral,  or  arise  out  of  the  apparent 


Chap.  I.  of  Christianity.  163 

reason  of  the  case,  without  such  external  command. 
Unleft  this  caution  be  observed,  we  shall  run  into 
endleft  confusion. 

Now  this  being  premised,  suppose  two  standing 
precepts  enjoined  by  the  same  authority;  that,  in 
certain  conjunc^tures,  it  is  impoftible  to  obey  both ; 
that  the  former  is  moral,  i.  e.  a  precept  of  which  we 
see  the  reasons,  and  that  they  hold  in  the  particular 
case  before  us ;  but  that  the  latter  is  positive,  i.  e.  a 
precept  of  which  we  do  not  see  the  reasons :  it  is 
indisputable  that  our  obligations  are  to  obey  the 
former ;  because  there  is  an  apparent  reason  for  this 
preference,  and  none  against  it.  Farther,  positive 
institutions,  I  suppose  all  those  which  Christianity 
enjoins,  are  means  to  a  moral  end :  and  the  end  must 
be  acknowledged  more  excellent,  than  the  means. 
Nor  is  observance  of  these  institutions  any  religious 
obedience  at  all,  or  of  any  value,  otherwise  than  as 
it  proceeds  from  a  moral  principle.  This  seems  to 
be  the  strict,  logical  way  of  stating  and  determining 
this  matter :  but  will,  perhaps,  be  found  lef^  appli- 
cable to  practice,  than  may  be  thought  at  first  sight. 

And  therefore,  in  a  more  practical,  though  more 
lax  way  of  consideration,  and  taking  the  words,  moral 
law  and  positive  institutions,  in  the  popular  sense ; 
I  add,  that  the  whole  moral  law  is  as  much  matter 
of  revealed  command,  as  positive  institutions  are : 
for  the  Scripture  enjoins  every  moral  virtue.  In  this 
respe<5l  then  they  are  both  upon  a  level.  But  the 
moral  law  is,  moreover,  written  upon  our  hearts ; 
interwoven  into  our  very  nature.  And  this  is  a  plain 
intimation  of  the  Author  of  it,  which  is  to  be  pre- 
ferred, when  they  interfere. 

But  there  is  not  altogether  so  much  necef^ity  for 
the  determination  of  this  question,  as  some  persons 
seem  to  think.     Nor  are  we  left  to  Reason  alone  to 


164  Of  the  Importance  Part  2. 

determine  it.  For,  first,  though  mankind  have,  in 
all  ages,  been  greatly  prone  to  place  their  Religion 
in  peculiar  positive  rites,  by  way  of  equivalent  for 
obedience  to  moral  precepts ;  yet,  without  making 
any  comparison  at  all  between  them,  and  conse- 
quently without  determining  which  is  to  have  the 
preference,  the  nature  of  the  thing  abundantly  shews 
all  notions  of  that  kind  to  be  utterly  subversive  of 
true  Religion :  as  they  are,  moreover,  contrary  to  the 
whole  general  tenor  of  Scripture  ;  and  likewise  to 
the  most  expref^  particular  declarations  of  it,  that 
nothing  can  render  us  accepted  of  God,  without 
moral  virtue.  Secondly,  Upon  the  occasion  of  men- 
tioning together  positive  and  moral  duties,  the  Scrip- 
ture always  puts  the  streft  of  Religion  upon  the  latter, 
and  never  upon  the  former :  Which,  though  no  sort 
of  allowance  to  negle(51:  the  former,  when  they  do  not 
interfere  with  the  latter,  yet  is  a  plain  intimation, 
that  when  they  do,  the  latter  are  to  be  preferred. 
And  farther,  as  mankind  are  for  placing  the  strei^  of 
their  Religion  anywhere,  rather  than  upon  virtue ; 
lest  both  the  reason  of  the  thing,  and  the  general 
spirit  of  Christianity,  appearing  in  the  intimation  now 
mentioned,  should  be  ineffectual  against  this  preva- 
lent folly :  Our  Lord  himself,  from  whose  command 
alone  the  obligation  of  positive  institutions  arises,  has 
taken  occasion  to  make  the  comparison  between 
them  and  moral  precepts ;  when  the  Pharisees  cen- 
sured him,  for  eating  with  publicans  and  sinners  ; 
and  also  when  they  censured  his  disciples,  for  pluck- 
ing the  ears  of  corn  on  the  Sabbath-day.  Upon  this 
comparison,  he  has  determined  exprefsly,  and  in 
form,  which  shall  have  the  preference  when  they 
interfere.  And  by  delivering  his  authoritative  de- 
termination in  a  proverbial  manner  of  expreftion,  he 
has  made  it  general :  I  will  have  mercy,  and  not  sa- 


Chap,  I.  of  Christianity.  165 

crifice.^  The  propriety  of  the  word,  proverbial,  is 
not  the  thing  insisted  upon :  though  I  think  the 
manner  of  speaking  is  to  be  called  so.  But  that  the 
manner  of  speaking  very  remarkably  renders  the 
determination  general,  is  surely  indisputable.  For, 
had  it,  in  the  latter  case,  been  said  only,  that  God 
preferred  mercy  to  the  rigid  observance  of  the  Sab- 
bath; even  then,  by  parity  of  reason,  most  justly 
might  we  have  argued,  that  he  preferred  mercy  like- 
^vise,  to  the  observance  of  other  ritual  institutions ; 
and  in  general,  moral  duties,  to  positive  ones.  And 
thus  the  determination  would  have  been  general ; 
though  its  being  so,  were  inferred  and  not  exprefted. 
But  as  the  pafsage  really  stands  in  the  Gospel,  it  is 
much  stronger.  For  the  sense  and  the  very  literal 
words  of  our  Lord's  answer,  are  as  applicable  to  any 
other  instance  of  a  comparison,  between  positive  and 
moral  duties,  as  to  this  upon  which  they  were  spoken. 
And  if,  in  case  of  competition,  mercy  is  to  be  pre- 
ferred to  positive  institutions,  it  will  scarce  bethought, 
that  justice  is  to  give  place  to  them.  It  is  remark- 
able too,  that,  as  the  words  are  a  quotation  from  the 
Old  Testament,  they  are  introduced,  on  both  the 
forementioned  occasions,  with  a  declaration,  that  the 
Pharisees  did  not  understand  the  meaning  of  them. 
This,  I  say,  is  very  remarkable.  For,  since  it  is  scarce 
pofsible,  for  the  most  ignorant  person,  not  to  under- 
stand the  literal  sense  of  the  paftage,  in  the  Prophet  ;^ 
and  since  understanding  the  literal  sense  would  not 
have  prevented  their  condemning  the  guiltlejl;^^  it 
can  hardly  be  doubted,  that  the  thing  which  our 
Lord  really  intended  in  that  declaration,  was,  that 
the  Pharisees  had  not  learnt  from  it,  as  they  might, 
wherein  the  general  spirit  of  Religion  consists  :  that 

^  Matth.  ix.  13,  and  xii.  7.  ^  Hos.  vi. 

*°  See  Matth.  xii.  7. 


i66  Of  the  Importance  of  Christianity.  Part  2, 

it  consists  in  moral  piety  and  virtue,  as  distinguished 
from  forms,  and  ritual  observances.  However,  it  is 
certain  we  may  learn  this  from  his  Divine  application 
of  the  paf^age,  in  the  Gospel. 

But,  as  it  is  one  of  the  peculiar  weaknef^es  of 
human  nature,  when,  upon  a  comparison  of  two  things, 
one  is  found  to  be  of  greater  importance  than  the 
other,  to  consider  this  other  as  of  scarce  any  import- 
ance at  all :  it  is  highly  neceftary  that  we  remind 
ourselves,  how  great  presumption  it  is,  to  make  light 
of  any  institutions  of  Divine  appointment ;  that  our 
obligations  to  obey  all  God's  commands  whatever,  are 
absolute  and  indispensable ;  And  that  commands 
merely  positive,  admitted  to  be  from  him,  lay  us 
under  a  moral  obligation  to  obey  them :  an  obliga- 
tion moral  in  the  stric^test  and  most  proper  sense. 

To  these  things  I  cannot  forbear  adding,  that  the 
account  now  given  of  Christianity,  most  strongly 
shews  and  enforces  upon  us  the  obligation  of  search- 
ing the  Scriptures,  in  order  to  see,  what  the  scheme 
of  Revelation  really  is ;  instead  of  determining  be- 
forehand, from  Reason,  what  the  scheme  of  it  must 
be.^^  Indeed  if  in  Revelation  there  be  found  any 
parages,  the  seeming  meaning  of  which,  is  contrary 
to  natural  Religion ;  we  may  most  certainly  con- 
clude, such  seeming  meaning  not  to  be  the  real  one. 
But  it  is  not  any  degree  of  a  presumption  against  an 
interpretation  of  Scripture,  that  such  interpretation 
contains  a  do6lrine,  which  the  light  of  Nature  cannot 
discover ;  ^^  or  a  precept,  which  the  law  of  Nature 
does  not  oblige  to. 

"  Seech,  iii.  »2  pp,  jgg^  ,69. 


1 

m 

ML 

1 
1 

Chap.  2.  Of  the  Supposed  Presumption,  &c.  167 


CHAPTER  II. 

Of  the  supposed  Presumption  against  a  Revelation, 
considered  as  miraculous. 

AVING  shewn  the  importance  of  the 
Christian  Revelation,  and  the  obliga- 
tions which  we  are  under  seriously  to 
attend  to  it,  upon  supposition  of  its 
truth,  or  its  credibility:  The  next 
thing  in  order,  is  to  consider,  the  supposed  presump- 
tions against  Revelation  in  general ;  which  shall  be 
the  subjedl  of  this  chapter :  and  the  objecftions  against 
the  Christian  in  particular  ;  which  shall  be  the  sub- 
ject: of  some  following  ones.^  For  it  seems  the  most 
natural  method,  to  remove  these  prejudices  against 
Christianity  ;  before  we  proceed  to  the  consideration 
of  the  positive  evidence  for  it,  and  the  objections 
against  that  evidence.^ 

It  is,  I  think,  commonly  supposed,  that  there  is 
some  peculiar  presumption,  from  the  Analogy  of 
Nature,  against  the  Christian  scheme  of  things ;  at 
least  against  miracles :  so  as  that  stronger  evidence 
is  necef^ary  to  prove  the  truth  and  reality  of  them, 
than  would  be  sufficient  to  convince  us  of  other  events, 
or  matters  of  fact.  Indeed  the  consideration  of  this 
supposed  presumption,  cannot  but  be  thought  very 
insignificant,  by  many  persons.  Yet,  as  it  belongs 
to  the  subje(5^  of  this  treatise  ;  so  it  may  tend  to  open 
the  mind,  and  remove  some  prejudices  ;  however 
needlef^  the  consideration  of  it  be,  upon  its  own  ac- 
count. 

*  Ch.  iii.  iv.  v.  vi.  '  Ch.  vii. 


1 68       Of  the  Supposed  Presumption   Part  2. 

I.  I  find  no  appearance  of  a  presumption,  from 
the  Analogy  of  Nature,  against  the  general  scheme 
of  Christianity,  that  God  created  and  invisibly  governs 
the  world  by  Jesus  Christ ;  and  by  him  also  will 
hereafter  judge  it  in  righteousneft,  i.e.  render  to 
every  one  according  to  his  works :  and  that  good 
men  are  under  the  secret  influence  of  his  Spirit. 
Whether  these  things  are,  or  are  not,  to  be  called 
miraculous,  is,  perhaps,  only  a  question  about  words; 
or  however,  is  of  no  moment  in  the  case.  If  the 
Analogy  of  Nature  raises  any  presumption  against 
this  general  scheme  of  Christianity,  it  must  be,  either 
because  it  is  not  discoverable  by  reason  or  experi- 
ence;  or  else,  because  it  is  unlike  that  course  of 
Nature,  which  is.  But  Analogy  raises  no  presump- 
tion against  the  truth  of  this  scheme,  upon  either  of 
these  accounts. 

First,  There  is  no  presumption,  from  Analogy, 
against  the  truth  of  it,  upon  account  of  its  not  being 
discoverable  by  reason  or  experience.  For  suppose 
one  who  never  heard  of  Revelation,  of  the  most  im- 
proved understanding,  and  acquainted  with  our  whole 
system  of  natural  philosophy  and  natural  Religion : 
such  an  one  could  not  but  be  sensible,  that  it  was  but 
a  very  small  part  of  the  natural  and  moral  system  of 
the  universe,  which  he  was  acquainted  with.  He 
could  not  but  be  sensible,  that  there  must  be  innu- 
merable things,  in  the  dispensations  of  Providence 
past,  in  the  invisible  government  over  the  world,  at 
present  carrying  on,  and  in  what  is  to  come ;  of 
which  he  was  wholly  ignorant,^  and  which  could  not 
be  discovered  without  Revelation.  Whether  the 
scheme  of  Nature  be,  in  the  strictest  sense,  infinite 
or  not ;  it  is  evidently  vast,  even  beyond  all  poftible 

3  P.  129. 


Chap,  2.  against  Miracles.  169 

imagination.  And  doubtlel^  that  part  of  it,  which  is 
opened  to  our  view,  is  but  as  a  point,  in  comparison 
of  the  whole  plan  of  Providence,  reaching-  through- 
out eternity  past  and  future  ;  in  comparison  of  what 
is  even  now  going  on,  in  the  remote  parts  of  the 
boundleft  universe  ;  nay  in  comparison  of  the  whole 
scheme  of  this  world.  And  therefore,  that  things 
lie  beyond  the  natural  reach  of  our  faculties,  is  no 
sort  of  presumption  against  the  truth  and  reality  of 
them:  because  it  is  certain,  there  are  innumerable 
things,  in  the  constitution  and  government  of  the 
universe,  which  are  thus  beyond  the  natural  reach 
of  our  faculties.  Secondly,  Analogy  raises  no  pre- 
sumption, against  any  of  the  things  contained  in  this 
general  do6lrine  of  Scripture  now  mentioned,  upon 
account  of  their  being  unlike  the  known  course  of 
Nature.  For  there  is  no  presumption  at  all  from 
Analogy,  that  the  whole  course  of  things,  or  Divine 
government,  naturally  unknown  to  us,  and  everything 
in  it,  is  like  to  anything  in  that  which  is  known  ;  and 
therefore  no  peculiar  presumption  against  any- 
thing in  the  former,  upon  account  of  its  being  unlike 
to  anything  in  the  latter.  And  in  the  constitution 
and  natural  government  of  the  world,  as  well  as  in 
the  moral  government  of  it,  we  see  things,  in  a  great 
degree,  unlike  one  another  :  and  therefore  ought  not 
to  wonder  at  such  unlikenei^  between  things  visible 
and  invisible.  However,  the  scheme  of  Christianity 
is  by  no  means  entirely  unlike  the  scheme  of  Nature  ; 
as  will  appear  in  the  following  part  of  this  treatise. 

The  notion  of  a  miracle,  considered  as  a  proof  of 
a  Divine  million,  has  been  stated  with  great  exa(5l- 
ne{^  by  divines ;  and  is,  I  think,  sufficiently  under- 
stood by  every  one.  There  are  also  invisible  miracles, 
the  incarnation  of  Christ,  for  instance,  which,  being 
secret,  cannot  be  alleged  as  a  proof  of  such  a  mis- 


1 70       Of  the  Supposed  Presumption   Part  2. 

sion ;  but  require  themselves  to  be  proved  by  visible 
miracles.  Revelation  itself  too  is  miraculous  ;  and 
miracles  are  the  proof  of  it :  and  the  supposed  pre- 
sumption against  these,  shall  presently  be  considered. 
All  which  I  have  been  observing  here  is,  that,  whether 
we  choose  to  call  everything  in  the  dispensations  of 
Providence,  not  discoverable  without  Revelation,  nor 
like  the  known  course  of  things,  miraculous ;  and 
whether  the  general  Christian  dispensation  now  men- 
tioned, is  to  be  called  so,  or  not ;  the  foregoing  ob- 
servations seem  certainly  to  shew,  that  there  is  no 
presumption  against  it,  from  the  Analogy  of  Nature. 

II.  There  is  no  presumption,  from  Analogy,  against 
some  operations,  which,  we  should  now  call  mira- 
culous ;  particularly  none  against  a  Revelation,  at 
the  beginning  of  the  world :  nothing  of  such  pre- 
sumption against  it,  as  is  supposed  to  be  implied  or 
expref^ed  in  the  word,  miraculous.  For  a  miracle, 
in  its  very  notion,  is  relative  to  a  course  of  Nature  ; 
and  implies  somewhat  different  from  it,  considered 
as  being  so.  Now,  either  there  was  no  course  of 
Nature  at  the  time  which  we  are  speaking  of:  or  if 
there  were,  we  are  not  acquainted,  what  the  course 
of  Nature  is,  upon  the  first  peopling  of  worlds.  And 
therefore  the  question,  whether  mankind  had  a  Re- 
velation made  to  them  at  that  tiine,  is  to  be  consi- 
dered, not  as  a  question  concerning  a  miracle,  but 
as  a  common  question  of  fact.  And  we  have  the 
like  reason,  be  it  more  or  lef^,  to  admit  the  report 
of  tradition,  concerning  this  question,  and  concerning 
common  matters  of  fa(?t  of  the  same  antiquity ;  for 
instance,  what  part  of  the  earth  was  first  peopled. 

Or  thus :  When  mankind  was  first  placed  in  this 
state,  there  was  a  power  exerted,  totally  different 
from  the  present  course  of  Nature.  Now,  whether 
this  power,  thus  wholly  different  from  the  present 
course  of  Nature,  for  we  cannot  properly  apply  to  it 


Chap,  2.  against  Miracles.  1 71 

the  word  miraculous  ;  whether  this  power  stopped 
immediately  after  it  had  made  man,  or  went  on,  and 
exerted  itself  farther  in  giving  him  a  Revelation,  is 
a  question  of  the  same  kind,  as  whether  an  ordinary 
power  exerted  itself  in  such  a  particular  degree  and 
manner,  or  not. 

Or  suppose  the  power  exerted  in  the  formation  of 
the  world,  be  considered  as  miraculous,  or  rather,  be 
called  by  that  name  ;  the  case  will  not  be  different : 
since  it  must  be  acknowledged,  that  such  a  power 
was  exerted.  For  supposing  it  acknowledged,  that 
our  Saviour  spent  some  years  in  a  course  of  working 
miracles  :  there  is  no  more  presumption,  worth  men- 
tioning, against  his  having  exerted  this  miraculous 
power,  in  a  certain  degree  greater,  than  in  a  certain 
degree  left ;  in  one  or  two  more  instances,  than  in 
one  or  two  fewer ;   in  this,  than  in  another  manner. 

It  is  evident  then,  that  there  can  be  no  peculiar 
presumption,  from  the  Analogy  of  Nature,  against 
supposing  a  Revelation,  when  man  was  first  placed 
upon  the  earth. 

Add,  that  there  does  not  appear  the  least  intima- 
tion in  history  or  tradition,  that  Religion  was  first 
reasoned  out :  but  the  whole  of  history  and  tradition 
makes  for  the  other  side,  that  it  came  into  the  world 
by  Revelation.  Indeed  the  state  of  Religion  in  the 
first  ages,  of  which  we  have  any  account,  seems  to 
suppose  and  imply,  that  this  was  the  original  of  it 
amongst  mankind.  And  these  refle(51;ions  together, 
without  taking  in  the  peculiar  authority  of  Scripture, 
amount  to  real  and  a  very  material  degree  of  evidence, 
that  there  was  a  Revelation  at  the  beginning  of  the 
world.  Now  this,  as  it  is  a  confirmation  of  natural 
Religion,  and  therefore  mentioned  in  the  former  part 
of  this  treatise  ;^  so  likewise  it  has  a  tendency  to  re- 

♦  Pp.  121,  &c. 


172       Of  the  Supposed  Presumption    Part  2. 

move  any  prejudices  against  a  subsequent  Revela- 
tion. 

III.  But  still  it  may  be  obje(5led,  that  there  is  some 
peculiarpresumption,from  Analogy,  against  miracles; 
particularly  against  Revelation,  after  the  settlement 
and  during  the  continuance  of  a  course  of  Nature. 

Now  with  regard  to  this  supposed  presumption,  it 
is  to  be  observed  in  general;  that  before  we  can 
have  ground  for  raising  what  can,  with  any  propriety, 
be  called  an  argument  from  Analogy,  for  or  against 
Revelation  considered  as  somewhat  miraculous,  we 
must  be  acquainted  with  a  similar  or  parallel  case. 
But  the  history  of  some  other  world,  seemingly  in 
like  circumstances  with  our  own,  is  no  more  than  a 
parallel  case :  and  therefore  nothing  short  of  this, 
can  be  so.  Yet,  could  we  come  at  a  presumptive 
proof,  for  or  against  a  Revelation,  from  being  in- 
formed, whether  such  world  had  one,  or  not ;  such 
a  proof,  being  drawn  from  one  single  instance  only, 
must  be  infinitely  precarious.  More  particularly : 
First  of  all ;  There  is  a  very  strong  presumption 
against  common  speculative  truths,  and  against  the 
most  ordinary  fa(fi:s,  before  the  proof  of  them ;  which 
yet  is  overcome  by  almost  any  proof.  There  is  a 
presumption  of  millions  to  one,  against  the  story  of 
CcBsar,  or  of  any  other  man.  For  suppose  a  number 
of  common  facets  so  and  so  circumstanced,  of  which 
one  had  no  kind  of  proof,  should  happen  to  come 
into  one's  thoughts ;  every  one  would,  without  any 
pof^ible  doubt,  conclude  them  to  be  false.  And  the 
like  may  be  said  of  a  single  common  fa6l.  And  from 
hence  it  appears,  that  the  question  of  importance,  as 
to  the  matter  before  us,  is,  concerning  the  degree  of 
the  peculiar  presumption  supposed  against  miracles  ; 
not  whether  there  be  any  peculiar  presumption  at 
all  against  them.     For,  if  there  be  the  presumption 


Chap.  2.  against  Miracles.  173 

of  millions  to  one,  against  the  most  common  fa6ls ; 
What  can  a  small  presumption,  additional  to  this, 
amount  to,  though  it  be  peculiar  ?  It  cannot  be  es- 
timated, and  is  as  nothing.  The  only  material  ques- 
tion is,  whether  there  be  any  such  presumption 
against  miracles,  as  to  render  them  in  any  sort  in- 
credible. Secondly,  If  we  leave  out  the  consideration 
of  Religion,  we  are  in  such  total  darkneft,  upon  what 
causes,  occasions,  reasons,  or  circumstances,  the 
present  course  of  Nature  depends ;  that  there  does 
not  appear  any  improbability  for  or  against  suppos- 
ing, that  five  or  six  thousand  years  may  have  given 
scope  for  causes,  occasions,  reasons,  or  circum- 
stances, from  whence  miraculous  interpositions  may 
have  arisen.  And  from  this,  joined  with  the  fore- 
going observation,  it  will  follow,  that  there  must  be 
a  presumption,  beyond  all  comparison,  greater, 
against  the  particular  common  fa6is  just  now  in- 
stanced in,  than  against  miracles  in  general ;  before 
any  evidence  of  either.  But,  thirdly,  take  in  the 
consideration  of  Religion,  or  the  moral  system  of  the 
world,  and  then  we  see  distin(5l  particular  reasons 
for  miracles  :  to  afford  mankind  instruction  additional 
to  that  of  Nature,  and  to  attest  the  truth  of  it.  And 
this  gives  a  real  credibility  to  the  supposition,  that 
it  might  be  part  of  the  original  plan  of  things,  that 
there  should  be  miraculous  interpositions.  Then, 
lastly,  miracles  must  not  be  compared  to  common 
natural  events  ;  or  to  events  which,  though  uncom- 
mon, are  similar  to  what  we  daily  experience :  but 
to  the  extraordinary  phenomena  of  Nature.  And 
then  the  comparison  will  be  between  the  presump- 
tion against  miracles,  and  the  presumption  against 
such  uncommon  appearances,  suppose,  as  comets, 
and  against  there  being  any  such  powers  in  Nature 
as  magnetism  and  ele(5lricity,  so  contrary  to  the  pro- 


1 74  Of  the  Supposed  Presumption,  &c.  Part  2. 

perties  of  other  bodies  not  endued  with  these  powers. 
And  before  any  one  can  determine,  whether  there 
be  any  peculiar  presumption  against  miracles,  more 
than  against  other  extraordinary  things ;  he  must 
consider,  what,  upon  first  hearing,  would  be  the  pre- 
sumption against  the  last-mentioned  appearances  and 
powers,  to  a  person  acquainted  only  with  the  daily, 
monthly,  and  annual,  course  of  Nature  respe^iing 
this  earth,  and  with  those  common  powers  of  matter 
which  we  every  day  see. 

Upon  all  this  I  conclude  ;  That  there  certainly  is 
no  such  presumption  against  miracles,  as  to  render 
them  in  any  wise  incredible :  That  on  the  contrary, 
our  being  able  to  discern  reasons  for  them,  gives  a 
positive  credibility  to  the  history  of  them,  in  cases 
where  those  reasons  hold :  And  that  it  is  by  no  means 
certain,  that  there  is  any  peculiar  presumption  at  all, 
from  Analogy,  even  in  the  lowest  degree,  against 
miracles,  as  distinguished  from  other  extraordinary 
phenomena :  though  it  is  not  worth  while  to  perplex 
the  reader,  with  inquiries  into  the  abstract  nature  of 
evidence,  in  order  to  determine  a  question,  which, 
without  such  inquiries,  we  see ^  is  of  no  importance. 

^  P.  172, 


Chap,  3.         The  Credibility,  &c.  175 


CHAPTER  III. 

0/  our  Incapacity  of  judging,  what  were  to  he  ex- 
pelled in  a  Revelation  ;  and  the  Credibility ,  from 
Analogy,  that  it  must  contain  things  appearing 
liable  to  OhjeStions. 

ESIDES  the  obje(5lions  against  the 
evidence  for  Christianity,  many  are 
alleged  against  the  scheme  of  it ; 
against  the  whole  manner  in  which  it 
is  put  and  left  with  the  world  ;  as  well 
as  against  several  particular  relations  in  Scripture : 
Obje(5lions  drawn,  from  the  deficiencies  of  Revela- 
tion ;  from  things  in  it  appearing  to  menfoolishnefi  ;^ 
from  its  containing  matters  of  offence,  which  have 
led,  and  it  must  have  been  foreseen  would  lead,  into 
strange  enthusiasm  and  superstition^  and  be  made 
to  serve  the  purposes  of  tyranny  and  wickednefs ; 
from  its  not  being  universal ;  and,  which  is  a  thing 
of  the  same  kind,  from  its  evidence  not  being  so 
convincing  and  satisfactory  as  it  might  have  been : 
for  this  last  is  sometimes  turned  into  a  positive  ar- 
gument against  its  truth.-  It  would  be  tedious,  in- 
deed impof^ible,  to  enumerate  the  several  particulars 
comprehended  under  the  obje cations  here  referred 
to ;  they  being  so  various,  according  to  the  different 
fancies  of  men.  There  are  persons,  who  think  it  a 
strong  obje(5lion  against  the  authority  of  Scripture, 
that  it  is  not  composed  by  rules  of  art,  agreed  upon 
by  critics,  for  polite  and  correal  writing.     And  the 

»   I  Cor.  i.  28.  2  See  ch.  vi. 


176  The  Credibility,  that  a  Revelation  Part  2, 

scorn  is  inexpref^ible,  with  which  some  of  the  pro- 
phetic parts  of  Scripture  are  treated  :  partly  through 
the  rashneft  of  interpreters ;  but  very  much  also,  on 
accountofthe  hieroglyphical  and  figurative  language, 
in  which  they  are  left  us.  Some  of  the  principal 
things  of  this  sort  shall  be  particularly  considered, 
in  following  chapters.  But  my  design  at  present,  is 
to  observe  in  general,  with  respe^l  to  this  whole  way 
of  arguing,  that,  upon  supposition  of  a  Revelation, 
it  is  highly  credible  beforehand,  we  should  be  in- 
competent judges  of  it,  to  a  great  degree  :  and  that 
it  would  contain  many  things  appearing  to  us  liable 
to  great  objections ;  in  case  we  judge  of  it  otherwise, 
than  by  the  Analogy  of  Nature.  And  therefore, 
though  objections  against  the  evidence  of  Christi- 
anity are  most  seriously  to  be  considered ;  yet  ob- 
je(5lions  against  Christianity  itself  are,  in  a  great 
measure,  frivolous :  almost  all  objections  against  it, 
excepting  those  which  are  alleged  against  the  parti- 
cular proofs  of  its  coming  from  God.  I  expreft  myself 
with  caution,  lest  I  should  be  mistaken  to  vilify  Rea- 
son :  which  is  indeed  the  only  faculty  we  have  where- 
with to  judge  concerning  anything,  even  Revelation 
itself:  or  to  be  misunderstood  to  aftert,  that  a  sup- 
posed Revelation  cannot  be  proved  false,  from  in- 
ternal chara(5ters.  For,  it  may  contain  clear  immo- 
ralities or  contradictions:  and  either  of  these  would 
prove  it  false.  Nor  will  I  take  upon  me  to  affirm, 
that  nothing  else  can  pof^ibly  render  any  supposed 
Revelation  incredible.  Yet  still  the  observation  above 
is,  I  think,  true  beyond  doubt ;  that  objections  against 
Christianity,  as  distinguished  from  objections  against 
its  evidence,  are  frivolous.  To  make  out  this,  is  the 
general  design  of  the  present  chapter.  And  with 
regard  to  the  whole  of  it,  I  cannot  but  particularly 
wish,  that  the  proofs  might  be  attended  to ;  rather 


Chap.  3.  must  appear  liable  to  Objedions.   177 

than  the  aftertions  cavilled  at,  upon  account  of  any 
unacceptable  consequences,  whether  real  or  sup- 
posed, which  may  be  drawn  from  them.  For,  after 
all,  that  which  is  true  must  be  admitted,  though  it 
should  shew  us  the  shortnel^  of  our  faculties ;  and 
that  we  are  in  no  wise  judges  of  many  things,  of 
which  we  are  apt  to  think  ourselves  very  competent 
ones.  Nor  will  this  be  any  objection  with  reasonable 
men,  at  least  upon  second  thought  it  will  not  be  any 
objection  with  such,  against  the  justneft  of  the  fol- 
lowing observations. 

As  God  governs  the  world,  and  instructs  his  crea- 
tures, according  to  certain  laws  or  rules,  in  the  known 
course  of  Nature  ;  known  by  reason  together  with 
experience  :  so  the  Scripture  informs  us  of  a  scheme 
of  Divine  Providence,  additional  to  this.  It  relates, 
that  God  has,  by  Revelation,  instru^led  men  in  things 
concerning  his  government,  which  they  could  not 
otherwise  have  known ;  and  reminded  them  of  things, 
which  they  might  otherwise  know :  and  attested  the 
truth  of  the  whole,  by  miracles.  Now  if  the  natural 
and  the  revealed  dispensation  of  things  are  both  from 
God,  if  they  coincide  with  each  other,  and  together 
make  up  one  scheme  of  Providence :  our  being  in- 
competent judges  of  one,  must  render  it  credible, 
that  we  may  be  incompetent  judges  also  of  the  other. 
Since,  upon  experience,  the  acknowledged  constitu- 
tion and  course  of  Nature  is  found  to  be  greatly  dif- 
ferent from  what,  before  experience,  would  have 
been  expelled;  and  such  as,  men  fancy,  there  lie 
great  obje(?i:ions  against :  this  renders  it  beforehand 
highly  credible,  that  they  may  find  the  revealed  dis- 
pensation likewise,  if  they  judge  of  it  as  they  do  of 
the  constitution  of  Nature,  very  different  from  ex- 
pe(5lations  formed  beforehand  ;  and  liable,  in  appear- 
ance, to  great  objections:    ObjecHiions  against  the 

N 


178  The  Credibility,  that  a  Revelation  Part  2. 

scheme  itself,  and  against  the  degrees  and  manners 
of  the  miraculous  interpositions,  by  which  it  was  at- 
tested and  carried  on.  Thus  suppose  a  prince  to 
govern  his  dominions  in  the  wisest  manner  poftible, 
by  common  I^nown  laws ;  and  that  upon  some  exi- 
gencies he  should  suspend  these  laws  ;  and  govern, 
in  several  instances,  in  a  different  manner :  If  one 
of  his  subje(5ls  were  not  a  competent  judge  before- 
hand, by  what  common  rules  the  government  should 
or  would  be  carried  on ;  it  could  not  be  expet^ed, 
that  the  same  person  would  be  a  competent  judge, 
in  what  exigencies,  or  in  what  manner,  or  to  what 
degree,  those  laws  commonly  observed  would  be 
suspended  or  deviated  from.  If  he  were  not  a  judge 
of  the  wisdom  of  the  ordinary  administration;  there 
is  no  reason  to  think,  he  would  be  a  judge  of  the 
wisdom  of  the  extraordinary.  If  he  thought  he  had 
objections  against  the  former  ;  doubtlei^,  it  is  highly 
supposable,  he  might  think  also,  that  he  had  objec- 
tions against  the  latter.  And  thus,  as  we  fall  into 
infinite  follies  and  mistakes,  whenever  we  pretend, 
otherwise  than  from  experience  and  Analogy,  to 
judge  of  the  constitution  and  course  of  Nature  ;  it  is 
evidently  supposable  beforehand,  that  we  should  fall 
into  as  great,  in  pretending  to  judge,  in  like  manner, 
concerning  Revelation.  Nor  is  there  any  more 
ground  to  expe(5l,  that  this  latter  should  appear  to 
us  clear  of  obje(5lions,  than  that  the  former  should. 
These  observations,  relating  to  the  whole  of  Chris- 
tianity, are  applicable  to  inspiration  in  particular. 
As  we  are  in  no  sort  judges  beforehand,  by  what 
laws  or  rules,  in  what  degree,  or  by  what  means,  it 
were  to  have  been  expe(5led,  that  God  would  natu- 
rally instru(5l  us :  so  upon  supposition  of  his  afford- 
ing us  light  and  instru(5lion  by  Revelation,  additional 
to  what  he  has  afforded  us  by  reason  and  experience. 


Chap,  3.  must  appear  liable  to  Objeclions.   179 

we  are  in  no  sort  judges,  by  what  methods  and  in 
what  proportion,  it  were  to  be  expe(5led,  that  this 
supernatural  light  and  instruction  would  be  afforded 
us.  We  know  not  beforehand,  what  degree  or  kind 
of  natural  information,  it  were  to  be  expected  God 
would  afford  men,  each  by  his  own  reason  and  ex- 
perience :  nor  how  far  he  would  enable,  and  effec- 
tually dispose  them  to  communicate  it,  whatever  it 
should  be,  to  each  other  :  nor  whether  the  evidence 
of  it  would  be,  certain,  highly  probable,  or  doubtful : 
nor  whether  it  would  be  given  with  equal  clearneis 
and  conviction  to  all.  Nor  could  we  gueft,  upon 
any  good  ground  I  mean,  whether  natural  know- 
ledge, or  even  the  faculty  itself,  by  which  we  are 
capable  of  attaining  it,  reason,  would  be  given  us  at 
once,  or  gradually.  In  like  manner,  we  are  wholly 
ignorant  what  degree  of  new  knowledge,  it  were  to 
be  expected,  God  would  give  mankind  by  Revela- 
tion, upon  supposition  of  his  affording  one :  or  how 
far,  or  in  what  way,  he  would  interpose  miraculously. 
to  qualify  them,  to  whom  he  should  originally  make 
the  Revelation,  for  communicating  the  knowledge 
given  by  it ;  and  to  secure  their  doing  it  to  the  age 
in  which  they  should  live ;  and  to  secure  its  being 
transmitted  to  posterity.  We  are  equally  ignorant, 
whether  the  evidence  of  it  would  be,  certain,  or  highly 
probable,  or  doubtful:'^  or  whether  all  who  should 
have  any  degree  of  instruction  from  it,  and  any  de- 
gree of  evidence  of  its  truth,  would  have  the  same: 
or  whether  the  scheme  would  be  revealed  at  once, 
or  unfolded  gradually.  Nay  we  are  not  in  any  sort 
able  to  judge,  whether  it  were  to  have  been  expected, 
that  the  Revelation  should  have  been  committed  to 
writing ;  or  left  to  be  handed  down,  and  subsequently 

'  See  ch.  vi. 


i8o  The  Credibility,  that  a  Revelation  Part  2. 

corrupted  by  verbal  tradition,  and  at  length  sunk 
under  it,  if  mankind  so  pleased,  and  during  such  time 
as  they  are  permitted,  in  the  degree  they  evidently 
are,  to  a(5l  as  they  will. 

But  it  may  be  said,  "  that  a  Revelation  in  some  of 
''  the  abovementioned  circumstances ;  one,  for  in- 
"  stance,  which  was  not  committed  to  writing,  and 
"  thus  secured  against  danger  of  corruption,  would 
"  not  have  answered  its  purpose."  I  ask,  what  pur- 
pose ?  It  would  not  have  answered  all  the  purposes 
which  it  has  now  answered,  and  in  the  same  degree  : 
but  it  would  have  answered  others,  or  the  same  in 
different  degrees.  And  which  of  these  were  the 
purposes  of  God,  and  best  fell  in  with  his  general 
government,  we  could  not  at  all  have  determined 
beforehand. 

Now  since  it  has  been  shewn,  that  we  have  no 
principles  of  reason,  upon  which  to  judge  beforehand, 
how  it  were  to  be  expected  Revelation  should  have 
been  left,  or  what  was  most  suitable  to  the  Divine 
plan  of  government,  in  any  of  the  forementioned  re- 
spects ;  it  must  be  quite  frivolous  to  obje(5t  afterwards 
as  to  any  of  them,  against  its  being  left  in  one  way, 
rather  than  another:  For  this  would  be  to  objeCl 
against  things,  upon  account  of  their  being  different 
from  expectations,  which  have  been  shewn  to  be 
without  reason.  And  thus  we  see,  that  the  only  ques- 
tion concerning  the  truth  of  Christianity,  is,  whether 
it  be  a  real  Revelation :  not  whether  it  be  attended 
with  every  circumstance  which  we  should  have  looked 
for  :  and  concerning  the  authority  of  Scripture,  whe- 
ther it  be  what  it  claims  to  be  ;  not  whether  it  be  a 
book  of  such  sort,  and  so  promulged,  as  weak  men 
are  apt  to  fancy,  a  book  containing  a  Divine  Reve- 
lation should.  And  therefore,  neither  obscurity,  nor 
seeming  inaccuracy  of  style,  nor  various  readings, 


Chap.  3.  must  appear  liable  to  Objedions.    181 

nor  early  disputes  about  the  authors  of  particular 
parts  ;  nor  any  other  things  of  the  like  kind,  though 
they  had  been  much  more  considerable  in  degree 
than  they  are,  could  overthrow  the  authority  of  the 
Scripture  :  unle{^  the  prophets,  apostles,  or  our  Lord, 
had  promised,  that  the  book  containing  the  Divine 
Revelation,  should  be  secure  from  those  things.  Nor 
indeed  can  any  obje(5lions  overthrow  such  a  kind  of 
Revelation  as  the  Christian  claims  to  be,  since  there 
are  no  obje(?i:ions  against  the  morality  of  it,^  but  such 
as  can  shew,  that  there  is  no  proof  of  miracles  wrought 
originally  in  attestation  of  it ;  no  appearance  of  any- 
thing miraculous  in  its  obtaining  in  the  world  ;  nor 
any  of  prophecy,  that  is,  of  events  foretold,  which 
human  sagacity  could  not  foresee.  If  it  can  be  shewn, 
that  the  proof  alleged  for  all  these,  is  absolutely  none 
at  all,  then  is  Revelation  overturned.  But  were  it 
allowed,  that  the  proof  of  any  one  or  all  of  them,  is 
lower  than  is  allowed ;  yet,  whilst  any  proof  of  them 
remains.  Revelation  will  stand  upon  much  the  same 
foot  it  does  at  present,  as  to  all  the  purposes  of  life 
and  prac^tice,  and  ought  to  have  the  like  influence 
upon  our  behaviour. 

From  the  foregoing  observations  too,  it  will  follow, 
and  those  who  will  thoroughly  examine  into  Reve- 
lation, will  find  it  worth  remarking ;  that  there  are 
several  ways  of  arguing,  which,  though  just  with  re- 
gard to  other  writings,  are  not  applicable  to  Scrip- 
ture :  at  least  not  to  the  prophetic  parts  of  it.  We 
cannot  argue,  for  instance,  that  this  cannot  be  the 
sense  or  intent  of  such  a  parage  of  Scripture  ;  for  if 
it  had,  it  would  have  been  exprei^ed  more  plainly, 
or  have  been  represented  under  a  more  apt  figure 
or  hieroglyphic  :  Yet  we  may  justly  argue  thus,  with 

*P.  189. 


1 82  The  Credibility,  that  a  Revelation  Part  2. 

respe<?i:  to  common  books.  And  the  reason  of  this 
difference  is  very  evident :  that  in  Scripture,  we  are 
not  competent  judges,  as  we  are  in  common  books, 
how  plainly  it  were  to  have  been  expe(5^ed,  what  is 
the  true  sense  should  have  been  exprel^ed,  or  under 
how  apt  an  image  figured.  The  only  question  is, 
what  appearance  there  is,  that  this  is  the  sense  ;  and 
scarce  at  all,  how  much  more  determinately  or  ac- 
curately it  might  have  been  exprefted  or  figured. 

"  But  is  it  not  self-evident,  that  internal  improba- 
'•  bilitiesofall  kinds,  weaken  external  probable  proof?" 
Doubtlef^.  But  to  what  pra(5lical  purpose  can  this 
be  alleged  here,  when  it  has  been  proved  before,^ 
that  real  internal  improbabilities  which  rise  even  to 
moral  certainty,  are  overcome  by  the  most  ordinary 
testimony  ;  and  when  it  now  has  been  made  appear, 
that  we  scarce  know  what  are  improbabilities,  as  to 
the  matter  we  are  here  considering :  as  it  will  farther 
appear  from  what  follows. 

For  though  from  the  observations  above  made,  it 
is  manifest,  that  we  are  not  in  any  sort  competent 
judges,  what  supernatural  instruction  were  to  have 
been  expec^ted;  and  though  it  is  self-evident,  that 
the  obje(5^ions  of  an  incompetent  judgment  must  be 
frivolous :  Yet  it  may  be  proper  to  go  one  step  far- 
ther, and  observe  ;  that  if  men  will  be  regardlef^  of 
these  things,  and  pretend  to  judge  of  the  Scripture 
by  preconceived  expe<51ations  ;  the  Analogy  of  Na- 
ture shews  beforehand  not  only  that  it  is  highly  cre- 
dible they  may,  but  also  probable  that  they  will, 
imagine  they  have  strong  obje(?i:ions  against  it,  how- 
ever really  unexceptionable :  for  so,  prior  to  expe- 
rience, they  would  think  they  had,  against  the  cir- 
cumstances and  degrees  and  the  whole  manner  of 

*  P.  172, 


Chap.  3.  must  appear  liable  to  Objeflions.    183 

that  instru(9:ion,  which  is  afforded  by  the  ordinary 
course  of  Nature.  Were  the  instruction  which  God 
affords  to  brute  creatures  by  instincts  and  mere  pro- 
pensions,  and  to  mankind  by  these  together  with 
reason,  matter  of  probable  proof,  and  not  of  certain 
observation  ;  it  would  be  rejected  as  incredible,  in 
many  instances  of  it,  only  upon  account  of  the  means 
by  which  this  instruction  is  given,  the  seeming  dis- 
proportions, the  limitations,  necefsary  conditions,  and 
circumstances  of  it.  For  instance  :  Would  it  not 
have  been  thought  highly  improbable,  that  men 
should  have  been  so  much  more  capable  of  discover- 
ing, even  to  certainty,  the  general  laws  of  matter, 
and  the  magnitudes,  paths  and  revolutions  of  the 
heavenly  bodies ;  than  the  occasions  and  cures  of 
distempers,  and  many  other  things,  in  which  human 
life  seems  so  much  more  nearly  concerned,  than  in 
astronomy  \  How  capricious  and  irregular  a  way  of 
information,  would  it  be  said,  is  that  of  invention,  by 
means  of  which,  Nature  instrucls  us  in  matters  of 
science,  and  in  many  things,  upon  which  the  affairs 
of  the  world  greatl}'^  depend :  That  a  man  should,  by 
this  faculty,  be  made  acquainted  with  a  thing  in  an 
instant,  when  perhaps  he  is  thinking  of  somewhat 
else,  which  he  has  in  vain  been  searching  after,  it 
may  be,  for  years.  So  likewise  the  imperfections 
attending  the  only  method,  by  which  Nature  enables 
and  directs  us  to  communicate  our  thoughts  to  each 
other,  are  innumerable.  Language  is,  in  its  very 
nature,  inadequate,  ambiguous,  liable  to  infinite  abuse, 
even  from  negligence ;  and  so  liable  to  it  from  de- 
sign, that  every  man  can  deceive  and  betray  by  it. 
And,  to  mention  but  one  instance  more  ;  that  brutes, 
without  reason,  should  acl,  in  many  respects,  with  a 
sagacity  and  foresight  vastly  greater  than  what  men 
have  in  those  respedls,  would  be  thought  impof^ible. 


184  The  Credibility,  that  a  Revelation  Part  2. 

Yet  it  is  certain  they  do  3(9:  with  such  superior  fore- 
sight :  whether  it  be  their  own  indeed,  is  another 
question.  From  these  things  it  is  highly  credible 
beforehand,  that  upon  supposition  God  should  afford 
men  some  additional  instruction  by  Revelation,  it 
would  be  with  circumstances,  in  manners,  degrees 
and  respeCls,  which  we  should  be  apt  to  fancy  we 
had  great  obje(fi:ions  against  the  credibility  of.  Nor 
are  the  obje(51;ions  against  the  Scripture,  nor  against 
Christianity  in  general,  at  all  more  or  greater,  than 

the  Analogy  of  Nature  would  beforehand not 

perhaps  give  ground  to  expeCl ;  for  this  Analogy  may 
not  be  sufficient,  in  some  cases,  to  ground  an  ex- 
pe(fi;ation  upon  ;  but  no  more  nor  greater,  that  Ana- 
logy would  shew  it,  beforehand,  to  be  supposable 
and  credible,  that  there  might  seem  to  lie  against 
Revelation. 

By  applying  these  general  observations  to  a  par- 
ticular obje<5lion,  it  will  be  more  distinctly  seen,  how 
they  are  applicable  to  others  of  the  like  kind :  and 
indeed  to  almost  all  obje(9;ions  against  Christianity, 
as  distinguished  from  objections  against  its  evidence. 
It  appears  from  Scripture,  that,  as  it  was  not  un- 
usual in  the  Apostolic  Age,  for  persons,  upon  their 
conversion  to  Christianity,  to  be  endued  with  mira- 
culous gifts;  so,  some  of  those  persons  exercised 
these  gifts  in  a  strangely  irregular  and  disorderly 
manner:  And  this  is  made  an  obje(51;ion  against  their 
being  really  miraculous.  Now  the  foregoing  obser- 
vations quite  remove  this  objec^tion,  how  considerable 
soever  it  may  appear  at  first  sight.  For,  consider  a 
person  endued  with  any  of  these  gifts  ;  for  instance, 
that  of  tongues :  It  is  to  be  supposed,  that  he  had 
the  same  power  over  this  miraculous  gift,  as  he  would 
have  had  over  it,  had  it  been  the  effect  of  habit,  of 
study  and  use,  as  it  ordinarily  is  ;  or  the  same  power 


Chap.  3.  must  appear  liable  to  Objedions.   185 

over  it,  as  he  had  over  any  other  natural  endowment. 
Consequently,  he  would  use  it  in  the  same  manner 
he  did  any  other ;  either  regularly  and  upon  proper 
occasions  only,  or  irregularly  and  upon  improper 
ones :  according  to  his  sense  of  decency,  and  his 
chara(5ter  of  prudence.  Where  then  is  the  objection? 
Why,  if  this  miraculous  power  was  indeed  given  to 
the  world,  to  propagate  Christianity  and  attest  the 
truth  of  it,  we  might,  it  seems,  have  expected,  that 
other  sort  of  persons  should  have  been  chosen  to  be 
invested  with  it ;  or  that  these  should,  at  the  same 
time,  have  been  endued  with  prudence  ;  or  that  they 
should  have  been,  continually,  restrained  and  di- 
rected in  the  exercise  of  it :  i.  e.  that  God  should  have 
miraculously  interposed,  if  at  all,  in  a  different  manner 
or  higher  degree.  But  from  the  observations  made 
above,  it  is  undeniably  evident,  that  w^e  are  not  judges, 
in  what  degrees  and  manners,  it  were  to  have  been 
expelled,  he  should  miraculously  interpose ;  upon 
supposition  of  his  doing  it  in  some  degree  and  man- 
ner. Nor,  in  the  natural  course  of  Providence,  are 
superior  gifts  of  memory,  eloquence,  knowledge,  and 
other  talents  of  great  influence,  conferred  only  on 
persons  of  prudence  and  decency,  or  such  as  are 
disposed  to  make  the  properest  use  of  them.  Nor 
is  the  instru(5lion  and  admonition  naturally  afforded 
us  for  the  condu(9:  of  life,  particularly  in  our  educa- 
tion, commonly  given  in  a  manner  the  most  suited 
to  recommend  it ;  but  often  with  circumstances  apt 
to  prejudice  us  against  such  instru(9;ion. 

One  might  go  on  to  add,  that  there  is  a  great  re- 
semblance between  the  light  of  Nature  and  of  Re- 
velation, in  several  other  respe(5ls.  Pra(?iical  Chris- 
tianity, or  that  faith  and  behaviour  which  renders  a 
man  a  Christian,  is  a  plain  and  obvious  thing :  like 
the  common  rules  of  condu($l,  with  respecft  to  our 


1 86  The  Credibility,  that  a  Revelation  Part  2. 

ordinary  temporal  affairs.  The  more  distindl  and 
particular  knowledge  of  those  things,  the  study  of 
which  the  apostle  calls  going  on  unto  p erf eSiion,^  and 
of  the  prophetic  parts  of  Revelation,  like  many  parts 
of  natural  and  even  civil  knowledge,  may  require 
very  exac^t  thought,  and  careful  consideration.  The 
hinderances  too,  of  natural,  and  of  supernatural  light 
and  knowledge,  have  been  of  the  same  kind.  And 
as,  it  is  owned,  the  whole  scheme  of  Scripture  is  not 
yet  understood  ;  so,  if  it  ever  comes  to  be  understood, 
before  the  restitution  of  all  things,''  and  without  mi- 
raculous interpositions  ;  it  must  be  in  the  same  way 
as  natural  knowledge  is  come  at :  by  the  continuance 
and  progreft  of  learning  and  of  liberty  ;  and  by  par- 
ticular persons  attending  to,  comparing  and  pursu- 
ing, intimations  scattered  up  and  down  it,  which  are 
overlooked  and  disregarded  by  the  generality  of  the 
world.  For  this  is  the  way,  in  which  all  improve- 
ments are  made  ;  by  thoughtful  men  tracing  on  ob- 
scure hints,  as  it  were,  dropped  us  by  Nature  acci- 
dentally, or  which  seem  to  come  into  our  minds  by 
chance.  Nor  is  it  at  all  incredible,  that  a  book,  which 
has  been  so  long  in  the  pofteftion  of  mankind,  should 
contain  many  truths  as  yet  undiscovered.  For,  all 
the  same  phenomena,  and  the  same  faculties  of  in- 
vestigation, from  which  such  great  discoveries  in 
natural  knowledge  have  been  made  in  the  present 
and  last  age,  were  equally  in  the  pof^ef^ion  of  man- 
kind, several  thousand  years  before.  And  poftibly 
it  might  be  intended,  that  events,  as  they  come  to 
paf^,  should  open  and  ascertain  the  meaning  of  se- 
veral parts  of  Scripture. 

It  may  be  obje(51ed,  that  this  Analogy  fails  in  a 
material  respect::   for  that  natural  knowledge  is  of 

*  Heb.  vi.  I.  '  Afts  iii.  21. 


Chap.  3.  must  appear  liable  to  Objedions.    187 

little  or  no  consequence.  But  I  have  been  speaking 
of  the  general  instruction,  which  Nature  does  or  does 
not  afford  us.  And  besides,  some  parts  of  natural 
knowledge,  in  the  more  common  restrained  sense  of 
the  words,  are  of  the  greatest  consequence  to  the 
ease  and  convenience  of  life.  But  suppose  the  Ana- 
logy did,  as  it  does  not,  fail  in  this  respe^ ;  yet  it 
might  be  abundantly  supplied,  from  the  whole  con- 
stitution and  course  of  Nature  :  which  shews,  that 
God  does  not  dispense  his  gifts,  according  to  our 
notions  of  the  advantage  and  consequence  they  would 
be  of  to  us.  And  this  in  general,  with  his  method 
of  dispensing  knowledge  in  particular,  would  together 
make  out  an  Analogy  full  to  the  point  before  us. 

But  it  may  be  objected  still  farther  and  more  ge- 
nerally ;  '•  The  Scripture  represents  the  world  as  in 
"  a  state  of  ruin,  and  Christianity  as  an  expedient  to 
"  recover  it,  to  help  in  these  respe^ls  where  Nature 
"  fails :  in  particular,  to  supply  the  deficiencies  of 
"  natural  light.  Is  it  credible  then,  that  so  many 
"  ages  should  have  been  let  pai^,  before  a  matter  of 
"  such  a  sort,  of  so  great  and  so  general  im.portance, 
''was  made  known  to  mankind;  and  then  that  it 
''  should  be  made  known  to  so  small  a  part  of  them  *? 
"  Is  it  conceivable,  that  this  supply  should  be  so  very 
"■  deficient,  should  have  the  like  obscurity  and  doubt- 
"  fulneft,  be  liable  to  the  like  perversions,  in  short, 
"  lie  open  to  all  the  like  objections,  as  the  light  of 
"  Nature  itself?"^  Without  determining  how  far  this 
in  fa(^  is  so,  I  answer  ;  It  is  by  no  means  incredible, 
that  it  might  be  so,  if  the  light  of  Nature  and  of  Re- 
velation be  from  the  same  hand.  Men  are  naturally 
liable  to  diseases :  for  which  God,  in  his  good  Pro- 
vidence, has  provided  natural  remedies.^  But  reme- 

»  Ch.  vi,  9  See  ch.  v. 


1 88  The  Credibility,  that  a  Revelation  Part  2. 

dies  existing  in  Nature,  have  been  unknown  to  man- 
kind for  many  ages :  are  known  but  to  few  now : 
probably  many  valuable  ones  are  not  known  yet. 
Great  has  been  and  is  the  obscurity  and  difficulty,  in 
the  nature  and  application  of  them.  Circumstances 
seem  often  to  make  them  very  improper,  where  they 
are  absolutely  necef^ary.  It  is  after  long  labour  and 
study,  and  many  unsuccefsful  endeavours,  that  they 
are  brought  to  be  as  useful,  as  they  are ;  after  high 
contempt  and  absolute  reje6lion  of  the  most  useful 
we  have  ;  and  after  disputes  and  doubts,  which  have 
seemed  to  be  endleft.  The  best  remedies  too,  when 
unskilfully,  much  more  if  dishonestly  applied,  may 
produce  new  diseases :  and  with  the  rightest  appli- 
cation, the  succef^  of  them  is  often  doubtful.  In 
many  cases,  they  are  not  at  all  efFe(9;ual :  where  they 
are,  it  is  often  very  slowly:  and  the  application  of 
them,  and  the  neceftary  regimen  accompanying  it, 
is,  not  uncommonly,  so  disagreeable,  that  some  will 
not  submit  to  them ;  and  satisfy  themselves  with  the 
excuse,  that  if  they  would,  it  is  not  certain,  whether 
it  would  be  succeftful.  And  many  persons,  who 
labour  under  diseases,  for  which  there  are  known 
natural  remedies,  are  not  so  happy  as  to  be  always, 
if  ever,  in  the  way  of  them.  In  a  word,  the  remedies 
which  Nature  has  provided  for  diseases,  are  neither 
certain,  perfecft,  nor  universal.  And  indeed  the  same 
principles  of  arguing,  which  would  lead  us  to  con- 
clude, that  they  must  be  so,  would  lead  us  likewise 
to  conclude,  that  there  could  be  no  occasion  for 
them ;  i.  e.  that  there  could  be  no  diseases  at  all. 
And  therefore,  our  experience  that  there  are  diseases, 
shews,  that  it  is  credible  beforehand,  upon  supposi- 
tion Nature  has  provided  remedies  for  them,  that 
these  remedies  may  be,  as  by  experience  we  find 
they  are,  not  certain,  nor  perfe(ft,  nor  universal ;  be- 


Chap.  3.  must  appear  liable  to  Obje6!ions.    189 

cause  it  shews,  that  the  principles  upon  which  we 
should  expe(ft  the  contrary,  are  fallacious. 

And  now,  what  is  the  just  consequence  from  all 
these  things  ?  Not  that  Reason  is  no  judge  of  what 
is  offered  to  us  as  being  of  Divine  Revelation.  For 
this  would  be  to  infer,  that  we  are  unable  to  judge 
of  anything,  because  we  are  unable  to  judge  of  all 
things.  Reason  can,  and  it  ought  to  judge,  not  only 
of  the  meaning,  but  also  of  the  morality  and  the 
evidence,  of  Revelation.  First,  It  is  the  province  of 
Reason  to  judge  of  the  morality  of  the  Scripture  ; 
i.e.  not  whether  it  contains  things  different  from  what 
we  should  have  expedled,  from  a  wise,  just  and  good 
Being;  for  obje(5lions  from  hence  have  been  now 
obviated :  but  whether  it  contains  things  plainly  con- 
tradictory to  wisdom,  justice  or  goodneft ;  to  what 
the  light  of  Nature  teaches  us  of  God.  And  I  know 
nothing  of  this  sort  obje(5led  against  Scripture,  ex- 
cepting such  objections  as  are  formed  upon  suppo- 
sitions, which  would  equally  conclude,  that  the  con- 
stitution of  Nature  is  contradictory  to  wisdom,  justice 
or  goodneft ;  which  most  certainly  it  is  not.  Indeed 
there  are  some  particular  precepts  in  Scripture,  given 
to  particular  persons,  requiring  acftions,  which  would 
be  immoral  and  vicious,  were  it  not  for  such  precepts. 
But  it  is  easy  to  see,  that  all  these  are  of  such  a  kind, 
as  that  the  precept  changes  the  whole  nature  of  the 
case  and  of  the  aClion ;  and  both  constitutes,  and 
shews  that  not  to  be  unjust  or  immoral,  which,  prior 
to  the  precept,  must  have  appeared  and  really  have 
been  so;  which  may  well  be,  since  none  of  these 
precepts  are  contrary  to  immutable  morality.  If  it 
were  commanded,  to  cultivate  the  principles,  and  aCl 
from  the  spirit  of  treachery,  ingratitude,  cruelty  ;  the 
command  would  not  alter  the  nature  of  the  case  or 
of  the  aClion,  in  any  of  these  instances.     But  it  is 


190  The  Credibility,  that  a  Revelation  Part  2. 

quite  otherwise  in  precepts,  which  require  only  the 
doing  an  external  a(51ion :  for  instance,  taking  away 
the  property  or  life  of  any.  For  men  have  no  right 
to  either  life  or  property,  but  what  arises  solely  from 
the  grant  of  God :  When  this  grant  is  revoked,  they 
cease  to  have  any  right  at  all,  in  either :  And  when 
this  revocation  is  made  known,  as  surely  it  is  pof^ible 
it  may  be,  it  must  cease  to  be  unjust  to  deprive  them 
of  either.  And  though  a  course  of  external  a6ls, 
which  without  command  would  be  immoral,  must 
make  an  immoral  habit ;  yet  a  few  detached  com- 
mands have  no  such  natural  tendency.  I  thought 
proper  to  say  thus  much  of  the  few  Scripture  pre- 
cepts, which  require,  not  vicious  a<5lions,  but  a(?i;ions 
which  would  have  been  vicious  had  it  not  been  for 
such  precepts ;  because  they  are  sometimes  weakly 
urged  as  immoral,  and  great  weight  is  laid  upon 
obje(?tions  drawn  from  them.  But  to  me  there  seems 
no  difficulty  at  all  in  these  precepts,  but  what  arises 
from  their  being  offences  :  i.  e.  from  their  being  liable 
to  be  perverted,  as  indeed  they  are,  by  wicked  de- 
signing men,  to  serve  the  most  horrid  purposes  ;  and 
perhaps,  to  mislead  the  weak  and  enthusiastic.  And 
obje(9:ions  from  this  head,  are  not  objections  against 
Revelation  ;  but  against  the  whole  notion  of  Religion, 
as  a  trial ;  and  against  the  general  constitution  of 
Nature.  Secondly,  Reason  is  able  to  judge,  and  must, 
of  the  evidence  of  Revelation,  and  of  the  obje(5lions 
urged  against  that  evidence  :  which  shall  be  the  sub- 
je6f  of  a  following  chapter.^*^ 

But  the  consequence  of  the  foregoing  observations 
is,  that  the  question,  upon  which  the  truth  of  Chris- 
tianity depends,  is  scarce  at  all,  what  obje(51ions  there 
are  against  its  scheme,  since  there  are  none  against 


Ch. 


Chap.  3.  must  appear  liable  to  Objedions.    191 

the  morality  of  it ;  but  what  obje6iions  there  are 
against  its  evidence :  or,  what  proof  there  remains 
of  it  after  due  allowances  made  for  the  ohjeSlions 
against  that  proof:  Because  it  has  been  shewn  that 
the  objeSiions  against  Christianity,  as  distinguished 
from  objeSlions  against  its  evidence,  are  frivolous. 
For  surely  very  little  weight,  if  any  at  all,  is  to  be 
laid  upon  a  way  of  arguing  and  objecfting,  which, 
when  applied  to  the  general  constitution  of  Nature, 
experience  shews  not  to  be  conclusive  :  and  such,  I 
think,  is  the  whole  way  of  objecting  treated  of 
throughout  this  chapter.  It  is  resolvable  into  prin- 
ciples, and  goes  upon  suppositions,  which  mislead  us 
to  think,  that  the  Author  of  nature  would  not  a6i,  as 
we  experience  he  does ;  or  would  acl,  in  such  and 
such  cases,  as  we  experience  he  does  not  in  like 
cases.  But  the  unreasonablenef^  of  this  way  of  ob- 
je(9;ing,  will  appear  yet  more  evidently  from  hence, 
that  the  chief  things  thus  objected  against,  are  jus- 
tified, as  shall  be  farther  shewn,'i  by  distinc't,  parti- 
cular, and  full  analogies,  in  the  constitution  and  course 
of  Nature. 

But  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that,  as  frivolous  as 
obje6^ions  of  the  foregoing  sort  against  Revelation 
are,  yet,  when  a  supposed  Revelation  is  more  con- 
sistent with  itself,  and  has  a  more  general  and  uni- 
form tendency  to  promote  virtue,  than,  all  circum- 
stances considered,  could  have  been  expelled  from 
enthusiasm  and  political  views ;  this  is  a  presump- 
tive proof  of  its  not  proceeding  from  them,  and  so 
of  its  truth  :  because  we  are  competent  judges,  what 
might  have  been  expelled  from  enthusiasm  and  po- 
litical views. 

"  Ch.  iv.  latter  part,  and  v.  vi. 


192  Christianity,  a  Scheme        Part  2. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Of  Christianity,  considered  as  a  Scheme  or  Consti- 
tution, imperfe6ily  comprehended. 

T  hath  been  now  shewn '  that  the  Ana- 
logy of  Nature  renders  it  highly  cre- 
dible beforehand,  that  supposing  a 
Revelation  to  be  made,  it  must  con- 
tain many  things  very  different  from 
what  we  should  have  expecfted,  and  such  as  appear 
open  to  great  obje(?lions :  And  that  this  observation, 
in  good  measure,  takes  off  the  force  of  those  objec- 
tions, or  rather  precludes  them.  But  it  may  be  al- 
leged, that  this  is  a  very  partial  answer  to  such  ob- 
jections, or  a  very  unsatisfactory  way  of  obviating 
them  :  because  it  doth  not  shew  at  all,  that  the  things 
objected  against  can  be  wise,  just,  and  good;  much 
left,  that  it  is  credible  they  are  so.  It  will  therefore 
be  proper  to  shew  this  distinctly ;  by  applying  to 
these  objections  against  the  wdsdom,  justice,  and 
goodnef^  of  Christianity,  the  answer  above  ^  given  to 
the  like  objeCtions  against  the  constitution  of  Nature  : 
before  we  consider  the  particular  Analogies  in  the 
latter,  to  the  particular  things  objeCted  against  in  the 
former.  Now  that  which  affords  a  sufficient  answer 
to  objections  against  the  wisdom,  justice  and  good- 
nef^  of  the  constitution  of  Nature,  is  its  being  a  con- 
stitution, a  system  or  scheme,  imperfeCtly  compre- 
hended ;  a  scheme,  in  which  means  are  made  use 
of  to  accomplish  ends ;  and  which  is  carried  on  by 

'  In  the  foregoing  chapter. 

