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LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY 01

LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

LIBRARY OF

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3SITY OF CALIFORNIA

LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFO?

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UITY OF CALIFORNIA

LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFOR

amcrican famtmzn

EDITED BY

JOHN T. MORSE, JR.

3Umirican £>tau#mm

ANDREW JACKSON

AS A PUBLIC MAN

WHAT HE WAS, WHAT CHANCES HE HAD, AND
WHAT HEDID WITH THEM

WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER

It

FiomsoB or POLITICAL and social science in tale college

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sSSpS*

BOSTON
HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY

NEW YORK : 11 EAST SEVENTEENTH STREET

1898

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Copyright, 1882,
Br WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER.

All rights reserved.

The Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass., (f. S. A.
Electrotyped and Printed by H. O. Houghton & Company.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER L
Thk First Fortt-fivb Years of Jackson's Lira 1

CHAPTER H.
Thb Creek Wax and the Wax with Enoland 2* +

CHAPTER HL
Jackson in Florida • . • • . . 4t ^

CHAPTER IV.
Election of 18N*- • •••«•.. 73

CHAPTER V.
Adams's Administration 100

CHAPTER VL
The Brlirf System of Krktuoxt • • • • lit

CHAPTER VIL

Internal History of Jackson's First Administra-
tion 13C

CHAPTER VHX

Public Questions of Jackson's First Administra-

iion. — i .164

(a.) 1. West India Trade; 2. Spoliation Claims.
(6.) 1 Federal Judiciary ; 2. Indians.

*:

VI . CONTENTS. - - #

m

CHAPTER IX.

FAM

Public Questions op Jackson's First Administra-
tion. — ii 184

8. Land ; 4. Internal Improvements ; 5. Tariff!

CHAPTER X.

Public Questions of Jackson's First Administra-
tion. — hi 907

6. Nullification.

^^HAPTER XL

Public Questions of Jackson's First Administra-
tion. — it. ... 234

(^Bank.

CHAPTER XIL
^Thb Campaign of 1832 250

CHAPTER XTTT.
Tariff, Nullification, j*^ t*»™»" Tv^n™ T^flA^
SeooiulAcministkatios 277

CHAPTER XIV

Speculation, Distribution, Currency Legislation,
and End of tito Rank. sa the United States . 322

CHAPTER XV.

Ihb New Spirit in Various Points of Foreign
and Domestic Policy 343

CHAPTER XVL
The Election of 1836. — End of Jackson's Career 374

Full Titles of Books referreb to in this Volume 387
Index , . . . 398

• 1

ANDREW JACKSON.

CHAPTER L

TKB VIB8T FOBTT-JTVK TKAB8 OT JACKSON'S LIFE.

In the middle of the last century a number of Scotch*
men and Scotch-Irishmen migrated to the uplands of
North and South Carolina. Among these was Andrew
Jackson, who came oyer in 1765, with his wife and two
sons, being accompanied also by several neighbors and
connections from Carrickf ergus, County Antrim, Ireland.
They appear to have been led to the spot at which they
settled, on the upper waters of the Catawba river, by
the fact that persons of their acquaintance in Ireland
had previously found their way thither, under special
inducements which were offered to immigrants. 1 The
settlement was called the Waxhaw Settlement, and was
in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, but close to the
South Carolina boundary. Andrew Jackson had no capi-
tal, and never became an owner of land. In 1767 he
died. His son Andrew was born within a few days of
the father's death, March 15, 1767. Partem fixes his
birthplace in Union County, North Carolina; Kendall

1 2 Hewitt, 18, 268, 272. A bounty was offered equal to th*
ijet of passage. Ship captains became immigration agents. (Fot
foil titles of books referred to see the list at the end of the vol

■J

1

t ANDREW JACKSON.

in South Carolina. In Jackson's Proclamation of 1832*
in a letter of December 24* 1830, 1 and in his will, he
•peaks of himself as a native of South Carolina.

It appears that Andrew Jackson's mother abandoned
the settlement which her husband had commenced, and
it is probable that she owed much to the assistance of
her relatives and connections while Andrew was a child.
\ Circumstances of birth more humble than those of this
[child can scarcely be imagined. It was not, probably,
hard to sustain life in such a frontier community.
Coarse food was abundant ; but to get more out of life
than beasts get when they have enough to eat was no
doubt very difficult The traditions of Jackson's educa-
tion are vague and uncertain. Of book-learning and
school-training he appears to have got very little indeed.

The population of the district was heterogeneous, and,
when the Revolutionary War (broke out, the differences
of nationality and creed divided the people by oppo»«
ing sympathies as to the war. The English penetrated
the district several times in the hope of winning re-
cruits and strengthening the tories. On one of these
raids Andrew Jackson was wounded by an officer, who
struck him because he refused to brush the officer's boots.
He and his brother were taken prisoners to Camden.
The war cost the lives of both Andrew's brothers, and
also that of his mother, who died while on a journey to
Charleston to help care for the prisoners there. An-
drew Jackson accordingly came to entertain a vigorous
hatred of the English from a very early age. In 1781
de was alone in the world. What means of support he
had we do not know, but, after trying tLe saddler's trade,
he became, in 1784, a student of law at Salisbury, North
1 39 Kites, 3*5.

THE STUDY OF LAW. 8

Carolina. Y The traditions collected by Parton of Jack-
son's conduct at this time give as anything but the pict-
ure, so familiar in political biography, of the orphan boy
hewing his way up to the presidency by industry and
self-denial. If the information is trustworthy, Jackson
was gay, careless, rollicking, fond of horses, racing,
cock-fighting, and mischief. Four years were spent ia
\tfris way.

It is necessary to note the significance of the fact that
a young man situated as Jackson was should undertake
to "study law."

In the generation before the Revolution the intellectual
activity of the young men, which had previously been
expended in theology, began to be directed to the law.
As capital increased and property rights became more
complicated there was more need for legal training. In
an agricultural community there was a great deal of
leisure at certain seasons of the year, and the actual
outlay required for an education was small. The stand-
ard of attainments was low, and it was easy for a farm-
er's boy of any diligence to acquire, in his winter's lei-
sure, as much book-learning as the best colleges gave*
In truth the range of ideas, among the best classes,
About law, history, political science, and political econ-
omy, was narrow in the extreme. What the aspiring
*lass of young men who were self-educated lacked, as
compared with the technically " educated," was the bits
of classical and theological dogmatism which the colleges
taught by tradition, and the culture which is obtained
by frequenting academical society, however meagre may
be the positive instruction given by the institution.
What the same aspiring youths had in excess of tht
h£ularly educated was self-confidence, bred by igno

I ANDREW JACKSON.

ranee of their own short-comings. They were therefore
considered pushing and offensive by the colonial aris-
tocracy of place-holders and established families, who
considered that "the ministry'' was the proper place
for aspiring cleverness, and that it was intrusive when
it pushed into civil life. The restiveness of the aspiring
class under this repression was one of the great causes
of the Revolution. The lawyers became the leaders in
the revolt everywhere. The established classes were, as
classes, tories. After the war the way was clear for
every one who wanted office, or influence, or notoriety, to
attain these ends. The first step was to study law. If
a young man heard a public speaker, and was fired by
the love of public activity and applause, or if he became
engaged in political controversy, and was regarded by
his fellows as a good disputant, or if he chanced to read
something which set him thinking, the result was very
wre to be that he read some law. The men, whose bi-
ographies we read because they rose to eminence, present
us over and over again the same picture of a youth, with
only a common school education, who spends his leisure
in reading law, while he earns his living by teaching or
by farm work. Those, however, whose biographies we
read are only the select few who succeeded, out of the
thousands who started on the same road, and were ar-
rested by one circumstance or another, which threw
them back into the ranks of farmers and store-keepers.
We shall see that Andrew Jackson so fell back into the
position of a farmer and store-keeper. Chance plays a
great role in a new community, just as it does in a primi-
tive civilization. Jhance had very much to do with
fackson's career. We have no evidence that he wai
dissatisfied with his circumstances, and set himself to

JACKSON GOES TO TENNESSEE. 6

work to get out of them, or that he had any stiong am-
bition towards which the law was a step. There is no
proof that he ever was an ambitious man ; but rather
the contrary. He never learned any law, and never to
the end of his life had a legal tone of mind ; even his
fklmirer, Kendall, admits this. 1 His study of law had
no influence on his career, and no significance for his
character, except that it shows him following the set or
fashion of the better class of young men of his gener-
ation. If conjecture may be allowed, it is most probable
that he did not get on well with his relatives, and that
he disliked the drudgery of farming or saddle-making.
A journey which he made to Charleston offers a very
possible chance for him to have had his mind opened
to plans and ideas.

^ In 1788, Jackson's friend, John McNairy, was ap»
pointed judge of the Superior Court of the Western
District of North Carolina (t. e., Tennessee), and Jack-
son was appointed public prosecutor. Jackson arrived
in Nashville in October, 1788. Tennessee was then a
wild frontier country, in which the Whites and Indians
were engaged in constant hostilities. It was shut off
from connection with the Atlantic States by the mount-
ains, and its best connection with civilization was down
the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. Such frontier com-
munities have always had a peculiar character. In
them the white man has conformed, in no small degree,
to the habits and occupations of the Indians. Cut off
from tools, furniture, clothing, and other manufactured
Articles such as civilized men use, he has been driven to
mch substitutes as he could produce by bringing hit
intelligence to bear on the processes and materials ow*4

T irkson 9 109.

6 ANDREW JACKSON.

by the Indians. Living where game is abundant, and
where the forests make agriculture difficult, he has often
sunk back to the verge of the hunting stage of civili-
sation. 1 The pioneers, so much lauded in song and
story, were men who first broke the path into the wil-
derness, but who derogated from the status of their race
to do it They became incapacitated for the steady
laboi of civilized industry, and when the country became
so filled up that game was scarce, agriculture a necessity,
and " law " began to be recognized and employed, the
pioneers moved on into the wilderness. In their habits
they were idle and thriftless, and almost always too
fond of strong drink. \ The class of settlers who suc-
ceeded them were but little better in their habits, al-
though they began to clear the forests and till the soil.
They were always very litigious.. Court day was an
occasion which drew the men to the county town, form-
ing an event in a monotonous existence, and offering
society to people oppressed by isolated life. ; This con-
course of people furnished occasion for gossip and news-
mongering, and the discussion of everybody's affairs for
miles around. " Public opinion " took control of every-
thing. Local quarrels involved the whole county sooner
or later. Friendships, alliances, feuds, and animosities
grew up and were intensified in such a state of society.
If there was an election pending the same concourse of
people furnished an opportunity for speech-making and
argument. The institution of " stump-speaking " was
born and developed in these circumstances. In the
tourt itself the parties to the suits and the jury enjoyed
x place before the public eye. The judge and the counsel

1 See Collins's Kentucky, Putnam's M iidU Tenntute, ad4

Kendmll't Jackson, 74.

FRONTIER SOCIETY. 7

Hade reputation day by day. The lawyers, as actual
or prospective candidates for office, were directly and
constantly winning strength with the electors. They
passed from the bar to the stomp or the tavern parlor,
and employed the influence which their eloquence had
won in the court room to advance the interests which
they favored in the election. There are features of
American democracy which are inexplicable unless one
understands this frontier society. Some of our greatest
political abuses have come from transferring to our now
large and crowded cities maxims and usages which were
convenient and harmless in backwoods county towns.
j" Another feature of the frontier society which it is
important to notice is, that in it the lack of capital and
the intimacy of personal relations led to great abuses
of credit. Idleness, drink, debt, and quarrels produced
by gossip have been the curses of such society. The
courts and the lawyers were always busy with the per-
sonal collisions which arose where no one was allowed
to practise any personal reserve, where each one's busi-
ness was everybody's business, where gossip never rested,
and where each one was in debt to some others.

In such a state of society the public prosecutor is the
general of the advancing army of civilization. He has
to try to introduce law and order, the fulfilment of con-
tracts, and the recognition of rights into the infant so-
ciety. This was the task which Jackson undertook in \
Tennessee. It required nerve and vigor. The westejr ,.J
counties of North Carolina were in a state of anarchy
resulting from the attempt to set up the state of Frank
tin, and the population were so turbulent and lawless
mat the representative of legal order was at open wa?
with them. The Indians and Whites were also engaged

B ANDREW JACKSON.

fan the final straggle of the former before yielding theif
hunting-grounds to the cultivation of the white man.
Jackson had to travel up and down the country in the
discharge of his duties, when he was in danger of his
life upon the road. He brought all the required force
and virtue to the discharge of the duties of this office.
He pursued his way without fear and without relenting.
He made strong enemies, and he won strong friends.
Kendall says that Jackson settled at Nashville, because
the debtors there tried to drive him away, he having
taken some collection cases. 1 His merits as prosecutor f
are vouched for by the fact that Governor Blount said
of him, in reference to certain intruders on Indian lands
who were giving trouble, "Let the District Attorney,
Mr. Jackson, be informed. He will be certain to do
his duty, and the offenders will be punished." •

Among the earlier settlers of Tennessee was John
Donelson, who had been killed by the Indians before
Jackson migrated to Tennessee. 4 Jackson boarded with
the widow Donelson. In the family there were also
Mrs. Donelson's daughter, Rachel, and the latter* s hus-
band, Lewis Robards. Robards, who seems to have
been of a violent and jealous disposition, had made in-
jurious charges against his wife with reference to other
persons, and he now made such charges with reference
to Jackson. Robards had been married in Kentucky
under Virginia law. There was no law of divorce in
Virginia. Robards, in 1791, petitioned the Legislature

1 Kendall's Jackson, 90.

* He was appointed district attorney by Washington in 179*
tfter the western counties of INorth Carolina were ceded.

* Putnam, 351.

* Putnam, 613 ig.

JACK801PB MARRUOS. ft

< — -

jf Virginia to pass an act of divorce in his favor, mak«
ing an affidavit that his wife had deserted him, and wa*.
living in adultery with Jackson. The Legislature of Vir-
*ginia passed an act authorizing the Supreme Court of
Kentucky to try the case with a jury, and, if the facts
proved to be as alleged, to grant a divorce. Robards
took no action for two years. September 27, 1793, he
obtained a divorce from the Court of Quarter Sessions of
Mercer County, Kentucky. In the mean time, Jackson
and Mrs. Robards, upon information of the legislative act
of 1791, which they assumed, or were informed, to be
an act of divorce, were married at Natchez, in July or
August, 1791. In January, 1794, upon hearing of the
action of the Mercer County Court, they were married
again. 1 The circumstances of this marriage were such
as to provoke scandal at the time, and the scandal,
which in the case of a more obscure man would have
died out during thirty years of honorable wedlock, came
up over and over again during Jackson's career. It
is plain that Jackson himself was to blame for contract-
ing a marriage under ambiguous circumstances, and
for not protecting his own wife's honor by proper pre-
cautions, such as finding out the exact terms of the act
of the Legislature of Virginia. He clung to this lady
until her death, with rare single-mindedness and devo-
tion, although she was not at all fitted to share the des-
tiny which befell him. He cherished her memory until
his own death in a fashion of high romance. An im-
putation upon her, or a reflection upon the regularity of
ds marriage, always incensed nim more than any other
personal attack. Having put her in a false position.
* Telegraph Extra, p. S3. Report of a Jackson committee is

10 ANDREW JACKSON.

Against which, as man and lawyer, he should have pro-
tected her, he was afterward led by his education and
the current ways of thinking in the society about him
to try to heal the defects in his marriage certificate by
shooting any man who dared to state the truth, that
said certificate was irregular.

Jackson was a member of the convention which met
at Knoxville, January 11, 1796, and framed a Constitu-
tion for the State of Tennessee. There is a tradition
that he proposed the name of the river as the name of
the State. 1 This Constitution established a freehold
qualification for voting and holding the chief offices, and
declared that the people of Tennessee had an inalien-
able right to navigate the Mississippi river to its mouth.
The federalists in Congress opposed the admission of
Tennessee, because it was a raw frontier community;
but it was admitted June 1, 1796. In the autumn Jack-
son was elected the first federal representative. A year
later, Blount, one of the senators from Tennessee, hav-
ing been expelled, Jackson was appointed senator in his
place. He held this position only until April, 1798,
when he resigned.

In December, 1796, therefore, at the age of thirty,
.- ackson first came in contact with a society as cultivated
as that of Philadelphia then was. Except for the brief
visit to Charleston in 1783, above referred to, he had
seen no society but that of Western North Carolina and
Tennessee. He came to Philadelphia just as the presi-
dential election of 1796 was being decided. Tennessee
Voted for Jefferson, and we may believe that whatevei
political notions Jackson had were Jeffersonian. H«
identified himself with the opposition to Washington*
1 Ramsey, 655.

IN CON ORE BS. 11

tdmiiiistration in the most factious and malicious act
which it perpetrated, namely, the vote against the ad-
dress to Washington at the close of his administration.
He and Edward Livingston were two oat of twelve in
the House who refused to vote for the address. It it
not known what Jackson's reasons were. Some refused
to vote that Washington's administration had been wis*.
Others objected to the hope that Washington's exampl*
would guide his successors. 1 The grounds of objection
to the administration were Jay's treaty and Hamilton's
financial measures. In the light of history the " irrec-
oncilable" minority which opposed these measures to
the bitter end must stand condemned. The republican
party, in 1796, was filled with ill-informed and ill-regu
lated sympathy for the French Revolutionists, and, if it
could have had its way, it would, under the lead of ref-
ugee editors filled with rancor and ignorant zeal, have
committed this country to close relations with France,
and would, by importing Jacobinism into this country,
have overthrown constitutional liberty here. The feder-
alists, on the other hand, fell into a panic about sedition
and sans-culottism quite similar to that which prevailed
in England at the same time. Washington's adminis-
tration had the hard task of maintaining statesman-like
steadiness and wisdom between these two tendencies,
and of establishing sound precedents for the details of
the government under the Constitution. It succeeded
so well in this task that the wider the perspective of
history in which it is regarded the more clearly does the

1 In 1830 Livingston attempted an elaborate defence of hif
tote. He tried to distinguish between Washington and hif ad
ministration, a vicious and untenable distinction Hunt's £•»»,
r.340.

12 ANDREW JACKSON.

moderation, wisdom, and statesmanship of that admini*
tration appear. Jay's treaty was a masterpiece of di-
plomacy, considering the time and the circumstances of
this country. Those who objected to it could propose
nothing hut a policy of bluster, which the country was
not prepared to follow up, or the imbecile device of a
commercial war. Jefferson, in 1806, had a renewal of
this treaty offered to him. He took the opposite course
from that which Washington had taken : he rejected it.
He tried the commercial war; adopting legislation as
tyrannical as any that ever stained a statute-book in the
effort to carry it out, subjecting the Union to the sever-
est strain, accomplishing nothing, and finally leading to
a fruitless war.

As for Hamilton's funding scheme, few will now be
found, whether lawyers, statesmen, or financiers, to ques-
tion its propriety or the ingenuity and skill with which
it was carried out. His bank is open to more question.
He and the other federalists had too much of a feeling
that they must invent artificial bonds and clamps to hold
the Union together. They did not sufficiently perceive
that the Union must consolidate itself in time by the ex-
perience which the people would win of its inestimable
value and political necessity. Public credit and Union,
however, were then, as they always have been, insepa-
rably bound up with each other. The history of the
old bank is so obscure that it is difficult to form a judg-
ment about it In making any attempt to do so, it is
necessary to bear in mind the fact that the currencies of
Europe were nearly all confused and depreciated during
the existence of this bank, and that this fact acted as *-
protection to save the Bank of the United States from
the ordinary penalties of a certain measure of bad bank

EABL1 POLITICAL OPINIONS. 18

tng. It is certain that there was a great deal of joK
bing in the shares of the bank when it was first founded,
and it very probably over-issued its notes. It did not
publish statements of its affairs. After 1793 the riski
of neutral commerce and its gains were both very great.
American merchants made and lost fortunes by violafc»
ing belligerent regulations. In 1797 and 1798 these
transactions culminated in a crisis and commercial panic
here, connected, to judge fronT^ll the information we
can obtain, with the crisis of 1797 and the bank re-
striction in England. All this trouble was charged,
without farther discussion, to the bank. Every time \
since the formation of the Union, when the strain on the
national finances has been great, we have been forced
to have recourse to national banks ; — 1781, 1792, 1816, )
1863.

History has not, therefore, justified the position on
these great political questions taken by the party with
which Jackson allied himself while he was in the na-
tional legislature.

In the Senate, Jackson voted, with only two others,
against a bill to authorize the President to buy or lease
cannon foundries, in view of possible war with France.
He voted against a bill to authorize the arming of mer-
chant ships, in favor of an embargo, and against a pro-
viso that the United States should not be bound to
cancel the Indian title to land on behalf of any State. 1

^e know nothing of any activity or interest shown
by Jackson in any measure save a claim of Hugh L.
White, and an act to reimburse Tennessee for expenses
incurred in an Indian war. The latter case was one
"fc&ohhas been constantly renewed La the frontier States
1 Annals of Congress ; 5th Congt <*ss, I. 485-532

14 ANDREW JACKSON.

Tennessee thought that the federal government was slow
and negligent about defending her against the Indians.
The federal government thought that Tennessee wai
hasty and aggressive towards the Indians. Jackson
gained this point on the claim of Tennessee while he
was in the House, to the great advantage of his popu-
larity at home.

We must infer from his conduct that he did not enjoy
political life and did not care for it He certainly did
not become engaged in it at all, and he formed no ties
which he found it hard to break at a moment's warn-
ing. He does not appear to have made much impres-
sion upon anybody at Philadelphia. \ Gallatin recalled
him years afterwards as " a tall, lank, uncouth-looking
personage, with long locks of hair hanging over his
face, and a cue down his back tied in an eel-skin ; his
dress singular, his manners and deportment that of a
rough backwoodsman." l There is, however, ample tes-
timony that Jackson, later in life, was distinguished and
elegant in his bearing when he did not affect roughness
and inelegance, and that he was able to command enco-
miums upon his manners from the best bred ladies in
the country. Jefferson said of him, in 1824 : " When I
was President of the Senate he was a senator, and he
could never speak on account of the rashness of his feel-
ings. I have seen him attempt it repeatedly, and aa
often choke with rage." fl

In 1798 Jackson was made judge of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee. Nothing is known of his conduct
in this position. No records or decisions of the cour*
from that period remain.

1 4 Hildreth, 692.

8 1 Webster's Corr. 371.

MAJOR-GENERAL OF MILITIA. 16

While Jackson was on the bench of the Supreme
Court, he and ex-Governor Sevier were in fend with each
other. The origin of the quarrel is obscure and not
worth picking ont from the contradictory backwoods
gossip in which it probably originated. It is enough to
notice that the two men were too much alike in temper
to be pleased with each other. Sevier was fifty-sevea
years old in 1801, and had been a leading man in the
country for years. Jackson was only thirty-four in that
year, and a rising man, whose success interfered with
Sevier's plans for himself. In 1801 the field officers of
the militia tried to elect a major-general. Sevier and
Jackson were the candidates. The election resulted in
a tie. The governor, Archibald Roane, who had the
casting vote, threw it for Jackson. Jackson had not
taken part in the Nickajack expedition, or otherwise
done military service, so far as is known, except as a
private in an Indian fight in 1789. On that occasion
one of his comrades described him as "bold, dashing,
fearless, and mad upon his enemies." 1 In 1803 Sevier
was elected governor, and he and the judge-major-
general drew their weapons on each other when they
met. Each had his faction of adherents; and it was
only by the strenuous efforts of these persons that they
were prevented from doing violence to each other. Ken-
dall says that Jackson's popularity was increased by his
quarrel with Sevier. 8 In 1804 Jackson resigned his
position as judge. Parton gives letters of Jackson £rbm
this period which are astonishingly illiterate for a man
in his position, even when all the circumstances are
taken into consideration. Jackson was made a trustet
•f th^ Nashville Academy in 1793."

1 Putnam, 318. * Kendall's Jackson, 108.

• Potnam. 410.

16 ANDREW JACKSON.

In 1804 Jackson was once more a private citizen, a
planter, and a store-keeper. Neither politics nor law had
apparently touched any chord of interest in him. The
turning point in his career was the vote which made
him major-general of militia, hut the time had not yet
arrived for him to show that all there was in him could
be aroused when there were public enemies to be crushed.
He had been engaged in trade for six years or more
before 1804, and was now embarrassed. He devoted
bimself to business for several years.

Mention has already been made of the general abuse
of credit in the frontier communities. Money is scarce
because capital is scarce, and is so much needed that
the community is unwilling to employ any of it in secur-
ing a value currency. It is true that the people always
have to pay for a value currency, whether they get it or
not, but they always cheat themselves with the notion
that cheap money is cheap. Food and fuel are abun-
dant, but everything else is scarce and hard to get.
Hopes are strong and expectations are great. Each
man gives his note, which is a draft on the glorious
future ; that is, every man makes his own currency at
he wants it, and the freedom with which he draws hit
drafts is as unlimited as his own sanguine hopes. The
hopes are not unfounded, but their fruition is often de-
layed. Continued renewals become necessary, and liqui-
dation is put off until no man knows where he stands.
A general liquidation, with a period of reaction and
stagnation, therefore, ensues upon any shock to credit
In Tennessee, between 1790 and 1798, land was used a?
a kind of currency ; prices were set in it, and it wa*
transferred in payment for goods and services. During
the same period there was a great speculation in nen

FRONTIER CODE. 17

luid throughout the country. Prices of land were in*
Bated, and extravagant notions of the value of raw lan<?
prevailed. 1 After the crisis of 1798 land fell in value all
over the country, to the ruin of thousands of speculator
Values measured in land all collapsed at the same time.
Jackson was entangled in the system of credit and
land investments, but he seems to have worked out of
his embarrassments during the next three or four years,
after which he abandoned trade and became a planter
only.

Another feature of this early southwestern frontier
society which excites the surprise and contempt of the
modern reader is, that store-keepers and farmers and
lawyers, who lived by their labor, and had wives and
children dependent on them, are found constantly quar-
relling, and in all their quarrels are found mouthing the
" code of honor." The earlier backwoodsmen quarrelled
and fought as above described, but they fought with fists
and knives, on the spur of the moment, as the quarrel
arose. It was a genteel step in advance, and marked
a new phase of society, when the code of the pistol came
into use, and the new higher social caste prided itself
not a little on being " gentlemen," because they kept up
in the backwoods a caricature drawn by tradition and
hearsay from the manners of the swaggerers about the
eourts of France and England a century before. An-
drew Jackson was a child of this society, an adherent
of its doctrines, and in his torn a propagandist and ex-
pounder of them. He proved himself a quarrelsome
pian. Instead of making ueace he exhausted all the
ehances of conflict which offered themselves. He was
remarkably genial and gentle when things went on t#

1 On the fallacies about the value of land, tee p.

1

18 ANDREW JACKSON.

roit him, and when he was satisfied with his companions,
He was very chivalrous about taking up the cause of
any one who was unjustly treated and was dependent.
Yet he was combative and pugnacious and over-ready
to adjust himself for a hostile collision whenever there
was any real or fancied occasion. The society in which
he lived developed, by its fashions, some of his natural
faults.

In 1795 he fought a duel with a fellow lawyer named
Avery, over some sparring which had taken place be-
tween them in a court room, when they were opposing
counsel. His quarrel with Sevier has been mentioned.
While on the bench he also quarrelled with his old friend
Judge McNairy, on account of an appointment made by
the judge which injured an old friend of both. 1 In
1806 he fought a duel with Charles Dickinson, who had
spoken disparagingly of Mrs. Jackson in the course of
a long quarrel which involved, besides Jackson, three
or four others, and which was a capital specimen of the
quarrels stirred up by the gossip and backbiting of men
who had too much leisure. This was the real cause of
Jackson's anger, although on the surface the quarrel
was about a strained and artificial question of veracity
concerning a bet on a horse-race, and it was inflamed
by some sarcastic letter-writing in the local newspaper,
and by some insulting epithets. Jackson's friends de-
clared that there was a plot to drive Jackson out of the
country. Each man meant to kill the other. They
met May 30, 1806. Jackson was wounded by a bullet
which grazed his breast and weakened him for life.
Dickinson was mortally wounded, and died the sain*
ivening.

Kendall's Jadcton. 105.

WESTERN FEELING ABOUT LOUISIANA. 19

Jackson had made the acquaintance of Burr when in
Congress. In 1805 Burr visited Jackson, and made a
contract with him for boats for the expedition down the
Mississippi. The people of Kentucky and Tennessee
had always regarded it as a vital interest of theirs to
have the free navigation of the Mississippi. So long as
a foreign power held the mouth of the river, plots were
formed for separating the trans-Alleghany country from
the Atlantic States, the strength of which plots lay in the
fact that the tie of interest which made the basis of a
anion with the holder of New Orleans was stronger than
the tie of interest which united the two sides of the
Alleghanies. In 1795 the United States by treaty with
Spain secured a right of deposit at New Orleans for
three years, and these separation plots lost all theii
strength. The "Annual Register " for 1796 (anti-fed-
eralist) very pertinently pointed out to the "Western
people the advantages they enjoyed from the Union.
" If they had been formed into an independent republic,
the court of Madrid would have scorned to grant such
a free navigation " * (i. e., as it granted in the treaty of
1795). Spain ceded Louisiana to France by the secret
treaty of St. Udefonso, October 1, 1800. This treaty
)ecame known in 1802 after the peace of Amiens. In
the same year Spain, which still held possession of
Louisiana, withdrew the right of deposit, and the West-
ern country was thrown into great excitement. In 1803
the whole matter of the navigation of the Mississippi
was settled by the purchase of Louisiana by the United
States, but then a new set of questions was opened. In
the treaty of 1795 Spain had acknowledged the parallel
•I 31° as the boundary of Florida from the Mississippi
i Ann. Reg. (1796) p. 83.

gO ANDREW JACKSON.

to the Chattahoochee, although she had been slow about
lurrendering posts held by her north of this line and
east of the Mississippi. Hence there had been com-
plaints and bad feeling. Now a new question arose aa
to how far Louisiana extended east of the Mississippi
river, and this question was of great importance to the
Gulf territories, because if, by the Louisiana purchase,
the United States had become owner of the territory east
as far as the Ferdido, then the Gulf coast with the valu-
able harbor of Mobile was available for the whole South-
west. Spain denied that Louisiana included anything
east of the Mississippi except the city of New Orleans,
and the bit of territory south and west of the Iberville
and the two lakes. 1 The territory remained in dispute,
and the relations between the two countries continued to
be bad, until Florida was purchased in 1819. In 1802
a treaty was made with Spain for the payment by he*
of claims held by American citizens, but Spain did not
ratify the treaty until 1818. She had her grievances
also, at first about Miranda's expedition, and afterwards
about aid to her revolted colonies. In 1810 the Presi-
dent ordered the Governor of Orleans to occupy the
territory as far as the Ferdido, and to hold it in peace
and order, subject -to the final decision of the pending
controversy with Spain. In 1812, Congress, by two
acts, divided the country east as far as the Ferdido into
two parts, and added one part to Louisiana, which was
admitted as a State, and the other part to the Missis-
sippi territory.

It has seemed convenient to pursue these proceeding!
«p to this point, because future reference to them wiL.

1 See the decision of the Supreme Court of the United State*
* Foster v. Neilson, 2 Peters, 353

BURRS SCHEMES. 21

be necessary. To return now to Burr and his expe-
dition : — It will be understood what were the relation*
of the United States to Spain in 1805 and 1806, and
especially what part of those relations peculiarly affected
the people of the Southwest at that time. Their col-
lisions with Spain no longer concerned New Orleans,
but West Florida and Mobile. It is still a mystery
what Burr really intended. Napoleon's career had fired
the imagination of men of a military and romantic turn
all over the world. It is quite as reasonable an expla-
nation of Burr's scheme as any other that he was re-
serving all his chances, and meant to do much or little,
according to the turn of events, and that he did not
himself define to himaftlf what he was aiming at. His
project had an unmistakable kinship with the old plans
for setting up a republic of the Mississippi, with its
capital at New Orleans. For that, however, he was ten
years too late. If he had intended to go on a filibus-
tering expedition against the Spaniards in Mexico, he
would have obtained secret aid and sympathy in Ken-
tucky and Tennessee, and the aid which he did get was
given under that belief. 1 If his scheme was aimed in
any manner against the United States he could not find
any aid for it. Since the purchase of Louisiana, and
the accession to power in the Union of the party to
which the great majority of the Western people be-
longed, there was no feeling for Burr to work on. a

In 1805 Burr found a cordial welcome and aid. He
was evidently trying to use Jackson without startling
him. His letter of March 24 1806, which Parton
{ives, 1 is a very crafty letter, for the purpose of engng*

1 2 Amer. Reg. ('807) 103, note.

* Cf. Jefferson's Message of January 22, 1W7.

8 I Parton, 31S.

24 ANDREW JACKSON.

The time was now at hand, however, when Andrew
Jackson would have a chance to show how he could
serve his country. At the age of forty-five he had com-
menced no career. He was a prominent man in Ilia
State, but he had held no political offices in it, and had
not, so far as we know, been active in any kind of pub-
lic affairs, although we infer that he had discharged all
his duties as general of militia. He had shown himself
% faithful friend and an implacable enemy. Every man
who has this character is self-centred. He need -not
be vain or conceited. Jackson was not vain or con-
ceited. He never showed any marked selfishness. He
had a great deal of amour propre. All things which
interested him at all took on some relation to his person, .
and he engaged his personality in everything which in-
terested him. An opinion or a prejudice became at
once for him a personal right and interest. To approve
it and further it was to win his gratitude and friend-
ship. To refute or oppose it was to excite his animos-
ity. There was an intensity and vigor about him which
6howed^lack of training. His character had never been
cultivated by the precepts and discipline of home, or by
the discipline of a strict and close society, in which
extravagances of behavior and excess of amour propre
are promptly and severely restrained by harsh social
penalties. There is, to be sure, a popular philosophy
that home breeding and culture are of no importance.
The fact, however, is not to be gainsaid that true honor
truthfulness, suppression of undue personal feeling, self
control, and courtesy are inculcated best, if not exclu-
sively, by the constant precept and example, in earlies*
ehildhood, of high-bred parents and relatives. There
b frothing on earth which it costs more labor to produce

STRONG PERSONAL FEELING. 25

fan a high-bred man. It is also indisputable that home
discipline and training ingrain into the character of
men the most solid and valuable elements, and that,
without such training, more civilization means better
food and clothes rather than better men. It is charac-
teristic of barbarians to put their personality always at
stake, and not to distinguish the man who disputes their
notions from the man who violates their rights. It is
possible, however, that the military virtues may flourish
where moral and social training are lacking. Jackson
was unfortunate in that the force of his will and the en-
ergy of his executive powers had never been disciplined,
but the outbreak of the second war with England af
forded him an arena on which his faults became vir*

CHAPTER II.

THE CREEK WAB AND THE WAB WITH ENGLAND.

In no place in the world was Napoleon more ardently
admired than in the new States of this country. The
popular enthusiasm about him in those States lasted
Long after he was rated much more nearly at his true
value everywhere else in the world. The second war
with England was brought on by the policy, the opin-
ions, and the feelings of the South and West, repre-
sented by a young and radical element in the Jeffer-
sonian party. The opinion in the South and West,
in 1811 and 1812, was that Napoleon was about to
unite the Continent for an attack on England, in which
he was sure to succeed, and that he would thus become
master of Europe and the world. It was thought that
it would be well to be in at the death on his side. It is
not necessary to point out in any detail the grounds for
tliis opinion which might have been put forward at that
time, or to show the partial and distorted information
on which it was founded. Jt is certain that the persons
who held this notion were very ill-informed on Euro-
pean politics, and their opinions were strongly biassed
by party conflicts at home. For twenty years the do-
mestic politics of the United States had been organized
on sympathy with one or the other of the belligerent
parties in Europe. This country was weak in a military
point cf view, but commercially it would have been t

JEFFER80W8 POLICY. 27

great advantage to either belligerent to have free inter-
course with the United States, and to keep his enemy
from it The English policy toward* the United States
was arrogant and insolent. That of France was marked
by duplicity and chicanery. Party spirit here took pos-
session of the people to such an extent that the federal-
ists made apology for any injury from England, no mat-
ter how insolent, and the democrats could not see any
wrong in the acts of Napoleon, in spite of the evident
fact that he was using this country for his own selfish
purposes while cajoling it with shameless lies. The
course of the weak neutral between two such belligerents
was very difficult

Washington succeeded in maintaining neutrality bf
Jay's treaty, but at the cost of bitter hostility at home.
Adams was driven to the verge of war with France by
his party, but succeeded in averting war, although his
party was destroyed by the reaction. Jefferson cannot
be said to have had any plan. The statesmen of his
party tried to act on the belligerents* by destructive
measures against domestic commerce and industry, chas-
tising ourselves, as Plumer said, with scorpions, in order
to beat the enemy with whips. They tried one measure
after another. No measure had a rational origin or
effect calculated and adjusted to the circumstances of
Jie case. Each was a new blunder. The republican
-jlers in France in 1792 could do nothing better for a
man who claimed protection from the Jacobin mobs
than to put him in prison, so that the mob could not get
at him. Jefferson's embargo offered the same kind of
protection to American shipping. Before the embargo,
merchants and ship-owners went to sea at great risk of
capture and destruction ; after if, they stayed at home

28 ANDREW J ALISON.

and were sure of ruin. Jefferson has remained a pop*
lar idol, and has never been held to the responsibility
which belonged to him for his measures. The alien and
sedition laws were not nearly so unjust and tyrannical *
as the laws for enforcing the embargo, and they did not
touch one man where the embargo laws touched hun-
dreds. The commercial war was . a device which, if it
had been sensible and practical, would have attained
national ends by sacrificing one group of interests and
laying a much inferior burden on others. New England
was denounced for want of patriotism because it re*
sisted the use of its interests for national purposes, but
as soon as the secondary effects of the embargo on agri-
culture began to be felt, the agricultural States raised
a cry which overthrew the device. Yet criticisms which
are justified by the most conclusive testimony of history
fall harmlessly from Jefferson's armor of popular plati-
tudes and democratic sentiments. He showed the traits
which we call womanish. He took counsel of his feel-
ings and imagination; he planned measures like the
embargo, whose scope and effect he did not understand.
He was fiery when deciding initiatory steps, like the re-
jection of the English treaty ; vacillating and timid
when he had to adopt measures for going forward in
the path which he had chosen. His diplomacy, besides
being open to the charge that it was irregular and un-
usual, was transparent and easily turned to ridicule. It
was a diplomacy without lines of reserve .or alternatives,
go that, in a certain very possible contingency it had no
course open to it. Jefferson finally dropped the reins of
government in despair, and, on a theory which would

1 See Carey's Olive Branch, page 50 for the opinion of a
on these laws after party spirit had cooled down.

CAUSES OF TEE SECOND WAR. 29

nake each presidential term last for three yean and
tight months, with an interregnum of four months, he
left the task to his successor. He had succeeded in
keeping out of war with either belligerent, but he had
shaken the Union to its foundations. The extremists in
the democratic party now came forward, and began to
push Madison into a war with England, as the extreme
federalists had pushed Adams into war with France.
Madison, therefore, had to inherit the consequences of
Jefferson's policy. An adherent of Jefferson describes
the bequest as follows : " Jefferson's honest experiment,
bequeathed to Madison, to govern without army or
navy, and resist foreign enemies without war, proved
<*>tal failures, more costly than war and much more
odious to the people, and dangerous to the Union." 1

The young and radical democrats, amongst whom
Clay was prominent, were restive under the predomi-
nance of the older generation of democrats of revolu-
tionary fame, and their favorites. The young democrats
wanted to come forward without the patronage of the
Virginia leaders. The presidential election of 1812 was
the immediate occasion of their action. The Jefferso-
nian policy had produced irritation at home and humili-
ation abroad. The natural consequence was a strong
war spirit. It was believed that the country would not
eally be engaged in military operations, because Eng-
land would be fully occupied in Europe ; that Canada
would be conquered ; tbat we should come in on the win-
ning side at the catastrophe of the great conflict in
Europe ; and that all this would be very popular in the
South and West. Madison was compelled greatly against
^m will to yield to the war party, as a condition of his
1 Ingersoll, 70 : — grammar of the original.

80 ANDREW JACKSON.

reflection. 1 England pointed out that Najxdeon had
not complied with the terms of the American demand*
on both belligerents, but had falsified a date and told a
lie. She withdrew her orders in council, and there re-
mained only impressment as the ostensible cause of war.
September 12, 1812, Admiral Warren offered an armis-
tice. Madison refused it unless the practice of impress-
ment was suspended. "Warren had not power to agree
to this. For purposes of redress the war was, therefore,
unnecessary, and the United States was duped into it by
Napoleon, so far as its avowed causes were concerned. 8

General Jackson offered his services, with those of
2,500 volunteers, as soon as he heard of the declaration
of war. January 7, 1813, he set out under orders for
New Orleans, an attack on that place being regarded as
a probable movement of the enemy. Jackson threw
himself into the business with all his might, and at once
displayed activity, vigilance, and skill. His letter to the
Secretary of "War when he started shows with what en-
thusiasm he set to work. He assured the Secretary
that his men had no " constitutional scruples," but
would, if so directed, plant the American eagle on the
walls of Mobile, Pensacola, and St Augustine. In
March he was at Natchez engaged in organizing his
force, and waiting for orders. While there he had a
quarrel with General Wilkinson on a question of rank.
Thomas H. Benton, who was serving under Jackson,
thought Jackson wrong on the point in question. Thi*
produced discord between him and Jackson.

Suddeidy Jackson received orders to dismiss hit
troops, as it did not appear that the enemy were intend

1 1 Statesman's Manual. 348. 1 Colton's Clay, 161.
* 8ee 1 Gallatin's Writings, 517 ; 2 ditto, 196, 211, 49*.

QUARREL WITH THE BEST0N8. 31

mg to attack New Orleans. He was, of course, greatly
shagrined at this order. He was also enraged at the
idea of disbanding his men, without pay or rations, five
hundred miles from home, to find their way back at
best they could. A subsequent order repaired part of
this error by ordering pay and rations, but Jackson hired
transportation on his own responsibility, and marched
his men home in a body. Thomas H. Benton, in June
following, succeeded in obtaining from the federal au-
thorities reimbursement of the expenses which Jackson
had incurred.

This act of Benton would perhaps have extinguished
the memory of the trouble about rank at Natchez, but,
in the mean time, Jackson had stood second to another
man in a duel with Jesse Benton, brother of Thomas.
A feud was speedily created out of this by the gossip
and tale-bearing already described. Up to this time
Jackson had had as many enemies as friends, but his
course in leading home the troops from Natchez had
made him very popular, and his conduct in acting as
second in the duel, although chivalrous in one point of
view, was overbearing in another. He threatened to
horsewhip Thomas Benton, and a rencontre between
him and the two brothers took place in a tavern at
Nashville. Blows and shots were exchanged, and Jack-
x>n came away with a ball in his shoulder, which he car-
tied for twenty years. This affair occurred September
4, 1813.

The great Indian chief Tecumseh had been trying for

years to unite all the red men against the whites. 1

There would have been an Indian war if there had

jeen no war with England, out the latter war seemed

1 Drake's Tecumteh.

J2 ANDREW JACKSON.

lo be Tecumseh's opportunity. Among the southwest*
em Indians he found acceptance only with the Creeks,
who were already on the verge of civil war, because
some wanted to adopt civilized life, and others refused.
The latter became the war party, under Weatherf ord,
a very able half-breed chief. The first outbreak in the
Southwest, although there had been some earlier hos-
tilities, was the massacre of the garrison and refugees
at Fort Mims, at the junction of the Alabama and Tom-
bigbee rivers, August 30, 1813. There were 553 per-
sons in the fort, of whom only five or six escaped. 3 If
Tecumseh had lived, and if the English had been able
to give their attention to an alliance with him, he would
have united the Indians from the Lakes to the Gulf,
and the " young democrats " would have found out what
sort of a business it may be to start a war for party
effect. The result of the massacre at Fort Mims was
that Alabama was almost abandoned by whites. Terror
and desire for revenge took possession of Georgia and
Tennessee. September 25th the Tennessee Legislature
voted to raise men and money to aid the people of the
Mississippi territory against the Creeks. Jackson was
still confined to his bed by the wound which Benton had
given him. He and Cocke were the two major-generals
of the militia of Tennessee. They concerted measures.
As soon as he possibly could, Jackson took the field.
Georgia had a force in the field under General Floyd.
General Claiborne was acting at the head of troops from
Louisiana and Mississippi This Indian war had «
ocal character and was outside the federal operations
Jtinugh in the end it had a great effect upon them

1 Folio State Papers, 1 Indian Affairs, 845 ig.
• S Pickett, 266.

ANNOYANCES IN THE FIELD. 38

Up to this time little had been known at Washington ol
Jackson, save that he had been a friend of Burr, an
enemy of Jefferson, and that he had just acted in a
somewhat insubordinate manner at Natchez, reflecting
en the administration and winning popularity for him-
self.

The Creek war 1 was remarkable for three things:
{1) the quarrels between the generals, and the want of
concert of action ; (2) lack of provisions ; (3) insubor-
dination in the ranks. Partly on account of the lack
of provisions, for which he blamed General Cocke (at
it appears, unjustly), Jackson fell into a bitter quarrel
with his colleague and junior officer. The lack of pro-
visions, and consequent suffering of the men ; was one
cause of insubordination in the ranks', but the chief
cause was differences as to the term of enlistment. The
enlistment was generally for three months, and constant
recruiting was necessary to keep up the army in the
field. A great deal of nonsense has been written and
spoken about pioneer troops. Such troops were always
insubordinate s and homesick, and very dependent for
success on enthusiasm for their leader and a prosperous
*»ourse of affairs. For these reasons the character of
the commander was all-important to such an army. On
three occasions Jackson had to use one part of his army
to prevent another part from marching home, he and
they differing on the construction of the terms of enlist-
ment. He showed very strong qualities under these
trying circumstances. He endured delay with impa-
tience, but with fortitude, and without a suggestion of

See Eaton's Jack^n and Pickett's Alabama.
2 See descriptions of Kciiincky militift in Kendall's AvtMf
mpiy, 134, 131.

4

54 ANDREW JACKSON.

abandoning the enterprise, 1 although he was in wretched
health all the time. He managed his soldiers with en-
ergy and tact He understood their dispositions. He
knew how to be severe with them without bringing thena
to open revolt, and he knew how to make the most effi-
cacious appeals to them.

In the conduct of the movements against the enemy
his energy was very remarkable. So long as there was
an enemy unsubdued Jackson could not rest, and could
not give heed to anything else. Obstacles which lay in
the way between him and such unsubdued enemy were
not allowed to deter him. This restless and absorb-
ing determination to reach and crush anything which
was hostile was one of the most marked traits in Jack-
son's character. It appeared in all his military opera-
tions,, and he carried it afterwards into his civil activity.
He succeeded in his military movements. This gave
him the confidence and adherence of his men. The
young men of the State then hastened to enlist with him,
and his ranks were kept well filled, because one who
had fought a campaign with him, and had a story to tell,
became a hero in the settlement. Jackson's military
career and his popularity thus rapidly acquired mo-
mentum from all the circumstances of the case and all
the forces at work. He was then able to enforce disci-
pline and obedience, by measures which, as it seems, no
other frontier commander would have dared to use.

On the 14th of March, 1814, he ordered John Wood
to be shot for insubordination and assault on an officer
This was the first of the acts of severity committed by

1 To Governor Blount, who proposed that he should retire from
vke expedition, Jackson wrote a strenuous remonstrance, even ai
admonition. (Eaton's Jackson, 101.)

EXECUTION OF WOOD. 85

Jackson as a commanding officer, which were brought
ap against him in the presidential campaigns. Wood
was technically guilty. He acted just as any man in
the frontier army, taught to reverence nobody and su)v
mit to no authority, would have acted under the cir
eumstances. If it had not been for the great need of
enforcing discipline, extenuating circumstances which
existed would have demanded a mitigation of the sen-
tence. Party newspapers during a presidential cam-
paign are not a fair court of appeal to review the acts
which a military commander in the field may think
necessary to maintain discipline. Jackson showed in
this case that he was not afraid to do his duty, and that
he would not sacrifice the public service to curry popu-
larity.

At the end of March Jackson destroyed a body of
the Creeks at Tohopeka, or Horse-Shoe Bend, in the
northeast corner of the present Tallapoosa County, Ala-
bama. With the least possible delay he pushed on to the
Last refuge of the Creeks, the Hickory Ground, at the
confluence of the Coosa and Tallapoosa, and the Holy
Ground a few miles distant. The medicine men, ap-
pealing to the superstition of the Indians, had taught
them to believe that no white man could tread the latter
ground and live. In April the remnant of the Creeks
lurrendered or fled to Florida, overcome as much by
Jie impetuous and relentless character of the campaign
against them as by actual blows. Fort Jackson was
built on the Hickory Ground. The march down through
Alabama was a great achievement, considering the cir-
cumstances of the country at the time. Major-General
Zhomas Pinckney, of the regular army, came to Fort
lackson, April 20th, and took command. He gave fe*

36 ANDREW JACKSON,

Jackson's achievements the most generous recognition
both on the spot and in his reports. April 21, 1814
the West Tennessee militia were dismissed, and the;
marched home.

The Creek campaign lasted only seven months. In
itself considered, it was by no means an important In-
dian war, but in its connection with other military
movements it was very important Tecumseh had been
killed at the battle of the Thames in Canada, October
5, 1813. His scheme of a race war died with him.
The Creek campaign put an end to any danger of hos-
tilities from the southwestern Indians, in alliance either
with other Indians or with the English. It was hence-
forth possible to plan military operations and pass
through the Indian territory without regard to the dis-
position of the Indians. This state of things had been
brought about very summarily, while military events
elsewhere had been discouraging.

This campaign, therefore, was the beginning of Jack-
son's fame and popularity, and from it dates his career,
He was forty-seven years old. On the 31st of May he
was appointed a major-general in the army of the United
States, and was given command of the department of
the South. He established his headquarters at Mobile
in August, 1814. That town had been occupied by
Wilkinson, April 13, 1813. There were fears of an at-
tack either on Mobile or New Orleans. English forces
appeared, and took post at Pensacola. Jackson natu
rally desired to attack the enemy where he found him
The relations of the parties must be borne in mind.
Spain was a neutral and owned Florida, but the boun-
daries of Florida were in dispute between Spain ami the
1 Seepage 20

CAPTURE OF PENSACOLA. 87

United States. Jackson would not have been a South*
western man if he had not felt strongly about that
dispute. We have seen 1 that one of Jackson's first
thoughts when war with England broke out, was that
Florida might be conquered. Now Spain allowed Eng-
land to use Florida as a base of operations. Jackson
wrote to Washington for leave to attack Pensacola. It
did not suit his temper to sit still under a great anxiety
as to which spot on a long coast might be chosen by the
enemy as the point of attack. The Secretary of War
(Armstrong) replied to Jackson's application that it
was necessary, before invading Spanish territory, to
know certainly whether Spain voluntarily yielded the
use of her territory to England. This letter did not
reach Jackson until the war was over. All Jackson's
letters of this period to the state and federal authori-
ties have a tone of lecturing which gives deep insight
into the character of the man. He meant no disre-
spect, but the case seemed so clear to him that he set
it forth with an unconscious directness of language.

Jackson had but a very small force at Mobile, very
inadequately provided with any of the necessaries of war.
The government at Washington was falling to pieces.
On the 24th of August the English captured Washing-
ton and burned the public buildings. Jackson could not
>btain either assistance or orders. September 14th the
English attacked Fort Bowyer, on Mobile Point, and
were repulsed with energy and good fortune. They
retired to Pensacola. Jackso^ advanced against Pen-
sacola without orders from Washington, and reached
that place November 6th, with $,000 men. He easily
formed the town. The Spaniards surrendered the forta
* Seepage 30.

B8 ANDREW JACKSON.

1 the town. The English blew up the fort at Bar*
rancas and departed. 1 Jackson immediately returned
to Mobile, fearing a new attack there. This energetic ac-
tion against Pensacola, which a timid commander would
have hesitated to take, although the propriety of it could
not be seriously questioned, was the second great step
in the war in the South west.\ If the Creeks had not
been subdued, Mobile could not have been defended.
If Pensacola had not been captured, New Orleans could
not have been defended three months later. Jackson
had extraordinary luck. All the accidents fell out in his
favor, and all contributed to his final success.

On the 2d of December, 1814, Jackson reached New
Orleans, where he expected the next blow to fall. Noth-
ing had been done there to prepare for defence, and no
supplies were there, — not even arms. Edward Liv-
ingston and a Frenchman named Louaillier were alone
active in preparing even the minds of the people for
defence. Jackson declared martial law as a means of
impressing soldiers and sailors, and began preparations
for defending the city, in spite of discouragements and
the lack of all proper means. He seemed to be pos-
sessed by a kind of frenzy or fanaticism at the idea
of any one " invading " American territory. As soon
as he heard of the landing effected by the English
titer they had destroyed the flotilla on the lakes, he set
out to meet them with such forces as he had. He ar
rested their advance as far from the city as possible,
pushed on his preparations with redoubled energy and
activity, and was indefatigable in devising and combin-
ing means of defence. "The energy manifested by
General Jackson spread, as it were, by contagion, an*
1 7 Nile* 271. • Latour, 44 fg.

BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS. 39

communicated itself to the whole army. I shall add,
that there was nothing which those who composed it did
not feel themselves capable of performing, if he ordered
it to be done. It was enough that he expressed a wish,
or threw out the slightest intimation, and immediately
a crowd of volunteers offered themselves to cany his
views into execution." l He made the utmost of all the
means he possessed and devised substitutes for what he
lacked. Thus, with every day that passed, his position
became stronger. The enemy were veteran troops,
amply provided with all the best appliances of war, but,
as it appears, not well commanded. An energetic ad-
vance on their part, at the first moment, would have won
the city. It was, however, Jackson who made the en-
ergetic advance at the first moment, and he never let
them get any farther. The story of the battle which '
took place is a strange one. Everything fell out favor-
ably for Jackson as if by magic. The English lost their
way, fired into each other, adopted foolish rumors, dis-
obeyed orders, neglected precautions. The two parties
built redoubts out of the same mud, and cannonaded
each other all day through a dense smoke. At night the
American works were hardly damaged, while the Eng-
lish works were battered to pieces and the cannon dis-
mounted. On the 8th of January, 1815, the English
made their grand assault on Jackson's works. Latour
Bays that they were over-confident, and that they disre-
garded the obstacles. They were repulsed with great
slaughter. Their loss in general and field officers was
•specially remarkable. Only on the west bank of the
river did the English gain some advantage. General
Jackson said then — and he always afterwards refused
1 Latour, Preface, p. 17.

40 ANDREW JACKSON.

to withdraw the assertion, in spite of the remonstrance*
of General Adair, and in spite of a long controversy—
that the Kentucky troops on the west side " ingloriously
fled." l This is worth noticing only because it shows
that Jackson would not recede from what he thought
true, either to soothe wounded pride or to win popular-
ity. If the English had had a little larger force on the
west side, they would have won that position, and would
have more than counterbalanced all Jackson's success
on the east bank, for the batteries on the west bank
could easily have been made to command Jackson's
camp and works. The English withdrew after their
repulse. Their loss, January 8th, was over 2,000 killed,
wounded, and missing ; Jackson's was seven killed and
six wounded. 2 The treaty of peace had been signed at
Ghent December 24, 1814, two weeks before the battle
took place. Before the English attempted any further
operations in Louisiana, the news of the peace was re-
ceived. They captured Fort Bowyer in a second attack,
February 12, 1815.

A brilliant victory was the last thing any one in the
United States had expected to hear of from New Or-
leans. The expectations under which the war had been
undertaken had all been disappointed. Canada had not
been conquered. The United States had ranged itself
with the defeated, and not with the successful party in
Europe. The war had been more than nominal, but
on land it had been anything but glorious. Only on the
sea did the few frigates which the federalists had built,
while they controlled the federal government, vindicate

1 7 Niles, 373. Latour, App. 52. Latour makes an apologi
•r the Kentnckiaiis, p. 174.
* Latour, App. 55, 148.

THE WAS AND THE WAR PARTY. 41

die national honor by brilliant successes. Jefferson's
a priori navy of gunboats had disappeared and been for-
gotten. The war party had looked upon Gallatin as
their financier. He had told them in 1809 that war
could be carried on without taxes, but they had squan-
dered, against his remonstrances, resources on which
he relied when he so declared, and they had refused to
re-charter the bank as he desired. When the war broke
out he went out to Russia as one of the peace commis-
sioners. There was no one competent to succeed him,
and the democrats never forgave him for the embar-
rassments which they suffered in trying to manage the
finances. 1 He did not resign his secretaryship, bu*
was superseded February 9, 1814. Good democrats
thought that sending him abroad was a repetition of
the course they had blamed in Jay's case. 9 It certainly
was a very strange policy to leave the treasury without
a regular head in war-time. The banks suspended, the
currency fell into confusion, heavy taxation became nec-
essary, and the public finances were brought to the verge
of bankruptcy. The party which had made such an
outcry about direct taxes, national bank, and eight per
cent loans imitated Hamilton's system of direct taxes
and excise throughout. They were discussing a big
paper-money bank on the day (February 13th) when
news of the Treaty of Ghent reached Washington, and
they would have adopted it if the war had continued.
They sold six per cent bonds for eighty and eighty-five
i- a currency of bank rags depreciated twenty or twenty-
five per cent. A grand conscription bill was also ir
Qreparction, and the Hartford convention hail just ad

1 See Ingersoll, 74.

* Carey's Olive Branch 63.

42 ANDREW JACKSON.

journed, having done much or little according as. peace
or war might make it expedient to put one sense or
another on ambiguous phrases. When Napoleon fell,
and England was left free to devote her attention to
this country as her only remaining foe, the war took on
a new aspect June 13, 1814, Gallatin wrote home that
\ large force was fitting out in England against Amer>
ica. Admiral Cochrane wrote to Monroe that he had
orders to devastate the coasts of the United States.
The first conditions of peace talked of by England in-
volved cession of territory in Michigan and the Ohio
territory, as well as concessions of trading privileges
and navigation of the Mississippi, — terms which could
not be accepted until after a great deal more hard
fighting. The feeling here in the autumn of 1814 was
one of deep despondency and gloom. 1 The victory of
New Orleans was the cause of boundless delight, espec-
ially because the news of it reached the North at just
about the same time as the news of peace, and there
was no anxiety about the future to mar the exultation.
The victory was a great consolation to the national
pride, which had been sorely wounded by military fail-
ures, and by the capture of Washington. The power
of Great Britain had been met and repulsed when put
forth at its best, and when the American resources
were scanty and poor. To the administration and the
war party the victory was political salvation, The pub-
lic plainly saw, however, that the federal administration
had done nothing for the victory. Jackson had been

1 See Nilea's Register, vol. 7 ; Pres. Message, 1 814 ; 1 Goodrich
Letter xxx. ; Carey's Olive Branch, preface 4th and 6th ed. In
gersoll find) room for the opinion that the prospects for 1815 wen
fcriftht.

BEBULT3 OF THE WAR. 48

the soul of the defence from the beginning, and to hit
energy and perseverance success was due. He therefore
got all the credit of it, and the administration was only
too glad to join in the plaudits, since attention was
thereby diverted from its blunders and failure. These
facte explain Jackson's popularity. In the space of
time between September, 1813, and January, 1815, he
had passed from the status of an obscure Tennessee
planter to that of the most distinguished and popular
man in the country. -

In the treaty of peace nothing was said about im-
pressment, the "principle" of which was what the
United States had been striving about ever since 1806,
and which was the only cause of the war. The war
was therefore entirely fruitless as to the causes which
were alleged for it at the outset Nevertheless, the
second war with England was a great and beneficial
event in our history. What the course of things might
have been, if a wiser statesmanship had adopted Monroe
and Pinkney's treaty, and pursued a steady course of
peace and industrial growth, so far as the state of the
world would allow, is a matter of speculation ; but, in
the course which things did take, there are especial and
valuable features of our history which are to be traced
to the second war with England as their originA The
discontent of New England faded away at once, and
there was a stronger feeling of nationality and confi-
dence throughout the country than there ever had been
before. 1 From that time on the Union had less of the
character of a temporary experiment The country had
also won respect abroad, and w»s r3cognized in the
family of nations as it had not ueen Def ore. From 1789

1 Gallatin expressed this opinion. I Gallatin's Writings. 700.

14 ANDREW JACKSON.

to 1815 the European nations were absorbed by Euro*
pean politics and war. At the end of this period they
turned to find that a new nation had begun to grow up
on the Western continent. The Americans had shown
that they could build ships of war, and sail them, and
fight them, on an equal footing. To the military states
of Europe this was a fact which inspired respect.

To return to our more immediate subject : There had
been another dispute about terms of enlistment at Fort
Jackson in September, 1814. About 200 men, some of
whom broke open a store-house to get supplies, marched
home without the consent of their commanding officer.
Most of them came back : some being compelled, others
thinking better of it, and others after assuaging their
homesickness. Six were put under arrest and tried by
court-martial. They were condemned to death, and,
by Jackson's orders, were executed at Mobile, February
21, 1815. 1 The question of law involved was a difficult
one. The men took the risk of acting on their own
view of that question, while they were under military
law. Jackson's reason for his course was to enforce
discipline. There had never been such discipline in an
American army, 2 least of all in the West ; but that was
just his contention. He said that there must be disci-
pline, and that this was the only way to establish it.
Some of the cases were very sad, and a less penalty
would probably have accomplished all the purpose.

After the English departed from New Orleans Jack-
son relaxed none of his vigilance, but continued to
itrcngthen his force by all the means at his command,

1 The documents are given in 34 Niles, 55.
* Jackson's apologists made much of an alleged parallel caw
mndei Washington.

MARTIAL LAW AT NEW ORLEANS. 45

In this he acted like a good and wise commander, who
iid not mean to he caught He could not assume that
the enemy would not make another attack, and he knew
nothing yet of the peace. He maintained the attitude
of alert preparation until he was sure that the war was
at an end. He maintained martial law in the city, and
a* administered it with rigor. The possession of abso-
lute and arbitrary power did not have a good effect on
him. The exhilaration and self-confidence of success
and flattery affected his acts. It appears that he did not
thoroughly respect all the inhabitants of the city. They
were a motley crowd, and he thought that some of them
were not ready to do what he thought they ought to do
to defend the city. 1 Any one who would not go to the
last extreme for that object could count on Jackson's
contempt. He meant to hold the city in such shape that
he could make every man in it contribute to its defence,
if the occasion should arise. Frenchmen had certain
privileges for twelve years, under the treaty of 1803.
They had generally cooperated in the defence, but, after
the English departed, they sought certificates of nation-
.%lity in order to secure the privileges and exemptions to
which they were entitled. To Jackson this seemed like
shirking a share of the common burdens. Livingston,
who had been on an embassy to the English fleet,
brought back news on the 18th of February 8 of the
peace. Jackson would not alter his attitude or proceed
ings on account of this intelligence, which came through

1 See his defence in reply tc Hall's writ, 8 Niles, 246.

8 Latour says on the 10th. This date is important for the
fnestion whether Jackson anew, at least unofficially, before he
illowed the six militiamen to be executed, that peace had bee*
made.

£6 ANDRE W J A CKSON.

the enemy. On February 28th he ordered all who had
certificates of French nationality to go to Baton Rouge
before March 3d, on the ground that he would have no
man in the city who was not bound to help defend it
March 8th he suspended this order, except as to the
French consul. March 3d the same Louaillier who
had been conspicuous as an advocate of energetic de-
fence, wrote an article for a local paper, criticising the
order of February 28th, and urging that martial law
should be abolished. The editor, when called to ac-
count for this article, gave up his contributor. Louail-
lier was arrested March 5th. Judge Hall, of the United
States District Court, issued a writ of habeas corpus for
him. Jackson received news of the peace from Wash-
ington on March 6th, but by some blunder the courier
did not bring the document containing the official notifi-
cation. On that day Jackson convened a court-martial
to try Louaillier. He sent an officer to arrest Judge
Hall, and to obtain from the clerk of the court the orig-
inal writ of habeas corpus. On the 8th he disbanded
the militia. The court-martial struck out all the charges
against Louaillier except one (illegal and improper con-
tact), for want of jurisdiction, and acquitted him on
that. Jackson disapproved of this finding, and defended
his own proceedings. On the 11th of March he sent
Hall four miles out of the city and released him. Lou-
aillier was kept in prison until the official document an-
nouncing the peace was received. On the 22d of March
the United States District Court ordered Jackson to
show cause why an attachment should not issue against
aim for contempt of court in wresting an original doco
aent from the court, disobeying the writ of habeas cor
pus, and imprisoning the judge. Jackson refused U

JACKSON'S FINE. 47

answer save by a general vindication of his proceedings.
This the judge refused to hear, and fined him Sl^OOO. 1
In 1842 Tyler recommended Congress to refund this
fine without reflecting on the court J. Q. Adams said
in a speech, January 6, 1843, that this was auctioneering
for the presidency, all the factions desiring Jackson*!
support. 3 In 1844 Congress refunded the fine with
interest, — total $2,700. In a letter to L F. linn,
March 14, 1842,* Jackson refers to the fine as haying
been laid because he declared martial law.

In this incident Jackson displayed some of the faults
of which he afterwards showed many instances. He
spoiled his military success by this unnecessary collision
with the civil authority. He proved himself wrong-
headed and persistent in a course in which every step
would have warned him of his error, if he had been
willing to learn. Being committed by his first passion-
ate and hasty step, he was determined to push through
on the course he had adopted. He knew to a mora
certainty from the 6th of March that the war was at an
end. All these mischievous proceedings took place on
and after that date. A very little concession and good
will at any time would have avoided the whole trouble,
but Jackson acted as if he was determined to grind out
of the opposing opinions all the friction of which they
were capable.

April 12th, Dallas, acting Secretary of War, wrote a

1 Report of a committee of the House of Representatives ; 64
Niles, 61 (1843). Cf. the account in 8 Niles, 246, and Judge
Hall's response, Ibid. 272(1815).

* 63 Niles, 312.

* 69 Niles, 212. For Jackson's own story of the fine, see €9
flues, 326.

48 ANDREW JACKSON.

dispatch to Jackson, expressing the President's "sur-
prise and solicitude," and asking for explanations of the
proceedings of which reports had reached Washington ;
but as the matter was all past and dead, and no one
desired to mar the exultation of the public or the per-
lonal satisfaction of Jackson, it was allowed to drop.

In the autumn of 1815 Jackson was in Washington ;
conferring with the War Department about the peace
footing of the army. In the spring of 1816 he was at
New Orleans on business of his military department.

/

CHAPTER m.

JACKSON IN JTORIDA.

Andrew Jackson took no important part in the <
Son of 1816. He had favored Monroe in 1808, and hi
preferred him to the other candidates in 1816. Craw-
ford was, at this time, Jackson's pet dislike. The
reason for this was that Crawford, as Secretary of War,
had modified Jackson's treaty with the Creeks, about
which the Cherokees, deeming the terms unjust to them,
had appealed to the President Jackson resumed the
negotiation, and bought again the lands ceded before.
As the people of Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama were
interested in the cession, Jackson, by re-obtaining it
after it had been given back, greatly increased his pop-
ularity. 1

In October, 1816, a letter, signed by Jackson, was ad*
dressed to Monroe, in anticipation of his election to the
presidency, urging the appointment of Wm. Drayton,
of South Carolina, as Secretary of War. Wm. B. Lewis,
Jackson's neighbor and confidential friend, husband of
one of Mrs. Jackson's nieces, wrote this letter. As Par-
ton says, one has no trouble in distinguishing those let-
ters signed Jackson which have been copied and revised
by Lewis, Lee, Livingston, and others, from those which
have not been through that process. 2 It is difficult to

1 11 Niles, 145.

9 A specimen of an unpolished Jackson letter may be mm la
the extract on page 384
4

50 AJfESEW JACKSON.

lee the significance of this letter and others which Jack-
ion wrote during this winter (1816-17), unless he was
being used to advance an intrigue on behalf of Drayton.
Drayton had been a federalist. He belonged to the
South Carolina aristocracy. No ties of any kind are
known to have existed between him and Jackson, either
before or after this time. Jackson said (in 1824) that
he did not know Drayton in 1816. 1 Drayton was not
appointed. These well-composed letters failed entirely
of their immediate object ; and they reposed in obscu-
rity for seven years. Lewis was an astonishingly far-
sighted man. We shall see abundant proofs, hereafter,
of his power to put down a stake where he foresaw that
it would be needed a little later, but it does not seem
credible that he can have foreseen and prepared for the
ultimate purpose which these letters served. In the
course of his argument on behalf of Drayton, Jackson
was led (in the letters) to discuss the general theory of
appointments, and to urge Monroe to abandon the pro-
scription of the federalists, to appoint them to office,
and to promote reconciliation and good will. In the
same letter he declared that he would have hung the
leaders of the Hartford convention, if he had been in
command in the eastern department in 1815. In 1823
and 1824 the letters were used with great effect to draw
federalists to the support of Jackson. They were de-
lighted with the tone and sentiment of them, 2 although
a few winced at the reference to the Hartford conven
don. In 1828 the other aspect of the letters rather
predominated. The democrats were not quite pleased
that Jackson should have urged Monroe to appoint fed
walists and disregard party.*

1 26 NHcs, 162. * Binns, 249.

• The whole correspondence, 26 Niles. 163 fg. See commend

INSUBORDINATION. 51

Monroe was being acted upon, when Jackson wrote U
him, from the other side, by those who wanted him to
favor the Monroe faction in the republican party. He
had enough to do to maintain himself between the two
demands. He answered Jackson, admitting the high
principle of the course Jackson advocated, but setthig
forth a theory of appointments more conformable to the
exigencies of party politics.

April 22, 1817, Jackson published an order to hit
department forbidding his subordinates to obey any or-
der from the War Department not issued through him.
He had been much and justly annoyed at incidents in
the service under him, of which he had not been in-
formed beforehand, and also by direct orders issued from
Washington, which interfered with his arrangements and
frustrated them without his knowledge. On the merits
of the question he was in the right, but his public " or-
der " produced an unnecessary scandal and public col-
lision in a case where a proper private representation to
the department would have answered every purpose.
Crawford was transferred to the treasury in October,

1816. There was difficulty in filling the position of
Secretary of War. Calhoun was appointed October 8,

1817. He conceded the point claimed by Jackson, re-
serving only the cases of emergency.

Some persons informed Jackson that General Scott
had animadverted upon his action in the matter just
mentioned, and had characterized if as mutiny. Sep-
tember 8, 1817, Jackson vrote a fiery letter to Scott,
falling him to account. Scott replied that, in private
tonversation, he had said that the order of April 22d

tnoted, Ibid. p. 219. For tta disapproval of the democrats, eec
Binnft, 246.

52 ANDREW JACKSON.

was mutinous as to the future, and a reflection on the
President, the Commander-in-Chief, as to the past. He
disclaimed any personal feeling. Jackson replied in a
very insulting letter, in which the well-battered question,
Who of us two is the gentleman ? did good service
again, and wound up with a challenge to a duel. Scott
declined the ob«tllenge on the ground of religious scru-
ples and patriotic duty. The correspondence was almost
immediately published. It created another scandal, for
the public was not edified to see two of the first officers
of the army engaged in such a quarrel. 1 Niles, who
at this time greatly admired Jackson, and who is al-
ways a good representative of the average citizens of
his time, refrained from publishing the correspondence
until April, 1819. 2 In this case, again, Jackson showed
evidence of an ungovernable temper and a willingness
to profit by every opportunity for a quarrel.

There was, however, more public fighting at hand.

There were in Florida many refugee Indians of the
Creek nation, who were hostile to the United States, and
many runaway negroes. I>iring the war the English
had sought such aid as they could get from these per-
sons in their operations against the United States. They
had built a fort on the Appalachicola River, about fif-
teen miles from its mouth, and had collected there an
immense amount of arms and ammunition. The Eng-
lish officers who were operating in Florida acted with a
great deal of arbitrary self-will. They were not under
gtrict responsibility to their own government They
were operating on Spanish territory. They were stirring
ip Indians and negroes, and were not commaDding I

* 14 Niles, 295; 4 Adams, 323.

* 16 Niles, 121.

THE NEGRO FOBV. 58

regular or civilized force. It is difficult to understand
some of their proceedings in any point of view, and
other of their doings certainly would not have been
sanctioned by the English government, if known. The
officers were able to gratify their own malice without
responsibility.

When the war ended, the English left the arms and
ammunition in the fort. The negroes seized the fort,
and it became known as the " Negro Fort" The au-
thorities of the United States sent General Gaines to the
Florida frontier with troops, to establish peace on the
border. The Negro Fort was a source of anxiety both
to the military authorities and to the slave-owners of
Georgia, and, according to some accounts, the first step
was its investment. It is otherwise stated that the
American authorities undertook to bring supplies up the
Appalachicola for a fort which they were building in
Georgia, and that the boats were fired on, after which
the troops marched down from Georgia and invested the
fort, having received permission to do so from the
Spanish authorities at Pensacola, who also very unwill-
ingly saw a great fortress established in their territory,
and held by negroes and Indians. 1 The fort was bom-
barded. A hot shot penetrated one of the magazines,
and the whole fort was blown to pieces, July 27, 1816.
There were three hundred negro men, women, and chil-
dren and twenty Choctaws in the fort ; two hundred and
leventy were killed. Only three came out unhurt,* and
these were killed by the allied Indians.

Spain was engaged in hostilities with her revolted colo-
nies in America. Filibusters and privateers took advan-
tage of this state of things to carrv on a certain grade ol
l Document A, 55. * Document A, 69.

64 ANDREW JACKSON.

piracy and the slave-trade. Amelia Island, on the north-
east coast of Florida, had been infested by smugglers,
slavers, and freebooters ever since the war with England.
In 1817 the island was occupied by a filibuster named
McGregor, and later by another named Aury. They
pretended to desire to render Florida independent, and
there was a measure of honest intention in their plane,
but the island was a nest of outlaws and a nuisance.
The troops of the United States took possession of the
island and drove the freebooters out, because Spain was
not able to do so. Old causes of annoyance have been
described above. 1 The hostile Indians and the free-
booters were new causes of annoyance. The Georgians
were also annoyed that their slaves found an easy ref-
uge in Florida. It had been amply proven that Spain
could not fulfil the duties which devolved upon her as
owner of Florida. Yet she strenuously insisted that
her sovereignty should be respected. 2 For all these
reasons the United States was very anxious to buy
Florida.

During 1817 there were frequent collisions on the
frontiers between Whites and Indians. Ex-Governor
Mitchell of Georgia, the Indian agent, the fairest and
best informed witness who appeared before the com-
nittee of Congress in 1818-19, deposed that the blame
or these collisions was equal, that one party was as
often the aggressor as the other, and that the lawless
persons in Florida were especially to blame for acts of
injury which provoked retaliation. 8 When Gaines wrote
to the chief Kenhigee that his Indians had killed Whites,
the chief replied that four Indians had been killed foi

1 See page 20. * Document A, 65.

• 16 Nile*. 85.

ATTACK ON FOWLTOWN. 55

pvery White. 1 The reports which were sent North were,
as usual in such cases, only such as tended to show an
aggressive disposition on the part of the Indians.*

On the 20th of November, General Gaines sent a
force of two hundred and fifty men to Fowltown, the
headquarters of the chief of the " Redsticks," or hos-
tile Creeks. They approached the town in the early
morning, and were fired on. An engagement followed.
The town was taken and burned. Gaines's dispatch to
the Governor of Georgia puts the number of Indians
killed at four. 8 Ex-Governor Mitchell of Georgia,
quoted above, said, "This fact was, I conceive, the
cause of the Seminole war." It is, however, fair to say
that Mitchell was unfriendly to Gaines and to Jackson. 4
The Indians of that section, after this, began general
hostilities, attacked the boats which were ascending the
Appalachicola, and massacred the persons in them.
Gaines states no reason at all for sending a force against
Fowltown, except that he had invited the chief to visit
him, in order to find out " whether his hostile temper
had abated." The chief refused to come. The friendly
Indians said that the Fowltown Indians had been hos-
tile ever since the last war. Therefore Gaines sent a
force equal to the number of Indians in the town " to
bring the chief and warriors, and, in the event of re-
sistance, to treat them as enemies." When the Indians
law this force approaching they fired on it, stood fire
once, and then ran away. Their property was then all
destroyed, and the United State? had an Indian war 01
Its hands.

