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THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION
NATURAL AND REVEALED
BY BISHOP BUTLER INTRODUC-
TION BY REV. RONALD BAYNE
p
MAYER
JOSEPH BUTLER, born at Wantage in 1692,
the son of a Presbyterian linen-draper.
Ordained priest in the Church of England,
1718. Bishop of Bristol, 1738; Bishop of
Durham, 17^0. Died in 1752.
THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION
BISHOP BUTLER
LONDON: J. M. DENT & SONS LTD.
NEW YORK: E. P. DUTTON & CO. INC.
All rights reserved
Made in Great Britain
at The Temple Press Letchworth
and decorated by Eric Ravilious
J. M. Dent &. Sons Ltd.
Aldine House Bedford St. London
Toronto . Vancouver
Melbourne . Wellington
First Published in this Edition 1906
Reprinted 1906, 1917, 1927
>T?
SA1VIA
INTRODUCTION
BY THE REV. RONALD BAYNE
JOSEPH BUTLER, according to Cardinal Newman "the
greatest name in the Anglican Church" and the author of
the most famous volume of English theology, was the eighth
and youngest son of a prosperous Presbyterian linen-draper
of Wantage, in Berkshire. Thomas Butler, the father, had
retired from business and was living in the outskirts of
Wantage at a house known as the Priory or the Chantrey,
when Joseph was born on 18 May, 1692. The lad began
his education at the " Latin " School of Wantage, then
under a master who was a clergyman of the Church of
England, the Rev. Philip Barton ; but it was his father's wish
to train Joseph for the Presbyterian ministry, and therefore
he was taken from the Wantage Grammar School at about
the age of nineteen and sent to the Nonconformist academy
established by Samuel Jones, originally at Gloucester, but
in 1712 removed to Tewkesbury. Samuel Jones was a
teacher of remarkable originality and character. He was
the son of a Welsh minister, who emigrated to America ;
but he was sent to England for his education, and afterwards
to Leyden University. He took into his academy sixteen
pupils for a five years' course of study. Among Butler's
fellow-students were Thomas Seeker, afterwards Archbishop
of Canterbury ; the distinguished Nonconformist divines.
Samuel Chandler, Daniel Scott, and Jeremiah Jones, and
John Bowes, who became Lord Chancellor of Ireland.
There is extant a letter 1 written in November, 1711, by
Seeker to Dr. Isaac Watts, which gives an account of the
studies of the second year of the five years' course. The
sixteen students rose at five o'clock ; they spoke Latin, "except
when below-stairs amongst the family" ; every day they turned
1 Printed in Thomas Milner's " Life of Isaac Watts," p. 832.
viii Introduction
two verses of the Hebrew Bible into Greek ; twice a week
they read Isocrates and Terence, with notes of the Leyden
Professor, Perizonius, under whom Jones had studied. In
logic they used the manual of another Leyden Professor,
Adrian Heereboord, but Seeker says that Jones was "no
great admirer of the old logic," and made his pupils go over
"the far greater part" of Locke's "Essay on the Human
Understanding." In the afternoon, after a lecture on the
Hebrew and Greek Scriptures, "we read a chapter in the
Greek Testament, and after that Mathematics." Seeker's
admiration for his master is emphatic. He has " real piety,
great learning, and an agreeable temper " ; " he is very strict
in keeping good orders, and will effectually preserve his
pupils from negligence and immorality." His library,
" composed for the most part of foreign books," is of great
advantage to the students.
It was at Tewkesbury, in November, 1713, being twenty-
one years old, that Butler gave the first indication of his
special aptitude for philosophical speculation. After Locke's
death in 1704, Samuel Clarke, of Norwich, was regarded
for a quarter of a century as the ablest English philoso-
pher. His reputation rested on his "Boyle Lectures,"
delivered in 1704 and 1705. Butler studied these lectures,
and in the " Demonstration of the Being and Attributes
of God " found certain difficulties. He wished to consult
Clarke on two points especially, and therefore addressed
to him, in November, 1713, an anonymous letter which
he signed " A Gentleman in Gloucestershire," and got
Seeker to post for him in the town of Gloucester. The
opening sentences of the letter are strangely prophetic of
the writer's future achievements. " I have made it, sir, my
business, ever since I thought myself capable of such sort of
reasoning, to prove to myself the being and attributes of
God . . . not only more fully to satisfy my own mind, but
also in order to defend the great truths of natural religion,
and those of the Christian revelation which follow from
them, against all opposers ; but must own with concern,
that hitherto I have been unsuccessful ; and though I have
got -very probable arguments, yet I can go but a very little
Introduction ix
way into demonstration in the proof of those things."
Clarke answered the letter at once, and by April, 1714, five
letters had been written by Butler, which, with their answers,
were all printed by Clarke in the fourth edition of the " Boyle
Lectures" in 1 7 1 6. The final sentence of Butler's fourth letter
throws a sudden search-light on the mind and aspirations of
the young man of twenty-one : " for, as I design the search
after truth as the business of my life, I shall not be ashamed
to learn from any person ; though, at the same time, I cannot
but be sensible, that instruction from some men is like the gift
of a prince it reflects an honour on the person on whom it
lays an obligation."
It was after the writing of these letters that Butler began
to feel that he could not enter the Presbyterian ministry.
There is a letter in the British Museum, written by Butler to
Dr. Clarke, from London, apparently in 1714, three weeks
after leaving the academy of Samuel Jones, in which he
reveals his distress of mind. He speaks of the " melancholy
thoughts I had upon my being obliged to quit those studies
that had a direct tendency to divinity, that being what I
should choose for the business of my life, it being, I think,
of all other studies, the most suitable to a reasonable
nature. I say my being obliged, for there is very little
encouragement (whether one regards interest or usefulness,)
nowadays for any to enter that profession, who has not got
a way of commanding his assent to received opinions
without examination." Butler's father attempted to remove
his son's scruples by arranging interviews with Presbyterian
ministers of repute, but no impression was made, and finally
the father gave way and allowed his son in March, 1714-15,
to enter at Oriel College, Oxford, perhaps without any
definite plan as to his future.
At Oriel, Butler did not find the routine of the Oxford
schools stimulating or useful. He writes in September, 1717,
to Dr. Clarke at Cambridge, proposing to migrate to that
University and take there a degree in laws, as his father has
consented to the plan. Of Oxford he says, " We are obliged
to mis-spend so much time here in attending frivolous lectures
and unintelligible disputations, that I am quite tired out with
x Introduction
such a disagreeable way of trifling." He goes on to discuss
with Clarke, " a difficulty in relation to Freedom, which very
much perplexes me." He has been reading Clarke's "Letters
to Leibnitz." " Upon reading what you last published . . .
I see great reason to be satisfied that Freedom and Action are
identical ideas, and that man is, properly speaking, an Agent
or a Free Being." But because he believes in our power to
act or not to act in any given case, he cannot see that it fol-
lows that he believes in our power to act virtuously. He
wishes for more light on the connection between Freedom and
Moral Government. He ends by saying that he is " conscious
of somewhat in myself, and discern the same in others,
which seems directly to contradict the foregoing objections,
but I am not able at present to see where the weakness of
them lies." His next words explain his discontent with
Oxford : " and our people here never had any doubt in their
lives concerning a received opinion ; so that I cannot men-
tion a difficulty to them." Butler wrote three letters in Sep-
tember and October, 1717, to Clarke, from Oriel, on this
subject. Clarke answered the first two and kept the corre-
spondence, endorsing it, " These to be added to ' Leibnitz's
Letters,' next edition."
Finding that the terms already kept at Oxford could not
be counted towards a Cambridge degree, Butler gave up the
idea of migrating. He had besides made valuable friends
at Oxford. Of these the chief was Edward Talbot, Fellow of
Oriel, whose father was bishop successively of Oxford, Salis-
bury, and Durham. In 1717 Talbot was made vicar of East
Hendred, near Wantage, and it appears from the parish
registers that Butler gave him assistance in his work. In
October, 1718, Butler took his B.A. degree, and before the
end of the month was ordained deacon by Bishop Talbot in
the Palace Chapel at Salisbury. The same Bishop in
December ordained him priest in the church of St. James,
Westminster, of which Dr. Clarke was rector. By Clarke's
and Talbot's influence he was appointed Preacher at the
Rolls Chapel in the following July, and held the post for
eight years. Meanwhile, Thomas Seeker had declined, like
Butler, to enter the ministry for which he was bred, and had
Introduction xi
turned to the study of medicine. He was in Paris in
1718-19 attending medical lectures and corresponding with
Butler, when he made the acquaintance of the saintly Martin
Benson, a friend of Edward Talbot's, who was returning with
Berkeley from Italy. Seeker, under the combined influence
of Butler and Benson, decided to seek ordination in the
English Church. He came to England in the summer of
1720, and was with Edward Talbot at Oxford. In December
the centre of this group of friends, Talbot, died of small-
pox, but the unexpected blow made his father especially
attentive to his son's last wishes that Benson, Butler, and
Seeker should be cared for by the Bishop. Benson's sister
was staying in Edward Talbot's house at the time of his
death, and formed so strong a friendship with his widow, that
when Miss Benson married Seeker in 1725, Mrs. Talbot and
her posthumous daughter Catherine took up their abode in
Seeker's household, and Seeker himself supervised Catherine's
education. Catherine Talbot and her friend, Mrs. Carter,
the translator of Epictetus, were lifelong friends of Butler.
To the group of men bound together by their friendship
with Edward Talbot must be added Thomas Rundle, after-
wards Bishop of Deny. These men in the first half of the
eighteenth century were the salt of the English Church.
They set a standard of personal holiness and intellectual
energy sorely needed in their day. Their advancement is to
be ascribed not only to the friendship of Bishop Talbot and
his eldest son Charles, who became Lord Chancellor in
1 733, but also to the high character and exceptional mental
gifts of Queen Caroline, the wife of George II. In 1720
Butler was made a prebendary of Salisbury, and in 1722
rector of Houghton-le-Skerne, near Darlington. These
preferments he owed to Bishop Talbot, but he was still in
1725 in receipt of money help from an elder brother and
was not in comfortable circumstances until Seeker in 1725
persuaded Bishop Talbot to give him the living of Stanhope
on the Wear in West Durham, known in the diocese as the
" golden rectory." Here he published in 1726, Fifteen Ser-
mons preached at the Rolls Chapel^ a book as important and
almost as famous as the Analogy. The book made no stir,
xii Introduction
but a second edition was published in 1729, witn a preface
in which the author states that the choice of the sermons
has been " in great measure accidental." Seeker is said to
have revised the language of this preface, which aimed at
making the general drift and object of the sermons more
easily followed and appreciated. Butler remained at Stan-
hope seven years, and very little is recorded of his life
there, except "a tradition of his riding a black pony,
and riding always very fast," perhaps to escape beggars,
whose importunities, we are told, he could not resist.
But we may fairly assume that the Analogy was planned and
mainly composed at Stanhope.
Charles Talbot became Chancellor in 1733 and appointed
Butler as his chaplain, with the understanding that he was
to reside half the year in his benefice. This brought
Butler into court circles. Bishop Talbot gave him a pre-
bendal stall at Rochester, and Queen Caroline made him
clerk of the closet in 1736, and requested his attendance
at those conversations upon philosophical and theological
subjects, which she loved to arrange between distinguished
divines and philosophers, from the hour of seven until
nine in the evening. But Butler was not a brilliant con-
versationalist. He complains in the Analogy of the ad-
vantage people have who attack Christianity, "especially
in conversation." It has even been suggested that the
Analogy owes its composition to the author's dissatisfac-
tion with himself as a defender of Christianity in the con-
versational tournaments then so popular. It is clear that
all the irrelevant graces of wit and eloquence which make
conversation delightful would appear to Butler treason to
truth. He had a habit of walking up and down in his
garden for hours "in the darkest night which the time of the
year could afford." That habit was characteristic. He was
a lonely thinker, who isolated himself as far as possible from
every distraction when he desired to concentrate his mind
upon the riddle of the universe. But the Analogy was
published in 1736. It must therefore have been composed
for the most part in the quiet and retirement of Stanhope,
and the flippancies of polite conversation can have had very
Introduction xiii
little to do with it. Both the Fifteen Sermons and the Analogy
came from deep down in Butler's own mind and are to be
defined fundamentally and primarily as realized portions of
that " search for truth " which from the first the author had
felt to be " the business of my life."
Butler's third work, Six Sermons preached upon Public
Occasions, is in a different class. It throws light upon his
interests and activities as a bishop and his opinions as a
Churchman. The sermons date from 1739 to 1748. Queen
Caroline died in 1737. She is said to have recommended
Butler for promotion " particularly and by name." A month
later he preached before the King a sermon by which his
Majesty was much affected. In 1738 he was made Bishop
of Bristol. T n accepting the see Butler remarks with great
frankness that it is " not very suitable either to the condition
of my fortune or the circumstances of my preferment." The
Bristol bishopric was the poorest in England, with a stipend
of less than .500, and in view of this fact Butler was allowed
to remain prebend of Rochester and rector of Stanhope until
1740, when he was appointed dean of St. Paul's, and enabled
to resign the other preferments. At Bristol he spent most
of his stipend in restoring the Palace and its Chapel. The
Bristol merchants helped him with a large present of cedar.
Above the altar of his chapel he placed a slab of black
marble with a cross inlaid in white, an ornament in the
opinion of Bishop Fitzgerald " not very prudently selected."
In all his cures he showed a great fondness for building
operations, forestalling in some degree the nineteenth-century
feeling for the beautiful in architecture. His house at
Hampstead, built by Sir Harry Vane, is described by Miss
Talbot as " a most enchanting, gay, pretty, elegant " residence,
and was adorned by windows of painted glass of Butler's
own choosing. The Protestants of the neighbourhood said
they were a present from the Pope. Bishop Seeker and his
wife, Bishop Benson, Mrs. Talbot and Miss Talbot formed
the nucleus of the circle which was gathered together under
the Hampstead roof. Miss Talbot, writing during Butler's
last illness, remarks : " We all live in suspense ; and there is
not a room in the house that does not peculiarly remind us
xiv Introduction
of him who was so lately its possessor and who has so
often, so cheerfully, and hospitably received us in it"
Butler's mind on the Roman Church is clearly declared
in his "Accession Day" discourse, delivered before the
House of Lords about a year after the battle of Culloden.
Liberty is declared to be "the very genius of our civil
constitution, extending its influence to the ecclesiastical
part of it " ; and therefore the Church of England is not
only valuable for itself, but also for " what it is a security
from ; I mean that great corruption of Christianity, popery,
which is ever hard at work to bring us again under its
yoke." The paragraph that follows is a sober but severe
criticism of the Church of Rome. The Six Sermons
have the same qualities of accurate and concentrated
thought which distinguish the other works of the preacher,
but they show us also that his heart and conscience
were strenuously supporting certain special fields of prac-
tical Christian endeavour. And both in the things he
cares for and his ways of caring for them he is in
advance of his time, not only because his abilities are
exceptional, but because his nature is exceptional. It is
the spiritual power and reality in Butler that give his
writings their appeal. It is a shallow judgment which
finds in them only candour and common sense. It is
likewise a shallow judgment which complains of his
"gloom." His "gloom" is his sense of the mystery
of life. He stares into life as we stare into the dark
of midnight, not frightened nor appalled, but fascinated
and God-encompassed. The anecdote told by his domestic
chaplain at Bristol, Dr. Tucker, reveals the man very
vividly. "His custom was, when at Bristol, to walk for
hours in his garden in the darkest night which the time of
the year could afford, and I had frequently the honour to
attend him. After walking some time he would stop
suddenly and ask the question, 'What security is there
against the insanity of individuals? The physicians know
of none ; and as to divines, we have no data, either from
Scripture or from reason, to go upon relative to this
affair.' ... He would then take another turn, and then
Introduction xv
stop short : c Why might not whole communities and public
bodies be seized with fits of insanity, as well as individuals 1
Nothing but this principle, that they are liable to insanity,
can account for the major part of those transactions of which
we read in history.' M1
In 1750 Butler was offered the See of Durham. Some
delay was caused in his appointment by his refusal to accept
the post on conditions. He distrusted his own worth and
capacity. " It would be a melancholy thing in the close of
life to have no reflections to entertain one's self with, but that
one had spent the revenues of the Bishopric of Durham in
a sumptuous course of living, and enriched one's friends
with the promotions of it, instead of having really set one's
self to do good and promote worthy men ; yet this right use
of fortune and power is more difficult than the generality of
even good people think, and requires both a guard upon
one's self and a strength of mind to withstand solicitations
greater (I wish I may not find it) than I am master of."
But of Butler's mind and temper at the end of his life a
most impressive record has come down to us in the famous
Charge delivered to the Durham clergy at the Bishop's
primary visitation in 1751. It begins by deploring the
" general decay of religion in this nation." The attitude
which the clergy should maintain against the popular and
voluble scepticism of the day is carefully considered, and
then the necessity of a more earnest and careful use of
external forms in religion is insisted upon : " the form
of religion may indeed be where there is little of the
thing itself; but the thing itself cannot be preserved
amongst mankind without the form." The Charge insists
regarding external forms that " these things are neglected
to a degree which is and cannot but be attended with
a decay of all that is good." One paragraph points out
that in the heathen world, among Mahometans, and in
Roman Catholic countries, religion through outward forms
and ceremonies " mixes itself with business, civil forms, diver-
sions, domestic entertainments, and every part of common
life." The Bishop therefore asks for more use of the services
1 Humble Addrtti and Eamtit Affeal to the Landed Intertst, p. 90.
xvi Introduction
of the Prayer Book, for the practice of family prayers and
private prayers, and for more careful preparation for con-
firmation. The Charge was taken by fanatical persons as
popish in its leanings. An anonymous writer a few years
after Butler's death asserted that he died in the communion
of the Roman Church. Archbishop Seeker demanded some
proof of this. The writer answered alleging the cross in the
chapel at Bristol and that "his last episcopal charge has
squinted very much towards that superstition." Another
writer stated that Butler had " a great fondness for the lives
of Romish saints and their books of mystic piety." These
attacks had the good effect of drawing from Seeker an
interesting account of his friend's character, but they deserved
no serious consideration. The important point about the
Charge is that it is delivered by the author of the Analogy^
who was not in the least inclined to exaggerate the im-
portance of external forms, but might have been expected
unduly to magnify the mind and exalt the inward spiritual
side of religion.
Soon after removing to Durham Butler's constitution
began to break up. We have from historians of Durham
some recollections of his appearance. 1 Surtees says that
" he conciliated all hearts ; in advanced years and on the
episcopal throne he retained the same genuine modesty, and
natural sweetness of disposition, which had distinguished
him in youth and in retirement. During the ministerial
performance of the sacred office, a divine animation seemed
to pervade his whole manner, and lighted up his pale, wan
countenance, already marked with the progress of disease,
like a torch glimmering in its socket, yet bright and useful to
the last." And Hutchinson says the same : " He was of a
most reverend aspect ; his face thin and pale ; but there was
a divine placidness in his countenance which inspired
veneration, and expressed the most benevolent mind. His
white hair hung gracefully on his shoulders and his whole
figure was patriarchal."
When the Bishop's condition became alarming he was re-
1 Surtees, History of Durham, p. 122 ; and Hutchinson's History of
Durham, i. 578.
Introduction xvii
moved to Bath where his friend, Martin Benson, Bishop of
Gloucester, attended him till the end. We have several
letters written by Benson and by Nathaniel Forster, Butler's
chaplain, to Seeker, then Bishop of Oxford, to keep him ac-
quainted with the condition of the patient. He died on June
1 6 at the age of sixty, and was buried in Bristol Cathedral.
Dr. Forster describes the funeral. "The hearse was fol-
lowed only by two coaches-and-six, the servants in livery going
before it on horseback. The pall was supported by the
Chancellor, Dr. Waterland, and four others of the senior
clergy, who were most known to his Lordship, and followed
by myself and the rest of the family, in the same order in
which we usually attended his Lordship to the cathedral at
Durham." His will left legacies of friendship and respect to
Mrs. Talbot and to Catherine Talbot, her daughter, as well
as to Seeker, and ordered "all my sermons, letters and
papers, whatever," to be "burnt without being read by any one
as soon as may be after my decease." In 1834 a monument
was erected in the cathedral by subscription, for which a
notable inscription was written by Southey. After recording
the name it proceeds :
" Others had established the historical and prophetical
grounds of the Christian religion, and that sure testimony
of its truth which is found in its perfect adaptation to the
heart of man. It was reserved for him to develope its
analogy to the constitution and course of nature ; and laying
his strong foundations in the depth of that great argument,
there to construct another and irrefragable proof : thus ren-
dering philosophy subservient to faith ; and finding in out-
ward and visible things the type and evidence of those within
the veil."
It remains now to explain very briefly the general philo-
sophical method of the Analogy and its connection with
the controversies of its time.
We have seen that Butler at the age of twenty-one was
studying the Boyle Lectures of Samuel Clarke. Those
lectures claimed to be a demonstrative proof of the being
and attributes of God, and to establish the moral law by
reasonings as irresistible as a proposition in Euclid. Clarke's
B 9
xviii Introduction
philosophy was influenced very largely by the mathematical
and physical reasonings of Descartes and Newton. He
aimed at using the same method in philosophical and ethical
inquiry. His reasoning is therefore on the whole a priori.
He deduces from fundamental axioms an elaborate system
of metaphysical truth. From this method Butler instinc-
tively recoiled. He did not question the value of Clarke's
work, but his own work was 'different. In the Fifteen
Sermons and the Analogy Butler aims at interpreting ex-
perience. He collects and arranges facts in the Fifteen
Sermons the facts of the moral experience of the individual
man ; in the Analogy, the facts of the experience of society
of life in the widest sense. Butler's method is therefore
inductive ; as Dr. Chalmers expresses it : " Butler is in
theology what Bacon was in science ; the reigning principle
of the latter is, that it is not for man to theorise on the
works of God ; and of the former, that it is not for man to
theorise on the ways of God. Both deferred alike to the
certainty of experience as being paramount to all the plausi-
bilities of hypothesis."
But the Analogy is written with a direct reference to the
voluminous deistical controversies of the beginning of the
eighteenth century. After the enthusiasms and excitements
of the civil wars an age of reason succeeded a reason
that tended to be severely logical. It was a rationalism
that found it easy to dispense with imagination and emotion
because the spiritual vitality of the time was low. Locke's
Reasonableness of Christianity, published in 1695, may be
taken as a starting-point for the whole of Deism. The next
step may be represented by Toland's Christianity not
Mysterious. Toland called himself a follower of Locke,
though Locke refused to acknowledge him. Toland's
position is further developed by Tindal in Christianity as
old as Creation. The very titles of these books explain the
course of the controversy. The deist ignored all that was
deepest and most characteristic in Christianity. He left out
that part of it which was not as old as creation. He fell
back upon a natural religion which he considered plain and
reasonable. He accepted a Creator and Governor of the
Introduction xix
universe Whose wisdom and power he did not deny. This
moral Governor all men by their natural reason can know
and obey ; and there is no necessity for revelation at all.
Butler's answer is directed especially to the deist who accepts
God as a moral Governor, and declares that no mysteries
are left in life. The Analogy urges that the deist accepts
his moral Governor in the face of the same difficulties and
mysteries which make him reject revelation. The deist has
not got rid of the mysteries of life by denying revelation.
If he will only look at life fairly, he will find that natural
and revealed religion are of a piece in their mysteriousness.
Man's unaided intellect does not find the world as reason-
able as a proposition of Euclid.
It has been said that Butler raises more doubts than he
solves. But he wrote against men who had no use for
revelation because they saw nothing to doubt about in the
universe. Butler's whole treatise implies that religious con-
viction cannot be made to depend only upon demonstrative
proof. There is no effort of faith in accepting the right
answer to a sum.
" You must mix some uncertainty
With faith if you would have faith be."
JOSEPH BUTLER, 1692-1752.
Fifteen Sermons preached at the Rolls Chapel. 1726.
The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the
Constitution and Course of Nature (with dissertations : " Of
Personal Identity," "Of the Nature of Virtue"). 1736.
Six Sermons preached upon public occasions. Published
separately, 1739, 1740, 1741, 1745, 1747, 1748.
A Charge delivered to the Clergy at the Visitation of
Durham. 1871.
Collected Edition (with Life and Notes), 1804; reprinted
1807 ; Life, by Thomas Bartlett. 1839.
Some Remains hitherto unpublished of Bishop ButUr.
1853. Edited by Bishop Steere.
ANALYSIS
THE Introduction distinguishes probable evidence from demonstra-
tion. It claims that we continually use in life and practice a
method of analogy which argues from a known series of facts to
a like (verisimile) series less known. The treatise that follows will
attempt to prove that the doctrines of religion have such a likeness
to the ordinary course of experience that the same Author is
probably responsible for both. This will at least be shown to be
possible. The argument assumes as its known series of facts a
world made and governed by God.
CHAPTER I. The first chapter of the Analogy "Of a Future
Life" states the argument for immortality without reference to
the teachings of revelation or to those deductions from essential
religious principles by which it is generally maintained. The
chapter therefore disappoints most readers, who are unaware how
very largely their faith in immortality depends upon considerations
which Butler's method compels him to ignore. It is disconcerting
to find rather the possibility than the probability of immortality
proved by the inductive method which reasons from the facts of
experience. The chapter is not therefore conclusive or exhaustive.
It is characteristic because it so conscientiously refrains from a priori
proof. But the case for immortality cannot be fully and fairly put
without a priori arguments, nor by the Christian without appeal to
the revelation through Christ. Butler, then, insists only that the
movement in nature from matter to mind forces us to conceive a
further movement ; nature's effect upon the mind of man is to
persuade him of the probability of a future life. The Dissertation
on Personal Identity belongs to the chapter.
CHAPTERS II. and III. In this world we observe a govern-
ment by consequences ; definite lines of conduct on the whole
bring their reward or their punishment. In certain respects punish-
ments appear more obvious and inevitable than rewards. But on
the whole God governs as a magistrate or parent does. Present
conduct has in this life future consequences ; and therefore this
Analysis xxi
life's conduct as a whole must be expected to have consequences in
a next life.
CHAPTER III. continues CHAPTER II. We perceive a govern-
ment by rewards and punishments, but is it a moral govern-
ment? Taking life as it is, what do we gather of the mind
of God ? What are the moral principles of His government ?
Here comes in the Dissertation on Virtue to insist that the dis-
tinction between vice and virtue is a natural one. Virtue as such
is rewarded as beneficial to society, and vice as such is punished as
mischievous. This chapter has been called the kernel of the
Analogy. As the sermons on human nature argue for a conscience
in the individual man, so this chapter may be said to be an inquiry
as keen as it is dispassionate into the question, Is there a conscience
in life as we know it ? Is there a moral Governor of the universe ?
CHAPTERS IV. and V. We proceed now to examine the mean-
ing of our state of probation. In our temporal interests, trial,
difficulties, and danger produce prudence ; and by analogy we may
expect that in our eternal interests the same tests are intended to
produce virtue. Why we must be in a state of hazard and danger
we cannot fully explain, but the constitution of nature is as it is.
Temporally our happiness and misery depend upon our conduct
under trial. It is credible, therefore, that our final and eternal
destiny is in the same case.
The subject continued. The life of youth as an education for
mature age offers an analogy to this life as a preparation for the
next. We have capacities now which we shall fully use and under-
stand then. We promote and establish in ourselves various habits.
We need habits in maturity which in youth we had not yet formed.
Most of all we need moral habits, or character. It is a general
law of life that what we were to be was to be the effect of what we
would do. By analogy the same will hold of the next life.
This is the most famous chapter in the Analogy. Its germ is to
be found in Sermon xv., " On the Ignorance of Man."
CHAPTER VI. The doctrine of necessity is made by many the
basis of unbelief, and therefore this chapter digresses to consider
whether "the opinion of necessity" interferes with the account
given of the moral government of the world. But that account
has been founded upon the facts of life, and these facts must be
proved different if our account is to be overthrown. Moreover, ID
xxii Analysis
practice we ignore the doctrine of necessity. We allow no theory
of fate to banish responsibility from human affairs. The doctrine
of necessity therefore considered as practical is false.
CHAPTER VII. This last chapter investigates the consequences
of the limitations of human knowledge. Our world is a corner only
of the universe ; our minds take only a narrow view of our corner.
We imperfectly comprehend God's natural and also God's moral
government. The sermon on the Ignorance of Man contains the
germ of this characteristic chapter, in which Butler's profound
conviction of the limitations of the reason he uses so patiently
within its limits, is set forth.
PART II. of the Analogy is summarised sufficiently in its Con-
clusion. Its arguments and statements have been more affected by
the progress of religious thought and criticism than Part i. The
subjects of prophecy and miracle, in chapter viL more especially,
are not convincingly treated from the standpoint of to-day. Chapters
iii. and iv. are the kernel of Part ii. , which generally aims at extend-
ing to the Christian revelation those positions which in Part i. have
been asserted for natural religion.
CONTENTS
PART ONE
OF NATURAL RELIGION
CHAPTER PACK
I. Of a Future Life 5
II. Of the Government of God by Rewards and Punish-
ments ; and particularly of the latter ... 22
III. Of the Moral Government of God .... 32
IV. Of a State of Probation, as implying Trial, Difficul-
ties, and Danger 55
V. Of a State of Probation, as intended for Moral Dis-
cipline and Improvement 62
VI. Of the Opinion of Necessity, considered as Influenc-
ing Practice ........ 84
VII. Of the Government of God, considered as a Scheme
or Constitution, Imperfectly Comprehended . . 99
Conclusion no
PART TWO
OF REVEALED RELIGION
I. Of the Importance of Christianity . . . . 1 19
II. Of the supposed Presumption against a Revelation,
considered as Miraculous . . . . 135
III. Of our Incapacity of Judging what were to be ex-
pected in a Revelation ; and the Credibility, from
Analogy, that it must contain things appearing
liable to Objection 141
IV. Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitu-
tion, imperfectly comprehended . . . 155
V. Of the particular system of Christianity ; the appoint-
ment of a Mediator, and the redemption of the
world by Him 163
VI. Of the want of Universality in Revelation ; and of
the supposed Deficiency in the Proof of it . 181
VII. Of the particular Evidence for Christianity . . 199
VIII. Of the Objections which may be made against argu-
ing from the Analogy of Nature, to Religion . 233
Conclusion 245
TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS
I. Of Personal Identity 257
II. Of the Nature of Virtue 263
AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION
PROBABLE evidence is essentially distinguished from demon-
strative by this, that it admits of degrees ; and of all' variety
of them, from the highest moral certainty, to the very lowest
presumption. We cannot indeed say a thing is probably
true upon one very slight presumption for it ; because, as
there may be probabilities on both sides of a question, there
may be some against it ; and though there be not, yet a slight
presumption does not beget that degree of conviction which
is implied in saying a thing is probably true. But that the
slightest possible presumption is of the nature of a proba-
bility, appears from hence ; that such low presumption often
repeated, will amount even to moral certainty. Thus a man's
having observed the ebb and flow of the tide to-day, affords
some sort of presumption, though the lowest imaginable,
that it may happen again to-morrow ; but the observation of
this event for so many days, and months, and ages together,
as it has been observed by mankind, gives us a full assurance
that it will.
That which chiefly constitutes Probability is expressed in
the word Likely, i.e., like some truth, or true event (vert-
simile) ; like it, in itself, in its evidence, in some more or
fewer of its circumstances. For when we determine a thing
to be probably true, suppose that an event has or will come
to pass, it is from the mind's remarking in it a likeness to
some other event, which we have observed has come to pass.
And this observation forms, in numberless daily instances, a
presumption, opinion, or full conviction, that such event has
or will come to pass ; according as the observation is, that
the like event has sometimes, most commonly, or always, so
far as our observation reaches, come to pass at like distances
of time, or place, or upon like occasions. Hence arises the
belief, that a child, if it lives twenty years, will grow up to the
stature and strength of a man ; that food will contribute to
Author's Introduction xxv
the preservation of its life, and the want of it for such a num-
ber of days be its certain destruction. So likewise the rule
and measure of our hopes and fears concerning the success
of our pursuits ; our expectations that others will act so and
so in such circumstances ; and our judgment that such actions
proceed from such principles ; all these rely upon our having
observed the like to what we hope, fear, expect, judge ; I say,
upon our having observed the like, either with respect to
others or ourselves. And thus, whereas the prince who had
always lived in a warm climate, naturally concluded in the
way of analogy, that there was no such thing as water's
becoming hard, because he had always observed it to be
fluid and yielding ; we, on the contrary, from analogy con-
clude, that there is no presumption at all against this ; that
it is supposable there may be frost in England any given day
in January next ; probable that there will on some day of the
month ; and that there is a moral certainty, i.e., ground for
an expectation without any doubt of it, in some part or other
of the winter.
Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an im-
perfect kind of information ; and is to be considered as rela-
tive only to beings of limited capacities. For nothing which
is the possible object of knowledge, whether past, present, or
future, can be probable to an infinite Intelligence ; since it
cannot but be discerned absolutely as it is in itself certainly
true, or certainly false. But to us, probability is the very
guide of life.
From these things it follows, that in questions of difficulty,
or such as are thought so, where more satisfactory evidence
cannot be had, or is not seen ; if the result of examination be,
that there appears upon the whole, any the lowest presump-
tion on one side, and none on the other, or greater presump-
tion on one side, though in the lowest degree greater ; this
determines the question, even in matters of speculation ; and
in matters of practice, will lay us under an absolute and
formal obligation, in point of prudence and of interest, to act
upon that presumption or low probability, though it be so
low as to leave the mind in very great doubt which is the
truth. For surely a man is as really bound in prudence to do
xxvi Author's Introduction
what upon the whole appears, according to the best of his
judgment, to be for his happiness, as what he certainly knows
to be so. Nay further, in questions of great consequence, a
reasonable man will think it concerns him to remark lower
probabilities and presumptions than these ; such as amount
to no more than showing one side of a question to be as sup-
posable and credible as the other : nay, such as but amount
to much less even than this. For numberless instances
might be mentioned respecting the common pursuits of life,
where a man would be thought, in a literal sense, distracted,
who would not act, and with great application too, not only
upon an even chance, but upon much less, and where the
probability or chance was greatly against his succeeding. 1
It is not my design to inquire further into the nature, the
foundation, and measure of probability ; or whence it proceeds
that likeness should beget that presumption, opinion, and full
conviction, which the human mind is formed to receive from
it, and which it does necessarily produce in every one ; or to
guard against the errors to which reasoning from analogy is
liable. This belongs to the subject of Logic, and is a part of
that subject which has not yet been thoroughly considered.
Indeed I shall not take upon me to say, how far the extent,
compass, and force, of analogical reasoning, can be reduced
to general heads and rules, and the whole be formed into a
system. But though so little in this way has been attempted
by those who have treated of our intellectual powers, and the
exercise of them ; this does not hinder but that we may be,
as we unquestionably are, assured, that analogy is of weight,
in various degrees, towards determining our judgment and
our practice. Nor does it in anywise cease to be of weight
in those cases, because persons, either given to dispute, or who
require things to be stated with greater exactness than our
faculties appear to admit of in practical matters, may find
other cases in which it is not easy to say whether it be, or be
not, of any weight ; or instances of seeming analogies, which
are really of none. It is enough to the present purpose to
observe, that this general way of arguing is evidently natural,
just, and conclusive. For there is no man can make a ques-
1 See Part II. chap. vi.
Author's Introduction xxvii
tion but that the sun will rise to-morrow, and be seen, where
it is seen at all, in the figure of a circle, and not in that of a
square.
Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen 1 has
with singular sagacity observed, that he who believes the
Scripture to have proceeded from him who is the Author of
Nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties
in it as are found in the constitution of Nature. And in a
like way of reflection it may be added, that he who denies
the Scripture to have been from God upon account of these
difficulties, may, for the very same reason, deny the world
to have been formed by him. On the other hand, if there
be an analogy or likeness between that system of things and
dispensation of Providence, which Revelation informs us of,
and that system of things and dispensation of Providence
which Experience together with Reason informs us of, i.e. y
the known course of Nature ; this is a presumption that they
have both the same author and cause ; at least so far as to
answer objections against the former's being from God,
drawn from anything which is analogical or similar to what
is in the latter, which is acknowledged to be from him ; for
an Author of Nature is here supposed.
Forming our notions of the constitution and government
of the world upon reasoning, without foundation for the
principles which we assume, whether from the attributes
of God, or anything else, is building a world upon hypo-
thesis, like Des Cartes. Forming our notions upon reason-
ing from principles which are certain, but applied to cases to
which we have no ground to apply them (like those who
explain the structure of the human body and the nature of
diseases and medicines from mere mathematics without
sufficient data), is an error much akin to the former ; since
what is assumed in order to make the reasoning applicable,
is Hypothesis. But it must be allowed just, to join abstract
reasonings with the observation of facts, and argue from
1 X/>?7 n&v Tol 7^ TOP Hiral; irapa8el;dnevor TOV Kriffamos rbv K&CT/J.OV
elvai rai/raj rds 7pa0is Treireiffffat, 8ri faro, irepl TTJS icrlfffus diravrf
rots farovffi riiv irepl our?)* \6yov, roOra Kal irtpl TUV ypa,<f>ui>.
Philocal. p. 23, Ed. Cant.
xxviii Author's Introduction
such facts as are known to others that are like them ; from
that part of the divine government over intelligent creatures
which comes under our view, to that larger and more general
government over them which is beyond it ; and from what
is present to collect what is likely, credible, or not incredible,
will be hereafter.
This method, then, of concluding and determining being
practical, and what, if we will act at all, we cannot but act
upon in the common pursuits of life ; being evidently con-
clusive, in various degrees, proportionable to the degree and
exactness of the whole analogy or likeness ; and having so
great authority for its introduction into the subject of reli-
gion, even revealed religion ; my design is to apply it to
that subject in general, both natural and revealed : taking
for proved, that there is an intelligent Author of Nature,
and natural Governor of the world. For as there is no
presumption against this prior to the proof of it, so it has
been often proved with accumulated evidence ; from this
argument of analogy and final causes, from abstract reason-
ings, from the most ancient tradition and testimony, and
from the general consent of mankind. Nor does it appear,
so far as I can find, to be denied by the generality of those
who profess themselves dissatisfied with the evidence of
religion.
As there are some who, instead of thus attending to what
is in fact the constitution of Nature, form their notions of
God's government upon hypothesis, so there are others who
indulge themselves in vain and idle speculations how the
world might possibly have been framed otherwise than it is ;
and upon supposition that things might, in imagining that
they should, have been disposed and carried on after a
better model than what appears in the present disposition
and conduct of them. Suppose now a person of such a turn
of mind to go on with his reveries till he had at length fixed
upon some particular plan of Nature as appearing to him
the best. One shall scarce be thought guilty of detraction
against human understanding, if one should say, even
beforehand, that the plan which this speculative person
would fix upon, though he were the wisest of the sons of
Author's Introduction xxix
men, probably would not be the very besi. even according to
his own notions of best; whether he thought that to be so
which afforded occasions and motives for the exercise of the
greatest virtue, or which was productive of the greatest
happiness, or that these two were necessarily connected,
and run up into one and the same plan. However, it may
not be amiss, once for all, to see what would be the amount
of these emendations and imaginary improvements upon the
system of Nature, or how far they would mislead us. And
it seems there could be no stopping till we came to some
such conclusions as these : that all creatures should at first
be made as perfect and as happy as they were capable of
ever being ; that nothing, to be sure, of hazard or danger
should be put upon them to do some indolent persons
would perhaps think nothing at all or, certainly, that
effectual care should be taken that they should, whether
necessarily or not, yet eventually and in fact, always do
what was right and most conducive to happiness, which
would be thought easy for infinite power to effect, either
by not giving them any principles which would endanger
their going wrong, or by laying the right motive of action in
every instance before their minds continually in so strong a
manner as would never fail of inducing them to act con-
formably to it : and that the whole method of government
by punishments should be rejected as absurd ; as an awk-
ward roundabout method of carrying things on : nay, as
contrary to a principal purpose for which it would be sup-
posed creatures were made, namely, happiness.
Now, without considering what is to be said in particular
to the several parts of this train of folly and extravagance,
what has been above intimated is a full direct general
answer to it, namely, that we may see beforehand that we
have not faculties for this kind of speculation. For though
it be admitted that, from the first principles of our nature,
we unavoidably judge or determine some ends to be abso-
lutely in themselves preferable to others, and that the ends
now mentioned, or if they run up into one, that this one is
absolutely the best, and consequently that we must conclude
the ultimate end designed in the constitution of Nature and
xxx Author's Introduction
Conduct of Providence is the most virtue and happiness pos-
sible ; yet we are far from being able to judge what par-
ticular disposition of things would be most friendly and
assistant to virtue ; or what means might be absolutely
necessary to produce the most happiness in a system of
such extent as our own world may be, taking in all that
is past and to come, though we should suppose it detached
from the whole of things. Indeed we are so far from being
able to judge of this, that we are not judges what may be
the necessary means of raising and conducting one person
to the highest perfection and happiness of his nature. Nay,
even in the little affairs of the present life, we find men of
different educations and ranks are not competent judges of
the conduct of each other. Our whole nature leads us to
ascribe all moral perfection to God, and to deny all imper-
fection of him. And this will for ever be a practical proof
of his moral character, to such as will consider what a
practical proof is ; because it is the voice of God speaking
in us. And from hence we conclude, that virtue must be the
happiness, and vice the misery, of every creature ; and that
regularity and order and right cannot but prevail finally in a
universe under his government. But we are in no sort
judges what are the necessary means of accomplishing this
end.
Let us then, instead of that idle and not very innocent
employment of forming imaginary models of a world, and
schemes of governing it, turn our thoughts to what we ex-
perience to be the conduct of Nature with respect to intelli-
gent creatures ; which may be resolved into general laws or
rules of administration, in the same way as many of the laws
of Nature respecting inanimate matter may be collected
from experiments. And let us compare the known con-
stitution and course of things with what is said to be the
moral system of Nature, the acknowledged dispensations of
Providence, or that government which we find ourselves
under, with what religion teaches us to believe and expect,
and see whether they are not analogous and of a piece.
And upon such a comparison it will, I think, be found that
they are very much so ; that both may be traced up to the
Author's Introduction xxxi
same general laws, and resolved into the same principles of
divine conduct.
The analogy here proposed to be considered is of pretty
large extent, and consists of several parts ; in some more, in
others less exact. In some few instances perhaps it may
amount to a real practical proof ; in others not so. Yet in
these it is a confirmation of what is proved otherwise. It
will undeniably show, what too many want to have shown
them, that the system of Religion, both natural and revealed,
considered only as a system, and prior to the proof of it,
is not a subject of ridicule, unless that of Nature be so too.
And it will afford an answer to almost all objections against
the system both of natural and revealed Religion ; though
not perhaps an answer in so great a degree, yet in a very
considerable degree an answer to the objections against the
evidence of it ; for objections against a proof, and objections
against what is said to be proved, the reader will observe are
different things.
Now the divine government of the world, implied in the
notion of religion in general and of Christianity, contains in
it that mankind is appointed to live in a future state; 1 that
there everyone shall be rewarded or punished; 1 rewarded
or punished respectively for all that behaviour here, which
we comprehend under the words virtuous or vicious, morally
good or evil ; * that our present life is a probation, a state of
trial, 4 and of discipline, 8 for that future one ; notwithstand-
ing the objections, which men may fancy they have, from
notions of Necessity, against there being any such moral
plan as this at all : 8 and whatever objections may appear to
lie against the wisdom and goodness of it, as it stands so
imperfectly made known to us at present; 7 that this world
being in a state of apostasy and wickedness, and con-
sequently of ruin, and the sense both of their condition and
duty being greatly corrupted amongst men, this gave occa-
sion for an additional dispensation of Providence of the
utmost importance; 8 proved by miracles; 9 but containing
in it many things appearing to us strange, and not to have
I Ch. i. * Ch. ii. * Ch. iii. Ch. iv. Ch. v.
Ch. vi. 7 Ch. yii. 8 Part II. c h. L Ch. ii.
xxxii Author's Introduction
been expected; 1 a dispensation of Providence, which is a
scheme or system of things ; a carried on by the mediation
of a divine person, the Messiah, in order to the recovery of
the world 1 ; yet not revealed to all men, nor proved with the
strongest possible evidence to all those to whom it is re-
vealed ; but only to such a part of mankind, and with such
particular evidence, as the wisdom of God thought fit. 4 The
design then of the following Treatise will be to show that
the several parts principally objected against in this moral
and Christian dispensation, including its scheme, its pub-
lication, and the proof which God has afforded us of its truth ;
that the particular parts principally objected against in this
whole dispensation, are analogous to what is experienced in
the constitution and course of Nature, or Providence ; that
the chief objections themselves which are alleged against
the former, are no other than what may be alleged with like
justness against the latter, where they are found in fact to be
inconclusive ; and that this argument from analogy is in
general unanswerable, and undoubtedly of weight on the
side of religion, 6 notwithstanding the objections which may
seem to lie against it, and the real ground which there may
be for difference of opinion, as to the particular degree
of weight which is to be laid upon it. This is a general
account of what may be looked for in the following Treatise.
And I shall begin it with that which is the foundation of all
our hopes and of all our fears all our hopes and fears,
which are of any consideration I mean a Future Life.
1 Ch. iii. 2 Ch. iv. Ch. T. Ch. vi. vii. Ch. viii.
ADVERTISEMENT
PREFIXED TO THE FIRST EDITION
IF the reader should meet here with anything which he had not
before attended to, it will not be in the observations upon the con-
stitution and course of nature, these being all obvious ; but in
the application of them : in which, though there is nothing but
what appears to me of some real weight, and therefore of greai
importance : yet he will observe several things which will appear
to him of very little, if he can think things to be of little, import-
ance, which are of any real weight at all, upon such a subject
as religion. However, the proper force of the following Treatise
lies in the whole general analogy considered together.
It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted, by many
persons, that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry ;
but that it is, now at length, discovered to be fictitious. And
accordingly they treat it, as if, in the present age, this were an
agreed point among all people of discernment ; and nothing re-
mained, but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule,
as it were by way of reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the
pleasures of the world. On the contrary, thus much, at least, will
be here found, not taken for granted, but proved, that any reason-
able man, who will thoroughly consider the matter, may be as
much assured, as he is of his own being, that it is not, however,
so clear a case, that there is nothing in it. There is, I think,
strong evidence of its truth ; but it is certain no one can, upon
principles of reason, be satisfied of the contrary. And the prac-
tical consequence to be drawn from this is not attended to by every
one who is concerned in it.
May, 1736.
C 9
THE ANALOGY
OF RELIGION
PART ONE
OF NATURAL RELIGION
THE
ANALOGY OF RELIGION
CHAPTER I
OF A FUTURE LIFE
STRANGE difficulties have been raised by some concern-
ing personal identity, or the sameness of living agents,
implied in the notion of our existing now and hereafter,
or in any two successive moments ; which, whoever
thinks it worth while, may see considered in the first
Dissertation at the end of this Treatise. But without
regard to any of them here, let us consider what the
analogy of nature, and the several changes which we
have undergone, and those which we know we may
undergo without being destroyed, suggest, as to the
effect which death may, or may not, have upon us ; and
whether it be not from thence probable, that we may
survive this change, and exist in a future state of life and
perception.
I. From our being born into the present world in the
helpless imperfect state of infancy, and having arrived
from thence to mature age, we find it to be a general law
of nature in our own species, that the same creatures,
the same individuals, should exist in degrees of life and
perception, with capacities of action, of enjoyment and
suffering, in one period of their being, greatly different
from those appointed them in another period of it. And
in other creatures the same law holds. For the differ-
ence of their capacities and states of life at their birth
(to go no higher) and in maturity : the change of worms
into flies, and the vast enlargement of their locomotive
powers by such change ; and birds and insects bursting
6 The Analogy of Religion
the shell of their habitation, and by thi? means entering
into a new world, furnished with new accommodations
for them, and finding a new sphere of action assigned
them ; these are instances of this general law of nature.
Thus all the various and wonderful transformations of
animals are to be taken into consideration here. But
the states of life in which we ourselves existed formerly
in the womb and in our infancy, are almost as different
from our present in mature age, as it is possible to con-
ceive any two states or degrees of life can be. There-
fore that we are to exist hereafter, in a state as different
(suppose) from our present, as this is from our former,
is but according to the analogy of nature ; according to
a natural order or appointment, of the very same kind
with what we have already experienced.
II. We know we are endued with capacities of action,
of happiness and misery ; for we are conscious of acting,
of enjoying pleasure and suffering pain. Now that we
have these powers and capacities before death, is a pre-
sumption that we shall retain them through and after
death ; indeed a probability of it abundantly sufficient
to act upon, unless there be some positive reason to
think that death is the destruction of those living powers :
because there is in every case a probability, that all
things will continue as we experience they are, in all
respects, except those in which we have some reason to
think they will be altered. This is that kind 1 of pre-
sumption or probability from analogy, expressed in the
very word continuance, which seems our only natural
reason for believing the course of the world will con-
tinue to-morrow, as it has done so far as our experience
or knowledge of history can carry us back. Nay, it
seems our only reason for believing, that any one sub-
stance now existing will continue to exist a moment
longer ; the self-existent substance only excepted. Thus,
if men were assured that the unknown event, death, was
not the destruction of our faculties of perception and of
1 I sayi/rfof presumption or probability ; for I do not mean to affirm that
there is the same degree of conviction, thatjour living powers will continue aftet
death, as there is that our substances will.
Of a Future Life 7
action, there would be no apprehension that any other
power or event, unconnected with this of death, would
destroy these faculties just at the instant of each creature's
death ; and therefore no doubt but that they would re-
main after it ; which shows the high probability that our
living powers will continue after death, unless there be
some ground to think that death is their destruction. 1
For, if it would be in a manner certain that we should
survive death, provided it were certain that death would
not be our destruction, it must be highly probable we
shall survive it, if there be no ground to think death will
be our destruction.
Now, though I think it must be acknowledged, that
prior to the natural and moral proofs of a future life
commonly insisted upon, there would arise a general
confused suspicion, that in the great shock and alteration
which we shall undergo by death, we, i.e., our living
powers, might be wholly destroyed ; yet even prior to
those proofs, there is really no particular distinct ground
or reason for this apprehension at all, so far as I can find.
If there be, it must arise either from the reason of the
thing, or from the analogy of nature.
But we cannot argue from the reason of the thing, that
death is the destruction of living agents, because we
know not at all what death is in itself; but only some
of its effects, such as the dissolution of flesh, skin, and
dones. And these effects do in no wise appear to imply
the destruction of a living agent. And besides, as we
are greatly in the dark, upon what the exercise of our
living powers depends, so we are wholly ignorant what
the powers themselves depend upon ; the powers them-
selves as distinguished, not only from their actual exer-
1 ^Dt 'struct 'ion of living powers is a manner of expression unavoidably
ambiguous ; and may signify either the destruction of a living being, so as that
the same living being shall be incapable of ever perceiving or acting again at
all ; or the destruction of those means and instruments oy which it is capable
eye is a destruction of living ppv
sense. But we have no reason to think the destruction of living powers in the
former sense, to be possible. We have no more reason to think a being, endued
with living powers, ever lo<es them during its whole existence, than to believe
that a stone ever acquires them.
8 The Analogy of Religion
cise, but also from the present capacity of exercising
them, and as opposed to their destruction ; for sleep, or
however a swoon, shows us, not only that these powers
exist when they are not exercised, as the passive power
of motion does in inanimate matter; but shows also
that they exist when there is no present capacity of
exercising them ; or that the capacities of exercising
them for the present, as well as the actual exercise of
them, may be suspended, and yet the powers themselves
remain undestroyed. Since then we know not at all
upon what the existence of our living powers depends,
this shows further, there can no probability be collected
from the reason of the thing, that death will be their
destruction ; because their existence raay depend upon
somewhat in no degree affected by death ; upon some-
what quite out of the reach of this king of terrors. So
that there is nothing more certain, than that the reason
of the thing shows us no connection between death and
the destruction of living agents. Nor can we find any-
thing throughout the whole analogy of nature, to afford
us even the slightest presumption, that animals ever
lose their living powers; much less if it were possible
that they lose them by death ; for we have no faculties
wherewith to trace any beyond or through it, so as to
see what becomes of them. This event removes them
from our view. It destroys the sensible proof, which
we had before their death, of their being possessed of
living powers, but does not appear to afford the least
reason to believe that they are, then, or by that event,
deprived of them.
And our knowing that they were possessed of these
powers, up to the very period to which we have faculties
capable of tracing them, is itself a probability of their re-
taining them beyond it. And this is confirmed, and a
sensible credibility is given to it, by observing the very
great and astonishing changes which we have experi-
enced ; so great, that our existence in another state of
life, of perception and of action, will be but according
to a method of providential conduct, the like to which
has been already exercised even with regard to ourselves ;
Of a Future Life 9
according to a course of nature, the like to which we
have already gone through.
However, as one cannot but be greatly sensible, how
difficult it is to silence imagination enough to make the
voice of reason even distinctly heard in this case ; as we
are accustomed, from our youth up, to indulge that for-
ward, delusive faculty ; ever obtruding beyond its sphere ;
of some assistance indeed to apprehension, but the
author of all error : as we plainly lose ourselves in gross
and crude conceptions of things, taking for granted that
we are acquainted with what indeed we are wholly
ignorant of : it may be proper to consider the imaginary
presumptions, that death will be our destruction arising
from these kinds of early and lasting prejudices ; and to
show how little they can really amount to, even though
we cannot wholly divest ourselves of them. And,
I. All presumption of death's being the destruction of
living beings must go upon supposition that they are
compounded and so discerptible. But since conscious-
ness is a single and indivisible power, it should seem
that the subject in which it resides must be so too. For
were the motion of any particle of matter absolutely one
and indivisible, so as that it should imply a contradiction
to suppose part of this motion to exist, and part not to
exist, i.e., part of this matter to move and part to be at
rest, then its power of motion would be indivisible ; and
so also would the subject in which the power inheres,
namely, the particle of matter : for if this could be
divided into two, one part might be moved and the
other at rest, which is contrary to the supposition. In
like manner it has been argued, 1 and, for anything ap-
pearing to the contrary, justly, that since the perception
or consciousness, which we have of our own existence, is
indivisible, so as that it is a contradiction to suppose one
part of it should be here and the other there, the percep-
tive power, or the power of consciousness, is indivisible
too, and consequently the subject in which it resides,
i.e., the conscious Being. Now upon supposition that
the living agent which each man calls himself, is thus a
1 See Dr. Clarke's Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defences of it.
io The Analogy of Religion
single being, there is at least no more difficulty in con-
ceiving than in conceiving it to be a compound, and of
which there is the proof now mentioned ; it follows, that
our organized bodies are no more ourselves, or part of
ourselves, than any other matter around us. And it is as
easy to conceive how matter, which is no part of our-
selves, may be appropriated to us in the manner which
our present bodies are, as how we can receive impres-
sions from, and have power over, any matter. It is as
easy to conceive that we may exist out of bodies as in
them ; that we might have animated bodies of any other
organs and senses wholly different from these now given
us, and that we may hereafter animate these same or new
bodies variously modified and organized, as to conceive
how we can animate such bodies as our present. And,
lastly, the dissolution of all these several organized
bodies, supposing ourselves to have successively ani-
mated them, would have no more conceivable tendency
to destroy the living beings ourselves, or deprive us of
living faculties the faculties of perception and of action
than the dissolution of any foreign matter, which we
are capable of receiving impressions from, and making
use of, for the common occasions of life.
II. The simplicity and absolute oneness of a living
agent cannot indeed, from the nature of the thing, be
properly proved by experimental observations. But as
these fall in with the supposition of its unity, so they
plainly lead us to conclude certainly, that our gross or-
ganized bodies, with which we perceive the objects of
sense, and with which we act, are no part of ourselves ;
and therefore show us, that we have no reason to believe
their destruction to be ours, even without determining
whether our living substances be material or immaterial*
For we see by experience, that men may lose their limbs,
their organs of sense, and even the greatest part of these
bodies, and yet remain the same living agents. And
persons can trace up the existence of themselves to a
time, when the bulk of their bodies was extremely small,
in comparison of what it is in mature age ; and we can-
not but think that they might then have lost a consider-
Of a Future Life n
able part of that small body, and yet have remained the
same living agents ; as they may now lose great part of
their present body and remain so. And it is certain,
that the bodies of all animals are in a constant flux,
from that never-ceasing attrition, which there is in every
part of them. Now things of this kind unavoidably
teach us to distinguish between these living agents our-
selves and large quantities of matter, in which we are
very nearly interested, since these may be alienated, and
actually are in a daily course of succession, and changing
their owners; whilst we are assured that each living
agent remains one and the same permanent being. 1
And this general observation leads us on to the following
ones.
First. That we have no way of determining by ex-
perience, what is the certain bulk of the living being
each man calls himself; and yet, till it be determined
that it is larger in bulk than the solid elementary
particles of matter, which there is no ground to think
any natural power can dissolve, there is no sort of reason
to think death to be the dissolution of it, of the living
being, even though it should not be absolutely in-
discerptible.
Secondly. From our being so nearly related to and in-
terested in certain systems of matter, suppose our flesh
and bones, and afterwards ceasing to be at all related to
them, the living agents ourselves remaining all this while
undestroyed notwithstanding such alienation, and conse-
quently these systems of matter not being ourselves ; it
follows further, that we have no ground to conclude any
other, suppose internal systems of matter, to be the
living agents ourselves ; because we can have no ground
to conclude this, but from our relation to and interest in
such other systems of matter ; and therefore we can
have no reason to conclude what befalls those systems of
matter at death to be the destruction of the living agents.
We have already several times over lost a great part or
perhaps the whole of our body, according to certain
common established laws of nature ; yet we remain the
l See Dissertation I.
12 The Analogy of Religion
same living agents : when we shall lose as great a part,
or the whole, by another common established law of
nature, death, why may we not also remain the same ?
That the alienation has been gradual in one case, and in
the other will be more at once, does not prove anything
to the contrary. We have passed undestroyed through
those many and great revolutions of matter, so peculiarly
appropriated to us ourselves ; why should we imagine
death will be so fatal to us ? Nor can it be objected,
that what is thus alienated or lost, is no part of our
original solid body, but only adventitious matter; be-
cause we may lose entire limbs, which must have con-
tained many solid parts and vessels of the original body *>
or if this be not admitted, we have no proof that any of
these solid parts are dissolved or alienated by death.
Though, by the way, we are very nearly related to that
extraneous or adventitious matter, whilst it continues
united to, and distending the several parts of our solid
body. But after all, the relation a person bears to those
parts of his body, to which he is the most nearly related ;
what does it appear to amount to but this, that the living
agent, and those parts of the body mutually affect each
other? And the same thing, the same thing in kind
though not in degree, may be said of all foreign matter,
which gives us ideas, and which we have any power over.
From these observations the whole ground of the imagi-
nation is removed, that the dissolution of any matter is
the destruction of a living agent, from the interest he
once had in such matter.
Thirdly. If we consider our body somewhat more dis-
tinctly, as made up of organs and instruments of percep-
tion and of motion, it will bring us to the same conclu-
sion. Thus the common optical experiments show, and
even the observation how sight is assisted by glasses
shows, that we see with our eyes in the same sense as we
see with glasses. Nor is there any reason to believe that
we see with them in any other sense ; any other, I mean,
which would lead us to think the eye itself a percipient.
The like is to be said of hearing ; and our feeling distant
solid matter by means of somewhat in our hand seems an
Of a Future Life 13
instance of the like kind, as to the subject we are con-
sidering. All these are instances of foreign matter, or
such as is no part of our body being instrumental in
preparing objects for, and conveying them to, the per-
ceiving power, in a manner similar or like to the manner
in which our organs of sense prepare and convey them.
Both are in a like way instruments of our receiving such
ideas from external objects, as the Author of Nature ap-
pointed those external objects to be the occasions of
exciting in us. However, glasses are evidently instances
of this ; namely, of matter which is no part of our body
preparing objects for, and conveying them towards the
perceiving power, in like manner as our bodily organs
do. And if we see with our eyes only in the same
manner as we do with glasses, the like may justly be
concluded, from analogy, of all other senses. It is not
intended by anything here said, to affirm that the whole
apparatus of vision, or of perception by any other of our
senses, can be traced through all its steps, quite up to
the living power of seeing or perceiving ; but that so far
as it can be traced by experimental observations, so far it
appears that our organs of sense prepare and convey on
objects, in order to their being perceived in like manner
as foreign matter does, without affording any shadow of
appearance that they themselves perceive. And that we
have no reason to think our organs of sense percipients
is confirmed by instances of persons losing some of
them, the living beings themselves, their former occu-
piers, remaining unimpaired. It is confirmed also by
the experience of dreams ; by which we find we are at
present possessed of a latent, and what would otherwise
be an unimagined unknown power of perceiving sensible
objects, in as strong and lively a manner without our
external organs of sense as with them.
So also with regard to our power of moving, or direct-
ing motion by will and choice; upon the destruction of a
limb, this active power remains, as it evidently seems,
unlessened ; so as that the living being who has suffered
this loss, would be capable of moving as before, if it had
another limb to move with. It can walk by the help of
14 The Analogy of Religion
an artificial leg ; just as it can make use of a pole or a
lever, to reach towards itself and to move things, beyond
the length and the power of its natural arm ; and this
last it does in the same manner as it reaches and moves,
with its natural arm, things nearer and of less weight.
Nor is there so much as any appearance of our limbs
being endued with a power of moving or directing them-
selves ; though they are adapted, like the several parts
of a machine, to be the instruments of motion to each
other, and some parts of the same limb to be instru-
ments of motion to other parts of it.
Thus a man determines, that he will look at such an
object through a microscope ; or being lame, suppose,
that he will walk to such a place with a staff a week
hence. His eyes and his feet no more determine in
these cases, than the microscope and the staff. Nor is
there any ground to think they any more put the deter-
mination in practice ; or that his eyes are the seers or his
feet the movers, in any other sense than as the micro-
scope and the staff are. Upon the whole then, our organs
of sense and our limbs are certainly instruments, which
the living persons ourselves make use of to perceive and
move with : there is not any probability, that they are
any more ; nor, consequently, that we have any other
kind of relation to them, than what we have to any
other foreign matter formed into instruments of percep-
tion and motion, suppose into a microscope or a staff (I
say any other kind of relation, for I am not speaking of
the degree of it) ; nor consequently is there any proba-
bility, that the alienation or dissolution of these instru-
ments is the destruction of the perceiving and moving
agent.
And thus our finding, that the dissolution of matter in
which living beings were most nearly interested, is not
their dissolution ; and that the destruction of several of
the organs and instruments of perception and of motion
belonging to them, is not their destruction ; shows de-
monstratively, that there is no ground to think that the
dissolution of any other matter, or destruction of any
other organs and instruments, will be the dissolution or
Of a Future Life 15
destruction of living agents, from the like kind of rela-
tion. And we have no reason to think we stand in any
other kind of relation to anything which we find dis-
solved by death.
But it is said these observations are equally applicable
to brutes; and it is thought an insuperable difficulty,
that they should be immortal, and by consequence
capable of everlasting happiness. Now this manner of
expression is both invidious and weak ; but the thing
intended by it is really no difficulty at all, either in the
way of natural or moral consideration. For ist, Sup-
pose the invidious thing, designed in such a manner of
expression, were really implied, as it is not in the least,
in the natural immortality of brutes : namely, that they
must arrive at great attainments, and become rational
and moral agents ; even this would be no difficulty :
since we know not what latent powers and capacities
they may be endued with. There was once, prior to ex-
perience, as great presumption against human creatures
as there is against the brute creatures, arriving at that
degree of understanding, which we have in mature age.
For we can trace up our own existence to the same
original with theirs. And we find it to be a general law
of nature, that creatures endued with capacities of virtue
and religion should be placed in a condition of being, in
which they are altogether without the use of them, for a
considerable length of their duration, as in infancy and
childhood. And great part of the human species go out
of the present world, before they come to the exercise of
these capacities in any degree at all. But then, zndly,
the natural immortality of brutes does not in the least
imply, that they are endued with any latent capacities of
a rational or moral nature. And the economy of the
universe might require, that there should be living
creatures without any capacities of this kind. And all
difficulties as to the manner how they are to be disposed
of are so apparently and wholly founded in our ignor-
ance, that it is wonderful they should be insisted upon by
any, but such as are weak enough to think they are ac-
quainted with the whole system of things. There is
1 6 The Analogy of Religion
then absolutely nothing at all in this objection, which is
so rhetorically urged, against the greatest part of the
natural proofs or presumptions of the immortality of
human minds ; I say the greatest part ; for it is less
applicable to the following observation, which is more
peculiar to mankind :
III. That as it is evident our present powers and
capacities of reason, memory, and affection, do not depend
upon our gross body in the manner in which perception
by our organs of sense does ; so they do not appear to
depend upon it at all in any such manner, as to give
ground to think, that the dissolution of this body will be
the destruction of these our present powers of reflection,
as it will of our powers of sensation ; or to give ground
to conclude, even that it will be so much as a suspension
of the former.