^  Part  I.  ch.  vii.  to  which  this  all  along  refers. 


Chap.  4.        imperfectly  comprehended.        193 

general  laws.  For  from  these  things  it  has  been 
proved,  not  only  to  be  poftible,  but  also  to  be  cre- 
dible, that  those  things  which  are  objedled  against, 
may  be  consistent  with  wisdom,  justice  and  good- 
nefs  ;  nay,  may  be  instances  of  them  :  and  even  that 
the  constitution  and  government  of  Nature  may  be 
perfect  in  the  highest  poftible  degree.  If  Christi- 
anity then  be  a  scheme,  and  of  the  like  kind ;  it  is 
evident,  the  like  obje(5lions  against  it,  must  admit  of 
the  like  answer.     And 

I.  Christianity  is  a  scheme,  quite  beyond  our  com- 
prehension. The  moral  government  of  God  is  ex- 
ercised, by  gradually  condu(5ling  things  so  in  the 
course  of  his  Providence,  that  every  one,  at  length 
and  upon  the  whole,  shall  receive  according  to  his 
deserts  ;  and  neither  fraud  nor  violence,  but  truth 
and  right,  shall  finally  prevail.  Christianity  is  a  par- 
ticular scheme  under  this  general  plan  of  Providence, 
emd  a  part  of  it,  conducive  to  its  completion,  with 
regard  to  mankind  :  consisting  itself  also  of  various 
parts,  and  a  mysterious  economy,  which  has  been 
carrying  on  from  the  time  the  world  came  into  its 
present  wretched  state,  and  is  still  carrying  on,  for 
its  recovery,  by  a  Divine  Person,  the  Mefsiah  ;  who 
is  to  gather  together  in  one,  the  children  of  God,  that 
are  scattered  abroad^""  and  establish  an  everlasting 
kingdom,  wherein  dnelleth  righteousnejl.^  And  in 
order  to  it ;  after  various  manifestations  of  things, 
relating  to  this  great  and  general  scheme  of  Provi- 
dence, through  a  succefsion  of  many  ages :  (For  the 
Spirit  of  Christ  which  was  in  the  Prophets,  testified 
beforehand  his  sufferings,  and  the  glory  that  should 
follow:  Unto  whom  it  ivas  revealed,  that  not  unto 
themselves,  but  unto  us  they  did  minister  the  things 

^  Joh.  xi.  52.  *  2  Pet.  ill.  13. 


194  Christianity,  a  Scheme        Part  2. 

which  are  now  reported  unto  us  by  them  that  have 
preached  the  Gospel ;  which  things  the  Angels  desire 
to  look  into  ;^) after  various  dispensations,  look- 
ing forward,  and  preparatory,  to  this  final  salvation : 
in  the  fulnejl  of  time,  when  Infinite  Wisdom  thought 
fit ;  He,  being  in  the  form  of  God, made  him- 
self of  no  reputation,  and  took  upon  him  the  form 
of  a  servant,  and  was  made  in  the  likenefl  of  men: 
And  being  found  in  fashion  as  a  man,  he  humbled 
himself,  and  became  obedient  to  death,  even  the  death 
of  the  crojl:  Wherefore  God  also  hath  highly^  ex- 
alted him,  and  given  him  a  name  which  is  above 
every  name :  That  at  the  name  of  Jesus  every  knee 
should  bow,  of  things  in  heaven,  and  things  in  the 
earth,  and  things  under  the  earth  ;  And  that  every 
tongue  should  confefs,  that  Jesus  Christ  is  Lord,  to 
the  glory  of  God  the  Father.^  Parts  likewise  of  this 
economy,  are  the  miraculous  mif^ion  of  the  Holy 
Ghost,  and  his  ordinary  aftistances  given  to  good 
men  :  the  invisible  government,  which  Christ  at  pre- 
sent exercises  over  his  Church  :  That  which  he  him- 
self refers  to  in  these  words.  In  my  Father's  house 

are  many  mansions /  go  to  prepare  a  place  for 

you ;'  and  his  future  return  to  judge  the  world  in 
righteousnef,,  and  completely  re-establish  the  king- 
dom of  God.  For  the  Father  judgeth  no  man  ;  but 
hath  committed  all  judgment  unto  the  Son :  That  all 
men  should  honour  the  Son,  even  as  they  honour  the 
Father.^  All  power  is  given  unto  him  in  heaven  and 
in  earth.^  And  he  must  reign,  till  he  hath  put  all 
enemies  under  his  feet.  Then  cometh  the  end,  when 
he  shall  have  delivered  up  the  kingdom  to  God,  even 
the  Father ;  when  he  shall  have  put  down  all  rule. 


^    I  Pet.  i.  II,  12.         ^   Phil.  ii.  6-11.         "^  Joh.  xiv.  2. 
^  Joh.  V.  22,  23.  ^  Matth.  xxviii.  18. 


Chap.  4.        imperfedly  comprehended.        195 

and  all  authority  and  power.  And  when  all  things 
shall  he  subdued  unto  him,  then  shall  the  Son  also 
himself  be  subjeSi  unto  him  that  put  all  things  under 
him,  that  God  may  be  all  in  alU^  Now  little,  surely, 
need  be  said  to  shew,  that  this  system,  or  scheme 
of  things,  is  but  imperfe(511y  comprehended  by  us. 
The  Scripture  expreftly  ai^erts  it  to  be  so.  And  in- 
deed one  cannot  read  a  paftag-e  relating  to  this  great 
mystery  of  godlinejl,^^  but  what  immediately  runs 
up  into  something  which  shews  us  our  ignorance  in 
it ;  as  everything  in  Nature  shews  us  our  ignorance 
in  the  constitution  of  Nature.  And  whoever  will 
seriously  consider  that  part  of  the  Christian  scheme, 
which  is  revealed  in  Scripture,  will  find  so  much  more 
unrevealed,  as  will  convince  him,  that,  to  all  the  pur- 
poses of  judging  and  objecting,  we  know  as  little  of  it, 
as  of  the  constitution  of  Nature.  Our  ignorance, 
therefore,  is  as  much  an  answer  to  our  obje(?tions 
against  the  perfedlion  of  one,  as  against  the  perfec- 
tion of  the  other.'- 

II.  It  is  obvious  too,  that  in  the  Christian  dispen- 
sation, as  much  as  in  the  natural  scheme  of  things, 
means  are  made  use  of  to  accomplish  ends.  And 
the  observation  of  this  furnishes  us  with  the  same 
answer,  to  objecftions  against  the  perfection  of  Chris- 
tianity, as  to  objec^tions  of  the  like  kind,  against  the 
constitution  of  Nature.  It  shews  the  credibility,  that 
the  things  obje(?i;ed  against,  ho\N foolish^''  soever  they 
appear  to  men,  may  be  the  very  best  means  of  ac- 
complishing the  very  best  ends.  And  their  appear- 
ing foolishnejl  is  no  presum.ption  against  this,  in  a 
scheme  so  greatly  beyond  our  comprehension.^^ 

III.  The  credibility,  that  the  Christian  dispensa- 
tion may  have  been,  all  along,  carried  on  by  general 

»"  I  Cor.  XV.  25-28.     "  I  Tim.  iii.  16.      '=^  Pp.  128,  &c. 
"  I  Cor.  i.  '*  Pp.  132,  133. 


196  Christianity,  a  Scheme         Part  2. 

laws/^no  lei^  than  the  course  of  Nature,  may  require 
to  be  more  distinctly  made  out.  Consider  then,  upon 
what  ground  it  is  we  say,  that  the  whole  common 
course  of  Nature  is  carried  on  according  to  general 
foreordained  laws.  We  know  indeed  several  of  the 
general  laws  of  matter :  and  a  great  part  of  the  na- 
tural behaviour  of  living  agents,  is  reducible  to  ge- 
neral laws.  But  we  know  in  a  manner  nothing,  by 
what  laws,  storms  and  tempests,  earthquakes,  famine, 
pestilence,  become  the  instruments  of  destru(9;ion  to 
mankind.  And  the  laws,  by  which  persons  born  into 
the  world  at  such  a  time  and  place,  are  of  such  ca- 
pacities, geniuses,  tempers ;  the  laws,  by  which 
thoughts  come  into  our  mind,  in  a  multitude  of  cases  ; 
and  by  which  innumerable  things  happen,  of  the 
greatest  influence  upon  the  affairs  and  state  of  the 
world  ;  these  laws  are  so  wholly  unknown  to  us,  that 
we  call  the  events  which  come  to  paf^  by  them,  ac- 
cidental :  though  all  reasonable  men  know  certainly, 
that  there  cannot,  in  reality,  be  any  such  thing  as 
chance  ;  and  conclude,  that  the  things  which  have 
this  appearance  are  the  result  of  general  laws,  and 
may  be  reduced  into  them.  It  is  then  but  an  ex- 
ceeding little  way,  and  in  but  a  very  few  respecfts, 
that  we  can  trace  up  the  natural  course  of  things 
before  us,  to  general  laws.  And  it  is  only  from  Ana- 
logy, that  we  conclude  the  whole  of  it  to  be  capable 
of  being  reduced  into  them :  only  from  our  seeing, 
that  part  is  so.  It  is  from  our  finding,  that  the  course 
of  Nature,  in  some  respedls  and  so  far,  goes  on  by 
general  laws,  that  we  conclude  this  of  the  rest.  And 
if  that  be  a  just  ground  for  such  a  conclusion,  it  is  ^ 
just  ground  also,  if  not  to  conclude,  yet  to  apprehend, 
to  render  it  supposable  and  credible,  which  is  suf- 

'5  Pp.  134,  135. 


Chap.  4.        imperfedly  comprehended.        197 

ficient  for  answering  objecftions,  that  God's  miracu- 
lous interpositions  may  have  been,  all  along  in  like 
manner,  by  general  laws  of  wisdom.  Thus,  that  mi- 
raculous powers  should  be  exerted,  at  such  times, 
upon  such  occasions,  in  such  degrees  and  manners, 
and  with  regard  to  such  persons,  rather  than  others  ; 
that  the  affairs  of  the  world,  being  permitted  to  go 
on  in  their  natural  course  so  far,  should,  just  at  such 
a  point,  have  a  new  dire(9;ion  given  them  by  mira- 
culous interpositions ;  that  these  inteqDOsitions  should 
be  exac9;ly  in  such  degrees  and  respe(?ts  only  ;  all 
this  may  have  been  by  general  laws.  These  laws 
are  unknown  indeed  to  us  :  but  no  more  unknown, 
than  the  laws  from  whence  it  is,  that  some  die  as 
soon  as  they  are  born,  and  others  live  to  extreme 
old  age ;  that  one  man  is  so  superior  to  another  in 
understanding ;  with  innumerable  more  things,  which, 
as  was  before  observed,  we  cannot  reduce  to  any 
laws  or  rules  at  all,  though  it  is  taken  for  granted, 
they  are  as  much  reducible  to  general  ones,  as  gra- 
vitation. Now,  if  the  revealed  dispensations  of  Pro- 
vidence, and  miraculous  inteq^ositions,  be  by  general 
laws,  as  well  as  God's  ordinary  government  in  the 
course  of  Nature,  made  known  by  reason  and  expe- 
rience ;  there  is  no  more  reason  to  expe6l,  that  every 
exigence,  as  it  arises,  should  be  provided  for  by  these 
general  laws  of  miraculous  interpositions,  than  that 
every  exigence  in  Nature  should,  by  the  general  laws 
of  Nature.  Yet  there  might  be  wise  and  good  rea- 
sons, that  miraculous  interpositions  should  be  by  ge- 
neral laws :  and  that  these  laws  should  not  be  broken 
in  upon,  or  deviated  from,  by  other  miracles. 

Upon  the  whole  then :  The  appearance  of  defici- 
encies and  irregularities  in  Nature,  is  owing  to  its 
being  a  scheme  but  in  part  made  known,  and  of  such 
a  certain  particular  kind  in  other  respe(5ls.     Now  we 


198  Christianity,  a  Scheme        Part  2. 

see  no  more  reason,  why  the  frame  and  course  of 
Nature  should  be  such  a  scheme,  than  why  Chris- 
tianity should.  And  that  the  former  is  such  a  scheme, 
renders  it  credible,  that  the  latter,  upon  supposition 
of  its  truth,  may  be  so  too.  And  as  it  is  manifest, 
that  Christianity  is  a  scheme  revealed  but  in  part, 
and  a  scheme  in  which  means  are  made  use  of  to 
accomplish  ends ;  like  to  that  of  Nature :  So  the 
credibility,  that  it  may  have  been  all  along  carried 
on  by  general  laws,  no  lef^  than  the  course  of  Na- 
ture, has  been  distin(511y  proved.  And  from  all  this 
it  is  beforehand  credible  that  there  might,  I  think 
probable  that  there  would,  be  the  like  appearance  of 
deficiencies  and  irregularities  in  Christianity,  as  in 
Nature  :  i.  e.  that  Christianity  would  be  liable  to  the 
like  obje(51:ions,  as  the  frame  of  Nature.  And  these 
obje(9:ions  are  answered  by  these  observations  con- 
cerning Christianity ;  as  the  like  objections  against 
the  frame  of  Nature,  are  answered  by  the  like  ob- 
servations concerning  the  frame  of  Nature. 

The  objedlions  against  Christianity,  considered  as 
a  matter  of  (a.6i/^  having,  in  general,  been  obviated 
in  the  preceding  chapter  ;  and  the  same,  considered 
as  made  against  the  wisdom  and  goodneft  of  it,  hav- 
ing been  obviated  in  this :  the  next  thing,  according 
to  the  method  proposed,  is  to  shew,  that  the  prin- 
cipal objections,  in  particular,  against  Christianity, 
may  be  answered,  by  particular  and  full  Analogies 
in  Nature.  And  as  one  of  them  is  made  against  the 
whole  scheme  of  it  together,  as  just  now  described, 
I  choose  to  consider  it  here,  rather  than  in  a  distin(5l 
chapter  by  itself.  The  thing  obje(?i:ed  against  this 
scheme  of  the  Gospel,  is,  "  that  it  seems  to  suppose, 

16  p.  127. 


Chap.  4.        imperfedly  comprehended.        199 

"  God  was  reduced  to  the  necefsity  of  a  long  series  of 
"  intricate  means,  in  order  to  accomplish  his  ends, 
"the  recovery  and  salvation  of  the  world:  In  like 
"  sort  as  men,  for  want  of  understanding-  or  power, 
"  not  being  able  to  come  at  their  ends  directly,  are 
"  forced  to  go  roundabout  ways,  and  make  use  of 
"  many  perplexed  contrivances  to  arrive  at  them." 
Now  everything  which  we  see,  shews  the  folly  of 
this,  considered  as  an  obje(9;ion  against  the  truth  of 
Christianity.  For,  according  to  our  manner  of  con- 
ception, God  makes  use  of  variety  of  means,  what 
we  often  think  tedious  ones,  in  the  natural  course  of 
Providence,  for  the  accomplishment  of  all  his  ends. 
Indeed  it  is  certain,  there  is  somewhat  in  this  matter 
quite  beyond  our  comprehension  :  But  the  mystery 
is  as  great  in  Nature,  as  in  Christianity.  We  know 
what  we  ourselves  aim  at,  as  final  ends :  and  what 
courses  we  take,  merely  as  means  conducing  to  those 
ends.  But  we  are  greatly  ignorant,  how  far  things 
are  considered  by  the  Author  of  nature,  under  the 
single  notion  of  means  and  ends ;  so  as  that  it  may 
be  said.  This  is  merely  an  end,  and  that  merely 
means,  in  his  regard.  And  whether  there  be  not 
some  peculiar  absurdity  in  our  very  manner  of  con- 
ception, concerning  this  matter,  somewhat  contra- 
di(5lory  arising  from  our  extremely  imperfect!;  views 
of  things,  it  is  jmpofsible  to  say.  However,  thus 
much  is  manifest,  that  the  whole  natural  world  and 
government  of  it  is  a  scheme  or  system  ;  not  a  fixed, 
but  a  progref^ive  one :  a  scheme,  in  which  the  ope- 
ration of  various  means  takes  up  a  great  length  of 
time,  before  the  ends  they  tend  to  can  be  attained. 
The  change  of  seasons,  the  ripening  of  the  fruits  of 
the  earth,  the  very  history  of  a  flower,  is  an  instance 
of  this  :  And  so  is  human  life.  Thus  vegetable  bodies, 
and  those  of  animals,  though  poftibly  formed  at  once, 


200         Christianity,  a  Scheme,  &c.      Part  2. 

yet  grow  up  by  degrees  to  a  mature  state.  And 
thus  rational  agents,  who  animate  these  latter  bodies, 
are  naturally  dire(?l;ed  to  form,  each  his  own  manners 
and  chara^ler,  by  the  gradual  gaining  of  knowledge 
and  experience,  and  by  a  long  course  of  a^lion.  Our 
existence  is  not  only  succef^ive,  as  it  must  be  of  ne- 
ceftity ;  but  one  state  of  our  life  and  being,  is  ap- 
pointed by  God,  to  be  a  preparation  for  another  ;  and 
that,  to  be  the  means  of  attaining  to  another  suc- 
ceeding one :  Infancy  to  childhood,  childhood  to 
youth ;  youth  to  mature  age.  Men  are  impatient, 
and  for  precipitating  things :  but  the  Author  of  na- 
ture appears  deliberate  throughout  his  operations ; 
accomplishing  his  natural  ends,  by  slow  succefsive 
steps.  And  there  is  a  plan  of  things  beforehand  laid 
out,  which,  from  the  nature  of  it,  requires  various 
systems  of  means,  as  well  as  length  of  time,  in  order 
to  the  carrying  on  its  several  parts  into  execution. 
Thus,  in  the  daily  course  of  natural  Providence,  God 
operates  in  the  very  same  manner,  as  in  the  dispen- 
sation of  Christianity  :  making  one  thing  subservient 
to  another  ;  This,  to  somewhat  farther  ;  and  so  on, 
through  a  progreftive  series  of  means,  which  extend, 
both  backward  and  forward,  beyond  our  utmost  view. 
Of  this  manner  of  operation,  everything  we  see  in 
the  course  of  Nature,  is  as  much  an  instance,  as  any 
part  of  the  Christian  dispensation. 


Chap.  5.         The  Appointment,  &c.  201 


CHAPTER  V. 

Of  the  particular  System  of  Christianity  ;  the  Ap- 
pointment of  a  Mediator,  and  the  Redemption  of 
the  World  by  him. 


-  -  /!  HERE  is  not,  I  think,  anything  relating 
^^}  to  Christianity,  which  has  been  more 
30\i\      obje(?ted  against,  than  the  mediation 

of  Christ,  in  some  or  other  of  its  parts. 

Yet, upon  thorough  consideration,there 


seems  nothing  lef^  justly  liable  to  it.      For, 

I.  The  whole  Analogy  of  Nature  removes  all  ima- 
gined presumption  against  the  general  notion  of  a 
Mediator  between  God  and  man}  For  we  find  all 
living  creatures  are  brought  into  the  w'orld,  and  their 
life  in  infancy  is  preserved,  by  the  instrumentality  of 
others :  And  every  satisfa(51ion  of  it,  some  way  or 
other,  is  bestowed  by  the  like  means.  So  that  the 
visible  government,  which  God  exercises  over  the 
world,  is  by  the  instrumentality  and  mediation  of 
others.  And  how  far  his  invisible  government  be  or 
be  not  so,  it  is  impofsible  to  determine  at  all  by  rea- 
son. And  the  supposition,  that  part  of  it  is  so,  ap- 
pears, to  say  the  least,  altogether  as  credible,  as  the 
contrary.  There  is  then  no  sort  of  objection,  from 
the  light  of  Nature,  against  the  general  notion  of  a 
Mediator  between  God  and  man,  considered  as  a 
dodlrine  of  Christianity,  or  as  an  appointment  in  this 
dispensation  :  since  we  find  by  experience,  that  God 
does  appoint  mediators,  to   be  the   instruments  of 

'   I  Tim.  ii.  5. 


202        Appointment  of  a  Mediator,       Part  2. 

good  and  evil  to  us ;  the  instruments  of  his  justice 
and  his  mercy.  And  the  objection  here  referred  to 
is  urged,  not  against  mediation  in  that  high,  eminent 
and  peculiar  sense,  in  which  Christ  is  our  Mediator  ; 
but  absolutely  against  the  whole  notion  itself  of  a 
mediator  at  all. 

II.  As  we  must  suppose,  that  the  world  is  under 
the  proper  moral  government  of  God,  or  in  a  state 
of  Religion,  before  we  can  enter  into  consideration 
of  the  revealed  dodlrine,  concerning  the  redemption 
of  it  by  Christ ;  so  that  supposition  is  here  to  be  dis- 
tinctly taken  notice  of.  Now  the  Divine  moral  go- 
vernment which  Religion  teaches  us,  implies,  that 
the  consequence  of  vice  shall  be  misery,  in  some 
future  state,  by  the  righteous  judgment  of  God. 
That  such  consequent  punishment  shall  take  effeCl 
by  his  appointment,  is  neceftarily  implied.  But,  as 
it  is  not  in  any  sort  to  be  supposed,  that  we  are  made 
acquainted  with  all  the  ends  or  reasons,  for  which  it 
is  fit  future  punishments  should  be  inflicted,  or  why 
God  has  appointed,  such  and  such  consequent  misery 
should  follow  vice ;  and  as  we  are  altogether  in  the 
dark,  how  or  in  what  manner  it  shall  follow,  by  what 
immediate  occasions,  or  by  the  instrumentality  of 
what  means ;  there  is  no  absurdity  in  supposing,  it 
may  follow  in  a  way  analogous  to  that,  in  which 
many  miseries  follow  such  and  such  courses  of  a(5tion 
at  present ;  poverty,  sicknef^,  infamy,  untimely  death 
by  diseases,  death  from  the  hands  of  civil  justice. 
There  is  no  absurdity  in  supposing  future  punish- 
ment may  follow  wickedne{^  of  course,  as  we  speak, 
or  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence  from  God's 
original  constitution  of  the  world  ;  from  the  nature 
he  has  given  us,  and  from  the  condition  in  which  he 
places  us :  Or  in  a  like  manner,  as  a  person  rashly 
trifling  upon  a  precipice,  in  the  way  of  natural  con- 


Chap.  5.      the  Redeemer  of  the  World.       203 

sequence,  falls  down  ;  in  the  way  of  natural  conse- 
quence, breaks  his  limbs,  suppose ;  in  the  way  of 
natural  consequence  of  this,  without  help,  perishes. 

Some  good  men  may  perhaps  be  offended,  with 
hearing  it  spoken  of  as  a  supposable  thing,  that  the 
future  punishments  of  wickednefs  may  be  in  the  way 
of  natural  consequence  :  as  if  this  were  taking  the 
execution  of  justice  out  of  the  hands  of  God,  and 
giving  it  to  Nature.  But  they  should  remember, 
that  when  things  come  to  paf^  according  to  the  course 
of  Nature,  this  does  not  hinder  them  from  being  his 
doing,  who  is  the  God  of  nature  :  And  that  the  Scrip- 
ture ascribes  those  punishments  to  Divine  justice, 
which  are  known  to  be  natural ;  and  which  must  be 
called  so,  when  distinguished  from  such  as  are  mi- 
raculous. But  after  all,  this  supposition,  or  rather 
this  way  of  speaking,  is  here  made  use  of  only  by 
way  of  illustration  of  the  subjedl  before  us.  For 
since  it  must  be  admitted,  that  the  future  punish- 
ment of  wickednefs  is  not  a  matter  of  arbitrary  ap- 
pointment, but  of  reason,  equity  and  justice ;  it  comes, 
for  aught  I  see,  to  the  same  thing,  whether  it  is  sup- 
posed to  be  inflicted  in  a  way  analogous  to  that,  in 
which  the  temporal  punishments  of  vice  and  folly 
are  inflicted,  or  in  any  other  way.  And  though  there 
were  a  difference,  it  is  allowable,  in  the  present  case, 
to  make  this  supposition,  plainly  not  an  incredible 
one  ;  that  future  punishment  may  follow  wickednefs 
in  the  way  of  natural  consequence,  or  according  to 
some  general  laws  of  government  already  established 
in  the  universe. 

III.  Upon  this  supposition,  or  even  without  it,  we 
may  observe  somewhat,  much  to  the  present  pur- 
pose, in  the  constitution  of  Nature  or  appointments 
of  Providence  :  the  provision  which  is  made,  that  all 
the  bad  natural  consequences  of  men's  actions,  should 


204      Appointment  of  a  Mediator,        Part  2. 

not  always  acflually  follow  ;  or  that  such  bad  conse- 
quences as,  according  to  the  settled  course  of  things, 
would  inevitably  have  follow^ed  if  not  prevented,  should 
in  certain  degrees,  be  prevented.  We  are  apt  pre- 
sumptuously to  imagine,  that  the  world  might  have 
been  so  constituted,  as  that  there  would  not  have 
been  any  such  thing  as  misery  or  evil.  On  the  con- 
trary we  find  the  Author  of  nature  permits  it :  But 
then  he  has  provided  reliefs,  and,  in  many  cases, 
perfect;  remedies  for  it,  after  some  pains  and  diffi- 
culties :  Reliefs  and  remedies  even  for  that  evil,  which 
is  the  fruit  of  our  own  miscondu6l ;  and  which,  in 
the  course  of  Nature,  would  have  continued,  and 
ended  in  our  destruction,  but  for  such  remedies. 
And  this  is  an  instance  both  of  severity  and  indul- 
gence, in  the  constitution  of  Nature.  Thus  all  the 
bad  consequences,  now  mentioned,  of  a  man's  trifling 
upon  a  precipice,  might  be  prevented.  And  though 
all  were  not,  yet  some  of  them  might,  by  proper 
interposition,  if  not  reje(ffed :  by  another's  coming 
to  the  rash  man's  relief,  with  his  own  laying  hold  on 
that  relief,  in  such  sort  as  the  case  required.  Per- 
sons may  do  a  great  deal  themselves  towards  pre- 
venting the  bad  consequences  of  their  follies :  and 
more  may  be  done  by  themselves,  together  with  the 
af^istance  of  others  their  fellow-creatures ;  which 
afsistance  Nature  requires  and  prompts  us  to.  This 
is  the  general  constitution  of  the  world.  Now  sup- 
pose it  had  been  so  constituted,  that  after  such  ac- 
tions were  done,  as  were  foreseen  naturally  to  draw 
after  them  misery  to  the  doer,  it  should  have  been 
no  more  in  human  power  to  have  prevented  that 
naturally  consequent  misery,  in  any  instance,  than  it 
is,  in  all ;  no  one  can  say,  whether  such  a  more  se- 
vere constitution  of  things  might  not  yet  have  been 
really  good.     But,  that  on  the  contrary,  provision  is 


Chap.  5.     the  Redeemer  of  the  World.       205 

made  by  Nature,  that  we  may  and  do,  to  so  great 
degree,  prevent  the  bad  natural  effe(fi:s  of  our  follies  ; 
this  may  be  called  mercy  or  companion  in  the  ori- 
ginal constitution  of  the  world  :  Compafsion,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  goodnefs  in  general.  And,  the  whole 
known  constitution  and  course  of  things  affording  us 
instances  of  such  compafsion,  it  would  be  according 
to  the  Analogy  of  Nature,  to  hope,  that,  however 
ruinous  the  natural  consequences  of  vice  might  be, 
from  the  general  laws  of  God's  government  over  the 
universe  ;  ^^et  provision  might  be  made,  pol^ibly 
might  have  been  originally  made,  for  preventing 
those  ruinous  consequences  from  inevitably  follow- 
ing :  at  least  from  following  universally,  and  in  all 
cases. 

Many,  I  am  sensible,  will  wonder  at  finding  this 
made  a  question,  or  spoken  of  as  in  any  degree 
doubtful.  The  generality  of  mankind  are  so  far  from 
having  that  awful  sense  of  things,  which  the  present 
state  of  vice  and  misery  and  darknefs  seems  to  make 
but  reasonable,  that  they  have  scarce  any  apprehen- 
sion or  thought  at  all  about  this  matter,  any  way : 
and  some  serious  persons  may  have  spoken  unad- 
visedly concerning  it.  But  let  us  observe,  what  we 
experience  to  be,  and  what,  from  the  very  constitu- 
tion of  Nature,  cannot  but  be,  the  consequences  of 
irregular  and  disorderly  behaviour ;  even  of  such 
rashnefSjwilfulnefs,  neglecT:s,as  we  scarce  call  vicious. 
Now  it  is  natural  to  apprehend,  that  the  bad  conse- 
quences of  irregularity  will  be  greater,  in  proportion 
as  the  irregularity  is  so.  And  there  is  no  compa- 
rison between  these  irregularities,  and  the  greater 
instances  of  vice,  or  a  difkolute  profligate  disregard 
to  all  Religion ;  if  there  be  anything  at  all  in  Reli- 
gion. For  consider  what  it  is  for  creatures,  moral 
agents,  presumptuously  to  introduce  that  confusion 


2o6       Appointment  of  a  Mediator,       Part  2. 

and  misery  into  the  kingdom  of  God,  which  mankind 
have  in  fa(9:  introduced  ;  to  blaspheme  the  sovereign 
Lord  of  all ;  to  contemn  his  authority ;  to  be  inju- 
rious, to  the  degree  they  are,  to  their  fellow-crea- 
tures, the  creatures  of  God.  Add  that  the  effe(51s 
of  vice  in  the  present  world,  are  often  extreme  mi- 
sery, irretrievable  ruin,  and  even  death.  And  upon 
putting  all  this  together,  it  will  appear,  that  as  no 
one  can  say,  in  what  degree  fatal,  the  unprevented 
consequences  of  vice  may  be,  according  to  the  ge- 
neral rule  of  Divine  government ;  so  it  is  by  no  means 
intuitively  certain,  how  far  these  consequences  could 
pofsibly,  in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  be  prevented, 
consistently  with  the  eternal  rule  of  right,  or  with 
what  is,  in  fa(5l,  the  moral  constitution  of  Nature. 
However,  there  would  be  large  ground  to  hope,  that 
the  universal  government  was  not  so  severely  strict, 
but  that  there  was  room  for  pardon,  or  for  having 
those  penal  consequences  prevented.     Yet, 

IV.  There  seems  no  probability,  that  anything  we 
could  do,  would  alone  and  of  itself  prevent  them : 
prevent  their  following,  or  being  inflicfled.  But  one 
would  think,  at  least,  it  were  impofsible,  that  the 
contrary  should  be  thought  certain.  For  we  are  not 
acquainted  with  the  whole  of  the  case.  We  are  not 
informed  of  all  the  reasons,  which  render  it  fit  that 
future  punishments  should  be  infli(51ed :  and  there- 
fore cannot  know,  whether  anything  we  could  do, 
would  make  such  an  alteration,  as  to  render  it  fit  that 
they  should  be  remitted.  We  do  not  know,  what 
the  whole  natural  or  appointed  consequences  of  vice 
are  ;  nor  in  what  way  they  would  follow,  if  not  pre- 
vented :  and  therefore  can  in  no  sort  say,  whether 
we  could  do  anything,  which  would  be  sufficient  to 
prevent  them.  Our  ignorance  being  thus  manifest, 
let  us  recolle(5l  the  Analogy  of  Nature  or  Providence. 


Chap.  5.      the  Redeemer  of  the  World.      207 

For,  though  this  may  be  but  a  slight  ground  to  raise 
a  positive  opinion  upon,  in  this  matter  ;  yet  it  is  suf- 
ficient to  answer  a  mere  arbitrary  aftertion,  without 
any  kind  of  evidence,  urged  by  way  of  objection 
against  a  do(5lrine,  the  proof  of  which  is  not  reason, 
but  Revelation.  Consider  then :  People  ruin  their 
fortunes  by  extravagance  ;  they  bring  diseases  upon 
themselves  by  exceft;  they  incur  the  penalties  of 
civil  laws,  and  surely  civil  government  is  natural : 
Will  sorrow  for  these  follies  past,  and  behaving  well 
for  the  future  alone  and  of  itself,  prevent  the  natural 
consequences  of  them  ?  On  the  contrary,  men's  na- 
tural abilities  of  helping  themselves  are  often  im- 
pmred  :  Or  if  not,  yet  they  are  forced  to  be  beholden 
to  the  af^istance  of  others,  upon  several  accounts, 
and  in  different  ways :  Afsistance  which  they  would 
have  had  no  occasion  for,  had  it  not  been  for  their 
miscondu6l ;  but  which,  in  the  disadvantageous  con- 
dition they  have  reduced  themselves  to,  is  absolutely 
neceftary  to  their  recovery,  and  retrieving  their  af- 
fairs. Now  since  this  is  our  case,  considering  our- 
selves merely  as  inhabitants  of  this  world,  and  as 
having  a  temporal  interest  here,  under  the  natural 
government  of  God,  which  however  has  a  great  deal 
moral  in  it :  Why  is  it  not  supposable,  that  this  may 
be  our  case  also,  in  our  more  important  capacity,  as 
under  his  perfecft  moral  government,  and  having  a 
more  general  and  future  interest  depending  \  If  we 
have  misbehaved  in  this  higher  capacity,  and  ren- 
dered ourselves  obnoxious  to  the  future  punishment, 
which  God  has  annexed  to  vice  :  it  is  plainly  credible, 

that  behaving  well  for  the  time  to  come,  may  be 

not  useleft,  God  forbid but  wholly  insufficient 

alone  and  of  itself,  to  prevent  that  punishment ;  or 
to  put  us  in  the  condition,  which  we  should  have 
been  in,  had  we  preserved  our  innocence. 


2o8       Appointment  of  a  Mediator,       Pari  2. 

And  though  we  ought  to  reason  with  all  reverence, 
whenever  we  reason  concerning  the  Divine  condudl : 
yet  it  may  be  added,  that  it  is  clearly  contrary  to  all 
our  notions  of  government,  as  well  as  to  what  is,  in 
fa(9:,  the  general  constitution  of  Nature,  to  suppose 
that  doing  well  for  the  future,  should,  in  all  cases, 
prevent  all  the  judicial  bad  consequences  of  having 
done  evil,  or  all  the  punishment  annexed  to  disobe- 
dience. And  we  have  manifestly  nothing  from  whence 
to  determine,  in  what  degree  and  in  what  cases, 
reformation  would  prevent  thjs  punishment,  even 
supposing  that  it  would  in  some.  And  though  the 
efficacy  of  repentance  itself  alone,  to  prevent  what 
mankind  had  rendered  themselves  obnoxious  to,  and 
recover  what  they  had  forfeited,  is  now  insisted  upon, 
in  opposition  to  Christianity  :  yet,  by  the  general 
prevalence  of  propitiatory  sacrifices  over  the  heathen 
world,  this  notion,  of  repentance  alone  being  suffi- 
cient to  expiate  guilt,  appears  to  be  contrary  to  the 
general  sense  of  mankind. 

Upon  the  whole  then  :  Had  the  laws,  the  general 
laws  of  God's  government  been  permitted  to  operate, 
without  any  interposition  in  our  behalf,  the  future 
punishment,  for  aught  we  know  to  the  contrary,  or 
have  any  reason  to  think,  must  inevitably  have  fol- 
lowed, notwithstanding  anything  we  could  have  done 
to  prevent  it.     Now, 

V.  In  this  darkneft,  or  this  light  of  Nature,  call 
it  which  you  please,  Revelation  comes  in ;  confirms 
every  doubting  fear,  which  could  enter  into  the  heart 
of  man,  concerning  the  future  unprevented  conse- 
quence of  wickednef^  ;  supposes  the  world  to  be  in 
a  state  of  ruin ;  (a  supposition  which  seems  the  very 
ground  of  the  Christian  dispensation,  and  which,  if 
not  provable  by  reason,  yet  is  in  no  wise  contrary  to 
it ;)  teaches  us  too,  that  the  rules  of  Divine  govern- 


Chap,  5.      the  Redeemer  of  the  World.      209 

ment  are  such,  as  not  to  admit  of  pardon  immediately 
and  dire(?lly  upon  repentance,  or  by  the  sole  efficacy 
of  it:  But  then  teaches  at  the  same  time,  what  Na- 
ture might  justly  have  hoped,  that  the  moral  govern- 
ment of  the  universe  was  not  so  rigid,  but  that  there 
was  room  for  an  interposition,  to  avert  the  fatal  con- 
sequences of  vice  ;  which  therefore,  by  this  means, 
does  admit  of  pardon.  Revelation  teaches  us,  that 
the  unknown  laws  of  God's  more  general  govern- 
ment, no  left  than  the  particular  laws  by  which  w^e 
experience  he  governs  us  at  present,  are  compas- 
sionate,- as  well  as  good  in  the  more  general  notion 
of  goodneft  :  And  that  he  hath  mercifully  provided, 
that  there  should  be  an  interposition  to  prevent  the 
destruction  of  human  kind  ;  whatever  that  destru6lion 
unprevented  would  have  been.  God  so  loved  the 
world,  that  he  gave  his  only-begotten  Son,  that  who- 
soever helieveth,  not,  to  be  sure,  in  a  speculative,  but 
in  a  pracftical  sense,  that  whosoever  believeth  in  him, 
should  not  perish  :^  Gave  his  Son  in  the  same  w^ay 
of  goodneft  to  the  world,  as  he  affords  particular 
persons  the  friendly  aftistance  of  their  fellow-crea- 
tures ;  when,  without  it,  their  temporal  ruin  w^ould 
be  the  certain  consequence  of  their  follies :  in  the 
same  way  of  goodneft,  I  say  ;  though  in  a  transcend- 
ent and  infinitely  higher  degree.  And  the  Son  of 
God  loved  us  and  gave  himself  for  us,  with  a  love, 
which  he  himself  compares  to  that  of  human  friend- 
ship :  though,  in  this  case,  all  comparisons  must  fall 
infinitely  short  of  the  thing  intended  to  be  illustrated 
by  them.  He  interposed  in  such  a  manner,  as  was 
neceftary  and  efteclual  to  prevent  that  execution  of 
justice  upon  sinners,  which  God  had  appointed  should 
otherwise  have  been  executed  upon  them :    Or  in 

'    Pp.   203,  Sec.  3    Joh^   l\l   j6. 


210         Appointment  of  a  Mediator,     Part  2. 

such  a  manner,  as  to  prevent  that  punishment  from 
a(51ually  following,  which,  according  to  the  general 
laws  of  Divine  government,  must  have  followed  the 
sins  of  the  world,  had  it  not  been  for  such  interpo- 
sition.^ 

If  anything  here  said,  should  appear,  upon  first 
thought,  inconsistent  with  Divine  goodnei^  ;  a  second, 
I  am  persuaded,  will  entirely  remove  that  appear- 
ance. For  were  we  to  suppose  the  constitution  of 
things  to  be  such,  as  that  the  whole  creation  must 
have  perished,  had  it  not  been  for  somewhat,  which 
God  had  appointed  should  be,  in  order  to  prevent 
that  ruin  :  even  this  supposition  would  not  be  incon- 
sistent, in  any  degree,  with  the  most  absolutely  per- 
fect goodneft.  But  still  it  may  be  thought,  that  this 
whole  manner  of  treating  the  subje(5l  before  us,  sup- 


*  It  cannot,  I  suppose,  be  imagined,  even  by  the  most  cur- 
sory reader,  that  it  is,  in  any  sort,  affiimed  or  implied  in  any- 
thing said  in  this  chapter,  that  none  can  have  the  benefit  of  the 
general  redemption,  but  such  as  have  the  advantage  of  being 
made  acquainted  with  it  in  the  present  life.  But  it  may  be 
needful  to  mention,  that  several  questions,  which  have  been 
brought  into  the  subjedl  before  us,  and  determined,  are  not  in 
the  least  enteied  into  here  :  Questions  which  have  been,  I  fear, 
rashlydetermined,  and  perhaps  with  equal  rashnefs  contrary  ways. 
For  instance,  Whether  God  could  have  saved  the  world  by  other 
means  than  the  death  of  Christ,  consistently  with  the  general 
laws  of  his  government.  And  had  not  Christ  come  into  the 
world,  what  would  have  been  the  future  condition  of  the  better 
sort  of  men  ;  those  just  persons  over  the  face  of  the  earth,  for 
whom,  Manafses  in  his  prayer  afserts,  repentance  was  not  ap- 
pointed. The  meaning  of  the  first  of  these  questions  is  greatly 
ambiguous.  And  neither  of  them  can  properly  be  answered, 
without  going  upon  that  infinitely  absurd  supposition,  that  we 
know  the  whole  of  the  case.  And  perhaps  the  very  inquiry, 
What  luould  hwve  foUotved  if  God  had  not  done  as  he  /las,  may  have 
in  it  some  very  great  impropriety  ;  and  ought  not  to  be  carried 
on  any  farther,  than  is  necefsary  to  help  our  partial  and  inade- 
quate conceptions  of  things. 


Chap,  5.      the  Redeemer  of  the  World.      211 

poses  mankind  to  be  naturally  in  a  very  strange  state. 
And  truly  so  it  does.  But  it  is  not  Christianity,  which 
has  put  us  into  this  state.  Whoever  will  consider 
the  manifold  miseries,  and  the  extreme  wickednef^ 
of  the  world:  that  the  best  have  great  wrongneftes 
within  themselves,  which  they  complain  of,  and  en- 
deavour to  amend ;  but  that  the  generality  grow 
more  profligate  and  corrupt  with  age  :  that  heathen 
moralists  thought  the  present  state  to  be  a  state  of 
punishment :  and,  what  might  be  added,  that  the 
earth  our  habitation  has  the  appearances  of  being  a 
ruin:  whoever,  I  say,  will  consider  all  these,  and 
some  other  obvious  things,  will  think  he  has  little 
reason  to  object  against  the  Scripture  account,  that 
mankind  is  in  a  state  of  degradation ;  against  this 
being  the  fa(5l :  how  difficult  soever  he  may  think  it 
to  account  for,  or  even  to  form  a  distincfl:  conception 
of  the  occasions  and  circumstances  of  it.  But  that 
the  crime  of  our  first  parents  was  the  occasion  of  our 
being  placed  in  a  more  disadvantageous  condition,  is 
a  thing  throughout  and  particularly  analogous  to 
what  we  see,  in  the  daily  course  of  natural  Providence ; 
as  the  recovery  of  the  world  by  the  interposition  of 
Christ,  has  been  shewn  to  be  so  in  general. 

VI.  The  particular  manner  in  which  Christ  inter- 
posed in  the  redemption  of  the  world,  or  his  office 
as  Mediator,  in  the  largest  sense,  between  God  and 
man,  is  thus  represented  to  us  in  the  Scripture.  He 
is  the  light  of  the  world  ;'^  the  Revealer  of  the  will 
of  God  in  the  most  eminent  sense.  He  is  a  propi- 
tiatory sacrifice  ;^  the  Lamb  of  God:"^  and,  as  he  vo- 
luntarily offered  himself  up,  he  is  styled  our  High- 

^  Joh.  i.  and  vlii.  la. 

^  Rom.  iii.  25,  and  v.  1 1 ;  i  Cor.  v.  7  ;  Eph,  v.  2 ;  I  Joh. 
ii.  2  ;  Matth.  xxvi.  28. 

'  Joh.  i.  29,  36,  and  throughout  the  book  of  Revelation. 


212         Appointment  of  a  Mediator,     Part  2. 

priest.^  And,  which  seems  of  peculiar  weight,  he 
is  described  beforehand  in  the  Old  Testament,  under 
the  same  charac^ters  of  a  priest,  and  an  expiatory 
vi(?i:im.^  And  whereas  it  is  obje^led,  that  all  this  is 
merely  by  way  of  allusion  to  the  sacrifices  of  the 
Mosaic  law,  the  Apostle  on  the  contrary  affirms,  that 
the  Law  was  a  shadow  of  good  things  to  come,  and 
not  the  very  image  of  the  things :  ^°  and  that  the 
priests  that  offer  gifts  according  to  the  law — serve 
unto  the  example  and  shadow  of  heavenly  things,  as 
Moses  was  admonished  of  God,  when  he  was  about 
to  make  the  tabernacle.  For  see,  saith  he,  that  thou 
make  all  things  according  to  the  pattern  shewed  to 
thee  in  the  mount}^  I.  e.  the  Levitical  priesthood  was 
a  shadow  of  the  priesthood  of  Christ ;  in  like  manner 
as  the  tabernacle  made  by  Moses,  was  according  to 
that  shewed  him  in  the  Mount.  The  priesthood  of 
Christ,  and  the  tabernacle  in  the  Mount,  were  the 
originals :  of  the  former  of  which,  the  Levitical  priest- 
hood was  a  type ;  and  of  the  latter,  the  tabernacle 
made  by  Moses  was  a  copy.  The  do61:rine  of  this 
epistle  then  plainly  is,  that  the  legal  sacrifices  were 
allusions  to  the  great  and  final  atonement,  to  be  made 
by  the  blood  of  Christ ;  and  not  that  this  was  an  al- 
lusion to  those.  Nor  can  anything  be  more  expref^ 
and  determinate,  than  the  following  pafsage.  It  is 
notpojlible  that  the  blood  of  bulls  and  of  goats  should 
take  away  sin.  Wherefore  when  he  cometh  into  the 
world,  he  saith.  Sacrifice  and  offering,  i.e.  of  bulls 
and  of  goats,  thou  wouldst  not,  but  a  body  hast  thou 

prepared  me Lo,  I  come  to  do  thy  will,  O  God 

By  which  will  we  are  sanSiified,  through  the 

offering  of  the  body  of  Jesus  Christ  once  for  all.^^ 

®  Throughout  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews. 

^  Ifa.  liii ;  Dan.  ix.  243  Ps.  ex.  4.  "^  Heb.  x,  I. 

"  Heb.  viii.  4,  5.  '2  j^^b.  x.  4,  5,  7,  9,  10. 


Chap.  S.      the  Redeemer  of  the  World.      213 

And  to  add  one  paftage  more  of  the  like  kind  :  Christ 
was  once  offered  to  bear  the  sins  of  many  ;  and  unto 
them  that  look  for  him  shall  he  appear  the  second 
time,  without  sin;  i.e.  without  bearing  sin,  as  he 
did  at  his  first  coming,  by  being  an  offering  for  it ; 
without  having  our  iniquities  again  laid  upon  him, 

without  being  anymore  a  sin-offering : unto  them 

that  look  for  him  shall  he  appear  the  second  time, 
without  sin,  unto  salvation}-^  Nor  do  the  inspired 
WTiters  at  all  confine  themselves  to  this  manner  of 
speaking  concerning  the  satisfaction  of  Christ ;  but 
declare  an  efficacy  in  what  he  did  and  suffered  for 
us,  additional  to  and  beyond  mere  instruction,  ex- 
ample and  government,  in  great  variety  of  expres- 
sion :  That  Jesus  should  die  for  that  nation  the  Jews : 
And  not  for  that  nation  only,  but  that  also,  plainly 
by  the  efficacy  of  his  death,  he  should  gather  together 
in  one,  the  children  ofGodthatwere  scattered  abroad :^^ 
That  he  suffered  for  sins,  the  just  for  the  unjust  :^^ 
That  he  gave  his  life,  himself,  a  ransom  :^^  That  we 
are  bought,  bought  with  a  price  .-^^  That  he  redeemed 
us  with  his  blood;  redeemed  us  from  the  curse  of 
the  law,  being  made  a  curse  for  us:^^  That  he  is  our 
Advocate,  Interceflor  and  Propitiation:^^  That  he 
was  made  perfect,  or  consummate,  through  suffer- 
ings :  and  being  thus  made  perfeSi,  he  became  the 
author  of  salvation  :-^  That  God  was  in  Christ  re- 
conciling the  world  to  himself;  by  the  death  of  his 
Son,  by  the  crojl  ;  not  imputing  their  trespajles  unto 
them  :"^  And  lastly,  that  through  death  he  destroyed 

'3  Heb.  ix.  28.  '<  Joh.  xi.  51,  52.  '^   j  p^^.  Hi.  18. 

"5  M3tth.  XX.  28  ;  Mark  x.  45  j   I  Tim.  ii.  6. 

^'  2  Pet.  ii.  I  ;  Rev.  xiv.  4;   i  Cor.  vi.  20. 

'8  I  Pet.  i,  19  ;  Rev.  v.  9  ;  Gal.  iii.  13. 

'9  Heb.  vii.  25  j    I  Joh.  ii.  1,2.      -"  Ileh.  ii,  10,  and  v.  9. 

2'  2  Cor.  V.  19  j  Rom.  v.  10;  Eph.  ii.  16. 


214        Appointment  of  a  Mediator,     Parti. 

him  that  had  the  power  of  death."  Christ  then  having 
thus  humbled  himself,  and  become  obedient  to  death, 
even  the  death  of  the  crcjl ;  God  also  hath  highly 
exalted  him,  and  given  him  a  name  which  is  above 
every  name:  hath  given  all  things  into  his  hands: 
hath  committed  all  judgment  unto  him  ;  that  all  men 
should  honour  the  Son,  even  as  they  honour  the 
Father.-'^  For,  worthy  is  the  Lamb  that  was  slain,  to 
receive  power,  and  riches,  and  wisdom,  and  strength, 
and  honour,  and  glory,  and  blefsing.  And  every 
creature  which  is  in  heaven,  and  on  the  earth,  heard 
I,  saying,  Blefsing,  and  honour,  and  glory,  and 
power  be  unto  him  that  sitteth  upon  the  throne,  and 
unto  the  Lamb  for  ever  and  ever}^ 

These  parages  of  Scripture  seem  to  comprehend 
and  expreft  the  chief  parts  of  Christ's  office,  as  Me- 
diator between  God  and  man,  so  far,  I  mean,  as  the 
nature  of  this  his  office  is  revealed ;  and  it  is  usually 
treated  of  by  divines  under  three  heads. 

First,  He  was,  by  way  of  eminence,  the  Prophet : 
That  Prophet  that  should  come  into  the  world,^^  to 
declare  the  Divine  will.  He  published  anew  the  law 
of  Nature,  which  men  had  corrupted ;  and  the  very 
knowledge  of  which  to  some  degree,  was  lost  among 
them.  He  taught  mankind,  taught  us  authoritatively 
to  live  soberly,  righteously  and  godly  in  this  present 
world,  in  expe(51:ation  of  the  future  judgment  of  God. 
He  confirmed  the  truth  of  this  moral  system  of  Na- 
ture, and  gave  us  additional  evidence  of  it ;  the  evi- 
dence of  testimony .-<'  He  distin(9;ly  revealed,  the 
manner  in  which  God  would  be  worshipped,  the 
efficacy  of  repentance,  and  the  rewards  and  punish- 

22  Heb.  li.  14.  See  also  a  remarkable  pafsage  in  the  Book 
of  Job,  xxxiii.  24. 

2^  Phil.  ii.  8,  9;  John  iii.  3<;,  and  v.  22,  23. 

24   Rev.  V.  12,  13.  '■^  Joh.  vi.  14.  26  pp_  j^Q^  5,j._ 


Chap.  ^.      the  Redeemer  of  the  World.      215 

ments  of  a  future  life.  Thus  he  was  a  Prophet  in  a 
sense,  in  which  no  other  ever  was.  To  which  is  to 
be  added,  that  he  set  us  a  perfecSl  example  that  we 
should  follow  his  steps. 

Secondly,  He  has  a  kingdom  which  is  not  of  this 
world.  He  founded  a  Church,  to  be  to  mankind  a 
standing  memorial  of  Religion,  and  invitation  to  it ; 
which  he  promised  to  be  with  always  even  to  the 
end.  He  exercises  an  invisible  government  over  it, 
himself,  and  by  his  Spirit :  Over  that  part  of  it,  which 
is  militant  here  on  earth,  a  government  of  discipline, 
for  the  perfecting  of  the  saints,  for  the  edifying  his 
body:  till  we  all  come  in  the  unity  of  the  faith,  and 
of  the  knowledge  of  the  Son  of  God,  unto  a  perfeSi 
man,  wito  the  measure  of  the  stature  of  the  fulnefl 
of  Christ.^''  Of  this  Church,  all  persons  scattered 
over  the  world,  who  live  in  obedience  to  his  laws,  are 
members.  For  these  he  is  gone  to  prepare  a  place, 
and  will  come  again  to  receive  them  unto  himself, 
that  where  he  is,  there  they  may  be  also :  and  reign 
with  him  for  ever  and  ever  :-^  and  likewise  to  take 
vengeance  on  them  that  know  not  God,  and  obey  not 
his  gospelP 

Against  these  parts  of  Christ's  office,  I  find  no 
objections,  but  what  are  fully  obviated  in  the  begin- 
ning of  this  chapter. 

Lastly,  Christ  offered  himself  a  propitiatory  sa- 
crifice, and  made  atonement  for  the  sins  of  the  world  : 
Which  is  mentioned  last,  in  regard  to  what  is  ob- 
jected against  it.  Sacrifices  of  expiation  were  com- 
manded the  Jews,  and  obtained  amongst  most  other 
nations,  from  tradition,  whose  original  probably  was 
Revelation.  And  they  were  continually  repeated, 
both  occasionally,  and  at  the  returns  of  stated  times  ; 

^'  Eph.  iv.  12,  13. 
28  Joh.  xiv.  2,  3  ;  Pv.ev.  iii.  21,  and  xi.  15.    ^  %  Th.fs.  i.  S. 


2i6         Appointment  of  a  Mediator,     Part  2. 

and  made  up  great  part  of  the  external  religion  of 
mankind.  But  now  once  in  the  end  of  the  world 
Christ  appeared  to  put  away  sin  by  the  sacrifice  of 
himself :^^  And  this  sacrifice  was,  in  the  highest  de- 
gree and  with  the  most  extensive  influence,  of  that 
efficacy  for  obtaining  pardon  of  sin,  which  the  hea- 
thens may  be  supposed  to  have  thought  their  sacri- 
fices to  have  been,  and  which  the  Jewish  sacrifices 
really  were  in  some  degree,  and  with  regard  to  some 
persons. 

How  and  in  what  particular  way  it  had  this  effi- 
cacy, there  are  not  wanting  persons  who  have  en- 
deavoured to  explain :  but  I  do  not  find  that  the 
Scripture  has  explained  it.  We  seem  to  be  very 
much  in  the  dark,  concerning  the  manner  in  which 
the  ancients  understood  atonement  to  be  made,  i.  e. 
pardon  to  be  obtained  by  sacrifices.  And  if  the  Scrip- 
ture has,  as  surely  it  has,  left  this  matter  of  the  sa- 
tisfaction of  Christ  mysterious,  left  somewhat  in  it 
unrevealed,  all  conjeClures  about  it  must  be,  if  not 
evidently  absurd,  yet  at  least  uncertain.  Nor  has 
any  one  reason  to  complain  for  want  of  farther  in- 
formation, unle{^  he  can  shew  his  claim  to  it. 

Some  have  endeavoured  to  explain  the  efficacy  of 
what  Christ  has  done  and  suffered  for  us,  beyond 
what  the  Scripture  has  authorized :  Others,  pro- 
bably because  they  could  not  explain  it,  have  been 
for  taking  it  away,  and  confining  his  office  as  Re- 
deemer of  the  world,  to  his  instruction,  example  and 
government  of  the  Church.  Whereas  the  do<5trine 
of  the  Gospel  appears  to  be  ;  not  only  that  he  taught 
the  efficacy  of  repentance,  but  rendered  it  of  the  ef- 
ficacy which  it  is,  by  what  he  did  and  suffered  for 
us :     That  he  obtained  for  us  the  benefit  of  having 

^  Heb.  ix.  26. 


Chap,  s,      the  Redeemer  of  the  World.      217 

our  repentance  accepted  unto  eternal  life  :  Not  only 
that  he  revealed  to  sinners,  that  they  were  in  a  ca- 
pacity of  salvation,  and  how  they  might  obtain  it ; 
but  moreover  that  he  put  them  into  this  capacity  of 
salvation,  by  what  he  did  and  suffered  for  them  ;  put 
us  into  a  capacity  of  escaping  future  punishment, 
and  obtaining  future  happineft.  And  it  is  our  wis- 
dom thankfully  to  accept  the  benefit,  by  performing 
the  conditions,  upon  which  it  is  offered,  on  our  part, 
without  disputing  how  it  was  procured,  on  his.  For, 
VII.  Since  we  neither  know,  by  what  means  pun- 
ishment in  a  future  state  would  have  followed  wick- 
ednef^  in  this ;  nor  in  what  manner  it  would  have 
been  inflicted,  had  it  not  been  prevented  ;  nor  all  the 
reasons  why  its  infii(?i;ion  would  have  been  needful ; 
nor  the  particular  nature  of  that  state  of  happinef^, 
which  Christ  is  gone  to  prepare  for  his  disciples : 
And  since  we  are  ignorant  how  far  anything  which  we 
could  do,  would,  alone  and  of  itself,  have  been  effec- 
tual to  prevent  that  punishment,  to  which  we  were 
obnoxious,  and  recover  that  happinef^,  which  we  had 
forfeited  ;  it  is  most  evident  we  are  not  judges,  ante- 
cedently to  Revelation,  whether  a  Mediator,  was  or 
was  not  necefsary,  to  obtain  those  ends :  to  prevent 
that  future  punishment,  and  bring  mankind  to  the 
final  happinef^  of  their  nature.  And  for  the  very 
same  reasons,  upon  supposition  of  the  necef^ity  of  a 
Mediator,  we  are  no  more  judges,  antecedently  to 
Revelation,  of  the  whole  nature  of  his  office,  or  the 
several  parts  of  which  it  consists ;  of  what  was  fit 
and  requisite  to  be  afkigned  him,  in  order  to  accom- 
plish the  ends  of  Divine  Providence  in  the  appoint- 
ment. And  from  hence  it  follows,  that  to  obje<9: 
against  the  expediency  or  usefulnef^  of  particular 
things,  revealed  to  have  been  done  or  suffered  by 
him,  because  we  do  not  see  how  they  were  conducive 


2i8         Appointment  of  a  Mediator,     Part  2. 

to  those  ends ;  is  highly  absurd.  Yet  nothing-  is 
more  common  to  be  met  with,  than  this  absurdity. 
But  if  it  be  acknowledged  beforehand,  that  we  are 
not  judges  in  the  case,  it  is  evident  that  no  obje6lion 
can,  with  any  shadow  of  reason,  be  urged  against 
any  particular  part  of  Christ's  mediatorial  office  re- 
vealed in  Scripture,  till  it  can  be  shewn  positively, 
not  to  be  requisite  or  conducive  to  the  ends  proposed 
to  be  accomplished ;  or  that  it  is  in  itself  unreason- 
able. 

And  there  is  one  obje(?i;ion  made  against  the  satis- 
faction of  Christ,  which  looks  to  be  of  this  positive 
kind :  that  the  doClrine  of  his  being  appointed  to 
suffer  for  the  sins  of  the  world,  represents  God  as 
being  indifferent  whether  he  punished  the  innocent 
or  the  guilty.  Now  from  the  foregoing  observations 
we  may  see  the  extreme  slightnef^  of  all  such  ob- 
jections ;  and  (though  it  is  most  certain  all  who  make 
them  do  not  see  the  consequence)  that  they  conclude 
altogether  as  much  against  God's  whole  original 
constitution  of  Nature,  and  the  whole  daily  course  of 
Divine  Providence  in  the  government  of  the  world, 
i.  e.  against  the  whole  scheme  of  Theism  and  the 
whole  notion  of  Religion  ;  as  against  Christianity. 
For  the  world  is  a  constitution  or  system,  whose 
parts  have  a  mutual  reference  to  each  other :  and 
there  is  a  scheme  of  things  gradually  carrying  on, 
called  the  course  of  Nature,  to  the  carrying  on  of 
which,  God  has  appointed  us,  in  various  ways,  to 
contribute.  And  when,  in  the  daily  course  of  natural 
Providence,  it  is  appointed  that  innocent  people  should 
suffer  for  the  faults  of  the  guilty,  this  is  liable  to  the 
very  same  objec^tion,  as  the  instance  we  are  now 
considering.  The  infinitely  greater  importance  of 
that  appointment  of  Christianity  which  is  objeClied 
against,  does  not  hinder  but  it  may  be,  as  it  plainly 


Chap,  5.      the  Redeemer  of  the  World.      219 

is,  an  appointment  of  the  very  same  kind,  with  what 
the  world  affords  us  daily  examples  of.  Nay  if  there 
were  any  force  at  all  in  the  obie(5iion,  it  would  be 
stronger,  in  one  respe^l,  against  natural  Providence, 
than  against  Christianity  :  because  under  the  former, 
we  are  in  many  cases  commanded,  and  even  neces- 
sitated whether  we  will  or  no,  to  suffer  for  the  faults 
of  others ;  w^hereas  the  sufferings  of  Christ  were 
voluntary.  The  world's  being  under  the  righteous 
government  of  God,  does  indeed  imply,  that  finally 
and  upon  the  whole  every  one  shall  receive  accord- 
ing to  his  personal  deserts :  And  the  general  doc- 
trine of  the  whole  Scripture  is,  that  this  shall  be  the 
completion  of  the  Divine  government.  But  during 
the  progrefs,  and,  for  aught  we  know,  even  in  order 
to  the  completion  of  this  moral  scheme,  vicarious 
punishments  may  be  fit,  and  absolutely  neceftary. 
Men  by  their  follies  run  themselves  into  extreme 
distrefs :  into  difficulties  which  would  be  absolutely 
fatal  to  them,  were  it  not  for  the  interposition  and 
afsistance  of  others.  God  commands  by  the  law  of 
Nature,  that  we  afford  them  this  afsistance,  in  many 
cases  where  we  cannot  do  it  without  very  great  pains, 
and  labour,  and  sufferings  to  ourselves.  And  we  see 
in  what  variety  of  ways,  one  person's  sufferings  con- 
tribute to  the  relief  of  another  :  and  how,  or  by  what 
particular  means,  this  comes  to  pa{^  or  follow^s,  from 
the  constitution  and  laws  of  Nature,  which  come 
under  our  notice  :  and,  being  familiarized  to  it,  men 
are  not  shocked  with  it.  So  that  the  reason  of  their 
insisting  upon  objecT;ions  of  the  foregoing  kind  against 
the  satisfaction  of  Christ,  is,  either  that  they  do  not 
consider  God's  settled  and  uniform  appointments  as 
his  appointments  at  all :  Or  else,  they  forget  that 
vicarious  punishment  is  a  providential  appointment 
of  every  day's  experience :    And  then,  from  their 


220         Appointment  of  a  Mediator,     Part  2. 

being-  unacquainted  with  the  more  general  laws  of 
Nature  or  Divine  government  over  the  world,  and 
not  seeing  how  the  sufferings  of  Christ  could  contri- 
bute to  the  redemption  of  it,  unleft  by  arbitrary  and 
tyrannical  will ;  they  conclude  his  sufferings  could 
not  contribute  to  it  any  other  way.  And  yet,  what 
has  been  often  alleged  in  justification  of  this  do(fi:rine, 
even  from  the  apparent  natural  tendency  of  this 
method  of  our  redemption  ;  its  tendency  to  vindicate 
the  authority  of  God's  laws,  and  deter  his  creatures 
from  sin  ;  this  has  never  yet  been  answered,  and  is 
I  think  plainly  unanswerable  :  though  I  am  far  from 
thinking  it  an  account  of  the  whole  of  the  case.  But 
without  taking  this  into  consideration,  it  abundantly 
appears,  from  the  observations  above  made,  that  this 
obje^lion  is,  not  an  obje^lion  against  Christianity, 
but  against  the  whole  general  constitution  of  Nature. 
And  if  it  were  to  be  considered  as  an  obje6lion  against 
Christianity,  or  considering  it  as  it  is,  an  objection 
against  the  constitution  of  Nature  ;  it  amounts  to  no 
more  in  conclusion  than  this,  that  a  Divine  appoint- 
ment cannot  be  necef^ary  or  expedient,  because  the 
obje(51or  does  not  discern  it  to  be  so :  though  he 
must  own  that  the  nature  of  the  case  is  such,  as  ren- 
ders him  incapable  of  judging,  whether  it  be  so  or 
not ;  or  of  seeing  it  to  be  necef^ary,  though  it  were 
so. 

It  is  indeed  a  matter  of  great  patience  to  reason- 
able men,  to  find  people  arguing  in  this  manner : 
objecting  against  the  credibility  of  such  particular 
things  revealed  in  Scripture,  that  they  do  not  see 
the  necef^ity  or  expediency  of  them.  For  though 
it  is  highly  right,  and  the  most  pious  exercise  of  our 
understanding,  to  inquire  with  due  reverence  into 
the  ends  and  reasons  of  God's  dispensations :  Yet 
when  those  reasons  are  concealed,  to  argue  from  our 


Chap.  5.      the  Redeemer  of  the  World.      221 

ignorance,  that  such  dispensations  cannot  be  from 
God,  is  infinitely  absurd.  The  presumption  of  this 
kind  of  objections,  seems  almost  lost  in  the  folly  of 
them.  And  the  folly  of  them  is  yet  greater,  when 
they  are  urged,  as  usually  they  are,  against  things 
in  Christianity  analogous  or  like  to  those  natural  dis- 
pensations of  Providence,  which  are  matter  of  expe- 
rience. Let  reason  be  kept  to :  and  if  any  part  of 
the  Scripture-account  of  the  redemption  of  the  world 
by  Christ,  can  be  shewn  to  be  really  contrary  to  it, 
let  the  Scripture,  in  the  name  of  God,  be  given  up  : 
But  let  not  such  poor  creatures  as  we,  go  on  obje(5l- 
ing  against  an  infinite  scheme,  that  we  do  not  see 
the  neceftity  or  usefulnefs  of  all  its  parts,  and  call 
this  reasoning ;  And,  which  still  farther  heightens 
the  absurdity  in  the  present  case,  parts  which  we 
are  not  actively  concerned  in.  For  it  may  be  worth 
mentioning. 