1 Document A, 140.

3 See the items of newp %>m Florida in 13 Nile*

• 13 Niks, 296 . * 4J Nifct, 80.

56 ANDREW JACKSON.

In December, on receipt of intelligence of the battl*
Kt Fowltown and the attack on the boats, Jackson was
ordered to take command in Georgia. He wrote to
President Monroe : " Let it be signified to me through
any channel (say Mr. J. Rhea) that the possession of
the Floridas would be desirable to the United States,
and in sixty days it will be accomplished." Much was
afterwards made to depend on this letter. Monroe waft
ill when it reached Washington, and he did not see 01
read it until a year afterward?, when some reference
was made to it Jackson construed the orders which
he received from Calhoun with reference to this letter.
He also afterwards affirmed 'that Rhea wrote to him
L hs,t the President approved of his suggestions, 1 but he
could not produce that letter. He had burned it. He
certainly supposed, however, that he had the secret con-
currence of the administration in conquering Florida.

When the orders to take command reached Jackson,
the Governor of Tennessee was absent from Nashville.
Jackson proceeded to raise troops in Tennessee on his
own responsibility ; he being authorized to call on the
Governors of the States which were neighbors to the
scene of war. He pushed on his preparations with great
energy and celerity. His acts were approved both by
the state and federal authorities. He advanced through
Georgia with great haste, and was on the Florida froiK
tier in March, 1818. He ordered part of his provisions
lent to Fort Scott by the Appalachicola, on which the
Spaniards had no fort, and he sent word to the Spanish
commander at Pensacola that if the fort at Barranca*
Hindered his supply boats from ascending the Fscambi?
18 should consider it an act of hostility to the United
* 8 Adams, 404.

NOTIONS ABOUT SPANIARD*. 57

States. These were, to say the least, very aggressive
proceedings against a nation with which we were at
peaco, for a man who had been thrown into paroxysms
of rage and energy at the idea of a redcoat resting on
the soil of Louisiana during a public war. Jackson im-
mediately advanced to St Mark's, which place he cap*
tared. On his way down the Appalachicola he found
the Indians and negroes at work in the fields, and un-
conscious of any impending attack. Some of them tied
to St. Mark's. His theory, in which he supposed that
he was supported by the administration, was that he was
to pursue the Indians until he caught them, wherever
they might go ; that he was to respect Spanish rights as
far as he could consistently with that purpose ; and that
the excuse for his proceedings was that Spain could not
police her own territory, or restrain the Indians. Jack-
son's proceedings were based on two positive but arbi-
trary assumptions : (1) That the Indians got aid and
encouragement from St. Mark's and Fensacola. (This
the Spaniards always denied, but perhaps a third as-
sumption of Jackson might be mentioned : that the word
of a Spanish official was of no value.) (2) That Great
Britain kept paid emissaries employed in Florida to stir
up trouble for the United States. This latter assump-
tion was a matter of profound belief generally in the
United States. Niles's reports and criticisms of events
in Florida all proceed from that assumption. 1 The
English government disavowed every act of Colonel
Nichols with the Indians which took definite shape and
♦ould be dealt with at all. The Indians whom he took
fc> England were kindly treated, but were not encouraged
*> look to England for any assistance or countena»><4,
1 U Niles ; all the articles on Florida.

68 ANDREW JACKSON.

not easy to break off the connections which had
been established, and destroy the hopes which had been
raised, during the war, but there is not the slightest
evidence that the English government did not act in
good faith, or that it was busy in such contemptible
business as employing emissaries to stir up some 2,000
savages to wage a frontier war on the United States.
Jackson's assumption, however, had serious import for
two unfortunate individuals.

A Scotchman, Alexander Arbuthnot, was found by
Jackson in St. Mark's. When the fort was taken Ar-
buthnot mounted his horse to ride away, but he was
seized, and put in confinement He was an Indian
trader, who had been in Florida for many years. He
had established as intimate and friendly relations as
possible with the Indians for his own security and ad-
vantage in trade. He had also sympathized with the
Indians, and had exerted himself in their behalf in many
quarters.

Several American vessels of war lay in the bay of St
Mark's to cooperate with the land forces. By display-
ing English colors on these ships, two Indian chiefs,
Hillis Hajo (or Francis) and Himollemico, were enticed
on board and made prisoners. They were hung by
Jackson's order. They had tortured and massacred
prisoners after the Indian fashion, but no one has ever
explained by what law or usage known in the service of
the United States they were put to death, when thus
raptured by stratagem, and not even on the field of bat-
tle.

Jackson pushed on with the least possible delay to the
Scwanee River, where were the headquarters of Boleck
(Billy Bowlegs), the Seminole chief. Arbuthnot hao

ARBUTHNOT AND AMBRISTEa. 69

s trading-post there. When he had heard of Jackson's
Advance, he had written to nis son, who was his agent
At Boleck's village, to cany the goods across the river.
Through this letter the Indians got warning in time to
cross the river and take to the swamps. Their escape
enraged Jackson. He had already regarded Arbuthnot
as one of the British emissaries. He now considered
Arbuthnot's letter an overt act of interference in the
war. The town was burned by Jackson. In its neigh-
borhood he captured an Englishman named Robert Am-
brister, an ex-lieutenant in the British marines, and
nephew of the Governor of New Providence. This man
was taken prisoner to St. Mark's, the troops being on
their way homewards, and the war being over. A
court-martial was convened at St. Marks. Arbuthnot
was tried for (1) inciting the Creek Indians to war
against the United States ; (2) being a spy and aiding
the enemy; (3) inciting the Indians to murder two
white men named. The court found him guilty of the
first charge and of the second except of being a spy, and
condemned him to be bun g. There was no evidence at
all against him on any charge. 1 Hie business in Florida
was open and obvious. He had always advised the In-
dians to peace and submission. His letter to his son
was not open to censure. Can traders be executed if
their information, not transmitted through the lines,
frustrates military purposes ? As Arbuthnot construed
the Treaty of Ghent* the Indians were to have their
lands restored, and he told them so. There was so
much room for this construction that diplomatic meas

1 Report of the trial in fnli, '.5 Nile*. 270. All the document!
•uont the Negro Fort and the nvasioji of Florida are in Docn
nent A.

60 ANDREW JACKSON,

ores were necessary to set it aside. Peace had bees
made with the Greeks before the Treaty of Ghent wa»
made.

Ambrister was tried for inciting the Indians and
levying war. His case was different. He had no osten-
sible business in Florida. He was an adventurer, and it
is not clear what he hoped or intended. He threw him-
self on the mercy of the court. He was condemned to be
•hot. This sentence was reconsidered, and he was then
condemned to fifty lashes and a year of hard labor.
Jackson disapproved of the reconsideration, revived the
first sentence, and ordered both men to be executed,
April 29, 1818, he left St. Mark's, having detached a
force to hold that place and to execute the sentence.
The same day both men were executed. Arbuthnot
was seventy years old ; Ambrister was thirty-three.

It was as a mere incident of his homeward march
that Jackson turned aside and captured Pensacola, May
24, 1818, because he was told that some Indians had
taken refuge there. He deposed the Spanish govern-
ment, set up a new one, and established a garrison. He
then continued his march homewards. On his way he
heard of an attack by Georgia militia on the villages of
friendly and allied Indians, and he became engaged in a
fiery correspondence with Governor Rabun of Georgia
about that affair. He was in the right, but it was an-
other case in which by violence he provoked anger and
discord, when he might have accomplished much more
by a temperate remonstrance.

In the whole Florida matter we see Jackson proceed*
ing to summary measures on inadequate facts and in
formation. He " knew " how the matter stood by tht
current prejudices and assumptions, not by evidence ant

THE 8SMIN0LE CAMPAIGN. 61

information. This was the tone of hit mind. Notions
and prepossessions which once effected a lodgment in hi*
mind, because circumstances gave them a certain plausi-
bility, or because they fell in with some general preju-
dice or personal bias of his, immediately gained for him
the character of obvious facts or self-evident truths. Ha
then pursued such notions and prepossessions to their
last consequences, and woe to any one who stood in the
way.

General Jackson had, in five months, broken the In-
dian power, established peace on the border, and sub-
stantially conquered Florida. This ^ve months and the
eighteen months service in 1813-15 is ail the actual
service he ever saw. The Seminole war was in its re-
lations and effects one of the most important events in
our history, but in itself it was one of the most insignifi-
cant of our Indian campaigns. Jackson had an over-
whelming force. The report of the Senate committee of
1819 puts his force at 1,800 whites and 1,500 friendly
Indians. The hostile Indians were never put by any-
body at a higher number than 2,000. This committee
put them at 1,000 9 not over half of whom, at any one
lame, were in front of Jackson. The allied Indians did
tH the fighting. They lost twenty men in the campaign.
Not one white man was killed. The number of hostile
Indians killed is put at sixty. 1

The trouble with Jackson's achievements was that he
had done too much. The statesmen and diplomatists
could not keep up with him. and the tasks he threw on
them were harder than those h* performed in the field.
The administration was not aware that it had authorized
ton to violate neutral territory. Federal administrations
* Perkins. 113.

/

82 ANDREW JACKSON.

in those days were always timid. They did not know th*
limits of their power, or what they dared do. Monroe
was especially timid. His administration wanted to buy
Florida, not conquer it. They did not thank Jackson
for plunging them into such a difficulty with Congress
and with England and Spain all at once. The two In*
dian captives who had been hung had no friends, but
their execution was an awkward thing to justify be-
fore the civilized world. The execution of the two
Englishmen was likely to provoke a great deal of diplo-
matic trouble. Jackson had been perfectly sure about
the law. He laid it down in the order for the execu-
tion. " It is an established principle of the law of
nations that any individual of a nation making war
against the citizens of any other nation, they being at
peace, forfeits his allegiance, and becomes an outlaw and
a pirate." If the facts are admitted, such a person un-
doubtedly forfeits his allegiance, and cannot demand the
protection of his sovereign, whatever may happen to
him. On this ground the English government took no
steps in relation to the execution of Arbuthnot and Am*
brister, beyond an inquiry into the facts of their alleged
complicity in the war, 1 and that inquiry was not pushed
as we may hope that the government of the United
States will push the inquiry, if an American citizen is
•ver executed as Arbuthnot was. The doctrine of Jack-
I on's order, that a person who engages in a war to which
Lis country is not a party becomes an outlaw and pirate
will not stand. As has been well said, there were a large
lumber of foreigners in the American army during the
Revolution, who, on this doctrine, would, if captured bj

1 l Rush, 473. "War might have been produced on tUiot
taiion ' if the ministry had but held up a finger/ " (488.)

JACKSON d INTERNATIONAL LAW. 68

die English, have forfeited their lives. The United
States would have protected any such persons by r*talisr
tion or otherwise. The Creeks were not a nation ra in-
ternational law, they were not the possessor* of tlie soil
on which they Iked and fought ; there had never been
a declaration of war ; yet they were not rebels against
the United States, and it could not be denied that they
had some belligerent rights. Whatever rights they had,
the Englishmen, even if they had been complete and un- \
questioned allies, must also have been entitled to from I
the American authorities. If, then, the Indians were not
to be hunted down like wild beasts, or executed by court-
martial, if captured, for levying war on the United
States, the Englishmen were executed without right or
law. There never was any proof that anybody incited
the Indians. The attack on Fowltown precipitated hos-
tilities in a situation where lawless men and savages, by
mutual annoyance, outrage, and retaliation, had prepared
the warlike temper. When the matter was investigated
this appeared, and it was seen that Jackson had acted
unjustifiably, because without evidence or law. The
popular feeling, however, would not allow him to be
censured. Niles, who well represents the popular tem-
per, believed in the emissary theory, and when that
theory broke down he became angry. 1 He also ex*
pressed the popular feeling with great exactness in this
paragraph : " The fact is that ninety-nine in a hundred
of the people believe that General Jackson acted on
every occasion for the good of his country, and success
universally crowned his efforts. He has suffered more
hardships and encountered higher responsibilities than
my man living in the United States to serve us, and lias
1 Fee \ub editorial, 16 Nile*. 25.

84 ANDREW JACKSON.

his reward in the sanction of his government and the
Approbation of the people." With this dictum the case
was dismissed, and the matter stood so that General
Jackson, having done important public service, could
not be called to account, although he had hung four
persons without warrant of law. His popularity had
already begun to exercise a dispensing power in hie
favor. A committee of the House of Representatives, 1
at the next session, reported a vote of censure ?m him
for the execution of the Englishmen, but the House,
after a long debate, refused to pass it

Jackson's proceedings came up in Monroe's cabinet
on the question what to do with him and his conquests.
Calhoun was vexed at Jackson's insubordination to the
War Department. He wanted Jackson censured. The
President and the whole cabinet, with the exception of
Adams, disapproved of Jackson's conduct in invading
Florida, and were ready to disavow his proceedings and
make reparation. On Adams would fall the labor of
vindicating Jackson's proceedings diplomatically, if the
administration should assume the responsibility for them.
He avowed himself ready to undertake the task, and to
perform it substantially on the grounds on which Jackson
justified himself. It was agreed that Pensacola and St.
Mark's should be restored to Spain, but that Jackson's
course should be approved and defended on the grounds
that he pursued his enemy to his refuge, and that Spain
could not do the duty which devolved on her. The
President, however, countermanded an order wliich
Jackson had given to Gaines to seize St. Augustine be-
cause some Indians had taken refuge there. All tht
members of the cabinet agreed to the policy decide!
1 15 Nile* 894.

BEMINOLE WAR IN CONQRE&B. 66

m, and all loyally adhered to it, the secret of their fint
opinion being preserved for ten yean. Calhoun wrote
so Jackson in accordance with the agreement, congratu-
lating and approving. Jackson inferred that Calhoun
had been his friend in the cabinet all the time, and that
his old enemy, Crawford, had been the head of the hot*
tile party. The political history of this country waa
permanently affected by the personal relations of Jack
son to Calhoun and Crawford on that matter. Monro*
had a long correspondence with Jackson to try to rec-
oncile him to the surrender of the forts to Spain. In
that correspondence Jackson did not mention the Rhea
letter.

At the next session of Congress (1818-19) the pro-
ceedings in Florida were made the subject of inquiry,
and were at once involved in the politics of the day.
Clay was in opposition to the administration because he
had not been made Secretary of State. He refused the
War Department and the mission to England. His
opposition was factious. After the administration as-
sumed the responsibility for Jackson's doings, Clay
opened the attack on them. Here began the feud be-
tween Clay and Jackson. The latter was in a doubly
irritable state of mind between the flatterers on one side
and the critics on the other. The personal element
came to the front. Any one who approved of his acts
was his friend ; any one who criticised was his enemy ;
whether any personal feeling was brought to the dis-
cussion of a question of law and fact or not. There art
tome facts which look as if Clay and Crawford had be-
gun to regard Jackson as a possible competitor for the
presidency. Crawford was in communication with the
tommittees on the Seminole war, apparently instigating
i

66 ANDREW JACKSON.

action, while Calhoun tried to quell the excitement and
avert action, out of loyalty to the decision adopted by
the administration of which he was a member. 1 The
Georgian friends of Crawford in Congress led the attack
on Jackson. 8 Crawford and Calhoun were enemies
A<lams was writing dispatches and preparing instrue*
fcions, by which, both with England and Spain, he suc-
ceeded in vindicating Jackson's proceedings. He and
Jackson were, at this time, friends, and one scheme was
to make Jackson Vice-President on a ticket with Adams.*
Adams's defence of Jackson was very plausible, and it
was fortified line by line with references to the docu-
mentary proofs, yet if it had been worth any one's while,
either in England or this country, to examine the al-
leged proofs, all the case against Arbuthnot would have
been found baseless. Adams quotes a certain letter as
proof that Arbuthnot was not truly a trader, but had
concealed purposes. The letter bears no testimony at
all to the fact alleged. 4 Rush cited to the English
minister another proof of this, which is equally frail, and
only proves that Arbuthnot had taken trouble to try to
serve the Indians out of pity for them. 6 His letter to his
son, besides warning him to save as much as possible of
their property, contained a message to Boleck not to

1 See Lacock's letter of June 25, 1832, in answer to Jackson •
Interrogatories. (43 Niles, 79.)

2 8 Adams, 240.

8 Adams said (in 1824) that the vice-presidency wonld be a
nice place for Jackson's old age. Jackson was four months older
khan Adams. This is not so ridiculous as it would be if Jacksov
had not pleaded old age and illness as a reason why he shouli
■ot go to the Senate in 1823. (See 6 Adams, 633.)

4 Document A, 20, cf. 147.

• 1 Rtuh, 52, cf. Document A, 115.

PURCHASE OF FLORIDA. 67

resist the Americans. 1 The Senate committee reported
February 24, 1819 (Lacock's Report), strongly against
Jackson on all the points from the independent recruit-
ing down to the taking of Pensacola. 8 No action was
taken. Jackson had been in Washington daring the
winter watching the proceedings. In February he made
an excursion as far north as New York. He was re-
ceived everywhere with enthusiasm. There was a story
that he was so angry at some of the proceedings in
censure of him that he went to the Senate chamber
to waylay some persons who had displeased him. He
yy denied this.

In 1819 the purchase of Florida was effected, al-
though the treaty was not ratified until February 22,
1821. In this treaty the western boundary of the
Louisiana purchase was for the first time defined.
Adams, while the negotiations were pending, called on
Jackson, and consulted him about the boundary to be
^contended for.* Jackson's interest then centred in
Florida, and he cared comparatively little for the wilder-
ness of Texas. He thought that the line of the Sabine
might well be accepted, if Florida could thereby be
secured. Monroe and his cabinet seem to have cared
just as little for Texas. Adams's diary shows that he
was not heartily supported in the efforts he was willing
to make to push the line westward. Jackson's opinion
about claiming Texas was of no value, but the fact that
he was consulted showed the amount of respect and con-
sideration which the administration was willing to pay
him In 1836, and again in 1843, Adams, citing his
jiary, declared that Jackson had been consulted, and
had approved the Florida treaty. Jackson contradicted
tuid denied it in a violent and insulting manner.

5 Document A ; 187. a 16 Niles, 83. /• 8 Adams, S3*-*

18 ANDREW JACKSON.

In the spring of 1821 Jackson was appointed Gov-
ernor of Florida, under the belief that the public would
be glad to see him so honored. On July 21st of the
tame year he published general orders, 1 taking leave of
his army, a reduction haying been made by which he
bad been thrown out. In these orders, or in a post-
script to them, he managed to come into collision with
his colleague and senior, Major-General Brown, then
chief in command of the army of the United States, by
taking up and criticising an order " signed Jacob
Brown," especially in regard to the punishment foi
desertion. Brown was a New York militia general,
some eight years younger than Jackson, who had dis-
tinguished himself, in the general ill-success of the war,
by some small successes on the northern frontier. He
seemed to be the coming military hero of the war until
he was eclipsed by Jackson. He took precedence of
Jackson by seniority of appointment, and so became
chief in command. It had become evident now that
Jackson needed much room in the world for all his
jealousies and animosities, and that his fellow-men must
put up with a great deal of arrogance and misbehavior
on his part His popularity shielded him. He had
become a privileged person, like a great nobleman of
the last century. To offend him was to incur extraor-
dinary penalties.* To get in his way was to expose
one's self to assaults which could not be resented as
they would be if they came from another man. All
this he had won by military success. One is led, then,
to inquire, what was the measure of this military ser-
vice ? It was but a little over two years of Indian
fighting, with only one battle against a civilized foe
x 1 SI Nile*, 5a.

GOVERNOR OF FLORIDA. 69

At least it seemed fair to expect that he would observe
military discipline and decorum. Bat he did not do toy
and no one dared call him to account.

/ Congress did not have time to legislate for the terri-
tory of Florida, after the treaty was ratified, before the
end of the session. An act was passed extending to the
new territory only the revenue laws and the law against
the slave-trade. Jackson was appointed Governor in
April, with all the powers of the Captain-General of
Cuba and the Spanish Governors of Florida, except that
he could not lay taxes or grant land. His position wai
therefore a very anomalous one, — an American Gov-
ernor, under Spanish law, of an American territory not
yet under the Constitution and laws of the United
States. Long delays, due to dilatoriness and inef-
ficiency, postponed the actual cession until July 17th.
Meanwhile Jackson was chafing and fuming, and
strengthening his detestation of all Spaniards.

In September certain persons represented to Jackson
that papers which were necessary for the protection of
their interests were being packed up, and would be car-
ried away by the Spanish ex-Governor, contrary to the
treaty. There were five or six sets of papers about
property and land grants 1 which were in demand.
There had been complaints against the Spaniards for

. granting lands belonging to the crown between the
making and the ratification of the treaty. Jackson no
doubt believed the worst against them. The persons
who claimed his aid were weak and poor. With charac-
teristic chivalry and impetuosity he sent an officer to
teize the papers. The ex-Governor, Callava, refused
*o give up any papers unless they wert described, and
1 SI Niks, '50.

70 ANDREW JACKSON.

% demand for them was addressed to him as Spanish
commissioner. He and Jackson seem to have worked
at cross-purposes unnecessarily. It is hard to make
out what the misunderstanding was (although the use
of two languages might partly account for it), unlesa
Jackson was acting under his anti-Spanish bias. Jack
son ended by sending Callava to the calaboose. Parton,
who gives some special and interesting details derived
from Brackenridge, the alcalde and interpreter, says that
Callava saw the ridiculous side of the affair, and that
he and his friends " made a night of it " in the calaboose.
Jackson sent an officer to Call&va's house to take the
papers, and then ordered Callava to be discharged.

Eligius Fromentin, of Louisiana, had been appointed
judge of the western district of Florida. He, upon
application, issued a writ of habeas corpus for Callava.
Jackson summoned Fromentin before him to show cause
why he had interfered with Jackson's authority as Gov-
ernor of the Floridas with the powers of the Captain-
General of Cuba, as " Supreme Judge," and as " Chan-
cellor." Fromentin sent an excuse on the ground of
illness. The next day he went to see Jackson, and after
a fierce interview each prepared a " statement " to send
to Washington. Callava went to Washington to seek
satisfaction. Some of his friends published, at Pensa
cola, a statement in his defence. Thereupon Jackson
ordered them out of Florida at four days' notice, on
pain of arrest for contempt and disobedience, if they
«vere found there later. After all, the heirs of Vidal,
who stirred up the whole trouble, were, according ta
Partem, indebted to the Forbes firm, against which they
raited to protect themselves. 1 This would not affect
1 2 Partem, 638

AFFAIR OF CALL AY A. 71

their right and interest in securing papers property
theirs. Whether the papers were being carried away,
and did properly belong to the claimants, is not known. 1

About the time of the trouble with Callava, Worth-
ington, the Secretary and acting Governor of East Flor-
ida, was having a contest with Coppinger, the Spanish
Governor of East Florida, about papers which the former
seized under Jackson's orders.

Here, then, was another trouble which Jackson had
prepared in about six months' service for his unhappy
superiors. He was ill and disgusted with his office.
He resigned and went home in October. It is plain
that he had acted from a good motive against Callava,
and, being sure of his motive, he had disregarded diplo-
matic obligations, evidence, law, propriety, and forms
of procedure. Those things only enraged him because
they balked him of the quick purpose, born of his sense
of justice and of his sympathy with an ex parte appeal
to his power. Such a man is a dangerous person to be
endowed with civil power. As to his quarrel with Fro-
mentin, it was a farce. If Jackson had been a man of
any introspection, he must have had, ever after, more
charity for the whole class of Spanish governors, when
he saw what an arrogant fool he had made of himself
while endowed with indefinite and irresponsible power.

Monroe's cabinet unanimously agreed that, as the only
laws which had been extended to Florida were the rev*
enue laws and those against the slave-trade, Fromentin's
jurisdiction was limited to those laws, 3 and he could not

1 All the documents are in Folio State Papers, 2 Miscellan
T99. The important papers are in 21 Niles.

* For Fromentin's own theory of his action, which was plainly
irroneoos, see 21 Niles, 252.

72 ANDREW JACKSON.

Issue a writ of habeas corpus. The President, Calhoun,
, »nd Wirt thought that he was not amenable for his er-
ror to Jackson. Adams took Jackson's part in this
matter also. He said that Fromentin had violated Jack-
son's authority. 1 The cabinet discussed the subject for
three days without reaching a decision. They were
greatly perplexed as to the law and justice of the mat-
ter, and also as to its political effect. Congrebs took ft
up, and the newspapers were filled with it At first the
tide of opinion was against Jackson, but his popularity
reacted against it, and the affair did not hurt him.

In 1823 Jackson was offered the mission to Mexico.
He declined it. Soon afterwards he published in the
Mobile " Register " a letter stating his reasons for de-
clining. These reasons were a reflection on the adminis-
tration, because they showed cause why no mission ought
to be sent. The letter was calculated to win capital out
of the appointment at the expense of the administra-
tion which had made it. 3 Monroe must have been often
reminded of what Jefferson said to him, in 1818, when
he asked whether it would not be wise to give Jackson
the mission to Russia : " Why, good G — d, he would
breed you a quarrel before he had been there a month ! " *

1 5 Adams, 359, V6S to 380. * 24 Nil*, 28*

• 4 Adams, 76.

CHAPTER IV.

ELECTION OF 183A.

Tkb congressional caucus met April 8, 1820. Tbm
question was whether to nominate any candidates for
President and Vice-President. Adams says that the
caucus was called as part of a plan to nominate Clay
for Vice-President. About forty members of Congress
attended. R. M. Johnson offered a resolution that it
was inexpedient to nominate candidates. This resolu-
tion was adopted, and the caucus adjourned. 1 Monroe
received, at the election, every electoral vote save one,
which was cast by Plumer, in New Hampshire, for
Adams. Tomkins was reelected Vice-President, but he
received fourteen less votes than Monroe. His repu-
tation was declining. In raising money for the pub-
lic service during the war he had engaged his own
security. His book-keeping was bad, and his accounts
and the public accounts became so entangled that he
eould not separate them. 5 On the one hand, he claimed
that he was a creditor and heavy loser by the steps
which he had taken out of patriotic zeal for the pub-
lic service, which steps had been of great benefit to
the country. On the other hand, the controller of the
State of New York found that Tomkins could not ac-
count for all the money which had passed through his
Hands, and which amounted to over three million dot
* 6 Adams, f*8, 60. a 1 Hammond, 508 tg.

74 ANDREW JACKSON.

lars. The affair was immediately entangled id the fac-
tion fights of New York, the Bucktails te»Ling sides with
Tomkins, and the Clintonians agair^c him. The con-
troller of the State and the Vice-F resident of the United
States were engaged, in 1818 and 1819, in a hitter cor-
respondence. 1 Tomkins became bankrupt, and acquired
the reputation of a defaulter. Finally, in 1821, an act
was passed by the state Legislature to balance his ao>
counts without payment either way. 5 He was not able
for some years to draw his salary as Vice-President,
because he stood a defaulter also on the books of the
federal treasury. He stood a suit in 1822 in the United
States District Court and won it.* In 1823 a committee
of the House reported in his favor, 4 and an act appropri-
ating $35,190 for his relief was passed. In April, 1824,
Monroe sent in a message, the matter having been re-
ferred to him, in which he found $60,239 6 due Tom
kins. The trouble was that, in order to show himself a
creditor, Tomkins had to include in his accounts interest,
commissions, damages, allowances, etc., with interest on
them all ; that is, all the ordinary and extraordinary
charges which a broker would make for finding funds
ior an embarrassed client If these charges were all
allowed, Tomkins could claim no credit for patriotism.
If he was to keep the credit of extraordinary patriotism,
he was a debtor. In 1816 he was very popular and had
high hopes of the presidency. In 1825 he retired neg*
lected and forgotten. He died in June, 1825.

During Monroe's second term each of the persona
(actions was intriguing on behalf of its chief, and striv

i 15 Niles, 425 ; 17 Niks, 21. * 1 Hammond, 542.

• 22 Niles, 242. * 23 Niles. 406.

• 26 Niles, 168.

TARIFF IN 10$. 76

kg to kill off all the others. There were no real Lanes.
On the return of peace in 1815, the industries which had
grown np here during the war to supply needs, which
eould not, under the then existing laws, he supplied
by importation, found themselves threatened with ruin.
The tariff of 1816, although its rates were of course far
below the " double duties " which had been levied dur-
ing the war, was supposed at the time to he amply pro-
tective. It had been planned to that end. The embargo,
non-intercourse, and war had created entirely artificial
circumstances, which were a heavy burden on the na-
tion as a whole, but which had given security and favor
to certain manufacturing industries. There was no way
to " protect " the industries after peace returned except
to reproduce by taxes the same hardship for everybody
else, and the same special circumstances for the favored
industries, as had been produced by embargo and war.
In 1819 a great commercial crisis occurred, which pros-
trated all the industry of the country for four or five
years. So long as vicious and depreciated currencies
existed in Europe, there was less penalty for a vicious
currency here ; but as fast as European currencies im-
proved after the return of peace, gold and silver began
to go to the countries of improving currency, and away
from the countries where the currency still remained
bad. The "hard times" were made an argument to
show that more protection was needed ; that is, that the
country had been prosperous during war, and that the
return of peace had ruined it, unless taxes could be de-
vised which should press as hard as the war had done.
Fhe taxes had not indeed been made so heavy as that,
and so more were needed. Currency theorists also arose
to anticipate all the wisdom of *ater days. Thay proved

76 ANDREW JACKSON.

wbai Ae people of the United States, with a great conli
nent at their disposal, could not get out of the continent
an abundance of food, clothing, shelter, and fuel be-
cause they had not enough bits of paper stamped " one
dollar" at their disposal. The currency whims, how-
ever, hardly got into politics at that period.

In 1820 a strong attempt was made to increase the
tariff, to do away with credit for duties, and to put a
check on sales at auction. As the presidential election
was uncontested, power to carry these bills could not b«
concentrated. In 1824 the case was different. No fao*
tion dared vote against the higher tariff for fear of losing
support 1 The tariff was not, therefore, a party ques-
tion. The act was passed May 22, 1824, by a combi-
nation of Middle and Western States against New Eng-
land, and on a combination of the iron, wool, hemp,
whiskey, and sugar interests. New England, as the
commercial district, was then for free trade.

Jackson had been elected to the Senate in the winter
of 1823-24. Parton brings the invaluable testimony of
William B. Lewis as to the reason why and the way in
which Jackson was elected.* John Williams had been
senator. His term expired. He was an opponent of
Jackson. He was a candidate for reelection, and was
so strong that no Jackson man but Jackson himself
could defeat him. Hence the men who were planning
to make Jackson President, of whom Lewis was the
chief, secured Jackson's election to the Senate. While
the tariff question was pending, a convenient person.
— Dr. Coleman, of Warrenton, Va. — was found to in
terrogate Jackson about it. His letter in reply was th#
first of the adroit letters or manifestoes by means r
* *A Nilet. 324. « 3 Parton, SI.

WIRE-PULLING 71

rhich the Jackson managers carried on the campaign in
Jackson's favor. They developed this art of electioneer-
ing in a way then not conceived of by other factions.
The Coleman letter was a model letter of its kind. It
said nothing clear or to the point on the matter in ques-
tion. It used some ambiguous phrases which the readei
could interpret to suit his own taste. It muddled the
question by contradictory suggestions, bearing upon il
from a greater or less distance, and from all points of
view, and it failed not to introduce enough glittering
platitudes to make the whole pass current Jackson
voted for the tariff and for a number of internal im-
provement schemes, which votes were afterwards quoted
against him. 1

Jackson was therefore fairly started as a candidate
for the presidency. Among all the remarkable acci-
dents which opened his way to the first position in the
country, it was not the least that he had William B.
Lewis for a neighbor and friend. Lewis was the greatN
fath er of the w ire-pullers. He first practised in a mas-
terly and scientific way the art of starting movements, •
apparently spontaneous, at a distance, and in a quarter
from which they win prestige or popularity, in order
that these movements may produce, at the proper time
and place, the effects intended by the true agent, who,
in the mean time, prepares to be acted on by the move-
ment in the direction in which, from the beginning, he
desired to go. On this system political activity is ren-
dered theatrical. The personal initiative is concealed.
There is an adjustment of roles, a mise en scene, and
a constant consideration of effect Each person acts on
the other in prearranged wavs. Cues are given and
* 38 Nilea W5.

T8 ANDREW JACKSON.

taken, and the effect depends on the fidelity of eaeh
to his part. The perfection of the representation if
reached when the audience or spectators are disre-
garded until the finale, when the chief actor, having
reached the denatiment towards which he and his com-
rades have so long been laboring, comes to the foot-
flights and bows to the "will of the people." Lewis
showed great astuteness in his manoeuvres. There was
nothing vulgar about him. There was a certain breadth
of generalship about his proceedings. He was very far-
sighted and prudent. He had the great knowledge re-
quired by the wire-puller, — knowledge of men. He
knew the class amongst whom Jackson's popularity was
strongest. He knew their notions, prejudices, tastes,
and instincts. He knew what motives to appeal to. He
wrote very well. When he wanted to go straight to a
point he could do so. When he wanted to produce
effects or suggest adroitly, without coming to the point,
he could do that too. He also knew Jackson well. He
no doubt sincerely loved and admired Jackson. He
threw his whole soul into the undertaking to elect Jack-
son, but he never showed any selfish or interested pur-
poses in that connection. So long as Jackson was unin-
formed or unprejudiced on any matter he was at the
disposition of any one who had won his confidence, and
who desired to influence him on that matter. He could
then be led to accept any view of it which was put be-
fore him in a way to strike his mind. Lewis knew how
to put a thing before Jackson's mind. However, when
Jackson had adopted any view or notion, his mind be-
came set or biassed,, and it was not easy, even for thost
who first influenced him, to deflect his mind from rigid
ky of inference, or his conduct from direct deduction

PROJECT TO NOMINATE JACK80*. 71

fie often outstripped the wishes and intentions of those
if ho had moved him first. To contradict him, at that
itage, would have been to break friendship. Lewis
treated him with great tact and influenced him very
often, but he did not control him or manage him. It
would have been a good thing for the country if no
worse man than Lewis had ever gained influence over
Jackson.

Parton obtained from Lewis a description of the first
steps towards Jackson's nomination. Lewis tells how
he used Jackson's letters to Monroe to win influential
federalists to Jackson's support It was after Jack-
son's return from Florida, in 1821, that the project was
definitely decided upon. At first Jackson rejected, with
some temper, the suggestion that he could or would run
for President He did not consider himself the right
sort of man, and he felt old and ilL In the spring of
1822 Lewis went to North Carolina, and worked up his
connections there for Jackson. On the 20th of July,
1822, the Tennessee Legislature made the formal nom-
ination. During the next two years Jackson's sup-
porters were gaining connections and undermining the
caucus, for he was an independent candidate and a
" disorganizer," because he was raised up outside of
the machine, and without any consultation with the es-
tablished party authorities.

Certain features of Jackson's character have appeared
already. We have seen some of his elements of strength
and some of his faults. The nation wanted to reward
him for military achievements and for a display of mil-
itary virtues. They had discarded dukedoms, pensions,
ribbons, and orders, and they had no sign of national
gratitude to employ but election to civil office. So fat

80 ANDREW JACKSON.

Jackson had not made public display of any qualities but
those of a military man, and violence, indiscretion, obsti*
oacy, and quarrelsomeness. In the campaign, those who
opposed him called him a " murderer." The only in-
cidents of his life which the biographer can note, aside
from his military service, are successive acts of impro-
priety and bad judgment Negatively, however, there
was more to be said for Jackson. He was above every
species of money vice ; he was chaste and domestic in
his habits ; 1 he was temperate in every way ; he was
not ambitious in the bad sense.

There were already four other candidates in the field,
who all belonged to the democratic-republican party.
Niles gives an instance in which seven democrats met
at Philadelphia, who all were for Schulze, the democratic
candidate for Governor. Each candidate for President
had a supporter among them, and no candidate had
over two. 2 De Witt Clinton was not altogether out of
consideration. A caucus of the South Carolina Legisla-
ture nominated Lowndes. 1

John Quincy Adams stood first among the candi-
dates by his public services and experience. He was
fifty-seven years old. He went to Europe with hip
father when he was eleven years old, and studied there
for several years. He was, through his father, intimate
from his earliest youth with public and diplomatic af-
fairs. As far as education and early training could go,
he had the best outfit for a statesman and diplomat. He
enjoyed great respect. Those who thought that a man
oeight to advance to the presidency through lower gradei
if public employment looked upon him as the most soil

* The only contrary suggestion known is in Binns, 245.

• 24 Niles, 369. « & Adams, 468.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS. 81

able candidate. He was not a man of genius, but one
of wide interests, methodical habits, and indefatigable
industry. It is hard to see what he ever did, from his
earliest youth, for amusement and entertainment. He
would have been a better statesman if he had be*,n mor*
frivolous. He was unsocial in his manners, h**d few
friends, and repelled those who would have been hit
friends. So far as we can learn, he engaged in no in-
trigues for the presidency. He certainly had the small-
est and least zealous corps of workers. His weakness
was that the great body of the voters did not have any
feeling that a man with the qualifications which he pos-
sessed was needed for the presidential office. He had
been a democrat since 1807, when he went over to the
administration party because he believed that the New
England federalists were plotting secession. His sound-
ness in " democratic principles " was doubted. He
was earnestly disliked by all the active politicians. In
the campaign he was called a "tory." Adams was
charged with offering, at Ghent, to yield to the English
the right of navigating the Mississippi, if they would
renew the rights to fish in Canadian waters ; that is,
with offering to sacrifice a Western interest to serve an
Eastern one. He published a small volume to expose
the untruth of this charge and the character of the evi-
dence by which it was supported. 1 In his own opinion,
this attack helped him. 9 He was in favor of the tar-
iff as it stood in 1824. He thought that it gave enough
orotection. He was also in favor of internal improve-
tients, but thought they might be abused. 8 He was a©

* The Duplicate Letters, che Fisheries and the Missiarippi.
1 6 Adams, 263.

• 6 Adams, 353, 451

82 ANDREW JACKSON.

rased of undemocratic care for etiquette, and also ol
ilovenliness in dress.

Calhoun enjoyed great popularity in New England,
in New Tork city, and in Pennsylvania, as well as at
home. He was forty-two years old, and was the " voting
men's candidate." He had actively favored the tariff of
1816 and the hank, and also plans for internal improve-
ments. In October, 1822, Adams wrote: "Calhoun
has no petty scruples about constructive powers and
state rights." 1 Calhoun and Adams had been strong
friends, and there was some idea of putting Calhoun on
the ticket with Adams until 1822, when some members
of Congress nominated Calhoun for President. 2 Web-
ster preferred Calhoun to all the other candidates. 8 His
brother wrote that Calhoun was the second choice of
New Hampshire. 4 Calhoun took the War Department
in 1817, when it was in great disorder. He had to bear
a great deal of abuse before he got it in order, but later
he was much praised for the system he had introduced. 6
He and Crawford were especial rivals, because Crawford
was the "regular" Virginia and Southern candidate.
In 1822 attempts were made to injure Calhoun by an
investigation of a contract for building the Rip Raps at
Old Point Comfort. The contract was private, not com-
petitive. He was exonerated by a committee of the
House. 6 As we shall see, Calhoun withdrew his nam*
before the election.

i 6 Adams, 75. 2 6 Adams, 42.

• 1 Curtis's Webster, 218, 236.

* 1 Webster's Correspondence, 823.

* 20 Niles, 5C. Adams thought this praise undeserved. (7 AA
UBS, 446.)

• 22 NUM. 251.

WILLIAM HARRIS CRAWFORJ. 89

Crawford was the regular candidate. He was fifty-
two years old. In 1798 he had been an " Addresser,"
that is, an orthodox federalist. 1 He had also been a
supporter of the old bank, and had been the leader in
the Senate for the renewal of its charter. He had also
opposed the embargo. 9 He had been very eagerly work-
ing for eight years to reach the presidency. In tke
campaign he was called an " intriguer." As Secretary
of the Treasury during the crisis of 1819, he had a very
difficult task to perform. He had undertaken even
more than his duty required, for he had aimed to " do
justice " between the banks, and to keep them from en-
croaching upon each other. To this end he distributed
his deposits, and in some cases favored certain banks.
When the crash came his funds were locked up in some
of these banks. He was then open to the charge, which
Ninian Edwards made oyer the signature "A. B.,"
that he had used the treasury funds to win political
capital, and had corruptly put the funds in unsound
banks. Crawford was exonerated by a committee of the
House, but he barely escaped ruin. 1 He introduced the
limited period of service, by the Act of May 15, 1820,
' into the Treasury Department. This act limits the pe-

riod of office of all persons engaged in collecting the rev-
enue to four years, at the expiration of which time they
go out of office or come up for reappointment. 4 It is
one of the most important steps in the history of the
abuse of the civil service. Crawford was believed by
his colleagues to have sacrificed the administration to
make capital for himself. Adams says that Crawford

» 24 Niks, 133. * Cobb, 141

i Folio State Papers ; 5 Fisumce, .

• * Adams, 424.

84 ANDREW JACKSON.

wad Monroe quarrelled to the verge of violence during
the last months of the administration. 1 In order to win
itrength for Crawford, Van Buren was nominated for
Vice-President by the Legislature of Georgia, This
proposition was overwhelmed by ridicule. 2 Crawford
was physically disabled from September, 1823, to Sep-
tember, 1824. He could not sign his name, and was
apparently a wieck. He used a fac-simile stamp on
public papers, or it was used by a member of his family
under his direction.

Clay had already assumed the championship of the
protective system. He had been one of the strongest op-
ponents of the re-charter of the first bank. He had also
made " sympathy with nations struggling for liberty "
one of his points, and had been zealous for the recog-
nition of the South American republics. He was a
great party leader. He had just the power to win men
to him and to inspire personal loyalty which Adams
had not. On the other hand he lacked industry. Ha
was eloquent, but he never mastered any subject which
required study. His strength lay in facility and practical
tact. He was forty-seven years old. He was stigma-
tized as a " gambler " by his opponents in the campaign.
From 1820 to 1823 he was not in public life, but was
retrieving his private fortunes. His enemies said that
his affairs had been embarrassed by gambling. He was
Speaker from 1815 to 1820, and again from 1823 to
1825. He was one of the commissioners who made the
treaty of Ghent.

The Crawford men wanted a congressional caucus in
2824, because they had control of the machine. Th«
opporters of the other candidates opposed any caucub
* 7 Aduni, 81. « Cobb, 909.

caucus or 1824. 86

bat secretly, because the caucus was now an established
Institution. The opponents of the caucus found a strong
ally in Niles, who opened fire on the caucus in his
" Register " without any reserve. His sincerity and
singleness of purpose are beyond question. He did not
use his paper to support any candidate. He was an old
Jeffersonian republican of 1798, and he believed sin-
cerely in all the " principles." He assailed the caucus,
because in his view it usurped the right of the people to
govern themselves. He denounced it steadily for mora
than a year, and he succeeded in casting odium upon it.
The Legislatures of New Tork and Virginia passed reso-
lutions in favor of a caucus, because these two States,
while united, could control the presidency through the
caucus. New York being rent by democratic faction
fights, and Virginia being led by a close oligarchy, New
York became an appendage to Virginia in their co-
alition. Tennessee, South Carolina, Alabama, and Ma-
ryland adopted resolutions against the caucus. The
Legislature of Pennsylvania declared against a " partial
caucus." 1 As the time for the caucus approached, ne-
gotiations for bargains between the candidates became
active, but it would be tedious to gather the recorded
reports and rumors of such transactions.

The caucus met in the chamber of the House of Rep
resentatives February 14, 1824. 2 Of 216 democrats in
Congress, 66 were present. Two, who were ill at home,
sent proxies. If proxies were allowable, the members
of Congress, when assembled in presidential caucus,
must have been regarded as independent powers, pos-
sessed of a prerogative, like peers or sovereigns. The
«ote was : Crawford, 64 ; AJams, 2 ; Jackson, 1 ; Macoiij
* 6 Aaams, 232. * 25 Niks, 38S.

B6 ANDREW JACKSON.

1 : u «., all but the Crawford men stayed uway. Gat
latin was nominated for Vice-President by 57 votes
An address was published, defending the caucus, and
arguing its ^dispensability to the party. 1 Some ques-
tion was raised about Gallatin's eligibility on account of
his foreign birth, but he possessed the alternative quali-
fication allowed by the Constitution. He had been •
commissioner at Ghent and a friend of Crawford. His
nomination did not strengthen the ticket. There was
still a great deal of rancor against him for forsaking the
Treasury Department when the war broke out. He
soon withdrew his name because the caucus was so un-
popular.

Martin Van Buren was chief engineer of this last con-
gressional caucus. He was senator from New York
He and his friends, under the new Constitution of 1821,
had established a very efficient party organization, which
they had well in hand. They were known as the
Regency, and they had renewed the alliance with Vir-
ginia to control the machine and elect Crawford. A
project which threatened to mar their scheme was the
proposition, in 1823, to take the election of presidential
electors from the Legislature of New York and .give it
to the people. The Regency-Tammany party opposed
this, as it would render useless all their machinery.
The advocates of the change (being the opponents of
Crawford, Tammany, and the Regency), formed the
" people's party." Clinton was for Jackson, so he was
allied with the people's party against Crawford. Al
though Clinton was the soul of the canal enterprise, hi
•vas removed from his office of canal commissioner U
Iry to break up this combination. It would never dt
1 Sft Nil**, S91.

INTRIGUE8 IN NEW YORK. 87

lor the Regency to oppose directly and openly a pmp#
rition to give the election to the people. When the law
was proposed, the Regency managed to twist it into such
preposterous shape that a general ticket was to be voted
for, and if there should not be a majority (which, with
four in the field, was a very probable result) the State
would lose its vote. The bill passed the House, but was
defeated in the Senate. 1 The popular indignation was
so great that the next Legislature was carried by the
people's party, and a joint ticket of electors was elected,
on which were 25 Adams men, 7 Clay men, and 4
Crawford men. 9 Some of them must have changed
their votes before the election.

A federalist convention at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,
February 22, 1824, nominated Jackson.* At a primary
meeting at Philadelphia, Dallas withdrew Calhoun's
name from the first place and nominated him for the
second. Calhoun was strong in Pennsylvania, but Jack
son had superseded him. This move was a coalition of
Jackson and Calhoun. The democratic convention at
Harrisburg, Marc s*> 4th, was stampeded for Jackson.
Only one vote was given against him. 4 Another demo-
cratic convention, called " regular," was convened Au-
gust 9th. It repudiated Jackson and adhered to Craw-
ford.* Jackson and his followers were denounced as
" disorganizes." The Albany " Argus " said of Jackson,
" It is idle in this State, however it may be in others, to
strive even for a moderate support of Mr. Jackson. He
is wholly out of the question as far as the votes of New

1 2 Hammond, 1*2.

8 27 Niles, 186. Hammond ' statement is obscure. (See I
Hammond, 177.) * 1 Sargent, 41.

4 26 Niles. Ml. * 1 Sargent, 42.

68 ANDREW JACKSON.

York are in it. Independently of the disclosures of hii
political opinions, he could not be the republican candi-
date. He is respected as a gallant soldier, but he stands,
in the minds of the people of this State, at an immeasur-
able distance from the executive chair." 1 After the
" Argus " changed its mind about Jackson, any one who
held the very judicious opinion embodied in this para-
graph was regarded by it as a " federalist," which was
M much as to say, an enemy of the American people*
Niles says that John Randolph opposed Jackson in a
public speech in 1822 because he was the candidate of
the Bank of the United States, and his election would
unite " the purse and the sword." a Jefferson said, " I
feel very much alarmed at the prospect of seeing Gen-
eral Jackson President. He is one of the most unfit
men I know of for the place. He has had very little
respect for laws or constitutions, and is, in fact, an able
military chief. His passions are terrible. • . . He
has been much tried since I knew him, but he is a dan-
gerous man." • On the contrary, Jackson's courtly
bearing won for him all the ladies. Webster wrote,
" General Jackson's manners are more presidential than
those of any of the candidates. He is grave, mild, and
reserved. My wife is for him decidedly." 4 Jackson's
friends induced him to have a kind of reconciliation
with Scott, Clay, and Benton. The last was a supporter
of Clay, but when Clay was out of the contest he turned
to Jackson. 6 Adams says that Benton joined Jackson
tfter Jackson's friends obtained for him the nominatiot

Quoted 49 Niles, 188. * 22 NMes, 73.

* 1 Webster's Correspondence, 371.

* 1 Webster's Correspondence, 346.

He went fiwt to Crawford, then to Jackson. (Cobb, Slit,

vote of im. 89

m minister to Mexico. When Adams came in he would
not ratify the appointment. 1 Daring the winter some
sort of a peace was made between Jackson and Craw-
ford. 2

The result of the electoral vote was: Jackson, 99;
Adams, 84 ; Crawford, 41 ; Clay, 37. For Vice-Presi-
dent the vote was : Calhoun, 182 ; Sanf ord, 30 ; Macon,
24 ; Jackson, 13 ; Van Buren, 9 ; Clay, 2 ; blank, 1.
New York voted : Jackson, 1 ; Adams, 26 ; Crawford,
5 ; Clay, 4. The electors were chosen by the Legislature
in Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, South
Carolina, and Vermont. In the other States the popular
vote stood (in round numbers) : Jackson, 155,800 ,
Adams, 105,300; Crawford, 44,200; Clay, 46,500.
The second choice of Clay's States (Ohio, Kentucky,
and Missouri) was Jackson. In Pennsylvania Jackson
had 36,000 votes, and all the others together had less
than 12,000. Only about one third of the vote of the
State was polled, because it was known that Jackson
would carry it overwhelmingly.*

The intriguing for the election now entered on a new
stage. Clay was out of the contest in the House, but
he had great influence there, and it has often been as-
serted that the House would have elected him if his
name had come before it as one of the three highest.
IJe was courted by all parties. It would be tedious to
collect the traces of various efforts to form combinations.
The truth seems to be this : Washington was filled dur-
ing the winter with persons* members of Congress and
others, who wero under great excitement about the
llection. All sorts of busybodbs were running about

* 6 Adams, 522. * 6 Adams. 478, 481.

•!7Niki, ISC.

BO ANDREW JACKSON.

talking and planning, and proposing what seemed to
each to be good. Persons who were in Washington,
and were cognizant of some one line of intrigue, 01
of the activity of some one person, have left records oi
what they saw or heard, and have vehemently main-
tained each that his evidence gives the only correct
clew to the result Every candidate's name is connected
with some intrigue, or some proposition for a coalition.
In no case is the proposition or intrigue brought home
to the principal party as a conscious or responsible par-
ticipator, and yet it appears that the negotiations were
often of such a character that they could have been
taken up and adopted if they had proved satisfactory.

The election in the House took place February 9,
1825. On the first ballot, Adams obtained the votes of
thirteen States, Jackson of seven, and Crawford of four.
For the first few days Jackson seemed to bear his defeat
good-naturedly. He met Adams on the evening of the
election at the President's reception, and bore himself
much the better of the two. 1

It was soon rumored that Clay was to be Secretary of
State. After a few days Clay accepted that post. The
charge of a corrupt bargain between Clay and Adams
was then started. It was an inference from Clay's ap-
pointment, and nothing more. Any man can judge to-
day as well as any one could in 1824 whether that fact
leads straight and necessarily to that inference. Not a
particle of other evidence ever was alleged. We have
naver had any definition of the proper limits of combi-
nations, bargains, and pledges in politics, but an agree*
raent to make Clay Secretary of State, if made, could
not be called a corrupt bargain. He was such a mat
1 Cobb, 226.

CHARGE OF CORRUPT BARGAIN. 91

that he was a fit and proper person for the place. No
one would deny that. Therefore no public interest
would be sacrificed or abused by his appointment. A
corrupt bargain must be one in which there is collusion
for private gain at the expense of the public welfare.
Bargains which avoid this definition must yet be toler-
ated in all political systems, although they impair the
purity of any system.

The men around Jackson — Eaton, Lewis, Livingston,
Lee, Swartwout — knew the value of the charge of
corrupt bargain for electioneering purposes, and the
political value of the appeal to Jackson's supporters
on the ground that he had been cheated out of his
election. Did not they first put the idea into Jackson's
head that he had been cheated by a corrupt bargain ?
Is not that the explanation of his change of tone from
the lofty urbanity of the President's assembly to the
rancorous animosity of a few days afterwards ? Such a
conjecture fits all the circumstances and all the charac-
ters. The men around Jackson might see the value of
the charge, and use it, without ever troubling themselves
to define just how far they believed in it ; but Jackson
would not do that Such a suggestion would come to
him like a revelation, and his mind would close on it
with a solidify of conviction which nothing ever could
shake.

Benton always scouted the notion of the bargain. 1
He says that he knew before Adams did, that Clay in-
tended to vote for Adams. Benton would not follow
Clay. Clay's reason for voting for Adams was that
Crawford was incapacitated by his broken health, 2 and

1 1 Benton, 48.

1 Crawford was taken to -he Capitol for a few hours, a day oi

92 ANDREW JACKSON.

that a military hero was not a fit person to be President
January 8th Clay wrote to F. P. Blair 1 that the friendi
of all the candidates were courting him, but that ha
shauld vote for Adams. January 24th Clay and the ma-
jority of the Ohio and Kentucky delegations declared
that they would vote for Adams. In a letter to F.
Brooke, January 28, 1825, Clay stated that he would
vote for Adams for the reasons given. 9 The Clay men
generally argued that if Jackson was elected he would
keep Adams in the State Department. It would thei
be difficult, in 1828, to elect Clay, another Westerr
man ; but Adams would have more strength. If Adamt
should be elected in 1824, the election of Clay, as a
Western man, in 1828, would be easier, especially if Ad-
ams would give him the Secretaryship.* On the 25th of
January, the day after the Western delegations came out
for Adams, an anonymous letter appeared in the " Co-
lumbian Observer," of Philadelphia, predicting a bar-
gain between Adams and Clay. Kremer, member of
the House from Pennsylvania, avowed his responsibility
for the letter, although it has generally been believed
that he could not have written it. Clay demanded an
investigation in the House, and a committee was raised,
but Kremer declined to answer them. The letter was
Another case of the general device of laying down anch-
'ors for strains which would probably need to be ex-
erted later. It would not do for Kremer to admit that

two before the election, but he was apparently a wreck. (Cobb
*18.)

1 Blair and Kendall, in 1824, were Clay men. They were botl
Active, hi 1825, in urging Clay men to vote for Adams. (40 NOef
78; Telegraph Extra, 300 fg.)

• 17 Nito, 886. » TeUgraph Eatr*. tti.

ADAMS AND CLAY. 91

fee mssertion in the letter was only a surmise of his. It
certainly was a clever trick. The charge would either
prevent Clay from going into Adams's cabinet, lest he
should give proofs of the truth of the imputation, or, if
he did go into the cabinet, this letter would serve as a
kind of evidence of a bargain. Immediately after the
inauguration Eremer made this latter use of it in an
address to his constituents. 1 On the 20th of February
Jackson wrote a letter to Lewis, in which he affirmed
and condemned the bargain. Lewis published this letter
in Tennessee. February 22d Jackson wrote a letter to
Swartwout, in which he spoke very bitterly of Clay, and
resented Clay's criticism of him as a " military chief-
tain." He sneered at Clay as not a military chieftain.
But he did not allege any bargain. Swartwout published
this letter in New York. 2 Both letters were plainly pre-
pared by Jackson's followers for publication. Clay re-
plied at the end of March in a long statement*

Jackson remained in Washington until the middle of
March. He was present at the inauguration, and pre-
served all the forms in his public demeanor towards
4dams. 4 His rage was all directed against Clay. In
the Senate there were fifteen votes against Clay's con-
firmation, but no charges were made there. 6 On his way
borne Jackson scattered the charge as he went. It is to
his own lips that it is always traceable when it can be
brought home to anybody. Up to this time it is ques-
tionable whether Jackson was more annoyed or pleased
at being run for President. Now that the element of

l 28 Niles, 21 3 28 Niles, 20.

• 18 Niles, 71- < 28 Nile*, 19.

• Branch made some alluar ns an 1 vague ccmmest*. (S3 Niks

94 ANDREW JACKSON.

personal contest was imported into the enterprise hif
whole being became absorbed in the determination te
achieve a victory. There was now a foe to be crushed,
a revenge to be obtained for an injury endured. He
did not measure his words, and the charge gained ampli
tude and definiteness as he repeated it In March, 1827,
Carter Beverly, of North Carolina, wrote to a friend an
account of a visit to Jackson, and a report of Jackson's
circumstantial assertion, at his own table, that Clay's
friends offered to support Jackson if Jackson would
promise not to continue Adams as Secretary of State.
Beverly's letter was published at Fayetteville, North
Carolina. 1 In June Jackson wrote to Beverly an explicit
repetition over his own signature. 2 The charge had now
a name and a responsible person behind it, — Jackson
himself. Clay at once called on him for his authorities
.and proofs. Jackson named Buchanan as his authority. 1
Buchanan had been one of the active ones 4 that win-
ter, but he had blundered. He now made a statement
which was not straightforward either way, but it did not
support Jackson's statement. He distinctly said that he
had never been commissioned by the Clay men for any-
thing he said to Jackson about appointing Adams/'
Clay then called on Jackson to retract, since his only
authority had failed. Jackson made no answer. He
never forgave Buchanan. In 1842 Carter Beverly
wrote to Clay that the charge had never been substan
feiated, and that he regretted having helped to spread it.*
4t Maysville, in 1843, Adams made a solemn denial o!

i 82 Niles, 162. * 32 Niles, 815.

* 82 Niles, 415.

* Markkas Letter, 83 Niles, 167.

ia»Nil<*,416. •6lNikM,40t.

ADAMS AND CLAY. 96

j» charge. 1 May 3, 1844, Jackson reiterated the
tharge in a letter to the " Nashville Union." He said :
" Of the charges brought against Mr. Adams and Mr.
Clay at that time I formed my opinions, as the country
at large did, from facts and circumstances which were
indisputable and conclusive, and I may add that this
opinion has undergone no change." 9 Of course this
means that he inferred the charge from Clay's appoint*
ment, never had any other ground for it, and therefore
had as much ground in 1844 as in 1825. Clay never
escaped the odium of this charge while he lived. At
Lexington, Ky., in 1842, he said that he thought he
would have been wiser if he had not taken office under
Adams. 8

On the publication of Adams's "Diary," probably all
students of American political history turned to see
what relations with Clay were noted in the winter of
1824-25. Clay and Adams had never been intimate.
Their tastes were by no means congenial. There was
an "adjourned question of veracity" outstanding be-
tween them, because Clay had given vague support to
the charge against Adams about the fisheries and the
Mississippi, and Adams had challenged him to produce
the proof which would impeach Adams's own story of
Jie negotiations at Ghent Clay had never answered.
December 17, 1824, Letcher, as one of Clay's nearest
friends, called on Adams. " The drift of all Letcher's
discourse was . . . that Clay would willingly support
me, if he could thereby serve himself, and the substance
©f his meaning was that if Clay's friends could know
{hat he would have a prominent srtare in the administr*

i 11 Adams, 431. * M Niks, 347.

«S Nik*, ML

96 ANDREW JACKSON.

lion, that might induce them to vote for me, even in tin
face of instructions. But Letcher did not profess to
have any authority from Clay for what he said, and he
made no definite propositions." 1 January 1, 1825, Clay
and Adams met by Letcher's intervention. Adams re-
corded in 1828 2 that Letcher told him, January 2, 1825,
that Kentucky would vote for him. January 9th Clay
told Adams that he should vote for him, and said that
Crawford's friends and Adams's friends had approached
him with personal considerations. January 21st Scott,
of Missouri, who held the vote of that State, told Ad-
ams that he wanted Clay to be in the administration.
Adams replied that he could give no assurances, but
that, in looking for a Western man, he could not over-
look Clay. On the same day, in answer to fears that
he would proscribe the federalists, he answered that he
would try to break up the old parties. February 3d Web-
ster called on Adams about the proscription of the feder-
alists. 8 Adams said that he could give no assurances
about his cabinet, but would try to harmonize parties. 4

The Jackson men found another grievance in the elec-
tion of Adams. They revived a doctrine which had
been advocated in 1801, to the effect that the House of
Representatives ought simply to carry out " the will of
the people," as indicated by the plurality vote. Benton
is the chief advocate of this doctrine. 6 He faces all

1 6 Adams, 447. 2 7 Adams, 462.

The federalists all hated Adams for "ratting." In 1828
Timothy Pickering was a Jackson man ; not that he loved de-
mocracy more, but that he hated Jackson less. (34 Niles, 246. ?

* 1 Curtis's Webster, 237.

• 31 Niles, 98, gives a homely but very pungent criticism o
ttentou's doctrine. It consists in showing what the " will of the
people " is, when the state divisions, Senate equality, and i
^presentation are taVan into account

DEMOCRACY VEBSU8 TEE CONST/TOT/ON 91

Jhe consequences of it without flinching. He says
plainly that there was a struggle " between the theory
of the Constitution and the democratic principle." The
Constitution gives to the House of Representatives the
right and power to elect the President in a certain con-
tingency. There is no provision at all in the Constitu-
tion for the election of President by a great national
democratic majority. The elected President is the per-
son who gets a majority of the votes constitutionally
described and cast, and the power and right of the House
of Representatives in the contingency which the Consti-
tution provides for is just as complete as that of the
electoral college in all other cases. But the electoral
college by no means necessarily produces the selection
which accords with the majority of the popular vote.
The issue raised by Benton and his friends was there-
fore nothing less than constitutional government versus
democracy. The Constitution does not put upon the
House the function of raising a plurality vote to a ma-
jority, for the obvious reason that it would be simpler
to let a plurality elect. The Constitution provides only
specified ways for ascertaining " the will of the people,"
and that will does not rule unless it is constitutionally
expressed. That is why we are, fortunately, under a
sonstitutional system, and not under an unlimited and
ever-changing democracy. Benton and those who agreed
with him weie, as he avows, making an assault on the
Constitution, when they put forward their doctrine of the
'unction of the House. On that doctrine the Constitu-
tion is every one's too\ while it answers his purposes, and
the sport of every faction which finds it an obstacle, if
they can only manage to carry an election. Their might
mud their right become one and the same thing,—

7

98 ANDREW JACKSON.

guarantees of each other. Such a doctrine is one of th*
most pernicious political heresies. A constitution is to
a nation what self-control under established rules of con-
duct is to a man. The only time when it is of value il
just the time when the temptation to violate it is strong,
and that is the time when it contravenes temporary and
party interests.

In its practical aspects, also, the election of 1824
showed how pernicious and false Benton's doctrine is.
" The will of the people," to which he referred as par-
amount, was an inference only. The moment we de-
part from constitutional methods of ascertaining the will
of the people, we shall always be driven to inferences
which will, in the last analysis, be found to rest upon
nothing but party prejudices and party hopes. In the
vote of 1824 the facts were as follows : Clay's states
indicated, as their second choice, Jackson. Jackson's
friends inferred that, if Clay had not been running,
Jackson would have carried those States and would
have been elected. Going farther, however, we find
that in New Jersey and Maryland the Crawford men
supported Jackson to weaken Adams. In North Car-
olina Adams men supported Jackson to weaken Craw-
ford. In Louisiana, Adams men and Jackson men
combined to weaken Clay. 1 Hence Jackson got the
whole or a part of the vote of these four States by bar-
gain and combination. How many more undercurrents
of combination and secondary intention there may havt
been is left to conjecture. What then becomes of the
notion of " the will of the people," as some pure and
■acred emanation, only to be heard and obeyed ? No
election produces any such pure and sacred product, bu*
1 1 Annual Regiiter, 40.

\

DEMOCRACY VBRBU8 THE CONSTITUTION. 99

•nly a practical, most limited, imperfect, and approxi-
mate expression of public opinion, by which we manage
to carry on public affairs. The " demos hraUo princi-
ple," to use Benton's jargon, belongs in the same cate-
gory with Louis Fourteenth's saying : L'itat Jest mou
One is as far removed from constitutional liberty at
the other.

Crawford went home to Georgia, disappointed, broken
in health, his political career entirely ended. He re-
covered his health to some extent. He became a cir-
cuit judge, and gave to Calhoun, five years later, very
positive evidence that he was still alive. He died m
1834.

CHAPTER V.

ADAMS'S ADMINISTRATION.

The presidency underwent a great change at the elec-
tion of 1824. The congressional caucus had, up to that
time, proceeded on the theory that the President was to
be a great national statesman who stood at the head
of his party, or among the leaders of it There were
enthusiastic rejoicings that " King Caucus " was de-
throned and dead. What killed the congressional cau-
cus was the fact that, with four men running, the ad-
herents of three of them were sure to combine against
the caucus, on account of the advantage which it would
give to the one who was expected to get its nomination.
However, it was a great error to say that King Caucus
was dead. Looking back on it now, we see that the
caucus had only burst the bonds of the chrysalis state
and entered on a new stage of life and growth.

Jackson was fully recognized as the coming man.
There was no fighting against his popularity. The
shrewdest politician was he who should seize upon that
popularity as an available force, and prove capable of
controlling it for his purposes. Van Buren proved him-
self to be the man for this function. He usurped the
position of Jackson leader in New York, which seemed by
priority to bolong to Clinton. He and the other Crawford
leaders had had a hard task to run a man who seemed
to be physically incapacitated for the duties of the presi

THE OPPOSITION. 101

iency, bat when Crawford's health broke down it was
too late for them to change the whole plan of their
sampaign. After the election they joined the Jackson
party. The "era of good feeling" had brought into
politics a large number of men, 1 products of the con*
tinoally advancing political activity amongst the least
educated classes, who were eager for notoriety and
spoils, for genteel living without work, and for public
position. These men were ready to be the janissaries
of any party which would pay well. They all joined the
opposition because they had nothing to expect from the
administration. All the factions except the Adams fac-
tion, that is to say, all the federalists, and all the non-
Adams personal factions of the old republican party
went into opposition. These elements were very inco-
herent in their political creeds and their political codes,
but they made common cause. 3 They organized at once
an opposition of the most violent and factious kind*
Long before any political questions arose, they devel-
oped a determination to oppose to the last whatever
the administration should favor. They fought for four
years to make capital for the next election, as the chief
business of Congress. John Randolph, who by long
practice had become a virtuoso in abuse, exhausted his
powers in long tirades of sarcasm and sensational denun-
ciations, chiefly against Clay. The style of smartness
which he was practising reached its climax when he
called the administration an alliance of Blinl and Black
George, the Puritan and the Black-leg. He and Clay
fought a duel, on which occasion, however, Randolph

* 3 Ann. Reg. 10

8 The new groupings caused intense astonishment to staple
minded observers. (See 32 Nile*, 339.)

102 ANDREW JACKSON.

fired in the air. After Jackson's election, Randolph
was given the mission to Russia, and was guilty of a
number of the abuses which he had scourged most freely.
He had to endure hostile criticism, as a matter of course,
and he learned the misery of a public man forced to
make " explanations " under malignant charges. He
proved to be as thin-skinned as most men of his stamp
are when their turn comes. 1

Van Buren initiated the opposition into the method*
and doctrines of New York politics. Ever since the
republicans wrested the State from the federalists in
1800, they had been working out the methods by which
an oligarchy of a half dozen leaders could, under the
forms of democratic-republican self-government, control
the State. As soon as the federalists were defeated, the
republicans broke up into factions. Each faction, when
it gained power, proscribed the others. Until 1821 the
patronage, which was the cohesive material by which
party organization was cemented, was in the hands of a
" council " at Albany. After 1821 the patronage, by
way of reform, was converted into elective offices. It
then became necessary to devise a new system adapted
to this new arrangement, and all the arts by which the
results of primaries, conventions, committees, and cau-
cuses, while following all the forms of spontaneous ac-
tion, can be made to conform to the programme of the
oligarchy or the Boss, were speedily developed. If now
the presidency was no longer to be the crown of public
service, and the prize of a very limited number of states-
men of national reputation, — if it was conceivable that
an Indian fighter like Jackson could come within tht
*nge of choice, — then the presidency must be era
1 2 Garland's Randolph, 339.

THE SPOILS SYSTEM. 108

after the position reserved for popular heroes, or, in tot f
absence of such, for " available " men, as the figure- j
heads with and around whom a faction of party leaden [
eould come to power. King Caucus was not dead, then. i
He had lost a town and gained an empire. It remained
to develop and extend over the whole country an or-
ganization of which the public service should constitute
the network. There would be agents everywhere to re-
ceive and execute orders, to keep watch, and to make
reports. The central authority would dispose of the
whole as a general disposes of his army. The general
of the " outs " recruited his forces from those who hoped
for places when the opposition should come in. As
there were two or three " outs " who wanted each place
held by those who were " in," recruits were not lacking.
It was during Adams's administration that the opposition
introduced on the federal arena the method of organiz-
ing federal parties by the use of the spoils, which method
had been previously perfected in the state politics of
New York.

The opposition invented and set in action two or three
new institutions. They organized local Jackson com-
mittees up and down the country, somewhat on the plan
*>f the old revolutionary committees of correspondence
and safety. It was the duty of these committees to
cany on a propaganda for Jackson, to contradict and
refute charges against him, to make known his services,
to assail the administration, and to communicate facts,
arguments, reports, etc., to each other. Partisan news-
Daper writing was also employed to an unprecedented
txtent. The partisan editor, who uses his paper to
reiterate and inculcate statements of fact and doctrine
iesigned to affect the mind of the voter, was not a new

104 ANDREW JACKSON.

figure in politics, but now there appeared all over the
eountry small local newspapers, edited by men who as-
sumed the attitude of party advocates, and pursued one
side only of all public questions, disregarding truth,
right, and justice, determined only to win. In 1826, at
Calhoun's suggestion, an " organ " was started at Wash*
ington, the " Telegraph," edited by Duff Green, of Mis-
souri. The organ gave the key to all the local party
newspapers.

Adams showed, in his inaugural, some feeling of the
unfortunate and unfair circumstances of his position. He
said, " Less possessed of your confidence in advance
than any of my predecessors, I am deeply conscious of
the prospect that I shall stand more and oftener in need
of your indulgence." In October the Legislature of
Tennessee nominated Jackson for 1828, and he ap-
peared before the Legislature to receive an address and
to make a reply. He resigned the senatorship in a very
careful and well-written letter, 1 in which he urged (re-
ferring, as everybody understood, to Clay's appointment)
that an amendment to the Constitution should be adopted
forbidding the appointment to an office in the gift of the
President of any member of Congress during, or for two
years after, his term of office in Congress. 2 In this let-

i 29 Niles, 156.

9 Robert 6. Harper once testified in a court of law his personal
belief, founded on general knowledge and inference, that Bun
could have been elected in 1801 if he would have used " certain
means," and his belief that Jefferson did use those means. (23
Niles, 282.) He referred to the appointment by Jefferson to In-
ijative offices of Linn, of New Jersey, and Claiborne, of Ten
Ftessee (each of whom controlled the vote of a State), and alss
•f Livingston, who could have divided the vote of New York
*H Niks, 197.) According to a return made to a call Irj Cos

METHODS OF THE OPPOSITION. 105

lor lie said that the senatorship had been given to him
ji 1823 without effort or solicitation ; also that he made
it a role neither to seek nor decline office. In his speech
before the Legislature he spoke more freely of the cor*
ruption at Washington, from which he sought to escape
by resigning. 1 He now had Livingston, Eaton, Lee,
Van Buren, Benton, Swartwout, Duff Green, and Lewis
managing his canvass, some of them at Washington a- id
some in Tennessee. They kept close watch over him,
and maintained constant communication with each other.
The first overt acts of the opposition were the objec-
tion to Clay's confirmation and the rejection of the
treaty with Colombia. Clay had been a champion of
the South American republics, and everything in the
way of intimacy with them was capital for him. These
votes occurred in March, 1825. The " Annual Regis-
ter," commenting, over a year later, on these votes, said :
" The divisions which had been taken on the foregoing
questions [those mentioned] left little doubt that the
new administration was destined to meet with a sys-
tematic and organized opposition, and, previous to the
next meeting of Congress, the ostensible grounds of op-
position were set forth at public dinners and meetings,
so as to prepare the community for a warm political
contest until the next election." a The public was
greatly astonished at the uproar among the politicians.
The nation acquiesced in the result of the election as
perfectly constitutional and regular, and it cost great ef-

gress in 1826, the number of members of Congress appointed to
•nice by the Presidents down to that time was, by Washington,
>0, by Adams, 13; by Jefferson, 25; by Madison, 29; by Mon-
roe* 85 ; by J. Q. Adams, in his first year, 5. (36 Nilet, 267.)
» 1 Ann. Reg. 21. * I Ann. Ueg. M.

106 ANDREW JACKSON.

fort to stir up an artificial heat and indignation about it
The " bargain " formed the first stock or capital of the
opposition. The claim that Jackson had been cheated
out of his election was the second. Some attempt was
made to get up a cry about " family influence," but this
did not take. The charge of bargain and fraud was so
assiduously reiterated that, in 1827, there were six sena-
tors and forty representatives who would not call on the
President 1 It was during the session of 1825-26 that
the discordant elements of the opposition coalesced into
a party, 3 the modern democratic party. Near the end
of the session a prominent Virginia politician declared
that the combinations for electing Jackson were already
formed. 1

It was proposed to adopt a constitutional amendment
taking away the contingent power of the House to elect
a President, but no agreement could be reached. A
committee on executive patronage was raised, in reality
to provide electioneering material. This committee re-
ported six bills, the most important of which provided
that the President might not appoint to office any person
who had been a member of Congress during his own
term in the presidential office, and that the President, if
he should remove any officer, should state his reasons
to the Senate on the appointment of a successor. No
action was taken.

The topic, however, on which the opposition most dis
tinctly showed their spirit was the Panama mission
Benton misrepresents that affair more grossly than any
ether on which he touches. The fact is that the opposi

* 7 Adams, 874. The federal members of Congieis womk
tot vMt Madison in 1815. (1 Curtis's Webtter, 135.)

• 1 Ann. Reg. 22. * Ibid

TEE PANAMA M188I0N. 107

turn were forced by their political programme to oppotc
a measure which it was very awkward for them to op
pose, and they were compelled to ridicule and misrepre-
sent the matter in order to coyer their position. Sar-
gent 1 tells a story of an opposition senator, who, when
rallied on the defeat of the opposition in the vote on
confirming the commissioners, replied, " Tea, they have
beaten us by a few votes after a hard battle ; but if they
had only taken the other side and refused the mission,
we should have had them ! "

When the Spaniards withdrew from South America,
in 1824, the newly independent States of South America
and Mexico drew together by natural instinct, and hav-
ing borrowed their new political institutions from the
United States, which institutions were for them exotic
and ill-understood, they sought friendly intercourse with
the Northern Union. There were then questions of in-
ternational law pending, in which the new continent
needed to make a stand against the old. The United
States, on its part, wanted commercial intercourse with
the states of Central and South America. It was pro-
posed by the Central American states to hold a Con-
gress for consultation. This scheme grew into one of a
general American Congress, in which the United States
was asked to join. Adams accepted the invitation and
appointed two commissioners. The question on the con-
firmation of these commissioners, and on appropriating
money for their salaries, gave rise to wordy and violent
debates in Congress, in which very extraordinary doc-
trines were laid down aoout the power of the Executive
in diplomatic affairs. It was declared that the mission
meant a general policy of foreign interference and " e»
1 Sargent, 117.