Human creatures exist at present in two states of life
and perception, greatly different from each other ; each
of which has its own peculiar laws, and its own pecu-
liar enjoyments and sufferings. When any of our
senses are affected or appetites gratified with the objects
of them, we may be said to exist or live in a state
of sensation. When none of our senses are affected or
appetites gratified, and yet we perceive, and reason, and
act, we may be said to exist or live in a state of
reflection. Now it is by no means certain, that any-
thing which is dissolved by death is any way necessary to
the living being in this its state of reflection, after ideas
are gained. For, though, from our present constitution
and condition of being, our external organs of sense are
necessary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers,
as carriages, and levers, and scaffolds are in architecture ;
yet when these ideas are brought in, we are capable of
reflecting in the most intense degree, and of enjoying the
greatest pleasure, and feeling the greatest pain, by means
of that reflection, without any assistance from our senses ;
and without any at all, which we know of, from that
body which will be dissolved by death. It does not
appear then, that the relation of this gross body to the
reflecting being is, in any degree, necessary to thinking ;
Of a Future Life 17
to our intellectual enjoyments or sufferings ; nor, conse-
quently, that the dissolution or alienation of the former
by death, will be the destruction of those present powers,
which render us capable of this state of reflection.
Further, there are instances of mortal diseases, which do
not at all affect our present intellectual powers ; and this
affords a presumption, that those diseases will not destroy
these present powers. Indeed, from the observations
made above, 1 it appears, that there is no presumption,
from their mutually affecting each other, that the dissolu-
tion of the body is the destruction of the living agent.
And by the same reasoning, it must appear too, that
there is no presumption, from their mutually affecting
each other, that the dissolution of the body is the
destruction of our present reflecting powers ; but in-
stances of their not affecting each other, afford a
presumption of the contrary. Instances of mortal
diseases not impairing our present reflecting powers,
evidently turn our thoughts even from imagining such
diseases to be the destruction of them. Several things,
indeed, greatly affect all our living powers, and at
length suspend the exercise of them ; as for instance
drowsiness, increasing till it ends in sound sleep; and
from hence we might have imagined it would destroy
them, till we found by experience the weakness of this
way of judging. But in the diseases now mentioned,
there is not so much as this shadow of probability, to
lead us to any such conclusion, as to the reflecting
powers which we have at present. For in those diseases,
persons the moment before death appear to be in the
highest vigour of life. They discover apprehension,
memory, reason, all entire; with the utmost force of
affection ; sense of a character, of shame and honour ;
and the highest mental enjoyments and sufferings, even
to the last gasp : and these surely prove even greater
vigour of life than bodily strength does. Now what
pretence is there for thinking, that a progressive disease
when arrived to such a degree, I mean that degree which
is mortal, will destroy those powers, which were not
1 Pages 9-14.
1 8 The Analogy of Religion
impaired, which were not affected by it, during its whole
progress quite up to that degree? And if death by-
diseases of this kind is not the destruction of our present
reflecting powers, it will scarce be thought that death by
any other means is.
It is obvious that this general observation may be
carried on further ; and there appears so little connec-
tion between our bodily powers of sensation, and our
present powers of reflection, that there is no reason to
conclude that death, which destroys the former, does so
much as suspend the exercise of the latter, or interrupt
our continuing to exist in the like state of reflection
which we do now. For suspension of reason, memory,
and the affections which they excite, is no part of the idea
of death, nor is implied in our notion of it. And our
daily experiencing these powers to be exercised, without
any assistance, that we know of, from those bodies which
will be dissolved by death ; and our finding often that
the exercise of them is so lively to the last ; these things
afford a sensible apprehension, that death may not, per-
haps, be so much as a discontinuance of the exercise
of these powers, nor of the enjoyments and suffer-
ings which it implies. 1 So that our posthumous life,
whatever there may be in it additional to our present,
yet may not be entirely beginning anew, but going
on. Death may, in some sort and in some respects,
answer to our birth ; which is not a suspension of
the faculties which we had before it, or a total change
of the state of life in which we existed when in the
womb, but a continuation of both, with such and such
great alterations.
Nay, for ought we know of ourselves, of our present
life and of death, death may immediately, in the natural
course of things, put us into a higher and more enlarged
1 There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life, here con-
sidered : Whether death be the destruction of living agents ; _if not, Whether it
be the destruction of their present powers of reflection, as it certainly is the
destruction of their present powers of sensation ; and if not, Whether it be the
suspension, or discontinuance of the exercise of these present reflecting powers.
Now, if there be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were pos-
lible, less for the next, and less still for the first.
Of a Future Life 19
state of life, as our birth does ; * a state in which our
capacities, and sphere of perception and of action, may
be much greater than at present. For as our relation to
our external organs of sense renders us capable of ex-
isting in our present state of sensation, so it may be the
only natural hindrance to our existing, immediately, and
of course, in a higher state of reflection. The truth is,
reason does not at all show us in what state death natur-
ally leaves us. But were we sure that it would suspend
all our perceptive and active powers; yet the suspension
of a power and the destruction of it, are effects so totally
different in kind, as we experience from sleep and a
swoon, that we cannot in any wise argue from one to the
other ; or conclude even to the lowest degree of proba-
bility, that the same kind of force which is sufficient to
suspend our faculties, though it be increased ever so
much, will be sufficient to destroy them.
These observations together may be sufficient to show
how little presumption there is, that death is the destruc-
tion of human creatures. However, there is the shadow
of an analogy, which may lead us to imagine it is the
supposed likeness which is observed between the decay
of vegetables and of living creatures. And this likeness
is, indeed, sufficient to afford the poets very apt allusions
to the flowers of the field, in their pictures of the frailty
of our present life. But in reason, the analogy is so far
from holding, that there appears no ground even for the
comparison, as to the present question, because one of
the two subjects compared is wholly void of that which
is the principal and chief thing in the other, the power
of perception and of action, and which is the only thing
we are inquiring about the continuance of. So that the
destruction of a vegetable is an event not similar or
analogous to the destruction of a living agent.
1 This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans, vo/j.itiv
fjv yap Si) rbv fjv fvOdde fHov, ut &t> OLKH^V Kvofdvwv elvaf rbv tit
06.va.rov, yivcffiv fit rbv 6rr<as filov, Kal rbv ev5aifj.oi'a rots <pi\o-
acxfirjffaffi. Lib. xv. p. 1039, Ed. Amst. 1707. To which opinion perhaps
Antoninus may allude in these words, <l)t vvv irepift,vta, irirre t/J-fipvov IK
TTJS yaffrpbs rrft yvvaiK6t ffov tJ-fkOji, otfrwj itcdfycffOcu, r^v uipav tv
jj rb Tftvx&pittr ffov rov f^iirpov ro&rov tKircffelrcu. Lib. ix. c. 3.
2O The Analogy of Religion
But if, as was above intimated, leaving off the delusive
custom of substituting imagination in the room of ex-
perience, we would confine ourselves to what we do
know and understand ; if we would argue only from that,
and from that form our expectations, it would appear at
first sight, that as no probability of living beings ever
ceasing to be so can be concluded from the reason of the
thing, so none can be collected from the analogy of
nature, because we cannot trace any living beings be-
yond death. But as we are conscious that we are endued
with capacities of perception and of action, and are
living persons ; what we are to go upon is, that we shall
continue so till we foresee some accident or event,
which will endanger those capacities, or be likely to
destroy us, which death does in nowise appear to be.
And thus, when we go out of this world, we may pass
into new scenes, and a new state of life and action, just
as naturally as we came into the present. And this new
state may naturally be a social one. And the advan-
tages of it, advantages of every kind, may naturally be
bestowed, according to some fixed general laws of wis-
dom, upon every one in proportion to the degrees of his
virtue. And though the advantages of that future
natural state should not be bestowed, as those of the
present in some measure are, by the will of the society,
but entirely by his more immediate action, upon whom
the whole frame of nature depends ; yet this distribution
may be just as natural, as their being distributed here by
the instrumentality of men. And, indeed, though one
were to allow any confused undetermined sense, which
people please to put upon the word natural, it would be
a shortness of thought scarce credible, to imagine that no
system or course of things can be so, but only what we
see at present : 1 especially whilst the probability of a
future life, or the natural immortality of the soul, is ad-
mitted upon the evidence of reason ; because this is
really both admitting and denying at once a state of
being different from the present to be natural. But the
only distinct meaning of that word is, stated, fixed, or
1 See Part II. chap. ii. and Part II. chap. !v.
Of a Future Life 21
settled ; since what is natural as much requires and pre-
supposes an intelligent agent to render it so, i.e., to effect
it continually, or at stated times, as what is supernatural
or miraculous does to effect it for once. And from
hence it must follow, that persons' notion of what is
natural will be enlarged in proportion to their greater
knowledge of the works of God, and the dispensations of
his Providence. Nor is there any absurdity in supposing
that there may be beings in the universe, whose capaci-
ties, and knowledge, and views, may be so extensive, as
that the whole Christian dispensation may to them
appear natural, i.e., analogous or conformable to God's
dealings with other parts of his creation ; as natural as
the visible known course of things appears to us. For
there seems scarce any other possible sense to be put
upon the word, but that only in which it is here used ;
similar, stated, or uniform.
This credibility of a future life, which has been here
insisted upon, how little soever it may satisfy our
curiosity, seems to answer all the purposes of religion in
like manner as a demonstrative proof would. Indeed a
proof, even a demonstrative one, of a future life, would
not be a proof of religion. For that we are to live here-
after is just as reconcilable with the scheme of atheism,
and as well to be accounted for by it, as that we are now
alive is ; and therefore nothing can be more absurd than
to argue from that scheme, that there can be no future
state. But as religion implies a future state, any pre-
sumption against such a state is a presumption against
religion. And the foregoing observations remove all
presumptions of that sort, and prove, to a very consider-
able degree of probability, one fundamental doctrine of
religion, which, if believed, would greatly open and dis-
pose the mind seriously to attend to the general evidence
of the whole.
22 The Analogy of Religion
CHAPTER II
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS
AND PUNISHMENTS;
AND PARTICULARLY OF THE LATTER
THAT which makes the question concerning a future life
to be of so great importance to us, is our capacity of
happiness and misery. And that which makes the con-
sideration of it to be of so great importance to us, is the
supposition of our happiness and misery hereafter de-
pending upon our actions here. Without this, indeed,
curiosity could not but sometimes bring a subject, in
which we may be so highly interested, to our thoughts,
especially upon the mortality of others, or the near
prospect of our own. But reasonable men would not
take any further thought about hereafter, than what
should happen thus occasionally to rise in their minds,
if it were certain that our future interest no way de-
pended upon our present behaviour; whereas, on the
contrary, if there be ground, either from analogy or any-
thing else, to think it does, then there is reason also for
the most active thought and solicitude, to secure that
interest, to behave so as that we may escape that misery,
and obtain that happiness in another life, which we
not only suppose ourselves capable of, but which we
apprehend also is put in our own power. And whether
there be ground for this last apprehension certainly
would deserve to be most seriously considered, were
there no other proof of a future life and interest than
that presumptive one, which the foregoing observations
amount to.
Now in the present state, all which we enjoy, and a
great part of what we suffer, is put in our own power. For
pleasure and pain are the consequences of our actions,
and we are endued by the Author of our nature with
capacities of foreseeing these consequences. We find by
experience he does not so much as preserve our lives,
exclusively of our own care and attention, to provide our-
selves with, and to make use of, that sustenance, by
Of the Government of God 23
which he has appointed our lives shall be preserved, and
without which he has appointed they shall not be pre-
served at all. And in general we foresee that the ex-
ternal things, which are the objects of our various
passions, can neither be obtained nor enjoyed, without
exerting ourselves in such and such manners ; but by
thus exerting ourselves we obtain and enjoy these objects,
in which our natural good consists, or by this means
God gives us the possession and enjoyment of them. I
know not that we have any one kind or degree of enjoy-
ment, but by the means of our own actions. And by
prudence and care we may, for the most part, pass our
days in tolerable ease and quiet ; or, on the contrary, we
may, by rashness, ungoverned passion, wilfulness, or
ven by negligence, make ourselves as miserable as ever
we please. And many do please to make themselves
extremely miserable, i.e. t to do what they know before-
hand will render them so. They follow those ways, the
fruit of which they know, by instruction, example, expe-
rience, will be disgrace, and poverty, and sickness, and
untimely death. This every one observes to be the
general course of things, though it is to be allowed, we
cannot find by experience that all our sufferings are
owing to our own follies.
Why the Author of Nature does not give his creatures
promiscuously such and such perceptions without regard
to their behaviour, why he does not make them happy
without the instrumentality of their own actions, and
prevent their bringing any sufferings upon themselves, is
another matter. Perhaps there may be some impossi-
bilities in the nature of things which we are unacquainted
with. 1 Or less happiness, it may be, would upon the
whole be produced by such a method of conduct than
is by the present. Or, perhaps, divine goodness, with
which, if I mistake not, we make very free in our specu-
lations, may not be a bare single disposition to produce
happiness, but a disposition to make the good, the faith-
ful, the honest man happy. Perhaps an infinitely perfect
Mind may be pleased with seeing his creatures behave
1 Part I. chap. vii.
24 The Analogy of Religion
suitably to the nature which he has given them, to the
relations which he has placed them in to each other, and
to that which they stand in to himself; that relation to
himself, which, during their existence, is even necessary,
and which is the most important one of all : perhaps, I
say, an infinitely perfect Mind may be pleased with this
moral piety of moral agents in and for itself, as well as
upon account of its being essentially conducive to the
happiness of his creation. Or the whole end, for which
God made, and thus governs the world, may be utterly
beyond the reach of our faculties ; there may be some-
what in it as impossible for us to have any conception of
as for a blind man to have a conception of colours. But
however this be, it is certain matter of universal expe-
rience that the general method of divine administration
is forewarning us, or giving us capacities to foresee, with
more or less clearness, that if we act so and so, we shall
have such enjoyments, if. so and so, such sufferings, and
giving us those enjoyments, and making us feel those
sufferings, in consequence of our actions.
" But all this is to be ascribed to the general course
of nature." True. This is the very thing which I am
observing. It is to be ascribed to the general course of
nature; i.e., not surely to the words or ideas course
of nature, but to him who appointed it and put things
into it, or to a course of operation from its uniformity
or constancy called natural, 1 and which necessarily
implies an operating agent. For when men find them-
selves necessitated to confess an Author of Nature, or
that God is the natural governor of the world, they
must not deny this again, because his government is
uniform ; they must not deny that he does things at all,
because he does them constantly, because the effects of
his acting are permanent, whether his acting be so or not,
though there is no reason to think it is not. In short
every man in everything he does, naturally acts upon the
forethought and apprehension of avoiding evil or ob-
taining good ; and if the natural course of things be the
appointment of God, and our natural faculties of know-
1 Pages 20, 21.
Of the Government of God 25
ledge and experience are given us by him, then the good
and bad consequences which follow our actions are his
appointment, and our foresight of those consequences
is a warning given us by him how we are to act.
" Is the pleasure, then, naturally accompanying every
particular gratification of passion, intended to put us
upon gratifying ourselves in every such particular in-
stance, and as a reward to us for so doing?" No,
certainly. Nor is it to be said that our eyes were
naturally intended to give us the sight of each particular
object to which they do or can extend, objects which are
destructive of them, or which for any other reason it may
become us to turn our eyes from. Yet there is no doubt
but that our eyes were intended for us to see with. So
neither is there any doubt, but that the foreseen plea-
sures and pains belonging to the passions were intended
in general to induce mankind to act in such and such
manners.
Now from this general observation, obvious to every
one, that God has given us to understand he has ap-
pointed satisfaction and delight to be the consequence
of our acting in one manner, and pain and uneasiness of
our acting in another, and of our not acting at all ; and
that we find the consequences, which we were before-
hand informed of, uniformly to follow, we may learn that
we are at present actually under his government in the
strictest and most proper sense, in such a sense as that
he rewards and punishes us for our actions. An Author
of Nature being supposed, it is not so much a deduction
of reason as a matter of experience, that we are thus
under his government; under his government in the
same sense as we are under the government of civil
magistrates. Because the annexing pleasure to some
actions and pain to others, in our power to do or forbear,
and giving notice of this appointment beforehand to
those whom it concerns, is the proper formal notion
of government. Whether the pleasure or pain which
thus follows upon our behaviour be owing to the Author
of Nature's acting upon us every moment which we feel
it, or to his having at once contrived and executed his
26 The Analogy of Religion
own part in the plan of the world, makes no alteration as
to the matter before us. For if civil magistrates could
make the sanctions of their laws take place without
interposing at all, after they had passed them, without a
trial, and the formalities of an execution; if they were
able to make their laws execute themselves, or every
offender to execute them upon himself, we should be
just in the same sense under their government then as
we are now, but in a much higher degree and more
perfect manner. Vain is the ridicule with which one
foresees some persons will divert themselves upon finding
lesser pains considered as instances of divine punish-
ment. There is no possibility of answering or evading
the general thing here intended, without denying all final
causes. For final causes being admitted, the pleasures
and pains now mentioned must be admitted, too, as in-
stances of them. And if they are, if God annexes
delight to some actions and uneasiness to others, with
an apparent design to induce us to act so and so, then he
not only dispenses happiness and misery, but also re-
wards and punishes actions. If, for example, the pain
which we feel, upon doing what tends to the destruction
of our bodies, suppose upon too near approaches to fire,
or upon wounding ourselves, be appointed by the Author
of Nature to prevent our doing what thus tends to our
destruction ; this is altogether as much an instance of
his punishing our actions, and consequently of our being
under his government, as declaring by a voice from
heaven, that if we acted so, he would inflict such pain
upon us, and inflicting it, whether it be greater or less.
Thus we find, that the true notion or conception of
the Author of Nature is that of a master or governor,
prior to the consideration of his moral attributes. The
fact of our case, which we find by experience, is, that he
actually exercises dominion or government over us at
present by rewarding and punishing us for our actions, in
as strict and proper a sense of these words, and even
in the same sense, as children, servants, subjects, are
rewarded and punished by those who govern them.
And thus the whole analogy of Nature, the whole
Of the Government of God 27
present course of things, most fully shows that there is
nothing incredible in the general doctrine of religion,
that God will reward and punish men for their actions
hereafter ; nothing incredible, I mean, arising out of the
notion of rewarding and punishing. For the whole
course of nature is a present instance of his exercising
that government over us, which implies in it rewarding
and punishing.
But, as divine punishment is what men chiefly object
against, and are most unwilling to allow, it may be proper
to mention some circumstances in the natural course of
punishments at present, which are analogous to what
religion teaches us concerning a future state of punish-
ment ; indeed, so analogous, that as they add a further
credibility to it, so they cannot but raise a most serious
apprehension of it in those who will attend to them.
It has been now observed, that such and such miseries
naturally follow such and such actions of imprudence
and wilfulness, as well as actions more commonly and
more distinctly considered as vicious ; and that these
consequences, when they may be foreseen, are properly
natural punishments annexed to such actions. For the
general thing here insisted upon is, not that we see a
great deal of misery in the world, but a great deal which
men bring upon themselves by their own behaviour,
which they might have foreseen and avoided. Now the
circumstances of these natural punishments, particularly
deserving our attention, are such as these : that often-
times they follow, or are inflicted in consequence o^
actions which procure many present advantages, and are
accompanied with much present pleasure ; for instance,
sickness and untimely death are the consequence of in-
temperance, though accompanied with the highest mirth
and jollity; that these punishments are often much
greater than the advantages or pleasures obtained by the
actions, of which they are the punishments or conse-
quences ; that though we may imagine a constitution of
nature, in which these natural punishments, which are,
in fact, to follow, would follow immediately upon such
28 The Analogy of Religion
actions being done, or very soon after ; we find, on the
contrary, in our world, that they are often delayed a great
while, sometimes even till long after the actions occa-
sioning them are forgot ; so that the constitution of
nature is such, that delay of punishment is no sort nor
degree of presumption of final impunity ; that after such
delay these natural punishments or miseries often come,
not by degrees, but suddenly, with violence, and at
once ; however, the chief misery often does ; that as
certainty of such distant misery following such actions
is never afforded persons; so, perhaps, during the
actions, they have seldom a distinct full expectation of
its following; 1 and many times the case is only thus
that they see in general, or may see, the credibility, that
intemperance, suppose, will bring after it diseases, civil
crimes, civil punishments ; when yet the real probability
often is, that they shall escape; but things notwith-
standing take their destined course, and the misery
inevitably follows at its appointed time, in very many of
these cases. Thus, also, though youth may be alleged
as an excuse for rashness and folly, as being naturally
thoughtless, and not clearly foreseeing all the conse-
quences of being untractable and profligate, this does
not hinder, but that these consequences follow, and are
grievously felt throughout the whole course of mature
life. Habits contracted even in that age are often utter
ruin ; and men's success in the world, not only in the
common sense of worldly success, but their real happi-
ness and misery, depends, in a great degree, and in
various ways, upon the manner in which they pass their
youth, which consequences they for the most part neglect
to consider, and perhaps seldom can properly be said to
believe, beforehand. It requires also to be mentioned,
that in numberless cases the natural course of things
affords us opportunities for procuring advantages to our-
selves at certain times, which we cannot procure when we
will, nor ever recall the opportunities if we have neglected
them. Indeed the general course of nature is an ex-
ample of this. If, during the opportunity of youth,
1 See Part 1 1. chap. vL
Of the Government of God 29
persons are indocile and self-willed, they inevitably suffer
in their future life for want of those acquirements, which
they neglected the natural season of attaining. If the
husbandman lets his seedtime pass without sowing, the
whole year is lost to him beyond recovery. In like
manner, though after men have been guilty of folly and
extravagance up to a certain degree, it is often in their
power, for instance, to retrieve their affairs, to recover
their health and character, at least in good measure ; yet
real reformation is in many cases of no avail at all
towards preventing the miseries, poverty, sickness, in-
famy, naturally annexed to folly and extravagance exceed-
ing that degree. There is a certain bound to imprudence
and misbehaviour, which, being transgressed, there re-
mains no place for repentance in the natural course of
things. It is further very much to be remarked, that
neglects from inconsiderateness, want of attention, 1 not
looking about us to see what we have to do, are often
attended with consequences altogether as dreadful as any
active misbehaviour, from the most extravagant passion.
And, lastly, civil government being natural, the punish-
ments of it are so too ; and some of these punishments
are capital, as the effects of a dissolute course of plea-
sure are often mortal. So that many natural punishments
are final 2 to him who incurs them, if considered only in
his temporal capacity; and seem inflicted by natural
1 Part II. chap. vi.
2 The general consideration of a future state of punishment, most evidently
belongs to the subject of natural Religion. But if any of these reflections
should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this doctrine, as taught in
Scripture, the reader is desired to observe, that Gentile writers, both moralists
and poets, speak of the future punishment of the wicked, both as to the dura-
tion and degree of it, in a like manner of expression and of description, as the
Scripture does. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of
mere Revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the great dis-
tinction between the righteous and the wicked, shall be made at the end of this
world ; that each shall then receive according to his deserts. Reason did, as it
well might, conclude that it should, finally and upon the whole, be well with ths
righteous, and ill with the wicked ; but it could not be determined upon any
principles or reason, whether human creatures might not have been appointed
to pass through other states of life and being, before that distributive justice
should finally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches us, that the next
state of things after the present is appointed for the execution of this justice ;
that it shall be no longer delayed ; but the myttery of God, the great mystery
of his suffering vice and confusion to prevail, shall then be finished; and he
will take to him his great power, and will reign by rendering to every oat
according to his works.
3O The Analogy of Religion
appointment, either to remove the offender out of the
way of being further mischievous, or as an example,
though frequently a disregarded one, to those who are
left behind.
These things are not what we call accidental, or to be
met with only now and then ; but they are things of
every day's experience : they proceed from general laws,
very general ones, by which God governs the world in the
natural course of his providence. And they are so
analogous to what Religion teaches us concerning the
future punishment of the wicked, so much of a piece
with it, that both would naturally be expressed in the very
same words, and manner of description. In the book of
Proverbs^ for instance, Wisdom is introduced as fre-
quenting the most public places of resort, and as rejected
when she offers herself as the natural appointed guide of
human life. How long, speaking to those who are
passing through it, how long, ye simple ones, will ye love
folly, and the scorners delight in their scorning, and fools
hate knowledge ? Turn ye at my reproof. Behold, I will
pour out my spirit upon you, I will make known my words
unto you. But upon being neglected, Because I have
called, and ye refused, I have stretched out my hand, and
no man regarded ; but ye have set at nought all my counsel,
and would none of my reproof: I also will laugh at your
calamity, I will mock when your fear cometh ; when your
fear cometh as desolation, and your destruction cometh as a
whirlwind ; when distress and anguish cometh upon you.
Then shall they call upon me, but I will not answer ; they
shall seek me early, but they shall not find me. This pas-
sage every one sees is poetical, and some parts of it are
highly figurative; but their meaning is obvious. And
the thing intended is expressed more literally in the fol-
lowing words : For that they hated knowledge, and did not
choose the fear of the Lord therefore shall they eat of the
fruit of their own way, and be filled with their own
devices. For the security of the simple shall slay them, and
the prosperity of fools shall destroy them. And the whole
passage is so equally applicable to what we experience in
i Chap. I.
Of the Government of God 31
the present world concerning the consequences of men's
actions, and to what Religion teaches us is to be ex-
pected in another, that it may be questioned which of
the two was principally intended.
Indeed, when one has been recollecting the proper
proofs of a future state of rewards and punishments,
nothing methinks can give one so sensible an apprehen-
sion of the latter, or representation of it to the mind ; as
observing, that after the many disregarded checks, ad-
monitions, and warnings, which people meet with in the
ways of vice and folly and extravagance ; warnings from
their very nature; from the examples of others; from
the lesser inconveniences which they bring upon them-
selves ; from the instructions of wise and virtuous men :
after these have been long despised, scorned, ridiculed ;
after the chief bad consequences, temporal consequences,
of their follies have been delayed for a great while ; at
length they break in irresistibly like an armed force;
repentance is too late to relieve, and can serve only to
aggravate their distress, the case has become desperate,
and poverty and sickness, remorse and anguish, infamy
and death, the effects of their own doings, overwhelm them
beyond possibility of remedy or escape. This is an ac-
count of what is in fact the general constitution of nature.
It is not in any sort meant that, according to what
appears at present of the natural course of things, men
are always uniformly punished in proportion to their
misbehaviour ; but that there are very many instances of
misbehaviour punished in the several ways now men-
tioned, and very dreadful instances too, sufficient to
show what the laws of the universe may admit ; and, if
thoroughly considered, sufficient fully to answer all ob-
jections against the credibility of a future state of punish-
ments, from any imaginations, that the frailty of our
nature and external temptations almost annihilate the
guilt of human vices, as well as objections of another
sort, from necessity, 1 from suppositions that the will of
1 That is, as is more fully explained in chap, vi., the supposition that men
are compelled by necessity to sin : a doctrine which, by destroying the doctrina
of free will, overthrows all notions of moral responsibility, saps the foundations
of morality and virtue, and destroys God's attribute of justice.
32 The Analogy of Religion
an infinite Being cannot be contradicted, or that he
must be incapable of offence and provocation. 1
Reflections of this kind are not without their terrors
to serious persons, the most free from enthusiasm, and of
the greatest strength of mind; but it is fit things be
stated and considered as they really are. And there is,
in the present age, a certain fearlessness with regard to
what may be hereafter under the government of God,
which nothing but an universally acknowledged demon-
stration on the side of atheism can justify, and which
makes it quite necessary that men be reminded, and if
possible, made to feel, that there is no sort of ground for
being thus presumptuous, even upon the most sceptical
principles. For, may it not be said of any person upon
his being born into the world, he may behave so as to be
of no service to it, but by being made an example of the
woful effects of vice and folly ? That he may, as any
one may, if he will, incur an infamous execution from the
hands of civil justice; or in some other course of ex-
travagance shorten his days ; or bring upon himself
infamy and diseases worse than death ? So that it had
been better for him, even with regard to the present
world, that he had never been born. And is there any
pretence of reason, for people to think themselves
secure, and talk as if they had certain proof that, let
them act as licentiously as they will, there can be nothing
analogous to this, with regard to a future and more
general interest, under the providence and government of
the same God ?
CHAPTER III
OF THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD
As the manifold appearances of design and of final
causes, in the constitution of the world, prove it to be
the work of an intelligent Mind ; so the particular final
causes of pleasure and pain distributed amongst his
creatures prove that they are under his government ;
1 See Chap. iv. and vi.
Of the Moral Government of God 33
what may be called his natural government of creatures
endued with sense and reason. This, however, implies
somewhat more than seems usually attended to, when we
speak of God's natural government of the world. It
implies government of the very same kind with that
which a master exercises over his servants, or a civil
magistrate over his subjects. These latter instances of
final causes as really prove an intelligent Governor of the
world, in the sense now mentioned, and before 1 dis-
tinctly treated of, as any other instances of final causes
prove an intelligent Maker of it.
But this alone does not appear, at first sight, to deter-
mine anything certainly, concerning the moral character
of the Author of Nature, considered in this relation of
governor; does not ascertain his government to be
moral, or prove that he is the righteous judge of the
world. Moral government consists not barely in re-
warding and punishing men for their actions, which the
most tyrannical person may do, but in rewarding the
righteous, and punishing the wicked in rendering to
men according to their actions, considered as good or
evil. And the perfection of moral government consists
in doing this, with regard to all intelligent creatures, in
an exact proportion to their personal merits or demerits.
Some men seem to think the only character of the
Author of Nature to be that of simple absolute benevo-
lence. This, considered as a principle of action and
infinite in degree, is a disposition to produce the greatest
possible happiness, without regard to persons' behaviour,
otherwise than as such regard would produce higher
degrees of it. And supposing this to be the only
character of God, veracity and justice in him would be
nothing but benevolence conducted by wisdom. Now,
surely this ought not to be asserted, unless it can be
proved, for we should speak with cautious reverence
upon such a subject. And whether it can be proved
or no, is not the thing here to be inquired into; but
whether in the constitution and conduct of the world, a
righteous government be not discernibly planned out,
1 Chap. ii.
E 90
34 The Analogy of Religion
which necessarily implies a righteous governor. There
may possibly be in the creation beings, to whom the
Author of Nature manifests himself under this most
amiable of all characters, this of infinite absolute bene-
volence, for it is the most amiable, supposing it not, as
perhaps it is not, incompatible with justice; but he
manifests himself to us under the character of a
righteous governor. He may, consistently with this, be
simply and absolutely benevolent in the sense now ex-
plained ; but he is (for he has given us a proof in the
constitution and conduct of the world that he is) a
governor over servants, as he rewards and punishes us
for our actions. And in the constitution and conduct
of it he may also have given, besides the reason of the
thing, and the natural presages of conscience, clear and
distinct intimations that his government is righteous or
moral ; clear to such as think the nature of it deserving
their attention ; and yet not to every careless person who
casts a transient reflection upon the subject. 1
But it is particularly to be observed, that the divine
government, which we experience ourselves under in the
present state, taken alone, is allowed not to be the per-
fection of moral government. And yet this by no
means hinders, but that there may be somewhat, be it
more or less, truly moral in it. A righteous government
may plainly appear to be carried on to some degree ;
enough to give us the apprehension that it shall be com-
pleted, or carried on to that degree of perfection which
religion teaches us it shall: but which cannot appear,
till much more of the divine administration be seen,
than can in the present life. And the design of this
chapter is to inquire how far this is the case : how far,
over and above the moral nature 2 which God has given
1 The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not being uni-
versal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be urged against natural
religion, as well as against revealed. And therefore th consideration of them
belongs to the first part of this Treatise, as well as the second. But _ as these
objections are chiefly urged against revealed religion, I choose to consider them
in the second part. And the answer to them there, Chap, vi., as urged against
Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as urged against the
Religion of Nature, to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to that chapter.
2 Dissertation II.
Of the Moral Government of God 35
us, and our natural notion of him as righteous governor
of those his creatures, to whom he has given this
nature : l I say how far besides this, the principles and
beginnings of a moral government over the world may be
discerned, notwithstanding and amidst all the confusion
and disorder of it.
Now one might mention here, what has been often
urged with great force, that, in general, less uneasiness
and more satisfaction, are the natural consequences 2 of
a virtuous than of a vicious course of life, in the present
state, as an instance of a moral government established
in nature ; an instance of it collected from experience
and present matter of fact. But it must be owned a
thing of difficulty to weigh and balance pleasures and
uneasinesses, each amongst themselves, and also against
each other, so as to make an estimate with any exact-
ness, of the overplus of happiness on the side of virtue.
And it is not impossible, that, amidst the infinite dis-
orders of the world, there may be exceptions to the
happiness of virtue; even with regard to those persons
whose course of life from their youth up has been
blameless; and more with regard to those who have
gone on for some time in the ways of vice, and have
afterwards reformed. For suppose an instance of the
latter case ; a person with his passions inflamed, his
natural faculty of self-government impaired by habits of
indulgence, and with all his vices about him, like so
many harpies, craving for their accustomed gratification :
who can say how long it might be before such a person
would find more satisfaction in the reasonableness and
present good consequences of virtue, than difficulties
and self-denial in the restraints of it ? Experience also
shows, that men can, to a great degree, get over their
sense of shame, so as that by professing themselves to
be without principle, and avowing even direct villany,
they can support themselves against the infamy of it.
But as the ill actions of any one will probably be more
talked of, and oftener thrown in his way, upon his refor-
1 Chap. vL
* See Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part II.
36 The Analogy of Religion
mation ; so the infamy of them will be much more felt,
after the natural sense of virtue and of honour is re-
covered. Uneasinesses of this kind ought indeed to be
put to the account of former vices ; yet it will be said
they are in part the consequences of reformation. Still
I am far from allowing it doubtful, whether virtue, upon
the whole, be happier than vice in the present world.
But if it were, yet the beginnings of a righteous ad-
ministration may, beyond all question, be found in
nature, if we will attentively inquire after them. And,
I. In whatever manner the notion of God's moral
government over the world might be treated, if it did not
appear, whether he were in a proper sense our governor
at all ; yet when it is certain matter of experience, that
he does manifest himself to us under the character of a
governor in the sense explained ; l it must deserve to be
considered, whether there be not reason to apprehend,
that he may be a righteous or moral governor. Since it
appears to be fact, that God does govern mankind by the
method of rewards and punishments, according to some
settled rules of distribution ; it is surely a question to be
asked, what presumption is there against his finally re-
warding and punishing them according to this particular
rule, namely, as they act reasonably or unreasonably,
virtuously or viciously ? since rendering men happy or
miserable by this rule certainly falls in, much more falls
in, with our natural apprehensions and sense of things,
than doing so by any other rule whatever ; since reward-
ing and punishing actions by any other rule would appear
much harder to be accounted for, by minds formed as he
has formed ours. Be the evidence of religion then more
or less clear, the expectation which it raises in us, that
the righteous shall, upon the whole, be happy, and the
wicked miserable, cannot however possibly be considered
as absurd or chimerical ; because it is no more than an
expectation, that a method of government already begun
shall be carried on, the method of rewarding and punish-
ing actions ; and shall be carried on by a particular rule,
which unavoidably appears to us at first sight more
1 Chap. ii.
Of the Moral Government of God 37
natural than any other, the rule which we call distributive
justice. Nor,
II. Ought it to be entirely passed over, that tran-
quillity, satisfaction, and external advantages, being the
natural consequences of prudent management of our-
selves, and our affairs ; and rashness, profligate negli-
gence, and wilful folly, bringing after them many incon-
veniences and sufferings ; these afford instances of a right
constitution of nature : as the correction of children, for
their own sakes, and by way of example, when they run
into danger or hurt themselves, is a part of right educa-
tion. And thus, that God governs the world by general
fixed laws, that he has endued us with capacities of re-
flecting upon this constitution of things, and foreseeing
the good and bad consequences of our behaviour, plainly
implies some sort of moral government ; since from such
a constitution of things it cannot but follow, that pru-
dence and imprudence, which are of the nature of virtue
and vice, 1 must be, as they are, respectively rewarded
and punished.
III. From the natural course of things, vicious actions
are, to a great degree, actually punished as mischievous
to society; and besides punishment actually inflicted
upon this account, there is also the fear and apprehen-
sion of it in those persons, whose crimes have rendered
them obnoxious to it in case of a discovery ; this state of
fear being itself often a very considerable punishment.
The natural fear and apprehension of it, too, which
restrains from such crimes, is a declaration of nature
against them. It is necessary to the very being of
society, that vices, destructive of it, should be punished
as being so ; the vices of falsehood, injustice, cruelty :
which punishment therefore is as natural as society ; and
so is an instance of a kind of moral government, natur-
ally established, and actually taking place. And, since
the certain natural course of things is the conduct of
Providence or the government of God, though carried
on by the instrumentality of men ; the observation here
made amounts to this, that mankind find themselves
1 See Dissertation II.
38 The Analogy of Religion
placed by him in such circumstances, as that they are
unavoidably accountable for their behaviour, and are
often punished, and sometimes rewarded, under his
government, in the view of their being mischievous, or
eminently beneficial to society.
If it be objected that good actions, and such as are
beneficial to society, are often punished, as in the case
of persecution and in other cases, and that ill and mis-
chievous actions are often rewarded, it may be answered
distinctly : first, that this is in no sort necessary, and
consequently not natural, in the sense in which it is
necessary, and therefore natural, that ill or mischievous
actions should be punished ; and in the next place, that
good actions are never punished, considered as beneficial
to society, nor ill actions rewarded, under the view of
their being hurtful to it. So that it stands good, without
anything on the side of vice to be set over against it,
that the Author of Nature has as truly directed that
vicious actions, considered as mischievous to society,
should be punished, and put mankind under a necessity
of thus punishing them, as he has directed and necessi-
tated us to preserve our lives by food.
IV. In the natural course of things virtue as such is
actually rewarded, and vice as such punished ; which
seems to afford an instance or example, not only of
government, but of moral government begun and estab-
lished, moral in the strictest sense, though not in that
perfection of degree which religion teaches us to expect.
In order to see this more clearly, we must distinguish
between actions themselves, and that quality ascribed to
them which we call virtuous or vicious. The gratification
itself of every natural passion must be attended with
delight ; and acquisitions of fortune, however made, are
acquisitions of the means or materials of enjoyment.
An action, then, by which any natural passion is gratified
or fortune acquired, procures delight or advantage, ab-
stracted from all consideration of the morality of such
action. Consequently, the pleasure or advantage in this
case is gained by the action itself, not by the morality,
the virtuousness or viciousness of it, though it be, per-
Of the Moral Government of God 39
haps, virtuous or vicious. Thus, to say such an action or
course of behaviour procured such pleasure or advan-
tage, or brought on such inconvenience and pain, is
quite a different thing from saying that such good or bad
effect was owing to the virtue or vice of such action or
behaviour. In one case, an action abstracted from all
moral consideration produced its effect; in the other
case, for it will appear that there are such cases, the
morality of the action under a moral consideration, i.e.,
the virtuousness or viciousness of it, produced the effect.
Now I say virtue as such, naturally procures considerable
advantages to the virtuous, and vice as such naturally
occasions great inconvenience, and even misery to the
vicious, in very many instances. The immediate effects
of virtue and vice upon the mind and temper are to be
mentioned as instances of it. Vice as such is naturally
attended with some sort of uneasiness, and, not uncom-
monly, with great disturbance and apprehension. That
inward feeling which, respecting lesser matters and in
familiar speech, we call being vexed with oneself, and in
matters of importance, and in more serious language,
remorse, is an uneasiness naturally arising from an action
of a man's own, reflected upon by himself as wrong, un-
reasonable, faulty, i.e., vicious in greater or less degree j
and this manifestly is a different feeling from that un-
easiness which arises from a sense of mere loss or harm.
What is more common than to hear a man lamenting an
accident or event, and adding but, however, he has
the satisfaction that he cannot blame himself for it ; or,
on the contrary, that he has the uneasiness of being
sensible it was his own doing? Thus, also, the disturb-
ance and fear which often follow upon a man's having
done an injury arise from a sense of his being blame-
worthy, otherwise there would in many cases be no
ground of disturbance, nor any reason to fear resentment
or shame. On the other hand, inward security and
peace, and a mind open to the several gratifications
of life, are the natural attendants of innocence and
virtue. To which must be added, the complacency,
satisfaction, and even joy of heart, which accompany
4O The Analogy of Religion
the exercise, the real exercise, of gratitude, friendship,
benevolence.
And here, I think, ought to be mentioned the fears of
future punishment, and peaceful hopes of a better life,
in those who fully believe or have any serious apprehen-
sion of religion ; because these hopes and fears are
present uneasiness and satisfaction to the mind, and
cannot be got rid of by great part of the world, even by
men who have thought most thoroughly upon that sub-
ject of religion. And no one can say how considerable
this uneasiness and satisfaction may be, or what upon
the whole it may amount to.
In the next place comes in the consideration, that all
honest and good men are disposed to befriend honest
good men as such, and to discountenance the vicious as
such, and do so in some degree, indeed in a considerable
degree; from which favour and discouragement cannot
but arise considerable advantage and inconvenience.
And though the generality of the world have little regard
to the morality of their own actions, and may be sup-
posed to have less to that of others, when they them-
selves are not concerned ; yet let any one be known to
be a man of virtue, somehow or other he will be
favoured, and good offices will be done him, from regard
to his character, without remote views, occasionally, and
in some low degree, I think, by the generality of the
world, as it happens to come in their way. Public
honours, too, and advantages are the natural conse-
quences, are sometimes at least the consequences, in
fact, of virtuous actions, of eminent justice, fidelity,
charity, love to our country, considered in the view of
being virtuous. And sometimes even death itself, often
infamy and external inconveniences, are the public con-
sequences of vice as vice. For instance, the sense which
mankind have of tyranny, injustice, oppression, addi-
tional to the mere feeling or fear of misery, has doubt-
less been instrumental in bringing about revolutions,
which make a figure even in the history of the world.
For it is plain, men resent injuries as implying faultiness,
and retaliate, not merely under the notion of having
Of the Moral Government of God 41
received harm, but of having received wrong ; and they
have this resentment in behalf of others, as well as of
themselves. So likewise even the generality are, in some
degree, grateful, and disposed to return good offices, not
merely because such a one has been the occasion of good
to them, but under the view that such good offices
implied kind intention and good desert in the doer. To
all this may be added two or three particular things,
which many persons will think frivolous; but to me
nothing appears so which at all comes in towards deter-
mining a question of such importance, as whether there
be or be not a moral institution of government, in the
strictest sense moral visibly established and begun in
nature. The particular things are these : that in domes-
tic government, which is doubtless natural, children and
others also are very generally punished for falsehood and
injustice, and ill-behaviour as such, and rewarded for the
contrary ; which are instances where veracity and justice
and right behaviour as such are naturally enforced by
rewards and punishments, whether more or less consider-
able in degree: that, though civil government be sup-
posed to take cognizance of actions in no other view
than as prejudicial to society, without respect to the
immorality of them, yet as such actions are immoral, so
the sense which men have of the immorality of them
very greatly contributes in different ways to bring
offenders to justice : and that entire absence of all crime
and guilt in the moral sense, when plainly appearing,
will almost of course procure, and circumstances of
aggravated guilt prevent, a remission of the penalties
annexed to civil crimes, in many cases, though by no
means in all.
Upon the whole, then, besides the good and bad
effects of virtue and vice upon men's own minds, the
course of the world does in some measure turn upon the
approbation and disapprobation of them as such, in
others. The sense of well and ill doing, the presages of
conscience, the love of good characters and dislike of bad
ones, honour, shame, resentment, gratitude; all these
considered in themselves, and in their effects, do afford
42 The Analogy of Religion
manifest real instances of virtue as such naturally
favoured, and of vice as such discountenanced, more or
less, in the daily course of human life, in every age, in
every relation, in every general circumstance of it. That
God has given us a moral nature 1 may most justly be
urged as a proof of our being under his moral govern-
ment ; but that he has placed us in a condition which
gives this nature, as one may speak, scope to operate,
and in which it does unavoidably operate ; i.e., influence
mankind to act, so as thus to favour and reward virtue,
and discountenance and punish vice; this is not the
same, but a further additional proof of his moral govern-
ment; for it is an instance of it. The first is a proof
that he will finally favour and support virtue effectually ;
the second is an example of his favouring and supporting
it at present in some degree.
If a more distinct inquiry be made, whence it arises,
that virtue as such is often rewarded, and vice as such is
punished, and this rule never inverted, it will be found
to proceed, in part, immediately from the moral nature
itself, which God has given us ; and also in part, from his
having given us, together with this nature, so great a
power over each other's happiness and misery. For,
first, it is certain that peace and delight, in some degree
and upon some occasions, is the necessary and present
effect of virtuous practice ; an effect arising immediately
from that constitution of our nature. We are so made,
that well-doing as such gives us satisfaction, at least,
in some instances; ill-doing as such, in none. And,
secondly, from our moral nature, joined with God's having
put our happiness and misery in many respects in each
other's power, it cannot but be, that vice as such, some
kinds and instances of it at least, will be infamous, and
men will be disposed to punish it as in itself detestable ;
and the villain will by no means be able always to avoid
feeling that infamy, any more than he will be able to
escape this further punishment, which mankind will be
disposed to inflict upon him, under the notion of his de-
serving it. But there can be nothing on the side of vice
1 See Dissertation II.
Of the Moral Government of God 43
to answer this ; because there is nothing in the human
mind contradictory, as the logicians speak, to virtue.
For virtue consists in a regard to what is right and
reasonable, as being so ; in a regard to veracity, justice,
charity, in themselves ; and there is surely no such thing
as a like natural regard to falsehood, injustice, cruelty.
If it be thought that there are instances of an approba-
tion of vice, as such in itself, and for its own sake
(though it does not appear to me that there is any such
thing at all ; but supposing there be), it is evidently
monstrous ; as much so as the most acknowledged per-
version of any passion whatever. Such instances of
perversion then being left out as merely imaginary, or,
however, unnatural ; it must follow, from the frame of our
nature, and from our condition in the respects now de-
scribed, that vice cannot at all be, and virtue cannot but
be favoured as such by others, upon some occasions, and
happy in itself, in some degree. For what is here in-
sisted upon, is not the degree in which virtue and vice
are thus distinguished, but only the thing itself, that they
are so in some degree ; though the whole good and bad
effect of virtue and vice as such, is not inconsiderable in
degree. But that they must be thus distinguished, in
some degree, is in a manner necessary : it is matter of
fact of daily experience, even in the greatest confusion
of human affairs.
It is not pretended but that, in the natural course of
things, happiness and misery appear to be distributed by
other rules, than only the personal merit and demerit
of characters. They may sometimes be distributed by
way of mere discipline- There may be the wisest and
best reasons why the world should be governed by
general laws, from whence such promiscuous distribu-
tion perhaps must follow ; and also why our happiness
and misery should be put in each other's power, in the
degree which they are. And these things, as in general
they contribute to the rewarding virtue and punishing
vice, as such, so they often contribute also, not to the
inversion of this, which is impossible ; but to the ren-
dering persons prosperous, though wicked; afflicted,
44 The Analogy of Religion
though righteous ; and, which is worse, to the rewarding
some actions, though vicious, and punishing other actions,
though virtuous. But all this cannot drown the voice of
Nature in the conduct of Providence, plainly declaring
itself for virtue, by way of distinction from vice, and
preference to it. For our being so constituted as that
virtue and vice are thus naturally favoured and dis-
countenanced, rewarded and punished, respectively as
such, is an intuitive proof of the intent of Nature that it
should be so; otherwise the constitution of our mind,
from which it thus immediately and directly proceeds,
would be absurd. But it cannot be said, because vir-
tuous actions are sometimes punished, and vicious
actions rewarded, that Nature intended it. For, though
this great disorder is brought about, as all actions are
done, by means of some natural passion ; yet this may
be, as it undoubtedly is, brought about by the perversion
of such passion, implanted in us for other, and those
very good purposes. And indeed these other and good
purposes, even of every passion, may be clearly seen.
We have then a declaration, in some degree of present
effect, from Him who is supreme in Nature, which side
he is of, or what part he takes ; a declaration for virtue,
and against vice. So far therefore as a man is true to
virtue, to veracity and justice, to equity and charity,
and the right of the case, in whatever he is concerned ;
so far he is on the side of the divine administration, and
co-operates with it: and from hence, to such a man,
arises naturally a secret satisfaction and sense of security,
and implicit hope of somewhat further. And,
V. This hope is confirmed by the necessary tendencies
of virtue, which, though not of present effect, yet are at
present discernible in nature, and so afford an instance
of somewhat moral in the essential constitution of it.
There is, in the nature of things, a tendency in virtue
and vice to produce the good and bad effects now men-
tioned, in a greater degree than they do in fact produce
them. For instance, good and bad men would be much
more rewarded and punished as such, were it not, that
justice is often artificially eluded, that characters are not
Of the Moral Government of God 45
known, and many, who would thus favour virtue and dis-
courage vice, are hindered from doing so by accidental
causes. These tendencies of virtue and vice are obvious
with regard to individuals. But it may require more
particularly to be considered, that power in a society, by
being under the direction of virtue, naturally increases,
and has a necessary tendency to prevail over opposite
power, not under the direction of it ; in like manner, as
power, by being under the direction of reason, increases,
and has a tendency to prevail over brute force. There
are several brute creatures of equal, and several of
superior strength, to that of men ; and possibly the sum
of the whole strength of brutes may be greater than that
of mankind : but reason gives us the advantage and
superiority over them ; and thus man is the acknowledged
governing animal upon the earth. Nor is this superiority
considered by any as accidental ; but as what reason has
a tendency, in the nature of the thing, to obtain. And
yet perhaps difficulties may be raised about the meaning,
as well as the truth, of the assertion, that virtue has the
like tendency.
To obviate these difficulties, let us see more distinctly,
how the case stands with regard to reason, which is so
readily acknowledged to have this advantageous tendency.
Suppose then two or three men, of the best and most im-
proved understanding, in a desolate open plain, attacked
by ten times the number of beasts of prey : would their
reason secure them the victory in this unequal combat ?
Power then, though joined with reason, and under its
direction, cannot be expected to prevail over opposite
power, though merely brutal, unless the one bears some
proportion to the other. Again : put the imaginary case,
that rational and irrational creatures were of like external
shape and manner : it is certain, before there were oppor-
tunities for the first to distinguish each other, to separate
from their adversaries, and to form a union among them-
selves, they might be upon a level, or in several respects
upon great disadvantage; though united they might be
vastly superior ; since union is of such efficacy, that ten
men united, might be able to accomplish what ten thou-
46 The Analogy of Religion
sand of the same natural strength and understanding
wholly ununited could not. In this case, then, brute
force might more than maintain its ground against reason,
for want of union among the rational creatures. Or
suppose a number of men to land upon an island in-
habited only by wild beasts ; a number of men who, by
the regulations of civil government, the inventions of
art, and the experience of some years, could they be
preserved so long, would be really sufficient to subdue
the wild beasts, and to preserve themselves in security
from them; yet a conjuncture of accidents might give
such advantage to the irrational animals as that they
might at once overpower, and even extirpate, the whole
species of rational ones. Length of time then, proper
scope and opportunities, for reason to exert itself, may
be absolutely necessary to its prevailing over brute force.
Further still : there are many instances of brutes succeed-
ing in attempts, which they could not have undertaken,
had not their irrational nature rendered them incapable
of foreseeing the danger of such attempts, or the fury of
passion hindered their attending to it ; and there are in-
stances of reason and real prudence preventing men's
undertaking what, it hath appeared afterwards, they
might have succeeded in by a lucky rashness. And in
certain conjunctures, ignorance and folly, weakness and
discord, may have their advantages. So that rational
animals have not necessarily the superiority over irra-
tional ones ; but, how improbable soever it may be, it
is evidently possible, that in some globes the latter may
be superior. And were the former wholly at variance
and disunited, by false self-interest and envy, by treachery
and injustice, and consequent rage and malice against
each other, whilst the latter were firmly united among
themselves by instinct ; this might greatly contribute to
the introducing such an inverted order of things. For
every one would consider it as inverted : since reason
has, in the nature of it, a tendency to prevail over brute
force ; notwithstanding the possibility it may not pre-
vail, and the necessity, which there is, of many concur-
ring circumstances to render it prevalent.
Of the Moral Government of God 47
Now I say, virtue in a society has a like tendency to
procure superiority and additional power, whether this
power be considered as the means of security from
opposite power, or of obtaining other advantages. And
it has this tendency, by rendering public good an object
and end to every member of the society, by putting
every one upon consideration and diligence, recollection
and self-government, both in order to see what is the
most effectual method, and also in order to perform
their proper part, for obtaining and preserving it ; by
uniting a society within itself, and so increasing its
strength; and, which is particularly to be mentioned,
uniting it by means of veracity and justice. For as
these last are principal bonds of union, so benevolence,
or public spirit, undirected, unrestrained by them, is,
nobody knows what.
And suppose the invisible world and the invisible
dispensations of Providence to be in any sort analogous
to what appears, or that both together make up one
uniform scheme, the two parts of which, the part which
we see, and that which is beyond our observation, are
analogous to each other, then there must be a like
natural tendency in the derived power throughout the
m.iverse, under the direction of virtue, to prevail in
general over that which is not under its direction, as
there is in reason, derived reason in the universe, to
prevail over brute force. But then, in order to the
prevalence of virtue, or that it may actually produce
what it has a tendency to produce, the like concurrences
are necessary as are to the prevalence of reason. There
must be some proportion between the natural power or
force which is, and that which is not, under the direc-
tion of virtue ; there must be sufficient length of time ;
for the complete success of virtue, as of reason, cannot,
from the nature of the thing, be otherwise than gradual j
there must be, as one may speak, a fair field of trial, a
stage large and extensive enough, proper occasions and
opportunities for the virtuous to join together, to exert
themselves against lawless force, and to reap the fruit of
their united labours. Now indeed it is to be hoped,
48 The Analogy of Religion
that the disproportion between the good and bad, even
here on earth, is not so great but that the former have
natural power sufficient to their prevailing to a consider-
able degree, if circumstances would permit this power
to be united. For, much less, very much less, power
under the direction of virtue, would prevail over much
greater not under the direction of it. However, good
men over the face of the earth cannot unite, as for
other reasons, so because they cannot be sufficiently
ascertained of each other's characters. And the known
course of human things, the scene we are now passing
through, particularly the shortness of life, denies to
virtue its full scope in several other respects. The
natural tendency which we have been considering,
though real, is hindered from being carried into effect
in the present state; but these hindrances may be re-
moved in a future one. Virtue, to borrow the Christian
allusion, is militant here, and various untoward acci-
dents contribute to its being often overborne; but it
may combat with greater advantage hereafter, and prevail
completely, and enjoy its consequent rewards, in some
future states. Neglected as it is, perhaps unknown,
perhaps despised and oppressed here, there may be
scenes in eternity, lasting enough, and in every other
way adapted to afford it a sufficient sphere of action,
and a sufficient sphere for the natural consequences of
it to follow in fact. If the soul be naturally immortal,
and this state be a progress towards a future one, as
childhood is towards mature age, good men may natur-
ally unite, not only amongst themselves, but also with
other orders of virtuous creatures, in that future state.
For virtue, from the very nature of it, is a principle and
bond of union, in some degree, amongst all who are
endued with it, and known to each other, so as that by
it, a good man cannot but recommend himself to the
favour and protection of all virtuous beings throughout
the whole universe who can be acquainted with his
character and can any way interpose in his behalf in
any part of his duration. And one might add, that
suppose all this advantageous tendency of virtue to
Of the Moral Government of God 49
become effect amongst one or more orders of creatures
in any distant scenes and periods, and to be seen by
any orders of vicious creatures throughout the universal
kingdom of God, this happy effect of virtue would have
a tendency, by way of example, and possibly in other
ways, to amend those of them who are capable of
amendment, and being recovered to a just sense of
virtue. If our notions of the plan of Providence were
enlarged in any sort proportionable to what late dis-
coveries have enlarged our views with respect to the
material world, representations of this kind would not
appear absurd or extravagant. However, they are not
to be taken as intended for a literal delineation of what
is in fact the particular scheme of the universe, which
cannot be known without revelation ; for suppositions
are not to be looked on as true because not incredible ;
but they are mentioned to show that our finding virtue
to be hindered from procuring to itself such superiority
and advantages, is no objection against its having, in
the essential nature of the thing, a tendency to procure
them. And the suppositions now mentioned do plainly
show this, for they show, that these hindrances are so
far from being necessary, that we ourselves can easily
conceive how they may be removed in future states, and
full scope be granted to virtue. And all these advan-
tageous tendencies of it are to be considered as declara-
tions of God in its favour. This, however, is taking a
pretty large compass, though it is certain, that, as the
material world appears to be, in a manner, boundless
and immense, there must be some scheme of Providence
vast in proportion to it.
But let us return to the earth our habitation ; and we
shall see this happy tendency of virtue, by imagining an
instance not so vast and remote ; by supposing a king-
dom or society of men upon it, perfectly virtuous, for a
succession of many ages ; to which, if you please, may
be given a situation advantageous for universal monarchy.
In such a state, there would be no such thing as faction ;
but men of the greatest capacity would of course, all
along, have the chief direction of affairs willingly yielded
F 9
50 The Analogy of Religion
to them ; and they would share it among themselves
without envy. Each of these would have the part
assigned him, to which his genius was peculiarly
adapted ; and others, who had not any distinguished
genius, would be safe, and think themselves very happy,
by being under the protection and guidance of those
who had. Public determinations would really be the
result of the united wisdom of the community; and
they would faithfully be executed, by the united strength
of it. Some would in a higher way contribute, but all
would in some way contribute, to the public prosperity ;
and in it, each would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue.
And as injustice, whether by fraud or force, would be
unknown among themselves, so they would be sufficiently
secured from it in their neighbours. For cunning and
false self-interest, confederacies in injustice, ever slight,
and accompanied with faction and intestine treachery;
these on one hand would be found mere childish folly
and weakness, when set in opposition against wisdom,
public spirit, union inviolable, and fidelity on the other;
allowing both a sufficient length of years to try their
force. Add the general influence, which such a kingdom
would have over the face of the earth, by way of example
particularly, and the reverence which would be paid it.
It would plainly be superior to all others, and the world
must gradually come under its empire ; not by means of
lawless violence, but partly by what must be allowed to
be just conquest, and partly by other kingdoms submit-
ting themselves voluntarily to it, throughout a course of
ages, and claiming its protection, one after another, in
successive exigencies. The head of it would be an
universal monarch, in another sense than any mortal
has yet been; and the eastern style would be literally
applicable to him, that all people, nations, and languages
should serve him. And though indeed our knowledge
of human nature, and the whole history of mankind,
show the impossibility, without some miraculous inter-
position, that a number of men here on earth should
unite in one society or government, in the fear of God
and universal practice of virtue, and that such a govern-
Of the Moral Government of God 51
ment should continue so united for a succession of ages;
yet admitting or supposing this, the effect would be as
now drawn out. And thus, for instance, the wonderful
power and prosperity promised to the Jewish nation in
the Scripture would be in a great measure the consequence
of what is predicted of them, that the people should be all
righteous^ and inherit the land for ever? were we to under-
stand the latter phrase of a long continuance, only suffi-
cient to give things time to work. The predictions of
this kind, for there are many of them, cannot come to
pass, in the present known course of nature; but suppose
them come to pass, and then the dominion and pre-
eminence promised must naturally follow, to a very con-
siderable degree.
Consider now the general system of religion : that the
government of the world is uniform, and one, and moral;
that virtue and right shall finally have the advantage, and
prevail over fraud and lawless force, over the deceits as
well as the violence of wickedness, under the conduct of
one supreme governor ; and from the observations above
made, it will appear, that God has, by our reason, given
us to see a peculiar connection in the several parts of
this scheme, and a tendency towards the completion of
it, arising out of the very nature of virtue : which ten-
dency is to be considered as somewhat moral in the
essential constitution of things. If any one should think
all this to be of little importance, I desire him to con-
sider, what he would think if vice had essentially and in
its nature these advantageous tendencies, or if virtue had
essentially the direct contrary ones.
But it may be objected, that notwithstanding all these
natural effects and these natural tendencies of virtue,
yet things may be now going on throughout the universe,
and may go on hereafter, in the same mixed way as here
at present upon earth : virtue sometimes prosperous,
sometimes depressed ; vice sometimes punished, some-
times successful. The answer to which is, that it is not
the purpose of this chapter, nor of this treatise, properly
to prove God's perfect moral government over the world,
Isa. Ix. 21
52 The Analogy of Religion
or the truth of Religion ; but to observe what there is in
the constitution and course of nature to confirm the
proper proof of it, supposed to be known ; and that the
weight of the foregoing observations to this purpose
may be thus distinctly proved. Pleasure and pain are
indeed to a certain degree, say to a very high degree,
distributed amongst us without any apparent regard
to the merit or demerit of characters. And were there
nothing else concerning this matter discernible in the
constitution and course of nature, there would be no
ground from the constitution and course of nature to
hope or to fear, that men would be rewarded or
punished hereafter according to their deserts ; which,
however, it is to be remarked, implies, that even then
there would be no ground from appearances to think,
that vice upon the whole would have the advantage,
rather than that virtue would. And thus the proof of a
future state of retribution would rest upon the usual
known arguments for it, which are I think plainly un-
answerable; and would be so, though there were no
additional confirmation of them from the things above
insisted on. But these things are a very strong con-
firmation of them. For,
First. They show that the Author of Nature is not
indifferent to virtue and vice. They amount to a declara-
tion, from him, determinate, and not to be evaded, in
favour of one, and against the other ; such a declaration,
as there is nothing to be set over against or answer, on
the part of vice. So that were a man, laying aside the
proper proof of Religion, to determine from the course
of nature only, whether it were most probable, that the
righteous or the wicked would have the advantage in a
future life, there can be no doubt but that he would
determine the probability to be, that the former would.
The course of nature then, in the view of it now given,
furnishes us with a real practical proof of the obliga-
tions of Religion.
Secondly. When, conformably, to what Religion
teaches us, God shall reward and punish virtue and vice
as such, so as that every one shall, upon the whole, have
Of the Moral Government of God 53
his deserts ; this distributive justice will not be a thing
different in kind, but only in degree, from what we ex-
perience in his present government. It will be that
in effect toward which we now see a tendency. It will
be no more than the completion of that moral govern-
ment, the principles and beginning of which have been
shown, beyond all dispute, discernible in the present
constitution and course of nature. And from hence it
follows,
Thirdly. That, as under the natural government of
God, our experience of those kinds and degrees of happi-
ness and misery, which we do experience at present,
gives just ground to hope for, and to fear, higher degrees
and other kinds of both in a future state, supposing a
future state admitted : so under his moral government
our experience, that virtue and vice are, in the manners
above mentioned, actually rewarded and punished at
present, in a certain degree, gives just ground to hope
and to fear, that they may be rewarded and punished in
a higher degree hereafter. It is acknowledged indeed
that this alone is not sufficient ground to think, that they
actually will be rewarded and punished in a higher
degree, rather than in a lower ; but then,
Lastly. There is sufficient ground to think so, from the
good and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For these
tendencies are essential, and founded in the nature of
things ; whereas the hindrances to their becoming effect
are, in numberless cases, not necessary, but artificial
only. Now it may be much more strongly argued, that
these tendencies, as well as the actual rewards and
punishments, of virtue and vice, which arise directly out
of the nature of things, will remain hereafter, than that
the accidental hindrances of them will. And if these
hindrances do not remain, those rewards and punish-
ments cannot but be carried on much farther towards
the perfection of moral government; i.e., the tendencies
of virtue and vice will become effect : but when, or
where, or in what particular way, cannot be known at all
but by revelation.
Upon the whole, there is a kind of moral government
54 The Analogy of Religion
implied in God's natural government; 1 virtue and vice
are naturally rewarded and punished as beneficial and
mischievous to society, 2 and rewarded and punished
directly as virtue and vice. 8 The notion, then, of a
moral scheme of government is not fictitious, but natural ;
for it is suggested to our thoughts by the constitution
and course of nature ; and the execution of this scheme
is actually begun in the instances here mentioned ; and
these things are to be considered as a declaration of the
Author of Nature, for virtue, and against vice ; they give
a credibility to the supposition of their being rewarded
and punished hereafter, and also ground to hope and to
fear that they may be rewarded and punished in higher
degrees than they are here, and as all this is confirmed,
so the argument for religion from the constitution and
course of nature is carried on farther, by observing that
there are natural tendencies, and, in innumerable cases,
only artificial hindrances, to this moral scheme's being
carried on much farther towards perfection than it is at
present. 4 The notion, then, of a moral scheme of
government, much more perfect than what is seen, is not
a fictitious, but a natural notion ; for it is suggested to our
thoughts by the essential tendencies of virtue and vice ;
and these tendencies are to be considered as intimations,
as implicit promises and threatenings from the Author
of Nature of much greater rewards and punishments
to follow virtue and vice than do at present ; and indeed
every natural tendency which is to continue, but which
is hindered from becoming effect by only accidental
causes, affords a presumption that such tendency will
some time or other become effect, a presumption in
degree proportionable to the length of the duration
through which such tendency will continue; and from
these things together arises a real presumption that the
moral scheme of government established in nature shall
be carried on much farther towards perfection hereafter,
and, I think, a presumption that it will be absolutely
completed. But from these things, joined with the
i P. 36. p. 37-
P. 38, &C. * P. 44, &C.
Of a State of Probation 55
moral nature which God has given us, considered as
given us by him, arises a practical proof 1 that it will be
completed ; a proof from fact ; and therefore a distinct
one from that which is deduced from the eternal and
unalterable relations, the fitness and unfitness of
actions.