Lastly,  That  not  only  the  reason  of  the  thing,  but 
the  whole  Analogy  of  Nature,  should  teach  us,  not 
to  expe(?i:  to  have  the  like  information  concerning  the 
Divine  condu6l,  as  concerning  our  own  duty.  God 
instructs  us  by  experience,  (for  it  is  not  reason,  but 
experience  which  instructs  us,)  what  good  or  bad 
consequences  will  follow  from  our  acting  in  such  and 
such  manners :  and  by  this  he  directs  us,  how  we 
are  to  behave  ourselves.  But,  though  we  are  suf- 
ficiently instructed  for  the  common  purposes  of  life  : 
yet  it  is  but  an  almost  infinitely  small  part  of  natural 
Providence,  which  we  are  at  all  let  into.  The  case 
is  the  same  with  regard  to  Revelation.  The  doc- 
trine of  a  Mediator  between  God  and  man,  against 
which  it  is  objected,  that  the  expediency  of  some 
things  in  it  is  not  understood,  relates  only  to  what 
was  done  on  God's  part  in  the  appointment,  and  on 
the  Mediator's  in  the  execution  of  it.     For  what  is 


222    Appointment  of  a  Mediator,  &c.  Part  2. 

required  of  us,  in  consequence  of  this  gracious  dis- 
pensation, is  another  subje(ft,  in  which  none  can 
complain  for  want  of  information.  The  constitution 
of  the  world  and  God's  natural  government  over  it, 
is  all  mystery,  as  much  as  the  Christian  dispensation. 
Yet  under  the  first,  he  has  given  men  all  things  per- 
taining to  life  ;  and  under  the  other,  all  things  per- 
taining unto  godlinei^.  And  it  may  be  added,  that 
there  is  nothing  hard  to  be  accounted  for  in  any  of 
the  common  precepts  of  Christianity :  though  if  there 
were,  surely  a  Divine  command  is  abundantly  suf- 
ficient to  lay  us  under  the  strongest  obligations  to 
obedience.  But  the  facl  is,  that  the  reasons  of  all 
the  Christian  precepts  are  evident.  Positive  institu- 
tions are  manifestly  necef^ary  to  keep  up  and  pro- 
pagate Religion  amongst  mankind.  And  our  duty 
to  Christ,  the  internal  and  external  worship  of  him ; 
this  part  of  the  religion  of  the  Gospel,  manifestly 
arises  out  of  what  he  has  done  and  suffered,  his  au- 
thority and  dominion,  and  the  relation,  which  he  is 
revealed  to  stand  in  to  us.'^^ 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Of  the  Want  of  Universality  in  Revelation:  and  of 
the  supposed  Deficiency  in  the  Proof  of  it. 

T  has  been  thought  by  some  persons, 
that  if  the  evidence  of  Revelation  ap- 
pears doubtful,  this  itself  turns  into  a 
positive  argument  against  it :  because 
it  cannot  be  supposed,  that  if  it  were 
true,  it  would  be  left  to  subsist  upon  doubtful  evi- 
3»  Pp.  156,  &c. 


"^jhap.  6.     Revelation  not  universal,  &c.     223 

dence.  And  the  obje<51ion  against  Revelation  from 
its  not  being  universal,  is  often  insisted  upon  as  of 
great  weight. 

Now  the  weakneft  of  these  opinions  may  be  shewn, 
by  observing  the  suppositions  on  which  they  are 
founded :  Which  are  really  such  as  these ;  that  it 
cannot  be  thought  God  would  have  bestowed  any 
favour  at  all  upon  us,  unlefs  in  the  degree,  which,  we 
think,  he  might,  and  which,  we  imagine,  would  be 
most  to  our  particular  advantage ;  and  also  that  it 
cannot  be  thought  he  would  bestow  a  favour  upon 
any,  unlets  he  bestowed  the  same  upon  all :  Suppo- 
sitions which  we  find  contradicfled,  not  by  a  few  in- 
stances in  God's  natural  government  of  the  world, 
but  by  the  general  Analogy  of  Nature  together. 

Persons  who  speak  of  the  evidence  of  Religion  as 
doubtful,  and  of  this  supposed  doubtfulneft  as  a  po- 
sitive argument  against  it,  should  be  put  upon  con- 
sidering, what  that  evidence  indeed  is,  which  they 
a(5l  upon  with  regard  to  their  temporal  interests. 
For,  it  is  not  only  extremely  difficult,  but,  in  many 
cases,  absolutely  impofsible,  to  balance  pleasure  and 
pain,  satisfaction  and  uneasinef^,  so  as  to  be  able  to 
say,  on  which  side  the  overplus  is.  There  are  the 
like  difficulties  and  impofsibilities  in  making  the  due 
allowances,  for  a  change  of  temper  and  taste,  for 
satiety,  disgusts,  ill-health:  any  of  which  render 
men  incapable  of  enjoying,  after  they  have  obtained, 
what  they  most  eagerly  desired.  Numberlel^  too 
are  the  accidents,  besides  that  one  of  untimely  death, 
which  may  even  probably  disappoint  the  best-con- 
certed schemes  :  And  strong  objections  are  often  seen 
to  lie  against  them,  not  to  be  removed  or  answered, 
but  which  seem  overbalanced  by  reasons  on  the  other 
side  ;  so  as  that  the  certain  difficulties  and  dangers 
of  the  pursuit  are,  by  every  one,  thought  justly  dis- 


224         Revelation  not  universal,         Part  2. 

regarded,  upon  account  of  the  appearing  greater 
advantages  in  case  of  succel^,  though  there  be  but 
little  probabiHty  of  it.  Lastly,  every  one  observes 
our  liableneft,  if  we  be  not  upon  our  guard,  to  be 
deceived  by  the  falsehood  of  men,  and  the  false  ap- 
pearances of  things  :  And  this  danger  must  be  greatly 
increased,  if  there  be  a  strong  bias  within,  suppose 
from  indulged  pafsion,  to  favour  the  deceit.  Hence 
arises  that  great  uncertainty  and  doubtfulnef^  of 
proof,  wherein  our  temporal  interest  really  consists ; 
what  are  the  most  probable  means  of  attaining  it ; 
and  whether  those  means  will  eventually  be  suc- 
ceftful.  And  numberlei^  instances  there  are,  in  the 
daily  course  of  life,  in  which  all  men  think  it  reason- 
able to  engage  in  pursuits,  though  the  probability  is 
greatly  against  succeeding ;  and  to  make  such  pro- 
vision for  themselves,  as  it  is  supposable  they  may 
have  occasion  for,  though  the  plain  acknowledged 
probability  is,  that  they  never  shall.  Then  those 
who  think  the  obje(9;ion  against  Revelation,  from  its 
Hght  not  being  universal,  to  be  of  weight,  should  ob- 
serve, that  the  Author  of  nature,  in  numberleft  in- 
stances, bestows  that  upon  some,  which  he  does  not 
upon  others,  who  seem  equally  to  stand  in  need  of 
it.  Indeed  he  appears  to  bestow  all  his  gifts,  with 
the  most  promiscuous  variety,  among  creatures  of 
the  same  species:  Health  and  strength,  capacities 
of  prudence  and  of  knowledge,  means  of  improve- 
ment, riches,  and  all  external  advantages.  And  as 
there  are  not  any  two  men  found,  of  exac^tly  like 
shape  and  features :  so  it  is  probable  there  are  not 
any  two,  of  an  exa6lly  like  constitution,  temper  and 
situation,  with  regard  to  the  goods  and  evils  of  life. 
Yet,  notwithstandingthese  uncertainties  and  varieties, 
God  does  exercise  a  natural  government  over  the 
world :  and  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  prudent  and 


Chap.  6.  and  its  Proof  supposed  deficient.   225 

imprudent  institution  of  life,  with  regard  to  our  health 
and  our  affairs,  under  that  his  natural  government. 
As  neither  the  Jewish  nor  Christian  Revelation 
have  been  universal ;  and  as  they  have  been  afforded 
to  a  greater  or  lef^  part  of  the  world,  at  different 
times :  so  likewise,  at  different  times,  both  Revela- 
tions have  had  different  degrees  of  evidence.  The 
Jews  who  lived  during  the  succefsion  of  Prophets, 
that  is,  from  Moses  till  after  the  captivity,  had  higher 
evidence  of  the  truth  of  their  religion,  than  those 
had,  who  lived  in  the  interval  between  the  last-men- 
tioned period,  and  the  coming  of  Christ.  And  the 
first  Christians  had  higher  evidence  of  the  miracles 
wrought  in  attestation  of  Christianity,  than  what  we 
have  now.  They  had  also  a  strong  presumptive 
proof  of  the  truth  of  it,  perhaps  of  much  greater 
force,  in  way  of  argument,  than  many  think,  of  which 
we  have  very  little  remaining ;  I  mean  the  presump- 
tive proof  of  its  truth,  from  the  influence  which  it 
had  upon  the  lives  of  the  generality  of  its  profefsors. 
And  we,  or  future  ages,  may  pofsibly  have  a  proof 
of  it,  which  they  could  not  have,  from  the  confor- 
mity between  the  prophetic  history,  and  the  state  of 
the  world  and  of  Christianity.  And  farther :  If  we 
were  to  suppose  the  evidence,  which  some  have  of 
Religion,  to  amount  to  little  more,  than  seeing  that 
it  may  be  true  ;  but  that  they  remain  in  great  doubts 
and  uncertainties  about  both  its  evidence  and  its  na- 
ture, and  great  perplexities  concerning  the  rule  of 
life:  Others  to  have  a  full  conviction  of  the  truth  of 
Religion,  with  a  distinct  kno\\  ledge  of  their  duty : 
and  others  severally  to  have  ail  the  intermediate  de- 
grees of  religious  light  and  evidence,  which  lie  be- 
tween these  two If  we  put  the  case,  that  for  the 

present  it  was  intended.  Revelation  should  be  no 
more  than  a  small  light,  in  the  midst  of  a  world 


226  Revelation  not  universal.      Part  2. 

greatly  overspread,  notwithstanding  it,  with  igno- 
rance and  darknei^  :  that  certain  glimmerings  of  this 
light  should  extend,  and  be  directed,  to  remote  dis- 
tances, in  such  a  manner  as  that  those  who  really 
partook  of  it,  should  not  discern  from  whence  it  ori- 
ginally came :  that  some  in  a  nearer  situation  to  it, 
should  have  its  light  obscured,  and,  in  different  ways 
and  degrees,  intercepted :  and  that  others  should  be 
placed  within  its  clearer  influence,  and  be  much 
more  enlivened,  cheered  and  directed  by  it ;  but  yet 
that  even  to  these,  it  should  be  no  more  than  a  light 
shining  in  a  dark  place :  All  this  w  ould  be  perfe^^ly 
uniform  and  of  a  piece  with  the  conduct  of  Provi- 
dence, in  the  distribution  of  its  other  biddings.  If 
the  fact  of  the  case  really  were,  that  some  have  re- 
ceived no  light  at  all  from  the  Scripture  ;  as  many 
ages  and  countries  in  the  heathen  world  :  that  others, 
though  they  have,  by  means  of  it,  had  eftential  or 
natural  Religion  enforced  upon  their  consciences, 
yet  have  never  had  the  genuine  Scripture-revelation, 
with  its  real  evidence,  proposed  to  their  considera- 
tion ;  and  the  ancient  Persians,  and  modern  Maho- 
medans,  may  pofsibly  be  instances  of  people  in  a 
situation  somewhat  like  to  this :  that  others,  though 
they  have  had  the  Scripture  laid  before  them  as  of 
Divine  Revelation,  yet  have  had  it  with  the  system 
and  evidence  of  Christianity  so  interpolated,  the  sys- 
tem so  corrupted,  the  evidence  so  blended  with  false 
miracles,  as  to  leave  the  mind  in  the  utmost  doubt- 
fulnef^  and  uncertainty  about  the  whole  ;  which  may 
be  the  state  of  some  thoughtful  men,  in  most  of  those 
nations  w^ho  call  themselves  Christian :  And  lastly, 
that  others  have  had  Christianity  offered  to  them  in 
its  genuine  simplicity,  and  with  its  proper  evidence, 
as  persons  in  countries  and  churches  of  civil  and  of 
Christian  liberty ;  but  however  that  even  these  per- 


Chap.  6.  and  its  Proof  supposed  deficient.  227 

sons  are  left  in  great  ignorance  in  many  respects, 
and  have  by  no  means  light  afforded  them  enough 
to  satisfy  their  curiosity,  but  only  to  regulate  their 
life,  to  teach  them  their  duty  and  encourage  them 
in  the  careful  discharge  of  it :  I  say,  if  we  were  to 
suppose  this  somewhat  of  a  general  true  account  of 
the  degrees  of  moral  and  religious  light  and  evidence, 
which  were  intended  to  be  afforded  mankind,  and  of 
what  has  actually  been  and  is  their  situation,  in  their 
moral  and  religious  capacity  ;  there  would  be  nothing 
in  all  this  ignorance,  doubtfulnef^  and  uncertainty, 
in  all  these  varieties,  and  supposed  disadvantages  of 
some  in  comparison  of  others,  respecting  Religion, 
but  may  be  parallelled  by  manifest  Analogies  in  the 
natural  dispensations  of  Providence  at  present,  and 
considering  ourselves  merely  in  our  temporal  capa- 
city. 

Nor  is  there  anything  shocking  in  all  this,  or  which 
would  seem  to  bear  hard  upon  the  moral  adminis- 
tration in  Nature,  if  we  would  really  keep  in  mind, 
that  every  one  shall  be  dealt  equitably  with  :  instead 
of  forgetting  this,  or  explaining  it  away,  after  it  is 
acknowledged  in  words.  All  shadow  of  injustice, 
and  indeed  all  harsh  appearances,  in  this  various 
economy  of  Providence,  would  be  lost;  if  we  would 
keep  in  mind,  that  every  merciful  allowance  shall  be 
made,  and  no  more  be  required  of  any  one,  than 
what  might  have  been  equitably  expelled  of  him, 
from  the  circumstances  in  which  he  was  placed  ;  and 
not  what  might  have  been  expected,  had  he  been 
placed  in  other  circumstances  :  i.  e.  in  Scripture  lan- 
guage, that  every  man  shall  be  accepted  according 
to  what  he  had,  not  according  to  what  he  had  not.^ 
This  however  doth  not  by  any  means  imply,  that  all 

'   2  Cor.  viii.  12. 


228  Revelation  not  universal,      Part  2. 

persons'  condition  here,  is  equally  advantageous  with 
respedl  to  futurity.  And  Providence's  designing  to 
place  some  in  greater  darknel^  with  respecft  to  reli- 
gious knowledge,  is  no  more  a  reason  why  they 
should  not  endeavour  to  get  out  of  that  darkneis,  and 
others  to  bring  them  out  of  it ;  than  why  ignorant 
and  slow  people,  in  matters  of  other  knowledge, 
should  not  endeavour  to  learn,  or  should  not  be  in- 
strucled. 

It  is  not  unreasonable  to  suppose,  that  the  same 
wise  and  good  principle,  whatever  it  was,  which  dis- 
posed the  Author  of  nature  to  make  different  kinds 
and  orders  of  creatures,  disposed  him  also  to  place 
creatures  of  like  kinds,  in  different  situations :  And 
that  the  same  principle  which  disposed  him  to  make 
creatures  of  different  moral  capacities,  disposed  him 
also  to  place  creatures  of  like  moral  capacities,  in 
different  religious  situations ;  and  even  the  same 
creatures,  in  different  periods  of  their  being.  And 
the  account  or  reason  of  this,  is  also  most  probably 
the  account,  why  the  constitution  of  things  is  such, 
as  that  creatures  of  moral  natures  or  capacities,  for 
a  considerable  part  of  that  duration  in  which  they 
are  living  agents,  are  not  at  all  subje(9:s  of  morality 
and  Religion  ;  but  grow  up  to  be  so,  and  grow  up  to 
be  so  more  and  more,  gradually  from  childhood  to 
mature  age. 

What,  in  particular,  is  the  account  or  reason  of 
these  things,  we  must  be  greatly  in  the  dark,  were 
it  only  that  we  know  so  very  little  even  of  our  own 
case.  Our  present  state  may  pofsibly  be  the  con- 
sequence of  somewhat  past,  which  we  are  wholly  ig- 
norant of:  as  it  has  a  reference  to  somewhat  to  come, 
of  which  we  know  scarce  any  more  than  is  neces- 
sary for  practice.  A  system  or  constitution,  in  its 
notion,  implies  variety ;  and  so  complicated  an  one 


Chap.  6.  and  its  Proof  supposed  deficient.  229 

as  this  world,  very  great  variety.  So  that  were  Re- 
velation universal,  yet  from  men's  different  capacities 
of  understanding,  from  the  different  lengths  of  their 
lives,  their  different  educations  and  other  external 
circumstances,  and  from  their  difference  of  temper 
cind  bodily  constitution;  their  religious  situations 
would  be  widely  different,  and  the  disadvantage  of 
some  in  comparison  of  others,  perhaps,  altogether  as 
much  as  at  present.  And  the  true  account,  whatever 
it  be,  why  mankind  or  such  a  part  of  mankind  are 
placed  in  this  condition  of  ignorance,  must  be  sup- 
posed also  the  true  account  of  our  farther  ignorance, 
in  not  knowing  the  reasons,  why,  or  whence  it  is, 
that  they  are  placed  in  this  condition.  But  the  fol- 
lowing practical  refle(9:ions  may  deserve  the  serious 
consideration  of  those  persons,  who  think  the  cir- 
cumstances of  mankind  or  their  own,  in  the  fore- 
mentioned  respe(51;s,  a  ground  of  complaint. 

First,  The  evidence  of  Religion  not  appearing  ob- 
vious, may  constitute  one  particular  part  of  some 
men's  trial  in  the  religious  sense  :  as  it  gives  scope, 
for  a  virtuous  exercise,  or  vicious  neglect  of  their 
understanding,  in  examining  or  not  examining  into 
that  evidence.  There  seems  no  poftible  reason  to 
be  given,  why  we  may  not  be  in  a  state  of  moral 
probation,  with  regard  to  the  exercise  of  our  under- 
standing upon  the  subjecl  of  Religion,  as  we  are  with 
regard  to  our  behaviour  in  common  affairs.  The 
former  is  as  much  a  thing  within  our  power  and 
choice,  as  the  latter.  And  I  suppose  it  is  to  be  laid 
down  for  certain,  that  the  same  charac1;er,  the  same 
inward  principle,  which,  after  a  man  is  convinced  of 
the  truth  of  Religion,  renders  him  obedient  to  the 
precepts  of  it,  would,  were  he  not  thus  convinced, 
set  him  about  an  examination  of  it,  upon  its  system 
and  evidence  being  offered  to  his  thoughts  :  And  that 


230  Revelation  not  universal,       Part  2. 

in  the  latter  state,  his  examination  would  be  with  an 
impartiality,  seriousnef^  and  solicitude,  proportion- 
able to  what  his  obedience  is  in  the  former.  And 
as  inattention,  negligence,  want  of  all  serious  con- 
cern, about  a  matter  of  such  a  nature  and  such  im- 
portance, when  offered  to  men's  consideration,  is, 
before  a  distin(5^  convic^iion  of  its  truth,  as  real  im- 
moral depravity  and  difsolutenefs ;  as  neglecft  of 
religious  pradice  after  such  convidlion :  so  a6live 
solicitude  about  it,  and  fair  impartial  consideration  of 
its  evidence  before  such  convi(?i;ion,  is  as  really  an 
exercise  of  a  morally  right  temper ;  as  is  religious 
pra(9;ice  after.  Thus,  that  Religion  is  not  intuitively 
true,  but  a  matter  of  deduction  and  inference ;  that 
a  convic^tion  of  its  truth  is  not  forced  upon  every  one, 
but  left  to  be,  by  some,  collected  with  heedful  at- 
tention to  premises ;  this  as  much  constitutes  reli- 
gious probation,  as  much  affords  sphere,  scope,  op- 
portunity, for  right  and  wrong  behaviour,  as  anything 
whatever  does.  And  their  manner  of  treating  this 
subje<?l:  when  laid  before  them,  shows  what  is  in 
their  heart,  and  is  an  exertion  of  it. 

Secondly,  It  appears  to  be  a  thing  as  evident, 
though  it  is  not  so  much  attended  to,  that  if  upon 
consideration  of  Religion,  the  evidence  of  it  should 
seem  to  any  persons  doubtful,  in  the  highest  sup- 
posable  degree ;  even  this  doubtful  evidence  will, 
however,  put  them  into  a  general  state  of  probation 
in  the  moral  and  religious  sense.  For,  suppose  a 
man  to  be  really  in  doubt,  whether  such  a  person 
had  not  done  him  the  greatest  favour ;  or,  whether 
his  whole  temporal  interest  did  not  depend  upon 
that  person :  No  one,  who  had  any  sense  of  grati- 
tude and  of  prudence,  could  poftibly  consider  him- 
self in  the  same  situation  with  regard  to  such  per- 
son, as  if  he  had  no  such  doubt.     In  truth,  it  is  as 


Chap.  6.  and  its  Proof  supposed  deficient.  231 

just  to  say,  that  certainty  and  doubt  are  the  same ; 
as  to  say,  the  situations  now  mentioned,  would  leave 
a  man  as  entirely  at  liberty  in  point  of  gratitude  or 
prudence,  as  he  would  be,  were  he  certain  he  had 
received  no  favour  from  such  person,  or  that  he  no 
way  depended  upon  him.  And  thus,  though  the 
evidence  of  Religion  which  is  afforded  to  some  men, 
should  be  little  more  than  that  they  are  given  to  see, 
the  system  of  Christianity,  or  Religion  in  general,  to 
be  supposable  and  credible  ;  this  ought  in  all  reason 
to  beget  a  serious  practical  apprehension,  that  it 
may  be  true.  And  even  this  will  afford  matter  of 
exercise,  for  religious  suspense  and  deliberation,  for 
moral  resolution  and  self-government ;  because  the 
apprehension  that  Religion  may  be  true,  does  as 
really  lay  men  under  obligations,  as  a  full  convic^lion 
that  it  is  true.  It  gives  occasion  and  motives  to  con- 
sider farther  the  important  subject ;  to  preserve  at- 
tentively upon  their  minds,  a  general  implicit  sense 
that  they  may  be  under  Divine  moral  government, 
an  awful  solicitude  about  Religion,  whether  natural 
or  revealed.  Such  apprehension  ought  to  turn  men's 
eyes  to  every  degree  of  new  light  which  may  be  had, 
from  whatever  side  it  comes ;  and  induce  them  to 
refrain,  in  the  mean  time,  from  all  immoralities,  and 
live  in  the  conscientious  practice  of  every  common 
virtue.  Especially  are  they  bound  to  keep  at  the 
greatest  distance  from  all  dif^olute  profanenef^  ;  for 
this  the  very  nature  of  the  case  forbids  ;  and  to  treat 
with  highest  reverence  a  matter,  upon  which  their 
own  whole  interest  and  being,  and  the  fate  of  Nature 
depends.  This  behaviour,  and  an  aclive  endeavour 
to  maintain  within  themselves  this  temper,  is  the 
businef^,  the  duty  and  the  wisdom  of  those  persons, 
who  complain  of  the  doubtfulnef^  of  Religion :  is 
what  they  are  under  the  most  proper  obligations  to. 


232  Revelation  not  universal,      Part  2. 

And  such  behaviour  is  an  exertion  of,  and  has  a  ten- 
dency to  improve  in  them,  that  charadler,  which  the 
pra(5lice  of  all  the  several  duties  of  Religion,  from  a 
full  convic'lion  of  its  truth,  is  an  exertion  of,  and  has 
a  tendency  to  improve  in  others :  Others,  I  say,  to 
whom  God  has  afforded  such  conviciiion.  Nay,  con- 
sidering the  infinite  importance  of  Religion,  revealed 
as  well  as  natural,  I  think  it  may  be  said  in  general, 
that  whoever  will  weigh  the  matter  thoroughly  may 
see,  there  is  not  near  so  much  difTerence,  as  is  com- 
monly imagined,  between  what  ought  in  reason  to 
be  the  rule  of  life,  to  those  persons  who  are  fully 
convinced  of  its  truth,  and  to  those  who  have  only 
a  serious  doubting  apprehension,  that  it  may  be  true. 
Their  hopes  and  fears  and  obligations  will  be  in  va- 
rious degrees:  But,  as  the  subject-matter  of  their 
hopes  and  fears  is  the  same  ;  so  the  subje(5l-matter 
of  their  obligations,  what  they  are  bound  to  do  and 
refrain  from,  is  not  so  very  unlike. 

It  is  to  be  observed  farther,  that,  from  a  chara(5^er 
of  understanding,  or  a  situation  of  influence  in  the 
world,  some  persons  have  it  in  their  power  to  do 
infinitely  more  harm  or  good,  by  setting  an  example 
of  profanenef^  and  avowed  disregard  to  all  Religion, 
or,  on  the  contrary,  of  a  serious,  though  perhaps 
doubting,  apprehension  of  its  truth,  and  of  a  reverend 
regard  to  it  under  this  doubtfulnef^ ;  than  they  can 
do,  by  acting  well  or  ill  in  all  the  common  inter- 
courses amongst  mankind.  And  consequently  they 
are  most  highly  accountable  for  a  behaviour,  which, 
they  may  easily  foresee,  is  of  such  importance,  and 
in  which  there  is  most  plainly  a  right  and  a  wrong ; 
even  admitting  the  evidence  of  Religion  to  be  as 
doubtful,  as  is  pretended. 

The  ground  of  these  observations,  and  that  which 
renders  them  just  and  true,  is,  that  doubting  neces- 


Chap.  6.  and  its  Proof  supposed  deficient.  233 

sarily  implies  some  degree  of  evidence  for  that,  of 
which  we  doubt.  For  no  person  would  be  in  doubt, 
concerning  the  truth  of  a  number  of  facts  so  and  so 
circumstanced,  which  should  accidentally  come  into 
his  thoughts,  and  of  which  he  had  no  evidence  at 
all.  And  though  in  the  case  of  an  even  chance,  and 
where  consequently  we  were  in  doubt,  we  should  in 
common  language  say,  that  we  had  no  evidence  at 
all  for  either  side  ;  yet  that  situation  of  things,  which 
renders  it  an  even  chance  and  no  more,  that  such  an 
event  will  happen,  renders  this  case  equivalent  to 
all  others,  where  there  is  such  evidence  on  both 
sides  of  a  question,^  as  leaves  the  mind  in  doubt 
concerning  the  truth.  Indeed  in  all  these  cases, 
there  is  no  more  evidence  on  one  side,  than  on  the 
other;  but  there  is  (what  is  equivalent  to)  much 
more  for  either,  than  for  the  truth  of  a  number  of 
fa61s  which  come  into  one's  thoughts  at  random. 
And  thus  in  all  these  cases,  doubt  as  much  presup- 
poses evidence,  lower  degrees  of  evidence  ;  as  belief 
presupposes  higher,  and  certainty  higher  still.  Any 
one,  who  will  a  little  attend  to  the  nature  of  evidence, 
will  easily  carry  this  observation  on,  and  see,  that 
between  no  evidence  at  all,  and  that  degree  of  it 
which  affords  ground  of  doubt,  there  are  as  many 
intermediate  degrees ;  as  there  are,  between  that 
degree  which  is  the  ground  of  doubt,  and  demon- 
stration. And  though  we  have  not  faculties  to  dis- 
tinguish these  degrees  of  evidence,  with  any  sort  of 
exa(9;neft ;  yet,  in  proportion  as  they  are  discerned, 
they  ought  to  influence  our  pra^lice.  For  it  is  as 
real  an  imperfe<51ion  in  the  moral  character,  not  to 
be  influenced  in  pra(51:ice  by  a  lov^'er  degree  of  evi- 
dence when  discerned,  as  it  is,  in  the  understanding, 

'  Introdudion, 


234  Revelation  not  universal,       Part  2. 

not  to  discern  it.  And  as,  in  all  subjecSls  which  men 
consider,  they  discern  the  lower  as  well  as  higher 
degrees  of  evidence,  proportionably  to  their  capacity 
of  understanding :  so,  in  pra6lical  subjecl:s,  they  are 
influenced  in  practice,  by  the  lower  as  well  as  higher 
degrees  of  it,  proportionably  to  their  fairneft  and 
honesty.  And  as,  in  proportion  to  defedls  in  the 
understanding,  men  are  unapt  to  see  lower  degrees 
of  evidence,  are  in.  danger  of  overlooking  evidence 
when  it  is  not  glaring,  and  are  easily  imposed  upon 
in  such  cases :  so,  in  proportion  to  the  corruption 
of  the  heart,  they  seem  capable  of  satisfying  them- 
selves with  having  no  regard  in  praclice  to  evidence 
acknowledged  real,  if  it  be  not  overbearing.  From 
these  things  it  must  follow,  that  doubting  concern- 
ing Religion  implies  such  a  degree  of  evidence  for 
it,  as  joined  with  the  consideration  of  its  importance, 
unquestionably  lays  men  under  the  obligations  be- 
fore mentioned,  to  have  a  dutiful  regard  to  it  in  all 
their  behaviour. 

Thirdly,  The  difficulties  in  which  the  evidence  of 
Religion  is  involved,  which  some  complain  of,  is  no 
more  a  just  ground  of  complaint,  than  the  external 
circumstances  of  temptation,  which  others  are  placed 
in ;  or  than  difficulties  in  the  practice  of  it,  after  a 
full  conviction  of  its  truth.  Temptations  render  our 
state  a  more  improving  state  of  discipline,-^  than  it 
would  be  otherwise :  as  they  give  occasion  for  a 
more  attentive  exercise  of  the  virtuous  principle, 
which  confirms  and  strengthens  it  more,  than  an 
easier  or  lei^  attentive  exercise  of  it  could.  Now 
speculative  difficulties  are,  in  this  respe(5l,  of  the 
very  same  nature  with  these  external  temptations. 
For  the  evidence  of  Religion  not  appearing  obvious, 
is,  to  some  persons,  a  temptation  to  rejedl  it,  with- 

^  Part  I.  ch.  V. 


Chap.  6.  and  its  Proof  supposed  deficient.   235 

out  any  consideration  at  all ;  and  therefore  requires 
such  an  attentive  exercise  of  the  virtuous  principle, 
seriously  to  consider  that  evidence,  as  there  would 
be  no  occasion  for,  but  for  such  temptation.  And 
the  supposed  doubtfulnef^  of  its  evidence,  after  it  has 
been  in  some  sort  considered,  affords  opportunity  to 
an  unfair  mind  of  explaining  away,  and  deceitfully 
hiding  from  itself,  that  evidence  which  it  might  see  ; 
and  also  for  men's  encouraging  themselves  in  vice 
from  hopes  of  impunity,  though  they  do  clearly  see 
thus  much  at  least,  that  these  hopes  are  uncertain : 
In  like  manner  as  the  common  temptation  to  many 
instances  of  folly  which  end  in  temporal  infamy  and 
ruin,  is,  the  ground  for  hope  of  not  being  detected, 
and  of  escaping  with  impunity  ;  i.  e.  the  doubtfulnef^ 
of  the  proof  beforehand,  that  such  foolish  behaviour 
will  thus  end  in  infamy  and  ruin.  On  the  contrary, 
supposed  doubtfulnefs  in  the  evidence  of  Religion 
calls  for  a  more  careful  and  attentive  exercise  of  the 
virtuous  principle,  in  fairly  yielding  themselves  up 
to  the  proper  influence  of  any  real  evidence,  though 
doubtful ;  and  in  practising  conscientiously  all  virtue, 
though  under  some  uncertainty,  whether  the  govern- 
ment in  the  universe  may  not  pofsibly  be  such,  as 
that  vice  may  escape  with  impunity.  And  in  gene- 
ral, temptation,  meaning  by  this  word,  the  lefser 
allurements,  the  wrong  and  difficulties  in  the  dis- 
charge of  our  duty,  as  well  as  the  greater  ones ; 
Temptation,  I  say,  as  such  and  of  every  kind  and 
degree,  as  it  calls  forth  some  virtuous  efforts,  addi- 
tional to  what  would  otherwise  have  been  wanting, 
cannot  but  be  an  additional  discipline  and  improve- 
ment of  virtue,  as  well  as  probation  of  it  in  the  other 
senses  of  that  word.^     So  that  the  very  same  ac- 

*  Part  I.  ch.  iv.  anJ  p.  107. 


236  Revelation  not  universal,      Part  2. 

count  is  to  be  given,  why  the  evidence  of  Religion 
should  be  left  in  such  a  manner,  as  to  require,  in 
some,  an  attentive,  solicitous,  perhaps  painful  exer- 
cise of  their  understanding  about  it ;  as  why  others 
should  be  placed  in  such  circumstances,  as  that  the 
practice  of  its  common  duties,  after  a  full  conviction 
of  the  truth  of  it,  should  require  attention,  solicitude 
and  pains :  Or,  why  appearing  doubtfulnei^  should 
be  permitted  to  afford  matter  of  temptation  to  some  ; 
as  why  external  difficulties  and  allurements  should 
be  permitted  to  afford  matter  of  temptation  to  others. 
The  same  account  also  is  to  be  given,  why  some 
should  be  exercised  with  temptations  of  both  these 
kinds ;  as  why  others  should  be  exercised  with  the 
latter  in  such  very  high  degrees,  as  some  have  been, 
particularly  as  the  primitive  Christians  were. 

Nor  does  there  appear  any  absurdity  in  supposing, 
that  the  speculative  difficulties  in  which  the  evidence 
of  Religion  is  involved,  may  make  even  the  principal 
part  of  some  person's  trial.  For,  as  the  chief  temp- 
tations of  the  generality  of  the  world,  are,  the  ordi- 
nary motives  to  injustice  or  unrestrained  pleasure  ; 
or  to  live  in  the  negle(51;  of  Religion  from  that  frame 
of  mind,  which  renders  many  persons  almost  with- 
out feeling  as  to  anything  distant,  or  which  is  not 
the  object  of  their  senses :  So  there  are  other  per- 
sons without  this  shallownef^  of  temper,  persons  of 
a  deeper  sense  as  to  what  is  invisible  and  future  ; 
who  not  only  see,  but  have  a  general  pra<51ical  feel- 
ing, that  what  is  to  come  will  be  present,  and  that 
things  are  not  lel^  real  for  their  not  being  the  ob- 
je(51;s  of  sense ;  and  who,  from  their  natural  consti- 
tution of  body  and  of  temper,  and  from  their  external 
condition,  may  have  small  temptations  to  behave  ill, 
small  difficulty  in  behaving  well,  in  the  common 
course  of  life.     Now  when  these  latter  persons  have 


Chap.  6.  and  its  Proof  supposed  deficient.  237 

a  distin(5l  full  convit^ion  of  the  truth  of  Religion, 
without  any  pofsible  doubts  or  difficulties,  the  prac- 
tice of  it  is  to  them  unavoidable,  unlei^  they  will 
do  a  constant  violence  to  their  own  minds  ;  and  Re- 
ligion is  scarce  any  more  a  discipline  to  them,  than 
it  is  to  creatures  in  a  state  of  perfecT;ion.  Yet  these 
persons  may  poftibly  stand  in  need  of  moral  disci- 
pline and  exercise  in  a  higher  degree,  than  they  would 
have  by  such  an  easy  practice  of  Religion.  Or  it 
may  be  requisite,  for  reasons  unknown  to  us,  that 
they  should  give  some  farther  manifestation^  what 
is  their  moral  character,  to  the  creation  of  God,  than 
such  a  prac^tice  of  it  would  be.  Thus  in  the  great 
variety  of  religious  situations  in  which  men  are 
placed,  what  constitutes,  what  chiefly  and  peculiarly 
constitutes,  the  probation,  in  all  senses,  of  some 
persons,  may  be  the  difficulties  in  which  the  evidence 
of  Religion  is  involved  :  and  their  principal  and  dis- 
tinguished trial,  may  be,  how  they  will  behave  under 
and  with  respe6l  to  these  difficulties.  Circum- 
stances in  men's  situation  in  their  temporal  capacity, 
analogous  in  good  measure  to  this  respecting  ReH- 
gion,  are  to  be  observed.  We  find  some  persons 
are  placed  in  such  a  situation  in  the  world,  as  that 
their  chief  difficulty  with  regard  to  conducT:,  is  not 
the  doing  what  is  prudent  when  it  is  known  ;  for  this, 
in  numberlef^  cases,  is  as  easy  as  the  contrary :  but 
to  some  the  principal  exercise  is,  recollection  and 
being  upon  their  guard  against  deceits,  the  deceits 
suppose  of  those  about  them  ;  against  false  appear- 
ances of  reason  and  prudence.  To  persons  in  some 
situations,  the  prinr  ipnl  exercise  with  respecft  to 
conduct,  is,  attention  in  order  to  inform  themselves 
what  is  proper,  what  is  really  the  reasonable  and 
prudent  part  to  a<5l. 

*  P.  107. 


238  Revelation  not  universal,       Part  2. 

But  as  I  have  hitherto  gone  upon  supposition, 
that  men's  diisatisfadlion  with  the  evidence  of  Reli- 
gion is  not  owing  to  their  negle(5ls  or  prejudices  ;  it 
must  be  added,  on  the  other  hand,  in  all  common 
reason,  and  as  what  the  truth  of  the  case  plainly  re- 
quires should  be  added,  that  such  difsatisfadlion 
poftibly  may  be  owing  to  those,  pofsibly  may  be 
men's  own  fault.     For, 

If  there  are  any  persons,  who  never  set  themselves 
heartily  and  in  earnest  to  be  informed  in  Religion : 
if  there  are  any,  who  secretly  wish  it  may  not  prove 
true  ;  and  are  left  attentive  to  evidence  than  to  dif- 
ficulties, and  more  to  objections  than  to  what  is  said 
in  answer  to  them:  these  persons  will  scarce  be 
thought  in  a  likely  way  of  seeing  the  evidence  of 
Religion,  though  it  were  most  certainly  true,  and 
capable  of  being  ever  so  fully  proved.  If  any  ac- 
custom themselves  to  consider  this  subject  usually 
in  the  way  of  mirth  and  sport :  if  they  attend  to 
forms  and  representations  and  inadequate  manners 
of  expref^ion,  instead  of  the  real  things  intended  by 
them :  (for  signs  often  can  be  no  more  than  inade- 
quately exprefsive  of  the  things  signified  :)  or  if  they 
substitute  human  errors,  in  the  room  of  Divine  truth  : 
Why  may  not  all,  or  any  of  these  things,  hinder 
some  men  from  seeing  that  evidence,  which  really 
is  seen  by  others  ;  as  a  like  turn  of  mind,  with  re- 
spect to  matters  of  common  speculation  and  pradliice, 
does,  we  find  by  experience,  hinder  them  from  at- 
taining that  knowledge  and  right  understanding,  in 
matters  of  common  speculation  and  pra(5tice,  which 
more  fair  and  attentive  minds  attain  to  ?  And  the 
effect  will  be  the  same,  whether  their  negle^l  of 
seriously  considering  the  evidence  of  Religion,  and 
their  indirect  behaviour  with  regard  to  it,  proceed 
from  mere  carelefsneft,  or  from  the  grower  vices  ; 


Chap.  6.  and  its  Proof  supposed  deficient.  239 

or  whether  it  be  owing  to  this,  that  forms  and  figu- 
rative manners  of  exprefsion,  as  well  as  errors,  ad- 
minister occasions  of  ridicule,  when  the  things  in- 
tended, and  the  truth  itself,  would  not.  Men  may 
indulge  a  ludicrous  turn  so  far  as  to  lose  all  sense 
of  condu6l  and  prudence  in  worldly  affairs,  and  even, 
as  it  seems,  to  impair  their  faculty  of  reason.  And 
in  general,  levity,  carelefsnef^,  pafsion,  and  preju- 
dice, do  hinder  us  from  being  rightly  informed,  with 
respect  to  common  things :  And  they  may,  in  like 
manner,  and  perhaps  in  some  farther  providential 
manner,  with  respecl  to  moral  and  religious  subjects  ; 
may  hinder  evidence  from  being  laid  before  us,  and 
from  being  seen  when  it  is.  The  Scripture^  does 
declare,  that  every  one  shall  not  understand.  And 
it  makes  no  difference,  by  what  providential  conduct, 
this  comes  to  pafs  :  Whether  the  evidence  of  Chris- 
tianity was,  originally  and  with  design,  put  and  left; 
so,  as  that  those  who  are  desirous  of  evading  moral 
obligations,  should  not  see  it ;  and  that  honest- 
minded  persons  should :  Or,  whether  it  comes  to 
paft  by  any  other  means. 

Farther :  The  general  proof  of  natural  Religion 
and  of  Christianity,  does,  I  think,  lie  level  to  common 
men ;  even  those,  the  greatest  part  of  whose  time, 
from  childhood  to  old  age,  is  taken  up  with  pro- 
viding, for  themselves  and  their  families,  the  com- 

^  Dan.  xii.  lo.  See  also  Is.  xxix.  13,  14;  Mat.  vi.  23,  and 
xi.  25,  and  xiii.  11,  125  Joh.  iii.  19,  and  v.  44;  i  Cor.  ii. 
14,  and  2  Cor.  iv.  4;  2  Tim.  iii.  13,  and  that  affedtionate,  as 
well  as  authoritative  admonition,  so  very  many  times  incul- 
cated, He  that  hath  ears  to  hear^  let  him  hear.  Grctius  saw  so 
strongly  the  thing  intended  in  these  and  other  pafsages  of  Scrip- 
ture of  the  like  sense,  as  to  say,  that  the  proof  given  us  of  Chris- 
tianity was  lefs  than  it  might  have  been,  for  this  very  purpose : 
Ut  ita  Jermo  E'vangelU  tanquam  lapis  ejset  Lydius  ad  quern  ingenia 
fanabilia  explorarentur.    De  Ver.  R.  C.  L.  2,  towards  the  end. 


240  Revelation  not  universal,     Part  2. 

mon  conveniencies  perhaps  neceftaries  of  life :  those, 
I  mean,  of  this  rank,  who  ever  think  at  all  of  asking 
after  proof  or  attending  to  it.  Common  men,  were 
they  as  much  in  earnest  about  Religion,  as  about 
their  temporal  affairs,  are  capable  of  being  convinced 
upon  real  evidence,  that  there  is  a  God  who  governs 
the  world  :  and  they  feel  themselves  to  be  of  a  moral 
nature,  and  accountable  creatures.  And  as  Chris- 
tianity entirely  falls  in  with  this  their  natural  sense 
of  things ;  so  they  are  capable,  not  only  of  being 
persuaded,  but  of  being  made  to  see,  that  there  is 
evidence  of  miracles  wrought  in  attestation  of  it,  and 
many  appearing  completions  of  prophecy.  But 
though  this  proof  is  real  and  conclusive,  yet  it  is  liable 
to  objec5}ions,  and  may  be  run  up  into  difficulties; 
which,  however,  persons  who  are  capable,  not  only 
of  talking  of,  but  of  really  seeing,  are  capable  also 
of  seeing  through :  i.  e.  not  of  clearing  up  and  an- 
swering them,  so  as  to  satisfy  their  curiosity,  for  of 
such  knowledge  we  are  not  capable  with  respect  to 
any  one  thing  in  Nature  ;  but  capable  of  seeing  that 
the  proof  is  not  lost  in  these  difficulties,  or  destroyed 
by  these  obje^ions.  But  then  a  thorough  exami- 
nation into  Religion,  with  regard  to  these  objections, 
which  cannot  be  the  businef^  of  every  man,  is  a 
matter  of  pretty  large  compaft,  and,  from  the  nature 
of  it,  requires  some  knowledge,  as  well  as  time  and 
attention  ;  to  see,  how  the  evidence  comes  out,  upon 
balancing  one  thing  with  another,  and  what,  upon 
the  whole,  is  the  amount  of  it.  Now  if  persons  who 
have  picked  up  these  objections  from  others,  and 
take  for  granted  they  are  of  weight,  upon  the  word 
of  those  from  whom  they  received  them,  or,  by  often 
retailing  of  them,  come  to  see  or  fancy  they  see 
them  to  be  of  weight ;  will  not  prepare  themselves 
for  such  an  examination,  with  a  competent  degree 


Chap.  6.  and  its  Proof  supposed  deficient.  24.1 

of  knowledge ;  or  will  not  give  that  time  and  atten- 
tion to  the  subje(5l,  which,  from  the  nature  of  it,  is 
neceftary  for  attaining  such  information  :  in  this  case, 
they  must  remain  in  doubtfulneft,  ignorance  or  error  ; 
in  the  same  way  as  they  must,  with  regard  to  com- 
mon sciences  and  matters  of  common  life,  if  they 
negledl  the  neceftary  means  of  being  informed  in 
them. 

But  still  perhaps  it  will  be  objected,  that  if  a  prince 
or  common  master  were  to  send  diredlions  to  a  ser- 
vant, he  would  take  care,  that  they  should  always 
bear  the  certain  marks,  who  they  came  from,  and 
that  their  sense  should  be  always  plain :  so  as  that 
there  should  be  no  pofsible  doubt,  if  he  could  help 
it,  concerning  the  authority  or  meaning  of  them. 
Now  the  proper  answer  to  all  this  kind  of  objections 
is,  that,  wherever  the  fallacy  lies,  it  is  even  certain 
we  cannot  argue  thus  with  respeCf  to  him,  who  is 
the  Governor  of  the  w^orld  :  and  particularly  that  he 
does  not  afford  us  such  information,  with  respeCf  to 
our  temporal  affairs  and  interest,  as  experience 
abundantly  shews.  However,  there  is  a  full  answer 
to  this  objection,  from  the  very  nature  of  Religion. 
For  the  reason  why  a  prince  would  give  his  direc- 
tions in  this  plain  manner,  is,  that  he  absolutely  de- 
sires such  an  external  adlion  should  be  done,  without 
concerning  himself  with  the  m.otive  or  principle  upon 
which  it  is  done :  i.  e.  he  regards  only  the  external 
event,  or  the  thing's  being  done  ;  and  not  at  all, 
properly  speaking,  the  doing  of  it,  or  the  action. 
Whereas  the  whole  of  morality  and  Religion  con- 
sisting merely  in  action  itself,  there  is  no  sort  of  pa- 
rallel between  the  cases.  But  if  the  prince  be  sup- 
posed to  regard  only  the  a(?tion  ;  i.  e.  only  to  desire 
to  exercise,  or  in  any  sense  prove,  the  understanding 
or  loyalty  of  a  servant ;  he  would  not  always  give 

R 


242  Revelation  not  universal,      Part  2. 

his  orders  in  such  a  plain  manner.  It  may  be  proper 
to  add,  that  the  will  of  God,  respedling  morality  and 
Religion,  may  be  considered,  either  as  absolute,  or 
as  only  conditional.  If  it  be  absolute,  it  can  only  be 
thus,  that  we  should  ac^  virtuously  in  such  given 
circumstances ;  not  that  we  should  be  brought  to  a6l 
so,  by  his  changing  of  our  circumstances.  And  if 
God's  will  be  thus  absolute,  then  it  is  in  our  power, 
in  the  highest  and  strictest  sense,  to  do  or  to  con- 
tradict his  will ;  which  is  a  most  weighty  considera- 
tion. Or  his  will  may  be  considered  only  as  condi- 
tional, that  if  we  a(5l  so  and  so,  we  shall  be  rewarded ; 
if  otherwise,  punished  :  of  which  conditional  will  of 
the  Author  of  nature,  the  whole  constitution  of  it 
affords  most  certain  instances. 

Upon  the  whole :  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  Reli- 
gion neceftarily  implies,  that  we  are  in  a  state  of. 
probation :  and  the  credibility  of  our  being  at  all  in 
such  a  state  being  admitted,  there  seems  no  pecu- 
liar difficulty  in  supposing  our  probation  to  be,  just 
as  it  is,  in  those  respects  which  are  above  objected 
against.  There  seems  no  pretence,  from  the  reason 
of  the  thing,  to  say,  that  the  trial  cannot  equitably 
be  anything,  but  whether  persons  will  a6l  suitably 
to  certain  information,  or  such  as  admits  no  room 
for  doubt ;  so  as  that  there  can  be  no  danger  of  mis- 
carriage, but  either  from  their  not  attending  to  what 
they  certainly  know,  or  from  overbearing  paftion 
hurrying  them  on  to  acft  contrary  to  it.  For,  since 
ignorance  and  doubt  afford  scope  for  probation  in  all 
senses,  as  really  as  intuitive  convi(9;ion  or  certainty  ; 
and  since  the  two  former  are  to  be  put  to  the  same 
account,  as  difficulties  in  pra(5i:ice  ;  men's  moral  pro- 
bation may  also  be,  whether  they  will  take  due  care 
to  inform  themselves  by  impartial  consideration,  and 
afterwards  whether  they  will  a6l  as  the  case  requires, 


Chap,  6.  and  its  Proof  supposed  deficient.  243 

upon  the  evidence  which  they  have,  however  doubt- 
ful. And  this  we  find  by  experience,  is  frequently 
our  probation,'^  in  our  temporal  capacity.  For,  the 
information  which  we  want  with  regard  to  our 
worldly  interests,  is  by  no  means  always  given  us  of 
course,  without  any  care  of  our  own.  And  we  are 
greatly  liable  to  self-deceit  from  inward  secret  pre- 
judices, and  also  to  the  deceits  of  others.  So  that 
to  be  able  to  judge  what  is  the  prudent  part,  often 
requires  much  and  difficult  consideration.  Then 
after  we  have  judged  the  very  best  we  can,  the  evi- 
dence upon  which  we  must  acft,  if  we  will  live  and 
adl  at  all,  is  perpetually  doubtful  to  a  very  high  de- 
gree. And  the  constitution  and  course  of  the  world 
in  fact  is  such,  as  that  want  of  impartial  considera- 
tion what  we  have  to  do,  and  venturing  upon  extra- 
vagant courses  because  it  is  doubtful  what  will  be 
the  consequence,  are  often  naturally,  i.e.  providen- 
tially, altogether  as  fatal,  as  misconduct  occasioned 
by  heedlef^  inattention  to  what  we  certainly  know, 
or  disregarding  it  from  overbearing  pafsion. 

Several  of  the  observations  here  made,  may 
well  seem  strange,  perhaps  unintelligible,  to  many 
good  men,  but  if  the  persons  for  whose  sake  they 
are  made,  think  so;  persons  who  object  as  above, 
and  throw  off  all  regard  to  Religion  under  pretence 
of  want  of  evidence  ;  I  desire  them  to  consider  again, 
whether  their  thinking  so,  be  owing  to  anything  un- 
intelligible in  these  observations,  or  to  their  own  not 
having  such  a  sense  of  Religion  and  serious  solici- 
tude about  it,  as  even  their  state  of  scepticism  does 
in  all  reason  require  ?  It  ought  to  be  forced  upon 
the  reflection  of  these  persons,  that  our  nature  and 
condition  necefsarily  require  us,  in  the  daily  course 

'  Pp.  40,  234,  237,  238. 


244       Revelation  not  universal,  &c.     Part  2. 

of  life,  to  acl  upon  evidence  much  lower  than  what 
is  commonly  called  probable  ;  to  guard,  not  only 
against  what  we  fully  believe  will,  but  also  against 
what  we  think  it  supposable  may,  happen ;  and  to 
engage  in  pursuits  when  the  probability  is  greatly 
against  succeft,  if  it  be  credible,  that  poftibly  we 
may  succeed  in  them. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Of  the  particular  Evidence  for  Christianity. 


HE  presumptions  against  Revelation, 
and  obje6lions  against  the  general 
scheme  of  Christianity,  and  particular 
things  relating  to  it,  being  removed ; 
there  remains  to  be  considered,  what 
positive  evidence  we  have  for  the  truth  of  it :  chiefly 
in  order  to  see,  what  the  Analogy  of  Nature  sug- 
gests with  regard  to  that  evidence,  and  the  objec- 
tions against  it :  or  to  see  what  is,  and  is  allowed  to 
be,  the  plain  natural  rule  of  judgment  and  of  action, 
in  our  temporal  concerns,  in  cases  where  we  have 
the  same  kind  of  evidence,  and  the  same  kind  of 
objedlions  against  it,  that  we  have  in  the  case  before 
us. 

Now  in  the  evidence  of  Christianity,  there  seem 
to  be  several  things  of  great  weight,  not  reducible 
to  the  head,  either  of  miracles,  or  the  completion  of 
prophecy,  in  the  common  acceptation  of  the  words. 
But  these  two  are  its  direcT;  and  fundamental  proofs : 
And  those  other  things,  however  considerable  they 
are,  yet  ought  never  to  be  urged  apart  from  its  di- 


Chap.  7.  Of  the  particular  Evidence,  &c.   245 

re(9;  proofs,  but  always  to  be  joined  with  them. 
Thus  the  evidence  of  Christianity  will  be  a  long  se- 
ries of  things,  reaching,  as  it  seems,  from  the  be- 
ginning of  the  world  to  the  present  time,  of  great 
variety  and  compai^,  taking  in  both  the  dire(5l,  and 
also  the  collateral,  proofs  ;  and  making  up,  all  of 
them  together,  one  argument :  the  con\i(ftion  aris- 
ing from  which  kind  of  proof  may  be  compared  to 
what  they  call  the  effe6i  in  archite(5lure  or  other 
works  of  art ;  a  result  from  a  great  numbet  of  things 
so  and  so  disposed,  and  taken  into  one  view.  I  shall 
therefore,  FIRST,  make  some  observations  relating 
to  miracles,  and  the  appearing  completions  of  pro- 
phecy ;  and  consider  what  Analogy  suggests,  in  an- 
swer to  the  objections  brought  against  this  evidence. 
And,  SECONDLY,  I  shall  endeavour  to  give  some 
account  of  the  general  argument  now  mentioned, 
consisting  both  of  the  direct  and  collateral  evidence, 
considered  as  making  up  one  argument :  this  being 
the  kind  of  proof  upon  which  we  determine  most 
questions  of  difficulty,  concerning  common  facls,  al- 
leged to  have  happened  or  seeming  likely  to  happen  ; 
especially  questions  relating  to  conduct. 

FIRST,  I  shall  make  some  observations  upon  the 
direct  proof  of  Christianity  from  miracles  and  pro- 
phecy, and  upon  the  objections  alleged  against  it. 

I.  Now  the  following  observations,  relating  to  the 
historical  evidence  of  miracles  wrought  in  attestation 
of  Christianity,  appear  to  be  of  great  weight. 

1.  The  Old  Testament  affords  us  the  same  his- 
torical evidence  of  the  miracles  of  Moses  and  of  the 
prophets,  as  of  the  common  civil  history  of  Moses 
and  the  kings  of  Israel ;  or,  as  of  the  affairs  of  the 
Jewish  nation.  And  the  Gospels  and  the  ASis  afford 
us  the  same  historical  evidence  of  the  miracles  of 
Christ  and  the  Apostles,  as  of  the  common  matters 


246  Of  the  particular  Evidence     Part  2. 

related  in  them.  This  indeed  could  not  have  been 
affirmed  by  any  reasonable  man,  if  the  authors  of 
these  books,  like  many  other  historians,  had  ap- 
peared to  make  an  entertaining  manner  of  writing 
their  aim ;  though  they  had  interspersed  miracles 
in  their  works,  at  proper  distances  and  upon  proper 
occasions.  These  might  have  animated  a  dull  re- 
lation, amused  the  reader  and  engaged  his  attention. 
And  the  same  account  would  naturally  have  been 
given  of  them,  as,  of  the  speeches  and  descriptions 
of  such  authors :  the  same  account,  in  a  manner,  as 
is  to  be  given,  why  the  poets  rra^ce  use  of  wonders 
and  prodigies.  But  the  fa6^s,  both  miraculous  and 
natural,  in  Scripture,  are  related  in  plain  unadorned 
narratives  :  and  both  of  them  appear,  in  all  respedls, 
to  stand  upon  the  same  foot  of  historical  evidence. 
Farther :  Some  parts  of  Scripture,  containing  an  ac- 
count of  miracles  fully  sufficient  to  prove  the  truth 
of  Christianity,  are  quoted  as  genuine,  from  the  age 
in  which  they  are  said  to  be  written,  down  to  the 
present :  And  no  other  parts  of  them,  material  in  the 
present  question,  are  omitted  to  be  quoted  in  such 
manner,  as  to  afford  any  sort  of  proof  of  their  not 
being  genuine.  And,  as  common  history,  when 
called  in  question  in  any  instance,  may  often  be 
greatly  confirmed  by  cotemporary  or  subsequent 
events  more  known  and  acknowledged ;  and  as  the 
common  Scripture-history  ;  like  many  others,  is  thus 
confirmed:  so  likewise  is  the  miraculous  history  of 
it,  not  only  in  particular  instances,  but  in  general. 
For,  the  establishment  of  the  Jewish  and  Christian 
Religions,  which  were  events  cotemporary  with  the 
miracles  related  to  be  wrought  in  attestation  of  both, 
or  subsequent  to  them,  these  events  are  just  what 
we  should  have  expecfled,  upon  supposition  such 
miracles  were  really  wrought  to  attest  the  truth  of 


Chap.  7.  for  Christianity.  247 

those  Religions.  These  miracles  are  a  satisfa(5lory 
account  of  those  events:  of  which,  no  other  satis- 
factory account  can  be  given ;  nor  any  account  at 
all,  but  what  is  imaginary  merely  and  invented,  it 
is  to  be  added,  that  the  most  obvious,  the  most  easy 
and  direct  account  of  this  history,  how  it  came  to  be 
written  and  to  be  received  in  the  world,  as  a  true 
history  ;  is,  that  it  really  is  so :  nor  can  any  other 
account  of  it  be  easy  and  dire(5l.  Now,  though  an 
account,  not  at  all  obvious,  but  very  far-fetched  and 
indire(5^,  may  indeed  be,  and  often  is,  the  true  ac- 
count of  a  matter;  yet  it  cannot  be  admitted  on  the 
authority  of  its  being  af^erted.  Mere  guef^,  suppo- 
sition, and  pofsibility,  when  opposed  to  historical 
evidence,  prove  nothing,  but  that  historical  evidence 
is  not  demonstrative. 

Now  the  just  consequence  from  all  this,  I  think, 
is,  that  the  Scripture-history  in  general  is  to  be  ad- 
mitted as  an  authentic  genuine  history,  till  somewhat 
positive  be  alleged  sufficient  to  invalidate  it.  But  no 
man  will  deny  the  consequence  to  be,  that  it  cannot 
be  rejected,  or  thrown  by  as  of  no  authority,  till  it 
can  be  proved  to  be  of  none  ;  even  though  the  evi- 
dence now  mentioned  for  its  authority,  were  doubt- 
ful. This  evidence  may  be  confronted,  by  historical 
evidence  on  the  other  side,  if  there  be  any :  or  ge- 
neral incredibility  in  the  things  related,  or  incon- 
sistence in  the  general  turn  of  the  history,  would 
prove  it  to  be  of  no  authority.  But  since,  upon  the 
face  of  the  matter,  upon  a  first  and  general  view,  the 
appearance  is,  that  it  is  an  authentic  history ;  it 
cannot  be  determined  to  be  fi«5^itious  without  some 
proof,  that  it  is  so.  And  the  following  observations, 
in  support  of  these  and  coincident  with  them,  will 
greatly  confirm  the  historical  evidence  for  the  truth 
of  Christianity. 


248  Of  the  particular  Evidence      Part  2. 

2.  The  Epistles  of  St.  Paul,  from  the  nature  of 
epistolary  writing,  and  moreover  from  several  of  them 
being  written,  not  to  particular  persons,  but  to 
Churches ;  carry  in  them  evidences  of  their  being 
genuine,  beyond  what  can  be  in  a  mere  historical 
narrative,  left  to  the  world  at  large.  This  evidence, 
joined  with  that  which  they  have  in  common  with 
the  rest  of  the  New  Testament,  seems  not  to  leave 
so  much  as  any  particular  pretence  for  denying  their 
genuinenefk,  considered  as  an  ordinary  matter  of 
facl  or  of  criticism :  I  say  particular  pretence,  for 
denying  it ;  because  any  single  fa(9:,  of  such  a  kind 
and  such  antiquity,  may  have  general  doubts  raised 
concerning  it,  iVom  the  very  nature  of  human  affairs 
and  human  testimony.  There  is  also  to  be  men- 
tioned, a  distinct  and  particular  evidence  of  the  ge- 
nuinenefs  of  the  Epistle  chiefly  referred  to  here,  the 
first  to  the  Corinthians ;  from  the  manner  in  which 
it  is  quoted  by  Clemens  Romanus,  in  an  Epistle  of 
his  own  to  that  Church.^  Now  these  Epistles  afford 
a  proof  of  Christianity,  detached  from  all  others, 
which  is,  I  think,  a  thing  of  weight ;  and  also  a  proof 
of  a  nature  and  kind  peculiar  to  itself.     For, 

In  them  the  author  declares  that  he  received  the 
Gospel  in  general,  and  the  institution  of  the  Com- 
munion in  particular,  not  from  the  rest  of  the  Apostles, 
or  jointly  together  with  them,  but  alone,  from  Christ 
himself;  whom  he  declares  likewise,  conformably  to 
the  history  in  the  A6is,  that  he  saw  after  his  ascen- 
sion.^ So  that  the  testimony  of  St.  Paul  is  to  be 
considered,  as  detached  from  that  of  the  rest  of  the 
Apostles. 

And  he  declares  farther,  that  he  was  endued  with 


*  Clem.  Rom.  Ep.  I.  c.  47. 

'  Gal.  i  j   I  Cor.  xi.  23,  &c.  j   1  Cor.  xv,  8. 


Chap.  7.  for  Christianity.  249 

a  power  of  working  miracles,  as  what  was  publicly 
known  to  those  very  people,  speaks  of  frequent  and 
great  variety  of  miraculous  gifts  as  then  subsisting 
in  those  very  Churches,  to  which  he  was  writing ; 
which  he  w  as  reproving  for  several  irregularities ; 
and  where  he  had  personal  opposers :  He  mentions 
these  gifts  incidentally,  in  the  most  easy  manner  and 
without  effort ;  by  way  of  reproof  to  those  who  had 
them,  for  their  indecent  use  of  them ;  and  by  way 
of  depreciating  them,  in  comparison  of  moral  virtues ; 
in  short  he  speaks  to  these  Churches,  of  these  mi- 
raculous powers,  in  the  manner,  any  one  would  speak 
to  another  of  a  thing,  which  was  as  familiar  and  as 
much  known  in  common  to  them  both,  as  anything 
in  the  world.-'  And  this,  as  hath  been  observed  by 
several  persons,  is  surely  a  very  considerable  thing. 
3.  It  is  an  acknowledged  historical  fact,  that  Chris- 
tianity offered  itself  to  the  world,  and  demanded  to 
be  received,  upon  the  allegation,  i.  e.  as  unbelievers 
would  speak,  upon  the  pretence,  of  miracles,  pub- 
licly wrought  to  attest  the  truth  of  it,  in  such  an 
age  ;  and  that  it  was  actually  received  by  great 
numbers  in  that  very  age,  and  upon  the  profef^ed 
belief  of  the  reality  of  these  miracles.  And  Chris- 
tianity, including  the  dispensation  of  the  Old  Testa- 
ment, seems  distinguished  by  this  from  all  other 
Religions.  I  mean,  that  this  does  not  appear  to  be 
the  case  with  regard  to  any  other :  for  surely  it  will 
not  be  supposed  to  lie  upon  any  person,  to  piove  by 
positive  historical  evidence,  that  it  was  not.  It  does 
in  no  sort  appear,  that  Mahometanism  was  first  re- 
ceived in  the  world  upon  the  foot  of  supposed  mi- 
racles,^ i.e.  public  ones:  for,  as  Revelation  is  itself 

5  Rom.  XV.  19  ;    i  Cor.  xii.  8,  9,  10-28,  &c.  and  c.  xiii.  1, 
2,8,  anJ  the  wholcxivth  ch.  5  2  Cor.  xii.  12,13  5  Gal.  iii.2,  5. 
*  See  the  Koran,  c.  xiii.  and  c.  xvii. 