108 ANDREW JACKSON.

tangling alliances." The Monroe doctrine was veto
tnently denounced. The commissioners were finally con-
firmed. One died on the way; the other arrived to*
ate for the meeting, which took place June 22, 1826.
The Congress adjourned to meet again, but, political
troubles breaking out, nothing came of it Benton says
that the result proved the folly of the original plan. Id
order to judge of that, it is necessary to form some
opinion as to what would have been the advantage polit-
ically to the South American republics of a close and
friendly relation with us, and what would have been the
advantage commercially to us of a close and friendly
relation with them. It is not at all improbable that a
grand chance for good to all concerned was lost. As to
"entangling alliances," the Congress was no doubt a
grand chance for a " jingo " policy. Everything de-
pended on the instructions with which the commis-
sioners were sent The opposition would not print the
instructions, because they plainly refuted all the in-
flated denunciations. It was not until 1829 that public
opinion forced the printing of the instructions, 1 but then
the whole matter was dead. It has passed into history
and popular tradition under a very false light

Adams had strong convictions about points of public
policy. He held that it was the duty of the President
to advise and recommend to Congress such measures as
he thought desirable in the public interest, and then to
leave to Congress the responsibility if nothing was done.
He therefore set out in his messages series of acts and
measures which he thought should be adopted. H«
thereby played directly into the hands of the opposition
lor they then had a complete programme before them ot
They are to be found 4 Ann. Reg. 29.

ADAMS'S POLICY. 109

irhat they had to attack. Adams held the active theory
of statesmanship. He was not content to let the people
done. He thought that a statesman could foresee, plan,
prepare, open the way, set in action, encourage, and
otherwise care for the people. To him the doctrine of
implied powers meant only that the Constitution had
created a government complete and adequate for all the
functions which devolved upon it in caring for all the
interests which were confided to it He regarded the
new land as a joint possession of all the States, the sale
of which would provide funds which ought to be used to
build roads, bridges, and canals, and to carry out other
works of internal improvement, which, as he thought,
would open up the continent to civilization. 1 He cared
more for internal improvements than for a protective
tariff. 1 He wanted a national university and a naval
school. He favored expenditures on fortifications and a
navy and an adequate army. He wanted the federal
judiciary enlarged and a bankruptcy law passed. Some
of the opposition found the party exigency severe which
forced them to oppose all the points in this programme.
In 1824 Crawford had been the only stickler for state
rights and strict construction. Men of that stamp were
now called " radicals." Calhoun and his friends had
been on the other side. The old-fashioned pettifogging
of the strict constructionists, and the cast-iron dogma-
tism of the state-rights men, were developed in the heat
or the factious opposition of 1825-29. All that, how-
ever, was at that time considered extreme or " radical."
Van Buren, on his reelection ta the Senate in 1827,
wrote a letter in which he promised go recover for the
Htates the " rights of which they had been deprived by
* 9 Adams, 162. * 8 Adams, 444.

110 ANDREW JACKSON.

construction," and to save what rights remained. 1 Ham
mond expresses the quiet astonishment which this ere*
ated in the minds of the people, even democrats like
himself, who were not aware that the States had suf
fered any wrong, especially at the hands of the exist-
ing administration. The country was in profound peace
and stupid prosperity, and the rancor of the politicians
seemed inexplicable. The public debt was being re*
funded advantageously. Immigration was large and
growing. The completion of the Erie Canal in 1825
opened up the great lakes to navigation, and the adja-
cent country to settlement. Public affairs were in fact
dull. The following passage from the " Annual Reg-
ister " shows the impression made by the agitation at
Washington : 8 —

" Nearly all the propositions which were called for by
the popular voice were defeated, either from want of
time for their consideration, or by an influence which
seemed to exert itself for the sole purpose of rendering
those who administered the government unpopular. The
community was generally disappointed as to the results
of the session. . . . Many of the members were new to
political life. . . . Others were predetermined to oppo-
sition, and from the first assembling of Congress devoted
themselves to thwarting the measures which its [the ad-
ministration's] friends urged upon the consideration of
Congress. The Vice-President and his friends were most
prominent in this class of politicians. . . . The manner,
too, in which the opposition attacked the administration
displayed an exasperated feeling, in which the comma
nity did not sympathize, and a general suspicion wai
felt that its leaders were actuated by private griefs, and
* 2 Hammond, 246. * 1 Ann. Reg. 149.

ADAMS AND TEE CIVIL SERVICE 111

Jnt the public interests were neglected in their earnest
itrnggle for power. The pride of the country, too, had
received a deep wound in the prostration of the dignity
of the Senate."

Calhoun appointed committees hostile to the adminis-
tration, which could not bring their own party to the
rapport of their reports. Calhoun also ruled that it was
not the duty of the Vice-President to preserve order
save upon the initiative of some senator on the floor.
Great disorder occurred, and John Randolph especially
took advantage of this license. The Senate was led at
the end of the session of 1825-26 to take from the
Vice-President the duty of appointing the committees of
the Senate. Letters which appeared in one of the Wash-
ington newspapers, signed " Patrick Henry," criticising
Calhoun's course, were ascribed to the President. An-
swering letters, signed " Onslow," were ascribed to the
Vice-President. 1

Adams took no steps to create an administration
party. He offered the Treasury to Crawford, who re-
fused it He then gave it to Rush, who had voted
against him. The Secretaries of War and of the Navy
had likewise supported other candidates. 3 Adams re-
fused to try to secure the election of Jeremiah Mason,
an administration man, to the Senate. 3 He had de-
clared, before the election, that he should reward no
one, and proscribe no one. He adhered to this faith-
rally. Clay urged him to avoid pusillanimity on the
one hand, and persecution on the other. 4 The election
being over, Clay said that no officer ought to be allowed
"to hold a conduct in open and continual disparage-

1 Harper's CaUioun, 8! * Perkins, 289.

» 7 Adams, 14. * 6 Adas*. 546.

112 ANDREW JACKSON.

mont of the administration and its head/' Adams re»
plied that, in the particular case under discussion (col*
lector at New Orleans), there had been no overt act
that four fifths of all the custom-house officers had been
unfavorable to his (Adams's) election, and were now in
his power ; that he had been urged to sweep them all
away ; that he could not do this as to one without open-
ing the question as to all, and that he would enter on no
such policy. In 1826 Clay urged Adams to remove
tha custom-house officers at Charleston and Philadelphia-
Adams refused, although he thought that these officers
were using the subordinate offices in their control against
the administration. 1 He appointed federalists when he
thought that they were better qualified than other can-
didates. This did not conciliate the federalists, and it
aroused all " the wormwood and the gall " of the old
party hatred. 3 In 1827 Clay and others urged him to
confine appointments to friends. He refused to adopt
that rule. 8 He expressed the belief that the opposition
were spending money to poison public opinion through
the press, but he would not do anything for Binns, an
administration editor. 4 In June, 1827, he refused to
go to Philadelphia, to make a speech in German to the
farmers at the opening of the canal, because he objected
to this style of electioneering. 5 In October, 1827, Clay
made a warm protest against Adams's action in retain-
ing McLean, the Postmaster-General. Clay alleged that
McLean was using the post-office patronage actively
against the administration. McLean hated Clay and
loved Calhoun, 6 but he claimed to be a loyal friend of

1 7 Adams, 163. 2 7 Adams, 207.

» 7 Adams, 257. * 7 Adams, 262.

• 7 Adams, 297. ° 7 Adams, 364.

ADAMS ON ELECTIONEERING. 118

file administration, Adams would not believe him a
traitor. 1 A campaign story was started that Adams's
Accounts with the Treasury were not in order. Qay
desired that Adams would correspond with an election
committee in Kentucky, and refute the charge. Ad«n«
refused, because he disapproved of the Western style
of electioneering and stump-speaking. 1 Binns, an Irish
refugee, editor of the " Democratic Press " of Phila-
delphia, ought by all affinities to have been a supporter
of Jackson, but he took the wrong turning after Craw-
ford's disappearance, and became a supporter of Adams.
He plaintively describes the results. He tried to talk
to Adams about appointments. " I was promptly told
that Mr. President Adams did not intend to make any
removals. I bowed respectfully, assuring the President
that I had no doubt the consequence would be that he
would himself be removed so soon as the term for which
he had been elected had expired. This intimation gave
the President no concern, and assuredly did in no wise
affect his previous determination."* Binns, however,
was wise in his generation.

Adams's administration had a majority in the Senate
until the 20th Congress met in 1827, when both Houses
had opposition majorities. Adams says this was the
first time in the history of the country that such had
been the case. 4 The session of 1827-28 was almost en-
tirely occupied in manufacturing political capital. A
committee on retrenchment and reform presented a
majority and a minority report. The majority ex-
pressed alarm at the increasing expenditures of the
federal government and tire extravagance of the ad

1 7 Adams, 348. * 7 Adams, 347.

* Binns, 25a * 7 Adsms, 8*7

114 ANDREW JACKBON.

ministration. The minority said that no expenditure*
had been made which Congress had not ordered, and
that the expenditures had not increased unduly, when
the size and population of the countay were considered.
It was charged that large sums had been spent in dec-
orating the President's house, especially the "East
Room." Congress had appropriated $25,000 for the
White House, of which $6,000 had been spent The
rest was returned to the Treasury. As soon as Jack*
son was elected, the " Courier and Enquirer " said that
the " East Room " was very shabby, and would at once
be made decent 1 There was no attempt to be fair or
truthful in these charges. They were made solely
with a view to effect Clamor and reiteration availed
to spread an opinion that the administration had been
extravagant.

The campaign was conducted, on both sides, on very
ruthless methods. Niles said it was worse than the cam-
paign of 1798. 2 Campaign extras of the " Telegraph "
were issued weekly, containing partisan material, ref-
utations of charges against Jackson, and slanders on
Adams and Clay. The Adams party also published a
monthly of a similar character. The country was del*
uged with pamphlets on both sides. These pamphlets
were very poor stuff, and contain nothing important on
any of the issues. They all appeal to low tastes and
motives, prejudices and jealousies. Binns issued a
number of hand-bills, each with a coffin at the head,
known as " coffin hand-bills," setting forth Jackson's
bloody and lawless deeds. 3 One Jackson hand-bill hat,

i Quoted 37 Niles, 229. * 35 Niles, 38.

8 Binns says he issued these hand-bills and was mobbed in 18S4
It seems that his memory failed him.

TONE OF THE CAMPAIGN. 115

ft broad-axe cut of John Quincy Adams driving off with
a horsewhip a crippled old soldier who dared to speak
to him, to ask an alms. In short, campaign literature
took on a new and special development in this cam-
paign, and one is driven to wonder whether the Ameri-
can people of that day were such that all this drivel and
vulgarity could affect their votes. It appears certain
that they had not yet learned the art of reading news-
papers, more especially campaign literature ; an art in
which the average American citizen has since become a
great adept It requires a very active party interest
now to break down the cynicism and skepticism with
which everything in a partisan newspaper is read by an
educated man of forty.

Against Jackson was brought up his marriage, and
all the facts of his career which could be made the sub-
ject of unfavorable comment. Against Adams were
brought charges that he gave to Webster and the fed-
eralists, in 1824, a corrupt promise; that he was a
monarchist and aristocrat ; that he refused to pay a sub-
scription to turnpike stock on a legal quibble ; that his
wife was an Englishwoman ; that he wrote a scurrilous
poem against Jefferson in 1802 ; that he surrendered a
young American servant-woman to the Emperor of
Russia ; that he was rich ; that he was in debt ; that he
had long enjoyed public office; that he had received
immense amounts of public money, namely, the aggre-
gate of all the salaries, outfits, and allowances he had
ever received ; that his accounts with the Treasury wero
not in order; that he had charged for constructive
journeys ; that he had put a billiard-table in the White
House at the public expense ; 1 thai he patronized duel*

1 Ley! Wooibury wai especially shocked at this. (Plumer'i
Pbmtr, 513.)

116 ANDREW JACKSON.

lists (Clay) ; that he had had a quarrel with his father
who had disinherited him ; that he had sent out men in
the pay of the government to electioneer for him; that
he had corrupted the civil service; that he had used
the federal patronage to influence elections. The fed-
eralists, in their turn, charged him with not having kept
his promise to Webster.

McLean's conduct towards the end of Adams's term
caused more and more complaint. He had been a
Methodist minister, and some administration men did
not want him dismissed lest the Methodists should be
offended. 1 Bache, the postmaster at Philadelphia, was
a defaulter. McLean had known it for eighteen months*
Finally he removed Bache, and appointed Thomas Sar-
gent, who had been allied with Ingham, Dallas, and
other Jackson men. Adams would not remove McLean. 9

In October, just before the election, but too short a
time before it to have any effect on it, Adams became
involved in a controversy with William B. Giles about
the circumstances and motives of his (Adams's) going
over to the administration in 1807. On account of reve-
lations which were made in this controversy, Adams was
involved in another with the descendants of the old high
federalists, who called him to account for allegations
that the federalists of 1803-1809 were secessionists.
The controversy developed all the acrimony of the old
quarrel between the Adamses and the high federalists.
John Quincy Adams prepared a full statement of the
facts on which he based his opinions and statements, but
It was not published until 1877. 8

i 7 Adams, 540. * 8 Adams, 8, 25, 51.

* New England Federalism, by Henry Adams. See alio Phi
ner't Plumer, and Lodge't Cabot

THE VOTE IN 1S98. 117

In September, 1827, the Tammany General Commit
tee and the Albany " Argus * came out for Jackson, 1 as
it had been determined, in the programme, that they
ihould do. A law was passed for casting the vote of New
York in 1828 by districts. The days of voting through*
oat the country ranged from October 31st to Novembet
19th** The votes were cast by the Legislature in Dela-
ware and South Carolina ; by districts in Maine, New
York, Maryland, Tennessee; elsewhere, by general
ticket. Jackson got 178 votes to 83 for Adams. The
popular vote was 648,273 for Jackson; 508,064 for
Adams.* Jackson got only one vote in New England,
namely, in a district of Maine, where the vote was, Jack-
son, 4,223 ; Adams, 4,028. 4 New York gave Jackson
20 ; Adams, 16. New Jersey and Delaware voted for
Adams. Maryland gave him 6, and Jackson 5. Adams
got not a single vote south of the Potomac or west of
the Alleghames. In Georgia no Adams ticket was
nominated. 6 Tennessee gave Jackson 44,293 votes,
and Adams 2,240. Parton has a story of an attempt,
in a Tennessee village, to tar and feather two men who
dared to vote for Adams. 6 Pennsylvania gave Jackson
101,652 votes; Adams, 50,848. For Vice-President,
Richard Rush got all the Adams votes ; Calhoun got all
the Jackson votes except 7 of Georgia, which were given
to William Smith, of South Carolina.

General Jackson was therefore triumphantly elected
President of the United States, m the name of reform,

* 3 Hammond, 258 2 Telegraph Extra, 565.

8 8 Ann. Beg. 31. Th« figirei for the popular vote varj ii
different authorities.

* 35 Nilee, \7T. « See page 179.

* 3 Parton, 151.

118 ANDREW JACKSON.

And as the standard-bearer of the people, rising in theif
might to overthrow an extravagant, corrupt, aristocratic,
federalist administration, which had encroached on the
liberties of the people, and had aimed to corrupt elec-
tions by an abuse of federal patronage. Many people
believed this picture of Adams's administration to be
Came. Andrew Jackson no doubt believed it Many
people believe it yet Perhaps no administration, ex-
cept that of the elder Adams, is under such odium.
There is not, however, in our history any administration
which, upon a severe and impartial scrutiny, appears
more worthy of respectful and honorable memory. 1 Its
chief fault was that it was too good for the wicked world
in which it found itself. In 1836 Adams said, in the
House, that he had never removed one person from
office for political causes, and that he thought that was
one of the principal reasons why he was not reelected. 3
The " Annual Register " 8 aptly quotes, in regard to
Adams, a remark of Burke on Lord Chatham : " For a
wise man he seemed to me, at that time, to be governed
too much by general maxims. In consequence of having
put so much the larger part of his opposers into power,
his own principles could' not have any effect or influence
in the conduct of affairs. When he had executed his
plan he had not an inch of ground to stand upon. When
he had accomplished his scheme of administration he
•ras no longer a minister."

1 See Morse's Adams 2 50 Nike, 1M.

* % Ann. Beg. 94.

CHAPTER TL
CHI "relief" system of kentuckt.

Before entering upon the history of Jackson's ad-
ministration it is necessary to notice a piece of local
history, to which frequent subsequent reference most be
made, on account of influences exerted on national poli-
tics. A great abuse of paper money and banking took
place in the Mississippi Valley between 1818 and 1828.
It was an outcome of the application of political forces to
the relations of debtor and creditor. It necessarily fol-
lowed that political measures were brought into collision
with constitutional provisions, and with judicial insti-
tutions as the interpreters and administrators of the
same, in such points as the public credit, the security
ef contracts, the sanctity of vested rights, the indepen-
dence of the judiciary, and its power to pass on the con-
stitutionality of laws. Kentucky was the scene of the
strongest and longest conflict between the constitutional
guarantees of vested rights and the legislative measures
for relieving persons from contract obligations, when the
hopes under which those obligations were undertaken
had been disappointed by actual experience. It was
from Kentucky, also, that the influe^es arose which were
brought to bear on national politics. .

Some very early incidents in the history of Kentucky
mow the spirit which was at work in the later troubles.
4n insurance company was chartered in 1801, an ob-

l20 ANDREW JACKSON.

icure clause in whose charter gave the power to issue
eurrency. At that time the Jeffersonian party wai
onder its anti-hank impulse, and, that party then being
in control, the power to issue currency would not have
been given intentionally. 1 In 1803, Judge Muter, of
the Court of Appeals, " being very poor and rather supev
annuated," was induced to resign by a pension of $300
guaranteed by the Legislature. The following year
the pension was repealed, as being unconstitutional. In
1809 the Bank of Kentucky was founded, with a capital
of a million. The State owned part of the capital stock.
In 1816 great popular hostility was manifested to the
practice of quoting English decisions in the courts.
This was one of Duane's 2 pet points of hostility to the
judiciary. Of course it appealed to popular prejudice.
All the English decisions breathed the spirit of perma-
nent institutions and traditions established to control
moving interests and wishes. A law was passed in
Kentucky forbidding the citation of any English cases
since July 4, 1776. The negative was left out of this
law. The cases were cited in the reports, but were not
read in court. The law fell into disuse.

During the period of inflation east of the Alleghanies
(1812-18), 8 the States west of the Alleghanies had
plenty of silver, and were free from financial disturbance.
At the session of 1817-18, the Legislature of Kentucky
plunged that State into the inflation system by charter-
kng forty banks, which were to issue notes redeemable
in Bank of Kentucky notes. The popular party was
£g$F under the dominion of a mania for banks, as tht
Institutions for making the poor rich. Clamorous ue

1 Collins, 56. ,J See page 369-

9 See page 229.

BANK MANIA. 121

Mads were, at the same time, made for a share in the
blessings which the Bank of the United States was to
shower over the country, and two branches were es-
tablished, one at Lexington and one at Louisville,
Prices immediately began to rise, specie was exported,
contracts were entered into, in the expectation of a con-
stant advance of the " wave of prosperity." All has-
tened to get into debt, because to do so was not only the
way to get rich, but the only way to save one's self from
ruin. In June, 1819, it is reported : " The whole State
is in considerable commotion. The gross amount of
debts due the banks is estimated at ten millions of
dollars. . . . Several county meetings have been held.
Their purpose is : (1) a suspension of specie payments ;
(2) more paper money; (3) an extra session of the
Legislature to pass some laws on this emergency. What
did we tell the people of Kentucky when they littered
their banks?" 1

In 1819 the banks of Tennessee and Kentucky and
nearly all in Ohio suspended specie payments. They
generally ascribed their ruin to the Bank of the United
States. They overissued their notes, which accumulated
in the branch of the bank, that being the strongest
holder. These notes were presented for redemption.
The local banks construed that as " oppression," and
eagerly warded off all responsibility from themselves by
representing themselves as the victims of an alien mon-
ster, which crushed them white they were trying to con-
fer blessings on the people about them. The big bank
was bad enough, but the plea of the local banks was in-
geniously false. It availed, however, to turn the popu-
lar indignation altogether against the Bank of the United
State*

122 ANDREW JACKSON.

Illinois chartered the Bank of Illinois, a private insti
fcution, in 1816 ; also the City and Bank of Cairo, tc
build a city, and to issue notes as a means of getting
other people's capital to do it with. In 1819 the State
Bank of Illinois was founded, 1 but its charter was soon
repealed, because it was too preposterous to stand. An-
other State Bank was founded in 1821, which was a
great paper-money machine, and produced ten years of
confusion and loss. 2 As early as 1816, Illinois had an
endorsement and replevin law.

July 26, 1820, the Bank of Tennessee was established,
to last until 1843, with a branch at Knoxville. Its
amount of issue was a million. Its notes were to be
loaned on mortgage security under an apportionment be-
tween the counties, according to the taxable property
in 1819. 3 There was already a Bank of Tennessee,
which would have nothing to do with the new "bank."
The Legislature of Tennessee also passed a law that both
real and personal property sold under execution should
be redeemable within two years by paying the purchaser
ten per cent advance. Jackson is mentioned as having
been a prominent and energetic opponent of the relief
system. 4 In June, 1821, the Court of Appeals of Ten-
nessee pronounced the replevin law unconstitutional, and
the relief system in that State came to an end. 6

Ohio, Indiana, and Missouri were, at the same period*
more or less entangled in the same system.

In 1817 the circulation of the Bank of Kentucky wai
$417,000. The forty banks and the two branches ol
the national bank went into operation in that year

i 16 Niles, 208 2 Edwards, 165, 174, 904.

• 18 Nile*, 452 ; Gouge, 39. « Ibid.

• SI Nfles, 402.

FORCED LIQUIDATION. 128

The Bank of Kentucky could not therefore sustain its
former circulation. It imported $240,000 in silver, and
reduced its circulation, November, 1818, to $195,000.
Nevertheless, it fell neavily in debt during 1818 and
1819 to the branches of the Bank of the United State. 1
In November, 1819, the latter bank ordered the debt to
be collected. The Bank of Kentucky suspended and
compromised. Its notes were at fifteen per cent dis-
count. A great reduction of the paper was forced, be-
cause the Bank of the United States came in to demand
payment Where any one strong creditor did that the
credit system fell. May 4, 1820, the stockholders of
the Bank of Kentucky voted to suspend specie payments.
This suspension became permanent. Intense rage was
excited against the Bank of the United States, but if the
facts are as alleged the Bank of Kentucky must have
been extending its loans, and if the Bank of the United
States had not called for payment it would have been
forced to stand back, and see the Bank of Kentucky use
the capital of the Bank of the United States as a means
of profit. Kentucky had laid a tax of $60,000 on each
of the branches of the national bank, in January, 1819.
At the same time the Supreme ' Court of the United
States declared the bank constitutional. 3 In December
the Kentucky Court of Appeals unanimously sustained
the state tax, on the ground that the bank was uncon-
•titutional. Two judges thought they must yield to the
Supreme Court of the United States. The third, Rowan,
thought they ought to stand out and force further trial
in the interest of state rights. 8

December 15, 1819, the Legis\ature of Kentucky

Kendall's Autobiography, 203. f See page 128.

1 Kendall's Autobiography % 20?

124 ANDREW JACKSON.

passed, over a veto, a law l to suspend for sixty day*
sales under executions, if the defendant gave bond*
that the goods levied on should be forthcoming at the
end of that time. The Bank of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky was established November 29, 1820, as a
further " relief " measure for the benefit of the debtors,
victims of the forty banks of 1818. As a further meas-
ure of relief a replevin law was passed, December 25,
1820, according to which the debtor was to have two
years in which to redeem, under an execution, unless
the creditor should endorse on the note that he would
take notes of the Bank of the Commonwealth, if the
debtor could pay them. Another act was passed, De-
cember 21, 1821, which forbade the sale of land on
execution, unless it should bring three fourths of its
value as appraised by a jury of neighbors. The Bank
of the Commonwealth was authorized to issue notes for
three millions of dollars. It had no stockholders. The
president and directors were elected annually by the
Legislature. Their salaries were paid by the State.
They were incorporated. The notes were issued in
loans on mortgage security, and were apportioned be-
tween the counties in proportion to the taxable property
in each in 1820. Loans were to be made, in 1820, only
to those who needed them, " for the purpose of paying
his, her, or their just debts," or to purchase the products
of the country for exportation. The bank had twelve
branches. Its funds were to be : all money thereafter
paid in for land warrants, or land west of the Tennessee
river ; the produce of the stock owned by the State in
the Bank of Kentucky after that bank should be wound
op ; the unexpended balances in the treasury at the end
1 Kendall's Autobiography, 227.

judge-breaking: 125

if the year. The profits of the hank were to go to tho
State. Stripped of all pretence, therefore, the hank was
the state treasury, put into the hands of a commission
elected by the Legislature, and incorporated. Its funds
were the current receipts of the treasury from land,
and its current balance, if it had one ; also the capital
already invested in the old bank, whenever that should
be released, which never was done. The notes of the
bank were legal tender to and from the State. The
Legislature appropriated $7,000 to buy books, paper,
and plates for printing the notes. This is all the real
capital the bank ever had. It was, therefore, just one
of the grand swindling concerns common at that period,
so many of which are described in the pages of Niles
and Gouge. 1 4

In 1822 Judge Clark, of the Circuit Court of Ken-
tucky, declared the replevin law of that State unconsti-
tutional. 9 He was cited before the House of Represen-
tatives of the State, and an effort was made to have him
removed by the Governor on the resolution of the Legis-
lature. The vote was 59 to 35 ; not two thirds, as re-
quired by the Constitution for this method of removal.
In this year the Legislature used its power in the election
of directors of the old Bank of Kentucky to put in " re-
lief " men who would make that bank accept Common-
wealth notes. The effect was that the stock of the old
bank at once fell to fifty, and it suspended. 3 In Oc-
tober, 1822, a specie dollar was worth $2.05 in Com-

i See 8 Peters, 118 ; 11 Peters, 257.

* 23 Niles, Supp. 153 ; (supphmen* to the 23d vol.). The
tadge's decision, the legislate proceedings and tbe Judge's dt
fence are there given.

'Collins, 89.

126 ANDREW JACKSON.

monwealth notes. 1 A Kentucky correspondent writes,
February, 1823 : The Bank of the Commonwealth "hai
nearly destroyed all commerce or trade, extinguished
personal credit, and broken down confidence between
man and man, as well as damped and depressed the
industry of the State ; but the people are beginning to get
> tired of its blessings, and its paper-mill will soon cease
working, leaving a debt, however, due to it from the
poorest of the people to the amount of two and a half
or three millions of dollars." 2

In 1823 the notes of the Bank of the Commonwealth
began to be withdrawn and burned. Governor Adair, in
his message of that year, approved of the relief system,
and denounced the courts for deciding the replevin laws
unconstitutional. This proceeding of the courts "Seems
to have been then regarded very generally by the people
of Kentucky as a usurpation by the judges, and an as-
sault on the liberties of the people. After Adair's term
expired, he petitioned for redress, on account of the
payment of his salary in depreciated paper.

In 1823 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky declared
the relief laws unconstitutional. The Legislature, in
January, 1824, affirmed the constitutionality of said
laws, and an issue was made up on the right and power
of courts to annul, on the ground of unconstitutionality,
laws passed by the representatives of the people. Tha
relief system thus brought directly to the test the power
of a system of constitutional guarantees, administered
by an independent judiciary, to protect rights against an
interested and corrupt majority of debtors, which waf

1 &3 Niles, 96.

1 2,1 Niles, 337. Kendall justly described the relief system ia
1821. ( Autobiography, 246.)

OLD COURT AND NEW COURT. 127

■fling its power, under democratic-republican self-govern*
■lent, to rob the minority of creditors. The state elec-
tion of 1824 was fought on the effort to elect a Legis-
lature two thirds of which would memorialize the Gov-
ernor for the removal of the judges who had decided the
relief laws unconstitutional. A majority was obtained,
but not two thirds. Another course was then taken.
The legislative act by which the state judkiary was
organized and the Court of Appeals created was re-
pealed. Reference was made, in defence of this action,
to the repeal of the federal judiciary act, at the begin-
ning of Jefferson's administration. 1 A new Court of Ap-
peals was constituted by a new act. William T. Barry
was appointed chief justice. The old court denied th«
constitutionality of the repeal and of the new court, anl
continued its existence, so that there were two courts.
In 1825 the parties in the State were " Old Court " and
" New Court" a The new court party affirmed, some-
times with vehemence, sometimes with solemnity, that
liberty and republicanism were at stake, and that the
contest was to see whether the judges should be above
the law. The old court party won a majority in the
lower House. The Senate, which held over, was still of
the new court party. The House voted to abolish the
new court, but the Senate did not agree. By this time
the contest had developed a whole school of ambitious,
rising politicians, who appealed with demagogical ad-
dress to the passions and distress of the embarrassed
debtors. In November, 1825, Niles quotes a Ken-
tucky paper that more persons had left that State than
Bad come to it for many years. It is plain *hat two
llassre of persons were driven *way by the relief system
Collins, 9a 2 28 Nile., S77.

128 ANDREW JACKSOX.

(1) those who wanted, by steady industry and accumnl*
tion without borrowing, to acquire capital and to be se-
cure in the possession of it; and (2) those who could not,
under the prevailing depression, work off the mortgages
which they had eagerly given to the Bank of the Com-
monwealth for its notes, in the hope of thus escaping
from old embarrassments. After five years their con-
dition was hopeless, and if they had any energy they
started westward to begin again.

In the mean time there had been a number of decisions
by the Supreme Court of the United States which irri-
tated the people of Kentucky, and enhanced their alarm
about the assaults of the judiciary on liberty. We have
seen how the state banks used the Bank of the United
States as a scapegoat for all their sins, and for all the
bad legislation of the States. The next swing of the
pendulum of popular feeling was over into hatred of the
Bank of the United States. Several States, of which
Kentucky was one, tried to tax the branches out of ex-
istence. In McCulloch vs. Maryland (1819) , x and in
Osborn vs. Bank of the United States (1824), 2 the Su-
preme Court of the United States declared that the
States could not tax the bank. In Sturges vs. Crownin-
shield (1819) , 8 the same court set limits to the state in-
solvent laws and thereby prevented the favor to debtors
wnich the embarrassed States desired to provide. R. M.
Johnson, of Kentucky, proposed an amendment to the
Constitution, January 14, 1822, giving appellate juris-
diction to the Senate in any case to which a State was 9
party, arising under the laws, treaties, etc., of the United
States. 4 In Bank of the United States vs. Halsteat 1

* ft Wheaton, 316. 2 9 Wheaton, 739.

• 4 Wbeaton. 139. * 7 Benton's Abridgment, lift.

ALLEGED FEDEPAL ENCROACHMENTS. 12*

(1825), 1 the Supreme Court decided that it had juris-
iiction in suits to which the Bank of the United States
iras a party, and that a law which forbade sales of land
under execution for less than three fourths of the ap-
praised value did not apply to writs of execution issued
by federal courts. The question of the constitutionality
of such a law was avoided. In Wayman v$. Southard
(1825),* the Supreme Court of the United States decided
that the replevin and endorsement law of Kentucky did
not apply to a writ of execution issued from a federal
eourt. In the Bank of the United States v$. the Plant-
ers' Bank of Georgia (1824),' it decided that if a State
became a party to a banking or commercial enterprise
the State could be sued in the course of the business.
This decision seemed to threaten the Bank of the Com
mon wealth of Kentucky. In Green v$. Biddle (1823), 4
the Supreme Court of the United States decided that
the laws of Kentucky of 1797 and 1812, which reduced
the liability of the occupying claimant of land to the
successful contestant, on account of rent and profits, as
compared with the same liability under the law of Vir-
ginia at the time of the separation, and which in a cor-
responding manner increased the claims of the occupying
claimant for improvements, were null and void, being in
violation of the contract between Kentucky and Virginia
at the time of separation. 6 In Dartmouth College vs.

i 10 Wheaton, 51. * 10 Wheaton, 1.

• 9 Wheaton, 904. 8 Wheaton, 1.

* Kentucky sent to Congress, May S, 1824, a remonstrance
against this decision. Letcher, of Kentucky, introduced a reso-
lution to amend the law, so that more than a majority of judge*
iho^.d be necessary to declare a state law void. (8 Beaton's

fbridgment, bl.)

9

130 ANDREW JACKSON.

Woodward (1819), l the Supreme Court had decided
that the charter of a private corporation was a contract
which a state Legislature might not violate, and had thus
put certain vested rights beyond legislative caprice. 2

Other decisions had also been made, bearing on state
rights and the powers of the federal judiciary in a more
general way. In Martin vs. Hunter's Lessee (1816),*
the constitutionality of the 25th section of the judi-
ciary act (power of the Supreme Court to pass upon
the constitutionality of state laws) was affirmed, and
the authority of the court in a case under a federal
treaty was maintained against the Court of Appeals of
Virginia. In Gibbons vs. Ogden (1824) , 4 the court
overruled the Supreme Court of New York, and declared
an act of the Legislature giving exclusive privileges in
the waters of New York unconstitutional and void. In
Cohens vs. Virginia (1821), 6 it was decided that, if 9
citizen of a State pleads against a statute of his own
State an act of Congress as defence, the 25th section
of the judiciary act gives the federal Supreme Court
jurisdiction to test whether that defence be good. In
the case of the " Marmion " (1823), the Attorney-Gen-
eral of the United States (Wirt) had rendered an opin-
ion 6 (1824) that a law of South Carolina (1822),
according to which any free negro sailors who should
iome into that State on board a ship should be impris-
oned until the ship sailed again, was incompatible with
the Constitution and with the international obligation!
of the United States. The District Court of the Unite*
States had decided (1823) to the same effect. 7

* 4 Wheaton, 518. a 1 Webster's Correspondence, 283.
» 1 Wheaton, 304. * 9 Wheaton, 1. «6 Wheaton, 264,

* I Opinions of the Attorneys-General, 659.
' 25 Nile*, 12.

GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 131

From our present stand-point of established doctrine
hi the points of constitutional law above enumerated,
it is difficult to understand the shocks which many or
all of these decisions gave to the Jeffersonian school of
politicians. The assertion that the reserved rights of
the States had been invaded * is to be referred to these
judicial decisions, not to executive acts. The strict
construction, state-rights school felt every one of these
decisions as a blow from an adversary against whom
there was no striking back, and the fact undoubtedly is
that the Supreme Court, under the lead of Marshall and
Story, was consolidating the federal system, and secur-
ing it against fanciful dogmas and exaggerated theories
which would have made the federal government as
ridiculous as the German Bund. Readers of to-day are
surprised to find that a great many people were alarmed
about their liberties under the mild and timid rule of
Monroe. 9 It was, however, by no means the scholastic
hair-splitters and hobby-riders in constitutional law
alone who were astonished and bewildered by the course
of the decisions. It needs to be remembered that the
system of the Constitution, even after the second war,
was yet, to a great degree, unestablished and unformed.
Actual experience of any legislative act or constitutional
provision is needed to find out how it will work, and
what interpretation its terms will take on from the
growth of institutions and from their inter-action. It is
impossible, upon reading a constitutional provision, to
figure to one's self, save in the vaguest way, what will
be the character and working of the institution which it

1 See page 109-10.

• See Garland's Randolph especially II 211, on Giobovs r*
Ogden.

134 ANDREW JACKSON.

but the Governor vetoed the repeal. 1 It was passed
over his veto December 30, 1826. By resignations
and new appointments among the judges, the court waa
reconstituted as a single anti-relief body in the years
1828-9.

In 1827 the currency of the States in the Mississippi
Valley was fairly good. There remained only $800,000
of Commonwealth paper out, and this was merchandise,
not currency. 2 The bank held notes of individuals to
the amount of one and a half millions, and real estate
worth $30,592. Hence there was due to it a balance
from the public, after all its notes should be paid in, of
$600,000. Its debtors had this to pay in specie or its
equivalent, or else the bank would get their property.
This sum, therefore, fairly represents the net final swin-
dle which the relief system perpetrated on its dupes, to
Bay nothing of its effects on creditors and on the general
prosperity of the State. The bank never had over
$7,000 capital even spent upon it. Its total issue of
bits of paper was printed with the denomination dollars
up to three millions. By this issue it had won $600,000
worth of real property, or twenty per cent in five years*
Who got this gain ? It seems that there must have been
private and personal interests at stake to account for
the rage which was excited by the decisions which
touched this bank, and by the intensity of friendship
. or it which was manifested by a leading political clique.

In 1828 the parties were still relief and anti-relief .
the former for Jackson, the latter for Adams. The
ideas, however, had changed somewhat A "relief*
man, in 1828, meant a state-rights man and strict con*
itructionist, who wanted to put bounds to the supposed
» 31 Nilei 810. 2 32 Niles. 37.

OTHER DECISIONS. 185

encroachments of the federal power, especially the
judiciary, and indeed to the constitutional functions
of the judiciary in general. Metcalf, the anti-relief
candidate for Governor, in 1828, defeated Barry, the
relief candidate, after a very hard fight, 1 hat the State
gave 7,912 majority for Jackson.

Two later decisions of the Supreme Court may here
be mentioned, because they carried forward the same
constitutional tendency which has been described.
They were connected with the political movements
which have been mentioned, and with those which came
later.

In the Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky vs.
Wister et al. (1829),* it was held that the bank must
pay specie on demand in return for a deposit which had
been made with it of its own notes, although these notes
were, when deposited, worth only fifty cents on the
dollar. It had been provided in the act establishing the
bank that it should pay specie. The bank tried to plead
the non-suability of a State, but it was held that, if the
State was sole owner and issued as a sovereign, it would
be non-suable. Then, however, the notes would be bills
of credit. If the State issued as a banker, not a sover-
eign, then it was suable under the decision in the case
of the Planter's Bank of Georgia. In Craig v$. Mis-
souri (1830) , 8 a law of Missouri (1821) establishing
loan offices to loan state currency issues on mortgages
was declared unconstitutional as to the notes issued,
Which were bills of' credit In this decision bills of
credit were defined.

i Collins, 93. * 9 Vetera. Sit.

* 4 Pdteif, 410.

%

CHAPTER VH.

DTCBRKAL HISTORY OF JACKSON'S FIRST ADMDTOTKA
TION.

Jackson came to power as the standard-bearer of a
new upheaval of democracy, and under a profession of
new and fuller realization of the Jeffersonian demo-
cratic republican principles. The causes of the new
strength of democracy were economic. It gained
strength every year. Everything in the situation of the
country favored it. Th£ cotton culture advanced with
great rapidity, and led to a rapid settlement of the
Southwestern States. The Ohio States filled up with a
very strong population. Steamboats came into common
use, and they had a value for this country, with its poor
roads, but grand rivers, bays, sounds, and lakes, such as
they had for no other country. Other forces have al-
ready been mentioned^ Railroads began to be built
just after Jackson's election. The accumulation of
capital in the country was not yet great. It was inade-
quate for the chances which were offered by the opening
up of the continent. Hence the industrial organization
did not take the form of a wages organization. Indi
viduals, however, found the chances of very free and
independent activity, which easily produced a simplt
abundance. The conditions were such as to give to eaclr
a sense of room and power. Individual energy an<*
tnterpris* were greatly favored. Of course, the effect

SOCIAL NOTIONS AND CHANGES. 137

>n the character of the people was certain. They be-
came bold, independent, energetic, and enterprising
.They were versatile, and adapted themselves easily to
circumstances. They were not disturbed in an emer-
gency ; and they were shrewd in dealing with difficul-
ties of every kind. The state constitutions became more
' and more purely democratic, under the influence of this
character j*f the people. Social usages threw off all tho
forms which had been inherited from colonial days.
The tone of mind was developed which now marks the
true, unspoiled American, as distinguished from all
Europeans, although it has scarcely been noticed by the
critics who have compared the two : namely, the tone of
mind which has no understanding at all of the notion
that A could demean himself by talking to B, or that B
could be raised in his own estimation or that of other
people by being spoken to by A, no matter who A and
B might be. Ceremonies, titles, forms of courtesy and
etiquette, were distasteful. Niles did not like it that
members of Congress were called "honorable." 1 He
criticised diplomatic usages. He devoted a paragraph
to denunciation of a fashionable marriage in Boston,
which took place in King's (!) Chapel, and at which the
people cheered the groom. He objected to the term
"cabinet," 3 and said, very truly, that there is no
cabinet in our system. He was displeased by public
honors to the President (Monroe).

The people of the period found themselves happy and
prosperous. Their lives were easy, free from gross
tares, and free from great political anxieties. They
knew little and cared less about other countries. They
irere generally satisfied with some crude notions and
1 37 Niles. S78. 2 40 Niles. 145.

138 ANDREW JACKSON.

easy prejudices about institutions and social states of
which they really had no knowledge. Niles knew no
more of the English Constitution and English politics
than a Cherokee Indian knew of the politics of the
United States. The American people did not think of
their economic and social condition as peculiar or ex-
ceptional. They supposed that any other nation could
be just like the United States if it chose. They
thought the political institutions, or, more strictly, the
political "principles," of this country made all the
difference. They gave their confidence to the great
principles, accordingly, all the more because those prin-
ciples flatter human nature. One can easily discern in
Jackson's popularity an element of instinct and personal '
recognition by- the mass of the people. They felt, u He
is one of us." " He stands by us." " He is not proud,
and does not care for style, but only for plenty of what
is sound, strong, and good." " He thinks just as we do
about this," The anecdotes about him which had the
greatest currency were those which showed him tramp-
ling on some conventionality of polite society, or shock-
ing the tastes and prejudices of people from " abroad."
In truth Jackson never did these things except for effect,
or when carried away by his feelings.

The Jackson party flocked to Washington to attend
the inauguration. " They really seem," said Webster, 1
" to think that the country has been rescued from some
threat danger." There was evidently a personal and
class feeling involved in their triumph. At the in-
auguration ball a great crowd of people assembled wht
had not been accustomed to such festivities. Jacksos

* l Curtis's Webster, 340. On the crowd, see Webster's Cm
rtipcndcnce, 470, 473.

JACKSON'S INAUGURATION. 139

refused to call on Adams* partly because, as he said,
Adams got his office by a bargain, and partly because he
thought that Adams could have stopped the campaign
references to Mrs. Jackson. That lady had died in the
previous December, and Jackson was in a very tender
frame of mind in regard to her memory. 1 Adams was
hurt at the slight pat upon him, and thought that he had
deserved other treatment from Jackson. 1 In March,
1832, B. M. Johnson came to Adams to try to bring
about a reconciliation with Jackson. Nothing came of
it*

The inaugural address contained nothing of any im-
portance. There was a disposition to give Jackson a
fair chance. Every one was tired of party strife, 4 and
there was no disposition in any quarter to make factious
opposition. The opposition had taken the name of
national republicans. They never acknowledged any
succession to the federalists. They claimed to belong
to the true republican party, but to hold national theo-
ries instead of state-rights theories. The Jackson party
was heterogeneous. In opposition it had been held to-
gether by the hope of success, but it had not been
welded together into any true party. No one yet
knew what Jackson thought about any political question.
It had been an unfortunate necessity to send him to the
Senate in 1823. He had made a record on tariff and
internal improvements. His Coleman letter, it is true,
left him safely vague on tariff, but he could only lose.
he could not possibly gain, by making a record on any-

1 The New York American followed her even beyond Hit
grave with a scurrilous epitaph
3 8 Adams, 128. 1 Aiams, 484.

* 5 Ann. Reg. 1.

140 ANDREW JACKSON.

thing. His advantage over the " statesmen " was tnai
every one of them was on record a dozen times on every
pubEe question.

Calhoun had been reelected Vice-President. He now
understood that Jackson would take only one term, and
that he (Calhoun) would have all Jackson's support in
1832. Van Buren, however, who had come into
Jackson's political family at a late date, had views and
ambitions which crossed this programme of Calhoun.
These two men came into collision in the formation of
the cabinet. Jackson introduced two innovations. He
put the Secretaries back more nearly into the place in
which they belong by the original theory of the law.
He made them executive clerks or staff officers. The
fashion has grown up of calling the Secretaries the
President's " constitutional advisers." It is plain that
they are not anything of the kind. He is not bound to
consult them, and, if he does, it does not detract from
his responsibility. Jackson, by the necessity of his
character and preparation, and by the nature of the
position to which he had been elected, must lean on
somebody. He had a number of intimate friends
and companions on whom he relied. They did not
hold important public positions. They came to be called
the "Kitchen Cabinet." The men were William B.
Lewis, Amos Kendall, Duff Green, and Isaac HilL
If the Secretaries had been the " constitutional advisers "
of the President, their first right and duty would have
been to break off the intimacy with these irresponsible
persons, and to prevent their influence. Jackson'J
second innovation was that he did not hold cabinet
councils. Hence his administration lacked unity an<J
discipline. It did not have the strength of hearty ana

JACKS01T8 CABINET. 141

t

jonscioos cooperation. Each Secretary went his way,
and gossip andnewsmongering had a special field of
%ctivhy open to them. The cabinet was not a strong
one. Van Buren was Secretary of State. S. D. Ingb
ham was Secretary of the Treasury. He had been an
active Pennsylvania politician, and a member of the
House for the last seven years. John H. Eaton, of
Kentucky, was Secretary of War. He had married, for
his first wife, one of Mrs. Jackson's nieces, and had been
an intimate friend of Jackson. He was brother-hvlaw
of Lewis. He finished, in 1817, a life of Jackson, which
had been began by Major John Reid. He had been in
the Senate since 1818. John Branch, of North Caro-
lina, was Secretary of the Navy. He had been in the
Senate since 1823. 1 John M. Berrien, of Georgia, wai
Attorney-General. He had been in the Senate since
1824. William T. Barry, of Kentucky, was Postmaster-
General, with a seat in the cabinet, a privilege to which
that officer had not previously been admitted. McLean
passed into high favor with the new administration, and
was asked to keep the postmaster-generalship with its
new rank. When the general proscription began he
would not admit it as to his department. He was trans-
ferred to the bench of the Supreme Court 9 Ingham,
Branch, and Berrien were understood to be the Calhoun
men in the cabinet.

The men wjio controlled the administration were the
members of the kitchen cabinet. Lewis does not ap-
pear to have had any personal ambition. He wanted
to return to Tennessee, but Jackson remonstrated thai
Lewis must not abandon him m the positi m to which h«

1 See page 9 J and note 5.
9 8 A lama, 112.

142 ANDREW JACKtyN.

had been elevated. 1 Lewis was ikade Second Auditol
of the Treasury. He only aske4 for an office with
little work to be done. 2 His character and antecedents
•have already been noticed. Amos ■ Kendall was born in
Massachusetts in 1789. He was It graduate of Dart-
mouth College. In 1814 he went to Washington. In
1815 he was a tutor in Hemy Clay's family. He
edited a newspaper, the " Frank/ort Argus," and prac-
tised law, and was postmaster at Georgetown, Kentucky.
He became a leading "relief"' man, director in the
Bank of the Commonwealth, and as such an enemy of
the Bank of the United States. Many of Clay's old
supporters, who became relief men, were carried over to
Jackson between 1824 and 1828. Kendall was one of
these. He had expected an office from Clay, and was
offered one, but it did not satisfy him. He had an
acrimonious correspondence with Clay in 1828. 8 He
was in debt. Clay was one of his creditors. His war
with Clay won him Jackson's favor. Kendall was an
enigmatical combination of good and bad, great and
small traits. His ability to handle important state ques-
tions and his skill as a politician are both beyond ques-
tion. He prostituted his talents to partisan purposes,
and was responsible for the bad measures adopted by
Jackson as much as any other one man. In his private
character he showed admirable traits of family devotion
and generosity. As a public man he belonged to the
worst school of American politicians. He brought the
vote of Kentucky to Washington, arid was appointed
Fourth Auditor of the Treasury. As time went on he
proved more and more the master spirit of the adminis*

1 3 Parton, 180. « Kendall's Autobiography, 308.

• Ttlegraph Extra, 30ft.

THE KITCHEN CABINET. 148

Irataon. Harriet Martineau wrote of him, in 1836, m
follows: "I was fortunate enough once to catch a
glimpse of the invisible Amos Kendall, one of the most
remarkable men in America. He is supposed to be the
moving spring of the whole administration, the thinker,
planner, and doer ; bat it is all in the dark. Documents
are issued of an excellence which prevents their being
attributed to persons who take the responsibility of
them ; a correspondence is kept up all over the country
for which no one seems to be answerable ; work is done,
of goblin extent and with goblin speed, which makes
men look about them with a superstitious wonder ; and
(lie invisible Amos Kendall has the credit of it all.
. . . He is undoubtedly a great genius. He unites
with his i great talent for silence' a splendid audac-
ity." l She goes on to say that he rarely appeared in
public, and seemed to keep up the mystery. She at-
tributes some of Lewis's work to Kendall, but the pas-
sage is a very fair representation of the opinions of
Washington society about Kendall. He had very great
executive and literary ability. Duff Green was a fighfc
ing partisan editor. He had the virtue of his trade.
He was loyal to the standard to which he had once
sworn. He was a Calhoun man, and he continued to be
a retainer of the most unflinching loyalty. For the
first years of Jackson's administration, Green, as editor
of the " organ," stood on guard all the time to advance
the .cause of the administration. Isaac Hill was born in
Massachusetts in 1788. His education was picked up
va a printing-office. In 1810 he bought and began to
tdit the " Patriot," published at Concord, New Hamp

* 1 Martiueau's Western TYut*, 155. Ot also 1 Society in
America, 4ft.

144 ANDREW JACKSON.

shire. He edited his paper with skill and ability, prop
agating " true republicanism " in partibm infideliunt,
for the people about him were almost all federalists.
He gained adherents. His paper became influential,
and he built up a democratic parly in New Hampshire. 1
He had long favored strict party proscription. In 1818
he remonstrated with Governor Plumer for appointing
a federalist sheriff. 2 He had the rancorous malignity
of those men who have been in a contest with persons
who have treated them from above downwards. He
was not able to carry New Hampshire for Jackson in
1828, but the vote was 24,000 for Adams to 20,600 for
Jackson. Hill was immediately taken into the inner-
most circle at Washington. The election of Jackson
meant that an uneducated Indian fighter had been
charged with the power of the presidency, and that
these four men wielded it through and for him. Van
Buren followed, in order to win the aid of Jackson
for the succession. He did not put forth any guiding
force. Eaton had some share in the kitchen cabinet.
No other member of the cabinet had any influence.
Barry, another relief man, but personally quite insignifi-
cant, was at the disposal of the kitchen cabinet. Henry
Lee had made himself " impossible " by an infamous
.domestic crime. He was offended at the poor share in

1 He had kept a boarding-house, at which members of the
Legislature, etc., boarded. In 1823 he is referred to as a power.
(1 Webster's Correspondence, 324.) During the New Hampshire
election of 1830, forged documents were sent on from Washing-
ton to prove Upham, the anti-Jackson candidate for Governor
guilty of smuggling under the embargo. (39 Niles, 156.) Mason
tiarged Hill with having sent the papers ' . Webster's Corr&
tpondenct, 495.)

* Plumer '§ Plumtr, 471.

THE VICTORB AND THE 8P0IL8. Ill

die spoils offered to him, and withdrew, relieving the
Administration of a load. Edward Livingston was in
the Senate, but no direct influence by him on the ad-
ministration, daring the first two years, is discernible.
The same may be said of Benton. "—

Some vague expressions in the inaugural about " re-
form " and the civil service frightened the office-holders,
who had already been alarmed by rumors of coining
proscription. There was an army of office-seekers and
editors in Washington, who had a very clear and posi-
tive theory that the victory which they had won, under
Jackson's name, meant the acquisition and distribution
amongst them of all the honors and emoluments of the
federal government. They descended on the federal
administration as if upon a conquered domain. The
office-holders of that day had generally staked their ex-
istence on the mode of getting a living which the civil
service offered. It did not pay well, but it was supposed
to be easy, tranquil, and secure. All these persons who
were over forty years of age saw ruin staring them in
the face. It was too late for them to change their
habits or acquire new trades. 1 All the stories by eye-
witnesses testify to the distress and terror of the " ins,"
and the rapacity of the " outs," at that time. It is cer-
tain that the public service lost greatly by the changes.
Sometimes they were made on account of trivial dis-
respect to Jackson. 2 It is not clear who was the author
or instigator of the policy. Lewis is said to have op-

1 Washingt^ removed nine persons, one a defaulter; Adams,
vf&^ftne a defaulter ; Jefferson, thirty-nine ; Madison, five, thret
defaulters; Monroe, nine ; Adams, two, both for cause. (5 inn.
Reg. 19.)

• I Curlfe's Webster, 948.
10

146 ANDREW JACKSON.

posed it. Kendall does not appear to have started with
the intention of proscription. March 24, 1829, h«
wrote to the editor of the Baltimore " Patriot " l i " The
interests of the country demand that the [Fourth Audit-
or's] office shall be filled with men of business, and not
with babbling politicians. Partisan feelings shall not
enter here, if I can keep them out To others belongs the
whole business of electioneering." Probably Jackson
believed that the departments were full of corrupt pep-
sons, and that Adams and Clay had demoralized the
whole civil service, so that a complete change was
necessary. It would be quite in character for Jackson
to take all the campaign declamation literally. One
man, Tobias Watkins, Fourth Auditor, was found short
in his accounts. 9 This seemed to offer proof of all that
had been affirmed. The proscription was really en-
forced by the logic of the methods and teachings of the
party while in opposition. The leaders had been taken
literally by the party behind them, and by the workers,
writers, and speakers who had enlisted under them. If
they had failed to reward their adherents by the spoils,
or if they had avowed the hollowness and artificiality of
their charges against the last administration, they would

1 49 Niles, 43. Cf. Kendall's Autobiography, 292.

2 Adams calls this " the bitterest drop in the cup of my afflic-
tions " (8 Adams, 144) ; and again he says, " The wrong done to
me and my administration by the misconduct of Watkins de-
serves a severer animadversion from me than from Jackson.'

S Adams, 290.) He there depicts Jackson's rancor a gains*
Watkins. Niles describes the virulent political animus of th«
(.cosecution. (36 Niles 421.) After Watkins's term of imprison-
toent was over, he was detained on account of an unpaid fine
By Jackson's personal order a label, " Criminal's Apartment,
irs* put 07er the door of the room in which lie was kept.

ORIGIN OF THE SPOILS SYSTEM.

14 1

hare thrown their party into confusion, and would have
destroyed their power. It has been shown above how
the spoils system had been developed, since the begin-
ning of the century, in Pennsylvania and New York. 1
It is a crude and incorrect notion that Andrew Jackson
corrupted the civil service. His administration is only
the date at which a corrupt use of the spoils of the pub-
lic service as a cement for party organization under
democratic-republican self-government, having been per-
fected into a highly finished" system in New York and
Pennsylvania, was first employed on the federal arena.
The student who seeks to penetrate the causes of the
corruption of the civil service must go back to study the
play of human nature under the political dogmas and
institutions of the States named. He cannot rest satis-
fied with the explanation that " Andrew Jackson did it"
Thirty-eight of Adams's nominations had been pesV
poned by the Senate, so as to give that patronage to
Jackson. Between March 4, 1829, and March 22, 1830,
491 postmasters and 239 other officers were removed,
and as the new appointees changed all their clerks, dep-
uties, etc., it was estimated that 2,000 changes in the
civil service took place. 3 Jackson, as we have seen, had
made a strong point against the appointment of mem-
bers of Congress to offices in the gift of the President.
In one year he appointed more members of Congress to
office than any one of his predecessors in his whole
term.* The Senate, although democratic, refused to
confirm many of the nominations made. Henry Lee,
appointed consul to Algiers, and James B. Gardner,

» Page 102.

* Holmes's speech in the Senate, April 28, '88ft

• 5 Ann. Beg. 20.

Tn-

148 ANDREW JACKSON.

register of the land office, were unanimously rejected.
Others were rejected by large votes. 1 Isaac Hill wax
one of these. Webster said that, but for the fear oi
Jackson's popularity out-of-doors, the Senate would
have rejected half his appointments. 8 The Senate ob-
jected to the obvious distribution of rewards among the
partisan editors who had run country newspapers in
Jackson's influence.* Eaton had visited Binns, and had
made to him a distinctly corrupt proposition to reward
him with public printing, 4 if* he would turn to Jackson.
The rejection of the editors was construed by the Jack-
son men as a proscription of " printers " by the " aristo-
cratic " Senate. 5 Kendall was confirmed by the casting
vote of Calhoun, for fear that he would, if not confirmed,
set up a newspaper in competition with Green's " Tele-
graph " for the position of administration organ. 6 On
subsequent votes some of the appointments were con-
firmed, for it was found that Jackson was thrown into a
great rage against the Senate which dared reject his
appointments. He was delighted when Hill, in 1831,
was elected by the Legislature of New Hampshire a
member of the Senate which had refused to confirm
him as Second Comptroller of the Treasury. Jackson
threw all the administration influence in favor of Hill's
election. Here we have an illustration of a method
of his of which we shall have many illustrations here-
after. When he was crossed by any one in a course in
which he was engaged, he drew back to gather forc«
with which to carry his point in some mode so much
more distasteful to his opponents than his first enterprise

1 5 Ann. Reg. 21. * 1 Webster's Correspondence, 501.

• 1 Webster's Correspondence, 488. 4 Binna, JW.

* Kendall's Autobiography, 370,
t Kendall's Autobiography, 371.

THE EATON AFFAIR. 149

that it would be a kind of punishment to them and a re-
dress to him.

Van Buren and Calhoun at once began to straggle
Cor the control of the patronage which was made dis-
posable by the system of proscription. Their contest
for the succession rent the administration.

It was a very noteworthy met that this administra-
tion, which represented a certain contempt for social
forms and etiquette, should immediately go to pieces on
a question of that kind. ' So true is it that etiquette is
never burdensome until we try to dispense with it

In January, 1829, John H. Eaton married Mrs. Tim-
berlake, widow of a purser in the navy, who had, a
short time before, committed suicide, while on service
in the Mediterranean, because he could not conquer
habits of excessive drinking. Mrs. Timberlake was the
daughter of a Washington tavern keeper. As Peggy
O'Neil she had been well known about Washington.
Eaton had paid her such attention, before her husband's
death, as to provoke gossip. He consulted Jackson be-
fore the marriage. Jackson, having in mind the case of
his own wife, was chivalrously ready to take sides with
any woman whose reputation was assailed. He made
no objection to the marriage. When it occurred, several
persons remonstrated with Jackson about it, on the
ground that Eaton was to be in the cabinet, and that it
would hurt the administration. Jackson replied with
tpirit to the effect that Mrs. Eaton was not to be in the
cabinet If he had kept that attitude towards the matter
there might have been no trouble. By Eaton's appoint-
ment his wife was introduced to the first circle in Wash-
ington The wives of the other Secretaries and the wife
ol the Vice-President did not recognize her. She tried

150 ANDREW JACKSON.

to force her way, and General Jackson tried to help her
He made a political question of it. R. M. Johnson waf
the agent for conferring with the Secretaries to prevail
on them to persuade their wives to recognize Mrs. Eaton.
The gentlemen were approached individually. Each said
that he left such matters to his wife, and could not un-
dertake to overrule her judgment. This answer had no
effect on Jackson. Mrs. Donelson, wife of Jackson's
nephew and private secretary, and presiding lady at the
White House, was as recalcitrant as any one. She was
banished to Tennessee for some months. Mrs. Huyghens,
wife of the Dutch minister, refused to sit by Mrs. Eaton
at a public ball. Jackson threatened to send her hus-
band home. September 10, 1829, he held a meeting of
his cabinet, before which Ely and Campbell, two clergy-
men who were held by Jackson partly responsible for the
stories about Mrs. Eaton, were called to appear. Jack-
son interrogated them, argued with them, and strove
to refute their statements, as a means of convincing the
members of the cabinet that there was no ground for
the position their wives had taken. Of course this fool-
ish and unbecoming proceeding had no result.

Van Buren, being a widower, was in a certain posi-
tion of advantage, which he used by showing Mrs. Eaton
public and private courtesies. In this way he won Jack-
son's heart, for as the matter went on Jackson became
more and more engaged in it On the other hand,
Calhoun suffered in Jackson's, good graces by the fault
of Mrs. Calhoun, who had been conspicuous for dis-
approval of Mrs. Eaton, Jackson had been growing
eold towards Calhoun for some time. He doubted if
Calhoun was thoroughly loyal to him in 1825 l or in

1 Wise (p. 82) says that Jackson was very angry with Calboiu
liter the election in 1825.

JACKSON'S RELATIONS WITH CALHOUN. 15i

1828. He thought that Calhoun, in 1825, would have
made other arrangements than 'those with Jackson, if
any more convenient ones had been offered him. Gal-
honn did, in fact, declare, in 1825, that he was quite
neutral as between Adams and Jackson. He did not
interfere at all with the election. 1 The Eaton affair
was either a pretext or a cause of widening the breach
between them. The factions opposed to Calhoun tried
to increase the bad feeling. Jackson was led to believe,
and he often affirmed, that the attack on Mrs. Eaton
was a plot to drive Eaton out of the cabinet. When
forced to justify his own interference, he put it on this
ground. He said that Clay was at the bottom of the
attack on Mrs. Eaton. All this trouble in the cabinet
remained for the time unknown to the public.

Lewis's statement, given by Parton, 2 covers the his-
tory of all Jackson's relations with Calhoun. Lewis had
an inkling, in 1819, that Calhoun had not, as Jackson
supposed, been Jackson's friend in Monroe's cabinet, in
the Seminole war affair. Lewis wrote to the " Aurora,"
suggesting that opinion, but Jackson wrote to him from
Washington to dismiss any suspicion as to Calhoun's un-
friendliness in that matter. It seems to be necessary to
read between the lines of Lewis's statement, on pages
815-30. Did he not always retain his suspicion of Cal-
houn ? Was he not on the watch for any evidence to
confirm it ? He speaks as if he had rested content with
Jackson's assurance, and had been corrected later by ac-
cident or entirely on the initiative of others. He does
not mention the first attempt made by the old Crawford
men to get over into the Jackson camp. It was not ao
rasy march, for in 1824 the Crawford men, as the " reg

* Cobb. 219. - S Parton, 310.

/

152 ANDREW JACKSON.

olars," hated intensely the Jackson men, as upstart*
and disorganizes. Crawford had carried into his re-
tirement a venomous and rancorous spirit, the chief ob-
ject of which was Calhoun. He could join any one to
hurt Calhoun. In 1828 there was a project to run
Crawford for Vice-President with Adams. 1 Adams re-
fused. 2 Crawford also, in 1828, by private letters to the
Georgia electors, tried to persuade them not to vote for
Calhoun. 8 In the same year he made friends with Clay,
writing to him that the charge of bargain was absurd.
In April, 1827, Van Buren and Cambreleng visited Craw •
ford, and first established ties between him and Jackson.
The first effect was a letter from Crawford to Balch, a
neighbor of Jackson, December 14, 1827, stating that
Calhoun and his friends bandied about the epithet " mili-
tary chieftain ; " also that Calhoun favored Auams until
Clay came out for Adams ; 4 and adding that it would do
Jackson a service to obtain assurances for Crawford that
Jackson's advancement would not benefit Calhoun. 6 This
letter was meant to separate Jackson and Calhoun, and
it may have had a general effect. Specific consequences
cannot be traced to it

According to Lewis's story, James A. Hamilton, on a
Jackson electioneering tour, went to see Crawford, in
January, 1828, in order to reconcile him with Jackson.
Lewis instructed Hamilton what to say to Crawford on
Jackson's part Hamilton did not see Crawford. He
left the business in the hands of Forsyth. Forsyth soon
wrote to Hamilton that Crawford affirmed that Jackson'*

i 33 Niles, 315. * 7 Adams, 390. » Cobb, 240.

4 Cf. Lewis, in 3 Far ton, 31 5, on the allusion to Banqno's gfao#
n "Webster's reply to Hayne.
• 40 Niles, 12.

CRAWFORD'S REVELATION. 163

enmity against him was groundless, since it was not he,
but Calhoun, in Monroe's cabinet, who had tried to have
Jackson censured for his proceedings in Florida in 1818.
In April or May Lewis was in New York. Hamilton
showed him Forsyth's letter. For the time, Lewis kept
thia information quite to himself. He was too clever to
spoil the force of it by using it too soon, and he well un-
derstood how, in the changes and chances of politics, a
conjuncture might arise in which such a fact would gain
tenfold force.

In April, 1828, Henry Lee tried to draw Calhoun into
a correspondence about the construction of the orders to
Jackson in 1818. Calhoun offered to give Jackson any
statements or explanations, but declined to correspond
with any one else. 1

In November, 1829, at the height of the Peggy
O'Neil affair, Jackson gave a dinner to Monroe. At
this dinner Ringold affirmed that Monroe alone stood
by Jackson in 1818. If Ringold did not have his cue,
he was by chance contributing astonishingly to Lewis's
plans. After dinner Lewis and Eaton kept up a con-
versation, within ear-shot of Jackson, about what Ringold
had said. Of course Jackson's attention was soon ar-
rested, and he began to ask questions. Lewis then told
him that he had seen, eighteen months before, the abova-
mentioned letter of Forsyth to Hamilton. Jackson
dispatched Lewis to New York the next morning to get
that letter. In all this story, it is plain how adroitly
these men managed the General, and how skilful they
were in producing " accidents." It is evident that they
did not think it was time yet to bring about the explo*
non Lewis came back from New York without For*
* 40 Nil**, u.

164 ANDREW JACKSON.

lyth's letter, and said that it was thought best to get a
letter directly from Crawford, containing an explicit
statement. In this position the matter rested all winter.
It is perfectly clear that the Jackson managers lost iaith
in Calhoun's loyalty to Jackson and the Jackson party,
and that they were hostile to him in 1827-28, but could
not yet afford to break with him. Jackson clung to his
friendships and alliances with a certain tenacity. As
Calhoun was drawn more and more into nullification,
the Jackson clique took a positive attitude in opposition
to it

In the autumn of 1829 the clique around Jackson had
decided that he must run again, if he should live, in
1832, in order to consolidate the party, which no one
else could lead to victory at that time, and that Van
Buren must succeed him in 1836. 1 Lewis was already
committed to Van Buren, and~Parton brings us some
more of Lewis's invaluable testimony as to this arrange-
ment. 2 Here, for once, a wire-puller put on paper a
clear description of his proceedings in a typical case.
There was fear in the Jackson camp, in 1829, on ac-
count of Jackson's very bad health, that he might not
Live through his term. Lewis says that he and Jackson
were both anxious that Van Buren should succeed Jack-
son, and they believed that, if Jackson should die, a po-
litical testament left by him would have great influence.
Accordingly, Jackson wrote a letter to his old friend,
Judge Overton, of Tennessee, dated December 31, 1829,
praising Van Buren, and expressing grave doubts about
Calhoun. A copy was duly kept, for Judge Overtoi

1 Farton says that Benton was booked for the period 1 844-53
<* Partun, 297.)
8 3 Parton, 293, S*7.

PLOTS FOR 1832. 155

iras nut informed of the contingent use for which the
letter was intended, and no risk was taken as to his
care in preserving the letter. This provision having
been made for the case that Jackson should die, the
next thing was to provide for his reelection, in case he
should live.

December 19, 1829, the " Courier and Enquirer "
came out in favor of Van Buren for the succession, if
Jackson should not stand for reelection. The " Tele-
' graph " was annoyed at this, called it " premature," and
likely to produce division. 1 These two papers, repre-
senting the Van Buren and Calhoun factions in the ad-
ministration party, were engaged, during the winter, in
acrimonious strife. 3 Niles no doubt expressed the senti-
ment of sensible people when he said, April, 1830, that
he did not see the necessity of action on the subject at
that time. His statement, however, only showed how
little he understood the processes by which the people
manifest their power of self-government.

March 11, 1830, Lewis wrote to Colonel Stanbaugh, of
Pennsylvania, suggesting that the Pennsylvania Legis-
lature should address to Jackson an appeal to stand for
reelection. To the end that they might send just the
proper appeal, Lewis inclosed it to them, already pre-
pared for their signatures. Lewis wrote to Stanbaugh
that he did not think it would be wise for Jackson's
friends in Washington to [be known to] lead in the
movement for his reelection, and Pennsylvania, the
stronghold of his popularity, seemed to be the most ad-
vantageous place from which the movement might [ap-
pear to] start. The address came back duly signed
with sixty-eight names. It wia published in the " Penn*
» 37 Nile*, 300. 2 38 Nflet 16*

156 ANDREW JACKSON.

lylvania Reporter," and copied all over the country as a
spontaneous and irrepressible call of the people to the
" old hero " not to desert his country. The enterprise
did not run off quite so smoothly as Lewis's narrative
would imply. There was^trong opposition by the Cal-
houn faction to Jackson's renomination, and a distinct
renomination could not be carried. 1 In April a caucus
of the New York Legislature declared that it responded
" to the sentiment of the Legislature of Pennsylvania."
This caucus was prompted from Washington, and man-
aged by the editor of the " Courier." 2 As soon as the
example was. set, other Legislatures followed it In
January, 1831, the " Globe " said that General Jackson
might be regarded as before the country for reelection.*
April 13, 1830 (Jefferson's birthday), while still the
letter from Crawford was not received, but while Jack-
son's mind was full of suspicion against Calhoun, a
banquet was prepared at Washington, which was in-
tended to be a nullification demonstration. 4 Jackson
gave as a toast, " Our federal Union : It must be pre-
served." This was a bomb-shell to the nulliners, and
a declaration of war against Calhoun, who at the same
banquet offered a toast and made a speech, the point of
which was that liberty was worth more than union.
How much the personal element of growing suspicion
and ill-will towards Calhoun had to do with the attitude
which Jackson took up towards nullification is a matter
of conjecture and inference. His opinions, however,
deduced from hatred of the Hartford convention, had
ilways been strongly favorable to the Union, and the
men in the kitchen cabinet, except Green, were strong

38 Nile*, 170. * Ibid.

• *• Nile*, 385 * 1 Benton, 148.

THE JEFFERSON* B BIRTHDAY BANQUET. 157

CTnhwfUBts, although Jackson and they all were likewise
ftrong state-rights men. Ten years earlier EcLdaU
had maintained the major premiss of nullification with
great zeaL 1

At the same banquet Isaac Hill offered the following
toast and " sentiment :' 9 " Democracy : ' Wherefore do
X take my flesh in my teeth, and put my life in mint
hand ? Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him.' :>
The quotation is from Job xiii. 14, and " he " is usually
interpreted as referring to God. This " sentiment"
therefore exalts democracy higher than any other known
expression, but it is best worth remembering as an il-
lustration of the slave-like spirit which is bred by ad-
herence to absolutist doctrines, whether the absolute
sovereign be an autocrat or a popular majority. All
together, the Jefferson's birthday banquet was a mem-
orable occasion.

A letter from Crawford's own hand, disclosing the
attitude of Calhoun in Monroe's cabinet towards Jack-
son and his proceedings in Florida in 1818, was at last
received about May 1, 1830. In this letter the John
Rhea letter from Jackson to Monroe first comes into
history, and is the pivot on which the whole Seminole
war question, in its revived form, is made to turn.
Crawford said that that letter was produced in the cab-
inet, and that it brought him over to Jackson's side,
but that Calhoun persisted in hostility. Monroe and
every member of his cabinet, when appealed to, denied
lhat the Rhea letter was produced, or brought into con-
sideration in 1818 at all. Jackson immediately, May
13th, inclosed a copy of Crawford's letter to Calhoun,
and demanded an explanation of Calhoun's apparent

* Autobiography, 823. » 38 Nibs, lftfc

158 ANDREW JACZ80*.

perfidy, as he construed it. Jackson's main point in this
letter, which was evidently u copied " for him, is that
Calhoun well knew, by virtue of his position in the cab-
inet, and as he had shown by his orders, 1 that Jackson,
in all that he did, had the approval and connivance of
the administration. This brought out all the tangled
misunderstandings about Jackson's letter to Monroe and
John Rhea's supposed reply. Calhoun at once recog-
nized his position. He could not understand the allu-
sions to previous understandings which had never existed,
but it was plain that Crawford had opened an irreparable
breach between Calhoun and Jackson, and that all the
hopes Calhoun had built upon his alliance with Jackson
were in ruins. He also saw that the whole movement
was a Van Buren victory over him. He replied on
May 20th, complaining and explaining. He really had
no charge to repel. He had done nothing wrong, and
was guiltless of any injustice or perfidy towards Jack-
son. The whole matter was a cabinet secret. Crawford
had violated confidence in making known the nature of
the preliminary discussions which preceded the adoption,
by Monroe's cabinet, of a definite policy as to Jackson's
proceedings. Calhoun was not to blame for any of the
misunderstandings about the previous authorization
which Jackson thought he had received. It seems that
Calhoun might have set forth this position with dignity.
He did not do so. Jackson replied to him, May 30th, in
a very haughty tone, declaring a complete breach be-
tween them on the ground of Calhoun's duplicity. This
letter was plainly prepared by the persons who wera
working on Jackson's strong personal feeling about hif
Florida campaign to bring him to a breach with Cal
1 See page 56.

THE "GLOBE" FOUNDED. 159

koun, and to throw him into a close alliance with Van
Buren. The plan was a complete success. Lewis says
that Jackson sent Calhoun's letter of May 20th to Van
Buren, that he might read it and give advice about it,
bat that Van Buren would not read it because he did
not want to be involved in the affair at alL Lewis
further says that Van Buren had nothing to do with
getting up the quarrel. We may well believe all this*
Lewis was not such a bungling workman in a job of that
kind as to commit his principal to any inconvenient y
knowledge or compromising activity. / k

The quarrel with Calhoun brought on a quarrel with
Don! Green and the " Telegraph." Amos Kendall sent for
Francis P. Blair, an old Kentucky friend and co-worker of
his, and his successor as editor of the " Frankfort Argus."
Blair was then thirty-nine years old. He was another
old Clay man, converted by Kentucky relief politics into
a Jackson man. He was a fanatical opponent of the
Bank of the United States, and strongly opposed to
nullification. Parton says he was forty thousand dollars
in debt. He had been president of the Bank of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, and was indebted to the
Bank of the United States. 1 Blair started the " Globe,"
and took Green's place in the kitchen cabinet, which
now contained a very large element of Kentucky relief
politics. Blair was the prince of partisan editors, a
man made to run an organ. For he was not a mere
mouth-piece. He was independent and able to go alone,
but had infinite tact, discretion, and shrewdness, so that
he was an easy man to work with. The organ, therefore,
worked perfectly. Every expression in it came directly
from the White House. If Blair spoke without consult*
1 Kendall's Autobwapw. 37*

160 ANDREW JACKSON.

tng Jackson, the harmony and sympathy of their ideas
was such that Jackson's mind was correctly interpreted.
If Jackson wanted anything said, Blair was in such
accord that it cost him nothing in the way of conces-
sion to say it He and Kendall went with Jackson
when no one else did, and they were the leading spirits
in the government of the country until 1840. The first
number of the " Globe " was issued December 7, 1830.
Since Blair had no capital, the paper was at first semi-
weekly, but Lewis and Kendall brought their connections
to bear on the office-holders to make them transfer their
subscriptions from the " Telegraph " to the " Globe." *
Parton says that Jackson compelled the departments to
give Blair their printing.

The quarrel between the President and the Vice-Pres-
ident did not become known until the end of the year.
Adams first refers to it in his diary under date of De-
cember 22, 1830. Niles mentions it as a rumor January
29, 1831. In February, 1831, Calhoun published a large
pamphlet about the whole matter. 2 The next thing for
his enemies to do was to get his three friends, Ingham
Branch, and Berrien, out of the cabinet. To this end
those who were in the secret resigned, as a means of
breaking up the cabinet and forcing a reconstruction
Barry was asked to remain in his office. Eaton re-
signed first, April 7, 1831. Van Buren resigned April
11, 1831, in a letter which was so oracular that no one
could understand it. 8 The main ideas in his letter of
resignation and in Jackson's reply were, (1) that Jack
■on did not intend to have any one in his cabinet wha
was a candidate for the succession. This indicated Van
Buren as such a candidate. (2) That the cabinet waf

* 40 Nilea, 318. * 40 Niles, 11. • 40 NUea, 145.