CHAPTER IV
OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS IMPLYING
TRIAL, DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER
THE general doctrine of religion, that our present life
is a state of probation for a future one, comprehends
under it several particular things distinct from each
other. But the first and most common meaning of it
seems to be, that our future interest is now depending,
and depending upon ourselves ; that we have scope and
opportunities here for that good and bad behaviour
which God will reward and punish hereafter, together
with temptations to one, as well as inducements of
reason to the other ; and this is in a great measure the
same with saying that we are under the moral govern-
ment of God, and to give an account of our actions to
him, for the notion of a future account and general
righteous judgment implies some sort of temptations to
what is wrong; otherwise there would be no moral
possibility of doing wrong, nor ground for judgment or
discrimination; but there is this difference, that the
word probation is more distinctly and particularly ex-
pressive of allurements to wrong, or difficulties in
adhering uniformly to what is right, and of the danger
of miscarrying by such temptations, than the words
moral government. A state of probation then, as thus
particularly implying in it trial, difficulties, and danger,
may require to be considered distinctly by itself.
And as the moral government of God, which religion
teaches us, implies that we are in a state of trial with
regard to a future world ; so also his natural government
1 See this proof drawn out briefly, Chap. vi. Ed.
56 The Analogy of Religion
over us implies that we are in a state of trial in the like
sense with regard to the present world. Natural govern-
ment by rewards and punishments as much implies
natural trial, as moral government does moral trial.
The natural government of God here meant 1 consists in
his annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain to others,
which are in our power to do or forbear, and in giving
us notice of such appointment beforehand. This neces-
sarily implies that he has made our happiness and
misery, or our interest, to depend in part upon our-
selves; and so far as men have temptations to any
course of action which will probably occasion them
greater temporal inconvenience and uneasiness than
satisfaction, so far their temporal interest is in danger
from themselves, or they are in a state of trial with
respect to it. Now people often blame others, and even
themselves, for their misconduct in their temporal con-
cerns; and we find many are greatly wanting to them-
selves, and miss of that natural happiness which they
might have obtained in the present life : perhaps every
one does in some degree. But many run themselves
into great inconvenience, and into extreme distress and
misery; not through incapacity of knowing better and
doing better for themselves, which would be nothing to
the present purpose, but through their own fault. And
these things necessarily imply temptation and danger of
miscarrying in a greater or less degree with respect to
our worldly interest or happiness. Every one too, with-
out having religion in his thoughts, speaks of the hazards
which young people run upon their setting out in the
world ; hazards from other causes than merely their
ignorance and unavoidable accidents ; and some courses
of vice, at least, being contrary to men's worldly interest
or good, temptations to these must at the same time be
temptations to forego our present and our future inter-
est. Thus in our natural or temporal capacity, we are
in a state of trial, i.e., of difficulty and danger, analogous,
or like to our moral and religious trial.
This will more distinctly appear to any one who thinks
1 Chap. ii.
Of a State of Probation 57
it worth while more distinctly to consider what it is which
constitutes our trial in both capacities, and to observe
how mankind behave under it.
And that which constitutes this our trial, in both these
capacities, must be somewhat either in our external cir-
cumstances, or in our nature. For, on the one hand,
persons may be betrayed into wrong behaviour upon sur-
prise, or overcome upon any other very singular and
extraordinary external occasions, who would otherwise
have preserved their character of prudence and of virtue :
in which cases every one, in speaking of the wrong
behaviour of these persons, would impute it to such
particular external circumstances. And on the other
hand, men who have contracted habits of vice and folly
of any kind, or have some particular passions in excess,
will seek opportunities, and, as it were, go out of their
way to gratify themselves in these respects, at the expense
of their wisdom and their virtue ; led to it, as every one
would say, not by external temptations, but by such
habits and passions. And the account of this last case
is, that particular passions are no more coincident with
prudence, or that reasonable self-love the end of which
is our worldly interest, than they are with the principle
of virtue and religion, but often draw contrary ways to
one, as well as to the other; and so such particular
passions are as much temptations to act imprudently
with regard to our worldly interest as to act viciously. 1
However, as when we say men are misled by external
circumstances of temptation, it cannot but be under-
stood that there is somewhat within themselves to render
those circumstances temptations, or to render them sus-
ceptible of impressions from them ; so when we say they
are misled by passions, it is always supposed that there
are occasions, circumstances, and objects exciting these
passions, and affording means for gratifying them. And
therefore, temptations from within and from without
coincide and mutually imply each other. Now the
several external objects of the appetites, passions, and
1 See Sermons preached at the Rolls, 1726, and edit. p. 105, &c. Pref.
p. >s, &c. Serm. p. 21, &c.
58 The Analogy of Religion
affections being present to the senses, or offering them-
selves to the mind, and so exciting emotions suitable to
their nature, not only in cases where they can be gratified
consistently with innocence and prudence, but also in
cases where they cannot, and yet can be gratified im-
prudently and viciously : this as really puts them in
danger of voluntarily foregoing their present interest
or good as their future, and as really renders self denial
necessary to secure one as the other; i.e., we are in a
like state of trial with respect to both, by the very same
passions, excited by the very same means. Thus man-
kind having a temporal interest depending upon them-
selves, and a prudent course of behaviour being necessary
to secure it, passions inordinately excited, whether by
means of example or by any other external circumstance,
towards such objects, at such times or in such degrees as
that they cannot be gratified consistently with worldly
prudence, are temptations dangerous, and too often
successful, temptations to forego a greater temporal
good for a less ; i.e., to forego what is, upon the whole,
our temporal interest for the sake of a present gratifica-
tion. This is a description of our state of trial in our
temporal capacity. Substitute now the word future for
temporal, and virtue for prudence ; and it will be just as
proper a description of our state of trial in our religious
capacity, so analogous are they to each other.
If, from consideration of this our like state of trial in
both capacities, we go on to observe farther how mankind
behave under it, we shall find there are some who have
so little sense of it that they scarce look beyond the
passing day ; they are so taken up with present gratifica-
tions as to have, in a manner, no feeling of consequences,
no regard to their future ease or fortune in this life, any
more than to their happiness in another. Some appear
to be blinded and deceived by inordinate passion, in
their worldly concerns as much as in Religion. Others
are not deceived, but, as it were, forcibly carried away by
the like passions against their better judgment, and feeble
resolutions too, of acting better. And there are men,
and truly they are not a few, who shamelessly avow, not
Of a State of Probation 59
their interest, but their mere will and pleasure, to be their
law of life, and who, in open defiance of everything that
is reasonable, will go on in a course of vicious extrava-
gance, foreseeing, with no remorse and little fear, that it
will be their temporal ruin ; and some of them under the
apprehension of the consequences of wickedness in
another state. And to speak in the most moderate way,
human creatures are not only continually liable to go
wrong voluntarily, but we see likewise that they often
actually do so with respect to their temporal interests, as
well as with respect to Religion.
Thus our difficulties and dangers, or our trials in our
temporal and our religious capacity, as they proceed from
the same causes and have the same effect upon men's
behaviour, are evidently analogous and of the same
kind.
It may be added, that as the difficulties and dangers
of miscarrying in our religious state of trial are greatly
increased, and one is ready to think in a manner wholly
made by the ill behaviour of others, by a wrong educa-
tion, wrong in a moral sense, sometimes positively vicious:
by general bad example ; by the dishonest artifices which
are got into business of all kinds, and in very many
parts of the world, by religion's being corrupted into
superstitions which indulge men in their vices; so, in
like manner, the difficulties of conducting ourselves pru-
dently in respect to our present interest, and our danger
of being led aside from pursuing it, are greatly increased
by a foolish education ; and, after we come to mature age,
by the extravagance and carelessness of others whom we
have intercourse with, and by mistaken notions, very
generally prevalent and taken up from common opinion,
concerning temporal happiness and wherein it consists.
And persons, by their own negligence and folly in their
temporal affairs, no less than by a course of vice, bring
themselves into new difficulties, and, by habits of indul-
gence, become less qualified to go through them; and
one irregularity after another embarrasses things to such
a degree that they know not whereabout they are, and
often makes the path of conduct so intricate and per-
60 The Analogy of Religion
plexed that it is difficult to trace it out difficult even to
determine what is the prudent or the moral part. Thus,
for instance, wrong behaviour in one stage of life, youth
wrong, I mean, considering ourselves only in our tem-
poral capacity, without taking in religion this, in several
ways, increases the difficulties of right behaviour in
mature age ; i.e., puts us into a more disadvantageous
state of trial in our temporal capacity.
We are an inferior part of the creation of God, 1
There are natural appearances of our being in a state of
degradation. And we certainly are in a condition which
does not seem by any means the most advantageous we
could imagine or desire, either in our natural or moral
capacity, for securing either our present or future interest.
However, this condition, low and careful and uncertain
as it is, does not afford any just ground of complaint.
For, as men may manage their temporal affairs with
prudence, and so pass their days here on earth in toler-
able ease and satisfaction, by a moderate degree of care;
so likewise with regard to religion, there is no more
required than what they are well able to do, and what
they must be greatly wanting to themselves if they
neglect. And for persons to have that put upon them
which they are well able to go through, and no more, we
naturally consider as an equitable thing, supposing it
done by proper authority. Nor have we any more reason
to complain of it, with regard to the Author of Nature,
than of his not having given us other advantages belong-
ing to other orders of creatures.
But the thing here insisted upon is that the state of
trial which Religion teaches us we are in is rendered
credible by its being throughout uniform and of a piece
with the general conduct of Providence towards us, in all
other respects within the compass of our knowledge.
Indeed if mankind, considered in their natural capacity
as inhabitants of this world only, found themselves from
their birth to their death in a settled state of security and
happiness, without any solicitude or thought of their own,
or if they were in no danger of being brought into incon-
1 Part II., chap. v.
Of a State of Probation 61
veniences and distress by carelessness, or the folly of
passion, through bad example, the treachery of others, or
the deceitful appearances of things ; were this our natural
condition, then it might seem strange and be some pre-
sumption against the truth of Religion that it represents
our future and more general interest, as not secure of
course, but as depending upon our behaviour, and re-
quiring recollection and self-government to obtain it.
For it might be alleged, " What you say is our condition
in one respect, is not in anywise of a sort with what we
find, by experience, our condition is in another. Our
whole present interest is secured to our hands without
any solicitude of ours, and why should not our future
interest, if we have any such, be so too ? " But since, on
the contrary, thought and consideration, the voluntary
denying ourselves many things which we desire, and a
course of behaviour, far from being always agreeable to
us, are absolutely necessary to our acting even a common
decent and common prudent part, so as to pass with any
satisfaction through the present world, and be received
upon any tolerable good terms in it ; since this is the
case, all presumption against self-denial and attention
being necessary to secure our higher interest, is removed.
Had we not experience, it might, perhaps speciously, be
urged that it is improbable anything of hazard and danger
should be put upon us by an infinite Being, when every-
thing which is hazard and danger in our manner of con-
ception, and will end in error, confusion, and misery, is
now already certain in his fore-knowledge. And indeed,
why anything of hazard and danger should be put upon
such frail creatures as we are, may well be thought a diffi-
culty in speculation, and cannot but be so till we know
the whole, or, however, much more of the case. But
still the constitution of nature is as it is. Our happi-
ness and misery are trusted to our conduct, and made to
depend upon it. Somewhat, and, in many circumstances,
a great deal too, is put upon us, either to do, or to suffer,
as we choose. And all the various miseries of life, which
people bring upon themselves by negligence and folly, and
might have avoided by proper care, are instances of this,
62 The Analogy of Religion
which miseries are beforehand just as contingent and
undetermined as their conduct, and left to be determined
by it
These observations are an answer to the objections
against the credibility of a state of trial, as implying
temptations, and real danger of miscarrying with regard
to our general interest, under the moral government of
God ; and they show, that, if we are at all to be con-
sidered in such a capacity and as having such an in-
terest, the general analogy of Providence must lead us to
apprehend ourselves in danger of miscarrying, in different
degrees, as to this interest, by our neglecting to act the
proper part belonging to us in that capacity. For we
have a present interest under the government of God,
which we experience here upon earth. And this interest,
as it is not forced upon us, so neither is it offered to our
acceptance, but to our acquisition ; in such sort, as that
we are in danger of missing it, by means of temptations
to neglect or act contrary to it, and without attention and
self-denial must and do miss of it. It is then perfectly
credible that this may be our case with respect to that
chief and final good which Religion proposes to us.
CHAPTER V
OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR
MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT
FROM the consideration of our being in a probation-
state of so much difficulty and hazard, naturally arises
the question, how we came to be placed in it ? But such
a general inquiry as this would be found involved in
insuperable difficulties. For though some of these
difficulties would be lessened by observing that all
wickedness is voluntary, as is implied in its very notion,
and that many of the miseries of life have apparent good
effects, yet when we consider other circumstances be-
longing to both, and what must be the consequence of
the former in a life to come, it cannot but be acknow-
Of a State of Probation 63
ledged plain folly and presumption to pretend to give an
account of the whole reasons of this matter ; the whole
reasons of our being allotted a condition out of which
so much wickedness and misery, so circumstanced,
would in fact arise. Whether it be not beyond our
faculties, not only to find out, but even to understand,
the whole account of this, or, though we should be sup-
posed capable of understanding it, yet, whether it would
be of service or prejudice to us to be informed of it, is
impossible to say. But as our present condition can in
no wise be shown inconsistent with the perfect moral
government of God, so Religion teaches us we were
placed in it that we might qualify ourselves, by the prac-
tice of virtue, for another state which is to follow it.
And this, though but a partial answer, a very partial one
indeed, to the inquiry now mentioned, yet is a more
satisfactory answer to another, which is of real, and of
the utmost importance to us to have answered : the in-
quiry, What is our business here ? The known end, then,
why we are placed in a state of so much affliction,
hazard, and difficulty, is, our improvement in virtue and
piety, as the requisite qualification for a future state of
security and happiness.
Now the beginning of life, considered as an education
for mature age in the present world, appears plainly, at
first sight, analogous to this our trial for a future one, the
former being in our temporal capacity what the latter is
in our religious capacity. But some observations com-
mon to both of them, and a more distinct consideration
of each, will more distinctly show the extent and force
of the analogy between them ; and the credibility which
arises from hence, as well as from the nature of the thing,
that the present life was intended to be a state of disci-
pline for a future one.
I. Every species of creatures is, we see, designed for
a particular way of life, to which the nature, the capaci-
ties, temper, and qualifications of each species, are as
necessary as their external circumstances. Both come
into the notion of such state or particular way of life,
and are constituent parts of it. Change a man's capaci-
64 The Analogy of Religion
ties or character to the degree in which it is conceivable
they may be changed, and he would be altogether in-
capable of a human course of life, and human happi-
ness ; as incapable as if, his nature continuing unchanged,
he were placed in a world where he had no sphere of
action, nor any objects to answer his appetites, passions,
and affections of any sort. One thing is set over against
another, as an ancient writer expresses it. Our nature
corresponds to our external condition. Without this
correspondence there would be no possibility of any
such thing as human life and human happiness, which
life and happiness, are, therefore, a result from our nature
and condition jointly ; meaning by human life, not living
in the literal sense, but the whole complex notion com-
monly understood by those words. So that, without
determining what will be the employment and happiness,
the particular life, of good men hereafter, there must be
some determinate capacities, some necessary character
and qualifications, without which persons cannot but be
utterly incapable of it ; in like manner, as there must be
some, without which men would be incapable of their
present state of life. Now,
II. The constitution of human creatures, and indeed
of all creatures which come under our notice, is such,
as that they are capable of naturally becoming qualified
for states of life for which they were once wholly un-
qualified. In imagination we may indeed conceive of
creatures, as incapable of having any of their faculties
naturally enlarged, or as being unable naturally to acquire
any new qualifications; but the faculties of every species
known to us are made for enlargement, for acquirements
of experience and habits. We find ourselves in par-
ticular endued with capacities, not only of perceiving
ideas, and of knowledge or perceiving truth, but also of
storing up our ideas and knowledge by memory. We
are capable, not only of acting, and of having different
momentary impressions made upon us, but of getting
a new facility in any kind of action, and of settled
alterations in our temper or character. The power of
the two last is the power of habits. But neither the
Of a State of Probation 65
perception of ideas, nor knowledge of any sort, are
habits, though absolutely necessary to the forming of
them. However, apprehension, reason, memory, which
are the capacities of acquiring knowledge, are greatly
improved by exercise. Whether the word habit is ap-
plicable to all these improvements, and in particular
how far the powers of memory and of habits may be
powers of the same nature, I shall not inquire. But
that perceptions come into our minds readily and of
course, by means of their having been there before,
seems a thing of the same sort as readiness in any par-
ticular kind of action, proceeding from being accustomed
to it. And aptness to recollect practical observations
of service in our conduct, is plainly habit in many cases.
There are habits of perception and habits of action.
An instance of the former is our constant and even in-
voluntary readiness, in correcting the impressions of our
sight concerning magnitudes and distances, so as to sub-
stitute judgment in the room of sensation imperceptibly
to ourselves. And it seems as if all other associations
of ideas not naturally connected might be called passive
habits; as properly as our readiness in understanding
languages upon sight, or hearing of words. And our
readiness in speaking and writing them is an instance
of the latter, of active habits. For distinctness, we may
consider habits as belonging to the body or the mind,
and the latter will be explained by the former. Under
the former are comprehended all bodily activities or
motions, whether graceful or unbecoming, which are
owing to use ; under the latter, general habits of life and
conduct, such as those of obedience and submission to
authority, or to any particular person ; those of veracity,
justice, and charity ; those of attention, industry, self-
government, envy, revenge. And habits of this latter
kind seem produced by repeated acts, as well as the
former. And in like manner as habits belonging to the
body are produced by external acts, so habits of the mind
are produced by the exertion of inward practical princi-
ples, i.e., by carrying them into act, or acting upon them;
the principles of obedience, of veracity, justice, and
G 9
66 The Analogy of Religion
charity. Nor can those habits be formed by any ex-
ternal course of action, otherwise than as it proceeds
from these principles ; because it is only these inward
principles exerted, which are strictly acts of obedience,
of veracity, of justice, and of charity. So likewise
habits of attention, industry, self-government, are in
the same manner acquired by exercise ; and habits of
envy and revenge by indulgence, whether in outward
act, or in thought and intention, i.e., inward act, for
such intention is an act. Resolutions also to do well
are properly acts. And endeavouring to enforce upon
our own minds a practical sense of virtue, or to beget
in others that practical sense of it which a man really
has himself, is a virtuous act. All these, therefore, may
and will contribute towards forming good habits. But
going over the theory of virtue in one's thoughts, talking
well, and drawing fine pictures of it, this is so far from
necessarily or certainly conducing to form a habit of it,
in him who thus employs himself, that it may harden the.
mind in a contrary course, and render it gradually more
insensible, i.e., form a habit of insensibility to all moral
considerations. For from our very faculty of habits,
passive impressions, by being repeated, grow weaker.
Thoughts, by often passing through the mind, are felt
less sensibly ; being accustomed to danger begets in-
trepidity, i.e., lessens fear; to distress, lessens the passion
of pity ; to instances of others' mortality, lessens the
sensible apprehension of our own. And from these two
observations together that practical habits are formed
and strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive
impressions grow weaker by being repeated upon us
it must follow that active habits may be gradually form-
ing and strengthening by a course of acting upon such
and such motives and excitements, whilst these motives
and excitements themselves are, by proportionable
degrees, growing less sensible; i.e., are continually less
and less sensibly felt, even as the active habits strengthen.
And experience confirms this ; for active principles, at
the very time that they are less lively in perception than
they were, are found to be, somehow, wrought more
Of a State of Probation 67
thoroughly into the temper and character, and become
more effectual in influencing our practice. The three
things just mentioned may afford instances of it. Per-
ception of danger is a natural excitement of passive
fear and active caution, and by being inured to danger
habits of the latter are gradually wrought, at the same
time that the former gradually lessens. Perception of
distress in others is a natural excitement, passively to
pity, arid actively to relieve it: but let a man set himself
to attend to, inquire out, and relieve distressed persons,
and he cannot but grow less and less sensibly affected
with the various miseries of life with which he must
become acquainted; when yet, at the same time, benevo-
lence, considered not as a passion, but as a practical
principle of action, will strengthen ; and whilst he pas-
sively compassionates the distressed less, he will acquire
a greater aptitude actively to assist and befriend them.
So also at the same time that the daily instances of
men's dying around us give us daily a less sensible pas-
sive feeling or apprehension of our own mortality, such
instances greatly contribute to the strengthening a prac-
tical regard to it in serious men, i.e,, to forming a habit
of acting with a constant view to it. And this seems
again further to show that passive impressions made
upon our minds by admonition, experience, example,
though they may have a remote efficacy, and a very
great one, towards forming active habits, yet can have
this efficacy no otherwise than by inducing us to such
a course of action ; and that it is not being affected so
and so, but acting, which forms those habits ; only it
must be always remembered, that real endeavours to
enforce good impressions upon ourselves are a species
of virtuous action. Nor do we know how far it is pos-
sible, in the nature of things, that effects should be
wrought in us at once, equivalent to habits, /.<?., what
is wrought by use and exercise. However, the thing
insisted upon is, not what may be possible, but what is
in fact the appointment of nature, which is, that active
habits are to be formed by exercise. Their progress
may be so gradual as to be imperceptible in its steps ;
68 The Analogy of Religion
it may be hard to explain the faculty by which we are
capable of habits, throughout its several parts, and to
trace it up to its original, so as to distinguish it from all
others in our mind ; and it seems as if contrary effects
were to be ascribed to it. But the thing in general,
that our nature is formed to yield, in some such manner
as this, to use and exercise, is matter of certain ex-
perience.
Thus by accustoming ourselves to any course of action,
we get an aptness to go on, a facility, readiness, and
often pleasure, in it. The inclinations which rendered
us averse to it grow weaker ; the difficulties in it, not only
the imaginary but the real ones, lessen ; the reasons for
it offer themselves of course to our thoughts upon all
occasions ; and the least glimpse of them is sufficient to
make us go on in a course of action to which we have
been accustomed. And practical principles appear to
grow stronger, absolutely in themselves, by exercise, as
well as relatively, with regard to contrary principles;
which, by being accustomed to submit, do so habitually,
and of course. And thus a new character, in several
respects, may be formed, and many habitudes of life
not given by nature, but which nature directs us to
acquire.
III. Indeed we may be assured, that we should never
have had these capacities of improving by experience,
acquired knowledge, and habits, had they not been neces-
sary, and intended to be made use of. And accordingly
we find them so necessary, and so much intended, that
without them we should be utterly incapable of that
which was the end for which we were made, considered
in our temporal capacity only the employments and
satisfactions of our mature state of life.
Nature does in nowise qualify us wholly, much less at
once, for this mature state of life. Even maturity of
understanding and bodily strength are not only arrived
to gradually, but are also very much owing to the con-
tinued exercise of our powers of body and mind from
infancy. But if we suppose a person brought into the
world with both these in maturity, as far as this is con-
Of a State of Probation 69
ceivable, he would plainly at first be as unqualified for
the human life of mature age as an idiot. He would be
in a manner distracted with astonishment, and apprehen-
sion, and curiosity, and suspense ; nor can one guess
how long it would be before he would be familiarized to
himself and the objects about him enough even to set
himself to anything. It may be questioned, too, whether
the natural information of his sight and hearing would
be of any manner of use at all to him in acting, before
experience. And it seems that men would be strangely
headstrong and self-willed, and disposed to exert them-
selves with an impetuosity which would render society
insupportable, and the living in it impracticable, were
it not for some acquired moderation and self-govern-
ment, some aptitude and readiness in restraining them-
selves, and concealing their sense of things. Want of
everything of this kind which is learnt would render a
man as uncapable of society as want of language would j
or as his natural ignorance of any of the particular em-
ployments of life would render him uncapable of pro-
viding himself with the common conveniences, or
supplying the necessary wants of it. In these respects,
and probably in many more of which we have no
particular notion, mankind is left by nature an unformed,
unfinished creature, utterly deficient and unqualified,
before the acquirement of knowledge, experience, and
habits, for that mature state of life, which was the end
of his creation, considering him as related only to this
world.
But then, as nature has endued us with a power of
supplying those deficiencies, by acquired knowledge,
experience, and habits, so likewise we are placed in a
condition, in infancy, childhood, and youth, fitted for it ;
fitted for our acquiring those qualifications of all sorts,
which we stand in need of in mature age. Hence
children, from their very birth, are daily growing ac-
quainted with the objects about them, with the scene in
which they are placed, and to have a future part ; and
learning somewhat or other, necessary to the performance
of it The subordinations, to which they are accustomed
70 The Analogy of Religion
in domestic life, teach them self-government in common
behaviour abroad, and prepare them for subjection and
obedience to civil authority. What passes before their
eyes, and daily happens to them, gives them experience,
caution against treachery and deceit, together with num-
berless little rules of action and conduct, which we could
not live without, and which are learnt so insensibly and
so perfectly, as to be mistaken perhaps for instinct,
though they are the effect of long experience and
exercise ; as much so as language, jr knowledge in par-
ticular business, or the qualifications and behaviour
belonging to the several ranks and professions. Thus
the beginning of our days is adapted to be, and is, a
state of education in the theory and practice of mature
life. We are much assisted in it by example, instruction,
and the care of others ; but a great deal is left to our-
selves to do. And of this, as part is done easily and of
course, so part requires diligence and care, the voluntary
foregoing many things which we desire, and setting our-
selves to what we should have no inclination to, but for
the necessity or expedience of it. For that labour and
industry, which the station of so many absolutely
requires, they would be greatly unqualified for in
maturity, as those in other stations would be for any
other sorts of application, if both were not accustomed
to them in their youth. And according as persons
behave themselves in the general education which all go
through, and in the particular ones adapted to particular
employments, their character is formed and made
appear ; they recommend themselves more or less ; and
are capable of, and placed in, different stations in the
society of mankind.
The former part of life, then, is to be considered as
an important opportunity which nature puts into our
hands, and which, when lost, is not to be recovered.
And our being placed in a state of discipline throughout
this life, for another world is a providential disposition
of things, exactly of the same kind as our being placed
in a state of discipline during childhood for mature age.
Our condition in both respects is uniform and of a
Of a State of Probation 71
piece, and comprehended under one and the same
general law of nature.
And if we were not able at all to discern how or in
what way the present life could be our preparation for
another, this would be no objection against the credi-
bility of its being so. For we do not discern how food
and sleep contribute to the growth of the body, nor
could have any thought that they would, before we had
experience. Nor do children at all think, on the one
hand, that the sports and exercises, to which they are
so much addicted, contribute to their health and growth,
nor, on the other, of the necessity which there is for
being restrained in them ; nor are they capable of
understanding the use of many parts of discipline,
which nevertheless they must be made to go through, in
order to qualify them for the business of mature age.
Were we not able, then, to discover in what respects the
present life could form us for a future one, yet nothing
would be more supposable than that it might, in some
respects or other, from the general analogy of Provi-
dence. And this, for aught I see, might reasonably be
said even though we should not take in the considera-
tion of God's moral government over the world. But,
IV. Take in this consideration, and consequently,
that the character of virtue and piety is a necessary
qualification for the future state, and then we may
distinctly see how, and in what respects, the present life
may be a preparation for it; since we want, and are
capable of, improvement in that character, by moral and
religious habits ; and the present life is fit to be a state of
discipline for such improvement ; in like manner as we
have already observed how, and in what respects,
infancy, childhood, and youth are a necessary prepara-
tion, and a natural state of discipline, for mature age.
Nothing which we at present see would lead us to the
thought of a solitary unactive state hereafter ; but, if we
judge at all from the analogy of nature, we must sup-
pose, according to the Scripture account of it, that it will
be a community. And there is no shadow of anything
unreasonable in conceiving, though there be no analogy
72 The Analogy of Religion
for it, that this community will be, as the Scripture
represents it, under the more immediate, or, if such an
expression may be used, the more sensible government,
of God. Nor is our ignorance what will be the
employments of this happy community, nor our conse-
quent ignorance what particular scope or occasion there
will be for the exercise of veracity, justice, and charity,
amongst the members of it with regard to each other, any
proof that there will be no sphere of exercise for those
virtues. Much less, if that were possible, is our ignor-
ance any proof that there will be no occasion for that
frame of mind or character which is formed by the daily
practice of those particular virtues here, and which is a
result from it. This, at least, must be owned in general,
that, as the government established in the universe is
moral, the character of virtue and piety must, in some
way or other, be the condition of our happiness or the
qualification for it.
Now from what is above observed, concerning our
natural power of habits, it is easy to see that we are
capable of moral improvement by discipline. And how
greatly we want it need not be proved to any one who is
acquainted with the great wickedness of mankind, or
even with those imperfections which the best are con-
scious of. But it is not perhaps distinctly attended to by
every one, that the occasion which human creatures
have for discipline, to improve in them this character of
virtue and piety, is to be traced up higher than to excess
in the passions, by indulgence and habits of vice.
Mankind, and perhaps all finite creatures, from the very
constitution of their nature, before habits of virtue, are
deficient and in danger of deviating from what is right,
and therefore stand in need of virtuous habits for a
security against this danger. For, together with the
general principle of moral understanding, we have in our
inward frame various affections towards particular ex-
ternal objects. These affections are naturally, and of
right, subject to the government of the moral principle,
as to the occasions upon which they may be gratified ; as
to the times, degrees, and manner, in which the objects
Of a State of Probation 73
of them may be pursued ; but then the principle of
virtue can neither excite them, nor prevent their being
excited. On the contrary, they are naturally felt when
the objects of them are present to the mind, not only
before all consideration whether they can be obtained
by lawful means, but after it is found they cannot. For
the natural objects of affection continue so ; the neces-
saries, conveniences, and pleasures of life, remain natur-
ally desirable, though they cannot be obtained inno-
cently; nay, though they cannot possibly be obtained
at all. And when the objects of any affection whatever
cannot be obtained without unlawful means, but may be
obtained by them, such affection, though its being
excited, and its continuing some time in the mind, be as
innocent as it is natural and necessary, yet cannot but
be conceived to have a tendency to incline persons to
venture upon such unlawful means, and, therefore, must
be conceived as putting them in some danger of it.
Now what is the general security against this danger,
against their actually deviating from right? As the
danger is, so also must the security be, from within
from the practical principle of virtue. 1 And the strength-
ening or improving this principle, considered as practical
or as a principle of action, will lessen the danger or
increase the security against it. And this moral prin-
ciple is capable of improvement by proper discipline and
exercise, by recollecting the practical impressions which
example and experience have made upon us ; and,
instead of following humour and mere inclination, by
1 It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually restrain
creatures_from doing wrong. But if by a sense of interest is meant a specula-
tive conviction or belief, that such and such indulgence would occasion them
greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than satisfaction, it is contrary to present
experience to say that this sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from
thus indulging themselves. And if by a sense of interest is meant a practical
regard to what is upon the whole our happiness, this is not only coincident
with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself.
And it is evident this reasonable self-love wants to be improved, as really as any
uppose,
which is the end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are profligate
men mistaken when they affirm they are wholly governed by interested/less and
self-love, and so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim this principle,
(See p. 58.)
74 The Analogy of Religion
continually attending to the equity and right of the case
in whatever we are engaged, be it in greater or less
matters ; and accustoming ourselves always to act upon
it, as being itself the just and natural motive of action ;
and as this moral course of behaviour must necessarily,
under the divine government, be our final interest.
Thus the principle of virtue, improved into a habit, of
which improvement we are thus capable, will plainly be,
in proportion to the strength of it, a security against the
danger which finite creatures are in, from the very nature
of propension or particular affections. This way of putting
the matter supposes particular affections to remain in a
future state, which it is scarce possible to avoid suppos-
ing. And if they do, we clearly see that acquired habits
of virtue and self-government may be necessary for the
regulation of them ; however, though we were not dis-
tinctly to take in this supposition, but to speak only in
general, the thing really comes to the same. For habits
of virtue thus acquired by discipline are improvement
in virtue ; and improvement in virtue must be advance-
ment in happiness, if the government of the universe
be moral.
From these things we may observe and it will further
show this our natural and original need of being im-
proved by discipline how it comes to pass that
creatures made upright fall, and that those who preserve
their uprightness, by so doing raise themselves to a more
secure state of virtue. To say that the former is
accounted for by the nature of liberty, is to say no
more than that an event's actually happening is ac-
counted for by a mere possibility of its happening.
But it seems distinctly conceivable from the very
nature of particular affections or propensions. For
suppose creatures intended for such a particular state of
life for which such propensions were necessary ; suppose
them endued with such propensions, together with moral
understanding, as well including a practical sense of
virtue as a speculative perception of it, and that all
these several principles, both natural and moral, forming
an inward constitution of mind, were in the most exact
Of a State of Probation 75
proportion possible, i.e., in a proportion the most
exactly adapted to their intended state of life, such
creatures would be made upright or finitely perfect.
Now particular propensions, from their very nature,
must be felt, the objects of them being present, though
they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the allowance
of the moral principle. But if they can be gratified
without its allowance or by contradicting it, then they
must be conceived to have some tendency, in how low
a degree soever, yet some tendency, to induce persons
to such forbidden gratification. This tendency in some
one particular propension may be increased by the
greater frequency of occasions naturally exciting it, than
of occasions exciting others. The least voluntary indul-
gence in forbidden circumstances, though but in thought,
will increase this wrong tendency, and may increase it
further, till, peculiar conjectures perhaps conspiring, it
becomes effect, and danger of deviating from right ends
in actual deviation from it, a danger necessarily arising
from the very nature of propension, and which therefore
could not have been prevented, though it might have
been escaped, or got innocently through. The case
would be as if we were to suppose a straight path
marked out for a person in which such a degree of
attention would keep him steady ; but if he would not
attend in this degree, any one of a thousand objects
catching his eye might lead him out of it. Now it is
impossible to say how much even the first full overt act
of irregularity might disorder the inward constitution,
unsettle the adjustments, and alter the proportions
which formed it, and in which the uprightness of its
make consisted ; but repetition of irregularities would
produce habits. And thus the constitution would be
spoiled, and creatures made upright become corrupt and
depraved in their settled character proportionably to
their repeated irregularities in occasional acts. But, on
the contrary, these creatures might have improved and
raised themselves to a higher and more secure state of
virtue by the contrary behaviour ; by steadily following
the moral principle supposed to be one part of their
76 The Analogy of Religion
nature, and thus withstanding that unavoidable danger
of defection which necessarily arose from propension,
the other part of it. For by thus preserving their
integrity for some time their danger would lessen, since
propensions, by being inured to submit, would do it
more easily and of course ; and their security against
this lessening danger would increase, since the moral
principle would gain additional strength by exercise;
both which things are implied in the notion of virtuous
habits. Thus then vicious indulgence is not only
criminal in itself, but also depraves the inward constitu-
tion and character. And virtuous self-government is
not only right in itself, but also improves the inward
constitution or character, and may improve it to such a
degree, that though we should suppose it impossible for
particular affections to be absolutely coincident with the
moral principle, and consequently should allow that
such creatures as have been above supposed would for
ever remain defectible, yet their danger of actually de-
viating from right may be almost infinitely lessened, and
they fully fortified against what remains of it, if that
may be called danger against which there is an adequate
effectual security. But still this their higher perfection
may continue to consist in habits of virtue formed in a
state of discipline, and this their more complete security
remain to proceed from them. And thus it is plainly
conceivable, that creatures without blemish, as they
came out of the hands of God, may be in danger of
going wrong ; and so may stand in need of the security
of virtuous habits, additional to the moral principle
wrought into their natures by him. That which is the
ground of their danger, or their want of security, may
be considered as a deficiency in them, to which virtuous
habits are the natural supply. And as they are natur-
ally capable of being raised and improved by discipline,
it may be a thing fit and requisite, that they should be
placed in circumstances with an eye to it, in circum-
stances peculiarly fitted to be to them a state of discipline
for their improvement in virtue.
But how much more strongly must this hold with
Of a State of Probation 77
respect to those who have corrupted their natures, are
fallen from their original rectitude, and whose passions
are become excessive by repeated violations of their
inward constitution ! Upright creatures may want to be
improved ; depraved creatures want to be renewed.
Education and discipline, which may be in all degrees
and sorts of gentleness and of severity, are expedient
for those; but must be absolutely necessary for these.
For these, discipline of the severer sort too, and
in the higher degrees of it, must be necessary, in order
to wear out vicious habits; to recover their primi-
tive strength of self-government, which indulgence must
have weakened ; to repair, as well as raise into a habit,
the moral principle, in order to their arriving at a secure
state of virtuous happiness.
Now, whoever will consider the thing may clearly see,
that the present world is peculiarly fit to be a state of
discipline for this purpose, to such as will set themselves
to mend and improve. For, the various temptations
with which we are surrounded; our experience of the
deceits of wickedness ; having been in many instances
led wrong ourselves ; the great viciousness of the world ;
the infinite disorders consequent upon it ; our being made
acquainted with pain and sorrow, either from our own feel-
ing of it, or from the sight of it in others : these things,
though some of them may indeed produce wrong effects
upon our minds, yet, when duly reflected upon, have, all of
them, a direct tendency to bring us to a settled modera-
tion and reasonableness of temper ; the contrary both
to thoughtless levity, and also to that unrestrained self-
will and violent bent to follow present inclination which
may be observed in undisciplined minds. Such experi-
ence as the present state affords of the frailty of our
nature; of the boundless extravagance of ungoverned
passion ; of the power which an infinite Being has over
us, by the various capacities of misery which he has
given us : in short, that kind and degree of experience
which the present state affords us, that the constitution
of nature is such as to admit the possibility, the danger,
and the actual event, of creatures losing their innocence
78 The Analogy of Religion
and happiness, and becoming vicious and wretched, hath
a tendency to give us a practical sense of things very
different from a mere speculative knowledge, that we
are liable to vice, and capable of misery. And who
knows, whether the security of creatures in the highest
and most settled state of perfection may not in part
arise from their having had such a sense of things as
this, formed, and habitually fixed within them, in some
state of probation ? And passing through the present
world with that moral attention which is necessary to the
acting a right part in it may leave everlasting impressions
of this sort upon our minds. But to be a little more
distinct : allurements to what is wrong ; difficulties in
the discharge of our duty ; our not being able to act a
uniform right part without some thought and care ; and
the opportunities which we have, or imagine we have, of
avoiding what we dislike, or obtaining what we desire,
by unlawful means, when we either cannot do it at all,
or at least not so easily, by lawful ones, these things, i.e.,
the snares and temptations of vice, are what render the
present world peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline, to
those who will preserve their integrity, because they
render being upon our guard, resolution, and the denial
of our passions, necessary in order to that end. And
the exercise of such particular recollection, intention of
mind, and self-government, in the practice of virtue, has,
from the make of our nature, a peculiar tendency to
form habits of virtue, as implying, not only a real, but
also a more continued and a more intense exercise of
the virtuous principle, or a more constant and a stronger
effort of virtue exerted into act. Thus, suppose a person
to know himself to be in particular danger, for some
time, of doing anything wrong, which yet he fully resolves
not to do ; continued recollection, and keeping upon his
guard, in order to make good his resolation, is a con-
tinued exerting of that act of virtue in a high degree^
which need have been, and perhaps would have been,
only instantaneous and weak had the temptation been so.
It is indeed ridiculous to assert, that self-denial is essen-
tial to virtue and piety ; but it would have been nearer
Of a State of Probation 79
the truth, though not strictly the truth itself, to have said,
that it is essential to discipline and improvement. For
though actions materially virtuous, which have no sort of
difficulty, but are perfectly agreeable to our particular in-
clinations, may possibly be done only from these particu-
lar inclinations, and so may not be any exercise of the
principle of virtue, i.e., not be virtuous actions at all ;
yet, on the contrary, they may be an exercise of that
principle ; and when they are, they have a tendency to
form and fix the habit of virtue. But when the exercise
of the virtuous principle is more continued, oftener re-
peated, and more intense, as it must be in circumstances
of danger, temptation, and difficulty, of any kind and
in any degree, this tendency is increased proportionably,
and a more confirmed habit is the consequence.
This undoubtedly holds to a certain length ; but how
far it may hold, I know not. Neither our intellectual
powers, nor our bodily strength can be improved beyond
such a degree ; and both may be over-wrought. Possibly
there may be somewhat analogous to this, with respect
to the moral character, which is scarce worth consider-
ing. And I mention it only, lest it should come into
some persons' thoughts, not as an exception to the fore-
going observations, which perhaps it is, but as a confuta-
tion of them, which it is not. And there may be several
other exceptions. Observations of this kind cannot be
supposed to hold minutely and in every case. It is
enough that they hold in general. And these plainly
hold so far, as that from them may be seen distinctly,
which is all that is intended by them that the present
world is peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline for our
improvement in virtue and piety ; in the same sense as
some sciences, by requiring and engaging the attention,
not, to be sure, of such persons as will not, but of such
as will set themselves to them, are fit to form the mind
to habits of attention.
Indeed the present state is so far from proving, in
event, a discipline of virtue to the generality of men,
that, on the contrary, they seem to make it a discipline
of vice. And the viciousness of the world is in different
8o The Analogy of Religion
ways the great temptation which renders it a state of
virtuous discipline, in the degree it is to good men.
The whole end and the whole occasion of mankind's
being placed in such a state as the present, is not pre-
tended to be accounted for. That which appears amidst
the general corruption is, that there are some persons
who, having within them the principle of amendment
and recovery, attend to and follow the notices of virtue
and religion, be they more clear or more obscure, which
are afforded them ; and that the present world is not
only an exercise of virtue in these persons, but an
exercise of it in ways and degrees peculiarly apt to
improve it; apt to improve it, in some respects, even
beyond what would be by the exercise of it required in
a perfectly virtuous society, or in a society of equally
imperfect virtue with themselves. But that the present
world does not actually become a state of moral dis-
cipline to many, even to the generality, i.e., that they do
not improve or grow better in it, cannot be urged as
a proof that it was not intended for moral discipline, by
any who at all observe the analogy of nature. For, of
the numerous seeds of vegetables and bodies of animals,
which are adapted and put in the way to improve to
such a point or state of natural maturity and perfection,
we do not see perhaps that one in a million actually
does. Far the greatest part of them decay before they
are improved to it, and appear to be absolutely destroyed.
Yet no one who does not deny all final causes will deny
that those seeds and bodies which do attain to . that
point of maturity and perfection answer the end for
which they were really designed by nature, and therefore
that nature designed them for such perfection. And
I cannot forbear adding, though it is not to the present
purpose, that the appearance of such an amazing waste
in nature, with respect to these seeds and bodies by
foreign causes, is to us as unaccountable as, what is
much more terrible, the present and future ruin of so
many moral agents by themselves, i.e., by vice.
Against this whole notion of moral discipline, it may
be objected in another way, that so far as a course of
Of a State of Probation 81
behaviour materially virtuous proceeds from hope and
tear, so far it is only a discipline and strengthening of
self-love. But doing what God commands, because he
commands it, is obedience, though it proceeds from
hope or fear. And a course of such obedience will
form habits of it. And a constant regard to veracity,
justice, and charity, may form distinct habits of these
particular virtues, and will certainly form habits of self-
government, and of denying our inclinations whenever
veracity, justice, or charity requires it. Nor is there any
foundation for this great nicety, with which some affect
to distinguish in this case, in order to depreciate all
Religion proceeding from hope or fear. For veracity,
justice, and charity, regard to God's authority and to
our own chief interest, are not only all three coincident,
but each of them is, in itself, a just and natural motive
or principle of action. And he who begins a good life
from any one of them, and perseveres in it, as he is
already in some degree, so he cannot fail of becoming
more and more, of that character which is correspondent
to the constitution of nature as moral, and to the relation
which God stands in to us as moral governor of it ; nor,
consequently, can he fail of obtaining that happiness
which this constitution and relation necessarily suppose
connected with that character.
These several observations, concerning the active
principle of virtue and obedience to God's commands,
are applicable to passive submission or resignation to
his will ; which is another essential part of a right
character connected with the former, and very much in
our power to form ourselves to. It may be imagined,
that nothing but afflictions can give occasion for or
require this virtue ; that it can have no respect to, nor
be any way necessary to qualify for, a state of perfect
happiness ; but it is not experience which can make us
think thus. Prosperity itself, whilst anything supposed
desirable is not ours, begets extravagant and unbounded
thoughts. Imagination is altogether as much a source
of discontent as anything in our external condition. It
is indeed true, that there can be no scope for patience,
H 9
82 The Analogy of Religion
when sorrow shall be no more ; but there may be need
of a temper of mind which shall have been formed by
patience. For though self-love, considered merely as an
active principle leading us to pursue our chief interest,
cannot but be uniformly coincident with the principle of
obedience to God's commands, our interest being rightly
understood ; because this obedience, and the pursuit of
our own chief interest, must be in every case one and
the same thing : yet it may be questioned whether self-
love, considered merely as the desire of our own interest
or happiness, can, from its nature, be thus absolutely
and uniformly coincident with the will of God, any
more than particular affections can ; l coincident in such
sort as not to be liable to be excited upon occasions and
in degrees impossible to be gratified consistently with
the constitution of things or the divine appointments.
So that habits of resignation may, upon this account, be
requisite for all creatures; habits, I say, which signify
what is formed by use. However, in general it is
obvious that both self-love and particular affection in
human creatures, considered only as passive feelings,
distort and rend the mind, and therefore stand in need
of discipline. Now denial of those particular affections,
in a course of active virtue and obedience to God's will,
has a tendency to moderate them, and seems also to
have a tendency to habituate the mind to be easy and
satisfied with that degree of happiness which is allotted
us, *>., to moderate self-love. But the proper discipline
for resignation is affliction. For the right behaviour
under that trial ; recollecting ourselves so as to consider
it in the view in which Religion teaches us to consider
it as from the hand of God ; receiving it as what he
appoints or thinks proper to permit in his world and
under his government; this will habituate the mind to
a dutiful submission. And such submission, together
with the active principle of obedience, make up the
temper and character in us which answers to his
sovereignty, and which absolutely belongs to the con-
dition of our being, as dependent creatures. Nor
1 Page 72
Of a State of Probation 83
can it be said that this is only breaking the mind to
a submission to mere power; for mere power may
be accidental and precarious and usurped : but it is
forming within ourselves the temper of resignation to
his rightful authority, who is by nature supreme over
all.
Upon the whole : such a character and such qualifica-
tions are necessary for a mature state of life in the present
world, as nature alone does in no wise bestow, but has
put it upon us, in great part, to acquire in our progress
from one stage of life to another, from childhood to
mature age ; put it upon us to acquire them, by giving
us capacities of doing it, and by placing us in the be-
ginning of life in a condition fit for it. And this is a
general analogy to our condition in the present world as
in a state of moral discipline for another. It is in vain,
then, to object against the credibility of the present life's
being intended for this purpose, that all the trouble and
the danger unavoidably accompanying such discipline
might have been saved us by our being made at once the
creatures and the characters which we were to be. For
we experience, that what we were to be was to be the
effect of what we would do ; and that the general con-
duct of nature is, not to save us trouble or danger, but
to make us capable of going through them, and to put it
upon us to do so. Acquirements of our own experience
and habits are the natural supply to our deficiencies
and security against our dangers, since it is as plainly
natural to set ourselves to acquire the qualifications, as
the external things, which we stand in need of. In par-
ticular, it is as plainly a general law of nature, that we
should, with regard to our temporal interest, form and
cultivate practical principles within us, by attention, use,
and discipline, as anything whatever is a natural law,
chiefly in the beginning of life, but also throughout the
whole course of it. And the alternative is left to our
choice ; either to improve ourselves, and better our con-
dition, or, in default of such improvement, to remain
deficient and wretched. It is therefore perfectly credible,
from the analogy of nature, that the same may be our
84 The Analogy of Religion
case, with respect to the happiness of a future state, and
the qualifications necessary for it.
There is a third thing which may seem implied in the
present world's being a state of probation ; that it is a
theatre of action for the manifestation of persons' cha-
racters with respect to a future one ; not, to be sure, to
an all-knowing Being, but to his creation, or part of it.
This may, perhaps, be only a consequence of our being
in a state of probation in the other senses. However, it
is not impossible, that men's showing and making mani-
fest what is in their heart, what their real character is,
may have respect to a future life, in ways and manners
which we are not acquainted with ; particularly it may be
a means, for the Author of Nature does not appear to do
anything without means, of their being disposed of
suitably to their characters, and of its being known to
the creation, by way of example, that they are thus dis-
posed of. But not to enter upon any conjectural
account of this, one may just mention, that the manifes-
tation of persons' characters contributes very much, in
various ways, to the carrying on a great part of that
general course of nature, respecting mankind, which
comes under our observation at present. I shall only
add, that probation, in both these senses, as well as in
that treated of in the foregoing chapter, is implied in
moral government ; since by persons' behaviour under it,
their characters cannot but be manifested, and, if they
behave well, improved.
CHAPTER VI
OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, CONSIDERED
AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE
THROUGHOUT the foregoing Treatise it appears, that the
condition of mankind, considered as inhabitants of this
world only, and under the government of God which we
experience, is greatly analogous to our condition, as
designed for another world, or under that farther govern-
ment which Religion teaches us. If, therefore, any
Of the Opinion of Necessity 85
assert, as a Fatalist must, that the opinion of universal
Necessity is reconcilable with the former, there imme-
diately arises a question in the way of analogy, whether
he must not also own it to be reconcilable with the
latter, i.e., with the system of Religion itself and the
proof of it. The reader then will observe that the ques-
tion now before us is not absolute. Whether the opinion
of Fate be reconcilable with Religion ; but hypothetical,
Whether, upon supposition of its being reconcilable
with the constitution of Nature, it be not reconcilable
with Religion also; or, what pretence a Fatalist, not
other persons, but a Fatalist, has to conclude from his
opinion that there can be no such thing as Religion.
And as the puzzle and obscurity, which must unavoidably
arise from arguing upon so absurd a supposition as that
of universal Necessity, will, I fear, easily be seen, it will,
I hope, as easily be excused.
But since it has been all along taken for granted, as a
thing proved, that there is an intelligent Author of
Nature or natural Governor of the world, and since an
objection may be made against the proof of this, from
the opinion of universal Necessity, as it may be supposed
that such Necessity will itself account for the origin and
preservation of all things, it is requisite that this objec-
tion be distinctly answered, or that it be shown, that a
Fatality supposed consistent with what we certainly ex-
perience does not destroy the proof of an intelligent
Author and Governor of Nature, before we proceed to
consider whether it destroys the proof of a moral Gover-
nor of it, or of our being in a state of Religion.
Now, when it is said by a Fatalist, that the whole
constitution of Nature, and the actions of men, that
everything, and every mode and circumstance of every-
thing, is necessary, and could not possibly have been
otherwise ; it is to be observed, that this Necessity does
not exclude deliberation, choice, preference, and acting
from certain principles, and to certain ends, because
all this is matter of undoubted experience acknowledged
by all, and what every man may every moment be con-
scious of. And from hence it follows that Necessity alone
86 The Analogy of Religion
and of itself, is in no sort an account of the constitution of
Nature, and how things came to be and to continue as
they are; but only an account of this circumstance relat-
ing to their origin and continuance, that they could not
have been otherwise than they are and have been. The
assertion that everything is by Necessity of Nature, is
not an answer to the question, Whether the world came
into being as it is by an intelligent Agent forming it
thus, or not, but to quite another question ; Whether it
came into being as it is in that way and manner which
we call necessarily, or in that way and manner which we
call freely. For suppose farther, that one who was a
Fatalist, and one who kept to his natural sense of
things, and believed himself a Free Agent, were dis-
puting together and vindicating their respective opinions,
and they should happen to instance in a house, they
would agree that it was built by an architect. Their
difference concerning Necessity and Freedom would
occasion no difference of judgment concerning this, but
only concerning another matter, whether the architect
built it necessarily or freely. Suppose, then, they
should proceed to inquire concerning the constitution of
Nature, in a lax way of speaking one of them might say
it was by Necessity, and the other by Freedom ; but if
they had any meaning to their words, as the latter must
mean a Free Agent, so the former must at length be
reduced to mean an Agent, whether he would say one or
more, acting by Necessity, for abstract notions can do
nothing. Indeed we ascribe to God a necessary exist-
ence, uncaused by any agent. For we find within
ourselves the idea of infinity, i.e., immensity and
eternity, impossible, even in imagination, to be removed
out of being. We seem to discern intuitively, that there
must, and cannot but be, somewhat external to our-
selves answering this idea or the archetype of it. And
from hence (for this abstract, as much as any other,
implies a concrete) we conclude that there is, and cannot
but be, an infinite and immense eternal Being existing
prior to all design contributing to his existence and
exclusive of it. And from the scantiness of language a
Of the Opinion of Necessity 87
manner of speaking has been introduced ; that Neces-
sity is the foundation, the reason, the account of the
existence of God. But it is not alleged, nor can it be
at all intended, that everything exists as it does by this
kind of Necessity ; a Necessity antecedent in nature to
design ; it cannot, I say, be meant that everything exists
as it does, by this kind of Necessity, upon several
accounts, and particularly because it is admitted that
design in the actions of men contributes to many altera-
tions in nature. For if any deny this, I shall not
pretend to reason with them.
From these things it follows: First, That when a
Fatalist asserts that everything is by Necessity he must
mean by an Agent acting necessarily ; he must, I say,
mean this, for I am very sensible he would not choose
to mean it ; and Secondly, That the Necessity by which
such an Agent is supposed to act, does not exclude
intelligence and design. So that were the system of
Fatality admitted, it would just as much account for the
formation of the world as for the structure of a house,
and no more. Necessity as much requires and supposes
a Necessary Agent, as Freedom requires and supposes a
Free Agent to be the former of the world. And the
appearances of design and of final causes in the constitu-
tion of nature as really prove this acting Agent to be an
intelligent designer, or to act from choice upon the
scheme of Necessity, supposed possible, as upon that of
Freedom.
It appearing thus, that the notion of Necessity does
not destroy the proof that there is an intelligent Author
of Nature and natural Governor of the world, the present
question, which the analogy before mentioned suggests,
and which I think it will answer, is this ; Whether the
opinion of Necessity supposed consistent with possibility,
with the constitution of the world, and the natural
government which we experience exercised over it,
destroys all reasonable ground of belief that we are in
a state of Religion, or * hether that opinion be recon-
cilable with religion, with the system, and the proof
of it.
88 The Analogy of Religion
Suppose, then, a Fatalist to educate any one, from his
youth up, in his own principles that the child should
reason upon them and conclude that since he cannot
possibly behave otherwise than he does, he is not a
subject of blame or commendation, nor can deserve to
be rewarded or punished ; imagine him to eradicate the
very perceptions of blame and commendation out of his
mind by means of this system ; to form his temper and
character and behaviour to it ; and from it to judge of
the treatment he was to expect, say, from reasonable
men upon his coming abroad into the world; as the
Fatalist judges from this system what he is to expect
from the Author of Nature, and with regard to a future
state. I cannot forbear stopping here to ask, whether
any one of common sense would think fit that a child
should be put upon these speculations, and be left to
apply them to practice. And a man has little pretence
to reason who is not sensible that we are all children in
speculations of this kind. However, the child would
doubtless be highly delighted to find himself freed from
the restraints of fear and shame with which his play-
fellows were fettered and embarrassed ; and highly con-
ceited in his superior knowledge, so far beyond his years.
But conceit and vanity would be the least bad part of
the influence which these principles must have, when
thus reasoned and acted upon, during the course of his
education. He must either be allowed to go on and be
the plague of all about him, and himself too, even to his
own destruction : or else correction must be continually
made use of to supply the want of those natural per-
ceptions of blame and commendation which we have
supposed to be removed ; and to give him a practical
impression, of what he had reasoned himself out of the
belief of, that he was in fact an accountable child, and
to be punished for doing what he was forbid. It is there-
fore in reality impossible but that the correction which
he must meet with, in the course of his education, must
convince him that if the scheme he was instructed in
were not false, yet that he reasoned inconclusively upon
it, and somehow or other misapplied it to practice and
Of the Opinion of Necessity 89
common life; as what the Fatalist experiences of the
conduct of Providence at present, ought in all reason
to convince him that this scheme is misapplied when
applied to the subject of Religion. 1 But supposing the
child's temper could remain still formed to the system,
and his expectation of the treatment he was to have in
the world be regulated by it, so as to expect that no
reasonable man would blame or punish him for anything
which he should do, because he could not help doing it;
upon this supposition it is manifest he would, upon his
coming abroad into the world, be insupportable to society,
and the treatment which he would receive from it would
render it so to him; and he could not fail of doing some-
what, very soon, for which he would be delivered over
into the hands of civil justice. And thus, in the end,
he would be convinced of the obligations he was under
to his wise instructor. Or suppose this scheme of Fatality
in any other way applied to practice, such practical ap-
plication of it will be found equally absurd equally
fallacious in a practical sense for instance, that if a
man be destined to live such a time, he shall live to it,
though he take no care of his own preservation; or if
he be destined to die before that time, no care can pre-
vent it ; therefore, all care about preserving one's life is
to be neglected, which is the fallacy instanced in by the
ancients. But now, on the contrary, none of these prac-
tical absurdities can be drawn from reasoning upon the
supposition that we are free, but all such reasoning with
regard to the common affairs of life is justified by ex-
perience. And therefore, though it were admitted that
this opinion of Necessity were speculatively true, yet,
with regard to practice, it is as if it were false, so far as
our experience reaches ; that is, to the whole of our
present life. For the constitution of the present world,
and the condition in which we are actually placed, is as
if we were free. And it may perhaps justly be concluded
that since the whole process of action, through every
step of it, suspense, deliberation, inclining one way,
determining, and at last doing as we determine, is as if
IP. 85.
90 The Analogy of Religion
we were free, therefore we are so. But the thing here
insisted upon is that under the present natural govern-
ment of the world, we find we are treated and dealt
with as if we were free, prior to all consideration whether
we are or not. Were this opinion, therefore, of Necessity
admitted to be ever so true, yet such is in fact our con-
dition and the natural course of things, that whenever
we apply it to life and practice, this application of it
always misleads us, and cannot but mislead us in a most
dreadful manner with regard to our present interest.
And how can people think themselves so very secure,
then, that the same application of the same opinion
may not mislead them also, in some analogous manner,
with respect to a future, a more general, and more im-
portant interest? For Religion being a practical subject,
and the analogy of nature showing us that we have not
faculties to apply this opinion, were it a true one, to
practical subjects, whenever we do apply it to the subject
of Religion, and thence conclude that we are free from
its obligations, it is plain this conclusion cannot be
depended upon. There will still remain just reason to
think, whatever appearances are, that we deceive our-
selves in somewhat of a like manner as when people
fancy they can draw contradictory conclusions from the
idea of infinity.
From these things together, the attentive reader will
see it follows, that if upon supposition of Freedom the
evidence of Religion be conclusive, it remains so, upon
supposition of Necessity, because the notion of Necessity
is not applicable to practical subjects; i.e., with respect
to them, is as if it were not true ; nor does this contain
any reflection upon reason, but only upon what is
unreasonable; for to pretend to act upon reason, in
opposition to practical principles, which the Author of
our Nature gave us to act upon, and to pretend to
apply our reason to subjects, with regard to which our
own short views, and even our experience will show us,
it cannot be depended upon; and such, at best, the
subject of Necessity must be; this is vanity, conceit,
and unreasonableness.
Of the Opinion of Necessity 91
But this is not all. For we find within ourselves a
will, and are conscious of a character. Now, if this
in us be reconcilable with Fate, it is reconcilable with
it, in the Author of Nature. And besides, natural
government and final causes imply a character and a will
in the Governor and Designer ; l a will concerning the
creatures whom he governs. The Author of Nature
then being certainly of some character or other, not-
withstanding Necessity ; it is evident this Necessity is
as reconcilable with the particular character of bene-
volence, veracity, and justice in him which attributes are
the foundation of Religion, as with any other character ;
since we find this Necessity no more hinders men from
being benevolent than cruel ; true, than faithless ; just,
than unjust ; or, if the Fatalist pleases, what we call un-
just. For it is said indeed, that what, upon supposition
of Freedom, would be just punishment, upon supposition
of Necessity becomes manifestly unjust; because it is
punishment inflicted for doing that which persons could
not avoid doing ; as if the Necessity, which is supposed
to destroy the injustice of murder, for instance, would
not also destroy the injustice of punishing it. However,
as little to the purpose as this objection is in itself, it is
very much to the purpose to observe from it how the
notions of justice and injustice remain, even whilst we
endeavour to suppose them removed ; how they force
themselves upon the mind, even whilst we are making
suppositions destructive of them; for there is not,
perhaps, a man in the world but would be ready to
make this objection at first thought.
But though it is most evident that universal Necessity,
if it be reconcilable with anything, is reconcilable with
that character in the Author of Nature which is the
foundation of Religion; "Yet, does it not plainly
destroy the proof that he is of that character, and con-
sequently the proof of Religion ? " By no means. For
we find that happiness and misery are not our fate in any
1 By will and character is meant that which, in speaking of men, w
should express, not only by these words, but also by the words temper, tastt,
diifositiont, practical principles; that whole framt of mind from whence
we act in one manner rather than another.
92 The Analogy of Religion
such sense as not to be the consequences of our be-
haviour ; but that they are the consequences of it. 1 We
find God exercises the same kind of government over
us, with that which a father exercises over his children,
and a civil magistrate over his subjects. Now, whatever
becomes of abstract questions concerning Liberty and
Necessity, it evidently appears to us that veracity and
justice must be the natural rule and measure of exercis-
ing this authority or government to a Being who can
have no competitions or interfering of interests with his
creatures and his subjects.
But as the doctine of Liberty, though we experience
its truth, may be perplexed with difficulties which run up
into the most abstruse of all speculations, and as the
opinion of Necessity seems to be the very basis upon
which infidelity grounds itself, it may be of some use to
offer a more particular proof of the obligations of Reli-
gion, which may distinctly be shown not to be destroyed
by this opinion.
The proof from final causes of an intelligent Author
of Nature is not affected by the opinion of Necessity,
supposing Necessity a thing possible in itself and recon-
cilable with the constitution of things. 3 And it is a
matter of fact, independent on this or any other specu-
lation, that he governs the world by the method of
rewards and punishments ; 8 and also that he hath given
us a moral faculty by which we distinguish between
actions, and approve some as virtuous and of good
desert, and disapprove others as vicious and of ill
desert.* Now this moral discernment implies in the
notion of it a rule of action, and a rule of a very
peculiar kind ; for it carries in it authority and a right
of direction, authority in such a sense as that we cannot
depart from it without being self-condemned. 6 And
that the dictates of this moral faculty, which are by
nature a rule to us, are moreover the laws of God laws
in a sense including sanctions may be thus proved.
Consciousness of a rule or guide of action in creatures
l Ch. ii. P. 85, etc. Ch. ii. * Dissert. II
' Scrm. II. at the Rolls.
Of the Opinion of Necessity 93
who are capable of considering it as given them by their
Maker, not only raises immediately a sense of duty, but
also a sense of security in following it, and of danger in
deviating from it. A direction of the Author of Nature,
given to creatures capable of looking upon it as such, is
plainly a command from him ; and a command from him
necessarily includes in it, at least, an implicit promise in
case of obedience, or threatening in case of disobedence.
But then the sense or perception of good and ill desert, 1
which is contained in the moral discernment, renders
the sanction explicit, and makes it appear, as one may say,
expressed. For since his method of government is to
reward and punish actions, his having annexed to some
actions an inseparable sense of good desert, and to
others of ill, this surely amounts to declaring upon whom
his punishments shall be inflicted, and his rewards be
bestowed; for he must have given us this discernment
and sense of things as a presentiment of what is to be
hereafter ; that is, by way of information beforehand,
what we are finally to expect in this world. There is
then most evident ground to think, that the government
of God, upon the whole, will be found to correspond to
the nature which he has given us ; and that, in the up-
shot and issue of things, happiness and misery shall, in
fact and event, be made to follow virtue and vice respect-
ively, as he has already in so peculiar a manner associated
the ideas of them in our minds ; and from hence might
easily be deduced the obligations of religious worship,
were it only to be considered as a means of preserving
upon our minds a sense of this moral government of
God, and securing our obedience to it, which yet is
an extremely imperfect view of that most important
duty.