250  Of  the  particular  Evidence     Part  2. 

miraculous,  all  pretence  to  it  must  necef^arily  imply 
some  pretence  of  miracles.  And  it  is  a  known  fa(ft, 
that  it  was  immediately,  at  the  very  first,  propagated 
by  other  means.  And  as  particular  institutions, 
whether  in  Paganism  or  Popery,  said  to  be  con- 
firmed by  miracles  after  those  institutions  had  ob- 
tained, are  not  to  the  purpose  :  So,  were  there  what 
might  be  called  historical  proof,  that  any  of  them 
were  introduced  by  a  supposed  Divine  command, 
believed  to  be  attested  by  miracles ;  these  would  not 
be  in  any  wise  parallel.  For  single  things  of  this 
sort  are  easy  to  be  accounted  for,  after  parties  are 
formed,  and  have  power  in  their  hands ;  and  the 
leaders  of  them  are  in  veneration  with  the  multitude  ; 
and  political  interests  are  blended  with  religious 
claims,  and  religious  distin(5lions.  But  before  any- 
thing of  this  kind,  for  a  few  persons,  and  those  of  the 
lowest  rank,  all  at  once,  to  bring  over  such  great 
numbers  to  a  new  Religion,  and  get  it  to  be  received 
upon  the  particular  evidence  of  miracles ;  this  is 
quite  another  thing.  And  I  think  it  will  be  allowed 
by  any  fair  adversary,  that  the  fa(5l  now  mentioned, 
taking  in  all  the  circumstances  of  it,  is  peculiar  to 
the  Christian  Religion.  However,  the  fa(ft  itself  is 
allowed,  that  Christianity  obtained,  i.  e.  was  profef^ed 
to  be  received  in  the  w^orld,  upon  the  belief  of  mi- 
racles, immediately  in  the  age  in  which  it  is  said 
those  miracles  were  WTought :  Or  that  this  is  what 
its  first  converts  would  have  alleged,  as  the  reason 
for  their  embracing  it.  Now  certainly  it  is  not  to  be 
supposed,  that  such  numbers  of  men,  in  the  most 
distant  parts  of  the  world,  should  forsake  the  Reli- 
gion of  their  country,  in  which  they  had  been  edu- 
cated ;  separate  themselves  from  their  friends,  par- 
ticularly in  their  festival  shows  and  solemnities,  to 
which  the  common  people  are  so  greatly  addi(5led, 


Chap.  7.  for  Christianity.  251 

and  which  were  of  a  nature  to  engage  them  much 
more,  than  anything  of  that  sort  amongst  us ;  and 
embrace  a  Religion,  which  could  not  but  expose 
them  to  many  inconveniencies,  and  indeed  must  have 
been  a  givmg  up  the  world  in  a  great  degree,  even 
from  the  very  first,  and  before  the  Empire  engaged 
in  form  against  them :  it  cannot  be  supposed,  that 
such  numbers  should  make  so  great,  and,  to  say  the 
least,  so  inconvenient  a  change  in  their  whole  insti- 
tution of  life,  unleft  they  were  really  convinced  of 
the  truth  of  those  miracles,  upon  the  knowledge  or 
belief  of  which,  they  profefsed  to  make  it.  And  it 
will,  I  suppose,  readily  be  acknowledged,  that  the 
generality  of  the  first  converts  to  Christianity,  must 
have  believed  them  :  that  as  by  becoming  Christians, 
they  declared  to  the  world,  they  were  satisfied  of 
the  truth  of  those  miracles  ;  so  this  declaration  was 
to  be  credited.  And  this  their  testimony  is  the  same 
kind  of  evidence  for  those  miracles,  as  if  they  had 
put  it  in  writing,  and  these  writings  had  come  down 
to  us.  And  it  is  real  evidence,  because  it  is  of  facts, 
which  they  had  capacity  and  full  opportunity  to  in- 
form themselves  of.  It  is  also  distin(5l  from  the  di- 
rect or  expreft  historical  evidence,  though  it  is  of 
the  same  kind  :  and  it  would  be  allowed  to  be  dis- 
tinct in  all  cases.  For  were  a  fact  expret^ly  related 
by  one  or  more  ancient  historians,  and  disputed  in 
after  ages ;  that  this  facl  is  acknowledged  to  have 
been  believed,  by  great  numbers  of  the  age  in  which 
the  historian  says  it  was  done,  would  be  allowed  an 
additional  proof  of  such  faCl,  quite  distinCl  from  the 
expref^  testimony  of  the  historian.  The  credulity  of 
mankind  is  acknowledged :  and  the  suspicions  of 
mankind  ought  to  be  acknowledged  too ;  and  their 
backwardneft  even  to  believe,  and  greater  still  to 
pra(51ise,  what  makes  against  their  interest.     And  it 


252  Of  the  particular  Evidence     Part  2. 

must  particularlybe  remembered,  that  education,  and 
prejudice,  and  authority,  were  against  Christianity, 
in  the  age  I  am  speaking  of.  So  that  the  immediate 
conversion  of  such  numbers,  is  a  real  presumption 
of  somewhat  more  than  human  in  this  matter :  I  say 
presumption,  for  it  is  not  alleged  as  a  proof  alone 
and  by  itself  Nor  need  any  one  of  the  things  men- 
tioned in  this  chapter,  be  considered  as  a  proof  by 
itself:  and  yet  all  of  them  together  may  be  one  of 
the  strongest.^ 

Upon  the  whole  :  As  there  is  large  historical  evi- 
dence, both  dire(?t  and  circumstantial,  of  miracles 
wrought  in  attestation  of  Christianity,  colle(9;ed  by 
those  who  have  writ  upon  the  subje^l ;  it  lies  upon 
unbelievers  to  shew,  why  this  evidence  is  not  to  be 
credited.  This  way  of  speaking  is,  I  think,  just ; 
and  what  persons  who  write  in  defence  of  Religion, 
naturally  fall  into.  Yet,  in  a  matter  of  such  unspeak- 
able importance,  the  proper  question  is,  not  whom 
it  lies  upon,  according  to  the  rules  of  argument,  to 
maintain  or  confute  objecfiions :  but,  whether  there 
really  are  any,  against  this  evidence,  sufficient,  in 
reason,  to  destroy  the  credit  of  it.  However,  un- 
believers seem  to  take  upon  them  the  part  of  shew- 
ing that  there  are. 

They  allege,  that  numberlei^  enthusiastic  people, 
in  different  ages  and  countries,  expose  themselves 
to  the  same  difficulties  which  the  primitive  Chris- 
tians did ;  and  are  ready  to  give  up  their  lives,  for 
the  most  idle  follies  imaginable.  But  it  is  not  very 
clear,  to  what  purpose  this  obje(?lion  is  brought. 
For  every  one,  surel^^,  in  every  case,  must  distin- 
guish between  opinions  and  facls.  And  though  tes- 
timony is  no  proof  of  enthusiastic  opinions,  or  of  any 

*  Pp.  284,  &c. 


Chap.  7.  for  Christianity.  253 

opinions  at  all ;  yet  it  is  allowed,  in  all  other  cases, 
to  be  a  proof  of  facts.  And  a  person's  laying  down 
his  life  in  attestation  of  facets  or  of  opinions,  is  the 
strongest  proof  of  his  believing  them.  And  if  the 
Apostles  and  their  cotemporaries  did  believe  the  fa61s, 
in  attestation  of  which  they  exposed  themselves  to 
sufferings  and  death ;  this  their  belief,  or  rather 
knowledge,  must  be  a  proof  of  those  facts  :  for  they 
were  such  as  came  under  the  observation  of  their 
senses.  And  though  it  is  not  of  equal  weight,  yet 
it  is  of  weight,  that  the  martyrs  of  the  next  age, 
notwithstanding  they  were  not  eye-witnefses  of  those 
fa6ls,  as  were  the  Apostles  and  their  cotemporaries, 
had,  however,  full  opportunity  to  inform  themselves, 
whether  they  were  true  or  not,  and  gave  equal  proof 
of  their  believing  them  to  be  true. 

But  enthusiasm,  it  is  said,  greatly  weakens  the 
evidence  of  testimony  even  for  facts,  in  matters  re- 
lating to  Religion :  Some  seem  to  think,  it  totally 
and  absolutely  destroys  the  evidence  of  testimony 
upon  this  subjecl:.  And  indeed  the  powers  of  enthu- 
siasm, and  of  diseases  too  which  operate  in  a  like 
manner,  are  very  wonderful,  in  particular  instances. 
But  if  great  numbers  of  men,  not  appearing  in  any 
peculiar  degree  weak,  nor  under  any  peculiar  sus- 
picion of  negligence,  affirm  that  they  saw  and  heard 
such  things  plainly  with  their  eyes  and  their  ears, 
and  are  admitted  to  be  in  earnest;  such  testimony 
is  evidence  of  the  strongest  kind  we  can  have,  for 
any  matter  of  facl.  Yet  pofsibly  it  may  be  over- 
come, strong  as  it  is,  by  incredibility  in  the  things 
thus  attested,  or  by  contrary  testimony.  And  in  an 
instance  where  one  thought  it  was  so  overcome,  it 
might  be  just  to  consider,  how  far  such  evidence 
could  be  accounted  for,  by  enthusiasm  :  for  it  seems 
as  if  no  other  imaginable  account  were  to  be  given 


254  Of  the  particular  Evidence     Part  2. 

of  it.  But  till  such  incredibility  be  shewn,  or  con- 
trary testimony  produced,  it  cannot  surely  be  ex- 
pelled, that  so  far-fetched,  so  indire(5t  and  won- 
derful an  account  of  such  testimony,  as  that  of  en- 
thusiasm must  be ;  an  account  so  strange,  that  the 
generality  of  mankind  can  scarce  be  made  to  un- 
derstand what  is  meant  by  it :  it  cannot,  I  say,  be 
expe(5led  ;  that  such  account  will  be  admitted  of  such 
evidence ;  when  there  is  this  direct,  easy  and  ob- 
vious account  of  it,  that  people  really  saw  and  heard 
a  thing  not  incredible,  which  they  affirm  sincerely 
and  with  full  afsurance,  they  did  see  and  hear. 
Granting  then  that  enthusiasm  is  not  (strictly  speak- 
ing) an  absurd,  but  a  pol^ible  account  of  such  testi- 
mony :  it  is  manifest  that  the  very  mention  of  it,  goes 
upon  the  previous  supposition,  that  the  things  so 
attested  are  incredible  ;  and  therefore  need  not  be 
considered,  till  they  are  shewn  to  be  so.  Much  lef^ 
need  it  be  considered,  after  the  contrary  has  been 
proved.  And  I  think  it  has  been  proved,  to  full  sa- 
tisfa(Rion,  that  there  is  no  incredibility  in  a  Revela- 
tion, in  general ;  or  in  such  an  one  as  the  Christian, 
in  particular.  However ;  as  Religion  is  supposed 
peculiarly  liable  to  enthusiasm,  it  may  just  be  ob- 
served, that  prejudices  almost  without  number  and 
without  name,  romance,  affectation,  humour,  a  de- 
sire to  engage  attention  or  to  surprise,  the  party- 
spirit,  custom,  little  competitions,  unaccountable 
likings  and  dislikings,  these  influence  men  strongly 
in  common  matters.  And  as  these  prejudices  are 
often  scarce  known  or  refleCled  upon  by  the  persons 
themselves  who  are  influenced  by  them,  they  are  to 
be  considered  as  influences  of  a  like  kind  to  enthu- 
siasm. Yet  human  testimony  in  common  matters 
is  naturally  and  justly  believed  notwithstanding. 
It  is  intimated  farther,  in  a  more  refined  way  of 


Chap.  7.  for  Christianity.  255 

observation,  that  though  it  should  be  proved,  that 
the  Apostles  and  first  Christians  could  not,  in  some 
respeds,  be  deceived  themselves,  and,  in  other  re- 
spec^ls,  cannot  be  thought  to  have  intended  to  im- 
pose upon  the  world  ;  yet  it  will  not  follow,  that  their 
general  testimony  is  to  be  believed,  though  truly 
handed  down  to  us:  because  they  might  still  in 
part,  I.  e.  in  other  respe<?i;s,  be  deceived  themselves, 
and  in  part  also  designedly  impose  upon  others  ; 
which,  it  is  added,  is  a  thing  very  credible,  from  that 
mixture  of  real  enthusiasm,  and  real  knavery,  to  be 
met  with  in  the  same  characters.  And,  I  must  con- 
feft,  I  think  the  matter  of  fa6l  contained  in  this  ob- 
servation upon  mankind,  is  not  to  be  denied;  and 
that  somewhat  very  much  akin  to  it,  is  often  sup- 
posed in  Scripture  as  a  very  common  case,  and  most 
severely  reproved.  But  it  were  to  have  been  ex- 
pecTted,  that  persons  capable  of  applying  this  obser- 
vation as  applied  in  the  objec^lion,  might  also  fre- 
quently have  met  with  the  like  mixed  character,  in 
instances  where  Religion  was  quite  out  of  the  case. 
The  thing  plainly  is,  that  mankind  are  naturally  en- 
dued with  reason,  or  a  capacity  of  distinguishing 
between  truth  and  falsehood ;  and  as  naturally  they 
are  endued  with  veracity,  or  a  regard  to  truth  in 
what  they  say :  But  from  many  occasions,  they  are 
liable  to  be  prejudiced  and  biaf^ed  and  deceived 
themselves,  and  capable  of  intending  to  deceive 
others,  in  every  different  degree :  Insomuch  that, 
as  we  are  all  liable  to  be  deceived  by  prejudice,  so 
likewise  it  seems  to  be  not  an  uncommon  thing,  for 
persons,  who,  from  their  regard  to  truth,  would  not 
invent  a  lie  entirely  without  any  foundation  at  all,  to 
propagate  it  with  heightening  circumstances,  after 
it  is  once  invented  and  set  a-going.  And  others, 
though  they  would  not  propagate  a  lie,  yet,  which 


256  Of  the  particular  Evidence     Part  2. 

is  a  lower  degree  of  falsehood,  will  let  it  paft  without 
contradiction.  But  notwithstanding  all  this,  human 
testimony  remains  still  a  natural  ground  of  aftent ; 
and  this  afsent,  a  natural  principle  of  a(?l;ion. 

It  is  objected  farther,  that  however  it  has  hap- 
pened, the  fa6l  is,  that  mankind  have,  in  different 
ages,  been  strangely  deluded  with  pretences  to  mi- 
racles and  wonders.  But  it  is  by  no  means  to  be 
admitted,  that  they  have  been  oftener,  or  are  at  all 
more  liable  to  be  deceived  by  these  pretences,  than 
by  others. 

It  is  added,  that  there  is  a  very  considerable  de- 
gree of  historical  evidence  for  miracles,  which  are, 
on  all  hands,  acknowledged  to  be  fabulous.  But 
suppose  there  were  even  the  like  historical  evidence 
for  these,  to  what  there  is  for  those  alleged  in  proof 
of  Christianity,  which  yet  is  in  no  wise  allowed,  but 
suppose  this ;  the  consequence  would  not  be,  that 
the  evidence  of  the  latter  is  not  to  be  admitted. 
Nor  is  there  a  man  in  the  w^orld  who,  in  common 
cases,  would  conclude  thus.  For,  what  would  such 
a  conclusion  really  amount  to  but  this,  that  evidence 
confuted  by  contrary  evidence,  or  any  way  over- 
balanced, destroys  the  credibility  of  other  evidence, 
neither  confuted,  nor  overbalanced  1  To  argue,  that 
because  there  is,  if  there  were,  like  evidence  from 
testimony,  for  miracles  acknowledged  false,  as  for 
those  in  attestation  of  Christianity,  therefore  the 
evidence  in  the  latter  case  is  not  to  be  credited  ; 
this  is  the  same  as  to  argue,  that  if  two  men  of 
equally  good  reputation,  had  given  evidence  in  dif- 
ferent cases  no  way  conne(5led,  and  one  of  them  had 
been  convicted  of  perjury,  this  confuted  the  testi- 
mony of  the  other. 

Upon  the  whole  then,  the  general  observation  that 
human  creatures  are  so  liable  to  be  deceived,  from 


Chap.  7.  for  Christianity.  257 

enthusiasm  in  Religion,  and  principles  equivalent  to 
enthusiasm  in  common  matters,  and  in  both  from 
negligence  ;  and  that  they  are  so  capable  of  disho- 
nestly endeavouring  to  deceive  others ;  this  does 
indeed  weaken  the  evidence  of  testimony  in  all  cases, 
but  does  not  destroy  it  in  any.  And  these  things 
will  appear,  to  different  men,  to  weaken  the  evidence 
of  testimony,  in  different  degrees :  in  degrees  pro- 
portionable to  the  observations  they  have  made,  or 
the  notions  they  have  any  way  taken  up,  concern- 
ing the  weaknef^  and  negligence  and  dishonesty  of 
mankind  ;  or  concerning  the  powers  of  enthusiasm, 
and  prejudices  equivalent  to  it.  But  it  seems  to  me, 
that  people  do  not  know  what  they  say,  who  affirm 
these  things  to  destroy  the  evidence  fi-om  testimony, 
which  we  have  of  the  truth  of  Christianity.  Nothing 
can  destroy  the  evidence  of  testimony  in  any  case, 
but  a  proof  or  probability,  that  persons  are  not  com- 
petent judges  of  the  fadls  to  which  they  give  testi- 
mony ;  or  that  they  are  actually  under  some  indirect 
influence  in  giving  it,  in  such  particular  case.  Till 
this  be  made  out,  the  natural  laws  of  human  a6f  ions 
require,  that  testimony  be  admitted.  It  can  never 
be  sufficient  to  overthrow  dire6f  historical  evidence, 
indolently  to  say,  that  there  are  so  many  principles, 
from  whence  men  are  liable  to  be  deceived  them- 
selves and  disposed  to  deceive  others,  especially  in 
matters  of  Religion,  that  one  knows  not  what  to  be- 
lieve. And  it  is  surprising  persons  can  help  reffe^l;- 
ing,  that  this  very  manner  of  speaking,  supposes 
they  are  not  satisfied  that  there  is  nothing  in  the 
evidence,  of  which  they  speak  thus;  or  that  they 
can  avoid  observing,  if  they  do  make  this  refle(5f  ion, 
that  it  is,  on  such  a  subje(5f,  a  very  material  one.*^ 


^  See  the  foregoing  chapter. 
S 


258         Of  the  particular  Evidence       Part  2. 

And  over  against  all  these  obje(?i:ions,  is  to  be  set, 
the  importance  of  Christianity,  as  what  must  have 
engaged  the  attention  of  its  first  converts,  so  as  to 
have  rendered  them  lef^  liable  to  be  deceived  from 
careleftnef^,  than  they  would  in  common  matters ; 
and  likewise  the  strong  obligations  to  veracity,  which 
their  Religion  laid  them  under :  So  that  the  first  and 
most  obvious  presumption  is,  that  they  could  not  be 
deceived  themselves,  nor  would  deceive  others. 
And  this  presumption  in  this  degree,  is  peculiar  to 
the  testimony  we  have  been  considering. 

In  argument,  aftertions  are  nothing  in  themselves, 
and  have  an  air  of  positivenefs,  which  sometimes  is 
not  very  easy :  Yet  they  are  necef^ary,  and  neces- 
sary to  be  repeated  ;  in  order  to  conne6l  a  discourse, 
and  distin(9:ly  to  lay  before  the  view  of  the  reader, 
what  is  proposed  to  be  proved,  and  what  is  left  as 
proved.  Now  the  conclusion  from  the  foregoing 
observations  is,  I  think,  beyond  all  doubt,  this  :  That 
unbelievers  must  be  forced  to  admit  the  external 
evidence  for  Christianity,  i.  e.  the  proof  of  miracles 
wrought  to  attest  it,  to  be  of  real  weight  and  very 
considerable  ;  though  they  cannot  allow  it  to  be  suf- 
ficient, to  convince  them  of  the  reality  of  those  mi- 
racles. And  as  they  must,  in  all  reason,  admit  this  ; 
so  it  seems  to  me,  that  upon  consideration  they 
would,  in  fa(9;,  admit  it ;  those  of  them,  I  mean,  who 
know  anything  at  all  of  the  matter :  In  like  manner 
as  persons,  in  many  cases,  own,  they  see  strong  evi- 
dence from  testimony,  for  the  truth  of  things,  which 
yet  they  cannot  be  convinced  are  true  :  Cases,  sup- 
pose, where  there  is  contrary  testimony :  or  things 
which  they  think,  whether  with  or  without  reason, 
to  be  incredible.  But  there  is  no  testimony  con- 
trary to  that  which  we  have  been  considering  :  and 
it  has  been  fully  proved,  that  there  is   no  incre- 


Chap.  7.  for  Christianity.  259 

dibility,  in  Christianity  in  general,  or  in  any  part 
of  it. 

II.  As  to  the  evidence  for  Christianity  from  pro- 
phecy, I  shall  only  make  some  few  general  obser- 
vations, which  are  suggested  by  the  Analogy  of  Na- 
ture ;  i.  e.  by  the  acknowledged  natural  rules  of 
judging  in  common  matters,  concerning  evidence  of 
a  like  kind  to  this  from  prophecy. 

1 .  The  obscurity  or  unintelligiblenei^  of  one  part 
of  a  prophecy,  does  not,  in  any  degree,  invalidate 
the  proof  of  foresight,  arising  from  the  appearing 
completion  of  those  other  parts  which  are  under- 
stood. For  the  case  is  evidently  the  same,  as  if  those 
parts,  which  are  not  understood,  were  lost,  or  not 
written  at  all,  or  written  in  an  unknown  tongue. 
Whether  this  observation  be  commonly  attended  to 
or  not,  it  is  so  evident,  that  one  can  scarce  bring 
oneself  to  set  down  an  instance  in  common  matters, 
to  exemplify  it.  However,  suppose  a  writing,  partly 
in  cypher,  and  partly  in  plain  words  at  length ;  and 
that  in  the  part  one  understood,  there  appeared 
mention  of  several  known  facts :  It  would  never  come 
into  any  man's  thoughts  to  imagine,  that  if  he  un- 
derstood, the  whole,  perhaps  he  might  find,  that 
those  fa(5ls  were  not  in  reality  known  by  the  writer. 
Indeed,  both  in  this  example  and  the  thing  intended 
to  be  exemplified  by  it,  our  not  understanding  the 
whole  (the  whole  suppose  of  a  sentence  or  a  para- 
graph) might  sometimes  occasion  a  doubt,  whether 
one  understood  the  literal  meaning  of  such  a  part ; 
But  this  comes  under  another  consideration. 

For  the  same  reason,  though  a  man  should  be  in- 
capable, for  want  of  learning,  or  opportunities  of  in- 
quiry, or  from  not  having  turned  his  studies  this 
way,  even  so  much  as  to  judge,  whether  particular 
prophecies,  have  been  throughout  completely  ful- 


26o         Of  the  particular  Evidence        Part  2. 

filled ;  yet  he  may  see,  in  general,  that  they  have 
been  fulfilled  to  such  a  degree,  as,  upon  very  good 
ground,  to  be  convinced  of  foresight  more  than  hu- 
man in  such  prophecies,  and  of  such  events  being 
intended  by  them.  For  the  same  reason  also, 
though,  by  means  of  the  deficiencies  in  civil  history, 
and  the  different  accounts  of  historians,  the  most 
learned  should  not  be  able  to  make  out  to  satisfaction, 
that  such  parts  of  the  prophetic  history  have  been 
minutely  and  throughout  fulfilled ;  yet  a  very  strong 
proof  of  foresight  may  arise,  from  that  general  com- 
pletion of  them,  which  is  made  out :  As  much  proof  of 
foresight,  perhaps,  as  the  Giver  of  prophecy  intended 
should  ever  be  afforded  by  such  parts  of  prophecy. 

2.  A  long  series  of  prophecy  being  applicable  to 
such  and  such  events,  is  itself  a  proof,  that  it  was 
intended  of  them  :  as  the  rules,  by  which  we  natu- 
rally judge  and  determine,  in  common  cases  parallel 
to  this,  will  shew.  This  observation  I  make  in  an- 
swer to  the  common  objection  against  the  applica- 
tion of  the  prophecies,  that  considering  each  of  them 
distinctly  by  itself,  it  does  not  at  all  appear,  that  they 
were  intended  of  those  particular  events  to  which 
they  are  applied  by  Christians ;  and  therefore  it  is 
to  be  supposed,  that,  if  they  meant  anything,  they 
were  intended  of  other  events  unknown  to  us,  and 
not  of  these  at  all. 

Now  there  are  two  kinds  of  writing,  which  bear  a 
great  resemblance  to  prophecy,  with  respe(5l  to  the 
matter  before  us  :  the  mythological,  and  the  satirical 
where  the  satire  is,  to  a  certain  degree,  concealed. 
And  a  man  might  be  allured,  that  he  understood 
what  an  author  intended  by  a  fable  or  parable,  re- 
lated without  any  application  or  moral,  merely  from 
seeing  it  to  be  easily  capable  of  such  application, 
and  that  such  a  moral  might  naturally  be  deduced 


Chap,  7.  for  Christianity.  261 

from  it.  And  he  might  be  fully  aftured,  that  such 
persons  and  events  were  intended  in  a  satirical 
writing,  merely  from  its  being  applicable  to  them. 
And,  agreeably  to  the  last  observation,  he  might  be 
in  a  good  measure  satisfied  of  it,  though  he  were 
not  enough  informed  in  affairs,  or  in  the  story  of 
such  persons,  to  understand  half  the  satire.  For, 
his  satisfacftion,  that  he  understood  the  meaning,  the 
intended  meaning,  of  these  writings,  would  be  greater 
or  left,  in  proportion  as  he  saw  the  general  turn  of 
them  to  be  capable  of  such  application  :  and  in  pro- 
portion to  the  number  of  particular  things  capable  of 
it.  And  thus,  if  a  long  series  of  prophecy  is  appli- 
cable to  the  present  state  of  the  Church,  and  to  the 
political  situations  of  the  kingdoms  of  the  world, 
some  thousand  years  after  these  prophecies  were 
delivered,  and  a  long  series  of  prophecy  delivered 
before  the  coming  of  Christ  is  applicable  to  him ; 
these  things  are  in  themselves  a  proof,  that  the  pro- 
phetic history  was  intended  of  him,  and  of  those 
events :  in  proportion  as  the  general  turn  of  it  is 
capable  of  such  application,  and  to  the  number  and 
variety  of  particular  prophecies  capable  of  it.  And, 
though  in  all  just  way  of  consideration,  the  appear- 
ing completion  of  prophecies,  is  to  be  allowed  to  be 
thus  explanatory  of,  and  to  determine  their  mean- 
ing ;  yet  it  is  to  be  remembered  farther,  that  the 
ancient  Jews  applied  the  prophecies  to  a  Meftiah 
before  his  coming,  in  much  the  same  manner  as 
Christians  do  now:  And  that  the  primitive  Chris- 
tians inteqDreted  the  prophecies  respecting  the  state 
of  the  Church  and  of  the  world  in  the  last  ages,  in 
the  sense,  which  the  event  seems  to  confirm  and 
verify.  And  from  these  things,  it  may  be  made  ap- 
pear: 

3.  That  the  shewing  even  to  a  high  probability,  if 


262         Of  the  particular  Evidence        Part  2. 

that  could  be,  that  the  Prophets  thought  of  some 
other  events,  in  such  and  such  predications,  and  not 
those  at  all,  which  Christians  allege  to  be  comple- 
tions of  those  predictions ;  or  that  such  and  such 
prophecies  are  capable  of  being  applied  to  other 
events  than  those,  to  which  Christians  apply  them 

that  this  would  not  confute  or  destroy  the  force 

of  the  argument  from  prophecy,  even  with  regard  to 
those  very  instances.  For,  observe  how  this  matter 
really  is.  If  one  knew  such  a  person  to  be  the  sole 
author  of  such  a  book,  and  was  certainly  allured,  or 
satisfied  to  any  degree,  that  one  knew  the  whole  of 
what  he  intended  in  it ;  one  should  be  af^ured  or 
satisfied  to  such  degree,  that  one  knew  the  whole 
meaning  of  that  book :  for  the  meaning  of  a  book,  is 
nothing  but  the  meaning  of  the  author.  But  if  one 
knew  a  person  to  have  compiled  a  book  out  of  me- 
moirs, which  he  received  from  another,  of  vastly 
superior  knowledge  in  the  subject!;  of  it,  especially 
if  it  were  a  book  full  of  great  intricacies  and  diffi- 
culties ;  it  would  in  no  wise  follow,  that  one  knew 
the  whole  meaning  of  the  book,  from  knowing  the 
whole  meaning  of  the  compiler:  for  the  original 
memoirs,  i.  e.  the  author  of  them,  might  have,  and 
there  would  be  no  degree  of  presumption,  in  many 
cases,  against  supposing  him  to  have,  some  farther 
meaning,  than  the  compiler  saw.  To  say  then,  that 
the  Scriptures  and  the  things  contained  in  them  can 
have  no  other  or  farther  meaning,  than  those  per- 
sons thought  or  had,  who  first  recited  or  wrote  them  ; 
is  evidently  saying,  that  those  persons  were  the  ori- 
ginal, proper,  and  sole  authors  of  those  books,  i.  e. 
that  they  are  not  inspired  :  which  is  absurd,  whilst 
the  authority  of  these  books  is  under  examination ; 
i.  e.  till  you  have  determined  they  are  of  no  Divine 
authority  at  all.     Till  this  be  determined,  it  must  in 


Chap.  7.  for  Christianity.  263 

all  reason  be  supposed,  not  indeed  that  they  have, 
for  this  is  taking  for  granted  that  they  are  inspired, 
but  that  they  may  have,  some  farther  meaning  than 
what  the  compilers  saw  or  understood.  And  upon 
this  supposition,  it  is  supposable  also,  that  this  far- 
ther meaning  may  be  fulfilled.  Now  events  corre- 
sponding to  prophecies,  interpreted  in  a  different 
meaning  from  that,  in  which  the  Prophets  are  sup- 
posed to  have  understood  them ;  this  affords,  in  a 
manner,  the  same  proof,  that  this  different  sense 
was  originally  intended,  as  it  would  have  afforded, 
if  the  Prophets  had  not  understood  their  prediclions 
in  the  sense  it  is  supposed  they  did :  because  there 
is  no  presumption  of  their  sense  of  them,  being  the 
whole  sense  of  them.  And  it  has  been  already  shewn, 
that  the  apparent  completions  of  prophecy,  must  be 
allowed  to  be  explanatory  of  its  meaning.  So  that 
the  question  is,  whether  a  series  of  prophecy  has 
been  fulfilled,  in  a  natural  or  proper,  i.  e.  in  any  real, 
sense  of  the  words  of  it.  For  such  completion  is 
equally  a  proof  of  foresight  more  than  human,  whe- 
ther the  Prophets  are,  or  are  not,  supposed,  to  have 
understood  it  in  a  different  sense.  I  say,  supposed  : 
for,  though  I  think  it  clear,  that  the  Prophets  did 
not  understand  the  full  meaning  of  their  predictions  ; 
it  is  another  question,  how  far  they  thought  they 
did,  and  in  what  sense  they  understood  them. 

Hence  may  be  seen,  to  how  little  purpose  those 
persons  busy  themselves,  who  endeavour  to  prove, 
that  the  prophetic  history  is  applicable  to  events,  of 
the  age  in  which  it  was  written,  or  of  ages  be- 
fore it.  Indeed  to  have  proved  this  before  there  was 
any  appearance  of  a  farther  completion  of  it,  might 
have  answered  some  purpose  ;  for  it  might  have 
prevented  the  expe(5lation  of  any  such  farther  com- 
pletion.    Thus  could  Porphyry   have   shewn,  that 


264         Of  the  particular  Evidence       Part  2. 

some  principal  parts  of  the  book  of  Daniel,  for  in- 
stance, the  seventh  verse  of  the  seventh  chapter, 
which  the  Christians  interpreted  of  the  latter  ages, 
was  applicable  to  events,  which  happened  before  or 
about  the  age  of  Antiochus  Epiphanes  ;  this  might 
have  prevented  them  from  expelling  any  farther 
completion  of  it.  And,  unlei^  there  was  then,  as  I 
think  there  must  have  been,  external  evidence  con- 
cerning that  book,  more  than  is  come  down  to  us ; 
such  a  discovery  might  have  been  a  stumblingblock 
in  the  way  of  Christianity  itself:  considering  the  au- 
thority which  our  Saviour  has  given  to  the  book  of 
Daniel,  and  how  much  the  general  scheme  of  Chris- 
tianity presupposes  the  truth  of  it.  But  even  this 
discovery,  had  there  been  any  such,'  would  be  of 
very  little  weight  with  reasonable  men  now ;  if  this 
padage,  thus  applicable  to  events  before  the  age  of 
Porphyry,  appears  to  be  applicable  also  to  events, 
which  succeeded  the  dif^olution  of  the  Roman  em- 
pire. I  mention  this,  not  at  all  as  intending  to  in- 
sinuate, that  the  division  of  this  Empire  into  ten 
parts,  for  it  plainly  was  divided  into  about  that  num- 
ber, were,  alone  and  by  itself,  of  any  moment  in 
verifying  the  prophetic  history :  but  only  as  an  ex- 
ample of  the  thing  I  am  speaking  of  And  thus 
upon  the  whole,  the  matter  of  enquiry  evidently 
must  be,  as  above  put.  Whether  the  prophecies  are 
applicable  to  Christ,  and  to  the  present  state  of  the 

'  It  appears,  that  Porphyry  did  nothing  worth  mentioning  in 
this  way.      For  Jerom  on  the  place  fays :   Duas  posteriores  bestias 

in  uno  Macedonum  regno  ponit.     And  as  to  the  ten  kings  ; 

Decern  reges  enumerat,  qui  fuerunt  sce-vifsimi :  ipsosque  reges  nan 
unius  ponit  regni,  'verbi  gratia,  Macedonia,  Syria,  Ana,  et 
j^gypti  ;  sed  de  diver  sis  regnis  unum  eff.cit  regum  ordinem.  And 
in  this  way  of  interpretation,  anything  may  be  made  of  any- 
thing. 


Chap,  7.  for  Christianity.  '     265 

world  and  of  the  Church  ;  applicable  in  such  a  de- 
gree, as  to  imply  foresight:  Not  whether  they  are 
capable  of  any  other  application  ;  though  I  know  no 
pretence  for  saying,  the  general  turn  of  them  is  ca- 
pable of  any  other. 

These  observations  are,  I  think,  just ;  and  the 
evidence  referred  to  in  them,  real :  Though  there 
may  be  people  who  will  not  accept  of  such  imper- 
fe(5l  information  from  Scripture.  Some  too  have  not 
integrity  and  regard  enough  to  truth,  to  attend  to 
evidence,  which  keeps  the  mind  in  doubt,  perhaps 
perplexity,  and  which  is  much  of  a  different  sort 
from  what  they  expecfted.  And  it  plainly  requires 
a  degree  of  modesty  and  faimeft,  beyond  what  every 
one  has,  for  a  man  to  say,  not  to  the  world,  but  to 
himself,  that  there  is  a  real  appearance  of  somewhat 
of  great  weight  in  this  matter,  though  he  is  not  able 
thoroughly  to  satisfy  himself  about  it ;  but  it  shall 
have  its  influence  upon  him,  in  proportion  to  its  ap- 
pearing reality  and  weight.  It  is  much  more  easy, 
and  more  falls  in  with  the  negligence,  presumption, 
and  wilfulneft  of  the  generality,  to  determine  at  once, 
with  a  decisive  air,  there  is  nothing  in  it.  The  pre- 
judices arising  from  that  absolute  contempt  and 
scorn,  with  which  this  evidence  is  treated  in  the 
w^orld,  I  do  not  mention.  For  what  indeed  can  be 
said  to  persons,  who  are  weak  enough  in  their  un- 
derstandings, to  think  this  any  presumption  against 
it ;  or,  if  they  do  not,  are  yet  weak  enough  in  their 
temper  to  be  influenced,  by  such  prejudices,  upon 
such  a  subjedl:. 

I  shall  now,  SECONDLY,  endeavour  to  give  some 
account  of  the  general  argument  for  the  truth  of 
Christianity,  consisting  both  of  the  direcft  and  cir- 
cumstantial evidence,  considered  as  making  up  one 
argument.     Indeed  to  state  and  examine  this  argu- 


266         Of  the  particular  Evidence       Part  i. 

ment  fully,  would  be  a  work  much  beyond  the  com- 
paft  of  this  whole  treatise :  Nor  is  so  much  as  a 
proper  abridgment  of  it  to  be  expeifted  here.  Yet 
the  present  subje(5l  requires  to  have  some  brief  ac- 
count of  it  given.  For  it  is  the  kind  of  evidence, 
upon  which  most  questions  of  difficulty,  in  common 
pradlice,  are  determined :  Evidence  arising  from 
various  coincidences,  which  support  and  confirm  each 
other,  and  in  this  manner  prove,  with  more  or  lef^ 
certainty,  the  point  under  consideration.  And  I 
choose  to  do  it  also :  First,  because  it  seems  to  be 
of  the  greatest  importance,  and  not  duly  attended  to 
by  every  one,  that  the  proof  of  Revelation  is,  not 
some  dire(5l  and  expreft  things  only,  but  a  great  va- 
riety of  circumstantial  things  also  ;  and  that  though 
each  of  these  dire(5l  and  circumstantial  things,  is 
indeed  to  be  considered  separately,  yet  they  are  af- 
terwards to  be  joined  together ;  for  that  the  proper 
force  of  the  evidence  consists  in  the  result  of  those 
several  things,  considered  in  their  respects  to  each 
other,  and  united  into  one  view:  And  in  the  next 
place,  because  it  seems  to  me,  that  the  matters  of 
fa6l  here  set  down,  which  are  acknowledged  by  un- 
believers, must  be  acknowledged  by  them  also  to 
contain  together  a  degree  of  evidence  of  great  weight, 
if  they  could  be  brought  to  lay  these  several  things 
before  themselves  distin(9;ly,  and  then  with  attention 
consider  them  together ;  instead  of  that  cursory 
thought  of  them,  to  which  we  are  familiarized.  For 
being  familiarized  to  the  cursory  thought  of  things, 
as  really  hinders  the  weight  of  them  from  being 
seen,  as  from  having  its  due  influence  upon  pra^lice. 
The  thing  averted,  and  the  truth  of  which  is  to 
be  enquired  into,  is  this  :  that  over  and  above  our 
reason  and  affec^lions,  which  God  has  given  us  for 
the  information  of  our  judgment  and  the  condudl  of 


Chap.  7.  for  Christianity.  267 

our  lives,  he  has  also,  by  external  Revelation,  given 
us  an  account  of  himself,  and  his  moral  government 
over  the  world,  implying  a  future  state  of  rewards 
and  punishments;  i.e.  hath  revealed  the  system  of 
natural  Religion  :  for  natural  Religion  may  be  ex- 
ternally^ revealed  by  God,  as  the  ignorant  may  be 

taught  it  by  mankind,  their  fellow-creatures that 

God,  I  say,  has  given  us  the  evidence  of  Revelation, 
as  well  as  the  evidence  of  reason,  to  ascertain  this 
moral  system  ;  together  with  an  account  of  a  parti- 
cular dispensation  of  Providence,  which  reason  could 
no  way  have  discovered,  and  a  particular  institution 
of  Religion  founded  on  it,  for  the  recovery  of  man- 
kind out  of  their  present  wretched  condition,  and 
raising  them  to  the  perfe(?tion  and  final  happinefs  of 
their  nature. 

This  Revelation,  whether  real  or  supposed,  may 
be  considered  as  wholly  historical.  For  prophecy  is 
nothing  but  the  history  of  events  before  they  come 
to  pafs :  Dodlrines  also  are  matters  of  fa6l :  and  pre- 
cepts come  under  the  same  notion.  And  the  gene- 
ral design  of  Scripture,  which  contains  in  it  this  Re- 
velation, thus  considered  as  historical,  may  be  said 
to  be,  to  give  us  an  account  of  the  world,  in  this  one 
single  view,  as  God's  world :  by  which  it  appears 
eftentially  distinguished  from  all  other  books,  so  far 
as  I  have  found,  except  such  as  are  copied  from  it. 
It  begins  with  an  account  of  God's  creation  of  the 
world,  in  order  to  ascertain,  and  distinguish  from  all 
others,  who  is  the  objecT:  of  our  worship,  by  what  he 
has  done  :  In  order  to  ascertain,  who  he  is,  concern- 
ing whose  Providence,  commands,  promises  and 
threatenings,  this  sacred  book,  all  along,  treats  ;  the 
Maker  and  Proprietor  of  the  world,  he  whose  crea- 

8  Pp.  149,  &c. 


268  Of  the  particular  Evidence    Part  2. 

lures  we  are,  the  God  of  nature  :  In  order  likewise 
to  distinguish  him  from  the  idols  of  the  nations,  which 
are  either  imaginary  beings,  i.  e.  no  beings  at  all ; 
or  else  part  of  that  creation,  the  historical  relation 
of  which  is  here  given.  And  St.  John,  not  impro- 
bably, with  an  eye  to  this  Mosaic  account  of  the 
Creation,  begins  his  Gospel  with  an  account  of  our 
Saviour's  pre-existence,  and  that  All  things  were 
made  by  him  ;  and  without  him  was  not  anything 
made  that  was  made  :^  agreeably  to  the  do(?trine  of 
St.  Paul,  that  God  created  all  things  by  Jesus 
Christ.^^  This  being  premised,  the  Scripture,  taken 
together,  seems  to  profeft  to  contain  a  kind  of  an 
abridgment  of  the  history  of  the  world,  in  the  view 
just  now  mentioned :  that  is,  a  general  account  of 
the  condition  of  Religion  and  its  profeftors,  during 
the  continuance  of  that  apostacy  from  God,  and  state 
of  wickedneft,  which  it  everywhere  supposes  the 
world  to  lie  in.  And  this  account  of  the  state  of 
Religion,  carries  with  it  some  brief  account  of  the 
political  state  of  things,  as  Religion  is  affected  by  it. 
Revelation  indeed  considers  the  common  affairs  of 
this  world,  and  what  is  going  on  in  it,  as  a  mere 
scene  of  distraction  ;  and  cannot  be  supposed  to  con- 
cern itself  with  foretelling,  at  what  time,  Rome  or 
Babylon  or  Greece,  or  any  particular  place,  should 
be  the  most  conspicuous  seat  of  that  tyranny  and 
dif^oluteneft,  which  all  places  equally  aspire  to  be ; 
cannot,  I  say,  be  supposed  to  give  any  account  of 
this  wild  scene  for  its  own  sake.  But  it  seems  to 
contain  some  very  general  account  of  the  chief  go- 
vernments of  the  world,  as  the  general  state  of  Re- 
ligion, has  been,  is,  or  shall  be,  affected  by  them, 
from  the  first  transgref^ion,  and  during  the  whole 

5  John  i.  3.  10  Eph.  iii.  9. 


Chap.  7.  for  Christianity.  269 

interval  of  the  world's  continuing  in  its  present  state, 
to  a  certain  future  period,  spoken  of  both  in  the  Old 
and  New  Testament,  very  distinctly,  and  in  great 
variety  of  expreftion :  The  times  of  the  restitution 
of  all  things :^^  When  the  mystery  of  God  shall  be 
finished,  as  he  hath  declared  to  his  servants  the 
Prophets  :^^  When  the  God  of  heaven  shall  set  up  a 
kingdom,  which  shall  never  he  destroyed :  And  the 
kingdom  shall  not  he  left  to  other  people,^^  as  it  is 
represented  to  be  during  this  apostacy,  but  judg- 
ment shall  be  given  to  the  saints,^^  and  they  shall 
reign  :^^  And  the  kingdom  and  dominion,  and  the 
greatnejl  of  the  kingdom  under  the  whole  heaven, 
shall  be  given  to  the  people  of  the  saints  of  the  most 
High}^ 

Upon  this  general  view  of  the  Scripture,  I  would 
remark,  how  great  a  length  of  time,  the  whole  re- 
lation takes  up,  near  six  thousand  years  of  which  are 
past:  and  how  great  a  variety  of  things  it  treats  of; 
the  natural  and  moral  system  or  history  of  the  world, 
including  the  time  when  it  was  formed,  all  contained 
in  the  very  first  book,  and  evidently  written  in  a  rude 
and  unlearned  age  ;  and  in  subsequent  books,  the 
various  common  and  prophetic  history,  and  the  par- 
ticular dispensation  of  Christianity.  Now  all  this 
together  gives  the  largest  scope  for  criticism  ;  and 
for  confutation  of  what  is  capable  of  being  confuted, 
either  from  reason  or  from  common  history,  or  from 
any  inconsistence  in  its  several  parts.  And  it  is  a 
thing  which  deserves,  I  think,  to  be  mentioned,  that 
whereas  some  imagine,  the  supposed  doubtfulneft  of 
the  evidence  for  Revelation  implies  a  positive  argu- 
ment that  it  is  not  true  ;  it  appears,  on  the  contrary, 


"  Afts  iii.  21.  *-  Rev.  x.  7.  ^^  Dan.  ii.  44. 

•*  Dan.  vii.  22.  '*  Rev.  xxii.  5.        '^  Dan.  vii.  27. 


270         Of  the  particular  Evidence       Part  2, 

to  imply  a  positive  argument  that  it  is  true.  For, 
could  any  common  relation,  of  such  antiquity,  ex- 
tent, and  variety  (for  in  these  things  the  stref^  of 
what  I  am  now  observing  lies)  be  proposed  to  the 
examination  of  the  world:  that  it  could  not,  in  an 
age  of  knowledge  and  liberty,  be  confuted,  or  shewn 
to  have  nothing  in  it,  to  the  satisfaction  of  reasonable 
men ;  this  would  be  thought  a  strong  presumptive 
proof  of  its  truth.  And  indeed  it  must  be  a  proof  of 
it,  just  in  proportion  to  the  probability,  that  if  it  were 
false,  it  might  be  shewn  to  be  so :  and  this,  I  think, 
is  scarce  pretended  to  be  shewn,  but  upon  principles 
and  in  ways  of  arguing,  which  have  been  clearly  ob- 
viated.^^  Nor  does  it  at  all  appear,  that  any  set  of 
men  who  believe  natural  Religion,  are  of  the  opinion, 
that  Christianity  has  been  thus  confuted.  But  to 
proceed : 

Together  with  the  moral  system  of  the  world,  the 
Old  Testament  contains  a  chronological-  account  of 
the  beginning  of  it,  and  from  thence,  an  unbroken 
genealogy  of  mankind  for  many  ages  before  common 
history  begins  ;  and  carried  on  as  much  farther,  as 
to  make  up  a  continued  thread  of  history  of  the 
length  of  between  three  and  four  thousand  years. 
It  contains  an  account  of  God's  making  a  covenant 
with  a  particular  nation,  that  they  should  be  his 
people,  and  he  would  be  their  God,  in  a  peculiar 
sense  ;  of  his  often  interposing  miraculously  in  their 
affairs  ;  giving  them  the  promise,  and,  long  after, 
the  pofseftion,  of  a  particular  country  ;  afsuring  them 
of  the  greatest  national  prosperity  in  it,  if  they  would 
worship  him,  in  opposition  to  the  idols  which  the 
rest  of  the  world  worshipped,  and  obey  his  com- 
mands; and  threatening  them  with  unexampled  pun- 

"  Chs.  ii,  iii,  &c. 


Chap.  7.  for  Christianity,  271 

ishments,  if  they  disobeyed  him,  and  fell  into  the 
general  idolatry:  insomuch  that  this  one  nation 
should  continue  to  be  the  observation  and  the  won- 
der of  all  the  world.  It  declares  particularly,  that 
God  would  scatter  them  among  all  people,  from  one 
end  of  the  earth  unto  the  other:  but  that  when  they 
should  return  unto  the  Lord  their  God,  he  would 
have  compafsion  upon  them,  and  gather  them  from 
all  the  nations,  whither  he  had  scattered  them:  that 
Israel  should  be  saved  in  the  Lord,  with  an  ever- 
lasting salvation  ;  and  not  he  ashamed  or  confounded 
world  without  end.  And  as  some  of  these  promises 
are  conditional,  others  are  as  absolute,  as  anything 
can  be  expref^ed :  That  the  time  should  come,  when 
the  people  should  be  all  righteous,  and  inherit  the 
land  for  ever:  that  though  God  would  make  a  full 
end  of  all  nations  whither  he  had  scattered  them,  yet 
would  he  not  make  a  full  end  of  them :  that  he  would 
bring  again  the  captivity  of  his  people  Israel,  and 
plant  them  upon  their  land,  and  they  should  be  no 
more  pulled  up  out  of  their  land:  that  the  seed  of 
Israel  should  not  cease  from  being  a  nation  for 
ever.^^  It  foretells,  that  God  would  raise  them  up 
a  particular  person,  in  whom  all  his  promises  should 
finally  be  fulfilled  ;  the  Meftiah,  who  should  be,  in 
an  high  and  eminent  sense,  their  anointed  Prince  and 
Saviour.  This  was  foretold  in  such  a  manner,  as 
raised  a  general  expectation  of  such  a  person  in  the 
nation,  as  appears  from  the  New  Testament,  and  is 
an  acknowledged  fa(5f ;  an  expectation  of  his  coming 
at  such  a  particular  time,  before  any  one  appeared 
claiming  to  be  that  person,  and  when  there  was  no 
ground  for  such  an  expecT:ation  but  from  the  pro- 


'8  Deut.  xxviii.   64  j  xxx.  2,  3;  Is.  xlv.  17  j  Ix.  21  5  Jer. 
XXX.  1 1 ;  xlvi.  28  i  Amos  ix.  155  Jer.  xxxi.  36. 


272  Of  the  particular  Evidence       Parti. 

phecies :  whicli  expe(5lation,  therefore,  must  in  all 
reason  be  presumed  to  be  explanatory  of  those  pro- 
phecies, if  there  were  any  doubt  about  their  mean- 
ing. It  seems  moreover  to  foretell,  that  this  person 
should  be  reje(51:ed  by  that  nation,  to  whom  he  had 
been  so  long  promised,  and  though  he  was  so  much 
desired  by  them.^^  And  it  expref^ly  foretells,  that 
he  should  be  the  Saviour  of  the  Gentiles  ;  and  even 
that  the  completion  of  the  scheme,  contained  in  this 
book,  and  then  begun,  and  in  its  progreft,  should  be 
somewhat  so  great,  that,  in  comparison  with  it,  the 
restoration  of  the  Jews  alone  would  be  but  of  small 
account.  It  is  a  light  thing  that  thou  shouldest  he 
my  servant  to  raise  up  the  tribes  of  Jacob,  and  to 
restore  the  preserved  of  Israel:  I  will  also  give  thee 
for  a  light  to  the  Gentiles,  that  thou  mayest  be  for 
salvation  unto  the  end  of  the  earth.  And,  In  the 
last  days,  the  mountain  of  the  Lord's  house  shall  be 
established  in  the  top  of  the  mountains,  and  shall  be 
exalted  above  the  hills  ;  and  all  nations  shall  flow 

into  it for  out  of  Zion  shall  go  forth  the  law, 

and  the  word  of  the  Lord  from  Jerusalem.     And  he 

shall  judge  among  the  nations and  the  Lord 

alone  shall  be  exalted  in  that  day,  and  the  idols  he 
shall  utterly  abolish.-^  The  Scripture  farther  con- 
tains an  account,  that  at  the  time  the  Meftiah  was 
expelled,  a  person  rose  up,  in  this  nation,  claiming 
to  be  that  Meftiah,  to  be  the  Person,  whom  all  the 
prophecies  referred  to,  and  in  whom  they  should 


'9  Is.  viii.  14,  15  ;  xlix.  5j  ch.  liii 
iii. 

20  Is.  xlix.  6  5  ch.  ii  5  ch.  xi ;  Ivi.  7  ;  Mai.  i.  1 1.  To  which 
must  be  added,  the  other  prophecies  of  the  like  kind,  several 
in  the  New  Testament,  and  very  many  in  the  Old  ;  which  de- 
scribe what  shall  be  the  completion  of  the  revealed  plan  of  Pro- 
vidence. 


Chap.  7.  for  Christianity.  273 

centre :  that  he  spent  some  years  in  a  continued 
course  of  miraculous  works ;  and  endued  his  imme- 
diate disciples  and  followers,  with  a  power  of  doing 
the  same,  as  a  proof  of  the  truth  of  that  Religion, 
which  he  commifsioned  them  to  publish :  that,  in- 
vested with  this  authority  and  power,  they  made 
numerous  converts  in  the  remotest  countries,  and 
settled  and  established  his  Religion  in  the  world ;  to 
the  end  of  which,  the  Scripture  profeftes  to  give  a 
prophetic  account  of  the  state  of  this  Religion 
amongst  mankind. 

Let  us  now  suppose  a  person  utterly  ignorant  of 
history,  to  have  all  this  related  to  him,  out  of  the 
Scripture.  Or  suppose  such  an  one,  having  the 
Scripture  put  into  his  hands,  to  remark  these  things 
in  it,  not  knowing  but  that  the  whole,  even  its  civil 
history,  as  well  as  the  other  parts  of  it,  might  be, 
from  beginning  to  end,  an  entire  invention ;  and  to 
ask,  what  truth  was  in  it,  and  whether  the  Revela- 
tion here  related,  was  real  or  a  fi^lion  ?  And  instead 
of  a  6\ve£i  answer,  suppose  him,  all  at  once,  to  be 
told  the  following  confefted  facls ;  and  then  to  unite 
them  into  one  view. 

Let  him  first  be  told,  in  how  great  a  degree  the 
profef^ion  and  establishment  of  natural  Religion,  the 
belief  that  there  is  one  God  to  be  worshipped,  that 
virtue  is  his  law,  and  that  mankind  shall  be  rewarded 
and  punished  hereafter,  as  they  obey  and  disobey  it 
here  ;  in  how  very  great  a  degree,  I  say,  the  pro- 
feftion  and  establishment  of  this  moral  system  in  the 
world,  is  owing  to  the  Revelation,  whether  real  or 
supposed,  contained  in  this  Book  :  the  establishment 
of  this  moral  system,  even  in  those  countries  which 
do  not  acknowledge  the  proper  authority  of  the 
Scripture.^^  Let  him  be  told  also,  what  number  of 
21  P.  226. 

T 


274         Of  the  particular  Evidence        Part  2. 

nations  do  acknowledge  its  proper  authorit3\  Let 
him  then  take  in  the  consideration,  of  what  im- 
portance Religion  is  to  mankind.  And  upon  these 
things,  he  might,  I  think,  truly  observe,  that  this  sup- 
posed Revelation's  obtaining  and  being  received  in 
the  world,  with  all  the  circumstances  and  effe(9:s  of 
it,  considered  together  as  one  event,  is  the  most 
conspicuous  and  important  event  in  the  story  of  man- 
kind :  that  a  book  of  this  nature,  and  thus  promulged 
and  recommended  to  our  consideration,  demands,  as 
if  by  a  voice  from  heaven,  to  have  its  claims  most 
seriously  examined  into :  and  that,  before  such  ex- 
amination, to  treat  it  with  any  kind  of  scoffing  and 
ridicule,  is  an  offence  against  natural  piety.  But  it 
is  to  be  remembered,  that  how  much  soever  the  es- 
tablishment of  natural  Religion  in  the  world  is  owing 
to  the  Scripture-Revelation,  this  does  not  destroy 
the  proof  of  Religion  from  reason ;  any  more  than 
the  proof  of  Euclid^ s  Elements  is  destroyed,  by  a 
man's  knowing  or  thinking,  that  he  should  never 
have  seen  the  truth  of  the  several  propositions  con- 
tained in  it,  nor  had  those  propositions  come  into  his 
thoughts,  but  for  that  mathematician. 

Let  such  a  person  as  we  are  speaking  of,  be,  in 
the  next  place,  informed,  of  the  acknowledged  an- 
tiquity of  the  first  parts  of  this  Book :  And  that  its 
chronology,  its  account  of  the  time  when  the  earth, 
and  the  several  parts  of  it,  were  first  peopled  with 
human  creatures,  is  no  way  contradicted,  but  is  really 
confirmed,  by  the  natural  and  civil  history  of  the 
world,  colle(5led  from  common  historians,  from  the 
state  of  the  earth,  and  from  the  late  invention  of  arts 
and  sciences.  And  as  the  Scripture  contains  an  un- 
broken thread  of  common  and  civil  history,  from  the 
Creation  to  the  Captivity,  for  between  three  and 
four  thousand  years :   Let  the  person  we  are  speak- 


Chap.  7.  for  Christianity.  275 

ing  of  be  told  in  the  next  place,  that  this  general 
history,  as  it  is  not  contradicted,  but  is  confirmed  by 
profane  history  as  much  as  there  would  be  reason  to 
expedl,  upon  supposition  of  its  truth ;  so  there  is 
nothing  in  the  whole  history  itself,  to  give  any  rea- 
sonable ground  of  suspicion,  of  its  not  being,  in  the 
general,  a  faithful  and  literally  true  genealogy  of 
men,  and  series  of  things.  I  speak  here  only  of  the 
common  Scripture -history,  or  of  the  course  of  ordi- 
nary events  related  in  it ;  as  distinguished  from  mi- 
racles, and  from  the  prophetic  history.  In  all  the 
Scripture -narrations  of  this  kind,  following  events 
arise  out  of  foregoing  ones,  as  in  all  other  histories. 
There  appears  nothing  related  as  done  in  any  age, 
not  conformable  to  the  manners  of  that  age  :  nothing 
in  the  account  of  a  succeeding  age,  which,  one  would 
say,  could  not  be  true,  or  was  improbable,  from  the 
account  of  things  in  the  preceding  one.  There  is 
nothing  in  the  charadlers,  which  would  raise  a  thought 
of  their  being  feigned  ;  but  all  the  internal  marks 
imaginable  of  their  being  real.  It  is  to  be  added 
also,  that  'mere  genealogies,  bare  narratives  of  the 
number  of  years,  which  persons  called  by  such  and 
•such  names  lived,  do  not  carr^'  the  face  of  fic^^ion  ; 
perhaps  do  carry  some  presumption  of  veracity  : 
and  all  unadorned  narratives,  which  have  nothing  to 
surprise,  may  be  thought  to  carry  somewhat  of  the 
like  presumption  too.  And  the  domestic  and  the 
political  history  is  plainly  credible.  There  may  be 
incidents  in  Scripture,  which  taken  alone  in  the  naked 
way  they  are  told,  may  appear  strange  ;  especially 
to  persons  of  other  manners,  temper,  education : 
But  there  are  also  incidents  of  undoubted  truth,  in 
many  or  most  persons'  lives,  which,  in  the  same 
circumstances,  would  appear  to  the  full  as  strange. 
There  may  be  mistakes  of  transcribers,  there  may 


276         Of  the  particular  Evidence        Part  2. 

be  other  real  or  seeming  mistakes,  not  easy  to  be 
particularly  accounted  for :  But  there  are  certainly 
no  more  things  of  this  kind  in  the  Scripture,  than 
what  were  to  have  been  expelled  in  books  of  such 
antiquity ;  and  nothing,  in  any  wise,  sufficient  to 
discredit  the  general  narrative.  Now,  that  a  history 
claiming  to  commence  from  the  Creation,  and  ex- 
tending in  one  continued  series,  through  so  great  a 
length  of  time,  and  variety  of  events,  should  have 
such  appearances  of  reality  and  truth  in  its  whole 
contexture,  is  surely  a  very  remarkable  circumstance 
in  its  favour.  And  as  all  this  is  applicable  to  the 
common  history  of  the  New  Testament ;  so  there  is 
a  farther  credibility,  and  a  very  high  one,  given  to 
it,  by  profane  authors :  many  of  these  writing  of  the 
same  times,  and  confirming  the  truth  of  customs 
and  events,  which  are  incidentally  as  well  as  more 
purposely  mentioned  in  it.  And  this  credibility  of 
the  common  Scripture -history,  gives  some  credi- 
bility to  its  miraculous  history :  especially  as  this  is 
interwoven  with  the  common,  so  as  that  they  imply 
each  other,  and  both  together  make  up  one  relation. 
Let  it  then  be  more  particularly  observed  to  this 
person,  that  it  is  an  acknowledged  matter  of  fa(9:, 
which  is  indeed  implied  in  the  foregoing  observation, 
that  there  was  such  a  nation  as  the  Jews,  of  the 
greatest  antiquity,  whose  government  and  general 
polity  was  founded  on  the  Law,  here  related  to  be 
given  them  by  Moses  as  from  heaven :  that  natural 
Religion,  though  with  rites  additional  yet  no  way 
contrary  to  it,  was  their  established  Religion,  which 
cannot  be  said  of  the  Gentile  world :  and  that  their 
very  being  as  a  nation,  depended  upon  their  acknow- 
ledgment of  one  God,  the  God  of  the  universe. 
For,  suppose  in  their  captivity  in  Babylon,  they  had 
gone  over  to  the  Religion  of  their  conquerors,  there 


Chap,  7.  for  Christianity.  277 

would  have  remained  no  bond  of  union,  to  keep  them 
a  distinct  people.  And  whilst  they  were  under  their 
own  kings,  in  their  own  country,  a  total  apostacy 
from  God  would  have  been  the  diftolution  of  their 
whole  government.  They,  in  such  a  sense,  nation- 
ally acknowledged  and  worshipped  the  Maker  of 
heaven  and  earth,  when  the  rest  of  the  world  were 
sunk  in  idolatry,  as  rendered  them,  in  fadl,  the  pe- 
culiar people  of  God.  And  this  so  remarkable  an 
establishment  and  preservation  of  natural  Religion 
amongst  them,  seems  to  add  some  peculiar  credi- 
bility to  the  historical  evidence  for  the  miracles  of 
Moses  and  the  Prophets :  Because  these  miracles 
are  a  full  satisfa(?l:ory  account  of  this  event,  which 
plainly  wants  to  be  accounted  for,  and  Ccinnot  other- 
wise. 

Let  this  person,  supposed  wholly  ignorant  of  his- 
tory, be  acquainted  farther,  that  One  claiming  to  be 
the  Mef^iah,  of  Jewish  extraction,  rose  up  at  the 
time  when  this  nation,  from  the  prophecies  above- 
mentioned,  expe(5led  the  Meftiah  :  that  he  was  re- 
je(5led,  as  it  seemed  to  have  been  foretold  he  should, 
by  the  body  of  the  people,  under  the  direction  of 
their  rulers  :  that  in  the  course  of  a  very  few  years, 
he  was  believed  on  and  acknowledged  as  the  pro- 
mised Meftiah,  by  great  numbers  among  the  Gen- 
tiles, agreeably  to  the  prophecies  of  Scripture,  yet 
not  upon  the  evidence  of  prophecy,  but  of  miracles,^ 
of  which  miracles  we  also  have  strong  historical  evi- 
dence ;  (by  which  I  mean  here  no  more  than  must 
be  acknowledged  by  unbelievers,  for  let  pious  frauds 
and  follies  be  admitted  to  weaken,  it  is  absurd  to  say 
they  destroy,  our  evidence  of  miracles  wrought  in 
proof  of  Christianity  :  ^^)  that  this  Religion  approving 

22    Pp.   249,  &C.  23    pp,   257,  &C. 


278         Of  the  particular  Evidence        Part  2. 

itself  to  the  reason  of  mankind,  and  carrying  its  own 
evidence  with  it,  so  far  as  reason  is  a  judge  of  its 
system,  and  being  no  way  contrary  to  reason,  in 
those  parts  of  it  which  require  to  be  believed  upon 
the  mere  authority  of  its  Author  ;  that  this  Religion, 
I  say,  gradually  spread  and  supported  itself,  for 
some  hundred  years,  not  only  without  any  aftistance 
from  temporal  power,  but  under  constant  discou- 
ragements, and  often  the  bitterest  persecutions  from 
it ;  and  then  became  the  Religion  of  the  world :  that 
in  the  mean  time,  the  Jewish  nation  and  govern- 
ment were  destroyed,  in  a  very  remarkable  manner, 
and  the  people  carried  away  captive  and  dispersed 
through  the  most  distant  countries ;  in  which  state 
of  dispersion,  they  have  remained  fifteen  hundred 
years :  and  that  they  remain  a  numerous  people, 
united  amongst  themselves,  and  distinguished  from 
the  rest  of  the  world,  as  they  were  in  the  days  of 
Moses,  by  the  profeftion  of  his  Law  ;  and  everywhere 
looked  upon  in  a  manner,  which  one  scarce  knows 
how  distinctly  to  expreft,  but  in  the  words  of  the 
prophetic  account  of  it,  given  so  many  ages  before 
it  came  to  paft  ;  Thou  shalt  become  an  astonishment, 
a  proverb,  and  a  by -word,  among  all  nations  whither 
the  Lord  shall  lead  thee.^^ 

The  appearance  of  a  standing  miracle,  in  the  Jews 
remaining  a  distin<5t  people  in  their  dispersion,  and 
the  confirmation  which  this  event  appears  to  give  to 
the  truth  of  Revelation ;  may  be  thought  to  be  an- 
swered, by  their  Religion's  forbidding  them  inter- 
marriages with  those  of  any  other,  and  prescribing 
them  a  great  many  peculiarities  in  their  food,  by 
which  they  are  debarred  from  the  means  of  incor- 
porating with  the  people,  in  whose  countries  they 

^*  Deut.  xxviii.  37.       _. 