DISRUPTION OF THE CABINET. 161

originally a " unit," and that Jackson wanted to keep hii
cabinet a unit ^ This hint had no effect on the other
Secretaries. They wanted to be dismissed, and a'sepa-
rate quarrel was necessary in the case of each. It was
in this connection that the Peggy (VNeil affair * and all
the old misunderstanding about the Seminole war came
to a public discussion. Van Buren was appointed min-
ister to England, and he went out. At the next session
of Congress a great political conflict arose over his con-
firmation. . When McLane was sent out to England, in
1829, He had instructions from Van Buren to reopen the
negotiations about the West India trade, 2 and, as a basis
for so doing, to point out to the English government that
the party which had brought that question into the posi-
tion in which it then stood had been condemned by the
people at the election. This introduced the internal
party contests of the country into diplomacy, and instead
of representing this nation to foreign nations as a unit,
having, for all its international relations, a continuous and
consistent life, it invited foreigners to note party changes
here, as if they had to negotiate at one time with one
American nation, and at another time with another. The
fact that Van Buren had given these instructions was
alleged as a reason for not confirming his appointment,
but the debate took a wide range. His confirmation
was defeated by the casting vote of Calhoun. This
check to Jackson's plans gave just the requisite spur of
personal pique to his desire to make Van Buren Presi-
dent, and he pursued that purpose from this time on
with all his powers. It was in the debate on Van

1 Webster knew of that affair and its political bearings in Jan
lary, 1830. (I Correspondence, 4$3.)
* See below, page 169.
11

162 ANDREW JACKSON.

Bpren's confirmation that William L. Marcy cynically
avowed the doctrine : "To the victors belong the spoils."

Eaton was in a state of ungovernable rage at the dis*
cuwion of his wife's reputation by the newspapers from
one end of the country to the other. He challenged
Campbell, one of the clergymen mentioned above as
prominent in connection with the scandal. June 18,
1831, he challenged Ingham, Secretary of the Treasury.
Ingham declined to fight. A few days later Ingham
complained to Jackson that he had been waylaid and
hindered in his duties by Eaton, Lewis, Randolph, and
others. They denied that they had molested him, or
had intended to do so. 1 Jackson's plan had been that
Hugh L. White, senator from Tennessee, should resign,
and that Eaton should take his place. White was to be
Secretary of War. 2 White, however, who perhaps was
piqued that he was not made Secretary of War in 1829,
declined to fulfil his share of this programme. He became
alienated from Jackson. Eaton was made Governor of
Florida. From 1836 to 1840 he was minister to Spam.
Parton says he quarrelled with Jackson, and was a whig
in 1840.* He died in 1856. Mrs. Eaton died about
1878.

The new cabinet was: Edward Livingston, of Loui-
siana, Secretary of State ; Louis McLane, of Delaware,
Secretary of the Treasury; Lewis Cass, of Michigan,
Secretary of War ; Levi Woodbury, of New Hampshire
(who had given up to Hill his place in the Senate;,
Secretary of the Navy ; Roger B. Taney, of Maryland,
Attorney-General. Adams mentions a story that the
War Department was offered to William Drayton

i 40 Nfles, 302. 2 Hunt's Living**, 35*

* 3 Parton, 368, 639. See, alio, page 273.

THE NEW CABINET. 163

leader of the Union party of South Carolina. 1 This*
cabinet was a " unit," and a unit for Jackson and the
successor on whom he had determined.

We have now brought the intimate and personal his-
tory of Jackson's first administration down to the time
when the campaign for his reelection opened. We have
teen bow Jackson construed the presidential office in ite
immediate bearings, and how he addressed himself to its
JMiiMulisln and personal duties.

* 9 Adams,!**

CHAPTER Vm.

raUUO QUESTIONS OF JACKSON'S FIRST ADMIN ISTKA
TION. — I.

It is proposed in this and the three following chapters
to take up, in categorical order, the great questions oi
public policy with which Jackson had to deal, to show
how each question stood when he was elected President,
and to show what was done about it, more especially
how he acted upon it, during his first administration
down to December, 1831, when the campaign of 1832
opened.

The first two points to be noticed are questions of
foreign relations.

I. The trade between the United States and the
British West Indies had been a source of irritation and
dissatisfaction ever since the United States had been in-
dependent. Great Britain declined, in 1815, to include
the West Indies in the commercial treaty then nego-
tiated. In the negotiations of 1818, Rush and Gallatin
offered complete reciprocity as to ships and goods, but
England would not give up her colonial system. 1 The
act of Congress of April 15, 1818, was intended to coun-
tervail the English navigation system. It introduced a
policy of retaliation in which, at that time, much faith
was placed. 2 This act provided that no British shipi
ihould come here from any port to which an America!
* i Bush. 417. s g M p^ 197

WEST INDIA TRADE 166

ihip might not go, and that an English ship, dealing
here, should give bonds not to land her cargo where an
American ship might not go. This law hurt the islands.
England then made HalifaY and St John's free ports
for goods in transit to the West Indies. This arrange-
ment drew American products to the ports mentioned,
from which they were taken to the West Indies in Brit*
fen snipe. Negotiations, which were attempted, came to
nothing, because the English insisted on laying differen-
tial duties to favor their northern colonies. By the act
of May 15, 1820, the United States forbade all trade
with the British West Indies in British vessels, and all
importation of British West India goods save in direct
trade from the place of production. This closed the
trade with the British colonies and forced concessions
from England, which greatly strengthened faith in the
"countervailing" policy. By an act of Parliament of
Jane 24, 1822, the British West Indies were opened to
foreign vessels, at specified ports, for specified goods,
subject to the colonial duties and to a ten per cent dif-
ferential duty to favor the products of British North
America. 1 The voyage of an English ship then was to
the United States, thence to Halifax, thence to the West
Indies, thence to England. Monroe's proclamation of
August 24, 1822, responded to the act of Parliament by
opening the ports of the United States to British ships
bearing West India goods, under a differential tonnage
duty of $1.00 per ton, and a differential impost of ten
per cent. Neither an American nor a British vessel
could then bring West India goods from a northern
British colony, nor products of a northern colony from
the West Indies. 2 By the act of March 1, 1823, ths
* 88 Niles, 28. * TvMsnry Circular, 83 Nitot , 84

166 ANDREW JACKSON.

United States confined the trade in English bottoms tt
the direct trade, and the differential tonnage duty was
pat at ninety-six cents. The demand of the United
States then was, to be put on the same footing in the
British West Indies as the British North American col
onies. If this claim had been made on a general free*
trade theory, it would have been wise and laudable, but
in advance of the age. Under the idea of trade which
then prevailed, it was thought to be an unbecoming de-
mand. The King of England, by an order in council,
July, 1823, laid a retaliatory differential tonnage duly of
4*. 3d. per ton on American ships in the West Indies.
Thus the statesmen of the two countries were trying to
see what mischievous devices they could invent to crip-
ple trade, and to treat a ship coming from such a port,
or with such goods, as if it were a pirate or pest-laden.
The English restrictions were aimed at the Americans,
but it was very plain to the West Indians that it was
they, and not the Americans, who bore the weight of all
the taxes and restrictions by which the shipping of
Great Britain was protected and the northern colonies
were favored. The American ships fell back into the
old-fashioned illicit trade, and did more and more of the
business, in spite of all the regulations. The geography
of the islands offered the greatest facilities for such
trade. The islanders connived at it Why should
planters in Jamaica pay ten per went extra duty, at
the bidding of statesmen in England, in order to buv
inferior flour of farmers in New Brunswick ? No men
}f the Anglo-Saxon race have been found who would
thus sacrifice their interests, if they saw the fact, and if
they could in any way help themselves. Adams tells •
tfory which he got from Foot, of Connecticut, who ha*

RELAXATION OF THE NAVIGATION SYSTEM. 167

himself been engaged in the West India trade. He took
u> the West Indies candles, which were subject to heavy
sluty. The inspector said they were not candles, bat
herrings, and passed them. 1

The whole English navigation system was decrepit.
JLs trade expanded, the old policy became impossible.
By the act of Parliament of July 5, 1825, England
divided the powers which had colonies from those which
had none. To the former she offered complete recip-
rocity, metropolis against metropolis, colonies against
colonies. To the latter she offered the same rights in
her colonies which they gave to England and her posses-
sions. Her empire as a whole was pat in reciprocity
with any other empire as a whole, but parts of her em-
pire were to favor each other. The proposition thus
made to all the world was to stand open for a year, and
was to go into operation in favor of any who, within
that time, should give notice of their acceptance of it.
On account of politics in Congress in 1825-26, no action
was taken by the United States. The protectionists here
ridiculed the pretended slackening of the navigation
system, and they made light of all Huskisson's reforms
which were carried out in the same connection, and from
which, in met, modern free trade dates. They thought
they saw interested and sinister reasons for the reforms.
Interested reasons there certainly were, and no others.
There never are, and never ought to be, any others, for
this kind of legislation. The navigation system was so
cumbersome and burdensome that it could not be sus-
tained. The act of 1825 was pitiful enough in com-
parison with sound doctrine, but it was a first breach in
%n old system, which was founded is strong prejudices
snd sustained by powerful interests.
* 7 Adams, 429.

168 ANDREW JACKSON.

July 27, 1826, an order in council was issued, closing
the ports of the English colonies in America, except
Canada and Nova Scotia, to American ships after
December 1, 1826. England now interdicted the trade
which the United States had interdicted in 1820. Galla-
tin had just arrived in England to try to renew negotia-
tions. Canning refused to negotiate, saying that Eng-
land meant to regulate her commercial relations by the
act of Parliament, not by negotiations. England did
not complain, he said, that the United States had not
cared to take what others thought worth having. Eng-
land held that colonial trade was a boon, to be paid for,
if granted at all. The United States held that trade is
its own reward, and is mutually advantageous. 1 The
latter ought to have put itself plainly and consistently
on that doctrine in all its bearings. American protec-
tionism even, at that time, was by no means a barbarian
prejudice against trade, or a sacrifice of national inter-
ests to private cliques, in the measure of their impu-
dence and rapacity. The United States wanted com-
plete reciprocity as to ships and the carrying trade, and
its doctrine was that each nation should arrange its fiscal
system to suit itself ; but it tried to countervail, by taxes
on imports, the taxes laid by foreign nations on Ameri-
can exports of grain, etc. 2 Part of the English regula-
tions belonged to the domestic fiscal system of Great
Britain, but others were part of the navigation system.
Hence the conflict arose.

1 Correspondence, 31 Niles, 269.

2 See below, page 195. Niles, who was a fanatical protection
1st, said, " To all the powers that wish 'free trade/ we say, LeJ
tree trade be ; to all that will restrict us, we say Let restrictioi
%•." (SI Ni'es, 240 : December, 1826.)

MC LANE'S MISSION 169

The matter had now (1827) been brought into a
iiplomatic dead-lock, where the next move most be for
one party or the other to recede from its position. Can*
Ding's sarcasm was not a little to blame for this state of
things. The opposition in the United States made
capital out of the entanglement. In the mean time the
illicit trade went merrily on, and the smuggler rectified,
in his way, the folly of statesmen. Thus the matter
stood when Jackson was elected.

One of his first acts was to send McLane to England
to reopen negotiations. This he was to do by pointing
to the result of the election as a rebuke to the former
administration, which had brought about the dead-lock. 1
Pending the negotiations an act of Congress was passed,
May 29, 1830, authorizing the President to declare the
acts of 1818, 1820, and 1823 repealed, whenever Amer-
ican ships should be allowed in the West Indies on the
same terms as British ships from the United States, and
when they should be allowed to carry goods from the
colonies to any non-British ports to which British ships
might go. This act was sent to England. Lord Aber-
deen said that it was all that England had ever de-
manded.* The colonial duties were raised, a differen-
tial duty in favor of the North American colonies was
laid, and the trade was opened. The President issued
his proclamation October 5, 1830. The administration
coasted of this diplomatic achievement. The truth was
that the United States set out to force England to let
American goods come into the West Indies on the same
footing as British North American goods. England was
doerced by the acts of 1818 and 1820. Canning said,
m 1826, that England had yielded to coercion, but that
CI page 161. 2 39 Niles, 390 fr.

irO ANDREW JACK80N.

the escaped from it as soon as she could. She opened
her trade to all the world as an escape. The counter*
vailing system of the United States, then, no longer exer-
cised any coercion, and the United States, to get the
trade reopened, abandoned the demands with which it
had started on the experiment of countervailing. This
last step was what the Jackson administration had ac-
complished. Niles and the other protectionists scoffed
at the new arrangement. They said that the illicit
trade was hotter than the new arrangement. 1 A proof
that this was true is found in the fact that the illicit
trade went on. The laws forced products of the United
States to reach the islands through Canada and Nova
Scotia, and this offered just so much premium to illicit
Jxade.

II. The claims of the United States for spoliations
against France and against all those states of Europe
which had been drawn by Napoleon into his Continental
system, had been a subject of fruitless negotiation ever
since 1815. 2 Jackson took up these claims with new
energy and spirit. He sent W. C. Hives to France in
1829, under instructions which covered the whole his-
tory of the claims, to try to get a settlement. In his
message of 1829, while these negotiations were pending,
Jackson referred to the claims as likely to " furnish a
subject of unpleasant discussion and possible collision."
This reference was not of a kind to help the negotia-
tions. In 1830 a revolution put Louis Philippe on the
throne under a Constitution. New hopes of a settlement

1 39 Niles, 298 ; 42 Niles, 148.

8 Succinct statements of the origin and history of these claimi
to the report of a minority of the committee of the Howe, 41
Wet. 6, and the article 47 NHes, 455.

TREATY OF PARIS. 171

si the claims were raised by this tarn in affairs. A
treaty was finally signed at Paris, July 4, 1831, by
which France agreed to pay twenty-five million francs,
and the United States agreed to pay one and a half
million francs, in final settlement of all outstanding
claims of citizens of one country against the government
of the other country. The treaty was ratified February
2, 1832. The first instalment became due February
2, 1833. Claims against the other States of the old
Continental league were likewise liquidated, and pay*
ment was secured during Jackson's administration. The
administration derived great credit from these settle-
ments. There was a great deal more in the matter than
the money. European nations, which had similar claims
against France, had secured payment soon after the
peace, but the claims of the United States had been
neglected. Payment now meant a concession of con-
sideration and respect to the United States, and the
people felt that Jackson had won this for the nation.

We have now to notice seven leading questions in the
internal policy of the nation up to and during Jackson's
first term of office : —

I. The federal judiciary had never yet been organ-
ized in such a manner as to discharge its functions satis-
factorily. The federal judiciary act, which was passed
at the close of Adams's administration, was hastily re-
pealed, as a political measure, immediately after Jeffer-
son's accession. The repeal was an error, for the fed-
eral judiciary continued weak and inadequate for lack of
just what that act had provided. After the decisions
on great constitutional points which were rendered be-
tween 1819 and 1825, a parry grew up which was ready
In make any attempt to reorganize the federal judiciarv

172 ANDREW JACKSON.

an occasion for an attack, both on the federal authority
and on the judicial institution. The strongest disposi-
tion so to act was evinced by the Kentuckians. 1

In the session of 1825-26, when a bill for some new
circuits of the Supreme Court was pending, Rowan, of
Kentucky, 2 moved an amendment that seven judges out
of ten (the number which the bill proposed) must con-
cur in order to declare any state law unconstitutional.
The whole bill was lost in a disagreement of the two
Houses.

In the session of 1827-28 a bill was introduced to
regulate the procedure of the federal courts in the new
States which had been admitted since the laws of Sep-
tember 29, 1789, and May 8, 1792, which regulated the
procedure of the federal courts, were passed. To this
bill Rowan proposed an amendment which would take
away from the federal courts the power to modify or
change any of the rules of procedure, or any of the
forms of writs of execution, which were to be those of
the State in which the court was sitting. 8 If this amend-
ment had been passed, the federal courts would not
have been allowed to change rules and forms, but the
state Legislatures would have had power to do so, and
the federal judiciary would have been handed over to
state control. This amendment was adopted by the
Senate. Webster, who had been away, returned to find
that the whole federal judicial system had been thrown
.nto confusion 4 by this hasty proposition, which had
been made only with reference to some of the whims of
Kentucky relief politics. He exposed the effects of the
bilL It was recommitted and recast, establishing foi

1 See chapter VI. * Cf. page 123.

• Cf. page 129. * 7 Adams, 4M.

JEALOUSY OF TEE FEDERAL JUDICIARY. 178

ibe new States the procedure then existing, with powcff
in the courts to modify under the supervision of the
Supreme Court, and in this shape it was passed.

In 1830 an attempt was made to repeal the twenty-
fifth section of the judiciary act, by which the Supreme
Court is empowered to pass upon the constitutionality
of state laws. The bill was lost in the House by the
vote of 137 to 51, but the minority consisted of some of
the leading administration men. In 1831 the House
refused, 115 to 61, to consider a resolution instructing
the judiciary committee to report a bill setting terms of
years for federal judges. 1 In 1830 Berrien gave an
opinion on the South Carolina Police Act, 1 in which he
overturned Wirt's opinion. He held that that act was
valid because it was an act of internal police. In this
opinion he laid down the doctrine of the extreme South-
ern state-rights men about the limits of federal power.
He held that the federal authorities ought not, in exer-
cising their powers, to make laws or treaties to come
into collision with anything which the States had done
under their reserved powers, unless it was necessary to
do so. The admission of black men into the State
was only convenient, not necessary ; hence collision on
that point would be improper.*

The Jackson party and the Executive Department
were on terms of jealousy and distrust with the judiciary
for several years. Another expression of these feelings
was the impeachment of Judge Peck, of Missouri. The
democrats were especially jealous of the prerogative
powers of the court3, among the rest of the power to im-
prison for contempt. Peck wrote out and published in

i 89 Niles, 405. » See page ISO. ,

* S Opinions of the Attorneya-Gf r.eral, 433.

174 ANDREW JACKSON.

% newspaper, in 1826, a decision which he had rendered.
Lawless, counsel for the defeated party, published a ne*
view of the opinion. Peck imprisoned him for twenty-
four hours, and suspended hhn from practice in the
court for eighteen months, for contempt Lawless peti-
tioned the federal House of Representatives during three
sessions for redress, in vain. In 1829 the democratic
House impeached Peck. Buchanan was the leader. 1
The impeachment was in the current of popular feeling,
and there was capital to he made out of it. January
31, 1831, the vote was, 21 to convict, 22 to acquit.
Adams says that Jackson favored acquittal lest Buch-
anan should gain by a conviction, just as Jefferson, in
Chase's case, favored acquittal lest John Randolph
should gain power by a conviction. 2 By an act ot
March 2, 1831, the power of the courts to punish a.
discretion for contempt was limited to cases of misbe-
havior in court, or so near to the court as to obstruct
the administration of justice.

II. The Indians of the Gulf States had been in col-
lision with the Whites ever since the Revolution, when
the Cherokees and Creeks were allied with England.
The government of the United States restrained the
Indians from intercourse with foreign nations, and made
them wards of the nation, but it made treaties with
them as independent tribes, not to say nations. The
history is a monotonous repetition of the same series of
tecis. The Indians occupied as much territory per man
for their hunting-grounds as would have supported a
dozen white families. The Whites gained economic ad

1 Charges and specifications, 38 Niles, 245. Cf., also, 3 K*»
lady's Wirt, 308.
• 8 Adams, 306.

TREATIES BETWEEN GEORGIA AND INDIANS. 175

vantages by spreading themselves thinly over a great
area. Treaties were made by which the Indians ceded
land, and a boundary was drawn. The Whites spread
oyer the territory and up to the boundary. The tw*
races then began to commit outrages on each other.
The Whites made no account of white outrages and
great account _oi red outrages. They set out to chastis*
the Indians. They forced a new treaty, with a new
land cession, established a new boundary, and began the
game process over again.

In November, 1785, Georgia made a treaty with the
Creeks at Galphinton, by which they ceded land. The
Continental Congress was not a party to this treaty, but
it made one with the Cherokees in December of the same
year, 1 at Hopewell. In 1786 Georgia made another
treaty with the Creeks at Shoulder Bone Creek. In
1789 the new federal government sent an agent to in-
vestigate the treaties made by Georgia. He approved of
them, but he failed in his effort to make another on be-
half of the federal government, because McGillivray,
the half-breed chief of the Creeks, opposed any further
treaties. 8 In 1790 McGillivray and several other chiefs
were persuaded to go to New York. There they made a
treaty. Washington's administration was in the attitude
of protecting the Indians against the Georgians. The
?atter were much displeased by the treaty of New York,
because it gave up to the Indians lands which had been
extorted from them at Galphinton. McGillivray died
in 1793, and Georgia, in the same year, made war on
the Creeks. Washington wrote to express strong dis-
Ipproval of this offensive movement on the part of

1 2 Stevens, 4.0 fg.

« See 3 Pickett, 30 fg fot the story of McGilliYray.

176 ANDREW JACKSON.

Georgia. 1 In 1796 the United States made a treaty at
Holston with the Cherokees, by which the latter were
to be subject to the United States only, and to treat with
the United States only. In the same year the federal
Indian Intercourse Act forbade any one to go into the
Indian territories under penalty of fine or imprisonment.
In 1798 the Cherokees made a further cession at Tel-
lico, in a treaty with the United States, by which their
remaining lands were secured to them, and they were
to have their own laws, to which any white person re-
siding amongst them was to be subject. 2 There was an
old treaty of 1777 between Georgia and the Cherokees,
which the former always made the basis of its claims. '
New lands, which were obtained by cession, were, ac-
cording to the practice of Georgia, distributed by lottery
amongst the citizens of the State. Hence the eagerness
for land cessions of the people of that State, and the con-
stantly renewed collisions with the Indians and with the
federal government. In 1802 the United States agreed'
to extinguish the Indian title to lands within the pre-
scribed boundaries of Georgia, "whenever it could be
peaceably done on reasonable terms," and Georgia ceded
1,0 the United States the present States of Alabama and
Mississippi, with the privilege of settling with the Ya-
eoo land-scrip holders, to do which ultimately cost four
jnillion dollars.

Georgia continually pressed the federal government
bo buy off the Indian title to lands in that State, and it
was oSne from time to time for certain portions. The
treaty of 1802 was supposed to cover Georgia's claims
for the expenses of the Indian wars of 1793-94, but

* 2 Stevens, 454 ; 2 Pickett, 144.

• 5 Ann. Beg. 45. 8 2 Kenned/g Wirt, 278.

TREATY OF INDIAN SPRING. 177

those claims were urged until 1827, when Congress voted
$129,375 to discharge them. At the urgent solicitation
of Georgia, Monroe appointed two commissioners to
treat with the Creeks, of whose lands nine and a hall
million acres were still under the Indian title. The
lower Creeks were then on the land west of the Flint
River, and north of 31° 30', and the upper Creeks were
almost entirely in Alabama, between the Coosa river and
the Georgia boundary, and north of an east and west line
through the Hickory Ground (Wetumpka). These boun-
daries were set by Jackson's treaty with the Creeks of
1814, and he guaranteed to them the lands which were
then left to them. 1 The Cherokees were in the north*
western corner of Georgia, the northeastern corner of
Alabama, and the southeastern corner of Tennessee, be-
tween the Chattahoochee, the Etowah, and the Hiwasee
rivers. The Creeks voted to put to death any one who
should vote to sell any more land, and refused to treat
with Monroe's commissioners. After the council broke
up, a few chiefs, headed by Mcintosh, made the treaty
of Indian Spring, February 12, 1825, ceding all their
lands in Georgia and Alabama for $400,000. The Sen-
ate confirmed this treaty, March 3, 1825. April 30th
the Creeks set Mcintosh's house on fire, and shot him as
he came out. Governor Troup of Georgia claimed the
lands for Georgia at once, and began to survey them.
H© also set up a lottery to dispose of them. President
Adams appointed an agent to investigate the negotia-
tion of the treaty. The agent reported that forty-nine
fiftieths of the Creeks repudiated the treaty as a fraud
on them. The President ordered General Gaines to
prevent any trespass on the lands of the Indians, and

1 Folio State Papers, 1 Indwi Affairs, 837
12

178 ANDREW JACKSON.

pointed out to Governor Troup the objections to hu
proceedings. Troup blustered, and asked if the Presi-
dent would hold himself responsible to the State of
Georgia. The Georgia Legislature did not sustain the
Governor. The treaty of Indian Spring was annulled,
and a new one was made in January, 1826, by which a
part of the lands in Georgia were ceded. This treaty
was not confirmed, and another, ceding all 1 the lands
in Georgia, was finally made, as Benton says, by appeal-
ing to the cupidity of the chiefs. The Mcintosh party
got an indemnity, and a large sum was given to the
chiefs. Land was to be provided west of the Mississippi
for all who would go there. This treaty did not satisfy
the Georgians. Nevertheless, inasmuch as by the last
treaty all the lands in Georgia were ceded, and by the
second treaty only part of those lands were ceded, the
Georgians claimed a substantial victory, 9 although not
all the lands in Georgia and Alabama were ceded, as by
the treaty of Indian Spring. The Cherokees still re-
mained undisturbed. In January, 1828, the Georgia
Legislature passed a set of resolutions, the truculency of
which is unparalleled, demanding that the United States
should extinguish the title of the Cherokees. 8

The Cherokees were the most civilized of the Gulf In-
dians, and perhaps they had reached a higher pitch of
civilization than any other Indians have ever yet reached. 4
They had horses and cattle, goats, sheep, and swine. They
raised maize, cotton, tobacco, wheat, oats, and potatoes,
«nd traded with their products to New Orleans. They
cad gardens, and apple and peach orchards. They had
built roads, and they kept inns for travellers. They

1 1 Benton, 59. * Hodgson, 141.

9 8 Ann Reg. t Local History, 143. * 3 Ann. Reg. 77.

CIVILIZATION OF THE INDIANS. 179

manufactured cotton and wool. Probably all this was
very poor in its way. Their numbers were increasing.
In 1825 there were 13,563, besides 220 resident whites
and 1,277 slaves, in the Cherokee country. One of their
number had invented an alphabet for their language.
They had a civil government, imitated from that of the
United States. The Ghickasaws had ten mills and
fifty workshops. They lived in the northeast corner
of Mississippi. They numbered 4,000, and were in-
creasing. The Choctaws, in Central Mississippi, num-
bered 21,000, and ranked next to the Cherokees in civil-
ization. The Creeks numbered 40,000, and were the
lowest in civilization. The money paid them tor their
lands had debauched them. It was the facts that the
Indians had reached a certain grade of civilization, that
they were increasing in numbers, and that they were
forming civilized civil and Christian bodies, which made
all the trouble, for these facts all led to the probability
that the Indians would remain a permanent part of the
society, and would occupy definite areas of land in the
midst of the States. It certainly was a home question,
when, in 1829, Jackson asked whether Maine or New
Tork would tolerate an Indian state within her own
civil limits. Peter B. Porter, Secretary of War under
Adams, prepared a plan for an Indian territory west of
the Mississippi, and for colonizing the Gulf Indians in
t. The plan was referred to the next administration.
Adams made himself very unpopular in the Southwest
by his action to protect the Indians. He did not get a
vote in Georgia In 1828. Jackson had abundantly
ihown 1 that he held the Southwestern white man'
riews of Indians and Indian rights.
1 Seepage**

180 ANDREW JACK80IT.

As soon as Jackson was elected, December 20, 1828 i
Georgia passed a law extending her jurisdiction over the
Cherokee lands and dividing them into counties, and
enacted that no Indian should testify against a white
man. In 1829 she modified this so that an Indian
might testify against a White who lived in the Indian
territory. In 1829 Alabama, and in 1830 Mississippi,
passed similar laws, but somewhat milder. The new
administration admitted the soundness of the theory of
these laws, which were plainly in contravention of the
treaties made with the Indians by the federal govern*
ment. In his message of 1829 Jackson said that he had
told the? Indians that their pretensions would not be sup*
ported. In the spring of 1830 Congress passed an act
for encouraging and facilitating the removal of the Gulf
Indians to a territory set apart for them west of the
Mississippi.

The quarrel between Georgia and the Indians had
now narrowed down to a struggle with the Cherokees,
who were the most civilized, and who had the strongest
treaty guarantees from the federal authority for their
territory and their self-government. It was proposed to
test the proceedings of Georgia before the Supreme
Court of the United States. In the summer of 1830,
Judge Clayton, a Georgia state judge, charged the grand
jury that he intended to allow no case to be withdrawn
Srom his jurisdiction by any foreign authority, but that
he should enforce the state laws about the Indians, and
he wanted to know whether he was to be supported by
the people. 1 The first test arose on a murder case
against George Tassel, a Cherokee, for killing another
Cherokee. The Superior Court of Hall County tried,
* 39 Nik», 99.

GEORGIA AND THE FEDERAL AUTHORITY. 181

sonvicted, and sentenced him. The Chief Justice of tho
Supreme Court of the United States issued a citation to
die State of Georgia, December 12, 1830, to appear and
show cause, in answer to a writ of error, why the sentence
against Tassel should not be corrected. 1 Governor Gil-
mer laid this document before the Legislature, which
ordered him to disregard it, and to resist by force any
attempt to interfere with the criminal law of the State.
On the 28th of December Tassel was hung.

The Governor of Georgia called on the President
to withdraw the federal troops, and leave Georgia to
deal with the Indians and gold-diggers. The President
complied. The Georgia militia marched in, and com-
plaints from the Indians at once began to be heard. The
President refused to enforce the treaty rights of the In-
dians. The Cherokees applied to the Supreme Court
for an injunction to prevent Georgia from interfering
with their treaty rights. In January, 1831, the court,
while in effect sustaining the claims and rights of the
Cherokees, declared that the remedy prayed for could
not be employed. What was needed was not a judicial
but a political remedy.* The political remedy belonged
to the Executive and the President had refused to use it

Georgia ordered all white residents of the Cherokee
country to obtain state licenses, and to take an oath of
allegiance to the State. Two missionaries, sent out by
a Boston society, Worcester and Butler, amongst others,
did not comply with this law. They were arrested, but
were at first released, under the belief that they were
disbursing agents of the federal government. The au-
thorities at Washington denied that they were such.
Thereupon they were rearrested, tried, convicted, and
i a9 Nile*, 338. 8 5 Peters, 1.

182 ANDREW JACKSON.

tondeinned to four year's hard labor in the penitentiary.
In sentencing them Judge Clayton made another stump
ipeech. 1 On a writ of error in 1832, the Supreme Couii
held that the law under which these men were convicted
was unconstitutional, that the laws of Georgia about the
Cherokees contravened federal treaties and were void,
and the men were ordered to be released. 2 Georgia re-
fused to obey. The Georgia doctrine seemed to be that
all three Departments of the federal government must
concur in holding a state law to be unconstitutional in
order to set it aside. 8 Jackson refused to take any exec-
utive action to give force to the decision of the court.
The presidential election was at hand, and he said that
he would submit his conduct to the j>eople, who could at
the election show whether they approved or disapproved
of his refusal to sustain the decision."** "J7o case could
more distinctly show the vice of the political philosophy
which Jackson professed. Twelve persons in all were
convicted, in Georgia, of illegal residence in the Indian
country. All were pardoned. 6 The missionaries refused
at first to accept a pardon. In January, 1833, they with
drew their suit in the Supreme Court, and were re-
leased. 6

In 1833 Alabama came into collision with the federal
government on account of Indians. Federal troops were
employed to expel intruders from the Indian territory.

i 41 Niles, 174. 2 6 Peters, 515.

8 9 Adams, 548.

4 Greeley has a story that Jackson said, " John Marshall haf
made his decision. Now let him enforce it." (1 Greeley, 106.)
Jackson disliked Marshall, although he had no active enmity
fgainst him. Scarcely two men could he found less likely to aj>
tractate each other personally or politically.

* 7 Ann. Beg. 265. « 43 Nile*, 419. -

REMOVAL OF THE QULF INDIAN8. 183

In executing this duty they killed one Owens. The state
authorities attempted to try for murder the soldiers
through whose action the man met his death. The mili-
tary authorities would not consent. The federal govern
ment, taught by nullification, took a firmer position than
in the case of Georgia. By a compromise, the reserva-
tion was made smaller, and the white intruders were al-
lowed to buy titles from the Indians. 1

In September, 1830, a treaty was negotiated at Danc-
ing Babbit Creek with the Choctaws, over whom Missis-
sippi had extended her laws, by which they ceded their
lands and went west of the Mississippi. They were to
be provided with land, transportation, houses, tools, a
year's subsistence, $50,000 for schools, $20,000 a year
for twenty years, $250 each, for twenty years, for four
chiefs, and $500 for another, as president of the nation,
should such an officer be chosen. When this treaty
was before the Senate for ratification the preamble was
stricken out, because it recited that " the President of
the United States has said that he cannot protect the
Choctaw people from the operation of these laws " of
Mississippi.* During the next eight years the tribes were
all half persuaded, half forced, to go. The Indian Terri-
tory was roughly defined by an act of June 30, 1834.
Part of the Cherokees had gone in 1818, because they
wanted to follow their old mode of life. In 1836 all
the rights of the Cherokees east of the Mississippi were
bought for five million dollars and the expenses of re-
moval. 8 In the same year the Creeks broke into hostili-
ties, and were forced to migrate. In 1838 the civilized
Cherokees migrated, except a few, who disappeared as
Indians have disappeared everywhere else.

1*45 Niles, 155 ; Hodgson, 179.

8 40 Niles. 106. • 50 KBes. 26»

CHAPTER IX

PUBLIC QUESTIONS OF JACKSON'S FIRST ADMINIdTSA

hon. — n.

m. The land system of the United States had been
adopted in 1800, when the price was fixed at $2.00 per
acre, and long credit was given, or at tone rate of $1.64
per acre, cash. 1 In 1820 the price was reduced to $1.25
per acre, cash, as a minimum price. There were heavy
arrears due for lands sold on credit. The policy to be
pursued with the lands came to be a great political ques-
tion. The popular notion was that the lands, while
wild and in the hands of the government, were a great
property. The earth's surface is an abode for man, and
a source from which he can get a supply of the things
to satisfy his needs, if he will work hard enough f oi
them. In its natural state the land is only an opec
chance, worth a great deal to a man who has no otkei
chance, but not attractive to a man who has any com-
mand of the resources of life which may be employed
in civilized communities. The earth's surface is not &
toon or gift of nature to man, and cannot be a thin^ of
ralue while wild. To subdue the land to the use of matt
costs hardship, labor, and self-denial. Often it costs dis-
ease, and the premature death of generations. Wnat
(ben, can any one afford to give for wild land ? He can
wily afford to give a remuneration for the survey which
1 Seybert, 354.

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND. 185

secures him a definite description and identification of
the land which he has appropriated, and for the author*
ity of a civil government which protects his tide. If,
then, the purchaser does not occupy and till, he looks to
the demand for land, which will advance as the country
fills up with population, to give him a profit on his out*
lay. He has appropriated part of a natural monopoly,
and advancing demand will give him profit. In the
mean time interest and taxes. are running against him*
Hence it has h appe ned again and again that land spec-
ulators have been ruined in financial revulsions. If the
purchaser occupies and tills the land, he is putting cap-
ital into it all the time, and he and his neighbors, as
they build up a commonwealth, gain incidentally by the
monopoly principle, and by cooperation. Any holder
who seeks only the monopoly profit on raw land is work-
ing against himself, unless he can divide his possessions,
and sell part and withhold part in a judicious adjust-
ment. Then, however, a great capital and a long time
are necessary. The federal government was in this last
position. Its lands, therefore, were not a source of in-
come or a valuable possession to it Down to Septem-
ber 30, 1832, the lands had cost $49.7 million, and the
total revenue received from them had amounted to
$38.3 million.

Various plans for dealing with the lands had been
proposed previous to Jackson's accession. One was that
the States should seize the lands by virtue of their " sov-
ereignty." This short and easy method recommended
itself to the politicians of the emphatic and metaphy-
sical school. It meant simply that the first settlers should
buy some land, organize a State, and get " sovereignty/*
tod then take possession of the rest of the land withia

186 ANDREW JACKSON.

€

the civil jurisdiction. Another plan was to sell to the
States at a nominal price. Another : to sell all the land
at graduated prices, for what it would bring. Another :
to give the land to actual settlers (since realized in the
homestead law). Another: to use the lands as a fund
for internal improvements and education (since realized
in the railroad subsidies and agricultural college land
grants). It is plain that if the federal government buys
territory by treaties like those of Louisiana and Florida,
and surveys the lands, and maintains civil institutions
over all the territory, and then gives the lands away,
what it gives is the outlay necessary to bring the land to
the point where a civilized man can begin to use it. Of
course the new States wanted population, and were
eager that the federal government should encourage im-
migration by making this outlay and giving away the
product of it.

The old States, especially the tariff States, then saw
distinctly the relation of the lands to the tariff. Every-
thing which enhanced the attractiveness of the land and
made it easier to get at it was just so much force draw-
ing the man who had no land and no capital away from
the old States and out of the wages class. Every im-
provement in transportation; every abolition of taxes
and restrictions like the corn laws, which kept American
agricultural products out of England; every reduction
in the price of land, increased the chances of the man
who had nothing, to become by industry and economy
an independent land-owner. The capitalist employer
in the old States was forced to offset this attractiveness
•f the land by raising wages. This of course is the rea-
son why wages in the United States are high, and why
to wages class has ever yet been distinctly differentiated

TARIFF AND LAND. 187

here. ^) It might justly be argued that it was improper
for the federal government to raise funds by taxation on
the old States, and expend them in buying, surveying,
and policing wild land, and then to give the land away
to either " the poor " or the rich ; but the protectionists
distinctly faced the issue which was raised for their pet
dogma, and demanded that the lands should not be sur-
veyed and sold abundantly and cheaply, but should be
kept out of the market. The effect of this would bt
to prevent the population from spreading thinly ovei
the whole continent, to make it dense in the old States,
to raise the value and rent of land there, to produce a
class dependent on wages, i. e., a supply of labor, and
to keep wages down. At the same time all the taxes
on clothing, furniture, and tools would reduce the net
return of the agriculturist and lower the attractiveness
of the land. Lower wages would then suffice to hold
the laborer in the East These two lines of legislation
would therefore be consistent and support each other ;
but they were sorely unjust to the man who had noth-
ing save his stout hands with which to fight the battle
of life and his good-will to work.

The free-trade States of the South and the free-land
States of the West, therefore, fell most naturally into
the " coalition " which the tariff men and national re-
publicans denounced. The latter said that the Southern-
ers had agreed to surrender the lands to the West as a
price for the assistance of the West against the Eastern
States and the tariff. 1 The sudden and unaccountable
popularity of Jackson in rural Pennsylvania threw that
State, in spite of the tariff interests of her capitalists, into
the combination to which Jackson belonged sectionally,
1 9 Adamj, 235.

188 ANDREW JACKSON.

and the ambitious politicians of New York, seeing th«
need 6i joining Jackson, brought as much as they could
of that State to his support These combinations con-
stituted the Jackson party, in regard to the incoherency
of whose elements something has been said and more
will appear. Clay was operating his political career
through tariff and internal improvements, with the lands
as a fund for colonization, canals, roads, and education.
This gave him no strength in the West, and he could
not break Jackson's phalanx in Pennsylvania, where his
own policy should have made him strong. Hence he
never could consolidate a party. Benton antagonized
Clay in the West by taking up the policy of free lands.
In 1827 Rush, Secretary of the Treasury, included in
his annual report a long dissertation on lands, tariff,
and internal improvements. He sees and states dis-
tinctly and correctly the relation between free land and
free trade, restricted land sales and protection. 1 He
makes an argument out of it for protection and for not
selling the lands cheaply, although he does not venture^
positively to urge the latter. He lays down the dogma
that " the creation of capital is retarded by the diffusion
of a thin population over a great surface of soil," — a
dogma which is the very opposite of the truth. He also
declares that the price at which the lands were being
sold was an encouragement by legislation to agriculture,
which is not true, and would not be true unless the
lands were sold for less than the cost of buying, survey-
ing, and policing. The figures above given show that
the lands had been sold as nearly as possible at cost
prce. Leaving out these errors, his recognition of th«
economic relations and their effects is correct ; yet they
i 33 Niles, 950.

FOOT 8 RESOLUTIONS 189

teem to him to sustain an argument for restriction on
trade and restriction on the sales of land, and he dis-
tinctly favors the plan of making it hard for the non-
capitalist to get upon the land, in order that the non-
capitalist may be kept in the old States, and may be
more willing to work there for wages. One thing, at
least, must be admitted to the credit of the statesmen of
that day who believed in the restrictive system. They
did not give away the lands by a homestead law, and
distribute them to railroads which were to render the
new land easily accessible, while they laid restrictions on
imports to encourage manufacturing, and they did not
propose to pay subsidies to ships for bringing goods in,
while they were laying duties to keep goods out Their
system was vicious, but the abuse was perpetrated only
once; it was not multiplied into itself three or four
times. It was based on an error, but the error was at
least logical and consistent with itself.

In January and February, 1829, Illinois and Indiana
adopted resolutions questioning the right of the federal
government to the lands in those States. They did not
adopt the Georgia tone, but they seemed disposed to
adopt the Georgia policy in case of a disagreement with
the federal government

Jackson had no settled policy in regard to land. In
Aiis first message he favored distribution of the surplus
revenue among the States, so soon as the debt should
be paid.

December 29, 1829, Foot, of Connecticut, offered in
toe Senate a resolution that the Committee on Public
uands should inquire into tta expediency of restricting
isles of land to lands not yet sold at the minimum price,
V &, within the areas which up to that time had been

190 ANDREW JACKSON.

pot upon the market. It was in the debate on tint
resolution that Webster and Hayne became involved is
their famous argument on the theory of the confedera-
tion. Benton introduced a bill for selling the lands
at graduated prices, so that those remaining unsold at
$1.25 should not be reserved, but sold at lower prices,
after they had been three years on the market. The
Senate passed this bill May 7, 1830. It was not acted
on in the House.

In January, 1831, the subject came up again in the
House, on an appropriation for surveys, 1 and produced
a long debate, in which all the views of the question were
represented. In his annual report for 1831, MeLane,
Secretary of the Treasury, proposed that the lands
should be sold to the States in which they lay at a fair
price, and that the sum thus obtained should be divided
amongst the States. March 22, 1832, Bibb moved, 3 in
the Senate, that the Committee on Manufactures should
report, as a preliminary to the consideration of the tariff,
on the expediency of reducing the price of the lands,
and also on the expediency of surrendering the lands to
the States. Clay reported from that committee against
both propositions, and in favor of giving ten per cent of
the proceeds of the lands to the new States, in addition
to wh*t they were already entitled to, and dividing the
residue among all the States. Clay's report was re
ferred to the Committee on Public Lands, which re-
ported, May 18th, adversely to his propositions, an*!
recommended a minimum price of $1.00 ; lands remain-
ing unsold at that price for five years to be then sold
for fifty cents ; fifteen per cent ctf the proceeds to be
divided amongst the new States. No action was takei

» < Ann. Reg. 81. » 7 Arm. Reg. 57.

£AE^T POLICY ABOUT IMPROVEMENTS. 191 «/

en account of the disagreement of the two Houses, but
the administration, by its attitude on the land question,
gained strength in the Western States for the presiden-
tial election of 1832.

IV. Internal improvements. In 1802 appropria-
tions were made for a road to the northwestern terri-
tory. In 1807 Gallatin made an elaborate report on
public works, laying down doctrines which no one would
dispute about the advantage of public highways and
means of transportation. The Jeffersonians were timid
on the point of constitutionality, but they did not raise
the question of expediency, and there was no party
question about internal improvements. By the act of
May 11, 1812, provision was made for the survey of a
road from Robinstown, Maine, to St Mary's, Georgia.
This was a north and south road, proposed, in the inter-
est of justice, to offset the Cumberland road from east
to west. The vice of the policy, therefore, presented
itself at once. It was impossible to select only the
enterprises which were of a national character, and
were really demanded by public necessity and con-
venience. Local jealousy and self-interest demanded
u equal " favor, and the enterprises were either all im-
possible, or could be carried out only by log-rolling to
include them all.

February 16, 1816, Calhoun moved for a committee
to inquire into the expediency of setting apart the bonus
«od profits from the Bank of the United States as a
land for internal improvements. At the next session
CU bill to that effect was passed Madison vetoed it,
because the federal government had not the power tc
engage in such enterprises. Monroe declared, in his
first message, that he held the same views as Mad

•*9!

I

92 ANDREW JACKSON,

feon on this subject 1 In 1817 the subject of 'internal
improvements was much agitated, but without action,
on account of Monroe's well-known views on the sub*
ject Popular opinions were strong to the effect that
all government expenditures were a boon or favor which
the government ought to distribute equally, and it was
very common to hear a congressman complain that the
federal government derived more revenue from his dis-
trict than the sums expended there. Congressmen were
also beginning to find out how the public expenditures
could be used to make capital for themselves. May 4,
1822, Monroe vetoed a bill for collecting tolls on the
Cumberland road, and keeping it in repair. In this veto
message he discussed the whole subject of internal im-
provements. He admitted that expenditures for that
purpose were advantageous and proper, if the enter-
prises were national in character; but he objected to
them strenuously when they were local and special, and
he thought that Congress had no constitutional power
to carry them out in either case.

By the act of April 30, 1824, $30,000 were appropri-
ated as an annual appropriation for surveys, to be made
by the board of engineers, of such roads, canals, and
river improvements as the President might designate.
The theory of this act was that the engineers might be'
advantageously employed, in time of peace, in finding
out what works were practicable and likely to be worth
executing. In the session of 1827-28 the whole subject
came up again on a question of passing the annual ap-
propriation of $30,000. The question of internal im
provements then first took on a party character, and
party exigency forced not a few men on either aide It
1 6 Ann. Reg. 68.

VETO OF TEE MAYBVILLE ROAD. VR^/

thange their opinions. Crawford alone of the canchV
dates in 1824 had been understood to be a strict con-
structionist. Calhoun had favored improvements. Clay
was not, at this time, earnestly in favor of them. 1 The
opposition assailed the policy as unconstitutional, and
some of the finest pettifogging of the political scholastics
and casuists was done on this question. Little was said
about the expediency of the policy Oakley, of New
York, in the House, March 1, 1828, declared that
under the act of 1824 the President had been exposed
to a constant assault from Governors, members of Con-
gress, Legislatures, mayors, and corporations, to cause
the surveys for local and private enterprises to be made
at the expense of the United States. The opposition
did not dare to oppose directly all projects under the
vicious system. Their proposition was to distribute
funds for internal improvements to the States. The
appropriation, in 1828, was finally carried, with a pro-
viso that the surveys were to be made only for works of
a national character.

Jackson^in his first message, indicated hostility to
the general policy of internal improvements, and favored
distribution. 9 May 27, 1830, he vetoed a bill for sub-
scription, by the United States, to the stock of the
Maysville and Lexington road. 8 In his veto message he
placed himself on the constitutional doctrine of Madison
Mid Monroe. The local and political interests which
had become involved in the system at this time were
very numerous and very strong. The evil of special

1 7 Adams, 191. * See page 189.

8 This road was to. ran through the strongest Jac&son district
fa Kentucky. | (Claj to* Webster . 1 WebsterV Correspondent*

13

L94 ANDREW JACKSON.

legislation was growing. Politicians and interested
speculators combined to further each other's interests at
the public expense. Jackson affronted the whole inter-
est ; one would say that he affronted it boldly, if it were
not that he acted with such spontaneous will and dis-
regard of consequences that there was no conscious
exercise of courage. He was not able to put an end to
the abuse, but he curtailed it. He used the exceptional
strength of his political position to do what no one else
would have dared to do in meeting a strong and grow-
ing cause of corruption. He held a bill for the Louis-
ville canal, and another for light-houses, over the ses-
sion, and then returned them unsigned. At the session
of 1830-31 a bill for improvements was passed by such
majorities that a veto was useless. In 1831-32 Jackson
signed one such bill and " pocketed " another. In the
session of 1832-33 an internal improvement bill was
defeated by parliamentary tactics. In the message of
1832 Jackson recommended the sale of all the stocks
held by the United States in canals, turnpikes, etc. He
educated his party, for that generation at least, up to a
position of party hostility to special legislation of every
kind.

V. Tariff. The " American system " is an elastic
designation, which can be applied to win a presumption
in favor of whatever one desires to recommend. In our
history it has changed its meaning in every generation
A.s above stated, 1 the United States, between the second
war and 1830, did not favor treaties of commerce. The
fcolicy of treaties of commerce was European. Its
•beory was that, all nations having restrictions on trad*
and regarding them as wise, one nation should break
1 See page 16S.

" RECIPROCITY." 195

down its restrictions to a specified degree and for a
specified counter-relaxation, in favor of another nation
with which it might make a commercial treaty. The
favors and relaxations granted were therefore special
and individual, and the relations of trade between na-
tions were the result of all the special and peculiar
relaxations which had been made, starting from a the-
ory of isolation and prohibition. The United States,
from the first independent acts performed b y it as a
nation with any other nation, the commercial treaty
and treaty of alliance with France in 1778, adopted a
different policy. It started not from an hypothetical
situation of prohibition and isolation, but from an hy-
pothesis of perfect freedom. It tried to get into the
commercial relations of Europe, but it would not grant
any special privileges. Its doctrine was that each na-\
tion, while rendering trade as free as possible, should
be governed in its fiscal arrangements by its own needs,
circumstances, and good judgment, but that, once having
adopted its system, it should present a uniform front
"to foreign nations. This was the "American system"^
in the first generation. In the second generation the
difficulty of combining an independent fiscal system
with commercial treaties led to a prejudice against the
latter, and they were sought almost exclusively for the
sake of receiving reciprocity as to ships and the carry**
ing trade. Then the "American system" underwent
\ change. " Reciprocity " did not mean mutual relaxa-
tion and concession, but retaliation. The United States
departed from the uniformity and independence of its
fiscal system to countervail and resent what it considered
discrimination against itself. There was no case in which
*ny nation placed on products of the United States »

196 ANDREW JACKSON.

heavier tax than was laid on the same products from
hnf other country, save in the case of colonies ; but the
discrimination complained of lay in the selection for
taxation of those commodities which the United States
produced, as a means of protecting the same commod-
tties when produced in the taxing countries. It was
urged that the American system required that the United
States should protect the production at home of products
similar to those which were produced by the country
whJeh taxed the products of the United States. Hence
the American system then meant retaliation to force a
foreign nation to break down its protective system, —
just the policy advocated by the newest school of " re-
ciprocitarians " and " fair traders " in England. Re-
taliation always amounts to just this : Inasmuch as the
other party has cut himself off, by his protective taxes,
from the share which he might have had, through trade,
in our natural advantages, incidentally narrowing the
market for our products, and so injuring us, therefore let
us now, in addition, cut ourselves off, by protective taxes,
from the share which we might obtain, through trade, in
his natural advantages, for the sake of incidentally nar-
rowing the market for his products, and so injuring
him. When the scale of operations is small enough for
the effects to be perceived, retaliation will generally ac-
complish its object ; for it is no satisfaction to us, in the
long run, when we are suffering from harm done us by
somebody, to know that he is hurting himself more ; but
when the scale of operations is large, retaliation is
powerless, because the effects of it then pass under that
great class of things, — the despair of the reformers add
ftocial philosophers, — the things which people do ndt-

"COUNTERVAILING." 197

In 1817 an act was passed to retaliate for certain re*
itrictions laid by Nova Scotia and New Brunswick on
New England ships engaged in the plaster trade. Here
the scale of operations was small and the effects were
immediate and evident The provinces repealed their
restrictions. This instance greatly stimulated faith in
the policy of " countervailing." It was referred to as a
demonstration of the power of that policy. 1 The ap-
plication of it to the West India trade has been noticed.

We have already briefly described the tariff of 1824. 1
In anticipation of the passage of that act large quantities
of woollen goods were imported. In that and the pre-
ceding year manufacturing in England had been very
active, under a pressure of flush times, and in the ex-
pectation of a good market in the South American states,
which had just won their independence. The expecta-
tions were disappointed. On the mania followed the
crisis and panic in 1825. Then large stocks were thrown
on this market and sacrificed for a quick return. In
1825 Huskisson brought forward the first reforms in
the system of taxation. His propositions, viewed from
to-day's stand-point, seem beggarly enough, but at that
time they 'seemed revolutionary. He reduced taxes on
raw materials, chemicals, dye-stuffs, and materials of
industry. Kaw wool was reduced from sixpence to a
Denny and a half penny per pound, according to quality.
After the tariff of 1824 was passed by Congress, the
English woollen producers imported some of their cloths
into this country in an unfinished state, in order to get
them in below the minimum (33 J cents;, and then had
mem finished here. They also sent agents to this coun-
try, to whom they invoiced their cloths below the open
Via Aet price.

1 5 Adams, 41. < 8eo page 76.

198 ANDREW JACK&ON.

Every one of the above statements, as will bo seen*
introduces a fact which affected the relations of the
American woollen industry in its competition with the
English woollen industry in a way to counteract any pro-
tection by the tariff. A number of persons had begun
the manufacture of woollens because the federal legisla-
tion encouraged them so to do, not because they under-
stood that business, or had examined the industrial con-
ditions of success in it. They were pleased to consider
Huskisson's legislation as hostile to the United States,
and they called for measures to countervail it They
also construed as fraud the importation of unfinished
cloths and the practice of invoicing to agents at manu-
facturer's cost. The " American system " therefore un-
derwent another transformation. It now meant to coun-
tervail and offset any foreign legislation, even in the
direction of freedom and reform or advance in civiliza-
tion, if that legislation favored the American consumer.

The first complaint came from the old free-trade sec-
tion. After 1824 the New England States, which up to
that time had been commercial States, turned to manu-
factures. They had resisted all the earlier tariffs. They
would have been obliged to begin manufacturing, tariff
or no tariff, on account of the growing density of the
population ; but there was force in Webster's assertion,
in reply to Hayne, that New England, after protesting
against the tariff as long as she could, had conformed to
a policy forced upon the country by others, and had
embarked her capital in manufacturing. 1 October. 23,
1826, the Boston woollen manufacturers petitioned Con-
gress for more protection. 3 They said that they had
been led, by the profits of the English woollen industry ii
» 3 Webster's Works, 305. * SI Nilei. U5.

TARIFF ON COTTONS AND WOOLLENS. 196

1824 and the tariff of 1824, to begin manufacturing
woollens, confident that they should not yield to fair com-
petition, and that such competition would be secured to
them by law. They went on to say that the English
woollen manufacturers had glutted the market in Eng-
land, and produced distress there, which had reacted on
this country. They said that they could not be relieved
" without the aid of their national government."

This appeal of the woollen manufacturers brought out
new demands from other quarters. Especially the wool-
growers came forward. They had not gained anything
by the tariff. A few shrewd men, who took to breeding
iheep and who sold out their flocks to the farmers (who
were eager buyers, because they were sure, since they
had a protective tax in their favor, that they were to
make fortunes out of wool), won by the tariff. No one
else did. It is stated that the woollen manufacturers did
not dare to ask for higher duties in 1824, because they
feared that the wool-growers would only demand so
much more. 1 They thought that their want of success
was due to want of experience and skill, and they looked
to make improvements. In fact, the tax on wool was
raised, in 1824, more than that on woollens.

By the tariff of 1816 the tax on cottons was fixed for
three years at 25 per cent ; after that at 20 per cent.
This was a direct application of the theory that a protect
ive tax is good to set up an industry, and that it may
then be lowered or removed. The device of the mini-
mum was introduced, however, and all cottons, except
nankeens, which cost less than 25 cents per square yard,
were to be held to have cost 25 cents. By this device
the tax on the lowest grades was made greatly highei
* 9 Ann. Eeg. 102.

200 ANDREW JACKSON.

titan it seemed to be. For the same three years wool
kens were to be taxed 25 per cent ; after that, 20 pel
cent. In 1824 the tax on cottons was put back to 25
per cent, and woollens were raised to 25 per cent i£
worth not above 33 J cents per square yard, and 30 per
cent or 33 J per cent if of greater value. Wool, which
was free in 1816, was graded at 15 per cent, 20 per
cent, and 30 per cent, in 1824.

January 10, 1827, Mallary, of Vermont, introduced the
" woollens bill," for " adjusting " the tariff on wool and
woollens. 1 Niles had taken up the high tariff doctrine
ten years before, and had preached it in his " Register "
assiduously. His economic notions were meagre and
erroneous throughout, and he had absolutely no training.
He had no doubt, however, that he was inculcating the
rules of prosperity and wise government. He unques-
tionably exerted a great influence; for he never tired
of his labored prescriptions for " giving a circulation to
money," and " encouraging industry." He took up the
cause of the woollen men with his whole heart Of his
sincerity and disinterestedness there can be no question.
To him and the economists and statesmen of his school
the minimum seemed to be a marvellous invention. Mal-
lary proposed to use it to the utmost. He proposed to
leave the rates of tax unchanged, but to apply them on
and between minima of 40 cents, $2.50, and $4.00.
Cloth, therefore, which cost 41 cents was to be held to
have cost $2.50, and the tax on it was to be 62 J cents.
Wool which cost over 10 cents was to be held to have
cost 40 cents. The duty on it was to be 35 per cent for
I year ; then 40 per cent. The principle now proposed
rap, therefore, that the duties should advance with time*
1 31 Nile*, 319.

THE "WOOLLENS BxLL." 201

rbe woollens bill passed the House, 106 to 95. ft i
tabled in the Senate by the casting vote of Calhoun.
Calhoun was forced into this vote oy a manoeuvre of
Van Buren, who " dodged." Calhoun suffered, in conse-
quence, in Pennsylvania and New York. Politics ran
very high on this bill. In fact, they quite superseded
all the economic interests. 1 The opposition were afraid
of offending either the Pennsylvania supporters of Jack-
son, or the Southern supporters of Jackson. Passion
began now to enter into tariff discussion, not only on
the part of the Southerners, but also between the wool
men and the woollen men, each of whom thought the
other grasping, and that each was to be defeated in his
purpose by the other. Niles said that it was more a
wool bill than a woollens bill, and the woollen men were
much dissatisfied with it

May 14, 1827, the Pennsylvania Society for the Pro-
motion of Manufactures and the Mechanic Arts called a
convention of wool growers and manufacturers. The
convention met at Harrisburg, July 30, 1827. It was
found necessary to enlarge the scope of the convention
in order to make allies of interests which would other-
wise become hostile. The convention went on the plan
of favoring protection on everything which asked for it.
The result was that iron, steel, glass, wool, woollens,
hemp, and flax were recommended for protection.
Louisiana was not represented, and so sugar was left
out. It was voted to discourage the importation of for-
eign spirits and the distillation of spirits from foreign
products, by way of protection to Western whiskey. The
•onvention proposed, as its idea of a reasonable and
proper tax on wool and woollens* the following:* On

1 81 Niles, 321 ; S3 Niles, 385. * 32 NUm, 888

202 ANDREW JACKSON.

wool which cost 8 cents or less per pound, 20 cents pet
pound and an advance of 2£ cents per pound per an-
num until it should be 50 cents ; on woollens, four
minima were proposed, 50 cents, $2.50, $4.00, and
$6.00, on which the tax was to be 40 per cent for a
year, 45 per cent the next year, and 50 per cent there-
after. The minimum on cottons was to be raised to 40
cents.

When the 20th Congress met, the tariff was the ab-
sorbing question. Popular interest had become engaged
in it and parties were to form on it, but it perplexed
the politicians greatly. It was to this Congress at its
opening that Rush sent the report described above. 1
Stevenson, of Virginia, an anti-tariff man, was chosen
Speaker. Adams says that Stevenson won votes by
promising to make a committee favorable to the tariff. 1
Stevenson put Mallary at the head of the committee,
but he put an anti-tariff majority behind him. The
" Annual Register " 8 stated the foreign trade of the
country then as follows: Twenty-four million dollars'
worth of cotton, rice, and tobacco were exported to
England annually. Four million dollars' worth more
were exported to other countries. The imports from
England were seven or eight millions' worth of wool-
Lens, about the same value of cottons, three or four mil-
lions' worth of iron, steel, and hardware, and miscella-
neous articles, bringing the total up to twenty-eight
millions. From this it was plain that the producers of
bread-stuffs in the United States, who were kept out of
England by the corn laws, were forced to take their
products to the West Indies and South America, and

1 See page 188. * 7 Adams, 369.

• 3 Ann. Reg. 37.

FOREIGN TRADE BALANCE, 1828. 208

•xchange them there for four millions' worth of colo»
nial produce, which England would receive, in order to
balance the account The editor of the " Annual Reg-
ister " built upon this fact his argument for protection
as a retaliation to break down the English corn laws.
He saw that the Southern staple products must be the
fulcrum for the lever by which the English restriction!
were to be broken. He offered the Southerners a cer-
tain consolation in the hope that there would be a larger
consumption of their staples at home, but really con-
cluded that, as between interests, the grain interest of
the North and West was worth more than the interests
of the South. It is not strange if this mode of reason-
ing was not relished in the South. 1

Mallary stated in debate that the consumption of
woollens in the United States was then seventy-two mill-
ion dollars per annum, of which ten millions' worth were
imported, twenty-two millions' worth were manufactured
in the United States, and forty millions' worth were pro-
duced by household spinning and weaving (" domestic
industry," as the term was then used). If these statistics
are worth anything, the twelve millions of population
consumed, on an average, six dollars' worth of woollens
per head per annum. What Mallary proposed to do
was to prevent the ten millions' worth from being im-
ported. To do this he would increase the cost of the
part imported and the part manufactured at home, the
result of which would be that still a larger part of the
population would have to be clothed in homespun.
Thus his project might easily defeat itself, so far as it
timed to benefit the American manufacturer, rod \X
Urould deprive the American people of the rest, leisura
1 See page S#8.

204 ANDREW JACRdON.

and greater satisfaction, as well as abundance, which
new machinery and the factory system were m inning
oat of the textile industries, as compared with the old
household spinning and weaving.

The Committee on Manufactures of the House had
been taking testimony on the tariff during the recess.
The Southern free-traders had brought this about against
the opposition of the Northern protectionists. There
were only twenty-eight witnesses examined, of whom
nine were voluntary and seven were members of Con-
gress. The evidence amounted to nothing but com-
plaints of hard times and losses. 1 The deduction that
these facts were due to a lack of sufficient tariff was
taken for granted. 2

Silas Wright and other anti-tariff men on the Com-
mittee on Manufactures would not let Mallary report
the propositions of the Harrisburg convention on wool
and woollens.* Mallary tried to introduce those propo-
sitions as amendments on the floor of the House. All
the interests, industrial and political, pounced upon the
bill to try to amend it to their notions. New England
and the Adams men wanted high duties on woollens and
cottons, and low duties on wool, iron, hemp, salt, and
molasses (the raw material of rum). Pennsylvania,
Ohio, and Kentucky wanted high taxes on iron, wool,
hemp, molasses (protection to whiskey), and low taxes

1 34 Niles, 1.

2 As a specimen of the value of such complaints : In April.
1828, Niles said that there was dullness in trade and great distress
Ht Baltimore. (34 Niles, 139.) In October he said that he hatf
not been through parts of the city for a long time, and that on •
•aeent walk he had been astonished at th) signs of prosperity

95 Niles, 81.)
• Hammond's Wright, 104.

TARIFF OF 1828. 206

on woollens and cottons. The Southerners wanted low
taxes on everything, bat especially on finished goods,
tnd if there were to be heavy taxes on these latter they
did not care how heavy the taxes on the raw materials
were made. This last point and the unswerving loyalty
of rural Pennsylvania to Jackson enabled the Jackson
party to hold together its discordant elements. The
political and economic alliances of the South were plainly
inconsistent 1

The act which resulted from the scramble of selfish
special interests was an economic monstrosity. The
industrial interests of twelve millions of people had been
thrown into an arena where there was little knowledge
of economic principles, and no information about the in-
dustrial state of the country, or about the special indus-
tries. It being assumed that the Legislature could,
would, and was about to, confer favors and advantages,
there was a scramble to see who should get the most
At the same time party ambitions and strifes seized
upon the industrial interests as capital for President-
making. May 19, 1828, the bill became a law. Tho
duty on wool costing less than 10 cents per pound was
15 per cent, on other wool 20 per cent and 30 per cent
That on woollens was 40 per cent for a year, then 45
per cent, there being four minima, 50 cents, $1.00,
$2.50, $4.00. All which cost over $4.00 were to be
taxed 45 per cent for a year, then 50 per cent. Niles
and all the woollen men were enraged at this arrange-
ment No South Carolinian was more discontented
than they. The " dollar minimum was the especial
taose of their rage. Cloth which cost 51 cents they
tinted to regard as costing $2.50, and to tax it 40 pet
See page 211

206 ANDREW JACKSON.

cent on that, i. e., $1.00. The dollar mini mum let in a
large class of cloths which cost from $1.00 to $1.25,
and which could be run down to cost from 90 to 99
cents.

The process of rolling iron had not yet been intro-
duced into this country. It was argued that rolled iron
was not as good as forged, and this was made the
ground for raising the tax on rolled iron from $30.00 to
$37.00 per ton, while the tax on forged iron was raised
from $18.00 to $22.40. Rolled iron was cheaper, and
was available for a great number of uses. The tax, in
this case, " countervailed " an improvement in the arts,
and robbed the American people of their share in the
advantage of a new industrial achievement The tax on
steel was raised from $20.00 to $30.00 per ton ; that on
hemp from $35.00 to $45.00 per ton ; that on molasses
from 5 cents to 10 cents per gallon ; that on flax from
nothing to $35.00 per ton. The tax on sugar, salt, and
glass remained unchanged, and that on tea also, save by
a differential tonnage duty. Coffee was classified and
the tax reduced. The tax on wine, by a separate act,
was reduced one half or more. 1

This was the " tariff of abominations," so called on
account of the number of especially monstrous provi
lions which it contained. In the course of the debate
on it the dogma was freely used that protective taxes
lower prices, and the exclusion of American grain by
the English corn laws was a constantly effective argu-
ment. Credit varying from nine to eighteen monthf
▼as allowed under this as under the previous tariffs,
1 See page 343.

CHAPTER X.

PUBLIC QUESTIONS OF JACKSON^ WJBfft ADMOTXftA

tion. — m.

YI. Nullification The Southerners Utterly de-
nounced the tariff of 1828. They had already begun
to complain of the operation of the system four or five
years before. To understand their complaint, it is
enough to notice with what reckless extravagance the
tariff theory, even if its truth were admitted, was being
handled in 1828. Of course the public argument in
favor of the tariff necessarily took the form of asser-
tions that, by some occult process or other, the taxation
proposed would be beneficent to all, and that the pro-
tective theory was a theory of national wealth. The
Southerners were sure that they paid the expenses of
the experiment, and they ventured the inference that
those who were so eager for the tariff saw their profit
im it ; but when the attempt was made to find any com-
pensation to the nation or to the South, no such thing
eould be found. Up to that point there was the plain
bet of capital expended and capital gained; at that
point all turned into dogma and declamation.

March 12, 1828, McDuflfie, of South Carolina, pre-
sented a report from the Committee on Ways and
Means 1 against the tariff. He enumerated the varieties
if woollens used by the people, and showed the operation
i 34 Nilet. r.

208 ANDREW JACKSON.

of the minima upon each. He then went on to discoM
the economic doctrines and the theory of protection as a
mode of increasing the wealth of the country, and more
especially the effect of the proposed taxes on the agri-
cultural and exporting sections. The facts and doctrines
stated by him were unanswerable, but they did not
touch either the political motives or the interested pe-
cuniary motives which were really pushing the tariff.
He had all the right and all the reason, but not the
power. The agricultural States ware forced, under the
tariff, either to export their products, exchange them
for foreign products, and pay taxes on these latter to
the federal treasury before they could bring them home,
or else to exchange their products with the Northern
manufacturers for manufactured products, and to pay
taxes to the latter in the price of the goods. All the
mysteries of exchange, banking, and brokerage might
obscure, they never could alter, these actual economic
relations of fact. When the Southerners were put off
with the glib commonplace reply to their remonstrance
that they would sell more cotton to the North, they
were doubly exasperated. If the South, under free
trade, produced 100 bales of cotton, of which it exported
75 bales for $3,750 and sold 25 bales to the North for
$1,250, it got $5,000 for 100 bales. If a ten per cent
tax was laid on manufactures, and if that tax availed,
as argued, to cause only 60 bales to be exported and 40
to be sold at the North, then the 60 exported, at the
«ame price as before, would bring $3,000 worth of man-
ufactured goods, on which ten per cent must be paid to
get them home ; net $2,700. The 40 bales sold at the
North would bring $2,000, at the same price as before
bat goods bought with this $2,000 would be enhance*.

THE SOUTHERN GRIEVANCE. 209

to price ten per cent by the protection, and, as comparer
with former returns, the goods now obtained would oe
worth $1,800. The South would therefore have ob-
tained for 100 bales $4,500 worth of products at the
old free-trade prices. Therefore the difference in the
distribution of the product could make no difference at
all in the facts of profit and the incidence of the tax,
and at the end of the calculation the intricate device
came to nothing but an imposition of ten per cent tax
on the agricultural products of the country.

The .protectionists always affected to deride the South-
ern declaration that the tax fell on the South. The pop-
ular notion was that the tariff tax bore on the foreigner
in some way or other, and helped the domestic producer
to a victory over the foreigner. Since the object of the
tariff was to prevent importations of foreign goods, it
would, if it succeeded, make the foreigner stay at home,
and keep his goods there. This of course deprived him
of a certain demand for his goods, and prevented him
from reaching a gain which, under other conditions, he
Blight have won, but it could not possibly render him or
his capital in any way available for " encouraging Amer-
ican manufactures." The American consumer of Amer-
ican products is the only person whom American laws
eould reach in order to make him contribute capital to
build up American industry. So far, then, as the Amer-
ican protected industries were concerned, they preyed
upon each other with such results of net gain and loss
as chance and stupidity might bring about. So far as
American non-protected industries were concerned, they,
being the naturally strong and independent industries of
the country, sustained the whole body of protected \ur
fastries, which were simply parasites apon them. The
u

210 ANDREW JACKSON.

protective theory, as a theory of wealth, therefore pro*
posed to organize national industry as an independent
body with a parasite upon it, while the free-trade theory
proposed to let industry organize itself as so many in-
dependent and vigorous bodies as the labor, capital, and
land of the country could support.

The grievance of the South in 1828 is undeniable.
So long as the exports of the country were almost ex-
clusively Southern products — cotton and tobacco — and
bo long as the federal revenue was almost entirely de-
rived from duties on imports, it is certain that the
Southern industries either supported the federal govern*
ment or paid tribute to the Northern manufacturers.
The Southerners could not even get a hearing or patient
and proper study of the economic questions at issue.
Their interests were being sacrificed to pretended national
interests, just as, under the embargo, the interests of New
England were sacrificed to national interests. In each
case the party which considered its interests sacrificed
came to regard the Union only as a cage, in which all
were held in order that the stronger combination might
plunder the weaker. No amount of precept or emphasis
can make the Union, which is the paramount civil inter-
est of the American people, strong and permanent, if
any section or party in it has reason to believe that its
interests are sacrificed in the Union; and the Union
neve* can be secure unless there is a disposition in the
predominant majority at any time to listen with patience
to any remonstrance, and to exercise power with moder-
ation and justice.

The more thoroughly the economist and political
philosopher recognizes the grievance of the Southerner*
in 1828, the more bo must regret the unwisdom of thf

VOTES ON TEE TARIFF OF 182S. 211

Southern proceedings. The opponents of the tariff of
1828 adopted the policy of voting in favor of all the
" abominations " on points of detail, in the hope that
Ihey could so weight down the bill that it would at last
tail as a whole. 1 Hence those Southerners who sup-
ported Jackson voted with the Pennsylvania and New
York high-tariff men for all the worst features of the
bill, while New England and the Adams men, who
started as high-tariff men, voted on the other side.
The Southern Jackson men wanted to give way suffi-
ciently on the tariff to secure one or two doubtful States.
For instance, they were willing to protect whiskey and
hemp to win Kentucky from Clay to Jackson. They
were, in fact, playing a game which was far too delicate,
between their economic interests and their political
party affiliations. They were caught at last In the
vote on the previous question in the House, the yeas
were 110, of whom 11 were Adams men and 99 Jackson
men ; the nays were 91, of whom 80 were Adams men
and 11 Jackson men. The nays were those who wanted
a tariff, but who wanted to amend the bill before them
a great deal more before they passed it ; that is, they
wanted to take out the abominations which the anti-
tariff men had voted into it On the final passage of
the bill, the yeas were 105, of whom 61 were Adams
men and 44 Jackson men ; the nays were 94, of whom
35 were Adams men and 59 were Jackson men. Of
the yeas only 3 were from south of the Potomac. The
policy of the Southern free-traders, like most attempts
at legislative finesse, proved an entire failure. The
high-tariff men, although every man had intense objee*
von to something in the bill voted for it rather that
* 35 NOm *9.

212 ANDREW JACKSON.

defeat the bill entirely. The New England men did
not know how to vote. In the end 23 of them voted
against the bill and 16 for it 1 The bill passed the
Senate, 26 to 21. Webster did not know on May 7th
how he should vote. 2 He voted for it, and then went
home and defended the vote on the ground that he had
to take the good and evil of the measure together. 1
After all, the tariff made no capital for anybody. The
protectionists by threatening both parties forced both to
concede the tariff, after which the protectionists voted
with either party, according to their preferences, just as
they would have done if both had resisted instead of
both yielding.

Van Buren obtained " instructions " from Albany to
vote for the tariff, in order to be able to do so without
offending the Southerners. 4 Calhoun declared, in a
speech in the Senate, February 23, 1837, that Van
Buren was to blame for the tariff of 1828.*

The South had already begun to discuss remedies be-
fore the tariff of 1828 was passed. Colonel Hamilton,
of South Carolina, at a public dinner in the autumn of
.1827, proposed " nullification " as a remedy, the term
being borrowed from the Virginia and Kentucky reso-
lutions of 1798. Those resolutions now came to have
for a certain party in the South the character and
authority of an addendum to the Constitution. They

i 35 Niles, 52. * 7 Adams, 584.

« 1 Webster's Works, 165.

* Mackeinzie, 103 ; Hammond's Wright, 105.

6 Green's Telegraph Extra, 271, says Adams wanted to t«U
the tariff of 1828, and throw himself on the South, uniting witk
Calhoun, bat that Clay would not let him do so, because thtf
would rain him and the American system. This is a very doubt
Witory.

THE RESOLUTION 8 OF 2799. 218

irere, in truth, only the manifesto of a rancorous oppo-
sition, and they belong, in the history of the country, in
the same box of curious products of political passion
with the resolutions of the Hartford convention. Yet,
at that time, to call a man a " federalist " would have
been a graver insult throughout the South than it would
be now, in the North, to call a man a secessionist.