Now, I say, no objection from Necessity can lie against
this general proof of Religion ? None against the pro-
position reasoned upon that we have such a moral
faculty and discernment, because this is a mere matter
of fact, a thing of experience, that human kind is thus
constituted; none against the conclusion, because it
1 Dissert. II.
94 The Analogy of Religion
is immediate and wholly from this fact. For the con-
clusion, that God will finally reward the righteous and
punish the wicked, is not here drawn from its appearing
to us fit l that he sfould, but from its appearing that he
has told us he will. And this he hath certainly told us,
in the promise and threatening which it hath been
observed the notion of a command implies, and the
sense of good and ill desert which he has given us more
distinctly expresses. And this reasoning from fact is
confirmed, and in some degree even verified, by other
facts, by the natural tendencies of virtue and of vice ; *
and by this, that God, in the natural course of his
providence, punishes vicious actions as mischievous to
society, and also vicious actions as such in the strictest
sense; 8 so that the general proof of Religion is un-
answerably real, even upon the wild supposition which
we are arguing upon.
It must likewise be observed further, that natural
Religion hath, besides this, an external evidence, which
the doctrine of Necessity, if it could be true, would not
affect. For suppose a person, by the observations and
reasoning above, or by any other, convinced of the truth
of Religion, that there is a God who made the world,
who is the moral Governor and Judge of mankind, and
will upon the whole deal with every one according to
his works ; I say, suppose a person convinced of this by
reason, but to know nothing at all of antiquity, or the
present state of mankind, it would be natural for such
a one to be inquisitive what was the history of this
1 However, I am hi from intending to deny that the will of God is de-
termined by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case ; though one chooses
to decline matters of such abstract speculation, and to speak with caution when
one does speak of them. But if it be intelligible to say, that it is jit and
reasonable for every one to consult his own happiness, tbenjttness of action, or
the right and reason of the case, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And
it seems as inconceivable to suppose God to approve one course of action,
or one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from design
implies that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in that end to be the
ground of the preference, as to suppose him to discern an abstract proposition
to be true, without supposing somewhat prior in it to be the ground of the dis-
cernment. It doth not therefore appear that moral right is any more relative to
perception than abstract truth is, or that it is any more improper to speak of the
fitness and rightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things,
than to speak of abstract truth as thus founded.
P- 44- P. 37, &C.
Of the Opinion of Necessity 95
system of doctrine, at what time, and in what manner,
it came first into the world, and whether it were believed
by any considerable part of it. And were he upon
inquiry to find that a particular person, in a late age, first
of all proposed it, as a deduction of reason, and that
mankind were before wholly ignorant of it ; then, though
its evidence from reason would remain, there would be
no additional probability of its truth from the account
of its discovery. But instead of this being the fact of
the case, on the contrary, he would find what could not
but afford him a very strong confirmation of its truth :
First. That somewhat of this system, with more or
fewer additions and alterations, hath been professed in
all ages and countries, of which we have any certain
information relating to this matter. Secondly. That it
is certain historical fact, so far as we can trace things up,
that this whole system of belief, that there is one God,
the Creator and moral Governor of the world, and that
mankind is in a state of Religion, was received in the
first ages. And Thirdly. That as there is no hint or
intimation in history, that this system was first reasoned
out ; so there is express historical or traditional evidence,
as ancient as history, that it was taught first by revela-
tion. Now these things must be allowed to be of great
weight. The first of them, general consent, shows this
system to be conformable to the common sense of man-
kind. The second, namely, that Religion was believed
in the first ages of the world, especially as it does not
appear that there were then any superstitious or false
additions to it, cannot but be a further confirmation of
its truth. For it is a proof of this alternative; either
that it came into the world by revelation, or that it is
natural, obvious, and forces itself upon the mind. The
former of these is the conclusion of learned men ; and
whoever will consider how unapt for speculation rude
and uncultivated minds are, will, perhaps from hence
alone, be strongly inclined to believe it the truth. And
as it is shown in the Second Part * of this Treatise that
there is nothing of such peculiar presumption against
Ch.il
96 The Analogy of Religion
a revelation in the beginning of the world, as there is
supposed to be against subsequent ones ; a sceptic could
not, I think, give any account which would appear more
probable even to himself of the early pretences to
revelation, than by supposing some real original one
from whence they were copied. And the third thing
above mentioned, that there is express historical or
traditional evidence as ancient as history of the system
of Religion being taught mankind by revelation ; this
must be admitted as some degree of real proof that it
was so taught ; for why should not the most ancient
tradition be admitted as some additional proof of a fact,
against which there is no presumption ? And this proof
is mentioned here, because it has its weight to show,
that Religion came into the world by revelation, prior to
all consideration of the proper authority of any book
supposed to contain it, and even prior to all considera-
tion whether the revelation itself be uncorruptly handed
down and related, or mixed and darkened with fables.
Thus the historical account, which we have of the origin
of Religion, taking in all circumstances, is a real con-
firmation of its truth, no way affected by the opinion of
Necessity. And the external evidence, even of natural
Religion, is by no means inconsiderable.
But it is carefully to be observed, and ought to be re-
collected after all proofs of virtue and religion, which are
only general, that as speculative reason may be neglected,
prejudiced, and deceived, so also may our moral under-
standing be impaired and perverted, and the dictates of
it not impartially attended to. This indeed proves
nothing against the reality of our speculative or practical
faculties of perception, against their being intended by
nature to inform us in the theory of things, and instruct
us how we are to behave, and what we are to expect in
consequence of our behaviour. Yet our liableness in the
degree we are liable to prejudice and perversion, is a most
serious admonition to us to be upon our guard with
respect to what is of such consequence as our determina-
tions concerning virtue and religion, and particularly not
to take custom, and fashion, and slight notions of honour,
Of the Opinion of Necessity 97
or imaginations of present ease, use, and convenience to
mankind, for the only moral rule. 1
The foregoing observations drawn from the nature of
the thing and the history of Religion, amount, when
taken together, to a real practical proof of it not to be
confuted ; such a proof as, considering the infinite im-
portance of the thing, I apprehend would be admitted
fully sufficient in reason to influence the actions of men
who act upon thought and reflection, if it were admitted
that there is no proof of the contrary. But it may be
said, " There are many probabilities which cannot indeed
be confuted, i.e., shown to be no probabilities, and yet
may be overbalanced by greater probabilities on the
other side ; much more by demonstration. And there
is no occasion to object against particular arguments
alleged for an opinion when the opinion itself may be
clearly shown to be false, without meddling with such
arguments at all, but leaving them just as they are. 2
Now the method of government by rewards and punish-
ments, and especially rewarding and punishing good and
ill desert as such respectively, must go upon supposition,
that we are Free and not Necessary Agents. And it is
incredible that the Author of Nature should govern us
upon a supposition as true which he knows to be false,
and therefore absurd to think he will reward or punish us
for our actions hereafter, especially that he will do it
under the notion that they are of good or ill desert."
Here then the matter is brought to a point. And the
answer to all this is full, and not to be evaded ; that the
whole constitution and course of things, the whole
analogy of providence shows beyond possibility of doubt,
that the conclusion from this reasoning is false, wherever
the fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom indeed
clearly shows where, in supposing ourselves Necessary,
when in truth we are Free Agents. But upon the sup-
position of Necessity, the fallacy lies in taking for
granted that it is incredible Necessary Agents should
be rewarded and punished. But that somehow or other
the conclusion now mentioned is false, is most certain.
Dissert. II. * See Author's Introduction.
98 The Analogy of Religion
For it is fact that God does govern even brute creatures
by the method of rewards and punishments, in the
natural course of things. And men are rewarded and
punished for their actions, punished for actions mis-
chievous to society as being so, punished for vicious
actions as such, by the natural instrumentality of each
other under the present conduct of Providence. Nay,
even the affection of gratitude, and the passion of resent-
ment, and the rewards and punishments following from
them, which in general are to be considered as natural,
i.e., from the Author of Nature : these rewards and
punishments being naturally 1 annexed to actions con-
sidered as implying good intention and good desert, ill
intention and ill desert these natural rewards and
punishments, I say, are as much a contradiction to the
conclusion above, and show its falsehood, as a more
exact and complete rewarding and punishing of good
and ill desert as such. So that if it be incredible that
Necessary Agents should be thus rewarded and punished,
then men are not necessary but free, since it is matter of
fact that they are thus rewarded and punished. But if
on the contrary, which is the supposition we have been
arguing upon, it be insisted that men are Necessary
Agents ; then there is nothing incredible in the further
supposition of Necessary Agents being thus rewarded
and punished, since we ourselves are thus dealt with.
From the whole, therefore, it must follow that a
Necessity supposed possible, and reconcilable with the
constitution of things, does in no sort prove that the
Author of Nature will not, nor destroy the proof that he
will, finally and upon the whole, in his eternal govern-
ment, render his creatures happy or miserable, by some
means or other, as they behave well or ill. Or, to ex-
press this conclusion in words conformable to the title
of the chapter, the analogy of nature shows us that the
opinion of Necessity, considered as practical, is false.
And if Necessity, upon the supposition above men-
tioned, doth not destroy the proof of natural Religion, it
evidently makes no alteration in the proof of revealed.
Serm. viii. at the R oils.
Of the Government of God 99
From these things, likewise, we may learn in what
sense to understand that general assertion, that the
opinion of Necessity is essentially destructive of all
religion. First, in a practical sense, that by this notion
atheistical men pretend to satisfy and encourage them-
selves in vice, and justify to others their disregard to all
religion. And secondly, in the strictest sense, that it is
a contradiction to the whole constitution of nature, and
to what we may every moment experience in ourselves,
and so overturns everything. But by no means is this
assertion to be understood as if Necessity, supposing it
could possibly be reconciled with the constitution of
things and with what we experience, were not also re-
concilable with Religion, for upon this supposition it
demonstrably is so.
CHAPTER VII
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, CONSIDERED
AS A SCHEME OR CONSTITUTION,
IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED
THOUGH it be, as it cannot but be, acknowledged that
the analogy of nature gives a strong credibility to the
general doctrine of Religion, and to the several particu-
lar things contained in it considered as so many matters
of fact ; and likewise that it shows this credibility not
to be destroyed by any notions of Necessity : yet still
objections may be insisted upon against the wisdom,
equity, and goodness of the divine government implied
in the notion of Religion, and against the method by
which this government is conducted ; to which objec-
tions analogy can be no direct answer. For the
credibility or the certain truth of a matter of fact does
not immediately prove anything concerning the wisdom
or goodness of it ; and analogy can do no more,
immediately or directly, than show such and such things
to be true or credible considered only as matters of fact
But still, if, upon supposition of a moral constitution of
nature and a moral government over it, analogy sug-
ioo The Analogy of Religion
gests and makes it credible that this government must
be a scheme, system, or constitution of government,
as distinguished from a number of single unconnected
acts of distributive justice and goodness, and likewise
that it must be a scheme, so imperfectly comprehended,
and of such a sort in other respects, as to afford a direct
general answer to all objections against the justice and
goodness of it ; then analogy is remotely of great ser-
vice in answering those objections, both by suggesting
the answer and showing it to be a credible one.
Now, this upon inquiry, will be found to be the case.
For, First) Upon supposition that God exercises a moral
government over the world, the analogy of his natural
government suggests and makes it credible that his
moral government must be a scheme quite beyond our
comprehension ; and this affords a general answer to all
objections against the justice and goodness of it. And,
Secondly p , A more distinct observation of some particular
things contained in God's scheme of natural govern-
ment, the like things being supposed, by analogy, to be
contained in his moral government, will further show
how little weight is to be laid upon these objections.
I. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral
government over the world, the analogy of his natural
government suggests and makes it credible that his
moral government must be a scheme quite beyond our
comprehension, and this affords a general answer to all
objections against the justice and goodness of it. It is
most obvious, analogy renders it highly credible, that,
upon supposition of a moral government, it must be a
scheme ; for the world, and the whole natural govern-
ment of it, appears to be so; to be a scheme, sys-
tem, or constitution, whose parts correspond to each
other, and to a whole, as really as any work of art, or
as any particular model of a civil constitution and
government. In this great scheme of the natural world
individuals have various peculiar relations to other in-
dividuals of their own species. And whole species are,
we find, variously related to other species upon this
earth. Nor do we know how much further these kinds
Of the Government of God 101
of relations may extend. And, as there is not any
action or natural event which we are acquainted with
so single and unconnected as not to have a respect
to some other actions and events, so possibly each of
them, when it has not an immediate, may yet have a
remote, natural relation to other actions and events
much beyond the compass of this present world.
There seems indeed nothing from whence we can so
much as make a conjecture whether all creatures,
actions, and events, throughout the whole of nature
have relations to each other. But as it is obvious that
all events have future unknown consequences, so if we
trace any, as far as we can go, into what is connected
with it, we shall find that if such event were not con-
nected with somewhat further in nature unknown to us,
somewhat both past and present, such event could not
possibly have been at all. Nor can we give the whole
account of any one thing whatever ; of all its causes,
ends, and necessary adjuncts, those adjuncts, I mean,
without which it could not have been. By this most
astonishing connection, these reciprocal correspondences
and mutual relations, everything which we see in the
course of nature is actually brought about. And things
seemingly the most insignificant imaginable are perpetu-
ally observed to be necessary conditions to other things
of the greatest importance ; so that any one thing
whatever may, for aught we know to the contrary, be a
necessary condition to any other. The natural world,
then, and natural government of it, being such an in-
comprehensible scheme, so incomprehensible that a
man must, really in the literal sense, know nothing at
all who is not sensible of his ignorance in it; this
immediately suggests and strongly shows the credibility,
that the moral world and government of it may be so
too. Indeed the natural and moral constitution and
government of the world are so connected, as to make
up together but one scheme ; and it is highly probable
that the first is formed and carried on merely in sub-
serviency to the latter, as the vegetable world is for the
animal, and organised bodies for minds. But the thing
IO2 The Analogy of Religion
intended here is, without inquiring how far the adminis-
tration of the natural world is subordinate to that of
the moral, only to observe the credibility that one
should be analogous or similar to the other ; that there-
fore every act of divine justice and goodness may be
supposed to look much beyond itself and its immediate
object, may have some reference to other parts of God's
moral administration, and to a general moral plan ; and
that every circumstance of this his moral government
may be adjusted beforehand with a view to the whole of
it. Thus for example : the determined length of time,
and the degrees and ways in which virtue is to remain
in a state of warfare and discipline, and in which
wickedness is permitted to have its progress ; the times
appointed for the execution of justice, the appointed
instruments of it, the kinds of rewards and punish-
ments, and the manners of their distribution ; all
particular instances of divine justice and goodness, and
every circumstance of them, may have such respects to
each other as to make up altogether a whole, connected
and related in all its parts ; a scheme or system, which
is as properly one as the natural world is, and of the
like kind. And supposing this to be the case, it is
most evident that we are not competent judges of this
scheme from the small parts of it which come within
our view in the present life, and therefore no objections
against any of these parts can be insisted upon by
reasonable men.
This our ignorance, and the consequence here drawn
from it, are universally acknowledged upon other occa-
sions, and though scarce denied, yet are universally
forgot when persons come to argue against Religion.
And it is not perhaps easy, even for the most reasonable
men, always to bear in mind the degree of our ignorance,
and make due allowances for it. Upon these accounts
it may not be useless to go on a little further, in order
to show more distinctly how just an answer our ignor-
ance is to objections against the scheme of Providence.
Suppose, then, a person boldly to assert that the things
complained of, the origin and continuance of evil, might
Of the Government of God 103
easily have been prevented by repeated interpositions ; *
interpositions so guarded and circumstanced as would
preclude all mischief arising from them ; or, if this were
impracticable, that a scheme of government is itself an
imperfection; since more good might have been pro-
duced without any scheme, system, or constitution at
all, by continued single unrelated acts of distributive
justice and goodness, because these would have occa-
sioned no irregularities. And farther than this, it is
presumed, the objections will not be carried. Yet the
answer is obvious ; that were these assertions true, still
the observations above, concerning our ignorance in the
scheme of divine government and the consequence
drawn from it, would hold in great measure, enough to
vindicate Religion against all objections from the dis-
orders of the present state. Were these assertions true,
yet the government of the world might be just and good
notwithstanding; for, at the most, they would infer
nothing more than that it might have been better. But
indeed they are mere arbitrary assertions ; no man being
sufficiently acquainted with the possibilities of things, to
bring any proof of them to the lowest degree of prob-
ability. For however possible what is asserted may
seem, yet many instances may be alleged in things much
less out of our reach, of suppositions absolutely im-
possible and reducible to the most palpable self-contra-
dictions, which not every one by any means would
perceive to be such, nor perhaps any one at first sight
suspect. From these things it is easy to see distinctly
how our ignorance, as it is the common, is really a satis-
factory answer to all objections against the justice and
goodness of Providence. If a man, contemplating any
one providential dispensation which had no relation to
any others, should object, that he discerned in it a
disregard to justice or a deficiency of goodness ; nothing
would be less an answer to such objection than our
ignorance in other parts of providence, or in the possi-
bilities of things no way related to what he was contem-
plating. But when we know not but the parts objected
1 Pp. ioj, 106.
IO4 The Analogy of Religion
against may be relative to other parts unknown to us,
and when we are unacquainted with what is, in the
nature of the thing, practicable in the case before us,
then our ignorance is a satisfactory answer, because
some unknown relation, or some unknown impossibility,
may render what is objected against just and good ; nay,
good in the highest practicable degree.
II. And how little weight is to be laid upon such
objections will further appear by a more distinct obser-
vation of some particular things contained in the
natural government of God, the like to which may be
supposed, from analogy, to be contained in his moral
government.
First. As in the scheme of the natural world, no ends
appear to be accomplished without means, so we find
that means very undesirable often conduce to bring
about ends in such a measure desirable as greatly to
overbalance the disagreeableness of the means ; and in
cases where such means are conducive to such ends, it is
not reason, but experience which shows us that they are
thus conducive. Experience also shows many means to
be conducive and necessary to accomplish ends, which
means, before experience, we should have thought would
have had even a contrary tendency. Now from these
observations relating to the natural scheme of the world,
the moral being supposed analogous to it, arises a great
credibility that the putting our misery in each other's
power to the degree it is, and making men liable to vice
to the degree we are, and in general, that those things
which are objected against the moral scheme of Provi-
dence, may be, upon the whole, friendly and assistant
to virtue, and productive of an overbalance of happiness ;
/.., the things objected against may be means by which
an overbalance of good will, in the end, be found pro-
duced ; and from the same observations, it appears to be
no presumption against this, that we do not, if indeed
we do not, see those means to have any such tendency,
or that they seem to us to have a contrary one. Thus
those things, which we call irregularities, may not be so
at all ; because they may be means of accomplishing wise
Of the Government of God 105
and good ends more considerable ; and it may be added,
as above, that they may also be the only means by which
these wise and good ends are capable of being accom-
plished.
After these observations it may be proper to add, in
order to obviate an absurd and wicked conclusion from
any of them, that though the constitution of our nature
from whence we are capable of vice and misery may, as
it undoubtedly does, contribute to the perfection and
happiness of the world; and though the actual per-
mission of evil may be beneficial to it (i.e., it would
have been more mischievous, not that a wicked person
had himself abstained from his own wickedness, but that
any one had forcibly prevented it, than that it was
permitted) : yet, notwithstanding, it might have been
much better for the world if this very evil had never
been done. Nay, it is most clearly conceivable, that
the very commission of wickedness may be beneficial to
the world, and yet, that it would be infinitely more
beneficial for men to refrain from it. For thus, in the
wise and good constitution of the natural world, there
are disorders which bring their own cures ; diseases
which are themselves remedies. Many a man would
have died, had it not been for the gout or a fever; yet it
would be thought madness to assert that sickness is a
better or more perfect state than health; though the like,
with regard to the moral world, hi a been asserted. But,
Secondly. The natural government of the world is
carried on by general laws. For this there may be wise
and good reasons; the wisest and best, for aught we
know to the contrary. And that there are such reasons
is suggested to our thoughts by the analogy of nature ;
by our being made to experience good ends to be
accomplished, as indeed all the good which we enjoy is
accomplished by this means, that the laws, by which the
world is governed, are general. For we have scarce any
kind of enjoyments, but what we are, in some way or
other, instrumental in procuring ourselves, by acting
in a manner which we foresee likely to procure them ;
now this foresight could not be at all, were not the
io6 The Analogy of Religion
government of the world carried on by general laws.
And though, for aught we know to the contrary, every
single case may be, at length, found to have been pro-
vided for even by these : yet to prevent all irregularities,
or remedy them as they arise, by the wisest and best
general laws, may be impossible in the nature of things ;
as we see it is absolutely impossible in civil government.
But then we are ready to think that the constitution of
nature remaining as it is, and the course of things being
permitted to go on in other respects as it does, there
might be interpositions to prevent irregularities, though
they could not have been prevented or remedied by any
general laws. And there would indeed be reason to
wish, which, by the way, is very different from a right to
claim, that all irregularities were prevented or remedied
by present interpositions, if these interpositions would
have no other effect than this. But it is plain they
would have some visible and immediate bad effects;
for instance, they would encourage idleness and neg-
ligence, and they would render doubtful the natural rule
of life, which is ascertained by this very thing, that the
course of the world is carried on by general laws. And
further, it is certain they would have distant effects, and
very great ones too, by means of the wonderful connec-
tions before mentioned ; l so that we cannot so much as
guess what would be the whole result of the interpositions
desired. It may be said, any bad result might be pre-
vented by further interpositions whenever there was
occasion for them; but this again is talking quite at
random, and in the dark. 2 Upon the whole, then, we
see wise reasons why the course of the world should
be carried on by general laws, and good ends accom-
plished by this means; and, for aught we know, there
may be the wisest reasons for it, and the best ends
accomplished by it. We have no ground to believe
that all irregularities could be remedied as they arise,
or could have been precluded by general laws. We
find that interpositions would produce evil and prevent
good ; and, for aught we know, they would produce
1 P. xoi, 4c. * P. 103.
Of the Government of God 107
greater evil than they would prevent; and prevent
greater good than they would produce. And if this be
the case, then the not interposing is so far from being
a ground of complaint, that it is an instance of good-
ness. This is intelligible and sufficient ; and going
further seems beyond the utmost reach of our faculties.
But it may be said, that "after all, these supposed
impossibilities and relations are what we are unacquainted
with ; and we must judge of Religion, as of other things,
by what we do know, and look upon the rest as nothing ;
or, however, that the answers here given to what is
objected against Religion may equally be made use of
to invalidate the proof of it, since their stress lies so
very much upon our ignorance." But,
First, Though total ignorance in any matter does
indeed equally destroy, or rather preclude, all proof
concerning it, and objections against it, yet partial
ignorance does not. For we may in any degree be
convinced that a person is of such a character, and
consequently will pursue such ends; though we are
greatly ignorant what is the proper way of acting, in
order the most effectually to obtain those ends ; and, in
Lhis case, objections against his manner of acting, as
seemingly not conducive to obtain them, might be
answered by our ignorance ; though the proof that such
ends were intended might not at all be invalidated by it.
Thus the proof of Religion is a proof of the moral
character of God, and consequently that his government
is moral, and that every one upon the whole shall
receive according to his deserts ; a proof that this is the
designed end of his government. But we are not com-
petent judges what is the proper way of acting in order
the most effectually to accomplish this end. 1 Therefore
our ignorance is an answer to objections against the
conduct of Providence, in permitting irregularities, as
seeming contradictory to this end. Now, since it is so
obvious that our ignorance may be a satisfactory answer
to objections against a thing, and yet not affect the
proof of it, till it can be shown, it is frivolous to assert,
1 See Author's Introduction.
io8 The Analogy of Religion
that our ignorance invalidates the proof of Religion, as
it does the objections against it*
Secondly. Suppose unknown impossibilities, and un-
known relations, might justly be urged to invalidate the
proof of Religion, as well as to answer objections against
it ; and that in consequence of this the proof of it were
doubtful : yet still, let the assertion be despised, or let it
be ridiculed, it is undeniably true, that moral obligations
would remain certain, though it were not certain what
would, upon the whole, be the consequences of observ-
ing or violating them. For these obligations arise im-
mediately and necessarily from the judgment of our own
mind, unless perverted, which we cannot violate without
being self-condemned. And they would be certain too,
from considerations of interest. For though it were
doubtful what will be the future consequences of virtue
and vice, yet it is, however, credible, that they may have
those consequences which Religion teaches us they will ;
and this credibility is a certain 1 obligation in point of
prudence to abstain from all wickedness, and to live in
the conscientious practice of all that is good. But,
Thirdly. The answers above given to the objections
against Religion cannot equally be made use of to in-
validate the proof of it. For, upon suspicion that God
exercises a moral government over the world, analogy
does most strongly lead us to conclude that this moral
government must be a scheme, or constitution, beyond
our comprehension. And a thousand particular analogies
show us that parts of such a scheme, from their relation
to other parts, may conduce to accomplish ends which
we should have thought they had no tendency at all to
accomplish, nay, ends, which, before experience, we
should have thought such parts were contradictory to,
and had a tendency to prevent. And therefore all these
analogies show that the way of arguing made use of in
objecting against Religion is delusive ; because they
show it is not at all incredible that, could we compre-
hend the whole, we should find the permission of the
disorders objected against to be consistent with justice
1 See Author's Introduction, and Part ii. chap. ri.
Of the Government of God 109
and goodness, and even to be instances of them. Now
this is not applicable to the proof of Religion, as it is
to the objections against it, 1 and therefore cannot in-
validate that proof, as it does these objections.
Lastly. From the observation now made, it is easy to
see that the answers above given to the objections against
Providence, though, in a general way of speaking, they
may be said to be taken from our ignorance ; yet are by
no means taken merely from that, but from somewhat
which analogy shows us concerning it. For analogy
shows us positively, that our ignorance in the possibilities
of things, and the various relations in nature, renders us
incompetent judges, and leads us to false conclusions,
in cases similar to this, in which we pretend to judge
and to object. So that the things above insisted upon
are not mere suppositions of unknown impossibilities
and relations, but they are suggested to our thoughts,
and even forced upon the observation of serious men,
and rendered credible too, by the analogy of nature.
And therefore to take these things into the account is to
judge by experience and what we do know; and it is
not judging so, to take no notice of them.
1 Serm. at the Rolls,
CONCLUSION
THE observations of the last Chapter lead us to consider
this little scene of human life in which we are so busily
engaged, as having a reference of some sort or other to
a much larger plan of things. Whether we are any way
related to the more distant parts of the boundless uni-
verse into which we are brought, is altogether uncertain.
But it is evident that the course of things which comes
within our view is connected with somewhat past, present,
and future, beyond it. 1 So that we are placed, as one
may speak, in the middle of a scheme, not a fixed but a
progressive one, every way incomprehensible ; incompre-
hensible in a manner equally with respect to what has
been, what now is, and what shall be hereafter. And
this scheme cannot but contain in it somewhat as won-
derful, and as much beyond our thought and conception, 2
as anything in that of Religion. For will any man in
his senses say that it is less difficult to conceive how the
world came to be and to continue as it is without than
with an intelligent Author and Governor of it? or ad-
mitting an intelligent Governor of it, that there is some
other rule of government more natural and of easier
conception than that which we call moral? Indeed,
without an intelligent Author and Governor of Nature,
no account at all can be given how this universe or the
part of it particularly in which we are concerned came to
be, and the course of it to be carried on as it is ; nor any
of its general end and design, without a moral Governor
of it. That there is an intelligent Author of Nature and
natural Governor of the world is a principle gone upon
in the foregoing treatise as proved, and generally known
and confessed to be proved. And the very notion of
an intelligent Author of Nature proved by particular
final causes, implies a will and a character. 3 Now as
1 P. too, &c. See Part ii. cb. ii. P. 91.
110
Conclusion 1 1 1
our whole nature, the nature which he has given us,
leads us to conclude his will and character to be moral,
just, and good; so we can scarce in imagination con-
ceive what it can be otherwise. However, in conse-
quence of this his will and character, whatever it oe,
he formed the universe as it is, and carries on the
course of it as he does rather than in any other manner,
and has assigned to us and to all living creatures a part
and a lot in it. Irrational creatures act this their part,
and enjoy and undergo the pleasures and the pains
allotted them without any reflection. But one would
think it impossible that creatures endued with reason
could avoid reflecting sometimes upon all this, reflecting,
if not from whence we came, yet at least, whither we
are going, and what the mysterious scheme in the midst
of which we find ourselves will at length come out and
produce a scheme in which it is certain we are highly
interested, and in which we may be interested even be-
yond conception; for many things prove it palpably
absurd to conclude that we shall cease to be at death.
Particular analogies do most sensibly show us that there
is nothing to be thought strange in our being to exist in
another state of life. And that we are now living beings
affords a strong probability that we shall continue so;
unless there be some positive ground, and there is none
from reason or analogy, to think death will destroy us.
Were a persuasion of this kind ever so well grounded,
there would surely be little reason to take pleasure in it.
But indeed it can have no other ground than some such
imagination as that of our gross bodies being ourselves,
which is contrary to experience. Experience too most
clearly shows us the folly of concluding from the body
and the living agent affecting each other mutually, that
the dissolution of the former is the destruction of the
latter. And there are remarkable instances of their not
affecting each other, which lead us to a contrary conclu-
sion. The supposition, then, which in all reason we are
to go upon, is that our living nature will continue after
death. And it is infinitely unreasonable to form an
institution of life, or to act upon any other supposition.
H2 The Analogy of Religion
Now all expectation of immortality, whether more or
less certain, opens an unbounded prospect to our hopes
and our fears; since we see the constitution of nature
is such as to admit of misery as well as to be productive
of happiness, and experience ourselves to partake of
both in some degree, and since we cannot but know
what higher degrees of both we are capable of. And
there is no presumption against believing further that
our future interest depends upon our present behaviour ;
for we see our present interest doth, and that the happi-
ness and misery which are naturally annexed to our
actions, very frequently do not follow till long after the
actions are done, to which they are respectively annexed.
So that were speculation to leave us uncertain, whether
it were likely that the Author of Nature in giving happi-
ness and misery to his creatures hath regard to their
actions or not ; yet, since we find by experience that he
hath such regard, the whole sense of things which he
has given us plainly leads us at once and without any
elaborate inquiries to think that it may, indeed must be
to good actions chiefly that he hath annexed happiness,
and to bad actions misery, or that he will upon the
whole reward those who do well, and punish those who
do evil. To confirm this from the constitution of the
world, it has been observed that some sort of moral
government is necessarily implied in that natural govern-
ment of God which we experience ourselves under ; that
good and bad actions at present are naturally rewarded
and punished, not only as beneficial and mischievous to
society, but also as virtuous and vicious ; and that there
is in the very nature of the thing, a tendency to their
being rewarded and punished in a much higher degree
than they are at present. And though this higher degree
of distributive justice which nature thus points out and
leads towards is prevented for a time from taking place, it
is by obstacles which the state of this world unhappily
throws in its way, and which therefore are in their nature
temporary. Now, as these things in the natural conduct
of Providence are observable on the side of virtue, so
there is nothing to be set against them on the side of
Conclusion 113
vice. A moral scheme of government, then, is visibly
established, and in some degree carried into execution ;
and this, together with the essential tendencies of virtue
and vice duly considered, naturally raise in us an appre-
hension that it will be carried on further towards perfec-
tion in a future state, and that every one shall there
receive according to his deserts. And if this be so, then
our future and general interest, under the moral govern-
ment of God, is appointed to depend upon our be-
haviour, notwithstanding the difficulty which this may
occasion of securing it, and the danger of losing it ; just
in the same manner as our temporal interest, under his
natural government, is appointed to depend upon our
behaviour, notwithstanding the like difficulty and danger.
For, from our original constitution, and that of the
world which we inhabit, we are naturally trusted with
ourselves, with our own conduct and our own interest.
And from the same constitution of nature, especially
joined with that course of things which is owing to men,
we have temptations to be unfaithful in this trust; to
forfeit this interest, to neglect it, and run ourselves into
misery and ruin. From these temptations arise the
difficulties of behaving so as to secure our temporal
interest, and the hazard of behaving so as to miscarry in
it. There is therefore nothing incredible in supposing
there may be the like difficulty and hazard with regard
to that chief and final good which Religion lays before
us. Indeed the whole account, how it came to pass that
we were placed in such a condition as this, must be be-
yond our comprehension ; but it is in part accounted for
by what Religion teaches us, that the character of virtue
and piety must be a necessary qualification for a future
state of security and happiness under the moral govern-
ment of God ; in like manner, as some certain qualifica-
tions or other are necessary for every particular condition
of life, under his natural government; and that the present
state was intended to be a school of discipline for im-
proving in ourselves that character. Now this intention
of nature is rendered highly credible by observing
that we are plainly made for improvement of all kinds ;
H4 The Analogy of Religion
that it is a general appointment of Providence that we
cultivate practical principles, and form within ourselves
habits of action in order to become fit for what we were
wholly unfit for before; that, in particular, childhood
and youth is naturally appointed to be a state of disci-
pline for mature age; and that the present world is
peculiarly fitted for a state of moral discipline; and,
whereas objections are urged against the whole notion
of moral government and a probationary state from the
opinion of Necessity, it has been shown that God has
given us the evidence, as it were, of experience, that all
objections against Religion on this head are vain and
delusive. He has also, in his natural government,
suggested an answer to all our short-sighted objections
against the equity and goodness of his moral govern-
ment, and in general he has exemplified to us the latter
by the former.
These things, which, it is to be remembered, are matters
of fact, ought in all common sense to awaken mankind,
to induce them to consider in earnest their condition,
and what they have to do. It is absurd, absurd to the
degree of being ridiculous, if the subject were not of so
serious a kind, for men to think themselves secure in
a vicious life, or even in that immoral thoughtlessness,
which far the greatest part of them are fallen into.
And the credibility of Religion, arising from experience
and facts here considered, is fully sufficient in reason to
engage them to live in the general practice of all virtue
and piety, under the serious apprehension, though it
should be mixed with some doubt, 1 of a righteous
administration established in nature, and a future judg-
ment in consequence of it ; especially when we consider
how very questionable it is whether anything at all can
be gained by vice, 2 how unquestionably little as well as
precarious the pleasures and profits of it are at the best,
and how soon they must be parted with at the longest.
For in the deliberations of reason concerning what we
are to pursue and what to avoid, as temptations to any-
thing from mere passion are supposed out of the case,
1 Part ii. ch. ri. * P. 35.
Conclusion 115
so inducements to vice from cool expectations of plea-
sure and interest so small and uncertain and short are
really so insignificant, as in the view of reason to be
almost nothing in themselves, and in comparison with
the importance of Religion they quite disappear and are
lost. Mere passion indeed may be alleged, though not
as a reason, yet as an excuse for a vicious course of
life. And how sorry an excuse it is will be manifest by
observing that we are placed in a condition in which we
are unavoidably inured to govern our passions by being
necessitated to govern them ; and to lay ourselves under
the same kind of restraints, and as great ones too from
temporal regards, as virtue and piety in the ordinary
course of things require. The plea of ungovernable
passion, then, on the side of vice is the poorest of all
things ; for it is no reason, and but a poor excuse. But
the proper motives to religion are the proper proofs of
it from our moral nature, from the presages of con-
science, and our natural apprehension of God under the
character of a righteous Governor and Judge ; a nature
and conscience and apprehension given us by him, and
from the confirmation of the dictates of reason, by lift
and immortality brought to light by the Gospel ; and the
wrath of God revealed from heaven against all ungodli-
ness and unrighteousness of men.
END OF THE FIRST PART
THE ANALOGY
OF RELIGION
PART TWO
OF REVEALED RELIGION
CHAPTER I
OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY
SOME persons, upon pretence of the sufficiency of the
light of nature, avowedly reject all revelation, as in its
very notion incredible, and what must be fictitious. And
indeed it is certain no revelation would have been given,
had the light of nature been sufficient in such a sense as
to render one not wanting and useless. But no man, in
seriousness and simplicity of mind, can possibly think it
so, who considers the state of Religion in the heathen
world before revelation, and its present state in those
places which have borrowed no light from it ; particu-
larly the doubtfulness of some of the greatest men con-
cerning things of the utmost importance, as well as the
natural inattention and ignorance of mankind in general.
It is impossible to say who would have been able to have
reasoned out that whole system, which we call natural
religion, in its genuine simplicity, clear of supersti-
tion ; but there is certainly no ground to affirm that
the generality could. If they could, there is no sort
of probability that they would. Admitting there were,
they would highly want a standing admonition to remind
them of it, and inculcate it upon them.
And further still, were they as much disposed to attend
to religion as the better sort of men are, yet even upon
this supposition there would be various occasions for
supernatural instruction and assistance, and the greatest
advantages might be afforded by them. So that to say
revelation is a thing superfluous, what there was no need
of, and what can be of no service, is, I think, to talk
quite wildly and at random. Nor would it be more
extravagant to affirm, that mankind is so entirely at ease
in the present state, and life so completely happy, that
it is a contradiction to suppose our condition capable of
being in any respect better.
119
I2O The Analogy of Religion
There are other persons, not to be ranked with these,
who seem to be getting into a way of neglecting and, as
it were, overlooking revelation as of small importance,
provided natural Religion be kept to. With little regard
either to the evidence of the former, or to the objections
against it, and even upon supposition of its truth ; " the
only design of it," say they, "must be, to establish a
belief of the moral system of nature, and to enforce the
practice of natural piety and virtue. The belief and
practice of these things were, perhaps, much promoted
by the first publication of Christianity ; but whether they
are believed and practised, upon the evidence and
motives of nature or of revelation, is no great matter." 1
This way of considering revelation, though it is not the
same with the former, yet borders nearly upon it, and
very much, at length, runs up into it, and requires to be
particularly considered with regard to the persons who
seem to be getting into this way. The consideration of
it will likewise further show the extravagance of the for-
mer opinion, and the truth of the observations in answer
to it just mentioned. And an inquiry into the import-
ince of Christianity cannot be an improper introduction
to a treatise concerning the credibility of it.
Now if God has given a revelation to mankind, and
commanded those things which are commanded in Chris-
tianity, it is evident, at first sight, that it cannot in any
wise be an indifferent matter, whether we obey or dis-
obey those commands; unless we are certainly assured
that we know all the reasons for them, and that all those
reasons are now ceased with regard to mankind in
general, or to ourselves in particular. And it is abso-
lutely impossible we can be assured of this. For our
ignorance of these reasons proves nothing in the case;
since the whole analogy of nature shows, what is indeed
1 Invenis multos propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia quasi sutEciunt
sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid mibi praecepturus
est Cbristus? Ut bene vivam? Jam bene vivo. Quid mihi necessarius est
Christus? Nullum bomicidium, nullum furtum, nullam rapinam facio, res
alienas non concupisco, nullo adulterio contaminor? Nam inveniatur in vita
mea aliquid quod reprehendatur, et qui reprehenderit facial Chrisiianum.
Auf. in Psal. xxxi.
Of the Importance of Christianity 121
in itself evident, that there may be infinite reasons for
things with which we are not acquainted.
But the importance of Christianity will more distinctly
appear by considering it more distinctly : First, as a re-
publication and external institution of natural or essential
Religion, adapted to the present circumstances of man-
kind, and intended to promote natural piety and virtue ;
and Secondly, as containing an account of a dispensation
of things not discoverable by reason, in consequence of
which several distinct precepts are enjoined us. For
though natural Religion is the foundation and principal
part of Christianity, it is not in any sense the whole of it.
I. Christianity is a republication of natural religion.
It instructs mankind in the moral system of the world :
that it is the work of an infinitely perfect Being, and
under his government, that virtue is his law, and that he
will finally judge mankind in righteousness, and render
to all according to their works in a future state; and,
which is very material, it teaches natural Religion in its
genuine simplicity, free from those superstitions with
which it was totally corrupted, and under which it was in
a manner lost.
Revelation is further an authoritative publication of
natural Religion, and so affords the evidence of testi-
mony for the truth of it. Indeed the miracles and pro-
phecies recorded in Scripture were intended to prove a
particular dispensation of Providence, the redemption of
the world by the Messiah ; but this does not hinder but
that they may also prove God's general providence over
the world as our moral Governor and Judge. And they
evidently do prove it, because this character of the
Author of Nature is necessarily connected with and im-
plied in that particular revealed dispensation of things ;
it is likewise continually taught expressly and insisted
upon by those persons who wrought the miracles and
delivered the prophecies. So that indeed natural Reli-
gion seems as much proved by the Scripture revelation
as it would have been had the design of revelation been
nothing else than to prove it.
But it may possibly be disputed how far miracles can
122 The Analogy of Religion
prove natural Religion, and notable objections may be
urged against this proof of it, considered as a matter of
speculation; but considered as a practical thing there
can be none. For suppose a person to teach natural
Religion to a nation who had lived in total ignorance or
forgetfulness of it, and to declare he was commissioned
by God so to do : suppose him, in proof of his commis-
sion, to foretell things future which no human foresight
could have guessed at ; to divide the sea with a word ;
feed great multitudes with bread from heaven ; cure all
manner of diseases ; and raise the dead, even himself, to
life : would not this give additional credibility to his
teaching, a credibility beyond what that of a common
man would have, and be an authoritative publication of
the law of nature, i.e., a new proof of it? It would be
a practical one of the strongest kind, perhaps, which
human creatures are capable of having given them. The
Law of Moses then, and the Gospel of Christ, are author-
itative publications of the religion of nature; they
afford a proof of God's general providence as Governor
of the world, as well as of his particular dispensations of
providence towards sinful creatures revealed in the Law
and the Gospel. As they are the only evidence of the
latter, so they are an additional evidence of the former.
To show this further, let us suppose a man of the
greatest and most improved capacity, who had never
heard of revelation, convinced upon the whole, notwith-
standing the disorders of the world, that it was under
the direction and moral government of an infinitely-
perfect Being ; but ready to question whether he were
not got beyond the reach of his faculties : suppose him,
brought by this suspicion, into great danger of being
carried away by the universal bad example of almost
every one around him, who appeared to have no sense,
no practical sense at least, of these things; and this,
perhaps, would be as advantageous a situation with
regard to Religion, as nature alone ever placed any man
in. What a confirmation now must it be to such a per-
son all at once to find that this moral system of things
was revealed to mankind in the name of that infinite
Of the Importance of Christianity 123
Being whom he had from principles of reason believed
in; and that the publishers of the revelation proved
their commission from him by making it appear that he
had entrusted them with a power of suspending and
changing the general laws of nature.
Nor must it by any means be omitted, for it is a thing
of the utmost importance, that life and immortality are
eminently brought to light by the Gospel. The great
doctrines of a future state, the danger of a course of
wickedness, and the efficacy of repentance, are not only
confirmed in the Gospel, but are taught, especially the
last is, with a degree of light to which that of nature is
but darkness.
Further : As Christianity served these ends and pur-
poses when it was first published by the miraculous
publication itself; so it was intended to serve the same
purposes in future ages by means of the settlement of a
visible church : of a society distinguished from common
ones, and from the rest of the world, by peculiar religious
institutions ; by an instituted method of instruction,
and an instituted form of external Religion. Miraculous
powers were given to the first preachers of Christianity,
in order to their introducing it into the world : a visible
church was established, in order to continue it and carry it
on successively throughout all ages. Had Moses and the
Prophets, Christ and his Apostles, only taught, and by
miracles proved Religion to their contemporaries, the
benefits of their instructions would have reached but to
a small part of mankind. Christianity must have been
in a great degree sunk and forgot in a very few ages. To
prevent this appears to have been one reason why a visi-
ble church was instituted ; to be like a city upon a hill,
a standing memorial to the world of the duty which we
owe our Maker ; to call men continually both by example
and instruction to attend to it, and by the form of Reli-
gion ever before their eyes remind them of the reality ;
to be the repository of the oracles of God ; to hold up
the light of revelation in aid to that of nature, and pro-
pagate it throughout all generations to the end of the
world the light of revelation, considered here in no other
124 The Analogy of Religion
view, than as designed to enforce natural Religion.
And in proportion as Christianity is professed and
taught in the world, Religion, natural or essential
Religion, is thus distinctly and advantageously laid
before mankind, and brought again and again to their
thoughts as a matter of infinite importance. A visible
church has also a further tendency to promote natural
Religion, as being an instituted method of education,
originally intended to be of more peculiar advantage to
those who conform to it. For one end of the institu-
tion was, that by admonition and reproof, as well as
instruction ; by a general regular discipline, and public
exercises of religion, the body of Christ, as the Scrip-
ture speaks, should be edified, i.e., trained up in piety
and virtue for a higher and better state. This settle-
ment, then, appearing thus beneficial, tending in the
nature of the thing to answer, and in some degree
actually answering those ends ; it is to be remembered,
that the very notion of it implies positive institutions,
for the visibility of the church consists in them. Take
away everything of this kind, and you lose the very
notion itself. So that if the things now mentioned are
advantages, the reason and importance of positive
institutions in general is most obvious, since without
them these advantages could not be secured to the
world. And it is mere idle wantonness to insist upon
knowing the reasons why such particular ones were
fixed upon rather than others.
The benefit arising from this supernatural assistance,
which Christianity affords to natural Religion, is what
some persons are very slow in apprehending. And yet
it is a thing distinct in itself, and a very plain obvious
one. For will any in good earnest really say, that the
bulk of mankind in the heathen world were in as advan-
tageous a situation with regard to natural Religion as
they are now amongst us ; that it was laid before them,
and enforced upon them, in a manner as distinct, and
as much tending to influence their practice ?
The objections against all this, from the perversion of
Christianity, and from the supposition of its having had
Of the Importance of Christianity 125
but little good influence, however innocently they may
be proposed, yet cannot be insisted upon as conclusive,
upon any principles but such as lead to downright
Atheism ; because the manifestation of the law of
nature by reason, which, upon all principles of Theism,
must have been from God, has been perverted and
rendered ineffectual in the same manner. It may
indeed, I think, truly be said, that the good effects of
Christianity have not been small ; nor its supposed ill
effects, any effects at all of it, properly speaking. Per-
haps, too, the things themselves done have been aggra-
vated; and if not, Christianity hath been often only a
pretence; and the same evils in the main would have
been done upon some other pretence. However, great
and shocking as the corruptions and abuses of it have
really been, they cannot be insisted upon as arguments
against it, upon principles of Theism. For one cannot
proceed one step in reasoning upon natural Religion,
any more than upon Christianity, without laying it down
as a first principle, that the dispensations of Providence
are not to be judged of by their perversions, but by
their genuine tendencies : not by what they do actually
seem to effect, but by what they would effect if man-
kind did their part that part which is justly put and
left upon them. It is altogether as much the language
of one as of the other : He that is unjust, Ut him be
unjust still: and he that is holy, let him be holy still. 1
The light of reason does not, any more than that of
revelation, force men to submit to its authority : both
admonish them of what they ought to do and avoid,
together with the consequences of each, and after this,
leave them at full liberty to act just as they please till
the appointed time of judgment. Every moment's
experience shows that this is God's general rule of
government.
To return, then : Christianity being a promulgation of
the law of nature ; being moreover an authoritative pro-
mulgation of it, with new light and other circumstances
of peculiar advantage adapted to the wants of mankind ;
1 Rev. xzii. n.
126 The Analogy of Religion
these things fully show its importance. And it is to be
observed further, that as the nature of the case requires,
so all Christians are commanded to contribute, by their
profession of Christianity, to preserve it in the world,
and render it such a promulgation and enforcement of
Religion. For it is the very scheme of the Gospel, that
each Christian should, in his degree, contribute towards
continuing and carrying it on : all by uniting in the
public profession and external practice of Christianity,
some by instructing, by having the oversight and taking
care of this religious community, the Church of God.
Now this further shows the importance of Christianity ;
and, which is what I chiefly intend, its importance in a
practical sense, or the high obligations we are under to
take it into our most serious consideration, and the
danger there must necessarily be, not only in treating it
despitefully, which I am not now speaking of, but in dis-
regarding and neglecting it. For this is neglecting to
do what is expressly enjoined us, for continuing those
benefits to the world, and transmitting them down to
future times. And all this holds, even though the only
thing to be considered in Christianity were its sub-
serviency to natural Religion. But,
II. Christianity is to be considered in a further view ;
as containing an account of a dispensation of things,
not at all discoverable by reason, in consequence of
which several distinct precepts are enjoined us. Chris-
tianity is not only an external institution of natural
Religion, and a new promulgation of God's general
providence, as righteous Governor and Judge of the
world; but it contains also a revelation of a particular
dispensation of Providence, carrying on by his Son and
Spirit for the recovery and salvation of mankind, who
are represented in Scripture to be in a state of ruin.
And in consequence of this revelation being made, we
are commanded to be baptized not only in the name of
the Father > but also of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost;
and other obligations of duty, unknown before, to the
Son and the Holy Ghost, are revealed. Now the im-
portance of these duties may be judged of, by observing
Of the Importance of Christianity 127
that they arise, not from positive command merely, but
also from the offices, which appear, from Scripture, to
belong to those divine persons in the Gospel dispensa-
tion, or from the relations which we are there informed
they stand in to us. By reason is revealed the relation
which God the Father stands in to us. Hence arises
the obligation of duty which we are under to him. In
Scripture are revealed the relations which the Son and
Holy Spirit stand in to us. Hence arise the obligations
of duty which we are under to them. The truth of the
case, as one may speak, in each of these three respects
being admitted ; that God is the governor of the world
upon the evidence of reason ; that Christ is the media-
tor between God and man, and the Holy Ghost our
guide and sanctifier, upon the evidence of revelation:
the truth of the case, I say, in each of these respects
being admitted, it is no more a question why it should
be commanded that we be baptized in the name of the
Son and of the Holy Ghost, than that we be baptized
in the name of the Father. This matter seems to
require to be more fully stated. 1
Let it be remembered, then, that Religion comes under
the twofold consideration of internal and external; for
the latter is as real a part of Religion, of true Religion,
as the former. Now when Religion is considered under
the first notion, as an inward principle, to be exerted in
such and such inward acts of the mind and heart, the
essence of natural Religion may be said to consist in
religious regards to God the Father Almighty ; and the
essence of revealed Religion, as distinguished from
natural, to consist in religious regards to the Son and
to the Holy Ghost. And the obligation we are under,
of paying these religious regards to each of these divine
persons respectively, arises from the respective relations
which they each stand in to us. How these relations
are made known, whether by reason or revelation, makes
no alteration in the case; because the duties arise out
of the relations themselves, not out of the manner in
1 See The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy of the Christian Sacraments,
&c., and Colliber of revealed Religion, as there quoted.
128 The Analogy of Religion
which we are informed of them. The Son and Spirit
have each its proper office in that great dispensation of
Providence, the redemption of the world ; the one our
mediator, the other our sanctifier. Does not, then, the
duty of religious regards to both these divine persons as
immediately arise, to the view of reason, out of the very
nature of these offices and relations, as the inward good-
will and kind intention which we owe to our fellow-
creatures arises out of the common relations between
us and them ? But it will be asked, " What are the in-
ward religious regards, appearing thus obviously due to
the Son and Holy Spirit, as arising, not merely from
command in Scripture, but from the very nature of the
revealed relations, which they stand in to us?" I
answer, the religious regards of reverence, honour, love,
trust, gratitude, fear, hope. In what external manner
this inward worship is to be expressed, is a matter of
pure revealed command; as perhaps the external man-
ner, in which God the Father is to be worshipped may
be more so than we are ready to think ; but the worship,
the internal worship itself, to the Son and Holy Ghost,
is no further matter of pure revealed command, than as
the relations they stand in to us are matter of pure
revelation; for the relations being known, the obliga-
tions to such internal worship are obligations of reason,
arising out of those relations themselves. In short, the
history of the Gospel as immediately shows us the reason
of these obligations, as it shows us the meaning of the
words Son and Holy Ghost.
If this account of the Christian Religion be just,
those persons who can speak lightly of it, as of little
consequence, provided natural Religion be kept to,
plainly forget, that Christianity, even what is peculiarly
so called, as distinguished from natural Religion, has
yet somewhat very important, even of a moral nature.
For the office of our Lord being made known, and the
relation he stands in to us, the obligation of religious
regards to him is plainly moral, as much as charity to
mankind is ; since this obligation arises, before external
command, immediately out of that his office and re-
Of the Importance of Christianity 129
lation itself. Those persons appear to forget, that
revelation is to be considered, as informing us of some-
what new in the state of mankind, and in the govern-
ment of the world; as acquainting us with some relations
we stand in, which could not otherwise have been known.
And these relations being real (though before revelation
we could be under no obligations from them, yet upon
their being revealed), there is no reason to think, but
that neglect of behaving suitably to them will be attended
with the same kind of consequences under God's govern-
ment, as neglecting to behave suitably to any other re-
lations made known to us by reason. And ignorance,
whether unavoidable or voluntary, so far as we can pos-
sibly see, will just as much, and just as little, excuse in
one case as in the other ; the ignorance being supposed
equally unavoidable, or equally voluntary, in both cases.
If therefore Christ be indeed the mediator between
God and man, i.e., if Christianity be true ; if he be in-
deed our Lord, our Saviour, and our God, no one can
say what may follow, not only the obstinate but the care-
less disregard to him in those high relations. Nay, no
one can say what may follow such disregard, even in the
way of natural consequence. 1 For as the natural con-
sequences of vice in this life are doubtless to be con-
sidered as judicial punishments inflicted by God, so
likewise, for aught we know, the judicial punishments
of the future life may be, in a like way or a like sense,
the natural consequence of vice, 2 of men's violating
or disregarding the relations which God has placed them
in here, and made known to them.
Again : If mankind are corrupted and depraved in
their moral character, and so are unfit for that state
which Christ is gone to prepare for his disciples ; and
if the assistance of God's Spirit be necessary to renew
their nature in the degree requisite to their being quali-
fied for that state, all which is implied in the express
though figurative declaration, Except a man be born of
the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God, J
supposing this, is it possible any serious person can think
1 Pp. 20, 21. * Ch. T. * John iii.
L 9
130 The Analogy of Religion
it a slight matter, whether or no he makes use of the
means expressly commanded by God for obtaining this
divine assistance ? especially since the whole analogy
of nature shows, that we are not to expect any benefits
without making use of the appointed means for obtain-
ing or enjoying them. Now reason shows us nothing
of the particular immediate means of obtaining either
temporal or spiritual benefits. This, therefore, we must
learn, either from experience or revelation. And ex-
perience the present case does not admit of.
The conclusion from all this evidently is, that, Chris-
tianity being supposed either true or credible, it is
unspeakable irreverence, and really the most presumptu-
ous rashness, to treat it as a light matter. It can never
justly be esteemed of little consequence, till it be posi-
tively supposed false. Nor do I know a higher and more
important obligation which we are under than that of
examining most seriously into the evidence of it, suppos-
ing its credibility ; and of embracing it upon supposition
of its truth.
The two following deductions may be proper to be
added, in order to illustrate the foregoing observations,
and to prevent their being mistaken.
First. Hence we may clearly see where lies the dis-
tinction between what is positive and what is moral in
Religion. Moral precepts are precepts, the reasons of
which we see ; positive precepts are precepts, the reasons
of which we do not see. 1 Moral duties arise out of the
nature of the case itself, prior to external command.
Positive duties do not arise out of the nature of the case,
but from external command ; nor would they be duties
at all, were it not for such command received from him
whose creatures and subjects we are. But the manner
in which the nature of the case, or the fact of the rela-
tion, is made known, this doth not denominate any duty
1 This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts considered re-
spectively as such. But yet, since the latter have somewhat of a moral nature,
we may see the reason of them considered in this view. Moral and positive
precepts are in some respects alike, in other respects different. So far as they
are like, we discern the reasons of both ; so far as they are different, we discern
the reasons of the former, but not of the latter. See p. 123, &c., and p. 131.
Of the Importance of Christianity 131
either positive or moral. That we be baptized in the
name of the Father is as much a positive duty as that we
be baptized in the name of the Son, because both arise
equally from revealed command; though the relation
which we stand in to God the Father is made known to
us by reason, the relation we stand in to Christ by reve-
lation only. On the other hand, the dispensation of the
Gospel admitted, gratitude as immediately becomes due
to Christ, from his being the voluntary minister of this
dispensation, as it is due to God the Father, from his
being the fountain of all good ; though the first is made
known to us by revelation only, the second by reason.
Hence also we may see, and for distinctness' sake it may
be worth mentioning, that positive institutions come
under a twofold consideration. They are either institu-
tions founded on natural Religion, as baptism in the
name of the Father; though this has also a particular
reference to the Gospel dispensation, for it is in the
name of God, as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ :
or they are external institutions founded on revealed
Religion, as baptism in the name of the Son and of the
Holy Ghost.
Secondly. From the distinction between what is moral
and what is positive in Religion, appears the ground of
that peculiar preference which the Scriptures teaches us
to be due to the former.
The reason of positive institutions in general is very
obvious, though we should not see the reason why such
particular ones are pitched upon rather than others.
Whoever, therefore, instead of cavilling at words, will
attend to the thing itself, may clearly see that positive
institutions in general, as distinguished from this or that
particular one, have the nature of moral commands,
since the reasons of them appear. Thus, for instance,
the external worship of God is a moral duty, though no
particular mode of it be so. Care, then, is to be taken,
when a comparison is made between positive and moral
duties, that they be compared no further than as they
are different ; no further than as the former are positive
or arise out of mere external command, the reasons of
132 The Analogy of Religion
which we are not acquainted with ; and as the latter are
moral, or arise out of the apparent reason of the case,
without such external command. Unless this caution be
observed, we shall run into endless confusion.
Now this being premised, suppose two standing pre-
cepts enjoined by the same authority, that, in certain
conjunctures, it is impossible to obey both; that the
former is moral, i.e., a precept of which we see the
reasons, and that they hold in the particular case before
us ; but that the latter is positive, i.e., a precept of which
we do not see the reasons : it is indisputable that our
obligations are to obey the former, because there is an
apparent reason for this preference, and none against it.
Further, positive institutions I suppose all those which
Christianity enjoins are means to a moral end, and the
end must be acknowledged more excellent than the
means. Nor is observance of these institutions any
religious obedience at all, or of any value, otherwise
than as it proceeds from a moral principle. This seems
to be the strict logical way of stating and determining
this matter ; but will, perhaps, be found less applicable
to practice than may be thought at first sight.
And therefore, in a more practical though more lax
way of consideration, and taking the words moral law
and positive institutions in the popular sense, I add, that
the whole moral law is as much matter of revealed com-
mand as positive institutions are, for the Scripture en-
joins every moral virtue. In this respect, then, they are
both upon a level. But the moral law is, moreover,
written upon our hearts; interwoven into our very
nature. And this is a plain intimation of the Author
of it, which is to be preferred when they interfere.
But there is not altogether so much necessity for the
determination of this question as some persons seem to
think. Nor are we left to reason alone to determine it.
For, first, though mankind have, in all ages been greatly
prone to place their religion in peculiar positive rites, by
way of equivalent for obedience to moral precepts, yet,
without making any comparison at all between them, and
consequently without determining which is to have the
Of the Importance of Christianity 133
preference, the nature of the thing abundantly shows all
notions of that kind to be utterly subversive of true reli-
gion, as they are, moreover, contrary to the whole general
tenor of Scripture; and likewise to the most express
particular declarations of it, that nothing can render us
accepted of God without moral virtue. Secondly \ upon
the occasion of mentioning together positive and moral
duties, the Scripture always puts the stress of Religion
upon the latter, and never upon the former, which,
though no sort of allowance to neglect the former, when
they do not interfere with the latter, yet is a plain in-
timation that when they do, the latter are to be preferred.
And further, as mankind are for placing the stress of
their religion anywhere rather than upon virtue, lest both
the reason of the thing, and the general spirit of Chris-
tianity, appearing in the intimation now mentioned,
should be ineffectual against this prevalent folly, our Lord
himself, from whose command alone the obligation of
positive institutions arises, has taken occasion to make
the comparison between them and moral precepts ; when
the Pharisees censured him for eating with publicans and
sinners, and also when they censured his disciples for
plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath day. Upon this
comparison he has determined expressly, and in form,
which shall have the preference when they interfere.
And by delivering his authoritative determination in a
proverbial manner of expression, he has made it general :
/ will have mercy, and not sacrificed The propriety of
the word proverbial 'is not the thing insisted upon, though
I think the manner of speaking is to be called so. But
that the manner of speaking very remarkably renders
the determination general, is surely indisputable. For
had it, in the latter case, been said only that God pre-
ferred mercy to the rigid observance of the Sabbath,
even then, by parity of reason, most jusffy might we
have argued, that he preferred mercy likewise to the ob-
servance of other ritual institutions, and, in general,
moral duties to positive ones. And thus the determina-
tion would have been general, though its being so were
1 Matt. ix. 13, and xii. 7.
134 The Analogy of Religion
inferred and not expressed. But as the passage really
stands in the Gospel, it is much stronger. For the sense
and the very literal words of our Lord's answer are as
applicable to any other instance of a comparison between
positive and moral duties as to this upon which they
were spoken. And if, in case of competition, mercy is
to be preferred to positive institutions, it will scarce be
thought that justice is to give place to them. It is re-
markable, too, that as the words are a quotation from the
Old Testament, they are introduced, on both the fore-
mentioned occasions, with a declaration that the Phari-
sees did not understand the meaning of them. This, I
say, is very remarkable. For, since it is scarce possible
for the most ignorant person not to understand the literal
sense of the passage in the Prophet, 1 and since under-
standing the literal sense would not have prevented their
condemning the guiltless? it can hardly be doubted that
the thing which our Lord really intended in that declara-
tion was, that the Pharisees had not learned from it, as
they might, wherein the general spirit of Religion con-
sists : that it consists in moral piety and virtue, as
distinguished from forms and ritual observances. How-
ever, it is certain we may learn this from his divine
application of the passage in the Gospel.
But as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human
nature, when upon a comparison of two things one is
found to be of greater importance than the other, to
consider this other as of scarce any importance at all, it
is highly necessary that we remind ourselves, how great
presumption it is to make light of any institutions of
divine appointment; that our obligations to obey all
God's commands whatever are absolute and indis-
pensable ; and that commands merely positive, admitted
to be from him, lay us under a moral obligation to obey
them, an obligation moral in the strictest and most
proper sense.
To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the ac-
count now given of Christianity most strongly shows
and enforces upon us the obligation of searching the
1 Hosea vi. " See Matt. zii. 7.
Against Miracles 135
Scriptures, in order to see what the scheme of revelation
really is, instead of determining beforehand, from reason,
what the scheme of it must be. 1 Indeed, if in Revelation
there be found any passages the seeming meaning of
which is contrary to natural Religion, we may most
certainly conclude such seeming meaning not to be the
real one. But it is not any degree of a presumption
against an interpretation of Scripture, that such inter-
pretation contains a doctrine which the light of nature
cannot discover, 2 or a precept which the law of nature
does not oblige to.
CHAPTER II
OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A
REVELATION, CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS
HAVING shown the importance of the Christian revelation
and the obligations which we are under seriously to
attend to it, upon supposition of its truth or its credi-
bility, the next thing in order, is to consider the supposed
presumptions against revelation in general, which shall
be the subject of this chapter, and the objections against
the Christian in particular, which shall be the subject of
some following ones. 3 For it seems the most natural
method, to remove these prejudices against Christianity,
before we proceed to the consideration of the positive
evidence for it, and the objections against that evidence. 4
It is, I think, commonly supposed that there is some
peculiar presumption, from the analogy of nature, against
the Christian scheme of things, at least against miracles,
so as that stronger evidence is necessary to prove the
truth and reality of them, than would be sufficient to
convince us of other events, or matters of fact. In-
deed the consideration of this supposed presumption
cannot but be thought very insignificant by many persons.
Yet, as it belongs to the subject of this Treatise, so it
may tend to open the mind, and remove some prejudices,
1 See ch. iii. Pp. 119. no. ' Ch. iii. iv. v. ri. * Ch. yii.
136 The Analogy of Religion
however needless the consideration of it be upon its
own account.
I. I find no appearance of a presumption, from the
analogy of nature, against the general scheme of Chris-
tianity, that God created and invisibly governs the world
by Jesus Christ ; and by him also will hereafter judge it
in righteousness, i.e., render to every one according to
his works, and that good men are under the secret in-
fluence of his Spirit. Whether these things are or are
not to be called miraculous, is perhaps only a question
about words ; or, however, is of no moment in the case.
If the analogy of nature raises any presumption against
this general scheme of Christianity, it must be either
because it is not discoverable by reason or experience, or
else because it is unlike that course of nature which is.
But analogy raises no presumption against the truth of
this scheme, upon either of these accounts.