Ckap.  J.  for  Christianity.  279 

live.  This  is  not,  I  think,  a  satisfa<5lory  account  of 
that  which  it  pretends  to  account  for.  But  what 
does  it  pretend  to  account  for?  The  correspondence 
between  this  event  and  the  prophecies ;  or  the  co- 
incidence of  both,  with  a  long  dispensation  of  Pro- 
vidence of  a  peculiar  nature,  towards  that  people 
formerly  ?  No.  It  is  only  the  event  itself,  which  is 
offered  to  be  thus  accounted  for ;  which  single  event 
taken  alone,  abstracted  from  all  such  correspondence 
and  coincidence,  perhaps  would  not  have  appeared 
miraculous:  but  that  correspondence  and  coinci- 
dence may  be  so,  though  the  event  itself  be  sup- 
posed not.  Thus  the  concurrence  of  our  Saviour's 
being  born  at  Bethlehem,  with  a  long  foregoing  se- 
ries of  prophecy  and  other  coincidences,  is  doubt- 
left  miraculous,  the  series  of  prophecy,  and  other 
coincidences,  and  the  event,  being  admitted :  though 
the  event  itself,  his  birth  at  that  place,  appears  to 
have  been  brought  about  in  a  natural  way  ;  of  which, 
however,  no  one  can  be  certain. 

And  as  several  of  these  events  seem,  in  some  de- 
gree exprefkly,  to  have  verified  the  prophetic  history 
already  :  so  likewise  they  may  be  considered  farther, 
as  having  a  peculiar  aspect  towards  the  full  comple- 
tion of  it ;  as  affording  some  presumption  that  the 
whole  of  it  shall,  one  time  or  other,  be  fulfilled.  Thus, 
that  the  Jews  have  been  so  wonderfully  preserved 
in  their  long  and  wide  dispersion  ;  which  is  indeed 
the  dire(5l  fulfilling  of  some  prophecies,  but  is  now 
mentioned  only  as  looking  forward  to  somewhat  yet 
to  come  :  that  natural  Religion  came  forth  from  Ju- 
dea,  and  spread,  in  the  degree  it  has  done  over  the 
world,  before  lost  in  idolatry  ;  which,  together  with 
some  other  things,  have  distinguished  that  very  place, 
in  like  manner,  as  the  people  of  it  are  distinguished  : 
that  this  great  change  of  Religion  over  the  earth, 


28o         Of  the  particular  Evidence       Part  2. 

was  brought  about  under  the  profeftion  and  acknow- 
ledgment, that  Jesus  was  the  promised  Meftiah  : 
Things  of  this  kind  naturally  turn  the  thoughts  of 
serious  men,  towards  the  full  completion  of  the  pro- 
phetic history,  concerning  the  final  restoration  of 
that  people  ;  concerning  the  establishment  of  the 
everlasting  kingdom  among  them,  the  kingdom  of 
the  Mefsiah  ;  and  the  future  state  of  the  world,  un- 
der this  sacred  government.  Such  circumstances 
and  events  compared  with  these  prophecies,  though 
no  completions  of  them,  yet  would  not,  I  think,  be 
spoken  of  as  nothing  in  the  argument,  by  a  person 
upon  his  first  being  informed  of  them.  They  fall  in 
with  the  prophetic  history  of  things  still  future,  give 
it  some  additional  credibility,  have  the  appearance 
of  being  somewhat  in  order  to  the  full  completion 
of  it. 

Indeed  it  requires  a  good  degree  of  knowledge, 
and  great  calmneft  and  consideration,  to  be  able  to 
judge,  thoroughly,  of  the  evidence  for  the  truth  of 
Christianity,  from  that  part  of  the  prophetic  history, 
which  relates  to  the  situation  of  the  kingdoms  of  the 
world,  and  to  the  state  of  the  church,  from  the  es- 
tablishment of  Christianity  to  the  present  time.  But 
it  appears,  fi^om  a  general  view  of  it,  to  be  very  ma- 
terial. And  those  persons  who  have  thoroughly  ex- 
amined it,  and  some  of  them  were  men  of  the  coolest 
tempers,  greatest  capacities,  and  least  liable  to  im- 
putations of  prejudice,  insist  upon  it  as  determinatdy 
conclusive. 

Suppose  now  a  person  quite  ignorant  of  history, 
first  to  recollect:  the  parages  abovementioned  out 
of  Scripture,  without  knowing  but  that  the  whole 
was  a  late  fic^tion,  then  to  be  informed  of  the  cor- 
respondent fa(51s  now  mentioned,  and  to  unite  them 
all  into  one  view  ;  That  the  profeftion  and  establish- 


Chap.  'J,  for  Christianity.  281 

ment  of  natural  Religion  in  the  world,  is  greatly 
owing,  in  different  ways,  to  this  Book,  and  the  sup- 
posed Revelation  which  it  contains ;  that  it  is  ac- 
knowledged to  be  of  the  earliest  antiquity ;  that  its 
chronology  and  common  history  are  entirely  credible ; 
that  this  ancient  nation,  the  Jews,  of  whom  it  chiefly 
treats,  appear  to  have  been,  in  fa6t,  the  people  of 
God,  in  a  distinguished  sense  ;  that,  as  there  was  a 
national  expectation  amongst  them,  raised  from  the 
prophecies,  of  a  Mefsiah  to  appear  at  such  a  time, 
so  one  at  this  time  appeared  claiming  to  be  that 
Meftiah ;  that  he  was  reje(5led  by  this  nation ;  but 
received  by  the  Gentiles,  not  upon  the  evidence  of 
prophecy,  but  of  miracles ;  that  the  Religion  he 
taught  supported  itself  under  the  greatest  difficul- 
ties, gained  ground,  and  at  length  became  the  Re- 
ligion of  the  world ;  that  in  the  mean  time  the  Jewish 
polity  was  utterly  destroyed,  and  the  nation  dispersed 
over  the  face  of  the  earth  ;  that  notwithstandmg  this, 
they  have  remained  a  distinct!:  numerous  people  for 
so  many  centuries,  even  to  this  day  ;  which  not  only 
appears  to  be  the  expreft  completion  of  several  pro- 
phecies concerning  them  ;  but  also  renders  it,  as  one 
may  speak,  a  visible  and  easy  pofsibility,  that  the 
promises  made  to  them  as  a  nation,* may  yet  be  ful- 
filled. And  to  these  acknowledged  truths,  let  the 
person  we  have  been  supposing,  add,  as  I  think  he 
ought,  whether  every  one  will  allow  it  or  no,  the  ob- 
vious appearances  which  there  are,  of  the  state  of 
the  world,  in  other  respects  besides  what  relates  to 
the  Jews,  and  of  the  Christian  Church,  having  so 
long  answered,  and  still  answering  to  the  prophetic 
history.  Suppose,  I  say,  these  fa(5ls  set  over  against 
the  things  before-mentioned  out  of  the  Scripture, 
and  seriously  compared  with  them ;  the  joint  view 
of  both  together,  must,  I  think,  appear  of  very  great 


282         Of  the  particular  Evidence       Part  2. 

weight  to  a  considerate  reasonable  person :  of  much 
greater  indeed,  upon  having  them  first  laid  before 
him,  than  is  easy  for  us,  who  are  so  familiarized  to 
them,  to  conceive,  without  some  particular  attention 
for  that  purpose. 

All  these  things,  and  the  several  particulars  con- 
tained under  them,  require  to  be  distinctly  and  most 
thoroughly  examined  into  ;  that  the  weight  of  each 
may  be  judged  of,  upon  such  examination,  and  such 
conclusion  drawn  as  results  from  their  united  force. 
But  this  has  not  been  attempted  here.  I  have  gone 
no  farther  than  to  show,  that  the  general  imperfect: 
view  of  them  now  given,  the  confei^ed  historical  evi- 
dence for  miracles,  and  the  many  obvious  appearing 
completions  of  prophecy,  together  with  the  collateral 
things  ^^  here  mentioned,  and  there  are  several  others 
of  the  like  sort ;  that  all  this  together,  which,  being 
fa(?i;,  must  be  acknowledged  by  unbelievers,  amounts 
to  real  evidence  of  somewhat  more  than  human  in 
this  matter :  evidence  much  more  important,  than 
careleft  men,  who  have  been  accustomed  only  to 
transient  and  partial  views  of  it,  can  imagine  ;  and 
indeed  abundantly  sufficient  to  a(5l  upon.  And  these 
things,  I  apprehend,  must  be  acknowledged  by  un- 
beUevers.  For'though  they  may  say,  that  the  his- 
torical evidence  of  miracles  wrought  in  attestation 
of  Christianity,  is  not  sufficient  to  convince  them  that 
such  miracles  were  really  wrought ;  they  cannot 
deny,  that  there  is  such  historical  evidence,  it  being 
a  known  matter  of  fac^t,  that  there  is.  They  may 
say,  the  conformity  between  the  prophecies  and 
events,  is  by  accident :  but  there  are  many  instances,  in 


2*  All  the  particular  things  mentioned  in  this  chapter,  not 
reducible  to  the  head,  of  certain  miracles,  or  determinate  com- 
pletions of  prophecy.     See  pp.  244,  245. 


Chap.  7.  for  Christianity.  283 

which  such  conformity  itself  cannot  be  denied.  They 
may  say,  with  regard  to  such  kind  of  collateral  things 
as  those  abovementioned,  that  any  odd  accidental 
events,  without  meaning,  will  have  a  meaning  found 
in  them  by  fanciful  people  :  and  that  such  as  are  fan- 
ciful in  any  one  certain  way,  will  make  out  a  thou- 
sand coincidences,  which  seem  to  favour  their  pecu- 
liar follies.  Men,  I  say,  may  talk  thus :  But  no  one 
who  is  serious,  can  poftibly  think  these  things  to  be 
nothing,  if  he  considers  the  importance  of  collateral 
things,  and  even  of  lef^er  circumstances,  in  the  evi- 
dence of  probability,  as  distinguished,  in  nature,  from 
the  evidence  of  demonstration.  In  many  cases  in- 
deed it  seems  to  require  the  truest  judgment,  to 
determine  with  exa(fine{^  the  weight  of  circumstan- 
tial evidence  :  but  it  is  very  often  altogether  as  con- 
vincing, as  that,  which  is  the  most  exprei^  and  direct:. 
This  general  view  of  the  evidence  for  Christianity, 
considered  as  making  one  argument,  may  also  serve 
to  recommend  to  serious  persons,  to  set  down  every- 
thing, which  they  think  may  be  of  any  real  weight 
at  all  in  proof  of  it,  and  particularly  the  many  seem- 
ing completions  of  prophecy  :  and  they  will  find, 
that,  judging  by  the  natural  rules,  by  which  we  judge 
of  probable  evidence  in  common  matters,  they  amount 
to  a  much  higher  degree  of  proof,  upon  such  a  joint 
review,  than  could  be  supposed  upon  considering 
them  separately,  at  different  times ;  how  strong  so- 
ever the  proof  might  before  appear  to  them,  upon 
such  separate  views  of  it.  For  probable  proofs,  by 
being  added,  not  only  increase  the  evidence,  but 
multiply  it.  Nor  should  I  dif^uade  any  one  from 
setting  down,  what  he  thought  made  for  the  con- 
trary side.  But  then  it  is  to  be  remembered,  not 
in  order  to  influence  his  judgment,  but  his  pra(5lice, 
that  a  mistake  on  one  side,  may  be,  in  its  conse- 


284         Of  the  particular  evidence        Part  2. 

quences,  much  more  dangerous,  than  a  mistake  on 
the  other.  And  what  course  is  most  safe,  and  what 
most  dangerous,  is  a  consideration  thought  very  ma- 
terial, when  we  deliberate,  not  concerning  events, 
but  concerning  condu^l  in  our  temporal  affairs.  To 
be  influenced  by  this  consideration  in  our  judgment, 
to  believe  or  disbelieve  upon  it,  is  indeed  as  much 
prejudice,  as  anything  whatever.  And,  like  other 
prejudices,  it  operates  contrary  ways,  in  different 
men.  For  some  are  inclined  to  believe,  what  they 
hope  ;  and  others,  what  they  fear.  And  it  is  mani- 
fest unreasonablenei^,  to  apply  to  men's  paf^ions  in 
order  to  gain  their  af^ent.  But  in  deliberations  con- 
cerning conduct,  there  is  nothing  which  reason  more 
requires  to  be  taken  into  the  account,  than  the  im- 
portance of  it.  For,  suppose  it  doubtful,  what  would 
be  the  consequence  of  acting  in  this,  or  in  a  contrary 
manner :  still,  that  taking  one  side  could  be  attended 
with  little  or  no  bad  consequence,  and  taking  the 
other  might  be  attended  with  the  greatest,  must  ap- 
pear, to  unprejudiced  reason,  of  the  highest  moment 
towards  determining,  how  we  are  to  a(5l.  But  the 
truth  of  our  Religion,  like  the  truth  of  common  mat- 
ters, is  to  be  judged  of  by  all  the  evidence  taken  to- 
gether. And  unlef^  the  whole  series  of  things  which 
may  be  alleged  in  this  argument,  and  every  par- 
ticular thing  in  it,  can  reasonably  be  supposed  to 
have  been  by  accident ;  (for  here  the  stref^  of  the 
argument  for  Christianity  lies ;)  then  is  the  truth  of 
it  proved :  In  like  manner,  as  if  in  any  common  case, 
numerous  events  acknowledged,  were  to  be  alleged 
in  proof  of  any  other  event  disputed ;  the  truth  of 
the  disputed  event  would  be  proved,  not  only  if  any 
one  of  the  acknowledged  ones  did  of  itself  clearly 
imply  it,  but,  though  no  one  of  them  singly  did  so, 
if  the  whole  of  the  acknowledged  events  taken  to- 


Chap.  7.  for  Christianity.  285 

gether,  could  not  in  reason  be  supposed  to  have 
happened,  unlei^  the  disputed  one  were  true. 

It  is  obvious,  how  much  advantage,  the  nature  of 
this  evidence  gives  to  those  persons,  who  attack 
Christianity,  especially  in  conversation.  For  it  is 
easy  to  shew,  in  a  short  and  lively  manner,  that  such 
and  such  things  are  liable  to  obje(9:ion,  that  this  and 
another  thing,  is  of  little  weight  in  itself;  but  im- 
poftible  to  shew,  in  like  manner,  the  united  force  of 
the  whole  argument  in  one  view. 

However,  lastly,  as  it  has  been  made  appear,  that 
there  is  no  presumption  against  a  Revelation  as  mi- 
raculous ;  that  the  general  scheme  of  Christianity, 
and  the  principal  parts  of  it,  are  conformable  to  the 
experienced  constitution  of  things,  and  the  whole 
perfe(5^1y  credible  :  So  the  account  now  given  of  the 
positive  evidence  for  it,  shews,  that  this  evidence  is 
such,  as,  from  the  nature  of  it,  cannot  be  destroyed ; 
though  it  should  be  leftened. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

Of  the  Ohje6lions  which  may  he  made  against  ar- 
guing from  the  Analogy  of  Nature,  to  Religion. 

F  every  one  would  consider  with  such 
attention  as  they  are  bound,  even  in 
point  of  morality,  to  consider,  what 
they  judge  and  give  chara(5lers  of; 
the  occasion  of  this  chapter  would  be, 
in  some  good  measure  at  least,  superseded.  But 
since  this  is  not  to  be  expe(5ied ;  for  some  we  find 
do  not  concern  themselves  to  understand  even  what 
they  write  against :   Since  this  treatise,  in  common 


286    Objections  against  arguing  from  Part  2. 

with  most  others,  lies  open  to  objections,  which  may 
appear  very  material  to  thoughtful  men  at  first  sight ; 
And,  besides  that,  seems  peculiarly  liable  to  the  ob- 
je(5lions,  of  such  as  can  judge  without  thinking,  and 
of  such  as  can  censure  without  judging  ;  it  may  not 
be  amif^  to  set  down  the  chief  of  these  objections 
which  occur  to  me,  and  consider  them  to  their 
hands.     And  they  are  such  as  these  ; 

"  That  it  is  a  poor  thing  to  solve  difficulties  in 
'  Revelation,  by  saying,  that  there  are  the  same  in 
'  natural  Religion ;  when  what  is  wanting  is  to  clear 
'■  both  of  them,  of  these  their  common,  as  well  as 
'  other  their  respective,  difficulties :  But  that  it  is  a 
'  strange  way  indeed  of  convincing  men  of  the  ob- 
'  ligations  of  Religion,  to  shew  them,  that  they  have 
'  as  little  reason  for  their  worldly  pursuits :  And  a 
'  strange  way  of  vindicating  the  justice  and  good- 
'  nel^  of  the  Author  of  nature,  and  of  removing  the 
'  objections  against  both,  to  which  the  system  of 
'  Religion  lies  open,  to  shew,  that  the  like  objections 
'  lie  against  natural  Providence  ;  a  way  of  answer- 
'  ing  objections  against  Religion,  without  so  much 
'  as  pretending  to  make  out,  that  the  system  of  it, 
'  or  the  particular  things  in  it  objeCted  against,  are 

'  reasonable especially,  perhaps  some  may  be 

•  inattentive  enough  to  add,  must  this  be  thought 
'  strange,  when  it  is  confef^ed  that  Analogy  is  no 
'  answer  to  such  objeCtions :  That  when  this  sort  of 
'  reasoning  is  carried  to  the  utmost  length  it  can  be 
'  imagined  capable  of,  it  will  yet  leave  the  mind  in 
'  a  very  unsatisfied  state :  And  that  it  must  be  un- 
'  accountable  ignorance  of  mankind,  to  imagine  they 
'  will  be  prevailed  with  to  forego  their  present  in- 
'  terests  and  pleasures  from  regard  to  Religion,  upon 
^  doubtful  evidence." 
Now,  as  plausible  as  this  way  of  talking  may  ap- 


Chap.  8.  Analogy  of  Nature  to  Religion.   28-^ 

pear,  that  appearance  will  be  found  in  a  great  mea- 
sure owing  to  half-views,  which  shew  but  part  of  an 
objeci:,  yet  shew  that  indistin(5lly ;  and  to  undeter- 
minate  language.  By  these  means  weak  men  are 
often  deceived  by  others,  and  ludicrous  men,  by 
themselves.  And  even  those,  who  are  serious  and 
considerate,  cannot  always  readily  disentangle,  and 
at  once  clearly  see  through  the  perplexities,  in  which 
subjecT;s  themselves  are  involved ;  and  which  are 
heightened  by  the  deficiencies  and  the  abuse  of 
words.  To  this  latter  sort  of  persons,  the  following 
reply  to  each  part  of  this  objedlion  severally,  may  be 
of  some  afsistance  ;  as  it  may  also  tend  a  little  to 
stop  and  silence  others. 

First,  The  thing  wanted,  i.  e.  what  men  require, 
is  to  have  all  difficulties  cleared.  And  this  is,  or  at 
least  for  anything  we  know  to  the  contrary,  it  may 
be,  the  same,  as  requiring  to  comprehend  the  Divine 
nature,  and  the  whole  plan  of  Providence  from  ever- 
lasting to  everlasting.  But  it  hath  always  been  al- 
lowed to  argue,  from  what  is  acknowledged,  to  what 
is  disputed.  And  it  is  in  no  other  sense  a  poor 
thing,  to  argue  from  natural  Religion  to  revealed,  in 
the  manner  found  fault  with,  than  it  is  to  argue  in 
numberleft  other  ways  of  probable  dedu(5lion  and 
inference,  in  matters  of  conduct,  which  we  are  con- 
tinually reduced  to  the  necefsity  of  doing.  Indeed 
the  epithet  poor,  may  be  applied,  I  fear  as  properly, 
to  great  part  or  the  whole  of  human  life,  as  it  is  to 
the  things  mentioned  in  the  objection.  Is  it  not  a 
poor  thing,  for  a  physician  to  have  so  little  know- 
ledge in  the  cure  of  diseases,  as  even  the  most  emi- 
nent have  ?  To  a6i  upon  conje6lure  and  gueft,  where 
the  life  of  man  is  concerned  ?  Undoubtedly  it  is : 
but  not  in  comparison  of  having  no  skill  at  all  in  that 
useful  art,  and  being  obliged  to  act  wholly  in  the  dark. 


288    Objeflions  against  arguing  from    Part  2. 

Further :  since  it  is  as  unreasonable,  as  it  is  com- 
mon, to  urge  objections  against  Revelation,  which 
are  of  equal  weight  against  natural  Religion ;  and 
those  who  do  this,  if  they  are  not  confuted  them- 
selves, deal  unfairly  with  others,  in  making  it  seem, 
that  they  are  arguing  only  against  Revelation,  or 
particular  docftrines  of  it,  when  in  reality  they  are 
arguing  against  moral  Providence  ;  it  is  a  thing  of 
consequence  to  shew,  that  such  objections  are  as 
much  levelled  against  natural  Religion,  as  against 
revealed.  And  objections,  which  are  equally  appli- 
cable to  both,  are  properly  speaking  answered,  by 
its  being  shewn  that  they  are  so,  provided  the  former 
be  admitted  to  be  true.  And  without  taking  in  the 
consideration  how  distinctly  this  is  admitted,  it  is 
plainly  very  material  to  observe,  that  as  the  things 
objected  against  in  natural  Religion,  are  of  the  same 
kind  with  what  is  certain  matter  of  experience  in  the 
course  of  Providence,  and  in  the  information  which 
God  affords  us  concerning  our  temporal  interest 
under  his  government;  so  the  objeCtions  against  the 
system  of  Christianity  and  the  evidence  of  it,  are  of 
the  very  same  kind  with  those  which  are  made 
against  the  system  and  evidence  of  natural  Religion. 
However,  the  reader  upon  review  may  see,  that  most 
of  the  Analogies  insisted  upon,  even  in  the  latter 
part  of  this  treatise,  do  not  neceftarily  require  to 
have  more  taken  for  granted  than  is  in  the  former ; 
that  there  is  an  Author  of  nature,  or  natural  Go- 
vernor of  the  world :  and  Christianity  is  vindicated, 
not  from  its  Analogy  to  natural  Religion,  but  chiefly, 
from  its  Analogy  to  the  experienced  constitution  of 
Nature. 

Secondly,  Religion  is  a  praCtical  thing,  and  con- 
sists in  such  a  determinate  course  of  life  ;  as  being 
what  there  is  reason  to  think,  is  commanded  by  the 


Chap,  8.  Analogy  of  Nature  to  Religion.   289 

Author  of  nature,  and  will,  upon  the  whole,  be  our 
happineft  under  his  government.  Now  if  men  can 
be  convinced,  that  they  have  the  like  reason  to  be- 
lieve this,  as  to  believe,  that  taking  care  of  their 
temporal  affairs  will  be  to  their  advantage  ;  such 
convi<9:ion  cannot  but  be  an  argument  to  them  for 
the  pra(51ice  of  Religion.  And  if  there  be  really  any 
reason  for  believing  one  of  these,  and  endeavouring 
to  preserve  life,  and  secure  ourselves  the  neceftaries 
and  conveniences  of  it :  Then  there  is  reason  also  for 
believing  the  other,  and  endeavouring  to  secure  the 
interest  it  proposes  to  us.  And  if  the  interest,  which 
Religion  proposes  to  us,  be  infinitely  greater  than 
our  whole  temporal  interest;  then  there  must  be 
proportionably  greater  reason,  for  endeavouring  to 
secure  one,  than  the  other :  since,  by  the  supposi- 
tion, the  probability  of  our  securing  one,  is  equal  to 
the  probability  of  our  securing  the  other.  This 
seems  plainly  unanswerable  ;  and  has  a  tendency  to 
influence  fair  minds,  who  consider  what  our  condi- 
tion really  is,  or  upon  what  evidence  we  are  natu- 
rally appointed  to  di£i ;  and  who  are  disposed  to  ac- 
quiesce in  the  terms  upon  which  we  live,  and  attend 
to  and  follow  that  practical  instruction,  whatever  it 
be,  which  is  afforded  us. 

But  the  chief  and  proper  force  of  the  argument 
referred  to  in  the  objection,  lies  in  another  place. 
For,  it  is  said  that  the  proof  of  Religion  is  involved 
in  such  inextricable  difficulties,  as  to  render  it  doubt- 
ful ;  and  that  it  cannot  be  supposed,  that  if  it  were 
true,  it  v^ould  be  left  upon  doubtful  evidence.  Here 
then,  over  and  above  the  force  of  each  particular 
difficulty  or  objection,  these  difficulties  and  objec- 
tions taken  together,  are  turned  into  a  positive  ar- 
gument against  the  truth  of  Religion :  which  argu- 
ment would  stand  thus.  If  Religion  were  true,  it 
u 


ago    Obje£lions  against  arguing  from    Part  2. 

would  not  be  left  doubtful,  and  open  to  objec^tions  to 
the  degree  in  which  it  is :  therefore  that  it  is  thus 
left,  not  only  renders  the  evidence  of  it  weak,  and 
le{^ens  its  force,  in  proportion  to  the  weight  of  such 
obje(5lions;  but  also  shews  it  to  be  false,  or  is  a 
general  presumption  of  its  being  so.  Now  the  ob- 
servation, that  from  the  natural  constitution  and 
course  of  things,  we  must  in  our  temporal  concerns, 
almost  continually,  and  in  matters  of  great  conse- 
quence, a(5i:  upon  evidence  of  a  like  kind  and  degree 
to  the  evidence  of  Religion ;  is  an  answer  to  this  ar- 
gument :  because  it  shews,  that  it  is  according  to 
the  condu(?t  and  character  of  the  Author  of  nature, 
to  appoint  we  should  a(?i:  upon  evidence  like  to  that, 
which  this  argument  presumes  he  cannot  be  sup- 
posed to  appoint  we  should  a(9;  upon :  It  is  an  in- 
stance, a  general  one  made  up  of  numerous  parti- 
cular ones,  of  somewhat  in  his  dealing  with  us, 
similar  to  what  is  said  to  be  incredible.  And  as  the 
force  of  this  answer  lies  merely  in  the  parallel,  which 
there  is  between  the  evidence  for  Religion  and  for 
our  temporal  condu(5t ;  the  ansv^er  is  equally  just 
and  conclusive,  whether  the  parallel  be  made  out, 
by  shewing  the  evidence  of  the  former  to  be  higher, 
or  the  evidence  of  the  latter  to  be  lower. 

Thirdly y  The  design  of  this  treatise  is  not  to  vin- 
dicate the  character  of  God,  but  to  shew  the  obli- 
gations of  men :  It  is  not  to  justify  his  Providence, 
but  to  shew  what  belongs  to  us  to  do.  These  are 
two  subjects,  and  ought  not  to  be  confounded.  And 
though  they  may  at  length  run  up  into  each  other, 
yet  observations  may  immediately  tend  to  make  out 
the  latter,  which  do  not  appear,  by  any  immediate 
connection,  to  the  purpose  of  the  former ;  which  is 
lef^  our  concern  than  many  seem  to  think.  For, 
first,  it  is  not  necei^ary  we  should  justify  the  dis- 


Chap.  8.   Analogy  of  Nature  to  Religion.   291 

pensations  of  Providence  against  obje^lions,  any  far- 
ther than  to  shew,  that  the  things  objected  against 
may,  for  aught  we  know,  be  consistent  with  justice 
and  goodneft.     Suppose  then,  that  there  are  things 
in  the  system  of  this  world,  and  plan  of  Providence 
relating  to  it,  which  taken  alone  would  be  unjust; 
yet  it  has  been  shewn  unanswerably,  that  if  we  could 
take  in  the  reference,  which  these  things  may  have, 
to  other  things  present,  past  and  to  come ;  to  the 
whole  scheme,  which  the  things  objecfled  against  are 
parts  of;  these   very  things  might,  for  aught  we 
know,  be  found  to  be,  not  only  consistent  with  jus- 
tice, but  instances  of  it.     Indeed  it  has  been  shewn, 
by  the  Analogy  of  what  we  see,  not  only  poftible 
that  this  may  be  the  case,  but  credible  that  it  is. 
And  thus  obje(5lions,  drawn  from  such  things,  are 
answered,  and  Providence  is  vindicated,  as  far  as 
Religion  makes  its  vindication  nece{^ary.     Hence  it 
appears,  secondly,  that  objections  against  the  Divine 
justice  and  goodnef^  are  not  endeavoured  to  be  re- 
moved, by  shewing  that  the  like  objec^tions,  allowed 
to  be  really  conclusive,  lie  against  natural  Provi- 
dence :    but  those   objedlions   being   supposed  and 
shewn  not  to  be   conclusive,  the   things  objected 
against,  considered  as  matters  of  faCt,  are  farther 
shewn  to  be  credible,  from  their  conformity  to  the 
constitution  of  Nature  ;   for  instance,  that  God  will 
reward  and  punish  men  for  their  a6lions  hereafter, 
from  the  observation,  that  he  does  reward  and  pun- 
ish them  for  their  actions  here.     And  this,  I  appre- 
hend, is  of  weight.     And  I  add,  thirdly,  it  would  be 
of  weight,  even  though  those  objeClions  were  not 
answered.      For,  there  being  the  proof  of  Religion 
above  set  down  ;  and  Religion  implying  several  facets  ; 
for  instance,  again,  the  faCt  last  mentioned,  that  God 
will  reward  and  punish  men  for  their  adlions  here- 


292  Objedions  against  arguing  from    Part  2. 

after ;  the  observation  that  his  present  method  of 
government  is  by  rewards  and  punishments,  shews 
that  future  fa^l  not  to  be  incredible :  whatever  ob- 
je<5lions  men  may  think  they  have  against  it,  as  un- 
just or  unmerciful,  according  to  their  notions  of  jus- 
tice and  mercy ;  or  as  improbable  from  their  belief 
of  neceftity.  I  say,  as  improbable :  for  it  is  evident 
no  objection  against  it,  as  unjust,  can  be  urged  from 
neceftity ;  since  this  notion  as  much  destroys  in- 
justice, as  it  does  justice.  Then,  fourthly,  though 
obje(9;ions  against  the  reasonableneft  of  the  system 
of  Religion,  cannot  indeed  be  answered  without  en- 
tering into  consideration  of  its  reasonablenefs ;  yet 
objections  against  the  credibility  or  truth  of  it,  may. 
Because  the  system  of  it  is  reducible  into  what  is 
properly  matter  of  fad :  And  the  truth,  the  probable 
truth,  of  fac^s,  may  be  shewn  without  consideration 
of  their  reasonablenefs.  Nor  is  it  neceftary,  though, 
in  some  cases  and  respects,  it  is  highly  useful  and 
proper,  yet  it  is  not  neceftary,  to  give  a  proof  of 
the  reasonablenefs  of  every  precept  enjoined  us,  and 
of  every  particular  dispensation  of  Providence,  which 
comes  into  the  system  of  Religion.  Indeed  the 
more  thoroughly  a  person  of  a  right  disposition  is 
convinced  of  the  perfe^lion  of  the  Divine  nature  and 
condudi,  the  farther  he  will  advance  towards  that 
perfe(?i:ion  of  Religion,  which  St.  John  ^  speaks  of. 
But  the  general  obligations  of  Religion  are  fully 
made  out,  by  proving  the  reasonablenefs  of  the  prac- 
tice of  it.  And  that  the  practice  of  Religion  is  rea- 
sonable, may  be  shewn,  though  no  more  could  be 
proved,  than  that  the  system  of  it  may  be  so,  for 
aught  we  know  to  the  contrary :  and  even  without 
entering  into  the  distin(?t  consideration  of  this.    And 

'   I  John  iv.  i8. 


Chap.  8.   Analogy  of  Nature  to  Religion.  293 

from  hence,  fifthly,  it  is  easy  to  see,  that  though 
the  Analogy  of  Nature  is  not  an  immediate  answer 
to  objections  against  the  wisdom,  the  justice  or  good- 
neft,  of  any  docftrine  or  precept  of  Religion :  j^et  it 
may  be,  as  it  is,  an  immediate  and  dire(?l:  answer  to 
what  is  really  intended  by  such  obje(ftions  ;  which  is, 
to  shew  that  the  things  objected  against  are  incre- 
dible. 

Fourthly,  It  is  most  readily  acknowledged,  that 
the  foregoing  treatise  is  by  no  means  satisfactory ; 
very  far  indeed  from  it :  But  so  would  any  natural 
institution  of  life  appear,  if  reduced  into  a  system, 
together  with  its  evidence.  Leaving  Religion  cut 
of  the  case,  men  are  divided  in  their  opinions,  Whe- 
ther our  pleasures  overbalance  our  pains  :  And  whe- 
ther it  be,  or  be  not,  eligible  to  live  in  this  world. 
And  were  all  such  controversies  settled,  which  per- 
haps, in  speculation,  would  be  found  involved  in  great 
difficulties ;  and  were  it  determined  upon  the  evi- 
dence of  reason,  as  Nature  has  determined  it  to  our 
hands,  that  life  is  to  be  preserved :  Yet  still,  the 
rules  which  God  has  been  pleased  to  afford  us,  for 
escaping  the  miseries  of  it  and  obtaining  its  satis- 
faClicns,  the  rules,  for  instance,  of  preserving  health 
and  recovering  it  when  lost,  are  not  only  fallible  and 
precarious,  but  very  far  from  being  exa6l.  Nor  are 
we  informed  by  Nature,  in  future  contingencies  and 
accidents,  so  as  to  render  it  at  all  certain,  what  is 
the  best  method  of  managing  our  affairs.  What  will 
be  the  succef^  of  our  temporal  pursuits,  in  the  com- 
mon sense  of  the  word  succeft,  is  highly  doubtful. 
And  what  will  be  the  succef^  of  them,  in  the  proper 
sense  of  the  word ;  i.e.  what  happinef^  or  enjoy- 
ment we  shall  obtain  by  them,  is  doubtful  in  a  much 
higher  degree.  Indeed  the  unsatisfa(51:ory  nature  of 
the  evidence,  with  which  we  are  obliged  to  take  up, 


294   Objedions  against  arguing  from    Part  2. 

in  the  daily  course  of  life,  is  scarce  to  be  expref^ed. 
Yet  men  do  not  throw  away  life,  or  disregard  the 
interests  of  it,  upon  account  of  this  doubtfulnef^. 
The  evidence  of  Religion  then  being  admitted  real, 
those  who  objec^l:  against  it,  as  not  satisfactory,  i.  e. 
as  not  being  what  they  wish  it,  plainly  forget  the 
very  condition  of  our  being :  For  satisfa(51icn^  in  this 
sense,  does  not  belong  to  such  a  creature  as  man. 
And,  which  is  more  material,  they  forget  also  the 
very  nature  of  Religion.  For,  Religion  presupposes, 
in  all  those  who  will  embrace  it,  a  certain  degree  of 
integrity  and  honesty ;  which  it  was  intended  to  try 
whether  men  have  or  not,  and  to  exercise  in  such 
as  have  it,  in  order  to  its  improvement.  Religion 
presupposes  this  as  much,  and  in  the  same  sense, 
as  speaking  to  a  man,  presupposes  he  understands 
the  language  in  which  you  speak ;  or  as  warning  a 
man  of  any  danger,  presupposes  that  he  hath  such 
a  regard  to  himself,  as  that  he  will  endeavour  to 
avoid  it.  And  therefore  the  question  is  not  at  all. 
Whether  the  evidence  of  Religion  be  satisfac^tory :  but 
Whether  it  be,  in  reason,  sufficient  to  prove  and  dis- 
cipline that  virtue,  which  it  presupposes.  Now  the 
evidence  of  it  is  fully  sufficient  for  all  those  purposes 
of  probation ;  how  far  soever  it  is  from  being  satis- 
fa(5lory,  as  to  the  purposes  of  curiosity,  or  any  other : 
and  indeed  it  answers  the  purposes  of  the  former  in 
several  respecfts,  which  it  would  not  do,  if  it  were  as 
overbearing  as  is  required.  One  might  add  farther ; 
that  Whether  the  motives  or  the  evidence  for  any 
course  of  a(5lion  be  satisfactory,  meaning  here  by 
that  word,  what  satisfies  a  man,  that  such  a  course 
of  aClion  will  in  event  be  for  his  good;  this  need 
never  be,  and  I  think,  strictly  speaking,  never  is,  the 
practical  question  in  common  matters.  But  the 
praClical  question  in  all  cases,  is,  Whether  the  evi- 


Chap.  8.  Analogy  of  Nature  to  Religion.    295 

dence  for  a  course  of  acftion  be  such,  as,  taking  in 
all  circumstances,  makes  the  faculty  within  us,  which 
is  the  guide  and  judge  of  conducft,^  determine  that 
course  of  adlion  to  be  prudent.  Indeed  satisfa(5lion 
that  it  will  be  for  our  interest  or  happineft,  abund- 
antly determines  an  action  to  be  prudent :  But  evi- 
dence almost  infinitely  lower  than  this,  determines 
actions  to  be  so  too ;  even  in  the  condudl  of  every 
day. 

Fifthly,  As  to  the  obje(5tion  concerning  the  influ- 
ence which  this  argument,  or  any  part  of  it,  may  or 
may  not,  be  expected  to  have  upon  men  ;  I  observe, 
as  above,  that  Religion  being  intended  for  a  trial 
and  exercise  of  the  morality  of  every  person's  cha- 
racter, who  is  a  subject  of  it ;  And  there  being,  as  I 
have  shewn,  such  evidence  for  it,  as  is  sufficient,  in 
reason,  to  influence  men  to  embrace  it :  To  object, 
that  it  is  not  to  be  imagined  mankind  will  be  influ- 
enced by  such  evidence,  is  nothing  to  the  purpose 
of  the  foregoing  treatise.  For  the  purpose  of  it  is 
not  to  enquire,  what  sort  of  creatures  mankind  are  ; 
but  what,  the  light  and  knowledge,  which  is  afforded 
them,  requires  they  should  be :  to  shew  how,  in 
reason,  they  ought  to  behave  ;  not  how,  in  fadl,  they 
will  behave.  This  depends  upon  themselves,  and  is 
their  own  concern ;  the  personal  concern  of  each 
man  in  particular.  And  how  little  regard  the  gene- 
rality have  to  it,  experience  indeed  does  too  fully 
shew.  But  Religion,  considered  as  a  probation,  has 
had  its  end  upon  all  persons,  to  whom  it  has  been 
proposed  with  evidence  sufficient  in  reason  to  influ- 
ence their  practice  :  For  by  this  means  they  have 
been  put  into  a  state  of  probation ;  let  them  behave 
as  they  will  in  it.     And  thus,  not  only  Revelation, 

2  See  Difsert.  II. 


296    Obje6!ions  against  arguing  from    Part  2. 

but  reason  also,  teaches  us,  that  by  the  evidence  of 
Religion  being  laid  before  men,  the  designs  of  Pro- 
vidence are  carrying  on,  not  only  with  regard  to 
those  who  will,  but  likewise  with  regard  to  those  who 
will  not,  be  influenced  by  it.  However,  lastly,  the 
objection  here  referred  to,  allows  the  things  insisted 
upon  in  this  treatise  to  be  of  some  weight :  And  if 
so,  it  may  be  hoped  it  will  have  some  influence. 
And  if  there  be  a  probability  that  it  will  have  any  at 
all,  there  is  the  same  reason  in  kind,  though  not  in 
degree,  to  lay  it  before  men,  as  there  would  be,  if  it 
were  likely  to  have  a  greater  influence. 

And  farther,  I  desire  it  may  be  considered,  with 
respect  to  the  whole  of  the  foregoing  obje^lions,  that 
in  this  treatise  I  have  argued  upon  the  principles  of 
others,^  not  my  own  :  and  have  omitted  what  I  think 
true,  and  of  the  utmost  importance,  because  by  others 
thought  unintelligible,  or  not  true.  Thus  I  have 
argued  upon  the  principles  of  the  Fatalists,  which  I 
do  not  believe  :  and  have  omitted  a  thing  of  the  ut- 
most importance,  which  I  do  believe,  the  moral  fit- 
neft  and  unfitneft  of  adlions,  prior  to  all  will  what- 
ever ;  which  I  apprehend  as  certainly  to  determine 
the  Divine  conduct,  as  speculative  truth  and  falsehood 
neceftarily  determine  the  Divine  judgment.  Indeed 
the  principle  of  liberty  and  that  of  moral  fitneft  so 
force  themselves  upon  the  mind,  that  moralists,  the 
ancients  as  well  as  moderns,  have  formed  their  lan- 
guage upon  it.  And  probably  it  may  appear  in 
mine :  though  I  have  endeavoured  to  avoid  it ;  and 
in  order  to  avoid  it,  have  sometimes  been  obliged  to 

^  By  arguing  upon  the  principles  of  others^  the  reader  will  ob- 
serve is  meant  5  not  proving  diXiy th\ng  from  those  principles,  but 
notnvithstanding  them.  Thus  Religion  is  proved,  not  from  the 
opinion  of  necefsity  ;  which  is  absurd  :  But,  notwithstanding  or 
even  though  that  opinion  were  admitted  to  be  true. 


Chap.  8.  Analogy  of  Nature  to  Religion.  297 

expreft  myself  in  a  manner,  which  will  appear  strange 
to  such  as  do  not  observe  the  reason  for  it :  But  the 
general  argument  here  pursued,  does  not  at  all  sup- 
pose, or  proceed  upon,  these  principles.  Now,  these 
two  abstra(5l  principles  of  liberty  and  moral  fitnef^ 
being  omitted,  Religion  can  be  considered  in  no 
other  view,  than  merely  as  a  question  of  fadt :  And 
in  this  view,  it  is  here  considered.  It  is  obvious,  that 
Christianity,  and  the  proof  of  it,  are  both  historical. 
And  even  natural  Religion  is,  properly,  a  matter  of 
fa(5l.  For,  that  there  is  a  righteous  Governor  of  the 
world,  is  so :  And  this  proposition  contains  the  ge- 
neral system  of  natural  Religion.  But  then,  several 
abstra(5l  truths,  and  in  particular  those  two  principles, 
are  usually  taken  into  consideration  in  the  proof  of 
it :  Whereas  it  is  here  treated  of  only  as  a  matter  of 
fa6l.  To  explain  this  :  That  the  three  angles  of  a 
triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  ones,  is  an  abstradl 
truth :  but  that  they  appear  so  to  our  mind,  is  only 
a  matter  of  fa(9:.  And  this  last  must  have  been  ad- 
mitted, if  anything  was,  by  those  ancient  sceptics, 
who  would  not  have  admitted  the  former ;  but  pre- 
tended to  doubt,  WTiether  there  were  any  such  thing 
as  truth,  or  WTiether  we  could  certainly  depend  upon 
our  faculties  of  understanding  for  the  knowledge  of 
it,  in  any  case.  So  Hkewise,  that  there  is,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  an  original  standard  of  right  and 
wrong  in  actions,  independent  upon  all  will,  but 
which  unalterably  determines  the  will  of  God,  to 
exercise  that  moral  government  over  the  world  which 
Religion  teaches,  i.  e.  finally  and  upon  the  whole  to 
reward  and  punish  men  respectively  as  they  acft 
right  or  wrong;  this  af^ertion  contains  an  abstract 
truth,  as  well  as  matter  of  fadl:.  But  suppose  in  the 
present  state,  every  man,  without  exception,  was  re- 
warded and  punished,  in  exadl  proportion,  as  he 


298    Objedions  against  arguing  from    Part  2. 

followed  ortransgrefted  that  sense  of  right  and  wrong, 
which  God  has  implanted  in  the  nature  of  every 
man :  this  would  not  be  at  all  an  abstract  truth,  but 
only  a  matter  of  fa(^.  And  though  this  fa(5l  were 
acknowledged  by  every  one  ;  yet  the  very  same  dif- 
ficulties might  be  raised,  as  are  now,  concerning  the 
abstra(51:  questions  of  liberty  and  moral  fitnef^ :  And 
we  should  have  a  proof,  even  the  certain  one  of  ex- 
perience, that  the  government  of  the  world  was  per- 
fe(?i;lv  moral,  without  taking  in  the  consideration  of 
those  questions :  and  this  proof  would  remain,  in 
what  way  soever  they  were  determined.  And  thus, 
God  having  given  mankind  a  moral  faculty,  the  ob- 
je6l  of  which  is  actions,  and  which  naturally  approves 
some  a(?i;ions  as  right  and  of  good  desert,  and  con- 
demns others  as  wrong,  and  of  ill-desert ;  that  he 
will,  finally  and  upon  the  whole,  reward  the  former 
and  punish  the  latter,  is  not  an  aftertion  of  an  ab- 
stract truth,  but  of  what  is  as  mere  a  fa(?l:,  as  his 
doing  so  at  present  would  be.  This  future  fa6l  I 
have,  not  indeed  proved  with  the  force  with  which 
it  might  be  proved,  from  the  principles  of  liberty  and 
moral  fitneft  ;  but  without  them  have  given  a  really 
conclusive  pra(5lical  proof  of  it,  which  is  greatly 
strengthened  by  the  general  Analogy  of  Nature  :  a 
proof,  easily  cavilled  at,  easily  shewn  not  to  be  de- 
monstrative, for  it  is  not  offered  as  such ;  but  im- 
poftible,  I  think,  to  be  evaded  or  answered.  And 
thus  the  obligations  of  Religion  are  made  out,  ex- 
clusively of  the  questions  concerning  liberty  and 
moral  fitnei^ ;  which  have  been  perplexed  v/ith  dif- 
ficulties and  abstruse  reasonings,  as  everything  may. 
Hence  therefore  may  be  observed  distincftly,  what 
is  the  force  of  this  treatise.  It  will  be,  to  such  as 
are  convinced  of  Religion  upon  the  proof  arising  out 
of  the  two  last-mentioned  principles,  an  additional 


Chap.  8.  Analogy  of  Nature  to  Religion.   299 

proof  and  a  confirmation  of  it :  To  such  as  do  not 
admit  those  principles,  an  original  proof  of  it,"*  and  a 
confirmation  of  that  proof.  Those  who  believe,  will 
here  find  the  scheme  of  Christianity  cleared  of  ob- 
je(flions,  and  the  evidence  of  it  in  a  peculiar  manner 
strengthened:  Those  who  do  not  believe,  will  at 
least  be  shewn  the  absurdity  of  all  attempts  to  prove 
Christianity  false,  the  plain  undoubted  credibility  of 
it ;  and,  I  hope,  a  good  deal  more. 

And  thus,  though  some  perhaps  may  seriously 
think,  that  Analogy,  as  here  urged,  has  too  great 
streft  laid  upon  it ;  and  ridicule,  unanswerable  ridi- 
cule, may  be  applied,  to  shew  the  argument  from  it 
in  a  disadvantageous  light :  yet  there  can  be  no 
question,  but  that  it  is  a  real  one.  For  Religion, 
both  natural  and  revealed,  implying  in  it  numerous 
fa61:s ;  Analogy,  being  a  confirmation  of  all  fa^ls  to 
which  it  can  be  applied,  as  it  is  the  only  proof  of 
most,  cannot  but  be  admitted  by  every  one  to  be  a 
material  thing,  and  truly  of  weight  on  the  side  of 
Religion,  both  natural  and  revealed :  And  it  ought 
to  be  particularly  regarded  by  such  as  profeft  to 
follow  Nature,  and  to  be  left  satisfied  with  abstradl 
reasonings. 


CONCLUSION. 

HATEVER  account  may  be  given,  of 
the  strange  inattention  and  disregard, 
in  some  ages  and  countries,  to  a  mat- 
ter of  such  importance  as  Religion  ; 
it  would,  before  experience,  be  in- 
credible that  there  should  be  the  like  disregard  in 

*  Pp.  118,  &c. 


300  Conclusion.  Part  2. 

those,  who  have  had  the  moral  system  of  the  world 
laid  before  them,  as  it  is  by  Christianity,  and  often 
inculcated  upon  them :  Because  this  moral  system 
carries  in  it  a  good  degree  of  evidence  for  its  truth, 
upon  its  beingbarely  proposed  to  our  thoughts.  There 
is  no  need  of  abstruse  reasonings  and  distinctions,  to 
convince  an  unprejudiced  understanding,  that  there 
is  a  God  who  made  and  governs  the  world,  and  will 
judge  it  in  righteousneft ;  though  they  may  be  ne- 
ceftary  to  answer  abstruse  difficulties,  when  once 
such  are  raised :  When  the  very  meaning  of  those 
words,  which  expref^  most  intelligibly  the  general 
dodirine  of  Religion,  is  pretended  to  be  uncertain ; 
and  the  clear  truth  of  the  thing  itself  is  obscured, 
by  the  intricacies  of  speculation.  But  to  an  unpre- 
judiced mind,  ten  thousand  thousand  instances  of 
design,  cannot  but  prove  a  designer.  And  it  is  in- 
tuitively manifest,  that  creatures  ought  to  live  under 
a  dutiful  sense  of  their  Maker  ;  and  that  justice  and 
charity  must  be  his  laws,  to  creatures  whom  he  has 
made  social,  and  placed  in  society,  hideed  the  truth 
of  revealed  Religion,  peculiarly  so  called,  is  not  self- 
evident  ;  but  requires  external  proof,  in  order  to  its 
being  received.  Yet  inattention,  among  us,  to  re- 
vealed Religion,  will  be  found  to  imply  the  same 
dissolute  immoral  temper  of  mind,  as  inattention  to 
natural  Religion :  because,  when  both  are  laid  before 
us,  in  the  manner  they  are  in  Christian  countries  of 
liberty  ;  our  obligations  to  enquire  into  both,  and  to 
embrace  both  upon  supposition  of  their  truth,  are 
obligations  of  the  same  nature.  For,  Revelation 
claims  to  be  the  voice  of  God :  and  our  obligation 
to  attend  to  his  voice,  is,  surely,  moral  in  all  cases. 
And  as  it  is  insisted,  that  its  evidence  is  conclusive, 
upon  thorough  consideration  of  it ;  so,  it  offers  itself 
to  us  with  manifest  obvious  appearances  of  having 


Part  2.  Conclusion.  301 

something  more  than  human  in  it,  and  therefore  in 
all  reason  requires,  to  have  its  claims  most  seriously 
examined  into.  It  is  to  be  added,  that  though  light 
and  knowledge,  in  what  manner  soever  afforded  us, 
is  equally  from  God ;  yet  a  miraculous  Revelation 
has  a  peculiar  tendency,  from  the  first  principles  of 
our  nature,  to  awaken  mankind,  and  inspire  them 
with  reverence  and  awe  :  And  this  is  a  peculiar  ob- 
ligation, to  attend  to  what  claims  to  be  so  with  such 
appearances  of  truth.  It  is  therefore  most  certain, 
that  our  obligations  to  enquire  seriously  into  the  evi- 
dence of  Christianity,  and,  upon  supposition  of  its 
truth,  to  embrace  it;  are  of  the  utmost  importance, 
and  moral  in  the  highest  and  most  proper  sense. 
Let  us  then  suppose,  that  the  evidence  of  Religion 
in  general,  and  of  Christianity,  has  been  seriously 
enquired  into,  by  all  reasonable  men  among  us.  Yet 
we  find  many  profefsedly  to  reje(?i:  both,  upon  spe- 
culative principles  of  infidelity.  And  all  of  them  do 
not  content  themselves  with  a  bare  neglect;  of  Re- 
ligion, and  enjoying  their  imaginary  freedom  fi-om 
its  restraints.  Some  go  much  beyond  this.  They 
deride  God's  moral  government  over  the  world.  They 
renounce  his  protec'tion,  and  defy  his  justice.  They 
ridicule  and  vilify  Christianity,  and  blaspheme  the 
Author  of  it ;  and  take  all  occasions  to  manifest  a 
scorn  and  contempt  of  Revelation.  This  amounts  to 
an  adlive  setting  themselves  against  Religion ;  to 
what  may  be  considered  as  a  positive  principle  of 
irreligion :  which  they  cultivate  within  themselves, 
and,  whether  they  intend  this  effe6\  or  not,  render 
habitual,  as  a  good  man  does  the  contrary  principle. 
And  others,  who  are  not  chargeable  with  all  this  pro- 
fligateneft,  yet,  are  in  avowed  opposition  to  Religion, 
as  if  discovered  to  be  groundleft.  Now  admitting, 
which  is  the  supposition  we  go  upon,  that  these  per- 


302  Conclusion.  Part  2. 

sons  a<5l  upon  what  they  think  principles  of  reason, 
and  otherwise  they  are  not  to  be  argued  with ;  it  is 
really  inconceivable,  that  they  should  imagine  they 
clearly  see  the  v/hole  evidence  of  it,  considered  in 
itself,  to  be  nothing  at  all :  Nor  do  they  pretend  this. 
They  are  far  indeed  from  having  a  just  notion  of  its 
evidence :  but  they  would  not  say  its  evidence  was 
nothing,  if  they  thought  the  system  of  it,  with  all  its 
circumstances,  were  credible,  like  other  matters  of 
science  or  history.  So  that  their  manner  of  treating 
it  must  proceed,  either  from  such  kind  of  obje(5lions 
against  all  Religion,  as  have  been  answered  or  ob- 
viated in  the  former  part  of  this  treatise  ;  or  else  from 
obje(9;ions  and  difficulties,  supposed  more  peculiar  to 
Christianity.  Thus,  they  entertain  prejudices  against 
the  whole  notion  of  a  Revelation,  and  miraculous  in- 
terpositions. They  find  things  in  Scripture,  whe- 
ther in  incidental  passages,  or  in  the  general  scheme 
of  it,  which  appear  to  them  unreasonable.  They  take 
for  granted,  that  if  Christianity  were  true,  the  light 
of  it  must  have  been  more  general,  and  the  evidence 
of  it  more  satisfactory,  or  rather  overbearing :  that 
it  must  and  would  have  been,  in  some  way,  other- 
wise put  and  left,  than  it  is.  Now  this  is  not  imagin- 
ing they  see  the  evidence  itself  to  be  nothing,  or  in- 
considerable ;  but  quite  another  thing.  It  is  being 
fortified  against  the  evidence,  in  some  degree  ac- 
knowledged, by  thinking  they  see  the  system  of 
Christianity,  or  somewhat  which  appears  to  them 
neceftarily  conne(5led  with  it,  to  be  incredible  or 
false :  fortified  against  that  evidence,  which  might, 
otherwise,  make  great  impreftion  upon  them.  Or, 
lastly,  if  any  of  these  persons  are,  upon  the  whole, 
in  doubt  concerning  the  truth  of  Christianity  ;  their 
behaviour  seems  owing  to  their  taking  for  granted, 
through  strange  inattention,  that  such  doubting  is, 


Part  2.  Conclusion.  303 

in  a  manner,  the  same  thing,  as  being  certain  against 
it. 

To  these  persons,  and  to  this  state  of  opinion  con- 
cerning Religion,  the  foregoing  treatise  is  adapted. 
For,  all  the  general  obje(?i:ions  against  the  moral 
system  of  Nature  having  been  obviated,  it  is  shewn, 
that  there  is  not  any  peculiar  presumption  at  all 
against  Christianity,  either  considered  as  not  dis- 
coverable by  reason,  or  as  unlike  to  what  is  so  dis- 
covered ;  nor  any  worth  mentioning,  against  it  as 
miraculous,  if  any  at  all ;  none  certainly,  which  can 
render  it  in  the  least  incredible.  It  is  shewn,  that 
upon  supposition  of  a  Divine  Revelation,  the  Analogy 
of  Nature  renders  it  beforehand  highly  credible,  I 
think  probable,  that  many  things  in  it  must  appear 
liable  to  great  obje(5lions ;  and  that  we  must  be  in- 
competent judges  of  it,  to  a  great  degree.  This 
observation  is,  I  think,  unquestionably  true,  and  of 
the  very  utmost  importance :  But  it  is  urged,  as  I 
hope  it  will  be  understood,  with  great  caution  of  not 
vilifying  the  faculty  of  reason,  which  is  the  candle  of 
the  Lord  within  us  ;^  though  it  can  afford  no  light 
where  it  does  not  shine  ;  nor  judge,  where  it  has  no 
principles  tojudge  upon.  The  objections  here  spoken 
of,  being  first  answered  in  the  view  of  objections 
against  Christianity  as  a  matter  of  fa(ft,  are  in  the 
next  place  considered  as  urged,  more  immediately, 
against  the  wisdom,  justice  and  goodneft  of  the 
Christian  Dispensation.  And  it  is  fully  made  out, 
that  they  admit  of  exa(ftly  the  like  answer,  in  every 
respe(ft,  to  what  the  like  obje(5lions  against  the  con- 
stitution of  Nature  admit  of:  That,  as  partial  views 
give  the  appearance  of  wrong  to  things,  which,  upon 
farther  consideration  and  knowledge  of  their  rela- 

'  Prov.  XX,  27. 


304  Conclusion.  Part  2. 

tions  to  other  things,  are  found  just  and  good ;  so 
it  is  perfectly  credible,  that  the  things  objedled, 
against  the  wisdom  and  goodneft  of  the  Christian 
Dispensation,  may  be  rendered  instances  of  wisdom 
and  goodnei^,  by  their  reference  to  other  things  be- 
yond our  view :  Because  Christianity  is  a  scheme 
as  much  above  our  comprehension,  as  that  of  Na- 
ture ;  and  like  that,  a  scheme  in  which  means  are 
made  use  of  to  accomplish  ends,  and  which,  as  is 
most  credible,  may  be  carried  on  by  general  laws. 
And  it  ought  to  be  attended  to,  that  this  is  not  an 
answer  taken,  merely  or  chiefly,  from  our  ignorance ; 
but  from  somewhat  positive,  which  our  observation 
shews  us.  For,  to  like  obje(51:ions,  the  like  answer 
is  experienced  to  be  jufl,  in  numberlefs  parallel  cases. 
The  obje(?i;ions  against  the  Christian  Dispensation, 
and  the  method  by  which  it  is  carried  on,  having 
been  thus  obviated,  in  general  and  together ;  the 
chief  of  them  are  considered  distin<?l:ly,  and  the  par- 
ticular things  obje(5^ed  to  are  shewn  credible,  by 
their  perfect  Analogy,  each  apart,  to  the  constitu- 
tion of  Nature.  Thus ;  If  man  be  fallen  from  his 
primitive  state,  and  to  be  restored,  and  infinite  wis- 
dom and  power  engages  in  accomplishing  our  re- 
covery :  it  were  to  have  been  expelled  it  is  said, 
that  this  should  have  been  effected  at  once  ;  and 
not  by  such  a  long  series  of  means,  and  such  a  va- 
rious economy  of  persons  and  things ;  one  dispen- 
sation preparatory  to  another,  this  to  a  farther  one, 
and  so  on  through  an  indefinite  number  of  ages, 
before  the  end  of  the  scheme  proposed  can  be  com- 
pletely accomplished :  a  scheme  conducted  by  in- 
finite wisdom,  and  executed  by  almighty  power. 
But  now  on  the  contrary,  our  finding  that  every- 
thing in  the  constitution  and  course  of  Nature  is 
thus  carried  on,  shews  such  expectations  concerning 


Part  2.  Conclusion.  305 

Revelation  to  be  highly  unreasonable  ;  and  is  a  satis- 
facflory  answer  to  them,  when  urged  as  obje(5lions 
against  the  credibility,  that  the  great  scheme  of 
Providence  in  the  redemption  of  the  world  may  be 
of  this  kind,  and  to  be  accomplished  in  this  manner. 
As  to  the  particular  method  of  our  redemption,  the 
appointment  of  a  Mediator  between  God  and  man : 
this  has  been  shewn  to  be  most  obviously  analogous 
to  the  general  condu^l  of  Nature,  i.  e.  the  God  of 
Nature,  in  appointing  others  to  be  the  instruments 
of  his  mercy,  as  we  experience  in  the  daily  course 
of  Providence.  The  condition  of  this  world,  which 
the  do(5lrine  of  our  redemption  by  Christ  presup- 
poses, so  much  falls  in  with  natural  appearances,  that 
heathen  moralists  inferred  it  from  those  appearances : 
inferred,  that  human  nature  was  fallen  from  its  ori- 
ginal re(5^itude,  and,  in  consequence  of  this,  degraded 
from  its  primitive  happineft.  Or,  however  this  opin- 
ion came  into  the  world,  these  appearances  must 
have  kept  up  the  tradition,  and  confirmed  the  belief 
of  it.  And  as  it  was  the  general  opinion  under  the 
light  of  Nature,  that  repentance  and  reformation, 
alone  and  by  itself,  was  not  sufficient  to  do  away  sin, 
and  procure  a  full  remiftion  of  the  penalties  annexed 
to  it ;  and  as  the  reason  of  the  thing  does  not  at  all 
lead  to  any  such  conclusion  :  So  every  day's  expe- 
rience shews  us,  that  reformation  is  not,  in  any  sort, 
sufficient  to  prevent  the  present  disadvantages  and 
miseries,  which,  in  the  natural  course  of  things,  God 
has  annexed  to  folly  and  extravagance.  Yet  there 
may  be  ground  to  think,  that  the  punishments,  which, 
by  the  general  laws  of  Divine  government,  are  an- 
nexed to  vice,  may  be  prevented  :  that  provision 
may  have  been,  even  originally,  made,  that  they 
should  be  prevented  by  some  means  or  other,  though 
they  could  not  by  reformation  alone.      For  we  have 

X 


3o6  Conclusion.  Part  2. 

daily  instances  of  such  mercy,  in  the  general  condu(5l 
of  Nature  :  Compaf^ion  provided  for  misery ,2  medi- 
cines for  diseases,  friends  against  enemies.  There 
is  provision  made,  in  the  original  constitution  of  the 
world,  that  much  of  the  natural  bad  consequences 
of  our  follies,  which  persons  themselves  alone  cannot 
prevent,may  be  prevented  by  the  aftistance  of  others  ; 
aftistance,  which  Nature  enables,  and  disposes,  and 
appoints  them  to  afford.  By  a  method  of  goodnei^ 
analogous  to  this,  when  the  world  lay  in  wickednei^ 
and  consequently  ruin,  God  so  loved  the  world,  that 
he  gave  his  only-begotten  Son  to  save  it:  And  he 
being  made  perfeSi  by  suffering,  became  the  author 
of  eternal  salvation  to  all  them  that  obey  him.^  In- 
deed neither  reason  nor  Analogy  would  lead  us  to 
think,  in  particular,  that  the  interposition  of  Christ, 
in  the  manner  in  which  he  did  interpose,  would  be 
of  that  efficacy  for  recovery  of  the  world,  which  the 
Scripture  teaches  us  it  was  :  But  neither  would  rea- 
son nor  Analogy  lead  us  to  think,  that  other  parti- 
cular means  would  be  of  the  efficacy,  which  expe- 
rience shews  they  are,  in  numberlef^  instances. 
And  therefore,  as  the  case  before  us  does  not  admit 
of  experience  ;  so,  that  neither  reason  nor  Analogy 
can  shew,  how  or  in  what  particular  way,  the  inter- 
position of  Christ,  as  revealed  in  Scripture,  is  of  that 
efficacy,  which  it  is  there  represented  to  be  ;  this  is 
no  kind  nor  degree  of  presumption  against  its  being 
really  of  that  efficacy.  Farther:  The  objections 
against  Christianity,  from  the  light  of  it  not  being 
universal,  nor  its  evidence  so  strong  as  might  pos- 
sibly be  given  us,  have  been  answered  by  the  general 
Analogy  of  Nature.     That  God  has  made  such  va- 

2  Serm.  at  the  Rolls,  p.  io6. 
'  John  iii.  i6  j  Heb.  v.  9. 


Part  2.  Conclusion.  307 

riety  of  creatures,  is  indeed  an  answer  to  the  former : 
But  that  he  dispenses  his  gifts  in  such  variety,  both 
of  degrees  and  kinds,  amongst  creatures,  of  the  same 
species,  and  even  to  the  same  individuals  at  different 
times  ;  is  a  more  obvious  and  full  cinsvver  to  it.  And 
it  is  so  far  from  being  the  method  of  Providence  in 
other  cases,  to  afford  us  such  overbearing  evidence, 
as  some  require  in  proof  of  Christianity ;  that  on  the 
contrary,  the  evidence  upon  which  we  are  naturally 
appointed  to  acl  in  common  matters,  throughout  a 
very  great  part  of  life,  is  doubtful  in  a  high  degree. 
And  admitting  the  facl,  that  God  has  afforded  to 
some,  no  more  than  doubtful  evidence,  of  Religion ; 
the  same  account  may  be  given  of  it,  as  of  difficul- 
ties and  temptations  with  regard  to  pra(5lice.  But 
as  it  is  not  impof^ible,^  surely,  that  this  alleged 
doubtfulnef^  may  be  men's  own  fault;  it  deserves 
their  most  serious  consideration,  whether  it  be  not 
so.  However,  it  is  certain,  that  doubting  implies  a 
degree  of  evidence  for  that,  of  which  we  doubt :  and 
that  this  degree  of  evidence,  as  really  lays  us  under 
obligations,  as  demonstrative  evidence. 

The  whole  then  of  Religion  is  throughout  credible  : 
Nor  is  there,  I  think,  anything  relating  to  the  re- 
vealed dispensation  of  things,  more  different  from 
the  experienced  constitution  and  course  of  Nature, 
than  some  parts  of  the  constitution  of  Nature  are 
from  other  parts  of  it.  And  if  so,  the  only  question 
which  remains,  is,  what  positive  evidence  can  be 
alleged  for  the  truth  of  Christianity.  This  too  in 
general  has  been  considered,  and  the  obje(5lions 
against  it  estimated.  Deducl:  therefore  what  is  to  be 
dedudled  from  that  evidence,  upon  account  of  any 
weight  which  may  be  thought  to  remain  in  these 

«  Pp.  238,  &c. 