An examination of the resolutions of 1798, as they
were adopted, will fail to find nullification in them.
The resolutions, with a number of other most interesting
documents connected therewith, are given by Niles in
a supplement to his 43d volume. By examination of
these it appears that Jefferson's original draft of the
Kentucky resolutions contained, in the eighth resolution,
these words : " Where powers are assumed which have
not been delegated, a nullification of the act is the right
remedy." The Legislature of Kentucky cut out this
and nearly all the rest of the eighth resolution. The
executory resolution, as drawn by Jefferson, ended thus :
' The co-States [he means those States which adopt these
resolutions] . . . will concur in declaring these acts
[the alien and sedition laws] void and of no force, and
will each take measures of its own for providing that
neither of these acts . . . shall be exercised within their
respective territories." The Legislature struck this out,
and adopted, as the executory resolution: "The co-
States . . . will concur in declaring these [acts] void
and of no force, and will each unite with this common-
wealth in requesting their repeal at the next session of
Congress." Some of the other States responded to these
resolutions, and in 1799 Kentucky passed a resolution
tn which occurs this statement : " A nullification by those
lovereignties of all unauthorized acts done under color

216 ANDREW JACKSON.

Anti-radical, and as such was opposed to Georgia*
South Carolina now declared the tariff, internal im-
provements, and appropriations for the colonization so-
ciety unconstitutional. Georgia declared the tariff and
internal improvements unconstitutional; declared that
Georgia would not submit to the action of Congress,
and affirmed the right of secession. 3 The told Crawford
party, however, took sides against nullification, and pre-
vented Georgia from ranging herself with South Caro-
lina. At a meeting at Athens, August 6, 1828, pre-
sided over by Crawford, a committee, consisting of
Wayne, Berrien, Cobb, Gilmer, Clayton, Troup, and
others, reported an address and resolutions denouncing
the tariff, but disclaiming all disunion sentiments or
purposes, and favoring 8 constitutional remedies. In
1832 Crawford advocated a theory that secession was
wrong until after a convention to amend the Constitu-
tion had been tried and proved a failure. 4 North Caro-
lina protested, in 1828, against the new tariff, declaring
that it violated the spirit of the Constitution and opposed
the interests of that State. Alabama denied the con-
stitutionality of the tariff, and denounced it as pillage of
that State.

The proceedings of South Carolina did not remedy
the matter at all. They altered the issue very much to
the satisfaction of the protectionists. The Union and
the supremacy of the law were something on which a
much better fight could be made than on the tariff, and
the protectionists, having secured the law, wanted noth*
ing better than to draw away attention from the criti»
tisni of it by making the fight on nullification. Cal

l 38 Nfles, 154. * 3 Ann. Reg. 64.

» 3b NiJcs, 14. * 42 Nile*, 389.

REASONS FOR EXASPERATION 317

houn and the South Carolinians had changed the fighting \
from free trade to nullification, and on that they stood )
alone. They threw away a splendid chance to secure I
a sound policy on one of the first economic interests I
of the country. In the debate between Webster and
Hayne the latter won a complete victory on tariff and
land. Webster made the fighting on the constitutional
question, and turned away from the other questions al-
most entirely. He had no standing ground on tariff
and land. He was on record in his earliest speeches as
an intelligent free-trader, and his biographer 1 has in-
finite and fruitless trouble to try to explain away the
fact. When Hayne opened the constitutional question
he gave Webster every chance of victory.

The action of Congress in passing the tariff of 1828,
in spite of the attitude of the South, seemed to the
Southerners to indicate an insolent disregard of their
expostulations. Of course it was not a question to be
settled by a majority. A remonstrance against injustice /
and wrong cannot be put down by any majority. There
may be many answers to the remonstrance, or it may
not be practicable to yield to it, but to disregard it and
answer it by a heavier and more reckless imposition of
the same kind is not good government, whether it be a
democratic majority which levies a tariff, or a despot
who levies a forced loan. The supporters of the tariff
were forced to argue that it was a wise public and na-
tional policy, just as it might be argued that a state
church or a state theatre is a beneficial public institution,
vhich it is expedient to support by taxation ; but the
remonstrance of one man, paying only one dollar tax,
rho should say that he did not believe in these institw
» 1 Carta's Wtbtter, 307 fg.

218 ANDREW JACKSON.

tions, and did not want to contribute to their support,
would at least be entitled to respectful consideration in
any Legislature, and it would suffice to condemn, in
the forum of political philosophy, the policy of support*
ing such institutions by taxation. In the winter of
1828-29 the South Carolina Legislature sent to the Sen-
ate an " Exposition and Protest " against the new law.
Georgia wanted to nullify both Indian legislation and
tariff. Virginia adopted the principle of nullification.
North Carolina denounced the tariff, but nullification
also. Alabama denounced the tariff, but recognized the
right of Congress to levy revenue duties, with incidental
protective effect. In 1829 Alabama went nearer to nul-
lification. This was the high water mark of nullifica-
tion outside of South Carolina. All these States were
taunted, in answer to their remonstrances, with the votes
at the Southern members on the details of the tariff of
abominations.

Neither party could let the tariff rest. A high tariff
is in a state of unstable equilibrium. If legislators could
ever gain full and accurate knowledge of all the circum-
stances and relations of trade in their own country, and
in all countries with which it trades ; if they had suffi-
cient wit to establish an artificial tax system which
should just fit the complicated facts, and produce the re-
sults they want without doing any harm to anybody's
interests ; and if, furthermore, the circumstances and re-
lations of trade would remain unchanged, it would be
possible to make a permanent and stable tariff. Each
of these conditions is as monstrously impossible as any-
thing in economics can be. Hence constant new efforts
are necessary, as well to suit those to whom the tariff
toe* not yet bring what they expected from it as U

EFFECT OF JACKB01TB TOAST. 219

•Hence those who are oppressed by it The persona
whose interests were violated by the tariff of 1828 tried
every means in their power to evade it. January 27,
1830, Mallary brought in a bill to render the custom
house appraisal more stringent and effective. McDuffie
responded with a proposition to reduce all taxes on
woollens, cottons, iron, hemp, flax, molasses, and indigo
to what they were before the tariff of 1824 was passed.
The whole subject was reopened. McDuffie's bill was
defeated, and Mallary's was passed. By separate bills
the taxes on salt, molasses, coffee, cocoa, and tea were
reduced.

In April, 1830, came Jackson's Union toast. 1 It was
a great disappointment to the mass of the Southerners,
who had been his ardent supporters, and who had hoped,
from his action in regard to Georgia and the Indians,
that he would let the powers of the federal government
go by default in the case of the tariff also. 9 The per-
sonal element, which always had such strong influence
with Jackson, had become more or less involved in the
nullification struggle with which Calhoun was identified.
The Georgia case involved only indirectly the authority
and prestige of the federal government. The immediate
parties in interest were the Indians. Nullification in-
volved directly the power and prestige of the federal
government, and he would certainly be a most excep-
tional person who, being President of the United States,
would allow the government of which he was the head
to be defied and insulted.

On the 22d of November, 1S30, a bill for a state con-
vention failed to get a two thirds vote in the South
Carolina Legislatrire. An attempt was then made to

1 See page 156. 2 Hodgson, 166-7

220 ANDREW JACKSON.

tost the constitutionality of the tariff in the courts by
refusing to pay duty bonds, and pleading " no consider-
ation " for the taxes levied ; but the United States Dis-
trict Court, in 1831, refused to hear evidence of " no
consideration " drawn from the character of the tariff of
1828. 1

June 14, 1831, Jackson wrote a letter to a committee
of citizens of Charleston, in answer to an invitation to
attend the celebration of the Fourth of July at that
city, in which he indicated that a policy of force would
be necessary and proper against nullification. The
Governor of the State brought this letter to the notice
of the Legislature, which adopted resolutions denounc-
ing the act of the President in writing such a letter,
and denying the lawfulness of the steps which he de-
scribed. North Carolina now denounced nullification,
but the other States as yet held back.

On the 5th of October, 1831, a free-trade convention
met at Philadelphia. On the 26th of October a protec-
tionist convention met at New York. Gallatin wrote the
address published by the former. Of course it was all
free trade, — no nullification. A. H. Everett wrote the
address issued by the New York convention. The public
debt was being paid off with great rapidity, and the
leed for revenue was all the time declining. The
free-traders said : In that case, let us abolish the taxes,
and not raise a revenue which we do not need. It will
be an additional advantage that we can do away, with-
out any complicated devices, with all the protective
taxes which one citizen pays to another, and which take
Bhelter under the revenue taxes. Let the people keep
%nd use their own earnings. The protectionists wantet
1 7 Ann. Reg. 260.

CLATS PROGRAMME. 221

fto remove the taxes from all commodities the like ol
which were not produced here. They argued that, if
the country was out of debt, it could afford to enter on
great schemes of national development by government
expenditure. They therefore proposed to keep up the
taxes for protective purposes, and to spend the revenue
(in which they regarded the revenue from land as a thing
by itself) on internal improvements, pensions, French
spoliation claims, etc. These were not yet strictly
party positions, but in general the former was the ad-
ministration policy and the latter the opposition policy.

The session of 1831-32 was full of tariff. A presi-
dential election was again at hand. J. Q. Adams was
put at the head of the Committee on Manufactures with
an anti-tariff majority. McDuffie was chairman of the
Committee on Ways and Means. January 19, 1832, the
House instructed the Secretary of the Treasury to col-
lect information about manufactures. A report was
rendered in two large volumes in 1833, after the whole
subject had been disposed of. Clay was nominated for
President in December, 1831, and was preparing his
policy and programme. A conference was held at
"Washington by his supporters, at which he presented
his views, as it appears, in a somewhat dictatorial man-
ner. 1 He wanted all the revenue taxes (on tea, coffee,
wine, etc.) abolished. The protective taxes he wanted
to make prohibitory, so as to stop revenue. He said that
the duties on hemp were useless, as our dew-rotted hemp
aever could compete with the water-rotted hemp which
iras imported. He was willing to allow a drawback on
dl rigging exported. Dearborn said that the tax on
feemp had closed every rope-walk in Boston. This was
* 8 Adam*, 445.

822 ANDREW JACKSON.

rather hard, considering that the tax on hemp had beea
laid for the sake of Kentucky, and now the membei
from Kentucky and father of the " American system "
said that protection to hemp was useless. Adams said
that the House Committee on Manufactures would re-
duce the duties prospectively ; that is, to take effect
when the debt should be paid. Clay wanted to stop
paying the debt in order to take away the administra-
tion "cry." Adams took sides with Jackson on the
point of paying the debt. He thought public opinion
favored that policy. He also thought Clay's programme
would appear like defying the South. Clay said that
he did not care whom he defied. "To preserve, main-
tain, and strengthen the American system he would defy
the South, the President, and the Devil." We may say
what we like of the nullifiers, but, so far as they met
with and knew of this disposition on the part of Clay
and his supporters, they would not have been free men
if they had not resisted it ; for it must not be forgotten
that the real question at issue was whether their prop-
erty should be taken away from them or not

In the annual message for 1831 Jackson recom-
mended that the tariff be amended so as to reduce
revenue. February 8, 1832, McDuffie reported a bfll
making the taxes on iron, steel, sugar, salt, hemp, flour,
woollens, cottons, and manufactures of iron twenty-five
per cent for a year after June 30, 1832, then eighteen
and three fourths per cent for a year, and then twelve
and one half per cent for an indefinite period. All other
goods which were taxed over twelve and one half pe?
rent at the time of passing the bill were to be taxed
twelve and one half per cent after June 30, 1831
Ipril 27> 1832, the Secretary of the Treasury (M«

TARIFF OF 1832. 223

Lane) presented a tariff bill in answer to a call by the
House. It was planned to raise twelve millions oi
revenue. It was proposed to collect fifteen per cent on
imports in general, with especial and higher rates on
the great protected commodities. This was the adminis*
tration plan. The House Committee on Manufacturer
reported a bill May 23d, which was taken up instead oi
the others. The battle reopened, and ranged over the
whole field of politics and political economy. The act, .
as finally passed (July 14, 1832), reduced or abolished
many of the revenue taxes. It did not materially alter
the protective taxes. The tax on iron was reduced,
that on cottons was unchanged, that on woollens was
raised to fifty per cent; wool costing less than eight
cents per pound was made free, other wool was taxed as
before. Woollen yarn was now first taxed. This was
the position of tariff and nullification when the prssi
iential election was held.

CHAPTER XL

rrauo questions of Jackson's first admutibtra
tion. — IV.

VJLL National bank. Democracy l affirms that men
Are, may be, ought to be, were born, or were created,
equal, and it determines that in politics they shall be
treated as if they were so, facts to the contrary notwith-
standing. The inequality of men in their industry, econ*
nomy, prudence, self-control, etc., etc., produces the most
marked results in the different amounts of capital which
they accumulate* For capital is the support and fortifi-
cation of human existence, and a man of virtuous habits
and right life secures his existence against destructive
forces by accumulating capital. His capital is at once
the reward of right living and the means of better liv-
ing. At the same time it is a proof of inequality and
the cause of inequality. The existence of capital is
therefore a refutation of all dogmas of equality. If
there were no capital, men would sink to the level of the
other animals, and become approximately equal to each
other when they were all equal to brutes. The advocates

1 Democracy is a theory about sovereignty, or who ought to
rule. Its first dogma is that all men are equal. Its second dogma
Is that power and rule belong of right to a majority of the equal
and undifferentiated units. It therefore affirms that the demos
ought to rule, in contradiction to autocracy, theocracy, aristocracy
and other theories of who ought to rule. The first principle ot
tivil liberty is that there is no one who, of right, ought to rale.

DEMOCRACY AND PLUTOCRACY, 225

»f equality consequently rage against capital which con-
teadicts their theories. The inequality in the distribu
kion of capital, which is at once the proof and the reward
of unequal effort and virtue, is a still more favorite ob-
ject of attack, but so long as men strive upwards and
away from their original brutishness, the inequalities in
their being and doing will inevitably produce inequali-
ties in their having and enjoying. Of all the supersti-
tions which have ever been entertained by men, the
most astonishing is the one which has been accepted
during the last century : That the mass of men are by
nature wise and good — although universal experience
proves that men become wise and good only by severe
and prolonged effort And yet, the fate of modern de-
mocracy is to fall into subjection to plutocracy. In its
struggles against what is called "the money power,"
democracy strives against its fate, yet hastens it on.
Democracy strives to banish the power of capital from
open and admitted influence in political affairs. One of
two results follows : (1) When the capital is combined
with virtue and high principle, it really is banished from
all share in politics. The consequence is that the com-
munity loses the incalculable advantage which it might
gain from the experience and good-will of men who
have accumulated capital by integrity, or have managed
inherited capital with honor and success, and whose
assistance in resisting corrupt schemes, or in reforming
Jaws which give chances to corrupt and crafty men to
accumulate capita* without industry or integrity, would
be invaluable. (2) When capital is in the hands of cor-
rupt and crafty men, it is driven to secret modes of in-
fluence, which undermine and destroy institutions, and
legislation is moulded to suit the ideas and modes oi
15

226 ANDREW JACKSON.

operation of the crafty and lazy, instead of those of the
honest and industrious. We might as well expect to
free ourselves from the pressure of the atmosphere as
to abolish " the money power." The effect would he as
mischievous in one case as in the other. What is true
is that selfishness and cupidity constantly strive to make
use of laws ana civil institutions to divert one man's
earnings to another man's use. This occurs whenever
laws change at all that distribution of products which
would he brought about by the free operation of eco-
nomic forces. The modern industrial organization, in-
cluding banks, corporations, joint-stock companies,
financial devices, national debts, paper currency, na-
tional systems of taxation, is largely the creation of
legislation (not in its historical origin, but in the mode
of its existence and in its authority), and is largely regu-
lated by legislation. Capital is the breath of life to this
organization, and every day, as the organization becomes
more complex and delicate, the folly of assailing capital
or credit becomes greater. At the same time it is evi-
dent that the task of the legislator to embrace in his view
the whole system, to adjust his rules so that the play of
the civil institutions shall not alter the natural play of
the economic forces, requires more training and more
acumen. Furthermore, the greater the complication
and delicacy of the industrial system, the greater the
chances for cupidity when backed by craft, and the task
of the legislator to meet and defeat the attempts of
this cupidity is one of constantly increasing difficulty
Finally, the methods and machinery of democratic re*
publican self-government, — caucuses, primaries, com
inittees, and conventions, — lend themselves perhaps
more easily than any other political methods and ma

BANK OF NORTH AMERICA. 227

thinery to the uses of selfish cliques which seek polifr
cal influence for interested purposes.

In the United States the democratic element in public
opinion has always been jealous of and hostile to the
money power. The hostility has broken out at different
times in different ways, as an assault on banks, corpora-
tions, vested rights, and public credit. Sometimes it
seems as if the " money power " were regarded super-
stitiously, as if it were a superhuman entity, with will
and power. The assaults on it are mingled with dread,
as of an enemy with whom one is not yet ready to cope,
but whose power is increasing rapidly, so that the chance
of ultimate victory over him is small. We are now to
study one of the greatest struggles between democracy
and the money power.

The Bank of North America was forced, in 1784-85,
to weather a storm of popular opposition and prejudice
in Pennsylvania. All the elements of the opposition,
which has been above described, were well represented
there. There was jealousy of capital, fear of the in-
fluence of a corporation of capitalists in politics, super-
stition about banking, denunciation of a monopoly, and
incoherent denunciations of the bank for the most con-
tradictory misdeeds. 1 When Hamilton founded the
first Bank of the United States 9 there arose the same
doubts and complaints, and the same opposition; and
the dissatisfaction, although it was silenced for a time,
lasted as long as that bank lasted, and came out again
when the question of rechartering it was brought up.
Each party regarded the bank as an available power in
politics, and each tried to get control of it The one

1 3 Sparks's Morris, 440 ; Jonsiderations on the Bank of North
Uaerica ; 3 Wilson's Works. a See page 12

228 ANDREW JACKSON

irfaich failed (the republicans) then denounced the bank
M dangerous to the state. Niles affirmed a great many
times that, in 1798, no man who was not a "black
cockade federalist" could get accommodation at the
bank. The bank authorities always denied this, and
it is very doubtful indeed if it was true. Niles is far
better authority for what the republicans believed at
that heated period than he is for the facts as to the
management of the bank. State banks at that time
were distinctly regarded as political engines. Each
bank had a well-defined party character, and " accom-
modated" only men of its own party. It seems that
people then would have been as much astonished if a
group of federalists asked for a bank charter from a
republican Legislature as we would be now if a repub-
lican should ask a democratic House to elect him clerk.
Jefferson, when President, wrote to Gallatin, Secretary
of the Treasury: "I am decidedly in favor of making
all the banks republican by sharing deposits amongst
them in proportion to the disposition they show." l Pit-
kin, who was a federalist, found it quite natural that a
republican Congress should not be willing to recharter
the Bank of the United States, since it was federalist.*
Very little is known of the banking merits or demerits
of the bank. It was favored by the suspension of specie '
payments by the Bank of England. It published no
reports of its condition until January, 1811.* Pitkin
gives a generalized statement, in round numbers, 4 of the
operations of the bank. It paid, on an average, eight
and thirteen thirty-fourths per cent dividend per annum.
In 1810, when the question of renewing the chartej

» I Gallatin's Writings, 129. * Pitkin, 421.

* Seyburt, 52a. * Pitkin, 418. * Seybert, m

FIRST BANK OF TOE UNITED STATES.

tame up, a great political and economic controversy
arose. It was generally expected that a commercial
crisis would occur if the bank was forced to wind up.
The business men and men of capital generally wanted
the charter renewed. Matthew Carey's letters to Adam
Seybert undoubtedly expressed the opinion of that class*
The republicans opposed the bank as aristocratic, fed-
eralist, a dangerous political engine, and because its
stock was partly held by foreign noblemen. Clay was
one of the leaden of the opposition to the bank. The
recharter was reported to the Senate by William H.
Crawford, who ardently favored it It was defeated .
by foe casting vote of the Vice-President, George Clin-
ton, of New York. The bank paid back its capital in
dividends from time to time down to 1834 ; in all 109 J
for 100 paid in.

The old bank went out of existence without any con-
vulsion in business. Its place was taken by local banks.
During the second war these banks suspended, except
in New England, and then went on to issue notes in the
most extravagant manner, until the currency of the
country was depreciated at least twenty-five per cent,
and was furthermore unequally depreciated, so that it
was necessary to have a list of all the banks, and a
quotation of them, in order to calculate the value of any
number of notes. The notes were loaned to the Treas-
ury, which did its business with the rags which the
banks manufactured and loaned to it for its six per cent
bonds. There was then no outcry against the money
power. The mania was to make more banks, and the
itate Legislatures were besieged by applicants for bank
•barters ; that is, by corporation? which desired the priv«
dege of issuing paper to be used as currency by the gov*

280 ANDREW JACKSON.

eminent and the public, who should pay them interest
Cor it, while it cost them nothing but the paper and
printing. The mischievous notion has always been held
in this country that a bank is an institution whose prime
function is to issue circulating notes. To read the
doctrines and plans of 1814-16 one would think the
people here thought that a bank manufactured capital
out of nothing, and could give it away. Its main duty
was to dole it out fairly, and if the existing banks did
not do this some more ought to be made. They talked
about a man's " right " to accommodation, as if a bank
resembled a town pump, at which every one might draw.
At this juncture there would have been some sense in
assailing the "money power," for ninety-nine in one
hundred of these banks were pure swindles. They had
no capital, by issuing notes they borrowed instead of
lending, and they paid no interest.

The administration was republican, but its financial
distress was so great that it was obliged to put away
its constitutional scruples and its party tradition, and
to propose a national bank. Many forms of this were
suggested, for it was very hard for the old republicans to
be obliged to reinstate Hamilton's bank. The Senate
wanted to make a bank to suit the administration ; that
in, one which should lend to the Treasury. No bank
could do this in the measure desired and maintain spe-
cie payments. The House would not consent to a big
paper-money machine, not paying specie, but providing
notes for the government. In January, 1815, after a
long struggle, a bank charter was passed to suit the
House. Madison vetoed it, because the bank would nol
help the Treasury at all if it could make no loans. Thg
Bouse was more anxious that it should restore the eat

CHARTER OF THE SECOND BANK. 281

rency, bettering that, if tiiat could be done, prices of
supplies would fall, loans could be placed in a sound
currency, and real relief would follow. There was
especial reason for this view, because the money market
of the country was then at Boston, where the currency
was not depreciated. It was said that the New Eng-
landers would not sustain the public credit, because they
would not subscribe to stocks in their currency at the
same rates at which the people of Philadelphia and
Baltimore subscribed to stocks in their currency. 1 The
New Englanders were also denounced for drawing specie
from the Middle States and exporting it,* because the
specie of course left the States where the paper issues
were excessive, and went to the States where the paper
issues were small. When it accumulated in excess of
the requirement in the latter States, it was exported,
which was another ground of denunciation.*

Another bill was introduced at once, which provided
for a bank to conform to the wishes of the administra-
tion. This bill was before the House on the day on
which news of the treaty of Ghent was received at
Washington (February 13th). Pitkin says the news
was received at the moment of voting. 4 The bill was
laid aside and was never -revived.

At the next session (1816-16) the proposition came
up for a national bank, not as a financial resource for
the Treasury, but to check the local banks and force a
return to specie payments. The charter became a law
April 10, 1816. It was a perfect imitation of Hamil-

1 See the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1815. Sec
also 3 Webster's Works, 35, his speech on the proposed bank.
a Ingersoll, 250.
• Carey's Olive Branch, 294, 298. * Pitkin, 427

£82 ANDREW JACR80N.

ton's bank. In this bank also the government had •
big stock note for seven millions of dollars of stock,
which it had subscribed for as a resource to pay its
lebts, not as investment for free capital The bank was
chartered for twenty years. . Its capital was thirty-five
millions, seven subscribed by the United States in a five
per cent stock note, seven by the public in specie, and
twenty-one by the public in United States stocks. It
was to pay a bonus of one and one half millions in two,
three, and four years. It was not to issue notes under
$5.00, and not to suspend specie payments under a pen-
alty of twelve per cent on all notes not redeemed on pres-
entation. Twenty directors were to be elected annually
by the stockholders, and &ve, being stockholders, were
to be appointed by the President of the United States
and confirmed by the Senate. The federal government
was to charter no other bank during the period of the
charter of this. The Secretary of the Treasury might
at any time redeem the stocks in the capital of the bank,
including the five per cent subscription stock. He
might remove the public deposits if he should see fit, but
must state his reasons for so doing to Congress at its next '
meeting. The bank engaged to transfer public funds
without charge. At first it undertook to equalize the
currency by receiving any notes of any branch at any
branch, but it was soon forced to abandon the attempt.
The old bank had never done this. 1 Two things were
mixed up in this attempt : (1) The equalization of the
different degrees of depreciation existing in the bank-
notes of different districts. This the bank could no 4
nave corrected save by relentlessly presenting all local
notes for redemption, until they were made equal tt
1 Carey's Letter* 55.

FAULTS OF THE CHARTER. 234

specie or were withdrawn. So far as the bank did this
it won the reputation of a " mo aster " which was crash-
ing oat the local banks. 1 (2) The equalization of the
domestic exchanges. This was impossible and undesir-
able, since capital never could be distributed in exact
proportion to local needs for it. The failure of the bank
to " equalize the exchanges/' and its refusal to take any
notes at any branch, earned it more popular condemna*
tion than anything else.

The bank charter contained a great many faults. To
mention only those which affected its career : The capi-
tal was too large. There was no reason for lending its
capital to the government, i. e., putting it into public
Btocks, or making it a syndicate of bond-holders. There
was every reason why the United States should not hold
stock in it, especially when it could not pay for the
same. The dividends of the bank from 1816 to 1831,
when the government paid its stock note, averaged five
per cent per annum, paid semi-annually. The United
States paid five per cent on its stock note quarterly.
This gave room for another complaint by the enemies of
the bank.

The bank was established at Philadelphia. It began
with nineteen branches, and grew to twenty-five. Specie
payments were resumed nominally February 20, 1817*
after which date, according to a joint resolution of Con
gress of April 16, 1816, the Treasury ought to receive
.tnly specie, or notes of the Bank of the United States,
or of specie-paying banks, or Treasury notes. In the
first two years of its existence the great bank was
carried to the verge of bankruptcy by as bad banking as
iver was heard of. Instead of checking the other
i See page 131.

234 ANDREW JACKBON.

Banks in their improper proceedings, it led and
passed them alL A clique inside the bank was jobbing
in its shares, and robbing it to provide the margins*
Instead of rectifying the currency, it made the currency
worse. Instead of helping the country out of the dis-
tress produced by the war, it plunged the country into
the commercial crisis of 1819, which caused a general
liquidation, lasting four or five years. All the old-
Bchool republicans denounced themselves for having
abandoned their principles. All the ill-doing of the
bank they regarded as essential elements in the charac-
ter of any national bank. Niles denounced the whole
system of banking, and all the banks. He had good
reason. It is almost incredible that the legislation of
any civilized country could have opened the chance for
such abuses of credit, banking, and currency as then
existed. The franchise of issuing paper notes to be used
by the people as currency, that is to say, the license to
appropriate a certain amount of the specie circulation of
the country, and to put one's promissory notes in the
place of it, was given away, not only without any
equivalent, but without any guarantee at all. When
Niles and Gouge denounced banking and banks, it was
because they had in mind these swindling institutions.
The great bank justly suffered with the rest, because it
had made itself in many respects like them. The popu-
lar anti-bank party, opposed to the money power, was
very strong during the period of liquidation.

Langdon Cheves, of South Carolina, was elected pres-
ident of the bank March 6, 1819. He set about re*
itoring it. In three years he had succeeded, although
the losses were over three millions. Nicholas Biddlt
ras elected president of the bank in January, 1823

BRANCH DRAFTS INVENTED. 286

He was only thirty-seven years old, and had been more
a literary man than anything else. He was appointed
government director in 1819. His election in Cheves's
place was the result of the conflict between a young and
progressive policy, which he represented, and an old
and conservative policy. At the nearest date to Janu-
ary 1, 1823, the bank had $4.6 million notes out; $4.4
million specie ; $2.7 million public deposits ; $1.5 mill-
ion deposits by public officers ; $3.3 million deposits by
individuals; $28.7 million bills discounted. Congress
refused to allow the officers of the branches to sign
notes issued by the branches. It is not clear why this
petition was refused, except that Congress was in no
mood to grant any request of the bank. The labor, for
the president and cashier of the parent bank, of signing
all the notes of the bank and branches was very great.
Accordingly, in 1827, branch drafts were devised to
avoid this inconvenience. They were the counterpart
of bank-notes. They were drawn for even sums, by the
cashier of any branch, on the parent bank, to the order
of some officer of the branch, and endorsed by the latter
to bearer. They then circulated like bank-notes. They
were at first (1827) made in denominations of $5.00 and
$10.00. In 1831 the denomination $20.00 was added.
Binney, Wirt, and Webster gave an opinion that these
drafts were legal. Rush, Secretary of the Treasury,
approved of them, and allowed public dues to be paid in
them. 1 These branch drafts were a most unlucky in-
vention, and to them is to be traced most of the subse-
quent real trouble of th^ bank. The branches, espe-
cially the distant ones, when they issued these drafts, did
mot lend their own capital, but that jf the bank at
1 Document £

236 ANDREW JACKSON.

Philadelphia. At the same time, therefore, thej fell in
debt to the parent bank. This stimulated their issues.
The borrowers used these drafts to sustain what were
called "race-horse bills." These were drafts drawn
between the different places where there were branches,
to that a bill falling due at one place was met by the
discount of a bill drawn on another place. This system
was equivalent to unlimited renewals. It kept up a
constant inflation of credit. Up to the time of Jackson's
accession these drafts had not yet done much harm, and
had attracted no adverse criticism.

At the session of 1827-28, P. P. Barbour brought
forward a proposition to sell the stock owned by the
United States in the bank. A debate arose concerning
the bank, and it seems that there was a desire on the
part of a portion of the opposition to put opposition to
the bank into their platform. 1 The project failed. Bar-
bour's resolution was tabled, 174 to 9.

The facts which are now to be narrated were not
known to the public until 1832. They are told here
as they occurred in the order of time.

June 27, 1829, Levi Woodbury, senator from New
Hampshire, wrote to Samuel Ingham, Secretary of the
Treasury, making confidential complaints of Jeremiah
Mason, the new president of the Portsmouth, New
Hampshire, branch of the Bank of the United States,
because (1) of the general brusqueness of his manner ;
(2) of his severity and partiality in the matter of loans
and collections. He added that Mason was a friend oi
Webster. " His political character is doubtless known
to you." He also said that the complaints were general
•od from all political parties. Ingham enclosed thi
- * 83 NflM, 275.

CORRESPONDENCE OF INGHAM AND BIDDLE. 237

tetter to Biddle, pointing out that the letter seemed to
ttave been called out by the political effects of the action
»f the branch. He said that the administration wanted
no favors from the bank. Biddle replied that he would
investigate.

One great trouble with Biddle, which appeared at
once in this correspondence, was that he wrote too
easily. When he got a pen in his hand, it ran away
with him. In this first reply, he went on to write a long
letter, by which he drew out all the venomous rancor of
Levi Woodbury and Isaac Hill against the old federal-
ists and Jeremiah Mason and the bank, all which lurked
in Ingham's letter, but came out only in the form of
innuendo and suggestion* The innuendoes stung Biddle,
and he challenged the suggestions instead of ignoring •
them. Thus he gave them a chance to come forth with-
out sneaking. He was jauntily innocent and unconscious
of what spirit he was dealing with and what impended
over him. He stated (1) that Mason had been appointed
jo a vacancy caused by the resignation, not by the re-
moval, of his predecessor; (2) that the salary of the
position had not been increased for Mason ; (3) that
lifter Mason's appointment, Webster was asked to per-
suade him to. accept. He quoted a letter from Wood-
bury to himself, in July, in which Woodbury said that
Mason was as unpopular with one party as the other,
Biddle inferred, no doubt correctly, that Mason, as
banker, had done his duty b) the bank, without re*
gard to politics. He explained that the branch had
previously not been well managed, and that Mason was
put in as a competent banker ard lawyer to put it right
again. It is easy to see that Mason, in order to put the
Vank right, had to act severely, and that he especially

288 ANDREW JACKSON

disappointed those who, on account of political sym-
pathy, expected favors, but did not get them. Polities
had run high in New Hampshire for ten or twelve
years. Mason and Webster on one side, and Hill,
Woodbury, and Plumer on the other, had been in
strong antagonism. The relations had been amicable
between some of them, but Hill and Mason were two
men who could not meet without striking fire. Hill was
now president of a small bank at Concord, and business
jealousy was added to political animosity. Woodbury
had been elected to the Senate as an Adams man, and
the personal and political feelings were only more in-
tense, because Adams was called a republican. The
federalists were first invited to support him, then they
i were ignored, 1 and Woodbury and Hill were working
for Jackson.

Biddle, as if dissatisfied with whatever prudence he
had shown in his first letter, wrote another, in which he
declared that the bank had nothing to do with politics ;
that people were all the time trying to draw it into
politics, but that it always resisted.

July 23d Ingham wrote again to Biddle, insisting that
there must be grounds of complaint, and that exemption
from party preference was impossible. He added that
he represented the views of the administration.

In August the Secretary of War ordered the pension
agency transferred from the Portsmouth branch to the
bank at Concord, of which Isaac Hill had been presi-
dent. The parent bank forbade the branch to comply
with this order, on the ground that it was illegal. The
trdei was revoked.

September 15th Biddle wrote again to Ingham. H#
1 1 Webster's CorreMjxmdence, 415, 419.

BIDDLE TO INGBAM—U29 239

had raited Buffalo and Portsmouth during the * ammer.
His letter is sharp and independent in tone. He says
that two memorials have been sent to him by Isaac Hill,
Second Controller of the Treasury, one from the bus*-
ness men of Portsmouth, and the other from sixty mem*
bers of the Legislature of New Hampshire, requesting
Mason s removal, and nominating a new board of di-
rectors, "friends of General Jackson in New Hamp-
shire." Those proceedings were evidently planned by
the anti-bank clique at Washington to provoke Biddle.
He hastened to crown that purpose with complete suc-
cess. He says that public opinion in the community
around a bank is no test of bank management, and that
the reported opinion at Portsmouth, upon examination,
" degenerated into the personal hostility of a very
limited, and for the most part very prejudiced, circle."
He then takes up three points which he finds in Ing-
ham's letters, suggested or assumed, but not formulated.
These are: (1) That the Secretary has some super-
vision over the choice of officers of the bank, which
comes to him from the relations of the government to
the bank. (2) That there is some action of the govern-
ment on the bank, which is not precisely defined, but of
which the Secretary is the proper agent (3) That it is
the right and duty of the Secretary to make known to
the president of the bank the views of the administra-
tion on the political opinions of the officers of the bank*
He then says that the board acknowledge no response
bility whatever to the Secretary in regard to the polit-
'cal opinions of the officers of the bank ; that the bank
is responsible to Congress only, and is carefully shielded
by its charter from executive control He indignantly
don tie that freedom from political bias is impossible

240 ANDREW JACKSON

■ho* s the folly of the notion of political "checks and
counter-balances " between the officers of the bank, and
declares that the bank ought to disregard all parties.
He won a complete victory on the argument of his
points, but delivered himself, on the main issue, without
reserve into the hands of his enemies.

Ingham's letter of October 5th is a masterly specimen
of cool and insidious malice. In form it is smooth,
courteous, and plausible, but it is full of menace and
deep hostility. He discusses the points implied by him,
but, in form, raised by Biddle. He says that if the
bank should abuse its powers the Secretary is authorized
to remove the deposits. Hence the three points which
Biddle found in his former letter are good. It does not
appear that Biddle ever thought of this power as within
the range of the discussion, or of the exercise of it as
amongst the possibilities. Ingham says there are two
theories of the bank: (1) That it is exclusively for
national purposes and for the common benefit of all, and
that the "employment of private interests is only an
incident, — perhaps an evil, — founded in mere con-
venience for care and management." (2) That it is
intended " to strengthen the arm of wealth, and coun-
terpoise the influence of extended suffrage in the dispo-
sition of public affairs," and that the public deposits are
one of its means for performing this function. He says
that there are two means of resisting the latter theory :
the power to remove the deposits, and the power to ap-
point five of the directors. He adds that, if the bank
should exercise political influence, that would afford him
the strongest motive for removing the deposits. Bid
idle's reply of October 9th shows that he recognizes a
'ast what temper he has to deal with. He is still gay

THE BANK CORRESPONDENCE. 241

and good-natured, and he recedes gracefully, only main*
Laining that it is the policy of the bank to keep out o!

politics.

In Ingham's letters of July 23d and October 5th is to
be found the key to the " bank war." Ingham argues
that the bank cannot keep out of politics, that its offi-
cers ought to be taken from both parties, and that, if
It meddles with politics, he will remove the deposits.
The only road left by which to escape from the situation
he creates is to go into politics on his side. No evidence
is known to exist that the bank had interfered in poli-
tics. The administration men are distinctly seen in this
correspondence, trying to driva it to use political in-
fluence on their side, and the bank resists, not on behalf
of the other party, but on behalf of its independence.
It is the second of the alleged theories in the letter of
October 5th, however, which demands particular atten-
tion. The Jackson administration always pretended
that the managers of the bank construed the character
and function of the bank according to that theory. It
is the Kentucky relief notion of the bank in its extreme
and most malignant form. The statement is, on its
face, invidious and malicious. It is not, even in form,
a formula of functions attributed to the bank. It is a
construction of the political philosophy of a national
bank. It is not parallel with the first statement. It
was ridiculous to allege that the stockholders of the
bank had subscribed twenty-eight million dollars, not
even for party purposes, but to go crusading against
democracy and universal suffrage- However, the justice
or injustice of the allegations in these letters, which
could be submitted to no tribunal, and which touched
taotives, not acts, was immaterial. The administration
n

■f

242 ANDREW JACKSON.

had determined to make war on the bank. The ultimata
agents were Amos Kendall, who brought the Kentucky
relief element, and Isaac Hill, who brought the element
of local bank jealousy and party rancor. Ingham pub-
lished, in 1832, 1 after the above correspondence had
been published, an " Address " in his own defence. He
says that he found, to his surprise, soon after he entered
Jackson's cabinet, that the President and those nearest
in his confidence felt animosity against the bank. He
saw that the persons who had the most feeling influ-
enced the President's mind the most. Allegations of
fact were reported in regard to political interference
by the bank. Ingham says that when he was urged to
action about the bank he tried to trace down these
stories to something tangible. He quotes the only state-
ment he ever got It is a letter by Amos Kendall,
giving second or third hand reports of the use of money
by officers of the bank in the Kentucky election of 1825,
when the court question was at issue. 3 The man whom
Kendall gave as his authority failed, when called upon,
to substantiate the assertion. In Kendall's Autobiog-
raphy there is a gap from 1823 to 1829, and the origin
of his eager hostility to the bank is not known. Jackson
is not known to have had any opinion about the bank
when he came to Washington. He is not known to
have had any collision with the bank, except that, when
he was on his way to Florida, as Governor, the branch
vt New Orleans refused his request that it would ad-
vance money to him on his draft on the Secretary ol
Stato.* Hill and Kendall, either by telling Jackson
that the bank had worked against him in the election,
•r by other means, infused into his mind the hostility U
* 49 Niles, 315. 2 See page 127. * 2 Parton, 596.

BINTS OF TBS COMING BANK WAR. 248

Pi which had long rankled in theirs. They were soon
reenforced by Blair, who was stronger than either, and
more zealously hostile to the bank than either.

In November, 1829, about a week before Congress
met, Amos Kendall sent privately 1 a letter to the
" Courier and Enquirer," Jackson organ at New York,
in which he insinuated that Jackson would come out
against the bank in the annual message. A head and
tail piece were put to this letter, and it was put in as
an editorial. It attracted some attention, but, its origin
being of course unknown, it was received with a great
deal of skepticism. In its form it consisted of a series
of queries, 8 of which the following may be quoted as the
most significant, and as best illustrating the methods of
procedure introduced in Jackson's administration. We
must remember that these queries were drawn up by a
man in the closest intimacy with the President, who
helped to make the message what it was, and we must
further remember what we have already learned of
William B. Lewis's methods. "Will sundry banks
throughout the Union take measures to satisfy the
general government of their safety in receiving deposits
of the revenue, and transacting the banking concerns of
the United States ? Will the Legislatures of the several
States adopt resolutions on the subject, and instruct their
senators how to vote ? Will a proposition be m*de to
authorize the government to issue exchequer bills, to the
amount of the annual revenue, redeemable at pleasure,
k o constitute a circulating medium equivalent <o the
totes issued by the United States Bank ? " So far as
tppears, no one saw in these queries +he oracle -vfricb

1 Memoirs of Bennett, III.

• It ii quoted 37 Niles, 3*1 (January 90, 1S30.1

M4 ANDREW JACK BON

foretold the history of the United States for the next
ten or fifteen years.

Jackson's first annual message contained a paragraph
on the hank which struck the whole country with as-
tonishment. " We had seen," says Niles, " one or two
dark paragraphs in certain of the newspapers, which
led to a belief that the administration was not friendly
to this great moneyed institution, but few had any sus-
picion that it would form one of the topics of the first
message." * After mentioning the fact that the charter
would expire in 1836, and that a recharter would be
asked for, the message said that such an important
question could not too soon be brought before Congress.
" Both the constitutionality and the expediency of the
law creating this bank are well questioned by a large
portion of our fellow citizens, and it must be admitted
by all that it has failed in the great end of establishing
a uniform and sound currency." The question is then
raised whether a bank could not be devised, " founded
on the credit of the government and its revenues,"
which should answer all the useful purposes of the Bank
of the United States.

No period in the history of the United States could
be mentioned when the country was in a state of more
jrofound tranquillity, both in its domestic and foreign
elations, and in a condition of more humdrum prosper-
ity in its industry, than 1829. The currency never had
been as good as it was then, for the troubles of the
early '20's, both in the East and in the West, had been
to a great extent overcome. 2 The currency has nevei

* 37 Niles, 257.
Seethe tables in 2 Macgregor, 1140; also Gallatin on th
r Jm4ncw and Banking System oftfie United State*.

CRITICISM OF THE MESSAGE. 245

been better and more uniform, if we take the whole
Dountry oyer, since 1829 than it was then. Tho pro-
ceedings, of which the paragraph in the message of 1829
was the first warning, threw the currency and banking
of the country into confusion and uncertainty, one thing
following upon another, and they have never yet re-
covered the character of established order and routine
operation which they had then. The bank charter was
not to expire until March 3, 1836 ; that is, three years
beyond the time when Jackson's term would expire.
He seems to apologize for haste in bringing up the ques-
tion of its renewal It certainly was a premature step,
and can only be explained by the degree of feeling
which the active agents had mingled with their opinions
about the bank. It was, moreover, a new mode of state-
ment for the President to address Congress, not on his
own motion, and to set forth his own opinions and rec-
ommendations, but as the mouth-piece of " a large por-
tion of our fellow citizens." Who were they? How
many were they ? How had they made their opinions
known to the President? Why did they not use the
press or the Legislature, as usual, for making known
their opinions ? Who must be dealt with in discussing
the opinions, the President or the " large portion," etc ?
What becomes of the constitutional responsibility of the
President, if he does not speak for himself, but gets his
notions before Congress as a quotation from somebody
else, and that somebody " a large portion of our fellow
citizens " ? Then again the question must arise : Does
the President correctly quote anybody ? No proofs can
be found that any hundred persons in the United States
lad active doubts of the constitutionality and expediency
if the bank, or were looking forward to its recharter M

246 ANDREW JACKSON.

% political crisis to be prepared for. If the theoretical
question had been raised, a great many people would
have said that they thought a national bank unconstitu*
tional. They would have said, as any one must say
now, that there was no power given in the Constitution
to buy territory, but they did not propose to give up
Louisiana and Florida. Just so in regard to a national
bank. The Supreme Court had decided in McCulloch
vs. Maryland that the bank charter was constitutional,
and that was the end of controversy. The question of
the constitutionality of the bank had no life, and oc-
cupied no place in public opinion, so far as one can
learn from newspapers, books, speeches, diaries, corre-
spondence, or other evidence we have of what occupied
the minds of the people. Jackson's statement was only
a figure of speech. The observation which is most Im
portant for a fair judgment of his policy of active hos-
tility to the bank is, that any great financial institution
or system which is in operation, and is performing its
functions endurably, has a great presumption in its
favor. The only reasonable question for statesman or
financier is that of slow and careful correction and im-
provement. The man who sets out to overturn and
destroy, in obedience to " a principle," especially if he
:>hows that he does not know the possible scope of his
own action, or what he intends to construct afterwards,
issumes a responsibility which no public man has any
right to take.

The vague and confused proposition of the President
for some new kind of bank added alarm to astonish'
tneuk ^Vhat did he mean by his bank on the credit
and revenues of the government? It sounded like «
big paper-money machine. If there was anv intelligible

ACTION OF CONGRESS ON TEE BANK. 247

klea in it, it referred to something like the Bank of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky on a still larger scale
The stock of the bank declined from 125 to 116 on
account of the message. 1 It was supposed that the
President must have knowledge of some facts about the
bank.

The part of the message about the bank was referred
In both Houses. April 13, 1830, 3 McDuffie made a
long report from the Committee on Ways and Means*
He argued that the constitutionality of the bank was
settled by the decision of the Supreme Court and by
prescription. He defended the history and expediency
of the bank, and ended by declaring the bank proposed
by the President to be very dangerous and inexpedient,
both financially and politically, — the latter because it
would increase the power of the Executive. In the
Senate, Smith, of Maryland, reported from the Com-
mittee on Finance in favor of the bank. 8 The House,
May 10, 1830, tabled, by 89 to 66, resolutions that the
House would not consent to renew the charter of the
bank, and on May 29th it tabled, 95 to 67, a series of
resolutions calling for a comprehensive report of the
proceedings of the bank. As yet there were no allega-
tions against the management of the bank. The stock
rose to 130 on the reports of the committees of Con-
gress.

A great many politicians had to " turn a sharp cor-
ner," as Niles expressed it, when Jackson came out
Igainst the bank. His supporters in Pennsylvania
tities were nearly all bank iron. Van Buren, Marcy,
tnd Butler had signed a petition, in 1826, for a branch

J 38 Nilea, 177. a 38 Niles, 183.

38 Niles. 126.

248 ANDREW JACKSON.

of the bank at Albany. 1 The petition was refused. la
January, 1829, Van Buren, as Governor of New York,
referred to banks under federal control as objectionable.
The administration party was not yet consolidated. It
was still only that group of factions which had united in
opposition to Adams. The bank question was one of
the great questions through which Jackson's popularity
and his will hammered them into a solid party phalanx.
All had to conform to the lines which he drew for the
party, under the influence of Kendall, Lewis, and HilL
If they did not do so, they met with speedy discipline.

In his message for 1830, Jackson again inserted a
paragraph about the bank, and proposed a bank as a
" branch of the Treasury Department." The outline is
very vague, but it approaches the sub-treasury idea.
No notice was taken of this part of the message in the
session of 1830-31. On a test question, whether to
refer the part of the message relating to the bank to
the Committee on Ways and Means or to a select com-
mittee, the bank triumphed, 108 to 67. Benton offered
a joint resolution, in the Senate, February 2, 1831,
"That the charter of the Bank of the United State*
ought not to be renewed." The Senate refused leave,
23 to 20, to introduce it. In July, 1831, the Secretary
of War ordered the pension funds for the State of New
York to be removed from the New York branch. Bid-
die remonstrated, because there was no authority of law
for the order, and the Auditor had refused to accept
such an order as a voucher in a previous case. Secre-
tary Cass revoked the order, March 1, 1832. In the
nessage of 1831 Jackson referred to the bank question
as one on which he had discharged his duty and free*
1 Mackeinzie, 98

MOLANE IN FAVOR OF THE BANK. 249

bis responsibility. The Secretary of the Treasury, Mc-
Lane, in his annual report, December, 1831, made a
long and strong argument in favor of the bank. If we
may judge from the tone of the message of 1831, Jack-
son was willing to allow the bank question to drop, at
least until the presidential election should be over.
There is even room for a suspicion that McLane's argu-
ment in favor of the bank was a sort of " hedging ; " for
although the Secretary's report was not necessarily sub-
mitted to the President, 1 Jackson was hardly the man to
allow a report to be sent in of which he disapproved.

We have now concluded our review of the public
questions which occupied attention during Jackson's
first administration, and have brought the history of
those questions, and of his proceedings in regard to
them, down to the time when the presidential campaigu
•f 1832 opened, — December, 1831.
» Sea page 302.

CHAPTER XH

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832.

Clay was the leading man in the opposition, but the
•ppoeition was by no means united. A new factor had
been gaining importance in politics for the last few
years. The politicians had ignored it and sneered at
it, but it had continued to grow, and was now strong
enough to mar, if it could not make, a national election.

In 1826 a bricklayer, named William Morgan, who
lived at Batavia, N. Y., and was very poor, thought that
he could earn something by writing an exposure of the
secrets of free-masonry, 1 he being a mason. The
masons learned that he had written such a book. They
caused his arrest and imprisonment over Sunday on a
frivolous civil complaint, and searched his house for the
manuscript during his absence. A month later he was
arrested again for a debt of $2.10, and imprisoned
under an execution for $2.69, debt and costs. The
next day the creditor declared the debt satisfied. Mor-
gan was released, passed at the prison door into the
hands of masked men, was placed in a carriage, taken
to Fort Niagara, and detained there. A few days later
a body was found floating in the river, which was iden-
tified as Morgan's body. The masons always denied
that this identification was correct Morgan has never

1 Report of the Special Agent of the State of New York. I
inn. Reg. 537.

OUTRAGE ON MORGAN. 251

been seen or heard of since. In January, 1827, certain
persons were tried for conspiracy and abduction. They
pleaded guilty, and so 'prevented a disclosure of details. 1
The masons confessed and admitted abduction, but de-
clared that Morgan was not dead. The opinion that
Morgan had been murdered, and that the body found
was his, took possessions of the minds of those people of
Western New York who were not masons. Popular
legend and political passion have become so interwoven
with the original mystery that the truth cannot now be
known.

The outrage on Morgan aroused great indignation in
Western New York, then still a simple frontier country.
Public opinion acted on all subjects. A committee ap-
pointed at a mass-meeting undertook an extra-legal
investigation, and soon brought the matter into such
shape that no legal tribunal ever after had much chance
of unravelling it. After the fashion of the time, and of
the place also, a political color was immediately given to
the affair. As Spencer, the special agent appointed by
the State to investigate the matter, declared in his re-
port, the fact of this political coloring was disastrous to
the cause of justice. The politicians tried to put down
the whole excitement, because it traversed their plana
uid combinations. They asked, with astonishment
and with justice, what the affair had to do with politics.
The popular feeling, however, was very strong, and it
^as fed by public meetings, committee reports, etc.
The monstrous outrage deserved that a strong public
opinion should sustain the institutions of justice in
finding out and punishing tne perpetrators. Some of
ihe officers were too lax ana indifferent in the discharge
1 2 Hammond. 376.

£52 ANDREW JACKSON.

ef their duties to suit the public temper. They ■
masons. Hence the inference that a man who was a
mason was not fit or competent to be entrusted with
public duties. The political connection was thus ren-
dered logical and at least plausible. Many persons re-
solved not to vote for anyone who was a mason for
any public office. Moreover, the excitement offered an
unexampled opportunity to the ambitious young orators
and politicians of the day. It was a case where pare
heat and emphasis were the only requirements of the
orator. He need not learn anything, or have any ideas.
A number of men rose to prominence on the movement
who had no claims whatever to public influence. They
of course stimulated as much as they could the popular
excitement against masonry, which furnished them their
opportunity and their capital. Many masons withdrew
from the order. Others foolishly made light of the
outrage itself. For the most part, however, the masons
argued that masonry was no more responsible, as an in-
stitution, for the outrage on Morgan than the Christian
church is responsible for the wrongs done in its name by
particular persons and groups. These discussions only
sharpened the issue, and masons and anti-masons came
to be a division which cut across all the old party lines
in the State of New York. In 1828 the anti-masons
were the old Clintonians, 1 the rump of the federalists,
and many buck-tails, with whom horror at the Morgan
outrage was a controlling motive. Jackson, Clinton,
and Van Buren were then allied. Jackson and Clinton
were masons. The Clintonians who would not follow
Clinton to the support of Jackson, either because they
disliked the man or because he was a mason, and tin
1 Clinton died February 11, 1888.

rOLITlCAL EFFECTS OF ANTI-MASONRY. 253

Dock-tails who would not vote for a mason, wet-e Adams
toen. The great body of the back-tails (amongst whom
party discipline was stronger than in any other faction),
the Clintonians who followed Clinton into the Jackson
camp, and the masons who let defence of the order con-
trol their politics, were Jackson men. Hence the New
York vote (which was taken by districts in 1828) was
divided.

The regency buck-tail democrats, being in control
of the state government, tried to put down the excite-
ment by indirect means, because of its disorganizing
effects. This made them appear to suppress inquiry, and
to be indifferent to the outrage. It only fanned the
flame of popular indignation, and strengthened anti-
masonry. The anti-masons came out as an anti-ad-
ministration party in 1830. They held a convention at
Utica in August, and framed a platform of national
principles. This is the first " platform," as distinguished
from the old-fashioned address. The anti-masons had
come together under no other bond than opposition to
masonry. If they were to be a permanent party, and a
national party, they needed to find or make some polit-
ical principles. This was their great political weakness
and the sure cause of their decay. Their party had no
toot in political convictions. It had its root elsewhere,
and in very thin soil too, for a great political organiza-
tion. Since the masons were not constantly and by the
We principle of their order perpetrators of outrages and
murders, they could not furnish regular fuel to keep up
the indignation of the anti-masons. The anti-masons,
then, put on their principles as at after-thought. Fof
this reason, however, they needed an explicit statement
of them, if possible, in a categorical form, i. e., a plafr

264 ANDREW JACKSON.

form, far more than a party which had an historical
origin, and traditions derived from old political contro-
versies. Anti-masonry spread rapidly through New
York and large parts of Pennsylvania and Massachu-
setts. Vermont became a stronghold of it. It is by no
means extinct there now. It had considerable strength
in Connecticut and Ohio. It widened into hostility to
all secret societies and extra-judicial oaths. Perhaps it
reached its acme when it could lead men like J. Q.
Adams and Joseph Story to spend days in discussing
plans for abolishing the secrecy of the Phi Beta Kappa
society of Harvard College. 1 It only showed to what
extent every man is carried away by the currents of
thought and interest which prevail for the time being in
the community.

The anti-masons next invented the national political
convention. 8 They held one at Philadelphia, September
11, 1830,* which called another, to meet September
26, 1831, at Baltimore, to nominate candidates for
President and Vice-President. At the latter date 112
delegates met. 4 William Wirt, of Maryland, was nomi-
nated for President, and Amos Ellmaker, of Pennsyl-
vania, for Vice-President, almost unanimously. Wirt
had been a mason, and had neglected, not abandoned, the

1 8 Adams, 383.

2 A convention of delegates from eleven States nominated D«
Witt Clinton, in 1812. Binns (page 244) claims to have invented
the national convention, but his was a project for introducing into
khe congressional caucus of the republican party special dele-
gates from the non-republican States, so as to make that body

epresent the whole party.
« 39 Niles, 58.

* 41 Niles, 83, 107. Twelve States were represented. W. B
fowaid and Thaddeus Stevens were in the convention.

ANTI-MA80NIC NOMINATIONS. 256

arder. In his letter of acceptance l he said that he had
often spoken of " masonry and anti-masonry as a fitter
subject for farce than tragedy." He circumscribed and
tamed down the whole anti-masonic movement, and put
himself on no platform save hostility to oaths which
might interfere with a man's civic duties. He put the
whole Morgan case aside, except so far as, on the trial,
it appeared that masonry hindered justice. The anti-
masons were, in fact, aiming at political power. They
had before them the names of McLean, Calhoun, and
J. Q. Adams. 3 New York wanted McLean. He de-
clined.* The anti-masonic convention published a long
address, setting forth the history and principles of the
party. 4 There was a hope, in which Wirt seems to
have shared, that when the anti-masons presented a
separate nomination Clay would withdraw, and the
national republicans would take up Wirt.' When this
hope had passed away, Wirt wanted to withdraw, but
could not do so. 6 He had from the first desired Clay's
election, and had agreed to stand only when assured
that Clay could not unite the anti-Jackson men. Clay
refused to answer the interrogatories of the anti-masons.
He said, " I do not know a solitary provision in the
Constitution of the United States which conveys the
slightest authority to the general government to inter-
fere, one way or the other, with either masonry or
*nti-masonry." He said that if the President should

i 2 Kennedy's Wirt, 350. 2 8 Adams, 412, 416.

» 41 Nile*, 259. * 41 Niles, 166.

* Judge Spencer thought that Wirt could unite the opposition.
t Clay would stand back, and that Wirt could be elected orei
!*ckson. (1 Curtis's Webster, 402.)

« 2 Kennedy's Wirt, 356, 362. 36ft.

\/{bi

6 ANDREW JACKSON.

meddle with that matter he would be a usurper and a
tyrant 1

The opposition therefore went into the contest divided
and discordant. The anti-masons were strong enough
to produce that state of things, and of course their con-
duct showed that the opposition was not united on any
political policy whatever. Jackson, on the contrary;,
bad been consolidating a, party, which had a strong con*
•ciousness of its power and its purpose and a vigorous
party will. Jackson had the credit of recovering the
West India trade, settling the spoliation claims, and
placing all foreign relations on a good footing. He
also claimed that he had carried the administration of
the government back to the Jeffersonian ideas. In
general this meant that he held to the non-interference
theory of government, and to the policy of leaving
people to be happy in their own way. He had not yet
been forced to commit himself on land and tariff, al-
though he had favored a liberal policy about land ; but
on internal improvements he had spoken clearly, and
inferences were freely drawn as to what he would do on
land and tariff. He had favored state rights and strict
construction in all the cases which had arisen. He had
discountenanced all heavy expenditures on so-called na-
tional objects, and had prosecuted as rapidly as possible
the payment of the debt. Here was a strong record
and a consistent one on a number of great points of
policy, and that, of course, is what is needed to form q
party. The record also furnished two or three good
party "cries." The general non-interference policy
strengthens any government which recurs to it. At
governments in time depart from it, because they al
1 41 Nike, 260 ; 8 Adams, 430.

JACKSON'S PARTY. 267

mtyB credit themselves with power to do better for the
people than the people can do for themselves. In
1831-32 Jackson had not yet reached this stage in hit
career. The delicate points in his record were tariff
and bank. If he assailed the tariff, would he not lose
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Kentucky ? If he favored it,
would he not lose the South ? This was the old division
in the body of his supporters, and it seemed that he
might now be ruined if that cleft were opened. Also, il
he went on with the " bank war," would he not lose
Pennsylvania ? His mild message on the bank in 1831
seemed to indicate fear.

Clay declared unhesitatingly that the campaign re-
quired that the opposition should force the fighting on
tariff and bank, especially on the latter. We have seen *
what his demeanor and demands were in the conference
at Washington. For the fight out-of-doors he thought
that the recharter of the bank was the strongest issue he
could make. Of course Benton's assertion 3 that the
bank attacked Jackson is a ridiculous misrepresentation.
Clay did, however, seize upon the question which Jack-
son had raised about the bank, and he risked that im-
portant financial institution on the fortunes of a political
campaign. The bank was very unwilling to be so used.
Its disinterested friends in both parties strongly dis-
suaded Biddle from allowing the question of recharter
to be brought into the campaign. 8 Clay's advisers tried
to dissuade him. The bank, however, could not oppose
the public man on whom it depended most and the
party leaders deferred at last to their chief. Jackson
never was more dictatorial and obstinate than Clay was
%t this juncture. Clay was the champion of the system

* Page 22? s 1 Benton, 227. 8 Ingenwll, let.

17

258 ANDREW JACKSON.

•f state-craft which makes public men undertake a tut*
lage of the nation, and teaches them not to be content to
let the nation grow by its own forces, and according to
the shaping of the forces and the conditions. His sys-
tem of statesmanship is one which always offers shelter
to numbers of interested schemes and corrupt enter-
prises. The public regarded the bank, under his polit-
ical advocacy, as a part of that system of state-craft

The national republican convention met at Baltimore,
December 12, 1831. 1 It consisted of 155 delegates from
seventeen States. Abner Lacock, of Pennsylvania, who
as senator had made a very strong report against Jack-
son on the Seminole war, was president of the conven-
tion. John Sergeant, of Pennsylvania, was nominated
for Vice-President. The convention issued an address,
in which the bank question was put forward. It was
declared that the President " is fully and three times
over pledged to the people to negative any bill that may
be passed for rechartering the bank, and there is little
doubt that the additional influence which he would ac-
quire by a reelection would be employed to carry
through Congress the extraordinary substitute which he
has repeatedly proposed." The appeal, therefore, was
to defeat Jackson in order to save the bank and prevent
.Jhe device proposed by Jackson from being tried.

Such a challenge as that could have but one effect on
Jackson. It called every faculty he possessed into
activity to compass the destruction of the bank. Instead
of retiring from the position he had taken, the moment
there was a fight to be fought, he did what he did at
New Orleans. He moved his lines up to the last point
he could command on the side towards the enemy. Th#
1 41 Niles, 301.

PETITION FOR RE CHARTER. 259

anti-bank men, Kendall, Blair, and Hill, must have been
delighted to see the adversary put spurs into Jackson's
animosity. The proceedings seemed to prove just what
the anti-bank men had asserted : that the bank was a
great monster, which aimed to control elections, and to
Bet up and put down Presidents. The campaign of
1832 was a struggle between the popularity of the bank
and the popularity of Jackson. His popularity in rural
Pennsylvania had never had any rational basis, and
hence could not be overthrown by rational deductions.
His spirit and boldness in meeting the issue offered by
Clay won him support His party was not broken ; it
was consolidated.

On the 9th of January, 1832, in prosecution of the
programme, the memorial of the bank for a renewal of
its charter was presented in the Senate by Dallas, and
in the House by McDufne. These men werp both
"bank democrats." Sargent 1 says Biddle told him
that the bank wanted Webster, or some such unequivocal
friend of the bank, to present the memorial, but that
Dallas claimed the duty as belonging to him. There was
great and just dissatisfaction with Dallas for the way in
which he managed the business. He intimated a doubt
whether the application was not premature, and a doubt
about the policy of the memorial, lest "it might be
drawn into a real or imaginary conflict with some higher,
Aome more favorite, some more immediate wish or pur-
pose of the American people." In the Senate the peti-
tion was referred to a select committee, and in the
House to the Committee on Ways and Means. The Sen-
Date committee reported favorably March 13th and rec-
ftmmended only a few changes in the old charter. Thej
1 1 Sargent, 215.

260 ANDREW JACKSON.

proposed to demand a bonus of one and a half millions
in three annual instalments. In the House, McDuffie
reported February 9th. 1 He said that the proposition to
recharter had called out a number of wild propositions.
The old bank was too large, but one was proposed with
a capital of fifty millions. He criticised the notion that
all citizens should have an equal right to subscribe to.
the stock of the bank. H A has $100 on balance and
B owes $100 on balance, their " equal right " to sub-
scribe to bank stock is a strange thing to discuss.

Benton 3 says that the opponents of the bank in Con-
gress agreed upon a policy. They determined to fight
the charter at every point, and to bring the bank into
odium as much as possible. He says that he organized
a movement to this effect in the House, incited Clayton,
of Georgia, to demand an investigation of the bank, and
furnished him with the charges and specifications on
which to base that demand. Clayton moved for an
investigation, February 23d. He presented Benton's
charges, seven important and fifteen minor ones. Mc-
Duffie answered the charges at once, but the investiga-
tion was ordered to be made by a special committee.
They reported, April 30th. The majority ipported that
the bank ought not to be rechartered until the debt was
all paid and the revenue readjusted. R. M. Johnson
signed this report* so as to make a majority, out of good-
nature. He rose in his place in Congress and said that
be had not looked at a document at Philadelphia. The
minority reported that the bank ought to be rechartered:
that it was sound and useful. John Quincy Adams
made a third report in which he brought his character
fctic industry to bear on the question, and discussed at
1 Document C. s 1 Benton 236.

CHARGES AGAINST THE BANK. 261

the points raised in the attack on the bank. It is to
his report that we are indebted for a knowledge of the
forrespondence of 1829 between Biddle and Ingham*
and the controversy over the Portsmouth branch, which
was the first skirmish in the " bank war." *

The charges against the bank, and the truth about
them, so far as we can discover it, were as follows : —

(1.) Usury. The bank sold Bank of Kentucky notes
to certain persons on long credit. When these persons
afterwards claimed an allowance for depreciation, it was
granted. A case which came to trial went off on tech-
nicalities, which were claimed to amount to a confession
by the bank of a corrupt bargain. 9 The bank had also
charged discount and exchange for domestic bills, when
these two together amounted to more than six per cent,
the rate to which it was restrained by its charter. This
charge was no doubt true. The device was used by all
banks to evade the usury law.

(2.) Branch drafts issued as currency. ' The amount
of these outstanding was $7.4 millions. The majority
of the committee doubted the lawfulness of the branch
drafts, but said nothing about the danger from them
as instruments of credit Adams said they were useful,
but likely to do mischief. These drafts were in form
redeemable where issued, but in intention and practice
they were redeemed hundreds of miles away, and they
had no true convertibility. There was no check what-
ever on the inflation of the currency by them so long as
credit was active. Cambreleng very pointedly asked
Biddle how the branch draft arrangement differed from

1 Document B.

* Of. Bank of the United States »s. William Owens * *l f
**>»» 527.

£62 ANDREW JACKSON.

in obligation of a Philadelphia bank to redeem all th«
notes of all the banks in Pennsylvania. Biddle replied
that the Bank of the United States controlled all the
branches which issued branch drafts on it That was,
to be sure, the assumption, but he had had hard ex-
perience all winter that ft was not true in fact. 1

(3.) Sales of coin, especially American coin. The
bank had bought and sold foreign coin by weight The
majority held that such coins were not bullion, because
Congress had fixed their value by law. Adams easily
showed the fallacy of this. All gold coins, then, Ameri-
can included, were a commodity, not money. 3 The
bank had sold $84,734.44 of American gold coin.

(4.) Sales of public stocks. The bank was forbidden
by the charter to sell public stocks, the object being to
prevent it from manipulating the price of the same. In
1824, in aid of a refunding scheme, the bank took
Borne public stocks from the government, and had spe-
cial permission by act of Congress to sell them. Tho
majority disapproved of the sale. /

(5.) Gifts to roads, canals, etc. The bank had made
two subscriptions of $1,500 each to the stock of turn-
pike companies. The other cases were all petty gifts
to fire companies, etc. The majority argued that, since
the administration had pronounced against internal im-
provements, the bank ought not to have assisted any such
works. Adams said that the administration had opposed
internal improvements, on the ground that they were
unconstitutional when undertaken by the federal govern*
aient; but he asked what argument that furnished
against such works when undertaken by anybody else.

(6.) Building houses to rent or sell. The bank had
1 See below, page 270-1. 2 See page 833.

CHARGES AGAINST THE BANK. 263

been obliged, in some cases, to take real estate for debts.
When it could not sell, it had, in a few cases, improved.

These points were the alleged violations of the charter.
Biddle denied the seventh charge, of norMiser, in failing
to issue notes in the South and West for seven years.
Adams pointed out that these charges would only afford
ground for a scire facias to go before a jury on the
facts. The charges of mismanagement, and the truth
about them, so far as we can ascertain, were as follows :

(L) Subsidizing the press. Webb and Noah, of the
"Courier and Enquirer" (administration organ until
April, 1831; then in favor of the bank), Gales and
Beaton, of the "National Intelligencer " (independent
opposition), Duff Green, of the " Telegraph " (adminis-
tration organ until the spring of 1831), and Thomas
Ritchie of the Richmond " Enquirer " (administration)
were on the books of the bank as borrowers. The
change of front by the " Courier and En<|uirer " was re-
garded as very significant. Adams said that there was
no law against subsidizing the press, and that the phrase
meant nothing. He protested against the examination
of the editors. The case stood so that, if the bank dis-
counted a note for an administration editor, it was said
to bribe him $ if for an opposition editor, it was said to
subsidize him.

(2.) Favoritism to Thomas Biddle, second cousin of
the president of the bank. Reuben M. Whitney was
the witness on this charge. T. Biddle was the broker
-»f the bank. N Biddle admitted that the bank had
tallowed a usage, adopted by other banks, of allowing
<ash in the drawer to be loaned out to particular persons,
tnd replaced by securities, which were passed as cash,
for a few days. He said the practice had been discon

264 ANDREW JACKSON.

tinned. Whitney made a very circumstantial charge
that T. Biddle had been allowed to do this, and that ha
had paid no interest for the funds of the bank of which
he thus got the use. N. Biddle proved that he was in
Washington when Whitney's statement implied his
presence in Philadelphia. Adams said Whitney lied.
I * was certainly true, and was admitted, that T. Biddle
had had enormous confidential transactions with the
bank, but Whitney was placed, in respect to all the im-
portant part of his evidence, in the position of a con-
victed calumniator. He went to Wasl^jfegton, where he
was taken into the kitchen cabinet and made special
agent of the deposit banks. In 1837 he\.published an-
" Address to the American People," in which he reit-
erated the charges against Biddle. 1 - = .

(3.) Exporting specie^ and drawing specie from the
South and West. The minority state that the usual
current was, that silver was imported from Mexico to
New Orleans, and passed up the Mississippi and Ohio,
and was exported to China from the East. From
1820 to 1832, $22.5 million were drawn from the South
and West to New York. The bank was charged with
draining the West of specie. So far as the current of
lilver was normal, the bank had nothing to do with
it. If there had been no banks of issue, the West would
have kept enough specie for its use, and the current
would have flowed through and past, leaving always
enough. The paper issues in the valley drove out the
specie, and little stayed. The branch drafts after 1827
helped to produce this result, and the charge was, ir
10 far, just. 2 The bank was also charged with export

* 52 Nile*, 106.

9 Gouge fays that, in 1828, there was no local bank in opera

CHARGES AGAIN8T THE BANK. 265

log specie as a result of its exchange operations. It
•old drafts on London for use in China, payable six
months after sight. They were sold for the note of the
buyer at one year. The goods could be imported and
sold to meet the draft This produced an inflation of
credit, since one who had no capital, if he could get the
bank accommodation, could extend credit indefinitely.
The majority made a point on this, but they added the
following contribution to financial science : " The legiti-
mate object of banks the committee believe to be grant-
ing facilities, not loaning capital." On that theory there
would have been no fault to be found with the China
drafts, which must have been a great " facility " to those
who could get them, and who had no other capital.

(4.) The improper increase of branches. It was
true that there were too many. Cheves, in his time,
thought some of them disadvantageous to the bank, but
it had been importuned to establish them, and there was
complaint if a branch was lacking where the government
or influential individuals wanted one.

(5.) Expansion of the circulation by $1.3 million be-
tween September 1, 1831, and April 1, 1832, although
the discounts had been reduced during the winter. The
bank was struggling already with the branch drafts, and
the facts alleged were produced by its efforts to cope
with the effects of the drafts.

(6.) Failure of the bank to serve the nation. The
majority made another extraordinary blunder here.
They said fhat the duties were paid at New York and
Philadelphia, and that drafts on these cities were al-
ways at a premium. Hence they argued that the bank

tSon in Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, or Missouri, and only odi
tach in Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama. (Gouge, 89.)

866 ANDREW JACKSON.

gained more the further it transferred funds for th*
government. The minority ridiculed this as an anni-
hilation of space, a means of making a thing worth mora
the further it was from where it was wanted.

(7.) Mismanagement of the public deposits. The
majority state what they think the bank ought to do.
It ought to use its capital as a permanent fund, and loan
the public deposits on time, so as to be payable near the
time when they would be required by the government
for the debt payments. If the bank had done this it
would have carried to a maximum the disturbances in
the money market which were actually produced by the
semi-annual payments on the debt. It would have in-
flated and contracted its discounts by an enormous sum
every six months.

(8.) Postponement of the payment of the three per
cents. These stocks were issued in 1792 for the accrued
interest on the Revolutionary debt. They were to be
paid at 100. The Secretary informed the bank, March
24th, just before the bank committee was raised, that
he should pay half the three per cents ($6 million) in
July. Biddle hastened to Washington to secure a post-
ponement ; not, as he affirmed, for the sake of the bank,
but for two other reasons : (1) that $9 million duty
bonds would be payable July 1st, and the merchants
would be put to inconvenience if the debt payment feU
at that time , (2) a visitation of cholera was to be
feared, which would derange industry ; and the payment
of the debt, with the recall of so much capital loaned
to merchants, would add to the distress. The friends of
the bank said that these reasons were good and sufll
eient. Its enemies said that they were specious, but wer«
»nly pretexts. The Secretary agreed to defer the pay

CHARGES A0AIN8T THE BANK. 26?

ttiont of $5 million of the three per cents until October
1st, the bank agreeing to pay the interest for three
months. 1 This matter will be discussed below.

(9.) Incomplete number of directors. Biddle was
both government director and elected director, so that
there were only twenty-four in alL

(10.) Large expenditures for printing : $6,700 in
1830 : $9,100 in 1831. From 1829, the date of Jack-
son's first attack, the bank spent money on pamphlets
and newspapers to influence public opinion in its favor.

(11.) Large contingent expenditures. There was a
contingent fund account, the footings of which, in 1832,
were $6 million, to sink the losses of the first few years,
the bonus, premiums on public stocks bought, banking
house, etc., etc.

(12.) Loans to members of Congress in advance of
appropriations. Adams objected to this as an evil prac-
tice. He said afterwards that the investigation into
this point was dropped, because it was found that a
large number of congressmen of both parties had had
loans.

(13.) Refusal to give a list of stockholders resident
in Connecticut, so that that State might collect taxes
from them on their stock.

(14.) Usurpation of the control of the bank by the
exchange committee of the board of directors, to the
exclusion of the other directors. This charge was de-
nied.

In all this tedious catalogue of charges we can find

nothing but frivolous complaints and ignorant criticism

successfully refuted, except when we touch the branch

drafts. The majority of the committee, if all theii

1 Document D.

868 ANDREW JACKSON.

points are taken together, thought that the bank ought
to lend the public deposits liberally, and draw them in
promptly when wanted to pay the debt, yet refuse no
accommodation (especially to any one who was em-
barrassed), not sell its public stocks, not increase its
circulation, not draw in its loans, not part with its
specie, not draw on the debtor branches in the West,
not press the debtor state banks, and not contract any
temporary loans. The student of the evidence and re-
ports of 1832, if he believes the bank 9 8 statements in the
evidence, will say that the bank was triumphantly vin-
dicated. Two facts, however, are very striking : (1)
The most important of the charges against which the
bank successfully defended itself in 1832 were the very
acts of which it was guilty in 1837-38, and they were
what ruined it ; these were the second charge, which
involved Whitney's veracity, and the fourteenth charge,
which the bank denied. (2) Whether the bank was
thoroughly sincere and above-board in these matters is
a question on which an unpleasant doubt is thrown by
the certainty that it was not thoroughly honest in. some
other matters. In regard to the three per cents, it is
certain that Biddle wanted to defer the payment for the
sake of the bank. He was embarrassed already by the
debt of the Western branches, which had been produced
by the operation of the branch drafts. Their effect was
just beginning to tell seriously. There was a great
movement of free capital in the form of specie to thia
country in 1830, on account of revolutions in Europe.
En 1830 and 1831 the United States paid its stock note
in the capital of the bank. Capital was easy to borrow.
In October, 1831, a certain stringency set in. Thf
Hranch drafts were transferring the capital of the v >anl

BIDDLE* 8 PLAUSIBILITY. 269

Id tie Western branches, and locking it up there in
ftccomniodation paper, indefinitely extended by drawing
Mid redrawing. Biddle could not make the Western
branches pay. He was forced to curtail the Eastern
branches. At such a juncture it was impossible for him
to see with equanimity a debt which bore only three
per cent interest paid off at one hundred, when the
market rate was seven or eight per cent. He wanted
to get possession of that capital. Even before he re-
ceived notice that the three per cents were to be paid,
he tried to negotiate with Ludlow, the representative
of a large number of holders of the three per cents,
for the purchase of the same. Ludlow had not power to
sell. 1 Great consequences hung on the strait into which
the branch drafts had pushed the bank, and this meas-
ure of relief to which Biddle had recourse. Biddle was
too plausible. In any emergency he was ready to write
a letter or report, to smooth things over, and present a
good face in spite of facts. Any one who has carefully
studied the history of the bank, and Biddle's " state-
ments," will come to every statement of his with a dis-
agreeable sense of suspicion. It is by no means certain,
whatever the true explanation of the contradiction may
be, that Whitney told a lie in the matter in which his
word and Biddle's were opposed.