First. There is no presumption, from analogy, against
the truth of it, upon account of its not being discover-
able by reason or experience. For suppose one who
never heard of revelation, of the most improved under-
standing, and acquainted with our whole system of
natural philosophy and natural religion; such a one
could not but be sensible that it was but a very small
part of the natural and moral system of the universe
which he was acquainted with. He could not but be
sensible that there must be innumerable things in the
dispensations of Providence past, in the invisible govern-
ment over the world at present carrying on, and in what
is to come, of which he was wholly ignorant, 1 and which
could not be discovered without revelation. Whether
this scheme of nature be, in the strictest sense, infinite
or not, it is evidently vast, even beyond all possible
imagination. And doubtless that part of it which is
opened to our view is but as a point, in comparison of
the whole plan of Providence, reaching throughout
eternity past and future ; in comparison of what is even
now going on in the remote parts of the boundless
universe; nay, in comparison of the whole scheme of
* Pp. 99, too.
Against Miracles 137
this world. And, therefore, that things lie beyond the
natural reach of our faculties, is no sort of presumption
against the truth and reality of them ; because it is cer-
tain there are innumerable things, in the constitution
and government of the universe, which are thus beyond
the natural reach of our faculties. Secondly, Analogy
raises no presumption against any of the things con-
tained in this general doctrine of Scripture now men-
tioned, upon account of their being unlike the known
course of nature. For there is no presumption at all
from analogy, that the whole course of things, or divine
government, naturally unknown to us, and everything in
it, is like to anything in that which is known, and there-
fore no peculiar presumption against anything in the
former, upon account of its being unlike to anything
in the latter. And in the constitution and natural
government of the world, as well as in the moral govern-
ment of it, we see things in a great degree unlike one
another, and therefore ought not to wonder at such un-
likeness between things visible and invisible. However,
the scheme of Christianity is by no means entirely un-
like the scheme of nature, as will appear in the following
part of this Treatise.
The notion of a miracle, considered as a proof of a
divine mission, has been stated with great exactness by
divines, and is, I think, sufficiently understood by every
one. There are also invisible miracles, the Incarnation
of Christ, for instance, which, being secret, cannot be
alleged as a proof of such a mission, but require them-
selves to be proved by visible miracles. Revelation
itself, too, is miraculous, and miracles are the proof of
it ; and the supposed presumption against these shall
presently be considered. All which I have been ob-
serving here is, that, whether we choose to call every-
thing in the dispensations of Providence, not discoverable
without revelation, nor like the known course of things,
miraculous; and whether the general Christian dispen-
sation now mentioned is to be called so or not ; the
foregoing observations seem certainly to show, that there
is no presumption against it from the analogy of nature.
138 The Analogy of Religion
II. There is no presumption, from analogy, against
some operations which we should now call miraculous,
particularly none against a revelation at the beginning
of the world nothing of such presumption against it
as is supposed to be implied or expressed in the word
miraculous. For a miracle, in its very notion, is relative
to a course of nature, and implies somewhat different
from it, considered as being so. Now, either there was
no course of nature at the time which we are speaking
of, or if there were, we are not acquainted what the
course of nature is, upon the first peopling of worlds.
And therefore the question, whether mankind had a
revelation made to them at that time, is to be considered,
not as a question concerning a miracle, but as a common
question of fact. And we have the like reason, be it
more or less, to admit the report of tradition concerning
this question, and concerning common matters of fact
of the same antiquity ; for instance, what part of the
earth was first peopled.
Or thus : When mankind was first placed in this state,
there was a power exerted, totally different from the
present course of nature. Now, whether this power,
thus wholly different from the present course of nature,
for we cannot properly apply to it the word miraculous ;
whether this power stopped immediately after it had
made man, or went on, and exerted itself further in
giving him a revelation, is a question of the same kind
as whether an ordinary power exerted itself in such a
particular degree and manner, or not.
Or suppose the power exerted in the formation of the
world be considered as miraculous, or rather be called
by that name, the case will not be different, since it must
be acknowledged that such a power was exerted. For
supposing it acknowledged that our Saviour spent some
years in a course of working miracles, there is no more
presumption, worth mentioning, against his having exerted
this miraculous power in a certain degree greater, than
in a certain degree less in one or two more instances,
than in one or two fewer in this, than in another
manner.
Against Miracles 139
It is evident, then, that there can be no peculiar pre-
sumption, from the analogy of nature, against supposing
a revelation, when man was first placed upon earth.
Add, that there does not appear the least intimation
in history or tradition that Religion was first reasoned
out; but the whole of history and tradition makes for
the other side that it came into the world by revelation.
Indeed the state of Religion in the first ages of which
we have any account seems to suppose and imply that
this was the original of it amongst mankind. And
these reflections together, without taking in the peculiar
authority of Scripture, amount to real and a very material
degree of evidence that there was a revelation at the
beginning of the world. Now this, as it is a confirma-
tion of natural Religion, and therefore mentioned in the
former part of this Treatise; 1 so likewise it has a ten-
dency to remove any prejudices against a subsequent
revelation.
III. But still it may be objected, that there is some
peculiar presumption from analogy against miracles ;
particularly against revelation, after the settlement and
during the continuance of a course of nature.
Now with regard to this supposed presumption, it is
to be observed in general, that before we can have
ground for raising what can, with any propriety, be
called an argument from analogy, for or against revela-
tion considered as somewhat miraculous, we must be
acquainted with a similar or parallel case. But the
history of some other world, seemingly in like circum-
stances with our own, is no more than a parallel case \
and therefore nothing short of this can be so. Yet,
could we come at a presumptive proof, for or against a
revelation, from being informed whether such world had
one or not, such a proof, being drawn from one single
instance only, must be infinitely precarious. More par-
ticularly : First of all, there is very strong presumption
against common speculative truths, and against the most
ordinary facts before the proof of them, which yet is
overcome by almost any proof. There is a presumption
1 P. 94, *C.
140 The Analogy of Religion
of millions to one against the story of Caesar, or of any
other man. For suppose a number of common facts so
and so circumstanced, of which one had no kind of
proof, should happen to come into one's thoughts, every
one would, without any possible doubt, conclude them
to be false. And the like may be said of a single com-
mon fact ; and from hence it appears, that the question
of importance, as to the matter before us, is concerning
the degree of the peculiar presumption supposed against
miracles ; not whether there be any peculiar presumption
at all against them. For, if there be the presumption
of millions to one against the most common facts, what
can a small presumption additional to this amount to,
though it be peculiar? It cannot be estimated, and is
as nothing. The only material question is, whether
there be any such presumption against miracles as to
render them in any sort incredible. Secondly. If we
leave out the consideration of Religion, we are in such
total darkness upon what causes, occasions, reasons, or
circumstances, the present course of nature depends,
that there does not appear any improbability for or
against supposing that five or six thousand years may
have given scope for causes, occasions, reasons, or cir-
cumstances, from whence miraculous interpositions may
have arisen; and from this, joined with the foregoing
observation, it will follow, that there must be a presump-
tion, beyond all comparison greater, against the particu-
lar common facts just now instanced in, than against
miracles in general, before any evidence of either. But,
Thirdly. Take in the consideration of Religion, or the
moral system of the world, and then we see distinct par-
ticular reasons for miracles : to afford mankind instruc-
tion additional to that of nature, and to attest the truth
of it. And this gives a real credibility to the supposition,
that it might be part of the original plan of things, that
there should be miraculous interpositions. Then,
Lastly. Miracles must not be compared to common
natural events, or to events which, though uncommon,
-are similar to what we daily experience, but to the extra-
ordinary phenomena of nature ; and then the compari-
Of our Incapacity of Judging 141
son will be between the presumption against miracles,
and the presumption against such uncommon appear-
ances, suppose, as comets, and against there being any
such powers in nature as magnetism and electricity, so
contrary to the properties of other bodies not endued
with these powers. And before any one can determine
whether there be any peculiar presumption against
miracles, more than against other extraordinary things,
he must consider what, upon first hearing, would be the
presumption against the last-mentioned appearances and
powers to a person acquainted only with the daily,
monthly, and annual course of nature respecting this
earth, and with those common powers of matter which
we every day see.
Upon all this I conclude, that there certainly is no
such presumption against miracles as to render them in
any wise incredible ; that, on the contrary, our being able
to discern reasons for them gives a positive credibility to
the history of them, in cases where those reasons hold ;
and that it is by no means certain that there is any
peculiar presumption at all, from analogy, even in the
lowest degree, against miracles, as distinguished from
other extraordinary phenomena ; though it is not worth
while to perplex the reader with inquiries into the
abstract nature of evidence, in order to determine a
question which, without such inquiries, we see 1 is of no
importance.
CHAPTER III
OF OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT WERE
TO BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION; AND
THE CREDIBILITY, FROM ANALOGY, THAT IT
MUST CONTAIN THINGS APPEARING LIABLE
TO OBJECTIONS
BESIDES the objections against the evidence for Chris-
tianity, many are alleged against the scheme of it;
against the whole manner in which it is put and left
with the world, as well as against several particular
IP. 139.
142 The Analogy of Religion
relations in Scripture objections drawn from the de-
ficiencies of revelation ; from things in it appearing to
men foolishness y 1 from its containing matters of offence
which have led, and it must have been foreseen would
lead, into strange enthusiasm and superstition, and be
made to serve the purposes of tyranny and wickedness ;
from its not being universal; and, which is a thing of
the same kind, from its evidence not being so convincing
and satisfactory as it might have been : for this last is
sometimes turned into a positive argument against its
truth. 2 It would be tedious, indeed impossible, to enu-
merate the several particulars comprehended under the
objections here referred to; they being so various, ac-
cording to the different fancies of men. There are per-
sons who think it a strong objection against the authority
of Scripture, that it is not composed by rules of art,
agreed upon by critics, for polite and correct writing.
And the scorn is inexpressible with which some of the
prophetic parts of Scripture are treated ; partly through
the rashness of interpreters, but very much also on ac-
count of the hieroglyphical and figurative language in
which they are left us. Some of the principal things of
this sort shall be particularly considered in the following
chapters. But my design at present is to observe in
general, with respect to this whole way of arguing, that,
upon supposition of a revelation, it is highly credible
beforehand, we should be incompetent judges of it to a
great degree ; and that it would contain many things ap-
pearing to us liable to great objections, in case we judge
of it otherwise than by the analogy of nature. And,
therefore, though objections against the evidence of
Christianity are most seriously to be considered, yet ob-
jections against Christianity itself are, in a great measure,
frivolous ; almost all objections against it, excepting
those which are alleged against the particular proofs of
its coming from God. I express myself with caution,
lest I should be mistaken to vilify reason ; which is in-
deed the only faculty we have wherewith to judge con-
cerning anything, even revelation itself : or be misunder-
1 i COT. i. 28. * See ch. vi.
Of our Incapacity of Judging 143
stood to assert, that a supposed revelation cannot be
proved false from internal characters. For, it may
contain clear immoralities or contradictions ; and either
of these would prove it false. Nor will I take upon me
to affirm, that nothing else can possibly render any
supposed revelation incredible. Yet still the observation
above is, I think, true beyond doubt, that objections
against Christianity, as distinguished from objections
against its evidence, are frivolous. To make out this, is
the general design of the present chapter. And with
regard to the whole of it, I cannot but particularly wish
that the proofs might be attended to, rather than the
assertions cavilled at, upon account of any unacceptable
consequences, whether real or supposed, which may be
drawn from them. For, after all, that which is true must
be admitted, though it should show us the shortness of
our faculties, and that we are in no wise judges of many
things of which we are apt to think ourselves very com-
petent ones. Nor will this be any objection with reason-
able men, at least upon second thought it will not be any
objection with such, against the justness of the following
observations.
As God governs the world and instructs his creatures
according to certain laws or rules in the known course
of nature, known by reason together with experience ;
so the Scripture informs us of a scheme of divine
Providence additional to this. It relates that God has,
by revelation, instructed men in things concerning his
government which they could not otherwise have known,,
and reminded them of things which they might other-
wise know, and attested the truth of the whole by
miracles. Now if the natural and the revealed dispensa-
tion of things are both from God, if they coincide with
each other, and together make up one scheme of Provi-
dence ; our being incompetent judges of one, must
render it credible that we may be incompetent judges
also of the other. Since, upon experience, the acknow-
ledged constitution and course of nature is found to be
greatly different from what, before experience, would
have been expected, and such as men fancy there lie
144 The Analogy of Religion
great objections against; this renders it beforehand
highly credible, that they may find the revealed dis-
pensation likewise, if they judge of it as they do of the
constitution of nature, very different from expectations
formed beforehand, and liable, in appearance, to great
objections ; objections against the scheme itself, and
against the degrees and manners of the miraculous
interpositions by which it was attested and carried on.
Thus, suppose a prince to govern his dominions in the
wisest manner possible by common known laws, and
that upon some exigencies he should suspend these
laws, and govern, in several instances, in a different
manner; if one of his subjects were not a competent
judge beforehand, by what common rules the govern-
ment should or would be carried on ; it could not be
expected that the same person would be a competent
judge in what exigencies, or in what manner, or to what
degree, those laws commonly observed would be sus-
pended or deviated from. If he were not a judge of the
wisdom of the ordinary administration, there is no
reason to think he would be a judge of the wisdom of
the extraordinary. If he thought he had objections
against the former, doubtless it is highly supposable he
might think also that he had objections against the
latter. And thus, as we fall into infinite follies and
mistakes whenever we pretend otherwise than from ex-
perience and analogy to judge of the constitution and
course of nature, it is evidently supposable beforehand
that we should fall into as great in pretending to judge,
in like manner, concerning revelation ; nor is there any
more ground to expect that this latter should appear to
us clear of objections, than that the former should.
These observations, relating to the whole of Chris-
tianity, are applicable to inspiration in particular. As
we are in no sort judges beforehand, by what laws or
rules, in what degree, or by what means it were to have
been expected that God would naturally instruct us ; so
upon supposition of his affording us light and instruc-
tion by revelation, additional to what he has afforded us
by reason and experience, we are in no sort judges by
Of our Incapacity of Judging 145
what methods and in what proportion it were to be ex-
pected that this supernatural light and instruction would
be afforded us. We know not beforehand what degree
or kind of natural information it were to be expected
God would afford men, each by his own reason and ex
perience ; nor how far he would enable and effectually
dispose them to communicate it, whatever it should be,
to each other ; nor whether the evidence of it would be
certain, highly probable, or doubtful; nor whether it
would be given with equal clearness and conviction to
all. Nor could we guess, upon any good ground I
mean, whether natural knowledge, or even the faculty
itself by which we are capable of attaining it, reason
would be given us at once, or gradually. In like man-
ner we are wholly ignorant what degree of new know-
ledge it were to be expected God would give mankind
by revelation, upon supposition of his affording one ; or
how far, or in what way, he would interpose miraculously
to qualify them to whom he should originally make the
revelation for communicating the knowledge given by it,
and to secure their doing it to the age in which they should
live, and to secure its being transmitted to posterity.
We are equally ignorant whether the evidence of it
would be certain or highly probable, or doubtful; 1 or
whether all who should have any degree of instruction
from it, and any degree of evidence of its truth, would
have the same ; or whether the scheme would be re-
vealed at once, or unfolded gradually. Nay, we are not
in any sort able to judge whether it were to have been
expected that the revelation should have been com-
mitted to writing, or left to be handed down, and con-
sequently corrupted by verbal tradition, and at length
sunk under it, if mankind so pleased, and during such
time as they are permitted, in the degree they evidently
are, to act as they will.
But it may be said, "that a revelation in some of
the above-mentioned circumstances one, for instance,
which was not committed to writing, and thus secured
against danger of corruption would not have answered
1 See ch. ri.
146 The Analogy of Religion
its purpose." I ask, what purpose ? It would not have
answered all the purposes which it has now answered,
and in the same degree, but it would have answered
others, or the same in different degrees. And which of
these were the purposes of God, and best fell in with
his general government, we could not at all have deter-
mined beforehand.
Now since it has been shown that we have no princi-
ples of reason upon which to judge beforehand, how it
were to be expected revelation should have been left, or
what was most suitable to the divine plan of govern-
ment in any of the forementioned respects, it must be
quite frivolous to object afterwards as to any of them,
against its being left in one way rather than another, for
this would be to object against things upon account of
their being different from expectations, which have been
shown to be without reason. And thus we see that the
only question concerning the truth of Christianity is,
whether it be a real revelation, not whether it be at-
tended with every circumstance which we should have
looked for ; and concerning the authority of Scripture,
whether it be what it claims to be not whether it be a
book of such sort, and so promulged, as weak men are
apt to fancy a book containing a divine revelation
should. And, therefore, neither obscurity nor seeming
inaccuracy of style, nor various readings, nor early dis-
putes about the authors of particular parts, nor any
other things of the like kind, though they had been
much more considerable in degree than they are, could
overthrow the authority of the Scripture ; unless the
Prophets, Apostles, or our Lord had promised that the
book containing the divine revelation should be secure
from those things. Nor indeed can any objections
overthrow such a kind of revelation as the Christian
claims to be, since there are no objections against the
morality of it 1 but such as can show that there is no
proof of miracles wrought originally in attestation of it,
no appearance of anything miraculous in its obtaining
in the world, nor any of prophecy, that is, of events
i P. 153-
Of our Incapacity of Judging 147
foretold, which human sagacity could not foresee. If it
can be shown that the proof alleged for all these is
absolutely none at all, then is revelation overturned.
But were it allowed that the proof of any one or all of
them is lower than is allowed, yet, whilst any proof of
them remains, revelation will stand upon much the same
foot it does at present, as to all the purposes of life and
practice, and ought to have the like influence upon our
behaviour.
From the foregoing observations, too, it will follow,
and those who will thoroughly examine into revelation
will find it worth remarking, that there are several ways
of arguing, which, though just with regard to other
writings, are not applicable to Scripture, at least, not to
the prophetic parts of it. We cannot argue, for instance,
that this cannot be the sense or intent of such a passage
of Scripture, for if it had it would have been expressed
more plainly, or have been represented under a more apt
figure or hieroglyphic; yet we may justly argue thus with
respect to common books. And the reason of this
difference is very evident ; that in Scripture we are not
competent judges, as we are in common books, how
plainly it were to have been expected, what is the true
sense should have been expressed, or under how apt an
image figured. The only question is, what appearance
there is that this is the sense; and scarce at all, how
much more determinately or accurately it might have
been expressed or figured.
" But it is not self-evident that internal improbabilities
of all kinds weaken external probable proof? " Doubt-
less. But to what practical purpose can this be alleged
here, when it has been proved before 1 that real internal
improbabilities, which rise even to moral certainty, are
overcome by the most ordinary testimony ; and when it
now has been made appear that we scarce know what are
improbabilities as to the matter we are here considering ;
as it will further appear from what follows.
For though from the observations above made it is
manifest that we are not in any sort competent judges
1 P. 37-
148 The Analogy of Religion
what supernatural instruction were to have been expected,
and though it is self-evident that the objections of an in-
competent judgment must be frivolous ; yet it may be
proper to go one step further, and observe that if men
will be regardless of these things, and pretend to judge
of the Scripture by preconceived expectations, the
analogy of nature shows beforehand, not only that it is
highly credible they may, but also probable that they
will, imagine they have strong objections against it, how-
ever really unexceptionable ; for so, prior to experience,
they would think they had, against the circumstances,
and degrees, and the whole manner of that instruction,
which is afforded by the ordinary course of nature.
Were the instruction which God affords to brute crea-
tures by instincts and mere propensions, and to man-
kind by these together with reason, matter of probable
proof and not of certain observation, it would be re-
jected as incredible, in many instances of it, only upon
account of the means by which this instruction is given,
the seeming disproportions, the limitations, necessary
conditions, and circumstances of it. For instance,
would it not have been thought highly improbable that
men should have been so much more capable of discover-
ing, even to certainty, the general laws of matter, and
the magnitudes, paths, and revolutions of the heavenly
bodies, than the occasions and cures of distempers and
many other things in which human life seems so much
more nearly concerned than in astronomy? How
capricious and irregular a way of information, would it
be said, is that of invention, by means of which nature
instructs us in matters of science, and in many things
upon which the affairs of the world greatly depend : that
a man should, by this faculty, be made acquainted with
a thing in an instant, when perhaps he is thinking of
somewhat else, which he has in vain been searching after,
it may be, for years. So likewise the imperfections
attending the only method by which nature enables and
directs us to communicate our thoughts to each other,
are innumerable. Language is, in its very nature, in-
adequate, ambiguous, liable to infinite abuse, even from
Of our Incapacity of Judging 149
negligence, and so liable to it from design, that every
man can deceive and betray by it. And to mention but
one instance more : that brutes without reason should
act, in many respects, with a sagacity and foresight
vastly greater than what men have in those respects,
would be thought impossible. Yet it is certain they do
act with such superior foresight; whether it be their
own, indeed, is another question. From these things it
is highly credible beforehand, that upon supposition
God should afford men some additional instruction by
revelation, it would be with circumstances, in manners,
degrees, and respects which we should be apt to fancy
we had great objections against the credibility of. Nor
are the objections against the Scripture, nor against
Christianity in general, at all more or greater than the
analogy of nature would beforehand not perhaps give
ground to expect ; for this analogy may not be sufficient,
in some cases, to ground an expectation upon ; but no
more nor greater than analogy would show it beforehand
to be supposable and credible, that there might seem to
lie against revelation.
By applying these general observations to a particular
objection, it will be more distinctly seen how they are
applicable to others of the like kind, and indeed to
almost all objections against Christianity as distinguished
from objections against its evidence. It appears from
Scripture that, as it was not unusual in the apos-
tolic age for persons, upon their conversion to Chris-
tianity, to be endued with miraculous gifts, so some of
those persons exercised these gifts in a strangely irregular
and disorderly manner ; and this is made an objection
against their being really miraculous. Now the fore-
going observations quite remove this objection, how
considerable soever it may appear at first sight. For,
consider a person endued with any of these gifts; for
instance, that of tongues : it is to be supposed that he
had the same power over this miraculous gift as he would
have had over it had it been the effect of habit, of study
and use, as it ordinarily is, or the same power over it as
he had over any other natural endowment. Consequently
150 The Analogy of Religion
he would use it in the same manner he did any other,
either regularly and upon proper occasions only, or
irregularly, and upon improper ones, according to his
sense of decency and his character of prudence.
Where then is the objection ? Why, if this miraculous
power was indeed given to the world to propagate Chris-
tianity and attest the truth of it, we might, it seems,
have expected that other sort of persons should have
been chosen to be invested with it ; or that these should
at the same time have been endued with prudence, or
that they should have been continually restrained and
directed in the exercise of it, i.e., that God should have
miraculously interposed, if at all, in a different manner
or higher degree. But, from the observations made
above, it is undeniably evident that we are not judges in
what degrees and manners it were to have been expected
he should miraculously interpose, upon supposition of
his doing it in some degree and manner. Nor, in the
natural course of Providence, are superior gifts of
memory, eloquence, knowledge, and other talents of
great influence, conferred only on persons of prudence
and decency, or such as are disposed to make the
properest use of them. Nor is the instruction and
admonition naturally afforded us for the conduct of life,
particularly in our education, commonly given in a
manner the most suited to recommend it, but often
with circumstances apt to prejudice us against such
instruction.
One might go on to add, that there is a great resem-
blance between the light of nature and of revelation in
several other respects. Practical Christianity, or that
faith and behaviour which renders a man a Christian, is
a plain and obvious thing, like the common rules of
conduct with respect to our ordinary temporal affairs.
The more distinct and particular knowledge of those
things, the study of which the Apostle calls going on
unto perfection? and of the prophetic parts of revelation,
like many parts of natural and even civil knowledge, may
require very exact thought and careful consideration.
l Heb. vi. i.
Of our Incapacity of Judging 151
The hindrances, too, of natural and of supernatural
light and knowledge have been of the same kind. And
as it is owned the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet
understood, so, if it ever comes to be understood before
the restitution of all things?- and without miraculous in-
terpositions, it must be in the same way as natural know-
ledge is come at : by the continuance and progress of
learning and of liberty, and by particular persons attend-
ing to, comparing, and pursuing intimations scattered up
and down it, which are overlooked and disregarded by
the generality of the world. For this is the way in which
all improvements are made, by thoughtful men's tracing
on obscure hints, as it were, dropped us by nature acci-
dentally, or which seem to come into our minds by chance.
Nor is it at all incredible that a book, which has been
so long in the possession of mankind, should contain
many truths as yet undiscovered. For, all the same
phenomena and the same faculties of investigation from
which such great discoveries in natural knowledge have
been made in the present and last age, were equally in
the possession of mankind several thousand years before.
And possibly it might be intended that events, as they
come to pass, should open and ascertain the meaning of
several parts of Scripture.
It may be objected that this analogy fails in a material
respect, for that natural knowledge is of little or no con-
sequence. But I have been speaking of the general
instruction which nature does or does not afford us.
And besides, some parts of natural knowledge, in the
more common restrained sense of the words, are of the
greatest consequence to the ease and convenience of
life. But suppose the analogy did, as it does not, fail
in this respect, yet it might be abundantly supplied from
the whole constitution and course of nature, which shows
that God does not dispense his gifts according to our
notions of the advantage and consequence they would
be of to us. And this in general, with his method of
dispensing knowledge in particular, would together make
out an analogy full to the point before us.
1 ActJ iii. IX.
152 The Analogy of Religion
But it may be objected still further and more generally,
"The Scripture represents the world as in a state of ruin,
and Christianity as an expedient to recover it, to help in
these respects where nature fails; in particular, to supply
the deficiencies of natural light. Is it credible, then,
that so many ages should have been let pass before a
matter of such a sort, of so great and so general importance,
was made known to mankind ; and then that it should
be made known to so small a part of them ? Is it con-
ceivable that this supply should be so very deficient,
should have the like obscurity and doubtfulness, be liable
to the like perversions, in short, lie open to all the like
objections, as the light of nature itself? 1 Without de-
termining how far this, in fact, is so, I answer, it is by
no means incredible that it might be so, if the light of
nature and of revelation be from the same hand. Men
are naturally liable to diseases, for which God, in his
good providence, has provided natural remedies. 3 But
remedies existing in nature have been unknown to man-
kind for many ages are known but to few now ; probably
many valuable ones are not known yet. Great has been
and is the obscurity and difficulty in the nature and ap-
plication of them. Circumstances seem often to make
them very improper, where they are absolutely necessary.
It is after long labour and study, and many unsuccessful
endeavours, that they are brought to be as useful as they
are, after high contempt and absolute rejection of the most
useful we have, and after disputes and doubts which have
seemed to be endless. The best remedies too, when unskil-
fully, much more if dishonestly applied, may produce new
diseases; and with the rightest application the success of
them is often doubtful. In many cases they are not at
all effectual ; where they are, it is often very slowly, and
the application of them, and the necessary regimen
accompanying it, is not uncommonly so disagreeable,
that some will not submit to them, and satisfy themselves
with the excuse, that if they would, it is not certain
whether it would be successful. And many persons who
labour under diseases for which there are known natural
1 Ch. Ti. * Ch. v.
Of our Incapacity of Judging 153
remedies, are not so happy as to be always, if ever, in
the way of them. In a word, the remedies which nature
has provided for diseases are neither certain, perfect,
nor universal. And, indeed, the same principles of
arguing which would lead us to conclude that they must
be so, would lead us likewise to conclude that there
could be no occasion for them, i.e., that there could be
no diseases at all. And therefore our experience that
there are diseases shows that it is credible beforehand,
upon supposition nature has provided remedies for them,
that these remedies may be, as by experience we find
they are, not certain, nor perfect, nor universal, because it
shows that the principles upon which we should expect
the contrary are fallacious.
And now, what is the just consequence from all these
things ? Not that reason is no judge of what is offered
to us as being of divine revelation. For this would be
to infer that we are unable to judge of anything because
we are unable to judge of all things. Reason can, and
it ought to judge, not only of the meaning, but also of
the morality and the evidence of revelation. First. It is
the province of reason to judge of the morality of the
Scripture; i.e., not whether it contains things different
from what we should have expected from a wise, just,
and good Being ; for objections from hence have been
now obviated : but whether it contains things plainly
contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness; to what
the light of nature teaches us of God. And I know
nothing of this sort objected against Scripture, excepting
such objections as are formed upon suppositions, which
would equally conclude that the constitution of nature
is contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness, which
most certainly it is not. Indeed there are some particu-
lar precepts in Scripture given to particular persons,
requiring actions which would be immoral and vicious
were it not for such precepts. But it is easy to see that
all these are of such a kind, as that the precept changes
the whole nature of the case and of the action, and both
constitutes and shows that not to be unjust or immoral,
which, prior to the precept, must have appeared and
154 The Analogy of Religion
really have been so; which may well be, since none of
these precepts are contrary to immutable morality. If
it were commanded to cultivate the principles, and act
from the spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty, the
command would not alter the nature of the case or of
the action in any of these instances. But it is quite
otherwise in precepts which require only the doing an
external action : for instance, taking away the property
or life of any. For men have no right to either life or
property, but what arises solely from the grant of God :
when this grant is revoked, they cease to have any right
at all in either; and when this revocation is made
known, as surely it is possible it may be, it must cease
to be unjust to deprive them of either. And though
a course of external acts, which without command would
be immoral, must make an immoral habit, yet a few
detached commands have no such natural tendency.
I thought proper to say thus much of the few Scripture
precepts, which require, not vicious actions, but actions
which would have been vicious, had it not been for such
precepts; because they are sometimes weakly urged as
immoral, and great weight is laid upon objections drawn
from them. But to me there seems no difficulty at all
in these precepts but what arises from their being
offences, i.e., from their being liable to be perverted, as
indeed they are, by wicked designing men, to serve the
most horrid purposes, and, perhaps, to mislead the weak
and enthusiastic. And objections from this head are
not objections against revelation, but against the whole
notion of religion, as a trial, and against the general
constitution of nature. Secondly. Reason is able to
judge, and must, of the evidence of revelation, and of
the objections urged against that evidence ; which shall
be the subject of a following chapter. 1
But the consequence of the foregoing observations is,
that the question upon which the truth of Christianity
depends is scarce at all what objections there are against
its scheme, since there are none against the morality of
it, but what objections there are against its evidence ; or,
Cb. Tii.
Of Christianity 155
what proof there remains of it after due allowances made
for the objections against that proof : because it has been
shown that the objections against Christianity, as distin-
guished from objections against its evidence, are frivolous.
For surely very little weight, if any at all, is to be laid
upon a way of arguing and objecting, which, when
applied to the general constitution of nature, experience
shows not to be conclusive; and such, I think, is the
whole way of objecting treated of throughout this
chapter. It is resolvable into principles, and goes upon
suppositions, which mislead us to think that the Author
of Nature would not act as we experience he does ; or
would act, in such and such cases, as we experience he
does not in like cases. But the unreasonableness of this
way of objecting will appear yet more evidently from
hence, that the chief things thus objected against are
justified, as shall be further shown, 1 by distinct, particu-
lar, and full analogies, in the constitution and course of
nature.
But it is to be remembered, that, as frivolous as ob-
jections of the foregoing sort against revelation are, yet,
when a supposed revelation is more consistent with itself,
and has a more general and uniform tendency to promote
virtue, than, all circumstances considered, could have
been expected from enthusiasm and political views, this
is a presumptive proof of its not proceeding from them,
and so of its truth : because we are competent judges,
what might have been expected from enthusiasm and
political views.
CHAPTER IV
OF CHRISTIANITY, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME
OR CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY
COMPREHENDED
IT hath been now shown 2 that the analogy of nature
renders it highly credible beforehand, that, supposing a
revelation to be made, it must contain many things very
1 Ch. iv. latter part, and v. vi. * In the foregoing chapter.
156 The Analogy of Religion
different from what we should have expected, and such
as appear open to great objections ; and that this obser-
vation, in good measure, takes off the force of those ob-
jections, or rather precludes them. But it may be alleged
that this is a very partial answer to such objections, or a
very unsatisfactory way of obviating them; because it
doth not show at all that the things objected against can
be wise, just, and good, much less that it is credible they
are so. It will therefore be proper to show this dis-
tinctly, by applying to these objections against the
wisdom, justice, and goodness of Christianity, the answer
above 1 given to the like objections against the constitu-
tion of Nature ; before we consider the particular analo-
gies in the latter, to the particular things objected against
in the former. Now that which affords a sufficient answer
to objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness
of the constitution of Nature, is its being a constitution,
a system, or scheme imperfectly comprehended; a
scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish
ends, and which is carried on by general laws ; for from
these things it has been proved not only to be possible,
but also to be credible, that those things which are
objected against may be consistent with wisdom, justice,
and goodness; nay, may be instances of them; and
even that the constitution and government of Nature
may be perfect in the highest possible degree. If
Christianity then be a scheme, and of the like kind, it
is evident the like objections against it must admit of
the like answer. And,
I. Christianity is a scheme quite beyond our compre-
hension. The moral government of God is exercised
by gradually conducting things so in the course of his
providence, that every one, at length and upon the
whole, shall receive according to his deserts, and neither
fraud nor violence, but truth and right, shall finally pre-
vail. Christianity is a particular scheme under this
general plan of Providence, and a part of it, conducive
to its completion with regard to mankind; consisting
itself also of various parts, and a mysterious economy
1 Part I. cb. vii., to which this all along refers.
Of Christianity 157
which has been carrying on from the time the world
came into its present wretched state, and is still carrying
on, for its recovery, by a divine person, the Messiah,
who is to gather together in one the children of God that
are scattered abroad?- and establish an everlasting kingdom,
wherein dwelleth righteousness? And in order to it,
after various manifestations of things relating to this
great and general scheme of Providence, through a suc-
cession of many ages; (for the Spirit of Christ which
was in the prophets, testified beforehand his sufferings, and
the glory that should follow : unto whom it was revealed,
that not unto themselves, but unto us, they did minister the
things which are now reported unto us by them that have
preached the Gospel, which things the angels desire to look
into ; *) after various dispensations looking forward and
preparatory to this final salvation ; in the fulness of time,
when infinite wisdom thought fit ; He, being in the form
of God, made himself of no reputation, and took upon
him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness
of men ; and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled
himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of
the cross ; wherefore God also hath highly exalted him,
and given him a name which is above every name : that at
the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in
heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth,
and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is
Lord, to the glory of God the Father* Parts likewise of
this economy are the miraculous mission of the Holy
Ghost, and his ordinary assistances given to good men ;
the invisible government which Christ at present exer-
cises over his church ; that which he himself refers to in
these words : In my Father's house are many mansions
I go to prepare a place for you ; 6 and his future return to
judge the world in righteousness, and completely re-
establish the kingdom of God. For the Father judgeth
no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son ;
that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour
the Father* All power is given unto him in heaven and
1 John xi. 52. * i Pet. Hi. 13. i Pet. i. n, 13.
* Phil. iL 6-xi. John xiv. a. ' John r. aa, 23.
158 The Analogy of Religion
in earth. 1 And he must reign, till he hath put all enemies
under his feet. Then cotneth the end, when he shall have
delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father ; when
he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and
power. And when all things shall be subdued unto him,
then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that
put all things under him, that God may be all in all?
Now little, surely, need be said to show that this system
or scheme of things is but imperfectly comprehended
by us. The Scripture expressly asserts it to be so ; and
indeed one cannot read a passage relating to this great
mystery of godliness? but what immediately runs up
into something which shows us our ignorance in it, as
everything m nature shows us our ignorance in the con-
stitution of nature. And whoever will seriously consider
tkat part of the Christian scheme which is revealed in
Scripture will find so much more unrevealed, as will
convince hiai, that, to all the purposes of judging and
objecting, we know as little of it as of the constitution
of nature. Our ignorance, therefore, is as much an
answer to our objections against the perfection of one,
as against the perfection of the other.*
II. It is obvious, too, that in the Christian dispensa-
tion, as much as in the natural scheme of things, means
are made use of to accomplish ends. And the observa-
tion of this furnishes us with the same answer to
objections against the perfection of Christianity, as to
objections of the like kind against the constitution of
nature. It shows the credibility that the things objected
against, how foolish 6 soever they appear to men, may be
the very best means of accomplishing the very best
ends. And their appearing foolishness is no presump-
tion against this, in a scheme so greatly beyond our
comprehension. 6
III. The credibility, that the Christian dispensation
may have been all along carried on by general laws, 7 no
less than the course of nature, may require to be
more distinctly made out. Consider, then, upon what
1 Matt, zxviii. 18. * i Cor. zv. 35, 34, 28. * i Tim iii. 16.
* P. 107. I Cor. i. Pp. 108, 109. 1 P. ua
Of Christianity 159
ground it is we say that the whole common course of
nature is carried on according to general fore-ordained
laws. We know indeed several of the general laws of
matter; and a great part of the natural behaviour of
living agents is reducible to general laws. But we know
in a manner nothing by what laws storms and tempests,
earthquakes, famine, pestilence, become the instruments
of destruction to mankind. And the laws, by which
persons born into the world at such a time and place
are of such capacities, geniuses, tempers ; the laws, by
which thoughts come into our mind in a multitude of
cases ; and by which innumerable things happen of the
greatest influence upon the affairs and state of the world;
these laws are so wholly unknown to us, that we call the
events, which come to pass by them accidental ; though
all reasonable men know certainly, that there cannot in
reality be any such thing as chance ; and conclude that
the things which have this appearance are the result of
general laws, and may be reduced into them. It is then
but an exceeding little way, and in but a very few
respects, that we can trace up the natural course of
things before us to general laws. And it is only from
analogy that we conclude the whole of it to be capable
of being reduced into them ; only from our seeing that
part is so. It is from our finding that the course of
nature, in some respects and so far, goes on by general
laws, that we conclude this of the rest. And if that be
a just ground for such a conclusion, it is a just ground
also, if not to conclude, yet to apprehend, to render it
supposable and credible, which is sufficient for answer-
ing objections, that God's miraculous interpositions may
have been all along in Hke manner by general laws
of wisdom. Thus, that miraculous powers should be
exerted at such times, upon such occasions, in such
degrees and manners, and with regard to such persons
rather than others; that the affairs of the world being
permitted to go on in their natural course so far, should,
just at such a point, have a new direction given them
by miraculous interpositions ; that these interpositions
should be exactly in such degrees and respects only ; all
160 The Analogy of Religion
this may have been by general laws. These laws are
unknown indeed to us ; but no more unknown than the
laws from whence it is that some die as soon as they are
born, and others live to extreme old age ; that one man is
so superior to another in understanding ; with innumer-
able more things, which, as was before observed, we
cannot reduce to any laws or rules at all, though it is
taken for granted they are much reducible to general
ones as gravitation. Now, if the revealed dispensations
of Providence, and miraculous interpositions, be by
general laws, as well as God's ordinary government in
the course of nature made known by reason and experi-
ence, there is no more reason to expect that every
exigence, as it arises, should be provided for by these
general laws of miraculous interpositions, than that every
exigence in nature should by the general laws of nature ;
yet there might be wise and good reasons that miracu-
lous interpositions should be by general laws, and that
these laws should not be broken in upon or deviated
from by other miracles.
Upon the whole, then, the appearance of deficiencies
and irregularities in nature is owing to its being a
scheme but in part made known, and of such a certain
particular kind in other respects. Now we see no more
reason why the frame and course of nature should be
such a scheme, than why Christianity should. And
that the former is such a scheme, renders it credible,
that the latter, upon supposition of its truth, may be so
too. And as it is manifest that Christianity is a scheme
revealed but in part, and a scheme in which means are
made use of to accomplish ends, like to that of nature ;
so the credibility that it may have been all along carried
on by general laws, no less than the course of nature,
has been distinctly proved. And from all this it is
beforehand credible that there might, I think probable
that there would, be the like appearance of deficiencies
and irregularities in Christianity as in nature ; i.e., that
Christianity would be liable to the like objections as
the frame of nature. And these objections are answered
by these observations concerning Christianity; as the
Of Christianity 161
like objections against the frame of nature are answered
by the like observations concerning the frame of nature.
The objections against Christianity, considered as a
matter of fact, 1 having, in general, been obviated in the
preceding chapter ; and the same, considered as made
against the wisdom and goodness of it, having been
obviated in this ; the next thing, according to the
method proposed, is to show that the principal objec-
tions, in particular, against Christianity, may be an-
swered by particular and full analogies in nature. And
as one of them is made against the whole scheme of it
together, as just now described, I choose to consider it
here, rather than in a distinct chapter by itself. The
thing objected against this scheme of the Gospel is,
"that it seems to suppose God was reduced to the
necessity of a long series of intricate means, in order to
accomplish his ends, the recovery and salvation of the
world; in like sort as men, for want of understanding
or power, not being able to come at their ends directly,
are forced to go roundabout ways and make use of
many perplexed contrivances to arrive at them." Now
everything which we see shows the folly of this, con-
sidered as an objection against the truth of Christianity.
For, according to our manner of conception, God makes
use of a variety of means, what we often think tedious
ones, in the natural course of providence for the accom-
plishment of all his ends. Indeed it is certain there is
somewhat in this matter quite beyond our comprehen-
sion, but the mystery is as great in nature as in
Christianity. We know what we ourselves aim at as
final ends, and what courses we take, merely as means
conducing to those ends. But we are greatly ignorant
how far things are considered by the Author of Nature
under the single notion of means and ends, so as that it
may be said this is merely an end, and that merely
means in his regard. And whether there be not some
peculiar absurdity in our very manner of conception
concerning this matter, somewhat contradictory arising
i Pp. 1,1, &i.
1 62 The Analogy of Religion
from our extremely imperfect views of things, it is
impossible to say. However, thus much is manifest,
that the whole natural world and government of it is a
scheme or system, not a fixed, but a progressive one ; a
scheme in which the operation of various means takes
up a great length of time before the ends they tend to
can be attained. The change of seasons, the ripening
of the fruits of the earth, the very history of a flower, is
an instance of this, and so is human life. Thus veget-
able bodies, and those of animals, though possibly
formed at once, yet grow up by degrees to a mature
state. And thus rational agents, who animate these
latter bodies, are naturally directed to form each his
own manners and character by the gradual gaining of
knowledge and experience, and by a long course of
action. Our existence is not only successive, as it must
be of necessity ; but one state of our life and being is
appointed by God to be a preparation for another, and
that to be the means of attaining to another succeeding
one ; infancy to childhood, childhood to youth, youth
to mature age. Men are impatient and for precipitating
things ; but the Author of Nature appears deliberate
throughout his operations, accomplishing his natural
ends by slow successive steps. And there is a plan of
things beforehand laid out, which, from the nature of it,
requires various systems of means, as well as length of
time, in order to the carrying on its several parts into
execution. Thus, in the daily course of natural provi-
dence, God operates in the very same manner as in the
dispensation of Christianity, making one thing subser-
vient to another ; this, to somewhat further ; and so on,
through a progressive series of means, which extend
both backward and forward, beyond our utmost view.
Of this manner of operation, everything we see in the
course of nature is as much an instance as any part of
the Christian dispensation.
Particular System of Christianity 163
CHAPTER v
OF THE PARTICULAR SYSTEM OF CHRISTIANITY ;
THE APPOINTMENT OF A MEDIATOR, AND THE
REDEMPTION OF THE WORLD BY HIM
THERE is not, I think, anything relating to Christianity
which has been more objected against than the media-
tion of Christ in some or other of its parts. Yet upon
thorough consideration there seems nothing less justly
liable to it. For,
I. The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined
presumption against the general notion of a Mediator
between God and man. 1 For we find all living creatures
are brought into the world, and their life in infancy is
preserved, by the instrumentality of others ; and every
satisfaction of it, some way or other, is bestowed by the
like means. So that the visible government which God
exercises over the world is by the instrumentality and
mediation of others. And how far his invisible govern-
ment be or be not so, it is impossible to determine at all
by reason. And the supposition that part of it is so ap-
pears, to say the least, altogether as credible as the con-
trary. There is then no sort of objection, from the light
of nature, against the general notion of a mediator
between God and man, considered as a doctrine of
Christianity, or as an appointment in this dispensation ;
since we find by experience that God does appoint
mediators to be the instruments of good and evil to us
the instruments of his justice and his mercy. And the
objection here referred to is urged, not against mediation
in that high, eminent, and peculiar sense in which Christ
is our mediator, but absolutely against the whole notion
itself of a mediator at all.
II. As we must suppose that the world is under the
proper moral government of God, or in a state of
religion, before we can enter into consideration of the
revealed doctrine, concerning the redemption of it by
1 x Tim. li. 5.
164 The Analogy of Religion
Christ, so that supposition is here to be distinctly taken
notice of. Now the divine moral government which
religion teaches us implies that the consequence of vice
shall be misery in some future state by the righteous
judgment of God. That such consequent punishment
shall take effect by his appointment, is necessarily im-
plied. But, as it is not in any sort to be supposed, that
we are made acquainted with all the ends or reasons for
which it is fit future punishments should be inflicted, or
why God has appointed such and such consequent
misery should follow vice ; and as we are altogether in
the dark how or in what manner it shall follow, by what
immediate occasions, or by the instrumentality of what
means ; there is no absurdity in supposing it may follow-
in a way analogous to that in which many miseries follow
such and such courses of action at present poverty,
sickness, infamy, untimely death by diseases, death from
the hands of civil justice. There is no absurdity in sup-
posing future punishment may follow wickedness of
course, as we speak, or in the way of natural conse-
quence from God's original constitution of the world ;
from the nature he has given us, and from the condition
in which he places us ; or, in a like manner, as a person
rashly trifling upon a precipice, in the way of natural
consequence, falls down; in the way of natural conse-
quence, breaks his limbs, suppose; in the way of
natural consequence of this, without help, perishes.
Some good men may perhaps be offended with hearing
it spoken of as a supposable thing that future punish-
ments of wickedness may be in the way of natural
consequence ; as if this were taking the execution of
justice out of the hands of God, and giving it to nature.
But they should remember, that when things come to
pass according to the course of nature, this does not
hinder them from being his doing who is the God of
nature, and that the Scripture ascribes those punish-
ments to divine justice which are known to be natural,
and which must be called so, when distinguished from
such as are miraculous. But after all, this supposition,
or rather this way of speaking, is here made use of only
Particular System of Christianity 165
by way of illustration of the subject before us. For
since it must be admitted, that the future punishment of
wickedness is not a matter of arbitrary appointment, but
of reason, equity, and justice, it comes, for aught I see,
to the same thing, whether it is supposed to be inflicted
in a way analogous to that in which the temporal punish-
ments of vice and folly are inflicted, or in any other way.
And though there were a difference, it is allowable, in
the present case, to make this supposition, plainly not
an incredible one, that future punishment may follow
wickedness in the way of natural consequence, or ac-
cording to some general laws of government already
established in the universe.
III. Upon this supposition, or even without it, we
may observe somewhat much to the present purpose in
the constitution of nature or appointments of Provi-
dence ; the provision which is made, that all the bad
natural consequences of men's actions should not always
actually follow, or that such bad consequences as,
according to the settled course of things, would in-
evitably have followed if not prevented, should, in
certain degrees, be prevented. We are apt presump-
tuously to imagine that the world might have been so
constituted as that there would not have been any such
thing as misery or evil. On the contrary, we find the
Author of Nature permits it ; but then he has provided
reliefs, and in many cases perfect remedies for it, after
some pains and difficulties ; reliefs and remedies even for
that evil which is the fruit of our own misconduct, and
which, in the course of nature, would have continued
and ended in our destruction, but for such remedies.
And this is an instance both of severity and indulgence
in the constitution of nature. Thus all the bad conse-
quences now mentioned of a man's trifling upon a preci-
pice might be prevented. And though all were not,
yet some of them might, by proper interposition, if not
rejected, by another's coming to the rash man's relief,
with his own laying hold on that relief in such sort as
the case required. Persons may do a great deal them-
selves towards preventing the bad consequences of theit
1 66 The Analogy of Religion
follies, and more may be done by themselves, together
with the assistance of others their fellow-creatures;
which assistance nature requires and prompts us to.
This is the general constitution of the world. Now,
suppose it had been so constituted that, after such
actions were done as were foreseen naturally to draw
after them misery to the doer, it should have been no
more in human power to have prevented that naturally
consequent misery, in any instance, than it is in all ; no
one can say whether such a more severe constitution of
things might not yet have been really good. But that,
on the contrary, provision is made by nature that we
may and do, to so great degree, prevent the bad natural
effects of our follies ; this may be called mercy or com-
passion in the original constitution of the world, compas-
sion as distinguished from goodness in general. And the
whole known constitution and course of things affording
us instances of such compassion, it would be according
to the analogy of nature to hope that, however ruinous
the natural consequences of vice might be, from the
general laws of God's government over the universe, yet
provision might be made, possibly might have been
originally made, for preventing those ruinous conse-
quences from inevitably following ; at least from follow-
ing universally, and in all cases.
Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this made
a question, or spoken of as in any degree doubtful. The
generality of mankind are so far from having that awful
sense of things which the present state of vice and
misery and darkness seems to make but reasonable, that
they have scarce any apprehension or thought at all
about this matter any way ; and some serious persons
may have spoken unadvisedly concerning it. But let us
observe what we experience to be, and what, from the
very constitution of nature, cannot but be, the conse-
quences of irregular and disorderly behaviour, even of
such rashness, wilfulness, neglects, as we scarce call
vicious. Now, it is natural to apprehend that the bad
consequences of irregularity will be greater, in propor-
tion as the irregularity is so. And there is no comparison
Particular System of Christianity 167
between these irregularities and the greater instances of
vice, or a dissolute, profligate disregard to all religion, if
there be anything at all in religion. For, consider what
it is for creatures, moral agents, presumptuously to in-
troduce that confusion and misery into the kingdom of
God which mankind have, in fact, introduced ; to blas-
pheme the Sovereign Lord of all, to contemn his
authority, to be injurious, to the degree they are, to their
fellow-creatures, the creatures of God. Add, that the
effects of vice in the present world are often extreme
misery, irretrievable ruin, and even death ; and upon
putting all this together, it will appear that as no one
can say in what degree fatal the unprevented conse-
quences of vice may be, according to the general rule of
divine government; so it is by no means intuitively
certain how far these consequences could possibly, in
the nature of the thing, be prevented, consistently with
the eternal rule of right, or with what is, in fact, the
moral constitution of nature. However, there would be
large ground to hope, that the universal government was
not so severely strict, but that there was room for
pardon, or for having those penal consequences pre-
vented. Yet,
IV. There seems no probability that anything we
could do would alone and of itself prevent them : pre-
vent their following or being inflicted. But one would
think at least it were impossible that the contrary should
be thought certain. For we are not acquainted with the
whole of the case. We are not informed of all the
reasons which render it fit that future punishments
should be inflicted ; and therefore cannot know, whether
anything we could do would make such an alteration, as
to render it fit that they should be remitted. We do not
know what the whole natural or appointed consequences
of vice are, nor in what way they would follow, if not
prevented ; and therefore can in no sort say, whether we
could do anything which would be sufficient to prevent
them. Our ignorance being thus manifest, let us recol-
lect the analogy of Nature or Providence. For, though
this may be but a slight ground to raise a positive
1 68 The Analogy of Religion
opinion upon in this matter, yet it is sufficient to answer
a mere arbitrary assertion, without any kind of evidence,
urged by way of objection against a doctrine, the proof
of which is not reason, but revelation. Consider then :
people ruin their fortunes by extravagance; they bring
diseases upon themselves by excess; they incur the
penalties of civil laws ; and surely civil government is
natural ; will sorrow for these follies past, and behaving
well for the future, alone and of itself prevent the
natural consequences of them ? On the contrary, men's
natural abilities of helping themselves are often im-
paired ; or if not, yet they are forced to be beholden to
the assistance of others, upon several accounts, and in
different ways ; assistance which they would have had no
occasion for, had it not been for their misconduct : but
which, in the disadvantageous condition they have
reduced themselves to, is absolutely necessary to their
recovery, and retrieving their affairs. Now since this is
our case, considering ourselves merely as inhabitants of
this world, and as having a temporal interest here, under
the natural government of God, which however has a
great deal moral in it ; why is it not supposable that this
may be our case also, in our more important capacity, as
under his perfect moral government, and having a more
general and future interest depending? If we have mis-
behaved in this higher capacity, and rendered ourselves
obnoxious to the future punishment which God has an-
nexed to vice, it is plainly credible, that behaving well
for the time to come may be not useless, God forbid
but wholly insufficient, alone and of itself, to prevent
that punishment; or to put us in the condition which
we should have been in had we preserved our in-
nocence.
And though we ought to reason with all reverence,
whenever we reason concerning the divine conduct, yet
it may be added, that it is clearly contrary to all our
notions of government, as well as to what is, in fact, the
general constitution of nature, to suppose, that doing
well for the future should, in all cases, prevent all the
judicial bad consequences of having done evil, or all the
Particular System of Christianity 169
punishment annexed to disobedience. And we have
manifestly nothing from whence to determine, in what
degree, and in what cases, reformation would prevent this
punishment, even supposing that it would in some. And
though the efficacy of repentance itself alone, to prevent
what mankind had rendered themselves obnoxious to,
and recover what they had forfeited, is now insisted upon,
in opposition to Christianity; yet, by the general pre-
valence of propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen world,
this notion of repentance alone being sufficient to
expiate guilt, appears to be contrary to the general sense
of mankind. 1
Upon the whole, then, had the laws, the general laws,
of God's government been permitted to operate without
any interposition in our behalf, the future punishment,
for aught we know to the contrary, or have any reason to
think, must inevitably have followed, notwithstanding
anything we could have done to prevent it. Now,
V. In this darkness, or this light of nature, call it
which you please, revelation comes in, confirms every
doubting fear which could enter into the heart of man
concerning the future unprevented consequence of
wickedness ; supposes the world to be in a state of ruin
(a supposition which seems the very ground of the
Christian dispensation, and which, if not provable by
reason, yet is in no wise contrary to it) ; teaches us too
that the rules of divine government are such as not to
admit of pardon immediately and directly upon repent-
ance, or by the sole efficacy of it ; but then teaches at
the same time, what nature might justly have hoped,
that the moral government of the universe was not so
rigid but that there was room for an interposition to
avert the fatal consequences of vice, which therefore, by
1 Our notions of moral government and the wide-spread belief of the world
in propitiatory sacrifices, are both of them against the supposition that mera
reformation and repentance will prevent the penal consequences of sin. That
the heathen believed their animal sacrifices to be not only of an expiatory bat
of a vicarious nature, might be shown from a variety of passages. For
instance,
" Cor pro corde, precor ; pro fibris sumite fibras.
Hanc animam vobis pro meliore dam us."
OVID, Fasti, vi. (Ed.)-
170 The Analogy of Religion
this means, does admit of pardon. Revelation teaches
us, that the unknown laws of God's more general govern-
ment, no less than the particular laws by which we
experience he governs us at present, are compassionate, l
as well as good in the more general notion of goodness ;
and that he hath mercifully provided that there should
be an interposition to prevent the destruction of human
kind, whatever that destruction unprevented would have
been. God so loved the world, that he gave his only
begotten Son, that whosoever believeth, not, to be sure, in a
speculative, but in a practical sense, that whosoever
believeth in him, should not perish : 2 gave his Son in the
same way of goodness to the world, as he affords par-
ticular persons the friendly assistance of their fellow-
creatures ; when without it their temporal ruin would be
the certain consequence of their follies ; in the same
way of goodness I say, though in a transcendent and
infinitely higher degree. And the Son of God loved us,
and gave himself for us, with a love which he himself
compares to that of human friendship ; though, in this
case, all comparisons must fall infinitely short of the
thing intended to be illustrated by them. He interposed
in such a manner as was necessary and effectual to pre-
vent that execution of justice upon sinners, which God
had appointed should otherwise have been executed upon
them ; or in such a manner as to prevent that punish-
ment from actually following, which according to the
general laws of divine government, must have followed
the sins of the world, had it not been for such inter-
position. 3
1 P. 165. * John iii. 16.
3 It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursory reader, that
it is, in any sort, affirmed or implied in anything said in this chapter, that none
can have the benefit of the general redemption but such as have the advantage
of being made acquainted with it in the present life. But it may be needful to
mention that several questions, which have been brought into the subject before
us and determined, are not in the least entered into here ; questions which have
been, I fear, rashly determined, and perhaps with equal rashness contrary ways.
For instance, whether God could have saved the world by other means than the
death of Christ, consistently with the general laws of his government. And
had not Christ come into the world, what would have been the future condition
of the better sort of men ; those just persons over the face of the earth for
whom Manasses in his prayer asserts repentance was not appointed. The mean-
ing of the first of these questions is greatly ambiguous, and neither of them can
properly be answered without going upon that infinitely absurd supposition that
Particular System of Christianity 171
If anything here said should appear, upon first
thought, inconsistent with divine goodness, a second, I
am persuaded, will entirely remove that appearance. For
were we to suppose the constitution of things to be such
as that the whole creation must have perished, had it not
been for somewhat which God had appointed should be,
in order to prevent that ruin ; even this supposition would
not be inconsistent in any degree with the most abso-
lutely perfect goodness. But still it may be thought that
this whole manner of treating the subject before us, sup-
poses mankind to be naturally in a very strange state. And
truly so it does. But it is not Christianity which has put
us into this state. Whoever will consider the manifold
miseries, and the extreme wickedness of the world, that
the best have great wrongnesses within themselves, which
they complain of, and endeavour to amend ; but that the
generality grow more profligate and corrupt with age ;
that even moralists thought the present state to be a
state of punishment ; and, what might be added, that
the earth our habitation has the appearances of being a
ruin : whoever, I say, will consider all these, and some
other obvious things, will think he has little reason to
object against the Scripture account, that mankind is in
a state of degradation, against this being the fact, how
difficult soever he may think it to account for, or even to
form a distinct conception of, the occasions and circum-
stances of it. But that the crime of our first parents
was the occasion of our being placed in a more dis-
advantageous condition, is a thing throughout and
particularly analogous to what we see in the daily course
of natural providence, as the recovery of the world by
the interposition of Christ has been shown to be so in
general.
VI. The particular manner in which Christ interposed
in the redemption of the world, or his office as Mediator^
in the largest sense, between God and man, is thus repre-
sented to us in the Scripture. H>. is the light of the
we know the whole of the case. And perhaps the very inquiry, What -would
have followed if God had not done as he has, may have in it some very great
impropriety, and ought not to be carried on any further than is necessary to help
our partial and inadequate conceptions of things.
172 The Analogy of Religion
world; 1 the revealer of the will of God in the most
eminent sense. He is a propitiatory sacrifice ; z the
Lamb of God : 3 and, as he voluntarily offered himself
up, he is styled our High Priest. 4 And, which seems of
peculiar weight, he is described beforehand in the Old
Testament under the same characters of a priest, and an
expiatory victim. 5 And whereas it is objected that all
this is merely by way of allusion to the sacrifices of the
Mosaic law ; the Apostle on the contrary affirms, that
the law was a shadow of good things to come, and not the
very image of the things : * and that the priests that offer
gifts according to the law serve unto the example and
shadow of heavenly things, as Moses was admonished of
God when he was about to make the tabernacle. For see
(saith he) that thou make all things according to the
pattern showed to thee in the mount: 1 i.e., the Levitical
priesthood was a shadow of the priesthood of Christ ;
in like manner as the tabernacle made by Moses was
according to that showed him in the mount. The
priesthood of Christ, and the tabernacle in the mount,
were the originals ; of the former of which the Levitical
priesthood was a type, and of the latter the tabernacle
made by Moses was a copy. The doctrine of this
epistle then plainly is, that the legal sacrifices were
allusions to the great and final atonement to be made by
the blood of Christ, and not that this was an allusion to
those. Nor can anything be more express or determinate
than the following passage. // is not possible that the
Mood of bulls and of goats should take away sins. Where-
fore, when he cometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice and
offering, i.e., of bulls and of goats, thou wouldest not, but
a body hast thou prepared me. Lo, I come to do thy will,
O God. By the which will we are sanctified through the
offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all? And
to add one passage more of the like kind : Christ was
1 John i. and viii. it.
2 Rom. iii. 25, v. n ; i Cor. v. 7 ; Eph. v. a ; \ John ii. a ; Matt. xxvi. 28.
* John L 29, 36, and throughout the book of Revelation.
4 Throughout the epistle to the Hebrews.
* Isa. liii. ; Dan. ix. 24 ; Ps. ex. 4. 6 Heb. z. i.
* Heb. viii. 4, 5. s Heb. x. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10.
Particular System of Christianity 173
once offered to bear the sins of many ; and unto them that
look for him shall he appear the second time, without sin ;
i.e., without bearing sin, as he did at his first coming,
by being an offering for it, without having our iniquities
again laid upon him, without being any more a sin-offer-
ing : unto them that look for him shall he appear the
second time, without sin, unto salvation?- Nor do the in-
spired writers at all confine themselves to this manner of
speaking concerning the satisfaction of Christ; but de-
clare an efficacy in what he did and suffered for us,
additional to and beyond mere instruction, example,
and government, in great variety of expression : Thai
Jesus should die for that nation, the Jews, and not for
that nation only, but that also, plainly by the efficacy of
his death, he should gather together in one the children oj
God that were scattered abroad : 2 that he suffered for sins,
the just for the unjust:* that he gave his life, himself,
a ransom : * that we are bought, bought with a price : 5
that he redeemed us with his blood : redeemed us from the
curse of the law, being made a curse for us : 6 that he is
our advocate, intercessor, and propitiation : 7 that he was
made perfect, or consummate, through sufferings ; and
being thus made perfect, he became the author of salvation : s
that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself,
by the death of his Son by the cross, not imputing their
trespasses unto them : 9 and lastly, that through death he
destroyed him that had the power of death Christ then,
having thus humbled himself, and become obedient unto
death, even the death of the cross ; God also hath highly
exalted him, and given him a name which is above every
name, hath given all things into his hands, hath committed
all judgment unto him ; that all men should honour the
Son, even as they honour the Father- For worthy is the
Lamb that was slain to receive power, and riches, and
wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and blessing.
1 Heb. ix. 28. * John xi. 51, 52.
4 Matt. xx. 28 ; Mark x. 45 ; i Tim. ii. 6.
i Pet. iii. 18.
a Pet. ii. i ; Rev. xiv. 4 ; i Cor. vi. 20.
* i Pet. i. 19 ; Rev. r. 9; Gal. iii. 13. 7 Heb. vii. 25 ; i John ii. i,
8 Heb. ii. 10, .9. 9 2 Cor. v. 19; Rom v. 10 ; Eph u. 16.
10 Heb. ii. 14. See also a remarkable passage in the book of Job, xxxiii 14,
H Phi! ii. 8, g ; John iii. 35, v. 22, 13.
174 The Analogy of Religion
And every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth,
heard I saying, Blessing, and honour, and glory, and
power, be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto
the Lamb, for ever and ever. 1
These passages of Scripture seem to comprehend and
express the chief parts of Christ's office as Mediator
between God and man, so far, I mean, as the nature of
this his office is revealed; and it is usually treated of
by divines under three heads.
First. He was by way of eminence the Prophet, that
Prophet that should come into the world* to declare the
divine will. He published anew the law of nature,
which men had corrupted; and the very knowledge of
which, to some degree, was lost among them. He
taught mankind, taught us authoritatively, to live soberly,
righteously, and godly, in this present world, in expecta-
tion of the future judgment of God.
He confirmed the truth of this moral system of
nature, and gave us additional evidence of it, the evi-
dence of testimony. 8 He distinctly revealed the manner
in which God would be worshipped, the efficacy of
repentance, and the rewards and punishments of a
future life. Thus he was a prophet in a sense in which
no other ever was. To which is to be added, that he
set us a perfect example, that we should follow his steps.
Secondly. He has a kingdom which is not of this world.
He founded a church to be to mankind a standing
memorial of religion, and invitation to it ; which he
promised to be with always even to the end. He exer-
cises an invisible government over it himself, and by his
Spirit : over that part of it which is militant here on
earth, a government of discipline, for the perfecting of
the saints, for the edifying his body : till we all come in
the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of
God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature
of the fulness of Christ.* Of this church, all persons
scattered over the world, who live in obedience to his
laws, are members. For these he is gone to prepare a
place, and will come again to receive them unto himself,
1 Rev. T. 12, 13. s John vi. 14. * P. 121. * Eph. ir. 12, 13.
Particular System of Christianity 175
that where he is, there they may be also ; and reign with
him for ever and ever -^ and likewise to take vengeance on
them that know not God, and obey not his Gospel?
Against these parts of Christ's office I find no objec-
tions but what are fully obviated in the beginning of
this chapter,
Lastly. Christ offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice,
and made atonement for the sins of the world ; which
is mentioned last, in regard to what is objected against
it. Sacrifices of expiation were commanded the Jews,
and obtained amongst most other nations, from tradi-
tion, whose original probably was revelation. And they
were continually repeated, both occasionally, and at the
returns of stated times ; and made up great part of the
external religion of mankind. But now once in the end
of the world Christ appeared to put away sin by the
sacrifice of himself? And this sacrifice was, in the high-
est degree and with the most extensive influence, of that
efficacy for obtaining pardon of sin which the heathens
may be supposed to have thought their sacrifices to
have been, and which the Jewish sacrifices really were
in some degree, and with regard to some persons.
How and in what particular way it had this efficacy,
there are not wanting persons who have endeavoured to
explain ; but I do not find that the Scripture has ex-
plained it. We seem to be very much in the dark
concerning the manner in which the ancients under-
stood atonement to be made, i.e., pardon to be obtained
by sacrifices. And if the Scripture has, as surely it has,
left this matter of the satisfaction of Christ mysterious,
left somewhat in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it
must be, if not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain.