3o8  Conclusion.  Part  2. 

objections,  after  what  the  Analogy  of  Nature  has 
suggested  in  answer  to  them:  and  then  consider, 
what  are  the  practical  consequences  from  all  this, 
upon  the  most  sceptical  principles,  one  can  argue 
upon:  (for  I  am  writing  to  persons  who  entertain 
these  principles :)  And  upon  such  consideration,  it 
will  be  obvious,  that  immorality,  as  little  excuse  as 
it  admits  of  in  itself,  is  greatly  aggravated,  in  persons 
who  have  been  made  acquainted  with  Christianity, 
whether  they  believe  it,  or  not :  Because  the  moral 
system  of  Nature,  or  natural  Religion,  which  Chris- 
tianity lays  before  us,  approves  itself,  almost  intui- 
tively, to  a  reasonable  mind  upon  seeing  it  proposed. 
In  the  next  place,  with  regard  to  Christianity,  it  will 
be  observed ;  that  there  is  a  middle,  between  a  full 
satisfaction  of  the  truth  of  it,  and  a  satisfaction  of  the 
contrary.  The  middle  state  of  mind  between  these 
two,  consists  in  a  serious  apprehension,  that  it  may 
be  true  ;  joined  with  doubt,  whether  it  be  so.  And 
this,  upon  the  best  judgment  I  am  able  to  make,  is 
as  far  towards  speculative  infidelity,  as  any  sceptic, 
can  at  all  be  supposed  to  go,  who  has  had  true 
Christianity,  with  the  proper  evidence  of  it,  laid  be- 
fore him,  and  has  in  any  tolerable  measure  consi- 
dered them.  For  I  would  not  be  mistaken  to  com- 
prehend all,  who  have  ever  heard  of  it :  Because  it 
seems  evident  that  in  many  countries,  called  Chris- 
tian, neither  Christianity,  nor  its  evidence  are  fairly 
laid  before  men.  And  in  places  where  both  are, 
there  appear  to  be  some,  who  have  very  little  at- 
tended to  either,  and  who  reject  Christianity  with  a 
scorn  proportionate  to  their  inattention  ;  and  yet  are 
by  no  means  without  understanding  in  other  matters. 
Now  it  has  been  shewn,  that  a  serious  apprehension 
that  Christianity  may  be  true,  lays  persons  under 
the  strictest  obligations  of  a  serious  regard  to  it. 


Part  2.  Conclusion.  309 

throughout  the  whole  of  their  life :  a  regard  not  the 
same  exactly,  but  in  many  respects  nearly  the  same, 
with  what  a  full  convi(5lion  of  its  truth  would  lay 
them  under.  Lastly,  it  will  appear,  that  blasphemy 
and  profanenef^,  I  mean  with  regard  to  Christianity, 
are  absolutely  without  excuse.  For  there  is  no  temp- 
tation to  it,  but  from  the  wantonnef^  of  vanity  or 
mirth :  And  these,  considering  the  infinite  import- 
cince  of  the  subje(?l:,  are  no  such  temptations  as  to 
afford  any  excuse  for  it.  If  this  be  a  just  account  of 
things,  and  yet  men  can  go  on  to  vilify  or  disregard 
Christianity,  which  is  to  talk  and  a(5l,  as  if  they  had 
a  demonstration  of  its  falsehood  ;  there  is  no  reason 
to  think  they  would  alter  their  behaviour  to  any 
purpose,  though  there  were  a  demonstration  of  its 
truth. 


The  End  of  the  Second  Part, 


TWO    BRIEF    DISSERTATIONS. 

I.  OF  PERSONAL  IDENTITY. 
II.  OF  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 


ADVERTISEMENT. 

In  the  first  copy  of  these  papers ^  I  had  inserted  the 
two  following  Dijlertations  into  the  chapters  Of  a 
Future  Life,  and.  Of  the  Moral  Government  of  God, 
with  which  they  are  closely  conneSied.  But  as  they 
do  not  direSily  fall  under  the  title  of  the  foregoing 
treatise,  and  would  have  kept  the  subje6i  of  it  too 
long  out  of  sight ;  it  seemed  more  proper  to  place 
them  by  themselves. 


DISSERTATION   I. 


Of  personal  Identity. 


HETHER  we  are  to  live  in  a  future 
state,  as  it  is  the  most  important  ques- 
tion which  can  pof^ibly  be  asked,  so 
it  is  the  most  intelligible  one  which 
can  be  exprefted  in  lan^age.  Yet 
strange  perplexities  have  been  raised  about  the 
meaning  of  that  identity  or  samenei^  of  person,  which 
is  implied  in  the  notion  of  our  living  now  and  here- 
after, or  in  any  two  succef^ive  moments.  And  the 
solution  of  these  difficulties  hath  been  stranger,  than 
the  difficulties  themselves.  For,  personal  identity 
has  been  explained  so  by  some,  as  to  render  the  en- 
quiry concerning  a  future  life,  of  no  consequence  at 
all  to  us  the  persons  who  are  making  it.  And  though 
few  men  can  be  misled  by  such  subtleties ;  yet  it 
may  be  proper  a  little  to  consider  them. 

Now  when  it  is  asked,  Wherein  personal  identity 
consists,  the  answer  should  be  the  same,  as  if  it  were 
asked,  wherein  consists  similitude  or  equality ;  that 
all  attempts  to  define,  would  but  perplex  it.  Yet 
there  is  no  difficulty  at  all  in  ascertaining  the  idea. 
For  as,  upon  two  triangles  being  compared  or  viewed 
together,  there  arises  to  the  mind  the  idea  of  simi- 


314  Of  personal  Identity.  D'lfs.  i. 

litude  ;  or  upon  twice  two  and  four,  the  idea  of 
equality  :  so  likewise,  upon  comparing  the  conscious- 
neftes  of  one's  self  or  one's  own  existence  in  any  two 
moments,  there  as  immediately  arises  to  the  mind 
the  idea  of  personal  identity.  And  as  the  two  former 
comparisons  not  only  give  us  the  ideas  of  similitude 
and  equality ;  but  also  shew  us,  that  two  triangles 
are  alike,  and  twice  two  and  four  are  equal :  so  the 
latter  comparison  not  only  gives  us  the  idea  of  per- 
sonal identity,  but  also  shews  us  the  identity  of  our- 
selves in  those  two  moments  ;  the  present,  suppose, 
and  that  immediately  past ;  or  the  present,  and  that, 
a  month,  a  year,  or  twenty  years  past.  Or  in  other 
words,  by  refle(^ing  upon  that,  which  is  myself  now, 
and  that,  which  was  myself  twenty  years  ago,  I  dis- 
cern they  are  not  two,  but  one  and  the  same  self. 

But  though  consciousneft  of  what  is  past  does 
thus  ascertain  our  personal  identity  to  ourselves,  yet 
to  say,  that  it  makes  personal  identity,  or  is  neces- 
sary to  our  being  the  same  persons,  is  to  say,  that  a 
person  has  not  existed  a  single  moment,  nor  done 
one  action,  but  what  he  can  remember ;  indeed  none 
but  what  he  refle(5ls  upon.  And  one  should  really 
think  it  self-evident,  that  consciousneft  of  personal 
identity  presupposes,  and  therefore  cannot  consti- 
tute, personal  identity ;  any  more  than  knowledge, 
in  any  other  case,  can  constitute  truth,  which  it  pre- 
supposes. 

This  wonderful  mistake  may  poftibly  have  arisen 
from  hence,  that  to  be  endued  with  consciousnei^, 
is  inseparable  from  the  idea  of  a  person,  or  intelligent 
being.  For,  this  might  be  exprefted  inaccurately 
thus,  that  consciousnef^  makes  personality :  And 
from  hence  it  might  be  concluded  to  make  personal 
identity.  But  though  present  consciousnei^  of  what 
we  at  present  do  and  feel,  is  neceftary  to  our  being 


Difs.  I.  Of  personal  Identity.  315 

the  persons  we  now  are ;  yet  present  consciousneft 
of  past  actions  or  feelings,  is  not  neceftary  to  our 
being  the  same  persons  who  performed  those  acftions 
or  had  those  feelings. 

The  enquiry,  what  makes  vegetables  the  same  in 
the  common  acceptation  of  the  word,  does  not  ap- 
pear to  have  any  relation  to  this  of  personal  identity : 
because  the  word,  same,  when  applied  to  them  and 
to  person,  is  not  only  applied  to  different  subjects, 
but  it  is  also  used  in  different  senses.  For  when  a 
man  swears  to  the  same  tree,  as  having  stood  fifty 
years  in  the  same  place,  he  means  only  the  same  as 
to  all  the  purposes  of  property  and  uses  of  common 
life,  and  not  that  the  tree  has  been  all  that  time  the 
same  in  the  stricft  philosophical  sense  of  the  word. 
For  he  does  not  know,  whether  any  one  particle  of 
the  present  tree,  be  the  same  with  any  one  particle 
of  the  tree  which  stood  in  the  same  place  fifty  years 
ago.  And  if  they  have  not  one  common  particle  of 
matter,  they  cannot  be  the  same  tree  in  the  proper 
philosophic  sense  of  the  word  same:  it  being  evi- 
dently a  contradi(5lion  in  terms,  to  say  they  are,  when 
no  part  of  their  substance,  and  no  one  of  their  pro- 
perties is  the  same  :  no  part  of  their  substance,  by 
the  supposition  :  no  one  of  their  properties,  because 
it  is  allowed,  that  the  same  property  cannot  be  trans- 
ferred from  one  substance  to  another.  And  there- 
fore, when  we  say  the  identity  or  samenef^  of  a  plant 
consists  in  a  continuation  of  the  same  life,  commu- 
nicated under  the  same  organization,  to  a  number  of 
particles  of  matter,  whether  the  same  or  not ;  the 
word  same,  when  applied  to  life  and  to  organization, 
cannot  pofsibly  be  understood  to  signify,  what  it  sig- 
nifies in  this  very  sentence,  when  applied  to  matter. 
In  a  loose  and  popular  sense  then,  the  life  and  the 
organization  and  the  plant  are  justly  said  to  be  the 


3i6  Of  personal  Identity.  D'lfs,  i. 

same,  notwithstanding-  the  perpetual  change  of  the 
parts.  But  in  a  stri^l  and  philosophical  manner  of 
speech,  no  man,  no  being,  no  mode  of  being,  no 
anything,  can  be  the  same  with  that,  with  which  it 
hath  indeed  nothing  the  same.  Now  samenef^  is 
used  in  this  latter  sense  when  applied  to  persons. 
The  identity  of  these,  therefore,  cannot  subsist  with 
diversity  of  substance. 

The  thing  here  considered,  and,  demonstratively, 
as  I  think,  determined,  is  proposed  by  Mr.  Locke  in 
these  words,  Whether  it,  i.e.  the  same  self  or  per- 
son, he  the  same  identical  substance?  And  he  has 
suggested  what  is  a  much  better  answer  to  the  ques- 
tion, than  that  which  he  gives  it  in  form.  For  he 
defines  person,  a  thinking  intelligent  being,  &c.  and 
personal  identity,  the  samenejl  of  a  rational  being,^ 
The  question  then  is,  whether  the  same  rational 
being  is  the  same  substance :  which  needs  no  an- 
swer, because  being  and  substance,  in  this  place, 
stand  for  the  same  idea.  The  ground  of  the  doubt, 
whether  the  same  person  be  the  same  substance,  is 
said  to  be  this ;  that  the  consciousneft  of  our  own 
existence,  in  youth  and  in  old  age,  or  in  any  two 
joint  succe{^ive  moments,  is  not  the  same  individual 
a6iion,~  i.e.  not  the  same  consciousnef^,  but  different 
succeftive  consciousneftes.  Now  it  is  strange  that 
this  should  have  occasioned  such  perplexities.  For 
it  is  surely  conceivable,  that  a  person  may  have  a 
capacity  of  knowing  some  object  or  other  to  be  the 
same  now,  which  it  was  when  he  contemplated  it 
formerly :  Yet  in  this  case,  where,  by  the  supposi- 
tion, the  obje6l  is  perceived  to  be  the  same,  the  per- 
ception of  it  in  any  two  moments  cannot  be  one  and 
the  same  perception.     And  thus,  though  the  suc- 

'  Locke's  Works,  vol.  I.  p.  146.  '  Locke ^  pp.  146, 147. 


Difs.  I,  Of  personal  Identity.  317 

ceftive  consciousneftes  which  we  have  of  our  own 
existence  are  not  the  same,  yet  are  they  conscious- 
neftes  of  one  and  the  same  thing  or  object ;  of  the 
same  person,  self,  or  living  agent.  The  person,  of 
whose  existence  the  consciousneft  is  felt  now,  and 
was  felt  an  hour  or  a  year  ago,  is  discerned  to  be, 
not  two  persons,  but  one  and  the  same  person  ;  and 
therefore  is  one  and  the  same. 

Mr.  Locke's  observations  upon  this  subject:  appear 
hasty  :  and  he  seems  to  profeft  himself  difsatisfied 
with  suppositions,  which  he  has  made  relating  to  it.^ 
But  some  of  those  hasty  observations  have  been  car- 
ried to  a  strange  length  by  others,  whose  notion, 
when  traced  and  examined  to  the  bottom,  amounts, 
I  think,  to  this  :^  "  That  personality  is  not  a  perma- 
*^  nent,  but  a  transient  thing  :  That  it  lives  and  dies, 
"  begins  and  ends  continually :  That  no  one  can  any 
"^  more  remain  one  and  the  same  person  two  mo- 
"  ments  together,  than  two  succef^ive  moments  can 
"  be  one  and  the  same  moment :  That  our  substance 
"  is  indeed  continually  changing ;  but  whether  this 
"  be  so  or  not,  is,  it  seems,  nothing  to  the  purpose ; 
"  since  it  is  not  substance,  but  consciousneft  alone, 
"  which  constitutes  personality ;  which  conscious- 
"  neft,  being  succeftive,  cannot  be  the  same  in  any 
"  two  moments,  nor  consequently  the  personality 
"  constituted  by  it."  And  from  hence  it  must  fol- 
low, that  it  is  a  fallacy  upon  ourselves,  to  charge  our 
present  selves  with  anything  we  did,  or  to  imagine 
our  present  selves  interested  in  anything  which  be- 
fell us,  yesterday ;  or  that  our  present  self  will  be 
interested  in  what  will  befall  us  to-morrow:  since 
our  present  self  is  not,  in  reality,  the  same  with  the 

^  Locke,  p.  152. 

*  See  an  Answer  to  Dr.  Clarke's  Third  Defence  of  his  Letter 
to  Mr.  Dodivell,  2nd  edit.  pp.  44,  56,  &c. 


3i8  Of  personal  Identity.         Difs.  i. 

self  of  yesterday,  but  another  like  self  or  person 
coming  in  its  room,  and  mistaken  for  it ;  to  which 
another  self  will  succeed  to-morrow.  This,  I  say, 
must  follow :  for  if  the  self  or  person  of  to-day,  and 
that  of  to-morrow,  are  not  the  same,  but  only  like 
persons  ;  the  person  of  to-day,  is  really  no  more  in- 
terested in  what  will  befall  the  person  of  to-morrow, 
than  in  what  will  befall  any  other  person.  It  may 
be  thought  perhaps,  that  this  is  not  a  just  represen- 
tation of  the  opinion  we  are  speaking  of:  because 
those  who  maintain  it  allow,  that  a  person  is  the 
same  as  far  back  as  his  remembrance  reaches.  And 
indeed  they  do  use  the  words,  identity  and  same 
person.  Nor  will  language  permit  these  words  to 
be  laid  aside :  since  if  they  were,  there  must  be,  I 
know  not  what  ridiculous  periphrasis,  substituted  in 
the  room  of  them.  But  they  cannot,  consistently 
with  themselves,  mean,  that  the  person  is  really  the 
same.  For,  it  is  self-evident,  that  the  personality 
cannot  be  really  the  same,  if,  as  they  expreftly  as- 
sert, that  in  which  it  consists,  is  not  the  same.  And 
as,  consistently  with  themselves,  they  cannot,  so,  I 
think  it  appears,  they  do  not,  mean,  that  the  person 
is  really  the  same,  but  only  that  he  is  so  in  a  fic- 
titious sense :  in  such  a  sense  only  as  they  aftert, 
for  this  they  do  af^ert,  that  any  number  of  persons 
whatever  may  be  the  same  person.  The  bare  un- 
folding this  notion,  and  laying  it  thus  naked  and  open, 
seems  the  best  confutation  of  it.  However,  since 
great  streft  is  said  to  be  put  upon  it,  I  add  the  fol- 
lowing things. 

First,  This  notion  is  absolutely  contradi(fl:ory  to 
that  certain  conviction,  which  neceftarily  and  every 
moment  rises  within  us,  when  we  turn  our  thoughts 
upon  ourselves,  when  we  reflect  upon  what  is  past, 
and  look  forward  upon  what  is  to  come.     All  imagi- 


Difs.  I.  Of  personal  Identity.  319 

nation  of  a  daily  change  of  that  living-  agent  which 
each  man  calls  himself,  for  another,  or  of  any  such 
change  throughout  our  whole  present  life,  is  entirely 
borne  down  by  our  natural  sense  of  things.  Nor  is 
it  poftible  for  a  person  in  his  wits,  to  alter  his  con- 
ducfl;,  with  regard  to  his  health  or  affairs,  from  a  sus- 
picion, that  though  he  should  live  to-morrow,  he 
should  not  however,  be  the  same  person  he  is  to-day. 
And  yet,  if  it  be  reasonable  to  ac^,  with  respedl  to  a 
future  life,  upon  this  notion  that  personality  is  tran- 
sient ;  it  is  reasonable  to  a(9;  upon  it,  with  respecl  to 
the  present.  Here  then  is  a  notion  equally  applicable 
to  Religion  and  to  our  temporal  concerns  :  And  every 
one  sees  and  feels  the  inexpreftible  absurdity  of  it  in 
the  latter  case.  If  therefore  any  can  take  up  with 
it  in  the  former,  this  cannot  proceed  from  the  reason 
of  the  thing,  but  must  be  owing  to  an  inward  un- 
faimeft,  and  secret  corruption  of  heart. 

Secondly,  It  is  not  an  idea,  or  abstract  notion,  or 
quality,  but  a  being  only,  which  is  capable  of  life 
and  a^lion,  of  happineft  and  misery.  Now  all  beings 
confeftedly  continue  the  same,  during  the  whole 
time  of  their  existence.  Consider  then  a  living  being 
now  existing,  and  which  has  existed  for  any  time 
alive :  this  living  being  must  have  done  and  suffered 
and  enjoyed,  what  it  has  done  and  suffered  and  en- 
joyed formerly,  (this  living  being,  I  say,  and  not 
another,)  as  really  as  it  does  and  suffers  and  enjoys, 
what  it  does  and  suffers  and  enjoys  this  instant.  All 
these  succef^ive  ad^ions,  enjoyments,  and  sufferings, 
are  acflions,  enjoyments,  and  sufferings,  of  the  same 
living  being.  And  they  are  so,  prior  to  all  consi- 
deration of  its  remembering  or  forgetting :  since  re- 
membering or  forgetting  can  make  no  alteration  in 
the  truth  of  past  matter  of  fact.  And  suppose  this 
being  endued  with  limited  powers  of  knowledge  and 


320  Of  personal  Identity.  Difs.  i, 

memory,  there  is  no  more  difficulty  in  conceiving  it 
to  have  a  power,  of  knowing  itself  to  be  the  same 
living  being  which  it  was  some  time  ago,  of  remem- 
bering some  of  its  a(5lions,  sufferings,  and  enjoy- 
ments, and  forgetting  others,  than  in  conceiving  it  to 
know  or  remember  or  forget  anything  else. 

Thirdly,  Every  person  is  conscious,  that  he  is  now 
the  same  person  or  self  he  was,  as  far  back  as  his 
remembrance  reaches :  since  when  any  one  refle<?ts 
upon  a  past  action  of  his  own,  he  is  just  as  certain 
of  the  person  who  did  that  ac^tion,  namely,  himself, 
the  person  who  now  reflects  upon  it,  as  he  is  certain 
that  the  a<$l;ion  was  at  all  done.  Nay,  very  often  a 
person's  afturance  of  an  acflion  having  been  done,  of 
which  he  is  absolutely  aftured,  arises  wholly  from 
the  consciousneft  that  he  himself  did  it.  And  this 
he,  person,  or  self,  must  either  be  a  substance,  or 
the  property  of  some  substance.  If  he,  if  person, 
be  a  substance ;  then  consciousneft  that  he  is  the 
same  person,  is  consciousnef^  that  he  is  the  same 
substance.  If  the  person,  or  he,  be  the  property  of 
a  substance  ;  still  consciousnef^  that  he  is  the  same 
property  is  as  certain  a  proof  that  his  substance  re- 
mains the  same,  as  consciousnef^  that  he  remains  the 
same  substance  would  be :  since  the  same  property 
cannot  be  transferred  from  one  substance  to  another. 

But  though  we  are  thus  certain,  that  we  are  the 
same  agents,  living  beings,  or  substances,  now,  which 
we  were  as  far  back  as  our  remembrance  reaches ; 
yet  it  is  asked.  Whether  we  may  not  pof^ibly  be  de- 
ceived in  it  ?  And  this  question  may  be  asked  at  the 
end  of  any  demonstration  whatever :  because  it  is  a 
question  concerning  the  truth  of  perception  by  me- 
mory. And  he  who  can  doubt,  whether  perception 
by  memory  can  in  this  case  be  depended  upon,  may 
doubt  also,  whether  perception  by  dedud^ion  and 


Difs.  I.  Of  personal  Identity.  321 

reasoning,  which  also  include  memory,  or  indeed 
whether  intuitive  perception  can.  Here  then  we 
can  go  no  farther.  For  it  is  ridiculous  to  attempt  to 
prove  the  truth  of  those  perceptions,  whose  truth  we 
can  no  otherwise  prove,  than  by  other  perceptions 
of  exacflly  the  same  kind  with  them,  and  which  there 
is  just  the  same  ground  to  suspect ;  or  to  attempt 
to  prove  the  truth  of  our  faculties,  which  can  no 
otherwise  be  proved,  than  by  the  use  or  means  of 
those  very  suspedled  faculties  themselves. 


DISSERTATION  II. 

Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue. 


7,  HAT  which  renders  beings  capable  of 
moral  government,  is  their  having  a 
moral  nature,  and  moral  faculties  of 
perception  and  of  adlion.  Brute  crea- 
tures are  imprefsed  and  a6^uated  by 


various  instinc9;s  and  propensions :  so  also  are  we. 
But  additional  to  this,  we  have  a  capacity  of  refle(5l- 
ing  upon  a(51ions  and  characfiers,  and  making  them 
an  objecl  to  our  thought :  And  on  doing  this,  we 
naturally  and  unavoidably  approve  some  a(5lions, 
under  the  peculiar  view  of  their  being  virtuous  and 
of  good  desert ;  and  disapprove  others,  as  vicious 
and  of  ill-desert.  That  we  have  this  moral  approv- 
ing and  disapproving'  faculty,  is  certain  from  our 

*  This  way  of  speaking  is  taken  from  EpiBetus  (Arr.  Epift. 
L.  I.  c.  i),  and  is  made  use  of  as  seeming  the  most  full,  and 
least  liable  to  cavil.  And  the  moral  faculty  may  be  understood 
to  have  these  two  epithets,  t^o/cz/yaoTtic^  and  a.7ro£oKifxa(TTiKri, 
upon  a  double  account:  Because,  upon  a  survey  of  adtions, 
Y 


322  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.         Difs.  2, 

experiencing  it  in  ourselves,  and  recognizing  it  in 
each  other.  It  appears  from  our  exercising  it  un- 
avoidably, in  the  approbation  and  disapprobation 
even  of  feigned  characfters  :  From  the  words,  right 
and  w^rong,  odious  and  amiable,  base  and  worthy, 
with  many  others  of  like  signification  in  all  lan- 
guages, applied  to  a(51:ions  and  characters :  From 
the  many  written  systems  of  morals  which  suppose 
it ;  since  it  cannot  be  imagined,  that  all  these  authors, 
throughout  all  these  treatises,  had  absolutely  no 
meaning  at  all  to  their  words,  or  a  meaning  merely 
chimerical :  From  our  natural  sense  of  gratitude, 
which  implies  a  distin(51;ion  between  merely  being 
the  instrument  of  good,  and  intending  it :  From  the 
like  distin(5lion,  every  one  makes,  between  injury 
and  mere  harm,  which,  Hobbs  says,  is  peculiar  to 
mankind  ;  and  between  injury  and  just  punishment, 
a  distin(?lion  plainly  natural,  prior  to  the  considera- 
tion of  human  laws.  It  is  manifest  great  part  of 
common  language,  and  of  common  behaviour  over 
the  world,  is  formed  upon  supposition  of  such  a  mo- 
ral faculty ;  whether  called  conscience,  moral  rea- 
son, moral  sense,  or  Divine  reason ;  whether  consi- 
dered as  a  sentiment  of  the  understanding,  or  as  a 
perception  of  the  heart,  or,  vvhich  seems  the  truth, 
as  including  both.  Nor  is  it  at  all  doubtful  in  the  ge- 
neral, what  course  of  a(9:ion  this  faculty,  or  pra6lical 
discerning  power  within  us,  approves,  and  what  it 


whether  before  or  after  they  are  done,  it  determines  them  to  be 
good  or  evil  j  and  also  because  it  determines  itself  to  be  the 
guide  of  adtion  and  of  life,  in  contradistinftion  from  all  other 
faculties,  or  natural  principles  of  adlion  :  in  the  very  same  man- 
ner, as  speculative  reason  dire^lly  and  naturally  judges  of  spe- 
culative truth  and  falsehood  j  and,  at  the  same  time,  is  attended 
with  a  consciousnefs  upon  refieBion,  that  the  natural  right  to 
judge  of  them  belongs  to  it. 


Dtfs.2.         Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  323 

disapproves.  For,  as  much  as  it  has  been  disputed 
wherein  virtue  consists,  or  whatever  ground  for 
doubt  there  may  be  about  particulars  ;  yet,  in  ge- 
neral, there  is  in  reality  an  universally  acknowledged 
standard  of  it.  It  is  that,  which  all  ages  and  all 
countries  have  made  profef^ion  of  in  public  :  it  is 
that,  which  every  man  you  meet,  puts  on  the  show 
of:  it  is  that,  which  the  primary  and  fundamental 
laws  of  all  civil  constitutions,  over  the  face  of  the 
earth,  make  it  their  businei^  and  endeavour  to  en- 
force the  pra(5lice  of  upon  mankind :  namely,  justice, 
veracity,  and  regard  to  common  good.  It  being 
manifest  then,  in  general,  that  we  have  such  a  faculty 
or  discernment  as  this ;  it  may  be  of  use  to  remark 
some  things,  more  distinctly,  concerning  it. 

Firsts  It  ought  to  be  observed,  that  the  obje(5l  of 
thiis  faculty  is  actions,'-  comprehending  under  that 
name  a(Sii\e  or  practical  principles  :  those  principles 
from  which  men  would  a<fl:,  if  occasions  and  circum- 
stances gave  them  power;  and  which,  when  fixed 
and  habitual  in  any  person,  we  call,  his  characfter. 
It  does  not  appear,  that  brutes  have  the  least  reflex 
sense  of  a(5lions,  as  distinguished  from  events :  or 
that  will  and  design,  which  constitute  the  very  na- 
ture of  a(5lions  as  such,  are  at  all  an  objedl  to  their 
perception.  But  to  ours  they  are :  And  they  are 
the  object:,  and  the  only  one,  of  the  approving  and 
disapproving  faculty.  A(Si\ng,  condu(fi:,  behaviour, 
abstratfled  from  all  regard  to  what  is,  in  fa6l  and 
event,  the  consequence  of  it,  is  itself  the  natural  ob- 
ject of  the  moral  discernment ;  as  speculative  truth 
and  falsehood  is,  of  speculative  reason.  Intention  of 
such  and  such  consequences,  indeed,  is  always  in- 


M.  Auton.  L.  9,  16.     Virtutis  laus  omnis  in  adlione  consibtic. 
Cic.  Off.  L.  I.  c.  6. 


324  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.         Difs.  2. 

eluded  ;  for  it  is  part  of  the  a(?i;ion  itself:  but  though 
the  intended  good  or  bad  consequences  do  not  fol- 
low, we  have  exa(5lly  the  same  sense  of  the  action 
as  if  they  did.  In  like  manner  we  think  well  or  ill 
of  characflers,  abstracted  from  all  consideration  of  the 
good  or  the  evil,  which  persons  of  such  chara(5lers 
have  it  a(?i:ually  in  their  power  to  do.  We  never,  in 
the  moral  way,  applaud  or  blame  either  ourselves  or 
others,  for  what  we  enjoy  or  what  we  suffer,  or  for 
having  impreftions  made  upon  us  which  we  consider 
as  altogether  out  of  our  power :  but  only  for  what 
we  do,  or  would  have  done  had  it  been  in  our  power  ; 
or  for  what  we  leave  undone  which  we  might  have 
done,  or  would  have  left  undone  though  we  could 
have  done  it. 

Secondly,  Our  sense  or  discernment  of  a(9;ions  as 
morally  good  or  evil,  implies  in  it  a  sense  or  dis- 
cernment of  them  as  of  good  or  ill  desert.  It  may 
be  difficult  to  explain  this  perception,  so  as  to  answer 
all  the  questions  which  may  be  asked  concerning  it : 
But  every  one  speaks  of  such  and  such  a6lions  as 
deserving  punishment ;  and  it  is  not,  I  suppose,  pre- 
tended that  they  have  absolutely  no  meaning  at  all 
to  the  expreftion.  Now  the  meaning  plainly  is  not, 
that  we  conceive  it  for  the  good  of  society,  that  the 
doer  of  such  a(5lions  should  be  made  to  suffer.  For 
if  unhappily  it  were  resolved,  that  a  man  who,  by 
some  innocent  a(?l:ion,  was  infected  with  the  plague, 
should  be  left  to  perish,  lest,  by  other  peoples'  com- 
ing near  him,  the  infection  should  spread :  no  one 
would  say,  he  deserved  this  treatment.  Innocence 
and  ill-desert,  are  inconsistent  ideas.  Ill-desert  al- 
ways supposes  guilt :  and  if  one  be  not  part  of  the 
other,  yet  they  are  evidently  and  naturally  connecfled 
in  our  mind.  The  sight  of  a  man  in  misery  raises 
our  companion  towards  him ;  and,  if  this  misery  be 


D'ifs.1.         Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  3^5 

infli(fi:ed  on  him  by  another,  our  indignation  against 
the  author  of  it.  But  when  we  are  informed,  that 
the  sufferer  is  a  villain,  and  is  punished  only  for  his 
treachery  or  cruelty ;  our  compafsion  exceedingly 
lei^ens,  and,  in  many  instances,  our  indignation 
wholly  subsides.  Now  what  produces  this  effe(5l,  is 
the  conception  of  that  in  the  sufferer,  which  we  call 
ill-desert.  Upon  considering  then,  or  viewing  to- 
gether, our  notion  of  vice  and  that  of  misery,  there 
results  a  third,  that  of  ill-desert.  And  thus  there  is 
in  human  creatures  an  afsociation  of  the  two  ideas, 
natural  and  moral  evil,  wickednef^  and  punishment. 
If  this  afsociation  were  merely  artificial  or  accidental, 
it  were  nothing :  but  being  most  unquestionably  na- 
tural, it  greatly  concerns  us  to  attend  to  it,  instead 
of  endeavouring  to  explain  it  away. 

It  may  be  observed  farther,  concerning  our  per- 
ception of  good  and  of  ill-desert,  that  the  former  is 
very  weak  with  respe6^  to  common  instances  of  virtue. 
One  reason  of  which  may  be,  that  it  does  not  appear 
to  a  speculator,  how  far  such  instances  of  virtue  pro- 
ceed from  a  virtuous  principle,  or  in  what  degree 
this  principle  is  prevalent :  since  a  very  weak  regard 
to  virtue  may  be  sufficient  to  make  men  acl  well  in 
many  common  instances.  And  on  the  other  hand, 
our  perception  of  ill-desert  in  vicious  actions  lef^ens, 
in  proportion  to  the  temptations  men  are  thought 
to  have  had  to  such  vices.  For,  vice  in  human  crea- 
tures consisting  chiefly  in  the  absence  or  want  of  the 
virtuous  principle  ;  though  a  man  be  overcome,  sup- 
pose, by  tortures,  it  does  not  from  thence  appear, 
to  what  degree  the  virtuous  principle  was  wanting. 
Ail  that  appears  is,  that  he  had  it  not  in  such  a  de- 
gree, as  to  prevail  over  the  temptation  :  But  pol^ibly 
he  had  it  in  a  degree,  which  would  have  rendered 
him  proof  against  common  temptations. 


326  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.        D'tfs.  1. 

Thirdly,  Our  perception  of  vice  and  ill-desert 
arises  from,  and  is  the  result  of,  a  comparison  of  ac- 
tions with  the  nature  and  capacities  of  the  agent. 
For,  the  mere  neglect;  of  doing  what  we  ought  to 
do,  would,  in  many  cases,  be  determined  by  all  men 
to  be  in  the  highest  degree  vicious.  And  this  de- 
termination must  arise  from  such  comparison,  and 
be  the  result  of  it ;  because  such  neglecfl  would  not 
be  vicious  in  creatures  of  other  natures  and  capa- 
cities, as  brutes.  And  it  is  the  same  also  with  re- 
spect; to  positive  vices,  or  such  as  consist  in  doing 
what  we  ought  not.  For,  every  one  has  a  different 
sense  of  harm  done  by  an  idiot,  madman  or  child, 
and  by  one  of  mature  and  common  understanding ; 
though  the  a61ion  of  both,  including  the  intention 
which  is  part  of  the  a(?i;ion,  be  the  same  :  as  it  may 
be,  since  idiots  and  madmen,  as  well  as  children,  are 
capable  not  only  of  doing  mischief,  but  also  of  intend- 
ing it.  Now  this  difference  must  arise  fiom  some- 
what discerned  in  the  nature  or  capacities  of  one, 
which  renders  the  a(fl:ion  vicious  ;  and  the  want  of 
which  in  the  other,  renders  the  same  a^lion  innocent 
or  lef^  vicious :  And  this  plainly  supposes  a  com- 
parison, whether  reflected  upon  or  not,  between  the 
a<9;ion  and  capacities  of  the  agent,  previous  to  our 
determining  an  a(?i;ion  to  be  vicious.  And  hence 
arises  a  proper  application  of  the  epithets,  incon- 
gruous, unsuitable,  disproportionate,  unfit,  to  ac^tions 
which  our  moral  faculty  determines  to  be  vicious. 

Fourthly,  It  deserves  to  be  considered,  whether 
men  are  more  at  liberty,  in  point  of  morals,  to  make 
themselves  miserable  without  reason,  than  to  make 
other  people  so :  or  difsolutely  to  neglecfl  their  own 
greater  good,  for  the  sake  of  a  present  lef^er  grati- 
fication, than  they  are  to  negle(fl;  the  good  of  others, 
whom  Nature  has  committed  to  their  care.   It  should 


Difs,2.         Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  327 

seem,  that  a  due  concern  about  our  own  interest  or 
happineft,  and  a  reasonable  endeavour  to  secure  and 
promote  it,  which  is,  I  think  very  much  the  mean- 
ing of  the  word,  prudence,  in  our  language  ;  it  should 
seem,  that  this  is  virtue,  and  the  contrary  behaviour 
faulty  and  blameable :  Since,  in  the  calmest  way  of 
refle(fi:ion,  we  approve  of  the  first,  and  condemn  the 
other  conduct:,  both  in  ourselves  and  others.  This 
approbation  and  disapprobation  are  altogether  dif- 
ferent from  mere  desire  of  our  own  or  of  their  hap- 
pineft,  and  from  sorrow  upon  mifsing  it.  For  the 
obje(51;  or  occasion  of  this  last  kind  of  perception,  is 
satisfaction,  or  uneasinefs  :  whereas  the  object  of  the 
first  is  a(?live  behaviour.  In  one  case,  what  our 
thoughts  fix  upon,  is  our  condition :  in  the  other, 
our  condu(?t:.  It  is  true  indeed,  that  Nature  has  not 
given  us  so  sensible  a  disapprobation  of  imprudence 
and  folly,  either  in  ourselves  or  others,  as  of  false- 
hood, injustice  and  cruelty  :  I  suppose,  because  that 
constant  habitual  sense  of  private  interest  and  good, 
which  we  alwaj's  carry  about  with  us,  render  such 
sensible  disapprobation  lef^  necefsary,  left  wanting, 
to  keep  us  from  imprudently  neglecting  our  own 
happineft,  and  foolishly  injuring  ourselves,  than  it  is 
neceftary  and  wanting  to  keep  us  from  injuring 
others,  to  whose  good  we  cannot  have  so  strong  and 
constant  a  regard :  And  also  because  imprudence 
and  folly,  appearing  to  bring  its  own  punishment 
more  immediately  and  constantly  than  injurious  be- 
haviour, it  left  needs  the  additional  punishment, 
which  would  be  inflic-led  upon  it  by  others,  had  they 
the  same  sensible  indignation  against  it,  as  against 
injustice  and  fraud  and  cruelty.  Besides,  unhappi- 
neft  being  in  itself  the  natural  object  of  compaftion  ; 
the  unhappineft  whicli  people  bring  upon  themselves, 
though  it  be  wilfully,  excites  in  us  some  pity  for 


328  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.         Difs.i. 

them  :  and  this  of  course  leftens  our  displeasure 
against  them.  But  still  it  is  matter  of  experience, 
that  we  are  formed  so,  as  to  refle61  very  severely 
upon  the  greater  instances  of  imprudent  negle<5ls 
and  foolish  rashnefs,  both  in  ourselves  and  others. 
In  instances  of  this  kind,  men  often  say  of  them- 
selves with  remorse,  and  of  others  with  some  indig- 
nation, that  they  deserved  to  suffer  such  calamities, 
because  they  brought  them  upon  themselves,  and 
would  not  take  warning.  Particularly  when  persons 
come  to  poverty  and  distref^  by  a  long  course  of  ex- 
travagance, and  after  frequent  admonitions,  though 
without  falsehood  or  injustice  ;  we  plainly  do  not 
regard  such  people  as  alike  obje^ls  of  compafsion 
with  those,  who  are  brought  into  the  same  condition 
by  unavoidable  accidents.  From  these  things  it 
appears,  that  prudence  is  a  species  of  virtue,  and 
folly  of  vice  :  meaning  hy  folly,  somewhat  quite  dif- 
ferent from  mere  incapacity  ;  a  thoughtlef^  want  of 
that  regard  and  attention  to  our  own  happineft,  which 
we  had  capacity  for.  And  this  the  word  properly 
includes ;  and,  as  it  seems,  in  its  usual  acceptation ; 
for  we  scarce  apply  it  to  brute  creatures. 

However,  if  any  person  be  disposed  to  dispute 
the  matter,  I  shall  very  willingly  give  him  up  the 
words  virtue  and  vice,  as  not  applicable  to  prudence 
and  folly ;  but  must  beg  leave  to  insist,  that  the  fa- 
culty within  us,  which  is  the  judge  of  actions,  ap- 
proves of  prudent  a(5iions,  and  disapproves  imprudent 
ones ;  I  say  prudent  and  imprudent  afiions  as  such, 
and  considered  distin(9:ly  from  the  happinef^  or  mi- 
sery which  the^?^  occasion.  And  by  the  way,  this 
observation  may  help  to  determine,  what  justneft 
there  is  in  that  obje(5lion  against  Religion,  that  it 
teaches  us  to  be  interested  and  selfish. 

Fifthly,  Without  enquiring  how  far,  and  in  what 


Difs.  2.         Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  329 

sense,  virtue  is  resolvable  into  benevolence,  and  vice 
into  the  want  of  it ;  it  may  be  proper  to  observe, 
that  benevolence  and  the  want  of  it,  singly  consi- 
dered, are  in  no  sort  the  whole  of  virtue  and  vice. 
For  if  this  were  the  case,  in  the  review  of  one's  own 
character  or  that  of  others,  our  moral  understanding 
and  moral  sense  would  be  indifferent  to  everything, 
but  the  degrees  in  which  benevolence  prevailed,  and 
the  degrees  in  which  it  was  wanting.  That  is,  we 
should  neither  approve  of  benevolence  to  some  per- 
sons rather  than  to  others,  nor  disapprove  injustice 
and  falsehood  upon  any  other  account,  than  merely 
as  an  overbalance  of  happinef^  was  foreseen  likely  to 
be  produced  by  the  first,  and  of  misery  by  the  se- 
cond. But  now,  on  the  contrary,  suppose  two  men 
competitors  for  anything  whatever,  which  would  be 
of  equal  advantage  to  each  of  them :  Though  no- 
thing indeed  would  be  more  impertinent,  than  for  a 
stranger  to  busy  himself  to  get  one  of  them  preferred 
to  the  other ;  yet  such  endeavour  would  be  virtue, 
in  behalf  of  a  friend  or  benefactor,  abstracted  from 
all  consideration  of  distant  consequences  :  as  that 
examples  of  gratitude,  and  the  cultivation  of  friend- 
ship, would  be  of  general  good  to  the  world.  Again, 
suppose  one  man  should,  by  fraud  or  violence,  take 
from  another  the  fruit  of  his  labour,  with  intent  to 
give  it  to  a  third,  who,  he  thought,  would  have  as 
much  pleasure  from  it,  as  would  balance  the  pleasure 
which  the  first  pof^efsor  would  have  had  in  the  en- 
joyment, and  his  vexation  in  the  lof^  of  it ;  suppose 
also  that  no  bad  consequences  would  follow :  yet  such 
an  action  would  surely  be  vicious.  Nay,  farther, 
were  treachery,  violence  and  injustice,  no  otherwise 
vicious,  than  as  foreseen  likely  to  produce  an  over- 
balance of  misery  to  society ;  then,  if  in  any  case  a 
man  could  procure  to  himself  as  great  advantage  by 


330  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.         Difs.i. 

an  a(5t  of  injustice,  as  the  whole  foreseen  inconve- 
nience, likely  to  be  brought  upon  others  by  it,  would 
amount  to  ;  such  a  piece  of  injustice  would  not  be 
faulty  or  vicious  at  all :  Because  it  would  be  no  more 
than,  in  any  other  case,  for  a  man  to  prefer  his  own 
satisfaction  to  another's  in  equal  degrees.  The  fadl 
then  appears  to  be,  that  we  are  constituted  so  as  to 
condemn  falsehood,  unprovoked  violence,  injustice, 
and  to  approve  of  benevolence  to  some  preferably  to 
others,  abstracted  from  all  consideration,  which  con- 
duct is  likeliest  to  produce  an  overbalance  of  happi- 
nei^  or  misery.  And  therefore,  were  the  Author  of 
nature  to  propose  nothing  to  himself  as  an  end  but 
the  produ(5lion  of  happinef^,  were  his  moral  charac^ter 
merely  that  of  benevolence  ;  yet  ours  is  not  so. 
Upon  that  supposition  indeed,  the  only  reason  of  his 
giving  us  the  abovementioned  approbation  of  bene- 
volence to  some  persons  rather  than  others,  and  dis- 
approbation of  falsehood,  unprovoked  violence,  and 
injustice,  must  be,  that  he  foresaw,  this  constitution 
of  our  nature  would  produce  more  happinef^,  than 
forming  us  with  a  temper  of  mere  general  benevo- 
lence. But  still,  since  this  is  our  constitution  ;  false- 
hood, violence,  injustice,  must  be  vice  in  us,  and 
benevolence  to  some  preferably  to  others,  virtue  ; 
abstra(51ed  from  all  consideration  of  the  overbalance 
of  evil  or  good,  which  they  may  appear  likely  to 
produce. 

Now  if  human  creatures  are  endued  with  such  a 
moral  nature  as  we  have  been  explaining,  or  with  a 
moral  faculty,  the  natural  object  of  which  is  a(51ions  : 
moral  government  must  consist,  in  rendering  them 
happy  and  unhappy,  in  rewarding  and  punishing 
them,  as  they  follow,  neglecft,  or  depart  from,  the 
moral  rule  of  adiion  interwoven  in  their  nature,  or 


Difs.  2.         Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  331 

suggested  and  enforced  by  this  moral  faculty;^  in 
rewarding  and  punishing  them  upon  account  of  their 
so  doing. 

I  am  not  sensible,  that  I  have,  in  this  fifth  obser- 
vation, contradicted  what  any  author  designed  to  as- 
sert. But  some  of  great  and  distinguished  merit, 
have,  I  think,  exprei^ed  themselves  in  a  manner, 
which  may  occasion  some  danger  to  careleft  readers, 
of  imagining  the  whole  of  virtue  to  consist  in  singly 
aiming,  according  to  the  best  of  their  judgment,  at 
promoting  the  happinef^  of  mankind  in  the  present 
state  ;  and  the  whole  of  vice,  in  doing  what  they 
foresee,  or  might  foresee,  is  likely  to  produce  an 
overbalance  of  unhappineft  in  it :  than  which  mis- 
takes, none  can  be  conceived  more  terrible.  For  it 
is  certain,  that  some  of  the  most  shocking  instances 
of  injustice,  adultery,  murder,  perjury,  and  even  of 
persecution,  may,  in  many  supposable  cases,  not 
have  the  appearance  of  being  likely  to  produce  an 
overbalance  of  misery  in  the  present  state  :  perhaps 
sometimes  may  have  the  contrary  appearance.  For 
this  reflecftion  might  easily  be  carried  on,  but  I  for- 
bear  The  happineft  of  the  world  is  the  concern 

of  him,  who  is  the  Lord  and  the  Proprietor  of  it : 
Nor  do  we  know  what  we  are  about,  \\hen  we  en- 
deavour to  promote  the  good  of  mankind  in  any 
ways,  but  those  which  he  has  directed ;  that  is  in- 
deed in  all  ways,  not  contrary  to  veracity  and  justice. 
I  speak  thus  upon  supposition  of  persons  really  en- 
deavouring, in  some  sort,  to  do  good  without  regard 
to  these.  But  the  truth  seems  to  be,  that  such  sup- 
posed endeavours  proceed,  almost  always,  from  am- 
bition, the  spirit  of  party,  or  some  indirecfl:  principle, 
concealed  perhaps  in  great  measure  from  persons 

3  P.  124. 


332  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.         Difs.  2. 

themselves.  And  though  it  is  our  businef^  and  our 
duty  to  endeavour,  within  the  bounds  of  veracity  and 
justice,  to  contribute  to  the  ease,  convenience,  and 
even  cheerfulnef^  and  diversion  of  our  fellow-crea- 
tures: yet  from  our  short  views,  it  is  greatly  uncer- 
tain, whether  this  endeavour  will,  in  particular  in- 
stances, produce  an  overbalance  of  happineft  upon 
the  whole  ;  since  so  many  and  distant  things  must 
come  into  the  account.  And  that  which  makes  it 
our  duty,  is,  that  there  is  some  appearance  that  it 
will,  and  no  positive  appearance  sufficient  to  balance 
this,  on  the  contrary  side  ;  and  also,  that  such  be- 
nevolent endeavour  is  a  cultivation  of  that  most  ex- 
cellent of  all  virtuous  principles,  the  a^ive  principle 
of  benevolence. 

However,  though  veracity,  as  well  as  justice,  is  to 
be  our  rule  of  life  ;  it  must  be  added,  otherwise  a 
snare  will  be  laid  in  the  way  of  some  plain  men,  that 
the  use  of  common  forms  of  speech  generally  un- 
derstood, cannot  be  falsehood  ;  and,  in  general,  that 
there  can  be  no  designed  falsehood  v^ithout  design- 
ing to  deceive.  It  must  likewise  be  observed,  that 
in  numberlef^  cases,  a  man  may  be  under  the  stri(5l- 
est  obligations  to  what  he  foresees  will  deceive,  with- 
out his  intending  it.  For  it  is  impofsible  not  to  fore- 
see, that  the  words  and  ac^tions  of  men  in  different 
ranks  and  employments,  and  of  different  educations, 
will  perpetually  be  mistaken  by  each  other :  And  it 
cannot  but  be  so,  whilst  they  will  judge  with  the  ut- 
most careleftnei^,  as  they  daily  do,  of  what  they  are 
not,  perhaps,  enough  informed  to  be  competent 
judges^of,  even  though  they  considered  it  with  great 
attention. 


INDEX  OF  WORDS  AND  THINGS. 


BSTRACT 
NOTIONS  must  be  applied  to  practical  sub- 
jects with  great  caution,' 115. 
KEASONiNG  iiiust  be  joined  with  the  obser- 
vation of  facts,  6. 
TRUTHS,  how  distinguished  from  matters  of 
fact,  297. 
Abstracts  imply  concretes,  111. 

Abstruse  reasonings  necessary  chiefly  to  answer  abstruse  ob- 
jections, 300. 
ACCIDENTAL.     See  Chance. 
what  we  call  accidental,  42. 

events  of  which  we  know  not,  the  laws  are  called  so,  196. 
the  punishments  of  vice  are  not  accidental,  42. 
the  hinderances  to  the  prevalence  of  virtue  are  so,  64,  70. 
accidental  hinderances  are  not  likelv  always  to  continue, 
72. 
Account,  we  cannot  give  the  whole  account  of  anything,  129. 
Acquirements,  the  natural  supply  of  our  deficiencies,  107. 
ACTION.     See  Habits. 

the  whole  of  morality  and  religion  consists  in  action 

merely,  241. 
this  world  a  theatre  of  it,  107. 
manifests  our  character,  107. 
effects  of  a  course  of  action,  88. 
ACTIONS.     See  Endeavours,  Resolution. 

will  and  design  distinguish  actions  from  events,  323. 
the  intention  but  not  the  actual  consequences  included 

in  our  sense  of  an  action,  323-4. 
the  object  of  the  moral  faculty,  323. 
what  the  name  comprises  in  moral  questions,  323. 


334         Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

ACTIONS  (cojithuied). 

when  they  have  a  tendency  to  fonn  and  fix  the  habit  of 

vh-tue/l02. 
our  own  are  the  sources  of  our  pleasures  and  great  part 

of  our  pains,  33. 
they  are  rewarded  and  punished,  37. 
are  to  be  distinguished  from  tlieir  moral  qualities,  52. 
every  action  and  event  has  relations  with  others,  we 

know  not  how  many,  129. 
Affections.     See  Particular  affections. 

AFFLICTION.     See  Hazard. 

the  end  of  our  being  placed  in  a  state  of  affliction,  &c.  is 
moral  improvement,  83. 

it  is  the  proper  discipline  for  resignation,  106. 
Allurements  to  wrong.     See  Temptations. 

AMENDMENT.      See  Repentance. 

b}'-  itself  does  not  prevent  punishment,  207. 

may  be  proinoted  by  seeing  the  success  of  virtue,  65. 

ANALOGICAL  REASONING.  ^q&  Probability,  Coincidences, 
Continuance.  • 

not  thoroughh'  considered  by  writers  on  logic,  4. 

cSiia.not  perfectly  satisfy  men,  286. 

cannot  give  a  direct  answer  to  all  objections,  127. 

can  only  directly  prove  things  true  or  credible  as  facts, 
127. 

is  the  ground  of  probability  in  various  degrees,  2. 

is  of  weight  in  determining  our  judgment  and  practice,  4. 
though  perhaps  not  in  all  cases,  4. 

ought  to  be  particularly  attended  to  by  those  who  pro- 
fess to  follow  nature,  299. 

is  a  confirmation  of  all,  the  only  proof  of  most  facts,  299. 

is  practical  and  conclusive,  6. 

Origen's  application  of  it,  5. 

how  the  author  means  to  apply  it,  6. 

there  can  be  no  argument  from  analogy  without  a  pa- 
rallel case,  172,  29. 

of  objections  against  arguing  from  the  analogy  of  nature 
to  religion,  Pt.  II.  Ch.  VIII.,  285. 

ANALOGY. 

of  the  difficulties  in  nature  to  those  in  Holy  Scripture,  5. 
of  the  changes  we  have  undergone  and  those  of  insects, 

&c.  to  our  entry  on  a  future  life,  12,  13. 
there  is  none  to  show  that  we  lose  our  living  powers  at 

death,  16. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things,         335 

ANALOGY  (continued). 

confirms  the  proof  of  our  indiscerptibility,  19. 

of  the  case  of  brutes  no  objection  to  our  immortality,  24. 

of  death  to  birth,  possible,  28. 

of  vegetables  in  their  decay  does  not  hold,  29,  315. 

the  end  of  our  creation  may  be  to  us  as  colour  to  a  blind 

man,  35. 
bet^veen  God's  government  and  that  of  civil  magistrates, 

37. 
of  God's  temporal  to  His  future  rewards  and  punish- 
ments, 32-8,  125. 

of  His  punishments  in  detail,  38-45. 
of  the  proofs  of  the  Ci'eator's  intelligence  to  those  of  His 

goodness,  46. 
of  the  increase  of  power  given  by  reason  to  that  given 

by  goodness,  60,  &c. 
of  our  state  of  trial  in  this  world  to  that  for  another,  73. 

considered  in  detail,  74-9. 
of  youth  as  a  state  of  discipline  for  mature  age  to  this 

world  as  one  for  a  future  life,  84,  &c.,  106,  ckc. 
leads  us  to  suppose  the  future  life  a  communit}',  93. 
of  our   limited  capacity  for  improvement  in  body  and 

mind,  to  that  in  our  moral  characters,  102. 
of  some  sciences  Avhich  form  habits  of  attention  to  the 

world  as  a  state  of  discipline,  102. 
of  the  waste  of  seeds  to  the  loss  of  souls,  103-4. 
of  the  inapplicability  of  the  opinion  of  necessity  in  com- 
mon life  to  its  effect  on  the  proofs,  &c.  of  religion, 

111,  &c. 
of  our  speculative  to  our  moral  understandings,  123. 
of  the  incomprehensibility  of  the  natural  to  that  of  the 

moral  government  of  the  world,  128. 
of  the  use  of  strange  and  apparently  undesirable  means 

in  the  natural  to  the  same  in  the  moral  world,  132, 

&c.,  138. 
of  the  government  by  general  laws  in  the  natural  to  the 

same  in  the  moral  world,  134 
between  diseases  and  moral  evil,  134,  187,  287. 
of  our  knowledge  of  a  person's  character  but  ignorance  of 

his  proper  mode  of  acting  to  what  we  know  of  God,  136. 
shows  that  God's  moral  government  may  be  a  scheme 

with  parts  misunderstood,  138. 
of  our  ignorance  of  the  reasons  of  things  in  nature  to  the 

same  in  Christianity,  149. 
of  the  perversions  of  reason  to  those  of  Christianity,  154. 


33^         Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

ANALOGY  {conthmcd). 

of  the  judicial  punishments  inflicted  by  God  in  the  pre- 
sent world  to  those  to  come  hereafter,  160,  43. 

of  our  ignorance  of  how  to  obtain  temporal  to  the  same 
of  spiritual  benefits,  160. 

raises  no  presumption  against"  the  general  scheme  of 
Christianity,  168. 

none  arises  from  its  not  being  discoverable  by  rea- 
son, 168. 

raises  no  presumption  that  everything  in  the  whole  course 
of  things  is  like  anything  known  to  us,  169. 

raises  no  presumption  against  miracles  at  the  first  peo- 
pling of  a  world,  170. 

nor  against  a  revelation  considered  as  miraculous  at 
any  time,  171. 

of  the  presumptions  against  the  story  of  Ca;sar  to  those 
against  miracles,  172. 

of  miracles  to  the  extraordinary  pha^nomena  of  nature, 
173. 

shows  Christianity  likely  to  contain  things  apparently 
liable  to  great  objections,  176 

of  what  reason  and  experience  tell  ixs  of  the  government 
of  the  world  to  what  revelation  declares  of  its  scheme, 
177. 

of  a  prince  governing  ordinarily  bv  general  laws  to  GoD, 
178. 

of  our  instruction  by  reason,  &c.,  to  that  by  inspiration, 
178. 

of  the  ways  in  which  the  meaning  of  other  books  is  to 
be  ascertained  cannot  be  applied  to  Scripture,  181,  186. 

of  the  objections  men  might  make  against  the  instruc- 
tion given  in  the  course  of  nature  to  those  made  against 
the  Scriptures,  182-4. 

of  the  abuse  of  miraculous  gifts  to  that  of  natural  gifts, 
&c.,  184. 

of  the  light  of  nature  to  that  of  revelation  in  their  ef- 
fects, hinderances,  and  our  possible  improvement  in 
knowledge  by  them,  185-7. 

of  the  light  of  revelation  to  the  remedies  for  diseases, 
187,  287. 

of  the  existence  of  diseases  to  the  imperfections  of  their 

remedies,  188. 
of  the  constitution  of  nature  as  a  system  to  that  of  Chris- 
tianity, 192. 

in  theuse  of  means  and  those  gradual,  195,  199-200. 
in  their  being  carried  on  by  general  laws,  196. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.  337 

ANALOGY  (^cojitinued'). 

shows  that  the  world  is  governed  by  general  laws,  196. 

of  the  intervention  of  others  for  our  temporal  benefit  to 
that  of  a  Mediator  for  our  salvation',  201. 

of  tlie  present  ill  effects  of  vice  to  its  mode  of  future  pun- 
ishment, possible,  202,  205. 

of  a  man's  trifling  on  the  edge  of  a  precipice  to  his  being- 
careless  about  religion,  202,  204. 

of  the  inefficacy  of  repentance  in  temporal  to  the  same 
in  religious  matters,  206-8. 

of  the  effects  of  the  Fall  to  what  we  see  daily,  211. 

of  the  sacrifices  of  Jews  and  heathens  to  that  of  Christ, 
215-6. 

of  Christ's  sufi'ering  for  the  guilty  to  what  we  see  dailv, 
218,  cScc. 

teaches  us  not  to  expect  the  same  information  concern- 
ing the  Divine  conduct  and  our  OAvn  duty,  221. 

of  the  mysteriousness  of  nature  to  that  of  Christianity,  222. 

of  the  evidence  we  usually  act  upon  to  what  we  have  of 
Christianity,  223,  242,  290,  293. 

of  the  varieties  of  natural  gifts  to  the  different  degrees 
of  light  from  revelation,  224-7,  228. 

of  the  duty  of  learning  and  teaching  common  things  to 
the  same  concerning  Christianity,  228. 

of  some  men's  ignorance  of  revelation  to  ours  of  why 
they  are  ignorant,  229. 

of  probation  by  defect  of  evidence  to  that  in  common 
behaviour,  285,  &c.,  236,  &c. 

of  defects  in  understanding  to  moral  corruption,  233. 

of  speculative  difficulties  to  external  temptations,  234. 

of  the  effects  of  levity,  &c.  in  common  matters  to  the 
same  in  estimating  the  evidence  of  revelation,  238. 

of  the  picking  up  of  objections  by  incompetent  persons 
in  science  to  the  same  in  religion,  240. 

of  a  prince's  directions  to  his  servants  to  God's  revela- 
tion, will  not  always  hold,  241 . 

of  the  conviction  produced  by  the  evidence  of  Christi- 
anity to  the  effect  in  architecture,  &c.,  245. 

of  the  mode  in  Avhich  St.  Paul  speaks  of  miracles  to  ours 
in  speaking  of  common  things,  249. 

of  the  first  Christian  miracles  to  those  of  paganism  and 
popery,  and  those  known  to  be  fabulous,  will  not  hold, 
250,  256. 

of  enthusiasm  to  ordinary  prejudices,  254. 
and  of  their  effects,  255. 


338  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

ANALOGY  {continued). 

of  the  obscure  parts  of  prophecy  to  parts  of  a  document 
written  in  cypher,  259. 

of  the  prophetical  to  the  mythological  and  satiric  styles 
of  writing,  260. 

of  the  prophets  to  the  compilers  of  memoirs  from  older 
documents,  262. 

of  the  revelation  of  natural  religion  to  the  ordinary 
teaching  of  the  ignorant,  267. 

of  a  common  relation  of  similar  antiquity,  &c.  to  the 
Scriptures,  270. 

of  the  proof  of  natm*al  religion  by  revelation  to  that  of 
geometrical  truth  b}'^  Euclid's  elements,  274. 

of  the  effect  of  hope  and  fear  upon  the  belief  of  Christi- 
anity to  the  same  in  other  matters,  284. 

of  the  practical  question  in  common  matters  to  that  in 
religion,  294. 

of  the  idea  of  equality  to  that  of  personal  identity,  313. 

of  consciousness  to  other  knowledge,  314,  316. 

of  the  unreasonablenes  of  acting  on  the  idea  that  per- 
sonal identity  is  fleeting  in  the  present  to  the  same  in 
regard  to  a  future  life,  319. 
Antiochus  Epiphanes,  264. 
ANTIQUITY.     See  History. 

or  RELIGION  one  of  its  evidences,  121. 

OP  SCRIPTURE,  122,  270. 
Antoninus,  31.  cited  28,  n.  323,  n. 

Apostles  and  3Iartt/rs,  their  death  in  attestation  of  facts,  evi- 
dence of  them,  253. 
APPREHENSION.     See  Fear. 

effects  of  a  serious  apprehension  that  Christianity  may 
be  true,  231,  308. 
APPROBATION.     See  3Ioral  Faculty,  Virtue. 

course  of  nature  turns  in  some  degree  on  our  approba 
tion  of  actions,  56. 

moral  approving  and  disapproving  faculty,  321. 

approbation  and  disapprobation  of  prudence  and  follv, 
.327. 
Assertions  in  argument,  nothing  in  themselves  but  sometimes 

necessar}',  258. 
ASSISTANCE  OF  OTHERS.     See  Vicarious,  Mediator. 

of  much  use  in  our  youth,  91, 

may  help  to  obviate  the  consequences  of  our  folly,  204. 

allowed  by  the  constitution  of  the  world  to  have  a  good 
effect,  204. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.         339 

ASSISTANCE  OF  OTHERS  {continued). 

absolutely  necessary  to  some  men's  recovery,  207. 

perhaps  the  constitution  of  the  world  would  not  have 
been  good  without  allowing  it,  204. 
Association  of  ideas,  sometimes  passive  habits,  85. 

ASTRONOMY. 

discoveries  in  it,  65. 

wonderful  that  it  should  be  more  easily  known  than  me- 
dicine, 183. 

ATHEISM.     See  Scepticism. 

as  consistent  with  a  futui'e  life  as  with  this,  32. 

a  demonstration  of  it  necessary  to  justify  fearlessness,  44. 
Atoms,  materia.],  19-20. 

ATONEMENT.     See  Christ,  Sacrifice. 

we  are  greatly  in  the  dark  how  the  ancients  supposed  it 
made,  216. 

ATTENTION.     See  Consideration. 

in  considering  doubtful  evidence  part  of  our  probation, 
235. 

necessary  in  considering  the  evidence  of  Christianitv, 
266,  283. 

moral  attention  how  improved  by  the  present  state  of 
the  world,  100. 

practical  principles  formed  by  attention,  use  and  disci- 
pline, 107. 

some  sciences  form  the  mind  to  habits  of  it,  102. 
Augustine,  S.,  cited  148,  n. 

AUTHOR  OP  NATURE.     See  God. 

to  be  assumed,  6. 

without  an  intelligent  Author  and  Governor  no  account 
can  be  given  of  the  world,  140. 

the  opinion  of  necessity  does  not  deny  the  proof  of  His 
intelligence,  110. 

the  true  notion  of  Him  is  that  of  a  moral  Governor,  38. 

uses  means,  108. 

is  deliberate  throughout  His  operations,  200. 

has  a  will  and  character,  116. 

His  character  proved  by  revelation,  150. 

has  declared  on  the  side  of  virtue,  69. 

has  put  mankind  under  the  necessity  of  punishing  vi- 
cious actions,  52. 

a  direction  from  Him  implies  a  promise  and  a  threat,  119. 

were  His  own  character  that  of  mere  benevolence.  He 
has  not  made  om'S  so,  330. 


34-0  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

BABYLON.     268,  276. 
Baptism,  form  of,  156. 

BEINGS-      See  Living  beings. 

beings  only,  not  ideas,  abstract  notions,  or  qualities  are 

capable  of  life,  happiness,  &c.,  319. 
Benefits  not  to  be  expected  without  the  use  of  the  appointed 

means  of  obtaining  them,  160. 

BENE  VOL  EXCE.     See  Goodness. 

benevolence  and  the  want  of  it  in  no  sense  the  whole  of 

virtue  and  vice,  329. 
active  principle  of  it  the  most  excellent  of  all  virtuous 
principles,  332. 

strengthened  by  relieving  distress,  87. 
absolute  benevolence  the  most  amiable  of  all  characters 

so  far  as  compatible  with  justice,  47. 
God  may  manifest  Himself  under  this  character  to  some 

beings,  47. 
true  benevolence  implies  a  regard  to  veracity  and  justice, 
63,  330. 
Bethlehem,  279. 

Birds,  the  hatching  of  their  eggs  goes  to  prove  a  law  of  pro- 
gress in  nature,  13. 

BIRTH, 

continuance  of  the  life  we  had  in  the  womb,  28. 
death  may  resemble  it,  28. 

BLAMEWORTHINESS.     See  Desert. 

sense  of  it  produces  a  peculiar  kind  of  uneasiness,  53-4. 
Blasphemy  and  profaneness,  inexcusable,  309. 