Biddle's theory of bank-note issues was vicious and
false. He thought that the business of a bank was to
furnish a paper medium for trade and commerce. He
thought that this medium served as a token and record
of transactions, the exchange turning upon itself, as it
irere, so that the transactions to be accomplished called
rat the paper, and when accomplished brought the paper
1 Polk's Minority Eeport, ' 835, Document E.

270 ANDREW JACKSON.

Deck. There could then be no inflation of the paper, if
It was only put out as demanded for real transactions.
Therefore he never distinguished between bills of ex*
change and money, or the true paper surrogate for
money, which is constantly and directly interchangeable
with money, so that it cannot degenerate into a negoti-
able instrument like notes and bills. Bis management
of the bank was a test of his theory on a grand scale.
The branch drafts were a special test of it. It was
proven that they had none of the character of convertible
bank-notes or money, but were instruments of credit,
and, like all instruments of credit which have cut loose
from actual redemption in capital, there was no more
limit to their possible inflation than to the infinity of
human hopes and human desires. Only a few months
after this investigation, November, 1832, the president
of the Nashville branch wrote to Biddle, " Be assured,
sir, that we are as well convinced as you are that too
many bills are offered and purchased, — amounting to
more than the present crop of cotton and tobacco will
pay ; I mean, before all these papers are taken up." It
does not appear that, in the spring of 1832, Biddle yet
perceived the operation of the branch drafts, and it
sould not be said that sincerity required that he should
avow a mistake to a hostile committee ; but his letter to
Clayton, appended to the report of 1832, is meretricious
and dazzling, calculated to repel investigation and cover
up weakness by a sensational assertion. " The whole
policy of the bank for the last six months has been ex-
clusively protective and conservative, calculated to miti-
gate suffering and yet avert danger." He sketches ou
bi broad and bold outlines the national and interna
tisnal relations of American industry and commerce

BIDDL&8 INSINCERITY. 271

tnd the financial relations of the Treasury, with the hank
enthroned over all as the financial providence of the
country. This kind of writing had a great effect on the
uninitiated. Who could dispute with a man who thus
handled all the public and private finance of the whole
country as a school-master would tell boys how to do a
sum in long division ? However, it was all humbug, and
especially that part which represented the bank as
watching over, and caring for the public As Gouge
most justly remarked, after quoting some of Biddle't
rhetoric : " The true basis of the interior trade of the
United States is the fertility of the soil and the industry
of the people. The sun would shine, the streams would
flow, and the earth would yield her increase, if the Bank
of the United States was not in existence." 1 If the
bank had been strong, Biddle's explanations would all
have been meretricious ; as it was, the bank had been
quite fully occupied in 1831-32 in taking care of itself,
nitigating its own sufferings and averting its own dan
gers.

No doubt the bank was the chief sufferer from th*
shocks inflicted on the money market by the sudden an* 1
heavy payments on the public debt. Long credits were
given for duties. When paid they passed into the bank
as public deposits. They were loaned again to mer-
chants to pay new duties, so that one credit was piled
upon another already in this part of the arrangement.
Then the deposits were called in to meet drafts of the
Treasury to pay the debt, and so passed to the former
fund-holders. These latter next entered tbe money
market as investor, and the capital passed into new em-
ployments. Therefore Benton's argument, which all tb«
i Gouge, 56.

272 ANDREW JACKBON.

anti-bank men caught up, that the financial heats and
chills of this period were certainly due to the malice of
the bank, is of no force at all. The disturbances were
such, they necessarily lasted so long, and they finally
settled down to such ^incalculable final effects that all
such deductions as Benton made were unwarranted. A
public debt is not a blessing, but it is not as great a
curse as a public surplus, and it is very possible to pay
off a debt too rapidly. We shall, on two or three fur-
ther occasions in this history, find the " public deposits "
banging about the money market like a cannon ball
loose in the hold of a ship in a high wind.

While the committee was investigating the bank the
political strife was growing more intense, and every
chance of dealing dispassionately with the question of
recharter had passed away. In January, Van Buren's
nomination as minister to England was rejected by the
Senate. 1 The Legislature of New York had passed
resolutions against the recharter of the bank. 3 This
hurt Van Buren in Pennsylvania. Such was the strange
combination of feelings and convictions at this time that
Jackson could demolish the bank without «h*lnng his
hold on Pennsylvania, but Van Buren was never for-
given for the action of his State against the bank. It
illustrated again the observation made above, that the
popular idol enjoys an unreasonable immunity, while
others may be held to an unreasonable responsibility.
All Jackson's intensest personal feelings, as well as the
choice of the kitchen cabinet, now converged on Vai
Buren's nomination. The Seminole war grudge, hatred
af Calhoun, the Eaton scandal, and animosity to th#
Senate contributed towards this end. •

* Sec page 161. « 2 Hamraool. 851.

DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION— 1832. 273

Parton gives us one of Lewis's letters, which shows
the wire-pulling which preceded the first democratic
convention. Kendall was in New Hampshire in the
spring of 1831. Lewis wrote to him to propose that a
convention should he held in May, 1832, to nominate
Van Buren for Vice-President. He suggested that the
New Hampshire Legislature should he prompted to
propose it. Kendall arranged this and wrote a letter,
giving an account of the meeting, resolutions, etc.,
which was published anonymously in the " Globe," July
6, 1831. The " Globe " took up the proposition and
approved of it. The convention met at Baltimore, May
21, 1832. John H. Eaton was a delegate to the con-
vention. He intended to vote against Van Buren, for,
although Van Buren had taken Mrs. Eaton's part, he
had not won Eaton's affection. Lewis wrote to Eaton
that he must not vote against Van Buren " unless
he was prepared to quarrel with the general." Van
Buren was nominated by 260 votes out of 326. The
* spontaneous unanimity " of this convention was pro-
duced by the will of Andrew Jackson and the energetic
discipline of the kitchen cabinet. It may well be
doubted whether, without Jackson's support, Van Buren
could have got 260 votes for President or Vice-Presi-
dent in the whole United States, in 1832. The " Globe "
dragooned the whole Jackson party into the support of
Van Buren, not without considerable trouble. The con-
vention adopted an address prepared by Kendall, con-
taining a review of Jackson's first administration. 1

May 7, 1832, a national republican convention of
roung men met in Washington. "VFllliam Cost Johnson
was president. The convention ratified the nominatioi

1 Kendall's Autobiography 296.

18

£74 ANDREW JACKSON.

if Clay and Sergeant, and passed a series of resolution!
In favor of tariff and internal improvements, and ap-
proving the rejection of Van Buren's nomination. 1

Daring the spring and summer Biddle took quarters
in Washington, from which he directed the congressional
campaign on behalf of 'the recharter. He was then at
the zenith of his power and fame, and enjoyed real re-
nown in Europe and America. He and Jackson were
pitted against each other personally. Biddle, however,
put a letter in Livingston's s hands, stating that he would
accept any charter to which Jackson would consent. 1
Jackson never fought for compromises, and nothing was
heard of this letter. Jackson drew up a queer plan of
a "bank," which he thought constitutional and suitable,
but ft remained in his drawer. 4 The anti-bank men
affirmed that Biddle was corrupting Congress.

The charter passed the Senate June 11th, 28 to 20,
and the House, July 3d, 107 to 85. It was sent to the
President July 4th. The Senate voted to adjourn July
16th. It was a clever device of theirs to force Jackson to
sign or veto by giving him more than ten days. They
wanted to force him to a direct issue. It is not prob-
able that there was room for his will to be any further
stimulated by this kind of manoauvring, but he never
flinched from a direct issue, and the only effect was
to put him where he would have risked his reelection
ftnd everything else on a defiant reply to the challenge

l 42 Niles, 206, 236.

• Livingston was on the side of the bank. (Hunt's Livingston
553.)

• Ingersoll, 26S. On the same page it is said that Biddle w«
•Iked of for President of the United States.

• Ingersoll, 283.

VETO OF THE BANK. 275

Dffered. Niles says * that, a week before the bill passed,
the best informed were " as six to half a dozen," whether
the bill, if passed, would be vetoed, but that, for the
two or three days before the bill was sent up, a veto
was confidently expected. The veto was sent in, July
10th. 2 The reasons given for it were : (1) The bank
would have a monopoly for which the bonus was no
equivalent. (2) One fifth of the stockholders were
foreigners. (3) Banks were to be allowed to pay the
Bank of the United States in branch drafts, which in*
dividuals could not do. (4) The States were allowed
to tax the stock of the bank owned by their citizens,
which would cause the stock to go out of the country.

(5) The few stockholders here would then control it

(6) The charter was unconstitutional. (7) The business
of the bank would be exempt from taxation. (8) There
were strong suspicions of mismanagement in the bank.

(9) The President could have given a better plan.

(10) The bank would increase the distinction between
rich and poor.

The bill was put to vote in the Senate July 13th, but
failed of two thirds (22 to 19). If the bank was to
continue to exist it was now necessary to defeat Jackson.
The state bank interest, however, had now been aroused
to the great gain it would make if the Bank of the
United States should be overthrown. The Jackson party
thereby won the adhesion of an important faction. The
•af ety-fund banks of New York were bound into a solid
phalanx by their system, and they constituted a great po-

1 42 Niles, 337.

3 Congress has chartered national banks as follows: 1792,,
*15 (vetoed), 1816, 1832 (vetoed' 1841, two bills, both vetoed,
1863.

276 ANDREW JACKSON.

litical power. The chief crime alleged against the Bank
of the United States was meddling with politics. The
safety-fund banks of New York were an active political
power under Van Buren's control, and they went into
this election animated by the hope of a share in the de-
posits. The great bank also distributed pamphlets and
subsidized newspapers, fighting for its existence. The
Jackson men always denounced this action of the Bank
of the United States as corrupt, and as proof of the
troth of Jackson's charges.

Jackson got 219 electoral votes ; Clay, 49 ; Floyd, 11
(of South Carolina, the nullification ticket) ; Wirt, 7
(of Vermont). There were two vacancies (in Mary-
land) Clay carried Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Con-
necticut, Delaware, and Kentucky, and five votes in
Maryland. For Vice-President Van Buren got 189.
Pennsylvania would not vote for him. She gave her 30
votes to William Wilkins. Sergeant got 49 votes;
Henry Lee, of Massachusetts, 11 (of South Carolina) ;
EUmaker, 7. At this election South Carolina alone
Jirew her vote by her Legislature. The popular vota
was 707,217 for Jackson; 328,561 for Clay; 254,720
for Wirt. Jackson's majority, in a total vote (excluding
Sooth Carolina) of 1,290,498, was 123,936. In Ala-
bama there was no anti-Jackson ticket

CHAPTER XITT.

fcAKZFF, NULLIFICATION, AND BANK DURING JACKSON'8
SECOND ADMINISTRATION.

General Jackson now advanced to another develop-
ment of his political philosophy and his political art
No government which has felt itself strong has ever had
the self-control to practice faithfully the non-interference
theory. A popular idol at the head of a democratic
republic is one of the last political organs to do so.
The belief in himself is of course for him a natural
product of the situation, and he is quite ready to be-
lieve, as he is constantly told, that he can make the
people happy, and can "save the country" from evil
and designing persons, namely, those who do not join
the chorus of adulation. A President of the United
States, under existing social and economic circum-
stances, has no chance whatever to play the role of Cae-
sar or Napoleon, but he may practise the methods of
personal government within the limits )f the situation.
Jackson held that his reelection was a triumphant vindi-
cation of him in all the points in which he had been
engaged in controversy with anybody, and a kind of
charter to him, as representative, or rather tribune, of
the people, to go on and govern on his own judgment
over and against everybody, including Congress. His
Action about the Cherokee Indians, his attitude to the
Supreme Court, his construction of his duties under the

278 ANDREW JACKSON.

Constitution, his vetoes of internal improvements and
the bank, his defence of Mrs. Eaton, his attitude toward
Calhoun and Clay, his discontent with the Senate, all
things, great and small, in which he had been active and
interested, were held to be covered and passed upon by
the voice of the people in his reelection. 1 Adulation and
success had already done much to make Jackson a dan-
gerous man. After his reelection, his self-confidence
and self-will became tenfold greater. 3 Moreover, his in-
intimates and confidential advisers, Kendall, Lewis,
Blair, and Hill, won more confidence in themselves, and
handled their power with greater freedom and certainty.
It has already been shown in this history that they were
perfect masters of the art of party organization, and
they had a strong hatred of the bank ; but they had no
statesman-like ideas in finance or public policy, and they
governed by playing on the prejudices and vanity of
Jackson.

1 We may test this theory in regard to one point, the bank.
The Legislature of Pennsylvania, on the 2d of February, 1832,
within eight months of the election at which Jackson got three
fifths of the vote of Pennsylvania, instructed the senators and
representatives in Congress from that State, by a unanimous
vote in the Senate, and by 77 to 7 in the House, to secure the r#-
charter of the bank.

2 "The truth is, I consider the President intoxicated with
power and flattery." " All the circumstances around him [when
ne came to office] were calculated to make him entertain an ex-
ilted opinion of himself, and a contemptuous one of others. Hia
,wn natural passions contributed to this result." (Duane, 133,
under date October, 1833.) " There is a tone of insolence and
insult in his intercourse with both Houses of Congress, especially
lince his reelection, which never was witnessed between the Kx-
Kutive and the Legislature before." (9 Adams, 51 : Decern b«t

*, 1*33}

PERSONAL GOVERNMENT. 279

Jackson's modes of action in his second term were
ihose of personal government. He proceeded avow-
edly, on his own initiative and responsibility, to experi-
ment, as Napoleon did, with great public institutions
and interests. It came in his way to do some good,
to check some bad tendencies and to strengthen some
good ones ; but the moment the historian tries to ana-
lyze these acts, and to bring them for purposes of
generalization into relations with the stand-point or
doctrine by which Jackson acted, that moment he per-
ceives that Jackson acted from spite, pique, instinct,
prejudice, or emotion, and the influence he exerted sinks
to the nature of an incident or an accident. Then, al-
though we believe in personal liberty with responsibility,
and in free institutions ; although we believe that no
modern free state can exist without wide popular rights ;
although we believe in the non-interference theory, and
oppose the extension of state action to internal improve
ments and tariffs ; although we recognize the dreadful
evils of bad banking and fluctuating currency ; and
although we believe that the Union is absolutely the
first political interest of the American people, yet, 2 we
think that intelligent deliberation and disciplined reason
ought to control the civil affairs of a civilized state, we
must say of Jackson that he- stumbled along through
a magnificent career, now and then taking up a chance
without really appreciating it ; leaving behind him dis-
torted and discordant elements of good and ill, just fit
to produce turmoil and disaster in the future. We
have already seen, in some cases, what was the tyranny
of his popularity. It crushed out reason and common
tense. To the gravest arguments and remonstrances,
she answer was, literally, " Hurrah for Jackson ! " Is*

r

280 ANDREW JACKSON.

then, that a sound state of things for any civilized state ?
b that the sense of democracy? Is a democratic re-
public working fairly and truly by its theory in such a
case ? Representative institutions are degraded on the
Jacksonian theory, just as they are on the divine-riglit
theory, or on the theory of the democratic empire.
There is not a worse perversion of the American system
of government conceivable than to regard the President
as the tribune of the people, endowed by his election
with prerogative to check, warn, correct, guide, and
watch the representatives of the nation in Congress as-
sembled.

One of the most remarkable modes of personal rule
employed by Jackson was the perfection and refinement
given to the " organ " as an institution of democratic
government. In the hands of Blair the " Globe " came
to be a terrible power. Every office-holder signed his
allegiance by taking the "Globe." In it both friend
and foe found daily utterances from the White House
a propos of every topic of political interest The sug-
gestions, innuendoes, queries, quips, and sarcasms of the
" Globe " were scanned by the men who desired to
recommend themselves by the zeal which anticipates,
and the subserviency which can even dispense with, a
command. The editorials scarcely veiled their inspira-
tion and authorization. The President issued a message
to his party every day. He told the political news con-
fidentially, and in advance of the mere newspapers,
while deriding and denouncing his enemies, praising the
adherents who pleased him, and checking, warning, or
stimulating all as he thought best to promote discipline
And efficiency. When we say " he " did it, we speak, of
tourse, figuratively. If it was Blair's voice, Jacksoi

NULLIFICATION CONVENTION. 281

ratified it. If it was Jackson's will Blair promulgated
it

The South Carolinians thought that the limit oi
proper delay and constitutional agitation had been
reached when«the tariff of July, 1832, was passed. In
the year 1832 the nullifiers, for the first time, got con-
trol of South Carolina. The Legislature was convened,
by special proclamation for the 22d of October 1832, —
a month earlier than usual. An act was passed, October
25th, ordering a convention to be held on the 19th of
November. The Legislature then adjourned until its
regular day of meeting, the fourth Monday in Novem-
ber. The convention met as ordered ; Governor Hamil-
ton was president of it It adopted an ordinance that the
acts of Congress of May 19, 1828, and July 14, 1832,
were null and void in South Carolina. These proceed-
ings conformed to a theory of the practice of nullification
which the South Carolina doctrinaires had wrought out :
namely, that the Legislature could not nullify, but that
a convention, being the State in some more original
capacity, and embodying the " sovereignty " in a purer
emanation, could do so. The theory and practice of
nullification was a triumph of metaphysical politics.
The South Carolinians went through the evolutions, by
which, as they had persuaded themselves, nullification
could be made a constitutional remedy, with a solem-
nity which was either edifying or ridiculous, according
as one forgot or remembered that the adverse party
attached no significance to the evolutions.

The ordinance provided that no appeal from a South
Carolina court to a fedaral court should be allowed
in any case arising under any of the laws passed in
pursuance of the ordinance; such an appeal to be a

282 ANDREW JACKSON.

contempt of court All officers and jurors were to take
an oath to the ordinance. South Carolina would secede
if the United States should attempt to enforce anything
contrary to the ordinance. November 27th the Legis-
lature met again, and passed the laws requisite to put the
ordinance in operation. Goods seized by the custom-
house officers might be replevied. Militia and volun-
teers might be called out. A thousand stand of arms
were to be purchased.

A Union convention met at Columbia early in Decern*
ber. It declared itself ready to support the federal
government It appeared, therefore, that there would
be civil war in South Carolina. The Union men were
strong in Charleston and in the Western counties.

Jackson immediately took up the defiance which
South Carolina had offered to the federal government
He ordered General Scott to Charleston, and caused
troops to collect within convenient distance, although
not so as to provoke a collision. He ordered two war
vessels to Charleston. He issued, December 10th, a
proclamation to the people of South Carolina. It was
written by Livingston, who, as we have seen, 1 had taken
up a position against nullification more than two years
before. He represented the only tariff State in the
South, — Louisiana. It has been asserted that Jackson
did not like the constitutional doctrines of the procla-
mation, which are Madisonian federalist, and not such as
he had held, but that he let the paper pass on account
of the lack of time to modify it* There is nothing of

* See page 214.

a Lewis in 3 Parton, 466; Tyler's Taney, 188. laney re-
torded, in 1861, that he should have objected to some of the doo
nines of th» proclamation, if he had been in Washington at thf
time. (/frtVj

ANTI-NULLIFICATION PROCLAMATION.

the Jacksonian temper in the document It is 6trong,
moderate, eloquent, and, at last, even pathetic. 1 It if
very long : The following passage is perhaps the most
important in it : "I consider the power to annul a law
of the United States, assumed by one State, incompatible
with the existence of the Union, contradicted expressly
by the letter of the Constitution, unauthorized by its
spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which it was
founded, and destructive of the great object for which
it was formed." This proclamation voiced the opinion
and feeling of the whole country, except the milliners in
South Carolina and a few of their comrades in other
Southern States. The dignified tone of the paper was
especially satisfactory. It was the right tone to take to
men who had allowed their passionate temper to commit
them to unworthy and boyish proceedings, and who had
sought a remedy for civil grievances in acts which made
liberty and security impossible. Jackson found him-
self a national civil hero for once, and he enjoyed
the plaudits of people who had detested him the most
earnestly. He lives in popular memory and tradition
chiefly as the man who put down this treason, but the
historian must remember that, if Jackson had done his
duty in regard to Georgia and the Indians, nullification
would never have attained any strength. The Southern-
ers were astonished at the proclamation. It seemed to
them inconsistent, even treacherous. 2 The constitutional
theories were not at all such as Jackson had been under-
stood to hold. They ascribed Jackson's attitude on this

1 Jackson contributed a suggestion of the pathos. (Hunt'f
Livingston, 373.)

* Hodgson, 173. Cf. Resolution oC Jie South Carolina Lsgis
*ture, 43 Niles, 300.

284 ANDREW JAQK80N.

question to hatred of Calhoun. Old John Randolph,
who was in a dying condition, roused himself as the
champion of state rights, although he had been a strong
adherent of Jackson, and went through the counties of
Virginia, in which he had once been a power, in his
carriage, to try to arouse the people to resist the danger-
ous doctrines of the proclamation, 1 and yet to uphold
the Union.

December 20th, Governor Hayne of South Carolina
issued a proclamation in answer to Jackson's. Calhoun
resigned the vice-presidency, December 28th. He was
elected senator in Hayne's place. He had been Vice-
President for eight years. He now returned to the
floor and to active work. He never afterwards took
position in any party. He was an isolated man, who
formed alliances to further his ends. South Carolina
also remained an isolated State until 1840, when she
voted for Van Buren and came back into the ranks.
Calhoun seemed to have lost the talent for practical
statesmanship which he had shown in his earlier years.
He involved himself tighter and tighter in spinnings of
political mysticism and fantastic speculation. Harriet
Martineau calls him a cast-iron man, and describes his
eager, absorbed, over-speculative type of conversation
and bearing, even in society. 3 " I know of no man who
lives in such utter intellectual solitude. He meets men
and harangues them by the fireside as in the Senate.
He is wrought like a piece of machinery, set going
vehemently by a weight, and stops while you answer
He either passes by what you say, or twists it into suit
ability with what is in his head, and begins to lector*

1 2 Garland's Randolph, 360.

* 1 Martineau, Western Travel, lit.

JACKSON ASKS FOB INCREASED POWERS. 285

again." He " is as fall as ever of his nullification doe*
bines [1836], And those who krow the force that is in
him. and his utter incapacity of modification by other
minus, . . . will no more expect repose and self reten-
tion from him than from a volcano in fall force. Re-
laxation is no longer in the power of his will. I never
saw any one who so completely gave me the idea of
possession."

In his message of 1832, Jackson said that the pro-
tective system most ultimately be limited to the commod-
ities needed in war. Beyond this limit that system had
already produced discontent He suggested that the
subject should be reviewed in a disposition to dispose of
it justly. December 13th the Senate called on the
Secretary of the Treasury to propose a tariff bill. De-
cember 27th, in the House, the Committee on Ways and
Means reported a bill based on the Secretary's views.
It proposed an immediate and sweeping reduction,
with a further reduction, after 1834, to a" horizontal "
rate of fifteen per cent or twenty per cent January 16,
1833, Jackson sent in a message, in which he informed
Congress of the proceedings of South Carolina, and
asked for power to remove the custom house and to
hold goods for customs by military force ; also for pro-
visions that federal courts should have exclusive juris-
dicticn of revenue cases, and that the Circuit Court of
the United States might remove revenue cases from state
courts. Calhoun, in reply to this message, declared that
South Carolina was not hostile to the Union, and he
cade one unanswerable point against Jackson's position*
Jackson had referred to the Supreme Court as the
proper authority to decids the constitutionality of the
tariff. The nullifiers had always wished to get the

286 ANDREW JACKSON.

tariff before the Supreme Court, but there was no way
to do so. The first tariff of 1789 was preceded by a
preamble, in which the protection of domestic manufact-
ures was specified as one of the purposes of the act,
but this form had not been continued. The anti-tariff
men tried to have such a preamble prefixed to the tariff
act of 1828, but the tariff majority voted it down.
Congress had unquestioned power to lay taxes. How
could it be ascertained what the purpose of the majority
in Congress was, when they voted for a certain tax law ?
How could the constitutionality of a law be tried, when
it turned on the question of this purpose, which, in the
nature of the case, was mixed and unavowed? 1 It
was not, therefore, fair to represent the nullifiers as
neglecting an obvious and adequate legal remedy. A
grand debate on constitutional theories arose out of Cal-
houn's criticism of Jackson's message and proclamation.
Calhoun, Grundy, and Clayton each offered a set of
resolutions, 2 and a flood of metaphysical dogmatizing
about constitutional law was let loose. As it began no-
where, it ended nowhere. In these disputes, the dis-
putants always carefully lay down, in their resolutions
about " the great underlying principles of the Constitu-
tion," those premises, which will sustain the deductions
which the disputant in question wants to arrive at for
the support of his interests. In the mean time the
merits of the particular question are untouched. To
inform one's self on the merits of the question would
require patient labor. To dogmatize on "great prin

1 The principle is covered fully by the decision in Loan Am*
elation vs. Topeka (20 Wallace, 655), but the practical difficulty
probably remains.

• 43 Niles, Supp. 222. The debate is then given

ENFORCEMENT ACT. 287

■plea" and settle the question by an inference u
•asy. Consequently, the latter method will not soon bt
abandoned.

On the 21st of January, 1833, a bill for enforcing the
collection of the revenue was reported to the Senate. It
gave the powers and made the provisions which Jackson
had asked for. On the next day Calhoun introduced
his resolutions : that the States are united " as parties to
a constitutional compact; " that the acts of the general
government, outside of the defined powers given to it,
are void ; that each State may judge when the compact
is broken ; that the theory that the people of the United
States " are now or ever have been united on the prin-
ciple of the social compact, and as such are now formed
into one nation or people," is erroneous, false in history
and reason. It would only be tedious to cite the other
resolutions offered. Webster was good enough lawyer
to get tired of the ^metaphysics very soon. Hodgson
says that he withdrew, defeated by Calhoun. 1 The
appearance of the " social compact " as an understood
and accepted element of political philosophy is worth
noting.

The state Legislatures also passed resolutions. Mas*
tachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, New York, Missouri,
Tennessee, and Indiana pronounced against nullification ;
North Carolina and Alabama against nullification and
tariff ; Georgia against the tariff, also that nullification
is unconstitutional, and that a convention of the Gulf
States should be held ; New Hampshire, that the tariff
ihould be reduced ; Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Ver-
mont, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, that the tarifl
1 Hodgra, 174.

288 ANDREW JACKSON.

iught not to be reduced. Virginia offered to mediate
between the United States and South Carolina. 1

The House was at work on the tariff during January,
February 12th, Clay introduced the compromise tariff u
the Senate, to supersede all other propositions and be a
final solution of all pending troubles. Of all the dutiei
which were over twenty per cent by the act of July 14,
1832, one tenth of the excess over twenty per cent was
to be struck off after September 30, 1835, and one tenth
each alternate year thereafter until 1841. Then one
half the remaining excess was to be taken off, and in
1842 the tax would be reduced to twenty per cent as a
horizontal rate, with a large free list, home valuation, and
no credit. Credit for duties worked very mischievously.
An importer sold his goods before he paid his duties.
The price he obtained contained the duties which he had
not yet paid. Hence he was able to get capital from
the public with which to carry on his business. In the
end perhaps he became bankrupt, and did not pay the
duties at all. In 1831 a report from the Treasury
stated the duty bonds in suit at $6.8 million, of which
only $1 million was estimated to be collectible. Clay's
compromise, as first drawn, had a preamble, in which it
was stated that, after March 3, 1840, all duties should
*e equal, " and solely for the purpose and with the in*
lent of providing such revenue as may be necessary to
an economical expenditure by the government, without
regard to the protection or encouragement of any branch
of domestic industry whatever." 2

Webster objected to the horizontal rate, and to ar
attempt to pledge future Congresses. He was now re*
dai«d, after having previously made some of the mosi

« • Ann. Reg. 43. » 1 Curtis* Webeter. 4S4. 455.

ENFORCEMENT AND COMPROMISE. 289

feiusterly arguments ever made for free trade, to defend
protection by such devices as he could. Now he de-
rided Adam Smith and the other economists. 1 He first
paltered with his convictions on the tariff, and broke his
moral stamina by so doing. Many of the people who
have been so much astonished at his " sudden " apostasy
on slavery would understand it more easily if their own
judgment was more open to appreciate his earlier
apostasy on free trade. February 13th, he introduced
resolutions against the compromise.*

Hie enforcing act passed the Senate, February 20,
* 1833, by 32 to 8. On the 21st the compromise tariff
was taken up in the Senate. On the 25th the House .
recommitted the tariff bill which was there pending,
with instructions to the committee to report the com-
promise bilL On the 26th the latter was passed, 119 to
85. On the same day the Senate laid Clay's bill on the
table, took up the same bill in the copy sent up from
the House, and passed it, 29 to 16. On the 27th the
House passed the enforcing bill, 111 to 40. Thus the
tdive branch and the rod were bound up together.

There was one moment in January when ex-Governor
Hamilton seemed ready to precipitate a conflict, and
when Governor Hayne seemed ready to support him ; •
but the leading nullifiers determined to wait until Con-
gress adjourned. February 1st was the day appointed
tor nullification to go into effect, but all action was post-
poned. The Legislature replied to Jackson's procla-
mation by a series of resolutions which charged him
*ith usurpation and tyranny. 4 Jackson was annoyed

1 1 Webster's Correspondence, W

* 43 Niles, 40t*. ' 8 Ann. Reg. 890

* 43 NOm. 300.

If

890 ANDREW JACKSON.

by these resolutions, and made -threats against the lead
ing milliners in January. The Governor had summoned
the convention to meet again on March 11th. The com-
promise tariff was regarded as a substantial victory. It
became a law on March 3d, the day on which the tariff
of July 14, 1832, went into effect. The convention
repealed the ordinance of nullification, passed another
ordinance nullifying the enforcement act, and adjourned.
It is not quite clear whether the last act was a bit of
fireworks to fete the conclusion of the trouble, or was
seriously meant. If it was serious, it strongly illus-
trated the defective sense of humor which characterized
all the proceedings of the milliners. The gentlemen
who had nullified a tax, and then nullified a contingent
declaration of war, would probably, in the next stage,
have tried, by ordinance, to nullify a battle and a do-
feat.

The compromise tariff settled nothing. The fact was
that Clay had been driven, by the rapacity of the pro-
tected interests, to a point from which he could neither
advance nor recede, and Calhoun had been driven by
the nullification enterprise into a similar untenable
position. Benton says that Calhoun was afraid of Jack-
son, who had threatened to hang the nullifiers. Curtis,
j>n the authority of Crittenden, says that Calhoun, in
alarm, sought an interview with Clay, and that Clay in-
tervened. 1 They met and patched up the compromise,
by which they opened an escape for each other. For
ten years afterwards they wrangled, in the Senate, over
*he question who was in the worse predicament and wh*
iron most in 1833. Clay claimed that he rescued pro
from the slaughter which awaited it in Vet
1 1 Curtis's Webster, 444.

THE BANK AND THE THREE PER CENTS. 291

planck's bill. Calhoun claimed that the con promise
tariff was a free-trade victory, won by nullification.
Clay said that he made the compromise out of pity for
Calhoun and South Carolina, who were in perii Cal-
houn said that nullification killed the tariff, and that
Clay was flat on his back until Calhoun helped him to
rise and escape by the compromise. The protected in-
terests were as angry with Clay as if he had never
served them. They accused him of treachery. He
never gained anything by his devotion to protection.
He was right at least in saying that protection would
have been overthrown in 1833 if it had not been for
the compromise tariff. 1

Jackson's animosity towards the bank, in the autumn
of 1832, had gathered the intensity and bull-dog ferocity
which he always felt for an enemy engaged in active
resistance. In the matter of the three per cents, the
bank gave him a chance of attack. In July Genera!
Cadwallader was sent to Europe to try to negotiate with
the holders of the three per cents for an extension of
the loan for a year beyond October, the bank becoming
the debtor, and paying, if necessary, four per cent on
the extension. The bank, then, instead of paying the
lebt for the government, desired to intrude itself into
the position of the Treasury, and extend a loan which
the Treasury wanted to pay. Its object of course was
to get a loan at three or four per cent This proceed-
ing was obviously open to grave censure* The obliga-
tion of the Treasury would not cease, although the bank
#ould have taken the public money appropriated to the

1 See a speech by Cla„non on Hugh L. White's action, Oc-
tote 5, 1842. (63 Niles 106.) Parton (HI. 478) has the sain«
«orY.

292 ANDREW JACKSON.

payment of the debt. Five million dollars were in fad
transferred, in October, to the Redemption of the Public
Debt Account. It seems to be indisputable that the
bank, in this matter, abused its relation to the Treasury
as depository of the public funds. August 22d General
Cadwallader made an arrangement with the Barings,
by which they were to pay off all the holders of the
stocks who were not willing to extend them and take
the bank as debtor. The Barings bought $1,798,597,
and extended $2,376,481. The arrangement with the
Barings was to be secret, but it was published in a New
York paper, October 11th. October 15th, Biddle re-
pudiated the contract, because, under it, the bank would
become a purchaser of public stocks, contrary to the
charter. Would he have repudiated the contract if it
had not been published ?

The message of 1832 was temperate in tone, but very
severe against the bank. The President interpreted
the eagerness of the bank to get possession of the three
per cents as a sign of weakness, and he urged Congress
to make a " serious investigation " to see whether the
public deposits were safe. An agent, Henry Toland,
was appointed to investigate on behalf of the Treasury.
He reported favorably to the bank. The Committee on
Ways and Means also investigated the bank. The
President's message created considerable alarm for a
time, and, at some places, there were signs of a run on
the branches. 1 February 13, 1833, Polk reported a bill
to sell the stock owned by the nation in the bank. It
was rejected, 102 to 91. The majority of the Committee
in Way* and Means reported (Verplanck's report) that
the bank was sound and that the deposits were sale
1 43 Nilec, 315.

REPORTS OF 1833 ON THE BANK. 298

On January 1, 1838, the assets were $80.8 million,
the liabilities $37.8 million ; leaving $43 million to pay
$35 million of capital. The circulation was $17.5
million ; specie $9 million. The state banks were esti-
mated to have $68 million circulation and $10 million
or $11 million specie. The minority report (Polk's)
doubted if the assets were all good, and hence doubted
the solvency of the bank. It referred to the Western
debts, and the minority gave, in a supplemental report,
evidence of the character of these debts. The com-
mittee investigated the proceedings of the bank in re-
lation to the three per cents. The minority reported
that they could not find out clearly what was the final
arrangement made by the bank, but it appeared that
the certificates had been surrendered, and that the bank
had, by and through the former transaction, obtained a
loan in Europe. The majority said that the bank had
receded from the project, and that there was nothing
more to say about it 1

October 4, 1832, Biddle informed the directors that
the bank was strong enough to relax the orders given to
the Western branches, in the previous winter, to con-
tract their loans and remit eastward. He then supposed
that the arrangement with the Barings about the three
per cents had been concluded. The Western affairs,
however, were at this time approaching a crisis. The
supplementary report (Polk's) by the minority of the
Committee on Ways and Means, March 2, 1833, 2 con-
tains conclusive evidence that the Western branchef
were in a very critical condition ; that there had been
drawing and redrawing between the branches, and that
Biddle knew it The directors bad testified to the
» Document E * Ibid.

294 ANDREW JACKBON.

committee that they knew nothing of any such proceed
kngs. Some of the most important points in evidence
Are as follows. September 11, 1832, the cashier of th*
branch at Lexington, Kentucky, wrote that he was en-
during a run. Two hundred and seventy-five thousand
dollars were sent to him from Philadelphia, Louisville,
St Louis, New Orleans, and Natchez. A letter from
Biddle to the president of the Nashville branch, dated
November 20, 1832, shows plainly that he knew that
redrawing was going on. In a letter from the president
of the Nashville branch, November 22d, the following
passage occurs : " We will not be able to get the debts
due this office paid ; indeed, if any, it will be a small
part; the means are not in the country." The same
branch officer, in a letter of November 24th, plainly
states that he had been forced to collect drafts drawn
on him by the parent bank, and the New York, Balti-
more, Washington, Richmond, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati,
Louisville, and Lexington branches, and that he could
not prevent a protest save by redrawing on New Or-
leans. Again, November 26th, he states that he had,
within a year, collected drafts for a million dollars for
the bank and branches, " which, with small exceptions,
have been paid through our bill operations." The
majority of the committee of 1832-33 had interpreted
the fluctuations in the amount of bills at Nashville as
proof that, when the crops came in, the debts were can-
celled. The minority show that these fluctuations were
iue to the presence of the " racers " at one or the other
end of the course. It is quite beyond question that a
nass of accommodation bills were chasing each othei
horn branch to branch in the years 1832-33, and tha
•hey formed a mass of debt, which the bank could not
"or (he time. controL

THE DRAFT ON FRANCE. 29fi

March 2, 1833, the House adopted, 109 to 46, a
resolution that the deposits might safely he continued in
the hank. The reports of the committee had not been
carefully considered by anybody. The hank question
was now a party question, and men voted on it accord-
ing to party, not according to evidence. Whatever
force might be attributed to any of the facts brought out
by Polk in the minority report, it does not appear that
anybody in Congress really thought that the bank was
insolvent and the deposits in danger. His supplemental
report bears date March 2d. Polk did not propose to
withdraw the deposits. He wanted to avoid any posi-
tive action. McDuffie objected to this policy that, if
Congress took no action, Jackson would remove the
deposits on the principle that silence gives consent. 1

The first instalment of the payment by France was
due February 2, 1833. The Secretary of the Treasury
did not draw until February 7th. Then he drew a sight
draft, which he sold to the bank for $961,240.30. Con-
gress, March 2d, passed an act ordering the Secretary
to loan this sum at interest. The treaty of July 4, 1831,
was unpopular in France, and the French Chambers had
not passed any appropriation to meet the payments pro-
vided for in it. The draft was therefore protested,
and was taken up by Hottinger for the bank, because it
bore the indorsement of the bank. The bank had put
the money to the credit of the Treasury, and it claimed
to prove, by quoting the account, that the funds had
been drawn. Hence it declared that it was out of funds
for twice the amount of the bill. It demanded fifteen
f& cent damages under an old law of Maryland, which
<ro» *he law of the District of Colombia. The Trea»
* 44 Nile*, 108.

296 ANDREW JACKSON.

wry paid the amount of the bill, and offered to pay the
actual loss incurred. July 8, 1834, Biddle informed
the Secretary of the Treasury that the sum of $170,041
would be retained out of a three and a half per cent
dividend payable July 17th, on the stock owned by the
United States. March 2, 1838, the United State*
brought suit against the bank, in the federal Circuit
Court of Pennsylvania, for the sum so withheld. It got
judgment for $251,243.54. The bank appealed to the
Supreme Court, which, in 1844, reversed the judgment,
finding that the bank was the true holder of the bill and
entitled to damages. 1 On a new trial the Circuit Court
gave judgment for the bank. The United States then
appealed on the ground that a bill drawn by a govern-
ment on a government was not subject to the law mer-
chant. The Supreme Court sustained this view, in 1847,
and again reversed the decision of the Circuit Court 1
No further action was taken.

In the spring of 1833, McLane was transferred from
the Treasury to the State Department. He was opposed
to the removal of the deposits by executive act, which
was now beginning to be urged in the inmost adminis-
tration circles. William J. Duane, of Pennsylvania, was
appointed Secretary of the Treasury. This appointment
yas Jackson's own personal act He had admired
Duane's father, the editor of the " Aurora," and he de-
clared that the son was a chip of the old block. In this
be was mistaken. Duane was a very different man
from his father. 8 He was a lawyer of very good stand

l 2 Howard, 711. 2 5 Howard, 382.

8 Parton obtained from William B. Lewis an inside account ot
ma removal of the deposits. Duane wrote a full account of It
and there is another account in Kendall's Autobiography, but I
<« by the editor, and only at second hand from Ken dak

PROJECT OF REMOVING THE DEPOSITS. 297

mg. He had never been a politician or office-holder,
but had shunned that career. Lewis says that he does
not know who first proposed the removal of the deposits,
but that it began to be talked of in the inner adminis-
tration circles soon after Jackson's second election. In
the cabinet McLane and Cass were so earnestly opposed
to the project that it was feared they would resign.
McLane sent for Kendall to know why it was desired
to execute such a project. This was before McLane
left the Treasury. Kendall endeavored to persuade him.
Cass finally said that he did not understand the ques-
tion. Woodbury was neutral. Barry assented to the
act, but brought no force to support it. Taney strongly
supported the project. He was an old federalist, who
had come into Jackson's party in 1824, on account of
Jackson's letters to Monroe about non-partisan appoint-
ments. 1 He was Jackson's most trusted adviser in 1833 :
bo his biographer says, and it seems to be true. Van
Buren warmly opposed the removal at first. Kendall
persuaded him. He seems to have faltered afterwards,
but Kendall held him up to the point. 9 Benton warmly
approved of the removal, but was not active in bringing
it about. Lewis opposed it.

The proceeding is traced, by all the evidence, to Ken-
dall and Blair as the moving spirits, 8 with Reuben M.
Whitney as a coadjutor. These men had no public
official responsibility. They certainly were not recog-
nized by the nation as the men who ought to have a
controlling influence on public affairs. They were ani-
mated by prejudice and rancor sixteen years old. An-
drew Jackson's power and popularity, moving now

* Tyler'f Taney, 158. 2 Kendall's Autobiography, 383.

* Kendall's Autobiography, 375.

298 ANDREW JACKSON.

fender the impulse of the passions which animate ai
Indian on the war-path, were the engine with which
these men battered down a great financial institution.
The bank had been guilty of great financial errors, but
they were not by any means beyond remedy. The
Bank of England, at the same period, was guilty of
great financial errors. Blair and Kendall were not
working for sound finance. Blair's doctrine was that
the bank would use the public deposits as a means of
corrupting the political institutions of the country. If
that were true, it proved the error of haying a great
surplus of public money in the Treasury, i. e. 9 in the
bank. He said that the bank would corrupt Congress. 1
In August Duane wrote, "It is true that there is an
irresponsible cabal that has more power than the people
are aware of." " What I object to is that there is an
under-current, a sly, whispering; slandering system pur-
sued." 2 In his history of the matter, written five years
later, he says : " I had heard rumors of the existence
of an influence at Washington, unknown to the Consti-
tution and to the country ; and the conviction that they
were well founded now became irresistible. I knew
that four of the six members of the last cabinet and
hat four of the six members of the present cabinet op-
posed a removal of the deposits, and yet their exertions
were nullified by individuals, whose intercourse with
the President was clandestine. During his absence [in
New England] several of those individuals called on
me, and made many of the identical observations, in the
identical language used by himself. They represented
Congress as corruptible, and the new members as if
1 of special guidance. ... In short, I felt satisfied.
I**wi« in 3 Parton, 503. * 1) sane, 130.

HEMOVAL OF THE DEPOSITS. 299

from all that I saw and heard, that factions and selfish
views alone guided those who had influence with the
Executive, and that the true welfare and honor of the
country constituted no part of their objects." 1 Lewis
gives a report of a conversation with Jackson, in which
he (Lewis) tried to persuade Jackson to desist from
the project. Jackson's points were, " I have no con
fidence in Congress." "If the bank is permitted to
have the public money, there is no power that can
prevent it from obtaining a charter ; it will have it if
it has to buy up all Congress, and the public funds
would enable it to do so ! " "If we leave the means of
corruption in its hands, the presidential veto will avail
nothing." 2 The statements in Kendall's " Autobiogra-
phy " are in perfect accord with these. It is perfectly
plain who was at the bottom of this project, what their
motives were, how they set to work, how they gave a
bias to Jackson's mind, and furnished him with argu-
ments and phrases. It is also worthy of the most care-
ful attention that they and Jackson were now busy
"saving the country," holding in check the constitu-
tional organs of the country, above all Congress ; and
that they were proceeding upon assumptions about the
motives and purposes of the bank which were not true,
and had not even been tested, and upon assumptions in
regard to the character of Congress which were insult-
ing to the nation. The Jeffersonian non-interference
theories were now all left far behind. Jacksonian democ-
racy was approaching already the Napoleonic type of
the democratic empire, in which "the elect of the
nation "is charged to pr3tect the state against every-
body, chiefly, however, against any constitutional organs.
1 Dnane, 9. 2 Lewis in 3 Patton, 505 fg.

800 ANDREW JACKSON.

On the first day of Duane's official life, Jane 1, 18331
Whitney called on him, obviously in a certain ambaf**
sadorial capacity, and made known to him the project
to remove the deposits from the bank, and to use state
banks as depositories and fiscal agents. A few days
later Jackson started on a progress through New Eng-
land. The recent overthrow of nullification had ren-
dered him very popular. No one knew of any new
trouble brewing, and there was a general outburst of en*
thusiasm and satisfaction that a great cause of political
discord had been removed, and that peace and quiet
might be enjoyed. Jackson was feted enthusiastically
and generally. Harvard College made him a Doctor of
Laws. Adams said that it was " a sycophantic compli-
ment." Jackson was very ill at this time. Adams wrote
a spiteful page in the " Diary," alleging that " four fifths
of his sickness is trickery, and the other fifth mere fa-
tigue." " He is so ravenous of notoriety that he crave*
the sympathy for sickness as a portion of his glory." 1
The low personal injustice which is born of party hatred
is here strikingly illustrated.

Duane did not accept the role for which he had been
selected. He objected to the removal of the deposits*
Jackson sent to him from Boston a long argument,
written by Kendall, to try to persuade him. Jackson re-
turned early in July. The question of the removal was
then debated between him and Duane very seriously,
Duane standing his ground. It is evident that Taney waa
then asked to take the Treasury in case Duane should
continue recalcitrant Jackson left Washington on an
excursion to the Hip Raps without having come to as
arrangement with Duane. 2

1 4 Adams, 5.

s In May. 1833, Jackson laid the corner-stone of a l

KENDALL'S NEGOTIATIONS. 301

In July rumors became current that the Presiden
intended to remove the deposits. 1 August 5, 1833,
while Jackson was absent, Taney wrote to him, encourage
ing him to prosecute the project of removal, and thor-
oughly approving of it. It is a sycophantic letter. 1 In
August Kendall went on a tour through the Middle
and Eastern States to negotiate with the state banks so
as to find out whether they would undertake the fiscal
duties. His first project seems to have been based on
the New York Safety Fund system. He got no en-
couragement for this.* To more general inquiries as to
a willingness to enter into some arrangement he got a
number of favorable replies. 4 Commenting on these
replies, Duane says, " It was into this chaos that I was
asked to plunge the fiscal concerns of the country at a
moment when they were conducted by the legitimate
agent with the utmost simplicity, safety, and despatch." *

On Jackson's return he took up the business at once.
Of course Kendall's negotiations could not be kept se-
cret. . " Niles's Register " for September 7, 1833, con-
tains a long list of extracts from different newspapers
presenting different speculations as to the probability of
the removal of the deposits. The money market was,
of course, immediately affected. The bank had ordered

;o Washington's mother. On his way to the site of the monu-
ment, while the steamboat was at Alexandria, Lieutenant Ran-
dolph, who had been dismissed from the navy because he could
Ikot make his accounts good, committed an assault on the Pres
ident, and attempted to pull his nose. Considerable politico*
beat was excited by the ex^ra legal measures taken to puniih
Randolph for his outrage. (44 Nibs, ] 70.)
i 44 Niles, 353. ' Tyler's Taney, 195*

• Document F. page 10. 4 Docanent F.

* Duane, 96.

B02 ANDREW JACKSON.

its branches to buy no drafts having over ninety days
to run. This was too short a time for " racers," consid-
ering the difficulty of communication. The Westers
debts had now been considerably curtailed by the stren-
uous efforts which had been made during the year. In
the cabinet, Duane was still resisting. The sixteenth
■action of the bank charter gave to the Secretary of the
Treasury, by specific designation, the power to remove
the deposits.

By the acts of July 2, 1789, and May 10, 1800, the
Secretary of the Treasury reports to the House of Rep-
resentatives. John Adams objected to the position thus
created for the Secretary of the Treasury. 1 At othor
times also it has caused complaint. 3 His position cer-
tainly was anomalous. His powers and responsibilities
were in no consistent relation to each other. He was
independent of the President in his functions, yet might
be removed by him. He reported to Congress what he
had done, yet could not be removed by Congress except
by impeachment. Jackson now advanced another step
in his imperial theory. He said to Duane : I take the
responsibility ; and he extended his responsibility over
Duane on the theory that the Secretary was a sub-
ordinate, bound only to obey orders. What then was
the sense of providing in the charter that the Secretary
might use a certain discretion, and that he should state
to Congress his reasons for any use he made of it?
Jackson's responsibility was only a figure of speech ; he
was elected for a set term, and could rot and would not

l I Gibbs, 569.

* 4 Adams, 501. See a history of the Treasury Department ii
% report of the Committee on Ways and Means, March 4, 1834
'4«Niles, 39.)

PAPER READ IN THE CABINET. 308

tand again. As Congress stood there was no danger of
impeachment. His position, therefore, was simply thai
he was determined to do what he thought best to do,
because there was no power at hand to stop him.

On the 18th of September the President read, in the
meeting of his cabinet, a paper prepared by Taney, 1 ia.
which he argued that the deposits ought to be removed,
The grounds were, the three per cents, the French bill,
the political activity of the bank, and its unconstitu-
tionality. He said that he would not dictate to the
Secretary, but he took all the responsibility of deciding
that, after October 1st, no more public money should be
deposited in the bank, and that the current drafts should
withdraw all money then in it. Duane refused to give
the order and refused to resign. He was dismissed,
September 23d. Taney was transferred to the Treas-
ury. He gave the order. Taney told Kendall that he
was not a politician, and that, in taking a political office,
he sacrificed his ambition, which was to be a judge of
the Supreme Court. 8 Duane at once published the final
correspondence between the President and himself, in
which he gave fifteen reasons why the deposits ought
not to be removed. 3 One of them was, " I believe that
the efforts made in various quarters to hasten the re-
moval of the deposits did not originate with patriots or
statesmen, but in schemes to promote factious and self-
ish purposes." The administration press immediately
turned upon Duane with fierce abuse.

The removal of the deposits was a violent and unnee-
tssary step, even from Jackson's stand-point, as Lewis
tried to persuade him. The bank had no chance of a

* Tyler's Taney, 204 Kendau's AytobtDyraphy, 186.

* 45 Niks, .136. * Lewis in 3 larton. 506.

304 ANDREW JACKSON.

recharter, unless one is prepared to believe that it could
and would buy enough congressmen to get a two-thirds
majority. If it had been willing to do that, it had
enough money of its own for the purpose, even after the
deposits were withdrawn* The removal caused a great
commotion, — even a panic. 1 Bank stock fell one and
one half per cent at New York. But it recovered when
the paper read in the cabinet was received, because the
grounds were only the old charges. The public con-
fidence in the bank had not been shaken by the charges,
investigations, and reports. The bank replied to the
President's paper by a long manifesto, in which it pur-
sued him point by point* No doubt Biddle wrote this
paper. In order to defend the bank in the matter of the
three per cents, he resorted to the tactics noticed before.
He said that there was heavy indebtedness to Europe
in 1832, on account of the importations of 1831. He
wanted to prevent an exportation of specie and give the
country leisure to pay that debt. He says that the
bank was at ease, and would have kept quiet if it had
considered only its own interests. Nothing less than the
movements which involve continents and cover years
will do for him to explain his policy. No motive less
than universal benevolence will suffice to account for the
action of the bank. These pretences were, as similar
ones almost always are, not true.

The average monthly balance in the bank, to tht
credit of the Treasury, from 1818 to 1833, was $6.7
million. In 1832 it was $11.3 million. In 1833 it
was $8.5 million. In September, 1833, it was $9.1
million.' Kendall reported to a cabinet meeting thi
tesolts of his negotiations with the banks. One bank
- 45 Nile*. 65. s 45 Niles. 248. * Document H.

DISORDER IN THE FISCAL SYSTEM. 805

was objected to " on political grounds." 1 Twenty-three
were selected before the end of the year. The chanc%
for favoritism was speedily perceived. The first in-
tention was to use the Bank of the Metropolis, Washing-
ton, as the head of the system of deposit banks, although
no system was devised. In fact, the administration had
taken the work of destruction in hand with great vigor,
but it never planned a system to take the place of th«
old one. The Bank of the United States had, of course,
been compelled to devise its own measures for carrying
en the business of the Treasury, so far as it was charged
with that business. The Treasury was now forced to
oversee, if it did not originate, the system of relations
between the 'deposit banks. January 30, 1834, Silas
Wright made a statement which was understood to be
authoritative. He said that the Executive had entered
again upon the control of the public money which be-
longed to him before the national bank was chartered ;
that the administration would bring forward no law to
regulate the deposits, but that the Executive would pro-
ceed with the experiment of using state banks. Webster
expressed strong disappointment and disapproval, claim-
ing that there should be a law. 2 March 18, 1834, Web-
ster proposed a bill to extend the charter of the Bank of
the United States for six years, without monopoly, the
public money to be deposited in it, it to pay to the
Treasury $200,000 annually on March 4th, none of its
notes to be for less than $20.00. The bank men would
not agree to support it. It was tabled and never called
up. 8 April 15, 1834, six moi? f Jis after the deposits were

1 Kendall's Autobiography, 387. * *6 Niles, 400.

* 46 Niles, 52 ; 1 CurnVs Webster, 485 ; 4 Webster « Work*

306 ANDREW JACKSON.

removed, Taney sent to the Committee on Ways and
Means a plan for the organization of the deposit hank
system, but it was a mere vague outline. 1 December
15, 1834, Woodbury sent in a long essay on currency
and banking, but no positive scheme or arrangement.
It was not until June, 1836, that the system was regu-
lated by measures aiming at efficiency and responsibility.
Taney desired that Kendall should be president oi
the Bank of the Metropolis and organize the system,
but Kendall's readiness, which had not before failed,
had now reached its limit. The Bank of the Metropolis
was then asked to admit Whitney as agent and corre-
spondent of the deposit banks. The bank refused to do
this, and the plan of making that bank the head was
given up. 2 The banks were recommended to employ
Whitney as agent and correspondent at Washington for
their dealings with the Treasury. He was thus placed
in a position of great power and influence. He did not
escape the charge of having abused it, and an investiga-
tion, in 1837, produced evidence very adverse to his
good character. Part of the correspondence between
him and the banks was then published. From that cor-
lespondence it is plain that the chief argument brought
to support an application for a share of the deposits, or
other favor, was devotion to Jackson and hatred of the
Bank of the United States. 8 It is not proven that the
deposits were ever used by the Bank of the United
States for any political purpose whatever. It is con-
clusively proven that the deposits were used by Jack*
■oil's administration, through Whitney's agency, to re
ward adherents and to win supporters. The first banfci

l 4* Niles, 157. » Kendall's Auiotnograpkg, 3M.

* St Niler S 1

THE TRANSFER DRAFT8. 807

which took up the system also, in some cases, used the
deposits which were given to them to put themselves in
the position which they were required, by the theory of
the deposit system, to occupy. Taney assumed that
the Bank of the United States would make a spiteful
attempt to injure the deposit banks by calling on them
to pay balances. It was then considered wrong and
cruel for one bank to call on another to pay balances
promptly. Taney, therefore, placed some large drafts
on the Bank of the United States in the hands of
officers of the deposit banks at New York, Philadelphia,
and Baltimore, so that they might offset any such ma-
licious demand. Otherwise, the drafts were not to be
used. The bank took no steps which afforded even a
pretext for using these drafts, but Hie president of the
Union Bank of Maryland cashed one of them for
$100,000 a few days after he got it, and used the money
in stock speculations. 1 For fear of scandal this act was
passed over by the Executive, but it led to an investiga-
tion by Congress. Taney was a stockholder in the
Union Bank. 3 The Manhattan Company used one of
these drafts for $500,000.* Taney claimed the power
to make these transfers. He referred it back to a pre-
cedent set by Crawford, 4 who, in his turn, when he had
been called to account for it, had referred it back to
Gallatin. The source of the stream, however, was not

1 Kendall's Autobiography, 389. Cf. Document H. page 33p
It is well worth while to read these two passages together in
»rder to see how much deceit there was in the proceedings about
the removal of the deposits

* Quincy's Adams, 2?7. He sold his stock Feoruary 18, 1*94
Document M.)

* Document EL
Document F.

808 ANDREW JACKSON.

Gallatin, but William Jones, Acting Secretary. 1 TW
baneful effects of the large surplus of public money an
plain enough.

At the session of 1833-34 the message alleged, as the
occasion of removing the deposits, the report of the
government directors of the bank, which showed, as
Jackson said, that the bank had been turned into an
electioneering engine. It was never alleged that the
bank had spent money otherwise than in distributing
Gallatin's pamphlet on currency, McDume's report of
1830, and similar documents. Some might think that
it was not wise and right for the bank so to defend it-
self, since politics were involved ; but its judge was now
the most interested party in the contest, the one to whom
that offence would seem most heinous, and he insisted
on imposing a penalty at his own discretion, on an ex
parte statement of his own appointees, and a penalty
which could not be considered appropriate or duly
measured to the offence. He also charged the bank
with manufacturing a panic. Taney reported "his"
reasons for the removal. He argued that the Secretary
must discharge his duties under the supervision of the
President; that the Secretary alone had power to re-
move the deposits ; that Congress could not order it to
be done ; that the Secretary could do it, if he thought
best, for any reason, not necessarily only when the bank
had misconducted itself. He put the removal which had
been executed on the ground of public interest. The
people had shown, in the election, that they did not
rant the bank rechartered. It was not best to remove

1 American State Papers, 4 Finance, 266. 279. Cf 1 Gal
fctiVs Writings, 80. It has been asserted that Hamilton use*
ite «Ama power. (Ingersoll 279. . Cf. 6 Hamilton's Works, 175/

WAR WITH THE SENATE. 809

Ae deposits suddenly when the charter should expire.
He blamed the bank for increasing its loans from De-
cember 1, 1832, to August 2, 1833, from $61.5 million
to $64.1 million, and then reducing them, from that date
until October 2, 1833, to $60 million. He said that
the bank had forfeited public confidence, had excluded
the government directors from knowledge to which they
were entitled, had shown selfishness in the affair of the
French bill, had done wrongly about the three per cents,
had granted favors to editors, and had distributed docu-
ments to control elections. He favored the use of the
Btate banks as fiscal agents of the government.

December 9th the bank memorialized Congress against
the removal of the deposits as a breach of contract A
great struggle over the bank question occupied the whole
session. The Senate refused, 25 to 20, to confirm the
reappointment of the government directors, who were
said to have acted as the President's spies. Jackson
sent the names in again with a long message, 1 and they
were rejected, 30 to 11. Taney's appointment as Secre-
tary of the Treasury was rejected, to Jackson's great
indignation. Taney was then nominated for judge of
the Supreme Court, and again rejected. Marshall died
in July, 1835. Taney was appointed Chief Justice, De-
tember 28, 1835, and confirmed, March 15, 1836.

December 11th Clay moved a call for a copy of the
paper read in the cabinet. Jackson refused it on the
ground that Congress had no business with it. The
document, in fact, had no standing in our system of
government. It was another extension of personal
government, by the adoption of a Napoleonic procedure.
The Emperor made known his vill by a letter of in
46 Niks, ISO.

«10 ANDREW JACKSON.

•tractions to his minister, and this, when published
Informed the public. Jackson used his " paper read in
khe cabinet" in just that way. By publishing it he
violated the secrecy and privilege of the cabinet, and
made it a public document, but when it was called for
he fell back on cabinet privilege. 1 If Jackson's doctrine
was sound, there would be modes of governing this
country without any responsibility to Congress, and the
"cabinet," as such, would come to have recognized
functions as a body for registering and publishing the
rescripts of the President. It was a thoroughly con-
sistent extension of the same doctrine that Jackson, in
his reply, in which he refused to comply with the call
of the Senate, professed his responsibility to the Amer-
ican people, and his willingness to explain to them the
grounds of his conduct. Such a profession was an insult
to the constitutional organ of the mind and will of the
American people worthy of a military autocrat, and al-
though it might have a jingle which would tickle the
ears of men miseducated by the catch-words of democ-
racy, a people which would accept it as a proper and
lawful expression from their executive chief would not
yet have learned the alphabet of constitutional govern-
ment.

In January, 1834, Jackson sei.t in a message com-
plaining that the bank still kept the books, papers, and
funds belonging to the pension agency with which it had
.Hitherto been charged. The Senate voted, May 26th,
26 to 17, that the Secretary of War had no authority to
remove the pension funds from the bank.

Clay introduced resolutions which finally took thil
tope : " Resolved, (1) That the President, in the UU
1 45 Niles, 247.

CENSURE OF JACKSON. 311

iKecutive proceed! gs in relation to the public revenue,
has assumed upon himself authority and power not con-
ferred by the Constitution and the laws, but in deroga-
tion of both. (2) That the reasons assigned by the
Secretaiy for the removal are unsatisfactory and insuf-
ficient." Benton offered a resolution that Biddle should
be called to the bar of the Senate to give the reasons for
the recent curtailments of the bank, and to answer for the
ase of its funds for electioneering. 1 January 5, 1834,
Webster reported from the Committee on Finance in
regard to the removal of the deposits. Clay's second
resolution was at once adopted, 28 to 18. March 28th
the first resolution was adopted, 26 to 20. April 15th,
Jackson sent in a protest against the latter resolution.
The Senate refused to receive it, 27 to 16, declaring it
a breach of privilege. The main points in the protest
were that the President meant to maintain intact the
rights of the Executive, and that the Senate would be
the judges in case of impeachment, but for that reason
ought not to express an opinion until the House saw fit
to impeach. The bank charter provided that the Secre-
tary should report his reasons to Congress. On the
doctrine of the protest, however, one House of Congress
could adopt no expression of opinion on the report sub-
mitted, because it must wait for the other. The ad-
ministration press kept up truculent denunciations of
the Senate all winter. The " Pennsylvanian " said : " The
democrats never heartily sanctioned it, and now, having
the power, should amend or get rid of it once and for*
tver." 2 The New York "Standard " called the sena-
tors " usurpers." 8

* 45 Niles 332. * 46 Nilei, .31.

• Ibid. 147.

812 ANDREW JACKSON.

The debates of the winter were acrimonious in the
extreme. Probably no session of Congress before
1860-61 was marked by such fierce contention in Con-
gress and such excitement out-of-doors. Chevalier,
who was an acute and unprejudiced observer, said thai
the speeches of the administration men resembled the
French republican tirades of 1791-92. They had the
same distinguishing trait, — emphasis. " Most generally
the pictures presented in these declamations are fantas-
tical delineations of the moneyed aristocracy overrun-
ning the country, with seduction, corruption, and slavery
in its train, or of Mr. Biddle aiming at the crown." a
The chief weapon of debate was emphasis instead of
fact and reason. With an " old hero " to support and the
" money power " to assail, the politicians and orators of
the emphatic school had a grand opportunity. There
is also an unformulated dogma, which seems to command
a great deal of faith, to this effect, that, if a man is only
sufficiently ignorant, his whims and notions constitute
" plain common sense." There are no questions on
which this dogma acts more perniciously than on ques-
tions of banking and currency. Wild and whimsical
notions about these topics, propounded with vehemence
and obstinacy in Congress, helped to increase the alarm
•ut-of-doors.

Senators Bibb, of Kentucky, and White, of Tennes-
see, went into opposition. Calhoun, also, for the tune,
allied himself heartily with the opposition.

The Virginia Legislature passed resolutions condemn

ing the dismissal of Duane and the removal of the do

posits. In pursuance of the dogmas of Virginia demon

-acy, Rives, senator from that State and supporter of thf

1 Chevalier, 61.

EXPUNGING AND INSTRUCTIONS. 818

administration measures, resigned. B. W. Leigh wa*
elected in his place.

As soon as the resolution of censure was passed, Ben-
ton gave notice of a motion to expunge the same from
the records. He introduced such a resolution at the next
session, and the Jackson party was more firmly consoli- .
dated than ever before in the determination to carry
it. The personal element was present in that enterprise,
with the desire for revenge, and the wish to demonstrate
loyalty. March 3, 1835, the words " ordered to be ex-
punged " were stricken from Benton's resolution, 39 to
7, and the resolution was tabled, 27 to 20. The agita-
tion was then carried back into the state elections, and
" expunging " came to be a test of party fealty. Ben-
ton renewed the motion December 26, 1836. The Leg-
islature of Virginia adopted instructions in favor of it.
John Tyler would not vote for it, and resigned. Leigh
would not do so, and would not resign. He never re-
covered party standing. 1 Rives was sent back in Tyler's
place. This martyrdom and Tyler's report on the bank,
mentioned below, made Tyler Vice-President. 2 The vice
of the doctrine of instructions was well illustrated in
these proceedings. If the Virginia doctrine were ad-
mitted, senators would be elected, not for six years, but
until the politics of the State represented might change.
The senator would not be a true representative, under
the theory of representative institutions, but a delegate,
vr ambassador. It would be another victory of pure
democracy over constitutional institutions.

The administration had a majority in the Senate in
1836, but Benton says that a caucus was held on expung

1 See his letter of reply ; 50 Nilea. 28.
1 Wise, 158.

B14 ANDREW JACKSON.

big. The resolution was passed, 24 to 19, that black
ines should be drawn around the record on the journal
of the Senate, and that the words " expunged, by order
of the Senate, this 16th day of January, 1837," should
be written across it It was a great personal victory for
Jackson. The Senate had risen up to condemn him for
something which he had seen fit to do, and he had suc-
cessfully resented and silenced its reproof. It gratified
him more than any other incident of the latter part of
his life. It was still another step forward in the de-
velopment of his political methods, according to which
his personality came more and more into play as a
political force, and the constitutional institutions of the
country were set aside. The day after the resolution
was expunged, leave was refused, in the House, to bring
in a resolution that it is unconstitutional to expunge any
part of any record of either House. 1

March 4, 1834, Polk reported from the Committee on
Ways and Means on the removal of the deposits, sup-
porting Jackson and Taney in all their positions. He
offered four resolutions, which were passed, April 4th :
as follows: (1) that the bank ought not to be re
chartered, 132 to 82 ; (2) that the deposits ought not
to be restored, 118 to 103 ; (3) that the state banks
ought to be depositories of the public funds, 117 to 105 ;
(4) that a select committee should be raised on the
bank and the commercial crisis, 171 to 42. The com-

1 There was a case of expunging in Jefferson's time. A ro»-
ilution which had been passed contained a statement thai; cer-
tain filibusters thought that they had executive sanction. This
was expunged. (1 Adams, 439.) A case is mentioned in Massa*
ehusetts. Quincy's resolution against rejoicing in naval victoriei
Iras expunged. (Ingersoll, 23.) For a discussion of other prece*
tots *ee the speeches of Rives and Leigh. (50 Nile*, 168, 1781

REPORTS OF 1834. 816

■nittee last mentioned reported May 22d.* The ma-
jority said that the bank had resisted all their attempts
to investigate. They proposed that the directors should
be arrested and brought to the bar of the House. The
position of the bank seemed to be, at this time, that
since the bank charter was to expire and the deposits
had been withdrawn, any further investigations were
only vexatious. The minority of the committee (Ed-
ward Everett and W. W. Ellsworth) reported that the
committee had made improper demands, and that the
instruction given to the committee to examine the ban*
in regard to the commercial crisis was based on iro
proper assumptions. The Senate, June 30th, instructed
the Committee on Finance to make another investiga
tion of all the allegations against the bank made by
Jackson and Taney in justification of the removal. Tha*
committee reported December 18, 1834, by John Tyler.*
The report goes over all the points, with conclusions
favorable to the bank on each. The time was long gone
by, however, when anybody cared for reports.

The excitement about the removal of the deposits was
greatly exaggerated. The public was thrown into a
panic, because it did not quite see what the effect would
be. It is untrue that the bank made a panic, and it is
untrue to say that there was no real crisis. The statistics
jf loans, etc., which the hostile committees were fond of
gathering, proved nothing, because they proved anything.
If the bank loans increased, the bank was extending
its loans to curry favor. If they decreased, the bank
was punishing the public, and making a panic. As bank
*«ans always fluctuate, the argument nev^r slackened.
Vhe figures appended to Tyler's report cover the whol«
» 4* Nfles. 221 '225. - Document I.

816 ANDREW JACKSON.

history of the bank. There are no fluctuations then
which can be attributed to malicious action by the bank
The root of all the wrong-doing of the bank, out ol
which sprang nearly all the charges which were in any
measure just, was in the branch drafts and the bad
banking in the West. The loans increased up to May,
1832, when they were $70.4 million. The increase, so
far as it was remarkable, was in the Western branches.
The operation of the " racers " is also distinctly trace-
Able in the accounts of the parent bank and some of the
branches. The effect of the general restraint imposed
can also be seen, and the movement can be traced by
which the bank, drawing back from the perilous position
into which it was drifting in 1832, got its branches into
better condition, and improved its whole status from
October, 1832, to October, 1833. It was this course
which afforded all the grounds for the charge of panic-
making.

The bank was very strong when the deposits were
removed. The loans were $42.2 million; domestic
exchange, $17.8 million ; foreign exchange, $2.3 mill-
ion ; specie, $10.6 million ; due from state banks,
$2.2 million; notes of state banks, $2.4 million; pub-
lic deposits, $9 million; private deposits, $8 million;
circulation, $19.1 million. It also held real estate
worth >$3 million. During the winter of 1833-34 there
was a stringent money market and commercial distress.
The state banks were in no condition to take the public
deposits. They were trying to strengthen themselves,
Mid to put themselves on the level of the Treasury re*
quireraents in the hope of getting a share of the deposits.
& was they who operated a bank contraction during thai
winter. It was six months, and then only by the favor

COMMERCIAL CRISIS. 811

toad concession of the Treasury, before the local banks,
" pet banks " as they soon came to be called, could get
into a position to take the place of the Bank of the
United States. This was the " chaos " into which
Duane, like an honest man, and man of sense, had re-
fused to plunge the fiscal interests of the country.
The administration, however, charged everything to
Biddle and the bank. Petitions were sent to Congress.
Benton and the others said that there was no crisis, and
that the petitions were gotten up for effect, to frighten
Jackson into restoring the deposits. The proofs of the
genuineness and severity of the crisis, in the forty-fifth
volume of " Niles's Register," are ample. In January,
1834, exchange on England was at one hundred and
one and a half (par one hundred and seven) ; capital
was loaning at from one and a half per cent to three per
cent per month; bank-notes were quoted at varying
rates of discount. 1 Delegations went to Washington to
represent to Jackson the state of the country. He be-
came violent ; told the delegations to go to Biddle ;
that he had all the money ; that the bank was a " mon-
ster," to which all the trouble was due. In answer to
a delegation from Philadelphia, February 11, 1834, Jack-
son sketched out the bullionist programme, which the
administration pursued from this time forth as an off-
set to the complaints about the removal of the deposits. 1
Up to this time it had been supposed that Jackson
rather leaned to paper-money notions. He now pro-
posed, as an " experiment " (so he called it), to induce

1 46 Nilea, 133.

1 Taney made the first official statement of the plan of the ad
toinlstration in a letter to the Comjait.ee -»n Ways and Mean*
lpru 15, 1834.

318 ANDREW JACKSON.

the banks, by promising them a share in the deposits, it
give np the nse of notes under $5.00, later to do away
with all under $10.00, and finally to restrict bank-notes
to $20.00 and upwards, so as to bring about a circulation
of which a reasonable part should be specie. The no-
tion was good as far as it went, but had precisely the
fault of a good financial notion in the hands of incompe-
tent men ; the scheme did not take into account aU the
consequences of distributing the deposits as proposed.
It persuaded the banks to conform to external rules
about circulation, but, under the circumstances, these
rules did not have the force they were supposed to have,
and the bank loans were stimulated to an enormous in-
flation, which threw the whole business of the country
into a fever, and then produced a great commercial
crisis. For a short period, in the summer of 1834, the
currency was in a very sound condition. The Bank of
the United States was, by the necessity of its position,
under strong precautions. The state banks, by their
efforts to meet the Treasury requirements, were stronger
than ever before. The popular sentiment, however, had
now swung over again to the mania for banks. Each
district wanted a deposit bank, so as to get a share in the
stream of wealth from the public Treasury. If a deposit
could not be obtained, then the bank was formed in
order to participate in the carnival of credit and specu-
lation, for a non-deposit bank could manage its affairs
as recklessly as it chose. The deposit banks speedily
drew together to try to prevent any more from being
admitted to share in the public deposits. The mania
for banking was such that formal riots occurred at tht
lubscription to the stock of new banks. 1 The favored

i 42 Niles, 257 ; 44 Niles, 371. See some of these facts ai*
tke ise made of them in Brothers'* United States p. U.

MANIA FOR BANKS. 8U

few, who could subscribe the whole, sold to the rest al
an advance. To be a commissioner was worth from
$500 to SljOOO. 1 There was a notion, borrowed per-
haps from the proceedings of the government of the
United States in the organization of both national banks,
that to make a bank was a resource by which a group of
insolvent debtors could extricate themselves from their
embarrassments. The Tammany society being in debt,
a plan was formed for paying the debt by making a
bank. 3 When the great fire occurred in New York, De-
cember, 1835, a proposition was made to create a bank
as a mode of relieving the sufferers. "To make a
bank," said Niles, " is the great panacea for every ill
that can befall the people of the United States, and yet
it adds not one cent to the capital of the community." *
The effect of this multiplication of banks, and of the
scramble between them for the public deposits, was that
an enormous amount of capital was arbitrarily distrib-
uted over the country, according to political favoritism
and local influence, and in entire disregard of the in-
dustrial and commercial conditions. The public debt
was all paid January 1, 1835. After that date the pub-
lic deposits increased with great rapidity, and there was
no occasion to spend them. The state of things was
therefore this : an immense amount of capital was being
collected by taxes, and then was being distributed to *
favored corporations, as a free loan for an indefinite
period, on which they could earn profits by lending it
at interest. No monster bank, under the most malicious
management, could have produced as much harm, either
political or financial, as this system produced while it
tasted.
» 46 Nile*. 188. * Mackeinzie. 7 J * 49 Nile., SM.

820 ANDREW JACKSON.

November 5, 1834, Secretary Woodbury informed
the Bank of the United States that the Treasury would
not receive branch drafts after January 1, 1835. This
Led to a spirited correspondence with Biddle, in which
the latter defended the drafts as good, both in law and
finance. 1 In the message of 1834 Jackson recapitulated
the old complaints against the bank, and Tecommended
that, on account of its " high-handed proceedings," its
notes should no longer be received by the Treasury, and
that the stock owned by the nation should be sold. The
session of 1834-35 was, however, fruitless as to banking
and currency. January 12, 1835, on Benton's motion,
the Committee on Finance was ordered to investigate
the specie transactions of the bank. Tyler took fire at
this, because it reflected on the report which he had just
made. In view of subsequent history, it is worth while
to notice the profession of faith which was drawn from
Tyler at this time. He said that he was opposed to any
national bank on constitutional grounds, but that he was
free from Jacksonism, and that he wanted to be just to
the existing bank. January 10th Polk introduced a bill
to forbid the receipt of notes of the Bank of the United
States at the Treasury, unless the bank would pay at
once the dividend which had been withheld in 1834.
Bills were also proposed for regulating the deposits in
the deposit banks. No action resulted.

In the message of 1835 Jackson referred to the war
which (as he said) the bank had waged on the govern-
ment for four years, as a proof of the evil effects of such
an institution. He declared that the bank belonged to
B, system of distrust of the popular will as a regulator of
political power, and to a policy which would supplant
1 Document J.