Nor has any one reason to complain for want of further
information, unless he can show his claim to it.
Some have endeavoured to explain the efficacy of
what Christ has done and suffered for us, beyond what
the Scripture has authorized : others, probably because
they could not explain it, have been for taking it away,
and confining his office as Redeemer of the world to his
1 John xiv. a, 3 ; Re. iii. 21, >ti. 15. a Thess. i. 8. * Heb. ix. 26.
176 The Analogy of Religion
instruction, example, and government of the church.
Whereas the doctrine of the Gospel appears to be, not
only that he taught the efficacy of repentance, but
rendered it of the efficacy of which it is, by what he did
and suffered for us : that he obtained for us the benefit
of having our repentance accepted unto eternal life :
not only that he revealed to sinners that they were in a
capacity of salvation, and how they might obtain it, but,
moreover, that he put them into this capacity of salva-
tion by what he did and suffered for them ; put us into
a capacky of escaping future punishment, and obtaining
future happiness. And it is our wisdom thankfully to
accept the benefit, by performing the conditions upon
which it is offered, on our part, without disputing how
it was procured on his. For,
VII. Since we neither know by what means punish-
ment in a future state would have followed wickedness
in this, nor in what manner it would have been inflicted
had it not been prevented; nor all the reasons why
its infliction would have been needful ; nor the particu-
lar nature of that state of happiness which Christ is
gone to prepare for his disciples : and since we are
ignorant how far anything which we could do, would,
alone and of itself, have been effectual to prevent that
punishment to which we were obnoxious, and recover
that happiness which we had forfeited ; it is most evi-
dent we are not judges, antecedently to revelation,
whether a mediator was or was not necessary to obtain
those ends; to prevent that future punishment, and
bring mankind to the final happiness of their nature.
And for the very same reasons, upon supposition of the
necessity of a mediator, we are no more judges, ante-
cedently to revelation, of the whole nature of his office,
or the several parts of which it consists, of what was fit
and requisite to be assigned him, in order to accom-
plish the ends of divine Providence in the appointment.
And from hence it follows, that to object against the
expediency or usefulness of particular things, revealed
to have been done or suffered by him, because we do
not see how they were conducive to those ends, is
Particular System of Christianity 177
highly absurd. Yet nothing is more common to be
met with than this absurdity. But if it be acknow-
ledged beforehand that we are not judges in the case, it
is evident that no objection can, with any shadow of
reason, be urged against any particular part of Christ's
mediatorial office revealed in Scripture, till it can be
shown positively not to be requisite or conducive to the
ends proposed to be accomplished, or that is in itself
unreasonable.
And there is one objection made against the satis-
faction of Christ, which looks to be of this positive
kind : that the doctrine of his being appointed to suffer
for the sins of the world, represents God as being
indifferent whether he punished the innocent or guilty.
Now from the foregoing observations we may see the
extreme slightness of all such objections ; and (though
it is most certain all who make them do not see the
consequence) that they conclude altogether as much
against God's whole original constitution of nature, and
the whole daily course of divine Providence in the
government of the world, i.e., against the whole scheme
of Theism and the whole notion of Religion, as against
Christianity. For the world is a constitution or system,
whose parts have a mutual reference to each other : and
there is a scheme of things gradually carrying on, called
the course of nature, to the carrying on of which God
has appointed us in various ways to contribute. And
when, in the daily course of natural providence, it is
appointed that innocent people should suffer for the
faults of the guilty, this is liable to the very same ob-
jection as the instance we are now considering. The
infinitely greater importance of that appointment of
Christianity which is objected against, does not hinder,
but it may be, as it plainly is, an appointment of the
very same kind, with what the world affords us daily
examples of. Nay, if there were any force at all in the
objection, it would be stronger, in one respect, against
natural providence than against Christianity; because
under the former we are in many cases commanded,
and even necessitated, whether we will or no, to suffer
o 9
178 The Analogy of Religion
for the faults of others ; whereas the sufferings of Christ
were voluntary. The world's being under the righteous
government of God does indeed imply, that finally and
upon the whole, every one shall receive according to his
personal deserts ; and the general doctrine of the whole
Scripture is, that this shall be the completion of the
divine government. But during the progress, and, for
aught we know, even in order to the completion of this
moral scheme, vicarious punishments may be fit, and
absolutely necessary. Men, by their follies, run them-
selves into extreme distress; into difficulties which
would be absolutely fatal to them, were it not for the
interposition and assistance of others. God commands
by the law of nature, that we afford them this assistance,
in many cases where we cannot do it without very great
pains, and labour, and sufferings to ourselves. And we
see in what variety of ways one person's sufferings con-
tribute to the relief of another; and how, or by what
particular means, this comes to pass, or follows, from
the constitution and laws of nature which came under
our notice ; and, being familiarized to it, men are not
shocked with it. So that the reason of their insisting
upon objections of the foregoing kind against the satis-
faction of Christ is, either that they do not consider
God's settled and uniform appointments as his appoint-
ments at all, or else they forget that vicarious punish-
ment is a providential appointment of every day's
experience; and then, from their being unacquainted
with the more general laws of nature or divine govern-
ment over the world, and not seeing how the sufferings
of Christ could contribute to the redemption of it,
unless by arbitrary and tyrannical will ; they conclude
his sufferings could not contribute to it any other way.
And yet, what has been often alleged in justification of
this doctrine, even from the apparent natural tendency
of this method of our redemption : its tendency to
vindicate the authority of God's laws, and deter his
creatures from sin ; this has never yet been answered,
and is, I think, plainly unanswerable, though I am far
from thinking it an account of the whole of the case.
Particular System of Christianity 179
But without taking this into consideration, it abundantly
appears, from the observations above made, that this
objection is not an objection against Christianity, but
against the whole general constitution of nature. And
if it were to be considered as an objection against
Christianity, or considering it as it is, an objection
against the constitution of nature, it amounts to no
more in conclusion than this, that a divine appointment
cannot be necessary or expedient, because the objector
does not discern it to be so, though he must own that
the nature of the case is such as renders him incapable
of judging whether it be so or not, or of seeing it to be
necessary, though it were so.
It is indeed a matter of great patience to reasonable
men, to find people arguing in this manner ; objecting
against the credibility of such particular things revealed
in Scripture, that they do not see the necessity or
expediency of them. For though it is highly right, and
the most pious exercise of our understanding, to inquire
with due reverence into the ends and reasons of God's
dispensation ; yet when those reasons are concealed, to
argue from our ignorance, that such dispensations can-
not be from God, is infinitely absurd. The presumption
of this kind of objections seems almost lost in the folly
of them. And the folly of them is yet greater, when
they are urged, as usually they are, against things in
Christianity analogous or like to those natural dis-
pensations of Providence which are matter of experi-
ence. Let reason be kept to; and if any part of the
Scripture account of the redemption of the world by
Christ can be shown to be really contrary to it, let the
Scripture, in the name of God, be given up ; but let not
such poor creatures as we go on objecting against an
infinite scheme, that we do not see the necessity or use-
fulness of all its parts, and call this reasoning ; and,
which still further heightens the absurdity in the present
case, parts which we are not actively concerned in.
For it may be worth mentioning.
Lastly. That not only the reason of the thing, but
the whole analogy of nature, should teach us not to
i8o The Analogy of Religion
expect to have the like information concerning the
divine conduct, as concerning our own duty. God
instructs us by experience (for it is not reason, but
experience which instructs us) what good or bad con-
sequences will follow from our acting in such and such
manners; and by this he directs us how we are to
behave ourselves. But though we are sufficiently in-
structed for the common purposes of life, yet it is but
an almost infinitely small part of natural providence
which we are at all let into. The case is the same with
regard to revelation. The doctrine of a mediator be-
tween God and man, against which it is objected that
the expediency of some things in it is not understood,
relates only to what was done on God's part in the
appointment, and on the Mediator's in the execution of
it. For what is required of us in consequence of this
gracious dispensation is another subject, in which none
can complain for want of information. The constitution
of the world, and God's natural government over it, is
all mystery, as much as the Christian dispensation.
Yet under the first he has given men all things pertain-
ing to life; and under the other all things pertaining
unto godliness. And it may be added, that there is
nothing hard to be accounted for in any of the common
precepts of Christianity ; though if there were, surely
a divine command is abundantly sufficient to lay us
under the strongest obligations to obedience. But the
fact is, that the reasons of all the Christian precepts are
evident. Positive institutions are manifestly necessary
to keep up and propagate religion amongst mankind.
And our duty to Christ, the internal and external wor-
ship of him ; this part of the religion of the Gospel
manifestly arises out of what he has done and suffered,
his authority and dominion, and the relation which he
is revealed to stand in to us. 1
1 P. 126, &c.
Revelation not Universal 181
CHAPTER VI
OF THE WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELA-
TION ; AND OF THE SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN
THE PROOF OF IT
IT has been thought by some persons that if the
evidence of revelation appears doubtful, this itself turns
into a positive argument against it because it cannot be
supposed that, if it were true, it would be left to subsist
upon doubtful evidence. And the objection against
revelation from its not being universal is often insisted
upon as of great weight.
Now the weakness of these opinions may be shown
by observing the suppositions on which they are founded,
which are really such as these : that it cannot be
thought God would have bestowed any favour at all upon
us, unless in the degree which we think he might, and
which we imagine would be most to our particular
advantage ; and also that it cannot be thought he
would bestow a favour upon any unless he bestowed
the same upon all suppositions which we find contra-
dicted not by a few instances in God's natural govern-
ment of the world, but by the general analogy of nature
together.
Persons who speak of the evidence of religion as
doubtful, and of this supposed doubtfulness as a positive
argument against it, should be put upon considering
what that evidence indeed is, which they act upon with
regard to their temporal interests. For it is not only
extremely difficult, but in many cases absolutely impos-
sible, to balance pleasure and pain, satisfaction and
uneasiness, so as to be able to say on which side the
overplus is. There are the like difficulties and im-
possibilities in making the due allowances for a change
of temper and taste, for satiety, disgusts, ill-health ; any
of which render men incapable of enjoying, after they
have obtained what they most eagerly desired. Number-
less too are the accidents, besides that one of untimely
1 82 The Analogy of Religion
death, which may even probably disappoint the best con-
certed schemes : and strong objections are often seen to
lie against them, not to be removed or answered, but
which seem overbalanced by reasons on the other side ;
so as that the certain difficulties and dangers of the pur-
suit are by every one thought justly disregarded, upon
account of the appearing greater advantages in case of
success, though there be but little probability of it.
Lastly, every one observes our liableness, if we be not
upon our guard, to be deceived by the falsehood of men
and the false appearances of things ; and this danger
must be greatly increased if there be a strong bias
within, suppose from indulged passion, to favour the
deceit. Hence arises that great uncertainty and doubt-
fulness of proof wherein our temporal interest really con-
sists, what are the most probable means of attaining it,
and whether those means will eventually be successful.
And numberless instances there are, in the daily course
of life, in which all men think it reasonable to engage
in pursuits, though the probability is greatly against
succeeding ; and to make such provision for themselves
as it is supposable they may have occasion for, though
the plain acknowledged probability is that they never
shall. Then those who think the objection against
revelation, from its light not being universal, to be of
weight, should observe, that the Author of Nature, in
numberless instances, bestows that upon some which he
does not upon others, who seem equally to stand in need
of it. Indeed, he appears to bestow all his gifts with
the most promiscuous variety among creatures of the
same species : health and strength, capacities of prudence
and of knowledge, means of improvement, riches, and
all external advantages. And as there are not any two
men found of exactly like shape and features, so it is
probable there are not any two of an exactly like con-
stitution, temper, and situation with regard to the goods
and evils of life. Yet, notwithstanding these uncertain-
ties and varieties, God does exercise a natural govern-
ment over the world, and there is such a thing as
a prudent and imprudent institution of life, with regard
Revelation not Universal 183
to our health and our affairs, under that his natural
government.
As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation have
been universal, and as they have been afforded to a
greater or less part of the world at different times, so
likewise at different times both revelations have had
different degrees of evidence. The Jews who lived during
the succession of prophets, that is, from Moses till after
the Captivity, had higher evidence of the truth of their
religion, than those had who lived in the interval between
the last-mentioned period and the coming of Christ.
And the first Christians had higher evidence of the
miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity than what
we have now. They had also a strong presumptive
proof of the truth of it, perhaps of much greater force
in way of argument than many think, of which we have
very little remaining ; I mean the presumptive proof of
its truth from the influence which it had upon the lives
of the generality of its professors. And we, or future
ages, may possibly have a proof of it, which they could
not have, from the conformity between the prophetic
history, and the state of the world and of Christianity.
And further, if we were to suppose the evidence which
some have of religion to amount to little more than see-
ing that it may be true, but that they remain in great
doubts and uncertainties about both its evidence and its
nature, and great perplexities concerning the rule of
life ; others to have a full conviction of the truth of
religion, with a distinct knowledge of their duty, and
others severally to have all the intermediate degrees of
religious light and evidence which lie between these two
if we put the case, that for the present, it was in-
tended revelation should be no more than a small light,
in the midst of a world greatly overspread, notwithstand-
ing it, with ignorance and darkness ; that certain glimmer-
ings of this light should extend and be directed to
remote distances, in such a manner as that those who
really partook of it should not discern from whence it
originally came ; that some in a nearer situation to it
should have its light obscured, and, in different ways and
184 The Analogy of Religion
de^ees, intercepted : and that others should be placed
within its clearer influence, and be much more enlivened,
cheered, and directed by it ; but yet that even to these
it should be no more than a light shining in a dark place ;
all this would be perfectly uniform, and of a piece with
the conduct of Providence, in the distribution of its
other blessings. If the fact of the case really were that
some have received no light at all from the Scripture, as
many ages and countries in the heathen world ; that
others, though they have, by means of it, had essential
or natural religion enforced upon their consciences, yet
have never had the genuine Scripture revelation with its
real evidence proposed to their consideration ; and the
ancient Persians and modern Mahometans may possibly
be instances of people in a situation somewhat like to
this ; that others though they have had the Scripture laid
before them as of divine revelation, yet have had it with
the system and evidence of Christianity so interpola ed,
the system so corrupted, the evidence so blended with
false miracles, as to leave the mind in the utmost doubt-
fulness and uncertainty about the whole, which may be
the state of some thoughtful men in most of those
nations who call themselves Christian ; and lastly, that
others have had Christianity offered to them in its
genuine simplicity, and with its proper evidence, as per-
sons in countries and churches of civil and of Christian
liberty ; but however that even these persons are left in
great ignorance in many respects, and have by no means
light afforded them enough to satisfy their curiosity, but
only to regulate their life, to teach them their duty, and
encourage them in the careful discharge of it ; I say, if
we were to suppose this somewhat of a general true
account of the degrees of moral and religious light and
evidence which were intended to be afforded mankind,
and of what has actually been and is their situation in
their moral and religious capacity; there would be
nothing in all this ignorance, doubtfulness, and uncer-
tainty, in all these varieties and supposed disadvantages
of some in comparison of others, respecting religion,
but may be paralleled by manifest analogies in the
Revelation not Universal 185
natural dispensations of Providence at present, and con-
sidering ourselves merely in our temporal capacity.
Nor is there anything shocking in all this, or which
would seem to bear hard upon the moral administration
in nature, if we would really keep in mind, that every
one shall be dealt equitably with : instead of forgetting
this, or explaining it away, after it is acknowledged in
words. All shadow of injustice, and indeed all harsh
appearances, in this various economy of Providence,
would be lost, if we would keep in mind, that every
merciful allowance shall be made, and no more be
required of any one, than what might have been equit-
ably expected of him, from the circumstances in which
he was placed ; and not what might have been expected
had he been placed in other circumstances: i.e., in
Scripture language, that every man shall be accepted
according to what he had, not according to what he had
not)- This, however, doth not by any means imply,
that all persons' condition here is equally advantageous
with respect to futurity. And Providence's designing to
place some in greater darkness with respect to religious
knowledge, is no more a reason why they should not
endeavour to get out of that darkness, and others to
bring them out of it, than why ignorant and slow people,
in matters of other knowledge, should not endeavour to
learn, or should not be instructed.
It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same wise
and good principle, whatever it was, which disposed the
Author of Nature to make different kinds and orders of
creatures, disposed him also to place creatures of like
kinds in different situations : and that the same prin-
ciple which disposed him to make creatures of different
moral capacities, disposed him also to place creatures of
like moral capacities in different religious situations ; and
even the same creatures in different periods of their
being. And the account or reason of this is also most
probably the account why the constitution of things is
such as that creatures of moral natures or capacities, for
a considerable part of that duration in which they are
I C j:. viii. 12.
1 86 The Analogy of Religion
living agents, are not at all subjects of morality and
religion, but grow up to be so, and grow up to be so more
and more gradually from childhood to mature age.
What, in particular, is the account or reason of these
things, we must be greatly in the dark, were it only that
we know so very little even of our own case. Our pre-
sent state may possibly be the consequence of somewhat
past, which we are wholly ignorant of, as it has a refer-
ence to somewhat to come, of which we know scarce any
more than is necessary for practice. A system, or con-
stitution, in its notion, implies variety ; and so compli-
cated a one as this world, very great variety. So that
were revelation universal, yet, from men's different
capacities of understanding, from the different lengths of
their lives, their different educations and other external
circumstances, and from their difference of temper and
bodily constitution ; their religious situations would be
widely different, and the disadvantage of some in com-
parison of others, perhaps, altogether as much as at
present. And the true account, whatever it be, why
mankind, or such a part of mankind, are placed in this
condition of ignorance, most be supposed also the true
account of our further ignorance in not knowing the
reasons why, or whence it is, that they are placed in this
condition. But the following practical reflections may
deserve the serious consideration of those persons who
think the circumstances of mankind or their own, in the
forementioned respects, a ground of complaint.
First. The evidence of religion not appearing obvious,
may constitute one particular part of some men's trial
in the religious sense ; as it gives scope for a virtuous
exercise, or vicious neglect of their understanding, in
examining or not examining into that evidence. There
seems no possible reason to be given, why we may not
be in a state of moral probation, with regard to the
exercise of our understanding upon the subject of re-
ligion, as we are with regard to our behaviour in
common affairs. The former is as much a thing within
our power and choice as the latter. And I suppose it
is to be laid down for certain, that the same character,
Revelation not Universal 187
the same inward principle, which, after a man is con-
vinced of the truth of religion, renders him obedient to
the precepts of it, would, were he not thus convinced,
set him about an examination of it, upon its system and
evidence being offered to his thoughts ; and that in the
latter state his examination would be with an imparti-
ality, seriousness and solicitude, proportionable to what
his obedience is in the former. And as inattention,
negligence, want of all serious concern, about a matter
of such a nature and such importance, when offered to
men's consideration, is, before a distinct conviction of
its truth, as real immoral depravity and dissoluteness, as
neglect of religious practice after such conviction ; so
active solicitude about it, and fair impartial considera-
tion of its evidence, before such conviction, is as really
an exercise of a morally right temper, as is religious
practice after. Thus, that religion is not intuitively
true, but a matter of deduction and inference ; that a
conviction of its truth is not forced upon every one,
but left to be, by some, collected with heedful attention
to premises; this as much constitutes religious proba-
tion, as much affords sphere, scope, opportunity, for
right and wrong behaviour, as anything whatever does.
And their manner of treating this subject, when laid
before them, shows what is in their heart, and is an
exertion of it.
Secondly. It appears to be a thing as evident, though
it is not so much attended to, that if, upon considera-
tion of religion, the evidence of it should seem to any
persons doubtful, in the highest supposable degree, even
this doubtful evidence will, however, put them into a
general state of probation in the moral and religious
sense. For, suppose a man to be really in doubt
whether such a person had not done him the greatest
favour ; or, whether his whole temporal interest did not
depend upon that person : no one, who had any sense
of gratitude and of prudence, could possibly consider
himself in the same situation, with regard to such
person, as if he had no such doubt. In truth, it is as
just to say that certainty and doubt are the same, as to
1 88 The Analogy of Religion
ay the situations now mentioned would leave a man as
entirely at liberty in point of gratitude or prudence, as
he would be were he certain he had received no favour
irom such person, or that he no way depended upon
him. And thus, though the evidence of religion which
is afforded to some men should be little more than they
are given to see the system of Christianity, or religion
in general, to be supposable and credible, this ought in
all reason to beget a serious practical apprehension that
it may be true. And even this will afford matter of
exercise for religious suspense and deliberation, for moral
resolution and self-government ; because the apprehen-
sion that religion may be true does as really lay men
under obligations as a full conviction that it is true. It
gives occasion and motives to consider further the im-
portant subject, to preserve attentively upon their minds
a general implicit sense that they may be under divine
moral government, an awful solicitude about religion,
whether natural or revealed. Such apprehension ought
to turn men's eyes to every degree of new light which
may be had, from whatever side it comes ; and induce
them to refrain, in the mean time, from all immoralities,
and live in the conscientious practice of every common
virtue. Especially are they bound to keep at the greatest
distance from all dissolute profaneness, for this the very
nature of the case forbids, and to treat with highest
reverence a matter upon which their own whole interest
and being, and the fate of nature, depend. This be-
haviour, and an active endeavour to maintain within
themselves this temper, is the business, the duty, and
the wisdom of those persons who complain of the doubt-
fulness of religion; is what they are under the most
proper obligations to, and such behaviour is an exertion
of, and has a tendency to improve in them that character
which the practice of all the several duties of religion,
from a full conviction of its truth, is an exertion of.
and has a tendency to improve in others : others, I
say, to whom God has afforded such conviction. Nay,
considering the infinite importance of religion, revealed
as well as natural, I think it may be said in general, that
Revelation not Universal 189
whoever will weigh the matter thoroughly, may see there
is not near so much difference, as is commonly imagined,
between what ought in reason to be the rule of life, to
those persons who are fully convinced of its truth, and
to those who have only a serious doubting apprehension
that it may be true. Their hopes, and fears, and obliga-
tions, will be in various degrees; but as the subject-
matter of their hopes and fears is the same, so the
subject-matter of their obligations, what they are bound
to do and to refrain from, is not so very unlike.
It is to be observed further, that, from a character of
understanding, or a situation of influence in the world,
some persons have it in their power to do infinitely
more harm or good, by setting an example of profane-
ness and avowed disregard to all religion, or, on the
contrary, of a serious, though perhaps doubting, appre-
hension of its truth, and of a reverend regard to it
under this doubtfulness, than they can do by acting well
or ill in all the common intercourses amongst mankind.
And consequently they are most highly accountable for
a behaviour, which, they may easily foresee, is of such
importance, and in which there is most plainly a right
and a wrong, even admitting the evidence of religion to
be as doubtful as is pretended.
The ground of these observations, and that which
renders them just and true, is that doubting necessarily
implies some degree of evidence for that of which we
doubt. For no person would be in doubt concerning
the truth of a number of facts so and so circumstanced,
which would accidentally come into his thoughts, and
of which he had no evidence at all. And though in
the case of an even chance, and were consequently we
were in doubt, we should in common language say that
we had no evidence at all for either side ; yet that
situation of things, which renders it an even chance and
no more, that such an event will happen, renders this
case equivalent to all others, where there is such evid-
ence on both sides of a question, 1 as leaves the mind in
doubt concerning the truth. Indeed in all these cases,
1 Introduction.
190 The Analogy of Religion
there is no more evidence on one side than on the
other ; but there is (what is equivalent to) much more
for either, than for the truth of a number of facts,
which come into one's thoughts at random. And thus,
in all these cases, doubt as much presupposes evidence,
lower degrees of evidence, as belief presupposes higher,
and certainty higher still. Any one who will a little
attend to the nature of evidence, will easily carry this
observation on, and see that between no evidence at all,
and that degree of it which affords ground of doubt,
there are as many intermediata degrees, as there are
between that degree which is the ground of doubt and
demonstration. And though we have not faculties to
distinguish these degrees of evidence with any sort of
exactness, yet, in proportion as they are discerned, they
ought to influence our practice. For it is as real an
imperfection in the moral character, not to be influenced
in practice by a lower degree of evidence when dis-
cerned, as it is in the understanding not to discern it.
And as, in all subjects which men consider, they dis-
cern the lower as well as higher degrees of evidence,
proportionably to their capacity of understanding : so,
in practical subjects, they are influenced in practice by
the lower as well as higher degrees of it, proportionably
to their fairness and honesty. And as, in proportion to
defects in the understanding, men are unapt to see lower
degrees of evidence, are in danger of overlooking evi-
dence when it is not glaring, and are easily imposed
upon in such cases ; so, in proportion to the corruption
of the heart, they seem capable of satisfying themselves
with having no regard in practice to evidence acknow-
ledged real, if it be not overbearing. From these things
it must follow, that doubting concerning religion im-
plies such a degree of evidence for it, as, joined with
the consideration of its importance, unquestionably lays
men under the obligations before mentioned, to have a
dutiful regard to it in all their behaviour.
Thirdly. The difficulties in which the evidence of
religion is involved, which some complain of, is no more
a just ground of complaint, than the external circum-
Revelation not Universal 191
stances of temptation which others are placed in, or
than difficulties in the practice of it, after a full convic-
tion of its truth. Temptations render our state a more
improving state of discipline, 1 than it would be other-
wise : as they give occasion for a more attentive exercise
of the virtuous principle, which confirms and strengthens
it, more than an easier or less attentive exercise of it
could. Now speculative difficulties are, in this respect,
of the very same nature with these external temptations.
For the evidence of religion not appearing obvious is to
some persons a temptation to reject it, without any
consideration at all ; and therefore requires such an
attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, seriously to
consider that evidence, as there would be no occasion
for, but for such temptation. And the supposed doubt-
fulness of its evidence, after it has been in some sort
considered, affords opportunity to an unfair mind of ex-
plaining away, and deceitfully hiding from itself, that
evidence which it might see; and also for men's en-
couraging themselves in vice, from hopes of impunity,
though they do clearly see thus much at least, that these
hopes are uncertain : in like manner as the common
temptation to many instances of folly, which end in
temporal infamy and ruin, is the ground for hope of not
being detected, and of escaping with impunity, i.e., the
doubtfulness of the proof beforehand, that such foolish
behaviour will thus end in infamy and ruin. On the
contrary, supposed doubtfulness in the evidence of
religion calls for a more careful and attentive exercise of
the virtuous principle, in fairly yielding themselves up
to the proper influence of any real evidence, though
doubtful; and in practising conscientiously all virtue,
though under some uncertainty, whether the government
in the universe may not possibly be such, as that vice
may escape with impunity. And in general, temptation,
meaning by this word the lesser allurements to wrong
and difficulties in the discharge of our duty, as well as
the greater ones ; temptation, I say, as such and of every
kind and degree, as it calls forth some virtuous efforts,
1 Part I. chap. v.
192 The Analogy of Religion
additional to what would otherwise have been wanting,
cannot but be an additional discipline and improvement
of virtue, as well as probation of it in the other senses
of that word. 1 So that the very same account is to be
given, why the evidence of religion should be left in
such a manner, as to require, in some, an attentive,
solicitous, perhaps painful exercise of their understand-
ing about it; as why others should be placed in such
circumstances, as that the practice of its common duties,
after a full conviction of the truth of it, should require
attention, solicitude, and pains; or, why appearing
doubtfulness should be permitted to afford matter of
temptation to some; as why external difficulties and
allurements should be permitted to afford matter of
temptation to others. The same account also is to be
given, why some should be exercised with temptations of
both these kinds; as why others should be exercised
with the latter in such very high degrees, as some have
been, particularly as the primitive Christians were.
Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing,
that the speculative difficulties, in which the evidence of
religion is involved, may make even the principal part
of some persons' trial. For as the chief temptations of
the generality of the world are the ordinary motives to
injustice or unrestrained pleasure; or to live in the
neglect of religion from that frame of mind, which
renders many persons almost without feeling as to any-
thing distant, or which is not the object of their senses :
so there are other persons without their shallowness of
temper, persons of a deeper sense as to what is invisible
and future ; who not only see, but have a general practi-
cal feeling, that what is to come will be present, and
that things are not less real for their not being the
objects of sense ; and who, from their natural constitu-
tion of body and of temper, and from their external
condition, may have small temptations to behave ill,
small difficulty in behaving well, in the common course
of life. Now when these latter persons have a distinct
full conviction of the truth of religion, without any pos-
1 Part I., chap, iv., and p. 83.
Revelation not Universal 193
sible doubts or difficulties, the practice of it is to them
unavoidable, unless they will do a constant violence to
their own minds ; and religion is scarce any more
a discipline to them, than it is to creatures in a state of
perfection. Yet these persons may possibly stand in
need of moral discipline and exercise in a higher degree,
than they would have by such an easy practice of
religion. Or it may be requisite, for reasons unknown
to us, that they should give some further manifestation 1
what is their moral character, to the creation of God,
than such a practice of it would be. Thus in the great
variety of religious situations in which men are placed,
what constitutes, what chiefly and peculiarly constitues,
the probation, in all senses, of some persons, may be
the difficulties in which the evidence of religion is
involved; and their principal and distinguished trial
may be, how they will behave under and with respect to
these difficulties. Circumstances in men's situation in
their temporal capacity, analogous in good measure to
this respecting religion, are to be observed. We find
some persons are placed in such a situation in the world,
as that their chief difficulty with regard to conduct, is
not the doing what is prudent when it is known ; for
this, in numberless cases, is, as easy as the contrary;
but to some the principal exercise is recollection and be-
ing upon their guard against deceits, the deceits suppose
of those about them ; against false appearances of reason
and prudence. To persons in some situations, the
principal exercise with respect to conduct is, attention
in order to inform themselves what is proper, what is
really the reasonable and prudent part to act.
But as I have hitherto gone upon supposition, that
men's dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion is not
owing to their neglects or prejudices ; it must be added,
on the other hand, in all common reason, and as what
the truth of the case plainly requires should be added,
that such dissatisfaction possibly may be owing to those,
possibly may be men's own fault. For,
If there are any persons who never set themselves
1 P. 8 3 .
p 90
194 The Analogy of Religion
heartily and in earnest to be informed in religion; if
there are any who secretly wish it may not prove true ;
and are less attentive to evidence than to difficulties,
and more to objections than to what is said in answer to
them : these persons will scarce be thought in a likely
way of seeing the evidence of religion, though it were
most certainly true, and capable of being ever so fully
proved. If any accustom themselves to consider this
subject usually in the way of mirth and sport ; if they
attend to forms and representations, and inadequate
manners of expression, instead of the real things in-
tended by them ; (for signs often can be no more than
inadequately expressive of the things signified;) or if
they substitute human errors in the room of divine
truth ; why may not all, or any of these things, hinder
some men from seeing that evidence, which really is
seen by others ; as a like turn of mind, with respect to
matters of common speculation and practice, does, we
find by experience, hinder them from attaining that
knowledge and right understanding, in matters of com-
mon speculation and practice, which more fair and
attentive minds attain to? And the effect will be the
same, whether their neglect of seriously considering the
evidence of religion, and their indirect behaviour with
regard to it, proceed from mere carelessness, or from the
grosser vices ; or whether it be owing to this, that forms
and figurative manners of expression, as well as errors,
administer occasions of ridicule, when the things in-
tended, and the truth itself, would not. Men may
indulge a ludicrous turn so far as to lose all sense of
conduct and prudence in worldly affairs, and even, as it
seems, to impair their faculty of reason. And in general,
levity, carelessness, passion, and prejudice do hinder us
from being rightly informed, with respect to common
things ; and they may, in like manner, and perhaps in
some further providential manner, with respect to moral
and religious subjects ; may hinder evidence from being
laid before us, and from being seen when it is. The
Scripture l does declare, that every one shall not under-
1 Dan. xii. 10. See also Isa. xxtx. 13, 14. Matt. vi. 23, and xi. 25, and xiii.
ti, 12. John iii. 19, and v. 44. i Cor. ii. 14, and 2 Cor. iv. 4. 2 Tim. Hi. 13 ;
Revelation not Universal 195
stand. And it makes no difference, by what providential
conduct this comes to pass : whether the evidence of
Christianity was, originally and with design, put and left
so, as that those who are desirous of evading moral obliga-
tions should not see it ; and that honest-minded persons
should: or whether it comes to pass by any other
means.
Further : the general proof of natural religion and of
Christianity does, I think, lie level to common men;
even those, the greatest part of whose time, from child-
hood to old age, is taken up with providing for them-
selves and their families the common conveniences,
perhaps necessaries, of life : those, I mean, of this rank
who ever think at all of asking after proof, or attending
to it. Common men, were they as much in earnest
about religion as about their temporal affairs, are capable
of being convinced, upon real evidence, that there is a
God who governs the world, and they feel themselves to
be of a moral nature, and accountable creatures. And
as Christianity entirely falls in with this their natural
sense of things, so they are capable, not only of being
persuaded, but of being made to see, that there is
evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it, and many
appearing completions of prophecy. But though this
proof is real and conclusive, yet it is liable to objections,
and may be run up into difficulties, which, however,
persons who are capable not only of talking of, but of
really seeing, are capable also of seeing through : i.e., not of
clearing up and answering them, so as to satisfy their
curiosity, for of such knowledge we are not capable with
respect to any one thing in nature ; but capable of see-
ing that the proof is not lost in these difficulties, or
destroyed by these objections. But then a thorough
examination into religion with regard to these objections,
which cannot be the business of every man, 'is a matter
and that affectionate as well as authoritive admonition, so very many times incul-
cated, He that hath tars to hear, let him hear. Grotius saw so strongly the thing
intended in these and other passages of Scripture of the like sense, as to say
that the proof given us of Christianity was less than it might have been, for
this very purpose : Ut ita sermo Evangelii tanquam lapis esset Lydius ad
qtum ingenia sanabilia explorarenlur. De Ver. R.C. lib. ii. towards the end.
196 The Analogy of Religion
of pretty large compass, and, from the nature of it,
requires some knowledge, as well as time and attention ;
to see how the evidence comes out, upon balancing one
thing with another, and what, upon the whole, is the
amount of it. Now, if persons who have picked up
these objections from others, and take for granted they
are of weight, upon the word of those from whom they
received them, or, by often retailing of them, come to
see or fancy they see them to be of weight ; will not pre-
pare themselves for such an examination, with a com-
petent degree of knowledge ; or will not give that time
and attention to the subject which, from the nature of it,
is necessary for attaining such information ; in this case
they must remain in doubtfulness, ignorance, or error :
in the same way as they must, with regard to common
sciences and matters of common life, if they neglect the
necessary means of being informed in them.
But still perhaps it will be objected, that if a prince
or common master were to send directions to a servant,
he would take care that they should always bear the certain
marks who they came from, and that their sense should
be always plain : so as that there should be no possible
doubt, if he could help it, concerning the authority or
meaning of them. Now, the proper answer to all this
kind of objection is, that, wherever the fallacy lies, it is
even certain we cannot argue thus with respect to Him
who is the governor of the world : and particularly that
he does not afford us such information, with respect
to our temporal affairs and interests, as experience
abundantly shows. However, there is a full answer to
this objection, from the very nature of religion. For,
the reason why a prince would give his directions in
this plain manner is, that he absolutely desires such an
external action should be done, without concerning him-
self with the motive or principle upon which it is done :
i.e., he regards only the external event, or the thing's
being done, and not at all, properly speaking, the doing
of it or the action. Whereas, the whole of morality and
religion consisting merely in action itself, there is no sort
of parallel between the cases. But if the prince be
Revelation not Universal 197
supposed to regard only the action ; i.e., only to desire
to exercise, or in any sense prove, the understanding or
loyalty of a servant ; he would not always give his orders
in such a plain manner. It may be proper to add, that
the will of God, respecting morality and religion, may be
considered either as absolute, or as only conditional. If
it be absolute, it can only be thus, that we should
act virtuously in such given circumstances ; not that we
should be brought to act so by his changing of our cir-
cumstances. And if God's will be thus absolute, then it
is in our power, in the highest and strictest sense, to do
or to contradict his will ; which is a most weighty con-
sideration. Or his will may be considered only as
conditional, that if we act so and so, we shall be
rewarded ; if otherwise, punished : of which conditional
will of the Author of Nature, the whole constitution of
it affords most certain instances.
Upon the whole : that we are in a state of religion
necessarily implies that we are in a state of probation :
and the credibility of our being at all in such a state
being admitted, there seems no peculiar difficulty in
supposing our probation to be, just as it is in those
respects which are above objecte.d against. There
seems no pretence, from the reason of the thing, to say
that the trial cannot equitably be anything, but whether
persons will act suitably to certain information, or such
as admits no room for doubt ; so as that there can be no
danger of miscarriage, but either from their not attend-
ing to what they certainly know, or from overbearing
passion hurrying them on to act contrary to it. For,
since ignorance and doubt afford scope for probation in
all senses, as really as intuitive conviction or certainty ;
and since the two former are to be put to the same
account as difficulties in practice, men's moral probation
may also be, whether they will take due care to inform
themselves by impartial consideration, and afterwards
whether they will act as the case requires upon the
evidence which they have, however doubtful. And this,
we find by experience, is frequently our probation 1 in our
1 Pp. 36, 189, &c.
198 The Analogy of Religion
temporal capacity. For the information which we want
with regard to our worldly interests is by no means
always given us of course, without any care of our own.
And we are greatly liable to self-deceit from inward
secret prejudices, and also to the deceits of others. So
that to be able to judge what is the prudent part often
requires much and difficult consideration. Then, after
we have judged the very best we can, the evidence upon
which we must act, if we will live and act at all, is per-
petually doubtful to a very high degree. And the con-
stitution and course of the world in fact is such, as that
want of impartial consideration what we have to do, and
venturing upon extravagant courses because it is doubt-
ful what will be the consequence, are often naturally,
i.e., -providentially, altogether as fatal, as misconduct
occasioned by heedless inattention to what we certainly
know, or disregarding it from overbearing passion.
Several of the observations here made may well seem
strange, perhaps unintelligible, to many good men. But
if the persons for whose sake they are made think so ;
persons who object as above, and throw off all regard to
religion under pretence of want of evidence ; I desire
them to consider again, whether their thinking so be
owing to anything unintelligible in these observations, or
to their own not having such a sense of religion and
serious solicitude about it, as even their state of scepti-
cism does in all reason require? It ought to be forced
upon the reflection of these persons, that our nature and
condition necessarily require us, in the daily course of
life to act upon evidence much lower than what is
commonly called probable ; to guard, not only against
what we fully believe will, but also against what we think
it supposable may, happen ; and to engage in pursuits
when the probability is greatly against success, if it be
credible, that possibly we may succeed in them.
Evidence for Christianity 199
CHAPTER VII
OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR
CHRISTIANITY
THE presumptions against revelation, and objections
against the general scheme of Christianity, and particu-
lar things relating to it, being removed ; there remains
to be considered what positive evidence we have for the
truth of it; chiefly in order to see what the analogy of
nature suggests with regard to that evidence, and the
objections against it : or to see what is, and is allowed
to be, the plain natural rule of judgment and of action
in our temporal concerns, in cases were we have the
same kind of evidence, and the same kind of objections
against it, that we have in the case before us.
Now in the evidence of Christianity there seem to be
several things of great weight not reducible to the head,
either of miracles, or the completion of prophecy, in the
common acceptation of the words. But these two are
its direct and fundamental proofs ; and those other things,
however considerable they are, yet ought never to be
urged apart from its direct proofs, but always to be
joined with them. Thus the evidence of Christianity
will be a long series of things, reaching, as it seems,
from the beginning of the world to the present time, of
great variety and compass, taking in both the direct and
also the collateral, proofs, and making up, all of them
together, one argument; the conviction arising from
which kind of proof may be compared to what they call
the effect in architecture or other works of art ; a result
from a great number of things so and so disposed, and
taken into one view. I shall therefore, first, make some
observations relating to miracles, and the appearing
completions of prophecy; and consider what analogy
suggests in answer to the objections brought against this
evidence. And, secondly, 1 shall endeavour to give some
account of the general argument now mentioned, con-
sisting both of the direct and collateral evidence,
2oo The Analogy of Religion
considered as making up one argument ; this being the
kind of proof upon which we determine most questions
of difficulty concerning common facts, alleged to have
happened, or seeming likely to happen ; especially ques-
tions relating to conduct.
First. I shall make some observations upon the direct
proof of Christianity from miracles and prophecy, and
upon the objections alleged against it.
I. Now the following observations relating to the
historical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of
Christianity appear to be of great weight.
i. The Old Testament affords us the same historical
evidence of the miracles of Moses and of the prophets,
as of the common civil history of Moses and the kings
of Israel, or as of the affairs of the Jewish nation. And
the Gospels and the Acts afford us the same historical
evidence of the miracles of Christ and the Apostles, as
of the common matters related in them. This, indeed,
could not have been affirmed by any reasonable man, if
the authors of these books, like many other historians,
had appeared to make an entertaining manner of writing
their aim, though they had interspersed miracles in their
works, at proper distances and upon proper occasions.
These might have animated a dull relation, amused the
reader, and engaged his attention. And the same
account would naturally have been given of them, as of
the speeches and descriptions of such authors : the same
account, in a manner, as is to be given, why the poets
made use of wonders and prodigies. But the facts, both
miraculous and natural, in Scripture, are related in plain
unadorned narratives : and both of them appear, in all
respects, to stand upon the same foot of historical
evidence. Further : some parts of Scripture containing
an account of miracles fully sufficient to prove the truth
of Christianity, are quoted as genuine, from the age in
which they are said to be written, down to the present :
and no other parts of them, material in the present
question, are omitted to be quoted in such manner as to
afford any sort of proof of their not being genuine.
And as common history, when called in question in any
Evidence for Christianity 201
instance, may often be greatly confirmed by contempo-
rary or subsequent events more known and acknow-
ledged : and as the common Scripture history, like
many others, is thus confirmed, so likewise is the mir-
aculous history or it, not only in particular instances,
but in general. For, the establishment of the Jewish
and Christian religions, which were events contemporary
with the miracles related to be wrought in attestation of
both, or subsequent to them, these events are just what
we should have expected, upon supposition such mir-
acles were really wrought to attest the truth of those
religions. These miracles are a satisfactory account of
those events : of which no other satisfactory account
can be given ; nor any account at all but what is imagin-
ary merely, and invented. It is to be added, that the
most obvious, the most easy and direct account of this
history, how it came to be written and to be received in
the world as a true history, is, that it really is so : nor
can any other account of it be easy and direct. Now,
though an account, not at all obvious, but very far-
fetched and indirect, may indeed be, and often is, the
true account of a matter, yet it cannot be admitted on
the authority of its being asserted. Mere guess, sup-
position, and possibility, when opposed to historical
evidence, prove nothing, but that historical evidence is
not demonstrative.
Now the just consequence from all this, I think, is,
that the Scripture-history in general is to be admitted
as an authentic genuine history, till somewhat positive
be alleged sufficient to invalidate it. But no man will
deny the consequence to be, that it cannot be rejected,
or thrown by as of no authority, till it can be proved to
be of none ; even though the evidence now mentioned
for its authority were doubtful. This evidence may be
confronted by historical evidence on the other side, if
there be any; or general incredibility in the things
related, or inconsistence in the general turn of the his-
tory, would prove it to be of no authority. But since,
upon the face of the matter, upon a first and general
view, the appearance is, that it is an authentic history ;
202 The Analogy of Religion
it cannot be determined to be fictitious without some
proof that it is so. And the following observations in
support of these, and coincident with them, will greatly
confirm the historical evidence for the truth of Chris-
tianity.
2. The Epistles of St. Paul, from the nature of epis-
tolary writing, and, moreover, from several of them
being written, not to particular persons, but to churches,
carry in them evidences of their being genuine, beyond
what can be in a mere historical narrative, left to the
world at large. This evidence, joined with that which
they have in common with the rest of the New Testa-
ment, seems not to leave so much as any particular
pretence for denying their genuineness, considered as
an ordinary matter of fact, or of criticism : I say par-
ticular pretence for denying it ; because any single fact,
of such a kind and such antiquity, may have general
doubts raised concerning it, from the very nature of
human affairs and human testimony. There is also
to be mentioned a distinct and particular evidence of
the genuineness of the epistle chiefly referred to here,
the first to the Corinthians ; from the manner in which
it is quoted by Clemens Romanus, in an epistle of his
own to that church. 1 Now these epistles afford a proof
of Christianity, detached from all others, which is, I
think, a thing of weight; and also a proof of a nature
and kind peculiar to itself. For,
In them the author declares, that he received the
Gospel in general, and the institution of the Com-
munion in particular, not from the rest of the Apostles,
or jointly together with them, but alone, from Christ
himself; whom he declares likewise, comformably to
the history in the Acts, that he saw after his ascension; 2
so that the testimony of St. Paul is to be considered as
detached from that of the rest of the Apostles.
And he declares further, that he was endued with a
power of working miracles, as what was publicly known
to those very people, speaks of frequent and great
1 Clem. Rom. Ep. i, c. 47.
* Gal. i. ; i Cor. xi. 23, &c. ; i Cor. xv. 8.
Evidence for Christianity 203
variety of miraculous gifts as then subsisting in those
very churches to which he was writing; which he was
reproving for several irregularities ; and where he had
personal opposers : he mentions these gifts incidentally,
in the most easy manner, and without effort ; by way of
reproof to those who had them, for their indecent use
of them; and by way of depreciating them, in com-
parison of moral virtues : in short, he speaks of these
churches, of these miraculous powers, in the manner
any one would speak to another of a thing, which was
as familiar, and as much known in common to them
both, as anything in the world. 1 And this, as hath been
observed by several persons, is surely a very consider-
able thing.
3. It is an acknowledged historical fact, that Chris-
tianity offered itself to the world, and demanded to be
received, upon the allegation, i.e., as unbelievers would
speak, upon the pretence, of miracles, publicly wrought
to attest the truth of it in such an age ; and that it was
actually received by great numbers in that very age, and
upon the professed belief of the reality of these miracles.
And Christianity, including the dispensation of the Old
Testament, seems distinguished by this from all other
religions. I mean, that this does not appear to be the
case with regard to any other ; for surely it will not be
supposed to lie upon any person to prove by positive
historical evidence that it was not. It does in no sort
appear that Mahometanism was first received in the
world upon the foot of supposed miracles, 2 i.e., public
ones : for, as revelation is itself miraculous, all pretence
to it must necessarily imply some pretence of miracles.
And it is a known fact, that it was immediately, at the
very first, propagated by other means. And as particu-
lar institutions, whether in Paganism or Popery, said to
be confirmed by miracles after those institutions had
obtained, are not to the purpose : so, were there what
might be called historical proof, that any of them were
1 Rom. xv. 19 ; i Cor. xii. 8, g, 10-28, &c., and xiii. i, 2, 8, and the whole
zivth chapter ; 2 Cor. xii. 12, 13 ; Gal. iii. 2, 5.
2 See the Koran, ch. xiii. and ch. xvii.
204 The Analogy of Religion
introduced by a supposed divine command, believed to
be attested by miracles ; these would not be in any wise
parallel. For single things of this sort are easy to be
accounted for, after parties are formed, and have power
in their hands ; and the leaders of them are in venera-
tion with the multitude ; and political interests are
blended with religious claims and religious distinctions.
But before anything of this kind, for a few persons, and
those of the lowest rank, all at once, to bring over such
numbers to a new religion, and get it to be received
upon the particular evidence of miracles ; this is quite
another thing. And I think it will be allowed by any
fair adversary, that the fact now mentioned, taking in all
the circumstances of it, is peculiar to the Christian
religion. However, the fact itself is allowed, that Chris-
tianity obtained, i.e., was professed to be received in the
world, upon the belief of miracles, immediately in the
age in which it is said those miracles were wrought : or
that this is what its first converts would have alleged, as
the reason for their embracing it. Now certainly it is
not to be supposed that such numbers of men, in the
most distant parts of the world, should forsake the
religion of their country, in which they had been edu-
cated ; separate themselves from their friends, particu-
larly in their festival shows and solemnities, to which
the common people are so greatly addicted, and which
were of a nature to engage them much more than any-
thing of that sort amongst us ; and embrace a religion,
which could not but expose them to many incon-
veniences, and indeed must have been a giving up the
world in a great degree, even from the very first, and
before the empire engaged in form against them : it
cannot be supposed, that such numbers should make so
great, and, to say the least, so inconvenient a change in
their whole institution of life, unless they were really
convinced of the truth of those miracles upon the
knowledge or belief of which they professed to make it.
And it will, I suppose, readily be acknowledged, that
the generality of the first converts to Christianity must
have believed them : that as by becoming Christians they
Evidence for Christianity 205
declared to the world, they were satisfied of the truth of
those miracles : so this declaration was to be credited.
And this their testimony is the same kind of evidence
for those miracles, as if they had put it in writing, and
these writings had come down to us. And it is real
evidence, because it is of facts, which they had capacity
and full opportunity to inform themselves of. It is also
distinct from the direct or express historical evidence,
though it is of the same kind : and it would be allowed
to be distinct in all cases. For were a fact expressly
related by one or more ancient historians, and disputed
in after ages; that this fact is acknowledged to have
been believed by great numbers of the age in which the
historian says it was done, would be allowed an ad-
ditional proof of such fact, quite distinct from the
express testimony of the historian. The credulity of
mankind is acknowledged : and the suspicions of man-
kind ought to be acknowledged too; and their back-
wardness even to believe, and greater still to practise,
what makes against their interest. And it must par-
ticularly be remembered, that education, and prejudice,
and authority, were against Christianity, in the age I am
speaking of. So that the immediate conversion of such
numbers is a real presumption of somewhat more than
human in this matter : I say presumption, for it is not
alleged as a proof alone and by itself. Nor need any
one of the things mentioned in this chapter be con-
sidered as a proof by itself : and yet all of them together
may be one of the strongest. 1
Upon the whole : as there is large historical evidence,
both direct and circumstantial, of miracles wrought in
attestation of Christianity, collected by those who have
writ upon the subject ; it lies upon unbelievers to show,
why this evidence is not to be credited. This way of
speaking is, I think, just ; and what persons who write
in defence of religion naturally fall into. Yet, in a
matter of such unspeakable importance, the proper ques-
tion is, not whom it lies upon, according to the rules of
argument, to maintain or confute objections : but whether
1 P. 2JI, &C.
206 The Analogy of Religion
there really are any, against this evidence, sufficient, in
reason, to destroy the credit of it. However, unbelievers
seem to take upon them the part of showing that there
are.
They allege, that numberless enthusiastic people, in
different ages and countries, expose themselves to the
same difficulties which the primitive Christians did ;
and are ready to give up their lives for the most idle
follies imaginable. But it is not very clear, to what pur-
pose this objection is brought. For every one, surely,
in every case, must distinguish between opinions and
facts. And though testimony is no proof of enthusiastic
opinions, or of any opinions at all ; yet it is allowed, in
all other cases, to be a proof of facts. And a person's
laying down his life in attestation of facts or of opinions,
is the strongest proof of his believing them. And if
the Apostles and their contemporaries did believe the
facts, in attestation of which they exposed themselves to
sufferings and death ; this their belief, or rather know-
ledge, must be a proof of those facts : for they were
such as came under the observation of their senses.
And though it is not of equal weight, yet it is of weight,
that the martyrs of the next age, notwithstanding they
were not eyewitnesses of those facts, as were the
Apostles and their contemporaries, had, however, full
opportunity to inform themselves, whether they were
true or not, and gave equal proof of their believing
them to be true.
But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the
evidence of testimony even for facts, in matters relating
to religion : some seem to think it totally and absolutely
destroys the evidence of testimony upon this subject.
And indeed the powers of enthusiasm, and of diseases
too, which operate in a like manner, are very wonder-
ful, in particular instances. But if great numbers of
men, not appearing in any peculiar degree weak, nor
under any peculiar suspicion of negligence, affirm that
they saw and heard such things plainly with their eyes
and their ears, and are admitted to be in earnest ; such
testimony is evidence of the strongest kind we can have,
Evidence for Christianity 207
for any matter of fact. Yet possibly it may be over-
come, strong as it is, by incredibility in the things thus
attested, or by contrary testimony. And in an instance
where one thought it was so overcome, it might be just
to consider, how far such evidence could be accounted
for, by enthusiasm ; for it seems as if no other imagin-
able account were to be given of it. But till such in-
credibility be shown, or contrary testimony produced, it
cannot surely be expected, that so far fetched, so indirect
and wonderful an account of such testimony, as that of
enthusiasm must be an account so strange, that the
generality of mankind can scarce be made to under-
stand what is meant by it : it cannot, I say, be expected,
that such account will be admitted of such evidence ;
when there is this direct, easy, and obvious account of
it, that people really saw and heard a thing not in-
credible, which they affirm sincerely and with full
assurance, they did see and hear. Granting then that
enthusiasm is not (strictly speaking) an absurd, but
a possible account of such testimony ; it is manifest,
that the very mention of it goes upon the previous sup-
position, that the things so attested are incredible : and
therefore need not be considered, till they are shown to
be so. Much less need it be considered, after the con-
trary has been proved, and I think it has been proved,
to full satisfaction, that there is no incredibility in
a revelation, in general ; or in such a one as the
Christian, in peculiar. However, as religion is sup-
posed peculiarly liable to enthusiasm, it may just be
observed, that prejudices almost without number, and
without name, romance, affectation, humour, a desire to
engage attention, or to surprise, the party spirit, custom,
little competitions, unaccountable likings and dislikings ;
these influence men strongly in common matters. And
as these prejudices are often scarce known or reflected
upon by the persons themselves who are influenced by
them, they are to be considered as influences of a like
kind of enthusiasm. Yet human testimony in common
matters is naturally and justly believed notwithstanding.
It is intimated further, in a more refined way of
2o8 The Analogy of Religion
observation, that though it should be proved, that the
Apostles and first Christians could not, in some respects,
be deceived themselves, and, in other respects, cannot
be thought to have intended to impose upon the world;
yet it will not follow, that their general testimony is to
be believed, though truly handed down to us : because
they might still in part, i.e., in other respects, be deceived
themselves, and in part also designedly impose upon
others ; which, it is added, is a thing very credible, from
that mixture of real enthusiasm, and real knavery, to be
met with in the same characters. And I must confess,
I think the matter of fact contained in this observation
upon mankind is not to be denied ; and that somewhat
very much akin to it is often supposed in Scripture as
a very common case, and most severely reproved. But
it were to have been expected, that persons capable of
applying this observation as applied in the objection,
might also frequently have met with the like mixed char-
acter, in instances where religion was quite out of the case.
The thing plainly is, that mankind are naturally endued
with reason, or a capacity of distinguishing between
truth and falsehood ; and as naturally they are endued
with veracity, or a regard to truth in what they say ; but
from many occasions they are liable to be prejudiced
and biassed and deceived themselves, and capable of
intending to deceive others, in every different degree :
insomuch that, as we are all liable to be deceived by
prejudice, so likewise it seems to be not an uncommon
thing, for persons, who, from their regard to truth, would
not invent a lie entirely without any foundation at all, to
propagate it with heightening circumstances, after it is
once invented and set agoing. And others, though they
would not propagate a lie, yet, which is a lower degree
of falsehood, will let it pass without contradiction. But,
notwithstanding all this, human testimony remains still
a natural ground of assent; and this assent a natural
principle of action.
It is objected further, that however it has happened,
the fact is, that mankind have, in different ages, been
strangely deluded with pretences to miracles and
Evidence for Christianity 209
wonders. But it is by no means to be admitted, that
they have been oftener, or are at all more liable to be
deceived by these pretences, than by others.
It is added, that there is a very considerable degree
of historical evidence for miracles, which are, on all
hands, acknowledged to be fabulous. But suppose
there were even the like historical evidence for these, to
what there is for those alleged in proof of Christianity,
which yet is in no wise allowed, but suppose this ; the
consequence would not be that the evidence of the
latter is not to be admitted. Nor is there a man in the
world, who, in common cases, would conclude thus.
For what would such a conclusion really amount to but
this, that evidence confuted by contrary evidence, or
any way overbalanced, destroys the credibility of other
evidence, neither confuted nor overbalanced ? To
argue, that because there is, if there were, like evidence
from testimony, for miracles acknowledged false, as
for those in attestation of Christianity, therefore the
evidence in the latter case is not to be credited ; this is
the same as to argue, that if two men of equally good
reputation had given evidence in different cases no way
connected, and one of them had been convicted of per-
jury, this confuted the testimony of the other.
Upon the whole, then, the general observation, that
human creatures are so liable to be deceived, from
enthusiasm in religion, and principles equivalent to
enthusiasm in common matters, and in both from
negligence ; and that they are so capable of dishonestly
endeavouring to deceive others ; this does indeed weaken
the evidence of testimony in all cases, but does not
destroy it in any. And these things will appear, to
different men, to weaken the evidence of testimony, in
different degrees : in degrees proportionable to the
observations they have made, or the notions they have
any way taken up, concerning the weakness and negli-
gence and dishonesty of mankind ; or concerning the
powers of enthusiasm, and prejudices equivalent to it.
But it seems to me, that people do not know what they
say, who affirm these things to destroy the evidence from
Q 9
2io The Analogy of Religion
testimony, which we have of the truth of Christianity.
Nothing can destroy the evidence of testimony in any
case, but a proof or probability, that persons are not
competent judges of the facts to which they give testi-
mony ; or that they are actually under some indirect
influence in giving it, in such particular case. Till this
be made out, the natural laws of human actions require,
that testimony be admitted. It can never be sufficient
to overthrow direct historical evidence, indolently to say,
that there are so many principles, from whence men are
liable to be deceived themselves, and disposed to deceive
others, especially in matters of religion, that one knows
not what to believe. And it is surprising persons can
help reflecting, that this very manner of speaking sup-
poses they are not satisfied that there is nothing in the
evidence, of which they speak thus ; or that they can
avoid observing, if they do make this reflection, that it
is on such a subject, a very material one. 1
And over against all these objections is to be set the
importance of Christianity, as what must have engaged
the attention of its first converts, so as to have rendered
them less liable to be deceived from carelessness, than
they would in common matters ; and likewise the strong
obligations to veracity, which their religion laid them
under; so that the first and most obvious presumption
is, that they could not be deceived themselves nor would
deceive others. And this presumption, in this degree,
is peculiar to the testimony we have been considering.
In argument, assertions are nothing in themselves, and
have an air of positiveness which sometimes is not very
easy; yet they are necessary, and necessary to be
repeated ; in order to connect a discourse, and distinctly
to lay before the view of the reader, what is proposed to
be proved, and what is left as proved. Now the con-
clusion from the foregoing observations is, I think,
beyond all doubt, this : that unbelievers must be forced
to admit the external evidence for Christianity, i.e., the
proof of miracles wrought to attest it, to be of real
weight and very considerable ; though they cannot allow
1 See the foregoing chapter
Evidence for Christianity 211
it to be sufficient, to convince them of the reality of
those miracles. And as they must, in all reason, admit
this ; so it seems to me, that upon consideration they
would, in fact, admit it; those of them, I mean, who
know anything at all of the matter; in like manner as
persons, in many cases, own they see strong evidence
from testimony, for the truth of things, which yet they
cannot be convinced are true: cases, suppose, where
there is contrary testimony ; or things which they think,
whether with or without reason, to be incredible. But
there is no testimony contrary to that which we have
been considering; and it has been fully proved, that
there is no incredibility in Christianity in general, or in
any part of it.
II. As to the evidence for Christianity from prophecy,
I shall only make some few general observations, which
are suggested by the Analogy of Nature ; i.e., by the
acknowledged natural rules of judging in common mat-
ters, concerning evidence of a like kind to this from
prophecy.
i. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of
a prophecy does not, in any degree, invalidate the proof
of foresight, arising from the appearing completion of
those other parts, which are understood. For the case
is evidently the same, as if those parts, which are not
understood, were lost, or not written at all, or written in
an unknown tongue. Whether this observation be com-
monly attended to or not, it is so evident, that one can
scarce bring oneself to set down an instance in common
matters, to exemplify it. However, suppose a writing,
partly in cipher, and partly in plain words at length ;
and that in the part one understood, there appeared
mention of several known facts ; it would never come
into any man's thoughts to imagine, that if he understood
the whole, perhaps he might find, that those facts were
not in reality known by the writer. Indeed, both in
this example and the thing intended to be exemplified
by it, our not understanding the whole (the whole, sup-
pose, of a sentence or a paragraph) might sometimes
occasion a doubt, whether one understood the literal
212 The Analogy of Religion
meaning of such a part : but this comes under another
consideration.
For the same reason, though a man should be incap-
able, for want of learning, or opportunities of inquiry,
or from not having turned his studies this way, even so
much as to judge whether particular prophecies have
been throughout completely fulfilled ; yet he may see, in
general, that they have been fulfilled to such a degree
as, upon very good ground, to be convinced of foresight
more than human in such prophecies, and of such
events being intended by them. For the same reason
also, though, by means of the deficiencies in civil his-
tory and the different accounts of historians, the most
learned should not be able to make out to satisfaction,
that such parts of the prophetic history have been
minutely and throughout fulfilled ; yet a very strong
proof of foresight may arise from that general comple-
tion of them which is made out : as much proof of
foresight, perhaps, as the giver of prophecy intended
should ever be afforded by such parts of prophecy.
2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to such
and such events, is itself a proof that it was intended of
them : as the rules by which we naturally judge and deter-
mine, in common cases parallel to this, will show. This
observation I make in answer to the common objection
against the application of the prophecies, that, consider-
ing each of them distinctly by itself, it does not at all
appear that they were intended of those particular
events, to which they are applied by Christians ; and
therefore it is to be supposed, that, if they meant any-
thing, they were intended of other events unknown to
us, and not of these at all.
Now there are two kinds of writing, which bear a
great resemblance to prophecy, with respect to the mat-
ter before us : the mythological and the satirical, where
the satire is, to a certain degree, concealed. And a
man might be assured, that he understood what an
author intended by a fable or parable, related without
any application or moral, merely from seeing it to be
easily capable of such application, and that such a
Evidence for Christianity 213
moral might naturally be deduced from it. And lie
might be fully assured, that such persons and events
were intended in a satirical writing, merely from its
being applicable to them. And, agreeable to the last
observation, he might be in a good measure satisfied of
it, though he were not enough informed in affairs or in
the story of such persons to understand half the satire.
For his satisfaction, that he understood the meaning,
the intended meaning of these writings, would be greater
or less in proportion as he saw the general turn of
them to be capable of such application; and in pro-
portion to the number of particular things capable of
it. And thus, if a long series of prophecy is appli-
cable to the present state of the church, and to the
political situations of the kingdoms of the world, some
thousand years after these prophecies were delivered,
and a long series of prophecy delivered before the
coming of Christ is applicable to him; these things
are in themselves a proof, that the prophetic history was
intended of him, and of those events : in proportion as
the general turn of it is capable of such application,
and to the number and variety of particular prophecies
capable of it. And though, in all just way of considera-
tion, the appearing completion of prophecies is to be
allowed to be thus explanatory of, and to determine,
their meaning ; yet it is to be remembered further, that
the ancient Jews applied the prophecies to a Messiah
before his coming, in much the same manner as Chris-
tians do now : and that the primitive Christians inter-
preted the prophecies respecting the state of the church
and of the world in the last ages, in the sense which the
event seems to confirm and verify. And from these
things it may be made appear :
3. That the showing even to a high probability, if
that could be, that the prophets thought of some other
events, in such and such predictions, and not those at
all which Christians allege to be completions of those
predictions ; or that such and such prophecies are cap-
able of being applied to other events than those to
which Christians apply them that this would not con-
214 The Analogy of Religion
fute or destroy the force of the argument from prophecy,
even with regard to those very instances. For observe
how this matter really is. If one knew such a person
to be the sole author of such a book, and was certainly
assured, or satisfied to any degree, that one knew the
whole of what he intended in it ; one should be assured
or satisfied to such a degree, that one knew the whole
meaning of that book : for the meaning of a book is
nothing but the meaning of the author. But if one
knew a person to have compiled a book out of memoirs,
which he received from another, of vastly superior know-
ledge in the subject of it, especially if it were a book
full of great intricacies and difficulties ; it would in no
wise follow, that one knew the whole meaning of the
book, from knowing the whole meaning of the compiler :
for the original memoirs, i.e., the author of them, might
have, and there would be no degree of presumption, in
many cases, against supposing him to have, some further
meaning than the compiler saw. To say, then, that the
Scriptures, and the things contained in them, can have
no other or further meaning than those persons thought
or had who first recited or wrote them, is evidently
saying, that those persons were the original, proper, and
sole authors of those books, i.e., that they are not in-
spired : which is absurd, whilst the authority of these
books is under examination ; i.e., till you have deter-
mined they are of no divine authority at all. Till this
be determined, it must in all reason be supposed, not
indeed that they have, for this is taking for granted that
they are inspired ; but that they may have, some further
meaning than what the compilers saw or understood.