BODY.     See  3Iatter,  Organs  of  sense. 

made  up  of  organs  and  instruments  of  perception  and 

motion,  21. 
our  existence  may  be  considered  without  it,  18. 
reason  and  memory  independent  of  it,  25. 
seemingly  not  necessary  to  our  intellectual  enjoyments 

and  sufierings,  26. 
our  organized  bodies  not  ourselves  or  part  of  ourselves, 

18,  &c. 
our  [supposed]  original  solid  body  no  part  of  ourselves,  20. 
dissolution  of  it  has  no  conceivable  tendency  to  destroy 

ourselves,  18,  20. 
foreign  matter  has  the  same  relation  to  us  [in  kind],  21. 
the  bodies  of  all  animals  in  a  constant  flux,  19. 
Book,  when  we  knov/  the  meaning  of  a  book,  262. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.         341 

BOUXDS. 

to  the  impunity  of  imprudence,  41,  43. 

to  the  possibility  of  recovery,  41,  43. 

to  improvement,  102. 
Brurhmaus,  their  opinion  concerning  death,  28,  n. 

BRUTES. 

instructed  by  instincts  and  propensions,  183. 

act  in  many  respects  Avith  more  sagacity  than  men,  183. 

stronger  perhaps  than  men  and  why  overcome,  60. 

succeed  sometimes  in  what  they  could  not  have  at- 
tempted if  rational,  62. 

it  does  not  appear  that  they  have  any  reflex  sense  of  ac- 
tions, or  of  will  and  design,  323. 

their  suggested  immortality  no  objection  to  the  immor- 
tality of  man,  24. 

CJESAR,  story  of,  its  antecedent  improbability,  172. 
CAPACITY.     See  Faculties. 
of  happiness  and  misery,  32. 
for  improving  intended  to  be  made  use  of,  89. 

CERTAINTY. 

what  is  meant  by  moral  certainty,  3. 

the  highest  degree  of  probable  evidence,  1 . 

CHANCE.     See  Accidental. 

there  cannot  be  any  such  thing  as  chance,  196. 
Chanc/es,  Avhich  we  ma}'  undergo  without  destruction,  12. 

CHARACTER. 

of  the  Author  of  nature,  46. 

of  God,  not  designed  to  be  vindicated  in  this  treatise,  290. 
being  known,  our  ignorance  answers  objections  to  His 
mode  of  Avorking,  136. 

will  and  character  defined,  116,  ii.  .323. 

why  we  think  well  or  ill  of  characters,  324. 

we  are  bound  to  consider  attentively  what  we  give  cha- 
racters of,  285. 

it  is  formed  and  shown  b}'  our  conduct,  91. 

its  manifestation  implied  in  probation,  and  may  have 
reference  to  a  future  life,  107. 

contributes  to  the  carrying  on  of  the  course  of  na- 
ture, 108. 

how  that  of  upright  beings  might  become  depraved,  97. 

that  which  makes  a  man  obedient  to  religion  would  set 
him  to  examine  it  duly,  229. 


342  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

CHARACTER  (continued). 

may  be  known  by  those  ignorant  of  its  propex*  mode  of 

working,  136. 
Childhood,     See  Infancy. 
CHRIST.     See  Mediator,  Messiah. 

our  Lord,  our  Saviour  and  our  GoD,  159. 

His  preexistence  taught  by  St.  John  and  St.  Paul,  268. 

His  office  of  Mediator  how  represented  in  Scripture, 

211-14. 
Prophet,  214. 

King  over  His  Church,  215. 
His  government  over  His  Church,  194. 
Priest  offering  Himself  a  propitiatory  Sacrifice,  211-215. 
way  in  which  this  sacrifice  had  its  effect  nn-sterious,  216. 
objections  on  this  ground  absurd,  218,  220. 
voluntary,  and  therefore  not  so  strange  as  many  things 

in  nature,  219. 
why  men  object  against  the  sacrifice  of  Christ,  219. 
His  satisfaction  has  an  efficacy  beyond  mere  example, 

213,  216. 
apparent  natural  tendency  of^His  sufferings,  220. 
on  what  ground  acknowledged  by  the  Gentiles,  277. 
Ch-istian  Dispensation  may  seem  natural  to  some  order  of  be- 
ings, 31,  195-6. 
CHRISTIANITY.     See  Gospel,  Revelation,  Evidence. 
Its  importance,  Pt.  II.  Ch.  I.  147. 
Considered  as  a  scheme  imperfectly  comprehended,  Pt. 

II.  Ch.  IV.,  192. 
the  particular  evidence  for  it,  Pt.  II.  Ch.  VII.,  244, 
Practical  Christianity  a  plain  thing,  185. 
the  general  proof  of  it  lies  level  to  common  men,  239. 
it  cannot  be  unimportant  if  it  come  from  God,  149. 
a  republication  of  natural  religion,  149. 

supplies  new  means  for  its  preservation,  152. 
does  that  now  by  the  Church  which  it  did  at  first  by 

miracles,  152. 
without  the  Church  might  have  been  sunk  and  forgot,!  53. 
its  good  effects  manifest,  its  bad  small  or  none,  154. 
corruptions  of  it  not  arguments  against  it,  155. 
Christians  are  bound  to  contribute  to  preserve  it  in  the 

world,  155. 
the  profession  and  duties  of  Christians  are  important  to 

natural  religion,  156. 
is  a  revelation  of  a  particular  scheme  carried  on  by  the 

Son  and  Holy  Spirit,  156. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.         343 

CHRISTIANITY  (continued). 

as  distinguished  from  natural  religion  has  somewhat  of 
moral  importance,  159. 

unspeakable  irreverence  and  rashness  to  treat  it  as  a  light 
matter,  160. 

a  statement  of  its  general  scheme,  168,  a  fuller  one,  193. 

the  question  is  whether  it  be  a  real  revelation,  not  whe- 
ther it  be  so  attended  as  Ave  expected,  180. 

a  particular  scheme  under  the  general  plan  of  Provi- 
dence, 193. 

a  mysterious  economy  for  the  recovery  of  the  world  b}' 
a  Divine  Person,  193. 

part  of  a  scheme  not  entirely  revealed  in  Scripture,  195. 

God  works  by  slow  and  successive  means  in  nature  as 
well  as  in  it,  200. 

different  degrees  of  evidence  for,  and  light  from  it,  225. 

its  establishment  confirms  the  miraculous  history  of  the 
Scripture,  246. 

offered  itself  and  was  received  upon  the  evidence  of  mi- 
racles, 249. 

this  peculiar  to  it,  249. 

persons  alleging  the  power  of  enthusiasm  admit  that  it 
has  some  evidence,  258. 

its  nature  supports  the  testimony  of  its  witnesses,  258. 

unbelievers  must  admit  its  external  evidence  considerable, 
258. 

a  general  argument  for  its  truth,  265,  &c. 

advantage  Avhich  the  nature  of  its  evidence  gives  to  those 
who  attack  it,  285. 

we  are  under  a  moral  obligation  to  inquire  into  its  truth, 
and  embrace  it  if  true,  300. 

no  reason  to  expect  men  to  behave  better  were  it  demon- 
strated, 309. 
CHURCH,  visible. 

what  it  is,  152. 

what  uses  it  seizes,  152. 

is  an  instituted  method  of  education,  153. 

it  is  the  duty  of  all  to  become  members  of  it,  156. 
Cicero,  cited,  323,  n. 
CIVIL  GOVERNMENTS. 

natural,  51,  207. 

punish  actions  prejudicial  to  society,  51. 

and  this  not  without  regard  to  their  moral  character,  56, 
CLARKE,  Dr.  S.,  cited,  17^  n. 

answer  to  his  third  defence  of  his  letter  to  Dodwell  re- 
ferred to,  317. 


•344  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

CItmens  Romunus,  cited,  248. 
COIXCIDENCES. 

evidence  arising  from  them  often  determines  practice,  266. 
fanciful  men  apt  to  malie  tliem  out  to  fa%^our  their  follies, 
283. 
Colliber,  S.  Of  revealed  religion,  pp.  154-5,  cited,  157,  n. 
Colour  may  be  as  intelligible  to  the  blind  as  the  end  of  our 

creation  to  us,  35. 
Convminion,  the  institution  of  it,  248. 
COMPASSION. 

vmhappiness  its  natural  object,  327. 

less  to  the  guilty  than  to  the  innocent,  325. 

lessened,  by  imprudent  neglect  and  foolish  rashness,  328. 

lessened,  as  a  sentiment,  by  being  used  to  see  suffering, 

87. 
its  existence  in  the  constitution  of  the  world,  205. 
and  in  the  laws  of  God's  government  declared  by  reve- 
lation, 209. 
Complacency,  attends  the  exercise  of  virtue,  54. 
CONSCIENCE.      See  3Ioral  Faculty. 
a  name  of  the  moral  faculty,  322. 
its  presages  declare  God's  government  moral,  47. 
a  real  instance  of  virtue  favoured  and  vice  discounte- 
nanced, 56. 
consciousness  of  a  rule  of  action  given  by  our  Maker 
raises  a  sense  of  security  in  following  and  danger  in 
deviating  from  it,  119. 

CONSCIOUSNESS.      See  Personal  Identity. 

single  and  indivisible,  and  proves  its  subject  to  be  so,  17. 

does  not  make  personal  identity,  but  presupposes  it,  314. 

successive  consciousnesses  not  the  same  but  of  the  same,  31 6. 

of  a  rule  of  action.     See  Conscience. 
CONSEQUENCES.     See  Tendencies. 

those  of  actions  ai-e  rewards  and  punishments,  35. 

those  of  vice,  judicial  punishments  inflicted  by  GoD,  160. 

those  of  foolish  actions  are  like  those  of  vicious  actions 
as  declared  by  religion,  42. 

some  men  disregard  them  as  much  in  temporal  as  in  re- 
ligious matters,  76. 

possible  consequences  of  one  overt  act  of  irregularity,  97. 

unacceptable  consequences  no  reason  to  cavil  at  truths,  1 7  7 . 

future  punishments  may  be  by  way  of  natural  conse- 
quence, 202. 

natural  consequences  of  vice  and  folly  sometimes  pre- 
vented, 204. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.         345 

Consideration,  often  necessary,  and  eftects  of  the  want  of  it, 
243. 

COXSTITUTIOX.     See  Scheme,  World. 

the  notion  of  a  constitution  implies  variety,  228. 

the  inward  constitution  of  a  finitely  perfect  being,  96. 

how  far  one  overt  act  might  disoi"der  it,  97. 
of  the  -world  all  mystery,  222. 

and  its  government  may  be  perfect  in  the  highest 

degree,  193. 
severity  and  indulgence  in  it,  204. 
Continuance,  as  expected  for  the  future,  a  probability  from 

analogy,  14. 
Conviction,  raised  by  probability,  1,  4. 
Corruption  of  heart  makes  men  disregard  evidence,  234. 

COURSE  OF  NATURE.      See  Law  of  Nature,  Nature. 

the  ground  of  all  analogy,  2. 

implies  an  operating  agent,  35,  203. 

what  comes  to  pass  in  it  is  God's  work,  203. 

is  an  instance  of  government  by  rewards  and  punish- 
ments, 38. 

the  whole  of  it  may  not  be  like  what  is  known  to  us,  169. 

upon  the  first  peopling  of  worlds,  what  ?   170. 

creation  of  mankind  totally  different  from  the  present,  170. 

so  dark  without  revelation  that  it  might  give  occasion  to 
miraculous  interpositions,  173. 

governed  by  general  laws,  and  how  we  conclude  this,  196. 
Avith  respect  to  intelligent  creatures,  9,  134, 196. 
Creation  of  the  world,  why  the  Scriptures  commence  with  an 

account  of  it,  267. 
CREATURES.      See  Finite  Creatures,  Hitman  Creatures. 

upright  creatures  need  improvement,  and  depraved  crea- 
tvu-es  renewal,  99. 

of  moral  natures,  not  subjects  of  morality  during  part  of 
their  lives,  228. 

ought  to  live  under  a  dutiful  sense  of  their  Maker,  309. 

submission  and  obedience  make  up  our  proper  character 
as  such,  106. 

all  creatures  may  require  habits  of  resignation,  10.5-6. 

their  awful  presumption  in  bringing  confusion,  &c.,  into 
the  world,  205-6. 
Credibility  merely,  of  religion  produces  an  obligation  in  pru- 
dence, 137,  144,  230. 
Cunning,  false  self-interest,  &c.  essentially  weaker  than  wis- 
dom, public  spirit,  Sec,  66. 


34^  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

Curiosity,  concerning  a  future  life,  32. 

Cursory  thought  of  tilings,  Avlien  familiar,  hinders  our  seeing 

their 'weight,  266. 
Cypher,  half  understood  prophecies  are  like  a  writing  partly 

in  it,  259. 


DANGER.      See  Hazard,  Affliction.. 
perception  of  it  a  natural  incitement  to  passive  fear, 
and  active  caution,  87. 
consciousness  of  a  danger  of  doing  wrong  may  improve 

virtue,  101. 
of  actually  deviating  from  right  may  be  infinitely  les- 
sened, 98. 
dangers  of  our  miscarrving  in  our  religious  state  of  trial, 
77. 

analogous  to  those  that  affect  our  temporal  success, 
80,  78. 
DANIEL,  THE  BOOK  of. 

authority  given  to  it  \>j  Christ,  264. 

presupposed  true  by  the  general  scheme  of  Christianitv, 

264. 
how  impeached  by  Porphyry,  263-4  and  n. 
had  more  external  evidence  once  than  we  have  now  of 
it,  264. 

DEATH,  13,  &c.      See  Future  Life,  Living  Beings,  Brachmans. 
a  gi'eat  shock,  or  alteration,  15. 
our  substances  will  continue  after  it,  14,  n. 
we  do  not  know  Avhat  it  is  in  itself,  but  only  some  effects 

of  it,  15. 
no  ground  to  think  it  the  destruction  of  living  agents,  24. 
no  reason  to  think  it  the  destruction,  or  suspension  of  our 

reflecting  powers,  27. 
reason  does  not  at  all  show  us  in  what  state  it  leaves  us, 

29. 
may  be  analogous  to  birth,  28. 
imagination  likely  to  mislead  us  concerning  it,  17. 
Deceit.     See  Falsehood. 
Definitions,  attempts  to  give  them  sometimes  onlv  perplex, 

313. 
Degradation  of  mankind,  the  Scripture  account  of  it  confirmed 

by  the  state  of  the  world,  211.      See  Fall  of  Man, 
Degrees  of  evidence,  233,  225. 

Demonstration,  how  it  differs  from  probable  evidence,  1 . 
Destruction  oi  living  powers,  what  this  means,  14,  n. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.         347 

Delay  of  Punisliment,  39,  43. 

Des  Cartes,  built  a  -world  ou  hypothesis,  5. 

DESERT.      See  Shame,  Resentment,  Gratitude. 

deserving  punishment  does  not  merely  mean  that  such 

suffering  is  for  the  good  of  Society,  324. 
ill  desert  ahvays  supposes  guilt,  324. 
perception  of  good  and  ill  desert  contained  in  moral  dis- 
cernment, 118. 

unavoidable  and  natural,  321. 

of  good  desert,  why  very  weak  in  common  instances 

of  virtue,  325. 
of  ill  desert,  lessens  in  proportion  to  the  force  of 

temptation,  325. 
arises  from  a  comparison  of  the  action  with  the  ca- 
pacity of  the  agent,  326. 
arising  from  the  perception  of  imprudence  and  follv, 
328. 
DESIGN.     See  Final  Causes. 
appearances  of,  45,  300. 

not  excluded  by  the  opinion  of  necessity.  111. 
ten  thousand  instances  of  it  must  prove  a  designer,  300. 
Differeyice  of  vieii's  situation  in  religious  matters,  224. 
would  continue  under  a  universal  revelation,  229. 

DIFFICULTIES.      See  Temptations,  Objections. 

analogy  between  those  in  Scripture  and  those  in  the 
world,  5. 

actions  materially  virtuous,  which  have  no   diificulty, 
may  not  be  really  virtuous  at  all,  101. 

speculative  difficulties  are  of  the  same  nature  with  ex- 
ternal temptations,  236. 

may  make  the  larger  part  of  some  persons'  trial,  236. 

seeing  through  difficulties,  240. 

difficulties  and  objections  wrongly  turned  into  positive 
arguments  against  religion,  289. 

to  clear  them  all  it  may  be  necessary  to  comprehend  the 
Divine  nature,  &c,,  287. 

those  concerning  personal  identity  and  their  strange  so- 
lutions, 313. 
DISCIPLINE.     See  Temptations. 

state  of  Probation  as  intended  for  Moral  Discipline,  Pt. 
I.  Ch.  v.,  82. 

happiness  and  misery  may  be  distributed  by  way  of  mere 
discipline,  58. 

need  of  it  may  be  traced  higher  than  to  excess  of  pas- 
sion, &c.,  94. 


348 


Index  of  Words  and  Things. 


DISCIPLINE  (continued). 

upright  creatures  may  be  improved  by  it,  99. 
depraved  creatures  need  the  severer  and  higher,  99. 
the  present  workl  peculiarly  tit  to  be  a  state  of  it,  99,  102, 
234. 

though  made  by  mau}^  a  discipline  of  vice,  103. 
speculati\e  difficulties  may  be  necessarv  to  put  some  men 
in  a  state  of  sutBcient  discipline,  236. 
Discoveries  in  natural  knowledge,  65,  187. 
DISEASES. 

their  very  existence  raises  a  presumption  that  their  re- 
medies would  not  be  certain,  perfect  and  universal,  188. 
they  are  not  so  in  fact,  188. 

this  refutes  an  objection  against  Christianity,  187. 
some  diseases  are  themselves  remedies,  134. 
some  mortal  diseases  do  not  affect  our  mental  powers,  27. 
some  operate  like  enthusiasm,  253. 
Disorders,  their  permission  may  be  consistent  with  justice  and 

goodness,  138. 
Dissatisfaction  with  the  evidence  of  religion,  often  owing  to 

men's  own  fault,  238. 
Dissolution  of  organized  bodies  has  no  tendency  to  destroy  the 

living  being,  18. 
DISTRESS.     See  Compassion,  Happiness. 

the  perception  of  it  arouses  passive  pity  and  active  bene- 
volence, 87. 
DIVIXE  GOVERNMENT.      See  God,  Moral  Governor,  &c. 
wbat  is  implied  in  the  notion  of  it,  10. 
not  perfectly  moral  as  we  see  it,  48. 
DOMESTIC. 

GOVERNMENT,  analogous  to  the  moral  government  of  the 

universe,  56. 
LIFE  teaches  us  self-government,  &c.,  90. 
DOUBTFULNESS,      See    Scepticism,  General  Douhts,  Evi- 
dence. 
doubting  implies  some  degree  of  evidence,  232,  269-70. 
not  so  much  difference  between  the  duties  arising  from 

conviction  and  serious  doubt,  232. 
the  duty  of  those  who  complain  of  the  doubtfulness  of 

religion,  231. 
of  i-eligion  calls  for  a  more  careful  exercise  of  the  vir- 
tuous principle,  235. 

puts  men  in  a  general  'State  of  probation,  230. 
of  the  best  mode  of  preserving  life,  and  attaining  tem- 
poral success,  293,  243. 


Index  of  Words  r.nd  Things.  349 

Dreams  show  that  we  can  have  a  lively  perception  of  external 

objects,  without  the  use  of  our  organs  of  sense,  22. 
Drowsiness.      See  Sleep. 
DUTIES.     See  3Ioral  duties,  Doiihtfulness. 

arise  out  of  relations,  however  made  known,  158. 

the  reasons  of  Christian  duties  evident,  222. 

EARTH,  the  Earth  has  the  appearance  of  being  a  ruin, 
210. 
EDUCATION.     See  Instriiction,  Assistance. 

its  power  for  evil,  77. 
Effect,  in  architecture,  &c.,  245. 
Effects.      See  Consequences. 
ENDS.      See  Final  Causes,  Means. 

for  which  the  world  may  have  been  constituted,  7. 

these  may  be  beyond  our  faculties,  35. 
of  creation,  as  regards  this  world,  a  mature  state  of  life, 

90. 
the  whole  end  of  man's  being  placed  here  not  pretended 

to  be  accounted  for,  103. 
we  unavoidably  judge  certain  ends  preferable  to  others,  8. 
we  are  not  competent  judges  as  to  the  mode  of  bringing 

about  the  ends  of  God's  government,  137. 
it  is  doubtful  whether  the  Author  of  nature  sees  things 
as  ends  and  means,  199. 
Endeavours  to  enforce  upon  ourselves  and  others  good  im- 
pressions are  virtuous  acts,  86,  88. 
ENTHUSIASM. 

its  effects  strange,  253. 
often  mixed  with  deceit,  255. 
prejudices  of  like  effects  to  it,  common,  255. 
does  not  destroy  the  evidence  of  testimony,  253. 
cannot  be  alleged  as  destroying  the  evidence  of  Christi- 
anity, 257. 
not  to  be  considered  till  the  matter  in  dispute  is  proved 

incredible,  254. 
Christianity  has  more  consistency  and  a  greater  tendency 
to  promote  virtue,  than  could  have  been  expected  from 
enthusiasm,  &c.,  191. 
Epictetus,  cited,  321,  n, 
Euclid's  Elements,  274. 
Events  have  always  unknown  future  consequences,  129. 

EVIDENCE.      See  Probable,  Historical,  Testimony,  Christi- 
anity. 


350  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

EVIDENCE  (continued). 

which  leaves  room  for  doubt  should  influence  practice,  3, 

234,  289,  290. 
perceived  degrees  of  it  should  have  proportionate  weight, 

234. 
on  which  we  act  as  regards  our  temporal  interests,  223. 
conviction  arising  from  many  items  of  it  is  like  the  effect 

in  architecture,  &c.,  245. 
cannot  be  trulv  judged  of  without  careful  consideration, 

266. 
circumstantial  evidence  often  as  convincing  as  direct,  283. 
degrees  of  it  not  distinguishable  with  perfect  exactitude, 

233. 
confuted  in  one  case,  may  be  sufficient  in  another,  256. 
which  keeps  the  mind  in  doubt,  is  not  acknowledged 

without  modesty  and  fairness,  265. 
we  are  obliged  ordinarilj^  to  take  up  with  extremely  un- 
satisfactory evidence,  293. 
the  practical  question  concerning  it  in  ordinary  matters, 

294-5. 
overbearing  evidence  is  not  according  to  the  method  of 

Providence,  307. 
OF  Religion  must  be  judged  of  by  reason,  190. 

may  be  designedly  left  by  God  less  than  it  might 

have  been,  241. 
liable  to  objections  which  those  who  can  see,  can 

see  through,  240. 
even  when  doubtful  should  beget  a  serious  appre- 
hension that  it  may  be  true,  231. 
dissatisfaction  with  it  may  be  men's  own  fault,  238. 
less  than  it  might  have  been,  to  serve  as  a  proba- 
tion, 239,  n. 
sufficient  for  purposes  of  probation,  294. 
of  natural  religion,  the  external  not  affected  by  the  opi- 
nion of  necessity,  121. 
of  revelation,  different  in  different  ages,  225. 

not  appearing  obvious  may  be  part  of  some  men's 
trial,  229. 
OF  Christianity  considered  in  its  particular  nature,  Pt. 
II.  Ch.  VII.,  244. 

such  as  in  the  nature  of  it  cannot  be  destroyed, 

however  lessened,  285. 
consists  of  miracles  and  prophecy  and  other  things, 

making  up  a  long  series,  244. 
the  fact  of  converts  having  believed  its  miracles, 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.         351 

EVIDEXCE  OF  Christianity  (^continued). 

testimony  distinct  from  the  mere  historical  evi- 
dence, 251. 
how  unbelievers  pretend  to  refute  it,  252. 
its  weight  impaired  by  our  being  familiarized  with 
it,  282. 
EVILs      See  Wickedness,  3Iisery. 

our  ignorance  an  answer  to  objections  drawn  from  its 

existence,  131. 
though  it  may  effect  good,  possibly  more  good  might 

have  been  effected  without  it,  134. 
presumptuous  to  imagine  that  the  world  might  have 

been  so  constituted  a^  to  exclude  it,  204. 
reliefs  and  remedies  even  for  voluntary  evil,  provided  by 

the  Author  of  nature,  204. 
mankind  naturally  connect  natural  and  moral  evil,  325. 

EXAMPLE.      See  Education. 

tendency  and  influence  of  virtue  byway  of  example,  65, 

67. 
bad  example  a  temptation,  77. 

those  who  are  doubtful  about  religion,  responsible  for  the 
example  they  set,  232. 
Existence.     See  Necessary,  Present. 

EXPERIENCE.     See  Freedom,  Instinct. 

how  it  confirms  the  unity  of  the  mind,  19. 

it  is  doubtful  whether  our  natm-al  faculties  would  be  of 

use  without  it,  89. 
it  and  revelation  alone  show  us  how  to  obtain  any  kind 

of  benefits,  160. 
teaches  us  the  good  and  bad  consequences  of  our  actions, 

221. 
EXTERNAL. 

as  really  a  part  of  religion  as  the  internal,  157. 
3IANNER  of  WORSHIP,  matter  of  revelation,  158. 
WORSHIP  of  GOD  a  moral  duty,  162. 

EYES. 

are  passive  instruments,  like  glasses,  not  percipients,  21. 
given  us  for  what  pui-poses,  36. 

FACT.     See  Matters  of  fact. 
there  is  the  strongest  presumption  against  the  most 
ordinary  facts,  before  the  proof  of  them,  172. 
Faction,  impossible  in  a  virtuous  kingdom,  or  society,  66. 


352  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

FACULTIES.     See  3Ioral  Faculty,  Capacihj,  Powers. 

our  want  of,  for  speculation   upon  the   constitution  of 

the  world,  8. 
natural  faculties  not  given  at  once,  89. 
their  truth  only  proved  by  means  of  themselves,  321-2. 

FALL  or  MAN.      See  Goodness,  3IanMnd. 

it  may  be  accounted  for  by  the  existence  of  particular 

affections,  94,  96. 
possible  consequences  of  one  sin,  97. 
makes  more  and  severer  discipline  necessary,  99. 
our  state  not  to  be  complained  of,  79,  210. 
Christianity  supposes  the  world  in  a  state  of  ruin,  208. 
there  are  natural  appearances  of  our  being  in  a  state  of 

degradation,  78,  305. 
and  the  earth  has  the  appearance  of  being  a  ruin,  211- 

305. 
It  is  not  Christianity  that  has  put  us  in  this  state,  211. 
heathen  moralists  thought  this  a  place  of  punishment, 

211,305. 
it  is  likely  that  the  sin  of  our  first  parents  should  change 
our  state  for  the  worse,  211. 
FALSEHOOD.      See  Veracity. 

naturally  disapproved  by  us,  330. 

men  deal  differently  with  different  degrees  of  it,  255. 

the  use  of  common  forms  of  speech  commonly  understood 

is  not  falsehood,  332. 
no  designed  fiilsehood  without  intention  to  deceive,  332. 
a  man  may  be  obliged  to  what  he  foresees  will  deceive, 
without  intending  it,  332. 
FATALIST.      See  Necessity. 

what  he  asserts,  and  must  assert,  109-12. 
could  not  educate  a  child  on  his  own  principles,  113-14. 
Fate.     See  Necessity. 

Faulty,  nature  and  effects  of  feeling  ones  self  so,  53. 
FEAR.      See  Immortality. 

a  punishment  in  itself,  51. 

of  future  punishment  cannot  be  got  rid  of  by  a  great 

part  of  the  world,  54. 
the  impression  of  it  Aveakened  by  repetition,  86. 
hope  and  fear  proper  motives  to  religious  obedience,  104. 
have  various  effects  on  men's  opinions,  284. 
Fearlessness  with  regard  to  futurity  unreasonable,  44. 
FINAL  CAUSES.     See  Design,  Ends. 

appearance  of  them  proves  an  intelligent  designer  of  the 
world.  45. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.         353 

FINAL  CAUSES  {continued). 

even  under  the  opinion  of  necessity,  112,  118. 
and  in  spite  of  partial  ignorance,  134-72. 
pleasures  and  pains,  instances  of  them,  37. 
the  notion  of  them  does  not  always  suppose  the  end  an- 
swered, 103. 
Final  and  irremediable  punishments,  instances  of,  41,  43. 
FINITE  CREATURES. 

perhaps  uecessai-ily  defectible,  94,  96. 
how  the  danger  of  defection  may  be  diminished,  perhaps 
removed,  98. 

FITNESS  OF  ACTIONS. 

founded  in  the  nature  of  things,  120,  n. 

whether  and  in  Avhat  sense  it  may  determine  the  Will 

of  God,  369, 120,  n. 
supplies  a  proper  proof  of  God's  moral  government,  72, 

298. 
the  language  of  moralists  fomied  upon  it,  296. 
how  applied  to  moral  actions,  326. 
believed  in  by  Butler,  296. 
the  argument  given  by  him  independent  of  it,  296-9. 

FOLLY  and  Foolish  Rashness.     See  Imprudence,  Negligence. 
a  vice,  328. 

somewhat  quite  different  from  mere  incapacity,  328. 
whv  not  so  sensibly  disapproved  by  nature  as  falsehood, 

&c.,  327. 
as  to  present  and  futm-e  interests,  compared,  77,  42. 

FOOLISHNESS. 

of  the  Gospel,  175,  195. 

of  the  means  used  in  the  Christian  dispensation,  195. 
Force  of  this  treatise,  298. 
FORESIGHT.     See  Prophecy. 

a  warning,  33,  37. 

impossible  without  general  laws,  134. 

of  brutes,  183. 

superhuman,  proved  by  the  fulfilment  of  predictions,  263. 
FREEDOM.     See  Liberty. 

the  principle  of  it  forces  itself  upon  the  mind,  296. 

believed  in  by  Butler  though  not  used  in  his  argument, 
296. 

the  opinion  that  we  are  free,  supported  by  experience, 
115. 

the  world  is  constituted  as  though  we  were  free,  115. 

A  A 


354  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

FREEDOM  {continued). 

if  necessary  agents  cannot  be  punished,  we  must  be  free, 

125-6. 
the  principle  of  liberty  makes  a  fall  only  possible,  96. 
in  the  creation  of  the  world  not  necessary  to  the  proof 
of  an  intelligent  Creator,  110. 
Frost,  expected  on  analogical  reasoning  only,  3. 

FUTURE  LIFE.      See  Atheism,  Punishincnt,  Personal  Iden- 
tity, Particular  Affections,  Death. 

its  probability  considered,  Ft.  I.  Ch.  I.,  12. 

this  life  a  state  of  Discipline  for  it,  Ft.  I.  Ch.  V.,  82. 

the  qiiestions  concerning  it,  28,  n. 

what  makes  the  question  concerning  it  of  so  great  im- 
portance to  us,  32. 

opens  an  unbounded  prospect  to  our  hopes  and  fears,  141 . 

foundation  of  all  our  hopes  and  fears,  11,  32. 

implied  in  religion,  32. 

proof  of  it  does  not  prove  religion,  32. 

belief  of  it  greatly  disposes  the  mind  to  attend  to  the 
evidence  of  religion,  32. 

its  credibility  of  equal  practical  effect  with  a  demonstra- 
tion of  it,  31,  32. 

taught  by  the  Gospel,  152. 

what  revelation  alone  teaches  us  concerning  it,  41,  n. 

some  determinate  capacities  and  qualifications  must  be 
necessary  for  it,  84. 

analogy  as  to  the  conditions  of  our  happiness  in  it,  107. 

men's  showing  Avhat  is  in  their  hearts  may  have  respect 
to  it,  108. 

probably  not  a  solitary  state,  but  a  communit}',  93. 
Future  Judgment  implies  some  sort  of  temptation,  73. 
Future  period  looked  forward  to  throughout  Scripture,  269. 
Future  Punishment.     See  Punishment. 

G^  ENERAL  doubts  may  be  raised  concerning  any  fact, 
r  248. 

GENERAL  LAWS.     See  Foresight. 

our  knowledge  and  our  ignorance  concerning  them,  196. 
the  government  of  the  world  is  carried  on  by  them,  51, 
134,  196. 
this  is  proved  by  analogy,  196. 
there  may  be  the  wisest  and  best  reasons  for  it,  58, 
134. 
interference  with  them  would  produce  some  bad  effects, 
135. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.         355 

GENERAL  LAWS  {contimied). 

the  Christian  dispensation  may  have  been  carried  on 

mider  them,  31,  197. 
miracles  may  be  possible  under  them,  197. 
future  punishments  may  follow  wickedness  under  them, 

203.  .  ' 

GENTILES. 

Our  Lord,  their  Saviour,  271. 

on  what  evidence  they  received  Him,  277. 
Gifts,  miraculous.      See  Miracles,  God. 
Glasses,  prepare  objects  for  the  sight,  as  eyes  do,  21. 

GOD.     See  Author   of  nature,   Character,    Christ,    Goodness, 
Governor,  Government,  Moral,  Infinite  intelliqence.  Love, 
Will,  Design. 
our  duties  to  God  the  Father,  157. 

to  His  Son  and  Spirit,  158. 
His  existence  should  be  admitted  by  a  Fatalist,  110. 
has  necessary  existence,  111. 
has  a  character  and  will,  116. 
is  all  perfect,  9. 

may  be  simply  and  absolutely  benevolent,  47. 
our  whole  nature  leads  us  to  ascribe  all  moral  perfection 

to  Him,  9. 
thorough  conviction  of  His  perfection  leads  to  perfection 

in  Religion,  292. 
His  government  by  rewards  and  punishments,  Pt.  I 

Ch.  XL,  32. 
is  the  natural  Governor  of  the  world,  35. 
the  end  for  which  He  made  and  governs  the  world  may 

be  utterly  beyond  our  faculties,  35. 
He  gives  us  pleasures  and  pains  by  showing  us  how  to 

obtain  them,  33. 
His  general  providence  proved  by  miracles  and  pro- 
phecy, 150. 
is  a  moral  Governor,  50. 
dictates  of  the  moral  faculty  His  laws,  118. 
regard  to  His  authority  coincident  with  justice  and  our 

own  chief  interest,  104. 
the  absence  of  interpositions  may  be  an  instance  of  His 

goodness,  136. 
does  not  dispense  His  gifts  according  to  our  notion  of 

the  advantage  they  Avould  be  to  us,  187. 
we  must  not  expect  the  same  information  concerning 

His  conduct,  as  concerning  our  duties,  221. 


35^  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

GOD  (^continued). 

how  He  has  given  us  all  things  necessary  to  life  and 

godliness,  222. 
we  do  not  know  in  what  manner  He  would  be  likely  to 

instruct  us,  179. 
does  instruct  us  by  experience,  221. 

and  invention,  183. 
objections  to  His  scheme  of  a  Mediator  obscure,  but  our 

duties  plain,  221. 
His  visible  government  carried  on  by  the  mediation  of 

others,  51,  201. 
makes  use  of  a  variety  of  means,  199. 
uses  a  progressive  series  of  means,  200. 
is  the  original  Author  of  prophecy,  262. 
His  covenant  with  a  particular  nation,  270. 
GOOD  ACTIONS.     See  Virtue. 

never  punished  as  beneficial  to  society,  52. 
not  natural  that  they  should  be  punished,  52. 
GOOD  MEN. 

disposed  to  befriend  good  men  as  such,  54. 
how  hindered  from  union  in  this  life,  64. 

GOODNESS.      See  Virtue,  Benevolence,  Interpositions. 
What  the  Divine  goodness  may  consist  in,  34. 
it  is  consistent  with  perfect  goodness  that  all  creation 
might  have  been  in  a  state  to  perish,  but  for  what 
God  had  appointed  to  prevent  it,  210. 
GOSPEL.      See  Foolishness,  Christianity. 
an  evidence  of  natural  religion,  151. 
light  and  immortality  brought  to  light  by  it,  146, 152. 
GOVERNMENT.     See  Civil,  Domestic,  Divine,  Moral,  3Iu- 
gistrates,  Natural. 
the  formal  notion  of  it,  37. 
or  THE  WORLD,  proof  of  it,  45,  36. 

is  a  scheme,  or  system,  128. 
OF  God,  a  scheme  incomprehensible,  Pt.  I.  Ch.  VII.,  127. 
a  scheme,  system,  or  constitution,  127. 
coiu-se  of  nature  another  name  for  it,  35,  51. 
uniformity  of  it  no  reason  to  deny  it,  35. 
veracity  and  justice  its  natural  rule,  118. 
reason  to  think  it  will  be  found  to  correspond  to 

our  nature,  119. 
we  are  not  competent  judges  of  its  scheme,  130. 
may  be  just  and  good  notwithstanding  the  exist- 
ence of  evil,  131. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.         357 

GOVERXOR  OF  THE  WORLD.  See  Moral,  God,  Govern- 
ment. 

to  be  assumed,  6. 

the  opinion  of  necessity  does  not  destroy  the  proof  of 
His  intelligence,  110. 

GRATITUDE. 

due  to  Christ  the  moment  the  Gospel  is  believed,  161-2. 
implies  a  distinction  between  being  the  mere  instrument 

of  good  and  having  a  good  intention,  322. 
contradicts  the  objection  to  religion  on  the  opinion  of 
necessity,  125. 
Greece,  268. 
Grotius,  cited,  239,  n. 

GUILT. 

not  annihilated  by  frailty  and  temptations,  44. 
taken  into  account  in  civil  tribunals,  56. 
the  idea  of  it  always  associated  with  that  of  ill  desert, 
324. 


H 


ABITS. —  Of  Resignation,    Virtue,  SiC.      See   Improve- 
ment. 

of  the  body  and  mind,  85. 
of  perception  and  of  action,  85. 
passive  habits,  85. 
faculty  of  acquiring  them,  84. 
are  the  means  by  which  Ave  are  prepared  in  one  state  for 

another,  84. 
we  get  by  them  aptness,  readiness,  and  often  pleasure  in 

a  course  of  action,  88. 
thev  are  produced  bv  repeated  acts,  86,  and  by  acts  onlv, 

88. 
active  habits  grow  more  powerful  as  the  motives  are  by 

repetition  less  felt,  87. 
we  know  not  how  far  similar  effects  might  be  wrought 

in  us  at  once,  88. 
nature  puts  us  in  a  position  to  acquire  them,  90. 

and  this  opportunity  must  not  be  lost,  91. 
an  immoral  habit  is  not  raised  by  obedience  to  a  few 

detached  commands,  190. 
Half  views,  a  source  of  error,  287. 

HAPPINESS.      See  Interest,  Pleasure,  Prosperitij. 

AND  MISERY,  not  always  distributed  according  to  per- 
sonal merit,  58. 


358         Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

HAPPINESS  AND  MISERY  (continued). 

are  not  our  fate  so  as  not  to  depend  upon  our  ac- 
tions, 117. 
ours  as  men  are  very  much  in  one  another's  power,  57. 
hereafter  may  depend  upon  our  actions  here,  32. 
results  from  our  nature  and  condition  jointly,  84. 
our  present  enjoyments  are  very  much  in  our  own  power, 

33. 
possible  reasons  why  we  are  not  made  happy  without 

our  own  actions,  34. 
improvement  in  virtue  improvement  in  happiness,  96. 
virtue  produces  it,  48-58. 

and  tends  to  produce  it  in  a  higher  degree,  60. 
a  necessary  qualification  for  a  future  state  of  it,  92, 
the  balance  of  it  now,  not  always  perhaps  on  the  side  of 

virtue,  48-9. 
a  due  concern  for  it  is  the  same  as  prudence,  327. 
HAZARD.      See  Banger. 

Hazard  and  danger  being  put  upon  us  is  a  speculative 
difficulty,  80. 
He  that  hath  ears  to  hear,  let  him  hear,  239. 
HEATHEN.     See  Atonement. 

not  in  so  advantageous  a  position  in  regard  to  natural 

religion  as  we,  152,  154. 
some  may  have  had  natural  religion  specially  enforced 
upon  them  in  consequence  of  the  existence  of  revela- 
tion, 225. 
Hebrews,  doctrine  of  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews,  212. 
HINDERANCES. 

to  justice  accidental,  65. 

accidental  hinderances  and  natural  tendencies  in  respect 

to  virtue,  65,  71. 
those  to  natural  and  supernatural  light  of  the  same  kind, 

186. 
levity,  carelessness,  passion  and  prejudice  hinderances  to 
right  information,  239. 
HISTORICAL  EVIDENCE.     See  Testimony,  Christianity. 
not  demonstrative,  246. 
not  destroyed  by  saying  that  men  may  deceive  or  be 

deceived,  257. 
of  the  miracles  the  same  as  of  the  common  facts  in  Scrip- 
ture, 246. 
HISTORY.     See  Scripture. 

its  account  of  religion  in  the  first  ages,  122. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.         359 

HISTORY  (continued). 

tends  to  show  that  religion  was  first  introduced  by  rev- 
elation, 171, 122. 
may  be  confirmed  by  cotemporaiy  or  subsequent  events, 

246. 
Scripture  history  is  so  confirmed,  246. 

testimony  of  profane  history  to  it,  276,  275. 
a  sketch  of  it,  267. 

how  much  of  profane  history  appears  in  it,  268. 
that  it  cannot  be  clearly  disproved  an  evidence  of 
its  truth,  269. 
Christianity  and  the  proof  of  it  are  both  historical,  297. 
prophecy  is  the  history  of  things  before  they  come  to 
pass,  267. 
Hobbes.     Leviathan,  c.  17,  p.  87,  cited,  322. 

HOLY  SPIRIT. 

our  Guide  and  Sanctifier,  157. 
His  miraculous  mission,  &c.,  194. 

our  duties  to  Him  moral,  and  obligations  of  reason,  156-8. 
Hope  and  Fear.     See  Fear. 

HUMAX.      See  Mankind. 

Creatures  perpetually  liable  to  go  wi-ong,  and  actually 
doing  so,  77. 

capable  of  becoming  qualified  for  new  states  of  life, 
84. 
Life,  part  of  a  much  larger  plan  of  things,  139. 

and  human  happiness  require  fitting  capacities  and 
circumstances,  84. 
Nature  prone  to  think  the  less  important  of  two  things 
of  no  value,  166. 

HYPOTHESIS. 

building  a  world  on  it,  5. 
applying  reasoning  by  it,  6. 

ICE,  its  existence  disbelieved  before  experience,  2. 
Identity.     See  Personal  Ideyitity. 

IGNORANCE. 

how  this  life  is  the  preparation  for  another  no  reason 
against  the  fact,  92. 

of  the  employments  of  a  future  life,  no  ground  to  expect 
a  virtuous  character  unnecessar}',  93. 

ours  of  the  natural  should  lead  us  to  expect  not  to  un- 
derstand the  moral  world,  127, 


360  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

IGNORANCE  (continued). 

ours  concerning  the  relations  of  things  to  one  another 
and  to  ourselves,  128-30. 

answers  objections  against  God's  Providence,  131. 

not  easy  for  any  one  always  to  bear  in  mind  its  extent, 
and  make  due  allowance  for  it,  131. 

■what  it  is  not  an  answer  to,  132. 

may  answer  objections  to  a  thing  without  aflfecting  its 
proof,  137. 

•when  an  argument  from  it  is  valid,  136-9. 

different  effects  of  total  and  partial  ignorance,  136. 

total  ignorance  would  not  destro}^  moral  obligations,  137. 

the  answers  to  objections  against  Providence  are  taken 
not  from  it,  but  from  something  analogv  tells  us  of  it, 
138. 

as  much  and  as  little  an  excuse  for  neglecting  the  obli- 
gations shown  by  revelation  as  those  shown  by  rea- 
son, 159. 

those  Avho  know  most  ignorant  of  many  things,  168. 

ours  of  the  course  of  nature  so  deep  that  we  know  not 
whether  it  may  include  miracles,  172-4. 

objections  against  Christianity  mostly  refuted  by  it,  175. 

we  are  in  no  wise  judges  of  many  things  we  are  apt  to 
think  ourselves  very  competent  judges  of,  177. 

ours,  how  it  might  be  expected  that  natural  and  super- 
natural knowledge  should  be  given,  179. 

concerning  the  laws  of  miracles,  not  greater  than 

concerning  many  natural  occurrences,  197. 
concerning  the  reason  and  extent  of  natural  punish- 
ment, 206. 

we  are  not  judges  whether  a  Mediator  were  necessary, 
or  of  the  nature,  or  parts  of  His  office,  217. 

absurd  to  argue  that  dispensations  cannot  be  from  God, 
because  we  do  not  discern  the  reasons  of  them,  220. 

in  matters  of  religion,  often  owing  to  men's  own  fault, 
238. 
Ill  behaviour  punished  as  such,  56. 

IMAGINATION. 

author  of  all  error,  17. 

a  source  of  discontent,  105. 

difficultv  of  silencing  it,  and  reasons  of  that  difficulty, 

17,  29-30. 
likely  to  mislead  us  concerning  the  effect  of  death,  17. 
must  not  be  substituted  for  experience,  30. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.         361 

IMMORALITY. 

■would  prove  a  pretended  revelation  false,  176. 

falsely  objected  to  some  precepts  in  Scripture,  189. 

its  heinousness  greatly  increased  by  becoming  acquainted 
with  Christianity,  308. 
Immortality.     See  Future  life,  Gospel. 

IMPOSSIBILITIES. 

many  unknown  to  us,  34. 

real,  are  not  always  apparent,  131. 

IMPROBABLE. 

improbable  events  to  be  considered  in  action,  3,  223. 
internal  inipi-obabilities  do  not  weigh  against  external 
probable  proof,  182. 

IMPROVEMENT.     See  Virtue,  Capacity,  Habits. 

in  virtue  and  piety,  the  end  of  our  being  placed  here,  83. 

in  understanding  and  natural  faculties,  gradual,  89. 

gained  by  exercise,  89. 

wisdom  of  this,  89. 

we  are  capable  of  moral  improvement,  and  want  it,  93. 

moral  and  religious  habits,  the  instruments  of  it,  92-3. 

of  the  principle  of  virtue  by  habit,  a  defence  against  the 

dangers  incident  to  finite  creatures,  96. 
in  virtue,  advancement  in  happiness,  96. 
the  capacity  of  it  limited  in  respect  of  our  intellectual 

and  bodily,  perhaps  also  of  our  moral  powers,  102. 

IMPRUDENCE.      See  Folly,  Prudence. 
naturally  punished,  39,  327. 
why  not  so  strongly  condemned  by  conscience  as  other 

vices,  327-8. 
beyond  a  certain  bound,  cannot  escape  punishment,  41. 

INCONSIDERATENESS.     See  Folly. 

often  punished  as  much  as  any  active  vice,  41,  238. 
Indivisible  powers  imply  indivisible  subjects,  17. 

INDULGENCE. 

the  least  in  forbidden  circumstances  increases  the  tend- 
ency to  wrong,  97. 
vicious  indulgences  not  only  criminal  but  depraving,  98. 

INFANCY. 

the  proper  state  for  acquiring  what  is  necessary  in  man- 
hood, 90. 

passing  from  it  to  manhood  proves  a  law  of  progress,  12- 
13. 


362  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

Infamy,  a  punishment  of  vice,  57. 

INFINITE  INTELLIGENCE.     See  God. 

no  object  of  knowledge  can  be  to  it  the  subject  of  prob- 
able evidence,  3. 

Information  needed  in  temporal  matters,  not  always  given  us, 
242. 

INJURY. 

always  distinguished  from  mere  harm,  and  just  punish- 
ment, 322. 
Hobbes  says  that  this  is  peculiar  to  mankind,  322. 
Innocent  people  daily  suffer  for  the  guilty,  218. 
Insects,  their  changes  prove  a  law  of  progress  in  states  of 
being,  13. 

INSPIRATION.     See  Prophecy. 

we  are  no  judges  by  what  laws  GoD  would  give  it,  178. 

makes  a  difference  in  the  rules  of  interpretation,  166, 
181,  262-5. 
Instruction,  not  commonly  given  in  the  manner  best  suited  to 

recommend  it,  185, 183. 
Instrumentality  of  others.      See  Assistance,  Mediator. 
Intellectual  powers  noi  affected  by  some  mortal  diseases,  there- 
fore probably  not  destroyed  by  death,  27. 
Intemperance,  its  consequences,  39. 

INTENTION. 

of  such  and  such  consequences,  part  of  the  action  itself, 

323-4. 
madmen  and  idiots  capable  of  the  intention  of  doing 

harm,  326. 

INTEREST.      See  Self-love,  Temporal 

a  moral  course  of  behaviour  must  be  our  final  interest,  95. 
our  own  chief  interest  a  just  and  natural  principle  of 

action,  104. 
SENSE  OF  INTEREST,  not  sufficient  to  restrain  us,  95,  n. 
needs  improvement,  95,  n. 
in  Avhat  sense  part  of  the  idea  of  virtue,  95,  n. 
our  present  interest,  not  forced  upon  us,  80. 

not  to  be  secured  Avithout  danger  and  difficulty,  74. 
origin  of  doubtfulness  concerning  our  temporal  interest, 

223. 
due  concern  for  it  the  same  as  prudence,  327. 

INTERPOSITIONS.     See  General  laws,  Miracles, 
might  have  bad  effects,  133. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.         363 

INTERPOSITIOXS  {continued). 

God's  not  interposing  may  be  an  instance  of  His  good- 
ness, 136. 
to  save  man  from  destruction,  possible,  209. 
Invention  seems  a  capricious  mode  of  instruction,  183. 
IRREGULAEITY. 

irregular  behaviour,  its  ill  consequences,  205. 

what  we  call  irregularities  may  not  really  be  so,  133-196. 

it  may  be  impossible  to  prevent  them  by  general  laws, 

135. 
unreasonable  to  wish  them  remedied  by  special  interpo- 
sitions, 135. 
lERELIGION. 

one  of  the  greatest  instances  of  vice,  205. 

especially  in  persons  of  influence  or  with  a  character  for 

understanding,  232. 
not  justified  by  the  doubtfulness  of  the  evidence  for  re- 
ligion, 234. 
a  positive  principle  of  irreligion,  301. 

JEROM'S  account  of  Porphyrin's  explanation  of  Daniel, 
264,  n. 

JEWS. 

their  promised  prosperity,  naturally  connected  with  their 

predicted  holiness,  67. 
the  establishment  of  their  religion  confirms  the  miracu- 
lous history  of  the  Scriptures,  246. 
their  sacrifices  of  expiation  ended  in  Christ,  215. 
a  statement  of  their  scriptural  histoiy,  270-3. 
which  is  confirmed  by  known  facts,  276. 
seems  only  to  be  accounted  for  by  the  truth  of  the 
miracles  recorded,  277. 
their  dispersion  a  fulfilment  of  prophecy,  278. 
their  continuance  a  standing  miracle,  278. 

not  accounted  for  by  the  natm-e  of  their  religion, 
279. 
their  ultimate   restoration  made  probable  by   present 

facts,  280. 
their  histoiy,  as  gathered  from  profane  writers,  281. 
S.  JOHN. 

to  what  he  probably  alludes  in  the  first  words  of  his 

Gospel,  268. 
his  doctrine  of  Christ's  preexistence  confirmed  by  S. 

Paul,  268. 
his  description  of  perfect  religion  (1  John  iv.  18),  292. 


364  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

JUDGMENT.     See  Future  judgment. 

involuntarily  substituted  for  sensation  in  several  cases, 
85. 
Just  persons,  their  future  condition,  210,  n. 

JUSTICE.      See  Virtue,  Veracity. 

a  natural  rule  of  government,  50. 

often  artificially  eluded,  60. 

a  special  means  of  uniting  society,  63. 

the  doctrine  of  distributive  justice  only  the  completion  of 

what  we  now  see,  69-70. 
coincident  with  our  own  chief  interest,  and  a  regard  to 

God's  authoritj^  104. 
notions  of  justice  and  injustice  remain  even  while  we  are 

making  suppositions  inconsistent  with  them,  117. 
not  to  be  sacrificed  to  supposed  benevolence,  330-2. 
justice  and  veracity  our  rule  of  life,  332. 

KINGDOM. 
of  Christ  how  described  in  Scripture,  215. 
the  Church  His  Kingdom,  215. 
the  hypothesis  of  one  perfectly  virtuous  and  its  conse- 
quences, 66. 

KNOWLEDGE. 

in  the  Sci-iptures  to  be  acquired  like  natural  knowledge 
and  how,  186. 

with  time  and  attention  necessary  to  examine  into  reli- 
gion and  its  evidences,  240. 

cannot  constitute  truth  but  presupposes  it,  314. 
Koran,  referred  to,  249. 

LABOUR  and  industry  absolutely  necessary  to  us,  91. 
LANGUAGE.     See  Words. 
its  inherent  defects,  183. 
learnt  by  long  experience  and  exercise,  91. 
of  the  prophecies,  figurative  and  hieroglyphical,  176. 
of  moralists,  296. 
Law  of  Moses  an  authoritative  republication  of  natural  reli- 
gion, 151. 

LAWS  OF  NATURE.     See   Course  of  Nature,  Providence, 
Analogy^  Natural  Laws. 
that  the  same  being  should  exist  in  different  states,  13. 
that  by  which  we  may  lose  part  of  the  body,  19. 
that  one  state  is  a  state  of  discipline  for  another,  92. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.         365 

LAWS  or  NATURE  (continued). 

that  we  should  form  practical  principles  by  attention, 

use  and  discipline,  107. 
many  of  them  unknown  to  us,  196. 
Levity,  carelessness,  passion  and  prejudice  hinder  our  being 

rightly  informed  in  anything,  239,  308. 
LIBERTY.     See  Freedom. 

necessary  to  the  progress  of  knowledge,  186. 
Lies,  persons  who  would  not  invent  will  propagate,  and  some 

who  would  not  propagate  will  let  them  pass,  255. 
LIFE.      See  Future  life,  Gospel,  Human. 

everv-  species  of  creature  is  adapted  to  its  own  state  of 

life,  83. 
creatures  genei-ally  capable  of  becoming  adapted  to  a 

new  state  of  life,  84. 
our  human  life  a  result  of  our  nature  and  condition 

jointly,  84. 
two  states  of  life  in  which  men  live,  25. 
whether  life  is  desirable  or  no,  sometimes  questioned,  293. 
it  is  not  preserved  to  us  without  our  care  and  attention, 

33. 
justice  and  veracity  our  rule  of  life,  332. 
probability  to  us  the  guide  of  life,  3. 
LIGHT  OF  NATURE.     See  Natural  religion,  Reason. 
has  a  great  resemblance  to  revelation,  185. 
not  so  sufficient  as  to  make  revelation  superfluous,  147. 
only  warns  men,  leaving  them  to  act  as  they  please  till 
the  time  of  judgment,  155. 
Likely,  its  meaning  and  how  attained,  2. 
Likeness  begets  in  every  one  presumption,  opinion  and  full 

conviction,  2-5. 
Limbs  have  no  power  of  moving  themselves,  23. 
Living  agents,  no  reason  to  think  any  system  of  matter  essen- 
tial to  them,  20. 
LIVING  BEINGS.     See  Personal  Identity,  Death. 
not  discerptible  or  compounded,  17. 
must  have  greater  size  than  a  material  atom,  or  be  in- 
capable of  dissolution,  19-20. 
organs  of  sense,  no  part  of  them,  22. 
no  probability  of  their  ever  ceasing  to  be,  30. 
their  sameness  independent  of  their  memory,  319. 
LIVING  POWERS. 

what,  13,  their  destruction,  14,  n.,  16. 

no  ground  to  think  them  destroyed  by  death,  16. 


366  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

LIVING  POWERS  {continued). 

nothing  but  death  can  be  supposed  to  destroy  them,  14. 
we  know  not  on  what  they  depend,  15. 
may  exist  though  suspended,  15. 

LOCKE,  J. 

his  story  of  the  Prince  of  Siam,  2. 
on  person  and  personal  identity,  316. 

his  observations  on  them  hasty,  317. 
Locomotive  powers,  to  what  part  of  us  they  belong,  22. 
Logic,  the  examination  of  the  force  of  analogy  belongs  to  it,  4. 
Love,  all  comparisons  must  fall  short  of  God's  love,  209. 
Ludicrous  turn  may  be  indulged  in  till  we  lose  all  sense  of 
prudence  and  conduct,  238. 

MA  GISTRATES,  their  government  analogous  to  God's 
government,  37. 
3Iahometanism,  not  offered  on  the  foot  of  public  miracles,  249. 
3Iahometans,  how  probably  affected  by  the  light  of  revelation, 

226. 
Manifestation  of  Character.     See  Character. 

MANKIND.     See  Full  of  3Ian,  Human  creatures,  &c.,  Mer- 
ciful. 

their  whole  nature  leads  them  to  ascribe  all  moral  per- 
fection to  God,  9. 
-     unavoidably  accountable  for  their  behaviour,  52. 

why  they  prevail  over  the  brutes,  60. 

an  inferior  part  of  the  creation  of  God,  78. 

their  natural  condition  one  of  trial  and  difficulty,  79. 

left  by  nature  unformed  and  unfinished  creatures,  90. 

creatures  who  are  fallen  from  their  original  rectitude,  99. 

before  the  formation  of  habits  of  virtue  deficient  and  in 
danger  of  falling,  94. 

are  evidently  permitted  to  act  as  they  will,  180. 

prone  to  place  religion  in  peculiar  positive  rites,  164. 

have  no  right  to  life  and  property  but  by  the  gift  of 
God,  190. 

their  life  is  not  only  successive  but  progressive,  199-200. 

impatient,  200. 

generally  do  not  realize  the  present  awful  consequences 
of  vice,  &c.,  205. 

naturally  in  a  very  strange  state,  211. 

no  two  men  exactly  alike,  224. 

their  suspicions  should  be  acknowledged  as  well  as  their 
credulity,  251. 

naturally  endowed  with  a  regard  to  truth,  255. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.  367 

MARTYRS.     See  Apostles. 

objections  to  their  testimony  insufficient,  252,  &c. 
Ilaterial  world,  in  a  manner  boundless  and  immense,  66. 
MATTER.     See  Bodi/. 

when  proved  indivisible,  1 7. 

solid  elementary  particles  of  it,  19. 

our  matter  does  not  cease  to  exist  by  death,  14,  n. 

foreign  matter  has  the  same  relation  to  us  as  our  mate- 
rial body,  21. 

MATTERS  OF  FACT. 

in  this  treatise  Christianity,  &c.,  are  so  regarded,  297. 

distinction  between  them  and  abstract  truths,  297. 

their  credibility  or  truth  proves  nothing  of  their  wisdom 
or  goodness,  127. 

analogy  can  only  prove  things  true  or  credible  as  mat- 
ters of  fact,  127. 

analogy  is  the  only  proof  of  most  and  a  confirmation  of 
all  matters  of  fact  to  which  it  can  be  applied,  299, 

the  proof  of  religion  as  a  matter  of  fact  cannot  be  aftected 
by  the  opinion  of  necessity,  117,  &c. 

MATURITY  or  UNDERSTANDING. 

not  given  at  once,  89. 

might  not  be  useful  if  so  given,  89. 
MEANS.     See  Ends. 

are  used  in  Christianity  as  in  nature,  195. 

experience  and  not  reason  is  the  judge  of  their  effects, 
133. 

undesirable  means  often  conduce  to  desirable  ends,  132. 

their  apparent  may  be  contrary  to  their  real  tendency, 
133. 

those  bv  which  instruction  is  given  to  brutes  and  men, 
183." 

why  God  makes  use  of  those  he  does,  a  mystery  in  na- 
ture as  well  as  in  revelation,  199. 

MEDIATOR.     See  Assistance,  Christ. 

the  appointment  of  a  Mediator  considered,  Pt.  II.  Ch. 
v.,  201. 

we  are  brought  into  the  world  and  receive  its  satisfac- 
tions by  the  mediation  of  others,  201. 

one  between  God  and  man,  agreeable  to  the  course  of 
nature,  201. 

Christ's  office  of  Mediator  how  represented  in  Scripture, 
211. 


368  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

Memory,  enables  us  to  store  up  our  ideas  and  knowledge,  84. 

Merciful  alloicances  will  be  made  for  man,  227. 

Mercy,  in  the  constitution  of  the  world,  205. 

Merit  and  demerit,  not  always  the  measm-e  of  happiness  and 

misery,  58. 
MESSIAH.     See  C/aist 

His  office,  193. 

prophecies  concerning  Him,  271. 

facts  concerning  Him  from  profane  history,  277. 

METHOD. 

of  providential  conduct.     See  Law  of  Nature,  Course  of 
Nature,  Providence. 

of  the  argument  of  this  treatise,  9, 
^Horoscope,  used  in  the  same  way  that  the  eye  is,  23. 
Militant,  virtue  is  militant  here,  64. 
MIRACLES.      See  Particular  Institutions. 

supposed  presumptions  against  them,  Ft.  II.  Ch.  11., 
167. 

miracle  a  relative  term,  31,  170. 

may  be  natural  to  other  beings,  31. 

may  happen  in  obedience  to  general  laws,  197. 

their  design,  150. 

natural  religion  may  be  proved  by  them,  150. 

the  notion  of  them,  169. 

visible  and  invisible,  169. 

no  presumption  against  them  at  the  beginning  of  the 
world,  170. 

no  presumption  against  the  more  or  less  of  its  exercise, 
when  once  a  miraculous  power  is  admitted,  171. 

no  argument  from  analogy  for,  or  against   them,  in 
themselves,  172. 

the  presumptions  against  them  after  the  settlement  of  [a 
course  of  nature  considered,  172,  &c. 

the  state  of  religion  in  the  first  ages  seems  to  imply  a 
miraculous  origin,  171,  122. 

religion  and  the  moral  system  of  the  universe  give  dis- 
tinct reasons  for  miracles,  173. 

must  be  compared  with  the  extraordinary  phsenomena  of 
nature,  173. 

occasions  for  them  might  arise  in  the  long  lapse  of  ages, 
173. 

our  seeing  reasons  for  them  makes  them  credible,  174. 

miraculous  gifts  not  unusual  in  apostolic  times,  and  ir- 
regularly u^ed  then,  184. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.         369 

MIRACLES  (continued). 

observations  upon  the  evidence  of  miracles,  245. 

the  evidence  of  the  miracles  in  scripture,  the  same  as  of 

the  common  facts,  245. 
Christianity  alone  propounded  as  proved  by  public  mi- 
racles, 249. 
the  fact  that  it  was  embraced  on  that  ground  proves 

their  truth,  250. 
their  truth  necessary  to  account  for  the  establishment  of 

Judaism  and  Christianity,  246. 
St.  Paul  speaks  of  them  as  matters  of  course,  249. 
pagan  and  popish  miracles  do  not  stand  on  the  same 

basis,  250. 
the  Jews  a  standing  miracle,  278. 
events  apparently  natural  may  by  relation  be  miraculous, 

279. 
MISERY.     See  Happiness. 

much  misery  brought  by  men  upon  themselves,  39. 
various  miseries  of  life,  contingent  upon  our  actions,  80. 
we  mav  make  ourselves  as  miserable  as  ever  we  please, 

34.  ' 
the  sight  of  it  produces  compassion  and  indignation, 

upon  Avhat  conditions,  324-5. 

MODERATION.     See  Self-government. 

the  state  of  the  world  has  a  tendency  to  produce  it,  100. 
MORAL. 

Duties.     See  Duties. 

take  precedence  of  positive  ones,  163. 

our  Lord  declares  expressly  for  them  before  positive 

ones,  164. 
duties  resulting  from  revealed  relations  are  moral, 
156-7. 
Faculty.     See  Conscience. 

"we  have  a  moral  approving  and  disapproving  fa- 
culty, 321. 
different  appellations  of  it,  322,  321,  n. 
implies  a  rule  of  action,  118. 
carries  authority  with  it,  118,  321,  n. 
the  guide  of  action  and  life,  321,  n. 
its  dictates  are  the  laws  of  GoD  in  a  sense  including 

sanctions,  118,  56. 
proofs  of  its  existence,  321-3. 
its  object  is  actions  and  practical  principles,  323, 
321,  n. 

B  B 


370  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

MORAL  Faculty  (^continued). 

deals,  not  with  what  we  enjoy  or  suffer,  but  with 
what  we  do  or  might  have  done,  324. 
Good  and  evil,  imply  good  and  ill  desert,  324. 
Government.     See  God. 

God's  moral  government,  Pt.  I.,  Ch.  III.,  45. 
Government,  a  practical  proof  of  it,  65-70. 
what  makes  us  capable  of  it,  321. 
what  it  consists  in,  46,  330. 
probation  implied  in  it,  108. 
an  instance  of  it,  56. 

implied  in  God's  natural  government,  71, 
scheme  of  it  not  fictitious  but  natural,  71. 
differences  between  what  is  implied  in  it,  and  in  a 

state  of  Probation,  73. 
our  present  condition  cannot  be  shown  inconsistent 

with  it,  82. 
the  moral  and  natural  government  of  the  world 

make  up  one  scheme,  129-30. 
how  it  is  exercised,  193. 
is  not  perfect  as  we  see  it  now,  48. 
may  be  perfect  in  the  highest  degree,  193. 
has  a  tendency  to  perfection,  60. 
Law,  as  much  a  matter  of  revealed  command  as  positive 
institutions  are,  163. 
written  in  our  hearts,  163. 
Nature,  has  scope  to  act  in  us,  this  an  instance  of  moral 
government,  57. 
it  is  itself  a  proof  that  God  will  support  virtue,  57, 

72. 
our  having  it  makes  us  capable  of  moral  govern- 
ment, 321. 
Precepts  and  duties,  what  they  are,  161. 

in  some  respects  resemble  positive  precepts,  161,  n. 
Principle  rightly  controls  but  does  not  originate  par- 
ticular affections,  94. 
Understanding,  96. 

may  be  perverted,  123. 
Virtue,  nothing  can  make  us  acceptable  to  GOD  with- 
out it,  164. 
MORALITY  OF  ACTIONS.     See  Htness. 

depends  partly  on  the  intention  of  the  agent,  323. 
partly  on  a  comparison  between  them  and  His  nature 

and  capacities,  326. 
is  immutable,  189. 