REVIEW OF THE BANK WAR. 821

Mir system by a consolidated government. ' Here, then,
%t the end of the bank war, we meet again with the sec-
ond of the theories of the bank which Ingham formulated
in bis letter to Biddle of October 5, 1829, 1 at the be-
ginning of the bank war. Ingham said that some peo-
ple held that theory. The assumption that the bank
held that theory concerning itself had been made the
rule of action of the government, and the laws and ad-
ministration of the country haft been made to conform
to that assumption as an established fact. At the ses-
sion of 1835-36 an attempt was made to investigate the
transactions of members of Congress with the bank.
It was abandoned when Adams declared that a similar
attempt in 1832 had been abandoned, because it e*l
both ways.

91

t

CHAPTER XIV.

inCULATION, DISTRIBUTION, CURRENCY LEOISIiAXIQH
AND END OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES.

In the spring of 1835 the phenomena of a period oi
•peculation began to be distinctly marked. There was
great monetary ease and prosperity in England and
France, as well as here. Some important improvements
in machinery, the first railroads, greater political satisfac-
tion and security, and joint stock banks were especially
favorable elements which were then affecting France
and England. The price of cotton advanced sharply
during 1834-35. Speculation seized upon cotton lands
in Mississippi and Louisiana, and on negroes. Next it
affected real estate in the cities at which cotton was
handled commercially. The success of the Erie Canal
led to numerous enterprises of a like nature in Pennsyl-
vania, Maryland, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Capital
for these enterprises was not at hand. The States en
deavored to draw the capital from Europe by the use
of their credit. The natural consequence was great
recklessness in contracting debt, and much " financier-
ing" by agents and middle-men. The abundant and
*,heap capital, here and abroad, of 1835-36 favored all
the improvement enterprises. These enterprises were,
however, in their nature, investments, returns from
irhich could not be expected for a long period. Ii
the mean time, they locked up capital. It appean

SPECULATION. 1835-36. 323

that labor and capital were withdrawn for a time from
agriculture, and devoted to means of transportation.
"Wheat and flour were imported in 1836. 1 The land of
Hie Western States had greatly risen in value since the
Erie Canal had been open. Speculation in this land
became very active. Timber lands in Maine were an-
other mania. 3 The loans of capital from Europe in-
creased month by month. The entire payment of the
public debt of the United States had a great effect upon
the imagination of people in Europe. It raised the
credit of the United States. It was thought that a
country which could pay off its debt with such rapidity
must be a good country in which to invest capital The
credit extended to the United States depressed the ex- '
changes, and gave an unusual protection to the excessive
bank-note issues in the United States. Those issues
sustained and stimulated the excessive credit which the
public deposits were bringing into existence. The banks
had an arbitrary rule that a reserve of specie for one
third of the circulation would secure them beyond any
danger. So long as the ^exchanges were depressed by
the exportation of capital from Europe to America, no
shipment of specie occurred, and the system was not
tested. All prices were rising; all was active and
hopeful; debt was the road to wealth. If one could
obtain capital for margins, and speculate on differences
in stocks, commodities, and real estate, he had a chance
to win enormous profits while the credit system went
on. Large classes of persons were drawn to city occu-
pations, exchange, banking, and brokerage, because these
Industries were most profitable. Cities grew, rents ad*
ranced, real estate rose in value. Pown to October 1,
i 50 Niles, 50, 74 ; 51 Nile§, 17 a 48 Nilet, 167.

S24 ANDREW JACKBO*.

1836, the following States had forbidden notes nudef
$5.00 : New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Georgia, Lou
isiana, Indiana, Alabama, New Jersey, Maryland, North
Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Maine. It appears,
however, that small notes of earlier issue were still in
circulation, and the state of things which the legislation
meant to bring about never was reached, so far as one
can now learn.

In the autumn of , 1835, the money market became
■lore stringent. This fact was charged to the pet banks
and to fears of trouble with France. 1 The pet banks
had every interest to arrest inflation. If they were held
to conservative rules, while the non-deposit banks about
them were not so held, the former only left free room
for the latter, and then the former had to receive the
notes of the latter. In January, 1836, the rate of dis-
count at Philadelphia was two per cent per month.'
Banks were still being multiplied. 8 During 1836 prices
continued to rise, speculation was active, rates for cap-
ital increased ; there was complaint of a scarcity of
money, and a demand for more banks. Governor
Marcy, of New York, in his message for 1836, pointed
out the " unregulated spirit of speculation " which pre
vailed, and he warned the Legislature against the falla-
cies involved in the demand for more banks. 4 In April
the best commercial paper was quoted, at New York,
at thirty per cent to forty per cent per annum ; second
rate, at one half of one per cent per day. 5 At Boston
the rate was one per cent per month. Exchange or
England at New York was one hundred and five (par

* 49 Niles, 225, 281. * 49 Niles, 313.

' 49 Niles, 435. * 2 Hammond, 449.

Evening Post, in 50 Niles, 134.

LAND DISTRIBUTION. 826

ane hundred and nine and three fifths), showing the cur*
rent of capital in spite of the inflation. In May Niles
laid, " There is an awful pressure for money in most
of the cities," 1 yet he also describes the unprecedented
activity of business in Baltimore.

In the first message after his reelection, in 1832, Jack-
son proposed, in regard to the public lands, that they
should be sold to the new States and to actual settlers at
a very low price. December 12th of that year Clay re-
introduced his land bill. 2 He succeeded in getting it
passed, but it was sent to the President within ten days
of the end of the session. Jackson did not sign it In
December, 1833, he sent in a message stating his rea-
sons for not doing so. He objected especially to the
policy of giving away the proceeds of the lands while
levying heavy duties on imports. The session of 1833-34
was fully occupied with the bank question and the re-
moval of the deposits. At the session of 1834-35 Clay
again brought in a land bill, but no action was taken.
Relations with France occupied the attention of Con-
gress during that session, which was a short one. At
the session of 1835-36 Clay introduced a bill to dis-
tribute the net proceeds of the lands, after taking out ten
per cent for the ten new States. Calhoun introduced a
joint resolution to amend the Constitution so that the
surplus revenue could be distributed among the States.
He also introduced a bill to regulate the public deposits.
A bill to distribute the surplus revenue was also intro-
duced. The land bill passed the Senate May 4, 1836,
by 25 to 20. It was tabled in the House, 104 to 85,
June 22d. The distribution bill and the deposit bill
trere consolidated into one, and passed by the Senatf

» 50 Nile*, 185. a See page 19a

526 ANDREW JACKSON.

June 17th, 38 to 6. On the 20th of June, in the House,
an effort was made to divide the hill, so as to separata
the regulation of the deposits from the distribution, but
the effort failed. The House then changed the plan of
distributing the surplus to the States as a gift into a
plan for " depositing " it with them subject to recall
[n this shape the bill passed, 155 to 38, and became a
law by the concurrence of the Senate and the President
The " Globe " 1 said that Jackson would have vetoed
the bill as it came from the Senate. He thought the
plan of " depositing " the surplus was free from consti-
tutional objections, but the " Globe " gave notice to all
whom it might concern that the President would not
sign any bill the effect of which would be to raise
revenue by federal taxation, and distribute the proceeds
among the States. The distribution measure was one
of those errors which are apt to be committed on the
eve of a presidential election, when politicians do not
dare to oppose measures which gratify class or local
feelings or interests. Webster opposed distribution, un»
less the land income could be separated. He said that
taxes must be reduced even at the risk of injuring some
industries. 2 It was provided in the bill that there
should be in each State a deposit bank, if a bank could
be found which would fulfil the prescribed conditions.
Each of these banks was to redeem all its notes in specie,
and to issue no notes for less than $5.00 after July 4,

1836. The Treasury was not to receive, after that date,
the notes of any bank which did issue notes under $5.00.
U was to pay out no note under $10.00 after the passagt
»f the act, and no note under $20.00 after March 3

1837. If the public deposits in any bank should ex
» 50 NUm. S81 « l Curtis'* WeUter. 537.

THE DEPOSIT AND DISTRIBUTION ACT. 827

teed one fourth of the capital of the bank, it was to pay
two per cent interest on the excess. No transfer of d»
posits from bank to bank was to be made by the Sec*
rotary, except when and because the convenience of the
Treasury required it In that case, he was to transfer
from one deposit bank to the next deposit bank in the
neighborhood, and so on ; i. e., not from one end of the
country to the other. As to distribution, the bill pro-
vided that all the money in the Treasury, January 1,
1837, in excess of $5 million, was to be deposited with
die States in the proportion of their membership in the
electoral college, and in four instalments, January, April,
July, and October, 1837. The States were to give nego-
tiable certificates of deposit, payable to the Secretary or
his assigns on demand. If the Secretary should negoti-
ate any certificate, it should bear five per cent interest
from the date of assignment While not assigned, the
certificates bore no interest 1

In his message of 1836 Jackson offered a long and
very just criticism on this act His objections were so
pertinent and so strong that we are forced to believe
that he did not veto only on account of the pending
election. A number of doubtful States were " improve-
ment States ; " that is, they had plunged recklessly into
debt for canals, etc., which were not finished, and credit
was declining while the money market was growing
stringent Those States were very eager (or, at least,
many people in them were) to get the money in the fed-
eral Treasury with which to go on with the works.
Jackson argued in favor of the redaction and abolition
»f all the taxes with which the compromise tariff allowed
Congress to deal, and he exposed completely the silly
1 50 Nflet. 290.

828 ANDREW JACKSON.

device by which the whigs tried to justify distribution
separating the revenue in imagination, and pretending
to distribute the part which came from land. Jackson
made a lame attempt to explain the recommendation!
which he had made in his early messages in favor of dis-
tribution. He gave a table showing the effect of dis-
tribution according to the ratio of membership in the
electoral college as compared with that on the ratio of
federal population. The small and new States gained
enormously by the plan adopted.

The best that can be said in excuse for distribution is
that the surplus was doing so much mischief that the
best thing to do with it was to throw it away. Unfort-
unately, it could not be thrown away without doing
other harm. We have already noticed the shocks given
to the money market by the debt-paying operation. 1 The
removal of the deposits took place before that was com-
pleted, and produced a new complication. The credit
relations formerly existing towards and around the great
bank were rudely cut off, and left to reconstruct them-
selves as best they could. As soon as the new state oi
things had become a little established, there was an accu-
mulation of a great surplus, nominally in the deposit
banks, really loaned out to individuals, and fully en-
gaged in speculative importations with credit for duties,
or in speculative contracts payment on which was to be
received in state bonds and scrip, or in still other inde*
scribable repetitions of debt and contract. The capital,
when thus fully absorbed, was next all called in again,
in order to be transferred to the States. The States did
not intend to loan the capital, they intended to spend it
kk public works ; that is, for the most part, comderinf
1 See page 271.

BTATE DEPOSIT FUNDS. 829

the actbfd facts as they existed, to sink it entirely. In
one way or another these funds were squandered by all
the States, or worse than squandered, since they served
corruption and abuse. In 1877 it was declared that the
Controller of New York did not know what had become
of the deposit fund of the State. For many years the
commissioners of only nine counties had made any re-
port. The Controller asked for $15,000 with which to
find out what had become of the $4 million which was
the share of New York. The fact that the funds were
squandered was the least of the purely financial evils at-
tendant on distribution. The effect on all the relations
of capital, credit, and currency, that is, the effect on
every man's rights and interests, was the most far-reach-
ing and serious consequence.

On the 1st of June, 1836, 1 the deposit banks stood
thus: capital, $46.4 million; due to the Treasurer of
the United States, $37.2 million ; due to public officers,
$3.7 million; circulation, $27.9 million; other depos-
its, $16 million; due to other banks, $17.1 million.
Contra : loans, $71.2 million ; domestic exchange, $37.1
million ; due from banks, $17.8 million ; notes of other
banks, $10.9 million ; specie, $10.4 million. It appears
then that these banks owed the United States $41 mill-
ion, while their whole capital was only $46 million \
that is to say, the public deposits furnished them with a
capital nearly equal to their own. If their " other depos
its " had been all cash capital deposited, four eleventh!
of all their loanable funds would have been public de-
posits, which would have V>een " called " by the act of
June 23, 1836. It is also n4tieeabie what a large sum
is due to and from other banks. The feeling that banks
* SO Nil*, 313,

880 ANUKKW JACKSON.

might to forbear demands on each other seems to hart
been an outgrowth of the war against the Bank of the
United States. The consequence was that the banks
were all locked together, and when the trouble came
they all went down together.

In December, 1836, Calhoun introduced another dis-
tribution bill to distribute any surplus which might be in
the Treasury on January 1, 1838. It was finally added
as a " rider " to an appropriation bill, providing money
for fortifications. The Senate passed the bill and rider,
but the House rejected the whole. Clay also intro-
duced another land distribution bill. Schemes of dis-
tribution were great whig measures down to Tyler's
time.

The first and second instalments of the distribution
of 1837 were paid in specie, in January and ApriL
The commercial crisis began in March. The banks
suspended in May. The third instalment was paid in
notes in July. Before August the Treasury, which was
giving away $35 million, was in the greatest straits.
Van Buren was forced to call an extra session of Con-
gress. That body had no more urgent business than to
forbid the Secretary to negotiate any of his " deposit "
certificates, or to call on any of the States for the money
deposited with them. The payment of the fourth in-
stalment was postponed until January 1, 1839. At
that date there was debt, not surplus, and the fourth
instalment never was paid. Congress has never re-
called any part of the other three instalments. Even
when the civil war broke out, it would not venture to do
this. The amount of the three instalments, $28 mill-
ion, stands on the books as unavailable funds. Tht
Secretary of the Treasury was obliged to draw his firs!

SPECIE CURRENCY. 831

three instalments where he could get them, so he drew
them from the North and East, the hanks of the South-
west being really ruined. The fourth instalment re-
mained due from the hanks of the Southwestern States.
It was years before any part of it could be recovered.
The Southwestern States participated in the distribu-
ion of the three instalments. 1

Reference has been made above a to the plans of the
administration for a specie currency, as a complement
or offset to the removal of the deposits and destruction
of the bank. 8 Benton, who was the strongest bullionist
in the administration circle, was under an exaggerated
opinion of the efficacy of a metallic currency to prevent
abuses of credit. A metallic currency is not liable to
certain abuses, and it requires no skill for its manage-
ment. In contrast with paper, therefore, it is surer and
safer. It, however, offers no guarantees against bad
banking. At most it could relieve the non-capitalist
wage-receiver from any direct share or risk in bad bank-
ing. In contending against plutocracy democracy ought
to put a metallic currency high up on its banner. The
most subtle and inexcusable abuse of the public which
has ever been devised is that of granting to corporations,
without exacting an equivalent, the privilege of taking
out of the circulation the value currency, for which the
public must always pay, whether they get it or not, and
putting into it their own promises to pay. The subtlety
of this device and the fallacies which cluster about it and
impose upon uneducated people are a full justification
for men of democratic convictions, if they say : We
do not understand it well enough to control it. "We

* See table, 53 Niles, 35. * See page 317.

• The Globe in 46 Nile*, 33 1.

182 ANDREW JACKSON.

cannot spend time and attention to watch it We wil
not allow it at all. Such confession of ignorance and
abnegation of power, however, is hardly in the spirit of
democracy. As a matter of history, the bullionist ten-
dencies of a section of the Jacksonian party were at war
with other parts of the policy of the same party, notably
the distribution of the public deposits in eighty banks,
with encouragement to loan freely.

The opposition party, on the other hand, took up
cudgels for banks and bank paper, as if there would be
no currency if bank paper were withdrawn, and as if
there would be no credit if there were no banks of
issue. In their arguments against the bullionist party,
they talked as if they believed that, if the public Treas-
ury did its own business, and did it in gold, it would get
possession of all the gold in the country, and that this
would give it control of all the credit in the country,
because the paper issue was based on gold.

In 1834 the administration was determined to have
a gold currency. The Committee on Ways and Means
reported, April 22, 1834, 1 that it was useless to coin
gold while the rating remained as it was fixed by the
laws of 1792 and 1793. The coinage law had often
been discussed before. Lowndes studied it and re-
ported on it in 1819 ; J. Q. Adams in 1820. In 1830
Sanford, of New York, proposed a gold currency with
subsidiary silver. In the same year Ingham made a
report, recommending the ratio 1 : 15.625. In 1831 a
coinage bill passed the Senate, but was not acted on in
the House. At the session of 1831-32 White and Ver.
pianck, of New York, wanted silver made sole money*
On account of the difficulty and delicacy of the suhjea
1 46 Nile«, 159.

BULLION MARKET. 383

m> action had been reached. In 1834 a new interest
tanie in. The gold product of the Southern AHeghanies
was increasing. In 1832 there came to the mint from
that region $678,000 value of gold, and in 1833
$868,000. There was a protectionist movement in be-
half of gold, the interest of which was that gold should
supplant silver, to which end an incorrect rating was
desired. 1 By the laws of 1792 and 1793 the gold eagle
weighed 270 grains and was \\ fine. The silver dollar
weighed 416 grains and was HSI foe, giving & ratio of
1 : 15. The market ratio was, from 1792 to 1830, about
1 : 15.6. Therefore gold was not money, but merchan-
dise. From 1828 to 1833 the average premium on gold
at Philadelphia was 4} per cent. 3 The reports before
Congress in 1834 showed that the real ratio was be-
tween 1:15.6 and 1:15.8. The mint put 1:15.8 as
the highest ratio admissible. Duncan, of Illinois, in a
speech, showed that the ratio since 1821 had been, on an
average, 1:15.625.* These authorities were all disre-
garded.

The administration politicians had determined to have
gold as a matter of taste, and the Southern gold interest
wanted it The law of June 28, 1834, made the gold
eagle weigh 258 grains, of which 232 grains were to be
pure ; fineness, .8992. The silver dollar was unaltered.
The ratio of gold to silver, by this law, was therefore
1 : 16.002. The old eagles were worth in the new ones
$10,681, or old gold coins were worth 94.827 cents per
pennyweight in the new. Taking gold to silver at
1 : 15.625, an old silver dollar was worth $1,024 in the
new gold one, and as the silver dollar had been the
standard of prices and contracts, and the new gold one

1 Rnjjuet, 236. a Ragaat 250. 8 47 Nfles, 29

384 ANDREW JACKSON.

now was such, the money of account had been depre-
ciated 2J per cent. In the new standard a pound ster*
ling was worth, metal for metal, $4.87073, and if the
old arbitrary par, £1 = $4.44 j, were 100, the true par
of exchange would be 109.59. Of course the supposed
gain to the gold producers from the incorrect rating was
a pure delusion. They got no more goods for their gold
than they would have got before, save in so far as the
United States added some small increment to the
previous demand in the whole world for gold. The
bullion brokers won by exchanging gold coins for silver
toins and exporting the latter.

In December, 1834, Woodbury, who had become
Secretary of the Treasury, gave the following statistics
of the circulation on December 1st : state bank paper,
from $57 million to $68 million ; Bank of the United
States paper, $16 million ; gold, $4 million ; silver,
$16 million ; total active circulation per head, $7.00.
In bank : specie, $18 J million ; paper, $35 million ;
grand total per head, $10.00« 1 The currency was then
in a very sound condition- 8

The bank paper increased before the gold could be
brought into circulation, and the gold currency never
was made a fact. Silver rose to a premium, and was
melted or exported. 8 The new mint law therefore
produced the inconvenience of driving out silver just
when the administration was trying to abolish small
notes. A gold dollar had been proposed in the new
\aw, but the provision for it was stricken out The
rilver dollars then on hand appear to have been aL
slipped or worn. 4 The first which had been coined sine*

* Document K. p. 64. 2 See page 318.

» 17 NUes. 147. * 37 Niles, 393

THE "SPECIE CIRCULAR." 335

1805 were coined in 1836. 1 They could not, however,
be kept in circulation. 3y the act of January 18, 1837,
two tenths of a grain were added to the pure contents of
the eagle. This made the fineness just .900. The pure
contents of the silver dollar were left unaltered, but the
gross weight was reduced to 412 J grains, so that the
fineness of this coin also was .900. The ratio of the
metals in the coinage was then 1:15.988. One pound
Bterling was then worth $4.8665, or, if $4.44$ be as-
sumed 100, par of exchange was 109$. As soon as the
crisis broke out, in 1837, all specie disappeared, and
notes and tickets for the smallest denominations came
into use.

At the session of 1835-36 Benton tried to get a reso-
lution passed that nothing but gold or silver should be
taken for public lands. He did not succeed. After
Congress adjourned, July 11, 1836, the Secretary of the
Treasury issued, by the President's order, a circular to
all the land offices, known afterwards as the " specie
circular," ordering that only gold, or silver, or land
scrip should be received for public lands. The occa-
sion for this order was serious. The sales of public
lands were increasing at an extraordinary rate. Lands
were sold for $4.8 million in 1834 ; for $14.7 million
m 1835 ; for $24.8 million in 1836. The receipts for
the lands consisted largely of notes of irresponsible
banks. Land speculators organized a " bank," got it ap-
pointed a deposit bank if they could, issued notes, bor-
rowed them and bought land ; the notes were deposited,
Ihey borrowed them again, and so on indefinitely. The
guarantees required of the deposit banks were idle
tgainst such a scheme. There was, of course, little
1 51 Nilei 241

886 ANDREW JACKSON.

ipecie in the West on account of the flood oi papa
there. The circular caused inconvenience, and bad
temper on the part of those who were checked in their
transactions. It also caused trouble and expense in
transporting specie from the East, and it no doubt
made a demand for specie in the East against the banks
there. In the existing state of the Eastern banks, this
demand was probably just the touch needed to push
down the rickety pretense of solvency which they were
keeping up. Specie could not be drawn in from Europe,
except by a great fall in prices and a large contraction
of the currency. Either through demand for specie or
fall in prices, the inflated currency must collapse, and
the crisis was at hand. Moreover, the banks were un-
der notice to surrender, on January 1st, one fourth of
the public deposits. Thousands of people who were
carrying commodities or property for a rise, or who
were engaged in enterprises, to finish which they de-
pended on bank loans, found themselves arrested by the
exorbitant rate for loans. The speculative period in
England had also run its course, and the inflation here
could no longer be sustained by borrowing there. From
all these facts, it is plain that the specie circular may
have played the role of the spark which produces an ex
plosion when all the conditions and materials have been
prepared ; but those who called the circular the cause of
the crisis made a mistake which is only too common in
the criticism of economic events. A similar circular
was issued in Adams's administration, which has hardly
been noticed. 1 There was a great deal of outcry agains*
.he President for high-handed proceedings in this mat
tor, but without reason. There were only two forms o,
1 7 Adams, 427.

WINDING UP THE UNITED 8TATE8 BANK. 887

•mrrency which were at this time by law receivable for
.ands, — specie and notes of specie value. 1 The notes
which were being received in the West were not of
specie ralue.

A bill to annul the specie circular passed the Senate,
41 to 5, and the House, 143 to 59. The President sent
it to the State Department at 11.45 p. m., March 3,
1837, and filed his reasons for not signing it, it having
been sent to him less than ten days before the end of
the session. His reason for not signing the bill was that
it was obscure.

The charter of the Bank of the United States was to
expire March 3, 1836. The history of the internal
affairs of the bank, after Tyler's report in 1834, was
not known to the public until 1841, when committees of
the stockholders published reports, from which we are
able to state the internal history of the bank in its true
historical connection. March 6, 1835, by a resolution of
the directors, the exchange committee was directed to
loan the capital of the bank, so fast as it should be re-
leased, on call on stock collateral. The exchange coin-
miteee, from this time on, secured entire control of the
bank. During the year 1835 branches were sold for
bonds having from one to five years to run. Down to
November, fifteen branches had been sold. 3 In No-
vember projects began to be talked about for getting a
itate charter from Pennsylvania. 8 There was a great
deal of jealousy at this time between New York and
Philadelphia. There was a proposition for a great fifty-
million-dollar bank at New York, and it seemed that if

1 Report by Silas Wright, May 16 i838, with history of tht
*W8 about currency receivable at the Treasury, 55 Nile*, iu6
* 49 Niks, 182. ' 49 Niles, 162.

22

338 ANDREW JACKSON.

Philadelphia lost her hank, and New York got one, tb§
financial hegemony would he permanently transferred
In December, 1835, after the great fire in New York,
the Bank of the United States was asked to give aid. It
did 80 hy opening credits for $2 million in favor of the
insurance companies. 1

The act of the Pennsylvania Legislature, by which
the United States Bank of Pennsylvania was chartered,
is, on its face, a piece of corrupt legislation. Its cor-
ruption was addressed to the people of the State, not to
private individuals. It comprised three projects in an
obvious log-rolling combination, — remission of taxes,
public improvements, and bank charter. The bank was
chartered a for thirty years. It was to pay a bonus of
$2J million, pay $100,000 per year for twenty years for
schools, loan the State not over a million a year in tem-
porary loans at four per cent, and subscribe $640,000
to railroads and turnpikes. Personal taxes were re-
pealed by other sections of the bill, and $1,368,147
were appropriated, out of the bank bonus, for various
canals and turnpikes. Either this bill was corruptly
put together to win strength by enlisting local and per-
sonal interests in favor of it, or else the Pennsylvanians,
having got their big bank to themselves, set to work to
plunder it. The charter passed the Senate, 19 to 12,
and the House, 57 to 30. 8 Inasmuch as the democrats
uad a majority in the Senate, it was charged that private
corruption had passed the bill. An investigation re-
sulted in nothing. There was found, in 1841, an entry,
of about the date of the charter, of $400,000 expendi-
ture, vouchers for which could not be produced. 4 Biddls

«3 Niles, 307. 2 49 Nfl eSj 377, 396.

'9 Niles, 434. 4 Second report, 1841, 60 Nile*, SOt

RETROSPECT OF THE BANK WAR. 833

represented the case as if the proposition that the State
should charter the hank had originated with leading
members of the Legislature, who asked the bank if it
would accept a state charter. 1 The act was dated
February 18, 1836. The bank accepted the charter,
and presented a service of plate to Biddle.*

In the story of the bank war, which has been given
in the preceding pages, the reader has perceived that
the writer does not believe that Jackson's administration
had a case against the bank, or that the charges it made
were proven. To say this is to say that Jackson's ad-
ministration unjustly, passionately, ignorantly, and with-
out regard to truth assailed a great and valuable
financial institution, and caluminated its management.
Such was the opinion of people of that generation, at
least until March 3, 1836. Jackson's charges against
the bank were held to be not proven. The effect of
them naturally was to make confidence in the bank
blind and deaf. In January, 1836, when it was ex-
pected that the bank would wind up in two months, its
Btock stood at 116. For four years afterwards, nothing
seemed able to destroy public confidence in the bank.
One thing alone suggests a doubt, and makes one hold
back from the adoption of a positive judgment in favor
of the bank, even down to the end of its national char-
ter : that is, a doubt of Biddle's sincerity. If he was
jot sincere, we have no measure for the degree of mis-
representation there may have been in his plausible
statements and explanations, or for how much may have
been hidden under the financial expositions he was so
fond of making, and which were, like the expositions of
% juggler, meant to mystify the audience still more.

1 Biddle to Adams, 51 Niles, 230. 2 4* Niles, 441.

B40 ANDREW JACKSON.

The final catastrophe of the hank has always affected
the judgment which all students of its history have
formed of the merits of its struggle with Jackson. The
Jackson men always claimed that the end proved that
Jackson and his coterie were right all the time. This
has probably been the general verdict. The whigs felt
the weight of the inference, and they tried to distin-
guish between the Bank of the United States and the
United States Bank of Pennsylvania. A little reflec-
tion will show that both these views are erroneous. A
bank may go on well and be sound for twenty years,
and then go wrong. It may make mistakes and re-
cover, and then make more mistakes and perish. We
must go by the facts all the way along. The state bank
and the national bank of the United States had an
unbroken life. The attempt to save one and condemn
the other, aside from an investigation of the merits, is
a partisan proceeding. It is not sound historically or
financially. We have now reached as just an opinion
as we can form about the bank up to the time of its
state charter.

The bank started on its new career under very bad
auspices. It never threw off the suspicion which at-
tached to its legislative birth. It was too large for its
- new sphere, yet pride prevented its reduction. It had
other aims than to win profits by sound banking. It
wanted to prove itself necessary, or to show itself a
public benefactor, or to sustain the rivalry of Philadel-
phia with New York. Biddle, freed from the restraints
•f the old organization, launched out into sensational
banking, and tested his theories of banking to tht
utmost. There is scarcely anything vicious and un
sound in banking which the great bank did not illustrate

UNITED STATES BANK OF PENNSYLVANIA. 341

during the next five years. Its officers plundered it.
Its end was so ignominious that no one wanted to re*
member that he had ever believed in it

On the 1st of February, 1836, the account of the
bank 1 showed a surplus of $7.8 million, which was ex-
pected to pay off the bonus, notes, etc. There were $20
million loaned on stocks, and there was the state bonus,
the government stock, and the circulation of the old
bank to be paid. New stock was sold to pay off the
government stock. £1 million were borrowed in Lon-
don, and 12.5 million francs in Paris. 2 Jaudon was
sent to England as agent of the bank. In May, the
money market at New York being very stringent, the
bank was asked for aid, which it gave. 9 By an act of
June 15, 1836, Congress repealed the 14th section of
the bank charter. This put an end to the receipt of
the notes of the old bank by the Treasury, and crippled
the circulation of the bank. In October there was a
report that the bank would surrender its state charter
if it could get back its bonus. 4 In that same month,
however, Biddle wrote another letter to Adams to show
the wrong of trying to repeal the state charter. June
23d, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Treasury
to treat with the bank for the payment of the govern-
ment stock. No agreement was reached, but, February
25, 1837, the bank sent a memorial to the Speaker, in
which it offered to pay off the public shares, at $115.58
per share, in four instalments, September, 1837-38-
39-40. This proposition was accepted March 3, 1837,
%nd the instalments were all paid.

In his message 1836, Jackson discharged a last

* 60 Nile*, 106. 2 First report, 841, 60 Nile§, 106. ,

• 60 Nile*, 267. * 51 Nilss, 113.

342 ANDREW JACKSON.

broadside at the bank. He seemed to be as angry tha..
the bank had escaped annihilation as he was in 1818
that Billy Bowlegs got across the Suwanee river. He
complained that the bank had not paid off the public
stock, and was reissuing its old notes. This latter pro
ceeding was stopped by an act of July 6, 1838. The
bank failed three times during the years of commercial
distress which followed, namely, May 10, 1837, with all
the other banks ; October 9, 1839, when it carried down
with it all which had resumed, except those in New.
York and a few in New England ; February 4, 1841,
when it was entirely ruined. Its stockholders lost all
their capital.

Biddle had resigned March 29, 1839, but he had been
so identified with the bank that its ruin was attributed
to him. He fell into disgrace. He was arraigned for
conspiracy to plunder the stockholders, but escaped on
a technicality. He died, insolvent and broken-hearted,
February 27, 1844, aged fifty-eight. 1

Webster declared, in 1842, that a bank of the United
States founded on a private subscription was an " obso-
lete idea ; " 2 but perhaps the unkindest cut of all was
that the Whig Almanac for 1843 could refer to " Nick
Biddle " as a rascal, and to " his bank " as one which
was " corruptly managed."

1 Ingersoll, 285 ; a very touching description of Biddle's lsjt
fears.
• 3 Webster's Works, \85.

CHAPTER XV.

ROB SOW SPIRIT IN VABIOUS POINTS OF FOREIGN ATO
DOMESTIC POLICY. •

The neglect of France to fulfil the stipulations of the
treaty of July 4, 1831, offered the occasion for the most
important diplomatic negotiation in which Jackson was
engaged. In his message of 1834, he gave a full ac-
count of the treaty and of the neglect of- the .French
Chambers, at two sessions, to appropriate money to meet
engagements which had been made, on behalf of the
French nation, by the i constitutional authorities of
France. The King had shown strong personal interest
in the matter, 1 and had exerted himself to secure a
satisfactory settlement and to prevent any bad feeling
from arising between the two nations. In the mean
time the United States had reduced the dirties on wine,
according to the engagement in the treaty, by an act of
July 13, 1832, and France was getting the benefit of the
treaty without performing her share of. it. It seemed to
Jackson that this state of things called for spirited
action. Moreover, Livingston wrote a very important
dispatch from Paris, November 22, 1834, 2 in which he
laid that there was a disposition in France to wait and
tee what the message would be ; also that the moderate

- Livingston's dispatch, 47 Niles, 417 Hires came heme ia
1831. Livingston went out in 1833.
■ 47 Niles, 417.

344 ANDREW JACKSON.

lone of the United States up to this time had had a bad
effect. " From all this you may imagine the anxiety 1
ihall feel for the arrival of the President's message.
On its tone will depend very much, not only the pay-
ment of our claims, but our national reputation for
energy." If Jackson had made a bad effect by toe
great moderation, that was precisely the error he knev
how to correct, and our " reputation for energy " wa<§
just what he was prepared to sustain. Accordingly he
prepared his message for 1834. The Due de Broglie,
the French minister, afterwards declared that the ap-
propriation would have been passed in December, 1834,
if copies of this message had not been just then received.
Jackson was under erroneous information as to the time
of meeting of the French Chambers. The Due de
Broglie had also, in the March previous, when the bill
drawn by the American Treasury went to protest, found
fault with the American government for selling the bill
to a bank, instead of receiving the money through a
liplomatic agent. 1 He argued that the United States
ought not to have regarded the treaty as definitive until
all the organs of the French government had assented to
it. In his message, before mentioned, Jackson suggested
that, if Congress inferred from the inaction of France
that she did not intend to fulfil the treaty, it might pro-
ceed to measures of coercion, amongst which he men-
tioned, as suitable and "peaceable," reprisals. He
proposed that a law should be passed authorizing re-
prisals, if France should neglect the fulfilment of the
reaty beyond a certain time. He added that this sug
jjestion ought not to be regarded by France as a
'menace." Chevalier thought that Jackson, having
i 47 Niles, 327.

RELATIONS WITH FRANCE. 345

tad his bout with the nullifiers, found his blood heateo
Mid his appetite for war reawakened ; that he satisfied
this appetite first in the bank war, and then in the
difficulty with France. 1

The message caused great excitement in France.
The French journals all regarded it as a menace*
The feeling was aroused that France could not then pay-
without dishonor. 2 Additional embarrassment arose
from the fact that the King's active interest was re-
vealed by the documents published in America. The
bad temper of the French was still further increased
when they read Rives's letters, in which he seemed to
boast of having outwitted the French minister, and
Livingston's letter, in which he suggested that France
never would pay unless the message brought her be-
havior before Congress in a spirited way. The Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate made a
report, 8 in which they expressed full agreement with the
President on all the essential points, but they regarded
the proposition to employ reprisals as premature, and
likely to embarrass the negotiations. In the House two
reports were made, 4 but they were not important The
Senate voted unanimously, January 14, 1835, that it
was not expedient to adopt any legi«'..»tive measures in re-
gard to the relations with France. In the House, J. Q.
Adams took the lead in sustaining Jackson's position,
ftnd was largely influential in securing the adoption by
the House, unanimously, March 2, 1835, of a resolution
mat the execution of the treaty should be insisted on.
Ihe French minister to the United States was recalled

1 Chevalier, 177. See his estimate of Jackson's character.

* French newspapers quoted, 47 Niles, 327.

1 47 Niles, 344. 4 48 Niles, 5 and 6.

346 ANDREW JACKSON.

His final note of January 14, 1835, was not received bj
Jackson, but was referred back to the French govern
ment They approved of it.

In December, 1834, the French Chambers rejected a
bill appropriating money to pay the indemnities. A
cabinet crisis followed, not on account of this vote, but
also not entirely, as it appears, without reference to it.
The Due de Broglie, however, returned to office with
the understanding that provision was to be made for
fulfilling the treaty. April 25, 1835, the French
Chambers passed the appropriation, but with a condi-
tion that no money should be paid until " satisfactory
explanations " of the President's message of 1834
should be received. The original condition in the law
was, " until it shall have been ascertained that th6
government of the United States has adopted no meas-
ures injurious to French interests ; " * but it was after-
wards changed to the other form 2 by amendment
Livingston wTote a note, April 25, 1835, declaring that
the message was a domestic document, for which no
responsibility to any foreign power would be admitted ;
that the message of 1834 itself contained a sufficient
disclaimer ; and that the condition which had been in-
corporated in the act of the French Chambers would pre-
vent it from being a satisfactory settlement. 8 He then
came home. In Congress, whose session ended March
4th, an amendment to the usual appropriation bill for
fortifications was proposed, by which $3 million were
appropriated for extraordinary expenditures for defence,
in case such should become necessary before the next
session. The whole bill was lost, borne down, as it ap-
pears, by this amendment. As the relations with Franc*

i 47 Niles, 436. 2 48 Nfles, 2 20. « 48 Niles, 318.

RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS*. 847

mere still more critical when Congress next met, and
nothing had been done for defence on account of the
failure of that bill, a great deal of crimination and re-
crimination took place in an effort to fix the blame
and responsibility. No result was reached. It is an
interesting instance of the working of the element of
responsibility under the American system. 1

In the message of 1835 Jackson reviewed the whole
affair, insisted that he had never used menace, and
alluded to Livingston's final note to the French minister
as having clearly so stated. He said that he would
never apologize. A long dispatch of the Due de Brog-
lie to the French chargi here, in June, 1836, set forth
the French case. It was read to Forsyth, but he de-
clined to receive a copy. 2 Jackson directed Barton,
charge d'affaires at Paris, to make a specific inquiry
what France intended to do. The Due de Broglie re-
plied that France would pay whenever the United
States would say that it regretted the misunderstanding,
that the misunderstanding arose from mistake, that the
good faith of France had not been questioned, and that
no menace was ever intended. This question and
answer were exchanged in October, 1835. 8 Barton
came home in January, 1836, and Pageot, the French
charge, was recalled at the same time, so that diplomatic
relations were entirely broken off.

January 18, 1836, Jackson sent in a special message
on the relations with France, 4 sending copies of Bar-
ton's correspondence. Livingston toned down 5 this
message somewhat from the first intention ; nevertheless
Jackson again recommended coercive measures. He

i 49 Niles, 446. 2 49 IKles, 333. 8 49 Niles, 347.

* 49 Niles 345. * Hunt's Livingtlon, 42S

348 ANDREW JACKSON.

proposed to exclude French ships and products from the
ports of the United States ; that is to say, his reserve
of force by which to sustain his spirited diplomacy was
the old, imbecile, and worn-out device of a commercial
war. He said that France was strengthening her navy ;
if against us, an apology from us was out of the ques-
tion.

Thus this question had been pushed into the worst
kind of a diplomatic dead-lock, out of which neither
party could advance without fighting, and neither could
recede without (supposed) dishonor. That is the evil
of spirited diplomacy, for good diplomacy would avoid
such a dead-lock as one of the worst blunders possible
in the profession. The English government now inter-
vened, and offered its good offices as mediator. The
French government declared to the English that the
President's message of 1835 had removed the bad im-
pressions of that of 1834. This declaration was made
known to Forsyth by the English minister at Washing-
ton, and was transmitted to Congress, with a message,
by the President, February 22, 1836. 1 It was very
good-natured of France to regard the message of 1835
&s compliance with the demands which had been made
to Barton in October. She simply covered her retreat,
for she had been in the wrong on the merits of the
question from the beginning, and she justly bore half
the blame of the diplomatic dead-lock. March 19,
1836, the King of France ordered four instalments of
the indemnity to be paid at once, in order to settle the
matter down to date, according to the terms of the
treaty

Barry, the Postmaster-General, was the only niembe?
1 49 Nilea, 442.

TEE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT. 349

•f the cabinet retained in 1831. In his hands the ad-
ministration of the Post-Office Department, both in iti
business and its finance, steadily declined. The com-
plaints in 1834-35 of the irregularity and delay of the
mails were very numerous and bitter. The department
was also running in arrears in its finances. Both Houses
of Congress, at the session of 1834-35, investigated the
department Barry's personal honesty does not seem
to have been questioned, but his chief clerk, Rev.
Obadiah B. Brown, 1 became for the time a very distin-
guished man, on account of relations with mail contract-
ors, which, if innocent, were very improper. The
contractors had made use of familiar devices, " straw
bids," " unbalanced bids," " expedited service," etc., if
not of corrupt influences on subordinates in the depart-
ment, by which devices shrewd men take advantage of
inefficient public officers. 1 Barry refused to answer
some of the questions put to him, and, after the fashion
of the time, published an "Appeal to the American
People," * instead. Brown resigned in an official docu-
ment, imitated apparently from Van Buren's resignation
of 1831. 4 He also published an " Appeal," etc. Jack-
Bon selected Kendall for Barry's successor, May 1, 1835.
Kendall's administrative ability was great, and he
speedily reorganized the department, and restored its
efficiency. There was great doubt, however, when he
was appointed, whether he would be confirmed. Barry
was sent as minister to Spain, but died on his way
-thither.

The emancipation of the slaves in the British "West
Indies in 1833 gave a great impulse in the United

* See page 377. * 47 Niles, 381, 393.

• 44 Niles, 338. * 47 Niles, 395.

85C ANDREW JACKSON.

States to abolition sentiment and effort, which had not
been active since the compromise of 1820 was adopted
The new spirit was manifested in the organization of
societies, distribution of pamphlets and newspapers, peti-
tions to Congress to abolish slavery in the District of
Colombia, and other forms of agitation. The first
efforts of this kind were frowned down all over the
North, but the general movement grew. The senti-
ments of democracy and of religion were both against
slavery, and every step which was taken to arrest the
agitation — the gag law in Congress, by which peti-
tions about slavery were practically shut out, and the
mob violence which was employed against the agitators
— only strengthened it. Towards the end of Jackson's
second administration the antislavery agitation was a
real growing movement, and an element in the social
and civil life of the nation. The story of these things
has been often told in detail, and may be passed over
here. The history of the United States has, in fact,
been studied by the present generation chiefly with re-
gard to the slavery question. Jackson's administration
was not called upon to act on the slavery issue save in
one or two points.

The abolition societies adopted the policy of sending
documents, papers, and pictures against slavery to the
Southern States. If the intention was, as was charged,
to incite the slaves to revolt, the device, as it seems to
us now, must have fallen far short of its object, for the
chance that anything could get from the post-office into
the hands of a black man, without going through the
hands of a white man, was poor indeed. These public*
tioiis, however, caused a panic and a wild indignation ii
me South. The postmaster at Charleston, being lecl

KENDALL 1 S ORDER ABOUT TEE MAILS. 351

fcred by the people there on his duty, turned to the
Postmaster-General for orders. August 4, 1835, Ken-
dall gave an ambiguous reply, so far as orders were
concerned. He, however, threw the postmaster on his
own discretion, and then said for himself, " By no act
or direction of mine, official or private, could I be in-
duced to aid, knowingly, in giving circulation to papers
of this description, directly or indirectly" (i. e., papers
alleged by the postmaster to be " the most inflamma-
tory and incendiary, and insurrectionary to the last
degree "). "We owe an obligation to the laws, but a
higher one to the communities in which we live, and, if
the former be perverted to destroy the latter, it is pa-
triotism to disregard them. Entertaining these views,
I cannot sanction, and will not condemn, the step you
have taken " [in refusing to deliver certain mail-matter].
August 22d Kendall wrote a long letter to Gouverneur,
postmaster at New York, elaborating and defending his
position. 1 Politics were already combined with the
slavery question in this incident Kendall's confirma-
tion by the Senate was very doubtful, and Van Buren's
Southern support was ready to abandon him at a mo-
ment's notice if slavery came into account Kendall
won enough Southern votes to carry his confirmation.
^JWhen J. Q. Adams, in 1819, was negotiating with
the Spanish minister the treaty by which the western
boundary of the United States was defined, he could get
/\ no encouragement from Monroe or any of his ministers
/ ^-o try to push the boundary westwards. 2 Monroe ap-
\ geared to think the United States would be weakened
J*~~ *y including territory west of the Sabine. 8 It was not
long, however, before the Southern slave-holding io
i 49 Niles, 8. !/ 2 See page 6" V 8 U Adaj* 348.

862 ANDREW JACKSON.

terest began to see the error of this view of the matter
After the Missouri Compromise was adopted, it appeared
that wild land for the formation of new free States was
owned north of that line from the Mississippi to the
Pacific, while south of that line similar land, available
for new slave States, extended only to the Sabine and
the 100 degree meridian. Only a few persons, however,
as yet perceived this view of the matter. In 1819 (June
23d), one James Long proclaimed the independence of
Texas. 1 In 1821 Austin colonized three hundred famil-
ies in Texas, by permission of Mexico. In 1826 some
American immigrants at Nacogdoches declared Texas
independent In 1824 the Emperor of Russia tried to
establish exclusive control over the Northern Pacific,
and the attention of the most far-seeing statesmen was
drawn to the interests of the United States in the North-
west and on the Pacific. It seems necessary to bear in
mind, all through the history of the annexation of Texas,
the connection of that question with the acquisition of
California, including the port of San Francisco, which
was then the chief reason for wanting California.
Adams, when President (1827), sent to Poinsett, min-
ster of the United States in Mexico, orders to try to
buy Texas for a million dollars. Poinsett did not
make the attempt. He gave as his reason the danger
of irritating Mexico by a proposition which was sure to
be rejected. 2
K In 1824 Mexico took the first steps towards the aboli-
tion of slavery; By a decree of September 15, 1828

j * 17 Niles, 31 ; Jay.
» f The attempt to bay Texas seems to have been Clay's ad
Of. 7 Adams, 239, 240; 9 Adams, 379; especially 11 AJami

SLAVERY IN TEXAS. 858

llavery was definitively abolished. In the mean tim e.
Americans had emigrated to Texas, chiefly from the
Southern States, and had taken slaves thither. They
resisted the abolition decree, and the Mexican govern-
ment saw itself forced to except the State of Texae
from the decree. It, however, united Texas with Coa-
huila, as a means of holding the foreign and insubor-
dinate settlers in check. The abolition of slavery by
Mexico affected the Southern States doubly: first, it
lessened the area open to slavery ; se cond , it put a free
State_on the flank and rear of the slave" territory. The
interest of the Southwestern States in the independence
of Texas, or its annexation, was at once aroused. A
fanciful doctrine, in the taste of the Southwestern states-
men, was immediately invented to give a basis for
stump-speaking in defence of a real act of violence. It
was declared that the United States must RE-annex what
had once been maliciously given away by a Northern
statesman. The gravity and care with which re-annex-
ation was talked about had its parallel only in the
theatrical legislation of nullification. In 1780 Spain
claimed that the eastern boundary of Louisiana was such
as to include nearly all the present State of Alabama,
and the Hiawasee, Tennessee, Clinch, and Cumberland
rivers through what is now Tennessee and Kentucky. 1
Inside of this claim she would take what she could get
The boundaries to the westward were still more vague.
Therefore, any one who chose to dabble In the author-
ities could prove anything he liked, and think himself
no contemptible scholar into the bargain. " Texas," as
1 State of the Mexican confederation* embraced only
* Ramsey, 583
II

864 ANDREW JACKSON.

the southeastern corner of the territory now included
* In the State of that name. 1

In the summer of 1829 Van Buren sent instruction*
to Poinsett to liy to buy Texas, and five million dollars
were offered for it In 1830 M exico, which had at first
welcomed the immigrants, forbade Americans to settle
In Texas. Of course this law had no effect

"We are indebted to a Ek- May), who was a hanger-on
at Washington during Jackson's time, for a little book
in which most of the Texas intrigue is laid bare. Mayo
was in the way of picking up certain information, and
more came to him by accident He gives also many
documents. He was intimate with ex-Governor Samuel
Houston, of Tennessee, an old • companion in arms of
Jackson, who came to Washington in 1829 to get Jack-
son's connivance at an enterprise which Houston had
in mind for revolutionizing Texas. That Jackson did
connive at this enterprise, just as he supposed Monroe
connived at his own proceedings in Florida, cannot be
established by proof, but it is sustained by very strong
inference. 8

April 5, 1832, two treaties with Mexico were pub-
lished,— one of commerce and one of boundaries,—
confirming the boundary of the Florida treaty.

In 1833 a revolution broke out in Mexico, which
threw the -whole country into anarchy, Texas with the
rest Santa Anna gradually established his authority.

1,1 Carey & Lea's Atlas, 1822. Cf. Carey's map of 1814.08
which Texas «eems to be delineated as extending from the Nue-
ces to the Sabine.

v « See 11 Adams, 41, 347, 357, 363; and his Fifteen D*j
Bpeech, of June, 1838. Wise {Decades, 148), affirms it very pos
ftively. He is better authority on this point than on some other*
tboufc which he is very positive, e. g. t the Adams-Clay bargain.

INDEPENDENCE OF TEXAS. 855

In the autumn of 1835 he tried to extend it oyer
Texas, but he met with armed resistance, and waa de-
feated. In Jul£2_1835, JaiksojL authorized an offer of
an additional half million dollars if Mexico would allow
the boundary, after the cession of Texas, to follow the
Rio Grande up to the thirty-seventh degree, and then
run on that parallel to the Pacific. 1 AlL_proposition8
to purchase failed. After the Texans proved able to
beat the Mexicans in battle, no further propositions of
that kind were made.

March 2, 1836, a Declaration of Independence, on
behalf of Texas, was adopted. March 6th the fort of
the Alamo was taken by the Mexicans, and its de-
fenders massacred. On -the 27th Colonels Fannin and
Ward, with other Texan (or American) prisoners, were
massacred. On the 17th of March the Constitution of
Texas was adopted. It contained the strongest pro-
visions in favor of slavery. The massacres aroused
great indignation in the Southwest, and hundreds of
adventurers hastened to Texas, where Houston was now
chief in command, to help him win independence. 2 The
decisive battle was fought at San Jacinto April 21st,
when Santa Anna was routed and captured. He prom-
ised everything in captivity, but cancelled his promises
after he was released. In June, 1836, Judge Catron
wrote to Webster, from Tennessee, that the spirit was
abroad through the whole Mississippi Valley to march
to Texas. 8 Perhaps the disposition to march was not
bo strong elsewhere, but immense speculations in land
ted already been organized, and great speculations in

tf\\ Adams, 362. ,y » Jay, 28.

f* 1 Webtter's Correspondence, 523.

166 ANDREW JACKSON.

% Texan 1 securities soon after began, which enlisted the
pecuniary interests of great numbers of people in the
independence of Texas.

A correspondence now began between the representa-
tives of the governments of the United States and
Mexico, which no American ought to read without
shame. It would be hard to find an equally gross in-
stance of bullying on the part of a large State towards a
small one. Jackso n had ordered that General Gaines
should enter the territory of Texas, and march to
Nacogdoches, if he thought there was any danger of
hostilities on the part of the Indians, and if there was
suspicion that the Mexican general was stirring up the
Indians to war on the United States. Here we have
another reminiscence of Florida revived. Gaines under-
stood his orders, and entered the Mexican territory.
Understanding also, no doubt, that the Jacksonian pro-
ceedings of 1818 had now been legitimized as the cor-
rect American line of procedure for a military officer,
he called on the governors of the neighboring States for
militia. Although companies were forming and march-
ing to Texas under full organization, this " call " was
overruled by the War Department The energetic re-
monstrances of the Mexican minister finally led to an
irder to Gaines to retire from Texan territory, not,
however, until after the Mexican minister had broken
off diplomatic relations.

In July, 1836, both Houses voted, the Senate unani
mously, that the independence of Texas ought to ba
acknowledged as soon as Texas had proved that sh*

7 The first issue of Texan bonds was authorized in November
886. The first Treasury notes were issued November 1, 183?
'Gouge's Texas, 57, 71.)

DEFINITION OF "TEXAS." 867

tould maintain it Texas was already represented by
agents applying for annexation. Jackson recommended
longer delay in a message of December 21, 1836. The
fact was that the geographical definition of "Texas"
was not yet satisfactorily established, and it was not de-
lirable to have annexation settled too soon. An act
was passed by the Legislature of Texas, December 19,
lffiffi, by which the Rio Grande was declared to be the
western boundary of Texas. In his message of Decem-
ber 22d Jackson submitted the report of his agent that
the boundaries of Texas, before the last revolution, were
the Nueces, the Red, and the Sabine rivers, but that
Bhe now claimed as her boundary the Rio del Norte to
its source, and from that point eastward and south-
' - — ward the existing boundary of the United States. 1 That
is as if Maine should secede and claim that her boun-
daries were the Alleghanies and the Potomac. Jackson's
message distinctly pointed out that in taking Texas then,
or later, the United States would take her with her new
boundary claims. That is as if Maine should join the
Dominion of Canada, and England should set up a claim
to the New England and Middle States based on the
" declaration " of Maine above supposed. The policy
was to keep the Texas question open until California
eould be obtained. The Mexican war ultimately be-
came necessary for that purpose, and for no other ; for
Texas, even to 'the Rio Grande, could have been ob-

t— tained without it. 2 Another reason for delay was that
opposition to the annexation of Texas had been aroused
in the North, and there wa&-not jet strength enough to

~) ]— wrry it. May 25, lS36,(Adams* made a speech against

v * Document L.

}' 2 3 Von Hoist, 67, 81, 103, 108, 112; Jay, 1* ^_ ..
• 60 Niles, 276 y*

868 ANDREW JACKSON.

% war with Mexico to conquer Texas, which had great
influence in the North.

March 1, 1837, the Senate recognized the indepen-
dence of Texas, 23 to 19. The House did not concur in
full form, but in effect.

In 1836 the government of the United States opened
a new battery against that of Mexico in the shape of a
series of claims and charges. The diplomatic agent of
the former power, Po whatan El lis, performed his duties
in such a rude and peremptory manner that one is forced
to suspect that he acted by orders, especially as his
rank was only that of charge d'affaires. The charges
were at first 15 in number, then 46»- then 61. They
were frivolous and forced, and bear the character of at-
tempts to make a quarrel. 1 Ellis abruptly came home.
In August, 1837, the agent of Texas, Memucan Hunt,
made a formal proposal for annexation. Van Buren
declined it Mexico next proposed a new negotiation
with arbitration in regard to the claims and charges
made against her by the United States. The opposition
to annexation in the North had grown so strong that de-
lay was necessary, and negotiations were opened which
resulted in the convention of August 17, 1840. Mexico
could not fulfil the engagements she entered into in that
treaty, or in a subsequent one of 1843, and so the ques-
tion was reopened, and finally was manoeuvred into a
war. It appears that Van Buren had the f eeling which
any President will be sure to have, adverse to any war
during his administration. The Mexican war ^as forced
»n bjr a cabinet intrigue, and Tyler forced it /on Polk.

The Texas intrigue and the Mexican war were full of
faeksonian acts and principles. There are constat*
* Jay, 36 fe.

&

BRISCOE «. BANK OF KENTUCKY. 869

•utcroppings of the old Seminole war proceedings and
doctrines. The army and navy were corrupted by
swagger and insubordination, and by the anxiety of the

. officers to win popularity by the methods of which Jack-

\l-^ »on had set the example. 1 The filibustering spirit, one
law for ouraelves and another for every one else, gained
a popularity for which Jackson was much to blame.
During the Texas intrigue Jacksgn engaged in private
and personal correspondence on public questions with
diplomatic agents, who were not always accredited, after

j — khe fashion of Louis XV. in the King's Secret. 8 His
" spirited diplomacy " was reduced to a farce when two
Bach men as Polk and Buchanan tried to employ it in
the Oregon question.

Thl834 the case of Briscoe vs. The Bank of the Com-
monwealth of Kentucky was argued before the Supreme

fc Y *~~~ Court. 8 Briscoe and others gave a note, in 1830,
which they did not pay at maturity. In the state Cir-
cuit Court, Briscoe pleaded " no consideration," on the
ground that the note was given for a loan of notes of
the Bank of the Commonwealth, which were " bills of
credit " within the prohibition of the Constitution, and
therefore of no value. The state court found for the

■ bank. The state Court of Appeals affirmed that decision.
The case was carried to the Supreme Court of the
United States on a writ of error. The court consisted,
In 1834, of Chief Justice Marshall, of Virginia, ap-
pointed by Adams in 1801; and Associate Justices

I x In 1824 Commodore Porter was guilty of an outrage at
Foxardo, Porto Rico. When court-martialled, he made an
ilaborate comparison of his proceedings with those of Jackson ia
Florida, by way of defence. (28 Niles, 370.; He was cashiered.
V * 11 Adams, 357 * 8 Peters. 118.

B60 ANDREW JACKSON.

Johnson, of South Carolina, appointed by Jefferson in
1804 ; Duvall, of Maryland, appointed by Madison in
1811 ; Story, of Massachusetts, appointed in the same
jrear by the same ; Thompson, of New York, appointed
by Monroe in 1823 ; McLean, of Ohio, appointed by Jack*
Bon in 1829 ; and Baldwin, of Pennsylvania, appointee
by Jackson in 1830. Johnson was absent all the term*
Duvall was absent part of tb'j term. Of the five whe
heard the argument in Briscoe's case, a majority thought
that the notes of the Bank of the Commonwealth were
bills of credit under the decision in Craig vs. Missouri, 1
but there were not four, a majority of the whole, who
concurred in this opinion. The rule of the court was
not to pronounce a state law invalid for unconstitution-
ality unless a majority of the whole court should concur.
Hence no decision was rendered.

The Circuit Court of Mercer County, Kentucky, de-
cided in 1834, under the decision in Craig vs. Missouri,
that the notes of the Bank of the Commonwealth were
bills of credit.*

Judge Johnson died in 1834. Duvall resigned in
January, 1835. Wayne took his seat January 14, 1835.
Hence there was one vacancy in 1835, and Briscoe's
ease went over. Marshall died July 6, 1835. In 1836
there were only five judges on the bench of the court.
Taney was confirmed March 15, 1836. P. P. Barbour,
of Virginia, was confirmed on the same day. This made
the co art complete again. Three changes had taken
place since 1834, and five of the seven judges were now
Jackson's appointees.

Briscoe vs. The Bank was decided in January, 1837
The decision was by McLean. It was held that abi.

* See page 135. * 46 N'Jee, 210

DEFINITION OF BILLS OF CREDIT. 861

if credit "is a paper issued by the sovereign power,
containing a pledge of its faith and designed to circulate
as money." Notes, to be bills of credit, must be issued
by the State and bind the faith of the State. Commis~
ftioners of issue must not impart any credit by signature,
nor be responsible. Hence it was held that the notes of
the Bank of the Commonwealth were not bills of credit.
Story rendered a very strong and unusually eager dis-
senting opinion. In it he gave a summary history and
analysis of " bills of credit " as they existed before the
Revolution, and as they were understood by the Consti-
tution-makers. He explicitly referred to the former
hearing of the case, and said that Marshall had been
in the majority against the constitutionality of the is-
sues.

The decision in Briscoe's case marks the beginning of
i new era in the history of the constitutional law of the
United States. Up to that time the court had not
foiled to pursue the organic development of the Consti-
tution, and it had, on every occasion on which it was
put to the test, proved the bulwark of constitutional
liberty, by the steadiness and solidity of judgment with
which it had established the interpretation of the Con-
stitution. Our children are familiarized, in their school-
books, with the names of statesmen and generals, and
popular tradition carries forward the fame of men who
have been conspicuous in public life ; but no one who
really knows how the national life of the United States
has developed will dispute the assertion that no man can
be named to whom the nation is more indebted for solid
rod far-reaching services than it is to John Marshall.
The proceedings of the Supreme Court are almost always
overlooked in ordinary narrations of history, but he who

562 ANDREW JACKSON.

looks for real construction or growth in the institution!
of the country should look to those proceedings first of
all. Especially in the midst of a surging democracy,
exposed to the chicane of political mountebanks and
the devices of interested cliques, the firmness and cor-
rectness with which the court had held its course on
behalf of constitutional liberty and order had been of
inestimable value to the nation. The series of great
constitutional decisions, to which reference has been
made in the preceding pages, have now entered into
the commonplaces of our law. They have been tested
through three quarters of a century. To see in the ret-
rospect that they were wise, and that the contrary decis-
ions would have produced mischief, is one thing ; to see
at the time, in the heat of controversy and under the
clamor of interests, what was the sound and correct in-
terpretation, and to pronounce it in spite of abuse, was
another thing.

In Briscoe's case the court broke the line of its de-
cisions, and made the prohibition of bills of credit
nugatory. 1 If the degree of responsibility and inde-
pendent authority which the directors of the Bank of
the Commonwealth of Kentucky possessed, and the
amount of credit they gave to the notes aside from the
credit of the State, was sufficient to put those notes out-
vide the prohibition of the Constitution, then no State
could find any difficulty in making a device for escaping
the constitutional prohibition. Wild-cat banking was
granted standing ground under the Constitution, and the

1 "A virtual and incidental enforcement of the depreciated
totes of the state banks, by their crowding out a sound medium
though a great evil, was not foreseen." (Madison to C. J. Ingm
*>U, February 22, 1831 ; 4 Elliott, 641.)

EFFECT ON THE COURT. 368

boast that the Constitutional Convention had closed and
oarred the door against the paper money with which the
colonies had been cursed was without foundation. The
great " banks " set up by the southwestern States be-
tween 1836 and 1837 were protected by this decision.
They went on their course, and carried those States
down to bankruptcy and repudiation. The wild-cat
banking which devastated Hie Ohio States between 1837
and 1860, and miseducated the people of those States
until they thought irredeemable government issues an
unhoped-for blessing, never could have existed if Story's
opinion had been law. The legal-tender notes of 1862
and the decisions of the Supreme Court on the constitu-
tionality of the legal-tender act must have borne an
entirely different color, if Marshall's opinion had pre-
vailed in Briscoe's case.

Jackson's appointments introduced the mode of action
by the Executive, through the selection of the judges,
on the interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme
Court. Briscoe's case marked the victory of Kentucky
relief finance and state-rights politics over the judiciary.
The effect of political appointments to the bench is al
ways traceable, after two or three years, in the reports,
which come to read like a collection of old stump
speeches. The climax of the tendency which Jackson
inaugurated was reached when the court went to pieces
on the Dred Scott case, trying to reach a decision
which should be politically expedient, rather than ons
. which should be legally sound. A later and similar
instance is furnished by the legal-tender cases. As for
ihe immediate effect of Jackson s appointments, it may
»e most decorously stated by quoting from Story's
reasons, in 1845, for proposing to resign : " I have been

r

864 ANDREW JACKSON.

long convinced that the doctrines and opinions of the
old court were daily losing ground, and especially those
on great constitutional questions. New men and new
opinions have succeeded. The doctrines of the Consti-
tution, so vital to the country, which, in former times,
received the support of the whole court, no longer main-
tain their ascendency. I am the last member now
living of the old court, and I cannot consent to remain
where I can no longer hope to see those doctrines
recognized and enforced." x

During Jackson's second term the growth of the
nation in wealth and prosperity was very great. It is
plain, from the history we have been pursuing, in spite
of all the pettiness and provincialism which marked
political controversies, that the civil life of the nation
was growing wider and richer. It was just because
there was an immeasurable source of national life in the
physical circumstances and in the energy of the people
that the political follies and abuses could be endured.
If the politicians and statesmen would only let the
nation alone it would go on, not only prosperously, but
smoothly ; that is why the non-interference dogma of the
democrats, which the whigs denounced as non-goverri-
jaent, was in fact the highest political wisdom. On re-
flection it will not be found strange that the period 1829
to 1837 should have been marked by a great deal of
violence and turbulence. It is not possible that a grow-
ing nation should spread over new territory, and feel
the thrill of its own young energies contending success-
fully with nature in all her rude force, without social
tommotions and a certain recklessness and uproar. The
sontagion of these forms of disorder produces other anJ
1 2 Story'g Story, 527.

VIOLENCE 866

less excusable forms. On account of the allowance to
be made for violence and lawlessness under the circum-
itances, and also on account of the disagreeableness of
recalling, if it can be avoided, old follies, no recapitu-
lation of the outrages, mobs, riots, etc., of the period will
here be attempted. Suffice it to say that they were
worse and more numerous than either before or since*
Brawls and duels between congressmen, and assaults on
congressmen by persons who considered themselves ag
grieved by words spoken in debate, were very frequent
at Washington. The cities possessed, as yet, no police.
The proposition to introduce police was resented as an
assault on liberty. Rowdies, native Americans, protest-
ants, firemen, anti-abolitionists, trades-unionists, anti-
bank men, etc., etc., in turn produced riots in the streets
of the great Eastern cities. From the South came
hideous stories of burning negroes, hanging abolition-
ists, and less heinous violence against the mails. From
Charlestown, Massachusetts, came the story of the cruel
burning of a convent. Niles, in August, 1835, gathered
three pages of reports of recent outrages against law and
order. 1 A month later he has another catalogue, and
he exclaims in astonishment that the world seems upside
down. 3 The fashion of the time seemed to be to pass at
once from the feeling to the act. That Jackson's char-
acter and example had done something to set this
fashion is hardly to be denied. Harriet Martineau and
Richard Cobden, both friendly critics, were shocked and
jlisappointed at the social condition. Adams, in 1834,
wrote thus: "The prosperity of the coantry, indepen-
dent of all agency of the government, is so great that the
people have nothing to disturb them but their own way
1 48 Nflei, 439. ' 49 Nile*, 49,

866 ANDREW JACKSON.

wardness and corruption. They quarrel upon dissent
•ions of a doit, and split up in gangs of partisans of A,
B, and C, without knowing why they prefer one to
another. Caucuses, county, state, and national conven-
tions, public dinners and dinner-table speeches, two or
three hours long, constitute the operative power of
electioneering ; and the parties are of working men,
temperance reformers, anti-masons, Union and state-
rights men, nullmers, and, above all, Jackson men, Van
Buren men, Clay men, Calhoun men, Webster men,
and McLean men, whigs and tories, republicans and
democrats, without one ounce of honest principle to
choose between them." * In his long catalogue he yet
omitted abolitionists and native Americans, the latter of
whom began to be heard of as soon ac foreign immigra-
tion became great. Great parties did not organize on
the important political questions. Men were led off on
some petty side issue, or they attached themselves to a
great man, with whom they hoped to come to power.
The zeal of these little cliques was astonishing. One
feels that there must have been a desire to say to them :
No doubt the thing you have taken up as your hobby is
fairly important, but why get so excited about it, and
why not pursue your reformatory and philanthropic
arork outside of politics ? Why not go about your pro-
posed improvement soberly and in due measure ? The
truth was that nearly all the cliques wanted to reach
their object by the short cut of legislation, that is, to
force other people to do what they were convinced it
was a wise thing to do, and a great many of them also
wanted to make political capital out of their " causes. v
There was something provincial about the gossip anf
1 9 Adams, 187.

ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF JACKSON 867

*ews-mongering over small things, and about the din*
mean and ovations to fourth-rate men. One wonders if
the people had not enough interesting things to occupy
them. They could not have been very busy or hard-
worked, if they had time to spend on all these things*
There was something bombastic, too, about the way In
which an orator took up a trifle. Everything in the
surroundings forced him to be inflated and meretricious,
in order to swell up to the dimensions of the occasion
the trifle with which he was forced to deal. At the
same time serious things, like nullification, were treated
by the same inflated method, which made them ridicu-
lous. On every occasion of general interest the peo-
ple ran together for a public meeting. Their method
of doing their thinking on any topic seemed to be to
hear some speeches about it. No doubt this was one \
reason why there was so much heat mixed up with all j
opinions. ^

The prevailing disposition to boast, and the over-
sensitiveness to foreign criticism which was manifested,
were additional symptoms of immaturity.

January 30, 1835, 1 Jackson attended the funeral, at
the Capitol, of Warren R. Davis, of South Carolina.
As he came out through the rotunda, a man named
Richard Lawrence snapped two pistols in succession at
him. Neither was discharged. Lawrence gave half a
dozen inconsistent reasons for the act. He was plainly
insane. Jackson immediately gave the attack a political
lignifioance. Some days after it occurred Harriet Mar-
tine au called upon him, and referred to the " insane at-
tempt." " He protested, in the presence of many
ftrangers, that there was no insanity in the case. I wag
1 47 Nilee, 340.

B68 ANDREW JACKSON.

silent, of course. He protested that there was a plot,
and that the man was a tool." 1 He went so far as to
name Senator Poindexter, of Mississippi, as the insti-
gator. He was at feud with Poindexter, although the
latter had been with him at New Orleans, and had de-
fended him in Congress in the Seminole war affair.
Harriet Martineau says it was expected at Washington
that they would have a duel as soon as Jackson's term
was out This was probably based on a reputed speech
of Poindexter, to which the " Globe " gave currency.*
That paper, nearly a month after the attempted assassina-
tion, treated the charge against Poindexter as not at all
incredible. Poindexter obtained an investigation by the
Senate, when the charge was, of course, easily proven to
rest upon the most frivolous and untrustworthy asser-
tions, no one of which would bear the slightest exami-
nation, and some of which were distinctly false. The
incident, however, illustrated one trait of Jackson's char-
acter, which has been noted several times before. The
most extravagant and baseless suspicion of a personal
enemy in connection with an injury to himself struck his
mind with such a degree of self-evident truth that ex-
ternal evidence to the contrary had no influence on him.
In the present case, this fault laid him open to a charge
of encouraging persons who had committed perjury and
suborned others to do so. Lawrence, on his trial, con-
tinually interrupted the proceedings. He was acquitted
and remanded to custody as an insane person.

A faction arose in New York city in 1834-35, whiek

* 1 Martineau, Western Travel, 162. She was in the Capito
* ton the attack occurred.

• 48 Nile*, 33.

THE EQUAL &IGHT8 PARTY. 869

sailed itself the " equal rights party," or the " Jeffer-
Ionian anti-monopolists." The organization of the
Tammany Hall democrats, under Van Buren and the
regency, had become rigid and tyrannical. The equal
rights faction revolted, and declared that Tammany
was aristocratic. They represented a new upheaval of
democracy. They took literally the dogmas which had
been taught them, just as the original Jackson men had
done ten years before, only that now, to them, the Jack-
son party seated in power seemed to have drifted away
from the pure principles of democracy, just as Monroe
had once appeared to the Jackson men to have done.
The equal rights men wanted " to return to the Jeffer-
sonian fountain " again, and make some new deductions.
They revived and extended the old doctrines which
Duane, of the " Aurora," taught at the beginning of the
century in his "Politics for Farmers," and similar
pamphlets. In general the doctrines and propositions
might be described as an attempt to apply the procedure
of a township democracy to a great state. The equal
rights men held meetings at first secretly, at four differ-
ent places, and not more than two successive times at
the same place. 1 They were, in a party point of view,
conspirators, rebels, — " disorganizes, " in short ; and
they were plotting the highest crime known to the polit-
ical code in which they had been educated, and which
they accepted. Their platform was : No distinction be-
tween men save merit ; gold and silver the only legiti-
mate and proper circulating medium; no perpetuities
or monopolies ; strict construction of the Constitution ;
no bank charters by States (because oanks of issue
Uvor gambling, and are " calculated to build up and

* Byrdsall, 16.
24

870 ANDREW JACKSON.

strengthen In our country the odious distribution oi
wealth and power against merits and equal rights") ;
approval of Jackson's administration ; election of Presi-
dent by direct popular vote. They favored the doc-
trine of instructions. They also advocated free trade
and direct taxes. 1 They had some very sincere and
pure-minded men among them, a large number of over-
heated brains, and a still larger number of demagogues,
who were seeking to organize the faction as a means oi
making themselves so valuable that the regular managers
would buy them. The equal rights men gained strength
so rapidly that, on the 29th of October, 1835, they were
able to offer battle to the old faction at a primary meet-
ing in Tammany Hall for the nomination of a con-
gressman and other officers. The "regular" party
entered the hall by the back entrance, and organized
the meeting before the doors were opened. The anti-
monopolists poured in, nominated a chairman and
elected him, ignoring the previous organization. The
question of " equal rights " between the two chairmen
was then settled in the old original method which has
prevailed ever since there has been life on earth. The
equal rights men dispossessed the other faction, and
•o proved the justice of their principles. The non-
equal rights party then left the hall, but they " caused "
tho equal rights men " to be subjected to a deprivation
of the right" to light by turning out the gas. The
equal rights men were thus forced to test that theory
of natural rights which affirms that said rights are
only the chance to have good things, if one can get them
In spite of their dogma of the equality of all men, which
would make a prudent man no better than a carelesl
i Byrdsall, 103.

THE "LOCO-FOCOS." 371

one, and a man with capital no better than one without
eapital, the equal rights men had foreseen the emer
gency, and had provided themselves with capital in the
shape of candles and loco-foco matches. They thus
established their right to light, against nature and
against their enemies. They duly adopted their plat-
form, nominated a ticket, and adjourned. The regular
leaders met elsewhere, nominated the ticket which they
had previously prepared, and dispensed, for that occa-
sion, with the ornamental and ceremonious formality of
a primary meeting to nominate it

On the next day the " Courier and Enquirer " dubbed
the equal rights party the loco-focos, and the name
clung to them. 1 Hammond quotes a correspondent 1
who correctly declared that " the workingmen's party
and the equal rights party have operated as causes,
producing effects that will shape the course of the two
great parties of the United States, and consequently
the destinies of this great republic." The faction, at
least in its better elements, evidently had convictions
and a programme. It continued to grow. The " Even-
ing Post" became its organ. That paper quarrelled
with the administration on Kendall's order about the
mails, and was thereupon formally read out of the party
by the " Globe." 8 The loco-focos ceased to be a re-
volting faction. They acquired belligerent rights. The
faction, however, in its internal economy ran the course
of all factions. It went to extremes, and then began
to split up. In January, 1836, it declared its indepen-
dence of the democratic-republican party. This alienated
ill who hated the party tyranny, but who wanted re

1 49 Niles, 162. 2 2 Hammond, 503.

• 49 Niles, 78.

572 ANDREW JACKSON

form in the party. The faction declared itself opposed
to all acts of incorporation, and held that all such acta
were repealable. It declared that representative insti-
tutions were only a practical convenience, and that
Legislatures could not create vested rights. 1 Then it
went on to adopt a platform of " equality of position, as
well as of rights."

In October, 1836, Tammany made overtures to the
equal rights men for a reunion, in preparation for the
presidential election. Some of the loco-focos wanted
to unite ; others refused. The latter were the men of
conviction ; the former were the traders. The former
called the latter " rumps ; " the latter called the former
" buffaloes." s Only one stage now remained to com-
plete the old and oft-repeated drama of faction. A
man named Slamm, a blatant ignoramus, who, to his
great joy, had been arrested by order of the Assembly
of New York for contempt and breach of privilege,
and who had profited to the utmost by this incident
to make a long " argument " against the " privilege "
of an American Legislature, and to pose as a martyr
to equal rights, secured his own election to the posi-
tion of secretary of the equal rights party. He then
secured a vote that no constitutional election could be
held unless called by the secretary. He never would call
one. There were those who thought that he sold out
the party.

Thus the faction perished ignominiously, but it was
not without reason that its name passed, a little later,
to the whole Jackson-Van Buren party ; i. e., to the rad
fcal anti-paper currency, not simply anti-United State*
Bank, wing of the national democratic party. The
* BywUall, 41. * Byrdaall, 171.