And, upon this supposition, it is supposable also, that
this further meaning may be fulfilled. Now events
corresponding to prophecies, interpreted in a different
meaning from that, in which the prophets are supposed
to have understood them : this affords, in a manner, the
same proof, that this different sense was originally in-
tended, as it would have afforded, if the prophets had
not understood their predictions in the sense it is sup-
posed they did : because there is no presumption of
Evidence for Christianity 215
their sense of them being the whole sense of them.
And it has been already shown, that the apparent com-
pletions of prophecy must be allowed to be explanatory
of its meaning. So that the question is, whether a
series of prophecy has been fulfilled in a natural or
proper, i.e., in any real sense of the words of it. For
such completion is equally a proof of foresight more
than human, whether the prophets are, or are not, sup-
posed to have understood it in a different sense. I say,
supposed : for though I think it clear, that the prophets
did not understand the full meaning of their predic-
tions ; it is another question how far they thought they
did, and in what sense they understood them.
Hence may be seen, to how little purpose those per-
sons busy themselves, who endeavour to prove, that the
prophetic history is applicable to events of the age in
which it was written, or of ages before it. Indeed, to
have proved this, before there was any appearance of a
further completion of it, might have answered some pur-
pose ; for it might have prevented the expectation of
any such further completion. Thus could Porphyry
have shown, that some principal parts of the book of
Daniel, for instance, the seventh verse of the seventh
chapter, which the Christians interpreted of the latter
ages, was applicable to events which happened before or
about the age of Antiochus Epiphanes ; this might have
prevented them from expecting any further completion
of it. And, unless there was then, as I think there must
have been, external evidence concerning that book, more
than is come down to us, such a discovery might have
been a stumbling-block in the way of Christianity itself;
considering the authority which our Saviour has given to
the book of Daniel, and how much the general scheme
of Christianity presupposes the truth of it. But even
this discovery, had there been any such, 1 would be of
1 It appears that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in this way. For
Jerome or, the place says, Duos posteriores iestias in uno Macedonian regno
ponit. And as to the ten kings ; Decem ref-ts enumerat, qvifucmntsccvissimi:
ipsosqut reges rum vnivsfonitregni, Verii gratia, Macedonia, Syritt, After, et
^gypti i stdde diversis rcgnis ttnum ejfficit regvm ordinem. And in this way
of interpretation, anything may be made of anything.
216 The Analogy of Religion
very little weight with reasonable men now ; if this
passage, thus applicable to events before the age of
Porphyry, appears to be applicable also to events which
succeeded the dissolution of the Roman empire. I
mention this, not at all as intending to insinuate, that
the division of this empire into ten parts, for it plainly
was divided into about that number, is, alone and by
itself, of any moment in verifying the prophetic history,
but only as an example of the thing I am speaking of.
And thus upon the whole, the matter of enquiry evidently
must be, as above put, Whether the prophecies are
applicable to Christ, and to the present state of the world,
and of the church ; applicable in such a degree, as to
imply foresight : not whether they are capable of any
other application ; though I know no pretence for say-
ing the general turn of them is capable of any other.
These observations are, I think, just ; and the evidence
referred to in them, real ; though there may be people
who will not accept of such imperfect information from
Scripture. Some too have not integrity and regard
enough to truth to attend to evidence, which keeps the
mind in doubt, perhaps perplexity, and which is much
of a different sort from what they expected. And it
plainly requires a degree of modesty and fairness, beyond
what every one has, for a man to say, not to the world,
but to himself, that there is a real appearance of some-
what of great weight in this matter, though he is not
able thoroughly to satisfy himself about it ; but it shall
have its influence upon him, in proportion to its appear-
ing reality and weight. It is much more easy, and more
falls in with the negligence, presumption, and wilfulness
of the generality, to determine at once, with a decisive
air, There is nothing in it. The prejudices arising from
that absolute contempt and scorn, with which this
evidence is treated in the world, I do not mention. For
what indeed can be said to persons, who are weak
enough in their understandings to think this any pre-
sumption against it; or, if they do not, are yet weak
enough in their temper to be influenced by such pre-
judices, upon such a subject ?
Evidence for Christianity 217
I shall now, Secondly, endeavour to give some account
of the general argument for the truth of Christianity,
consisting both of the direct and circumstantial evidence,
considered as making up one argument. Indeed to state
and examine this argument fully, would be a work much
beyond the compass of this whole treatise ; nor is so
much as a proper abridgment of it to be expected here.
Yet the present subject requires to have some brief
account of it given. For it is the kind of evidence
upon which most questions of difficulty, in common
practice, are determined : evidence arising from various
coincidences, which support and confirm each other, and
in this manner prove, with more or less certainty, the
point under consideration. And I choose to do it also :
First, because it seems to be of the greatest importance,
and not duly attended to by every one, that the proof of
revelation is, not some direct and express things only
but a great variety of circumstantial things also ; and
that though each of these direct and circumstantial
things is indeed to be considered separately, yet they are
afterwards to be joined together; for that the proper
force of the evidence consists in the result of those
several things, considered in their respects to each other,
and united into one view : and in the next place, because
it seems to me, that the matters of fact here set down,
which are acknowledged by unbelievers, must be acknow-
ledged by them also to contain together a degree of
evidence of great weight, if they could be brought to lay
these several things before themselves distinctly, and
then with attention consider them together, instead of
that cursory thought of them to which we are familiar-
ized. For being familiarized to the cursory thought of
things, as really hinders the weight of them from being
seen, as from having its due influence upon practice.
The thing asserted, and the truth of which is to be in-
quired into, is this : That over and above our reason
and affections, which God has given us for the informa-
tion of our judgment and the conduct of our lives,
he has also, by external revelation, given us an account
of himself and his moral government over the world,
2i8 The Analogy of Religion
implying a future state of rewards and punishments, r>.,
hath revealed the system of natural religion : for natural
religion may be externally 1 revealed by God, as the
ignorant may be taught it by mankind, their fellow-
creatures that God, I say, has given us the evidence of
revelation, as well as the evidence of reason, to ascertain
this moral system, together with an account of a particu-
lar dispensation of Providence, which reason could no
way have discovered, and a particular institution of
religion founded on it, for the recovery of mankind out
of their present wretched condition, and raising them to
the perfection and final happiness of their nature.
This revelation, whether real or supposed, may be
considered as wholly historical. For prophecy is noth-
ing but the history of events before they come to pass ;
doctrines also are matters of fact; and precepts come
under the same notion. And the general design of
Scripture, which contains in it this revelation, thus con-
sidered as historical, may be said to be, to give us an
account of the world, in this one single view, as God's
world : by which it appears essentially distinguished
from all other books, so far as I have found, except such
as are copied from it. It begins with an account of
God's creation of the world, in order to ascertain, and
distinguish from all others, who is the object of our
worship, by what he has done : in order to ascertain
who he is, concerning whose providence, commands,
promises, and threatenings, this sacred book, all along,
treats ; the Maker and Proprietor of the world, he
whose creatures we are, the God of Nature: in order
likewise to distinguish him from the idols of the nations,
which are either imaginary beings, i.e., no beings at all ;
or else part of that creation, the historical relation of
which is here given. And St. John, not improbably
with an eye to this Mosaic account of the creation,
begins his Gospel with an account of our Saviour's pre-
existence, and that all things were made by him; and
without him was not anything made that was made ; 2
agreeably to the doctrine of St. Paul, that God created
* P. 120. 2 John i. 3.
Evidence for Christianity 219
all things by Jesus Christ} This being premised, the
Scripture, taken together, seems to profess to contain
a kind of an abridgment of the history of the world in
the view just now mentioned ; that is, a general account
of the condition of religion and its professors, during
the continuance of that apostasy from God, and state of
wickedness, which it everywhere supposes the world to
lie in. And this account of the state of religion carries
with it some brief account of the political state of
things, as religion is affected by it. Revelation indeed
considers the common affairs of this world, and what is
going on in it, as a mere scene of distraction ; and can-
not be supposed to concern itself with foretelling at
what time Rome, or Babylon, or Greece, or any particu-
lar place, should be the most conspicuous seat of that
tyranny and dissoluteness, which all places equally
aspire to be; cannot, I say, be supposed to give any
account of this wild scene for its own sake. But it
seems to contain some very general account of the chief
governments of the world, as the general state of
religion has been, is, or shall be, affected by them, from
the first transgression, and during the whole interval of
the world's continuing in its present state, to a certain
future period, spoken of both in the Old and New
Testament, very distinctly, and in great variety of ex-
pression : T/te times of the restitution of all things : a
when the mystery of God shall be finished, as he hath
declared to his servants the prophets : 3 when the God of
heaven shall set up a kingdom, which shall never be
destroyed: and the kingdom shall not be left to other
people ', 4 as it is represented to be during this apostasy,
but judgment, shall be given to the saints, 6 and they shall
reign : 6 and the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness
of the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to
the people of the saints of the Most High?
Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would
remark, how great a length of time the whole relation
takes up, near six thousand years of which are past ;
1 Eph. iii. 9. 2 Acts iii. ai. J Rev. x. 7. * Dan. u 44.
8 Dan. vii. aa. 6 Rev. xx. 6. 7 Dan. vii. 27.
22O The Analogy of Religion
and how great a variety of things it treats of; the
natural and moral system or history of the world, in-
cluding the time when it was formed, all contained in
the very first book, and evidently written in a rude and
unlearned age ; and in subsequent books, the various
common and prophetic history, and the particular dis-
pensation of Christianity. Now all this together gives
the largest scope for criticism; and for confutation of
what is capable of being confuted, either from reason, or
from common history, or from any inconsistence in its
several parts. And it is a thing which deserves, I think,
to be mentioned, that whereas some imagine the sup-
posed doubtfulness of the evidence for revelation implies
a positive argument that it is not true; it appears, on
the contrary, to imply a positive argument that it is true.
For, could any common relation of such antiquity,
extent, and variety (for in these things the stress of what
I am now observing lies), be proposed to the examina-
tion of the world : that it could not, in an age of know-
ledge and liberty, be confuted, or shown to have nothing
in it, to the satisfaction of reasonable men ; this would
be thought a strong presumptive proof of its truth. And
indeed it must be a proof of it, just in proportion to the
probability, that if it were false, it might be shown to be
so : and this, I think, is scarce pretended to be shown,
but upon principles and in ways of arguing, which have
been clearly obviated. 1 Nor does it at all appear, that
any set of men, who believe natural religion, are of the
opinion, that Christianity has been thus confuted. But
to proceed :
Together with the moral system of the world, the Old
Testament contains a chronological account of the
beginning of it, and from thence, an unbroken genealogy
of mankind for many ages, before common history begins ;
and carried on as much farther as to make up a con-
tinued thread of history of the length of between three
and four thousand years. It contains an account of
God's making a covenant with a particular nation, that
that they should be his people, and he would be their
1 Ch. ii. iii., &c.
Evidence for Christianity 221
God, in a peculiar sense; of his often interposing
miraculously in their affairs; giving them the promise,
and, long after, the possession of a particular country ;
assuring them of the greatest national prosperity in it, if
they would worship him, in opposition to the idols which
the rest of the world worshipped, and obey his com-
mands ; and threatening them with unexampled punish-
ments if they disobeyed him, and fell into the general
idolatry : insomuch that this one nation should con-
tinue to be the observation and the wonder of all theworld.
It declares particularly, that God would scatter them
among all people, from one end of the earth unto the
other ; but that when they should return unto the Lord
their God, he would have compassion upon them, and
gather them from all the nations, whither he had scattered
them : that Israel should be saved in the Lord, with an
everlasting salvation ; and not be ashamed or confounded
world without end. And as some of these promises are
conditional, others are as absolute, as anything can be ex-
pressed : that the time should come, when the people should
be all righteous, and inherit the land for ever : that though
God would make a full end of all nations whither he had
scattered them, yet would he not make a full end of them ;
that he would bring again the captivity of his people Israel^
and plant them upon their land, and they should be no
more pulled up out of their land : that the seed of Israel
s/iould not cease from being a nation for ever. 1 It fore-
tells, that God would raise them up a particular person,
in whom all his promises should finally be fulfilled ; the
Messiah, who should be, in a high and eminent sense,
their anointed Prince and Saviour. This was foretold
in such a manner, as raised a general expectation of
such a person in the nation, as appears from the New
Testament, and is an acknowledged fact ; an expecta-
tion of his coming at such a particular time, before
any one appeared claiming to be that person, and when
there was no ground for such an expectation, but from
the prophecies : which expectation, therefore, must in
1 Deut. xxviiL 64, xxx. a, 3 ; Isa. xlv. 17, Ix. ai ; Jer. xxx. n, xlvi. a!s ;
Amoi. ix. 14, 15 ; Jer. xxxi. 36.
222 The Analogy of Religion
all reason be presumed to be explanatory of those
prophecies, if there were any doubt about their mean-
ing. It seems moreover to foretell, that this person
should be rejected by that nation, to whom he had been
so long promised, and though he was so much desired
by them. 1 And it expressly foretells, that he should be
the Saviour of the Gentiles ; and even that the comple-
tion of the scheme contained in this book, and then
begun, and in its progress, should be somewhat so great,
that in comparison with it, the restoration of the Jews
alone would be but of small account. It is a light thing
that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes of
Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel : I will also
give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou maycst be
my salvation unto the end of the earth. And, In the
last days, the mountain of the Lord's house shall be estab-
lished in the top of the mountains, and shall be exalted
above the hills ; and all nations shall flow into it for out
of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord
from Jerusalem. And he shall judge among the nations
and the Lord alone shall be exalted in that day, and
the idols he shall utterly abolish?' The Scripture further
contains an account, that at the time the Messiah was
expected, a person rose up in this nation, claiming to be
that Messiah, to be the person whom all the prophecies
referred to, and in whom they should centre : that he
spent some years in a continued course of miraculous
works ; and endued his immediate disciples and follow-
ers with a power of doing the same, as a proof of the
truth of that religion, which he commissioned them to
publish : that, invested with this authority and power,
they made numerous converts in the remotest countries,
and settled and established his religion in the world ;
to the end of which the Scripture professes to give a
prophetic account of the state of this religion amongst
mankind.
1 Isa. viii. 14, 15, xlix. 5. ch. liii. ; Mai. i. 10, u, and ch. iii.
2 Isa. xlix. 6, ch. il, ch. xi., ch. Ivi. 7; Mai. i. _n. To which must be
added the other prophecies of the like kind, several in the New Testament,
and very many in the Old, which describe what shall be the completion of the
revealed plan of Providence.
Evidence for Christianity 223
Let us now suppose a person utterly ignorant of his-
tory, to have all this related to him out of the Scripture.
Or suppose such a one, having the Scripture put into
his hands, to remark these things in it, not knowing but
that the whole, even its civil history, as well as the
other parts of it, might be from beginning to end an
entire invention ; and to ask, What truth was in it, and
whether the revelation here related was real, or a fiction?
And instead of a direct answer, suppose him, all at
once, to be told the following confessed facts ; and then
to unite them into one view.
Let him first be told, in how great a degree the pro-
fession and establishment of natural religion, the belief
that there is one God to be worshipped, that virtue is
his law, and that mankind shall be rewarded and pun-
ished hereafter, as they obey and disobey it here ; in
how very great a degree, I say, the profession and
establishment of this moral system in the world is owing
to the revelation, whether real or supposed, contained
in this book : the establishment of this moral system,
even in those countries which do not acknowledge the
proper authority of the Scripture. 1 Let him be told
also, what number of nations do acknowledge its proper
authority. Let him then take in the consideration of
what importance religion is to mankind. And upon
these things he might, I think, truly observe, that this
supposed revelation's obtaining and being received in
the world with all the circumstances and effects of it,
considered together as one event, is the most conspicu-
ous and important event in the history of mankind :
that a book of this nature, and thus promulged and
recommended to our consideration, demands, as if by a
voice from heaven, to have its claims most seriously
examined into : and that, before such examination, to
treat it with any kind of scoffing and ridicule, is an
offence against natural piety. But it is to be remem-
bered, that how much soever the establishment of nat-
ural religion in the world is owing to the Scripture
revelation, this does not destroy the proof of religion
i p. 184.
224 The Analogy of Religion
from reason, any more than the proof of Euclid's Ele-
ments is destroyed, by a man's knowing or thinking that
he should never have seen the truth of the several
propositions contained in it, nor had those propositions
come into his thoughts, but for that mathematician.
Let such a person as we are speaking of be, in the
next place, informed of the acknowledged antiquity
of the first parts of this book ; and that its chrono-
logy, its account of the time when the earth, and the
several parts of it, were first peopled with human crea-
tures, is no way contradicted, but is really confirmed, by
the natural and civil history of the world, collected from
common historians, from the state of the earth, and
from the late invention of arts and sciences. And as
the Scripture contains an unbroken thread of common
and civil history, from the creation to the captivity, for
between three and four thousand years ; let the person
we are speaking of be told in the next place, that this
general history, as it is not contradicted, but is confirmed
by profane history as much as there would be reason to
expect, upon supposition of its truth ; so there is noth-
ing in the whole history itself, to give any reasonable
ground of suspicion of its not being, in the general, a
faithful and literally true genealogy of men and series of
things. I speak here only of the common Scripture
history, or of the course of ordinary events related in it,
as distinguished from miracles, and from the prophetic
history. In all the Scripture narrations of this kind,
following events arise out of foregoing ones, as in all
other histories. There appears nothing related as done
in any age, not conformable to the manners of that age :
nothing in the account of a succeeding age, which one
would say could not be true, or was improbable, from
the account of things in the preceding one. There is
nothing in the characters which would raise a thought of
their being feigned; but all the internal marks imagin-
able of their being real. It is to be added also, that
mere genealogies, bare narratives of the number of years,
which persons called by such and such names lived, do
not carry the face of fiction ; perhaps do carry some pre-
Evidence for Christianity 225
sumption of veracity; and all unadorned narratives,
which have nothing to surprise, may be thought to carry
somewhat of the like presumption too. And the domes-
tic and the political history is plainly credible. There
may be incidents in Scripture which, taken alone in the
naked way they are told, may appear strange, especially
to persons of other manners, temper, education ; but
there are also incidents of undoubted truth in many or
most persons' lives, which, in the same circumstances,
would appear to the full as strange. There may be mis-
takes of transcribers, there may be other real or seeming
mistakes, not easy to be particularly accounted for ; but
there are certainly no more things of this kind in the
Scripture than what were to have been expected in books
of such antiquity ; and nothing in any wise sufficient to
discredit the general narrative. Now that a history claim-
ing to commence from the creation, and extending in one
continued series, through so great a length of time and
variety of events, should have such appearances of reality
and truth in its whole contexture, is surely a very remark-
able circumstance in its favour. And as all this is appli-
cable to the common history of the New Testament, so
there is a further credibility, and a very high one, given
to it by profane authors : many of these writing of the
same times, and confirming the truth of customs and
events, which are incidentally as well as more purposely
mentioned in it. And this credibility of the common
Scripture history gives some credibility to its miraculous
history, especially as this is interwoven with the common,
so as that they imply each other, and both together make
up one relation.
Let it then be more particularly observed to this per-
son, that it is an acknowledged matter of fact, which is
indeed implied in the foregoing observation, that there
was such a nation as the Jews, of the greatest antiquity,
whose government and general polity was founded on
the law, here related to be given them by Moses as from
heaven : that natural religion, though with rites additional
yet no way contrary to it, was their established religion,
which cannot be said of the Gentile world ; and that
R 9
226 The Analogy of Religion
their very being as a nation, depended upon their
acknowledgment of one God, the God of the universe.
For, suppose in their captivity in Babylon they had gone
over to the religion of their conquerors, there would
have remained no bond of union to keep them a distinct
people. And whilst they were under their own kings, in
their own country, a total apostasy from God would have
been the dissolution of their whole government. They
in such a sense nationally acknowledged and worshipped
the Maker of heaven and earth, when the rest of the
world were sunk in idolatry, as rendered them, in fact,
the peculiar people of God. And this so remarkable
an establishment and preservation of natural religion
amongst them, seems to add some peculiar credibility to
the historical evidence for the miracles of Moses and the
Prophets ; because these miracles are a full satisfactory
account of this event, which plainly wants to be
accounted for, and cannot otherwise.
Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of history, be
acquainted further, that one claiming to be the Messiah
of Jewish extraction, rose up at the time when this nation,
from the prophecies above mentioned, expected the
Messiah: that he was rejected, as it seemed to have been
foretold he should, by the body of the people, under
the direction of their rulers : that in the course of a
very few years he was believed on and acknowledged
as the promised Messiah by great numbers among the
Gentiles, agreeably to the prophecies of Scripture, yet
not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles, 1
of which miracles we have also strong historical evidence,
(by which I mean here no more than must be acknow-
ledged by unbelievers ; for let pious frauds and follies be
admitted to weaken, it is absurd to say they destroy, our
evidence of miracles wrought in proof of Christianity : 2 )
that this religion approving itself to the reason of man-
kind, and carrying its own evidence with it, so far as
reason is a judge of its system, and being no way con-
trary to reason in those parts of it which require to be
believed upon the mere authority of its Author ; that
P ,03. P oq
Evidence for Christianity 227
this religion, I say, gradually spread and supported itself
for some hundred years, not only without any assistance
from temporal power, but under constant discourage-
ments, and often the bitterest persecutions from it, and
then became the religion of the world ; that in the
mean time the Jewish nation and government were
destroyed in a very remarkable manner, and the people
carried away captive and dispersed through the most
distant countries, in which state of dispersion they have
remained fifteen hundred years ; and that they remain a
numerous people united amongst themselves, and dis-
tinguished from the rest of the world, as they were in
the days of Moses, by the profession of his law ; and
everywhere looked upon in a manner, which one scarce
knows how distinctly to express, but in the words of the
prophetic account of it, given so many ages before it
came to pass : Thou shalt become an astonishment, a
proverb^ and a by-word, among all nations whither the
JLord shall lead thee^
The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews
remaining a distinct people in their dispersion, and the
confirmation which this event appears to give to the
truth of revelation, may be thought to be answered by
their religion's forbidding them intermarriages with those
of any other, and prescribing them a great many pecu-
liarities in their food, by which they are debarred from
the means of incorporating with the people in whose
countries they live. This is not, I think, a satisfactory
account of that which it pretends to account for. But
what does it pretend to account for? The corre-
spondence between this event and the prophecies, or the
coincidence of both, with a long dispensation of Provi-
dence, of a peculiar nature, towards that people
formerly? No. It is only the event itself which is
offered to be thus accounted for; which single event,
taken alone, abstracted from all such correspondence
and coincidence, perhaps would not have appeared
miraculous ; but that correspondence and coincidence
may be so, though the event itself be supposed not.
1 Deuu xxviiL 37.
228 The Analogy of Religion
Thus the concurrence of our Saviour's being born at
Bethlehem, with a long foregoing series of prophecy and
other coincidences, is doubtless miraculous ; the series of
prophecy, and other coincidences, and the event, being
admitted : though the event itself, his birth at that place,
appears to have been brought about in a natural way ; of
which, however, no one can be certain.
And as several of these events seem, in some degree
expressly, to have verified the prophetic history already,
so likewise they may be considered further as having a
peculiar aspect towards the full completion of it, as afford-
ing some presumption that the whole of it shall, one time
or other, be fulfilled. Thus, that the Jews have been so
wonderfully preserved in their long and wide dispersion,
which is indeed the direct fulfilling of some prophecies,
but is now mentioned only as looking forward to some-
what yet to come ; that natural religion came forth from
Judea, and spread, in the degree it has done, over the
world before lost in idolatry ; which, together with some
other things, have distinguished that very place, in like
manner as the people of it are distinguished ; that this
great change of religion over the earth was brought
about under the profession and acknowledgment, that
Jesus was the promised Messiah : things of this kind
naturally turn the thoughts of serious men towards the
full completion of the prophetic history, concerning the
final restoration of that people ; concerning the estab-
lishment of the everlasting kingdom among them,
the kingdom of the Messiah ; and the future state of the
world, under this sacred government. Such circum-
stances and events, compared with these prophecies,
though no completions of them, yet would not, I think,
be spoken of as nothing in the argument by a person
upon his first being informed of them. They fall in with
the prophetic history of things still future, give it some
additional credibility, have the appearance of being
somewhat in order to the full completion of it.
Indeed it requires a good degree of knowledge, and
great calmness and consideration, to be able to judge
thoroughly of the evidence for the truth of Christianity,
Evidence for Christianity 229
from that part of the prophetic history which relates to
the situation of the kingdoms of the world, and to the
state of the church, from the establishment of Christianity
to the present time. But it appears from a general view
of it to be very material. And those persons who have
thoroughly examined it, and some of them were men of
the coolest tempers, greatest capacities, and least liable
to imputations of prejudice, insist upon it as determin-
ately conclusive.
Suppose now a person quite ignorant of history, first
to recollect the passages above mentioned out of Scrip-
ture, without knowing but that the whole was a late
fiction, then to be informed of the correspondent facts
now mentioned, and to unite them all into one view :
that the profession and establishment of natural religion
in the world is greatly owing in different ways, to this
book, and the supposed revelation which it contains ;
that it is acknowledged to be of the earliest antiquity ;
that its chronology and common history are entirely
credible; that this ancient nation, the Jews, of whom
it chiefly treats, appear to have been, in fact, the people
of God, in a distinguished sense ; that as there was a
national expectation amongst them, raised from the
prophecies, of a Messiah to appear at such a time,
so one at this time appeared claiming to be that Messiah ;
that he was rejected by this nation, but received by the
Gentiles, not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of
miracles; that the religion he taught supported itself
under the greatest difficulties, gained ground, and at
length became the religion of the world ; that in the
mean time the Jewish polity was utterly destroyed, and
the nation dispersed over the face of the earth ; that
notwithstanding this, they have remained a distinct
numerous people for so many centuries, even to this day ;
which not only appears to be the express completion of
several prophecies concerning them, but also renders
it, as one may speak, a visible and easy possibility that
the promises made to them as a nation, may yet be
fulfilled. And to these acknowledged truths, let the
person we have been supposing add, as I think he ought,
230 The Analogy of Religion
whether every one will allow it or no, the obvious
appearances which there are, of the state of the world,
in other respects besides what relates to the Jews, and of
the Christian Church, having so long answered, and still
answering, to the prophetic history. Suppose, I say,
these facts set over against the things before mentioned
out of the Scripture, and seriously compared with them ;
the joint view of both together must, I think, appear of
very great weight to a considerate reasonable person : of
much greater indeed, upon having them first laid before
him, than is easy for us, who are so familiarized to them,
to conceive, without some particular attention for that
purpose.
All these things, and the several particulars contained
under them, require to be distinctly and most thoroughly
examined into ; that the weight of each may be judged
of, upon such examination, and such conclusion drawn
as results from their united force. But this has not
been attempted here. I have gone no further than to
show, that the general imperfect view of them now
given, the confessed historical evidence for miracles,
and the many obvious appearing completions of pro-
phecy, together with the collateral things 1 here men-
tioned, and there are several others of the like sort ;
that all this together, which, being fact, must be acknow-
ledged by unbelievers, amounts to real evidence of
somewhat more than human in this matter : evidence
much more important than careless men, who have been
accustomed only to transient and partial views of it,
can imagine; and indeed abundantly sufficient to act
upon. And these things, I apprehend, must be acknow-
ledged by unbelievers. For though they may say, that
the historical evidence of miracles wrought in attesta-
tion of Christianity, is not sufficient to convince them
that such miracles were really wrought : they cannot
deny, that there is such historical evidence, it being a
known matter of fact that there is. They may say, the
conformity between the prophecies and events is by
1 All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not reducible to the
head of certain miracles, or determinate completions of prophecy. Se p. igg.
Evidence for Christianity 231
accident : but there are many instances in which such
conformity itself cannot be denied. They may say,
with regard to such kind of collateral things as those
above mentioned, that any odd accidental events, with-
out meaning, will have a meaning found in them by
fanciful people : and that such as are fanciful in any one
certain way, will make out a thousand coincidences,
which seem to favour their peculiar follies. Men, I say,
may talk thus : but no one who is serious, can possibly
think these things to be nothing, if he considers the
importance of collateral things, and even of lesser cir-
cumstances, in the evidence of probability, as dis-
tinguished in nature, from the evidence of demonstration.
7'i many cases indeed it seems to require the truest
judgment, to determine with exactness the weight of
circumstantial evidence : but it is very often altogether
as convincing as that which is the most express and
direct.
This general view of the evidence for Christianity,
considered as making one argument, may also serve to
recommend to serious persons, to set down everything
which they think may be of any real weight at all in
proof of it, and particularly the many seeming comple-
tions of prophecy : and they will find, that, judging by
the natural rules, by which we judge of probable evi-
dence in common matters, they amount to a much
higher degree of proof, upon such a joint review, than
could be supposed upon considering them separately,
at different times ; how strong soever the proof might
before appear to them, upon such separate views of it.
For probable proofs, by being added, not only increase
the evidence, but multiply it. Nor should I dissuade
any one from setting down, what he thought made for
the contrary side. But then it is to be remembered,
not in order to influence his judgment, but his practice,
that a mistake on one side may be, in its consequences,
much more dangerous than a mistake on the other.
And what course is most safe, and what most dangerous,
is a consideration thought very material, when we de-
liberate, not concerning events, but concerning conduct
232 The Analogy of Religion
in our temporal affairs. To be influenced by this con-
sideration in our judgment, to believe or disbelieve
upon it, is indeed as much prejudice as anything what-
ever. And, like other prejudices, it operates contrary
ways in different men ; for some are inclined to believe
what they hope, and others what they fear. And it is
manifest unreasonableness to apply to men's passions in
order to gain their assent. But in deliberations con-
cerning conduct, there is nothing which reason more
requires to be taken into the account, than the import-
ance of it. For, suppose it doubtful, what would be
the consequence of acting in this, or in a contrary
manner : still, that taking one side could be attended
with little or no bad consequence, and taking the other
might be attended with the greatest, must appear, to
unprejudiced reason, of the highest moment towards
determining how we are to act. But the truth of our
religion, like the truth of common matters, is to be
judged of by all the evidence taken together. And
unless the whole series of things which may be alleged
in this argument, and every particular thing in it, can
reasonably be supposed to have been by accident (for
here the stress of the argument for Christianity lies) ;
then is the truth of it proved ; in like manner, as if in
any common case, numerous events acknowledged, were
to be alleged in proof of any other event disputed ; the
truth of the disputed event would be proved, not only
if any one of the acknowledged ones did of itself clearly
imply it, but, though no one of them singly did so, if
the whole of the acknowledged events taken together
could not in reason be supposed to have happened,
unless the disputed one were true.
It is obvious, how much advantage the nature of this
evidence gives to those persons who attack Christianity,
especially in conversation. For it is easy to show, in
a short and lively manner, that such and such things are
liable to objection, that this and another thing is of
little weight in itself; but impossible to show, in like
manner, the united force of the whole argument in one
view.
Against arguing from Analogy 233
However, lastly, as it has been made appeal, that
there is no presumption against a revelation as miracu-
lous ; that the general scheme of Christianity, and the
principal parts of it, are conformable to the experienced
constitution of things, and the whole perfectly credible :
so the account now given of the positive evidence for it
shows, that this evidence is such, as, from the nature of
it, cannot be destroyed, though it should be lessened.
CHAPTER VIII
OF THE OBJECTIONS WHICH MAY BE MADE
AGAINST ARGUING FROM THE ANALOGY OF
NATURE, TO RELIGION
IF every one would consider, with such attention as
they are bound, even in point of morality, to consider,
what they judge and give characters of ; the occasion of
this chapter would be, in some good measure at least,
superseded. But since this is not to be expected; for
some we find do not concern themselves to understand
even what they write against : since this treatise, in
common with most others, lies open to objections, which
may appear very material to thoughtful men at first
sight ; and, besides that, seems peculiarly liable to the
objections of such as can judge without thinking, and
of such as can censure without judging ; it may not be
amiss to set down the chief of these objections which
occur to me, and consider them to their hands. And
they are such as these :
" That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revela-
tion by saying, that there are the same in natural
religion ; when what is wanting is to clear both of them
of these their common, as well as other their respective,
difficulties : but that it is a strange way indeed of con-
vincing men of the obligations of religion, to show
them, that they have as little reason for their worldly
pursuits : and a strange way of vindicating the justice
and goodness of the Author of Nature, and of removing
the objections against both, to which the system of
234 The Analogy of Religion
religion lies open, to show, that the like objections lie
against natural providence; a way of answering ob-
jections against religion, without so much as pretending
to make out, that the system of it, or the particular
things in it objected against, are reasonable especially,
perhaps some may be inattentive enough to add, Must
this be thought strange, when it is confessed that
analogy is no answer to such objections : that when this
sort of reasoning is carried to the utmost length it can
be imagined capable of, it will yet leave the mind in
a very unsatisfied state ; and that it must be unaccount-
able ignorance of mankind, to imagine they will be pre-
vailed with to forego their present interests and pleasures,
from regard to religion, upon doubtful evidence."
Now, as plausible as this way of talking may appear,
that appearance will be found in a great measure owing
to half views, which show but part of an object, yet
show that indistinctly, and to undeterminate language.
By these means weak men are often deceived by others,
and ludicrous men, by themselves. And even those,
who are serious and considerate, cannot always readily
disentangle, and at once clearly see through the per-
plexities, in which subjects themselves are involved ; and
which are heightened by the deficiencies and the abuse
of words. To this latter sort of persons, the following
reply to each part of this objection severally, may be of
some assistance ; as it may also tend a little to stop and
silence others.
First. The thing wanted, i.e., what men require, is to
have all difficulties cleared. And this is, or, at least for
anything we know to the contrary, it may be, the same,
as requiring to comprehend the divine nature, and the
whole plan of Providence from everlasting to everlasting.
But it hath always been allowed to argue from what is
acknowledged, to what is disputed. And it is in no
other sense a poor thing to argue from natural religion
to revealed, in the manner found fault with, than it is to
argue in numberless other ways of probable deduction
and inference, in matters of conduct, which we are con-
tinually reduced to the necessity of doing. Indeed the
Against arguing from Analogy 235
epithet poor may be applied, I fear as properly, to great
part or the whole of human life, as it is to the things
mentioned in the objection. Is it not a poor thing, for
a physician to have so little knowledge in the cure of
diseases, as even the most eminent have ? To act upon
conjecture and guess, where the life of man is concerned ?
Undoubtedly it is : but not in comparison of having no
skill at all in that useful art, and being obliged to act
wholly in the dark.
Further : since it is as unreasonable, as it is common,
to urge objections against revelation, which are of equal
weight against natural religion ; and those who do this,
if they are not confused themselves, deal unfairly with
others, in making it seem, that they are arguing only
against revelation, or particular doctrines of it, when in
reality they are arguing against moral providence ; it is
a thing of consequence to show, that such objections
are as much levelled against natural religion, as against
revealed. And objections, which are equally applicable
to both, are properly speaking answered, by its being
shown that they are so, provided the former be admitted
to be true. And without taking in the consideration
how distinctly this is admitted, it is plainly very material
to observe, that as the things objected against in natural
religion are of the same kind with what is certain matter
of experience in the course of providence, and in the
information which God affords us concerning our
temporal interest under his government; so the ob-
jections against the system of Christianity, and the
evidence of it, are of the very same kind with those
which are made against the system and evidence of
natural religion. However, the reader upon review may
see, that most of the analogies insisted upon, even in
the latter part of this treatise, do not necessarily require
to have more taken for granted than is in the former ;
that there is an Author of Nature, or natural Governor
of the world ; and Christianity is vindicated, not from
its analogy to natural religion, but chiefly from its
analogy to the experienced constitution of nature.
Secondly. Religion is a practical thing, and consists in
236 The Analogy of Religion
such a determinate course of life, as being what, there
is reason to think, is commanded by the Author of
Nature, and will, upon the whole, be our happiness
under his government. Now if men can be convinced
that they have the like reason to believe this, as to
believe that taking care of their temporal affairs will be
to their advantage; such conviction cannot but be an
argument to them for the practice of religion. And if
there be really any reason for believing one of these,
and endeavouring to preserve life, and secure ourselves
the necessaries and conveniences of it, then there is
reason also for believing the other, and endeavouring to
secure the interest it proposes to us. And if the in-
terest, which religion proposes to us, be infinitely greater
than our whole temporal interest; then there must be
proportionably greater reason for endeavouring to secure
one, than the other; since, by the supposition, the
probability of our securing one is equal to the pro-
bability of our securing the other. This seems plainly
unanswerable; and has a tendency to influence fair
minds, who consider what our condition really is, or
upon what evidence we are naturally appointed to act ;
and who are disposed to acquiesce in the terms upon
which we live, and attend to and follow that practical
instruction, whatever it be, which is afforded us.
But the chief and proper force of the argument re-
ferred to in the objection, lies in another place. For,
it is said that the proof of religion is involved in such
inextricable difficulties, as to render it doubtful; and
that it cannot be supposed, that, if it were true, it
would be left upon doubtful evidence. Here then, over
and above the force of each particular difficulty or
objection, these difficulties and objections taken to-
gether are turned into a positive argument against the
truth of religion, which argument would stand thus. If
religion were true, it would not be left doubtful, and
open to objections to the degree in which it is : there-
fore that it is thus left, not only renders the evidence
of it weak, and lessens its force, in proportion to the
weight of such objections ; but also shows it to be false,
Against arguing from Analogy 237
or is a general presumption of its being so. Now the
observation, that, from the natural constitution and
course of things we must in our temporal concerns,
almost continually, and in matters of great consequence,
act upon evidence of a like kind and degree to the
evidence of religion, is an answer to this argument ;
because it shows, that it is according to the conduct
and character of the Author of Nature to appoint we
should act upon evidence like to that, which this
argument presumes he cannot be supposed to appoint
we should act upon : it is an instance, a general one,
made up of numerous particular ones, of somewhat in>
his dealing with us, similar to what is said to be incred-
ible. And as the force of this answer lies merely in the
parallel, which there is between the evidence for religion
and for our temporal conduct ; the answer is equally
just and conclusive, whether the parallel be made out,
by showing the evidence of the former to be higher, or
the evidence of the latter to be lower.
Thirdly. The design of this treatise is not to vindi
cate the character of God, but to show the obligations
of men : it is not to justify his providence, but to show
what belongs to us to do. These are two subjects, and
ought not to be confounded. And though they may at
length run up into each other, yet observations may
immediately tend to make out the latter, which do not
appear, by any immediate connection, to the purpose of
the former ; which is less our concern, than many seem
to think. For, first, it is not necessary we should justify
the dispensations of Providence against objections, any
farther than to show, that the things objected against
may, for aught we know, be consistent with justice and
goodness. Suppose then, that there are things in the
system of this world, and plan of Providence relating to
it, which taken alone would be unjust : yet it has been
shown unanswerably, that if we could take in the refer-
ence, which these things may have to other things
present, past, and to come ; to the whole scheme, which
the things objected against are parts of; these very
things might, for aught we know, be found to be, not
238 The Analogy of Religion
only consistent with justice, but instances of it. Indeed
it has been shown, by the analogy of what we see, not
only possible that this may be the case, but credible
that it is. And thus objections, drawn from such
things, are answered, and Providence is vindicated, as
far as religion makes its vindication necessary. Hence
it appears, secondly, that objections against the divine
justice and goodness are not endeavoured to be re-
moved, by showing that the like objections, allowed to
be really conclusive, lie against natural providence : but
those objections being supposed and shown not to be
conclusive, the things objected against, considered as
matters of fact, are farther shown to be credible, from
their conformity to the constitution of nature ; for in-
stance, that God will reward and punish men for their
actions hereafter, from the observation, that he does
reward and punish them for their actions here. And
this, I apprehend, is of weight. And I add, thirdly, it
would be of weight, even though those objections were
not answered. For, there being the proof of religion
above set down ; and religion implying several facts ;
for instance again, the fact last mentioned, that God
will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter ;
the observation, that his present method of government
is by rewards and punishments, shows that future fact
not to be incredible : whatever objections men may
think they have against it, as unjust or unmerciful,
according to their notions of justice and mercy ; or as
improbable from their belief of necessity. I say, as
improbable : for it is evident no objection against it, as
unjust, can be urged from necessity ; since this notion
as much destroys injustice, as it does justice. Then,
fourthly, though objections against the reasonableness
of the system of religion cannot indeed be answered
without entering into consideration of its reasonable-
ness ; yet objections against the credibility or truth of it
may. Because the system of it is reducible into what
is properly matter of fact : and the truth, the probable
truth, of facts, may be shown without consideration of
their reasonableness. Nor is it necessary, though, in
Against arguing from Analogy 239
some cases and respects, it is highly useful and proper,
yet it is not necessary, to give a proof of the reason-
ableness of every precept enjoined us, and of every
particular dispensation of Providence, which comes into
the system of religion. Indeed the more thoroughly
a person of a right disposition is convinced of the
perfection of the divine nature and conduct, the farther
he will advance towards that perfection of religion,
which St. John 1 speaks of. But the general obligations
of religion are fully made out, by proving the reason-
ableness of the practice of it. And that the practice of
religion is reasonable, may be shown, though no more
could be proved, than that the system of it may be so,
for aught we know to the contrary : and even without
entering into the distinct consideration of this. And
from hence, fifthly, it is easy to see, that though the
analogy of nature is not an immediate answer to objec-
tions against the wisdom, the justice, or goodness, of
any doctrine or precept of religion ; yet it may be, as it
is, an immediate and direct answer to what is really in-
tended by such objections ; which is, to show that the
things objected against are incredible.
Fourthly. It is most readily acknowledged, that the
foregoing treatise is by no means satisfactory ; very far
indeed from it : but so would any natural institution of
life appear, if reduced into a system, together with its
evidence. Leaving religion out of the case, men are
divided in their opinions, whether our pleasures over-
balance our pains : and whether it be, or be not, eligible
to live in this world. And were all such controversies
settled, which perhaps, in speculation, would be found
involved in great difficulties; and were it determined
upon the evidence of reason, as nature has determined
it to our hands, that life is to be preserved, yet still, the
rules which God has been pleased to afford us, for
escaping the miseries of it, and obtaining its satisfac-
tions, the rules, for instance, of preserving health, and
recovering it when lost, are not only fallible and pre-
carious, but very far from being exact. Nor are we in-
1 x John IT. 18.
240 The Analogy of Religion
formed by nature, in future contingencies and accidents,
so as to render it at all certain, what is the best method
of managing our affairs. What will be the success of our
temporal pursuits, in the common sense of the word
Success, is highly doubtful. And what will be the
success of them in the proper sense of the word, i.e.,
what happiness or enjoyment we shall obtain by them, is
doubtful in a much higher degree. Indeed the unsatis-
factory nature of the evidence, with which we are
obliged to take up, in the daily course of life, is scarce
to be expressed. Yet men do not throw away life, or dis-
regard the interests of it, upon account of this doubtful-
ness. The evidence of religion, then, being admitted real,
those who object against it as not satisfactory, i.e., as not
being what they wish it, plainly forget the very condition
of our being : for satisfaction, in this sense, does not
belong to such a creature as man. And, which is more
material, they forget also the very nature of religion.
For, religion presupposes, in all those who will embrace
it, a certain degree of integrity and honesty ; which it
was intended to try whether men have or not, and to
exercise in such as have it, in order to its improvement.
Religion presupposes this as much, and in the same
sense, as speaking to a man presupposes he understands
the language in which you speak ; or as warning a man
of any danger presupposes that he hath such a regard
to himself as that he will endeavour to avoid it. And
therefore the question is not at all, Whether the evi-
dence of religion be satisfactory ; but Whether it be, in
reason, sufficient to prove and discipline that virtue,
which it presupposes. Now the evidence of it is fully
sufficient for all those purposes of probation, how far so-
ever it is from being satisfactory, as to the purposes of
curiosity, or any other : and, indeed, it answers the pur-
poses of the former in several respects, which it would
not do, if it were as overbearing as is required. One might
add further ; that whether the motives or the evidence
for any course of action be satisfactory, meaning here, by
that word, what satisfies a man, that such a course of
action will in event be for his good ; this need never be,
Against arguing from Analogy 241
and I think, strictly speaking, never is, the practical
question in common matters. But the practical question
in all cases is, Whether the evidence for a course of
action be such as, taking in all circumstances, makes the
faculty within us, which is the guide and judge of
conduct, l determine that course of action to be prudent.
Indeed, satisfaction that it will be for our interest or
happiness, abundantly determines an action to be pru-
dent : but evidence almost infinitely lower than this,
determines actions to be so too ; even in the conduct of
every day.
fifthly. As to the objection concerning the influence
which this argument, or any part of it, may, or may not
be expected to have upon men ; I observe, as above, that
religion being intended for a trial and exercise of the
morality of every person's character, who is a subject of
it ; and there being, as I have shown, such evidence for
it, as is sufficient, in reason, to influence men to embrace
it : to object, that it is not to be imagined mankind will
be influenced by such evidence, is nothing to the pur-
pose of the foregoing treatise. For the purpose of it is
not to inquire, what sort of creatures mankind are ; but
what the light and knowledge, which is afforded them,
requires they should be : to show how, in reason, they
ought to behave ; not how, in fact, they will behave.
This depends upon themselves, and is their own concern ;
the personal concern of each man in particular. And
how little regard the generality have to it, experience in-
deed does too fully show. But religion, considered as a
probation, has had its end upon all persons, to whom it
has been proposed with evidence sufficient in reason to
influence their practice : for by this means they have
been put into a state of probation ; let them behave as
they will in it. And thus, not only revelation, but rea-
son also, teaches us, that by the evidence of religion
being laid before men, the designs of Providence are
carrying on, not only with regard to those who will, but
likewise with regard to those who will not, be influenced
by it. However, lastly, the objection here referred to,
1 See Dissert. II.
242 The Analogy of Religion
allows the things insisted upon in this treatise to be of
some weight ; and if so, it may be hoped it will have
some influence. And if there be a probability that it
will have any at all, there is the same reason in kind,
though not in degree, to lay it before men, as there would
be, if it were likely to have a greater influence.
And further, I desire it may be considered, with
respect to the whole of the foregoing objections, that in
this treatise I have argued upon the principles of others, 1
not my own ; and have omitted what I think true, and of
the utmost importance, because by others thought
unintelligible, or not true. Thus I have argued upon
the principles of the Fatalists, which I do not believe ;
and have omitted a thing of the utmost importance
which I do believe, the moral fitness and unfitness of
actions, prior to all will whatever ; which I apprehend as
certainly to determine the Divine conduct, as speculative
truth and falsehood necessarily determine the Divine
judgment. Indeed, the principle of liberty, and that of
moral fitness, so force themselves upon the mind, that
moralists, the ancients as well as moderns, have formed
their language upon it. And probably it may appear in
mine : though I have endeavoured to avoid it ; and, in
order to avoid it, have sometimes been obliged to express
myself in a manner, which will appear strange to such as
do not observe the reason for it : but the general argu-
ment here pursued does not at all suppose, or proceed
upon these principles. Now, these two abstract prin-
ciples of liberty and moral fitness being omitted,
religion can be considered in no other view than merely
as a question of fact : and in this view it is here con-
sidered. It is obvious, that Christianity, and the proof
of it, are both historical. And even natural religion is,
properly, a matter of fact. For, that there is a righteous
Governor of the world, is so : and this proposition con-
tains the general system of natural religion. But then,
several abstract truths, and in particular those two prin-
1 By arguing upon the principles of oilier s, the reader will observe is meant,
not proving anything from those principles, but notwithstanding them. Thus
religion is proved, not/ram the opinion of necessity, which is absurd, but not-
withstanding or even though that opinion were admitted to be true.
Against arguing from Analogy 243
ciples, are usually taken into consideration in the proof
of it : whereas it is here treated of only as a matter of
fact. To explain this : that the three angles of a triangle
are equal to two right ones, is an abstract truth ; but that
they appear so to our mind, is only a matter of fact.
And this last must have been admitted, if anything was,
by those ancient sceptics, who would not have admitted
the former : but pretended to doubt, Whether there were
any such thing as truth, or Whether we could certainly
depend upon our faculties of understanding for the know-
ledge of it in any case. So likewise, that there is, in the
nature of things, an original standard of right and wrong
in actions, independent upon all will, but which unalter-
ably determines the will of God, to exercise that moral
government over the world, which religion teaches, i.e.,
finally and upon the whole to reward and punish men re-
spectivelyas theyact right or wrong; this assertion contains
an abstract truth, as well as matter of fact. But suppose,
in the present state, every man, without exception, was
rewarded and punished, in exact proportion as he
followed or transgressed that sense of right and wrong,
which God has implanted in the nature of every man :
this would not be at all an abstract truth, but only a
matter of fact. And though this fact were acknowledged
by every one ; yet the very same difficulties might be
raised as are now, concerning the abstract questions of
liberty and moral fitness : and we should have a proof,
even the certain one of experience, that the government
of the world was perfectly moral, without taking in the
consideration of those questions : and this proof would
remain, in what way soever they were determined. And
thus, God having given mankind a moral faculty, the
object of which is actions, and which naturally approves
some actions as right, and of good desert, and condemns
others as wrong, and of ill desert; that he will, finally
and upon the whole, reward the former and punish the
latter, is not an assertion of an abstract truth, but of
what is as mere a fact, as his doing so at present would be.
This future fact I have not, indeed, proved with the force
with which it might be proved, from the principles of
244 The Analogy of Religion
liberty and moral fitness ; but without them have given
a really conclusive practical proof of it, which is greatly
strengthened by the general analogy of nature : a proof
easily cavilled at, easily shown not to be demonstrative,
for it is not offered as such ; but impossible, I think, to
be evaded, or answered. And thus the obligations of
religion are made out, exclusively of the questions con-
cerning liberty and moral fitness ; which have been
perplexed with difficulties and abstruse reasonings, as
everything may.
Hence, therefore, may be observed distinctly, what is
the force of this treatise. It will be, to such as are con-
vinced of religion upon the proof arising out of the two
last-mentioned principles, an additional proof and a
confirmation of it : to such as do not admit those
principles, an original proof of it, 1 and a confirmation of
that proof. Those who believe will here find the scheme
of Christianity cleared of objections, and the evidence
of it in a peculiar manner strengthened : those who do
not believe, will at least be shown the absurdity of all
attempts to prove Christianity false, the plain undoubted
credibility of it ; and, I hope, a good deal more.
And thus, though some perhaps may seriously think,
that analogy, as here urged, has too great stress laid
upon it ; and ridicule, unanswerable ridicule, may be
applied, to show the argument from it in a disadvantage-
ous light ; yet there can be no question, but that it is
a real one. For religion, both natural and revealed, im-
plying in it numerous facts ; analogy, being a confirma-
tion of all facts to which it can be applied, as it is the
only proof of most, cannot but be admitted by every
one to be a material thing, and truly of weight on the
side of religion, both natural and revealed : and it ought
to be particularly regarded by such as profess to follow
nature, and to be less satisfied with abstract reasonings.
i P. 91.
CONCLUSION
WHATEVER account may be given of the strange in-
attention and disregard, in some ages and countries,
to a matter of such importance as Religion ; it would,
before experience, be incredible, that there should be
the like disregard in those, who have had the moral
system of the world laid before them, as it is by
Christianity, and often inculcated upon them : because
this moral system carries in it a good degree of evidence
for its truth, upon its being barely proposed to our
thoughts. There is no need of abstruse reasonings and
distinctions, to convince an unprejudiced understanding,
that there is a God who made and governs the world,
and will judge it in righteousness ; though they may be
necessary to answer abstruse difficulties, when once such
are raised : when the very meaning of those words-,
which express most intelligibly the general doctrine of
religion, is pretended to be uncertain ; and the clear
truth of the thing itself is obscured by the intricacies of
speculation. But to an unprejudiced mind, ten thousand
thousand instances of design cannot but prove a designer.
And it is intuitively manifest, that creatures ought to
live under a dutiful sense of their Maker ; and that
justice and charity must be his laws, to creatures whom
he has made social, and placed in society. Indeed the
truth of revealed religion, peculiarly so called, is not
self-evident, but requires external proof, in order to its
being received. Yet inattention, among us, to revealed
religion, will be found to imply the same dissolute im-
moral temper of mind, as inattention to natural religion ;
because, when both are laid before us, in the manner they
are in Christian countries of liberty, our obligations to
inquire into both, and to embrace both upon supposition
of their truth, are obligations of the same nature. For
revelation claims to be the voice of God : and our
245
246 The Analogy of Religion
obligation to attend to his voice is surely moral in all
cases. And as it is insisted, that its evidence is con-
clusive, upon thorough consideration of it ; so it offers
itself to us with manifest obvious appearances of having
something more than human in it, and therefore in all
reason requires to have its claims most seriously examined
into. It is to be added, that though light and know-
ledge, in what manner soever afforded us, is equally
from God; yet a miraculous revelation has a peculiar
tendency, from the first principles of our nature, to
awaken mankind, and inspire them with reverence and
awe : and this is a peculiar obligation to attend to what
claims to be so with such appearances of truth. It is
therefore most certain, that our obligations to inquire
seriously into the evidence of Christianity, and, upon
supposition of its truth, to embrace it, are of the utmost
importance, and moral in the highest and most proper
sense. Let us then suppose, that the evidence of
religion in general, and of Christianity, has been seriously
inquired into, by all reasonable men among us. Yet we
find many professedly to reject both, upon speculative
principles of infidelity. And all of them do not content
themselves with a bare neglect of religion, and enjoying
their imaginary freedom from its restraints. Some go
much beyond this. They deride God's moral govern-
ment over the world. They renounce his protection,
and defy his justice. They ridicule and vilify Chris-
tianity, and blaspheme the author of it; and take all
occasions to manifest a scorn and contempt of revelation.
This amounts to an active setting themselves against
religion ; to what may be considered as a positive
principle of irreligion ; which they cultivate within
themselves, and, whether they intend this effect or not,
render habitual, as a good man does the contrary princi-
ple. And others who are not chargeable with all this
profligateness, yet are in avowed opposition to religion,
as if discovered to be groundless. Now admitting,
which is the supposition we go upon, that these persons
act upon what they think principles of reason, and
otherwise they are not to be argued with ; it is really in-
Conclusion 247
conceivable, that they should imagine they clearly see
the whole evidence of it, considered in itself, to be
nothing at all : nor do they pretend this. They are far
indeed from having a just notion of its evidence : but
they would not say its evidence was nothing, if they
thought the system of it, with all its circumstances, were
credible, like other matters of science or history. So
that their manner of treating it must proceed, either
from such kind of objections against all religion, as
have been answered or obviated in the former part of
this treatise; or else from objections and difficulties,
supposed more peculiar to Christianity. Thus, they
entertain prejudices against the whole notion of a revela-
tion, and miraculous interpositions. They find things
in Scripture, whether in incidental passages, or in the
general scheme of it, which appear to them unreason-
able. They take for granted, that if Christianity were
true, the light of it must have been more general, and
the evidence of it more satisfactory, or rather over-
bearing : that it must and would have been, in some
way, otherwise put and left, than it is. Now this is not
imagining they see the evidence itself to be nothing,
or inconsiderable ; but quite another thing. It is being
fortified against the evidence, in some degree acknow-
ledged, by thinking they see the system of Christianity,
or somewhat which appears to them necessarily con-
nected with it, to be incredible or false ; fortified against
that evidence, which, might otherwise, make great im-
pression upon them. Or lastly, if any of these persons
are, upon the whole, in doubt concerning the truth of
Christianity; their behaviour seems owing to their taking
for granted, through strange inattention, that such
doubting is, in a manner, the same thing as being
certain against it.
To these persons, and to this state of opinion con-
cerning religion, the foregoing treatise is adapted For,
all the general objections against the moral system of
nature having been obviated, it is shown, that there
is not any peculiar presumption at all against Chris-
tianity, either considered as not discoverable by reason,
248 The Analogy of Religion
or as unlike as to what is so discovered ; nor any worth
mentioning against it as miraculous, if any at all ; none,
certainly, which can render it in the least incredible.
It is shown, that, upon supposition of a divine revela-
tion, the analogy of nature renders it beforehand highly
credible, I think probable, that many things in it must
appear liable to great objections ; and that we must be
incompetent judges of it, to a great degree. This
observation is, I think, unquestionably true, and of the
very utmost importance : but it is urged, as I hope it
will be understood, with great caution of not vilifying
the faculty of reason, which is the candle of the Lord
within us ; l though it can afford no light, where it does
not shine; nor judge, where it has no principles to
judge upon. The objections here spoken of, being
first answered in the view of objections against Chris-
tianity as a matter of fact, are in the next place con-
sidered as urged more immediately against the wisdom,
justice, and goodness of the Christian dispensation.
And it is fully made out, that they admit of exactly the
like answer, in every respect, to what the like objections
against the constitution of nature admit of: that, as
partial views give the appearance of wrong to things,
which, upon further consideration and knowledge of
their relations to other things, are found just and good ;
so it is perfectly credible, that the things objected
against the wisdom and goodness of the Christian dis-
pensation, may be rendered instances of wisdom and
goodness, by their reference to other things beyond our
view : because Christianity is a scheme as much above
our comprehension, as that of nature; and like that, a
scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish
ends, and which, as is most credible, may be carried on
by general laws. And it ought to be attended to, that
this is not an answer taken merely or chiefly from our
ignorance ; but from somewhat positive, which our obser-
vation shows us. For, to like objections, the like answer
is experienced to be just, in numberless parallel cases.
The objections against the Christian dispensation, and
1 Prov. xx. IT.
Conclusion 249
the method by which it is carried on, having been thus
obviated, in general and together ; the chief of them
are considered distinctly, and the particular things ob-
jected to are shown credible, by their perfect analogy,
each apart, to the constitution of nature. Thus, if man
be fallen from his primitive state, and to be restored,
and infinite wisdom and power engages in accomplish-
ing our recovery : it were to have been expected, it is
said, that this should have been effected at once; and
not by such a long series of means, and such a various
economy of persons and things ; one dispensation pre-
paratory to another, this to a further one, and so on
through an indefinite number of ages, before the end of
the scheme proposed can be completely accomplished ;
a scheme conducted by infinite wisdom, and executed
by almighty power. But now, on the contrary, our
finding that everything in the constitution and course of
nature is thus carried on, shows such expectations con-
cerning revelation to be highly unreasonable ; and is a
satisfactory answer to them, when urged as objections
against the credibility, that the great scheme of Provi-
dence in the redemption of the world may be of this
kind, and to be accomplished in this manner. As to
the particular method of our redemption, the appoint-
ment of a Mediator between God and man : this has
been shown to be most obviously analogous to the
general conduct of nature, i.e., the God of nature, in
appointing others to be the instruments of his mercy,
as we experience in the daily course of providence.
The condition of this world, which the doctrine of our
redemption by Christ presupposes, so much falls in with
natural appearances, that heathen moralists inferred it
from those appearances : inferred, that human nature
was fallen from its original rectitude, and in consequence
of this, degraded from its primitive happiness. Or,
however this opinion came into the world, these appear-
ances must have kept up the tradition, and confirmed
the belief of it. And as it was the general opinion
under the light of nature, that repentance and reforma-
tion, alone and by itself, was not sufficient to do away
250 The Analogy of Religion
sin, and procure a full remission of the penalties an-
nexed to it ; and as the reason of the thing does not at
all lead to any such conclusion ; so every day's experi-
ence shows us, that reformation is not, in any sort,
sufficient to prevent the present disadvantages and
miseries, which, in the natural course of things, God
has annexed to folly and extravagance. Yet there may
be ground to think, that the punishments, which, by
the general laws of divine government, are annexed to
vice, may be prevented : that provision may have been,
even originally, made, that they should be prevented by
some means or other, though they could not by reforma-
tion alone. For we have daily instances of such mercy,
in the general conduct of nature : compassion provided
for misery, 1 medicines for diseases, friends against ene-
mies. There is provision made, in the original con-
stitution of the world, that much of the natural bad
consequences of our follies, which persons themselves
alone cannot prevent, may be prevented by the assist-
ance of others ; assistance, which nature enables, and
disposes, and appoints them to afford. By a method of
goodness analogous to this, when the world lay in
wickedness, and consequently in ruin, God so loved the
world, that he gave his only begotten Son, to save it : and
he being made perfect by suffering, became the author of
eternal salvation to all them that obey him? Indeed,
neither reason nor analogy would lead us to think, in
particular, that the interposition of Christ, in the manner
in which he did interpose, would be of that efficacy
for recovery of the world, which the Scripture teaches
us it was : but neither would reason nor analogy lead us
to think, that other particular means would be of the
efficacy, which experience shows they are, in numberless
instances. And therefore, as the case before us does
not admit of experience; so, that neither reason nor
analogy can show how, or in what particular way, the
interposition of Christ, as revealed in Scripture, is of
that efficacy, which it is there represented to be ; this is
no kind nor degree of presumption against its being
1 Serin, at the Rolls, p. 106. * John iii. 16 ; Heb. v. 9.
Conclusion 251
really of that efficacy. Further, the objections against
Christianity, from the light of it not being universal,
nor its evidence so strong as might possibly be given us,
have been answered by the general analogy of nature.
That God has made such variety of creatures, is indeed
an answer to the former : but that he dispenses his
gifts in such variety, both of degrees and kinds, amongst
creatures of the same species, and even to the same
individuals at different times ; is a more obvious and
full answer to it. And it is so far from being the
method of Providence in other cases, to afford us such
overbearing evidence, as some require in proof of Chris-
tianity ; that, on the contrary, the evidence upon which
we are naturally appointed to act in common matters,
throughout a very great part of life, is doubtful in a
high degree. And admitting the fact, that God has
afforded to some no more than doubtful evidence of
religion j the same account may be given of it, as of
difficulties and temptations with regard to practice.
But as it is not impossible, 1 surely, that this alleged
doubtfulness may be men's own fault ; it deserves their
most serious consideration, whether it be not so. How-
ever, it is certain, that doubting implies a degree of
evidence for that of which we doubt : and that this
degree of evidence as really lays us under obligations as
demonstrative evidence.
The whole, then, of religion is throughout credible :
nor is there, I think, anything relating to the revealed
dispensation of things, more different from the experi-
enced constitution and course of nature, than some
parts of the constitution of nature are from other parts
of it. And if so, the only question which remains is,
what positive evidence can be alleged for the truth of
Christianity ? This too, in general, has been considered,
and the objections against it estimated. Deduct, there-
fore, what is to be deducted from that evidence, upon
account of any weight which may be thought to remain
in these objections, after what the analogy of nature has
suggested in answer to them : and then consider, what
i P. i 93 .
252 The Analogy of Religion
are the practical consequences from all this, upon '.he
most sceptical principles one can argue upon (for I am
writing to persons who entertain these principles) : and
upon such consideration it will be obvious, that immor-
ality, as little excuse as it admits of in itself, is greatly
aggravated, in persons who have been made acquainted
with Christianity, whether they believe it or not : be-
cause the moral system of nature, or natural religion,
which Christianity lays before us, approves itself, almost
intuitively, to a reasonable mind, upon seeing it pro-
posed. In the next place, with regard to Christianity,
it will be observed ; that there is a middle between a
full satisfaction of the truth of it, and a satisfaction of
the contrary. The middle state of mind between these
two, consists in a serious apprehension, that it may be
true, joined with doubt whether it be so. And this,
upon the best judgment I am able to make, is as far
towards speculative infidelity, as any sceptic can at all
be supposed to go, who has had true Christianity, with
the proper evidence of it, laid before him, and has in
any tolerable measure considered them. For I would
not be mistaken to comprehend all who have ever heard
of it : because it seems evident, that in many countries
called Christian, neither Christianity, nor its evidence,
are fairly laid before men. And in places where both
are, there appear to be some, who have very little atten-
ded to either, and who reject Christianity with a scorn
proportionate to their inattention ; and yet are by no
means without understanding in other matters. Now it
has been shown, that a serious apprehension that Chris-
tianity may be true, lays persons under the strictest
obligations of a serious regard to it, throughout the
whole of their life : a regard, not the same exactly, but
in many respects nearly the same, with what a full con-
viction of its truth would lay them under. Lastly, it
will appear, that blasphemy and profaneness, I mean
with regard to Christianity, are absolutely without ex-
cuse. For there is no temptation to it, but from the
wantonness of vanity or mirth : and these, considering
the infinite importance of the subject, are no such
Conclusion 253
temptations as to afford any excuse for it. If this be a
just account of things, and yet men can go on to vilify
or disregard Christianity, which is to talk and act as if
they had a demonstration of its falsehood ; there is no
reason to think they would alter their behaviour to any
purpose, though there were a demonstration of its truth.
KXD OF THE SECOND PART
THE ANALOGY
OF RELIGION
TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS
I. OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
II. OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE
IN the first copy of these Papers, I had inserted the two
following Dissertations into the Chapters, " Of a Future
Life," and, "Of the Moral Government of God;" with
which they are closely connected. But as they do not
directly fall under the title of the foregoing Treatise, and
would have kept the subject of it too long out of sight ;
it seemed more proper to place them by themselves.