'•  Index  of  Words  and  Things.  371 

Moses,  his  miracles,  245,  277. 
Motives,  to  religion,  145. 
MYSTERIES. 

in  Christianity,  195. 

as  great  in  nature  as  in  Christianity,  196,  &c.,  217-22. 

Mystery  of  God,  42,  n. 
of  godliness,  195. 

NATURE.      See  Author,  Course,  Law,  Light,  Government, 
Mankind,  World. 
its  scheme,  evidently  vast  beyond  all  imagination,  168. 
we  see  but  as  a  point  in  it,  169. 
gives  us  power  to  supply  our  natural  deficiencies,  90. 
intent  of  nature  that  virtue  should  be  rewarded,  &c.  59. 
its  necessary  tendencies  show  something  moral  in  it,  60. 
severity  and  indulgence  in  its  constitution,  204, 
man's  nature  leads  him  to  ascribe  all  moral  perfection  to 

God,  9. 
our  nature  corresponds  to  om*  external  condition,  84. 
what  position  nature  places  us  in  as  to  the  knowledge  of 

religion,  152. 
no  presumption  that  everything  in  the  whole  course  of 
nature  is  like  what  is  knoAvn  to  us,  169. 
NATURAL. 

meaning  of  the  word,  31. 
Government  of  the  world.     See  World. 
in  what  it  consists,  73. 

we  are  dealt  with  under  it,  as  if  Ave  were  free,  115. 
makes  up  one  scheme  with  its  moral  government, 
129-30. 
Laws  of  human  actions  require  that  testimony  be  ad- 
mitted, 257. 
Religion.     See  Religion. 

future  punishments  belong  to  it,  41,  n. 

proved  by  history  and  general  consent,  121. 

its  external  evidence  by  no  means  inconsiderable, 

123. 
scarcely  any  one  could  have  reasoned  out  its  system, 

147,  274. 
ought  not  to  be  the  sole  object  of  our  regard,  148. 
taught  by  Christianity  in  its  genuine  simplicity,  and 

authoritativeh',  150. 
the  profession  and  establishment  of  it,  much  owing 
to  the  Scriptures,  273,  226. 
"^  its  proof  from  reason  is  not  thereby  destroyed,  274. 


372  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

NATURAL  Religion  {continued). 

may  be  proved  by  prophecy  and  miracles,  151. 

what  it  contains,  122,  273.*^ 

its  essence,  in  one  sense,  religious  regards  to  GoD  the 

Father,  157. 
may  be  revealed  and  is  so,  267. 
objections  to  it  answered  from  analogy,  10. 
promoted  by  the  establishment  of  the  Church,  153. 
general  proof  of  it  level  to  common  men,  239. 

approves  itself  almost  intuitively  to  a  reasonable 

mind,  308. 
its  analogy  to  Revelation,  a  good  ground  of  argu- 
ment, 286. 
Necessary  existence  of  GOD,  111. 

NECESSITY,  OPINION  of.     See  Fatalist,  Freedom. 

practically  considered,  Ft.  I.,  Ch.  VI.,  109. 

does  not  exclude  deliberation,  choice,  preference,  and 
acting  from  certain  principles  to  certain  ends,  110. 

in  itself  no  account  of  the  constitution  of  nature,  but 
only  of  a  circumstance  of  it,  110. 

does  not  exclude  an  agent,  but  only  a  free  agent,  111. 

effects  of  educating  a  child  in  this  opinion,  113. 

misapplied,  when  applied  to  the  subject  of  religion,  114. 

all  practical  applications  of  it  practically  fallacious,  114. 

how  reconcileable  with  benevolence,  veracity,  and  jus- 
tice in  the  Author  of  nature,  117. 

neeessary  agents  may  be  rewarded  and  punished,  125. 

how  it  destroys  religion,  126. 

does  not  make  punishment  unjust,  even  if  improbable, 
125,  292. 

NEGLIGENCE.     See  FoIIi/. 

may  make  us  as  miserable  as  we  please,  34. 

no  more  excusable  in  revealed  than  in  natural  religion, 

156,  300. 
a  source  of  dissatisfaction  with  the  evidence  of  religion, 

238. 

OBEDIENCE  not  the  less  real,  because  proceeding 
from  hope,  or  fear,  104. 
OBJECTIONS. 

Revelation  likely  to  seem  liable  to  them,  Pt.  II.,  Ch.  III., 

175. 
those  against  arguing  from  the  analogy  of  nature  to  re- 
ligion, Pt.  II.,  Ch.  VIII.,  285. 


index  of  Words  and  Things.         373 

OBJECTIONS  (continued). 

those  against  a  proof,  none  against  the  thing  proved,  10. 
some  may  be  seen  through,  though  not  cleared  up,  240. 
in  matters  of  importance,  the  question  is,  not  upon  whom 
it  lies  to  support  them,  but  whether  they  have  any 
real  existence,  252. 
men  will  probably  fancy  they  have  strong  ones  against 

what  is  really  unexceptionable,  182. 
those  who  pick  them  up  without  qualifying  themselves 
for  their  examination  are  in  doubt  by  their  own  fault, 
240. 
what  qualifications  are  necessary  in  examining  them, 

240. 
some  may  be  urged  not  directly  answerable  by  analogy, 

127. 
they  need  not  alwaj's  be  removed,  291. 
how  far  analogy  answers  them,  10. 
those  from  ignorance,  when  particularly  absurd,  221. 
those  to  the  scheme  of  Providence,  generally  mere  arbi- 
trary assertions,  131. 
those  against  divine  justice  are  first  shown  inconclusive, 

and  then  its  credibility  is  established,  291. 
nature  of  those  urged  against  Christianity,  302. 

they  are  not  valid  unless  they  overthrow  all  that 

is  miraculous  in  it,  181. 
not  greater  than  analogy  would  lead  us  to  expect, 

184. 
those  against  its  evidence,  most  important,  175. 
those  against  itself,  generally  frivolous,  168,  175- 

91. 
unreasonable  way  of  objecting  against  it,  191. 

OBJECTIONS  CONSIDERED. 

against  arguing  from  the  analogy  of  nature  to  religion, 
Pt.  II.,  Ch.  VIII.,  285. 

that  it  is  a  poor  thing  to  show  the  same  difficulties 

in  natural  and  revealed  religion,  286. 
that  it  does  not  clear  up  difficulties,  287. 
that  it  does  not  show  the  evidence  of  religion  not 

to  be  doubtful,  289. 
that  it  does  not  vindicate  God's  character,  290. 
that  it  is  not  satisfactory,  293. 
that  it  is  not  likely  to  have  influence,  295. 
against  the  constitution  of  the  world  as  imperfect,  7. 
against  our  natural  immortalitv  from  the  case  of  brutes, 
24. 


374         Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

OBJECTIOXS  CONSIDERED  {continued). 
from  that  of  vegetables,  29,  315. 

that  the  pleasure  attached  to  all  gratifications  of  the 
passions  is  intended  as  a  reward,  36. 

against  the  credibility  of  future  punishments,  38. 

against  religion  that  its  evidence  is  not  so  strong  as  it 
might  be,  47,  n. 

that  things  may  go  on  for  ever  as  they  are,  without  any 
triumph  of  virtue,  68. 

against  this  world's  being  a  state  of  trial,  81. 

that  we  cannot  discern  how  thi^  life  is  a  preparation  for 
another,  92. 

that  our  powers  of  improvement  may  be  limited,  102. 

that  this  world  is  in  fact  a  discipline  of  vice,  103. 

that  \artuous  habits  proceeding  from  hope  and  fear  only 
strengthen  self-love,  104. 

against  rewards  and  punishments  on  the  opinion  of  ne- 
cessity, 124,  292. 

against  religion  on  the  same  opinion,  117. 

against  the  justice  and  goodness  of  Providence,  132. 
from  seeming  irregularities,  133. 

that  evil  might  easily  have  been  prevented  by  repeated 
interpositions,  131. 

that  our  ignorance  may  be  objected  against  the  proof  of 
religion,  as  well  as  against  the  objections  to  it,  136. 

that  revelation  is  of  little  importance,  if  natural  religion 
be  kept  to,  148. 

that  natural  religion  cannot  be  proved  by  miracles,  150. 

that  the  analogy  between  natural  and  revealed  know- 
ledge fails,  on  account  of  the  impoi-tance  of  the  last, 
186-7. 

against  miraculous  gifts  from  their  iiTegular  use,  184. 

against  the  analogy  between  the  methods  of  natural  and 
revealed  instruction,  187. 

against  the  notion  of  a  Mediator  at  all,  202. 

that  the  nature  of  the  Jewish  religion  kept  the  Jews  dis- 
tinct, 278. 

that  religion  teaches  us  to  be  interested  and  selfish,  328, 
104,  95,  n. 

against  Scripture,  that  it  is  not  written  according  to  the 
rules  of  art,  175,  180. 

that  it  contains  immoral  precepts,  189. 

against  Christianity  generally,  181. 

from  the  sufiiciency  of  the  light  of  nature,  147. 
from  the  supposed  incredibility  of  miracles,  167. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.         375 

OBJECTIONS  CONSIDERED  ^continued). 

especially  after  the  settlement  of  a  course  of  na- 
ture, 172. 
from  the  unequal  distribution  of  religious  know- 
ledge, 185. 
from  its  complex  contrivances  and  slow  develop- 
ments, 187, 199. 
to  its  wisdom,  justice,  and  goodness,  192. 
from  its  disappointing  anticipations,  182, 192. 
from  its  mysteriousness,  193,  220. 
from  its  want  of  universality,  223. 
from  its  being  perverted  and  having  little  influence, 

154. 
from  its  supposed  deficiency  of  proof,  229,  258. 
from  its  lateness,  partiality,  and  obscurity,  187. 
that  it  supposes  God  obliged  to  use  roundabout 

means,  199. 
that  Christ's  suffering  for  the  guilty  makes  GoD 
indifferent  whether  he  punish  the  innocent  or  the 
guilty,  218. 
that  a  master  would  give  clear  directions  to  his  ser- 
vants, 241. 
that  there  have  been  enthusiastic  people  in  all  ages, 

252. 
that  the  apostles  might  partly  deceive,  partly  be 

deceived,  254. 
that  in  fact  men  have  been  strangel}'  deluded  by 

pretended  miracles,  255. 
from  the  obscurity  of  some  parts  of  prophecy,  259. 
from  the  difficulty  of  showing  its  exact  fulklnient, 

260. 
from  the  suppositions  that  the  prophets  intended 
something  else,  261-2. 
OBLIGATIONS.     See  Duties. 

raised  in  practical  matters  by  the  slightest  balance  of 
probability,  3. 

nay,  even  by  the  smallest  presumption  alone,  3. 
those  of  religion  practically  proved  by  the  course  of  na- 
ture, 69. 
those  of  religious  worship,  119. 
moral  obligations  remain,  though  religion  be  not  proved, 

137. 
arise  from  the  bare  credibility  of  religion,  137,  230,243-4. 
the  mere  credibility  of  the  consequences  of  virtue  and 
vice  raises  some,  137. 


376         Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

OBLIGATIONS  (continued). 

those  of  duty  to  the  Son  and  Holy  Spirit,  revealed  by 
Christianity,  157. 

arise  naturally  from  our  relations  to  them,  157. 
those  of  a  command  remain  until  we  knoiv  that  the  rea- 
son of  it  has  ceased,  149. 
Obscurity  of  the  Scripture  does  not  overthrow  its  authority, 

180. 
Observation  in  like  cases,  a  common  ground  of  conclusion,  2. 
Omission,  when  vicious,  324. 

ONENESS.     See  Sameness,  Personal  Identity. 

the  absolute  oneness  of  a  living  agent  cannot  be  proved 
by  experiment,  18,  19. 

how  it  may  be  proved,  17, 18. 
OPPORTUNITIES. 

may  be  lost  for  ever,  40. 

for  deceiving  ourselves,  235. 

ORGANS  OF  SENSE.     See  Body. 

not  percipients  but  instruments,  21,  23. 
our  connection  with  them  may  be  a  hinderance  to  a 
higher  life,  28. 
Origen,  his  hint  concerning  analogy,  5. 

Outward  circumstances  may  be  changed  so  as  to  ensure  the 
triumph  of  virtue,  71. 

PA  GANIS3I,  its  miracles,  250.     See  Heathen. 
Pain.     See  Pleasure,  Punishment,  Misery. 
Pardon,  grounds  for  hoping  there  may  be  room  for  it,  207. 
PARTICULAR  AFFECTIONS,  94. 
involuntarily  excited,  94. 

tend  to  incline  to  unlawful  means  of  gratification,  95. 
the  practical    principle   of  virtue,  our  only   safeguard 

against  this,  95. 
they  may  remain  in  a  future  state,  96. 
show  how  the  fall  and  improvement  of  finite  creatures 

may  take  place,  96. 
stand  in  need  of  discipline,  106. 
Particular  Institutions,  their  having  been  brought  in  and  con- 
firmed by  miracles,  not  analogous  to  the  case  of  Chris- 
tianity, 250. 

PASSIONS.      See  Particular  Affections,  Levity. 
particular  gratifications  of  them,  36. 
all  actions  are  done  by  means  of  some  natural  passion,  59. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.         377 

PASSIONS  {continued). 

good  purposes  of  every  natural  passion  may  be  seen,  59. 
particular  passions  not  more  consistent  with  self-love, 

than  with  virtue,  75. 
no  excuse  for  a  vicious  life,  145. 

PASSIVE. 

Habits.     See  Habits. 

Impressions,  grow  weaker  by  repetition,  86. 

only  effective  as  they  tend  to  produce  active  habits, 
87-8. 
SuB>nssiON.     See  Resignation. 
Patience,  a  matter  of  gi-eat  patience  to  reasonable  men,  220. 

S.  PAUL. 

his  epistles  carry  with  them  evidence  of  their  genuine- 
ness, 248. 

prove  the  truth  of  Christianity,  248,  &c. 
He  teaches  Christ's  pre-existence,  268. 

PERCEPTION.      See  Sensation,  Judgment. 

our  powers  of  perception  distinct  from  our  organs  of 

sense,  21. 
dreams  prove  a  latent  power  of  perception,  22. 
the  truth  of  perceptions  cannot  \)Q  proved,  321. 
difficult  fully  to  explain  our  perceptions  of  good  and  ill 

desert,  324. 

PERFECTION. 

of  finite  creatures,  96. 

their  higher  perfection  may  consist  in  habits  of  vir- 
tue, 98. 
going  on  unto  perfection,  186. 
of  religion,  292. 
of  moral  government,  46. 
Persecution,  considered  as  an  objection  to  God's  moral  go- 
vernment, 52. 
Persians,  perhaps  influenced  by  revelation,  226. 
Person,  Locke's  definition,  316. 

PERSONAL  IDENTITY.     See  Sameness,  Oneness. 
Dissertation  upon  it,  313. 

personality  a  permanent,  not  a  transient  thing,  317-21. 
the  sameness  of  living  agents,  12,  316. 
cannot  be  defined,  313. 
the  body  no  part  of  it,  19. 
ascertained  by  consciousness,  314. 
organs  of  sense  not  essential  to  it,  22. 


37^  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

PERSONAL  IDENTITY  (contmued). 

"  consciousness  makes  personality  "  false,  probable  origin 

of  it,  314. 
Locke's  definition,  316. 
absurd  consequences  of  the  opinion,  that  it  is  constituted 

by  consciousness,  317. 
consciousness  proves  the  sameness  of  our  substance,  320. 
Pious  frauds  may  weaken,  but  cannot  destroy  our  evidence 

of  miracles,  277. 
PLEASURE.     See  Happiness. 

or  advantage  of  actions  sometimes  independent  of  their 

morality,  .53. 
and  pain  consequences  of  our  actions,  33. 

in  some  degree  distributed  without  regard  to  cha- 
racter, 69. 
this  would  not  even  alone  disprove  moral  govern- 
ment, 69. 
how  far  intended  to  put  us  upon  gratifying  our  passions, 

36. 
annexing  it  to  some  actions  and  pain  to  others  is  our 

proper  notion  of  government,  37. 
when  a  reward,  45,  53. 

whether  our  pleasures  overbalance  our  pains  ?  293. 
Political  state  of  things,  incidentally  referred  to  in  Scripture, 

268. 
Poor  (as  an  epithet),  287. 
Popery,  its  miracles,  250. 
Porphyry,  his  objections  to  the  book  of  Daniel,  263-4,  and  n. 

POSITIVE. 

Precepts  and  duties.     See  Moral. 
what  they  are,  161. 

danger  of  being  misled  in  comparing  them  with 
moral,  166. 
Institutions,  reasonable  and  important,  153. 
come  under  a  twofold  distinction,  162. 
have  the  nature  of  moral  commands,  162,  166. 
their  observation  only  valuable,  as  it  proceeds  from 

a  moral  principle,  163. 
great  presumption  of  making  light  of  them,  166. 
Rites,  mankind  always  prone  to  place  religion  in  them, 
164. 
Possibilities  of  things  unknown  to  any  man,  131. 
POWERS.     See  Living,  Reflecting. 
limit  to  their  improvement,  102. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.         379 

PRACTICAL.     See  Religion. 

PRINCIPLE  of  Yirtue.      See  Virtue. 
QUESTION  concerning  conduct,  294-5. 

PRACTICE.     See  Actions. 

in  matters  of  practice,  their  importance  is  always  to  be 

considered,  284. 
differently  influenced  by  different  degrees  of  evidence, 
234. 
Precepts  change  the  nature  of  some  acts  in  Scripture,  189. 
Precipice,  effects  of  trifling  on  the  edge  of  one,  202,  204. 
Preexistence  of  our  Saviour,  268. 

PRESENT  EXISTENCE.     See  Life. 

aftbrds  a  presumption  of  continuance,  13. 

as  gi-eat  a  difiicult}'  to  atheism  as  a  future  state,  32. 
Present  state  of  man  may  be  a  consequence  of  somewhat  past, 

228. 

PRESUMPTIONS.     See  Probability. 

the  lowest  preponderance  on  one  side,  acted  on,  3. 
presumptions  against  revelation,  167. 
there  are  strong  ones  against  common  truths  and  ordinary 
facts,  172. 

PRESUMPTUOUSNESS. 

not  justified  by  scepticism,  45. 
implied  in  sin,  205. 

PRIESTHOOD. 

of  Christ,  215. 

the  Levitical,  a  shadow  of  Christ's,  212. 
Primitive  Christians,  purity  of  their  lives,  225. 

PRINCIPLES. 

of  the  Author,  not  here  argued  upon,  296. 
Avhat  is  meant  by  arguing  on  the  principles  of  others, 
296,  n. 

PROBABLE  EVIDENCE  and  pkobabilitt.    See  Evidence, 
Analogical  reasoning. 
admit  of  degrees,  1. 

there  may  be  probabilities  on  both  sides,  1,  233, 
the  slightest  possible  presumption  is  of  this  nature,  1. 
lowest  presumption  often  repeated  produces  conviction,  1 . 
chiefl)'  constituted  by  likeness — likelihood,  2. 
rule  of  our  hopes,  fears,  expectations,  and  judgments,  2. 
peculiar  to  beings  of  a  limited  capacity,  3. 
to  them  the  very  guide  of  life,  3. 


380  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

PROBABLE  EVIDENCE  {continued). 

extremely  small  probabilities  acted  on,  4,  223,  244. 
importance  of  collateral  things  in  probable  evidence,  283. 
the  addition  of  probable  proofs  multiplies  the  evidence, 

283. 
PROBATION,  STATE  OF.     See  Trial. 

as  implying  trial,  &c.  Pt.  I.,  Ch.  IV.,  72. 

as  intended  for  discipline  and  improvement,  Pt.  I.,  Ch. 

v.,  82. 
as  implying  a  theatre  of  action,  107. 
religion  as  a  Probation  has  its  end  on  all,  295. 
how  it  differs  from  moral  government,  73. 
general  doctrine  of  religion  concerning  it,  73. 
how  we  come  to  be  placed  in  it  involves  unanswerable 

difficulties,  82. 
we  may  be  in  one  as  to  the  use  of  our  understanding  in 

religious  matters,  229. 
religious  probation,  230. 
doubtfulness  of  the  evidence  of  religioa  puts  us  in  a 

general  one,  230. 
PROFANENESS. 

to  be  shunned  by  those,  who  are  not  certain  that  religion 

cannot  be  true,  231. 
especially  if  in  an  influential  position,  232. 

PROOF.     See  Evide?ice. 

of  God's  perfect  moral  government  and  of  the  truth  of 

religion,  not  to  be  sought  in  this  work,  68. 
of  the  future  completion  of  a  moral  scheme  of  govern- 
ment, 72. 
when  very  slight,  overcomes  innumerable  presumptions, 

172. 
Propensions.     See  Particular  Affections,  Brutes. 
PROPHECY.     See  3Iiracles,  Jeivs. 

intended  to  prove  a  particular  dispensation  of  Providence, 

150. 
proves  God's  general  Providence,  &c.,  150. 
the  obscurity  of  one  part  does  not  defeat  the  evidence  of 

another,  259. 
may  give  proof  of  foresight  to  those,  who  cannot  make 

out  its  exact  fulfilment,  260. 
expressed  in  figurative  and  hieroglyphical  language,  175. 
prophetical  parts  of  Scripture  treated  with  scorn,  175. 
its  applicability  proves  the  propriety  of  its  application, 

260. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.  381 

PROPHECY  (continued). 

its  applicatii)n  to  an  expected  event  proves  the  propriety 
of  its  apjjlication  to  that  event,  when  it  has  happened, 
261. 

as  in  the  case  of  the  Messiah,  and  of  the  last  ages 
of  the  world,  261. 

not  inapplicable  because  the  Prophets  understood  it 
otherwise,  262, 

its  applicability  to  some  events,  no  proof  of  its  inappli- 
cability to  others,  263. 

resembles  a  compilation  from  memoirs,  not  fully  under- 
stood, 262. 

is  the  history  of  things  before  they  come  to  pass,  267. 

summary  of  it,  268-9,  270-3. 

concerning  the  kingdoms  of  the  world  and  state  of  the 
Church,  280. 

tendency  of  things  towards  the  future  completion  of  it, 
279. 

qualifications  necessary  to  judge  thoroughly  the  force  of 
its  evidence,  280. 

the  conformity  between  prophecy  and  events  not  to  be 
lightly  set  aside,  282-3. 

PROPHET. 

Christ  a  Prophet,  214. 

Prophets  not  the  sole  authors  of  what  they  wrote,  262. 

PROSPERITY.     See  Happmess. 

in  a  virtuous  kingdom  all  would  contribute  to  it,  66. 

naturall}'  connected  with  virtue,  67. 

begets  unbounded  and  extravagant  thoughts,  105. 

PROVIDENCE,     See  God. 

how  our  ignorance  is  an  answer  to  objections  against  its 

scheme,  131. 
how  far  it  is  necessary  to  vindicate  it,  291. 
there  must  be  some  scheme  of  Providence  in  a  manner 

boundless,  66. 

PRUDENCE.     See  Folly. 

meaning  of  the  word,  327. 

there  is  such  a  thing  notwithstanding  the  uncertainties 

and  variety  of  things,  224. 
how  a  virtue,  326-7. 

requires  often  very  much  and  difficult  consideration,  243. 
may  oblige  us  to  act  on  verv  slight  presumptions,  3,  223, 

244,  295. 


382  Index  of  Words  and  Things, 

PRUDENCE  {continued). 

capacities  of  it,  the  gift  of  God,  224. 

what  determines  actions  to  be  prudent,  295. 
Public  Spirit,  the  true  notion  of  it  includes  veracity  and  jus- 
tice, 63. 

PUNISHMENT.     See  Consequences,  Vicarious,  Pardon. 
government  by  it,  8. 

the  government  of  God  by  it,  Pt.  I.,  Ch.  II.,  32,  38. 
its  injustice  destroyed  by  the  opinion  of  necessity,  117, 

292. 
we  do  not  know  all  the  ends  and  reasons  of  future  punish- 
ment, 202. 
means  of  it,  unknown  to  us,  202. 
may  be  by  way  of  natural  consequence,  202-3. 
to  be  ascribed  to  God's  justice,  203. 
not  a  matter  of  arbitrary  appointment,  203. 
repentance  does  not  necessarily  prevent  it,  207. 
contrary  to  nature  that  future  doing  well  should  prevent 

the  consequences  of  past  evil,  208,  40. 
natural  provisions  for  saving  men  from  it,  207. 
Son  of  God  interposed  to  prevent  that  appointed  to  our 

sin,  209. 
wickedness  and  punishment,  naturally  connected,  325. 
heathen  moralists  thought  this  life  a  state  of  it,  211. 
natural,  analogous  to  that  taught  by  religion  as  future, 
38. 

in  being  often  long  delayed,  39,  43, 
often  much  greater  than  the  pleasures  gained  by  in- 
curring it,  39. 
uncertain,  39. 
sudden,  39. 

not  escaped  by  the  excuse  of  youth,  &c.,  40. 
sometimes  final  and  irremediable,  41,  43. 
the  offices  of  reason  and  revelation  concerning  future 

punishment,  41,  n. 
Gentile  writers  speak  of  it  as  the  Scriptures  do,  41,  n. 
of  vice  as  folly,  51. 

as  hurtful  to  society,  51. 
as  such,  52. 

in  ourselves  and  by  others,  54. 
virtue  never  punished  as  such,  53, 
incompleteness  and  seeming  doubtfulness  of  evidence  may 
be  a  punishment,  238. 


"  Index  of  Words  and  Things.         383 

REASON.    See  Experience,  IgnorancCy  Abstruse,  Abstract, 
Analogical. 

is  the  candle  of  the  Lord  within  us,  303. 

the  only  fticulty  whereby  we  can  judge  anj^thing,  176. 

must  judge  of  the  morality  of  Scripture,  189. 

and  of  the  evidence  of  revelation  and  the  objections  to  it, 
190. 

Scripture  if  really  contrary  to  it  must  be  given  up,  22 1 . 

power  under  its  directiou  does  prevail  over  brute  force, 
60. 

conditions  of  this,  61. 

it  has  a  natural  tendency  to  prevail  over  brute  force,  62. 

shows  us  a  general  connection  in  the  system  of  religion 
and  a  tendency  to  its  completion,  68. 

to  pretend  to  act  upon  it  against  plain  practical  princi- 
ples is  unreasonable,  116. 

its  light  does  not  force  men  to  obey  it,  155. 

may  be  impaired  by  the  indulgence  of  a  ludicrous  turn, 
239. 

cannot  judge  where  it  has  no  principles  to  judge  upon, 
303. 

teaches  a  certain  doctrine  of  a  future  state,  41,  n.- 

might  not  have  discovered  natural  religion,  147. 

could  not  have  discovered  Christianity,  156. 

this  is  no  objection  against  Christianity,  168. 

gives  us  no  principles  by  which  to  judge  of  how  revela- 
tion should  have  been  left  in  the  world,  180. 

shows  us  nothing  of  the  immediate  means  of  obtaining 
benefits,  Avhether  spiritual,  or  temporal,  160. 

absurd  reasoning  against  Christianity,  221. 

unreasonable  objections  to  Christiauit}',  302. 

it  is  highly  useful  and  proper  to  show  the  reasonableness 
of  all  God's  dealings,  292,  220. 
Reason  to  wish,  different  from  a  right  to  claim,  135. 

REASONS. 

of  a  Divine  command  must  be  known,  and  known  to 

have  ceased,  before  the  obligation  ceases,  149. 
reasons  why  God  made  different  creatures,  and  why  he 

put  similar  creatures  in  different  positions,  unknown 

to  us,  but  probably  similar,  228. 
inquiring  into  the  reasons  of  God's  dispensations,  right 

and  pious,  220,  292. 
RecoUtction  and  being  on  their  guard  against  deceits,  the  greatest 

difficulty  to  some,  237. 


384         Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

Recovery,  only  possible  up  to  a  certain  degree,  40,  43. 

Rectitude.     See  Virtue. 

REDEMPTION,     See  Christ,  Mediator,  Assistance. 

the  i-edemptiou  of  the  world  by  a  Mediator,  Pt.  II.,  Ch. 
v.,  201. 

Scripture  account  of  it,  211-16. 

analogous  to  the  use  of  natural  remedies,  204. 

may  extend  to  those  who  have  never  heard  of  it  in  this 
fife,  210,  n. 

moral  tendency  of  the  scriptural  doctrine,  220. 

how  it  makes  the  innocent  suffer  for  the  guilty,  218. 

REFLECTION.     See  Intellectual  powers.  Moral  faculty. 
a  STATE  of  reflection,  26. 

POWERS  of  reflection  may  not  be  destroyed  by  death,  26. 
or  even  suspended,  26. 
it  may  improve  them,  28. 

REFORMATION.     See  Repentance,  Amendment. 
the  uneasiness  attending  it,  49. 

to  be  put  to  the  account  of  the  former  vice,  49. 
not  sufficient  to  hinder  the  effect  of  past  vice,  305. 
RELATIONS.     See  Duties. 

exist  between  the  individuals,  species,  &c.,  in  the  world, 

128. 
revealed,  as  well  as  natural,  give  rise  to  obligations,  157. 
relations  of  moral  action,  &c.,  may  be  infinite,  129. 
eternal  and  unalterable  relations  of  things,  72. 
to  us  of  the  Son  and  Spirit  of  GoD,  revealed  in  Scripture, 

157. 
to  us  of  God  the  Father,  revealed  by  reason,  157. 

RELIGION.  See  Natural,  Revelation,  Christianity,  GoD,  Mi- 
racles, Obligations. 

requires  no  more  than  we  are  well  able  to  do,  79,  227. 

proof  of  a  future  life  no  proof  of  it,  32. 

what  the  notion  of  it  contains,  10. 

is  here  considered  as  a  question  of  fact,  297. 

its  general  system,  &c.,  shows  a  tendency  to  its  comple- 
tion, 68. 

teaches  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  probation,  72. 

whether  the  opinion  of  fate  be  consistent  with  it,  109,  &c. 

a  practical  subject,  therefore  the  opinion  of  necessity  is 
inapplicable  to  it,  116. 

a  proof  of  it  as  a  matter  of  fact,  117. 

how  destroyed  by  the  opinion  of  necessity,  126. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.         385 

RELIGION  (continued). 

what  position  nature  places  us  in  regard  to  a  knowledge 

of  it,  152. 
twofold,  internal  and  external,  157. 
distinction  between  the  moral  and  positive  in  it,  161. 
moral  piety  and  virtue  its  general  spirit,  as  distinguished 

from  ritual  observances,  166. 
indifference  about  it,  real  immoral  depravity,  230. 
its  practice,  to  whom  unavoidable,  237. 
does  not  regard  the  thing  done,  but  the  mode  of  doing  it, 

241. 
a  practical  thing,  consisting  in  a  course  of  life  agreeable 

to  the  Avill  of  God,  288. 
presupposes  integrity  and  honesty,  and  in  what  sense,  294. 
the  incredible  inattention  to  it,  299. 
its  origin  according  to  history  and  tradition,  122. 
apparently  pure  in  the  first  ages  of  the  world,  122. 
probably  introduced  at  first  by  revelation,  122,  171. 
its  general  truth  proved  by  a  dilemma  as  to  its  origin, 

122. 
state  of  it  in  the  heathen  world,  147. 
unreasonableness  of  the  opposition  to  it,  301-2. 
its  great  importance,  145. 
its  evidence  not  appearing  obvious  may  be  some  men's 

trial,  229. 
the  temper,  which  would  cause  obedience  to  it,  would 

lead  a  man  to  examine  its  evidence,  229, 
degrees  of  acquaintance  with  it,  not  a  subject  of  com- 
plaint, 227. 
proper  motives  to  it,  145. 
a  practical  and  the  proper  proof  of  it,  69-72. 
it  implies,  a  future  life,  32. 

God's  government  by  rewards  and  punishments,  38, 

292. 
God's  peifect  moral  government,  68. 
founded  in  the  moral  character  of  the  Author  of  nature, 

117. 
its  perfection  is  that  perfect  love,  which  casteth  out  fear, 

292. 
common  men  may  be  convinced  of  it  on  real  evidence, 

239. 
Does  it  teach  us  to  be  selfish?  95,  n.,  104,  328. 
KEMEDIES.     See  Diseases,  Assistance,  Compassion, 

FOR  DISEASES,  long  unknowu,  and  known  now  to  but 
few,  188. 

c  c 


386  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

REMEDIES  FOR  Diseases  (continued). 

neither  certain,  perfect,  nor  universal,  188. 
analogous   to   Chi-istianity,  viewed   as  a  remedy, 
187-90. 
FOR  the  MISERY  and  evil  in  the  world,  204. 
exhibit  both  severity  and  indulgence,  204. 
Remorse,  follows  vice  only,  53. 

REPENTANCE.      See  Pardon,  Reformation. 

does  not  seem  sufficient  to  expiate  guilt,  206-8. 
pardon,  not  admissible  by  the  sole  efficacy  of  it,  209. 
made  acceptable  through  Christ,  216. 

its  efficacy  taught  by  the  Gospel,  216,  152. 
who  are  said  in  the  prayer  of  Manasses  not  to  need  it, 
210,  n. 

RESENTMENT. 

roused  by  a  perception  of  faultiness,  not  of  mere  harm,  55. 
contradicts  the  objection  to  religion  on  the  opinion  of 
necessity,  125. 

RESIGNATION. 

the  same  reasoning  applicable  to  this  as  to  active  virtues, 

105. 
habits  of  it  may  be  requisite  to  all  creatures,  105-6. 

how  formed,  106. 
affliction,  the  proper  discipline  for  it,  106. 
moderates  our  passions,  and  tends  to  make  us  easy  and 
satisfied,  106. 
Resolutions  to  do  well  are  properly  acts,  86. 
Restitution  of  all  things,  186. 

REVELATION.  See  Religion,  Christianitg,  Evidence,  Scrip- 
ture. 

likely  to  contain  things  liable  to  objections,  Pt.  II.,  Ch. 
III.,  175. 

want  of  universalitv  and  deficiencies  in  the  proof  of  it, 
Pt.  II.,  Ch.  VI.,  222. 

what  is  implied  in  the  scheme  of  it,  10-11,  156-60. 

particular  scheme  of  the  universe  cannot  be  known  with- 
out it,  65. 

determines  the  time  only  of  future  punishment,  &c.,  41,  n. 

time  at  which  the  hinderances  of  justice  will  be  removed 
cannot  be  known  without  it,  71. 

that  natural  religion  came  into  the  world  by  it,  122,  171. 

a  real  one  may  be  concluded  from  the  existence  of  pre- 
tended ones,  122. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.         387 

REVELATION  {continued). 

opinion  of  necessity  does  not  destroy  the  proof  of  re- 
vealed religion,  126. 

light  of  nature,  no  reason  against  it,  147. 

not  to  be  considered  of  small  importance  provided  natural 
religion  be  followed,  148. 

teaches  natural  religion  purely  and  authoritatively,  150. 

of  the  relations  in  which  we  stand  to  the  Son  and  Holy 
Spirit  raises  obligations  of  duty,  156. 

the  essence  of  revealed  religion  in  one  aspect  con- 
sists in  these,  157. 

to  be  considered  as  teaching  us  new  facts  and  new  rela- 
tions raising  duties,  158. 

alone  shows  us  how  to  obtain  spiritual  benefits,  160. 

scheme  of  it  to  be  searched  for  in  the  Scriptures,  not  de- 
termined beforehand  by  reason,  166. 

is  not  contrary  to  natural  religion,  166. 

no  presumption  against  it,  that  it  contains  things  not 
discoverable  by  the  light  of  natm-e,  166. 

there  must  be  innumerable  things  not  to  be  discovered 
without  it,  168. 

no  presumption  against  supposing  one,  when  man  was 
first  placed  on  the  earth,  171. 

we  are  incompetent  judges  of  it,  176. 

supposed  revelations  may  be  proved  false  by  internal 
evidence,  176. 

our  being  incompetent  judges  of  the  course  of  nature 
makes  our  being  so  of  revelation  likely,  177. 

we  are  no  judges  beforehand  how  it  should  be  com- 
municated, 179. 

we  cannot  say  that  any  particular  form  of  it  would  not 
have  answered  God's  purposes,  180. 

raises  a  practical  duty  so  long  as  any  proof  at  all  re- 
mains of  it,  181. 

what  reason  can  judge  concerning  it,  189. 

its  nature  may  be  compared  with  what  Ave  should  have 
expected  from  enthusiasm,  &c.,  191. 

has  a  greater  tendency  to  promote  virtue,  &c.,  than 
could  have  been  expected  from  them,  191. 

probably  gave  origin  to  sacrifices,  215. 

a  light  shining  in  a  dark  place,  226. 

if  it  were  universal  men  would  still  be  in  diff"ereut  re- 
ligious situations,  229. 

is  itself  miraculous,  249-50,  171. 

its  evidence  circumstantial  as  well  as  direct,  265. 


388  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

REVELATION  {continued). 

may  be  considered  as  wholly  historical,  267. 

the  doubtfulness  of  its  evidence  under  the  circumstances 
proves  its  truth,  269-70. 

its  reception,  &c.,  one  of  the  most  important  events  in 
the  history  of  mankind,  274. 

"  it  is  a  poor  thing  to  clear  it  by  showing  the  same  diffi- 
culties in  natural  religion,"  286. 

it  is  unreasonable  to  urge  against  it  alone,  what  is  of 
equal  weight  against  natural  religion,  288. 

inattention  to  it  immoral,  300. 
Revolutions,  sometimes  brought  about  by  the  sense  of  injustice, 
55. 

REWARDS.     See  Punishments,  Goverjiment,  Moral,  General 
laws,  Virtue. 
government  bv  rewards  and  punishments,  Pt.  I.,  Ch,  II., 

32. 
even  brutes  are  governed  by  them,  125. 
natural  rewards  of  virtue,  53-8. 
when  given  to  vicious  actions,  are  not  according  to  the 

intent  of  nature,  59. 
some  grounds  for  the  hope  of  them  in  the  virtuous,  60, 

&c. 
what  are  real  rewards  and  punishments,  37. 
hope  of  them,  a  proper  motive  to  obedience,  104. 
RIDICULE.     See  Levitt/,  Ludicrous,  Scorn. 

religion  no  more  subject  to  it  than  nature,  10. 
of  the  notion  of  smaller  pains  being  punishments,  37. 
may  be  occasioned  by  expressions,  though  not  by  the 
thing  expressed,  239. 

this  ridicule  may  hinder  the  perception  of  truth,  238. 
unanswerable,  299. 

of  Scripture,   before   serious    examination,   an   offence 
against  natural  piety,  274. 
Roman  Empire,  plainly  was  divided  into  about  ten  parts  as 

foretold  by  Daniel,  264. 
Rom,e,  Greece,  and  Babylon,  how  noticed  in  prophecy,  268. 

SACRIFICE.     See  Christ,  Mediator,  Vicarious. 
its  prevalence  disproves  the  idea  of  the  sufficiency 
of  repentance,  208. 
heathen  sacrifices  traditional  probably  from  a  revelation, 
215. 

thought  efficacious,  but  the  manner  is  not  clear,  216. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.  389 

SACRIFICE  (continued). 

commanded  to  the  Jews,  215. 

Levitical,  a  shadow  of  Christ's,  212. 
efficacious  in  some  degree,  216. 
Safety,  an  important  consideration  in  matters  of  action,  284. 

SAMENESS.     See  Personal  Identity. 

same,  not  applied  to  vegetables  as  it  is  to  persons,  315. 

SANCTIONS.      See  Punishment. 

of  civil  and  divine  government,  37. 

of  the  dictates  of  the  moral  faculty,  119. 
Satirical  writing,  has  some  analogy  to  the  prophetic,  260. 

SATISFACTION. 

of  Christ,  216.     See  Sacrifice,  Atonement. 

is  a  consequence  of  virtue,  36,  48,  54. 

[perfect]  satisfaction  does  not  belong  to  man,  294. 

no  natural  institution  of  life  is  satisfactory,  293. 

SCEPTICISM.      See  Doubtfulness,  Obligations. 
no  justification  of  fearlessness  in  religion,  44. 

requires  men  to  have  some  solicitude  about  it,  243. 
immorality  and  irreligion  not  excused  by  it,  308. 
what  the  ancient  sceptics  must  have  admitted,  297. 
how  far  a  man  can  go  towards  speculative  infidelity,  308. 

SCHEME.      ^QQ  Nature,  Course  of  Nature. 

The  government  of  Gob  a  scheme  incomprehensible,  Pt. 

I.,  Ch.  VII.,  127. 
Christianity  a  scheme  imperfectly  comprehended,  Pt. 

II.,  Ch.  IV.,  192. 
a  scheme,  or  system  implies  variety,  228. 

SCOPvN.     See  Ridicule. 

part  of  the  prophetical  writings  treated  with  scorn,  176. 
great  weakness  to  be  influenced  by  it,  265. 
scorn  and  contempt  of  revelation  in  some  persons,  301. 
proportioned  to  their  inattention,  308. 

SCRIPTURE.      See  Revelation,  Christianity,  Evidence. 

its  design  is  to  give  an  account  of  the  world  as  God's 
world,  267. 

this  distinguishes  it  from  all  other  books,  267. 
in  what  its  notices  terminate,  269. 
antiquit}'  of  its  first  parts,  269. 

mistakes  of  transcribers,  inc.,  not  gi-eater  than  its  anti- 
quity makes  probable,  275-6. 
profession  of  natural  religion  may  be  owing  to  it,  226. 


390         Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

SCRIPTURE  (continued). 

reason  must  judge  of  its  morality  and  evidence,  189, 190, 

221. 
mode  of  discovering  its  meaning,  186. 
maj^  contain  things  not  yet  discovered,  186. 
duty  of  searching  it,  166. 
where  we  may  determine  its  seeming  meaning  not  the 

true  one,  166. 
Origen's  observation  concerning  difficulties  in  it,  5. 
future  punishments  spoken  of  by  heathens   as  by  it, 

41,  n. 
its  account  of  our  state  hereafter,  93. 
proves  natural  religion,  150. 
always  puts  the  stress  on  moral,  rather  than  on  positive 

duties,  164. 
Scripture,  not  reason,  shows  what  Christianity  is,  166. 
its  stj'le  objected  against,  175 
what' it  tells  us,  verv  briefly  stated,  177,  at  more  length, 

267-9.      -See  211-15. 
its  authority  not  overthrown  by  certain  objections,  181. 
modes  of  arguing  applicable  to  other  books,  not  so  to  this, 

326,  181. 
our  understanding  of  it  may  be  increased  as  our  natural 

knowledge  is,  186. 
events  may  ascertain  its  meaning,  186. 
precepts  recorded  in  it  justify  actions  otherwise  vicious, 

190. 
ascribes  natural  punishments  to  God's  justice,  203. 
its  account  that  mankind  is  in  a  state  of  degradation, 

confirmed  by  observation,  211. 
declares  that  every  one  shall  not  understand,  239. 
relates  miracles  as  part  of  its  history,  246. 
its  miraculous  history,  confirmed  by  the  establishment  of 

the  Jewish  and  Christian  religions,  246. 
cannot  be  rejected  till  proved  of  no  authority,  247. 
may  have  a  greater  meaning  than  its  compilers  perceived, 

262. 
its  extent  and  structure  afford  the  largest  scope  for  criti- 
cism, 269. 
civil  history  no  way  confutes,  but  rather  confirms  it,  274. 
nothing  in  its  history  gives  ground  of  suspicion  against 

its  truth,  275. 
wh}'  it  begins  with  an  account  of  the  creation,  267. 
SECURITY.     See  Safeti/. 

sense  of  it  arises  from  being  true  to  virtue,  60. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.  39 1 

SECURITY  {continued). 

of  finite  creatures  may  depend  upon  their  having  habits 

of  virtue,  98. 
of  highest  state  may  depend  upon  the  practical  sense  of 
things  obtained  in  a  state  of  probation,  100. 
Seeds,  how  few  come  to  maturity,  103. 
Self.     See  Personal  Identity. 

Self-deceit  concerning  the  evidence  of  Christianity,  235. 
SELF-DENIAL. 

not  essential  to  virtue  and  piety  [in  themselves],  101. 
highly  conducive  to  discipline  and  improvement,  101. 
as  necessary  to  secure  our  worldly,  as  our  eternal  in- 
terest, 76,  80. 
how  required  in  upright  creatures,  97. 
productive  of  resignation  to  God's  will,  106. 
SELF-GOVERNMENT.      See  Domestic  Life,  Recollection. 
recollection  and  self-government  necessary  to  temporal 

prosperity,  80. 
virtuous  self-government  improving  as  well  as  right,  98. 
SELF-LOVE.     See  Interest. 
reasonable,  75,  95,  n. 
the  passions  opposed  to  it,  75. 

coincident  with  the  will  of  God  and  part  of  the  idea  of 
virtue,  95,  n.,  105. 

not  perhaps  always,  however,  105. 
in  what  sense  it  needs  strengthening,  95,  n. 
a  proper  motive  of  action,  105. 
is  moderated  by  active  virtue  and  obedience,  106. 
how  far,  and  to  Avhat  purpose,  moral  discipline  strengthens 

it,  104-6. 
with  particular  affections,  distorts  and  rends  the  mind, 
106. 
Selfish,  in  what  sense  religion  teaches  us  to  be  so,  104,  328. 
Sensation,  a  state  of,  25.      See  Judgment. 
Sense  of  Interest.      See  Interest. 
Sermons  preached  at  the  Rolls,  referred  to,  75,  118,  125,  138, 

306. 
Shaftesbury,  Lord,  cited,  48. 

Shame,  arises  from  a  sense  of  blameworthiness,  54. 
Simplicity.      See  Oneness. 
SLEEP. 

shows  that  our  living  powers  may  exist  unexercised,  15, 

29. 
shown  by  experience  only  not  to  destroy  them,  27. 


392         Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

SOCIETY.     See  Civil  Government. 

natural,  51. 

its  power  increased  by  being  under  the  direction  of 
virtue,  60. 

the  future  state  may  be  one  of  society,  93. 
SON  OF  GOD.      See  Christ,  Moral  duties,^SiC. 

Mediator  between  God  and  man,  1.57,  &c. 
Speculations  concerning  the  constitution  of  the  world,  7. 
Staff,  used  in  the  same  way  that  our  limbs  are,  23. 
Strabo,  cited,  28,  n. 

STRANGE. 

EVENTS  occur  in  most  persons'  lives,  275. 
EXPRESSIONS  in  this  treatise,  how  accounted  for,  297. 

STYLE  OF  THE  SCRIPTURES,  305. 

its  inaccuracy  does  not  overthrow  their  authority,  180, 
175. 
Success  in  temporal  pursuits,  doubtful  both  in  its  common  and 
in  its  true  sense,  293. 

SUMMARY. 

of  the  whole  work,  10-11. 

of  the  first  part,  141-4. 

of  the  second  part,  303-7. 

of  revealed  religion  considered  as  historical,  267-9,  270-3. 

of  Christianity,  193-5. 

of  the  doctrines  of  Scripture  concerning  Christ  as  a  Me- 
diator, 211-16. 
Swoons  prove  the  same  things  as  sleep  more  strongly.     See 

Sleep. 
System.     See  Scheme, 

TEMPORAL  Interest, -vf^xerv  in  danger  from  ourselves,  74. 
TEMPTATION.    See  Particular  Affections, Fall,  Trial, 

Difficulties. 
no  moral  possibility  of  doing  wrong  without  it,  73. 
external  and  internal  how  connected,  75. 
with  respect  to  our  worldly  interest,  74-7. 
to  forego  a  greater  temporal  good  for  a  less,  76. 
viciousness  of  the  world,  the  great  temptation,  77,  103. 
what  are  the  chief  temptations  of  the  generality  of  the 

world,  236. 
makes  this  an  improving  state  of  discipline,  99, 234,  &c, 
makes  this  present  world  peculiarly  fit  to  be  a  state  of 

discipline,  99,  &c. 
to  reject  religion  without  any  consideration  of  it  at  all, 

234-5. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.  393 

TEMPTATION  {continued). 

implied  in  the  ideas  of  a  general  righteous  judgment,  73. 
of  moral  government,  73. 
but  especially  of  probation,  73. 
its  greatness  diminishes  our  perception  of  ill  desert,  325. 

TENDENCIES.     See  Consequences,  Means. 

when  natural  may  be  expected  to  prevail  over  accidental 

hinderances,  72. 
to  Avrong  are  inherent  in  particular  affections,  97. 
means  may  seem  to  tend  to  the  contrary  end  to  that  they 

bring  about,  133. 
tendencies  of  the  manner  of  our  redemption,  220. 

TESTIMONY.     See  Evidence. 

the  strongest  evidence  we  can  have  for  many  facts,  254. 

may  possibly  be  overcome,  253. 

enthusiasm  not  so  easy  an  account  of  it,  as  its  truth,  254. 

its  force,  not  destroyed  by  confuting  like  testimony  in 
other  cases,  256. 

human  testimony,  a  natural  ground  of  assent,  256. 

natural  laws  of  human  actions  require  its  admission,  257. 

that  men  are  liable  to  enthusiasm  and  capable  of  deceit 
weakens,  but  does  not  destroy  it,  256. 

what  destroys  its  evidence,  257. 

that  of  the  early  Christians  declared  by  their  conversion, 
the  same  as  if  it  had  been  written,  251. 

of  S.  Paul  to  the  truth  of  Christianity,  248. 
Theory  of  Virtue,  going  over  and  talking  of  it  tends  to  pro- 
duce practical  indifference,  86. 
7'trfe,howwe  are  assured  that  it  will  ebb  and  flow  to-morrow,  1. 

TRIAL.     See  Temptation,  Probation,  Discipline,  Difficulties. 
a  state  of  Probation  as  implying  it,  Pt.  I.,  Ch.  IV.,  72. 
our  state  of  temporal  trial  how  constituted,  74. 
how  men  act  under  it,  76. 

our  difficulties  increased  by  the  misconduct  of  our- 
selves, and  others  under  it,  77. 
affords  no  just  ground  of  complaint,  79. 
thedeficiency  of  evidence  may  be  part  of  some  men's,  229. 
may  be  as  to  whether  we  will  take  care  to  inform  our- 
selves impartially,  242. 
our  being  placed  in  a  state  of  trial,  how  rendered  credi- 
ble, 79. 
speculative  difficulties  may  make  the  larger  part  of  some 
men's,  236. 


394         Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

TTNBELIEVERS.     See  Scepticism. 

KJ  what  they  must  acknowledge,  266,  282. 

how  they  endeavour  to  show  the  evidence  of  Christianity 
insufficient,  252. 

must  admit  it  to  be  considerable,  258. 

UNDERSTANDING.     See  Maturity,  Moral. 
its  most  pious  exercise,  220. 
our  probation  in  respect  of  it,  234. 

UNION. 

its  vast  force,  61. 

of  good  men  with  other  orders  of  virtuous  beings  possi- 
ble, 64. 
the  union  of  good  men  now  prevented,  64. 
Universal  monarch,  the  head  of  a  perfectly  virtuous  society 

would  become  so,  67. 
TTniversality,  objections  to  Christianity  from  the  want  of  it, 
Pt.  II.,  Ch.  VI.,  222. 

UNIVERSE.      See  World,  3Iaterial. 

the  scheme  of  it  cannot  be  known  without  revelation,  65. 

UNREASONABLE.     See  Reason. 

unreasonable  actions  ground  of  remorse,  53. 

USE  AND  EXERCISE.     See  Habits. 
naturally  yielded  to,  88. 

VARIOUS  readings  in  the  Scripture  do  not  overthrow  its 
authority,  180. 

VEGETABLES. 

their  decay  not  exactly  analogous  to  our  death,  29. 
vegetable  world,  subservient  to  the  animal,  130. 
what  same  means  when  applied  to  them,  315. 

VERACITY.     See  Falsehood,  Jtistice,  Public  Spirit. 

a  special  means  of  uniting  society,  63. 

with  justice,  the  natural  rule  of  conduct  in  a  supreme 
Being,  118. 

mankind  naturally  endued  with  it,  255. 

our  natural  regard  to  it,  330. 

should  be  our  rule  of  life,  332. 

only  violated  b}^  intentional  deceit,  332. 

not  by  the  use  of  common  forms  of  speech,  332. 
Verisimile,  2,  n. 
Vexed,  being  vexed  with  oneself,  a  result  of  faultiness,  53. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.  395 

VICARIOUS  PUNISHMENTS.     See  Assistance,  Mediator, 
Christ. 
considered  by  way  of  Analog}-,  203-20. 
may  be  fit  and  absolutely  necessary,  219. 

VICE.      See  Evil,  Folly,  Indulgence,  Moral,  Punishment. 

does  not  consist  merely  in  the  intention  or  tendency  to 

produce  unhappiness,  330. 
manner  in  which  a  habit  of  it  is  formed,  97. 
this  life  is  to  some  a  discipline  of  it,  103. 
passion  a  poor  excuse  for  it,  145. 
its  natural  bad  consequences,  judicial  punishments,  37, 

203. 

those  in  a  future  life  maybe  by  way  of  natural  con- 
sequence, 160. 
private  vices  may  have  good  effects  and  yet  have  been 

better  avoided,  134. 
hinderances  to  its  complete  punishment  accidental,  64,  70. 
it  must  be  the  misery  of  every  creature,  9. 
considerations  showing  its  enormity,  205. 
imprudent  wilfulness  as  well  as  actual  vice,  punished,  39. 
vice  punished  as  such,  52. 

whence  this  proceeds,  57. 
discountenanced  as  such,  56. 
infamous  and  why,  57. 
punished  as  mischievous  to  society,  51,  71. 
some  actions  though  vicious,  rewarded  by  the  operation 

of  general  laws,  59. 
ridiculous  for  men  to  think  themselves  secure  in  it,  144, 
how,  incongruous,  unsuitable,  disproportionate  and  unfit, 

326. 
approbation  of  it  for  its  own  sake  monstrous,  58. 
Avhat  if  it  had  the  same  effects  as  virtue  ?  68. 
no  such  declaration  in  its  favour  as  in  that  of  virtue,  69. 
its  snares  render  this  world  peculiarly  fit  for  a  state  of 

discipline,  101. 
it  is  uncertain  whether  anything  can  be  gained  by  it, 

certain  that  little  can,  145. 
provision  may  have  been  made  against  its  ruinous  con- 
sequences always  following,  205. 
its  awful  effects  in  this  present  world,  206. 
consists  chiefly  in  the  want  of  the  virtuous  principle,  325. 

VIRTUE.     See    Self-government,   See,  Justice,  Moral,   Pru- 
dence, Goodness. 
Dissertation  on  its  nature,  321. 


39^        Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

VIRTUE  (continued). 

what  it  consists  in,  58,  323. 

has  regard  to  actions,  323,  n. 

inconsistent  with  the  idea  of  ill  desert,  324. 

common  instances  of  it  produce  a  very  weak  feeling  of 
good  desert,  325. 

does  not  consist  Avholly  in  benevolence,  329. 

going  over  its  theory,  may  harden  the  heart,  86. 

habit  of  it  how  formed,  85-6. 

its  improvement  progressive,  98. 

improved  by  temptation,  99,  &c. 

how  secured,  95. 

self-denial  not  essential  to  it  [in  itself],  101. 

has  a  natural  tendency  to  prevail  over  vice,  60,  64,  70. 
this  tendenc}^  hindered,  64. 
the  hinderances  to  it  accidental,  64-72. 

its  final  triumph,  credible  and  likely,  60-72. 

the  practice  of  it  includes  a  reference  to  revelation,  149, 
156,  274,  300. 

is  generallv  attended  with  more  satisfaction  than  vice, 
48,  49,  57. 

yet  there  may  be  exceptions,  49. 

rewarded  as  such,  52,  71. 

as  beneficial  to  society,  51-71. 

conciliates  good  offices,  54-5. 

public  honours  and  advancements  its  natural  rewards,  55. 

favoured  as  such,  56. 

peace  and  delight  sometimes  arise  necessarily  from  it,  57. 

nothing  in  the  human  mind  contradictory  to  it,  58. 

necessarily  distinguished  from  vice,  58. 

some  actions  though  virtuous  punished  by  the  operation 
of  general  laws,  59. 

so  far  as  a  man  is  true  to  it  he  is  on  the  side  of  the  Di- 
vine administration,  59-60. 

being  true  to  it  gives  rise  to  a  sense  of  security,  secret 
satisfaction,  and  implied  hope,  60. 

it  and  vice  tend  to  produce  their  good  and  bad  effects  in 
a  greater  degree  than  they  do,  60. 

tends  to  increase  the  power  of  a  society  directed  by  it 
and  how,  62. 

conditions  of  the  prevalence  of  power  directed  by  it,  63. 

much  less  power  under  its  direction  would  prevail  over 
much  more  not  so,  64. 

existence  of  this  tendency,  not  refuted  by  its  being  hin- 
dered, 65. 


Index  of  Words  and  Things.         397 

VIRTUE  icoyitinued). 

to  see  it  work  out  its  effects  in  one  order  of  beings  may 

be  very  useful  to  others,  65. 
it  and  vice  will  probably  be  rewarded  and  punished  in  a 

higher  degree  hereafter,  70, 
improvement  in  virtue  and  piety  the  end  of  our  being 

placed  here,  83. 
we  need  improvement  in  it,  and  for  that  this  life  is  a  fit 

state  of  discipline,  92. 
reasonable  self-love,  part  of  the  idea  of  it,  404,  95,  n., 

104. 
practical  principle  of  it,  how  strengthened,  95. 
habits  of  it,  improvement  in  it,  and  this  is  advancement 

in  happiness,  96. 

necessary  to  all,  even  to  perfect  creatures,  94. 
how  necessary  in  a  future  state,  96. 
the  necessary  exercise  of  moral  attention,  &c.,  implies  an 

effort  of  virtue  more  real,  constant,  &c.,  101. 
it  may  be  promoted  by  what  seems  opposed  to  it,  133. 
moral  virtue  alone  makes  us  acceptable  to  God,  164. 
in  general  there  is  a  universally  acknowledged  standard 

of  it,  323. 
profession  of  it  universal,  323. 
Voice  of  Nature  m  the  conduct  of  Providence  declares  for  vir- 
tue, 59. 

TT/'ARXIXGS.     See  Consequences. 
\  V  against  the  consequences  of  vice,  &c.,  36,  43. 

fearful  effect  of  disregarding  them,  43-4. 
Waste  apparent  in  nature  to  us  unaccountable,  104. 
Waterland,  his  tract  on  the  nature,  obligation,  and  efficacy  of 

the  Christian  Sacraments,  cited,  157,  n. 
llliat  we  were  to  he,  the  effect  of  what  we  would  do,  107. 

WICKEDNESS. 

voluntary,  82. 

the  danger  of  it  taught  by  the  Gospel,  152. 
Wilfulness  has  the  effects  of  vice,  39. 

WILL.     See  Character,  GOD. 

of  God,  may  be  regarded  as  absolute,  or  conditional,  242. 

our  sin  and  its  effects  in  these  two  views,  242. 
how  determined.     See  Fitness,  120,  n. 
Wisdom,  in  the  book  of  Proverbs,  42. 

Words  show  the  existence  of  something  they  were  meant  to 
represent,  322. 


398  Index  of  Words  and  Things. 

WORLD.      See  Material,  Universe,  Earth,  Nature. 

how  we  ought  to  form  our  notions  of  its  government  and 

constitution,  5-6. 
peculiarly  fit  to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  depraved 

creatures,  99. 
its  viciousness  makes  it  a  state  of  virtuous  discipline  to 

good  men,  103. 
is  a  theatre  of  action,  107. 

the  natural  world  and  its   government,  a  progressive 
scheme,  or  system,  199. 

probably  intended  to  be  subordinate  to  the  moral, 

130. 
both  alike  incomprehensible,  129-30. 
its  histor}',  how  given  in  Scripture,  267. 
no  account  of  its  origin  can  be  given  without  an  intel- 
ligent Author,  nor  of  its  general  design  without  a 
moral  Governor,  140. 

WRONG.     See  Injury. 

sense  of  it,  implied  in  remorse,  53. 
and  in  resentment,  322. 

YO  UNG  people,  their  hazards  in  temporal  matters,  74. 
YOUTH.      See  Infancy. 
effects  of  misbehaviour  in  it,  78. 

the  state  for  acquiring  what  is  necessary  in  manhood,  90. 
no  sufficient  excuse  for  rashness  and  folly,  40. 
an  opportunity  which  may  be  lost  for  ever,  91. 


IXDEX    OF    TEXTS    CITED    OR 
REFEERED    TO. 


Page 

Page 

Genesis  i. 

267. 

Malachi  I.  11, 

272. 

Beut.  xxviii.  37, 

278. 

III. 

272. 

64, 

271. 

Ecclns.  XLii.  24,  25, 

84. 

XXX.  2,  3, 

271. 

3Ianasses'  Prayer, 

210,  n. 

Job  XXXIII.  24, 

214. 

Matt.  VI.  23, 

239,  n. 

Psalm  ex.     4, 

212. 

IX.  11,  13, 

164. 

Proverbs  I. 

42-3. 

XI.  25, 

239,  n. 

XX.  27, 

303. 

XII.  1,  7, 

164,  165. 

XIII.  11,  12, 

239,  11. 

Isaiah  ii. 

272. 

XX.  28, 

213. 

VIII.  14,  15, 

272. 

XXVI.  28, 

211. 

XI. 

272. 

XXVIII.  18, 

194. 

XXTX.  13,  14, 

239,  n. 

19, 

156. 

XLV.  17, 

271. 

XLIX.  5, 

272. 

3Iark  X.  45, 

213. 

6, 

272. 

John  I.     3, 

268. 

LIII. 

212,272. 

9, 

211. 

LVI.      7, 

272. 

29,  36, 

211. 

LX.  21, 

67,271. 

III.    5, 

160. 

Jer.  XXX.  11, 

271. 

16, 

209,306. 

XXXI.  36, 

271. 

19, 

239,11. 

XL VI.  28, 

271. 

35, 

214. 

V.  22,  23, 

194,214. 

Daniel, 

264. 

44, 

239,  u. 

II.  44, 

269. 

VI.  14, 

214. 

VII.    7, 

264. 

VIII.  12, 

211. 

14,  22, 

67,269. 

XI.  51,  52, 

213. 

27, 

269. 

52, 

193. 

IX.  24, 

212. 

XIV.     2, 

194. 

XII.  10, 

239,  n. 

2,  3, 

215. 

Hosea  VI.    6, 

165. 

xviii.  36, 

215. 

Amos  IX.  15, 

271. 

Acts, 
III.  21, 

248. 
186,  269 

Malachii.  10,  11, 

272. 

xvii.  31, 

194. 

400 


Index  of  Texts  cited. 


Romans  l.  18, 
III.  25, 

Page 
146. 
211. 

2  Tim.  I.  10, 
lu.  13, 

Page 
146,152 
239,  n. 

V.  10, 

213. 

Titus  11.  12, 

214. 

11, 
XV.  19, 

211. 
249. 

Hebreivs, 

II.  10, 

212,  n. 
213. 

1  Cor.  I.  27, 

175,195. 

14, 

214. 

II.  14, 

239,n. 

V.    9, 

213,  306 

V.  7, 

211. 

VI.     1, 

186. 

VI.  20, 

213. 

vn.  25, 

213. 

XI.  23,  &c. 

248. 

VIII.    4, 

5, 

212. 

XII.     8-28, 

249. 

IX.  26, 

216. 

XIII.  1,  2,  8, 

249. 

28, 

21.3. 

XIV. 

249. 

X.     1, 

212. 

XV.    8, 

248. 

4,5 

,9, 

10,       212. 

25-8, 

2  Cor.  IV.    4, 
V.  19, 
VIII.  12, 
XII.  12,  13, 

Galat.  I. 

III.    2,  5, 
13, 

194-5. 

239, 11. 
213. 

227. 
249. 

248. 
249. 
213. 

1  Peter  1.  11, 

19, 

11.  21, 

III.  18, 

2  Peter  I.  19, 

II.     1, 
III.  13, 

12, 

194. 
213. 
215. 
213. 

226. 
213. 
193. 

IV.    4, 

194. 

1  John  11.     1, 

2, 

213. 

Ephes.  II.  16, 
III.     9, 

213. 

268. 

2, 
IV.  18, 

211. 
292. 

IV.  12, 

12,  13, 
V.     2, 

1.53. 
215. 
209,211. 

Revelation, 

III.  21, 
V.    9, 

211,n. 

215. 

213. 

Philip.  II.     6-11, 
8,  9, 
2  Thess.  I.    8, 

194. 
214. 

215. 

12, 

X.    7, 

XI.  15, 

17, 

13, 

214. 
269. 
215. 

42,  n. 

1  Tim.  II.     5, 

201,211. 

XIV.    4, 

21.3. 

6, 

213. 

XXII.    5, 

269. 

III.  16, 

195. 

11» 

255. 

THE 

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