INFLUENCE OF THE L0C0-F0C08. 87S

tqual rights men maintained impracticable doctrines of
civil authority and fantastic dogmas about equality, but
when these were stripped away there remained in their
platform sound doctrines and imperishable ideas. They
first put the democratic party on the platform which for
five or six years it had been trying to find. When it
did find that platform it was most true to itself, and it
contributed most to the welfare of the country. To-
day the democratic party is, by tradition, a party of
hard money, free trade, the non-interference theory of
government, and no special legislation. If that tradi-
tion be traced up to its source, it will lead back, not to
the Jackson party of 1829, but to the loco-focos of
1835

CHAPTER XVL

THE ELECTION OF 1836. — END OF JACKSON'S

The attempt was made in 1834 to unite and organize
the whole opposition to Jackson. Niles first mentions
the party name "whig" in April, 1834. 1 He says
that it had come into use in Connecticut and New York.
It was adopted with antagonistic reference to the high
prerogative and (as alleged) tory doctrines of Jackson.
The anti-masons and national republicans ultimately
merged in the new whig party, hut time was required
to bring about that result. In 1834 it was impossible.
The anti-masons insisted on acting independently. Their
candidate for President then was Francis Granger.*
Clay would not run in 1836 because he could not unite
the opposition. He was disgusted with public life, and
desired to retire. 8

The administration party, on the other hand, was
perfectly organized. The corps of federal office-holders
had been drilled by the " Globe " into thorough disci-
pline and perfect accord of energy and will. Each offi-
cer was held to " revere the chief," and to act in obedi-
ence to the indications of his will which came through
the " Globe." They did so. There was no faltering.
There was only zealous obedience. It caused some
bewilderment to remember that this was the party which
Had denounced Adams for using the federal officers U

» 46 Nilen, 101. 2 50 Niles 284. » 9 Adams, I7tt

DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION— 1835. 875

electioneer. Lewis had been known to interfere di-
rectly in elections, and Blair had done the same in his
private capacity. 1 The party had been wonderfully held
together. In 1830 there were only four anti-Jackson I
Legislatures in the Union, namely, Vermont, Massa-
ehusetts, Connecticut, and Delaware. In the six years
from 1830 to 1835, both inclusive, twenty-seven States
held 162 sessions of their Legislatures. Of these 116
had Jackson majorities, 40 anti-Jackson, and 4 Cal-
houn. 3 There was some talk of a third term for Jack-
ton, but it never grew strong. The precedents were
cited against it Jackson's bad health and Van Buren's
aspirations were perhaps stronger objections. Adams
says that Jackson had " wearied out the sordid subser-
viency of his supporters." 8 That is not at all improb-
able.

The democratic convention was held at Baltimore,
May 20, 1835. Jackson had written to Tennessee
recommending that a convention should be held of
" candidates fresh from the people." There were not
wanting those who called this convention a caucus, and
said that it was the old congressional monster in a new
mask. Tennessee did not send any delegates. Even
Jackson could not bring that State to support Van Bu-
ren. Tennessee was a whig State until 1856. Her
hostility to Van Buren was adroitly combined with that
of Pennsylvania, in 1844, by the selection of Polk as a
candidate, to defeat Van Buren. In 1835 a caucus of
the New Hampshire Legislature, which nominated Hill
for Governor, passed a resolution begging Tennessee not
to divide the party. 4 Tennessee, however, had another

* 40 Niles, 299. * 63 Niles, 308.

* 9 Adams, 312. 4 48 Nik* SS*

876 ANDREW JACKSON.

rery popular candidate, Hugh L. White, a former friend
of Jackson, whom Jackson now hated as a traitor and
renegade. 1 John Bell, the Speaker, was a supporter of
White, and he and his friends claimed that they were
not in opposition ; that they and White were good repub-
licans, and that they preferred White to the man whom
Jackson had selected. 2 The "Globe" attacked Bell
with bitterness. Jackson was greatly enraged, and ex-
erted himself personally and directly against White.*
One Tennessee man, being in Baltimore when the con-
vention was held, took upon himself to represent that
State. His name was Rucker, and to "ruckerize"
passed into the political slang of the day, meaning to as-
sume functions without credentials.

The Baltimore convention was largely composed of
office-holders. Twenty-one States were represented. 4
Andrew Stevenson, of Virginia, was chairman. The
two-thirds rule was adopted, because Van Buren was
sure of two thirds. He actually got a unanimous vote,
265. For Vice-President, R. M. Johnson, of Kentucky,
got 178 votes; W. C. Rives, of Virginia, 87. The
Virginia delegation declared, on the floor of the con-
vention, that Virginia would never vote for Johnson, be-
cause he favored tariff, bank, and internal improve-
ments, and because they had no confidence in his
principles or character. 5 Van Buren, in his letter of
acceptance, 6 said that he had been mentioned as Jack-
ion's successor " more through the ill-will of opponents
han the partiality of friends." That statement waf
k> adroit that it would take a page to tell whether ft

i See page 312. « Bell's speech in 48 Niles, 534.

* 49 Nile*, 85. * 48 Niles, 207, 227, 244.

• 48 Nflei, 248. • 48 Nile*, 267.

CANDIDATES AND PLATFORMS — 1836. 377

was true or not He made a full and eager declaration
that he had asked for no man's support He said that
he would " endeavor to tread generally in the footsteps
of President Jackson, — happy if I shall be able to per-
fect the work which he has so gloriously begun."
Johnson, in his letter of acceptance, 1 declared that he
was opposed to the old bank, or to one like it, but
thought that such a bank as Jackson talked of in his
earliest messages might be a good thing. On tariff and
internal improvements he said that he agreed with
Jackson. Van Buren was fifty-four years of age and
Johnson fifty-six. Johnson had been in Congress ever
since 1807, except during the second war with England,
when he took the field. He served with some distinc-
tion, but a ridiculous attempt to credit him with the kill-
ing of Tecumseh has caused his real merits to be for-
gotten. As a public man he managed to be as near as
possible to the head of every popular movement, and to
get his name connected with it, but he never contrib-
uted assistance to any public business. His name is
also met with frequently as a messenger, middle-man,
manipulator, and general efficiency man of the Jackson
party. He made a report, in 1829, on the question of
runiring the mails on Sunday, which was one of his
claims to fame. It was written for him by the Rev. O.
B. Brown. 2 A chance was found in this report to utter
some noble sentiments on religious liberty, and to lay
down some specification of American principles in that
regard which were not likely to provoke contradiction.
This valuable production was printed on cloth, and hung
tp in stage offices and bar-rooms all o^er the country

i 48 Niles, 329.

• See page 349. Kendall's Autobiography, 107.

878 ANDREW JACKSON.

Johnson had nourished presidential aspirations for some
years. He did not abandon them till 1844.

The anti-Jackson men, in 1834-35, were opposed, on
principle, to a national convention. They said that
the convention was King Caucus revived. The anti-
masons held a state convention at Harrisburg, Decem-
ber 16, 1835. 1 It was decided not to call a national
convention. They thought the free action of the people
would be best brought out by state conventions. They
nominated William H. Harrison by 89 votes to 29 for
Webster and 3 for Granger. For Vice-President,
Granger got 102 votes ; Hugh L. White, 5 ; William
Blade, of Vermont, 5 ; and William A. Palmer, of Ver-
mont, 7. The whigs of Pennsylvania adopted the nom-
inations of the anti-masons, and coalesced with them.
Webster was very anxious, at this time, to be nominated
and supported by the whigs. It pleases some people to
think that Webster ought not to have had this ambition.
He was a strange compound of the greatest powers and
some mean traits. To such a man the presidential am-
bition is very sure to mean moral shipwreck. Still it
was not wrong for Webster to want the insignia of suc-
cess in his career. His dissatisfaction was well-founded
when, after his splendid services, he saw William Henry
Harrison preferred before him ; and it is a point which
deserves careful attention, that, if Webster's just am-
bition had been fairly gratified, he would have been a
better man. He was nominated by the Legislature of
Massachusetts.

Hugh L. White, of Tennessee, was nominated by the
Legislatures of Alabama, Tennessee, and Illinois. Judgt
McLean was nominated in Ohio. He had had pre*
1 49 Nilet, 265, 287.

ADMISSION OF MICHIGAN. 879

«

dential aspirations ever since 1828. 1 The Northern
whigs supported Harrison, and the Southern whigs sup-
ported White. Thus the opposition went into the cam-
paign disorganized and devoted to defeat

Harrison and White were of the same age, sixty-three.
Harrison was a man of no education. He had done
some good service as an Indian fighter. The anti-Jack-
son men, who had derided Jackson's candidature be-
cause he was not a statesman, selected, in Harrison, the
man nearest like him whom they could find. They
hoped to work up a popularity for him on the model of
Jackson's popularity.* Harrison answered the anti-
masons that he was not a mason, and did not like
masonry, but that the federal government had nothing
to do with that subject. This did not satisfy Thaddeus
Stevens, who wanted Webster. 8 White has been men-
tioned several times. He had a fair education, a good
character, and was very much respected, but he was a
man of only ordinary ability.

During the winter of 1835-36 there was a great strug-
gle in the House over a contested election in North Car-
olina. It was thought very probable that the presiden-
tial election might be thrown into the House, and the
vote of North Carolina might decide the result. The
sitting member (Graham) was unseated, and the case was
referred back for a new election.

There were two States whose admission was pending
when the election approached, — Arkansas and Michi-
gan. In 1835 Michigan became involved in a boundary

1 Kendall's Autobiography, 304.

1 For an estimate of Harrison, written in 1828, which is per
baps too highly colored to quote, see * Adams, 530.
8 9 Adams, 273 .

B80 ANDREW JACKSON

dispute with Ohio. The act which organized the tern
toiy of Michigan, January 11, 1805, described, as iti
southern boundary, a due east and west line running
through the southernmost point of Lake Michigan. The
Constitution of Ohio gave that State, as its northern
boundary, a line drawn from the southernmost point of
Lake Michigan to the northernmost cape of Maumee
Bay. Indiana's northern boundary had been described
as a due east and west line ten miles north of the
southernmost point of Lake Michigan. The northern
boundary of Illinois had been placed on the parallel of
42° 30'. Michigan, therefore, found her territory re-
duced. Jackson, at first, on the advice of Butler, the
Attorney-General, took the side of Michigan. The peo-
ple of Michigan held a convention in September, 1835,
and framed a Constitution, which was to go into effect in
November. In October, the Assistant Secretary of State,
Asbury Dickens, wrote, at the President's orders, that
no such reorganization of the government could take
place without the consent of Congress. In 1835-36 there
was some danger of an armed collision between Ohio and
Michigan ; but it is not easy, on account of the rhetoric
which was then in fashion, to judge how great this dan-
ger was. June 15, 1836, Arkansas and Michigan were
admitted together; but Michigan was put under the
condition that she must accept the southern boundary
which resulted from the northern lines of Indiana and
Ohio, and accept compensation on the peninsula north of
Lake Michigan. The Legislature of Michigan, in July
called a convention, which met September 26th, and re
jected the condition. On the 5th and 6th of December
by the spontaneous action of the people, delegates wen
elected to a convention, which met December 14, 1836

THE VOTE IN 1899. 381

and assented to the condition. Jackson, in a message,
December 26th, informed Congress of the action of
Michigan. 1 Michigan was admitted January 26, 1837.
She offered a vote in the presidential election. In an-
nouncing the vote, the vote of Michigan was included in
the alternative form.

In the spring of 1836 Sherrod Williams interrogated
ihe candidates for President Harrison 2 favored dis-
tribution of the surplus revenue and of the revenue from
lands ; opposed internal improvements except for works
of national scope and importance ; would cliarter a bank,
but with great reservations ; thought that neither House
of Congress had a right to expunge anything from its rec-
ords. Van Buren opposed national bank, internal im-
provements, and all distribution. The equal rights men
interrogated the candidates. The committee reported
that they were greatly pleased with Johnson's replies,
but that Van Buren's were unsatisfactory. Many " ir-
reconcilable " equal rights men refused to vote for Van
Buren. Later, however, he became fully identified with
that wing of the national democratic party which took
up the essential features of the loco-f oco doctrine.

In the election* Van Buren received 170 votes, count-
ing 3 of Michigan ; Harrison, 73 ; White, 26 (Georgia
and Tennessee) ; Webster, 14 (Massachusetts) ; W. P
Mangum, of North Carolina, 11 (South Carolina). Van
Buren's majority over all was 46. Van Buren's and
Harrison's votes were well distributed geographically.
Van Buren carried Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Isl-
and, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
North Carolina, Alabama. Mississippi, Louisiana, Uli
tois, Missouri, Arkansas, Michigan. Harrison carried

1 51 Nile*, 278. * 51 N*les, 23, • 58 Niles, 39*.

382 ANLREW JACK80N.

Vermont, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky
Ohio, and Indiana. The popular vote was : fop Van
Buren, 761,549 ; for all others, 736,656 ; Van Buren'a
majority, 24,89s. 1 For Vice-President, R. M. Johnson
got 147 votes ; Francis Granger, 77 ; John Tyler, 47 ,
William Smith, of Alabama, 23 (Virginia). As no one
had a majority, the Senate elected Johnson. In Janu-
ary, 1837, Webster wrote to Massachusetts 2 that he
should renign his seat. He intended to retire from pub-
lic life, at least temporarily.

Van Buren was now at the height of his ambition ;
but the financial and commercial storm which had been
gathering for two or three years, the accumulated result
of rash ignorance and violent self-will acting on some of
the most delicate social interests, was just ready to burst.
High prices and high rents had already before the elec-
tion produced strikes, trades-union conflicts, and labor
riots, 8 things which were almost unprecedented in the
United States. The price of flour was so high that
493,100 bushels of wheat were imported at New York
in 1836, and 857,000 bushels before April, in 1837. 4
Socialistic notions of course found root, and flourished
like weeds at such a time. An Englishwoman, named
Fanny Wright, became notorious for public teachings of
an " emancipated " type. The loco-focos were charged
with socialistic notions, not without justice. There were
socialists amongst them. The meeting held in the City
Hall Park, at New York, February 13, 1837, out of
which the " bread riots " sprang, was said to have bee»

* American Almanac for 1880. The figures in Nile* are full o*
tfcricus errors.

* i Webster's Correspondence, 25 fg.

* 48 Niles, 171 ; 50 Niles, 130. * 52 Niles, 147.

THE BREAD R10TB. 38&

sailed by them. They certainly had habituated the city
populace to public meetings, at which the chance crowd
»f idlers was addressed as " the people," with all the
current catch-words and phrases, and at which blatant
orators, eager for popularity and power, harangued the
crowd about banks, currency, and vested rights. Of
course in these harangues violence of manner and lan-
guage made up for poverty of ideas, and the minds of
the hearers were inflamed all the more because they
could understand nothing of what the orators said, except
that they were being wronged by somebody. On that
day in February the crowd got an idea which it under-
stood. 1 Some one said : Let us go to Hart [a provision
merchant], and offer him eight dollars a barrel for his
flour. If he will not take it — ! In a few hours the
mob destroyed five hundred barrels of flour and one
thousand bushels of wheat The militia were needed to
restore order. 2 The park meetings were continued.

The commercial crisis, burst on the country just at
the beginning of March, when Jackson's term ended.
There was a kind of poetic justice in the fact that Van
Buren had to bear the weight of all the consequences of
Jackson's acts which Van Buren had allowed to be
committed, because he would not hazard his standing
in Jackson's favor by resisting them. Van Buren dis-
liked the reputation of a wire-puller and intriguer, but
lie had well earned his title, the " little magician," by
the dexterity with which he had manoeavred himself
•cross the slippery arena of Washington politics and up
to the first place. He had just the temper for a pofr

1 Byrdsall (103) says the not was not tne fault of the Wo*
locos.
* 51 Nile*. 403.

384 ANDREW JACKSON.

tician. Nothing ruffled him. He was thick-skinned,
elastic, and tough. He did not win confidence from
anybody. He was, however, a man of more than aver-
age ability, and he appears to have been conscious oi
lowering himself by the political manoeuvring which he
had practised. As President he showed the honorable
desire to have a statesman-like and high-toned adminis-
tration, and perhaps to prove that he was more than a
creature of Jackson's whim. He could not get a fair
chance. The inheritances of party virulence and dis-
trust which he had taken over from Jackson were too
heavy a weight He lost his grip on the machine with-
out winning the power of a statesman. He never was
able to regain control in the party. American public
life is constituted out of great forces, which move on in
a powerful stream, under constantly changing phases
and combinations, which it is hard to foresee. Chance
plays a great role. If a man, by a chance combination
of circumstances, finds himself in one of the greater
currents of the stream, he may be carried far and high,
and may go on long ; but if another chance throws him
put, his career is, almost always, ended forever. The
course of our political history is strewn with men who
were for a moment carried high enough to have great
ambitions and hopes excited, but who, by some turn in
the tide, were stranded, and left to a forgotten and dis-
appointed old age. Van Buren illustrated all these

cases. g>vc& jUmJLo^a-' -

Parton quotes a letter of Jackson to Trist, 1 written
March 2, 1837, in which he says : " On the 4th I hop*
to be able to go to the Capitol to witness the glorioui
i of Mr. Van Buren, once rejected by the Senate,
1 9 Parton, 624

JACKSOIPB LAST DAYS. 885

jworn into office by Chief Justice Taney, also being re*
jected by the factious Senate." The election of Van
Buren is thus presented as another personal triumph of
Jackson, and another illustration of his remorseless pur-
suit of success and vengeance in a line in which any one
had dared to cross him. This exultation was the temper
in which he left office. He was satisfied and triumph-
ant. Not another President in the whole list ever went
oat of office in a satisfied frame of mind, much less
with a feeling of having completed a certain career in
triumph.
/\ On the 7th of March Jackson set out for Tennessee*
He was surrounded to the last with affection and re-
jpect. On his way home he met more than the old
marks of attention and popularity. He was welcomed
back to Nashville as he had been every time that he
had returned for twenty years past. These facts were
not astonishing. He retained his popularity. Hence
he was still a power. It was still worth while to court
him and to get his name in favor of a man or a measure.
Parton says that office-seekers pursued and pestered
him up to his last days. Politicians sought to get let-
ters from him which they could use for their purposes.
In 1843 a letter was obtained from him favoring the
annexation of Texas, which was then being pushed for-
ward by a new intrigue in and around Tyler's cabinet
This letter was evidently prepared for Jackson after the
fashion of Lewis. It was held back for a year, and
ihen published with a false date. So Jackson was used
by the annexation clique to ruin his friend Van Buren.
The party which he and Van Buren had consolidated
passed, by the Texas intrigue, away from Van Buren
ud under the control of the slavery wing of it Th«

186 ANDREW JACKSON.

last-mentioned letter of Jackson brought him again into
collision with Adams, for in it Jackson repeated hif
former assertions that he had always disapproved of
the treaty of 1819, and of the boundary of the Sabine.
Adams produced the entries in his " Diary " as proof to
the contrary. Jackson lent all his influence to Polk in
1844. Probably he was mortified that Tennessee voted
for Clay, although by only 113 majority in a vote of
120,000. Letters signed by him favoring Polk were
constantly circulated through the newspapers, and they
no doubt had their effect. This was his last public ac-
tivity. /He died June 8, 1845. He had had honors
beyond anything which his own heart had ever coveted.
His successes had outrun his ambition. He had held
more power than any other American had ever pos-
sessed. He had been idolized by the great majority of
his countrymen, and had been surfeited with adulation.
He had been thwarted in hardly anything on which he
had set his heart. He had had his desire upon all his
enemies. He lived to see Clay defeated again, and to
help to bring it about He saw Calhoun retire in de-
spair and disgust He saw the bank in ruins ; Biddle
arraigned on a criminal charge, and then dead broken-
hearted. ' In his last years he joined the church, and,
on that occasion, under the exhortations of his spiritual
adviser, he professed to forgive all his enemies in a

, fepdyj It does not appear that he ever repented ol

anything, ever thought that he had been in the wrong he
anything, or ever forgave an enemy as a specific inii
ridual.

f ~ — -

FULL TITLES OF BOOKS REFERRED TO IN THIS
VOLUME, IN THE ALPHABETICAL ORDER OF THK
SHORTER DESIGNATIONS BY WHICH THEY HAVE
BEEN CITED.

Adams : Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Comprising Portion!
of his Diary from 1795 to 1848; edited by Charles Francis
Adams. 12 volffr Lippincott : Philadelphia, 1876,

American Annual Register for 1796. Philadelphia.

American Register. 7 vols. 1806-1810. Conrad : Philadelphia

Annual Register: The American Annual Register. 8 vols,
[numbered for the purposes of the present work as follows] :
I. 1825-6; II. 1826-7; III. 1827-8-9, Part I.; IV. 1827-8-9,
Part II.; V. 1829-30; VI. 1830-1; VH. 1831-2; VIII.
1832-3.

Benton : Thirty Years' View ; or, A History of the Working of
the American Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850;
by a Senator of Thirty Years [Thomas H. Benton], 2 vols.
Appleton : New York, 1854.

Binns : Recollections of the Life of John Binns ; written by him-
self. Philadelphia, 1854.

Brothers : The United States of North America as They Are,
Not as they are Generally Described : Being a Cure for Rad
icalism; by Thomas Brothers. Longman & Co.: London
1840.

Byrdsall : The History of the Loco-Foco or Equal Rignts Party
by F. Byrdsall. Clement £ Packard : New York, 1842.

Carey's Letters: Nine Letters to Dr. Adam Seybert; by Mat-
thew Carey. Author: Philadelphia, 1810.

Carey's Olive Branch : The Olive Branch ; or, Faults on Botb
Sides, Federal and Democratic ; by Matthew Carey. Author :
Philadelphia, 1818. (10th Edition )

Chevalier : Society, Manners, and Politics in the United States :
Being a Series of Letters on North America; by Michael

. ».4ievaliet (translated). Weeks, Jordan & Co: Boston, 1839

888 FULL TITLES OF BOOKS REFERRED TO.

Cobb : Leisure Labors ; or, Miscellanies, Historical, Literary, and

Political, by Josepb B. Cobb. Appleton : New York, 1858.
Cobbett's Jackson : Life of Andrew Jackson ; by William Cob

bett. Harpers : New York, 1834.
Collins: Historical Sketches of Eentncky; by Lewis Collins

Cincinnati, 1847.
Colton's Clay : The Life and Times of Henry Clay ; by C. Coi

ton. 2 vols. Barnes : New York, 1846.
Curtis's Webster : Life of Daniel Webster ; by George Ticknoi

Curtis. 2 vols. Appleton : New York, 1870.
Documents Relating to New England Federalism, 1800 to 1815

edited by Henry Adams. Little, Brown & Co. : Boston, 1877
Document A. 15th Congress, 2d Session, Reports, No. 100.
Document B. 22d Congress, 1st Session, 4 Reports, No. 460.
Document C. 22d Congress, 1st Session, 2 Reports, No. 283.
Document D. 22d Congress, 2d Session, 1 Exec. Docs. No. 9.
Document E. 22d Congress, 2d Session, Reports, No. 121.
Document F. 23d Congress, 1st Session, 1 Senate Docs. No. 17.
Document G. 23d Congress, 1st Session, 1 Senate Docs. No. 2.
Document H. 23d Congress, 1st Session, 1 Senate Docs. No. 16.
Document L 23d Congress, 2d Session, 1 Senate Docs. No. 17.
Document J. 23d Congress, 2d Session, 1 Exec. Docs. No. 9.
Document K. 23d Congress, 2d Session, 2 Senate Docs. No. 13.
Document L. 24th Congress, 2d Session, 2 Exec. Docs.
Document M. 23d Congress, 1st Session, Senate Docs. No. 238.
Drake's Tecumseh : Life of Tecumseh, and of his Brother, the

Prophet, with a Historical Sketch of the Shawanoe Indians ;

by Benjamin Drake. Morgan : Cincinnati, 1841.
The Duplicate Letters, the Fisheries, and the Mississippi ; Docu-
ments Relating to Transactions at the Negotiation of Ghent ;

Collected and Published by John Quincy Adams. Davis &

Force: Washington, 1822.
Duane : Narrative and Correspondence Concerning the Removal

of the Deposits and Occurrences Connected Therewith. [W

J. Duane.] Philadelphia, 1838.
Duane's Pamphlets: Duane's Collection of Select Pampbletf

[W. Duane.] Philadelphia, 1814.
Raton's Jackson : The Life of Andrew Jackson ; Commenced ty

John Reid, Completed by John H. Eaton. Carey : Philade',

phia, 1817.

FULL TITLES OF B00K8 REFERRED TO, 389

Edwards: History of Illinois, from 1778 to 1833; and Life and
Times of Ninian Edwards ; by his Son, Ninian W. Edwards.
Illinois State Journal Co. : Springfield, Illinois, 1870.

Elliott : The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution. 4 vols. Edited by
Jonathan Elliott: Washington, 1836.

Folio State Papers : American State Papers ; Documents Legis-
lative and Executive of the Congress of the United States from
the 1st Session of the 18th Congress to the 1st Session of the
20th Congress. Gales & Seaton : Washington, 1859. Subdi-
visions : Finance, Indian Affairs, etc., etc.

Grallatin : Considerations on the Currency and Banking System
of the United States; by Albert Gallatin. Carey & Lea:
Philadelphia, 1831. Reprinted from the American Quarterly
Review for December, 1830.

Gallatin's Writings : The Writings of Albert Gallatin; edited by
Henry Adams. Lippincott : Philadelphia, 1879.

Garland's Randolph : The Life of John Randolph of Roanoke ;
by Hngh A. Garland. 2 vols. Appleton : New York, 1851.

Gibbs: Memoirs of the Administrations of Washington and
John Adams; edited from the Papers of Oliver Wolcott,
Secretary of the Treasury ; by George Gibbs. 2 vols. New
York, 1846.

Goodrich : Recollections of a Life-Time ; by S. G. Goodrich. 2
vols. Miller : New York, 1851.

Goodwin's Jackson : Biography of Andrew Jackson ; by Philo A.
Goodwin. Clapp & Benton : Hartford, 1832.

Gouge : A Short History of Paper Money and Banking in the
United States ; by William M. Gouge. Collins : New York,
1835.

Gouge's Texas : The Fiscal History of Texas ; by William
Gouge. Lippincott : Philadelphia, 1852.

Greeley : The American Conflict ; by Horace Greeley. Case :
Hartford, 1873.

Hamilton's Works : The Works of Alexander Hamilton. Fran-
cis: New York, 1851.

Hammond : The History of Political Parties in the State of New
York, from the Ratification of .he Federal Constitution to De-
cember, 1840. 2 vols. By Jabet D Hammond, fourth Edf
tiro, with notes by General Root. Phinney : Buffalo, 1850

390 FULL TITLES OF BOOKS REFERRED TO.

Hammond's Wright: Life and Times of Silas Wright; by

Jabez 1). Hammond. Barnes : New York, 1848.
Harpers's Calhoun: Life of John C. Calhoun. (Anonymoat

Pamphlet.) Harpers : New York, 1843.
Hewitt : An Historical Account of the Rise and Progress of tbt

Colonies of South Carolina and Georgia. 2 vols. Anony-
mous [Alexander Hewitt]. Donaldson : London, 1779.
Hodgson: The Cradle of the Confederacy, or the Times of

Troup, Quitman, and Yancey by Joseph Hodgson, of Mo-
bile. Register Office : Mobile, 1876.
Howard : Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Su-
preme Court of the United States.
Hunt's Livingston: Life of Edward Livingston; by Charles

Havens Hunt. Appleton : New York, 1864.
fngersoll: Historical Sketch of the Second War between the

United States of America and Great Britain * by Charles J.

Ingersoll. Events of 1814. Lea & B Ian chard * Philadelphia,

1849.
fay : A Review of the Causes and Consequences of the Mexican

War ; by William Jay. Mussey : Boston, 1849.
Kendall's Autobiography : Autobiography of Amos Kendall ;

edited by his Son-in-law, William Stickney. Lee & Shepard :

Boston, 1872.
Kendall's Jackson : Life of Andrew Jackson, Private, Military,

and Civil ; by Amos Kendall. Harpers : New York, 1849.

(Unfinished.)
Kennedy's Wirt : Memoirs of the Life of William Wirt ; by

John P. Kennedy. 2 vols. Lea & Blanchard : Philadelphia

1849.
Latour: Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and

Louisiana in 1814-15; by Major A. L. Latour. Conrad

Philadelphia, 1816.
Lodge's Cabot : Life and Letters of George Cabot ; by Henrj

Cabot Lodge. Little, Brown & Co. : Boston, 1877.
\facgregor : The Progress of America, from the Discovery bj

Columbus to the Year 1846 ; by John Macgregor. 2 yoIs

Whittaker : London, 1847.
•fackeinzie: The Lives and Opinions of Benjamin F. Botl*

and Jesse Hoyt ; by William L. Mackeinzie. Cook & C*

Boston, 1845.

\

FULL TITLES OF BOOKS REFERRED TO. 391

Martineau's Society, etc. : Society in America ; by Harriet Mar

tineau. 2 toIs. Saunders & Otley: New York and London,

1837.
Martineau's Western Travel: Retrospect of Western Travel

by Harriet Martinean. 2 vols. Harpers : New York, 1838.
-Mayo: Political Sketches of Eight Years in Washington; by

Robert Mayo : .Baltimore, 1839.
Memoirs of Bennett : Memoirs of James Gordon Bennett and

his Times ; by a Journalist. Stringer & Townsend : New York,

1855.
Morse's Adams : John Quincy Adams ; by John T. Morse, Jr.

Houghton, Mifflin & Co. : Boston, 1882.
Nile*: Niles'g Weekly Register, 1811 to 1848.
Opinions of the Attorneys-General : Official Opinions of tht

Attorneys-General of the United States. Washington, 1852.
Parton: Life of Andrew Jackson; by James Parton. 3 voUl

Mason Brothers : New York, 1861.
Perkins: Historical Sketches of the United States from the

Peace of 1815 to 1830; by Samuel Perkins. Converse: New

York, 1830.
Peters : See Howard.
Pickett : History of Alabama and Incidentally of Georgia and

Mississippi, from the Earliest Period; by A. J. Pickett. %

vols. Walker & James: Charleston, 1851.
Pitkin : A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United

States of America ; by Timothy Pitkin. Durrie & Peck : New

Haven, 1835.
Plumer's Plumer : Life of William Plumer ; by his son, William

Plumer, Jr. Phillips, Sampson & Co. : Boston, 1856.
Putnam : History of Middle Tennessee, or Life and Times of

General James Robertson ; by A. W. Putnam. Nashville,

1859.
Quincy's Adams : Memoirs of the Life of John Quincy Adams ;

by Josiah Quincy. Phillips, Sampson & Co. : Boston, 1858.
Baguet: A Treatise on Currencv and Banking; by Condy

Raguet. Grigg & Elliott • Philadelphia, 1839.
Ramsey : The Annals of Tennessee to toe End of the Eight-
eenth Century ; by J. G M. Ramsey. Russell : Charleston,

1853.
Rush : Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London ; by

92 FULL TITLES OF BOOKS REFERRED TO.

Richard Rush. I. Key & Biddle : Philadelphia, 1833. II

Lea & Blanchard : Philadelphia, 1845.
Bargent : Public Men and Events from the Commencement o»

Mr. Monroe's Administration in 1817 to the Close of Mr. fill

more's Administration in 1853 ; by Nathan Sargent. 2 vols.

Lippincott: Philadelphia, 1875.
Beybert: Statistical Annals of the United States from 1789 U

1818 ; by Adam Seybert Dobson : Philadelphia, 1818.
Sparks's Morris: Life of Gouverneur Morris, with Selection!

from his Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers ; by Jared

Sparks. 3 vols. Gray & Bowen : Boston, 1832.
[The] Statesman's Manual. 3 vols. Williams: New York,

1854.
Stevens: A History of Georgia from its First Discovery by

Europeans to 1798 ; by William Bacon Stevens. 2 vols.

Butler: Philadelphia, 1859.
Story's Story : Life and Letters of Joseph Story ; by his Son,

W. W. Story. Little, Brown & Co. : Boston, 1851.
Telegraph, Extra : United States Telegraph, Extra ; March to

November, 1828. Weekly. Green & Jarvis : Washington.
Tyler's Taney : Memoirs of Roger Brook Taney ; by Samuel

Tyler. Murphy: Baltimore, 1872.
Von Hoist : The Constitutional and Political History of the

United States ; by Dr. H. von Hoist (translated). 3 vols.

Callaghan: Chicago, 1878-81.
Webster's Correspondence: The Private Correspondence of

Daniel Webster ; edited by Fletcher Webster. 2 vols. Little,

Brown & Co. : Boston, 1857.
Webster's Works : The Works of Daniel Webster. 6 vola. Lit-
tle, Brown & Co. : Boston, 1851.
Wheaton : See Howard.
Whig Almanac: The Whig Almanac (from 1838). Horace

Greeley : New York.
Wilson's Works : The Works of James Wilson, LL. D. 1

vols. Philadelphia, 1804.
Wiar> • Seven Decades of the Union ; by Henry A. Wise. Lip

pincctt. Philadelphia, 1873

INDEX.

A.B.,"88.

Aberdeen, Lord, 109.

Abolition. See Slavery.

Accommodation paper, 268 294.

Adair, General, 40, IB*.

Adams, John, 27, 29, 118, 146, 171,
215,802.

Adams, J. Q., 47-886 passim

1 Addresser," 83.

Alamo, the, 856.

Alien act. See Law.

Almanac, the Whig, 842.

Ambrister, R., 69, 60, 62.

Amelia Island, 54.

Amendment of the Constitution, 104,
106, 128, 826.

American, the N. T., 189.

'American System," 194, 19&, 198,
212, 222.

Amiens, peace of, 19.

Ancestry, Jackson's, 1.

Animosity, Jackson's, 68, 91, 291,
298

Anti-bank, 120, 234, 259, 272, 274.

Anti-masons and -masonry, 262-266,
879.

Anti-relief. See Relief.

Appalachicola, 62, 68.

Appointments, 104, 106, 106, 112,
148; correspondence of Jackson
and Monroe on, 60. 51, 79, 297.

Arbuthnot, A., 68, 69, 60. 62, 66.

Argus, the Albany, 87. 8$, 117.

Argus, the Frankfort, 142, 169.

Aristocracy, colonial, 4.

Arkansas, 879.

Army, the, 68, 109, 869.

Arrogance. Jackson's, 278.

issassination, attempted, of Jack-
son, 867.

Assault on Jackson, 80L

tthens, Ga., 216.

* notion, 76.

Auctioneering, 47.

aurora, tk»7l51, 296, 869.

Ivy, 54.

Austin, 8. V., 852.
Autobiography, Kendall's, Ml

Baohs, 116.

Balch, 152.

Baltimore, 281, 254, 278, 825. 876.

Bank : of Cairo, 122 ; of the Com-
monwealth of Kentucky, 124-184.
142, 159. 247, 861, 862. («*. Wister
186, (Briscoe vs.) 359-868 ; of Eng-
land, 228, 298 : of Illinois, 122 ; of
Kentucky, 120-126. 261 ; Manhat-
tan Co. , 807 ; of the Metropolis , 806,
806 ; of North America, 227 ; State,
of Illinois, 122 ; of Tennessee, 122 ;
Union, of Mai-viand, 807 ; of the
United State* (the nrstl, 12, 41, B6,
84.227-22^232; [tin- second), M,
121-123 128, 129, 132, 142, 159, 191,
231-249. 267-272.274 f 276, 278, 2H1-
S10, 315-320, 330 f 837-841 ; (of
Pennsylvania), S^, 340-842, 888,
l«. Halsted] 128,0* William Ow-
ens] 281, (tw. Planters* Bank) 13fl,
1&5, f*e ktrhurifT Fvr><) KfinoVat :
charters, 230, 231, 245, 24G ; demo-
crats. 259; con timet km, HA&\ ma-
nia, 120, 220. 818. 323, 324 ; na-
tiujj-tl, IS, 82, 224, 226, 232, ttL
246, 257 27 fi. 305, 320, 842 ; notion
ol ft, 230, 319; proposed by Jack-
son, 244, 24*5, 248, SS3, 274 J re-
striction, 13 ; »wlml*efr, 134, S»J T
234, £35; tlieor" of a nariniiaL
240,241, 321; war, 241, 246, 367,
2R320.S31 ± WjlM&

Banking, llu, 233. 233. 234, 312, 331,
840, 862.

Bank-notes. 229, 230, 234. 269. 270,
817, 823, 324, 331, 362, 369.

Bankruptcy, 109.

Banks, 41, 13H V 863,869; "tfca for-
ty,» of Kentucky, 120-124 ; local
or state, 275, 801,306, 809, 816, 818
881, 836; the ••pet" or deposit
306-807, 317, 318, 324, 328, 829

394

INDEX.

836: and politic*, 227, 228. 237- I
239, 241, 269, 276, 276, 806-308, 811 ;
safety fund, 276, 276, 301.

Banquet, Jefferson's birth-day, 166,
16?.

Banquo's ghost, 162.

Barbour, P. P., 236.

bargain. 98 ; between Clay and Ad-
ams, 90-96, 106, 189, 162, 864.

Baring Bros., 292, 298.

Barry* W. T., 127, 136, 141, 144, 180,

Barton, T.' P., 847.

Bataria, N. Y., 250.

Bell, J., 876:

Belligerent-regulations, 13, 27.

Benton, Jesse, 81.

Benton. T. H.. 80, 81, 88, 91, 96, 97,
106, 106, 108, 145, 154. 178, 188,
190, 248, 267, 260. 271. 272, 297,
811, 818, 817, 820, 881, 886.

Berrien, J M., 141, 160, 173, 216.

Beverly, Carter. 94.

Bibb, G. M., 190, 812.

Biddle, Nicholas. 234, 237-240, 248,
267, 269-276, 292-296, 3d4. 311, 812,
817, ?20, 821, 838-842, 886.

Biddle, Thomas, 263, 264.

Billiard-table. 116.

Binney, H., 285.

Binus, J., 112-114, 148, 244.

Birth-place, Jackson's, 1.

Black George, 101.

Black-leg, 101.

Blair, P. P. . 92. 169, 160, 243, 259,
278,280,297,298,876.

Blifil, 101.

Blount, Gorernor, 8, 10

Boleck.68,66,342.

Boss, 102.

Boston, 137, 221, 230.

Boundary : of Florida, 19 ; of Loui-
siana, 67, 363 ; of Michigan, 379.

Bowlegs. See Boleck.

Branch, J., 141, 160.

Branch drafts, 236, 286, 261-270, 316,
820.

Briscoe vs. The Bank of the Com-
monwealth. See Bank.

Broglie, Due de, 844, 846, 847.

Brokers, 834.

Brooke, F., 92.

Brown, General, 68.

Brown, Key. O. B., 849, 877.

Buchanan, James, 94, 174, 869.

Buoktails, 74, 262, 268.

Buffalo, 289.
Buffaloes," 872.

Bullionism See Currency, tpeeU.

Burnt, the German, 181.

Burke, E., 118.

Burr, A., 19, 21, 88, 104.

Butler, missionary, 181
Butler, B. P., 247, 880.

Cabal, 298.

Cabinet, 137, 140 ; paper read in the

808, 804, 809, 810 ; the kitchen

140, 141, 167, 169, 264, 272, 271

298.
Cadwallader, General, 291, 292
CsBsar, 277.

Calhoun, J. C., 51-336 passim.
Oalboun, Mrs. J. C, 160.
California. 852, 867.
Oallata, 69-71.
Cambreleng, C. C, 162, 261.
Campaign methods. 112. 114, 116.
Campbell, G. W., 22.
Campbell, Rer. Mr., 160, 162.
Canada, 29, 40, 168 257.
Canal, the Brie, 86, 110, 822. 828.
Candles, 167.

Canning, George, 168, 169.
Capital, 224, 226, 819, 822
Carey, M., 229.
Cass, L, 162, 248, 297.
Catron, Judge, 356.
Caucus: 102. 818, 875; eongiw

sional, 73, 79. 84, 86, 100, 264^876

state, 80, 166; " King,'' 100, 10t

878.
Censure. See Resolutions,
Central America, 107.
Ceremonies, 137.
Charleston, S. C, 5, 10, 112, 220, 289

860. ..,-,,

Charlestown, Mass., 866.
Charter, 130. See Bank.
Chatham, Lord, 118.
Chattahoochee, 177.
Cherokees, 49, 138, 174-188, 277.
Chevalier, M., 812, 844.
Cheves,L.,234.285, 266.
Chickasaws, 179.
China, 264, 266.
Choctaws. 63, 179, 188.
Cholera, 266.
Circulation, 818, 823, 884. See Cm

rency.
Civil service, 88, 108, 116, 118, 14*

147. See Patronage.
Civilization of Indians, 178.
Clark, Judge, 125.
Clay,H.,r 1 ~-

Clayton, A. S., 180, 182, 216, 980.
Clayton, J. M., 270, 286, 291.
Clinton, George, 229.
Clinton, De Witt, 80, 86, 89, 100,2

Olmtonians, 74, 252,289.
Coahuila, 868.
Cobb, T. W., 216.
Cobden,B 866

INDEX.

396

e, Admiral, 42.

Oode of honor, 17.

Coffin handbills, 114.

Cohens «w. Virginia, 130.

Coin, 262.

Coleman, Dr., 76 ; letter to, 189

Colombia, 105.

Colonial system, 164.

Colonies, Spanish, 20.

Colonization Society, 216.

Colombia, S. C, 282.

Columbia, District of, 295 850

Columbian Observer. 92.

Committee, party, 102, 103.

Common sense, plain, 312.

Community, frontier, 2, 3, 5, 16, 17,
251.

Compromise, the Missouri, 350, 852 ;
tariff. See Tariff of 1833.

Concord, N. H-, 238.

Congress : American, 107, 108 ; of
the United States, 101, 104, 105,
108, 890 ; Jackson a member of,
10-i8.

Connecticut, 254, 267, 374.

Conscription, 41.

Constitution, the, 97, 104, 109, 128,
130-132. 212-216. 246, 255, 278, 283,
298, 811, 361-338 ; the English,
188: state, 137.

Constitutional theories, 285, 286.

Constitutionality, 119, 126-130, 178,
860.

Continental system, 170.

Contracts, 119, 121, 130.

Controller of New York, 78, 74.

Controversy between Adams and the
federalists, 116.

Convention: 87, 102. 216; anti-ma-
sonic state, 253. 37o ; the constitu-
tional, of 178«, 363; free trade,
220: Harrisburg tariff, 201, 204;
Hartford, 41, 50, 157, 213 ; nullifi-
cation, 219, 281, 290 ; protectionist,
220; union, 282.; national, 254,
878 ; of anti-masons, 254, 255 ; of
democrats, 273, 875 ; of national
republicans, 258, 278.

Coosa, 177.

Qoppinger, 71.

Corn laws, 202, 208, 208.

Correspondence of Jackson and Mon-
roe. See Appointments.

Corruption, political, 105, 329.

Cotton, 186, 822.

Countervailing, 164, 165, 168, 170,
196,197,198,206. See Reciprocity.

Courier and Enquirer, 114, 15b, 156.

248, 268, 271.
lourt: contempt of, 46, 173, 17/
282 ; supreme, of the United States,
128. 182. 277, 359, 361.

Craig vs. Missouri, 185, 860.

Crawford, W. H., 49, 61, 65, 66, 82
83. 86, 89. 99, 101. 109, 111, 118
15^-158.198,216.229.307.

Credit : 226, 265, 328. 832 ; abuse of
6, 16, 126, 234, 328; bills of, 186
859-862 ; for duties. 76, 206, 271
288, 828; public, 12, 119, 281.
system, 123, 323.

Creeks, the, 32. 85, 87, 88. 49, 62, 66
60. 68, 174-183.

Crisis: commercial, 229, 818, 886
of 1798, 13,17; of 1819, 75, 284:
of 1825, 197 ; of 1884, 816-317 ; cJ
1887, 830, 383.

Crittenden, J. J., 290.

Cumberland Road. 191. 192.

Currency, 229, 812, 831. See Circu-
lation', of Europe, 12, 75 ; of the
States, 16, 120, 134, 135 : of the
United States, 41, 75, 76, 229, 231-
284, 248-245, 318, 832, 334, 886;
specie, 817, 831, 832, 334, 869 .
value, 831.

Curtis, Q. T., 290.

Dallas, G. M., 47, 87, 116, 259.

Damages. See France, Draft on.

Dancing Rabbit Creek, 188.

Dartmouth College, 142; e*. Wood
ward,129.

Davis, W. R., 867.

Dearborn, H. A. S., 221.

Debt: 121, 126, 222, 256. 260. 88;
the public, 110, 189, 220. 266, 272,
819 823 ''''''

Debtors, 119, 124, 126-128, 819.

Defaulter, 74, 116, 145.

Democracy, 7. 97, 127, 136, 157, 281
241, 280, 299, 310-318, 831, 882, 860
862,869.

Democratic Press, 113.

Democrats. See Party.

Deposit Act of 1836, 325, 826.

Deposits: the public, 228, 232, 240
243, 265, 271, 272, 276, 292, 296
298, 299, 804, 307. 316-819, 826,
829, 832, 836, see Removal: regu
lation of the, 805, 306, 820, 826
826.

Desertion, 68.

Desha, Governor, 132, 188.

Diary of J. Q. Adams, 95, 160, 80u
388.

Dickens, A., 880.

Dickenson, C-, 18.

Differential duties, 165,166, 168, IN

Dinsmore, S., 22.

Directors, government, 808, 809.

Disorgartsers, 79, 87, 152. 2o3. 839

Distribution, 189, 198. 825-880

District attorney, Jackson, 8.

\\

396

INDEX.

Dividend withheld. See Franc*,

Draft on.
Divorce, 8, 9.
Donelson, J., 8.
Donelson, Mrs. A. J., 160
Donelson, Mrs. J., 8.
Dooelson, Rachel. 8.
Drayton, W., 49, 60. 168.
Pred Scott case, 863.
Duane, W., 120, 296, 869.
Duane, W. J., 296, 298 800, 302, 808,

812, 817.
Duel, 18, 62, 101.
Duncan, J., 888.

Iin Boom, the, 114.

■aton, J..H.. 91. 105,141, 144, 148-

168, 160-162, 278, 278.
toton, Mrs. J. H., 149-158, 161, 162,

273. 278,
Editor* . 145, 148, 159.
Education, Jae kjoo/i, 2.
Edwards, N", t *3
Election : 79 t C'7, 98, 11B, US, 127,

183, 242, a 13, tfifl I contented, 379 ;

ttreMJdentfcil, of ITfltf, W : i>f 1900,

104 -, of im t 49; of 1S12, 29; of

isig, 4a : or mm. 73 r re i of 1*24,

89. 90, 98. 105 t 151 ; of 1828, 106,

m, llfl, 242, 268 : of 1*32, 182,

221, 228, 24fl J 2B&-2rfl; of IBS6,8T2,

879 1 of 1844, 376, 3au\
Election wring, 77, 91 1 100, 112, 118,

14fl t l&2. 308,311, 300,375,
Electors, B7.
SlUa, P., 358,
Ellmaker, A., 264.
Ellsworth. W. W.. 815.
Elj,Bev.Mr.,160.
Embargo, 18, 27, 28. 76, 88, 210.
Emissaries, 67, 69, 63.
Emphasis. 186, 252, 312, 867, 88$.
Empire, the democratic, 299.
Encroachments, federal, 133, 186.
Energy: Jackson's, 83, 34, 88, 43,

170 ; American, 136.
Enforcement Act, 285, 287, 289, 290.
England: 11, 18, 17, 27, 57, 62, 66,

161, 166, 167-169, 174, 857 ; King

of.ibU
English, the, 2,52, 53, 58.
Enquirer, the Richmond, 263.
Epitaph, 189.
Era of good feeling, 101.
Etiquette, 82, 137, 149.
Etowah, 177.
Everett, A H.,220.
Brerett, Edward. 816.
Exchange committee, the, 267.
Exchanges : the domestic, 288 f sr-

•tai,5l7,
txeheqi

bills, 248.

Execution, sales under. 122, 124, US
Executive, the, 107, 247, 278, 298

805,811,868.
Expedition: Burr's, 21; Miranda*

20; the Nickajaek, 16.
Experiment, 815, 817.
Expunging. See Resolution.
Extravagance, 118.

Factions. 74, 76. 77, 101-103, 109, UO
189,151,155.249,866,871.

Fair-traders, 196.

Fannin, Colonel, 356.

Federalism, 214, 282.

Federalist, 88, 213, 228, 397. Sat
Party.

Filibusters, 63,314, 869.

Financiering, 822.

Finances, public, 41.

Fine, Jackson's, 47.

Fire at.New Tork, 819, 888.

Fisheries, 81, 96.

Flint Hirer, 177.

Florida: 19. 86, 87, 62, 64, 66, 168
1157, 159. 162, 854,856.869; oestio*
of, 69 ; invasion of, 60-65, see War
Seminole; Jackson governor of
68, 70, 71, 242; laws for, 69; pur
chase of, 20. 67, 69, 246. Set
Treaty of 1819.

Foot, 3. A., I6fl,

Forbes ^ Tm °*t 70.

Fois t v£h t J„ 153 164 347, 848.

Fort : Bowyer, 37, 40 ; Jackson, 86
44; Mims, 32; Negro, 62, 63; Ni-
agara, 250 ; Bcott. M*

Fortification*, 1'W. 330, 346.

Fowitown, &5» 56, 63,

Foxardo, 8™.

Franco ; 13 T 17, 27 t 170, 171, 296, 324
325, 341-346; dmft on, 296, 808
309, 32D, 344, 345 ; King of (Louil
Philippe), 343, 345, 848.

Franklin, 7.

Freeman i) iii* »ad masonry, 260, 262.

Free trn,1e, 7G> 168, 167, 210, 2W. 220
l^j, 370, 373 ; convention, 220.

Fromentin, B.. 70,71.

Frontier, 2, 6, 85, 261

Funding. 12.

Funds, state deposit, 829.

Gainss, General, 68-66, 866.

Gales and Beaton, 268.

Gallatin, K., 14, 41, 42, 86, 164, 169

191, 220, 228, 307, 808.
Galpninton, 176.
Gardner, J. B., 147.
Georgia^, 66, 84, 117, 176-188, 21ft

Ghent, 40,' 41, 46, 69, 60, 81, 84, 8f
96,281

INDEX.

897

9 V9. Ogden, 180.

Hies, W.B., 116.

tilmer, Gorernor, 181, 216.

rlobe, the, 166, 169. 160, 278, 280,
826, 868, 871, 874, 876.

fold, 882-834.

t*ouge,W\,125,264,271.

Sourerneur, 8. L.,851.

-Jorernment: constitutional, 97 ; pa-
ternal, 109, 268 ; personal, 277. 279,
280, 299, 302, 809. 314 : non-inter-
ference theory of, 266, 277, 279,
299, 864, 878.

Changer, P., 874,878.

Treat Britain. See England.

greeley, H., 182.

fitreen, Duff, 104, 106, 140, 148, 167,
169, 268.

9reen vs. Biddle, 129.

Starandy, P., 286.

Habbas Corpus, 46, 70, 72.

Halifax, 166.

Hall, Judge, 46.

Hamilton, A., 11, 41, 227, 280, 281,

308.
Hamilton, James, 212. 289.
Hamilton, James A., 162, 168.
Hammond, J., 371.
Hard Times, 76, 204.
Harper, R. G.,104.
Harrison, W. H., 878, 379, 881.
Harvard College, 264. 800.
Hayne, R. T., 162, 190, 198, 217, 284,

Health, Jackson's, 34, 164, 300.

Hiawassee, 177, 853.

Hickory Ground, 85, 177

Hill, L, 140, 143, 148, 157, 168, 237-

239, 242, 248, 259, 278, 875.
Hillis Hajo, 68.
Himollemico, 68.
Holston, 176.
Holy Ground, 85.
Honorable, title of, 187.
Hopewell, 176.
Horse Shoe Bend, 86.
Hottinger, 296.
House of Representatives, 64, 190,

280 ; on the Bank, 247, 248. 274,

814 ; power of, to elect President

97.
Houston, S., 854, 855
Sunt, M., 868.
Huskisson, W., 167, 197, 198.
Huyghens, Mrs., 160

Uuirois, 122, 189, 880.
Illiteracy, Jackson's, 16, 49.
rfnmaturity, 867.
immigration, 110.
Weaunment, 174, 802, 808 811.

Impmsnifcnt, 30, 48.

Improreimrjjtp, internal, 17, 81, 82
109, 183, 19U194, 2J6, 221, 266,282
279, 27H, 327. ~

Inaugural, Adams's, 104,

Inaugural, Jackson's, ISO,, 146.

Inauguration, AOnziu'e, 93.

Inauguration, Jm/keon s, 138.

Incendiary publications, !J50.

Indtoiia, M, 3S0.

Indians, 174-183, 219, 283; aggra*.
BUym by or on, 14, 31, 54, 557171
8&fli treat j riffht* of, 18L '

Indian Spring, 177. 1781

Indian Territory, 179, ISO, 183.

Indian title ti> Land. 13. 176.

Inflation, 12U, 286, 961, 270, 318, 834
82&.
fham. 8. D., 116, 141, 160, 162,286-
42, 261, 821, 882.

Insolrent laws, 128.

Institutions, representatiye, 280, 818

Instructions, 96, 108, 212. 248, 278
818, 870 ; to McLane, 161, 169.

Insubordination, 83, 84, 44, 869.

Interference theory. See Qovtr+>
men*, paternal.

Intrigues, 90.

Iron, 206.

Irreconcilables, 18.

Jaoksoit, A., Sur., 1.

Jackson, A., Jr., 2.

Jackson, Mrs. A., Jr., 9, 18, 49, 189

149.
Jacksonism, 320.
Jacobinism, 11, 216.
Jaudon, S., 341.
Jay, J., 11, 41.
Jefferson, T., 10, 12, 14, 22, 27-29, 88

41. ?2, 88, 104, 116. 12?, 146, foe

171, 174, 213, 216, 228, 814.
Jeffersonians. See Party.
Jeffersonian school, 131, 266.
Jingo policy, 108.
Johnson, B. M., 73, 128, 189, 146,200

876, 877, 881.
Johnson, W. 0., 278.
Jones, W., 808.
Jamaica, 166.
Judge, Jackson a, 14.
11 Judge-breaking '* 126, 127.
Judiciary, the, 119, 120, 126, 127, 868 :

the federal, 1 % 127-130, 186, 171-

174, 180.
Judiciary Act, 180.

Kktoall. A., 1, 5, 8, 16, 140, 142, 148
146, 148, 257, 169. 160. 242, 248, 248
269, 278 278, 296-806 849, 861
371.

198

INDEX.

,64.
Kentucky , 9, 19. 21, 96, 119, 121, 128,

126, 128, 129, 182 198, 204, 2ll, 222,

242,257,868.
King '• Chapel. 187
Kramer, a., 92.

Uooox, A., 07, 268.

Lend, 16, 17, 69, 1Q9, 184-186, 191, 256,

825, afe.

Latour, 89.

Jaw, ellen end mditlon, 18, 213-216 ;
coinage, 882-884 ; constitutional,
181, 881; endorsement and replevin,
122, 124-126, 129, 188 ; the '*gag,»
860 ; homestead, 186, 189 ; insol-
vent, 128 ; international, 62, 107 ;
martial, 88, 45, 46 ; merchant, 296 ;
occupying claimant, 129, 188 ; rev-
enue, 69 ; student, Jackson a, 2 ;
the study of, 8, 4 ; Spanish, 69.

Lawless, L., 174.

Lawrence, R., 867, 868.

Laws, Jackson a Doctor of, 800.

Lawyers, 4.

Lee, II., 49, 9\ 105, 144, 147, 15a

Legal-tende 125 : act, 86?
gta; *«• * °^

Leigh, H. MT., 313.au

Letcher, J., 95, 93, V&.

Letters, campaign, 76, 03-

Lewla, \Y< B,, 49, fiO, 76-79, 91 ,93, 105,
140^146, 151-162, 243, 24S, 273, 278,
282,296,297,291376,3*6.

Islington, Kt., I2i, 294, m.

Liberty, constitutional, 99, 132, 224,
279, 233, 261,362 f religious*, 377.

Liquidation, 16, 234.

Li riogston, E . 11, 38, 45, 49, 91, 105,
14A, 192, 2U, 274, 282, Uii t 345-

m.

Loco-foeos. See Party.

Log-rolling, 191

Long, J., 852.

Louaillier, 88, 46.

Louisiana, 19, 20, 67, 98, 201, 246,

282,822,858.
Louis XIV., 99 ; XV., 869 ; Philippe,

170. See France. King of.
Louisrille,Ky., 121.
Lowndes, W., 882.

tfAomm, 79, 84.

Madison. J., 29, 80, 146, 191, 193, 214,

216, 280.
Kadisonlan federalism, 214, 282.
Kails, incendiary documents in the,

850,872; Sunday, 377.
«aine, 179, 823, 857.
Kajqr-general, Jackson a, 15, 86.
ifajor^y, the, 157. 210. 217, 224.
Hailary, X. C, 200, 202-204, 219.

Manners, Jackson's, 14, 88, 181

Marcy, W. L., 162, 247, 824.

" Marmion," the, 130.

Marriage, Jackson's, 9, 115.

Marshall, J., 131, 182, 809, 861.

Martin «s. Hunter's Lessee, 180.

Martineau, H., 284, 866, 867.

Maryland, 98.

Mason, J., Ill, 144, 286-289.

Masons. See Freemasons.

Massachusetts, 254, 314, 878

Massacre, 82, 66, 866.

Mayo, Dr., 854.

McOulloch vs. Maryland, 128, 946.

McPuffle, G.. 207. 219, 221, 232, JTJ
253, 2*0, 29& 80S.

McGLlliTmy, 175.

Mi'liregor, 64,

Mi-lv,;..^t, 177,

McLane. L., 161, 1®, 169, 190, 228
249, 29fi, 297.

McJ^enn, J, , 112,116, Ml, 254, #78

McNairy, J., 6, 18 +

Meanage, 230 j Adair's, 126 ; Adatos'a
HW i DsuhVa, l:i"2: .inokrinn's, o
1829, 179, 139, 1U3, Ma. 244. 247
of MMS; of 1831.222, 243,249
257 : of 1*82,2*5, 292 , of Kj3,808
oMS34, 344, 34fJ, 34* ; of 1*35, 847
'J4 - <f 1S36, 341 ; jipaaial, on Frenck
relations, 847, 'MS ; special, oa
Texas, 867. " "

Metcalf, Oorernor, 185.

Methodists, 116.

Mexico. 107, 264, 362-369 ; mission to
72, 89.

Michigan, 879-881.

Ml ' -v service, Jackson's, 61.

Militiamen "the six," 44.

Minim rim, 199, 200, 205, 208.

Mirijiiouariiu, 181, 132.

Mlf siB^ippi, 180, 183, 822 \ river, 10
19, 20. 42, 81, 95, 852 ; valley, 119
134, 8&6.

Missouri, 96, 135.

Mitchull. ex-Governor, 64, 66.

Mobile, 21, 30, 86, 37,

Money, 16 ; mousy -marfcet, 231, 266
267", 271, 272, 501 , 3-24, 327, WL 841
*■ mouey power," 225-23Q, 312,

Monroe, J,, 42- 193 jmsim, 361, 864
869.

Monroe doctrine, 108.

Morgan, W.. 250-262, 266.

Mortgage, 122, 124, 128, 186.

Muter, Judge, 120.

Naooodoohks, 862, 366

Napoleon Bonaparte, 21, 26. 27, 81

42, 170 277, 279.
National uuuracter, 186.
National Intelligencer, 268 -

INDEX.

394

frihTille.6,8,970,294.

fetches, 6, 80, 88.

*aval school, 109. .

Navigation system. 164, 167, 168.

Kary, the, 40, 4V&69.

Ifagrofort,63,&>.

flegroes, 62, 67, 180.

14 New Court," 127, 183, 242.

New England, 28, 76, 82, 198, 204

New Hampshire 82,144,273.

New Jersey, 98.

New Orleans, 19. 80, 86, 88, 42,44,

48, 112, 242, 868 ; battle of. 39.
Newspapers, partisan, 86, 108, 104,

New York city* 67, 82, 837, 338, M0.
New York State, 86, 100, 147, 179, 254,

272, 829, 874.
Nichols, Colonel, 67.
Niles, H., 62-874 passim.
Nomination of Calhoun, 1822, 82;

of Clay, 1882, 258. 274 ; of Jackson,

1822, 79, 87 ; 182o, 104; 1832, 154-

x66 ; of Van Buren, 1882, 164, 161,

272,278.
Nominations by Jackson, 147
Non-intercourse, 75.
Non-interference. See Government.
JToiwuer, 268.
North Carolina, 7, 8, 79, 98, 216, 218,

220,879.
Nova Scotia, 168.
Nueces, 867.
^Nullification, 154-159. 188, 207-228,

281-291, 800, 846, 858

Oaklst, T. J., 198.

Obligations, international. 180.

Occupying claimant, 129, 182, 183.

Office-holders, 145, 160, 874, 376.

Office-seekers, 145, 885.

Ohio, 121, 204, 254, 257, 880.

" Old Court." See " New Court."

Oligarchy, 102.

O'Neil, Peggy. See Mrs. J. H. Eaton.

"OnslowTnLll.

Order. Jackson's departmental, 51 ;
Jackson's general, 68; Kendall's
mail, 860, 871 ; in council, 80, 166
168.

Oregon, 869.

Organ, 104, 143, 148, 169, 160, 280.

Osborn vs. United States Bank, 128.

Orerton. Judge, 166.

Owens, 188.

Pacific, the, 852.
Palmer, W. A., 378.
Pamphlets, 114, 267. 276.
Panama Congress. 106-1081
\mic,804,S0* 315,816

Paper money, 119, 121, 122, 126, 280

Parliament, Act of, 166. 167. 168.

Parton, J., 1. 8. 16, 21, 28, 49, 70, 76
79, 117, 161, 164, 159, 160, 162, 278
291. 296, 884, 886.

Party, 280; the antf-Jackion, 250
2rVJ, 374 1 378, 379 ; tht* hull-hlipmucv
253-255, "il74 : the anti-monopoly,
*ee the eqiial-righta ; the dftnjo-
oratlo-wpublkian Jefferaoui&u, U_
1S L 21, 2fl f 27, 29, 41 T 60, 80, 101,
lufl, 100, m t \m t 144, 17a, l&i
228-200, £34, 258, 871, 3*2; tb*
aqual-rightf, of ioco-foco. 3t£-373
381, 382: tho federal, 11, 12, 2*

w t ea, loi, ios, ua, iio, m, iaa

144,238, 252: tht» Jackson. 139
164,173, IBS, 306, 23U, 248,206, 257,
8.18, 374, 375; tb« J nekton Aan
Buren,37»; the national ri-f»ub]i-
can, 13ft, 187, 874; the nullifica-
tion. 212; the people, 89: th«
wh^, 838, 330 a33 T MO, 374, 879 1
the union, 168; discipline, 348,
313; exigency, 109, 192; hatred,
SW H 334 ; policy. 221 ; strife, 13!*.

" Patrick Henry," 111.

Patriot, the New Hampshire, 143 ; th
Baltimore, 146.

Patronage, 102, 106. 112, 116, 118, 147, -
149. See Civil Serviu.

Peck, Judge, 173.

Pennsylvania. 82, 117, 147,166,187
188, 204, 206, 211, 227, 264, 267
272, 278, 387, 875.

Pennsylvania Reporter, 166.

Pennsylvanian, the. 811.

Pensacola, 80, 86-38, 68, 66, 60, 64,
67, 70.

Pension, 120, 221 ; agency, 288, 248,
810.

People, will of the, 96-98.

Perdido, 20.

Personal feeling, Jackson's. 28 24
66, 156, 162, 219, 272, 818, 814.

Phi Beta Kappa, 254.

Philadelphia, 10. 14, 80, 87. 112. 116.
231,233,254.824,887.888,840.

Pickering, T, 96.

Pinckney.T., 35.

Pinkney, W..43.

Pioneers, 6, 88.

Piracy, 54.

Pitkin, T., 228, 281.

Planter, Jackson a, 16, 17

Plaster trade. 197.

Platform, 258.

Plumer, W., 27, 78. 144, 288

Plutocracy 226, 831. 8m Mm*
power.

Poindexter, G 868

400

INDEX.

Poinsett, J. R., 862, 864.

Police, 366.

Political philosophy, Jackson's, 277.

Politic*, 104 ; domestic, 26 ; national.

119 ; New York, 102, 103.
folk, J. K., 292, 814, 820, 868, 869,

376. 886. See Report.
Popularity, Jackson's. 14, 16, 81, 84-

86, 48, 49, 63, 64, 68, 72, 78, 100,

135, 166, 187, 269, 279, 297, 879,

886.
Porter, P. B., 179 ; Commodore, 859.
Portsmouth, N. H., 236, 288, 289, 248,

261.
Post, N. T. Evening, 871.
Post-office, 849-861.
Potomac, 117, 357.
Powers, implied, 109.
Presidency, the, 47, 100, 102.
President, the. See the Executive.
Press, the, 263.
Prices, 121, 382.
Primary, 87, 102.
Principles, political, 188, 246, 286.
Printing, public, 148, 160.
PriTateers, 53.
Privileges, 130.
Procedure, 172. 17a
Proclamation, anti-nullification, 282,

289; on West India trade, 169;

Monroe's, 165.
Prohibitory taxes, 221.
Proscription, party, 102, 111 , 112. 141,

144-146, 149; of the federalists,

96 ; of printers, 148.
Prosperity, 110. 121, 864, 866.
Protectionists, 167, 170, 187, 209, 212,

216, 220, 291.
Protective duties, 76, 81, 84, 196, 206,

220, 221, 223, 326 ; system, 166, 168,

188, 207, 208, 210, 286, 286, 288-290,

833. See Tariff.
Protest, Jackson's, 811.
Proxies, 86.

Public prosecutor, 6, 7.
Puritan, 101.

Quaebil, 62; of Jackson and Cal-
houn, 168, 160.

Quarrelsomeness, Jackson's, 17, 47,
62, 60, 67, 72, 80.

Quincy, J., 814.

Rabun, Governor, 60
'Race-horse bills," 236, 294, 802,

816.
Radicals, 109.
Randolph, J., 88, 101, 102. 111,174,

284 ; Lieutenant, 162, 801.
Ratio of value, gold to silver, 333.
Baeharter of the first national bank,

11,88,84,228,229,246,248; of the

second, 244. 267, 259, 260, 372, 174
276, 804, 808.

Reciprocity and retaliation, 164. 186-
168,196-197. See Counttrvmxlmg.

Redrawing, 293, 294.

Red River, 867.

Red Sticks, 65.

Reelection. Jackson's interpretaUo*
of his, 2? 7, 278.

Reform, 113, 117.

Regency, 86, 87, 369.

Register, the Annual, 19, 106, HO
118, 202, 203; the Mobile, 72
Niles's, 85, 200, 801, 817.

Reid, Major, 141.

Relief system, 122. 124, 126, 127
182-135, 142, 169. 172, 241, 242,868

Removal, from office, 106, 118, 118
146, 147: of Judges, 126, 127, set
"Judge-breaking;" of the publle
deposits, 232, 240, 241, 296-604
806^815.325,328,831.

Rents, 382.

Report, on the bank, 247, 269. 260
2ti&, 292-294, 296, 808, 816, 837 ; on
manufactures, 221 ; on the Mor-
gan outrage, 261 ; on the removal
of the deposits, 808 ; on the Semi-
nole war, 64, 67, 268 ; on the tariff,
207, 228.

Republicans. See Party.

Resignation, Jackson's, of senator-
ship, 104; Clay's, 874; Webster's
878.

Resolutions, Virginia and Kentucky,
212, 213, 215: Calhoun's, 287;
Clay's, censuring Jackson, 810-
813 ; Benton's expunging, 818, 814.

Responsibility of the President, 245,

Resumption of specie payments, 281,

238.
Retaliation. See Reciprocity and

Countervailing.
Retrenchment, 118.
Revenue taxes, 221, 228; surplus,

825,328.
Revolutions, 170, 268, 864,
Rhea, J., 66. 65, 167, 168.
Rights, belligerent, 68; protection

of, 126; natural, 370: notion!

about, 280, 260; vested, 119, 130

372.
Ringold, 163.

Rio Grande del Norte, 867.
Riots, 318, 382. 383.
Ritchie, T., 268.
Rives, W. C, 170, 312-814, 848, Itt

876.
Roane, A., 15.
Robards, L., 8,9. ,•

Robards, Mrs. L. c 8, 9.

INDEX.

40l

ftobinstc wd, Me., 191.
fcowan, J., 128, 172.
Rucker, to " ruckerise," 876.
« Rumps," 372.

Bush, R., 66, 111, 164, 188, 202, 235.
Russia, Emperor of, 116, 852 ; mis-
sion to, 72, 102.

Sabine, 67, 851, 352, 857, 886.

Saddler, Jackson a, 2.

St. Augustine, 64.

Bt. John's, 165.

Bt. Mark's, 67-60, 64

Bt. Mary's, Ga., 191.

Salisbury, N. C., 2.

Sanford, N., 832.

San Francisco, 852.

Ban Jacinto, 855.

Banta Anna, 854, 855.

Sargent, N., 107, 259.

Sargent, T., 116.

Scandal, 62.

Scire facias, 268.

Bcott, General, 61. 88. 282

Scott, J., 96.

Secession. 116, 216, 282.

Secessionist, 218.

Secret, the King's, 859.

Beif-goTernment, 102, 127, 147, 156,

Self-will, Jackson's, 278.

Senate, 67, 106, 111, 118, 128, 147.
148, 172, 177, 189, 190, 280, 268 j
democracy vs. the, 311 ; on the
Bank, 247, 248, 274, 275, 816 : Jack-
son's quarrel with the, 272, 278,
814, 884 ; committees of the, 111.

Senator, Jackson a, 10, 76.

Sergeant, J., 268.

Serier, Governor, 15, 18.

Seward, W. H., 254.

Seybert, A., 229.

Shoulder Bone Creek, 175.

Silver, 120, 123, 882, 888.

Blade, W.JJ78.

Blamm, 872.

Slavery and slaves, 849-852, 855.

Slave-trade. 23, 64, 69.

Smith, A., 289.

Smith, 8., 247

Socialists, 382.

Vouth American republics, 84, 105.
107,108,202.

South Carolina 215-220, 281-291:
police act, 130, 173, 215.

lovercignty, 185, 224, 281.

Spain, 19. 21, 86, 53, 64,67, 62, 64, 66
107, 858.

special legislation, 194.

Ipede, 120. 121. 123. 125. 134, 135,
281, 264, 268, 804. 815. 820. 828, 836-
887 i dtoular, the, 885-887 ; pay-

ments, 121, 280, 282. Seeitowfis*
Hon. Suspensionjjknd Currency.

Speculation, 82*4-324; Texan laal
and stock, 855.

Spencer, A., 265.

Spencer, J. 0., 251.

Spoils, 108, 146, 147, 162.
- -Spoliation claims, 170, 171, 221, 264.

Stanbaugh, Colonel, 155.

Standard, the. New York, 811.

"tate rights, 82, 109, 128, 180-184, 188
"157,178,266,284,863.

Steamboats, 186.

Sterens, Thad., 254, 879.

Stevenson, A., 202, 876.

Stock-jobbing, 13.

Storekeeper, Jackson a, 16.

Story, J., 181, 264, 861. 868.

Strict construction, 109, 184, 266.

Strikes, 882.

Stump speaking, 6, 118.

Sturges vs. Crowninshield, 128.

Suability of a State, 129, 186.

Sub-treasury, 248.

Suspension of specie payments, 121

Suwanee Hirer, 68, 842.
Swartwout, 91, 98, 106

T±HHAKT 1 &l p 117 t 8fifl,87l

Taney, B, B. t 16S, 282, 297, 300-809
314, ai7 L 38&.

Tariff, 1% 1W-209. 213 t 215, 218,
121, 222, 27S, 286, 3&6\ 288-291, set
fraltctiw dulia *ad Widljfwation;
of 1780.233 j of 1916,75; in ISM
76; of 1824, 7fl t 197: of 1923 ("of
abomination* ")♦ 2W, 207, 211,213,
216-220, 281 j of 1832, 222, 223,
2fil. 2S8 f 290; *' compromise »» of
1883, 285, 288, 289-291, 827 i J. Q
Adams on the, 81, 10B ; Calhoun
on the, 82 ; troti.vtitu Li anally of;
tbe h 220. 285; contention, 220,
Jackson on the, 7fl f IBS, 254, 257 j
and land. 18Q, 188, 190.

Tassel, G., 180,181.

Taxes, 69, 76, 187, 217, 218, see Pre*
hibitory, Revenue, and Protective :
leried on the United States Bank
123, 128, 132.

Teeumseh, 81, 82, 86, 877.

Telegraph, the, 104, 114, 148, 155
169,160*268.

Tellico, 176.

Tennessee, 6, \ 8, 10, IS, 14, 16, 19
21. 66, 104. 105, 117, 121, 122, 160
853,376,386: river, 868.

Texas, 67, 862-869,885.

Thames, battle of the. 86.

Theatricalism in po Itics, 77.

Third term, 87ft.

m

INDEX.

rhne per cents, the, 206, 268, 269,
291-298, 803, 804, 809.

rimberlake, Mn. Bee Mrs. J. H.
Eaton.

Titles, contested land, 129, 132; of
courtesy, 187.

Toast, Jackson's anion, 156, 219.

Tohopeka, 86.

Toland, II., 292.

TomkinB, D. D.. 78.

Trade, illicit, 166, 169, 170.

Trade* onions, 882.

Transfer drafts. 8l)7.

Treasury, the federal, 74, 114. 115 ,
secretary of the, 232, 802, 808, 311.

Treaty, with France (1778). 196:
with England (1795), 11. 12, 27,
180; with Spain (1795), 19 ; of St.
ildefonso,19: with France (1808),
186 ; proposed with England (1806*
28: with Spain (1819), 20, 67. 69,
186,854,886; with France (1881),
171, 296, 848. 844, 846 ; with Mex-
ico (1882), 654, (1840 and 1843),
868 ; commercial, 164, 194, 195 ;
Indian, 174-188.

Trist, N. P., 884.

Troop, Governor, 177, 178, 21& „

Trostee, Jackson a, 16.

Tyler, J., 47, 818, 825, 880, 858, 386.

Unoir, the, 12, 19, 29, 157, 210, 216,

279,283-285.
tfnion, the Nashville, 95.
University, national, 109.
Usages, diplomatic, 137.
Usory, 261.

Vak Buben, 84-384 passim.

Veracity, " adjourned question of,"
96.

Vermont, 254.

Verplanck, G. 0., 292, 332. See Re-
port.

Veto. 124, 134, 198, 194, 280, 274, 276,

Vidal', heirs of , 70.
Vindictiveness, Jackson's, 148, 886.
Violence, mob, etc, 850, 863, 865.
Virginfe. 8, 9, 85, 129, 130, 218, 288,

Vote for President, 89, 90, 117, 276,

Votes cast by Jaokson, 18, 77, 189.

Wages, I80 t lfiti, 189.

War t 285; pItU, m 2B2, 3S0; com
nsercial, 12, 2t. Hi, 348 ; Urn Creak
33, 35 i with FrAflw, 18, 29 ; la
4L&D, lr"i h 32, 33, 175 h 17G ; vh« Mel
leu, 367 t 3ti$; IteToluttotiary, 2, 8
ffii, 174. 301 ; of 1612, 2S t 29, £0
40. 42, 43. 88. 75, 234 ; the 3*»|
nole, 56, t*l p 06, 151, 157. 161, MM
272, 3 h A 3n&,m

Ward, Colubel.Soii,

Warren, Admiral, 30.

Washington, G., 8, 10-13, 27, 141
176; mother of, 801.

Washington, city of, 83, 87, 42, 48
70. 105, 188, 143, 1457149,156, 1M

Watklns, T., 146. ,

Wayman vs. Southard, 129. <

Wayne, J. M., 216.

Weatherford, 82.

Webb, J. W., 268.

Webster, D., 82-879 passim

West Indies, 202, 849.

West India trade, 161, 164-170, 268.

Whig. See Party.

Wheat imported, 823, 382.

White, 0. P., 332.

White, H. L., 13, 162, 291, 812, 876

878, 879.
White House, 114, 115, 150, 160,280.
Whitney, &. M., 263, 268, 269, 297

800, oOo.
Wilkinson, General, 21, 80, 86.
Williams, J., 76.
Williams, S., 881.
Wire-polling. 77, 164, 2TO.
Wirt, WVTC, 180, 178, 286, 264

266.
Wood J 84
Woodbury, L., 115, 162, 286-288,287

306,820,834.
Wool, 199.

Woollens, 198, 199, 208, 207.
Woollens bill. 200, 201.
Worcester, missionary, 18L
Worthington, 71.
Wright, Fanny, 882.
Wright, S., 204, 805.
Writs of execution, 128, 188, 172 ; e

•nor, 181, 182.

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