DISSERTATION I
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
WHETHER we are to live in a future state, as it is the
most important question which can possibly be asked,
so it is the most intelligible one which can be expressed
in language. Yet strange perplexities have been raised
about the meaning of that identity or sameness of
person, which is implied in the notion of our living now
and hereafter, or in any two successive moments. And
the solution of these difficulties hath been stranger than
the difficulties themselves. For personal identity has
been explained so by some, as to render the inquiry
concerning a future life of no consequence at all to us
the persons who are making it. And though few men
can be misled by such subtleties, yet it may be proper
a little to consider them.
Now, when it is asked wherein personal identity con-
sists, the answer should be the same, as if it were asked
wherein consists similitude, or equality; that all attempts
to define would but perplex it. Yet there is no difficulty
at all in ascertaining the idea. For as, upon two
triangles being compared or viewed together, there
arises to the mind the idea of similitude ; or upon twice
two and four, the idea of equality : so likewise, upon
comparing the consciousness of one's self or one's own
existence, in any two moments, there as immediately
arises to the mind the idea of personal identity. And
as the two former comparisons not only give us the
ideas of similitude and equality ; but also show us, that
two triangles are alike, and twice two and four are equal :
so the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of
personal identity, but also shows us the identity of our-
selves in those two moments ; the present, suppose, and
that immediately past ; or the presen*, and that a month,
a year, or twenty years past. Or, in other words, by
T 9<> 257
258 The Analogy of Religion
reflecting upon that which is myself now, and that
which was myself twenty years ago, I discern they are
not two, but one and the same self.
But though consciousness of what is past does thus
ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say,
that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our
being the same persons, is to say, that a person has not
existed a single moment, nor done one action, but what
he can remember ; indeed, none but what he reflects
upon. And one should really think it self-evident, that
consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and
therefore cannot constitute, personal identity : any more
than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth,
which it presupposes.
This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from
hence ; that to be endued with consciousness is in-
separable from the idea of a person, or intelligent being.
For, this might be expressed inaccurately thus, that
consciousness makes personality : and from hence it
might be concluded to make personal identity. But
though present consciousness of what we at present do
and feel is necessary to our being the persons we now
are ; yet present consciousness of past actions or feel-
ings is not necessary to our being the same persons who
performed those actions, or had those feelings.
The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same in the
common acceptation of the word, does not appear to
have any relation to this of personal identity : because,
the word same, when applied to them and to person, is
not only applied to different subjects, but it is also used
in different senses. For when a man swears to the same
tree, as having stood fifty years in the same place, he
means only the same as to all the purposes of property
and uses of common life, and not that the tree has been
all that time the same in the strict philosophical sense of
the word. For he does not know, whether any one
particle of the present tree be the same with any one
particle of the tree which stood in the same place fifty
years ago. And if they have not one common particle
of matter, they cannot be the same tree in the proper
Of Personal Identity 259
philosophic sense of the word same : it being evidently
a contradiction in terms, to say they are, when no part
of their substance, and no one of their properties, is the
same : no part of their substance, by the supposition ;
no one of their properties, because it is allowed, that
the same property cannot be transferred from one sub-
stance to another. And, therefore, when we say the
identity or sameness of a plant consists in a continuation
of the same life, communicated under the same organi-
zation, to a number of particles of matter, whether the
same or not ; the word same, when applied to life and to
organization, cannot possibly be understood to signify,
what it signifies in this very sentence, when applied to
matter. In a loose and popular sense then, the life and
the organization, and the plant, are justly said to be the
same, notwithstanding the perpetual change of the parts.
But in a strict and philosophical manner of speech, no
man, no being, no mode of being, no anything, can be
the same with that, with which it has indeed nothing the
same. Now sameness is used in this latter sense, when
applied to persons. The identity of these, therefore,
cannot subsist with diversity of substance.
The thing here considered, and demonstratively, as
I think, determined, is proposed by Mr. Locke in these
words, Whether it, i.e., the same self or person, be the
same identical substance ? And he has suggested what is
a much better answer to the question, than that which
he gives it in form. For he defines Person, a thinking
intelligent being, &c., and personal identity, the sameness
of a rational Being?- The question then is, whether the
same rational being is the same substance : which needs
no answer, because Being and Substance, in this place,
stand for the same idea. The ground of the doubt,
whether the same person be the same substance, is said
to be this ; that the consciousness of our own existence,
in youth and in old age, or in any two joint successive
moments, is not the same individual action? i.e., not the
same consciousness, but different successive conscious-
nesses. Now it is strange that this should have occa-
1 Locke's Works, vol. i. p. 146. * Locke, pp. 146, 147.
260 The Analogy of Religion
sioned such perplexities. For it is surely conceivable,
that a person may have a capacity of knowing some
object or other to be same now, which it was when he
contemplated it formerly : yet in this case, where, by the
supposition, the object is perceived to be the same, the
perception of it in any two moments cannot be one and
the same perception. And thus, though the successive
consciousnesses which we have of our own existence are
not the same, yet are they consciousnesses of one and
the same thing or object; of the same person, self, or
living agent. The person, of whose existence the con-
sciousness is felt now, and was felt an hour or a year
ago, is discerned to be, not two persons, but one and
the same person ; and therefore is one and the same.
Mr. Locke's observations upon this subject appear
hasty : and he seems to profess himself dissatisfied with
suppositions, which he has made relating to it. 1 But
some of those hasty observations have been carried to a
strange length by others ; whose notion, when traced and
examined to the bottom, amounts, I think, to this : z
"That Personality is not a permanent, but a transient
thing : that it lives and dies, begins and ends continu-
ally : that no one can any more remain one and the
same person two moments together, than two successive
moments can be one and the same moment: that our
substance is indeed continually changing ; but whether
this be so or not, is, it seems, nothing to the purpose;
since it is not substance, but consciousness alone, which
constitutes personality : which consciousness, being suc-
cessive, cannot be the same in any two moments, nor
consequently the personality constituted by it." And
from hence it must follow, that it is a fallacy upon our-
selves, to charge our present selves with anything we did,
or to imagine our present selves interested in anything
which befell us yesterday ; or that our present self will
be interested in what will befall us to-morrow : since our
present self if not, in reality, the same with the self of
1 Locke, p. 152.
2 See an Answer to Dr. Clarke's Third Defence of his Letter to Mr. Dodwell,
and edit., pp. 44, 56, &c.
Of Personal Identity 261
yesterday, but another like self or person coming in its
room, and mistaken for it ; to which another self will
succeed to-morrow. This, I say, must follow : for if the
self or person of to-day, and that of to-morrow, are not
the same, but only like persons ; the person of to-day is
really no more interested in what will befall the person of
to-morrow, than in what will befall any other person. It
may be thought, perhaps, that this is not a just represen-
tation of the opinion we are speaking of : because those
who maintain it allow, that a person is the same as far
back as his remembrance reaches. And indeed they do
use the words identity and same person. Nor will lan-
guage permit these words to be laid aside ; since if they
were, there must be I know not what ridiculous peri-
phrasis substituted in the room of them. But they
cannot, consistently with themselves, mean, that the
person is really the same. For it is self-evident, that the
personality cannot be really the same, if, as they expressly
assert, that in which it consists is not the same. And
as, consistently with themselves, they cannot, so, I think
it appears, they do not, mean, that the person is really
the same, but only that he is so in a fictitious sense ; in
such a sense only as they assert, for this they do assert,
that any number of persons whatever, may be the same
person. The bare unfolding this notion, and laying it
thus naked and open, seems the best confutation of it.
However, since great stress is said to be put upon it, I
add the following things.
First. This notion is absolutely contradictory to that
certain conviction, which necessarily and every moment
rises within us, when we turn our thoughts upon ourselves,
when we reflect upon what is past, and look forward upon
what is to come. All imagination of a daily change of
that living agent which each man calls himself, for
another, or of any such change throughout our whole
present life, is entirely borne down by our natural sense
of things. Nor is it possible for a person in his wits to
alter his conduct, with regard to his health or affairs,
from a suspicion, that, though he should live to-morrow,
he should not, however, be the same person he is to-day.
262 The Analogy of Religion
And yet, if it be reasonable to act, with respect to a
future life, upon this notion, that personality is transient ;
it is reasonable to act upon it, with respect to the pre-
sent. Here, then, is a notion equally applicable to re-
ligion and to our temporal concerns ; and every one sees
and feels the inexpressible absurdity of it in the latter
case ; if, therefore, any can take up with it in the former,
this cannot proceed from the reason of the thing, but
must be owning to an inward unfairness, and secret cor-
ruption of heart.
Secondly. It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or
quality, but a being only, which is capable of life and
action, of happiness and misery. Now all beings con-
fessedly continue the same, during the whole time of
their existence. Consider then a living being now exist-
ing, and which has existed for any time alive : this living
being must have done and suffered and enjoyed, what it
has done and suffered and enjoyed formerly (this living
being, I say, and not another), as really as it does and
suffers and enjoys, what it does and suffers and enjoys
this instant. All these successive actions, enjoyments,
and sufferings, are actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, of
the same living being. And they are so, prior to all con-
sideration of its remembering or forgetting : since
remembering or forgetting can make no alteration in the
truth of past matter of fact. And suppose this being
endued with limited powers of knowledge and memory,
there is no more difficulty in conceiving it to have a
power of knowing itself to be the same living being
which it was some time ago, of remembering some of its
actions, sufferings, and enjoyments, and forgetting others,
than in conceiving it to know or remember or forget any-
thing else.
Thirdly. Every person is conscious that he is now the
same person or self he was as far back as his remembrance
reaches : since, when anyone reflects upon a past action
of his own, he is just as certain of the person who did
that action, namely, himself, the person who now reflects
upon it, as he is certain that the action was at all done.
Nay, very often a person's assurance of an action having
Of the Nature of Virtue 263
been done, of which he is absolutely assured, arises
wholly from the consciousness that he himself did it.
And this he, person, or self, must either be a substance,
or the property of some substance. If he, if person, be
a substance, then, consciousness that he is the same
person is consciousness that he is the same substance.
If the person, or he, be the property of a substance,
still consciousness that he is the same property is as cer-
tain a proof that his substance remains the same, as con-
sciousness that he remains the same substance would be :
since the same property cannot he transferred from one
substance to another.
But though we are thus certain, that we are the same
agents, living beings, or substances, now, which we were
as far back as our remembrance reaches ; yet it is asked,
whether we may not possibly be deceived in it? And
this question may be asked at the end of any demonstra-
tion whatever : because it is a question concerning the
truth of perception by memory. And he who can doubt,
whether perception by memory can in this case be de-
pended upon, may doubt also, whether perception by
deduction and reasoning, which also include memory, or
indeed whether intuitive perception, can. Here then we
go no further. For it is ridiculous to attempt to prove
the truth of those perceptions, whose truth we can no
otherwise prove, than by other perceptions of exactly
the same kind with them, and which there is just the
same ground to suspect ; or to attempt to prove the truth
of our faculties, which can no otherwise be proved, than
by the use or means of those very suspected faculties
themselves.
DISSERTATION II
OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE
THAT which renders beings capable of moral government,
is their having a moral nature, and moral faculties of per-
ception and of action. Brute creatures are impressed
and actuated by various instincts and propensions; so
264 The Analogy of Religion
also are we. But additional to this, we have a capacity
of reflecting upon actions and characters, and making
them an object to our thought ; and on doing this, we
naturally and unavoidably approve some actions, under
the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of good
desert; and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill
desert. That we have this moral approving and dis-
approving 1 faculty, is certain from our experiencing it in
ourselves, and recognising it in each other. It appears
from our exercising it unavoidably, in the approbation
and disapprobation even of feigned characters : from the
words right and wrong, odious and amiable, base and
worthy, with many others of like signification in all lan-
guages applied to actions and characters : from the many
written systems of morals which suppose it ; since it
cannot be imagined that all these authors, throughout all
these treatises, had absolutely no meaning at all to their
words, or a meaning merely chimerical : from our natural
sense of gratitude, which implies a distinction between
merely being the instrument of good, and intending it :
from the like distinction every one makes between injury
and mere harm, which, Hobbes says, is peculiar to man-
kind ; and between injury and just punishment, a dis-
tinction plainly natural, prior to the consideration of
human laws. It is manifest great part 2 of common lan-
guage, and of common behaviour over the world, is
formed upon supposition of such a moral faculty ;
whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense,
or divine reason ; whether considered as a sentiment of
the understanding, or as a perception of the heart ; or,
which seems the truth, as including both. Nor is at all
doubtful in the general, what course of action this
1 This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus, 2 and is made use of as
seeming the most full, and least liable to cavil. And the moral faculty may be
understood to have these two epithets doKifM.ffTi.Ki] and dirodoKifMffTiKT),
upon a double account, because, upon a survey of actions, whether before or
after they are done, it determines them to be good or evil ; and also because it
determines itself to be the guide of action and of life, in contradistinction from
all other faculties, or natural principles of action, in the very same manner as
speculative reason directly and naturally judges of speculative truth and false-
hood ; and at the same time is attended with a consciousness upon reflection,
that the natural right to judge of them belongs to it.
8 Arr. Epict. lib. i. cap. x.
Of the Nature of Virtue 265
faculty, or practical discerning power within us, approves
and what it disapproves. For, as much as it has been
disputed wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for
doubt there may be about particulars ; yet, in general,
there is in reality a universally acknowledged standard of
it. It is that, which all ages and all countries have made
profession of in public : it is that, which every man you
meet puts on the show of : it is that, which the primary
and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions over the
face of the earth make it their business and endeavour
to enforce the practice of upon mankind : namely,
justice, veracity, and regard to common good. It being
manifest, then, in general, that we have such a faculty or
discernment as this, it may be of use to remark some
things more distinctly concerning it.
First, It ought to be observed, that the object of this
faculty is actions, 1 comprehending under that name
active or practical principles : those principles from
which men would act, if occasions and circumstances
gave them power ; and which, when fixed and habitual
in any person, we call his character. It does not appear,
that brutes have the least reflex sense of actions, as
distinguished from events : or that will and design,
which constitute the very nature of actions as such, are
at all an object to their perception. But to ours they
are : and they are the object, and the only one, of the
approving and disapproving faculty. Acting, conduct,
behaviour, abstracted from all regard to what is in fact
and event the consequence of it, is itself the natural
object of the moral discernment ; as speculative truth
and falsehood is of speculative reason. Intention of
such and such consequences, indeed, is always included ;
for it is part of the action itself: but though the in-
tended good or bad consequences do not follow, we
have exactly the same sense of the action as if they did.
In like manner we think well or ill of characters, ab-
stracted from all consideration of the good or the evil,
which persons of such characters have it actually in their
Ka.1 KdKLo. in irelffei, dXXa fvepyelq., M. Anton, lilx
ix. 16. Virtutis laus omnis in actione cocststit. Cic. Off. lib. i. cap. 6.
266 The Analogy of Religion
power to do. We never, in the moral way, applaud or
blame either ourselves or others, for what we enjoy or
what we suffer, or for having impressions made upon us
which we consider as altogether out of our power : but
only for what we do, or would have done, had it
been in our power : or for what we leave undone, which
we might have done, or would have left undone, though
we could have done it.
Secondly. Our sense or discernment of actions as
morally good or evil, implies in it a sense or discern-
ment of them as of good or ill desert. It may be
difficult to explain this perception, so as to answer all
the questions which may be asked concerning it : but
every one speaks of such and such actions as deserving
punishment ; and it is not, I suppose, pretended, that
they have absolutely no meaning at all to the expression.
Now the meaning plainly is not, that we conceive it for
the good of society, that the doer of such actions should
be made to suffer. For if, unhappily, it were resolved,
that a man, who, by some innocent action, was infected
with the plague, should be left to perish, lest, by other
people's coming near him, the infection should spread ;
no one would say he deserved this treatment. Inno-
cence and ill desert are inconsistent ideas. Ill desert
always supposes guilt : and if one be not part of the
other, yet they are evidently and naturally connected
in our mind Tie sight of a man in misery raises our
compassion towards him; and, if this misery be in-
flicted on him by another, our indignation against the
author of it. But when we are informed, that the
sufferer is a villain, and is punished only for his treach-
ery or cruelty ; our compassion exceedingly lessens, and
in many instances our indignation wholly subsides.
Now what produces this effect is the conception of that
in the sufferer, which we call ill desert. Upon consider-
ing, then, or viewing together, our notion of vice and
that of misery, there results a third, that of ill desert.
And thus there is in human creatures an association of
the two ideas, natural and moral evil, wickedness and
punishment. If this association were merely artificial
Of the Nature of Virtue 267
or accidental, it were nothing : but being most unques-
tionably natural, it greatly concerns us to attend to it,
instead of endeavouring to explain it away.
It may be observed further, concerning our perception
of good and of ill desert, that the former is very weak
with respect to common instances of virtue. One rea-
son of which may be, that it does not appear to a
spectator, how far such instances of virtue proceed from
a virtuous principle, or in what degree this principle is
prevalent : since a very weak regard to virtue may be
sufficient to make men act well in many common in-
stances. And, on the other hand, our perception of ill
desert in vicious actions lessens, in proportion to the
temptations men are thought to have had to such vices.
For, vice in human creatures consisting chiefly in the
absence or want of the virtuous principle ; though a
man be overcome, suppose, by tortures, it does not from
thence appear to what degree the virtuous principle was
wanting. All that appears is, that he had it not in such
a degree, as to prevail over the temptation ; but possibly
he had it in a degree, which would have rendered him
proof against common temptations.
Thirdly. Our perception of vice and ill desert arises
from, and is the result of, a comparison of actions with
the nature and capacities of the agent. For the mere
neglect of doing what we ought to do, would, in many
cases, be determined by all men to be in the highest
degree vicious. And this determination must arise from
such comparison, and be the result of it ; because such
neglect would not be vicious in creatures of other
natures and capacities, as brutes. And it is the same
also with respect to positive vices, or such as consist in
doing what we ought not. For, every one has a differ-
ent sense of harm done by an idiot, madman, or child,
and by one of mature and common understanding;
though the action of both, including the intention,
which is part of the action, be the same : as it may be,
since idiots and madmen, as well as children, are cap-
able not only of doing mischief, but also of intending it.
Now this difference must arise from somewhat discerned
268 The Analogy of Religion
in the nature or capacities of one, which renders the
action vicious ; and the want of which, in the other,
renders the same action innocent or less vicious : and
this plainly supposes a comparison, whether reflected
upon or not, between the action and capacities of the
agent, previous to our determining an action to be
vicious. And hence arises a proper application of the
epithets, incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit,
to actions which our moral faculty determines to be
vicious.
Fourthly. It deserves to be considered, whether men
are more at liberty, in point of morals, to make them-
selves miserable without reason, than to make other
people so; or dissolutely to neglect their own greater
good, for the sake of a present lesser gratification, than
they are to neglect the good of others, whom nature has
committed to their care. It should seem, that a due
concern about our own interest or happiness, and a
reasonable endeavour to secure and promote it, which
is, I think, very much the meaning of the word pru-
dence, in our language; it should seem, that this is
virtue, and the contrary behaviour faulty and blamable ;
since, in the calmest way of reflection, we approve of
the first, and condemn the other conduct, both in our-
selves and others. This approbation and disapproba-
tion are altogether different from mere desire of our
own, or of their happiness, and from sorrow upon miss-
ing it. For the object or occasion of this last kind of
perception is satisfaction or uneasiness : whereas the
object of the first is active behaviour. In one case,
what our thoughts fix upon is our condition : in the
other, our conduct. It is true, indeed, that nature has
not given us so sensible a disapprobation of imprudence
and folly, either in ourselves or others, as of falsehood,
injustice, and cruelty : I suppose, because that constant
habitual sense of private interest and good, which we
always carry about with us, renders such sensible dis-
approbation less necessary, less wanting, to keep us
from imprudently neglecting our own happiness, and
foolishly injuring ourselves, than it is necessary and
Of the Nature of Virtue 269
wanting to keep us from injuring others, to whose good
we cannot have so strong and constant a regard : and
also because imprudence and folly, appearing to bring
its own punishment more immediately and constantly
than injurious behaviour, it less needs the additional
punishment, which would be inflicted upon it by others,
had they the same sensible indignation against it, as
against injustice, and fraud, and cruelty. Besides, un-
happiness being in itself the natural object of com-
passion ; the unhappiness which people bring upon
themselves, though it be wilfully, excites in us some
pity for them : and this of course lessens our displeasure
against them. But still it is matter of experience, that
we are formed so as to reflect very severely upon the
greater instances of imprudent neglect and foolish rash-
ness, both in ourselves and others. In instances of this
kind, men often say of themselves with remorse, and of
others with some indignation, that they deserved to suffer
such calamities, because they brought them upon them-
selves and would not take warning. Particularly when
persons come to poverty and distress by a long course
of extravagance, and after frequent admonitions, though
without falsehood or injustice ; we plainly, do not regard
such people as alike objects of compassion with those,
who are brought into the same condition by unavoid-
able accidents. From these things it appears, that
prudence is a species of virtue, and folly of vice : mean-
ing by folly, somewhat quite different from mere incapa-
city ; a thoughtless want of that regard and attention to
our own happiness, which we had capacity for. And
this the word properly includes ; and, as it seems, in its
usual acceptation : for we scarcely apply it to brute
creatures.
However, if any person be disposed to dispute the
matter, I shall very willingly give him up the words
virtue and vice, as not applicable to prudence and folly :
but must beg leave to insist, that the faculty within us,
which is the judge of actions, approves of prudent
actions, and disapproves imprudent ones : I say prudent
and imprudent actions as such, and considered distinctly
270 The Analogy of Religion
from the happiness or misery which they occasion.
And by the way, this observation may help to determine
what justness there is in that objection against religion,
that it teaches us to be interested and selfish.
Fifthly. Without inquiring how far, and in what sense,
virtue is resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the
want of it; it may be proper to observe, that benevo-
lence, and the want of it, singly considered, are in no
sort the whole of virtue and vice. For if this were the
case, in the review of one's own character, or that of
others, our moral understanding and moral sense would
be indifferent to everything, but the degrees in which
benevolence prevailed, and the degrees in which it was
wanting. That is, we should neither approve of benevo-
lence to some persons rather than to others, nor dis-
approve injustice and falsehood upon any other account,
than merely as an overbalance of happiness was fore-
seen likely to be produced by the first, and of misery by
the second. But now, on the contrary, suppose two
men competitors for anything whatever, which would be
of equal advantage to each of them ; though nothing
indeed would be more impertinent, than for a stranger
to busy himself to get one of them preferred to the
other ; yet such endeavour would be virtue, in behalf of
a friend or benefactor, abstracted from all consideration
of distant consequence : as that examples of gratitude,
and the cultivation of friendship, would be of general
good to the world. Again, suppose one man should, by
fraud or violence, take from another the fruit of his
labour, with intent to give it to a third, who he thought
would have as much pleasure from it as would balance
the pleasure which the first possessor would have had in
the enjoyment, and his vexation in the loss of it ; sup-
pose also that no bad consequences would follow : yet
such an action would surely be vicious. Nay, further,
were treachery, violence, and injustice, no otherwise
vicious, than as foreseen likely to produce an over-
balance of misery to society ; then, if in any case a man
could procure to himself as great advantage by an act of
injustice, as the whole foreseen inconvenience, likely to
Of the Nature of Virtue 271
be brought upon others by it, would amount to ; such
a piece of injustice would not be faulty or vicious at all :
because it would be no more than, in any other case, for
a man to prefer his own satisfaction to another's in equal
degrees. The fact, then, appears to be, that we are
constituted so as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked
violence, injustice, and to approve of benevolence to
some preferably to others, abstracted from all considera-
tion, which conduct is likeliest to produce an over-
balance of happiness or misery. And therefore, were
the Author of Nature to propose nothing to himself as
an end but the production of happiness, were his moral
character merely that of benevolence ; yet ours is not so.
Upon that supposition, indeed, the only reason of his
giving us the above-mentioned approbation of benevo-
lence to some persons rather than others, and dis-
approbation of falsehood, unprovoked violence, and
injustice, must be, that he foresaw this constitution of
our nature would produce more happiness, than forming
us with a temper of mere general benevolence. But
still, since this is our constitution ; falsehood, violence,
injustice, must be vice in us, and benevolence to some,
preferably to others, virtue ; abstracted from all con-
sideration of the overbalance of evil or good, which
they may appear likely to produce.
Now if human creatures are endued with such a moral
nature as we have been explaining, or with a moral
faculty the natural object of which is actions, moral
government must consist in rendering them happy and
unhappy, in rewarding and punishing them as they
follow, neglect, or depart from the moral rule 'of action
interwoven in their nature, or suggested and enforced by
this moral faculty ; a in rewarding and punishing them
upon account of their so doing.
I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observation,
contradicted what any author designed to assert. But
some of great and distinguished merit, have, I think,
expressed themselves in a manner which may occasion
some danger to careless readers, of imagining the whole
i p. 91.
272 The Analogy of Religion
of virtue to consist in singly aiming, according to the
best of their judgment, at promoting the happiness of
mankind in the present state ; and the whole of vice in
doing what they foresee, or might foresee, is likely to
produce an overbalance of unhappiness in it : than
which mistakes, none can be conceived more terrible.
For it is certain, that some of the most shocking
instances of injustice, adultery, murder, perjury, and
even of persecution, may, in many supposable cases, not
have the appearance of being likely to produce an over-
balance of misery in the present state ; perhaps some-
times may have the contrary appearance. For this
reflection might easily be carried on, but I forbear.
The happiness of the world is the concern of him who
is the Lord and the Proprietor of it : nor do we know
what we are about, when we endeavour to promote the
good of mankind in any ways, but those which he has
directed : that is, indeed, in all ways not contrary to
veracity and justice. I speak thus upon supposition of
persons really endeavouring, in some sort, to do good
without regard to these. But the truth seems to be,
that such supposed endeavours proceed, almost always,
from ambition, the spirit of party, or some indirect
principle, concealed perhaps in great measure from per-
sons themselves. And though it is our business and
our duty to endeavour, within the bounds of veracity
and justice, to contribute to the ease, convenience, and
even cheerfulness and diversion of our fellow-creatures :
yet, from our short views, it is greatly uncertain, whether
this endeavour will, in particular instances, produce an
overbalance of happiness upon the whole ; since so
many and distant things must come into the account.
And that which makes it our duty is, that there is some
appearance that it will, and no positive appearance
sufficient to balance this, on the contrary side ; and also,
that such benevolent endeavour is a cultivation of that
most excellent of all virtuous principles, the active
principle of benevolence.
However, though veracity, as well as justice, is to be
our rule of life; it must be added, otherwise a snare
Of the Nature of Virtue 273
will be laid in the way of some plain men, that the use
of common forms of speech, generally understood, can-
not be falsehood ; and, in general, that there can be no
designed falsehood without designing to deceive. It
must likewise be observed, that in numberless cases,
a man may be under the strictest obligations to what he
foresees will deceive, without his intending it. For it is
impossible not to foresee, that the words and actions of
men, in different ranks and employments, and of different
educations, will perpetually be mistaken by each other :
and it cannot but be so, whilst they will judge with the
utmost carelessness, as they daily do, of what they are
not, perhaps, enough informed to be competent judges
of, even though they considered it with great attention.
THE END
U 9
NOTES
THERE are two excellent annotated editions of the Analogy: the
first, Bishop Fitz-Gerald's, 2nd edition, 1860; and the second,
Dr. Bernard's, in the English Theological Library, 1900. The
notes that follow translate Greek and Latin quotations and explain
a few of Butler's allusions.
Page xxiv.
Butler puts on his title-page a sentence from Quintilian (Instit.
Orat., \. 6), " Ejus (analogise) haec vis est, ut id quod dubium est,
ad aliquid simile, de quo non quseritur, referat ut incerta certis
probet," i.e. "this is the method of analogy, what is in doubt
it compares to something like it which is not in doubt, and so by
certainties proves uncertainties." Mill discusses analogy in chap.
xx. , Book iii. of his Logic. He says that, " analogical reasoning
may be reduced to the following formula : Two things resemble
each other in one or more respects ; a certain proposition is true of
the one ; therefore it is true of the other : but we have nothing
here by which to discriminate analogy from induction, since this
type will serve for all reasoning from experience." Analogical
reasoning in Butler's use of it is made to include all probable
reasoning, which differs from true induction in degree and not in
kind. Dr. Bernard points out that Butler's doctrine of probability
follows very closely the argument of Bishop Wilkins in Principles
and Duties of Natural Religion, chap, iii., published in 1675.
But we must bear in mind the passage already quoted (p. viii.) from
Butler's first letter to Clarke. To the sentence from Quintilian
just quoted, and the sentence from Origen on page xxvii. , we must
add the quotation from Ecclcsiasticus given in Part i., chap, v.,
"One thing is set over against another." This gives a touch of
mysticism to what is on the whole a line of argument essentially
practical and in touch not only with every man's experience, but
with every man's action and practice.
Page xxvii. : note.
Dr. Bernard doubts whether Butler got this quotation t first
hand from Origen's Philocalia. But Butler's reference is to
William Spencer s edition published at Cambridge in 1658. Spencer
was a fellow of Trinity, and it was probably from his editions
of Origen against Celsus and the Philocalia that Samuel Clarke
obtained his acquaintance with Origen. The Latin of Tarinus is
given with the Greek, and there seems no reason to doubt that
275
276
Notes
Butler consulted the book. The quotation occurs in the third
extract from Origen's tome on the first Psalm. Origen argues that
every letter of Scripture must have a significance, just as God's
power is to be detected not only in sun and stars, but in the
smallest and meanest things. "It befits him therefore who once
has recognized that the Scriptures are the work of the Creator of
the world, to be persuaded also that whatever things are met with
in the creation by those inquiring into its plan, these things are
also met with in the Scriptures." Butler's translation is very free.
Origen has not "difficulties" in his mind, but the inspired signifi-
cance of words and letters !
Page i.
Compare the opening sentence of Butler's Charge to the Clergy
of Durham. "It is impossible for me, my brethren, upon our
first meeting of this kind, to forbear lamenting with you the
general decay of religion in this nation ; which is now observed
by every one, and has been for some time the complaint of all
serious persons." This was Butler's opinion in 1751, the year
before his death. The question is discussed by Mark Pattison in
his essay on "Tendencies of Religious Thought in England, 1688-
1750," published in Essays and Reviews.
Page 9.
Dr. Samuel Clarke, of Norwich (1675-1729), answered in 1706
an eccentric treatise by Henry Dodwell, the elder, which was
entitled An Epistolary Discourse concerning the Souts Immortality.
Dodwell argued that the soul becomes immortal by Christian
baptism, validly administered. According to Dodwell, therefore,
the soul was naturally mortal. Antony Collins, the Deist, came
forward to support this position against Clarke, and Clarke replied,
finishing the controversy with a Fourth Defence. The letters and
defences on both sides will be found in Clarke's works.
Plato in "the Phaedo makes Socrates argue for the immortality of
the soul on the ground of its singleness or simplicity : if it has no
parts it cannot be taken to pieces. The argument is taken by
Butler from Clarke, and had been re-stated for modern philosophy
by Descartes in his Meditations. It has been discredited since
Butler wrote by Kant's criticism of it. He points out that this idea
of taking to pieces applies to matter only. You must prove the
soul a thing before you can speak of it as indiscerptible. But
Butler is mainly concerned to insist upon a negative, that
reason cannot prove that physical death ends the soul ; and he
could therefore easily adapt Kant's position to his argument. He
would argue to-day that you cannot get from matter to mind. No
arguments which apply to matter or affect matter can by Kant's
reasoning affect mind. There is in the soul a spiritual and rational
element to which the terms which define matter and motion do not
apply. You cannot therefore prove that the soul dies. Consult
Notes 277
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Book ii. chap. i. " of the Paralo-
gisms of Pure Reason," and Caird's discussion in his Philosophy of
Kant, chap xv. (1877).
Page 19.
" For they think that our present life is a kind of prenatal state,
and death the birth into the true and happy life for those who have
been lovers of wisdom."
"As now thou awaitest the time when thy child shall emerge
from the womb of thy wife, so expect the hour in which thy soul
shall fall out of this shell." Marcus Aurelius seems in this chapter
on the verge of an argument for immortality : "A wise man there-
fore must neither run giddily nor stalk haughtily into his grave ;
he must look upon death as Nature's business, and wait her leisure,
as he does for the progress and maturity of other things."
Page 23.
Fitz-Gerald says : " Butler here hints at several possible solutions
of the old atheistical dilemma. God prevents not evil, either
because He cannot, or because He will not. If He cannot, He is
not Almighty. If He will not, He is not All-good. Butler shows
us that neither conclusion can be safely drawn " (Analogy, p. 42).
Page 24.
Compare Clarke's criticism of the "mechanical hypothesis" which
makes nature a machine that goes of itself. "The terms nature
and powers of nature and course of nature and the like are
nothing but empty words, and signify merely that a thing usually
or frequently comes to pass. The raising a human body out of
the dust of the earth we call a miracle ; the generation of a human
body in the ordinary way we call natural, for no other reason but
because the power of God effects one usually, the other unusually.
. . . Did men usually arise out of the grave as corn grows out
of seed sown we should certainly call that also natural" (Con-
troversy -with Leibnitz, p. 351).
Page 26.
It may be thought that Butler slips back here into the mechanical
theory. This passage reads as the germ of the elaborate argument
of Paley's Natural Theology, which compares the world to a watch
wound up by God. But Butler does not mean to deny the imma-
nence of God. He wishes to insist that this immanence must be
discerned in the regular and everyday, in our preservation no less
than in our creation.
Page 29.
The "Gentile moralists" in Butler's mind were probably Plato
and Virgil, but he would be aware of the passages cited by Clarke
278
Notes
in his Evidences. In the Phaedo, Plato says : " Those who appear
to be incurable by reason of the greatness of their crimes are
hurled into Tartarus, which is their suitable destiny, and they
never come out" (113 E.).
Page 34.
Compare Sermon xii. on Benevolence, and the Dissertation on
Virtue.
Page 35.
Book ii. Part ii. p. 99. Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of
Shaftesbury (1671-1713), is criticised by Butler in the Preface to
the Fifteen Sermons. "He has shown," says Butler, "beyond
all contradiction, that virtue is naturally the interest or happiness,
and vice the misery, of such a creature as man, placed in the
circumstances which are in this world " ; but by not allowing a
sufficient supremacy to conscience he fails to give his " moral
sense " any real authority.
Page 38.
Perhaps Butler has in mind Bernard Mandeville's Fable of the
Bees, or Private Vices Public Benefits, published 1714 (gth edition,
T 755) where it is argued that private vices are public benefits and
luxury necessary to the welfare of the community. The book
caused much stir. William Law wrote against it, and Berkeley
in his Akiphron, 1732.
Page 64.
Ecclus. xlii. 24. "All things are double one against another;
and He hath made nothing imperfect" ; and xxxiii. 15, " So look
upon all the works of the Most High : and there are two and two,
one against another." From the former chapter Butler quotes the
saying in the beginning of Sermon vi. It evidently worked much
in his mind, and as much as the quotation from Origen (p. xxvii.)
produced the Analogy.
Page 86.
The argument here is in the main that discussed in the letters
Butler wrote to Samuel Clarke (see In trod., p viii.)
Page 94.
Butler's note here alludes to a much debated question. Does
God's will fix what is good so that good is what God commands,
or is there an immutable right and wrong? Cudworth discussed
the point in his Eternal and Immutable Morality. Butler holds
to the doctrine of "immutable morality." The good is eternally
inherent in the divine mind and will, but God's mere will does not
constitute the good, because in that case the world would have no
real meaning.
Notes 279
Page 119.
Butler here has in view the school of religious thought, so popular
and active in his day, known as Deism. John Toland and Matthew
Tindal were its leaders. For their main positions see Introd.,
p. xviii. Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1581-1648) is usually counted
the founder of the school.
Page 120.
St. Augustine is speaking of the heathen of his own time.
"You find many who are unwilling to become Christians because
their own strength suffices them in living the good life. The need
is, says such an one, to live well ! Now what is Christ going to
enjoin upon me ? To live well ? But I am living well ! How is
Christ necessary to me ? I commit no murder : I do not steal : I
rob no man : I am stained by no adultery ! Find in my life some-
thing culpable, and let him who proves me a culprit make me a
Christian."
Page 127 : note.
The first book referred to was published in 1730 by Archdeacon
Waterland. Samuel Colliber, whom Waterland quotes, was the
author of Columna Rostrata, a naval history still valuable for the
Dutch wars, and of several religious and philosophical treatises.
He was not a clergyman, and very little is known of his life.
Waterland says : " I am well enough pleased with an observation
of a grave and serious writer (S. Colliber of Revealed Religion,
pp. 154, 155), whom I could wish to haveoftener agreeing with me
that ' the faith which the Christian Revelation requires in its great
Revealer as importing our acceptance of him for our supreme
Lord is what we were antecedently obliged to by the very law of
nature, on supposition that his real Divinity was discoverable by
us. In this case, he that believeth not is condemned already, viz.
by the law of nature ' " ( Works, iv. 58).
Page 195 : note.
Dr. Bernard "has no doubt" that Butler got this quotation
from Grotius out of Bishop Wilkins's Natural Religion. Bishop
Wilkins's arguments are used by Butler in this chapter, but the
reference to Grotius is to his whole paragraph, which replies "to
those who demand arguments more in number and more con-
vincing." God's will is that what we accept by faith should not
be so clear as what we perceive with the senses or understand by
mathematical demonstration: "that so the word of the Gospel
should be like the Lydian touchstone, a means by which the health
of our minds should be tested."
280 Notes
Page 202.
Clement says: "Take up the epistle of the blessed Paul the
apostle ! What did he write to you at the first preaching of the
Gospel among you? In truth he admonished you by the Spirit
concerning himself and Cephas and Apollos, because even then
you had begun to make parties and factions among yourselves."
The reference is clearly to i Cor. i. Clement's letter was written
about 95 A.D.
Page 203 : note 2.
In the places referred to the Koreish demand miracles from
Mahomet, which he refuses. Butler is following Samuel Clarke,
who says that force of arms and not miracles spread the Mahometan
religion.
Page 215 : note.
Many scholars to-day accept the view of Porphyry that the book
of Daniel dates from the time of Antiochus Epiphanes and the
Maccabaean uprising. Porphyry was a Neo-Platonist philosopher,
who lived about 303 A.D. St. Jerome, in his commentary on
Daniel, quotes Porphyry's views: "he places the two last beasts
in the single Macedonian kingdom"; and, "he enumerates ten
kings who were very cruel : and these kings he does not place each
in one kingdom, say Macedonia, Syria, Asia, and Egypt : but
using different kingdoms he makes one order of kings."
Page 260 : note 2.
Butler is here alluding to Collins's arguments founded in part
upon Dodwell's eccentric opinion that the soul is mortal until
baptized (see p. 9).
Page 265.
'* Neither virtue nor vice is a quiescence, but an actirity."
"All the praise we give to virtue we give to it as an activity."
Page 271.
The authors "of great and distinguished merit" are the group
known as the Cambridge Platonists, Cudworth, More, Smith,
and Frances Hutcheson. They made virtue consist so entirely in
benevolence that they recognized no self-regarding virtues, such as
prudence.
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Per Volume : Cloth, 2s. Net
Library Binding, 3s. Net. Paste Grain Leather, 3s. Qd. Net
REFERENCE SECTION
Cloth, 2s. 6d. Net. Library Binding, 3s. Qd. Net
Average Postage per Volume, +d.
Abbott's Rollo at Work, etc., 27*
Addison's Spectator, 164-167
/Eschylus' Lyrical Dramas, 62
/Esop's and Other Fables, 657
Aimard's The Indian Scout, 428
Ainsworth's Tower of London, 400
Old St. Paul's, 522
Windsor Castle, 709
A'Kernpis' Imitation of Christ, 484
Alcott's Little Women, and Good
Wives, 248
Little Men, 512
Alpine Club. Peaks, Passes and
Glaciers, 778
Andersen's Fairy Tales, 4
Anglo-Saxon Poetry, 794
Anson's Voyages, 510 [344
Aristophanes' The Acharaians, etc.,
The Frogs, etc., 516
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics,
Politics, 605 [547
Arnold's (Matthew) Essays, 115
Poems, 334
Study of Celtic Lit-
erature, etc., 458
Augustine's (Saint) Confessions, 200
A ur elms' (Marcus) Golden Book, 9
Austen's (Jane) Sense and Sensi-
bility, 21
Pride and Prejudice, 22
Mansfield Park, 23
Emma, -24
Northanger Abbey, and
Persuasion, 25
Bacon's Essays, 10 [719
Advancement of Learning,
Bagehot's Literary Studies, 520,
521 [Sea, 539
Baker's (Sir S. W.) Cast up by the
Ballantyne's Coral Island, 245
Martin Rattler, 246
Ungava, 276
Balzac's Wild Ass's Skin, 26
Eugenie Grandet, 169
Old Goriot, 170
Atheist's Mass, etc., 229
Christ in Flanders, etc., 284
The Chouans, 285
Quest of the Absolute, 288
Cat and Racket, etc., 349
Catherine de Medici, 419
Cousin Pons, 463
The Country Doctor, 530
Rise and Fall of C6sar
Birotteau, 596
Lost Illusions, 656
The Country Parson, 686
Ursule Mirpuet, 733
Barbusse's Under Fire, 798
Barca's (Mme. C. de la) Life in
Mexico, 664 [446
Bates' Naturalist on the Amazons,
Beaumont and Fletcher's Select
Plays, 506 [597
Beaumont's (Mary) Joan Seaton,
Bede's Ecclesiastical History, etc.,
479 [561
Belt's The Naturalist in Nicaragua,
Berkeley's (Bishop) Principles of
Human Knowledge, New Theory
of Vision, etc., 483
Berlioz (Hector), Life of, 602
Biims' Life of Abraham Lincoln, 783
Bjornson's Plays, 625, 696
Blackmore's Lorna Doone, 304
Springhaven, 350
BlackwelTs Pioneer Work for
Women, 667
Blake's Poems and Prophecies, 792
Boebme's The Signature of All
Things, etc., 569
Bonaventura's The Little Flowers,
The Life of St. Francis, etc., 485
Sorrow's Wild Wales, 49
Lavengro, 119
Romany Rye, 120
Bible in Spain, 151
Gypsies in Spain, 697
BoswelTs Life of Johnson, 1, 2
Tour in the Hebrides,
etc., 387
Boult's Asgard and Norse Heroes,
689
Boyle's The Sceptical Chymist, 559
Bright's (John) Speeches, 252
Bronte's (A.) The Tenant of Wild-
fell Hall, 685
Bronte's (C.) Jane Eyre, 287
Shirley, 288
Villette, 351
The Professor, 417
Bronte's (E.) Wuthering Heights,
243
Brooke's (Stopford A.) Theology
in the English Poets, 493
Brown's (Dr. John) Rab and His
Friends, etc., 116
Browne's (Frances) Grannie's Won-
derful Chair, 112
Browne's (Sir Thos.) Religio Medici,
etc., 92
Browning's Poems, 1833-1844, 41
1844-1864, 42
The Ring and the Book,
502
Buchanan's Life and Adventures
of Audubon, 601
Bulfinch's The Age of Fable, 472
Legends of Charlemagne,
556
Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress, 204
Burke's American Speeches and
Letters, 340
Reflections on the French
Revolution, etc., 460
Burnet's History of His Own Times,
Burney's Evelina. 352 [85
Burns' Poems and Songs, 94
Burrell's Volume of Heroic Verse,
Burton's East Africa, 500 [574
Butler's Analogy of Religion, 90
Buxton's Memoirs, 773
Byron's Complete Poetical and
Dramatic Works, 486-488
Caesar's Gallic War, etc., 702
Canton's Child's Book of Saints, 61
Canton's Invisible Playmate, etc.,
566
Carlyle's French Revolution, 31. 32
Letters, etc., of Crom-
well, 266-268
Sartor Resartus, 278
Past and Present, 608
Essays, 703, 704
Cellini's Autobiography, 51
Cervantes' Don Quixote, 335, 386
Chaucer's Canterbury Tales, 307
Chretien de Troyes' Eric and Enid,
698
Cibber's Apology for his Life, 668
Cicero's Select Letters and Ora-
tions, 345
Clarke's Tales from Chaucer, 537
Shakespeare's Heroines,
109-111
Cobbett's Rural Rides, 638, 639
Coleridge's Biographia, 11
Golden Book, 43
Lectures on Shake-
speare, 162
Collins* Woman in White, 464
Collodi's Pinocchio, 538
Converse's Long Will, 328
Cook's Voyages, 99
Cooper's The Deerslayer, 77
The Pathfinder, 78
Last of the Mohicans, 79
The Pioneer, 171
The Prairie, 172
Cousin's Biographical Dictionary
of English Literature, 449
Cowper's Letters, 774
Cox's Tales of Ancient Greece, 721
Craik's Manual of English Litera-
ture, 346
Craik (Mrs.). See Mulock. [300
Creasy's Fifteen Decisive Battles,
CrAvecoeur's Letters from an Amer-
ican Farmer, 640
Curtis's Prue and I, and Lotus, 418
Dana's Two Years Before the
Mast, 588
Dante's Divine Comedy, 308
Darwin's Voyage of the Beagle.
104 [558
Dasent's The Story of Burnt Njal,
Daudet's Tartarm of Tarascon, 423
Defoe's Robinson Crusoe, 59
Captain Singleton, 74
Memoirs of a Cavalier, 283
Journal of Plague, 289
De Joinville's Memoirs of the
Crusades, 333
Demosthenes' Select Orations, 546
Dennis' Cities and Cemeteries of
Etruria, 183, 184
De Cjuincey's Lake Poets, 163
Opium-Eater, 223
English Mail Coach,
etc., 609
De Retz (Cardinal), Memoirs of,
735, 736
Descartes' Discourse on Method,
570
Dickens' Barnaby Rudge, 76
Tale of Two Cities, 102
Old Curiosity Shop, 173
Oliver Twist, 233
Great Expectations, 234
Pickwick Papers, 235
Bleak House, 236
Sketches by Boz, 237
Nicholas Nickleby, 238
Christmas Books, 239
Dombey & Son, 240
Martin Chuzzlewit, 241
David Copperfield, 242
American Notes, 290
Child's History of Eng-
land, 291
Hard Times, 292
Little Dorrit, 293
Our Mutual Friend, 294
Christmas Stories, 414
Uncommercial Traveller,
536
Edwin Drood, 725
Reprinted Pieces, 744
Disraeli's Coningsby, 535
Dixon's Fairy Tales from Arabian
Nights, 249
Dodge's Hans Brinker, or the Silver
Skates, 620
Dostoieffsky's Crime and Punish-
ment, 501
The House of the
Dead, or Prison
Life in Siberia, 533
Letters from the
Underworld, etc.,
654
The Idiot, 682
Poor Folk, and The
Gambler, 711
Dowden's Life of R. Browning, 701
Dryden's Dramatic Essays, 568
Dufferin's Letters from High Lati-
tudes, 499
Dumas' The Three Musketeers, 81
The Black Tulip, 174
Twenty Years After, 175
Dumas' Marguerite de Valols, 326
The Count of Monte Cristo,
393, 394
The Forty-Five, 420
Chicot the Jester, 421 [596
Vicomte de Bragelonne, 593-
Le Chevalier de Maison
Rouge, 614
Duruy's History of France, 737, 738
Edgar's Cressy and Poic tiers, 17
Runnymede and Lincoln
Fair, 320
Heroes of England, 471
Edgeworth's Castle Rackrent, etc.,
410
Edwardes' Dictionary of Non-
Classical Mythology, 632
Eliot's Adam Bede, 27
Silas Marner, 121
Romola, 231
Mill on the Floss, 325
Felix Holt, 353
Scenes of Clerical Life, 468
Elyot's Gouernour, 227
Emerson's Essays, 12
Representative Men, 279
Nature, Conduct of Life,
etc., 322
Society and Solitude, etc.,
567
Poems, 715
Epictetus' Moral Discourses, etc.,
404
Erckmana - Chatrian's The Con-
script and
Waterloo,
354
Story of a Pea-
sant, 706, 707
Euripides' Plays, 63, 271
Evelyn's Diary, 220, 221
Ewing's (Mrs.) Mrs. Overtheway'i
Remembrances,
and other Stories,
730
Jackanapes, Daddy Dar-
win's Dovecot, and The
Story of a Short Life,
731
Faraday's Experimental Researches
in Electricity, 576
Fielding's Tom Jones, 355, 356
Joseph Andrews, 467
Finlay's Byzantine Empire, 33
Greece under the Romans,
185
Fletcher's (Beaumont and) Select
Plays, 506
Ford's Gatherings from Spain, 152
Forster's Life of Dickens, 781, 782
Fox's Journal, 754
Fox's Selected Speeches, 759
Franklin's Journey to Polar Sea,
447
Freeman's Old English History
for Children, 540
Froissart's Chronicles, 57
Froude's Short Studies, 13, 705
Henry VIII., 372-374
Edward VI., 375
Mary Tudor, 477
History of Queen Eliza-
beth's Reign, 583-587
,, Life of Benjamin Dis-
raeli, Lord Beacons-
field, 666
Gait's Annals of the Parish, 427
Gallon's Inquiries into Human
Faculty, 263
Cask ell's Cranford, 83
Charlotte Bront, 318
Sylvia's Lovers, 524
Mary Barton, 598
Cousin Phillis, etc., 615
North and South, 680
Gatty's Parables from Nature, 158
Geoffrey of Monmouth's Histories
of the Kings of Britain, 577
George's Progress and Poverty, 560
Gibbon's Roman Empire, 434-436,
474-476
Autobiography, 511
Gilfillan's Literary Portraits, 348
Giraldus Cambrensis, 272
Gleig's Life of Wellington, 341
The Subaltern, 708
Goethe's Faust (Parts I. and II.),
335
Wilhelm Meister, 599, 600
Gogol's Dead Souls, 726
Taras Bulba, 740
Goldsmith's Vicar of Wakefield, 295
Poems and Plays, 415
Gorki's Through Russia, 741
Gosse's Restoration Plays, 604
Gotthelf s Ulric the Farm Servant,
228
Gray's Poems and Letters, 628
Green's Short History of the Eng-
lish People, 727, 728
The cloth edition is in 2 vols.
or 1 vol. All other editions are
in 1 vol.
Grimms' Fairy Tales, 66
Grote's History of Greece, 186-197
Guest's (Lady) Mabinogion, 97
Hahnemann's The Organon of the
Rational Art of Healing, 663
Hakluyt's Voyages, 264, 265, 313,
314, 338, 339, 388, 389
Hallam's Constitutional History,
621-623
Hamilton's The Federalist, 519
Harte's Luck of Roaring Camp,
681
Harvey's Circulation of Blood, 262
Hawthorne's Wonder Book, 5
The Scarlet Letter, 122
House of Seven Gables,
176
The Marble Faun, 424
Twice Told Tales, 531
Blithedale Romance, 592
Hazlitt's Shakespeare's Characters,
65
Table Talk, 321
Lectures, 411
Spirit of the Age and
Lectures on English
Poets, 459
Hebbel's Plays, 694
Helps' (Sir Arthur) Life of Colum-
bus, 332
Herbert's Temple, 309
Herodotus (RawUnson's), 405, 406
Herrick's Hesperides, 310
Hobbes' Leviathan, 691
Holinshed's Chronicle, 800
Holmes' Life of Mozart, 564
Holmes' (O. W.) Autocrat, 66
Professor, 67
Poet, 68
Homer's Iliad, 453
Odyssey, 454
Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, 201,
202
Horace's Complete Poetical Works,
515
Hughes' Tom Brown's Schooldays,
58
Hugo's (Victor) Les Miserables, 363,
364
Notre Dame, 422
Toilers of the Sea,
509
Hume's Treatise of Human Nature,
etc., 548, 549
Hutchinson's (Col.) Memoirs, 317
Hutchinson's (W. M. L.) Muses'
Pageant, 581, 606, 671
Huxley's Man's Place in Nature, 47
,, Select Lectures and Lay
Sermons, 498
Ibsen's The Doll's House, etc., 494
Ghosts, etc., 552
Pretenders, Pillars of So-
ciety, etc., 659
Brand, 716
Lady Inger, etc., 729
Peer Gynt, 747
Ingelow's Mopsa the Fairy, 619
Ingram's Anglo-Saxon Chronicle,
624
Irving's Sketch Book, 117
Conquest of Granada, 478
Life of Mahomet, 513
James' (G. P. R.) Richelieu, 357
James (Wm.), Selections from,
739 [770-771
Johnson's (Dr.) Lives of the Poets,
Johnson's (R. B.) Book of English
Ballads, 572
Jonson's (Ben) Plays, 489, 490
Josephus' Wars of the Jews, 712
Kalidasa's Shakuntala, 629
Keats' Poems, 101
Keble's Christian Year, 690
King's Life of Mazzini, 562
Kinglake's Eothen, 337
Kingsley's (Chas.) Westward Ho!
Heroes, 113 [20
Hypatia, 230
Water Babies and
Glaucus, 277 [296
Hereward the Wake,
Alton Locke, 4G2
Yeast, 611
Madam How and
Lady Why, 777
Poems, 793
Kingsley's (Henry) Ravenshoe, 28
Geoffrey Hamlyn, 416
Kingston's Peter the Whaler, 6
Three Midshipmen, 7
Lamb's Tales from Shakespeare, 8
Essays of Elia, 14
Letters, 342, 343
Lane's Modern Egyptians, 315
Langland's Piers Plowman, 571
Latimer's Sermons, 40
Law's Serious Call, 91
Layamon's (Wace and) Arthurian
Chronicles, 578
Le Sage's Gil Bias. 437, 438
Leslie's Memoirs of John Constable.
563
Lever's Harry Lorrequer, 177
Lewes' Life of Goethe, 269
Lincoln's Speeches, etc., 206
Livy's History of Rome, 603, 669,
670, 749, 755, 756
Locke's Civil Government, 751
Lockhart's Life of Napoleon, 3
Life of Scott, 55
Burns, 156
Longfellow's Poems, 382
Lormrott's Kalevala, 259, 260
Lover's Handy Andy, 178
Lowell's Among My Books, 607
Lucretius: Of the Nature of Things,
750
Liitzow's History of Bohemia, 432
Lyell's Antiquity of Man, 700
Lytton's Harold, 15
Last of the Barons, 18
Last Days of Pompeii, 80
Pilgrims of the Rhine, 390
Rienzi, 532
Macaulay's England, 34-36
Essays, 225, 226
Speeches on Politics,
etc., 399
Miscellaneous Essays,
439
MacDonald's Sir Gibbie, 678
Phantasies, 732
Machiavelli's Prince, 280
Florence, 376
Maine's Ancient Law, 734
Malory's Le Morte D' Arthur, 45, 48
Malthus on the Principles of
Population, 692, 693
Manning's Sir Thomas More, 19
Mary Powell, and De-
borah's Diary, 324
Marcus Aurelius' Golden Book, 9
Marlowe's Plays and Poems, 383
Marryat's Mr. Midshipman Easy, 82
Little Savage, 159
Masterman Ready, 160
Peter Simple, 232
Children of New Forest,
247
Percival Keene, 358
Settlers in Canada, 370
King's Own, 580
Marrvat's Jacob Faithful, 618
Martineau's Feats on the Fjords,
429
Martinengo-Cesaresco's Folk-Lore
and Other Essays, 673
Maurice's Kingdom of Christ, 146,
147
Mazzini's Duties of Man, etc., 224
Melville's Moby Dick, 179
Typee, 180
Omoo, 297
Merivale's History of Rome, 433
Mignet's French Revolution, 713
Mill's Utilitarianism, Liberty, Re-
presentative Government, 482
Miller's Old Red Sandstone, 103
Milman's History of the Jews, 377,
378
Milton's Areopagitica and other
Prose Works, 795
Milton's Poems, 384 [545
Mommsen's History of Rome, 542-
Montagu's (Lady) Letters, 69
Montaigne, Florio's, 440-^442
More's Utopia, and Dialogue of
Comfort against Tribulation, 461
Morier's Hajji Baba, 679
Moms' (Wrn.) Early Romances, 261
Life and Death of Jason,
575
Motley's Dutch Republic, 86-88
Mulock's John Halifax, 123
Neale's Fall of Constantinople, 655
Newcastle's (Margaret, Duchess of)
Life of the First Duke of New-
castle, etc., 722 [636
Newman's Apologia Pro Vita Sua,
On the Scope and Nature
of University Educa-
tion, and a Paper on
Christianity and Sci-
entific Investigation,
723
Oliphant's Salem Chapel, 244
Osbome (Dorothy), Letters of, 674
Owen's A New View of Society,
etc., 799
Paine' s Rights of Man, 718
Palgrave's Golden Treasury, 96
Paltock's Peter Wilkins, 676
Park (Mungo), Travels of, 205
Parkman's Conspiracy of Pontiac,
302, 303
Parry's Letters of Dorothy Os-
borne, 674
Paston's Letters, 752, 753
Paton's Two Morte D' Arthur
Romances, 634
Peacock's Headlong Hall, 327
Penn's The Peace of Europe, Some
Fruits of Solitude, etc., 724
Pepys' Diary, 53, &4
Percy's Reliques, 148, 149
Pitt's Orations, 145
Plato's Republic, 64
Dialogues, 456, 457
Plutarch's Lives, 407-409
Moralia, 565
Poe's Tales of Mystery and Imag-
ination, 336
Poe's Poems and Essays, 791
Polo's (Marco) Travels, 306
Pope's Complete Poetical Works, 7 60
Prelude to Poetry, 789
Prescott's Conquest of Peru, 301
Conquest of Mexico, 397
398
Procter's Legends and Lyrics, 150
Rawlinson's Herodotus, 405, 406
Reade's The Cloister and the
Hearth, 29
Peg Woffington, 299
Reid's (Mayne) Boy Hunters of the
Mississippi, 582
Reid's (Mayne) The Boy Slaves,
797
Reynolds' Discourses, 118
Rhys' Fairy Gold, 157
New Golden Treasury, 695
Anthology of British His-
torical Speeches and Ora-
tions, 714
Political Liberty, 745
Golden Treasury of Longer
Poems, 746
Ricardo's Principles of Political
Economy and Taxation, 590
Richardson's Pamela, 683, 684
Roberts' (Morley) Western Avernus,
762
Robertson's Religion and Life, 37
Christian Doctrine, 38
Bible Subjects, 39
Robinson's (Wade) Sermons, 637
Roget's Thesaurus, 630, 631
Rossetti's (D. G.) Poems, 627
Rousseau's Emile, on Education,
518
Social Contract and
Other Essays, 660
Ruskin's Seven Lamps of Archi-
tecture, 207
Modern Painters, 208-218
Stones of Venice, 213-215
Unto this Last, etc., 216
Elements of Drawing, etc.,
217
Pre-Raphaelitism, etc., 218
7
Ruskin's Sesame and Lilies, 219
Ethics of the Dust, 282
Crown of Wild Olive, and
Cestus of Aglaia, 323
Time and Tide, with other
Essays, 450
The Two Boyhoods, 688
Russell's Life of Gladstone, 661
Russian Short Stories, 758
Sand's (George) The Devil's Pool,
and Francois the Waif, 534
ScheSel's Ekkehard: A Tale of the
10th Century, 529
Scott's (M.) Tom Cringle's Log,
Scott's (Sir W.) Ivanhoe, 16 [710
Fortunes of Nigel, 71
Woodstock, 72
Waverley, 75
The Abbot, 124
Anne of Geierstein, 125
The Antiquary, 126
Highland Widow, and
Betrothed, 127
Black Dwarf, Legend
of Montrose, 123
Bride of Lammermoor,
129
Castle Dangerous, Sur-
geon's Daughter, 130
Robert of Paris, 131
Fair Maid of Perth, 132
Guy Mannering, 133
Heart of Midlothian,
Kenilworth, 135 [134
The Monastery, 136
Old Mortality, 137
Peveril of the Peak,
The Pirate, 139 [138
Quentin Durward, 140
Redgauntlet, 141
Rob Roy, 142
St. Ronan's Well, 143
The Talisman, 144
Lives of the Novelists,
331 [551
Poems and Plays, 550,
Seebohm's Oxford Reformers, 665
Seeley's Ecce Homo, 305
Sewell's (Anna) Black Beauty, 748
Shakespeare's Comedies, 153
Histories, etc., 154
Tragedies, 155
Shelley's Poetical Works, 257, 258
Shelley's (Mrs.) Frankenstein, 616
Sheppard's Charles Auchester, 505
Sheridan's Plays, 95
Sismondi's Italian Republics, 250
Smeaton's Life of Shakespeare, 514
Smith's A Dictionary of Dates, 554
Smith's Wealth of Nations, 412, 413
Smith's (George) Life of Wm.
Carey, 395
Smith's (Sir Wm.) Smaller Classical
Dictionary, 495
Smollett's Roderick Random, 790
Sophocles, Young's, 114
Southey's Life of Nelson, 52
Speke's Source of the Nile, 50
Spence's Dictionary of Non-Classi-
cal Mythology, 632
Spencer's (Herbert) Essays on Edu-
cation, 504
Spenser's Faerie Queene, 443, 444
Spinoza's Ethics, etc., 481
Spyri's Heidi, 431 [89
Stanley's Memorials of Canterbury,
Eastern Church, 251
Steele's The Spectator, 164-167
Sterne's Tristram Shandy, 617
Sterne's Sentimental Journey and
Journal to Eliza, 796
Stevenson's Treasure Island and
Kidnapped, 763
Master of Ballantrae
and the Black Arrow,
764
Virginibus Puerisque
and Familiar Studies
of Men and Books,
765
An Inland Voyage,
Travels with a Don-
key, and Silverado
Squatters, 766
Dr. Jekyll and Mr.
Hyde, The Merry
Men, etc., 767
Poenis, 768
In the South Seas and
Island Nights' Enter-
tainments, 769
St. Francis, The Little Flowers of,
etc., 485
Stopford Brooke's Theology in the
English Poets, 493
Stow's Survey of London, 589
Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin, 371
Strickland's Queen Elizabeth, 100
Swedenborg's Heaven and Hell, 379
Divine Love and
Wisdom, 635
Divine Providence,
Swift's Gulliver's Travels, 60 (655
Journal to Stella, 757
Tale of a Tub. etc., 347
8
Tacitus' Annals, 273
AgricolaandGermania,274
Taylor's Words and Places, 517
Tennyson's Poems, 44, 626
Thackeray's Esmond, 73
Vanity Fair, 298
Christmas Books, 359
Pendennis, 425, 426
Newcomes, 465, 466
The Virginians, 507, 508
English Humorists, and
The Four Georges, 610
Roundabout Papers, 687
Thierry's Norman Conquest, 198,
Thoreau's Walden, 281 [199
Thucydides' Peloponnesian War,
455
Tolstoy's Master and Man, and
Other Parables and
Tales, 469
War and Peace, 525-527
Childhood, Boyhood and
Youth, 591
Anna Karenina, 612, 613
Trench's On the Study of Words and
English Past and Present, 788
Trollope's Barchester Towers, 30
Framley Parsonage, 181
Golden Lion of Granpere,
The Warden, 182 [761
Dr. Thome, 360
Small House at Aldington,
361 [391, 392
Last Chronicles of Barset,
Trotter's The Bayard of India, 396
Hodson, of Hodson's
Horse, 401
Warren Hastings, 452
Turgeniev's Virgin Soil, 528
Liza, 677
Fathers and Sons, 742
TyndaU's Glaciers of the Alps, 98
Tytler's Principles of Translation,
168
Vasari's Lives of the Painters,
784-7
Verne's (Jules) Twenty Thousand
Leagues under the
Sea, 319
Dropped from the
Clouds, 367
Abandoned, 368 [369
The Secret of the Island,
Five Weeks in a Balloon
and Around the World
in Eighty Days, 779
Virgil's jEneid, 161
Eclogues and Georgics, 222
Voltaire's Life of Charles XII., 270
Age of Louis XIV., 780
Wace and Layamon's Arthurian
Chronicles, 578
Walpole's Letters, 775
Walton's Compleat Angler, 70
Waterton's Wanderings in South
America, 772
Wesley's Journal, 105-108
White's Selborne, 48
Whitman's Leaves of Grass (I.)
and Democratic Vistas, etc., 573
Whyte-Melville's Gladiators, 523
Wood's (Mrs. Henry) The Channings,
Woolman's Journal, etc., 402 [84
Wordsworth's Shorter Poems, 203
Longer Poems, 311
Wright's An Encyclopaedia of Gar-
dening, 555
Xenophon's Cyropaedia, 672
Yonge's The Dove in the Eagle's
Nest, 329 [33P
The Book of Golden Deeds,
The Heir of Redclyffe, 362
The Little Duke, 470
, , The Lances of Lyn wood, 579
Young's (Arthur) Travels in France
and Italy, 720
Young's (Sir George) Sophocles, 114
The New Testament, 93.
Ancient Hebrew Literature, 4 vols., 253-256.
English Short Stories. An Anthology, 743.
Everyman's English Dictionary, 776
NOTE. The following numbers are at present out of print:
110, 111, 118, 146, 324, 331, 348, 390, 505, 529, 581, 697, 641-52.
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